WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION   
WT/REG275/2 
10 June 2011 
 (11-2881) 
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements Original:   English 
  
 
ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT BETWEEN JAPAN AND VIET NAM  
(GOODS AND SERVICES) 
 
Questions and Replies 
  
 The following communication, dated 8 June 2011, is being circulated at the request of the 
delegations of Japan and Viet Nam.   This document reproduces the questions addressed to the Parties and the responses submitted. 
 
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Questions from the Delegation of Australia 
 
1. How do the Parties view the EPA outcom es in relation to obligations under 
GATT Article XXIV, including the elimination of duties and other restrictive regulations of 
commerce on substantially all the trade within a re asonable length of time (ten years)?  We note 
that: 
 - 946 tariff lines on the Japanese side are not subject to eventual tariff elimination, 
 and 788 on the Vietnamese side.  
  - at the end of the implementation period, only 61.7% of Japan's agricultural 
 product tariff lines will be tariff-free for Vietnamese products. 
 
 The Parties to the Agreement believe that the coverage of the JVEPA between Japan and 
Viet Nam fulfils the "substantially all tr ade" requirement under GATT Article XXIV. 
  "Substantially all trade" does not amount to all trade.  The criterion refers to overall trade 
rather than to either imports or exports, and is not necessary equal to the coverage of specific sectors 
or products. 
  
 Moreover, as the liberalization undertaken by the Parties in the JVEPA covers substantially 
all the trade carried out between the Parties, we are of the view that the coverage of the Agreement is 
fully consistent with our WTO obligations.  2. The average final tariff in Japan on dutiabl e agricultural products ranges from 13.4% 
to 22.4%.  Are there any provisions to reduce these tariffs after the implementation period? 
 Article 16.2 of the Agreement stipulates that the Parties shall negotiate on issues such as 
improving market access conditions on originating g oods designated for negotiation in the Schedules 
in Annex 1, in accordance with the terms and conditions set out in such Schedules.  
 WT/REG275/2 
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  3. In Table III.2A, the lines under HS Sections I to IV that retain duties at the end of the 
implementation period in Japan will have a combination of both ad valorem  and specific duties.  
Are there any provisions to simplify these tariffs?  
No, there are not such provisions. 
 
4. How were the average final tariffs (dutiable)  in HS sections I to IV in Table III.2A 
calculated?  What price data/series was used?  Was this a period of high or low prices for those 
commodities that retain specific duties? 
 The final tariff rates were calculated by the CRTA based on the tariff data provided by the 
Parties;  thus the Parties do not have information on the specific methodologies of processing the 
tariff data upon preparation of the Factual Presentation. 
 
5. Why is Japan scheduling MFN exemptions on fishing, energy and other services that are 
not scheduled under its GATS MFN exemptions? 
 The difference between Japan's MFN exem ption list under the GATS and that under the 
Agreement is due to the difference between Jap an's commitments under the GATS and those under 
the Agreement.  
6. Do Japan and Viet Nam expect to conc lude negotiations concerning the possible 
acceptance by Japan of Vietnamese-qualifi ed nurses and certified caregivers by 
1 October 2011? 
 Both Parties have held two meetings of the Sub-Committee on MNP in July and December 
2010 respectively, after the entry into force of the Agreement.   As stipulated in the Agreement, both sides will continue to negotiate with a view to reaching a 
conclusion of the negotia tions regarding the possibility of accep tance of Vietnamese qualified nurses 
and careworkers by Japan by 1 October 2011. 
 
Questions from the Delegation of the European Union 
 
7. Paragraph 22 indicates that the end of the implementation in 2024, 89.3% of tariff lies 
and 96.5% imports by value from Viet Nam will be duty-free.  Paragraph 23 notes that tariffs 
are to be phased out progressively eliminated in  annual stages with the bulk of liberalization to 
take place in 2019 and 2024.  Paragraph 30 further notes that most of Viet Nam's tariff elimination liberalization under the Agreement is to take place after ten years of the Agreement's entry into force in 2018 when 4,954  lines will become duty-free for imports from 
Japan.  The liberalization concerns all HS sections.  We therefore note that the end of 
implementation in 2024 exceeds ten years and there  is furthermore substantial backloading of 
liberalization in year 2019 and 2024.  
 Could the Parties explain the reasons  for having backloaded liberalization 
commitments?  
 The trade liberalization undertaken in the JVEPA  is the result of negotiations between Japan 
and Viet Nam with the aim to strike a balance betw een their specific interests and sensitivities, while 
also ensuring conformity with the requirements of GATT Article XXIV. 
 
  WT/REG275/2 
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  8. Paragraph 26 notes that for Japan 946 lines will retain a duty at the end of the 
implementation period falling under the HS sections  1-IV.  Paragraph 31 notes that the tariff 
lines that remain dutiable at the end of the implementation period (2027) are found in particular in HS sections XVIII, XVI, IV and XV.  Table III.3 and Chart III.6 set out the average final tariffs by Viet Nam.  
 Could Parties confirm how much of HS ch apter 87 in trade value and tariff lines is 
included in this category?   
 For Japan, customs duties on all tariff lines under chapter 87 were eliminated from the date of 
entry into force of JVEPA. 
 
 For Viet Nam, please refer to the WTO RTA da tabase for customs duties on all tariff lines 
under chapter 87. 
 
9. Viet Nam retains high average dutiable rates in various HS chapters at the end of the 
implementation period.  
(a) Could Viet Nam explain the reasons for having maintained high duties on a 
large number of products, and how this  reconciles with the requirement to 
liberalize substantially all the trade, as laid down in Article XXIV? 
 The tariff reduction and elimination commitmen ts provided in the Agreement were achieved 
through the negotiations between the two countries.  Trade liberalization is a result of processes. 
Through the accession to the WTO and participa tion in various bilate ral and regional trade 
agreements, Viet Nam is moving towa rd complete trade liberalization. 
 
(b) Could the Parties confirm that there are no a priori  exclusions of any group of 
products or product? 
 There are no a priori  exclusions of any group of products or product. 
 
Movement of natural persons 
 
10. Paragraph 77 indicates that for nursing services, a Viet Nam nurse qualified in Japan 
may practice nursing for one or three years (extendable) up to seven years from the date of 
qualification.  Japanese nationals qualified under Viet Nam laws and regulations may practice 
nursing in Viet Nam, for a maximum of three years (extendable).  Sub-Part B of Annex 7 
provides that within the Sub Committee on Move ment of Natural Persons, (established per 
Article 78 of the Agreement) Japan would enter in to negotiations with Viet Nam concerning the 
possibility of acceptance of Vietnamese qualif ied nurses and certified caregivers.  Those 
negotiations are mandated to conclude by 1 October 2011.   
 Could Japan give an update on the current state of play of these postponed 
negotiations?  Does Japan consider that the deadline of October will be respected?  
 Both Parties have held three meetings of the Sub-Committee on MNP in July and December 
2010 and June 2011 respectively, after the entry into force of the Agreement. 
 
 As stipulated in the Agreement, both sides will continue to negotiate with a view to reaching a 
conclusion of the negotia tions regarding the possibility of accep tance of Vietnamese qualified nurses 
and careworkers by Japan by 1 October 2011. 
 WT/REG275/2 
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  Relationship with other Agreements concluded by the Parties 
 
11. Japan and ASEAN members signed an FTA wh ich entered into force in December 2008.  
In this regard, Article 21 of the Japan-Viet Nam FTA notes that commitments made under this agreement will not affect the commit ments made under Japan-ASEAN FTA.  
(a) Could the Parties explain the benefits of maintaining two FTAs in place?  What 
are the main benefits that the Japan-Viet Nam FTA provides over those generated by the Japan-ASEAN FTA?  
 
 In JVEPA, there are some tariff lines whose dut y is more liberalized than in Japan-ASEAN 
FTA (AJCEP).  Moreover, JVEPA has some chapters  which are not substantia lly covered by AJCEP, 
such as ones on Intellectual Property and Competition.   Exporters or suppliers can select the more beneficial one from the two FTAs in terms of 
transaction cost including the rules of origin.  
 
(b) Could the Parties indicate how economic agents are informed of the differences 
between both FTAs so that they benefit the most and their transaction costs are 
minimized?  
 
 The business circle is informed of the differences  by relevant ministries including Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan and Ministry of Industry and Trade of Viet Nam through such 
means as website and seminars.   
(c) In view of on-going negotiations of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 
would this Agreement represent a third FTA between the Parties if Japan joined 
the negotiations? 
 Japan is currently considering a possibility to  join the TPP negotiation, and not in a position 
to answer the question.  
(d) Are the Parties considering the possibility that former FTAs between the 
partners are superseded by FTAs negotiated at a later stage?  
 No, neither party is considering that possibility with respect to the JVEPA at this moment. 
 
Government Procurement 
 
12. Could the Parties explain in detail the commitments made under this Agreement 
concerning government procurement?  
 Under Article 106, Chapter 11 (Improvement of the Business Environment), each Party, 
subject to its laws and regulations, policies, and pr actices, shall endeavour to enhance transparency of 
the measures regarding government procurement, an d implement in a fair and effective manner the 
measures regarding government procurement.   Competition 
 13. Could the Parties clarify how the comp etition provisions are enforceable? 
 
 With regard to Article 99 of the Agreement, each Party shall implement its obligations of 
promoting competition by addressing anti-competitiv e activities, in accordance with its laws and  WT/REG275/2 
 Page 5 
 
 
  regulations and in conformity with the principles of transparency, non-discrimination, and procedural 
fairness.   With regard to the Parties' obligations of  cooperation under Article 101 of the Agreement, 
they shall be implemented thr ough the cooperation between their competition authorities, which may 
take the form of exchange of information, notifi cation and coordination of enforcement activities, and 
consultation.  Detailed arrangeme nts to implement the competition provisions may be made between 
the competition authorities, as provided fo r in Article 104 of the Agreement. 
 
Business environment 
 
14. Paragraph 154 indicates that Article 105 requires the Parties to take measures to 
improve the business environment in their territory  for the benefit of nationals of the other 
party, in accordance with its laws and regulations.  
 
(a) Could the Parties indicate the issues that have been identified as problems?  
 
 Promotion of Investment, Banking/Tax/Accoun ting, Labour, Logistics/Customs, Technology 
Transfer, Industries, and Infrastructure are the i ssues specifically discussed in the Viet Nam-Japan 
Joint Initiative explained below.  
(b) What measures will be/have been taken to improve the business environment? 
 The Government of Japan and the Government of Viet Nam have been making efforts to 
improve the business environment in Viet Nam-Japan Joint Initiative.  Under this scheme, action plan 
has been agreed among the Government of Viet Nam, the Government of Japan and the Japanese 
private firms.  
 
Questions from the Delegation of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, 
and Matsu 
 
15. Paragraphs 66 and 67 of page 27 of WT /REG275/1 indicate that according to 
Article 70.1 of the Agreement, a Party may deny the benefits of this services chapter of the 
Agreement to juridical-person serv ice suppliers which are owned or controlled by persons of a 
non-party where the Party does not maintain diplom atic relations with the non-party, or the 
denying Party takes measures with respect to the non-party that prohibit transactions with the 
juridical person or that would be circumvented if  the benefits were accorded to the juridical 
person.  According to Article 70.2, a Party m ay deny the benefits to juridical-person service 
suppliers which are not from the other Party. 
(a) What is the difference in definition between the "juridical person" as stipulated 
in Article 70.1 and the juridical person as stipulated in Article 70.2 of the Agreement? 
 There is no difference in definition between the "juridical person" as stipulated in Article 70.1 
and the juridical person as stipulated in Article 70.2, which is stipulated in paragraph (d) of Article 58. 
 
(b) Why do the Parties not use the concept of "substantive business operations in 
the territory of the Parties" provided for in GATS Article 5.6 to deny the benefits acquired by the juridical-person service suppliers owned or controlled by persons of a non-party? 
 WT/REG275/2 
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   The concept of "substantive business operations in the territory of the Parties" is included in 
the definition of "juridical person of the other party".  (Article 58(e))  
(c) Why does the provision in the Agreement regarding the denial of benefits refer 
specifically to non-parties with whom th e Parties do not maintain diplomatic 
relations?  Does this not constitute the creation of trade barriers as far as 
non-parties not maintaining diplomatic rel ations with the Parties are concerned? 
 Article 70 is not intended to derogate from th e parties' rights and obligations under the GATS. 
In this context, it should be noted that Article 70 does not provide that the Parties necessarily deny the 
benefit where the conditions therein are met. 
 
(d) According to GATS Article 5.6 which stipulates that juridical-person service 
suppliers of any other Member constituted under the laws of a Party that engages in substantial business operations in the territory of the Parties shall be 
entitled to treatment granted under the Agreement, why do the Parties deny the 
benefits obtained by those service s upplies of a non-Party which is a WTO 
Member but does not have diplomatic relations with the Parties? 
 Please refer to answer for (c). 
 
(e) Why does Article 70.1 of the Agreement which provides for the denial of benefits 
to the juridical-person service suppliers owned or controlled by persons of a 
non-party not include the procedures of prior notification and consultation 
provided for in Article 70.2 which applies to juridical-person service suppliers which are not from the other Party? 
 Article 70.1 does not provide for the procedures of prior notification and consultation in order 
to give the denying party discretion to deny th e benefit on its own judgment when the conditions 
stipulated in Article 70.1(a)(b) are met. 
 
16. As indicated in paragraph 77 of page 28, WT/REG275/1, for nursing services, according 
to Sub-Part B of Annex 7 of the Agreement, the Parties would enter into negotiations concerning the possibility that Japan accep ts Vietnamese qualified nurses and certified 
caregivers.  Those negotiations are expect ed to be concluded by 1 October 2011. 
(a) Why does Viet Nam request that Japan unilaterally recognizes its qualified 
nurses and certified caregivers? 
 Japan and Viet Nam committed to enter into  negotiations regarding the possibility of 
acceptance of Vietnamese qualified nurses and certified careworkers by Japan.  
(b) What kind of agreement, (e.g. the mutual recognition agreement on nursing 
services in accordance with Article 66 of  the Agreement), would be signed by the 
Parties if the aforementioned negotiations can be concluded as scheduled? 
 The way to reflect the result of such ne gotiations will also be discussed in the 
Sub-Committee.  
 
    WT/REG275/2 
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  17. Paragraph 142 of page 41 of WT/REG275/1 indi cates that according to Article 9.2 of the 
Agreement, the WTO Agreement shall prevail in the event of any inconsistency between the 
Agreement and the WTO Agreement.  However, acco rding to Article 9.3, in the event of any 
inconsistency between this Agreement and an y agreement other than the WTO Agreement to 
which both Parties are signatories, the Parties sh all immediately consult with each other with a 
view to finding a mutually satisfactory solution. 
(a) What is the scope of the coverage of the "WTO Agreement" as defined in 
Article 2(g) of the Agreement?  Does it also include Annexes of multilateral and bilateral trade agreements in addition to  the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization? 
 The "WTO Agreement" means the Marrakesh  Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization.  
(b) Why do the provisions of the WTO Ag reement prevail over those of the 
Agreement if there is inconsistency between these two Agreements?  What 
criteria are applied to resolving this inconsistency? 
 We have been promoting the trade liberaliza tion in the multilateral trade system such as 
WTO, and is of the view that the EPAs with ot her countries or regions complement this system. 
Considering this relationship, we included the pr ovision that in the event of any inconsistency 
between the Agreement and the WTO Ag reement, the latter shall prevail. 
 
(c) Why does the Agreement adopt a differen t way to resolve the inconsistency 
between the Agreement and any agreement other than the WTO Agreement to which both Parties are signatories, from that adopted between the Agreement and the WTO Agreement? 
 Both parties are parties of a number of multilate ral agreements, and since there is a possibility 
that amendments may be made in the future to the provisions of such multilateral agreements, we 
included this provision in order to be able, in such events, to find a mutually satisfactory solution for 
both Parties regarding the inconsistency between the Agreement and any agreement other than the 
WTO Agreement taking into consideration general principles of international law.  
 
Questions from the Delegation of the United States 
 Liberalization of Trade and Tariff Lines  
 18. According to Paragraphs 22 and 24 and Annex I of the Factual Presentation 
(Table A.I1-A.I2):  
 Viet Nam eliminates tariffs on 91.6% of a ll tariff lines covering 90.1% of imports by 
value from Japan under the agreement.  91.7% of industrial tariffs are duty-free and 92.9% of agricultural tariff lines are duty-free under the agreement. 
 
 Japan eliminates duties on 89.3% of all tariff lines covering 96.5% of imports by value 
from Viet Nam under the Agreement.  Howeve r, though 95.9% of industrial tariffs are 
duty-free, only 61.7% of agricultural ta riff lines are duty-free under the Agreement. 
 
(a) How does Japan explain its highly disp roportionate liberalization between the 
industrial and agricultural sectors? WT/REG275/2 
Page 8  
 
   The trade liberalization undertaken in the JVEPA  is the result of negotiations between Japan 
and Viet Nam with the aim to strike a balance betw een their specific interests and sensitivities, while 
also ensuring conformity with the requirements of GATT Article XXIV.  
(b) For what reasons did Japan undertake libera lization on a lower percentage of 
agricultural tariff lines than Viet Nam?   
 The figures reflect the result of the negotiations conducted by both Parties, taking into 
consideration each side's specific interest and concerns.  
Japan's liberalization schedule 
 
19. Paragraph 26 of the Factual Presentation indi cates that in Japan's trade liberalization 
commitments, of the total 946 lines that still retai n a duty at the end of the implementation 
period, the majority fall under HS sections I to  IV (approximately 84%).  Notably, 53% of the 
tariff lines in Section I (live animals and animal  products) and 51% of the lines in Section IV 
(prepared foods) still retain a duty after full implementation in 2024.  
 Could Japan please explain how the level of tariff elimination achieved meets the 
"substantially all trade" standard set out in GATT Article XXIV? 
 
 The Parties to the Agreement believe that the coverage of the JVEPA between Japan and 
Viet Nam fulfils the "substantially all tr ade" requirement under GATT Article XXIV. 
  “Substantially all trade" does not amount to all trade.  The criterion refers to overall trade 
rather than to either imports or exports, and is not necessary equal to the coverage of specific sectors 
or products.   Moreover, as the liberalization undertaken by the Parties in the JVEPA covers substantially 
all the trade carried out between the Parties, we are of the view that the coverage of the Agreement is 
fully consistent with our WTO obligations. 
 
20. Paragraph 65 of the factual presentation no tes that Article 9.4 of the Agreement 
provides that an existing bilateral investment tr eaty between the Parties is incorporated into 
and forms part of the Agreement, except for the treaty's Article 20 (which is not incorporated 
into the Agreement). 
(a) Could the Parties describe the main feat ures of their 2003 investment treaty, and 
in particular those provisions of the trea ty that affect market access or national 
treatment for mode 3 service suppliers? 
 The Agreement between Japan and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam for the Liberalization, 
Promotion and Protection of Investment provid es "National Treatment (NT)" and "Most-Favored 
Nation Treatment (MFN)" for investment activities including pre-establishment phase (Article 2).  It 
also provides "Prohibition of Performance Requirements (PR)" as many as ten items including 
(e) "restrict sales", (f) "SMBD" and (i) "R&D" (Article 4).    Article 2 (NT, MFN) 
 
1. Each Contracting Party shall in its Area accord to investors of the other Contracting Party and 
to their investments treatment no less favorable than  the treatment it accords in like circumstances to 
its own investors and their invest ments with respect to the estab lishment, acquisition, expansion,  WT/REG275/2 
 Page 9 
 
 
  operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoymen t, and sale or other disposal of investments 
(hereinafter referred to as "investment activities").  2.  Each Contracting Party shall in its Area accord  to investors of the other Contracting Party and 
to their investments treatment no less favorable than  the treatment it accords in like circumstances to 
investors of any third country and to their inv estments with respect to investment activities. 
 Article 4 (PR) 
 1. Neither Contracting Party shall impose or enfo rce, as a condition for investment activities in 
its Area of an investor of the other Contracting Party, any of the following requirements: 
  (a)  to export a given level or percentage of goods or services;  (b)  to achieve a given level or  percentage of domestic content; 
 (c)  to purchase, use or accord a preference to goods produced or services provided in its 
 Area, or to purchase goods or services from natural or legal persons or any other 
 entity in its Area; 
 (d) to relate the volume or value of imports to the volume or value of exports or to the 
 amount of foreign exchange inflows associa ted with investments of that investor; 
 (e) to restrict sales of goods or services in its Area that investments of that investor 
 produces or provides by relating such sales to  the volume or value of its exports or 
 foreign exchange earnings; 
 (f) to appoint, as executives, managers or memb ers of boards of directors, individuals of 
 any particular nationality; 
 (g) to transfer technology, a production pr ocess or other proprietary knowledge to a 
 natural or legal person or any other entity in its Area, except when the requirement  
 
 (i) is imposed or enforced by a cour t, administrative tribunal or competition 
 authority to remedy an alleged violation of competition laws; or 
 (ii) concerns the transfer of intellect ual property rights which is undertaken in a 
 manner  not inconsistent with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
 Intellectual Property Rights, Anne x 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement 
 Establishing the World Trade Organization; 
  (h) to locate the headquarters of that investor  for a specific region or the world market in 
  its Area;  (i) to achieve a given level or value of  research and development in its Area; or 
 (j) to supply one or more of the goods that the investor produces or the services that the 
 investor provides to a specific region or  the world market, exclusively from the Area 
 of the former Contracting Party. 
 2. The provisions of paragraph 1 above do not preclude either Contracting Party from 
conditioning the receipt or continued receipt of an advantage, in connection with investment activities 
in its Area of an investor of the other Contracti ng Party, on compliance with any of the requirements 
set forth in paragraph 1 (f) through (j) above.  
(b) Could the Parties describe Article 20 of their 2003 investment treaty, and 
explain why they excluded this Article from incorporation into the Agreement? 
 Article 20 of Japan-Viet Nam bilateral inv estment treaty (BIT) provides a Joint Committee 
under the BIT.  As the Parties considered it difficu lt and inappropriate to place the established Joint 
Committee under the BIT in the Agreement, the Parties agreed to exclude this Article from 
incorporation into the Agreement.  WT/REG275/2 
Page 10  
 
  Article 20 (Joint Committee) 
 
1. The Contracting Parties shall establish a Join t Committee (hereinafter referred to as "the 
Committee") with a view to accomplishing the objectives of this Agreement. 
 
The functions of the Committee shall be: 
  (a) to discuss and review the implemen tation and operation of this Agreement; 
 (b)  to discuss the exceptional measures adopted  or maintained pursuant to Article 5 for 
 the purpose of encouraging favorable conditions for investors of the Contracting 
 Parties; 
 (c) to review the exceptional measures ma intained, amended, modified or adopted 
 pursuant to Article 6 for the purpose of contributing to the reduction or elimination of  such exceptional measures;  and 
 (d) to discuss any other investment-rela ted matters concerni ng this Agreement. 
 
2. The Committee may, as necessary, make appr opriate recommendations by consensus to the 
Contracting Parties for the more effective functioni ng or the attainment of the objectives of this 
Agreement.  3. The Committee shall be composed of repr esentatives of the Contracting Parties.  The 
Committee shall determine its own rules of procedure to carry out its functions. 
 4.  The Committee may establish sub-comm ittees and delegate specific tasks to such 
sub-committees.  The Committee, upon mutual consen t of the Contracting Parties, may hold joint 
meetings with the private sectors. 
 
5. Unless otherwise decided by the Contracting Parties, the Committee shall meet once a year, 
and otherwise at the request of either Contracting Party.  
21. Paragraph 112 of the factual presentation no tes that Viet Nam's specific commitments 
under the Agreement (as contained in its Annex 5 schedule) "reproduce" its GATS schedule.  
The only additional description provided in the presentation of Viet Nam's specific 
commitments under the Agreement (in paragraph 113 of the factual presentation) notes that in 
one sector, maritime transport services, Viet Nam has scheduled a "new" limitation. 
(a) Could the Parties confirm that it was th eir intention that Viet Nam's specific 
commitments under the Agreement would be the same as its commitments under 
the GATS;  in other words, that no new liberalization of market access or 
national treatment for services would result from the Agreement? 
 Viet Nam accorded our commitments under the GATS/WTO to Japan.  It can be noted that 
according to Article 63 of VJEPA Agreement, after the Agreement enters into force, if a Party 
concludes or amends an agreement with a non-Party, it shall provide the other Party an opportunity to 
consult on the possibility of according treatment no less favourable than that granted to services and 
service suppliers of the non-Party under that agreem ent to like services and service suppliers of that 
other Party.  
   
 
  WT/REG275/2 
 Page 11 
 
 
  (b) Could the Parties explain the inclusion of a new limitation on Viet Nam's 
commitments in the maritime transport se rvices sector, and why this limitation 
was deemed necessary for commitments under the Agreement, as opposed to its 
commitments under the GATS? 
 The specific commitments are not intended to de rogate from the Parties' rights and obligations 
under the GATS.  There is no difference in th e meaning of commitments between the VJEPA 
Agreement and the GATS.  The sentence "The lim itation on the number of joint ventures shall be 
applied on a global basis." is included for the purpose of clarification and transparency.  
 
Tariff-Rate Quotas under the Agreement 
 
22. According to Annex II, Paragraph 1, Japan maintains a tariff-rate quota (TRQ) on 
honey (040900000), allowing for an IQR of 12.8%  (approximately half of the 2009 MFN duty).  
This is the only product with a TRQ in the Agreement.  
 Can Japan explain the reasons for this exception and provide information on how the 
TRQ is being administered?  
  It reflects the result of the negotiations conducted by both Parties. 
  The tariff rate quota is implemented through a certificate of tariff rate quota issued by the importing Party on the basis of a certificate issu ed by the exporting Party for each export.  The 
detailed regulations shall be to stipulated in the Implementing Regulations adopted by the Joint 
Committee in October 2009. 
 
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