RESTRICTED  WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  WT/DSB/M/220 
2 November 2006 
 (06-5280) 
Dispute Settlement Body 
28 September 2006  
 
 
MINUTES OF MEETING 
 
Held in the Centre William Rappard  
on 28 September 2006  
 
Chairman:  Mr. Muhamad Noor Yacob (Malaysia) 
 
 Subjects discussed
: Page  
 
1. Surveillance of implementation of recommendations adopted by the DSB.........................2  
(a) United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropr iations Act of 1998:  Status report by 
the United States .............................................................................................................. ...........2  
(b) United States – Anti-dumping measures on certain hot-rolled steel products from 
Japan:  Status report by  the United States...................................................................................5  
(c) United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act:  Status report by  
the United States .............................................................................................................. ...........5  
2. Implementation by the European Co mmunities of the recommendations and 
rulings of the DSB in relation to "European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas" and related subsequent WTO 
proceedings .................................................................................................................... ............6
 
(a) Statements by Honduras, Ni caragua and Panama.......................................................................6  
3. United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000:  
Implementation of the recommenda tions adopted by the DSB ............................................8  
(a) Statements by Canada, the Eur opean Communiti es and Japan...................................................8  
4. United States – Subsidies on upland cotton..........................................................................11  
(a) Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Brazil:  Request for the establishment  
of a panel..................................................................................................................... ..............11  
5. China – Measures affecting imports of automobile parts ...................................................13  
(a) Request for the establishment of a pa nel by the European Communities.................................13  
(b) Request for the establishment of a panel by the United States .................................................13  
(c) Request for the establishment of a panel by Canada ................................................................13  
6. United States – Measures relating to shrimp from Thailand..............................................15  
(a) Request for the establishment of a panel by Thailand ..............................................................15  
7. Swearing-in ceremony of the newly a ppointed Appellate Body member ..........................16  
(a) Statement by the Chairman...................................................................................................... .16 WT/DSB/M/220 
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  1. Surveillance of implementation of recommendations adopted by the DSB 
(a) United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropria tions Act of 1998:  Status report by the 
United States (WT/DS176/11/Add.46) 
(b) United States – Anti-dumping measures on certain hot-rolled steel products from Japan:  
Status report by the United States (WT/DS184/15/Add.46) 
(c) United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act:  Status report by the United States 
(WT/DS160/24/Add.21) 
1. The Chairman
 said that Article 21.6 of the DSU required that "unless the DSB decides 
otherwise, the issue of implementation of the re commendations or rulings shall be placed on the 
agenda of the DSB meeting after six months follo wing the date of establishment of the reasonable 
period of time pursuant to paragraph 3 and shall remain on the DSB's agenda until the issue is 
resolved".  He proposed that the three sub-items  to which he had just referred be considered 
separately. 
(a) United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropria tions Act of 1998:  Status report by the 
United States (WT/DS176/11/Add.46) 
2. The Chairman  drew attention to document WT/DS176/ 11/Add.46, which contained the status 
report by the United States on progress in the impl ementation of the DSB's recommendations in the 
case concerning US Section 211 Omni bus Appropriations Act of 1998. 
3. The representative of the United States  said that his country had provided a status report in 
this dispute on 15 September 2006, in accordance w ith Article 21.6 of the DSU.  As noted in the 
status report, several legislative proposals that  would implement the DSB's recommendations and 
rulings in this dispute had been introduced in th e current Congress, both in the US Senate and the US 
House of Representatives. The US administration continued to work with the US Congress to 
implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings.   
4. The representative of the European Communities said that more than four and a half years had 
passed since the United States had been condemned in this dispute for breaching the core principles of 
national and most-favoured-nation treatment embodied  in the TRIPS Agreement.  Since the DSB's 
ruling, the United States had never made any serious efforts to bring itself into compliance with its 
obligations.  Coming from one of the promoters of  the TRIPS Agreement, such an attitude was 
particularly damaging, and this was even more so si nce this dispute was not an isolated case.  For an 
even longer period, the United States had shown equally no interest in implementing the DSB's 
rulings condemning Section 110 of its Copyright Act.   That legislation breached other fundamental 
pillars of the protection of intellectual property rights , which were the exclusive right for an author to 
exploit his work and the entitlement to remunerati on from that exploitation.  In both disputes, the 
United States undermined the authority of the TRIPS Agreement and thus sacrificed the interests of 
the majority to preserve legislation that benefited th e limited interests of very few companies.  Indeed, 
recently the US administration had refused the specific licence that would have allowed the renewal 
of the registration of the Havana Club mark.  Th at decision was disturbing as the renewal would not 
have given away or granted rights, but would only  preserve the status quo and would thus allow the 
US courts to decide in pending proceedings who wa s the legitimate owner of that mark.  How could 
the United States refuse the very possibility to defend  potential rights to a mark in a court of law?  
What was even more disturbing was the US explan ation that this decision had been made on the 
foreign policy grounds.  This was in clear cont radiction with the principle strongly promoted 
worldwide by the United States that ownership of intellectual property rights should be decided in 
courts on the basis of the law without interference of political considerations. If this US policy had  WT/DSB/M/220 
 Page 3 
 
 
  been followed, it would seriously undermine the efforts to promote rules-based protection of 
intellectual property rights.  Therefore, the EC i nvited the United States to reconsider its position.  
Finally, the EC urged the United States, the only WT O Member that consistently did not comply with 
panel rulings under the TRIPS Agreement, to bring itself into compliance. 
5. The representative of Cuba  said that for the past four years and seven months, every single 
meeting of the DSB had witnessed a discussion on compliance with the recommendations in this 
dispute, yet the United States still limited itself to reiterating that the US administration was working with the US Congress with respect to appropriate stat utory measures to resolve this matter. The status 
reports submitted by the United States to-date shown no sign that the US authorities would resolve this matter in the immediate future, or even in th e coming months, or that any progress at all had been 
made towards reaching a solution. The truth of th e matter was that the United States continued to 
ignore the DSB's recommendations and rulings in re lation both to Section 211 and to other disputes 
that had also been on the DSB's agenda for several years. The fact was that the US authorities had not 
ceased working to find new ways to impair legiti mate industrial property rights acquired by Cuban 
entities in that territory.  On 3 August 2006, the US Patent and Trademark Office had rejected the 
application filed by the Cuban company Cubaexport to renew the Havana Club trademark in the said 
territory. In the wake of that decision, the Bacardi company, which had participated in the drafting of 
Section 211 and had not rested until it had been ad opted by the US Congress in October 1998, had 
started marketing rum produced in Puerto Rico under the Havana Club trademark, which was a fraudulent action misleading for consumers of this fa mous and prestigious rum produced exclusively 
in the Cuban territory. All of this had been possi ble because the arbitrary and discriminatory Section 
211, which had been declared inconsistent with the basic WTO rules and princi ples, was still in force. 
The reasons for the failure of the United Stat es to implement the rulings and recommendations 
adopted by the DSB on 2 February 2002 were clear.   Equally obvious was that the US government 
was not particularly concerned about respecti ng its commitments under th e WTO Agreements or 
about the erosion of the balance, security and predictability of the Multilateral Trading System 
triggered by its conduct.  This ne gative attitude of the United States was in marked contrast to the 
scrupulous respect shown by the Cuban Government fo r the over 4,930 US trademarks registered in 
Cuban territory (15 of which were owned by th e Bacardi company), as befitted Cuba's traditional 
observance of the rules of international law and its  confidence that these a nd no other practices would 
prevail. Cuba would not cease in its efforts;  it reite rated its call for prompt and effective action to be 
taken to enforce the terms of the WTO Agreemen ts and decisions and demanded that the United 
States comply immediately and unconditionally with the DSB's rulings and recommendations, in 
particular those pertaining to this dispute, by repealing the unfair and discriminatory Section 211. 
6. The representative of Brazil
 said that his country wished to thank the United States for its 
status report and the statement made at the present meeting.  At the same time, Brazil wished to reiterate its systemic concerns about the lack of  implementation in the case under consideration.   
Brazil was conscious of the difficulties involved in  the process of implementation of the DSB's 
recommendations.  It was clear, however, that the cr edibility of the WTO dispute settlement system as 
a tool to protect rights and enforce obligations w as a key element for maintaining the relevance and 
strength of the system.  That credibility was serious ly undermined when Members – in particular, the 
major players – did not to comply with the DSB's recommendations within a reasonable time period.   
Moreover, Brazil believed that the lack of complianc e in an unrelated dispute could not serve as an 
excuse for a respondent not to explain the reasons for its own debts to the system.  In light of these 
considerations, Brazil invited the United States to take the necessary and urgent steps to bring itself into conformity with the relevant  DSB's rulings and recommendations. 
7. The representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
 said that his country wished to 
thank the United States for its status report and Cuba  for the statement made at the present meeting. 
His country fully agreed with Cuba's statement that Section 211 was incompatible with the WTO 
principles and rules.  As his delegation had stated  on previous occasions, the lack of compliance with WT/DSB/M/220 
Page 4  
 
  the WTO rules was regrettable and might create a precedent with negative implications for other 
Members, which would not be desirable.  For that reason, his country called for a prompt resolution of 
this dispute, which would be satisfactory to the par ties concerned,  and urged the United States to find 
an appropriate solution in accord ance with the WTO rules.   
8. The representative of China
 said that, due to systemic interests, his country, once again, 
wished to express its continued concern about this dispute.  China thanked the United States for its 
status report and the statement made at the present meeting.  However, it was very regrettable that 
although more than four years had passed since the adoption by the DSB of the Panel and the Appellate Body Reports pertaining to this dispute, there was no clear indication as to when this matter 
would be resolved to the satisfaction of the parti es and other Members.  Such a delay caused systemic 
concerns about the efficient functioning of the dis pute settlement system.  China firmly believed that 
prompt and full implementation of the DSB's ruli ngs and recommendations was one of the major 
cornerstones of the WTO dispute settlement system .  Therefore, China urged the United States to 
implement the decision of the DSB in this dispute as soon as possible. 
9. The representative of India
 said that his country thanked the United States for its status report, 
but had to stress the importance of the prin ciple of prompt compliance with rulings and 
recommendations of the DSB for ensuring effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members.  India continued to have  systemic concern that due consid eration of this vital principle 
appeared to be missing in this dispute.  Alt hough a solution mutually acceptable to the parties was 
preferred, parties should keep the DSB informed of  progress being made towards such a solution in a 
meaningful manner.  Unfortunately, this was not a pparent from the statements made by the parties, 
even though four years had elapsed since the a doption of the DSB's recommendations and rulings. 
India again urged the parties to this dispute to r espond to these systemic concerns and to inform the 
DSB how they intended to fulfill th e objective of prompt settlement. 
10. The representative of Argentina
 said that his delegation also wished to thank to the United 
States for its status report regarding Section 211 the Omnibus Appropriations Act 1998.  Argentina 
wished to reiterate its concern about the delays  in implementing the rulings and recommendations 
adopted by the DSB more than four years ago.  Prompt compliance with the DSB's rulings and recommendations was an essential element of the WTO dispute settlement system. The lack of 
progress in implementation affected the credibility of the system and had a negative impact on all 
Members, especially developing countries, for wh ich the system represented an instrument of 
particular importance.  Argentina, therefore, ur ged the United States to make renewed efforts to 
comply with the DSB's rulings and recommendations in this dispute.  
11. The representative of the United States 
said that his country regretted that the EC was again 
making unfounded comments on the US intellectual pr operty rights record.  As his delegation had 
stated at previous DSB meetings, the United States was second to none in providing strong protection 
for intellectual property rights. The United States also  regretted that the EC was again suggesting that 
US actions in this dispute had somehow undermined  the authority of the TRIPS Agreement.  The 
United States failed to understand how its commitm ent to implement the DSB's recommendations and 
rulings in this dispute and its efforts to comp ly could undermine the "authority" of the TRIPS 
Agreement.  To the contrary, th ese affirmed Members' commitments to the TRIPS Agreement.  None 
of the recommendations or rulings of the DSB in th is proceeding related to the renewal of specific 
trademarks, so this was not an issue related to the implementation of the DSB's recommendations and 
rulings. 
12. The DSB took note  of the statements and agreed  to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting.  WT/DSB/M/220 
 Page 5 
 
 
  (b) United States – Anti-dumping measures on certain hot-rolled steel products from Japan:  
Status report by the United States (WT/DS184/15/Add.46) 
13. The Chairman  drew attention to document WT/DS184/ 15/Add.46, which contained the status 
report by the United States on progress in the impl ementation of the DSB's recommendations in the 
case concerning US anti-dumping measures on certain hot-rolled steel products from Japan. 
14. The representative of the United States  said that his country had provided a status report in 
this dispute on 15 September 2006, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU.  As of 23 November 2002, the US authorities had addresse d the DSB's recommendations and rulings with 
respect to the calculation of anti-dumping margins in the hot-rolled steel anti-dumping duty investigation at issue in this dispute.  Details  were provided in document WT/DS184/15/Add.3.  The 
US administration continued to support legislative amendments that would implement the DSB's 
recommendations and rulings with respect to the US  anti-dumping duty statute, and was working with 
the US Congress to pass such amendments. 
15. The representative of Japan
 said that his country noted the statement made by the United 
States along with its latest status report.  Japan appreciated that the US administration would continue 
to work with the US Congress to enact legislation H.R. 2473.  However, it was regrettable that Japan 
had not seen any progress in the situation since that legislation had been introduced in the US Congress in May 2005.  As his delegation had repeat edly stated at previous DSB meetings, Japan 
believed that a full and prompt im plementation of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB was a 
principal factor for the credibility of the WTO dis pute settlement system.  Japan understood that the 
target adjournment of the 109th US Congress was 6 Oc tober 2006.   Under these circumstances, Japan  
wished to renew its strong hope that the United States  would intensify its efforts to pass the legislation 
at the earliest possible date. 
16. The DSB took note
 of the statements and agreed  to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting. 
(c) United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act:  Status report by the United States 
(WT/DS160/24/Add.21) 
17. The Chairman  drew attention to document WT/DS160/ 24/Add.21, which contained the status 
report by the United States on progress in the impl ementation of the DSB's recommendations in the 
case concerning Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act. 
18. The representative of the United States  said that his country had provided a status report in 
this dispute on 15 September 2006, in accordance w ith Article 21.6 of the DSU.  As noted in the 
report, the US administration was working closely with the US Congress, and conferring with the EC, 
to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of this matter. 
19. The representative of the European Communities  said that, once again, the United States had 
submitted to the DSB a status report which was empty of  any meaningful content.  From that report, it 
seemed clear that there was a total lack of progr ess in solving this long-standing dispute.  This 
situation had now lasted for more than five years.   If one were to judge the commitment of the United 
States to its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement on the basis of this dispute, the appraisal would 
be all,  but positive.  The United States had failed to take any steps to amend a piece of legislation that 
violated intellectual property rights and hurt the in terests of music creators.  The United States was 
failing to comply at home with the rules that it act ively sought to enforce abroad. This situation of 
double standards created damage that went beyond the boundaries of this specific dispute.  Therefore, 
the EC urged, once again, the United States to provi de information on the specific steps that it had 
taken or intended to take to solve this dispute. Th is situation of non-compliance had already lasted too WT/DSB/M/220 
Page 6  
 
  long.  Finally, the EC wished to recall that it had reserved its right to reactivate, at any point in time, 
the arbitration proceedings on the level of retaliation. 
20. The representative of the United States
 said that, in response to the suggestion just made that 
the US compliance record was poor, the facts simply di d not support that assertion.  Indeed, the record 
showed that the United States had fully complied in the vast majority of its disputes.  As for the 
remaining few, the United States was actively working towards compliance. 
21. The DSB took note  of the statements and agreed  to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting. 
2. Implementation by the European Communiti es of the recommendations and rulings of 
the DSB in relation to "European Communiti es – Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas"1 and related subsequent WTO proceedings 
(a) Statements by Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama 
22. The Chairman  said that this item was on the agenda of the present meeting at the request of 
Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama.  He then invite d the representatives of the respective countries to 
speak. 
23. The representative of Honduras  said that his delegation wished to refer again to prior 
statements made by Honduras in which it had expl ained why this dispute – which had become a WTO 
symbol of non-compliance – ought to be considered pursuant to the provisions of Article 21.5 of the 
DSU.  It was possible that, at the present meeting, the EC would make the same statement like the one 
made at  the 1 September DSB meeting, namely that  the data available to-date showed "increases" in 
MFN and ACP volumes, and, therefore, "give no reas on to believe that [MFN] access is not [being] 
maintained."  If it was true that MFN access wa s being "maintained", then why after only seven 
months following the entry into force of this new arrangement, had there been an increase of almost 
10 per cent in the market share of ACP suppliers, and why had the market share of traditional Latin 
American suppliers decreased by 3 per cent ? Why were ACP volumes  up 20 per cent while the 
volumes of Honduras were down by more than 50 per cent ?  Why had MFN prices in the EC market 
fallen by  20 per cent ? Why, when the high tariff was excluded from the MFN price, did African 
bananas end up with an EC wholesale price that w as so much higher than the MFN price?  Why did 
the media and the capital-market analysts repeatedly  confirm that all investments in bananas were 
being transferred out of Latin America and into Africa for the sole purpose of gaining better access to the EC market? 
24. Far from confirming the EC's claims, these new marketplace developments gave every reason 
"to believe that MFN access is not being maintained" suggesting that there were much greater losses 
to come for MFN countries.  Judging from current i nvestment transfer and displacement trends, by the 
time the EC brought its new free trade agreements with the ACP countries in 2008, Latin America would never be able to recover the market pos ition it once had. Indeed, without some means of 
ensuring compliance,  countries like Honduras, consta ntly combating against poverty, would be left 
with even a more modest market share than they had had in 1996, when this dispute had originally 
been brought before the DSB. In other words, as far as Honduras was concerned, the dispute 
settlement system, far from being remedial, had been punitive, betraying the DSU's objectives of 
prompt compliance and particular attention to the trade interests of developing countries. His delegation appealed to the Members of the DSB to help Honduras to avoid that outcome.  
                                                     
 
1 WT/DS27.  WT/DSB/M/220 
 Page 7 
 
 
  25. The representative of Panama  said that, for the past several months, Panama and other 
countries had been expressing concern over the new EC  banana regime. During that period of time,  
the EC had announced one, and only one, proposed "modification" to this regime.  That one change graphically captured what this dispute was all about and why a US$4.22/box tariff was so unfair to developing countries.  The new modification, announ ced in the past week by  the Commission, was a 
commitment to increase its banana subsidy payments  to approximately US$360 million a year for the 
next few years. This new amount  was substantially higher than the EC's annual average banana 
subsidy payments over the past five years.  It  equated to about US$10 for every box of bananas 
produced in France, Spain and el sewhere in the EC.  On a per-box basis, it covered more than 
Panama's tropical costs, ocean freight and EC unloading and handling expenses. The EC Commission 
called these increased payments "subsidy reforms"  because the new "envelope" of money was being 
transferred to its "producer organizations" for ad ministration.  However, once those monies were 
received by the producer groups, they could still be  granted as direct, price-contingent domestic 
support, exactly as they had been for the past 13 y ears.  The truth was that, were it not for this 
entrenched and expanding subsidy programme, the pr oducer countries of Latin America would not be 
facing a new, more-than-doubled tariff. The Commissi on reasons that by substantially inflating its 
external tariff rate and refusing to lower it, it could protect uncompetitive French and Spanish 
producers from global competition, while collecting th e tariff revenues needed to fund its increasingly 
extravagant subsidy expenditures. Thus, the developi ng countries were being forced to pay a punitive, 
discriminatory tariff of US$4.22 per box so that French and Spanish producers could receive US$10 per box in domestic support. They were losing volum e and market share so that the EC's growing 
amber-box "subsidy envelope" was not compromised.  Panama was sharing this background with the 
DSB Members to help them to understand why it ha d taken great issue when the EC asserted to the 
DSB that it "is well aware of the importance of th e banana industry for Latin America".  If the EC 
were truly aware of the importance of bananas for La tin America, it would not have taken the decision 
to increase their discriminatory tariff burden by over US$2.50 per box – in breach of its Article 21 
compliance obligations – in order to underwrite massive subsidy payments for French and Spanish 
producers. 
26. The representative of Nicaragua
  said that his delegation wished to refer to three aspects of 
the EC banana regime that were particularly objectionable. First,  these measures formed part of the 
drawn out pattern of non-compliance by the EC.  These were not isolated violations.  The EC had ignored Bananas I as well as Bananas II cases, and now, with its recent "single tariff" regime, it had 
twice ignored the recommendations and rulings in th e Bananas III case.  Second,  the main objective 
of these new restrictive measures, like all of the banana-related breaches that had preceded them, was 
the protection of French and Spanish banana prod ucers and of the generous subsidies that they 
received.  Under the most recent arrangement, developing countries were paying €176 per metric 
tonne in order to finance the payment of a subs idy amounting to US$10 per crate for each farmer 
producing bananas in the EC. Third,  these restricti ons and the subsidies that financed them were 
extremely costly to the developing countries of Latin America.  Members had just heard the statistics.  
The ACP was already enjoying a 9 per cent increase in its market share at the expense of Latin 
America.  Nicaragua was totally out of the EC ma rket, and others would soon follow.  Owing mainly 
to the increase in ACP volumes, prices in the EC had fallen, according to some by as much as 25 per 
cent.  As profitability and access declined, investment s were leaving Latin America for Africa.  In a 
few months, when Romania and Bulgaria joined th e EC, the erosion would be even greater.  While 
the tariffs were low in those countries, as soon as th ey joined the EC, the totality of the 200,000 tons 
of MFN access  those markets would be subject to a much higher tariff rate of €176 per metric tonne. 
The erosion was set to worsen yet again at the end of 2007, when the EC began granting enormous additional advantages to the ACP countries in the fra mework of the new regulations included in the 
free trade agreements. This alarming combination of  concerns – repeated non-compliance, increased 
border protection to back up the escalation in the domestic support granted, and an obvious indifference to the interests of the developing coun tries – was producing a result that was contrary to 
what the system had set out to achieve.  If the DSB could do nothing to correct such obvious failures, WT/DSB/M/220 
Page 8  
 
  what did the dispute settlement system have to offe r to an impoverished country like Nicaragua  in 
need of a solution? In the interest of all devel oping countries, Nicaragua once again appealed to the 
DSB for its support in ensuring prompt compliance on the part of the EC. 
27. The representative of the European Communities
 said that the EC had listened to the 
statements made by some WTO Members on this ma tter.  The EC wished to refer to its prior 
statements on why this matter was not an "implement ation issue" covered by Article 21 of the DSU.  
The EC remained open to addressing the concerns of  Latin American suppliers in relation to its 
import regime in the appropriate fora.  The EC was well aware of the importance of the banana 
industry for Latin American countries, as well as th e ACP countries, and had always taken these 
interests into consideration. The EC was in regular contact with the WTO Members involved to 
discuss this issue, including the rebinding of th e MFN tariff.  The EC remained committed to 
maintaining access to the EC market for all banana supplying countries. Contrary to the statements 
made by Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama at th e previous DSB meeti ng, data on overall MFN 
imports available to date gave no reason to believe that such access was not maintained.  The new EC 
tariff had thus far resulted in the increase in im ports from both MFN and ACP suppliers as compared 
to 2005. 
28. The representative of the United States  said that, once again, his country had heard Members 
express serious concerns about the EC's bananas regi me, but no report that the EC had taken any steps 
to address those concerns.  The concerns were  become increasingly urgent as market access 
conditions deteriorated for many interested Memb ers.  This continued to be deeply troubling, 
especially given the great social and economic import ance of this issue to th ese Members.  The US 
was continuing to hold informal discussions with  interested Members to determine the most 
appropriate way to address the concerns with the EC 's regime.  At the same time, the United States 
strongly urged the EC to work with interested Me mbers to resolve this dispute as expeditiously as 
possible.  As the United States had noted at the pr evious DSB meeting, Members asserting a systemic 
interest in prompt implementation under item 1 of the DSB's agenda must now be fully aware that this 
item involved a dispute that had left several Me mbers waiting for full compliance nearly a decade, 
following the adoption of the DSB' s recommendations and rulings.  The United States, therefore, 
again looked forward to hearing these delegations e xpress their systemic interest under this agenda 
item.  
29. The DSB took note  of the statements. 
3. United States – Continued Dumping and Subsid y Offset Act of 2000:  Implementation of 
the recommendations adopted by the DSB 
(a) Statements by Canada, the European Communities and Japan 
30. The Chairman  said that this item was on the agenda of the present meeting at the request of 
Canada, the European Communities and Japan.  He then invited the respective representatives to 
speak. 
31. The representative of Canada  said that his country had repeatedly expressed its appreciation 
with the steps the United States had taken towards implementing the DSB's rulings and 
recommendations in this dispute.  However, the United States had only prospectively repealed the 
Byrd Amendment.  Anti-dumping and countervailing duties collected up to 30 September 2007 could 
still be disbursed to US producers under the terms of th is legislation. As such , Canada believed that 
the US claim – made in its last status report fro m over seven months ago – that it had "taken the 
actions necessary to implement the rulings and recommendations" in this dispute was not accurate. 
Canada, therefore, called on the United States to resume the submission of status reports and to 
immediately repeal the Byrd Amendment.  WT/DSB/M/220 
 Page 9 
 
 
  32. The representatives of the European Communities  said that, in a few days, the fiscal year 
would end in the United States and a new round of distribution of the anti-dumping and countervailing duties to the US complaining industry would start.  According to provisional estimates 
made available by the US Customs and Border Prot ection in June, this distribution would exceed the 
amount reached in the previous year's distribution.  The US Congressional Budget Office had also 
foreseen that the distribution of the anti-dumping and countervailing duties would continue until at 
least the fiscal year 2010 starting on 1 October 2009.  In January 2003, the DSB had adopted the Reports finding that those distributions breached Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and 
Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement.  The United States had until 27 December 2003 to comply with 
its WTO obligations.  As long as those transfers conti nued, the United States would be in breach of its 
WTO obligations and full implementation would still ha ve to be delivered.  And, yet, at the previous 
DSB meeting, the United States had again asserted that it did not see the purpose of reporting on its 
progress to implementation as it had taken all steps to bring itself into compliance with its WTO 
obligations.  In fact, by denying its obligation to  take further steps so as stop immediately the 
distributions under the CDSOA, the United States ha d granted itself the right to comply with the 
DSB's rulings at some undetermined date in th e future, regardless of Members' duty to comply 
promptly with the DSB's rulings.  The FSC dispute where US Congress had finally put an end to WTO-illegal grandfathering clauses periods showed that the United States could revisit the delayed 
termination of the Byrd Amendment if the political will was there.  The EC wished to ask again the 
United States if and what steps it intended to take to stop the transfer of anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties without further delay.  The EC  also renewed its call on the United States to 
abide by its clear obligation under Article 21.6 of the DSU and to submit status reports on 
implementation in this dispute. 
33. The representative of Japan
 said that his country had to reiterate its disappointment that the 
United States had not, once  again, submitted a status report this month despite its statements in the 
previous DSB meetings.  In spite of the enactment  by the United States of the Deficit Reduction Act 
of 2005, duties collected on imports prior to 1 Oct ober 2007 would continue to be distributed to the 
US domestic industries under the transitional clause.  Therefore, the United States had not fully implemented the DSB's recommendations and rulings.  This was also what Japan had repeatedly 
stated in the previous DSB meetings.  In fact, Japan understood that the United States was currently 
preparing the distribution for 2006.  Japan regretted very much the above situation, and again, it 
strongly called on the United States to make furthe r efforts towards a prompt and full implementation 
of the DSB's recommendations and rulings.  
34. The representative of Mexico
 said that, on 13 September 2006, Mexico had published a 
decree in which it had announced the suspension of benefits to the United States, pursuant to the 
authorization granted to Mexico by the DSB in November 2004 due to the US failure to comply with the recommendations in the DS234 (Byrd Amendment) dispute in an amount of US$6.1 million.  This 
suspension was carried out in acco rdance with the methodology established in the Decision by the 
Arbitrator contained in document WT/DS234/ ARB/MEX.  Under the above-mentioned decree, 
Mexico had raised the import duty on dairy products for tariff item 1901.90.05 to 110 per cent ad 
valorem . Mexico acknowledged the efforts made by the US administration, which had led to the 
signing of the Deficit Reduction Act repealing the "Byrd Amendment".  However, in spite of the 
repeal, the United States would continue to allo cate the quotas extending up to 30 September 2007, to 
the detriment of Mexican exporters, compelling Me xico, once again, to suspend concessions to the 
United States in the goods sector. 
35. The representative of Brazil
 said that his country wished to thank Canada, the EC and Japan 
for drawing the DSB's attention to this important is sue.   Needless to repeat, Brazil judged that the 
prospective repeal of the Byrd Amendment was not su fficient to sustain the claim by the United States 
that all necessary implementing actions had been put into place.  Brazil recalled that a new and 
significant disbursement round was expected to  occur in October 2006, showing that the WTO-WT/DSB/M/220 
Page 10  
 
  inconsistency found to exist by the DSB remained in force.  Brazil did not want to downplay the 
relevance of the legislative action by the United Stat es on this matter, but Me mbers should obtain, at a 
minimum, an explanation from the United States on how this fact could be reconciled with US 
statements on compliance and the relevant DSB' s recommendations.  Unfortunately, no answer had 
been offered thus far.  Brazil remained of the opinion – solidly grounded in the DSB's 
recommendations in this dispute – that full compliance on the part of the United States would only 
come through the complete elimination of all dis bursements under the Byrd Amendment. Given that 
this was not the case, the co-complainants could not  be deprived of any right conferred by the DSU 
with respect to this situation of non-compliance. 
36. The representative of Thailand
 said that his country wished to thank Canada, the EC, and 
Japan for bringing this item before the DSB agai n. Thailand again wished to express its ongoing 
disappointment at the US continued illegal dis bursement of funds under the CDSOA, and at its 
continued refusal to submit any status report on its outstanding implementation in the "US – 
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000".  Thailand, therefore, re peated its call for the 
United States to cease these illegal di sbursements, to immediately repeal the Byrd Amendment, and to 
resume providing status reports for this dispute until such actions were taken and this matter had been 
fully resolved. 
37. The representative of India  said that his country wished to thank Canada, the EC and Japan 
for raising this issue at the DSB again.  Unfo rtunately, there had not been any response from the 
United States to the question put by India at  previous DSB meetings as to how continued 
disbursements of duties collected on imports entering the United States squared up with its 
compliance obligations.  The United States needed to  do more than reiterate a clearly indefensible 
position on compliance, in the face of new administration action based on the very CDSOA that it admitted had been found inconsistent with WTO rules and asserted had been withdrawn.  Such 
unilateral action undermined the WTO dispute settleme nt system.  India urged the United States again 
to inform the DSB of the steps it proposed to take  to ensure full compliance.  India reiterated its 
request, that the United States should resume submitting status reports in this dispute. 
38. The representative of Hong Kong, China
 said that her delegation wished to thank Canada, the 
EC and Japan for once again bringing this item before the DSB. In respect of this dispute, Hong Kong, China had long disagreed with the Unite d States that it had fully implemented the DSB's 
rulings and recommendations through the prospectiv e repeal of the Byrd Amendment.  Under the 
repeal, the Byrd Amendment would remain in operation until the end of  September 2007 and the 
duties collected would continue to be distributed sev eral years after that date.  As long as the illegal 
disbursements were not terminated, the United States  still fell short of full compliance with the DSB's 
rulings and recommendations.  Until full compliance was achieved, the United States should continue 
to submit status reports on implementation.  Most  important of all, Hong Kong, China had systemic 
concerns regarding the US prolonged delay in  implementing the rulings and recommendations 
adopted by the DSB.  This would undermine the credibility of the WTO dispute settlement system.  
Hong Kong, China called on the United States to addr ess these concerns by fully repealing the Byrd 
Amendment as soon as possible. 
39. The representative of China
 said that his delegation fully agr eed with  previous speakers and 
strongly urged the United States to implement the DSB's rulings and to fully comply with their commitments. China strongly urged the United St ates to ensure that the DSB's rulings were 
implemented and to submit their status reports on progress in implementation and to resolve the Byrd 
Amendment dispute as soon as possible.   
40. The representative of the United States
 said that his country had already explained at previous 
DSB meetings that the US President had si gned the Deficit Reduction Act into law on 
8 February 2006.  That Act included a provisi on repealing the Continued Dumping and Subsidy  WT/DSB/M/220 
 Page 11 
 
 
  Offset Act of 2000. Thus, the United States ha d taken all actions necessary to implement the 
recommendations and rulings in these disputes.  With  regard to the EC's criticism concerning future 
actions that might be taken under the CDSOA, the Un ited States, once again, noted with interest the 
EC's statement made at the 19 June DSB meeting in connection with the Sugar dispute.  In claiming 
that it had already come into compliance, the EC had described that – on an annualized basis – its 
revised measure would place it in a position to maintain  its subsidized exports within its commitments 
only from the marketing year 2006/20 07.  Nevertheless, the EC had asserted that it was already in 
compliance.  The United States reiterated that it had taken all steps necessary to implement the 
recommendations and rulings in the CDSOA dispute. 
41. The United States also noted that the CDSOA did not apply to imports from Canada so the 
United States could not understa nd why Canada had put this item on the agenda of the present 
meeting.  Given Canada's silence under the previous  agenda item, the United States noted that what 
Canada characterized as its "systemic" interest in compliance appeared to be somewhat selective, and 
the United States would welcome Canada's interventi on in a manner that truly reflected a systemic 
approach. His delegation was surprised by the asserti ons made that the United States would not have 
implemented the DSB's recommendations and rulings until the last CDSOA distribution was made.  
Of course, such questions were for panels to decide .  Mexico had not yet notified the DSB of its latest 
suspension of concessions in this dispute.  The Un ited States had become aware of this recent action 
and intended to review it further.  At this time, th e United States was not able to share Mexico's view 
on the consistency of its suspen sion of concessions with the authorization granted by the DSB. 
42. The representative of the European Communities  said that there was clearly no possible 
comparison between what the United States was doi ng in the present dispute and what the EC had 
done in the Sugar dispute.  In the Sugar dispute, the EC had not granted any new subsidies in breach 
of the WTO rules after the expiry of the implementa tion period and had, therefore, fully implemented 
the DSB's ruling and recommendations within the reas onable period of time.  In the CDSOA dispute, 
more than two and a half years after the expiry of the implementation period, the United States was 
still granting new subsidies and under the current stat e of the law would continue for an undetermined 
number of years.  
43. The representative of Canada  said that Canada's retaliatory measures had expired on 
30 April 2006 and that Canada was curren tly considering its retaliatory options. 
44. The representative of Mexico  said that his delegation wished to briefly reply to the statement 
just made by the United States.  He noted that, in its previous statement, Mexico had referred to the 
suspension of concessions. He, therefore, could no t understand why the United States claimed that it 
had not been formally notified.  
45. The DSB took note  of the statements.  
4. United States – Subsidies on upland cotton  
(a) Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Brazil:  Request for the establishment of a panel 
(WT/DS267/30) 
46. The Chairman  recalled that the DSB had considered this matter at its meeting on 
1 September 2006 and had agreed to revert to it.  He drew attention to the communication from Brazil 
contained in document WT/DS267/30, and inv ited the representative of Brazil to speak. 
47. The representative of Brazil  said that on 1 September 2006 the DSB had examined, for the 
first time, Brazil's request for the establishment of a panel, pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU in the 
case:  "United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton" .  Brazil's request had been circulated as WT/DSB/M/220 
Page 12  
 
  document WT/DS267/30, and was before the DSB again at the present meeting.  Brazil reiterated that, 
with respect to some of the DSB's recommendati ons and rulings (adopted on 21 March 2005), the 
United States had adopted no impl ementation measures at all, and the implementation measures it had 
adopted fell far short of compliance with the cove red agreements and the DSB's recommendations and 
rulings.  The United States had a different view, as expressed for example in its statement at the 
previous DSB meeting.  Given the disagreement as to  the existence and consis tency with the covered 
agreements of measures taken to comply with th e DSB's recommendations and rulings,  Brazil sought 
recourse to the dispute settlement mechanism under Ar ticle 21.5 of the DSU.  Brazil also requested 
that the DSB refer the matter to the original Panel.   
48. The representative of the United States
 said that his country was fully in compliance with its 
WTO obligations.  Indeed, the United States had gone  to extraordinary lengths to implement the 
DSB's recommendations and rulings.  As of 1 Augu st 2006, the United States had terminated the 
Step 2 program, eliminating hundreds of millions of dollars of annual payments to domestic users and 
exporters of US cotton.  Brazil had challenged th e Step 2 program as a prohibited subsidy, but 
payments under that program were also part of the measure found to be causing serious prejudice to 
Brazil's interests.  The United States had also ceased operating the GSM-103 and SCGP programs, 
two of three export credit guarantee programs that  Brazil had challenged as being prohibited export 
subsidies.  There were no exports under those pr ograms at present.  The sole remaining guarantee 
program (GSM-102) had been substantially modifi ed.  The United States had eliminated countries 
presenting the highest risk of non-payment from the program altogether, and the United States had applied a new "risk-based" fee structure to a ll guarantees under the program.  Thus, the revised 
program no longer constituted an e xport subsidy.  Given all these changes, there was no basis for 
Brazil's request for a compliance panel.  While Br azil's request was disappointing, the United States 
looked forward to the Panel's confirming that the United States was complying with its WTO obligations.  All knew from experience that this dispute was one of the most complex disputes to 
come before the WTO.  If a panel was established, the United States intended to make every effort to 
cooperate on procedural matters so that the panel could focus on the substantive issues at hand.  The 
United States hoped that Brazil shared this interest in cooperating so that the panel could produce the 
highest quality report possible. 
49. The DSB took note
 of the statements and agreed , pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU, to refer 
to the original Panel, if possible, the matter rais ed by Brazil in document WT/DS267/30.  The Panel 
would have standard terms of reference. 
50. The representatives of Argentina , Australia , Canada , China , the European Communities , 
India , Japan  and New Zealand  reserved their third-party rights to participate in the Panel's 
proceedings.   
51. The representative of Benin   said that his delegation wished to indicate that the four countries 
of the Cotton Initiative were now consulting regard ing the matter at hand, but unfortunately the 
Ministers had had several meetings this month and had not been able to meet.  He believed that in the 
coming ten days, one of the four countries would be indicating their interest in reserving third-party rights to participate in the Panel's proceedings.   
52. The DSB took note
 of the statements.   WT/DSB/M/220 
 Page 13 
 
 
  5. China – Measures affecting imports of automobile parts 
(a) Request for the establishment of a panel by the European Communities (WT/DS339/8) 
(b) Request for the establishment of a panel by the United States (WT/DS340/8) 
(c) Request for the establishment of a panel by Canada (WT/DS342/8) 
53. The Chairman  proposed that the three sub-items to wh ich he had just referred be considered 
together since they pertained to the same matter.  First, he drew attention to the communication from 
the European Communities contained in document WT/DS339/8 and invited the representative of the 
European Communities to speak. 
54. The representative of the European Communities  said that on its accession to the WTO, China 
had committed itself to limit the rate of the cu stom duty applied on most automobile parts to 
10 per cent.  The measures challenged by the EC pr ovided instead that the 25 per cent duty rate for a 
complete vehicle would apply when the imported pa rts, once they were produced and assembled into 
complete vehicles, fulfilled the "characteristics of a whole vehicle".  To be characterized as a whole 
vehicle, it was just enough that a few specific auto mobile components assembled in that vehicle were 
imported.  And, it was clear that those specific co mbinations of imported au tomobile parts were far 
from constituting a whole vehicle.  These measures al so resulted in applying on imported products 
charges and administrative requirements, which had not been imposed on domestic like products, thus 
discriminating against imported products.  By enacting and maintaining these measures, China 
breached a long list of its WTO obligations.  He would not repeat the specific claims raised by the EC 
since all details were contained in the EC's request  for the establishment of a Panel.  He would just 
highlight the fact that this dispute went to the fundamental principles of the WTO, which were the 
national treatment obligation, the binding of customs duties or the prohibition per se  of a certain form 
of subsidies.  This dispute raised issues of systemic importance for the whole WTO as evidenced by the panel requests made at the present meeting in respect of the same measures by Canada and the 
United States, and by the number of Members that had reserved their third-party rights already at the consultation stage.  The EC had discussed this matter with China on several occasions and at all 
levels, but regrettably it had not received any concrete solution from China.  The EC regretted the 
situation.  While the EC always remained open to a negotiated solution, at the present meeting,  the 
EC had no other option than to pursue this dispute further and to request the establishment of a panel 
to review the WTO compatibility of China's measures on the import of automotive parts. 
55. The Chairman
 drew attention to the communication from the United States contained in 
document WT/DS340/8 and invited the representative of the United States to speak. 
56. The representative of the United States  said that his country was concerned about Chinese 
measures distorting trade in the auto sector.  As outlined in the US panel request, China assessed a 
charge on imported auto parts that was equal to th e tariff on complete motor vehicles, rather than 
assessing the lower tariff on auto parts.  This ch arge was paid by the auto manufacturer and was 
assessed whenever a complete vehicle did not contain an arbitrarily set minimum quantity or value of 
Chinese auto parts. China had also imposed additio nal, burdensome administrative obligations such as 
record keeping and security requirements on manufactu rers which produced vehicles that did not meet 
the specified local content requirements.  Need less to say, China's measures discouraged auto 
manufacturers in China from using parts imported fr om the United States and other foreign countries 
in the assembly of new vehicles.  China's measur es appeared to be inconsistent with several 
provisions of the WTO Agreement, including Articles II and III of the GATT 1994, Article 2 of the 
TRIMs Agreement, and several provisions of Chin a's own Protocol of Accession.  The broad, 
systemic concerns raised by these regulations wa s underscored by the fact that the DSB was also 
considering the panel requests of the EC and Canada  at the present meeting.  The United States had WT/DSB/M/220 
Page 14  
 
  consulted extensively with China, both formally and informally.  Regr ettably, those consultations had 
not resolved this dispute.  The United States, theref ore, requested that the DSB establish a panel at the 
present meeting.  The United States further requested  that a single panel be established to examine the 
US, EC, and the Canadian complaints in accordance with Article 9.1 of the DSU. 
57. The Chairman
 drew attention to the communicati on from Canada contained in document 
WT/DS342/8 and invited the representative of Canada to speak. 
58. The representative of Canada  said that China was a major, gr owing market in both import and 
export trade for this key sector of the Canadian economy, and clearly had a significant stake in the further development of global trade in automobiles and automobile parts.  It was in their mutual 
interest that China had a thriving automotive sector .  However, China had imposed various measures 
on the import of automobile parts, including on those from Canada, which Canada believed were 
inconsistent with China's WTO obligations.  Thes e measures, outlined in Canada's panel request, 
dated 15 September 2006, included local content requ irements and charged on imported parts equal to 
the higher tariff on complete motor vehicles.  On 13 April 2006, Canada had requested consultations 
with China with respect to these measures.  Consul tations had been held jointly between China and 
Canada, the United States and the EC in Geneva on 11 and 12 May 2006.  Canada had made several 
efforts since then to arrive at a mutually satisf actory solution. Unfortunately, these consultations had 
only reinforced Canada's view that the Chinese meas ures in question were inconsistent with a number 
of Chinese commitments in the GATT, the TRIM s Agreement, the SCM Agreement and China's 
Protocol of Accession to the WTO.  On that basis,  Canada requested that a panel be established to 
examine this matter. 
59. The Chairman
 invited the representative of China to speak. 
60. The representative of China  said that it was regrettable fo r China to see that the EC, the 
United States and Canada had chosen to request the establishment of panels at the present meeting in 
spite of China's efforts to settle the dispute throu gh consultations.  China had shown great sincerity in 
the process of consultations.  China had always been willing to pursue further consultations in order to 
settle disputes in a mutually satisfactory manner.  China had taken its commitments very seriously 
since its accession to the WTO, including its commit ments on automobiles and auto parts.  According 
to its schedules, China had significantly reduced its tariff on automobiles and auto parts.  The tariffs 
had been reduced from 80 per cent in 2001 to 25 per cent for automobiles and from 30 per cent in 
2001 to 10 per cent for auto parts.  The liberalizat ion process had been completed by 1 July 2006, 
which provided unprecedented market access opportun ities on automobiles and auto parts for all 
trading partners.  Turning to the measures in relati on to current disputes, China strongly believed that 
those measures were consistent with WTO rules.  In  particular, those measures served to prevent tariff 
evasion and circumvention by companies which ai med at importing complete automobiles as auto 
parts to avoid higher tariff rates.  These measures did not create any discrimination to imported products.  For the reasons mentione d above, China was not in a position to agree to the establishment 
of panels requested by the EC, the US and Canada. 
61. The DSB took note
 of the statements and agreed  to revert to these matters.  WT/DSB/M/220 
 Page 15 
 
 
  6. United States – Measures relating to shrimp from Thailand 
(a) Request for the establishment of a panel by Thailand (WT/DS343/7) 
62. The Chairman  drew attention to the communicati on from Thailand contained in document 
WT/DS343/7, and invited the repr esentative of Thailand to speak. 
63. The representative of Thailand  said that his country requested that the DSB establish a panel 
to examine the matter described by Thailand in it s request for the establishment of a panel, dated 
18 September 2006, contained in document WT /DS343/7.  While Thailand regretted that 
consultations with the United States had thus far faile d to resolve this dispute, in view of the ongoing 
and escalating harm to its industry,  Thailand considered it necessary to request the establishment of a 
panel to resolve this matter as rapidly as possible.  There were two main aspects of Thailand's request.  
First, Thailand challenged the requirement imposed  by the United States on importers of shrimp from 
Thailand subject to anti-dumping duties to maintain a continuous bond in addition to paying cash deposits of anti-dumping duties at the time of im portation of the merchandise.  The continuous bond 
was calculated as the amount of the applicable anti-dumping duty margin multiplied by the value of 
imports of shrimp imported by the importer in the preceding year.  In order to obtain this bond, Thai 
exporters and their importers had had to post collateral of the full value of the amount of the anti-
dumping duty.  As a result, they must pay not only a cash deposit of estimated anti-dumping duties equal to the margin of dumping determined by the United States, but must also incur significant 
additional costs to obtain and maintain a contin uous bond in the amount described for each year's 
imports until the final assessment of anti-dumping duti es on that year's imports – which could take up 
to five years.   
64. The US measures that Thailand was challenging at the present meeting threatened the 
livelihood and sustainability of its shrimp industr y, whose exports to the US, its largest market, 
accounted for 50 per cent of its total exports.  More over, Thailand's shrimp industry employed about 
1 million people, of which a significant portion were  shrimp farmers whose only source of income 
derived from shrimp exports.  Many of these farm ers were still repaying massive debt incurred to 
repair the catastrophic damage from the December 2004 tsunami, which had wiped out approximately 
US$500 million of their property, hatcheries, and equipment.  While the United States claimed the continuous bond requirement was necessary to secure  payment of anti-dumping duties, it had imposed 
the requirement on only one anti-dumping order – that  against shrimp from Thailand and certain other 
countries.  In Thailand's view, the continuous bon d requirement constituted an attempt by the United 
States to increase the burden and effect of its anti-dumping measures beyond what was contemplated 
or permitted under Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement.  These 
Agreements were intended to place limits on the ma nner and circumstances in which Members could 
impose anti-dumping measures.  Therefore, they must be read to restrict Members from developing and applying new and creative ways – such as this  continuous bond requirement – of increasing the 
severity and trade-restrictive impact of their anti-dumping measures. 
65. In addition, Thailand considered that th e continuous bond requi rement constituted a 
restriction on importation prohibite d under Article XI of the GATT 1994 and was inconsistent with 
the United States' obligations under Articles I and II of the GATT 1994.  Furthermore, by applying 
the continuous bond requirement only to shrimp from Thailand and five other countries, the United States had failed to administer its customs laws, regulations and administrative rulings in an 
uniform, impartial or reasonable manner as require d under Article X of the GATT 1994.  Finally, the 
continuous bond requirement was not  justified by paragraph (d) of  Article XX of the GATT 1994 and 
in any case was not applied consistently with the re quirements set out in the chapeau of Article XX. 
Thailand's request for the establishment of a panel al so challenged the use by the United States in its 
anti-dumping determinations with respect to shrimp from Thailand of the practice known as 
"zeroing".  The Appellate Body had already found th e use of this practice in circumstances such as WT/DSB/M/220 
Page 16  
 
  were present in this dispute to be inconsistent  with the US obligations under the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement.  Thailand, therefore, hoped that this asp ect of the dispute could be resolved quickly and 
satisfactorily.  Accordingly, Thailand requested the establishment of a panel to examine these matters.  
66. The representative of the United States
 said that his country was disappointed that Thailand 
had requested a panel on this matter.  As previ ously noted, the US Department of Commerce had 
already announced its intention to abandon the use of  "zeroing" with average-to-average comparisons 
in anti-dumping investigations.  Furthermore, Member s had the right to ensure that importers paid 
duties owed.  Nevertheless, the United States had been working with Thailand in an effort to 
understand its concerns and to address them.  In light  of these efforts, the United States believed that 
this panel request was premature, and the United St ates was unable to agree to the establishment of a 
panel at this time. 
67. The DSB took note  of the statements and agreed  to revert to this matter. 
7. Swearing-in ceremony of the newly appointed Appellate Body member 
(a) Statement by the Chairman  
68. The Chairman , speaking under "Other Business", said that, as he had announced at the outset 
of the present meeting, he wished to remind delega tions that the swearing-in ceremony of the newly 
appointed Appellate Body member, Mr. David Unterh alter, would be held on 28 September 2006 at 
6 p.m. in the Salle des Pas Perdus at the WTO.   The ceremony would be followed by a cocktail 
reception hosted by the Director-General, the Chairm an of the DSB, Deputy Director-General Jara, 
and the Permanent Mission of South Africa.  All delegations were cordiall y invited to attend the 
ceremony.  
69. The DSB took note  of the statement. 
__________