RESTRICTED  WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  TN/TF/M/3 
21 March 2005 
 (05-1182) 
Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation  
  
 
 
SUMMARY MINUTES OF THE MEETING  
 
Held in the Centre William Rappard
 
on 7 and 9 February 2005  
 
Chairman:  Mr. Muhamad Noor Yacob (Malaysia) 
 
 
 
1. The Chairman  said that the purpose of the meeting was to provide delegations with an 
opportunity to make contributions on the agenda of the Negotiating Group, as set out in the Work Plan adopted in November 2004.  Secondly, Members would be invited to adm it relevant international 
organizations, including the IMF, OECD, UNCTAD,  WCO and the World Bank, to attend the next 
meeting of the Group on an ad hoc basis. 
2. Under "Other Business", the representative of Egypt
 wished to offer suggestions on the 
format of the minutes of the meetings of the Negotiating Group. 
3. The agenda was adopted . 
A. CONTRIBUTIONS ON THE AGREED AGENDA OF THE NEGOTIATING GROUP  
4. The Chairman  said that he would first take up the written contributions in their order of 
submission, and then seek Members' feedback on thos e papers.  After that, there would be opportunity 
to make additional – verbal – contributions.  In making inputs, delegations would be free to address 
any aspects of the agenda in a cross-cutting manner without being bound by a particular sequence.  
The Secretariat would then be invited to present its contributions, focussing on technical assistance 
and capacity building. Inputs had also been prepared  by other IGOs, especially with respect to the 
Group's work on identifying Trade Facilitation needs and priorities. 
5. The representative of the European Communities  introduced the EC's submission on how to 
clarify and improve Article X of the GATT (TN/TF/W/6), explaining that it also addressed the 
important areas of costs, benefits and resources.  The proposals were based on the feedback received 
from the business community in developed and deve loping countries on where they see the need for 
improvements, notably with respect to transparency and predictability of border crossing procedures.  
They reflected what traders saw as a priority a nd represented measures to reduce time and costs of 
doing business, while at the same time maintaini ng, and even improving, the ability of customs and 
other administrations to carry out the full range of  their functions.  The proposals were also based on 
previous discussions in the Council for Trade in  Goods and modelled on existing GATT rules and 
practice, with the resulting benefit of Members already being familiar with them. 
6. First, the EC proposed to increase the level of transparency currently found in Article X to 
ensure that there was a commitment to provide tr ansparency, particularly for customs and other 
related import and export procedures.  That s hould be ensured not only as regards the primary 
legislation but also with respect to lower level re gulations, decrees, and the more regular procedures TN/TF/M/3 
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and decisions made by customs and other authoriti es concerned with border crossing trade.  One way 
of doing that was a notification procedure through the creation of enquiry points and the like, as already known from the TBT, SPS and Customs Valuation Agreements. 
7. The second proposal was to establish some degree  of consultation and prior information of 
business about regulations and changes to them.  Th e EC proposed that Members put in place a fairly 
systematic practice of consulting with the busin ess community on their import and export rules and 
procedures and any important changes to them.  Th at was particularly important for small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).  Small compan ies lacked resources to chase up information and 
could not devote manpower and resources to find out about the regulations, opening hours and 
changes to practices in border management.  They also lacked the economic weight and leverage to 
make their views known unless there was a systematic  and workable consultation process managed by 
governments.  The EC's consultati ons with the trading community had shown that the existence of a 
regular channel of discussion/consultation was a real pr iority for those enterprises.  It helped create 
the often missing good cooperative relationship between the administration and the trading community.  Part of the proposal would be the idea  of providing a certain minimum time between the 
consultation on regulations and their approval, and between the approval of rules/procedures and their 
entry into force, to allow traders the time to adju st to any changes in the rules which affected them. 
8. The third and final element in the EC's proposal  related to appeal procedures and to due 
process.  Article X of the GATT already containe d the basic rudiments of appeal rights against 
customs decisions.  However, it merely required Me mbers to introduce an appeal system "as soon as 
practicable".  That commitment had been agreed upon in 1948, and the EC was of the view that it was 
practicable 57 years later to introduce such pro cedures.  Most countries already had some form of 
appeal mechanism at customs.  The Communitie s would like to see that long-standing notion in 
Article X actually implemented by all Members since it was very important for all traders to have the 
right to appeal against decisions which affected th eir trade on a day-to-day basis.  The EC therefore 
proposed to confirm and slightly expand Article X to ensure that there was the right of recourse to an 
independent authority to appeal against initial deci sions by authorities.  A frequent problem in that 
context was that, even when the right to appeal wa s provided for, the appeal process encountered very 
long delays.  Goods were often le ft at docks for long periods while  appeals were considered.  To 
ensure that trade continued to flow, the Communities had provided some ideas for guarantees or bonds to be lodged pending the resolution of an appe al process.  It was also important for companies 
to have the possibility of using a lawyer or an ag ent to carry out the appeal, especially for SMEs, as 
they could not devote time to pursuing an appeal by themselves. 
9. The submission also made initial observations about the benefits and potential costs of 
implementing the proposals.  The Communities' initia l assessment, corroborated by the analysis by 
the World Bank and the OECD, was that most of the proposals were relatively cost free.  Soundings with partners and WTO Members on cost implications  had shown that, in virtually all cases, many of 
the suggested practices were already taking place.  They were generally provided for within the 
normal running budgets of customs and would therefore not represent important costs.  As for the benefits, feedback received from traders showed that  more transparency, greater predictability, fewer 
sudden changes to regulations, and the right of consul tation would be of real benefit to them, whether 
they were from developed or de veloping countries, and irrespective of whether they were 
multinationals or SMEs.  If there were costs in  implementing or improving existing transparency 
mechanisms, the EC was certainly pr epared to provide technical assist ance in those areas as part of its 
trade-related development assistance.  While the pr ovision of aid depended on the receipt of requests 
for such assistance, the EC's interest and willingn ess to provide support were clearly there.   
10. The representative of Korea
 introduced Korea's communication (TN/TF/W/7), noting that it 
further developed ideas on how to improve and clar ify GATT Article X that had been proposed in a 
previous contribution (G/C/W/377).  The new propo sal included four specific suggestions, dealing  TN/TF/M/3 
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with (i) publication of information, (ii) notifi cation and prior commenting periods regarding core 
measures, (iii) interval between publication and impl ementation and (iv) Single National Focal Points. 
11. With respect to the publication of informa tion, Korea proposed that Members publish the 
laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administra tive rulings as defined in Article X.1 of the GATT, 
as well as binding advance rulings of general app lication and any agreements with other Members 
relating to such relevant regulations/laws.  Korea also proposed that Members notified the media used 
for such publication to the WTO Secretariat, wh ich would then disseminate the information to 
Members, as currently done in the Agreement on Government Procurement. 
12. Regarding notification and prior commenting peri ods on core measures, Korea suggested that 
Members notified the Secretariat of proposed su ch measures and their amendment at an early 
appropriate stage, as was done with the measur es under the TBT and SPS Agreements.  Scope and 
definition of "core measures" and "appropriate st age" could be subject of further discussion. 
13. Korea also proposed that Members allowed for a reasonable period of time between 
publication and implementation of new or amended measures, to give all interested parties an 
opportunity to adjust their practices accordingly. 
14. A fourth proposal aimed at establishing a Single National Focal Point as a centre to 
communicate with other competent domestic authorities in order to provide more efficient responses 
to inquiries on a non-discriminatory basis.  The implementation of the measure was relatively easy as 
each government simply needed to designate an offi ce to receive and answer inquiries by liaising with 
the appropriate government agencies. 
15. Korea fully took into account the implementation concerns of some developing countries, 
especially LDCs, and was prepared to consider fl exible conditions for them in implementing the 
proposals. 
16. The representative of Japan  introduced the communication by  Japan, Mongolia and Chinese 
Taipei (TN/TF/W/8), explaining that it aimed at further clarifying and improving GATT Article X by 
allowing traders to obtain accurate and timely info rmation on trade procedures and reduce cost and 
time required for the cross-border movement of go ods.  Such improvement would lead to increased 
business opportunities, especially for SMEs, which had so far missed the oppor tunity to engage in 
international trade.  For governments, facilitated tr ade would allow for a more efficient allocation of 
human and financial resources while at the same  time contributing to economic development. 
17. The submission first categorized various elements  of Article X into three principles, i.e., 
transparency, predictability and impartiality, and gave  examples of the problems faced by the private 
sector in the area.  It then suggested a non-exha ustive list of possible measures to address them. The 
paper also contained proposals on special and diffe rential (S&D) treatment, technical assistance and 
support for capacity building as well as on cost impli cations of proposed measures.  Japan intended to 
continue providing necessary technical assistance  and capacity building in the relevant areas. 
18. Transparency was of the utmost importance.  If trade regulations were not published, traders 
encountered difficulties to comply with the required procedures.  While Article X obliged Members to 
publish trade regulations in a prompt manner, it did not provide detailed coverage of the information 
to be published or the means to publicize them.  The submission therefore proposed that all trade-
related laws regulations be made public.  A clarif ication with respect to the required methods of 
publication might be another beneficial measure.  The use of government gazettes or official websites 
could be an option in that context.  Notification of  major trade regulations to the WTO in one of the 
official WTO languages was another measure to  address the problem.  In doing so, the WTO 
Secretariat, in cooperation with other international or ganizations, might have a role to play, especially 
for those least-developed members that had difficulti es in publicizing their trade regulations on their TN/TF/M/3 
Page 4  
 
websites.  The establishment of inquiry points was al so an important element to provide traders with 
improved accessibility to information on required trade procedures. 
19. Predictability was crucial as well.  If laws and regulations were suddenly revised, or if the 
revisions were not published before their implem entation, traders would not have enough time to 
comply with the altered regulations appropriate ly.  That made doing business more difficult, 
especially for SMEs.  It also made it more difficu lt for governments to secure compliance.  In trying 
to address problems related to predictability, publica tion of trade-related laws  and regulations before 
implementation would be an impor tant element to consider.  It might include the providing of 
opportunities for interested parties to comment on pr ospective laws and regula tions.  Other elements 
might include an advance ruling system and the clear  identification of the required trade procedures in 
the relevant laws and regulations. 
20. Impartiality was another indispensable elemen t.  Non-impartial administration of trade 
regulations incurred additional costs for traders.  La ck of appropriate appeal systems caused a loss of 
confidence in a country's trading system.  For the gove rnment, it led to inefficient allocation of limited 
government resources and inefficient duty collection.  Elements of a solution to such problems were a 
uniform administration of trade regulations throughou t Members' territories.  That could be achieved 
by establishing a central function within the government for interpreting trade regulations and compiling and distributing casebooks for officials at the border.  Adequate training of officials was another important measure to enhance the impartial administration of trade regulations.  Integrity was 
an additional element of maintaining impartiality throughout the territory. It could be improved by 
developing codes of conduct for officials concerned. 
21. The representative of Canada
 presented a proposal on advance rulings on behalf of Canada 
and Australia (TN/TF/W/9), stressing that such rulings  had proven to be a valuable instrument for 
many economies to expedite the movement, releas e and clearance of goods.  Traders benefited from 
the resulting transparency, as well as from the impr oved predictability for their transactions.  The 
increased certainty in transaction costs provided by advance rulings also encouraged greater 
investment and capital flows.  Customs and othe r competent authorities further benefited from the 
efficiencies, cost savings and overall rationalization of resources that advance rulings could bring.  
Such rulings especially helped to ensure consiste ncy in treatment of similar goods.  Overall, the 
efficiencies to be gained from advance rulings cons tituted an important policy tool for all countries to 
help sustain domestic reform efforts. 
22. The Canadian-Australian proposal was inspired  by a review of existing advance ruling 
regimes in both developed and deve loping countries.  It was anchored on the underlying principles of 
them being (i) issued on tariff classification, including applicable rate of duty; (ii) issued within a defined period of time; (iii) binding on customs authorities for a specified period of time; and (iv) to the extent possible, made publicly available.  Appropriate provisions addressing S&D treatment could 
be incorporated to reflect the specific circumstanc es of individual Members.  Technical assistance and 
capacity building were basic and integral parts of any measure on advance rulings. 
23. The representative of Australia
 said that multilateral commitments on advance rulings 
promoted transparency and consistency in the admi nistration of customs regulations, in accordance 
with Article X of the GATT.  The availability of  advance rulings on tariff classification facilitated 
trade by providing certainty for importers, exporte rs and producers as to how their goods would be 
treated by the country of import.  They establis hed confidence between customs administrations and 
traders, thereby encouraging compliance and minimizing delays, complaints and appeals. 
24. To a large extent, adopting commitments on advance rulings in the WTO context would 
merely formalize a widespread practice.  Cust oms authorities in both developed and developing 
countries generally had the facility to provide advi ce on the customs treatment of goods prior to their 
importation, whether those procedures were  codified in legislation or not.    TN/TF/M/3 
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25. Subject to confidentiality requirements, the pu blication of advance rulings would enhance 
transparency, thereby promoting consistency on non-d iscrimination in the administration of customs 
regulations.  While legitimate business confidentia lity considerations might preclude the publication 
of individual rulings, it was open to customs admi nistrations to publish re levant information of 
general application in a way that maintained th e confidentiality of individual applicants.   
26. Multilateral commitments on advance rulings would be consistent with the aims of Article X 
to promote transparency and consistency in th e administration of customs regulations.  Such 
commitments were not new to the WTO.  Members were already requi red to provide advance rulings 
on origin questions under the Rules of Origin Agreem ent.  It was appropriate for that commitment to 
be reaffirmed as part of the outcome of th e Trade Facilitation negotiations.  An additional 
commitment to provide advance rulings on classi fication would represent a logical extension of 
existing disciplines that was modest and achievabl e and would deliver real benefits for business. 
27. The proposal was technology-neutral:  it did not prescribe any particular form of delivery for 
an advance ruling system.  Members would be free to  implement advance rulings in a way best suited 
to their own national customs infrastructure, accord ing to their means.  Nevertheless, Australia 
recognized that developing countries and LDCs mi ght require technical assistance to provide such 
rulings and stood ready to share its experience and expertise in that area. 
28. The representative of Chinese Taipei  proposed measures aimed at improving Article VIII 
(TN/TF/W/10) that had shown to reduce clearance ti mes facilitated trade.  With the exception of 
IT/automation, they could all be applied without requiring huge investments in infrastructure. The 
suggested measures included the use of pre-arrival clearance, risk management and post-clearance 
audit as well as expedited clearance for express consi gnments.  To enhance Article X's transparency 
requirements, Chinese Taipei further suggested a dvance rulings on tariff classification and one-stop 
services in the form of information centres or inquiry points. 
29. The suggestions were derived from some succes sful measures implemented in Chinese Taipei 
in the course of the modernization of its customs ope rations to further expedite legitimate trade flows. 
Chinese Taipei was committed to do its best in providing other devel oping Members with the 
necessary technical assistance. 
30. The representative of the United States  introduced the US proposals to clarify and improve 
GATT Articles X and VIII, explaining that they s uggested commitments to establish binding advance 
ruling regimes and provide for internet publication of  the elements listed in Article X as well as of 
import procedures.  A third proposal covered the area of fees, aiming at improving transparency by 
commitments on internet publication and by clarifying  the parameters of opera tion under Article VIII.  
The fourth proposal aimed at establishing a regime  for expedited treatment of express shipments. 
31. Each of the proposals had the common theme of  bringing certainty and transparency to 
traders.  Their implementation not only improved a trading regime, but also brought cost savings and 
improved efficiency.  They all attempted to refer to other elements of the modalities, particularly 
concerns regarding costs. Some informal research had shown that many of the proposed commitments 
were already being implemented by a number of Me mbers.  Internet publication of import procedures 
and laws, for instance, was already a reality in mo re than 90 developing countries, about 45 of which 
had very comprehensive sites.  Others were at various stages of implementing such a measure.  The same could be said with regard to express shipment regimes.  Suggestions were also made on how to 
proceed with each of the proposals, which the United States envisaged refining further. It was also 
very important to develop the best method for assessi ng the situation of developing countries and their 
needs before then returning to the proposals.  That would certainly be a challenge, but it was an 
integral part of the work and ensured that Memb ers engaged in a true pr oblem-solving mode in the 
negotiations. TN/TF/M/3 
Page 6  
 
32. Another common theme of the proposals was their significance for small- and medium-sized 
enterprises.  Each measure was extremely important  to small enterprises around the world in terms of 
becoming familiar with potential market oppor tunities and doing business across borders. 
33. The representative of the Philippines,
 speaking on behalf of the Core Group , said that the goal 
of enhancing transparency, predictability and impar tiality, and the overall benefits of increasing trade 
flows and assisting SMEs in taking advantage of th e global trading system were known and laudable.  
The task and challenge of the Negotiating Grou p was to develop a concrete list of specific 
components and criteria for promoting Trade Facilita tion that enabled such general objectives to be 
realized, while keeping in mind that the negotiations were being carried out in the context of the Doha 
Development Round, and were limite d in scope to reviewing and clarifying Articles V, VIII and X. 
34. It would be useful to examine for each Memb er which Trade Facilitation measure had or had 
not been undertaken and to assess related costs.  A "laundry list" of Trade Facilitation measures could 
perhaps be prepared on a country-by-country basi s, indicating the presence or absence of such 
particular Trade Facilitation components.  The prop osed measures were already practiced by many 
Members. Sharing that data with the rest of the membership would greatly assist in determining which 
Members would or would not have to undertake particular actions.  
35. S&D treatment, financial and technical assi stance and capacity building were integral 
components of any review and clarification of GATT Articles V, VIII and X.  The proposals made so 
far did neither contain any defin itive or concrete S&D offers nor financial and technical assistance 
components.  It was important that such component s were integrated into each and every proposal. 
36. The question of what legal commitments, if an y, a new agreement would entail had to be 
addressed.  This should include a discussion on whether the components of a Trade Facilitation 
agreement would lead to dispute resolution and rul es-based commitments of compelled reforms, or to 
a more general incentives-based re form commitment process that recognized the large resources and 
extensive time frame required to enable developi ng countries to achieve the desired trade and 
development results, for which financial and technical assistance programs would be necessary 
components.  The Core Group looked forward to a rriving at a fair and balanced Trade Facilitation 
agreement in parallel with achieving substan tial results in the other negotiating areas. 
37. Speaking on behalf of the LDCs,  the representative of Zambia  said that the LDCs wished to 
reiterate the need for implementing the July Package in  terms of its approach to ensure the availability 
of adequate financial, administrative, and techni cal resources in the negotiations, including the timing 
of implementing obligations in favour  of developing countries and LDCs. 
38. Everybody agreed on the importance and urgency of providing financial and technical support 
to LDCs to enable them to de velop and improve their capacities in areas such as modernization of 
customs procedures and facilities.  That had to  be part of the support by the WTO and the 
international community for LDCs in the area of Tr ade Facilitation.  It was th erefore essential that the 
July Package was honoured by ensuring the provis ion of increased financial and technical assistance 
as well as support for economic infrastructure developm ent of LDCs.  The LDCs also wished to recall 
the innovative approach taken in drafting the ne gotiating modalities, stating that no implementation 
requirements would be imposed on de veloping countries that went beyond their means and capacities.  
39. The work of the Negotiating Group should keep  pace and be linked to other substantive 
negotiating areas of the DDA.  Commitments by the LDCs in the Trade Facilitation negotiations were 
therefore dependent on what they received in retu rn in the negotiations on S&D, Agriculture, NAMA, 
Services, etc.  S&D obligations further had to be  linked to the substantive issues of the modalities, 
namely Articles V, VIII and X of GATT.  TN/TF/M/3 
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40. The LDCs attached great importance to the ag reed Work Plan and its agenda items, which 
provided a useful starting point for the discussions on Trade Facilitation.  They would like to see the Group effectively and meaningfully address developm ental items of the age nda in accordance with 
the negotiating modalities, including S&D treatment, the identification of Trade Facilitation needs and 
priorities and the addressing of cost implications  of proposed measures, technical assistance and 
support for capacity building and work with relevant international organizations.   
41. The Negotiating Group should not, however, lose sight of the intrinsic linkage between 
different items of the agenda.  A discussion of  developmental aspects could only make sense if 
considered in relation to the substantive aspects of the negotiations.  The Group should ensure that 
consideration of substantive issues in respect of clarification and implemen tation of relevant aspects 
of GATT Articles V, VIII and X was done in a ho listic manner, so that relevant developmental 
aspects could be considered in parallel as a cluster.   The consideration of any proposed clarification 
and improvement ought to include the examination of developmenta l implications and remedial 
measures of the proposed measures, in terms of S&D treatment, cost implications, Trade Facilitation 
needs and priorities, technical assistance and suppor t for capacity building and working with relevant 
international organizations, as agreed in the modalitie s.  That would ensure that the agreed modalities 
were fully and meaningfully implem ented throughout negotiation process. 
42. The proposals that had been tabled would be studied, especially with respect to how they 
would impact on LDC economies.  The LDCs apprecia ted that those suggestions recognized the need 
for assistance to implement whatever might be accepted as a result of the negotiations by the 
Membership, but wanted to see a clear and categorical  commitment by the developed partners to meet 
all additional costs, in addition to the offer of technical assistance.   
43. The representative of Rwanda
 fully endorsed the statements by Zambia and the Philippines.  
Rwanda would like to share some ideas on possible avenues within which to improve and clarify the 
three relevant GATT Articles.  Rwanda was inte rested in discussing Trade Facilitation issues that 
would assist in mitigating difficulties faced by land-l ocked countries in international trade, some of 
which were experienced in non-landlocked countries as well. 
44. Rwanda had reviewed a number of existing pr oposals such as the one on advance rulings, 
which was a good suggestion to reduce the delays faced by many traders during customs clearance.  Such delays entailed far-reaching costs that were a burden to business.  For Rwanda, some of the 
imports were industrial inputs, with delays in that area affecting the manufacturing process.  
Moreover, business often had to be conducted on bank arrangements, thereby facing interest rate 
implications in the case of delays.  Further and caref ul reflection had to be given to those issues in 
order to address some concerns that might arise in  the context of that proposal, such as fraud.  
Flexibility should be reserved for customs authorities to modify or even replace an earlier ruling if 
necessary. 
45. Rwanda intended to do more work on limiting formalities and documentation to the extent 
possible.  Traders faced complicated and duplica tive paperwork, whose multiplicity sometimes had 
cost implications.  There were also problems rela ting to too many authorities being involved in the 
process, causing delays in the processing of documen ts.  Rwanda would like to explore the possibility 
of a "one-stop customs centre" where all paper work  was done in one location.  Furthermore, there 
should be a defined maximum period of time for the goods to remain in customs.  That would allow for more predictability and transp arency, and be more convenient. 
46. There was need to provide techni cal assistance at an early stage to countries that had to assess 
their negotiating needs and priorities.  Rwanda noted  the speed with which negotiations were moving, 
yet many countries had not even been able to as sess what their needs and priorities were.  S&D 
treatment, particularly for least-developed countries, should be a component of every proposal.  Rwanda further urged Members to seriously focu s on S&D treatment provisions for land-locked TN/TF/M/3 
Page 8  
 
countries to minimize barriers to trade and compe titiveness caused by additional costs and delays in 
transit countries. 
47. The representative of Romania
 commented on the EC proposal, saying that publication and 
administration of trade regulations on customs la ws and border procedures were important both for 
traders and authorities.  Traders' interest in having a transparent legal framework governing all 
procedures and rules applicable at the border st emmed from their preoccupation to simplify clearance 
procedures and reduce costs.  A transparent and predictable system was also important for national authorities to better support exporters and to fight bu reaucracy and corruption.  To that end, enquiry 
points or trade desks might be a solution.  Romania therefore supported the proposals by the EC.  
48. To allow developing countries to achieve the objective of transparency, predictability and 
simplification and to speed up customs procedures, Members had to consider technical assistance for 
those countries.  Romania had embarked on an ambitious programme of modernizing and improving 
customs activities about ten years ago.  The process would not have been possible without technical assistance from other bodies.  But the results were enc ouraging:  the system had  been simplified, was 
transparent and accessible to the business envir onment;  the time for customs clearance had 
diminished substantially and there was better allo cation of financial and human resources.  The EC 
paper could be a basis to further discuss clarifications and improvements of Article X. 
49. The representative of Norway
 said that the tabled proposals were promising contributions for 
further work on Trade Facilitation.  Making informat ion on rules and procedures easily available to 
traders was a cornerstone in Trade Facilitation. 
50. The EC contribution contained many proposals No rway could generally support.  To a great 
extent, they corresponded with many of the measur es Norway had introduced at the national level.  
The implementation of those measures would take ti me and required S&D treatment in order to make 
them effective and operational.  It was also cl ear that technical assistance would be needed to 
implement some of those measures. 
51. The document from Korea included many interes ting proposals.  Norway fully agreed with 
the suggestions contained in its pa ragraph 5 on the publication of information.  With respect to the 
proposal of providing a prior commenting period on changes in "core measures that have a significant 
effect on trade of other Members", with the WTO S ecretariat being given the task of forwarding that 
information to "interested parties", Members shoul d thereafter be given time to make comments on 
the proposed measures.  For Norw ay, it was an important principle in law that any changes in 
legislation should go on "hearing" to interested part ies at the national level.  Norway had, however, 
not had the same experience in sending proposals on an international  hearing.  Nevertheless, should 
anyone at the international level provide comme nts on the proposed measures, they would be 
considered.  For practical reasons, it was neces sary to limit the proposal to "core measures". 
52. Norway also agreed with the proposal to establish a "Single National Focal Point" as it would 
substantially facilitate efforts to comply with the existing rules and procedures.  The introduction of 
such centres did however take time, and required a certain implementation period for countries that 
did not already have such facilities in place.  One relatively simple measure that could be introduced 
as a first step was a "virtual focal point", allowing for expertise from different places to be connected 
to a focal telephone point, which could then be contacted via phone. 
53. The communication from Japan, Mongolia an d Chinese Taipei presented a number of 
interesting concepts.  Its focus on enhancing tr ansparency, predictability and consistency was 
something that had often come up as a result of Norway's consultations with the private sector, 
especially SMEs, on the improvements they were seek ing with respect to the three GATT Articles.  
Norway largely agreed with th e proposed measures.  Further information would, however, be 
appreciated as to what the suggested advance ruling system would imply.  TN/TF/M/3 
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54. The proposals by Chinese Taipei on "pre-arrival clearance, risk management and 'one stop 
service'" were particularly noteworthy.  As for fe es and formalities connected with import and export, 
Norway was strongly committed to avoiding unnecessary procedural barriers to trade in the design 
and application of import and export procedures, to ensure that such procedures did not unduly slow 
down the movement or release of goods.  Thus, future rules should ensure that import and export 
procedures were not more trade restrictive than n ecessary to fulfil legitimate objectives.  Norway was 
also committed to working towards a reduc tion in the number of fees and charges. 
55. The Norwegian consultation process with the priv ate sector had revealed the benefits of a 
standardized format for documents related to the shipment of goods, and their reduction.  There was 
also need for a reduction in consular formaliti es and fees, as well as for introducing a "Single 
Window" where all official controls were in th e hands of one single agency at the border. 
56. The fact that Members' level of development varied was fully recognized in the negotiating 
modalities.  S&D treatment for developing and least -developed countries was an integral part of the 
mandate.  Norway favoured an approach whereby, on  the basis of individual proposals put forward, 
S&D treatment would be considered based on the di fferent development needs.  The development of 
effective and operational S&D trea tment therefore seemed necessary.  While taking due account of 
paragraph 3 of Annex D, LDCs should be encouraged to implement new measures, as they would 
benefit from the advantages of an upgraded system. 
57. There was undoubtedly need for substantive TRTA for developing countries and LDCs.  
Instruments developed by the WCO to facilitate i ndividual Member's assessment of their needs were 
most welcome and would hopefully be made availabl e soon.  Additional technical assistance would, 
however, be required multilaterally as well as on a bilateral basis, as work progressed. 
58. The representative of India  sought further clarifications on some of the suggested 
improvements of GATT Article X.   
59. The EC submission, which was helpful in taking previous CTG work and the NAMA NTB 
notifications into account and in being modelled  on existing WTO Agreements, aimed at increasing 
the scope of transparency solicited by Article  X by extending the coverage from "laws and 
regulations", "judicial decisions" and "administrative rulings of general application" to "administrative 
guidelines" and "decisions", while suppressing the transparency requirement for "judicial decisions".  In that context, India would like clarification on th e precise meaning of "administrative guidelines" as 
certain guidelines could be confidential in nature.  India would also like to know whether there was 
any difference between "administrative decisions " and "administrative rulings".  The Indian 
delegation further wondered whether the EC had not made a reference to "judicial decisions" due to 
an assumption of it continuing to be a part of the clarified and improved Article X. 
60. The term "publish and make easily available" had been used in the chapeau of the proposal, 
whereas the existing Article X only referred to "publis h(ed) promptly".  In India's view, there was no 
need for such an addition as l ong as there was a commitment to publish the requisite information. 
61. India also requested clarification of the term "r elevant".  In the existing Article X, there was 
an enumeration of the areas where laws and regulati ons had to meet the transparency requirement.  
India wondered whether the word "relevant" capture d all those various areas or a larger and a more 
undefined category.  A more concise scope of subjects to be covered under the transparency 
requirement of Article X could be considered. 
62. With respect to the suggested information on customs and other "border-related agency 
processes" it was necessary to understand what "bor der-related agency processes" were being referred 
to.  As for the suggestion for cond itions for different forms of customs treatment,  it would be helpful 
if the EC could clarify the concept with a concrete  example.  With regard to appeal procedures, TN/TF/M/3 
Page 10  
 
including standard times and conditions for appeal , the proposed commitment would need to be 
limited to the filing of appeals without extending to its disposal. 
63. On the issue of notifying all fees and charg es applicable to import, export and transit 
procedures and requirements, India would request th e EC to share with Members the practice in the 
EC's system so as to further clarify the unders tanding on the proposal's implementation aspects. 
64. India had concerns regarding the proposal for customs' and other government agencies' 
management plans relating to th e implementation of WTO commitments to be notified.  Such 
management plans might not necessarily be drawn up in a rigid and codified manner - they were dynamic by nature, and subject to change depe nding upon certain exigencies and even competing 
development goals.  It was also premature to suggest  certain elements of such a management plan like 
standard processing times or relevant reform a nd modernization programmes when there was no 
clarity regarding the kind of commitments that would emerge on Trade Facilitation. 
65. Clarity was needed on the meaning of the term "officially designated medium".  Did it mean 
something more than publication on the website a nd official gazette?  It was also necessary to 
understand whether the expression "simple and accessib le manner" had any specific meaning.  If not, 
it was subjective and one could atte mpt to improve the language.  The suggestion to establish enquiry 
points was desirable, but needed further deliberati on as regards the structure, location and number of 
such enquiry points.  Further, while the proposal of having an appropriate consultation mechanism 
was relevant and desirable, it should not be subj ect to rigid commitments requiring adequate time 
periods for commenting on the proposed rules and pro cedures by all interested parties and providing 
time gaps between finalization and their putting into force.  That would lead to several practical 
problems including delays and comp etitive lobbying.  It was theref ore proposed that the consultation 
mechanism should be flexible to suit the need s and policy frameworks of various Members. 
66. On the suggestion of rules and procedures being accompanied by a statement of policy 
objectives, India noted that the word "etc" had been used, leaving the scope of the proposed 
commitments undefined and unclear.  In India's view, the expected commitment would only be for 
providing comments by way of a statement of the policy objectives sought without extending to areas 
such as an explanation on how the measure was least trade restrictive or how certain other procedures 
could not meet the same objective.  That was some thing which had already been proposed by the EC. 
67. India also had difficulty in accepting the proposal for setting up a standard time for the 
resolution of minor appeals at the administrative le vel.  "Minor appeal" was a relative and subjective 
term which needed greater clarity.  Some clarity  was also required as to whether the provision for 
appeal would also apply to certain SPS-related d ecisions like rejection of a consignment or its 
destruction on account of high pesticide residue leve l or on account of some other SPS regulation.  On 
the EC proposal for goods involved in an appeal to normally be released with the possibility in given 
circumstances for duty payment to be left in abeyan ce, subject to the provision of a guarantee, such as 
a surety deposit, where required by national legislati on, India felt that the issue was one of appeal and 
not of the determination of customs value which w as the subject of Article 13 of the Agreement on 
Customs Valuation (CVA).  Even the CVA did not re quire the extension of such release in appeal 
cases.  Thus, it would be difficult for India to accept such a proposal since the appeal would only arise 
after the decision had been taken following due process.   Lastly, India had noted that section D of the 
EC's proposal referred to individual LDCs requiri ng technical assistance to provide advance rulings 
without however making a proposal for setting up an authority for such rulings. 
68. With respect to Korea's proposal, India soug ht clarification on its reference to "core 
measures", looking for a concrete example of such a measure.  As for the suggestion to establish a 
Single National Focal Point, observations had already b een made in the context of the EC submission.  
Greater clarity was required on the proposal to ensure that it did not lead to a burdensome 
commitment.  With respect to the issue of prio r consultation and comments, India's position had  TN/TF/M/3 
 Page 11 
 
 
already been stated in response to the EC submission.  Whilst Korea recognized that it might be 
difficult for developing countries and LDCs to im plement its proposal due to them not having 
sufficient resources, Korea had limited the S& D and technical assistance aspects to longer 
implementation periods, which was not sufficient to overcome implementation concerns. 
69. With respect to the proposal on prior consu ltation and comments contained in TN/TF/W/8, 
India's position had already been stated in comme nting on the EC proposal.  On the suggestion 
regarding the processing of notified trade regulatio ns in a committee set up in the WTO, it was not 
clear to India what that would entail since the oblig ation presently related to transparency.  Therefore, 
as long as Members complied with the requirement , there was no call for further processing the 
information.  India proposed that Members notif ied the place where the relevant information was 
available, rather than all the regulations/procedures to the WTO, as that would be cumbersome both to  
Members as well as to the WTO Secretariat.  As  for maintaining integrity among officials, India 
agreed that that was a laudable objective, but something which did not fall in the ambit of the WTO. 
70. The representative of Nicaragua  supported the idea of Members submitting contributions in 
writing in the most detailed manner possible.  The Japanese intervention was welcomed. Nicaragua 
intended to observe the developments of the ne gotiations and would later comment on the proposals 
and contributions which properly addre ssed the objective of the negotiations of  facilitating trade for 
developing countries.  The Japanese proposal coinci ded with regional efforts taken by Nicaragua to 
facilitate commercial customs procedures. 
71. The representative of New Zealand  said that the commonalities and overlaps between the 
papers suggested shared ideas for achieving the objectives of predictability, simplification, 
transparency and access to information.  The propo sals were largely practical and pragmatic in their 
approach.  They reflected the realities of the curre nt trading environment and the vast changes that 
had taken place since the GATT had been adopted.  Re peated references had been  made to issues such 
as internet publication, just-in-time inventories and express shipments.  In all cases, the proposals 
reflected what was already best practice in customs and border administrations with many of its ideas 
already being widely applied throughout the worl d at developed- and de veloping-country borders. 
72. The point on the benefit of the proposals to SMEs was of particular interest to New Zealand, 
as the bulk of its exporters and importers were su ch enterprises.  New Zealand was very conscious 
that inefficient border procedures hampered exports  and imports and had greater impact on SMEs 
than on larger traders which had greater resources to address and manage complex border procedures.  
Another useful aspect of many papers was the reference to existing and familiar principles and 
practices within the WTO.  New Zealand very mu ch supported the idea of establishing enquiry points 
which would allow greater transparency and simpli city.  However, New Zealand also agreed with 
India that Members would need to work togeth er to develop a more complete and unambiguous 
understanding of the scope and the responsibility of such enquiry points.  Nevertheless, New Zealand 
saw real value in building on and re plicating existing best practices w ithin the WTO system to ensure 
consistency and coherency within the broader package of WTO oblig ations.  Many of the papers also 
addressed potential cost implications and technical assistance, both of which would be an essential 
element to discuss as the proposals were developed.  It was also a reminder of the need to ensure 
meaningful and practical coordination with  relevant organizations and agencies. 
73. New Zealand welcomed the inclusion of next steps in the US paper and acknowledged that 
there was plenty more work to be done on those papers  in order to clarify and,  where necessary, better 
specify how they might be developed and operationalized  to the benefit of all.  Members also had to 
work hard to ensure they responded to the questions raised.  
74. The representative of Pakistan  said that all tabled proposals ma de an important contribution to 
improving and clarifying Article X.  They had a common objective of improving transparency, predictability and impartiality.  Pa kistan could generally support most of the suggested measures, and TN/TF/M/3 
Page 12  
 
would like to co-sponsor the submission by Japan, Mongolia and Chinese Taipei.  All administrations 
believed in transparency and most had already some ki nd of rules in place to ensure that objective.  
However, some of those rules needed updating.  Mo reover, different administrations had some of the 
elements missing.  A Single National Focal Point w as, for instance, not a prevalent practice in many 
countries.  Similarly, many administrations di d not have any mechanism for advance rulings. 
75. Having all those measures in any eventual agre ement would enable countries with different 
systems to look at their existing systems against a template and make efforts to implement the missing 
elements to bring in more transparency.  Depe nding on the countries' capacity to implement those 
proposals and the extent to which countries could bring in more transparency, there would be a 
corresponding impact on clearance of goods, reduction of malpractices, cutting red-tape, removal of 
corruption, etc.  It was a "win-win" situation.   However, some proposals would not be easy to 
implement, such as binding advance rulings, central enquiry points, uniform administration of trade regulations throughout various ports of entry, etc.   Those measures might seem very simple but, in 
practice, they were not that easy, and it was a pr oblem for both developing and developed countries.  
Those were some of the areas where much technical  assistance and other resources, such as financial 
assistance, would be needed.  In addition to what had been identified, there were some elements 
missing.  For instance, Pakistan's experience had show n that simplification of tariffs could bring even 
more transparency and impartiality.  Similarly,  simplification and compilation of trade-related 
procedures in a way that made them easily accessibl e brought more transparency and predictability. 
76. The representative of Brazil
 said that legislation at all leve ls should be published and be as 
easily available as possible.  At the same time, Braz il shared India's concerns that some administrative 
procedures might be confidential.  Procedures dea ling with risk analysis in customs could, for 
instance, not be made available as that would a llow for import operations to be conducted in a way 
that circumvented risk analysis procedures.  A rela ted point was the availability of the information on 
the internet, which was something most countries would be interested in for their own benefit.  That 
was certainly an area where there was ample scope for technical assistance and financial assistance to 
those countries that did not yet publish their legislation on the internet. 
77. With regard to the single-desk enquiry point,  Brazil had some doubts about the usefulness of 
establishing some sort of core centre which would not have the authority to handle the information but 
would only serve as some kind of mailbox.  Enquiry points had to be as closely connected as possible to the people with actual authority to authorize th e importation of the goods.  For instance, in most 
countries, imports of nuclear or radiological materi als had to go through one very specialized agency 
and it would not make much sense to convey such enquiries through a Trade Ministry. 
78. On the issue of notification, Brazil had a speci al concern regarding the issue of translating 
legislation into official WTO languages in addition to  the concern expressed by India in that regard.  
It was one thing to notify legislation which had then to be discussed and analysed with regard to its 
compatibility with WTO Agreements, but it was something else to provide information on the 
hundreds of trade-related legislations.  That was an  area where one would perhaps be stepping into the 
role of other, international or national organizations.  The issue w as facilitation and not information.  
In that context, the Korean paper had presented a useful formulation aiming at the notification of where the information could be found, wh ich would be a better way to proceed.   
79. With regard to the interval between publi cation and implementation, Article 1 of the 
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures containe d a good formulation, requiring a 21-day period. 
Obviously, things had to be publis hed before they were implemented.  The length of the necessary 
interval depended in some cases on how the legisla tion was established.  In some cases, the delay 
could not be very long for reasons of efficacy. 
80. As for the issue of prior consultation on re gulations, Brazil had doubts about the usefulness 
and appropriateness of establishing an obligation to that end, especially as regards partners in other  TN/TF/M/3 
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countries.  That would go beyond the issues of tr ansparency and predictability and would strike the 
substance of the regulation.  The parallelism with  the TBT and SPS Agreements was not appropriate 
as they established a presumption regarding technical re gulations and phytosanitary regulations that, if 
a measure was in accordance with in ternational rules, it was legitimate.  But on Trade Facilitation, 
there was no international standard in most cases.  It was also not an obligation for all parties. 
81. On appeal procedures and due procedures, Br azil agreed with most of what had been 
presented in the proposals.  On the release of goods subject to appeal under guarantee, Brazil was of 
the view that there should be provisions for that, ev en though it was easy to think of situations where 
it was necessary to have additional guarantees besides the financial ones, or ot her situations in which 
the nature of the dispute did not allow for the rel ease of the goods, such as cases involving intellectual 
property questions.  Therefore, Brazil could agree on th at in principle, but details would have to be 
worked out, which was not a trivial matter. 
82. As for fees, it seemed obvious that all fees had to  be published if there had to be charges at 
all.  Simplification was a good idea although not necessarily an easy one.  The unification of fees on the other hand was not such a good idea, especially  in cases like Brazil where some fees were federal 
while others were s ub-national in nature. 
83. The representative of Kenya
 associated his delegation with the views expressed by the 
Philippines on behalf of the Core Group.  Kenya was concerned that some of the proposals on GATT Article X exceeded the scope of that provision.  Pr ior external consultation, for instance, would focus 
on the substantive content of the measure and ther efore went beyond the coverage of Article X.  
Article X merely dealt with the publication and ad ministration of trade regulations, leaving it up to 
Members to regulate their substantive content.  Some of the proposals would further constrain the 
ability of certain Members to address their needs a nd concerns, especially development-related ones.  
That was especially the case for countries relying on cu stom revenue for their national budget.  It was 
necessary to have a clear demarcation between the publication and administration of laws relating to 
foreign trade and their substantive content, whic h fell outside the scope of Article X.  Another 
concern related to the fact that some proposal s represented burdensome transparency obligations 
without taking into account the limited capacities faced by most developing countries.  Prior to the July package, there was a strong commitment from the proponents with respect to providing financial 
and technical assistance to address some of those concerns. But at present, there was very little 
integration of S&D provisions into the proposal s, which was a matter of great concern. 
84. The representative of Djibouti
 thanked the EC for stressing the need to provide technical 
assistance to countries requiring that support, and for acknowledging the importance of assistance for 
small enterprises.  Djibouti paid particular importance to the training of staff as an area requiring special attention.  Necessary technical assistance had to be provided to enable developing and least-
developed countries to meet Trade Facilitation require ments.  Regional or nati onal seminars could be 
helpful in that context and were therefore solic ited by Djibouti.  As a least-developed country, 
Djibouti needed donors to continue and enhance their support in order for Djibouti to meet the 
necessary requirements for the facilitation of trade. 
85. The representative of Mauritius
 sought clarification on the EC’s proposal on appeal 
procedures and due process.  Such a proposal could have major cost implications beyond just modest 
start-up costs for countries not having such procedures already in place.  It would be useful if the EC could clarify whether related S&D treatment would be limited to more time for implementation or 
whether - and what - other concrete measures we re being contemplated to assist Members with 
implementing such proposal.  The same implication aro se, albeit of a different nature, in respect to the 
advance ruling proposals made by other delegations. Mauritius sought clarification on that as well. 
86. The representative of Egypt
 fully supported the statement by the Philippines on behalf of the 
Core Group.  Transparency was one of the core el ements of the WTO system and all trade operators TN/TF/M/3 
Page 14  
 
in all countries would benefit from it.  No one coul d challenge that.  But it had to be taken into 
account that, for many countries, the inadequacy of  the human, financial and infrastructure resources 
as well as policy difficulties were major problems.  Transition periods were therefore not enough to tackle those shortcomings.  It also had to be not ed that WTO Members were at different levels of 
development.  Adjustment costs for implementin g the suggested measures had to be considered, 
especially for those countries implementing them  for the first time.  When assessing the 
implementation costs of some proposed measures such as the notification requirement, it would 
become clear that, although apparently easy, they were difficult for some Members to comply with. 
87. With respect to the EC proposal to publish a ll administrative guidelines, a clarification was 
needed on the definition and scope of those administ rative guidelines.    On the suggested publication 
of management plans relating to the implementation of WTO commitments,  Egypt shared the views 
expressed by India as the logic behind that sugges tion was not clear.  Egypt could understand that a 
country should notify when it was going to implemen t an obligation, but it was not relevant or 
adequate to prescribe the country how to do so. 
88. Paragraph 7 of Korea's document referred to rules for notifying "core measures".  Egypt 
would like to know the scope of such core measur es, who would determine whether the measure was 
a core one and what would be the criteria for such an assessment.  On paragraph 8, Egypt wanted to 
know the envisaged time period for submitting comme nts on the proposed measures, and if it would 
be the same for all countries, deve loped and developing alike.  On th e concept of prior consultation, 
Egypt supported the statement made by Brazil in that regard. 
89. The representative of Sri Lanka
 said that excessive formalities and procedures connected to 
imports and exports had become more exposed as a general impediment to trade. Sri Lanka supported 
certain proposals aimed at transparency, simplificati on and predictability as they enhanced efficiency.  
Sri Lanka supported the paper by Japan, Mongolia and Chinese Taipei, which introduced several new 
ideas on how to improve the transparency and predictability aspects of Trade Facilitation.  
Transparency was enshrined as a principle in a num ber of WTO agreements and there was an urgent 
need to introduce it to the area of  Trade Facilitation as well.  It was a principle that all Members 
supported as everybody stood to benefit from it.  Th e measures suggested in the paper were very 
simple, but the benefits to the exporting trading co mmunity and to the regulators were immense.  The 
key word that attracted Sri Lanka’s attention w as “SMEs”, as small-and medium-sized enterprises 
contributed 50 % to its GDP.  The bulk of Sri Lanka ’s exporters were SMEs, making benefits to them 
very important to Sri Lanka.  SMEs could benefit from enlarged/enhanced transparency and 
predictable and impartiality of trade regulations . Entrepreneurs spent a lot of time and money to 
collect and process information.  Information wa s costly, especially for SMEs.  Sri Lanka was 
interested in avoiding unnecessary documentation pro cedures as it allowed for savings in logistical 
costs and time.  At the same time, Sri Lanka had a few questions.  The term “judicial decision” was unclear and should be clarified as there were far-reach ing implications.  Also, the value added had to 
be known.  When implementing those measures, the capacities of developing countries and LDCs 
should be fully taken into account.  Technical and financial assistance were an integral part of the 
negotiations. 
90. The representative of Jamaica
 said that the tabled proposals were valuable contributions 
which should help move work forward.  Despite the assurances given regarding the likely minimal 
costs of those proposals, Jamaica remained very concerned about the technical assistance and the 
financial implications of the proposed measures.   All proposals would need to address technical 
assistance and financial needs much more explicitly a nd in much greater detail.  The proposals tabled 
so far, inasmuch as they related largely to cust oms administration procedures, were proposals that 
Jamaica could respond to in a fairly positive manne r since Jamaica had been engaged in a customs 
modernization programme for the past several years.   Measures consistent with the objectives pursued 
under its customs modernization project were, in pr inciple, measures on which Jamaica would be able 
to look favourably.   TN/TF/M/3 
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91. Nevertheless, Jamaica had noted that the EC had set out very sweeping requirements 
regarding the provision of information, which were  suggested not only to be published, as Article X 
currently required, but also to be made "easily av ailable".  While the Jamaican Customs Department 
currently maintained a website and provided timely information on the formalities and requisites for 
transacting business, it was unclear as to what more would be needed and what the costs were – both 
in human resources and financial terms – and to what extent that would go beyond what Jamaica 
currently did.  The same applied for the suggested prior consultation on new a nd amended rules.  Such 
consultations and related informa tion dissemination currently took place in Jamaica.  New regulations 
or changes in the Customs Act were gazetted.  Sin ce Article X dealt with transparency, it was unclear 
to Jamaica why there should be the need for ex ternal prior consultations on measures to be 
implemented.  There was already a fairly ri gorous process of consultations with domestic 
stakeholders.  In the case of appeals procedures and due process, there were both internal and external 
review procedures in place that were internal to  the Customs Department.  The ultimate body for 
appeals in customs-related matters was the Revenue Court. 
92. With respect to Korea’s suggestion on notifying information and changes to the WTO, with 
the WTO then disseminating the information, the pro cedure might be less important than the scope of 
the information.  The aim should be  to enhance transparency rather  than burdening the system.  As 
regards the submission by Japan, Mongolia and Ch inese Taipei, Jamaica agreed with India on the 
maintaining of integrity amongst officials being a desirable and worthwhile objective, but one that 
should not be part of the Trade F acilitation negotiations in the WTO. 
93. Implementing the proposals by Canada, Australia  and Chinese Taipei on advance rulings on 
tariff classification would cause a greater burden on the system than the ones on origin questions.  
Jamaica wanted to know how and to what extent ha d advance rulings been utilized in implementing 
the Agreement on Rules of Origin.  On a more genera l level, Jamaica was of the view that many of 
the proposed measures already existed in some count ries, placing the real implementation requirement 
on other Members.  It would therefore be useful to ha ve an inventory of what currently existed so that 
Members could have a clear sense of what had to be done to meet the proposed commitments. 
94. The US proposals were quite useful.  Jamaica ha d particularly noted the linkage between the 
proposals and potential technical assistance requirements and a clear indication of the importance of integrating that element into any proposals made.   
95. The representative of Indonesia
 associated his delegation with the Philippines' statement on 
behalf of the Core Group, as well as with Zambia’s  statement on behalf of the LDCs.  Indonesia’s 
concern related to the fact that, as the largest ar chipelago in the world covering more than 17 000 
islands, the implementation burde n was particularly high. Indonesia therefore expected the 
negotiations to lead to the elaboration of e ffective provisions on S&D treatment, as well as on 
technical assistance and support for capacity building.   The issue of technical assistance and capacity 
building would therefore be vital in all stages of the negotiations, as well as in the eventual 
implementation phase. 
96. The representative of Lesotho  supported the statement made by Zambia on behalf of the 
LDCs and agreed with the intervention by Rwanda .  Clarifying and improving relevant elements of 
GATT Articles V, VIII and X would benefit both deve loping and developed co untries alike.  Through 
increased trade, it would assist in attracting FDI which would lead to overall economic growth.  However, it had to be ensured that the proposals did not go beyond the scope of the relevant GATT 
provisions. 
97. For some small economies, efficiency was very important.  Lesotho could go along with the 
idea of a one stop service at some clearance stations to provide a full range of services to the business 
community and minimize delays.  But it was evident that technical assistance was required to be able to catch up with the rest of the other customs authorities in facilitating trade. TN/TF/M/3 
Page 16  
 
98. The representative of Morocco,
 speaking on behalf of the African Group , said that African 
countries attached a lot of importance to Trad e Facilitation and were currently working on the 
specifics of Annex D.  The Annex stated that negotiations should aim at clarifying and improving 
relevant aspects of Articles V, VIII and X and at identifying the Trade Facilitation needs and priorities 
of Members, in particular developing and least-developed ones.  It was therefore important to reaffirm 
the understanding that the scope of the negotiations  was limited to the above-mentioned Articles. 
99. S&D treatment was a key principle of Annex D.  The different levels of development of WTO 
Members should be taken into account.  The principl e had to be early identified in the negotiations 
and should not be limited to longer implemen tation periods for possible new commitments.  
Paragraph 3 of Annex D had to be made operational and faithfull y implemented by ensuring that 
LDCs would not have to undertake commitments they considered incompatible with their 
development, financial or trade needs, or with  their administrative and institutional capabilities. 
100. Paragraph 4 of Annex D required Members,  specially developing and least-developed 
countries to identify their Trade Facilitation need s and priorities.  Many African countries faced 
resource constraints, limiting their ability to undertak e a comprehensive review of their existing Trade 
Facilitation infrastructure as a basis for identifyi ng their individual Trade Facilitation needs and 
priorities.  The provision of external sources a nd resources to support the identification process was 
therefore extremely essential.  Furthermore, a study  on the needs and priorities of African countries, 
including flexibilities and cost of adjustment, had to be conducted.  The provision of technical 
assistance and capacity building was a sine qua non  for African countries to implement the results of 
the negotiations and the Secretariat had to be tha nked for their endeavours in co-operating with other 
international organizations  to achieve that goal. 
101. The representative of Chile  said that advance rulings were important for improving 
transparency and deepening trade among countries.  A look could be taken at the scope of such rulings to decide whether they shou ld apply only to classification and origin or to other areas, too.  
The EC's proposals would also be beneficial to im porters and exporters in developing and developed 
countries.  Chile sought clarification on the reas on for not referring to administrative arrangements in 
the proposal on publication and availability of informa tion, even though that was mentioned in Article 
X.  Chile would also like to know how the EC proposal on administrative appeals differed from the obligation currently contained in Ar ticle X, Paragraph 3, and whether such appeals were to take place 
within the body applying the measure. 
102. The US proposals on fees and charges were impor tant for importers and exporters as they had 
to know what was to be paid for their goods to en ter a market.  Those charges should be limited to the 
cost of services rendered and should not constitute an indirect protection for national goods.  Chile 
wondered whether the United States had any specifi c parameters in mind for introducing disciplines 
in that area or whether they were me rely flagging the issue for discussion. 
103. The idea of a focal point was interesting as well.  Chile sought clarification as to whether those 
points were merely meant to respond to issues or questions regarding customs matters and frontier 
procedures and what the experience had been  with implementing such focal points. 
104. The representative of Switzerland
 said that transparency in the domestic regulatory process 
was essential as one of the foundations of democracy and a basic requirement for efficient markets, 
helping to remove economic distortions that might undermine domestic policy objectives towards 
general welfare.  Transparency was crucial for economic actors to take maximum advantage for the 
opportunities created by global trade, and its impor tance could therefore not be over-emphasized. 
105. Information had to be readily and easily availa ble in an impartial manner.  Transparency 
provisions should at no time and by no means require any Member to disclose confidential information which would impede law enforcement, be  contrary to the public interest or prejudice  TN/TF/M/3 
 Page 17 
 
 
legitimate commercial interests of particular enterp rises.  The incremental gain for traders through 
enhanced transparency should not be outweighed by administrative costs.  It should further be shown by which steps Members at different stages of development could implement the measures. 
106. The tabled proposals by Chinese Taipei on Artic le X contained several central elements. 
Focal points were a highly efficient measure not onl y for the ease to traders but also for enhancing 
cooperation between border agencies.  They should, in  the first instance, have a coordinating role.  
Switzerland also agreed with many elements listed in the EC proposals.  A clarification was sought 
with respect to the regular consultative mechanism proposed in paragraph 4.  Switzerland wanted to 
know how that would work. 
107. Korea’s submission was appreciated for its fo cus on the essential and pragmatic solutions 
adapted.  It allowed for a flexible implementa tion of obligations, such as by not imposing certain 
means for publication, but merely requiring the m eans to be widely accessible and for Members to 
notify the way through which measures were pub lished.  Switzerland also appreciated Korea's 
pragmatic ideas on the Single National Focal Point.  With regard to publication and information, 
Switzerland asked Korea to explain in more depth thei r concept of informing interested parties of new 
or modified regulations as inspired by the Agreement on Public Procurement. 
108. Regarding the submission by Japan, Mongolia and Chinese Taipei, Switzerland liked the way 
the contribution exposed the problems and provided for solutions, as well as the link made to possible 
solutions that could be found in other WTO Agre ements.  The grouping of the proposed measures 
around transparency, predictability and impartiality ma de the submission very clear.  It was important 
to be informed at any time on the motivations of a measure, and there were several ways to do that. 
Impartial and uniform administration of regulations was not easy as regulations were interpreted daily 
by all border authorities, but nevertheless important.   
109.  Canada’s submission was also welcomed.  The mo st important point was that all traders had 
the possibility in all countries to receive such advan ce rulings.  Canada's proposal rightly tempered the 
obligation to publish decisions on advance ruli ngs with the requirement to do so without 
compromising confidentiality needs. 
110. Chinese Taipei’s submission raised essential issues in the areas of pre-arrival clearance, risk 
management, post audit controls and one-stop services.   The Swiss delegation would be interested in 
hearing from Chinese Taipei as to how they saw  such a one-stop service centre functioning. 
111. Switzerland also welcomed all the submissions by the United States, and looked forward to 
discussing them further, especially as regards devel opment of parameters for the application of fees, 
the treatment of express shipments and other aspects. 
112. The representative of Costa Rica
 welcomed the tabled proposals which tackled identified 
problems regarding Articles VIII and X in a way that  allowed everybody to benefit, especially SMEs, 
which represented a large proportion of Costa Rica's trade.  It was essential for Members to inform 
traders of all requirements they had to comply w ith, especially in the area of customs procedures.  
Simple, clear and well-docum ented procedures had to be developed to provide traders, particularly 
SMEs, with the greatest security possible when carrying out business transactions. 
113. Costa Rica shared many of the factors pointed  out by Japan, Korea and Chinese Taipei and 
the European Communities regarding transparency an d predictability.  Article X did not determine the 
content of the information and where the publica tion must be made.  The information had to be 
rapidly disclosed.  It was also important to notif y administrative procedures and contact points to 
guarantee greater transparency and predictability. TN/TF/M/3 
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114. Regarding the EC proposal on the publication an d availability of information, Cost Rica 
wondered about the difference between decisions a nd administrative rulings, and whether decisions 
included judicial decisions as currently established in Article X.  Costa Rica agreed with the idea of 
advance consultations, but had some doubts as to the scope of the measure mentioned in point six. 
115. Costa Rica supported the proposals by Canada, Australia and the United States on advance 
rulings to increase legal security.  They could, inter alia , cover areas such as tariff clarification, 
applicable taxes, and non-tariff requirements. 
116. It was very important that developed count ries and other donors supported developing 
countries and LDCs in developing procedures and administrative structures to formulate advance 
criteria and develop electronic procedures for receiv ing applications.  While providing information, 
the protection of confidential commercial or busines s information had to be guaranteed.  Access to 
non-confidential information should be unlimited and not subject to discriminatory treatment. 
117. Costa Rica supported the proposal to promote the use of the internet for the dissemination of 
information required by traders.  The information shoul d be at the disposal on an official website in an 
updated manner.  The administration of this site mi ght include the designation of one or more contact 
points which would ensure rapid answers to any que ries concerning import and export requirements.  
That would allow traders everywhere to have access in real time to commercial and customs 
legislation.  Importance should be paid to keepin g the information up to date.  Technical assistance 
would be of the greatest use there.  The designated contact points must ensure that queries are dealt 
with rapidly and information on the procedures to ma ke such queries must be made available.  Costa 
Rica also supported the proposals to improve appeal  procedures and due process as key elements of 
any rule of law.  Due process must be ensured th rough a rapid revision of administrative rulings and 
administrative bodies of judicial bodies independently of the authority making the initial ruling. 
118. As for proposals regarding Article VIII, Costa Rica supported the development of rules to 
ensure efficiency, simplification and harmonizati on of import and export documents to reduce costs 
and fulfil official requirements and commercial require ments applied in international trade.  For that, 
Members must, whenever possible, take into  account existing international regulations.  
119. Costa Rica supported the proposal by the United States on rapid customs clearance.  One had 
to promote the use of modern clearance procedures for express shipments.  The principles developed by the World Customs Organization might be useful in that regard.  Simplification of import and export documents, their submission before a single body, and risk assessment were important as well. 
120. The representative of Peru
 said that in Peru, Trade Facilitation could become a model of what 
could be achieved through cooperation and techni cal assistance from international bodies which 
allowed countries not just to increase their business  opportunities but also their trade flows.  The 
harmonization of policies was also important and so mething Peru wanted to promote in the WTO.  
Peru had decided to co-sponsor the proposals contai ned in document TN/TF/W/8. It pursued the most 
adequate approach for work in that area, based on the principles of transparency, predictability and 
impartiality.  Enhancing predictab ility through the publication of laws  and regulations before their 
implementation was important to facilitate trade flows.   At the same time, the proposal did not require 
anyone to publish regulations regarding customs procedures as that might create bigger internal 
problems regarding coordination amongst the differe nt bodies in charge of those matters. Greater 
human and financial resources were required as well.   Within the proposed examples, Peru preferred 
the one on publishing laws a nd regulations before implementation because it allowed Members to 
publish laws which had already been adopted rather  than laws that were still in draft  form.  
121. Regarding impartiality and uniform administrati on of trade regulations throughout Members' 
territories, it was a good idea to have training of customs staff based on case books on customs classification and customs valuation.  The developed countries must play a key role in providing such  TN/TF/M/3 
 Page 19 
 
 
training.  Experience gained within APEC on the impl ementation of the CVA could be relevant in that 
regard.  Progress made on Trade Facilitation in Peru had been due to important technical and financial 
assistance. It was fundamental for developing c ountries to have such assistance, as well as S&D 
treatment to be able to implement Trade Facilitation measures to improve Article X. 
122. The representative of Hong Kong, China  said that the proposals on Article X contained 
constructive ideas on how to achieve greater transpar ency and predictability in trading practices and 
better administration of regulations.  Hong Kong, Ch ina was in full agreement with those objectives.  
However, the scope of the proposed measures had to be defined more precisely.  Further clarification 
from the proponents on the questions raised with rega rd to the suggested measures would be useful. 
123. Hong Kong, China supported the proposal on adva nce rulings. Article II of the Agreement on 
Rules of Origin already incorporated a similar pr ovision.  Hong Kong, China’s experience with such a 
system was very positive, with the related costs being  minimal.  The scope of an advance ruling 
system had to be defined more clearly.  Hong K ong, China believed that the suggested establishment 
of national enquiry points and the provision of a on e stop service, or trade desks, would be a very 
trade-friendly measure and useful to encourage better coordination among border agencies.  The 
proposals by Chinese Taipei on pre-arrival clearance , risk assessment and post-clearance were also 
very interesting as they reflected modern-day tr ade practices.  There should be further discussion 
among Members on whether such ideas could be  turned into potential obligations. 
124. The representative of Malaysia  associated himself with the statement by the Philippines on 
behalf of the Core Group.  With respect to the EC  proposal on appeal procedures, it was important to 
take into account the level of capacity of countries to  adhere to standard times.  There was also need 
to clarify the criteria for “minor appeals”.  Clarification was also required on the term “core 
measures” used in Korea's proposal. Concrete examples would facilitate the understanding those 
proposals.  Examples would also be helpful to better understand the proposal by Japan, Mongolia and 
Chinese Taipei on standard processing times for “major trade procedures”.  It was important to note that different countries had different interpretati ons of what constitutes major trade procedures.  
Malaysia also wanted the proponents to reflect fu rther on their proposals to establish a committee in 
the WTO to process notifications.  Such notifica tions could also be done by other means.  The 
effectiveness and cost-benefit ratio  of such a Committee should be re -assessed.  The US proposal on 
advance rulings would benefit from a clarification on its precise scope. 
125. The representative of China
 was concerned about the suggested scope of the proposal on 
advance rulings.  While advance rulings on tariff classification and applicable duty rate seemed 
logical, it was neither reasonable nor practical to  have customs value determined before the 
transaction actually occurred.  The CVA called for th e customs value determination to be made on the 
basis of a price actually paid, or payable. 
126. On the proposal regarding the publication and av ailability of information, the difficulty of 
publishing numerous documents in official WT O languages required S&D treatment to allow 
developing countries and LDCs to publish such info rmation.  Regarding the proposals on notification 
and prior commenting periods, China sought clarif ication on the coverage of the term “core 
measures”.  China also wanted the EC to clarify their definition of “minor appeals” used in their 
submission. China had difficulties in accepting the propo sal on duty payment to be left in abeyance 
due to the need to secure customs revenue and main tain in conformity with Article 13 of the CVA. 
127. China further believed that fi nancial and technical assist ance, and support for capacity 
building by international organi zations and developed countries w as of paramount importance and 
had to be substantive and sufficient rather than me rely of an educative nature to allow developing 
countries and LDCs to solve their problems.  As sistance also had to enhance their negotiating 
capacities and to include infrastructure support to as sist those countries in upgrading their ability to 
implement the results of the negotiations.  Chin a also hoped that, apart from S&D treatment for TN/TF/M/3 
Page 20  
 
developing countries and LDCs, their enforcemen t capacities due to huge differences in their 
economic development were also fully taken into account. 
128. The representative of Mongolia
 said that Mongolia had co-sponsored document TN/TF/W/8 
with a firm belief that the launch of negotiations on Trade Facilitation was of crucial importance to 
land-locked developing countries and small economi es, including small island-developing countries. 
Countries with small trade volumes and high per un it transportation cost would hugely benefit from a 
proper agreement on Trade Facilitation due to the resulting cost reductions for their export goods. 
129.  The fact that the voices of those groups of developing countries were often not heard in the 
negotiations should not be interpreted as them not being interested in Trade Facilitation.  They were in 
fact all well aware of its importance, but their lim ited capacities to cover all the negotiations running 
in parallel prevented them from bei ng active.  Nevertheless, their in terests should not be ignored and 
S&D provisions should be fully taken into account .  Initiatives to advance the understanding of the 
negotiations would be very important.   
130. Trade facilitation was not a new issue. There were many directly related bilateral, plurilateral 
and international processes. The provision of fina ncial and technical assistance should have its 
legitimate place in the negotiations.  The develope d countries had repeatedly expressed their readiness 
and commitment to provide such assistance so that the required resources would be available.  In drafting the text of the Trade Facilitation Agreement, the existing experiences could be used. 
131. The representative of Singapore
 associated her delegation with most of the proposals and the 
way in which they had been presented, as they had started to clearly define what Trade Facilitation 
consisted of, and what one would like to see in  terms of binding commitments resulting from the 
negotiations.  Singapore welcomed the fact th at many proposals already drew upon existing WTO 
provisions, which facilitated the analysis of the sugg estions, not only in terms of understanding what 
was advocated but also in assisting with the identif ication of concerns regarding costs implications, 
technical assistance and capacity building. Members could relate to their own experiences in implementing the same provisions in other Agreemen ts and take it as a reference of how something 
would have to be implemented in the Trade Fac ilitation context and what S&D was required to reach 
the same objective. 
132. The representative of Colombia
 said that the proposals and their pragmatic approach were 
most useful in moving the discussions forward.  Colombia wondered whether the EC was ready to introduce an element of flexibility regarding their proposal on publication to allow each country to 
give priority to certain issues depending on its partic ular situation and the available resources.  A step-
by-step approach might be useful in that context.   On the proposals regarding prior consultation, 
Colombia wanted to get more information on th e scope of the envisaged statement of policy 
objectives.  Colombia shared Brazil's concerns about the proposal by Japan, Mongolia and Chinese 
Taipei to publish regulations on the internet in mo re than one WTO language.  There were significant 
cost implications, creating difficulties for certain de veloping countries due to their limited resources.  
Colombia was thankful for the ideas presented on tec hnical assistance and capacity building.  They 
were a good basis for a coordination mechanism amongst the intergovernmental bodies capable of 
providing financial assistance to help developi ng countries with the negotiations and with 
implementing the commitments emerging as a result. 
133. The representative of Thailand
 said that Thailand was ready to establish enquiry points or 
trade desks as proposed by the EC, despite the fact th at some sort of enquiry points already existed in 
many ministries.  Thailand welcomed the assistance to better the existing system.  On the last intent of 
paragraph 11, requesting the publication of a summary of trade regulations in more than one official 
WTO language on the website, Thailand was of the view that, for a country, whose native language 
was not one of the official WTO languages, tran slating the existing regulations into English was 
already a major task.  Therefore, if the Englis h version was not sufficient, help was required.  TN/TF/M/3 
 Page 21 
 
 
134. On the suggested compilation and distribu tion of casebooks of examples of customs 
classification and customs valuation, Thailand was of the view that most cases were considered to 
involve trade secrets of businesses, the exposure of wh ich might be sensitive.  Nevertheless, Thailand 
was interested in further clarifications on that ma tter.  Numerous things proposed in the Japanese 
paper might constitute an administrative burden for deve loping countries.  It might be better to adopt a 
step-by-step approach.  Members should work together  on what should be done first and what later.  
More time was required to study all the proposals in depth. 
135. The representative of Guatemala  said that, for small developi ng economies, advancements in 
Trade Facilitation were of great benefit, especia lly for SMEs, which represented a large share of 
Guatemalan enterprises.  The proposals by Canada  and the US on transparency and predictability 
clearly bore benefits for those enterprises.  Gu atemala supported the intervention by Hong Kong 
China on the importance of defining the scope of th e tabled proposals, as well as the suggestions by 
Costa Rica, Chile, India and Colombia. Technical assistance, capacity building and S&D treatment 
were key elements for small econom ies to benefit from the rules to be agreed in the negotiations. 
136. The representative of the Dominican Republic  said that many of the suggested measures were 
already implemented in the Dominican Republic, especi ally with respect to expedited clearance, but 
more work was required.  The current discussions we re very helpful in that regard.  The Dominican 
Republic would like to take an active part in the negotiations to benefit from that special opportunity.  
All fundamental issues involved in customs transactions such as advance rulings, legislation, regulations and decisions should be put on the internet to familiarise tr aders with the applicable rules 
and procedures.  S&D treatment, financial and technical assistance and capacity building were of 
essential importance to help implement those measures. 
137. The representative of Mexico
 said that the tabled proposals were all important contributions 
to the negotiations.  Various dele gations had identified a number of topics for further discussion.  
Mexico would be interested, inter alia,  in analyzing possible commitments on advance rulings on 
tariff classification and prior consulta tions about new and modified rules. 
138. The representative of Japan  recalled that the measures suggest ed by Japan were merely meant 
to be elements of solutions for Article X-relate d problems in assisting Members’ deliberations on 
possible commitments. They were no intended to constitute the commitments themselves. 
139. As for the question on prior consultation on tr ade rules and regulations, Japan believed that 
such consultation was important to increase predictab ility.  It was beneficial not only in allowing 
interested parties to know the contents of the am endments in advance, but also in enabling the 
government to receive useful input from academics, business and consumers. 
140. Notification of trade-related regulations to the WTO was a way to further increase their 
accessibility.  While trade regulations might be publicized in government gazettes or national 
websites, the accessibility of the information was ofte n still limited as traders, particularly small ones, 
could not find those sources or did not understand the language in which they were published.  
Notification to the WTO would allow traders easier access to the required information.  Submitting to 
the WTO a web link of each national website where tr aders could get the necessary information in an 
official WTO language was also a possible solution. 
141. Maintaining the integrity of the staff at th e border was important to secure the impartial 
administration of trade regulations required by paragraph 3 of Article X and should therefore be 
included as an element in the negotiations.  Memb ers should be encouraged to provide sufficient 
training to raise the level of integrity of officials working at the border. 
142. As for the scope of publication, the existence of different legal systems required Members to 
work on a general definition of what rules and regul ations had to be publicized and notified.  With TN/TF/M/3 
Page 22  
 
respect to confidentiality concerns, Article X clearly  stipulated that Members were not required to 
disclose confidential information whic h would impede law enforcement. 
143. The representative of Korea
 said that Korea was willing to clarify open questions and come 
up with more concrete ideas.  The concerns by developing countries' regarding S&D treatment, 
technical assistance and capacity building would be  taken into consideration as well.  As for the 
question regarding the scope of the "core measures" , Korea was still in the process of defining it and 
open to ideas in that regard. 
144. The representative of the European Communities  noted that Members' readiness to engage in 
substance was a good sign.  
145. With respect to India's question on the precise meaning of "administrative guidelines", the EC 
was of the view that the term could cover a numbe r of issues such as explanatory or interpretative 
notes issued by customs or operating procedures pub lished at individual border points.  There was a 
lot of information which was not in itself a decision , ruling or law with less of a status in the legal 
framework but which was nonetheless important for trad ers to know about.  What the EC tried to do 
in its proposal was to move the scope of notificati on and transparency at another level below that of 
the broader laws and regulations dow n to the kind of information of importance to freight forwarders, 
traders and other stakeholders clustered around a customs post.  All of them had to know that 
information on a day-to-day basis. 
146. As regards the question of whether any distin ction should be made between decisions and 
rulings, it should be clarified that the two terms ha d been included in the EC's proposal for the sake of 
completeness.  Depending on a country's jurisdictio n, some Members talked about decisions, while 
others referred to rulings.  The current discussi on on advance rulings suggested that rulings and 
decisions were not always the same thing.  Advan ce rulings should not to be equated with advance 
decisions, as there were differences. 
147. As for India's question of whether judicial deci sions should also be made publicly available, 
the EC was of the view that that should be the case.   With respect to the meaning of "relevant import 
and export procedures", the EC thought that one s hould cast the net relatively wide, but was open to 
further discussion on what would be a realis tic scope to aim for in the negotiations. 
148. On the question of what kinds of customs tr eatment should be made publicly available and 
what was meant by "forms of customs treatme nt", the Communities considered procedures for 
temporary admission, warehousing, inward processi ng or differential duty ra tes to be relevant 
examples, depending on the end use of the imported pr oduct.  It was quite legitimate that information 
on those matters was made available to interested parties. 
149. With respect to the question of why customs administrations should make their management 
plans available, the EC was of the view that it was often in those documents that information of real 
interest to the trading community could be found.  Things had to be as transparent as possible. The Communities also held the view that, when speakin g about publishing or making available rules and 
laws in officially-designated media, websites or official gazettes would count. 
150. Questions had also been raised as to what was meant by making information easily available.  
One thing the EC certainly wanted to see was for information to be available on a non-discriminatory 
basis.  Article X's lack of a non-discrimination re quirement as regards the availability of information 
was one of its major problems. 
151. One the other side, the EC had not intended to suggest that a elaboration of Article X should 
include appeals against decisions made by veterinary authorities.  But if India and others believed that  TN/TF/M/3 
 Page 23 
 
 
the scope of Article X should be improved to includ e appeals against the whole range of interventions 
at the border, including those by veterinary authorities, the EC was open to looking at that. 
152. With respect to the meaning of "minor appeal s", examples included appeals in cases of low 
value consignments, imports by i ndividuals, appeals against minor points of law or appeals in cases 
where the duties payable may be fixed below a certain threshold, say € 1,000 or U$1,000, or the like. 
153. On the proposal of governments providing some ki nd of justification for a proposed measure, 
regulation or procedure when consulting with traders or  interested parties, the EC felt that that was a 
completely reasonable idea.  It was very important that, when a government proposed a regulation, law, or procedure, which effected the way traders did business, the rule was not simply picked out of the blue.  There should be some kind of rationale  for it and in inviting comments it seemed natural 
that the justification for the measure should be given up-front.  That would, at the very least, give an 
explanation to the trading community as to why th e measure was being produced, which would lessen 
the risk of friction between the relevant  authorities and the affected traders. 
154. As for the Brazilian observations regarding c onsultation with business or with governments, 
there were two options which might or might not be alternatives.  More important from the EC's point 
of view was that each Member had some form of consultation on a day-to-day basis with the local 
trading community affected by customs operations at the border every day.  Almost any business 
federation around the world would say that transparen cy about applicable rules and fees was first on 
their wish list.  Second came the right to actua lly talk about the rules and fees, and to have 
consultations with governments.  If, in addition, it would be found useful to implement some of the 
concepts that had proven useful in the TBT and SPS Agreements in terms of notification of basic 
legislation to the WTO, or, at the very least, notification of the place where that information could be 
found, that would also be a plus.  The EC agreed with Brazil on the necessity to have some flexibility 
and that it could not be expected that everybody had exactly the same system of consulting with 
business.  In designing the idea and working on it further, it was necessary to find a balance between 
ensuring that each Member found a consultation m echanism that suited its way of operation while 
also being sufficiently clear to ensure changes on the ground. 
155. The rationale for providing for the release of  goods during an appeal procedure in certain 
cases subject to the payment of a bond or surety, w as something the EC wished to explore further. 
The EC did not have very fixed ideas on that but considered the model in the Customs Valuation 
Agreement (CVA) to be a useful one that could be applied to other areas of customs treatment. 
156. Jamaica was right in saying that the EC proposals would not require it to do much more 
domestically.  The way in which Jamaica operated its information points and consulted business was 
exemplary, so that Jamaica already tended to meet virtually all the requirements of the EC proposals.  
157. As for Chile's question about the aspects in wh ich the EC proposal on appeals differed from 
the existing Article X, there were six differences to point out.  First, it introduced it as an absolute 
requirement, which was not the case under Article X so far.  Secondly, the EC proposed that, as a way 
to save money and time, an appeal could be made initially within the same agency at administrative 
level.  Thirdly, the EC suggested that each country  set its own domestic standard time for processing 
mundane appeals.  There should be some kind of normal standard times - not harmonized across the 
WTO, but within each individual administration.  F ourthly, the EC suggested that any costs should be 
commensurate with the costs for providing for an ap peal mechanism.  Fifthly, it was proposed that 
enterprises had the right to be represented at any st age of an appeal procedure by an agent or legal 
representative, which was particularly important for sm all companies.  Finally, the proposal had been 
made for involved goods to be released under ce rtain circumstances with duty payment left in 
abeyance subject to the lodging of a security or guarantee.  None of those proposals were present in 
Article X, and all of them aimed at simplifying and improving the situation for traders on the ground. TN/TF/M/3 
Page 24  
 
158. On Colombia's question of whether one c ould envisage flexibility in the mentioned 
publication proposal, Colombia's suggestion of a st ep-by-step implementation seemed logical as it 
took into account that countries needed to bui ld up capacities in those areas progressively. 
159. As for technical assistance, it was self-evident  that where proposed commitments represented 
a cost, there should be some effort towards assist ance, where necessary.  The EC was already doing 
that with many programmes for partners who had ra ised particular concerns such as Egypt, the 
Philippines and some of the ACP countries. 
160.   The representative of Chinese Taipei
 replied to the enquiries by Chile and Switzerland on 
the suggested one-stop services that  the goal was to set up a one-stop service centre at every clearance 
station to provide a full range of services to the business community, in particular around-the-clock 
services for all express consignments, and for cargoes to be  released to aircrafts or ships.  As for other 
import and export shipments, customs might assign officers to process urgent imports or exports whenever advanced applications were made.  Bu t at the present juncture, Chinese Taipei would only 
recommend that information centres or enquiry point s were set up with the competent officers to 
provide instant responses to enquiries. 
161. The representative of the Unites States
 responded to Chile's questi on of whether the US had 
any specific ideas about the parameters of its prop osal on fees that the United States had merely 
wished to flag the matter for future consideration.  There was no intention to drag the matter into one 
particular direction.  The feeling was that the cu rrent language of the Artic le could be made more 
clear.  It seemed useful to see whether one coul d not develop more certainty for the future. 
162. As for Malaysia's and China's questions on the scope of the proposed advance rulings, the US 
saw a minimum coverage of classification, valua tion and duty drawback application.  The US 
experience with valuation rulings was that it was a valuable asset both for the trading community and 
customs officials to have binding rulings on valuation in advance of trade.  An important focus was on 
whether certain elements should be included, such as royalties, which made up the final valuation.  
Experience had shown that there can be cases of trade proceeding and customs officials then 
disagreeing with the fact that a particular royalty had not been included, with the unpleasant result of 
millions of dollars suddenly being at stake, which w as bad for business, investors and customs.  There 
was therefore merit in having a regime related to customs valuation.  The precise coverage could be 
discussed further as the elements of the proposal were refined.  As for notification, the US shared a 
certain caution in that regard. Costs and benefits had to be considered. 
163. The United States was pleased to hear the EC  recognize the importance of every Member 
having to have appeal procedures that could deliver  rapid results, and looked forward to learning more 
about that.  The US was also pleased with the genera l level of engagement in the current discussions.  
The United States would continue working on the pr oposals and return to them at a later stage. 
164. It was important to undert ake an assessment of the n eeds related to the proposed 
commitments, which should be taken up in a very concrete way.  Members should find a good way of 
both refining the proposals and identifying the needs to implement them. 
165. The representative of Canada  said that, in submitting its proposal, Canada had hoped to assist  
with the identification of developing countries' need s and to better understand their specific situations. 
166. As for the question regarding the possible appli cation of advance rulings  on valuation matters, 
Canada had been silent on that issue in reco gnition of the existing challenges associated with 
implementing disciplines on advance rulings in that area.  Canada had therefore decided to focus on 
advance rulings on tariff classification and applicable du ties.  It was true that valuation rulings were 
often trader-specific and might involve confidentia l information.  But Article X did not require  TN/TF/M/3 
 Page 25 
 
 
Members to disclose confidential information or information that would prevent effective law 
enforcement.  Therefore, those concerns could be addressed in the context of the negotiations. 
167. A second concern had been expressed with rega rd to the ability to implement potential 
disciplines on advance rulings.  In that regard, Canada looked forward to a dialogue with other 
Members on the specifics of their situation.  Canada  would be ready to explore in more detail the 
appropriate S&D treatment.  But for many coun tries, moving towards advance rulings on tariff 
classification would not involve major adjustments, while the benefits of legal certainty and support 
for domestic reform efforts would be significant. 
168. The Chairman  said that, while it seemed that Members had exhausted their discussion on that 
item, the next meeting would offer the opportunity to revert to those matters and discuss them in more 
detail.  The Secretariat would now brief the Gr oup on its contributions for the current meeting. 
169. The representative of the Secretariat  explained that the three papers on the relevant GATT 
Articles were updates of earlier Se cretariat documents on the topic which had originally been drafted 
in response to a request by Members for such doc umentation in 2002.  The current papers had been 
prepared in an effort to keep  the Group abreast of latest developments regarding the regulatory 
framework under consideration in the ne gotiations that occurred since then. 
170. All papers maintained the factual appro ach of the original documents, limiting the 
examination to a legal analysis of the three Articles and their interpretation by GATT and WTO 
panels.  New inputs mostly related to the jurispr udence section, where additional rulings had been 
incorporated that had come up over the course of th e last three years.  Modifications had been made 
on the editing side in an attempt to stream line the structure and enhance readability.   
171. With respect to technical assistance and capacity  building, the Secretariat had prepared a 
paper in response to the questions raised by de legations in that regard, circulated as document 
TN/TF/W/5.  The document addressed three main i ssues: (i) technical assistance activities of the 
WTO Secretariat; (ii) coordination with other releva nt international organizations and (iii) assessing 
needs and priorities. 
172. With respect to technical assistance, the Secr etariat would be providing three-day regional 
workshops on Trade Facilitation in each of the 7 WTO regions as identified in the WTO Technical 
Assistance Plan.  In addition, the Secretariat tried to accommodate ad hoc requests for national 
workshops.  However, its resources were limited, particularly with respect to human resources.  
Therefore, if Members were interested in a na tional workshop on Trade Facilitation as one of their 
technical assistance priorities for 2005, they would have to submit a request, in writing, as soon as 
possible, so that the Secretariat coul d try to work it into its TA Plan. 
173. The second part of the Secretariat paper concer ned coordination with ot her intergovernmental 
organizations as required by paragraph 8 of Annex D.   Paragraph 10 of the paper described the Global 
Facilitation Partnership for Transportation and Trad e (GFP), which was an excellent framework for 
bringing together international organizations a nd government agencies involved in Trade Facilitation, 
including the private sector.  The GFP was the perfect  forum to fulfill the requirement of paragraph 8 
of Annex D.  The next meeting would be in Sept ember, hosted by UNCTAD.  The Secretariat would  
keep delegates informed of any important issues that resulted from that meeting. 
174. The third topic was related to the assessment of needs and priorities.  At the last NG meeting, 
one delegate had suggested the development of a database of problems encountered by customs 
officials.  One way of respond to that proposal was to update WTO document G/C/W/393.  But 
clearly, the usefulness of the end result would de pend on the quantity and qu ality of inputs that 
Members were prepared to provide.  As to Members' self- assessment of their needs and priorities, the paper described some of the tools currently availabl e that would be useful for that purpose.  One of TN/TF/M/3 
Page 26  
 
them was a self-assessment check-list developed by  the WCO, which the Secretariat intended to use 
in a shortened version in its technical assistance  programs to help Members identify their needs under 
GATT Articles V, VIII, and X.  As those needs w ould become clearer, the Secretariat would refer 
them to the GFP to try to determine how they could best be met. 
175. The Chairman
 said that inputs had also been prepared  by several international organizations 
on their work on the identification of Trade Facilitation needs and priorities. 
176. The representative of the WCO  said that the WCO had produced a Customs Assessment 
Checklist, drawing from the WCO's experience with cu stoms capacity building practices.  It had been 
produced from the WCO's broader customs reform a nd modernization diagnostic tools.  The Checklist 
was an extract from WCO instruments and best pr actices pertinent to GATT Articles V, VIII and X. 
177. The structure of the Checklist followed the prin ciple of the Customs Diagnostic Framework, 
addressing legal aspects, systems and procedures, information technology, cooperation, strategic 
management and resources.  It showed the snapshot of customs in relation to each GATT Article by assisting them to identify difficulties, bottlenecks a nd gaps between its legislation and practices and 
the WCO instruments pertinent to the GATT Articles.   The findings might be a base for a country to 
identify its Trade Facilitation needs and priorities for the negotiations. 
178. Three aspects had to be pointed out.  First, th e tool was designed for customs procedures only 
and it did not cover all formalities and procedures related to importa tion, exportation and transit as 
described in the GATT Articles, while some of th e aspects, notably those related to transparency, 
could apply to other government agencies' trade pr ocedures.  Secondly, the issues enumerated in the 
Checklist were not meant to prejudge the scope of  the WTO negotiations.  After conducting the self-
diagnosis, countries could identify possible implem entation-related difficulties and bottlenecks and 
decide which measures they wanted under what c onditions.  Thirdly, the tool was a living document 
and would be modified as the negotiations progressed. 
179. For conducting the self-assessment using the Ch ecklist, the WCO trained and pooled experts 
for those requesting assistance from the WCO secretar iat.  Aware of the importance of enhancing 
collaborative efforts on Trade Facilitation-related capac ity building, the WCO was ready to work with 
like-minded intergovernmental organizations, le nding agencies and other development partners. 
180. The Chairman
 said that  the Checklist seemed to be a very useful instrument that could offer 
valuable help in Members' efforts to identify their Trade Facilitation needs and priorities.  He 
suggested turning it into a WTO document, to make it  available more widely and allow the Secretariat 
to offer a version in all official WTO languages.  
181. It was so agreed .  
182. The representative of the World Bank  said that paragraphs 4 and 8 of Annex D were most 
relevant for the Bank’s work on Trade Facilitation.   A lot information already existed about the 
content of the negotiating agenda.  Therefore, the area the Bank could most help with related to the 
process rather than its content.  In the short- term, the Bank would offer a process to support the 
Geneva negotiations.  It was also interested in  sharing best practice and information about the 
practical issues of implementation, and in doing research and analysis on the cost of implementation.  In the longer term, the Bank’s interest was in s upporting developing and least-developed countries to 
implement any obligations flowing from the Geneva process. 
183. The Bank’s work on assessing Trade Facilitation n eeds and priorities covered five areas.  
Diagnostic Trade Integration Studies were conducted with the Integrated Framework partners.  12 
countries had already been covered, with 14 more in  the planning stages.  There was also the Trade 
and Transport Facilitation Audit, which had been c onducted in ten countries, with more being in the  TN/TF/M/3 
 Page 27 
 
 
pipeline.  The Bank further participated in Trade Facilitation seminars where interesting information 
about needs and priorities emerged.  It also suppor ted the GFP and developed customs-related projects 
where a lot of information was collected.   
184. While all that was very useful, there were also limitations, due to the fact that the information 
was sometimes not closely enough aligned to the WTO process  and as a result of the time and 
resource requirements of that work.  There was also a long lead time from implementation to 
completion, and the approaches were not dynamic enoug h to allow for feedback in real time.  Other 
constraints related to the complex and technical natu re of the subject matter or the fact that many 
Geneva-based negotiators had no ready access to e xpert advice from their capitals.  Many countries 
had not established appropriate coordination mechanisms in their capitals that were able to respond to 
the questions emerging in Geneva. 
185. To overcome those problems, the World Bank had initiated Trade Facilitation Negotiations 
Support Projects to assist developing and least-d eveloped countries with establishing appropriate 
coordination mechanisms in the form of committees  or task forces in their capitals.  Those bodies 
could provide specialist advice on customs and othe r border-management agencies and identify needs 
and priorities related to specific issues emerging the negotiations.  The Bank would provide assistance 
to create a real time analysis capacity using those committees/task forces to r espond to issues raised 
by Geneva-based negotiators.  To do that, the Bank was providing a non prescriptive tool to give guidance on how to form those committees, what the mandate of such a group should be, what its composition and what the administrative framework supporting it.  Guidance was also offered on how 
to assess cost-benefit implications of any propo sals tabled, how to strengthen the communication 
network between Geneva and the ca pitals and how to create a more formal linkage that allowed 
questions being raised and answered in real time. 
186. The process was hoped to assist Members in participating more effectively in the 
negotiations.  The envisaged coordi nation and liaison mechanism would be vital not only in terms of 
assessing needs and priorities, but also as regards act ual implementation.  The issues had to be looked 
at on a country-by-country basis.  At the same ti me, the information generated through the process, if 
collated on a regional and international level, woul d support the determination of needs and priorities 
in a general sense, allowing donor organizations to target their assistance most effectively. 
187. The Bank was also developing a template for assisting countries to assess both 
implementation costs and benefits of potential commi tments under consideration. It built on already 
existing assessment instruments, including the WCO tool, and the one developed by UNCTAD, which 
were both very useful. The Bank template would look at legal impediments to any issues suggested in 
the negotiations, administrative and/or procedural  changes required to implement them and the 
existing commitments already included in many regi onal trading agreements.  It would also look at 
coordination issues between administrations and mini stries and financial and resource requirements.  
Other areas covered by the tool were training, t echnical assistance and capacity building needs related 
to any particular proposal, time requirements for e ffective implementation, possible sequencing issues 
and benefits for governments and trade.  The t ool would be available by the March meeting.  A 
country would be selected to become a pilot for th at process. The Bank would work together with the 
WCO to run a pilot workshop to demonstrate the effectiveness of the tool, using the WCO's self-
assessment Checklist.  The Bank also secured funding support from the UK DFID to run another five 
or six pilots around the world, conducted with the WCO.  Following those, the Bank would look at 
regional opportunities to use the process.  A pr ocess was under way to identify suitable pilot 
countries.  
188. The representative of UNCTAD
 introduced UNCTAD’s Guidelines to assess Trade 
Facilitation needs and priorities in least-developed c ountries, a preliminary draft of which would be 
ready by the end of February.  TN/TF/M/3 
Page 28  
 
189. Countries often lacked the perception of what Trade Facilitation measures were particularly 
relevant under given local circumstances and what were the costs and benefits of their implementation.  In most cases, a combination of regulatory reforms a nd operational improvements 
would help.  In some other cases, the use of inform ation systems might appear more appropriate.  But 
in all cases, the required measures would not be easy to define and to implement if genuine obstacles 
to trade were not clearly identified. 
190. The UNCTAD Guidelines were based on the be lief that (i) national trade policy priorities 
should be set in order to define Trade Facilitation n eeds, and that (ii) obstacles to the achievement of 
those priorities should then be identified so that  suitable remedial actions could be formulated. 
191. As for content and structure, the tool was b ased on existing expertise and case studies.  It was 
structured in three parts: (i) assess ment of the local trade context, analysing the country’s current trade 
patterns and the most common domestic and internati onal trade and transport routes; (ii) Identification 
of major obstacles to trade, looking at key barri ers and inefficiencies inhibiting national trade policy 
priorities, their direct and indirect effects, the pa rties responsible for the obstacles or inefficiencies 
and the cost of implementing possible remedial acti ons and reforms; and (iii)  Programme formulation, 
covering the design of institutional arrangements for remedial actions, of cohe rent and comprehensive 
trade and transport facilitation programmes as well as the formulation of specific projects to be 
included in the trade and transport facilitati on programmes as part of a national strategy. 
192. The assessment of the local trade context would reveal the “priorities” of the national Trade 
Facilitation programme to improve trade with th e country’s current and foreseen major trading 
partners.  The identification of the obstacles would identify the “needs” in terms of procedural, formal 
or institutional pitfalls to be addressed and overcome.  The formulation of the programme would lead 
to the implementation of coherent so lutions within the national context. 
193. The Guidelines were geared to wards the implementation of existing international standards 
and recommended practices.  Furthermore, whenever  appropriate, they sugg ested the use of other 
available tools or experiences, such as the Trad e Facilitation Audit Methodol ogy developed by the 
World Bank, the customs self assessment tools developed by the WCO, the process currently 
coordinated by the OECD, as well as other valuab le initiatives carried out at the regional level. 
194. Scope and application of the proposed self-assessment embraced a wider range of issues on a 
longer term basis than the WTO negotiating proc ess might require.  In terms of coverage, the 
Guidelines were intended to assess a large spectru m of operational, regulatory, managerial and 
technological obstacles to efficient international trad e and transport.  That went well beyond the more 
limited scope of the three GATT Articles, and of any proposal for their improvement. 
195. In terms of time, the Guidelines aimed at building long-term capacity to design and 
implement national trade and transport facilitati on programmes, based on self-assessed needs and 
priorities.  Once built, the capacity would be appreci ated when time came to implement commitments.  
However, that required time and was not likely to  meet the short or medium term needs of the 
negotiating process.  But even under such circumstan ces, the Guidelines could help to review and, as 
appropriate, clarify and improve rele vant aspects of Articles V, VIII and X.  They could be used to 
examine the merit of any tabled proposal in light  of Members' actual implementation capacities in 
terms of cost, time, human, technical and financia l resources.  They could also contribute to assess the 
required technical assistance and capacity building.  Th ey might also help Members to formulate new, 
additional proposals based on their needs and pr iorities at the national or regional level. 
196. The representative of Switzerland  wondered to what extent the UNCTAD Guidelines were of 
help to identify relevant needs and cover th e gaps between the proposed measures and related 
technical assistance needs, given that they were not likely to meet the short-term needs of the 
negotiations.    TN/TF/M/3 
 Page 29 
 
 
197. The representative of Djibouti  said that UNCTAD had done a great deal of technical 
assistance for developing countries, particularly  for Africa and the LDCs.  Those countries had 
difficulties negotiating WTO rules and needed help, esp ecially in the area of Trade Facilitation, which 
was a new field for them.  Djibouti therefore wondered whether UNCTAD c ould offer some help 
within the framework of the negotiations, bearing in mind its experience and funding possibilities.  
198. The representative of India  said that many developing countries still had a lot of concerns 
about the likely financial implica tions of taking on commitments.  The presented World Bank project 
was a good idea as it allowed countries to get inputs in real time on the implications of the proposals, likely cost implications and how to address th em.  UNCTAD’s self-assessment process helped 
Members identify their obstacles to having an effici ent trade policy and the costs of overcoming them. 
India would be greatly interested in knowing more about UNCTAD’s ideas and tools in that regard. 
199. The representative of the European Communities
 observed that there was now a major 
collaborative effort underway between the key organi zations in the area of Trade Facilitation, notably 
the World Bank, UNCTAD and the WCO.  It was ve ry important that those organizations worked 
together.  That collaborative work had to continue and run in parallel with th e negotiating process.  It 
would be vital when the stage of implementing any outcomes from that process would be reached. 
200. The presentations by the World Bank, UNCTAD and the WCO had shown that their technical 
assistance programmes and their diagnostic tools were  much more comprehensive in their scope and 
coverage than the coverage of th e WTO negotiations.  It was important to keep that in mind.  At a 
later stage in the negotiation process,  when there was more clarity on the proposals, one had to try to 
identify the specific technical assistance needs and pr iorities in respect to the specific suggestions.  If 
linked to the proposals on Articles V, VIII and X, the scope of technical assistance would be easy to 
define and more narrow in scope and ambition th an the more comprehensive approaches unrolled by 
the World Bank and UNCTAD.  The EC hoped to assist in that work at a later stage and to develop a 
clearer correlation between specific proposals on Tr ade Facilitation in the WTO and the specific 
technical assistance needs that particular countries might have to implement them. 
201. When it came to implementing that assistance, it would be carried out within the broader 
framework of the larger scale programmes the Wo rld Bank, UNCTAD, the WCO as well as the EC 
provided.  It would be useful to think how to re late specific proposals emerging from the work in the 
coming months with countries' precise technical as sistance requirements and to invite the World 
Bank, UNCTAD and the WCO in the framework of th eir country programmes to look at the proposals 
and see how they could be addressed in that context.   
202. The representative of Egypt  wondered about the coordina tion between UNCTAD, WCO and 
World Bank in that area, given that both UNCTAD and the WCO had said that their self-assessment tools extended beyond the scope of the WTO negot iations. Egypt wondered whether it was possible 
for the three agencies to coordinate and come up with a single, simple self-assessment tool which 
focused exclusively on the WTO negotiating mandate and its scope, which would be of great help.  
203. The representative of UNCTAD
 said that the idea for the Guidelines had emerged from 
Members’ discussion on Trade Facilitation in th e WTO when observing the difficulties of some 
Members to identify their needs and priorities. UNCTAD had considered working on some tool to 
assist Members in that regard.  UNCTAD's experience had shown that the three GATT Articles alone were not that meaningful to change trade pattern s among countries. Also, at the time of the tool’s 
development, it had not yet been clear what th e negotiations would cover. Therefore, a wider 
approach had been adopted.  That did not mean th at UNCTAD was not trying to work on something 
closely aligned to Members' current work on Trade Facilitation.
 
204. UNCTAD was trying to reduce the scope of its tool  to fit the requirements of the negotiations, 
to provide Members with the necessary political  elements of responding to proposals made. TN/TF/M/3 
Page 30  
 
UNCTAD would also look at the implications of possible commitments and the requirements for developing countries to be able to fulfil th e commitments emerging from the negotiations. 
Collaboration between organizations was vital for the effective delivery of technical assistance both 
during the negotiations and at the implementation stag e.  At the same time, one had to bear in mind 
that different organizations applied different a pproaches and focussed on different elements of the 
package which everybody tried to merge into one joint package thr ough, for instance, the GFP, to 
ensure a maximum of coherence. 
205. The representative of the World Bank
 said that both the UNCTAD and the WCO tool were 
content focused.  The Bank had also content-orient ed tools such as the Integrated Framework, the 
Diagnostic Trade Integration Studies, or the Trad e and Transport Facilitation Audits, designed to 
identify needs and develop solutions on a broad ra nge of trade policy and Trade Facilitation issues. 
206. The tool the Bank was currently proposing was quite different.  It was not content-focused, 
but a process, based on the assumption that the best pe ople to determine the needs, priorities and costs 
already existed in all countries.  There were pe ople on the ground who could answer those questions, 
determine the costs and compare what was being pr oposed within the Trade Facilitation  negotiations 
with what was happening on the ground at home.   The process proposed by the World Bank was 
designed to do just that.  It was very narrow and would only occur as and when proposals were put on 
the table, and would be restricted to that.  It was not a general Trade Facilitation needs and priorities 
identifications tool, but merely one for making such an identification specifically related to the agenda 
items discussed in Geneva.  Unlike other tools, it w ould not look at deep and comprehensive reform 
and analysis but aim at empowering people in capit als to look at the issu es specific to the WTO 
negotiating agenda and offer answers on costs, needs and priorities. 
207. The representative of the WCO  said that the WCO was responsible for improving the content 
of the tools to identify Trade Facilitation needs and priorities in the field of customs.  The WCO's 
Checklist had been developed before knowing what proposals would be made in the WTO 
negotiations.  It therefore used WCO instruments and best practices to fill the gaps, without that being 
intended to prejudge the scope of the negotiations  in any way.  As a living document, it would 
constantly updated to incorporate the devel opments in the negotiations as they emerged. 
208. The representative of the Secretariat  said that technical assistance and capacity building were 
a very important part of the negotiating mandate .  There was the potential to confuse and to 
complicate the matter which was going in exactly th e wrong direction from what was actually needed 
in terms of technical assistance and capacity bu ilding at the moment.  It was necessary to offer 
delegations a relatively simple process, involving Me mbers setting up teams in their capitals from the 
agencies involved in border procedures, customs and other agencies.  Those teams  could undertake the kind of needs assessment di scussed in the Negotiating Group for which various tools were 
available.  They would also back up the negotiators in Geneva. 
209. The Secretariat would assist delegations with  the help of the other intergovernmental 
organizations to set up those teams in capitals.  It would be helpful to discuss that with the African-, 
LDC- and ACP Group, and other interested develo ping countries on a more informal basis and in 
smaller groups.  The importance was to offer a rela tively simple process that could be implemented 
quickly and responded to countries’ need for he lp in the negotiations at the present stage.  
Implementation could come later.  At the moment , the focus should be on the proposals made and on 
capacity building in capitals, so that there was good coordination at the national level and 
communication between capitals and the Geneva pro cess.  The Secretariat would focus its technical 
assistance on that area as a start. 
210. The representative of Djibouti
 agreed with the approach sugg ested by the Secretariat which 
would make it easier for Members to negotiate.  There w as great  need of that expertise.  Djibouti also 
agreed with the intervention by the EC.  The question of how the international organizations could  TN/TF/M/3 
 Page 31 
 
 
assist developing countries and LDCs was very im portant, and there should  be regular contacts 
amongst the various providers of such help.  Cohere nce was key. Unfortunately, it was often lacking, 
leading to duplication of work.  Donors of ten did not know what other donors were doing. 
211. The representative of Bolivia  said that Bolivia's experience in  institutional strengthening and 
customs reform with the support of the World Bank and other organizations had been a positive one, 
leading to an improvement in the trading conditi ons and in implementing tax recommendations.  The 
Secretariat papers were very useful for starting wo rk on the three GATT Articles, especially document 
TN/TF/W/2, which would help  clarify the scope of Article V.  The historical context helped Members 
understand certain restrictive aspects, such as paragra ph 2, calling for free transit "through the routes 
most convenient  for international transit".  That was so mething that could be improved in the 
negotiations.  There were also other clarifications and questions set out in that document that should 
be taken up in the forthcoming meetings to help countries with no direct access to the sea. 
212. The representative of Sri Lanka  stressed the need for the help presented by the participating 
international organizations.  So many proposals were  tabled which were difficult to respond to.  The 
World Bank had come up with a very good idea in that regard that would really help to respond in real 
time and a more focused manner. Sri Lanka looke d forward to seeing the project take off. 
213. The representative of Uganda  said that the main problem in the area of capacity building and 
technical assistance was the coordination between Geneva and the capitals.  Most of the issues 
discussed were very specific.  One had to be on the ground to know them.  Sustained coherence would 
help the negotiating process.  Uganda looked fo rward to seeing such mechanism put in place. 
214. The representative of the OECD  recalled that, at the last meeting of the Negotiating Group, 
the OECD had reported on its ongoing work to asses s the cost of introducing and implementing Trade 
Facilitation measures.  That work was continuing,  with studies of three Asian countries, the 
Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam hoped to be conti nued soon, in cooperation with research institutes 
and universities in that region.  A new additiona l approach had been adopted to involve local 
researchers in the concerned countries so as to build  additional expertise on those areas that could be 
used later in other subjects of interest in the field of Trade Facilitation.  The OECD also continued its 
direct and strong cooperation with the WCO on that i ssue, adding several more countries to the list of 
countries examined, including several African countries. 
215. Contacts had further been established with UNESCAP which had undertaken research on the 
cost of Trade Facilitation measures and on identifying  needs and priorities of countries in the region, 
including those of the business community.  UNESCAP  was trying to establish a research network on 
trade-related issued called "artnet", bringing together  research institutions in the region to gradually 
build up currently lacking expertise and to get invol ved in helping their governments further reflect on 
Trade Facilitation.  At the moment, there were four  research institutions in China, India, Bangladesh 
and Indonesia involved in the process, which were h oped to build up relevant expertise in the area of 
Trade Facilitation by the end of summer 2005. 
216. The representative of UNCTAD  said that there was a new UNCTAD project directly related 
to the WTO negotiations:  the Trade Facilitation Tr ust Fund.  The immediate objective of that Fund 
was to provide assistance to developing countries  and LDCs to (i) incr ease awareness on issues 
related to the clarification and improvement of Ar ticles V, VIII and X; (ii) build their capacity to 
effectively participate in the negotiations and ( iii) build and improve implementation capabilities in 
developing countries.  Particular attention would be paid to landl ocked developing countries and their 
transit problems.  Direct beneficiaries included trad e officials and negotiators in capitals and Geneva 
delegates.  Private sector representatives involved in the provision of trade and transport-related services would benefit as well.  In addition, numerou s other officials in developing countries would 
benefit directly through technical assistance and indirectly through the dissemination of policy 
research and analysis.   TN/TF/M/3 
Page 32  
 
217. Activities proposed under the present work progra mme would involve two main areas:  (i) 
analysis of Trade Facilitation issues, coveri ng advisory services, research on key negotiating 
proposals and the preparation of training material s; and (ii) human resources and institutional 
capacity-building, comprising the organization of  regional workshops/sem inars and Geneva-based 
one day seminars/brainstorming sessions.  The volume of the activities foreseen under that Trust Fund 
would be adjusted in light of resource availability. 
218. The Trust Fund activities were a contribution to  the collaborative effort between relevant 
international organizations calle d for in paragraph 8 of Annex D.  Cooperation and coordination 
would be sought through the mechanism of the GFP.  The Trust Fund was open in nature and conceived as a multidonor trust fund.  All donor countr ies were invited to contribute to it.  UNCTAD 
further hoped that its Commission on Enterprise,  Business facilitation and Development would 
establish a proposed  consultative group on Trade Fac ilitation as an integral part of the Trust Fund 
activities to deepen the dialogue on Trade Facilitation. 
219. The representative of the WCO
 introduced an information note on WCO instruments and 
Articles V, VIII and X, explaining that it endeavoured  to briefly illustrate how the requirements of the 
three Articles were dealt with in  the WCO instruments in the context of customs.  Most of the 
information was extracted from the previous WCO contributions to WTO work in Trade Facilitation 
made in 2002.  The fact that the information note  was limited to customs matters should not be seen 
as an effort to prejudge the scope of the WTO negotia tions, which was for WTO negotiators to decide.   
220. The Negotiating Group took note  of the statements made. 
B. AD HOC ATTENDANCE OF RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS , INCLUDING THE 
IMF,  OECD,  UNCTAD,  WCO  AND THE WORLD BANK, AT THE NEXT MEETING OF THE 
NEGOTIATING GROUP  
221. The Chairman  suggested inviting relevant internati onal organizations, including the IMF, 
OECD, UNCTAD, WCO and the World Bank to atte nd the next meeting of the Negotiating Group on 
an ad hoc  basis, as provided for in the Work Plan.  
222. It was so agreed.  
C. OTHER BUSINESS  
223. The representative of Egypt  suggested a different format of the minutes of the Negotiating 
Group meetings. The minutes prepared so far were quite lengthy, quoting more or less delegations' 
integral interventions.  In other negotiating bodies,  summaries were used instead.  Egypt therefore 
proposed the adoption of a similar summary approach  for the Trade Facilitation meetings and offered 
some suggestions in that regard.  Each dele gation would still have its name put down.  The 
intervention itself would be summarized.  It would be left for each delegation to request the 
Secretariat to have its intervention recorded in its entirety.  But if no so such requests were made, the 
Secretariat should have flexibility to summarize the te xt.  One could not deal with 50 pages each time.  
224. The Chairman  supported the proposal by Egypt. 
225. The representative of Cuba  supported the Egyptian proposal as it facilitated both Members’ 
work and the work of the Secretariat.  At the sa me time, Cuba wished to make the reservation that, 
while statements should be summed when exceedi ng a certain number of sentences or when being 
repetitive, important points should not get lost. It  was important that Members' positions were 
expressed properly, and Cuba wanted to see that reflected in the minutes.  TN/TF/M/3 
 Page 33 
 
 
226. The Chairman  said that it had always been the intention to ensure that important views of 
delegations were reflected and suggested adopting the Egyptian pr oposal, while also taking Cuba's 
points into account.  
227. It was so agreed.  
228. The Chairman  informed that the dates for the next meeting originally indicated on the list 
communicated to Members last November were  no longer available due to a conflicting TNC 
meeting, and suggested to hold the next Ne gotiating Group meeting from 22-24 March instead. 
229. It was so agreed.  
230. The Negotiating Group took note  of the statements made. 
231. The meeting was closed.  
 
__________