WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION   
G/ADP/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11 
G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11 6 June 2012 
 
(12-2965) 
Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices  
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Original:   English 
 
 
 
NOTIFICATION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS  
UNDER ARTICLES 18.5 AND 32.6 OF THE AGREEMENTS  
 
UNITED STATES 
 
Supplement 
   The following communication, dated 23 May 2012, is being circulated at the request of the 
Delegation of the United States. 
 
_______________ 
 
 
Pursuant to Article 32.6 of the Agreemen t on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and 
Article 18.5 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 1994, the United States hereby notifies:  
Modification to Regulation Concerning the Revocation of Antidumping and Countervailing 
Duty Orders, 77 Fed. Reg. 29875 (21 May 2012) 
 
The attached document eliminates the provision for revocation of an antidumping or 
countervailing duty order with respect to individual exporters or producers based on those individual 
exporters or producers having received antidumping rates of zero for three consecutive years, or 
countervailing duty rates of zero for five consecutive y ears.  This change to the regulation will apply 
to all reviews that are initiated on or after 20 June 2012. 
 
[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 98 (Monday, May 21, 2012)] [Rules and Regulations] [Pages 29875-29884] From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov] 
[FR Doc No:  2012-12257] G/ADP/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11 
G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11 Page 2 
 
 
  DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
 International Trade Administration  
19 CFR Part 351 
 [Docket No. 110315198-1622-02] RIN 0625-AA86  
 
Modification to Regulation Concerning the Revo cation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty 
Orders  AGENCY:  Import Administration, International Tr ade Administration, Department of Commerce. 
 
ACTION:  Final rule.  -----------------------------------------------------------------------  SUMMARY:  The Department of Commerce (the Depa rtment) is amending its regulations concerning 
the revocation of antidumping and countervailing duty orders in whole or in part, and the termination 
of suspended antidumping and countervailing duty inv estigations.  This rule eliminates the provision 
for revocation of an antidumping or  countervailing duty order with respect to individual exporters or 
producers based on those individual exporters or producers having received antidumping rates of zero for three consecutive years, or countervailing du ty rates of zero for five consecutive years. 
 
DATES:  This Final Rule is effective June 20, 2012.   This rule will apply to all reviews that are 
initiated on or afte r June 20, 2012. 
 FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONT ACT:  James Maeder at (202) 482-3330, Mark Ross at 
(202) 482-4794, or Jonathan Zielinski at (202) 482-4384. 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:    Background  
On March 21, 2011, the Department pub lished a proposed rule entitled "Proposed 
Modification to Regulation Concerning the Revo cation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty 
Orders'' that would modify its regulations  concerning the revocation of antidumping and 
countervailing duty orders. (76 FR 15233).  The Proposed Rule deta iled proposed changes to the 
Department's regulations that provide for revoca tion of antidumping and countervailing duty orders.  
Certain parties commented on the Proposed Rule, and the Department has addressed those comments 
in the section below entitled "Response to Comments on the Proposed Rule''. 
 
After analyzing and carefully considering all of  the comments that the Department received in 
response to the Proposed Rule, the Department is adopting the proposed changes and is amending its 
regulations to eliminate the provision for revocatio n of an antidumping or countervailing duty order 
with respect to individual exporters or produ cers based on those individual exporters or producers 
having received antidumping rates of zero for three consecutive years, or countervailing duty rates of zero for five consecutive years.  The Proposed Rule , comments received, and this Final Rule can be 
accessed using the Federal eRulemaking Portal at http://www.regulations.gov  under Docket Number 
ITA-2011-0001.  G/ADP/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11 
 G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11  Page 3 
 
 
  Explanation of Changes to 19 CFR 351.222 
 
To implement this rule, the Department is re moving 19 CFR 351.222(b)(2) and (3) (dumping) 
and 351.222(c)(3) and (4) (counterva ilable subsidy), and is making conforming changes as necessary 
to the remaining paragraphs of 19 CFR 351.222.  In addition, the Department is amending 
19 CFR 351.222(f)(2) to make it clear that a request  for revocation that does not conform with the 
requirements of paragraph (e) does not require the S ecretary to undertake the actions provided for in 
paragraphs (f)(2)(i) through (f)(2)(vi).  The Department  also is correcting a grammatical error in the 
third sentence of 19 CFR 351.222(a) (changing "hav e'' to "has'') and deleting 19 CFR 351.222(m) 
(a provision related to the Uruguay Round Agreements Act that is no longer applicable).  Finally, the 
Department is correcting a typographical error in Sec. 351.222(e)(1)(i) that was identified in 
comments on the Proposed Rule (changed "the person'' to "they'').  The Department is retaining, with 
some conforming changes, the sections of 19 CFR 351.22 2 that regard revocations of orders in whole.  
The Department is not making any changes with  respect to revocations as described under 
paragraphs (g) through (l) of 19 CFR 351.222. 
 Response to Comments on the Proposed Rule 
 The Department received numerous comments on the Proposed Rule.  As indicated in the 
"Background'' section, these comments can be accessed  using the Federal eRulemaking Portal at 
http://www.regulations.gov  under Docket Number ITA-2011-0001.  The Department analyzed and 
carefully considered all of the comments received.  Below is a summary of the comments, grouped by 
issue category and followed by the Department's response.  Comment 1--U.S. Law, the WTO Agreemen ts, and Company-Specific Revocations 
 
Some commenters assert that the use of the word "may'' in Section 751(d)(l) of the Tariff Act 
of 1930, as amended (the "Act''), makes it clear th at Congress fully delegated to the Department the 
authority to prescribe the specific conditions under whic h revocation of an order, whether in whole or 
in part, is appropriate.  Some commenters also ass ert that, given the availability of revocation and 
termination in whole or in part in changed circumstances reviews and in whole in five-year sunset 
reviews, respondents seeking relief from antidumping or countervailing duties have more than ample 
opportunity to achieve that goal without the company-specific avenue contained in 19 CFR 351.222(b)(2) and (b)(3) and 351.222(c)(3) and (c)(4).  Further, in addition to not being 
required by U.S. law, some parties assert that th e company-specific revocation provisions are not 
required by any of the relevant WTO agreements.  These parties assert that the WTO dispute 
settlement panel in United States 
 Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods , 
paragraph 7.166, WT/DS282/R (adopted June 20,  2005) found that 19 CFR 351.222(b)(2) of the 
Department's regulations was not required by th e United States' WTO obligations because there was 
an opportunity for foreign companies to request revocation under the changed circumstances review 
provisions (i.e., 19 CFR 351.222(g)). 
 Some commenters suggest that further cost sav ings can be attained by withdrawing the 
regulations providing for country-wide revoca tions at 19 CFR 351.222(b)(l) (dumping) and 
351.222(c)(1) and (2) (subsidies).  They assert that, b ecause as part of a sunset review the Department 
already considers whether there has been continued dumping or subsidies after issuance of an order, 
there is no compelling need to maintain the company-specific and country-wide revocation 
procedures set forth at 19 CFR 351.222(b) and (c). 
 One commenter asserts that when a company de monstrates that it has not dumped its products 
over a certain period of time, the statue no longer justifies binding that company to costly G/ADP/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11 
G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11 Page 4 
 
 
  administrative reviews.  Another party asserts that the statute calls for revocation "in whole or in part'' 
based on administrative review results, and that this is evidence of the drafters' intent to allow for 
other means of revocation besides termination of th e order itself. One party asserted that the proposed 
rule, if implemented, would essentially eliminate the only viable opportunity for revocation for 
individual exporters/producers.  Several commenter s note that company-specific revocations have 
been a practice for many years and assert that parti es have relied upon that practice in the expectation 
of being granted a revocation in part. 
 One commenter asserts that the additional risk i nherent in the U.S. retrospective system is 
partly offset by the possibility of revocation, and re quests that the Department take this into account in 
assessing whether to eliminate company-specific revo cations of antidumping and countervailing duty 
orders.  One party proposes that the Department's current revocation provisions remain in effect for 
developing countries as a form of special and differe ntial treatment per Article 15 of the Antidumping 
Agreement and Article 27 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailin g measures.  Another 
commenter contends that pursuant to Articles 11 of the Antidumping Agreement, WTO members can 
only continue an antidumping duty order "to the ex tent necessary'' to "counteract dumping'' and must 
consider the request of "any interested party'' to "examine whether the continued imposition of the 
duty is necessary to offset dumping.'' Citing Am ended Regulation Concer ning the Revocation of 
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders;  Fi nal Rule, 64 FR 51226 (September 22, 1999), the 
party asserts that in that Federal Register notice the Department concluded that Article 11.2 of the 
Antidumping Agreement requires the Department to  revoke an antidumping order for any exporter 
who demonstrates the absence of dumping for three y ears, provided there is no evidence of record to 
the contrary.  One party asserts that the Department vigorously defended company-specific revocations pursuant to Article 11 of the Anti dumping Agreement in WTO litigation (citing report of 
WTO Panel, United States 
 Antidumping duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors 
from Korea , WT/DS99/R (adopted March 19, 1999) (DRAMS). 
 Response to Comments:  Company-specific revocations are not required by U.S. law, and 
thus, the elimination of such revocations is consis tent with U.S. law.  Section 751(d)(1) of the Act 
states, in relevant part, that the Department "may revoke, in whole or in part * * * .'' an antidumping 
or countervailing duty order.  As several parti es note, the use of the word "may'' indicates that 
revocations under this section of the Act, whether in whole or in part, are not required.  Because the 
authority for company-specific revocations derives from section 751(d)(1) of the Act, those types of 
revocations are not mandatory. 
 
We agree that section 751(d)(1) of the Act perm its revocations other than revocation of an 
order in whole, i.e., the provision permits the Depa rtment to revoke an order in part.  The Act does 
not, however, define what it means to revoke an order in part.  See Sahaviriya Steel Ind. Pub Co. Ltd. 
v. United States, No. 2010, slip op. at 9-10 (Fed. Cir. June 17, 2011).  The Department has the discretion to interpret this provision, and is not required to interpret it to include company-specific 
revocations.  The Proposed Rule does not affect othe r types of revocations in part.  For example, 
orders may continue to be revoked in part if a party demonstrates a lack of interest in maintaining the 
order on a certain type of subject merchandise by substa ntially all of the domestic industry.  See, e.g., 
Certain Pasta from Italy;  Final Results of Count ervailing Duty Changed Circumstances Review and 
Revocation, In Part, 76 FR 27634 (May 12, 2011). 
 
Regarding the comment from several parties that  company-specific revocations have been a 
practice for many years and that parties have relie d upon that practice in the expectation of being 
granted a revocation in part, the age of a practice does not affect the legality of its elimination.  
Rather, the Department has the au thority to change its practice at any time provided that it gives a 
reasoned explanation for its change.  See Alleghe ny Ludlum Corp. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1368,  G/ADP/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11 
 G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11  Page 5 
 
 
  1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Allegheny Ludlum).  In th e Proposed Rule and the below sections entitled 
"Comment 2--Whether the Department Provided a Reasoned Analysis for the Proposed Rule'' and 
"Comment 4--Reasons for Discontinuing Company-Sp ecific Revocations'', the Department further 
explains its rationale for eliminating company-sp ecific revocations.  Moreove r, the Department has 
provided parties ample notice of the change and opportunity to comment, and took those comments 
into consideration for this Final Rule.  In any ev ent, the statute and the regulation make clear that 
revocation is discretionary. 
 Regarding the comments from several parties that the Proposed Rule would be contrary to the 
United States' obligations under the Antidumping Agreem ent, we disagree.  We note that the Act "is 
intended to bring U.S. law fully into compliance wi th U.S. obligations under [the WTO Agreements].'' 
See SAA accompanying the URAA, HR Doc 316, Vol.  1, 103d Cong (1994) at 669.  And, as 
explained above, U.S. law does not require company-specific revocations.  Moreover, there is nothing in Article 11 of the Antidumping Agreement that requires company-specific revocations.  We also 
note that the Department is not eliminating its prac tice, as codified in its regulations, of revoking an 
order in whole based on the absence of dumping. 
 Regarding the argument that the Department defended company-specific revocations pursuant 
to Article 11 of the Antidumping Agreement in the DRAMS dispute, that dispute concerned the 
evidence that could be relied upon in determining whether revocation was prope r.  The Department's 
regulation at the time required it to determine that  sales of subject merchandise at below normal value 
in the future were not likely.  The Panel considered  whether this "not likely '' standard was consistent 
with the requirements of Article 11.2 of the Anti dumping Agreement, and dete rmined that it was not.  
This dispute was not about whether company-specifi c revocations were required by the Antidumping 
Agreement, and the Panel's findings did not involve that issue. 
 
Finally, with regard to the suggestion that th e company-specific revocation regulations remain 
in effect for developing countries as a form of speci al and differential treatment per Article 15 of the 
Antidumping Agreement and Article 27 of the Agre ement on Subsidies and Countervailing measures, 
neither Article requires company-specific revocati ons, and we have not ad opted this suggestion. 
 
Comment 2--Whether the Department Provided a Reasoned Analysis for the Proposed Rule 
 Several commenters assert that U.S. administrative law requires that the Department provide 
a "reasoned analysis'' for this propo sed change to the regulations, and that the Proposed Rule lacked a 
"reasoned analysis'' because the Department did not explain why the Proposed Rule is being 
undertaken and why the facts and circumstances that underlay the existing revocation policy should 
be disregarded.  They assert that, because the Depa rtment has not provided a reasoned analysis or the 
basic factual assumptions underlying the Proposed Ru le, interested parties have been denied a 
meaningful opportunity to comment.  One of these parties cites Motor Veh. Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 42, in support of its assertion that U.S. administrative law requires that 
the Department provide a "reasoned analysis'' for th is proposed change to th e regulations.  It argues 
further that pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 
556 U.S. 502 (2009), "a reasoned explanation is need ed for disregarding facts and circumstances that 
underlay or were engendered by the prior policy.'' The same party cites that in a prior rulemaking 
exercise the Department stated that it "has consis tently considered that an absence of dumping for 
three consecutive years was indica tive that a foreign respondent was not likely to sell at less than 
normal value in the future.'' See Proposed Regulation Concerning Revocation of Antidumping Duty 
Orders;  Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 64 FR 2981 8 (June 3, 1999).  It contends that in the 
Proposed Rule the Department made no effort to refu te this statement, and that by not explaining the 
proposed change the Department's proposal runs afoul of the Administrative Procedures Act.  The 
party also asserts that because the Department ha s not provided a reasoned analysis or the basic G/ADP/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11 
G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11 Page 6 
 
 
  factual assumptions underlying the proposed change, in terested parties have be en denied a meaningful 
opportunity to comment. 
Response to Comments:  The Department explained its reasons for eliminating company-
specific revocations in the Proposed Rule.  Specifi cally, the Department stated that it was proposing 
the elimination of company-specific revocations because:  (1) The existing regulation requires the 
Department to expend additional resources in condu cting administrative reviews where a request for 
company-specific revocation is being considered;  (2) only a small fraction of the companies the 
Department reviews are ultimately found to be eligib le for a company-specific revocation;  (3) to the 
extent that eligible companies maintain antidumpi ng duty or countervailing duty rates of zero percent, 
the proposal would not change the amount of duties a pplied to subject entries;  and (4) many of the 
companies for which reviews have been request ed may not have the opportunity to amass the 
three antidumping rates of zero percent or five c ountervailing duty rates of zero percent necessary to 
be eligible for a company-specific revocation b ecause the Department frequently is not able to 
examine all companies under review.  The Department further stated that "[r]ather than administering 
the company-specific revocation regulations in a mann er that does not afford equitable opportunity to 
all companies to seek revocation, and in light of the additional factors noted, the Department proposes 
to eliminate the company-specific revocation regulations.'' 
 The Department may change its practice at  any time as long as it provides a reasoned 
explanation for the change.  See Allegheny Ludl um.  Here, the Department provided a reasoned 
explanation.  The Department explained the burden on its resources that company-specific revocation 
reviews entail.  It is reasonable for the Departme nt to make changes in response to its resource 
constraints.  See Pakfood Public Co. Ltd. v. Unite d States, 753 F. Supp 2d 1334 (Ct. of International 
Trade 2011) (holding that administrative convenience is a valid reason for a change in practice). 
 
The Department has not ignored the circumstances that supported the existence of the 
regulation in the first place, but rather has determined  that it is no longer appropriate to continue the 
practice in light of current resources for th e reasons described in the Proposed Rule. 
 Comment 3--Effective Date 
 
Some commenters ask that the Department adopt  and implement the proposed change to the 
revocation regulations immediately (i.e., make the change applicable to all administrative reviews 
currently pending before the Department).  Others request that the Department  continue to allow for 
revocations in all ongoing reviews in which a re vocation request has been  made.  One commenter 
suggests that the Department "grandfather in'' any company that had reviews of itself initiated prior to 
the adoption of this rule to give them the opportunity  to earn three zeros and, ultimately, revocation.  
Another party expresses concern that the proposal could undermine legitimate expectations of 
exporters, given uncertainty over entry into force of the proposed change. 
Response to Comments:  As indicated in the DATES section above, this Final Rule will apply 
to all reviews that are initiated on or after June 20, 2012.  The Department beli eves that this is a fair 
and reasonable approach to the effective date i ssue for this particular change.  Importantly, 
implementing the Final Rule in this manner will pr ovide parties that have requested revocation in 
ongoing reviews the opportunity to complete those re views and obtain a revocation should they meet 
the regulatory requirements in effect when that review was initiated.   G/ADP/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11 
 G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11  Page 7 
 
 
  Comment 4--Reasons for Discontinuing Company-Specific Revocations 
 a. Conserve Resources 
 
Some commenters agree with the Department 's assertion that, pursuant to the existing 
regulation, the Department is re quired to expend additional resources,  including additional mandatory 
verifications, in conducting administrative review s when company-specific revocations are being 
considered.  They assert, therefore, that the change  will help to conserve resources as the Department 
will save money by not having to conduct "mandatory  verifications.'' They also argue that the 
Department will have fewer requests for review, as co mpanies that are already subject to low deposit 
rates will be less likely to request a review and th ere will be less of an incentive for companies to 
"engineer'' sales for purposes of achieving re vocation, rather than for normal commercial 
considerations.  The parties contend that the Depa rtment will also save r esources by not having to 
conduct the changed circumstance reviews that ar e currently needed to determine whether an 
exporter, once revoked, needs to be reinstated in the order.  Finally, they contend that removal of the 
country-wide revocation procedures is permissibl e and would result in further cost savings. 
 Another party cites to burdens on the U.S. govern ment that are created by circumvention and 
evasion of trade relief with respect to certain tr ade remedies, and asserts that such circumstances 
demonstrate the importance of the proposed changes to the revocation regulations.  It asserts that the 
individual exporter exclusions provided for under th e regulations at issue substantially complicate 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection's responsib ilities for enforcement of antidumping orders, and 
cites to certain duty evasion issues that the U.S. government experienced while administering certain 
antidumping measures.  It contends that company-spec ific exclusions can also necessitate a significant 
allocation of resources by the domestic industry to monitor shipments, and try and prevent 
circumvention of the trade relief. 
 Some commenters assert that revocations actually reduce administrative burdens by 
eliminating the need for administrative reviews of  companies that are revoked from an antidumping or 
countervailing duty order, and that by continuing  to grant company-specific revocations the 
Department will free up resources to review other companies.  One party asserts that there is no 
reason to presume that the availability of revo cations increases the number of proceedings the 
Department must undertake.  For example, it conte nds that in a case with a small number of exporters 
to the U.S. market, revocations could reduce th e Department's case load.  Other commenters assert 
that it would be an inefficient use of resources to  review companies over and over when they have 
demonstrated that they do not engage in dumping.  A few parties contend that the Proposed Rule will 
consume more resources because companies will never have a chance for revocation and will bear the 
expense and burden of participating in more reviews.  Some commenters request that the Department 
find other ways to reduce burdens so that it is ab le to continue to administer company-specific 
revocations under the regulations at issue (e.g., crea te a more efficient and less rigorous process for 
administrative reviews, make verifications discret ionary, allow exporters to certify they are not 
dumping when they believe that to be the case). 
 
One party argues that because the number of companies who are eligible for a 
company-specific revocation is so small, the a dditional resources, including additional mandatory 
verifications that the Department cites as a reason fo r the proposed change, cannot be so great.  It also 
asserts that over time the proposed change will increase the resources expended on reviews as 
companies continue to request reviews to receive zer o or low duty rates.  The same party asserts that 
if the company-specific revocation regulations remain in effect, the Department  and other U.S. federal 
agencies (e.g., Customs and Border Protection)  may ultimately save resources as the pool of 
respondents subject to review diminishes over time. 
 G/ADP/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11 
G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11 Page 8 
 
 
  Another party asserts that since money is collected from respondent parties in the form of 
antidumping duties and it is relatively inexpens ive to conduct a revocation proceeding, the 
Department should not eliminate the revocation provis ion in the name of resource constraints.  It 
argues that any additional resources that may be required for considering a revocation request are 
minimal, and suggests that the Department inst ead conserve resources by  limiting the ability of 
domestic producers to request verification. 
 Response to Comments:  The Department believ es that the change will result in savings as it 
will no longer have to expend the additional resources associated with the conduct of administrative 
reviews, particularly mandatory verifications, wh en requests for company-specific revocations are 
being considered.  In addition, the Department anticipates cost savings from not having to conduct 
changed circumstances reviews currently needed to  determine whether an exporter, once excluded, 
should be reinstated in the order. 
 
With regard to various conflicting arguments that the change will result in either a decrease or 
an increase in the number of reviews that are request ed and, therefore, that cost savings may or may 
not actually be realized, we find them to be based  on speculation as to the motivations of individual 
parties who may request reviews.  Pursuant to 19 CFR 351.213(b), an administrative review of an exporter or producer may be requested by a domes tic interested party, a foreign government, an 
exporter or a producer, or an importer.  The Depart ment is in no position to determine for any given 
proceeding what a particular party's motivations woul d be in deciding to request a review and how the 
change may influence its decision.  However, the Department would note that there would be no 
reason for a respondent, with a zero or de minimis ca sh deposit rate, to request another administrative 
review but for the possibility of revocation. 
 
Regarding the comment suggesting the eliminati on of the country-wide revocation procedures 
as an additional means to save resources, the Propo sed Rule and this Federal Register notice only 
pertain to company-specific revocations and the i ssues the Department has experienced and hopes to 
resolve by eliminating those types of revocations.  The Final Rule does not include any changes to the 
parts of the revocation regulations th at concern country-wide revocations. 
 
With regard to the suggestion that company- specific revocations should be eliminated 
because they may be tied to circumvention or duty evasion issues that necessitate a significant 
allocation of resources by the domestic industry to  monitor shipments, we have not relied on this 
claim as a basis for our decision to implement the proposed rule since we do not have evidence of 
increased burdens associated with such monitoring. 
 
With regard to the suggestion that the Depart ment conserve resources by limiting the ability 
of domestic producers to request verifications, we find that our current regulations provide 
appropriate guidance and flexibility for the conduct of verifications requested by domestic producers 
in light of the Department's resource considerati ons.  Finally, if necessary, we may in the future 
consider additional cost-savings measures in addition to the savings associated  with the changes made 
by this rule. 
 b. A Small Portion of Reviewed Companies Have Been Found To Be Eligible for a 
Company-Specific Revocation 
 
Several commenters assert that the small portio n of companies found to be eligible for 
company-specific revocation is not a relevant factor  to cite in support of changing the regulations.  
One commenter asserts that such a statistic is simp ly a consequence of the difficulty of satisfying the 
requirements for revocation.  Another asserts that th is measurement is not relevant to the antidumping 
orders on exports from its country because a numbe r of companies were revoked from one of those  G/ADP/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11 
 G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11  Page 9 
 
 
  antidumping orders.  Several commenters argue that the small number of company-specific 
revocations supports that the existing revocation re gulations do not have a material impact on the 
Department's resources. 
 
Response to Comments:  We disagree with the assertion that the number of reviewed 
companies that the Department has ultimately found to be eligible for a company-specific revocation 
is not an important factor to cite in support of  modifying 19 CFR 351.222.  As indicated in the 
Proposed Rule, while the Department annually conducts administrative reviews of hundreds of 
foreign companies subject to antidumping or count ervailing duty orders, only a small fraction of the 
reviewed companies are ultimately found to be elig ible for a company-specific revocation.  Moreover, 
in evaluating this matter in terms of the burden a nd administrative procedures involved, it is important 
to consider that many of the companies that  request a company-specific revocation under the 
regulations at issue go through the process of being reviewed but are, ultimately, not found to be 
eligible for a company-specific revocation.  We exam ined the review requests for orders that were in 
effect between 2005 and 2009 and learned that r oughly 75% of the company-specific revocation 
requests that we received ultimately were denied.  Many of the companies that requested partial 
revocation under the regulations at issue did not obt ain one because either:  (1) The company was still 
dumping;  (2) the company did not make sales in commercial quantities;  (3 ) the company withdrew 
its request for revocation and/or review after we initiated the review;  (4) a revocation of the entire 
order via the sunset review process took pl ace prior to completion of our review of the 
company-specific revocation request;  or (5) the company was not selected as a respondent because 
the Department did not have the resources to pro ceed with a company-specific examination.  Thus, 
with the status quo, the Department can expect to  continue to expend significant resources examining 
unsuccessful requests for company-specific revocations .  Instead, the Department has determined, in 
part, to eliminate the disconnect between the large amount of resources expended conducting these 
company-specific revocation reviews and the few companies that benefit. 
 We also disagree with the assertion by one commenter that, with respect to antidumping 
orders on exports from its country, the small fract ion of the reviewed co mpanies the Department 
ultimately found eligible for a company-specific revoca tion is not a relevant fa ctor to cite in support 
of modifying 19 CFR 351.222.  The commenter indicat es that a number of companies were revoked 
from one of the antidumping orders on imports fro m its country.  Nonetheless, in evaluating and 
deciding on this particular change to the regula tions our focus has been on all antidumping and 
countervailing duty orders/measures that are admini stered by the Department, not just revocation 
requests for one particular measure, industry, or country.  
c. This Amendment Will Not Change the Amount  of Duties Applied to Entries Subject to 
Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Orders Where the Duty Rates Remain Zero  Some parties agree with the Department's reliance on this factor.  Others argue that, when 
companies maintain antidumping or countervailing dut y rates of zero percent, both the Department 
and interested parties are expending resources on reviews of companies that are unlikely to dump or 
receive countervailable subsidies in the future.  An other party asserts that the Department's rationale 
does not take into account the unpredictability a nd costs imposed by antidumping and countervailing 
duty orders.  One party comments that the Departme nt appears to be saying that its proposal is 
revenue neutral because it would not affect the amount of duties applied, and asserts that the amount of revenue collected in antidumping or countervailing duties is not a matter within the jurisdiction of 
the Department. 
 Response to Comments:  The Department's statement is a matter of fact--if a company 
maintains an antidumping or countervailing duty rate  of zero, its duty liability will not change as a 
result of this amendment.  As for arguments con cerning the expenditure of resources in the conduct of G/ADP/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11 
G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11 Page 10 
 
 
  reviews for companies that maintain zero dumping or countervailing duty rates, such arguments are 
based on conjecture about the future pricing behavior  of those companies and future subsidization by 
governments.  It also assumes that interested parties will request reviews of those companies.  We are 
not in a position to predict such fu ture behavior.  The Department's point is that, as long as a company 
maintains a dumping or countervailing duty rate  of zero, it will incur no antidumping or 
countervailing duty liability.  The De partment's reference to this ch ange not impacting the amount of 
duties collected was simply an effort to consider  the burden of the proposal on parties, and not in 
consideration of the impact on U.S. revenue.  
d. Many Companies May Not Have the Opportunity To Amass the Three AD Rates of 
Zero Percent or Five CVD Rates of Zero Percent  Certain commenters favoring the proposed change  to the revocation regulations assert that it 
will result in a more equitable administration of the antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings 
for both the petitioners and respondents.  One of  these commenters claims that company-specific 
revocations can improperly advantage certain produ cers or exporters over others, and that such 
inequities also create difficulties for petitioners in en suring that orders are effective in eliminating 
injurious dumping and subsidization. 
 Several commenters assert that the current company-specific revocation regulations do a good 
job of promoting equity by revoking orders ag ainst companies that are not dumping or receiving 
countervailable subsidies.  They also assert that wh en such revocations result in one less company to 
review, it permits companies not previously examined  an opportunity to be selected for examination.  
One commenter contends that there is no reason to deny the important benefits of company-specific revocations simply because it may be impractical in every case.  The party also asserts that there are 
other benefits in the antidumping and countervailing duty regime that are applied unevenly (notably, 
the ability to obtain one's own margin, as opposed to an average of other rates).  Some commenters 
suggest that the Department adopt new procedures that will allow for all interested and eligible 
exporters to participate in reviews to the extent  necessary to achieve revocation.  A few commenters 
assert that certain factors we cite in support of this  change to the revocation regulations do not apply 
to the unique circumstances of trade remedy measu res on their exports (e.g., certain cases involve a 
"manageable'' number of companies and, therefore,  the Department should not be concerned with 
companies in those cases not having an opportunity to  be reviewed and amass the requisite zero rates). 
 Response to Comments:  The Department continues to find that this change to the regulations 
will, in general, result in a more equitable admi nistration of the antidumpi ng and countervailing duty 
proceedings.  In particular, and as explained in th e Proposed Rule, many of the companies for which 
reviews are requested may not have the opportuni ty to amass the three antidumping rates of 
zero percent (demonstrating an absence of dumping for three consecutive years) or five countervailing 
duty rates of zero percent (demonstrating an absence of countervailable subsidies for five consecutive 
years) necessary to be eligible for a company-sp ecific revocation.  See Proposed Rule, 76 FR 15234.  
This is because it is often not practicable for th e Department to examine all companies for which 
reviews have been requested, and where such circum stances exist, the Act permits the Department to 
limit the number of companies it individually  examines.  Rather than administering the 
company-specific revocation regulations in a manner that does not afford equitable opportunity to all 
companies to seek revocation, and in light of the comments and various factors noted in the Proposed 
Rule and this Federal Register notice, the Depart ment is eliminating the company-specific revocation 
regulations.  Moreover, by eliminating the need to obtain two/four subsequent  reviews for revocation, 
the Department anticipates that fewer companies with zero or de minimis deposit rates will request 
reviews, freeing up limited resources to consider th e antidumping or counterva iling duty rates of other 
companies. 
  G/ADP/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11 
 G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11  Page 11 
 
 
  With regard to the suggestion that the Depa rtment develop or adopt new company-specific 
revocation procedures, the Department has not iden tified any new procedures for company-specific 
revocations that would address all the reasons it ha s for discontinuing such revocations.  As for the 
commenters that assert that our reasons for discon tinuing company-specific revocations do not apply 
to a particular antidumping or countervailing duty orde r, we do not find that any sort of differential 
treatment would be appropriate. 
e. Trade Law Enforcement Initiative 
 One commenter states that  the genesis of this proposal was an August 2010 announcement by 
the Secretary of Commerce to strengthen trade enfo rcement with a particular focus on illegal import 
practices from non-market economy countries.  The comme nter contends that there is little correlation 
between illegal import practices from non-market ec onomies and the Proposed Rule, and asserts that 
the Secretary's concerns are more appropriately addressed by other items mentioned in the August 2010 announcement. 
 
Response to Comments:  This proposal was identified in the August 26, 2010, announcement 
of a Trade Law Enforcement Package to strengthen the administration of the nation's trade remedy 
laws.  In making the announcement about this initiative, addressing illegal import practices from 
non-market economies was highlighted as an objective, but that objective is secondary to the overall 
purpose of the initiative which is to strengthen the ad ministration of the nation' s trade remedy laws.  
Further, in the Proposed Rule, and in the above se ctions of this notice, the Department provides a 
detailed explanation and information about the factor s that warrant this amendment.  Those factors 
and the rule change are not specific to imports fro m any one country or type of economy (market or 
non-market).  
Comment 5--Company-Specific Revocations Award Good Behavior 
 Several commenters assert that the Depart ment should maintain the existing rules for 
company-specific revocations as a direct incentive to  induce individual foreign firms to adjust prices 
and eliminate dumping or receiving subsidies.  Anot her party comments that such revocations give 
respondents hope that if they comply with the United States antidumping and countervailing duty 
laws, their efforts may be recognized and rewarded  by revocation.  Another party asserts that 
company-specific revocations ensure that U.S. ma nufacturers, retailers and consumers are not denied 
access to fairly traded goods. 
 Response to Comments:  While we appreciate that companies may wish to retain the 
opportunity to be revoked from an order, as we noted  under Comment 1, there is no obligation under 
U.S. law or the WTO Agreements to provide for such company-specific revocations.  Moreover, if a foreign firm stops dumping or receiving countervaila ble subsidies, it will eliminate its liability for 
antidumping and countervailing duties, and U.S. ma nufacturers will have full access to its fairly 
traded goods.  Finally, the antidumping and counte rvailing duty laws do not exist to reward any 
behavior.  Instead, these laws exist to provide a re medy for injurious market-distorting unfair trade 
practices.  The imposition of a remedial duty discour ages such practices to the extent they are found 
to exist.  As noted above, by maintaining a zer o dumping margin or zero subsidy rate, companies 
avoid liability for these duties.  Comment 6--Impact of the Proposed Change on the Economy and Trade 
 
Several commenters request that the Departme nt not change its revocation policy until it 
conducts a review of the impact of the change on consuming industries and other parties that utilize 
imports that are subject to antidumping or counterv ailing duty orders.  They assert that such parties G/ADP/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11 
G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11 Page 12 
 
 
  will be negatively affected as a result of the Department performing administrative reviews of 
individual companies that would have otherwise b een revoked from an order.  One commenter asserts 
that the proposed change would restrict the ability of U.S. retailers to pr ovide consumers with a 
variety of high-quality products at affordable prices, undermine U.S. competitiveness, put U.S. jobs at 
risk, and undermine the Administration's goal of doubling U.S. exports. 
 Response to Comments:  With respect to the comment about consuming industries and other 
parties that utilize imports that are subject  to antidumping or countervailing duty orders, 
5 U.S.C. 605(b) requires that the Department cons ider the "economic impact on a substantial number 
of small business entities'' which includes such par ties.  The Department provided the analysis 
required by 5 U.S.C. 605(b) when it issued the Pr oposed Rule.  See Proposed Rule, 76 FR at 15234.  
More specifically, the Department  explained that in the past five years, despite conducting 
administrative reviews of well over five hundred companies, only 15 companies (of various sizes) have obtained a company-specific revocation under the relevant portions of 19 CFR 351.222.  We 
also believe that in considering the economic impact that this change may have, it is important to take 
into account the fact that less than two percent of all imports of goods into the United States are subject to antidumping or countervailing duties, an d only a very small portion of those imports will 
ever be affected by this change to the revocation regulations.  For these reasons, we continue to find 
that this change to the revocation regulati ons will not have a significant economic impact. 
 
Comment 7--Calculation of the Marg in for Non-Selected Companies 
 One commenter urges that, in light of this re gulatory change, the Department should consider 
carefully its methodology for calculating the rate that  is assigned to respondents that are not selected 
for individual review when the Department limits its examination in an administrative review.  It 
notes that when the Department limits its examin ation to the largest exporters, it applies to the 
non-examined companies the average of the individual margins assigned to the mandatory 
respondents, except for any margins that are zero, de minimis, or based on adverse facts available.  It 
also notes that when all of the mandatory respondents receive margins that are zero, de minimis or based on adverse facts available, the Department ba ses the margin for the non-selected respondents on 
the most recently calculated affirmative margin from a previous administrative review.  It asserts that 
this situation is likely to arise with far greater  frequency once zeroing in administrative reviews is 
eliminated and the revocation regulations are modified .  It also asserts that over time, a margin for 
non-selected companies identified in this manner could be based on a margin ca lculated several years 
in the past and it would no longer be a reasona ble approximation of the pricing behavior of 
non-selected respondents. 
 
Response to Comments:  With regard to th e Department's practice or methodology for 
calculating the rate that is assigned to respondents th at are not selected for individual review when the 
Department limits its examination, we believe it w ould be premature to try and address that issue in 
the context of a change to the revocation regulations.  It would be more appropriate to evaluate that 
issue in the context of future antidum ping or countervaili ng duty proceedings. 
 
Comment 8--Zeroing in Relation to Company-Specific Revocations 
 One company cites to the possible elimination of zeroing in AD reviews (see Antidumping 
Proceedings:  Calculation of the Weighted Average Dumping Margin and Assessment Rate in Certain 
Antidumping Proceedings, 75 FR 81533 (December 28, 2010)), and asserts that if the Department 
stops zeroing, one would expect that a significant number of exporters may qualify for revocation in 
the years following the change.  Another company s uggests that eliminating zeroing while retaining 
the possibility of revocation should materially reduce the Department's workload  after a few years;   G/ADP/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11 
 G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11  Page 13 
 
 
  however, if the Department eliminates both zeroing a nd revocation, then the Department will waste its 
resources in repetitious reviews of companies with zero margins. 
 Response to Comments:  On February 14, 2012, in response to several WTO dispute 
settlement reports, the Department adopted a revi sed methodology which allows for offsets when 
making average-to-average comparisons in reviews.   See Antidumping Proceedings:  Calculation of 
the Weighted-Average Dumping Margin and A ssessment Rate in Certain Antidumping Duty 
Proceedings;  Final Modification, 77 FR 8101 (February 14, 2012). ("Final Modification for Reviews'').  The Final Modification for Reviews makes clear that the revised methodology will apply 
to antidumping duty administrative reviews wher e the preliminary results are issued after 
April 16, 2012.  The revision to our calculation methodology in antidumping duty administrative reviews was made to implement certain findings by  the WTO Appellate Body with respect to that 
methodology in several disputes.  See United States 
 Laws, Regulations and Methodology for 
Calculating Dumping Margins , WT/DS294/R, WT/DS294/AB/R, adopted May 9, 2006;  
United States  Measures Related to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews , WT/DS322/R, WT/DS322/AB/R, 
adopted Jan. 23, 2007;  United States − Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel From 
Mexico , WT/DS344/R, WT/DS344/AB/R, adopted May 20, 2008;  United States − Continued 
Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology , WT/DS350/R, WR/DS350/AB/R, adopted 
Feb. 19, 2009.  The Department's decision to ch ange the revocation regulations has been made 
without regard to, and irrespective of, the change in our calculation methodology as a result of the implementation.  Moreover, the comments regarding the possible effects of the proposed revision to 
our calculation methodology in antidumping duty reviews are based solely upon speculation.  
Comment 9--Revocations of AD and CVD Measures--In Whole 
 Several parties indicate that with respect to  revocation or termination in whole, the 
Department's regulations would re main substantively unc hanged and, therefore, in addressing whether 
or not to award revocation or termination in whole, the Department will need to consider whether "all 
exporters and producers'' have not dumped for at least three consecutive years or have not applied for 
or received any net countervailable subsidy for at least  five consecutive years, respectively.  In light 
of the fact that the Department often reviews individually only a small number of the foreign exporters and producers covered by an order, they  ask the Department to consider and address how 
these prerequisites for revocation or termination in w hole are to be satisfied.  They propose that each 
foreign exporter or producer must demonstrate affirmatively that it met these conditions for the 
prescribed number of years before revocation or termination in whole will be granted by the 
Department.  One of these parties also asked the Department to consider how to address revocation 
requests when all mandatory respondents receive ra tes of zero percent for the requisite number of 
years under Sec. 351.222(b)(1) and (c)(1)-(2);  in pa rticular, whether these rates would be assigned to 
all non-reviewed companies and, if so, whether th e order in whole would then be eligible for 
revocation.  One commenter suggests that in add ition to withdrawing the regulations establishing 
company-specific revocations at 19 CFR 351.222(b)(2) and (3) and 351.222(c)(3) and (4), the Department should withdraw its regulations  providing for country-wide revocations. 
 Response to Comments:  We generally agree with  the commenters' assertion that each foreign 
exporter or producer would have to demonstrate that it met the regulatory requirements for the 
prescribed number of years before revocation or termination in whole could be granted by the 
Department.  With regard to considering how to address revocation requests when all mandatory 
respondents receive rates of zero percent for the requisite number of years under Secs. 351.222(b)(1) 
and (c)(1)-(2), we believe it is premature to d ecide whether such circumstances would warrant a 
revocation of an order in whole.  We will address any such scenarios as they arise in the context of 
future antidumping or countervailing duty proceedi ngs.  In addition, we have not adopted the G/ADP/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11 
G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11 Page 14 
 
 
  suggestion that in addition to withdrawing the re gulations establishing company-specific revocations 
at 19 CFR 351.222(b)(2) and (3) and 351.222(c)(3) a nd (4), the Department should withdraw its 
regulations providing for country-wide revoca tions at 19 CFR 351.222(b)(l) (dumping) and 
351.222(c)(1) and (2) (subsidies).  The Proposed Rule and this Federal Register notice only pertain to 
company-specific revocations and the issues the De partment has experienced and hopes to resolve by 
eliminating those types of revocations.  See the Proposed Rule and Comment 4 above. 
 Comment 10--Reinstatement of AD and CVD Measures 
 
Several commenters requested that the Depart ment not withdraw the subsections of the 
revocation regulations that deal with the reinst atement of partially revo ked orders (i.e., 19 CFR 
351.222(b)(2)(i)(B), (e)(1)(iii) (antidumping duty orders) and (c)(3)(i)(B), (e)(2)(iii)(D) 
(countervailing duty orders)).  They contend that if the subsections are removed, it is unclear what 
recourse would be available to the Department in the event that companies, for which orders have 
already been partially revoked, resume making U. S. sales at dumped prices or resume benefitting 
from countervailable subsidies in violation of trade re medy laws.  They suggest that in light of the 
proposed amendments to 19 CFR 351.222, the Depa rtment should maintain the rules that would 
provide for the reinstatement of partially revo ked antidumping and counter vailing duty orders.  One 
party suggests that the Department maintain the current version of Sec. 351.222(b)(2)(i)(B), 
(c)(3)(i)(B), (e)(1)(iii), and (e)(2)(iii)(D) in its regulati ons but clarify that they apply only to orders 
that have been partially revoked prior to the effective date of the change in regulations. 
 Response to Comments:  We have not adopted the changes proposed by these parties.  Any 
company that has been revoked from an antidumping or countervailing duty order will remain subject to its certified agreement to be reinstated with respec t to that order if the Department finds it to have 
resumed dumping or to be benefitting from a c ountervailable subsidy.  The modification does not 
absolve the company from its obliga tions under its existing agreement. 
 Comment 11--Clerical Error in the Proposed Rule 
 Two commenters assert that the Depart ment made a typographical error in 
Sec. 351.222(e)(1)(i) of the proposed amendment to the revocation regulations.  One commenter 
suggests that the term "the person'' may need to be  changed to the plural form to conform to "all 
exporters and producers.''  The other suggests that th e reference to "the person'' be changed to "the 
exporter or producer in each instance.'' 
 
Response to Comments:  We agree that there is  a typographical error in Sec. 351.222(e)(1)(i) 
of the Proposed Rule.  The term "the person'' needs to be in a plural form, so we have changed the 
term to "they''.  Classification  
Executive Order 12866 
 The rule has been determined to be not significant for purposes of Executive Order 12866. 
 Regulatory Flexibility Act 
 
The Chief Counsel for Regulation has certified to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the 
Small Business Administration ("SBA'') under the provisions of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), that the proposed rule would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small business entities.  The factual basis for the certification was published in the  G/ADP/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11 
 G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11  Page 15 
 
 
  Proposed Rule.  The Department received comments re garding the factual basis for this decision, and 
has summarized and responded to those comments in the above section of this notice entitled 
"Comment 4--Reasons for Discontinuing Company-Specific Revocations''.  Based upon the Department's analysis, as discussed above, the factua l basis used in the Proposed Rule to determine 
that the rule, if promulgated, would not have a significant impact on a subs tantial number of small 
business entities did not change.  As a result, a Fina l Regulatory Flexibility an alysis is not required 
and has not been prepared. 
Paperwork Reduction Act 
 
This rule does not contain a collection of information for purposes of the Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 1980, as amended (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).  List of Subjects in 19 CFR Part 351 
 
Administrative practice and procedure, An tidumping, Business and industry, Cheese, 
Confidential business information, Countervailing duti es, Freedom of information, Investigations, 
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. 
 Dated:  May 15, 2012. 
 
Paul Piquado, 
Assistant Secretary for Import Administration. 
 For the reasons stated, 19 CFR part 351 is amended as follows: 
 
PART 351--ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES 
 1. The authority citation for 19 CFR part 351 continues to read as follows: 
 Authority:  5 U.S.C. 301;  19 U.S.C. 1202 note;  19 U.S.C. 1303 note;  19 U.S.C. 1671 et 
seq.;  and 19 U.S.C. 3538. 
 
2. In Sec. 351.222, revise paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (e), and (f), remove paragraph (m), and 
redesignate paragraph (n) as para graph (m) to read as follows: 
 
Sec. 351.222  Revocation of orders;  te rmination of suspended investigations. 
 
(a) Introduction.  "Revocation'' is a term of ar t that refers to the end of an antidumping or 
countervailing proceeding in which an order has been issued.  "Termination'' is the 
companion term for the end of a proceeding in which the investigation was suspended 
due to the acceptance of a suspension agreement.  Generally, a revocation or termination may occur only after the De partment or the Commission has conducted 
one or more reviews under section 751 of th e Act. This section contains rules 
regarding requirements for a revocation or termination;  and procedures that the 
Department will follow in determining whet her to revoke an order or terminate a 
suspended investigation. 
(b) Revocation or termination based on absence of dumping.   
(1) In determining whether to revoke an  antidumping duty order or terminate a 
suspended antidumping investigation, the Secretary will consider: G/ADP/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11 
G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11 Page 16 
 
 
  (i) Whether all exporters and prod ucers covered at the time of 
revocation by the order or the suspension agreement have sold the subject merchandise at not less than normal value for a period of at least three consecutive years;  and 
(ii) Whether the continued application of the antidumping duty order is 
otherwise necessary to offset dumping. 
(2) If the Secretary determines, based upon the criteria in paragraphs (b)(1)(i) 
and (ii) of this section, that the antidumping duty order or suspension of the antidumping duty investigation is no longer warranted, the Secretary will revoke the order or terminate the investigation. 
(c) Revocation or termination based on absence of countervailable subsidy.   
(1) (i) In determining whether to revoke a countervailing duty order or 
terminate a suspended countervailing duty investigation, the Secretary 
will consider: 
(A) Whether the government of the affected country has 
eliminated all countervailable subsidies on the subject 
merchandise by abolishing for the subject merchandise, for a 
period of at least three consecutive years, all programs that the Secretary has found countervailable; 
(B) Whether exporters and producers of the subject merchandise 
are continuing to receive a ny net countervailable subsidy 
from an abolished program referred to in paragraph (c)(1)(i)(A) of this section;  and 
(C) Whether the continued application of the countervailing duty 
order or suspension of countervailing duty investigation is otherwise necessary to offset subsidization. 
(ii) If the Secretary determines, based upon the criteria in 
paragraphs (c)(1)(i)(A) through (C ) of this section, that the 
countervailing duty order or susp ension of the countervailing duty 
investigation is no longer warranted, the Secretary will revoke the order or terminate the suspended investigation. 
(2) (i) In determining whether to revoke a countervailing duty order or 
terminate a suspended countervail ing duty investigation, the 
Secretary will consider: 
(A) Whether all exporters and pr oducers covered at the time of 
revocation by the order or the suspension agreement have not applied for or received any net countervailable subsidy on the subject merchandise for a period of at least five consecutive years;  and 
(B) Whether the continued application of the countervailing duty 
order or suspension of the countervailing duty investigation is otherwise necessary to offset subsidization.  G/ADP/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11 
 G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11  Page 17 
 
 
  (ii) If the Secretary determines, based upon the criteria in 
paragraphs (c)(2)(i)(A) and (B) of th is section, that the countervailing 
duty order or the suspension of the countervailing duty investigation is no longer warranted, the Secretary will revoke the order or 
terminate the suspended investigation. 
* * * * * 
(e) Request for revocation or termination - 
(1) Antidumping proceeding.  During the third and subsequent annual 
anniversary months of the publication of an antidumping order or suspension 
of an antidumping investigation, any exporter or producer may request in 
writing that the Secretary revoke an order or terminate a suspended investigation under paragraph (b) of this  section if the person submits with 
the request: 
(i) Certifications for all exporters and producers covered by the order or 
suspension agreement that they so ld the subject merchandise at not 
less than normal value during the period of review described in Sec. 351.213(e)(1), and that in the future they will not sell the merchandise at less than normal value;  and 
(ii) Certifications for all exporters and producers covered by the order or 
suspension agreement that, durin g each of the consecutive years 
referred to in paragraph (b) of this section, they sold the subject merchandise to the United States in commercial quantities. 
(2) Countervailing duty proceeding.   
(i) During the third and subsequent annual anniversary months of the 
publication of a countervailing duty order or suspension of a countervailing duty investigation, the government of the affected 
country may request in writing that the Secretary revoke an order or terminate a suspended investigati on under paragraph (c)(1) of this 
section if the government submits with the request its certification 
that it has satisfied, during the period of review described in 
Sec. 351.213(e)(2), the requirements of paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this section regarding the abolition of countervailable subsidy programs, 
and that it will not reinstate for the subject merchandise those programs or substitute other c ountervailable subsidy programs; 
(ii) During the fifth and subsequent  annual anniversary months of the 
publication of a countervailing duty order or suspended countervailing duty investigation, the government of the affected 
country may request in writing that the Secretary revoke an order or 
terminate a suspended investigati on under paragraph (c)(2) of this 
section if the government submits with the request: 
(A) Certifications for all exporte rs and producers covered by the 
order or suspension agreement that they have not applied for 
or received any net counterva ilable subsidy on the subject G/ADP/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11 
G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11 Page 18 
 
 
  merchandise for a period of at least five consecutive years 
(see paragraph (c)(2)(i) of this section); 
(B) Those exporters' and producers' certifications that they will 
not apply for or receive any net countervailable subsidy on 
the subject merchandise from any program the Secretary has found countervailable in any proceeding involving the affected country or from other countervailable programs (see 
paragraph (c)(2)(ii) of this section);  and 
(C) A certification from each exporter or producer that, during 
each of the consecutive years referred to in paragraph (c)(2) of this section, that person sold the subject merchandise to 
the United States in commercial quantities. 
(f) Procedures.   
(1) Upon receipt of a timely request for revocation or termination under 
paragraph (e) of this section, the Secretary will consider the request as including a request for an administrativ e review and will initiate and conduct 
a review under Sec. 351.213. 
(2) When the Secretary is considering a request for revocation or termination 
under paragraph (e) of this section, in addition to the requirements of 
Sec. 351.221 regarding the conduct of an administrative review, the Secretary will: 
(i) Publish with the notice of initiation under Sec. 351.221(b)(1), notice 
of "Request for Revocation of Order' ' or "Request for Termination of 
Suspended Investigation'' (whichever is applicable); 
(ii) Conduct a verification under Sec. 351.307; 
(iii) Include in the preliminary resu lts of review under Sec. 351.221(b)(4) 
the Secretary's decision whether there is a reasonable basis to believe 
that the requirements for revocation or termination are met; 
(iv) If the Secretary decides that there is a reasonable basis to believe that 
the requirements for revocation or termination are met, publish with the notice of preliminary results of review under Sec. 351.221(b)(4) 
notice of "Intent To Revoke Order'' or "Intent To Terminate 
Suspended Investigation'' (whichever is applicable); 
(v) Include in the final results of review under Sec. 351.221(b)(5) the 
Secretary's final decision whether the requirements for revocation or 
termination are met;  and 
(vi) If the Secretary determines that the requirements for revocation or 
termination are met, publish with the notice of final results of review 
under Sec. 351.221(b)(5) notice of "Revocation of Order'' or 
"Termination of Suspended Investiga tion'' (whichever is applicable).  G/ADP/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11 
 G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.11  Page 19 
 
 
  (3) If the Secretary revokes an order, the Secretary will order the suspension of 
liquidation terminated for the mercha ndise covered by the revocation on the 
first day after the period under review, and will instruct the Customs Service 
to release any cash deposit or bond. 
* * * * * [FR Doc. 2012-12257 Filed 5-18-12;  8:45 am] 
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P  
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