WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  TN/RL/W/246 
27 November 2009 
 (09-6018) 
Negotiating Group on Rules  
  
 
RULES NEGOTIATING GROUP 
 
INFORMAL OPEN-ENDED MEETING WITH  
SENIOR OFFICIALS:  25 NOVEMBER 2009 
 
Statement by the Chairman
 
   Good morning and welcome to this informal  open-ended meeting of the Negotiating Group 
on Rules.  I would in particular like to extend a warm welcome to Senior Officials and Heads of 
Delegation who are here with us today.  I certainly ap preciate your interest in the work of this Group.   
  The purpose of today's meeting is to review th e state-of-play in the Rules negotiations, and to 
discuss our programme of work moving forward.  We have of course been meeting frequently and 
intensively over the past year at the level of Ru les negotiators on the subs tantive issues before the 
Group, but it has been a while since we have stoppe d to reflect on where we stand and where we are 
going.   
  If this exercise of collective reflection is to  be meaningful, it sh ould not represent a mere 
repetition of your well-known positio ns on various issues, or a restatement of how crucial you 
consider the Rules negotiations to be for the fate  of the DDA.  While those views are of utmost 
importance, I suggest that we take them as given and concentrate our efforts instead on how we can 
best advance the work in the Rules area.     In planning for this meeting some weeks ago my feeling was, and remains, that this sort of 
exercise, undertaken at a political level, and taking advantage of many Senior Officials in town (and 
in any case Heads of Delegation) will help us to be tter prepare ourselves for the months ahead.  In 
particular, it will help keep Senior Officials like you rselves fully informed about developments in the 
Group and will help to prepare you for whatever fu ture involvement may prove necessary as we seek 
to bring the DDA to a successful conclusion.     I have been Chairman of this Group for quite some time now, and there are some among you 
who have been involved in the Rules negotiations si nce before I came to Geneva.  It is however 
sobering as I look around this room to realize how  few of you were here when I assumed the 
Chairmanship in 2004.  Thus, I would like to begin by reviewing the evolution of our work since 2001, as that history helps to explain where we are today and how we got here.  I ask the 
indulgence of those of who experienced this history first-hand.   
 
 Let's start with AD and horizontal subsidies.  I think it might be useful first to recall the 
situation with respect to anti-dumping that preva iled in the period leading up to Doha.  At the 
beginning of the Uruguay Round only a handful of de veloped Members were significant users of anti-
dumping, and their targets were predominantly ex ports from other developed Members.  By 2001, 
however, the number of users had climbed to fo rty-five, and the new users were principally 
developing Members.  What's more, as developing Members' role first as exporters  increased and then 
as their own markets grew, the number of cases br ought against developing Members increased, and TN/RL/W/246 
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  cases affecting south-south trade climbed dramatica lly.  These trends reflected the reality that as 
liberalization brought down tariffs and other barrier s to trade in developed and developing Members 
alike, trade remedies assumed much greater importance as the protection of last resort.     The Doha mandate in this area reflects  these developments.  It provides that:  
 
 "In light of experience and of the increasing application of these instruments by 
Members, we agree to negotiations aimed at clarifying and improving disciplines under [the Agreements on Anti-Dumpi ng and on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures], while preserving the basic concep ts, principles and effectiveness of these 
Agreements and their instruments and obj ectives, and taking into account the needs 
of developing and least-d eveloped participants." 
  While the Doha mandate indicates the overall th rust of the negotiations, it provided little 
specificity on the precise issues that should be taken up in the negotiations.  Rather, it called on 
participants, in an initial phase of the negotiations , "to indicate the provisions, including disciplines on 
trade-distorting practices, that they seek to clarify and improve in the subsequent phase".     Given that the Doha Declaration set a 1 Janua ry 2005 end-date for the DDA, the Rules Group 
quickly began its work.  This "initial phase" cu lminated, in August 2003, shortly before the 
Cancun Ministerial, in the issuance by my predecessor of a compilation of the 141 submissions 
received as of that time, circulated as document TN /RL/W/143.  While the number of issues identified 
by participants was enormous, th e submissions were often quite ge neral and discussion was extensive 
but unfocused.     After Cancun, while much of the Round went into a period of suspended animation, we 
quickly resumed our activities.  Indeed, we shif ted gears, and the Group's work became more 
intensive, specific and technical.  In order to ach ieve greater focus in our work and to narrow the 
issues to a manageable number, I asked participan ts to submit elaborated proposals identifying the 
precise changes they sought, and in mid-2004 I insisted  that those proposals needed to be in the form 
of specific proposed textual changes.    
 Since our focus had now shifted to text-based  proposals, our work shifted from formal to 
informal meetings, and our plenary sessions were  supplemented by bilateral and plurilateral 
consultations where we were able to examine in  detail the proposals made.  This intense work 
provided insight into exactly what proponents were  seeking and how other participants felt about each 
proposal.   
 
 While the Group met in a variety of formats dur ing this period, we were always careful to 
maintain a high degree of inclusiveness and transpar ency.  All elaborated proposals were discussed in 
open-ended format before we moved to plurilateral consultations.  Pa rticipation in consultations was 
based on variable geometry, so that participants that had manifested pa rticular interest in a given issue 
had an opportunity to engage on that issue plurilate rally.  Further, I reported back regularly to the 
plenary on the consultations held, and offered to br ief interested delegations that had not attended a 
given consultation.     As we headed towards the Hong Kong Minister ial, and the optimistic prospect of achieving 
modalities in Agriculture and NAMA in 2005, the Gr oup began to ask itself how Rules fit into the 
picture.  Some participants advocated the circulati on of Chair texts in advance of the Ministerial.  
Others, such as the European Communities, suggested  that we should try to develop some kind of 
intermediate product, such as a list of substantive i ssues to be addressed and, for some, indications as 
to the possible direction of the results.  Senior o fficials from the Friends of AD negotiations suggested 
that we identify a list of broad objectives for the negotiations (TN/RL/W/171).    TN/RL/W/246 
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 Ultimately, while the Hong Kong declaration usefully provides a political  message of 
commitment to advance work on AD and horizontal subsidies, and a more re fined mandate, we were 
unable to agree on any language that provides a clear  sense of anticipated results.  Rather, given the 
complexity of the issues, the inter-linkages betwee n dozens of specific issues, and the understandable 
reluctance of Members to openly signal their intent ions, it became clear that the negotiations could 
best be advanced through Chair texts.  Such texts would allow me to provide an overall assessment of 
the direction in which the Group was moving and the possible trade-offs that could be envisioned, 
without expecting much less requiring participants to agree to anything at this stage.    
 The Ministerial Declaration thus critically mandated me to circulate consolidated Chair texts 
that would be the basis for further negotiations.  The Declaration indicated that the texts should be circulated "early enough to ensure a timely outcome  within the context of the 2006 (!) end-date for the 
DDA and taking into account progress in other areas of the negotiations".  The Declaration was a 
clear indication that participants were ready for th e Chair to put forward an arbitrated text that 
proposed a possible basis to reconcile the many c onflicting positions and intere sts in the negotiations 
once sufficient progress had been made in other areas of the DDA.     Even those of you not present at Hong Kong will recall that no modalities were achieved there, and that in the period following Hong Kong continued efforts to achieve such modalities did not 
bear fruit.  Nevertheless, the Hong Kong Declaration ushered in a third and very intensive stage of our 
work.  Despite a general suspension of activity on  the DDA during part of 2006, Rules negotiators 
never slacked off, but rather helped me to conti nue moving the process forward.  With the knowledge 
that Chair texts were in the offing, participants rolled up their sleeves and engaged heavily to try to 
provide me with ideas and options for formulating specific language to address the many issues under 
consideration.   
 
 While the second half of 2007 was not a period of great movement elsewhere in the Round, we felt that the time was ripe to move forward in  our Group.  The issues were mature and there was 
no indication that texts in the Rules area would je opardize work in other areas of the DDA.  Thus, in 
December 2007 I took the leap and issued my first comprehensive draft texts.    
 My first draft texts were ambitious arbitrat ed texts, with no brackets or alternatives, 
addressing a wide range of critical issues, sugges ting trade-offs, and prop osing an overall possible 
solution.  I warned participants wh en I released the texts that every participant would find things in 
them they did not like, and even things that they disliked intensely.  I was not wrong!  We had an intense and focused discussion on my draft texts duri ng 2008, and while each pa rticipant found things 
they liked in my draft texts, they also objected strongly to other elements.   
  The discussion of my first draft texts was in my view very useful and played an important role in moving our process forward.  I tabled them "with  the objective of stimulating serious reflection by 
participants on the broad parameters of possible outcomes" and I believe they served that objective 
well.  As I made clear when I issued those texts, how ever, I considered them to be "not the end of our 
negotiating process but only the first step in a new phase involving further intensive discussions 
within the Group".     During the course of 2008 it became clear that my first draft texts had served their initial 
purpose, and that further documentation would be requi red.  It was clear that participants were not 
prepared at that point to accept the trade-offs propo sed and balance struck in the first draft texts.  
Further, there was widespread acceptance of the proposition that the next draft texts should be 
bottom-up texts, which should seek to make pr oposals only where some degree of convergence 
among delegations appeared to exist.    TN/RL/W/246 
Page 4  
 
   In May 2008, I issued a Working Document reflecting all proposals by participants, the 
Chair's texts and a summary of participants' views on those texts, circulated as document 
TN/RL/W/232.     Then, in December 2008, I released new draft texts.  These texts contain extensive proposed 
changes in the form of un-bracketed text, and in my view reflect substantial progress towards 
convergence on numerous technical issues.  As prom ised however, they do not seek to provide any 
magic solutions or propose a new balance on the major political issues regarding AD and horizontal 
subsidies that sharply divide the Group.  Rather, th e revised texts identified in brackets certain major 
AD and subsidy issues where I saw no convergence a nd where I considered that I had no basis or 
mandate at this point to propose compromise solutions.   
  The decisions required for my December 2008 text s were not always easy.  I needed to make 
difficult decisions regarding which issues should be moved to brackets and which issues could remain 
as un-bracketed text.  My decisions on some of those issues were controversial, and this is a matter we 
continue to discuss in the Group.   
  In the anti-dumping area, I identified eleven issues as lacking the convergence necessary to 
justify maintaining proposed texts.  They are:  ze roing, causation of injury, material retardation, the 
exclusion of related producers, produc t under consideration, informati on requests to affiliated parties, 
public interest & lesser duty, anti-circumvention, sunset reviews, third country dumping and special & 
differential treatment/technical assistance.   
  By contrast, I maintained or revised specific dr afting on dozens of other issues, including cost 
allocations, exchange rates. model matching, a pplications, pre-initiation notification of exporting 
governments, back-to-back investigations, the id entification of exporters and domestic producers, 
non-confidential files, new shipper reviews, duty assessment proceedings, interim reviews, 
verifications, and the review of Members' anti-dumpi ng policy and practice, to name just as few.   
  In the subsidies area, both the number of brackets and the amount of un-bracketed text is less than in the area of anti-dumping.  In part, this re flects that I did not in these draft texts attempt to 
make changes in the countervail area paralleling changes on anti-dumping issues.  However, it also 
reflects the far lower number of proposals, and relatively lesser appetite for major changes on 
horizontal subsidies as opposed to anti-dumping.     That said, there are four major bracketed i ssues in my draft ASCM text, regarding certain 
financing by loss-making institutions, export comp etitiveness, export credits – market benchmarks 
and export credits – successor undertakings.  These are important and challenging issues.  In addition, 
the un-bracketed issues related to regulated pric ing are highly controversial and of comparable 
importance.  And significant issues, such as pass- through and subsidy allocation, are also addressed 
through un-bracketed text.     Despite a reduction of the pace in other area s of the DDA, we have continued our work 
intensively over the past year, working through these new texts.  The process has been long, time-
consuming and sometimes tedious.  We have held intensive clus ters in February, May, June, 
September and October, and another cluster will be held in December .  The work has been slow but 
we have advanced, and by the end of our December cluster I expect that we will have completed our 
line-by-line discussion of all un-bracketed language in the two texts, will have reverted to all the 
unaddressed issues raised by participants, and will ha ve discussed all but a handful of the bracketed 
issues, which we will complete early next year.  We have also begun to reflect on differences between 
provisions of the existing AD and ASCM Agreements re lating to similar issues, such as investigation 
procedures and injury determinations.     TN/RL/W/246 
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   In terms of where we go next, I think a few things are clear.  First, while we have made 
progress on technical issues, we are no nearer consen sus on the big political issues than we were in 
December 2008, and we are not likely to see the type of engagement that could lead participants to 
negotiate compromises on these issues  until the overall direction of the Round becomes clearer.  Thus, 
any effort to identify agreed "landing zones" at this stage is unlikely to achieve any success beyond 
our results at Hong Kong.  Second, I have seen no indi cations that participants are prepared for me to 
propose a new comprehensive balance at this stage of the negotiations;  it is clear that participants for 
now want to stick with a bottom-up approach.     So what should our next steps be?  First, co mplete our review of bracketed and un-bracketed 
text.  It may be a tedious process but it has been worthwhile.   
  Second, proceed with the discussion of AD/CVD transposition.  One thing on which Ministers did agree at Hong Kong was the desirability of applying to both AD and CV measures any clarifications and improvements which are relevant a nd appropriate to both instruments.  We could for 
example begin by exploring the extent to which un-bracketed text in AD might be relevant or 
appropriate to the countervail context, and if so, what  changes might be required in order to effectuate 
such a transposition.  Any such discussion would of course be without prejudice to participants 
positions on that un-bracketed text.     Third, and as conditions warrant, we could sel ect technical issues that may warrant further 
exploration in varying formats.   
  It is clear that much remains to be done on anti-dumping and horizontal subsidies, and in particular that the proper balance and trade-offs  among remaining big political issues remains to be 
struck.  That said, we should not forget how far we have come since 2001.  We moved from 
141 general submissions in our first phase, through th e identification of scores of detailed elaborated 
text-based proposals, to detailed Chair texts propos ing numerous un-bracketed changes to the current 
rules.  While there is of course no consensus on these  changes, and some remain highly controversial, 
there is a high degree of convergence on many of them.     Equally important, we have clearly identified slightly more than a dozen key issues within 
which we know the trade-offs necessary to complete  our work must be found, and we have already 
explored in detail possible options for addressing these i ssues.  Further, participants continue to take 
proposed language from my first draft texts as a poin t of reference on many of these issues.  Thus, if 
we can complete technical work in such areas as tr ansposition, I am convinced that we will be well-
positioned to tackle the outstanding political issues when the time is ripe.   
 
 I'd like now to turn our attention to fisheries subsidies
.  Here the story is a bit different.  At 
present, there are of course no sector-specific disciplin es on fisheries subsidies in the WTO.  Thus, in 
our work in this area we are starting from a clean  sheet.  The Doha Mandate gave us little guidance 
indeed by simply calling on the Group to "clarify and improve WTO disciplines on fisheries subsidies, taking into account the importance of  this sector to developing countries".   
 
 Before getting into the specifics of the work of the Negotiating Group in this area, I would recall why
 the Ministers decided to launch negotiations on fisheries subsidies at Doha.  It goes 
without saying that the mandate did not come out of nowhere.  To the contrary, it reflected the increasing attention being paid over the preceding decade at least, in many international fora including 
the WTO, to the problems of overcapacity and over-fish ing in marine capture fisheries, and the role 
that subsidies could play in contributing to those problems.     Indeed, by 1995 the FAO and other UN bodies had for some time identified depletion of the world's fisheries resources as an issue of urgency, an d called on all nations to work together to resolve TN/RL/W/246 
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  this pressing problem.  For example, the FAO estimat ed that by 1994 some 69 per cent of the world's 
marine fish stocks were fully- to over-exploited.  Furthermore, a number of international fisheries 
management instruments entered into force in 1995, including the Code of Conduct for Responsible 
Fisheries and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, refl ecting already at that time an international 
consensus that world fisheries r esources were in trouble and that  collective action was urgently 
needed.   
  The possible connection with subsidies also ha d been recognized for many years prior to the 
launch of the fisheries subsidies negotiation.  As early as 1992 the FAO published a paper drawing 
attention to the potential of subsidies to stimulat e overcapacity and over-fishing.  By the late 1990s, 
the World Bank, the OECD and others had issued studies estimating that the magnitude of subsidies 
to the fisheries sector was enormous, and highlighting the potential of those su bsidies to contribute to 
overcapacity and over-fishing.  And by 2001, FAO me mbers had adopted the International Plans of 
Action on Capacity Management and on Illegal, Unre ported and Unregulated Fishing, both of which 
call for the elimination of subsidies contri buting to overcapacity and over-fishing.   
 
 At the same time, it was widely recognized , as reflected in the various international 
instruments, that the fisheries sector is of pa rticular importance and sensitivity to developing 
countries, given its importance as a source of food, and its frequent role as employer of last resort where other employment opportunities are scarce.  Along with this, however, was the recognition that certain developing country fish stocks were  under intense and increasing fishing pressure.   
 
 Meanwhile, in the WTO itself, Members were beginning to look at the issue of fisheries 
subsidies.  Already in 1997, certain delegati ons in the Committee on Trade and Environment 
identified the reduction of fisheries subsidies as a potential win-win-win for trade, development and 
the environment.  In 1998, the CTE examined the treatment of fisheries subsidies under WTO rules, 
and analyzed the notifications to the WTO of subsidi es that appeared to be fisheries-related.  Growing 
out of this work in the CTE, in 1999 the Seattle Dr aft Ministerial Declaration contained language for a 
mandate to negotiate the creation of new disciplines on fisheries subsidies.     Given the very general mandate that was ulti mately adopted at Doha, and the fact that 
fisheries subsidies was a new issue in the WTO, the first several years of our work were dedicated to 
exploring a range of broad conceptual issues:  did we need fisheries-specific subsidies disciplines at 
all;  what should be the objectives of any such disci plines;  how should those disciplines relate to 
horizontal subsidies rules;  what should be the basi c architecture of any such disciplines;  what types 
of fisheries activities should the disciplines relate to?  Views varied widely, and it took the Group some time to move towards convergence on these questions.   
 
 That said, in the outside world, attention to  the issue, and the international consensus in 
favour of effective new rules on fisheries subsidies,  were growing.  The Plan of Implementation of 
the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development reflected this, calling for the elimination of 
subsidies that were harmful to fisheries as part  of the WTO negotiations to clarify and improve 
disciplines on subsidies.   
 
 In short, it was clear and widely recognized long before the launch of the DDA that the situation of the world's fisheries was dire, that many poor populations we re depending on increasingly 
precarious natural resources for their livelihoods, and that the WTO could make an important 
contribution to improving those situations throug h the development of new disciplines on fisheries 
subsidies.  Since the negotiations were launched, the expectations of the world about the results of our 
work have only increased.     By the time of the Hong Kong Ministerial, the Negotiating Group had made considerable 
progress in clarifying the nature of the issues before  it, and the Declaration adopted by the Ministers  TN/RL/W/246 
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  represented a fundamental step in consolidating th is progress, resolving some of these issues and 
orienting our work going forward.  The enha nced mandate from Hong Kong calls on the Group to 
"strengthen disciplines on subsidies in the fisheries sector, including through the prohibition  of certain 
forms of fisheries subsidies that contribute to ove rcapacity and over-fishing", and to include in the 
disciplines provisions on "transpare ncy and enforceability", as well as  "appropriate and effective 
special and differential treatment for developing and least-developed Members [which] should be an 
integral part of the ... negotiations, taking into acc ount the importance of this sector to development 
priorities, poverty reduction, and livelihood and food security concerns".  Thus the key points of the 
Declaration were that the focus was overcapacity and over-fishing, that the disciplines should include 
a prohibition on certain forms of subsidies that cont ributed to such overcapacity and over-fishing, that 
the rules needed to be enforceable, and that effectiv e special and differential treatment needed to be an 
integral part of our work.     After Hong Kong, and guided by the Declarati on, the Group shifted its focus to considering 
ways to achieve these objectives.  As with AD and ho rizontal subsidies, I called upon participants to 
table elaborated proposals including, where possible, draft texts.  As in the areas of AD and horizontal 
subsidies, this intensive work clarified many issues and provided me with a sufficient basis to table a 
draft text, in the form of an Annex to the proposed revised version of the SCM Agreement.  This draft 
Annex was circulated as part of document TN/RL/W/ 213, in November 2007.  Again, this draft text 
was an arbitrated text proposing a comprehensive solution.    
 As you all know, my draft text on fisheries subsidies proved at least as controversial as my 
draft texts on AD and horizontal subsidies.  Neve rtheless it incorporated the substantial progress 
towards convergence that the Group had made on some fundamental issues:  that the subsidies to be 
disciplined would be in respect of marine wild cap ture fisheries;  that the new disciplines would be 
annexed to, and thus subject to the basic defi nitions and coverage of , the SCM Agreement (in 
particular the elements of financial contribution, benefit and specificity);  that the core of the 
disciplines would be a prohibition;  that fisheries ma nagement would play a central role in terms of 
access to various forms of exceptions;  and that special and differential treatment would exempt least-developed Members from new disciplines, a nd would go well beyond traditional time-bound 
transition periods for the other developing Members.    
 The architecture of my draft text aimed to en capsulate these principles in such a way as to 
effectively fulfil the mandate from Ministers, which all participants have emphasized as the sine qua 
non of these negotiations.  First, the basic discipline proposed in the text is a prohibition of certain 
subsidies, in the form of a bottom-up list ra ther than a top-down overall ban.  The proposed 
prohibition thus is not absolute:  not all fisherie s subsidies would be banne d, and furthermore the 
prohibition would be modulated by certain excepti ons, general and for S&D.   However, given the 
potential for exceptions to undermine disciplines, th e draft proposes a cautious approach to most 
exceptions, in terms of their scope and their bein g conditioned on meeting fisheries management and 
transparency requirements.     On this last point, I would emphasize that th e proposed approach to special and differential 
treatment, and indeed to all of the flexibilities in th e text, is different from, and more sophisticated 
than, typical transitional periods, as it is embedded in the whole structure of the draft.  In particular, 
the subsidies in question have to do with the cap ture of wild marine natural resources, upon which 
many people depend for their very survival, and whose survival in turn depends on the proper 
management of those resources in the long-term.  T hus, while certain flexibilities in the draft text 
would be time-limited, others woul d be permanent, and it is because of their permanent nature that 
these latter flexibilities would be conditioned on implementation of fisheries management.   
  The text also recognizes that such a re quirement could impose burdens on developing 
Members, and for this reason recognizes the need for specific, focused tec hnical assistance for the TN/RL/W/246 
Page 8  
 
  implementation of fisheries management.  Participants  will certainly continue to discuss in the months 
ahead how best to make use of existing and/or ne w institutions and structures to ensure that such 
technical assistance is forthcoming.     Both the basic structure and the details of the draft text were discussed at length during 2008.  
And in spite of convergence on some of the princi ples at issue, our discussions revealed profound 
disagreements in respect of virtually all of the details, inter alia , regarding the form and breadth of the 
prohibition and general exceptions, the nature and exte nt of special and differe ntial treatment and how 
management conditionalities and transparency provisi ons should operate, and what their respective 
legal implications should be.  In spite of much  discussion, and the submission by a number of 
participants of new, alternative proposal s, no narrowing of positions emerged.   
  Thus, when I issued my new texts in December  2008, I was not in a position to issue a revised 
comprehensive text on fisheries, nor, given that the fisheries text was a wholly new text rather than adjustments to an existing framework, was I able to revert on controversial issues to an existing 
agreement.  Accordingly, I decided to circulate a roadmap in this area, detailing specific focused 
questions on all aspects of the proposed disciplines.   The purpose of the roadmap was to provide a 
basis for a well-structured point-by-point discussion  on the wide range of complex issues facing the 
Group.     We have dedicated this year to considering each  and every one of the questions raised in that 
roadmap, in respect of the prohibition;  the gene ral exceptions;  special and differential treatment;  
general disciplines / actionability;  fisheries ma nagement;  transparency;  dispute settlement;  
implementation;  and transition rules.  In this revi ew, in particular, we have analyzed the balance and 
relationship among the various structural elements in  possible new disciplines:  the relationship of the 
breadth of a prohibition to the breadth of general and S&D exceptions, with a view to ensuring an 
effective but not overly broad discipline;  the relati onship of fisheries management to the possibility to 
access certain types of subsidies;  and the rela tionship between using flexibilities and providing 
transparency in respect of their u se.  It has been long and painful, but we have almost completed the 
process, with the last issues to be taken up in December.     Where do we go next?  Here, the situation is clear.  A number of participants have signalled 
their desire to table new text-based proposals that  would offer new approaches, and perhaps even 
fundamentally different alternative architectures, for disciplines on fisheries subsidies.  I have 
committed to delegations that I will make the necess ary time available for a thorough consideration of 
these proposals.  We will also, no doubt, come back to other issues raised in our discussions, for 
example, specificity.  We will begin this exercise in December, time allowing.  Clearly, participants 
have a right to expect those opportunities, and no ne w text from me could be envisioned before they 
are provided.  In any event, my clear sense is that in  this area as in the others, participants are not yet 
ready to abandon a bottom-up approach to our work.  While the time may come when a new arbitrated 
Chair text is required, we are certainly not there yet.     That said, I would like to recall the urgency of these negotiations, which has been emphasized 
at some point during our meetings by virtually all delegations, from every region and at all levels of 
development.  The objective reality that forms the bac kdrop of our work is that the dire state of global 
fish stocks has only continued to worsen sinc e the WTO first took up the question of fisheries 
subsidies in the late 1990s.  The latest figures from the FAO are dramatic – 80 per cent of world fish 
stocks are fully or over-exploited, as are most of th e stocks of the top ten species.  In spite of much 
international work on the issue, fishing capacity continues to far exceed available stocks.  And the 
enormous level of subsidies continues unabate d, with the negative c onsequences not only of 
contributing to the depletion of fish stocks but also of encouraging fishing well beyond economically 
rational levels, costing society as a whole billions of dollars annually in lost potential profits, in 
addition to the direct costs of the subsidies.  The clock thus is ticking ever more loudly as the decline  TN/RL/W/246 
 Page 9 
 
 
  in fish stocks and the economically irrational fishi ng activities put at increasing risk the livelihoods of 
vast numbers of people around the globe.     So, our challenge here is to achieve results in  these negotiations that create new disciplines 
that can be effective in addressing the contribution of subsidies to that overcapacity and over-fishing, 
before it is too late.  And here, we  must be very careful when we think about our ambition level.  In 
particular, given the unique characteristics of the fisheries sector, if we lower our sights too low, we will end up with a result that is contrary
 to our mandate.  In other word s, while certain trade-offs are 
imaginable in the context of fish eries subsidies disciplines, the pr inciple of establishing a discipline 
that is effective in controlling subsidies that cont ribute to overcapacity or over-fishing, by definition, 
limits the number and scope of such potential trade-offs .  It is for this reason that the questions in my 
roadmap sought, among other things, to concentrate the minds of delegations on the need to reconcile 
their legitimate concerns over the impact on them of  new disciplines with a result that conforms to, 
rather than undermines, our mandate in regard to overcapacity and over-fishing.  This has been and 
remains our central challenge in these negotiations.   
 
 Finally, on RTAs , I would also like to take stock of where we are and how we got here.  The 
subject of RTAs is in need of a political engagement, and it is my hope that I can get that from you today.     It seems to me that the starting point of any discussion on how to progress in the area of 
RTAs is to go back to the beginning:   
 
• Our meeting today takes place 14 years after the proposal by Canada for the establishment of 
a committee on regional trading arrangements;  th ree months later, in February 1996, the 
Committee on RTAs (CRTA) was established.   
 
• At the time of the creation of the CRTA in 1996, there were 112 RTAs notified and in force, 
and 3 notifications were made in that year.  In 2001, the year in which the Doha Round was 
launched, these figures had increased to 195 in fo rce, and 15 notifications.  Eight years later, 
in 2009, the figures are 263 RTAs in force, and 34 notifications.  And the year is not over!   
 
• The world has therefore changed considerably since the WTO began its work on RTAs.   
 
 As of mid-2002, the Negotiating Group on Rules h as given priority to negotiations regarding 
procedural aspects, and in particular on the "transpa rency of RTAs".  This, you will recall, resulted in 
the General Council Decision of 14 December 2006 setting up the Transparency Mechanism for 
Regional Trade Agreements.     Substantive discussions on systemic issues were launched in June 2004, on the basis of a road 
map suggested by the Chairman.  The road map wa s drafted on the basis of submissions made by 
various delegations.  Since 2001, seventeen submissi ons have been made rega rding systemic issues, 
the most recent dating back to October 2005.     I would like to make a few remarks regarding the roadmaps circulated:   
 
• Four informal roadmaps were circulated, two dealing with broad subjects – namely coverage 
of RTAs, neutrality of RTAs vis-à-vis  third-parties, and other issues (coherence, 
development-related issues, inte raction between RTAs/multilateral trading system, effects on 
non-parties, and retroactive application of rul es) – while two others dealt more specifically 
with "substantially all the trade" and transition periods;   
 TN/RL/W/246 
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  • the roadmaps aimed at assisting Members in organizing the Group's discussions on systemic 
issues;   
 
• they presented "priority" issues as identified in participants' written and oral submissions to 
the Group, but did not
 constitute a comprehensive list of systemic issues for negotiations;   
 
• most of the systemic issues are interlinked, and can be approached in a variety of ways, 
depending on the objectives pursued.  The roadmaps  had a legal focus, in keeping with the 
rule-making approach taken by participants in the Negotiating Group.  The intention was:  (a) 
to offer a logical approach to the discussions;  (b) to tackle, in parallel, issues relating to 
goods and services;  and (c) to establish a certa in balance between potentially more and less 
controversial issues.   
 
 The Group has explored all the proposals by Me mbers and all the points raised in the road 
map, some more deeply than others.  The issues of  "substantially all the trade" (SAT) and transition 
periods, for example, were discussed in greater dept h and, several concrete proposals were tabled on 
the criteria for measuring SAT.  The discussions, although useful, have shown that there was no 
appetite for interpreting, on a strict legal basis, controversial aspects of the WTO rules on RTAs.   
 
 Thus, it would seem to me that in taking our  negotiations forward, we might benefit from 
pursuing, in parallel, a different, more fact-findi ng built-in agenda, where work in the CRTA could 
prepare the ground for a new way of dealing with RTAs in the WTO.    
 In this regard, the work of the CRTA is most relevant:   
 
• Back in 1997, the Committee had agreed to d eal with systemic issues under a three-pronged 
approach, encompassing (i) a legal analyses of relevant WTO provisions;  (ii) horizontal 
comparisons of RTAs;  and (iii) a debate on the context and economic aspects of RTAs.  As a background for these discussions, the Secretariat wa s instructed to prepare documents dealing 
with the systemic issues from these three di fferent angles, as appropriate, for Members' 
consideration.  With the speeding up of the negotiations in the Negotiating Group on Rules, 
this work was discontinued in 2002.  It would,  in my view, be advantageous for our further 
work on systemic issues in the Negotiating Group on Rules if that work in the CRTA were to 
be restarted on the basis of the considerable insights into RTAs that are resulting from the 
Transparency Mechanism.   
 
 My idea would be for me to consult the Chair of the CRTA with a view to seeing the extent to 
which the work of the CRTA could feed further discussions in the Negotiating Group on Rules.  The 
Transparency Mechanism we establis hed 3 years ago is working well in the CRTA and has revealed 
interesting details about recent RTAs.  Some of these details have been discussed briefly in the 
Director General's Annual Overview of Developm ents in the Trading System, which was issued 
recently.  It may be useful to use that informati on further to develop a wo rk programme in the CRTA 
dealing with a range of topics that Member s believe worthy of deeper study.   
  Work on these topics could form the basis of discussion in the CRTA and could also be used 
by the Negotiating Group on Rules, through for example, an invitation to the CRTA to report 
periodically to the NG Rules, perhaps twice a y ear, to report on these discussions.  Such reporting 
would keep the NG Rules informed about discussions on topics of interest to Members and also help 
the Group to reflect better on the next steps in the process to clarify WTO Rules on RTAs.     In any event, I would suggest that we st art imagining a built-in agenda for pursuing 
substantive issues in RTAs.    TN/RL/W/246 
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   That concludes my introductory remarks.  I would now like to open the floor to hear your 
views.  Since we only have the morning available to  us, we obviously don't have the time for separate 
discussions on each area of the Rules negotiations.  T hus, I would suggest that delegations address in 
a single intervention their views on all of the areas they  would like to discuss.  The floor is open.   
 
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