WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  TN/C/7 
WT/GC/105 9 February 2006 
 
(06-0563) 
Trade Negotiations Committee 
General Council Original:   English/ 
 Spanish 
 
 
 
IRREGULARITIES IDENTIFI ED IN THE NEGOTIATION AND DECISION MAKING 
PROCESS AT THE SIXTH WTO MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE 
 
Communication from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Cuba  
 
 
 The following communication, dated 7 February 20 06, is being circulated at the request of the 
Delegations of the Bolivarian Re public of Venezuela and Cuba. 
 
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1. Introduction 
 The decision-making process at the WTO, partic ularly during the ministerial conferences, has 
become increasingly complex as Members, ten year s after the implementation of the Agreements 
resulting from the Uruguay Round, have had to face  the good and bad decisions of the commitments 
made in the Organization, which have had a direct  impact on the implementation or disarticulation of 
economic, trade and social policies due to their bindi ng nature.  This impact has been greater in 
developing countries.  
 It should be noted that there is a gap of almo st two years between one ministerial conference 
and the next, in which no progress or substantive agre ements are made with regard to the negotiations 
and their texts.  However, it is expected that in a few weeks or days prior to or during the ministerial 
conference an agreement will be reac hed concerning documents which are tens of pages long.  This is 
particularly difficult and puts countries with small delegations at a negotiating disadvantage, as they 
lack sufficient capacity to react to the large amount of documents circulated a nd meetings convened.   
 
 Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement governs the formal decision-making in the 
Organization.  The Regulation of Meetings of WTO Bodies (July 1997), including the ministerial 
conference, also refers to this Article, as well as the other provisions concerning the decision-making 
of said agreement. 
 
 However, nowhere in any of its five para graphs or in any other WTO provision, is it 
established how the process for final adoption of d ecisions or the exchange of information and 
communication between Members and the Secretariat shall be carried out, nor is there any information regarding the limits of action of the latte r.  There are, however, agreed principles such as 
transparency, non-exclusive participation of all Me mbers, as well as the need to guarantee respect for 
what has been concerted, which cannot be ignored.    In 2000 and 2002, internal transparency-related is sues and effective participation of Members 
in the WTO decision-making, were the focus of the General Council’s discussions for months.  
Therefore, this is not the first time that legitimate concerns that have emerged, in particular, after a 
Ministerial Conference is held, have been addressed.  But, in spite of the work done, we have not been TN/C/7 
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  able to prevent some of these irregularities from being retaken and, even, some new ones from 
reoccurring.    During the Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, China, from 13 to 18 December 2005, and 
even during the preparatory process that began in November in Geneva, a number of procedures were 
implemented to seek consensus, which did not have  the support of all Members, and in many cases 
received the manifest disagreement of a majority of developing countries. However, with the support 
of some Members, they were imposed by decision of the Secretariat, which thus exceeds its functions.  
 
 These actions which involve the taking of impor tant decisions are extremely worrying, and 
thus it is necessary that the General Council r ealize that they are undermining the WTO’s own 
credibility.  Account must be taken of the fact that any decision adopted during Ministerial Conferences, including procedures to arrive at consensus among Members (and not only in case of substantive matters per se), will eventually have  an impact on the development policies of the 
countries, hence its extreme sensitivity and the need to avoid in future the repetition of processes or 
procedures that did not have due consensus b ecause they were not generally accepted by the 
members.   On this basis, the process of adoption of th e Ministerial Declaration in Hong Kong can be 
considered to have been an unfavorable exercise to  maintain confidence in the WTO at any cost and 
to enable the assertion that this Organization can gua rantee conditions that translate into tangible and 
sustainable economic results for developing countries.  
2. The irregularities identified 
 During the preparatory process in Geneva, in particular, during the last phase, the following 
irregularities were identified: 
 
• The delayed submission of the first draft Mi nisterial Declaration (26 November) leaving 
little time before the beginning of the conf erence. This brought about other negative 
actions that are listed below.  
 
• The imposition of a non-consensus negotiati ng text (Annex C on Services) that was 
prepared by the Chair of the negotiating body, with the sustained rejection of a significant 
amount of Members.  This took shape with th e delay in the introduction of brackets and 
the subsequent removal of them, without ha ving the positive consensus of all Members. 
 
• The sudden removal, without cons ultation and just a few days into the Conference, of the 
cover note that was part of the draft Mini sterial Declaration which made clear, upon 
insistence of many delegations, that the annexes did not have consensus among the 
Members. 
 
• The introduction, for the first time, of reports by Chairs of the negotiating bodies as an 
integral part of the text of the Ministerial Declaration which, in fact, should contain texts 
agreed on by the Members  
 
 During the negotiating process in Hong Kong, China, the following irregularities were 
identified:  
• The holding of only two formal meetings ( opening and closing sessions) in the entire 
Conference to formally adopt the decisions , whose format was designed to prevent  TN/C/7 
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  delegations from taking the floor and speaki ng extensively on the matters subject to 
approval, due to the fact that the seating in the halls was not arranged with delegations in 
mind and no microphones were available.  The other meetings were informal, and 
therefore, there is no record of the discussions  that took place therein, which is something 
that has had a crucial impact on the outcome of the Ministerial Conference.  Furthermore, 
what was discussed in these consultations was not always promptly put forth to all Members for their consideration. 
 
• The reoccurrence of “Green Rooms”, whic h were given the name of “Chairman’s 
Consultative Groups”, and which were mech anisms that helped to present positions 
agreed by a few countries and which gene rally attempted to impose themselves on the 
non-participating majority.  It must be not ed that the groups of countries with small 
delegations see their reaction capacity diminish ed before alternative proposals in so little 
time. Furthermore, the lack of a record of  the discussions in these limited transparency. 
 
• The granting of occasionally unlimited power to  the facilitators.  There were issues in 
which an open meeting to all Members was never held, not even to inform of the 
modifications of the text of the Ministerial Declaration on the basis of their interactions with some delegations.  On other occasions th e substantive intervention of the countries 
was restrained during these open informal  consultations, arguing that there was no 
consensus and it was necessary for delegations to  first come to an agreement on the issues 
of divergence. 
 
• The lack of attention to some proposals by  important groups of developing members, 
which were not considered at all, nor nego tiated with them; simply, predetermined texts 
were imposed. 
 
3. Conclusions 
 The WTO is responsible for always guaranteeing a transparent and reliable decision-making 
process, whatever these decisions may be, but pa rticularly those deriving from a Ministerial 
Conference whose results have a particular impact on the membership and the future work for a given 
period of time.  The situations described above must  be avoided at all cost in the future as they 
severely undermine the credibility of the agreements and, thus, jeopardize the Organization itself.  
 
 In addition, we consider that the above- mentioned irregularities attempt against the full 
realization of the development dimension of the Do ha Work Programme, an immensely relevant issue 
for developing countries which, as a matter of f act, make up the majority of members in this 
Organization. 
 
 Consequently, it is advisable to promote an open discussion on these issues for the General Council to make a decision, in light of the experi ence of the preparatory process and the very holding 
of the Sixth Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, as well as the irregularities already analyzed from 
preceding Ministerial Conferences, in order to prev ent this type of actions from being retaken during 
future decision-making processes.  
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