WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  TN/AG/GEN/30 
28 January 2010 
 (10-0443) 
Committee on Agriculture 
Special Session Original:   English 
 
 
 
REFOCUSING DISCUSSIONS ON THE SPECIAL SAFEGUARD MECHANISM (SSM): 
OUTSTANDING ISSUES AND CONCERNS ON ITS DESIGN AND STRUCTURE 
SUBMISSION BY THE G-33 
  
 The following communication, dated 27 January 2 010, is being circulated at the request of the 
G-33.  
 
_______________ 
 
 I. INTRODUCTION 
1. Paragraph 13 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration (DMD) requires that Special and 
Differential (S&D) provisions in the agriculture ne gotiations must be "operationally effective to 
enable developing countries to effectively take acc ount of their development needs, including food 
security, livelihood security and rural development".  It is also imperative to recall the Mandate 
agreed in Hong Kong that developing countries sha ll have recourse to both volume and price-based 
Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM).
1  This is a fundamental S&D instrument for developing 
countries. 
2. Recent discussions on the SSM have highlighted th e gulf that persists in perceptions on the 
rationale, structure and the design of the instrument.  The proponents of the SSM have highlighted the 
need for an effective, easy to operate instrume nt which addresses their development needs, in line 
with the mandate in paragraph 13 of the Doha Minist erial Declaration.  However, some members have 
focused on its possible disruptive impact on trade flows.  Based on this, they have sought to circumscribe the functioning of the SSM by proposing disciplines which would prevent it from disrupting "normal trade".  The concept of norma l trade has never been defined in the debate. 
3. As a part of its constructive engagement, the G- 33 considers it necessary at this stage to recall 
the rationale for the SSM as originally mandated and from this, derive some conclusions regarding its 
structure and design.  This submission discusses some of the key concepts that have been raised over 
time, in the discussions on SSM, including "nor mal trade", prorating, seasonality, crosscheck, 
duration and spillover.  This submission relies prim arily on technical analysis conducted by the G-33 
itself, and references some technical work al ready published by various agencies like the FAO, 
ICTSD, WTO, South Centre, and Carnegie Endowment  for International Peace.  The experience of 
SSG usage by developing countries is also drawn upon. 
II. RATIONALE 
4. Two factors are central to the rationale of the SSM.  The first concerns the objective reality of 
agriculture in most parts of the developing world where the central preoccupation of the hundreds of 
                                                     
 
1 Hong Kong Ministerial Declar ation contained in WT/MIN(05) /DEC dated 22 December 2005. TN/AG/GEN/30 
Page 2  
 
  millions of people engaged in agriculture is that of survival, not trade. There are an estimated 
1.1 billion agricultural workers and about 1.5 b illion food-insecure people living on approximately 
500 million agricultural holdings of less than 2 hect ares worldwide.  This accounts for 85% of the 
total world agricultural holders.
2  The second factor has to do with the distortions that characterize 
agriculture in most developed countries and whic h constitute the principal subject matter of the 
negotiations mandated in Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture and Paragraph 13 of the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration. 
5. It is important that the SSM is not viewed primarily through the prism of commerce.  The 
correct perspective is to view it as an instrument  which allows developing countries to address their 
central concerns of food and livelihood security  and rural development while undertaking 
liberalization commitments.  It needs to be emphasi zed that in most developing countries, agriculture 
which provides the bulk of employment, is not a comm ercial activity per se, but a way of life.  Most 
agriculture production in such countries involves small land holdings mainly producing for self 
consumption.  Subsistence agriculture is deeply mired in the vicious cycle of low investment and 
growth.  Such agriculture is also deeply conn ected with issues of poverty alleviation as about 
75 per cent of the world's poor live in rural areas wh ere agriculture is the main economic activity.  
The last decade has witnessed many disquieting de velopments in developing country agriculture 
which reflect the interplay between economic liberali zation and the crisis of subsistence agriculture.  
Greater openness to international markets has br ought incessant price fluctuations which adversely 
impact on the food security of the poorest sections of the population.  The World Bank has estimated that due to high food and oil prices in 2007 and 2008, the number of people living in extreme poverty 
may have increased by 130-150 million.
3  Frequent food riots and farmer suicides have reflected the 
violent face of this crisis.  Greater reliance on imports  has also led to large scale displacement of local 
crops in several countries with the attendant imp act on rural employment and food security.  Several 
crops which are environmentally well-suited to pa rticular agro-climatic zones have also been 
displaced by cheaper imports. 
6. It is important to recall that trade in agriculture  was kept out of the ambit of disciplines in the 
GATT for seven Rounds preceding the Uruguay Round.  The Uruguay Round made a modest 
beginning to introduce disciplines and recognized that "the long term objective of substantial 
progressive reductions in support and protection r esulting in fundamental reform is an ongoing 
process".4  Despite attempts at reducing Trade Distorti ng Support in the context of the Doha Round of 
negotiations, these have yielded minimal results.  For example, loosely defined Green Box disciplines 
have created the possibility of box shifting.  Furthe r, in market access, developed countries have been 
able to secure carve outs through Sensitive Produc ts, the retention and creation of TRQs, and non-
application of a Swiss formula to tariff reducti ons.  Key issues such as tariff capping and tariff 
simplification remain to be negotiated.  Based on th e current draft modalities, it is realistic to assume 
that the Doha Round will not make a serious dent into  the removal of distortions in agricultural trade. 
7. It is essential for the sustainability of the global trading system that the agricultural crisis in 
developing countries is addressed urgently.  The centr al policy intervention in this connection has to 
be to remedy the huge investment deficit in devel oping country agriculture through national efforts as 
well as multilateral interventions.5  While massive investments in phy sical infrastructure, appropriate 
agricultural technologies, training, and the like are some  of the major elements to address this crisis, it 
is important that agricultural markets are not de-s tabilized during this process and farmers are given 
                                                      
2  Document Number A/HRC/9/23 dated 8 September 2008 of UN General Assembly. 
3 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects-Commodities at the Crossroads, 2009, page 96. 
4 Article 20, Agreement on Agriculture. 
5 The Independent Evaluation Group of the World Bank in its report in 2007 indicated that the World 
Bank's support for agriculture dropped from 33 per cent of its development aid in 1981 to only 8 per cent in 
2001.  TN/AG/GEN/30 
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  the right incentives through well functioning markets.   Developing country governments need a robust 
SSM that would permit them to address the volatility  in global markets leading to import surges or 
price declines.  In fact, drawing from the lessons of the food and financial crises – the impacts of which are still ongoing - the architecture and modaliti es for the SSM need to be further strengthened. 
8. The crisis in developing country agriculture  is exacerbated by the severe distortions that 
persist in global agriculture trade.  Most of these distortions are related to the huge support given to 
agriculture in developed countries.  The OECD estimates that its members spend more than 
US$375 billion every year on agricultural support.
6  On average, more than a third of farm receipts in 
developed members of OECD countries come from gove rnment programmes.  The value of support is 
more than five times higher than official spendi ng on ODA and twice the value of agricultural exports 
from all developing countries. 
III. "NORMAL TRADE" 
9. Opponents of an operationally effective SSM have sought to introduce more and more 
conditions, including for example, higher volume triggers, which are intended to prevent the 
disruption of "normal trade".  It is important to not e that the issue of "normal trade" does not figure in 
the mandate for the SSM.  Neither is there any refere nce to "normal trade" in other Agreements such 
as the Agreement on Safeguards, Agreement on S ubsidies and Countervailing Measures and the SSG 
in the Agreement on Agriculture.  These Agreements seek to offset the harm to local producers from 
import surges, price declines and subsidies.  Thus , the principle on which they are based is to 
minimize the damage by restricting imports on a te mporary basis. Such measures imply that business 
cannot continue as usual.  The fact that some disr uption to trade would occur due to application of 
these measures is inbuilt in these Agreements.  That th e concept of "normal trade" is being raised in 
the context of the SSM, which is meant only for developing countries, is therefore, a matter of concern to the G-33.  
10. There is a significant variance in import growth rates amongst countries, and amongst 
products, making it difficult to arrive at a single average figure that would adequately represent the 
current and future trading realities of all countries and all products. 
11. An examination of the top ten globally traded products by quantity for the year 2007 has been 
carried out (Annex 1).  For these products, for the pe riod 1987 to 2007, data is available only for six 
products.
7  The examination reveals that the annual compounded import growth rates for these six 
products during the period are in single digits.  In fact for the staple products which are the main requirements of developing countries, the growth is  0.8% for barley;  0.9% for wheat;  1.8% for 
milled rice;  2.6% for maize and 4.8% for soybeans. 
12. Annual compounded import growth rate for the same period for the LIFDCs (Low Income 
Food Deficit Countries)
8 which consist of 77 developing countries, has also been examined.  The 
import growth of these six products for the LIFDC's al so shows similar trends of single digit growth 
(except soybeans).  The growth is 5.3% for barley;  1.0 % for wheat;  4.8% for milled rice;  3.6% for 
maize and 21.2% for soybeans. 
13. The annual compounded production gr owth rates for these six products for the period 1987 to 
2007 are also in single digits.  The data reveals grow th of –1.4% for barley;  1.0% for wheat;  2.8% 
for maize and 4.0% for soybeans.  The data highlig hts that there is some correlation between growth 
in agricultural trade and growth in agriculture production.  
                                                      
6 OECD Report, "Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries: Monitoring and Evaluation 2009". 
7 FAOSTAT, http://faostat.fao.org/site/342/default.aspx  
8 LIFDCs:  FAO definition.  See http://www.fao.org/countryprofiles/lifdc.asp  TN/AG/GEN/30 
Page 4  
 
  14. Thus, the arguments for tighter disciplines on the SSM on the basis of products which have 
short term high growth which cannot be sustained ove r a period of time, are therefore faulty as they 
overlook the global trends in agriculture producti on and trade growth over a reasonable period of 
time.  Country and product variations are also not considered while seeking for tighter disciplines.  
Further, the arguments rely on value of agriculture  products to project the growth rather than the 
quantity of products exported.  The value of an agricultural product depends on a number of factors 
including currency fluctuations, demand and supply a nd opportunity cost while agriculture production 
is based on what is possible and can be grown and sustained over a period. 
15. The G-33 believes that the discourse around "norma l trade" is therefore a distraction from a 
SSM that supports food security, live lihood security and rural development. 
IV. SSG & SSM 
16. Since the SSM is not yet operational, the con cerns regarding its frequent can only be assessed 
by examining a similar instrument. In this regard, an examination of the functioning of the SSG, on whose provisions the SSM is broadly stru ctured, is relevant and instructive. 
17. Out of the 39 countries that have access to the SSG, 22 were developing countries.  A WTO 
compilation shows that the SSG could be  invoked on a total of 6,156 tariff lines.
9  During the period 
1995-2008, a total of 2433 SSG measures were notified.10  Out of this, developed countries accounted 
for 1906 SSG measures (around 78%) as compared to 527 applications by developing countries (22%).  Between 2001 and 2008, developing countri es used it only 465 times.  The SSG measures 
were invoked during 1995-2008 only by six out of the 22 participant developing Members.  Out of 
these six, if Chinese Taipei is excluded, the re maining five Members used the SSG only 171 times. 
An examination of the SSG usage by four devel oping Members (Barbados, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and 
the Philippines) shows that while they could ha ve used the volume based SSG 29 times during the 
period 2000-2004, they actually invoked it only on one occasion.  The above facts make it abundantly 
clear that most developing countries, for various reasons, are not in a position to frequently use the 
SSG even though the necessary technical conditions may be met. 
18. Based on the above empirical behavior trends of developing countries in the usage of the 
SSG, it can be safely predicted that developing c ountries will not be "trigger happy" while using the 
SSM as a mere breach of the trigger cannot be presumed to mean invocation of the measure. 
19. The above analysis raises a number of issues regarding the structure and design of the SSM.  
While over the last 15 years the SSG has been an in strument regularly used by a number of developed 
countries to protect the commercial interests of th eir agriculture sectors, the SSM has to perform a 
qualitatively different function of protecting the li velihoods and food security interests of developing 
countries by preventing damaging import surges and price declines.  Therefore, its design has to be much simpler than that of the SSG. 
20. A comparison of the SSG and the SSM on the basi s of the proposals in the Chair's text (Rev.4 
and W/7) clearly illustrates how the SSM provisions pr oposed are far more stringent than those of the 
SSG (Annex-2).  The major concerns include, inter alia , the following: 
• Limit on products and tariff lines on which the SSM can be triggered for above the pre-Doha 
bound rates.  In the SSG, there is no such limitation.  
                                                     
 
9 WTO document TN/AG/S/12 dated 24 December 2004. 
10 Compiled from WTO website: 
http://members.wto.org/ddf/agriculture/Regular_session_datasets_e.htm   TN/AG/GEN/30 
 Page 5 
 
 
  • Data requirement of imports of preceding three ye ars for the volume based SSM.  In the SSG, 
the data requirement is much more flexible.  
• Capping of remedies relative to pre-Doha bo und levels and rates bound at the Doha Round.  
• The application of the concept of Pro-rating. Pro-rating does not exist in the SSG.  
• The cross-check mechanism for th e volume-based SSM, which does not exist for the volume-
based SSG.  There is also a cross-check for th e price-based SSM, which is more stringent 
than that for the price-based SSG.  
• Exclusion of Preferential Trade.  The SSG is silent on preferential trade, meaning that it can 
also be applied to preferential trade.  
• More constraints on duration of use of the SSM than the SSG.  
• Restrictive provisions for seasonal products in  terms of duration and review mechanism.  In 
the SSG such conditions do not exist.  
• En route shipments which had completed custom s clearance at exporting country are exempt 
from the SSM.  This is not the case for the price-based SSG.  
• Trigger price, remedy available and remedy ce iling for the price based SSM are much more 
stringent . 
 
21. It is remarkable that an instrument meant to address the development concerns of most 
developing country members is sought  to be burdened with conditions far more restrictive than those 
on the SSG which is mainly being used by developed countries.  The G-33 has always advocated for the SSM to be more flexible than the SSG. 
V. ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS IN CHAIR'S TEXTS WHICH WEAKEN THE SSM 
22. The dynamic nature of agricultural producti on and trade makes it necessary for developing 
countries to have access to a measure that is easy to  implement and is respons ive to the heterogeneous 
situations of different crops across different countries.
11  The SSM remedies need to be timely and 
sufficient to stop the import surge that is taking place.   Apart from the issues of triggers and remedies 
(which the G-33 will address separately), a number of proposals in the Chair's texts will require developing countries to fulfill certain conditions  before they can apply these remedies.  These 
conditions like prorating, seasonality, crosscheck , duration and spillover will obviously have an 
impact on the ease with which the measure can be invoked.  The G-33 has undertaken technical 
analyses of the justification and impact of these conditions and will be making separate submissions 
to share its findings with Members.  The summary of the findings is however provided below. 
A. P
RO-RATING  
23. Pro-rating has been proposed for the SSM even though it does not exist for SSG.  Two 
concepts of pro-rating have been introduced  in the Chair's texts (TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4 and 
TN/AG/W/7), both of which ensure the use of trigge rs which are always higher than would otherwise 
have obtained.  Either of the two proposed concepts can facilitate the continued increase in the 
triggers to very high levels over a short period of time.  Therefore, pr orating substantially inhibits any 
subsequent use of SSM. 
24. The G-33 reiterates that pro-rating is an additional layer of restriction for the SSM and 
therefore, rejects the concept. 
                                                      
11 Actionaid Policy brief, "Structure, application and Scope of SSM for Developing Countries". TN/AG/GEN/30 
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  B. S
EASONALITY  
25. The request of the G-33 on "Seasonal and Perishab le Products" was for treatment identical to 
that which obtains in the SSG.  It must be noted that in the SSG the seasonal product provision relate 
to seasonal products from the perspective of importers.  It is the importing member that is entitled to 
use a "shorter time period" in calculating the b ase period for volume based SSG, and "different 
reference prices for different periods" for price ba sed SSG.  There are no separate shorter duration 
periods for seasonal products.  On the other hand, the Chair's text (TN/AG/W/7) looks at seasonality 
from the perspective of exporters and sti pulates a shorter duration of application. 
26. The G-33's examination of export figures from sev eral exporters found that while seasonality 
in production may be the norm for certain produc ts, it is not the norm for all products from all 
countries.  Thus, "seasonality in production" does not necessarily translate into "seasonality in trade".  
Furthermore, amongst products that exhibited overa ll "seasonality in trade" patterns, examples were 
found where the "seasonality in trade" did not necess arily translate into individual bilateral trade 
relations. 
27. The G-33 is of the view that the current seasonality language for the SSM must be re-
examined.  Retaining the language as it is in the Ch air's texts not only fails to accurately reflect the 
current trading patterns, but would unne cessarily complicate the use of the SSM. 
C. CROSS CHECK  
28. The proposed modalities in the Chair's texts provide that the SSM cannot be invoked unless 
the following cross check provisions are applied: 
(a) For the volume-based SSM, Members should not  have recourse to exceeding pre-Doha 
bound rates in cases where import surges are not accompanied by price declines.  
(b) For the volume-based SSM, imports are at a negligible level in relation to domestic 
production and consumption. 
(c) For the price based SSM, when import volumes are declining. 
(d) For the price based SSM, if the volume of imports  is manifestly declining or a negligible 
level incapable of undermining the domestic price level. 
 
29. A recent study by South Center12 indicates that in 85% of cases of import surges were not 
accompanied by price declines. In addition an ICTSD13 study points out that the availability of the 
SSM will be more than halved if so called market tests with price depressions are imposed.  It must 
also be emphasized that there can be several reasons for domestic prices not declining with import 
surges, including possible displacement of local production. 
30. The introduction of a mandatory cross-check w ould make it difficult for developing countries 
to apply the SSM as they would need to first establish the "proof" of domestic price or volume 
changes.  There may be considerable time lags  between import surges and its impact on domestic 
markets.  Further, most developing countries ha ve difficulty in capturing real time price data. 
Moreover, establishing the domestic prices for each co rresponding tariff line is very difficult.  As a 
result, the SSM would be unworkable for many developing countries. 
                                                      
12 South Centre, "The Volume Based SSM: Analysis of the Conditionalities in the December 2008 
WTO Agriculture Chair's Texts” October 2009, SC/TDP/AN/AG/9. 
13 ICTSD, "Implications of Proposed Modalities for the Special Safeguard Mechanism: A Simulation 
Exercise” Issue Paper No.10  TN/AG/GEN/30 
 Page 7 
 
 
  31. The G-33's view is that a mandatory cross-check  will seriously hamper the use of the SSM 
and limit its effectiveness and timeliness of application in addressing a temporary import surge. 
D. DURATION AND SPILL OVER  
32. The Chair's text imposes conditions on the dur ation of remedies and how soon the SSM can 
be re-invoked after its termination.  In the context of  duration, certain restrictive elements have been 
proposed, in the event of the need for  remedies to "spillover" beyond the end of the year in question. 
33. The G-33 believes that the duration of remedies should be sufficient to ensure that the import 
surge or price decline has been addressed.  The duration should not be constrained to a calendar, 
financial or market year. 
VI. OTHER ISSUES 
34. There are a number of other conditionalities in th e Chair's texts which have implications for 
the effectiveness and timeliness of the SSM.  Some of these include: 
• The Price-based and volume-based triggers shall be on the basis of MFN trade only; 
• The Volume-based SSM cannot be applied if rolling average of imports in the preceding 
three-year period is not available; 
• The level of triggers and remedies; 
• The exclusion of negligible trade from SSM coverage; 
• Limiting the SSM remedies to two consecutive periods;  and 
• The SSM application limited by an "off" period. 
 A. P
RICE-BASED SSM 
35. As agreed in the Hong Kong Ministerial Declar ation developing countries shall have recourse 
to both volume-based and price-based SSM.  Howeve r, since the issuance of the Chair's second draft 
modalities in May 2008, discussions  on the SSM have mainly centered on the volume-based SSM.  
Though the G-33 has submitted its concerns on the price-based SSM14, there has been little or no 
discussion on this issue.  Further, several additi onal burdensome requirements and restrictions were 
included in the third and fourth drafts of the Ch air's modalities text which would render the SSM an 
ineffective mechanism. 
36. WTO data reveals that the price-based SSG has been used much more frequently (74%) than 
the volume-based SSG (26%), by both devel oped countries and developing countries. 
37. The G-33 is of the view that the price-based SSM is an essential measure for developing 
countries.  It will be submitting a separate and more  comprehensive technical paper on the elements of 
the price-based SSM including the triggers, th e reference price, remedies, pre-Doha cap, ad valorem  
duties and preferential trade.  There is a need  for a comprehensive discussion on this measure. 
VII. SMALL AND VULNERABLE ECONOMIE S (SVES) AND LEAST DEVELOPED 
COUNTRIES (LDCS)  
38. The G-33 would also like to reiterate that while a majority of developing countries face 
development challenges due to their under-developed  agriculture sectors, these challenges are even 
more acute for the smallest developing countries.   Additional constraints that the Small and 
Vulnerable Economies  (SVEs) face include limited resources, higher transaction costs due to poor 
                                                      
14 G-33 Job document (08)/47 dated 3 June 2008. TN/AG/GEN/30 
Page 8  
 
  infrastructure, limitations in crop diversification, etc.  These constraints make it even more difficult 
for SVEs to address the challenges of food and live lihood security and make them more vulnerable to 
the adverse effects of import surges and price declin es.  It is in this context that the G-33 had 
submitted a separate proposal (TN/AG/GEN/29) on 10 February 2009, seeking enhanced flexibilities 
in the SSM for SVEs.  The G-33 expects these proposals to receive due consideration. 
39. The G-33 wishes to emphasize that the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in the WTO are 
the poorest and most vulnerable amongst us.  As such, these economies deserve the most flexible 
treatment on all elements of the SSM, including unlimited product coverage, and unlimited remedies 
beyond the pre-Doha bound rate.  The G-33 fully s upports LDCs' access to a simple, effective and 
operational mechanism that takes into account  the challenges faced by these countries. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
40. The basic objective of this submission is to  shift the focus of the SSM debate to the 
development dimension of the Round.  Recent globa l developments have highlighted the need for 
policy reform in developing countries to strengthe n food security and to a ddress livelihood concerns 
of the poor, the bulk of whom depend on agriculture fo r sustenance.  For these reform initiatives to be 
successful, it is necessary to ensure a stable policy environment.  The SSM is an essential element for 
this purpose. 
41. For the SSM to be successful in providing the re quired stability, it has to be simple, non-
burdensome.  The analysis of the SSG usage clear ly establishes that developing countries (unlike 
developed countries) have been extremely restrained in their use of the instrument.  There are various 
reasons why such restraint can also be expected in the case of the SSM.  Apart from the difficulties 
that most developing countries have in genera ting on-time data, many de veloping countries import 
agricultural products to manage critical shortages. 
42. It is clear from this analysis that much of th e architecture proposed for the SSM in Chair' text 
and W/7 needs to be revisited.  It is necessary to recall the mandate for the SSM, and to note that this 
instrument was intended to be one tangible way of  operationalizing S&D.  The SSM must be easy to 
use and allow developing countries to respond swiftly to market disruption.  A strong, effective SSM 
is essential to the achievement of a balan ced outcome for many developing countries.  TN/AG/GEN/30 
 Page 9 
 
 
  ANNEX 1 
 
Table 1:  
  
Top 10 globally traded agricultural pr oducts by quantity (Source:  FAOSTAT)  
  
  
Commodity  Quantity 
(tonnes)    
Wheat 132832103   
Maize 109684205   
Soybeans 74402997   
Cake of Soybeans 61365251   
Pigs 30799813   
Sugar Raw Centrifugal 28698463   
Rice Milled 27433888   
Palm oil 26043146   
Barley 23611187   
Sugar Refined 23091993   
  
  
  
Table 1a:  Annual compounded global import growth over 20 years  
  
Quantity   
  1987-2007 
Barley 0.8% 
Maize 2.6% 
Soybeans 4.8% 
Wheat 0.9% 
Palm oil 8.3% 
Rice Milled 1.8% 
  
  
Table 1b:  Annual compounded import growth over 20 years (LIFDCs)  
  
Quantity   
  1987-2007 
Barley 5.3% 
Maize 3.6% 
Soybeans 21.2% 
Wheat 1.0% 
Wine 8.9% 
Palm oil 9.1% 
Rice Milled 4.8% 
  
  TN/AG/GEN/30 
Page 10  
 
  Table 2: 
  
 Annual compounded production growth rates over 20 years
 
  
 
  1987-2007 1997-2007 
Barley -1.4% -1.5% 
Maize 2.8% 3.0% 
Soybeans 4.0% 4.3% 
Wheat 1.0% 0.0% 
Palm oil 7.9% 7.8% 
Paddy rice 1.8% 1.3% 
 
  
 
_______________ 
  TN/AG/GEN/30 
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  ANNEX 2 
 
Comparison of SSG and SSM  
  
S. No.  Concept being 
compared  Article 5, AoA:  SSG  Doha Round Modalities on SSM 
(Chair's texts (TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4 
and TN/AG/W/7 hereinafter refered 
to as  Rev.4 and W/7)  
1. Data 
requirements in volume-based triggers  Data relating to volume 
triggers to implement SSG is expressed for the " three 
preceding years for which 
data is available ." 
Calculation of additional duty 
also takes into account the volume change in "domestic consumption of the product concerned in the most recent 
year for which data are 
available." The language used in Para 133 of Dec. 
08 Main Text for the volume triggers does not qualify the use the phrase "preceding years with " for which data 
is available" . 
2. Cross-checks on 
Volume-based 
triggers  No cross-checks exist. Cro ss-check mechanism prescribed. 
3. Price-based 
triggers   Trigger price for SSG 
under Art. 5 were equal to the 
1986-88 reference price. 
Since the reference period is "fixed", so is the "reference price", which Members were required to notify.  The formula for 
calculation of remedy is 
based on 5 levels of fall of the cif price below the trigger price.   The reference price is a "moving 
average" based on cif import price 
relative to data on "MFN-sourced 
price" for the most recent preceding three year period preceding year of importation, for which data is available.  Trigger & Remedy: When CIF 
Import Price falls below 85% of 
"Reference Price", then remedy will be 85% of the difference between import price and trigger price. 
4. Data 
requirements in price-based triggers  This was not an issue since 
"trigger price" is a "fixed price". Provision on price-based triggers refers 
to calculation of the reference price on the basis of the most recent three- year period preceding the year of importation "for which data is 
available."  
5. Cross-checks on 
Price-based 
triggers  Members shall not take 
action "as far as practicable", 
where the volume of imports 
of the concerned product are declining.     - This is a soft non-binding obligation. Rev.4
 
There is stronger, more binding 
language for countries to not take 
action when the volume of imports is declining or is at "manifestly negligible level incapable of undermining the domestic price level". (Para 137) TN/AG/GEN/30 
Page 12  
 
  S. No.  Concept being 
compared  Article 5, AoA:  SSG  Doha Round Modalities on SSM 
(Chair's texts (TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4 
and TN/AG/W/7 hereinafter refered 
to as  Rev.4 and W/7)  
   W/7  
(i) Remedies not applicable unless domestic price is actually declining, unless "in exceptional circumstances", 
the authorities have "good reason to 
believe that there would be at least an imminent foreseeable decline". (ii) If action is taken in "such exceptional circumstances", then there will be an "expedited review by a 
standing panel of experts". 
6. Capping of 
Remedies 
relative to:  (a) 
pre-Doha bound levels; and (b) current bound rates (i.e., rates bound at the 
Doha round).   The additional duty for 
the volume-based SSG was 
capped at one-third of level 
of ordinary custom duty (applied tariff) in effect in the year in which action is taken.  No cap for price-based 
SSG. 
  Article 5 is silent on 
whether remedies should be imposed on bound or applied tariffs.   In practice, importing 
countries were allowed to 
increase tariffs above their bound rates.  
 Doha Modalities: 
Proposal that Article 5 would 
need to be amended to reflect 
that developed countries using the SSG will not breach the pre-Doha bound tariff rates.  
 However, it is silent on 
breaching by developed countries of the "current bound tariffs" arrived at under the Doha Round. 
 No limits on tariff lines 
or number of products under 
Art. 5; although under December Modalities changes to Art. 5 pertain to commitment to reduce no. of 
tariff lines on which SSG can 
be applied. Rev.4
 
 Principle that "pre-Doha bound 
tariffs" cannot be exceeded. The 
language used suggests that the level cannot be breached for both volume and price- based triggers (Para 142).  
 However, the text also provides 
that Maximum Additional Duty could 
breach the pre-Doha bound tariffs provided certain conditions were met. These conditions are defined as a certain percentage of "current bound tariff". 
 Differential rates were specified for 
LDCs, SVEs and other developing countries ( Paras  143-145.)   
 Limits were placed on no. of 
products/ tariff lines: ( Paras  143-145.)  
 Further limitation on other 
developing countries: cannot use SSM "for two consecutive periods".   
W/7
 
 This text does not cross-refer to the 
Main Text; instead the proposal here is in relation to SSM triggers "above bound rate".  
 Proposal for a flat rate for all 
developing countries in respect of 
circumstances when the maximum 
remedy can exceed the "current bound tariff". The thresholds for determining the maximum additional duty are defined as volume of imports in any 
period .  TN/AG/GEN/30 
 Page 13 
 
 
  S. No.  Concept being 
compared  Article 5, AoA:  SSG  Doha Round Modalities on SSM 
(Chair's texts (TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4 
and TN/AG/W/7 hereinafter refered 
to as  Rev.4 and W/7)  
7. Limits on 
Products & Tariff Lines on which SSG/SSM 
can be triggered.   All lines specified under 
Article 5 can avail of the SSG.  Rev.4
 
 Limits have been suggested for the 
number of products on which SSM can be invoked in any given period above 
the pre-Doha bound tariff rates: 40% 
of lines for LDC's;10-15% of tariff lines for SVEs in any given period; and only 2-6 products in any given period for "other developing countries". (Paras 143-145)  
  
W/7
 
 The Suppl. Text states that a 
country cannot invoke SSM on more than 2.5% of tariff lines in any 12-
month period. 
8. Exclusion of 
Preferential Trade  SSG does not differentiate 
between MFN trade and "preferential" trade. Preferential trade excluded from 
calculation of triggers and application of safeguard measures  
9. Duration of 
Safeguards (Products other 
than Seasonal 
ones) ; 
  
Review Mechanism  
   For volume-based 
triggers, additional duty can be maintained until the end of 
the year in which it has been 
imposed.  There is no limitation of 
number of consecutive periods for which SSM may be imposed. 
 There is no "review 
mechanism". Rev.4
 
 The maximum period for use of 
SSM is 12 months, from the initial 
invocation of the measure. (Para 140)  
 SSM can be imposed only in 2 
consecutive periods; and where this has occurred, consecutive application can be resorted to only after a further 2 consecutive periods. 
  
W/7
 
For SSM application "above bound 
rate", the following has been proposed:   Length of remedy should be "4/8 
months". 
 It may be re-imposed after "4/8 
months" (after lapse of equal period of time).  Review mechanism proposed by 
"standing group of experts" to review 
application of SSM for 3 consecutive 12 month periods: Ambit of review would be: effective functioning of the SSM, whether it is affecting "normal trade", or whether it is a response to an 
"underlying more structural problem". TN/AG/GEN/30 
Page 14  
 
  S. No.  Concept being 
compared  Article 5, AoA:  SSG  Doha Round Modalities on SSM 
(Chair's texts (TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4 
and TN/AG/W/7 hereinafter refered 
to as  Rev.4 and W/7)  
10. Seasonal 
Products: Duration of SSM and  Review 
Mechanism   There is no separate 
period specified for seasonal products.  Duration would be 
applicable as highlighted for 
all products in point 9 above. Rev.4
 
 The maximum period for use of 
SSM is 6 months in the case of seasonal products, or period to cover 
seasonality- whichever is longer. (Para 
140) 
 SSM can be imposed only in 2 
consecutive periods; and where this has occurred, consecutive application can be resorted to only after a further 2 
consecutive periods. 
  
W/7
 
For SSM application "above bound 
rate", the following has been proposed: 
  Length of remedy should be "4/8 
months".  It may be re-imposed after "4/8 
months" (after lapse of equal period of time). 
 But if maintained in 2 consecutive 
12 month periods for total period of 12 or more months, then cannot spill to next period.  Review mechanism proposed by 
"standing group of experts" for SSM 
for seasonal products. 
11. Shipments en 
route  Art. 5 states that exemption 
for en route shipments from 
SSM duty is applicable only 
to volume-based SSM. En route shipments (which had 
completed customs clearance at 
exporting country) are required to be 
exempt from SSM, both under price 
and volume based SSM.  
 
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