WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  TN/RL/GEN/70 
14 October 2005 
 (05-4701) 
Negotiating Group on Rules Original:   English 
  
 
SUBSIDIES TO FISHERIES INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
Paper from New Zealand
 
 
  The following communication, dated 13 October 2005, is being circulated at the request of 
the Delegation of New Zealand.   The submitting delegation has requested that th is paper, which was submitted to the Rules 
Negotiating Group as an informal document (JOB(05)/ 242), also be circulated as a formal document. 
 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
1. Recent meetings of the Rules Negotiating Gr oup have seen detailed discussions on a number 
of categories of fisheries subsidies.  To date, there have substantive exchanges on subsidies to: 
management services; vessel decommissioning and licence retirement; IUU fishing; and aquaculture.
1  
There has also been a good initial discussion of categor ies of subsidies of particular importance to 
developing countries, including subsidies to arti sanal fishing and subsid ised access fee payments.2    
 
2. The objective of this phase of discussions h as been to develop a common understanding of the 
definitions and treatment of various categories of fi sh subsidies.  This technical discussion is essential 
to ensuring that we produce clear and enforceable rul es, irrespective of the ultimate structure of those 
rules.   
3. The purpose of this paper is to initiate a di alogue on the category of “subsidies to fisheries 
infrastructure”.  As with our previous paper on s ubsidies to management services, we have developed 
our framework with extensive reference to existing fisheries subsidies work that has been undertaken 
in other international forums.  We look forward to hearing other Members’ views on this topic. 
 
                                                     
 
1 JOB(05)/44, Fisheries Subsidies to Management Services  - New Zealand; TN/RL/GEN/41, Fisheries 
Subsidies: Programmes for Decommissioning of Vessels and Licence Retirement  - United States; JOB(05)/100, 
IUU Fishing and Fisheries Subsidies  - Japan; TN/RL/GEN/54, Contribution to the Discussion on the 
Framework for Disciplines on Fisheries Subsidies – Aquaculture  - Australia, Ecuador and New Zealand. 
2  TN/RL/GEN/56, Contribution to the Discussion on the Framework for Disciplines on Fisheries 
Subsidies  - Brazil; TN/RL/GEN/57/Rev.2, WTO Fisheries Subsidies Disciplines: Architecture on Fisheries 
Subsidies Disciplines  - Antigua and Barbuda; Barbados; Dominican Republic; Fiji; Grenada; Guyana; Jamaica; 
Papua New Guinea; St. Kitts and Nevis; St. Lucia; Solomon Islands; and Trinidad and Tobago. TN/RL/GEN/70 
Page 2  
 
 II. SUBSIDIES TO FISHERIES INFRASTRUCTURE 
1. General Infrastructure vs. Fisheries Infrastructure 
4. Government provision of “general infrastruct ure” is excluded from the definition of a subsidy 
under Article 1.1 of the WTO Agreement on Subs idies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM).  As 
noted in TN/RL/W/166, it is not New Zealand’s intention to include general infrastructure in any new 
fisheries subsidies disciplines.
3   In our view, it will be preferable for new fisheries subsidies 
disciplines to be consistent with the existing Article  1 definition of a “subsidy”.  The more that new 
fisheries subsidies disciplines draw upon the exis ting concepts used within the ASCM, the more 
predictable and enforceable  these disciplines will be.4  We therefore think it is important that 
Members aim to reach a clear understanding in th ese negotiations of what types of programmes 
should be treated as fisheries infrastruct ure as opposed to general infrastructure.5    
 
Discussion of Subsidy Category 
 
5. Fisheries infrastructure accounts for a substa ntial proportion of government expenditure on 
global fisheries, particularly in developed count ries.  In 1997, the OECD estimated that OECD 
government financial transfers on fisheries infra structure accounted for US$2.47 billion, roughly 
equivalent to 43 per cent of total OECD governme nt financial transfers related to fisheries.6  T h e  
APEC 2000 study estimated that, in 1997, APEC Members spent approximately US$2.63 billion on 
fishing port infrastructure enhancement alone, roughl y equivalent to 21 per cent of the total APEC 
expenditure on fisheries programmes.7    
 
6. However, despite the size of this category of subsidies, there is little detailed information 
available on the different types of infrastructure s ubsidies.  As with management services, there may 
therefore be merit in trying to break down the categ ory of fisheries infrastructure into sub-categories.  
Members can then consider how these sub-categories,  or elements within them, should be treated 
under new rules and whether they shoul d be exempt from any prohibition. 
 
Identification and Definition of Subsidy Category 
 
7. In attempting to identify the types of subsid y programmes that would fall within a fisheries 
infrastructure category, we have referred to th e existing subsidy classifications in the fisheries 
subsidies literature.  
 
                                                      
3 TN/RL/W/166, Fisheries Subsidies  - Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, New Zealand, Philippines and Peru. 
4 We are aware that this will also require a discussion on the issue of specificity.  This will need to be 
considered further when we return to discussions on the structure of new rules for fish subsidy disciplines at a later stage.  That discussion is however beyond the scope of the present paper. 
5 We note that this issue has already been raised by some Members. In TN/RL/W/172, Contribution to 
the Discussion on the Framework for the Disciplines on the Fisheries Subsidies , Japan, the Republic of Korea 
and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu suggested that the construction of 
fishing ports, sewage facilities for fishing communities and coastal protection against storms and waves were 
included under general infrastructure and therefore should be outside the scope of new disciplines for fisheries 
subsidies by reason of Article 1 and Article 2 of the ASCM. 
6 OECD (2000), Transition to Responsible Fisheries: Economic and Policy Implications , Paris; OECD 
(2000), Review of Fisheries in OECD Countries , Paris. Also, in TN/RL/W159, Fisheries Subsidies: Proposed 
Structure of the Discussion , Japan noted that 69.7 per cent of Japan’s government financial transfers on fisheries 
goes toward “fishery infrastructure”. 
7 PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP (2000), Study into the Nature and Extent of Subsidies in the Fisheries 
Sector of APEC Members’ Economies . The APEC 2000 study estimated the total value of APEC fisheries 
programmes in 1997 at US$12.6 billion.  TN/RL/GEN/70 
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 8. The UNEP study of 2004 identified three common types of fisheries infrastructure:8    
 · harbour facilities and moorage · fishing port infrastructure enhancement · support to producers organisations 
 
9. The OECD has identified the following types of  programmes as falling within the category of 
“fisheries infrastructure expenditure”:
9   
 · support to build port facilities for commercial fishers 
· reduced charges for use of government provided infrastructure  
· support to improve fishing villages  · regional development grants  · support to enhance the fisheries community environment · fisheries enhancement expenditure 
· support for artificial reefs  
· aid for restocking of fish resources · expenditure on exploratory fishing  10. Drawing on these and other studies, we propose th at subsidies to fisheries infrastructure that 
should be subject to further consideration pursuan t to the Rules Negotiating Group mandate be broken 
down into the following three sub-categories: 
 (i) subsidies to fishing port facilities (ii) subsidies to the development of fishing communities (iii) subsidies to processing facilities for fisheries products 
 
11. To aid discussion, we have provided examples  below of the types of programmes that could 
fall under these sub-categories.
10  We would reiterate that in c onsidering subsidies to fisheries 
infrastructure pursuant to the Rules Negotiating Group mandate it is our view that only those 
programmes that: (a) are subsidies within the mean ing of Article 1 of the ASCM, and therefore not 
“general infrastructure”;  and (b) confer a benefit within the meaning of Article 1 of the ASCM on the 
fishing industry would fall within the scope of these sub-categories.    
 12. The primary objective of this paper is to tr y and identify the types of programmes that could 
be classified as fisheries infrastructure and theref ore subject to new disciplines.  Once clarity is 
reached on the scope of new disciplines with respect to infrastructure, the next question for Members 
to consider will be how these different types of  subsidies should be treated under new rules.  
New Zealand is conscious that the fisheries infr astructure subsidy category comprises a large amount 
of fisheries expenditure and there is currently lit tle clarity or transparency about the nature of 
spending in this area.  Improved transparency is a nother important outcome that we would like to see 
as a result of these negotiations.  We also believe that infrastructure programmes of the types listed 
below can have an effect on overfishing and overcapac ity in that they artificially lower the cost of 
fishing and therefore may lead to a greater level of  fishing than would occur in the absence of these 
programmes.  
                                                     
 
8 Porter, G (2004), Analysing the Resource Impacts of Fisheries Subsidies: A Matrix Approach , 
commissioned by Economics and Trade Branch, United Nations Environment Programme. 
9 OECD (2003), Environmental Aspects of Fisheries Subsidies , Background Paper prepared for the 
OECD Technical Expert Meeting on Environmentally Harmful Subsidies, Paris, 3-4 November; OECD (2000), 
Transition to Responsible Fisheries: Economic and Policy Implications , Paris. 
10 These lists are not exhaustive but rather are exam ples of the types of programmes we see falling 
under these sub-categories. TN/RL/GEN/70 
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(i) Subsidies to Fishing Port Facilities
 
 13. The fishing port facilities sub-category is considered to include the following: 
 
• the construction and provision of harbour f acilities, including vessel moorage facilities, 
wharves, transhipment facilities, vessel lo ading and unloading facilities, vessel cleaning 
facilities, and vessel sanitation facilities; 
• the provision of transport infrastructure; 
• the provision of facilities for vessel repair, incl uding the use of slipways, dry docks, vessel 
lifts, ancillary cranes and pumps; 
• the provision of storage facilities for raw a nd processed seafood, including cold stores, 
freezers and cooling rooms; 
• the provision of facilities for the storage of fishing equipment, including the storage of fishing 
gear and nets and the storage of vessels in non-fishing periods; 
• the provision of seafood landing areas. 
 
Treatment under New Rules 
 
14. We note that there are examples of subsidies to fishing port facilities listed in a number of the 
current WTO subsidies notifications under fisheries activities.11  However, there is generally limited 
information available on the types of activities in th is area.  The types of subsidies in this sub-
category are considerably varied and, as noted abov e, account for a sizeable share of total fisheries 
expenditure.  We therefore believe that further discu ssion and information is needed before reaching a 
decision on how this sub-category, or different elem ents within it, should be treated under new rules. 
 
(ii)  Subsidies to the Development of Fishing Communities  
 15. The fishing community development sub-cate gory is considered to include the following: 
 
• the provision of housing for fishermen; 
• the provision of transport infrast ructure for fishing communities. 
 
Treatment under New Rules 
 
16. We are aware that for several Members many of the programmes in this area fulfil important social policy objectives.  Consequently, removal of these subsidies may have unintended negative 
social or developmental impacts.  Accordingly, subject to further discussion and information on these 
types of programmes, we consider that subsidies to the development of fishing communities would be 
a suitable candidate for exemption from any prohibited category of fisheries subsidies.   (iii)  Subsidies to Processing Facilities for Fisheries Products
 
 
17. The fisheries processing facilities sub-category is considered to include the following:  
 
• the provision of processing facilities, including th e use and construction of: processing plants, 
equipment and systems;  freezers;  cooling rooms;   packaging plants, equipment and systems;  
cleaning systems;  waste disposal systems;  and sanitation systems; 
                                                      
11 G/SCM/N/123/EEC, New and Full Notification Pursuant to Article XVI:1 of the GATT 1994 and 
Article 25 of the ASCM  - European Communities, p 49; G/SCM/N/123/EEC/Add.5 - Demark, p. 27; 
G/SCM/N/123/EEC/Add.24 – Sweden, pp. 33-34.  TN/RL/GEN/70 
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 • the provision of storage facilities for raw a nd processed material, including cold stores, 
freezers and cooling rooms; 
• the provision of seafood sales areas, including: market floors for sale of landed catch; auction 
facilities; and wholesale sale facilities; 
• the provision of transport infrastructure to fishing processing facilities; 
• the provision of sanitary facilities, including th e installation of systems to improve water 
quality; waste disposal and sanitation measures. 
 
Treatment under New Rules 
 18. Subsidies to processing facilities for fisheries pr oducts may have an indirect effect on fishing 
effort or capacity by reducing the costs and/or in creasing the revenues associated with fishing, which 
would increase the incentive to fish.  Unlike subsidie s to the development of fishing communities, we 
are not aware of any mitigating reasons that would merit the exemption of subsidies to processing facilities from any prohibited category of fisheri es subsidies.  However, we are open to other 
Members’ views on this point.  
 Subsidies to “Operational Infrastructure”
 
19. In devising the list above, we  have specifically focused on “capital infrastructure” subsidies 
more typically associated with indirect costs of  production - e.g. ports, storage, and transport 
infrastructure - rather than on what could be refe rred to as “operational infrastructure” subsidies more 
typically associated with direct costs of production – e.g. subsidies to the provision of bait services, 
fuel, ice and at-sea fishing support services (such as transhipment and refuelling vessels).  The UNEP 
study of 2004 treated fuel and bait related subsid ies as part of a separate category of “subsidies to 
variable costs”.  The OECD has al so treated fuel and bait related cost reducing transfers as sitting 
outside the infrastructure category. It is our view th at these direct or variable cost subsidies should be 
prohibited under new disciplines, as set out in our paper of April 2004, TN/RL/W/154.12   
 Subsidies to “Conservation” and to “Research and Development”
 
20. We have also excluded programmes whose primary objectives are conservation or research 
and development.  Examples of c onservation subsidies could include support for artificial reefs, aid 
for restocking of fish resources and, potentially, fi sheries enhancement expend iture (listed above in 
the OECD infrastructure category).13  As indicated in JOB(05)/44, we believe that ‘conservation’ and 
‘research and development’ should be treated as separate subsidy categories and we would welcome 
other Members’ views and contributions on these areas.   
 
 
                                                     
 
12 TN/RL/W/154, Fisheries Subsidies: Overcapacity And Overexploitation  - New Zealand. We are 
aware however that these types of operational subsidies may have development objectives for developing 
countries. In TN/RL/GEN/56, Contribution to the Discussion on the Framework for Disciplines on Fisheries 
Subsidies , Brazil suggested that subsidies to fuel, bait or ice supplied for fishing activities should be subject to 
certain special and differential treatment (S&DT) provis ions.  We are therefore open to discussing how these 
issues could be addressed within an S&DT framework to  provide sufficient flexibility for developing countries, 
for example, through a de minimis provision.  New Zealand hopes to be able to expand on this concept in a future paper. 
13 We note also that in TN/RL/W/172, Japan, the Republic of Korea and the Separate Customs 
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu referred  to artificial reefs in the context of subsidies to 
“resource enhancement and protection of environment”, along with ocean ranching , fingerlings release and 
fishing ground clean-up. It was proposed that subsidies to these areas should be treated as non-actionable. TN/RL/GEN/70 
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 Special and Differential Treatment Considerations 
21.  New Zealand recognises that subsidies to fisher ies infrastructure can play an important part in 
the overall fisheries strategy of developing countri es.  Furthermore, developing countries’ existing 
level of infrastructure is likely to be significantly  lower than that of developed countries and therefore 
may require greater future expenditure.  These fact ors will need to be addressed through adequate 
special and differential treatment provisions, if di sciplines are placed on some subsidies to fisheries 
infrastructure.  This is consistent with our mandate  to take into account the importance of the fisheries 
sector to developing countries.  Again, we would note that New Zealand is interested in exploring further how these and similar issues could be addressed through the use of a de minimis  provision for 
developing countries. 
 
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