RESTRICTED  WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  S/C/W/270/Add.1 
30 November 2006 
 
 (06-5754) 
Council for Trade in Services    
  
 
    
SECOND REVIEW OF THE AIR TRANSPORT ANNEX 
 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AIR TRANSPORT SECTOR 
(PART TWO) 
 
QUANTITATIVE AIR SERVICES AGREEMENTS REVIEW (QUASAR) 
 
  
(VOLUME I) 
 
 
Note by the Secretariat
1  
 
 
Addendum
                                                      
1 This document has been prepared under the Secret ariat's own responsibility and without prejudice to 
the positions of Members and to their rights and obligations under the WTO.  S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 2  
 
  TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
LIST OF TABLES, FIGURES AND BOXES ................................................................................. I. 5  LIST OF ACRONYMS AND A BBREVIATIONS ......................................................................... I. 6 
 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................... I.  8 
 PART A 
INTRODUCTION TO QUASAR..................................................................................................... I. 9  
1. Main market access features of bila teral Air Services Agreements ............................... I. 11 
(a) Sources and geographical scope ............................................................................................I . 11 
(b) Selection of the main market access featur es and construction of an Air Liberalisation 
 Index ......................................................................................................................... .............I. 12 
2. Types of bilat eral agreements ............................................................................................ I. 16 
3. Weighting of the Air Liberalisation Indexes by traffic.................................................... I. 17 
4. Comparing "governmental" networ ks to airlines' networks.......................................... I. 18 
5. Application of the QUASAR methodology to plurilateral Air Services  Agreements .................................................................................................................... ...... I. 18 
 
PART B 
PRELIMINARY RESULTS ........................................................................................................... I . 22 
A. G
LOBAL ANALYSIS ................................................................................................................I.  23 
1. Traffic concentration....................................................................................................... ... I. 23 
(a) Findings ................................................................................................................... ..............I. 23 
(b) Comments ................................................................................................................... ...........I. 29 
2.  Impact of plurilateral agreements..................................................................................... I. 29  
(a) Findings ................................................................................................................... ..............I. 29 
(b) Comments ................................................................................................................... ...........I. 30 
3. Degree of openness of high-traffic agreements................................................................. I. 31 
(a) Findings ................................................................................................................... ..............I. 31 
(b) Comments ................................................................................................................... ...........I. 31 
4.  Restrictive market access features prevalent in bilateral agreements ........................... I. 33 
(a) Findings ................................................................................................................... ..............I. 33 
(b) Comments ................................................................................................................... ...........I. 33 
5.  Typology of bilateral agreements ...................................................................................... I. 35  
(a) Findings ................................................................................................................... ..............I. 35 
(b) Comments ................................................................................................................... ...........I. 35 
6. Analysis by type ............................................................................................................ ...... I. 35  S/C/W/270/Add.1 
 Page I. 3 
 
 
  (a) Findings ................................................................................................................... ..............I. 35 
(b) Comments ................................................................................................................... ...........I. 36 
7. QUASAR types and ICAO's Template  Air Services Agreements.................................. I. 37 
(a) Findings ................................................................................................................... ..............I. 37 
(b) Comments ................................................................................................................... ...........I. 39 
B.  R EGIONAL ANALYSIS .............................................................................................................I.  39 
1. Analysis by Air Liberalisation Index range...................................................................... I. 39 
2. Analysis by type of agreements.......................................................................................... I. 4 0 
3. Analysis by traffic destination ........................................................................................... I.  41 
4. Analysis by features ........................................................................................................ .... I. 42 
(a) Fifth freedom traffic rights............................................................................................... ......I. 42 
(b) Seventh freedom traffic rights ............................................................................................. ..I. 42 
(c) Cabotage traffic rights.................................................................................................... ........I. 43 
(d) Designation ................................................................................................................ ............I. 43 
(e) Withholding/ownership...................................................................................................... ....I. 43 
(f) Capacity ................................................................................................................... ..............I. 44 
(g) Tariffs.................................................................................................................... .................I. 46 
(h) Cooperative arrangements ................................................................................................... ..I. 46 
(i) Exchange of  statistics..................................................................................................... ........I. 46 
 
APPENDIX TO PART B – GLOBAL  AND REGIONAL PROFILES ...................................... I. 47 
ANNEX B-I...................................................................................................................... ................. I. 66 
ANNEX B-II ..................................................................................................................... ................ I. 81 
 PART C 
ECONOMIC, TRADE AND TRAF FIC PROFILES ................................................................... I. 82 
INDEX OF CONTRACTING STATES PROFILED................................................................... I. 89 
 
PART D 
METHODOLOGICAL NOTES AND PO SSIBLE REFINEMENTS .....................................II. 643 
A. M
ETHODOLOGICAL NOTES ................................................................................................ II.  644 
1. Scope of the analysis ....................................................................................................... .II. 644 
(a) Qualifications to the Air Services Agreements included in the WASA ............................ II. 645 
(b) Qualifications to ICAO's coding of Air Services Agreements .......................................... II. 646 
2. Weighting system – Air Liberalisation Index................................................................II. 647 
(a) Selection of market access features ................................................................................... II. 6 47 
(b) Relative importance of each market access feature in the Air Liberalisation Index.......... II. 648 
(c) Variants of each market access feature – ICAO coding and relative weights ................... II. 650 S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 4  
 
  (i) Traffic rights ............................................................................................................. ......... II. 650 
(ii) Designation............................................................................................................... ......... II. 651 
(iii) Statistics............................................................................................................... .............. II. 651 
(iv) Cooperative arrangements................................................................................................. I I. 652 
(v) Capacity................................................................................................................... .......... II. 652 
(vi) Tariffs................................................................................................................... .............. II. 655 
(vii) Withholding.............................................................................................................. .......... II. 656 
(d) Non-standard weighting systems ....................................................................................... II. 65 8 
(i) Fifth freedom traffic rights (5
th+) ...................................................................................... II. 658 
(ii) Withholding/ownership provisions (OWN+) ..................................................................... II. 659 
(iii) Multiple designation (DES+)............................................................................................. I I. 660 
3. Types ....................................................................................................................... ..........II. 662 
4. Traffic data................................................................................................................ .......II. 664 
5. Additional indicators ....................................................................................................... II. 666 
B. C ONCLUSIONS – POSSIBLE REFINEMENTS TO QUASAR................................................... II.  667 
 
ANNEX D-I...................................................................................................................... ..............II. 668 
ANNEX D-II..................................................................................................................... .............II. 722 
 
  S/C/W/270/Add.1 
 Page I. 5 
 
 
  LIST OF TABLES, FIGURES AND BOXES 
 
PART A – QUASAR:  INTRODUCTION  
Table A1:  Air Liberalisation I ndex weighting sy stems .....................................................................I. 14  
Table A2:  Definitions of the Freedom s of the Air and their incorporation 
 in the Air Liberalisation Index..........................................................................................I. 15  
Table A3:  QUASAR types of bilate ral Air Services Agreements .....................................................I. 17 
Table A4:  Parties to plurilateral  Air Services Agreements, 2005......................................................I. 20 
 PART B – PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
 
Box B1: Main findings.......................................................................................................... ..........I. 23 
Table B1:  Parties to the top- 67 (over one million passengers)  
 and top-100 WASA agreements  in terms of traffic,  
 and their traffic relations of simila r size not appearing in WASA....................................I. 25 
Table B2:  Share of total international scheduled traffic  covered by plurilateral agreements, 2005 ........................................................................I. 30 Table B3:  Weighted Air Liberalisation Index of hi gh-traffic bilateral Air Se rvices Agreements .....I. 31 
Table B4:  Analysis by Air Services Agreement type ........................................................................I. 36  
Table B5:  Correspondence between QUASAR types A to G and the ICAO Template  
 Air Services Agreements provisions.................................................................................I. 38 
Table B6:  Template for the comparison  of routes and capacity granted ...........................................I. 45 
 
PART D – METHODOLOGICAL NOTES AND POSSIBLE REFINEMENTS 
 Table D1:  Relative importance of the market access features in the Air Liberalisation Index...... II. 649 
Table D2:  Standard Air Liberalisa tion Index weighting system.................................................... II. 658 
Table D3:  5
th+ Air Liberalisation Index weighting system............................................................ II. 659 
Table D4:  OWN+ Air Liberalisati on Index weighting system ...................................................... II. 660 
Table D5:  DES+ Air Liberalisati on Index weighting system ........................................................ II. 661 
Figure D1:  Possible combinations of the main market access features of  
  Air Services Agreements .............................................................................................. II. 663 
Figure D2:  Difference between OF OD and IATA passenger data ................................................ II. 665 
 S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 6  
 
  LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
A  
ACAC Arab Council Economic Commission 
ACS Association of Caribbean States 
ALI Air Liberalisation Index 
ANDEAN Pact Decisions 297, 320, 360, as consolidated by decision 582 
ASA Air Services Agreement 
ASAP Air Services Agreement Projector 
ASEAN Association of South-East Asian Nations 
ATI Air Transport Intelligence 
B  
BIMP/EAGA Brunei Indonesia Malaysia Philippines/East Asia Growth Area 
BSP Billing Settlement Plan 
BST Brunei Singapore Thailand 
C  
CAPA Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation 
CARICOM-MASA Caribbean Community Multilateral Air Services Agreement 
CEMAC Communauté Économique et M onétaire de l'Afrique Centrale 
CEPII Centre d’Études Prospectives et  d’Informations Internationales 
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States 
CLMV Cambodia Lao Myanmar Vietnam 
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
CRS Computer Reservation System 
D  
DAGMAR Database of Aeronautical Agreements and Arrangements 
DES+ Designation-plus (weighting system) 
DOT (US) Department of Transport 
E  
ECA Economic Community of Africa 
ECAA European Common Aviation Area 
ECJ European Court of Justice 
EEA European Economic Area 
F  
FTA Free Trade Agreement 
G  
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
I  
IASTA International Air Services Transit Agreement 
IATA International Air Transport Association 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
IDB (WTO) Integrated Data Base 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IMT Indonesia Malaysia Thailand 
M  
Maint Repair and maintenance 
MALIAT Multilateral Agreement on the Libera lization of International Air Transport 
MFN Most Favoured Nation 
MIDT Market Information Data Tapes 
O  
OAA Open Aviation Area 
OAG Official Airline Guide  S/C/W/270/Add.1 
 Page I. 7 
 
 
  OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OFOD On-Flight Origin and Destination 
OWN+ Ownership-plus (weighting system) 
P  
Pax Passengers (abbreviation used for statistical purposes)  
PIASA Pacific Islands Air Services Agreement 
PPOB Principal Place Of Business 
Q  
QUASAR Quantitative Air Services Agreements Review 
S  
SAM Single Aviation Market 
Sell/Mark Selling and marketing 
SOEC Substantial Ownership and Effective Control 
T  
TASA (ICAO's) Template Air Service Agreement 
W  
WAEMU West African Economic and Monetary Union 
WALI Weighted Air Liberalisation Index 
WASA (ICAO's) World Air Services Agreements (database) 
  
5th+ Fifth freedom-plus (weighting system) 
 
 S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 8  
 
  GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1. This Note is the second part of the documentati on on developments in the air transport sector 
that the Secretariat has been mandated to produ ce by the Council for Trade in Services in the 
framework of the second review of the GATS Annex on Air Transport Services.   
2. It is focused on scheduled air passenger services and seeks to offer a detailed and, as far as 
possible, comprehensive analysis of market access features of bilateral Air Services Agreements 
(ASAs).  For the purpose of this analysis, the S ecretariat has developed a specific approach, the 
Quantitative Air Services Agreement Review (QUA SAR), which combines both a methodology and a 
database of information drawn from a variety of sources.   
3. It is structured in four parts.  While Part A provides an introduction to the QUASAR 
methodology, Part B outlines the preliminary globa l and regional results that emerge from its 
application.  Part C provides a systematic and in-d epth analysis of the bilateral ASAs concluded by 
184 Contracting States, the term used by the Inte rnational Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) for its 
members, and of their level of openness.  Finally, Part D contains a detailed methodological note on 
the QUASAR and suggestions for possible future methodological refinements.   
4. A number of issues, which have not been addresse d in the current Note in light of time and 
resource constraints, have been suggested as possibl e areas of further work that Members might wish 
to consider.  There might be further refinements or  additional facets that could be addressed in the 
QUASAR, and the Secretariat stands ready to unde rtake such further work, provided any necessary 
additional data can be secured in a functional format. 
5. Because of technical problems linked to the dissemination of such a large document, both on 
paper and electronically, it has been necessary to di vide it into two volumes of roughly equal sizes.  
Volume I contains Parts A and B, as well as about half of Part C, while Volume II contains the remainder of Part C and Part D.  Given that this sub-division is dictated by purely technical reasons, 
this Note is treated in all respects (e.g. cro ss-references) as a single document, save for page 
numbering.  
6. A more detailed analysis of the global and re gional results obtained for bilateral ASAs (in 
terms of types, level of openness, traffic concentrat ion, regions, region-pairs, etc.) and an examination 
of plurilateral ASAs based, mutatis mutandis, on the QUASAR methodology will be contained in a 
second document. 
7. This second document will be complemented by a CD-Rom containing an analytical tool, the 
Air Services Agreement Projector (ASAP).  The AS AP allows Members to select bilateral ASAs on 
the basis of a number of criteria, namely combina tions of signatories and regions, levels of openness, 
types and traffic levels.  Once selected, these AS As will be charted on a map and the underlying 
relevant data will be displayed.  The maps containe d in Part C of the present Note are black and white 
versions of the maps that it will be  possible to generate from the ASAP. S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 9 
 
 
   
    
 
    
 
    
 
PART A 
 
INTRODUCTION TO QUASAR S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 10  
 
  8. Current literature on air transport contains no  comprehensive analysis of the degree of 
liberalization of bilateral Air Services Agreements .  For instance, there are no statistics on the amount 
of global traffic covered by "open skies"
2 agreements, nor by regional or plurilateral agreements.  
Some partial analyses have been undertaken on cargo traffic3 and on the transatlantic sector.4  The  
only systematic study carried out thus far is a recen tly published analysis of the "Economic impact of 
air services liberalization" by InterV ISTAS Consultants-ga (September 2006).5  This study  tries to 
assess the impact of air services liberalization on air fares and traffic and on economic growth, via an econometric model based on a sample similar to  that of the QUASAR (around 2000 bilateral 
agreements), which is applied to five test cases.   
9. Hence, most current accounts of air tran sport services liberalization are of an 
"impressionistic" nature and based, at best, on a listing of the provisions contained in the relevant 
bilateral ASAs.  For instance, a "classical open sk ies" agreement between th e US and Burkina Faso, 
which covers no direct traffic, was given more pr ominence than a semi-liberal agreement between the 
US and China, which cover millions of passengers.  
10. In the documentation produced for the first revi ew, the WTO Secretariat had been constrained 
by the state of the documentation available at th e time and followed this same "impressionistic" 
approach (see compilation, pages 167-216). 
11. By the time of the second review, however, the da ta needed to establish the equivalent of an 
WTO Integrated Data Base (IDB) (i.e. merchandi se trade flows on the one hand, and level of 
obstacles to trade on the other) had beco me available in a convenient format, mutatis mutandis , also 
for the air transport services sector.  In May 2006, ICAO published, on a CD-Rom, the World Air 
Services Agreements (WASA) database, 2005 edition.  The database contains, in a searchable format, 
codified summaries of the main provisions of bilateral ASAs.   
12. The QUASAR combines the information containe d in the WASA database, which has been 
assessed in terms of degree of openness in consu ltation with a group of aviation professionals, 
government experts, international civil servants an d academics, with traffic data obtained from the 
International Air Transport Association (IATA).  This  has allowed, for the first time, the simultaneous 
measuring of the openness and volume of air transport exchanges on a global level.  
                                                     
 
2 The expression "open skies" has no single undisputed definition.  It seems to cover at least two kinds 
of agreements.  The US Department of Transport, which coined the term, uses it to designate agreements with 
no control of routes, tariffs and capacity and allowing fifth freedom rights (see compilation pages 167-169).  
Such agreements may, however, differ depending on the ti me of signature and on the bilateral partner concerned 
(some of which refuse or refused to term such agreements "open skies").  Other WTO Members (e.g. Australia, 
New Zealand) also use the term, but in relation to mo re ambitious ASAs (which include principal place of 
business, seventh freedom, and, in certa in instances, cabotage).  In view of these ambiguities, the Secretariat has 
avoided using the term "open skies".  It has either qua lified it, by distinguishing between "classical open skies" 
for the first kind and "more than open skies" for agreemen ts of the second, or replaced it, whenever possible, by 
an objectively defined sui generis  concept, i.e. "type G" agreements. 
3 Micco, A. and T. Serebrisky, "Infrastructure, Competition Regimes, and Air Transport Costs:  Cross-
Country Evidence" (July 2004).  World Bank Policy Re search Working Paper no. 3355, available at SSRN:  
http://ssrn.com/ab stract=610399 . 
4 See, for instance, The Brattle Group, "The econom ic impact of an EU-US Open Aviation Area" report 
prepared for the European Commission, December 2002 available at: http://www.brattle.com/Publications/PublicationListings .asp?ParentExpertiseID=61&PublicationTableID=2. 
5 See third document on http://www.icao.int/cgi/goto_m_atb.pl?icao/en/atb/ecp/dubai2006/Docs.htm or 
http://www.intervistas.com/4/reports.asp. S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 11 
 
 
  13. Furthermore, some earlier partial studies appl ying econometric models to measure the impact 
of air transport liberalization on traffic, levels of service and prices6 have militated in favour of 
gathering further economic, trade and aviation data  so as to extend these approaches on a universal 
scale.7  Air transport is, in effect, a special case w ithin services in so far as that both its regulatory 
environment and economic reality are heavily docum ented.  It thus appears possible to establish 
correlations and, hopefully, cau salities, provided all determinants of traffic are identified.   
14. To construct the QUASAR, the Secretariat has undertaken the following steps:  first, 
assessing the main market access features of bilateral Air Services Agreements and their level of 
openness;  second, categorizing these ASAs by type;  third, weighting the agreements by the traffic 
covered;  and, fourth, introducing an elemen t of "reality check" through a comparison with 
commercial data.  In addition, the Secretariat has applied, mutatis mutandis , the same methodology to 
plurilateral ASAs.  Each of these steps is discussed in more detail below. 
1. Main market access features of b ilateral Air Services Agreements 
(a) Sources and geographical scope 
15. To identify the main market access features of bilateral ASAs, the WTO Secretariat has used 
the recently published World Air Services Agreem ent (WASA) database of ICAO, 2005 edition, 
which codes in detail the provisions of the over 220 0 bilateral agreements recorded by ICAO.   
16. This implies that the QUASAR has a broader coverage than WTO Membership, as it covers 
184 ICAO Contracting States.  Part C of the pr esent document therefore contains 184 Contracting 
State profiles. 
17. Since ICAO Contracting States do not always comply with their notification obligations in 
full (confidential memoranda are not notified, for ex ample), the 2200 agreements coded in the WASA 
do not give a complete picture of all bilatera l agreements in force.  The WASA database8 also 
contains a number of outdated agreements.  Cases in point are the bilateral agreements concluded 
between EC Member States (which were superseded  by the Single Aviation Market (SAM) in 1993), 
which were excluded from the Secretariat's analysis.9  
18. WASA is, however, by far the best and most ho mogeneous data set on b ilateral agreements.  
Calculations by the WTO Secretariat based on IA TA statistics for country-pair scheduled passenger 
traffic show that the WASA10 covers about 70 per cent of intern ational scheduled traffic (349 million 
passengers out of 496 million in 2005).  WASA is , therefore, a much better source than usually 
                                                      
6 See, for instance, the report by The Brattle Group ( op. cit .);  Gonenc, R. and G. Nicoletti, 
"Regulation, Market Structure and Performance in Air Passenger Transportation" (August 2000), OECD 
Economics Department Working Paper no. 254, available at SSRN:  http://ssrn.com/ abstract=238207 ;  Harrigan, 
J. (2005), ‘Airplanes and comparative advantage’, (October 2005), NBER Working Paper no. 11688. 
7 QUASAR data sources include ICAO (coding of b ilateral agreements, fleet, number of international 
airports, etc), IATA (traffic statistics, existing servic es), Centre d’Études Prospectives et d’Informations 
Internationales (CEPII) (distance, historical ties, comm on borders, etc), other UN agencies (population density, 
size) and the WTO (various trade data relevant to air transport). 
8 The terms WASA and WASA database are used interchangeably throughout this document. 
9 With the SAM, the EC operates as a quasi-domestic  market, where, for inst ance, stand-alone cabotage 
is permitted and all restrictions on foreign owners hip of airlines are lifted vis-à-vis EC nationals. 
10 Out of the 2204 agreements  coded in WASA, the Secretariat has re tained 1970 in its analysis (for a 
fuller explanation, see the Methodological notes in Part D.)  In the present document, notions of WASA 
agreements and WASA traffic refer to those 19 70 agreements and the traffic they cover. S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 12  
 
  assumed.  Experts estimate the coverage of WASA in  terms of number of ASAs to be about 60 per 
cent, which would imply a traffic coverage of about 70 per cent.
11   
19. There is, at least, one source that claims to  be more extensive than WASA, i.e. the 
Aeroaccords database (http://www.aero accords.com).  It is not clear whether this database codes all 
clauses of the bilaterals concerned, but, at any rate, it lacks the official status of ICAO coding.12   
20. Another source of data that only partially ove rlap with ICAO registration is the UN Treaties 
series, but these contain no "coded" information either.  Also, through web searches it would be possible to find more up to date agreements than  those contained in WASA, but this information 
would not be coded and there may be serious linguistic problems.  
21. The Secretariat has thus preferred to rely on the WASA coding at the expense of the size of 
the sample.  However, this work could be comp lemented with additional data drawn from other 
sources and from information communicated by individual Members
13, if Members so wish.  The 
coding would be done in a transparent manner, so as to allow for corrections by Members, and with 
the help of the ICAO Secretariat.  
(b) Selection of the main market access features a nd construction of an Ai r Liberalisation Index 
22. Among the numerous provisions coded by IC AO in the WASA, the WTO Secretariat has 
selected those deemed to be of particular si gnificance for market access:  i.e. designation, 
withholding14, tariffs, capacity, traffic rights, absence of  exchange of statistics, allowance of 
cooperative arrangements.  It has then given "points"  to the various variants of these provisions (e.g. 
dual approval of tariffs, a very restrictive provision, is attributed zero points, whereas free pricing, the 
most liberal of the tariff provisions, is given eight points).  Both the selection and the weighting have 
been undertaken in collaboration with a panel of professionals, academics and air transport 
negotiators.   
23. The points attributed can be altered to take in to account the specific situation of a country, by 
giving more weight to fifth freedom traffic rights (5th+, e.g. Australia and New Zealand), liberal 
withholding/ownership  provisions (OWN+, e.g. Switzerland and Hong Kong, China) or multiple 
designation (DES+, e.g. the UK, US, India, China and Brazil).  The software employed for the 
development of the ASAP CD-Rom (i.e. Flash) did not  allow to incorporate further flexibility with 
regard to the weighting, but this may remain a long-term objective for any future versions of the 
QUASAR. 
24. The Air Liberalisation Index (ALI) is the sum of the points obtainable by a given Air Services 
Agreement.  The value of the ALI ranges between zero , for very restrictive ASAs, and fifty, for very 
liberal ones.  This valuing system is in tended to fulfil four objectives, namely:  
                                                      
11 See, for example, Earl Scott in  Airline Business, April 2006  Th e above estimates are necessarily 
subject to uncertainties. 
12 In spite of repeated e-mail messages, the Secretar iat has received no reply and has thus been unable 
to access the database on a trial basis.  It would appear , at any rate, to be more expensive than the WASA 
database. 
13 Annex D-II in Part D contains a template for an y Member wishing to provide the Secretariat with 
complementary information about ASAs it has concluded or amended, but which are not recorded as such in the 
WASA database. 
14 The term "withholding clause" is used by ICAO, but this clause is often referred to as "designation" 
or, more frequently, "ownership" clause, given that the "standard" requirement is that, to be designated by a 
Contracting State to utilize the rights granted in an ASA, an airline be "substantially owned and effectively 
controlled" by the nationals of that Contracting State. S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 13 
 
 
  • easy conversion into an index of restric tiveness ranging between 0 and 1 for regression 
purposes; 
 
• consideration of additional features coded by ICAO that have not been retained in the 
QUASAR, which Members may want to see included (e.g. routes, commercial opportunities for selling and marketing or ground handling, access to/use of equipment and infrastructure, 
etc); 
 
• possibility of coding of new features that may emerge in the future such as those found in 
"more than open skies" common aviation markets;  and 
 
• future attribution of points to cargo and non-sche duled services, if data comparable to those 
for scheduled passenger traffic become  available in those two sectors. 
 
25. Table A1 indicates the number of points attributed to each feature in each of the weighting 
systems:  standard, 5th+, OWN+, and DES+.  The de finitions of market access features, as per the 
WASA Explanatory Notes, can be found in the Methodological notes in Part D.  Alternatively, definitions drawn from the ICAO Manual of Regulati on (2004), are reproduced in the compilation and 
cross-referenced in the second column of Table A1. 
26. The QUASAR database does not contain the deta ils of ICAO coding because of copyright-
related constraints.  It would nevertheless be possible for a Member to re-calculate its ALI by 
purchasing the WASA database
15, extracting and manipulating the re levant data.  The Secretariat 
stands ready, on request, to assist Members in this regard.  
                                                      
15 The WASA database can be ordered at the following address:  
http://icaodsu.openface.ca/documen tItemView.ch2?ID=9515. S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 14  
 
  Table A1 
Air Liberalisation Index weighting systems 
Source
:  WTO Secretariat. 
                                                      
16 See Methodological notes in Part D. Air Liberalisation Index Element References Standard 5th+ OWN+ DES+ 
GRANT OF RIGHTS      
Fifth Freedom Compilation page 194, 
paragraph 28  6 12 5 5.5 
Seventh Freedom Compilation page 196, 
paragraph 40 6 5 5 5.5 
Cabotage Compilation page 197, 
paragraphs 44-48 6 5 5 5.5 
CAPACITY Compilation page 216, 
paragraphs 107-108 and pages 
203-204, Table A2     
Predetermination  0 0 0 0 
"Other restrictive"16  2 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Bermuda I  4 3.5 3.5 3.5 
"Other liberal"1  6 5 5 5.5 
Free Determination  8 7 7 7.5 
TARIFFS Compilation page 201-202, 
Table A2      
Dual Approval  0 0 0 0 
Country of Origin   3 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Dual Disapproval  6 5 5 5.5 
4 3.5 3.5 3.5 Zone Pricing  8 7 7 6 7 6 7.5 6.5 
Free Pricing   8 7 7 7.5 
WITHHOLDING Compilation page 208, 
paragraph 66     
Substantial Ownership and 
Effective Control Compilation page 208, 
paragraphs 66 and 68  0 0 0 0 
Community of Interest Compilation page 210, 
paragraph 78 4 3.5 7 3.5 
Principal Place of Business Compilation page 209, 
paragraph 77 8 7 14 7.5 
DESIGNATION Compilation page 208, 
paragraph 65     
Single Designation  0 0 0 0 
Multiple Designation  4 3.5 3.5 7.5 
STATISTICS Compilation page 202, Table 
A2     
Exchange of Statistics  0 0 0 0 
No exchange of Statistics   1 1 1 1 
COOPERATIVE 
ARRANGEMENTS Compilation pages 223-224, 
paragraphs16-20     
Not allowed  0 0 0 0 
Allowed  3 2.5 2.5 2.5 
TOTAL  50 50 50 50 S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 15 
 
 
  27. For readers not familiar with the concept of freedoms of the air and the precise scope of 
individual elements, Table A2 recalls the definitio ns of the nine freedoms, and indicates to what 
extent they have been taken into account in the analysis.  
Table A2 
Definitions of the Freedom of the Air and thei r incorporation in the Air Liberalisation Index 
 
Definitions of the Freedoms of the Air Coverage in the ALI 
 
FIRST FREEDOM 
To overfly one country en-route to another  
 
 
SECOND FREEDOM 
To make a technical stop in another country  First and second freedoms are regulated either by 
a multilateral instrument, the ICAO IASTA (see compilation pages 184-191, paragraphs 1 to 16), or by unilateral regimes.   
They are not coded by WASA and therefore not 
dealt with in the QUASAR.  
 
 
THIRD FREEDOM 
To carry freight and passengers from the home country to another country  
 
 
FOURTH FREEDOM 
To carry freight and passengers to the home country from another country  These freedoms are not given any points per se  
because they are the main object of the bilateral ASA.    
What appears in the QUASAR are the various 
elements on capacity, tariffs, designation, withholding/ownership, statistics and cooperative arrangements, which apply mainly to third and fourth freedom and only marginally, from a 
statistical perspective, to fifth and seventh 
freedoms.   
 
 
FIFTH FREEDOM 
To carry freight and passengers between two 
countries by an airline of a third country on route 
with origin / destination in its home country  Taken into consideration as a self-standing 
element.  
It proved impossible to isolate statistically fifth 
freedom traffic as such.  Hence, figures given in the QUASAR are traffic figures about agreements granting fifth freedom rights, not fifth freedom traffic figures. 
 
 
SIXTH FREEDOM 
To carry freight and passengers between two countries by an airline of a third country on two 
routes connecting in its home country 
 Although certain bilateral agreements deal 
explicitly with sixth freedom,
. they have no real 
bearing on this type of "land-bridge" traffic as it is regulated by the combination of a fourth-
freedom right under a first bilateral (from A to B) 
and of a third freedom right under a second bilateral agreement (from B to C).  Sixth freedom is therefore not considered in the QUASAR. S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 16  
 
  Definitions of the Freedoms of the Air Coverage in the ALI 
 
 
SEVENTH FREEDOM 
To carry freight and passengers between two countries by an airline of a third country on a route with no connection with its home country 
 Taken in consideration as a self-standing element. 
 It proved impossible to isolate statistically seventh-freedom traffic as such.  Hence, figures given in the QUASAR are traffic figures about 
agreements granting seventh freedom rights, not 
seventh freedom traffic figures. 
 
 
EIGHTH FREEDOM OR CABOTAGE 
To carry freight and passengers within a country by an airline of another country on a route with 
origin / destination in its home country 
 
 
 
TRUE DOMESTIC 
To carry freight and passengers within a foreign country with no connection with the home country 
 Clauses granting eighth and ninth freedom traffic 
rights are relatively rare in bilateral agreements
17 
though, for instance, the bilateral version of the ICAO Template Air Services Agreement
18 
devotes a special provision to them19 in 
anticipation of their future spreading and although one can find them in several plurilateral 
agreements some of which are effectively 
implemented.  They can also be granted exceptionally to foreign operators through national regulations on ownership .   
 Source
:  ICAO Manual of Regulation (2004) and WTO Secretariat. 
 2. Types of bilateral agreements 
28. As a next step, the Secretariat sought to speci fy a limited number of "standard" types of 
ASAs.  Although it is often said that there is an infi nite diversity of agreements, a closer look reveals 
certain recurrent patterns of market access features. 
29. The QUASAR has allowed the identification of seven types of agreements that cover 1424 
ASAs and more than 70 per cent of the traffi c.  Hypothetically, these 1424 agreements could, 
therefore, be replaced by seven plurilaterals, at  least for key provisions (i.e. capacity, pricing, 
withholding/ownership, fifth and seventh freedom, cabotage and multi-designation).  The analysis by 
types as well as the analysis of plurilaterals contain more details in this regard.  The types retained by 
the Secretariat are illustrated in Table A3. 
                                                     
 
17 They are found in the following ASAs:  China-Albania (ICAO no. N0109, 28 March 1972), New 
Zealand-Brunei Darussalam (ICAO no. 4265, 4 March 1999) and New Zealand-Australia (not recorded in 
WASA, but mentioned in the compilation, page 197, paragraphs 47 and 49).  
18 ICAO has produced two Template Air Services Agreements (TASAs), one for bilateral situations 
and one for regional or plurilateral situations.  Unless ot herwise indicated, all references to the TASA in the 
current document are to the bilateral version. 
19 See ICAO's bilateral Template Air Services Agreement (Attachment A), page A-93, Annex I, route 
schedules, "Full liberalization" option, which reads: 
"A.  Routes to be operated by the designated airline (or airlines) of Party A:  point to, from and within the territory of party B.   
B.  Routes to be operated by the designated airlin e (or airlines) of Party B:  point to, from and within 
the territory of party B". S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 17 
 
 
  Table A3 
QUASAR types of bilateral Air Services Agreements 
 
Type Freedoms Designation Withho lding/ownership Tariffs Capacity Number 
of ASAs Traffic 
covered 
A 3rd and 4th Single 
designation  Substantive ownership 
and effective control  Double 
approval Pre-
determination  221 
(11.2%) 18.4 m 
(5.3%) 
B 3rd and 4th Multi-
designation Substantive ownership 
and effective control  Double 
approval Pre-
determination 182 
(9.2%) 19.7 m 
(5.6%) 
C 3rd,4th,5th Single 
designation  Substantive ownership 
and effective control  Double 
approval Pre-
determination 432 
(21.9%) 30.2 m 
(8.7%) 
D 3rd,4th,5th Single 
designation  Substantive ownership 
and effective control  Double 
approval Bermuda I  99 
(5.0%) 10.4 m 
(3.0%) 
E 3rd,4th,5th Multi-
designation Substantive ownership 
and effective control  Double 
approval Pre-
determination 267 
(13.6%) 43 m 
(12.3%) 
F 3rd,4th,5th Multi-
designation  Substantive ownership 
and effective control  Double 
approval Bermuda I  154 
(7.8%) 71.1 m 
(20.4%) 
 
G 3rd,4th,5th Multi-
designation Substantive ownership 
and effective control 
or 
Community of interest 
or 
Principal place of 
business  Free 
pricing 
or 
Double 
disapproval Free 
determination 69 
(3.5%) 58 m 
(16.6%) 
 
i Incomplete 
ICAO coding  If either:  "n/a" "n/a" "other" 302 
(15.3%) 56 m 
(16.0%) 
o All other 
combinations      244 
(12.4%) 41.8 m 
(12%) 
 
Source :  WTO Secretariat. 
 3. Weighting of the Air Liberalisation Indexes by traffic 
30. ALIs have been combined with IATA traffi c statistics so as to compute a Weighted Air 
Liberalisation Index (WALI) by ICAO Contracting Stat e, region, region-pair, t ype, level of traffic, 
etc.  The WALIs are based on a conventional we ighted-average formula.  For example, for 
Contracting State A, which has three bilateral agreements with B, C and D: 
(TA-B x ALI ASA (A-B)) + (T A-C x ALI ASA (A-C) ) + (T A-D x ALI ASA (A-D) ) WALI A=  TA-B + T A-C + T A-D 
 
Note :  T = traffic covered by the ASA in question 
 
31. The country–pair scheduled passenger traffic sta tistics that IATA has kindly provided are by 
far the most comprehensive set of data available.  They do not suffer in particular from the reporting 
difficulties and the confidentiality constrai nts of the ICAO statistical series OFOD.20 
32. These IATA country-pair statistics cover all traffic between a country-pair, including indirect 
traffic (e.g. US-Burkina Faso via France), and do no t therefore always correspond exactly to the ambit 
of a given bilateral agreement.  Yet, this limita tion is essentially relevant only for thin routes without 
direct traffic which, therefore, have a marginal statistical impact.  In any event, comprehensive 
statistics corresponding to the precise ambit of bila teral agreements do not seem to exist either in 
                                                      
20 For a detailed explanation of the statistical difficu lties faced and of the statistical choices made, see 
the Methodological notes in Part D. S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 18  
 
  ICAO, IATA or Official Airline Gu ide (OAG) at an affordable price.
21  There is contradicting 
information about the ability of Computer Reserva tion System (CRS) vendors to provide similar data 
through their Market Information Data Tape (MID T), but the price of MIDT information is even 
higher. 
33. Finally, in view of their commercial value and of confidentiality requirements, IATA 
statistics have been re-aggregated by ranges of 500,000 passengers for any given bilateral agreement.  
However, IATA has allowed the WTO Secretariat to  give exact summations when needed.  Should 
Members be willing to obtain, against payment, more  detailed statistics they may turn directly to 
IATA.22 
4. Comparing "governmental" networ ks to airlines' networks 
34. The Secretariat has tried to compare the "gov ernmental" network of bilateral ASAs as 
reflected in the ICAO WASA database and the network effectively operated by airlines as covered by the IATA mileage statistics  
35. This comparison has allowed for the identification of: 
• unused rights (at least for the summer 2006 IATA  season), that is, ASAs concluded between 
two parties which have no corresponding dir ect air transportation service (i.e., a service 
operated under the same flight number);
23 
 
• "orphan services", i.e. existing direct air tr ansportation services for which no corresponding 
bilateral agreement is recorded in WASA.  Th is lack of correspondence may reflect different 
causes:  in rare instances, the absence of a bilateral agreement (e.g. between France and 
Switzerland before the EC-Switzerland agreement) ;  the substitution of a plurilateral for a 
bilateral agreement (a factor imperfectly take n into account by WASA, which, for instance, 
still records intra-EC agreements);  or, in most  instances, non-registration of the agreement in 
question with ICAO. 
 
5. Application of the QUASAR methodology to plurilateral Air Services Agreements 
36. Since the 1980s, there has been a proliferation of plurilateral agreemen ts, whose relationship 
with pre-existing bilateral ASA is not always clear .  Nevertheless, plurilate ral ASAs lend themselves 
to the quantification of traffic and asse ssment of openness through the application, mutatis mutandis , 
of the same methodology used for bilaterals. 
37. In order to be consistent with the approach followed for bilateral agreements, where the ICAO 
selection has been used as a basis,  the WTO Secretariat has decided to use a list recently drawn up by 
ICAO for the Global Symposium on Air Transport Li beralisation held in Dubai in September 2006.24  
This list is in two parts.  
                                                      
21 Direct services traffic mileage statistics (IATA)  and direct services capacity statistics (OAG) do 
exist, but the price of subscriptions to these da ta is, respectively, US$39,000 and GB£20,000.  
22 IATA's Business Intelligence Services can be contacted at bis@iata.org 
23 An unused right in a given season does not necessar ily mean that the ASA se rves no purposes,  as 
airlines increase, diminish and redeploy capacity constantly depending on the general economic conditions and 
the growth or contraction of given markets.  An unused right over the last five to ten years would be a more 
meaningful indicator, but its id entification would imply full access to very costly data sets. 
24 See "Regulatory and Industry Overview", Informa tion Paper presented by the ICAO Secretariat at 
the Global Symposium on Air Transport Liberalisation, dated 15 August 2006, paragraphs 2.3 to 2.10, available 
from:  www.icao.int/cgi/goto_m_atb.pl?icao/en/atb/ecp/dubai2006/index.html. S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 19 
 
 
  38. The first part consists of 14 agreemen ts, grouped without a precise common criterion. 25 
− the Single Aviation Market of the EC (1987)26;  
− the Decision on the Integration of Air Transpor t within the Andean Pact (Andean Pact;  
1991);  
− the Caribbean Community Multilateral Air Services Agreement (CARICOM-MASA;  
1996);  
− the Fortaleza Agreement (1996);  
− the Cambodia, Lao, Myanmar, Vietnam (CLM V) Agreement (1998; followed by formal 
multilateral agreements in 2003);  
− the Intra-Arab Freedom of the Air Programme  of the Arab Council Aviation Commission 
(ACAC;  1999)27;  
− the Air Transport Agreement of the Comm unauté Economique et Monétaire d'Afrique 
Centrale (CEMAC;  1999);  
− the Air Transport Liberalization Programme  of the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA;  1999);  
− the Yamoussoukro II Ministerial Decision (1999);  
− the Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand (IM T) Growth Triangle Region (1999);  
− the Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines East Asia Growth Area (BIMP/EAGA;  
1999);  
− the Multilateral Agreement on the Liberali zation of International Air Transport 
(MALIAT;  2001);  and  
− the Brunei, Singapore, Thailand (BST) Agreement (2004).   
39. The second part consists of "arrangements in the signature or ratification process" and 
comprises:   
− the Pacific Islands Air Services Agreement (PIASA;  2003);  
− the Common Air Transport Programme of th e West African Economic and Monetary 
Union (WAEMU;  2002);  
− the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Sectoral Integration Protocol for 
Air Travel (ASEAN Roadmap;  2005);   
− the Air Transport Agreement for a Common Aviation Area of the Association of 
Caribbean States (ACS; 2004);  
− the Open Aviation Area (OAA)28 between the EC and United States (started in December 
2005);  
− the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement between the EC and Morocco (EU-Morocco Euro 
Mediterranean Air Transport Agreement;  2005);  and 
− the European Common Aviation Area (ECAA) between the EC, Norway, Iceland and 
several Balkan States (started in December  2005, opened for signature as of June 2006). 
                                                      
25 The date of conclusion is indicated in parenthesis. 
26 The SAM has not been included in the analysis of plurilateral agreements, since it has been 
considered throughout this document as covering domestic  traffic.  It has been described at length in the 
documentation produced for the first review (see compilation, pages 178-179 and 207). 
27 It should be noted that, for the present document, the Secretariat has taken into consideration a more 
recent agreement concluded under the aegis of the ACAC in December 2004 , the "Agreement on the 
Liberalization of Air Transport between the Arab States". 
28 The Open Aviation Area is the term used by ICAO (see footnote 24) and by the European 
Communities (see http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air_portal/intern ational/pillars/global_partners/us_en.htm).  It is 
not used by the US, which refers to the agreement in formal terms as the "Draft First-Phase US-EU Air 
Transport Agreement".  The expressi on "US-EU Air Transport Agreement"  seems to be acceptable to both 
parties and will henceforth be used in the present document. S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 20  
 
  40. The membership of all these agreements is d escribed in Table A4.  The borderline between 
these two groups is not very clear, given uncertainties surrounding the state of ratification of individual agreements.   
41. The present document will only deal with the traffic impact of plurilaterals.  The 
measurement of their degree of openness raises relative ly complex questions and will be dealt with in 
a second document. 
 
Table A4 
Parties to plurilateral Air Services Agreements, 2005 
 
 
Plurilateral ASAs 
  
Parties 
Andean Pact Decisions 297, 320, 360, as consolidated by decision 582 ("Andean pact"), 1991 Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru 
Caribbean Community Multilateral Air Services 
Agreements (CARICOM-MASA), 1996 Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, 
Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago 
FORTALEZA Agreement, 1996 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, 
Uruguay 
BANJUL Accord Group Agreement, 2004 Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone 
The Cambodia, Lao, Myanmar, Vietnam (CLMV) Agreement, 1998-2003 Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic 
Republic, Myanmar, Vietnam 
Agreement on the Liberalization of Air Transport between the Arab States (ACAC) 1999-2004 Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates 
Agreements on Air Transport among the Members of the Communauté Économique et Monétaire de 
l'Afrique Centrale (CEMAC), 1999 Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon 
Air Transport Liberalization Program of the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), 
1999 Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon 
Yamoussoukro II Ministerial Decision, 1999 Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina 
Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome 
and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 21 
 
 
   
Plurilateral ASAs 
  
Parties 
Memorandum of Unders tanding between the 
governments of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand (IMT) on expansion of air linkages, 1995 Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand 
The Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines East 
Asia Growth Area (BIMP/EAGA), 1995 Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines 
Multilateral Agreement on the Liberalization of 
International Air Transport (MALIAT), 2001 Brunei, Chile, Cook Islands, New Zealand, 
Peru, Samoa, Singapore, Tonga, United 
States 
Multilateral Agreement on the Liberalization of passenger Air Services between Brunei, Singapore 
and Thailand (BST), 2004 Brunei, Singapore, Thailand 
Common Program on air Transport of the West 
African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), 2002 Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea 
Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo 
Pacific Islands Air Services Agreement (PIASA), 2003 Cook Islands, Federated States of 
Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, 
Vanuatu 
Air Transport Agreement among the Member States 
and associate Members of the Association of Caribbean States (ACS), 2004 Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, 
Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Mexico, Venezuela 
ASEAN Sectoral Integration Protocol for Air Travel (ASEAN Roadmap), 2005 Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam 
US-EU Air Transport Agreement, 2005 EC and US 
EU-Morocco Euro-Mediterranean Air Transport Agreement, 2005 EC and Morocco 
European Common Aviation Area (ECAA), 2005 EC, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, FYROM, Iceland, Norway, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
Note:  Agreements that are still in the signatu re/ratification process are indicated in italics. 
Source :  Compiled by the WTO Secretariat on the basis of ICAO regulatory data. 
  S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 22  
 
   
    
 
    
 
    
 
PART B  
 
PRELIMINARY RESULTS  
 
 S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 23 
 
 
  42. This Part outlines the preliminary results that  emerge from the application of the QUASAR 
methodology.  It is divided into  two sections:  the first section describes the salient findings of a 
global analysis, while the second section contains an acc ount of regional results, in terms of range of 
ALI, type of ASA, geography of traffic and individual market access features. 
43. The main findings of the global analysis are summarised in box B1. 
Box B1 
Main findings 
 
• Traffic is highly concentrated:  100 ASAs, i nvolving 50 parties, cover two-thirds of total 
WASA traffic. 
 
• Plurilateral agreements could, theoretically, have  a decisive liberalising impact on one-quarter 
of the traffic. 
 
• High-traffic bilateral ASAs are only marginally more liberal than the others. 
 
• Restrictive features, such as dual approval of ta riffs and substantial ow nership and effective 
control, are still largely prevalent in ASAs, at least on paper. 
 
• Bilateral agreements exhibit a great degree of similarity:  just seven types cover 72 per cent of 
the traffic. 
 
• An analysis by type reveals a more liberal picture:  one out of six passengers travels under 
liberal conditions and one out of three un der liberal or semi-liberal conditions. 
 
• The key market access provisions of 1424 agreements could be replaced by seven sets of 
provisions drawn from ICAO's Temp late Air Services Agreements. 
 
A. GLOBAL ANALYSIS  
1. Traffic concentration 
(a) Findings 
44. An analysis of the traffic covered by  bilateral ASAs reveals the following: 
• the agreements covering over one million passengers  (67 agreements), i.e. 3.4 per cent of all 
WASA agreements, involve 39 parties29 and cover 55.7 per cent of the WASA traffic; 
 
• the first 100 agreements ranked by traffic, i.e. 5.1 per cent of all WASA agreements 
(involving 50 parties)30, account for 63.5 per cent of the traffic;  and 
 
                                                      
29 Argentina, Australia, Bolivarian Republic of Ve nezuela, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, France, Germany, Hong Kong, China;  India,  Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Neth erlands, New Zealand, Norw ay, Philippines, Republic 
of Korea, Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States. 
30 The eleven additional parties concerned are:  Aruba, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Netherlands Antilles, Pakist an, Peru, Saudi Arabia and Sweden. S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 24  
 
  • the first 200 agreements ranked by traffic, i. e. 10.1 per cent of all WASA agreements 
(involving 76 parties)
31, account for 77.4 per cent of the traffic.  
 45. Table B1 lists the 67 agreements covering over one million passengers and the 100 most 
traffic-intensive agreements.  The parties involved in  the first 67 agreements are indicated in bold, 
those involved only in the next 31 in normal font.  Pa rties are listed in alphabetical order, so that each 
agreement is quoted twice, first for party A and then for party B.  For more elements on the 
agreements concerned (e.g. ALI, distance, traffic range, etc.) see either the Contracting State profiles of the parties concerned (Part C of the present document) or the table listing the main features of the bilateral Air Services Agreements considered in th e QUASAR in Annex D-I.  Table B1 also lists the 
bilateral traffic relations of comparable  volume which do not appear in WASA. 
    
                                                     
 
31 The 27 additional parties involved as compared to the top-100 ASAs are:  Barbados, Cambodia, 
Chile, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Honduras, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritius, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Oman, 
Panama, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vietnam. S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 25 
 
 
  Table B1 
Parties to the top-67 (over one million passengers) a nd top-100 WASA agreements in terms of traffic, 
and their traffic relations of similar size not appearing in WASA 
 
WASA  AGREEMENTS TRAFFIC RELATIONS 
NOT APPEARING IN 
WASA PARTY A  
WALI 
NUMBER OF 
ASA S 
PARTY B (TRAFFIC RANGE , ALI) PARTY B 
(TRAFFIC RANGE ) 
Argentina  8.8 19 Brazil (1.5-2 m pax, ALI 10), Spain (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 11), 
US (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 5)  Chile (1-1.5 m pax) 
Aruba 34 1 US (0.715-1 m pax ALI 34) - 
Australia 9 42 China (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 0),  Hong Kong, China (1-1.5 m 
pax, ALI 12), Indonesia (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 6),  Japan (1-1.5 
m pax, ALI 8), Malaysia (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 6), New 
Zealand (3.5-4 m pax, ALI 10),  Singapore (1.5-2 m pax, ALI 
6), Thailand (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 10),  United Kingdom (1-1.5 
m pax, ALI 14), US (1.5-2 m pax, ALI 8) - 
Austria 10.6 61 Switzerland (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 14) - 
Belgium 12.6 64 US (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 25) - 
Bolivarian 
Republic of 
Venezuela 8 14 US (1-1.5 m pax, ALI 10) - 
Brazil 8.8 36 Argentina (1.5-2 m pax, ALI 10), US (2-2.5 m pax, ALI 15) - 
Canada 20.2 45 China (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 6),  France (1-1.5 m pax, ALI 10), 
Germany (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 14), Mexico (0.715-1 m pax, 
ALI 4),  United Kingdom (2-2.5 m pax, ALI 12), US (18-18.5, 
m pax, ALI 27) - 
China 5.5 73 Australia (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 0), France (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 
6), Germany (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 11), Republic of Korea 
(5.5-6 m pax, ALI 4), Malays ia (1-1.5 m pax, ALI 0), 
Singapore (2-2.5 m pax, ALI 11), Thailand (1.5-2 m pax, ALI 0), US (2-2.5 m pax, ALI 14)  Japan (6-6.5 m pax);  
Hong Kong, China 
(6.5-7 m pax) 
Colombia 11.8 11 US (1-1.5 m pax, ALI 15) - 
Costa Rica 22 12 US (1.5-2 m pax, ALI 28) - 
Denmark 15.3 44 US (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 28) Norway (1-1.5 m 
pax) 
Dominican Republic 28.9 8 US (3-3.5 m pax, ALI 34) - 
Ecuador 12.5 12 US (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 15) - 
El Salvador 33.7 2 US (1-1.5 m pax, ALI 34) - 
France 9.4 60 Canada (1-1.5 m pax, ALI 10), China (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 6), 
Japan (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 15), Morocco (2-2.5 m pax, ALI 
11), Russian Federation (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 0), Switzerland 
(1-1.5 m pax, ALI 7), Tunisia (1-1.5 m pax, ALI 13) US (4.5-5 m pax);  
Algeria (2.5-3 m 
pax) 
Germany 16.4 80 Canada (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 14), China (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 
11), Japan (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 10), Norway (0.715-1 m pax, 
ALI 7), Russian Federation (2-2.5 m pax, ALI 1), 
Switzerland (2.5-3 m pax, ALI 6),  Thailand (0.715-1 m pax, 
ALI 10), Turkey (3.5-4 m pax, ALI 12), US (7-7.5 m pax, 
ALI 42)  - 
Guatemala 31.7 7 US (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 34) - S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 26  
 
  WASA  AGREEMENTS TRAFFIC RELATIONS 
NOT APPEARING IN 
WASA PARTY A  
WALI 
NUMBER OF 
ASA S 
PARTY B (TRAFFIC RANGE , ALI) PARTY B 
(TRAFFIC RANGE ) 
Hong Kong, China 13.5 50 Australia (1-1.5 m pax, ALI 12), Japan (2.5-3 m pax, ALI 
18), Malaysia (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 12),  Philippines (1-1.5 m 
pax, ALI 12), Singapore (1.5-2 m pax, ALI 12), Republic of 
Korea (1-1.5 m pax, ALI 12), Thailand (2.5-3 m pax, ALI 12), United Kingdom (1-1.5 m pax, ALI 16), US (1.5-2 m 
pax, ALI 17) China (6.5-7 m pax); 
Chinese Taipei
32 (5-
5.5 m pax) 
India  7.9 73 Malaysia (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 6), United Kingdo m (1.5-2 m 
pax, ALI 10), Singapore (1-1.5 m pax, ALI 10), US (1.5-2 m 
pax, ALI 12)  United Arab 
Emirates (3-3.5 m 
pax),;Saudi Arabia 
(1.5-2 m pax); 
Thailand (0.715-1 m 
pax) 
Indonesia 12.9 25 Australia (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 6), Japan (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 
10), Malaysia (2-2.5 m pax, ALI 14), Singapore (3-3.5 m 
pax, ALI 16)  - 
Ireland 13.3 10 US (1.5-2 m pax, ALI 14) - 
Israel 11.9 32 US (1-1.5 m pax, ALI 25) - 
Italy 13 34 Switzerland (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 4), US (3-3.5 m pax, ALI 28)  - 
Jamaica 24.7 19 US (2-2.5 m pax, ALI 28) - 
Japan 14.8 51 Australia (1-1.5 m pax, ALI 8), France (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 
15), Hong Kong, China (2.5-3 m pax, ALI 18), Germany 
(0.715-1 m pax, ALI 10), Indonesia (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 10),  
Philippines (1-1.5 m pax, ALI 14 ), Republic of Korea (6.5-7 
m pax, ALI 14), Singapore (1-1.5 m pax, ALI 14), Thailand 
(2-2.5 m pax, ALI 15), United Kingdom (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 
14), US (11-11.5 m pax, ALI 18) China ( 6-6.5 m 
pax);  Chinese Taipei (2.5-3 m pax) 
Malaysia 10.7 39 Australia (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 6), China (1-1.5 m pax, ALI 0),  
Hong Kong, China (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 12), India (0.715-1 m 
pax, ALI 6), Indonesia (2-2.5 m pax, ALI 14), Singapore 
(1.5-2 m pax, ALI 14), Thailand (1-1.5 m pax, ALI 11)  - 
Mexico 14.6 32 Canada (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 4), US (15.5-16 m pax, ALI 17)  - 
Morocco 10.5 51 France (2-2.5 m pax, ALI 11) - 
Netherlands 14.8 83 US (2.5-3 m pax, ALI 25) - 
Netherlands 
Antilles 34 1 US (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 34) - 
New 
Zealand 13.4 34 Australia (3.5-4 m pax, ALI 10)  - 
Norway 9.4 53 Germany (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 7), United Kingdo m (1.5-2 m 
pax, ALI 4)  Denmark (1-1.5 m 
pax);  Sweden 
(0.715-1 m pax) 
Pakistan 9.6 53 United Kingdom (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 14) United Arab 
Emirates (1.5-2 m 
pax);  Saudi Arabia (1-1.5 m pax) 
Peru 22.7 15 US (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 34) - 
Philippines 13.1 38 Hong Kong, China (1-1.5 m pa x, ALI 12), Japan (1-1.5 m 
pax, ALI 14), Republic of Korea (1-1.5 m pax, ALI 7), US 
(1-1.5 m pax, ALI 29) - 
                                                      
32 Chinese Taipei does not appear in WASA since it is not an ICAO Contracting State. S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 27 
 
 
  WASA  AGREEMENTS TRAFFIC RELATIONS 
NOT APPEARING IN 
WASA PARTY A  
WALI 
NUMBER OF 
ASA S 
PARTY B (TRAFFIC RANGE , ALI) PARTY B 
(TRAFFIC RANGE ) 
Republic of Korea 11.7 45 China (5.5-6 m pax, ALI 4), Hong Kong, China (1-1.5 m 
pax, ALI 12), Japan (6.5-7 m pax, ALI 14), Philippines (1-
1.5 m pax, ALI 7), Thailand (1-1.5 m pax, ALI 6), US (3-3.5 
m pax, ALI 28) Chinese Taipei (1-
1.5 m pax) 
Russian 
Federation 4.2 94 France (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 0), Germany (2-2.5 m pax, 
ALI 1)  Ukraine (0715-1 m 
pax) 
Saudi 
Arabia 9.3 19 United Arab Emirates (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 10) India (1.5-2 m pax);  
Egypt (1.5-2 m pax);  
Pakistan (1-1.5 m 
pax)    
Singapore 13 68 Australia (1.5-2 m pax, ALI 6), China (2-2.5 m pax, ALI 
11), Hong Kong, China (1.5-2 m pax, ALI 12), India (1-1.5 
m pax, ALI 10), Indonesia (3-3.5 m pax, ALI 16), Japan (1-
1.5 m pax, ALI 14), Malaysia  (1.5-2 m pax, ALI 14), 
Thailand (2.5-3 m pax, ALI 10) - 
South 
Africa 9.9 52 United Kingdom (1-1 .5 m pax, ALI 14) - 
Spain 8.3 61 Argentina (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 11), Switzerland (1.5-2 m pax, 
ALI 5), US (1.5-2 m pax, ALI 18)  - 
Sweden 9 52 US (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 7) Norway (0.715-1 m 
pax) 
Switzerland 9.8 103 Austria (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 14), France (1-1.5 m pax, ALI 
7), Germany (2.5-3 m pax, ALI 6),  Italy (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 
4), Spain (1.5-2 m pax, ALI 5), United Kingdom (3.5-4 m 
pax, ALI 14), US (1-1.5 m pax, ALI 28)  - 
Thailand 9.9 50 Australia (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 10), China (1.5-2 m pax, ALI 
0), Germany (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 10),  Hong Kong, China 
(2.5-3 m pax, ALI 12), Japan (2-2.5 m pax, ALI 15), 
Malaysia (1-1.5 m pax, ALI 11), Republic of Korea (1-1.5 m 
pax, ALI 6), Singapore (2.5-3 m pax, ALI 10), United Kingdom (1-1.5 m pax, ALI 10)  Chinese Taipei (1-
1.5 m pax);   India 
(0.715-1 m pax) 
Tunisia 9.9 36 France (1-1.5 m pax, ALI 13) - 
Turkey 11.5 46 Germany (3.5-4 m pax, ALI 12), United Kingdom (0.715-1 m 
pax, ALI 11) - 
United 
Arab Emirates 11.3 20 Saudi Arabia (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 10), United Kingdom (1.5-
2 m pax, ALI 14)  India (3-3.5 m pax);  
Iran (1-1.5 m pax);  Pakistan (1.5-2 m 
pax);  Bahrain 
(0.715-1 m pax);  Egypt (0.715-1 m 
pax) 
United 
Kingdom  12 90 Australia (1-1.5 m pax, ALI 14), Canada ( 2-2,5 m pax, ALI 
12), Hong Kong, China (1-1.5 m pax, ALI 16), India (1.5-2 
m pax, ALI 10), Japan (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 14),  Norway (1.5-
2 m pax, ALI 4), Pakistan (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 14),  South 
Africa (1-1.5 m pax, ALI 14), Switzerland (3.5-4 m pax, ALI 
14), Thailand (1-1.5 m pax, ALI 10), Turkey (0.715-1 m pax, 
ALI 11),  United Arab Emirates 1.5-2 m pax, ALI 14), US 
(14.5-15 m pax, ALI 13) - S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 28  
 
  WASA  AGREEMENTS TRAFFIC RELATIONS 
NOT APPEARING IN 
WASA PARTY A  
WALI 
NUMBER OF 
ASA S 
PARTY B (TRAFFIC RANGE , ALI) PARTY B 
(TRAFFIC RANGE ) 
United States 22.6 98 Argentina (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 5), Aruba (0,5-1 m pax ALI 
34), Australia (1,5-2 m pax, ALI 8), Belgium (0.715-1 m pax, 
ALI 25),  Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (1-1.5 m pax, 
ALI 10), Brazil (2-2.5 m pax, ALI 15), Canada (18-18.5 m 
pax, ALI 27), China (2-2.5 m pax, ALI 14), Colombia (1-1.5 
m pax, ALI 15), Costa Rica (1.5-2 m pax, ALI 28), Denmark 
(0.715-1 m pax, ALI 28),  Dominican Republic (3-3.5 m pax, 
ALI 34), Ecuador (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 15),  El Salvador (1-1.5 
m pax, ALI 34), Germany (7-7.5 m pax, ALI 42), Guatemala 
(0.715-1 m pax, ALI 34),  Hong Kong, China (1.5-2 m pax, 
ALI 17), India (1.5-2 m pax, ALI 12), Ireland (1.5-2 m pax, 
ALI 14), Israel (1-1.5 m pax, ALI 25), Jamaica (2-2.5 m pax, ALI 28), Japan (11-11.5 m pax, ALI 18), Italy (3-3.5 m pax, 
ALI 28), Mexico (15.5-16 m pax, ALI 17), Netherlands (2.5-
3 m pax, ALI 25), Netherlands Antilles (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 
34), Peru (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 34),  Philippines (1-1.5 m pax, 
ALI 29), Republic of Korea (3-3.5 m pax, ALI 28), Spain 
(1.5-2 m pax, ALI 18), Sweden (0.715-1 m pax, ALI 7),  
Switzerland (1-1.5 m pax, AL I 28), United Kingdom (14.5-
15 m pax, ALI 13) France (4.5-5 m 
pax), Bahamas (3.5-
4 m pax), Chinese 
Taipei (2-2.5 m pax) 
Notes:   Parties to the top-67 agreements (i.e. those over 1 million passengers) are indicated in bold. 
 "m pax" stands for "million passengers". Source
:  Computed by the WTO Secretariat on the basis of ICAO regulatory data and IATA traffic data. 
 S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 29 
 
 
  (b) Comments 
46. While corresponding to a large extent to trade patterns, these results seem to contradict 
traditional perceptions in the sector.  It is gene rally deemed impossible to harmonize the bilateral 
ASA regime because bilateral agreements are so numerous and diverse.  ICAO has recorded over 
2200 bilaterals, and the total number of existing bilate rals is estimated to be over 3000, if not even 
4000.   
47. However, this perception is clearly unfounded in  terms of volume of traffic covered.  The 
QUASAR figures suggest that, in order to liberalize nearly two-thirds of world traffic, only 100 agreements involving 50 parties would need to be changed.
33   
48. The top-100 agreements in terms of traffic all are all above the threshold of 715,000 
passengers and, as Table B1 shows, the coverage of  high-traffic bilateral relations in the WASA is 
particularly good.  The WASA data base covers 89 per cent of the tr affic of bilateral relations over 
715,000 passengers, compared with an estimated c overage for all bilateral ASAs of 70 per cent. 34    
2. Impact of plurilateral agreements 
(a) Findings 
49. The WTO Secretariat has computed the traffic covered by plurilateral agreements, whether in 
existence or in the process of signature or ratif ication, as identified in ICAO's "Regulatory and 
Industry Overview"35 on the basis of IATA traffic statistics.  It  has added up the traffic for all bilateral 
relations involved (e.g. for the Yamoussoukro II  Agreement, 50x49 = 2450 traffic relations) and 
related it to total scheduled international traffic ( 496 million passengers), rather than to WASA traffic 
(348 million), since at present WASA does not record any plurilateral agreement. 
50. As Table B2 illustrates, the traffic covered by  plurilateral agreements is relatively high, 
accounting for 23.3 per cent of international traffic. 
                                                      
33 These figures do not take into account any increases  in traffic that would result from the opening-up 
of those 100 agreements. 
34 These figures exclude traffic with  Chinese Taipei (15.9 million passengers), which is not an ICAO 
Contracting State. 
35 See op. cit.   S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 30  
 
  Table B2 
Share of total international scheduled tra ffic covered by plurilateral agreements, 2005 
 
Plurilateral agreements Total traffic covered 
by the plurilateral 
(pax) Share of plurilateral in 
total international 
traffic 
Andean Pact 1,068,223 0.2% 
CARICOM-MASA 1,999,281 0.4% 
Fortaleza 5,200,960 1.0% 
Banjul 446,285 0.1% 
CLMV 718,696 0.1% 
ACAC 12,798,832 2.6% 
CEMAC 423,328 0.1% 
COMESA 1,693,025 0.3% 
Yamoussoukro II 9,255,464 1.9% 
IMT 4,132,715 0.8% 
BIMP/EAGA 2,911,980 0.6% 
MALIAT 2,489,974 0.5% 
BST 3,076,749 0.6% 
WAEMU 1,131,880 0.2% 
PIASA 239,578 0.1% 
ACS 5,847,233 1.2% 
ASEAN Roadmap 17,469,507 3.5% 
US-EC 26,880,170 5.4% 
EU-Morocco 4,100,435 0.8% 
ECAA 13,681,311 2.8% 
Total 115,565,626 23.3% 
Note:  Agreements that are still in the signatu re/ratification process are indicated in italics. 
Source :  Computed by the WTO Secretariat on the basis of ICAO regulatory data and IATA 
statistical data. 
 
(b) Comments 
51. The high share of traffic covered by plurilatera l agreements needs to be interpreted with 
caution.  There are at least two caveats. 
52. First, more than half of the traffic covered, i.e. 12.8 per cent, comes from agreements in the 
process of signature or ratification (WAEMU, PIASA, ASEAN Roadmap, US-EU Air Transport 
Agreement, EU-Morocco, ECAA) on the fate of wh ich it is difficult to speculate.  The US-EU Air 
Transport Agreement counts, in that respect, for 5.42 per cent of the traffic.  
53. Second, even for those plurilateral agreements that have entered into force, the degree of 
effective implementation varies considerably, according to both operators and the parties concerned.  
The extensive literature of the Economic Community  of Africa (ECA) about the difficulties generated 
by the non-application of the Yamoussoukro II declaration is a case in point.36  Another example is a 
statement by the former Deputy Director of the Air Transport Bureau of ICAO, Chris Lyle who, in a 
recently published article, writes "The [agreements] re lated to the European Union are substantive in 
effect, as are the CLMV, MALIAT and the three current intra-ASEAN agreements (BST, IMT and 
                                                      
36 See www.uneca.org/itca/Yamoussoukro S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 31 
 
 
  BIMP/EAGA).  However, the others are each only partly  functional.  One reason for this is that there 
is no strong underlying economic au thority for the regions concerned."37 
54. Against this background, the fact that most of these twenty plurilateral agreements have semi-
liberal and liberal features akin to "classical open sk ies" and type G agreements needs to be seriously 
qualified.   
3. Degree of openness of high-traffic agreements 
(a) Findings 
55. Table B3 contains the WALIs for the high-traffic bilateral ASAs, as well as for all the ASAs 
considered in the QUASAR. 
Table B3 
Weighted Air Liberalisation Index of high -traffic bilateral Air Services Agreements 
 
ASAs concerned WALI 
Top-67 ASAs 16.6 
Top-100 ASAs 16.1 
Top-200 ASAs 15.4 
All QUASAR ASAs (1970) 14.0 
 
Source :  Computed by the WTO Secretariat. 
 56. The WALI of the first 200 agreements by volume is of 15.4, compared with the only slightly 
lower WALI of 14.0 for the totality of the QUAS AR ASAs (i.e. 1970).  This figure needs to be 
contrasted with an ALI of zero for "traditional" ASAs
38, an ALI of 30 for "classical open skies" 
agreements39, and an ALI of 50 for "more than open skies" agreements.40  
(b) Comments 
57. These results might appear somewhat surprising at first glance.  Given that the parties to 
"classical open skies" and "more than open skies" bilateral and plurilateral agreements include the 
largest aviation markets (e.g. US, EC, Singapore, Au stralia, New Zealand) one might have expected 
the high-traffic ASAs to be substantially more open,  in terms of their WALIs, than smaller-traffic 
ASAs.  This is the picture described, for instan ce, in ICAO's "Regulator y and Industry Overview".41  
58. However, a closer analysis provides at least tw o sets of explanations for the above results.  
First, the outcome is affected by the absence of intr a-EC traffic.  If intra-EC ASAs had been included, 
they would have obtained an ALI of 50, which w ould have had to be weighted by the 192 million 
passenger intra-EC traffic (to be compared with a cu rrent WASA traffic of 348 million, or a rectified 
                                                      
37 Airlines Business, November 2006.  This article contains also some general considerations about the 
GATS and air transport services. 
38 Those including third and fourth freedom traffic rights, predetermination of capacity, dual approval 
of tariffs, substantial ownership and effective control, single designation, exchange of statistics and no provision 
for cooperative arrangements.   
39 Those including third, fourth and fifth freedom traffic rights, free determination of capacity, free 
pricing, substantial ownership and effective control, mu lti-designation, no exchange of statistics and provision 
for cooperative arrangements.   
40 Those including third, fourth, fifth, seventh freedom and cabotage traffic rights, free determination of 
capacity, free pricing, principal place of business, multi-de signation, no exchange of statistics and provision for 
cooperative arrangements.   
41 See op. cit , paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3.  S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 32  
 
  one of 348+192=540 million).  The exclusion of intr a-EC traffic lowers the WALI of the largest 
ASAs considerably. 
59. Second, a large part of the biggest traffic relations are either not, or not yet fully, governed by 
liberal provisions.  In case they are, the relevant provisions are not necessarily amended or recorded as such in WASA.  Hence, they are not analysed  in the QUASAR.  The following examples illustrate 
this point: 
• Not governed by fully liberal provisions
 
− US-Japan:  fourth largest WASA agreement in  terms of traffic, between 11 and 12 million 
passengers, ALI 11;   
− Japan-Republic of Korea:  sixth largest WASA agreement in terms of traffic, between 6.5 
and 7 million passengers, ALI 14;   
− China-Republic of Korea:  seventh largest WA SA agreement in terms of traffic, between 
5.5 and 6 million passengers, ALI 4;   
− Turkey-Germany:  eighth largest WASA agreemen t in terms of traffic, between 3.5 and 4 
million passengers, ALI 12;   
− US-China:  twenty-fourth largest WASA agreem ent in terms of traffic, between 2 and 2.5 
million passengers, ALI 14. 
 
• Not yet governed by liberal provisions  
− Agreements between the US and individual EC Member States which are not "classical 
open skies" agreements (e.g. US-United Ki ngdom:  third largest WASA agreement in 
terms of traffic, between 14 and 15 milli on passengers, ALI 13) pending the ratification 
by both parties of the US-EU Air Transport Agreement, which would bring the US-EC 
ALI from 22 to 32 for the 18 EC Members States that have registered an agreement with 
the US with ICAO.  
 
• Governed by liberal provisions, but not yet amended as such in WASA  
− US-Mexico:  second largest WASA agreement in terms of traffic, between 15 and 16 
million passengers, WASA ALI 17, actual ALI unknown;   
− Australia-New Zealand:  ninth largest WASA agreement in terms of traffic, between 3.5 
and 4 million passengers, ALI 10.  With the Tr ans-Tasman Single Aviation Market (see 
compilation, page 197, paragraph 47), this  ALI should be in the order of 50; 
− Switzerland-United Kingdom:  tenth largest WASA agreement in terms of traffic, 
between 3.5 and 4 million passengers, ALI 14, but  in fact covered by the EC-Switzerland 
agreement, which is a common market and therefore would rank in the vicinity of 50;   
− Switzerland-Germany:  sixteenth largest WASA  Agreement in terms of traffic, between 
2.5 and 3 million passengers, ALI 6 (same cons iderations apply as for Switzerland-United 
Kingdom).  
 
• Governed by liberal provisions but not recorded at all in WASA  
− US-France:  between 4.5 and 5 million passenge rs (a "classical open skies" agreement);  
− Denmark-Norway:  between 1 and 1.5 million passengers.  Covered by the European 
Economic Area (EEA), which is a common market, and whose ALI would amount to 
about 50. 
 60. While these examples underline the incomplete ness of the WASA sample, one should also 
note that ICAO has added to its 2005 edition of WASA , proprio motu,  without registration by the 
parties concerned, the largest b ilateral agreement in volume terms, i.e. US-Canada (between 18 and 
18.5 million passenger), whose elements give it an ALI of 27. S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 33 
 
 
  4. Restrictive market access features prevalent in bilateral agreements 
(a) Findings 
61. The following restrictive market access featur es are commonly contained in bilateral ASAs:  
• Dual approval of tariffs are found in 85 per cent of agreements, covering 73 per cent of the 
traffic. 
 
• Substantial ownership and effective control (SOEC) clauses are found in 90 per cent of 
agreements, covering 90 per cent of the traffic.   By comparison, principal place of business 
provisions are found in 6 per cent of agreements , covering 8 per cent of the traffic, while 
community of interest clauses are found in less than 1 per cent of agreements, covering 0.1 
per cent of the traffic.42 
 
• Exchange of statistics, a key control instrume nt for governments, is still included in 77 per 
cent of agreements, covering 63 per cent of the traffic. 
 
• Only 6 per cent of the agreements, covering 26 per cent of the traffic, contain a clause 
explicitly allowing cooperative arrangements among airlines.   
 
(b) Comments 
62. Current practice may be more liberal than what these figures seem to imply.   
63. With regard to dual approval of tariffs, Civil Aviation Directorates no longer seem to control 
tariffs in a systematic manner.  Such control, wh ich would require considerable resources, has become 
extremely difficult in practice, since, with the advent of yield management systems, not a single 
passenger on the same plane pays the same tariff.  According to industry pr actitioners and government 
officials, control of tariffs is done ex post  and only in case of complaints by competitors.  It is 
relatively difficult to document these prac tices, however.  The same could be said, mutatis mutandis , 
for the exchange of statistics but, again,  this point is difficult to document. 
64. As for substantial ownership and effective control, the relevant clause has remained 
dominant.  Still, three qualifications are necessary.   
65. First, as a result of the November 2002 European Court of Justice (ECJ) judgements43, any 
bilateral agreement by an EC Member State is illegal under EC law if it does not contain a 
withholding/ownership "Community clause" to cove r the possibility of designating airlines of other 
EC Member States.  The WASA database records 888 ASAs by EC Member States, accounting for 21 
per cent of the WASA traffic (nearly 73 million passengers out of 348 million).   
66. Following the ECJ decision, the EC Commissi on has been mandated to conclude aviation 
agreements on behalf of the Member States with a number of third-country partners, such as the US 
(the US-EU Air Transport Agreement, covering 28 .6 million passengers and 5.4 per cent of total 
scheduled traffic44), Morocco (Euro-Mediterranean Agreemen t, covering 4.1 million passengers and 
                                                      
42 The WASA does not code withholding/ownership provisions for 3.05 per cent of agreements, 
representing 2.26 per cent of the traffic. 
43 European Court of Justice (2002), Commission v. the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, Germany, cases C-466/98, C-467/98, C-468/98, C-469/98, C-471/98, C-472/98, C-475/98 and C-476/98. 
44 The comparison with WASA traffic is difficult because only 18 EC Members States out of 25 have, 
thus far, an ASA with the US whic h is recorded in the WASA database and significant portions of the US-EC S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 34  
 
  0.8 per cent of world traffic) and eight South-East-European partners (the ECAA
45, covering 13.6 
million passengers and 2.8 per cent of total sche duled traffic).  The Commission has also been 
mandated to negotiate, on behalf of the Member St ates, "horizontal agreements", i.e. agreements 
aimed at modifying only the withholding/ownership clause in existing bilateral ASAs (as of July 2006, 342 such agreements have be en concluded, involving 23 non- EC parties).  Individual EC 
Member States have also started re-negotiating thei r own bilateral ASAs, with the aim of introducing 
a "Community clause" (as of July 2006, 84 agre ements have been ame nded, involving 40 non-EC 
parties).
46 
67. The second factor that qualifies the pervasiveness of the substantial ow nership and effective 
control clause is that variations  in restrictiveness do not appear in the WASA coding.  For instance, a 
SOEC clause can cover a 100 per cent national ownership requirement, a 75 per cent ownership 
requirement (e.g. US) or a 49 per cent ownership re quirement (e.g. EC, waived for other EC Members 
States' investors, who can own 100 per cent of any EC airline). 
68. The third qualification concerns the fact that substantial ownership requi rements, but also the 
effective control prerequisite, are often waived in  practice.  Aerolineas Argentinas, for instance, was 
never denied the right to fly a lthough it had two successive Spanish majority owners.  The same was 
true for Sabena when it was owned by Air France and then by Swissair, and the same is hoped for by 
the foreign owners of KLM (i.e. Air France)47, and of Swiss (i.e. Lufthansa) when the respective 
merger processes will be completed.   
69. This situation is, however, legally uncertain, as there is no entitlement to a permanent waiver.  
A threat by the US Department of Transport (DOT ) to refuse such a waiver dissuaded British Airways 
from taking over KLM (see compilation, page 221, foot note 4).  In Latin America, Lan Peru and the 
companies owned by Brazil's Synergy Group have faced at various times similar difficulties.  Nevertheless, Latin America, with at least five trans-nationally-owned airlines (i.e. TACA, LAN, the 
Synergy Group's carriers
48, Aerolineas and Gol) appear to certain observers49 as a place where a " lex 
mercatoria "50 with regard to the withholding/ownership clause is progressively emerging.  
70. A more systematic follow-up of waivers and examples of " lex mercatoria " could be 
undertaken on the basis of flights effectively fl own and the ownership structure of airlines as 
contained, for instance, in the annual ownership repor ts of Airline Business.  All flights operated by 
the airlines recorded in  the compilation (page 220, Table 1, second row, and Table A1, pages 230-
233, listing airlines trans-nationally owned) would fa ll under this category, if the nationality of their 
owner has not changed since.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
traffic (e.g. France-US) escape the WASA reach.  At any rate, the US-EU Air Transport Agreement would 
account for a higher share of traffic if the numerator were the WASA traffic rather than total traffic. 
45 Once fully implemented, the ECAA will integrat e Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, the FYROM, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro and the U.N. Mission in Kosovo into the EC's internal 
aviation market, which consists of the 25 EC Member  States as well as Norway and Iceland (see also 
http://ec.europa.eu/tran sport/air_portal/inte rnational/pillars/common_aviation_area/ecaa_en.htm). 
46 The complete list of extra-EC parties involved in horizontal agreements and in individual EC 
Member States' re-negotiations is contained in Annex B-II. 
47 Insofar as the term "foreign" can be applied to intra-EC ownership. 
48 In Latin America, these are:  Avianca and its subsidiary SAM in  Colombia, Ocean Air in Brazil, 
Wayraperú in Peru and VIP in Ecuador.   
49 Carlos Grau Tanner, IATA Director for Government and Industry Affairs.  This is a personal opinion 
that does not engage IATA. 
50  The body of pragmatic rules and principles laid down by medieval merchants to regulate their 
dealings that replaced the various fe udal laws and Roman law, which were  not sufficiently responsive to the 
growing demands of commerce. S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 35 
 
 
  71. With regard to cooperative arrangements, the no tion of "lex mercatoria" appears even more 
relevant.  The specialized literature, and in partic ular Airline Business's annual reports on alliances 
and code-sharing, shows that the geographical sc ope of cooperative arrangements spans well beyond 
the 126 WASA agreements that contain a clause explicitly allowing them.   
72. Individual decisions taken by the States c oncerned outside the framework of bilateral 
agreements may explain this situation, but these d ecisions are difficult to document.  However, in 
view of the quasi-universality of the practice51 and its inherent bilateral nature, it seems strange that 
cooperative agreements' clauses are not more systema tically included within bilateral agreements.  
5. Typology of bilateral agreements 
(a) Findings 
73. By combining the main market access f eatures of the QUASAR coding system, 1536 
different kinds of agreements are theoretically possible52, i.e. nearly as many as the number of 
agreements in WASA (i.e. 1970). 
74. However, a detailed examination of bilatera l agreements shows that just seven "types" , 
combining features on freedoms, designation, withho lding/ownership, tariffs and capacity, cover 1424 
agreements and 72 per cent of the WASA traffic (a nd possibly more, since ICAO has not fully coded 
15 per cent of its registered agreements due to incomplete notifications).   
(b) Comments 
75. It is often said that one of the reasons that  would prevent the establishment of a multilateral 
framework in aviation is the "infinite variety" of  bilaterals.  This commonly held perception is, 
however, invalidated by the figures above, which im ply that the key market access provisions of the 
1424 agreements concerned could theoretically be  replaced by just seven sets of provisions.   
76. It could still be argued that the diversity of AS As is attributable to three other provisions, 
namely: 
• Confidential memoranda, which are not available for analysis;   
 
• Differences in route schedules.  However, a lthough difficult to examine (see Methodological 
notes in Part D), it is likely that a closer l ook at the routes granted and effectively flown 
would show very similar patterns for each ASA ty pe (i.e. unlimited granting of city-pairs for 
type G, capital cities and two or three of th e largest cities for the preceding types);   
 
• Capacity.  The level of capacity and number of frequencies allowed for each city-pair would 
seem to be the only remaining factor of diversit y.  Its relevance could be further explored, 
however, for instance by relating capacity levels gr anted to the total traffic of the two airports 
concerned (see also section B.4(f) in this regard). 
 
6. Analysis by type  
(a) Findings 
77. As illustrated by section 3 above, an analysis b ased on WALIs is not very informative.  The 
top-67 WASA agreements (i.e. those covering ove r 1 million passengers), as well as the top-100 and 
                                                      
51 Third country code-sharing arrangements are rarer, however, though increasingly frequent. 
52 In this regard, see the Methodological notes in Part D. S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 36  
 
  top-200 WASA agreements in terms of traffic show a relatively similar average WALI to that of the 
full WASA sample (see Table B3).  This is because th e high-traffic agreements have not proven to be 
necessarily more liberal than  the lower-traffic ones.  
78. ICAO has developed a rudimentary classification of ASAs based on whether they follow one 
of the three approaches – i.e. traditional, transitiona l and full liberalization – defined in its Template 
Air Services Agreements.  However, the allocati on of the over 2200 agreements contained in WASA 
among these three approaches – 1982 traditional, 154 transitional and 65 full liberalisation ASAs – 
does not allow for a particularly informative analys is either.  The QUASAR types prove more useful 
in this regard. 
79. Table B4 illustrates the situation for the seven  QUASAR types in terms of number of ASAs, 
volume and percentage of traffic covered, as well as their average WALI.   
 
Table B4 
Analysis by Air Services Agreement type 
 
Type Number of 
agreements Traffic covered 
(million pax) Percentage of 
WASA traffic WALI 
A 221 18.4 5.3% 0.3 
B 182 19.7 5.6% 4.2 
C 432 30.2 8.7% 6.2 
D 99 10.4 3.0% 10.2 
E 267 43.0 12.3% 10.3 
F 154 71.1 20.4% 15.5 
G 69 58.0 16.6% 30.4 
i 302 56.0 16.0% 10.6 
o 244 41.8 12.0% 14.3 
Source :  Computed by the WTO Secretariat 
 (b) Comments 
80. An analysis by type traces a rather liberal picture. 
• The most liberal type, type G
53 (comprising multi-designation;  substantial ownership 
and effective control, principal place of business or community of interest;  free pricing or dual disapproval of tariffs;  fifth freedom traffic rights;  and free 
determination of capacity), covers 3.5 per cent of the agreements (69), but 16.6 per 
cent of the traffic. 
 
• The next type in terms of openness, type F (comprising multi-designation, substantial 
ownership and effective control, double a pproval, fifth freedom traffic rights and 
Bermuda I) covers 7.8 per cent of the agre ements (154), but 20.4 per cent of the 
traffic.  
 
• The above data suggest that, for more than one third of the WASA traffic, i.e. 129 
million passengers, there are relatively few restrictions and very similar rules.  
 
                                                     
 
53 Type G covers "classical open skies" and "more than open skies" agreements.  It is the most liberal 
type identified, but not all of the features that define  it are necessarily the most liberal ones (e.g. substantial 
ownership and effective control may still be present). S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 37 
 
 
  81. A tendency towards openness and common rules is  also manifest in recent plurilateral 
agreements.  If they were all ratified and fully im plemented, plurilateral ag reements would result in 
the application of liberal or semi-liberal provisi ons to 115 million passengers.  Added to the 129 
million passengers covered by type G and F bilateral agreements, they  would nearly double the share 
of total scheduled traffic covered by liberal provisions. 
7. QUASAR types and ICAO's Template Air Services Agreements 
(a) Findings 
82. ICAO devised the Template Air Services Agr eements for the Fifth ICAO Worldwide Air 
Transport Conference.  The TASAs are constructed as three sets of provisions following three possible approaches:  traditional, transitional and full liberalization.  ICAO has allocated the over 
2200 ASAs contained in the WASA database to these three categories, in what could be termed a 
"top-down" approach. 
83. The QUASAR types have instead been constr ucted in a "bottom-up" manner.  The WTO 
Secretariat used the coding of the WASA database to assess the 1970 ASAs retained for its analysis.  
An examination of this coding revealed recurrent pa tterns that led to the identification of the seven 
types.   
84. The various elements making up each type were  found to have exact counterparts in the 
TASAs, but not necessarily within the same approach .  For a given type, the corresponding provisions 
of the TASAs combined different approaches.   
85. Table B5 illustrates the correspondence between the QUASAR types and the provisions of the 
TASAs.  The text corresponding to the TASAs' provi sions for each type is contained in Annex B-I. 
  
  S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 38 Table B5 
Correspondence between QUASAR types A to G and the ICAO Template Air Services Agreements provisions 
 Freedoms Designation Withholding/Ownership Tariffs Capacity 
TYPE A 3rd and 4th only 
Art TD 2.2.c page A-9 + Annex I, 
Section 1, TD.A, page A-92 Single designation 
Art TD 3.1, page A-11 Substantive ownership and effective 
control  
Art TD 4 a, page A-16 Double approval 
Art TD 17.1-2, pages A-41-42 Pre-determination 
Art TD 16.1-5, pages A36-
37 
TYPE  B 3rd and 4th only 
Art TD 2.2.c page A-9 + Annex 1, 
Section 1, TD.A, page A-92 Multi-designation 
Art TS 3.1, page A-12 Substantive ownership and effective 
control  
Art TD 4.a, page A-16 Double approval 
Art TD 17.1-2, pages A-41-42 Pre-determination 
Art TD 16.1-5, pages A-
36-37 
TYPE  C 3rd,4th,5th 
Art TS-FL 2.2.c & 3, page A-9 + Annex 
I, Section 1, TS option 1.A-B, page A-92 Single designation  
Art TD 3.1, page A-11 Substantive ownership and effective 
control  
Art TD 4.a, page A-16 Double approval 
Art TD 17.1-2, pages A-41-42 Pre-determination 
Art TD 16.1-5, pages A-
36-37 
TYPE  D 3rd,4th,5th 
Art TS-FL 2.2.c & 3, page A-9 + Annex 
I, Section 1, TS option 1.A-B, page A-92 Single designation  
Art TD 3.1, page A-11 Substantive ownership and effective 
control  
Art TD 4.a, page A-16 Double approval 
Art TD 17.1-2, pages A-41-42 Bermuda I 
Art TS 16.1-5, pages A-37-
38  
TYPE E 3rd,4th,5th 
Art TS-FL 2.2.c & 3, page A-9 + Annex 
I, Section 1, TS option 1.A-B, page A-92 Multi-designation 
Art TS 3-1, page A-12 Substantive ownership and effective 
control  
Art TD 4.a, page A-16 Double approval 
Art TD 17.1-2, pages A-41-42 Pre-determination 
Art TD 16.1-5, pages A-
36-37 
TYPE F  3rd,4th,5th 
Art TS-FL 2.2.c & 3, page A-9 + Annex 
I, Section 1, TS option 1.A-B, page A-92 Multi-designation 
Art TS 3-1, page A-12 Substantive ownership and effective 
control  
Art TD 4.a, page A-16 Double approval 
Art TD 17.1-2, pages A-41-42 Bermuda I 
Art TS 16.1-5, pages A-37-
38 
TYPE G  3rd,4th,5th 
Art TS-FL 2.2.c & 3, page A-9 + Annex 
I, Section 1, TS option 1.A-B, page A-92 Multi-designation 
Art FL 3-1, page A-14 Substantive ownership and effective 
control  
Art TD 4.a, page A-16 
or 
Principal Place of Business 
Art TS 4, option 2.a., page A-17 
or 
Community of interest 
Regional or Plurilateral TASA 
(Attachment B), page B-11, TD 2.a  Free Pricing 
Art FL 17, page A-51 
or 
Double Disapproval 
Art TS 17.1-17.2, option 1-2, pages 
A-49-50 Free Determination 
Art FL 16.2-4, pages A-39-
40 
Notes:   TD:  Traditional approach;  TS:  Trans itional approach;  FL:  Full liberalization approach 
Source :  Compiled by the WTO Secretariat.  S/C/W/270/Add.1 
 Page I. 39 
 
 
  (b) Comments 
86. The provisions of the TASAs are directly inspir ed by "real life" examples and by the various 
editions of the ICAO Manual of Regulation.54  From a technical perspective, they could perfectly 
replace the corresponding market access featur es of the bilateral ASAs concerned.  
B. REGIONAL ANALYSIS  
87. At the outset, it should be noted that the regions used correspond to those normally identified 
in WTO publications.  They are based on geographical criteria and, therefore, not homogeneous in terms of size, number of countries or territories (e .g. 3 in North America, 54 in Africa), level of 
development or volume of traffic.  Hence the value of a percentage point identified in the charts and 
tables for Africa or the Middle East is much lower th an in Asia and Oceania or North America.  The 
only percentage data that are comparable among re gions are those contained in the "all regions" 
profile.   
88. The charts presented in the Appendix to Part B, "Global and Regional Profiles", follow, 
mutatis mutandis , the same structure as those contained in the profiles by Contracting State in Part C 
of the present document. 
1. Analysis by Air Liberalisation Index range 
89. The most prevalent range of ALI is the 10-14 range
55, which covers 41 per cent of WASA 
traffic.  It is the most common range, in terms of tra ffic, in five out of seven regions, i.e. Africa, Asia 
and Oceania, Europe, the Middle East and South and Central America and the Caribbean.   
90. The 10-14 range comes only third in the Common wealth of Independent States (CIS) region, 
where more restrictive index values prevail, and in  North America, where more liberal ones are more 
common.  In South and Central America and the Caribbean, the most liberal range, 26-50 is as 
common, in terms of traffic covered, as the 10- 14 one, probably because of the numerous "classical 
open skies" agreements concluded with North Amer ica and the liberal policy of some Contracting 
States of the region (e.g. Costa Rica, with a WALI of 22).   
91. The most liberal range, 26-50, accounts for 16 per cent of worldwide WASA traffic.  To reach 
an ALI of more than 25, an ASA must contain most of the features of a "classical open skies" 
agreement or, at least, half of the characteristics of a "more than open skies" agreement.  This level of 
ALI corresponds almost exclusively to type G agreements.56  This means, in essence, that one 
passenger out of six travels under a "classical open skies" or "more than open skies" regime.  The next most liberal range, 20-25, covers 2 pe r cent of worldwide WASA traffic. 
92. The more liberal ranges, 26-50 and 20-25 are completely marginal in the CIS, Africa, the 
Middle East, and, perhaps more surprisingly, Asia  and Oceania, where big volumes combine with low 
ALIs (see also Table B1).  However, the effect s of certain plurilateral agreements (BIMP/EAGA, 
BST, IMT, CLMV, ASEAN Road Map, MALIAT) or bilateral agreements (Australia-New Zealand 
Trans Tasman Single Aviation Market) in the Asia and Pacific region, whose ALIs are well above 25, 
are not taken into account by these WASA figures.
57 
                                                      
54  The latest edition (i.e. the fourth one) is dated 2004. 
55 The features that make up these 10-14 points and their variations will be analysed in more details in a 
second document as well as the features determining other ranges.   
56 Type G agreements all rank between 24 and 50, with  a WALI of 30.42;  type F agreements all rank 
between 14 and 18, with a WALI of 15.54. 
57 A more detailed analysis of the WALIs and traf fic impact of plurilateral agreements will be 
conducted in a second document.   S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 40  
 
  93. The two most liberal traffic ranges also account  for a surprisingly low proportion of traffic in 
Europe.  However, it should be recalled that intra-EC  traffic relations are excluded (ALI 50;  traffic 
194 million passengers) and that several plurilateral and bilateral agreements concluded by the EC 
(e.g. EC-Switzerland, or, pending ratification, the ECAA or US-EU Air Transport Agreement) as well 
as some existing high-traffic liberal agreement (e.g . US-France) are not taken into account.  This 
qualification would need to be borne in mind more generally for all the results obtained for Europe. 
94. In North America, the two most liberal ranges accoun t for nearly half of the traffic.  This is 
due, notably, to the liberal polici es and high-traffic volumes of the US, but also of Canada.  These are 
the only developed countries with WALIs higher than 20.
58  Mexico, which in line with WTO 
practices has been included in the North American re gion, contributes, to a certain extent, to these 
results.  Its WALI of 14.6, though lower than that of Canada and the US, exceeds that of Contracting 
States with similar size, population and GDP per capita and of many developed countries.   
95. The liberal policies and high traffic of North Am erica have strong knock-on effects in South 
and Central America and the Caribbean, for which No rth America represents 53 per cent of the traffic 
and where a number of "classical open skies" agreemen ts have been concluded with the US (e.g. US-
Costa Rica, US-Dominican Republic, US-Guatemala, US-El Salvador, US-Jamaica).  As for Europe, 
traffic with North America is largely liberalized, with the notable exception of the UK.  Ratification 
of the US-EU Air Transport Agreement would provide an additional push.  
96. The most restrictive ranges, 0-4 and 5-9, account  for, respectively, 12 per cent and 14 per cent 
of worldwide WASA traffic.  They are mostly fo und in the CIS region, where they represent 80 per 
cent of the traffic, but also in Africa and the Middle East. 
2. Analysis by type of agreements 
97. Types are analysed in four groups:  G and F (liberal and quasi-liberal), D and E (types with 
two liberal features, i.e. fifth freedom and Berm uda I for D, and fifth freedom and multi-designation 
for E), C and B (types with only one liberal feature, i.e. multi-designation for B and fifth freedom for C) and type A ("traditional" agreements scoring zero ).  Type "o", all other ASAs, may cover very 
different situations, from totally illiberal to liberal , and it is too heterogene ous to draw any general 
conclusions.
59 
98. The most liberal types, type G ("classical open skies" and "more than open skies") and F 
represent together 35 per cent of the traffic.  They  are prevalent in the two American regions, and 
their combined share is much lower in other regions. 
99. Types which encompass two liberal features, i.e. D and E, account together for 15 per cent of 
worldwide WASA traffic.  Type D is insignificant in every region except Asia and Oceania, where it 
accounts for 6 per cent of the traffic.  Type E is th e prevalent type in the Middle East and Africa (24 
per cent), while it is marginal in the CIS and North America. 
100. Types B and C, which encompass only one liberal feature, account together for 15 per cent of 
global traffic.  They are most prevalent in the CIS, Africa and the Middle East, and of marginal 
importance in North America.   
                                                      
58 All other Contracting States having a WALI higher  than 20 are developing countries, namely: Aruba, 
Netherlands Antilles, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Marshall Islands, Nicaragua, 
Grenada, Jamaica, Peru, Costa Rica and Nauru. 
59 Type "i" (incomplete WASA coding) which accounts for 16 percent of the traffic globally and is 
mostly present in the CIS, Europe and Africa has been discarded.  This "incomplete coding" category has no 
equivalent in the ALI ranges, as any incomplete or un-coded features is given a "0" value by the QUASAR 
methodology, thereby lowering the ALI of the bilateral agreement concerned..  S/C/W/270/Add.1 
 Page I. 41 
 
 
  101. Type A, i.e. the "traditional" ASA, accounts gl obally for only 5 per cent of WASA traffic, and 
is particularly frequent in the Middle East, where it accounts for 11 per cent of the traffic.  
3. Analysis by traffic destination 
102. Regional traffic patterns reflect a variety of f actors, including size, geography, levels of 
economic activity.  They must be interpreted with care.  Also, it is important to bear in mind that 
traffic relations are not symmetrical when expressed in  percentages:  for example, the traffic between 
Europe and Africa constitutes 10 per cent of overall traffic to and from Europe, but only 61 per cent 
of traffic to and from Africa. 
103. Intra-regional traffic ranks first in three regions , i.e. Asia and Oceania, where it accounts for 
70 per cent of the traffic, North America, where it stands at 40 percent, and Europe, where it covers 
35 per cent.60  It ranks second in South and Central Amer ica and the Caribbean, with traffic with 
North America ranking first, Africa and the Middle East , where the largest share of the traffic is with 
Europe  In the CIS, instead, intra-regional traffic ranks third, with traffic with Europe and Asia and 
Oceania taking, respectively, the first and second places.   
104. The importance of intra-regional traffic gives particular weight to regional plurilateral 
liberalization initiatives.   
105. As for inter-regional traffic patterns, they co rrespond to a very large extent to goods and 
services trade flows, historical links and geographical proximity.  There are very few, if any, surprise 
observations in that regard, as the following figures show. 
106. For Africa, traffic to Europe comes first (61 pe r cent), followed distantly by traffic with Asia 
and Oceania, the Middle East, and North America.  Traffic with South and Central America and the 
Caribbean and with the CIS is virtually inexistent.  
107. For Asia and Oceania traffic with Europe and North America rank first at 13 per cent, with 
the bulk of the traffic being intra-regional.  Other regions represent only marginal shares. 
108. Traffic with Europe is by far the most impor tant for the CIS, accounting for 66 per cent of 
total traffic, followed distantly by Asia and Ocean ia, with 14 per cent, North America and the Middle 
East.  Traffic with Africa and South and Central America and the Caribbean is trivial. 
109. For Europe, traffic is the least concentrated of all regions.  Aside from intra-European traffic, 
which accounts for 35 per cent, inter-regionally Nort h America comes first, at 25 per cent of total 
traffic, followed by Asia and Oceania at 15 per cen t, Africa at 10 per cent, and the CIS, South and 
Central America and the Caribbean and the Middle East all standing at 5 per cent. 
110. For Middle East, Europe comes first with 41 per cent of total traffic, followed by Asia and 
Oceania and North America.  The other regi ons only account for more marginal traffic. 
111. For North America, Europe also comes first, with  27 per cent of total traffic, followed by Asia 
and Oceania and South and Central America and the Caribbean.  Traffic with all other regions is 
minor. 
112. Finally, South and Central America and the Ca ribbean is the only region where Europe, with 
30 per cent of total traffic, ranks second.  For obvi ous reasons, it trails after North America, which 
accounts for 53 per cent of the traffic.  The share for Asia and Oceania seems particularly low, 
                                                      
60 Intra-European traffic ex cludes intra-EC traffic. S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 42  
 
  notably in view of at least one trans-Pacific pl urilateral air transport agreement, the MALIAT, and 
numerous trans-Pacific trade agreements. 
4. Analysis by features 
(a) Fifth freedom traffic rights 
113. Fifth freedom traffic rights are granted in two-th irds of all agreements which, in turn, cover 
close to 80 per cent of global traffic.  Of course, the share of fifth freedom traffic in total traffic is 
much lower, because not all rights are used and b ecause third and fourth freedom traffic constitutes 
the bulk of the traffic.  The identification of fift h freedom traffic flows has been impossible with the 
set of available data and, to the Secretariat's know ledge, it has never been atte mpted.  Estimates might 
be possible in the context of a longer-term project requiring relatively costly data sets.
61 
114. Like multi-designation, fifth freedom rights ar e frequently associated with "classical open 
skies" agreements.  Traffic coverage of almost 80 per cent implies, however, that fifth freedom is 
present in many more agreements than just types F and G.  Somewhat paradoxically, this may cast 
doubts on the degree of openness implied.  While freque ntly used to introduce third-party competition 
on a given route, fifth freedom would not be grante d so widely if it had such radical effects. 
115. Two technical elements may contribute to expl aining these findings.  First, WASA only codes 
the existence or absence of a clause granting fifth freedom rights, but does not indicate if these rights 
are unlimited or limited to some, or even just one city-pair.  A proper assessment would necessitate a 
detailed analysis of the route schedules, a probabl y very revealing, but complex and time-consuming 
exercise (see Methodological notes in Part D). 
116. Second, a closer look at the rights effectively exercised would probably show that fifth 
freedom is really needed only by a handful of Cont racting States.  Due to their geographic situation or 
insufficient hinterland, carriers may need to serve intermediary or beyond destinations to operate 
economically viable services.  For other carriers, fi fth freedom rights may be of marginal importance, 
and be used only to generate add itional revenue while aircraft are repositioned.  In most instances, 
carriers prefer to serve beyond markets either dir ectly, if it makes commercial sense, or otherwise via 
code-shares and alliances. 
117. At regional level, variations appear relatively limited, save for the CIS, where fifth freedom 
rights are granted in ASAs accounting only for 29 per cent of the traffic.  In all other instances, the 
granting of fifth freedom concerns two-thirds or more of the traffic covered by the agreements 
concerned.   
(b) Seventh freedom traffic rights 
118. Seventh freedom rights remain, as expected, a marginal feature.  They are granted only in 39 
agreements (2 per cent of all QUASAR agreements), covering about 6 per cent of the WASA traffic.  
However, this feature is present in all regions, even  if only marginally in the CIS, Africa, Asia and 
Oceania, and the Middle East.   
119. It should be borne in mind, however, that the WASA coding does not distinguish between 
seventh freedom rights for cargo, a more common feat ure, and seventh freedom rights for passengers, 
                                                      
61 The IATA and OAG data sets could provide the starting point for the estimation of fifth freedom 
traffic.  IATA and OAG data would allow to distinguish, w ithin direct services (e.g. services operated under the 
same flight number), between non-stop flights (i.e. third and fourth freedom flights) and other flights where a 
third city is served (i.e., either flights entailing consecutiv e cabotage – a very rare featur e – or flights with a fifth 
freedom component).   S/C/W/270/Add.1 
 Page I. 43 
 
 
  a very uncommon feature.  Furthermore, it has not been possible to identify seventh freedom traffic 
flows with the set of data available to the Secret ariat.  They might, however, be estimated in the 
context of a longer-term project, using the same costly data sets as for fifth freedom traffic. 
(c) Cabotage traffic rights 
120. The granting of cabotage is an extremely rare feature in WASA.  It appears in only two 
agreements, i.e. China-Albania and New Zealand-Br unei Darussalam, which cover very little traffic. 
121. Cabotage traffic has not been identified as such by  the Secretariat.  In view of the low number 
of agreements involved, given the appropriate data sets it might be possible to identify whether such 
rights are used, and it might even be feasible to estimat e the traffic.  Further analysis could include at 
least one additional agreement not recorded in WASA , which covers significant traffic (i.e. Australia-
New Zealand, with between 3.5 and 4 million passenge rs).  Moreover, several plurilateral agreements 
covering several million passengers contain cabot age rights implicitly or explicitly (e.g. EEA, 
ECAA).  
(d) Designation 
122. The results obtained for multi-designation clauses are comparable to those for fifth freedom 
traffic rights.  While traditionally considered as a liberal and modern feature, associated with 
"classical open skies" agreements, multi-designation is  in fact not confined to these kinds of ASAs.  
Globally, this feature appears in 1063 agreements (54 per cent of QUASAR agreements), covering 
close to 80 per cent of WASA traffic.  However, in  most instances, Contracting States have only one 
international scheduled airline and would therefore not actually need multi-designation, even if this 
situation is progressively changing with the multiplica tion of low-cost carriers operating international 
services, notably in Asia. 
123. Aside from the CIS, where it accounts for 42 per cent of the traffic, in all other regions multi-
designation covers more than two-thirds of the tra ffic.  It accounts for nearly 95 per cent in North 
America.   
124. WASA coding does not distinguish between double and multiple designation.  Identifying 
instances where designation is limited to two airlines might be possible, but it would require using  
ICAO's Database of Aeronautical Agreements and Arrangements (DAGMAR) to access the text of the agreements.
62  Nevertheless, the fact that, in numerous instances, designation may be limited to 
two airlines is not necessarily a restrictive feature, pr ovided that the parties involved do not have more 
than two international airlines each.   
125. It might be interesting to analyse changes in the number of airlines by Contracting State over 
time, taking into account the type of traffic carried (national, international, scheduled, non-scheduled) 
and fluctuations in the participa tion of low-cost carriers, to see whether the need for multi-designation 
has increased and whether the ag reements have followed suit.  
(e) Withholding/ownership 
126. The substantial ownership and e ffective control criterion (SOEC) remains overly dominant, 
representing about 90 per cent of total traffic, and exhibits very lit tle regional variation.63  T h e  
                                                      
62 Out of the 2204 WASA agreements, only 1837 ar e recorded in DAGMAR an d the Secretariat would 
need to obtain the text of the remaining agreements.  ICAO's DAGMAR is available from: 
http://www.icao.int/applications/dagmar/main.cfm?UserLang=_e 
63 SOEC accounts for 91 per cent of traffic in Europe.  An important qualification results from the 
November 2002 European Court of Justice rulings, whic h make the community of interest criteria compulsory 
for all agreements involving EC Member States S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 44  
 
  pervasiveness of the SOEC criterion, however, needs to be qualified in at least tw o respects.  First, as 
discussed earlier (see section 4 of the Global Anal ysis), the WASA only codes the nature of the 
withholding/ownership provision, not its actual conten t, which may be more or less restrictive.  
Second, waivers to this requirement are widespread.  Hence, a statistical follow-up of waivers granted 
would also show that reality is more complex and more liberal, though less stable, than these figures 
might suggest. 
127. The principal place of business criterion accounts for less than 8 per cent of overall traffic.  It 
is found predominantly in Asia and Oceania, in agreements covering 14.5 per cent of the regional 
traffic, in North America (5.6 per cent) and in Europe  (5.2 per cent).  In othe r regions, this criterion is 
virtually inexistent. 
128. The community of interest criterion accounts for about 2 per cent of the traffic in the CIS 
region and is insignificant in all other regions. 
129. Finally, WASA contains an "undetermined" cat egory which accounts for 2 per cent of global 
traffic, but 18 per cent in the CIS region. 
(f) Capacity 
130. Predetermination is the dominant capacity feature, accounting fo r about 44 per cent of world 
traffic.  However, it represents over 90 per cent of the traffic in the CIS, and only about 10 per cent in North America. 
131. Anecdotal evidence
64 suggests that predetermination of capacity is a restrictive market access 
feature, even if the actual effects may vary widely  in practice.  A predetermination clause limiting 
capacity to a level well above the commercial potential of a city-pair is in practice equivalent to a free 
determination clause.  
132. Details of capacity clauses are often contained in confidential memoranda that are not notified 
to ICAO.  Even if available, e.g. through the ICAO DAGMAR application, it would be difficult to 
assess whether these actually restrain traffic as long as the route schedules are not taken into account. 
133. Two sets of benchmarks could be used, nevertheless, to judge the degree of openness of 
capacity and routes.  The first is of commercial natu re:  Are the individual city-pairs covered by the 
route schedule of commercial interest?  Are commercially attractive city-pairs missing from the schedule?  Do the capacity clauses (frequencies, numbe r of seats, change of gauge) offered by the 
agreement exhaust the commercial potential of th e city-pairs covered?  Information about the 
commercial potential of city-pairs is highly valu able and IATA, for instance, organizes regular 
meetings ("routes") on this subject.  In practice, this  information is concentrated with the two airlines 
of the two countries served plus the major "global airlines" and fifth and sixth freedoms carriers, CRS 
vendors (when providing MIDT services), some very specialized consulting firms (Air Transport Intelligence (ATI), the Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation (CAPA), OAG) and the planning sections of 
aircraft manufacturers.  However, the different vi ew taken by Boeing and Air bus with regard to the 
intensification of the hub-and-spoke  model (possibly best served by A380s) versus the multiplication 
of city-pair links (possibly best served by th e Boeing 787s) is an example of the uncertainties 
surrounding such information.  The same goes for the capacity granted on a given city-pair, e.g. only a 
handful of experts would know if two flights a week between Paris and Chengdu are restrictive or not.   
                                                     
 
64 According to air negotiators, capacity and route feat ures are key because agreements tend to be very 
similar (virtually all of them include substantial owners hip and effective control and dual approval of tariffs, 
which is never applied in practice except on denuncia tion) and because what ai rlines are pr edominantly 
interested in, when briefing their national governments, is the commercial potential of city-pairs.   S/C/W/270/Add.1 
 Page I. 45 
 
 
  134. The second type of benchmark cons ists of a comparison of the patt erns of capacity and routes 
granted by a country to its partners within a given ASA type.  This comparison could take the form of 
a matrix of routes, as exemplified by Table B6.  Fo r each route, the level of capacity granted could be 
assessed via an index.  Such an index would take into account a number of different elements, including:   
− total international traffic of the two airports concerned; 
− the relative size of these two airports, as the volume of traffic between a given city-pair is 
largely determined by the smallest of the two airports concerned (e.g. Brussels-Beijing 
versus London-Beijing);   
− the level of development of the parties con cerned, insofar as it influences the volume and 
nature of the traffic (scheduled versus  non-scheduled, business versus economy class), 
through indicators such as GDP per capita or  the share of air passenger travel in total 
trade; 
− the distance between the two airports;   
− the capacity granted
 for the city-pair;65  and, possibly 
− the load factor. 
 
Table B6 
Template for the comparison of  routes and capacity granted 
 
Party A Bilateral partners for type F ASAs:  parties B, C, D and E 
 1st largest city 2nd largest city 3rd largest city 4th largest city 5th largest city 
1st largest city B,C,D C,D    
2nd largest city  B,F     
3rd largest city      
4th largest city      
5th largest city      
Source  : WTO Secretariat 
 135. Such comparisons are subject to caveats.  Fo r example, there are obvious reasons why the 
capacity clause of an agreement, say between Ma li and China on capital c ities (Bamako-Beijing), is 
lower than the capacity clause between Beijing a nd London.  Still, it would allow for useful 
inferences when the cities concerned are located at similar distances, have similar levels of 
development and similar traffic volumes (e.g. Be ijing on the one hand, Paris, Frankfurt and London 
on the other). 
136. The second most frequent capacity clause is Bermuda I, which accounts for 26 percent of 
world traffic, with limited regional variation.  The only exception is the CIS region, where, in light of 
the pervasiveness of predetermination, Bermuda I is only found in ASAs covering less than 4 per cent 
of the traffic. 
137. Bermuda I is a semi-liberal criterion where the control of capacity takes place ex post .  The 
actual degree of restrictiveness depends on the parties' approach to monitoring.  Since it is generally 
difficult to backtrack on a liberal capacity policy, this  criterion has been valued as semi-liberal in the 
QUASAR.  Similarly, the absence of a requirement to  exchange statistics, which is combined with 
Bermuda I in 70 cases out of 341, is another clue to the relative openness of this capacity clause.
66  
                                                      
65  These data would be available from OAG. 
66 A possible refinement of the QUASAR methodology could consist of giving additional weight to the 
combination of certain features, such as Berm uda I and absence of exchange of statistics. S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 46  
 
  138. The most liberal capacity criterion, free determination, accounts for 18 per cent of global 
traffic, but covers as much as 46 per cent of the traffic in North America.  It is of marginal importance in Africa and the CIS.   
139. Finally, WASA contains an "undetermined" cate gory for capacity whose weight is significant, 
accounting for 12 per cent of total traffic, and nearly twice as much in Europe. 
(g) Tariffs 
140. Free determination, the most liberal tariff clause,  is of marginal importance.  It is found in 
only one region, i.e. Asia  and Oceania, in ASAs covering 310,0 00 passengers, i.e. 0.25 per cent of 
regional traffic.
67  Two other semi-liberal features, i.e. zone pricing and country of origin, are of little 
significance as well. 
141. The dominant tariff clause is dual approval, wh ich accounts for 73 per cent of total traffic, 
over 90 per cent of traffic in Asia and Oceania and around 50 per cent in Latin America, the 
Caribbean and North America.  In both regions several "classical open skies" agreements are in force.   
142. A semi-liberal clause, i.e. dual disapproval, ranks a distant second.  It accounts for 20 per cent 
of world traffic, but for as much as 45 per cent of tr affic in North America and just below 7 per cent in 
Asia and Oceania.  Finally, WASA has an "undete rmined" category for tariffs which covers about 4 
per cent of world traffic.  
143. As discussed in section 4 of Global Analysis, these results are somewhat surprising in view of 
yield management practices, whereby the price for the same seat varies significantly depending on time of purchase and the load factor of the plane.  Such practices imply a degree of tariff flexibility 
which appears difficult to reconcile with a completely a priori -administered pricing system.  
However, apart from rare cases making the headlin es (e.g. the Italian authorities checking British 
Airways tariffs in 2004), tariff practices are not docum ented and problems, if any, tend to be solved 
discreetly through bilateral consultations.  
(h) Cooperative arrangements 
144. Clauses allowing for cooperative arrangements are found in ASAs accounting for only one-
quarter of world traffic.  While covering over 70 per cent of the traffic in North America, they are of 
little importance in Africa and the CIS.  As expl ained in section 4 of th e Global Analysis, these 
arrangements are more widespread in pr actice than these shares might suggest.   
(i) Exchange of statistics 
145. The absence of compulsory exch anges of statistics among governments is indicative of the 
intention not to monitor closely the evolution of capacity and prices. 
146. There are three regions where the exchange of statistics is relatively unimportant, i.e. South 
and Central America and the Caribbean, North Amer ica, and the CIS.  Agreements requiring the 
exchange of statistics account for 63 per cent of world traffic, but over 80 per cent in Asia and Oceania.   
                                                     
 
67 The agreements concerned are New Zealand-Si ngapore, New Zealand-Brunei Darussalam and 
Marshall Islands-Nauru.  S/C/W/270/Add.1 
 Page I. 47 
 
 
  APPENDIX TO PART B 
 
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL PROFILES 
 
 
This Appendix contains global and re gional profiles.  They consist of charts reflecting the degree of 
openness, incidence of types and regional distribution of traffic, as well the main market access features of bilateral ASAs, globally and for each of  the seven WTO statistical regions, i.e. Africa, 
Asia and Oceania, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Europe, Middle East, North America 
and South and Central America and the Caribbean. 
 
Each profile is made up of the following elements: 
 
• Chart 1 illustrates the share of the total WASA traffic
68 of the region concerned accounted 
for by bilateral ASAs falling within given ALI ranges.69 
 
• Chart 2 illustrates the share of the total WASA traffic of the region concerned accounted 
for by bilateral ASAs belonging to given QUASAR types. 
 
• Chart 3 illustrates the share of the total WASA traffic of the region concerned accounted 
for by bilateral ASAs concluded with partners from given geographical regions. 
 
• Chart 4 illustrates, for each of the market access elements analysed  in QUASAR, the share 
of the total WASA traffic of the region concer ned that is accounted for by the ASAs that 
contain each of the different options (e.g. for fifth freedom, the share of traffic accounted 
for by those ASAs that grant it and the share of traffic accounted for by those that do not). 
 
147. A mock profile for a hypothetical region A, whic h contains all the data sources and technical 
notes for the individual tables and charts , precedes the global and regional profiles. 
 
                                                      
68 This is total incoming and outgoing WASA traffic. 
69 The ALI ranges are as follows:  0-4;  5-9;  10-14;  15-19; 20-25;  and above 25.  
  S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 48 REGION A 
  
  
Chart 1  
Share of traffic by ALI range 
(percentage, 2005) Chart 2  
Share of traffic by type 
(percentage, 2005) Chart 3  
Share of traffic by region of partner 
(percentage, 2005) 
0-4
12%
5-9
19%
10-14
69%
 i
53%
A
13%E
26%C
0%B
8%D
0%
 1
3%2
2% 3
7%
4
80%5
4%6
4%7
0%
 
  1 Africa, 2 Asia and Oceania,  
3 Commonwealth of Independent States, 
4 Europe, 5 Middle East, 6 North America,  
7 South and Central America and the Caribbean 
 
Note: "0%" indicates a share of between 0.01% and 0.49%.  Total may not equal 100 due to approximation. 
Source :  WTO Secretariat (2006)  
   S/C/W/270/Add.1
 Page I. 49REGION A 
 
Chart 4  
Share of traffic by feature of bilateral Air Services Agreements (percentage, 2005) 
36.9%63.1%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
25.7%74.3%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
20.3%1.0%72.9%3.6%
0.1%2.2%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
18.0%26.5%43.6%11.9%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
90.0%2.3%
7.6%0.1%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
78.5%21.5%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
0.0%100.0
%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
5.7%94.3%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
78.2%21.8%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
 
 5° Freedom 7° Freedom Cabotage Designation Wit hholding Capacity Tariffs Cooperation Statistics  
Notes:  Sum may not equal 100 due to approximation.  0%" indicates a share of between 0.01% and 0.49%. 
 Designation  in this chart refers to the right to designate one or more airlines (i.e. multiple  designation). 
 Statistics  in this chart refers to " no exchange of statistics ".  In the example above, there is no requirement to exchange statistics in ASAs covering 36.9% of the traffic. 
 Cooperation  refers to the presence of a provision for entering into cooperative marketing arrange ments, such as blocked-space or code-shar ing. 
 Source
:  WTO Secretariat (2006) 
 
5° Freedom, 7° Freedom, Cabotage, 
Designation, Cooperation, Statistics Withholding Capacity Tariffs 
 With  Principal Place of Business  Free Determination  Free Pricing 
 Without  Community of Interest  Bermuda I  Zone Pricing 
   Substantial Ownership and Effective Control  Pre–Determination  Double Disapproval 
   Undetermined  Undetermined  Country of Origin 
       Double Approval 
       Undetermined 
 
  
  S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 50 ALL REGIONS 
 
  
  
Chart 1  
Share of traffic by ALI range 
(percentage, 2005) Chart 2  
Share of traffic by type 
(percentage, 2005) Chart 3  
Share of traffic by region of partner 
(percentage, 2005) 
0-4
12%
5-9
14%
10-14
41%15-19
15%20-25
2%>25
16%
 i
16%
o
12%
A
5%
E
12%C
9%B
6%F
20%D
3%G
17%
 1
4%
2
33%
3
2%
4
27%5
3%6
25%7
6%
 
  1 Africa;  2 Asia and Oceania; 
3 Commonwealth of Independent States; 
4 Europe;  5 Middle East;  6 North America; 
7 South and Central America and the Caribbean 
  
   S/C/W/270/Add.1
 Page I. 51ALL REGIONS 
 
Chart 4  
Distribution of traffic by feature of bilatera l Air Services Agreements (thousand passengers, 2005) 
 
36.9%63.1%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
25.7%74.3%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
20.3%1.0%72.9%3.6%
0.1%2.2%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
18.0%26.5%43.6%11.9%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
90.0%2.3%
7.6%0.1%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
78.5%21.5%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
0.0%100.0
%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
5.7%94.3%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
78.2%21.8%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
 
 5° Freedom 7° Freedom Cabotage Designation Wit hholding Capacity Tariffs Cooperation Statistics  
 
5° Freedom, 7° Freedom, Cabotage, 
Designation, Cooperation, Statistics Withholding Capacity Tariffs 
 With  Principal Place of Business  Free Determination  Free Pricing 
 Without  Community of Interest  Bermuda I  Zone Pricing 
   Substantial Ownership 
and Effective Control  Pre–Determination  Double Disapproval 
   Undetermined  Undetermined  Country of Origin 
       Double Approval 
      
 Undetermined 
  
  S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 52 AFRICA 
 
  
  
Chart 1  
Share of traffic by ALI range 
(percentage, 2005) Chart 2  
Share of traffic by type 
(percentage, 2005) Chart 3  
Share of traffic by region of partner 
(percentage, 2005) 
0-4
16%
5-9
30%10-14
49%20-25
1%>25
1% 15-19
3%
 i
20%
o
19%
A
7%E
24%C
17%B
7%D
0%F
5%G
1%
 1
25%
4
61%5
5%6
4%7
0%
2
5%
3
0%
 
  1 Africa;  2 Asia and Oceania; 
3 Commonwealth of Independent States; 
4 Europe;  5 Middle East;  6 North America; 
7 South and Central America and the Caribbean 
 
 
 
  
   S/C/W/270/Add.1
 Page I. 53AFRICA 
 
Chart 4  
Distribution of traffic by feature of bilatera l Air Services Agreements (thousand passengers, 2005) 
 
23.6%76.4%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
1.7%98.3%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
10.9%3.4%83.3%2.4%
0.00% 0.00%0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
1.0%15.6%65.9%17.5%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
95.0%3.8%
1.0%0.2%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
67.9%32.1%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
100.0
%
0.00% 0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
0.8%99.2%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
67.2%32.8%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
 
 5° Freedom 7° Freedom Cabotage Designation Wit hholding Capacity Tariffs Cooperation Statistics  
 
5° Freedom, 7° Freedom, Cabotage, 
Designation, Cooperation, Statistics Withholding Capacity Tariffs 
 With  Principal Place of Business  Free Determination  Free Pricing 
 Without  Community of Interest  Bermuda I  Zone Pricing 
   Substantial Ownership 
and Effective Control  Pre–Determination  Double Disapproval 
   Undetermined  Undetermined  Country of Origin 
       Double Approval 
      
 Undetermined 
  
  S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 54 ASIA AND OCEANIA 
 
  
Chart 1  
Share of traffic by ALI range 
(percentage, 2005) Chart 2  
Share of traffic by type 
(percentage, 2005) Chart 3  
Share of traffic by region of partner 
(percentage, 2005) 
0-4
14%
5-9
14%
10-14
53%15-19
15%20-25
1%>25
3%
 i
5%
o
20%
A
7%
E
15%C
11%B
7%F
26%D
6%G
3%
 2
70%3
1%4
13%5
2%6
13%1
1%7
0%
 
  1 Africa;  2 Asia and Oceania; 
3 Commonwealth of Independent States; 
4 Europe;  5 Middle East;  6 North America; 
7 South and Central America and the Caribbean 
 
    
   S/C/W/270/Add.1
 Page I. 55ASIA AND OCEANIA 
 
Chart 4  
Distribution of traffic by feature of bilatera l Air Services Agreements (thousand passengers, 2005) 
 
18.4%81.6%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
8.3%91.7%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
90.2%0.4%
03 %2.1%6.9%0.1%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
3.6%33.2%59.2%3.9%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
14.5%0.0%85.1%0.4%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
72.2%27.8%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
0.0%100.0
%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
1.0%99.0%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
72.3%27.7%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
 
 5° Freedom 7° Freedom Cabotage Designation Wit hholding Capacity Tariffs Cooperation Statistics  
 
5° Freedom, 7° Freedom, Cabotage, 
Designation, Cooperation, Statistics Withholding Capacity Tariffs 
 With  Principal Place of Business  Free Determination  Free Pricing 
 Without  Community of Interest  Bermuda I  Zone Pricing 
   Substantial Ownership 
and Effective Control  Pre–Determination  Double Disapproval 
   Undetermined  Undetermined  Country of Origin 
       Double Approval 
      
 Undetermined 
  
  S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 56 COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES 
 
  
    
 
Chart 1  
Share of traffic by ALI range 
(percentage, 2005) Chart 2  
Share of traffic by type 
(percentage, 2005) Chart 3  
Share of traffic by region of partner 
(percentage, 2005) 
0-4
43%
5-9
37%10-14
20%15-19
0%20-25
0% >25
0%
 i
41%
o
19%A
8%E
3%C
12%B
17%F
0%D
0%G
0%
 2
14%
3
12%
4
66%5
3%6
4%1
1%7
0%
 
  1 Africa;  2 Asia and Oceania; 
3 Commonwealth of Independent States; 
4 Europe;  5 Middle East;  6 North America; 
7 South and Central America and the Caribbean 
  
   S/C/W/270/Add.1
 Page I. 57COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES 
 
Chart 4  
Distribution of traffic by feature of bilatera l Air Services Agreements (thousand passengers, 2005) 
  
49.9%50.1%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
1.6%98.4%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
12.5%5.0%55.6%26.8%
0.00%0.00%0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
92.3%3.8%
0.2%3.6%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
79.9%18.0%
0.1%1.9%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
41.6%58.4%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
100.0
%
0.00% 0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
0.2%99.8%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
29.2%70.8%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
 
 5° Freedom 7° Freedom Cabotage Designation Wit hholding Capacity Tariffs Cooperation Statistics  
 
5° Freedom, 7° Freedom, Cabotage, 
Designation, Cooperation, Statistics Withholding Capacity Tariffs 
 With  Principal Place of Business  Free Determination  Free Pricing 
 Without  Community of Interest  Bermuda I  Zone Pricing 
   Substantial Ownership 
and Effective Control  Pre–Determination  Double Disapproval 
   Undetermined  Undetermined  Country of Origin 
       Double Approval 
      
 Undetermined 
  
  S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 58 EUROPE 
 
  
    
 
Chart 1  
Share of traffic by ALI range 
(percentage, 2005) Chart 2  
Share of traffic by type 
(percentage, 2005) Chart 3  
Share of traffic by region of partner 
(percentage, 2005) 
0-4
15%
5-9
19%
10-14
50%20-25
2%>25
9%
15-19
5%
 i
28%
o
7%
A
6%
E
13%C
10%B
8%F
15%D
3%G
10%
 1
10%
2
15%
3
5%
4
35%5
5%6
25%7
5%
 
  1 Africa;  2 Asia and Oceania; 
3 Commonwealth of Independent States; 
4 Europe;  5 Middle East;  6 North America; 
7 South and Central America and the Caribbean 
  
   S/C/W/270/Add.1
 Page I. 59EUROPE 
 
Chart 4  
Distribution of traffic by feature of bilatera l Air Services Agreements (thousand passengers, 2005) 
  
44.6%55.4%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
11.7%88.3%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
77.5%6.8%
0.00% 0.5%13.6%1.5%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
10.9%21.8%45.9%21.4%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
91.0%3.6%
5.2%0.2%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
74.2%25.8%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
0.0%100.0
%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
4.4%95.6%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
75.4%24.6%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
 
 5° Freedom 7° Freedom Cabotage Designation Wit hholding Capacity Tariffs Cooperation Statistics  
 
5° Freedom, 7° Freedom, Cabotage, 
Designation, Cooperation, Statistics Withholding Capacity Tariffs 
 With  Principal Place of Business  Free Determination  Free Pricing 
 Without  Community of Interest  Bermuda I  Zone Pricing 
   Substantial Ownership 
and Effective Control  Pre–Determination  Double Disapproval 
   Undetermined  Undetermined  Country of Origin 
       Double Approval 
      
 Undetermined 
  
  S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 60 MIDDLE EAST 
 
  
   
Chart 1  
Share of traffic by ALI range 
(percentage, 2005) Chart 2  
Share of traffic by type 
(percentage, 2005) Chart 3  
Share of traffic by region of partner 
(percentage, 2005) 
0-4
21%
5-9
22%
10-14
43%15-19
4%20-25
6%>25
4%
 i
13%
o
5%
A
11%
E
25%C
11%B
13%F
11%D
2%G
9%
 1
6%
2
18%
3
2%
4
41%5
22%6
11%7
0%
 
  1 Africa;  2 Asia and Oceania; 
3 Commonwealth of Independent States; 
4 Europe;  5 Middle East;  6 North America; 
7 South and Central America and the Caribbean 
  
   S/C/W/270/Add.1
 Page I. 61MIDDLE EAST 
 
Chart 4  
Distribution of traffic by feature of bilatera l Air Services Agreements (thousand passengers, 2005) 
  
23.2%76.8%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
4.7%95.3%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
11.9%81.1%4.1%
0.00%0.00%3.0%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
9.5%17.0%68.4%5.1%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
94.0%4.2%
1.6%0.2%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
73.2%26.8%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
100.0
%
0.00% 0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
1.9%98.1%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
66.7%33.3%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
 
 5° Freedom 7° Freedom Cabotage Designation Wit hholding Capacity Tariffs Cooperation Statistics  
 
5° Freedom, 7° Freedom, Cabotage, 
Designation, Cooperation, Statistics Withholding Capacity Tariffs 
 With  Principal Place of Business  Free Determination  Free Pricing 
 Without  Community of Interest  Bermuda I  Zone Pricing 
   Substantial Ownership 
and Effective Control  Pre–Determination  Double Disapproval 
   Undetermined  Undetermined  Country of Origin 
       Double Approval 
      
 Undetermined 
  
  S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 62 NORTH AMERICA 
 
  
    
 
Chart 1  
Share of traffic by ALI range 
(percentage, 2005) Chart 2  
Share of traffic by type 
(percentage, 2005) Chart 3  
Share of traffic by region of partner 
(percentage, 2005) 
0-4
2%5-9
4%
10-14
18%
15-19
30% 20-25
3%>25
43%
 i
16%
F
28%D
0%G
43%
C
2%
B
0%E
3%A
2%o
6%
 1
1% 2
17%
3
0%
4
27%
5
1%6
40%7
14%
 
  1 Africa;  2 Asia and Oceania; 
3 Commonwealth of Independent States; 
4 Europe;  5 Middle East;  6 North America; 
7 South and Central America and the Caribbean 
  
   S/C/W/270/Add.1
 Page I. 63NORTH AMERICA 
 
Chart 4  
Distribution of traffic by feature of bilatera l Air Services Agreements (thousand passengers, 2005) 
  
49.5%50.5%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
70.6%29.4%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
45.3%0.2%49.1%1.7%
0.00%3.8%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
46.1%29.8%9.9%14.2%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
93.5%0.8%
5.6%0.0%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
94.9%5.1%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
100.0
%
0.00% 0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
11.2%88.8%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
93.8%6.2%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
 
 5° Freedom 7° Freedom Cabotage Designation Wit hholding Capacity Tariffs Cooperation Statistics  
 
5° Freedom, 7° Freedom, Cabotage, 
Designation, Cooperation, Statistics Withholding Capacity Tariffs 
 With  Principal Place of Business  Free Determination  Free Pricing 
 Without  Community of Interest  Bermuda I  Zone Pricing 
   Substantial Ownership 
and Effective Control  Pre–Determination  Double Disapproval 
   Undetermined  Undetermined  Country of Origin 
       Double Approval 
      
 Undetermined 
  
  S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 64 SOUTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 
 
  
    
 
Chart 1  
Share of traffic by ALI range 
(percentage, 2005) Chart 2  
Share of traffic by type 
(percentage, 2005) Chart 3  
Share of traffic by region of partner 
(percentage, 2005) 
0-4
6%
5-9
14%
10-14
32%
15-19
16%20-25
0%>25
32%
 i
13%
o
9%
A
3%
E
21%
C
7%B
2%F
13%D
1%G
31%
 5
0%
6
53%7
25%4
21%1
0%2
1% 3
0%
 
  1 Africa;  2 Asia and Oceania; 
3 Commonwealth of Independent States; 
4 Europe;  5 Middle East;  6 North America; 
7 South and Central America and the Caribbean 
  
   S/C/W/270/Add.1
 Page I. 65SOUTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 
 
Chart 4  
Distribution of traffic by feature of bilatera l Air Services Agreements (thousand passengers, 2005) 
  
60.7%39.3%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
32.3%67.7%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
31.9%2.0%53.3%6.3%
0.00%6.5%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
32.8%18.4%43.5%5.3%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
94.9%4.6%
0.3%0.2%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
86.8%13.2%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
100.0
%
0.00% 0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
20.1%79.9%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
87.4%12.6%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
 
 5° Freedom 7° Freedom Cabotage Designation Wit hholding Capacity Tariffs Cooperation Statistics  
 
5° Freedom, 7° Freedom, Cabotage, 
Designation, Cooperation, Statistics Withholding Capacity Tariffs 
 With  Principal Place of Business  Free Determination  Free Pricing 
 Without  Community of Interest  Bermuda I  Zone Pricing 
   Substantial Ownership 
and Effective Control  Pre–Determination  Double Disapproval 
   Undetermined  Undetermined  Country of Origin 
       Double Approval 
      
 Undetermined 
 S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 66  
 
  ANNEX B-I 
 
Correspondence between the provisions of the ICAO Template Air Services Agreements and 
the QUASAR types 
 
 
TYPE A 
 
Freedoms 
 Art. 2.2.c, Traditional "Grant of rights"
 
 Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the ai rline(s) designated by each Party, shall enjoy the 
following rights:  
[...] 
the right to make stops at the point(s) on the r oute(s) specified in the Route Schedule to this 
Agreement for the purpose of taking on board and di scharging international tr affic in passengers, 
cargo or mail [separately or in combination].  Annex 1, Section 1, Traditional "Route schedules"
 
 
• Routes to be operated by the designated airline (or airlines) of Party A: 
 
From (named cities) in Party A via (intermediate points) to (named cities) in Party B and beyond 
(beyond points). 
 
• Routes to be operated by the designated airline (or airlines) of Party B: 
 
From (named cities) in Party B via (named interm ediate points) to (named cities) in Party A and 
beyond (named beyond points). 
 
Designation 
 
Art. 3.1 & 3.2.a, Traditional "Designation and authorization"  
 Each Party shall have the right to designate in wr iting to the other Party an airline to operate the 
agreed services [in accordance with this Agreement] and to withdraw or alter such designation.  
 
On receipt of such a designation, and of applica tion from the designated airline, in the form and 
manner prescribed for operating authorization [and t echnical permission], each Party shall grant the 
appropriate operating authorization with mi nimum procedural delay, provided that:  
 Substantial ownership and effective control are vested in the Party designating the airline, nationals of 
that Party, or both. 
 
Withholding/ownership  
 
Art 4.1.a, Traditional "Withholding, revo cation and limitation of authorization"
 
  S/C/W/270/Add.1 
 Page I. 67 
 
 
  The aeronautical authorities of each Party shall have  the rights to withhold the authorizations referred 
to in Article (Authorization) of this Agreement w ith respect to an airline designated by the other 
Party, and to revoke, suspend or impose conditi ons on such authorizations, temporarily or 
permanently:  
In the event that they are not satis fied that substantial ownership and effective control are vested in the 
Party designating the airline, nationals of that Party, or both.  
Tariffs 
 Art 17.1 & 2, Traditional "Pricing (tariffs)"
 
 The tariffs to be applied by the designated airline or airlines of a Party for services covered by this Agreement shall be established at re asonable levels, due regard being paid to all relevant factors, 
including interests of users, cost of operation, char acteristics of service, reasonable profit, tariffs of 
other airlines and other commercial cons iderations in the market-place.  
 The tariffs shall, wherever possible, be agreed by  the designated airlines concerned of both Parties, 
after discussion as required with their respective gove rnments and, if applicable, consultation with 
other airlines.  Such agreement shall, wherever po ssible, be reached by the use of the appropriate 
international tariff coordination mechanism.  Fa iling any multilateral or bilateral agreement, each 
designated airline may develop tariffs individually.  
 
Capacity 
 
Art 16.1 to 5, Traditional "Capacity"
 
 
The total capacity to be provided on the agreed ser vices by the designated airlines of the Parties shall 
be agreed between, or approved by, the aeronau tical authorities of the Parties before the 
commencement of the operations, and thereafter according to anticipated traffic requirements.   The agreed services to be operated by the designated airlines of the Parties shall have as their primary 
objective the provision at reasonable load factors of ca pacity adequate to meet the traffic requirements 
between the territories of the two Parties.   Each Party shall allow fair and equal opportunity fo r the designated airlines of both Parties to operate 
the agreed services between their respective territories so as to achi eve equality and mutual benefit, in 
principle by equal sharing of the total capacity between the Parties.  
 Each Party and its designated airline(s) shall take into consideration the interests of the other Party 
and its designated airline(s) so as not to affect unduly the services which the latter provides.  If, on review, the Parties fail to agree on the cap acity to be provided on the agreed services, the 
capacity that may be provided by the designated airlines of the Parties shall not exceed the total 
capacity (including seasonal variations) previously agreed to be provided. 
 S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 68  
 
   
TYPE B 
 
Freedoms 
 
Art. 2.2.c, Traditional "Grant of rights"
 
 Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the ai rline(s) designated by each Party, shall enjoy the 
following rights:  
[...] 
the right to make stops at the point(s) on the r oute(s) specified in the Route Schedule to this 
Agreement for the purpose of taking on board and di scharging international tr affic in passengers, 
cargo or mail [separately or in combination].  
Annex 1, Section 1, Traditional "Route schedules"
 
 
• Routes to be operated by the designated airline (or airlines) of Party A: 
 
From (named cities) in Party A via (intermediate points) to (named cities) in Party B and beyond 
(beyond points). 
 
• Routes to be operated by the designated airline (or airlines) of Party B: 
 
From (named cities) in Party B via (named interm ediate points) to (named cities) in Party A and 
beyond (named beyond points). 
 
Designation 
 
Art 3.1, Transitional "Designation and authorization"  
 On receipt of the operating authorization of paragra ph 2, a designated airline may at any time begin to 
operate the agreed services for which it is so desi gnated, provided that the airline complies with the 
applicable provisions of this Agreement.  
 Each Party shall have the right to designate in wr iting to the other Party one or more airlines to 
operate the agreed services [in accordance with this  Agreement] and to withdraw or alter such 
designation.  
On receipt of such a designation, and of applica tion from the designated airline, in the form and 
manner prescribed for operating authorization [and t echnical permission], each Party shall grant the 
appropriate operating authorization with mi nimum procedural delay, provided that:  
 the airline is and remains substantially owned and effectively controlled by nationals of any one or 
more States in a group, or by any one or more of the Parties themselves.  
 
Withholding/ownership  
 
Art 4.1.a, Transitional "Withholding, revo cation and limitation of authorization"
 
 
The aeronautical authorities of each Party shall have the right to withhold the authorizations referred 
to in Article (Authorization) of this Agreement w ith respect to an airline designated by the other  S/C/W/270/Add.1 
 Page I. 69 
 
 
  Party, and to revoke, suspend or impose conditi ons on such authorizations, temporarily or 
permanently.   In the event that they are not satisfied that th e airline is and remains substantially owned and 
effectively controlled by nationals of any one or more  States in a group, or by any one or more of the 
Parties themselves.  
 
Tariffs 
 
Art 17.1 & 2, Traditional "Pricing (tariffs)"
 
 
The tariffs to be applied by the designated airline or airlines of a Party for services covered by this Agreement shall be established at re asonable levels, due regard being paid to all relevant factors, 
including interests of users, cost of operation, char acteristics of service, reasonable profit, tariffs of 
other airlines and other commercial cons iderations in the market-place.  
 
The tariffs shall, wherever possible, be agreed by  the designated airlines concerned of both Parties, 
after discussion as required with their respective gove rnments and, if applicable, consultation with 
other airlines.  Such agreement shall, wherever po ssible, be reached by the use of the appropriate 
international tariff coordination mechanism.  Fa iling any multilateral or bilateral agreement, each 
designated airline may develop tariffs individually.  
 
Capacity 
 
Art 16.1 to 5, Traditional "Capacity"
 
 
The total capacity to be provided on the agreed ser vices by the designated airlines of the Parties shall 
be agreed between, or approved by, the aeronau tical authorities of the Parties before the 
commencement of the operations, and thereafter according to anticipated traffic requirements.   The agreed services to be operated by the designated airlines of the Parties shall have as their primary 
objective the provision at reasonable load factors of ca pacity adequate to meet the traffic requirements 
between the territories of the two Parties.  
 Each Party shall allow fair and equal opportunity fo r the designated airlines of both Parties to operate 
the agreed services between their respective territories so as to achi eve equality and mutual benefit, in 
principle by equal sharing of the total capacity between the Parties.  
 
Each Party and its designated airline(s) shall take into consideration the interests of the other Party 
and its designated airline(s) so as not to affect unduly the services which the latter provides.  If, on review, the Parties fail to agree on the cap acity to be provided on the agreed services, the 
capacity that may be provided by the designated airlines of the Parties shall not exceed the total 
capacity (including seasonal variations) previously agreed to be provided. 
 S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 70  
 
   
TYPE C 
 
Freedoms 
 Art 2.2.c, Transitional and full liberalization
 
 Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the airline(s) designated by each Party shall enjoy the 
following rights:  
the rights otherwise specifi ed in this Agreement. 
 Annex 1, Section 1, Option 1,  Transitional "Routes schedules"
 
 Airlines of each Party designated under this Anne x shall be entitled to pr ovide air transportation 
between points on the following routes: 
 
• Routes to be operated by the designated airline (or airlines) of Party A: 
 
From any point or points in Party A via (intermediate points) to any point or points in Party B and beyond (beyond points):  
• Routes to be operated by the designated airline (or airlines) of Party B: 
 
From any point or points in Party B via (intermediate points) to any point or points in Party A and beyond (beyond points). 
 
Designation 
 
Art l, 3.1 & 3.2.a, Traditional "Designation and authorization"
 
 Each Party shall have the right to designate in wr iting to the other Party an airline to operate the 
agreed services [in accordance with this Agreement] and to withdraw or alter such designation.  
 
On receipt of such a designation, and of applica tion from the designated airline, in the form and 
manner prescribed for operating authorization [and t echnical permission], each Party shall grant the 
appropriate operating authorization with mi nimum procedural delay, provided that:  
 substantial ownership and e ffective control are vested in the Party designating the airline, nationals of 
that Party, or both. 
 
Withholding/ownership  
 
Art 4.1.a, Traditional "Withholding, revo cation and limitation of authorization"
 
 
The aeronautical authorities of each Party shall have  the rights to withhold the authorizations referred 
to in Article (Authorization) of this Agreement w ith respect to an airline designated by the other 
Party, and to revoke, suspend or impose conditi ons on such authorizations, temporarily or 
permanently:  
In the event that they are not satis fied that substantial ownership and effective control are vested in the 
Party designating the airline, nationals of that Party, or both.  S/C/W/270/Add.1 
 Page I. 71 
 
 
  Tariffs 
 
Art 17.1 & 2, Traditional "Pricing (tariffs)"  
 The tariffs to be applied by the designated airline or airlines of a Party for services covered by this 
Agreement shall be established at re asonable levels, due regard being paid to all relevant factors, 
including interests of users, cost of operation, char acteristics of service, reasonable profit, tariffs of 
other airlines and other commercial cons iderations in the market-place.  
 The tariffs shall, wherever possible, be agreed by  the designated airlines concerned of both Parties, 
after discussion as required with their respective gove rnments and, if applicable, consultation with 
other airlines.  Such agreement shall, wherever po ssible, be reached by the use of the appropriate 
international tariff coordination mechanism.  Fa iling any multilateral or bilateral agreement, each 
designated airline may develop tariffs individually.   Capacity 
 
Art 16.1 to 5 Traditional "Capacity"
 
 The total capacity to be provided on the agreed ser vices by the designated airlines of the Parties shall 
be agreed between, or approved by, the aeronau tical authorities of the Parties before the 
commencement of the operations, and thereafter according to anticipated traffic requirements.  
 The agreed services to be operated by the designated airlines of the Parties shall have as their primary 
objective the provision at reasonable load factors of ca pacity adequate to meet the traffic requirements 
between the territories of the two Parties.  
 
Each Party shall allow fair and equal opportunity fo r the designated airlines of both Parties to operate 
the agreed services between their respective territories so as to achi eve equality and mutual benefit, in 
principle by equal sharing of the total capacity between the Parties.   Each Party and its designated airline(s) shall take into consideration the interests of the other Party 
and its designated airline(s) so as not to affect unduly the services which the latter provides. 
 If, on review, the Parties fail to agree on the cap acity to be provided on the agreed services, the 
capacity that may be provided by the designated airlines of the Parties shall not exceed the total 
capacity (including seasonal variations) previously agreed to be provided. 
 S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 72  
 
   
TYPE D 
 Freedoms 
 Art 2.2.c Transitional and full liberalization
 
 Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the airline(s) designated by each Party shall enjoy the 
following rights:  
the rights otherwise specifi ed in this Agreement. 
 Annex 1, Section 1, Option 1,  Transitional "Routes schedules"
 
 Airlines of each Party designated under this Anne x shall be entitled to pr ovide air transportation 
between points on the following routes: 
 
• Routes to be operated by the designated airline (or airlines) of Party A: 
 
From any point or points in Party A via (intermediate points) to any point or points in Party B and 
beyond (beyond points).  
• Routes to be operated by the designated airline (or airlines) of Party B: 
 
From any point or points in Party B via (intermediate points) to any point or points in Party A and 
beyond (beyond points). 
 
Designation 
 
Art 3.1 & 3.2.a, Traditional "Designation and authorization"
 
 Each Party shall have the right to designate in wr iting to the other Party an airline to operate the 
agreed services [in accordance with this Agreement] and to withdraw or alter such designation.  
 
On receipt of such a designation, and of applica tion from the designated airline, in the form and 
manner prescribed for operating authorization [and t echnical permission], each Party shall grant the 
appropriate operating authorization with mi nimum procedural delay, provided that:  
 substantial ownership and e ffective control are vested in the Party designating the airline, nationals of 
that Party, or both. 
 
Withholding/ownership  
 
Art 4.1.a, Traditional "Withholding, revo cation and limitation of authorization"
 
 
The aeronautical authorities of each Party shall have  the rights to withhold the authorizations referred 
to in Article (Authorization) of this Agreement w ith respect to an airline designated by the other 
Party, and to revoke, suspend or impose conditi ons on such authorizations, temporarily or 
permanently:  
In the event that they are not satis fied that substantial ownership and effective control are vested in the 
Party designating the airline, nationals of that Party, or both.  S/C/W/270/Add.1 
 Page I. 73 
 
 
  Tariffs 
 
Art 17.1 & 2, Traditional "Pricing (tariffs)"  
 The tariffs to be applied by the designated airline or airlines of a Party for services covered by this 
Agreement shall be established at re asonable levels, due regard being paid to all relevant factors, 
including interests of users, cost of operation, char acteristics of service, reasonable profit, tariffs of 
other airlines and other commercial cons iderations in the market-place.  
 The tariffs shall, wherever possible, be agreed by  the designated airlines concerned of both Parties, 
after discussion as required with their respective gove rnments and, if applicable, consultation with 
other airlines.  Such agreement shall, wherever po ssible, be reached by the use of the appropriate 
international tariff coordination mechanism.  Fa iling any multilateral or bilateral agreement, each 
designated airline may develop tariffs individually.   Capacity 
 
Art 16.1 to 5, Transitional "Capacity" (Bermuda I)
 
 The air transport facilities available to the trave lling public should bear a close relationship to the 
requirements of the public for such transport. 
 
The designated airline or airlines of each Party shal l have a fair and equal opportunity to [compete] 
[operate] on any agreed route between the territories of the two Parties.   Each Party shall take into consideration the inter ests of the airlines of the other Party so as not to 
affect unduly their opportunity to offer th e services covered by this Agreement.  
 Services provided by a designated airline under this Agreement shall retain as their primary objective 
the provision of capacity adequate to the traffic dema nds between the country of which such airline is 
a national and the country of ultimate destination of the traffic. The right to embark or disembark on 
such services international traffic destined for and coming from third countries at a point or points on 
the routes specified in this Agreement shall be ex ercised in accordance with the general principles of 
orderly development of international air transport to  which both Parties subscribe and shall be subject 
to the general principle that capacity should be related to:  a) the traffic requirements between the country  of origin and the countries of ultimate 
destination of the traffic; 
b) the requirements of through airline operations; and c) the traffic requirements of the area through wh ich the airline passes, after taking account of 
local and regional services.  
 Consultations between the Parties shall be arra nged whenever a Party requests that the capacity 
provided under the Agreement be reviewed to en sure the application of the principles in the 
Agreement governing the conduct of services.  S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 74  
 
  TYPE E 
 Freedoms 
 
Art 2.2.c, Transitional and full liberalization
 
 
Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the airline(s) designated by each Party shall enjoy the 
following rights:  the rights otherwise specifi ed in this Agreement. 
 
Annex 1, Section 1, Option 1,  Transitional "Routes schedules"
 
 Airlines of each Party designated under this Anne x shall be entitled to pr ovide air transportation 
between points on the following routes. 
 
• Routes to be operated by the designated airline (or airlines) of Party A: 
 
From any point or points in Party A via (intermediate points) to any point or points in Party B and beyond (beyond points).  
• Routes to be operated by the designated airline (or airlines) of Party B: 
 From any point or points in Party B via (intermediate points) to any point or points in Party A and 
beyond (beyond points). 
 
Designation 
 Art 3.1, Transitional "Designation and authorization"
 
 On receipt of the operating authorization of paragra ph 2, a designated airline may at any time begin to 
operate the agreed services for which it is so desi gnated, provided that the airline complies with the 
applicable provisions of this Agreement.  
 
Each Party shall have the right to designate in wr iting to the other Party one or more airlines to 
operate the agreed services (in accordance with this  Agreement) and to withdraw or alter such 
designation.  On receipt of such a designation, and of applica tion from the designated airline, in the form and 
manner prescribed for operating authorization (and t echnical permission), each Party shall grant the 
appropriate operating authorization with mi nimum procedural delay, provided that:  
 the airline is and remains substantially owned and effectively controlled by nationals of any one or 
more States in a group, or by any one or more of the Parties themselves.  
 
Withholding/ownership  
 
Art 4.1.a, Transitional "Withholding, revo cation and limitation of authorization"
 
 The aeronautical authorities of each Party shall have the right to withhold the authorizations referred 
to in Article (Authorization) of this Agreement w ith respect to an airline designated by the other  S/C/W/270/Add.1 
 Page I. 75 
 
 
  Party, and to revoke, suspend or impose conditi ons on such authorizations, temporarily or 
permanently.   In the event that they are not satisfied that th e airline is and remains substantially owned and 
effectively controlled by nationals of any one or more  States in a group, or by any one or more of the 
Parties themselves.  
 
Tariffs 
 
Art 17.1 & 2, Traditional "Pricing (tariffs)"
 
 
The tariffs to be applied by the designated airline or airlines of a Party for services covered by this Agreement shall be established at re asonable levels, due regard being paid to all relevant factors, 
including interests of users, cost of operation, char acteristics of service, reasonable profit, tariffs of 
other airlines and other commercial cons iderations in the market-place.  
 
The tariffs shall, wherever possible, be agreed by  the designated airlines concerned of both Parties, 
after discussion as required with their respective gove rnments and, if applicable, consultation with 
other airlines.  Such agreement shall, wherever po ssible, be reached by the use of the appropriate 
international tariff coordination mechanism.  Fa iling any multilateral or bilateral agreement, each 
designated airline may develop tariffs individually.  
 
Capacity 
 
Art 16.1 to 5, Traditional "Capacity"
 
 
The total capacity to be provided on the agreed ser vices by the designated airlines of the Parties shall 
be agreed between, or approved by, the aeronau tical authorities of the Parties before the 
commencement of the operations, and thereafter according to anticipated traffic requirements.   The agreed services to be operated by the designated airlines of the Parties shall have as their primary 
objective the provision at reasonable load factors of ca pacity adequate to meet the traffic requirements 
between the territories of the two Parties.  
 Each Party shall allow fair and equal opportunity fo r the designated airlines of both Parties to operate 
the agreed services between their respective territories so as to achi eve equality and mutual benefit, in 
principle by equal sharing of the total capacity between the Parties.  
 
Each Party and its designated airline(s) shall take into consideration the interests of the other Party 
and its designated airline(s) so as not to affect unduly the services which the latter provides.  If, on review, the Parties fail to agree on the cap acity to be provided on the agreed services, the 
capacity that may be provided by the designated airlines of the Parties shall not exceed the total 
capacity (including seasonal variations) previously agreed to be provided. 
  S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 76  
 
  TYPE F 
 
Freedoms 
 
Art 2.2.c, Transitional and full liberalization
 
 
Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the airline(s) designated by each Party shall enjoy the 
following rights:  the rights otherwise specifi ed in this Agreement. 
 
Annex 1, Section 1, Option 1,  Transitional "Routes schedules"
 
 Airlines of each Party designated under this Anne x shall be entitled to pr ovide air transportation 
between points on the following routes. 
 
• Routes to be operated by the designated airline (or airlines) of Party A: 
 
From any point or points in Party A via (intermediate points) to any point or points in Party B and beyond (beyond points)  
• Routes to be operated by the designated airline (or airlines) of Party B: 
 From any point or points in Party B via (intermediate points) to any point or points in Party A and 
beyond (beyond points). 
 
Designation 
 Art 3.1, Transitional "Designation and authorization"
 
 On receipt of the operating authorization of paragra ph 2, a designated airline may at any time begin to 
operate the agreed services for which it is so desi gnated, provided that the airline complies with the 
applicable provisions of this Agreement.  
 
Each Party shall have the right to designate in wr iting to the other Party one or more airlines to 
operate the agreed services [in accordance with this  Agreement] and to withdraw or alter such 
designation.  On receipt of such a designation, and of applica tion from the designated airline, in the form and 
manner prescribed for operating authorization (and t echnical permission), each Party shall grant the 
appropriate operating authorization with mi nimum procedural delay, provided that:  
 the airline is and remains substantially owned and effectively controlled by nationals of any one or 
more States in a group, or by any one or more of the Parties themselves.  
 
Withholding/ownership  
 
Art 4.1.a, Transitional "Withholding, revo cation and limitation of authorization"
 
 The aeronautical authorities of each Party shall have the right to withhold the authorizations referred 
to in Article (Authorization) of this Agreement w ith respect to an airline designated by the other  S/C/W/270/Add.1 
 Page I. 77 
 
 
  Party, and to revoke, suspend or impose conditi ons on such authorizations, temporarily or 
permanently.   In the event that they are not satisfied that th e airline is and remains substantially owned and 
effectively controlled by nationals of any one or more  States in a group, or by any one or more of the 
Parties themselves.  
 
Tariffs 
 
Art 17.1 & 2 Traditional "Pricing (tariffs)"
 
 
The tariffs to be applied by the designated airline or airlines of a Party for services covered by this Agreement shall be established at re asonable levels, due regard being paid to all relevant factors, 
including interests of users, cost of operation, char acteristics of service, reasonable profit, tariffs of 
other airlines and other commercial cons iderations in the market-place.  
 
The tariffs shall, wherever possible, be agreed by  the designated airlines concerned of both Parties, 
after discussion as required with their respective gove rnments and, if applicable, consultation with 
other airlines.  Such agreement shall, wherever po ssible, be reached by the use of the appropriate 
international tariff coordination mechanism.  Fa iling any multilateral or bilateral agreement, each 
designated airline may develop tariffs individually.  
 
Capacity 
 
Art 16.1 to 5, Transitional "Capacity" (Bermuda I)
 
 
The air transport facilities available to the trave lling public should bear a close relationship to the 
requirements of the public for such transport.  The designated airline or airlines of each Party shal l have a fair and equal opportunity to [compete] 
[operate] on any agreed route between the territories of the two Parties.   
Each Party shall take into consideration the inter ests of the airlines of the other Party so as not to 
affect unduly their opportunity to offer th e services covered by this Agreement.  
 Services provided by a designated airline under this Agreement shall retain as their primary objective 
the provision of capacity adequate to the traffic dema nds between the country of which such airline is 
a national and the country of ultimate destination of the traffic. The right to embark or disembark on 
such services international traffic destined for and coming from third countries at a point or points on the routes specified in this Agreement shall be ex ercised in accordance with the general principles of 
orderly development of international air transport to  which both Parties subscribe and shall be subject 
to the general principle that capacity should be related to:  
a) the traffic requirements between the country  of origin and the countries of ultimate 
destination of the traffic; 
b) the requirements of through airline operations; and c) the traffic requirements of the area through wh ich the airline passes, after taking account of 
local and regional services.  
 
Consultations between the Parties shall be arra nged whenever a Party requests that the capacity 
provided under the Agreement be reviewed to en sure the application of the principles in the 
Agreement governing the conduct of services. S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 78  
 
  TYPE G 
 
Freedoms 
 
Art 2.2.c, Transitional and full liberalization
 
 
Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the airline(s) designated by each Party shall enjoy the 
following rights:  the rights otherwise specifi ed in this Agreement. 
 
Annex 1, Section 1, Option 1,  Transitional "Routes schedules"
 
 Airlines of each Party designated under this Anne x shall be entitled to pr ovide air transportation 
between points on the following routes. 
 
• Routes to be operated by the designated airline (or airlines) of Party A: 
 
From any point or points in Party A via (intermediate points) to any point or points in Party B and beyond (beyond points)  
• Routes to be operated by the designated airline (or airlines) of Party B: 
 From any point or points in Party B via (intermediate points) to any point or points in Party A and 
beyond (beyond points). 
 
Designation 
 Art 3.1, Full Liberalization "Designation and authorization"
 
 Each Party shall have the right to designate in wr iting to the other Party as many airlines as it wishes 
to operate the agreed services [in accordance with th is Agreement] and to withdraw or alter such 
designation.  
 
Withholding/ownership  
 
Art 4.1.a, Transitional "Withholding, revo cation and limitation of authorization"
 
 The aeronautical authorities of each Party shall have the right to withhold the authorizations referred 
to in Article (Authorization) of this Agreement w ith respect to an airline designated by the other 
Party, and to revoke, suspend or impose conditi ons on such authorizations, temporarily or 
permanently.   In the event that they are not satisfied that th e airline is and remains substantially owned and 
effectively controlled by nationals of any one or more  States in a group, or by any one or more of the 
Parties themselves.   
OR 
 
Art 4, Option 2.a, Transitional, "Withholdi ng, revocation and limitation of authorization
" 
  S/C/W/270/Add.1 
 Page I. 79 
 
 
  In the event that they are not sa tisfied that the designated airline has its principal place of business 
(see (i) below) [and permanent residence] in the territory of the designating Party.  (i) Evidence of principal place of business includes such factors as: the airline is established and 
incorporated in the territory of the designating Pa rty in accordance with relevant national laws and 
regulations, has a substantial amount of its operations and capital investment in physical facilities in 
the territory of the designating Party, pays income tax, registers and bases its aircraft there, and 
employs a significant number of nationals in ma nagerial, technical and operational positions.  
 
OR 
 
Regional or Plurilateral TASA, (Attachment B), pages B-11, Traditional, "Designation and 
authorization"  
 Each Party shall have the right to designate in wr iting an airline [or an eligible airline from another 
Party State] to operate the agreed services in accord ance with this Agreement and to withdraw or alter 
such designation.  Such designation shall be tr ansmitted to the other Parties in writing through 
diplomatic channels [and to the Depository].  On receipt of such a designation, and of applica tion from the designated airline, in the form and 
manner prescribed for operating authorization [and t echnical permission], each Party shall grant the 
appropriate operating authorization with mi nimum procedural delay, provided that: 
 The airline is substantially owned and effectively c ontrolled by one or more of the Parties to this 
Agreement, their nationals or both.  Tariffs 
 
Art 17, Full Liberalization, "Pricing (Tariffs)"
 
 Prices [Tariffs] charged by airlines shall not be required to be filed with, or appr oved, by either Party.  
 
OR 
 
Art 17.1 & 2, Option 1 & 2, Transitional "Pricing (Tariffs)"
 
 The Parties agree to give particular attention to tariffs which may be objectionable because they 
appear unreasonably discriminatory, unduly high or restrictive because of the abuse of a dominant 
position, artificially low because of direct or indi rect subsidy or support, or "predatory".  
 Each Party may require notification or filing of tari ffs proposed by the design ated airline(s) [of the 
other Party] [of both Parties] for carriage to or fro m its territory. Such notification or filing may be 
required not more than ... days before the proposed da te of introduction. In special cases, this period 
may be reduced.  
 Prices for international air transportation between the territories of the Parties shall not be required to 
be filed, unless such filing shall be required fo r the purpose of implementing a mutual agreement 
reached under paragraph 3 of this Article. Neither Pa rty shall require notification or filing by airlines 
of the other Party of prices charged by chartere rs to the public, except as may be required on a non-
discriminatory basis for information purposes. Notw ithstanding the foregoing, the designated airlines 
of the Parties shall continue to provide immediat e access, on request, to information on historical, 
existing and proposed prices to the aeronautical au thorities of the Parties in a manner and format 
acceptable to those aeronautical authorities.  S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 80  
 
  Capacity 
 
Art 16.2, 3 & 4, Full Liberalization "Capacity"
 
 Each Party shall allow each designated airline to determine the frequency and capacity of the 
international air transportation it offers based on commercial considerations of the marketplace.  
 Neither Party shall unilaterally limit the volume of tr affic, frequency, or regularity of service, or the 
aircraft type or types operated by the designated airlines of the other Party except as may be required 
for customs, technical, operational, or environm ental reasons under uniform  conditions consistent 
with Article 15 of the Convention. 
 Neither Party shall impose on the other Party's desi gnated airlines a first refusal requirement, uplift 
ratio, no-objection fee, or any other requirement with respect to the capacity, frequency or traffic 
which would be inconsistent with the purposes of this Agreement.  
 
Neither Party shall require the filing of schedules, programmes for charter flights, or operational plans 
by airlines of the other Party for approval, except as may be required on a non-discriminatory basis to enforce uniform conditions as foreseen by paragraph 2) of this Article or as may be specifically 
authorized in an Annex to this Agreement. If a Pa rty requires filings for information purposes, it shall 
minimize the administrative burdens of filing requirements and procedures on air transportation 
intermediaries and on designated airlines of the other Party.  
   S/C/W/270/Add.1 
 Page I. 81 
 
 
  ANNEX B-II 
 
Bilateral ASA brought into conformity with EC law  
since the ECJ judgments of 5 November 2002 
Bilateral ASAs brought into legal conformity 
under Member States bilateral negotiations Bilateral ASAs brought into legal conformity 
under EC Horizontal Agreements 
Third country Number of bilateral 
ASAs amended Third country Total number of 
bilateral ASAs amended 
Afghanistan Algeria Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Armenia Bahrain 
Belarus 
Belize Brunei Cambodia Cape Verde 
Costa Rica 
Cuba Democratic Rep. of Congo Dominican Republic Ecuador 
Fiji 
Ghana Guinea-Bissau Indonesia Iran 
Macao 
Madagascar Netherlands Antilles North Korea Panama Peru 
Qatar 
Senegal Sri Lanka Suriname Syria 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania Togo Turkmenistan Uganda 
United Arab Emirates 
Uzbekistan Zambia 1 
5 1 4 1 5 
1 
1 1 1 3 
1 
4 1 2 3 
1 
1 1 1 4 
2 
3 2 1 1 2 
9 
4 1 1 2 
1 
1 2 2 1 
4 
1 1 Albania 
Australia Azerbaijan Bosnia-Herzegovina Bulgaria Chile 
Croatia 
FYROM Georgia Kyrgyzstan Lebanon 
Malaysia 
Maldives Moldova Morocco New Zealand 
Paraguay 
Romania Serbia and Montenegro Singapore Ukraine 
Uruguay 
Vietnam 12 
14 17 
9 
22 10 
23 
14 12 
5 
17 
19 
7 
15 18 12 
6 
21 19 22 25 
8 
15 
Total:  40 84 23 342 
Source:  European Commission (July 2006) (available from: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air_portal/interna tional/pillars/horizontal_agreements_en.htm) S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 82  
 
   
    
 
    
 
    
 
   
PART C  
 
ECONOMIC, TRADE AND TRAFFIC 
PROFILES  S/C/W/270/Add.1 
 Page I. 83 
 
 
  148.  This Part contains individual profiles for 184 Contracting States.  Each profile is identical 
and made up of the following elements: 
• A map, drawn from the Air Services Agreements Projector (ASAP) software.  The map 
charts all bilateral ASAs concluded by the Contracting State concerned as recorded in the World Air Services Agreement (WASA) database.
70  The thickness of the lines linking the 
parties to each ASA is indicative of the volume of the traffic, with thicker lines signifying 
higher-traffic agreements.  Given that the map is centred on the Atlantic Ocean, the lines 
do not follow actual aeronautical routes implying, for example, that trans-Pacific flights are shown as going all the way across the Atlantic.  
• Table 1 contains data of general economic a nd demographic nature as well as trade and air 
transport statistics for the Contracting State, drawn from a variety of sources. 
 
• Chart 1 illustrates the share of the total WASA traffic
71 of the Contracting State accounted 
for by bilateral ASAs falling within gi ven Air Liberalisation Index (ALI) ranges.72 
 
• Chart 2 illustrates the share of the total WASA traffic of the Contracting State accounted 
for by bilateral ASAs belonging to given QUASAR types. 
 
• Chart 3 illustrates the share of the total WASA traffic of the Contracting State accounted 
for by bilateral ASAs concluded with partners from given geographical regions. 
 
• Chart 4 illustrates, for each of the mark et access elements analysed in QUASAR, the 
amount of WASA traffic of the Contracting State that is accounted for by the ASAs that contain each of the different options (e.g. fo r fifth freedom, the traffic accounted for by 
those ASAs that grant it and the traffic accounted for by those that do not). 
 
• Table 2 contains selected indicators for all b ilateral ASAs concluded by the Contracting 
State as recorded by the WASA database, orde red by descending volume of traffic.  For 
each agreement, the table lists the name of th e ASA partner, the date of conclusion, the 
standard and non-standard (i.e. 5
th+, OWN+ and DES+) ALIs, the QUASAR type, the 
existence, or otherwise, of a direct air transportation service between the two parties in 
question, the distance between them, and the traffic, expressed as a range, covered by the 
agreement.  
 
• Table 3 lists the countries or territories with which the Contracting State has a direct air 
transportation service in the absence of a corresponding bilateral ASA as recorded in the 
WASA, as well as the range of traffic covered by this service.73 
 
149. The figure for total WASA traffic in Tabl e 1 has been expressed as a range for those 
Contracting States which have concluded only one ASA74 as recorded in the WASA for copyright 
                                                      
70 The numbering of the ASAs currently reflects on ly software programming needs, but it will be 
refined in the final ASAP CD-Rom. 
71 This is total incoming and outgoing WASA traffic. 
72 The ALI ranges are as follows:  0-4;  5-9;  10-14;  15-19; 20-25;  and above 25. 
73 In this respect, the scope of QUASAR extends fu rther than that of the WASA to all countries and 
territories that appear as distinct entities within the IATA  mileage statistics, including territories that have no 
autonomy regarding their air transport policy (e.g. the French Département of Guadeloupe). 
74 The Contracting States in question are:  Antigua, Aruba, Bahamas, Bhutan, Djibouti, Estonia, Haiti, 
Netherlands Antilles, Saint Kitts and Nevi s, Sao Tome and Principe, Swaziland. S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 84  
 
  reasons.
75  The same rationale is behind the removal of the traffic labels in Chart 4 of the relevant 
profiles.  Charts 1 to 4 are empty whenever the WASA traffic of the Contracting State in question 
equals zero. 
150. The index of the Contracting Stat es profiled is containe d on page I. 89.  It is preceded by a 
mock profile for a hypothetical Contracting State A, which contains all the data sources and technical 
notes for the individual tables and charts. 
                                                      
75 Otherwise, the exact amount of the traffic covered by the single ASA in question would have been 
disclosed.  
   S/C/W/270/Add.1
 Page I. 85CONTRACTING STATE A 
 
Table 1 
Selected indicators 
STATISTICAL DATA POLICY DATA 
General (2004) Trade (2004) Air transport (2004) Trade (2006) Air Transport (2005) 
Population 
(million) 1Total trade 
(million US$) 8 WASA traffic (passengers) 
(2005) 15 Final bound MFN tariffs 
(%) 23 Traffic weighted average ALI 
(Standard) 31 
Share in world 
population (%) 2Share in world trade 
(%) 9 Share of total WASA traffic 
(%) (2005) 16 Services sectors committed 
(out of ~160 sub-sectors) 24 Traffic weighted average ALI 
(5th+) 32 
GDP 
(million current US$) 3Trade per capita 
(US$) 10 Number of planes (o f which, 
in parenthesis, jets ) (2005) 17 Tourism and travel-rela ted services sectors 
committed (out of 3 sub-sectors) 25 Traffic weighted average ALI 
(OWN+) 33 
Share in world GDP 
(%) 4Trade to GDP ratio 
(%) 11 Number of international 
airports (2005) 18 Services auxiliary to all modes of transport 
committed (out of 4 sub-sectors) 26 Traffic weighted average ALI 
(DES+) 34 
GDP per capita 
(current US$) 5Commercial services trade 
(million US$) 12 Domestic traffic (passengers) 
(2005) 19 Air transport services sectors committed 
(out of 4 sub-sectors) 27 Dispersion of ALI 
(standard) 35 
Size 
(km²) 6Share in world commercial 
services trade (%) 13 Air transport services 
(million US$) 20 MFN exemptions on air transport services 28 National ownership regime 
(2004) 36 
Density 
(pop. by km²) 7Travel services 
(million US$) 14 Passenger air transport 
services (million US$) 21 Number of bilateral FTAs 29 Number of bilateral ASAs 
recorded by ICAO 37 
      Freight air transport services 
(million US$) 22 Number of regional FTAs 30 Number of plurilateral ASAs 
recorded by ICAO (2006) 38 
Source :  WTO Secretariat (2006), compiled on the basis of:  
1-7  World Bank World Development Indicators 
online database (September 2006) 
8-14,23-24  WTO Secretariat (as of September 2006) 
15,16  WTO Secretariat, on the basis of ICAO, WASA 
Database (2005), and IATA traffic data (2005) 
17-19  ICAO Secretariat 
20-22   IMF Balance-of-Payments CD-Rom (July 2006) 
25-30   WTO Secretariat 
31-34,37   WTO Secretariat 
36  ICAO Secretariat, Responses to State Letter 
SC5/6-03/88, 26 September 2003 
38  ICAO Secretariat, Information Paper 
"Regulatory and Industry Overview", 15 August 
2006 
  
 
  Notes
: 
Unless otherwise indicated, "Statistical Data" refer to 2004, "Policy Data – Trade" to 2006 and "Policy Data – 
Air Transport" to 2005.  
8-14 Data refer to exports plus imports of goods, comm ercial services and travel (balance of payments 
basis)  
15,16 WASA traffic is traffic covered by the ASAs contained in the WASA database (2005) 
17,18  17 - Fixed wing civil aircraft regi stered in ICAO Contracting States with maximum certified take-off 
weight equal or greater than 2000 lbs.  18 - Airports from which internat ional services are offered. 
23 Simple average;  excludes non ad valorem  duties 
24-28  Based on available information and in light of the W/120 and Air Annex classification 
27 The 4 sub-sectors are:  Computer Reservation System (CRS); Selling and marketing (Sell/Mark); 
Repair and maintenance (Maint); and Other 
29,30 Goods FTAs in force, notified and non-notified to the GATT/WTO, as of 30 June 2006 
31-35  For an explanation of "Standard", "5th+", "OWN+" and "DES+", see Methodological notes in Part D 
36 SOEC = Substantial Ownershi p and Effective Control;  PPOB  = Principal Place of Business 
Symbols and abbreviations : 
... Not available or not reported - Not applicable (non WTO Member) 
ALI Air Liberalisation Index ASA Air Services Agreement 
GDP Gross Domestic Product MFN Most Favoured Nation 
FTA Free Trade Agreement WASA World Air Services Agreements  
  S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 86  
 
CONTRACTING STATE A 
 
  
 
Chart 1  
Share of traffic by ALI range 
(percentage, 2005) Chart 2  
Share of traffic by type 
(percentage, 2005) Chart 3  
Share of traffic by region of partner 
(percentage, 2005) 
0-4
12%
5-9
19%
10-14
69%
 i
53%
A
13%E
26%C
0%B
8%D
0%
 1
3%2
2% 3
7%
4
80%5
4%6
4%7
0%
 
  1 Africa, 2 Asia and Oceania,  
3 Commonwealth of Independent States, 
4 Europe, 5 Middle East, 6 North America,  
7 South and Central America and the Caribbean 
 
Note: "0%" indicates a share of between 0.01% and 0.49%.  Total may not equal 100 due to approximation. 
Source :  WTO Secretariat (2006)  
   S/C/W/270/Add.1
 Page I. 87CONTRACTING STATE A 
 
Chart 4  
Distribution of traffic by feature of bilatera l Air Services Agreements (thousand passengers, 2005) 
1000 passengers 
8136
020406080100120140
145
020406080100120140
1368
020406080100120140
011431
020406080100120140
1440
020406080100120140
0144
020406080100120140
145
020406080100120140
145
020406080100120140
12817
020406080100120140
 
 5° Freedom 7° Freedom Cabotage Designation Wit hholding Capacity Tariffs Cooperation Statistics   
Notes:  Sum of traffic may not equal the total WASA tr affic figure contained in Table 1 due to approximation. 
 "0" indicates that a feature is presen t and covers between 1 and 999 passengers. 
 Designation  in this chart refers to the right to designate one or more airlines (i.e. multiple  designation). 
 Statistics  in this chart refers to " no exchange of statistics ".  In the example above, there is no  requirement to exchange statistics in ASAs covering 8,000 passengers. 
 Cooperation  refers to the presence of a provision for entering into cooperative marketing arrange ments, such as blocked-space or code-shar ing. 
 
Source :  WTO Secretariat (2006). 
5° Freedom, 7° Freedom, Cabotage, 
Designation, Cooperation, Statistics Withholding Capacity Tariffs 
 With  Principal Place of Business  Free Determination  Free Pricing 
 Without  Community of Interest  Bermuda I  Zone Pricing 
   Substantial Ownership and Effective Control  Pre–Determination  Double Disapproval 
   Undetermined  Undetermined  Country of Origin 
       Double Approval 
       Undetermined  
  S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 88 CONTRACTING STATE A 
  
Table 2 
Bilateral Air Services Agreements recorded by ICAO, selected indicators (2005) 
 
Party Date Direct services ALI 
Standard ALI 
5th+ ALI 
OWN+ ALI 
DES+ Type Distance 
(km) Traffic Range 
(passengers) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Notes:  1,2 List compiled on the basis of the information contained in ICAO, World Air Services Agreements (WASA) database (2005). 
 3 Existence of direct services (i.e. service operated under the same flight number) by IATA member airlines, based on summer 200 6 data. 
 4-8 Computed by the WTO Secretariat 
9 Data refer to the distance between the main city of Contracting State A and the main city of its ASA partner.  Compiled from th e Centre d'Études 
Prospectives et d'Informations Internatio nales (CEPII), Country Data "geo_cepii", available from http://w ww.cepii.fr/anglaisgra ph/bdd/distances.htm.   
10 IATA traffic data (2005).   
"<1" implies that there is no traffic. 
 
Source : WTO Secretariat (2006) 
 
  
Table 3 
Direct air transport services not covered by a bilatera l Air Services Agreement as recorded by ICAO (2005) 
 
Countries or territories Traffic range  Countries or territories Traffic range 
1 2  1 2 
Notes:  1 List compiled on the basis of a comparison between the information contained in ICAO, World Air Services Agreements (WASA) dat abase (2005), and data on 
direct services by IATA memb er airlines (summer 2006). 
 2 IATA traffic data (2005). 
Symbol: ... Not available  
Source
: WTO Secretariat (2006)  S/C/W/270/Add.1 
 Page I. 89 
 
 
  INDEX OF CONTRACTING STATES PROFILED 
 
Afghanistan I. 91 Czech Republic I. 413 
Albania I. 97 Denmark I. 421 
Algeria I. 103 Djibouti I. 429 
American Samoa I. 111 Dominican Republic I. 435 
Angola  I. 117 Ecuador I. 441 
Antigua and Barbuda I. 123 Egypt I. 447 
Argentina I. 129 El Salvador I. 455 
Armenia I. 137 Equatorial Guinea I. 461 
Aruba I. 143 Estonia I. 467 
Australia  I. 151 Ethiopia I. 473 
Austria I. 157 Fiji I. 481 
Azerbaijan I. 165 Finland I. 487 
Bahamas  I. 171 France I. 495 
Bahrain I. 177 FYR Macedonia I. 503 
Bangladesh I. 185 Gabon I. 513 
Barbados I. 191 Gambia I. 519 
Belarus  I. 197 Georgia I. 525 
Belgium I. 203 Germany I. 531 
Benin  I. 215 Ghana I. 541 
Bhutan I. 221 Greece  I. 549 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela I. 227 Grenada I. 557 
Bolivia I. 233 Guatemala I. 563 
Bosnia and Herzegovina I. 239 Guinea I. 569 
Botswana I. 245 Guinea-Bissau I. 575 
Brazil I. 251 Guyana I. 581 
Brunei Darussalam I. 259 Haiti I. 587 
Bulgaria I. 267 Honduras I. 593 
Burkina Faso I. 275 Hong Kong, China I. 599 
Burundi I. 281 Hungary I. 607 
Cambodia I. 287 Iceland I. 615 
Cameroon I. 293 India I. 621 
Canada I. 299 Indonesia I. 629 
Cape Verde I. 307 Iran, Islamic Republic of I. 637 
Central African Republic I. 313 Iraq I. 645 
Chad  I. 319 Ireland I. 653 
Chile I. 325 Israel I. 659 
China I. 333 Italy I. 667 
Colombia I. 341 Jamaica I. 675 
Comoros I. 347 Japan I. 683 
Congo, Democratic Republic of I. 353 Jordan I. 691 
Congo I. 359 Kazakhstan I. 699 
Cook Island I. 367 Kenya I. 705 
Costa Rica I. 373 Korea, Democratic  People's Republic of I. 713 
Côte d'Ivoire I. 379 Korea, Republic of I. 719 
Croatia  I. 387 Kuwait I. 727 
Cuba I. 397 Kyrgyz Republic II. 5 
Cyprus I. 405 Lao People's Democratic Republic II. 11 
 
 
Latvia II. 17 Rwanda II. 331 
Lebanon II. 23 Saint Kitts and Nevis II. 337 
Lesotho II. 31 Saint Lucia II. 343 
Liberia II. 37 Samoa II. 349 S/C/W/270/Add.1 
Page I. 90  
 
  Libyan Arab Jamahiriya II. 43 Sao Tome and Principe II. 355 
Lithuania II. 51 Saudi Arabia II. 361 
Luxembourg II. 57 Senegal II. 369 
Macao, China II. 63 Serbia  and Montenegro II. 377 
Madagascar II. 71 Seychelles II. 385 
Malawi II. 77 Sierra Leone II. 391 
Malaysia II. 83 Singapore II. 397 
Maldives II. 91 Slovak Republic II. 405 
Mali II. 97 Slovenia II. 411 
Malta II. 105 Solomon Islands II. 417 
Marshall Islands II. 111 Somalia II. 423 
Mauritania II. 117 South Africa  II. 429 
Mauritius II. 123 Spain II. 437 
Mexico II. 129 Sri Lanka II. 445 
Moldova II. 137 Sudan  II. 453 
Mongolia II. 143 Suriname II. 459 
Morocco II. 149 Swaziland II. 465 
Mozambique II. 157 Sweden  II. 471 
Myanmar II. 163 Switzerland II. 479 
Namibia II. 171 Syrian Arab Republic II. 489 
Nauru II. 177 Tanzania II. 497 
Nepal II. 183 Thailand II. 503 
Netherlands Antilles II. 189 Togo II. 511 
Netherlands II. 195 Tonga II. 517 
New Zealand  II. 205 Trinidad and Tobago II. 523 
Nicaragua II. 213 Tunisia II. 529 
Niger II. 219 Turkey II. 537 
Nigeria II. 225 Turkmenistan II. 545 
Norway II. 233 Tuvalu II. 551 
Oman II. 241 Uganda II. 557 
Pakistan II. 249 Ukraine II. 563 
Panama II. 257 United Arab Emirates II. 571 
Papua New Guinea II. 263 United Kingdom II. 579 
Paraguay II. 269 United States II. 589 
Peru II. 275 Uruguay II. 599 
Philippines II. 281 Uzbekistan II. 605 
Poland II. 289 Vanuatu II. 613 
Portugal II. 297 Viet Nam II. 619 
Qatar II. 305 Yemen II. 625 
Romania II. 313 Zambia II. 631 
Russian Federation II. 321 Zimbabwe II. 637