WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  WT/TPR/OV/M/7/Add.1 
5 May 2010 
 (10-2491) 
Trade Policy Review Body 
22 January 2010  
 
 
OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL TRADING ENVIRONMENT 
 
Record of the Meeting  
 
Written statements by Members 
 
Addendum  
 
 
BRAZIL  
1. As the Trade Policy Review Mechanism completes 20 years, a word of praise is in order for 
its significant contribution to the multilateral trading system.  Indeed, through the collective review of 
trade policies and practices adopted by Member s, the mechanism has allowed for a better 
understanding of such policies, their compliance with and impact on the WTO system. 
2. In the course of its existence, the TPRM has ex amined at least once the trade policies of the 
overwhelming majority of WTO’s 153 Members, comprisi ng almost the totality of international trade.  
Brazil has already been submitted to five re views, the last of which in March 2009. 
3. The usefulness of the TPRM can also be assessed in the context of this monitoring exercise in 
relation to Members’ reaction to th e crisis.  Four important reports were issued in 2009 and they have 
allowed for meaningful interaction among Members a nd contributed to a better understanding of the 
effects of the crisis and the responses to it. 
4. I also wish to thank the DG and the Secret ariat for the Annual Report titled “Overview of 
Developments in the International Trading Environm ent”.  This most comprehensive report provides a 
wealth of information and interesting analysis putting in context the 2009 trade developments and 
outlining in the second part of the report the future trade perspectives. 
5. The report portrays a picture of the underlying factors that have shaped the current downturn, 
the most dramatic and deepest since the Great Depressi on. It also describes the origins of the crisis in 
the assets bubbles of the developed countries, and the prompt reaction by the G20 leaders avoiding 
worse scenarios.  It also highlight s the contribution of the multilateral trading system in the efforts to 
avoid open protectionism. 
6. The picture that emanates from the report is of low intensity protectionism.  Members mostly 
did not resort to measures that openly contradict WTO disciplines, in response to pleas from affected 
domestic interests.  Members avoided increases in b ound tariffs but in the developed world, there was 
some backtracking in previous liberalizing actions an d the reintroduction of export subsidies is a clear 
example of that.  The developed economies also re sorted to stimulus packages and sectoral bailout 
schemes.  In brief, developed Members used thei r policy space sometimes testing the limits of the 
multilateral trading disciplines. WT/TPR/OV/M/7/Add.1 
Page 2  
 
7. According to the report, slippages were minor, affecting just 1% of world trade.  Some in-
depth analysis on the impact of targeted measures is warranted, and that was the point extensively 
made by the representative of Argentina.  For exam ple, the USA and the EU put together financial 
packages of over US$20 trillion and the average spe nding by developed economies in such packages 
reached about 3.5% of their GDP.  Some of these measures will necessarily have distorting effects on 
specific markets or will divert part of the stimul us measures to domestic suppliers by virtue of 
“hire/contract/lend/local” provisions. 
8. The picture for developing countries is quite differe nt.  They were hit the hardest in terms of 
job lost, GDP decline and reduced exports.  Moreover, they do not count with social protection safety 
nets that enable them to mitigat e these effects.  They are also on the receiving end of a double hit 
derived from the anti-cyclical policies put in place by developed economies, which depress prices and 
crowd out non-subsidised suppliers.  
9. Likewise, the report correctly points out additi onal impacts derived from restrictions on trade 
finance, FDI inflows, curtailed remittances and declining tourism revenues.  Recent data made 
available by UNCTAD illustrate the extent of the dec line of foreign direct investment affecting both 
developed and developing countries.   We can only hope that predictions for a rebound of FDI in 2010 
are accurate. 
10. Turning now to Brazil I would like to report that  Brazil has displayed re markable resilience in 
the face of the downturn.  Sound macroeconomic  policies and prompt government reaction have 
attenuated the worst consequences of the world contracti on.  Brazil was one of the latest to be hit, was 
hit less severely than most, and was one of the first to resume recovery. 
11. Looking forward, we should not bask in the fact that the worst scenario was avoided.  There is 
no room for complacency and in some major economie s the balance could still be precarious.  The 
overall outlook of the world economy remains uncertain  despite indications of healthy recoveries in 
some countries and markets.  Prospects of a jobl ess recovery or another contraction in developed 
countries cannot be outright discarded. 
12. The risk associated to a relapse into protectionism  lingers in many quarters, a scenario that is 
always accompanied by the spectre of a spiral of countermeasures and retaliations.  We must continue to pull ahead the world trading system, to improve it, and to fortify it. 
13. Brazil continues to believe that concluding th e DDA is the best option available.  It can 
generate a tripe win by:  (1) strengthening the ru les-based system;  (2) providing an additional and 
substantial non-distorting stimulus package by means of renewed trade;  (3) advancing the cause of 
development, as developing countries are the most vulnerable to economic downturns and more likely 
to suffer the adverse consequences of protectionist policies. 
EUROPEAN UNION 
14. I would like to offer comments in three areas.  First of all some comments on the monitoring 
exercise which is the substance of much of this report, secondly some observations on the proposal by 
Argentina and others for more in-depth analysis  of specific support programmes, and thirdly some 
comments on the recommendations made in the DG’s report to further improve the functioning of the WTO system. 
15. On the monitoring of trade measures, we thi nk the report gives a very comprehensive and 
accurate picture of trade developments over the last  year against the background of the financial and 
economic crisis.  Our own reading of the situation,  based in part on our own internal monitoring 
intelligence, is similar to that of the WTO.  There has been some resort to trade protectionist measures 
since the start of the crisis, but the greatly f eared and widespread and systemic escalation of WT/TPR/OV/M/7/Add.1 
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protectionism has not taken place, and we are already starting to see the dismantling of some, if not many, of the measures taken last year.  We also share fully the conclusion in this report that the programmes that were introduced to tackle or mitigat e the crisis have, above all, helped to prevent a 
bigger contraction in international trade than would otherwise have been the case, and that thanks to 
these measures we are seeing hesitant signs of recovery.   
16. Overall we believe that the efforts by the G-20 and others to coordinate the international 
response to preventing economic meltdown and to rej ecting protectionism has been broadly a success.  
Thanks to the decisive action taken over the past  year we are seeing signs of a gradual recovery. 
17. The key to recovery is not only about resis ting protectionism.  As Ambassador Sun very 
eloquently said himself, the key for a faster recovery is in our hands, we need to move forward 
energetically with the Doha Round Agenda whic h is the international stimulus programme par 
excellence that would not cost a penny to our treasu ries and would not have any trade-distortive effect 
but rather the reverse. 
18. The report notes that the risk of certain trad e measures remaining in place even as the crisis 
retreats; I think that it is a very pertinent observation.  The path to recovery is by no means 
straightforward, there will be significant burdens on  national budgets and pers istent high levels of 
unemployment for months, if not years, to come.  As the report warns, these could become readily a 
source of new protectionist pressures, so we have to  remain on the alert.  We would agree with the 
suggestion made in the WTO report that monitoring of the withdrawal of measures will be important 
to ensure that any winding down of support measures is also done in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner. 
19. After the way forward with the monitoring exerci se itself, we would, like others, to encourage 
the WTO Secretariat to continue monitoring develo pments in the months ahead.  We would support 
possibly a less-frequent reporting exercise, perhaps tw ice or three times a year, and that would allow 
the reports to review longer time-periods and perhaps contain more relevant and revealing 
information.  We also feel strongly that the repor ts should continue to cove r also measures taken by 
non-Members of the WTO because the freedom of non- Members to take trade measures is, of course, 
less constrained by WTO rules. 
20. And last on the question of monitoring we do encourage the Secretariat to give emphasis to 
monitoring Members compliance with notification obligations.   
21. On the proposal by Argentina, Ecuador and othe rs, to go more into depth on some specific 
support programmes and by bail-out packages, we believe  that the intention of the proponents of this 
proposal is good, a desire first of all to improve  transparency, and we would certainly support any 
measures that we can take in this house to improve transparency.  That is, and must remain, a focus of 
the Secretariat’s efforts in the TPRB exercise.   
22. With regard to the suggestion that there could be  an in-depth analysis of stimulus measures or 
support measures for particular sectors we are open to these suggestions, but with a number of 
caveats. 
23. First of all we think it is more feasible, and will be more productive, to analyse those sectors 
and those trade measures that have a more easily identifiable impact on trade flows and on relative competitiveness.  It seems to us that it would be mo re productive to start our work in the area of goods 
looking perhaps at the automobile sector or/and th e steel sector, two sectors which have received a 
large amounts of financial support in the last 18 mont hs.  We are not convinced that for the services 
sector there is data available that would rend any anal ytical exercise very useful.  We also believe that 
any analysis of the stimulus measu res or bail-out packages is going to be inherently difficult since we 
are dealing with a very, I would say, unique and parallel set of circumstances and measures taken in a WT/TPR/OV/M/7/Add.1 
Page 4  
 
period of massive economic turbulence and where we  simply lack any counterfactual evidence.   
What, for example would have been the effect on tr ade of not introducing certain stimulus measures 
or bail-outs.  It is very hard to be specific, and pa rticularly in the field of banking or financial services 
we should recognize that much of the support was not in the form of subsidies, but simply the extension of last-resort credit lines or guarantees wh ich have not been utilized by the institutions at all 
in many cases, and which in turn explains the rath er surprising speed of which many institutions and 
companies are effectively repaying back the suppor t extended.  We would accept a more in-depth 
study of support progra mmes, but focussing perhaps on goods sectors such as automobiles or steel 
where we think that the data is more readily av ailable, and will allow us to draw some useful 
conclusions as to what kind of measures are best likely to promote market-openness. 
24. Turning to the multilateral recommendations su ggested in the Annual Report, as well as in 
Part II of the report, we agree with the sugges tion in several places that the multilateral rule book 
needs to be strengthened;  that there is still ro om for improvement in areas such as government 
procurement and subsidies.  Certainly if one outco me of this monitoring exercise and the analysis 
being done is to convince the broader Membership of  the value of stronger rules in areas such as 
subsidies and greater participation by Members in the Government Procurement Agreement then this 
would be a very valuable outcome. 
25. We also agree that more work can, and need s, to be done on Regional Trade Agreements 
(RTAs).  A better understanding of th eir content, scope, the trends in  RTAs will help us to better 
understand how RTAs could support the WTO system.  We would like to compliment the approach taken in this report in addressing the relationship between RTAs and the WTO.  The report avoids the 
usual unanswerable question as to whether RTAs are building blocks or stumbling blocks, but instead 
takes a more interesting cost comparison of differe nt RTAs to look at tre nd in terms of coverage, 
ambition and scope.  We think this is the right track  to follow, and we would support the deepening of 
the dialogue on RTAs along those lines to see how and whether we might wish to update the rule 
book on RTAs ultimately, whether we can identify b est practices across different RTAs and in doing 
so see what scope there might be for Members arriving at, or taking, common approaches in their 
different RTAs on specific rules or other matters, which should of course make multilateralization of 
those RTA provisions easier in the future. 
26. Last but not least, on the TPRB and the TPRM itself, the monitoring report and the 
contribution that data has given to the G20 and to  the international community, has actually breathed 
new life into the TPRM.  We think, however, that  there is room for considerable sharpening and 
improvement of the TPRB when it comes to its mo re classic peer review function of individual 
Members’ trade policies.  The current review system is not interactive, it doesn’t fulfil its potential, 
and we think we need a serious reflection on how to  improve it.  We would encourage some informal 
brainstorming, perhaps involving outside experts, to see how the TPRM can be made more effective.  
As part of this, we think it is ne cessary that all Members, without ex ception, accept to be subjected to 
this very important peer review system. 
27. My last comment on Part B of the report, whic h is a very thought-pr ovoking presentation on 
shaping factors for the future trading system, we thank the DG and the Secretariat for including this 
very interesting analysis.  We were very struck by the analysis of the public perceptions of trade 
policing and the relationship between support for tr ade openness and the existence of social welfare 
safety nets.  It is an issue which certainly explains  the different levels of acceptance of globalization 
and trade openness in different regions of the wo rld.  The comments in the report in Part B on 
currency movements and the inertia effect of the domin ant currency for international trade is also very 
pertinent, and the analysis of trade and climate ch ange, although it is cursory, seems to us to be 
accurate.  We would like to put on record our apprecia tion of this analysis in Part B of the report and 
we would hope that we can find an occasion in the fu ture for more in-depth discussion of the shaping 
factors for trade as set out in Part B of the report.       WT/TPR/OV/M/7/Add.1 
Page 5 
 
 
AUSTRALIA 
28. The Director-General’s report  is a timely reminder of the  policy challenges that have 
confronted Members over the past year.  But also as some other Members have mentioned, it also is in 
a more positive frame, reminds us of the effec tiveness of coordinated global policy responses both on 
trade and on wider economic measures.  We certainly  support the Director-General's leadership in 
undertaking this monitoring exercise which provides a useful factual basis for assessing the impact of 
the global financial and economic crisis on trade and trade policy. 
29. The fact that we have avoided widespread pr otectionism certainly reflects the commitment to 
the multilateral disciplines on trade and to the collec tive policy response.  But I think maybe 2010 is 
also the time to move on.  After all the WTO's basi c mandate is to do more than just maintain the 
status quo, we have to continue to move forwar d.  We also welcome the evidence of various 
governments undertaking autonomous liberalization in the past year, which is also a very welcome 
development, and signals importantly an appreciation of the c ontribution that domestic reform and 
other economic policies contribute to our capacity to respond the crises.  Australia, through a range of 
appropriate policy responses manage d to avoid the recession, and the Australian Government is 
continuing it's own domestic reform having undertaken  very significant further reductions in two key 
sensitive sectors of the economy on 1 January 2010.  The maximum tariff on clothing and finished 
textiles has fallen from 17.5% to a maximum of 10%  and another textile-clothing-footwear sector 
tariffs has fallen to a maximum of 5%.  By 2015 all ta riffs in this sector will fall to a maximum of 5%.  
Similarly, in the area of passenger motor vehicles an d related components, whic h others have raised, 
Australia reduced further its tariffs in this sect or on 1 January 2010 and they have fallen from a 
maximum of 10% to a maximum of 5%. 
30. We all know that an open and transparent system of multilateral trade is the best form of 
insurance against costly restrictions and discrimina tion, and of course the challenge now is, as others 
have mentioned, and we certainly strongly endorse,  the challenge now is to top up that insurance 
policy through the completion of the Doha Round this  year and for the Organisation to continue to 
move ahead. 
31. Finally, again like a previous speaker John Clar k, we welcome the reference to RTAs in the 
Director General’s report, and support his call for Me mbers to look further at the relationship between 
RTAs and the WTO, and to continue building on an analysis of RTAs.  The provisionally adopted 
RTA transparency mechanism has, in our view, been a success, and has improved considerably 
Members' understanding of RTAs, and we are certain ly committed to its permanent adoption as part 
of the final Doha package.  The tr ansparency mechanism is not an end in itself, we would like to see 
the information gathered and analysed to determine how Members are implementing the 
commitments on the Article 24, and ultimately this analysis, and any conclusions drawn, could feed 
into the RTA Rules negotiation.  We would also  like to see an agreement on a further work 
programme on RTAs to be pursued in the post-Doha context. 
VENEZUELA 
32. The report before us provides interesting f ood for thought, analysis and discussion regarding 
the context of the economic crisis and its impact on trade and on the Doha Round.  However, it has a 
number of shortcomings that need to be corrected. 
33. We need to examine and measure the impact of the stimulus policies in the developed 
countries and the extent to which they have distor ted world trade, which is why we agree with the 
proposal made in this connection by Argentina, Ecuador, India and South Africa. 
34. The report seeks to list the measures taken in the framework of the crisis , but fails to mention 
their effects and the fact that their impact was totally different for the developed countries and the WT/TPR/OV/M/7/Add.1 
Page 6  
 
developing countries – in other words, not everyone suffered in the same way, partly because not all 
of the countries are able to apply the kind of support measures introduced in the large economies. 
35. The report provides a picture of the state of the multilateral trading system, but since that 
system is focussed on one main goal, namely the Do ha Round, it might be worth tackling the issue of 
how the crisis is helping or preventing us from achievi ng that goal and the impact that this could have 
on development, above all when we are faced with situations in which trade is on the decline and 
unemployment on the increase. 
36. We have been listening to some very important statements, but I believe that what we see in 
many of them is the G-20 approach which has beco me a sort of platitude.  We must acknowledge the 
contributions made by, among others, the delegati ons of Switzerland, Chin a, Ecuador and Canada, 
regarding the financial system. 
37. Attempts have been made to point the finger at protectionism as "the demon", the source of 
all that is wrong and nothing has been  said about the true origin of th e crisis, namely the lack of State 
supervision and control of the inte rnational financial system, the lack  of regulation and the ill-fated 
path towards financial liberalization:  this is so mething that is seldom mentioned in international 
forums. 
38. Some action is already being taken – we hear d President Obama yesterday evening speaking 
about finance and an announcement a few days ago from the Government of China about measures to 
stimulate the economy.  I think it was most aptly referred to as regulated liberalization by the 
Ambassador of China. 
39. It was appropriate for Mr Lamy to express his concerns about excess liquidity and the 
possible development of a new crisis in his statem ent, with particular reference to the stimulus 
packages.  I have confidence in Mr Lamy's capacity for work, like a majority of us here, and in his 
intelligence. 
40. In his capacity as Director-General of this Or ganization, I believe he has certain possibilities 
which have enabled him to carry out studies with a vi ew to alerting us to the need to regulate the 
financial system. 
41. He will encounter a few allies along the way, since many countries in the world share his 
concern and I understand, as I have mentioned, that the Chinese government and President Obama 
have recently expressed the same view, as well as the representatives of Ecuador, and that Canada has expressed a similar opinion.  We should therefore be  looking at the topic of finance as the causal 
factor and main concern in these matters. 
42. I do have one concern about the report:  I think it is very good on systemic issues, but it fails 
to address the economic situation, to address Doha.  W ill current trends in world trade bring us closer 
to, or move us further away from, Doha?  Because ultimately, the principal task for this Organization is to conclude the Doha Agenda, and these trading policies must be looked in that context:  do they 
move us closer to Doha, or further away? 
43. Also – since after all, Doha is a tool for development – we need to examine whether these 
policies are moving us towards development, partic ularly in the case of the developing countries, 
given that for us, there can be no doubt that this is an essential part of the whole process and one of 
our main concerns. 
44. It is for this reason that I wanted to raise these matters and encourage you, Mr Lamy, and the 
WTO Secretariat, to continue improving this report. WT/TPR/OV/M/7/Add.1 
Page 7 
 
 
UNITED STATES 
45. The United States would like to thank the Secretar iat for its continuing efforts to monitor the 
trade related implications of individual economies' responses to the economic crisis.  We begin this 
year, as we do every New Year, with hope.  Domestically the U.S. economy is gradually emerging from a severe recession, with the OECD projecting th at U.S. GDP this year will see  positive growth 
of 2.5%.  We note too the encouraging conclusi on from the November TPRB report that up to this 
point no WTO Member has retreated into widespread  trade restriction or protectionism, nor has there 
been any significant incidence of trade retaliation.  We believe this outcome was greatly facilitated by 
the fact that Members have been able to use the WTO and its process to reshape and reconsider 
measures that might otherwise have lapsed into pr otectionism.  We are starting 2010, as we say, on 
the right foot, but as recovery moves forward we still need to remain vigilant. 
46. The United States continues to be interested in working with our trading partners to use the 
relevant Committees, Working Parties, and Councils to address some of the concerns highlighted in 
the reports to date.  From our standpoint, the day to day work of these Bodies remains instrumental in 
our efforts to contain protectionism.  In this rega rd we welcome the work that it has been done in 
improving notification procedures and look forward to further work on this in the new year. 
47. Turning to the proposal for further work that it  has been offered by Argentina, Ecuador and 
India, though we believe it is more appropriate for th is proposal to be addressed in this Body rather 
than in the General Council, we remain of the view  that the proposal itself is flawed.  The proponents 
have not adequately addressed the shortcomings that we and others identified the last three times this 
proposal was put forward.  Tasking the Secretariat to undertake an enormous effort to come up with a 
theoretical analysis of the crisis is likely to yield little of value to Memb ers.  If Members have 
experienced difficulties or have serious cause for c oncern over measures that have been taken, we 
believe that the most effective approach is for them  to raise them here, or in another relevant WTO 
Bodies, rather than asking the WTO Secretariat to go looking for issues.  Should discussions of issues 
that are brought to the table by Members suggest that they would benefit from input by the 
Secretariat, we could then all decide to ask fo r such input.  And should these discussions take on a 
sectoral cast, as some have suggested, we should not limit the analysis the so-called new types of measures but should also look at traditional tools for protectionism that have already existed in these 
sectors with further intensification both just  before and during the financial crisis. 
48. As we have said before, we share the interest of  others in learning what lessons there are to be 
learned from the way Members have responded to the fi nancial crisis in areas of relevance to the work 
of the WTO.  We simply believe that this work must be Member-led.  The United States has been, and 
will continue to be, very active in making inter ested parties aware of our policy responses and the 
effects as we know them. We encourage a ll Members to be equally transparent. 
CUBA 
49. As the Director-General has made clear in both his report and his presentation, there are risks 
regarding the sustainability of the global economic recovery.  The signs of recovery are weak and 
contradictory and it is necessary to view them with great caution.  The improvement of certain indices 
is negligible, others remain nega tive, but all behave differently be tween regions and countries.  Nor 
can slight improvements in one, two, three or fou r-month indicators be taken as definitive, as this 
could lead us to draw erroneous  conclusions.  One of the great risks for the emerging signs of 
recovery is the fact that, in a number of countri es, it is accompanied by increased unemployment with 
attendant negative effects on the real economy, consumption and increased poverty, as well as 
potential effects on political and social stability.  More over, there is a fairly sharp distinction between 
the crisis measures adopted by developed and deve loping countries.  In essence, the developed 
countries have injected multi-million dollar sums into  large companies, banks, financial institutions 
and the real estate sector.  Many developing count ries, on the other hand, have introduced support WT/TPR/OV/M/7/Add.1 
Page 8  
 
measures inter alia  for small and medium-sized businesses, consumers and the most vulnerable and 
low-paid groups. 
50. From the point of view of trade, the inform ation available from various sources points to a 
lower negative growth in the world economy  in 2009 and some positiv e growth in 2010, due 
fundamentally to the growth of the emerging econo mies, although the amount of aid obtained by the 
latter has been several times smalle r, in absolute and relative terms,  than that which industrialized 
countries have given to their business sectors.  Desp ite this, the majority of developing countries, in 
particular those that are most vulnerable, such as the least developed, small economies and African 
countries, have experienced a large number of negativ e effects on trade, as regards trade financing, 
reduced investments, remittances, official devel opment assistance and tourist income.  On the other 
hand, another potential risk for trade recovery and for developing countries is that the multi-million 
dollar aid packages granted to the banking, insuran ce and other sectors have not been accompanied by 
genuine and much needed reform and clear regulator y measures to avoid another speculative financial 
disaster.  This leads to the danger of further speculati on.  Indeed, between the end of last year and the 
first few weeks of this year, price increases were  observed on a large number of agricultural products 
and basic minerals, such as cocoa, coffee,  sugar, copper and oil, amongst others. 
51. It appears that these increases have even reached  historic levels, for several decades in some 
cases, and at the same time the futures markets or exchanges have seen price increases of several tens 
of percentage points, and even 50 per cent, over current prices for the same products.  This is 
obviously a clear indication that some of the multi-million dollar resources that went to the banks, businesses and financial institutions are being utilized  for speculative purposes, which seriously risks 
making the crisis worse or even creating a new crisis, such as a food crisis. 
52. At the same time, there is also a serious dange r to trade and trade financing.  If excessively 
strict rules on trade financing are established, partic ularly with regard to risks, there is a serious 
danger of hindering the growth of  such financing, which is already much reduced on account of the 
crisis and which governs a very high proportion or the bulk of world trade. 
53. In conclusion, Cuba reiterates its support for the proposals made by Argentina, Ecuador and 
India in the General Council as presented in the Committee on Financial Services, which relate to 
increasing transparency and establishing clear methodologies for a systematic analysis of aid and recovery packages applied mainly by the develope d countries and their potentially negative effects on 
competition and trade.  NORWAY 
54. There is broad agreement that protectionist actions  have played little or no role in the trade 
collapse that occurred during the financial crisis.  It was rather due mainly to falling demand and 
reduced availability of trade finance.  This illu strates the strength of the WTO and the multilateral 
rules-based trading system as a global defence agai nst protectionism and as an essential part of the 
system of global governance.  However, although we ha ve all promised to keep it that way, we have 
been seeing a step-by-step build-up of protectioni sm, increased use of antidumping measures, built-in 
national preferences in stimulus packages and so on.  Most of this has probably not been intended as 
protectionism.  Nevertheless, we have witnessed a trend that needs reversing.  We thus need to keep a 
close watch on the exit strategies developed to wi nd down the extraordinary support measures, and 
return the industries concerned to normal competitive conditions. 
55. The two monitoring reports foreshadowed by th e Director General will be essential in this 
respect.  Recovery will be slow, uneven and with  long-term negative effects, for not least for 
employment.  As always, the poor in developing c ountries will be most severely affected.  Most 
developing countries have not been able to provide safety nets or to introduce large-scale stimulus 
packages;  they will have to rely on trade to pull themselves out of the crisis.  WT/TPR/OV/M/7/Add.1 
Page 9 
 
 
56. In this context, it is interesting to note that  many of the positive liberalising measures that the 
Secretariat has recorded in its report have been take n by developing countries.  As often in the case of 
trade policy the challenge is how to balance the polic y space needed to combat the crisis with the need 
to limit our freedom of action so as not to bow to inevitable protectionist pressures.  Basically, the 
contribution trade policy can make to recovery, gr owth and development has four components:  two 
for governments individually and two collectively th rough the WTO.  The first is avoiding bowing to 
pressures to introduce antidumping measures or buy national preferences;  the second is scaling-down support measures before the industries concerned get too dependant on them;  the third is continuing 
to strengthen the WTO peer pressure exercises in the TPRB and elsewhere, and the last but not least, 
is completing the DDA. 
BANGLADESH 
57. We thank the DG for the excellent report; a nd we would welcome the WTO if they can 
increase the frequency of the reports.  As you know, LDCs are not the creators of the current financial 
crisis, but they are the worst suffers.  So the LD Cs demand more intensifed support from the global 
community in the form of more assistance in Aid fo r Trade and EIF to tide over the crisis.  As the DG 
has mentioned on previous occasions that Doha is an insurance against protectionism, so we urge 
developed countries to pay the premium of the insurance by zeroing the tariffs for the products of the LDCs. 
58. Finally I think Bangladesh as an LDC deserves some appreciation as it has notified its humble 
package to the WTO to tide over the crisis.  This is not an easy task for a very  poor country, an LDC 
like Bangladesh.  We can’t afford to do it again a nd again.  So I now look forward to the future 
reporting from the DG. 
__________