RESTRICTED  WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  TN/CTD/M/30 
13 August 2007 
 
 (07-3402) 
Committee on Trade and Development 
Thirtieth Special Session  
 
 
 
NOTE ON THE MEETING OF 11 JULY 2007 
Chairman:  Ambassador Burhan Gafoor (Singapore) 
 
 
A. ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA .........................................................................................................1  
B. AGREEMENT -SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ..............................................................................................1  
C. THE MONITORING MECHANISM ...................................................................................................6  
D. OTHER BUSINESS .........................................................................................................................7  
 
 
A. ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA  
1. The draft agenda for the meeting as containe d in airgram WTO/AIR/3039 of 29 June 2007 
was adopted .   
B. AGREEMENT -SPECIFIC PROPOSALS  
2. The Chairman  reminded Members that the Special Session did not exist in isolation but 
coexisted in the larger process currently underway.  He said that the meeting at Potsdam had been a 
setback and had had an impact on reducing the momentum in the larger process.  This would, to some extent, impact the work of the Special Session as Members were preoccupied with the negotiations on 
Agriculture and Non-Agricultural Market Access ( NAMA).  Despite this, it was important for the 
Special Session not to lose, but rath er build on the progress that had b een made over the past year and 
a half.  Members' positive attitude had enabled them  to carry out their work in a constructive, 
business-like manner, which was something he hoped would be maintained as the work continued. 
3. He recalled that at the last formal meeting held on 5 June, Members had engaged in detailed 
discussions on the remaining Agreement-specific propo sals.  Following that meeting, an informal 
small group consultation was held on 15 June on three of the Agreement-specific proposals, namely 
proposal no. 13 on Article XVIII of the GATT and pr oposal nos. 24 and 25 on Article 10.3 of the 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement).  He had decided to focus on 
these proposals, because it was his sense that they stil l required a lot of work.  Based on the informal 
consultations and the discussions that had taken place at the last formal meeting, he had revised the 
language on Article XVIII.  This language was available to Members at the back of the room.  
Similarly, on proposal nos. 24 and 25 on Article 10. 3 of the SPS Agreement, he had held informal 
consultations on the basis of the revised language tabled by New Zealand.  This language had been 
useful in that it proposed an alternative formul ation to the time by which the SPS Committee should 
take a decision to grant specified, time-limite d exceptions to developing countries from their 
obligations under the SPS Agreement.  On these propo sals, he had also put together a revised text 
which was also available at the back of the r oom.  The revised texts on the proposals relating to 
Article XVIII and Article 10.3 of the SPS Agreement we re in no way definitive or final.  They were TN/CTD/M/30 
Page 2  
 
  simply an attempt to capture some of the constructi ve elements that had come up in the discussions 
that Members had had so far.  He had not held in formal consultations on proposal nos. 28, 29 and 30 
relating to Article 3.5 of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, because there already 
existed a fair degree of convergence on these proposals.   
4. He recalled that he had carried out some in formal consultations on proposal no. 79 on 
Article 10.2 of the SPS Agreement.  Due to the di vergences that existed, as well as the fact that it 
would be difficult to reach convergence on the basis of the language that was currently on the table, 
he had been inclined to set that proposal aside.  However, India, the proponent of the proposal, had put forward some revised language which was also av ailable at the back of the room.  He would, 
therefore, also devote some time to that proposal.  Members would begin by taking up proposal no. 13 
on Article XVIII, followed by proposal nos. 24 to  25 on Article 10.3 of the SPS Agreement and, 
finally, proposal no. 79 relating to Article 10.2 of the SPS Agreement. 
5. The meeting continued in an informal mode and reverted back to a formal mode to address 
proposal no. 79 on Article 10.2 of the SPS Agreement.   
6. The representative of India
 recalled that when his delegation had introduced its proposal on 
Article 10.2 of the SPS Agreement, it had clarified that the proposal was based on practical problems 
faced by exporters from developing countries when having to comply with onerous and expensive 
SPS measures introduced by other Members.  His delegation had also clarified that it was seeking a period of at least six months to comply with r estrictive SPS measures.  This did not relate to 
liberalizing measures nor did it relate to "emergen cy" measures which were already provided for 
under the SPS Agreement.  SPS measures of many developed countries restricted market access to 
products from developing countries.  In complying with the SPS measures of developed countries, 
Indian exporters from mainly small and medium enterp rises were forced to incur very high costs.  He 
gave the example of the Indian marine sector whic h had, over the past couple of years, suffered on 
account of having to comply with SPS measures of some developed countries.  During 2003 and 
2004, the Indian marine sector had had to spend large amounts of money to comply with the EU's 
food safety requirements.  In the late 1990s, in order to comply with EU requirements, the Indian 
Export Inspection Authorities invested large amounts to improve their laboratories.  The laboratory 
operated by the Marine Products Export Development Authority had to install new HPLC-MS/MS 
equipment in order to perform laboratory analysis  of antibiotic residues.  Article 10.2 of the SPS 
Agreement stated that "where the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary production allows for 
the phased introduction of new sanitary or phytosan itary measures, longer time-frames for compliance 
should be accorded on products of interest to developing country Members so as to maintain 
opportunities for their exports".  However, the implem entation of this provision was not satisfactory.  
In its review of the operation and implementa tion of the SPS Agreement, the SPS Committee had 
recognized this but had not suggested any conc rete measures to overc ome the problems that 
developing countries were facing.  The main re ason for the ineffective implementation of the 
provision was the manner in which the provision ha d been drafted.  Unless and until the provision 
specified a time-period to be accorded to developing countries to comply with new measures, Article 10.2 would remain a best endeavour clause whose implementation would not address 
developing country concerns.  It was logical to assume that producers in exporting countries would 
begin to undertake steps to comply with new m easures only after the consultation process had been 
exhausted and the concerned Member had indicated  its intention to finally promulgate an SPS 
measure, whether in the form that it was originally  notified or in an amended form as a result of the 
consultations.  That interval was as critical, if not more so, to ensure that SPS measures did not act as 
trade barriers.  If such a period was not provide d for, new SPS measures initiated by Members could 
very easily result in the temporary restriction of  exports, particularly from developing countries.  TN/CTD/M/30 
 Page 3 
 
 
  7. He went on to say that a number of countri es had differences over tolerance limits for 
pathogens, pests, weeds, pesticide residues and ot her substances relating to agro-products.  The 
difficulty was that all these issues related primarily  to cases where the importing countries set limits 
which the exporting countries found difficult to meet .  As such, these acted  as non-tariff barriers.  
This was more so the case when importers introduced  measures that went beyond health concerns and 
other established SPS norms.  The GATT and the SPS Agreement permitted governments to set their 
own product standards to protect human, animal or plant health.  Though both the GATT and the SPS 
Agreement specified that this should not be used as  a protectionist tool, this  was unfortunately seldom 
the case unless challenged.  Article 20 of the GATT categorically stated that self-determined norms should not be discriminatory in nature or used as disguised protectionism.  The SPS Agreement went 
a step further and stipulated that standards and regulations must be based  on science and should be 
applied only to the extent necessary to protect human , animal or plant life.  There had been specific 
instances where notifications had been issued on the last day of a month, indicating the next month as the date of entry into force of a new measure, pr oviding practically no time for Members to comply 
with the proposed measure.  One reason for this was that the Agreement did not specify what should 
be deemed to be the sufficient time-period betw een the notification of a proposed measure and its 
entry into force.  While recognizing the need for flexibility in urgent circumstances, his delegation felt 
that this was an issue which needed to be addressed when reviewing the Agreement.   
8. The representative of Australia
 said that while the proposal by India was in textual form for 
the first time, it did not appear to be different from previous iterations and did not address the core 
problem that her delegation had identified, and that  others had shared, on the concept of a mandatory 
minimum time-frame of six months  for compliance by developing countries to new SPS measures.  
The fact that the mandatory minimum time-frame  would only be provide d upon request did not 
overcome the problem because that time-frame would still have to be provided, if requested.  That 
meant that Members would not be able to set  their own scientifically-based SPS measures and 
implement them in a manner and time-frame consistent with the risk that they identified.  It appeared, 
from some of the comments made by the delegation of  India, that one of the major problems facing 
some developing countries in meeting SPS re quirements of developed countries was the 
underutilization of the existing flexibility in Article 10.2.  Her delegation did not believe that seeking 
to strengthen the existing provision by sti pulating a mandatory minimum time-frame would 
necessarily address that problem.  It could in fact, as  had been mentioned in the past, have the adverse 
effect of Members deciding not to provide any phase-in period in order to avoid providing the 
minimum six months.  It could also lead to disputes.   She recalled that Ministers at Doha had stated 
that "no country should be prevented from taking measures for the protection of human, animal or 
plant health at the levels it considers appropriate".   For the reasons she had mentioned, her delegation 
still considered that the Chairman's assessment made at the last formal meeting was valid, that is, that 
there was little prospect for reaching agreement on that proposal.  
9. The representative of the United States  agreed with the assessment made by the representative 
of Australia.  She said that her delegation was alrea dy meeting its obligations under Article 10.2 of the 
SPS Agreement and efforts had been, and were bei ng made to allow Members time to comply with 
new SPS measures.  These efforts were being made in  good faith to ensure that Article 10.2 was more 
than a best endeavour clause.  Where a certain de gree of protection was allowed, that applied to 
planned changes for SPS requirements necessary to address national needs, measures implemented in 
response to unanticipated events and measures adopt ed to implement international standards.  The 
proposed "not less than six months" in a sense  was meant to replace the word "normally" in 
paragraph 3.1 of the Doha Decision on Implemen ted-Related Issues and Concerns, effectively 
creating a mandatory minimum time-period for de veloping country Members to comply with new 
measures.  That was something that her delegation could not agree to.   TN/CTD/M/30 
Page 4  
 
  10. The representative of Egypt
 said that Members could not deny the importance of granting 
developing countries longer time-frames to comp ly with SPS measures imposed by importing 
Members.  Article 10.2 and paragraph 2 of Annex B of the SPS Agreement provided longer 
time-frames for compliance with SPS measures.  The idea of introducing an obligation to grant longer 
time-frames for compliance wa s already contained in paragraph 2 of Annex B of the SPS Agreement.  
However, despite that obligation, Members did not fulfil it.  Article 10.2 did not apply to all SPS 
measures, it applied to non-emergency measures which could be phased in.  When new measures 
were introduced, a developing country exporting Me mber would probably seek the least time possible 
to comply with a measure in an attempt to preser ve its market share.  Where a country could not 
comply within six months, it could request the importing Member to grant a minimum of six months 
to enable it to comply with the new measures.  This would, of course, be granted "upon request" as 
stated in the proposal and would not be appli cable to all cases in which new measures were 
introduced.  The proposal was attempting to  ensure balance in the SPS Agreement. 
11. The representative of Pakistan  lent her delegation's support to the proposal and reiterated that 
amongst the numerous SPS-related measures, the is sue of time-frame for compliance represented a 
small part of the problems faced by developing countries.  The proposal related to the phased 
introduction of new measures.  These measures were limited to non-emergency measures and a 
request would be required for longer time-periods to  comply.  The proposal represented realistic needs 
and perhaps her delegation would pr ovide examples of some of the problems exporters in Pakistan 
faced in this regard.   
12. The Chairman  urged the key stakeholders with an inte rest in the proposal to consult with one 
another.  Without that, it would be difficult to brid ge what he considered to be a fairly conceptual 
divide on the proposal.   
13. He concluded the discussions by summarizing th e status of work on the Agreement-specific 
proposals.  Of the 16 remaining Agreement-specific proposals to be addressed in the Special Session, 
he said that Members had so far come up with revised language on six of the proposals, namely 
proposal 13 on Article XVII, proposals 24 and 25  on Article 10.3 of the SPS Agreement, and 
proposals 28, 29 and 30 on Article 3.5 of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures.  On the seventh proposal, proposal 79 on Article 10.2 of the SPS Agreement, India had tabled revised 
language.  The revised language on these proposals represented work in progress and was not yet 
agreed.  It was clear that Members would need to  build on the progress already made and continue 
small group consultations on the basis of that lang uage.  He encouraged those Members which still 
had concerns on the proposals to reach out to one an other to move the process forward.  With respect 
to the remaining nine proposals, despite Memb ers having addressed those proposals both in an 
informal and formal context, they had not been ab le to make progress.  As he had mentioned in his 
report to the General Council on 7 May 2007, th ere were wide divergences on these proposals and it 
was his view that it would be difficult to reach convergence on them on the basis of the existing 
language.  He saw no value in continuing discussions on those proposals as that would only lead to a 
repetition of known positions.  He had also mentioned that it was his in tention to set aside those nine 
proposals and take no further action on them for the time being.  
14. The representative of Kenya
 said that he did not believe that setting aside the nine proposals 
was the best solution.  There were perhaps some Me mbers that wished to see them set aside, but those 
proposals were important to the Members that had tabled them.  He suggested that the Chairman 
reconsider his position.  He said that the African Group had, at one stage, considered setting aside 
some of the proposals if Members were able to reach convergence on the proposal relating to 
Article XVIII.  However, on the basis of the re vised language that the Chairman had tabled on 
Article XVIII, it was not clear whether Members were going to get there.  His delegation, therefore, 
had a desire to address those nine proposals.  Perh aps Members needed to take some time to reflect 
and consider whether some progress could be made after the summer break.    TN/CTD/M/30 
 Page 5 
 
 
  15. In response to the representa tive of Kenya, the Chairman  stated that paragraph 4 of page two 
of his report to the General Council on 7 May,  read "On the remaining 9 Agreement-specific 
proposals, wide divergences still exist and it is my vi ew that it will be difficult to reach convergence 
on the basis of the existing language.  For this reason,  I have urged and I continue to urge Members to 
put forward new ideas or table alternative language so  as to take the process forward.  It is my 
assessment that until and unless Memb ers do so, there would be no va lue in continuing discussions on 
these proposals as this would only lead to a repetition of positions already known".  It was on this 
basis that he had made the decision to set aside the nine proposals and take no further action on them 
for the time being.  His position still stood which meant that if there was an interest in pursuing any of 
the proposals, then it would be helpful to the pr ocess, the Chairman and the Members for new ideas or 
alternative language to be put forward.  He ha d not received any new ideas or alternative language 
that would help take the process forward.  As mentioned by the representative of Kenya, it was 
perhaps necessary for Members to take some time to  reflect.  However, when Members resumed their 
work, they would need to reach out to one anothe r and provide alternative language on some of the 
proposals.  Absent alternative language, the ex ercise would involve a repetition of positions.  
16. The Chairman  went on to say that under this agenda item, Members would, as they had in the 
past, consider the duty-free quota-free (DFQF) ma rket access decision adopted at the Hong Kong 
Ministerial Conference.  He recalled that at the last formal meeting, the least-developed countries 
(LDCs) had indicated that experts from their capitals would be available to meet with interested stakeholders on the DFQF market access issue, in cluding on rules of origin.  Outreach between the 
different stakeholders was something he had always encouraged as he considered it important to take 
the process forward.  He asked whether the LDCs or  other stakeholders wished to brief Members on 
any bilateral consultations they may have  held on the DFQF market access issue. 
17. The representative of Lesotho
 said that the LDC Group had not been successful in securing 
meetings to address the issue of product coverage and rules of origin issues.  However, the DFQF 
issue remained important to the LDCs and the Group  would continue to work towards ensuring that 
the decision was implemented effectively.  The LDCs  wished the issue to remain on the agenda of 
future meetings of the Special Session.   
18. The representative of Bangladesh  said that, at the meeting of the Regular Session of the CTD 
held the previous day, Members had discussed the initiatives taken by the Government of Canada to 
provide DFQF market access to the LDCs along with fl exible rules of origin.  The LDCs appreciated 
the review process that took place in the Regular Sessi on of the CTD, but were of the view that the 
Special Session, as well as other relevant negotiating bodies, were the appropriate  fora to negotiate the 
DFQF issue.  The LDC Group had tabled two s ubmissions, one on market access and the other on 
rules of origin to the Special Session as well as  the Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture 
and the Negotiating Group on Market Access.  It was unfortunate that the LDCs were yet to receive any substantive feedback or reactions from Members on those submissions.  The EC was the only 
Member that had submitted detailed technical questions  on the rules of origin submission.  The LDCs 
appreciated this.  The LDC Group had repeatedly re quested the Chairman to facilitate dialogue on the 
DFQF issue with the key stakeholders and appreciated the efforts that had been made in this regard.  
However, he urged the Chairman to intensify his e fforts.  He said that the demand for DFQF market 
access by the LDCs was logical and genuine.  It w as something they continued to push for because the 
livelihood of their people depended on it.  The ra tionale of DFQF market access was acknowledged 
by all WTO Members and the LDCs were request ing developed country Me mbers and developing 
country Members declaring themselves in a position to  do so, to implement the commitment made by 
their Ministers.  He acknowledged that some deve loped country Members had already fulfilled their 
commitments, regardless of the fa ct that the Round was yet to be c oncluded.  The LDCs appreciated 
the steps taken by the Government of Japan to provide DFQF to LDCs from 1 April 2007.  Other 
Members including the EC, Canada, Australia, No rway and Switzerland were already providing 
DFQF market access to the LDCs even before th e decision had been adopted.  He urged other TN/CTD/M/30 
Page 6  
 
  developed country Members to provide DFQF market  access to the LDCs on an expedited basis.  A 
number of developing country Members, including I ndia and Brazil, had informed Members that they 
were undertaking domestic processes to see how they  would implement the decision.  The LDCs 
welcomed these efforts and hoped to receive fu rther information on progress on these domestic 
processes, as well as information on when the LDCs  could expect these countries to implement the 
decision.  It was clear that granting full DFQF mark et access to LDCs would not benefit them if it was 
accompanied by complicated and stringent rules of or igin.  He urged Members to consider and engage 
on the LDCs' submission on rules of origin.  It w as common knowledge that the LDCs' share of world 
trade was negligible.  Providing the LDCs with DFQF, along with simple and transparent rules of 
origin in developed and developing country mark ets, would not affect domestic producers in the 
developed and devel oping countries or these countries' access to  other markets.  The LDCs stood to 
benefit largely from DFQF market access and would hopefully be able to further integrate into the 
multilateral trading system.  
C. 
THE MONITORING MECHANISM  
19. The Chairman  recalled that at the last formal mee ting, Members had engaged in constructive 
discussions on the possible elements of a Monitoring Mechanism on the basis of the non-paper he had 
circulated at the formal meeting held on 26 Apri l 2007.  At the last formal meeting held on 
5 June 2007, it was his sense that the majority of  Members felt that the non-paper provided a good 
basis for further work.  There was also a feeling that  that there was a need to fine-tune some of the 
elements contained therein.  On the basis of t hose discussions, he had further revised the non-paper 
keeping in mind the various comments that had been  made at the formal and informal meetings.  
While a copy of the revised non-paper had been made  available, he said that he did not expect 
Members to engage in comprehensive discussions as they had not had enough time to consider it.  He 
did, however, wish to hear Members' initial reactions  on it.  He recalled that the last discussions on 
the non-paper, had focused on bullet three of the scope of the Monitoring Mechanism which was 
related to the sub-bullets of the structure rela ting to the two levels at which the Monitoring 
Mechanism would function.  His sense was that the other elements contained in the non-paper were 
by and large acceptable to delegations, notwithst anding some fine-tuning which might be needed 
when the non-paper was translated in to a decision.  He explained that the third bullet of the scope had 
been deleted and its elements merged into the st ructure.  The second phrase of the second bullet which 
read "aimed at improving the implementation a nd effectiveness of S&D provisions" had been taken 
from the third bullet of the scope.  With respect to the two levels at which the Monitoring Mechanism 
would function, the options provided in the revised  non-paper left open the question as to whether the 
monitoring would take place in a Sub-Committee or in dedicated sessions.  That was a question on 
which Members would need to further reflect .  There had been some discussion on whether 
submissions should be made directly to the General Council and, as a result, he had reformulated the 
second sub-paragraph which now stated that submi ssions would be made either to the dedicated 
sessions or the Sub-Committee.  Also, recommendations would now be made by the CTD to the 
General Council.  He reiterated that the revised non-paper built on what Members had been discussing 
since April 2007.  He said that like the Agreement-specific proposals, the revised text would probably require some informal consultations in a small group context.  However, it would be helpful to hear 
Members' initial reactions on the paper.   
20. The discussions continued in an informal mode. 
21. While Members considered the revised non-paper as a useful basis to continue work on the 
Monitoring Mechanism, a number of clarifications were sought on some of the elements contained 
therein.  Positions differed on whether the Mechanism would be limited to monitoring the implementation and effectiveness of special and differential treatment (S&D) provisions in the 
existing agreements or whether it would also m onitor the implementation and effectiveness of S&D 
provisions that would result from the Doha Round of negotiations.  In one Member's view, regardless  TN/CTD/M/30 
 Page 7 
 
 
  of what would be decided as its scope, the Monitori ng Mechanism would need to be forward looking, 
dynamic and not duplicate the work of the Special Se ssion.  The need for the Mechanism to be simple 
and practical was reiterated.   
22. Thereafter, the meeting reverted to a formal mode. 
23. The Chairman  said that the discussions had been useful in that they had highlighted those 
areas on which further work was required.   
D. OTHER BUSINESS  
24. The Chairman  announced that this was the last meeting that he would be chairing.  No other 
issue was raised under Other Business.   
25. Members thanked the Chairman for his tireless efforts in taking th e S&D work programme 
forward. 
26. The meeting was accordingly adjourned . 
__________