WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  RESTRICTED 
WT/GC/M/131 
30 June 2011 
 (11-3228) 
General Council 
3 May 2011  
 
 
 
MINUTES OF MEETING 
 
Held in the Centre William Rappard 
on 3 May 2011 
 
Chairman:  Mr. Yonov Frederick Agah (Nigeria) 
 
 Subjects discussed: Page 
1.  Report by the Chairman of the Trade Negotiations Committee .......................................... 2  
2.  Work Programme on Small Economies – Report by the Chairman of the 
Dedicated Session of the Committ ee on Trade and Development ........................................ 4  
3.  Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration – Report on meeting of 
March 2011 .................................................................................................................... ............ 5 
4.  Waivers under Article IX of  the WTO Agreement ................................................................ 7  
(a)  Cape Verde – Implementation of Article VII of GATT 1994 and of the Agreement on 
Customs Valuation – Draft decision ........................................................................................... 7 
(b)  European Union – Request for a waiver on additional autonomous trade preferences 
granted by the European Union to Pakistan   – Statement by the Chairman of the 
Council for Trade in Goods .................................................................................................... .... 7 
5.  WTO Pension Plan Management Board – Election of Chairman, Members and 
Alternates – Proposal by the Chai rman of the General Council .......................................... 9  
6.  Accession of Vanuatu – Statement by the Chairman ............................................................ 9  
7.  Eighth Ministerial Conference – Statement by the Chairman ........................................... 11  
8.  Chairmanship of the Working Party on the Accession of the Bahamas – 
Statement by the Chairman ................................................................................................... 1 1 
9.  Administrative Measures for Members in arrears – Statement by the Chairman ........... 12  
ANNEX I – Statements by delegations at the informal meeting of the Trade Negotiations 
Committee on 29 April 2011 .................................................................................................... ........... 13  
ANNEX II – Statement by China at the informal meeting of the Trade Negotiations 
Committee on 29 March 2011 .................................................................................................... ......... 54 
 
 WT/GC/M/131 
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  1. Report by the Chairman of the Trade Negotiations Committee 
1. The Chairman invited the Director-General, as Chairman of the TNC, to report on the TNC's 
activities since his last report to the Council. 
2. The Director-General said that since the last meeting of the General Council, the TNC had 
met in informal mode on three separate occasions.  On 8 and 29 March par ticipants had reviewed 
developments in the Doha Development Agenda si nce the beginning of 2011, and in anticipation of 
the package that had been circulated by himself a nd the Negotiating Chairs on 21 April.  On 29 April, 
the TNC had met again to consider the next step s in the process.  His re marks at the informal 
meetings of the TNC in March had been circulated in documents  JOB/TNC/8 and 9, and he would not 
repeat what he had said then.  Delegations had used  both meetings to express their concern at the lack 
of substantive progress in key areas of the negotiati ons and to call for a collective demonstration of 
compromise to assist the Negotiating Group Chairs in  preparing their texts before Easter.  On 
21 April, those Chairs and he, as Chair of the TNC, had circulated to all participants documents which 
represented the product of the work in their Ne gotiating Groups over the past months.  These 
documents had been accompanied by an introductory cover note by him, as well as a report on the 
consultations he had been conducti ng on NAMA sectoral negotiations.  For the first time since 2001, 
Members had the opportunity to consider the entire Doha package, including all market-access areas 
as well as the entirety of the regulat ory agenda.  At the 29 April informal TNC he had emphasized the 
gravity of the situation for the Round and for all of  the efforts and aspirations it embodied.  He had 
also emphasized the heavy collective responsibilit y, not only for the Doha Round, but for the 
multilateral trading system as a whole.  There was no individual clever escape from this collective 
responsibility.  While he would not repeat his statement to the 29 April TNC, which had been 
circulated as JOB/TNC/10, he did wish to stress hi s call to Members to listen to each other and to 
focus constructively on the way ahead.  This was a time, if there ever was one, to think and act 
systemically. 
3. Members had approached the discussion on 29 Ap ril in a realistic yet positive manner, and a 
number of important points had emer ged upon which they could build th e further process.  First, all 
Members were aware of the grave risk of the current stalemate – for the DDA and for the WTO 
system more generally.  Second, no Member was read y to throw in the towel in terms of what had 
been built so far , nor was anyone ready to let the DDA drift.   Third, there was general agreement that 
a new approach beyond business-as-usual was required  and that such an approach should lead to 
results in 2011, in particular bearing in mind the Eighth Ministerial Conference to take place in 
Geneva on 15-17 December.  Fourth, various ideas  including, but not limited to, solving the NAMA 
impasse had been floated.  These and other ideas need ed further discussion, soon er rather than later, 
including at the political level.  In sum, Members were clear about what they did not want and were 
open to ideas on the way forward.  This was the prio rity in the weeks ahead.  The exchange of views 
on 29 April represented a first step on Members' co llective journey towards defining an appropriate 
way forward.  Over the next weeks trade Ministers would be meeting – first at ASEAN, then APEC 
and subsequently at the OECD – and this would a llow for them to provide a political input to the 
discussions in Geneva.  As he had said the prev ious week, he intended to keep consulting with 
individual and groups of Members over the next  few weeks to follow up on the views and ideas 
expressed at the TNC.  On 31 May he would call another informal TNC to inform all Members on these activities.  The weeks ahead would be intense and would agai n put to the test Members' ability 
to deliver collectively, starting the following Monday,  when they would be meeting in Istanbul for the 
fourth UN Conference on LDCs.  The last such conf erence had taken place in 2001, just a few months 
before the launch of the Doha Development Round.  For this Conference, as for the Doha Round, it 
was not a question of words but of deeds.  It was a question of delivering on the mandates that had been agreed almost ten years earlier.  It was a bout showing that the international community could 
deliver.  WT/GC/M/131 
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  4. The Chairman invited any delegation that wished  the statement it had made at the informal 
TNC meeting held on 29 April 2011 to be incl uded in the Minutes of the present meeting, to 
communicate this directly to the Secretariat.1 
5. The representative of Peru thanked the Director-G eneral for his detailed report on the state of 
play in the negotiations and for his relentless effo rts, together with the Chairs of the Negotiating 
Groups, in these complex and difficult circumstances to achieve a successful conclusion to this 
Round.  Peru was deeply concerned about the curre nt state of the negotiations.  Although it welcomed 
the reports presented by the Director-General and th e Negotiating Group Chairs to the extent that they 
provided Members with a snapshot of what had been  negotiated so far in all the negotiating areas, it 
was disappointing to note there had not been more  extensive progress to ensure that the Members' 
objective would be reached in 2011.  As had been  stated so many times before, Members clearly 
needed to translate political will into concrete and tangible results in the we eks ahead.  All seemed to 
agree on the importance of preserving the acquis  and on their commitment to continue working 
towards completion of what they had started ten y ears earlier.   Peru firmly believed that these 
reports and what was now on the table were the f undamental elements for th e package Members still 
had to finish putting together.  Although it had been  widely recognized that at the present time the 
NAMA sectoral negotiations were one of the major obstacles to be overcome, Members should not forget that there were other issues of critical im portance to the success of th e Round.  For his country, 
it was essential that the interests of the developing countries should be at the heart of the outcome of 
these negotiations, in line with the Doha mandate.  Peru therefore regarded environmental goods and 
services, Fisheries Subsidies, Trade Facilitation and Mode IV in Services, inter alia , as priority issues. 
6. The current state of world fisheries was unsustainable and global rules had to be promptly 
established to prohibit fisheries subsidies that  contributed to overcapacity and overfishing.  
Distortions in agricultural trade, through recourse to export subsidies and dom estic support, affected 
trade and the weakest Members in particular.  Any successful outcome would have to afford greater protection for genetic resources and the traditional k nowledge associated with such resources, in the 
context of an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement.  To that end, a significant group of developing-
country Members, including Peru, had recently submitted a draft decision to strengthen mutual support between the TRIPS Agreement and the Conv ention on Biological Diversity.  For developing 
countries such as Peru, the ultimate objective was to  achieve far-reaching and ambitious reforms that 
allowed greater openness, security and transparency in the international trade regime, which had to 
become more fair and equitable.  To ensure this, it was also essential to fully adhere to the Single 
Undertaking principle under which these negotiati ons were being conducted, because this was the 
only way Members could guarantee that the outcomes stemming from these negotiations reflected a satisfactory balance for all countries.  In the week s to come, Members needed to give positive and 
realistic thought to the direction they wished to take , so as to have an idea of  the road ahead.  Hence, 
Peru welcomed the consultations to be held by th e TNC Chairman in various formats, to discuss not 
only the next steps, but also all initiatives aimed at finding a way out of the current impasse.  In this 
connection, Peru welcomed the European Union's se ctorals initiative concerning chemicals, industrial 
machinery and electronics as an alternative that c ould serve as a basis for a compromise solution, to 
the extent that it provided for participation on a non- mandatory basis while promoting participation by 
the key Members involved in trade in these sectors.  Although the search for a solution to this issue 
had to take priority, and Peru supported every e ffort to that end, Members also had to work 
collectively to find innovative approaches that woul d enable them to reach consensus in the other 
major areas.  Peru accordingly supported the Dir ector-General's proposal that the Negotiating Group 
Chairs should continue their work should they deem necessary to do so.  His country regarded trade as 
one of the cornerstones of its development policie s, and Peru, with its open economy, was highly 
committed to the multilateral trading system.  Hi s delegation therefore stood ready to make a 
constructive contribution to the delicate process of reflection and consultations that the Director-
                                                      
1 Such statements are reproduced in  Annex I to the present records. WT/GC/M/131 
Page 4  
 
  General proposed to conduct, which Peru consid ered appropriate, if Members were to decide 
collectively on the way forward. 
7. The representative of China asked that the stat ement his country had made at the informal 
meeting of the TNC on 29 March 2011 be included in the present records.2 
8. The General Council took note of the Directo r-General's report and of the statements. 
2. Work Programme on Small Economies – Report by the Chairman of the Dedicated 
Session of the Committee on Trade and Development 
9. The Chairman said that in line with the frame work and procedures agreed by the General 
Council in 2002, the Work Programme on Small Economies was a standing item on the General 
Council's agenda, and the Committee on Trade and De velopment reported regularly to the Council on 
the progress of work in its Dedicated Sessions on th is subject.  He invited Mr Maruping (Lesotho), 
Chairman of the Dedicated Session of the CTD, to  report on the progress of work in this area. 
10. Mr Maruping (Lesotho), Chairman of the Dedicated Session of the CTD, welcomed the non-
resident Members and Observers attending the presen t meeting as part of Geneva Week.  Many of 
these were small, vulnerable economies and had a special interest in this agenda item.  Since the last 
report to the General Council in February, th e proponents of SVEs had continued to follow 
developments in all areas under negotiation in the Doha Round and in the regular WTO bodies.  The 
SVEs continued to actively follow developments as they related to the DDA overall, and were paying 
particular attention to those areas where they  sought flexibilities, mainly Agriculture, NAMA, 
Services, and Fisheries Subsidies.  During the past  two months, SVEs had also made new proposals in 
some of these Negotiating Groups.  In the Speci al Session of the Committee on Agriculture, for 
example, SVEs had made a proposal on 23 March on  "Flexibilities in the Agricultural Modalities on 
the Pillars of Domestic Support and Export Compe tition".  The proposal called for flexibilities for 
those SVEs which were not currently listed as Net Food-Importing Developing Countries.  A second 
proposal in the Special Session called for the speci al safeguard mechanism to apply to small and 
vulnerable economies.  Other proponents of this paper, which had been circulated as JOB/AG/17, 
included the ACP and the African Groups.  Anothe r area of the DDA where SVEs had been active 
was NAMA, where El Salvador on behalf of SV Es had submitted a document on S&D treatment and 
the technical assistance concerns in regard to Annex A of the NAMA text on Procedures for the 
Facilitation of Solutions to Non-Tariff Barriers. 
11. In the Negotiating Group on Rules, SVEs had submitted a revised proposal on 20 April 
concerning additional flexibilities for SVEs under Artic le III of the draft Chair's text on Fisheries 
Subsidies.  In the Committee on Trade and Environm ent in Special Session, SVEs had circulated on 
1 April a proposal on "Views of the Small an d Vulnerable Economies on the Negotiation of 
Paragraph 31 (iii) of the Doha Ministerial Declara tion".  The proposal concerned the reduction and/or 
elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental goods and services.  In their proposal, the 
SVEs maintained that the trade and environmen t negotiations should not adversely affect the 
flexibilities that had been agreed for SVEs in other negotiating areas of the DDA, such as NAMA and 
Agriculture.  In regard to the Services Council's Working Party on Domestic Regulation, the SVEs 
had tabled a room document at the end of March con cerning paragraph 42 of the Chairman's draft text 
on time extensions for applying certain disciplines.  The SVEs had been joined in this submission by 
Argentina, Brazil, China, Ecuador, India, Indonesi a, the Philippines, South Africa and Turkey.  As 
could be seen, the SVEs continued their pro-ac tive engagement, as evidenced by these recent 
proposals, and were taking relevant steps to defend th eir interests.  He was sure they would continue 
to keep abreast of all developm ents in the Doha negotiations. 
                                                      
2 The statement is reproduced in Annex II to the present records.  WT/GC/M/131 
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  12. The representative of Barbados, on behalf of  the SVEs, welcomed Mr Maruping in his 
capacity as the new Chair of the Dedicated Session of  the CTD, thanked him for his report, and said 
the SVEs looked forward to working closely with him in the coming year.  They also wished to 
express their appreciation for the leadership and dedication of the former CTD Chair during his term.  The SVEs had actively continued to pursue their trad e-related interests within the context of the Doha 
negotiations and on this basis, in the last few week s, had made a number of submissions in the areas 
of Agriculture, NAMA, Services, Trade and Environm ent and Fisheries Subsidies.  In Agriculture, 
they had made two submissions:  one in relation to flexibilities on th e pillars of domestic support and 
export competition for Net Food-Importing Developing Countries, and one rega rding application of 
the Special Safeguard Mechanism to SVEs, which had been co-sponsored by two other developing-
country groups.  Both communications identified c oncrete elements for effective S&D treatment for 
SVEs.  With respect to the NAMA negotiations, most  recently the SVEs had made a contribution to 
the discussions on the Horizontal Mechanism, mo re specifically regarding S&D treatment and 
technical assistance provisions.  In Services, the SVEs had collaborated with a number of other developing-country Members and had developed a speci fic proposal for transition periods in the area 
of domestic regulation.  The SVEs' submission in the Trade and Environment negotiations sought to 
provide some general views on the negotiations on Paragraph 31 (iii) of the Doha Declaration, and 
ensured that they would be effectively taken into c onsideration in future discussions in this area.  In 
Fisheries Subsides, the SVEs had provided some updated statistical information to their textual 
proposal for additional flexibilities for SVEs under Ar ticle III of the proposed draft Chair’s text on 
Fisheries Subsidies.  The underlying theme of th ese submissions sought to preserve and/or enhance 
flexibilities for SVEs in accordance wi th their special circumstances. 
13. In the area of Aid for Trade, the SVEs had b een participating very actively in the run-up to 
the Third Global Review.  As they had reported at the February Council, they were working on a 
proposal for an SVE Framework on Aid for Trade th at focused particularly on promoting effective 
mainstreaming of trade into national developmen t strategies.  While Members were collectively 
reflecting on the way forward for the Doha negotia tions, the SVEs urged that their concerns as 
articulated within the Doha framework, be consid ered against the larger backdrop of the Work 
Programme on Small Economies that had been manda ted to frame responses to the trade-related 
issues identified for the fuller integration of SVEs in to the multilateral trading system.  It was for this 
reason that for the SVEs, the Work Programme and the CTD in Dedicated Session continued to represent an important facilitating mechanism for th e discussion and advancement of issues critical to 
small economies and their role in the global trading system.  In this process the SVEs urged Members 
to remain mindful of them not only when special flexibilities were being negotiated, but that there be 
a general consciousness of the need for considera tion of how general modalitie s affected SVEs.  The 
SVEs looked forward to continuing their work with  Members in the Dedicated Session in the coming 
months. 
14. The General Council took note of the report of the Chairman of the Dedicated Session of the 
Committee on Trade and Development and of the statement. 
3. Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration – Report on meeting of March 2011 
(WT/BFA/123) 
15. The Chairman drew attention to the repor t of the Committee on Budget, Finance and 
Administration in document WT/BFA/123 and invite d Mr Vaaranmaa (Finland), Chairman of the 
Committee, to introduce the report. 
16. Mr Vaaranmaa (Finland), Chairman of  the Committee on Budget, Finance and 
Administration, said that at its meeting in Marc h 2011, the Committee had reviewed the budgetary 
and financial situation of the Secretariat for both  regular and extra-budgetary funds as of the end of 
February.  While the WTO budgetary performance had remained on schedule after two months, the WT/GC/M/131 
Page 6  
 
  funding situation of the DDA Global Trust Fund had started to be of some concern.  The Committee 
had then taken note of the progress made on the build ing project and the fact that it continued to 
remain within schedule and budget.  The construc tion of the South Courtyard Conference Centre and 
the North Courtyard Atrium had started, and these fa cilities should be operational by the end of 2011.  
The Committee had also been informed of upcoming changes and new construc tion related to parking 
facilities.  The Secretariat had updated the Committ ee on the situation and projects underway in the 
area of human resources.  The Committee had been informed of the result  of the annual salary 
adjustment methodology and the freezing of salaries for WTO staff in 2011.  The Committee had then examined the second annual report on diversity.  This  report provided an overview on the evolution of 
staff diversity since 1995.  Data were presented by  Member, gender, number of applications received 
and candidates interviewed.  The report pointed out  that the WTO remained committed to merit and 
diversity in its recruitment policy by, for example, participating in several events in 2010 that had 
raised awareness of career opportunities at the WT O.  Members had welcomed the report and the 
progress achieved.  The Secretariat had provided a report containing high-level information on the 
activity level of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism a nd also on the details of the related expenditure 
incurred by the Secretariat. 
17. The Committee had been informed  that the Republic of Burund i and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo had accepted payment schemes to liquidate their arrears over a period of 20 and 5 years, 
respectively.  In accordance with the decision of the General Council of 15 May 2006, the Committee 
recommended that the General Council suspend the a pplication of Administrative Measures for the 
Republic of Burundi, which had agreed to, and undertook to abide by, a schedule of instalment 
payments aimed at liquidating all arrears over a pe riod of 20 years, starting on 30 June 2011.  The 
Committee also recommended that the General Counc il suspend the application of Administrative 
Measures for the Democratic Republic of Congo, wh ich had agreed to, and undertook to abide by, a 
schedule of instalment payments aimed at liquidating all arrears over a period of five years, starting 
on 1 January 2011.  These payments had to be r eceived no later than 31 December of each year, 
failing which the Administrative Measures would be reinstated.  The Administrative Measures 
approved by the General Council provided that a Me mber was declared as an Inactive Member if 
more than three full years of assessed contributions remained outstanding at the end of the financial 
year.  These Measures also required that the list of Inactive Members be notified to the General 
Council by the Committee each year, with a recommendation that these Members be urged to liquidate their arrears.  The Committee theref ore recommended to the General Council that the 
following seven Members be urged to liquidate thei r arrears:  Chad, Djibouti, Dominica, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania and Sierra Leone.  Th e Secretariat had updated the Committee on its 
efforts to find solutions with respect to those Members.  The Committee had welcomed the progress 
achieved in reducing the number of Inactive Members from 18 to 7 in the past two years.  Finally, the 
Committee had welcomed the Executive Director of the ITC, who had notified the Committee of the 
request received from the UN Secretary General to submit a budget reduction of at least three per cent 
for the next biennium.  Members had expressed the need to respect the timing of the budgetary and 
consultative processes as provided in the administrative arrangement between the ITC's two parent organizations. 
18. The representative of China thanked the Chair of  the Budget Committee for his report.  China 
also wished to express its appreciation to the Secr etariat for its second annua l report on diversity in 
the Secretariat, which had been discussed at the meet ing.  His delegation noted that further efforts had 
been made by the Secretariat to improve its divers ity, which China believed was in the right direction, 
though with limited progress.  Having said that, as  the leading party of the joint proposal on the 
Diversification of the WTO Secretariat, China believed diversity still remained a serious systemic issue against the representativeness of developing-country  Members in the Secretariat.  Therefore, it 
encouraged more dynamic and targeted efforts by the Secretariat and looked forward to more tangible 
progress in the diversification of the Secretariat in the future.  WT/GC/M/131 
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  19. The representative of Korea said his delegation welcomed the second annual report on 
diversity and was pleased with the continuous progr ess made with respect to the diversity of Members 
represented in the Secretariat.  Korea shared the view  that diversification should be a priority for the 
WTO's recruitment policy.  Thus, it wished to reco mmend that the Secretariat continue its efforts to 
further improve the situation. 
20. The General Council took note of the statem ents, approved the Budget Committee's specific 
recommendations in paragraphs 33,  34 and 37 of its report in doc ument WT/BFA/123, and adopted 
the report. 
4. Waivers under Article IX of the WTO Agreement 
(a) Cape Verde – Implementation of Article VII of GATT 1994 and of the Agreement on 
Customs Valuation (G/C/W/646/Rev.1) – Draft decision 
21. The Chairman said this sub-item related to a draft waiver decision for Cape Verde on the 
implementation of Article VII of GATT 1994 and of  the Agreement on Customs Valuation.  This 
matter had been considered by the Council for Tr ade in Goods at its meetings in January and 
March 2011.  He invited Mr Seilenthal (Estonia), Chairman of the Council for Trade in Goods, to 
report on that Council's consideration of this matter. 
22. Mr Seilenthal (Estonia), Chairman of the Council for Trade in Goods, said that at its meeting 
on 21 March 2011, the Goods Counc il had approved the draft waiver decision in document 
G/C/W/646/Rev.1 which had been submitted by Cape  Verde.  The draft Decision followed up on a 
request by Cape Verde pursuant to Article IX:3 of  the Marrakesh Agreement, contained in document 
G/C/W/643, made at the Goods Council meeting on 31 January 2011, where it had been first 
addressed.  The draft decision waived, until 1 January  2012, the implementation by Cape Verde of the 
Customs Valuation Agreement and attached an updated Ac tion Plan in this regard.  It also contained a 
request that Cape Verde submit to the Committee on Customs Valuation, by 30 September 2011, an 
interim report on the progress in fulfilling its updated Action Plan and the status of the implementation of the Customs Valuation Agreement. 
23. The Chairman thanked Mr Seilenthal for his repor t and drew attention to the draft decision in 
document G/C/W/646/Rev.1.  He proposed that, in  accordance with the Decision-Making Procedures 
under Articles IX and XII of the WTO Agreement agreed in November 1995 (WT/L/93), the General 
Council adopt this draft decision. 
24. The General Council so agreed.3 
(b) European Union – Request for a waiver on a dditional autonomous trade preferences granted 
by the European Union to Pakistan (G/C/W/640)  – Statement by the Chairman of the Council 
for Trade in Goods 
25. The Chairman said this sub-item related to a re quest in document G/C/W/640 for a waiver by 
the European Union on additional autonomous trade preferences to Pakistan.  He understood that the 
Council for Trade in Goods had considered this request  at its last three meetings.  In accordance with 
Article IX:3 of the Marrakesh Agreement, Mr Seile nthal, Chairman of the Goods Council, wished to 
make a statement on that Council's consideration of this matter. 
26. Mr Seilenthal (Estonia), Chairman of the Council for Trade in Goods, said that at the meeting 
of the Goods Council on 30 November 2010, the Europ ean Union, pursuant to Article IX:3 of the 
                                                      
3 The Decision was subsequently circulate as document WT/L/812. WT/GC/M/131 
Page 8  
 
  Marrakesh Agreement, had introduced document G/ C/W/640 requesting a waiver of its obligations 
under paragraph 1 of Article I and under Article XIII of the GATT 1994 to the extent necessary to 
permit the European Union to afford duty-free or ot her preferential tariff treatment to certain products 
originating in Pakistan, without being required to extend the same treatment to like products of any 
other Member.  At that meeting some delegations, while highlighting the importance of the initiative, 
also indicated they had concerns regarding the po ssible collateral systemic and commercial effects of 
the EU proposal on their economies.  In this regard  they expressed their willingness to consult further 
on the issue with the EU.  At the Goods Council meeting in January 2011, the EU had informed 
Members that it had started a consultation process w ith delegations who had raised concerns, and at 
the 21 March 2011 meeting, the EU had indicated th at the consultation process was still underway and 
that it would inform the Goods Council of the outcome  of these consultations at the next meeting.  
This meant that the Goods Council had not yet comp leted its consideration of the waiver request 
within the 90 days stipulated in Article IX:3.  Therefore, the Goods Council requested the General 
Council to agree to allow it to continue considerati on of the EU waiver request and to report back to 
the General Council once it had completed this work. 
27. The representative of the European Union tha nked the Goods Council Chair for his report.  
The proposed waiver request had been discu ssed in the Goods Council in November 2010, on 
31 January 2011 and on 21 March 2011 without a conclusion.  As stated by the Goods Council Chair, 
more time was needed in order to reach a con sensus on this proposal.  Since the Goods Council 
meeting on 21 March, the EU had held extensive consultations with Members who had expressed 
both systemic and/or economic concerns on the impact  of the waiver.  During these constructive talks, 
the EU had managed to ease some of the concerns.  It intended to continue  these consultations over 
the next few weeks.  However, it was clear that di scussions on this issue could not continue for much 
longer, in view of the objective of providing relief to  the Pakistani economy.  Therefore, the EU again 
encouraged those Members who still had concerns to c ontinue to work with it with a view to rapidly 
finding a way forward that would allow for a consensus decision in support of the waiver. 
28. The representative of Pakistan expressed his delegation's appreciation for the EU's initiative 
to provide further market access to Pakistan by seeking the waiver in question.  Recognizing that 
Pakistan was facing an unprecedented calamity which had affected over 20 million people and 160,000 square kilometers of Pakistan's territory , a large number of Members including developed 
countries, the ACP Group, the African Group and LDCs had supported this initiative when the request 
for a waiver had been first discussed on 30 November 2010.  This great deal of solidarity had 
established that this organization had a human face .  Pakistan had always been committed to the 
multilateral rule-based trading regime, as one of the founding contracting parties of GATT and a 
founding Member of the WTO.  The Marrakesh Ag reement contained a window through which to 
seek help in exceptional circumstances to keep the economy of a country on track.  The EU had 
attempted to use that opportunity.  Given what Pakistan had undergone, timely assistance was the key 
to start rebuilding.  Pakistan acknowledged that  a few Members had specific trade and systemic 
concerns and remained engaged with the EU.  It  hoped that these ongoing consultations would be 
concluded positively before the ne xt meeting of the Goods Council to  be convened later in May.  
Once again, his delegation appreciated and acknow ledged the membership for supporting the EU's 
waiver request. 
29. The representative of China said th at as all knew, Pakistan had suffered devastating floods in 
the summer of 2010 which had led to millions of peopl e being in urgent need of aid.  Humanitarian 
aid was of course the primary instrument in this kind of emergency, but cr afting a long-term strategy 
to help the economy get back on track was even more important.  The EU's measure would help 
Pakistan to recover from this emergency and to  progress towards future development, and China 
supported the early adoption of this waiver.  WT/GC/M/131 
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  30. The Chairman proposed that in the light of the Goods Council Chair's statement and the 
request by the Goods Council, the General Counc il agree to allow the Goods Council to continue 
consideration of the request from the European Un ion and to report back to the General Council once 
it had completed this work.  He also proposed that  the General Council take note of the statements. 
31. The General Council so agreed. 
5. WTO Pension Plan Management Board – Election of Chairman, Members and 
Alternates – Proposal by the Chairman of the General Council (WT/GC/W/632) 
32. The Chairman recalled that Article 4(a) of the Regulations of the WTO Pension Plan 
provided, inter alia,  for the election by the General Council of a Chairman, four members and four 
alternates to the Management Board of the WTO Pe nsion Plan, each for a three-year term.  The term 
of office of the current membership of the Management Board would expire on 7 May.  Following 
consultations on this matter, he had circulated  document WT/GC/W/632, in which he had proposed 
the names of representatives who had kindly agreed to  have their names put forward for election as 
chairman, members and alternates.  He had invite d delegations to submit any comments they might 
have regarding the proposed nominations by close- of-business on 29 April.  He had not received any 
comments regarding the proposed nominations, and ther efore proposed that the General Council agree 
to the election of the candidates whose names were li sted in that document, to serve in these positions 
on the Pension Plan Management Board for a three-year term. 
33. The General Council so agreed.4 
34. The Chairman, on behalf of the General C ouncil, thanked the candidates who had kindly 
agreed to serve on the Pension Plan Management Board. 
6. Accession of Vanuatu – Statement by the Chairman 
35. The Chairman, speaking under "O ther Business," said the Counc il had the honour of having 
Vanuatu's Minister of Trade, Industry and Tourism, H.E. Sela Molisa, Minister of Trade, Commerce, 
Industry and Tourism of Vanuatu, present at the meeting.  As Members were no doubt aware, 
Vanuatu had now effectively reached the end of its WTO accession process.  The previous day, a 
meeting of the re-convened Working Party on the Accession of Vanuatu had taken place, chaired by 
Deputy Director-General Jara on his behalf.  He understood that the Working Party had now 
successfully completed its work on an ad referendum  basis.  He invited DDG Jara to report on this to 
the General Council. 
36. Deputy Director-General Jara, Chairman of th e Working Party on the Accession of Vanuatu, 
said that at the formal meeting of the re-convene d Working Party the previous day, Members had 
adopted the draft accession package of Vanuatu ad referendum.  It had been agreed that the package 
would be circulated to all Members, which had been done in WT/ACC/VUT/16 and Adds 1 and 2.  
As also agreed, Members had a week from th e date of issue of the package agreed ad referendum  to 
submit any further comments they might have.  At the end of one week, barring any new outstanding 
issues, the General Council would be in a position to  approve the package.  He recalled that in 
October 2001, a draft accession package for Vanuatu  had been adopted by the Working Party.  
However, Vanuatu had requested more time to consid er the package.  In 2008, the Government of 
Vanuatu had addressed a letter to the Director-Gen eral in which it had signalled its interest in 
resuming and concluding its accession process and had requested the update of its 2001 accession 
package.  Under the authority of  the then Chairman of the Gene ral Council, the Secretariat had 
embarked on the technical update of the 2001 accession package to take into account new 
                                                      
4 The Decision was subsequently circulated in document WT/L/813. WT/GC/M/131 
Page 10  
 
  developments, including legislative reforms, and to reflect technical modifications to the draft goods 
and services schedules.  Members had been regularly consulted and advised as the process of the technical update evolved.  The technical update of the 2001 Draft Accession Package took account of 
the passage of time and brought greater precision to the draft report of the Working Party.  The re-convened Working Party on the Accession of Vanuat u had accomplished its task successfully.  He 
wished to pay homage to the dele gation headed by H.E. Sela Molisa and his team, who had remained 
fully committed to pursuing the accession process, pe rsevering in the updating exercise, and putting 
into place WTO-consistent legislation, in particular  during the past few months.  A lot of hard work 
had been done.  He also wished to thank Me mbers for their engagement, goodwill, and spirit of 
compromise, which had enabled this accession process to be brought to a successful completion.  This 
was a tribute to both the multilateral trading system  and the Government of Vanuatu.  At the re-
convened Working Party meeting the previous day,  Members had underlined and welcomed the fact 
that the conclusion of Vanuatu's accession process w as a deliverable for the Fourth UN Conference on 
LDCs to be held in Istanbul in a few days' time. 
37. The Chairman said that since the Worki ng Party had completed its work on an ad referendum 
basis only the previous day, it had not been possibl e to include this item on the agenda of the present 
meeting in line with the Council's Rules of Proce dure.  He intended to convene a meeting of the 
General Council in the near future to formally adopt the accession package and to welcome Vanuatu 
as the 154th Member of the WTO. 
38. The representative of Vanuatu, sp eaking as an observer, said this was an historic moment for 
the Government and People of Vanuatu and, he hoped, for the WTO as well.  The previous day 
Members had agreed on Vanuatu's accession package ad referendum .  The Government of Vanuatu 
thanked DDG Jara for his leadership and management of the process.  On behalf of the Right Honourable Serge Vohor, Prime Minister of Vanua tu, the Government of Vanuatu expressed its 
sincere appreciation to all Members for the deci sion in favour of Vanuatu's WTO accession.  It 
thanked Members for opening the doors of WTO membership.  His Government wished to place on 
record its sincere and special appreciation to the Governments of Australia, the European Union, New 
Zealand and the United States for their concrete technical assistance and policy advice since 2008.  
This was the period when Vanuatu had worked ac tively with the Secretariat to update the 2001 
accession package.  The Government of Vanuatu was grateful for the consistently principled position 
of the LDCs in the Informal Group on Accessions and in the General Council, which called attention 
to and insisted on the observance of the 2002 Gu idelines on the accession of LDCs.  The Prime 
Minister had specifically asked him to convey Vanuatu 's special appreciation to  the Director-General 
for his strong support for bringing Vanuatu to this  final stage of its accession and for his long-term 
vision for a rules-based multilateral trading system  that took account of and was sensitive to the 
priorities and concerns of LDCs like Vanuatu. 
39. The background to Vanuatu's accession was a story now well known in the trade policy 
community.  The Working Party on the Accession of  Vanuatu had been esta blished in 1995 and had 
concluded its work in October 2001.  Vanuatu was a democracy.  It had needed time to evaluate the 
package, build domestic ownership and enact the ne cessary reforms through its parliamentary process.  
This had taken 16 years but this had been Vanua tu's own choice.  In November 2008, Vanuatu had 
requested the Director-General to resume the proce ss.  It had sought the assistance of the Secretariat 
to undertake the technical update of its 2001 accession package.  This process had been concluded.  
As a Government and people, Vanuatu knew that  it had offered a quality accession package to the 
WTO.  Regardless of Vanuatu's LDC status, this  package was as high-quality as any Government 
could offer.  Vanuatu had undertaken these comm itments and offered this package because trade 
opening, properly sequenced, within the framework of the rules-based multilateral trading system, 
provided a necessary condition and an impetus for m odernization, integrati on into the global economy 
and rapid growth.  Because Vanuatu was an LDC and was vulnerable to pressures, it had made a 
conscious and rational choice in fa vour of "open protection" under rules-based multilateralism.  This  WT/GC/M/131 
 Page 11 
 
 
  had been a rational choice.  Vanuatu had carefully  examined the Director-General's 2010 Report on 
Accessions.  All Members who had acceded via the Marrakesh Agreement Article XII negotiations had grown faster and performed much better than most .  Rules-based trade reforms were an engine for 
growth.  Vanuatu had taken these decisions and implemented these domestic reforms because it believed that it was good for Vanuatu and good fo r the WTO.  It was a win-win situation. 
40. Even beyond the WTO negotiations and the commitments it had made, Vanuatu had gone 
further.  For example, within the framework of  the OECD Tax Informati on Exchange Agreement, 
Vanuatu had concluded agreements with 10 Governments, which included some Members.  Vanuatu 
had done so for transparency reasons, to fight corruption and combat money laundering.  It had acted in good faith and with good will, fully conscious of the decisions it had taken.  Many of its WTO 
commitments since 2001 had already been implemente d.  His delegation also pledged that Vanuatu 
stood by and would implement all the concessions it ha d undertaken.  It had already established a date 
for the parliamentary ratification of its accession p ackage in June.  His delegation was deeply pleased 
by the position Members had expressed in the re -convened Working Party the previous day that 
Vanuatu's accession was considered as a positive deliv erable for the Fourth UN Conference on LDCs, 
and particularly wished to thank Turkey for its  strong support.  Vanuatu looked forward to the 
meeting of the General Council in the near future , when its accession package would be approved by 
Members. 
41. The Chairman recalled that the Council would meet again in the near future to formally adopt 
Vanuatu's accession package, and dele gations would have an opportunity then to make statements of 
welcome to the new Member. 
42. The General Council took note of the statements. 
7. Eighth Ministerial Conference – Statement by the Chairman 
43. The Chairman, speaking under "Other Business, " recalled that at the February Council 
meeting, his predecessor had reported on the consulta tions he had undertaken on the Eighth Session of 
the Ministerial Conference, which would take place in Geneva on 15-17 December 2011.  The 
consultations had shown convergence on the following points.  First, in the preparations as well as at 
the Conference itself, the "FIT" principle – Full participation, Inclusiveness, and Transparency – 
which had been successfully applied at the previ ous Ministerial Conference in 2009, would continue 
to guide Members.  Second, in keeping with the FIT principle, MC8 should be centred around Plenary 
Sessions in which all Ministers could participate e qually.  Third, like the previous Ministerial 
Conference, MC8 would need to be a lean and economical event, in view of the budgetary and 
physical space constraints.  He, as the new Gene ral Council Chair, would continue these consultations 
with Members, as announced by his predecessor, in or der to develop the more detailed parameters of 
MC8.  It was his intention to begin consultations  with Members on both the practical aspects of the 
Conference and its substantive agenda, starting in the next few days.  In keeping with usual practice, 
he would be meeting with delega tions in a variety of formats – individual delegations, Group 
coordinators, small groups and la rger groups – and his door was, of course, always open to any 
Member who wished to meet with him.  He woul d report back to the full membership on the progress 
of his consultations as appropriate. 
44. The General Council took note of the statement. 
8. Chairmanship of the Working Party on the Accession of the Bahamas – Statement by 
the Chairman 
45. The Chairman, speaking under "Other Business," said he wished to inform Members that, 
following consultations with Members of the Worki ng Party and the authorities of the Bahamas, and WT/GC/M/131 
Page 12  
 
  in keeping with usual WTO practice, it had been  agreed that Mr Wayne McCook (Jamaica) would 
serve as Chairman of this Working Party, replaci ng Mr Peter Black who had left Geneva and was no 
longer available to serve in this capacity.  On be half of the General Council, he wished to thank 
Mr Black for having served as Chairman of this Working Party. 
46. The General Council took note of the statement. 
9. Administrative Measures for Members in  arrears – Statement by the Chairman 
47. The Chairman, speaking under "Other Business," re called that at its meeting in May 2006, the 
General Council had approved a recommendati on from the Committee on Budget, Finance and 
Administration regarding revised Administrative Measures for Members in arrears.  Among these 
Administrative Measures was a requirement that at each meeting of the General Council, the 
Chairman of the Committee on Budget, Finance a nd Administration should provide information with 
regard to which Members were under Administra tive Measures in Categories II through IV.  He 
invited Mr Vaaranmaa (Finland), Chairman of th e Budget Committee, to provide the Council with 
this information. 
48. Mr Vaaranmaa (Finland), Chairman of  the Committee on Budget, Finance and 
Administration, said that as required by the deci sion of the General Council, he would list the 
Members under Categories II through IV of the Admi nistrative Measures as at 2 May 2011.  There 
were five Members in Category II:  Benin, Camero on, Mali, Nicaragua and Venezuela.  There were 
two Members in Category III:  Saint Kitts and Nevi s, and Uganda.  There were seven Members in 
Category IV:  Chad, Djibouti, Dominica, Guinea,  Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania and Sierra Leone. 
49. The Chairman said that under the revised Admi nistrative Measures, he was also required at 
each Council meeting to request those Members in Ca tegories III and IV of the Measures to inform 
him before the next meeting of the General Council,  as to when their payment of arrears might be 
expected.   
50. The General Council took note of the statements. 
  WT/GC/M/131 
 Page 13 
 
 
  ANNEX I 
Statements by delegations at the informal meeting  
of the Trade Negotiations Committee 
on 29 April 2011 
 
 
 At their request, the statements made by a number of delegations at the above-mentioned meeting are included below as part of th e Minutes of the General Council meeting. 
  1. Argentina  
 
 We would like to begin by endorsing the statem ents by Australia for the Cairns Group, Brazil 
for the G-20 and the Dominican Republic for th e Informal Group of Developing Countries.  We 
would also like to thank the TNC Chair and the Ne gotiating Group Chairs for all your efforts over the 
past few months.  We would like to share our pre liminary views on the current situation and on the 
steps to be taken, which is indeed the whole pur pose of this meeting.  In December 2010, we set 
ourselves the objective of intensifying our negotiating efforts at small-group level, for example in the 
G-11, and at bilateral level and ne gotiating-group level, with a view  to concluding the Doha Round in 
2011.  In accordance with the agreed procedure, we  also set out to develop consolidated texts by 
Easter.  This second objective has been achieved – we have texts that show the state of play in all 
areas of the negotiations.  However, it should be note d that much work remains to be done.  Gaps 
remain in all areas and need to be filled.  On this  occasion, we would like to refer specifically to the 
text presented by the Chairman of the TRIPS Counc il, without prejudice to the comments we hope to 
make on other texts in the near future.  First, we  endorse the statement by Chile for the Joint Proposal 
Group.  In his report, the Chairman of the TRI PS Council has not respected the negotiating mandates 
and, unlike Switzerland, which feels it is unreasonabl e to maintain an "out-dated" mandate, Argentina 
considers this to be a matter of serious concern that  will complicate the negotiations in the future.  We 
therefore disagree with the Chairman of the TRI PS Council and do not consider the draft composite 
text to be a suitable basis for further work.  A ccording to Switzerland's co mments, it would appear 
that Argentina is, in effect, being completely un reasonable by wanting to comply with the Doha 
mandate, including in relation to TRIPS.  The curre nt situation, described in the cover note to the 
compilation of documents, has put us in the position of having to determine what our options are for 
moving forward in view of the 2011 deadline.  This re quires careful reflection, not only at the political 
level but also at the technical level, on what can be  done in all market-access areas in order to meet 
the proposed objective for this stage, which is to  resolve outstanding issues in NAMA, Agriculture 
and Services.  From your assessment, which we share, it is clear that at present, the resolution of these 
issues is an insuperable stumbling block, especially considering the time left before the end of the 
year.  
The question therefore is how to proceed.  What are the next steps?  Abandoning the Round is 
clearly not an option for anyone here.  As far as we  know, not one delegation has received instructions 
to abandon the Doha Roun d, and most certainly not Argentina.   Continuing the Round is essential if 
we are to conclude the objective that we set oursel ves in 2001, but the question is "how?".  We agree 
that the "business as usual" option, mentioned by some , is not plausible.   Starting from scratch is not 
acceptable either.  If we do not first conclude what we started, nothing will be achieved.   Sitting back 
and waiting for "auspicious signs" s hould also be counted out.  For a system to survive, appropriate 
adjustments must be made to enable it to ad apt to ever-changing circumstances.  The multilateral 
trading system is no exception.   We know that there is political will to conclude the Doha Round 
successfully.  What can be done to ensure that we move forward and meet the 2011 deadline?  We 
urgently need to adopt a realistic approach and, firs t of all, consider if there is any course of action 
that would enable us to achieve results in certa in areas during the course of this year, so as to WT/GC/M/131 
Page 14  
 
  consolidate the overall value of the Round.  In short, we understand that we need to focus 
immediately on the areas in which progress could be made between now and the end of the year.  The 
2011 deadline is drawing inexorably closer and must not  find us empty-handed.   At the same time we 
need to think carefully ab out how to resolve the issue of market access in all areas.  Argentina stands 
ready to contribute to this collective reflective dialogue and to search for ways to overcome the 
difficult situation we are currently facing. 
 
2. Australia for the Cairns Group 
 
Having listened carefully to your statement, we  in the Cairns Group would take issue with 
any suggestion that Agriculture might have overloa ded the Doha agenda.  Agriculture is the key 
reason the Round was started – the unfinished business of the Uruguay Round.  It was and remains the 
largest sector affected by trade distortions, with th e most far-reaching consequences for development.  
The Cairns Group has therefore continued to work  tirelessly to secure an ambitious and balanced 
Doha outcome in Agriculture, recognising that developm ent is central to the Round and that reform of 
the agricultural trading system would deliver signifi cant benefits to low-income farmers in developing 
and least-developed countries.  We would wish to register our appreciation for your efforts, Director-General, and those of the Agriculture Chair in taking these negotiations forward over the past two 
years.  We agree with your assessme nt that the current situation is "grave for the Round and for all of 
the efforts and aspirations it embodies."  It is particul arly unfortunate that in Agriculture – one of the 
central drivers of these negotiations – the Chair's report clearly shows only limited progress has been 
made over the past two years.  We are deeply con cerned about the current state-of-play of the Doha 
Round.  It is clear that substan tial gaps in positions on key outstan ding issues remain, and this places 
real doubts on our ability to conclude the Round this year.  The Cairns Group is not prepared to accept 
this scenario lightly – there is simply too much at stake in respect of the multilateral trading system 
and the importance of trade as an engine for economic growth and development.  We agree that in the 
coming weeks, all Members need to think careful ly about how we approach this most serious 
situation, in order to find a way to break throu gh the deadlock.  The Cairns Group will continue to 
work closely with all Members in our efforts to do  so.  However, one thing is clear – a constructive 
contribution to get the Round done is needed from all Members. 
 
3. Australia  
 
We would first like to thank the TNC Chair, along with all the Chairs of the Negotiating 
Groups and indeed all delegations for all the hard wo rk that is reflected in the documents issued the 
past week.  We agree with your assessment that th e documents tell us not only how much has been 
done in the Round, but also makes clear that ther e are some significant gaps and no obvious means to 
bridge them.  From Australia’s point of view, we cons ider this to be a very serious situation.  Clearly 
we need to take some time now to reflect on how to deal with the fact that negotiations are blocked.  
We need to consider our next steps carefully and wi th a clear view of what is at stake for the Doha 
Round and for the multilateral trading system more generally.  We cannot continue with business as 
usual.  However,  nor are we prepared to accept failu re.  From Australia’s perspective, this means we 
need to focus our attention on how to conclude the Round.  This is not Australia’s assessment alone.  
On 15 April, Ministers from 13 Members signed an open letter, circulated as a TNC document to all 
Members.  The signatories represent a group of Memb ers at varied stages of development and from 
different regions of the globe, but united in a determination for the Round to be brought to a 
successful conclusion.  I will not read out the lette r in its entirety – but let me summarise its key 
messages.  Our Ministers want to ensure that every effort is made to conclude the Round.  They 
believe that a deal is achievable and worth fighting for and has a significant contribution to make to 
development and to the long-term health of the multilateral trading system upon which we all so 
heavily rely.  The documents we now have before us  reflect ten years of hard work.  We need to 
discuss how the points of agreement from this work ca n be captured, making sure that in doing so we 
safeguard the global rules-based trading system and deliver a credible development dividend.  We are  WT/GC/M/131 
 Page 15 
 
 
  willing to look closely at all ideas aimed at bridgi ng the gaps.  The EU has suggested possible new 
approaches to address NAMA, and we will be happy to explore these ideas further in coming days.  
Solutions will also be needed across the range of  areas, not least Agriculture and Services.  The 
seriousness of the situation also requires political involvement and guidance.  There will be a number 
of opportunities for Ministerial engagement in the coming weeks to inject political input on how to 
move forward.  Trade Ministers will be meeting to discuss Doha in APEC on 19-20 May and in the 
margins of the OECD MCM on 26 May.  We look fo rward to working with delegations to work 
through the impasse at which we now find ourselves. 
 
4. Bangladesh for the LDC Group 
 
 I thank you for your frank assessment.  You have given us a realistic picture.  You have also 
identified the stumbling blocks.  The challenge confronting us today is how to get around these 
obstacles and pave the way forward.  I humbly refuse to  believe that we are at our wits end.  Over the 
last ten years, time and again we have proved that  we are capable of bridging our differences in a 
creative and constructive manner.  The current stalem ate is a reality, but not an ultimate one.  We 
believe that it is a transitory phase that can be ove rcome with our collective efforts and perseverance.  
We do not subscribe to any scepticism about the future  of the Doha Round, nor can we afford to do 
so.  After all, the DDA is the first round of trade talk s in the past 70 years with development content at 
its core.  Furthermore, the DDA was agreed to co rrect the imbalances of the Uruguay Round.  We 
draw strength from our unequivocal commitment to the aims of the Round, which is shared across the 
board.  This is our biggest asset that we must con tinue to nurture and build on.  The Easter Package 
reflects the current state of play.  It outlines the contours and substance of the Doha package in its 
entirety.  It also reveals the fault-lines of the negotia tions which were not quite visible to many of us.  
We believe that there is a desire to remain e ngaged and not to shy away from the responsibility to 
address the remaining gaps.  We now perhaps need  a carefully calibrated work programme with 
parallel tracks of variable pace to sustain the moment um of our work.  We need to consolidate issues 
where there is broad convergence of views.  At th e same time, we need to give time to create a 
sufficient comfort level for issues that still remain  intractable.  For the LDC Group, the journey from 
Doha has not been an easy one.  We have waite d a long time now for specific deliverables from the 
Round.  Meanwhile, we fell victim to multiple crises that were not of our own making.  They weighed 
down on our fight against poverty, rolled back year s of our development gains and aggravated our 
structural weaknesses.  We pinned our hopes on the successful conclusion of the Doha Round to tide 
us over from these losses.  The way forward must factor in these realities.  There exists broad 
convergence on LDC-specific issues.  With sufficien t political will, these could be developed into an 
early harvest and early implementation.  That woul d be very much in line with the specific Doha 
mandate.  This would also lend credibility to th e multilateral trading system and create a positive 
environment for concluding the Doha Round in a prog ressive manner.  In ten days the international 
community will meet in Istanbul for the Fourth UN Conference on LDCs.  It will be an opportunity for Members to reaffirm and demonstrate their co mmitment to the 880 million of the world’s most 
vulnerable population in 48 LDCs.  Turning back the clock on them will undermine the multilateral 
trading system, which we can ill afford  in a turbulent world.  To remain on the right side of history, 
we must re-engage around the negotiating table with  renewed vigour and dete rmination to deliver on 
our mandated task. The LDC Group remains committed to this end. 
 
5. Barbados for the SVEs 
 
I would like to thank you for your report this morning as well as for the unstinting efforts that 
you have made in advancing the D oha negotiations.  We would also like to thank all the Negotiating 
Group Chairs for their hard work in producing the re ports and text documents circulated on 21 April.  
We would agree with your assessm ent outlined in the cover note, that these impressive documents 
represent a realistic picture of the Doha package before  us.  It is such realism that places us in a most 
sobering situation today, requiring us  to make careful and hard decisions that will direct our future WT/GC/M/131 
Page 16  
 
  path.  Our main guidepost on the road thus far tr avelled has been the focus on development and its 
intended centrality to the Doha outcome, that  would facilitate the promotion of economic 
development and contribute to the alleviation of poverty.  Like all delega tions, SVE proponents have 
dedicated significant resources and energy to th is process.  Having very limited financial, 
administrative and human resources to begin with, the co st of participation alone has been substantial.  
Nevertheless, our delegations have worked tirelessl y, and continue to be  active and constructive 
across the negotiating spectrum, to advance our interest s and contribute to the balance of interest of all 
Members.  Working to secure development for our c ounties is more than a mandate.  It is a reality-
based imperative from which we do not have the luxur y to deviate.  Our delegations have therefore 
supported a rapid, balanced and successful conclusion to the Doha Round according to our mandate, 
as we see international trade and our participation in the multilateral trading system as fundamental 
components leading to this objective.  We would not wish to see the products of ten solid years of effort overlooked or side-lined.  Nor is it feasible to start over again, since the same issues will need to 
be tackled, as the Chair had pointed out.  We believe that we still have the opportunity to continue the 
work in this Round and to ensure that it is haile d as a development Round.  This will do much to lift 
the profile of the WTO and at the same time achi eve important gains for LD Cs and SVEs for whom 
waiting has a cost. 
 We therefore remain committed to the fulfilmen t of a development-centred outcome.  While 
this latter component remains our primary point of reference, our framework going forward must also 
take into account the changed reality of the glob al circumstances since the launch of the Round in 
2001.  Moreover, in the aftermath of what many cons ider to be the worst financial crisis since the 
1930s, it may well be that the development gains fr om this Round are all the more compelling and 
urgent, though in changed circumstances, more diffi cult to achieve.  Let me also remind Members that 
a considerable portion of the Work Programme on Small Economies agreed at Doha in 2001, includes 
the Doha negotiating agenda.  It is therefore critical for us that the progress made for SVEs in the 
various negotiating groups, and captured in the cu rrent documents, is preser ved and built upon.  
Notwithstanding this, in some other areas of the negotia tions our interests still need to be taken into 
account.  We believe that there are still a number of  areas on which agreement can be reached, and we 
may wish to consider targeting those areas in order to achieve a positive outcome.  While our 
substantial contribution to world trade remains mini mal, the contribution of trade to our development 
on the other hand, is too critical for us to be an ything but a part of a strong multilateral rules-based 
system that is responsive to our particular needs.  We therefore pledge our continued support to the 
collective efforts required to determine the way fo rward for the Doha negotiations, that will respond 
to our developmental objectives.  In this sense, we  do not believe it is feas ible at this point to 
disregard the substantive progress made to date, and we therefore need to craft collectively creative 
options to move the process forward, which will gu ide our future work in the various negotiating 
groups.  In this sense, it is important that out of  this meeting, we help to develop a process to 
determine the way forward, and one that underscores th e need to meet as freque ntly as needed in this 
format, through an open and frank dialogue among Members, and one that is also open to new 
approaches.  Trade negotiations will always be an on going activity.  We must not allow a message to 
go out that the end of the Round is the end of the WTO's work.  It is an ongoing activity and the idea of completion is not an appropriate way to view th e role of the WTO.  Its goals are long-term, and 
while world trade continues to take centre stag e, its work will be co nstant and continuous. 
 
6. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela  
 
 We would like to thank the Director Genera l for his report on the current status of the 
negotiations, as well as the Chairs of the Negotiating Groups for the documents they have circulated.  
We are also grateful to Brazil, Indonesia and th e Dominican Republic for their statements for the 
G-20, the G-33, and the Informal Group of Devel oping Countries, respectively.  We agree with you 
that this is a good opportunity to see where we st and politically and to gauge the impact of this 
deadlock in the WTO and in the Doha Round.  It is  essential that we engage in dialogue and that we  WT/GC/M/131 
 Page 17 
 
 
  discuss and reflect, as you said, in a constructive spirit, so that we can find ways to move forward.  It 
has been almost a year since we have spoken in any of the TN C meetings.  We ha ve attended them, 
and taken note of everything that has happened.  We remember the frustration and discouragement 
caused by the failure in 2009, and the general optim ism that followed the proposals for a "cocktail" 
approach in March 2010.  For our part, we were not carried away with optimism.  We know how 
difficult it is for this Round to produce a fair and ba lanced agreement – the ch allenges are enormous.  
The dynamics of international agreements are ex tremely complex.  A negotiator of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, speaking of the complexity of that document, described his mission as trying to blend Confucius and St Thomas.  However,  although the problems we have may be complex, 
these are also difficult times.  All of us here know that we progress in cycles of fat years and lean 
years.  Today, we are faced with many ch allenges and many problems  – political fragility, 
institutional weaknesses, economic crisis, high unemplo yment, exchange rate instability, debt crisis, 
banking crisis, social unrest and political unrest.  Do such times of great trouble lend themselves to a Round?  Some believe that they do, precisely becau se big problems call for big solutions.  I must 
confess I do not have the answer myself.  What I ha ve is doubts.  I am filled with doubt.  The hard 
times, the same old procedure and its repeated fa ilures, the same process under different names, and 
the same priorities – all this led us to be sceptical a nd for a year we preferred to remain silent and to 
hope.  
Now we have decided to speak with a view to contributing, finding solutions and issuing 
warnings.  We need to reflect on what has been ha ppened.  We can have straightforward and sincere 
discussions aimed at correcting the situation, or we can gloss things over and change very little, go on 
doing the same, altering things that would lead back to  the same result.  In th e words of the Count of 
Lampedusa, now that Lampedusa has become fashi onable in connection with the events in North 
Africa, "things will have to change to remain the sa me".  I have no intention of pinning the blame for 
the failure on anyone in particular, and I think it w ould be a mistake for us to play the blame game.  
All of us are responsible, all of the Members, and th e Secretariat as well, while we are at it.  We all 
know that when we tried to pin the blame on the em erging countries in 2008, it was a disaster.  Nor do 
I wish to focus this brief statement on substantive matters.  They have been addressed by a number of 
colleagues.  But I am concerned by the procedural aspect, and we do want to discuss the failure of the 
cocktail approach.  So, reverting to your histori cal review, I would like to comment on the rise and 
fall of this procedure.  The co cktail approach was first presen ted in March 2010 as a mechanism to 
move the Round forward.  The pessimism, discourag ement and frustration caused by the failure in 
2009 were left behind.  In June, after a few mee tings, came the Toronto Su mmit in Canada, and the 
heads of government were asked to empower our Ministers and prepare our parliaments to give 
substance to the Doha Round.  The priority was to try to deal with a WTO problem through organizations other than the WTO.  A strategy that should have been complementary became the 
primary strategy, and the Round started working in wards rather than outwards.  As the French 
Minister of Cooperation said during a recent visit to Geneva, "the solution of the Round does not lie 
with the G20, it lies with the WTO".  In other words,  the decisions had to be made in Geneva, and not 
at the summits.  Geneva worked intensively, and the G20 in Seoul, the APEC in Japan and the latest 
Davos Forum fuelled overblown expectations.  I woul d like to recall that a number of voices here did 
question this strategy, stressing that, with due resp ect for those involved, the mandate was not in the 
hands of the G20, APEC or Davos – it was in the hands of the G-153 meeting in Geneva.  What could 
not be achieved within was being sought beyond the confines of the WTO through the media.  In this wave of disproportionate optimism, we went as far as to enlist supers tition as our ally, with references 
to the Year of the Rabbit in the Chinese horoscope .  And that was not all – the whole process was 
accompanied, or dressed up, or garnished with phrases that fuelled the ambient optimism:  "we have 
received a pressing appeal", "we have just been mand ated to conclude the Round", "there is renewed 
confidence in the WTO", and when the optimism re ached its apex, we even heard "we are awaiting 
authorization to conclude the Round", "we are in the final phase of the Round", "we are going to force 
the pace".  The list of such phrases is long, and I do not intend to mention them all, but there were a 
few dramatic ones like "this is the last chance," a phrase that we heard all over the place. WT/GC/M/131 
Page 18  
 
   
In fact, there is no such thing as the last chance.  It is worth recalling the TNC of 
3 November 2010.  It was all about "optimism, eup horia and timetables".  In spite of the warnings 
against forcing dates, a timetable was drawn up.  Some delegates took the floor to question this 
timetable strategy, but such was the euphoria that what remains foremost in my mind is the statement 
by a distinguished friend that at the Seventh Mini sterial Conference in December 2010 we were going 
"to hammer out the final deal", and yet an Ambassa dor from a developed country subtly remarked that 
"the window could be narrow".  This was a forewarn ing of what eventually became public at the TNC 
of 29 March this year, which was recent enough for us all to remember.  Since that TNC of 29 March, 
the discouragement, indeed the frustration, is back .  We went from discouragement and frustration in 
2009 to excessive optimism in 2010, and back again.  With all due respect for those who drew up the 
timetable, who, after all, are my friends, I do not think that it was a good idea.  It was arbitrary, it was a piece of wishful thinking, done in haste and carri ed by optimism, albeit in good faith.  This Round 
has no date.  We should not have been establishing ti metables.  Let me recall once again, many were 
those who questioned the wisdom of the timetable.  In establishing dates for the conclusion of the 
Round, we failed to assess the risks of failing to meet  the timetable and the impact of such failure on 
the organization and on the Round.  In this day and age, we need to look at risks.  The financial 
system and indeed the world are paying for its failu re to assess the sub-prime mortgage risk.  As 
someone already mentioned here today, the current circumstances call for an urgent review of the 
timetable concept to avoid proclaiming deadlines to the world that we cannot meet.  I have one major 
concern in connection with all that has been said he re today.  Because it is impossible to pin the blame 
for our troubles in reaching an agreement on any act or in particular, the blame will be pinned on 
certain principles which will be called into question as a result – for example the rule of consensus or 
the Single Undertaking.  Let me be clear, we will not support such initiatives.  There are rules and 
principles that we will fight for – multilateralism, th e concept of the Development Round, the rule of 
consensus, the Single Undertaking, special and diffe rential treatment, and others.  My statement has 
been somewhat critical and rather long.  I apologize.  I think we owe our appreciation to the Chairs of 
the Negotiating Groups, whose effort s have pushed us towards the conclusion of the Round.  They 
deserve our praise, and thanks to them we have b een able to assess all of the progress made over the 
past ten years.  Distinguished colleagues, I thi nk we also need to acknowledge the efforts of the 
Director-General, his tenacity and his unshakable fait h in the Round even in times of great difficulty, 
and his tireless work.  You are among those who have  been fighting day after day, and you deserve 
our confidence. 
 
7. Plurinational State of Bolivia  
 
 Thank you, first, for your opening remarks a nd your two documents reflecting your views on 
the status of the Round.  We also welcome the efforts made by all the Chairs of the various 
Negotiating Groups.  As you yourself and other Memb ers have said, we are in a very difficult 
situation or "impasse", to quote the Cover Note to the documents circulated on 21 April 2011, and the 
appropriate question at this time would be:  Why are we in this situation?  As Bolivia sees it, in order 
to find a reply to this question it would be worthwhile  to begin by answering other questions that lie at 
the heart of the problem.  The first question is:  Have we delivered on the development objectives at 
the centre of this Round and on the mandates given?   From my country's standpoint, we are far from 
having obtained the satisfactory outcomes we exp ected from the Round in development terms.  Let 
me give you just one example in Agriculture .  As regards sensitiv e products, TRQs, tariff 
simplification and other issues, the results have not measured up to the expectations of the developing 
countries.  The developing countries have given in  and made concessions in favour of the developed 
countries on subsidies and domestic support, since leve ls will remain almost  the same as when the 
Round began.  The few cuts will be made practically within "water" levels and, worse still, most of 
the support has been or is being diverted to the Green Box, which this Round, it would appear, will 
not succeed in amending in order to reduce its distorting effects to a minimum, and we are even granting flexibilities so that the developed countries should not seek to touch it again, for example in  WT/GC/M/131 
 Page 19 
 
 
  update periods.  In exchange for all this flexibility on the part of the developing countries, when our 
countries request special safeguard measures to protect  those who need them most, in order to protect 
our impoverished rural communities, we are denied an efficient and user-friendly mechanism.  So the 
questions we ask ourselves are:  Is this the balance we  were seeking?  Is this  the development we were 
hoping for when the Round began?  I doubt whethe r there can be any positive answers to these 
questions.  You may believe this to be an exception and that we are securing substantial results on the 
development front in other areas.  However, this is  unfortunately a tendency that almost invariably 
repeats itself.  Therefore my next question would be:  Why is this so-called Development Round not 
succeeding in delivering significant outcomes for the de veloping countries?  Part of the response, in 
my delegation's view, is that the original purpose of  the Round has been turned  on its head.  In this 
world, what counts are the unfettered ambitions of the developed countries, ambitions that might be 
confused with greediness because of  these countries' unbridled demands in general terms or the lack 
of solutions to pressing problems.  Otherwise, how can one explain, for example, that the issue of 
duty-free quota-free market access for the least-developed countries or the cotton issue for other countries has still not been promptly addressed, and prio rity is being given to other interests over the 
urgency of dealing with development matters.  At the end of the day, what counts in this Round is the 
interests of the developed countries, their appe tite for opening up markets, even of the poorest 
countries, their concerns and their political limita tions, thus relegating to second or fourth place the 
legitimate aspirations of the majority of the me mbership to enjoy the right to development. 
 
We would be fooling ourselves in continui ng to call this the Development Round.  
Furthermore, once the developed countries have secure d, by various means, all the flexibilities and the 
full market openness they need, they will no long er have any major incentive to give serious 
consideration to the development issues that remain  outstanding in the documents we have received.  
Returning to the original question, we therefore w onder where the failure actually lies at this stage in 
the negotiations – in the Round itself or in the l ack of commitment to its primary objective, i.e. 
development?  The answer is clear.  The key failu re at this stage in the negotiations is lack of 
commitment to the development objectives we agreed in  the past.  The system's principal failure is not 
to have failed to meet either the mandates or the interests of the developing countries.  The loss of legitimacy of the multilateral trading system does not stem from inability to conclude the Round 
within the artificially established timeframes, but fro m the absence of development in this so-called 
Development Round.  Consequently, the response to the future of this organization and the Round 
would become clearer if the other questions were answered first.  Whatev er the future of the 
negotiations or the regular work of this organization,  the way forward is clear, and that is to put the 
organization in general back on track  towards genuine development.  Let us therefore make the most 
of this period of reflection imposed on us by  the current status of this improperly named 
"Development Round" and reinstate our principal objective in all our areas of work, bringing 
development back to centre stage in every part of  the work we do and back from the side-lines where 
it currently lies.  
8. Brazil  
 
 I must start by thanking you for your sobe r and thoughtful oral account, which complements 
your written report and the documents circulated by th e Negotiating Group Chairs just before Easter.  
Through you I wish to place on record Brazil’s d eepest appreciation for the outstanding contribution 
of the current Chairmen and their predecessors  to the whole membership.  They scrupulously 
followed a consensus, bottom-up, and no-surprises a pproach.  In examining the voluminous set of 
documents delivered to us, it becomes obvious how much we have advanced in translating into 
technical concepts, structure, and legal language th e Doha Declaration, the July 2004 Framework, and 
the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration.  The reports  by you and the Chairs are the basis for the 
resumption of work on any of the pillars of the Single Undertaking, whenever, wherever and in 
whatever format if happens.  They consolidate a deca de or more of hard work and the bargains made 
in that period.  This must be treasured and preserved by us all.  Like others, we are deeply WT/GC/M/131 
Page 20  
 
  disappointed that we have, so far, not been able to deliver the promises of the Development Round.  
Brazil shares the view prevailing across the member ship that we should not leave any stone unturned 
to find a way that takes us to an ambitious, balan ced and fair conclusion of the Round.  Both through 
the WTO G-20 and individually, Brazil has contributed substantively to putting together this package.  
The G-20 contributions are clearly stamped throughout the texts, and we believe that, were it not for 
the work of that Group, the DDA would be even more lacking in terms of its development dimension.  
Brazil remains committed to work under the Doha mandate and the subsequent multilaterally agreed 
mandates.  We share he Director-General's asse ssment that the conclusion of the Round would 
represent a very significant triple-win in terms of  economic results, strengthening of the system and 
developmental benefits.  Not being able to place development at the heart of the multilateral rules-
based trading system would represent a blow to the overwhelming majority of the Members of this 
organization, especially to the most vulnerable  amongst us.  Despite the challenging scenario you 
described in your report, Brazil is confident that if we all show commitment and political will, we 
may, in a reasonably short period of time, achieve outcomes that benefit the least-developed countries.  
Political and technical efforts continue to be depl oyed in order to address the identified negotiating 
gaps and to find solutions.  We welcome all steps taken in that direction,  we support them, and we 
wish them to bear fruit.  Nevertheless, we share yo ur assessment that gaps, at least today, seem to be 
unbridgeable.  We must keep seeking solutions, but we  must also face the fact that, right now, the 
chances of success for gap-closing efforts in market  access are disappointingly low.  We cannot bury 
our heads in the sand and keep work ing in the same mode we were before.  At a minimum, we must 
talk to each other, in confid ence when necessary, but always honestly, candidly, openly and 
sometimes even bluntly, about how to deal with th e situation you described in your report.  This 
conversation must not prejudge what we do with the Doha Single Undertaking.  This is precisely one 
of its key components.  
Brazil is quite open-minded in its approach for th e future, observing just a few basic concepts.  
First, consistent with the words of the Director-G eneral earlier today, we would not favour scenarios 
that are close to “business as usual”.  This do es not mean we should stop work under the Single 
Undertaking.  It simply means that we must work with a better and more clearly defined strategy.  We cannot keep changing negotiating formats in the hope  that our differences will somehow wondrously 
evaporate.  Whatever strategy we choose, it cannot  be based on expectations that we will have a 
miraculous outcome in the market-access negotiating pillars anytime soon.  Second, and again in line 
with the comments of the Director-General, Braz il would strongly oppose any scenario resembling 
what you described in your report as a “stop and rebo ot” approach.  A supposed “fresh start”, without 
previous substantial further convergence in terms of expectations for the market-access negotiations, 
would simply bring us back to the very same spot where we are now.  However, should this convergence of expectations occur, the texts that we  have today offer better chances of an expeditious 
conclusion of our mandates.  Third, Brazil will al ways prefer scenarios that favour the development 
dimension of the Doha mandate.  “Development” for Brazil is not a temporary or circumstantial 
objective, linked to the DDA only.  It must be the co rnerstone of any work done in this organisation.  
Finally, Brazil also rejects the notion that this or ganisation’s credibility and legitimacy are in a death 
embrace with the Round.  We are under a duty to ensure  that our future work is also directed to the 
strengthening and revitalisation of the WTO, which is bigger than the Round and transcends it.  In 
conclusion, let me express our firm conviction that under your leadership we can start this process of 
deliberation about the best ways to address the situ ation we face today.  We remain convinced that 
Members should talk to each other, to their capital s and also to you.  You may surely count on 
Brazil’s full commitment and engagement in whichever process you devise for us.  9. Brazil for the G-20  
 
The G-20 would like to thank the Cha irman of the TNC for his report and assessment of the 
situation.  The Group would also l ike to tha
nk, in particular, the Chairman of the Special Session on 
Agriculture for his efforts in producing his text.  As Agriculture remains the engine of the Round for  WT/GC/M/131 
 Page 21 
 
 
  the G-20, our remarks will be focused on the Agri culture document and the process ahead.  There are 
two important elements in the report submitted by the Chair of the Negotiating Group on Agriculture 
which the G-20 would like to highlight .  The first and most important element is the preservation of 
document TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4  in its integrity.  The December 2008 text remains the basis for any 
future agreement and is the expression of years of negotiatio ns and trade-offs .  The Chair has properly 
preserved that negotiating history, which c ontains a significant number of contributions , in terms of 
both structure and landing zones, developed by th e G-20 since its inception eight years ago.  The 
second element is that the Chair's report in document TN /AG/26 is objective and follows a consensus -
based, bottom-up, no-surprises approach.  The G-20 takes note of the Chair 's assessments and 
comments in his report.  Those views will certain ly be tested in any effort to advance nego tiations 
under the different negotiating pil lars of the December 2008 draft modalities.  The G-20 concurs with 
the assessment of the Director General that the Doha Round faces a critical situation.  The G-20 
believes t hat Members must promptly engage in discussions to consider co urses of action that could 
respond to the challenges we face, in ways that  are supportive of the multilateral trading system .  The 
Group is ready to engage in such effort in a constructive and solution-finding mode.  The G-20 will 
continue to pursue the objective of achieving an ambitious and balanced outcome in Agricult ure that 
delivers on the development objectives of the Round in accordance with the mandate.  
 
10. Burkina Faso for the Cotton 4 
 
Thank you for giving us your assessment of the stat e of play in the negotiations and for your 
report of 21 April on the consultations you have been holding on the NAMA sectoral s.  I also wish to 
thank and congratulate the Negotiating Group Chairs  for the quality of their reports, also dated 
21 April, which we had hoped to receive and which we re indeed circulated.  In our view, these reports 
provide a clear picture of the results of the resp ective Groups' work in the various negotiating areas 
and highlight the points of convergence and the di fferences which some regard as unbridgeable.  
I commend the TNC Chair for the skilful way in whic h he has played his role as arbiter in attempting 
to bring the various positions closer together.  I do, of course, support the statements by Kenya for the 
African Group, Mauritius for the ACP, and Banglad esh for the LDCs.  On behalf of the African 
cotton-producing countries and the four co-sponsors of the Sectoral Initiative in favour of Cotton (Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and Chad) in particul ar, I wish to express not only our sincere and 
unwavering resolve over the course of these long years of negotiation to work towards a conclusion of 
the Doha Round that fulfils the mandate we recei ved in Hong Kong, but also our long-standing 
concern about what can only be described as a stalem ate marked by a genuine lack of commitment on 
the part of our negotiating partners since the cruc ial issue of cotton was first placed on the table.  
Nonetheless, we urgently appeal to the Members of this organization to demonstrate true political will 
in order to save the Doha Round.  Without a su ccessful and multilateral conclusion to this Round, 
small countries such as ours cannot survive the law of  the jungle, which is dictated, as we all know, 
by those that are the strongest.  Though sceptical  at first, we ended up endorsing the Doha 
Development Round and will not accept that some Members do away with all of our efforts and 
jeopardize its completion, however real the constrai nts may be or whatever the obstacles encountered 
in the NAMA sectorals.  The C-4 takes due not e of the prospects you have outlined, and 
notwithstanding these difficult times, it will therefore continue to engage in  a constructive manner 
with a view to completion of these negotiations on the basis of what h as been achieved over the 
course of ten years of work, which, once again, we are not prepared to forego without any other 
credible alternative.  Should there be such an alternative – whether plan A, B, C, or Z – it should give 
the African cotton-producing countries a clear sen se of what to expect regarding the issue of 
agricultural subsidies, and particularly  those that distort the cotton market. 
 
11. Chile  
 
First, we thank you for your determination to ensu re that the texts were circulated within the 
deadline, and that was done as it should be.  We  acknowledge and value the efforts made by the WT/GC/M/131 
Page 22  
 
  Negotiating Group Chairs.  These texts and reports refl ect the current state of play, with no surprises.  
However, as you so rightly said, they also reflect the fact that, in many areas, the gaps between positions remain, and in NAMA woul d appear to be unbridgeable at this time.   A couple of weeks 
ago, most Members were inclined to throw in the towe l.  Today, thanks to these texts, the picture has 
changed, becoming less clear and more complex but al so more true to reality.  We now have two new 
elements.  First, the texts show the progress that ha s been made and highlight what might be gained 
from a successful Round.  Although that is good, it is  not sufficient for some.  On the other hand it is 
not bad.  And this is why a majority of Members do  not want to lose, but rather to preserve and/or 
save what has been achieved so far.  Second, your  opening remarks of today suggest that the Round 
may not be concluded, which woul d bring further discredit on the WTO and add to the erosion of the 
multilateral trading system.  Consequently, the memb ership, capitals, the media and opinion leaders 
are reluctant to forego the luxury of having a form of  rule of law in the international trading system.  
Both realities have led us to take stock of where we  stand.  We agree with your assessment and with 
your "non-options".  These will not help us to view th e future with confidence.  They do not give us 
any process to follow.  In our mind, the time has now  come to reflect.  We need to start a process of 
discussion on the Round and its possibilities in the light of current political realities and the way in 
which the multilateral system has evolved over the past  ten years.  The debate should be a collective 
one, honest but low-key, an open discussion without any prejudgement of the options.  Lastly, you yourself, in your capacity as Chair of the TNC, should conduct a debate on how to move forward in such a way as to minimize damage to the credibility of this organization.  This is a matter of urgency.  
We here in Geneva need to put forward some ideas for our Ministers - our bosses - who will be 
meeting in various formats in the weeks to come.  As an ancient Chinese say ing goes:  "A process of 
reflection is like digging a well:  the water is cloudy at  first but then becomes clear".  Let us get down 
to work in the coming days and weeks in search of clear water.  12. Chile for the Joint Proposal Group
1 
 
The Joint Proposal Group welcomes the progress made to date, which includes text-based 
negotiations that have led to a bracketed text drafted by Members concerning a system for notification 
and registration of geographical indications (GIs) for wines and spirits.  Significantly, much of the 
text is supported by all Members, and considerable  portions of the text are supported by the Joint 
Proposal Group and several other Members.  The Joint Proposal Group thanks Mr Mwape for his 
efforts as Chair of the Special Session to facilitate these negotiations.  In particular, we welcome the 
Chair’s clear statements regarding the mandate of  the Special Session negotiations.  As stated by 
Mr Mwape in his report (TN/IP/21), the specific negotiating mandate of this Group is, and I quote, "limited to the negotiations of a register of GIs fo r wines and spirits".  The report references paragraph 
18 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration which states that, "With a view to completing the work started 
in the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Inte llectual Property Rights (Council for TRIPS) on the 
implementation of Article 23.4, we agree to negotia te the establishment of a multilateral system of 
notification and registration of geographical indications  for wines and spirits…"  Contrary to this clear 
mandate, however, certain delegations  have endeavoured to expand th e scope of these negotiations to 
include GIs beyond wines and spirits.  As ment ioned, the mandate of the Special Session is 
negotiating a registration system for GIs for wines and spirits only. Efforts to exceed the mandate 
have complicated the work of the TRIPS Council Sp ecial Session.  The Joint Proposal Group remains 
committed to engaging constructively within the mandate on a multilateral system for GIs on wines 
and spirits, and strongly encourages other Members to  do the same.  We conclude by welcoming the 
progress of the Special Session, and thank the Chair and the Secretariat for their efforts, including 
with respect to the Chair's statements rega rding the scope of the mandate before us. 
 
 
                                                      
1 Multilateral System of Notification and Registration of Geographical Indications for Wines and 
Spirits in the TRIPS Council Special Session.  WT/GC/M/131 
 Page 23 
 
 
   
13. China  
 
Let me start by extending our appreciations to  you and the Chairs of the Negotiating Groups 
for your reports.  First, according to our preliminar y analysis, these reports have basically captured the 
progress, or the status-quo, in all negotiation areas.  Therefore, we tend to be positive towards these 
documents.  However, since they are only reports, inst ead of modality texts as planned, they should be 
regarded as a build-on, instead of a replacement, of  the 2008 texts, which most Members believe still 
remain the basis of our negotiations.  Second, we would like to share with you our assessment of the 
current situation.  It is obvious that we are be hind schedule in coming up with texts, which poses a big 
question mark to our original plan of concluding the Round in 2011 as instructed by our leaders.  Like 
others, we are very disappointed at this situati on, as Members have made tremendous efforts over the 
past ten years.  What lie on the table are hard -won achievements.  If the Round suffers a setback 
again, the credibility of the multilateral trading syst em will be damaged, and developing countries will 
suffer the most.  The biggest problem now is that  the negotiations seem to be deviating from the 
development mandate.  For instance, you indicated clearly in your report that the NAMA sectoral is 
the gateway issue that is impeding progress of the whole negotiations.  What was not said is the fact 
that the sectors of chemicals, electrical and electronics, and industrial machinery represent the export interests of only the developed-country Members.  We are very much concerned that the development 
objective and mandate may have been marginalized.  Having said that, we do not think it is time to 
give up.  What can we do and what should we do ne xt?  You are right that "business as usual" will not 
work.  You are also right that "stop and reboot" will no t work either.  As you have pointed out in your 
report, "the issues to be addressed in any new R ound would necessarily bring us back to the issue 
which is blocking progress today."  Should we go do wn that path, it would simply mean a waste of 
another ten years.  I trust each of us has a good memory, or at least a good institutional memory.  So let us not deceive ourselves as well as others.  We need to take collective decisions on the next steps.  
The priority should be to preserve the multilateral trading system and the development mandate.  We 
should also consider delivering on some issues th at are closely related to development.  Some 
Members have been talking about "early agreem ent and implementation" for quite some time, 
especially on issues of interest to the LDCs.  We belie ve that this is a fair and reasonable appeal as 
presented just now by Bangladesh, which we support.   Before concluding, we wish to associate 
ourselves with the statements by the IGDC, the G-20 and the G-33, and lend our support to the 
statements by the African Group, the ACP and the C-4.  Finally, I want to sum up my statement using 
an old Chinese saying, "where there is a will, there is a way." 
 
14. Colombia 
 
We wish to endorse the statement by Australia for the Cairns Group.  We also thank you for 
your comprehensive report on the current state of play .  More particularly, our delegation is grateful 
to you and to the Chairs of the Negotiating Groups for circulating the reports and texts during Easter 
week.  These are important and useful documents, not only because they provide greater transparency 
but above all because they give us a full picture of  what has been achieved and what remains to be 
done before reaching the goal.   The conclusion that  emerges from these reports is that we are at a 
critical stage in the negotiations.  The first step, th erefore, is to be well and fully aware of the 
problems facing us.  The Round is in grave danger and hence, so are the new market-access opportunities and the strengthening of the rules of th e multilateral system.  These are valuable assets 
for a developing country such as Colombia, and we w ould like to preserve them.  In this connection, 
our Minister of Trade was among the 13 Ministers who signed the open letter to which reference has 
been made by Australia, Korea and Mexico, among ot hers.  In the present circumstances it is essential 
for us to engage in profound reflection on a collectiv e basis.  Our thinking should be realistic, in the 
light of the considerable progress achieved and the gaps that still remain in the different areas.  
Balance can only be reached through a political, frank  and open discussion.  The substantive issue to WT/GC/M/131 
Page 24  
 
  be addressed without further delay is whether so lutions can be found to the obstacles we are 
encountering today, starting with the NAMA sectoral s.  The largest Members, which are the key 
stakeholders in this area, have the first word.  To th e extent that there is the requisite political will, we 
are prepared to explore, with them, all possible options, as long as they are realistic and take into 
account the interests of everyone involved.  Colombia  is willing to continue contributing to the very 
end.  Nonetheless, the solution does not depend on us.  We can only go the extra mile to the end of the 
Round if the major Members have the political will to do so.  We are in favour of pursuing the 
consultations under your leadership and with work done in such groups as th e respective Chairs deem 
useful.  What is to be avoided is to let the negotiatio ns slide.  This would be of no help to anyone and, 
on the contrary, will prove damaging to the Round, the organization and the multilateral system itself.  
We are living historic moments.  We sincerely hope that they will help us to overcome the obstacles 
and deliver on our joint – albeit different – responsibilities as Members of this organization. 
 15. Costa Rica 
 
Thank you for your report and your comments.   Thank you also to the Negotiating Group 
Chairs for their texts.  Costa Rica endorses the statem ent by Australia for the Cairns Group.  It also 
endorses the statement by Chile for the Joint Proposal Group regarding the GIs register.  The Minister 
of Trade of Costa Rica is a signatory to the open le tter that was signed by 13 Ministers on behalf of 
their respective governments.  I would like to reite rate Costa Rica's willingness, as shown by this 
letter, to work with all Members and in all ar eas in order to conclude the Round successfully.  We 
believe in fighting for this objective.  All that the multilateral trading system has achieved in just over 
six decades is of immense value.  Trade liberalization and rules have provided new opportunities and 
security, thereby promoting growth  and development.  The Doha Round negotiations provide an 
opportunity to strengthen these rules and achieve greater trade liberalization.  New flows of agricultural and non-agricultural trade and trade in  services would be of benefit to all.  The 
multilateral system's achievements are so important that we cannot allow them to be undermined.  
Similarly, what this Round could achieve is so valu able that we cannot allow it not to be achieved.  
Costa Rica thanks the EU for its proposal on NAMA sectoral negotiations.  Agricultural market 
access has sometimes been presented as the gateway to  resolving problems in other sectors.  Now we 
see NAMA being presented in the same way.  NAMA and Agriculture have become the subject of a debate much like the one over the chicken and the eg g.  Which should come first?  I do not know.  At 
the end of the day, I think that NAMA and Agricu lture, like the chicken and the egg, both need each 
other.  In fact, there are three parties involve d:  the chicken, the egg and the cock.  NAMA, 
Agriculture and Services must all be resolved if we are to achieve results in market access.  We are 
confident that in time we will see proposals that close the gaps in these three areas.  I mention market 
access because it is vital in these negotiations.  This morning you referred to the CUTS discussion forum and, in particular, the reasons cited therei n for the impasse in the Doha Round negotiations.  I 
would like to add one more reason that I read about in this discussion forum, but which has not been 
mentioned.  The author says that it would be a mistake of historic proportions not to seek new trade flows.  The WTO's purpose is to liberalize trade, not  as an end in itself, but in order to increase jobs, 
incomes and global economic efficiency, reduce cost s for consumers and producers of goods, food 
and services, and raise the standard of living of all pe oples.  I think it is important to add this to your 
list, not so we look backwards, but so we bear th is in mind when striving to move forward.  Costa 
Rica agrees that the business-as-usual approach is not the way to proceed with our work, and yet we 
cannot give up our objective, which is to ensure the successful conclusion of the Round.  Costa Rica 
will do its utmost to ensure that together we u se this tiny window of opportunity to find a way to 
reach agreement.   WT/GC/M/131 
 Page 25 
 
 
  16. Cuba  
 
I can see that history repeats itself.  I asked for the floor as soon as you opened it for 
discussion, and this is the second time I find myself among the very last to speak.  We thank you for 
this morning's frank assessment of the state of pl ay in the negotiations and for your efforts in 
attempting to put the process back on track.  We endorse the statements by the ACP, G-20, SVEs, 
Informal Group of Developing Countries and G-33.  We  also fully concur with Venezuela, Bolivia, 
Ecuador and the views expressed by other delegations that the focus has been on a market-access approach rather than on settling a ll the outstanding issues relating to development.  We would like to 
emphasize the following points in connection with the call being made for collective thinking along 
political lines.  First, we do not agree with the vi ew that the WTO and the multilateral trading system 
will be discredited if the Doha Roun d is not concluded this year.  We believe that what will indeed 
throw discredit on all of us here is if we fail to make every possible effort to fulfill the development 
objective we set ourselves in November 2001 at the Doha Ministerial Conference.  Second, in our 
mind, what will prove truly damaging to the WTO is failure to do our utmost to tackle or meet the 
Doha Development mandate and, looking to the future , failure to evaluate with all due and serious 
attention all of the documents on the table, which express the needs and interests of the developing 
countries.  What we have before us today, in Cu ba's case at any rate, falls far short of a full-scale 
response to our priorities.  Third, returning to th e question of the date, why should we adhere to a 
timetable agreed or adopted in this organization at the behest of a handful of Ministers from the select 
group of G20 nations or those that participated in the Asia-Pacific Forum at the end of 2010?  By all 
accounts, the conditions are not ripe for a successful conclusion to the Round this year, because we 
cannot give up the Development Agenda agreed in 2001.  Fourth, I am not saying we should throw 
away so many years of work or start from scratc h, let alone continue in this vicious circle, 
considering, as others have said before me, the hi gh cost and sacrifice this has represented for the 
smaller delegations.  Fifth, irrespective of the ci rcumstances or moment in history, it should be 
remembered that it took 17 years to incorporat e Part IV on Trade and Development into the 
GATT 1947, and today we would be  renouncing the commitments enshrined therein and sacrificing 
the Development objective to finish this Round at all costs and at any price, so as to comply with a 
fictitious timetable that as yet fails to meet the ex pectations of nearly a decade of negotiations. Sixth, 
we believe there is no shortage of intelligence in this organization to understand what needs to be 
done and what lies ahead of us.  What is lacking is political will among the de veloped countries to put 
matters into practice and fulfill the Doha mandate.  It is these countries that should be making the 
greatest concessions.  Cuba stands ready to cont inue exploring ideas and working constructively 
without haste or fictitious timetables.  If this is a time to pause in order to avoid making mistakes, our 
efforts will be along those lines.  17. Dominican Republic  
 
During his recent visit to the WTO, the Domi nican President, Leonel Fernández, expressed 
his support for the organization's efforts to br ing the Doha Development Round to a successful 
conclusion.  Mr Fernández also expressed how im portant it was to the Dominican Republic, a small 
and vulnerable economy, that the outcome reflects the spirit that had given impetus to the Round, one 
with development at its heart.  Previous Rounds ha d failed to achieve this objective, which would be 
expressed in the special treatment flexibilities that  differentiate between the various levels of 
development and the areas of vulnerabi lity of Members.  As I said yesterday, when you joined us at 
the meeting of the Informal Group of Developing Co untries, which I chaired, this group of Members 
believes in the benefits of multilate ral agreements, a multilateral system of rules, and trade as a factor 
in growth and economic development,  provided that this trade is used properly.  According to an 
economic report issued by the World Bank in Marc h 2011, despite the economic dynamism and rapid 
expansion of trade over the past decade, more th an 70 per cent of the world's poor live in middle-
income countries.  Developing countries that continue  to have high numbers of poor inhabitants and a 
low human development index cannot therefore be  expected to assume the same obligations as WT/GC/M/131 
Page 26  
 
  countries that achieved their high level of developm ent by opening up their markets gradually over a 
long period of time.  There are also a number of determining factors which lie beyond the WTO's 
scope and which have hampered the dynamism of the Round.  The ever-prevailing high level of 
unemployment in developed countries, a result of the severity of the recent crisis, stimulates activity 
in the protectionist sectors of these countries.  The strong appreciation of many developing-economy 
currencies is effectively cutting the existing level of applied tariff rates, which in some cases 
significantly affects the application of the market -access formulas negotiated in this Round.  If we 
want to conclude the Round within the set time fr ame, we will perhaps have to seek compromises that 
reflect this reality, and the solution quite possibly li es in the implementation period of the agreements.  
In any case, as regards the texts brought to the table,  greater efforts need to be made in all the 
negotiating areas in order to achieve convergence between  the parties.  This will require the work and 
time of the chairpersons and all the delegations in wh at must be an inclusive and transparent process.  
We accept the reality of the current situation and ca nnot hide from the truth.  They say that numbers 
are objective, but when you analyze the causes and e ffects of the facts, you can see the living and the 
dead behind the numbers, and, at the end of the day,  this is something for which we protagonists are 
responsible.  Hope for the future of our populatio ns and for the effectiven ess of the multilateral 
trading system lies in our hands.  Let us continue to build hope and carry the pride of a civilization 
committed to the development of humanity.  
18. Dominican Republic for the Informal Group of Developing Countries  
  I would like to thank you for your report and for the tireless efforts you have made to bring 
the Doha Round to a successful conclusion.  I would also like to thank you for having accepted my 
invitation to come to our IGDC meeting yesterda y.  As you have rightly pointed out on numerous 
occasions, concluding the Doha Round is of capital im portance to all developing countries.  There are 
several reasons for this.  As we have seen fro m the responses to the economic crises and from the 
importance that the Dispute Settleme nt Mechanism has taken in the WTO, a rules-based system is of 
most benefit to the weaker and smaller developing countries.  This was one of the main conclusions 
we reached at a recent workshop on participation of developing countries in the Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism that I had the pleasure of organizing and chairing for the benefit of our Group.  The small 
and weak developing countries, due to their rela tive size, possess few other means of leverage to 
influence the bigger players on the world stage.  Re cent figures released by the World Bank show that 
70 per cent of the world's poor populations live in middle-income countries.  This highlights that 
making positive efforts designed to ensure that devel oping countries secure a sh are in the growth of 
world trade commensurate with their needs of ec onomic development, as well as strengthening the 
special and differential treatment provisions with a view to securing meaningful integration into the 
multilateral trading system, are issues of utmost impor tance.  But just as we have much to win from a 
successful development-oriented conclusion of the Round, so do we stand to lose much more than 
others if we were to fail.  If there is a collapse of  the Doha Round, in the best-case scenario we will 
fall back on what is the current status quo.  Now the problem is that the status quo is not good for the developing countries.  As you have also pointed out on other occasions, one of the main reasons for 
launching a new round of negotiations at Doha was to rebalance the rules of the WTO resulting from 
the Uruguay Round in favour of development, in partic ular in the area of Agriculture, which is central 
to the developing countries.  Nobody is completely happy with what is on the table, but as the 
Director-General has pointed out, there are importa nt gains on development, from both the offensive 
and defensive sides, as can be judged from th e collection of documents, negotiating texts and 
chairperson's reports circulated on 21 April. Nevert heless, quite a lot of work remains to be done in 
order to fully capture the developmental aspirations of the developing countries in the current texts.  
Moreover, it is clear that substantial gaps in pos itions on key issues remain, and this places real doubts 
on our ability to conclude the Round in 2011.  
We need to reflect carefully about how we appr oach this most serious situation in the coming 
weeks.  But we must persevere in our efforts to  conclude a development-oriented Round, both  WT/GC/M/131 
 Page 27 
 
 
  because we need bring to fruition th e hard work that has been done to date, and because the credibility 
of the multilateral trading system depends on us fu lfilling the objective we set in Doha in 2001 to 
place development at the heart of the WTO.  Indeed , what we are trying to preserve here goes beyond 
the immediate benefits further trade liberalization may bring.  It is about safeguarding a valuable 
common good that has taken 70 years to build and, dare  we say, also the future of multilateral co-
operation.  So what should be the wa y forward?  The only way forward is to go step by step and as we 
say in Spanish, "para atrás ni para tomar impulso".   We must redouble our efforts, set for ourselves 
reasonable way-points on the road to completion a nd review our progress against them every step of 
the way, as well as against our overarching developm ent mandate.  The collection of texts that is 
before us is a significant milestone on the road to  a successful Doha Round.  It allows Members to 
have an overview of the whole of the negotiations  so we can start seeing the forest and not the 
individual trees.  For the developing countries, it  is also an extremely important exercise in 
transparency, as it allows many of us to see what has been happening in some of the bilateral and 
plurilateral consultations that have been held.  De veloping countries stand at the ready to collectively 
find a way forward in the negotiations that will hopefully be crowned by an ambitious,  balanced and 
development-oriented Doha Round package. 
 
19. Ecuador  
 
In November 2001 it was agreed that the "needs"  and "interests" of the developing countries 
would be at the "heart" of the Doha Work Progra mme.   More specifically, it was reaffirmed that 
"provisions for special and differential treatment ar e an integral part of the WTO Agreements" and 
that "all special and differential treatment provisions  shall be reviewed with a view to strengthening 
them and making them more precise, effective and operational".   Ten years on from the start of the 
negotiations, the Doha Round is in a critical state.  In  addition to the large gaps that exist in various 
negotiating areas, including NAMA, much work re mains to be done to fulfil the development 
dimension of the mandate, in particular as regards sp ecial and differential treatment.  Priority must be 
given to continuing the negotiations on the Monitori ng Mechanism.  At the same time, it is just as 
important to resume addressing specific issues relatin g to special and differential treatment, which are 
identified in Annex C of the draft Cancún Ministeria l Declaration of 2003 (JOB(03)/150/Rev.2).   In 
light of the above, Ecuador feels that the TNC should keep the respective negotiating group informed about the uninterrupted development of this proces s – an essential part of the development dimension 
– so that it can present its report and final texts prior to the Eighth Ministerial Conference at the end 
of the year.  With regard to the documents circulat ed on 21 April, we thank you and the Chairs of the 
respective Negotiating Groups for th e work that has been done.  Howe ver, we wish to place on record 
that Ecuador considers these texts to be "referen ce documents", since their content was prepared by 
the aforementioned Chairs.  Generally speaking, in  the market-opening negotiations, the possibility of 
recourse to country-specific additional flexibilities in market access will, in certain cases and in 
accordance with WTO practice, have to be considered  and maintained, in order to address structural 
and cyclical factors relating to foreign trade and,  in general, the economies of various developing-
country Members.  Ecuador has expressed this view in the TNC and in the context of the negotiations 
on Agriculture and NAMA, and reiterates it now.  I would like to thank you and the Chairs of the 
Negotiating Groups for the information given to us on  1 April.   We also welcome the information 
received at the GRULAC meeting on the current state of the Doha Round. 
 20. Egypt 
 
 Today, we have listened to a critical report on the state of play of the DDA and an assessment 
of the Director-General's consultations.  We ob served the suggestion that gaps over NAMA sectorals 
are now unbridgeable and, accordingly, the Single Undertaking is now at an impasse.  We also 
listened to statements wherein frustrations, appreh ensions over unfulfilled development ambitions and 
aspirations were manifested, and fina lly we were left with the daunting task of deciding where to take WT/GC/M/131 
Page 28  
 
  the DDA from here, as if it was a matter of choice between “planned versus perceived obsolescence”.  
Frankly, what we are hearing today is proving to be discomforting to say the very least. This is a 
distorted tune, very different from what we had b een assured, over the past two years, would be the 
case now.  Over the last two years, we welcomed  political signals and embraced intentions to 
conclude the Round in 2011.  We agreed to shif t the negotiations into higher gear, intensified the 
negotiations on all fronts and left no stone unturned.  We maintained an open mind regarding the 
negotiation process and format.  We gave the cocktail approach and other non-multilateral 
configurations ample time to inject the necessary mo mentum to move things forward.  We remained 
optimistic that encouraging signals would immi nently spur on the willingness on the part of 
developed-country Members to move forward from th eir comfort zones and into a more constructive 
“pro-development” mode of engagement.  We even ma naged to turn a blind eye to the attempts to re-
sequence the negotiations, and we presumed that we all shared the same convictions and collective 
responsibility to safeguard the integrity of the multilate ral trading system.  However, the final count of 
all this commotion after two years is truly alarmi ng.  We can no longer go about our business as usual, 
nor can we endure sustaining the intensification process ad-infinitum without any conceivable 
development outcomes.  To do that would only tarnis h the integrity of the multilateral trading system 
that we have been keen to build  over the years, and to strut about in the face of global economic 
turmoil.  We need to be clear by now that the development outcomes we are seeking will not be 
brought about by raising the level of ambition of the Round, as suggested by some, so long as the word “ambition” is used synonymously to refer to securing further market  access for some, while 
others are driven to move from their comfort zone s, irrespective of the fact that Agriculture and 
development are the setters of the ambition of this Round.  We should reconcile with the reality that 
while much of the talk has been about pursuing an “ambitious and balanced development outcome”, 
the emphasis has only been on the word “ambitious”,  to sanction further market-access improvements 
for some, while negotiations to achieve a “balanced  outcome” on core development issues have been 
hampered by inexorable inflexibilities. 
 
We would therefore subscribe to the views e xpressed by the African Group, the ACP and the 
LDCs, as well as the Informal Group of Developing C ountries in this regard.  We thank the Director-
General and the Chairs of the various Negotiating Groups for their tireless efforts and for presenting 
us with their reports on the work undertaken thus far in the various negotiating tracks. The reports 
give a bottom-up snapshot of where we are and how mu ch is at stake. Some of the reports go a step 
further in giving an indication of the magnitude of  the gaps, while others elaborate on the divergent 
positions maintained by Members. These asymmetri es should not be construed as alternatives or a 
replacement of the proposals and positions maintain ed by developing and least-developed Members in 
each and every negotiating track, which we believe in  their entirety form the baseline and reference 
point for the way forward.  There is no easy answer to the question of where to go from here.  
However, if we were to seek prematurely any change s to the Single Undertaking at this point in time, 
then we risk facing a catch-22 situation. Before giving verdicts that the gaps are unbridgeable, we 
need to have a shared understanding of what the gaps are, while knowing that they are not just 
confined to NAMA sectorals.  If we were to subscribe to the view that the gaps over NAMA 
voluntary sectorals are not technical, but rather of a political nature, then in all earnest, the predicament lies beyond the ambit of the rules-based tr ading system.  If we are being told today that 
the DDA, which was launched in the first instance to level the playing field, inject development into 
the multilateral trading system and cater to the ne eds of its large developing and least-developed 
constituency, is being held hostage over a “voluntary” issue, then we ought to reconsider our positions 
on this voluntary issue rather than change an esta blished ten-year multilateral consensus to capitalize 
on a development outcome in all DDA tracks.  Some mu ltilateral reflection ought to be in place at this 
point to address several fundamental questions needed to re-instate principles and reach a 
determination over what should be the conceivable level of ambition for the DDA.  Only then would 
we be in a position to map any future course of action and prevent the same situation from occurring 
in other important tracks, which in their own merit hold the key for any possible breakthrough to 
achieve a development outcome.  We would also caution against proposals that aim at leaving the  WT/GC/M/131 
 Page 29 
 
 
  current impasse for Ministers to figure out in Dece mber or during other Ministerial gatherings which 
the majority of developing and least-developed Members are not part of, yet again risking 
compromises, to the detriment of our developm ent interests.  The WTO cannot endure another 
Cancun scenario.  We would also argue against th e suggestion that the DDA has become démodé or 
any propositions that would advocate a Tabula Rasa .  President Abraham Lincoln was wise enough to 
say that “if he had 8 hours to chop down a tree, he would spend six to think about how to sharpen his 
axe”.  So, if we were to chop ten years of multilate ral trade negotiations, or even change their raison 
d’être of development, how long would we need to think of that before deciding to do so.  
21. European Union 
 
Thank you for the assessment that you have provide d, both in writing last week and orally 
today, on the state of play in the negotiations of the Doha Development Agenda.  Indeed, as your report correctly highlights, after almost ten years of  hard work we are today closer than ever to 
concluding the Doha Round, but at the same time we are stuck in one of the ke y market-acces s areas.  
I would like to touch on three issues:  (i) the EU's assessment of the state of play in the negotiations, 
including as regards the documents prepared by the Chairs of the Negotiating Groups;  
(ii) possibilities to unlock the negotiations in NAMA sect orals;  and (iii) some broader considerations 
and a brief look ahead.  On the state of play in th e negotiating areas, the EU welcomes the reports and 
documents that were circulated to Members on 21 April.  While each report is of course unavoidably 
overshadowed by the standstill of th e negotiations, mainly due to what  the Director-General describes 
as a large political gap in market access, on the whol e the documents are very valuable in capturing 
the work and progress achieved in the course of almo st ten years of negotiations, even if in a few 
cases our proposals have not been adequately re flected.  Together, the documents and reports 
constitute a solid basis for further negotiations.  As you have correctly pointed out, the stabilised part 
of the Single Undertaking comprises the vast majo rity of the issues that are part of the Doha 
Development Round.  The EU agrees that Members are well-advised to carefully evaluate the value of 
what is already on the table and the way this coul d be affected by a prolonged stalemate in the NAMA 
sectoral negotiations.  Regarding unlocking the ne gotiations in NAMA sectorals, as you have 
correctly pointed out, the negotiations on NAMA sect orals constitute at this moment the immediate 
and next gateway issue.  It is clear that without  an ambitious result on sectorals – particularly as 
regards the economically significant sectors of chem icals, machinery and electronics – it will not be 
possible to conclude the Round in its current form.  Our view has always been that not all options and 
avenues in this market-access area had been explored .  This is why we felt we should formulate ideas 
to stimulate further engagement.  We have sought over the last few days and hours to engage with a 
large number of Members, and would like to repor t briefly on this today in a proper multilateral 
setting, so as to ensure full transparency. 
 
To summarize the objective of our initiative, we tr ied to demonstrate that it is technically and 
realistically possible to bridge the gaps if the po litical will is there.  The present patterns of world 
trade, which have seen profound changes since th e conclusion of the Uruguay Round, mean that 
participation of both developed and developing Members is needed for any sectoral to reach the 
required coverage of world trade.  Allow me to em phasize that the EU fully understands and respects 
the fact that not all developing countries will be able  to participate in NAMA s ectorals at the time of 
the conclusion of the Doha Round.  Our proposal sets out the principle that developing countries can exercise their right to use paragraph 7 flexibilities al so in sectorals.  Furthermore, in accordance with 
the development mandate of this Round, we want to stress the importance of ensuring that NAMA 
sectorals will not undermine the provisions in the current draft modalities text to address the issue of 
preference erosion, which is a particularly impor tant challenge faced by a number of the poorest 
Members of this organization.  However, as concer ns developing countries that are highly competitive 
exporters accounting for a large share of world trade,  it is only logical and legitimate to expect them 
to join developed countries in additional liberalisation through NAM A sectorals.  While participation 
of certain large developing-country Members is a necessary condition for a sectoral to enter into WT/GC/M/131 
Page 30  
 
  force, the exact modality of their participation is  subject to negotiation, and would not necessarily 
have to be identical to that applied by develope d-country Members.  However, the modality does need 
to be one that delivers significant and proportionate tariff reductions on top of the results created by 
the application of the Swiss formula, and efforts proportionate to those of developed Members.  The 
EU is convinced that methods and formulae do exist to generate a sectoral package that would deliver 
significant new market access in both developed an d developing countries, while respecting S&D 
treatment, which is the guiding principle of the whole Doha Development Agenda.  We are also 
confident that solutions can be found to ensure that  efforts that Members would be asked to make in 
sectorals are proportionate to the tariff levels they  will have following the ap plication of the Swiss 
formula.  For the three biggest and economically mo st important sectors of chemicals, machinery and 
electronics, such a compromise solution, foll owing the Product Basket Approach, could be 
constructed along the following lin es:  Developed-country Members eliminate their tariffs for all 
products;  developing-country Members could eliminat e their tariffs for some products, particularly 
for products covered by existing sectoral arrangeme nts coming from the Uruguay Round;  for other 
products, developing-country Members would reduce th e end-rates created by the Swiss formula by a 
further fixed percentage point.  The size of this pe rcentage point cut would have to be one that leads 
to significant further liberalisation, proportionate tariff reductions and efforts that are commensurate 
with what developed-country Members would do.  In  chemicals, all developing-country participants 
should reduce their tariffs to at least the leve ls of the existing Chemicals Tariff Harmonisation 
Agreement (CTHA), if it is lower than the result of the additional cut in fixed percentage points. 
Those developing-country Members that already appl y the levels of the CTHA should apply a fixed 
percentage point cut on top of the Swiss formula, arriving at end rates that are between zero and the 
levels of the CTHA. 
 In electronics and electrical machinery, par ticipating developing-country Members would be 
expected to join the effort of developed countries and eliminate their tariffs in this sector in which 
they are highly competitive exporters.  Audio-visu al products, being sensitive for various Members, 
would in our proposal be excluded.  The EU has spent a considerable time studying the economic 
impacts of such a compromise package for NAMA sect orals, and our analysis confirms that it would 
create significant additional market access on top of  the tariff-cutting formula, while ensuring that 
efforts are balanced and proportionate, and in line  with the principle of S&D treatment.  This 
approach would also be simple, and thus rather easily negotiable provided Members have the political 
will to look for solutions to the problems that are currently blocking progress in the Round.  Other 
sectors could of course also be considered as part of a NAMA sectoral package, but in the first instance, focus would clearly have to be on the thr ee sectors with the greatest economic potential.  For 
the other sectors, which are more limited in sc ope and coverage, and wh ere developing-country 
Members are often the most competitive exporters, the modality should be tariff elimination by all 
participating Members.  Looking ahead, as you ha ve correctly pointed out, political will by both 
developed and developing -country Members is needed to overc ome the current difficulties in the 
negotiations.  As far as the EU is concerned, we are not prepared to give up until we have made a 
serious and concerted effort to negotiate solutions to  the issues that currently divide the membership.  
I do not know if anyone here has received from capita ls, political - i.e. Ministerial-level - instructions 
to abandon the market-access part of the negotiation.  Certainly, this is not the case for the EU.  The 
European Union believes that such an effo rt must be made in the coming weeks. 
 Today we have outlined in broad terms a potential compromise scenario for NAMA sectorals.  
We are prepared to engage in structured, substa ntive negotiations, not just bilaterally, but also 
plurilaterally and multilaterally in order to discuss our ideas in more detail.  We are calling other 
Members, and of course primarily those that actively engaged in bilaterals until now, to join us in an 
effort to explore with an open mind concrete so lutions to unlock the NAMA impasse.  While the 
gateway to progress is clearly through the NAMA sectorals, we must not set aside or ignore other 
important areas where a lot of work remains to be done. On the market-access side this includes 
Services, where results are clearly disappointing.  In  addition, solid results in a number of rules-type  WT/GC/M/131 
 Page 31 
 
 
  negotiation topics are required to reinforce the WTO as a guarantor of open markets.  Also, in 
Agriculture, unfinished business should be concluded.   The situation is very serious, and your call 
upon Members to consider the consequences of throwi ng away ten years of work is both timely and 
necessary.  We have carefully listened to the wa rnings you have expressed about the long-term risks 
to the organisation.  We take them seriously.  They  reinforce our determination to forge ahead in the 
DDA negotiations.  The Ministerial meetings and Summits within the next few weeks offer an 
occasion for some Members to engage in frank ex changes in order to establish a clear political 
understanding about the direction that Leaders a nd Ministers want the Doha Round and the WTO to 
take, and the mandates that they consequently wish  to give their negotiators.  While the European 
Union looks forward to these discussions, we do not think the negotiators can afford to go into stand-
by mode.  We believe work in Geneva must co ntinue while our political masters consider the 
situation. 
 
22. Guatemala 
 
As other delegations ha ve done, I wish to thank you for your  report and for the compilation of 
texts and reports reflecting the state of play in the negotiations.   As a member of the G-20, the Cairns 
Group, the G-33 and the SVEs Group, Guatemala s upports the statements by Brazil, Australia, 
Indonesia and Barbados, respectively, on behalf of these Groups.  It also endorses the statement by 
Chile for the Joint Proposal Group.  While it is tr ue that there are still major differences, viewed by 
some as impossible to bridge, progress has also unquestionably been made.  Albeit modest in some 
areas, advances have been significant in others.   Today for the first time, we have a compilation of 
negotiating texts and reports in all areas with which to measure the size of the gaps and focus political 
stakeholders' efforts on pressing key issues.  It is  obvious, moreover, that not all negotiating areas 
have reached the same level of progress.  Although bridging the gaps in some areas clearly calls for 
political decisions, in others there is still tec hnical work to be done, especially in areas where 
Members have recently begun working on text-based proposals.   Accordingly, my delegation 
recommends that we use the texts and the Chairs' reports as a basis for identifying those issues that 
require political decisions and those that still need to be worked on from a technical standpoint.  On 
that basis, bearing in mind that nothing is agreed  until everything is agreed, Guatemala suggests that 
Members refrain from placing tactical constraints on issues that could be resolved from a technical 
point of view, simply in the hope that political solutions may be found in other areas.  Lastly, 
Guatemala reiterates its commitment to the Round and to this organi zation.  It is determined to 
continue to work hard to achieve a balanced outcome  that will benefit all Members.  This, of course, 
implies taking due account of the development dimension. 
 
23. Hong Kong, China  
 
 I will start by thanking you for the report that you issued on 21 April and your supplementary 
remarks this morning.  In particular, we agree with ot hers that it is appropriate to rule out the three so-
called non-options that you outlined.  Our apprecia tion also goes to the Negotiating Group Chairs for 
their commendable efforts in leading the negotiations  and producing their reports, which represent a 
comprehensive and realistic assessment of the DDA negotiations over the past ten years, and more 
importantly provide us with a useful and practical starting point for our work going forward.  We all 
recognise that the Doha Round negotiations are at a cr itical juncture, and you have rightly called this 
TNC for Members to discuss the next steps collect ively.  In addressing this vexed question, we 
believe we need to keep in the forefront of our minds the total economic and systemic value that the 
successful conclusion of the Round will offer.  My delegation has time and again stressed in this 
forum and on other occasions in other venues the benefits of the Round and the opportunity and 
systemic costs of failure.  I will not repeat them  here but would like to quote what my Minister, 
together with those of 12 other Members, said in th eir joint open letter of 15 April, that the DDA deal 
is one “worth fighting for, both in its own right, and in the longer-term inte rests of the multilateral WT/GC/M/131 
Page 32  
 
  trading system, upon which we all so heavily rely.”  Much as we stress the value and benefits at stake, 
we cannot downplay the predicament that we are in.  As you have set out in your analysis, there has 
been no “real back and forth negotiation” to reso lve the stalemate in NAMA sectorals, and the gap 
there is apparently unbridgeable t oday.  Disappointing as it is in itself, this impasse also threatens to 
hold other areas in the Round hostage to the principl e of the Single Undertaking.  But fundamentally, 
are we satisfied that we have exhausted all possible means to narrow the gap in NAMA sectorals?  
Are we saying that there is no room for more work on other equally important issues?  Are we prepared to throw away ten years of hard work and conclude that there cannot be a deal, because there 
is no agreement over cuts on some tariff lines?  Surely not.  On NAMA sectorals, we have just received a proposal from the European Union of a new solution to take us forward.  As a Friend of 
Sectorals, Hong Kong, China has b een actively supportive of the propo sed product basket approach in 
recent months, and we welcome any further initiative  that will help break the impasse.  We will 
therefore study the EU’s proposal carefully.  This pr oposal also well illustrates the point that we have 
not yet tried out all possibilities.    In the same vein, as shown in the repor ts by various Negotiating 
Group Chairs, there is scope for further work on th e outstanding issues, notably on the rule-making 
side, to bring them to a greater level of maturity, building on what we have achieved thus far.  For 
instance, the current blockage on NAMA sectorals does not constrain us from cleaning up the Trade 
Facilitation negotiating text or building more consensus on the LDC Waiver, or on Domestic Regulation in Services.   This is not to say we  should conduct our business as usual, which, as you and 
others have noted, is neither a credible nor sustai nable option.  Rather, we should set or reset our 
focus on the areas where we can make further progr ess, while trying to resolve our differences on the 
gateway issue of NAMA sectorals.  We should a pproach the outstanding issues with a renewed sense 
of urgency and realism, and we should recalibrate our requests and offers in full cognizance of the 
dire consequences of having no Round, or only a partial Round, if even that is achievable.  This is the 
time for sober assessment of what is  at stake, for true reflection of our collective responsibility to the 
multilateral trading system, and for evaluation of th e alternatives available.  In this respect, we 
welcome and support your plan to conduct further consultations with groups and individuals on the 
best way forward.  At this critical juncture, Hong Kong China continues to stand by our commitment to play our part in reaching a successful conclusion of the Round.  We call on all Members to do the 
same.  
24. India  
 
Our delegation would like to associate itself with the statements by the G-20, G-33 and the 
Informal Group of Developing Countries.  Before we proceed to other matters, we would like to 
congratulate and commend you and all the Chairs of the Negotiating Groups for bringing out the documents on 21 April.  These documents provide  a snapshot of the progress achieved in the 
negotiations and also point to the wide gaps still existing, not only in NAMA sectorals but in many 
other areas of the negotiations.  Notwithstanding th ese differences and gaps, these documents have 
helped preserve the progress made in the negotia tions since 2001, as had been captured in the 
December 2008 texts.  Though we feel that our positi ons have not been reflected  adequately in certain 
documents, we do not want to discuss them today but  will bring them up in the respective Negotiating 
Groups at the appropriate time.  We fully share the views expressed by other delegations about the 
critical stage reached in the negotiations.  India, one of the founder members of the GATT and of the 
WTO, is deeply concerned about the impasse in the negotiations and its adverse implications for 
global trade in general and for developing countries in particular.  India stands fully committed to 
bringing the Round to a successful conclusion and in th is context, would like to refer to the relevant 
part of the Hainan Declaration of 13 April 2011 of the leaders of the BRICS countries, “ Brazil, 
China, India and South Africa remain committed a nd call upon other members to support a strong, 
open, rule-based multilateral trading system embodied in the World Trade Organization and a successful, comprehensive and balanced conclusi on of the Doha Development Round, built on the 
progress already made and consistent with its deve lopment mandate.”  India is willing and keen to  WT/GC/M/131 
 Page 33 
 
 
  engage with the rest of the membership in all form ats and on all issues, to seek constructive solutions 
to the problems that confront us in the Round. 
 While all of us strive in the weeks and m onths ahead to resolve the deadlock on NAMA 
sectorals and the other outstanding issues, we need to constantly remind ourselves that this Round is 
the only round in the last seven decades that h as been specially designated as a Development Round, 
with the professed aim to bring the benefits of globa lisation and international trade within reach of the 
developing countries so that they can successfully  tackle the challenges of poverty, unemployment 
and growth.  In this regard, we do feel very disappointed when we note the attempt to shift the 
discourse from development to purely mercantilist i ssues, most of them having scant relevance for 
developing countries.  We fully share your views that allowing a gradual drift in the process, or 
renegotiating the mandate at this late stage, or  continuing with business as usual are not feasible 
options to bring the Round to a successful conclusion  by end-2011.  We must, therefore, collectively 
think of all options and alternative paths to reach  our objective of concludi ng the Round - whether in 
one go or in a phased manner.  In this regard we appreciate the hard work put in by you to consult 
with individual delegations and gr oups of countries to exchange views on the next steps.  We hope 
that your endeavours will bear fruit and you would be able to bring the collective views of the 
membership on the way forward, to the next TNC meeting for a thorough discussion and decision.  In this context, we all need to be mindful of the twin  deadlines that we have set  for ourselves, of July 
2011 for the conclusion of the text-based negotiatio ns and of mid-December 2011, when we have 
scheduled our next Ministerial meeting.  Before I conclude, I would like to draw the attention of the 
membership to the fact that the WTO is not  only about the Doha Round of negotiations. It 
encompasses much more besides, including carrying on with the work in the Committees to make the 
global trading system more open, transparent, predicta ble and development-friendly.   In this context, I 
would like to mention the many outstanding implementation issues of the Uruguay Round which represent unfinished business and which were very mu ch alive until the Cancun Ministerial, but are 
under threat of falling through the cracks unless they ar e given due attention.  I hope that these issues 
receive the attention that they so richly deserve, because that would provide a re-affirmation of the 
commitment of the whole membership to th e development mandate of the Doha Round. 
 
25. Indonesia for the G-33 
 
The G-33 would like to thank you for convening  this meeting and for your report on the 
progress of the Doha negotiations. We commend your tireless efforts aimed at advancing the Doha 
Development Round of negotiations. We also wish  to commend the Chairs of various Negotiating 
Groups for their commitment to the process and fo r coming up with the Reports.   G-33 members are 
of the view that the Agriculture Chair's Report in  TN/AG/26 dated 21 April 2011 broadly captures the 
state of play of the Agriculture negotiations.  The report also does not depart from the expectation of 
all Members that any revision of the document TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4 must be based on a bottom-up, 
Member-driven process.  The report also contains th e Chair's assessment of various issues in the draft 
modalities text.  The future work should also invol ve discussion of this assessment.  That said, 
however, the G-33 is deeply concerned at the lack  of progress in the Doha negotiations, despite the 
collective agreement of Members to conclude the Round this year.  Substantial divergences have 
emerged over key outstanding issues, and the window of opportunity is narrowing fast, but is not yet 
completely closed.  The G-33 therefore urges all Members to engage immediately to find creative solutions.  We attach very high importance to th e conclusion of the Round with development as its 
core.  We believe that failure to conclude the R ound will be very costly a nd detrimental not only to 
the development interests of most  of the Members, but also to the credibility of the multilateral 
trading system as a whole.  On the future proces s that we will embark on, the G-33 will abide by the 
collective wisdom of the Members, the Agriculture Ch air, and the Director-General, provided that this 
process will be guided by the principles of incl usiveness, multilateralism, a bottom-up approach and 
the centrality of development.  Finally, the G-33 lo oks forward to the resolution of the technical and WT/GC/M/131 
Page 34  
 
  political issues on the SSM and will engage constructiv ely in any future activities in the Agriculture 
negotiations, with a view to concluding the Round and advancing its development mandate. 
 
26. Indonesia for ASEAN 
 
I take this opportunity to th ank you for your latest assessment of the status of the Doha 
Development Round negotiations.  ASEAN welcomes  the circulation of the documents on 21 April 
2011. We thank you for your work in guiding th ese negotiations and for your frank assessments 
outlined in your covering note to  the documents.  ASEAN also highly  appreciates your tireless efforts, 
and also the hard work that all the Negotiating Gr oup Chairs have put into preparing these documents.  
We agree with your assessment as TNC Chair that "these documents will leave no-one in any doubt 
about the value of what is on the table".  ASE AN values the comprehensiveness and breadth of the 
package before us, and the fact that these documents  bring us to the point where for the first time 
since 2001, Members will have the opportunity to consider the entire Doha package.  As you have 
noted, however, this current package of documents also reveals the many issues that still divide 
negotiations and put the successful conclusion of  the Round at serious risk.  As such, ASEAN 
reminds Members of the repeated commitments made by our leaders to concluding the Round.  ASEAN remains committed to the process and will conti nue to engage construc tively in negotiations.  
This includes taking the last and most difficult step s towards concluding the Round.  Nonetheless, we 
are also very mindful of the issues in NAMA and sectorals which you have highlighted as significant 
gaps in our negotiations.  ASEAN recognises that a clear political decision is required.  We need a 
new approach to solving these.  In this regard, we  welcome any new ideas that can be brought to the 
negotiating table as a middle-ground approach in bri dging the existing gaps.  We call on, and express 
our support for the efforts of, the key players in these specific issues to  exercise leadership, 
pragmatism and flexibility.  As we consider ne xt steps in our negotiations, ASEAN wishes to 
underline the greater benefit and value of the multilatera l trading system to us all.  There are costs to 
failure, and we need to reflect on these carefully .  These costs include foregone economic growth, 
more open markets, insurance against protecti onism, and most importantly, opportunities for the 
poorest among us in developing and least-developed countries.  ASEAN wants to assure Members of 
our commitment to the WTO.  Vietnam and Ca mbodia, as Recently-Acceded Members, are 
vigorously implementing their commitments and have  actively participated in these negotiations.  
Laos is working hard to accede to the WTO, rec ognising the importance of this organisation to global 
trade.  Our other members play constructive roles in both the DDA and the WTO's regular 
committees.  We trust that other Members will show  the same spirit of common responsibility in the 
next few months.  ASEAN will continue to strongly support your efforts in bringing the negotiations 
to a fruitful conclusion.  We support your call for all Members to reflect seriously in the coming 
weeks.  We will need to be very cautious in taking  the next steps forward in order to best preserve 
what is most valuable for all of us in the multilateral trading system. 
 
27. Israel 
 
Israel wishes to associate itself with the stat ements by Switzerland for the G-10 and by Chile 
for the Joint Proposal Group regarding the work in the TRIPS Council in Special Session on the 
multilateral system for registration of GIs for wines a nd spirits.  At the outset, let me join others in 
praising the hard work and efforts that you and all the Chairpersons of the different Negotiating 
Groups – as well as the Secretariat – have invested in this process in the weeks and months leading to 
this meeting.  As a result of those tireless efforts,  we have now before us a set of documents that 
provides us with a clear picture of where we stand, a so-called "état des lieux" of the Round, which 
we consider vital to enhancing our understa nding of the negotiations and assessing possible ways 
forward.  Although recognizing the worthiness of the work undertaken in variable geometries and 
formats, Israel firmly believes that there is no s ubstitute to the multilateral track, which guarantees the 
ownership over the negotiating process and a ny potential outcome, as well as the necessary 
transparency and inclusiveness.  Ov er the past weeks we have heard with great concern that we could  WT/GC/M/131 
 Page 35 
 
 
  be facing a potential impasse in our discussions.  We are indeed concerned, because we have always 
been firm supporters of the multilateral trading syst em and we fear the potential negative impact of 
not concluding the Round.  In this sense, as ha s been the case throughout the past ten years of 
negotiations, Israel remains committed to doing its outmost to contribute its share to reaching an 
agreed outcome to the Round – an outcome accepta ble and beneficial to all Members across this 
room.  Nevertheless, recognizing that all Members, big or small, have a shared responsibility over the 
fate of the Doha Round, the flexibility and cons tructive engagement of key Members of this 
organization is crucial in our efforts to reach a good port and successfully conclude the Round.  
Regarding substance, we must voice a sentiment of  frustration.  We, as well as the rest of the 
membership, have invested over the years precious  time and resources in the negotiations.  Those 
collective efforts have indeed amounted to what co uld be fairly considered as progress, in the course 
of the months since the beginning of the year.  This progress in such areas as TRIPS, Trade Facilitation and NTBs in the NAMA Negotiating Gr oup, is noteworthy and well captured in the 
documents tabled by the chairpersons.  At the same time- several gateway issues are now seen as possibly not lending themselves to a politically ag reed solution among key Members, which leaves 
the entire Round at grave risk.  This is a serious s ituation and we urge all Members to contemplate its 
implications for the WTO, and more widely for th e trading system and global governance.  Israel 
would like to highlight that – in our view - both market access and rules-related issues are important 
elements in a final package aimed at reaching an outcome that could be deemed satisfactory.  Thus, both dimensions should be further discussed in the n ear future.  Finally, regarding our future work, 
Israel is of the view that the current state of uncer tainty regarding the process may be injurious to our 
goals and objectives.  Therefore, working on a clear definition of the work that may lie ahead of us 
should be one of our priorities at this stage.  
28. Jamaica 
 
Let me at the outset take this opportunity to associate my delegation with the statements by 
the SVEs, the ACP, the G33 and the Informal Group of Developing Countries.  We also wish to 
recognize the important points made by the African  Group.  My delegation wishes to thank you for 
your frank assessment of the state of play, and thank you and the Chairs of the Negotiating Groups for your tireless efforts and hard work in preparing the reports.  We believe that this compendium is a 
useful document which provides an overview of wh ere we are in the negotiations.  My delegation 
recognizes that we are in a dire political situation.  We share the view that while being realistic about 
the extent of the crisis, we ought not to accept a noti on of inertia and paralysis.  In that regard, we 
wish to emphasize that Jamaica agrees with the view that the abandonment of the Round or stopping 
and restarting the Round are not acceptable options.  Ou r work over the past ten years has been and 
remains valuable, even though incomplete in several  areas of interest to us and other SVEs.  The 
progress made in the areas of importance to devel oping countries, including SVEs, must be preserved 
and built upon.  We feel that there remains significan t work to be done to ensure that the development 
dimension is adequately addressed within the cont ext of the Round.  While we agree that rigid 
timelines can be problematic – as current developments attest – Jamaica feels that to move forward without some sense of urgency is simply not feasible.  We must all be weighing the costs of protracted negotiations that require the expensive deployment of  resources that we can scarcely afford here in 
Geneva and in our capitals.  I say all of that to say that negotiating for the sake of negotiating or for 
keeping up appearances is also not an option with which my delegation could be comfortable.  We 
agree with the view that the stability of the multilate ral trading system must remain a priority in our 
next steps.  In considering the way forward, we mu st act quickly and prudently to prevent or mitigate 
damage to the organization and the multilateral trading system for which it is a custodian.  
Recognizing the dire situation in which we find our selves and its potential implications for the DDA 
negotiations and the multilateral trading system as a whole, there is a need for constructive dialogue 
and consultations among Members on how to break the current deadlock so that we can move forward 
collectively in the negotiations.  My de legation is committed to such efforts. 
 WT/GC/M/131 
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  29. Kenya for the African Group 
 
We support the statements by Bangladesh for th e LDCs and Mauritius for the ACP.  I would 
like to start by thanking you and all the Chairs of the Negotiating Groups for your reports, and reiterate again the African Group’s full support in our collective efforts to advance the negotiations. 
Not concluding the DDA and its deve lopment objectives is not an option for Africa.  It is our 
considered view that the situation is graver than it might look.  At this critical juncture, it is obvious 
that the dilemma is not only about discarding ten y ears of multilateral work, but rather questioning the 
role of the WTO.  In 2001, the developing countri es were reluctant to launch a new Round, as they 
were still grappling and digesting the Uruguay Rou nd outcome and its implem entation challenges.  
However, the Doha Development Agenda was la unched ostensibly to a ddress their development 
concerns.  Lamentably and since then, the focu s of the negotiations has gradually shifted from 
development to market access.  Having said that, I would like to underscore the true commitment by 
all African countries to engage constructively to co mplete this Round.  The African Group believes in 
the multilateral trading system and expects the global benefits to accrue to all of us, especially the 
poorest.  We had the motivation for global co-opera tion, but today the multilateral trading system 
appears to be stalling.  This threatens the futu re of multilateral trade negotiations.  After all the 
intensive efforts and attendant costs born throughout the years, there is need to change our style of 
doing business to save the situation.  At this poi nt, we wish to pose the following question:  “Is it 
expected that after ten years of tireless efforts, developing countries will be invited to join another 
Round of trade negotiations if this one fails?  Unfort unately, the answer to this question is not an easy 
one.  We wonder, if the Doha Development Agenda is not concluded this year, what consequences it 
would have on future attempts to negotiate.  Definitely the differences that are not bridgeable at this 
stage shall be weighed against the role of the WT O as a negotiating body, and we therefore urge all 
Members to be realistic and to re-think the global co sts that are inherent in the failure of the system.  
Our decisions today will shape the future of our world.   Thus, it requires true wisdom to get us out of 
this impasse.  We will not go into our detaile d response to the documents produced by our 
Negotiating Group Chairs, whose efforts we again laud and encourage.  We shall be circulating an 
appropriate response in writing at a later stage to ensure that our positions are on record when we 
agree to re-engage. 
 But allow us to make the following remarks.  We are extremely concerned at the willingness 
of some Members to hold up an important trade- based development and growth package, without 
attempting to make any contribution to the positive acquis of the Round to date in favour of LDCs, 
SVEs and other disadvantaged economies.  Although we believe in the Single Undertaking, we are 
also keenly aware that the speed at which the va rious  elements of the Round have moved has been 
unequal.  Here we would like to register our concer n at the slow speed with which our concerns have 
been addressed, and the lack of engagement by our pa rtners therein.  A failure at this juncture will 
only strengthen those undesirable protectionist elements within our own countries.  It is no secret that 
serious consideration is being given world-wide to  alternatives to the multilateral trading system’s 
capacity to open markets based on so lid rules.  We cannot allow those elements to win.  We welcome 
the new proposals to break the impasse.  We should, however, also bear in mind that there are also 
older proposals touching on development submitte d earlier and still on the table undiscussed.  We ask 
that due recognition be given to such proposals.  Furthermore, all our previously submitted proposals 
remain on the table and must be discussed, together  with the new proposals.   Finally, the African 
Group would like to stress once again that for Africa, development outcomes in each of the negotiating areas remain the main prio rity of the Round, and Africa w ill join the consensus only if the 
Round delivers on concrete de velopment deliverables.  We theref ore call on all partners to rethink 
their strategies at this important moment for the common good of the Round.  
  WT/GC/M/131 
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  30. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
 
I would like to start by thanking you and all the Chairs of the Negotiating Groups for their 
reports.  Saudi Arabia shares the disappointment of  its fellow Members with the current impasse in 
the Doha Round negotiations.  At the same time, we ag ree that the past ten years of effort must be 
converted into concrete benefits for our countries and for our multilateral trading system.  In this 
spirit, I would like to reaffirm the view that th e conclusion of the Doha Round will provide a much-
needed boost to the global economy by facilitating gr eater transparency and market access, and by 
strengthening confidence in the multilateral trading system overall.  Notwithstanding the current lack 
of progress in the negotiations, it is important to reconfirm at this time that our collective commitment 
to the aims of the Doha Round remains as st rong as ever.  Although the critical window of 
opportunity for concluding the Round continues to narrow further, efforts should be intensified to 
engage and seek out all possible options to conc lude the Round.  Failure of the Round is not an 
option, because in this case all Members would lo se, and the poorest countries stand to lose the most 
through a delayed conclusion of this Development Round.  Despite sharing the widespread 
disappointment concerning the limited progress of th e Doha Round negotiations, Saudi Arabia stands 
steadfastly by its commitment to further an incl usive and transparent negotiating process that can 
ensure a balanced and fair outcome of the Round.  We recognize the hard work and dedication of the 
Chairs of the Negotiating Groups and hope that the package of their work can evolve toward consensus, with some n ecessary adjustments.  Although the remarks of some key Members leave little 
room for optimism, we hope our consensus today on the seriousness of the situ ation and on the need 
for more wisdom in the coming weeks will enable us  to collectively salvage this Round.  Finally, 
Saudi Arabia would like to acknowledge the WTO's continuing importance as an institution, and the 
daily accomplishments achieved separate and apart fr om the negotiations.  We would like to reiterate 
our continuing full support for the organization' s value, as expressed in all of its functions. 
 
31. Republic of Korea  
 
Korea would like to associate itself with the st atement by the Philippines for the G-33 and by 
Switzerland for the G-10.  I would like to thank you for your frank assessment of where we stand at 
this critical juncture.  As you quite aptly pointed  out this morning, the decade-old DDA negotiations 
are in a serious stalemate.  We are particularly  disappointed over the current situation, as we are 
vividly mindful of the strong political message from our leaders gathered both at the G20 Seoul 
Summit and the APEC Leader’s Meeting in Yokoham a in November 2010.  Nevertheless, we share 
the view that now is not the time to give up on the Doha Round.  Thus, we agree that the three non-
options you have just referred to - business as usual, stop and start from scratch, and drifting away - are not the options that we are collectively looking for.  As regards the next steps, I would like to 
make three comments.  First, the new documents circ ulated before Easter should merit our attention, 
as they are impressive in their comprehensive coverage  and reflect well the work we have done so far.  
We appreciate all Negotiating Group Chairs for their sincere efforts to come up with the documents 
under such a difficult situation.  We hope that the do cuments will serve as useful references so that 
Members will continue the negotiations in all nego tiating areas.  Second, while various options related 
to Plan B may be discussed in an informal way, it is premature to engage in a serious discussion on 
Plan B.  Rather, it is time to continue the negotiatio ns with a renewed sense of urgency.  This is why, 
as Australia said, our Minister, together with 12 ot her trade Ministers, has recently signed a joint open 
letter calling for an early and successful conclusion of the Round.  We hope that these Ministers will be able to provide further momentum for the negotiations as they meet in Montana and in Paris in May.  In this regard, we support the suggestion that work on each negotiating area should continue, on 
each Negotiation Group Chair’s initiative and judgment.   Trade Facilitation is one such area.  I can 
assure you that our delegation will continue to pa rticipate in the negotiations in an active and 
constructive manner.  Finally, we very much appr eciate the EU’s recent efforts to find common 
ground in sectorals.  The EU’s proposal on sectorals should deserve our careful consideration at this WT/GC/M/131 
Page 38  
 
  critical juncture.  We hope that Members, particularly major players, will start discussing it without 
prejudice to their final position, in order to get the ball rolling.    
32. Malaysia 
 
Malaysia would like to join others in thanki ng you for your assessment on the state of play of 
the DDA negotiations.  We would also like to endorse the statement made by Australia for the Cairns 
Group and associate ourselves with the statement by  the Philippines for ASEAN.  We welcome the 
recently issued Easter "package",  which represents ten years of our hard work on the Doha Round.  
We wish to extend our appreciation for your leadersh ip and the untiring efforts of the Chairs of the 
Negotiating Groups in tabling these documents.  We are well aware of the stumbling blocks that 
currently persist and agree with you on the graveness of the situation before us.  The very important 
question that we have to face now is – how do we proceed from here?  Malaysia remains steadfast in 
its commitment to concluding the Round, and this is evidenced through the letter our Minister jointly 
signed with 12 other Trade Ministers on 15 April, as in troduced by Australia this morning.  Failure is 
not an alternative for us, but we accept that we cannot carry on with business as usual.  We welcome 
the EU proposal as a possible middle-ground approach in  bridging the gap in sectorals.  We urge the 
key players to positively look into the compromise solution proposed if it adequately reflects their interests and if it could serve as a basis to move th e negotiations forward in order to break the current 
deadlock.  We wish to reaffirm that we will con tinue to support you and the consultations you will be 
undertaking with Members on the possible next steps.   We stand ready to work closely with all 
Members, and we look forward to the entire member ship exercising collective responsibility in these 
coming weeks and months ahead as we embark on our pursuit towards finding the best option to move ahead and preserving the credibility of  the multilateral trading system. 
 
33. Mauritius for the ACP Group 
 
I would like to thank you for the comprehensiv e report on the state of play in the DDA. I 
particularly thank you for the candid and frank diag nostic of the situation and its wider implications 
for the global trading system.  We are also thankful  to the Chairs of the Negotiating Groups for their 
tremendous efforts in providing us with their repor ts, which provide Members broadly with a common 
baseline on where we are.  It is, of course, obvi ous that these are Chairs' reports and not discussed 
amongst the Members.  We also welcome the EU pr oposal in NAMA which is a genuine effort to try 
to focus on real negotiations on a difficult issue, with a view to finding a way forward.  Although the ACP is not a party to sectoral participation, we ur ge all concerned Members to consider this proposal 
to sort out the present impasse.   It is, however, clear th at the DDA is in a stalemate.   It is a reality that 
we have to acknowledge, however frustrating this is, mainly for the small and vulnerable economies 
of the ACP Group.  It is, however, important that th e membership not give in to the easy temptation of 
starting a negative blame-game instead of reflecting on the implications of this deadlock and how to 
map out the future.  Clearly, we cannot just thro w away ten years of protracted negotiations and 
considerable gains that would have improved the gl obal trading system.  In reflecting on the present 
situation, let us not forget where we are coming from.  The global trading system was and is an imbalanced one which is strongly biased against many developing countries.  This is why in 2001, we 
dubbed this Round a Development Round where devel opment outcomes would be the measure of its 
success and where at long last we could start correcti ng some of the glaring imbalances in the system, 
and this after more than 70 years of a tilted multilateral trading history.  Our hopes were geared towards certain clear development outcomes from an  ACP perspective, namely:  (i) achieving some 
systemic gains in changing the mercantilist orienta tion of the system towards a more development-
friendly one;  (ii) achieving some gain in market access for developing countries or, at least, for some 
to preserve existing market-access opportunities;  (iii ) to address the huge distortions in the market, 
mainly in Agriculture, that developed-country subs idies engender;  (iv)  to address some of the 
imbalances in the horizontal rules governing trade,  which were against development.  The ACP Group 
of countries, which are small and vulnerable, did no t have the luxury of a choice in committing to the  WT/GC/M/131 
 Page 39 
 
 
  DDA.  It was compelling, in view of the need fo r a working and viable rule-based multilateral trading 
system as a vehicle for their smooth integration into the global economy and to guard against any form of unilateralism by other bigger players.  This is why the ACP has always engaged 
constructively in the DDA, and this engagement has undeniably contributed in resolving some 
difficult problems to allow for progress.  Yet we ar e faced with a stalemate to-day, and the ACP will 
have to pay a high price if the Round is not conclude d.  Let us not fool ourselves, those who will be 
the most severely affected will be the poorer count ries, and this will have deep consequences for the 
global system as a whole.  But beyond the economic effect of a failure for our countries, there will be a resounding interrogation that our leaders will inevitab ly have to address.  After having invested so 
many years and resources in those negotiations, what is the outcome?  It is one where the multilateral 
trading system cannot deliver on its promise of de velopment, and the question arises, why must we 
have faith in such a system?  To prevent that cred ibility crisis, the ACP believes that we are not in a 
technical dilemma in the negotiations anymore.  Nor are we in a process dilemma where some 
tweaking here and there will deliver.  We are clearl y in a political problem and we should collectively 
seek to consider ways and means to  face up to the situation, what options are available to us and how 
we face up to that situation.  We shall need to be  creative collectively and chart out a course of action 
which will have as its horizon the December Minister ial Conference and beyond.  Such a process has 
to be Member-driven.  In so doing, we need to  think about how we ensure, on the one hand, the 
continued existence of the WTO as an institution wh ose indispensable role as the guardian of a rule-
based system no-one can deny, and on the other, en sure that its normative role in liberalising trade 
does not get frozen.  We hope that Members will, beyond mercantilist concerns of market access, turn 
their attention to these broader questions. 
 
34. Mexico  
 
We thank you for your opening remarks and fully agree with your detailed assessment of the 
situation in which we now find ourselves, and your profound insights regardi ng the consequences of a 
failure of the Round.  We also thank all the Chairs  of the Negotiating Groups - with the exception of 
Services - for their outstanding work in showing us  the current situation in each area.  These are 
difficult times for the negotiations.  We are in an extremely critical situation which Members jointly 
have to find a way to overcome.  We agree with you that there are three options which are not in fact 
options:  continuing business as usua l;  stopping and starting from scratch, in other words, clearing the 
slate and beginning anew;  and letting the negotiations  simply drift away and disappear.  The question 
is, therefore, what to do to in order to find a way out of a situation in which the gaps, at least between 
some Members, are so wide as to appear unbridgeable , at least for the time being.  Mexico's Minister 
of the Economy is among the 13 Ministers who si gned the letter circulated on 15 April expressing 
deep concern about lack of progress in the Round and the fact that our collective ability to conclude 
the Round this year might seriously be in questi on.  The letter states that the 13 Members will not 
stand by with such important stakes in play for th e multilateral system, and are prepared to show even 
further flexibility to contribute to the successful c onclusion of the Round this year, calling on the rest 
of the membership to do the same.  Accordingly, Mexi co's first priority is to successfully conclude the 
Round and to do so this year.  As you yourself mentioned, our attention was drawn yesterday to a 
book edited by Richard Baldwin and Simon Evenett, containing contributions by leading experts on 
the subject.  The title of the book, "Why World Lead ers Must Resist the False Promise of Another 
Doha Delay" is eloquent indeed.  We not only agr ee with the title, but also with the content of the 
book.  We must resist that false promise, and the only way to do so is for us, here in Geneva, to reach 
an agreement that will avoid our pursuing this see mingly interminable Round.   In fact, if we 
continue as we have done so far, stalling the nego tiating process, the Doha Round will remain with us 
for many years to come. 
 
Let us face the facts:  no one will venture to sign the death warrant of the Round.  Moreover, 
most Members would object to doing away with it, because that would mean fal ling into the "clear the 
slate and begin anew" scenario, which in practice does not exist.  Many years would go by before we WT/GC/M/131 
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  agreed to hold another round of negotiations, in wh ich the same issues as those that are complicating 
our lives today would certainly re-emerge.  Therefor e, the only solution is for us to conclude the 
Round this year.  We are not in a position today to know whether the outcomes would be any more, or 
less, ambitious than what is set forth in the texts circulated by the Chairs.  What we do know is that 
whatever we may or may not manage to agree is the final package, will have to be ready in time for 
the December Ministerial meeting.  Mexico wishes to make clear that it is open to discussing different 
alternatives in order to achieve th e basic aim, which is to move beyond the Doha Round, but to do so 
in a successful manner and, as for the outcomes, the more ambitious the better.  Although the serious 
gaps in the NAMA sectorals are not, in the absolute , the only obstacle we are facing, any effort aimed 
at bridging positions is welcome.  An informal document prepared by the EU was recently circulated, 
and introduced by that delegation at the present meeting, outlining a proposal that might prove 
acceptable to the key stakeholders.  We thank the author s for their effort and, subject to more in-depth 
analysis, Mexico believes that this paper could ser ve as a basis for serious discussions on the issue, 
involving a wider circle of Members.  In this connection, one of the main problems we have 
encountered in these negotiations is to follow rep eatedly the same negotiating procedures, hoping to 
achieve different results.  A sausage-making mach ine will not produce ballpoint pens if it uses the 
same manufacturing process and the same inputs.  There are clearly some things that have to continue 
to be done in the same way, since they have prove d effective and productive, but  there are others that 
need to change.  Let us discuss this in all frankn ess and make the necessary adjustments.  When the 
Duke of Enghien was killed in 1804, Fouché, Napole on's Minister of Police, said, "C'est pire qu'un 
crime, c'est une faute".  In English this has been translated as, "More than a crime, it was a blunder", 
and in Spanish,  "Más que un crimen, fue una estupi dez" - a phrase that would be entirely appropriate 
if the Round were to collapse.  That  would indeed be a colossal blunder. 
 
35. Namibia 
 
Thank you for calling this critical informal TNC me eting, which we believe is in line with the 
principle of transparency and inclusiveness.  Nami bia wishes to associate her self with the statements 
by Mauritius for the ACP and Kenya for the African Group.  Moreover, we are extremely worried about the state of play in the DDA negotiations, especially the gridlock on key areas of interest to developing countries, and Africa in particular.  Th e worst-case scenario shoul d the negotiations fail, 
could lock exports of smaller c ountries out of major world markets and derail expectations of 
integrating at the multilateral level, thus we shoul d remain positive in trying by all means possible to 
safe this Round.  Our governments have spent e normous human and financial resources to ensure 
effective participation in the Round, in which we believed developmenta l objectives were at the 
pinnacle of the negotiations.  Our assessment of th e package on the table is that it does not support the 
interests of developing countries, in that very little  of actual development value has been obtained in 
the last ten years of negotiations.  This is due to the refusal by developed countries to provide further 
flexibilities to developing countries.  As such, Nami bia would only support an outcome of the Round 
that is development-oriented, where developing c ountries will have similar access to the developed 
countries' markets.  After having read through th e various chairpersons' reports, we are unable to 
make an informed recommendation on the way forwar d, because we do not understand what it is that 
we are losing or gaining in this Round.  It is Namibia’s considered view that a study should be 
commissioned to take stock of the negotiations and clearly articulate situations of various 
configurations in order to help us make informed  decisions.  Without this study, we might make 
decisions based on gut reactions, which may lead to hasty conclusions.  Finally, I wish to encourage 
colleagues to remain positive and think of what positive change we can achieve in the Round, as 
opposed to protectionism, which is not in accordance with WTO principles. 
 
36. 
Nepal 
 
We thank you for your comprehensive report and an alysis of the dynamics that are at play in 
the Doha Round.  We also thank the Chairs of  the Negotiating Groups for their hard work and  WT/GC/M/131 
 Page 41 
 
 
  commendable patience to produce documents.  We support the statement by Bangladesh for the 
LDCs.  The first decade of the twenty-first century , which coincides with the launching of the Doha 
Development Agenda, also happens to be the decade of the Brussels Program of Action about 
partnership for development and partnership against poverty in LDCs.  The decade has witnessed 
tremendous geopolitical and economic s hocks of an exceptional nature.   Business as usual is certainly 
not an option.  These are challe nging times for all of us, but the compounding effects of a series of 
multiple crises on LDCs have been disproportiona te, and the burden of their cumulative impacts on 
them has become unbearable, through no fault of their own.  These challenges call for a greater 
commitment to, and demonstrated enhanced level of, assistance to help LDCs overcome their long-
standing structural impediments and vulnerabilities wh ich have a great bearing on the maintenance of 
peace, security, progress and prosperity in this increasingly interconnected and globalized world.  
When it comes to addressing the fallouts from these shocks, trade as an engine of growth and 
powerful instrument for poverty reduction would have been a natural part of a response strategy.  The 
deadlock in the Round is a big setback to the multi lateral trading system and, for that matter, for 
multilateralism's failure to address global developm ent challenges.  But there is no escape from 
remaining engaged, in order to get unblock the situat ion we are in at the moment.  We agree with you 
that it is necessary now to come together and "look at the wider picture and keep some distance from 
narrow national interests."  Nepal would like to re iterate its commitment to the inevitability of the 
multilateral approach to address the growing list of challenges on multiple fronts. 
 The launching of the Doha Development Agenda in 2001 came with many expectations.  The 
global focus was centred on the develo pment dimension.  It is disappoint ing to note in page after page 
of the documents the remaining gaps, despite year s of tireless and intensive negotiations.  Since we 
have been talking about the DDA in the WTO fo r a decade now, to many, the WTO is seen as the 
Doha Round.  Back home, we have a huge duty to  explain to the common people who have long been 
aspiring to benefit from the developmen t dimension of this Round.   We  need to have answers to their 
questions.  Where did the poor and voiceless peopl e figure in our decade-long development discourse 
of the Doha Development Agenda in this house?  What relevance does this organization have for 
those who confront the issue of survival on a daily basis?  These questions are linked to our work here 
and the future of the organization, and we need to ta ke them seriously.  LDCs have a great stake in the 
rule-based, predictable, and non-discriminatory multilatera l trading system that is the WTO.   To us, 
the WTO is a rule-based system.  It not only mak es rules but enforces them.  We remain committed to 
maintaining the relevance and legitimacy of this or ganization and to strengthening this system for the 
protection of the poor and vulnerable.  In a w eek’s time, we go to Istanbul for the Fourth UN 
Conference on LDCs.  This conference takes place once in a decade and is the only conference 
exclusively dedicated to the aspirations of the poorest, most vulnerable, marginalized and most 
resource-challenged people living in 48 least-devel oped countries constituting about 12 per cent of the 
world population, accounting for less than two per cent of world GDP and a mere one per cent of 
global trade.  This conference is not just another c onference in a series of countless conferences.  It is 
about people, peace, security, stability and developm ent in the next decade.  We should look to 
Istanbul with all seriousness for a forward-looking and result-oriented program of action.  As we 
continue to remain engaged in c onsultations to unblock the deadlocked situation in the DDA, it is 
compellingly necessary to find a possible way to come  out with actionable and result-oriented actions 
and deliverables to ensure additionality from th e Istanbul conference.  These deliverables should 
include:  (i) an early and effective implementation of DFQF for all LDCs;  (ii) simplified rules of 
origin;  (iii) building supply-side capacity, expandi ng infrastructures, building productive capacity and 
adjustment assistance through enhanced resources fr om Aid for Trade and the Enhanced Integrated 
framework;  (iv) some mechanism should be agreed to deal effectively with commodity problems;  
(v) augment institutional strength and allow policy space;  and (vi) put accession of LDCs on a fast 
track, as was promised in 2002.  These are less sensitive and less burdensome matters, but their cumulative effects will go a long way to creating a salutary impact on the LDCs.  WT/GC/M/131 
Page 42  
 
  37. New Zealand 
 
We meet today to discuss the state of play in the Doha Round negotiations.  However, in 
reflecting on that, it is important that we first take some time to recall why we have invested so much 
effort to date in the Round, and why we believe it is worth continuing efforts to find a way forward.  
The abiding value of the legal framework of rules negotiated under the GATT and the WTO in 
advancing multilateral trade, and the role this has pl ayed in helping to resist protectionist pressures 
during times of economic crisis, is clear.  The rules-based multilateral trading system, built over 
decades of successive negotiating rounds, has been, a nd will, we believe, con tinue to be, of great 
benefit to us all.  It is because this system has the potential to be strengthened further that New 
Zealand continues to make the successful conclu sion of the Doha Round as our number one trade 
priority.  Our commitment here has been highlighted  in the letter that New Zealand has recently co-
signed, along with a number of other concerned Members and which has been circulated as a TNC 
document.  We thank you and the Chairs of the Negotiating Groups for your reports.  In our view, 
they usefully highlight the state of play in all areas of the negotiation.   They also reflect the 
tremendous efforts which have been made to arrive  at agreed substantive outcomes in a number of 
key areas, while also highlighting areas where further work is required.  At this juncture, we do not 
intend to comment in detail on the reports.   We do, however, wish to endorse the statements by 
Australia for the Cairns Group and Chile for the Joint Proposal Group in the TRIPS GI Register negotiations.  We agree wholeheartedly with the obser vation in your introductory report that there is a 
need now for careful reflection on the next steps a nd, in particular, that Members should “think hard 
about the consequences of throwing away ten years of solid multilateral work”.  We note your specific 
reference to the “political gap” on NAMA, and your de piction of the reality that bridging that gap will 
be necessary to unblock progress on the Round as a whole.  We therefore encourage continued engagement, particularly with and between key play ers, in order to find a way through the current 
impasse in this area.  We welcome all constr uctive proposals that are aimed at achieving this 
necessary engagement.  Beyond the NAMA gap, the Chai rs’ reports also highlight the extent to which 
other important issues remain to be resolved.  In th at context, we were particularly struck by the 
concluding remark made by the Chair of the Negotiating Group on Rules in respect of fisheries subsidies that in addressing the challenges in th is area, negotiators will have to focus on the 
incontrovertible reality of the ongoing depletion of global fish stocks, no matter how inconvenient, 
and less on protecting their short-term defensive inte rests.  We recognise that we are still some way 
from locating the desired solutions that will resolv e the current logjam.  What we are clear about, 
however, is that the Doha Round remains a work in  progress, that extremely useful work has been 
achieved over the last ten years, and that we must fi nd a way forward to complete this work.  There is 
too much at stake to arrive at any other conclusion. 
 
38. Oman 
 
This is no doubt one of the most important TNC meetings in the life of the Doha Round.  I 
think at this stage all of us have to be realistic and very frank.  To begin w ith, I would like to convey 
the profound thanks of the Sultanate of Oman to you and to all the Chairs of the Negotiating Groups 
for presenting a comprehensive package of nego tiating documents.  We recognize the tremendous 
amount of work done so far, as reflected in these documents.  However, we should not deceive 
ourselves - there is still a tremendous amount of wo rk to be done in practically all areas of the 
negotiations.  In this regard, we share your assessm ent of the current situation.  Oman strongly 
believes in the rules-based mu ltilateral trading system.  Oman  acceded to the WTO because we 
recognized its value and its contribution to trade re lations and to internati onal economic cooperation.  
We made extensive commitments to join the WT O, and these commitments are close to, or even 
exceed, the anticipated results of the Doha Round.   We had the genuine expectation that other 
Members would match our level of commitments and would summon the political will to make the 
necessary courageous decisions to conclude the Round , similar to the courageous decision we made to 
accede to the WTO.  Today I want to express our disappointment that, after ten years, Oman and other  WT/GC/M/131 
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  RAMs are the only ones who have provided great market access opportuniti es to other Members, 
while other Members preach the benefits and ga ins of market opening but unfortunately do not 
practice it.  We have to make an honest, hard-headed  assessment and take the crucial decision of what 
we want to do, in the best interest of the WTO a nd in the best interests of its entire membership.  
Oman would support finding a new solution-oriented  approach around which consensus can be built, 
and we stand ready to engage in such efforts.  Before concluding, I would like to associate my 
delegation with the statement by Ch inese Taipei for the RAMs Group. 
 
39. Pakistan 
 
You are already steering the multilateral pro cess in the WTO in difficult times. Your 
introductory comments and the cover note to the documents on 21 April were concise, but comprehensive and revealing.  A lthough presently it appears to be difficult to move forward to 
complete the Round, the documents presented to the membership after the intensive phase of 
negotiations, launched since the beginning of the year, have captured the current state of play in all 
areas of the Doha mandate for the very first time since the beginning of the Round.  The hallmark of 
this effort was the engagement and hard work of all the players.  This is a step forward.  We can now 
see where we stand.  We agree that this is the time to reflect on our situation.  The point to reflect on 
is not only to find ways to conc lude the Round, but also the impact of failure on the multilateral rule-
based trading system that has been  so carefully and painstakingly developed.  All of us are the 
beneficiaries of this system.  We have to think a bout what is good for the system.  The issue is with 
the content and not with the process.  We have no option but to move forward, and a period of 
reflection will be necessary in order to begin our efforts from where we are at present.  We cannot afford to lose the gains and conve rgence achieved after ten years of endeavour.  The documents on the 
table reveal that we need to bridge gaps even in  areas other than NAMA sectorals, which can be done 
with consistent hard work and without losing mome ntum.  After the period of reflection, we may re-
engage in the same intensive ph ase as we witnessed during the last four months.  We will certainly 
welcome new ideas and proposals, including on NAMA sectoral issues, and remain engaged with an 
open mind, even during this phase of the Round.  Be fore concluding, I also associate my delegation 
with the statements by Brazil for the G-20, Austra lia for the Cairns Group and Indonesia for the G-33. 
 
40. Paraguay 
 
Thank you for your report.  I wish to support the statements by Brazil for the G-20 and 
Australia for the Cairns Group.   The year 20 11 opened with a propitious window of opportunity, 
signalling the genuine possibility of a successful y ear marked by the completion of these already 
long-standing Doha Round negotiations .  However, today the prospects are slim.  Through you, I want 
to thank the Chairs of the various Negotiating Groups for the considerable work they have 
accomplished.  The reports circulated reflect ten years' worth of negotiations.  Though we are not 
altogether satisfied with the results, we still cannot  set aside the gains made so far, which must 
constitute the basis for pursuing the process.  In  my delegation's view, this Round is still the 
Development Round, and Agriculture is still the drivi ng force behind it.  It is therefore imperative to 
move forward in reforming the agricultural tradin g system, and this is the Round in which that 
objective must be reached.  Paraguay is a small and vulnerable economy, with five agricultural 
products accounting for more than 80 per cent of its export base.  In participating in these 
negotiations, Paraguay has always s ought to build a multilateral tradi ng system in which everyone can 
share in the benefits that market  access has to offer, striving to wards freer, more transparent and 
non-distorting trade.  Although there still appear to be vast differences separating us today, we must 
not stop working on the basis of what has already b een achieved.  We cannot throw away ten years' 
worth of time, work and sacrifice.  Today's acquis  should be the bedrock on which to continue 
building and strengthening the system, so that this Round can aptly be named the Development 
Round. WT/GC/M/131 
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  41. Singapore 
 
I would like to associate Singapore with other colleagues in thanking the Director-General 
and the Negotiating Group Chairs for their tremendous efforts leading up to the issuance of documents before Easter. Singapore also associates wi th the statement by the Philippines for ASEAN.  
We are a staunch supporter of the system and the Round.    So naturally, it is with disappointment that 
we agree with your assessment that political gaps in  key negotiating areas are “not bridgeable today”.  
But at a time like this, one challenge is to resist  our emotions, in favour of applying cooler heads 
towards finding a solution.  We have recognised in the past that problems in the negotiations were 
more about the substance than the process.  The Easter texts and their covering notes present the 
overall state of the substance.  The substance shows that we have come a long way in ten years. 
Notwithstanding the gaps which exist, the various ite rations of the texts have brought us closer in 
many other areas.  These latest texts allow Member s to recognise the value of the substance in the 
package.  If we take a broader view, this will not be the first time an international organisation has 
found itself at such a juncture.  So we do not subscr ibe to the doomsday forecasts about the fate of the 
DDA and the WTO.  The future of this organisation is  in the hands of the membership, and it is clear 
to us from interventions today that all Memb ers highly value the global trading system, as 
institutionalised in the WTO.  However, it was a useful and timely reminder in your remarks this 
morning for us to have been warned of the con sequences of a prolonged inability by the membership 
to deliver.  It is important that as we deal with the next steps, we uphold the great value which we all 
place in the system.  We agree that it is now time for serious reflection, but we should also be very 
clear to what end.  It is to find an agreed way ahead which must be inclusive and supported by the 
entire membership.  It is clear that we should not  continue in a “business as usual” paradigm.  The 
question we have to discuss with honesty, and without  recrimination, is how do we move forward in a 
way which enables us to capture the value which is before us, and yet deal creatively with the difficult 
issues which are obstacles?  We support the three “non-options” outlined by you.  These parameters 
emerged from your consultations with the me mbership, and will guide us as we begin our 
conversation.  If we are to find a useful solutio n, we should have no pre-conceived ideas.  Our 
delegation is prepared to engage with an open mind, guided by the principle that we want to protect 
and uphold the value of the system.  We should be rea listic in recognising that this will not be an easy 
conversation to have.  If we dwell on the past, we neglect the present and the future.  If we deal too 
narrowly with specific interests, we risk injuring th e broader system which we value.  We will also 
need a political lens, as the next steps are invariably tied to the Ministerial interactions in the months 
ahead, culminating in our own Ministerial Conference  in December.  This is a necessary conversation 
for us to begin, if we are to understand each othe r’s concerns enough to find convergence.  It is a 
conversation in which we hope all Members will e ngage actively and constructively.  We have 
confidence in the Chairs of both the TNC and the GC to collectively guide us, in the correct spirit, on 
a credible way forward. 
 
42. South Africa 
 
We thank you for your overall assessment of the current state of play of the Round and your 
objective account of the nature of the differences be tween some of the major players in the Round on 
NAMA sectorals. We recognize, too, the relentless e fforts that you have made to conclude the Doha 
Round under your leadership of the TNC.  We also thank the Negotiating Group Chairs for their 
efforts on the progress made over the past two y ears since the collapse of the Doha Round in 
July 2008 and the last Chairs' texts of December 2008.  Your report and the report of the Chairs make it clear that the Doha Round is deadlocked and that there has been very little, if any, progress made on 
the major issues of the Round since the last Chairs’ te xts in December 2008.  In this context even on 
the SA-SACU issue, one of vital national interest to  South Africa and our part ners in SACU, there has 
been no progress whatsoever.  Indeed there has not been a single negotiating meeting held on the SA-
SACU issue since the collapse of the negotiations in  December 2008, despite our repeated offers to 
resume negotiations in order to resolve this ma tter.  I will make brief remarks on the documents  WT/GC/M/131 
 Page 45 
 
 
  submitted to us by the Chairs.  More detailed co mments will be made in the relevant negotiating 
groups.  On NAMA, we must re-iterate the statement we made at the TNC meeting of 
17 December 2008 in response to the Chair's report on the SA-SACU issue at that time.  We wish to 
place this statement on the record of this TNC meeti ng to avoid repeating all the points that we made 
then.2  Let me highlight a few of the points.  We clea rly stated then that South Africa and SACU as a 
whole do not agree with and cannot support the proposed  solution offered by the Chair in his report.  
We presented a final position of 16 per cent half cuts  and 3 per cent no cut, at a Swiss Coefficient of 
22, despite our constituencies' continued demand fo r greater flexibilities. Our need for additional 
flexibilities was fully substantiated with detailed technical information and arguments during the 
intense negotiations we held with key trading pa rtners in 2008 on the issue.  Our demands for 
additional flexibility are entirely reasonable, they ha ve been objectively motivated and they have been 
supported by the majority of Members.  South Afri ca’s support for a final Doha outcome will depend 
on whether our concerns are dealt with in a fair and reasonable manner by our trading partners.  We 
do not see any link between the level of ambition set by the formula and flexibilities, on the one hand, 
and the sectorals on the other.  The Doha mandate states clearly that sectorals are a voluntary and 
supplementary modality and can onl y be considered on their merits  after the negotiations on the 
formula and flexibilities are concluded.  Nevertheless , it is clear that the formula to be applied to 
South Africa and to SACU will involve wide and deep  tariff reductions to our applied rates. Minister 
Davies, our Minister of Trade and Industry, has indicated that South Africa will therefore not be volunteering its participation in sectorals.  Furthermore, we cannot contemplate this when the demandeur s of sectorals are not willing to reciprocate by  making further cuts in their agricultural 
markets, or make any real cuts in their applied levels of trade-distorting agricultural subsidies. 
 There is no doubt that the window of opportunity that our G20 Leaders urged us to use in 
2011 to conclude the Doha Round has almost comp letely closed.  How should we understand this 
reality and how should we move ahead?  The curre nt trading system emerging from previous rounds 
of trade negotiations is imbalanced and unfair.  It is biased against developing countries.  We 
therefore agreed almost ten years ago at Doha th at this Round must redress these inequities.  We 
agreed that the Doha Round must prioritize the re moval and reduction of trade-distorting measures in 
agriculture prevalent in developed countries, and we agreed that the Round must ensure enhanced 
market access for products of export interest to de veloping countries in the NAMA negotiations.  We 
also agreed that the Doha Round should address several  imbalances in the current Rules.  We agreed 
to strengthen the provisions on special and differen tial treatment in favour of developing countries.  
Most importantly, we agreed to prioritize the inte rests of the poorest countries by providing the LDCs 
with DFQF market access and to remove the dist ortions caused by trade-distorting cotton subsidies on 
the poorest farmers in Africa.  Now, almost ten years since the launch of the Doha Round, it seems 
that the developed world is still not ready for a De velopment Round.  In the ten years since the launch 
of the Doha Round we have witnessed several attemp ts to backtrack on the development mandate of 
the Doha Round.  The Doha mandate agreed that Ag riculture would be the centre of the Round, and 
the contribution of developed countries in Agricultu re should lead the level of ambition.  You will 
recall that the G20, since its formation in Cancún, has been at pains not to make extreme or onerous 
demands on developed countries, but positioned it self in the middle ground.  Such accommodation 
has not been reciprocated, and is sorely lacking in  NAMA and Services.  The trend since the launch of 
the Round has witnessed the lowering of the level of ambition in Agriculture while the level of 
ambition in NAMA and Services has been raised for developing countries.  This has been the cause of 
the imbalance created in the texts in July 2008 against developing countries.   You will recall that 
South Africa was not part of the agreements reached  by some Members in the July 2008 package.  
Our assessment was that the July texts were im balanced, by going further to accommodate the 
sensitivities of developed countries in Agriculture , while demanding too much from developing 
countries in terms of reductions in their applie d industrial tariffs and policy space for industrial 
development.  However, as our Minister stated at the Seventh Ministerial Conference, "[we] have 
                                                      
2 See JOB/TNC/13. WT/GC/M/131 
Page 46  
 
  been willing to work to see whether, on the basis of  the existing texts, the specific problems posed for 
SA and SACU, arising from the hi storic injustice of South Afri ca’s classification in the Uruguay 
Round as a 'developed country', can be resolved in a fair manner." 
 However, this has not been the approach of so me Members that seek to re-open convergences 
reached in the July and December 2008 texts.  So me Members have sought to raise the level of 
ambition in NAMA and Services beyond the Doha mandate and way beyond the contribution that they themselves are prepared to make in Agricultu re.  They have argued that the emerging developing 
countries - that include over 30 developing countries, led by China, India and Brazil – are now major beneficiaries of the trading system and must assume  greater responsibilities.  There is no doubt that 
the emerging economies have gained significantly in terms of their share of global trade and 
investment flows since the launch of the Doha R ound in November 2001.  However, these emerging 
markets are a long way from matching the levels of  development of the major developed countries.  
Developing countries, including so-called emergi ng economies, still confront severe development 
challenges and high levels of poverty and inequality that place them in a qualitatively different 
position than advanced industrial economies.  In So uth Africa, the democratic government inherited 
profound inequalities and widespread poverty from the ap artheid era.  We also confront structural 
unemployment at a rate of 23 per cent, to whic h a million more unemployed were added during the 
global economic crisis that we had no part in cr eating.  The Doha Round can only be saved if the 
promise made in the Doha mandate to ensure that the outcome of this Round is consistent with the 
concerns and interests of developing countries is fulfilled.  You will recall that the Doha mandate 
recognized that, “the majority of Members are deve loping countries”, and paragraph 2 stated clearly 
that, "[we] seek to place their need s and interests at the heart of the Work Programme adopted in this 
Declaration.”  This is why we have agreed to  call this work programme, the Doha Development 
Agenda.  A strengthened, balanced, more open, tran sparent, development-oriented multilateral trading 
system is a global public good.  We should all strive  to achieve this goal.  If the world is not ready to 
conclude a Development Round, and fu lfil the promises made in Doha, we should all at least step up 
to the plate and find a fast track mechanism to  address the concerns of the poorest and most 
vulnerable Members.  Surely we can agree the foll owing:  to provide DFQF market access to the 
LDCs;  to grant a waiver for LDCs in Services;  to remove the distortions caused by cotton subsidies 
in African countries;  and to address the capacity -building and technical-assistance needs of the 
poorest countries.  History will not forgive us if  we abandon the poorest countries at this time. 
 
43. Sri Lanka 
 
Sri Lanka joins with other Members in commendi ng your tireless efforts in keeping the Doha 
Round alive in spite of the stumbling blocks that  we encounter today.  We also thank all the 
Negotiating Group Chairs for their hard work in tr ying to bridge the existing gaps among Members.  
Sri Lanka wished to associate with the statemen ts by Indonesia for the G-33 and by the Dominican 
Republic for the Informal Group of Developing Countr ies.  We agree with your assessment that the 
Round is at a critical stage and it is the poorest a nd vulnerable economies who will suffer most if it 
fails.  The documents circulated before the Easter break represent the hard work of ten years, and 
represent the first time the entire Doha package is pre sented in its entirety.  We must preserve them.  
Therefore, stopping or rebooting the Round cannot be accepted at this moment.  Of course, in the 
package presented, there are gaps.  We heard that gaps of all types are prevailing in various negotiating areas.  There are several areas where our concerns have not been adequately accommodated.  We believe this is  not the time to reflect on them in detail, but we will reflect on 
them in the appropriate negotiating bodies and tec hnical-level discussions.  At this stage, we are 
deeply frustrated with the current impasse or deadlock of the Round.  We hear that the main reason 
for this is that some complex issues in NAMA have  taken the lead and in fact have taken over from 
the development dimension of the Round.  The resu lt had been that the window of opportunity that 
was available to conclude the Round by the end of this year is increasingly becoming a moving target.  
Some countries can afford this, or any delays in c oncluding the Doha Round, but for us and a majority  WT/GC/M/131 
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  of developing countries it will be a big blow.  For Sri Lanka, a country dependent on MFN for it 
external trade, our hope is the early conclusion of the Round.  We therefore urge key players to engage constructively to iron out their differences, and to find middle ground to make this moving 
target an attainable, reachable target.  To this e nd we agree that “business as usual” will not work, but 
the key players need to go an extra distance for both systemic reasons and most importantly to 
preserve the world’s most valuable public good – the rule-based WTO multilateral trading system. 
 
44. Switzerland 
 
Colombia has just reminded us that today is an historic occasion, and he is quite right - two 
people have managed to say yes.  What will it take for 153 of us to say yes?  I believe that this line of 
reflection should complement our everyday nuts-and- bolts work in the negotiating groups.  Thank you 
for your introductory remarks this morning.  I would also like to thank you for having brought to the table a package which, though perhaps not tree friendly,  is substantial, comprehensive and complex.  
This package shows us not only what we have achieve d in the past ten years, but also what we have 
not achieved and where we must now focus our attenti on.  In your introductory remarks, you referred 
more than once to the history of the multilateral sy stem, and I would like to make a few comments in 
this regard.  Past negotiating rou nds all had one objective which they succeeded in meeting:  to create 
a greater sense of balance, mainly in north-north tr ade.  Over the last ten years, however, we have 
been somewhat surprised by the fact that more than 50 per cent of trade in goods now takes place 
between southern countries.  This has resulted in the need to rebala nce mainly south-south trade, but 
also perhaps north-south and north-north trade, and we will only succeed if we manage to draw 
conclusions about the reality of today's world trade, ev en if it forces us to abandon concepts that have 
become obsolete.  We talk a lot about developmen t, which is good, but I hear about the performance 
of developing countries, and in this regard I am delighted for a number of our  southern partners and 
wonder what exactly a developing country is, when it s performance far exceeds that of the traditional 
northern countries.  Refocusing the Round on the existing mandates and on these new efforts, rather 
than hanging on to somewhat out-dated concepts, is  I feel the only possible way to develop solutions 
that take into account the present and the future.  Th e package on the table sh ows us that despite all 
the ground already covered, there is still much to be  done at political level.  This, of course, does not 
involve us, our focus being on the day-to-day work.  I have not counted the number of words in the package, but can tell you that in the negotiations on non-tariff barriers, we spent three hours assessing 
the meaning of two words.  If we apply this qua ntitative pace to the entire process, the Doha Round 
will become the "Gaga Round" because we will all be sufficiently old and gaga by the time we reach 
the end.  Switzerland continues to be of the opinion that a deal is worth fighting for both in its own right and in the longer-term interest of the multila teral trading system upon which we all so heavily 
rely.  As our Minister stated, together with 12 other like-minded colleagues in an open letter of 
15 April which Australia has introduced, we are comm itted to continuing to work across all areas of 
the negotiations and with all Members to bring an ambitious and balanced conclusion to the 
negotiations.  We are prepared to show further flex ibility and to continue to the successful conclusion 
of the Round this year, and we call on all Members to do the same. 
 We agree with you that the three situations y ou have described are not situations we would 
like to support and to strive for.  In addition to  certain activities in the negotiating groups, I think 
certain conceptual discussions need to take place, and in this context we would like to thank the 
European Union for having made a proposal related to  sectoral negotiations.  I think it is an excellent 
basis for further reflection and possibly further work .  It is timely for the European Union to get 
engaged in these debates, which are crucial for our futu re work.   Further reflections are certainly also 
needed in the fields of Trade and Environment a nd in Trade Facilitation, where the devil has been 
locked in 850 square brackets.   We have noted th e comments made, inter alia, by Chile and others on 
the issue of GIs extension.  We very often agree with Chile, because very often they are reasonable.  
When it comes to GIs, they are not, because they are still talking about the mandate, so there is a 
difference of ten years between us and Chile.  We  are looking forward, not backward, and there too WT/GC/M/131 
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  the mandate looks a little bit out-dated and starts to smell a little bit.  Wine and spirits were very 
important to me too, up until recently, but now there is a life outside wine and spirits.  
45. Switzerland for the G-10 
  Yes the G-10 still exists and the G-10 still is not convinced about some ideas floating around 
the Agriculture negotiations - ideas that float but do n not fly.  The G-10 is a strong supporter of the 
Doha Development Agenda.  It h as engaged constructively in the Agriculture negotiations, including 
in the last month in line with the mandate provi ded by our Ministers - the recent mandate, not the 
mandate of ten years ago.  We have worked hard to ensure that renewed engagement and 
intensification in 2011 would brin g long-awaited results.  Today more than ever, the G-10 places great 
emphasise on a strong and functional WTO recognizi ng its supremacy as a trade institution.  The G-
10 would like to express its sincere appreciation to the Chair of the Agriculture negotiations for his 
report to the TNC.  Our view is that the re port summarizes quite well the work we have been 
undertaking since March 2010 and presents in genera l a fair and painful assessment of where we are 
at this critical juncture.  We cannot but note our deep concern at the lack of progress in the 
negotiations up to this point.   The G-10 has alwa ys advocated an agreemen t in Agriculture which 
balances the need for both an ambitious continua tion of the reform process and an appropriate 
consideration of all Members' sensitivities, as well as special and differential treatment for developing 
countries, and also one which responds to the legi timate concern on food security.  The G-10 has 
always engaged in the negotiations, based on the draft modalities and its annexes, with a willingness 
to come to an agreement, even though we have not always felt that our con cerns were appropriately 
reflected in the texts.  For the G-10, these consid erations and priorities have not changed.  The G-10 
remains committed to a successful conclusion of this  Round, and we can assure the membership of 
our continued constructive engagement .  In conclusion, I would say we are now at a crossroads where 
we have a choice between a multilateral system  of competition or a multilateral system of 
cooperation. 
 
46. Chinese Taipei for the RAMs Group 
 
First, the RAMs Group would like to thank you and all the Negotiating Group Chairs for your 
presentations last Thursday of the documents ac ross the entire range of negotiating areas.  We 
certainly share the view that these documents repres ent the product of the collective work of Members 
in the DDA negotiations over the past ten years.  It is also the first time since 2001 that Members have 
had the opportunity to consider the whole Doha pack age and the value of what is on the table.  While 
we recognize that what is reflected in these docum ents is impressive, the RAMs could not agree more 
on the reality of the situation that Members have to  face right now, and that is how to bridge the 
remaining gaps in order to have a successful conclusion of the Round by the end of this year.  In the 
view of the RAMs Group, the task ahead is extrem ely daunting, and the time available very limited.  
The multilateral trading system embodied in the WTO is far too important to every Member of this 
organization.  It would be too risky and costly to le t go of what is already on the table, which we have 
collectively accumulated over the past ten years.  The RAMs Group would like to make it very clear that the only option is to continue the DDA nego tiation until a package can be crafted through an 
inclusive, transparent and truly multilateral proce ss, and the RAMs remain committed to engaging in 
the substantive discussions within that upcoming process.  
47. Turkey 
 
Thank you for your report on the state of play in the Round.  I also thank you for your Cover 
Note as TNC Chair, which is quite concise, reflec ting a very concrete and objective image of where 
we are.  I agree with the points made in the Cover Note where you underlined that successful 
conclusion of the Round would have major impacts on both the quality and volume of world trade.  It 
would also provide a better ground for developm ent as our core mandate.  I thank all Negotiating  WT/GC/M/131 
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  Group Chairs for their valuable contribution to th e process through the reports they have prepared. 
We are of course examining the documents in a very careful manner.  As a preliminary comment, I can say that they generally represent the state of th e negotiations.  We hope that we will not encounter 
any devil hiding in the details.  However, Chile's  statement regarding GI negotiation on wines and 
spirits showed us that we will never be short of su rprises.  Thanks to the constructive approach of all 
Members and the Negotiating Group Chairs, today, as th e TNC Chair has stated in his Cover Note, we 
for the first time have a full Doha package in hand , which comprises more than 600 pages.  That is a 
tangible testimony of where we are in our work.  These documents put a focus on both the positive aspects of the current situation, like underlining the points of convergence, but also on the difficulties 
and areas of divergences among the Members.  I have listened to the interventions of my colleagues 
very carefully.  There is no doubt that the air of impasse is yet prevailing.  The question we are asking 
ourselves is what to do next.  It is not an easy question to which to find the most pertinent answer. However, the answer lies with us.  We, the membersh ip, should do the thinking and afterwards do the 
heavy lifting.  The Turkish delegation is more than  ever eager to engage in the most constructive 
manner.  To quote a dear friend, expectation of a Me ssiah will not materialize.   We should explore all 
avenues and meetings and come up with a tangible a pproach before the Ministerial Conference at the 
end of this year.  The way forward should be based  on the principles that we have so far jealously 
guarded.  They are simply the Single Undertaki ng, bottom-up approach, inclusiveness, transparency 
and keeping development at the heart of the Round.  At this juncture, the other priority objective of 
the membership should be to safeguard the WTO a nd the multilateral trade system.  The statement by 
Bangladesh for the LDCs deserves our attention.  We associate ourselves with the statement by 
Indonesia for the G-33.  On the other hand, the initiative undertaken by the EU on sectoral tariff 
liberalization is an encouraging sign.  We hope that with the participation of major stakeholders this 
initiative will lead us to a course where we can hopefull y tackle the impasse we are in.  So far I have 
not heard negative responses, which is positive.  W ithout any doubt, we are all striving to create an 
advanced rules-based multilateral trading system th at has development at its core, yet reflects the 
realities of the present nature of the international wo rld order.  We hopefully will bring it in line with 
the changes in world trade.  At this juncture we cannot  just give up and risk ten years of hard work in 
negotiations.  I believe that preserving an optimistic  mood with dedication and determination is not 
only necessary for us, but a moral imperative as well.  
48. Uganda 
 
First, I would like to state categorically that Uganda associates itself with the statements by 
Kenya for the African Group, Bangladesh for the LD Cs, and Mauritius for the ACP.  Ever since I 
came here almost two years ago, I have been he aring only lamentations on Doha, and they tend to 
continue.  I have been encouraged by your speech when you requested for the way forward.  I would 
like to suggest a way forward.  As a Chinese proverb  says, "even a journey of 1000 miles begins with 
the first step".  The best way to start is to start.   Perhaps the reason Doha is suffering is because it is 
being handled by diplomats.  Diplomats are very di plomatic, and thus move slowly.  They are not like 
politicians, who push.  But I think now, in this  era of commercial diplomacy, we should blend 
diplomacy with business.   We should be frank and we should not fear.   The famous Doha Round 
has been on for ten years, and the end does not seem to be in the vicinity.  I remember a certain priest 
telling a lady that if you cohabit with a man for sev en years and he refuses to marry you, you should 
break the relationship – that man will never marry yo u.  Doha has been on for ten years and it is still 
on.  But we cannot break the relationship because if we do, we have no place to go.  I think what we 
should do is follow what Winston Churchill said:  "If you are faced with a huge problem, cut it into pieces.  When I was still a student, the teacher told us  that during exams, start with the easy questions, 
because if you take them up one by one, you ma y get stuck on a hard qu estion which will consume 
your time and make you lose a lot of marks that you would have gained from the easy ones.  I think that was a wise statement.  I followed this piece of advice and ever since I have passed all my exams.  
I think the Mexican Minister said that it will dama ge our capability if we do not conclude Doha.  I 
think we should not throw the ball to Ministers,  as that would show that we are incompetent. WT/GC/M/131 
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This is what I think we should do.  Doha shoul d be realised in phases.  India spoke about, but 
did not develop the idea, that if the Round needs to be  realised in phases, let it be.  I think we should 
pick out the non-controversial issues which we have  already agreed upon, put them into an agreement 
and sign the first phase of Doha.  We should move.  If we do not move now we shall never move.  We 
have to start, and the best way to start is to start.  Already, ther e are non-controversial issues agreed 
upon five years ago in Hong Kong concerning LDCs.  However, up to the present they have never 
been implemented.  Why?  We s hould have moved five years ago.  South African touched upon these 
issues, and also Paraguay said we cannot lose what we  have achieved so far.  So we should move.  
After signing phase one, we go to phase two – those i ssues which are not very controversial.  Then 
after resolving those and after signing phase two, we go to the issues which have brought the impasse.  
Those issues are very well known by everybody.  But you know, with diplomacy you have to be diplomatic.  You have to say some things and not  say others.  I have a political background, where 
one talks about things.  I am being coached that in  diplomacy, you have to be good.  I understand that 
the big fish have failed to agree on three issues, but this cannot put the whole mighty Doha Round on 
hold.  Sometimes what one sees as a problem may be a blessing in disguise.  For example, one 
country fears that if it gives in on a certain item it  will lose millions of jobs.  But it should know that 
when trade increases, more opportunities arise.  So metimes, as I said, a problem can be a blessing in 
disguise.  In the UK, when Margaret Thatcher saw that strikes of the coal miners were becoming 
chronic, she closed the mines a nd found an even better alternative for electricity.  There was life 
outside coal-mine electricity, to borrow the words of Switzerland.  So some people have fears about 
giving in.  May I suggest that you or the Council set up a special committee to set out this impasse 
that will sit with the big fish and see that they iron out their differences.  Because there are groups 
which sit here – people who are sceptical and suspicious  – but if it is an official committee, that body 
can report to the General Council.  This is necess ary, because you cannot bring a problem to a large 
group like this and solve anything.  And I think we are moving towards the end. 
 
Another idea is that when you are appointing pe ople to this committee, you also remember 
people from LDCs.  We have good ambassadors and good ideas.  Sometimes intelligence is tied to 
wealth.  I know it is very hard to convince peopl e that you are intelligent when you are poor, because 
they will ask why your intelligence does not help you to  become rich.  But it must be remembered that 
some of the best football coaches have never played football.  Professors write volumes of books full 
of wisdom which people use to make money, but th ey are sometimes very poor.  So you cannot say 
they do not have wisdom.  They have wisdom.  There is a professor who wrote a book and said there 
are eight types of intelligence.  You may be bright in  the class but poor on the football pitch.  So even 
if we come from poor countries, we have good am bassadors who can negotiate, who can help the big 
fish solve the impasse.  We must focus on the impasse.   First, let us finish the first phase and then go 
for that impasse, because we shall all concentrate on that.  Lastly, Doha should be flexible and revise-
able.  Some people fear that once they commit them selves, there will be no safety valve.  The final 
Doha agreement should not be made  of stone.  To avoid these fears, let us focus on agreeing on the 
implementation of non-controversial issues and try them  for a year or two.  If a country finds out that 
things are not going well, the agreement must be able  to allow us to come back to the drawing board.  
We can say that Doha can be reviewed every two years for the first ten years, in order to see if 
Members are comforta ble.  Lack of flexibility causes problems.  I was happy that Barbados said that 
negotiations are continuous.  Even if the Doha  Round was concluded to day, you would still go on 
with the negotiations.  One cannot say that now it is finished, and we stop negotiating, because more 
will come.   One of the reasons Doha should be flex ible is that today, for example, some countries do 
not produce wines and spirits.  But tomorrow things could change.  Uganda, for example, now has oil, 
and we will be rich and can then produce many th ings.  So we should not find the doors sealed.  We 
should be given a chance to come back and negotiate an amendment on the wines and spirits clause.  I 
hope Members will consider my views. 
  WT/GC/M/131 
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  49. United States 
 
I would like to start by thanking the Direct or-General for his assessment of the current 
situation in Geneva.  Certainly, it is sobering, but it is  also an important part of our collective effort to 
grapple with the difficulties we all face.  I would also like to thank the Chairs of the Negotiating 
Groups for the work products they have provided.   The Chairs all showed good judgment in the 
various types of documents they used to capture th e state of play and, taken together, these documents 
provide a good overall sense of where things stan d.  We are pleased that, by and large, Chairs 
remained true to the bottom-up approach to the ne gotiations that Members advocated.  At the same 
time, the report format gave the Chairs an opportunity  to offer some of their own important insights.  
We hope that these texts and reports have contributed to the ability of all Members to make their own, 
independent assessment of the state of the Round.  We agree with the conclusion of the Director-
General's report that there is a fundamental ga p in expectations among key Members, but this 
fundamental gap is not, in our vi ew, limited to NAMA.  We do not agree with the suggestion in the 
report that if we could work out our differences in  NAMA, then other areas of the negotiations would 
simply fall into place.  As we pointed out at the la st TNC meeting, fundamental differences also exist 
with respect to Agriculture and Services.  The Dir ector-General’s report suggests that the issues that 
divide us on NAMA are political, not technical or pro cedural.  We agree with this assessment, but we 
also believe the same is true of Agriculture and Services.  Beyond market-access issues, the Chairs’ 
documents also provide a fairly clear picture of the broader situation in our Doha negotiations, and 
that picture is mixed.   For instance, there has been noteworthy progress on Trade Facilitation, and our 
negotiators deserve a lot of credit fo r the hard work that has gone into this effort.  At the same time, 
the 850 remaining brackets make clear that much hard work remains.  It is also useful that we now 
have texts in negotiating groups wh ere we did not have them before.  But these texts are tools – a 
snapshot – not end-results.  The texts all show major substantive differences among Members.  The 
documents also show that in some cases, little, if any, progress has been made.  Ambassador Francis’s 
report on the fisheries subsidies negotiations is a very clear example of such a situation.  We 
appreciate his candour in warning us all that too much effort has been placed in trying to preserve the status quo rather than, as he puts it,  in “eff ectively addressing a common and rapidly worsening 
problem.” 
 I will not comment on all the documents, as I trust there will be other opportunities to do so.  
As is undoubtedly the case with most Members, ther e are individual points in the various documents 
with which we would disagree.  But such issues will be best addressed in the Negotiating Groups 
themselves.  At today’s meeting, it is more impor tant to focus on the broader picture.  The United 
States has not given up on Doha, but we believe th e negotiations, and the WTO more broadly, cannot 
avoid hard truths.  One truth is that there is no clear path for closing the stark gaps among the key 
players.  Our collective approach for the past year or more has been intensive engagement through 
what the Director-Gener al dubbed a cocktail of multiple config urations.  As my colleagues well 
understand, the United States has played a leading role  in this effort, and we have learned much from 
it.  As is also known, we felt – and we continue to believe – that a vigorous element of bilateral 
engagement among key Members is one vital element of the cocktail approach.  Unfortunately, our 
shared effort has not produced meaningful results.  Instead, this process has only confirmed how far 
apart we find ourselves, especially on the vital mark et-access elements of th e Round.  In a sense, of 
course, the unbridged gaps on market access – and here  again, I refer to Services and Agriculture, as 
well as NAMA – should not come as a surprise.  Ma rket opening is hard.  It exposes economic 
sensitivities.  Economic sensitivities, in turn, expose political sensitivities.  But this negotiation will 
set the terms of trade for decades to come, and an agreement that does not reflect twenty-first century 
realities will contribute neither to the strength of  the global trading system nor to the long-term 
viability of this institution.  Despite the difficulties,  the United States will not throw in the towel.  As 
long as there are willing partners, we are willing to work together to find solutions.  But we have 
reached a juncture where we need a hard-nosed consideration of the options for moving forward.  The 
European Union has presented one option with it s new NAMA proposal.  We appreciate the effort WT/GC/M/131 
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  that went into this proposal, and we are studying it carefully.  The key threshold question, in our view, 
is whether this or any other proposal can serve as a catalyst for real negotiations – for true give and 
take.  None of us can know the ultimate outcome of such a complex negotiation, but all of us can 
answer that threshold question.  We owe each ot her an honest assessment, and we need it quickly.  
We need to determine – collectively – whether some branch of the current path can lead us to the 
finish line.  If so, let us all get to work.  If not, we  need to consider the viability of other pathways.  
Hollow declarations of our support for Doha will not ge t us to the finish line.  We are where we are 
because the issues that confront us  are hard ones.  They can only be resolved through hard choices by 
key players.  As I have said before, time is not  on our side.  Our discussion about productive next 
steps must be serious – and immediate.  It cannot be open-ended.  We need to confront the issues 
forthrightly and resist the temptation simply to pos ture so as to deflect blame in the case of failure.  
We must not allow decisions to be made through inde cision.  This institution is much too important to 
all of us to allow that to happen.  
50. Uruguay 
 
 I would first of all like to thank you for your repor t and your efforts to keep this process alive.  
We also endorse the statements by Brazil for the G- 20 and Australia for the Cairns Group.  Overall, 
Uruguay also shares the views expressed by Chile regarding the joint proposal on GIs for wines and 
spirits.  As other colleagues have stated before me , we are facing a highly critical situation in these 
negotiations which must aim to achieve - I rep eat, aim to achieve - a balanced and reasonable 
outcome for all Members.  In Uruguay's view, th e conclusion of the Doha Round is absolutely 
essential to Agricultural reform, which can only be ach ieved within this multila teral body.  Moreover, 
failure of this Round of negotiations  may have indirect affects for other efforts, present and future, in 
the areas of international cooperation and global g overnance, not only in the trade policy sphere.  
Uruguay therefore continues to support and promote a successful conclusion of the Round as a whole, 
in all sensitive areas, aware as it is th at we stand at a crossroads where either we make a final effort to 
put together a relevant and balanced package, or we  opt for the risk of seeing the WTO discredited by 
its lack of effectiveness in the negotiating sphere a nd potential institutional irrelevance.  To Uruguay's 
mind, the option is self-evident.  Now, we are cl early facing a complex equation on the negotiating 
front, which reflects world trade developments over th e past decade, lack of international leadership 
and weakness among global govern ance institutions, compounded by the blows dealt by the 
international financial and economic crises, the su rge in prices of raw materials, the political and 
economic situation in the major de veloped economies, the events in North Africa, and all this set 
against the backdrop of a latent currency war.   For quite some time now, our delegation has been 
calling on all Members of this organization to act responsibly and to comply with the previously 
agreed mandates.  We believe that a realistic, mode rate and balanced ambition in all areas covered by 
the Round is a way out, in terms of completing th e negotiating process, but unfortunately the absence 
of these three ingredients, coupled with a lack of  genuine political will to reach a conclusion, has 
landed us in a critical situation to which we now n eed to find a solution.  The term ambition must be 
understood not only as what we want to receive, but al so as what we intend to give.  Accordingly, we 
once again urge all Members to reflect on the cost of failure, not to admit themselves beaten, and to 
understand that we are facing an historic challenge which we need to address in a responsible manner, 
each Member according to its own responsibilities on  the international scene and in the multilateral 
trading sphere.  Uruguay maintains its position of support for the negotiations and the preservation of 
the acquis achieved in the Round to date, pending a new and significant political opportunity to bring 
it to fruition, which we trust does not lie not too far ahead.  All can count on every member of the 
Uruguayan delegation to work intensively on being part of the solution, not the problem, so as to find 
a suitable path that can lead to fulfilment of th e development objectives proposed when this reform 
process was launched in 2001.   WT/GC/M/131 
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  51. Zimbabwe 
 
Let me express my delegation' s gratitude and appreciation to  you for your report on the state 
of play in the Doha Development Round, and yo ur frankness on the situation at hand. Let me also 
thank the Chairs of the Negotiating Groups for th eir efforts to produce the reports on the various 
issues under negotiation.  My delegation would like to associate itself with the statements by Kenya 
for the Africa Group, Mauritius for the ACP, Indon esia for the G-33, and Brazil for the G-20.  We 
would also like to support the statement by Bangl adesh for the LDCs and the Dominican Republic for 
the Informal Group of Developing Countries.  We would like to underscore the sentiments expressed 
by these groups and other Members that it is imperati ve that we address the current imbalances in the 
Doha Round of negotiations, where our perennial de velopmental concerns, which date back to the 
Uruguay Round, continue to be marginalized.  This is regrettably so in spite of the fact that the Doha 
Round was launched with the clear understanding that deve lopmental concerns were to be at its core.  
But from the way the negotiations have been going, we are left to wonder as to wh en issues of interest 
to developing countries are going to be addressed.  As you rightly point out, we are today being held 
back by what currently appears to be unbridgeab le gaps in NAMA sectoral negotiations.  This 
situation is unfortunate, and of deep concern to us.  It is in this context that we welcome your very 
important call this morning for Members to ente r into a period of seri ous reflection and soul-
searching.  As we reflect on the way forward, we should retrace our footsteps to Doha and recapture 
the letter and spirit of the Doha Development Agenda .  We should recommit ourselves to ensure that 
development remains the core ingredient in whatever  cocktail we plan to make in the Green Room, or 
whatever room where the future of the Doha Round  will be on the agenda.  Any other cocktail or 
concoction which betrays the Doha  development mandate will, wit hout doubt, cause indigestion, and 
will not be acceptable to the developing countries who have waited far too long to have their 
grievances resolved.  My delegation remains committe d to the successful completion of the Round in 
a manner that ensures a balanced outcome.  In th is regard, we look forward to considering any 
creative measures that you might propose, based on Members' submissions, to move the Round 
forward.   
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Page 54  
 
  ANNEX II 
Statement by China at the informal meeting 
of the Trade Negotiations Committee 
on 29 March 2011 
 
 
At the request of the delegation, the stat ement made by China at the above-mentioned 
meeting is included below as part of th e Minutes of the General Council meeting. 
 
 
China shares the anxiety and disappointmen t expressed by previous speakers. With the 
various deadlines imminent every day, the lack of  progress in substance is worrisome. The question 
mark is getting bigger as to whether we are able  to grasp the narrow window of opportunity to 
conclude the Round in 2011, as instructed by our Leaders and agreed to by all Members at the General Council meeting in December 2010.  Si nce we last met three weeks ago, intensive 
engagement has continued multilaterally, plurilatera lly as well as bilaterally.  As known by all, China 
is not the demandeur  of sectoral liberalization, nor does it intend to participate in any sectoral 
initiative.  The three sectors of ch emicals, industrial machinery, and electronic and electrical products 
which the developed-country Members demand co mprise 43 per cent of China’s total NAMA tariff 
lines, and more than 55 per cent of its total NAMA imports.  In addition, the above sectors are very sensitive to China, and participation in the sector al arrangement means fundamentally altering the 
level of China’s tariff reduction in the Doha Round, which obviou sly goes beyond the capabilities of a 
developing country. However, in order to save the R ound, China is still trying its hardest to take part 
in the negotiations on various forms in a constr uctive manner, as long as those negotiations will not 
challenge the Doha mandate for developing countries ' "participation on a non-mandatory basis" and 
"special and differential treatment", and that sector s will be chosen "in par ticular on products of 
export interest to developing countries".  We acknowl edge that despite our utmost efforts, the gaps 
between us and some developed-country Members on  market access are still big.  Nevertheless, we 
believe such an attempt to bridge the differences s hould not be wasted.  For this purpose, we are of the 
view that the broader membership needs to be involved in the process and make concrete 
contributions.  Let us pool the wisdom of all and make concerted efforts to save the Round from going 
under. 
 
Here I would like to clarify that on top of China's extensive and comprehensive accession 
commitments, its contribution in the Doha Round is already well above the average level of all 
Members, and we have pushed ourselves to the limit.  Even so, in order to finish the end-game, China 
is open to any form of negotiations, as long as t hose negotiations respect the development mandate, 
build on the progress achieved and center around the multilateral process.  Meanwhile, in order to 
make these negotiations meaningful, the major demandeurs  have to come back to earth and get 
realistic about their ambition.  History has proven and will continue to prove that it is of vital 
importance for us all to preserve the multilateral trad ing system.  Failure of the Doha Round will be a 
big blow, not only to the multilateral trading system, but also to the global economy.  Finally, I would like to reiterate that China will re main constructive and work closely with the TNC Chair, the Chairs 
of the Negotiating Groups and other Members to br ing the Doha Round to a successful and balanced 
conclusion.  If, on the last day, there is any Memb er who is still standing by Doha, it will be China. 
  
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