RESTRICTED  WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  TN/RL/M/40 
18 May 2011  
 
(11-2511) 
Negotiating Group on Rules  
  
 
SUMMARY REPORT OF THE MEETING  
HELD ON 8 APRIL 2011 
 
Note by the Secretariat
 
 
 
1. The Negotiating Group on Rules ("the Group") held a formal meeting on 8 April 2011. 
A. ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA  
2. The Group adopted the following agenda: 
A. ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA .........................................................................................................1  
B. REPORT BY THE CHAIRMAN ON THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ..............................................1  
C. REVIEW OF THE TRANSPARENCY MECHANISM FOR REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS .................5  
D. SYSTEMIC ISSUES RELATED TO REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS ................................................8  
E. OTHER BUSINESS .......................................................................................................................11  
 
B. REPORT BY THE CHAIRMAN ON THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS  
3. The Chairman reported on the informal consulta tions held on 4 April, which focused on the 
draft text of the Transparency Mechanism (TM) circulated to all Members on 30 March, and the submission by the Plurinational State of Bolivia , circulated as TN/RL/W/250.  The report would 
elaborate on the changes that had been proposed to th e draft TM text;  copies of the report, as well as 
of a new draft TM text incorporating these changes,  had been made available in the room.  All new 
changes to the draft text, including those in the "comments" column, were presented in bold.  No 
written comments to the TM text distributed had been received to date. 
4. He could not but report that unfortunately, in general, positions remain unchanged.  That was 
neither desirable nor welcomed but reflected the r eality of that day. He would not try to summarize 
positions, but rather indicate the very few areas where a common view was emerging, or showing a 
potential to emerge, and new proposals that had been tabled orally at these consultations. 
5. On Section A on "Early announcement", with the exception of one Member, all seemed to be 
in agreement with the proposed Secretariat temp late.  Further, there was agreement on replacing 
"WTO website" by "RTA database" in paragraph 2.   One Member was considering further the last 
sentence of the footnote.  Only one Member was of  the view that reference should be made in the 
body of the TM to the template;   in this regard, he recalled that the template for notification adopted 
in 2006 was not itself referred to in the TM text.  On Section B on "Notification", India had proposed 
to modify paragraph 4.  Various changes had be en proposed regarding Section C on "Procedures to 
Enhance Transparency".  One Member had requested  the United States to clarify the reference to 
plurilateral agreements in paragra ph 6.  The United States had suggested that the Secretariat prepare a 
chart comparing the current and the proposed timelines;  this was attached to the revised draft text as 
Annex 2.  The need for enhanced transparency on RTAs with non-Members had been underlined and TN/RL/M/40 
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  it had also been suggested that the Secretariat could propose something;  this was attached to the draft 
revised text as Annex 3.  Egypt had proposed on pa ragraph 12 that more time  be given to developing 
countries to reply to written questions, and on para graph 13 to replace "website" by "database".  On 
that same paragraph, New Zealand was considering ways to deal with questions received after the 
deadline, and there was agreement fo r the replacement of eight by ten weeks, as had been suggested 
by the Secretariat.  On Section D on "Subsequent Notification and Reporting", China had proposed 
that the written report provided for in paragraph 15 be submitted "jointly", and there was agreement 
for replacing "website" by "database" in paragraph 17.  On Section E on "B odies Entrusted with the 
Implementation of the Mechanism", Chinese Taipei and Singapore had informed that they were 
working together on a follow-up to the oral proposal made by Chinese Taipei at the previous meeting 
with a view at same point to formalize a proposal  in writing.  No changes had been proposed as 
regards Sections F and G, respectively "Techni cal Support for Developing Countries" and "Other 
Provisions".  As for paragraph 21 in the latter S ection, there seemed to be agreement on the changes 
proposed by the Secretariat.  It was proposed to modify the title of Section H to "Application of the 
Transparency Mechanism".   On Section I on "Rea ppraisal of the Mechanism", there seemed to be 
agreement that the Ministerial Conference was not the appropriate body and that this role should 
rather be that of the General Council.  It had been proposed by some that an opportunity be given for a 
continuous dialogue on improvements to the TM.  No proposals had been made as relates to the 
Annex "Submission of Data by RTA Parties".  No evolution had taken place as regards the proposal 
made by the Plurinational State of Bolivia, circulated as TN/RL/W/250. 
6. The Chairman urged Participants to avoi d repeating long-standing, well known positions. 
7. Participants thanked the Chairman for the report made, as it was important to ensure 
transparency as regards the small group consultations.  They also thanked him for his engagement in 
consulting in different forms and formats to adva nce the Group's work.  Appreciation was also shown 
for the Secretariat's hard work.  
8. Some Participants shared the Chairman's frust ration regarding the absence of breakthrough.  
The point was made that the Group continued to  suffer from a repetition of well-known entrenched 
positions, not only on systemic issues but also as re gards some elements of the TM.  Some optimism 
was shown about a successful review of the TM, whil e more mixed feelings were expressed regarding 
an outcome on systemic issues.  
9. As regards the TM, one Participant noted that agreement on paragraph 20 remained 
outstanding, and that on paragraph 23 it would ap pear that the General Council, instead of the 
Ministerial Conference, would be the appropria te body for reappraisal of the TM.  Another 
Participant's comments on the draft TM text were that  on Section A, there was a need to maintain both 
steps, and that submissions be made jointly;  on Section B, precision was needed to ensure that all 
formal notifications had to be made jointly;  on Section C, there was a need to (a) relax the 
timeframes applied in cases of RTAs involving deve loping and least-developed countries, (b) to 
address the question of RTAs concluded with non-WTO Members so as not to pre-empt their rights, 
and (c) that factual presentations not be circul ated in the absence of parties' comments.   
10. Divergent views were expressed on how to fulfil the Group's mandate on systemic issues, in 
particular as relates to developm ental aspect of RTAs and a post- Doha work programme on systemic 
issues. 
11. Some Participants noted that paragraph 29 of  the Doha Declaration gave the Group a clear 
mandate to deal with developmental aspects of  RTA, which the Group should address within this 
round and not leave it for after Doha.  It was reca lled that the proposal in TN/RL/W/250 constituted a 
very simple and concrete way of integrating speci al and differential (S&D) treatment in Article XXIV 
of the GATT 1994;  it posed no difficulty and the Group should pursue its consideration.  Others  TN/RL/M/40 
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  pointed out that while Participants repeatedly indi cated their continued commitment to fulfilling the 
mandate to clarify and strengthen RTAs rules, the reality in the Group had been a replication of long-
standing debates held for years in the Group.  Th ey remained ready and committed to discussing the 
proposals on the table;  however, there was a need to  remain realistic and confront the possibility of 
not overcoming the challenge of successfully concl uding negotiations on systemic issues within the 
timeframes. The two strands of work did not need to be mutually exclusive;  they requested the Chair 
to ensure that negotiations did not lose track of what  the real scope of systemic issues was, and that 
the mandate, which was very broad, be fulfilled in its  entirety.  It was not possible to focus work on a 
single issue and there was a need for preparing an in- built agenda to ensure that RTAs systemic issues 
would continue to be on the top of Members' agendas after the Round. 
12. Divergent views were expressed regarding a pos t-Doha work programme on systemic issues. 
It was recalled that the post-Doha work programme on  systemic issues had been informally agreed to 
by a small group of Ambassadors in November 2010;  some Participants stated that delegations that 
had not been part of the small gr oups were not bound by agreements re ached therein, and, in any case, 
agreements reached in small groups could not supp lant the Negotiating Group. Various Participants 
noted that enough appetite had been shown in th e Group to start discussions on a forward-looking 
post-Doha work programme, and that submissions  on specific issues to be included therein had 
already been made.  Various other Participants rej ected engaging into such discussions;  focus, they 
noted, should be on the mandate of paragraph 29.  They pointed out that the Chairman's remark made in a previous meeting on the lack of appetite for enga ging into that work remained valid.   Further, it 
was also noted that there was a lack of precision on what was meant by post-Doha given that it was 
not clear when such a period would start.  A sugg estion was made, and supporte d by one Participant, 
that the Group engage, in a non-prejudicial way, on a discussion on the work programme;  that would make sense given the time pressure and the need  to achieve an outcome on systemic issues. 
13. The need for clarity on where the Group was heading was underlined, and clarification was 
sought on how the Chairman intended to proceed in a ll aspects of the work on systemic issues, and in 
particular if he planned to circulate a relate d text and the main aspects to be covered. 
14. The Chairman summarized the three distinct stre ams of thought of the Group.  One view was 
that in the letter of the mandate there was no mention of a forward-looking work programme and therefore it would be inappropriate and in some sense  a violation of the mandate to pursue discussions 
on a forward-looking work programme without firs t exhausting consideration of systemic issue 
proposals that had been placed on the Group's agenda , including the latest one from the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia.  Another view was that a slavis h adherence to the mandate left no room to dissect it 
and therefore, to the extent that Members desired to act in accordance with the mandate, that would 
automatically mean a discussion of the full scope of  the mandate as it related to systemic issues.  A 
final view was what some might regard as a mo re pragmatic approach, which did not deny the 
existence of the mandate but acknowledged that, in light of the virtual paralysis that existed and 
taking into account the limited time available,  it would make sense, while not setting aside a 
consideration of the systemic issues and theref ore not denying the mandate, to commence in a non-
prejudicial way, a discussion of what a forward-looking work programme might look like, on the understanding that this could not and would not be formalized until a later stage.  Delegations had 
asked for his views;  he noted that these positions were those of the Group, not his own.  As he had 
previously indicated, and taking a risk for which ther e had been no uptake, his ears were open to hear 
from Members at what point in time it would be desirable to commence consultations on a forward-
looking work programme.  At that point in time,  several Members had indicated that it was not 
appropriate to start at that time such discussions.  As it appeared that this would be useful for the 
process, he then invited Members to react, in a no n-prejudicial way, to the suggestion made by one 
Participant and seconded by another one, that discu ssions on the work programme be initiated, in a 
non-prejudicial manner.  In order to avoid misunders tandings, the Chairman clarified that he was not 
himself placing the question back in the agenda;  rath er, the debate was held on the basis of a proposal TN/RL/M/40 
Page 4  
 
  from a Participant that had been seconded by another Participant;  in his capacity as Chairman, he was 
listening.  Those discussions were useful to dete rmine the scope of appetite towards the proposal 
made. 
15. Participants thanked the Chairman for his summing-up. 
16. One Participant noted that the first priority of  the Group should be to conclude the review of 
the TM and implement it on a permanent basis.  Anot her Participant noted that there was no mandate 
specifically on transparency and systemic issues and these were not seen as different elements with 
regards to the mandate;  the adoption of the TM already fulfilled the DDA mandate. 
17. Participants agreed that timeframes pointed agai nst an exhaustive analysis of all systemic 
issues.  Some noted however that these could not  be put aside given the Doha mandate and the 
increasing number of RTAs.  It was noted that substantive discussions on systemic issues had taken 
place in the Group from 2002 until 2005 but had declined  since that time;  nevertheless, the Group 
had at least 20 proposals with issues to be cons idered, and that would require as comprehensive a 
debate as possible.   
18. Several Participants supported the commencement of discussions on a work programme;  they 
noted that it did not seem that the path followed by the Group up to that point would produce any 
outcome.  They were of the view that sufficien t appetite had been shown for engaging in such 
discussions;  further, they noted that Participants  remained ready and committed to discussing other 
issues in parallel, including the proposal made by th e Plurinational State of Bolivia.  In that context, 
they remained optimistic that the systemic issu es discussions could be successfully concluded.  
Several other Participants rejected going down that  road;  they noted that the DDA provided for a 
single undertaking and that engagement in that issue would constitute an  unacceptable backtracking 
from the DDA mandate.  It was recalled that such a tandem approach had earlier been proposed by the 
Chairman but subsequently withdr awn due to negative reactions;  since that time, it did not appear 
that positions had changed in order to change the si tuation.  Further, it was recalled that "post-Doha" 
lacked clarity;  it would appear, after the meeti ng of the Trade Negotiations Committee held before 
the meeting, that Members were already in a pos t-Doha environment.  A post-Doha environment 
would require agreeing on a mandate and terms of reference, and the same stumbling blocks as the 
Group faced at present would also be present in that environment.   
19. Various Participants stressed that there was a clear mandate on development that should be 
fulfilled and become a reality in the rules as well as in market access.  Ambiguities of Article XXIV 
were not a conceptual issue but a reality that had to be addressed;  moving ahead without addressing 
them placed an albatross around the necks of deve loping countries especially.  Various proposals had 
been made to address these questions, including a fr esh one;  discussions should be pursued on them.  
Neither postponing the development mandate to a next round, nor a backtracking from the Doha 
mandate on development, was acceptable.  The next round would be appropriate for a wider 
discussion on RTA rules, not this one;  this was a development round.  Further, giving attention to a 
work programme would divert attention from the mandate and might even violate it.   
20. Responding to the comments made, one Participant stated that it had not been his delegation's 
intention to make a proposal;  rather,  to indi cate its position as well as summarize what he had heard 
from the Members.  He thanked all those that ha d supported starting discussions on a forward-looking 
work programme;  as for those not supporting it, he ha d nevertheless in some cases been able to detect 
some nuances.  It was his delegation's hope that the Group could revert to this question in the future.  TN/RL/M/40 
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  C. REVIEW OF THE TRANSPARENCY MECHANISM FOR REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS  
21. In informal mode, the Group discussed adjustment s proposed to the TM text that had been 
made available to Participants.  This would be incor porated in a new text that would be circulated to 
the Group in the near future. 
22. The Chairman invited Participants to comment  on the TM text distributed as well as on 
proposals listed in the Airgram, including from their sponsors. 
23. Participants stated that both oral and written pr oposals made with respect to the TM had been 
well captured in the draft TM text compiled by th e Secretariat.  The need for the Group to work 
harder and try to find more convergence and bridge  gaps on the different ideas and suggestions on the 
table was noted. 
24. Some Participants supported continuing discussi ng details on how to improve the circulation 
of documents in order to optimise the considerati on process of RTAs, and maximise the transparency 
offered in each meeting.  Some support was also expressed for maintaining a periodic review of the 
TM in order to keep it up-to-date with  RTA practices and delegations' needs. 
25. Divergent views were expressed regarding the proposal circulated as TN/RL/W/248.   
26. Opponents remarked that any review of an RTA,  wherever it occurred, had to be performed 
according to the relevant legal basis that had been  invoked to justify WTO consistency.  Any review 
of an RTA notified under the Enabling Clause had to  be carried out in accordance with the terms of 
reference and the rules of procedure established by th e CTD.  Anything that undermined the role of 
the CTD or the Enabling Clause was a backward st ep;  no responsibilities should be taken away from 
the CTD.  The proposal sought to place the issue of venue of consideration at the centre stage of the 
negotiations and by doing that diverted attention fr om the real underlying systemic issues that should 
be discussed, and without undue delay, if the Grou p was to finalize the review and make the TM 
permanent.  In that context, it was stressed that an y attempts to improve the transparency procedures 
applicable to RTAs with dual notification status w ould remain contingent upon resolving the specific 
and systemic issues that had been raised in connection with these RT As in the CTD and in the Group.  
The point was also made that the proposal was full of  contradictions;  first,  it did not qualify under the 
mandated review, as indicated in previous meetings;  second, none of the reports by the Chairmen of 
the CRTA and the CTD as well as of the Secretariat, nor Members' submissions on the operation of the TM had indicated problems with the review in the CTD, therefore, if there was no problem there 
was no need to fix it;  third, at the 81
st Session of the CTD, the sp onsor had stated that dual 
notification did not exist in the WTO vocabulary;  thus, if that was a hypothetical concept,  why was 
the Group was trying to find a solution to that ques tion.  The point was made that there were far less 
blunt means to achieve the objectives being soug ht than had been proposed;  the sponsor was 
therefore urged to reconsider its proposal.  It was further noted that problems raised by dual 
notification pointed to the important and re levant character of joint notifications. 
27. One Participant noted that the sponsor had been  strongly discouraging developing countries 
from notifying RTAs under the Enabling Clause, and even when a notification had been made under 
that Clause, strong efforts had been made to shif t the RTA consideration to the CRTA.  Consistent 
efforts had also been made to replace the Enab ling Clause by Article XXIV as a benchmark for the 
consideration of such RTAs.  The proposal made suggestions similar to ideas presented in the past,  
and those had been debated and decidedly dealt with in the CTD and also previously in this Group.  
As a result the time had come to move to address the real problems identified for the TM review.   TN/RL/M/40 
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  28. The position maintained by the African Group, the ACP, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 
India, China and other developing and least-d eveloped Members, who had called for a swift 
development outcome on systemic issues including th ose raised in connection with the TM and RTAs 
with dual notification status, was supported.  One Participant noted that one major underlying reason 
why developing countries wanted the examina tion of RTAs in CTD was the absence of de jure  
flexibilities for them in Article XXIV.  In the case of any eventual possibility that changed language 
in Article XXIV was adopted to provide these flex ibilities along the lines of e.g. GATS Article V, he 
enquired whether the venue questi on would still be relevant.   
29. Supporters reiterated that maintaining one single Committee to implement the TM was a 
forward-looking suggestion;  it provided a stable a nd functional solution that ensured  transparency 
for RTAs without impairing any Member's oblig ations and rights.  The CRTA was the WTO's 
specialized body for RTAs and the most appropriate  to discuss the relationship between RTAs and the 
multilateral trading system. 
30. Replying to the comments made, the sponsor of TN/RL/W/248 noted that the proposal 
provided a simple and practical solution to functio nal problem not initially envisaged in 2006.  In 
order to avoid continuous disagreement among the Me mbership concerning the choice of forum, there 
was a need to find a practical and simple solution th at did not impair Members' rights or obligations.  
Rather than creating a different review procedure fo r different notifications, the simplest solution was 
to establish a single forum for all RTAs regardl ess of whether the RTA was notified under GATT, 
GATS or the Enabling Clause.  The 2003 Secretariat legal note on the Enabling Clause circulated as 
WT/COMTD/W/114 underlined that it would be in stitutionally more efficient and legally more 
coherent for the CRTA to consider all RTAs, without  impairing Members' rights and obligations.  He 
reiterated that in no way was his delegation attempti ng to detract from Members' rights or undermine 
the Enabling Clause and that they had no concern with any country notifying a qualifying agreement under the Enabling Clause.  He stressed once more  that the proposal did nothing to prevent any 
Member from raising any matter of concern invol ving an Enabling Clause agreement in the CTD, 
even if the consideration was officially conducted in the CRTA.   
31. The sponsor took strong exception to the statement suggesting that his delegation was 
discouraging Members from notifying under the Enab ling Clause and also making efforts to replace 
the Enabling Clause by Article XXIV;  that was un unsupported and false alle gation.  His delegation 
had no problem with the Enabling Clause for pr oper qualifying RTAs;  he wondered why such a 
statement had been made in light of the Group's  constructive spirit.  Past discussions had indicated 
that there was no consensus on how to handle the i ssue of dual notifications.  The most practical 
solution that would ensure a timely review of  RTAs was to focus on creating a single uniform 
procedure for the consideration of all RTAs.  The CRTA, which was created after the entry into force 
of the WTO, thus after the CTD was established, was given a broad mandate to examine RTAs.  The 
2003 legal note recognized the CRTA as the speciali zed body responsible for the consideration of 
RTAs;  the CRTA could be reckoned as the specializ ed body to which Members had delegated their 
power to examine, question, consult on and re view RTAs pursuant to GATT Article XXIV, GATS 
Article V and the Enabling Clause.  In light of the CRTA's technical expertise on RTAs, it was the most appropriate technical body fo r such reviews of RTAs.  By no means were these comments meant 
to undermine the importance of the flexibilities pr ovided for developing countries by the Enabling 
Clause and the important role of the CTD.  He understood that some Members continued to have 
concerns about the proposal;  te xt suggestions that would address these concerns were welcomed.  
32. In response to the comment on the unsupported a nd false allegation the experience of the Gulf 
Co-operation Council (GCC) was noted as regards the discouragement of notifications by developing 
countries under the Enabling Clause, where, in spite of the fact that its parties were developing 
countries, WTO accession commitments require d the customs union to be notified under 
Article XXIV;  this did not only constitute a di scouragement but was instead a commitment.  As  TN/RL/M/40 
 Page 7 
 
 
  regards efforts to take RTAs under the Enabling Cl ause to the CRTA, and despite the long standing 
practice that such RTAs were considered in the CTD, discussions had taken place with respect to the 
India-Sri Lanka FTA at the 41st -44th Sessions of the CTD in 2002-2003 (WT/COMTD/M/41-44), in 
which the sponsor had raised queries and questions for referring that RTA to the CRTA.  Also, when 
the GCC had been notified only under the Enabling Cl ause, strong statements had been made by the 
sponsor and other delegations that the GCC cust oms union should be only discussed in the CRTA.  
Another Participant noted that these were facts, not allegations;  challe nges to  developing and 
least-developed countries' rights to notify under th e Enabling Clause had taken place in the cases cited 
previously but also with respect to the East African customs union (WT/COMTD/M/61), 
MERCOSUR Agreement, the Chile-India FTA (WT/COMTD/RTA/M/4), the Comprehensive 
Co-operation Agreement between ASEAN and Ch ina (WT/COMTD/M/52-64) - dropped only once 
the sponsor had been satisfied with the respon ses, the India-Korea FTA, the ASEAN-Korea FTA, all 
of which, according to his delegation’s views, had been challenged.  It would appear that Members 
that had challenged the application of the Enabli ng Clause to customs unions had taken a selective 
approach;  a clarification was therefore s ought on what basis the GCC invocation of the 
Enabling Clause had been challenged while othe r customs unions had been accepted under the 
Enabling Clause, including the East African Cust oms Union, the Economic and Monetary Community 
of Central Africa, the Central African Customs a nd Economic Union, the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union.   
33. The sponsor appreciated the responses provided;   they were perhaps illustrative of the 
disconnect that was hampering the Group’s work.  There seemed to be a sense by a couple of 
delegations that how an RTA was notified could affe ct what its legal status was, as opposed to which 
were the terms of the agreement and its parties.  He did not disagree that most, if not all, of the RTAs 
referred to had been objected to by his delegation because they did not consider those to be appropriate for Enabling Clause.  As pointed out, some were not appropriate under that Clause because of accession protocol commitments and b ecause they were customs unions.  Regardless of 
what the parties to an RTA might call it in the no tification, if an RTA did not satisfy the legal 
requirements of the Enabling Clause, it did not belong  in the CTD.  That might be where the Group 
was stuck.  It appeared that some delegations consider transparency to be a back door way of 
expanding the reach of the Enabling Clause beyond th e types of agreements that were contemplated 
by it.  
34. The proposal made by India and reflected in th e draft TM text circulated was supported by 
some Participants;  in their view, it resolved the i ssue raised with respect to  transparency aspects of 
RTAs with dual notification status.  The proposal suggested that the goods parts of RTAs dually 
notified were to be considered by the CTD;  th is was the premise for a possible way forward to 
improve the procedures under the TM that apply to dually notified RTAs.  Its sponsor noted that the 
proposal was simple, practical and in consonance with  the mandate of TM review in paragraph 23 of 
the TM;  it met the mandate and terms of referen ce of the CTD and preserved the sanctity of the 
Enabling Clause, the special nature of the CTD a nd its terms of reference.   Other Participants 
expressed their disagreement with the proposal made on the basis of two main arguments, namely that 
the CTD did not have the capacity to do so and th at dual consideration would imply additional work. 
35. Divergent views were expressed on whether the CT D had the capacity to deal with RTAs.  
One Participant noted that the CTD did not have th e capacity or technical expertise to address every 
WTO issue involving a developing country;  further, it would not be practical to examine issues 
assigned to another WTO body in the CTD.  The WTO had specific technical bodies for a reason and all Members represented in the CTD also participat ed in the technical bodies including the CRTA.  
That, it was noted, was independent from the full r ecognition of the CTD's terms of reference as the 
focal point for consideration and coordination of work on development issues in the WTO;  but just 
because an issue might involve developing countries did not mean that the issue had to be taken up in 
the CTD.   These arguments were rejected by a fe w Participants;  none of the submissions regarding TN/RL/M/40 
Page 8  
 
  the implementation of the TM had identified pr oblems on the way the CTD had discharged this 
function.  One Participant noted that in 1995 the Chairman of the Working Group on Notifications Obligations and Procedures had recalled that the CTD was responsible for notification requirements 
of Article XXIV and the Enabling Clause and Part IV  of the GATT.  If the case was to have only one 
body dealing with RTAs, he suggested going back to  the previous practice of dealing with RTAs in 
the CTD.  As for efficiency and the risk of dup lication, it was noted that only one Division in the 
WTO prepared factual presentations of all RTAs, thus  all that was needed was to change the reference 
of the document to either a REG series or a CO MTD series;  there was no need for drafting two 
factual presentations.  The fact that Members of the CTD and of the CRTA were the same ensured the 
absence of duplication.  Referring to paragraph 13 of TN/RL/W/248, one Participant noted that it 
would appear that the proposal dealt with dual notifications and not with efficiency.    
36. The Group was recalled that the idea of a join t session of the CTD and CRTA to deal with 
RTAs that had been dually notified had been introduced  at the Group's last meeting;  at that occasion, 
several Participants had responded positively, believing that the idea merited further consideration and 
encouraged a written submission.  Since that me eting, the Chinese Taipei delegation had been 
working on a proposal with the Singapore delegation;  consultations with other delegations were also 
being undertaken without prejudice to their outco me.  These delegations would report to the 
Membership any further development at an appropria te time.  Various Participants indicated they 
were looking forward to receiving the Chinese Taipei proposal in writing.  The need to be pragmatic 
was emphasized, and in that context one Participan t noted that a joint session could be a solution to 
the issue.  The Chairman noted that it would appear  that the Group would be interested in having sight 
of this proposal once it was ready to be tabled. 
37. Regarding communications from the Parties, and in particular as relates to proposals under 
TN/RL/W/249, some Participants noted that not  much value would be added by introducing 
references to "jointly ", as Members had so far understood the notification process as a joint process 
and had thus proceeded together wh en notifying their agreements to WTO.   Joint notifications, as 
advocated by the proposal, made sense but it ma de no sense to make that a legal requirement.  
Further, Members had to be cautious about introduci ng such references in the text as it could interfere 
with the individual notification obligations of each Member;  these would modify Members' rights 
and obligations, which presently ap plied to Members individually.  The real value added in 
introducing such new legal obligations that could im pair the fulfilment of individual ones remained 
unclear.   
D. 
SYSTEMIC ISSUES RELATED TO REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS  
38. Noting that the items in the agenda had alread y been formally addressed in two meetings, the 
Chairman invited any further comments that Participants might wish to make on them. 
39. The sponsor of TN/RL/W/250 noted that since th e last meeting, her delegation had noted a 
growing interest especially by developing countri es on this issue, with a number of countries and 
groups generally supporting the thrust of her de legation's proposal on Article XXIV.  The proposal 
was only the latest in a series of development-relate d proposals on RTAs that were on the table;  all of 
them were valid and provided a good basis for di scussion.  Her delegation’s proposal took into 
account past and present developments in the negotiati ons and proposed a simple and concrete way to 
anticipate how to integrate S&D treatment in Article  XXIV of the GATT.  Its objective was to update 
and strengthen the WTO rules on RTAs in line with  the mandate outlined in paragraph 29 of the 
DDA.  As stated in the proposal, North-South RTAs should be sensitive to the differences in 
development, trade flows and fi nancial conditions existing betw een developed and developing 
countries.  Recognizing these asymmetries and deve lopment realities amongst and between these two 
groups of countries had to be reflected in WTO legal provisions so that RTAs corresponded and 
responded to the objectives and development realiti es of developing countries.  As stated in the  TN/RL/M/40 
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  proposal, GATS Article V recognised that in econom ic integration agreements there should be 
flexibilities for developing countries.  The proposal was not asking for something new, all it did was 
ask for flexibilities that were already provided in a de facto  way by giving them a de jure  basis in this 
development round.  There should be no difficulties in recognizing this simp le recognition in favour 
of developing countries of a principle that was already part of the Organization, that is the principle of 
less than full reciprocity, as well as mirroring GATS Article V in GATT Article XXIV;  further, the 
proposal would not affect the rights of Members. 
40. The point was made that RTAs should be ne gotiated and evaluated in terms of their 
contribution to the development of trade, within  the overarching principle of development being 
espoused by developing countries themselves;  at th e same time, there was a need for RTAs to be 
related to development within the WTO in order to  conform to the mandate but also to be more 
enabling than the existing legal framework.  In th at context, the proposal could be supported as the 
addition of de jure  development provisions in Article XX IV would reduce developing countries 
concerns for two main reasons.  First because Ar ticle XXIV, which was a child of GATT  1947, was 
if not obsolete at least obsolescent;  probably, some sort of improvement to factor in developing 
countries’ concerns might advance Members' mutual objectives, which were not mutually exclusive.  
Second because developing countries had certain disab ilities, or a lack of enabling provisions, and 
concluding an RTA in particular with developed countries exposed them to greater competition and 
compelled them to make changes in institutiona l and para-institutional me chanisms, which entailed 
costs and compulsions;  however, developing countri es could not be oblivious to these realities given 
the proliferation of RTAs and their geographical expa nsion in international trade.  The point was also 
made that the emergence of a sort of distinct  ownership of the Enabling Clause by developing 
countries and of Article XXIV by  developed countries could be discerned from the discussions;  it 
might be time for Members to pause and dis card rigidities.  There was a recognition that 
improvements and clarifications were needed;  in  that line, Members should be open rather than 
challenging each other and sticking to well-known positions.   
41. The Chairman welcomed that statement, as it we nt in the direction of suggesting need for 
openness, flexibility, compromise and pragmatism.  He  urged Members to think and act in that mode;  
merely talking at each other, almost in a mechani cal way, was not going to lead the Group out of the 
impasse.  Members could see the wisdom of exerci sing some flexibility, however prudently so;  he 
was not asking anyone to be imprudent but to be realistic. 
42. Some Participants recalled that clarification had been sought on the scope and objectives of 
the proposal, and that suggestions had been made so that the proposal better targeted all possible 
scenarios where development and trading capacity disparities were apparent, and consequently, 
flexibilities might be needed.  The proposal was ju st targeting some RTAs, namely, those between 
developed and developing countries,  which did not cover the whole universe of RTAs where notable 
disparities in trading capacities existed.  The objectiv e of such a suggestion was to ensure that the 
proposal fulfilled its objective across the board, without exclusions, for the sake of granting 
flexibilities where really needed.  However, th e sponsor had not yet provided detailed comments 
regarding questions previously posed, and had not actively engaged in either trying to reassure doubts 
or considering any modification of its original pr oposal.  The reason why the sponsor did not consider 
necessary to grant flexibilities for developing count ries in all cases, including when two developing 
countries negotiated, still remained to be understood.   That, it was noted, put into question that the 
actual, ultimate objective of the proposal was to ensu re that flexibilities were  granted where needed.  
It was not appropriate to complain  about lack of engagement and a ppetite for the proposal if there was 
no interest from the proponents in working on reassu ring Members' concerns and being flexible in 
order to bridge gaps.  If there was no willingness to adopt different approaches, there was the risk of 
repeating the unsatisfactory outcome of previous debat es, namely lack of any agreement.  It was also 
important to recall that the proposal required furthe r work from all Members, as flexibilities needed to 
be qualified and somehow quantified;  that was wh y the Group could not overlook the whole list of TN/RL/M/40 
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  systemic issues.  The Group should not invert the or der of proceedings;  first, there was the need to 
have a common understanding of what existing rules stand for, and only then could Members define 
how flexibility should apply.  At the present time the Group seemed to be seeking to establish 
unqualified flexibilities, but the baseline of the flex ibilities themselves had not been determined;  in 
other words, the cart was being put before the horse.  The Group should also be mindful about the 
other proposals tabled by a good number of Members,  whereby they had attempted to provide some 
clarity on how the rules should be defined.  In this regard, it was also important that the Chair made sure that the Group did not lose track of the complete list of systemic issues.  In light of this, it was 
assumed that any future negotiating te xt would consider all proposals th at have been made up to that 
date, without necessarily giving priority to the last proposal that had been tabled. 
43. One Participant noted that RTAs that complied with Article XXIV on its existing formulation 
were important to drive trade liberalization which contributed to economic growth and development.  
High calibre trade agreements such as those requi red under Article XXIV were also important for 
paving the way for the political will necessary to und ertake sometimes difficult pro-trade domestic 
reforms needed to drive trade liberalization.  Th ese reforms benefitted not onl y the RTA partners but 
the multilateral trading system as a whole, thus c ontributing to economic grow th and development.  
Such high calibre RTAs also contributed to in tegrating developing countries into the multilateral 
trading system by driving WTO-consistent institu tional reforms.  His dele gation supported measures 
to facilitate closer economic integration of agreemen ts that fully liberalized trade.  Ensuring RTAs 
that facilitated closer economic integration throug h the full opening of trade to the parties was a 
benefit not only to the parties but to the system as a whole.  In light of the be nefits of Article XXIV of 
the GATT, his delegation had serious concerns wi th such proposals as it could potentially reduce 
ambition and weaken commitments on trade liberalizati on in RTAs represented.  It also raised other 
concerns, in particular the effects of such RTAs on GATT Article I and how that would affect developing countries not parties to such agreem ents that produced similar products to those 
developing countries parties to the RTAs.  The pr oposal was also a depart ure from the bilateral, 
regional and multilateral liberalization needed to  facilitate new trade flows and drive economic 
growth and development.  To truly deliver on the development promise of D oha there was a need to 
expand trade liberalization, not retrieving from it. 
44. Some Participants placed emphasis on the Doha development mandate and in particular its 
paragraph 29;  it would be disappointing if clarif ication and improvement of  Article XXIV of the 
GATT fell short of integrating S& D into it.  The proposal adequa tely addressed various challenges 
faced by developing countries, and proposed a pragmatic  and realistic approach to integrate S&D into 
Article XXIV of the GATT.  The importance and f unction of RTAs in promoting trade within the 
multilateral trading system was not questioned;  howev er, it was noted, there was a need for fair trade 
based on the  recognition of the asymmetries and diffe rence between countries.  Given what had been 
said previously, one Participant suggested that an  exhaustive legal analysis of Article XXIV be 
scheduled in future meetings to see from that analysis how the proposal fit into Article XXIV;  the 
sponsor noted that that would be useful, but that  the proposal had been ma de with a time-saving 
aspect in mind.   
45. The sponsor thanked developing countries that had taken the floor to express the need for 
having an agreement which included and reflected their needs and interests.  While the Group had 
been focusing on Article XXIV, that was a reality th at applied to all WTO agreements.  Reacting in a 
preliminary manner to the points made, she noted that  some replies and reassurance had already been 
provided at previous meetings.  The proposal was guided by the mandate of paragraph 29 and in 
particular its developmental aspects.  Her delega tion's understanding was that this mandate affected 
generally all developing countries and therefore app lied to all of them;  however, it was difficult for 
her delegation to speak on behalf of other developi ng countries or other groups to which her country 
did not belong.  Given that it was not possible to have an amendment of Article XXIV affecting only 
her country, what was being proposed would be nefit all developing countries.  As regards  TN/RL/M/40 
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  quantification, it was her understanding that previous  discussions had reached a stalemate;  given the 
time constraints and the length that any  such di scussion would entail, her delegation had tabled a 
clear straight-forward proposal that added S&D and less than full reciprocity for developing countries 
into Article XXIV of the GATT;  doing otherwise w ould be detrimental to achieving a result.  All 
Members had, as a common objective, ambitious results  in the negotiations, either in the WTO or at 
the bilateral level;  however, the ambitions of de veloped and developing c ountries were different, as 
too were the circumstances.  In her country, 60 per cent of the population lived on one or two dollars 
per day, its trade capacity was very limited, and the country was a Small and Vulnerable Economy.  
Whatever it could get from the negotiations was limited, because of those two elements and also because of its limited trade structure, where the majority of exports were constituted of gas and 
petrochemicals.  Unilateral liberali zation had taken place in her count ry;  however, that had killed the 
very small infant industry it had and aggravated poverty.  Therefore, with low and concentrated 
exports, the ambition for her country would be an in crease in trade but also to allow poverty rates to 
decrease as far as possible.  As regards weakeni ng Article I of the GATT, she noted that Article 
XXIV was already an exception to th e MFN principle;  thus there was no weakening but simply the 
addition of a layer that recognized differences and made improvements.  In 1947 developing countries 
did not negotiate for their rights;  they were now  independent and soverei gn and were negotiating to 
have articles in  GATT that reflected their development needs.   
E. 
OTHER BUSINESS  
46. The Chairman indicated that the current sche dule of the following meetings, foresaw small 
group consultations on Wednesday 13 and 20 April, and a formal NGR meeting on Thursday 14 
April.  He was exploring possible dates for othe r meetings, both formal and informal.  Members 
wishing to make new submissions would have to wa it until the following formal NGR meeting, to be 
held late April or early May, to ha ve them placed on the NGR's agenda. 
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