. /.   WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  G/ADP/IG/W/53 
12 March 2008 
 (08-1119) 
Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices 
Informal Group on Anti-Circumvention  
 
 
 
COMPILATION OF COMMENTS SUBMITTED BY VARIOUS MEMBERS  
ON THE "BUNDLING" ISSUE  
 
Note by the Secretariat  
 
  At its last meeting, the Informal Group on Anti-Circumvention directed the Secretariat to produce a brief memo describing the comments su bmitted by various Members on the so-called 
"bundling" issue which New Zealand submitted in document G/ADP/IG/W/52 to the meeting of the 
Informal Group held on 24 April 2007.  
 
In the document, New Zealand describes a fictiti ous example where reference price duties and 
price undertakings is being avoided by "bundling" of  an invoice – i.e. overstating the transaction price 
(value for duty) on the goods that are subject to the anti-dumping measure and understating by the 
corresponding amount the transaction price for another line of goods on the invoice that an exporter is 
supplying to the same importer.
1  New Zealand explains that it has a prospective system for which the 
duty payable is the difference between the transacti on price and the reference price.  The reference 
price would normally be based on the normal value established in an investigation and generally 
represents the un-dumped value of the goods at the FOB level.  Based on this example, New Zealand 
asks:  (i) how do you identify if such practices are occu rring? (ii) is there anything that can be done to 
prevent such a practice? and (iii)what action can  be taken if such a practice is discovered? 
 The following briefly recaps th e comments made by Members at the meetings of the Informal 
Group held on 24 April 2007 and on 24 October 2007 on this issue.  All of these comments were 
made orally, and there have been, to  date, no comments submitted in writing. 
 
• Members should discuss whether the example cite d should be treated as anti-circumvention, 
or whether it should be treated as customs fraud.  
 
• Members should discuss the distinction between  an improper "bundling" and a legitimate 
business practice.  
 
• Although New Zealand assumes a reference price in this example, a similar problem would 
arise in the case of an ad valorem  duty.  
 
• Although New Zealand assumes a manipulation on pr ices, investigation authorities can face a 
similar problem when importers report a fraudulent tariff classification of the imported goods.  
 
• Although New Zealand assumes a manipulation of prices in the same invoice, investigation 
authorities can face a similar problem even when an importer does not "bundle" – that is, an importer reports fraudulent prices in two separate invoices.  
 
                                                     
 
1  See document G/ADP/IG/W/52 for details.  G/ADP/IG/W/53 
Page 2  
 
  • While New Zealand assumes a prospective dut y collection system, what would be the 
situation in a retrospective duty collection system?  
 
• What, in the views of Members, should the specifi c reaction of investigating authority be?  Is 
Article 11.2 of the AD Agreement relevant ?  Is Article 2.3 of the Agreement on 
Implementation of Article V II of the GATT 1994 relevant?  
 
• Is an Article 5.6 investigation a possible response?  
 
• If Article 11.2 of the AD Agreement were rele vant, what should be the timeframe of the 
review?  
 
• In actuality, it may be difficult to prove such a manipulation.  
 
• In a situation such as the one described by  New Zealand, the option of initiating a new 
investigation seems meaningless. It is a matter of enforcement of an existing measure.  
 
• This example – false valuation – is in fact  an example that should fall under cases which 
New Zealand described as being "not circumve ntion" in a paper submitted in April 2003.
2   
  
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 2  G/ADP/IG/W/49.