WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  WT/CFMC/W/13 
18 April 2008 
 
 (08-1824) 
 Original:   French 
  
DIRECTOR-GENERAL'S CONSULTATIVE FRAMEWORK 
MECHANISM ON COTTON 
 
The Cotton Sector
1 
 
Communication from Côte d'Ivoire 
 
 
 The following communication, dated 22 February 2006, is being circulated at the request of 
the delegation of Côte d'Ivoire.  
_______________ 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. The cotton sector is noteworthy for the great variety of its producer countries, domestic 
marketing methods, growing and processing technol ogies and raw cotton quality and prices.  Raw 
cotton is produced and marketed by rich and by poor countries.  In Côte d'Ivoire, cotton is the main 
source of cash income for farmers in the savanna h areas, where it has been the driving force of 
economic and rural development for more than thir ty years.  Alongside cotton cultivation, industrial 
activity has developed on a large scale to process cotton products:  fibre, yarn, kernels and oil.  Over 
the last five years, fibre production has reached almost 169,000 tonnes, with a ginning rate of approximately 43 per cent – one of the highest in th e world.  Cotton fibre production is an important 
source of foreign exchange for Côte d'Ivoire.  W ith a turnover of some 9.3 billion CFA francs, cotton 
fibre accounts on average for 4 per cent of Côte d'Ivoire's export earnings, though among agricultural exports it ranks second, after the cocoa bean and befo re green coffee.  Thanks to cotton, the savannah 
areas have seen the beginnings of industrialization, particularly de pressed localities su ch as Dianro, 
Zatta, Ouangolo, M'Bengue, Mankono and private ec onomic operators have now appeared in the 
transport sector.  In addition, a spinning mill and an oil production plant have been built at Bouaké 
and spinning mills at Dimbokro and Agboville.  With the arrival of industrialization, jobs have been 
created.  Cotton has contributed to improving habi tat and to the building of social infrastructure 
(e.g. health centres, schools).  Cotton growing has made a significant contribution to the modernization of farms in the savannah areas thr ough the use of agricultural inputs, intermediate 
mechanization and animal traction.  Since the night  of 19 September 2002 all this has been held to 
ransom and the cotton sector is facing growing difficu lties.  Before turning to the damage caused by 
the armed strife, it is useful to look at  production trends over the last ten years. 
 
                                                     
 
1 This communication was distributed to the Development Community by e-mail on 16 March 2006 
and circulated at the 7th round of the DGCFMC. WT/CFMC/W/13 
Page 2  
 
  B. PRODUCTION
 OVER  THE  LAST  TEN  YEARS 
(i) Cotton Production Trends  
 
CROP 
YEAR AREA 
(hectares) SEED 
COTTON 
PRODUCTION
(tonnes) YIELD 
Kg/ha FIBRE 
PRODUCTION 
(tonnes) GINNING 
RATE 
% SEED 
COTTON 
PRICE 
per kg 
(CFAF) 
1995-
1996 204,380 217,261 1,065 96,337 44.36 170 
1996-
1997 210,534 265,145  1,259 114,118 43.04 180 
1997-
1998 244,313 337,097 1,380 146,906 43.58 205 
1998-
1999 271,371 365,003 1,345 156,533 42.88 200 
1999-
2000 291,457 402,367 1,380 117,284 44.06 183 
2000-
2001 248,478 287,000 1,155 122,518 42.68 210 
2001-
2002 282,678 392,979 1,390 171,160 43.55 190 
2002-
2003 269,730 396,416 1,469 171,928 43.51 180 
2003-
2004 257,564 180,144 699 78,839 43.76 200 
2004-
2005* 328,336 258,817 - 103,807 43.27 185 
  
* Current crop year, partial result as at 30 April 2005. 
 
(ii) Comments  
2. Seed cotton production has felt the impact of the armed conflict:  in the 2003-2004 crop year, 
it fell to below 200,000 tonnes, the lowest level recorded  in the last ten years.  The cotton sector is in 
crisis because the entire production area corresponds to areas under rebel control. 
C. DAMAGE  CAUSED  BY THE  FIGHTING 
3. The extent and range of the damage and losses sustained by cotton operators warrant 
declaring a state of emergency in the cotton sector.  Operators are nonetheless continuing to grow cotton in the hope of an early end to the war follo wed by urgent measures to launch recovery of the 
sector. 
4. In the last quarter of 2004, damage and lo ss amounted to an estimated CFA francs 4 to 
5 billion, distributed as follows: 
(a) Producers 
5. Damage and losses included: 
(a) stolen vehicles;  WT/CFMC/W/13 
 Page 3 
 
 
   
(b) pillaged stores, stolen inputs (MPK, urea, insecticides); 
(c) cash losses; 
(d) seed cotton from the 2001-2002 crop year stored by URECOS-C1 on the site of the 
SICOSA  factory, which was destroyed; 
(e) damaged and stolen office furniture and equipment; 
(f) bad debts due to absence of sales; 
(g) loss in cotton value due to poor storage; 
(h) UCEA-CI animal traction farming losses. 
6. All the above damage and loss has been estimated at CFA francs 8.380 billion. 
(b) Ginning Companies 
7. Damage and losses sustained by ginners include the following: 
(a) staff:  all staff who left the war zone had their homes pillaged; 
(b) logistics:  companies lost more than 100 vehicles; 
(c) inputs:  all stocks of production inputs in storage were stolen; 
(d) production units:  not until February 2003 di d all factories resume operations, and 
normal running resumed only in November; 
(e) non-observance of commercial contracts, giving rise to delays and penalties; 
(f) difficulties in repaying input credits. 
8. The above-mentioned damage and losses amounted to an estimated 
CFA francs 52.850 billion. 
(c) Spinners and Oil Extractors 
9. Secondary processing plants, entirely dependent on  the performance of the cotton companies, 
have likewise been hard hit by the fighting. 
10. FTG's large spinning plant at Bouaké  has suffered incalculable damage: 
(a) prolonged stoppage of machinery; 
(b) collapse of the local sales market; 
(c) the decline of export sales; 
(d) fraud has taken over in certain activities; 
(e) the closure of TEXACODI; WT/CFMC/W/13 
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(f) FTC has been replaced by other suppliers; 
(g) personnel:  no care is available for those who have remained and the homes of those 
who fled have been pillaged. 
11. The losses are estimated at CFA francs 9.416 billion. 
(d) Service Providers (CNRA and ANADER) 
12. At ANADER, in addition to damage to the propert y of staff who fled the war zone, there were 
two deaths. 
13. With the CNRA, the sector has lost its entire scien tific research base:  the Bouaké station was 
the theatre of fighting between the belligerent for ces, and offices, laboratories, housing and cold 
rooms have been destroyed.  Computer theft has mean t the loss of large data stocks and a halt in field 
tests of scientific varieties.  The losses are estimated at CFA francs 3.598 billion. 
14. The extent of the damage and losses requires pos t-crisis emergency measures if fresh hope is 
to be given to the savannah cotton growing area as a whole. 
D. CURRENT
 SITUATION 
15. After three years of fighting, it is worthwhile taking stock of the situation (June 2005) at a 
time when all operators in the sector are engaged in  preparations for the 2005-2006 crop year.  An 
explanation of how the sector is organized is useful at this juncture. 
(a) Organization of the Cotton Sector 
16. With the liberalization and privatization of the cotton sector, INTERCOTON was formed in 
November 2002.  It is an association of all operato rs in the cotton sector and has a Governing Board 
of 11 members representing seven "colleges": 
(a) Producers (3 members of the Governing Board); 
(b) Ginners (3 members); 
(c) Spinners (1 member); 
(d) Oil extractors (1 member); 
(e) Trainers (1 member); 
(f) Researchers (1 member); 
(g) Financiers (1 member). 
17. The Governing Board's decisions are carried out  by the Executive Secretary, an employee of 
INTERCOTON.  WT/CFMC/W/13 
 Page 5 
 
 
  (i) Organization of producers 
18. Producers and their occupational associations (" OPAs") are affiliated to six federations: 
(a) URECOS-CI; 
(b) UCOOPAG-CI; 
(c) UIRECOOPAG-CI; 
(d) UCEA-CI; 
(e) UCAP-CI; 
(f) UCODA-CI. 
19. The tasks of the Federations include consolid ating needs and distributing inputs, collecting 
and loading cotton and distributing payments to pr oducers.  The six Federations grouped together in 
August 2002 to form a confederation:  AFFICOT-CI ( Association  des faîtières de la filière de Côte 
d'Ivoire). 
20. As well as the official cooperatives set up under the Law on Cooperatives, there are numerous 
unofficial groups, and independent le gal cooperatives (i.e. not affiliate d to a federation), that work 
directly with the cotton companies.  The entire coope rative environment will have to be restructured if 
the cooperatives are to gain credibility. 
(ii) Organization of cotton companies 
21. Alongside their normal activities, some ginneries also provide services for producers (advice, 
supply of inputs, crop loans, bridging loans, training  … ).  There are three such companies:  CIDT, 
IVOIRE COTON, LCCI. 
22. Other ginning companies purchase the cotton fre e of transport (paid by the supplier).  
Officially, they provide no services to producers, a nd as a rule they work directly with one of the 
federations:  URECOS-CI.  There are two such companies:  SICOSA SA at Korhogo belonging to URECOS-CI in partnership with a financial gr oup and DOPA at Bouaké belonging to FTG/COTIVO 
with URECOS-CI as a shareholder. 
23. In addition to the above, there is a cottonseed  oil extraction company, TRITURAF, which has 
a plant at Bouaké that manufactures cottonseed oil and meal.  Before the crisis, it processed 
approximately 155,000 tonnes of cottonseed.  Th ere are three spinning-weaving companies:  
COTIVO, FTG and UTEXI.  The latter has fallen foul of the armed conflict. 
(b) Current Situation 
24. The current situation will be assessed agains t three indicators:  production, seed cotton 
marketing and research. 
(i) Production 
25. The land is there and most of the producers ha ve survived.  But the conditions for cotton 
production have become increasingly difficult.  Risk s both at country level and at customer level 
make the supply of inputs to producers an increasi ngly difficult equation to solve.  Nowadays, all WT/CFMC/W/13 
Page 6  
 
  transactions are payable in cash, and the federations  and cotton companies are struggling to find the 
resources they need in order to grow cotton. 
26. Since the fighting started, the level of seed cotton production has escaped all control.  From 
more than 400,000 tonnes in 2002-2003, output fell to 180,000 tonnes in 2003-2004, the lowest level recorded in the last ten years.  As to the curre nt crop year, 2004-2005, seed cotton output as at end 
April 2005 stood at 258,000 tonnes. 
27. Is there any hope of it attaining the 300,000 tonne mark? 
28. There are yet other difficulties facing production: 
(a) supply of inputs is difficult; 
(b) training for cotton farmers is unsatisfactory; 
(c) dirt tracks are not maintained so transpor t of seed cotton to factories is difficult; 
(d) no flow of personnel and goods in production areas; 
(e) the absence of banks in the production areas is conducive to non-payment of 
producers by ginning companies; 
(f) appearance of intermediaries ("pisteurs ") in the production areas is causing non-
repayment of input loans.  The cotton pr oduced with inputs supplied by the cotton 
companies and some federations is sold for less than the price set by INTERCOTON, 
often subsidized by the State, to buyers from the subregion.  Producers selling their 
cotton in this way do not repay loans.  Th e resulting arrears are likely to jeopardize 
cotton growing.  Suppliers will now only deliver inputs against payment of cash. 
29. Unless proper solutions are found, the cotton co mpanies and federations, which are crippled 
by debt, will be unable to find the resources they need for new inputs. 
30. These difficulties are compounded by the various ta xes levied on the charges of operators in 
the cotton sector because of the prevailing situation. 
(ii) Marketing 
31. The difficulties mentioned above directly affect  the processing of seed cotton.  Because there 
are no banks in the production areas, cotton companies are having to use their wits to find a payment 
system for the seed cotton delivered to factories. 
32. Maintenance of dirt roads being either non-exis tent or inadequate, regular delivery of raw 
materials to the factories is difficult. 
33. The cotton companies and/or the federations, wh ich financed the inputs, are now having to 
compete with the pisteurs , who are weakening domestic production by causing non-repayment of 
input loans.  Unless something is done to set the matter right, the cotton sector will pay a heavy price 
and everything that existed before the cris is will suffer some degree of deterioration. 
34. The difficulties of marketing seed cotton are harming the quality of the fibre produced in 
factories.  The proportion of second grade cotton ha s risen, with a consequent drop in the proportion 
of top grade fibre.  WT/CFMC/W/13 
 Page 7 
 
 
  (iii) Cotton research 
35. The most pressing need here is to rehabilitate  the research station at Bouaké which was 
destroyed by the war.  The cotton sector owes its good performance to the quality of the research 
carried out by the CNRA at Bouaké.  This multi-s ite research facility had four laboratories (fibre and 
micro-spinning technology, seed technology, cyto genetics, and insect breeding and insecticide 
toxicology), 30 hectares of testing plots, a seed farm  at Foro and seven observation points.  It is now 
no more than a distant memory and needs to be rebuilt as a matter of urgency. 
E. PROSPECTS 
36. As can be seen from all the foregoi ng, the cotton sector really is in a state of emergency.  To 
save it, urgent rehabilitation measures must be e nvisaged so that the cotton activities on which the 
north of the country depends can be resumed in full. 
(a) The State's Role 
37. Stock must be taken of the arrears owed by the producers to the cotton companies or 
federations (input loans) and by the cotton companie s to the producers (unpaid shipments).  All these 
debts must be cleared so that a fresh start can be made.  The Bouaké research station must also be 
rehabilitated so that it can contribute to the recove ry of the cotton sector.  It will be necessary to: 
(a) reconstitute and manage cotton genetic resources; 
(b) create and select classical varieties that are resistant to fusariosis and to stinging and 
sucking insects; 
(c) create and select higher-productivity coloured cotton varieties. 
38. Rebuilding the research station includes rehabilita ting the various laboratories currently out of 
commission. 
(b) The Role of Producers and Cotton Companies 
39. It is essential that the two main operators in th e sector agree on, or join forces in, setting up a 
company to supply inputs that is given the wherewithal to play its role fully.  This will put a stop to 
the race to supply inputs that is currently d estabilizing the cotton sector, creating the following 
problems: 
(a) producers are generally speaking over equippe d in terms of inputs (even in a normal 
year) and hence heavily in de bt, with the serious consequence that their income is 
eroded; 
(b) failure to manage collection at source, for which the ginning companies have sole 
responsibility; 
(c) rerouting of seed cotton shipments to factories:  in order to avoid payments at source, 
products will be shifted fro m one area to another. 
40. Any rehabilitation plan must enable the sector to attain the following objectives: 
(a) timely equipment of all producers with inputs of the requisite quality and quantity, on 
the basis of the established plan; WT/CFMC/W/13 
Page 8  
 
   
(b) harmonious development of the sector; 
(c) sufficient income for producers; 
(d) a guaranteed supply of seed cotton to factories. 
41. There are definite advantages to pur suing these objectives.  They include: 
(a) establishment of an independent structure th at will operate freely, uninfluenced either 
by producers or by ginners; 
(b) timely supply of inputs for all producers; 
(c) guaranteed repayment of input credits by ginners; 
(d) control over the input supply circuit thanks to the recovery of loans; 
(e) ideal opportunity to restructure the cooperative movement;  OPAs will have to be 
accredited in order to receive inputs; 
(f) the input supply company can allocate yearly earnings, ne t of statutory reserves and 
payments to shareholders, to  development activities determined in agreement with the 
shareholders. 
F. CONCLUSION 
42. It is quite clear from the foregoing overview that the cotton sector is in jeopardy.  It must 
therefore be rehabilitated as soon as the crisis is over.  Urgent measures must include reconstituting 
the genetic material destroyed during the war.  It might be a good idea to build a new research station 
outside town.  If the WARDA were relocated, woul d it not be possible to use the site for a new 
CNRA station? 
43. Thereafter, a new input supply system will have to be set up to cover all operators in the 
sector, the idea being that producers will obtain i nputs through their cooperatives.  Seed cotton 
production will then be sufficient to feed all the ginneries in the country.  This will enable the 
ginneries to take the necessary st eps to balance their accounts. 
 
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