WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  WT/L/687 
12 July 2007 
 (07-2960) 
 Original:   English 
  
DECLARATION ON DEVELOPMENT CONCERNS AND ISSUES  
IN THE CURRENT WTO NEGOTIATIONS 
 
Communication from the ACP Group, the African Group,
 
the LDC Group, Bolivia and Venezuela  
 
 
 The following communication, dated 21 June 2007, has been received from the Delegation of 
Jamaica with the request that it be circulated to all Members. 
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DECLARATION ON DEVELOPMENT CONCERNS AND ISSUES IN 
THE CURRENT WTO NEGOTIATIONS 
 
Geneva 21 June 2007 
 
Issued by the ACP Group, the African Group, the LDC Group, Bolivia and Venezuela 
  
PART I:  CENTRALITY OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE DOHA PROGRAMME 
 
Our groupings and countries represent a large pr oportion of developing country members in 
the WTO.  The present stage of negotiations in the Doha Work Programme (DWP) is crucial.  It is 
thus imperative that the WTO membership and the wo rld public be reminded that the central objective 
of the DWP is to help developing countries achieve development.  The Doha Ministerial Declaration 
(para 2) states:  “We recognise the need for all our  peoples to benefit from the increased opportunities 
and welfare gains that the multilateral trading system  generates.  The majority of WTO members are 
developing countries.  We seek to place their needs and interests at the hear t of the Work Programme 
adopted in this Declaration.”   
The ACP Council of Ministers, at its session in Brussels on 22-24 May 2007, adopted a 
Decision on the WTO Doha Negotiations in which the Ministers reiterated “that the development 
dimension must be included in all aspects of the results of the Doha Round.” 
For the developing countries, what matters in this Round is the content of the agreements, 
which must translate into positive outcomes for our trade and trade balance, improvement in 
production and supply capacity, and increased employment and incomes of our people.  These are among the development yardsticks by which proposal s, negotiations, modalities and texts have to be 
assessed. 
We are also concerned that the Round should be  completed as soon as possible.  This has to 
be done by ensuring that the content of the proposals and draft texts conforms to the development interests of developing countries.  Content cannot be sacrificed for timelines.  It is more important to 
get the agreements right than to meet deadlines.  Therefore the WTO members should not be rushed WT/L/687 
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  into agreements on modalities, if they are not satis fied that the development concerns are fully taken 
into account. 
A statement issued after the G20 Ministerial m eeting with coordinators of developing country 
groups on June 11 2007 stated:  “Developing coun tries’ support for the urgent conclusion of the 
Round is contingent upon a result that, in each area of the negotiations and in the overall balance of 
the single undertaking, fully delivers on the commitment to make this a development round, by 
placing the interests  and needs of developing count ries, especially  the least developed among them, 
at its heart.”  We fully support this. 
We are concerned that some of the most cr itical issues for many developing countries have 
been marginalised or left behind as the negotiatio ns have proceeded.  For example, the S&D and 
Implementation Issues were to be resolved ahead of agriculture and NAMA, but these have been now 
given low priority.  Focus is put on so-called core  market access issues in NAMA and agriculture; 
while issues of more concern to many developing countries such as commodities, preference erosion, 
cotton, tariff escalation, Green Box subsidies, ne t food importing developing countries, have been 
given less attention. 
It is imperative if the Round is to be comple ted that the concerns and issues that matter to a 
majority of developing countries are dealt with satis factorily, and that our development interests are 
truly addressed and promoted.  
PART II: PROCESS 
 A. P
ARTICIPATION AND TRANSPARENCY   
The ACP Council of Ministers, in its meeting in Brussels on 22-24 May 2007, adopted a 
Decision on the WTO Doha Negotiations, reaffirmed  that the WTO negotiating processes “should be 
transparent, inclusive and with a bottom-up appro ach”; and underlined that “ACP members should be 
accorded adequate time to examine in detail th e proposals submitted by other WTO Members and 
Chairs of the negotiating bodies with a view to consulting their respective authorities and taking 
informed decision on these proposals.” 
In this context, we reaffirm the centrality of the principles of transparency, full participation 
of all members, and the multilateral process. The view s, concerns and interests of the majority of 
members should be fully reflected in the negotiati ons, in the modality papers and in the outcomes. 
A major positive feature of the multilateral trading system is the principle that it allows all 
trading partners the opportunity to participate in making the rules.  The legitimacy of the WTO rests 
on whether this principle is adhere d to.  We have been concerned th at the recent negotiating process 
has been less than transparent and participator y.  Although it is widely known that important 
negotiations are taking place in the G4 process, th e vast majority of members have little or no 
knowledge of the progress and content of differe nt stages of the negotiations.  Although two 
developing countries are part of the G4, we ca nnot expect them to carry the responsibility of 
representing the views and positions of all developing countries.  We have been told that the Geneva 
multilateral process is central, but without knowledge of the political or technical aspects of the G4 
negotiations, it is not possible for the majority of members to prepare themselves or provide inputs.  
We are concerned that members may be faced with  texts arising from small plurilateral processes and 
requested to consider them at very short notice and to adopt them for the sake of the system.  As we 
are the majority of members of the system, we have the right to know what is going on and to be 
given the opportunity to participate.  WT/L/687 
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  We therefore call for a much more transpar ent and participatory overall process.  The 
multilateral process with full participation of all memb ers in discussion and in preparing the drafts and 
final texts must be central.  The multilateral system cannot be used to rubber stamp and legitimise the 
decisions made by a few members. 
B. FULL MODALITIES AND NOT PARTIAL MODALITIES NEEDED  
The Doha Work Programme outcome is a “Single Undertaking.”  All issues that are important 
to members must be considered in  a balanced and equitable manner.  The modalities and solutions for 
all issues therefore have to be considered and settle d simultaneously.  It is unfair to seek a deal first on 
so-called “core issues” and to promise that “other issues” be settled later.  Firstly, it is a matter of 
subjective interpretation what the “core issues” are because different members have different 
priorities.  Secondly, there is a concern that “other  issues” will be left aside after the so-called “core 
issues” are settled.  It is recalled, for instan ce, that S&D and Implementation Issues were once 
considered priority issues, but after Cancun they we re not included in the so-called four key issues to 
resolve, and they have fallen aside, despite  promises that they are equally important. 
We therefore cannot accept the concept that th ere will be “partial modalities” to be settled 
first (for instance by end of July 2007), with only some issues included, while excluding others.  Our 
position is that any settlement of modalities has to be on the whole range of issues of importance to 
the membership.  There has to be “f ull modalities.”  The issues that we wish to include are, inter alia,  
SDT,  Implementation Issues and Concerns, duty free and quota free market access for LDCs and 
simplified and transparent Rules of  Origin, special concerns of Small and Vulnerable Economies, 
commodities, tariff escalation, long-standing prefer ences, cotton, flexibilities for developing countries 
in agriculture including special products and specia l safeguard mechanism;  special treatment for 
countries with ceiling bindings in agriculture; sp ecial treatment for LDCs and net food-importing 
developing countries relating to elim ination of export credits; operationa lisation of the “less than full 
reciprocity” principle; adequate flexibilities for de veloping countries in NAMA; special treatment for 
countries with less than 35% bound tariffs in NAMA (par a 6 countries).  We recall that many of these 
issues have been mentioned by the ACP Council of Ministers.1  
C. BALANCE BETWEEN OBLIGATIONS AND BENEFITS  
Another key principle is that for members, especially the developing country members, the 
level of obligations must be commensurate with the level of benefits to be obtained in the Round.  
There should not be a situation in which developing countries are asked to undertake obligations which are not matched by the same level of benefits, as the costs wi ll outweigh the benefits, causing a 
net and disproportionate loss.  For developing coun tries, there are serious concerns that the Round 
must not result in de-industrialisation or in import surges in agriculture that adversely affect food security, farmers’ livelihoods and rural development.  This w ould defeat the purpose of the 
development objectives of the Round. 
Many developing countries are unable to take  advantage of opportunities arising from 
increased market access resulting fro m the Round because of factors such as non-tariff barriers and 
limited supply capacity.  Many studies have conclude d that most developing countries will gain little 
or nothing and many will be losers from existing proposals put forward by developed countries.  Most of these countries belong to our groupings.  Even if assistance is provided to build their supply 
capacity, it would take a long time before the positive effects are felt.  These countries should therefore not be asked to undertake obligations that  result in costs and losses which are not made up 
for by benefits.   
                                                     
 
1   Many of these are issues mentioned by the ACP Council  of Ministers in their Deci sion on WTO, at Brussels 
24 May 2007. WT/L/687 
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  D. P
RINCIPLE OF LESS THAN FULL RECIPROCITY  
It is critical that the negotiations and the outco me adheres to the principle of less than full 
reciprocity (LTFR), which is affirmed in the D oha Declaration.  At the minimal it means that 
developing countries are to undertake less obliga tions than developed countries (for example as 
measured by percentage reduction in tariffs). 
However, this principle has a much deeper a nd broader meaning, as elaborated by several 
clauses in the GATT Agreement.  It is clear that the LTFR principle gives the right to developing 
countries to make decision on their commitments wh ich they consider to be consistent with their 
development, financial and trade needs, and th ey cannot be expected to make commitments 
inconsistent with their needs, thei r particular situation and problems. 
PART III:  SUMMARY OF SUBS TANTIAL POSITIONS AND CONCERNS 
 
The following is a summary of some of our s ubstantive concerns and positions.  We reserve 
the right to present more details of these in due course. 
AGRICULTURE 
Domestic Support 
 
1. Developed countries must commit to real and e ffective cuts in their overall trade distorting 
domestic support (OTDS), combined with effectiv e disciplines and an effective monitoring and 
surveillance mechanism to avoid b ox-shifting and concentration.  
2. There must be new disciplines for the use of th e Green Box subsidies by developed countries 
to ensure they are really non trade-distorting, as well as the establishment of   a strong and effective 
monitoring and surveillance mechanism.  Green Box subsidies, especially those provided as 
decoupled income support, insurance against income loss and investment aid, should be subjected to 
eligibility criteria such as low levels of income , status as a producer or landowner, landholding and 
production level, in a fixed and unchanging base pe riod.  There should be thresholds placed on the 
criteria.  We also support the Africa Group and G2 0 proposals for the expanded use of the Green Box 
for developing countries. 
3. We will not agree with any attempt to re-instate the peace clause. 
4. We support the elimination of export subsidi es as agreed in Hong Kong and we recall 
proposals made in this regard by different members and groups. 
Market Access 
 
5. We reiterate and support the ACP proposal  on agriculture market access in JOB 
(05)/257/Rev.1. 
6. An effective solution must be found for devel oping country Members with tariff ceilings and 
homogeneous low bindings through specific modalities. 
7. We support the proposals of least developed c ountries and small and vulnerable economies. 
8. We reiterate  the position in the joint communication from the G-33, African Group, ACP, and 
LDCs on special products and the special safegua rd mechanism in TN/AG/GEN/17 (dated 11 May  WT/L/687 
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  2006), which supported “meaningful modalities to secure simple and operationally effective 
instruments of SPs and SSM.” 
9. On special products, we reiterate the Hong Kong Declara tion that developing countries can 
“self designate” an appropriate number of tariff lines as SPs. We support the G33 position that the selection of SPs is only to be guided by the indicat ors and not dictated by them.  We support the G33 
proposal (JOB(05)/304) as the basis for the negotiations.  
10. On Special Safeguard Mechanism  (SSM), we reiterate the Hong Kong decision on this 
issue.   We support the  G33 proposal in JOB(06)/64 dated 23 March 2006 as the basis for the 
negotiations.  We reaffirm that a ll developing countries will have recourse to the SSM.  For LDCs, the 
SSM should be delinked from liberalisation. 
11. Commodities:    We support the proposal on commodities submitted by the Africa Group 
(TN/AG/GEN/18).  Modalities must be adopted that would ensure the elimination of non-trade barriers and that tariff cuts following the application of the formula result in satisfactory reduction in 
the level of tariff escalation.  Where the applica tion of the formula would not be effective in the 
removal of tariff escalation, there should be bilate ral or plurilateral negotia tions among the concerned 
countries, in order to effect the elimination of tariff escalation.  We also support the Africa Group’s 
proposal that provisions of Article XX (h) s hould be clarified to permit commodity producing 
countries to enter into commodity agreements for th e management of supplies and for stabilization of 
prices, without having to invite commodity c onsuming countries to become parties to these 
agreements.  Concrete technical and financial assi stance must be provided to commodity-dependent 
countries. 
12. LDCs : We reaffirm our full support for the H ong Kong decision on the need for developed 
countries and developing countries in a position to do so,  to provide duty free quota free market 
access for all products originating from  all LDCs by 2008, and to apply transparent and simplified 
Rules of Origin in the process.  For developed c ountries facing difficulties in providing full duty free 
quota free market access, we support the proposal by  the Chair of the agriculture negotiations for 
setting a specific deadline for extending DFQF treatme nt to the remaining 3% of tariff lines, i.e. by 
the end of the implementation period. 
13. Cotton:  We support the proposal submitted by the Cotton-4 (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and 
Mali) in June 2006 regarding the re duction in the specific measure of support applicable to cotton.  
We reaffirm the decision in Hong Kong requesting th e elimination in 2006 of all forms of subsidies 
granted to cotton by developed countries. We al so propose that developed countries, will, and 
developing countries in a position to do so, should provide duty free and quota-free access for imports 
of cotton from LDCs.  This could cover imports fro m all developing countries as well.  We stress the 
need to set up a mechanism to deal  with the loss of revenue that cotton producing countries in Africa 
are facing as a result of declining cotton prices. 
14. Longstanding preferences and preference erosion:  We urge that the agriculture 
negotiations and modalities fully address the issue of erosion of preferences through appropriate and 
meaningful trade solutions.  The issue of longsta nding preferences is vital.  Its importance is duly 
recognized both in the July Framework and the Hong  Kong Ministerial Declaration.  We will not be 
able to join a consensus on a modalities text which does not address through appropriate trade 
measures the issue of preference erosion in a mean ingful and effective manner.  Failure to do so 
would impose a disproportionate share of the cost s of reform on some of the poorest and most 
vulnerable Members of the WTO.  We reiterate that we have adopted a very constructive approach on 
this issue throughout the negotiating process and have  in this regard submitted a list of products, 
benefiting from preferences, which must be given due consideration along the lines mentioned in the 
Agriculture Chairman’s draft modalities text of Ju ly 2006, including a longer transition period for WT/L/687 
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  tariff reduction for such products.  We note that th e ACP Group is in the process of refining their 
original list of products submitted.  We are concerne d by the very minimalist  approach taken by the 
Agriculture Chair in his Challenges Paper and which limits products c overed under longstanding 
preferences to merely two products.  We call on the Chairman to reinstate in any modality text the 
options outlined in his July 2006 Draft Modalities Text. 
15. Tropical and diversification products .  Due consideration should be given to the overlap 
between liberalisation of tropical pr oducts and products relating to pref erence erosion.  The lists for 
tropical products liberalisation and for preference eros ion have to be dealt with together.  A balanced 
solution is also needed to address the mandates for tropical products and for products of particular 
importance to the diversification of produc tion from the growing of illicit narcotic drugs. 
16. We stress the importance of strengthening disci plines on export prohibitions and restrictions 
provided under Article 12.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture (applied as unilateral coercive 
measures), as mandated in paragraph 50 of the July  2004 Framework and affirm that the proposal in 
JOB (06)/147 is a good basis for addressing the issue.   
NAMA 
17. We insist that the principle of “less than full reciprocity” is fully respected and adhered to in 
the modalities and the outcome of negotiations.  We will not accept any modalities and outcome of 
negotiations that will lead to de-indus trialisation in developing countries. 
18. On flexibilities for countries under paragraph 6 of the July 2004 framework on NAMA, we 
support the proponents of the paragraph 6 proposal fo r a binding coverage of up to 70% and at an 
overall average tariff rate of 28.5%. 
19. On flexibilities for small and vulnerable economie s, we support that a solution for SVEs shall 
be found outside the formula, in a banded appro ach that adequately addresses the dispersion of the 
current bound averages of the proponents.  
20. On least developed countries, we support the process outlined by the LDC Group on the 
implementation of the Hong Kong Decision on the Duty Free Quota Free Market Access for the 
LDCs in accordance with the LDC Market Acce ss proposal TN/MA/W/78 dated 30 June 2006.  
21. We support the position expressed by the NAMA 11 group of developing countries in 
TN/MA/W/86 dated 8 June, including the principl es of “double proportionality” (less than full 
reciprocity principle and balance between NAMA and agriculture negotiations) and the need for 
expanded flexibilities for developing countries. 
22. We reiterate the vital role of long standing pr eferences in the development of our countries 
and urge in this regard the WTO NAMA Negotiati ng Group to fully address the issue of erosion of 
preferences through appropriate and meaningful tr ade solutions, taking into account the constructive 
proposal of the ACP Group in NAMA.    
Services 
 
23. We reaffirm that each developing country has the right to choose the commitments in GATS 
that it wishes to make, and developing countries s hould thus not be subjected to pressure to make 
offers.  The bilateral request-offer process shoul d remain the main method of negotiations and 
participation in other processes of negotiations should be voluntary.   WT/L/687 
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  24. There should be no attempt to re-introduce any forms of bench-marking, or use of formulae 
and guidelines to pressurise developing countries to increase their commitments.  Any restricted negotiating processes (“Green Room” or small-group meetings) should be fully representative and in 
line with the principles of inclusiveness and transpar ency (i.e. they should not be restricted only to 
those having participated in plurilaterals). 
25. We insist on the need for effective implem entation of GATS provisions on improving market 
access in sectors and modes of export interest to developing countries, especially Modes 1 and 4. 
26. Disciplines on Domestic Regulation under th e GATS should not constrain the ability of 
developing countries to regulate services in order to  meet their developmental needs and to ensure 
access and availability of essential services to thei r citizens.  The proposed draft disciplines on 
Domestic Regulation may no longer formally contain the term “necessity test”; however the proposed 
disciplines couched with implicit operational necess ity tests may still constr ain domestic regulatory 
policy flexibility of developing countries, and therefore improvements to the draft are required.  
27. We fully support proposals for provisions in  GATS which exclude the applicability of GATS 
rules and commitments with regard to water services and other essential services.  Besides, 
developing countries require provisions which also guarantee universal access. 
28. We urge members to consider seriously the proposal on the Mechanism for Granting Special 
Priority to LDCs that the LDC Group tabled.  The LDCs are concerned over the lack of progress in the implementation of the Hong Kong Ministerial decision on the development of a mechanism for 
granting special priority to the LDCs in line with  the modalities for the Special Treatment for LDCs in 
the negotiations on trade and services adopted in 2003. 
Special and differential treatment (SDT) and Implementation Issues 
 
29. SDT and Implementation Issues are key development issues that were provided priority status 
in the Doha Ministerial Declaration. Unfortunate ly the negotiations in these two areas have been 
increasingly marginalised, with few positive results so fa r.  We insist that the outcome in these issues 
should not be left to the end of the negotiations , but should be part of the core modalities which 
should be settled at the same time as other important issues.   
Rules 
 
30. We call upon  WTO members to adopt rules and provisions in Regional Trade Agreements 
that allow developing countries to have adequate  development flexibilities, including non-reciprocal 
commitments and the SDT principle (as reflected in the submission on RTAs made by the ACP Group in TN/RL/W/155 dated 28 April 2004) when negotiati ng and concluding bilateral and regional trading 
arrangements with develope d country members.  We propose clarif ications and modifications in the 
existing provisions of Article XXIV of GATT 1994 to incorporate S&D treatment for developing 
countries and submit that the Enabling Clause should be preserved to continue to provide the legal 
basis within which to negotiate South-South RTAs. 
31. On fisheries subsidies disciplines, we reiterate  the importance of ensuring that the interests 
and concerns of ACP coastal and island states and SVEs are fully addressed and that special and 
differential treatment provisions shall be an inte gral part of any outcome of the negotiations. 
TRIPS 
32. We support the proposal, co-sponsored by the Africa Group together with other developing 
countries, on the requirements of disclosure of countri es of origin, prior informed consent and benefit WT/L/687 
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  sharing, in relation to patent applications i nvolving genetic resources and associated traditional 
knowledge.  An agreement to amend th e TRIPS Agreement in this regard should be an integral part of 
the outcome of the Doha Round. 
33. We reiterate the importance of the review process of  Article 27.3b of the TRIPS Agreement, 
including the treatment of patenting of mi cro-organisms and microbiological process, and 
the sui generis  system in relation to plant varieties. 
Trade Facilitation 
 
34. We reiterate that technical assistance and capacity building and special and differential 
treatment are integral parts of any outcome  on Trade Facilitation.  We therefore envisage 
commitments and  adequate and effective mechanisms  on technical assistance and capacity building.  
In that context, we recall the unique and specifi c mandate outlined in Annex D of the July 2004 
Framework Agreement which links the undertaking of  commitments to the provision of technical 
assistance and capacity building. 
Aid For Trade 
 
35. Although Aid for Trade is not part of the Single Undertaking, we reaffirm the importance of 
implementing effectively the recommendations of the Task Force on Aid for Trade and making Aid For Trade additional, non-conditional, pred ictable, sustainable and effective.  
Enhanced Integrated Framework 
 
36. We welcome the recommendations of the EIF Task Force, and we further urge the IF 
Agencies incorporating partners to ensure speedy and effective implementation of the 
recommendations 
 
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