RESTRICTED  WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  S/CSC/M/53 
28 May 2010 
 (10-2975) 
Committee on Specific Commitments   
  
 
REPORT OF THE MEETING HELD ON 29 APRIL 2010 
 
Note by the Secretariat
1 
  
1. The Committee on Specific Commitments (CSC ) held a meeting on 29 April 2010. The 
agenda for the meeting, contained in WTO/AIR/3547, was adopted.  
A. A
PPOINTMENT OF CHAIRPERSON OF THE COMMITTEE  
2. The outgoing Chair , Mr. Jean-Marc Mignon from France, informed the Committee that the 
Chair of the Council for Trade in Services had conc luded his consultations on the slate of names for 
the Chairpersons of the various bodies.  He pr oposed that the Committee elect Ms. Natalie Burke 
from Barbados as its new Chair by acclamation.   
3. It was so agreed .   
4. The outgoing Chair thanked the delegations for their trust and support.  He recalled that 
important progress had been made in the past year.  In particular, it was agreed that the replacement 
method would be the working assumption to incorpor ate the results of the market access negotiations 
into the GATS; three proposals had been submitte d, which had provided a good basis for future 
discussion on the relationship between old and ne w commitments.  He also recalled that the 
Committee had held an informal discussion on the re levance of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties to the prevention of rollbacks.  Given the importance and legal complexity of the issue, he 
encouraged delegations not to wait until the last moment to solve it. 
5. The meeting was then chaired by Ms. Natalie Burke. 
B. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OLD AND NEW COMMITMENT  
6. The Chair  recalled that Members had agreed to b ase their work on the assumption that the 
replacement method would be the approach to inco rporating the results of current services market 
access negotiations into the GATS.  In previous discussions, Members had expressed concern that the 
level of treatment provided by pre-existing commitments might be undermined when these are 
replaced by commitments in the new schedules.   In this context, the key issue was how  to ensure that 
there would be no such rollbacks in the new schedul es, or to find a means to deal with potential 
rollbacks after the entry into force of the prot ocol implementing the results of the Round.   
7. She noted that encouraging progress had been  made under this item as delegations had 
submitted concrete proposals or ha d engaged in substantive discussi ons.  Her predecessor, in his 
informal Note circulated last week, had ou tlined the approaches proposed by Members and 
                                                      
1 This document has been prepared under the Secret ariat's own responsibility and without prejudice to 
the positions of Members and to their rights and obligations under the WTO. S/CSC/M/53 
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  highlighted the divergence of views.  At the info rmal meeting last Friday, he had suggested that 
delegations make comments on these approaches at today's meeting.   
8. The representative of Japan
 stated that with respect to the three approaches referred to in the 
informal Note from the previous Chairman dated 20 April 2010, Approach 1, i.e. relying on Article 
XIX of the GATS with no particular language in the protocol, was not sufficient to prevent rollbacks.  
The combination of Approaches 2 and 3 would be th e best scenario for Japan.  Japan believed that 
Members would undertake a thorough verification exercise and try their best to prevent any types of rollback.  At the same, Japan also believed that some mechanism or language in the protocol was 
needed in order to address rollbacks identified after the entry into fo rce of the protocol, including a 
negotiating process as mentioned in Approach 3.  Several topics brought up in the informal Note 
might need further discussion.   
9. Referring to the proposal from Japan, he stated that Japan welcomed any comments.  While 
recognizing the merit of China's suggestion that Members make a self-declaration concerning any changes to their schedules during the verification ex ercise,  his delegation noted that Members might 
disagree on the existence of rollback.  It might be  difficult to prevent rollbacks simply based on good 
will of Members.  The Japanese proposal was thus re levant.  Recalling that several delegations had 
asked for the details of the proposed mechanism, he  said that Japan wished to deepen discussions in 
this regard when there was agreement on the elem ents proposed.  The procedures for the modification 
of schedules and the procedures for the certification of rectifications to schedules, respectively contained in documents S/L/80 and S/L/84,  could serve as references for such discussions.  Members' 
agreement that new schedules should contain no rollbacks should be reflected in the protocol.  The 
premise of the Japanese proposal was to have a thorough verification exercise.  Therefore, Japan 
wished to have a discussion in this regard.  Rega rding some delegations' concerns about the legal 
uncertainty arising from the Japanese proposal, he sai d that under the proposal, Members would be 
allowed only to replace new commitments with ol d commitments during a transitional period and 
thereafter old commitments would have no legal validity.      
10. The representative of Chinese Taipei
 noted that the informal  Note from the previous 
Chairman had summarized the state of play on th is issue and could serve as a good starting point for 
further discussion under the leadership of the new Chai r.  Two questions had been raised in this note: 
First, how to prevent rollbacks in the new schedules ?  And second, how to find a means to deal with 
potential rollbacks after the entry into force of th e protocol?  His delegation believed that Members 
needed to ensure due diligence and good faith before the submission of  final draft schedules, and have 
adequate procedures for verification after the submissi on of draft schedules.  With respect to the three 
approaches referred to in the informal Note, Appro ach 1 might not be a sufficient "insurance policy" 
to deal with potential rollbacks due to lack of clarity regarding "progressively higher level of 
liberalization" in Article XIX of the GATS.  Co ncerning Approach 2, his delegation supported the 
idea of introducing  appropriate languages in the protocol.  Th e text proposed by Australia seemed to 
be in the right direction, while the Swiss proposal  provided certain operational guidance to deal with 
disputes over potential rollbacks.  Regarding Appr oach 3 to set up a negotiating process after the 
Round, as proposed by Japan, the implementation mechanism had yet to be materialized.  Disagreement on the existence of rollbacks would ultimately need to be resolved through the 
procedures under the DSU.  Therefore, the verifica tion exercise before the conclusion of the Round 
should be strengthened.  Nevertheless,  his delegation was interested in Japan’s further clarifications.   
11. The representative of Hong Kong, China
 stated that, in order to preserve Members' rights and 
obligations in case of rollback notwithstanding the entr y into force of the new consolidated schedules, 
an express safeguard provision in the protocol was need ed.  It should ensure that commitments in the 
new schedules would not afford treatment less favour able than that provided previously.  Such an 
express provision was to ensure that the relevant ar ticles of the Vienna Convention, namely Articles 
31 and 32, would be applicable be yond legal doubt in cases of disputes over rollback.  Given the large  S/CSC/M/53 
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  WTO membership and the complexity and techni cality of services schedules, whilst all Members 
would have acted in good faith in scheduling their new commitments, there could be different views 
on whether a particular change in a Member's  commitment would constitute a rollback.  His 
delegation was not against the idea of instituting a consultative mechanism as  Japan had suggested.  
However, it was unlikely that all such cases could be resolved through negotiations as there could be 
disagreement on issues of substance as well as on interp retation.  It was essential to have an effective 
mechanism to provide recourse to the old schedules as the interpretative context for the new schedules 
to preserve Members' rights and obligations in such  situations.  For the above reasons, his delegation 
did not support relying only on Article XIX of the GATS without particular protocol language, or to 
address rollback problems only through negotiations.  These two approaches would not provide a 
comfortable level of legal certainty.   He noted that some Members were concerned that a legally 
binding instrument recognizing the interpretative st atus of old schedules would result in two legally 
valid schedules.  However, insofar as the instrume nt was carefully crafted to only legalise the old 
schedules as a valid source of interpretation, there would be no such risk.   
12. The representative of Norway  was of the view that none of the alternatives referred to in the 
previous Chairman's informal Note seemed to pr ovide the perfect solution to the potential problem.  
In particular, Approach 2 would potentially lead to  an uncertain legal situation where there could be 
doubts as to which commitments were actually in for ce.  Therefore, her delegation was not convinced 
of this alternative.  With regard to Approach 1,  Article XIX of the GATS could be of significance as 
context when it came to the interpretation of new commitments.  However, the provision itself did not 
necessarily imply that each of the new commitments s hould have a higher level of liberalization.  This 
provision related to services sectors in general, and "a  higher level of liberali zation" could be achieved 
for a sector, even if some commitments were less  ambitious.  Approach 3 was the most interesting 
alternative which could ensure le gal certainty and stability of commi tments through consultations and 
negotiations during the verification period.  That pe riod could in principle start right now.  It was 
possible to address disagreement that could not be r esolved within the period of verification through 
appropriate procedures.  These should follow the same  principle as the verification exercise without 
introducing a two-track system.  When the new sche dules entered into force, the old schedules would 
have no legal value any more.  All other so lutions might create legal uncertainty.   
13. The representative of Turkey  noted that Article XIX provided that "Members shall enter into 
successive rounds of negotiations ... with a view  to achieving a progressively higher level of 
liberalization".  It further stated that "such ne gotiations shall be directed to the reduction or 
elimination of the adverse effects on trade in services of measures as a means of providing effective 
market access".  This provision prevented Memb ers from making changes to their commitments that 
would cause rollbacks.   In addition, Article XXI established the conditions and requirements for the 
modification and withdrawal of commitments.   Th ese principles and procedures were sufficient to 
guarantee progressive liberalization of commitments.  If Members were not satisfied with this 
approach, her delegation was open to the approach to  include particular language in the protocol to 
prevent rollbacks in the new schedul es.   However, such language should be as clear and certain as 
possible.  Australia's proposal could be a possible ba sis for such language.  Article XIX should also be 
referred to in the protocol. 
14. The representative of Pakistan  first commented on the thr ee approaches outlined in the 
previous Chairman's informal Note.  His delegati on had hesitations with respect to Approach 1.  
Merely relying on Article XIX was not sufficient because a Member might improve some 
commitments and at the same time reduce some others and, nevertheless, achieve on average a higher level of liberalization, unless there was more clarity  in Article XIX.  While Approach 3 had some 
merits, many Members did not have capacity and sk ills to enter into a new negotiation phase, which 
involved different interpretations and would lead up to  potential disputes.  Such type of consultations 
existed in other areas.  His delegation had been  supporting Approach 2 since the beginning of the 
discussion as it could provide more certainty and clarity.  It did not mean that each Member would S/CSC/M/53 
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  have two schedules in parallel.  It was to ensure th at the new schedules be read in the context of the 
replaced schedules.   Finally, there was a need to define what a rollback was.  There might be four 
types of definition.  Rollback could be anything that did not meet the criteria of "progressively higher level of liberalization".  However, this definition w as too loose.  Other possible definitions of rollback 
could be: any deletion or downward amendment of existing commitments; or addition of restrictions 
on market access/national treatment; or incorporat ion of regulatory changes into market access 
commitments by making them more restrictive.  He thought that more conceptual clarity would help 
Members find the appropriate a pproach to address rollbacks.  
15. The representative of Canada
 stated that Article 32 of the Vienna Convention allowed the 
recourse to supplementary means of treaty interpre tation such as negotiating history when the text was 
ambiguous.  If the Doha Round commitments repl aced the commitments from the Uruguay Round 
and accessions, the Vienna Convention would likely allow Members to refer to the latter in cases 
where the ordinary meaning was not clear, but w ould not likely allow Members to use them in 
interpreting the ordinary meaning in context according to the general rule of interpretation, since they 
were no longer part of the WTO agreements.  Ca nada's paper in 2006 had been intended to spark 
discussion on this subject.  Although there were di fferent views in terms of how to achieve legal 
certainty, Members had a common objective of preventi ng rollbacks.  Canada's view was most closely 
in line with Approach 2 as set out in the informal Note of the previous Chairman.  There were three 
points Canada wished to stress.  Firstly, it conti nued to support the replacem ent method at the end of 
the Doha Round negotiations, which would effectively allow new schedules to replace old schedules.  
This was a practical way to proceed.  Secondly, the replacement method should be without prejudice 
to Members' legal rights under previous commitmen ts, allowing Members to have recourse to old 
commitments in cases where rollbacks were identifie d following the verification process.  Rollbacks 
were only permitted through Article XXI procedures.  Specific language included within the protocol 
could provide Members with legal certainty on both of these points .  Thirdly, Members needed to 
have a thorough and comprehensiv e verification exercise which was aimed at identifying any 
potential rollbacks and errors in schedules.  Cana da was concerned, however, that a comprehensive 
verification exercise might not be sufficient, esp ecially when disagreement between Members could 
not be resolved.  For this reason, Canada was in fa vour of strong language in the protocol to ensure 
that the replacement method was without prejudice to Members' legal rights under previous schedules.   
16. The representative of Colombia  stated that Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention could 
be partially useful in the discussion regarding th e meaning and scope of the commitments resulting 
from the Doha Round.  As far as Article 31 was conc erned, it was clear that the object and purpose of 
the commitments was liberalization of trade in ser vices.  With respect to Article 32, and without 
prejudice to the fact that its use was restricted, the circumstances of conclusion of the GATS should 
include one of the key elements of the WTO Ag reement, which was to achieve the substantial 
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade as we ll as the elimination of discriminatory treatment in 
international trade relations, as mentioned in its  Preamble.  While Articles 31 and 32 should not be 
totally discarded from the analysis regarding the relationship between old and new commitments, the 
way they might be used could reduce the effec tiveness in achieving the objective Members were 
pursuing.  The objective was to ensure that the commitments resulting from the Doha Round 
negotiations would contain no rollbacks.  The interp retation exercise in accordance with Articles 31 
and 32 of the Vienna Convention would take plac e after the negotiations had concluded and its 
outcome could not be guaranteed.  Relying excl usively on Article XIX of GATS to achieve the 
objective would pose similar problems.  Therefore,  this would not be the approach Colombia 
preferred.  The other two approaches (i.e. inclusion of particular language in  the final protocol and 
negotiations) were closer to helping Members ac hieve their objective.  These approaches were not 
conflicting, but rather complementary.  The appr oach to addressing rollbacks through negotiations 
could be very effective for those Members who held information, possessed human and technical 
resources to analyze it, and had negotiating strength.  The approach to including particular language in 
the protocol would provide other Members with great er confidence in avoiding rollbacks.  One of the  S/CSC/M/53 
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  concerns surrounding this approach was the binding  nature of commitments in the old and new 
schedules.  This issue could be resolved by clear and precise drafting .  
17. The representative of the Republic of Korea  stated that the replacement method was the 
ultimate approach to prevent the co-existence of old and new commitments and that negligence might 
be inevitable in the verification exercise.  In vi ew of this, the three proposals presented respectively 
by Australia, Switzerland and Japan had provided u seful ideas.  However, these proposals did not 
address all concerns raised by Members.  For exam ple, who should legitimately carry out the "no less 
favourable treatment" test suggested by Australia  and Switzerland?  The negotiating process proposed 
by Japan was more an ex-post negotiation than a le gal interpretation.  Another concern related to 
imbalanced consultations insofar as a scheduling Me mber was highly likely to be confronted with 
multiple complaints.   Due to the complexity a nd legal nature of commitments interpretation, 
schedules had to be dealt with in the legal forum of the WTO.  Echoing China's idea expressed at the 
Committee's previous meeting, Korea wished to draw attention to Article XIX of the GATS and the dispute settlement system.  Any Memb er should be able to have recourse to DSB in order to challenge 
another Member's the violation of Article XIX.   This provision co uld not prevent all rollbacks since it 
did not specify the criteria for liberalization.  Clarif ying language might thus need to be included into 
the protocol.  While supporting the replacement  method and recognizing the importance of the 
verification exercise, he noted that the latter wa s no guarantee against negligence and rollbacks.   
Therefore, dispute settlement, together with an ag reed interpretation of Ar ticle XIX, should be the 
final resort to address rollbacks.   
18. The representative of the European Union
 endorsed the interpretation of Article XIX 
presented by Norway and Pakistan.  She agreed th at this provision was not sufficient to prevent 
rollbacks.  Interpretation of commitments in acc ordance with Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention was mainly textual, not based on th e commercial meaning of commitments.  Her 
delegation supported the replacement method because of the legal certainty and simplicity it might 
provide.  Recognizing the need to prevent rollback s, her delegation thought that the verification 
exercise should be carried out during a reasonable ti me period and before the entry into force of new 
commitments.  Her delegation supported Approach 3 under which a multilateral exercise could be a 
useful tool to eliminate rollbacks.  She sought clarifications from the Secretariat on previous 
experience in addressing disagreement arising fro m the verification exercise.  Noting Korea's 
comments on a "no less favourable treatment" test, she stated that carrying out such a test should not give legal value to old commitments.  Otherwise,  it would contradict the replacement method.  
19. The representative of the Secretariat
 noted that there had been no disagreement cases in 
previous three verification exercises in services (i .e. verification of the Uruguay Round schedules and 
of the results of the extended negotiations on fina ncial services and telecommunications). This was 
because these exercises had taken place after the conc lusion of relevant negotia tions and their nature 
had been consultative.  They had focused on the t echnical consistency with the Scheduling Guidelines 
and GATS provisions and rollback had not been an issu e then.  It had been up to each participant to 
decide whether to act on the comments it had receive d on its schedule.  Members needed to consider 
the nature and timing of the verification exercise for the current round.    
20. With respect to the issue of what constitute d a rollback, he recalled an example he had 
mentioned previously, a quota limitation on license bei ng replaced by a foreign equity limitation.  It 
showed that it was difficult to determine in the abstract what rollback w as.  He suggested to 
delegations to think about concepts other than ro llback, which could provide legal certainty.   One 
idea for consideration might be to specify in the protocol that the benefits accruing to services and 
services suppliers of Members under the old schedules should not be affected by the entry into force 
of the new schedules.   S/CSC/M/53 
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  21. The representative of Australia
 noted that the whole discussion was premised on the idea that 
there were perceived deficiencies in Article XI X and/or the Vienna Convention, which prevented 
these tools from ensuring the absence of rollbacks as part of the conclusion of the Doha Round.  
Rather, the emphasis needed to be placed on the veri fication exercise which should take place prior to 
the conclusion of the negotiations.  Australia woul d go along with parts of Approach 3 mentioned in 
the previous Chairman's informal Note.  That wa s to focus on the verification exercise, including 
related negotiations and carefully design the process.  Since this might still be insufficient to prevent 
rollbacks, a thorough verification exercise should be co mbined with specific language in the protocol.  
This was not inconsistency with the replacement method, as there would be only one schedule, the 
new schedule, in force.  The language proposed by  Australia would allow Members to ensure that 
new commitments would not be interpreted as accord ing less favourable treatment than that under old 
commitments.  This was in line with what the repr esentative of the Secretariat had suggested.  Since 
rollback could be defined differently, the definiti on should not be a precondition for any further work 
on particular language in the protocol or on th e designing of the verification process.     
22. The representative of Mexico  agreed that Article XIX was not  sufficient to avoid rollbacks.  
To include particular language in the protocol to this effect, as proposed by Australia, could be an 
option.  The consultative approach was complementary to the inclusi on of particular language in the 
protocol, but needed further discussion.    
23. The representative of China  noted that the discussion in the Committee focused on how to 
prevent rollbacks as consensus had emerged on the replacement method.  The verification exercise 
was the most important phase to prevent rollbacks.   He reiterated China's suggestion that the 
scheduling Members declare in good faith any techni cal modifications, amendments or changes to 
their schedules so as to facilitate the verification process.  China was cautious about any particular 
text added to the protocol, which might create legal uncertainty for the new commitments.  The Vienna Convention and the existing WTO instrume nts provided recourse for Members to address 
their problems.  Nevertheless, China was open to  further discussion.  Finally, he echoed the 
suggestion by Pakistan to discuss the definition of rollback.   
24. The representative of Chile
 stated that Article XIX was suffici ent to prevent rollbacks.  It was 
difficult to define it precisely and any additional la nguage in the protocol might cause interpretation 
problems.  Article XIX was sufficiently clear and di d not need to be strengthened through particular 
language in the protocol, which might be s ubject to inappropriate interpretation.  
25. According to the representative of Switzerland,  it was not clear that to what extent the 
relationship between old and new commitments was equivalent to treaty succession.  If these were 
regarded as two different treaties, to what de gree was it possible to find incompatibilities of 
obligations so that the rules for treaty succession would apply?  However, services commitments were 
positive commitments which could be implemented cu mulatively.  This was also  the practice in 
bilateral free trade agreements.     
26. With respect to the approaches ou tlined in the previous Chairman's informal Note, he shared 
the view that these were complementary to some  extent.  Regarding Approach 1, Article XIX 
provided the legal basis for the current negotiations on progressive liberalization.  Therefore, rollback 
commitments were not permitted.  Article XXI was a powerful tool to interpret Article XIX.  In the 
absence of Article XXI, Article XIX might give rise to  divergent interpretations.  With the existence 
of Article XXI, however, there should be no inte rpretation problem.  Noting that not everybody 
shared this view, Switzerland together with some other delegations believed that the inclusion of 
particular language in the protocol  would be useful in clarifying the intention of Members.  This 
would help preserve rights acquired in preceding ne gotiations, but could not be equated with the 
existence of two schedules.  Regarding some de legations' concern about incompatibility with the 
replacement method, he reiterated that the repl acement method was a practical tool, not a legal  S/CSC/M/53 
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  concept or a WTO concept, whose possible legal imp lications remained to be defined.  The proposed 
approach was not incompatible with the replacem ent method.  On Approach 3, Switzerland favoured 
a verification exercise taking place before the conc lusion of the negotiations , which would be a good 
complement to Approaches 1 and 2.  As to the two questions raised in paragraph 11 of the previous 
Chairman's informal Note, he asked for whom le gal stability of commitments was sought for.  He 
thought that legal stability should be sought for trad ing partners and service suppliers to ensure that 
what had been ratified would be maintained for a lo ng time and that all commitments fulfilled.  On the 
suggestion to define rollback, he thought that this should be tackled on a case-by-case basis and not be 
part of the work in relation to Approach 2.  The communication from Switzerland (S/CSC/W/56), in 
particular paragraph 15, sought to clarify the treat ment granted by commitments.  It would not be 
difficult for dispute settlement bodies to determin e on a case-by-case basis whether two commitments 
provided for the same or different treatment.  Th e proposal by Australia was a good working basis to 
continue with Approach 2. 
27. The representative of New Zealand  stated that while Article XIX as well as the Vienna 
Convention along with the verification exercise were helpful, they did not suffice to prevent or 
subsequently deal with rollbacks.  New Zealand s upported having particular la nguage in the protocol 
along the lines proposed by Australia.  The verifi cation exercise should take place before the Doha 
Round schedules were incorporated by protocol at the conclusion of the Round.  During the verification process, Members who identified rollbac ks should notify the relevant delegation.  The 
Member concerned should then be given opport unity to correct its schedule before it was 
incorporated.  In the absence of correction, th at Member's schedule would be incorporated 
nevertheless.  After the Doha Round, rollbacks that  were identified as errors in schedules would still 
be able to be rectified through Article 79 of the Vi enna Convention.  Explicit language in the protocol 
as proposed by Australia would allow Members to challenge the interpretation of rollback 
commitments.  They would then need to have recourse to dispute settlement.    
28. The representative of Guatemala
 supported the replacement method for the incorporation of 
commitments resulting from the Doha Round.  It w as not necessary to include any element in the 
protocol referring to previous schedules as source of  interpretation.  The Vi enna Convention applied 
to the interpretation of commitments, regardless of whether explicit language was included in the 
protocol, particularly in the case where Member s disagreed on the meaning of commitments.  
Likewise, there was no precedent in the WTO of in cluding such language of this nature in an 
instrument.  With respect to the three approaches referred to in th e previous Chairman's informal 
Note, it was not necessary to include particular language in the protocol to ensure that new 
commitments would not undermine previous comm itments since it was presumed that any rollback 
should be discussed and resolved during the negotia ting process.  Therefore, Guatemala's preference 
was a combination of Approaches 1 and 3.     
29. The representative of the United States  recognized the importance of the verification process 
as the essential means to address possi ble rollbacks.  Some ideas in Japan's proposal were promising 
in this regard.  Members needed to be careful  about introducing protoc ol language which might 
undermine legal certainty.  None of the proposals so far could persuasively ensure clarity and 
certainty.  The United States looked forward to further discussion under this item.    
30. The representative of Brazil  stated that his delegation was not convinced that there was a need 
to have particular language in the protocol.  While Brazil fa voured Approaches 1 and 3, it was open to 
further discussion.  
31. The Chair  noted that the divergence of views ha d remained.  She suggested to hold 
consultations on future work, and that the Committee take note of the statements made and revert to 
this agenda item at its next meeting.   S/CSC/M/53 
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  32. It was so agreed
. 
C. SCHEDULING ISSUES  
33. The Chair  recalled that the Committee, at its mee ting on 8 October 2009, had requested the 
Secretariat to update its previous Note on econom ic needs tests (ENTs), which was contained in 
document S/CSS/W/118, dated 30 November 2001.  It had been agreed that the update should 
examine only the schedules of those Members that  had acceded to the WTO after 30 November 2001.  
In response to the request, the S ecretariat had prepared a Note as an addendum to S/CSS/W/118, 
which was included in the document package for this meeting. 
34. Noting that there was no intervention, the Chair  suggested that the Committee revert to this 
item at the next meeting. 
35. It was so agreed . 
D. CLASSIFICATION ISSUES  
36. There was no intervention under this item either.  
37. Noting that there had been no interventions unde r the two standing items – scheduling issues 
and classification issues – for quite some time, the Chair  invited delegations to consider how to 
reinvigorate the regular work of the Committee.  She recalled that the mandate of the Committee 
included overseeing the implementation of specific commitments and the application of the procedures for the modification of schedules under Article XXI.  It was also the Committee's responsibility to examine, at the request of Me mbers, schedules of specific commitments and MFN 
exemption lists with a view to improving their technical accuracy and coherence in the future.  
38. She recalled that a delegation had suggested at the Council's last meeting that the Committee 
consider some classification issues identified in the Secretariat's Background Note on energy services.  
Some other delegations had suggested at the Co mmittee's previous meetings that the Committee 
discuss new services in various sectors based on the Background Notes currently prepared by the 
Secretariat.   
39. She suggested to hold consultations on future wo rk, and that the Committee revert to this item 
at the next meeting. 
40. It was so agreed
. 
E. OTHER BUSINESS  
41. There was no intervention under this item.   
 
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