Fiji WT/TPR/S/213 
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II. TRADE POLICY REGIME:  FRAMEWORK AND OBJECTIVES 
(1) OVERVIEW  
1. Fiji’s second coup since the last Trade Policy Review, in December 2006, resulted in an 
interim military government being installed in January 2007 (the previous coup lasted some 
16 months until September 2001).  According to the au thorities, the new Constitution that entered into 
force in July 1998 remains Fiji’s supreme law an d was effectively legitimized by a High Court 
decision in October 2008 (currently under appeal as some have questioned the constitution's status 
given the nature of the interim Government), re lying upon the President’s use of his prerogative 
powers to ratify the dismissal of an elected governme nt and appoint a caretaker Prime Minister that 
subsequently dissolved Parliament pending the ho lding of fresh elections.  Elections, initially 
scheduled for March 2009 now appear uncertain as the Government first wishes to make electoral and 
other reforms being considered to remove ethnic discrimination;  whether they will be held by the 
date "ear marked" of June 2010 in the interim Government’s November 2007 Development Strategy 
is also unclear.  The recently formed National Council for Building a Better Fiji (co-chaired by the 
interim Prime Minister) has drafted a Peoples' Charte r for Change, Peace and Progress, to be finalized 
by 2009, to supplement the Constitution.  During Par liament’s dissolution, legislation is authorized by 
Presidential Promulgations, considered to ha ve equal status to Parliamentary laws. 
2. The latest ministerial re-structuring was in Se ptember 2008.  The focal ministry responsible 
for external trade policy remains with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Inte rnational Co-operation and 
Civil Aviation (MFAICCA), formerly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade.  It consults 
widely within the bureaucracy to formulate trade policies, mainly through semi-regular meetings of 
the Cabinet-mandated inter-ministerial Trade a nd Development Committee (TDC), chaired by the 
head of the Ministry's External Trade Division.  No independent body publicly evaluates (or advises) 
government on trade policies or sectoral assistance,  to the detriment of public accountability and 
decision making.  However, to improve account ability by facilitating active broad community 
involvement in evaluating and reviewing proposed and existing trade agreements (e.g. the EU’s EPA 
and the PICTA Trade in Services with the Forum Island countries), two government-convened 
national consultations were held with non-state-actors, including the private sector, in April 2006 and 
June 2008, respectively, with the active participation of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS).  
Reform of outdated trade-relate d laws, while on-going, has been slow, largely piece-meal, and 
handicapped by political uncertainty and technical-capacity constraints.   
3. In November 2007, as part of the 2008 Budget, the Interim Government introduced the 
Sustainable Economic and Empowerment Developm ent Strategy (SEEDS) 2 008-2010 to supersede 
the previous Government's Strategic Development Plan (SDP) 2007-11, based on the 20 Year Development Plan 2001-2020.  SEEDS also in corporates the United Nation's Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and e quitable participation of all et hnic groups in socio-economic 
development, including a more effective Affirma tive Action Plan to address inequalities faced by 
indigenous Fijians, along with a short- to medium -term strategy for strengthening good governance, 
raising growth, and enhancing social and community development to achieve a better Fiji for all.  
Trade reforms are integral to Fiji's economic prior ities of developing an efficient, and therefore 
competitive, open economy to promote export-led grow th.  Nevertheless, the Government’s approach 
to further trade liberalization will be gradual due to revenue concerns, dictated by the pace of internal 
adjustments to fiscal systems and structural reforms, which will also provide time for non-competitive industries to adjust to foreign competition.  An essential component of Fiji's trade policy 
implementation is the National Export Strategy (N ES) published in 2006.  While its implementation 
has been stalled since December  2006, the NES Core Team re-conve ned in September 2008.  Six 
groups (agri-business, forestry, marine products, mine ral water, ICT, and audio-visual) have been WT/TPR/S/213 Trade Policy Review 
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initially selected to improve Fiji’s export perform ance.  A Summit Working Group on International 
Trade is to be formed.  Fiji has made few WTO notifications since 2000. 
4. Fiji accords at least MFN treatment to all (i ncluding non-WTO) trade partners, and is 
committed to multilateralism.  It has a multi-faceted approach to trade:  it has expanded its network of 
bilateral and regional agreements since the last Review.  Fiji nevertheless acknowledges that their 
proliferation increases risks of raising business costs by creating excessively complex and opaque trade regimes that may result in more trade (and i nvestment) diversion than creation.  Substantial 
empirical evidence questions the economic benefits to Fiji of discriminatory trade arrangements.  A 
trade agreement with Australia and New Zealand (Pacific Agreement for Closer Economic Relations, 
PACER) seems to offer most promise economically, a lthough its benefits are likely to be less than 
what Fiji could achieve from unilateral non-discriminat ory liberalization.  PACER would also be very 
ambitious and challenging for Fiji given its imbalance in economic de velopment, technical capacities, 
and certain conflicting trade and ec onomic interests with Australia a nd New Zealand e.g. the adverse 
revenue implications for Fiji .  It has faced, according to author ities, "immense" pressure to sign a 
south-south free trade agreement among Forum Isla nd Countries of the Pacific and the EU, in the 
form of an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA);   while revenue losses appear manageable, Fiji is 
concerned that its EPA tariff reductions will set a precedent for its forthcoming PACER negotiations 
where revenue losses are likely to be far more si gnificant given the importanc e of Australia and New 
Zealand as import sources.   
5. Fiji has liberalized and rationalized its foreign investment regime.  Some activities, however, 
are either reserved wholly for Fijian citizens/100%  Fijian-owned entities or limited by specified 
restrictions, especially minimum investment levels.  The latest foreign investment regulations, effective July 2008, removed a ll foreign equity limits, except on fishing where the 30% cap was 
retained;  for example, the 40% fo reign equity cap in agriculture w as replaced with a minimum cash 
investment of F$250,000.  A minimum FDI leve l of F$250,000 was introduced on all activities, 
except for those specifically subject to higher limits, some of which were rais ed and extended to cover 
additional activities, mainly services.  A local-cont ent scheme requiring 50% of locally grown tobacco 
was introduced for foreign investors manufacturing ci garettes, and the range of activities reserved for 
Fijians seemingly slightly increased.  Numerous  Fijian investment incen tives are of dubious cost-
effectiveness.  Fiji has no bilateral investment tr eaties, but agreed to an Investment Promotion and 
Protection Framework Agreement with the EU in 2005.  Fiji has several double taxation agreements 
(DTAs).  It reached a DTA with Singapore in 2005 and is negotiating similar bilateral instruments 
with India and the United States. 
6. Fiji has benefited from trade-related technical as sistance since its last Review, but faces major 
resource and capacity constraints that limit its  multilateral responses, including transition from 
reliance on preferences to a more open, and thus mo re competitive, economy.  Its technical assistance 
needs cover most areas of trade policy formulation and implementation, includ ing within unilateral, 
multilateral and regional initiatives.   
(2) G
ENERAL CONSTITUTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK  
7. Important political and constitutio nal developments have occurred since Fiji's Review in 
1997.  A new Constitution (Constitution Amendment B ill 1997) passed by Parliament in May 1997 
became law in July 1998.  It increased the num ber of Lower House (House of Representatives) seats 
by one, to 71, and reduced those reserved for indige nous Fijians from 37 to 23, for Indo-Fijians from 
27 to 19, and for other ethnic groups from five to three (the Rotuman ethnic group retained its single 
seat).  The remaining 25 seats are "open" (non-reserved) and elected by all voters.  Voting is Fiji WT/TPR/S/213 
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compulsory for people over 21 years of aged.1  As Head of State, the President, appointed for five-
year terms by the Great Council of Chiefs (Bos e Levu Vakaturaga), has reserve and executive 
authority, including assent to all laws.  He appoint s the Prime Minister from the Lower House and the 
ministers based on the Prime Minister’s advice.  The new Constitution requires ministerial positions 
to be allocated among parties (those with over 10%  of seats) in proportion to their Lower House 
numbers.2 
8. The current interim Government came to power in January 2007 after the Government elected 
in May 2006 was deposed by the military in Dece mber 2006.  The interim Prime Minister suspended 
the Great Council of Chiefs in April 2007.   The 1998 Constitution remains in force, supported by a 
October 2008 High Court decision (although this decision is currently being appealed to the Court of 
Appeal as some have questioned the constituti on's status given the nature of the interim 
Government).3  The interim Government intends to hold elections after making certain electoral and 
other reforms, under considerati on, to remove ethnic discrimination, especially replacing communal 
voting with proportional representation, redrawing electoral boundaries, and controlling corruption.  
Elections by the foreshadowed date of March 2009 now appear uncertain, with more time needed to 
implement these reforms, and it is unclear whether the Government’s "earmarked" date in SEEDS of 
June 2010 will be met.4  The current political uncertainty follows a period of relative stability since 
September 2001 when an elected government was re turned after the "civil" coup of May 2000.5 
9. Prior to being dissolved, Parliament's role  had expanded, with the adoption of the 
Constitutional Sector Standing Committee system in 1998, to review bills and scrutinize government 
policies referred by the House of Representatives.  A minimum of five sector standing (or Legislative) 
committees were required and six existed.  External  trade legislation was handled by the Sector 
Standing Committee on Foreign Relations and ther e was a Sector Standing Committee on Economic 
Services.  Nine select committees deliberated on bills and discussed issues raised in Parliament;  no 
select committee specifically covered trade or economic policies.  The Sugar Select Committee advised the relevant Minister, who was also its Ch airman.  During Parliament’s dissolution, Cabinet 
decisions are authorized into legislation by way of Presidential promulgations, which are considered 
to have equal status to Parliamentary laws.  Expe rience of previous coups suggests that Presidential 
promulgations are allowed legitimacy by incomi ng democratic governments provided they did not 
have a direct impact on the Constitution. 
10. Fiji's independent judiciary consists of the Hi gh Court, the Court of Appeal, and the Supreme 
Court, the highest appellate court.  The President appoints the Chief Justice on the Prime Minister's 
advice after consultation with the Leader of the Oppos ition.  Lower Magistrates' Courts also exist.  
                                                     
 
1 The President appoints the 32 members of the Uppe r House (Senate), 14 on the advice of the Bose 
Levu Vakaturaga (9 of which must support bills through Parliament on indigenous Fijian affairs), 9 on the Prime 
Minister's advice, 8 on the advice of the Leader of th e Opposition, and one on the advice of the Council of 
Rotumans. 
2 The Opposition constitutionally challenged the elected government on these grounds in 2002. 
 3 In October 2008, the High Court decision ruled that the Constitution remained in tact and effectively 
legitimized the interim Government’s coming to power following the December 2006 coup by relying upon the 
President’s use of his “prerogative powers not provided for in the Constitution under exceptional circumstances 
to act for the public good in a crisis” to ratify the di smissal of the democratic government and to appoint a 
caretaker Prime Minister that subseque ntly dissolved Parliament pending the holding of fresh elections.  Viewed 
at: http://www.nswbar.asn.au/circulars /october08/fiji.pdf.  Any decision from the Court of Appeal may be 
appealed to the Supreme Court, on which international judges will sit on the bench (High Court judges sit on the 
Court of Appeal).  
 4 Government of Fiji (2007), p. 40. 
 5 The President had dissolved Parliament and a military interim government installed that was declared 
unconstitutional by the Court of Appeal in March 2001.   WT/TPR/S/213 Trade Policy Review 
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Councils overseen by the Fijian Affairs Board gove rn 14 provincial administrations for indigenous 
Fijians covering four districts (Central, Northern, Eastern and Western).  Councils overseen by the 
Ministry of Housing, Urban Development a nd Environment administer urban centres. 
(3) STRUCTURE OF TRADE POLICY FORMULATION  
(i) Executive branches of government 
11. Several ministerial and departmental reshuffles have occurred since Fiji's last Review.  The 
latest restructuring, in September 2008, created the Ministry of Provincial and Multi-Ethnic Affairs;  
there are 12 ministries. 
12. The main ministry responsible for external trad e policy is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
International Co-operation and Civil Aviation (MFAI CCA), restructured from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and External Trade.  It handles bilateral, regional, and multilateral trade negotiations (External 
Trade Division) and the sectoral interests of civil aviation.  To formulate trade policies, MFAICCA 
consults widely within the bureaucracy, including th e Reserve Bank of Fiji (the central bank), mainly 
through semi-regular meetings of the Cabinet-ma ndated inter-ministerial Trade and Development 
Committee (TDC), chaired by the Ministry's Deput y Secretariat and head of the External Trade 
Division.  The Focused TDC comprises government  representatives while the Extended TDC includes 
private-sector stakeholders. Trade-related polici es are discussed within TD C forums whereby the 
MFAICCA submits either a Cabinet Information Paper or Discussion Paper for deliberation.  
Presidential promulgations are published in the Government Gazette . 
13. The re-organized Ministry for Industry, Tourism, Trade, and Communication (MITTC) 
formulates and implements policies on investment, internal trade and commerce, small business development, consumer protection and fair tradi ng.  Its focus is to create a supportive business and 
commercial environment.  MTTIC is responsible fo r the statutory Fiji Islands Trade and Investment 
Bureau (FTIB), and for negotiations on trade in services (those on trade in goods are handled by MFAICCA).  Other ministries involved in trade -related matters include:  the MOF, which is 
responsible for customs and tariffs through its Fiji Islands Revenue and Customs Authority (FIRCA), 
as well as national planning, sugar, water, and energy ;  Attorney-General, Just ice, Electoral Reform, 
Public Enterprises and Anti-Corruption;  Works and Transport;  Lands, Mineral Resources and 
Environment;  and Primary Industries.  The main mini sterial departments with trade-related roles are: 
Civil Aviation;  Communications;  Energy and Rura l Electrification;  Fiji Islands Maritime Safety;  
Information, Technology and Computing Se rvices;  and Mineral Resources.     
(ii) Advisory, planning, and other bodies 
14. In November 2007, as part of the 2008 Budget,  the interim Government superseded the 
previous Government’s Strategic Development Plan  (SDP) 2007-11 (in November 2006), based on its 
20 Year Development Plan (2001-2020), with the S EEDS.  The 20 Year Development Plan provided 
for an Affirmative Action Plan to address inequaliti es faced by indigenous gr oups.  This involved a 
nine-point plan incorporating, inter alia:   more concessions under the Commercial Loans to Fijian 
Scheme (CLFS) administered by the Fiji Devel opment Bank;  minimum indigenous ownership of 
selected resource-based industries (e.g. sugar, ot her agricultural activities, forestry, fishing and 
minerals), reserving for them certa in industrial or commercial activiti es and raising their participation 
in commerce, finance and tourism;  and indigenous ownership of at least one  daily English newspaper 
(The Daily Post ).
6  The SDP incorporated the United Nation's Millennium Development Goals 
                                                      
6 20 Year Development Plan (2001-2020) for the Enhancement of Participation of Indigenous Fijians 
and Rotumans in the Socio-Economic Development of Fiji,  and MOF (2002).  CLFS provides finance of up to Fiji WT/TPR/S/213 
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(MDGs) and was developed by the National Econom ic Development Council (NEDC), formed under 
the finance ministry in early 2005 to monitor the implementation of plans, supported by nine summit 
working groups.7  The SDP's medium-term strategy was to  maintain stability (particularly by 
promoting peace and harmony, enhancing security, la w and order, alleviating poverty, strengthening 
good governance, reviewing the Constitution, reso lving the agricultural land-lease issue, and 
implementing affirmative action), and to sustai n growth (maintaining macroeconomic stability;  
restructuring to promote competition and efficiency, including of the public sector;  raising exports;  
increasing investment to create jobs;  and rural and outer island development).  Past "easy" low-
growth options of protection, and inefficient suppl y-driven resource allocation were to give way to 
greater reliance on markets to allocate resources to  most productive uses so as to promote a more 
efficient economy.8  Raising investment from all sources and exports was seen as essential to 
promoting growth and development, and trade polic y as integral to reducing agriculture and other 
tariff protection needed to improve international competitiveness.  
15. SEEDS adopted and extended many of the SDP initiatives.  It also incorporated the MDGs;  
equitable participation of all ethnic groups in soci o-economic development, including a more effective 
Affirmative Action Plan to address inequalities faced by indigenous Fijians;  rural and outer island 
development;  and a short- to medium-term stra tegy of strengthening good governance, raising 
growth, and enhancing social and community devel opment to achieve a better Fiji for all.  Major 
elements to achieve economic growth include good macroeconomic mana gement and developing 
sustainable and globally competitive tourism, as well as manufacturing (including sugar) and 
commerce sectors capable of competing with im ports and expanding exports ;  reforming and re-
structuring the public sector, including the civil servi ce and public enterprises;   reforming financial 
services;  and improving land tenure and utilization.   The National Council for Building a Better Fiji 
(NCBFF), formed in January 2008 and co-chaired  by the interim Prime Minister, prepared a 
comprehensive report, the State of the Nation and the Economy (SNE), and drafted a Peoples Charter 
for Change, Peace and Progress, released in August 2008, to supplement the Constitution;  
consultations with stakeholders were extended and the Chamber is expected to be finalized by 2009.9  
The SNE was prepared by three National Task Team s established within the NCBFF, each with three 
working groups, looking at:  good governance (l egal, political, institutional and constitutional 
reforms), growing the economy, and social -cultural identity and nation building. 
16. No independent body publicly evaluates or advises government on trade policies or sectoral 
assistance.  There are no government-funded inde pendent economic research institutes.  The 
University of the South Pacific provides limited economic policy research, and is represented on the 
Summit Working Group on Structural Reforms.  Several academics regularly provide newspaper and 
other commentary on domestic economic challeng es and policy issues.  Multilateral or bilateral 
donors fund most research and analysis on trad e-related policy, including at times through the 
activities of the Pacific Islands Forum.   
17. The private sector interacts formally and info rmally with the Government.  The NEDC, the 
main formal consultative mechanism, has repr esentatives from the Fiji Ch amber of Commerce and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
80% of the project’s total cost, and  a Small Business Scheme was also introduc ed in 2000 to assist ethnic groups 
not covered by CLFS. 
7 Strategic Development Plan 2007-11.  This repl aced the Strategic Development Plan 2003-05, since 
the draft Plan for 2005-07 was not adopted.  The NEDC , chaired by the finance mi nister, meets quarterly and 
includes other public- and private-sector representatives, including NGOs.  The nine working groups include macroeconomic management and state in stitutions;  structural reforms;  ru ral development;  poverty and social 
justice;  infrastructure;  and natural resources. 
8 Strategic Development Plan 2007-11, p. 86. 
9 National Council for Building a Better Fiji (2008). WT/TPR/S/213 Trade Policy Review 
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Industry, Fiji Indigenous Business Council, Fiji Ma nufacturers Association, and numerous trade union 
and NGO representatives.  These, and other private sector and NGO representatives, are also on the 
Summit Working Groups.  Annual national economic summits, the last held in September 2008, 
provide an important forum for private and public sectors to interact and for government to consult 
with stakeholders on economic policy.  Private  sector representatives are also on the Extended TDC.    
(4) TRADE POLICY OBJECTIVES  
18. Trade reforms are integral to Fiji's economic priority of developing an efficient open economy 
to promote export-led growth.  According to th e authorities, Fiji has adopted an outward-looking 
approach to trade by lifting import restrictions a nd favouring export marketing and promotion.  Fiji 
believes that while a more open economy has raised prosperity and created jobs it has contributed to 
the country’s greater vulnerability, including lost ta x revenue from reduced tariffs.  Nevertheless, Fiji 
believes, in principle, that tariffs on imports become taxes on exports, and policies of protection 
distort investment decisions in favour of non-competitive producers.10  The switch from an economy 
driven by consumption to exports requires, ac cording to the Government, the removal of well-
established interventions, such as tariffs and other forms of protection, tax and customs exemptions, 
and incentives.  Fiji is of the view that the primary tariff policy should be to avoid cascading duties by 
adopting a low and uniform rate structure, and that a permanent restructuring of taxes and tariffs to 
promote economic efficiency and competition woul d advance the country’s economic development 
much more than market-distor ting interventions.  However, due to revenue concerns, the 
Government’s approach to further trade liberalization will be gradual, dictated by the pace of internal 
adjustments to fiscal systems and structural reforms, which will also provide time for non-competitive 
industries to adjust to foreign competition.11 
19. Fiji remains committed to meeting its mu ltilateral and regional trade obligations.12  It strongly 
supports the WTO and a successful end to the Doha round, and also pursues an export-oriented trade 
regime via regional and bilateral approaches.13  However, Fiji acknowledges that proliferating trade 
agreements may result in excessively complex and opaque trade regimes that distort trade and 
investment and raise business costs.14  Government policy is to promote regional integration in ways 
to complement MFN liberalization to avoid undesi rable trade diversion from free-trade agreements.15  
20. Central to Fiji's trade policy is the progressive  implementation of a National Export Strategy 
(NES) to boost exports.  This includes diversifyi ng markets (especially in the Asia-Pacific) and 
products away from sugar and garments, adversely affected by, inter alia , the erosion of preferences 
in Australia, New Zealand, the United States,  and EC, a major "external shock" to Fiji.16  The draft 
NES presented at the 2006 National Economic Summit was endorsed by Cabinet, and was finalized 
for 2007-11.  It attaches priority to manufacturing, services, and export development, and to public and private partnerships.  An NES Core Team, c onsisting of senior officials from the various trade-
related agencies/ministries and private sector repr esentatives, monitors implementation and reports 
progress to the NEDC.
17  Despite the stalled implementati on of the NES since December 2006, the 
Team re-convened in Sept ember 2008 to review use of the F$ 2 million budget allocation to help 
                                                      
10 Government of Fiji (2007), p. 21. 
11 Ministry of Finance and National Planning (2008b), p. 103. 
12 FRC (2004), p. 18. 
13 Acting Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and External Trade (2007);  and Minister of 
Finance and National Planning (2007). 
14 Government of Fiji (2006). 
15 Government of Fiji (2006). 
16 Government of Fiji (2007). 
17 Minister for Commerce and Industry (2006), p. 6;  and Cirikiyasawa (2007). Fiji WT/TPR/S/213 
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restore the economy’s short-term export capacity.  Six of thirteen identified sectors (agri-business, 
forestry, marine products, mineral water, ICT a nd audio-visual) have been selected initially to 
improve Fiji’s export performance.  Inconsistent government policies and a non-level playing field for 
entrepreneurs are deterring exports;  and incentives,  skewed mainly to pa rticular sectors that 
discriminate against other potential export  sectors, are seen as largely ineffective.18 
(5) TRADE LAWS AND REGULATIONS  
21. Reform of outdated trade-related laws has been slow during the review period, largely piece-
meal and handicapped by lack of institutional cap acity and possibly by political instability coupled 
with changing priorities and government administ rations (Table II.1).  While ministries and 
departments are encouraged to prepare lists of outda ted laws for review, many laws are outdated (e.g. 
quarantine regulations) and appear i noperative.  Several major laws or  amendments have been enacted 
since the last Review of Fiji (e.g . customs and financial services).  Legislation is published in the 
Government Gazette, and many ministries and departments have  websites to disseminate information, 
albeit of varying coverage. 
Table II.1 
Main trade-related legislation, November 2008  
Area Legislation 
Agriculture Agricultural Marketing Authority Act, 2004  
 Banana Export and Marketing Act 
 Coconut Industry Development Authority Act, 1999 
 Co-operative Dairy Companies Act 
 Copra Industry Loans Act 
 Dairies Act 
 Fiji Sugar Corporation Ltd Act (inoperative) 
 Fiji Sugar Corporation (Repeal) Act, 2006 
 Fruit Export and Marketing Act, 1985 
 Ginger Council of Fiji Act, 1996 
 Meat Industry Act 
 Sugar Industry Act 
Audio visual Fiji Audio Visual Communication Decree, 2001 
Aviation  Civil Aviation Act 
 Civil Aviation Authority of Fiji Act 
 Civil Aviation Reform Act, 1999 
Quarantine and SPS Animals (Contagious Disease) Act, 1985 
 Animals Importation Act, 1978 
 Plant Quarantine Act, 1982  
 Quarantine Act 
Banking and finance Banking Act, 1995 
 Bankruptcy Act, 1945 
 Broadcasting Commission Act, 1953 
 Insurance Act, 1999 
 Insurance Law Reform Act, 1996 
 Capital Markets Development Authority Act, 1996 
 Reserve Bank of Fiji Act, 1985 
 Consumer Credit Act, 1999 
 Exchange Control Act 
 Fiji Development Bank Act 
 Marine Insurance Act 
Table II.1 (cont'd) 
                                                      
18 Minister for Commerce and Industry (2006). WT/TPR/S/213 Trade Policy Review 
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Area Legislation 
Commerce Business Licensing Act  
 Commerce Act, 1999  
 Counter Inflation Act , 1973  
 Fair Trading Decree, 1999 
 Fijian Development Fund Act  
 Public Enterprise Act, 1996 
 Public Private Partnerships Act, 2006 
 Small and Micro Enterprise Development Decree, 2001  
Customs  Dumping and Countervailing Duty Act, 1998 
 Excise Act, 1986 
 Fiji Islands Revenue and Customs Authority Act, 1999  
Energy  Electricity Act, 1966  
Environment  Ozone Depleting Substances Act, 1998 
 Fiji Endangered and Protected Species Act, 2003  
Fisheries  Fisheries Act, 1942  
 Marine Spaces Act, 1977 
 Marine Spaces (Foreign Fi shing Vessels) Regulation, 1979 
Forestry  Forest Decree, 1992  
 Forest Management Act, 1953 (inoperative) 
Intellectual property  Copyright Act, 2000 
 Merchandise Marks Act  
 Patents Act 
 UK Designs (Protection) Act 
 Trade Marks Act, 1970 
Land  Land Development Act 
 Land Sales Act, and Land Transfer Act 
 Native Lands Act 
 Native Lands Amendment Act, 2002 
Mining Fiji National Petroleum Company Ltd Decree, 1991 
 Mining Act, 1978 
 Petroleum (Exploration and Exploitation) Act, 1978 
 Petroleum (Exploration and Expl oitation) (Amendment) Act, 1995 
Shipping Marine Act, 1991 
 Maritime and Ports Authority of the Fiji Islands Act (inoperative) 
Standards Dangerous Drugs Act 
 Food Safety Act, 2003 (inoperative) 
 Pesticides Act 
 Pharmacy and Poisons Act 
 Trade Standards and Quality Control Decree 1992  
Taxation Income Tax Act 
Tourism Fiji Tourism Commission and Visitors Bureau Act (inoperative) 
 Hotel Aids Act 
Land transport Land Transport Act, 1999 
Source: Information provided by the Fijian authorities. 
(6) TRADE AGREEMENTS AND ARRANGEMENTS  
(i) Fiji and the WTO 
22. Fiji still accords at least MFN treatment to all, including non-WTO, trading partners.  It is not 
a member or observer of the WTO Plurilateral Agre ement on Government Procurement or on Trade in 
Civil Aircraft.  Fiji does not participate in th e Working Group on Transparency in Government 
Procurement.  It is not a party to the Minister ial Declaration on Trade in Information Technology 
Products (the Information Technology Agreement). Fiji WT/TPR/S/213 
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23. As a non-resident WTO Member with no Geneva mission, Fiji's WTO participation is more 
difficult and less effective than for other Members;   such matters are handled part-time by its EC 
mission in Brussels and the Pacific Islands Forum Representative Office to the WTO, established in 
Geneva in 2004.   Despite having resource and staff constraint s the Office has facilitated Fiji’s trade 
interests in the WTO and the Doha negotiations, in cluding through Fiji’s membership of the Group on 
Small and Vulnerable Economies (SVEs) and of Like-Minded Economies.  Fiji supports the WTO 
Work Programme on Small Economies.19  It supports agricultural liberalization but believes its 
contribution, as a small economy, must reflect ca pacity constraints and vulnerability as well as its 
policy objectives and development needs.20  Fiji and other SVEs feel that a successful Doha outcome 
must comprehensively address the needs of farmers in developing countries, achieve real market 
access improvements, and reduce or eliminate trad e-distorting support provided by WTO developed 
Members.21  An agriculture agreement would have to advance work on key issues, including 
"underpinning rules and disciplines", and avoid backdoor protectionism through fairer and more 
predictable trade disciplines.  Negotiated agreem ents should reflect development dimensions, and 
assist developing countries to integrate globally .  Fiji sees an open global trading environment 
essential to reducing poverty, and agricultural trad e as a key factor in lifting real incomes and 
achieving sustainable development.   
24. Fiji attaches priority to the NAMA negotia tions, including application of special and 
differential treatment.  It believes that developi ng countries, especially SVEs, should be able to 
protect infant industries and not have to bind tariffs for highly strategic and sensitive products.22  Fiji 
feels that adopting a simple Swiss formula to reduce tariffs would unreasonably burden those 
countries.23  In Fiji's view, trade facilitation should focu s on regional approaches (e.g. regional trade 
agreements) and cover technical assistance/ capacity building for developing economies.24  A n y  
disciplines on fisheries subsidies should incorpor ate, unconditionally, special and differential 
treatment and cover only ocean fishing.25  Fiji has not revised its initial GATS offers on services made 
in June 2003 as part of the D oha negotiations (Chapter IV).26   
Notifications and dispute settlement 
25. Fiji has made few WTO notifications since 2000 and, to the detriment of transparency, 
32 were outstanding at end September 2008 (Table II.2).27  However, it has regularly submitted tariff 
data to the WTO Integrated Data Base (IDB), incl uding for 2008.  Fiji has been in no formal disputes, 
but was a third party in the case of EC-Export S ubsidies on Sugar brought by Australia, Brazil, and 
Thailand in 2003. 
                                                      
19 SVEs negotiated the extension of the Tax Free Factories (TFF) and Tax Free Zone (TFZ) schemes 
from end-2007 to end-2015, subject to standstill provisions and transparency. 
20 Fiji, no longer a Cairns Group member, distanced itself from the Group's WTO position by not 
signing its October 2000 WTO proposal for deep tariff cuts and greater market access for all agricultural 
products, due largely to Fiji's reliance on high-priced EC sugar exports and support for agriculture's 
"multi-functionality" (FAO, 2003). 
21 WTO documents WT/MIN(05)/ST/11, 14 December 2005, and WT/MIN(03)/ST/16, 
10 September 2003. 
22 WTO document TN/MA/W/38, 16 June 2003. 
23 WTO document, TN/MA/W/66, 11 November 2005. 
24 WTO document TN/TF/W/129/Rev.1, 21 July 2006. 
25 WTO document TN/RL/W/210/Rev.2, 22 June 2007. 
26 WTO document, TN/S/O/FJI, 16 June 2003. 
27 WTO (2007a). WT/TPR/S/213 Trade Policy Review 
Page 28 
 
 
Table II.2 
Main notifications under WTO Agreements, 2000 to November 2008 
Agreement Requirement/content Document symbol and date of latest 
notification 
Agreement on Implementation of GATT Article VI of the GATT 1994 (Anti-dumping)  
Article 16.4 Semi-annual reports of anti- dumping actions (taken within the 
preceding six months) G/ADP/N/85//Add.1/Rev.5, 22 January 2008 
Article 16.5 Competent authorities G/ADP/N/14/Add.24, 15 October 2007 
Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights  
Article 63.2 Laws and regulations and ma jor changes IP/N/1/FJI/C/1, 12 July 2001 
Article 69 Contact points IP/N/3/Rev.7, 19 August 2003 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures  
Article 7 and Annex B Notification of SP S measures G/SPS/N/FJI/2, 10 September 2001 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)  
Article 15.2 Implementation and administration of  Agreement G/TBT/2/Add.90, 12 September 2006  
Agreement on Subsidies a nd Countervailing Measures 
Article 25.1 Subsidies  G/SCM/N/160/FJI, 4 September 2007 
Article 25.12 Competent authorities G/SCM/N/18/Add.24, 15 October 2007 
Source:  WTO documents. 
(ii) Preferential, regional, and bilateral arrangements 
26. Fiji has a multi-faceted approach to trade a nd has expanded its netw ork of bilateral and 
regional arrangements since its last Review.  It pursues trade policy objectives at the multilateral, regional, and bilateral levels, a nd has several such agreements.
28  However, given trade diversion 
possibilities, preferential agreements among Pacifi c states (e.g. MSG or PICTA) may not enhance 
regional welfare.  While Fiji, being more diversif ied, is likely to be the major beneficiary, these 
benefits are likely to come at the expense of smal ler island economies.  Any benefits to Fiji are also 
likely to be small relative to a PACER-Plus Ag reement with Australia and New Zealand, and 
especially compared with Fiji's own non-discriminator y liberalization, achieved either unilaterally or 
multilaterally.29  Unilateral trade reforms would maximize Fijian welfare by improving resource 
allocation and introducing dynamic efficiency gains from greater competition and openness to 
investment, technology, skills, and ideas.30  The EU Economic Partnershi p Agreement (EPA) with Fiji 
is likely to generate few economic benefits.31  Fiji is concerned by the an ticipated adjustment costs for 
domestic industries and the revenue losses from trade liberalization (tariffs accounting for some 20% 
of government tax revenue), especia lly under a PACER-Plus Agreement.32  It is estimated that such 
agreements may reduce Fiji's tariff revenue by up to half.33  Using tariffs as a primary revenue source 
                                                      
28 Ministry of Finance and National Planning (2007), p. 21.  The South Pacific Regional Trade and 
Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA) was notifie d by Australia to the WTO in February 1981, and 
the Melanesian Spearhead Group Trade Agreement (MSG) by Papua New Guinea in October 1999, both as 
partial scope agreements under the Enabling Clause  (WT/COMTD/N/9, 7 October 1999).  PICTA was also 
notified to the WTO under the Enabling Clause by the group of participating countries in 2007. 
29 ADB (2007).  The term PACER-Plus refers to the negotiated PACER as distinct from the existing 
framework Agreement. 
30 ADB (2007);  CIE (1998);  and World Bank (2002). 
31 ADB (2007). 
32 Ministry of Finance and National Planning (2007), p. 62. 
33 While Fijian imports come predominantly from Australia and New Zealand, other imports, especially 
from Japan, account for about half of its tariff revenue (FRC, 2004).  Another study also estimated that Fiji, 
PNG, Samoa, and Vanuatu may each lose tariff revenue of at least US$10 million annually on imports from 
Australia and New Zealand (Pacific Is lands Forum Secretariat, 2007).   Fiji WT/TPR/S/213 
 Page 29 
 
 
is best minimized as they distort resource-use effici ency.  Domestic tax reforms may thus be required 
in order to be able to rely less heavily on distorting tariffs to raise revenue (Chapter III). 
(a) Preferential arrangements for devel oping and least developed countries 
27. Fiji is not a member of the Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP) and provides no 
preferential tariff treatment for developing countries or least developed countries.  Of the 13 countries 
notifying national Generalized System of Prefer ences (GSP) schemes to UNCTAD, only Estonia does 
not provide trade preferences to Fijian exports.34  Only a small share of Fiji exports (e.g. to the United 
States) depend on GSP benefits because most enter major markets under more generous non-GSP 
preferential arrangements.  Nevertheless, lower tariff preferences and/or  restrictions on eligibility, 
including restrictive rules of origin and the possib ility of import quotas affecting exports of interest to 
Fiji (e.g. textiles, clothing, footwear, leather produc ts, fish, and agricultural products (mainly livestock 
e.g. beef) would reduce any benefits to Fiji from  GSP schemes.  For example, Fiji's main exports 
(garments, agricultural and fishery products) would be either ineligible or classified as sensitive 
products to receive lower preferences under the "g eneral arrangements" of the EC's revised GSP 
Scheme operating from 2006-15.35   
28. The extension of non-quota duty-free access to  competing exports from least developed 
countries, such as the EU Everything But Arms (EBA ) Scheme, has also disadvantaged Fijian exports, 
which remain either excluded from, or receive re duced or restricted, GSP benefits (or potentially 
should exports become too competitive).  Non-ACP least developed countries enjoy better market access than non-least-developed ACP countries, thereb y potentially diverting exports and foreign 
direct investment from Fiji.  The United States' African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) has 
similar adverse effects, encouraging some internatio nal clothing firms to re-locate from Fiji to Africa 
(Chapter IV).
36 
(b) Regional arrangements 
South-Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA)  
29. Fiji, along with other Forum Island Countri es (FICs), is a member of SPARTECA, a 
non-reciprocal preferential agreement signed in 1981 with Australia and New Zealand.  All of Fiji's 
exports to these two markets, except sugar to Au stralia, which is banned, enter duty-free without 
restriction.37  Textiles, clothing and footwear (TCF), Fi ji's second largest industry, has been a major 
beneficiary of SPARTECA under its special bilatera l trade arrangement with Australia, called the 
SPARTECA (S-TCF) Scheme, which was introdu ced in March 2001 and extended from end-2004 
until end-2011 to facilitate duty-free access of pro ducts manufactured in FICs (Chapter III).  In 
May 1999, New Zealand also extended indefinitely the three-year derogation introduced in 1994 that 
reduced local-content requirements on Fiji clothing e xports to 45% (Chapter III).  Fiji (and other 
                                                      
34 Other countries notifying GSP Schemes to UNCTAD are Australia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, EU, 
Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, Switzerland, Turkey, and th e United States (UNCTAD, 
2006).  However, not all countries notify GSP schemes to UNCTAD;  some 25 nations are thought to maintain 
them. 
35 EC (2005).  Non-sensitive products benefit from suspension of tariff duties while sensitive products 
(most agricultural goods, textiles, clothing, carpets, and f ootwear) mainly enjoy tariff reductions of 3.5% on the 
MFN ad valorem  rate and 30% on specific duties (WTO, 2007b).  Although the EC's GSP scheme restored 
benefits for certain fish products as from 2006, benefits to Fiji seem relatively minor since they were classified 
as sensitive, and fish products of major Fijian interest (HS Chapters 03 and 05) remain excluded. 
36 Scollay (2006). 
37 ADB (2007). WT/TPR/S/213 Trade Policy Review 
Page 30 
 
 
FICs) wants SPARTECA’s rules of origin reviewed to improve market access to Australia and New 
Zealand.38  Since Fijian TCF exporters import most, if not all, material inputs they seemingly face 
extreme difficulties meeting SPARTEC A’s restrictive value-added rul es of origin, including under the 
S-TCF Scheme; Fiji is pursuing efforts to furthe r reduce the minimum local area content from 35% to 
25% (Chapter III).  According to the authorities, the exclusion of wool a nd wool-blend products by 
Australia from this bilateral scheme has also effectively  crippled Fiji’s TCF industry, which, if 
included, would have been able to develop a comp arative advantage in exports of wool and wool-
blend products.  Furthermore, according to the authorities the FTA negotiate d by New Zealand with 
China, Fiji’s major TCF competitor, has effectivel y eroded whatever tariff preferences Fiji has with 
New Zealand, and they are concerned that an Australia-China FTA would do likewise.   SPARTECA, 
which has lost importance owing to, inter alia , erosion of tariff preferences and restrictive rules of 
origin, will be superseded by PACER-Plus. 
Melanesian Spearhead Group Trade Agreement (MSG) 
30. Fiji ratified the 1993 MSG in April 1998 (signed in 1996).39  A revised MSG, signed in 
October 2005, replaced the positive tariff concessi ons list, which had ex panded to cover some 
530 six-digit tariff items, with a negative list and opene d membership to other Forum countries;  tariff 
schedules were also expanded from 4-digit to 6-digi t HS headings to better identify products covered 
by preferential treatment.40  Fiji has no negative list (apart from the Common Exclusion List of 
"excepted imports" adopted by all members), and while strongly supporting the move to a negative 
list believes that other members’ lists disadvant age the development of competitive Fijian infant 
industries.41  Even thought the MSG has seemingly had little impact on intra-trade, Fiji believes that, 
especially with its less onerous rules of origin th an PICTA, it will continue to be relevant until 
members ratify PICTA, on which progress has been sl ow.  Nevertheless, the majority of intra-regional 
trade in goods is conducted under MSG instead of PICTA. 
31. The MSG calls for reduced and eventual el imination of tariffs, no quantitative import 
restrictions on eligible goods (except for ba lance-of-payments reasons), and no new export 
prohibitions or restrictions.  Tariffs were to be phased out over a maximum of nine years, with rates 
below 30% being progressively removed more quickly e. g. rates of up to 6% were to be abolished in 
the second year and of between 6-8% in the third year.42  The authorities indicate that Fiji met these 
tariff reductions on schedule.  Safeguard provision s cover tariffs and import quotas.  For economic 
development purposes, Members can suspend tari ff concessions on products  of new or existing 
industries for up to three years purposes.  However,  many of the MSG's new provisions, e.g. on the 
timing of tariff reductions, appear loosely drafted, and this, along with members' lack of commitment 
to liberalization obligations, has contributed to numerous trade disputes.43  A long-standing trade 
dispute whereby Fiji prohibited imports of Vanuatu Kava in 2005, in retaliation for Vanuatu's ban on 
                                                      
38 Forum Secretariat (2007). 
39 PNG, Vanuatu, and the Solomon Islands are founding members and New Caledonia joined later as 
an observer.   
40 While MSG leaders endorsed at the 1999 Summit the introduction of a negative list by 2003 for 
developing countries (PNG and Fiji) and 2005 for least de veloped countries (Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands), 
it was decided at the 2003 and 2005 Summits that all members should phase them in by end-September 2005.  
The common positive list of products covered all members and specified maximum concessionary tariffs ranging from free to 27%, but mainly at rates of 10% and 15%, on various agricultural and industrial products.  
It also specified a VAT on eligible imported items of 10%, which has not been changed to reflect Fiji’s higher 
VAT rate. 
41 The MSG specifically excludes mineral fuels, tobacco products, alcoholic beverages and vinegar, 
and cane sugar (HS code 17011100). 
42 The MSG makes no mention of the treatment of non-ad valorem  tariff rates. 
43 Scollay (2006). Fiji WT/TPR/S/213 
 Page 31 
 
 
imports of Fijian biscuits in 1999, was eventually resolved with both countries lifting the restrictions 
in December 2005.44  On SPS grounds, Fiji also banned P NG corned beef (mainly Ox and Palm) 
made from PNG cattle certified free of mad cow di sease;  Fiji required it to be made from beef 
imported from disease-free sources e.g. Australia.45  In addition, in an on-going disagreement which 
began in 2006, PNG, which produces Pepsi, refuses to grant preferential access to Fijian exports of 
Coca-Cola;  according to the authorities, PNG’s negative list does not exclude it from preferential 
tariff treatment. 
32. While the MSG excludes services it was agreed in  2005 to consider a multilateral air services 
agreement.   
Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER)  
33. The PACER, an "umbrella" agreement signed in August 2001, entered into force in 
August 2002.  It  is a defensive framework aimed at protecting Australian and New Zealand interests 
in FIC markets by developing a single regiona l market to increase economic opportunities and 
competitiveness.46  Its "triggering" mechanism provides for WTO-consistent negotiations to establish 
a reciprocal free-trade arrangement (either a single free-trade area or a customs union) to commence:  
within eight years from PICTA's entry into force (i.e . in 2011);  or as soon as practical, either jointly 
or individually, with Australia and New Zeal and following commencement of FTA negotiations 
between any FIC and any OECD country.  Moreover,  such individual or joint consultations with 
Australia and New Zealand would also be activated  as soon as practicable if any FIC concluded free-
trade arrangements with any developed non-FIC, an d are to offer Australia and New Zealand the 
opportunity of negotiating free-trade arrangement s where the FIC arrangement involves a non-FIC 
with higher GDP per capita than that of the lowest developed FIC member.47  If Australia or New 
Zealand commence formal negotiations for free-trade arrangements with any non-FIC they must offer 
to undertake consultations as soon as  practical with each FIC with a view to commencing negotiations 
for improved market access.  Any new trade arrangements between FICs, Australia, and New Zealand should be non-discriminatory, except for appropri ate special and differential treatment of less 
developed countries.  Fiji’s initialing in Nove mber 2007 of an EPA with the EU has seemingly 
triggered PACER-Plus negotiations with Australia  and New Zealand, and it remains to be seen 
whether PICTA will be re-negotiated  These have st arted informally with Australia and New Zealand 
wishing to include a wide range of Singapore issu es and urging formal negotiations to commence.  
However, Pacific Forum Trade Ministers have agreed  to delay formal negotiations until the Office for 
the Pacific’s Chief Trade Advisor is  established;  this is to be funded by Australia and New Zealand 
which have also offered to fund th ree further informal discussions, the fi rst to be held late 2008.  Fiji 
is especially concerned with the likely adve rse revenue implications of PACER-Plus. 
                                                     
 
44 At the time of the dispute, Fiji imported Vanuatu Kava worth US$5 million while Vanuatu imported 
Fijian biscuits valued at US$1.9 million. 
45 Scollay (2006). 
46 As at end-September 2008 Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Cook Islands, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Papua 
New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, and Tonga had ratified PACER. 
47 If the PICTA parties jointly commence negotiations  for free-trade arrangements with any non-FIC, 
consultations as soon as practical would be offered to Au stralia and New Zealand, either individually or jointly, 
with a view to commencing negotiation of free-trade arrangements.  Moreover, any FIC not involved in 
negotiations activating the PACER may participate in an y consultations or negotiations with Australia or 
New Zealand.  The PACER will not appl y to the accession of any Pacific isla nd country to th e PICTA provided 
that the PICTA rules of origin do not discriminate between Australia and New Zealand and other developed 
countries, or any bilateral/p lurilateral free-trade arrang ements between or among c ountries each of which is a 
FIC, a Pacific island country or territory, or a least deve loped country provided that the rules of origin do not 
discriminate between Australia, New Zealand and other developed countries. WT/TPR/S/213 Trade Policy Review 
Page 32 
 
 
34. Gradual voluntary unilateral tariff liberalizati on by all FICs is encouraged and each party 
should periodically review tariffs with a view to re ductions.  Fiji has not conducted such a review, 
which according to the authorities is only required once PACER-Plus has been negotiated.  Members 
are also required to implement detailed trade f acilitation programmes.  WTO Members should provide 
no less favourable treatment than among themselves to non-WTO members in areas of SPS, customs 
procedures, and standards and conformance.  The PACER is open to any Pacific island country or 
territory.  
Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA) 
35. The PICTA, also signed in August 2001 as a s ubsidiary agreement to PACER, aims to 
establish a single market by creating a free-trade area among FICs.48  While it entered into force in 
2003 (2005 for Vanuatu) and was intended to be fu lly operational by 2007, the PICTA is only 
partially operational, as only Fi ji and five other FICs have passed the necessary legislation.49  Thus, 
schedules to eliminate tariffs on intra-regional trad e progressively by 2016 were extended to 2021 for 
all FICs.  Tariffs on "non-excepted" goods are to  be removed by 2017 (originally 2010 for Fiji and 
other FICs, except for small island stat es and least developed countries (2012)).50  Fiji and other 
developed FICs are to reduce maximum tariffs on these goods immediately to 25% in 2009 and to 
phase them out by 2017;  to lower rates from 15-20%  to 15% in 2009 and to phase them out by 2017;  
to lower rates from 15-20% to 15% in 2009 and to phase them out by 2015;  to lower rates from 10-
15% to 10% in 2009 and to phase them out by 2013;  and to reduce rates of 10% and below to 5% in 
2009 and to eliminate them by 2011.51  As Fiji  negotiated no "excepted imports " (i.e. a negative list) it 
is to phase out all tariffs by 2015.52  Different tariff liberalization schedules apply to non-LDC/Small 
Island States (SISs) like Fiji, which must phase out all tariffs by 2015, and LDC/SISs (e.g. Cook Islands, Niue and Samoa, by 2017).  While LDC/SI S countries currently open to trade can access non-
LDC/SIS markets from 2007, non-LDC/SIS countries like Fiji can only access LDC/SIS markets from 2009. Fiji is the only non-LDC/SIS country currently trading under the PICTA. 
36. Members must extend to each other MFN treatment in tariffs (including levying methods), 
export taxes, internal taxes and sale of imports, and foreign exchange administration.  Most FICs are 
not WTO members.  The PICTA provides for immediate elimination of all import and export prohibitions or restrictions, including quotas, licensi ng or other similar measures, as well as voluntary 
export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements or other similar trade measures.  Internal taxes and 
other charges must not discriminate against imports .  Safeguard measures by way of tariffs and other 
contingency measures apply.  Members may raise ta riffs for up to 5 years generally and 10 years for 
small island states and least developed countries (ext endable to 10 and 15 years, respectively), where 
a causal link can be shown objectively between impor ts and the "domestic industry's development" 
(tariffs may only be raised if the good concerned is produced domestically).  The PICTA also covers 
government procurement, trade facilitation, and dispute settlement.  Fiji strongly supports the 
intention to include services, especially labour mobility.  Two rounds of services negotiations have 
taken place, and the third was scheduled for December 2008. Fiji has unofficially offered 
                                                     
 
48 As of April 2007, 12 FIC had ratified the PICTA:  Fiji (October 2001), the Cook Islands, the 
Federated States of Micronesia (2007), Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, 
Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu (ratified in June 2005).  The Marshall Islands and Palau have not yet signed.    
49 These are the Cook Island s, Niue, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. 
50 Small island states are the Cook Islands, Kiribati,  Nauru, Niue, Marshall Islands and Tuvalu.  Least 
developed states are the Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Samoa (due to soon lose this status), Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. 
51 While FICs are encouraged to convert non- ad valorem  tariffs to ad valorem  rates by the start of the 
scheduled reductions, to enable standard phase-out arrangements to apply, any remaining non- ad valorem  duties 
are to be reduced by 80% by 2009 and phased out by 2017. 
52 Tariffs on "excepted" goods are to be reduced to a 50% maximum by 2012 and phased out by 2021. Fiji WT/TPR/S/213 
 Page 33 
 
 
liberalization in tourism, telecommunications, busin ess, and financial services, aimed at creating an 
enabling business and investor-friendly environment.   Membership of the PICTA is open to Pacific 
island states and territories.   
37. Intra-regional trade remains negligible and is mainly between Fiji, the major participant and 
regional hub, Papua New Guinea, and Samoa.  F iji re-exports food (including imported cereals from 
Australia, Thailand, and the United States) mainly to Vanuatu, Kiribati, and Tuvalu, and beverages, 
textiles, metal products, and electronic equipment to the region.   
The Cotonou Agreement (CA) 
38. Fiji-EC trade relations have been governed by the CA, which entered into force provisionally 
to replace the Lome Convention in March 2000.53 The EC's WTO waiver for the CA expired at end 
2007.  It provided Fiji (and other ACP countries ex cept South Africa) non-reciprocal trade preferences 
by way of duty-free entry of industrial, and certain agricultural and fishery products, subject to safeguards.
54  Certain products (bananas, beef, veal, and sugar) are subject to "commodity protocols" 
that provide restricted market access.  Preferential rules of origin specifying maximum import content, 
processing criteria, and change in tariff headings, including product-specific rules, appear overly 
restrictive even though generally allowing for cumu lation among participating countries (Chapter III).   
39. Fiji's EC market access under the CA mirrors the non-quota duty-free access least developed 
countries receive under the EBA, except for far l ess liberal access due to tariff quotas or less 
preferential tariff margins on beef and veal, sugar, a nd fish (especially canned tuna).  Under the Sugar 
Protocol and related arrangements, the EC guarant ees to buy a fixed quantit y of sugar (1.3 million 
tonnes annually from ACP states and India) at yearly "negotiated" prices aligned with EC prices, 
which, due to high protection exceed  world levels by up to three times prior to the EC sugar reform.55  
Fiji's sugar quota of 12.5% of the EC's total quota allocated to ACP states amounts to annually 165,348 tonnes under the Sugar Protocol which had been supplemented by on average another 30,000 tonnes under the Special Preferential Sugar arrangement, which ended from July 2006 and was 
replaced by the Complementary Quantity.
56  The EC’s Sugar Protocol will terminate from end-
September 2009.  Sugar has accounted for up to 80% of  Fiji's EC exports (60%  of sugar production), 
and the expected 36% fall in EC white sugar pri ces by 2009/2010 from domestic reforms is estimated 
to lower its export receipts by €42.8 million.  Also concerning Fiji is further export growth of least 
developed sugar suppliers to the EC  at its expense as their transitiona l periods for full liberalization of 
sugar access under the EBA expire in 2009).57 
EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 
40. In accordance with the CA, Fiji (and Papua New Guinea) negotiated an interim EPA on 
29 November 2007, operative for Fiji from 2008 (I nterim Partnership Agreement Between Pacific 
                                                      
53 The CA covers African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP ) States.  The Pacific states are the 14 FICs and 
East Timor, which acceded to the CA in May 2003. 
54 While 97% of non-LDC ACP exports to the EC ar e eligible for Cotonou duty-free preferences, the 
coverage is only 8% for Fiji.  Many of these exports are covered by lower EC GSP preferences.  Below 5% of 
Fiji's EC exports receive zero MF N tariffs (South Centre, 2007b). 
55 MFN suppliers to the EC face more restricted acce ss under tariff quotas with  an in-quota rate of 
US$98 per tonne, well above the zero rate for ACP exporters (South Centre, 2007a).  Between 1990 and 2001 
average EC prices were US$0.6114 per kg compared with US$0.222 per kg on the world market (Laurent, 
2004). 
56 South Centre (2007a);  and Scollay (2003). 
57 EC sugar imports from EBA countries, especially Sudan, Bangladesh, Mozambique and Zambia, 
have risen rapidly to some 2 million tonnes (Stoler, 2005). WT/TPR/S/213 Trade Policy Review 
Page 34 
 
 
States and the EC) (Box II.1).58  It is currently trading under a te mporary extension of market access 
under the CA enforced through EC legislation af ter initialling the EPA until end-2008 by which time 
the interim EPA is expected to be signed.  The Fijian Governme nt believes it is under "immense" 
pressure to sign a "substantive" EPA with the EU.59  Failure to do so will see Fiji’s EC market access 
revert to much less favourable GSP conditions.  EPA negotiations, including other Pacific island 
states, re-convened in September 2008, when the st ates agreed to activate a "rendez-vous clause" 
whereby no further negotiations will take place until the EC commits to agree to proposals on labour 
mobility schemes.60 
41. EPAs provide a means of circumventing the CA's non-WTO compliance by replacing non-
reciprocal with reciprocal prefer ences between the EC and ACP states.  Fiji and the other 13 affected 
Pacific states decided to negotiate a joint EPA, commencing in September 2004.  Their chief 
negotiator (or Lead Spokesperson), Fiji's Minister  of Foreign Affairs and External Trade, was 
replaced in December 2006 after the coup.  The inte rim EPA covers goods and is open to any Pacific 
state.  A comprehensive EPA including also servi ces, development cooperation, fisheries, and trade-
related rules is due to be concl uded by 2009.  Fiji and other Pacific states have tried unsuccessfully to 
include the temporary movement of people in the EPA .  The EC's refusal to negotiate a bilateral or 
multilateral memorandum of u nderstanding on this or on aid-for-tra de, remains a major sticking point, 
and it seems less enthusiastic to negotiate on services, a major focus of the Pacific states.61  Fiji's other 
main concerns are:  EC treatment of sugar exports after the CA Sugar Protocol expires;  maintaining 
at least preferential tariff access on canned tuna  exports, which is being reduced, and securing 
improved rules of origin.  The interim EPA includes improved sectoral rules of origin, especially for 
fishery products, agri-processing, and textiles.  The EC has also de-listed Fiji for eligibility to export 
any fishery-related products until, according to the authorities, it complies with the EC’s stringent sanitary and phytosanitary regulations, including upgrading of the shipping fleet as well as major 
overhaul of processing plants and related administra tive functions, such as implementing a credible 
audit and compliance system.   
                                                     
 
58 Fiji risks losing its EC preferential tariff access under the CA following termination if it does not 
negotiate a reciprocal EPA in conformity with WTO rules.  As a developing country, loss of Cotonou 
preferences would imply less preferential access to the EC under the "general" GSP scheme, especially for 
important Fiji exports of canned tuna and sugar, e.g. the tariff on canned tuna imports would rise from duty-free 
to a GSP rate of 24% while duty-free access under the EB A would be available to competing non-ACP and from 
2008 ACP pacific least developed states (East Timor, Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu).   
59 Ministry of Finance and National Planning (2008b), p. 103. 
60 Ministry of Finance and National Planning (2008b), p. 104. 
61 ICTSD (2008).  According to the authorities, the contentious issue of including semi-skilled and 
unskilled workers under labour mobility (mode 4) with the EC  reflects not so much the interests of Pacific states 
in having them move to the EC but of not wanting to set a precedent of accepting no access arrangements on 
mode 4 given the impending PACER-Plus negotiations with Australia and New Zealand, where gaining such access is seen as critical by Pacific states. Fiji WT/TPR/S/213 
 Page 35 
 
 
Box II.1:  Major features of the in terim EPA between Fiji and the EU 
The interim EPA requires the EU's immediate full liberalization on all products (excluding arms and 
ammunition) except rice, for which there is a transition period until 2010 (excluding on tariff heading 
10061010, which are immediate liberalization) and sugar, where CA Protocol 3 applies until end-September 2009 when EC sugar tariffs (tariff heading 1701) will be eliminated.  Until then, an additional 
zero duty tariff quota of 10,000 tonnes is to be provided on white sugar (tariff heading 17011110) for the 
2008/09 marketing year.  To get a tariff quota licence the importer must buy white sugar at the Protocol's guaranteed price.  From October 2009 to end-September 2015, the EC may remove tariff concessions on 
sugar imports (tariff heading 1701) fr om non-LDC ACP states if they ex ceed certain levels (set in white 
sugar equivalents) and disturbing the EC market.  Total of 3.5 million tonnes annually from ACP states, and individually from any state of 1.38 million tonnes in 2009/10, rising to 1.45 million tonnes in 2010/11 
and 1.6 million tonnes in the following four years.  In addition to multilateral safeguards, the EC may 
impose bilateral safeguards for up to two years and P acific states for up to four  years (extendable for a 
further two years and four years, respectively,  in exceptional circumstances) by way of 
removing/suspending tariff concessions or introducing tariff quotas if sugar imports cause or threaten 
serious injury to domestic industries; economically or socially disturb a sector/industry that may seriously deteriorate the country’s economic situation; or disturb the markets or marketing arrangements of 
agricultural products (as defined in the WTO), including food security concerns.  The EC may impose 
bilateral safeguards for up to four years (extendable by  four years) against ACP states.  Bilateral safeguards 
over one year must be eliminated progressively and may not be re-applied within one year.  The EC may 
impose multilateral safeguards, excluding exports from P acific states, for up to five years from the EPA's 
date of entry into force (extendable by agreement).  Any State may also request, with the EC's agreement, 
the EPA Trade Committee to review its tariff reducti on schedule with a view to modifying commitments if 
certain imports pose serious difficulties.  Pacific stat es may take special safeguard measures to protect 
infant industries from "disturbances" or serious injury caused or threatened by higher imports from the EC 
due to lower tariffs (initially for up to 7 years for non -LDC states and 12 years for Pacific LDC states and 
small island states, extendable in all cases for up to  3 years).  Measures are to develop productive 
industries, and coverage is limited to 3% of the States' tariff lines or 15% of total EC imports averaged over 
the previous three years (available for 20 years).  EPA safeguard provisions potentially provide LDCs 
better access than non-LDC ACP states.  
Fiji has agreed to liberalize over 15 years, by 2023, 80% of tariff items, covering some 82% of EC exports 
to Fiji (9% of tariff lines immediately, covering 24% of imports from the EC, 22% of tariff lines by 2013, 
and 62% by 2018).  A negative list excluded certain agricultural, forestry, and processed goods from liberalization to protect infant industries and fiscal revenue. 
The EPA prohibits import/export prohibitions or quantita tive restrictions, and export taxes except to protect 
Pacific states' fiscal solvency or environment, or in exceptional circ umstances as a justified temporary 
MFN means to protect infant industries after the EC’s mutual agreement.  The EC will phase out 
agricultural export subsidies on all products sold to Pacific states subject to tariff reductions and negotiated 
modalities.  MFN clauses require the EC and Fiji to accord each other any mo re-favourable-treatment 
offered to trading partners under future trade agreemen ts.  For Pacific states this clause applies only to 
agreements with "major" trading partners, defined as any developed economy, a country with a share of world merchandise exports ex ceeding 1%, or any group of countries ac ting individually or collectively with 
a total share of world merchandise exports above 1.5%  (in the year preceding the implementation of the 
trade agreement).  WTO Members are disputing its legality and many ACP states oppose it. 
Source:  WTO Secretariat;  European Centre  for Development Policy Management, EPA Negotiations: Where 
Do We Stand? , Maastricht, 15 February 2008.  Viewed  at:  http://www.acp-eu-trade.org;  EU-
PNG/Fiji Interim EPA Agreement, EU-Pacific Interim FTA (2007) , 29 November 2007.  Viewed at: 
http://www.bilaterals.org/article.p hp3?id_article=10605;  ICTSD, MFN provisions in EPAs: a threat 
to south-south trade , Trade Negotiations Insights, Vol. 7, No. 2, March 2008.
 
 WT/TPR/S/213 Trade Policy Review 
Page 36 
 
 
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) 
42. Fiji is a member of the PIF (the South Pacific Forum until October 2001).62  To strengthen 
regionalism, members endorsed th e Pacific Plan in October 2005 (revised in October 2006) to be 
implemented over ten years.  The Plan envisages increasing sustainable regional trade (including in 
services), and investment to promote pro-poor economic growth by lowering trade barriers among 
members, including physical (e.g. border) and tec hnical (e.g. quarantine, import taxes and passport 
requirements) measures.63  Initiatives to be implemented immedi ately (2006-08) included:  expansion 
of markets in trade in goods under SPARTECA, PICTA, PACER and with non-Forum countries;  
integration of services trade, including temporar y movement of labour, into PICTA and the EPA;  
timely and effective implementation of the Regi onal Trade Facilitation Programme (RTFP);  and 
investigation of the potential impact of PACER.64   
(c) Bilateral arrangements 
43. Most of Fiji’s regional bilateral agreements have expi red and have been replaced by the MSG 
and PICTA.  Tonga received non-reciprocal duty- free access (including on onions and vanilla) on 
about 50 items, under a bilateral trade agreement signed in 1998, until 2003 when the Agreement 
expired.  A 1998 Agreement with Vanuatu  granti ng reciprocal duty-free importation of a range of 
agricultural, fish, and industrial products, including plywood and veneer, cement, clothing and footwear, also expired in 2003.  A 1996 reciprocal bilateral trade agreement with Papua New Guinea  
was not renewed, given the existence of the MSG.  The 1998 Fiji-Cook Islands trade agreement 
lapsed, and Fiji is undertaking national consultati ons on the Cook Islands’ re quest to renegotiate.  
While Fiji and the Cook Islands are among the six co untries currently trading under PICTA, Fiji is the 
only non-LDC/SIS country, and while the LDC/SIS countries (including the Cook Islands) could 
export their products under the preferential tariffs from 2007, Fiji could not access these markets until 2009.  Thus, Fiji was closely consid ering reactivating a new bilateral agreement, and according to the 
authorities, is willing to explore further market acce ss liberalization opportunities that would mutually 
benefit both countries economically and socially.   
44. The 1995 bilateral agreement with the Unite d States on Fiji's quota for garment exports 
expired at the end of 2004 when MFA global quotas ended.  Although such exports became eligible 
for GSP treatment, this adversely affected F iji, since the only company (Singaporean) producing 
clothing for the United States' market closed with in eight months.  The Fiji-Australia Trade and 
Economic Cooperation Agreement (FATERA), signed in March 1999, sets a framework to improve 
bilateral trade but excludes preferential arrangements. 
45. Fiji is negotiating a renewed non-reciprocal bilate ral trade agreement with Tuvalu in line with 
Fiji’s economic priority of redistributing the benefits  of trade and economic development to the island 
of Rotuma.  It has the potential to export agricultura l products to Tuvalu, which is closer than Suva.  
Fiji declared Rotuma an international port of entry so  that such exports to Tuvalu do not need to be 
first transported to Suva.
65  Fiji-New Zealand negotiations on a bilateral trade agreement were 
suspended in May 1999.  Fiji is  seeking improved rules of origin, especially reducing the minimum 
                                                      
62 PIF includes Australia, New Zealand and 14 pacifi c islands.  New Caledonia and French Polynesia, 
previously observers, were granted Associate Membersh ip in 2006.  Current observers are Tokelau (2005), 
Wallis and Futuna (2006);  Timor Leste is a special observer (2002). 
63 Pacific Islands Foru m Secretariat (2006b). 
64 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (2006a). 
65 Since Rotuma also has fruit fly, its agricultural products are prohibited from being transported to the 
mainland. Fiji WT/TPR/S/213 
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local-area-content (MLAC) requirements on exports with FIC materials from 35% to 25%, as agreed 
to with Australia (Chapter III). 
(7) FOREIGN INVESTMENT REGIME  
(i) Overview 
46. Fiji has liberalized and rationalized its foreign investment regime since its last Review but 
obstacles remain.66  Its national investment policy recognizes the importance of investment to Fiji, 
including raising productivity, incomes, employme nt, and diversifying the economy.  A revised 
National Investment Policy adopted in 2005 included, inter alia,  measures on investment facilitation, 
incentives and concessions, work permits, infrast ructure and site development, business 
establishment, legislative changes since 1999, and re forms in the investment approval process, aimed 
at establishing a non-discretionary, simple  and transparent investment regime.67  Government priority 
is to raise annual investment to 25% of GDP (currently at most 20%), by increasing public 
investment, especially in infrastructure and human capital, and facilitating higher private (including foreign) investment.  Fiji's annual inward foreign di rect investment (FDI) target is F$350 million.  It 
believes investment policies and measures should not discriminate between foreign and domestic 
investors, or between "like" foreign investors (subjec t to bilateral or multilateral investment treaties).  
Foreign and domestic investors have the same  constitutional protection against compulsory 
acquisition and the same rights to access domestic courts and tribunals to resolve disputes.
68   
47. Fiji acknowledges that the long, complex, and n on-transparent investment approval process is 
a major impediment to private investment.  For some  projects, it may take up to a year to obtain the 
requisite approvals from departments/authorities.  Fiji is reforming the investment approval process 
and moving towards a "one stop shop" to facilitate FD I, by liaising closely with government agencies 
to remove investment impediments.  In 2004, Cabinet approved reforms to improve the approval 
process, based on a private commissioned report that noted major inefficiencies and delays.  The Fiji 
Islands Trade and Investment Bureau (FTIB) is being re-constituted to include representatives of key 
implementing agencies, such as the Director of Immigr ation, the Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, 
the Director of Town and Planning, and the Centra l Bank, and four private-sector members (one as 
Chairman).69  Foreign investors must obtain an investor's  permit from the FTIB, which is issued for 
up to seven years for investments of at least F$500,000 and for three years on smaller projects.  Projects must be registered and be in the "nationa l interest" to be approved.  The authorities indicate 
that this requirement only applies in practice to  major sensitive investments in which case Cabinet 
decides whether the project is consistent with the "national interest".  The FTIB implemented 
paperless foreign investment registrations on-line in July 2008.  Foreign investors must also obtain 
                                                     
 
66 The 2008 Index of Economic Freedom scores Fiji's investment freedom at only 30% because foreign 
investment is highly controlled and regulated, judicial enforcement of relevant regulations is erratic, and there is 
a significant backlog of court cas es (Heritage Foundation, 2008). 
67 FTIB (undated). 
68 Investment disputes have concerned mainly land,  particularly in logging and tourism, and have 
generally been resolved through labour-management dialogue, government intervention, referral to compulsory arbitration, or the courts.  Expropri ation of private property is constituti onally prohibited, except in emergencies 
and then subject to compensation. 
69 A Projects Committee, consisting of agencies such  as Tourism, Finance, Commerce, Immigration, 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, aimed at facilitating and fast-tracking investment proposals was abolished. WT/TPR/S/213 Trade Policy Review 
Page 38 
 
 
work permits, which may be granted for up to three years, and require the skills to be unavailable 
domestically and locals to be trained as understudies.70 
(ii) Restrictions on foreign investment 
48. The FTIB, an independent statutory body, administers FDI guidelines and regulations (the 
Foreign Investment Act 1999, the Foreign Invest ment (Amendment) Act 2004 and regular, often 
annual, regulations, the latest in July 2008).71  As well as conducting investment and export 
promotional activities, it regulates FDI, including:  appraising and approving , under strict general 
legislative guidelines in collaboration with other rele vant agencies (e.g. Reserve Bank, FIRCA and the 
Department of Immigration), applications for Fo reign Investment Registration Certificates (called 
Foreign Investment Certificates before the 2004 ame ndments);  and monitoring registered projects to 
ensure approval conditions are met.  The FTIB is required to issue a certificate for any genuine 
application to invest in non-reserved or restricted activities that meets the specified conditions.  Applications are to be processed within five working days (reduced from 20 to 15 in 2004 and to 
current levels in 2005), and decisions may be appeal ed to the Minister of Industry, Tourism, Trade 
and Communications.
72  While the FTIB is currently registering projects on average within three days 
and trying to reduce this to two, most criticisms re late to delays in obtaining the permission needed to 
start projects.73  According to the authorities, introducing "paperless" registrations has substantially 
reduced "red tape" and increased transparency by introducing "digital footprints" as checks and 
balances.  Moreover, bureaucratic registration a nd approval procedures for foreign investment are 
seemingly often applied non-transparently.74  Political instability, regulation, land issues, and 
infrastructure bottlenecks seem to di scourage investment, especially FDI.75 
49. Some activities are either reserved wholly fo r Fijian citizens and 100% Fijian-owned entities 
or restricted subject to specified conditions, incl uding minimum foreign equity levels.  The lists of 
these activities are reviewed biennially in principle;  the latest, effective July 2008, removed foreign 
equity limits on all activities, except on fishing wher e the 30% cap was retained (Table II.3);  the 40% 
foreign equity cap in agriculture was removed.  Minimum FDI levels of F$250,000 were introduced 
on all activities.  Moreover, the range of services s ubject to specific, higher FDI minimum levels was 
increased:  such limits replaced foreign equity caps (e.g. in agriculture, manufacture of wooden 
furniture, restaurants, cultural heritage activiti es, motor vehicle repair and maintenance, and 
construction);  were introduced on new activities (e .g. F$500,000 for boat building, F$1.5 million for 
inter-island-shipping and passenger services, and F$300,000 for laundry services);  and were 
increased in other activities.  In addition, minimu m FDI levels were raised on some activities (e.g. 
hairdressing and other beauty treatments, and earthmoving).  A local-content scheme of 50% of locally grown tobacco was introduced for foreign i nvestors manufacturing cigarettes.  Seemingly, the 
2008 amendments also slightly increased the range of activities reserved for Fijians.  FDI is prohibited in some activities, e.g. gambling and the manufactur e of arms and ammunition, whether domestic or 
foreign.  While foreign investors may acquire real  estate, land dealings are complex and only a small 
                                                     
 
70 Average time to process new work;  permit applications has been reduced from 40 to 14 working 
days (Minister of Finance, 2005, p. 22). 
71 A foreign investor is defined as  any foreigner or entity not wholly-owned by Fiji citizens.   
72 An investor survey in 2005 found it took more than  four years to obtain a Certificate in over half of 
FDI applications (FIAS, 2005a, p. 33). 
73 Ministry of Finance and National Planning (2007), p. 17.  A foreign investor survey found that below 
40% of approved investments were implemented (FIAS, 2005a, p. 10). 
74 Heritage Foundation (2008). 
75 FIAS (2005a). Fiji WT/TPR/S/213 
 Page 39 
 
 
share (some 10%) of land is available for purchase.76  Difficulties in obtaining land titles impede 
investment and growth.77  Native and crown/state land may only be leased with approval of the Lands 
Department, which usually takes at least a month.78  Foreign investors may repatriate capital, 
earnings, and loan repayments, subject to exchange control guidelines.79  According to the authorities, 
foreign investors are not, as claimed, discouraged fro m acquiring a controlling interest in or taking 
over an existing locally owned enterprise.80  
Table II.3 
FDI reserved and restricted activities, high lighting changes introduced in July 2008 
Status/minimum FDI conditions 
Activity 
Before 11 July 2008 From 11 July 2008 
Reserved activities  Milk bars, cafeterias, taxis, buses, handicrafts, 
plumbing, electrical or office services, kava saloons, retail stalls and markets tailoring, shoe 
repairs, plant nurseries, day-care centres, internet 
cafes, home-stay lodging services, veterinary services, forestry, and tour ism facilities or ventures  As before except for the addition of repair of personnel 
and household goods, backpacker operations, and bakery, nightclub and liquor businesses (except those 
operated within the vicinity of hotels/resorts and/or run 
by foreign-owned hotels) 
Restricted activities   
Fishing  Minimum 30% Fijian equity (FSIC sub-class 
05001)  No change 
Agriculture  Minimum 40% Fijian equity (FSIC Division 1, 
which includes 6 Classe s and 31 Sub-classes) Foreign equity cap removed;  foreign investor must 
have at least F$250,000 in cash from the operational 
date  
Manufacturing Minimum 30% Fijian equity in carpentry and 
joinery activities, including furniture (FSIC Sub-
classes 36102) Foreign equity cap removed;  foreign investor engaged 
in the manufacture of wood furniture must have at least 
F$300,000 in cash from the operational date 
 None Foreign investor enga ged in boat building (FSIC Sub-
class 35111) must have at least F$500,000 in cash from 
the operational date 
 None Foreign invest or engaged in the manufacture of tobacco 
products must use at least 50% locally grown and 
processed tobacco in all do mestic cigarette production 
and must have at least F$750,000 in cash from the operational date 
Table II.3 (cont'd) 
                                                      
76 The Minister of Lands must approve purchases of property larger than one acre.  Freehold sale of 
land over 25 acres must first be advertised locally to give indigenous landowners first right to "buy back" the 
land (FTIB, 2006, p. 6);  and Heritage Foundation (2008). 
77 Heritage Foundation (2008). 
78 Approval is usually given if the land is transf erred within three months , any offshore funds are 
brought onshore, and the development is finished within two years.  Government leases for industrial use are for up to 99 years, with rents re-assessed 10-yearly.  Nati ve Lands Trust Board (NLTB) leases are normally for 50 
to 75 years, with rents re-assessed 5-yearly.  Rents on crown and native land leases are capped at 6% of its 
unimproved capital value, and leases usually specify conditions requiring the lessee to make improvements.  
Leases can be sold, transferred or varied with NLTB and Lands Department approval. 
79 Government guidelines allow foreign investors to re mit current year's profit plus four years' retained 
earnings if not previously remitted and up to F$15 million profit per annum per company or business entity 
(Fijian Embassy, undated).  Local borrowing by non-re sidents is permitted without prior Reserve Bank approval 
up to F$10 million for business entities and of up to F$0.5 million for individuals provided the debt to equity ratio is below 3:1.  Residents may hold foreign exchange accounts subject to government approval; non-
residents also face restrictions.  Mo st payments and transfers (includi ng capital) are subject to government 
approved limits (Heritage Foundation, 2008). 
80 Heritage Foundation (2008). WT/TPR/S/213 Trade Policy Review 
Page 40 
 
 
Status/minimum FDI conditions 
Activity 
Before 11 July 2008 From 11 July 2008 
Tourism Minimum of F$0.2 milli on in fixed assets and 50% 
Fijian equity for investments up to F$0.5 million in 
fixed assets in restaurant s not operated by foreign-
owned hotels (FSIC Sub-class 55201) Foreign equity cap removed;  foreign investor must 
have at least F$250,000 in cash from the operational 
date 
 Minimum of F$0.5 million in fixed assets in 
rental/hire car or a chartered land transport tour 
operator business (FSIC Sub-class 60223) No change 
 Minimum 51% Fijian equity and of F$0.25 million 
in any activity involving Fiji's cultural heritage 
(FSIC Sub-classes 92141 and 92321) Foreign equity cap removed;  foreign investor must 
have at least F$500,000 in cash from the operational 
date 
Services Minimum of F$0.25 million in fixed assets in 
hairdressing and other beauty treatment (FSIC 
93021) Foreign investor must have at least F$500,000 in cash 
from the operational date 
 Minimum of F$0.5 million in fixed assets and 50% 
Fijian equity for investments of up to F$1 million in 
fixed assets in maintenance and repair of motor 
vehicles (FSIC Sub-class 50201) Foreign equity cap removed;  foreign investor must 
have at least F$500,000 in cash from the operational 
date 
 Minimum of 51% Fijian equity in activities of a 
Customs House, real estate management and 
development, and inte r-island shipping and 
passenger services (FSIC Sub-classes 63099 and 70101 Foreign equity cap removed;  foreign investor engaged 
in freight forwarding and a customs house agent must 
have at least F$500,000 in cash from the operational 
date.  For real estate mana gement and development the 
minimum is F$5 million in cash from the operational date. 
 Minimum of 40% Fijian equity in construction 
(FSIC Sub-class 45201) Foreign equity cap removed;  foreign investor must 
have at least F$5 million in cash from the operational 
date  
 Minimum of F$1 million in fixed assets in 
earthmoving (FSIC Sub-class 45101) Foreign investor must have at least F$2.5 million in 
cash from the operational date   
 Minimum of 30% Fijian equity in pest control and 
fumigation, advertising a nd marketing, and business 
and management consulta ncy services (FSIC Sub-
classes 01401, 74301 and 74141) Foreign equity cap removed;  foreign investor must 
have at least F$500,000 in cash from the operational 
date   
 Minimum of F$1 million in fixed assets in retailing 
and in distribution services (FSIC Division 52 
which includes 11 Classes and 18 Sub-classes, and 
Division 51, which include s 11 Classes and 18 Sub-
classes) No change 
 None Foreign investor engagi ng in inter-island shipping and 
passenger services (FSIC Sub- class 61101) must have at 
least F$1.5 million in cash from the operational date 
 None Foreign investor provi ding laundry cleaning services 
(FSIC Sub-class 93011) must have at least F$300,000 in 
cash from the operational date 
All other activities None Foreign investor s must have at least F$250,000 in cash 
from the operational date 
Note: FSIC means Fiji Standard Industrial Classification. 
Source: Ministry of Industry (2005 and 2008), Tourism, Trade and Communication,  Foreign Investment Regulations.  
Viewed at:  http://www.commerce.gov.fj/files/0 /29/published/FOREIGN%20 INVESTMENT%20REGS%20 
2005%20-%20 FINAL2.doc;  and http://www.ftib .org.fj/invest-fiji-foreign-act.cfm. 
(iii) Incentives 
50. Fiji has traditionally offered a range of investment incentives to both domestic and foreign 
investors aimed at increasing exports, growth, and employment.  They were last reviewed in the 2007 interim Budget following major changes introduced in  2001 to improve transparency and to broaden Fiji WT/TPR/S/213 
 Page 41 
 
 
their base.81  Incentives risk unduly distorting private sect or behaviour and Fiji' s resource allocation, 
such as by favouring large over small businesses, capital over labour-intensive activities and non-services over services.
82  Evidence also suggests incentives, especially tax holidays, erode the tax base 
and can be costly in revenue forgone, with little increase in efficient investment, including FDI.  A 
more economically effective (and possibly revenue neut ral) reform to facilitate investment may be to 
reduce the general company tax rate of 31%, seeming ly high by regional standards, and abolish tax 
incentives, which on FDI could be costing F iji F$19 million annually in revenue forgone.83   
51. All exporters, including of services, receive ge nerous income tax exemptions intended to 
encourage investment.84  Investment allowances of 40% a pplied from 2001 until end-2008 (minimum 
annual investment of $50,000) for broadly defined activities of agricultural, forestry, and marine 
resource processing provided they are "substantially tr ansformed" (processed into products that have a 
different HS classification, excluding  re-packaging, re-bottling, and logging );  manufacturing 
businesses located in rural areas;  and most  businesses supplying information technology 
(Table AIII.1).  More generous industry-speci fic investment incentives, including generous 
investment allowances, other income tax concession s (especially tax holidays of up to 20 years on 
new investment), and tariff concessi ons, also apply;  local-content and export requirements apply in 
some cases.  Registered foreign (and domestic) inv estors must apply to the Fiji Islands Customs and 
Revenue Authority (FIRCA) for duty and tax concessi ons, including for tourist -related benefits under 
the Hotels Aid Act (previously administ ered by the Ministry of Tourism).   Special regional incentives 
apply to businesses located in the Northern Island (Vanua Levu).  The FTIB promotes the Kalabu ICT 
Park for establishing back-office operations by provi ding a ten-year tax holiday to firms setting up 
software development business processing operations.   
(iv) International agreements 
52. Although Fiji is a long-standing signatory of th e ICSID Convention and member of the World 
Bank Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) , no projects have been guaranteed in Fiji.  It 
is not a party to  the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the 
New York Convention) and has introduced no arb itration and conciliation rules in line with the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Internati onal Commercial Arbitration. 
53. Fiji has no bilateral investment treaties (BITs)  and is negotiating none.  Official proposals 
from the United Kingdom and, in 2007, from China on a BI T have not been signed by Fiji.  It agreed 
on an Investment Promotion and Protection Framew ork Agreement with the EU in 2005.  Fiji has 
double taxation agreements with the United King dom, Japan, New Zealand, Australia, Korea, 
Malaysia, and Papua New Guinea and, since its last  Review, with Singapore (December 2005).  It is 
negotiating agreements with India and the United States.   
                                                      
81 The Fiji Fiscal Review Committee advocated investment incentives to "kick start" investment and 
growth, especially given Fiji's political instability (FRC, 2004, p. 38). 
82 ADB (2005a), pp. 21-22.  International evidence suggests that investment incentives generally have 
high redundancy rates i.e. most of the investment would have occurred without them.  Other factors, such as 
economic potential, opportunities, sound economic management, and political stability, appear more important.  Moreover, any FDI attracted by incentives is likely to be  inefficient, low quality, and footloose, with little flow-
on effects to the economy and highly likely to re-locate wh en incentives are removed – as experienced by Fiji 
(ADB, 2005a). 
83 ADB (2005a).  It has been estimated that the 40% investment allowance for sawmills alone costs 
some F$300,000 annually in revenue foregone (FAO, 2007). 
84 However, a foreign investor survey showed some 75% of investment projects catered for the 
domestic market (FIAS, 2005a, p. 20). WT/TPR/S/213 Trade Policy Review 
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(8) AID FOR TRADE  
54. Fiji benefited from a range of trade-related technical assistance activities during the review 
period, but continues to face significant human resource and capacity challenges that limit its 
multilateral responsiveness and handicap implementa tion of WTO obligations.  Implementing new 
commitments from the DDA is likely to further challe nge already stretched resources.  International 
support could help Fiji to integrate into the multi lateral trading system and face changing trading 
conditions, including transition from dependence on pr eferences to an open competitive economy.   
55. According to the Joint WTO/OECD database,  Fiji received trade-related assistance from 
international donors totalling US$9.89 millio n from 2001-06.  Assistance jumped from 
US$0.775 million in 2005 to US$6.288 million in 20 06, reflecting an increase from US$0.49 million 
to US$5.95 of trade development assistance from Ja pan, France, Korea, New Zealand, the EC, and 
UNESCAP.85  Fiji has received minimal assistance on trade policy and regulations (US$0.333 million 
in 2006), mainly from Japan, Korea, New Zealand, UNESCAP, and the WTO, which provided trade-related training education through the "Geneva w eek" and regional workshops, seminars, and training 
courses.
86 
56. The authorities indicate a need for further wi despread trade-related technical assistance 
covering almost all areas of unilateral, multilatera l, and bilateral initiativ es covered by the Trade 
Policy Review.  Specific areas identified include tr ade and customs facilitation;  reviewing tariff and 
other tax concessions and incentives;  reforming government procurement procedures;  updating SPS 
arrangements, including on fishery products a nd operation of SPS enquiry points, as well as the 
relevant departments in the Ministry of Hea lth;  developing a privatization programme and 
implementation policies;  accessing and using the WT O Integrated Data Base;  improving collection 
and reporting of economic statistic s, including of the balance of payments where "errors and 
omissions" are substantial;  and enha ncing capacity of the legal unit within the trade ministry.  Fiji has 
very few experienced trade lawyers or trade policy economists. 
                                                      
85 Areas of assistance were market analysis an d development, business support services and 
institutions, trade finance, trade promotion strate gy design and implementation, and e-commerce. 
86 Areas of assistance were trade-related training ed ucation, trade facilitation, customs valuation, trade-
related intellectual property rights, trade and competition, trade mainstreaming in development plans and PRSPs, regional trade agreements, accession, and services.