WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION   
WT/TPR/OV/M/9 
28 February 2012 
 (12-1114) 
Trade Policy Review Body 
5 December 2011  
 
 
OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL TRADING ENVIRONMENT 
 
Record of the Meeting 
 
Chairperson:  H.E. Mr. Mario Matus (Chile) 
 
 
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON 
1. The purpose of this meeting is to allow the TPRB to undertake its annual overview of 
developments in the international trading environm ent, pursuant to paragraph G of Annex 3 of the 
Marrakesh Agreement.  This annual overview incl udes a Report by the Director-General, which was 
distributed in document WT/TPR/OV/14 of 21 Nove mber 2011.  The delegations should have noted 
that the information contained in this Report is exha ustive and covers all of the events relevant to our 
exercise, in accordance with our transparency mandate. 
2. As we have already mentioned on various o ccasions, it is important for all governments to 
continue actively participating in the trade monitoring  exercise, which is of general systemic value to 
multilateral trade.  I would thus urge all Member s and Observer Governments to continue providing 
timely and accurate information on any trade and trade related measures - whether trade restricting or trade facilitating they may have adopted. 
3. The most recent Report by the Director-General shows that during the period under review, 
there was a strong upward trend in the imposition of  restrictive measures over the previous year, due 
to an unfavourable economic environment, lowere d economic growth projections and historically 
high levels of unemployment.  Now more than ever, the accumulation of restrictive measures is a risk that requires our utmost attention. 
4. I am pleased once again to note the presence of WTO-acceding countries and to highlight 
their active participation in the monitoring exer cise.  As the delegations will recall, the TPRB 
approved the Fourth Appraisal of the operation of  the TPRM last 25 November.  Let me commend 
once more the collective efforts that led us to r each an agreement which will allow the operation of 
this Mechanism to improve.  This Appraisal will be submitted to the Ministers during the Ministerial Conference being held from 15 to 17 December.  Likewise, the Ministers will be able to send a clear message on the trade monitoring exercise. 
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL 
5. I would like to make a short statement to introduce to the Trade Policy Review Body my 
Annual Report on the Overview of Developments in the International Trading Environment.  This 
Report builds on the trade monitoring report issued last June.   
6. The monitoring reports presented to the TPRB at regular intervals since the end of 2008 have 
helped enhance transparency and further strengthe n the multilateral surveillance of trade policies.  WT/TPR/OV/M/9 
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The Annual Report highlights the trade and trad e-related policy develo pments over the past 
12 months, and includes an assessment of the main  issues emerging from the trade monitoring.   
7. At our last meeting in June, I stressed the need for increased vigila nce in a context where 
protectionist pressures were still being generated by stubbornly high levels of unemployment in many 
countries, persistent global imbala nces, and macroeconomic  concerns.  In the meantime the outlook 
for the global economy has seriously worsened.   
8. The current global difficulties, especially increasing concerns about debt in many large 
countries, are affecting economic activity and hence, trade.  Indeed, in recent months, world trade has 
grown more slowly than was expected at the beginning of the year.  In light of the deteriorating economic situation, the forecast for world export growth in 2011 has been revised down to 5.8%.  
Exports from developed economies are now expected to rise by 3.7% and those from developing 
countries by 8.5%.   
9. The multilateral trading system has helped Member s navigate the crisis and resist inevitable 
protectionist pressures so far.  Our system has proved its resilience and usefulness for all.  At a time of 
greater economic uncertainty and rising global risks,  it is all the more important that the process of 
global trade opening continues, including, short-term, through the accession of new Members to the 
multilateral trading system, as well as through the conclusion of the GPA negotiations.   
10. Let me now make a few specific comments about some of the key points emerging from my 
Annual Report.  It is not my intent ion to cover all issues included in th is Report, but to  highlight those 
that I consider would be of greater interest to Members for today's discussions. 
11. First, some elements regarding the main observations emerging from the trade monitoring 
exercise.  Although we could say that, on the whol e, governments have largely continued to resist 
protectionist pressures, the picture is becoming less rosy.  In my intermediate monitoring report last 
June, I warned that the incidence of trade rest rictions was becoming more pronounced than in 
previous periods.  The Annual Report in front of yo u today confirms this assessment: a clear upward 
trend was noted in the imposition of new trade rest rictions over the past 12 months.  Between October 
2010 and October 2011, 339 new trade restrictive m easures were recorded, wh ich is an increase of 
more than 50% over the previous period.  I know th at these measures are not directly comparable, in 
particular in terms of their impact on trade flows; some of them affect only a few specific tariff lines 
while others may affect entire sectors.  Some measures affect imports from specific trading partners, while others may affect imports from all partners.  Nevertheless, the upward trend in the total number 
of restrictions is worrying.   
12. Moreover, there is a growing perception that protectionist pressures are gaining ground in 
some parts of the world as a political reaction to cu rrent local difficulties.  As I have said on many 
occasions, unilateral actions to shield domestic i ndustries or to save jobs, although appealing from a 
narrow, short-term perspective, w ill not solve global problems.  On the contrary, this type of action 
may make things worse by triggering similar reac tions from other trading partners. The well-known 
threat of domino effect has become more impor tant as global supply chains have gained in 
importance. 
13. The rise in the number of new trade restrictions over the past twelve months was more 
pronounced in areas such as export restriction, im port tariffs, and import licensing requirements.  On 
the other hand, the number of initiations of new trad e remedy investigations has remained broadly the 
same, as have government support me asures. Members are also maintain ing the general thrust of their 
policies and levels of market openness in the area of trade in services. 
14. As was the case in the past, some countries have  also adopted specific measures to facilitate 
trade.  Indeed, some 48% of the total number of  measures recorded in the annual report can be WT/TPR/OV/M/9 
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considered as trade facilitating.  This is encour aging, but it would be more so if the share of 
facilitating measures was higher than that of restricting ones. 
15. Another area I would like to address is Regional Trade Agreements.  It is evident that RTAs 
continue to be an important and growing feature of  the international trading system.  As of end of 
October 2011, 390 RTAs have been notified to the WTO, and the Secretariat estimates that there are 
about 100 other agreements in forc e which have not yet been notified.  In a context of increasing 
numbers of RTAs, transparency becomes all the mo re important through the av ailability of relevant 
information.  The Transparency M echanism for RTAs has a crucial role to play in this respect, and 
Members should spare no efforts in ensuring that this  mechanism works well for the benefit of all.  I 
must add that its efficiency depends to a large ex tent on the availability and the quality of relevant 
information provided by Members. The factual pres entations on RTAs offer a very useful tool, not 
only to enhance transparency but also as a lear ning exercise;  for example, the most recent 
presentations illustrate that RTAs are becoming deeper and tackling measures that go beyond WTO 
commitments. 
16. I believe this is area which requires substantia l and sustained efforts in 2012. If we are to be 
faithful to the Decision adopted in 2006 on a transp arency mechanism for RTAs, we must make an 
effort to better understand all RTAs  concluded by all Members.  
17. Another important aspect included in the Annua l report relates to the general topic of 
transparency, monitoring and surveillance of trade po licies.  In this area, I know that the issue of 
notifications is of interest to many Members.  
18. This issue may not be eye-catching for th e press.  But, notifications guarantee the 
implementation, administration, and operation of  WTO Agreements, and increase the Organization's 
institutional effectiveness. The Annual Report shows th at important steps were taken recently by all 
WTO Councils and Committees to improve the implem entation of WTO notification requirements.  
However, the situation is far fro m perfect; gaps still exist in the WTO's knowledge about its Members' 
trade policies and practices.  Most of these gaps  are related to poor compliance with formal 
notifications.  In order to achieve the greatest leve l of transparency, additional efforts are needed from 
all.  Members need to meet their notification obliga tions and report regularly on their trade policies.  
And we have made sure that the WTO Secretaria t is ready to respond to requests from developing 
countries, in particular LDCs, for technical assistan ce in this area.  The recently adopted Biennial 
Technical Assistance and Training Plan for 2012 -2013 takes into account these considerations.  
19. Finally, I would like to mention the area of trad e finance, which is crucial to oil trade flows. 
In the current financial volatile environment, we are seeing significant bank deleveraging which is 
starting to affect trade financing. We must remain vigilant and be ready to ring the alarm bell if the 
credit crunch further impacts trade flows, in particular in poorer developing countries. 
20. Before concluding, let me stress that in the difficult circumstances we are facing today, with 
serious economic uncertainties in many parts of the world, Members need to send a clear and strong 
message of commitment to strengthen the multila teral trading system, and to avoid trade 
protectionism that could only aggravate the situa tion. The upcoming Ministerial gathering offers an 
opportunity to send credible signals of co-operation to a world economy in distress. In times of global 
economic uncertainty, the WTO's role is more impor tant - not only as an insurance policy against a 
return to protectionism, but also as an active inst rument of multilateral coope ration in the pursuit of 
economic growth and development objectives. 
21. Finally, I would like to inform delegations about the frequency of the monitoring reports for 
next year. As was the case this year, there will be  two WTO-wide monitoring reports, one in June and 
one in November. We will also produce two reports for the G-20 in 2012. WT/TPR/OV/M/9 
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STATEMENTS BY MEMBERS 
MEXICO 
22. At the end of 2010, we congratulated ourselves because, in spite of the unprecedented drop in 
the volume of world trade in 2009, positive growth was achieved as expected.  We also applauded the 
fact that governments continued to contain protectionist pressures and that a relatively large number 
of Members had taken measures to liberalize and/or facilitate trade.  This year, however, concludes 
with a much less encouraging outlook:  expectations  for world economic growth have been adjusted 
downwards as a result of the contraction in global demand, a few natural disasters, and the problems 
generated by the sovereign debt cris is and the volatility of the foreign exchange and stock markets.  In 
fact, according to recent OECD estimates, exports fr om the major trading countries fell by 1% in the 
third quarter and imports rose by only 1%. 
23. It is also very unsettling that, despite many c ountries' efforts to stimulate aggregate demand 
and reduce unemployment, the latter has not been rest ored to its pre-2008 levels and, on the contrary, 
remains very high.  Labour market pressures and the economic slowdown have pressured many 
governments to introduce new protectionist trade me asures, which, in the long run, cannot solve 
global problems and make matters wo rse by triggering tit-for-tat reactions in which we all lose. 
24. It is not to our credit that, between Oct ober 2010 and October 2011, 339 restrictive or 
potentially restrictive measures were identified, a 53% increase over the period from November 2009 
to October 2010.  Of particular concern is the ri se in export restrictions, which accounted for almost 
20% of the restrictive measures analysed during this period and which cause significant market 
distortions, especially in food, mineral and other raw material markets.  Other border measures 
included tariff increases and the introduction of non-automatic import licences and other non-tariff 
barriers. 
25. Although the members of the G20 have constant ly reiterated their status quo commitment to 
not impose new protectionist barriers since 2008, when the global crisis began, some of them have 
implemented measures that restrict or distort trade.   My delegation would have therefore appreciated 
having a more ambitious text than the one agreed  in the Possible Elements for Political Guidance for 
inclusion in the statement by the Chairman of th e Eighth Ministerial Conference.  What the world 
really needs is a commitment from all not to incr ease any type of protection during these times of 
great global economic uncertainty. 
26. However, despite this bleak outlook, the Repor t also highlights some countries that have 
adopted measures to facilitate trade, reducing impor t tariffs, terminating trad e remedies actions, and 
streamlining customs procedures.  Mexico counts itself among the Members that believe in trade 
liberalization and, even in the midst of a crisis a nd despite the forms of domestic resistance which are 
bound to occur, it continued lowering tariffs and facilitating trade. 
27. As we have said since the monitoring mechan ism was established in 2008, Mexico has made 
significant efforts to reduce tariffs on trade.  In  January 2011, we implemented a new phase of the 
unilateral tariff reduction progra mme, under which the average app lied tariff on industrial products 
was lowered from 5.3% in 2010 to 4.6%.  The average tariff in December 2008 was approximately 12%. 
28. The Promotion of Competitiveness Programme, which endeavours to simplify import and 
export formalities, was established in August 2010 and is still under way, is among the trade 
facilitating measures implemented by Mexico in 2011.  Certain requirements applicable to cosmetics 
imports were also eliminated, and measures fa cilitating conformity assessment procedures in 
telecommunications equipment were implemented.  Li kewise, tariffs that were maintained as a result 
of anti-dumping and countervaili ng measures were abolished. WT/TPR/OV/M/9 
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29. I would also like to mention the trucking dispute between the United States and Mexico.  I do 
not want to miss this opportunity to report that , on 21 October, a truck from the Mexican company 
Transportes Olympic crossed the border between Mexico and the United States to provide international freight services, in conformity with the new cross-border trucking programme that both 
countries agreed on in order to end the long-sta nding dispute under NAFTA.  From that day onwards, 
Mexico suspended the import tariffs on 99 US products  that it had been forced to impose in retaliation 
for the cancellation of the previous programme in 2009. 
30. Finally, I would like to conclude by thanking the Director-General and the Secretariat once 
again for such an excellent and exhaustive Report to this Body.  This exercise is of great importance 
and the information that is presented is crucial fo r understanding what is happening in world trade 
management, but obviously, as the Director-General  mentioned, the notifications from us Members 
form the basis of this information.  We should therefore strengthen the notification process in this 
Organization, with notifications being submitted on a consolidated and not just a compartmentalized 
basis, that is, only in the Committees, as has been  the case until now.  This is why my delegation 
insisted so much on this matter in the meetings that were held during the Fourth Appraisal of the 
Trade Policy Review Mechanism. 
SINGAPORE 
31. The Annual Report presents a very sobering picture on several fronts but it does not come as a 
surprise to us. We received some good news in the last Annual Report in 2010 that total trade restrictive measures had fallen to below the worst during the economic and financial crisis. We are 
now back to those levels we experienced in 2008-2009 , if not worse.  
32. The Report points out several specific areas of trade policy that should be of concern to 
Members, and I note that the Director General himself was extremely prescient in his introductory remarks in 2010. At that time, he drew our attenti on ''to an increased use of export restrictions" and 
here our fears have been confirmed in that the nu mber of new export restrictions that are now 150% 
higher over the previous period of review. 
33. If I may point out one key element of the Report that Singapore would fully support, and that 
is the enhanced coverage in Section VI. Transparen cy, Monitoring and Surveillance of Trade Policies.  
Two sub-issues are of crucial importance to us. First, is the fact that formal notifications continue to 
be the ''weakest area" in our efforts and transparency. 
34. Much has recently been made of notificati ons and what our Ministers should say on 
notifications at MC8. We have had discussions in the General Council and during the Appraisal of the 
TPRM. The fundamental point which nobody has re futed is the importance of notifications and 
transparency to the work of the WT O. We heard much affirmation of this obligation, and yet we could 
not agree on how our Ministers could publicly affirm  this. Let us use the Report as a wake-up call.  
35. We cannot deny that this is something that  we can all improve on - no matter in what 
Committee or forum we discuss it in. I thank the Secr etariat for the added scrutiny provided, and we 
urge them to continue to do so. Second, we also note that there are "serious  gaps" in the number of 
RTAs notified to the Secretariat. Indeed, the Secret ariat has been able to prepare and distribute fewer  
factual presentations this year, compared to last -  and the backlog of RTAs needing review now 
numbers more than 100.  
36. As another key element of transparency in the WTO, this is clearly unsustainable. Again, we 
have debated in recent weeks over whether and how the WTO should consider the implications of the 
growing number of RTAs on the multilateral trading system, we should simply get the basics  right 
first.
  We need to improve on our notifications, support the Secretariat in the provision and 
verification of data for factual presentations , and work towards clearing the backlog. WT/TPR/OV/M/9 
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37. Finally, the timing of the Report -  coming at the end of the year, is always good. As was done 
at MC7 this Report will no doubt be brought to the attention of my Minist er, and I hope all other 
Ministers. The message to Ministers from this Re port is clear: that the risks to the global economy 
persist, growth in trade will slow, and trade-rest rictive measures are an acute and sustained problem. 
We have already achieved consensus on political guid ance against protectionism for MC8. It is our 
hope that when our Ministers arrive in Geneva, th ey will through their own words provide an even 
stronger message on how to curb the da ngers outlined in the Annual Report. 
38. To conclude, we stress as we have always done , that the value of this ever-improving Report 
will depend on the degree of support that we provide to the Secretariat in providing information on 
measures, and where necessary, in verifying th ese measures. There has been some slippage 
since 2009. I hope this trend will correct itself in th e coming year. You have Singapore's commitment  
to do so.  
SWITZERLAND 
39. The 2011 Annual Report on tr ade-related developments, once again, presents a 
comprehensive and valuable picture of the situati on, problems and challenges we are currently facing 
in the area of international trade and trade policy.  We welcome this continued monitoring of trade 
measures – positive and restrictive – which contribu tes to improved transparency in the multilateral 
trading system. This exercise has added a new di mension to the core functions of the WTO. 
40. Pursuing this transparency exercise remain s essential. Indeed, with the considerable 
deterioration of the outlook for the global economy  in recent months, the worsening of the sovereign 
debt crisis on both sides of the Atlantic, high une mployment in many developed economies, and the 
persistent misalignment of exchange rates, we ha ve now reached a very dangerous new stage in the 
unfolding of the financial and economic crisis. A continued monitoring of government actions 
remains therefore more than ever warranted. Switz erland fully shares, in this respect, the concern 
raised in the report that the present downside risks are being further aggravated by perceptions in 
markets that government responses to the challenge s met by the world economy have so far been 
inadequate.  
41. The facts remain of great concern. There is a strong need to reestablish fiscal sustainability, 
particularly among industrialized countries. The outbreak  of the financial and economic crisis made it 
clear that the lack of budgetary control in the past pushed many States on the brink of bankruptcy. Countries facing high deficits and/or large debts wo uld therefore be well advised to introduce debt 
brake mechanisms to balance the budget over the ec onomic cycle. Switzerland introduced such an 
instrument in 2003 after a national referendum on th is issue in 2001. Thanks to it, Switzerland was 
able to better weather the global recession and to maintain a budget surplus even during the crisis. 
42. Nevertheless, the present currency misalignments  which largely reflect policy actions taken 
by others remain of great concern to us. With mo re sustainable public finances there will be a lesser 
need for reliance on very expansionary monetary policies, and third countries will be less negatively 
affected. At the same time, incr eased sustainability will provide a greater margin of maneuver to 
governments for coping with the unemployment conseque nces of a future crisis. Hence, they will also 
be less subject to pressures to adopt protecti onist measures. We therefore urge all concerned 
governments to act decisively and with no further delay to restore sustainability in their public 
finances, a necessary condition to restore confidence and end the crisis. 
43. Looking at trade policies in particular, Switzerland was disappointed to see that the report did 
not more forcefully emphasize the fact that the number of new trade restrictions, or measures having 
the potential to restrict trade imposed during the pe riod under review reached again the same level as 
at the start of the financial and economic crisis. An  increase of more than 50% of such measures from 
one year to the next is not only very worrying. It also lies in stark contrast with the repeated WT/TPR/OV/M/9 
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statements made, notably by members of the G20,  as recently as at the Cannes Summit, that they 
continue to stand by their standstill commitments to  avoid new restrictive trade measures, and intend 
to rollback any new protectionist measure taken during the crisis. 
44. On specific measures taken to restrict trade, th e Director General rightly puts the emphasis on 
the new challenges that measures restricting exports  represent for the multilateral trading system. We 
certainly support the view that WTO Members ne ed to focus their atte ntion increasingly on these 
issues, especially given that there are presently fe wer disciplines in the WTO system dealing with 
export restrictions than with import barriers. The surge in export restrictions represents a dangerous 
trend that requires to be monitored closely in the months and years to come. We therefore very much 
encourage the WTO to continue collecting informati on and to develop the analysis on this type of 
measures in future reports. 
45. Also, Switzerland remains seriously concerned about the continued pervasive use of trade 
remedies that certain governments, notably member s of the G20, are yielding to as a surrogate for 
structural adjustment of domestic industries and services which failed to adapt to the new conditions 
set by economic and trade globalization. More than often, the fact that certain sectors or companies 
are seeking protection from imports through trade remedies is a clear sign that domestic reforms 
and/or restructurings are badly needed to regain international competitiveness. 
46. Furthermore, we are concerned about the lack  of transparency that some Members are 
providing to other Members incl uding with regard to the timeliness and accuracy of their 
notifications.  Before I conclude, I would like to call on all Members to think beyond the MC8 and in 
particular about the work in 2012. We not only need  to find ways to preserve the work carried out so 
far in the Doha Round. We also need to reest ablish a good confidence basis among Members so that 
we can resume next year with a positive spirit our efforts toward updating the multilateral trading 
rules, fighting protectionism and opening markets,  and maintaining the relevance of the WTO, 
including, in finding ways to negotiate in future  more successfully than in the past few years. 
ARGENTINA 
47. My delegation believes that the Report is skew ed and includes subjective opinions that go 
beyond what could be considered the purview of the Director-General.  First of all, the document is 
unbalanced in three ways:  to begin with, only certain distortions, usually border measures, are 
reviewed in detail, and there is no detailed review  of monetary and fiscal stimulus packages, or 
distorting subsidies especially in the agricultural sect or.  It should be noted that the Secretariat has 
information on these types of agricultural subsidies,  as Members are obliged to notify them under the 
Agreement on Agriculture.  A balanced Report should therefore include a list of the notifications of 
agricultural subsidies, as well as a list of other typ es of mandatory notifications, such as anti-dumping 
measures. 
48. Furthermore, there is no mention of the special  safeguard measures applied under Article 5 of 
the Agreement on Agriculture.  These measures are implemented on an annual basis and are notified 
to the WTO both annually and at the time of thei r implementation.  Moreover, there is not a single 
reference to the use of tariff quotas.  The under-u tilization of these quotas should be reported, since 
inappropriate quota procedures, especially in agriculture, are a source of protectionism. 
49. Secondly, the meagre analysis of subsidies im plies that many developing countries, which are 
financially unable to provide subsidies and thus  may have greater incentives for applying border 
measures, could be called protectionist;  however , many developed countries that use distorting 
subsidies are not described this way. 
50. It is important to remember that, from a stric tly economic perspective:  (i) a border measure 
(for example, an import duty) has the same economic  effects as a subsidy for a domestic product that WT/TPR/OV/M/9 
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competes with imported goods;  (ii) any incentive for domestic production can have an impact on international trade, especially if  it causes excess domestic supply whic h is then exported and may thus 
affect international prices.  This is particular ly true in the case of agricultural commodities.  
Therefore, production subsidies may also be, ge nerally speaking, a form of protectionism. 
51. Thirdly, only a few new measures are reviewed in the Report, without taking into 
consideration the measures that alread y existed when the international cr isis began.  It should be noted 
that certain sectors were already protected in 2008 and are still protected today, and not have required 
any new measures as such.  There are only marginal re ferences to previous measures, for example, in 
the last sentence of paragraph 10.  Since the Repor t covers only new measures, it is not useful in 
providing an overall picture of the trade distortions that actually existed at a given time. 
52. The document is subjective in two ways:  (a) like the previous Report by the 
Director-General (WT/TPR/OV/5), it is not a f actual Report.  This is because it criticizes 
WTO Members' trade policies in areas where these policies are not inconsistent with the WTO Agreements or with the negotiating mandate  of the Doha Round (paragraph 54, on export 
restrictions), and (b) the imbalances referred to a bove also imply a value judgement, since only certain 
types of measure (generally border measures) are hi ghlighted and there is no comprehensive analysis 
of other types of measures (subsidies, mone tary and fiscal stimulus packages, etc.). 
53. The Report should include only those measures that have actually been verified through 
official sources in the country applying them.  In pa rticular, we believe that the inclusion of measures 
that have been reported only in the press diminishes  the credibility of the Report.  Furthermore, we 
ask that all comments and corrections from Members be  included in the drafts sent by the Secretariat.  
For our part, we have submitted some corrections  and will submit some new ones on our country's 
trade measures, described in Annex I Trade and trade-related measures , which were already made by 
Argentina in previous drafts. 
54. Paragraph 7 criticizes the use of import s ubstitution policies to promote leading national 
enterprises and associates these typ es of industrial policies with protectionism.  First of all, it cannot 
be said that industrial policies in general are at  odds with the GATT 1994.  In any case, the current 
multilateral trading rules of the GATT 1994 do not  prohibit such measures, and the development 
policies of the GATT 1994 contain elements s upporting them (for example, Part IV of the 
General Agreement).  It should also be noted that , generally speaking, import substitution policies and 
other industrial policies are development policies, a nd have traditionally been adopted by developing 
countries and developed countries alike during the early stages of their development. 
55. Paragraph 14:  Under the WTO Agreements, notif ications are within the specific competence 
of each Committee.  Argentina places the highest im portance on the transparency principle, but we 
understand that it is not for the Annual Report on trade and trade-related measures to refer to the state 
of the Committees' work. 
56. Paragraph 37:  Only restrictive border measures are analysed, although certain distorting 
subsidies may also end up having trade-restrictive effects. 
57. Trade remedy measures (paragraph 55 onwards):  As in previous Reports, the analysis is 
incomplete, in part because there is no analysis of sunset reviews, which are mostly used by 
developed countries. 
58. Sanitary and phytosanitary measures and technical  barriers to trade, respectively:  The Report 
lacks substance.  It only offers information on notif ications (whether regular or emergency), and the 
extent to which they have involved food safety, an d animal or plant health.  While there is a value 
judgement on other aspects of trade measures, there is no commentary on the persistent and growing 
recourse to sanitary and phytosanitary measures lacking any scientific basis. WT/TPR/OV/M/9 
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59. Paragraph 72 mentions specific trade concerns  raised by Members during the period in 
question (October 2010-October 2011):  a total of 16 qualified as import restrictions in the reports of 
the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measu res.  It should be noted that more than 
300 specific trade concerns have been submitted to this Committee since 1995, all of which have been 
measures restricting imports of agricultural goods .  The scientific grounds for such measures have 
been questioned in all of these case s, as can been seen just from looking  at the reports of the meetings 
of the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. 
60. Furthermore, we believe that it would be more  appropriate for the analysis to focus on the 
specific trade concerns (STCs) raised during the respective meetings of the Committee on Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures and the Committee on T echnical Barriers to Trade, since they would 
reflect measures that have been identified as possible trade restrictions and allegedly violate SPS or 
TBT provisions.  Both paragraphs address the ST Cs only in passing when these should be the focal 
point of their analysis. 
61. Moreover, we would point out that any measure th at has been the subject of an STC should be 
included in Annex I of the Report, along with the r est of the trade measures listed there.  It is 
important to bear in mind that these measures ha ve a particularly negative impact on exports from 
developing countries and that the application of  such measures diverts us from our objective of 
achieving a more just, market-oriented international trading system. 
62. At no point does the Report mention the impact from the growing use of private standards, 
which is devastating particularly for small products  from developing countries.  The proliferation of 
voluntary private standards without scientific groun ds, the lack of harmonization and the cost of 
compliance turn them into mechanisms that prevent small producers from gaining access to 
international markets.  This issue has been widely debated and examined in the Committee on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and has b een the subject of a descriptive analysis in 
document G/SPS/GEN/932. 
63. Paragraphs 51 through 54 show an  unjustified and arbitrary bias against export restrictions.  
We reiterate all of the comments made during the m eeting of last 21 June.  We are very concerned 
about the fact that this paragraph expresses a valu e judgement on the absence of disciplines on export 
restrictions, which is totally misplaced because disci plines on import restrictions - especially sanitary, 
phytosanitary and technical measures with regard to agricultural products - are more lenient. 
64. We believe that it is inappropriate for the Dir ector-General to make a point of stressing the 
need for greater bilateral cooperation, as he does in paragraph 54 in particular , to mitigate the impact 
of these measures on importing countries.  It should be borne in mind that this issue is the subject of 
debate and that Members have yet to reach a con sensus on the potential effects of such measures and 
the need for discipline. 
COLOMBIA 
65. As usual, the Secretariat Report illustrates recent developments in international trade that are 
having an impact on the multilateral trading system.  This Report is significantly better than the first 
one from January 2009.  This time, the Report conf irms the signs of a slowdown in global economic 
activity and the increase in risks exacerbated by the s overeign debt crisis, fiscal  constraints and lower 
global demand, which have resulted in high levels of unemployment, increased debt levels, weakened 
confidence and lower rates of growth. 
66. Consequently, various international organizations  have downgraded their forecasts, just as the 
WTO lowered its export growth forecast from 6.5% to 5.8%.  Countries have responded by adopting 
new trade restrictions.  The Report describes how , during the period under re view, 339 new measures 
were adopted, representing a 53% increase over the prev ious period, and that while they affect only WT/TPR/OV/M/9 
Page 10  
 
0.87% of total world imports, the trend is cause for concern.  There was an increase in the three types 
of measures reviewed:  trade remedy measures rose  by 6%;  border measures, 103%;  and export 
measures, 156%. 
67. Although trade remedy measures are still on the rise, the proportion of initiated anti-dumping, 
safeguard, and countervailing duty investigations that led to definitive measures has declined.  During 
this period there was an increase in counter vailing duty investigations in particular. 
68. There was still an upward trend in the imposition of new export restrictions, mainly on food 
products and some minerals.  This  trend and the absence of clear multilateral disciplines reopens the 
debate on the whether or not Members should begin working on this front. 
69. The Report also reflects the fact that tariffs remain an important obstacle and draws attention 
especially to industrialized countries where averag e applied MFN tariff rates are seemingly low, but 
where tariff peaks in certain sectors such as textiles,  clothing and agriculture, which are of particular 
interest to developing countries, en tail extremely high tariff protection. 
70. In general, the Report warns of the perception of increased protectionism.  Colombia does not 
believe that a return to protectionism will solve th e problems that we are currently facing.  On the 
contrary, we believe that implementing restrictive po licies has an impact that may continue to affect 
countries even more and hinder the desired rec overy.  During the period under review, Colombia 
further opened up its economy, pursuing a tariff stru ctural reform and negotiating more regional trade 
agreements. 
71. At this juncture, the Report mentions the significant number of regional trade agreements 
notified to the WTO (390).  As a country with a cl ear policy on trade agreements, we should mention 
that although there seems to be greater knowledge of  these agreements on an individual basis, thanks 
to the transparency mechanism,  there needs to be deeper knowledge of them horizontally and 
globally, as well as a better understanding of the in teraction between regional trade agreements and 
the multilateral trading system. 
72. We would further like to point out that the im provements in the Report are also the result of 
better information from Members, while we echo the call from the Director-General, who said that the 
quality of the Reports depends on the active particip ation of all Members, who must provide complete 
and timely information.  All of the Committees' effo rts to improve notifications are welcome and are 
well reflected in the Report.  However, we should in tensify the work in the re gular Committees so that 
we are up-to-date on notifications. 
73. Finally, we believe that Members should respond  to the current context of global economic 
uncertainty by strengthening the multilateral trading system, maintaining open trade and turning out 
the spectre of protectionism.  We should send clear signals to the world on how to proceed, find a way 
to overcome the Doha Round impasse, and be vig ilant guardians of the system in the face of 
protectionist measures. 
JAPAN 
74. The report describes that, although members are largely resisting protectionist pressures, 
protectionism is taking root in some parts of the world under the current slowing economic recovery.  
According to this report, and as noted by the Direct or General this morning, the number of new trade 
restrictive measures has increased by 53% compared  with the previous period. Among other things, 
export restrictions have increased sharply from 25 cases to 64 cases. We are particularly concerned 
with the issue of export restrictions, and agree with the Director General's report in paragraphs 51 to 
54 regarding frequent use of export restrictions. Unfortunately, this is an area where the WTO WT/TPR/OV/M/9 
Page 11 
 
 
Agreement does not have clear rules. Japan str ongly support statement made by Switzerland in this 
regard, and encourage the Secretariat to continue a nd if necessary strengthen its analysis on this issue. 
75. More generally, Japan is concerned with th e trend of increased protectionism in some 
Members, and therefore believes that we, WTO Memb ers, need to take action on the issue at the 
MC8. As we agreed last week, language on resisting protectionism in all forms is already included in 
the consensual elements for the MC8, and we do respect this consensus.  
76. However, given this alarming tendency as describ ed in this report, we would expect that 
many ministers will express support for stronger commitments against protectionism, including commitments to standstill and rollback as declared in the G20 and APEC leaders' statement.  
77. Japan would also reiterate its support for con tinuation of the monitoring exercise on trade-
related measures. This exercise has helped us unde rstand clearly the overall picture in trade policies 
by providing the necessary information. In this co ntext, we strongly support the Director General's 
call for enhanced efforts for the implementati on of notification obligations and provision of 
information to the Secretariat for this report and fo r other activities. This report shows that only 36% 
of Members provided the necessary information for its an alysis. Also, in a separate context, it is also a 
fact that only 20% of the Membership is fully co mpliant with their notification obligations in a 
particular area.  
78. This is an issue we have discussed in the 4
th TRPM appraisal, and we did agree on  the 
commitment "to comply with the existing transpar ency obligations and reporting requirement needed 
for the preparation of these monitoring reports".  Japan urges Members, who did not provide 
information for this report or have not filed their notification in respective areas, to take necessary 
steps following the forthcoming ministers' action. 
CHINA 
79. In our view this meeting is taking place at  an opportune time. To start with, the global 
economic outlook is getting gloomy again. And to co mpound that, the volume of world trade this year 
will only grow by 5.8%, in sharp contrast to the su rge of 14.5% last year. Against this economic and 
trade backdrop, it is disturbing to find that the "upward trend in the number of trade restricting 
measures has remained unabated". Clearly, the ghosts  of Smoot and Hawley are still haunting in the 
hall. Protectionism is gaining ground again. In light  of this grim situation, my delegation commends 
you, for leading the Members in the 4th Appraisal of the TPRM to conclude that trade monitoring 
needs to be continued and strengthened. We are also encouraged that Members have agreed to 
recommend the Ministers to resist all forms of prot ectionism. My delegation w ill continue to support 
and cooperate with the Secretariat in a constructive fashion in preparing future monitoring reports. 
80. Regarding the specific measures analyzed by th e Report, I will limit myself to trade remedies 
only at this meeting. We take note that, contrary  to initial worries, WTO Members started fewer trade 
remedy investigations since the outbreak of the cr isis and that the proportio n of definitive measures 
among investigations has also declined. However, the Report points to recent data  in showing that this 
trend may be coming to an end. Moreover, for so me Members, new initiations are picking up at 
striking paces. For instance, one particular deve loped Member who has been a strong advocate of 
standstill has increased its anti-dumping investigatio ns from 7 to 16, a jump of 129%. For us, the 
resolve to fight protectionism starts at  home and should be judged by actions. 
81. As we are about to welcome the Ministers to Geneva next week, I applaud the Chair of the 
General Council and the Director-General for fo rging the consensus on the elements for political 
guidance by Ministers.   WT/TPR/OV/M/9 
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82. China had hoped that more deliverables could have been made on concerns of developing 
members, in particular those of LDCs, such as dut y-free quota-free and cotton. We take note that the 
Overview Report highlights the recent decision by China to extend DFQF market access to 97% of 
products from LDCs. We hope all major players co uld do more to help these poor countries. That 
being said, although China is not fully satisfied w ith the elements reached, we do sense that everyone 
is showing sincerity and everyone wants to have outcomes at the MC8. And what Ambassador Agah 
has presented to the Chair of the MC8 is pretty mu ch the compromise we can get. Building on this, we 
hope the Ministers could have fruitful exchang es and achieve tangible outcomes, especially on 
development by addressing in particular the concerns of LDCs as a priority.  
CANADA 
83. Canada continues to be a strong supporter of  the WTO monitoring process and we encourage 
Members to continue cooperating with requests to provide information on their trade-related 
measures. While we found the content of this la test report of the Director General to be a 
comprehensive compilation of the measures taken over the last year, unfortunately, the global 
economic situation depicted in th e report is far from encouraging. Financial volatility, unemployment 
and slower than expected growth in trade are very  concerning to Canada. However, the most upsetting 
reference in the report is its observation that there was an upward trend this year in the imposition of 
new trade restrictions. Canada could not agree more  with the assertion in the report that unilateral 
actions to shield domestic industries can only "make th ings worse by triggering a spiral of tit-for-tat 
reactions"  and thus further impact the state of the global economy. We must acknowledge the threat 
that these actions pose, commit to stop taking protectionist measures, and begin to roll back those 
already in place. 
84. The Director General's reports on surveillance a nd monitoring issued in June and November, 
supplemented by two additional reports of G20 tr ade and investment measures, contribute positively 
to our efforts to respond to the global economic cr isis. We encourage the WTO to continue this high 
level of monitoring and informati on sharing and we are pleased that the TPRB, in its Report on the 
4
th Appraisal of the TPRM, includes a recommendation that the Eighth Ministerial Conference take 
action on strengthening the monitoring exercise of tr ade measures. We are also concerned with the 
gaps noted in the report in WTO notification activities, gaps so important that they are said to undermine the value of the individual WTO Agreem ents. We strongly encour age all WTO Members, 
to each do our part in improving the record of not ifications by which we would all benefit from 
increasing our timely knowledge of Members' trade policies and practices. 
85. Canada sees a continued need to keep our ma rkets open and to take concrete measures to 
actively promote the liberalization of trade and in vestment by reducing national barriers to prevent 
new protectionist measures particularly in times of  economic uncertainty. Canada is pleased to see 
that some countries have adopted measures to facilitate trade, especially by reducing or temporarily 
exempting import tariffs. For our part, Canada announced on November 27 the elimination of duties 
on 70 additional tariff lines, bringing to more than  1,800 the number of tariff lines liberalized since 
2009. This builds on our commitment to make Cana da a tariff-free zone for industrial manufacturers. 
This action demonstrates Canada's conti nuing commitment to free and open trade.  
86. We also recognize the importance of Aid for Tr ade in building trade capacity in the case of 
developing countries and the LDCs. Our support for Aid for Trade has grown to CAN$719 million in 
2010-11. We continue to provide predictable s upport to the WTO Global Trust Fund, the Enhanced 
Integrated Framework, and other trade-related as sistance agencies such as the International Trade 
Centre and urge other Members to do so similarly. 
87. Finally, while we are ready to acknowledge th at the Round has reached an impasse and that 
we need to be creative and explore new avenues, Canada remains c onvinced that a successful 
conclusion is the best way to contribute to economic recovery , to reinforce the benefits of the WT/TPR/OV/M/9 
Page 13 
 
 
multilateral trading system and to provide future insu rance against the further threat of protectionism. 
Canada remains committed to working with fello w WTO Members towards a successful multilateral 
conclusion of the Doha Developmen t Agenda.  All WTO Members need, more than ever before, to 
unify and build on the WTO's crucial role in provi ding for an international framework that can 
effectively guard us against protectionism.  
TURKEY 
88. Unfortunately, there is an increasing pressure to wards an open global trading system mounted 
in the second half of 2011 from several fronts. Fr om macroeconomic persp ective, conditions are 
worsening in Europe and China. Still having the fear of "double dip" recession, the U.S. economic 
recovery does not seem to be certain. The financial ch aos in Europe has the Achilles heel of the global 
economy. As a matter of fact, the report succinc tly explained the prospect we face now: "Global 
activity is slowing down, economic performance conti nues to be uneven across countries, debt levels 
and financial volatility are rising, high unemployment levels persist in many countries, and confidence 
has recently fallen sharply. These risks are aggravated  by perceptions in markets that governments' 
responses to these challenges have  so far been inadequate."  As a result, risks and uncertainties are 
gaining momentum after the positives signals of rec overy seen at the end of 2010.  In recent years 
following the 2009 financial crisis, there has been a tradition by international organizations to change 
their economic forecasts downwards. This time there is no exception.  
89. Coming to the trade front, unfortunately negative mood is also mounting. At the end of 
September, the WTO Secretariat also revised its forecast for the volume of world trade in 2011 to 
5.8% from its earlier estimate of 6.5%, released in April. The projected growth rate for exports from 
developed economies was also revised downward, to 3.7% from 4.5%, while that for the rest of the 
world, including developing economies and the Co mmonwealth of Independent States (CIS), was 
reduced to 8.5% from 9.5%.  
90. Although, the Report mentions that "the rela tively strong trade performance of developing 
economies should continue in the coming months,  it continues with a negative analysis by underlying 
that, but even the most dynamic developing economi es would still find themselves strongly affected 
by another global recession". 
91. There is no doubt that one of the most important pressures we feel strongly on the global 
trading system is the issue of global unemployment.  We all know and as underlined by the report that 
"the economic recovery has so far not been str ong enough to reduce significantly high levels of 
unemployment in many countries. According to the ILO, based on current trends, employment is not 
projected to return to its 2008 level before  2015 in high-income economies. The number of 
unemployed stood at 205 million in 2010, with little hope  of this figure reverting to the pre-crisis 
levels in the near term. All WTO Members should seriously be anxious about the ILO's recent warning on the possibility of a 'dramatic downturn' in employment over the coming months unless 
governments act to soften the effect of the economic slowdown on labour markets."  
92. During the period under review, 339 new trade rest rictive measures were recorded, which is 
53% more than in the previous period. In partic ular, we are observing that the number of new export 
restrictions has increased sharply; although accounti ng for only 19% of total restrictions during the 
monitoring period, export measures were the fastes t growing component. More over, persistent high 
unemployment and fiscal austerity in developed economies could increase protectionist tendencies, 
could be detrimental for international trade. 
93. In the Report it is mention that "there is a growing perception that trade protectionism is 
gaining ground in some parts of the world as a po litical reaction to current local economic difficulties 
within the form of industrial policies, unilatera lly shielding domestic industries. With narrow and 
short term perspective, these actions may make thi ngs worse by triggering an escalation of tit-for-tat WT/TPR/OV/M/9 
Page 14  
 
reactions in which every country will lose. There is  no need to mention that these developments are 
adding further risks to the current fragile structure of the global economy." 
94. Nonetheless, it is also mentioned in the Repor t that the New restrictive measures introduced 
in the period between mid-October 2010 and mid-Oc tober of this year cover around 0.9% of world 
imports, down from 1.2% recorded in the previous 12-month period. 
95. In summary, currently high unemployment and worsening fiscal equilibriums in advanced 
economies seem to have a strong potential to fu rther increase protectionist sentiment globally. And 
therefore, poses serious threats for the global econom y, trade and fort multilateral trading system.  
There is no need to mention that, all these devel opments clearly emphasize the vital role WTO plays 
to keep an open and functioning trading system. 
96. Finally, I would like to mention that, of the 17 measures cited in the Report on Turkey, 
9 measures are either elimination or reductions of import tariffs or a measure. One of them is about 
the registration of environmental wastes.  
HONG KONG, CHINA 
97. We have however read this report with mixed f eelings. I can still recall that when this Body 
undertook more intensive monitoring of trade measur es when the financial crisis was mounting, we 
were encouraged by the fact that Members had larg ely resisted protectionism. The Director General's 
reports produced at that time clearly shown Member s' commitment to open trade. We fear that this 
strong commitment is now wavering. The report in fr ont of us today as well as the last trade and 
trade-related development report produced by the Director General earlier this year have shown 
worrying signs that protectionism is haunting us. 
98. During the period under review, there were 339 ne w trade restrictive measures put in place, 
which represents a 53% increase over previous review  period.  In terms of trade remedy actions, the 
anti-dumping investigations initiated by Members in 2011 are likely to be as many as in 2010. 
Perhaps more alarming than the mere increase in the fi gure, we also sense that the resort to some of 
the protectionist measures might have been given greater legitimacy in certain economies in recent 
months. While it may be expedient to employ prot ectionist measures for short term comfort, it is 
much more difficult to get out of it when such me asures trigger retaliating fro m others and the whole 
thing goes down a vicious downward spiral.  
99. The clear trajectory of the increasing use of export restrictions is worrisome, particularly as 
the WTO does not have disciplines in this area. The im pact of export restrictions can be enormous and 
those relating to agricultural pr oducts in particular may aggrav ate the worldwide food security 
problem and affect more severely the neediest people.  We are therefore disappointed by the findings of the report in these respects. We urge Members to  exercise greater self-restrain and show stronger 
determination to revert these trends. 
100. The situation in trade in services may be less  worrying as we note the analysis in the report 
that Members have largely kept to pre-existing le vels of market openness. We are however mindful 
that some Members have recently enacted regulations that have the effect of limiting the supply of services through foreign investment in the insurance and maritime transport services. Trade liberalisation and regulatory reform in any services s ector should be mutually reinforcing, rather than 
mutually exclusive. We hope Members could strive to maintain the right balance. 
101. Turning to other chapters of the Director Gene ral's report, we are impressed by the section on 
notifications and surveillance. The report has pointed out  that there are wide gaps to be filled in terms 
of notification compliance in literally all areas of the WTO. The report captures how the various WTO 
bodies overseeing relevant notification records have  appraised the current less than satisfactory WT/TPR/OV/M/9 
Page 15 
 
 
situations. We hope Members would step up effort in  this regard. This is one of the areas in which 
Members should be able to make greater progress in  upholding the systemic value of transparency in 
our multilateral trading system. 
102. We also read with interest the section on re gional trade agreements. The observation made in 
the report that modern RTAs are becoming deeper a nd tackling more the "behind the border" measures 
is a very valid and useful insight for us to refl ect on how the unstoppable growth of RTAs may impact 
on the multilateral rules. We also agree with the an alysis in the report that it would be a valuable 
complement to the RTA transparency mechanism if we could study in greater depth and in a cross-
cutting way the similarities and differences across RTAs. We look forward to WTO undertaking more work in this direction in the co ming future. 
103. On trade finance, we do recall the warnings ma de by the Director General's Expert Group on 
Trade Finance recently, that U.S. dollar liquidity  amongst banks was increasingly tight adversely 
impacting banks ability to provide trade finance, particularly the SMEs and those in the LDCs.  
Although we do note some positive signs in recen t weeks, both from the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision and from six Central banks towards allevia ting the trade finance crisis, the situation is still 
bad and should continue to be carefully monitored. 
104. Let me conclude by once again congratulating th e Director General for his report, which is 
factual and impartial, but at the same time sharp and succinct in highlighting the challenges faced by 
Members and by this Organisation. We attach great value to the continuation of this reporting exercise, 
and we hope that our Ministers will show even grea ter political appreciation for the usefulness of this 
exercise at the MC8.  
UNITED STATES 
105. The United States can report that domestically, our recovery from the recession continues.  
U.S. real GDP has grown the last nine quarters at  an annual rate of 2.4%.  Employment, though not as 
strong as we would like, is up nearly 2.5 million between February 2010 an d November 2011, with 
private employment up by 2.9 million. U.S. nomin al exports of goods and services are up 42% over 
the last nine quarters while impor ts of goods and services are up 46%. 
106. In terms of the Director General's report, we note its encouraging conclusion that trade 
facilitating measures implemented during the last y ear "account for 48% of the total number of 
measures recorded in Annex 1". We also note that  "new restrictive measures" introduced during the 
reporting period "cover around 0.9% of world imports , down from 1.2%".  This said, we agree that 
vigilance remains necessary.  One important elem ent of WTO vigilance relates to the signal our 
Ministers send at MC8. 
107. We agree with the position expressed by many Me mbers today that our consent statement and 
protectionism, while important, should have been stronge r.  This is an important juncture, scrutiny is 
very high and signals matter.  Transparency is al so a key issue noted in the report.  For the TPRB 
transparency exercise to be most effective, we would like to encourage the more than 50% of 
Members and Observers who do not regularly part icipate in the monitoring and reporting process 
become participants. In our view, the value of  the exercise can only increase as more of the 
Membership takes part. 
108. We appreciate in particular the focus in this report on the issue of notifications. 
Unfortunately, we cannot disagree with the report's conclusion that, "in some areas, it is not an 
exaggeration to say that the gaps that exist in the WTO's knowledge about its Members' trade policies 
and practices are still so serious that they underm ine the value of individual WTO Agreements." WT/TPR/OV/M/9 
Page 16  
 
109. Among the issues of greatest concern to us is the large number of regional trade agreements 
that are in force that have not been notified. Th e Director General's report estimates that there are 
around 100 such agreements. Under the Transparency  Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements, all 
RTAs must be notified, irrespective of whethe r they are partial scope or comprehensive. 
110. We also appreciate the Secretariat's attention to the issue of export restrictions. That the 
fastest area of growth of trade restrictive measures is export measures is an in teresting development. It 
is also interesting to note that it is on the i ndustrial goods and inputs side where measures have 
increased the fastest in recent months.  The United States is very concerned about efforts by Members 
to control access to key industrial inputs such as scrap  or rare earths, especially when access is used as 
a means to give domestic industries an advantage over other global producers. 
111. We find it troubling that the number of measures is increasing, despite strong concerns that 
the international community has expressed. And the f act that the trend is increasing more broadly to 
other Members seems to indicate that a beggar-thy-neighbour trend is developing. 
112. The Director General's report states, in paragraph 54, that "there is a risk that, in the absence 
of clearer multilateral disciplines, governments may be tempted to use export restrictions to alter to 
their advantage the relative price of their exports  or to expand production by domestic industries. 
More self-imposed discipline on the use of export r estrictions and closer multilateral cooperation is 
needed to mitigate the impact of these measures on importing countries."  We strongly support this 
comment and the sentiment expressed by many other Members at the last TPRB meeting that export restrictions is an area where the WTO lacks sufficient disciplines. 
113. In addition, this is an area where solid inform ation is not available in the WTO system since 
notifications are few and far between.  The mark et distortions that such measures create are 
exacerbated by this lack of information provi ded to the international trading community.  The TPRB 
report begins to shed some light on these measures, but traders need much more information in terms of duration of measure, requirements, w ho to contact, who received licenses, etc. 
114. While there is much focus by WTO Members on the area of agriculture restrictions - 
including recent debates in the General Council on proposals that touched upon the damaging effects 
of export restrictions on the global food supply - there remains very little discussion (outside of 
dispute settlement) on export restrictions on indust rial goods and inputs. The United States would like 
to see a more comprehensive treatment of this  worrisome trend and the underlying measures. 
115. In this regard, the United States continues to be actively interested in working with our 
trading partners to use the relevant committees, wo rking parties and councils to address some of the 
concerns highlighted in this report. This day-to-d ay work is fundamental to our efforts to contain 
protectionism. 
AUSTRALIA 
116. The report's long list of challenges facing th e global economy makes for sobering reading, 
and to list some of these:  increasing risk and uncertainty;  weakness in business and consumer 
confidence;  a slowdown in global economic activity;  a slowdown in the growth of world trade;  
rising debt levels and financial vol atility;  persistent high unemploym ent levels in some countries;  
and a perception that trade protectionism is gaining ground in some parts of the world. 
117. We strongly agree with the report's finding th at the multilateral trading system has been 
instrumental in maintaining trade openness in recent tim es.  We agree too that in a context of greater 
economic uncertainty and rising global risks, it is all the more important that the process of global 
trade opening continues. WT/TPR/OV/M/9 
Page 17 
 
 
118. We have therefore been heartened by the str ong anti-protection commitments that we have 
heard from a large number of countries over recent months, including in the G20 and at APEC.  It is also encouraging that among the elements for politi cal guidance for the Ministerial Conference is an 
important message against protectionism.  We expect that Ministers will want to use the opportunity 
while they are in Geneva to place a strong emphasis on the importance of resisting protectionism in all 
its forms.  We expect that they will also want to send a message about the n eed to think creatively, 
pragmatically and flexibly to move the Doha Round beyond its current impasse. 
119. This year's report raises some other important i ssues that Members should consider further, in 
a structure and detailed way in this and other committees of the WTO.  These issues are not new, but they are no less deserving of our considered attention for that. 
120. Clearly, the continued increase in RTA activity is an important issue and we very much 
welcomed this year's World Trade Report for sheddi ng further light on the extent of liberalization and 
rule-making that is being undertaken in an RTA c ontext.  Certainly we agree with the Director 
General that further detailed work is necessary in this area, given the implications for the WTO. 
121. We would also agree with others on the need to strongly support strengthening of compliance 
with notification and reporting requirements, includi ng in light of the report's acknowledgement that 
the gaps that exist in the WTO's knowledge about Member's trade policies and practices are still so serious that they undermine the value of the individual agreements. 
122. Australia agrees strongly that anti-dumping measures should not be used as a tool of 
protectionism.  In this regard, we would make the obvious point that initiation of an anti-dumping 
investigation is not in itself evidence of protectionist  policy.  In Australia, trade remedy investigations 
are triggered by applications from domestic industr y, not by government policy.  If industry satisfies 
the legislative requirements, the governme nt must initiate an investigation.  
SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU 
123. My delegation would first like to express our a ppreciation of the efforts of the Director 
General and the Secretariat in producing this repor t, which provides us with a very comprehensive 
review of the economic situation, as well as the developments of trade and trade-related policies.  At 
the beginning of the year, we saw signs of a recovery being sustained, albeit at a low level.  From midway through the year, however, the global economy started to slow down, and lower growth is 
now expected to be with us for some years.  Fo llowing the financial crisis, the economies of the major 
developed countries have weakened, with structural problems and continued rising unemployment in particular dragging down the pace of global recove ry, and increasing the risks of economic instability.  
In terms of trade-related policies, over the period under review, new export restrictions have been 
brought into play, and there are signs of a return to  protectionism in order to tackle the difficulties in 
certain vulnerable areas or sectors. 
124. The situation we face now is even more critical th an it was during the financial crisis.  As we 
have witnessed before, being a rules-based organiza tion and with its regular monitoring mechanism, 
the WTO can provide a global solution to the growing threat of protectionism.  We therefore 
encourage the Director General to continue with  the work in this regard, undertaken under the 
auspices of the TPRM.  For our part, we are certa inly committed to continuing to work with you as 
closely and constructively as possible. 
MALAYSIA 
125. We welcome the report which is being presented today in particular considering the outlook 
for the global economy has worsened considerably in  recent months with risks and uncertainties are 
increasing, after the encouraging signals of recovery seen at the end of 2010. We are also mindful of WT/TPR/OV/M/9 
Page 18  
 
the WTO forecast for world export growth in 2011 which was revised to 5.8%, down from the earlier 
estimate of 6.5%. 
126. We welcome and are encouraged to note that G overnments have strived to resist protectionist 
measures and exercised restraint over imposition of new trade restrictions thorough out 2011. This 
collective responsibility demonstrated by Governme nts of not resorting to protectionism will 
eventually pave the way towards a sustained economic recovery. 
127. On the other hand, we are concerned that new restrictive measures introduced during the 
review period had increased 53% as compared to the previous 12 month period. We hope that these 
measures are temporary in nature and Governme nts demonstrate responsibility and commitment in 
discontinuing this negative trend which will not bode well for glob al trade and slow down economic 
recovery. 
128. As a trading nation, Malaysia welcomes initia tives by Members to introduce measures that 
facilitate trade. For Malaysia, the Government has continued in its efforts to enhance and strengthen 
Malaysia as an attractive place to do business and invest . It is in this light that the liberalisation 
measures have been formulated and advocated. We  believe that a facilitative business and regulatory 
environment would help steer the nation out of the crisis and place the country on a sustainable 
trajectory of higher growth. At the recent budge t announcement on 15 Oct ober 2011, the Malaysian 
Government has committed to a second tranche of services liberalisation measures with the removal 
of foreign equity restrictions for the sectors of telecommunication, healthcare, engineering, 
architecture and legal services.  On the goods sector, we have also committed to abolish import duties 
for about 300 retail and consumer goods. 
129. Some colleagues that have spoken earlier, have also highlighted the significance of the 
transparency mechanism for RTAs as addressed in th e report.  We do find the portion on RTAs useful 
particularly in demonstrating the critical importa nce of the relationship and linkages between RTAs 
and the multilateral trading system.  We hope that this  important and useful work be further examined 
and address in the formal work programme under the ambit of the WTO. 
130. Malaysia would like to emphasis the importance of this monitoring exercise to ensure that we 
are continuously kept abreast on the trade and econom ic policies of Members, and also in assessing 
and keeping protectionist tendencies at bay. We ag ree with the report that there are still gaps that 
exists in Members knowledge of each other's tr ade policy regimes due to poor compliance with 
formal notification requirements. Malaysia continues to believe that transparency is pertinent within 
this organization to ensure Members are kept abr east of developments on new trade policy data and 
information. Thus we fully support this transpar ency exercise to be continued and that Members 
continue to work with the Secretariat in providing the necessary updates and verification of 
information to ensure this exercise is indeed  meaningful and beneficial to all Members. 
PAKISTAN 
131. The Annual Report regarding the impact of the current international trading environment on 
the multilateral trading system is of special importan ce at this point in time. In less than two weeks, 
Ministers will gather in Geneva for the WTO's Mi nisterial Conference. This Report will provide the 
context to the Ministers to reflect upon the functi oning of multilateral trading system, its relevance 
during the testing times, how to strength it and the way forward. 
132. The 2008-09 recession, sometimes termed as great  recession resulted in a massive economic 
contraction, first in the developed world and gra dually impacting all the economies, big, medium or 
small. At that time, the major concern was whethe r these events may lead to protectionism on populist 
demands to isolate national economies. In this c ontext trade policy monitoring initiative of the WTO 
was launched in January 2009 to bring transparency on new measu res and keep a watch on their WT/TPR/OV/M/9 
Page 19 
 
 
impact on the global trade. Accordingly, since the l ast WTO Ministerial, it has been the major and the 
most commendable activity of the WTO. The efforts of the Director General to place adequate resources of the Secretariat to this work are d eeply appreciated. Perhaps the only reason that the 
recession did not convert into an experience like the Great Depression of 1930s is the presence of 
multilateral disciplines since 1948 and the limits of Trade Policies got well-defined especially with 
the establishment of WTO in 1995, under a single unde rtaking.  The relevance and importance of the 
WTO is not questioned by anyone, though there are diffe rences is strengthening the rules of the game. 
133. The issues relating to strengthening the rule-b ased multilateral trading system and to make it 
more responsive to the needs of the Members incl uding to keep markets open is an important theme 
for the political guidance of the Ministers during the MC8. Many thoughts are expected to come to the 
surface in the interventions of the Ministers in th is area, which may give a direction for future 
endeavours at the multilateral level. 
134. In case we analyze the measure s adopted in the Trade Policies by Members annexed to the 
Report, it would appear that many countries have  also embarked upon trade facilitation and reduction 
in applied tariffs on certain products. Major protec tionist tendencies, however, are witnessed in other 
areas like strengthening the non-tariff measures a nd other border measures by certain Member 
countries. 
135. An important facet of the Report is that in many cases, the protectionist measures including 
rise in tariffs, are not applied to the RTA partners due to binding of tariffs and non-tariff measures 
while concluding such bilateral and regional agreem ent. Such measures have far reaching impact on 
third parties which include many developing countr ies like Pakistan. They do not remain competitive 
and their trade is driven out from major markets. We  request the WTO that in its future reports, this 
aspect may also be analyzed further to unders tand where these policies have a real impact.  
136. Protectionist policies in the area of agriculture , when we are witnessing rising food prices and 
shortage of food, adversely affect  consumers in developing and l east developed countries including 
net food importing countries.  Agriculture export restrictions and trade distortions in the agriculture 
trade is an area where we need to discuss in the relevant committees during 2012. Protectionism in 
this area can trigger human misery across many countries.  
137. The Report also contains an overview of Trade Policy Reviews undertaken during this year. 
We place on record the hard work done by Ambass ador Mario Matus, Chairman of the TPRB, who 
has also undertaken a review of the Mechanism and successfully deve loped convergence to make the 
TPRs more meaningful and an interactive exercise. Besides, there was also consensus that the WTO 
will continue to report to the Members about th e changes in Trade Policies of the Members and 
whether protectionist sentiments are adopted in th e current difficult macro-economic difficulties. This 
will be the most important work during 2012 in the backdrop of the fact the Doha Round, which 
would have been an insurance against pr otectionism, is not likely to conclude. 
138. The issues brought out in my intervention are only illustrative in nature. We need to get 
together and develop convergence to combat protec tionism in all areas collectively by adopting the 
right policies.  In the globalized world, balanced  trade policies would be to address the real and 
systemic concerns for all less developed countries. 
BRAZIL 
139. We are glad to see that the report captures some  positive recent developments in Brazil's trade 
policy regime.  Paragraph 47, for instance, acknowle dges the fact that "although tariffs tend to be 
considerably higher in developing countries … in  Brazil the average applied tariff has dropped 
substantially to 11.5%". Brazil stresses, however , that this falling trend should become more 
challenging in light of recent exchange rate m ovements, which put domestic producers under pressure WT/TPR/OV/M/9 
Page 20  
 
from highly competitive sales – at home and abroad  – from countries with markedly undervalued 
currencies. 
140. With regard to the number of anti-dumping investigations initiated during the period under 
review, the report recognises that Brazil, as well as  India and Pakistan "have slowed down their 
activity significantly in 2011". Indeed, Brazil has reduced by 28% the number of new anti-dumping 
investigations. This is a noteworthy feature give n that in the same period some developed economies 
– the report mentions the U.S. and Australia – have resorted more often to trade remedies. 
141. Notwithstanding this observation, it is worth recalling that, as a general rule, anti-dumping 
measures are legitimate remedies that countries may resort to in order to  offset the disruptive effect of 
unfair competition and illegitimate business practices. In fact, when a trade remedy measure is 
initiated, the "problem" may be found on either si de of it. The "problem" could be on the importing 
side if the investigation is not conducted properly. It may also be on the exporting side, if the exports 
are unfair and reflect predatory practices. In fact, it is our suggestion that in the future the report 
should also focus on the exporting side as well.  
142. Regarding possible improvements to the report, le t me underline that Brazil is also concerned 
with the optics of the report. Quite often, media ar ticles simply count the number of measures listed in 
the report and use these numbers in their analysis of  what they perceive to be the "protectionist" 
trends of WTO Members. I should note, however, that this is a strikingly misleading methodology. In the case of Brazil, for example, nearly half the meas ures, 44% to be more exact, listed in the report 
have an unequivocal liberalising effect, given that all of them either account for the lowering of 
applied tariffs or for the termination of anti-dumping measures. My suggestion is that in future reports 
the Secretariat should make an effort to somehow  differentiate measures which are clearly are not 
trade restrictive. We believe that such effo rt could be quite straightforward and simple. 
143. Let me also stress our concern with the fact that the report does not capture the levels of 
domestic subsidisation with farm  programs. Although strictly these could fall under section III.B, 
titled Government Support Measures, that section is currently essentially reporting only subsidies and 
other support measures in the services and non-agri cultural sectors. There is a brief reference to 
"specific support to farmers" in the last sentence of that section, which essentially states that these 
were reported. 
144. As far as Brazil is concerned this is not e nough. We would need a more robust analysis of 
trends in farm support, particularly in light of the G20 leader's commitment to refrain from 
protectionist measures. As we all know, farm s ubsidies are one of the most malignant forms of 
protectionism, because they generate food insecuri ty and quell the growth potential of the poorest 
WTO Members in one of the key few sectors wher e they might possibly compete in the global 
markets. 
145. Still in this context, I would like to note one very conspicuous absence in the report. I'm 
referring to export subsidies, especially in the ag ricultural sector. If export restrictions are mentioned 
with some emphasis in the report, export subsidi es are not. These are extremely distortive measures 
and should receive dedicated attention by the Secret ariat. Brazil, underscores, for example, the fact 
that the report does not mention the exports of subsid ised sugar by the EU. In the last meeting of the 
General Council, Brazil raised this issue and showed  that these illegal exports are increasing in a way 
that not only distorts trade, but also violates WTO commitments. Of course we would not expect the report to contain any opinions of the Secretariat regarding the WTO conformity of the export 
subsidies eventually compiled, but we would fully ex pect a special effort to report them in detail and 
analyse their trends. 
146. Let me also express concern with the brevity of  coverage of section III.A.4, entitled "Sanitary 
and Phitosanitary Measures". A large proportion of Br azil's exports is affected by these restrictive WT/TPR/OV/M/9 
Page 21 
 
 
measures, which are often disproportional to their alleged motivation and have  small or no linkage 
with actual animal, plant, or human health concerns . The report should also take a look at measures 
that have been in effect for a large number of years – decades in some cases – and that show no sign of being seriously reviewed. These are also protectionist measures that affect trade in a very significant and negative way. The fact that they  were introduced before the 2008 crisis cannot 
discourage us from taking a closer look at them; in fact, that should lend further support to the need 
for a more serious review of these long-lasting restrictive measures.  
147. We are somehow victims of our own success, and the public opinion follows the issuance of 
these reports quite closely. This is a practice that must continue, but that must also be perfected. 
While we welcome the report and commend the effort of  the Secretariat, Brazil is convinced that there 
is room for improvement. We take note of statements from previous de legations that substantiate this 
view, Argentina's in particular, which rightly empha sises the report's lack of proper consideration to 
non-border restrictive measures. Br azil is ready to work together with the Secretariat and other 
Members to improve this review exercise so that  we have a more balanced, comprehensive, and 
accurate report for our next interaction. 
EL SALVADOR 
148. In general, we believe that th is Report is quite exhaustive a nd, as a country, we do not see any 
other endeavour that provides us with information - which is inherently fairly difficult to assemble 
and which, in some way, has a certain logic - in a comprehensive manner.  Obviously the information 
contained in this Report does not catch us by surp rise, since the deterioration in every sense over the 
past few months and the potential outlook for 2012 are matters of great concern.  What is rather 
worrisome is that this is December 2011, and the crisis occurred in 2008 when our countries were 
slightly stronger.  Obviously dealing with a double pr oblem such as this one is taking its toll on many 
Members that, regardless of their level of developm ent, have been much weakened and are facing 
huge problems stemming from 2008.  In other words, we have not even overcome the problems from that year.  Right now what we do is very importa nt and sounding the alarm on protectionist measures 
is doubly important. 
149. I think that, as a country, we can be very pl eased with ourselves since we are doing what we 
are expected to do in such circumstances.  We ar e happy to announce that we have not applied any 
protectionist measures since the last Report.  As ca n be seen in this Report, we have done just the 
opposite and continue lowering tariffs under non-subs tantial but certainly very sensitive headings, and 
have reduced the number of border procedures to facilita te trade in goods.  I believe that this is not 
faithfully recorded in the Report and we would like it to be reflected in the next one. 
150. It is disconcerting that, according to the Director-General, reciprocity from certain 
WTO Members is not the same, as paragraph 6 of the Report mentions a 53% increase in protectionist measures.  It is important to stress that although the Report is very precise, there is room to verify certain measures that are described as not necessaril y having protectionist purposes.  In other words, 
some measures that are mentioned in the Repor t do not necessarily have a protectionist end in 
themselves.  The Members and the Secretariat share this responsibility, and the situation may be 
improved with the notifications that Members shoul d submit to the Organization in a timely manner. 
151. We cannot fail to mention the clear increase in prices of primary commodities, as shown in 
Chart 3 of this Report, or the measures that every Me mber uses in this connection.  However, what is 
at stake here is a basic principle that, in the end, is our very objective, that is the well-being of our 
peoples, including those who are most vulnerabl e, who already find themselves in precarious 
situations that we should ha ve overcome a long time ago. 
 WT/TPR/OV/M/9 
Page 22  
 
CHILE 
152. I would like make a few comments on three areas,  beginning with economic developments.  
The situation has worsened since the last exercise.  Forecasts say that economic activity has slowed 
down at the growing risk of greater difficulties.  Following a severe contraction a couple of years ago, trade recovered fairly quickly, along with the ec onomy.  We have no doubt that the WTO's actions 
played a significant role in this outcome.  No w, in this context of lower growth and high 
unemployment, there will be more demands for greater  protection.  The Ministers must therefore send 
a very strong and clear message against protectionism over the next few days. 
153. Secondly, I would like to comment on trade measures.  The Report highlights positive trade 
policy measures, such as tariff reductions and trade facilitating measures, but also mentions negative 
developments such as the increas e in export restricting measures.  Although there is a downward trend 
in trade defence measures, with fewer measures being applied, it is important to bear in mind that the 
mere fact of initiating investigations can discourage trade flows.  In other words, investigations can 
undermine trade even though measures may not be imposed. 
154. Thirdly, I would like to talk about monitori ng and surveillance.  The document makes a 
quantitative reference to the WTO notifications sy stem.  Although it is a long Report in quantitative 
terms, it requires something more.  We must, on the occasion of this Report, collectively carry out a broader and more comprehensive anal ysis of these notifications.  For example, in a context of fewer 
tariffs, protectionism may be disguised as measures that seem legitimate but are not duly justified.  
This is true of sanitary measures and technical barri ers to trade, as in other WTO areas.  Hence, we 
regret that the European Union proposal on no tifications has still not achieved the necessary 
consensus and hope that it can be reached as quick ly as possible.  We also need to improve both 
Members' notifications of regional trade agreements  and the subsequent analysis and study of such 
agreements.  In the same vein, Chile considers pe riodic trade policy reviews part of the monitoring 
exercise, since they provide detailed information on  Members' trade policies.  Moreover, we believe 
that the importance of monitoring and surveillance sh ould be reiterated, at the Ministerial Conference, 
as a way of building up a picture with many more hues that will give us a clearer insight into trade 
policy trends and help keep protectionist pressures at bay. 
EUROPEAN UNION 
155. Let me just focus on two of our concerns whic h we have been covered in the report which are 
protectionism and transparency. The report identifies an upward trend in the use of trade restrictive 
measures, which has registered an annual 53% increase.  This is certainly worrying as is the fact that 
very few of the measures that have b een taken already have been rolled back . And even more 
distressing is the identified growing perception that  trade protectionism is gaining ground in some 
countries, where industrial support coupled with trade -restrictive measures is emerging. We share this 
perception as it is in line with our own analysis. 
156. Furthermore, there is a lingering upward trend on the use of export restrictions, which have 
more than doubled over the last year. New measures continue to be added to the existing stockpile of 
potential trade restrictions despite the fact that  many countries have now fully recovered from the 
shocks of the crisis and reached a rather stable pattern of economic growth. In a context of greater 
economic uncertainty and rising global risks, protec tionism poses a real threat to global economic 
recovery and it is all the more important that the process of global trade openi ng continues. The report 
has certainly captured this risk.  Therefore we cannot  but once again urge Members to resist to these 
practices, and recall our G20 fellows to abide by their commitments to this endeavour. We will 
certainly continue carefully watching the recourse to trade protectionism and address the measures 
that infringe WTO rules in all appropriate ways. WT/TPR/OV/M/9 
Page 23 
 
 
157. Let me just make a short parenthesis to answer the question that has been raised by Brazil on 
a recent measure on export subsidies.  Certainly it is not our understanding that we can discuss this 
issue here in depth, but for the sake of clarity, le t me just say, that of course we take extremely 
seriously our WTO commitments especially in the area of sugar.  On the particular issue, let me 
clarify that on 30 November an implementation regulation has been adopted by the Commission 
fixing the quantitative limits for out of quota sugar fo r the marketing year 2011-12.  This increases the 
overall quantity from 650,000 to 1.35 million tons, and th erefore I am confident that we can show and 
demonstrate that this is full in  line with our WTO commitments.  
158. Transparency continues to be an essential pillar in this Organisation. In this respect, we 
welcome the detailed section on transparency initiati ves under the WTO umbrella. It is in this spirit 
that the EU has actively and cons istently supported all initiatives c onducive to enhance transparency 
of trade policies and practices in the WTO which have  already been singled out in this annual report. 
159. The EU pays high importance to the first and fo remost transparency obligations within the 
WTO: the regular notifications laid down in th e WTO Agreements. We have strongly advocated the 
need to improve the record of compliance with WTO notification obligations . A related EU proposal 
was discussed just last week in the General Counc il, but unfortunately no consensus could be found 
on having ministerial language to emphasise more  specifically this important component.  
160. As stated in the report, the progress made in resp ecting notifications obligations is still slow, 
as significant gaps still remain in all areas of th e WTO's work. While useful initiatives have been 
carried forward in each WTO Committee to this end, the record of compliance remains unsatisfactory. 
The completeness and timeliness of such notifications be nefits the daily business of  this institution. It 
feeds into the work of each WTO Committee and Council and helps Member s better understand the 
trade practices and policies undertaken by each Member in real time. 
161. Unless this basic and indispensable source of  information by and for Members is not 
complete, this institution will be deprived of th e essential transparency con ducive to a better, and 
accurate, assessment and understanding of its Members' trade policies. 
162. We also note with regret that this report contin ues to be afflicted by the low participation by 
delegations in the necessary reporting of measures. The report states that only 28 delegations, 19 of 
which are G20 Members, have provided informa tion on their own measures.  This lack of 
transparency is not only regrettable, but also inco mpatible with our shared objective of strengthening 
the role of the WTO in resisting protectionism.  G20 Members have committed to report to the WTO 
about their own measures, and so did the WTO Membership as a whole when supporting the TPRB's 
tasks of monitoring protectionism. In fact, Members have  just re-stated this interest in the context of 
the TPRM appraisal, which will be echoed by Ministers later this month. 
163. The satisfactory continuation of these monitoring reports is  entirely dependent on WTO 
Member's eagerness to duly participate and exercise their commitment to transparency. As this annual 
report acknowledges, the content and accuracy of the monitoring reports is impaired by data 
weaknesses and shortage of reporte d information. Furthermore, the possibility to produce more in-
depth analysis is also jeopardised by the lack of reliable information in due time. Therefore, for all 
these reasons, we urge Members to duly report and ve rify the measures contained in this report, and 
we invite the Secretariat to suggest appropriate wa ys to facilitate further Members' participation to 
this exercise. Furthermore, and given the long list of unverified measures contained in Annex I, we 
also invite those Members whose measures are listed to inform about their difficulties in verifying 
these measures, and to update Members on the state of play of the listed measure.  WT/TPR/OV/M/9 
Page 24  
 
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF 
164. The world economy has remained sluggish for so me years now. Due to uncertainties for the 
future, everyone is doubtful of the possibility of a quick economic rebound. We understand that some 
countries may be tempted to use protectionist measures to safeguard domestic industries and 
employment. Nevertheless, we believe that, as hi story has repeatedly shown us, resorting to 
protectionism is never the right solution to economic hardships. 
165. In this context, Korea notes with great concern the findings of the report that, during the 
period under present review, 339 new trade restrictiv e measures were recorded , which is 53% more 
than those in the previous period. We pay our partic ular attention to the fact that the number of new 
trade restrictive measures exceeded that of the pe riod before the previous period when the world 
experienced the global financial crisis. 
166. Indeed, we have recently witnessed that so me Members, even those who are widely 
recognized as major players in the WTO, have take n new measures that seem to be inconsistent with 
their obligations under the WTO Agreements. Thus, we  share the concern that those measures could 
serve as precedents that will inv ite other Members to follow suit, given that protectionism is 
contagious. 
167. As the report rightly points out, it may only make things worse by triggering a spiral of tit-
for-tat reactions in which every country will lose. Wh at is more regrettable is that these developments 
have come at a time when the relevance of this Organization is being seriously needed. Korea, with 
other Members, has expressed, during the meetings  of WTO bodies, its deepest concerns over the 
negative impact that protectionist measures can have on global welfare and the multilateral trading 
system. We take this very seriously and with disa ppointment. We very much hope that the Members 
concerned will take decisions to revoke t hose measures in an expeditious manner. 
168. Against this backdrop, we welcome the recent G20 and APEC Leaders' Declarations both of 
which contain a strong message aimed at coping with  protectionism. They provide timely momentum 
for advancing our current monitoring exercise. Our shar ed task at the MC8 is to prove the value of the 
WTO as the guardian of the multilateral trading system. One of the ways of doing this is for our 
Ministers to make the most of the upcoming Ministerial and to collectively send a clear and strong message against protectionism.  
INDIA 
169. We have noted with concern the report's observa tions with regard to the worsening outlook 
for the global economy in recent months. As po inted out therein, risks and uncertainties are 
increasing, global activity is slowing down, econom ic performance continues to be uneven across 
countries, debt levels and financial volatility are rising, and high unemployment levels  persist in many 
countries. On the trade front too, growth has slow ed down in recent months  which is impacting both 
developed and developing countries. India too has no t remained impervious to these developments. Its 
economic growth has slowed down to 6.9% during July-September 2011 compared to 8.4% over the 
same period last year.  
170. At the outset, we would like to state that "protectionism" connotes different things to different 
countries.  While the report implies the raising of a pplied tariffs within the binding ceiling and use of 
trade defence measures as protectionist measures, ra ising the level of subsidies within permissible 
levels has not been treated on a similar footing.  Th ere appears to be a serious lacuna in the approach 
and efforts need to be made to first work out a set of objective criteria in the WTO as to what 
constitutes a protectionist measure and then to gauge whether protectionism on a global scale is 
increasing or decreasing. WT/TPR/OV/M/9 
Page 25 
 
 
171. While the report notes that on the whole govern ments have largely continued to resist 
protectionist pressures, it also expresses concern over an upward trend in the imposition of new trade restrictions. In para. 6, the report notes that 339 new trade restrictive measures were recorded, which 
is 53% more than in the previous period. However, to get an overall picture of trade restrictiveness, it 
is important to look at the trade coverage of these  restrictive measures, which as per para. 8 of the 
report, has come down. In para. 8, the report notes that "new restrictive measures introduced in the 
period between mid-October 2010 and mid-Octobe r 2011 cover around 0.9% of world imports, down 
from 1.2% recorded in the previous 12-month period".  
172. Further, as per para. 9, 48% of the total numbe r of measures recorded in Annex I are trade 
facilitating measures. A clear distinction needs to  be made between trade restrictive and trade 
facilitating measures. 
173. Thus, the figures presented in the report do not gi ve a clear indication of a rise in protectionist 
tendencies. Moreover, the report covers the peri od from mid-October 2010 to mid-October 2011. The 
country-specific measures listed in Annexes 1 a nd 2 are new measures implemented by governments 
during the period under review.  The report does not c ontain information about the status of measures 
implemented before mid-October 2010, i.e. whether those are still in place or have been dropped. In 
the absence of this information, it is difficult to determine whether protectionism overall has increased 
or decreased since we do not have a cumulative picture.   
174. Importantly, the report does not cover subsidies wh ich are equivalent to tariffs in terms of 
their impact on trade.  Any analysis of protectionism  must take into account the role of subsidies in 
impacting trade.  This is an area that needs to  be studied in depth because developing countries 
generally do not have deep pockets  to use subsidies as a form of protectionism. Domestic support 
measures constitute an important barrier to trade and these must be given due attention in the annual 
report of the Director General. 
175. Further, non-tariff measures such as giving pref erence to local products in procurement which 
change the direction of trade also play an im portant role in restricting trade and enhancing 
protectionism. These must be covered in future reports. 
176. More specificity is also required in the analys is of tariff measures. As noted in the report, 
while tariffs may no longer appear to be major ba rriers to international trade as far as industrial goods 
are concerned, low tariff averages conceal high tariff rates and peaks in other areas. Simple averages 
of applied MFN rates underestimate the actual level of protection.  
177. A more detailed analysis of the impact of SPS measures and Technical barriers to trade must 
also be included in the report, in particular im position of SPS measures without scientific justification 
and the increasing use of private standards. Several specific trade concerns have been highlighted in 
the relevant Committees.  
178. The impact of exchange rates on trade is anothe r area that needs further examination.  It is 
evident from the above that a number of areas need  further analysis to make the report a more 
balanced one. While the report lays great emphasi s on border measures, it fails to accord similar 
importance to behind the border measures such as s ubsidies and stimulus packages, which have an 
equally distortionary impact on trade.  
179. The report also goes into fair amount of detail on transparency, monitori ng and surveillance, 
specifically on the status of notifications in each Committee of the WTO. While we recognize the 
importance of notifications in enhancing transparen cy, and have noted the extensive work carried out 
in various Committees in this rega rd, we believe that follow-up on notifications is best left to the 
concerned Committees which are competent to  handle this work under the relevant WTO 
Agreements.  WT/TPR/OV/M/9 
Page 26  
 
180. The report repeatedly uses the terminology "e merging" economies (paras. 17, 20, 21, 124, 
139), while the only recognized categories in WTO Agreements are "developed", "developing" and LDCs. At other places, the report makes subjective re ferences with regard to export restrictions. 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
181. The Report prepared by the Secretariat for this  meeting is more detailed than the previous 
one, although we share the concerns expressed by other delegations and think that it could be 
expanded to include restrictive non-border measures.   We also agree with others that it is the 
notifications mechanism that allows this Organiza tion to monitor the behaviour of the system, which 
means that Members should be more ready to submit  notifications of new trade measures in a timely 
fashion. 
182. We can see from the Report's charts of m acroeconomic indicators that the developed 
economies have been hardest hit by the crisis, resulting in less economic growth and higher unemployment than in the developing economies, wh ich is why the develope d countries should have a 
greater propensity to adopt trade restricting measur es.  For example, in Table 4(a) containing the 
MFN rates in the leading developed economies, we can see that there are countries in this group that 
have increased their average app lied rates.  We see the opposite behaviour in Table 4(b), which 
concerns developing countries. 
183. We also note that the rates that they appl y to agricultural imports are twice and even 
three times higher than their average rates.  The same is true of the rates applied to textiles.  We 
observe that notifications from the developed count ries rose from 28% to 36% of all notifications 
concerning sanitary and phytosanitary measures.  Likewise, notifications by the developing countries 
relating to measures considered technical barriers to trade decreased by 332, i.e. 27%, over 2010, 
while those from the developed countries declined by 40, i.e. 14%. 
184. In terms of the number of new measures applied,  if we analyse the Report by type of measure, 
we can see that things are not as bad as they woul d seem.  Nonetheless, this does not mean that the 
Organization should not remain vigilant by con tinuously monitoring what is happening within the 
system, especially in terms of lack of progress in the Doha Round.  Looking closely at the Report, we 
observe the following:  (a) new export restrictions are reduced from 64 to 31 if we subtract measures 
that have been abolished;  (b) there are fewer ne w anti-dumping measures than in 2010;  (c) likewise, 
there is a decrease in the number of safeguard inv estigations initiated;  (d) while there are more 
countervailing measures than in 2010, there are 50% fe wer than in 2009;  (e) notifications of sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures have also declined;  (f) likewise, the number of notifications of measures 
considered as technical barriers to trade has dropped;   and (g) the relative weight of the measures in 
the total value of trade also fell from 1.20 to 0. 87%, even though there were 117 new measures. 
185. That said, I join the other delegations th at have asked why anti-dumping and safeguard 
measures are regarded as trade-restrictive, when th e truly restrictive measures are the dumping and the 
subsidies that caused them.  We therefore think th at the criteria used to define measures affecting 
trade flows should be changed. 
186. Finally, the reported gaps between the app lied and bound tariff rates in the developing 
countries are policy spaces needed to counteract th e harmful effects of subsidies and currency 
appreciation.  Those of us who share this view cannot not be regarded as being at odds with the 
system for defending this, because it now appears that  the best managed economies are penalized, in a 
matter of hours, by the huge inflows of short-term sp eculative capital, in search of easy profit, which, 
however, destroy an economy's e xport production apparatus, built up over decades of effort and 
investment, in just a few weeks.  This is the great  challenge that the development of world trade is 
already facing, and one which will be increasingl y detrimental to its expansion unless multilateral 
measures are applied to regulate the flows of such capital. WT/TPR/OV/M/9 
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FINAL REMARKS BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL 
187. Let me thank delegations for their comments and observations.  Obvi ously this Report has 
attracted a lot of your attention, and I can only we lcome this again, given the intentions we had in 
launching this exercise and given the dire macroeconom ic environment we are in.  What I heard this 
morning amounts to a clear, strong and overwhelming endorsement of this exercise and of the way the 
Secretariat has done it, which is a tribute to the team s that have worked hard, both in the Secretariat 
and in your delegations.  I will now present a few re plies to some of the less-positive points presented 
by a few delegations. 
188. First, regarding protectionism, the reality is th at it is probably the word which is the most 
frequently pronounced in this Organization, but this  Organization has no defin ition of protectionism.  
There are different views on that, and I recognize that  if we use this word in reporting on trade-policy 
developments, this may be understood differently by  different people who have  a different notion of 
what protectionism means.  I agree, and this will be  taken on board in the future, that in the Report the 
word protectionism has to be used with care.  I ca nnot say it cannot be used but I think it is better in 
general terms to talk about trade restrictive, tr ade-distorting, trade-opening and trade-facilitating 
measures, which in a way is more objective, remi nding of course about the footnote which has always 
been on page 1 of the Report where we say that this does not prejudice Members' positions on any sort of legal qualification or whether this is , or not, within Members' rights and obligations. 
189. Second, on the exhaustivity of the Report, we ha ve heard by some delegations that we do not 
report fully about the whole picture where there ar e what Members consider as trade-distorting, or 
trade-restricting measures, some of them having been  there for a long time.  This exercise is about 
Developments, it's about  variations.  The purpose is during a time of crisis, where we know 
protectionist pressures are there, how much of thes e protectionist pressures have translated into new 
trade policy instruments and measures.  I think we rea lly have to keep this focus on the differential.  
We have limited resources, we cannot give an overall message on existing measures without a huge 
work of investigation and analysis and I do not think, unless others think differently among the 
Membership, we should change the focus of the exer cise, which is to track and analyze, changes, 
developments which have to do with the present economic circumstances.   
190. Third, on agriculture, we have heard this morning from two delegations - Argentina and 
Brazil - that there is not enough reporting and analys is on agriculture.  We will look into agricultural 
subsidies, domestic trade-distorting support, ex port subsidies, safeguards, unfilled quotas, SPS, 
whether we can track developments which would have happened in the period, or in the next period, 
which would not have been there before and analy se them.  My own intuition at this stage, to be 
checked of course, and I read Reports the Secretariat gives to me about notifications in the agriculture 
sector, notably in subsidies, is that if these numbers  have to be reported, th ey will rather be on a 
downwards path, rather than upwards, for a simp le reason which is that most trade-distorting 
subsidies in agriculture have some sort of link w ith prices, and given where prices are now, subsidies 
which are linked to prices are downwards and not upwa rds.  But we will check it, and it may be true, 
that as compared to other sectors, agriculture trad e policy developments, deserve a bit more focus.   
191. Lastly, on three remarks of detail, Brazil men tioned that we had not reported the EU sugar 
support.  It is only because it became publicly-known after the cut-off date of mid-October, which is 
the moment where we stopped the radar-screening, so  it would be in the next one, again whichever 
appreciation Members may have on whether this is, or not, within the rights of the EU.   
192. Regarding the Brazilian remark on a clearer di stinction between trade-facilitating and trade-
restricting measures, I think it' s an improvement we can make. WT/TPR/OV/M/9 
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193. Finally, regarding Argentina's remark on paragra ph 54, I have read in your statement that you 
have a concern about our language ab out bilateral-issue of consultation.  If you read this paragraph, 
we do not talk about bilateral, but  about multilateral, so I suppose ther e is a lapsus academic mistake 
from your side somewhere. 
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