WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  TN/MA/W/138 
28 June 2010 
 (10-3522) 
Negotiating Group on Market Access Original:   English 
  
 
 
MARKET ACCESS FOR NON-AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
 
International Standards
 
 
Communication from the United States 
 
 The following communication, dated 28 June 2010,  is being circulated at the request of the 
delegation of the United States.  
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 1. Voluntary standards are tools used to meet specific, often highly technical, objectives.  The 
WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT  Agreement) recognizes the important role that 
international standards can play in meeting regul atory objectives and facilitating trade.  However, 
several proposals related to the TBT Agreement in the NAMA/NTB negotiations – regarding autos 
and electronics in particular – seek to designa te particular bodies as "relevant international 
standardizing bodies" as a means to promote great er harmonization.   The United States supports 
efforts to facilitate trade through greater ha rmonization where appropriate, but does not support 
designating particular bodies as "relevant internationa l standardizing bodies" in these sectors, or any 
sector, as a sensible, or indeed advisable, means to promote the goal of greater harmonization.  
Fundamentally, whether a standard is relevant, e ffective and appropriate in fulfilling a Member’s 
particular regulatory or market need is not determin ed by which body developed it.  Further, greater 
harmonization results from increased worldwide use of a standard, and that use is directly attributable 
to relevance, effectiveness and appropriateness of th e standard itself in meeting a specific need.    
 
2.      To facilitate Members’ understanding of our  position, and to inform their own considerations, 
we draw Members’ attention to the following:   Relevance depends on the standard not the body
 
 
3.      First, the technical content of a standa rd is the paramount consid eration in determining its 
relevance and appropriateness for use in meeting a specific need or objective.  By designating 
particular bodies as "relevant international sta ndardizing bodies," Members would essentially be 
endorsing the standards that such bodies produce, wit hout reviewing their content, and regardless of 
whether those standards are ones that ultimately  meet specific regulatory or market needs. 
 
4.      The TBT Agreement recognizes this critical  nexus between the standard and the objective.  
Specifically, Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement refers to relevant international standards, not relevant 
international bodies.  It links whether a standard is  "relevant" to the legitimate objective pursued.  It 
does not link the term, "relevant", to the body that developed the standard.   
5.      Further, designating particular bodies as "relevant international standardizing bodies" has 
specific, and undesirable, legal implications.  In  particular, designating "relevant international TN/MA/W/138 
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  standardizing bodies" would establish a presumption that technical regulations and conformity 
assessment procedures based on standards develo ped by a designated body are not unnecessary 
obstacles to trade, even in situations where, for ex ample, a standard developed by a designated body is 
inappropriate, outdated or otherwi se flawed or disproportionately reflects the interests of some 
Members over others.  
    
6.      With the notable exception of the UNECE 1958 Agreement, the United States actively 
participates in the technical committees of the bodies the proposals would designate, and U.S. entities 
use many of the standards developed by these bodi es as the basis for U.S. technical regulations and 
conformity assessment procedures.  The fact that a Member may use a standard developed by a 
designated body should not be construed as endorseme nt of each and every standard developed by 
that body as "relevant" to any give n regulatory or market need.   
 7.      The value of participating in the developm ent of a standard by a particular body, or a decision 
to use a standard developed by a particular body to  fulfill a given market or regulatory need, stands 
wholly apart from the wisdom of designating that body or any other bodies as "relevant international 
standardizing bodies."    Many bodies develop standards that meet regulatory and market needs 
 
 8.      Many bodies other than those listed in the proposals develop standards that may be 
considered international and that can be used to meet regulatory objectives and market needs in the 
autos and electronics sectors.  These bodies include, for example, for electronics, the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and Unde rwriters Laboratories (UL), and for autos, the 
Society of Automotive Engineers Internati onal (SAE), and ASTM International.  
 
9.      The simple reality is that bodies developi ng standards in any partic ular area have changed, 
and will continue to change ove r time, as product technologies evolve and new products are 
developed in ways that cannot be anticipated.  For example, mechanical parts have been increasingly 
replaced with electronic IT parts in automobiles ove r the last decade, which has implications for the 
relevance of the underlying standards and the bodies that produce them.    
10.     In today’s complex world, the bodies d esignated in the proposals cannot produce the breadth 
and diversity of standards needed to fulfill all of the regulatory and market needs across the autos and 
electronics sectors.  A fundamental question creat ed by the proposals is:  how will encouraging 
Members to use standards developed by the design ated bodies benefit industry or regulators or 
facilitate trade in those instances where standards de veloped by other bodies are the most relevant and 
effective to fulfilling the objective pursued?   
 11.     The diversity of bodies that develop standards promotes innovation and helps ensure that 
standards are of high quality and respond to re gulatory and market needs – and it is this 
responsiveness that enables new regul atory challenges to be met while facilitating the growth of world 
trade.   
 
Designating bodies will not facilitate developing country participation 
 
 12.     Designating specific bodies is neither a sensi ble or advisable strategy  to facilitate greater 
developing country participation in  standards development or provi de a no-fail "one stop shop" for 
developing country regulators in search  of the relevant standard.    
 13.    Promoting the development of standards to meet the diverse needs of the developing countries 
is a critical issue – and one that we believe merits increased attention.  If it were simply a matter of designating a particular body, then arguably the matt er could have been resolved long ago.  Clearly,  TN/MA/W/138 
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  there is more to it.  Understanding how nati onal standards bodies and standards developing 
organizations operate is the key to distinguishing between proposals that can effectively advance the 
interests of all WTO Members and those that advance the interests of a particular region.    14.     Most bodies producing market-relevant standards are private sector entities.  These bodies are 
responsible for covering the cost of their operations through the sale of standards.  The desire to sell 
standards is a strong incentive for standardizing bod ies to produce standards that respond to relevant 
market and regulatory needs, including the needs of potential users from developing countries.  Rather 
than creating incentives to meet the needs of deve loping countries, designating bodies would have the 
opposite effect.  It would render any standard produc ed by a designated body as "relevant," regardless 
of whether that standard in fact responds to th e needs of developing countries, and would work 
counter to the goal of promoting the development of standards to meet the diverse needs of the 
developing countries.   15.     The work of the national standards bodi es, particularly in the outreach, recruitment and 
organization of domestic stakehol ders on national technical and mi rror committees, is the key to 
effective participation in standards development at both the national and internat ional level.  Effective 
and efficient work programs of the national sta ndards bodies ensure that international standards 
incorporate essential differences to the extent possibl e, and enable the adaptation of international 
standards to reflect essential di fferences in geography, climate, and infrastructure, legitimate 
regulatory objectives, and valid development priorities, etc. – for domestic use.   
 
16.     Designating bodies would not facilitate these efforts.  Moreover, designating particular bodies 
as "relevant international standardizing bodies" would undermine the implementation of the TBT 
Committee Decision principles.  These principles have  led many standards bodies to adopt or modify 
their procedures to try to ensure they meet the six principles in th eir standards development processes 
with the view that standards developed in accord ance with the six principles may be considered 
"international."   17.     The "development dimension" principle of the Committee Decision has in fact catalyzed 
significant additional cooperation between standards developing orga nizations and national standards 
bodies in many developing countries to advance the st andardizing work in sector-specific priorities.  
While participation in standards development and use can be costly, foregoing participation can be 
costlier.  Catalyzing cooperative efforts by standa rds developing organizations can result in more 
effective and efficient participation in the devel opment and use of standards by developing country 
stakeholders.    
18.     Yet, designating particular bodies would eliminate the incentive for bodies that are not 
designated in the proposals to apply the Committee Decision principles, since regardless of whether 
the body applies them it would not be a designated "r elevant international standardizing body."   It 
would also lessen the incentive for designated bodi es to apply the Committee Decision principles 
since regardless of whether they are applied, th e designated bodies would be considered "relevant 
international standardizing bodies."  This would dimi nish the quality of the standards developed, as 
well as the leverage that WTO Members have with  these bodies to produce standards that facilitate 
trade and economic growth through more open, tr ansparent and relevant standards development 
processes.  Considerations relating to standards that are outda ted, lack relevance or reflect regional needs  
 
 
19.     Participation in standards development is voluntary, and is driven largely by the expectation 
that the resulting standard will be responsive to, and adequately address, market or regulatory needs 
for performance, safety and other objectives.  Because pa rticipation is a cost, if the technical work in a 
particular body is not relevant or responsive to market or regulatory needs, or does not incorporate the TN/MA/W/138 
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  market-relevant technology, or progress does not reflect the product’s time to market, then there is 
little incentive to participate further.  As a conse quence, the resulting standard is not likely to be 
widely adopted.   20.     There are other important considerations re garding the proposal to designate bodies.  In some 
cases, the standards developed by the bodies the proposals designate may not be widely used by 
industry or regulators, because they only reflect the specific needs of the participants that developed 
them or are outdated or otherwise not relevant.  We ask Members to consider the implications of 
encouraging Members to base technical regula tions and conformity assessment procedures on 
standards that are not actually used, or are not wide ly used, in the marketplace or by regulators.   
 
21.     Further, some regulators allow producers the flexibility to use more than one standard to meet 
their objectives since multiple standards may meet  regulatory objectives or market needs.  Would 
designating particular bodies as international encourag e regulators to delete, or remove from use, 
standards developed by other bodies that are curren tly being used?  If so, how would this loss of 
flexibility affect trade?  Would industry benefit from this loss of flexibility, particularly in instances 
where removing a standard from use would re quire the producer to redesign its products? 
 22.     In some instances, standards developed by the designated bodies reflect infrastructure and 
other conditions of particular Members as opposed  to others.  What are the implications of 
designating these bodies "relevant international st andardizing bodies" when the standards they 
develop may not be useable or ot herwise relevant in some Members’ markets due to differences in 
infrastructure or other local conditions?   Conclusion
 
 
23.     In sum, widespread use of an internationa l standard that is globally relevant can result in 
significant benefits to trade and economic devel opment.  The United States strongly encourages 
efforts, including strengthening application of the TBT Committee Decision principles, by WTO Members to advance these benefits.  For the r easons outlined above, de signating international 
standardizing bodies, however, is not  an appropriate means to do so.  
 
24.     We also note that it would not be a particularly effective one either.  Even if Members use 
standards developed by only certain bodies, they will nevertheless need to deviate from such standards – for example, to reflect differences in  geography, climate, national priorities, regulatory 
needs, development priorities, etc. – when incorpor ating them into domestic measures.  Deviation is 
an important exercise, whose necessity is well r ecognized in the international standards community, 
and which enables standards to effectively achieve regulatory and market needs.   
 25.     In this regard, it is notable that the bodies that the proposals would designate are ones in 
which the EU, in many instances, has a greater voice than other Members, or reflect infrastructure or 
conditions prevalent in Europe but not elsewhere.  This is true of the UNECE 1958 Agreement, as 
well as ISO and IEC, where the combination of the Vienna and Dresden Agreements and the 
participation of 27 EU member states can result in  the EU having greater influence in ISO and IEC 
than other countries.  While we presume the intentio n of the proposals’ drafters was not to enshrine 
bodies in which they have greater influence in a WTO text, we would be remiss if we did not ask 
Members to consider that designating bodies would have this result.  
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