RESTRICTED  
  
G/C/M/146  
 
27 September  2023 
(23-6460) Page: 1/102 
Council for Trade in Goods    
 
MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS  
6 AND 7 JULY  2023  
CHAIRPERSON: H.E. DR ADAMU MOHAMMED ABDULHAMID  
The meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG, or the Council) was convened by 
Airgram  WTO/AIR/CTG/ 25 and WTO/AIR/CTG/ 25/Rev.1 ; the proposed agenda for the meeting was  
circulated in document  G/C/W/ 828. 
 
1   NOTIFICATION OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS  ................................ ....................  4 
2   WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED KINGDOM FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION:  
PROCEDURES UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII: 3 OF GATT  1994 – COMMUNICATION  
FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION (G/L/1385/ADD.4)  ................................ ...........................  4 
3   UNITED KINGDOM'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION: PROCEDURES 
UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 – COMMUNICATION FROM THE UNITED 
KINGDOM (G/L/1386/ADD.4)  ................................ ................................ .........................  5 
4   MC12  IMPLEMENTATION MATTERS: FUNCTIONING OF THE CTG AND ITS  
SUBSIDIARY BODIES AND WTO  RESPONSE TO THE PANDEMIC – STATUS REPORT  
FROM THE CHAIRPERSON (JOB/CTG/32, JOB/CTG/33) ................................ ...................  6 
5   MEMBERS' NON -RESPONSIVENESS TO QUESTIONS POSED BY OTHER MEMBERS – 
REQUEST FROM THE UNITED S TATES  ................................ ................................ ...............  7 
6   MEMBERS' NON -NOTIFICATION OF ITEMS PURSUANT TO CERTAIN  
WTO  AGREEMENTS – REQUEST FROM  THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ..............  8 
7   MEASURES TO ALLOW GRADUATED LDCS, WITH GNP BELOW USD  1,000, BENEFITS 
PURSUANT TO ANNEX  VII(B) OF THE AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND  
COUNTERVAILING MEASURES – REQUEST FROM DJIBOUTI  
ON BEHALF OF THE LDC  GROUP (G/C/W/752)  ................................ ..............................  10 
8   EUROPEAN UNION – IMPLEMENTATION OF NON -TARIFF BARRIERS ON 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL, CANADA,   
COSTA RICA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, GUATEMALA, PANAMA, PARAGUAY,  
THE UNITED STATES, AND URUGUAY  ................................ ................................ .............  12 
9   CHINA – IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE  
MEASURES – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA  ................................ ................................ ...... 22 
10   EUROPEAN UNION – DRAFT COMMISSION REGULATION AMENDING  
ANNEXES  II AND V TO REGULATION (EC) NO.  396/2005 OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL AS REGARDS MAXIMUM RESIDUE LEVELS FOR 
CLOTHIANIDIN AND THIAMETHOXAM IN O R ON CERTAIN PRODUCTS – REQUEST  
FROM AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL, AND THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ...................  25 
11   CHINA – ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES FOR REGISTRATION OF OVERSEAS 
PRODUCERS OF IMPORTED FOODS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, THE E UROPEAN 
UNION, AND THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ..................  32 
12   CHINA – COSMETICS SUPERVISION AND ADMINISTRATION REG ULATIONS (CSAR) – 
REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN,  
AND THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ..............................  34 G/C/M/146  
 
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  13   CHINA – SUBSIDY TRANSPARENCY AND CHINA'S PUBLICATION AND INQUIRY 
POINT OBLIGATIONS UNDER CHINA'S PROTOCOL OF ACCESSION – REQUEST  
FROM AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN,  
THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES  ................................ .........................  37 
14   INDIA – ORDER RELATED TO REQUIREMENT OF NON -GM CUM GM FREE  
CERTIFICATE ACCOMPANIED WITH IMPORTED FOOD CONSIGNMENT –  
REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ .............  40 
15   INDIA – RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN PULSES – REQUEST FROM 
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE UNITED STATES  .....................  42 
16   EGYPT – HALAL CERTIFICATION MEASURE, BASED ON EGYPTIAN STANDARD 
ES 4249/2014 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR HALAL FOOD ACCORDING  
TO ISLAMIC SHARIA – REQUEST FROM CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION,  
AND THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ..............................  43 
17   PANAMA – ONIONS AND POTATOES HARVEST LIFE AND SPROUTING 
REQUIREMENTS – REQUEST FROM CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES  ..........................  46 
18   KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES,  
THE STATE OF KUWAIT, OMAN, AND QATAR – SELECTIVE TAX ON CERTAIN  
IMPORTED PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION,  
SWITZERLAND, AND THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ..... 46 
19   UNITED STATES – TRADE DISTORTING AND DISCRIMINATORY SUBSIDIES 
MEASURES OF THE INFLATION REDUCTION ACT OF 2022 – REQUES T FROM CHINA  ...... 48 
20   UNITED STATES – A SERIES OF DISRUPTIVE POLICY MEASURES ON THE GLOBAL 
SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY CHAIN AND SUPPLY CHAIN – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ...... 49 
21   EUROPEAN UNION – SWEDE N'S DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS  
PROHIBITION ON 5G  EQUIPMENT – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ..........  50 
22   EUROPE AN UNION – CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM  
(THE EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL OF DECEMBER  2019) – REQUEST FROM  
BRAZIL, CHINA, INDONESIA, AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ..... 51 
23   AUSTRALIA – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION ON  
5G EQUIPMENT – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ....... 58 
24   MEXICO – CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE UNDER MEXICAN OFFICIAL 
STANDARD NOM -223-SCFI/SAGARPA -2018, "CHEESE NAMES, SPECI FICATIONS, 
COMMERCIAL INFORMATION, AND TEST METHODS", PUBLISHED ON  
31 JANUARY  2019 – REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATES  ................................ .............  59 
25   INDIA – IMPORT POLICIES ON TYRES – REQUEST FROM CANADA; THE EUROPEAN 
UNION; INDONESIA; THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, 
KINMEN AND MATSU; AND THAILAND  ................................ ................................ ...........  60 
26   INDIA – IMPLEMENTATION OF CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT POLICY THROUGH 
QUALITY CONTROL ORDERS (QCOS) IN VARIOUS SECTORS – REQUEST  
FROM CANADA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ... 62 
27   INDONESIA – IMPORT AND EXPORT RESTRICTING POLICIES AND PRACTICES – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, AND NEW ZEALAND  ............................  63 
28   UNITED STATES – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON APPLES AND PEARS –  
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ .........  67 
29   INDIA – IMPORT RESTRICTION ON AIR CONDITIONERS – REQUEST FROM  
JAPAN AND THAILAND  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 68 
30   CHINA ― DRAFT OF CHINESE RECOMMENDED NATIONAL STANDARD (GB/T) FOR 
OFFICE DEVICES (INFORMATION SECURITY TECHNOLOGY -SECURI TY SPECIFICATION 
FOR OFFICE DEVICES) – REQUEST FROM JAPAN  ................................ ............................  70 
31   CHINA ― DRAFT REVISION OF CHIN ESE GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT LAW – 
REQUEST FROM JAPAN  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 71 G/C/M/146  
 
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  32   CHINA ― NEW EXPORT CONTROL LAW IN DRAFT – REQUEST FROM  
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND JAPAN  ................................ ................................ ...............  72 
33   EUROPEAN UNION – RENEGOTIATION OF TARIFF RATE QUOTA COMMITMENTS  
IN RESPONSE TO BREXIT: SYSTEMIC CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM URUGUAY  ..............  75 
34   UNITED KINGDOM – DRAFT GOODS SCHEDULE AND PROPOSED 
UK TRQ COMMITMENTS: SYSTEMIC CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM URUGUAY  .................  76 
35   EUROPEAN UNION – QUALITY SCHEMES FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND 
FOODSTUFFS – THE REGISTRATION OF CERTAIN TERMS OF CHEESE AS  
GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS – REQUEST FROM NEW ZEALAND AND URUGUAY  ..........  77 
36   INDONESIA – COMMODITY BALANCE MECHANISM – REQUEST FROM  
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND JAPAN  ................................ ................................ ...............  78 
37   US-JAPAN -NETHERLANDS – AGREEMENT ON EXPORT CONTROLS ON 
SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING EQUIPMENT – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ..................  81 
38   UNITED STATES – DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE MEASURES IN THE NAME OF 
NATIONAL SECURITY – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ .............................  83 
39   EUROPEAN UNION – DEFORESTATION FREE COMMODITIES – REQUEST FROM 
BRAZIL, INDONESIA, AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ..................  84 
40   EUROPEAN UNION – THE EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL – REQUEST  FROM  
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ................................ ................................ ............................  91 
41   SRI LANKA – IMPORT BAN ON VARIOUS PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM THAILAND  . 92 
42   NEPAL – IMPORT BAN ON ENERGY DRINKS – REQUEST FROM THAILAND  ...............  93 
43   EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION (EU)  2017/2321 AND REGULATION 
(EU)  2018/825 – REQUEST FROM THE RUS SIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ...... 94 
44   AUSTRALIA, CANADA, EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, SWITZERLAND, 
UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES – UNILATERAL TRADE RESTRICTIVE 
MEASURES AGAINST RUSSIA – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  .................  94 
45   OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 101  
45.1   Tentative Annu al Plan of Meetings – Subsidiary Bodies of the Council for Trade  
in Goods (JOB/CTG/31) and Evolving Tentative Calendar of Formal Meetings of 
WTO  Bodies for 2023 (WT/INF/231/REV.1)  ................................ ................................  101  
45.2   eAgenda  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............  101  
45.3   Date of Next Meeting  ................................ ................................ ..........................  102  
 
 
The Chairperson  observed that, given the long agenda, it would be preferable for Members to keep 
their interventions short, if possible. He invited those Members that were planning to submit longer 
written statements for incorporation into the meeting 's minutes to expres sly indicate their intention 
to do so when taking the floor. To ensure transparency in the preparation of the minutes, the 
Secretariat would only reflect what had been said at the meeting, except in those cases where a 
Member had explicitly indicated that it was their intention to submit a longer statement in writing.  
He added that t he deadline for uploading written statements on eAgenda, or for sending written 
statements to the Secretariat, was 14 July. Finally, he asked if any delegation wished to add any  
other issue under the agenda item, "Other Business ". 
The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
China would like to revise the title of Agenda  Item 37 in the Airgram , as follows: 
"US-Japan -Netherlands – Agreement on Export Controls on Semiconductor Manufacturing 
Equipment".  G/C/M/146  
 
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  The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
Canada would like to be added to the list of co -sponsors of Agenda I tems 25 and 26  in the Ai rgram, 
which relate  to "India – Import Policy on Tyres" and "India – Implementation of Conformity 
Assessment Policy Through Quality Control Orders (QCO s) in Various Sectors".  
The Chairperson  informed Members  that, in addition, Panama had requested to be added to Agenda 
Item 8 in the Airgram, "European Union – Implementation  of Non -Tariff Barriers on Agricultural 
Products" , and th at he would be sharing  information under " Other Business" with respect to the 
functioning of the CTG and its subsidiary bodies, the eAgenda, and on the date of the next meeting.  
The agenda was agreed  with these modifications . 
1  NOTIFICATION OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS  
1.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that, under the working procedures agreed by the Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) , and following the adoption by the General Cou ncil of the 
Transparency Mechanism1, the CTG was to be kept informed of Members ' notifications of new 
regional trade agreements (RTAs). He informed the Council that three RTAs had been notified to the 
CRTA, as followed:  
Notification of Regional Trade Agreements  
• Free Trade Agreement between El Salvador, Honduras and the Separate Customs Territory 
of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu – Notification of Suspension between El  Salvador and 
the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, Goods  
(WT/REG283/N/2 ) 
• Free Trade Agreement between Colombia and Israel, Goods (WT/REG468/N/1 ) 
Notification of Changes to Existing RTAs  
• Free Trade Agreement between Iceland, Liec htenstein and Norway and the United Kingdom, 
Goods  (WT/REG459/N/2/Add.1 ) 
1.2.  The Council took note  of the information provided.  
2  WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED KINGDOM FROM THE EU ROPEAN UNION: PROCEDURES 
UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 – COMMUNICATION FROM THE EUROPEAN 
UNION (G/L/1385/ADD.4 ) 
2.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  the 
European Union.  
2.2.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
2.3.  To recall , on 22  December  2020, the European Union submitted 
document  G/SECRET/42/Add.3  in connection with the process, launched earlier under Article  XXVIII 
of the GATT  1994, for the apportionment of the European Union 's tariff -rate quota concessions  
following the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union. That communication 
effected the modification of EU  TRQ tariff concessions, and simultaneously highlighted that t he 
European Union strives for the rapid and successful conclusion of the negotiations and consultations.  
2.4.  After three  years of negotiations, the European Union  is pleased to report excellent progress 
achieved so far with agreements signed formally with 10 WTO partners, initialled with three  other 
partners , and negotiations and consultations being close to reaching an agreement with other 
partners.  
 
1 Documents  WT/REG/16 , WT/L/671 , and G/C/M/88 . G/C/M/146  
 
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  2.5.  In line with the established practice in the framework of Article  XXVIII negotiations (also under 
Article  XXIV:6 ), the European Union believes it is desirable to extend the timelines of Article  XXVIII:3 
of the GATT  1994 by another six  months, that is, until 1  January  2024. This is , of course , as always , 
without prejudice to the question of whether there are any righ ts to withdraw concessions pursuant 
to Article  XXVIII:3(a) and (b).  On this basis, the European Union and other Members involved in 
these Article  XXVIII procedures will be able to conclude any open negotiations or consultations over 
the coming weeks , and w ill be able to complete any domestic procedures required for the conclusion 
of agreements under Article  XXVIII of the GATT  1994 in the coming months.  
2.6.  Therefore, the European Union  proposes that the C TG take note of this communication and of 
the extension of the deadline , as indicated in document  G/L/1385/Add.4 , until 1 January  2024.  
2.7.  The delegate of India, addressing Agenda Items  2 and 3,  indicated the following:  
2.8.  India continue s to discuss the issues of agriculture  aggregate measurement of support ( AMS), 
special safeguard mechanisms , and TRQs in light of the develo pments noted in Agenda Items 2 and 
3. Our discussions with both the European Union  and the United Kingdom remain ongoing on issues 
relevant to the respective Member.  
2.9.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
2.10.  The Council so  agreed . 
3  UNITED KINGDOM 'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION: PROCEDURES UNDER 
ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 – COMMUNICATION FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM 
(G/L/1386/ADD.4 ) 
3.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  the 
United Ki ngdom.  
3.2.  The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
3.3.  The United Kingdom refers to document  G/L/1386/A dd.4, which was circulated on 
31 May 2023. The document outlines that the UK has extended the timelines under  Article  XXVIII:3 
of the GATT  1994 by six months, until 1  January  2024.  Members will be aware that the United 
Kingdom  has been undertaking negotiations and consultations with relevant trading partners with 
respect to its obligations within the UK 's Schedule of concessions and commitments on goods under 
the Article  XXVIII process.  
3.4.  The United Kingdom 's negotiations and con sultations are now largely completed, with the vast 
majority of Members having concluded negotiations, or working through internal processes in order 
to do so. The new deadline set for this process will enable this latter group to conclude formally.  The 
United Kingdom thanks all Members who have engaged constructively on matters relating to our 
Goods schedule. We will further update Members and this forum following the conclusion of 
Article  XXVIII negotiations, in line with WTO  practice.  
3.5.  The delegate of India, addressing Agenda Items  2 and 3,  indicated the following:  
3.6.  India continues to discuss the issues of agriculture  AMS, special safeguard mechanisms, and 
TRQs in light of the developments noted in Agenda Items  2 and 3. Our discussions wi th both the 
European Union and the United Kingdom remain ongoing on issues relevant to the respective 
Member.  
3.7.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
3.8.  The Council so agreed . G/C/M/146  
 
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  4  MC12  IMPLEMENTATION MATTERS: FUNCTIONING OF THE  CTG AND ITS SUBSIDIARY 
BODIES AND WTO  RESPONSE TO THE PANDEMIC – STATUS REPORT FROM THE 
CHAIRPERSON (JOB/CTG/32 , JOB/CTG/33 ) 
4.1.  The Chairperson  indicated the following:  
4.2.  I would like to report to the Council on the status of the work we have undertaken on 
MC12  Implementation Matters since our last formal meeting, held on 3 ‑4 April 2023. It is not my 
intention to have an in -depth discussion of these issues, but simply to provide a report for the record.  
4.3.  As you may rec all, at the Council 's last formal meeting, Members agreed on three  issues as 
contained in the updated document  JOB/CTG/27 : (i) an extension to 15  calendar days for requesting 
the inclusion of an agenda item; (ii) separating the trade concerns into new and previously raised 
concerns; and (iii) on including CTG  trade concerns in the Trade Concerns Database.  
4.4.  The former  Chairperson provided an update on the status of work following the formal meeting 
of 3-4 April, as contained in document  JOB/CTG/28 , which includes a table of the almost 30  concrete 
proposals to improve the functioning of the CTG that were put forward by Members, noting where 
progress has been made and agreement reached. There are also many issues where the Counci l has 
requested the Secretariat to undertake work for further consideration of the Council.  
4.5.  On 31  May 2023, the Council met again to continue the discussions on the functioning of the 
CTG and the WTO  response to the pandemic. On the functioning of the CTG,  under my responsibility, 
the Secretariat prepared document  JOB/CTG/32 , which reflects the current status of wo rk following 
these discussions. On the WTO  response to the pandemic, the Council reflected further on the type 
of report that should be submitted to the General Council in response to paragraph  24 of the 
"Ministerial Declaration on the WTO  Response to the COVID -19 Pandemic and Preparedness for 
Future Pandemics " (WT/MIN(22)/31 ). It also considered a template that was  proposed by Ecuador 
in document  RD/CTG/20 . 
4.6.  Since Members seemed to be willing to proceed along these lines, and without prejudice to the 
contents of the report or the views of Members, I requested the Secretariat to start working on a 
first draft based on reports that were prepared by the Chairs of the subsidiary bodies last year, with 
the idea of discussing it at the next informal CTG  meeting, which will take place on 19  September.  
4.7.  I conveyed this information to the Chairpersons of the CTG 's 14 subsidiary bodies and invited 
them to a meeting that was held on 30  June 2023. For transparency, my communication was a lso 
circulated in document  JOB/CTG/33 . At this meeting, I explained the status of work, and we also 
coordinated on how best to move forward.  
4.8.  On the better functioning of the Committees, I requested them to submit the reports describing 
the outcome of their discussions by the first  week of November, so the information can then be 
compiled by the Secretariat and consi dered by the CTG at its meeting of 30  November. The process 
for preparing these reports will need to be looked at by each Committee, and may include a mix of 
meetings and written procedures.  
4.9.  On the WTO  response to the pandemic, I asked them to inform the C TG Secretariat of any 
change with respect to the past reports so that such changes could be taken into account in the 
draft report to be prepared by the Secretariat.  
4.10.  Coming back to the discussions at the CTG  level, we will continue at an informal meeting t hat 
has been scheduled for 19  September. In light of the tight calendar of meetings, I doubt we will be 
able to meet beyond this date, so I would urge you to meet among yourselves with a view to trying 
to close the discussions at this meeting.  
4.11.  Does any del egation wish to take the floor on this issue? As I mentioned at the beginning, it 
is not my intention to have a substantive debate on these issues, which I think will be better 
addressed at the 19  September meeting.  G/C/M/146  
 
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  4.12.  The delegate of Peru indicated the follo wing:  
4.13.  Thank you, Chair, for your report. Peru would like to inform Members that my delegation  has 
joined as a co -sponsor of document  JOB/CTG/21 . A third  revision of this document  was circulated 
on 29  June to reflect this addition . We would also like to appreciate the progress that has been made 
in the functioning of this Council and its subsidiary bodies, which was partly thanks to the  docum ent 
we are now co -sponsoring and other documents. Finally, Peru reiterated its engagement with the 
process and thank s you and the Secretariat for the work that you have been doing.  
4.14.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
4.15.  Thank you , Chair. You mentioned that the subsidiary bodies would be submitting their reports 
around the first  week of November so that the CTG could then review and include them in its own 
report  to the G eneral Council . Could you please clarify whether the review process that you referred 
to will be taken at the  CTG, or will the Committees have the opportunity to review them before they 
are submitted to the CTG ? 
4.16.  The Chairperson  explained that he had asked the previous  Chairperson s of the subsidiary 
bodies to prepare  these reports. He had also requested the new Chairs to meet with their Committees  
and prepare  a report so it could be added to the  CTG for compilation . The CTG  report would then be 
considered at the 30  November  meeting and be submitted  to the General Council.  
4.17.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
4.18.  The Council so agreed . 
5  MEMBERS ' NON-RESPONSIVENESS TO QUESTIONS POSED BY OTHER MEMBERS – 
REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATES  
5.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  the 
United States.  Specific details had been included in Annex 1 of the Agend a. 
5.2.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
5.3.  The United States is once again raising this issue before the Council to identify certain Members ' 
non-responsiveness to questions posed by other Members. These have been outstanding issues on 
the agendas of the identified bodies for some time, and we are raising them up to the Council as a 
normal administrative matter.  
5.4.  As indicated in Annex  1, there are a series of questions that have been outstanding in the 
identified subsidiary bodi es for some time, without response.  To be clear, this is not about the quality 
of a response or any other substantive issue in the questions themselves, but simply there being no 
response at all to the questions being posed.  The United States stands willin g to consult and/or work 
with all of the other Members identified in the Annex, so that those Members can provide the 
necessary responses.  As the United States has demonstrated many times over in the various 
subsidiary bodies, we are happy to work with Mem bers with such routine committee business and 
in exploring ways to improve the question -and-answer process going forward.  That being said, since 
the April  2023 meeting, we have received a response from Zimbabwe to the questions posed in the 
Committee on Sa feguards and we thank Zimbabwe for those responses.  
5.5.  The delegate of India, addressing Agenda Items  5 and 6,  indicated the following:  
5.6.  India remain s engaged with the delegation of the United States on the issue raised on the 
Working Party on State Trading Enterprises. As mentioned in our statement in the previous 
CTG meeting, to respond to the concerned questions, we have been awaiting the release of our 
updated National Trade Policy, which has been introduced a few weeks ago.  
5.7.  Our belief is that the WTO  Members act as per their best capacities to comply with the various 
notification obligations of this Organization. More broadly, transparency brought a bout by complying 
to the notification obligations must permeate all parts of this Organization.  For example, we recently 
highlighted a situation in the Committee on Agriculture, where there has been a situation where G/C/M/146  
 
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  counter -notifications were issued again st our delegation, including by Members who have not 
submitted their own domestic support notification. The delegation of the US has also been involved 
in this discussion. However, this anomaly is not captured in the agenda item raised today by the US 
for the CTG.  
5.8.  If the intent here is to highlight discrepancies and anomalies, we would request the delegation 
of the US not to cherry -pick what would constitute transparency in the working of the CTG and its  
subsidiary bodies. And we would also request the dele gation of the US not to co -sponsor papers on 
certain subjects along with defaulters on the same subject.  
5.9.  The delegate of  the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
5.10.  The Russia n Federation  shares the view that questions posed by other Members need to be  
answered. Transparency is of immense importance to the Organization. These are the words that 
are often heard in the WTO. It is unfortunate that the actions of some WTO  Members run counter to 
their words.  
5.11.  At the previous CTG  meeting , the Russian Federatio n described our concern s in detail ; hence , 
we will not delve into the detail s this time. However, we will highlight  instances of transparency 
incompliance that a number of WTO  Members employ.  Specifically, such examples involve 
non-responsiveness from the United States to questions posed by Russia in the Committee on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the Committee on Anti -Dumping Practices, the Committee 
on Agriculture , as well as the Trade Policy Review Body.  
5.12.  Some other WTO  Members unfortunately decided to follow suit.  Japan did not respond to 
written questions submitted by Russia during its last TPR. Written questions to the European Union  
on the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism circulated two  years ago in the Committee on Ma rket 
Access ( CMA) and CTG still remain unanswered. Similarly, questions to the EU posed during the 
Committee on Market Access and the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade meetings on the 
elements of the EU's Green Deal  were left unaddressed.  In additio n, Australia, Canada, the European 
Union, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom have consistently left written 
questions in the Committee on Agriculture regarding their unilateral measures that affect their trade 
in agriculture  without respo nse. 
5.13.  Selective transparency compliance undermine s the WTO's transparency mechanism. The 
Russia n Federation  calls upon the above -mentioned Members to increase their overall transparency 
compliance rate in the WTO by improving their transparency track record.  
5.14.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
5.15.  We thank India for their update. As India has indeed noted, the United States and India have 
cooperatively  discussed this issue in the past  and w e stand ready to further consult with India if 
necessary. In response to  their specific  comment regarding cherry -picking, as we stated in our 
opening comments, this is not about the quality of any response or substantive issues or the 
questions themselves, but the lack of response to the questions. We will continue working with India 
to obtain a response to the questions. With regard to the Russian Federation, for reasons that are 
self-evident and that we will not repeat here, we will not be substantively responding to their 
comments.  
5.16.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
5.17.  The Council so agreed . 
6  MEMBERS ' NON-NOTIFICATION OF ITEMS PURSUANT TO CERTAIN WTO  AGREEMENTS 
– REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATES  
6.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agen da at the request of  the 
United States.  Specific details had been included in Annex  2 of the Agenda.  G/C/M/146  
 
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  6.2.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
6.3.  Similarly to the previous agenda item, the United States is bringing this agenda item to the 
Council to identify certain Members ' non-notifications of items pursuant to certain WTO  Agreements.  
This non -notification issue has been raised in the identified subsidiary bodies for several years now, 
and we are now raising this up to the Council as a no rmal administrative matter.  
6.4.  As the United States has stated in past meetings, we appreciate the Chairs ' and Secretariat 's 
attempts in the relevant subsidiary bodies to get Members to make their respective notifications, 
and we have noticed that an increasi ng number of Members have done so.  However, as indicated in 
Annex  2, there remain a number of Members that have not yet made their respective notifications.  
6.5.  In reviewing the list, the United States notes that, for nearly every Member, information has 
been reported to the WTO through the TPR  process , whether the Member does or does not have the 
requisite obligation item in place. In other words, most WTO  Members have been made aware of 
their status, albeit in another forum.  
6.6.  As other Members have demonstrated  in the past, the notification  requirement  is not overly 
burdensome and, for most Members, will likely result in a nil  notification.  Therefore, the United 
States continue s to encourage all of the outstanding Members who have yet to make their respective 
notifications to review their individual situations and make the applicable notification.  
6.7.  As many of these notifications have been outstanding for over 25  years, and if Members have 
questions on their notification obligations, they should approach the Secret ariat for guidance on the 
requirements under the applicable WTO  Agreements. Alternatively, if for some reason a Member is 
unable to reach  out to the Secretariat, Members can also reach out to other Members for guidance 
and assistance. We have all been in a  situation of having to prepare a notification for the first  time 
at one time or another, so we should all be sympathetic to the challenges that some delegations 
may face. As many Members in the subsidiary bodies can attest to, including L east Developed 
Countries (LDCs) , and also other small delegations, we stand ready to help in any way we can and 
have indeed already helped many Members with their pending notifications.  
6.8.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
6.9.  The notifications to the CTG 's subsidiary committees are important from the perspective of 
ensuring transparency and monitoring the implementation of the Agreement, as well as from the 
perspective of improving the functioning of the CTG and its subsidiary bodies . We would like to point 
out that Members have to redouble their efforts on this , while also taking into account the capacities 
of developing and LDC Members.  
6.10.  The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
6.11.  The United Kingdom is grateful to the United States for raising this issue. Members know well 
that the UK – like so many others – shares the US ' passion for the underlying principles of 
transparency and resolution of trade concerns.  We would also be keen t o hear from the Members 
listed what would be most helpful to them in order to fulfil their notification or response 
requirements.  The UK will continue to provide technical assistance and capacity -building to help 
partners meet their obligations, and we loo k forward to continuing this conversation on 
transparency.  
6.12.  The delegate of Nepal  indicated the following:  
6.13.  Nepal thank s the United States for raising its concerns regarding Nepal's notification under 
paragraph  25.2 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Counterv ailing Measures, paragraph  1 of the 
Understanding of the W orking Party on State Trading Enterprises , and replies to the Checklist of 
Issues (G/VAL/5 ). The messages have been communicated to Capital. I will update the Council as 
soon as I receive the relevant information from Capital.  Furthermore, I would like to make it clear 
that LDCs are trying their best to fulfil the ir obligations and commitments under the 
WTO Agreements ; however , due to limited capacity, they do so with delays . G/C/M/146  
 
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  6.14.  The delegate of Bangladesh  indicated the following:  
6.15.  Bangladesh thanks  the United States for raising these issues , and for helping Bangladesh  in 
this notification process . Bangladesh believes  that, as one of the pillars  of the multilateral trading 
system , notification helps in transparency and for future decision -making process. As a part of this 
process , Bangladesh already notified under Article  16.4 of the Anti -Dumping Practice; Article  25.11 
of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM  Agreement); and Article  18.2 of 
the Agreement of Agriculture (Domestic Support). In this connection, Bangladesh would like  to refer 
to Article  XI:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement and echoes the delegation of Nepal on the constraints 
and challenges faced by the LDCs.  Our Capital -based  colleagues are working on the issues raised 
and will submit our notifications in due course.  
6.16.  The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
6.17.  I would like to draw Members' attention to other activities within this forum . Two weeks ago, 
the Development Division held a n LDC  Transparency and Notifications Session , where t here were a 
number of presenta tions not just on the act of providing notifications and the difficulties Members 
face in terms of providing information , but also  there was a large discussion around the value of the 
notifications. I think that this is  one of the things that we often miss  in our discussions here. There 
is a lot of value and information that is taken from them, not just for us delegates and Capital -based  
officials to learn about our trading partners, but also by our private sector, our businesses, who are 
able to access thi s public information, and use it and look at the analysis that is produced by some 
academics and the WTO , based on that information . There are activities in this Organization that 
speak to the notifications , and there  is great value ascribed that we are ab le to provide to 
WTO Members.  
6.18.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
6.19.  I would like to thank  Japan, the United Kingdom, and Canada for their interventions. Indeed, 
as the UK mentioned, we too would be interested to hear from Members  as to what would work best 
to help them with their notification s. To Nepal and Bangladesh, indeed your efforts are recogni zed 
by us in terms of  what you have done , and what you are working on , and we look forward to hearing 
from you in the near future.  
6.20.  The Chairperson  indicated the following:  
6.21.  I would like to emphasi ze the need for Members to comp ly with their notification 
requirements , and note t hat I have often heard in meetings encouragement to developing countries 
to seek support where necessary . I further encourage Members to reach out to the WTO  Secretariat 
for technical assistance , and to other Members who have offered to support them , to comply with 
their notification obligations.  
6.22.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
6.23.  The Council so agreed . 
7  MEASURES TO ALLOW GRADUATED LDCS, WITH GNP BELOW USD  1,000, BENEFITS 
PURSUANT TO ANNEX  VII(B) OF THE AGREEMEN T ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING 
MEASURES – REQUEST FROM DJIBOUTI ON BEHALF OF THE LDC  GROUP (G/C/W/752 ) 
7.1.  The Chairpe rson recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Djibouti on behalf of the LDC  Group.  He also drew  Members' attention to document  G/C/W/752 , 
submitted in April  2018, which ha d a request by the LDC  Group and a draft decision by the General 
Council. He understood  that the main thrust of this proposal was to allow graduated LDC  Members 
to have a similar treatment to that granted to certain developing Members listed in Annex  VII(b) of 
the SCM  Agreement. Following a request at the CTG's July  2021 meeting, the Secretariat had 
updated the GNP  calculations for all Members, which was circulated in November  2021 in 
document  G/SCM/W/585 . Finally, he understood  that this issu e had also been discussed at the 
General Council.  G/C/M/146  
 
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  7.2.  The delegate of Bangladesh , on behalf of the LDC  Group,  indicated the following:  
7.3.  Members are aware of the LDC  Group's request on this issue. According to Art icle 27.2(a) of 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Co untervailing Measures ( ASCM ), some Members are eligible to 
enjoy flexibilities under this Agreement (i.e.  for the use of export subsidies for non -agricultural 
products). Those Members are specified in Annex  VII of the Agreement in two  separate categories:  
(i) all least developed countries (listed as Annex  VII(A)) and  (ii) some developing countries (listed 
in Annex  VII(B)), as long as their GNI  per capita remains below the threshold of USD  1,000 in 
constant 1990  US dollar terms.  
7.4.  It is not clear  from the ASCM whether an LDC , after graduation, which remains below the same 
threshold of USD  1,000, should also benefit from the same flexibilities as do developing countries 
listed in Annex  VII(B). 
7.5.  In the communication we are discussing now, the LDC  Group propose s that an LDC after 
graduation, as long as its GNI remains below the threshold of USD  1,000 in constant 1990  US dollar 
terms, should be allowed to use the flexibility under Article  27.2 of the ASCM like the developing 
counties listed in Annex  VII(B). Such a decision is required for clarity and predictability.  
7.6.  We have cited an example earlier , namely  that, by mistake , Honduras was not at first included 
in 1994 in the Annex  VII(B) list. Rather, Honduras was included  only later , considering that its 
GNI per capita was below the USD  1,000 threshold . In other words, it is possible to clarify the 
provision that an LDC after graduation should also be eligible to avail itself of this flexibility and be 
treated as  an Annex  VII(B) Member as long as it stays belo w the threshold  of USD  1,000 in constant 
1990 US dollar terms . Therefore, the  CTG can approve the LDC  submission and recommend it to the 
General Council  for appropriate action.  
7.7.  The Secretariat note contained in document  G/SCM/W/585 , dated 22  November  2021, with the 
title "GNP Per Capita Calculations for All WTO  Members using the Methodology in G/SCM/38 ", 
confirms the conc erns of the LDC  Group. From the growth -rate trend in th at note, it is evident that 
many LDCs may graduate from the LDC  category with GNI  per capita below the threshold of 
USD 1,000 in constant 1990  US dollar terms.  
7.8.  The LDC  Group is grateful to all the WTO  Members that have been supporting this proposal 
since its submission in 2018. Bangladesh, along with the LDC  Group, will continue working with the 
delegations of the European Union and the United States, and welcomes further  suggestions from 
Members to achieve a positive result in this regard.  
7.9.  For clarification , the current communication on Annex  VII of the ASCM has also been referred 
to as an item in Annex  II to the LDC  Group's proposal on Graduation submitted to the General  
Council  in document WT/GC/W/807/Rev.2 . In other words , the specific item on the ASCM in the 
LDC Graduation proposa l will depend on the CTG  decision , which will play a complementary role. We 
trust that this clarification is helpful in avoid ing any confusion in this regard.  
7.10.  The delegate of Nepal  indicated the following:  
7.11.  Nepal aligns itself with the statement delivered by Bangladesh  on behalf of the LDC  Group , 
and wishes to add the following few points . 
7.12.  Some LDCs are on the path to graduation from the LDC  category, and it is good news to all 
of us. However , meeting the graduation criteria does not necessarily mean that graduated LDCs will 
not face trade and development challenges. On the contrary, a graduated LDC may face enormous 
challenges to cope in a new trade and economic environment.  Nepal itself has not met the 
GNI criteria in the triennial review s of 2015, 2 018, and 2021 by the CDP . In this way, it is on the 
path to graduation only insofar as it meets the HAI and EVI  criteria . 
7.13.  In this regard, the decision in the proposal submitted by the LDC Group is necessary for 
greater clarity and predictability , including  that an LDC, after its graduation, and as long as its GNI 
remains below the threshold of USD  1,000 in constant 1990  US dollar terms, should be allowed the 
possibility to use the flexibility available under Article 27.2 of the ASCM , as are the developing G/C/M/146  
 
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  countries listed in Annex  VII(b). Therefore, my delegation urges all WTO Members to engage 
constructively to expedite the proposal.  
7.14.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
7.15.  We thank Bangladesh and Nepal for their comments. We have reviewed the document 
carefully, and unfortunately the calculations confirm our concerns. There remain gaps in information 
that is needed for this proposal to be workable from a practical perspective. H owever, we remain 
willing to consider ideas or proposal s as to how to address those gaps or otherwise address the issue 
raised by the proposal . 
7.16.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
7.17.  The European Union thanks Bangladesh and Nepal for t heir presentations today.  The 
EU position on this proposal is well  known , and we refer to our past statements.  We also thank 
Bangladesh and Nepal for the clarification provided today as to how this proposal in the C TG links to 
the LDC  proposal on graduatio n at the level of the General Council.  We are available for bilateral 
contacts with the LDC  Group , as they deem appropriate . 
7.18.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
7.19.  The Council so agreed . 
TRADE CONCERNS  
7.20.  The Chairperson  indicated the following:  
7.21.  We will now move to discuss the trade concerns, which are listed in the order in which they 
were received by the Secretariat. As you may recall, at the last formal meeting, the Council agreed 
to modify the agenda to sep arate the new trade concerns from those previously raised, so the 
Secretariat implemented the request in the agenda for today's meeting. However, I would like to 
draw your attention to the fact that no new trade concern was raised and, in fact, the 37  trade 
concerns that will be discussed at this meeting have been previously raised.  
7.22.  Given the long list of items, I would once again encourage you to keep your interventions 
short. As a reminder, please note that you can make shorter statements at the meeting a nd 
expressly request the incorporation of a longer statement into the Minutes. The longer statement 
can be submitted either through the eAgenda platform or by emailing it to the Secretariat, but please 
remember to indicate this during the meeting.  
NEW TRAD E CONCERNS  
NIL 
PREVIOUSLY RAISED TRADE CONCERNS  
8  EUROPEAN UNION – IMPLEMENTATION OF NON -TARIFF BARRIERS ON AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL, CANADA, COSTA RICA, DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, GUATEMALA, PANAMA, PARAGUAY, THE UNITED STATE S, AND 
URUGUAY  
8.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama, 
Paraguay, the United States, and Uruguay.  
8.2.  The delegate of Paraguay , addressing Agenda Items  8 and 10,  indicated the following:  
8.3.  To save time, I will cover Agenda I tems 8 and 10 in this intervention , since they are related . 
My delegation would like to note that we have not received answers from the European Union  to the 
questions we presented jointly with the delegations of Colombia, Ecuador,  and Guatemala,  in G/C/M/146  
 
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  November  2022 at the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures ( SPS Committee ), nor 
in the following meetings of the said Committee , nor in the meetings of this Council.  We thank the 
European Union for the plurilateral meeting held with my delegation , and others, to go over some 
of our concerns , which took place on the margins of the SPS  Committee meeting last March . We 
hope that this dialogue can continue in the future , and that we can receive answers to our questions 
soon. 
8.4.  Regarding new developments, allow me to note that, given that the SPS  Committee will only 
meet next week, we will present in this Council some of the new questions we have for the European 
Union, noting that  some of them were also presented at the Committee on Technical Barriers to 
Trade ( TBT Committee ) meeting last month. According to the Minutes of the European Commission's 
Standing Committee on Plants, Animals , Food and Feed (SCoPAFF)  of 10 -11 May 2023,  "the 
Commission presented Revision  4 of the Draft Regulation that clarifies that the M aximum Residue 
Limits (MRLs)  for tricyclazole  should be established in Annex  2 of the Regulation  396 of 2005. [The 
Commission ] proposes to modify the MRL of tricyclazole for rice from  0.01 mg/k g to 0.09  mg/kg , 
according to the request for tolerance to the import based on the Good Agricultural Practices (GAP s) 
of Brazil , for which the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)  confirmed that the MRL proposed is 
totally supported by  data and is safe for consumers. " However, many EU  member States did not 
support the Draft Regulation presented by the Commission and the required majority was not 
reached.  
8.5.  Some of  the arguments made by the se Members  include : (i) that tolerances to imports should 
not be accepted for substances that are no longer approved in the EU; and (ii) that approving them 
would have a negative impact on the competitiveness of European rice producer s, who cannot use 
the same substances as third  countries to combat certain pests effectively.  
8.6.  In light of this, we would like the European Union to answer the following:  
(a) If a tolerance for imports is proposed for an MRL which is, and I quote, " totally supported 
by data and is safe for consumers ", according to its own scientific authority , how would 
it be compatible with the obligations under the SPS Agreement  to reject said tolerance  
to imports on the basis of "a negative impact on the competiti vity of European 
producers "? 
 
(b) If in cases of MRLs set with the objective of protecting human health member States 
are not giving a favourable  vote for import tolerances, how can the Commission argue 
that requesting import tolerances is a feasible way forward for MRLs set with 
environmental objectives (e.g.  for neonicotinoid substances)?  
 
8.7.  In the face of repeated questioning on the excessive use of emergency authorizations by 
EU member States, the EU indicated, in this and other WTO  Committees and Councils, that, in light 
of the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European  Union  (CJEU) of 19  January  2023 
(Case  C-162/21), member States can no lon ger grant emergency authorizations for plant protection 
products containing banned neonicotinoids. In this regard, we note the following:  
(a) There are several emergency authorizations that were approved prior to the 
CJEU ruling, but whose application cove rs a period after the CJEU  ruling. Will these 
emergency authorizations remain valid for the entire period for which they were 
approved, despite the CJEU  ruling?  
 
(b) On 4 April 2023, the Czech Republic granted an emergency authorization for the banned 
substance thiamethoxam for the period from 20 April to 16 July 2023, claiming as 
justification and as a mitigation measure that "the product will only be used on the crop 
intended for export to countries outside the European Union".  
 
(c) How can the export of the crop for which thiamethoxam has been used be considered 
as a mitigation measure that protects European pollinators?  
 
(d) How is the emergency authorization granted by the Czech Republic compatible with the 
objective that the EU  claims to purs ue with Regulation (EU) No.  2023/334, i.e.  to 
protect pollinator populations worldwide?  
 G/C/M/146  
 
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  8.8.  We will circulate these and some additional questions for the European Union  under the specific 
trade concerns in the SPS  Committee, and they will be addressed next we ek. 
8.9.  The delegate of Ecuador  indicated the following:  
8.10.  First, m y delegation wishes to refer for the record  to the content of its interventions on this 
matter  that were previously made both in this Council , as well as  in the SPS and TBT Committees . 
Ecuador on ce again expresses its trade  concern regarding non -tariff barriers to agricultural products  
by the European Union . Once again, it is regrettable that the discussion on this issue has not 
generated any progress, despite the constant calls to consider the im pact of the European Union's 
non-tariff barriers. These barriers hit especially hard those small and medium -sized farmers whose 
production seeks to serve the market s of EU  member States . 
8.11.  We would like to recall the five objections and arguments on which the  trade concerns raised 
under this this agenda item are  based: (i)  the adoption of measures without scientific evidence; 
(ii) non-compliance with international standards; (iii)  non-compliance with the obligations of the 
SPS Agreement; (iv)  the suspension of MRLs that go beyond the Codex Alimentarius; and, (v)  the 
lack of reasonable adjustment deadlines in cases that prove necessary.  
8.12.  The five  elements we have pointed out above have not been adequately addressed or have 
received only partial answers and explanations. The fifth  point is particularly crucial: trading partners 
need at least five years on average to adapt agricultural practices and put processes in place to 
allow the use of substitutes. I would also like to reca ll that, with a constructive approach, my 
delegation and other Members ha ve engaged in consultations related to impact assessments of these 
measures in tropical developing countries, as well as with small and medium -sized farmers from 
these countries.  
8.13.  The lack of authorized substances directly impacts market access for typically Andean and 
tropical fruits, which, being minor crops, have few defined residue limits for approved substances.  
On the other hand, the substitution or reduction of pesticides require s the development of new 
technologies and innovations, which can take more than 11  years of research and development , on 
average, as well as huge investment from the private sector. The approval of these substances is 
very strict,  and the associated costs continue to increase due to the requirements for their approval.  
It should also be considered that any new substances require time for adaptation, as their efficiency 
in tropical conditions is not always certain. This reinforces our request for reasonable adjustment 
periods.  
8.14.  Finally, Ecuador renews its willingness to maintain a constructive exchange in order to find a 
definitive solution to this issue  that address es the concerns of the European Union and its trading 
partners within the principles governing the functioning of the multilateral trading system. Only a 
frank and committed dialogue will enable us to achieve this objective and consolidate the benefits 
of a rules -based multilateral trading system for all its Members.  
8.15.  The delegate of  the Dominican Republic  indicated the following:  
8.16.   The Dominican Republic wishes to reiterate its statement from the formal meeting of the 
CTG, held on 3-4 April 2023. We share the European Union's concern for the protection of human 
and animal health, as well as measures to protect the environment. However, we are concerned 
about the systemic and commercial impact that the measures on the reduction of maximum residue 
limits (MRLs) may have on exports from our country, considering that this type of regulation has a 
direct socioeconomic impact in the Dominican Republic, particularly affecting agricultural producers, 
who generally constitute the most vulnerable populations in LDCs and developing countries , and 
who suffer directly the socioeconomic consequences of thes e restrictions to international trade.  
8.17.  The Dominican Republic considers that any measure applied by the European Union should 
be developed in accordance with the rules agreed upon in the WTO.  The regulatory project presented 
by the EU on MRLs should take i nto consideration the scientific evidence.  We therefore invite the EU 
to adhere to the Codex Alimentarius when reconsidering the implementation of these measures.  
8.18.  We have a specific  concern about the possible modification of M RLs of "imazalil" , which is a 
fundamental product for fruits such as bananas and mangoes . We express the concern of the G/C/M/146  
 
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  Dominican Republic over the European Union's  notification in document  G/SPS/N/EU/319 , of 
5 April 2019, which inform ed Members  of a proposal for a preliminary draft Commission Regulation 
amending Annexes  II and III of Regulation (EC) No . 396/2005 of the European Parliam ent and of 
the Council as regards the revision of the M RLs of imazalil  in certain foodstuffs.  
8.19.  The Dominican Republic recognizes the right of the European Union  to adopt the sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures it deems necessary to achieve the level of heal th protection of its citizens , 
in accordance with Article  2 of the SPS Agreement.  However, this right to adopt sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures to achieve an adequate level of protection entails basic obligations. In 
general, Members  may adopt sanitary and phytosanitary measures provided that:  (i) they are only 
applied to the extent necessary to protect life or health;  (ii) they are based on scientific principles 
and are not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence;  and (iii)  they do not unjustifiably 
discriminate between domestic and foreign origin or between external source s of supply.  
8.20.  Imazalil  is a key post -harvest fungicide which is of great economic and agricultural 
importance, widely used for the cultivation of fruits such as banana s, mango es, and avocado s, being 
an essential tool in the post -harvest treatment of these foods, as they are prone to experience 
different diseases caused by fungal pathogens that can only be prevented by the use of imazalil  as 
part of an effective control program me. Exports of banana, mango , and avocado represent abo ut 
20% of the Dominican Republic 's total annual food exports , and the main destination of these fruits  
is the European Union , in particular for bananas . 
8.21.  The reduction of MRLs for the active ingredient imazalil would cause serious problems for our 
industry. It is practically a zero-tolerance  measure. At this time, there is no effective substitute 
among plant protection products with the efficacy of  imazalil , especially with respect to fungal 
pathogen control.  
8.22.  In April 2015, through notification  G/SPS/W/284  of April  2015, India noted the frequent 
practice of adopting the limit o f determination as the MRL for pesticides not registered or not used 
in the territory of the importing Member , and the ensuing disruptions in international trade. As a 
consequence of this notification, t he SPS  Committee has held several technical workshops  with the 
aim of reducing or eliminating this practice by some Member s. 
8.23.  The Dominican Republic regrets that the European Union's  authorities have not taken into 
account the recommendations of the workshops on the establishment of MRLs carried out by the 
SPS Committee , and made the proposal to amend Regulation  396/2005 to modify the MRLs of 
imazalil based on the Limit of Quantification without taking into consideration the impact on 
international trade.  
8.24.  The Joint Statements on SPS  issues at the 12th Ministerial Conference (MC12) ; the statement 
on Trade in Food and Agricultural Products at the 11th Ministerial Conference  (MC11) ; and the 
Declaration of the G20  Agriculture Ministers Meeting in July  2018 reinforce the European Union's 
commitment as a Memb er to the SPS  Agreement and refrain from adopting unnecessary barriers to 
international trade.  
8.25.  We encourage the European Union to find an alternative solution on MRLs for imazalil , and 
that we address our concerns without unnecessarily undermining our economies  and agriculture. 
The Dominican Republic notes that  the E FSA risk assessment of 5 September  2017, annexed to 
notification  G/SPS/N/EU/319 , states that the MRLs for banana derived from Good Agricultural 
Practices (GAP) are tentative and that the toxicity of the metabolite R014821 formed in post -harvest 
applications is still inconclusive.  
8.26.  In view of the above, the Dom inican Republic, as a WTO  Member, expresses its concern ; 
furthermore, it does not agree with the European Union's  policy on the establis hment of MRLs based 
on Limit of Quantification because it is not a policy that contribute s to guaranteeing the health of 
consumers , and because it creates unnecessary obstacles in the trade of agricultural products 
exported from Members , in violation of Articles  2 and 5 of the SPS  Agreement, respectively . 
Therefore , we request that the establishment of MRLs for imazalil be supported by scientific 
evidence.  G/C/M/146  
 
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  8.27.  The delegate of Panama  indicated the following:  
8.28.  Panama would like to reiterate the importance that it attaches to this issue. The reduction of 
MRLs without sufficient scientific evidence restricts access to essent ial substances for agricultural 
production, especially in tropical countries such as Panama. Panama considers that the European 
Union's policies and practices as a whole risk nullifying and undermining the legitimate rights of 
WTO Members, signatories to t he Agreement on Agriculture and the SPS Agreement. Panama shares 
the EU's objective of supporting the global transition towards more sustainable world agri -food 
systems, but these must be based on the construction of solutions designed and implemented 
through dialogue mechanisms and multilateral cooperation schemes. We regret that no progress has 
been observed to date. We once again urge the European Union to listen to the legitimate concerns 
of dozens of WTO  Members. In our view, a constructive, serious , and permanent dialogue, together 
with mutually agreed technical assistance, will lead to a mutually beneficial solution for all parties.  
8.29.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
8.30.  Australia has raised or supported several specific trade concerns rel ating to the E uropean 
Union's implementation of non -tariff barriers on agricultural products, including at the most recent 
SPS and TBT  Committee meetings. Australia remains concerned that the EU 's application of its health 
and environmental standards to imported agriculture and agri -food products – in many aspects – 
does not facilitate trade and is not conducive to achieving productive and sustainable outcomes in 
the agriculture sector.  
8.31.  For imported agricultural products, the E uropean Union's regulatory approach to agricultural 
inputs, production requirements, and specific measures targeted at protecting the environment has 
impacted third -country producers ' ability to access the EU  market. These concerns include the EU 's 
recent attempts to set  MRLs for certain pesticides in order to achieve environmental outcomes in 
third countries.  
8.32.  Australia does not consider that MRLs are an appropriate or efficient tool to achieve 
environmental outcomes. Third -country national competent authorities are the b est decision maker 
to ensure that pesticide application is undertaken in a safe, responsible, and sustainable manner in 
each country, in accordance with their unique environment.  
8.33.  Australia also maintains concerns over the unfair competitive advantage provi ded to 
EU producers in applying EU  domestic production requirements to imports, without allowing for the 
recognition of third -country systems that achieve equivalent outcomes. EU  producers are subsidi zed 
to implement the EU  production requirements , and if they are unable to maintain productivity and 
profitability, then only EU  producers can access EU  exemptions from certain regulatory 
requirements, such as emergency authori zations for the use of Plant Protection Products (PPPs). This 
creates a two -tiered sy stem, with imported products subject to more stringent regulatory conditions 
than domestically produced products.  
8.34.  Australia recogni zes the right of WTO  Members to regulate agricultural imports in a manner 
that protects animal, plant and human health and th e environment. However, Members are also 
bound by WTO  obligations, particularly in relation to undertaking science -based risk assessments 
and ensuring that measures are no more trade -restrictive than necessary to achieve legitimate 
objectives. To ensure th e free flow of agricultural trade without unnecessary regulatory burden, 
Australia maintains its request that the EU apply international standards and best practice for 
regulating imported agricultural products.  
8.35.  We thank the European Union for its ongoing engagement with Australia on these 
long-running issues.  
8.36.  The delegate of Costa Rica  indicated the following:  
8.37.  Costa Rica shares the concerns that have been raised by other Members today , and on 
previous occasions in this Council, and continues to co -sponsor and support this agenda item and 
document  G/C/W/767/Rev.1 . We consider that the concerns raised over the European Union's 
regulatory approach remain relevant , and that the resolution of these concerns remains urgent, 
especially for developing countries with tropical climates, as is the case of Costa Rica.  G/C/M/146  
 
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  8.38.  In the  area of M RLs, Costa Rica maintains systemic and commercial concerns about the 
European Union's  hazard -based approach. In practice, this approach has led to the elimination of 
dozens of substances that are essential for the control of pests and diseases in  agricultural 
production in tropical climates. To this is added the implementation of measures based, according 
to the EU itself, on "environmental concerns of a global nature". Beyond the eminently extraterritorial 
nature of this type of measure, we are c oncerned that such justification does not appear to be 
consistent with the principles of the SPS  Agreement or the TBT  Agreement.  
8.39.  We also note that the European Union is implementing measures to control deforestation and 
forest degradation outside its terri tory through policies that affect the import of certain agricultural 
products, including tropical products such as cocoa, coffee , and palm oil. In this regard, multiple 
methodological doubts arise regarding the design and implementation of a trade mechanis m such 
as the one proposed by the EU. Regarding this policy, we urge the EU to ensure that its measures 
are consistent with the WTO  Agreements and their fundamental principles, that they are not 
discriminatory , and that they do not constitute disguised bar riers to trade.  
8.40.  Costa Rica once again urges the European Union to continue its dialogue with interested 
parties in order to overcome the concerns of Members expressed in this Council and its subsidiary 
bodies.  
8.41.  The delegate of Canada  indicated the following : 
8.42.  As noted in its previous interventions on this subject, Canada emphasizes the need for 
transparency and predictability in international trade. Regulatory frameworks are an important 
aspect in achieving this. These frameworks have been developed based on scientific data and risk 
analysis, and have taken into account the comments of trading partners so that they may achieve 
desired outcomes while facilitating trade where this is feasible and appropriate.  
8.43.  In accordance with WTO  obligations, Canada recognizes  Members ' right to regulate in the 
public interest and to apply the food safety measures deemed necessary to protect human health. 
However, such measures must be implemented in a transparent manner and in accordance with 
international obligations so as to not unjustifiably restrict international trade.  
8.44.  The European Union is the world 's leading agricultural and forest products importer and 
therefore plays an important role in ensuring a predictable and open trade environment. To that 
end, Canada  would like t o comment on two  particular policy initiatives where the EU 's approach is 
more trade restrictive than necessary and will likely result in increased uncertainty, higher 
compliance costs for importers and exporters, negatively impact trade , and further complicate 
international supply chains.  
8.45.  Firstly, I would like to comment on the E uropean Union's recently published Regulation on 
deforestation -free products . While Canada shares the EU 's objective of preventing global 
deforestation, the compl iance mechanisms that have been proposed within the legislation, including 
the use of plot -of-land-based traceability, will result in increased costs and administrative burden 
for countries exporting to the EU  market. Since the Regulation has already enter ed into force, it is 
imperative that the EU carry out comprehensive engagement sessions , and that it takes into account 
the concerns of trading partners while ensuring that the regulation , which aims to help curb global 
deforestation , does not unnecessaril y impact trade.  
8.46.  Additionally, I would like to raise Canada 's concerns regarding the series of measures that 
support the E uropean Union's approach to regulating pesticides. Canada is particularly concerned 
with the apparent strategy to restrict the use of i mportant plant protection products through the 
reduction of M RLs, which was most recently manifested in a restriction based on environmental 
concerns rather than dietary risks, which could lead to significant barriers to trade. Canada urges 
the EU to consi der dietary risk when setting MRLs, as all countries should have the ability to use 
plant protection products that are appropriate to their particular circumstances and needs without 
unnecessarily jeopardizing trade. Canada urges the EU to consider pollen,  nectar , and floral residues 
for pollinator exposure in its risk assessment, while adhering to its international trade obligations.  
8.47.  Canada also recalls that the European Union  has stated that it will be changing how requests 
for import tolerances are estab lished, including taking into account certain environmental impacts G/C/M/146  
 
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  in the country of origin. Canadian growers and exporters have yet to be assured of the real -world 
feasibility, commercial viability and compliance with international obligations of the EU 's proposed 
approach. Consequently, Canada once again requests that the EU maintains MRLs for substances 
that do not pose unacceptable dietary risks to European consumers, as this would be the only means 
by which consumers would be exposed to these products . 
8.48.  For example, Canada is concerned by the E uropean Union's decision to adopt legislation to 
lower the MRLs for clothianidin and thiamethoxam to the Limit of Quantification (LOQ) based on 
perceived environmental concerns rather than protection of consumer health. Additionally, this 
legislation does not take into account successful risk mitigation measures, which have been taken 
by exporting countries or residues in pollinator relevant matrices such as pollen and/or nectar. This 
type of policy and r ationale restricts trade and appears to be the EU 's attempt at levelling the playing 
field for regulations they have imposed upon their own agricultural producers. If a pesticide does 
not have dietary concerns and poses no risks to EU  consumers, the EU sho uld maintain the MRLs or 
harmonize with Codex.  
8.49.  Lastly, Canada requests the European Union to take into account the timelines necessary for 
practical decision -making by farmers and producers , as well as the time and effort required to bring 
products to market, particularly for commodities with long shelf lives. Transition periods should 
therefore be appropriate to the circumstances and product type and should allow commodities to 
clear channel s of trade where no dietary risks of concern to consumers have been identified.  
8.50.  In conclusion, Canada hopes that the reiteration of its concerns will emphasize the importance 
that Canada, and many WTO  Members, attribute to seeking enhanced transparency and  
predictability for trade, particularly in a context where such trade can contribute to global food 
security and supply.  
8.51.  The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
8.52.  Uruguay continues to maintain its trade and systemic concern regarding the general app roach 
followed by the European Union in its regulatory decisions related to sanitary and phytosanitary 
matters, and the way in which this approach interacts with other instruments of European trade and 
agricultural policy , such as subsidies and tariffs , to restrict access to the European market, thereby 
preventing third -country producers from competing with their European counterparts on equal 
terms, in line with what other delegations have stated.  
8.53.  In particular, we are concerned about the implementation of  an approach whereby the 
European Union  decided to reduce the MRLs of a growing list of active substances used at different 
stages of the production process of various agricultural products to levels lower than those agreed 
in Codex, and even to the level of detection, without necessarily carrying out a full risk assessment 
that would justify such a departure based on conclusive scientific evidence.  
8.54.  In our view, any determination in this area, particularly when it departs from internationally 
accepted stand ards and harmonization efforts made in multilateral settings such as Codex, must 
necessarily be based on a thorough scientific risk assessment and conclusive scientific evidence, in 
accordance with the provisions of the SPS  Agreement. This is essential to maintain the effective 
balance that must exist between the right of Members to pursue their legitimate objectives and the 
need to avoid creating unnecessary obstacles to trade.  
8.55.  Uruguay agrees with other Members that the issue of exception regimes, includin g the 
existence and implementation in practice of emergency authorizations, seems to highlight the 
tensions between the domestic policies of the member States of the Union and the objective of 
protecting health at the Community level . It generates situatio ns in the commercial sphere that are 
potentially discriminatory with respect to third  parties. In this regard, we would be interested to 
know how the European Union has been, or foresees to be, affected by the consideration of 
emergency authorizations for substances subject to restrictions at Community level, in light of the 
recent ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) of 19 January  2023, which 
considers them illegal in certain cases. In this regard, we support the questions submitted by 
Paraguay to the European Union today, both on emergency authorizations and on certain import 
tolerances, and await a response to them.  G/C/M/146  
 
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  8.56.  Uruguay is also concerned that insufficient transition periods are being provided to make the 
necessary adjustments in  production and ensure compliance of the products concerned with the 
modified MRLs, and that the international consultation processes opened by the European Union  
seem to be treated as a mere bureaucratic step and not as an effective instance of regulatory  
cooperation in which the contributions of third  countries are taken into account.  
8.57.  Finally, Uruguay once again urges the European Union to reconsider the direction of its 
regulatory approach with a view to avoiding the unjustified proliferation of barriers  to international 
trade in agricultural products, taking into account its WTO  obligations, as well as the socio -economic 
consequences that these policies may have on its trading partners, particularly developing and least 
developed countries.  
8.58.  The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
8.59.  Brazil regrets that , since this issue was first  raised , nearly two years ago, the European Union 
has not only not provided adequate answers to the many concerns raised by a large number of 
WTO Members, but has continued to adopt NTBs that lack scientific evidence and further imbalance 
the trade in agricultural goods. Brazil therefore make s reference t o its previous statements on this 
topic, as all Brazil's concerns remain valid.  Additionally, Brazil  would like to note that , while the 
European Union has claimed that the measures being questioned have not prevented it from being 
a large importer of agric ultural goods, nowhere in the GATT does it say that being a large importer 
of agricultural goods enables a WTO Member to go against the basic principles of the 
SPS Agreement.  
8.60.  Second, such imports simply reflect the reality that other regions of the world c an produce 
more effectively and more sustainably than the European Union  without the thousands of euros of 
subsidies per farmer. But while enabling a more efficient allocation of production, and promoting the 
rise of living standards through trade, are key  goals of this Organization, we have never had a level 
playing field in the trade of agricultural goods, and the reform mandated by Article  20 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture ( AoA) is a clear indication of that.  
8.61.  Besides, the scientific principle, enshrined  in the SPS  Agreement and materialized through 
risk analysis, exists for a reason , namely to establish a balance between the principle of protection 
of life and human and animal health and the guarantee that the market access conditions negotiated 
multilat erally are not undermined by unjustified NTBs.  However, after nearly thirty  years, the 
European Union has not engaged meaningfully in redressing the imbalance in its favour  in the AoA, 
and is constantly imposing prohibitions based on the hazard approach an d/or recourse to Article  5.7 
of the SPS  Agreement, despite contrary technical advice from renowned institutions. This not only 
tilts the balance towards protectionism, but also undermines the capacity of developing countries to 
raise living standards in ru ral areas.  
8.62.  It is thus worrying that, twenty -five years after its adoption, the interpretation that is given 
to the SPS  Agreement is moving away from the purposes that guided the negotiations during the 
Uruguay Round. It is also worrying that we have to bri ng debates of this nature to the CTG, while 
instruments that create new non -tariff trade barriers, under the guise of environmental protection, 
are proliferating worldwide.  
8.63.  Additionally, Brazil would like to note that it is still waiting for adequate answe rs regarding 
the compatibility with WTO  law of the publication by the European Union  of more than 
2,600 emergency authorizations by its member States of substances under review since 2017, some 
of which simply do not offer any justification , and yet were approved.  
8.64.  As a final comment, Brazil  must stress that the world is facing an acute food security crisis, 
which will become even more challenging in the next decades as the world population grows. It is 
thus imperative to have in place incenti ves and policies that support agriculture in those areas that, 
blessed with a favourable  climate for agriculture, can increase output in a sustainable manner. 
Unfortunately, EU  policies in this area are not pulling in the direction we need to support the p oorest 
in developing countries, and increase food security worldwide.  G/C/M/146  
 
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  8.65.  The delegate of United States  indicated the following:  
8.66.  The United States joins Australia, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay, and Ur uguay in again raising concerns regarding the 
European Union 's implementation of non -tariff barriers on agricultural products.  As we have noted 
in the past, the European Union continues to lower many pesticide s Maximum Residue Levels, or 
MRLs, to trade -restrictive levels without clear scientific justification or measurable benefit to human 
health. This hazard -based approach to pesticide regulation may lead to trade barriers that threaten 
the security of global food systems.  
8.67.  Further, the European Union enforces newly reduced pesticide MRLs at the point of production 
for domestic goods, while enforcing these MRLs at the point of importation for imported goods. This 
difference in the treatment of domestic and imported goods causes trade inefficiencies and 
disruptions for products destined for the EU  market and results in an unfair advantage for 
EU producers, especially for those that produce products with long shelf lives.  
8.68.  We reiterate our concerns that the European Union  appears to be following a similar approa ch 
with its new veterinary drug legislation through prohibitions on the use of antimicrobials that are not 
considered medically important for human health.  
8.69.  Like other Members, we have shared our concerns in the SPS  Committee that these 
prescriptive restric tions, which do not appear to be based on completed risk assessments, will apply 
to foreign producers exporting animals and animal products to the EU.  
8.70.  Given the European Union 's position as one of the largest importers in the world, EU  polices 
affect produ ction practices in third  countries, as producers must choose between adopting European 
production practices or abandoning trade with the EU. The United States again requests that any 
EU measure allows flexibility to trading partners to meet the EU  level of  protection in a manner that 
is appropriate to the needs of farmers and producers within the exporting countries ' own domestic 
context.  
8.71.  In light of recent calls for coordinated action to ensure predictable trade flow and to support 
international food secur ity, the international community should be working together to support 
science -based measures that promote a safe and sustainable food supply, and we call on the 
European Union  to join with its trading partners in identifying such mutually beneficial appro aches.  
8.72.  Separately, the United States would like to raise a systemic concern with regard to the 
intervention of several Members  under this agenda item . We believe it is fundamentally unfair for a 
Member to refer back to a longer statement that is submitted on eAgenda, while only raising a few 
points in the actual statement that is delivered in the room.  Members are then put in a 
disadvantageous position of appearing to respond only to those points that were raised in the room 
and not all the points that have  been made by the Member in their posted statement.  Given this 
fundamental unfairness, we would ask that Members give serious consideration to revising their 
approaches so that Members have a full and fair opportunity to respond to a Member 's concerns.  
8.73.  The delegate of India indicated the following:  
8.74.  India shares the concerns raised by other Members on the European Union 's application of 
non-tariff barriers on agricultural products. The EU's unilateral measures are increasingly 
undermining regulatory principles and are not founded on internationally agreed risk analysis 
principles. They do not take into account alternative approaches to meeting regulatory objectives. 
In implementing its SPS  measures , as well as in its new approach to using TBT measures for 
environmental reasons, the European Union seems to impose its own domestic regulatory approach 
onto its trading partners. India observe s with concern that this is becoming a wider trend , as also 
seen under the European Green Deal -related re gulations.  
8.75.  The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
8.76.  We would like to thank the delegations that included this item on the agenda.  Argentina once 
again reiterates its concern and stresses the importance of ensuring that all Members implement 
measures based on risk assessments based on  scientific criteria.  G/C/M/146  
 
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  8.77.  While Argentina shares the European Union's  concern over strengthening the prote ction of 
human health and the environment, it would once again like to underline the importance of 
complying with the provisions of the WTO  Agreements to ensure that measures are not more trade -
restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective.  
8.78.  We are particularly concerned by the number of substances banned by the EU  Commission, 
which have been increasing with each passing day. This situation may have serious consequences 
for a number of WTO  Members, particularly developing countries, whose popul ations and economies 
are highly dependent on agricultural exports, as highlighted in several previous statements.  In 
addition, the approach taken by the EU to establish transition periods for MRLs is too hasty and does 
not take into account the needs and a daptive capacities of third parties.  Lastly, we echo the remarks 
made by several other delegations about the need to take into account the concerns raised, and the 
fact that it is crucial for the EU to use a risk assessment approach in the analysis of regu latory 
changes and to have conclusive scientific studies to determine the various aspects that may affect 
human health and the environment.  
8.79.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
8.80.  Japan  acknowledge s that the European Union is working to take specific measures that are 
already under  way, including the lowering of MRLs to protect pollinator insects and the introduction 
of deforestation -free product rules in order to ensure that the EU  health and environmental 
standards are applied to imported ag ricultural, livestock and fishery products within the framework 
of a mirror clause.  However, in order to build a sustainable food system, it is necessary not only to 
address agricultural products imported into the European Union, but also agricultural prod ucts 
produced around the world. To that end, it is important for each country to work on building a 
sustainable food system that takes into account its own climate and other factors. Japan is of the 
view that EU  health and environmental standards should no t be uniformly applied to imported goods, 
but rather that the efforts of each country should be respected.  
8.81.  The European Commission 's report on the "Application of EU  health and environmental 
standards to imported agricultural and agri -food products " has st ated that the European Union will 
continue to make efforts at the multilateral level to obtain a global consensus on internationally 
agreed standards. If the EU introduces such a new approach, Japan would like to request that it 
ensure that its measures ar e consistent with the WTO Agreements , and that it hold international 
discussions on this matter.  
8.82.  The delegate of Guatemala  indicated the following:  
8.83.  We regret that we must continue to pursue this concern, which has been discussed countless 
times in this Council, as in others. However, the reason we are pursuing the matter is that there has 
been no change to date that would justify removing the concern from the agenda.  We have 
previously asked the European Union for longer transition periods that acknowledge the reality of 
phases in agricultural production, however, the reply was negative. Some sectors are currently 
trialling other substances – tests began in January 2022 and the results will be available by the end 
of 2023 – to assess their impact and effecti veness in a production area. It should be noted that 
production has already fallen by 20% because of the ineffectiveness of the alternative substances. 
This is why  we need to use these substances; because Guatemala is a tropical country with extreme 
temper atures.  
8.84.  The real impact on trade is once again measured in volume, and will continue to grow as 
sectors are left without any alternatives on the market. The consequences in terms of the economic, 
social and rural impact will be irreversible, which is why w e would like to look for alternatives ahead 
of time.  It is important to stress that, today, third -country producers lack the alternatives and 
options that European producers enjoy. For instance, emergency authorizations have been granted 
to resolve issues that European producers are faced with, despite the conditions being the same or 
even worse in tropical countries such as Guatemala.  
8.85.  In view of the foregoing, we would be grateful if the European Union could indicate the actions 
it is taking to ensure that  this measure does not distort trade further than is necessary, and how 
this measure upholds the WTO  principles of national treatment and non -discrimination.  We thank 
the European Union for providing space for dialogue in March this year. However, we are l ooking for G/C/M/146  
 
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  genuine solutions because the issues are real; they are not merely statements made at this 
Organization.  
8.86.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
8.87.  The European Union takes note of the comments by WTO  Members.  The European Union 
provided detailed replies at previous CTG  meetings. Our statements remain valid in their entirety.  
The European Union has engaged extensively, including on the basis of the questions raised in this 
Council as well as at the SPS and TBT  Commi ttees.  The European Union has also engaged bilaterally , 
both here in Geneva and in respective capitals. Recently, on 17  March, a plurilateral meeting took 
place in Geneva which allowed for a frank technical discussion.  
8.88.  The European Union has organi zed info rmation sessions and provided detailed information. 
Since 2019 , we have circulated no less than ten communications to the SPS  Committee in relation 
to our pesticides policy. Another communication is currently being circulated to the SPS  Committee 
and will be available to WTO Members shortly . We refer in particular to 
document  G/SPS/GEN/1494/Rev.2 , circulated in July  2022. The latter document provide s an 
overview of the ongoing review of MRL of pesticides in the European Union . Importantly, it describes 
the review process , as well as how non -EU countries can actively contribute to it.  
8.89.  We will address the issue of emerg ency authori zations under Agenda I tem 10. 
8.90.  The European Union remains open to engage in further discussions on how we can work 
together in order to facilitate trade in agricultural products treated with plant protection products.  
The European Union continue s to provide technical assistance to developing countries and LDCs in 
improving SPS  capacity and market access, directly or through other international organi zations and 
partnerships, such as the WTO -hosted Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF). The EU 
shared detailed information on the SPS -related Technical Assistance it had provided in the period 
2019-2020 at the SPS  Committee ( G/SPS/GEN/1139/A dd.6). 
8.91.  The European Union  remains convinced of our common interest in ensuring that pesticide 
residues are not present at levels presenting an unacceptable risk to human health.  Finally, the 
first Stocktakin g Moment of the 2021  UN Food Systems Summit is taking place later this month. We 
believe that we have a shared interest in making our food systems sustainable by tackling the issue 
of toxic active substances and protecting our citizens ' health.  
8.92.  The Chairpe rson proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
8.93.  The Council so agreed . 
9  CHINA – IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE MEASURES – 
REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA  
9.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Australia.  
9.2.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
9.3.  Australia acknowledges further positive developments in the relationship with China over recent 
months, including agreement to step -up dialogue under the China -Australia Free Trade Agreement 
(ChAFTA) and other platforms to stabili ze the trading relationship.  We share a mutually beneficial 
trading relationship through ChAFTA and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. We 
share the benefits, as do all WTO  Members, of a s table, predictable and open global trading system. 
That is why Australia continues to seek the removal of trade disruptive and restrictive measures, 
and the return to normal trade between our two  countries . 
9.4.  Australia 's concerns are well known. Measures, ap plied without adequate transparency or 
justification, continue to affect trade in a range of Australian products. Some products, namely 
barley, live rock lobsters, bottled wine, hay and meat, have been impacted for well over two  years. 
While these measures  remain in place, we will continue to raise our concerns here and in other 
committees.  We will continue to work constructively with China, in the WTO and under our G/C/M/146  
 
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  Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, to find ways to address remaining trade concerns in a t imely 
way, in the interests of both China and Australia.  
9.5.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
9.6.  The United States shares Australia 's concerns regarding China 's trade disruptive and restrictive 
measures. We note Australia 's report during  the April  meeting that , although some progress has 
been made, China 's measures impeding trade in many other products remain. We remain deeply 
troubled by the information about China 's ongoing measures.  
9.7.  As the United States has noted previously, China 's actions are not isolated to Australia. There 
are many instances of China using economic coercion against WTO  Members in apparent retaliation 
for unconnected bilateral issues.  It is clear that there is a broader pattern of similarly coercive actions 
taken by China against other Members. We are all aware of many instances where China uses, or 
threatens to use, abusive, arbitrary, or pretextual trade actions to pressure or influence the 
legitimate decision -making of sovereign governments.  
9.8.  China claims to uphold the "rules-based multilateral trading system ", but its actions speak for 
themselves. China continues to exploit the rules -based system to its advantage, ignoring or breaking 
rules in order to inflict harm on others to advance its geopolitical and economic ends.  China 's failure 
to adhere to global trade norms and WTO  principles threatens and undermines the rules -based 
multilateral trading system and harms relations between its Members.  
9.9.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
9.10.  As stated in previous meetings, the European Union shares Australia 's concerns with regard 
to the matters Australia is once again raising in this Council on China 's implementation of trade 
disruptive and restrictive measures. Australia has reported some progr ess on a number of products 
and measures, while others have remain ed unresolved over a very long period of time.  In this 
respect, the European Union  wishes to reiterate the points it made before. The form, number , and 
wide-ranging effects which China 's mea sures seem to have are themselves all cause for concern. 
Informal, unpublished , and non -transparent trade restrictions are not in line with the WTO 's rules 
and spirit.  
9.11.  A separate problem is the alleged purpose of the measures in question, which seems coerc ive, 
placing those measures into incompatibility with general international law.  Within the European 
Union, an anti -coercion instrument will come into force in due course. On 6  June 2023, the EU's 
legislature reached a full political agreement on this legi slation.  Also, the European Union pursues a 
WTO dispute with China in relation to a range of measures negatively affecting its trade with China,  
where the facts indicate that there has been such a coercive intention as well.  
9.12.  The delegate of Japan  indicated  the following:  
9.13.  As we mentioned in the previous CTG  meeting,  Japan shares the concerns expressed by 
Australia regarding China 's trade measures, including its trade remedies.  If China implements trade 
measures in an arbitrary manner , as reported, this conflicts with the free, fair , and rules -based 
international trading system. We hope that China will respond to Australia 's concerns in good faith , 
and in a timely manner.  
9.14.  The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
9.15.  New Zealand continues to hold a syst emic interest in the concerns that have been expressed 
on this topic by Australia and other WTO  Members.  As New Zealand has repeatedly noted in a 
number of fora, the multilateral rules -based trading system provides that all Members, regardless 
of their siz e or trading capacity, are subject to the same rights and obligations. We wholeheartedly 
endorse the view that through the WTO we share the benefits, as do all WTO  Members, of a stable, 
predictable , and open global trading system.  This provides the predictability and certainty necessary 
to ensure that trade can take place  efficiently and with the least friction possible.  If Members step 
away from their commitments, or adopt remedies or other measures  provided for under the 
WTO Agreements for unconnected  purposes,  this will undermine the predictability and certainty on 
which the system rests.  The adoption of measures by WTO  Members that cause widespread G/C/M/146  
 
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  disruption to trade and lack transparency have ca used serious concern to New Zealand, including 
the actions taken by China against a range of exports from Australia – some of which remain in 
place.  
9.16.  The delegate of  the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
9.17.  The United Kingdom would like to support Austra lia's concerns about trade restrictive 
measures taken by China. We appreciate that some measures have been lifted and we welcome this.  
It is vital that all WTO  Members adhere to the fundamental principles and objectives of free and fair 
trade that underpin  the rules -based multilateral trading system. Actions that deliberately target 
against goods of certain Members for political reasons risk undermining the integrity of this system 
and lead to harmful consequences for business and citizens worldwide.  The Un ited Kingdom 
welcomes further lifting of these measures and encourages China to engage constructively and 
transparently on these measures to help address the concerns raised by Members.  
9.18.  The delegate of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
9.19.  My delegation thanks Australia for raising this agenda item and for providing updates on the 
latest developments.  We remain concerned about certain of China's trade measures, which have 
impeded the trade interests of many Members. Many of the measures adopted by China s eem to 
have been based on unrelated bilateral issues. Whether these measures are formally imposed or 
taken under the direction or instruction of the Chinese authorities, they have systemic implication s 
that risk undermining the rule s-based multilateral tra ding system and have serious detrimental 
impacts , not only on Australia 's exports , but also on exports from all other Members.  We just heard 
from Australia that there have been positive developments to resolve their issues bilaterally. We will 
be continuou sly monitoring the developments, especially on the systemic aspect of the measures.  
9.20.  The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
9.21.  Canada t hanks Australia for raising this issue again , and for providing an update on the 
situation it faces.  Canada remains concerned with the long -term challenges posed by disruptive and 
discriminatory trade restrictions applied for political purposes.  While we welcome recent positive 
signals from China regarding our own challenges, concerns remain with the lack of bil ateral 
engagement and progress in resolving them.  These measures are inconsistent with established 
international practices and continue to negatively impact Canada 's exports, including for agricultural 
products, as described in detail during past meetings.  To conclude, we encourage all WTO  Members 
to support the rules -based trading system by abiding by their WTO  commitments and applying 
measures in a non -discriminatory and transparent manner.  
9.22.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
9.23.  China  would like t o refer to its statements made at previous meetings of this Council and the 
Committee on Market Access.  China has taken normal inspection and quarantine measures on some 
products imported from Australia with a view to protecting the health and safety of Ch inese 
consumers. These measures are in line with Chinese laws and regulations, international practices , 
and the China -Australia Free Trade Agreement. We also informed Australia of the measures in a 
timely manner.  At present, as some Australia -imported prod ucts concerned have met China 's 
inspection and quarantine requirements, we have resumed the imports of these products.  We hope 
that China and Australia will continue working together to strengthen the bilateral economic 
cooperatio n. 
9.24.  The Chairperson  propose d that the Council take note of the statements made.  
9.25.  The Council so agreed . G/C/M/146  
 
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  10  EUROPEAN UNION – DRAFT COMMISSION REGULATION AMENDING ANNEXES  II AND 
V TO REGULATION (EC) NO.  396/2005 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL AS REGARDS MAXIMUM RESIDUE LEVE LS FOR CLOTHIANIDIN AND 
THIAMETHOXAM IN OR ON CERTAIN PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL, 
AND THE UNITED STATES  
10.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Australia, Brazil, and the United States.  
10.2.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
10.3.  The United States reiterates its concerns that this measure lacks sufficient technical 
justification to fulfil its environmental objective, challenges the expertise of national competent 
authorities, undermines good agricultural practices, and introduces a dangerous precedent for an 
unsubstantiated use of a food safety metric to achieve supposed environmental aims.  Given the 
critical importance of these pesticides for the production of crops  that are exported to the European 
Union  from the United States and other WTO  Members, we are concerned that the reduction of these 
MRLs to the limit of determination (LOD) may pose a significant obstacle to trade.  
10.4.  As the European Union  has previously reco gnized, global environmental challenges cannot be 
achieved by one -size-fits-all approaches that are narrowly tailored to the conditions in one  country 
or region. Once again, the United States urges the EU to pursue a collaborative approach to 
protecting po llinators, using appropriate international venues to advance a shared understanding of 
this global challenge.  
10.5.  In the most recent meetings of the SPS and TBT  Committees, we continued to ask the 
European Union  to explain how the conclusions from these risk a ssessments support the reduction 
of MRLs to the LOD for the impacted products. We further asked the EU to provide any analysis and 
studies that it conducted to review production systems outside the EU. Unsurprisingly, the EU has 
to date failed to provide e ither the explanation or the information we requested.  
10.6.  In the absence of scientific or technical information indicating how the reduction of MRLs to 
the LOD on the impacted products contributes to the objective of protection of pollinators, including 
bees,  the United States requests that the European Union  maintain its current MRLs for clothianidin 
and thiamethoxam.  
10.7.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
10.8.  Australia joins other Members in expressing our concerns about the European Union's 
amendmen ts to its Regulation  396/2005 arising from Commission Regulation  2023/334 regarding 
MRLs for clothianidin and thiamethoxam in or on certain products, consistent with our concerns 
previously expressed in relation to Agenda Item 8 (implementation of non -tariff barriers on 
agricultural products) at this and previous CTG  meetings. The amendments consider environmental 
impacts in exporting countries when setting import MRLs and assessing requests for import 
tolerances. Australia has also expressed these concerns  in the TBT and SPS  Committees.  
10.9.  Australia recogni zes the right of WTO  Members to regulate agricultural imports in a manner 
that protects animal, plant and human health and the environment. However, Members are also 
bound by WTO  obligations, particularly in  relation to undertaking science -based risk assessments 
and ensuring that measures are no more trade -restrictive than necessary.  
10.10.   Australia does not support using MRLs on imported products to achieve environmental 
outcomes outside the EU 's borders. This extra-territorial approach impacts the ability of 
third countries to implement environmental policies consistent with their unique environmental 
circumstances.  National authorities of third  countries are best placed to ensure that pesticide 
application is undertaken in a responsible and sustainable manner in each country, and in accordance 
with their unique environment.  
10.11.   Australia is concerned about the limitations of the 2018  EFSA risk assessments cited by the 
European Union in the draft regulation. These s tudies have been used to support a link between the G/C/M/146  
 
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  lowering of MRLs to the limit of determination and pollinator health. We request that the EU provide 
robust scientific evidence in support of this conclusion.  
10.12.   Australia requests the European Union to  provide information on the health of pollinators in 
all trading countries where the new MRLs are likely to apply. The EU may wish to consider restricting 
the new MRLs to only those countries where it has robust evidence to support its policy objective.  
We look  forward to continuing to engage with the European Union on this important topic.  
10.13.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
10.14.   With regard to the European Union's proposed Regulation, notified as G/TBT/ N/EU/908, 
which withdraws the approval of active substances  thiamethoxan  and clothianidin and restricts the 
maximum residue levels in or on certain products , Brazil would like to recall Article  2.2 of the 
TBT Agreement, according to which each Member "shall ensure that technical regulations are not 
prepared, adopted or applie d with a view to  or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to 
international  trade. For this purpose, technical regulations shall not be more trade -restrictive than 
necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non -fulfilment would create. " 
We understand that the EU's proposal goes against this commitment  as it is out of the scope of the 
TBT Agreement to support unilateral policies aimed  at protecting the environment in third  countries.  
10.15.   Besides the need for further discussion on the sound scientific discussion about the risk s that 
thiamethoxan and clothian idin may have on bees ' population worldwide, Brazil understands that one 
could not expect to extend to all countries of the world trade restrictive measures that do not 
consider the variety of local conditions, including climate and soil. Furthermore, ther e are different 
needs and challenges posed by agricultural production in each country.  
10.16.   The European Union  affirms  that its restrictive measure would seek to avoid the transfer of 
adverse effects on bees from food production in the EU to food production in non-EU countries. 
However, for Brazil, this approach is not properly considering that many countries, including Brazil, 
have rigid technical procedures for approving substances.  
10.17.   Furthermore, Brazil believes that, due to its extraterritorial e ffects, the European Union's  
proposed regulation goes against the rules and jurisprudence of the Multilateral Trading System. To 
highlight how, for Brazil, it remains unclear that the EU's proposed trade restrictions could be 
justified , Brazil notes that thiamethoxan itself is an important substance, used in control strategies 
of pests, such as the citrus psyllid, an insect that transmits the greening disease , which is a pest  
recogni zed by the EFSA as a priority pest for control . Furthermore, in  EFSA's List  of Priority Pests of 
October  2019, greening is listed as a major cause of losses in orange production, not only in Brazil 
but worldwide.  
10.18.   In Brazil, the State of S ão Paulo is the main citrus fruits producer, and it is also where 84% 
of honey production is concentrated. In that State, there is no evidence  of a decline in the number 
of pollinators. On the contrary, honey production in that region has increased by about 136% in the 
last 15  years.  
10.19.   We also have a concern that, if the current proposal for restricting the use of thiamethoxan 
and clothianidin becomes the basis for other similar restrictions , farmers in Brazil and worldwide can 
face serious problems that will affect productivity and their capacity to contribute to global food 
security.  
10.20.   Brazil calls on the European Commission to consider a more balance d approach that 
harmoni zes with the Codex Alimentarius recommendations for clothianidin and thiamethoxan MRLs. 
Brazil also appreciates the o pportunity to provide comments , and would be grateful if they were 
taken into account and replied to before the adoption of the notified Draft.  
10.21.   The delegate of Ecuador  indicated the following:  
10.22.   Ecuador appreciates the interest of Australia, Brazil,  and the United States in including this 
concern on the agenda of this meeting. My delegation concurs with their concern over this matter, 
in line with what we have already stated in this Council and the Committees on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures and Market Access.  We insist that the European Union's regulatory proposal G/C/M/146  
 
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  would distort the objective of Regulation  396/2005, since it changes the focus of protection of the 
"European consumer", adding the unilateral consideration of "environmental factors" from cou ntries 
outside the territory and jurisdiction of the European authorities.  
10.23.   Moreover, the  approach  disregards and disqualifies the adequacy of the regulatory policies 
of other countries, which sovereignly establish the conditions of food production and agri cultural 
activity in their jurisdictions. These extraterritorial objectives of the European Union  appear to be 
inconsistent with the WTO rules; furthermore , they  do not seem to take into account the climatic 
conditions and development of its various tradin g partners.  Several Members have warned that the 
contents of the Green Pact may go against the EU's obligations within the framework of this 
Organization, in particular, the commitments contained in the WTO  Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), in relation to which the EU is required to know whether a conclusive 
risk analysis has been established with respect to the impact on human health and pollinators.  
10.24.   With regard to the same SPS  Agreement, the European Union's  measures may go against 
the principles of non -discrimination against imported products (Article  2.3), transparency (Article  7 
and Annex  B), the need for scientific justification and the use of international standards (Articles  2, 
3 and 5) and control, ins pection , and approval procedures that facilitate trade (Annex  C). 
10.25.   Sustainability rests on three  pillars: social ; economic ; and environmental. The adoption of 
measures on MRLs must consider the negative effects on the other pillars of sustainability on the 
European Union's trading partners, particularly if they are developing countries. With these 
arguments, we once again urge the EU to maintain the current MRLs for third  countries, as import 
tolerances, also taking into consideration the efforts made by our  productive sectors for the economic 
recovery from the crisis caused by the COVID -19 pandemic.  
10.26.   The delegate of Paraguay , addressing Agenda Items  8 and 10,  indicated the following:  
10.27.   My delegation would like to note that we have not received answers from the European Union  
to the questions we presented jointly with the delegations of Colombia, Ecuador,  and Guatemala,  in 
November  2022 at the SPS  Committee, nor in the following meetings of the said Committee , nor in 
the meetings of this Council. We thank the Eur opean Union for the plurilateral meeting held with my 
delegation , and others, to go over some of our concerns, which took place on the margins of the 
SPS Committee meeting last March. We hope that this dialogue can continue in the future , and that 
we can r eceive answers to our questions soon. 
10.28.   Regarding new developments, allow me to note that, given that the SPS  Committee will only 
meet next week, we will present in this Council some of the new questions we have for the European 
Union, noting that some of th em were also presented at the TBT  Committee meeting last month. 
According to the Minutes of the European Commission's Standing Committee on plants, animals, 
food and feed (SCoPAFF) of 10 -11 May 2023, "the Commission presented Revision  4 of the Draft 
Regula tion that clarifies that the MRL for tricyclazole should be established in Annex  2 of the 
Regulation  396 of 2005. [The Commission] proposes to modify the MRL of tricyclazole for rice from 
0.01 mg/kg to 0.09  mg/kg, according to the request for tolerance to the import based on the GAP 
of Brazil, for which EFSA confirmed that the MRL proposed is totally supported by data and is safe 
for consumers." However, many EU  member States did not support the Draft Regulation presented 
by the Commission and the required majority was not reached.  
10.29.   Some of the arguments made by these Members include : (i) that tolerances to imports 
should not be accepted for substances that are no longer approved in the EU; and (ii)  that approving 
them would have a negative impac t on the competitiveness of European rice producers, who cannot 
use the same substances as third  countries to combat certain pests effectively.  
10.30.   In light of this, we would like the European Union to answer the following:  
(a) If a tolerance for imports is pr oposed for an MRL which is, and I quote, "totally supported 
by data and is safe for consumers", according to its own scientific authority, how would 
it be compatible with the obligations under the SPS  Agreement to reject said tolerance 
to imports on the ba sis of "a negative impact on the competitivity of European 
producers"?  
 G/C/M/146  
 
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  (b) If in cases of MRLs set with the objective of protecting human health member States 
are not giving a favourable vote for import tolerances, how can the Commission argue 
that reques ting import tolerances is a feasible way forward for MRLs set with 
environmental objectives (e.g.  for neonicotinoid substances)?  
 
10.31.   In the face of repeated questioning on the excessive use of emergency authorizations by 
EU member States, the EU indicated, in this and other WTO  Committees and Councils, that, in light 
of the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European (CJEU) of 19  January  2023 (Case  C-162/21), 
member States can no longer grant emergency authorizations for plant protection produc ts 
containing banned neonicotinoids. In this regard, we note the following:  
(a) There are several emergency authorizations that were approved prior to the 
CJEU ruling, but whose application covers a period after the CJEU  ruling. Will these 
emergency author izations remain valid for the entire period for which they were 
approved, despite the CJEU  ruling?  
 
(b) On 4 April 2023, the Czech Republic granted an emergency authorization for the banned 
substance thiamethoxam for the period from 20  April to 16  July 2023, claiming as 
justification and as a mitigation measure that "the product will only be used on the crop 
intended for export to countries outside the European Union".  
 
(c) How can the export of the crop for which thiamethoxam has been used be considered 
as a mitigation measure that protects European pollinators?  
 
(d) How is the emergency authorization granted by the Czech Republic compatible with the 
objective that the EU  claims to pursue with Regulation (EU) No.  2023/334, i.e.  to 
protect pollinator populat ions worldwide?  
 
10.32.   We will circulate these and some additional questions for the European Union  under the 
specific trade concerns in the SPS  Committee, and they will be addressed next week.  
10.33.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
10.34.   Argentina fully s hares the European Union's  genuine interest in the strategic importance of 
pollinators for the global environment, especially bees for ecosystems and biodiversity. Likewise, as 
a major food producer, it recognizes the significant contribution they make to agriculture and global 
food security.  This is why, like many other countries, we have taken extreme measures to provide 
producers with the tools needed for adequate plant protection, so as to enable them to continue 
producing food while , at the same time, through good agricultural practices, reducing the effect on 
pollinators from the use of certain products.  However, everything seems to suggest that this 
EU measure will result in the creation of an obstacle undermining the ability of third -country 
producers to export to the EU.  
10.35.   Various studies from around the world show that the decline in the number of pollinators 
has multifactorial causes and that the neonicotinoids clothianidin and thiamethoxam are safe for 
bees when used following good agricultu ral practices (GAP) , and are absolutely necessary to control 
certain pests in intensive  farming.  In this case, the notified measures are not based on a risk analysis 
of the toxicity levels of both neonicotinoids in all food and feed notified , and their con sequent effect 
on human life and health within an EU member  State's territory. Instead, the draft Regulation in 
question appears to be based on assessments of the risk of exposure of bees to these neonicotinoids 
when used outdoors, as the EU 's stated objec tive is to address an environmental concern of a global 
nature, namely the decline in pollinators worldwide. Seen in this light, the draft Regulation would be 
inconsistent with the EU 's obligations, as it has failed to provide a scientific assessment under  the 
terms of the SPS  Agreement (Articles  2.2 and 5.1) to justify the adoption of the measure in question.  
10.36.   Equally of concern to Argentina is that implementing the measure would amount to a 
disguised restriction on international trade, contrary to the prov isions of Article  5.3 of the 
SPS Agreement. This observation is based, on the one  hand, on the fact that the performance of 
pollinators does not depend solely on the two  substances banned by the EU, and, on the other hand, 
on the many emergency uses author ized by the EU under conditions that could not be extrapolated 
to third  countries (or countries of export).  G/C/M/146  
 
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  10.37.   Furthermore, Argentina is of the opinion that there is no clear justification for setting limit 
of quantification (LOQ) values for these neonicotino ids, and that doing so constitutes a disguised 
restriction on international trade under Article  2.2 of the WTO  Agreement. Such a measure is 
disproportionate to the objective it claims to protect and unduly restricts trade as it prevents the 
marketing of an y product that has been treated with these neonicotinoids that may exceed the LOQ, 
even though the EU is unable to demonstrate that MRLs at the level set by the Codex may affect the 
health of consumers, which ultimately is the intended purpose of an MRL.  
10.38.   The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
10.39.   Uruguay would like to thank the delegations of Australia, Brazil and the United States for 
placing this concern back on the agenda.  Uruguay regrets the approval, without substantive 
modifications, of Regulati on 2023/334 modifying the MRLs for clothianidin and thiamethoxam, 
despite the substantive comments and concerns presented by numerous trading partners, from 
different geographical and productive conditions , and at different levels of development, in the 
international consultation process, as well as in recent meetings of the Goods Council and the SPS, 
TBT, and Market Access Committees and, more recently, in the European Union's Trade Policy 
Review.  
10.40.   Uruguay understands that the establishment of MRLs for pesticides is a tool designed to 
safeguard the health of consumers from the risks arising from ingestion a nd, therefore, that it is a 
type of measure that naturally falls within the scope of the SPS  Agreement. For these issues, the 
international reference body is the Codex Alimentarius Commission, where, for the adoption of MRLs, 
health issues are considered e xhaustively, without currently examining environmental aspects in t he 
relevant risk analyses.  
10.41.   Without prejudice to what other rules of the vast and complex European regulatory 
framework indicate, the European Union Regulation N o. 396/2005, which is the mai n and specific 
rule on MRLs for pesticides in food and feed, defines MRLs in its Article  3(d) as: "the upper legal 
limit of concentration of a pesticide residue in food or feed established in accordance with this 
Regulation, based on good agricultural prac tice and the lowest consumer exposure necessary to 
protect all vulnerable consumers".  In such a legal provision , there would appear to be a convergence 
with the view expressed by Uruguay and many WTO  Members on the nature of MRLs, which is in 
line with the  EU's own repeated assertion , at least until March  2022, that, as a matter of principle, 
concerns regarding the setting of MRLs for pesticides, and any specific issues related to their 
application, are matters to be discussed in the SPS  Committee, and not in the TBT  Committee.  
10.42.   Uruguay has serious doubts as to the relevance and legal basis, in Community law and 
WTO rules, for raising reductions of MRLs to the level of determination on the grounds of 
"environmental issues of global concern" or issues other th an human health.  
10.43.   As regards environmental aspects, although we recognize their importance, we understand 
that they are outside the process of setting MRLs, and that they are , and must be , addressed by 
each country in its territory through the appropriate t ools, taking into account its production and 
regulatory system, and its environmental and political conditions. In this regard, we note that, in 
Uruguay, the phytosanitary products affected by this Regulation are already regulated by the 
competent national  authority in order to have a correct, safe and judicious use, as part of a National 
Environmental Plan focused on good agricultural practices.  
10.44.   Uruguay shares the interest in promoting the protection of pollinators, in harmony with the 
protection of the en vironment and biodiversity, and supports the existence of regulatory 
environments based on scientific criteria, so as not to jeopardize food safety and not to constitute 
barriers to trade. In this regard, Uruguay reiterates its willingness to work cooperat ively with other 
Members, including the European Union, to find mechanisms to achieve these objectives without 
unnecessarily restricting trade, while ensuring the conservation of the environment and the 
protection of human, animal and plant health.  
10.45.   Like ot her delegations, we are also concerned about the continued granting of emergency 
authorizations to producers in EU  member States for the use of these substances, which would seem 
to contradict the objective expressed by the European Union for the introduct ion of this measure, in 
addition to being discriminatory in nature. Along these lines, we would be interested in receiving an G/C/M/146  
 
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  update from the EU as to how it envisages that the consideration of emergency authorizations for 
the use of these substances, and eventually others that may be subject to restrictions at the 
community level, will be affected in light of the recent ruling of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) of 19 January  2023, which considers them illegal in certain cases. We support the 
questions raised by Paraguay in relation to this issue, and await the European Union's responses in 
this regard.  
10.46.   In sum, Uruguay considers that MRLs should be established on the basis of a risk 
assessment, with the objective of protecting the health of  consumers, and not for environmental 
protection purposes. In this regard, Uruguay wishes to emphasize that sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures adopted or applied by WTO  Members must conform to the objectives set out in 
paragraph  1 of Annex  A of the SPS  Agreement, and the other substantive obligations of that 
Agreement, such as those relating to international harmonization, avoidance of unnecessarily trade  
restrictive approaches, and transparency, as well as the obligations under the GATT  1994.  
10.47.   The delegate  of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
10.48.   New Zealand refers to statements previously made to this Council on this specific trade 
concern.  New Zealand once again shares and supports the concerns raised by other Members 
regarding the European Union's  adoption of legislation, originally notified in 
document  G/TBT/N/EU/908 , which seeks to address pollinator decline by lowering the MRLs of the  
active substances clothianidin and thiamethoxam to the limit of quantification.  
10.49.   New Zealand, like other Members, remains concerned with the European Union 's approach, 
including its proposed mechanism of implementation. New Zealand reiterates that unilaterally 
imposing prescriptive import measures, in a manner such as those notified, may not successfully 
achieve the intended goal, and could create unjustified trade barriers for trading partners.  New 
Zealand encourages all WTO  Members to address global environmental matters, including 
sustainable pesticide use, by working with trading partners in the appropriat e multilateral fora.  
10.50.   The delegate of Costa Rica  indicated the following:  
10.51.   Costa Rica has already made reference to its position on this issue  under Agenda I tem 8, 
and request that our earlier intervention be reflected in the minutes with reference to CTG  ID 136. 
10.52.   Costa Rica shares the concerns that have been raised by other Members today and on 
previous occasions in this Council, and continues to co -sponsor and support this agenda item and 
document  G/C/W/767/Rev.1 . We consider that the concerns raised over the European Union's 
regulatory approach remain relevant , and that the resolution of these concerns remains urgent, 
especially for developing countries with tropical climates, as is the case of Costa Rica.  
10.53.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
10.54.   India thank s the delegations of Australia, Brazil,  and the United States  for raising this item 
on the agenda. T he European Union's policies on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures have already 
been discussed under Agenda Item 8. The rich discussion showed Members ' wide-ranging concerns 
on EU  policies on administering its policies related to Maximum Residual Limits.  This particular 
agenda item has been discussed in the Committee on Agriculture, the Committee on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures , where we raise d this as a separate item , and the Committee on T echnical 
Barriers to Trade . It is unfortunate that the European Union  is using the environment as a pretext 
to manage MRL -related issues , and without taking into account the unique climatic, environmental 
and soil conditions which prevail in different parts of the world.  
10.55.   The EU  member States have been in the past given emergency authorizations to use the 
same substances as a derogation, a practice which is clearly discriminatory in nature.  We also note 
with concern that the list of active substances which are being regulated in this unilateral fashion 
may also cont inue to grow, as may be the case after the European Union 's new notification in 
document  G/TBT/N/EU/982 . G/C/M/146  
 
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  10.56.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
10.57.   The European Union's lowering of the MRLs for the tw o active ingredients for the protection 
of pollinator insects outside the region is clearly different from the previous method of setting MRLs 
for the protection of human life or health, and deviates from the international harmonization on 
MRLs.  The EU claims that this measure is a TBT  measure on the grounds that it is not directly related 
to consumer health issues and is intended to protect the environment, but we believe that when 
bringing in a new approach to measures that affect third  countries, such as  MRLs, it is necessary to 
have full discussions with third  parties , including at the SPS Committee meetings.  
10.58.   The European Union  states that if there is no risk to pollinators, it is possible to apply for 
import tolerance, but details should be clarified.  Given that the environmental conditions in each 
country are different, and that the authorities in each country set the method of use of pesticides in 
consideration of those  environmental conditions, the European Union  should not make decisions on 
whether o r not to use pesticides in third  countries.  
10.59.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
10.60.   The European Union takes note of the interest by several Members on this issue. We refer 
to our past intervention on this issue where we provided detail s about our approach.  As previously 
communicated, the European Union  takes into account environmental objectives when deciding 
about setting MRLs for substances no longer approved in the EU due to environmental concerns of 
global nature, while respecting WTO  standards and other international obligations.  We have 
explained in previous meetings the rationale for the measures and refer to these explanations. The 
environmental objectives of global concern that this Regulation targets are those relat ed to the 
protection of pollinators.  
10.61.   These two  neonicotinoid substances , clothianidin and thiamethoxam , are known to 
contribute significantly to the decline of pollinator populations. Their intrinsic properties lead to 
adverse effects on pollinators, indep endent of where they are used geographically.  The European 
Union  considers that currently there is no alternative to the lowering of the MRLs of clothianidin and 
thiamethoxam which would be less trade restrictive and equally contribute to the objective of 
protecting pollinators. We have been mindful of the trade impacts that the new Regulation may 
have. This is why the application date of the Regulation is deferred to 36  months after entry into 
force (instead of six months, which is the standard period give n in the EU). This means the 
Regulation will therefore become applicable only at the beginning of 2026.  
10.62.   In the meantime, the European Union  has already several programmes to assist 
third countries, in particular developing countries, to comply with EU  legislation and to build capacity 
and knowledge in the SPS  field. We invite countries interested in receiving SPS -related technical  
assistance to approach the EU  Delegation in their country or the relevant directorates of the 
European Commission.  
10.63.   The European Union  also acknowledges that third  countries may face production conditions 
and pest pressures different from those in mainland Europe. Therefore, import tolerances can be 
granted to active substances not authori zed in the EU provided that the submitted in formation 
demonstrates that the use is safe to pollinators.  On emergency authori zations in the European Union , 
the Commission is still considering the implications of the recent judgment of the CJEU for the 
granting of other emergency authorizations.  
10.64.   The European Union remains open to engage in discussions about how we can work together 
in order to facilitate trade of agricultural products treated with plant protection products.  
10.65.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
10.66.   The Council so agreed . G/C/M/146  
 
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  11  CHINA – ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES FOR REGISTRATION OF OVERSEAS 
PRODUCERS OF IMPORTED FOODS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
AND THE UNITED STATES  
11.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Australia, the European Union, and the United States.  
11.2.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
11.3.  As part of China 's Regulation on Registration and Administration of Overseas Manufacturers 
of Imported Food, promulgated as Decree  248, Australia appreciates the ongoing cooperation 
between the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry and the General Administration of 
Customs of China (GACC) to work through the implementation of the China Import Food Ent erprise 
Registration (CIFER) system.  However, Australia remains concerned that China 's measures have 
made trade more restrictive and complicated than necessary , thereby adding additional cost to fulfil 
China 's food safety objectives where these costs might  have otherwise been avoided.  
11.4.  Australia has previously raised its concerns on several occasions in both the Committee on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS)  Measures and the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).  
Australia is concerned at the resourc e and labour -intensive costs borne by exporters and exporting 
countries ' competent authorities to comply with registration in the CIFER  system. Australian food 
exporters are ready and willing to comply with China 's food safety requirements, but businesses and 
governments need clarity and a reasonable time -frame to make changes to comply with the 
measures. It should be noted that Australia, like other Members , does not have access to  the 
information collected in the CIFER  system , thereby reducing the transpa rency of this listing process.  
11.5.  In light of the above, Australia requests that China 's customs authorities continue to adopt a 
flexible approach to implementation and consider Australian applications in a consistent and timely 
manner.  Australia remains will ing to work collaboratively with China to ensure that food safety is 
upheld while facilitating undisrupted trade.  
11.6.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
11.7.  The European Union reiterates its concerns over the implementation of "administrat ive 
measures for registration of overseas producers of imported foods ", namely  Decree  248 of the 
General Administration of Customs of the People 's Republic of China (GACC).  Most recently, in 
May 2023, the European Union  raised its concerns in a joint letter to the Permanent Mission of the 
People 's Republic of China in Geneva. The EU co -signed the letter with five  other WTO  Members.  
11.8.  In general, EU  applicants are still facing many issues in the registration process, mostly due 
to recurrent technical problems with the online registration system (CIFER), making the electronic 
submission of documents cumbersome, time -consuming and uncertain, be it to apply for new 
registrations and/or to amend or renew existing registrations.  More specifically, over the last weeks, 
the European Union expressed concerns with the deadline of 30  June 2023 to provide supplementary 
information for existing registrations , as it continues to cause uncertainty for EU  traders. As 
mentione d in the joint letter of May  2023, as well as in a bilateral meeting with China held on the 
margins of the TBT  Committee meeting in June  2023, the EU has called for a pragmatic approach in 
the implementation of Decree  248 that will allow establishments to continue exporting beyond the 
deadline of 30  June 2023.  
11.9.  To avoid any food trade disruption due to Decree  248, the European Union urges China to 
simplify and facilitate the process to apply for new registrations and/or to amend or renew existing 
registratio ns. The European Union  would also like to thank China for the constructive dialogue which 
has allowed it to address several questions related to implementation of Decree  248, and which has 
so far helped to avoid major trade disruptions.  
11.10.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
11.11.   The United States remains deeply concerned with China 's lack of response to requests for 
scientific justification or explanation of how Decrees  248 and 249 will address food safety and public 
health concerns.  The lac k of guidance provided by China, and inconsistency in China 's G/C/M/146  
 
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  implementation and enforcement of the measures , is causing considerable confusion for exporters 
and competent authorities, which is leading to negative trade impacts.  In addition, we again note 
that China 's General Administration of Customs (GACC) appears to require foreign competent 
authorities to maintain information in China 's online system for each registered facility from their 
country producing certain categories of products. Such a requirement creates tremendous 
administrative burdens on foreign competent authorities without a clear connection to food safety 
outcomes. GACC should ensure that all facilities are able to self -register without foreign competent 
authority involvement or u nreasonable information requirements.  We maintain our availability to 
work with China on this issue and look forward to receiving the information that we have requested.  
11.12.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
11.13.   Canada welcomes China 's recent changes  to the China Import Food Enterprise Registration 
(CIFER)  system to facilitate the registration and renewal process by addressing some of the 
challenges, such as uncertainty and delays, faced by foreign establishments.  Canada also 
appreciates the efforts b y Chinese authorities to discuss CIFER  functionality issues with us, including 
the information session on the margins of the June  2023 TBT  Committee meeting.  While Canada 
appreciates the efforts made to facilitate the registration and renewal process, we c all on China to 
maintain consistent and timely channels of communication to allow for effective dialogue on this 
important issue, and to continue to provide flexibilities to ensure that the CIFER  system does not 
become a barrier to trade and an unnecessary  administrative burden to food exporters to China.  
11.14.   The delegate of  the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
11.15.   The Republic of Korea would like to reiterate its concerns with China 's administrative 
measures for registration of overseas producers of impo rted foods, and refer to our statement 
delivered at previous meetings.  Korea recognizes China 's efforts to ensure food safety and its right 
to take measures necessary for protecting its citizens from related risks.  However, Korea remains 
concerned about th e expansion of products to be managed by the authorities of exporting Members.  
Accordingly, Korea once again urges China to improve the registration process for overseas 
producers and to provide scientific evidence for its measures introduced in accordance  with the 
SPS Agreement.  The Republic of Korea stands ready to further engage with China to resolve these 
issues constructively . 
11.16.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
11.17.   My delegation has persistently expresse d its concerns regarding China 's administrative 
measures on the registration of overseas manufacturers of imported food.  Our concerns have been 
explained in detail at various occasions, including at the most recent TBT  meeting. We would like to 
reiterate the following points.  
11.18.   Firstly, we  urge China to designate and provide an enquiry point that those business facilities 
can directly engage with to address their specific concerns about the online registration system, and 
seek solutions to overcome them. Moreover, while China has indicated that technical guidance, 
regulatory interpretations and supporting documentation have already been provided, we would 
urge that this information be placed on a publicly accessible website so that it can be accessed 
directly by overseas facilities.  
11.19.   Secondly , we urge the GACC (General Administration of Customs of China) to comply with 
the requirements as set out under Article  5.2.2 of the TBT  Agreement. These include transparency 
and the requirements for the applicants to be informed in a precise and complete  manner of all the 
deficiencies in their applications, allowing for any necessary corrections to be made.  
11.20.   Thirdly, we urge China to clarify the ambiguity of HS  code categorization and the scope of 
the products subject to this measure.  
11.21.   Fourthly, we would li ke to reiterate the concerns constantly expressed by many other 
Members regarding the unnecessary and unjustified burdens imposed on the competent authorities 
of exporting Members with respect to 18  categories of food products. We urge China to reconsider 
its approach based on the scientific evidence and based on the "less trade restrictive principle ". G/C/M/146  
 
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  11.22.   Finally, despite seeking clarification from China several times through both bilateral channels 
and this forum, we have yet to receive a sufficient and detai led response. We therefore urge China 
to engage in a constructive dialogue to resolve the above -mentioned difficulties.  
11.23.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
11.24.   We note that there are many uncertainties in the registration procedures related to China 's 
"Regulations for Management of Registration of Overseas Manufacturers of Imported Foods ", which 
impose a significant burden on overseas authorities and business operators . For example, the online 
registration system may be changed suddenly without prior notice.  We request that China improve 
the operations and the transparency of procedures related to the implementation of these 
regulations so that the procedures do not become an excessive burden on business operators.  
11.25.   The delegate of  the United King dom indicated the following:  
11.26.   The United Kingdom continues to support Australia, the United States, and the European 
Union  in their concerns on China 's administrative measures for the registration of overseas 
producers.  The UK has now spoken numerous times on this concern both here and at the 
SPS Committee so we will keep this statement short and refer to our previous statements on this 
issue.  The UK remain s concerned that the application of these measures is disproportionate to the 
risk posed by many of the  products and the UK would again urge China  to take a proportionate 
approach to the application of administrative measures, taking into account the UK 's own rigorous 
controls and processes for ensuring the safety of food destined for domestic and internati onal 
markets.  
11.27.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
11.28.   We would like to refer to the statements made in previous meetings in this Council and the 
latest statement we made at the 91st TBT Committee meeting in June.  We would like to highlight 
that sinc e the relevant measures came into effect on 1 January  2022, China  has made great efforts 
to actively engage with the M embers concerned , both bilaterally and multilaterally , to ensure the 
relevant measures will be implemented in a smooth manner. Up to now , more than 80,000  overseas 
manufacturers , from 165  economies , have been registered ; and 229  overseas competent 
authorities , from 130  economies , have joined the China  Import Food Enterprise Registration 
(CIFER)  system. We would like to express our sincere appreciation for the strong cooperation made 
by the competent food safety authorities of relevant Members.  
11.29.   During the 91st TBT Committee meeting in June, my colleagues from the competent Chinese 
authorities orga nized an information session to further clarify the relevant measures and responded 
to Members ' questions. We also had bilateral discussions with a few Members on this matter. We 
thank the relevant Members for attending the information session and having b ilateral talks with us. 
We will continue to engage with relevant Members on this matter.  
11.30.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
11.31.   The Council so agreed . 
12  CHINA  – COSMETICS SUPERVISION AND ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (CSAR) – 
REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA , THE EUROPEAN UNION , JAPAN , AND THE UNITED STATES  
12.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Australia , the European Union , Japan , and the United States . 
12.2.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
12.3.  Australia  respects the right of Members to implement technical measures for legitimate policy 
purposes and in accordance with their WTO obligations. Australia , however, remains concerned that 
measures under China 's Cosmetics Supervision and Administration Regulatio n (CSAR) and various 
implementing regulations, which entered into force on 1  May 2021, are more stringent and 
restrictive than necessary for low -risk cosmetics.  G/C/M/146  
 
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  12.4.  Australian exporters are concerned about stringent and inflexible measures under the 
CSAR  frame work, particularly regarding testing and registration requirements, and requirements to 
provide detailed information on production processes and other aspects of their intellectual property. 
In that context, we ask that China  pursue its objective of ensuri ng the safety and quality of imported 
cosmetics using less trade -restrictive measures. We also request that China  clarify why it has 
maintained its requirement for mandatory animal testing of cosmetics products to be used on 
children.  
12.5.  We reiterate that Australia is a reliable supplier of high -quality and safe cosmetics products 
domestically, and to international markets. The Australian Government looks forward to working 
with China  on CSAR  implementation.  
12.6.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the fol lowing:  
12.7.  The European Union  would like to thank the Chinese authorities for extending the deadline 
for registration of cosmetics ' raw materials and finished products until 1  January  2024. We also 
welcome the announced changes in terms of providing more flex ibility to producers when registering 
raw materials ' safety information.  At the same time, the EU would like to reiterate the concerns it 
already shared in previous meetings of this Council , since 2021 , with regard to the Cosmetic 
Supervision and Administr ation Regulation in force since 1  May 2021. Because our concerns are well  
known, we refer to our past statements on this issue.  We urge China  to address these concerns 
expeditiously.  
12.8.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
12.9.  Japan has continued to express its concerns on China 's Cosmetics Supervision and 
Administration Regulations as well as the related Implementing Regulations.  We call for the following 
measures to be taken to ensure that trade restrictive measures are not more res trictive than 
necessary in accordance with Articles  2.2 and 5.1.2 of the TBT  Agreement . First, we call for the 
acceptance of test results of overseas inspection institutions that have the same qualifications and 
capabilities as the domestic cosmetics regis tration inspection institutions in China ; and second, for 
the approval of test methods that are internationally recognized by OECD, ISO, etc. in order for the 
regulations not to be overly regulated.  We request that the basis for efficacy claims evaluation be 
determined by cosmetics registrants/notifiers based on specific wording of claims and scientific 
validity, that the scope of application of the "Guiding Principles for Evaluating Equivalent Efficacy " 
be expanded, and that the concept of read -across be i ntroduced.  We also request that no more 
detailed information be required on cosmetic ingredients than necessary for cosmetics registration, 
even for products containing high -risk ingredients or for new products.  Regarding labelling  rules, we 
request that t he labelling  of cosmetics should not be required to be labelled  by the manufacturing 
company, but by the person who registered or notified the cosmetics, and that ingredients with a 
content of 1% or less can be listed in no particular order, in accordance with international practice.  
Furthermore, we request that , in the future, when implementing relevant laws and regulations, an 
appropriate period of time be allowed between the publication to the implementation of each relevant 
law and regulation in accorda nce with Articles  2.12 and 5.9 of the TBT  Agreement so that cosmetics 
registrants and notifiers can bring their products into compliance with the new relevant laws and 
regulations.  
12.10.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
12.11.   It is unfortunat e that despite the United States  and other WTO  Members raising significant 
concerns with the Cosmetics Supervision and Administration Regulation (CSAR) and its 
implementing measures in the past 12 TBT Committee meetings and six  meetings of the C TG, China  
has not sought to work with the United States  and other WTO  Members to reach resolution.  
12.12.   The United States  maintains its serious concerns with CSAR and its implementing measures, 
and request s that China  address specifically:  unequal treatment for imports;  overly burdensome and 
disproportionate information requirements;  lack of procedures to ensure the protecti on of 
confidential and proprietary information;  duplicative in -country testing; and  continued challenges 
with transparency in the development and implementation of the CSAR  measures.  G/C/M/146  
 
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  12.13.   We do thank China  for Announcement No. 34 issued by the National Medical Products 
Administration (NMPA) in March  2023 on the management of cosmetics ingredient safety 
information, which extended the transition period for providing ingredient safety information and 
reduced the filing requirements for registration filings before 2024. These steps will lessen the 
immediate burden for companies, but do not address overarching concerns.  
12.14.   We find it very concerning that China , in its floor statements for the CTG and TBT  Committee, 
continues to assert that the many long -standing concern s with CSAR raised by WTO  Members are 
due to a misunderstanding of the requirements. As CSAR progresses into implementation, it is 
increasingly clear that China 's requirements are burdensome, treat imports unequally, and do not 
address WTO  Members ' concern s as to the protection of companies ' intellectual property. The United 
States  asks that China  discontinue its practice of reiterating CSAR 's requirements and instead 
acknowledge and resolve concerns.  
12.15.   Finally, we refer China  to the previous statements of th e United States  and many other 
WTO Members for our unresolved concerns, and suggestions as to how these concerns could be 
addressed.  
12.16.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
12.17.   New Zealand  has taken into account the response given by China  at the previous C TG. We 
reiterate our well -documented concerns from previous meetings, as well as during our recent Joint 
Trade and Economic Commission meeting, regarding China 's regulatory system for cosmetics. We 
continue to urge China  to consider additional measures to allow for:  the exemption of animal testing 
requirements through non -government regulatory authority -issued GMP  certification or other trade 
facilitative mechanisms for providing product assurances;  and providing flexibil ity in respect of 
product testing requirements. In particular, we encourage China  to accept test reports from 
accredited laboratories situated outside of China ; and  further limitations on product disclosure 
requirements, particularly in relation to sensiti ve information – i.e. limited to that which is required 
to assure product safety in China 's domestic market, so as not to compromise intellectual property.  
New Zealand  looks forward to engaging further with China  on its C SAR to address these issues.  
12.18.   The de legate of  the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
12.19.   The Republic of Korea  shares concerns expressed by other Members regarding China 's CSARs 
and its implementing measures, and refers to our statement delivered at previous meetings .2 Given 
our mutual interest in the cosmetics industry, Korea once again urges China to resolve this issue 
promptly, while underlining the importance of continuing our dialogues and exchanges regarding 
cosmetic regulations via both bilateral and multilateral channels.  The Rep ublic of Korea stands ready 
to further engage with China to resolve these issues constructively.  
12.20.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
12.21.   This issue was discussed at last month's TBT Committee meeting and I do not have any 
further update on it. For the sake of time, I will not repeat the same, long and technical statement 
we made at the 91st TBT Committee meeting. Therefore, we suggest that the relevant Members 
refer to our statement ma de at the 91st TBT Committee meeting in June.  
12.22.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
12.23.   The Council so agreed . 
 
2 See documents  G/C/M/143 , paragraphs  8.31-8.34, G/C/M/144 , paragraphs  33.30 -33-31, and 
G/C/M/145 , paragraphs  25.21 -25.22  G/C/M/146  
 
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  13  CHINA – SUBSIDY TRANSPARENCY AND CHINA 'S PUBLICATION AND INQUIRY POINT 
OBLIGATIONS UNDER CHINA 'S PROTOCOL OF AC CESSION – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, 
CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED 
STATES  
13.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, the Unite d Kingdom, and the United States.  
13.2.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
13.3.  As this Committee is aware, over the years, the United States and other Members have had 
numerous concerns with respect to the transparency of China 's industrial subsidy regime.  In China 's 
Protocol of Accession, China agreed to publish all trade -related measures in a single journal, which 
China has designated as the China Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Gazette, or 
MOFCOM  Gazette. However, China r arely publishes its subsidy measures in the MOFCOM  Gazette, 
especially what it calls "normative documents ", as well as measures from sub -central  governments. 
And sometimes, as we have now learned, these measures are not made public at all.  
13.4.  In its Protocol of Accession, China also agreed to "establish or designate an enquiry point 
where, upon request of any individual, enterprise or WTO  Member all information relating to the 
measures required to be published may be obtained. " 
13.5.  Several years ago, we came across references to five  legal measures, two relating to fuel 
subsidies for fishermen, one relating to the development of China 's distant water fishing fleet, and 
two relating to the semiconductor industry.  Unable to find these measures in the MOFCOM  Gazette, 
or anywhere else, we submitted a request to China 's WTO  enquiry point in April  2020, over 
three  years ago now.  
13.6.  Under its Protocol of Accession, China agreed with respect to its enquiry point that "Replies 
to requests for information shall generally be  provided within 30  days after receipt of a request. In 
exceptional cases, replies may be provided within 45  days after receipt of a request. Notice of the 
delay and the reasons therefor shall be provided in writing to the interested party. " 
13.7.  It has been th ree years now since our original request. China 's refusal to provide a written 
response – as we have seen in several contexts over the years in the Subsidies Committee – 
indicates to us that China realizes that its arguments cannot withstand the light of d ay. 
13.8.  Four months after our request, a Ministry of Commerce representative did speak with the 
US Embassy and stated that China would not provide a copy of one of the requested measures 
because it was soon to be replaced by a new measure , and furthermore, none of the other measures 
would be provided because they are not covered by China 's WTO  commitments . 
13.9.  And, indeed, the one  measure that was to be replaced was eventually replaced , but it was 
18 months after our enquiry point request. Obvi ously, if China believes that it does not need to 
provide a requested measure if the measure may be replaced at some future point in time, the 
enquiry point obligation, as interpreted by China, would be nearly entirely meaningless.  
13.10.   As to the other measures , it is interesting to note that China is now arguing that the legal 
measures at issue are neither "laws, regulations or other measures " nor measures "pertaining to or 
affecting trade in goods ". 
13.11.   As to the form of the legal measures covered, China 's Protoco l of Accession enquiry point 
commitment is written very broadly, covering "laws, regulations and other measures ". It is difficult 
to imagine more inclusive language.  Moreover, it has been observed in the dispute settlement 
context that "any act or omission  attributable to a WTO  Member can be a measure of that Member ". 
Surely the requested measures – one of which is from China 's State Council, the highest executive 
office in the Chinese government – is easily included under such a broad definition.  
13.12.   As to the  substance of the legal measures, China 's Protocol of Accession makes clear that 
all measures "pertaining to or affecting trade in goods " are covered. The two  subject matters of the 
measures at issue are semiconductors and fisheries – two heavily traded go ods. These measures G/C/M/146  
 
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  concern the development of China 's fisheries and semiconductor sectors, and would certainly appear 
to meet the standard of "pertaining to or affecting trade in goods ". 
13.13.   It is important to understand the historical context for the enquiry  point obligation to which 
China agreed. According to the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, the creation 
of the enquiry point was meant to address the concerns of WTO  Members at the time of China 's 
accession with regard to "the difficu lty in finding and obtaining copies of regulations and other 
measures undertaken by various ministries as well as those taken by provincial and other local 
authorities. " Twenty -two years after China agreed to establish an enquiry point, we are now learning 
that not only is there difficulty in finding legal measures in China, but that some legal measures – 
even ordinary fishery subsidy measures – are not obtainable anywhere in the public domain, almost 
as if they were secret governm ent documents. Is there any other WTO  Member that operates in this 
manner?  
13.14.   Recently, China stated that it has faithfully fulfilled its transparency obligations and that the 
government has been promoting information disclosure and policy transparency. Our e xperience in 
making a very simple request using China 's enquiry point demonstrates otherwise. And we can only 
wonder what else it is that China is not showing us, despite the transparency obligations, upon which 
WTO Members insisted, and to which China agr eed. 
13.15.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
13.16.   Australia attaches considerable importance to the WTO  notification and transparency 
obligations, particularly relating to subsidies, which stem from both the Agreements and the 
obligations made by Mem bers under their Protocols of Accession.  Transparency remains critical to 
the proper functioning of the WTO and underpins the Subsidies Agreement. It creates certainty for 
all our exporters in being able to compete fairly in international markets.  It is fo r the subsidizing 
Member to promptly and comprehensively notify its measures and not a burden of discovery placed 
on other WTO  Members.  Australia therefore urges China to fulfil the transparency commitments 
made as part of its Protocol of Accession.  
13.17.   The de legate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
13.18.   The European Union  wishes to reiterate its support to the concerns raised by other 
co-sponsors regarding China 's compliance with its transparency obligations under its Accession 
Protocol.  The EU refers to its past statement on the matter. We urge China to comply fully with its 
Member -specific commitments by publishing all trade -related measures , as it agreed to do , and to 
respond to requests for information under the enquiry point without undue delay.  
13.19.   The delegate of  the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
13.20.   The United Kingdom continues to support concerns raised by other co -sponsors on China 's 
compliance with its transparency obligations under its Accession Protocol.  The UK has now spoken 
numerous time s on this concern , both here and at the SCM  Committee , so we will keep this 
statement short and refer to our previous statements on this issue.  After much discussion , China is 
still failing to notify all trade measures on the MOFCOM  Gazette, and to provide Members with clarity 
on how they should engage with its enquiry point.  As we requested during the last  meeting of the  
SCM Committee , we once again ask that China please provide advice to Members on what it regards 
as within the scope of its obligations,  as well as to provide clear guidance on how Members can seek 
information through its enquiry point.  We once again hope they will engage constructively and 
transparently on the concerns raised both here and at the SCM Committee.  
13.21.   The dele gate of Japan  indicated the following:  
13.22.   Japan has repeatedly pointed out in the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures that if transparency in subsidy disbursement is not ensured, distortions in subsidy 
disbursement will be encouraged, which may  lead to problems such as excess production capacity. 
In particular, various Members have expressed concerns about the transparency of Chinese subsidies 
and the possibility that they may not be notified, but it is difficult to say that China is taking suff icient 
action in response to the points raised.  We would like to request that China also fulfil its notification G/C/M/146  
 
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  obligations under the Subsidy Agreement and its transparency obligations agreed to in the Accession 
Protocol, and ensure the effectiveness of t he mechanisms that contribute to improving transparency.  
13.23.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
13.24.   Canada has repeatedly echoed the concerns of other Members regarding China 's compliance 
with WTO  transparency obligations.  When it acceded to the WTO i n 2001, China accepted 
comprehensive transparency obligations, and Canada is disappointed that China continues to not 
fulfil these obligations.  The proper functioning of the multilateral trading system depends on 
Members upholding their notification and tr ansparency requirements, and it is imperative that all 
Members comply with notification obligations and responses to enquiries in accordance with  
WTO rules.  
13.25.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
13.26.   As noted in the April  meetings of the C TG, New  Zealand considers transparency as critical 
to the proper functioning of the WTO, and attaches considerable importance to adherence by all 
Members, including China, to WTO  notification and transparency obligations, particularly in relation 
to subsidies, in cluding under their Protocols of Accession.  New Zealand therefore urges that all 
Members, including China, fulfil these obligations in a timely manner, including any Member -specific 
commitments. Adhering to these obligations helps build certainty for expor ters and makes an 
important contribution to the successful functioning of the rules -based international trading system.  
13.27.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
13.28.   We take note of the statements made by relevant Members. We regret that this issue has 
been added to the agenda multiple times despite China having  already provided its explanations to 
the US through the US embassy in Beijing , and in this Council.  China attaches great importance to 
compliance with the WTO rules, and its fulfilment  of its WTO obligations. We would like to make a 
few further points on this matter.  
13.29.   First, China 's commitment on establishing an enquiry point reflects the importance China 
attaches to transparency. When China joined the WTO in 2 001, it was not convenient to get relevant 
information in China at that time due to the limited ways and channels to access information. Within 
this context, China made a commitment to establish an enquiry point. The commitment we made is 
above the general  level of WTO  Members ' commitments in this regard, reflecting China 's willingness 
to provide relevant information to stakeholders, including WTO  Members , with the greatest sincerity 
and to the greatest extent possible.  
13.30.   Second, the Chinese government has be en continuously enhancing the transparency of our 
policies over the years. For example, China 's Government Information Openness Regulations, 
formulated in 2007 and revised in 2019, has stipulated the scope of government information 
disclosure, which includ es trade policies. In recent years, with the rapid development of internet and 
telecommunication technology, it has become more convenient to access relevant information in 
China.  
13.31.   Third, with regard to the policy documents that the United States enquired a bout, and as we 
said in previous meetings, the fishery development policies have been published on the official 
website of the State Council of China. The other policies are neither laws, regulations and other 
measures affecting trade, nor the information which falls within the scope of information disclosure 
of relevant Chinese laws and regulations. My colleagues who work in the enquiry point have 
explained this to the ir US colleagues in Beijing , and we have also clarified this matter multiple times 
in this Council.  
13.32.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
13.33.   The Council so agreed . G/C/M/146  
 
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  14  INDIA – ORDER RELATED TO REQUIREMENT OF NON -GM CUM GM FREE CERTIFICATE 
ACCOMPANIED WITH IMPORTED FOOD CONSIGNMENT – REQUEST FROM THE UNITED 
STATES  
14.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the United States.  
14.2.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
14.3.  The United States continues to reiterate serious concerns with India 's measure mandating 
"non-GM (genetically modified) origin and GM  free certificates " for certain agricultural imports into 
India,  notified on 2 September  2020, as G/TBT/N/IND/168 , and a later notified entry -into-force date  
of 1 March  2021.  To date , India has not responded to our questions regarding its rationale for 
requiring a non -GM certificate on a consignment basis.  The United States must str ess that, while 
India's authority to regulate "GM" foods is neither new nor in question, the requirement of a 
non-GM certificate for import of all varieties of the 24  crops from a competent authority on a 
consignment basis was first  ordered in 2020 and cau sed trade disruptions to US  apple and rice 
shipments in 2021.  The United States requests that India immediately revoke this trade restrictive 
Order and engage in further dialogue with the United States to find mutually agreeable alternatives 
that do not un necessarily impact trade.  
14.4.  The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
14.5.  Canada thanks the United States for placing this item on the agenda.  Canada wishes to 
reiterate its concerns raised at previous meetings of the Council for Trade in Goods, as well as  the 
recent SPS and TBT  Committees, regarding India 's non -GM Order, which mandates that a 
non-genetically modified (non -GM) or GM  free certificate accompany imported consignments of 
24 imported food products.  We are concerned with the lack of scientific support for India 's measure 
given the broad scientific consensus that GM  products are as safe as their conventional counterparts. 
It remains unclear to Canada how India 's non -GM certification requirement will fulfil its intended 
objective.  We ar e equally concerned with the undue burden and negative commercial impact the 
measure creates on exporting countries through unjustified certification requirements.  Canada 
requests once again that India suspend the implementation of this measure and permit trade to 
continue without a GM -free certificate requirement.  This would enable India to engage with Members 
to discuss and consider alternate, less trade -restrictive approaches that would meet India 's 
objectives and minimize impacts on trade.  
14.6.  The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
14.7.  Argentina reiterates its concern over this measure, and once again we would like to stress 
that there is no scientific explanation to support it. As we have explained on previous occasions in 
this Council and in the TB T Committee, Argentina is concerned that this requirement would set a 
precedent for other products or even their derivatives to be included in the future, and that this 
requirement could hinder trade.  
14.8.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
14.9.  Japan ex presses its concern that there might be a possibility that this would constitute a 
trade-restrictive measure that is not based on scientific evidence. We request that agricultural 
products exported from exporting countries that exercise proper control of t heir genetically modified 
agricultural products be excluded from this requirement.  
14.10.   The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
14.11.   Uruguay wishes to thank the delegation of the United States for placing this concern back 
on the agenda. Uruguay recognizes India's right to take measures to ensure food safety and the 
health of its population. However, there should be a logical connection between the proposed 
measure and the objective pursued, and in this case, beyond the responses provided by India so 
far, th ere does not seem to be a technical justification for the application of the proposed certification 
measure, taking into account the legitimate objective cited, which is to ensure the health and safety G/C/M/146  
 
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  of imported food. In light of this objective, we wish to reiterate that, in our opinion, this measure 
should be notified to the SPS  Committee.  
14.12.   We consider it appropriate to recall, once again, the international consensus that genetically 
modified products approved by exporting countries on the basis of Codex recommendations on risk 
assessment methodology are equivalent to their conventional counterparts.  Likewise, Uruguay 
wishes to stress the importance of Members establishing measures based on scientific principles, 
and particularly that these be applied with  the objective of minimizing negative effects on trade, in 
line with the provisions of the SPS and TBT  Agreements.  
14.13.   Finally, we wish to reiterate the questions raised by Uruguay at the last meetings of this 
Council and the TBT and SPS  Committees regarding t he relationship between the measure referred 
to in this PCE and the one notified by India on 5 January  2023 to the TBT and SPS  Committees, 
under G/TBT/N/IND/240 –G/SPS/N/IND/290 , with respect to the Draft Food Safety and Foo d 
Standards (Genetically Modified Food) Regulations, 2022, on which we are still awaiting response.3 
14.14.   We remain attentive to the comments and responses that the Indian delegation may provide 
in response to the concerns of Members, which have been expressed  both in Geneva and in New 
Delhi for more than two  years by numerous delegations.  
14.15.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
14.16.   My delegation would like to thank the delegation of the United States for placing this item 
on the agenda.  We report that th ere have been no new developments on this specific trade concern  
since the last SPS  Committee meeting in March, nor at the last TBT  Committee meeting last June. 
We hope that India will be able to report on what actions have been taken to address the trade 
concerns of its partners on this issue, which was first introduced at the SPS  Committee in 
November  2020.  In the event that India is unable to provide an update and answers to the specific 
questions presented on previous occasions, we hope that it will do so next week at the 
SPS Committee.  We are particularly interested in understanding the relationship between the draft 
Standard notified on 5 January of this year under G/TBT/N/IND/240  and G/SPS/N/IND/290  and the 
certification requirement that is the subject of this specific trade concern.  
14.17.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
14.18.   This issue is being discussed in the TBT Committee , and in the TBT Committee's last 
meeting , in June  2023, we reiterated o ur position on this measure.  The FSSAI has notified the 
requirement of a non-GM certificate to accompany an imported food consignment, which is only an 
assurance provided by the competent authority of the exporting country that the food crops which 
are not  approved by GEAC (Genetic Engineering Approval Committee) are not being imported in to 
India,  and that the importer has to provide the certificate as per the format notified by FSSAI.  
14.19.   Some countries have also established tolerance and traceability requirem ents for 
adventitious presence of GMOs, while others are in the process of developing or adopting legislation. 
The threshold for labelling of adventitious presence of approved GM  material in non -GM grain varies 
from 0.9% (e.g., in the EU) to 5% (e.g., in Japan). Noting the restriction of GM  foods in India, the 
 
3 "In this regard, we wish to recall that the Order dated August 21, 2020, laying down the requirement 
of certificate for import of consignments of any of the 24 crops detailed in its Schedule, states in its point 2 
that such requirement is adopted to ensure that only non -GM food crops are imported into India while 
regulations relating to products subject to genetic engineering or modification as laid down in section 22 of the 
Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 are being developed.  
The draft Standard notified on January 5, 2023 refers in its recitals, among other legal provisions, to 
section 22 of the Food Safety and Standards Act 2006, which is the same as the one referred to in the Order of 
August 21, 2020. In this regard, in line with what was discussed bilaterally in the margins of this meeting, we 
would like to request India if it c ould clarify to us the relationship between the two measures, if there is one, 
including whether or not the recently notified draft corresponds to the Standard referred to in the Order dated 
August 21, 2020.   
If yes, does this mean that the certification r equirement under the said Order will cease to apply once 
the draft Standard notified on January 5, 2023, in its current or amended form, comes into force? If no, could 
India please inform this Committee on the status regarding the development of regulation s relating to products 
subject to genetic engineering or genetic modification as set out in section 22 of the Food Safety and 
Standards Act, 2006."  G/C/M/146  
 
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  tolerance limit for adventitious presence of GMOs at 1% is permissible in imported food crops , and 
the same was notified vide the FSSAI  Order dated 8  February  2021.  
14.20.   Accordingly, import is permissible if the adventitious presence of GM  content is less than the 
notified tolerance limit. To date, several of India's trading partners , like the United States , Australia, 
Canada, Türkiye , Iran, China, Thailand,  and the European Union, including Italy, Germany, and 
France,  are already providing the requisite certificate and trade is going on smoothly.  The regulatory 
body, FSSAI , is open to interact ing with trading partners to discuss said matter in order to facilitate 
the trade.  
14.21.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
14.22.   The Council so agreed . 
15  INDIA – RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN PULSES – REQUEST FROM 
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE UNITED STATES  
15.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Australia, Canada, the European Union, a nd the United States.  
15.2.  The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
15.3.  Since 2018, the use of trade restrictive and domestic support measures for dry peas have 
had a significant negative impact on exporters to India.  Canada 's exports of dry peas have decrea sed 
from 1.3  million ton nes before the measures were implemented in 2018 , to 627  tonnes last year.  
Our significant concerns with India 's policy measures therefore remain unchanged. Canada again 
calls for India to immediately cease its trade restrictive measures and to implement alternative, 
WTO-consistent measures that promote a predictable and transparent import regime for pulses.  We 
will continue to closely monitor India 's unjustified trade restrictive and distorting measures.  
15.4.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
15.5.  The United States shares the concerns regarding India 's quantitative restrictions for select 
varieties of pulses.  As we have stated previously , in the Committee on Import Licensing  (CIL), the 
Committee on Agric ulture ( COA), and the CMA, we repeat our requests for information on how the 
measures reflect India 's WTO  commitments, and when and how the measures will be ended.  We 
continue to urge India to consider less trade restrictive requirements and to notify futu re relevant 
measures and regulations in a timely manner.  
15.6.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
15.7.  The European Union fully shares the concerns expressed by other Members over India's 
quantitative restrictions on certain varieties of puls es. We call on India to review the measures and 
to ensure they are WTO -consistent.  Last but not least, we encourage India to consider the permanent 
removal of its quantitative restrictions on pulses. The certainty and stability of the import regime for 
certain varieties of pulses would have a positive impact both on India 's food security and the global 
pulses market.  
15.8.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
15.9.  Australia thanks India for their response to Australia 's questions raised during the previo us 
meeting of the CTG, held in April  2023.  Australia once again encourages India to consider the 
longer -term benefits to its own food security of permanently removing their quantitative restrictions 
on all pulses. More permanent, open trade settings would be more effective at building greater 
resilience in India 's supply of pulses, provide greater certainty to suppliers and reduce risk -related 
costs. For consumers, more open trade settings would mean a more reliable supply of pulses and 
lower  prices, with clear benefits for food security.  G/C/M/146  
 
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  15.10.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
15.11.   As we have stated on previous occasions in this Council, this measure affects two of the 
main pulses exported from Argentina to India: yellow peas and mung b eans. As in previous 
statements, and as clearly articulated by Australia, Argentina reiterates its concern over the 
uncertainty that this measure creates for its exporters, and requests that it be reviewed by the 
Indian authorities.  
15.12.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
15.13.   India would like to thank the intervening delegations for their continued interest in this issue. 
As previously stated, the measures adopted by India are undertaken for the purpose of maintaining 
food and nutritional security. This is an area of great importance to our economy and the policies on 
imports are regularly reviewed and updated. The trade measures applicable to pulses are in 
compliance with the relevant WTO  agreements and specified procedures of these agreements.  
15.14.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
15.15.   The Council so agreed . 
16  EGYPT – HALAL CERTIFICATION MEASURE, BASED ON EGYPTIAN STANDARD 
ES 4249/2014 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR HALAL FOOD ACCORDING TO ISLAMIC 
SHARIA – REQUEST FROM CANADA, TH E EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE UNITED STATES  
16.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Canada, the European Union, and the United States.  
16.2.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
16.3.  The United State s acknowledges and thanks Egypt for delaying the implementation of its new 
Halal requirements for dairy products; we understand the most recent delay is now in effect until  
30 September  2023. However, the United States continues to share the concerns expressed by 
multiple Members regarding Egypt 's implementation of the Halal certification requirements.  The 
United States and other Members continue to call on Egypt to provide the implementi ng procedures 
needed for exporters to be able to understand and comply with the measure.  Likewise, the United 
States continues to express concern with Egypt 's intention of utilizing the services of only one  Halal 
certifying company without allowing for oth er certifying companies to participate. The effects of 
maintaining this policy would likely hurt Egyptian consumers.  The United States requests that Egypt 
suspend any new Halal requirements until the requested information has been made available and 
certifier issues have been resolved. These efforts will provide the assurance that US and other 
exporters need in order to confidently ship Halal-compliant dairy products to Egypt.  
16.4.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
16.5.  The European Union re iterates its concerns with regard to Egypt 's requirements on Halal 
certification applying as of 1  October  2021 based on the Egyptian Halal standard  4249/2014. The 
EU is concerned about the negative impact of this measure on food and beverages imports to Eg ypt. 
The EU would like to invite Egypt to notify the Halal standard  4249/2014 to the WTO before its 
finalization, as well as the comprehensive list of products that should be Halal certified.  Once the 
Halal standard is finalized and adopted, the EU would r ecommend introducing a transition period of 
at least six months to enable operators to adjust to new conditions.  
16.6.  The European Union has noted that the requirement for dairy products was suspended until 
30 September by the latest Addendum of 16 June. We ver y much appreciate this flexibility from 
Egypt 's authorities, which is very helpful to economic operators.  
16.7.  The European Union  would also like to invite Egypt to reconsider the decision to grant the 
right to certify the compliance with Halal requirements to a single company, IS  EG Halal, and to 
provide for a Halal certification system that would allow multiple, well -established certification 
entities, in accordance with the international best practices. Re -certification by IS  EG Halal of G/C/M/146  
 
- 44 - 
 
  products from establishments already certified by other companies is an unnecessary duplication 
and would lead to longer time to market and higher costs for consumers.  
16.8.  The European Union would like to ask Egypt to consider keeping the Halal certification and 
labelling v oluntary for dairy products, to pursue the legitimate objective of ensuring reliable 
information without unduly hindering trade flows. Consumers should be able to decide whether to 
buy Halal -certified food or not, based on clear labelling.  
16.9.  Finally, the European Union would like to ask Egypt about the concrete steps envisaged to 
provide comprehensive information about the new measures and clear written and publicly available 
guidance to stakeholders, including a detailed description of the certification proc edure, its duration, 
costs, and required documents, as well as the process for registration of suppliers.  
16.10.   The European Union is ready to work with Egypt on solutions that would prevent the negative 
impact this measure would have on food and beverages impor ts to Egypt.  
16.11.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
16.12.   Canada continues to be concerned with Egypt 's Halal certification requirements for all 
imported food and beverage products.  Canada understands Egypt 's objective to ensure that Egyptian 
consumers are confident that they are buying and consuming Halal -certified products. However, 
such measures should not create unnecessary barriers to international trade or be more 
trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil that objective.  
16.13.   Canada welcomes Egypt 's delayed implementation of the Halal certification for dairy products 
to 30 September  2023. However, Canada requests that this measure be suspended until the 
following questions are answered. Canada requests further information on procedures to rece ive 
certification, fee structures, details on audits, and specificity on how these requirements will be 
implemented.  
16.14.   In light of these concerns, Canada refers to our previous statements made at this Council 
and urges Egypt to reconsider the implementation of this measure. In particular, Canada invites 
Egypt to consider a Halal certification system that would allow multiple, well -established certification 
entities, in accordance with international best practices.  Canada is open to meeting with Egypt 
bilatera lly to have an open and transparent discussion, further clarify the requirements under this 
new measure, and consider the impact it may have on trade. Until then, we respectfully request that 
Egypt suspend the implementation of the measure.  
16.15.   The delegate of  Paraguay  indicated the following:  
16.16.   On behalf of my delegation, I would like to thank the delegations of Canada, the European 
Union,  and the United States for including this item on the agenda. We would like to report that , 
since the last SPS  Committee meet ing in March and the last TBT  Committee meeting in June 
concerning this trade concern , there have been no new developments.  We hope that Egypt will be 
able to report on what actions have been taken to address the trade concerns of its partners on this 
topic, which was first  introduced in the TBT  Committee in November  2021.  
16.17.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
16.18.   New Zealand has taken into account Egypt 's comments on this issue at the previous C TG 
meeting in April, and the recent meeting of the TBT Committee. However, we remain concerned 
about the ongoing uncertainty this measure is generating for exporters.  
16.19.   New Zealand notes that a final Halal standard has not yet been implemented or published. 
We are grateful for Egypt 's recent notification to the TBT  Committee regarding an extension on the 
implementation of Halal requirements for milk and dairy products until 30  September  2023. We 
further request that Egypt suspend these requirements until the implementation of a final Halal 
standard which clarifies the scope of dairy products covered and requests that Egypt provide a 
reasonable period of 6 to 12 months once this has been consulted, implemented and notified to the 
WTO as a final standard to allow exporters time to understand and comply with the new standard.  G/C/M/146  
 
- 45 - 
 
  16.20.   We look forward to receiving the document regarding implementation issues referred to by 
Egypt in the last C TG meeting, which we understand is being prepared by the General Authority for 
Veterinary Services. We also join other s in calling for a draft technical measure that sets out any 
new requirements , including for registration, auditing and labelling that accompany Egypt 's new 
Halal standard. We also request that Egypt specify requirements of transparency around any Halal 
certification fees, to provide certainty for importers and exporters, and to ensure that these are 
applied neutrally between producers, including domestic and foreign producers, in accordance with 
WTO rules. We request that these are also notified to the WTO  with sufficient time to enable Members 
to provide feedback and for business es to implement the new requirements.  
16.21.   We invite Egypt to clarify the process for new Halal certification bodies to be approved for 
certification of exports to the Egyptian market, in accordance with international best practice. 
Allowing multiple, well -established, certification bodies to certify products as Halal will make Egypt 's 
Halal regulations less trade restrictive, reduce the impact of duplication and other unnecessary costs 
on consumers, help resolve supply chain issues, and promote Egypt 's overall food security.  
16.22.   The delegate of Egypt  indicated the following:  
16.23.   Egypt thanks the United States, the European Union, Canada, New Zealand,  and Paraguay 
for their ongoing interest i n this issue and their continuous interest in the matter. We recognize 
Egypt's right to adopt the Halal certification requirements, which we deem necessary and appropriate 
to achieve our legitimate policy objective , while remain ing consistent with our obligati ons under the 
WTO Agreements.  
16.24.   Recogni zing the comments that our trading partners raised at the last CTG meeting, and in 
the bilateral meetings we had with them, Egypt would like to point out that , since the introduction 
of the requirements  with respect to milk and dairy products by the General Organization for 
Veterinary Services, Egypt has introduced a number of facilitating measures extending the timeline  
to abide by the requirements by more than  a year now. This has provided the business operators an 
appropriate period of time to adapt to the set of requirements.  
16.25.   It is also important to note that , since its initial notification, Egypt has been clear that the 
certification body currently recogni zed by the General Organization  for Veterinary Services,  is 
ISEG Halal. In fact, a lot of exporters have indeed approached ISEG  Halal and been issued the Halal 
certification successfully.  
16.26.   The WTO  Agreements have explicit regulations on all WTO  Members to protect their 
legitimate interests according to their own regulatory autonomy. It is also important to clarify that 
the Egyptian standard, ES 4249, does not , and shall not , provide for any supervision requirements 
for a specific certification bo dy. 
16.27.   Through the ePing, Egypt has submitted addendum  G/TBT/N/EG Y/313/Add.5 , for the 
purpose of extending the ti me-period during which imports of milk and dairy products that are no t 
accompanied by a Halal certification were allowed to enter into Egypt,  until 13 September  2023, as 
a trade facilitating measure, and in response to the request made in this respect. However, during 
the period  starting from April  2023 until now, no imports of milk and dairy products have been 
denied entry if not accompanied by a Halal certificate. More over, the relevant authorities are 
preparing a decision on the requirements for importing Halal milk and dairy products to clarify the 
points and issues raised in this respect. The decision shall clarify the scope of products and the 
conformity assessment procedures for issuing Halal certificates.  
16.28.   I would also like to remind the CTG that Egypt has taken measures to ease the application 
of this Decision, giving particular attention to the consideration and interests of our trading partners. 
It is worth notin g that we received specific questions from some Members , and that we have provided 
answers  and replies to many of those questions. Our colleagues  in Capital are working on the 
remaining questions. We will be sharing those answers in due course.  
16.29.   Finally, I  would like to stress that Egypt is committed to continuing its bilateral exchanges 
on the matter with all interested trading partners , and to taking into account the ir concerns , as 
appropriate . Egypt stress es our commitment to the transparency requirements  under the 
WTO Agreements.  G/C/M/146  
 
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  16.30.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
16.31.   The Council so agreed . 
17  PANAMA – ONIONS AND POTATOES HARVEST LIFE AND SPROUTING REQUIREMENTS 
– REQUEST FROM CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES  
17.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Canada and the United States.  
17.2.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
17.3.  The United States continues to raise its concerns on Panama 's technical regulations for onions 
and potatoes. Despite continued attempts to constructively engage with Panama on this issue, 
Panama continues to be unrespons ive and has yet to provide the scientific justification for these 
measures.  We maintain our availability and commitment to work with Panama to refine the measures 
so that they meet Panama 's legitimate objectives while not being unnecessarily restrictive.  In the 
interim, we reiterate our request that Panama provide the scientific justification for its measures or 
suspend implementation of both the potato and onion regulations until technical discussions have 
concluded.  
17.4.  The delegate of Canada  indicated the fo llowing:  
17.5.  Canada continues to be concerned with Panama 's quality requirements for fresh potatoes, 
implemented in February  2020, which are having a direct impact on Canada 's ability to export 
potatoes to Panama.  Canada would like to refer to its previous int ervention at the April  2023 
CTG meeting on this item and ask it to be included in the meeting record as the situation has not 
changed.4 Canada respectfully requests again that Panama pause the enforcement of these 
requirements to allow for additional technical dialogue to occur and ensure that Panama 's quality 
standards do not continue to create unintended barriers to our mutually beneficial bilateral trade in 
agriculture.  
17.6.  The delegate of Panama  indicated the following:  
17.7.  Panama thanks the delegation s of the United States and Canada for their comments. We take 
note of their concerns. Panama continues to carefully study the comments received from our trading 
partners , and we have been open to listen to their concerns. Panama reaffirms its com mitments on 
transparency and notes that the Panamanian authorities continue to address this issue in conjunction 
with the relevant governmental bodies. We reiterate that any updates will be duly shared and notified 
to this Council . 
17.8.  The Chairperson  proposed  that the Council take note of the statements made.  
17.9.  The Council so agreed . 
18  KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, THE 
STATE OF KUWAIT, OMAN, AND QATAR – SELECTIVE TAX ON CERTAIN IMPORTED 
PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNIO N, SWITZERLAND, AND THE UNITED 
STATES  
18.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the European Union, Switzerland, and the United States.  
18.2.  The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
18.3.  Switzerland has rai sed this issue in the CTG for many years now , together with the United 
States and the European Union . Since the selective tax entered into force in June  2017 in the 
 
4 Document  G/C/M/145 , paragraphs  38.4-38.5.  G/C/M/146  
 
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  first Gulf Cooperation Council ( GCC) member State, we provided information and expressed ou r 
concerns, as well as requested more details on the next steps from our GCC  partners.  
18.4.  Working closely with our GCC  partners  over several years , a first positive step was reached  
with the adoption of the principle to switch from an ad valorem  excise tax to a tiered volumetric tax , 
as indicated by the delegation of the Kingdom of Bahrain during the CMA  meeting of May  2019. 
Since then, we have received only little information about the concrete next steps and , in particular , 
on the implementation date from our GCC  partners. We are fully aware that this reform is a very 
complex process that takes time.  However, we would appreciate more transparency on the timeline 
and the content of t he tax reform , as well as when the implementation will take place.  Switzerland 
remains ready to hold a meeting with the delegation s of Oman and  the Kingdom of  Saudi Arabia,  as 
well as with the GCC  authorities in charge of the reform. We encourage the GCC t o be more 
transparent and to engage with interested Members.  Switzerland hopes that this issue can be 
resolved in the near future.  
18.5.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
18.6.  With regard to the GCC "Treaty on Excise Tax " of December  2016, the European Union would 
like to reiterate the importance of harmonizing the implementation of the Excise Tax law and the 
need for a close engagement with private industry stakeholders on the process for revising the tax.  
The European Union  welcomes informa tion that the present GCC  excise tax system is under review , 
and that a volumetric tax model based on international best practice is being considered based on 
the "Tax Reform Study ". The European Union would consider it important that any transition from 
the present to a new tax regime include a provision to equali ze the tax rate of energy drinks with 
other soft drinks , with an immediate effect.  The European Union is ready to continue engaging with 
the GCC on this important issue.  
18.7.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
18.8.  The United States, along wi th Switzerland, the European Union and Japan, circulated 
questions in March  2021 to GCC  member State governments regarding the status of the selective 
tax on beverages.  While we appreciate the information provided during the last Council meeting , as 
well a s separate discussions with member State officials since then , we note that we still have yet 
to receive written responses to the questions from March  2021, and ask these Members to update 
us as to when such responses to those questions will be provided.  As we have conveyed before, we 
request a substantive update on revisions to the GCC  excise tax model and its implementation plan 
under the GCC  Unified Excise Tax Agreement, and note the importance of timely engagement with 
interested parties regarding this issue.  
18.9.  The delegate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  indicated the following:  
18.10.   On behalf of the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar and the State of Kuwait; I would like to thank  the 
delegations of the United States, Switzerland,  and the European  Union for the interest they attach 
to the GCC's Excise Regime, and for their communication on the application of the Excise Tax and 
carbonated soft drinks , malt beverages, energy drinks, sport drinks and other sweetened beverages.  
18.11.   As for the timeline of the ongoing process of the new GCC  Excise Tax model  and its 
implementation, let me restate once again that the revision of the Excise Tax on beverages is a 
complex exercise that req uires significant efforts, extensive coordination , and comprehensive 
studies. The GCC  Working Group  on Tax Issues  is sparing no efforts to complete this exercise in 
order to submit to the GCC  member States the appropriate results and high standards for the  Excise 
Tax model.  
18.12.   In conclusion, the GCC member States are follow ing the  appropriate procedures and timeline 
for the revision of their Excise Tax Regime s. Once the process is completed, the relevant information 
will be shared with the WTO  Members.  
18.13.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
18.14.   The Council so agreed . G/C/M/146  
 
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  19  UNITED STATES – TRADE DISTORTING AND DISCRIMINATORY SUBSIDIES MEASURES 
OF THE INFLATION REDUCTION ACT OF 2022 – REQUEST FROM CHINA  
19.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
China.  
19.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
19.3.  We would like to refer to the statements we made in previous meetings in this Council.5 Since 
the IRA came into effect on 1 January  2023, it has caused significant disruptions to the industry 
chain and supply chain of the Electric Vehicles industry. In order to obtain the subsidies provided by 
IRA, a large amount of investment related to the EV  industry has been allocated to Nort hern America, 
resulting in a shift of industry and technology outflows from other Members , and has triggered a 
transatlantic subsidy race . For example, when the European Union recently released the Net -Zero 
Industry Act and Critical Raw Materials Act in response to the IRA.  
19.4.  We believe that the "siphon  effect " caused by the subsidy race will lead to distortion and a 
mismatch of resources in the global electric vehicle market. It would significantly reduce developing 
Members ' opportunity and capacity to acces s clean energy products and relevant investment and 
technologies, which will not be conducive to achieving the global emission reduction targets. The 
subsidy race may also weaken developing Members ' capacity to address global challenges and wider 
the gap b etween rich and poor.  
19.5.  We take note that the United States  believes that the IRA is an important bill to address 
climate change , and that the relevant subsidies are naturally justified. We are happy to see the US 
increase its public investment with a view t o promoting green transformation, but subsidies to 
address climate change should be non -discriminatory, consistent with WTO  rules, and should not 
lead to a "race to the bottom competition ", which will disrupt the supply chain and negatively impact 
developing Members ' green development.  
19.6.  Finally, we call on the United States  to eliminate discriminatory, distorting , and 
WTO-inconsistent subsidies in its IRA. We also call on the WTO to strengthen its role in monitoring 
this matter.  
19.7.  The delegate of  the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
19.8.  The Russian Federation would like to thank the delegation of China for raising this concern. 
The Russian Federation reiterates its statement on t his issue, made during the previous meeting of 
the CTG.  The Inflation Reduction Act introduces discriminative measures on a wide range of products 
originating from non -eligible WTO  Members and undermines global trade in goods over the entire 
supply chain. The legislation aims to exclude products from certain WTO  Members from participation 
in supply chains, provoke international trade fragmentation , as well as destabilize trade and 
investment flows.  
19.9.  What makes the law even worse is that , in order to administ ratively choose with whom to 
trade, the US  Administration aims to conclude bilateral arrangements in the form of special raw 
materials pacts with a number of WTO  Members that provide the status of a  Free Trade Agreement  
(FTA) partner to such Members , and m ake their products eligible for US  tax credits.  
19.10.   The Inflation Reduction Act is yet another US  initiative that explicitly violates the WTO  rules, 
in particular, the m ost-favoured-nation and national treatment provisions of the Agreement on 
Trade -Related Investment Measures and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 
Members taking such steps merely neglect fundamental WTO principles , despite the ir speeches in 
favour of support ing the multilateral system.  
 
5 Document s G/C/M/144 , paragraphs  9.2–9.31 and  G/C/M/145 , paragraphs  15.2–15.4. G/C/M/146  
 
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  19.11.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
19.12.   On this issue, rather than repeat our previous statements, w e would simply like to refer 
Members back to our statements  from previous meetings . 
19.13.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
19.14.   The Council so agreed . 
20  UNITED STATES – A SERIES OF DISRUPTIVE POLICY MEASURES ON THE GLOBAL 
SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY CHAIN AND SUPPLY CHAIN – REQUEST FROM CHINA  
20.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
China.  
20.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
20.3.  We continue to express serious concern over the disruptive and discriminatory measures 
taken by the United States with regard to the semiconductor industry.  The United States Department 
of Commerce recently issued a Notice of Funding Opportunity CHIPS  Incentive Program – 
Commercial Fabrication Facilities. We believe some measures in this notice may violate WTO  rules 
and severely distort the market.  
20.4.  The notice sets the prioritization and selection fac tors for selecting applications for funding. 
One factor is to strength en the intent to use domestically produced iron, steel, and construction 
materials. This may result in local content subsidies which are not consistent with the 
SCM Agreement.  The notice  indicates that an applicant must demonstrate how the CHIPS  Incentives 
requested will incentivize the applicant to make investments in the United States that would not 
occur in the absence of the CHIPS  Incentives. It seems that the applicant 's investment d ecisions 
may not be based on market orientation and commercial logic, because those investments would 
not occur without the CHIPS  Incentives.  
20.5.  As for funding, the CHIPS  Direct Funding is up to USD 38 billion; and the CHIPS  Loans and 
CHIPS  Loan Guarantees ar e up to USD 75 billion in direct loan or guaranteed principal. For a specific 
project, the total amount of a CHIPS  Incentives Award may reach 35% of project capital 
expenditures. The eligible projects may also get additional funding from the State and loca l 
Governments , and may enjoy a 25% tax credit. It is highly likely that these massive subsidies and 
incentives will significantly distort the market.  
20.6.  We also take note that the United States Department of Commerce released a Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking f or the guardrails, which strictly limits recipients of funding from investing in  
the expansion of semiconductor manufacturing in foreign countries of concern. The proposed rules 
define significant transactions based on a monetary level of USD 100,000 and d efine material 
expansion as increasing a facility 's production capacity by 5%. If you compare these figures with 
the massive subsidies provided and the ambitious goal of production capacity set by the US in the 
CHIPS and Science Act, the double standard is  clearly evident.  
20.7.  To protect its own interests, the United States has taken various measures to exclude China 
and some other Members from the semiconductor industry chain and restrict China 's semiconductor 
development. These are typical examples of "Cold W ar mentality ", "zero-sum game " and "trade 
bullying ". The "small yard, high fence " approach the US is taking is detrimental not only to China 's 
interests, but also to the interests of the US itself and other Members. It has severely undermined 
the global semiconductor industry chain, violated market principles, disrupted the normal order of 
international trade and investment, and negatively affected the rules -based multilateral trading 
system.  
20.8.  The United States has long been an advocate of free trad e, and often criticizes other Members ' 
so-called non -market practice on many occasions. However, the US  action speaks for itself. The 
above -mentioned measures clearly show that the US is implementing non -market practice solidly 
now. Finally, China calls on  the WTO to strengthen the monitoring of the relevant measures that 
may violate WTO  rules.  G/C/M/146  
 
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  20.9.  The delegate of  the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
20.10.   We thank the delegation of China for putting this item on the agenda. The Russian Federation 
is deepl y concerned by the protectionist course taken by the United States in the semiconductor 
industry.  The United States  is seeking to secure its own economic interests and global leadership 
positions by introducing a wide range of trade restrictions on semicon ductor and electrical 
component markets. Disruptive and restrictive measures introduced by the US include , in particular , 
restrictions on export s from the US of semiconductors. Measures also involve anti -competitive 
arrangement s with Japan and the Netherla nds to jointly restrict advanced chip -manufacturing 
equipment exports to China.  
20.11.   US trade restrictions are not aimed only at China. The record number of unilateral measures 
imposed against Russia – including bans on the supply of semiconductor products – leaves no doubt 
about the geopolitical nature of the US ' unlawful actions, aimed at putting up barriers to prevent 
access to innovative products as well as to undermine technological progress and development 
prospects for the economies of certain countries.  
20.12.   The u nilateral imposition of politically motivated trade restricting measures clearly 
demonstrate s the new reality that no Member is safe from the same unlawful treatment.  Washington 
continues to abuse national security exceptions stipulated by the WTO  provisions to justify 
discriminatory measures aimed at restrict ing fair competition. Such actions undermine the 
functioning of an open and fair multilateral trading system.  
20.13.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
20.14.   In the interest of time , I will not give an overview of the CHIPS  Acts and the transparency 
that the United States has undertaken to date, but we are going to refer Members back to our 
previous statements from earlier meetings.6 With regard to China's comments on the subsidies a nd 
market distortions, the United States believes that its contemplated support is consistent with US  law 
and its international commitments. Contrary to China's speculation, the evaluation criteria do not 
contain a requirement to use domestically produced inputs, the Subsidies Agreement does not have 
obligations with regards to restrictions of entities receiving government support, and the 
US Department of Commerce will implement certain restrictions to ensure that those who receive 
CHIPS  funds cannot compr omise national security.  
20.15.   Those national security -based restrictions are described in more detail in the Act and in a 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking published in the Federal Register on 23 March, which also solicited 
comments on the proposed rule. Entities c an choose whether or not to apply for incentives through 
the CHIPS  program and thus be subject to the national security limitations. And, for reasons that 
have been made multiple time s in various WTO  bodies, we are not providing a substantive response 
to Russia's intervention.  
20.16.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
20.17.   The Council so agreed . 
21  EUROPEAN UNION – SWEDEN 'S DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION ON 
5G EQUIPMENT – REQUEST FROM CHINA  
21.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
China.  
21.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
21.3.  We continue to express our serious concern over the Swedish Post and Telecommunications 
Authority 's decision to ban Huawei and ZTE from supplying 5G  equipment to Swedish mobile firms 
and remove the equipment of these companies that has already been installed by 1 January  2025.  
To date, Sweden has not yet provided any credible explanations and evidence to prove that the 
 
6 Please see documents G/C/M/144 , paragraphs  10.24 to 10.29 , and G/C/M/145 , paragraphs  16.8 and 
16.9.  G/C/M/146  
 
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  5G products of Huawei and ZTE pose so -called "national security " threats to Sweden. We are deeply 
concerned about these discriminatory measures , which are inconsistent with WTO  rules. We are also 
disappointed with the ruling made by the Swedish appeals cou rt on this matter.  
21.4.  We would like to reiterate that Huawei and ZTE have been operating in Sweden for more than 
20 years , and do not have any so -called "national security " risks being reported before. Some 
European countries have conducted security investiga tions on the products of the companies and 
find no back -doors on the products. Many telecommunication operators also confirm that the 
equipment provided by the companies pose s no security risks.  China urges Sweden to comply with 
WTO rules, and provide a fa ir, transparent and non -discriminatory environment for Chinese 
companies to operate in Sweden.  
21.5.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
21.6.  The European Union regrets that this matter is raised again, despite the fact that it is under 
legal proceedings under the bilateral investment agreement between Sweden and China.  The EU 
reiterates that , in light of these ongoing proceedings, the EU will not enter into details on this issue 
in the Council today.  
21.7.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council t ake note of the statements made.  
21.8.  The Council so agreed . 
22  EUROPEAN UNION – CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM (THE EUROPEAN 
GREEN DEAL OF DECEMBER  2019) – REQUEST FROM BRAZIL, CHINA, INDONESIA, AND 
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
22.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Brazil, China, Indonesia, and the Russian Federation.  
22.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
22.3.  China believes that to effectively respond to climate change, realize global sus tainable 
development , and build a community with a shared future for humankind, Members need to 
earnestly implement the goals, principles and requirements of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement, reduce barriers , and promote trade and 
investment liberalization.  
22.4.  We believe that the European Union's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)  is a 
unilateral measure that deviates from the basic principles of "common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities " and "Nationally Determined Contribution Arrangements " 
of the UNFCC and the Paris Agreement. It may not comply with the basic principle of 
non-discrimination of the WTO.  
22.5.  Numerous studies have shown that the CBAM may have a much greater negativ e impact on 
developing than developed Members. First, due to different stages  of development , developing 
Members often lack financial resources and green technology to support energy transition. This is 
why the energy transition process of developing Membe rs is relatively slow and emission intensity 
is relatively high. Second, the economies of developing Members are more vulnerable to carbon 
price increases. In particular, developing Members do not have good systems and capacity to collect, 
calculate and verify emission data, including the specific emission data for individual enterprises. To 
establish and improve such data -collecting systems, the cost will be huge for developing Members. 
Third, if some Members set up an exclusive carbon club  based on CBAM, it would cause greater 
losses to developing Members ' output and welfare, lead to a decline in global trade, distort the 
market , and widen development inequality.  
22.6.  We thank the European Union  for publishing for public comment the draft implem entation 
regulations on reporting obligations during the transitional period of the CBAM in June, but we believe 
that the four-week consulting time is not enough to conduct a detailed analysis of the CBAM and 
submit comments on it. We hope that the EU will  further improve inclusiveness and transparency in G/C/M/146  
 
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  the subsequent process of CBAM  implementation , and ensure the CBAM 's consistency with 
WTO rules.  
22.7.  China made two  proposals at the Committee on Trade and Environment ( CTE) meetings in 
March and June respecti vely. We proposed to carry out dedicated discussions on environmental 
measures that could significantly impact trade from five perspectives, namely the basic operating 
mechanism, various elements of policy design, environmental contribution, trade impact , and the 
inclusiveness of the measures.  We hope that the discussions will enhance the WTO's role in trade 
and environment based on the MC12  Ministerial Declaration and the WTO's mandate, provide 
opportunities to consider different Members ' needs and concerns , and contribute to the UN  2030 
Agenda for sustainable development.  
22.8.  The delegate of  the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
22.9.  The Russian Federation reiterates its statements on this issue that were made during the 
previous meeting s of the CMA, the CTG, and the CTE. The Regulation on the establishment of the 
CBAM was published on 16  May 2023. Our analysis shows that the European Union has failed to 
make it compatible with the WTO  rules.  
22.10.   By using this mechanism , the European Union seeks to ensure cross -border application of 
its emission trading system or carbon pricing methodology, to protect its domestic industry from fair 
foreign competition, as well as to resolve the problem of relocation of its production facilities to 
third count ries. The CBAM will be applicable only to goods originating in the WTO  Members which 
will not establish an emission trading system fully linked with the EU  Emissions Trading System 
(ETS)  or apply a carbon price without any rebates beyond those also applied  in accordance with the 
EU ETS. 
22.11.   In this regard , we would like to point out that there is no evidence that the emission trading 
system is effective or that it is the only correct solution to address the problem of climate change. 
It should be kept in mind t hat agreements at the international level provide for the possibility for 
countries to be able to choose measures to combat climate change in the most effective way for 
each of them.  Even at the EU  level, industries continue to receive a significant share of their emission 
allowances for free – for many industries this free share constitutes 100%. Thus, the EU also cannot 
fully assess the effectiveness of its ETS in terms of its impact on addressing climate change.  
22.12.   The next issue that we would like to draw attention to is that the CBAM covers the most 
sensitive sectors of the EU  economy , namely  cement, fertilizers, iron and steel, and aluminium,  
which are those sectors where the EU usually applies anti -dumping or safeguard measures  to protect 
its producers . It is equally interesting that the CBAM also covers hydrogen energy, which is still in 
development. By including hydrogen into the scope of the CBAM the EU makes it clear that this 
regulation has nothing to do with the problem of combating climate change. We would like to note 
that hydrogen is a key technology for the low -carbon transition, as it does not emit any greenhouse 
gas at the point of use. Thus, there is no doubt that the inclusion of hydrogen in the regulation aims 
to secure foreign investment for EU companies in renewable hydrogen, and to decrease the 
competitiveness of other kinds of energy sources, in particular those derived from natural gas, 
methane , and others.  
22.13.   With this regulation the European Union  establishes not only additional charges on the 
importation of products, but also substantial administrative burden and import restrictions. 
According to the CBAM  Regulation , "goods shall be imported into the customs territory of the Union 
only by an autho rised CBAM  declarant ". It will also be prohibited to import goods without 
CBAM  certificates.  The European Union  introduces the system of verification of embedded emissions. 
The Regulation provides for the principles of verification, content of verification  report, and 
requirements for an accredited verifier.  
22.14.   The European Union constantly argues that the CBAM will mirror the EU  ETS. However, 
according to the Regulation "the CBAM  system has some specific features when compared to the 
EU ETS, including with respect to the calculation of the price of CBAM  certificates, the possibilities 
to trade CBAM  certificates and their period of validity. Those features are due to the need to preserve 
the effectiveness of the CBAM as a measure to prevent car bon leakage over time ". G/C/M/146  
 
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  22.15.   For the sake of time , we will not outline all the elements of the CBAM that are questionable 
from the point of view of WTO  norms and international climate agreements. However, our 
preliminary analysis shows that the CBAM is incompat ible with Articles  I, II, III , and IX of the 
GATT  1994.  We urge the European Union  to bring the Regulation in to line with the WTO  rules.  
22.16.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
22.17.   Brazil refers to its previous statements on the topic. The proposed Eur opean C BAM appears 
to pose challenges to a broad array of WTO  rules, including in disciplines related to tariffs, as well 
as in the fundamental principles of non -discrimination and national treatment.  
22.18.   Members have consistently highlighted worrying asymmetr ies between the CBAM and the 
European Emissions Trading System (ETS) that could put foreign products at a disadvantage before 
European competitors. Furthermore, the CBAM appears to adopt selective gaps in its coverage, for 
instance in accounting for indire ct emissions, that could exacerbate its discriminatory nature.  Many 
stakeholders have highlighted the hybrid legal nature of trade -related environmental measures and 
the need for those measures to comply with both trade and environmental multilateral rules . 
22.19.   Historical responsibilities mean that countries that industrialized first, benefiting from cheap 
and more polluting energy sources, should bear a larger brunt of the costs of emission reduction. In 
both the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement, the European Un ion has agreed to take into account the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. This principle 
should, therefore, be correctly reflected in European trade -related climate measures, such as the 
CBAM.  
22.20.   Finally, it should be noted that the CBAM 's monolithic climate approach appears to contradict 
the "bottom -up" spirit of the Paris Agreement, where each country establishes their Nationally 
Determined Contribution and the means to achieve them, particularly  with regard to the distribution 
of the burdens between economic sectors. That spirit is crucial for the effectiveness of the 
environmental regime, since it allows Members to design strategies that tap into their respective 
climate potentials and align wit h their national trajectories for sustainable development. Instead, 
the CBAM apparently attempts to impose on other Members a European model that ignores other 
modalities of climate action besides direct carbon pricing and addresses only specific sectors 
unilaterally determined by the European Union.  
22.21.   Brazil urges the European Union  to observe the need for its trade -related climate measures 
to comply with both trade and environmental multilateral rules. We remain committed to work 
together with the EU to sha pe a fair and effective multilateral treatment for the nexus between trade 
and sustainability that aligns with and supports the commitments made by Members in 
environmental fora.  
22.22.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
22.23.   Indonesia has once again c onveyed its objections to the European Union regarding the 
adoption of the C BAM regulation. According to Indonesia, any trade policy pertaining to the 
environment and climate change, including CBAM, must be implemented with extreme caution in 
order to prev ent it from becoming an unnecessary non -tariff trade barrier that breeds protectionism.  
22.24.   Indonesia is aware that the CBAM will levy import taxes on a variety of goods, such as iron 
and steel, cement, fertilizers, aluminium , chemical base materials, fertiliz ers, refineries, and energy, 
depending on the amount of carbon emissions generated during manufacturing. Additionally, it is 
suggested that the range of these products be broadened to encompass a variety of additional goods, 
such as plastics, hydrogen, org anic compounds, and ammonia. The Emission Trading System (ETS) 
of the European Union will then be used to alter the carbon tax price.  
22.25.   As a developing country, Indonesia has taken a number of significant actions as part of its 
commitment to combating climat e change, including: (i)  Presidential Decree No.  98 of 2021 
concerning Carbon Economic Value (NEK) which contains efforts to achieve Nationally Determined 
Contribution (NDC) targets, reporting, validation and verification , as well as certification of emiss ion 
reductions followed by the derivative regulations of the Minister of Environment and Forestry No. 21 
of 2022 concerning Procedures for Implementing Carbon Economic Values; (ii)  Permen  of ESDM G/C/M/146  
 
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  No. 16/2022 concerning Procedures for Implementing the NEK i n the Power Generation Subsection; 
(iii) Formulation of Minister of Environment and Forestry concerning Implementation of Nationally 
Determined Contribution (NDC) , Draft Regulation of Minister of Environment and Forestry concerning 
Procedures for Carbon Tr ading in the Forestry Sector , Draft Regulation of Minister of Home Affairs 
concerning the Role of Regional Governments in Implementing Carbon Economic Value in the 
Context of achieving NDC  Targets , and Preparation RPOJK regarding the Establishment and 
Technical Arrangement of Carbon Exchange by KLHK and OJK; (iv)  Green Industry Standard System 
(SIH) set by the Ministry of Industry (The Ministry of Industry); and (v)  several industrial sectors 
have started calculating carbon emissions and KADIN has formed Th e KADIN  Net Zero Hub to 
mobilize the private sector to achieve net zero emission or engage with the Global Carbon Council 
(GCC)  Protocol.  
22.26.   Furthermore, Indonesia has also learned that , in paragraph  70 of the CBAM  Regulation 
preamble, it is stated that "A dialogue with third  countries should continue and there should be space 
for cooperation and solutions that could inform the specific choices to be made on the details of the 
CBAM during its implementation, in particular during the transitional period. " In th is regard, 
Indonesia intends to question the form of cooperation that will be carried out by the European Union 
with third  countries in the implementation of its CBAM.  
22.27.   Indonesia believes that the CBAM  policy is discriminatory because it violates the WTO 's 
most-favourite -nation (MFN) and national treatment standards.  According to EU  Regulation 
No. 2023/956 , Article  2, Point 6, Letters  A and B, the European Union signals that a third  country 
may be excluded from adopting CBAM if it has implemented ETS and im poses a carbon tariff that is 
higher than the European Union 's carbon tariff. The MFN  principle of the WTO, according to which 
each WTO  Member is expected to treat imported goods from all other WTO  Members equally and 
without difference, may be broken by t he European Union in this regard.  
22.28.   By paying attention to the principles of the WTO  National Treatment, the European Union 
should provide equal treatment between imported goods that are subject to additional tariffs based 
on CBAM, with local goods produced domestically in the European Union. Indonesia observes that, 
in the ETS, operators or industries that have carbon emissions below a certain "cap" or limit are not 
required to purchase certificates or allowances. However, the said arrangement does not apply  to 
industries in other WTO  Members that export their products to the European Union.  
22.29.   In relation to Article  II of the GATT  1994, Indonesia believes that CBAM has the potential to 
impose additional costs on producers of commodities outside of the EU, with additional levies beyond 
the tariffs in accordance with the EU  Schedule of concession s. Indonesia requests that the European 
Union quickly evaluate the CBAM  laws to ensure that they adhere to WTO  rules, including Article  II 
of the GATT  1994, as well as the  MFN and national treatment principles of the WTO.  Indonesia 
further requested that the European Union take into account the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement 's 
Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR -RC) principles when 
creating and implementing CBAM  regulations. Indonesia believes that any trade policy relating to 
the environment and climate change must be supported by factual data and scientific research, or 
it risks devolving into unilateral and covert protectionism.  
22.30.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
22.31.    Paraguay thanks the European Union for the briefing during the Environment week. 
However, Paraguay's systemic concerns were not adequately addressed,  and I would like to repeat 
them again in  this Council:  
• How is the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
responsibilities taken into account in the light of national circumstances and nationally 
determined contributions to this measure for environmental purposes?  
• How are mitigation measures other than carbon pricing taken into account in the CBAM, 
especially in countries such as Paraguay, which are carbon sinks?  
22.32.   We would also like to know if the European Union  is planning to implement any mechanism 
to provide prefe rential access to products that, despite coming from countries that do not have a 
carbon pricing mechanism, have a lower carbon footprint or come from developing countries that G/C/M/146  
 
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  are highly impacted by the negative effects of climate change and carbon sinks such as Paraguay. 
On this, we have already heard the EU say that the CBAM takes into account the specific emissions 
of imported goods, but at most this would allow not imposing the additional tariff, not providing 
preferential access.  
22.33.   The industrial sector  in Paraguay and in many other developing countries is very small. 
Measures such as the CBAM will not contribute to green industriali zation without other elements and 
policies, but rather impede it.  Does the EU envisage redirecting proceeds from the CBAM t o support 
green transition in developing countries, in line with its funding commitments , and to provide a 
means of implementation as set out in international environmental law?  
22.34.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
22.35.   India would  like to thank the d elegation of the European Union for its recent engagement on 
the European Green Deal -related issues in the June  2023 edition of the Trade and Environment 
week. We also acknowledge the bilateral engagement on these issues , including in the 
first India – European Union Trade and Technology Council.  
22.36.   India has raised its concerns on the measures under the C BAM, Deforestation -Free 
Commodities , and other Green Deal proposals in various forums. Most recently, India submitted a 
paper (document  JOB/TE/78 ) to the Committee on Trade and Environment , in March  2023, which 
pointed out that we are witnessing potential trade fragmentation if Members continue to take 
unilateral trade measures which apply extra -territorially. We also urged the need to act in accordance 
with the principles of common but differentiated  responsibilities and respective capabilities 
(CBDR -RC), as well as honouring the nationally determined contributions (NDCs).  
22.37.   While we remain concerned with the idea of a carbon border adjustment itself, the issue is 
further complicated by the fact that th e CBAM  implementation regulation published in June  2023 
come s very close to the 1  October  2023 date, when part of the regulation comes into force. This 
situation may lead to trade disruptions as the measure kicks in, even if the initial requirement is 
only for reporting.  
22.38.   In the Trade and Environment week in June  2023, the EU  delegation stated7 that the 
European Union was taking into account differences in national circumstances through the different 
carbon price which may prevail in different countries. This position completely disregards the fact 
that carbon price itself may not be the chosen policy instrument in every country precisely due to 
the varying national circumstances. This EU  admission of extra -territoriality of the CBAM  design is 
reflected in the choice of the policy instrument, namely carbon price , is extremely worrisome.  
22.39.   In the International Energy Agency event on steel decarbonization in the Trade and 
Environment week, representatives of many key steel -making countries participat ed. In that event, 
there was a broad recognition that development of standards like the ISO standards was important, 
rather than a fragmentation of standardization measures like the one reflected in CBAM.  
22.40.   Finally, we remain additionally concerned that othe r WTO  Members may also implement 
their own equivalent CBAM  measures and all these adjustment measures may not be compatible 
with each other, imposing huge compliance costs on developing countries and especially the MSMEs.  
22.41.   The delegate of Türkiye  indicated the following:  
22.42.   Türkiye always indicated our support to global efforts to mitigate the impacts of climate 
change while ensuring cooperation so as to achieve a strong global response to the se challenges . 
We also continuously emphasize that each country contr ibutes to this effort in accordance with its 
own national responsibilities and capabilities , as based on international environmental law. We are 
pursuing our own objectives to transform the Turkish economy into a sustainable, resource -efficient , 
and low -carbon production structure.  
22.43.   In our view , the WTO could help facilitate the transformation to environmentally sustainable 
economic growth globally, in an inclusive and just manner.  With this in mind, we have been closel y 
 
7 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dfZFqc1b2NI&t=6879s  (statement starting at 3:09:40) . G/C/M/146  
 
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  following the ongoing legislative processes under the European Green Deal , including the CBAM . We 
thank the EU for its transparent approach in devising the regulatory rules , and for its openness to 
inputs from trade partners in the process.  However, our concerns with regard to the compatib ility of 
the CBAM with international environmental and trade law , as we have explained on multiple 
occasions from the beginning , still persist.  
22.44.   First of all, the lack of a development dimension and disregard for national responsibilities 
and ca pabilities is a general criticism with regard to this process.  Furthermore, we believe that there 
are several discriminative aspects of the CBAM, which result in  placing importers and imported goods 
at a competitive disadvantage compared to their counterpa rts in the E U. For example, there are  
difference s between the scope of the EU  ETS and that of the CBAM.  As we have also mentioned in 
previous meetings, w hile CBAM applies to products identified by CN  codes, the ETS applies to 
installations identified in te rms of their activity/production process, subject to minimum capacity or 
total rated thermal input thresholds. Therefore, while CBAM would capture all producers of 
CBAM  goods in third  countries, EU  producers of the same goods that are below the set thresho lds 
are exempted from the EU  ETS. Nor will this  divergence be addressed with the initiation of the ETS -2, 
which will be a separate carbon pricing regime for fuel distribution for road transport and buildings, 
as this system will impose a much lower carbon cost than the current ETS, and will not subject 
industrial installations that would be affected by it to any GHG  monitoring, reporting , and verification 
obligation. Therefore, we believe it is necessary that exemptions be provided under the CBAM to 
third country operators in line with the EU  ETS scope thresholds.  
22.45.   A second  issue relates to the treatment of precursors , as also explained before . The CBAM, 
due to its focus on embedded emissions in products, brings an additional burden on producers in 
third countries to account for the embedded emissions in input materials they use in the production 
process. The burden increases as the good becomes more complex. In our internal consultations, 
especially end -user product producers at SME  status , inform us of the difficulty and burden of 
tracking input emissions , and indicate that their EU  counterparts do not have similar obligations 
under the EU  ETS. Furthermore, in the EU  ETS, applications such as over -allocation of free 
allowances and ability to trade allowan ces, state aid provided by member States with regard to 
CO2 costs related to electricity use, and funding opportunities , provide EU  producers with a 
competitive advantage over third country producers with fewer resources. Hence, remedies to 
address these i mbalances should be sought.  
22.46.   In this regard , we believe that  the allocation of CBAM  revenues to the financing of the green 
transformation projects of developing countries and LDCs could at least help alleviate such 
imbalances, and would also be more in line  with the climate change mitigation objectives underlying 
the CBAM  Regulation. In this process, ensuring that developing countries and LDCs have access to 
critical technologies will also be key to the CBAM's inclusivity and overall success.  
22.47.   The delegate of  Thailand  indicated the following:  
22.48.   Thailand would like to join others in expressing its concern over the European Union's  CBAM. 
We would like to refer to our statement previously raised in the last meeting of the CTG.8 Suffice it 
to say that we fully recognize and share the firm commitment of the international community to 
addressing the issue of climate change. At the same time, we also think it is important to ensure 
that international rules and principles are respect ed, including the basic principles of 
non-discrimination under the WTO and "Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective 
Capabilities " enshrined in the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC. While we look forward to receiving 
an update on the EU 's CBAM regulations from the European Union , we urge the EU to seriously 
consider the compatibility of its CBAM with the WTO  rules and well -established practices in the 
international community , and to modify the regulations accordingly.  
22.49.   The delegate of  the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  indicated the following:  
22.50.   The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would like to reiterate its concerns on the CBAM. This issue 
has been addressed under the agenda of the Committee on Market Access, where Members 
discussed, and will continue to discu ss in depth , their views and concerns in this regard.  Moreover, 
unilateral trade measures that are not based on clear, WTO -consistent justifications must not be 
 
8 Document  G/C/M/145 , paragraphs  19.49 -19.53.  G/C/M/146  
 
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  accommodated. We support the concerns raised by the co -sponsor and other Members on the effects  
of such measures, and their potential inconsistency  with the WTO  rules.  
22.51.   The delegate of Kazakhstan  indicated the following:  
22.52.   Kazakhstan reiterates its position as set out at the Council's last meeting, and continues to 
follow developments around the Europe an Union's C BAM. Kazakhstan urges the European Union to 
fully consider the CBAM's compatibility with the WTO rules and regulations , and to ensure that any 
mechanism does not create obstacles to trade.  
22.53.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
22.54.   Regarding the European Union's CBAM, which entered into force in May this year, Japan 
understands that it has been explained as being part of the EU's climate change measures. We would 
like to continue to emphasi ze that it should be an initiative that does not conflict with global emission 
reduction efforts, not only within the EU  region.  
22.55.   Climate change is one of the most important issues. Co untries must raise their ambitions 
and policy efforts to achieve carbon neutrality worldwide by 2050, while at the same time ensuring 
a level  playing field and preventing carbon leakage. Therefore, policy coordination is important for 
the production and in troduction of products with low carbon intensity.  
22.56.   When discussing policy coordination, each country has been making reduction efforts in the 
past according to their own circumstances, such as energy source constraints and the industrial 
environment, and in  principle, the focus should be on "carbon intensity " as the "result " of such 
reduction efforts.  In other words, if the "carbon intensity " of a country or sector is low, this would 
be the result of that country or sector having taken sufficient measures, s o that there are no 
problems in terms of the level playing field or carbon leakage. In this regard, the European Union's  
CBAM is designed to charge at the border based on the level of specific policy , such as an explicit 
carbon price at the present stage. In this case, even if the product has the same actual carbon 
intensity and does not cause any carbon leakage, taxation will occur due to the explicit difference in 
carbon price.  
22.57.   In this respect, the environmental objective itself cannot be justified from t he viewpoint of 
preventing carbon leakage, but sufficient consideration is required from the viewpoint of ensuring 
fair, competitive conditions. In addition to the above -mentioned institutional design issues, it is a 
prerequisite that this measure be desig ned consistently with the WTO  rules, as has been repeatedly 
stated.  
22.58.   As we note that the European Union's CBAM was provisionally agreed among EU  member  
States  at the end of last year, we would like to request that the EU consult with WTO Members 
sufficientl y through conducting an expert meeting on methods for measuring CO 2 emissions of 
products. We hope that the CBAM will not be introduced by the EU without it first ensuring sufficient 
international understanding, otherwise this could potentially lead to int ernational trade disputes.  
22.59.   We are also concerned that the Draft Implementing Regulation on the application of CBAM 
during the transition period was only published in June of this year, and that there is not enough 
time to prepare before its entry into application in October, despite it imposing new reporting 
requireme nts on business operations. We would like to call on the European Union to fully discuss 
with each Member, including a n experts ' meeting on the method measuring CO 2 emissions of 
products, so as not to impose an excessive burden on trade, and to avoid intro ducing CBAM without 
sufficient international understanding, which may lead to trade disputes with other countries.  
22.60.   The delegate of  the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
22.61.   Regarding the E uropean Union's CBAM, while highlighting the significance of establishing its 
Implementation Acts and Delegated Acts in a manner consistent with the WTO  rules, the Republic 
of Korea requests the EU to consider the importance of recognizing each Member 's valid methodology 
for emissions calculation, al ongside the EU 's own methodology.  In particular, Korea believes that it 
is crucial to compare the actual reporting burdens between those subject to the CBAM and those 
under the EU  ETS, with a view to adjusting them to proportional parity.  G/C/M/146  
 
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  22.62.   The Republic of Korea understands that the E uropean Union's current draft allows for other 
Members ' calculations by the end of 2024, provided their data coverage and accuracy are similar to 
that of the EU. We believe that this approach should continue beyond the aforementi oned period.  
The Republic of Korea stands ready to further engage with the European Union to resolve these 
issues constructively.  
22.63.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
22.64.   During previous meetings, the European Union  had the opportunity to provide Members with 
an outline of the proposal, its objectives, and its interaction with other EU  policies targeted at 
achieving environmental sustainability and carbon neutrality. We have been transparent throughout 
the design sta ge. We will continue to engage now that CBAM will enter the transitional period. Most 
recently, during the WTO  Trade and Environment Week , on 14  June, the EU gave a technical 
presentation of CBAM and answered many technical questions on the measure. As Mem bers showed 
great interest, we will continue our engagement with partners in the WTO in addition to our bilateral 
exchanges.  CBAM will be introduced gradually, from October  2023 until the end of 2025. During that 
transitional period, only reporting obligat ions under the Regulation will apply.  
22.65.   In that regard, the European Union  circulated a communication to the Committee on Trade 
and Environment informing Members that, on 13  June 2023, the EU ha d published the text of the 
Implementing Regulation on the repor ting obligations during the transitional period of the CBAM. 
The European Commission invites feedback on its "Have Your Say " website. The feedback period will 
run until 11  July 2023.  
22.66.   Feedback from the consultation will be taken into account when finali zing the Implementing 
Regulation on the reporting obligations during the CBAM's transitional period. Feedback received will 
also be published on the European Commission 's "Have Your Say " website. The Implementing 
Regulation will be finali zed at the end of July , after consultation with the CBAM  Committee. That 
Committee will adopt an implementing act concerning the information to be reported for the 
transitional period of CBAM , from 1  October  2023 until 31  December  2025.  We invite all interested 
Members to reply  to the consultation by 11  July. 
22.67.   The European Union  will also roll out an information campaign on CBAM.  The campaign will 
feature online seminars, physical events, the distribution of guidance documents, and direct 
assistance. The objective will be to assi st third -country operators and importers to the EU in 
performing all the new obligations required by the CBAM  Regulation and its secondary legislation.  
EU Delegations around the world will be involved. The transitional period will involve extensive 
consult ations with stakeholders, including international partners, to increase our mutual 
understanding of the instrument.  
22.68.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
22.69.   The Council so agreed . 
23  AUSTRALIA – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION ON 5G  EQUIPMENT – 
REQUEST FROM CHINA  
23.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
China.  
23.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
23.3.  We continue to express concern with regard to Australian  restrictions on 5G  equipment of 
relevant Chinese companies.  To date, Australia has not provided reasonable rationale on these 
measures. We believe these discriminatory measures are inconsistent with WTO  rules. We urge 
Australia to bring its measures in to line with WTO  rules, and to provide a fair, transparent , and 
non-discriminatory environment for Chinese companies to operate in Australia.  G/C/M/146  
 
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  23.4.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
23.5.  Australia notes China 's statement.  Since China first raised this i ssue in the WTO in late 2018, 
Australia has engaged constructively with China to explain the rationale for its position on 
5G networks.  As Australia has previously stated, its position on 5G  networks is country -agnostic, 
transparent, risk -based, non -discriminatory , and fully WTO -consistent. Australia also notes that 
other WTO  Members have made similar decisions in their national interest on equipment for national 
5G networks.  
23.6.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
23.7.  The Council so agreed . 
24  MEXICO – CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE UNDER MEXICAN OFFICIAL 
STANDARD NOM -223-SCFI/SAGARPA -2018, "CHEESE NAMES, SPECIFICATIONS, 
COMMERCIAL INFORMATION, AND TEST METHODS ", PUBLISHED ON 31  JANUARY  2019 – 
REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATES  
24.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the United States.  
24.2.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
24.3.  The United States remain s highly concerned with the revised measure. Could Mexico provide 
a timeline for when it will respond to WTO  Member comments?  Could Mexico also please provide an 
update on the status of this measure and an estimated time -frame of when the revised measure w ill 
be notified to the WTO?  
24.4.  The United States is concerned this measure may conflict with the ongoing redrafting of the 
corresponding cheese standard. How will Mexico harmonize its update to the NOM -223 cheese 
standard with the NOM -223 cheese CAP notified to the WTO on 8 February  2022?  Has Mexico 
considered extending its eventual timeline for implementation of the measure to  a period of 
12 months or more? If Mexico proceeds with implementation of the current measure, the United 
States (Government and industry) would need at least one  year to launch systems to comply.  
24.5.  The United States urges Mexico to indefinitely delay implementation of the measure and 
consider less trade -restrictive alternatives as previously proposed by the US  Government, other 
WTO Members, and industry stakeholders.  
24.6.  The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
24.7.  New Zealand has considered Mexico 's response on this matter at the previous C TG in April 
and at the recent TBT  Committee. However, we remain concerned that the conformity assessment 
procedures that Mexico has set out for cheese under NOM -223 are more trade restrictive than 
necessary, with some aspects of the conformity assessment procedure creating unnecessary 
obstacles to international trade and likely to cause difficulties for New Zealand exporters. We support 
the request for Mexico to consider less trade -restrictive alternatives to the measures.  We look 
forward to receiving a response from Mexico to the concerns raised, and an update on the status of 
any revise d version of the Conformity Assessment Procedure.  
24.8.  The delegate of Mexico  indicated the following:  
24.9.  With regard to the procedure for the conformity assessment of NOM -223 of SAGARPA  2018, 
Mexico would like to reiterate that the competent regulatory authoritie s are still in the process of 
analysing the 174  comments from domestic and foreign proponents received during the consultation 
period. The Government of Mexico will be in a position to notify delegations that raised this concern, 
and all WTO  Members, once the analysis period has been concluded. We assure Members that this 
process will continue to be conducted in the strictest compliance with the obligations of the 
TBT Agreement and its correlatives in the FTAs to which Mexico is a party.  
24.10.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  G/C/M/146  
 
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  24.11.   The Council so agreed . 
25  INDIA – IMPORT POLICIES ON TYRES – REQUEST FROM CANADA;  THE EUROPEAN 
UNION; INDONESIA; THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN 
AND MATSU; AND THAILAND  
25.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Canada, the European Union, Indonesia, Chinese Taipei , and Thailand.  
25.2.  The delegate of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
25.3.  Chinese Taipei would like to draw India 's attention again to its Notification No.  12/2015 -2020, 
which amended India 's import policy concerning new Pneumatic tyres from "Free" to "Restri cted". 
We remain disappointed that Members ' concerns have not been appropriately addressed.  According 
to statistics from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry of India, the quantity of our tyre exports 
to India from 2020 to 2022 sharply decreased by 50% , compared to the exports in 2019. At the 
same time, according to the Indian Automotive Tyre Manufacturers Association (ATMA), India 's tyre 
exports to the global market have surged by 70%. These figures demonstrate that India 's tyres have 
benefited from the u nrestricted markets in other Members, whereas tyre producers in other 
WTO Members have to face increased trade barriers to enter the Indian market.  
25.4.  The core issue to be addressed is the procedure for granting import licen ces. We urge India 
to abide by the relevant provisions of the WTO  Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures. 
Specifically, India 's import licen ce requirement should neither restrict nor distort trade, and India 
must publish complete information about the import licen ce application to ensure the required level 
of transparency so that foreign manufacturers are able to understand the criteria for licen ce approval 
and the detailed reasons for potential licen ce rejections.  
25.5.  The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
25.6.  Indonesia expresses its concerns to India as it has not  yet received a satisfactory response 
from the Indian government about the issue of banning t yre imports. Indonesian t yre exports to 
India are still being hindered at this time. In fact, imported t yres from India have recently made 
their way onto the Indonesian market.  Indonesia request s India to provide more information on 
three  issues, including the restriction on importing t yres that can be made domestically in India, the 
charging of a fee for the us e of the Indian Standard Mark (IS  Mark) on t yre products exported to 
third countries, and the sampling of imported tyre containers and packaging.  
25.7.  As contained in the Notification by the Directorate General of Foreign Trade of India 's Ministry 
of Trade and E-Commerce , in Notification No.  12/2015 -2020 on 12  June 2020, the Government of 
India has made amendments to the tyre import policy , from "free" to "restricted ". Indonesia has 
learned that India has required importers to make separate statements via email regarding import 
restrictions for specific types and size categories of t yres that can be produced domestically in India. 
Any violation of these provisions will be subject to criminal penalties under the FTDR  Act 1992.  
Furthermore, India 's import policy has now become even more stringent, where every container 
containing imported t yres must be sampled for Indian customs purposes. Next, importers are also 
required to fulfil the registration requirements of the warehouse where imported t yres are stor ed. 
25.8.  The ban on t yre imports, according to Indonesia, is discriminatory because it only applies to 
a small number of WTO  Members who could pose a threat to India 's domestic t yre industry. As a 
result, the policy may be in conflict with one of the core WTO  principles, namely the principle of 
non-discrimination. In addition, because India is one of the major t yre producers in the world and 
can create a variety of t yre kinds and sizes, the regulation restricting imports of Indian t yres has 
de facto made it more  difficult for Indonesian t yre goods to access the Indian market.  
25.9.  Indonesia also seeks India 's clarification regarding the imposition of a marking fee on t yre 
products marked with the Indian Standard (IS)  Mark. The imposition of IS  Mark marking fees on 
tyre products that will be exported to third  countries can burden business actors and create 
unnecessary trade barriers in international trade.  G/C/M/146  
 
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  25.10.   The import of t yre products into India is a form of non -automatic licensing procedure 
(non-automatic import licensi ng), which is in conformity with the WTO  Agreement on Import 
Licensing (AIL), according to India 's statement at the last CTG  meeting , on 3–4 April 2023. 
Indonesia requested more information from India about this problem at this CTG  meeting.  
25.11.   Indonesia there fore requests that India 's government provide details regarding the scope 
and timeline for implementing the policy restricting t yre imports , as well as additional explanation s 
regarding the execution of the aforementioned policy.  
25.12.   Indonesia also requested I ndia to review its import restrictions on t yre products right away 
to ensure compliance with the WTO 's principles of transparency and non -discrimination, as well as 
with Articles  2.1 and 2.2 of the TBT  Agreement, Articles  3.2 and 3.3 of the Import Licensing 
Agreement, and Article  XI of the GATT  1994 regarding the general elimination of quantitative 
restrictions. Indonesia is also willing to continue talking with India in order to resolve this issue in 
any number of potential international fora, incl uding bilaterally.  
25.13.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
25.14.   The European Union  reiterates its concerns relating to the long -standing issue of India 's 
import policy on tyres. We have explained our position on multiple occasions in various  bodies of 
the WTO, including this Council, the Market Access Committee, the TBT  Committee, the Import 
Licensing Committee, and the TRIMs  Committee.  This measure continues to have a negative impact 
on stakeholders in the European Union . The EU once again u rges India to reconsider and eliminate 
unconditionally any implicit or explicit quantitative or other restrictions on the import of replacement 
tyres as these restrictions are contrary to WTO  rules.  
25.15.   The delegate of Thailand  indicated the following:  
25.16.   Thailan d finds it necessary to bring our concern on India 's import policies on tyres to the 
attention of the Council once again , after having done so numerous times in various WTO  bodies, 
and yet no progress has been made.  Having said that, we would like to thank  India for the 
information about the number of the licen ces granted to Thailand 's tyres since 2019. We also 
appreciate India 's engagement in the bilateral consultation with us on 16  June 2023.  
25.17.   Thailand 's tyre exports to India still suffer from this import restriction and our tyre exports 
to India continue to decline by 55% in the first  quarter of 2023 compared to the same period in 
2022, and by a staggering 80% compared to the same period in 2019 , before this import restriction 
was implemented. Globally, In dia's total imports of car tyres from the whole world declined by 70% 
in volume for the first quarter of 2023 compared to the same period of 2022. We wonder , "How far 
will these import figures decline until India stops implementing that measure? " 
25.18.   Despite the information about the number of licen ces granted to Thailand 's tyres, we regret 
to say that India has yet to provide us with the information about the administration of the 
restrictions, including the time -frame or period for processing applica tions, and the distribution of 
such licen ces among supplying countries. We urge India to provide us with the above information 
without delay.  
25.19.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
25.20.   Canada would like to reiterate its concerns with India 's non -automatic import licensing 
system, which effectively imposes quotas on imports of t yres. These concerns have previously been 
expressed by a number of Members, including Canada, in various WTO  bodies, including this Council.  
Canada once again calls on India  to eliminate this quantitative import restriction in accordance with 
its WTO  obligations.  
25.21.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
25.22.   India would  like to thank various Members for their continued interest in this issue. We would 
also like to refer to o ur response provided in the previous meetings of the C TG, the Committee on 
Market Access , and the Committee on Import Licensing.  My delegation would  like to reiterate that 
the non -automatic licensing requirements for tyres are administered in a manner cons istent with the G/C/M/146  
 
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  rules of the WTO  Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, including with respect to the 
time-frames for the grant ing of import licen ces. We are engaging bilaterally with the concerned 
Members , including by providing information and data on  the applications received and lice nces 
granted.  
25.23.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
25.24.   The Council so agreed . 
26  INDIA – IMPLEMENTATION OF CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT POLICY THROUGH 
QUALITY CONTROL ORDERS (QCOS) IN VARIOUS SECTORS – REQUEST FROM CANADA 
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION  
26.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Canada an d the European Union.  
26.2.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
26.3.  The European Union  is deeply concerned by the increasing number of Quality Control Orders 
(QCOs) issued by India. Since 2019, more than 100  QCOs have been notified by India t o the 
TBT Committee, and more than half of these have been subject of specific trade concerns raised by 
WTO Members. The EU has consistently been raising the issue of QCOs , in particular in relation to 
toys, automotive parts including tyres, chemical and p etrochemical substances, steel, etc.  The 
majority of QCOs introduced appear to have a protectionist orientation and consequently raise 
questions regarding their compliance with the TBT  Agreement 's obligations.  The EU is particularly 
concerned by the visibl e trend of QCOs prescribing India-specific standards where international 
standards already exist.  
26.4.  Furthermore, QCOs prescribe mandatory conformity assessment procedures that are more 
restrictive than necessary to fulfil their legitimate objective. They cau se extra burden and economic 
cost to the European stakeholders as a result of unnecessarily cumbersome procedures, including 
mandatory factory inspections by B ureau of Indian Standards (BIS)  officials, sample testing in Indian 
laboratories to obtain necess ary permissions or licences for products already tested and certified 
under established international standards and schemes. There is no provision for a streamlined 
process on the basis of existing certification from any international body.  The European Un ion also 
would like to recall the importance of duly notifying all of these measures as required notably under 
the TBT  Agreement.  
26.5.  The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
26.6.  Canada remains concerned by the Quality Control Orders (QCOs) issued by India across a 
variety of sectors.  As expressed in other fora, such as the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, 
Canada is concerned by the QCO  objectives, notification processes and systemic issues in the 
framework.  We hope India meaningfully engages with these concerns, and answers questions posed 
by many Members, including Canada. We urge India to ensure QCO  implementation is consistent 
with its WTO  obligations.  
26.7.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
26.8.  Japan supports the European Union  and Cana da's comments on India 's QCOs. Although Q COs 
provide for overseas factory inspections by the B IS, Japan requests that Q COs not be more trade 
restrictive than necessary, in accordance with Articles  2.2 and 5.1.2 of the TBT  Agreement.  In 
addition, we request  that Q COs be consistent with the TBT  Agreement, for example, that 
international standards be used as the basis for Q COs in accordance with Articles  2.4 and 5.4 of the 
TBT Agreement, and that an appropriate period be allowed before implementing QCOs  in acc ordance 
with Article  2.12 and 5.9 of the TBT  Agreement. Japan requests India to ensure that the orders 
comply with the TBT  Agreement.  G/C/M/146  
 
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  26.9.  The delegate of  the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
26.10.   We thank the European Union and Canada for raising this item.  The United Kingdom also 
has concerns with the number of Q COs being introduced by India on a number of goods which seem 
to be more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfil India 's legitimate objectives. Notably, we have 
raised concerns on Indian footwear regulations in the TBT  Committee and thank India for their 
bilateral engagement on this matter.  We would encourage India to ensure that existing and incoming 
regulations are in accordance with international standards where they exist in order to prevent 
adverse impacts for foreign businesses and trade.  
26.11.   We look forward to continued engagement with India on this issue across WTO  fora. 
26.12.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
26.13.   In accordance with the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), India is  committed 
to facilitating international trade while taking steps to ensure the quality of the products and 
protection of human, animal, and plant health and life, of the environment, and prevent deceptive 
practices, among other objectives. The Q COs issued  by India are a step in this direction to ensure 
the quality of products, public health and safety and protection of consumers.  
26.14.   India notes the importance of adequate transition time for the industry members. India is 
responsive to the concerns of the indu stry and its consumers. Wherever appropriate, India has 
extended dates for implementation of the QCOs in certain instances.  India is continuously working 
towards facilitating trade and safeguarding consumer interests. In pursuit of these goals, measures 
have been instituted to provide alternatives to traditional physical labelling for some products.  
26.15.   Most of the standards formulated by the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS), which is the body 
responsible for the formulation of standards in India, ar e based on international standards and the 
minor variations which might exist, are due to the specific climatic or environmental conditions and 
technological development in the country. BIS also undertakes regular review of the standards to 
ensure that the  standards are not rendered redundant. The TBT  Agreement recognizes the right of 
a Party to adopt international standards as per the appropriateness or effectiveness for the Party.  
26.16.   India acknowledges that while certain jurisdictions allow virtual audit for  management 
systems, widespread adoption of virtual audits for product assessment remains limited. Virtual audits 
for management systems are also practi sed by India, demonstrating its commitment to efficient 
evaluation methodologies. Furthermore, India act ively processes all the applications for licen ces or 
inspections by foreign manufacturers.  
26.17.   In the month of March, India also hosted a National Workshop on TBT, conducted by the 
distinguished members of the WTO  Secretariat. We also invited a senior subject matter expert from 
the US to engage with our regulators and officials.  We have been providing detailed responses for 
the specific trade concerns raised in the TBT Committee in relation to our QCOs and 
TBT notifications. Additionally, we also remain bilater ally engaged with Members raising these STCs.  
26.18.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
26.19.   The Council so agreed . 
27  INDONESIA – IMPORT AND EXPORT RESTRICTING POLICIES AND PRACTICES – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, AND NEW ZEALAND  
27.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the European Union, Japan, and New Zealand.  
27.2.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
27.3.  The European Union  regrets that once ag ain the Council on Trade in Goods needs to address 
import and export restrictive policies and practices by Indonesia.  This item has been on the agenda 
of this Council for several years now, and despite the deep concerns repeatedly expressed by the 
European  Union  – as well as by many other WTO  Members – it is worrisome that no real progress G/C/M/146  
 
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  could be registered. Rather, the number and scope of Indonesian restrictions have further expanded 
over time, with negative impacts on trade flows.  
27.4.  We took due note of th e comments by the Indonesian Delegation in the last meeting of this 
Council about Indonesia 's intention to comply with its WTO  commitments, including in particular the 
principles of transparency and non -discrimination. We also raised this issue in bilateral contacts over 
the last months.  However, we have unfortunately not yet seen changes in this direction in 
Indonesia 's policies or practices, and our operators continue to face a business environment which 
is increasingly restrictive.  
27.5.  In particular,  the European Union reiterates its serious preoccupations with the many issues 
we have already raised multiple times: Indonesia 's burdensome and lengthy SPS  import 
authori zation procedures, complex rules and lack of pragmatic certification procedures for Halal 
labelling, mandatory use of domestic SNI  standards diverging from international ones for an 
increasing number of products, wider use of local content requirements, and restrictive import 
licensing requirements or other import control measures, as well  as export bans.  
27.6.  In addition to the concerns we continue to raise on the commodity balance mechanism 
(Agenda I tem 36), the European Union notes the introduction of a new export regime under 
Regulation  18/2021, which appears to significantly expand the scop e of goods subject to export 
prohibitions (from 39 to 275  tariff lines), creating additional obstacles to trade flows and raising 
doubts in terms of compliance with WTO  obligations.  
27.7.  The European Union  calls again on Indonesia to address the many trade barr iers of concern 
to its trading partners and notify all relevant measures to the WTO.  
27.8.  The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
27.9.  New Zealand echoes the concerns raised by the European Union, Japan, and others, in 
previous CTG  meetings. We have con sidered Indonesia 's response on this matter. However, 
New Zealand continues to raise this issue in the C TG because we believe that Indonesia 's restrictions 
on agricultural imports continue to undermine core WTO  principles. The frequent changes to import 
requirements reduce commercial certainty, which in turn hampers returns for businesses and can 
lead to increased costs. Moreover, in the food and beverage sector, this uncertainty also contributes 
to the ongoing increasing cost of food, which can have a part icularly negative effect on people on 
low incomes.  
27.10.   New Zealand would like to reiterate the following concerns and requests:  
27.11.   New Zealand remains concerned about the inconsistent time -frames and issuance of import 
licences. Uncertainty around import licences  is leading to commercially significant market access 
issues for trading partners. We request that Indonesia provide greater clarity on the time -frames for 
the issuance of import recommendations for commodities not currently under the SNANK  system, 
and how  import volumes are calculated and allocated to importers. We also request that Indonesia 
provide further information to trading partners on the Commodity Balance Mechanism, including 
how the mechanism is calculated, and how Indonesia is undertaking to mak e the mechanism more 
transparent.  
27.12.   New Zealand welcomes that a stated objective of the Presidential Regulation  32/2022 on 
Commodity Balances is to improve the import licensing process and facilitate business access to 
imports. However, we note that the Regu lation appears likely to add further complexity, as it allows 
for import restrictions to be applied where domestic supply is calculated to be sufficient to meet 
projected demand. Details of the commodity balance/import licensing system are yet to be provid ed, 
which is adding to the uncertain environment for imports.  
27.13.   Finally, New Zealand appreciates Indonesia 's comments at the CTG  meeting in July  2022 
that, "in principle, Indonesia has no intention to impede the flow of international trade through our 
import  and export policies "; that "Indonesia always pursues for simplification, transparency, and 
efficiency to make exports and imports easier to implement "; and that "Indonesia stands ready to 
engage bilaterally with WTO  Members on their concerns ". We join others in asking Indonesia to G/C/M/146  
 
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  make renewed efforts to address these long -standing concerns about Indonesia 's import restricting 
policies and their impact on agricultural trade.  
27.14.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
27.15.   In past CTG and TRIMs  Committee  meetings , Japan has continuously expressed its concerns 
about the various Local Content Requirement (LCR)  measures implemented by Indonesia related to 
4G LTE equipment, TV  equipment, and the retail industry , etc., and the consistency of these 
measures with the WTO  Agreement s. 
27.16.   The Indonesian government has been implementing import and export restrictions on steel 
products, textile products and air conditioners, among other products . However, in May  2022, the 
Indonesian government announced that it would introduce the "Neraca Komoditas " (Commodity 
Balance System) for these products from 2023, based on Ministerial Decree No.  25 of 2022 of the 
Minister of Commerce. Japan 's concerns about the commodity balance system, as we will address 
in Agenda Item 36, are that it violates Article  XI:1 of the GATT (prohibition of quantitative 
restrictions), Article  X (publication of trade rules), and the provisions of the Import Licensing 
Agreement, among others, and we call for a remedy for the situation to be found as soon as possible.  
In particular, imports of steel products are currently suspended, which has a serious impact on 
Japan.  
27.17.   Furthermore, with regard to textile products, safeguard measures on carpets were 
introduced on 17  February  2021. There are two  main problems with this: one is that the tariff is as 
high as 150 -200% in terms of ad valorem  tax conversion, and the other is that the tariff has been 
introduced in a situation in which carpet imports have dropped sharply. At the meeting of the 
Safeguards Committee in May  2023, it was stated that "the measures are a legitimate, albeit 
temporary, measure and are exceptionally necessary to remedy the serious damage to the domestic 
industry ". As the aforementioned issues have not been addressed and the effects  of import 
restrictions remain unchanged, Japan requests that these measures be eliminated as soon as 
possible.  
27.18.   Japan is concerned about the increasing number of trade restrictive measures in Indonesia, 
which are thought to be inconsistent with the WTO  Agreement s, and we would like to request a 
concrete explanation regarding the background of the introduction of these systems and their 
consistency with the WTO  Agreement s. In particular, Japan has submitted written questions to the 
Import Licens ing and TRIMs  Committee s on three  measures: the import regulation on air 
conditioners ; the import licen ce for steel ; and the import regulation for textiles. We expect a prompt 
response from Indonesia. We do hope that import regulations on air conditioners will be opera ted 
so as not to fall under import restrictions, and that licensing standards and procedures will be 
stipulated with more transparency, and that other measures will be corrected or eliminated as soon 
as possible.  
27.19.   The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the f ollowing:  
27.20.   Switzerland shares the concerns expressed by other delegations. According to feedback from 
our exporters, the import of dairy products is repeatedly subject to delays or blockages that are 
incomprehensible.  Since the previous CTG  meeting in April , we would kindly remind Indonesia that 
we are still waiting for further specific information on its current import system. We reiterate our 
request for more details regarding the way in which import licen ces are issued , and also what the 
possible reasons are for difficulties faced by our exporters.  Switzerland stands ready to exchange 
bilaterally with Indonesia in the near future.  
27.21.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
27.22.   As we intervened in April, we would like to take this opportunity to  again underscore our 
concerns with Indonesia 's import and export restricting policies and practices.  The United States has 
raised concerns with specific Indonesian policies in past meetings of the Council, as well as in the 
TRIMs, TBT, ITA, and Market Acc ess Committees.  G/C/M/146  
 
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  27.23.   First, we again ask Indonesia to provide the Council with an update on its review of its local 
content policies which have been ongoing for some time.  We underscore the importance of ensuring 
that its consultations allow for broad public in put. 
27.24.   Second, we continue to have concerns regarding Indonesia 's continued application of tariffs 
on multiple ICT  products that appear to exceed its WTO  bound tariff commitments.  We have raised 
this issue with Indonesia bilaterally and across multiple WTO  committees over the past four  years, 
without a substantive response to our concerns.  We urge Indonesia to engage constructively on this 
issue, and finally address these long -standing concerns to ensure the integrity of its market access 
commit ments.  
27.25.   Third, we are concerned by Indonesia 's continued practice of finalizing trade -related 
measures without sufficient opportunities for stakeholder input.  Indonesia has demonstrated a 
pattern of issuing final measures connected to its Halal product assurance law without sufficient 
notification and with little, if any, opportunities for public input.  These measures have the potential 
to impact a significant p roportion of global goods trade with Indonesia, including U S exports. By 
finalizing measures in this manner, Indonesia misses an opportunity to receive valuable feedback 
from stakeholders regarding the trade impact of its measures.  
27.26.   Additionally, we remain concerned that Indonesia has yet to respond to important questions 
on its Halal measures that we have circulated at the TBT  Committee.  
27.27.   Going forward, we strongly encourage Indonesia to adopt a more transparent and 
consultative policymaking process as well as reconsider its trade -restrictive policies which will 
support its broader economic goals as well as the interest of Indonesian consumers, workers, and 
businesses.  
27.28.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
27.29.   Similar to the United States'  concerns arou nd ICT  products, Canada has also raised this issue 
in the ITA  Committee.  In particular, Canada continues to have systemic concerns with Indonesia 's 
application of tariffs above its bound rates on ICT  products.  Canada calls upon Indonesia to 
implement impor t measures in a transparent and predictable manner, in accordance with relevant 
WTO provisions.  
27.30.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
27.31.   Indonesia thanks Members for their continue d interest in Indonesia 's import and export 
policies and practices . Indonesia reiterate s its position from the previous meetings of the CTG  and 
TRIMs  Committee regarding concerns raised by the European Union and Japan regarding the 
Domestic Component Level (TKDN), according to which TKDN is intended for policies relatin g to 
government procurement, policies relating to meeting needs to maintain welfare, necessities of life 
for Indonesians, and policies relating to strategic resources managed by the state. Indonesia is 
currently conducting multiple reviews of the intended policy, and these studies are still in progress. 
Increasing local products for government purchases, especially those made by central and provincial 
governments, is a current priority for the Indonesian government. Indonesia is dedicated to 
enhancing the b usiness climate through streamlining rules and procedures as a destination for 
investment and exports. Regarding the European Union and Japan's concerns over the textile import 
licensing regime, Indonesia intends to repeat its statement previously delivere d at the CTG, that 
applications for import licensing are currently being carried out electronically , and that, after all the 
licensing documents submitted are complete and appropriate, import permits will be processed 
within a relatively short period of ti me, in accordance with the Import Licensing Agreement. In order 
to comply with Indonesia 's obligations under the TRIMs  Agreement and other WTO  rules, this goal 
is pursued in order to assist investors and strengthen the Indonesian economy.  
27.32.   In response to qu eries about the licensing system for Japanese imports of electronic goods 
and air conditioners , Indonesia has previously stated that the regulation 's primary goals were to 
enhance the licensing system and assure the administration of product import superv ision. 
Applications for import approval are made electronically in accordance with current requirements. 
Following the completion and accuracy of the paperwork, the Import Approval will be performed G/C/M/146  
 
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  quickly and in compliance with the Import Licensing Agree ment. Indonesia therefore believes that 
there are no restrictions on the import of the aforementioned air conditioner goods.  
27.33.   As Indonesia stated at the previous CIL and CTG  meetings, it intends to make sure that all 
steel products entering the Indonesian market can meet standards, specifications, and requirements 
related to health aspects and safety in the use of imported steel products. This is in response to 
concerns regarding the licensing regime for imports of steel products by Japan. Additi onally, 
Indonesia believes that the aforementioned policy is in keeping with the WTO 's principles of 
transparency and non -discrimination, as well as the terms of the Import Licens ing Agreement, and 
is meant to restrict imports through the import licensing system for steel products.  
27.34.   Regarding issues about the licensing system for New Zealand 's imports of agricultural 
products, which have been frequently raised at the Dispute Settlement Body ( DSB) meeting s, 
Indonesia continues to reiterate its resolve to foll ow the recommendations and decisions of the DSB 
by repealing the relevant procedures.  
27.35.   Indonesia reiterate s its position from the previous meeting of the  CTG and  SPS Committee 
on the European Union 's concerns over the import licensing procedures relating to  SPS standards. 
As required by Articles  7 and 8 of the SPS  Agreement , and to take into account EU  interests, 
Indonesia updated the policy in a transparent way, giving justifications and policy developments, 
details of modifications, and the progress of imp lementing policies for each EU  member State. In 
addition, Indonesia considered that the purported unjustified delay by the EU was no longer relevant 
because it had been two  years. Indonesia has demonstrated its dedication to development, 
enhancement, and t ransparency in its approval processes. Indonesia has demonstrated its 
dedication to advancement, reform, and openness in its approval processes. Each EU  member State 
has received a copy of the policy 's development in preparation for the next step in the ap proval 
process.  
27.36.   Indonesia plans to bring up the earlier concern regarding safeguards on carpet product s, 
raised by Japan at both the CTG and the most recent meeting of the Committee on Safeguards . 
Before enacting security measures, Indonesia always follow s protocol, which includes 
announcements and consultations. Before making a decision, Indonesia carefully reviewed all the 
issues brought up by  the interested parties. This course of action was required to repair the 
substantial harm done to the domestic s ector. According to Indonesia, the entire process was 
conducted objectively, measurably, transparently, and in conformity with WTO  regulations.  
27.37.   In essence, Indonesia wants to reaffirm its commitment to upholding all of its obligations 
under all agreements,  rules, and WTO  principles, particularly the principles of transparency and 
non-discrimination. Additionally, Indonesia has never meant to obstruct international trade flows 
through its import and export regulations, particularly those that are connected t o government 
procurement regulations that are focused on ensuring the welfare and basic necessities of the 
Indonesian population . 
27.38.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
27.39.   The Council so agreed . 
28  UNITED STATES – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON APPLES AND PEARS – REQUEST FROM 
THE EUROPEAN UNION  
28.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the req uest of  
the European Union.  
28.2.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
28.3.  The European Union reiterates its well -known concerns as the United States has still not 
solved this unjustified barrier.  This concern is long -standing. All the necessa ry scientific groundwork 
has been carried out.  More than five  years ago, the US  scientific assessment concluded that apples 
and pears from the EU are safe for imports into the United States under the "accepted systems " 
approach.  But the United States  continues to not take the purely administrative step needed to G/C/M/146  
 
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  unblock the situation, namely the publication of a final notice. There is no scientific justification for 
such a delay. The United States is therefore not respecting its obligations under the SPS  Agreement.  
28.4.  In previous meetings, the United States stated that its market is at present already open for 
apples and pears for several EU  member States. However, these exports to the United States can 
only take place under a so -called pre -clearance procedure, which is overly costly and is not  
economically viable for the exporters. Under this procedure only very limited exports are taking 
place. This means that in reality the United States market is closed for apples and pears from the 
European Union.  
28.5.  The European Union reiterates its request and urges the United States to respect its 
obligations under the SPS  Agreement. We urge the US to base its import conditions on science and 
to resolve this important matter without further delay. The EU looks forw ard to continuing working 
together with the United States with a view to resolving this issue expeditiously.  
28.6.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
28.7.  The United States thanks the European Union  for its continued interest in the status of the 
request from eight  EU member States to export apples and pears under a systems approach to the 
United States.  The US  Department of Agriculture continues to work through its administrative 
procedures on this request.  We would again note that the EU is a ble to export apples and pears to 
the United States under the existing pre -clearance program.  
28.8.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
28.9.  The Council so agreed . 
29  INDIA – IMPORT RESTRICTION ON AIR CONDITIONERS – REQUEST FROM JAPAN AND 
THAILAND  
29.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Japan and Thailand.  
29.2.  The delegate of Thailand  indicated the following:  
29.3.  Thailand is compelled to raise our concern once again  regarding India 's import prohibition on 
air conditioners containing refrigerants. Despite our intervention on numerous occasions in various 
WTO bodies and yet absolutely no pro gress has been made so far. In the meantime, Thai exports of 
air conditioners to India continue to be adversely affected by this import measure, which is clearly 
inconsistent with Article  XI:1 and Article  XX of the GATT  1994.  In this regard, Thailand refer s to our 
statements delivered at the meeting of the Committee on Market Access of 26 April 20239, and the 
CTG of 3 April 202310, where the details of these inconsistencies were provided.  
29.4.  However, we would like to ask India once again to explain why, accor ding to India 's 
notification  G/LIC/N/2/IND/21 , the importation of hydrofluorocarbons into India is still allowed g iven 
that a non -automatic import licen ce is granted, yet the importation of the same substance is banned 
if it is contained in an air  conditioner. To us, this is a blatantly self -contradictory and discriminatory 
action.  
29.5.  Last but not least, according to paragraph  4 of Article  1 of the Montreal Protocol , which reads 
"Controlled substance excludes any controlled substance or mixtures which is in a manufactured 
product other than a container used for the transportation or storage of that substance " and 
"Decis ion on Controlled Substances  I/12A ", paragraph  (d), which reads "If a mere dispensing of the 
product from the containers constitutes the intended use of the substance, then that container is 
itself part of a use system and the substance contained in it is,  therefore, excluded from the 
definition. Moreover, paragraph  (e), subparagraph  (ii), of the same Decision clearly states that air 
conditioner is an example of a use system to be considered as products for the purpose of 
paragraph  4 of Article  1 of the Mon treal Protocol. All this means that refrigerants contained in an air 
 
9 See document  G/MA/M/78  paragraphs  27.6-27.10.  
10 See document  G/C/M/145  paragraphs  13.7-13.13. G/C/M/146  
 
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  conditioner are not controlled substances under the Montreal Protocol. Therefore, we are of the view 
that India 's claim that this import restriction on air conditioners containing refrige rants is in line with 
the Montreal Protocol is false and unsupported by facts.  
29.6.  For these reasons, Thailand  reiterate s that India must amend or discontinue the measure as 
soon as possible to ensure that it is in compliance with its commitments under the WTO  and the 
Montreal Protocol . 
29.7.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
29.8.  Japan continues to express its concerns that India 's import ban on air conditioners including 
refrigerants, introduced in October  2020, is a measure that unreasonably imposes a rest ructuring of 
corporate supply chains. Japan is seriously concerned that this measure is likely to constitute an 
import ban that is inconsistent with Article  XI:1 of the GATT , as well as Article  2.1 of the 
TRIMs  Agreement.  
29.9.  India stated in the CTG 's previous meeting that , as reported in the Import Licensing 
Committee ( G/LIC/N/2/IND/21 ), and as pointed out by Indi a in Japan 's recent TPR, it was of the 
view that, taking into account the share of Japanese air conditioners in India over the past 
three  years, it was unfortunate that Japan was handling the matter in the CTG and related 
committees. India also stated  that it was unfortunate that Japan treated this as a case, and that the 
TBT Committee had already dealt with the examination pointed out by Japan.  
29.10.   However, we would like to point out three  things: first, the notification ( G/LIC/N/2/IND/21 ) 
in the Import Licensing Committee relates to the importation of refrigerants themselves, which is a 
different notification from the ref rigerants enclosed in air conditioning equipment, which is the 
subject of this agenda item, and is not related to this measure.  Second, there is no relationship 
between the share of Japan 's air conditioners in India and the fact that the measure is not con sistent 
with the WTO  Agreement . Rather, it could be considered that the share has not increased due to 
import restrictions. We look forward to a good faith and prompt response from India, including a 
response to the written questions we submitted in Septem ber 2020.  Third, while we are aware of 
India's response to the BIS  review by the TBT  Committee, we reiterate our request that the 
significant delays in the certification process for real imports be resolved.  
29.11.   Finally, with regard to the IS  Mark certificatio n system based on the Q COs for air conditioners 
and their parts, which has been reextended to October  2023, and in order to prevent delays in the 
certification procedure for imported products, we would like to ask that the B IS conduct smooth 
overseas factory inspections, or that India consider alternative procedures for certification other than 
overseas factory inspection. If it is difficult to do so, we would like to ask India to again extend the 
date to implement the measures . 
29.12.   The delegate of  the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
29.13.   The Republic of Korea shares the concerns expressed by other Members regarding India 's 
import restriction on air conditioners.  Korea believes that the measure appears to be inconsistent 
with WTO rules, particularly Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994, thereby creating an unnecessary obstacle 
to trade.  The Republic of Korea requests that India resolve the issue in a timely manner. We stand 
ready to further engage with India.  
29.14.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
29.15.   India would like to thank various Members for their continued interest in this issue. We would 
also like to refer to our response provided in other WTO  bodies on this issue.  My delegation has 
already shared details of these measures, the intent and ongoing developments with the delegations.  
This concern has also been discussed bilaterally. We will continue to engage in these discussions 
and try to address the questions raised.  
29.16.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
29.17.   The Council so agreed . G/C/M/146  
 
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  30  CHINA ― DRAFT OF CHINESE RECOMMENDED NATIONAL STANDARD (GB/T) FOR 
OFFICE DEVICES (INFORMATION SECURITY TECHNOLOGY -SECURITY SPECIFICATION 
FOR OFFICE DEVICES) – REQUEST FROM JAPAN  
30.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this ite m had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Japan.  
30.2.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
30.3.  Japan has expressed its concerns during the relevant committees with regard to the 
amendment of the Recommended National Standards of China (GB/T) for office devices , such as 
multifunction peripherals and printers , that are procured by the operators of critical information 
infrastructure . In this regard , we have been informed that the standard would compulsor ily require 
that: (i) office devices , such as multifunction peripherals and printers , including their components , 
are required to be developed, designed and produced in China ; and (ii)  to disclose information to 
prove that office devices and/or their components are developed, designed and produced in China.  
These national standards raise concerns that foreign products, including Japanese products, will be 
discriminated against  by other countries, that trade will be restricted more than necessary, and that 
technology transfer will be forced.  There would be the possibility that this would be inconsistent with 
various WTO  Agreements , including Article  2.1 of the TRIM s Agreement, Articles  2.1 and 2.3, and 
5.1.2 of the TBT Agreement, Article  III:4 of the GATT  1994, and also Article  7.3 of China 's Accession 
Protocol.  
30.4.  We understand that a study is being conducted under the direction of the National Information 
Security Standardization Technical Committee (TC260), and we would like to know the status of the 
study of this draft National Standard and its contents. We would appreciate if China could share the 
facts in this regard, including: (i) the schedule up to the establishment of this National Standard, 
including when it will be open for public comment; (ii) the contents of the draft National Standard, 
in particular the scope of application of this National Standard, including the definition of critical 
information infrastructure operat ors; and ( iii) the provisions requiring the development and 
production of office equipment and its components in China and the provisions requiring information 
proving that the equipment was developed and produced in China. We would like China to share the 
aforementioned  facts with us in good faith.  
30.5.  We have not received any convincing explanation from China regarding the specific concerns 
raised by Japan and other concerned Members at the successive meetings of the TBT  Committee, 
the CTG, the Market Access Committee, the TRIM s Committee, and the Gover nment Procurement 
Committee. We hope that the concerns raised by the concerned Members at this meeting will be 
well-taken care of in the revised draft, and that the draft will be made available for public comment 
with a sufficient period of time to allow i nterested parties to fully express their views on the contents 
of the revised draft.  
30.6.  The measures to be taken by China must eliminate concerns that foreign products will be 
treated in a discriminatory manner due to ambiguities in the wording and regulation s that leave 
room for arbitrary application. Japan strongly hopes that the draft amendment to the National 
Standard will not be implemented in a form that raises concerns, and that measures containing 
similar requirements will not be formulated and introdu ced, not only in the area of multifunction 
peripherals and printers, but also in other areas.  
30.7.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
30.8.  The European Union  intervenes on this issue mainly because of systemic concerns. Based on 
the informat ion available for this measure, the EU is concerned that the revised requirements, if 
enacted, would rule out the possibility for overseas office device providers to participate in 
government procurement in China, as most of their products rely heavily on overseas components.  
The EU would like to emphasi ze that all office equipment cannot be classified as critical information 
infrastructure and underline once again the importance of providing clarity on terms such as "critical 
information infrastructure ". The EU also urges China not to take similar measures in other sectors 
or products.  G/C/M/146  
 
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  30.9.  The delegate of  the Philippines  indicated the following:  
30.10.   The Philippines shares the concerns raised by Japan and the European Union on China 's 
Recommended National Standard f or Office Devices. We also request China to provide clarifications 
particularly on : (i) the definition of critical information infrastructure operators ; and (ii) the possible 
discriminatory treatment of foreign products vis -à-vis the requirement for critic al information 
infrastructure operators to procure office devices and their components that are produced in China.  
30.11.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
30.12.   The Standardization Administration of China has approved the revision plan of this 
recommended  standard. During the comment period for the revision plan, we did  not receive any 
comments from Japan and other Members, despite Japan repeatedly raising this issue in various 
WTO bodies.  We will continue keeping the process transparent and welcome sugges tions and 
comments from Japan, the European Union , the Philippines,  and other Members.  
30.13.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
30.14.   The Council so agreed . 
31  CHINA ― DRAFT REVISION OF CHINESE GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT LAW – 
REQUEST FROM JAPAN  
31.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Japan.  
31.2.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
31.3.  In July of last year, China pu blished a draft for revision of the Government Procurement Law 
(a public hearing draft).  With regard to the scope of the revised law, in addition to "state agencies, 
business units and organizations " in the current Article  2, "other procurement entities " has been 
added in Article  2 and Article  12. With consideration to "other procurement entities ", Article  12 of 
the revised bill refers to "public interest state -owned enterprises that engage in public works and 
operate public infrastructure or public service  networks to realize public purposes ", and adds "other 
procurement entities to which this Law applies and their specific scope of procurement shall be 
determined by the State Council. " 
31.4.  If the scope of application of the Government Procurement Law expands t o include even 
procurement beyond "procurement by governmental agencies ", as stipulated in Article  III:8(a) of 
the GATT, and Local Content Requirement (LCR) is made based on Article  23 of the revised law, 
foreign products, including those from Japan, may be treated discriminator ily and violate Article  III:4 
of the GATT . 
31.5.  In addition to the existing local content requirements regulation, Article  23 of the revised bill, 
which clearly includes "support for domestic industries ", adds a new local content req uirement that 
gives preferential treatment in government procurement for products with a high added value ratio 
within China. Japan would like to point out that this , too, cannot be permitted under the government 
procurement exception of Article  III:8(a) of the GATT , unless it truly falls under government 
procurement, and this local content requirement may also violate Article  III:4 of the GATT  and 
Article  2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement . 
31.6.  At the previous CTG  meeting, China stated that it treats foreign and domes tic Chinese 
companies equally in government procurement, except in matters related to security, but it 
continues to discriminate in the treatment of goods. In addition, at the last CTG  meeting, China 
stated that it would like to discuss the issue within th e framework of the negotiations on the 
accession to the WTO  Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), but as previously mentioned, the 
issue should be addressed by the CTG , as this would leave room for local content requirement 
measures to be implemented in a way that would include procurement beyond "procurement by 
government agencies " as defined in Article  III:8(a) of the GATT. In addition to this, no convincing 
explanation was provided by China at the Government Procurement Committee meeting held in 
June. These new provisions in the proposed amendments represent a move toward, rather than a G/C/M/146  
 
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  failure to meet, the standards required by the GPA, to which China has already been negotiating for 
accession for many years, and which it has yet to apply for accession  to the GPA  and other 
high-standard agreements.  
31.7.  We would like to reiterate that China 's application to join the GPA and other high standard 
agreements cannot help but raise questions as to whether it intends to meet the standards.  
31.8.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
31.9.  We regret that Japan has again raised this issue in this Council, as this is an issue regarding 
government procurement , and one that was already discussed at the Committee on Government 
Procurement in June. We have indicated multiple times in this Council that we are willing to discuss 
this issue with Japan under the framework of China 's accession negotiation to the GPA. We do not 
believe this Council is an appropriate place to discuss this issue.  
31.10.   We would like to reiterate again that supporting domestic products through government 
procurement is a common international practice. We take note that the public procurement in some 
GPA parties also cover s the procurement of public utility State -owned enterprises. With regard to 
adding "other procurement entities " into the scope of government procurement, the main purpose 
is to facilitate the future implementation of international rules after China 's accession to the GPA. 
Japan 's concern will be a ddressed when China joins the GPA, as China will consider the products of 
GPA parties as domestic products after joining the GPA.  
31.11.   China is making great efforts in accelerating the process of its accession to the GPA. We 
hope that GPA parties , including Japan, could actively engage with China and provide realistic and 
pragmatic requests with a view to reaching agreements with China at an early date.  Finally, China 's 
government procurement law revision is still in process. We welcome constructive comments fro m 
all Members.  
31.12.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
31.13.   The Council so agreed . 
32  CHINA ― NEW EXPORT CONTROL LAW IN DRAFT – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN 
UNION AND JAPAN  
32.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the European Union and Japan.  
32.2.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
32.3.  Japan  continues to have concerns over China 's Export Control Law, which entered into force 
in December  2020. The details of export -controlled items and the details of regulations and 
operations are still unclear.  In relation to that, in April 2022, a draft ordinance for the Dual -Use Item 
Export Control (draft of public consultations) was published regarding the operation of the law 
concerning dual -use products. The opacity of the legal operation has not been resolved at all in 
relation to the scope of items subject to regulation and disclosure requirements of techniques, and 
we will continue to request explanations of the details of the regulations related to the law.  
32.4.  In this regard, China stated in the last CTG that "we are currently conducting a comprehensi ve 
review based on the said comments and will continue to work with Japan and interested countries. " 
We would like to know the schedule for future enactment and specific details based on the 
comments.  
32.5.  As we have stated in past CTG  meetings, taking into con sideration the objective of the law to 
safeguard national interests, we would like to reiterate our concerns on the following points in 
particular. First, we are concerned there might be a possibility that the scope of products subject to 
export control is  excessive. Second, we are concerned there might be cases that require unnecessary 
disclosure of its technical information during classification and end -user or usage investigations. 
Third, we are also concerned that the provisions on countermeasures again st export regulations by 
other countries have been maintained in the law. We are concerned that the aforementioned export G/C/M/146  
 
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  restrictions stipulated in this law may constitute an overly stringent export regulation or be 
unnecessary. They may therefore fall un der the export restrictions prohibited in Article  XI of the 
GATT and consequently be inconsistent with the WTO  Agreement.  
32.6.  In addition, we continue to have concerns about the Unreliable Entities List (UEL)  measure 
and the Export Prohibited and Restricted Te chnology List under the Foreign Trade Act, including the 
unclear relationship between the UEL and the Export Administration Act Entity List and Item and 
Technology Lists. In particular, the "Unreliable Entity List " is not clear. In particular, there are 
concerns about whether fairness and transparency in application can be ensured with respect to the 
identification of foreign entities to be included in the "List of Unreliable Entities " and the content of 
measures to be taken against foreign entities, as wel l as the possibility of non -conformity with 
Article  X of the GATT, etc, because the predictability of its operation is extremely low. In addition, 
since the predictability of the operation of the measures is extremely low, the possibility that the 
measures  will be inconsistent with Article  X of the GATT, etc, is noted.  
32.7.  In relation to this, we would like to reiterate that we have concerns with regard to the fact 
that the draft regulations on rare earth s published in January  2021 mentioned a plan to set out 
strategic reserves. We believe that this plan could mean there is a possibility that China might 
introduce controls on exports of rare earth -related products in accordance with the aforementioned 
Export Control law.  
32.8.  We would like to ask about the status of consideration within the Chinese government 
regarding the proposed revisions to the "Inventory of Export Prohibited and Export Controlled 
Technologies in China " enacted in accordance with the Foreign Trade Law and the Regulations on 
the Management of Expor t and Import of Technology, which were published in December  2022. In 
addition, we would like to express our concern about the fact that the proposed revisions include 
items such as silicon manufacturing technology for solar panels, which are subject to re strictions, 
and that exports with little risk of military diversion are excessively restricted.  
32.9.  Finally, on 3 July, China 's Ministry of Commerce announced the introduction of a measure to 
restrict exports of gallium and germanium -related items by means of a permit system, for reasons 
of national security and protection of interests. Japan is concerned about the intention of this 
measure. We therefore request detailed information from China, in particular on what China claims 
to mean by "national security an d protection of interests ", and the detailed procedure of operation 
of the measure.  
32.10.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
32.11.   At the April CTG  meeting, the European Union took note that China is conducting a 
comprehensive review of public  comments to the "Draft Regulation on the Export Control of Dual -Use 
Items ", published in May  2022. The European Union would like to ask China when the review will be 
completed and when the Regulation will be published.  The European Union reiterates the concerns 
it previously expressed in previous meetings of this Council over China 's export control regime, 
notably as regards its extra -territorial application, its rules on deemed exports and re -exports, its 
objectives and scope of controls,  and its risk assessment with regard to destination countries or 
regions and control lists.  
32.12.   The European Union would also like to once again convey its concerns with regard to China 's 
plan for revision of the catalogue of technologies restricted or prohibi ted for export, as stated in the 
comments previously submitted by the EU  Delegation in China to MOFCOM. The European Union 
urges China to address these concerns in upcoming implementing measures.  On 3 July, China 's 
Ministry of Commerce announced that expor ts from China of items containing gallium and 
germanium will require a dual -use export licen ce as of 1  August  2023, on the alleged basis of 
"national security and interests ". The scope of the announced export restrictions is very broad : China 
has not defin ed any technical parameters for these items that would relate to their use in military 
applications. Instead, China seems to restrict all exports of products containing gallium and 
germanium regardless of any specific dual -use concerns.  The European Union is particularly 
concerned about the timing of these new measures and that these export restrictions are unrelated 
to the need to protect international peace and stability or the implementation of China 's 
non-proliferation obligations arising from internati onal treaties.  G/C/M/146  
 
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  32.13.   The European Union invites China to provide information on the scope, including on the 
technical parameters for these controls, and the security -related rationale of the measures.  
32.14.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
32.15.   Canada would like to reiterate its concerns expressed at the three  CTG meetings in 2022 on 
this agenda item, including in respect of the notable differences between China 's Export Control Law 
(ECL) and standard international practice related to export controls.  Canada also thanks the 
European Union and Japan for bringing to the attention of the Council the 3  July 2023 announcement 
by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and the General Administration of Customs on the Export 
Control of Gallium and Germanium -Related Items on  the grounds of protecting national security and  
interests.  Canada would appreciate clarification from China on the specific national security and 
interests these provisions are meant to address.  Canada will closely monitor the implementation of 
these new measures, in particular their consistency with WTO commitments.  
32.16.   The delegate of  the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
32.17.   The Republic of Korea thanks the European Union and Japan for placing this item on the 
agenda.  Korea shares concerns expressed by other Members regarding China 's Export Control  Law. 
Korea is closely monitoring the potential ramifications of China 's recent announcement of export 
restrictions on gallium and germanium, key materials for manufacturing semiconductors, with re gard 
to global supply chains and the multilateral trading system.  Korea expresses its desire for this 
measure to be implemented in a fair and transparent manner in accordance with WTO  principles, 
ensuring that it does not undermine bilateral and multilater al trade relationships.  
32.18.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
32.19.   We note the statements by Japan and the European Union in relation to China 's Export 
Control Law.  As we set out in Australia 's submissions to China 's consultations on these then pro posed 
laws and regulations, we welcomed efforts to codify the regulatory framework for defence export 
controls.  However, Australia still has concerns about the broad scope of the export control law, 
including China 's recent announcement on the implementati on of export controls on gallium and 
germanium -related items on the basis of "national security ". Australia is closely monitoring this 
latest measure in regard to its WTO -consistency and its impact on global supply chains.  
32.20.   We encourage China to continue to  provide greater clarity in relation to key elements of the 
law, including jurisdiction, the scope of administrator powers, how these measures safeguard China 's 
national security, and confirmation that the law is consistent with China 's international 
commi tments , including WTO  rules and the China -Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA).  We 
continue to urge China to take account of the concerns of foreign businesses and Members in the 
implementation of this law and development of any associated measures.  
32.21.   The delegate of  the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
32.22.   The United Kingdom thanks Japan and the European Union for tabling this item on the 
agenda today and would again reiterate the concerns regarding China 's Export Control Law measure.  
We continue to se ek any further clarification possible on what China would define as its "national 
interest " for the purposes of this law; how this law would relate to any export restrictions arising 
from it; as well as further information on how China would decide which "other goods, technologies, 
services " would come within the scope of this law and what the limitations are.  
32.23.   Export restrictions on goods inevitably disrupt global supply chains . The UK joins the calls 
for further transparency from China around their Export Control Law 's implementation.  We would 
welcome China setting out timelines for their response to comments on the Draft Regulation on the 
Export Control of Dual -Use Items and any further guidance they intend to publish that will affect the 
use of the Export  Control Law.  
32.24.   Further, noting the recent reports of China 's intention to place export controls on germanium 
and gallium , we ask China for further clarification on the nature of these policies, the rationale and 
extent to which China intends to apply them.  G/C/M/146  
 
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  32.25.   The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
32.26.   Switzerland would also like to refer to the recent announcement made by the Chinese 
authorities with regard to the export control of gallium and germanium for reasons of national 
security.  This measure i s likely to have a strong impact on the global supply chains and the 
multilateral trad ing system.  Switzerland will therefore analyse the measure and its implementation 
and welcomes further clarifications, especially with regards to its WTO -compatibility.  
32.27.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
32.28.   We refer to the statements made at previous meetings in this Council and would like to 
update the Members concerned that the Daft Regulation on the Export Control of Dual -Use Items 
has been included in the Legi slative Work Plan of the State Council for 2023.  
32.29.   With regard to China 's latest export control on gallium and germanium, we stress that China 
is always committed to keeping the global industrial and supply chains secure and stable. China 's 
export control me asures have always adhered to the principle s of fairness, reasonableness , and 
non-discrimination.  Industrial products and materials containing gallium and germanium can 
apparently be used for both military and civilian purposes. China 's export control on the relevant 
items is a common international practice. Some Members have also imposed export control s on the 
relevant products and materials.  
32.30.   China 's export control s on the relevant items do not target any specific Member. It is not a 
ban on relevant export s. Permit s will be granted if exports comply with China 's relevant laws and 
regulations.  
32.31.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
32.32.   The Council so agreed . 
33  EUROPEAN UNION – RENEGOTIATION OF TARIFF RATE QUOTA COMMITMENTS IN 
RESPONSE TO BREXIT: SYSTEMIC CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM URUGUAY  
33.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Uruguay.  
33.2.  The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
33.3.  Uruguay wishes to reiterate its position and trade and systemic concerns on the issue of 
unilateral modifications of concessions in the form of tariff rate quotas by the European Union under 
Article  XXVIII of the GATT  1994 after Brexit,  in particular with respect to the lack of necessity and 
legal basis under the WTO  Agreements to proceed in this regard.  
33.4.  Uruguay reiterates its disagreement given that so far, notwithstanding the numerous 
instances of bilateral discussions, the European Un ion has not been open to consider even the most 
modest and reasonable requests from my country, despite the damage studies opportunely 
submitted, and the special relevance and sensitivity for Uruguay of the conditions and concessions 
of access to the marke ts under discussion, which require a commensurate consideration.  
33.5.  Uruguay takes advantage of the presentation of communication  G/L/1385/Add.4 , whereby 
the European Union  extends the deadline for concluding the relevant negotiations and consultations 
until 1  January  2024, to reaffirm once again its openness and willingness to seek a mutually agreed 
solution. In this regard, my delegation reiterates its call on the EU to recognize the specific conditions 
and needs of Uruguay and to demonstrate the political will requir ed to reach an agreement.  
33.6.  Finally, without prejudice to the commitments bilaterally agreed between the European Union 
and the United Kingdom, Uruguay once again requests the EU to unequivocally omit the UK from 
the potential users of its tariff rate quotas  in its Schedule of Concessions in the WTO. At the same 
time, Uruguay continues to expect that the EU will proceed to adjust downward the authorized levels 
of Final Bound AMS in its Schedule of Concessions, in line with the announcements made at the 
time. G/C/M/146  
 
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  33.7.  The delegate of Paraguay , addressing Agenda Items  33 and 34, indicated the following:  
33.8.  Paraguay would like to thank the delegation of Uruguay for including this item on the agenda. 
In the interest of time, I will refer to Agenda Items  33 and 34 in this same  intervention.  
33.9.  I would like to highlight the following points of interest to my delegation. In the case of the 
European Union , we wish to know when we will see an equivalent reduction in its list of 
AMS commitments that has been reflected in the United Kin gdom's list of commitments as a result 
of its exit from the EU. In the case of the UK, we reiterate our systemic concerns about the approach 
taken with respect to a number of entitlements that belonged to the EU. This includes the allocation 
of an AMS with out a corresponding reduction in the EU's Schedule of commitments, quota 
partitioning , and the allocation of SSG  duties without minimum access commitments to justify them.  
33.10.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
33.11.   The European Union  is negotiating with its WTO  partners in full respect of the provisions laid 
down in Article  XXVIII of the GATT  1994 as regards the modification of the Schedule.  The European 
Union  has been open to discuss with its WTO partners the proposed TRQ  apportionment. Wh enever 
the WTO  partners have presented valid data and arguments justifying a modification of the proposed 
TRQ volumes, the EU has been open to meet such requests.  
33.12.   WTO partners have also asked the European Union  to exclude the United Kingdom  from 
access to its WTO  erga omnes  TRQs (and vice versa). The EU has fully met this request. This  
provision is laid down in Article  33 of the EU -UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement.  
33.13.   The efforts of the European Union to seek mutually agreed solutions with its WTO  partners 
have given very good results. The EU is pleased to report excellent progress achieved so far with 
the majority of our partners. Agreements have been formally signed with 10 partners, initialled with 
another three  partners , and negotiations and con sultations are close to reaching an agreement with 
other partners.  
33.14.   The European Union  welcomes the increased engagement of many WTO  Members, and 
remains fully committed to continuing these negotiations and consultations and to bring ing them to 
a successful  close in the coming weeks.  
33.15.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
33.16.   The Council so agreed . 
34  UNITED KINGDOM – DRAFT GOODS SCHEDULE AND PROPOSED 
UK TRQ COMMITMENTS: SYSTEMIC CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM URUGUAY  
34.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Uruguay.  
34.2.  The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
34.3.  First, Uruguay wishes to reiterate once again its position and concerns with respect to the 
United Kingdom's claim to have a significant Total Consolidated  AMS of GBP 4,949.3  million , the 
proposed currency conversion in that Member's draft Schedule of Concessions and its implications 
for the proposed leve ls of domestic support and market access commitments , and the UK's intention 
to replicate the rights to invoke the special agricultural safeguard in Article  5 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture for all products and under the same criteria and conditions as those set out in the 
European Union's  Schedule.  
34.4.  Secondly, with respect to the ongoing Article  XXVIII process, my delegation takes advantage 
of the submission of communication  G/L/1386/Add.4 , by which the United Kingdom extends the 
deadline for concluding the relevant negotiations until 1  January  2024, to reaffirm Uruguay's 
openness and willingness to continue working with t he United Kingdom with a view to reaching a 
mutually advantageous agreement, which would allow that Member to have an independent G/C/M/146  
 
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  Schedule of Concessions formally established in the WTO, while safeguarding the legitimate rights 
and interests of our country . 
34.5.  The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
34.6.  Paraguay would like to thank the delegation of Uruguay for including this item on the agenda. 
In the interest of time, I will refer to Agenda I tems 33 and 34 in this same intervention.  
34.7.  I would like to hig hlight the following points of interest to my delegation . In the case of the 
European Union , we wish to know when we will see an equivalent reduction in its list of 
AMS commitments that has been reflected in the United Kingdom's list of commitments as a result 
of its exit from the EU. In the case of the UK, we reiterate our systemic concerns about the approach 
taken with respect to a number of entitlements that belonged to the EU. This includes the allocation 
of an AMS without a c orresponding reduction in the EU's Schedule of commitments, quota 
partitioning , and the allocation of SSG  duties without minimum access commitments to justify them.  
34.8.  The delegate of  the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
34.9.  The United Kingdom would like t o thank Uruguay and Paraguay for their continued interest in 
this process and indeed to thank those Members who have concluded discussions with the UK in 
recent months.  As set out under Agenda Item 3, the new deadline ensures that those Members who 
have ag reed to conclude these talks have sufficient time to progress through their internal 
procedures.  The UK has now been operating on the basis of its own Goods Schedule since 
January  2021, and since that time we have worked with partners to protect existing r ights, 
obligations, and the continuity of trade. We are pleased with the overarching successes this approach 
and our discussions have achieved.  
34.10.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
34.11.   The Council so agreed . 
35  EUROPEAN UNIO N – QUALITY SCHEMES FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND 
FOODSTUFFS – THE REGISTRATION OF CERTAIN TERMS OF CHEESE AS GEOGRAPHICAL 
INDICATIONS – REQUEST FROM NEW ZEALAND AND URUGUAY  
35.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the req uest of  
New Zealand and Uruguay.  
35.2.  The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
35.3.  New Zealand refers the European Union to its previous statements on this matter. 
New Zealand has considered the EU 's response on this matter. However, New Zealand continues to 
raise this item in the C TG because we still see a conflict in the European Commission 's approach to 
protecting the cheese names "Danbo " and "Havarti ", for which there are existing CODEX  standards. 
We remain concerned that the EU 's approach und ermines the integrity of the standards -setting 
system that promotes reliability and consistency in international trade rules, which we would expect 
the EU to support.  
35.4.  The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
35.5.  Uruguay regrets having to include  this item on the agenda again , and wishes to refer to its 
previous interventions, while reaffirming its commercial and systemic concern regarding the 
European Union's decision to register the term Danbo as a protected geographical indication in favour  
of Denmark , despite the objections raised by several Members, such as Argentina, Australia, the 
United States , Kenya, New Zealand,  and Uruguay, as well as  producer organizations, in recent years.  
35.6.  In systemic terms, Uruguay  is concern ed that recognized international standards are being 
disregarded, calling into question the integrity and value of the international harmonization efforts 
undertaken in the Codex Alimentarius. It seems counterintuitive that the international community 
should have made the effort to agree multilaterally 57  years ago, and renew on several occasions 
since then, a Codex standard aimed at ensuring the quality and uniformity of Danbo cheese, only to G/C/M/146  
 
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  have a Member of that international community , which participated in the preparation and renewal 
of that standard , decide unilaterally to arrogate to itself the exclusive right to use the corresponding 
term.  
35.7.  As Uruguay has been pointing out for a long time, Codex Stan  264 establishes the 
characteristics, method of production , and labelling  of the type of cheese known as Danbo, stating 
that this name may be applied to cheese made in accordance with this standard, and that the country 
of origin of the product must be declared, clarifying that it is the country where the cheese was 
made, and n ot the country of origin of the name. The general interpretation of this Codex standard 
is that Members recognize Danbo as a generic term used to refer to a product that can be produced 
in various locations, as long as it complies with the requirements of the standard.  
35.8.  In terms of trade, Uruguay  is concern ed about the creation of unnecessary barriers to the 
marketing of this type of cheese in the EU market , and their extension to third  markets through 
trade agreements. This situation generates uncertainty a bout the legitimate expectations of 
small -scale producers to place their products in third  markets, ignoring the fact that these same 
producers, or their predecessors, gained access to the know -how related to cheese production 
through cooperation program mes offered by Denmark more than 50  years ago.  
35.9.  Uruguay considers that the registration of the term Danbo as a protected geographical 
indication not only contradicts this historical policy of cooperation in cultural matters, but also 
constitutes a negative pr ecedent of the de facto establishment of a monopolistic use of a term 
defined in a Codex standard.  
35.10.   By virtue of the foregoing, and despite the time that has elapsed , and the facts that were 
consummated by turning a deaf ear to the legitimate commercial and  systemic concern raised by 
Uruguay and other Members, my delegation continues to keep this item on the Council's agenda.  
35.11.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
35.12.   Argentina wishes to register its support for this trade concern and thanks Uruguay and New 
Zealand for including it on the agenda. Argentina also wishes to reiterate that the Codex standard 
for Danbo cheese is the international reference standard for the identity and quality of this product 
in the context of the TBT  Agreement. As  this is the international reference standard for the identity 
and quality of "Danbo" cheese, no country basing its technical regulations on this standard should 
encounter trade restrictions due to misappropriation of the term. For Argentina, it is not 
comprehensible  that efforts should be made to agree at the multilateral level on a Codex standard 
for "Danbo" cheese if the use of the term is then to be the exclusive privilege of Danish producers. 
In essence, registering the term "Danbo" as a geographical i ndication constitutes an undue 
restriction on international trade in Danbo cheese. In any case, as Argentina has stated on previous 
occasions, its concerns are not purely commercial , but also encompass systemic aspects, in 
particular the impact on internat ional harmonization efforts.  
35.13.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
35.14.   The European Union takes note of the concerns expressed by New Zealand and Uruguay.  
The EU has provided detailed replies to these concerns at previous CTG  meetings. Th e EU would like 
to underline that its previous statements remain relevant,  and we therefore refer to these.11 
35.15.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
35.16.   The Council so agreed . 
36  INDONESIA – COMMODITY BALANCE MECHANISM – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN 
UNION AND JAPAN  
36.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the European Union and Japan.  
 
11 Document  G/C/M/145 , paragraphs  11.9-11.12.  G/C/M/146  
 
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  36.2.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the fol lowing:  
36.3.  Government Regulation  5/2021 , and Ministry of Trade Regulations  19/2021 and 20/2021 , 
established a commodity balance system , which continues to raise concerns, including because its 
scope of application keeps expanding.  At the last CTG  meeting , the Indonesian delegation 
commented that the commodity balance is aimed at improving the business environment and 
providing certainty for economic operators.  
36.4.  We welcome efforts to ensure a coordinated and streamlined approach on the management 
of import and e xport licen ces. However, the European Union  regrets that the design and 
implementation of the mechanism so far may lead to further restrictions to trade flows – in turn 
raising questions as to the WTO  compatibility of the scheme.  Furthermore, we lack clarity as to the 
actual implementation of the commodity balance, including on its scope and timelines for the 
application to different groups of products. This creates additional challenges for economic operators 
in terms of legal certainty and predictabi lity. 
36.5.  The European Union  again asks Indonesia to clarify the measures that it intends to take for 
the implementation of the "commodity balance " system as the basis for issuing import (and export) 
approvals. We also encourage Indonesia to clarify how it wil l ensure that this mechanism will be 
compliant with Indonesia 's WTO  obligations , and how it delivers on the stated objective of facilitating 
free trade flows – rather than creating a more restrictive business environment.  
36.6.  Finally, the European Union  reiter ates that imports remain necessary as a part of Indonesia 's 
ambition to develop its domestic industry, and that raising barriers to trade would hamper its 
economic growth, which cannot be achieved through export promotion alone.  
36.7.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
36.8.  Under the "Commodity Balance System, " an SPI (Import Permit) is required to be obtained 
for the import of subject products, and the issuance of export and import permits to businesses is 
to be conducted through the "National Commodity B alance System (SNAS -NK)" based on the 
government -determined commodity supply and demand balance, thus it put the existing import 
application and permit system out of operation in December  2022.  However, in January  2023, there 
were delays and glitches in th e operation of SNAS -NK, which is compliant with the system, resulting 
in major disruptions, such as import permits being delayed in the case of steel products.  
36.9.  In the case of iron and steel products, the system has been severely impacted, with import 
applications themselves being blocked for a period of time, inventories have been exhausted, and 
local related industries are facing a situation in which production stoppages are a real possibility.  In 
addition, the number and timing of approvals after applicat ions, including for air conditioners and 
textiles, has been making it impossible to ensure trade stability and predictability, and obstacles to 
imports persist, such as approvals for only a small portion of the applied volume.  
36.10.   We understand that "textile p roducts " are included in the scope of this system, but question 
whether carpets and rugs have been covered by this system in duplicate. If so, we would like to 
know what requirements are in place, and we would be grateful to obtain further details on the 
timetable and arrangements for the application of the commodity balancing system to textile 
products.  
36.11.   Indonesia explained in the previous CTG that the system "is not intended to impede imports 
by WTO  Members, but to improve the business environment for free  trade". However, as seen in the 
actual operation of the system as described before, the commodity balancing system is highly likely 
to violate Article  XI:1 of the GATT and others, as a measure that has a trade -restrictive effect on 
imports. In addition, t he specific formula for calculating the commodity balance and the specific 
method for determining the volume of imports allowed are not specified in the law, which is 
inconsistent with the obligation to publish trade rules under Article  X of the GATT , and in light of the 
significant obstacles to import licensing that have arisen in actual operation, we are concerned that 
the Import Licensing Agreement may also be violated. We are concerned about this and request that 
the situation be remedied as soon as possible.  G/C/M/146  
 
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  36.12.   The delegate of  the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
36.13.   The Republic of Korea shares concerns expressed by other Members regarding Indonesia 's 
Commodity Balance Mechanism.  It has been reported that many businesses are encountering issues 
such as undue delays in the issuance of the recommendations and limited quantity of import quotas, 
stemming from the implementation of the Commodity Balance Mechanism.  In particular, Korea 
believes that Indonesia 's measures , based on its own projections of domestic supply and demand, 
serve as import restrictions and significantly contribute to trade distortions. This appears to be 
inconsistent with Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994. Accordingly, the Republic of Korea requests that 
Indonesia improve the functioni ng of the mechanism so that the system may not operate as a means 
to restrict import quantity virtually.  Korea stands ready to deepen our engagement with Indonesia 
to fully resolve this matter.  
36.14.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
36.15.   The United States joins the European Union  and Japan in again raising concerns regarding 
Indonesia 's commodity balance policy.  Since the policy was implemented, importers have reported 
experiencing significant delays in obtaining import licen ces for certain a gricultural products, as well 
as reductions in the volumes received.  
36.16.   Please explain how the Government of Indonesia is addressing these administrative delays.  
36.17.   Please explain whether importers are entitled to receive a licen ce covering whatever volume 
they request and why there are reports that this is not happening.  
36.18.   The commodity balance policy appears to be stipulated for certain commodities in different 
stages. For example, in 2021, the first  stage stipulated that commodity balances would exist for 
rice, sugar, beef, salt, and fisheries, but it has since been expanded to include non -agricultural 
products. Please explain how the Government of Indonesia determines to which products the policy 
will apply.  
36.19.   Finally, while Indonesia has previously explaine d that this policy was designed to build better 
trade governance and transparency, we strongly urge Indonesia not to expand its policy to other 
products, and to rethink this counter -productive and trade -disruptive goal of import substitution.  
36.20.   The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
36.21.   As indicated in previous meetings of the Council, Switzerland shares the concerns raised by 
the European Union , Japan,  and other Members, regarding Indonesia's  commodity balance 
mechanism, in particular the rationale  for this measure and the implementation details of the 
commodity balance system.  We further remain interested in receiving more information on how 
Indonesia intends to ensure the consistency of these measures with its WTO  obligations.  
36.22.   The delegate of  the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
36.23.   The United Kingdom  shares the concerns raised by Japan and the European Union. Although 
we support Indonesia 's effort to be more transparent, it appears that Indonesian regulations related 
to commodity balance could be trade restrictive.  UK businesses already experience procedural delays 
in entering the Indonesian market, particularly in agricultural and food and drink sectors.  The UK 
also continues to request that Indonesia reconsider its import substitution pr ogramme and reduce 
local content requirements across all sectors.  The UK would welcome further information from 
Indonesia on any future developments regarding this policy and looks forward to future engagement 
on this subject.  
36.24.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
36.25.   The goal of commodity balances is to serve as a vehicle for providing complete, accurate, 
and trustworthy information through an integrated national database system . Indonesia wishes to 
restate its position as set out in the CTG 's pre vious meeting . Additionally, a better business climate, 
corporate certainty, and the free flow of goods are goals of the commodities balance.  G/C/M/146  
 
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  36.26.   Commodity balance will not be an additional burden for Indonesia 's import regime, but it 
will accelerate Indonesia 's import licensing procedures. This is primarily due to the emphasis on the 
principles of simplification and transparency in the Commodity Accounts. The Commodity Balance 
will provide complete, detailed, transparent and accurate data, which will be implem ented by the 
relevant Ministries  and institutions . 
36.27.   Indonesia continues to believe that the commodity balance will streamline import approval 
procedures, increase the ease of doing business, and facilitate transparent trade and forecasting for 
business deve lopment.  
36.28.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
36.29.   The Council so agreed . 
37  US-JAPAN -NETHERLANDS – AGREEMENT ON EXPORT CONTROLS ON SEMICONDUCTOR 
MANUFACTURING EQUIPMENT  – REQUEST FROM CHINA  
37.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
China.  
37.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
37.3.  In February this year, several media reports indicated that the United States , Japan,  and the 
Netherlands had reached an agreement on restricting exports of advanced semiconductor 
manufacturing equipment to China. A relevant enterprise also mentioned the agreement in its press 
release.  
37.4.  In April 's CTG meeting, the United States said, in its statement under this item , that "[T]he 
United St ates takes issue with the agenda item description as put forward by China ".12 The European 
Union  also said that "[T]he European Union takes issue with the description of the agenda point by 
China, as a factual matter ".13 However, after April 's CTG meeting,  there were some new 
development s which lead us to further believe that it is highly likely that there is an agreement 
among the three  Members on this matter.  
37.5.  We note with concern that , following the US  export control measures on semiconductor 
products aga inst China,  issued on 7 October  2022, Japan and the Netherlands also introduced new 
export control measures on semiconductor manufacturing equipment , respectively on 23 May and 
on 30 June 2023. Our question is , if no such agreement exists among the three  Members, could the 
three  Members explain why, within such a short period of time, the three  Members all revised 
relevant laws and regulations in a synchronized manner to introduce new export control measures 
on the same sector , which is the semiconductor in dustry.  
37.6.  It appears to us that the agreement was made under the US ' coercion. The US ' coercive 
practice is not new to this Council. As early as 1995, which was the first  year of the operation of this 
Council, one  Member called the US ' practice de facto coercion , when the United States requested 
this Member to open up its domestic automobiles market. In recent years, we have seen more 
US coercive practice, ranging from steel, aluminium products to semiconductors. The United States 
has continuously abused  export control measures and coerced other Members to suppress and 
contain China 's semiconductor development to serve its own interests at the expense of others. The 
export control has become a tool for the US to achieve its ideological and geopolitical go als. 
37.7.  With regard to Japan 's export controls on 23  types of chip -making equipment, we take note 
with concern that the scope of products subject to new export controls is clearly excessive, as it 
covers the products that have long been removed from the Wasse naar Arrangement. Despite Japan's  
claim that the objective of the measures is to prevent technology from being diverted for military 
use, and to safeguard international peace and security, and that it does not target any specific 
country or region, many pr oducts and related technology among the 23  types of chip -making 
equipment are civilian devices and technology. In addition, the classification of export licensing and 
 
12 Document  G/C/M/145 , paragraph  23.6.  
13 Document  G/C/M/145 , paragraph  23.10.  G/C/M/146  
 
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  groupings of country or region under this export control reflect that the measures adopte d by Japan 
are discriminatory and are targeted against China.  
37.8.  With regard to the new export controls on semiconductor equipment issued by the Dutch 
government, we take note with concern that certain semiconductor equipment will be subject to the 
new export  controls, although these products are not covered by the EU dual-use export control list. 
The measures taken by the Dutch government go beyond the scope of the control list of items of 
the Wassenaar Arrangement and expand the application of the EU  Dual-Use Regulations.  
37.9.  We believe that the latest export control measures taken by the United States , Japan,  and 
the Netherlands clearly deviate from the export control objective and practice widely shared by the 
international community , and are contrary to the pu rpose of the peaceful use of science and 
technology.  
37.10.   Finally, the agreement among the three  Members is not in line with the WTO principles of 
openness and transparency. It also undermines the authority and effectiveness of WTO  rules. We 
request the three  Members to notify the agreement and its follow -up measures to the WTO, and call 
on the WTO to strengthen its monitoring of these measures.  
37.11.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
37.12.   The United States reiterates that it takes issue with the way the issue has been described 
by China. Also, the United States believes that the Council for Trade in Goods is not the appropriate 
forum to discuss national security issues, including export controls.  
37.13.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated th e following:  
37.14.   The European Union  recalls the statement we made in the previous meeting of the CTG. The 
EU continues to take issue with the description of the agenda point by China, as a factual matter. 
Moreover, the type of measures regulated by the GATT ar e those adopted by individual Members. 
The EU 's statement therefore relates to the latter only.  
37.15.   The matter raised by China concerns national export control measures by the Netherlands 
relating to advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment adopted by Re gulation of the Minister 
for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation of 23  June 2023, no. MinBuza.2023.15246 -27 
which was published on 30  June 2023.14 
37.16.   This measure falls under the dual use and export control framework of the European Union. 
This framewor k allows EU  member States to impose additional national export controls based on 
essential security interests.  The measure was adopted, in the same way as all existing restrictions 
of this type, in full conformity with the applicable WTO  rules. Most notabl y, the exceptions of the 
GATT permit Members to take action which they consider necessary for the protection of their 
essential security interests relating to traffic in goods carried on directly or indirectly for supplying 
military forces.  
37.17.   The delegate of  Japan  indicated the following:  
37.18.   On chip export restrictions, Japan has long been conducting strict export control s based on 
the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act, which Japan considers necessary from the perspective 
of maintaining international peace and security and in a manner that is consistent with the 
WTO Agreement.  We will continue to take action in accordance with the aforementioned policy.  
37.19.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
37.20.   The Council so agreed . 
 
14 https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stcrt -2023-18212.html  G/C/M/146  
 
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  38  UNITED STATES – DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE MEASURES IN THE NAME OF 
NATIONAL SECURITY – REQUEST FROM CHINA  
38.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
China.  
38.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
38.3.  We refer to the statement made in previous meeting in this Council.  As the Council is aware, 
since 2018, the United States has taken a large number of trade restrictive measures in the name 
of national security against China and o ther Members. These measures can be placed into 
eight categories:  (i) tariff measures, such as Section 232 tariff measures against imported steel and 
alumin ium products;  (ii) rule of origin measures, such as discriminatory application of origin 
marking;  (iii) direct export restrictions, including extensive export controls on commercial products 
exported to China;  (iv) extra-territorial application of export restrictions, which restrict 
third-countries from export ing products to China even if the products do  not contain any 
"US content "; (v) procurement prohibition  – for example, the US prohibits federal government 
agencies from procuring or using telecommunications products and services from certain Chinese 
companies;  (vi) discriminatory subsidies policies  – such as restricting semiconductor companies 
receiving US  government subsidies from expanding their relevant investment in China;  (vii) market 
authorization prohibitions, which prohibit some Chinese telecommunication equipment from 
obtaining certificates n ecessary for market access;  (viii) ICTS transaction reviews  – such as the 
US review of commercial transactions for a very broad range of ICT  products and services.  
38.4.  We believe that the large and growing number of measures taken by the United States  in the 
name of national security reflects how the US is abusing "national security ". The US believes that 
the application of the "security exemption " provisions is solely "self-judging " and is not subject to 
review by WTO  dispute settlement panels. Howeve r, as indicated by several dispute settlement 
panels, neither the negotiating history of the GATT, the text of the GATT, nor the interpretation of 
the relevant provisions by many other Members agree with the US  claim.  
38.5.  The US  export controls exceeds interna tional practice, and its extraterritorial use clearly 
reflects the extreme of this unilateral approach.  We have witnessed how the United States raised 
tariffs based on groundless , so-called "national security ", and then selectively lowered tariffs only 
for certain Members. This practice shows the discriminatory and arbitrary nature of the US  in 
implementing its trade policy.  
38.6.  Procurement prohibition and ICTS  transaction reviews on Chinese telecommunication 
equipment cover s all sales and imports, including th ose commercial ones. We note with surprise that 
the United States  even consider s China -made EV  battery components a potential threat to 
US national security , therefore requiring discriminatory treatment in its subsidies policy.  
38.7.  The United States believe s that the WTO is "on thin ice " in challenging national security -based 
trade decisions. In fact, it is the US  abuse of national security that really puts the WTO on thin ice. 
By abusing "national security ", the US has broken one  window after another of the mansion of the 
multilateral trading regime, and would give rise to the "broken window theory ", where exemptions 
become the rule and put the rule s-based multilateral trading regime in danger.  
38.8.  Finally, China believes that it is ne cessary to enhance review and monitoring of the practice 
of abusing security exemptions under the WTO  framework.  
38.9.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
38.10.   As we have stated previously, we do not believe that the Council for Trade in Goods is the 
appropriate forum to discuss issues related to national security.  
38.11.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
38.12.   The Council so agreed . G/C/M/146  
 
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  39  EUROPEAN UNION – DEFORESTATION FREE COMMODITIES – REQUEST FROM BRAZIL, 
INDONESIA, AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
39.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Brazil, Indonesia, and the Russian Federation.  
39.2.  The delega te of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
39.3.  Indonesia again conveys its concern regarding the European Union 's DFC  regulation.  
Indonesia has noted that the DFC  regulation will prohibit the import and sale of seven  commodities, 
namely cattle products, cocoa, coffee, rubber, soybeans, wood, palm oil, and their derivative 
products, which have the potential to have an impact and originate from deforestation and forest 
and land degradation.  In addition, the intended DFC  regulation will also impose mandatory due 
diligence on the seven  products. Importers are required to carry out due diligence to show that their 
products are legal and free from deforestation and forest degradation.  
39.4.  In essence, this DFC  law imposes stringen t traceability standards, links the commodity in 
question with the agricultural land where the commodity was produced, and will be challenging for 
SMEs, particularly small farmers, and have a significant impact. Although MSMEs and large industries 
have bee n given a grace period to implement the European Union Deforestation -Free Regulation  
(EUDR ), Indonesia understands that this will still make it challenging for Indonesian farmers, who 
make up the majority and are smallholders, to comply with the rules and be free from deforestation 
and forest degradation and the required due diligence.  
39.5.  Indonesia thus hopes that the European Union will adopt EUDR  indicators that are more 
sensible and well -liked by developing nations like Indonesia,  as well as L DCs. In this i nstance, 
Indonesia also wants to let the European Union know that it has made significant progress (far more 
progress) in terms of sustainability, both through laws and corporate practices that support 
sustainable agriculture and industry. This is true for  both for the government and for business 
players in Indonesia. There are several government initiatives in Indonesia that have backed 
sustainability, such as: Several Indonesian Government policies that have supported sustainability , 
including : (i) Sustai nable Jurisdiction Indicators compiled by the Ministry of National Development 
Planning/Bappenas (The Ministry of National Development Planning/National Development Agency) 
which can accommodate sustainability principles; (ii)  Minister of Agriculture No.  98/2013 concerning 
Guidelines for Plantation Business Licensing; (iii)  Minister of Agriculture No.  38/2020 concerning the 
Implementation of Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil Plantation Certification Articles  28 and 29 , which 
regulate traceability; and (iv)  activities to strengthen the governance of smallholder oil palm 
plantations and the formation of a Task Force (Satgas) to Improve Governance of the Palm Oil 
Industry , which aims to improve governance of the palm oil industry with a focus on smallholders, 
carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture. In addition , Indonesia wishes to ask the European Union 
for clarification of the existence of a high/standard /low-risk assessment of WTO  Members based on 
an assessment completed by the European Union under Article  29 of the EUDR regarding assessment 
of countries . Information provided by non -governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as other 
stakeholders , including indigenous peoples and civil society organizations, as well as WTO  Members 
and corporate actor s (operators), will also be used in the intended assessment. Indonesia wishes to 
seek clarification in this instance regarding the standards for third  parties permitted to submit the 
assessment as well as the format of the assessment methodology to be appl ied, given the vast array 
of assessment sources the European Union is permitted to employ.  
39.6.  Indonesia believes that the intended DFC regulation has the potential to provide different 
treatment between European Union domestic products and imported products, creates unnecessary 
barriers to international trade, and threaten s the livelihoods of small farmers, such that it can disrupt 
product market access and agriculture in developing countries and LDCs that are not compliant with 
Article  4.2 of the WTO  AoA concerning agricultural market access . 
39.7.  Indonesia also believes that the EUDR 's Article  1 definition of the "7 (seven) products and 
their derivatives " is not supported by sufficient scientific evidence and that the majority of the goods 
it covers are imports th at are not made domestically by the European Union. The MFN and national 
treatment principles, as well as the less favourable  treatment outlined in Article  2.1 of the 
TBT Agreement, may be violated, as well as other WTO  norms and principles.  G/C/M/146  
 
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  39.8.  In relation to  this issue, Indonesia emphasizes that the European Union needs to consider the 
CBDR -RC principles in the process of formulating and implementing trade policies related to the 
environment and climate change, including DFC  regulations, as contained in discu ssions at the 
UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement.  In addition, Indonesia also plans to remind the European Union 
that any trade policy relating to the environment and climate change must be supported by objective 
research and scientific data in order to avoid devolving into covert protectionism and to be consistent 
with the objectives of achieving sustainable development  by taking into account social and economic 
factors.  
39.9.  The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
39.10.   Brazil refers to its previous statements o n this topic and reiterates its concerns regarding 
the European Regulation on Deforestation and Forest Degradation -Free Supply Chains. We believe 
that the European regulation establishes an illegitimate obstacle to international trade, is strongly 
discrimi natory in nature, and will have little impact on its alleged goal of reducing deforestation and 
forest degradation.  
39.11.   The Brazilian Government considers curbing deforestation a first order priority. In our 
Nationally Determined Contribution to the UNFCCC  Paris Agreement, Brazil pledged to strive to end 
illegal deforestation in the Amazon by 2028. Last month, the Brazilian Government has launched a 
new phase of our Action Plan for Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Amazon that steps 
up even further  the ambition of our efforts through a vast array of different measures, with the goal 
of achieving net zero deforestation by 2030.  
39.12.   Our experience shows that deforestation is a multivariable problem that should be tackled 
through comprehensive public polic ies in the short, medium and long term. Law enforcement against 
illegal deforestation is absolutely crucial, and – in the first five  months of 2023 alone – the Brazilian 
Government has applied more than USD  400 million dollars in fines and severely increased seizure 
of goods related to environmental violation and embargoes. But , on the other hand, alternative 
means of livelihood must be made available to the millions of people that live near forests.  
39.13.   Sustainable development only materializes through the improvement of its three  core 
dimensions: economic, social , and environmental. International trade has a proven beneficial effect 
by providing opportunities for medium and small companies, as well as for families, to access new 
markets and improve thei r income, escape poverty , and improve their economic and social 
conditions. Frequently , this is also a necessary step to enable those stakeholders to improve their 
environmental practices. These effects have been repeatedly acknowledged and demonstrated by  
several UN  agencies, the WTO, and the European Union itself.  
39.14.   Nevertheless, the  European proposal  focuses solely on restricting trade. It envisages a ban 
on the trade of several commodities based on a concept of "deforestation -free products " which 
diverges  from the 2030  Agenda for Sustainable Development and all relevant multilateral 
environmental agreements, including the UNFCCC and the CBD, which acknowledge the importance 
of notions such as sustainable use, ecosystem regeneration , and reforestation.  
39.15.   The European Union's  regulation is, therefore, likely to have very little impact in terms of 
actually reducing deforestation. It lacks provisions or pathways for rehabilitation, and offers no 
incentive for struggling producers to improve their practices. Inste ad, it promotes disengagement 
and punishes even those producers that have been acting in accordance with domestic law and 
international standards of sustainability.  
39.16.   The European regulation also sets up a country -based benchmarking system with a tiered 
classification that would impose different treatments to Members according to criteria unilaterally 
set by the European Union. By mandating "enhanced scrutiny " over products originating from 
high-risk areas, it could stigmatize entire countries and penalize ev en producers within those areas 
effectively adopting sustainable practices. More than that, it could promote trade diversion, as 
operators interested in avoiding heavy compliance burdens would have an incentive to reduce 
exchanges with countries deemed as "high risk ". 
39.17.   Finally, the criteria used to evaluate the risk of non -compliance with the regulation are not 
sufficiently clear and objective. They may be applied in a discretionary manner by the Commission. G/C/M/146  
 
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  In addition, those criteria are not internationall y agreed and there is no harmonized methodology to 
assess and evaluate them.  
39.18.   Throughout the years, we have consistently voiced our concerns to the European Union 
without having them addressed and without being able to debate this measure on a meaningful 
basis. We look forward to cooperat ing with the European Union  on shaping an effective and inclusive 
response to deforestation. In Brazil' s view, that can only be accomplished by a cooperative 
framework that engages producers with positive incentive s for chan ge towards better and more 
sustainable production practices.  
39.19.   The delegate of  the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
39.20.   The Russian Federation reiterates its position regarding this issue, which was stated during 
the previous meetings of the CTE, CMA , and CTG.  The Regulation constitutes yet another example 
of the protectionist policy conducted by the EU under the cloak of climate change.  It introduces a 
prohibition to make products available on the EU  market or to export products from the EU, unless 
all the following conditions are fulfilled by the products covered by the Regulation , namely : (a) they 
are deforestation -free; (b) they have been produced in accordance with the relevant legislation of 
the country of production; and  (c) they are covered by a due diligence statement.  
39.21.   With this regulation , the European Union not only seeks cross -border application of its 
regulation, but also seeks to determine if an imported product complies with the legislation of the 
country of its origin or not.  The role of judge is assigned to the operator, who shall verify and analyse 
the collected information, as well as to carry out a risk assessment in order to determine if there is 
a risk that the relevant products intended to be placed on the market are non -compliant, including 
with the relevant legislation of the country of production.  
39.22.   The risk assessment should include, inter alia : (i) the presence of indigenous peoples in the 
country of production or parts thereof;  (ii) the consultation and cooperation in  good faith with 
indigenous peoples in the country of production or parts thereof;  and (iii)  concerns in relation to the 
country of production and origin or parts thereof, such as level of corruption, prevalence of document 
and data falsification, lack of law enforcement, violations of international human rights, armed 
conflict or presence of sanctions imposed by the UN  Security Council or the Council of the European 
Union.  
39.23.   In this context, we are wondering: how do these criteria relate to climate change? On what 
international agreements does the European Union  base these requirements to be met by the 
WTO Members? Has the EU considered other options for resolving the issue of deforestation at 
relevant international platforms? If so, has it led to any results ? 
39.24.   The Regulation, up to the present moment, covers trade in live cattle, meat and meat 
products, cocoa, coffee, oil palm, rubber, soya, and wood. However, this list might be extended in 
the future.  In our view, this Regulation provides a simple quantitativ e restriction violating the 
WTO rules. Thus, we urge the European Union  to bring its measures in to consistency with the 
WTO norms.  
39.25.   The delegate of Ecuador  indicated the following:  
39.26.   First of all, my delegation would like to thank you for including this item on the agenda of 
this meeting. Ecuador considers that the European Union's  deforestation -free regulation  has 
discriminatory features, because it addresses specific products, qualif ied as "drivers of deforestation 
and degradation", in order to stop the expansion of agricultural land. These products include palm 
oil, cocoa, coffee, rubber, cattle, timber, and soybeans, as well as some of their derivatives such as 
chocolate, furniture,  tyres, printed products, etc. These crops are basic products of several 
developing economies, including Ecuador.  
39.27.   My country has worked for the fulfilment  of the commitments of the Paris Agreement with 
the objective of achieving a balance between economic development, social development, and 
environmental sustainability. However, the European Union's deforestation -free proposal lacks this 
balance.  The new E U deforestation regulation would create barriers for small farmers, as it imposes 
obligations such as those concerning the geolocation of their crops.  As we can anticipate, there will G/C/M/146  
 
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  be additional production costs to comply with this new regulation. This  new regulation  would not 
affect EU  companies or local consumers to a great degree, but the greatest impact will obviously be 
on the Ecuadorian production and export sector.  
39.28.   In conclusion, Ecuador considers that this regulation poses a great risk to the glo bal 
commodity market, especially considering that developing countries are still struggling to recover 
from the effects of the COVID -19 pandemic.  
39.29.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
39.30.   India would  like to thank the delegation of the European Union for its recent engagement on 
the European Green Deal -related issues in the June  2023 edition of Trade and Environment week. 
We also acknowledge the bilateral engagement on these issues , including in the first India –European 
Union Trade and Technology Counc il. 
39.31.   India has raised its concerns on the proposed European Union measures under the C BAM, 
Deforestation -Free Commodities and other Green Deal proposals in various forums. Most recently, 
India submitted a paper in document  JOB/TE/78  to the March  2023 meeting of the Committee on 
Trade and Environment , which pointed out that we are witnessing potential trade fragmentation if 
Members continue to take unilateral trade measures which apply extra -territorially. We also urged 
the need to act in accordance with the principle s of common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities (CBDR -RC), as well as honouring the nationally determined contributions 
(NDCs).  
39.32.   The measure as proposed right now will hurt agriculture exports in the chosen commodities 
to the European Union . Its worst effects will be felt by small and marginal farmers in developing 
countries. The agriculture sector in developing countries , including India,  is a key driver for 
employment , as well as the economic well -being of a large part of the po pulation, especially women 
and those associated with MSMEs. It is unfortunate that the EU is making policy choices which 
directly harm the economic interests of these socio -economic groups.  
39.33.   The delegate of Peru indicated the following:  
39.34.   Peru would first like to thank the delegations that have raised this agenda item.  In this 
regard, we would like to share our concern over the recent approval of this regulation and its prompt 
entry into force, since we believe it could result in major disruptions to trade flows in products that 
fall under its scope, especially in those chains involving small -scale producers.  
39.35.   We believe a multilateral setting is the appropriate space in which to develop this kind of 
initiative, sinc e unilateral actions such as the one in question do not take into account the different 
realties and efforts of different countries, whose producers and exporters will ultimately be the ones 
required to comply with this measure.  In the case of Peru, export s of the products covered by the 
European Union 's regulation form a significant share of Peru's agricultural exports to the world, 
which meet high quality and sustainability standards.  
39.36.   Palm oil, cocoa, coffee and timber have value chains with Europe, North  America and Asia 
as their primary markets. More specifically, the total export value of these four products reached 
USD 2,095 million, a 39% increase compared to total exports in 2021, with the European Union 
being one of the main destinations and the pri mary driver of this export growth. These value chains 
include thousands of small -scale producers (200,000 for coffee and 90,000 for cocoa, for example). 
This is why policies that impact products like these have major repercussions for exports from our 
country overall and, ultimately, for our economy, affecting thousands of producers whose livelihoods 
depend on the sale and export of such goods.  
39.37.   Furthermore, we are concerned that there are still many aspects of this European regulation 
that remain unclear or  require supplementary regulations. In practice, this means that the actual 
time-frame operators and exporters have to bring themselves into line will be far shorter than the 
18-month time -frame set out for implementation.  For example, the EU  regulation do es not specify 
what documents operators will require for exporters to be able to prove their products are 
deforestation -free and that they comply with the legal parameters established.  The time -frames for G/C/M/146  
 
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  all the procedures envisaged by the regulation are also not specified, which will result in significant 
discretion and ambiguity in their implementation that may affect trade.  
39.38.   Our concerns are based on our first -hand experience of implementing the EU  regulation on 
a due diligence process for timber exports , which will soon be replaced by the regulation on 
deforestation -free products. Both the regulation currently in force and the regulation set to enter 
into force in 2025 lack clarity with regard to the documents required by customs authorities and the 
time-frames for procedures. This has resulted in Peruvian containers being held in Belgium for over 
one year and four  months, for instance, without us being informed of the reasons for this, exactly 
what documents were required to release the containers, or ho w long it would take the customs 
authorities to resolve the matter. Even the Commission itself was unable to obtain this information 
and share it in a bilateral setting.  
39.39.   Moreover, this regulation appears to favour European Union member States and nationals  
over third countries given that it establishes an ample time -frame of six  months for EU  members to 
simply provide notification of the competent authorities responsible for complying with the 
obligations under the regulation, while third  countries are expe cted to implement complicated 
processes within 18  months, including in relation to traceability, geolocation and the monitoring of 
agricultural chains involving hundreds of thousands of producers. Furthermore, it establishes a 
special time -frame of 24  months to implement the regulation in SMEs within the bloc, whereas 
MSMEs and small -scale producers from third  countries that are suppliers to the chains will have to 
comply with all the requirements within the aforementioned 18 -month time -frame.  
39.40.   Under this re gulation, countries will unilaterally be assigned a deforestation risk rating, the 
specific criteria and methodology for which have not been communicated or coordinated with the 
countries potentially affected. In this respect, if the rating is based on gen eral indices and does not 
take into account the specific circumstances that may arise in each country, it could have a negative 
effect on producers and exporters from low -risk areas, putting them at a disadvantage in relation to 
like products from other co untries.  
39.41.   We believe there are many ways to tackle deforestation, and we find it regrettable that the 
EU regulation selects only one particular option that does not, for instance, encourage the adoption 
of reforestation measures, since it will not allow exp orts from reforested areas. As a result, small -
scale producers that have struck a harmonious balance between farming and taking care of forests 
will be deprived of the opportunity to continue pursuing economic activities to lift themselves out of 
poverty.  
39.42.   All WTO  Members are committed to addressing the threat of climate change, global warming 
and deforestation; however, the decision on how to tackle these issues should not be taken 
unilaterally if it depends on the actions of third parties, and we should no t adopt measures that 
impose needless restrictions on trade, which is a tool for growth and sustainable development.  
Additionally, we cannot lose sight of the fact that one of the main drivers of deforestation is poverty, 
which international trade offers u s tools to combat, for instance through trade in several of the 
products affected by this European regulation, and that, in the case of Peru, some of the products 
concerned also serve as alternative crops to illicit crops.  
39.43.   In conclusion, we believe this re gulation should be implemented only once an in -depth 
discussion on the matter has been held in a multilateral setting, there is clarity on the requirements 
and time -frames laid down, and we have certainty that the proponents of the regulation, i.e. the 
Commission, have the necessary capacity to resolve any issues its implementation may cause.  
39.44.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
39.45.   Allow me to thank the delegations of Brazil, Indonesia,  and the Russian Federation for 
including this topic on today's agenda.  Paraguay thanks the European Union for the briefing held 
during the Trade and Environment Week , the recent publication of a document with frequently asked 
questions , and the bilateral discussions. However, Members' concerns and queries persist , as 
evidenced by the trade concerns and discussions on the European Regulation for deforestation -free 
commodities in the various WTO  committees.  G/C/M/146  
 
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  39.46.   The issue was addressed at the last meeting of the Committee on Agriculture held last June. 
On that occasion, the delegations of Brazil and China presented questions under AG  IMS ID 105034. 
The European Union  responded that farmers receiving CAP  payments under environmental 
program mes must set aside at lea st 4% of their arable land as non -productive areas and conditions 
that benefit biodiversity.  In this regard, we note that under Annex  II, Item 10 of the A oA, "Structural 
readjustment assistance provided through drawdown programs," the EU has notified 
EUR 152.3 million in subsidies for afforestation of agricultural land.  We deeply regret the lack of 
equivalence measures in the European Regulation. Chair, allow me to remind you that in Paraguay, 
in the lands where land use change is still allowed, our farmers  must maintain 40%, not 4%, of 
forests, and this they must do by legal obligation, not because they receive subsidies.  
39.47.   Additionally, Chair, on that occasion , the European Union indicated that it maintain ed 
two cooperation program mes for the five -year perio d 2021 -2024 in order to facilitate the just 
transition of developing countries, for a combined amount of EUR 3.5 billion. This would be 
equivalent to about EUR 700 million per year for all developing countries.  Let me contextualize the 
numbers to put them in perspective. In one  year, the EU  provided voluntary coupled aid and 
transitional national aid to the milk and dairy sector of EUR  919.1  million, while reporting a current 
total AMS for butter alone of almost EUR  3 billion. However, EUR 700 million per year is expected to 
be sufficient to finance the transition for all developing countries.  
39.48.   In addition to these shortfalls, there are also some questions about the restoration 
obligations included, for example, in the Kunming -Montreal Global Bio diversity Framework.  The 
Framework established the objective of protecting 30% of the planet's surface, which to some extent 
could imply an additional obligation to developing countries, as they are home to the remaining 
ecosystems, but at the same time it  sets the objective of restoring 30% of degraded ecosystems, 
which implies a relative burden on developed countries, as their development processes involved 
massive deforestation processes that we can still observe today.  However, we see that in the 
Europe an Parliament the proposal to restore damaged ecosystems and recover nature throughout 
Europe15 does not even have the required majority in the Committee on the Environment.  With this 
it would seem that the EU is enlisted to fulfil its restoration obligati ons but at the same time demands 
greater conservation commitments from its trading partners than those agreed internationally and 
assumed autonomously by them.  
39.49.   How is this consistent with the objective pursued by the European Union with this measure ? 
And how is it consistent with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective responsibilities in light of national circumstances and nationally determined contributions?  
39.50.   The European Union  has previously responded that the obligation and requirements are not 
discriminatory as they apply equally to products originating in the EU. However, most of the products 
covered are not produced in the EU , and most of the deforestation in the EU was pri or to the selected 
cut-off date , so we again request clarification as to how it avoids discrimination in its application.  
39.51.   This, added to the resistance to restore  ecosystems , would seem to indicate at least a great 
inconsistency between the stated objectiv es of the measure and the European Union's  actions , if not 
a disguised restriction on trade , especially for products that are produced in the EU, or those not 
produced  in the EU  (e.g. palm oil) , but for which there are similar domestic products (rapeseed o il). 
39.52.   The delegate of Türkiye  indicated the following:  
39.53.   Companies that use products that fall within the scope of this regulation as inputs in their 
production or that trade in these products are obliged to show that the products are produced in a 
way that does not cause deforestation to be able to enter into the EU  market. The strictness of 
demonstration responsibilities will be determined in accordance with the risk classification made by 
the EU. Therefore, it is crucial that the EU work with its partner countries in making these 
categori zations , and that it base its determinations on solid scientific data.  
39.54.   Türkiye  also believe s that the technical requirements of the proposed regulation , like 
certification or verification , that third country operators will face should not be  so overburdensome 
as to discourage small producers from supply chains because of the resulting administrative burden.  
 
15 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/es/press -room/20230626IPR00847/no -majority -in-committee -
for-proposed -eu-nature -restoration -law-as-amended   G/C/M/146  
 
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  Moreover , in order to ensure  that this regulation is not unnecessarily restricting the trade of any 
product, possi ble extensions in scope of the legislation should be determined on the basis of solid 
data showing that the products covered are indeed the biggest contributors to global deforestation.  
39.55.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
39.56.   Argentina wishes to  place on record its support for this trade concern and thanks the 
delegations that included it in the agenda. Argentina is closely following the European Union's 
legislative process , and we would like to express our concern about the concept of a single m odel 
that the EU  intends to impose, which does not take into account the different characteristics of the 
production models of the various countries. We also reiterate that the regulations must be 
compatible with the WTO rules. Argentina considers that it is necessary that the new regulations 
derived from the European Green Pact respect the commitments of the EU before the WTO , and be 
based on scientific evidence, in order to ensure that its measures do not constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable d iscrimination, or a disguised restriction on international trade.  
39.57.   Argentina shares Europe's concerns about climate change , and especially shares the 
objective of sustainable food production, taking into account the current challenges of safeguarding 
food s ecurity under changing climatic conditions. At the same time, it should be taken into account 
that there are regional and national differences in natural resources, environmental challenges, and 
the impacts of climate change, so that best practices in one  region of the world may be different 
from those in another.  
39.58.   Within this framework, Argentina is convinced that there is no single model for achieving 
environmental protection, and that environmental degradation, including climate change, must be 
combated r especting the central principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. Therefore, 
solutions must be adapted to local realities, and the policies and initiatives proposed for the 
legitimate purpose of environmental protection must be flexible, pragm atic, implementable and 
realistic, as well as the most effective in achieving the desired objective and the least trade restrictive 
to that end.  
39.59.   Particularly with respect to the regulation on deforestation, we are concerned that it does 
not contemplate mea sures that could be less restrictive in commercial terms to achieve the 
environmental objective sought. On the contrary, the regulation applies the same EU  standards at 
a global level, without clarifying the criteria established by the EU or the scientific  basis for 
determining "high", "medium" and "low" risk countries, given that there could be different local and 
regional realities in each country with respect to forest conservation, and therefore generalizations 
should be avoided. Similarly, by imposing mandatory and more onerous due diligence requirements 
on countries classified as high risk than on others, the EU will apply more demanding and more trade 
restrictive criteria to certain countries classified by the EU  itself as "high risk", which could be 
inconsistent with the WTO rules. Furthermore, the proposed approach is inconsistent with the 
historical responsibilities for environmental degradation of developed countries, including the EU, by 
setting a baseline of 2020, without considering the changes in land use and deforestation that have 
occurred since the Industrial Revolution in these countries, effectively penalizing developing 
countries, inconsistent with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.  
39.60.   In summary, Argentina wishes to  emphasize the importance of avoiding unilateral actions 
without due legal or multilateral support, or the necessary scientific basis, which result in covert 
restrictions on international trade in the name of the environment.  
39.61.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
39.62.   The EU  Regulation on deforestation -free supply chains entered into force on 29  June 2023. 
It will enter into application on 29  December  2024, with an additional 6 -month flexibility for SMEs.  
The Regulation aims at ad dressing the main driver of deforestation and forest degradation: the 
expansion of agricultural land, linked in particular to the production of a series of commodities of 
which the EU is a major consumer , namely beef, wood, palm oil, soya, coffee, cocoa, and rubber.  
The final text of the Regulation has now been published in the Official Journal.  
39.63.   The European Union  held an information session on 14  June during the WTO  Trade  and 
Environment Week to explain the practical implications of the Regulation, and ans wered the various G/C/M/146  
 
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  technical questions that Members and Stakeholders had. We will continue our engagement in the 
WTO in the future , in addition to the bilateral exchanges we are having with the countries that are 
most affected.  The European Union would also  like to inform Members that last week the Commission 
issued a "Frequently Asked Questions " document to support the compliance by operators and 
traders, in particular SMEs, with the requirements of this Regulation. We invite partners to consult 
that docume nt. 
39.64.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
39.65.   The Council so agreed . 
40  EUROPEAN UNION – THE EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION  
40.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the Russian Federation.  
40.2.  The delegate of  the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
40.3.  The Russian Federation reiterates the statements made during the previous meetings of the 
CTG. Under the umbrella of the Green  Deal, the European Union  is implementing many measures 
aimed at restricting trade , including the CBAM, the Regulation on deforestation, Chemical Strategy, 
additional requirements for new batteries, and a new proposal on packaging and packaging waste , 
etc. Under the Green Deal, the European Union  establishes new charges, quantitative restrictions, 
including import and export prohibitions, and new technical requirements in the absence of 
international standards. All these measures are subject to discussions at the relevant WTO  working 
bodies.  We would like to note that these measures lead to a growth in protectionism and undermine 
the multilateral trading system.  We would be grateful for the European Union's explanation of 
whether or not there is a scientific  justification for the proposed measures. What effect will they 
provide in terms of combating climate change? Does the EU consider any other alternatives to the 
proposed measures?  To conclude, the Russian Federation would like to urge the European Union  one 
more time to respect the WTO  rules and international agreements in the field of environmental 
protection.  
40.4.  The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
40.5.  Uruguay would like to thank the delegations of Brazil, China, Indonesia and Russia for raising 
various STCs regarding EU policies within the framework of the European Green Deal. These 
concerns are addressed under Agenda Items 22, 39 and 40.  My delegation agrees with several of 
the points raised in the statements of a number of delegations, including Brazil and Paraguay, in 
particular under item  22 of the agenda.  
40.6.  Uruguay shares the objectives of combating climate change and protecting the environment, 
as reflected in the commitments that it has made under the multilateral agreements on the ma tter, 
including the Paris Agreement, and the policies adopted to comply with those agreements.  However, 
Uruguay remains concerned at the attempts to impose the view that there is only one single model 
of production and sustainable development that should b e emulated worldwide, without taking into 
account the local characteristics and specific conditions of different countries and regions, the 
realities of their production systems and their relative contributions to the problems that need to be 
addressed.  
40.7.  Also cause for concern are t he excessively restrictive effects that the practical implementation 
of several of the strategies and policies announced in the European Green Deal, such as those 
mentioned under previous agenda items, may have on international tr ade and production beyond 
the borders of the European Union, as well as the possible inconsistencies between those strategies 
and policies and the WTO rules.  
40.8.  In view of the above, Uruguay urges the European Union to ensure the compatibility of its 
trade and environmental measures with the principles, commitments and obligations of both the 
WTO Agreements and the multilateral environmental agreements.  G/C/M/146  
 
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  40.9.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
40.10.   For well -known reasons, we will not be r esponding to the Russian Federation  and refers to 
the statement we will deliver under Agenda Item  44. In response to the comments by Uruguay , we 
have set ourselves ambitious targets in the Paris Agreement. We have made significant progress 
this December in  the Kunming -Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework and are continuing to engage 
in multilateral environmental agreements tackling pollution (Basel, Rotterdam, Stockholm and 
Minamata conventions). This requires all of us to step up efforts, internationally  and through national 
policies to put our commitments into action.  
40.11.   Non-action is not an option. The question is not "if", but how we design policies while 
ensuring their WTO  compatibility and minimi zing the negative spill -over effects.  
40.12.   The European Union  has laid out the path in the European Green Deal. The initiative 
comprises many policy actions tackling reduction of carbon footprint and halting biodiversity loss 
from a number of angles. Boosting circular economy, creating sustainable food systems, gree ning 
our Common Agricultural Policy, and investing in renewable energy are just a few examples of the 
policy initiatives taken in this context.  
40.13.   Conscious about the potential relevance of these measures for the European Union's trading 
partners and the need  to comply with WTO  rules, the EU has designed all its European Green Deal 
measures very carefully.  We have also developed an external strategy for design and implementation 
stages that is based on the principles of transparency, engagement, and respect of  international 
commitments.  We have engaged with third  countries already in the very early stages – through 
public consultations, bilateral meetings, and engagement in the WTO.  And w e are continuing all 
these efforts at the implementation stage. We have or ganized two  information sessions during the 
recent WTO  Trade and Environment Week to hear the concerns and answer all technical questions 
our trading partners may have.  
40.14.   We are further considering how to work together, including on how to facilitate the 
implementation through all possible tools and mechanisms , such as : guidelines to operators; 
approaches to recogni ze the efforts that third  countries (or companies) make; and to give 
third-country stakeholders a voice in the development of implementation tools  for instance through 
the Deforestation Platform or CBAM  methodologies expert group.  We are also working with our 
international partnership colleagues to see how capacity building can help countries meet 
EU requirements.  
40.15.   To conclude, w e can only deliver on  our international commitments if we take national action. 
But we also need to work together to ensure we preserve a liveable planet for future generations.  
40.16.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
40.17.   The Council so agreed . 
41  SRI LANKA – IMPORT BAN ON VARIOUS PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM THAILAND  
41.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Thailand.  
41.2.  The delegate of Thailand  indicated the following:  
41.3.  Thailand would like once again to raise our concern on Sri Lanka 's import bans according to 
the Imports and Exports (Control) Regulations No.  02/2020 and No.  03/2020 which still have 
significantly impacted Thailand 's exports to Sri Lanka, especially small passenger vehicles.  Having 
said th at, Thailand keenly follows the economic situation in Sri Lanka and understands that the 
balance -of-payments problems of the country still necessitates the continued implementation of 
such import bans. Nevertheless, we congratulate Sri Lanka on the success ful negotiation with the 
International Monetary Fund that secured an approximately USD  3 billion economic relief package , 
which should help set the country on the path towards economic recovery and the relaxation of its 
import control measures. In this reg ard, we welcome the Imports and Exports Regulations G/C/M/146  
 
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  No. 09/2023 , dated 9  June 2023, discontinuing the import control of 286  product items, which 
unfortunately do not include small passenger vehicles.  
41.4.  In light of this, Thailand would, therefore, like to req uest Sri Lanka to further relax its import 
restrictive measures, especially the small passenger vehicles, that has been in effect since 
June 2020. In addition, Thailand encourage s Sri Lanka to inform Members of the timeline for the 
removal of its import re strictions in the future. Finally, we urge Sri Lanka to notify the measures to 
the WTO as soon as possible.  
41.5.  The delegate of Sri Lanka  indicated the following:  
41.6.  Sri Lanka thanks Thailand for its continuous interest in Sri Lanka's import trade policy 
measures , which have been introduced on a temporary basis to curb the adverse impact of the 
COVID -19 pandemic. At the meeting of the Committee on Market Access held on 27  April 2023, my 
delegation mentioned that positive steps would be taken by Sri Lanka to remove  the restrictive 
import policy measures in a progressive manner. Accordingly, through Gazette No.  2335/26 of 
9 June 2023, Sri Lanka made arrangements to remove restrictive import policy measures on 
286 items with effect from 9  June 2023.  
41.7.  Sri Lanka will arr ange to remove restrictive import policy measures on other products in a 
progressive manner  as well . We are currently making arrangements to notify the restrictive import 
policy measures to the WTO. We have taken good note of the concerns expressed by Thailand today, 
and we will arrange to provide responses to such concerns in consultation with our Capital. 
41.8.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
41.9.  The Council so agreed . 
42  NEPAL – IMPORT BAN ON ENERGY DRINKS – REQUEST FROM THAILAND  
42.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Thailand.  
42.2.  The delegate of Thailand  indicated the following:  
42.3.  Thailand would like to express our concern once again regarding Nepal 's import ban on 
caffeinated mixed energy drinks and flavoured  synthetic drinks from Thailand since 2019 , which 
understandably aims to alleviate the balance -of-payments  difficulties the country has been facing.  
In this regard, Thailand would like to remind Nepal that WTO  Members facing balance -of-payment s 
difficulty may apply import restrictions subject to the provisions under  Article  XII of the GATT  1994, 
provided that they do not exceed those necessary, are progressively relaxed, and are maintained 
only to the extent that the conditions still justify the ir application.  
42.4.  Thailand would also like to encourage Nepal to enter into a consultation with the Committee 
on Balance -of-Payments Restrictions as per the provision by Article  6 of the Understanding on the 
Balance -of-Payments Provisions of the GATT  1994 th at obliges Member s applying new restrictive 
import measures taken for Balance -of-Payments purposes to do so within four  months of the 
adoption of such measures. We encourage Nepal to take this important step towards greater 
transparency in its import restr iction policy.  
42.5.  The delegate of Nepal  indicated the following:  
42.6.  Nepal would like to thank Thailand for its statement and continued interest in Nepal 's trade 
policy measures , and notes that this concern has also been raised in the CMA. In response to the 
concern raised today, Nepal wishes to refer to its statement delivered at the previous meeting of 
the CTG, in April  2023. Furthermore, I would also like to assure you that my delegation will update 
the Council as soon as possible once we receive further commun ication from Capital.  
42.7.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
42.8.  The Council so agreed . G/C/M/146  
 
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  43  EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION (EU)  2017/2321 AND REGULATION (EU)  2018/825 
– REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
43.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the Russian Federation.  
43.2.  The delegate of  the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
43.3.  The Russian Federation reiterates its concerns regarding the amendments to the European 
Union 's basic regulation on protection against dumped imports introduced by Regulation 
(EU) 2017/2321 and Regulation (EU)  2018/825.  Once again, we would like to point out the 
discriminatory nature of these amendments , which can be illustrated by the following.  First, the 
European Commission can punish the exporters twice for the same situation labelled by the 
amendments as "significant distortions " and "raw material distortions ". Second, the European 
Commission has issued only two  "reports " on so -called "signifi cant distortions " in two  particular 
exporting countries. It clearly shows the discriminatory nature of the EU 's approach regarding the 
application of anti -dumping measures.  Without going further into detail, we would like once again 
to reiterate our system ic concern about the WTO -inconsistency of the amendments. We urge the EU 
to refrain from their application and not to violate its WTO  obligations.  
43.4.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
43.5.  The European Union refers to the statement it wil l deliver under Agenda I tem 44. 
43.6.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
43.7.  The Council so agreed . 
44  AUSTRALIA, CANADA, EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, SWITZERLAND, 
UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES – UNILATERAL TRADE RESTRICTIVE 
MEASURES AGAINST RUSSIA – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
44.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included  on the agenda at the request of  
the Russian Federation.  
44.2.  The delegate of  the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
44.3.  The Russian Federation reiterates its statements made with regard to the unilateral trade 
restrictive measures during the previous CTG  meetings. The number of anti -Russian measures 
imposed by Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States continues to grow rapidly. The EU alone has already introduced 
11 packages of measure s. Under the new 11th package , the EU restricts the sale, supply, transfer or 
export of certain goods not only to Russia, but also to third  countries whose jurisdictions are 
considered to be at continued and particularly high risk of circumvention of measu res introduced 
earlier. It also extends the prohibition of export, import and transit of certain goods.  
44.4.  Despite the enormous number of unilateral trade restrictive measures introduced, we have 
witnessed a number of attempts to accuse Russia of triggering t he global food and energy crisis. 
Such an active disinformation campaign is carried out to persuade the global community that Russia 
is solely responsible for the increase in the global prices for food, fertilizers , and energy resources.  
44.5.  A clear example of speculation on the needs of the poorest countries is the situation with the 
implementation of the "Black Sea Initiative " for the export of Ukrainian food and Russian ammonia 
and the Russia -UN Memorandum on the norm alization of agricultural exports.  These agreements 
were presented as aimed at reducing the threat of famine and providing assistance to the neediest 
countries in Asi a, Africa and Latin America. In reality, their implementation resulted in the 
commercial e xport of Ukrainian grain to "well-fed", primarily European, markets.  
44.6.  These conclusions are based on the quantitative data of the fulfilment  of the Black Sea 
initiative. Since 1 August  2022, over 32.5  million ton nes of grain have been transported from the 
ports of Odessa, Yuzhny , and Chernomorsk. The biggest share of grains (more than 26  million G/C/M/146  
 
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  tonnes, or 81%) is sent to the countries with high and upper middle income, including the EU , which 
accounted for about 40% of supplies.  Such significant imports of grain have led to another problem 
in the EU – certain EU  member  States,  based on their producers ' demands , pleaded for a closure of 
their markets even to Ukraine grain transit.  But what about Asia, Africa and other countries? 
Countries in need , like Ethiop ia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Sudan,  and Somalia account for only 
832,086  tonnes, or 2.6% of cargo.  
44.7.  The other part of the package of the Black Se a Initiative has never been implemented by the 
collective West. The systemic issues related to the exportation of Rus sian agricultural products , as 
well as fertilizers , are still not resolved. Such issues involve the reconnection of Rosselkhozbank – 
which is the main agricultural bank in Russia serving domestic and foreign trade transactions – to 
SWIFT; supply of spare p arts for agricultural machinery; restart ing Togliatti -Odessa ammonia 
pipeline; lifting restrictions on insurance and transportation; and "unfreezing " assets.  
44.8.  In respect of the energy crises, we would like to note that the collective West uses the demand 
for energy resources as a "political weapon ", of which it attempts to accuse us. The Russian fuel and 
energy sector was chosen as one of the immediate targets of the unilateral restrictive measures. 
Contrary to the traditional rhetoric about the adherence to  market mechanisms, the collective West 
made a choice to introduce anti -market measures (ban on the import of Russian coal, oil and oil 
products; creation of "cartel of buyers " and establishment of the so -called "price ceiling " for crude 
oil and petroleum products; and limiting the supply of oil and gas equipment). This has led to a 
break in historical value chains, a redistribution of global energy flows , and an increase in transaction 
costs. Illegitimate restrictions and anti -market measures in the energy sector set a dangerous 
precedent for international trade, pose a serious threat to global energy security , and disrupt the 
stability of energy markets.  
44.9.  In this context, the Russian Federation calls for the immediate lifting of  unilateral trade 
restrictive measures, including those with extraterritorial implications, and the termination of their 
coercive actions aimed at forcing other WTO  Members to follow suit.  
44.10.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
44.11.   The European Union reiterates its resolute condemnation of the Russian Federation 's war of 
aggression against Ukraine, which deliberately violates the UN  Charter and disregards the 
rules-based international order.  The European Union reaffirms th at its support for Ukraine 's 
sovereignty, territorial integrity , and right of self -defence is unwavering.  The European Union 
remains committed to maintaining and increasing collective pressure on Russia, as demonstrated by 
the adoption of the eleventh  package of sanctions on 23  June 2023.  
44.12.   At the same time, the European Union is committed to stepping up its efforts to ensure the 
effective implementation of sanctions at European and national level. The EU also continues its 
engagement with third  countries who se jurisdictions are considered to be at continued and 
particularly high risk of sanctions circumvention.  
44.13.   We strongly condemn Russia 's disinformation attempts which blame international sanctions 
for rising food insecurity. We must repeat again that EU  sanctions do not target trade in agricultural, 
food or medical products, nor the trade of Russia with third  countries.  Russia, by weaponizing  food 
in its war against Ukraine, is solely responsible for the global food insecurity that this war has 
provoked.  
44.14.   The continued availability and affordability of agricultural products for the countries most in 
need is essential. The EU will continue its efforts through , inter alia , the UN  Black Sea Grain Initiative, 
the EU 's Solidarity Lanes , and the Ukrainian "Grain from  Ukraine"  initiatives to bolster global food 
security.  
44.15.   Additionally, the Commission has recently proposed to set up a dedicated Facility to support 
Ukraine 's recovery, reconstruction , and moderni zation, together with the implementation of key 
reforms on it s EU accession track.  
44.16.   The European Union has taken all its measures in a fully transparent manner. The relevant 
EU measures are publicly accessible.  The European Union calls on Russia to stop its acts of G/C/M/146  
 
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  aggression and fully respect Ukraine 's territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence within its 
internationally recogni zed borders.  
44.17.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
44.18.   The United States condemns Russia 's unjustifiable, unprovoked, and illegal aggression 
against ind ependent and sovereign Ukraine, and the suffering and loss of life it continues to cause.  
The United States will spare no efforts to hold President Putin and the architects and supporters of 
this aggression accountable for their actions. We underline our r esolve to impose severe economic 
and financial consequences on Russia.  As we have said before, Russia is complaining about a 
situation that it has created, and is trying to shift the blame for the death and destruction that it has 
caused.  
44.19.   Russia started th is war; Russia perpetuates this war; Russia illegally tried to annex parts of 
Ukraine; Russia continues to destroy Ukraine 's agricultural and energy infrastructure; and Russia 
continues to spread disinformation that western sanctions are causing food insec urity when we have 
made it quite clear that banks, insurers, shippers, and other actors can continue to bring Russian 
food and fertilizer to the world.  In short, Russia, with support from Belarus 's complicity, is 
responsible for much of the devastation and  disruption being felt around the world.  
44.20.   The United States will continue to condemn Putin 's brutal, unprovoked, and unjustified war 
against Ukraine.  The United States will continue to support Ukraine 's courageous efforts to defend 
itself, uphold its territ orial integrity, and protect its population.  The United States will continue to 
work with its partners and allies to sustain and intensify international pressure on President Putin 's 
regime, and its enablers in Belarus, for as long as necessary.  
44.21.   The delega te of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
44.22.   The United Kingdom continues to reject the lies that Russia keeps recycling in the CTG and 
other bodies. Indeed, Russia 's transparent attempts to divert, disinform , and blame others for the 
impacts of their  own, illegal, unprovoked, and barbaric invasion of Ukraine – a sovereign country – 
are farcical.  Because let us be clear, Russia and only Russia continues to be responsible for the global 
food shortages, rising inflation, and supply chain disruptions that  they have caused through invading 
another country.  Russia 's fictional narrative is as unconvincing as it is implausible; the facts speak 
for themselves.  
44.23.   Turning to the facts on the consequences of Russia 's invasion: Since our last CTG  statement, 
the globa l consequences of Russia 's chosen war have continued to come into increasingly sharpening 
focus. Their actions are having catastrophic worldwide impacts on food prices.  The impact of Russian 
tanks preventing Ukrainian farmers sowing hundreds of square mile s of wheat – and we  are talking 
about an area the size of Belgium – continue s to be felt.  
44.24.   Russia has also kept disrupting vital operations like the Black Sea Grain Initiative by delaying 
ships and blocking inspections, this has resulted in a 29%  decrease in food exports by weight 
compared to March  2023, and a 66%  decrease in May.  Russian obstru ctions of these operations 
harm global food security by restricting supplies and keeping prices high around the world. This 
makes it even harder for people in developing countries to afford the food they need.  
44.25.   The explosion of the Kakhovka Dam, another cat astrophe exacerbated by this war, will also 
have far -reaching consequences on food security, putting at risk the production of vital grain, 
causing a knock -on effect on grain supply and inflation.  
44.26.   Russia 's Domestic Policies: Against these supply chain impl ications of their war, we have 
already outlined that Russia is taking an active choice to make a bad situation worse by continuing 
to take unilateral steps that further increase global prices of agri -food. Russia 's own autonomous 
export restriction measure s have covered numerous agricultural goods – including fertili zer, white 
sugar, raw cane sugar, wheat, rye, meslin, barley, corn, rice, sunflower oil and seeds, and rapeseed 
oil and seeds.  G/C/M/146  
 
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  44.27.   The actions we just outlined are clear proof that Russia is continu ing to weaponize food and 
making the situation even worse by unilaterally cutting global supply and stimulating price hikes in 
global food prices.  
44.28.   Turning to our own sanctions and next steps more broadly: On the other hand, the United 
Kingdom has specifica lly not targeted food or fertili zer exports from Russia to third  countries. We 
have only introduced sanctions as a way of targeting Putin 's war machine.  The UK will continue to 
shine a light on the far -reaching consequences of this war, and we will continu e to support those 
across the world who are on the sharp end of the consequences of Russia 's illegal and unprovoked 
attack on Ukraine.  The UK will continue to stand with Ukraine, against this attack on their sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, for as lo ng as it takes.  
44.29.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
44.30.   New Zealand continues to condemn, unequivocally, Russia 's ongoing war of aggression 
against Ukraine.  Russia 's actions have already caused thousands of deaths, a massive humanitarian 
crisis, and untold suffering.  Russia 's egregious disregard for the principles that underpin global peace 
and prosperity have serious implications for global order, security, and economic stability.  Let us be 
clear: It is Russia 's invasion of Ukraine that has cr eated uncertainty and volatility in world food 
pricing and supply.  
44.31.   New Zealand has joined the international community in applying sanctions in a transparent 
manner.  Information on the Russia Sanctions Act that was passed by the New Zealand Government 
on 8 March  2022 and all subsequent regulations that implement sanctions are publicly  available on 
the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade website.  Sanctions under the Act are a direct 
response to Russia 's illegal war of aggression, and are not int ended to disrupt trade in essential 
goods like food. They include prohibitions on dealing with assets and services, travel bans on 
individuals from entering New Zealand, tariff increases on imports of Russian origin, a luxury goods 
import and export ban fr om/to Russia, and a prohibition of certain goods intended for use by military 
or security forces from being exported to Russia and Belarus.  
44.32.   New Zealand remains united with the international community to hold those responsible for 
violations of humanitarian  and international law to account. Imposing sanctions on Russia is a means 
to bring an end to this war.  We continue to stand in full solidarity with Ukraine and its people and 
reaffirm our unwavering support for the independence, sovereignty, and territori al integrity of 
Ukraine.  
44.33.   The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
44.34.   Switzerland condemns Russia's military aggression against Ukraine in the strongest terms 
and calls on Russia to take military de -escalation measures, to end hostilities and to im mediately 
withdraw its troops from Ukrainian territory.  The continuation of this military attack blatantly violates 
international law, most notably the prohibition on the use of force, the principle of the territorial 
integrity of States and the obligation  to protect the civilian population.  In response to Russia's 
military aggression, Switzerland has taken a number of economic measures, which are exceptional 
in nature and have been taken on account of the violation of international law by Russia. The 
measu res taken by Switzerland are in accordance with international law, including WTO  law. 
Switzerland also remains committed to combating the world food and energy crises, and none of the 
sanctions against Russia target agricultural or food products.  
44.35.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
44.36.   No amount of misinformation can hide that Russia is solely responsible for this crisis it 
describes.  The Russian invasion of Ukraine was a major shock to an already strained food system 
resulting in record -setting food, fuel, and fertilizer prices.  Global food prices remain historically high 
and domestic food prices continue to rise sharply in most countries. High prices disproportionately 
affect the poor, who spend most of their income on food and other basic  needs.  
44.37.   High fertilizer and energy prices are likely to result in a decline in agricultural productivity, 
reducing future food availability, undermining farmer livelihoods and impacting economies of the G/C/M/146  
 
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  Global South.  The evolving food crisis remains a top priority  for Canada and other donors, as 
demonstrated by continued prioritization within G7 and G20  agendas in 2023.  
44.38.   Canada will continue to support humanitarian partners, such as the World Food Programme, 
to help meet the emergency food and nutrition needs of the  growing number of acutely food insecure 
people.  Canada is also supportive of efforts to mitigate export shortfalls from Russia 's unprovoked 
and unjustifiable invasion of Ukraine and reduce global food prices, including through the 
EU Solidarity Lanes and the Black Sea Grain Initiative.  Canada firmly believes that Russia must end 
its obstruction of operations and confirm its participation in the Black Sea Grain Initiative as long as 
it is needed.  
44.39.   We will continue to take actions that we consider necessary t o protect our essential security 
interests, and we will work closely with like -minded partners to promote peace and security for all 
states and their citizens.  Canada 's support for Ukraine and its people is unwavering, and we will 
work to find ways to use trade to support Ukraine in rebuilding its economy and its society.  We once 
again call for Russia to immediately cease all hostile actions against Ukraine.  
44.40.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
44.41.   As other Members who have spoken, Australia again  condemns, in the strongest possible 
terms, Russia 's illegal and immoral invasion of Ukraine. This invasion is a gross violation of 
international law. Australia strongly supports Ukraine 's sovereignty and territorial integrity.  
44.42.   Australia has imposed a comp rehensive suite of measures against Russia in response to its 
invasion of Ukraine, including more than 1,100  targeted financial sanctions and trade measures. 
Australia has notified these trade measures to the WTO to ensure transparency, which is an 
importa nt obligation on all Members that Australia takes seriously.  These measures are justified 
given Russia 's unprecedented invasion, and are justified under WTO  rules, in particular Article  XXI 
of the GATT  1994. Food and agricultural commodities (aside from a limited number of luxury goods, 
such as lobster and caviar) are not sanctioned by Australia.  Rather, it is Russia 's own decisions that 
are constraining its contribution to global food stocks, including through the imposition of restrictions 
on its own expo rts. 
44.43.   Australia is committed to strengthening the global rules -based order and is a ready and able 
partner for all countries that seek a peaceful and prosperous world, where sovereignty is respected.  
44.44.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
44.45.   Russia 's aggression of Ukraine clearly infringes upon Ukraine 's sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, and constitutes a grave breach of the United Nations Charter, which prohibits the use of 
force. Japan will never accept the unilateral attempt to change the status  quo by force , and it is an 
extremely serious situation that shakes the very foundation of the international order. Japan 
condemns Russia 's actions in the strongest terms.  In response to Russia 's aggression, Japan is 
implementing strict sanctions in close cooperation with the international community, including the 
G7. We continue to work with our partners, including international organizations, to proactively 
address the impact of Russia 's aggression of Ukraine on areas such as energy and food, among 
others , across many countries.  Japan and other countries have been carefully addressing the 
situation by imposing sanctions in a manner that does not hinder the provision of humanitarian 
assistance or the operation of global agricultural trade.  
44.46.   The delegate of  the Republic of Moldova  indicated the following:  
44.47.   From the first  day of the war, the Republic of Moldova has condemned Russia's aggression 
in Ukraine in the strongest terms – a war that causes destruction and suffering in our neighbouring 
countr y on a daily basis. Referring to this agenda item, we would also like to add our voice of support 
and solidarity with Ukraine and the Ukrainian people, along with other Members who have spoken 
before us.  
44.48.   The economic and social repercussions caused by Russ ia's war have been strongly felt in 
and around Ukraine, including in the Republic of Moldova. Since the beginning of this war we have 
been facing multiple challenges: amplified security threats and unprecedented influx of people G/C/M/146  
 
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  fleeing this war; massive t rade disruptions; economic slowdown , which has affected all our economic 
sectors , with an inflation rate exceeding 30% in 2022; and a severe energy crisis which was also 
caused intentionally by Russia. From the market access perspective, it should be noted  that, due to 
this aggression against Ukraine, Moldova's economic agents have lost access to an important share 
of markets and transit routes to Asian partners.  
44.49.   This invasion is a gross violation of international law and the multilateral legal framework 
established within the WTO, affecting the majority of our Members. The Republic of Moldova, like 
other Members, believes that it is essential to focus on the very origin of this aggravated situation, 
which poses  a significant threat to the multilateral tradi ng system. The solution is obvious and well 
known. The aggressors have to stop this war, stop the propaganda, and withdraw their troops from 
the Ukrainian territory immediately and unconditionally.  
44.50.   The delegate of Norway  indicated the following:  
44.51.   Norway imp lements the restrictive measures mentioned by other Members under Agenda 
Item 44. These restrictive measures have been taken as a reaction to Russia's unprovoked military 
invasion of Ukraine and its illegal attempts to annex Ukrainian territory, which Norw ay condemns in 
the strongest possible terms. We refer to our earlier statements in this regard.16 
44.52.   The restrictive measures are directed at Russia's war machine. We are appalled by Russia's 
continuous war of aggression, which is a gross violation of international law and the UN  Charter. The 
blame for the global consequences of this aggression, such as f ood and security, lies with Russia. 
Norway reiterates its full solidarity with Ukraine and the Ukrainian people.  
44.53.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
44.54.   The Republic of Korea has been strongly condemning Russia's armed invasion again st 
Ukraine. Regarding the current item, Korea believes that it is essential to focus on the very origin of 
the sharply aggravating situation on the global supply chain in many areas, posing a significant 
threat to the rules -based global trade order under t he WTO. The way to end all this is the stopping 
of Russia's military action in Ukraine. Importantly, Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and 
independence should be respected.  
44.55.   The delegate of Ukraine  indicated the following:  
44.56.   Ukraine would like to express its sincere gratitude to Australia, Canada, the European Union, 
Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Moldova, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom,  and the United States, for their continuous support of Ukraine's sovereignt y and 
territorial integrity, and for their commitment to the rules -based international order.  
44.57.   Russia reiterated its statement on the so -called unilateral trade restrictive measures, 
complaining about the issue that it has created itself, and is trying to s hield the blame for the death 
and destruction that it has caused on others. At the same time, solely Russia continues terrori zing 
Ukrainian civilians by attacking critical infrastructure and residential areas with missiles, guided 
aerial bombs, and Iranian -made attack drones – and the most recent attack happened last night , 
which has led to the deaths and injuries of at least 40  people in the city of Lviv.  
44.58.   The destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant by the Russian occupiers was 
another heinous crime of ecocide. This man -made ecological disaster will have far -reaching and 
long-term consequences not only for Ukraine but also for many other countries of the world , also 
because of the ecosystems  destroyed , the destruction of crops, livestock , and fish, which will lead 
to even greater global food shortage s. Russia cynically continues to blame international sanctions 
for the rise in food insecurity and the global crisis, although the sanctions are exceptional in nature 
and not intended to disru pt trade in essential goods. They do not  hinder trade in agriculture, food 
and medical products ; rather, they are targeted at ending Russia's  illegal, unprovoked and 
unjustified war of aggression. The sanctions that have been imposed are the result of Russ ia's 
 
16 See, for example, documents  G/C/M/144 , paragraphs  14.33 -14.34 and G/C/M/145 , 
paragraphs  31.40 -31.41.  G/C/M/146  
 
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  violation of international law, and have been  imposed in full accordance with the respective 
provisions of International Law, including WTO  Law. 
44.59.   We are confident that the sanctions regime against Russia should not only be maintained, 
but also strength ened, as the Russia n state still manages to circumvent the international sanctions 
regime , and still acquires technologies through a network of suppliers. The strengthening of 
sanctions  is needed to reduce Russia's ability to fund its war, and to ensure th at Russia is not able 
to manufacture and maintain high -tech weapons. And for your information, every calibre missile 
includes over 44  components.  
44.60.   Regarding the Black Sea Grain Initiative, we cannot  help but once again to attract the 
attention of Members to Russia's sabotage and deliberate slowdown of works that have persisted for 
eight months, resulting in the world missing out on at least 20  million tonnes of food. There are 
currently more than 50  vessels waiting for inspection in territorial wat ers of Türkiye , intended to be 
loaded with 2.4  million tonnes of food. Some vessels have been waiting for GCC  inspection for over 
three  months, resulting in losses exceeding USD  1 billion, and impacting the final cost of food for 
the whole world. Once agai n, Russia has found a way to limit global food supplies by blocking the 
registration of new incoming ships and obstructing the largest port of Pivdennyi for two  months in a 
row, which is a blatant violation of the terms of the Black Sea Grain Initiative to which  the aggressor 
country also agreed. What is more, with now less than two  weeks before the expiration date of the 
Initiative's extension, we  are witnessing another repetitive Russian attempt to inflame the situation, 
providing the world with another p ortion of uncertainty regarding the supply of wheat, maze, 
sunflower meal and oil soybeans in the upcoming months.  
44.61.   Moreover, despite today's false claims  from Russia , Russia's own statistics clearly show an 
increase in exports of agricultural goods, as wel l as transhipment of mineral fertilizers in 2022 and 
early 2023. I provided the respective statistics , in detail,  in the previous meeting of the Committee 
on Agriculture.  
44.62.   To put things all together, Ukraine sees nothing more in Russia's so -called request s, 
concern s, or other questions put to Members, than an attempt  to distract Members , to spread false 
narratives among the international trade community , and to obstruct the work of this Council. We 
reiterate our gratitude t o all our partners for the ir comprehensive support and call on other 
WTO Members to put more pressure on Russia to end its ability to wage war and undermine the 
rules-based multilateral trading system and its sustainable development, which is impossible without 
achieving peace and stability.  
44.63.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
44.64.   Article  IV of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization provides 
for the Council for Trade in Goods to oversee the functioning of the Multilateral Trade Agreements 
in Annex  I. Hence, the substantial part of the interventions to which we listened a few minutes ago 
are clearly irrelevant to the mandate of the CTG.  
44.65.   As underlined many times in this house 's discussions on the regional or global security 
situation, UN  Charter enforcement or compliance evidently goes beyond the mandate of 
WTO working bodies, including this one. These discussions belong to the specialized UN  bodies and 
agencies. It is in these bodie s and agencies where Russia share s its position , in detail,  on the roots 
and reasons for its special military operation in Ukraine,  as well as on the issues that arise during 
its conduct , such as the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant destruction.  
44.66.   Given th at the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (Kakhovka dam) was mentioned today 
by a number of delegations, Russia condemns the disinformation campaign by Ukraine and the 
western media for putting the blame on Russia for the destruction of the Kakhovka dam. T he dam 
was destroyed by Ukrainian armed forces , and its destruction has led to a devastating humanitarian 
and environmental disaster.  
44.67.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
44.68.   The Council so agreed . G/C/M/146  
 
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  45  OTHER BUSINESS  
45.1  Tentativ e Annual Plan of Meetings – Subsidiary Bodies of the Council for Trade in 
Goods  (JOB/CTG/31 ) and Evolving Tentative Calendar of Formal Meetings of WTO Bodies 
for 2023 (WT/INF/231/REV.1 ) 
45.1.  The Chairperson  indicated the following:  
45.2.  I would like to draw your attention to document  JOB/CTG/31 , the Tentative Annual Plan of 
Meetings of the Subsidiary Bodies of the Council for Trade in Goods, and to document 
WT/INF/231/Rev.1 , the Evolving Tentative Calendar of Formal Meetings of WTO  Bodies for 2023.  
These documents were prepared in close coordination between the Secretary of the Goods Council 
and the Secretaries of the CTG  subsidiary bodies, with the aim to avoid overlaps and to ensure an 
optimal scheduling of meetings. These Annual Plans are prepared to facilitate identifying any 
potential issues at an early stage, while at the same time allowing you to plan accordingly.  In 
addition, and as you ha ve surely noticed, the Secretariat has changed the way in which the calendar 
of meetings in the WTO  webpage operates, so that it is now even easier for Members to have 
information about the meetings. I have been informed by the Secretariat that you need to  log on to 
the WTO  webpage to have full access to the information and functionalities.  
45.3.  The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
45.4.  Paraguay  thank s the Secretariat for the coordination efforts and would like to have an update 
on the coordination work between the CTG and other Councils, especially the General Council and 
the negotiating bodies, where we have noticed the most recent overlapping meeting s. In particular, 
between the Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture and the informal meetings of this 
Council, as well as the last formal meeting of the TBT Committee.  
45.5.  The Secretariat  (Mr Roy Santana) indicated the following:  
45.6.  In the planning of meetings, the Secretariat always does it s best to abide by the "Guidelines 
for the Arrangement and Scheduling of Meetings of WTO  bodies", document  WT/L/106 , which were 
adopted in 1995. In that year, the WTO only had four  big meeting rooms where Committee meetings 
could take place. Since then, the WTO has added three  more meeting rooms , so we now have 
seven   such meeting roo ms, most of which are constantly full. What are the rules? On the one hand, 
the Guidelines provide that only one  Council meeting should take place at the same time, so this 
means meetings of the General Council, the DSB, the TPRB, the CTG, the CTS, and the  
TRIPS  Council. The Secretariat has been quite good in respecting this rule as there is never a 
situation when they overlap. The Guidelines also provide that there should not be more than 
two simultaneous formal meetings of WTO  bodies , and here the coordin ation has also been quite 
good in terms of avoiding overlaps. It is true that there are occasionally scheduling problems, but 
these often have to do with overlaps of formal and informal meetings. In these cases, the Guidelines 
provide that we should try to  avoid the overlaps as much as possible. However, it should also be 
borne in mind that the activity at the WTO has increased considerably over the years. For example, 
some bodies organize meetings that take place during  a whole week, followed by meetings o f another 
body that also take place during a whole week, and there are also frequent seminars, workshops, 
and so on , which means that the conditions for the planning are quite challenging. I would like to 
apologize for those occasions  when we have not been able to fully comply with the Guidelines, but 
I can guarantee that the Secretariat is doing its best to minimize this type of situation. Unfortunately, 
we cannot guarantee that it will be fully avoided.  
45.7.  The Chairperson  thanked the Secretar iat for the explanation.  
45.2  eAgenda  
45.8.  The Chairperson  indicated the following:  
45.9.  On 27  April, the Secretariat informed Members, through document  JOB/CTG/3 0, of the 
implementation of the eAgenda on a trial basis, following the 10  February  2023 Decision (as 
contained in document  G/L/1481 ). This is the first  formal CTG  meeting in which the eAgenda has 
been used. I have been informed that we did experience some minor glitches, including the G/C/M/146  
 
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  numbering issue and the names of the previously raised trade concerns, but that the Secretariat 
quickly identified and resolved the problems. If you would like to provide feedback  on further 
improvements to the eAgenda or have questions , please contact the Secretariat directly.  
45.3  Date of Next Meeting  
45.10.   The Chairperson  indicated that the Council's next formal meeting s had been scheduled for 
the dates of 30  November to 1  December  2023, with an informal meeting scheduled on 
19 September . These dates would be confirmed in due course.  
45.11.   The meeting was closed . 
__________