RESTRICTED  WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  TN/RL/M/39 
5 May 2011  
 
(11-2348) 
Negotiating Group on Rules  
  
 
SUMMARY REPORT OF THE MEETING  
HELD ON 17 MARCH 2011 
 
Note by the Secretariat
 
 
 
1. The Negotiating Group on Rules ("the Group") held a formal meeting on 17 March 2011. 
A. ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA  
2. The Group adopted the following agenda: 
A.  ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA .........................................................................................................1  
B.  REVIEW OF THE TRANSPARENCY MECHANISM FOR REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS .................4  
C.  SYSTEMIC ISSUES RELATED TO REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS ..............................................11  
D.  OTHER BUSINESS .......................................................................................................................15  
 
3. The Chairman reported on the informal consu ltations held on 16-17 February and 14-15 
March, both of which addressed the Group's two main  topics of work, namely the review of the 
Transparency Mechanism (TM) for regional trade agreements (RTAs), and the systemic issues.  
Copies of the report were made available in the room. 
4. On the TM review, at the February consulta tions, an oral presentation had been made by 
Ms. Gabrielle Marceau, Counsellor in the Legal Affa irs Division, regarding the legal review foreseen 
in paragraph 23 of the TM Decision, following the Group's request.  Ms. Marceau had addressed 
two main issues, namely Types of changes brought about by the TM Decision  and Possible Solutions: 
GATT/WTO tools available to reconcile or bring together existing Treaty provisions with the 
RTA TM Decision .  Following her presentation, numerous ques tions had been posed, in particular on 
the status of the TM Decision vis-à-vis  other WTO rules on RTAs, challenging RTAs at the WTO, the 
lex specialis  nature of the Enabling Clause, consistency assessment of RTAs, and choice of forum as 
relates to the consideration of RTAs in the context of the TM.  Members had very much appreciated 
her presentation.  No further inputs from the Secretar iat had been requested.  As regards other aspects 
of the review, and also in the February consultations, Members discussed the TM Decision section by section.  For that, they have had at their disposal a Compendium of Submissions  prepared by the 
Secretariat, which included submissions made by Members, the Chairmen of the Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) and the Comm ittee on Trade and Development (CTD), and the 
Secretariat, relating to the text of TM.  Suggesti ons had been made on improving adherence to early 
announcements, in particular through the development of a template;  ensuring timely submissions of 
notifications;  increasing the time for Parti es to comment on the Secretariat's draft 
Factual Presentation and for replying to questions posed by Members which might affect the overall 
timeframe for considering an RTA;  and, in the context of the transformation of the TM into a 
permanent mechanism, the possibility of providing for some type of rendez-vous or periodic review 
clause.  Discussions had also been held on the proposals by the United States and by Ecuador – 
respectively TN/RL/W/248 and TN/RL/W/249 – both of which were related to the issue of TN/RL/M/39 
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  "dual notification".  India had made a proposal – along the lines of that of Ecuador – requiring all 
Parties to an RTA to jointly provide an early anno uncement, and notification of, an RTA.  However, 
apart from India's proposal, positions had not e volved on this question.  Following these 
consultations, a draft of the Transparency Mechanis m for RTAs, dated 1 March, had been circulated 
on 3 March along with the proposals and suggestions made by delegations both in writing and also 
orally during the meeting on 16 and 17 February.  This  was not a Chair's text but simply a compilation 
of proposals.  That text had formed the basis for discussions in the informal consultations held on 14 
and 15 March. 
5. During the March consultations, Members once again had held detailed discussions on all 
Sections of the TM, based on the revised draft compilation of proposals made.  Progress had been 
achieved on some issues;  in particular, a proposed te mplate indicating information to be provided for 
early announcements prepared by the Secretariat ha d been welcomed and supported.  Various other 
issues remain however under discussion.  Intensive discussions had been held on various points and 
some suggestions had been made,  however, give n that the vast majority of these suggestions 
remained vague, the Chairman underlined the need  for concrete textual proposals, as the time for 
requesting inclusion of a "principle" or an "id ea" had long passed, given the timeframes the Group 
was working under.  Building on Ecuador's proposal, Indi a's proposal for joint notifications at the last 
meeting had once more been discussed but positions remained divergent.  New proposals had been 
made as a reaction to the United States' proposal on the bodies entrusted to implement the TM: India 
had proposed that the goods aspects of all dual notific ations be considered in the CTD, while Chinese 
Taipei had proposed that such RTAs be considered  in a joint session of the CTD and CRTA.  While 
India's proposal had been supported by a few Members, there had been a great deal of interest in the 
proposal by Chinese Taipei which had been qualif ied by several delegations as an interesting 
compromise.  The Chairman noted his relief when  he heard for the first time reference to a 
"compromise" on this contr oversial issue of dual notification.  Finally, it would appear also that there 
was general support for having a periodic review of the TM once it was made permanent;  the 
language used in the TPRM had been mentioned as a possible template, as had the possibility of a 
review outside the periodic review.  All of these poi nts would be incorporated in a new revised draft 
text that would be circulated in the near  future by the Chairman to all Members. 
6. On systemic issues, not much progress had been made during both the February and March 
discussions on the proposal made by the Plurinational State of Bolivia.  While some additional points 
had been clarified, unfortunately this  had not allowed positions to evolve. 
7. As regards a possible post-Doha work progra mme on systemic issues, the Chairman noted 
that he had made it clear that a substantive work programme on systemic issues formed on the basis of 
Chair consultations with Members as regards its sc ope and content, could be achieved, but whether 
this should be achieved remained a matter for discu ssion and consensus.  In this respect, he had 
requested that countries wishing to pursue this matter to come to the consultations prepared to indicate 
the issues they would like to be included.  On the basis of the debate held in the consultations, and 
without going into much detail, he had suggested that Members engage, in parallel with discussions 
on the proposal by the Plurinational State of Bolivia, on the elements of a possible post-Doha work programme.  Some delegations had ask ed for additional time for consu ltations before agreeing to that 
approach.  Following this “time for reflection”, he had been contacted by several delegations 
including India, Saint Lucia on behalf of the ACP countries and the Plurinational State of Bolivia.  
The bottom line of reactions from these delegations  had been that an outcome on the development-
related aspects was essential and could not be overlooke d, in particular given that Doha was after all a 
development Round and the best framework to addr ess the development dimension.  Therefore, a 
work programme could not be in lieu of an outcome on development issues, but only in addition to an 
outcome on the development-related aspects of RT As;  discussions on a work programme, at this 
stage, would divert attention from the Group's mand ate on development-related issues.  In view of 
these points, these Members would not be willing to  engage in discussions on a work programme  TN/RL/M/39 
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  prior to progress on deve lopment-related systemic issues;  India however had stated that it was also 
open to the idea of discussing a substantive work programme and proposed elements for inclusion therein, provided and once an outcome on developmen t could be foreseen.  At the same time, he had 
also received from the European Union points that  it would wish to be reflected in the work 
programme;  some other Members had also indicated possible elements in the course of the various 
informal consultations. 
8. He noted that this state of play had been reported to the informal consultations held on 
14-15 March, and these positions had been restat ed.  Some had noted that as an outcome on 
development could not be foreseen at this stage, the fact of addressing the work programme at this 
stage risked a failure to address the mandate;  such  a failure to address development-related issues in 
the context of RTAs would change the balance of the DDA.  Others had stressed that in light of the 
timeframes, a work programme was the only feasibl e and realistic way forward;  it represented a 
"landing zone" and  the Group should embark in th ese discussions immediatel y because the time had 
come to focus on what was doable given the time left .  The point was made that it was not appropriate 
to refer to a possible failure to address the mandate as the TM in itself was already a significant result 
of the RTA negotiations.  The Chairman then repor ted on the concluding remarks he had made at the 
end of the March 14-15 consultations.  First, a nd reflecting a comment that had been made by a  
Member, it was time to do what was doable.  Sec ond, it was for Members to decide what to do and 
when to do so.  Third, for the time being there was no consensus on what was doable and when what 
was doable should become the focus of a post-Doha  work programme.  Fourth, some Members did 
not accept to engage in discussions on a work progra mme in lieu of discussions of systemic issues, 
and without proper discussions on the proposal by the Plurinational State of Bolivia.  Fifth, some 
other Members were of the view that in light of the experience of nine years of negotiations, it was 
likely that further progress could not be made on systemic issues, and having regard to an 
understanding informally reached by a group of Am bassadors the year before outside the multilateral 
context, a forward-looking work programme coul d represent an outcome for these negotiations.  
Sixth, it was in this context that the Chair at th e last meeting had suggested, without prejudice, that 
with regard to the proposal by the Plurinational St ate of Bolivia and on the understanding that nothing 
was agreed until everything was agreed, that it might be a pragmatic approach to commence a 
discussion on a work programme in tandem with Bo livia's proposal.  Seventh, Members were aware 
of the evolution of this suggested approach because he had provided an account of reactions received.  
The situation therefore remained unchanged.  Eighth,  Members would appreciate that in light of the 
fact that there had been no uptake of his proposal that the Group might approach these issues in 
tandem, the Chair would be listening keenly to hear from Members at what point, if at all, it would be 
desirable to launch discussions on a post-Doha work programme.  Ninth, for the Chair, as of now, the 
proposal was no longer on the table.  The Chair woul d remain alert to signals from Members relating 
to the point at which they felt there was a compelling desire to initiate this work. 
9. The Chairman reiterated what he had noted at th e end of his consultations, namely that these 
were the Members' negotiations and that Members ha d to conduct them.  Nevertheless, the clock was 
ticking and the time had come to act and think cr eatively, to engage towards some zone of 
accommodation that could allow some acceptable way fo rward to arise;  it was counter-productive to 
merely assemble and reassemble long-standing positions.  He urged Members to avoid repeating long-
standing, well known positions, in particular given th at the agenda was the sa me as that of the last 
meeting and time was restricted.  Of course, evol utions of positions, clarifications, new proposals and 
creative thinking were welcomed, but a mere repetition of positions was to be avoided. 
10. 
Following remarks by some Participants rega rding the use by the Ch airman of the word 
"compromise" in respect of the proposal by Chine se Taipei, the Chairman clarified that the word 
"compromise" had been used in his report on his info rmal consultations.  In that context, neither was 
it a value judgement nor did it represent his opinion;  his report simply reflected the fact that the word 
had been used by several Participan ts in the course of the informal consultations.  It was the fact that TN/RL/M/39 
Page 4  
 
  some Members had evoked the possibility of a comp romise that gave him hope and not the proposal 
per se . 
11. The point was made that additional information could be provided to delegations that did not 
participate in the informal consultations regardi ng the oral presentation made by the representative of 
the Legal Affairs Division. 
12. Some Participants requested the Chairman to allow the opportun ity for delegations that were 
not following the informal consultation to neverthe less actively participate in the revision of the TM 
text.  It was noted that it would be useful if Participants be made aware of the Members that were invited to attend such informal consultations. 
B. 
REVIEW OF THE TRANSPARENCY MECHANISM FOR REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS  
13. The Chairman recalled that the Group had had an extensive debate at its last meeting on the 
proposals made by the delegations of the United States and Ecuador, circulated respectively as TN/RL/W/248 and TN/RL/W/249.  Members had also b een able to react to JOB/RL/1, 2 and 4 which 
had provided inputs from the Chairmen of the Committees on Regional Trade Agreements and Trade and Development, as well as the Secretariat, rega rding the experience gained from the TM.  Some 
delegations had noted that their comments were of a preliminary nature and that the meeting provided 
a further opportunity for any additional comments or clarifications;  sponsors of the proposals might also have something to add.  Reactions to his re port regarding the informal consultations held earlier 
that week were also welcomed. 
14. Some Participants indicated their appreciation for the efforts made by Chairman in pushing 
forward these negotiations, and by the Secretaria t to consolidate the comments and submission by 
Members with regard to the TM, as this was a us eful input for all Members to discuss possible 
improvements to the TM. 
15. The proponent of TN/RL/W/248  stressed that his delegation's proposal provided a simple and 
practical solution for a functional problem that Me mbers had encountered and which had not initially 
been envisaged in 2006.  The CRTA had specifi cally been established as a Committee committed to 
the discussion of RTAs and their impact on the multila teral system;  thus, it should be the forum in 
which all RTAs were considered regardless of the provision under which they were notified.  He 
reiterated that his delegation w as not attempting to touch upon the question of which provision the 
agreement was notified under, be it Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 or the Enabling Clause.  Rather, 
it was simply proposing that regardless of which pr ovision the RTA was notified under, it was to be 
reviewed by those with the most knowledge of RTAs, namely the technical experts on RTAs who 
participated in CRTA meetings.  His delegation re mained open to considering specific language that 
made it clear that Members' rights should not be prejudiced by a review of the RTA in the CRTA, and in that respect he referred to paragraph 60 of  the Secretariat's legal note in WT/COMTD/W/114, 
which stated that: "… it might be institutionally mo re efficient and legally more coherent for the 
CRTA to conduct the primary examination of all RTAs, without impairing Members' rights and 
obligations".  The proposal did nothing to prevent any Member from raising any matter involving an 
Enabling Clause RTA in the CTD even if the factual presentations were officially considered in the 
CRTA. 
16. The point was made by some Participants that  the proposal did not qualify under the review 
mandate of the RTA TM containe d in its Paragraph 23, which c learly specified that " Members will 
review, and if necessary modify, this Decision, in light of the experience gained from its provisional 
operation …".  The proposal did not emerge from "experience gained from the provisional 
application" of the TM;  it was based on the propone nt's old insistence that all RTAs, irrespective of 
the notification provision, be examined in the CRT A.  The proponent had made the same suggestion  TN/RL/M/39 
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  in 2002-03, when the India-Sri Lanka FTA had been  considered in the CTD;  the issue had been 
considered and the CTD had decided against the sugges tion.  This had also led to the preparation of 
the Secretariat's Legal Note in 2003, which clearly mentioned that the CTD had a mandate to review 
RTAs.  Efforts made by some developed countries to consider all RTAs in the CRTA had already 
been highlighted in paragraph 7 of TN/RL/W/114 of June 2003, and the current proposal represented 
another effort to bring in the same proposal thr ough the backdoor.  Later, during the negotiations on 
the RTA TM, this point had been discussed at c onsiderable length and had not been accepted.  
Further, the proposal sought to introduce fundament al changes to the TM, and this did not comply 
with the principles set for the TM review.  When consensus had been reached to launch the review, 
several Members had stated that the TM had opera ted successfully in general and that only modest 
adjustments were needed, in accordan ce with the experience gained from its operation;  that had been 
made very clear in the Chairman's concluding rema rks.  One Participant noted that the proposal was 
actually construed to eliminate the TM altogether by merely giving more prerogatives to the CRTA, 
while another pointed to the risk of reopening the negotiation of the TM.   
17. Divergent views were expressed regarding the pr oposal.  For those supporting the proposal, it 
represented a practical, pragmatic and efficient so lution to address the so-called dual notification 
issue;  it did not modify the rights and obligations of Members but was simply a matter of procedure.  This matter had been already discu ssed in the past but had remained  unresolved;  given that progress 
had to be made on this issue, the proposal was the best solution in these circumstances.  The 
interpretation by some Participants that this ma nner of proceeding would be  in conflict with the 
mandate was not correct.  It was noted by some th at the venue for the consideration of an RTA and 
the legal provision under which it had been notified and was to be considered  were two independent 
issues.  With regard to the relation between notifica tion and review referred to in Section B and E, one 
Participant noted that no changes to current rights and obligations should be made under the review of 
the TM. 
18. Opponents to the proposal stressed that the cha nge of venue ignored the mandate and TORs 
of the CTD.  The Enabling Clause was one of th e effective tools for developing Members to better 
integrate into the multilateral trading system and to achieve their development goals.  The central role 
of the CTD in development-related issues, including  the application of Article 2(c) of the Enabling 
Clause, should be maintained and strengthened.  Th e TORs of the CTD provided that it would "serve 
as a focal point for consideration and coordinatio n of work on development" and "consider any 
questions which may arise with regard to either the application or the use of special provisions in the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements and related Ministerial Decisions in  favour of developing country 
Members";  therefore, any issue related to th e Enabling Clause was certainly under the CTD's 
competence and Members could not just pass on its duties to other WTO bodies like the CRTA. 
19. Divergent views were expressed on the arguments  on the efficiency of a single committee and 
the expertise of the CRTA.  Those in favour of th e proposal placed emphasis on the fact that in the 
end it was the expertise that counted, at all levels  – behind the border, in the back office, in the 
Secretariat but also the expertise of the Membership  gathered in the CRTA.  Others pointed out that 
the CTD had been doing a great job at reviewing RTAs that had been notified under the Enabling 
Clause;  there was no reason at this stage to eliminate any CTD role unless there was a hidden 
meaning behind it.  The point was made that irresp ective of whether the RTA was considered in the 
CTD or in the CRTA, factual presentations of RTAs were prepared by the same WTO Division, they 
had the same content, the meeti ngs followed the same procedures,  and representation in both bodies 
was the same;  thus, there was no distinction as related to efficiency. 
20. As regards paragraph 11 of the proposal, the point was made that no convincing arguments 
had been given as to why the current practice should be changed;  accordingly, questions were posed 
on why such a change was being sought and an explanation was requested on the concern that 
consideration in the CTD might dissipate the su ccessful operation of the TM.  The proponent had TN/RL/M/39 
Page 6  
 
  recognised that this was the result of a political ag reement;  attempts to unravel such an agreement 
would not be in the best interests of this negotiation.   
21. Referring to the last sentence of the proposal, one Participant noted that his delegation's 
concerns, instead of being dissipated, had become aggravated seeing the efforts of some developed 
country Members to deny the prerogative of developing countries to notify their RTAs under the 
Enabling Clause.  Also, the insistence that dual no tified RTAs be examined in CRTA, instead of the 
CTD, was another reflection of the concerted efforts to undermine rights and prerogatives under the Enabling Clause.  That, they said, was a closed matter since there h as been consensus over the issue in 
the CTD in 2003 and the RTA TM negotiations;  Member s need not consider it again and again.  The 
Group should confine its work to the real problems in the functioning of the RTA TM as mentioned in 
the reports by the Chairmen of the CRTA and the CTD as well as of the Secretariat.  According to 
these three reports, one of the major problems encountered in the provisional application of the RTA-TM was dual notification.  While proposals from I ndia and from Chinese Taipei squarely sought to 
address this issue, that was not the case of the propo sal from the United States;  in that context, he 
wondered whether the proponent intended to modify its proposal to address only the problems faced.  
22. The point was made by some Participants that while some interventions  appeared to suggest 
that the Group was renegotiating the Enabling Clause or the CTD's mandate;  however, no Member had the intention of doing that. 
23. Although disagreeing with the proposal, one Particip ant felt encouraged in that, by tabling the 
proposal, the proponent had recognized a number of syst emic issues, namely that the TM in its current 
form was not equipped to deal with RTAs with dual notifications and that there were persistent 
problems in this regard;  that no decision had b een taken on the appropriate manner in which RTAs 
with dual notification status should be considered under the TM – an issue that had puzzled Members 
during the past few years and had resulted in a fa ilure to adopt the CRTA and CTD annual reports;  
that it supported the observations in the Secretaria t's Legal Note circulated in WT/COMTD/W/114, 
despite its opposition to allow for its  update to reflect changes in gr ound realities since 2003;  and that 
there were a number of specific and systemic legal and procedural issues that Members needed to 
discuss in the appropriate forum that went well be yond the review of the TM and the scope of the 
proposal.  This change in position was welcomed, gi ven that for the past three years a number of 
developing countries had persistently raised system ic concerns over the appropriate manner by which 
RTAs with dual notification status should be considered under the TM.  
24. He noted that these concerns had been enumer ated in detail in many  configurations and 
placed on record in the CTD, the CRTA, the Council for Trade in Goods and finally during the 
General Council's meeting on 14 December 2010, all of which formed in their entirety his country's 
contributions to the review of the TM, including the submission made regarding the specific and systemic issues arising from the dual notification of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) and circulated as document WT/COMTD/W/175.   
25. The point was made by a few Participants that the proposal was too simple as it explored a 
possible solution to a symptom rather than the underlying problem. 
26. A few Participants noted that the proposal reve rberated ideas presented by the sponsor in the 
44
th CTD meeting in March 2003.  These ideas had al ready been discussed, challenged and refuted by 
many developing countries, as reflected in th e discussions in the CTD, which had led to the 
preparation of the Secretariat's 2003 Legal Note on RTAs under the Enabling Clause.  It was argued 
that the CTD had decided against them and the is sue was thus a closed matter;  it was therefore 
unclear why the same ideas had been presented agai n, in particular given the difficult political 
agreement that had been reached in the TM to consider Enabling Clause RTAs in the CTD.  That 
agreement represented a vulnerable balance that should not be broken in the context of the review.    TN/RL/M/39 
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  27. One Participant commented on vari ous paragraphs of the proposal.  Paragraph 1 indicated that 
the proposal addressed questions about the appropriate  venue to consider RTAs with dual notification 
status;  in fact, this was but a mere implication of  the procedural and legal systemic issues that had 
been raised in connection to dually notified RTAs in both the CTD and the CRTA.  Paragraph 2 of the 
proposal stated that the TM had been universally  recognized as a success;  while Members might have 
different views regarding such optimism, he ask ed how such a qualification found premise having 
witnessed that some developed Members had inhibited the application of the TM with respect to an 
RTA between developing countries that had been  exclusively notified to the WTO under the 
Enabling Clause for nearly a whole year.  It was wo rth mentioning that such action came contrary to 
the assertions made by the Chair of the CTD, who ha d clearly declared that the RTA concerned was to 
be reviewed in the CTD Dedicated Session and scheduled for completion within one year, in 
accordance with the TM's procedures.  He questioned its implications for the work of the Negotiating 
Group on Rules, in particular as regards the disciplin es under section C.5 of the TM that needed to be 
re-enforced to ensure that no a priori  challenge was permissible to  contest developing Members' 
rights to notify their RTAs under the Enabling Clause or  otherwise.  In other words, there was a need 
to ensure that the primary function of this M echanism remained transparency and not any other 
reason;  his delegation therefore proposed the inser tion of additional disciplines to uphold that, upon 
notification and regardless of the legal basis of the notification or Members presumptions, the procedures established by the TM must be triggere d and take effect.  There was a need to avoid 
establishing the practice whereby Members would challenge prima facie  whether an RTA conformed 
or not with particular WTO provisions;  moreover,  the Group should re-assert that any interpretation 
of Article XXIV or the scope of the Enabling Clause lay within the General Council and was not a 
right that Members bestowed upon themselves.  
28. On paragraph 5 of the proposal, this Participant noted that it was apparent that an attempt had 
been made to strike resemblance between two dis tinct problems arising from dual notifications;  it 
was his delegation's view that the two scenarios ha d to be distinguished. The first scenario occurred 
when two RTAs had been notified by each party on the basis of two different legal provisions;  the 
other case was entirely different, where one Member had submitted two notifications on the same RTA, each on the basis of a different legal provi sion, and involved two issues, namely Member's 
accession versus transparency commitments.  As regards the second scenario, the proponent presumed 
that a decision had been taken on the appropriate forum for considering the RTA;  however, if that had been the case, then the entire proposal was self-defeating: if Members had actually reached a 
decision on how to appropriately address RTAs w ith dual notification status under the TM, he 
questioned the point of the present proposal.  Clearly these two cases required two different substantive approaches that went beyond the mere de termination of the choice of forum or venue in 
which to examine RTAs with dual notification status  as proposed in paragraph 6.  If the issue was to 
be simply resolved by having all RTAs consider ed in a single WTO committee, then his delegation 
was compelled to ask whether Members would agr ee to have instead all RTAs considered in 
dedicated sessions of the CTD.  It was apparent how ever that such a proposition not only would raise 
concerns due to what some Members would deem as prejudicing their rights under Article XXIV of GATT, but also on the premise that it would undermin e the role of the CRTA.  For these very reasons 
his delegation would also argue against the propo sal since it would not only prejudice developing 
country rights under Paragraph 4 of the Enabling Clause, but would also undermine the role of the 
CTD, by abolishing altogether its prerogatives to review RTAs notified under the Enabling Clause, 
notwithstanding that such a proposal would be in  direct contradiction to the CTD's TORs – a 
Committee which had been established by Ministers,  as set out in the Marrakesh Agreement, to 
consider any questions which might arise with rega rd to either the application or use of special 
provisions in favour of developing countries, incl uding the Enabling Clause.  The CTD was the focal 
point within the WTO concerned with the integral  examination of every issue having to do with 
development including the application of the Enabli ng Clause. This proposal was not in the spirit of a 
Doha Development outcome;  the Group should be looking at how to increase the prerogatives, the 
mandate and the efficiency of the CTD rather than  eliminating its role at such a point in time. TN/RL/M/39 
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  29. The Participant then enumerated a number of matters which the Group needed to resolve.  
First, the Group needed to determine clearly th e rights and obligations of Members, and an open 
question was whether Members should have the prerogative to bestow upon themselves the right to unilaterally notify an RTA under a specific legal pr ovision without prior consent of the other parties 
to the RTA.  It had become apparent however th at such unilateral actions had not only triggered a 
second notification of these RTAs, but had raised c oncerns over how unilatera l actions would impair 
the rights and privileges of other Members to the sa me RTA.  His delegation therefore proposed that 
necessary disciplines be devised to further consolid ate the notification provisions under paragraphs 1 
and 4 of the TM to ensure that Members of an  RTA reached an agreement among themselves on the 
appropriate legal basis that should be invoked to notify their RTA’s to the WTO.  Unless such an 
understanding was reached, the transparency proced ures envisaged in paragr aphs 5 to 13 should not 
be triggered so as to avoid any contention between  Members over having draft factual presentations 
circulated by the Secretariat in a manner that might  adversely affect Members' rights and obligations. 
Moreover, paragraph 20 should also be amended so that any releva nt information provided to the 
WTO secretariat would be submitted with the consent of all Members parties to an RTA, in order to 
avoid a situation whereby Members would find their RTA being placed on the Work Programme by 
the Secretariat despite clear reservations made in that respect.  Second, and under the second scenario 
which referred to a particular RTA with dual notifi cations status, there was a need to differentiate 
between two issues, namely Members' accessions versus transparency commitments.  A possible 
solution would run along the lines of the conclusions of the 2003 Secretariat's legal Note, so that 
dually notified RTAs would be examined in the CT D.  This was supported by the fact that the 
Enabling Clause was considered as lex specialis  in WTO law, which should prevail, and also by 
paragraphs 58, 61 and 62 of the Le gal Note, which clearly indicated the vast prerogatives of the CTD, 
and its mandate to review  RTAs notified under the Enabling Clause.  The Group needed to be focused 
and review the TM in a manner that did not underm ine either the Enabling Clause or the CTD's TORs 
nor the rights and obligations of Members under the Enabling Clause.  Attention was brought to the 
final conclusion of the Secretariat's 2003 Legal Note that  stated "It is clear that any review of an RTA, 
wherever it occurs, must be performed acco rding to the relevant applicable WTO law – 
Enabling Clause, GATT 1994 Article XXIV, or GATS Article V - that has been invoked to justify the WTO consistency of the RTA in question.  More over, any review of an RTA notified under the 
Enabling Clause must be carried out in accordance with TORs and the procedures provided by the 
CTD."   
30. One Participant noted that some of his delega tions' questions had not been replied to.  It 
appeared that supporters and opponents of the prop osal were talking at different frequencies;  the 
proponent had placed emphasis on the efficiency of  examining RTAs by channelling them into the 
system through one single committee, while that was not his delegation's emphasis, nor was the 
question of the venue either.  He wondered whethe r a proposal to channel all RTAs through the CTD 
would be acceptable.  In any case, efficiency of the Secretariat was fully ensured in that all the work 
was done in the same Division.  What was importa nt was that the examination be carried out under 
the legal provision the RTA had been notified;  in  the case of dual notifications, and assuming that the 
CRTA had prerogatives to examine them, the qu estion was under which legal provision the 
examination would be carried out – Article XX IV of the GATT 1994 or the Enabling Clause.  
Dual notifications posed questions related to the a pplication of the Enabling Clause and this should be 
addressed in the CTD.  Consistency and efficiency c ould be addressed by dealing with all RTAs in the 
CTD. 
31. The way RTAs were dealt with prior to the est ablishment of the CRTA in 1996 was debated.  
One Participant noted that all RTAs were dealt with by working groups and the CTD;  it was only 
after the CRTA's establishment that  two committees had been deali ng with RTAs and he wondered 
why the practice had been changed. His view was that  it did not seem appropriate that 15 years after 
the CRTA's establishment changes were once more being sought.  It was th e understanding of another 
Participant that prior to 1996 RTAs were reviewed  by individual Working Parties and not a standing  TN/RL/M/39 
 Page 9 
 
 
  body;  it was only after the Uruguay Round and the creation of the CRTA that a standing body for 
RTAs existed and the situation was therefore signifi cantly different.  Another Participant pointed out 
(unless corrected by the Secretariat) that at th at period the Council of the GATT 1947 established, on 
a case-by-case basis, individual Working Parties to  examine the RTAs and also provided for their 
terms of reference. 
32. India informed the Group of his delegation's propo sal in the informal consultations, namely to 
amend current paragraph 18 of the TM Decision by inserting an additional sentence between the first 
and second sentences that would read "The CTD sha ll also implement this Transparency Mechanism 
for RTAs where the goods part is notified under both paragraph 2(c) of the Enabling Clause and Article XXIV of the GATT 1994."  The suggestion respected the lex specialis nature of the Enabling 
Clause and the mandate and terms of reference of  the CTD;  it was also consistent with the 
Secretariat's Legal Note.  Needless to say th at consideration under the RTA-TM was without 
prejudice to the rights and obligations of Members. 
33. Divergent views were expressed regarding this  proposal from India.  Supporters of the 
proposal argued that it addressed the issue of dual notifications, whether those made in the past or 
ones that would be made in the future, without altering any weights or legal emphasis between the 
Enabling Clause and Article XXIV of GATT 1994 while  also not eroding the prerogatives or role or 
TORs of the CRTA or of the CTD.  The CTD was the focal point for development-related issues, 
hence it had the mandate and the capability to re view RTAs notified under the Enabling Clause, 
irrespective of whether or not they had been dua lly notified.  From an opposing position, the point 
was made that not all RTAs were eligible to be c onsidered in the CTD even under the existing rules;  
in particular, there was no provision comparable to the Enabling Clause with respect to services 
agreements and the Enabling Clause did not cover cu stoms unions.  However, it was clear that the 
CRTA had the capability to consider all RTAs, wh ether they were services agreements, customs 
unions, free-trade agreements, and tariff elimination ag reements.  The fact that all types of agreements 
could be considered in a single venue created simpli city and that had been supported and underlined 
by various Participants;  Members were encouraged to further reflect on that. 
34. Given that not all Members attended the informal  consultations, the repr esentative of Chinese 
Taipei briefly explained her delegation's proposal.  Given the wide divergence of views on how to 
deal with the issue of dual notifications, her de legation was thinking that a joint session of the CRTA 
and the CTD to consider dually notified RTAs woul d probably be the way to accommodate Members’ 
different concerns.   Her delegation's idea was that, in the cases where the same RTA had been 
notified by different parties under Article XXIV of GATT 1994 and the Enabling Clause respectively, 
a joint session of the CRTA and the CTD should be convened to consider the RTA in question.  
Furthermore, where an RTA contained both goods and services, and the goods part was notified under 
the Enabling Clause and the services part under the GA TS, such RTA should also be considered in a 
joint session of the CTD and the CRTA.  It was her de legation's belief that this  approach could reduce 
the duplication of the work of the Secretariat and the Committees, and Members would have a much 
better overall understanding of an  RTA covering both goods and services.  The idea of joint 
meetings/sessions was nothing new in the WTO;  for example, a special joint meeting of the TBT and 
the SPS Committees on procedures for information exch ange had been held on  6-7 November 1995, 
and the report of the joint meeting could be found in document G/TBT/W/16.  Precedents also existed 
in the GATT and Uruguay Round;  if Members were in terested in these, her delegation was willing to 
share the symbols of the relevant documents.  Her de legation hoped that this would help to move the 
negotiations forward, and was ready for further discu ssion of the idea with all Members.  Finally, she 
thanked those Members who thought that the proposal was practical and sensible, as well as others for their questions and comments. 
 TN/RL/M/39 
Page 10  
 
  35. Participants thanked the proponent for the propo sal, as it was important that Members brought 
in new ideas and contributed to the process.  They  indicated that they looked forward to a written 
proposal so that it could be properly analysed;  pr ior to that, only preliminary comments could be 
made.  The point was also made that it was unders tandable that Members had to consider the politics 
of the situation. 
36. Some Participants noted that while more de tail was needed, this proposal might be a 
compromise, second-best solution to the current im passe on this issue.  Co mmenting on that aspect, 
one Participant recalled that, as indicated at the info rmal consultations, the issue was not that of where 
an RTA should be handled but rather under which provision;  the venue was not the problem.  He 
recalled and quoted paragraph 61 of the Secretar iat's Legal Note of 2003 (WT/COMTD/W/114).  His 
delegation, as well as the African Group and many other developing countries, sub scribed to this view 
which resulted in a political agreement for the TM in  2006;  this political agreement was still on the 
table and work was proceeding under this premi se unless somebody informed them otherwise.   
37. A few Participants noted that the proposal did not appear to be a practical solution.  One 
Participant inquired how a joint session would in prac tice differ from a review of the RTA only in the 
CRTA.  Both Committees maintain ed the same Membership, thus the same Members would be 
present regardless of whether it was a joint meeting or a meeting of the CRTA.  It would seem that the suggestion arose from certain Members' positions that  RTA reviews should take place in the CTD;  it 
remained unclear why a review in the CTD was e ssential as opposed to one in the CRTA, which was 
the body with the expertise in RTA issues.  He invi ted the proponent, in elaborating its proposal, to 
explain its benefits as these remained unclear, and seemed only to add a further layer of complication 
or administrative burden thus necessitating addition al coordination between two committees.  The 
proposal appeared to recommend a new precedent wh ereby any issue involving developing countries 
could only be addressed if the CTD was also present in tandem with the WTO technical committee responsible for the issue;   that could not be seen as practical.  No such a special scenario should be 
allowed for RTAs. 
38. The proponent thanked Participants for their in terest in his delegation's proposal, whose main 
aim was to move the process forward, to provide a solution otherwise the Group would be stuck in the 
two extreme camps.  His delegation was still cons ulting with Members so that the proposal could 
incorporate their views and he welcomed the view s of Members on the proposal so that a textual 
proposal providing a solution could be submitted.  Th e Chairman thanked the sponsor in particular for 
his willingness to engage with other Members in this exercise.    
39. The proponent of TN/RL/W/248 thanked all the delegations who had commented on the 
proposal, those that had supported it and those that had indicated it remained their first preference 
even if some might be considering other possibiliti es.  The proposal fitted into the Group's mandate;  
it would appear that some Participants had argued th at given that the genesis of the proposal predated 
the TM review, it was somehow precluded from the review because it was not based on the 
experience gained over the course of the implementati on of the provisional TM.  It was a very curious 
argument that just because his delegation had anti cipated some of the issues that might have 
developed in the past, that it was now precluded from returning to them when these very same issues 
had matured.  He disagreed with the view that  the Group should not upset a political agreement 
reached at the time a decision was taken to have a provisional TM;  the whole point of a provisional mechanism was to try it and see how it worked.  In  the single undertaking, his delegation was not 
satisfied with the outcome and wanted it to be impr oved;  that was the basis of the proposal.  If some 
advocated that a political agreement reached at a point in time was forever, the Group would go 
nowhere in the Rules negotiations.  Further, give n that both Committees had the same Membership, 
and all developing countries repr esented in the CTD were also  represented in the CRTA, his 
delegation did not believe that its proposal in any way diminished the consideration of development 
issues in the CRTA;  however it did provide the opportunity to RTA technical experts to participate in  TN/RL/M/39 
 Page 11 
 
 
  the review.  On the question of whether his country intended to modify its proposal to address the 
question of dual notifications, he noted it was the first time he had heard such a request and he 
appreciated that this was an indication of a willingn ess to work constructively on  the proposal.  At the 
present time his delegation had no intention to modify it in any way, but he would refer that back to 
his capital for consideration.    
40. Some Participants stressed that time was runni ng out;  in that context, a few Participants 
indicated they remained open to possible compromises that were worth exploring. 
C. SYSTEMIC ISSUES RELATED TO REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS  
41. The Chairman invited Members to comment on both the proposal by the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia and the Secretariat’s In formal Background Note, circulated  respectively as TN/RL/W/250 and 
JOB/RL/3, jointly with Corrigendum 1 for the Eng lish version. He also invited comments on his 
report about his informal consultations on this issue.   The sponsor was also invited to share with the 
Group any additional comments it might have. 
42. The sponsor of TN/RL/W/250 noted that her de legation had made an extensive presentation 
of its proposal at the last meeting and she wished to  reply to questions that had been posed at that 
meeting.  The proposal had been prepared taking in to account the present and past situations of the 
negotiations;  it had proposed in a very simple a nd concrete manner that special and differential 
(S&D) treatment – in particular less than full r eciprocity – be provided for developing countries in 
Article XXIV of the GATT 1994.  The proposal simply  replied to the mandate of paragraph 29 of the 
Doha Development Agenda (DDA) to strengthen th e development dimension of WTO rules on RTAs;  
it did not ask for something new but only that flexibilities that were applied de facto  had a de jure  
basis as a result of these negotiations.  Her delega tion could not see nor understand the difficulties in 
recognizing on a legal basis a practice that was applied in reality.  The proposal also did not diminish what was already established in Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 nor affected Members' rights;  it 
simply provided for the recognition of S&D in favour  of developing countries, which was an integral 
part of the WTO,  and of the less than full reciprocity principle, by mirroring what was provided for in 
Article V:3 of the GATS.   
43. Replying to the questions posed and comments made at the last meeting, she noted that 
Article XXXVI of the GATT 1994 was a best end eavours clause;  thus in actual negotiations, 
reciprocity in trade liberalization was expected and demanded from developing countries partners.  In 
reply to paragraph 29 of the DDA,  her delegations had required a de jure  clarification of the 
flexibilities that developed countries should accord to  developing countries in RTA negotiations.  The 
status quo  would continue the de facto interpretation of flexibilities for developing countries;  that 
was neither secure in nature nor sufficient in scope, and the legal validity of introducing the 
development dimension was in line with the mandate  of  paragraph 29 of the DDA.  In short, a de jure  
clarification of the flexibilities and S&D that could be provided to developing countries in RTAs negotiated with developed countries was necessary to  meet the DDA mandate, and enhance the legal 
certainty and predictability of flexibilities avai lable to developing countries, including from 
development provisions in Article XXXVI of the GATT 1994.  Her delegation's proposal did not seek 
to undermine the MFN principle nor to diminish Article XXIV;  what it proposed was to meet the 
mandate of paragraph 29 of the DDA and to be co nsistent with the overall emphasis on development 
in the DDA to introduce more explicit S&D into Article XXIV.  RTAs between developed and 
developing countries with flexibilities for the latte r would fall under the legal exception to the MFN 
principle.  The introduction of S&D in Article XX IV sought to strengthen the development dimension 
of that Article, consistent with DDA paragraph 29.  Such an improvement to the rules could only 
facilitate rather than undermine the interests of c ountries in  negotiations on RTAs between developed 
and developing countries.  GATS Article V already incorporated S&D provisions, and her delegation 
had never seen an RTA on services undermined as a result;  thus, there was no real proof of the TN/RL/M/39 
Page 12  
 
  affirmation of that reality.  The proposal aimed to modernize and update WTO rules on RTAs in the 
direction of the mandate of paragraph 29 of th e DDA, by reflecting the development dimension 
particularly in respect of Article XXIV.   
44. She noted that in years following the establishm ent of the WTO, RTAs had proliferated and 
many now involved negotiations be tween developed and developing countries, unlike in the pre-WTO 
years.  As noted in the proposal, such North-South RTAs needed to be respons ive to differences in the 
trade, development and financial conditions between developed and developing countries.  
Recognition of asymmetries in development realiti es between developed and developing countries 
needed to be translated into legal provision in the WT O, so that the result in RTAs catered to the trade 
and development interests of developing countries while  also promoting those of other parties.  As 
also noted in the proposal, GATS Article V, wh ich was the counterpart to GATT Article XXIV, 
recognized that in Economic Integration Agreemen ts involving developed a nd developing countries, 
flexibilities were to be provided to developing c ountries.  Thus, the extension of this accepted 
principle in GATS Article V, a more modern agreement on RTAs, to GATT Article XXIV was in order to meet the DDA paragraph 29 mandate.  The proposal did not seek to undermine the right of 
any WTO Member to negotiate and enter into an RT A;  it sought to respond to a key mandate of the 
DDA to reflect the development dimension in rules a ffecting RTAs so that such agreements promoted 
trade and development.  It also sought to clar ify and make more explicit the flexibilities and S&D 
treatment provided to developing countries.  She reaffirmed her delegation's willingness to work on 
delivering a development outcome under the existing mandate and looked forward to engaging in all 
developing countries proposals on this matter, being it from India, Africa or the ACP.  The proposal 
was only the last in a long line of proposals on which action should be taken, so that an outcome 
would be reached under the Single Undertaking of the round.  
45. Participants thanked her for the additional in formation provided.  Divergent views were 
expressed on the proposal made. 
46. Supporters of the proposal noted, first, that it was clear from paragraph 29 of the DDA that 
the clarification and review of the provisions of  Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 were set in the 
context of an overall process of development, both in  terms of the overarching results that were to 
emerge from the DDA but also specifically in the context of paragraph 29.  It was therefore incumbent upon the Group to seek a solution whic h addressed the development challenges faced by 
developing countries by providing them with flex ibilities;  the proposal ad dressed these issues and 
responded to the Chairman's call for textual proposals.  Second, the proposal was not asking for 
anything new, as it encapsulated sev eral proposals that had been made by developing countries in the 
past;  these also had been supported by variou s Participants.  The proposal addressed the 
development-related mandate th rough the provision of S&D for developing countries and less than 
full reciprocity principle in RTAs under Article  XXIV of the GATT 1994.  The latter was a well-
established principle in NAMA negotiations, while paragraph 44 of the DDA mandate recognized that 
S&D treatment should be an integral part of the WT O Agreements.  The need for parity, or balance, 
between the S&D provisions of the more recen t GATS Agreement and the GATT, which had the 
vintage of a time in history when global economic re alities were vastly different from today, had also 
been underlined.  
47. Opponents of the proposal noted that it sent th e WTO and the Group in the wrong direction;  
the purpose of the WTO and of these negotiations shoul d not be to encourage Members to enter into 
RTAs.  The central importance of the MFN principle had to be ensured;  attempts to lower current 
standards regarding the completion of RTAs were a matter of worry and should be resisted.  The dilution of Article XXIV disciplines was not a signal that should come from the WTO, even if records 
showed that Article XXIV had been and was bein g abused.  The weakening of Article XXIV was 
incompatible with the need to en sure that RTAs did not undermine the multilateral trading system but 
rather that they were consistent with and reinfor ced it.  The benefits of Article XXIV in its current  TN/RL/M/39 
 Page 13 
 
 
  formulation, particularly its requirements that RTAs  cover substantially all trade, were stressed.  
RTAs that complied with Article XXIV could drive trade liberalization and economic studies 
continued to demonstrate that trade liberalization contributed to economic gr owth, and development.  
High calibre trade agreements such as those re quired under Article XXIV facilitated sometimes 
politically difficult pro-trade domes tic reforms necessary to drive tr ade liberalization.  These reforms 
benefitted not only the RTA partners but the multilate ral trading system as a whole, facilitating both 
economic growth and development.  One Participan t noted that the proposal sought to renegotiate 
Article XXIV of the GATT 1994, while the mandate was to engage in negotiations  aimed at clarifying 
and improving disciplines and procedures under exis ting WTO provisions applying to RTAs;  that 
renegotiation being sought  went beyond the mandate and weakened Article XXIV. 
48. It was noted that the proposal aimed at a ddressing the different levels of economic 
development and trading capacity of the parties that negotiated an RTA, but appeared only to envisage flexibilities being granted to RTAs be tween developed and developing countries.  
Clarification was sought on whether (a) the proponent  thought that flexibilities would also be needed 
to bridge the gaps between the significant diffe rences in trading capacities between two developing 
countries when they negotiated an RTA;  and (b ) the objective pursued by the proponent would be 
achieved if flexibilities were to be granted for th e less developed countries in all cases, including 
when two developing countries with significant di fferences in trading capacities negotiated an RTA. 
49. Some Participants noted that the particulars of  an RTA, including S&D, should be dealt with 
on a bilateral basis within the framework of a libera lization of "substantially all trade";  a  mandatory 
clause in Article XXIV was not appropriate.   
50. The point was made by a few developing c ountries which had entered into RTAs with 
developed countries that Article XXIV as it stoo d provided enough flexibilities for dealing with 
asymmetries in levels of development, and that these had worked well in the context of their RTA 
negotiations.  
51. Reference made by document JO B/RL/3 to TN/RL/W187 entitled Best Practices for 
RTAs/FTAs in APEC  was recalled, and it was suggested th at this document would merit further 
discussions.   
52. Clarification was sought on how the proposal w ould affect developing countries that were 
third parties to those RTAs, as well as those developing countries that had already concluded RTAs  with developed countries.  For such RTAs, the prop osal might have negative effects and that was a 
matter of concern for the countries involved. 
53. Reference was once more made to the fact that Members were talking at different frequencies, 
as it would appear that while for some high quality and high ambition results on RTAs referred to a 
mercantilist approach, with the development aspects of RTAs not being perceived as high quality, for 
others high quality and high ambition results should rather be those that would not leave people 
unemployed.  There was a clear lack of engageme nt and progress on development-related issues;  if 
development was the wrong direction, than the Grou p should be pessimist about achieving a result.  
The view that the proposal was beyond the mandate  could only be rejected as the DDA's key mandate 
was development.   
54. Divergent views were expressed on the follow-up  to the proposal.  Some Participants 
favoured a continuation of the debate.  They were of  the view that the level of engagement between 
the two main issues covered by the Group's age nda had been unbalanced, with a substantial 
engagement on the TM review and dual notificati on but a lack of engagement not only on that 
proposal but more generally on development in th e context of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994.  An 
outcome on development was critical to some Member s' understanding of what would be needed for a TN/RL/M/39 
Page 14  
 
  landing zone for the Doha Round;  Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 was essential to a comprehensive 
package on development.  One Participant speaking on behalf of a group of countries urged Members 
to engage and pursue an approach which would fulf il the mandate given by Ministers.  Some other 
Participants, while appreciating the time Members had put into preparing the textual proposal, were of 
the view that it was an inappropriate to focus the Group's work on it, since it seemed very clear that 
the Membership was unable to agree to such speci fic changes to Article XXIV, nor had the Group 
appetite for interpreting any systemic issues.  In that  context, it had been pointed out that while the 
importance of the development aspects of the DDA should be recognized, the development aspect of 
Article XXIV of GATT 1994 were not independent fro m other disciplines such as substantially all 
trade and transition periods;  long discussions held on systemic issues in the round had shown a lack 
of consensus on interpreting any of these.  In th e limited time the Group had left, the most productive 
focus was a forward looking work programme;  it had been noted that issues raised in the proposal 
were likely to come up  post-Doha and should theref ore be addressed at that time.  Yet some other 
Members noted their openness to continue discu ssions although pointing that discussions on both the 
proposal and the work programme should not n ecessarily be conducted in the same format or 
precisely at the same time. 
55. Reacting to the questions posed and comments made, the proponent of TN/RL/W/250 
thanked those Participants that  had supported her delegation's pr oposal.  She had noted a strong 
willingness and interest from developing countries to  have a strong result in the DDA on RTAs' and 
development.  Regarding the questions posed, sh e noted her delegations' understanding that the 
DDA's provisions and principles encompassed all development and applie d to all developing 
countries.  It was at the end of the negotiations that developing countries would see what they had 
been able to obtain as concrete and real results;  generally, developing countries'  expectations were for 
the highest level of results.  As regards referenc es to "wrong direction", she noted that that DDA 
direction was that of development;  that was an appropriate directi on to go and it should be 
strengthened – if that was a wrong direction, she wo ndered why Members had agreed to engage in the 
DDA.  The mandate referred to developmental aspects  of RTAs, but also overall to placing the needs 
and interests of developing countries at the hear t of the DDA work progra mme.  Thus, a concrete 
outcome as mandated by paragraph 29 would mean a strengthened Article XXIV as regards the needs 
and interests of developing countries, resulting in  a win-win situation of RTAs of improved quality 
that would fit into development objectives such as the Millennium goals of poverty eradication.  
Another result would be that devel oping countries would be more inter ested in such negotiations.  She 
also noted that Article XXIV was already an ex ception to the MFN principle and her delegation's 
proposal was not changing that.  Referring to the qu estion of other systemic issues, she noted that 
considering every single detail encompassed by Article XXIV was a time-consuming exercise; it was precisely to avoid long discussions that the proposal was a very straight-forward, concrete and simple 
solution to incorporate into Article XXIV S&D and l ess than full reciprocity as general principles.  
While in its explanatory part the proposal referred to SAT, it did not delve into it because that also 
was subject to negotiations among the parties to the RTAs;  S&D treatment would be taken into 
account during the negotiations on SAT, but the fi nal result was dependent upon the parties.  The 
change from the current situation would be that developing countries could count upon increased legal 
certainty.  Referring to the effects of the proposal on RTAs already in force between developed and 
developing countries, she noted that her country was not party to any such agreements, thus having no 
experience; it would seem that a case-by-case analysis would be required to see how to apply these 
flexibilities a posteriori  in the context of bilateral negotiations with the parties to the RTAs.  Finally, 
she stressed that a development-oriented outcome  on RTAs was a critical i ssue that affected the 
overall balance of the DDA;  the absence of a conc rete, development-oriented result on RTAs was not 
an option. 
56. Divergent views were expressed regarding the Chairman's conclusion regarding a post-Doha 
work programme.   TN/RL/M/39 
 Page 15 
 
 
  57. Some Participants noted that there was appe tite for such a work programme and that the 
Chairman had enough ground to reflect that in his conclusions;  the Group should not abandon efforts 
at the first perceived hurdle.  They also noted that support would increase provided enough attention, 
in an "in tandem" mode, was given to the proposal by  the Plurinational State of Bolivia.  While they 
remained committed to delivering a result on system ic issues – and the necessary time and resources 
would be devoted to do so – they also felt that ther e was a need to maintain the momentum to prepare 
an in-built agenda ensuring that systemic issues wo uld continue to be on top of all Members' agendas 
also after the Round.  There was a need to be rea listic;  in light of the experience over the last ten 
years of negotiations, the Group might not be ab le to overcome the ch allenges of successfully 
concluding systemic issues within the time frame of this Round.  The working scenario accepted by 
leaders was to conclude the Round within a few m onths;  hence, it would be pertinent to start 
considering the fundamental elements of this work  programme without further delay.  They were 
firmly of the view that at this very late hour this would be the only feasible result.  Also, they noted, 
any systemic issues could be dealt with in the course of discussions on the work programme. 
58. Some other Participants supported the Chairman 's remarks and reaffirmed their disagreement 
to start working on a post-Doha work programme, as this would divert attention from the core 
negotiation mandate on systemic issu es on paragraph 29 of the Doha Declaration.  While there was a 
mandate for a development outcome, there was none for a work programme;  however, some 
Participants were not engaging in delivering a resu lt on the former while willing to prepare in an 
outcome on the latter. They noted that the window of opportunity was closing every day;  placing systemic issues on a working programme contradicted  the mandate for a pro-development outcome on 
systemic issues.  The point was also made that a failure to deliver a development outcome under this 
mandate might be seen as a failure of the Doha R ound to deliver on one of its main mandates;  this 
would disproportionately affect developing count ries that were or would be engaged in RTA 
negotiations with developed countries.  Given that  paragraph 29 was part of the single undertaking 
and of great importance to a number of developing  countries, its outcome would affect the overall 
balance in the entire Doha Round package.  The c onsideration of a possible work programme should 
take this fully into account. 
59. The point was made by some Participants that work carried out by a small group of 
Ambassadors could not supplant ne gotiations in the WTO Negotiating Groups in the WTO;  the only 
way to progress was through a bottom-up approach.  It was noted that movement in concentric circles 
outside the WTO posed a problem because Members not involved tended to refute whatever was 
agreed outside the multilateral process.  Some ot her Participants noted that this was a shared 
understanding reached among a substantial number of  Ambassadors in November 2010;  such inputs 
into the negotiating process was the usual practice. 
D. 
OTHER BUSINESS  
60. The Chairman recalled the Group was working not only under time pressure but also 
changing schedules, at least as regards dates of meetings.  The date of the Group's next formal 
meeting had once more been modified and was scheduled to take place on Friday, 8 April.  
Submissions to be considered at that meeting should reach the Secretariat at the latest by 25 March.  
Small group consultations were scheduled  to take place on Monday, 4 April and 
Wednesday, 13 April.  
__________