WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
28 October 2009 
 (09-5371) 
Committee on Trade and Development 
Aid for Trade  
 
 
 
SECOND GLOBAL REVIEW OF AID FOR TRADE 
 
6 AND 7 JULY 2009 
 
SUMMARY REPORT 
  
 The attached summary report of the Second Global Review of Aid for Trade, which took 
place on 6 and 7 July 2009, is being circul ated to delegations for information. 
 
 
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   WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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SECOND GLOBAL REVIEW OF AID FOR TRADE 
 
6 AND 7 JULY 2009 
 
SUMMARY REPORT 
 
 
I. OPENING ADDRESS ..............................................................................................................5  
II. SESSION 1:  AID FOR TRADE – THE GLOBAL OUTLOOK..........................................5  
III. SESSION 2:  AID FOR TRADE – FROM COMMITMENT TO 
IMPLEMENTATION ..............................................................................................................8  
IV. SESSION 3:  AID FOR TRADE – ASSESSING IMPLEMENTATION...........................21  
V. SESSION 4:  AID FOR TRADE - PRIVATE SECTOR PARTNERSHIP FOR GROWTH......................................................................................................................... .......30
 
VI. SESSION 5:  AID FOR TRADE – MAINSTREAMING TRADE IN NATIONAL  
AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMP ETITIVENESS STRATEGIES.................43  
VII. SESSION 6:  AID FOR TRADE – REGIONAL IMPLEMENTATION 
EXPERIENCES .................................................................................................................... ..54 
A. COMESA-EAC-SADC  NORTH -SOUTH CORRIDOR .................................................................54  
B. GREATER MEKONG DELTA SUB-REGION ..................................................................................58  
C. INFRASTRUCTURE AND INTEGRATION CORRIDORS IN LATIN AMERICA ...................................61  
VIII.  SESSION 7:  AID FOR TRADE – ASSESSI NG IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS .....63  
IX. SESSION 8:  AID FOR TRADE – SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION 
EXPERIENCES .................................................................................................................... ..71 
X. SESSION 9:  AID FOR TRADE – WAY FORWARD........................................................81  
XI. SESSION 10:  AID FOR TRADE – LOOKING AHEAD.................................................109  
 
ANNEX – ANNOTATED AGENDA  ...................... .............................. ............................ ...............113 
  
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  I. OPENING ADDRESS 
1. Opening the Second Global Review of Aid for Trade, Mr. Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General, 
United Nations (UN) , stated that the Review came at a cr itical moment.  The global financial and 
economic crisis was having a severe impact on global tr ade, with a decline of ten per cent predicted in 
2009.   Unless the crisis was reversed, it would unravel the progress that developing countries had 
made over the past two decades in reducing poverty.   
2. Trade had long had tremendous potential as an engine of sustained economic growth and 
development.  Trade also had to be part of effo rts to stimulate recovery.  Mr. Ban Ki-moon recalled 
that the United Nations Conference on the World Fi nancial and Economic Cris is and its Impact on 
Development had urged countries to meet existing pl edges on Aid for Trade.  The United Nations had 
repeatedly stressed Aid for Trade as a crucial component in improving trade competitiveness of 
developing country producers and exporters. 
3. Trade openness alone was not sufficient.   Count ries had first to have in place a competitive 
production base, the necessary infrastructure and lega l frameworks in order to export.   Knowledge 
also played a key role in enabling countries to take  advantage of international rules and opportunities.  
With these steps, as well as reforms to the global trading regime, trade could achieve a great deal. 
4. According to Mr. Ban Ki-moon, the Aid-for-T rade initiative had made good progress in the 
three years since its launch.   The April 20 09 G-20 Summit pledge of US$250 billion for trade 
financing could lead to a significant increase to the US$25 billion that Aid for Trade received in 2007.  
He noted with pleasure that a number of donor countries and agencies were steering aid towards 
policies and strategies that would bring practical c ontent to the Initiative and urged other development 
partners to do the same. 
5. The Secretary-General noted, however, that ma ny developing countries had not benefited, 
even though they received traditional trade-related technical assistance.   To them, Aid for Trade remained a concept rather then a practical reality.  The Second Global Review would help find ways 
to increase Aid for Trade without subtracting from th e volume of official development assistance and 
without creating new debts.  He encouraged the meeting to find ways to make Aid for Trade more 
predictable and easier to access, especially for the poorest countries, but noted that beneficiary 
countries must also do their part. 
6. The United Nations had expertise in trade and development and was well-positioned to 
provide capacity-building, advisory services and analys is to support Aid for Trade.  In conclusion, 
Mr. Ban Ki-moon stated that at this time of pr ofound uncertainty and growing need, the UN looked 
forward to working with partners on the promising, Aid-for-Trade  initiative.   
II. SESSION 1:  AID FOR TRADE – THE GLOBAL OUTLOOK 
7. Mr. Pascal Lamy, Director-General, World Trade Organization (WTO)
, expressed his thanks 
to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon for his opening remarks and noted that his presence sent a very strong signal of commitment from the w hole UN family towards Aid for Trade.   
8. The Director-General noted that much had b een achieved since the launch of the Aid-for-
Trade initiative in 2005.  It had entered a new ph ase and was living up to its promise of moving from 
making trade possible, to making it happen.  In the past 18 months, implementation had been stressed 
in national and regional events, the monitoring frame work had been refined and developing country 
members had shown a much higher degree of engagement.    WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  9. The regional review meetings held in Zamb ia, Jamaica and Cambodia had underlined the 
commitment of partners and donors to cooperate and coordinate in the pursuit of common goals.  
Tangible progress had been made in turning commitments into implementation action. 
10. Secretary General Gurría and his team at the OECD had done an excellent job in putting 
together the flagship report on Aid for Trade.  The 2007 edition had been groundbreaking; the 2009 
version should be prize-winning such was the depth of its analysis and the clarity of its presentation.  
The report painted an up-beat picture of trade being prioritized by partner countries in national development strategies;  of donors offering more a nd better Aid for Trade, of new partners becoming 
engaged in South-South cooperation.  The increases in Aid for Trade had been achieved without 
reducing resources to other development priorities such as health, education or environment.  
11. The Director-General recalled that the global trading environment had worsened dramatically 
since the First Global Review in November 2007.  Global trade growth of six per cent in 2007 had 
been replaced by a projected 10 per cent contraction in  2009.  It was one of the biggest challenges that 
the multilateral trading system had faced since its in ception.  The crisis had a human face.  Poverty 
alleviation targets, notably the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), had become more 
challenging to achieve.  If Aid for Trade was urgent in 2007, it was essential today.  It was the 
investment that would allow many developing prep are to exit the crisis by enhancing their trade 
capacity. 
12. Trade finance had been identified as a major c onstraint during the regional events held in 
2007 prior to the current crisis.  Since then the situ ation had worsened significantly.  In this context, 
the Global Trade Liquidity Program was a very tangi ble answer to address supply-side constraints and 
was in harmony with the mandate given by Minist ers in Hong Kong.  Another key initiative was the 
Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) for least-dev eloped countries (LDCs).  After months of hard 
work by all stakeholders, the Dir ector-General noted that the EIF w as fully operational and that the 
first two projects, for Yemen and Sierra Leone, had been approved for funding.  
13. The G20 process had highlighted the importance of sticking to commitments to scale up aid.  
It had also struck a note of optimism in its reaffi rmation of commitments to meet the MDGs and to 
achieving Official Development Assistance (ODA) pl edges, including commitments on Aid for Trade, 
debt relief, and the Gleneagles commitments, especially  to sub-Saharan Africa.  Collectively, it had to 
be ensured that this commitment did not fade.  This was the reason why the theme for the Global 
Review was "Maintaining Momentum".  The prize was better trade performance on the part of developing countries, and in particular, the LDCs.  This trade performance had, in turn, led to 
economic growth which lifted people out of poverty.  An early and successful completion to the Doha 
Round would enhance market access opportunities fo r the countries that needed it most.  Aid for 
Trade would ensure that these market access opport unities were seized, in particular by the poorest 
Members of the WTO.  A collective objective was to  demonstrate what was known to be true: that 
Aid for Trade was worth doing and worth doing well. 
14. The Director-General made it clear that it was up to Members to make this happen by 
integrating trade into national deve lopment strategies; by living up to aid commitments, and offering 
new ones; by turning commitment into concrete act ion, and by concluding the Doha Round.  Equally 
critical to the success of these efforts, was the role and contribution of the private sector. The 
Director-General noted his interest in articulating a comprehensive strategy to enhance the role of the 
private sector, particularly in developing countries.  In conclusion, the Director-General remarked that 
while WTO was not a development agency and did not aspire to become one, it remained committed 
to playing the role of Aid-for-Trade coordinator.  
15. Mr. Angel Gurría, Secretary-General, Or ganisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) , opened his speech with the proverb: "The  best time to plant a tree is twenty  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  years ago; the second best time is now".  A fruit bearing tree was a fitting metaphor for the benefits 
that countries could reap from outward looking grow th strategies.  Although th e relationships between 
international trade, sustainable economic grow th and poverty reduction was complex, evidence 
strongly suggested that openness was fundamental to  growth.  No country had achieved sustainable 
growth in the long run without the expansion of trade flows.  This was easier said than done.  Low-
income countries often lacked the basic capacity – in terms of policies, institutions or infrastructure – 
to exploit the opportunities that more open markets pr esented to trade out of poverty.  The goal of the 
Aid-for-Trade initiative was to help them develop this capacity.  
16. This challenge was more important than ever in the current context as developing countries 
had been hit hard by the crisis.  Aid for Trade wa s an example of short-term measures with long-term 
impact.  It was the classic double dividend that had been promoted as a good practice to exit the crisis.  
17. Mr. Gurría called the Aid-for-Trade initiative a success.  Since its inception in 2005, partner 
countries had increasingly prioritized trade in their development strategies and donors had responded with additional aid to help them overcome their s upply-side constraints.  OECD and WTO had been 
working together closely to monitor how this was taking shape.  Between 2005 and 2007, Aid-for-
Trade flows had grown by more than 20 per cent in  real terms.  Total new concessional commitments 
had reached more than US$25 billion in 2007.  Funding for global and regional programmes, 
identified as an area which required special attention,  had more than doubled since 2005.  Preliminary 
data for 2008 showed a further increase of Aid-for-T rade flows by around 10 per cent in real terms.  
In November 2008, OECD leaders had endorsed an  "Aid Pledge" and committed to maintain aid 
flows. It was also important to note that Aid-for-Tra de increases were "additiona l" to other aid flows, 
i.e. they did not come at the expense of funding for social programmes, such as health and education.  
18. Non-concessional lending from multilateral a nd regional organizati ons had generated 
US$27 billion in trade-related financing.  In 2007 more than US$52 billion had been committed to 
tackle supply-side constrains in  developing countries. OECD calcula tions showed disbursement rates 
hovering around 90 per cent; meaning that nine  out of 10 commitments actually materialized in aid-
for-trade projects and programmes.  
19. Partner countries were increasingly taking owners hip of the Aid-for-Trade initiative; almost 
90 had participated in the 2009 monitoring exercise, compared to only seven two years ago.  A majority of these countries had assessed that they were mainstreaming trade in their development 
strategies. In the context of the economic crisis , and given the competing claims on limited donor 
resources, this increased engagement by partner countries would help secure continued funding for 
their Aid-for-Trade priorities. 
20. The mirror image of this engagement by part ner countries was that "Aid-for-Trade" was also 
assuming growing importance in donor programmes.  Donors were increasing Aid-for-Trade resources, bolstering in-house expertise and raisi ng awareness among policy-makers and practitioners 
at home and in the field.  Most had met thei r 2005 Hong Kong Aid-for-Trade pledges. And, despite 
the economic crisis, donors had reaffirmed their commitm ents to sustain aid flows.  This interest of 
donors was also evidenced by the participation of 57 bilateral and multilateral donors in the survey, 
compared to 43 the first time. 
21. The second monitoring exercise had put a spotlig ht on a number of positive developments. 
Existing coordination and delivery mechanisms had resu lted in more and better Aid for Trade, i.e. aid 
that was more predictable and sustainable, based on partner priorities, aligned around their systems 
and with more harmonization among donors, including those from the South.  This was a huge 
success. And better still, donors had indicated that th ey expected their Aid-for-Trade allocations to 
continue to grow over the medium term. For that to  happen, it was necessary to continue to build on WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  the progress made. This would depend, critically, on:  (i) linking Aid for Trade to the wider 
development agenda, and (ii) broadening and deepening the Aid-for-Trade dialogue. 
22. Aid for Trade could play an important role in  supporting development goals. It could provide 
immediate economic stimulus and create opportunities for local employment.  But beyond that, Aid 
for Trade could also help developing countries build  capacities that, in turn, could contribute to a 
healthier environment and to fighting poverty. Link ing Aid for Trade to a more inclusive, global 
development agenda required broade ning and deepening the policy dialogue.  Mr. Gurría said that the 
Aid-for-Trade initiative could make a real contribut ion to the common objective of a more inclusive 
and environmentally sustainable world economy.  
23. The Aid-for-Trade country fact sheets containe d in the joint OECD-WTO Aid-for-Trade at a 
Glance 2009 report (hereafter referred to as "Aid-fo r-Trade at a Glance 2009 report") were a first 
effort to reinforce – at the country-by-country le vel – the links between the 'demand', the 'response', 
the outcomes, and the impact of Aid-for-Trade pr ojects and programmes.  The value of these country 
fact sheets lay in creating incentives – through enha nced transparency and accountability – to improve 
the synergies between Aid for Trade and a broade r development agenda.  This, in turn, would 
encourage more and better Aid for Trade.   
24. The OECD would continue to work closely with the WTO to monitor Aid for Trade; to 
collect and synthesize good practices that would help focus Aid for Trade on delivering results; to also design a common evaluation framework to asses s Aid-for-Trade outcomes and impacts in terms 
of trade capacities, poverty reduction and environmental sustainability.  
25. In conclusion, Mr. Gurría said that one should not forget to pick the low-hanging fruit of the 
tree we planted in 2001.  He called for a conclusi on to the Doha Developmen t Agenda which would, 
through increased trade, help raise millions of people out of poverty.  
III. SESSION 2:  AID FOR TRADE – FROM COMMITMENT TO IMPLEMENTATION  
26. Mr. Robert Zoellick, President, World Bank
, stated that the world was in the midst of the 
most serious global financial and economic crisis in  70 years.  Between October 2008 and April 2009, 
Central and Eastern European exports were down 35 per cent, East Asian exports were down 25 per 
cent and Latin American exports down 20 per cent.  The large drops in trade reflected a more 
integrated world where a significant amount of trade was occurring within global supply chains.  Each 
dollar of exports contained more imports than befo re – so contracting cons umption in high-income 
countries had a magnified effect on exports from developing economies.  Even as recovery in output began, the recovery in employment was like ly to lag behind by some 12 to 24 months.  
27. Mr. Zoellick cautioned that the politics of trade would not get easier in the coming months.  
Thus far, instances of protectionism had been a low grade fever rather than a full-blown influenza.  
But the temperature of the fever was rising.  Hi gh-income countries had used subsidies for troubled 
industries, while low-income countries were using se lective increases in border barriers.  These trends 
could easily spin out of control in coming months as unemployment rose, and one country felt 
compelled – "tit-for-tat" – to respond defensively to the policies of another.  The United States' "Buy 
America" provisions were an example that had r eceived attention; as local governments in the United 
States began discriminating in proc urement, Canadian localities started to respond in kind.  Both 
countries suffered.  And China had adopted "Buy Chinese" provisions as part of its Government 
stimulus programme.  Shortly after the European Union had re-imposed subsidies for some dairy 
exports, the United States had followed suit with its  own dairy export subsidies.  Mr. Zoellick warned 
that government leaders needed to recogni ze that they were playing with fire.   WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  28. Protectionism was particularly damaging to de veloping countries, especially to those with 
weak fiscal positions and those that depended h eavily on exports of a small number of products. 
Garments, for example, comprised more than thr ee-quarters of Bangladeshi and Cambodian exports.  
So even when global growth recovered, protecti onist actions that prevented developing countries from 
benefiting from the recovery would protract the su ffering.  This need for restraint against trade 
barriers applied as much to developing as to high- income countries.  South-South trade was becoming 
increasingly important: one-third of Africa’s exports went to developing countries.  
29. Remembering his time as the US Trade Represen tative, Mr. Zoellick opined that it was far 
better to be on "offence" rather than "defence" – to be debating ho w to further open markets rather 
than just beating back protectionist measures.  The successful completion of the Doha Round would 
be the best way to concentrate attention on opening markets.  And there was a good deal on the table 
right now.  From a development perspective, the Doha agreement would provide important disciplines 
on agricultural subsidies that depressed the incom es of poor farmers, lowered tariff peaks that 
protected labour-intensive manufactures, and curt ailed tariff escalation that discouraged value 
addition in developing countries.  There were also benefits to be gained from lower prices for imports 
and more competitive services.  Trade barriers were  defended by those with preferred positions: it was 
those without special influence who were hurt the most.  Key WTO Members needed to step up.  
Leading developed countries had a responsibility to try to solve the remaining problems, but the 
developing world’s engagement was critical too; there was an opportunity to shape the multilateral 
trade architecture for a generation to come.  
30. Turning to the World Bank Group’s Aid-for-Trade  work, he said it had been recognized that 
lower trade barriers and trade agreements needed to  be combined with stronger "hardware" and better 
"software" to boost trade.  The Bank could help wi th the "hardware" of ports and infrastructure and 
with the "software" of clear customs rules, support for logistics chains and standards, trade finance 
and developing a better climate for private business.  The World Bank Group’s total lending and 
investments for trade had doubled from about US$10 billion a year during 2002 to 2005 to an average 
of US$20 billion a year in 2007 and 2008.   
31. The Bank's Aid-for-Trade lending to low- income countries was funded through the 
International Development Association (IDA), which provided grants and no-interest loans for the 79 
poorest countries.  IDA's Aid-for-Trade financing had risen from US$2.4 billion a year from 2002 to 2005, to an average of US$3.9 billion for each of 2007 and 2008.  And the number of projects had 
increased dramatically – to 123 a year.  More than  one-third of this lendi ng was for sub-Saharan 
Africa.  The World Bank Group as a whole had incr eased trade-related lending to middle-income 
countries from an average of US$6.6 billion a year from 2002 to 2005, to an average of US$12.6 billion in 2007 and 2008.  
32. For example, the Bank had launched a US $250 million "Integration and Competitiveness 
Project" in Tunisia.  The project was designed to improve competitiveness by reducing trade costs and 
improving the business climate – including through streamlined border clearance procedures and e-
government.   The Bank Group's private sector arm, th e International Finance Corporation (IFC), had 
added another US$3.4 billion a year in 2007 and 2008 in investments related to trade.  The IFC was particularly focused on building new productive capacity in low-income countries, especially in Africa. "Crowding in" the private sector was goi ng to be essential to keep trade flowing.  
33. Success in Aid for Trade went beyond simple dollar numbers.  Technical assistance, analysis 
of policy options, and sharing learning about what worked for trade might be less quantifiable – but 
just as critical.  For example, countries could benefit from training to upgrade the skill levels of their civil servants, tackle problems of corruption, and set up systems of accountability and performance standards.  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  34. When trade finance had begun to dry up last year, strangling exports and imports around the 
world, the Bank Group had worked together with th e WTO to help to mobilize additional resources.  
Trade credit guarantee coverage was boosted to US $3 billion for developing-country banks, many of 
them in Africa. The US$50 billion Global Trade Li quidity Program (GTLP) had been launched in 
support of trade finance.  Under this programme, for every 40 cents invested by the Bank and its 
public partners, commercial banks  would put up 60 cents more.  
35. Together with the UK, the Netherlands, a nd Sweden, the Bank Group had also launched a 
new Trade Facilitation Facility at the WTO-CO MESA Aid-for-Trade Conference in April.
1  The first 
projects would target areas such as improving th e Chirundu border crossing between Zimbabwe and 
Zambia, creating customs value databases for LDCs in  Southern Africa, and building the capacity of 
the Abidjan-Lagos corridor organization.  
36. The crisis offered an opportunity to develop ne w partnerships – especially with the private 
sector .  Who better to help on trade facilitation than traders?  There were some good examples of 
productive partnerships with the private sector at the global level, notably with  international logistics 
and express companies.  At a recent meeting of the World Bank Group with private investors in 
Africa, there had been agreement to pilot new a pproaches to facilitate tran sit trade on the Abidjan-
Lagos corridor in Nigeria.  
37. The crisis had also revealed the importance of  working with civil society. A good example 
was the Global Trade Alert initiative, a web-based to ol that drew on inputs by trade policy institutes 
from around the world to provide real time information on new trade-distorting measures and barriers.   
38. The crisis provided a political window of opportunity to address long-standing bottlenecks to 
competitiveness.  Through the Bank's Doing Busin ess and Logistics Performance Index awareness 
had been raised of the importance of reform s for trade competitiveness, and especially trade 
facilitation, as well as identifying key bottlenecks.  The payoffs could be large. For one major 
trucking company in Kenya, for example, impr ovements in trade and transport facilitation had 
translated into a 50 per cent incr ease in vehicle utilization – from 8,000 km to 12,000 km per truck per 
month.  
39. In Mr. Zoellick's opinion, the real success of Aid for Trade lay in its results.  In Mali, mango 
growers had seen an increase in the volume of fruit exports to Europe after the Bank Group helped 
improve practices in mango production, quality, a nd commercialization. Rural smallholders were 
reviving abandoned orchards and raising their incom es.  In Morocco, garment exporters had benefited 
from improvements made by the government, w ith the Bank’s support, in trade facilitation, 
transportation, and logistics, which had reduced tran sport times to European markets.  In East Africa, 
most trucks clearing the Malaba border between Ke nya and Uganda now waited three hours instead of 
three days. This was a result of the one-stop border post concept, and modernization and 
interconnectivity of customs systems.  This work also included simplified processes at the Port of 
Mombassa in Kenya and road rehabilitation along th e Northern Corridor. Similar results were being 
seen in other parts of the world: improved comp etitiveness in Mauritius by reducing trade barriers; 
more efficient processing of goods through customs in Laos and Cambodia after a major customs reform project; soaring customs re venues and reduced waiting time for trucks in Afghanistan after a 
Bank project helped modernize major border crossings.  
40. The modern open trading system had been forged out of historic adversity.  The current 
financial crisis which faced the world was also  historic.  For Mr. Zoellick, it was essential 
policymakers continued on the same path of openness.   There were many planks upon which recovery 
would be built – and trade was one of them.  Trade was one of the first sectors to be decimated by 
                                                     
 
1 COMESA-EAC-SADC North-South Corridor Review held in Lusaka, Zambia on 6 and 7 April 2009.  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  contracting consumption in high-income countries.  But it would also be one of the first sectors to 
recover once the global economy picked up steam.  Those countries that position themselves now to take advantage of renewed trade would accelerate out of recession with the fastest momentum.  
41. In conclusion, Mr. Zoellick said that this meant that efforts at promoting Aid for Trade – and 
in keeping markets open during the current global cris is – had assumed a new urgency.  Shared efforts 
to boost Aid for Trade and to help the workers, fa rmers, and consumers engaged in trade would pay 
dividends in expanded opportuni ties, lower poverty, and higher growth.  The World Bank Group 
would work hard to be a partner in this process.   
42. Mr. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Managing Dir ector, International Monetary Fund (IMF)
, began 
his intervention by noting that th e presence of so many eminent persons underlined that trade was not 
a special issue set apart from development and financ ing.  Developing countries had been hard hit by 
the global financial crisis.  In most emerging c ountries, the consequences of what had started almost 
two years ago in the US was only now being felt.  In  low-income countries, the direct financial impact 
had been rather limited, but the downturn in grow th had led to decreasing exports, decreasing foreign 
direct investment (FDI), decreasing price co mmodities and falling remittances.  These spill-over 
effects were threatening to roll back the hard-won ga ins on macro stability made over the last decade.   
43. The IMF was forecasting, together with other in stitutions, that recovery  would probably take 
place in the first semester of 2010.  Forecasts in this  period were even more uncertain than they were 
at other times.  Recovery could only take place providing the right policies were in place, including 
the cleansing of the balance sheets of the banking sect or.  A lot had been done at the beginning of the 
crisis by central banks to provide liquidity, learni ng from the errors of the great depression more than 
70 years ago.  The second line of defense had been  the different stimulus packages which had been 
implemented around the world – where the fiscal room was available to implement such policies.  In 
January, the IMF has asked for a global stimulus of two per cent.  When combined, the various stimuli 
packages added up to this amount, but these amount s were unevenly spread – higher in some 
countries, lower in some others.  Altogether t hough, these stimuli efforts have limited a lot the 
negative effects of the crisis.   
44. The IMF had experience of more than 100 bank ing crises over the last 70 years.  One 
common conclusion across these crises was the fact th at recovery never really commenced until the 
balance sheets of the banks were cleansed.  And this had not been totally done.  It would be unfair to 
say that nothing had been done – a lot had been done – but there was still a lot left to do.  Depending 
on the speed of this cleansing of balance sheets, r ecovery would come sooner or somewhat later.   
45. Trade was not only a consequence of growth, it  was a factor in growth.  That was why 
increasing financing on highly concessional terms in  line with the Gleneagles commitments was 
absolutely essential for emerging and low-income countries.   
46. The IMF provided the macro financial environmen t which made recovery possible.  It had 
improved access to crisis-related facilities and support ed a large range of countries including Haiti, 
Zambia, and Grenada, and had increased the s upport it gave to different countries under the 
exogenous shock facility (e.g. to Ke nya, Senegal, Tanzania, and othe rs).  Doubling the access limits 
for this programme meant more fina ncing for the IMF's membership.   
47. The IMF had also secured a tripling of its lending capacity.  In reply to criticisms that the way 
the IMF leant was too rigid, Mr. Strauss-Kahn ar gued that the IMF had much more flexibility now 
than in the past to consider the real political and hi storical situation of the countries, and not just the 
macroeconomic figures.  This meant streamlining c onditionality, focusing on what was critical and 
not including a lot of other things which might be good for countries, but which had little to do with 
the programme.  Ensuring social safety nets was a case in point, and the IMF was now allowing more WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  spending than before on social programmes, as the mo st vulnerable had been hit hardest by the crisis.  
The issuance of US$250 billion in Special Drawing Ri ghts, as proposed by the G20 and decided at the 
IMF spring meeting, was complete.  For low-income  countries, this meant close to US$20 billion in 
reserves which would help stability.   
48. Mr. Strauss-Kahn was more hopeful than ever that a Doha deal could be done, but cautioned 
Members that it rested on their shoulders.  He added that the conclusion of the Round was not 
sufficient.  Aid for Trade was also needed to lay the bricks for the foundation of a dynamic global 
system.  It was absolutely critical for developing co untries if they wanted to benefit from a return to 
growth. 
49. He cautioned against a new "financial protectionism" whereby countries called back their 
capital from developing countries.  This was a new kind of protectionism which put national 
economies first without consideration for the negativ e impact on other economies.  Mr. Strauss-Kahn 
referred to a number of instances in which major ef forts had been made to recapitalize national banks, 
with strict accompanying instructions to keep this  money at home.  This new kind of protectionism 
was more difficult to fight against, but it involved  the same threats as traditional protectionism with 
similarly negative effects.  In closing, Mr. Stra uss-Kahn assured the meeting of the IMF's continued 
engagement.   
50. Ms. Helen Clark, Administrator, Unite d National Development Programme (UNDP)
, recalled 
that the global recession had come on top of the recent experience of high food and fuel prices. Developing countries were experiencing serious drops in exports, in investment and in remittances. 
Those least responsible for the crisis were also the least able to respond.  Developing countries needed 
more support so that the hard won progress towa rds achieving the MDGs was not reversed.  
51. UNDP had an important role to play in articul ating and supporting a c oherent global response 
to the current global crisis.  The UN had a humanitarian imperative to help countries put in place social protection systems which addressed the needs of those who were vulnerable.  It was also important to support maintenance of the invest ments made in poverty reduction and longer term 
development.  The building blocks for recovery an d renewed growth had to be put in place and the 
capacity of countries to engage in trade was centra l to that endeavour.  International trade was a 
powerful engine for economic growth and for achievi ng the MDGs.  It was imperative that the Doha 
Round of trade negotiations was completed and th at it had a strong development component as had 
been envisaged when it was launched in 2001.  But to take advantage of more open markets, nations 
needed to build capacity, infrastructure, and ins titutional frameworks.  Aid for Trade was a way of 
ensuring that this happened.  
52. The Aid-for-Trade at a Glance 2009 Report cont ained good news.  Commitments had steadily 
increased since the initiative had been launched in 2005 at Hong Kong, reaching US$25 billion in 
2007.  This was encouraging, as were the findings that developing countries were making progress in 
mainstreaming trade in their development strategies and that trade was increasingly the main driver of 
regional integration. 
53. Ms. Clark foresaw two challenges where concerted action was needed, especially by donors. 
Firstly, a robust rate of real growth in Aid for Trad e needed to be sustained.  This had to be truly 
additional, without detracting from aid to the social sector and for other purposes.  ODA pledges already made, including those at the G8 summits, had to be met, if not augmented, to support low- 
income countries through the current crisis.  Th e forthcoming G8 summit had the opportunity to 
follow through on the 2005 Gleneagles Commitments, particularly on aid for African countries.  
Secondly, Aid for Trade to low-income countries was growing faster than that to other income groups 
of nations. While that was to be welcomed, there w as still more scope to target resources so that the  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
 Page 13 
 
 
  poorest countries received the most Aid for Trade – and so reducing the current concentration of 
assistance.  
54. UNDP was strongly committed to the Aid-for-Trade initiative, and to the Enhanced Integrated 
Framework Initiative for Least Developed Countries.  Both were important in building more inclusive 
and fair globalization which e xpanded opportunities for all.  UNDP’s trade-related support 
emphasized interventions in three main areas:  (i ) assistance to partner countries on mainstreaming 
trade into national development and poverty reduction strategies;  (ii) capacity support to negotiate 
trade agreements which prioritized human deve lopment outcomes; and (iii) capacity support to 
enhance countries’ competitiveness and to ease suppl y side constraints.  Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, and Uzbekistan were examples of countries where UNDP had supported trade needs 
assessments – an essential first step in establishing na tional priorities for Aid-for-Trade support.  In 
response to demand from the Central Asian countri es for a regional initiative, this support was now 
being extended to Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Tajikista n, and Turkmenistan, and also to the Southern 
African Customs Union and its member states.  In middle-income countries, such as Syria, UNDP had 
provided support to governments for WTO pre-accession processes. 
55. UNDP also fostered South-South cooperation on tr ade, and was helping to share experiences 
and expertise on Aid for Trade.  In this respect, UNDP had coordinated the preparation of a guide on 
best practice for trade needs assessments.  UNDP’s work  on trade was a vital part of its effort to help 
countries reduce poverty and achieve the MDGs.  In these challenging times, it was imperative that there was greater support for enhancing countries’ capacity to grow through trade and for laying the 
basis for long-term and sustainable development.  The Aid-for-Trade initiativ e was an excellent way 
of helping to make that happen, and Ms. Clark str essed that UNDP was pleased to be a partner in the 
initiative. 
56. Mr. Donald Kaberuka, President, African Development Bank (AfDB)
, began his intervention 
by noting that at the start of the current economic crisis there was an optimistic, perhaps naïve, view 
that Africa would not be affected.  The reality was that the crisis had come sooner, was deeper and 
could last longer in Africa than anyone had expect ed.  The crisis had been transmitted to African 
economies through trade, or more specifically, the commodities channel.  Those economies most 
dependent on commodities ha d suffered the most.   
57. Projections suggested that African growth w ould be cut to three per cent by the current 
economic downturn, but this average hid a more co mplicated reality.  About a dozen countries were 
still holding out and growing at about five per cent.  Another dozen or so were showing surprising 
resilience and holding growth at around three per cen t, but there was a group of countries, about 26 in 
total, who were causing lot of concern.  Aid for Tr ade was more critical than ever before, as in the 
same way that Africa had been affected faster, so its recovery would be slower once the world economy returned to growth.   
58. Mr. Kaberuka informed the meeting that the Af DB was launching an initiative to look at 
Africa's port capabilities, examining the delays, e xplaining their causes and examining options to 
ensure that port capacity was maximized.  A lot of progress had been made in mainstreaming trade into national plans.  One example was the nu mber of countries which had now allowed 24-hour 
border opening.  In the past, many border delays  were caused by frequent border closures.   
59. The AfDB had increased almost three-fold its support for regional programmes, mainly trade-
related infrastructure, building the capacity of re gional economic organizations  and relevant regional 
public goods.  Experience had shown that interna tional aid allocation was essentially national and 
performance-based.  There was a vi ew, which Mr. Kaberuka thought was misleading, that regional 
programmes provided large free riding problems.  Th is view constrained AfDB capacity to increase 
support for regional programmes.  It created  an unnecessary competition between national and WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 14  
 
  regional resources.  Mr. Kaberuka felt this issu e needed to be tackled head-on.  The African 
Development Bank committed about 20 per cent of its  resources to regional programmes.  This was 
not enough.  Mr. Kaberuka noted he would like to be able to do more for regional programmes, not 
least because they reinforced national programmes.   
60. Another lesson learnt was with respect to the capacity of regional economic organizations.  
Mr. Kaberuka opined that the best way to build th e capacity of these institutions was not to bypass 
them but to work with them and build capacity over time.  There was no alternative to these 
organizations.  AfDB was working on regional infrast ructure, for example a 250 kilometre highway in 
the East African community, a major portion of the trans-African highway between Nigeria and Cameroon, and another US$250 million programme be tween Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique.  All 
these programmes underlined the need for stronger, regional ownership of these programmes.  This 
could only come about through increasing collabor ation with, and between, the regional economic 
communities (RECs). 
61. During the structural adjustment years, many  services critical to African trade had been 
privatized.  For the railway networks, this strategy  had not worked.  The railways were in a ruinous 
state.  The time had come to re-examine this issu e as railways were an ideal mode of transport for 
bulky, raw materials.  In collaboration with the Wo rld Bank and other institutions, the AfDB would be 
re-examining the issue of railway concessioning – a huge impediment to the trade performance of the 
continent  
62. Turning to commodity dependence, Mr. Kaberuka noted that if one looked at East Africa over 
the last five years, economic fortunes had fluctuat ed depending on the cycle of commodities.  Over 
the last decade good growth had been experien ced on the back of strong commodity demand and 
because of increased regional trade in both  recorded and unrecorded trade.    
63. On trade finance, Mr. Kaberuka recalled that, at the onset of the current crisis, the AfDB had 
been of the view that it was a development institu tion whose role was long-term project finance.  
Trade finance had not been considered  part of its mission.  But providing trade finance had become an 
emergency and so AfDB had put in place a US$1 bil lion trade finance facility.  AfDB was joining the 
International Finance Corporation in the Globa l Trade Liquidity Program and contributing US$500 
million dollars.  Another half a b illion dollars was being put at the disposal of African finance 
institutions and sub-regional organizations.   
64. Mr. Kaberuka noted the outcomes of the London G 20 summit, but stated that it was clear that 
the next G20 would have to look again at the issu e of low-income countries.  Their issues would not 
go away quickly.  He felt it important that a new look was taken at what low-income countries were 
doing to build up their own potential.   
65. In closing, Mr. Kaberuka noted his optimism about  Africa's development.  If the crisis had 
come 20 years ago, the consequences for the con tinent would have been far more serious.  In 
Mr. Kaberuka's view, the reforms initiated over the last 15 years had produced a continent which was 
much more resilient, and better able resist external  shocks.  In contrast to richer countries which 
where putting up financial and other barriers, African countries had actually accelerated their pace of reforms throughout this crisis. 
66. Mr. Haruhiko Kuroda, President, Asian Development Bank (AsDB)
, recalled that the AsDB 
had been active in Aid for Trade since 2006, as a member of the WTO Advisory Group, and as co-
host for Regional Review Meetings in Manila in  September 2007 and in Siem Reap, Cambodia in 
May 2009.  The AsDB also served as the secretariat of the Regional Technical Group for the region.   WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
 Page 15 
 
 
  67. Recent meetings had underlined three key point s for making Aid for Trade more effective. 
The first was that regional approaches that supporte d national development st rategies were best for 
multiplying the benefits of Aid for Trade.  Sec ond, establishing cross-border economic corridors lay 
at the heart of successful Aid-for-Trade programmes.  And third, building stro ng partnerships between 
governments, the private sector, and the donor community ensured the sustainability of benefits.  
68. The Asia and Pacific region had prospered i mmensely through export-led growth over the 
past four decades.  Many countries though still con tinued to experience lagging growth and severe 
poverty.  The AsDB estimated that as many as 900  million people in developing Asia lived on less 
than US$1.25 per day.  And even within more pr osperous countries, rich and poor regions existed 
side-by-side, making the two faces of Asia a st riking reality.  The global economic crisis had 
exacerbated the situation.  With a precipitous drop in the region’s exports, aggregate Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) growth in developing Asia was forec ast to decline from 6.3 per cent in 2008 to around 
3.4 per cent this year.  While the region was expected to recover to a 6 per cent aggregate growth in 2010, with a gradual pick up in external demand,  lower income countries and small states would 
probably still lag behind and rising poverty was a major concern.  
69. Rebalancing growth toward greater domestic a nd regional demand was an important key to 
the region's recovery.  This would foster increased intraregional trade, help the region recover faster 
and strengthen Asia's approach to open regionalis m.  It was critically important, however, that 
countries refrain from taking protectionist measures.   In the wake of falling demand and job losses, 
protectionist pressures were rising, largely due to  the influence of political lobbies in declining 
sectors.  Some countries appeared to be resorting to  traditional forms of protection such as tariffs and 
subsidies, while others were using more subtle  measures, particularly sanitary and phytosanitary 
(SPS) measures, anti-dumping measures, and even so- called "green protectionism".  To counter this, 
the Asia and the Pacific region needed to keep ma rkets open, cooperate regionally, train workers and 
develop safety nets.   
70. Aid for Trade was vital for economic recovery and for long-term development and structural 
change.  There was no "one-size-fits-all" approach  to Aid-for-Trade projects.  However, AsDB's 
experience suggested that project assistance yielded la rge returns.  Of course this was best where 
political will and effective donor coordination combin ed.  Indeed, these were the core lessons that 
flowed from more than 15 years supporting the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) programme.  Under the GMS programme, Cambodia, China, La o People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), 
Myanmar, Thailand and Viet Nam had come toge ther to promote development through closer 
economic linkages.  Substantial progress has been ma de since the programme be gan in 1992.  As of 
the end of 2008, 41 GMS projects had been implem ented costing an estimated US$11 billion of which 
AsDB has extended loans worth US$3.8 billio n and co-financing worth US$4 billion.   
71. The GMS north-south corridor, which linked Chin a and Thailand though Lao PDR, illustrated 
what could be achieved.  In 1997, it took three da ys for goods to move across one 270 km section of 
dirt track along the corridor in Lao PDR.  Today that  same trip took four hours, with a large increase 
in commercial traffic, thanks to a US$90 million project – funded by China, Thailand, and AsDB. 
Most importantly, last year’s per capita GDP in one of the poorest provinces in Lao PDR rose sharply.   
72. The GMS countries' share of trade among themse lves rose sharply over  the past decade.  
GMS initiatives had brought rapid expansion to corri dor projects.  Critically, the GMS transport and 
trade facilitation programme had already created a de monstration effect and was being replicated in 
other sub-regions around developing Asia, such  as in the more recent Central Asia Regional 
Economic Cooperation (CAREC) initiative.  As the re gion's development bank, AsDB was the natural 
catalytic agent for helping to mobilize and channel Aid-for-Trade effectively.  This could be done 
initially in three ways: first, thr ough increased lending for trade-relate d infrastructure at regional, sub-
regional and national levels; second, by  helping to coordinate the many  participants in Aid for Trade WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 16  
 
  as secretariat for the newly created Regional Tech nical Group, co-chaired by Cambodia and Japan; 
and third, by sharing cross-border experience a nd technical expertise on Aid-for-Trade activities 
through policy dialogues and studies.  In conclusion,  Mr. Kuroda looked forward to collaborating with 
global and regional development part ners in carrying forward the Aid -for-Trade initiative in Asia and 
the Pacific.  
73. Mr. Thomas Mirow, President, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
,  
expressed his strong support for the Aid-for-Trade in itiative.  EBRD had been established in 1991 to 
promote the transition of the former centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe 
towards market based economies.  One of the key challenges had been the n eed to integrate these 
economies into international mark ets so that they could fully benefit from skills, know-how and 
technological transfer that were  associated with trade.  
74. Transition countries had overwhelmingly endor sed trade openness and many were now 
members of the WTO.  Mr. Mirow cautioned that th e significance of the institutional reforms and 
changes these countries had made should not be  underestimated.  Even countries in the CIS 
(Commonwealth of Independent States) yet to become WTO members had become more open to 
international trade by most standards.  Average ta riff rates in transition countries were only 4.5 per 
cent in 2007 – much lower than the average of 8.7 per cent for middle income countries – and their 
trade to GDP ratio had exceeded 110 per cent in 2008.  
75. Rapid WTO accession by Russia and several other countries in the CIS region remained a 
crucial target that should not be allowed to slip.  WTO membership conveyed a stability and 
predictability to global economic relations for wh ich there was no substitute, and it helped anchor 
domestic reforms.  The formation of a customs uni on between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan could 
be beneficial, but Mr. Mirow cautioned that it should not become a distraction from WTO entry 
negotiations.  Equally, he appealed  to negotiators on all sides to  show the necessary flexibility by 
keeping their eyes on the larger goal. 
76. As a project-based institution with a mandate to  work with the private sector, EBRD provided 
support through trade finance, investment in cro ss-border trade infrastructure, and finance and 
technical support to enterprises to help them explore new foreign markets and improve product 
quality.  The economic downturn had reminded EBRD that market frameworks and institutions were 
vulnerable to changing global pressures.  EBRD ex pected its region’s economies to suffer a major 
contraction in growth in 2009, with  output falling back to 2006 levels .  Similarly, it expected trade 
volumes to decline sharply.  Recovery was only likely during 2010, and even then it was expected to 
be halting.  International capital flows would remain far more modest than in the recent past.  Support 
for trade by public institutions had become even mo re important.  Like othe r International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs), the EBRD had responded with a rapid crisis r esponse programme.  EBRD's lending 
and investment volumes in 2009 were expected to  increase beyond €7 billion, up from €5.1 billion in 
2008.   
77. Mr. Mirow strongly welcomed Director-General Lamy’s commitment to systematically 
monitor and mobilize trade finance.  Trade finan ce had become scarce and, where it was available, 
more expensive.  This was both because of global liquidity shortages and a general re-assessment of 
counterparty risk concerning trade finance under the Basle II requirements.  In turn, this may have 
further exacerbated the contraction in trade.  Dr awing on its close working relationships with local 
financial institutions, the EBRD had developed a tr ade financing programme that promoted trade by 
overcoming trade credit counter-party risks between banks.  Since its launch ten years ago, the EBRD 
had supported over 8,000 transactions worth €5 billion through its Trade Facilitation Programme 
(TFP).  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
 Page 17 
 
 
  78. In response to crisis needs in the region, in 2009, EBRD had nearly doubled the annual limit 
of the TFP programme from €800 million to €1.5 billi on.  However, a surprising decline in demand 
for trade finance had occurred during the first five months of 2009.  Mr. Mirow believed this partly 
reflected declining trade volumes but also a pers istent reluctance by commercial banks to take 
additional trade finance risks on their clients.  This was of particular concern as there was a clear limit 
to the extent to which IFIs, including EBRD, c ould replace commercial bank trade finance – which 
totaled an estimated US$600 billion in  2008 in the EBRD region alone.  
79. In this context, efforts to stabilize the financia l sector were of the utmost importance.  In 
cooperation with other IFIs and governments, EB RD had developed an in itiative which supported 
bank balance sheets in its countries of operation.  Unde r this initiative, a target of some € 3 billion in 
equity and debt finance in 2009 had already been approved by the EBRD.  
80. In the medium- to long-term, as growth resumed, the extent of challenges to address supply 
and infrastructure constraints to trade was likely to differ across the region.  Landlocked countries in 
Central Asia would continue to require special attention in terms of overcoming their natural 
geographical disadvantages.  In this context, EBRD fully supported the on-going regional Aid-for-
Trade needs assessment for SPECA countries (Cen tral Asian countries plus Azerbaijan and 
Afghanistan) and the implementation of regional tran sport and electricity infrastructure projects in 
cooperation with other IFIs  and bilateral donors.  
81. The general investment climate was also important  in the Aid-for-Trade discussion.  In many 
EBRD countries, costs of trade were magnified by high levels of unofficial payments to customs 
officials.  EBRD regularly monitored the inv estment climate through business surveys undertaken 
jointly with the World Bank, the results of which co uld also be integrated into the monitoring of Aid 
for Trade.   He noted his belief that the Aid-fo r-Trade initiative would benefit from more engagement 
with the private sector, both in the context of national or regional review s and in monitoring its 
effectiveness going forward.  In closing Mr. Mirow assured participants that  EBRD was committed to 
playing its part in the common effort to promote Aid for Trade. 
82. Mr. Luis Alberto Moreno, President, Inter-American Development Bank (IaDB) , noted that 
the Second Global Review of Aid for Trade represente d an important milestone to take stock of the 
gains made since 2007.  The IaDB was very proud to be a partner of this initiative.  Latin America 
and the Caribbean, together with the IaDB, ha d endorsed and supported this initiative since its 
inception as they understood the power of trade to change societies and the region.  The Bank was committed to this objective and had invested in pr omoting the Aid-for-Trade initiative in its region 
through a range of projects and initiatives:  suppor ting countries in the negotiation, implementation 
and administration of trade agreements;  strengthe ning trade and investment promoting institutions;  
fostering private sector development for trade, in particular for small and vulnerable economies 
(SMEs);  and Enhancing economic competitiven ess and regional economic integration.  
83. Political will to further bring down trade cost s and trade barriers was needed to accompany 
these efforts.  No time was more appropriate than th is time of turbulence to boost this commitment.  
The global economic downturn had already accent uated the importance of trade and economic 
integration as engines of growth and development.  Global trade was the best "antidote" to economic 
turbulence and the best "stimulus package" for nationa l economies to get back to their growth paths.  
84. The impact of the current crisis in Latin America and the Caribbean had largely been 
channeled through the slowdown of global trade, in pa rticular affecting those countries that were more 
trade dependent.  The  region had been better prepared  to face this crisis, with greater reserves, sound 
policies and a solid macroeconomic framework.  Howe ver, the continuing contraction of exports, the 
widening of fiscal gaps and the increasing difficulties in  the access to finance, were all contributing 
factors to the economic difficulties of the region.  Trade had to continue to flow and expand. WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 18  
 
  Protectionism as a policy reaction to the crisis would be a great error.  The lesson of history was very 
clear on this point.  
85. The case of Latin American and the Caribbean illustrated how trade integration had been the 
main driver not only for fostering development and growth, but also political cooperation and regional 
integration.  The commitment of the region to mu ltilateral trade had been complemented by more than 
30 comprehensive free trade agreements (FTAs) from intra-regional partnerships to free trade 
alliances with other regions and countries around th e world.  They had opened new markets to 
channel the energy of the private sector.  They  had boosted competitiveness and innovation for the 
region delivering new economic opportunities.  Most im portantly, they had contributed to raise people 
out of poverty.  
86. But much more had to be done. Trade had b een liberalized and markets opened at an 
unprecedented speed in the past 20 years, but major ch allenges were still being faced.  First, the "soft" 
costs of trading:  the region had to address the in creasing complexity of a trading system dominated 
by the proliferation of overlapping and complex ru les.  These could impose undue transaction costs on 
traders, investors and customs officials.  A rece nt survey conducted by the IaDB revealed that 
companies in the region would receive important gains from the harmonization of rules across 
regional agreements, in particular in areas such as rul es of origin, standards, customs procedures, etc.  
87. Second, the "hard" costs of trading:  the region had to focus its attention on transport costs 
and logistics.  The IaDB estimated that the aver age ocean export freight rate from Latin America to 
the US market was almost 50 pe r cent higher than exporting the same good from Europe, controlling 
all relevant factors such as distance.  Similarly, the impact of a 10 percent reduction in the freight 
rates would increase the volume of trade by a factor of 20 times higher than a similar reduction in 
tariffs.  In particular, cross-border interventions  offered an important opportunity for reducing 
logistical costs.  It was estimated that delays in  customs clearance in Latin America and the Caribbean 
increased transport costs by between five and 15 percent.   
88. Third, the "information" costs of trading: The region had an urgent need to modernize some 
of its institutional trade architecture for export prom otion and investment attraction.  A forthcoming 
report by the IaDB, to be released in the autu mn, showed the critical role that modern export 
promotion agencies could play in fostering commer ce.  They could support the private sector (in 
particular SMEs) to navigate the difficult path to become an exporter for the first time or to discover 
new niches and markets.  
89. The Aid-for-Trade initiative was a key platform to move this agenda forward.  And it was 
already yielding results.  The national and regional Aid-for-Trade Reviews organized by the IaDB in 
collaboration with the WTO in Latin America and the Caribbean
2 had shown that countries in the 
region were mainstreaming the Aid-for-Trade princi ples into their national and regional development 
strategies.  Mr. Moreno was particularly pleased to report that the private sector had played a major role in the Aid-for-Trade dialogue, as he had seen  in the Regional Review held in Jamaica.  
90. The IaDB was committed to supporting nationa l development strategies as well as region-
wide initiatives conducive to a success ful trade integration agenda.  Mr. Moreno highlighted three 
areas that he considered of importance and which IaDB was supporting in the context of its Aid-for-
Trade strategy.   
                                                     
 
2 National Review held in Lima, Peru on 3 March 2009;  National Review held in San Pedro Sula, 
Honduras on 4 May 2009;  and Latin America and Caribbean Regional Review held in Montego Bay, Jamaica 
on 7 and 8 May 2009.  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
 Page 19 
 
 
  91. First, continued support for both "soft" and "hard" regional infrastructure to ensure efficient 
trade and economic integration was essential.  IaDB had implemen ted a wide range of programmes 
on, inter alia , trade facilitation, trade logistics, cust oms modernization, transport corridors, 
harmonization of regulatory standards and norms.  The recent IaDB project " International Goods 
Transit System ", in the context of the Mesoamerican Proj ect, was an example of how delays at border 
crossings could be reduced, saving companies and consumers time and money. The average time to 
cross the border had been reduced from more than one  hour to just eight minutes on average.  Similar 
trade facilitation projects were being implem ented in South America and the Caribbean. 
92. Second, continuous strengthening of trade ins titutions to promote trade and investment, 
supporting the engagement of the region's private sector into the global market was needed.  The 
IaDB had implemented innovative programmes, in cluding, for example, for export promotion, 
attraction of foreign investment, private sector deve lopment (in particular assistance to SMEs), export 
clusters, and trade finance.  Restoring trade finance was crucial in the present crisis.  The IaDB had responded swiftly by expanding its Trade Finance F acilitation Program to US$1 billion.  A new IaDB 
programme named " Export Plus" would allow small- and medium-ent erprises to take advantage of 
enhanced market access through capac ity building in the area of certification of standards, marketing, 
and management of trade logistics. 
93. Third, new resources had to be mobilized a nd innovative partnerships promoted, including 
through a new "Aid-for-Trade Strategic Fund" which had been approved the previous year.  The Aid-
for-Trade Fund would enable IaDB to meet the gr owing demand and needs of our region.  Some 
donors had already expressed their interest and commi tment to this Fund, notably from the UK.  The 
Aid-for-Trade Fund would be an opportunity to deepen, enhance, and break new ground in regional 
cooperation.  The IaDB was committed to this  objective, and was currently exploring new 
mechanisms to create incentives for enhancing South-South cooperation. 
94. While initiatives such as Aid for Trade were critical, Mr. Moreno also believed that the 
protection of the multilateral trading system was paramount.  The conclusion of the Doha Round was 
imperative for the Latin American and Caribbean regi on and the future of the world trading system.  
Scaling up initiatives on all of these fronts required s ubstantial investment, and this was where the 
role of the Bank became relevant, working togeth er with other organizations and the public and 
private sectors.  In these times of economic crisis and uncertainty, trade needed to become a major 
anchor for growth and development.  It called for reinforced trade and integration efforts.  
95. Mr. Moreno strongly believed the Aid-for-Trade in itiative was now more relevant than ever.  
He invited everyone to continue working together on this shared path with energy and resolve to 
promoting solid growth and sustainable development through trade. 
96. Mr. Waleed Al-Wohaib, Chief Executive Offi cer, International Islamic Trade Finance 
Corporation (ITFC) , recalled that the global economy was in d eep recession.  Food, fuel and financial 
crises had hit the world hard, especially the poor coun tries.  World trade was projected to contract by 
nine per cent.  In order  to mitigate adverse impacts, the flow of goods and services had to be kept 
moving within and across regions.  No country or region in the world had grown successfully without 
large expansion of its trade.   
97. Trade had very special importance for the Is lamic Development Bank (IDB) Group and its 56 
member countries due to its critical role in pove rty reduction, growth and development.  The 
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) had set a target to increase intra-OIC trade volumes 
from 15 per cent in 2005 to 20 per cent by 2015.  In  order to meet this challenge, the IDB Group had 
taken a number of strategic initiatives, in additi on to establishing the International Islamic Trade 
Finance Corporation in 2006.  A strategy with a road map for enhancing intra-OIC trade had been 
adopted in 2008.  It had five major business lines: tr ade financing, trade promotion, trade facilitation, WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 20  
 
  capacity building, and developing strategic commodities.   This strategy would help achieve or even 
exceed the 20 per cent target.  Intra-OIC trade had risen from around 14 per cent in 2004 to around 
17 per cent in 2007 (from US$333 billion in  2004 to around US$421 billion in 2007). 
98. IDB had been a pioneer among the multilateral de velopment banks on trade financing.  The 
Bank had made tremendous contributions and innovations in Is lamic financing and had offered a 
viable model in this area.  Various Islamic financ ial products such as Murabaha and Ijara, were asset-
backed and were well suited for many markets.  To date, the Group’s trade financing amounted to 
US$34 billion or close to 60 per cent of the Group’s lending volume.  In 2008, ITFC trade financing 
was worth US$2.5 billion, of which 44 per cent had been allocated to the least-developed member 
countries.  Under its trade coope ration and promotion programme, I TFC had supported more than 72 
projects for trade promotion, capacity building an d trade facilitation in 36 member countries.   
99. The IDB Group had enhanced the scope of trade transactions among member countries 
through the Islamic Corporation for the Insurance of Investment and Export Credit  that provided the 
Shari’ah compliant export credit and re-insurance fa cilities to exporters, banks, trade financiers and 
export credit agencies.  
100. The IDB Group played a special role in the development of the private sector through 
ordinary operations and through the Islamic Cor poration for Development (ICD) which provided a 
variety of financial products such as direct financing through equity pa rticipation, lines of financing to 
commercial banks and nationa l development financing institutions, short-term corporate finance, asset 
management, structured financing, and advisory services to public and private companies. In 2008, 
ICD had approved US$347 million for 33 private sect or operations.  Overall, ICD had financed 132 
projects in 28 member countries with assistance of over US$1 billion dollars. 
101. Development of trade-related infrastructure, pa rticularly for transport, communication and 
energy, was at the heart of the Bank’s assistance to  its member countries.  The Bank had financed 
more than 2,000 infrastructure and related operatio ns worth US$17.5 billion.  Examples included the 
East West (Trans-Sahelien) and North South (Tra ns Saharan) corridors and regional roads between 
Mauritania and Mali, and Djibouti and Somalia. 
102. The Bank gave special importance and atten tion to productive capacity development through 
South-South cooperation.  Over the past years, th e Bank had created many success stories in capacity 
development.  The ITFC had won the prestigious Euromoney Trade Finance Deal of the Year Award 
in 2008 for its financing operations in the cotton sect or in Côte d'Ivoire.  In 2008, ITFC had supported 
the cotton sector with US$121 million for operations mo stly in sub-Saharan Africa.  IDB was actively 
supporting the food sector.  For example, in respon se to the food crisis, the IDB Group had pledged a 
five-year assistance package of US$1.5 billion through its Jeddah Declaration Initiative on Food Security adopted in 2008. The initiative supported me mber countries, particularly the least-developed 
ones, in strengthening their food security and revitalizing their agricu lture sector.  Assistance included 
US$250 million for financing trade in agricultural inputs and US$200 million for trade and private 
sector development.  Under the Initiative, sin ce June 2008, the Bank had approved US$442 million 
including US$52 million by the ITFC, representing over 29 per cent of the total pledged amount.  
103. The IDB Group’s new Vision 2020 – called A Vision for Human Dignity – and the Group’s 
new thematic strategy for 2009-2011 prioritized fi ve key areas for poverty reduction, with business 
and trade development as core elements:  (i) Comp rehensive human development;  (ii) Infrastructure 
development with emphasis on transport, energy and information and communication technology;  
(iii) Regional economic cooperation and integration;  (iv) Productive capacity development, and (v) 
Private sector development.  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
 Page 21 
 
 
  104. In 2009, as part of its response to assist member  countries address the challenges of the global 
financial crisis, the IDB Group was scaling-up its oper ations by increasing its annual growth rate from 
15 per cent to 30 per cent, resulting in an add itional US$2.5 billion over th e period 2009-2011.  
105. ITFC was offering its full support to the prepar ation of the Aid-for-Trade Roadmap for the 
United Nations Special Program for the Economie s of Central Asia and Afghanistan (SPECA) 
Region.  A preparatory meeting had been held in  Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic  in March 2009 which had 
agreed to articulate regional and national prioriti es on Aid for Trade with special reference to the 
challenges and prospects during and after the global fi nancial crisis.  In 2010, ITFC was planning to 
organize an Expert Meeting in Bishkek, Kyrgyz  Republic, and a Ministerial Meeting in Baku, 
Azerbaijan, in support of the Aid-for-Trade Roadmap for the SPECA Region.  
106. ITFC was planning to launch an Aid-for-Tra de initiative for the Economic and Social 
Commission for West Asia (ESCWA) Region and would be pleased to work in partnership with all stakeholders.  ITFC would also be pleased to partner similar initiatives in Africa.   
107. In conclusion, Mr. Al-Wohaib reiterated the overriding importa nce the IDB Group attached to 
trade promotion, and at the same time expressed hi s readiness to cooperate with other international 
financial institutions and partners on Aid for Trad e, with the objective of scaling up trade-related 
infrastructure financing and capacity development. 
IV. SESSION 3:  AID FOR TRADE – ASSESSING IMPLEMENTATION  
108. Opening the session, the Moderator, Mr. Jon Snow, Channel Four News
, noted that the EC 
and its member States were on track to meet their Hong Kong pledges on Aid for Trade ahead of 
schedule.  The Commission had published an Aid-for-Trade Strategy in 2007 and most member States 
had activities in the Aid-for-Trade area.  Total European Union (EU) Aid for Trade had reached 
€7.17 billion in 2007, with Africa the region receiving the highest proportion at about 44 per cent.  Turning to Commissioner Louis Michel of the Eur opean Commission, Mr. Snow asked him where he 
thought the EC could do more and how th e global downturn had changed the outlook?  
109. In reply, Mr. Louis Michel, Commissioner, European Commision (EC)
, noted his expectation 
that the commitments that the EC had undertaken on Aid for Trade would be respected.  It would not 
be easy, however.  Member States had to be convi nced to respect their co mmitments and a lot of 
pressure had to be brought to bear.  Commissione r Michel had great hope, not least because in 2008 
the figures showed very clearly that the EC was moving closer to its ODA target.   
110. In 2007, the EU had provided €7.17 billion in Ai d-for-Trade funding, just for that one year.  
In comparison, expenditure for the period 2001-2005  was €5.29 billion.  There had therefore been a 
tremendous increase.  The EU was focusing its attention on regional integration, and offering 
comprehensive support to have Economic Part nership Agreements (EPAs) based on regional 
programmes.  Regional funding had been doubled in support of the EPAs, which should increase 
considerably the funds availabl e to liberalize markets.   
111. The EU had also prioritized infrastructure.  Economic development was impossible without 
infrastructure.  Looking at Africa, communications infrastructure, ports, airports and roads, 
particularly for landlocked countries were lacking.  An infrastructure fund had been established with 
the European Investment Bank to address this area.   
112. Another major focal point of the EC's Aid fo r Trade was policy development.  Difficult 
political decisions were sometimes ne cessary.  In the EPA context, it was clear that if one got rid of 
taxes at the border, the resources generated had to  be replaced with some type of compensatory 
mechanism.  It was very difficult for partners to do that, but the EC had offered aid in this area.  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 22  
 
  Commissioner Michel also highlighted that, particul arly in Africa, the lack of clear governance caused 
problems for investors. 
113. The Moderator
 noted that the UK had been badly aff ected by the economic crisis.  The Prime 
Minister's personal commitment to aid in general and to Aid for Trade was very strong, but as a 
former Chancellor of the Exchequer, he also kne w he had to balance the books.  Jon Snow asked 
Minister Gareth Thomas if the UK could keep its Ai d-for-Trade pledges in the current economic crisis 
and how it could justify expenditure to its own tax payers? 
114. In reply, Minister Thomas  stated that the UK intended to  follow through on the commitments 
it had made on Aid for Trade.  A new White Pape r on Development would be  published which would 
include a very substantial commitment on spending on growth and trade, the bulk of which could be 
counted as Aid for Trade.  The Prime Minister's atte ndance at the G8 Summit would also be used to 
generate momentum behind Aid for Trade.   
115. Minister Thomas noted his agreement with Co mmissioner Michel on the importance of trade 
to the global economic recovery.  His ambition was to see a much more  inclusive form of 
globalization which had at its heart not only a reducti on in tariffs and subsidies by the richest nations, 
and key to that would be getting an agreement in the Doha Round.  Aid-for-Trade resources were 
required to deal with some of the infrastructure problems which were making trading difficult.  The 
UK was also going to be following through on commitments  made in the G20 in terms of global trade 
finance and announcing significant financial commi tment to the IFC's Global Trade Liquidity 
Program.   
116. The importance of the practical implementation of Aid-for-Trade projects was also alluded to 
by Minister Thomas.  He referred to the commi tments made in Lusaka in April 2009 at the North-
South Corridor Conference.  Commitments had been ma de on investment in roads, ports, railways and 
harmonized border crossings.  These engagements were  a good example which could be replicated in 
other corridor programmes.  Minister Thomas noted his keen interest to help other parts of Africa see 
further progress on their corridor programmes. 
117. Returning to Commissioner Michel, the Moderator  remarked that the Commissioner had a lot 
of people to satisfy in his position: the European Pa rliament, the Court of Au ditors and, above all, 
European public opinion.  He asked Commissioner Mi chel how confident he was that he could carry 
these people with him in this co mmitment to Aid for Trade?  
118. Commissioner Michel  replied that there was a basic consensus on the fact that there would be 
no economic development if there was no economic pr osperity.  If one compared what one per cent 
economic growth meant for a developing country rela tive to the receipt of ODA, it was clear that the 
impact of economic growth was more beneficial.  The problem lay in the difference between what the 
major donors were saying on the one hand, and what they were actually doing on the other hand.  
With the exception of Spain and the UK, who ha d made major efforts despite difficult national 
situations, most other countries were extremely re ticent.  Commissioner Michel gave the example of 
the efforts he had made to get the quick impact food facility programme appr oved.  This had taken a 
year of discussion and had been ultimately in vain.  He concluded that there was a lack of political 
will among major donors.  Emerging de veloping countries also had to become active partners in Aid 
for Trade.   
119. The Moderator  highlighted that Africa had received US$9.5 billion in Aid for Trade in 2007.  
This figure was US$4.1 billion higher than in 2007.  He asked what impact the funds were having on 
Africa's trade performance?    WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
 Page 23 
 
 
  120. In reply, Commissioner Elizabeth Tankeu (African Union Commission) , stated that the tax 
payers of the North and South should be reassure d.  The African Union (AU) had seen tangible 
results.  In macro-economic terms, growth rates be fore the crisis had been high and some countries 
were close to meeting the MDGs.  However, the fina ncial crisis had been a set back for many African 
countries.  
121. Growth in Aid for Trade to Africa was welcome, but not enough yet to meet Africa's needs.  
Africa remained very vulnerable to structural di sruption, faced internal problems and external 
upheavals.  There, a lack of infrastructure and high commodity dependence continued.  A further 
increase in Aid-for-Trade to Africa was necessary if  the continent was going to achieve its integration 
and economic development objectives.  Africa had to be opened up in a positive sense.  Many African 
LDCs were landlocked and they needed to be opened up to the outside world if their situation was to 
improve.  The North-South Corridor was a welcom e development and further such corridors were 
needed, such as the one between Djibouti and Addis Ab aba, or that linking Benin and Burkina Faso.   
122. On the topic of boosting productive capacity, Co mmissioner Tankeu noted that African Heads 
of State had recently organized a summit on industria l development.  Africa needed to take more 
advantage of what it had on the ground and make be tter use of its raw materials in a way that would 
help Africa to export manufactured goods to world ma rkets.  This was the best way to help Africa 
eradicate poverty, but this could not be achieved wi th aid alone.  She hoped that Aid for Trade would 
support Africa in its efforts to boost productive capacity.   
123. Responding to Commissioner Louis Michel's point that the political environment did not 
always encourage investors, Commissioner Tankeu sa id that the reason was because there were too 
many difficulties facing some countries.  She drew a ttention also to the fact that investors, and the 
private sector in particular, had a major role to play in helping countries in Africa improve their political environment.  If the private sector got mo re involved in Africa's economic development, it 
would be very helpful in improving the political climate.  If young peopl e had no jobs, there was 
always going to be political tension.  It was only with economic de velopment and productive 
structures that Africa would be able to tackle these problems.  Economic development could not be 
achieved with aid alone.  It was the development of Africa's productive capacities and engagement in 
trade which would help Africa to achieve prosperity.  
124. Turning to Mr. Franklin Moore of USAID, the Moderator
 speculated if US commitment to 
Aid for Trade would remain constant in the financia l crisis and asked if curre nt funding levels could 
be maintained if taxpayers were not sure why this was necessary. 
125. In reply, Mr. Moore, Deputy Assistant Administrator, USAID , argued that Americans, like 
the Obama Administration, realized that trade was a key component of economic growth – and a key component of US economic growth.  It meant that tradi ng partners had to be able to trade.  It was the 
President's desire that the US should expand its de velopment assistance and this had been welcomed 
by the US public.  The US was very committe d to the concept of economic growth.   
126. The US looked at Aid for Trade in three ma in areas:  capacity building; organizational 
innovation;  and infrastructure.  All three were criti cal to create local trading partners for countries 
and their neighbours in the developing world and for long distance trade.  The US tended to emphasize grants rather than lo ans and allocated funding based on an expression of priorities.  If 
trade-related needs were among the priorities with in a country, then that was picked up in 
conversations with USAID Missions.  The M illennium Challenge Cooperation (MCC) provided 
significant financing for trade, mostly for infrastruct ure.  The US had participated in the North-South 
Corridor Conference and was actively looking at simila r projects in other parts of Africa, particularly 
in West Africa.   WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 24  
 
  127. In reply to a question on Japan's Aid-for-Trade st rategy, Mr. Shintaro Ito, State Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs , recalled that in 2005 Japan had announced  the Development Initiative for Trade.  
Over the following three years, Japan had met all its commitments under the Initiative by doubling 
ODA for Africa at the Tokyo International Conf erence on African Development (TICAD IV) and 
through the "One Village, One Product Campaign"  which aimed to support developing countries' 
efforts to enter the Japanese ma rket.  These Japanese initiatives had been highly appreciated by 
partners countries.  
128. At the Second Global Review meeting, Japan inte nded to reaffirm its commitment to Aid for 
Trade.  Mr. Ito announced the "Development Initia tive for Trade 2009" as Japan's new strategy for 
Aid for Trade.  Under this Initiative, Japan w ould provide US$12 billion through bilateral assistance 
for trade-related projects from 2009 to 2011.  Japan  would also provide technical assistance over the 
same period for 40,000 people in the field of trade-re lated activities.  In line with Japan's efforts to 
keep trade open, Japan would initiate  an overall review of the Generalized System of Preferences.  
Japan would also implement its commitment to trade finance, as promised at the G20 Summit and on other occasions, because of the need to facilita te exports from developing countries.   
129. Japan would implement this new Initiative th rough a tailor-made approach and it would pay 
due consideration to country owne rship.  Attention would be give n to the socio-economic conditions 
of each developing country, including poverty,  environment and gender aspects, as well as the 
concept of the "right place and the right product" which was related to Japan's "One Village, One 
Product Campaign".   
130. Japan would intensify its efforts on Aid for Tr ade through this new Initiative.  However, in 
order to enlarge developing countries' trade volumes , Mr. Ito hoped there would be a conclusion to the 
Doha Round.  A successful outcome would bring benef its to all member countries, in particular to 
developing members.  He stressed the synergy be tween the conclusion of the Doha Round and the 
promotion of Aid for Trade.   
131. Commissioner Michel
 clarified that his comments on the reticence of some member States to 
meet their commitments did not relate to th e major performers, countries such as Sweden, 
Netherlands, Denmark, Luxembourg, Belgium – all of  whom were making effort s.  Several countries 
were beyond 0.7 per cent of GDP for their ODA a nd it was not those countries to which he was 
referring.  He also noted that EU development policy was grant based.  
132. In the discussion which follow ed, the representative of Sweden  thanked the WTO, OECD and 
other involved agencies for their ex cellent work in driving the Aid-for-Trade agenda forward.  Aid for 
Trade was a highly priority of the Swedish Govern ment.  Sweden was a good example of the crucial 
role that trade could play to sustain economic gr owth.  History told that openness to trade was an 
effective means to generate economic growth.  By overcoming structural limitations and weak 
capacity to produce and compete, developing count ries could make further use of the opportunities 
inherent in trade, thereby increasing resources for poverty reduction.  The challenge was to provide 
Aid for Trade in a manner that generated pro-poor growth.  Since the incidence of poverty was 
country-specific, any pro-poor policy, including trade policy and Aid-for-Trade interventions, had first to identify the binding constraints to trade, who the poor were, where they lived, how they earned 
their livelihoods, and what constrained them fro m participating in growth-generating economic 
activities.   
133. Since the First Global Review, progress had been made in terms of raising awareness on the 
importance of Aid for Trade, identifying binding co nstraints to trade and up-scaling resources.  The 
spotlight effect was working.  Trade was in creasingly found in partner countries' national 
development plans or Poverty Reduction Strategy papers (PRSPs).  There was an increased focus on 
regional initiatives and on improved monitoring and reporting on Aid-for-Trade flows.  Lastly, the  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
 Page 25 
 
 
  Enhanced Integrated Framework had been la unched and funding secured at a conference in 
Stockholm in September 2007.   
134. The EU Aid-for-Trade Strategy adopted in 2007 confirmed the EU's strong commitment to 
Aid for Trade, as manifested in the pledge ma de in 2005 to commit  €2 billion annually to trade-
related assistance by 2010.  Sweden's own trade-rela ted assistance had tripled since the beginning of 
the Doha Development Agenda.  Priority areas for Sweden's trade-related assistance were standards 
(SPS/TBT), support related to the European Partne rships Agreements (EPAs) with the African-
Caribbean Pacific (ACP) countries, trade and climate change, and trade procedures.   
135. Sweden also faced challenges as a national do nor.  Time and energy had been spent in 
reviewing its systems for policy development and fo r delivering development assistance to improve 
their efficiency.  This included, among other things, going through every country's specific and 
regional development strategy to see how Aid for Tr ade could be addressed.  The review had to be 
done in consultation with the partner c ountries and/or regions concerned.   
136. Sweden also underlined some focus areas to secu re efficient implementation of Aid for Trade, 
particularly in light of the gl obal economic downturn.  These priority areas were (i) strengthened 
country ownership of Aid for Trade, (ii) strengthe ned pro-poor focus to Aid for Trade, and (iii) the 
coherence objective which was of particular concern as a way to interlock aid policy with trade policy 
in a coherent strategy for poverty reduction.  Fi nally, the representative of Sweden hoped that in 
future trade would be a development sector as na tural and self-evident as education and health was 
today. 
137. The representative of Spain  noted that Spain would be taking over the Presidency of the EU 
after Sweden.  This meant another friend for Aid for Trade in the first six months of 2010!  He noted 
the wide reaching consensus on the ability of trade to be one of the driving forces behind economic 
recovery.  This was perfectly in line with the appr oach and the principles take n by Spain with respect 
to Aid for Trade.  Donors had a responsibility to ma intain and respect commitments and beneficiaries 
had a responsibility to integrate trade into their na tional development strategies.  There was a shared 
responsibility to better identify priorities and needs.  The private sector also had a fundamental role to 
play.   
138. Noting that Commissioner Michel had mentione d compliance with commitments by the EC 
and by its member States, he said that Spain had increased its trade-related technical assistance to 
reach €81 million in 2007.  Spain aimed to reach the 0.7 per cent target of aid as part of GDP by 2012 
and hoped that additional funding for Aid for Trad e would become available since it was a basic 
priority.  Just meeting commitments on figures was not enough.  It was necessary to boost efficiency.   
139. The representative of France  reassured the meeting of his government's commitment to Aid 
for Trade.  France had developed an Aid-for-Trade  strategy focusing on regional integration with 
support for regional trade development and help for market development at national, regional and 
global level.  France's Aid-for-Trade expenditu re would increase to reach €850 million per year 
starting in 2010, a 50 per cent increase comp ared with the 2002-2005 baseline.   
140. The representative of Ecuador  noted that sometimes the problem was a lack of political will to 
meet commitments.  Political will was what would turn commitments into tangible programmes on 
the ground.  He noted that, while trade was a very  important component of economic development, it 
was not the only one and was just one instrument along with others.  He expressed concern that Aid 
for Trade was something that might have to be  reimbursed – tantamount to setting conditions and 
earmarking.  Earmarking was not always in the inte rests of the beneficiary countries.  Many countries 
had national economic developmen t, and economic and trade growth programmes on which great WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 26  
 
  emphasis was laid on boosting trade.  Earmarked programmes or tying to set conditions was not 
necessarily in line with national priorities.  He urged that conditionality should be avoided.   
141. Referring back to the IMF intervention, he ar gued that the IMF was applying pro-cyclical 
policies.  The IMF approved of the stimulus pack ages that most developed countries had adopted, but 
developing countries were in a different situation.  Loans which could be granted by the developed 
world or by the IMF tended to be granted on the basis of a pro-cyclical policy which was not always 
of assistance. 
142. In reply to a question from the Moderator on how the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Africa (UNECA) was monitoring the impact of Aid for Trade, Mr. Abdoulie Janneh, Executive 
Secretary, UNECA , noted that only three per cent of global trade was with Africa and only 
10 per cent of Africa's total trade was with itself ..  From previous interventions, it was clear that 
significant flows of resources were going to Africa.  When African nations had met in Dar es Salaam in 2007, the message that had emerged was that for Aid for Trade to be meaningful resources on 
infrastructure, on trade facilitation and on standa rds were needed.  Resources in these areas would 
really improve Africa's competitiveness and encour age export diversification.  The resources were 
now becoming available.   
143. There were many ways to measure impact.  One was to see if inter-African trade was 
improving or if for special groups of African count ries – for example, LDCs or landlocked countries –
trading costs were falling or the trading time be tween landlocked countries and coastal countries was 
being reduced.  These were some of the areas UNEC A wanted to examine.  UNECA had prepared a 
report on the supply and demand of Aid for Trade for Africa in which the distribution of Aid for 
Trade had been examined.  To assess the impact , indicators had been examined which would 
constitute the measurements of demand.  UNECA would continue to work on this area, together with 
the WTO Secretariat and the AfDB.  UNECA was represented at the sub-regional level in Africa and it would work together with the RECs and others to  look at impact.  In conclusion, it was still early 
days, but started credible work was underway a nd Mr. Janneh hoped that by the time of the next 
Review something more conc rete would have emerged. 
144. The Moderator
 picked up on the theme of standards, noting that the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO) had done a lot of work on standards compliance through its 
three C's approach – compete, conform, connect.   
145. In reply, Mr. Kandeh Yumkella, Director-General, UNIDO , noted that what a country 
produced mattered a lot.  If Aid for Trade was goi ng to help Burkina Faso and Mali sell more cotton, 
it had to help both countries (and other African count ries) to produce higher value products that they 
could sell.  How Aid for Trade could help Afri ca diversify its production base was another issue  
Assuming that the cotton countries could in fact pr oduce higher value products or continue to expand 
their production of commodities, would these products meet international standards?  This was an 
area where UNIDO had focused attention during the past 15 years. 
146. Various standards were not imposed by governments, but by large private sector entities.  To 
get a product on the shelf at Tesco or Carrefour, fo od safety and other standards had to be met.  In 
West Africa, UNIDO had focused its help on establishi ng institutional infrastructure to help countries 
meet these standards.  UNIDO had upgraded la boratories and testing procedures, and conducted 
enterprise audits to see whether the process itself c onformed to certain standards to encourage market 
access.  Significant support had been received fro m the European Commission, France, Switzerland 
and Norway.  There was impact, but efforts needed to  be scaled up.  So far, only some 50 laboratories 
had been upgraded.  There were many more th at needed assistance, across different sectors.  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
 Page 27 
 
 
  147. Another dimension was enterprise upgrading.  Assuming that a country had an opportunity to 
supply Tesco, how could the company be helped to improve its technology or  management practices 
to be able to be part of that value chain.  Th e initial programme that the EC had funded, had achieved 
results with about 80 companies.  UNIDO's am bition under the EPA was to scale that up to 3,000 
companies with the support of the ECOWAS (E conomic Community of West African States) 
Commission and WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union).  UNIDO had set up 
standards infrastructure and accreditation systems and it was helping companies take advantage of these opportunities.  Mr. Yumkella made reference to  a recent article in the Financial Times about 
traceability and a new technical standard: the carbo n footprint.  He hoped it would not be a new 
technical barrier to trade at the expense of poor countries.   
148. To help poor countries diversify UNIDO had to  do what the African Growth and Opportunity 
Act (AGOA) had done.  This was to allow African c ountries – Lesotho and others – to be able to 
source inputs from others, finish goods and then export them so that countries did not have to specialize in the production of the whole product.  They could specialize in components.  However, if 
other trading arrangements were too strict on rules of origin this would kill the initiative on regional 
integration.  In AGOA, what had made a difference was that there was some flexibility in these rules  
of origin.  Director-General Yumkella hoped th at new trade agreements would allow African 
countries to produce certain components of a value chain.   
149. Replying to a question about ECOWAS's devel opment strategy and the role that Aid for 
Trade could play in its achievement, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, President, ECOWAS Commission
, 
outlined the Vision 2020 of a borderless West African  region.  In the region, people would live in 
peace and democracy, able to move about freely and to take advantage of the huge resources, human 
and natural, with which the region was endowed.  Ai d for Trade could help realize that vision in many 
ways.  First and foremost, for people to be able to  move about and to do legitimate business they had 
to have physical infrastructure.  This meant sca ling up building regional cross-border infrastructure.  
A lot of support was coming from the EU, World Bank,  AfDB and other bilateral partners to address 
these infrastructural constraints.  There was also a need to ensure the right policy environment to 
facilitate trade.   
150. Cross-border trade in West Africa was averaging only about  15 per cent.  There was 
tremendous potential to increase trade, with benefi ts for all  This called for capacity building in 
member states but also at regional level, for trad e policy formulation, and for negotiations.  Aid for 
Trade was not only designed to help improve an d increase regional trade but also the region's 
participation in global world trade.  At that regi onal level, improvements were needed both in member 
states and in regional level capacity for trade po licy formulation.  Harmonization of policies, 
standardization, and trade negotiation capacity were  all important areas where assistance should be 
provided.  
151. In the context of the EPA, discussions were not only focusing on market access, but also the 
capacity of the region to increase production and to dive rsify production.  In that context, there was a 
very useful discussion going on with the EU on the development dimension.  He hoped that whatever 
regional development programme was designed would permit other partners to come on-board.  This 
was not only something that concerned Europe, but al so other development part ners.  It would help 
ECOWAS to increase its regional capacity, to become  more competitive, to diversify, to add value 
and be less exposed to the fl uctuations in global trade. 
152. Mr. Franklin Moore  added that in Africa, four global competitiveness hubs had been 
established by USAID – in Gaborone for Southern A frica, in Kenya for East and Central Africa, and 
two in West Africa in Dakar and in Accra.  For ECOWAS, the trade hub examined regional trade 
issues and worked not only with governments, but with civil society organizations and private 
enterprise.  In the MCC compact countries in West Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso , Cape Verde, Ghana, WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 28  
 
  and Mali) approximately US$2billion worth of developm ent had been engaged, much of which was in 
hard infrastructure.  For example, there was a corridor from Bamako, Mali, which went through 
Ougadougou, Burkina Faso to the coast both in Gh ana and Togo.  The US was looking at working 
there, in particular on food security and the movement of staple crops. 
153. Director-General Yumkella
 noted that he had heard a lot about infrastructure but not much 
about access to energy.  He opined that energy infr astructure had to be improved otherwise industries 
in these countries would not be competitive.  In Burkina Faso, the cost of power was between 24-
35 cents per kilowatt hour.  This made its industries uncompetitive, even if all the other infrastructure 
was in place.  Energy access was crucial. 
154. Mr. Petko Draganov, Deputy Secretary-General, United Nations Committee on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) , recalled that the mandate of UNCTA D was to help developing countries 
make the most of their trade, investment and deve lopment opportunities and participate beneficially in 
the global economy.  UNCTAD tried to focus its effo rts where they were needed the most and this 
was in LDCs.  Most LDCs were in Africa: 33 out of 49.  UNCTAD's mandate fell within the 
definition of Aid for Trade; UNCTAD had been doing it for the last 45 years.   
155. UNCTAD offered research and analysis, and help  for acceding countries to the WTO.  It also 
provided factual reports and analytical work so that developing countries made the right choices.  
Technical assistance, such as the ASYCUDA (Aut omated System for Customs Data) programme 
which existed in more than 90 countries, had been k nown to help raise revenues up to 70  per cent.  
He underlined the importance of donor countries sticki ng to their pledges and that recipient countries 
were better organized to propose better projects not only  at the national but also at the regional level. 
156.  The representative of Cambodia  noted that his country had hosted two key meetings, an LDC 
Ministerial with UNIDO3, and another with the AsDB and WTO on Aid for Trade4.  The strong 
message which emerged from these two meetings was that Aid for Trade was a must for all the developing countries, especially LDCs.  It was very important that all stakeholders played their part, 
by developing ownership and by  mainstreaming trade policies in to poverty reduction and national 
development strategies.  By putting their own hou ses in order, developing countries would also be 
creating the best environment for Aid-for-Trade resources to flow.  There was a need for more 
assistance to developing countries to increase their supply-side capacity.  Minister Prasidh commended donors on keeping to their 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Conference pledges, but noted that more assistance needed to come at this difficult time.   
157. The representative of Jamaica
 noted that Jamaica fully supported Aid for Trade and had been 
pleased to host the Second Regional Review on Aid fo r Trade for Latin America and the Caribbean in 
Montego Bay in May 2009.  Ministers, senior officials, and private sector representatives from across the region, as well as trade related and developmenta l organizations had met to assess and confirm the 
region's Aid-for-Trade priorities.  It was generally  agreed that the meeting had been a success and 
given added urgency by the global financial a nd economic crises.  The discussions had been 
substantive and interactive, and included issues su ch as the challenges faced by countries in the area 
of trade development, translating trade agreem ents into actual market penetration and trade 
liberalization adjustment issues.  Other subjects di scussed included the important issue of preference 
erosion, export-import strategies, issues arising from trade facilitation and infrastructure, the 
constraints faced by the private sector, as well as the new and non-traditional areas being pursued by 
the private sector.  There were also discussi ons on specific Aid-for-Trade initiatives which had 
achieved particular success. 
                                                     
 
3 LDC Ministerial Conference, Siem Reap, Cambodia, 19-20 November 2008. 
4 Regional Meeting for ASEAN members states held in Siem Reap, Cambodia on 28-29 May 2009.  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
 Page 29 
 
 
  158. The Regional Review on Aid for Trade for Latin  America and the Caribbean had proved very 
useful and had heightened interest in Aid for Trad e, both at the national and regional levels.  It had 
also provided new impetus to regional cooperation in the area of Aid for Trade.  In that regard, a decision had been taken by the Caribbean Community to  accelerate, as a priority, the preparation of a 
Caribbean Aid-for-Trade strategy, the objective of which was to develop a ho listic and comprehensive 
approach to competitiveness, adjust ment and trade development.  The region would also improve its 
monitoring capabilities, including the creation of new mechanisms to more effectively monitor Aid-
for-Trade flows, and the effectiveness and developm ental impact of Aid-for-Trade programmes.  In 
conclusion, the representative of Jamaica noted that Ai d for Trade was now a reality.  All involved 
recognised the enormous potential of Aid for Trade a nd had a vested interest in making it a success.   
159. The representative of Zambia
 stated that it had been  privilege to host the High-Level resource 
mobilization conference on the North-South Corrido r and concurrently the regional Aid-for-Trade 
Review on 6-7 April 2009.  The North-South Corridor was a joint COMESA-EAC-SADC pilot Aid-for-Trade initiative emanating from the October 2008 Tripartite Summit.  It cut across Botswana, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi, Mozamb ique, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe.  This Project had been designed, based  on a holistic, integrated and sequential approach, 
to cover infrastructure development relating to ro ads, railway, border facilities and procedures, weigh 
bridges and energy, among others.  The objective of the project was to reduce the time and hence the 
cost of moving goods within and beyond the re gion in order to enhance competitiveness.   
160. The Conference had brought together the Presidents of Zambia, Kenya, South Africa and 
Uganda.  A wide array of representatives from the private sector, public sector organizations, regional 
bodies, international organizations as well as bilateral and multilatera l cooperating partners had also 
attended.  The Conference had resulted in tota l pledges amounting to over US$1.3 billion. An 
additional US$1.5 billion had also been secured from the Development Bank of Southern Africa.  An 
institutional framework to start implementing the specific projects was being put in place.  The region looked forward to the successful implementation of this project. 
161. The representative of China
 expressed her appreciation to the WTO and OECD for the 
excellent preparation of the Review.  It had come at an opportune time when the world was 
experiencing a crisis unprecedented since the 1930s in  which developing countries, particularly the 
least-developed, had been the hardest hit.  The thre e regional reviews in which China had participated 
(Zambia, Jamaica, and Cambodia) confirmed the WT O Aid-for-Trade initiative as a success story.  It 
was also encouraging to see that awareness had been  raised and the level of commitment to Aid for 
Trade from the international community had been  increased.  One topic was how South-South 
partners could become further e ngaged in the Aid-for-Trade initiative.  She announced that on top of 
its first contribution last year, the Chinese Governme nt had decided to make a further contribution to 
the WTO within the framework of the Aid-for-Trade initiative.  Chin a would continue to increase its 
level of commitment through both bila teral and multilateral channels.   
162. The representative of Switzerland  began his comments with the slogan: "Implementation! 
Implementation! Implementation!".  The test for the Aid-for-Trade initiative lay in its implementation.  
He noted his pleasure at the very interesti ng examples from partner countries and multilateral 
institutions, in particular in the standards area.  Without standards compliance, it was impossible to 
transfer goods and services from one place to anot her.  The standards area was complex and was 
deserving of a lot of attention.  He recommended that donors should come together in order to 
implement programmes, as should international orga nizations.  Switzerland strongly believed that Aid 
for Trade would only achieve concrete and sustainable outcomes if development assistance was aligned with national priorities that resulted fro m a solid consensus-building process among local 
stakeholders.  In this regard, Switzerland consider ed that the Enhanced Integrated Framework and 
complementary implementation schemes such as the UN CEB Inter-Agency Cluster on Trade and 
Productive Capacity could make a real difference by providing a firm foundation for the WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 30  
 
  implementation of Aid for Trade on the ground.  He  finished with a further call to implement, 
implement, implement!   
163. The representative of Mali
 noted the support offered by the World Bank with respect to 
mango exports and thanked the Neth erlands for building a processing centre.  On the topic of the 
contribution that could be made by the interna tional private sector, he noted that Mali was a poor 
country in the real meaning of the word.  It did not have natural resources which would draw 
investors, like other countries, and was a landlocked country with seven borders.   
164. Commissioner Michel  replied to a comment from the Moderator about whether or not the 
drive to halt climate change could result in new barri ers to trade, particular carbon footprint.  What 
was really at stake in the fight against climate ch ange and in attempts to mitigate was to know what 
the international community was going to do.  The real problem was going to be if money was going 
to be taken out of the regular development budget to fight against climate change.  If so, another 
disaster would be added on top of the existing one .  The poorest countries were not responsible for 
climate change;  responsibility lay with the wealthy c ountries.  Therefore, what was at stake here was 
to know whether or not there was sufficient political  will – and honesty too – among the leaders of the 
wealthy countries to admit that and to find the ad ditional resources needed to fight against climate 
change.   
165. Wrapping up the session, the Moderator  stated that it was very clear that Aid for Trade was 
alive and well, but that the Swiss had still needed to call to implement, implement, implement on all 
sides.  Eyes had to be kept very clearly on what was actually being done, and whether or not what was 
being talked about as being done  was actually being done.   
V. SESSION 4:  AID FOR TRADE - PRIVATE SECTOR PARTNERSHIP FOR 
GROWTH  
166. The Moderator, Mrs. Patricia Francis, Execu tive Director, International Trade Centre (ITC) , 
introduced the Session and explained that it would start with a discussion on what was happening in 
the financial sector and what had been happening  in the Asian region, followed by a discussion on 
past success stories, looking at the critical success factors for moving Aid for Trade forward.  She 
addressed her first question to Peter Jones and asked  him to provide information on what challenges 
Africa was facing with regard to resources for trad e finance and whether those resources were being 
diverted to other bigger players? 
167. Mr. Peter Jones, Chief Executive Officer,  Africa Trade Insurance Agency (ATI) , said that the 
existing problem of access to trade finance in Africa , and particularly in sub- Saharan Africa, had been 
made worse by the current economic crisis, and by th e shortage of US dollar liquidity.  The result was 
an asymmetrical risk allocation in both security and the interest margin on borrowing, particularly by 
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) e xporters within Africa who were doubly hit because 
they were required to raise significant amounts of secu rity in order to get any access to funding at all, 
and also to pay very high margins.  SMEs were also forced to take what was called "open account" 
risk on the people to whom they were selling.  This  meant that when they bought in goods, they were 
being forced to pay cash or put up letters of credit, and when they sold, they were forced to take the 
credit risk of the buyer with no credit protection at  all.  This was a complete reversal of what 
happened in the developed world.  Adding to the problem was that, depending on the African country 
involved, this resulted in a heavy concentration of  industry in the form of exports and a lack of 
diversification.  There was significant risk dive rsification if a number of African countries were 
brought together and one of the key reasons why regional organizations such as the African Trade 
Insurance Agency had been set up was to bring countr ies together to enable them to benefit from the 
risk diversification that came from being within a regional grouping.  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
 Page 31 
 
 
  168. Despite the information about banks and th eir trade finance operations supporting global 
trade, he said that when commercial banks talked ab out focusing on trade fi nance they were actually 
concentrating on their traditional markets (Latin Am erica, Eastern Europe, Russia, Asia, China), and 
not on sub-Saharan Africa.  Africa  tended to fall off the radar scree n, particularly in times of 
economic crisis.  A solution to this problem had to  be found through the involvement of and support 
from the private sector.  The Africa Trade Insura nce Agency focused on developing trade and 
investment finance within Africa and supporting A frican companies' export so that they could 
compete globally and had both private and public sect or members and investors.   In order to provide 
the capacity and support that was required to bring investment to Africa and to support regional and 
international trade from Africa on a global basis, ATI also partnered with other risk bearing insurance 
institutions such as Zurich Insurance, Lloyds of London, and Ace Insurance of Bermuda.  This could 
not be done without private sector support.  Ev en though ATI was a single A-rated entity and could 
effectively mitigate the risk of buyers in Africa and buyers outside Africa, it could not solve the 
liquidity problem.  It was critical that that issue was dealt with immediately.  It was a long-standing issue and, hopefully, out of the crisis would come a permanent solution. 
169. Both pre- and export finance were needed to  assist African companies to finance the 
production of goods that they were going to sell ove rseas and then to fund it while the goods were 
being sold on an "open account" – where the buyer would only pay, for example, after 30, 60, or 100 days.  The International Finance Corporation's (IF C) global trade finance programme which supported 
LDCs only supported imports into developing countries and so did not really address this issue.  The 
recently-launched IFC and African Development Bank, Global Trade Liquidity Program, had the 
potential to change this, particularly through its re financing window for export credit agencies.  Since 
there were very few export credit agencies within Afri ca the risk was that a lot of this liquidity might 
be focused on countries and regions outside Africa .  ATI was therefore exploring both with IFC and 
with the African Development Bank to see how ATI could act as a conduit for getting funding to its 
insured exporters.  In effect, creating a self-li quidating facility meant that ATI would provide the 
financing but would already be taking the risk on the credit of the buyer of the goods.  If the buyer 
paid on time, the facility revolved and was refinanced.  If the buyer did not, ITA would be required to 
pay a claim and it would be refinanced.  This resulted in a very significant gearing effect from the recycling of resources which were being directed to where they were required, namely the SMEs 
exporting from Africa. 
170. He concluded by saying that the key challe nge to the successful deployment of these 
programmes would be to support African exports and not  just imports into the continent.  Discussions 
had been held with commercial banks and with othe r development institutions, particularly within the 
Middle East, to see if they would be interested in pr oviding support.  In orde r to reach this objective, 
partnerships would be needed with  regional institutions, private sector  banks, and also the private- and 
public-sector insurers. 
171. The Moderator
 then addressed a second question to Mr . Jones concerning whether, in terms 
of the capacity of the private sector to produce ba nkable documents, there was a need for technical 
assistance to be given to some of the institutions th at supported the private sector to ensure that the 
quality of the requests coming to financial institutio ns was of a standard to actually be bankable. 
172. In reply, Mr. Jones  said that, as a single A-rated agency, ITA reinsured on partnerships with 
other A- or AA-rated insurers and th at from the point of view of that quality there was not a problem.  
The difficulty and challenge lay in liquidity and funding. 
173. The Moderator  then referred to the fact that i mmediately prior to the recently-held 
G20 Summit there had been a call for about US$100- 300 billion needed for trade finance.  She asked 
Toru Matsutani to provide a situation analysis on what the Tokyo Mitsubishi Bank had actually seen 
happening as far as the financial crisis was concerned? WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 32  
 
  174. Mr. Toru Masutani, Head of Export Credit Agencies, Commodities and Trade Finance, Tokyo 
Mitsubishi Bank (TMB) , said that a figure of US$200 billion was probably in line with what was 
going on in the world.  From the point of view of individual business transactions, however, that 
amount was not necessary at this stage because all tr ansactions had been covered.  The announcement 
made at the G20 meeting had nevertheless had a very  good stabilizing effect on the financial market.  
From the point of view of commercial banks, there was a risk-taking ability and, of course, financial 
costs were increasing.  As a result, banks' ability to  lend as they used to be able to do had become 
more limited. 
175. The economic crisis had impacted the financial market in two main ways.  One was the direct 
impact of the crisis to the financial institutions, in  other words the market loss of derivative products.  
The second aspect concerned emerging markets.  Reduced risk-taking ability and weakened capital 
market had a significant impact on banks' ability to le nd to the emerging markets.  The effect was not 
the same in all countries or for all borrowers.  Borro wers were seeking alternatives.  Exporters, too, 
were now much more at risk and, to hedge th e risk of collecting funds, were asking the banks 
(including TMB) to issue or confirm letters of credit. 
176. The Tokyo Mitsubishi Bank had branches in over 40 countries and had more than 3,000 
corresponding banks around the world.  It also had over 300 credit lines to banks around the world so therefore had been very active on a global basis, especially in Asia, the Middle East, Turkey, and 
some countries in Africa.  One big change – befo re and after the crisis – was that all TMB's 
commitment lines had been fully utilized.  Its real lending exposure had therefore increased by almost 
twenty per cent.  On the other hand, not all need s could be met because TMB had its own constraints 
vis-à-vis  its balance sheet.  That was why, since 2008, it had sought an opportunity to team up with 
multilaterals banks and export credit agencies.  
177. In October 2008, the TMB had signed a Memo randum of Understanding (MoU) with the IFC 
which included trade finance, and in February 2009 it had signed a similar MoU with the AsDB to promote trade finance, utilizing the trade fina nce facilitation programme.  Under these programmes, 
either the TMB would co-lend with multilaterals, or the multilaterals would guarantee the local bank 
risk with confirmed letters of credit.  In so-doing , TMB's capacity to lend or  guarantee to these banks 
or sectors had dramatically increased.  Also to be taken into consideration was the co-relation with export credit agencies.  In this respect, as a Japan ese bank the TMB worked closely with the JBIC 
(Japan Bank for International Cooperation) and NE XI (Nippon Export and Investment Insurance).  
After the 2008 TICAD IV meeting, the Japanese Go vernment announced a set of measures to support 
African development by utilizing JBIC to double investment from Japan to Africa.  The Tokyo 
Mitsubishi Bank also had two previous transactions, bot h in South Africa.  One was to strengthen the 
network of transmission lines in South Africa a nd the other was to expand port capacity in South 
Africa;  both were to improve South Africa's business environment.  Finally, he said that the previous 
month, TMB – together with IFC – had announced  support for the Indian Exim Bank to support 
exports of Indian SMEs.  The Tokyo Mitsubishi Ba nk would like to gradually build up these types of 
transactions to contribute to Aid for Trade. 
178. The Moderator
 addressed her next question to Timoth y Turner of the African Development 
Bank.  She asked what the African Development Bank expected the recently-launched Global Trade 
Liquidity Program to accomplish and, in the cont ext of what had been said by the previous two 
speakers, what AfDB's expectations were over the next couple of years? 
179. Mr. Timothy Turner, Director, Private Sector Operations Department, African Development 
Bank , said that the GTLP was a response of interna tional financial institutions to the global trade 
crisis that had spun out of the gl obal financial crisis.  The GTLP inte nded to be a pool of resources of 
about US$5 billion provided by between 10 and 15 multila teral and bilateral partic ipating institutions.  
An amount of US$2.5 billion had already been comm itted of which US$1 billion had been signed by  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
 Page 33 
 
 
  the World Bank Group, led by the IFC.  The Board of Directors at the African Development Bank, 
whose contribution would be used exclusively to finance trade in Africa, had approved a 
US$500 million contribution to the programme.  In add ition, there were a number of other bilateral 
agencies and multilateral agencies, and regional devel opment banks that would be part of the GTLP.  
The JBIC was also part of the programme, in a parallel way, for an amount of US$1.5 billion.  The 
aim was to raise a total of US$5 billion which w ould be channeled throug h a group referred to as 
"utilization banks", i.e. those that were large in ternational commercial ba nks, as well as regional 
commercial banks that were very active in trade finance.   
180. As mentioned by a previous speaker, the global fi nancial crisis had not only led to constraints 
on the credit side but also to an even stronger constraint on the liquidity side.  In other words, the 
banks that were financing trade finance did not have sufficient liquidity in US dollars to be able to 
provide financing for trade.  The GTLP was launc hed as a response to this situation, channeling 
liquidity through the large utilization banks to a netw ork of issuing banks and local banks.  The GTLP 
was a global response to the global financial crisis, but  since Africa had been the hardest hit, at least 
one-third of GTLP resources were expected to go to Africa.  The GTLP's principal mechanism was a 
risk participation structure whereby the utilizati on banks, with their local correspondent or issuing 
banks, would generate trade receivables and then re quest from GTLP refinancing of 40 per cent.  The 
risk sharing arrangement meant that GTLP would take  40 per cent of the risk and that the commercial 
market would take 60 per cent.  In other words,  with US$5 billion of funding, which was then 
leveraged up by 60 per cent from the commercial institu tions, this would typically be an average of 
about 270 days' financing over a three-year pe riod and would lead to around US$50 billion in 
additional liquidity for the marketplace – of which it was hoped that approximately US$15 billion 
would be for Africa.  Now that the GTLP had been launched, it was hoped that in the course of the 
next few weeks it would move into execution and im plementation mode with the objective of moving 
the resources as quickly as possible. 
181. In response to the Moderator 's comment that, in looking at the African Development Bank, 
this would provide a cushion for insurance agencies a nd their clients to be able to actually begin to 
move things forward over the next three years, he said that the GTLP was a temporary, transitional arrangement with a two-year termination date – al beit with a possibility of extension.  The idea was 
that liquidity would be provided to address the cu rrent constraints and that, thereafter, the GTLP 
would slowly move out of the market as commerc ial financing came back to its normal levels. 
182. The Moderator
 then asked Arin Jira, as head of the ASEAN Business Advisory Council, to 
give an idea of where he expected new demand to come from within the current crisis, and how the 
Business Advisory Council was facing the situation?  She mentioned the fact that, in recent years, 
ASEAN had pushed to expand access for its products w ithin Asia by signing free trade agreements 
with Japan, China and the Republic of Korea wh ich had expanded ASEAN's home market to cover 
about two billion people. 
183. Mr. Arin Jira, Chairman, ASEAN Business Advisory Council , said that the Asian economies 
were in a good position to cushion what was happeni ng in the current financial crisis.  This was 
because lessons had been learnt from the 1997-1998 Asia n financial crisis.  Many companies had also 
developed corporate strategies to avoid the crisis  and to undertake trade investment and business 
activities regionally.  Pained at seeing lost invest ment, the companies had been trying to secure the 
half-a-billion-people market of ASEAN and also to further move into the two billion consumers 
involving Japan, China and the Republic of Korea.  As a result, governments of ASEAN countries, in 
partnership with the private sector, were riding ou t of the crisis quite satisfactorily.  The common 
aspiration for countries in the region was to be more  self-sustaining and not to rely too heavily on 
Western market-style influence and financial instituti ons.  Malaysia was a good example of this trend.  
During the Asian financial crisis it had not follo wed IMF prescriptions and had managed to work 
outside the conventional wisdom to succeed.  That w as something from which others could learn.  He WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 34  
 
  was of the view that consumerism in ASEAN count ries remained strong and that those countries still 
had purchasing power;  demand for goods and services would remain and be sustained locally and 
regionally.  As far as the ASEAN Business Adviso ry Council was concerned, it had noted that 
investment risks in China, quotas and safeguards, intellectual property protection, and environmental 
risks were driving global firms to diversify and shif t production out of China.  That situation could 
provide opportunities for the ASEAN's private sector .  A further example was the fact that Japan 
imported about 60 per cent of its food.  Even t hough demand and exports we re down, demand would 
always be there, but just in a smaller quantity, and that the opportunity was there for many countries to replace China as a supplier due to concerns ove r quality and standards generally.  But to do this, 
trade financing was needed, especially for SMEs – to whom the banks were not lending at all.   
184. Turning to the issue of market  access, he said that the intern ational global market offered 
more opportunities for companies in the region.  In  collaboration with governments, efforts had been 
made to ensure that Western countries did not apply protectionist measures.  During the Asian financial crisis, for example, international in stitutions in Western countries were suggesting 
liberalization as a salvation measure to enable investment and take-over of some ailing Asian 
companies.  The only question that arose was how op en would the Western market be to welcome the 
penetration of the Asian products and services.  As ian countries also had a lot of natural resources 
which were in goods required worldwide, both for food and for energy security, and also alternative 
sources derived from agricultural products which were more affordable. 
185. He concluded by saying that the question of using China, ASEAN and other Asian economies 
to lead the world out of the current crisis was a rh etorical one since this was not in the minds of the 
private sector or relevant stakeholders.  The globa l financial crisis was bad for everyone and ASEAN, 
for its part, was closely following the statem ents of economic and financial experts.   
186. In response to the comment by the Moderator that the Asian economies did not expect the 
West to behave differently to what they had prescr ibed during the Asian financial crisis, he said that 
as the East had done, the West was looking at reca pitalization of government banks, and at saving 
some of the big companies.  A lot could be learnt from what the West was doing on trying to be more 
stringent with these institutions which, in turn, would have an impact on the global financial 
institutions.  This was something that woul d help in overcoming the financial crisis. 
187. Turning to infrastructure investment, the Moderator
 then asked how Mr. Jira saw that type of 
investment and whether he thought it would offer a stimulus to the economy? 
188. Mr. Jira  said that he fully supported the idea of infrastructure investment and had 
recommended to the ASEAN leaders that there was no better time to build infrastructure than the 
present.  The time to build infrastructure was wh en everything slowed do wn so that when the 
economy picked up you would be able to go faster than the others.  Of course, money was needed to do this and he said he was sure that AsDB c ould provide resources.  The geography of ASEAN 
countries prevented movements of goods and services, and people, and caused divergence in levels of 
development.  Indonesia and the Philippines were a case in point.  These countries were made up of 
thousands of islands and many analysts were qui ck to assume that their respective governments did 
not take care of the people.  If one looked at the primary cost, this could be seen as a result of a lack of infrastructure.  Lao PDR, for example, was la ndlocked with no sea ports to facilitate the movement 
of goods.  It relied on roads that remained insignifican t and poor.  What was needed was to ensure that 
the proper measures were taken so that goods destin ed to go through Lao PDR did not end up going 
through other countries.  Direct flights to secondary or tertiary cities in ASEAN were also difficult.  
And some flights from ASEAN to Europe were shor ter and cheaper than the secondary and tertiary 
cities.  What was interesting – and in a sense good news – was that one could argue that the reason 
this region was not significantly effected by the cu rrent global crisis was because it was cut off from 
the world market and therefore not too much inf ected by the global market trading system.  He  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
 Page 35 
 
 
  therefore fully supported infrastructure building a nd said it was something that governments, not only 
in ASEAN but everywhere, should also support. 
189. Continuing on the issue of infrastructure, the Moderator  then asked Mr. Vinod Kala, whose 
company, Emergent Venture India was heavily in volved in providing services to mitigate climate 
change through consulting on carbon value lifecycles , how the carbon value lifecycle could generate 
investment resources for infrastructure development?  
190. Mr. Vinod Kala, Managing Director, Em ergent Ventures India Pvt. Ltd. , explained that 
carbon credits came from a structure and procedure d esigned to invest in projects that reduced carbon 
dioxide emissions or greenhouse gases.  Reduced carbon emissions resulted in carbon credits which 
had value in monetary terms and c ould generate investment surplus.   The reduced carbon credit could 
therefore generate value in the international mark et.  Carbon credits could, for example, generate 
value for investment in important and fundament al infrastructure in developing countries.   
191. Such a project could be, for example, a wind energy plant built to reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions by a factor of about two thousand tons per mega watt of the capacity that was created in a year which, on a ten-year timeframe, could generate  approximately 30-40 per cent of investment that 
had gone in to creating that particular plant.  All that credit could actually be sold.  By designing the 
project according to universally defined methodologies and actually selling the credit well, over approximately 10 years almost 30-40 per cent of the value invested could be generated just by carbon trades.  Sometimes the projects qualified for 21 years so that percentage would be higher.  It was interesting to note that developing countries had very high levels of renewable energy resources 
which so far had not had any value at all.  These in cluded, for example, agricultural waste, and forest 
waste where forests became carbon sinks due to abso rbed carbon dioxide.  There were also other 
infrastructure areas where a lot of investment su rpluses or carbon credits could be generated by a 
developing country without resorting to aid or lo ans.  These included plantations (both bio fuel and 
commercial), and waste treatment (for example, me thane gas from cattle waste).  In India, for 
example, the gas generated from cattle waste could pr ovide electricity to villages – both as a source of 
light and for a cooking medium.   In this way, an entire investment of roughly US$35-40 million 
would more or less be covered, over a timefra me of about 10 years, through carbon credits. 
192. The issue of climate change was an urgent one an d required cooperation at international level.  
A single country could not solve the problem on its own.  Developing countries were responsible only 
for 20 per cent of the problem in climate change, ye t 80 per cent of the solution could be found in the 
developing world by investing in renewable energy resources that had not been valued so far (e.g., 
solar power, agricultural waste, and forest r esources) and thereby reducing carbon emissions.  
Investments could also involve local communities which could have a huge impact on poor people.  
The prediction was that approximately US$150-300 b illion every year would need to be invested 
across the world to effectively combat climate change  issues.   If climate change issues were tackled 
well, and if the world came up with the right kind of structure for post-2012, this would have a huge 
impact not only on development and poverty reduction, but also on the ability to live. 
193. The Moderator
 then opened the floor for comments. 
194. Addressing the issue of renewable energy in developing countries, the representative of 
Zimbabwe  said that there was the problematic issue of coal deposits.  Most energy in developing 
countries was generated from coal and while it was true that there was a lot of interest to invest in 
coal, there was very little interest regarding issu es of renewable hydro or solar energy because the 
capital injection needed for those i ssues was higher than that needed  for coal.  He asked Vinod Kala 
how this issue could be dealt with so that ther e was less coal-energy generation and more renewable 
energy projects? WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 36  
 
  195. In reply, Mr. Kala
 said that this was a classic problem.  Renewable energy was still new and 
there were few players that could develop renewabl e energy projects.  There was little clarity as to 
what policies should be used to promote renewable energy.  In India, for example, the problem was 
that, although a coal waste power plant could easily generate electricity at something like six cents a 
kilowatt hour, how could an investment be just ified in a solar power plant which would cost 
something like 25 cents a kilowatt hour?  However, if one was to disaggregate the problem and look 
at the economic system, most renewable energy sources started to become justified.  This was the way 
that policy-makers needed to look at it.  A lot of policy work needed to be done to see what kind of 
renewable energy could be promoted.  It was not a question of just creating a system of subsidies to support renewable energy; renewable energy was very co mparative in itself.  The other factor that was 
not accounted for, especially in Africa, was the co st of carbon which in itself could actually justify 
investments in renewable energy.  A lot of thou ght was therefore needed about how and where to 
justify renewable energy.  Another interesting factor  was that it was just like any other new industry.  
The cost of renewable energy generation was fallin g very significantly and a policy needed to be 
created to keep the future in mind; renewable energy would then definitely start to flow.   
196. Addressing his question to Timothy Turner, the representative of  Zambia
 asked, when talking 
about collaborative funding, in particular trade re ceivables, what guarantees there were that the 
partnership and benefits w ould be passed on to the private sector and how would that be done?  What 
should not happen was that this became a means of  bailing the banks out as opposed to bailing out the 
trade receivables. 
197. In reply, Mr. Turner  stated that the GTLP would only be refinancing new trade receivables.  
The utilization banks that qualified to participate in the GTLP had a network of correspondent issuing 
banks – i.e. the local banks – that were performing the trade finance transactions.  As they generated 
new receivables, these would go into "pools" for ri sk sharing to get the GTLP to purchase 40 per cent 
of those trade receivables.  So the GTLP, whose administering agent was the IFC, would be looking at the receivables presented to determine whether or not th ey were valid, i.e. whether they were kinds of 
sectors that GTLP wanted to support, were they the right institutions that GTLP had agreed to 
support, the right maturities, or the right instrume nts, etc.  There was a good control mechanism in 
place to ensure that the resources went towards st imulating new trade as opposed to bailing out ailing 
banks.  It was also interesting that, through th is mechanism, the utili zation banks – i.e. the 
international banks – would always keep 60 per cen t of the risk and were therefore not looking to 
subsidize any of the local banks.  They just wanted to be able to turn over that business faster.  The 
GTLP was, in effect, a substitute; it was helping to r ecreate the secondary market for trade receivables 
which had all but dried up as a result of the financial crisis. 
198. The representative of Djibouti
 addressed his question to all the panellists.  He said that in the 
1990s, when the IMF was promoting structural ad justments, there had been limited government 
interventions, particularly in industrial type project s.  Now, as a result of the current economic crisis, 
governments were increasingly nationaliz ing banks and were intervening as regulators.  This had been 
done on a massive scale within public companies in th e framework of automobile companies, or other 
companies that had found themselves in a complex situ ation.  Given this situation, he asked whether 
the principle of liberalization itself could be called into question?  The private sector in developing countries was not performing very well because of  a lack of funding and technology, and the 
government's role was becoming increasingly significan t.  As the principle of liberalization had now 
been discussed for some time, he asked wh ether that principle was still being used. 
199. The Moderator
 said that she would ask the panellist s to address this question during the 
summing-up of the Session by looking at how they saw the industry that they represented from the current perspective vis-à-vis  perhaps what they might have looked like in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s 
when those kinds of decisions were made.    WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
 Page 37 
 
 
  200. She then invited Mr. Mehta of Power Technics, Ke nya to provide an insight as to what sort of 
challenges his company faced in respect to its opera tions in Kenya, Tanzania  and Uganda and whether 
the various financial institutions were in fact  providing the support they had spoken about? 
201. Mr. Naresh Mehta, Chief Executive Officer, Power Technics, Kenya , said that the Kenyan 
vision of achieving industrialization by 2030 could onl y be ensured if there was sufficient industrial 
capacity.  Aid for Trade could help companies such as Power Technics and other SMEs in East Africa 
to build that capacity.  Industrial capacity would lead to trade but trade would only flourish with a sustained industrialization process focusing on thr ee key areas: trade finance, building industrial 
capacity, and intellectual capacity.  Power Technics, for example, had used intellectual capacity in 
industry property rights to protect some of the e quipment that it had designed and developed locally.  
If all the parameters worked in conjunction, there w ould be success.  Turning to trade finance, he said 
there was a lack of long-term credit to source capita l goods.  Most of the banks were giving credit for 
five or six years, or five plus one, or six plus one, normally with a one-year moratorium (or four if it 
was for capital equipment) and if this long-term  credit was available the working capital could be 
used for growth, building capacity and mobilizing t echnology for high-productivity.  Energy was also 
fundamental to this industrialization process and i nvestment should be encouraged in this sector.  
From the perspective of East Africa, for example,  only 15 per cent of the people had power in their 
homes.  The energy sector offered opportunities fo r growth.  Business collaborations should be 
encouraged and sub-contracts created with SMEs and multinational companies which in turn could 
lead to sustained local supply chains.  Barriers shoul d be eliminated and special treatment accorded to 
developing country SMEs.   
202. Turning to industry capacity, he said there were three key areas for growth:  energy 
infrastructure, information and communication technologies , and roads.  Aid for Trade could help in 
these areas by facilitating and supporting what compan ies such as Power Technics and other SMEs in 
the energy sector had embarked on.  Laying a foundation for cottage industries or grass roots 
industries was fundamental for the industrializa tion process; over time and with the right support, 
those cottage industries could become small-scale in dustries.  One of the ch allenges in this respect 
was to bring new entrepreneurs and innovations in to the system, e.g., building local capacities and 
manufacturing electrical engineering products.  An ex ample of this concerned the mobile telephone.  
Ten years ago there were less than 100,000 mobile phon es, today there were over 17 million.  A lot of 
infrastructure was therefore needed in terms of energy, towers, and servicing the equipment which 
was being installed in the country.  Unless a cap acity and process to use the technology were built, 
servicing of this high-tech equipment again became a problem.  Focus therefore needed to be put on 
training so that any possibility of failure was reduced.  He referred to the fibre optic link that was soon 
to be installed in Mombassa which would open ne w avenues for business processes and call centres 
and hence new avenues for growth in trade and industry.  
203. Whilst governments, donor agencies and institutions  were looking at projects that would take 
years to complete and implement, renewable energy su ch as in the area of minor hydro, solar, or wind, 
were a good place to start to already get projects up and running.  An example of this was the 
experience he had had with the African Growth Oppo rtunity Act (AGOA) that had assisted in creating 
capacity in the garment industry.  Power Technics ha d been involved with rega rd to developing power 
needs for several garment industries when AGOA had been announced.  AGOA would help Africa 
even more if it was expanded to include othe r non-traditional manufactured items which would 
enhance local industrial capacity. 
204. With regard to intellectual capacity, he said that unless an industrialization process was 
created to absorb people of the region into the sy stem and intellect within the countries, there was 
always going to be a shortage of knowledge workers.    Power Technics and other SMEs were in the 
forefront of the industrialization process and some of the high-level officials who had visited the 
company, including the President of the European Investment Bank, had considered it to be an WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 38  
 
  incubator of knowledge, because of its focus on traini ng.  Aid for Trade could be the catalyst in the 
process and could help companies such as Power T echnics to become centres of excellence.  The 
industrialization process would create capacity to address the country's and region's needs and good 
progress could be made in this regard.  To do th is, governments and regulatory authorities needed to 
play their part as well. Tax incentives could be prov ided for trade.  Barriers such as verification of 
quality and standards by third parties could be redu ced.  Aid for Trade could help here by providing 
investment in quality assurance and training and enforcement of compliance with international 
standards.  Once the standards were implemented, it would create an avenue for growth, employment 
and the establishment of regional standards offices. 
205. In the area of education, aid should be focu sed on teaching equipment which was desperately 
lacking in universities, for example, that offered education in technical fields.  Power Technics had 
been providing donations and bringing in professors a nd lecturers to do the training.  However, if Aid 
for Trade could assist in areas such as teaching equipment, this would fast-track the training of graduates.  Training was a costly area for industri es; it took at least three years for a graduate to 
receive knowledge after training to attain the level of  output expected of an engineer.  As a result, 
industries were looking for trained staff which m eant that an avenue was being closed for new 
graduates coming into the system.  Collaboration w as needed with higher education institutes with a 
view to developing skills and appr opriate industrial needs.  Aid for Trade could assist in setting up 
mechanisms with the authorities to facilitate gradua te training needs.  As an incentive, a direct 
government subsidy or tax rebate coul d be offered to offset the cost of training.  In the long run, new 
trained manpower – and hence income – would be created for the countries involved. 
206. In conclusion, he said that the target of achieving industrialization by 2030 could only be 
achieved if the fundamentals of basic industriali zation processes were well-planned without further 
degradation of the environment.  Developing co untries such as Kenya could learn from the past 
experience of developed countries and ensure that  the burden of cleaning the environment was not 
passed on to future generations.  Aid for Tr ade could help in this important area. 
207. The Moderator
 said that there was huge opportunity for the private sector to get involved in 
supporting this new kind of infrastructure and tec hnology but not enough companies taking advantage 
to actually fuel entrepreneurship .  She turned to Rosa Whitaker a nd asked her to provide additional 
information on what AGOA had been doing. 
208. Ms. Rosa Whitaker, President and Chief Executive Officer, The Whitaker Group , said that 
one thing that AGOA had demonstrated was that market access could definitely work.  AGOA had 
promoted a 300 per cent increase in African exports  to the US markets to reach approximately 
US$66 billion in value.  Non-oil exports from Africa  to the US market had increased by about 200 per 
cent.  Through AGOA, Africa had acce ss to the US market for a wide range of products.  The most 
successful example was in Lesotho where AGOA ha d created 40,000 jobs in the textile and apparel 
industry.  For the first time in Lesotho's history, there were more people working in the private sector 
than in the public sector.   
209. The differing results experienced under AGOA and other market access initiatives had come 
about because a comprehensive approach was needed .  It was almost disingenuous to talk about 
providing market access to countries with dysfunctional systems, or dysfunctional states.  Without the capacity to trade, trade finance, technical assistance, or technology transfer, market access meant very 
little.  There had been enough studies to confirm that  80 per cent of the business constraints in Africa 
had to do with infrastructure, power and transport and the Aid-for-Trade initiative really needed to 
focus on these areas.  Focusing on infrastructure, power and transport would significantly reduce the 
cost of doing business in Africa and spur regional trade.  Africa's level of regional trade was only about 10 per cent - the lowest in the world.  An approach with results-oriented interventions was 
needed and she recommended that  the Aid-for-Trade initiative should support an expanded facility  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
 Page 39 
 
 
  within the African Development Bank that would establish an infrastructure fund at the Bank to 
provide loans and grants to support infrastructure in African countries. 
210. While AGOA had created jobs and had certainly  made a considerable change regarding 
exports to the US, it had not prompted the desire d investment response.  A new AGOA was being 
drafted for the current US Administration that fo cused on tax incentives.  Tax incentives were very 
important because they worked.  US companies that invested in labour  intensive sectors, particularly 
those that had multiplying effects and value addition in Africa, would be able to repatriate profits back 
to the US without taxes.  They would also get ta x credits for wage and fri nge benefits for African 
workers and a tax credit for sourcing products that we re made with significant African content.  The 
next level that the new AGOA was aiming for was to  have a trade capacity building fund to provide 
the kind of technical assistance to which Power Tec hnics had referred.  As a result, it was hoped to 
globalize market access.  She concluded by saying that the EU and the US should provide similar 
market access and that she would like to see a global AGOA. 
211. The Moderator  commented to Rosa Whitaker that the same result would not be seen in hard 
infrastructure unless there were harmonized custom s verification or quality assurance systems.  
Investment was dependent on the business environment.   
212. Ms. Whitaker  agreed and noted that there were a lot of donors that were willing to invest to 
make the business environment work.  She cited a proverb "money is coward, it does not go where it 
fears".  It was important for the Aid-for-Trade initia tive to invest in those areas where notable results 
were being achieved and where other donors were re luctant to provide support.  That was why she 
had suggested that Aid for Trade should have a sp ecific focus on infrastructure, power and transport 
while at the same time coordinating other donor assistance around the business environment.  It was 
equally important for the systems to be harmoni zed as could be seen from the models for those 
countries that had been successful in developmen t and tracking investment.  Those countries had 
infrastructure, a good business environment, rela tively strong institutions, and they focussed on 
education.  In sum, the donor response with the private sector should be a coordinated one. 
213. Turning to the issue of good policy development, the Moderator  then asked Ms. Whitaker 
whether she thought that SMEs had the conduits to  have their voice heard by the business community 
and by governments? 
214. In reply, Ms. Whitaker  said the Whitaker Group was an SME and that SMEs in Africa would 
have a greater voice if they were in the game.  Fo r this to happen, in addition to increasing the voice 
of SMEs, a mechanism should be found that could st rengthen the SME network throughout Africa.  In 
this respect, she referred to the success of Coca Co la's distribution centre which had enabled SMEs to 
get into the supply chain and which had create d not only an additional 12,000 jobs but also 
US$500,000 in income.  Another example was the brewers SABMiller who had just announced an 
investment initiative in Angola which would cr eate 66,000 jobs.  Global companies should be 
encouraged to bring SMEs into their supply chain and more technology transfers should be made to 
SMEs.  SMEs needed a greater voice and needed to  get more into the game of global trade.   
215. The Moderator  addressed a further question to Mr. Me hta regarding SMEs having their voice 
heard or getting into the game and contrasted what might have happened if they had been in ASEAN.  
She recalled a visit she had made to Malaysia wher e she had seen many training institutions that were 
all private-sector led and which were there to co mplement the growth that was taking place.  The 
question of franchise could also be one of the so lutions to providing some of these entrepreneurial 
mechanisms to take care of opportunities.  She asked whether there really was a vibrant SME 
community that had its voice heard? WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 40  
 
  216. Mr. Mehta
 referred to Kenyan Industrial Estates a nd noted that in every town there were 
industrial estates that were developed to create small-scale industries wh ich would coordinate 
activities and become part of the su pply chain.  Taking the example of Korea, India and China with 
regard to vehicle plants, the idea was that ancillary industries that were surrounding a vehicle assembly plant would be working in tandem with it.  That had created a growth avenue for newly 
industrialized countries, including, for example, Indo nesia, Malaysia, and others.  If the same focus 
was applied in Africa it would provide an opportuni ty for small-scale industries to thrive.  Some 
companies had progressed rapidly, especially where in formation technology centres were concerned.   
217. The Moderator
 asked Mr. Jira if, from the ASEAN Bu siness Advisory Council perspective, 
SMEs were getting their voices heard? 
218. Mr. Jira  said that the situation in ASEAN countri es was no different from elsewhere.  SMEs 
everywhere in the world were complaining about how difficult it was to get financing and this was 
something that governments around the world should be helping with.  He argued that donors should 
look into the situation because many SMEs were capab le of doing so much but were unable to do so 
because they could not find the credit.  This was th e case not only in Asia but in Africa as well.  The 
problem was turning talk into action. 
219. The Moderator  addressed her final question to the Gene va representative of the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), noting that the ICC represented not only SMEs but a broad base of the private sector right across the globe.  She asked what  ICC's perspective was on what was taking place, 
where solutions existed, and what the private sector  perspective was on the topic of Aid for Trade? 
220. Ms. Jacqueline Cote, Permanent Representativ e in Geneva, International Chamber of 
Commerce , stated that ICC had broad representation fro m both small and large companies and laid 
particular emphasis on bringing SMEs into its policy dialogue.  For the private sector to fulfill its role 
as an engine for growth, ODA spending had to be  devoted to (i) infrastructure (e.g., roads, 
telecommunications, energy, and rail road imports );  (ii) regulatory frameworks (i.e. business 
environment);  (iii) knowledge (e.g., education and allowing SMEs to have access to financial 
services);  and (iv) fair and competitive global mark ets.  There was no one-size-fits-all solution.  In 
this respect, it was good to be able to see specific examples in certain countries of what had worked.  
Solutions would vary by continent and by country.  Only so much could be done at the global level.  
Promoting the discussion at national and regional level was essential.  This was the view that the Aid-
for-Trade initiative had also taken.   
221. For the private sector to make investments, access to finance was essential.  ICC had carried 
out a global survey in Spring 2009 of the 122 banks which participated in the ICC banking 
commission.  The survey had come up with some of the same conclusions that had already been 
mentioned during the course of the discussions.  Fo r example, priority areas were trade facilitation, 
trade guarantee facilities, increasing financial liquidi ty pools, and improvement  of export insurance 
processes.  Referring to trade facilitation – which in cluded customs modernization, capacity building, 
and building up the competence of governments – Ms. Co te said that for the last ten years the ICC had 
been strongly advocating a WTO agreement on trad e facilitation.  ICC hoped that an agreement on 
trade facilitation would be one of the outcomes of the Doha Round. 
222. The Moderator  noted that ITC saw the private sector playing three important roles:  (i) a 
beneficiary role;  (ii) as a provider of Aid for Trade,  particularly in the area of infrastructure, where 
the private sector could provide financing; and (iii) as  a route to market.  In ITC's view, it was critical 
to match real needs with where the resources went.  She then opened the floor for further comments. 
223. The representative of Nepal  stressed the need to focus on infrastructure development, 
particularly physical infrastructure such as power, transportation, and information and communication  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
 Page 41 
 
 
  technologies, which were important in order to bui ld up the productive capacity of LDCs.  Aid for 
Trade should be able to intervene in this area  and the multilateral funding agencies and bilateral 
donors should focus on providing this kind of infrastructure so that LDCs could build up their productive capacity.   
224. The representative of Barbados
 noted that the notion of public-private partnership was 
extremely important because it helped to determin e buy-in.  It also helped to determine the 
sustainability of aid projects and to ensure that the private sector was involved in the medium- and long-term monitoring of those projects.  Referring to the discussion on the regional dimension of Aid for Trade and the need to accelerate interaction on regional processes, he asked whether there was any 
existing interface between SMEs a nd regional organizations?  If so, wh at was the level of interaction 
between SMEs and these regional organizations in term s of public-private partnership?  Barbados had 
taken note of the idea of a possible SME network to ensure that there was some role and interaction 
for SMEs in the decision-making process, but would be interested to learn of best practices with 
regard to enhancing the relationship between th e private sector and government agencies.   
225. In relation to infrastructure projects, he asked what was considered to be the role of the 
private sector in developing and supporting infrastruct ure projects?  He said there was a role for the 
private sector to take ownership of certain infrastru cture projects which would have direct short- and 
medium-term benefits.  As far as basic infrastructur e, such as roads, was concerned, Barbados could 
understand the suggestion that even in the current time of financial crisis one should continue to 
enhance, build and maintain infrastructure.  For th e Caribbean, where secondary  infrastructure such as 
tourism was needed, he asked whether it was respons ible, from a fiscal point of view, to continue to 
implement infrastructure projects given the current financial climate? 
226. The representative of Ecuador
 said that Ecuador paid particular attention to the statements 
relating to the importance of SMEs in developi ng Aid-for-Trade development programmes and it was 
taking the development of SMEs into account in its national development plan.  Ecuador believed that 
this was essential in order to achieve economic deve lopment and to be able to integrate into trade 
strategies and other instruments.  Obviously a deve loping-country SME was very different in size to a 
developed-country SME and it was very important to  bear this mind.  One problem in Ecuador, for 
example, was the lack of liquidity and financial cap ital to be able to export and import.  There was 
also the problem of international standards, some of which had been set up by multilateral 
mechanisms and others by private institutions.  Th is was a serious problem and was something to be 
borne in mind in the context of the development of Aid-for-Trade programmes.  With respect to 
competition, Ecuador believed that it was essential th at the importance of private sector participation 
was incorporated into Aid for Tr ade.  This stemmed from the fact  that Aid-for-Trade programmes 
could help with technology transfer .  Another important area was the facilitation of acces s to markets, 
including on the supply side.  That was where all thes e factors came into play.  He asked the panellists 
how, in their experience, did they believe Aid fo r Trade could be strengthened, particularly in 
developing-country SMEs?  In conclusion, he sai d that Ecuador shared the comment expressed by 
Barbados with regard to the de velopment of an SME network. 
227. The representative of Malawi  recommended the establishment of regional bureaux for 
standards.  With regard to investment and addr essing supply-side constraints, one should not lose 
sight of the issue of promotional investment.  This was something that could be taken up, for example, 
by the international chambers of commerce because they needed to be enco uraged to modernize and 
to share experiences.  Malawi had recently been classed as one of the most peaceful countries in 
Africa and he invited the international chambe rs of commerce to assist Malawi in promoting 
investment in some of its crucial sectors. 
228. The representative of Sudan  said that the issue of restructuring services had been discussed 
but not private-sector involvement in agricultural in vestment.  He asked how the right model for this WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 42  
 
  could be found so that private-sector partnership in agriculture investment could benefit both the 
people in Africa as well as the investors, and how SM Es could be a partner with a foreign investor in 
agriculture?  Sudan hoped that the recently-launc hed GTLP would specifically consider agriculture. 
229. The Moderator
 noted that the point about the challenges and opportunities with regard to 
private-sector investment in agriculture was an im portant one.  She said that there were probably 
some best practices and models of what had been  done and what had worked so that SMEs could 
benefit from public-private partnerships.  Some sp ecific questions had been targeted at the ICC, 
including with respect to SME development and te chnology transfer, and she asked Jacqueline Cote 
what some of the benchmarks were in terms of pub lic-private partnerships and asked her to provide 
examples of the regional dimension to this issue.   
230. In response, Ms. Cote  said that one of the roles of the private sector that had not been 
mentioned thus far was its role as an advisor to governments in how they should apply their Aid-for- 
Trade funds.  The private sector – including large companies and even some of the smaller global 
companies – had an enormous amount of knowledge th at could be beneficial on the supply chain and 
on how projects were managed a nd funded, and on how performance could be improved.  If ICC's 
view was sought on these very fundamental manageme nt points, programmes could go a lot further.  
The private sector had a lot to gain from Aid for Tr ade and, equally, had a lot to contribute.  There 
was a need for strengthened dialogue at the local le vel and global organizations such as ICC could 
facilitate in this regard and be the agent for the di alogue to take place.  She agreed that the private 
sector had a lot of untapped potential and said sh e had seen good presidential, ministerial or 
government private-sector advisory committee models that worked best when they were broken down 
by sector.   
231. Another way to engage the private sector was through joint ventures but the problem there 
was that companies in the developing world were mo stly too small to have an effective partnership 
with the larger companies.  However, there we re models where the government and donors would 
help to organize cooperatives and structure them into arrangements where smaller companies could 
work with larger companies.  Finally, she said that  there were a lot of untapped resources going to the 
developing world through foundations.  Corporate social responsibility was more "philanthropic 
capital" and this capital was not being mobilized or  tracked.  This was another approach whereby 
countries could raise capital and also have strategies  that dealt directly with  the consumers.  There 
were now more socially conscious consumers – American teenagers, fo r example, spent about 
US$1 billion dollars on clothing and an initiative, Purc hase for Africa, had just been launched to get 
them to purchase those clothes from African factori es.  There were a lot of innovative approaches for 
African countries to engage the private sector and also global consumers.  
232. Ms. Whitaker  said much could still be done.  Private co mpanies tended to retain staff even in 
times of crises so that when things picked up they coul d be the first in the system to take off.   There 
therefore had to be some mechanism to understand the role of the private sector and how it could help 
countries in terms of sustaining social responsib ilities.  The experience that the Whitaker Group had 
had in technology transfer had, for example, helped it create an export market out of Kenya to the neighbouring countries and beyond.  So technology transfer partnerships had also assisted during 
difficult times as well.  It was interesting to hear public-private sector partnerships being cited as an 
important way of building infrastructure, especially w ith regard to climate change.  In this respect, 
Asia and Africa had examples of where the government, private sector and local community had all 
worked successfully together. 
233. Mr. Jira
 said that Aid for Trade was a very good initiative.  It was important to involve the 
private sector in the initiative becau se trade was carried out primarily by that sector.  It was also 
important for the private sector to understand government initiatives so those initiatives could be 
followed and appropriate advice given.  What needed  to be stressed was that financial schemes should  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
 Page 43 
 
 
  be created for SMEs.   Although the importance of building infrastructure had been referred to, 
equally important was human resource development in which governments should play a big part. 
234. Mr. Turner  said that the African Development Ba nk was an example of an institutional 
public-private partnership and work on infrastructure was a priority both on the public and private side.  The issue of regulatory frameworks was also  a high priority and the Bank worked with the 
government through its public sector windows on this qu estion.   Access to fina nce was also a priority 
for the Bank because of the current situa tion in the international markets.   
235. Mr. Masutani
 said that in the implementation stage the role of the commercial bank was very 
important and the Tokyo Mitsubishi Bank had a lot of  expertise which it could share with the other 
players involved in trade finance issues. 
236. Mr. Jones  said that two points had come out of th e discussion.  The first was that regional 
integration was not only particularly relevant to A frica, but also to any grouping of small developing 
countries.  Countries needed to integrate their ma rkets to create a domestic market large enough to 
compete in the global marketplace.  The second was that one had to make sure that liquidity guarantees, structures, and programmes were made available to developing-country SMEs to support 
their business growth.   
237. In summing-up the Session, the Moderator
 said that it was clear that the private sector had a 
critical role to play – be it with respect to acce ss to finance, access to human resources, or access to 
knowledge – when countries set their priorities and de termined where resources went.  The right kind 
of mechanism had to be found so that a public-pri vate dialogue could take place, whether it was on 
policy formation and how the private sector accessed finance, particularly for SMEs.  Another 
important issue that had come up in the discussion was the question of regional standards bodies.  For 
cross-border trade to expand and m ove forward, regional standards al so had to be accepted otherwise 
the existing third country trade would continue.  On the issue of human resource development, the 
question was how that was going to be done.  Here there was a potential role  for regional centres of 
excellence to ensure that resources matched current needs.  The role of investment also played an 
important part in moving forward a nd expanding trade and all countries were interested in finding the 
right mix of policies to attract the right kind of investment.  The regulatory environment was critical 
for infrastructure to work properly,  for business to work properly, a nd for attracting the right kind of 
investment.  It had also been made clear that financial institutions need ed to operate within a 
framework which built trust and confidence.  On pub lic-private partnerships , a number of questions 
had been raised, including:  what were the right ki nds of public-private partnerships; what were the 
best kind of benchmarks to look at;  and what was the role of public-pri vate partnerships in the area of 
agriculture.  There were best practices of public -private partnerships and the dissemination of 
information about where these partnerships were working was something to be considered.   
VI. SESSION 5:  AID FOR TRADE – MAINSTREAMING TRADE IN NATIONAL  AND 
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPETITIVENESS STRATEGIES 
238. Addressing his first question to Minister Udenwa, Nigeria, the Moderator, Mr. Ricardo 
Meléndez-Ortiz, Chief Executive, International Ce ntre for Trade and Sustainable Development 
(ICTSD) , said that although Nigeria's economic grow th was expected to continue its positive  trend in 
2009, staying at just over two per cent, the econom y was nevertheless dependent on one commodity.  
He asked what Nigeria's dependence on petroleum products meant for its economy and for its foreign 
trade? 
239. Minister Achike Udenwa, Minister of Commerce and Industry, Nigeria , said that up to now 
Nigeria's economy had depended on oi l which contributed to over 80 pe r cent of its revenue.  Changes 
in the global economy and world politics had caused problems with regard to oil prices and Nigeria's WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 44  
 
  oil income had fluctuated.  Nigeria had neglected ma ny of its other main sectors such as agriculture, 
manufacturing, and minerals with the result that, until recently, little or no income had been coming 
from these sectors.  Nigeria's oil income had been u sed to invest in manufacturing, especially in basic 
industries such as iron and steel, petro-chemicals, a nd fertilizers.  Unfortunately, most of these basic 
industries had collapsed because they had not been  properly managed by the Government.  On a 
positive note, Nigeria had been able to reduce its foreign debt from about 36 per cent in 2004 to 
four per cent in 2007.   
240. The Moderator
 said that he understood that the Nigerian Government was trying to push for 
market reforms necessary to diversify its export b ase and generate long-term growth.  These reforms 
were no doubt challenging and he asked whether the realities of politics in such a diverse and young 
nation would mean that progress would be slow? 
241. Minister Udenwa  said that Nigeria had made quite a lot of progress over recent years.  Nigeria 
had celebrated 10 years of continuous democracy a nd, in October 2010, would celebrate 50 years of 
independence.  A lot had happened in the past, but over the last ten years – and especially during the current President's regime – many reforms had been  implemented such as in the areas of tax, trade, 
banking, and legislation.  There were currently many reforms that tried to remove public sector 
monopolies and to diversify the economy by bringi ng in the private sector.  These included, for 
example, in the areas of ports, the power and en ergy sector, and railways.  The private sector was 
playing a more important role in Nigeria's economy.  Trade was also now part and parcel of Nigeria's 
national planning.  All of this, together with politi cal stability, meant that Nigeria had become a very 
important and viable market for future investments. 
242. The Moderator
 agreed that in terms of long-term gr owth this sounded very positive and, as a 
final question to Minister Udenwa, he asked what ro le Aid for Trade could play in Nigeria's continued 
economic growth? 
243. Minister Udenwa  referred to the fact that Nigeria was a developing country and many of its 
neighbours were LDCs.  The role of Aid for Trad e was crucial in carrying out the reform process 
which was needed to build capacity, to stabilize a nd to increase confidence in Nigeria's economy, and 
to build supply-side capabilities.  Aid for Trade could help maintain c onsistency and economic 
policies which, in turn, would lead to growth in  industry, for example in SMEs, by standardizing 
programmes and producing exports at more competitive prices. 
244. Turning to Minister Prasidh, Cambodia, the Moderator  asked how, given his many years of 
accumulated experience as Trade Minister, he saw th e current crisis and whether it made him question 
Cambodia's faith in the export-led model of growth? 
245. Senior Minister and Minister of Commerce, Cham Prasidh, Kingdom of Cambodia , noted that 
at the time of the 1997 Asian financial crisis when  many South East Asian countries were badly hit, 
Cambodia, had been able to make a speedy recovery  due to its open trade policy.  In the present 
economic crisis, however, countries were trying to c ope with an even worse situation which affected 
food, fuel, flu and finance.  Cambodia was now star ting to see the impact:  factory closures had laid 
off some 63,000 workers;  there had been a 20 per cen t drop in tourist arrivals;  and the construction 
sector was at a standstill.  Cambodia had doubled its GDP growth in the past five years, but this year,  
the IMF had forecast Cambodia's 2009 GDP growth at minus 0.5 per cent.  This forecast had since 
been revised to 2.5 per cent, but it was still lowe r than the double-digit figures to which Cambodia 
had been accustomed.  All this inevitably had fi nancial repercussions and support was needed to 
ensure that Cambodia remained afloat.   
246. Export-led growth needed to continue, and more market access was needed.  This led 
Minister Prasidh to express concerns about back-doo r protectionism.  He argued that LDCs in Asia  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
 Page 45 
 
 
  should enjoy the same trade preferences as other LDCs.  Aid for Trade was important as a stimulus 
package for LDCs.  There was also a need for increased trade finan ce; goods were there to export but 
traders did not have the money to buy them.  Cambodia intended to pursue export-led growth, whilst at the same time pushing for greater duty-free and quota-free market access arrangements.    
247. The Moderator
 asked Minister Prasidh to expand on his experience of aligning donor 
resources to promoting economic diversificati on and growth and how Cambodia's Trade SWAP 
programme – which was an interesting mode l in this regard – had been set up. 
248. Minister Prasidh  said that the objective of the Trad e SWAP programme was to initiate 
dialogue among all relevant stakeholders – incl uding government, private sector, development 
partners, financial institutions, academia, and civil society – to forge a national consensus on a 
common economic policy for Cambodia's needs and requirements.  It was important to receive 
coordinated and well-channeled assistance, which w as geared to the needs expressed by beneficiary 
countries.  In Cambodia's Trade SWAP programme, tr ade groups – or trade pillars – which consisted 
of government officials, experts and consultant s were used as a mechanism to design and prepare 
projects in core areas such as reform, product development, services for export development and 
capacity for trade development.  He envisaged now a dding trade finance to the list of trade groups.  It 
was important that these mechanisms conformed with the Paris Principles on alignment, harmonization, transparency, and accountability.
5 
249. The Moderator  noted that Zambia was also dependent on one commodity, i.e. copper.  
Referring to the fact that the price of copper in international markets had dropped from US$3.15 per 
pound in 2008 to roughly US$1.90 per pound in 2009, he asked what this price decline had done to 
the Zambian economy? 
250. Ambassador Mwape, Permanent Representative to the WTO, Permanent Mission of Zambia, 
Geneva , said that not only was Zambia  dependent on one commodity, copper, but it was dependent on 
the mining sector more generally.  There had been a slight improvement in the price of copper, which 
was now just over US$2.25 per pound, and the out look was more optimistic, but he said that the 
financial crisis had lowered demand for commodi ties which had provided only minimal foreign 
influence in Zambia.  This had had consequences on Zambia's inflation rate which had risen to 
16.6 per cent – almost double what it had been before  the crisis – and Zambia's local currency had 
been devalued by over 27 per cent.  Another ne gative impact was on the mining houses which were 
cutting costs by reducing their labour force.  Some 10 ,000 coal-mining jobs had been lost as a result.  
Government revenue – particularly during the seco nd quarter of 2009 – had also suffered drastic 
reductions to approximately US$60 million dollars.  This was particularly significant for a small 
economy such as Zambia.  The solution to these ne gative impacts was to reduce the cost of doing 
business, including in the transport and energy sector s.  For example, how could the costs of moving 
goods to markets be reduced and how could more pow er be generated in order to reduce customer 
tariffs.  Zambia was therefore looking at measures to mitigate the negative situation and to diversify 
its economy away from copper.   
251. The Moderator  noted that falling copper earnings had also  translated into decreased domestic 
demand in other sectors.  He asked what that declin e had meant for Zambia with regard to its efforts 
to diversify its economy, particularly in the ag riculture and services sector? He wondered if regional 
markets offered a way out of the situation? 
252. Ambassador Mwape  said that Zambia considered that diversification was key to overcoming 
the current situation.  The economic  crisis had led the government to refocus its economic priorities.  
Zambia had started promoting divers ification within the mining sector, looking at other metals such as 
                                                      
5 Paris Declaration on Aid E ffectiveness, 2 March 2005. WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 46  
 
  gold and nickel.  It was also looking at resetting pr iorities in the agriculture and tourism sectors and 
creating policies that would attract investment.  The North-South Corridor project showed that 
regional markets were important a nd that being landlocked was no longer a disadvantage.  Countries 
could take advantage of being "landlinked" by using the available markets around them.  With this in mind, Zambia wanted to go beyond the regional ma rket aspect and benefit from the global multilateral 
trading system.  The Doha negotiations, in which Zambia had been actively involved, was therefore 
an important remedy to its situation as a small economy. 
253. Commenting on the fact that Zambia, as an LDC,  was eligible to benefit from the Integrated 
Framework, the Moderator
 asked Ambassador Mwape what that initiative had achieved in Zambia? 
254. Ambassador Mwape  said that the EIF was an important tool and had assisted Zambia in 
mainstreaming trade into its fifth National Devel opment Plan for 2006-2010, as well as in setting the 
right priorities.  This, in turn, had assisted donor s in their decisions on where to make specific 
interventions.  The EIF also ensured country owners hip by facilitating private sector involvement and 
coordination with the government and by being in strumental in leveraging additional Aid-for-Trade 
funds over and above those available in the EIF Trust Fund. 
255. Turning to the Latin American region, the Moderator  recalled that inflation in Peru in the 
1990s had been close to 7,000 per cent and income pe r capita had been falling sharply.  Poverty had 
increased by 10 per cent and was affecting almost half  of the population.  Over the last 20 years, 
however, Peru had been able to turn this situation around.  Since 2005, its GDP had been increasing at 
a rate of between approximately five and 10 per cen t per annum and the prospects for growth in 2009 
were roughly 3 per cent.  Peru's economic performance was a lot bette r than many OECD countries.  
He asked Ms. Liliana Honorio, Peru, what role tr ade and trade policy had played in enabling the 
Peruvian authorities to turn this situation around? 
256. Ms. Liliana Honorio, Coordinato r for Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Tourism, 
Peru, said that trade had played a fundamental role in turning around Peru's fortunes and was a key 
catalyst for its economic growth.  Peru aimed at exporting a diverse range of high quality goods and 
services products.  Peru was of the view that any process of integration had to be based on improving 
quality of life and reducing poverty.  This was achieved by improving access to export markets 
through facilitating exports, provi ding more positive investment conditions, and making good on its 
commitments.  This process of turning trade into  a key component of its development agenda had 
entailed three major stages for Peru:  the opening up of its trade regime;  the inclusion of the private 
sector in negotiations on the Free Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA);  and  the development of a 
trade for development agenda.   
257. The Moderator  then asked how Peru had managed to secure private sector involvement in 
trade negotiations and also what role had been played by other groups?  
258. Ms. Honorio  said that by involving all stakeholders in the process, including various social 
partners, employers, trade unions, academia and othe r civil society groups, it had been possible to 
keep the private sector interested.  There had been total support from the public sector. 
259. The Moderator  noted that Peru was a middle income-country and it had limited access to 
grant funding.  He asked what role Aid for Trade c ould play for Peru and what trade-related direction 
Peru would be taking in the future. 
260. In reply, Ms. Honorio  explained that at the time of the FTAA negotiations there was a 
hemispheric cooperation programme that had built trade negotiation capacity.  This had provided 
incentives for the further strengthening of what w as Peru's current Ministry  of Foreign Trade and 
Tourism.  Regional trade arrangements were playin g an important role in economic growth in the  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
 Page 47 
 
 
  Latin American region.  In each agreement, there wa s a chapter on trade capac ity building.  The role 
of Aid for Trade was therefore fundamental to Peru  not only to ensure that it could implement its 
various trade-related obligations, but also so that  it could take advantage of and benefit from the 
opportunities that trade opening offered. 
261. The Moderator  turned to the Integrated Framework (IF) and its role in getting LDCs to 
mainstream trade in national development plans and into PRSPs (Poverty Reducti on Strategy Papers).  
He said that given the fact that the IF Secretar iat's focus was on working with national authorities to 
identify their trade constraints and getting the domes tic policy-environment right it could be difficult 
to show tangible outcomes.  In this respect, he asked Ms. Dorothy Tembo what the IF had achieved 
with mainstreaming and how its impact c ould become more tangible in the future. 
262. Ms. Dorothy Tembo, Executive Director, E nhanced Integrated Framework Executive 
Secretariat6, emphasized that the ultimate goal was to inte grate LDCs into the global economy so they 
were able to trade and reap tangible benefits.  Mainstreaming was a means of reaching that goal but 
this also had to be accompanied by specific interv entions that addressed the constraints identified as 
part of the DTIS (Diagnostic Trade Integration Studies)  process.  In other words, mainstreaming trade 
policies and international developm ent strategies required the syst ematic promotion of mutually 
reinforcing policy action across government departme nts and agencies creating synergies in support 
of agreed development goals.  In practical terms, th is required a lot of work on the part of countries 
that had already indicated their capacity constraint s not only in relation to ensuring that effective 
institutional structures were put in place, but also in  relation to being able to undertake the necessary 
needs assessment and pinpoint what priority areas needed to be addressed.  The pace at which this 
process moved forward depended on the respective count ries' different situations.  She said that over 
time it had become clear to countries that the PRSPs  and DTIS taken together could ensure that 
relevant trade issues were take n on-board and included in national development strategies.  This 
reflected an increased recognition that trade could pl ay an important role in development objectives.  
This had been demonstrated by the fact that out  of the 31 LDCs who had responded to the Aid-for-
Trade partner-country questionnair e, 17 had acknowledged that trade was a priority and had been 
included in their national development plans, and othe rs had stated that trade had been mainstreamed 
into other policy t ools such as sector policy and budget.   
263. One of the current challenges was accompanying mainstreaming with the necessary human 
and financial resources.  The role of the EIF was important in this respect because it could assist countries in the coordination of institutional di alogues and resource mobilization from either the 
national budget or from the donor side.  Countries clearly recognized the need for a concrete 
foundation as far as institutional set-up was concerne d, without which it would not be possible for 
them to move forward in a coordinated way and ach ieve tangible results.  It was therefore important 
to work with countries to ensure that the appropria te institutional structures were put in place, that 
there was effective dialogue and, finally, implemen tation of the programme.  Another key element in 
the process was enhanced country ownership;  countr ies had to take a lead in identifying their needs 
and how help should be provided.  Countries had al so recognized the importance of the role of the 
donor facilitator to collaborate with the EIF Focal  Point and to assist in  committing the necessary 
financial support.  In conclusion, she said that the EIF was an important tool that LDCs could use to 
tap into the broader Aid-for-Trade resources that were available.   
264. The Moderator
 then opened the floor for comments. 
265. The representative of Sri Lanka  said that Sri Lanka was not categorized as an LDC but, as a 
net food importing and net energy importing country, it was classed as a low- to middle-income country.  As an import-export economy, Sr i Lanka relied on two commodities (apparel  and tea) and 
                                                     
 
6 The Enhanced Integrated Framework Executive Secretariat was established on 13 October 2008.  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 48  
 
  two export markets (EU and US) both of which had been affected by the current economic downturn 
and financial crisis.  Commodity prices had gone down due to a decline in  demand and exports had 
seen a 7.2 per cent decline over the first quarter of  2009.  There had also been a large decline in 
imports and in tourism – which was Sri Lanka's major income sector.  The external shocks and impact in these four areas had been very severe.  He stressed the importance of Aid for Trade for Sri Lanka 
but noted that, according to the figures quoted in the OECD-WTO Aid for Trade at a Glance 2009 
report, in 2007 the total amount of Aid for Trade given to Sri Lanka had declined by 50 per cent 
compared to 2002 and 2005.  To overcome the negati ve impact of the economic downturn, Sri Lanka 
could now look forward to developing its tourism industry which had for some time also been 
thwarted by internal terrorism.  However, to achieve  this Sri Lanka needed an objective, transparent, 
and proper analysis of the security situation and to have the adverse travel advisories immediately 
removed.  Sri Lanka was now beginning a new chapte r in its history and needed short-term standby 
arrangements.   In this regard, technical details and discussions had been completed but there had still 
not been a satisfactory conclusion. 
266. The representative of Burundi
 said his comments concerned the coordination of aid and the 
identification of needs in respect of  Aid for Trade.  On the issue of aid coordination, in some countries 
Aid for Trade was considerable but sometimes the need s were not properly identified.  Burundi, itself, 
had faced that problem in that there were many parties and organizations involved in a specific sector but often that had not been clearly identified.  Difficulties had arisen, for example, where non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that were accredite d to work in a clearly identified specific sector 
had expanded and widened their activities with the r esult that the Government did not always know 
exactly what the NGO was doing and where it was workin g which, in turn, resulted in ineffective aid.  
If aid was to have a positive effect it needed to  be properly managed and properly channeled. 
267. Regarding the identification of needs, he said that although most international bodies or 
organizations worked in their own specific and clearly defined area – e.g., capacity building or 
infrastructure financing – they might not necessarily be  able to identify all the problems.  Burundi, for 
example, was now trying to improve  the situation that had arisen with the private sector – one of the 
driving forces behind economic development.  USAID was helping by providing assistance to 
Burundi's private sector to enable it to become mo re competitive.  This was important in Burundi 
because, due to savings levels being very low, its financial and banking sectors were not very efficient 
and could not provide the necessary medium- or long-term financing required to set up and run 
projects.  Up until recently this problem had not been properly identified but now some of Burundi's 
partners were getting invol ved to help these particular sectors become more efficient both nationally, 
regionally, and internationally.  The targeting and management of aid were therefore equally 
important so that the aid went to the right place and had the right effect. 
268. The representative of Pakistan
 said that local ownership of programmes was crucial for their 
success and that they needed to r espond to local needs and aspirati ons.  Pakistan's trade policy was 
well integrated into its economic growth policy but without capital inflows integration could be very 
difficult.  The need for Aid for Trade was felt very acutely in South Asia.  Pakistan was of the view 
that the 900 million poor people of Asia would be pushed further into hunger and poverty if Aid for 
Trade was not given the support it required from donor s.  Although perhaps not a correct assessment, 
he noted that the figures regarding Aid-for-Trade flows to Asia over the last three years had been static.  Enhanced Aid for Trade was needed to overcome the major challenges faced in Asia which 
included high emerging costs, infrastructure deve lopment, trade financing, diversification and 
competitiveness and, in the case of Pakistan, the add itional burden of the fight against terrorism.  
Pakistan hoped that the Second Global Review would look at these issues so that Aid for Trade could 
be streamlined and better channeled to furthe r augment development in the Asian region. 
269. Turning to mainstreaming by donors, the Moderator
 asked Ambassador Horn af Rantzien 
whether, from the perspective of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
 Page 49 
 
 
  (SIDA), the increase in Aid-for-Trade resources from donors suggested that donors were responding 
to the call for Aid for Trade.  He noted that, taki ng the EU alone, 22 of its 27 member States had Aid-
for-Trade operations.  He asked if the challenge was now one of coordination, rather than resource 
mobilization? 
270. Ambassador Mia Horn af Rantzien, Deputy Director-General, SIDA , referred to the joint Aid-
for-Trade strategy adopted by the EU in 2007 wh ich embraced the full Aid-for-Trade agenda as set 
out in the Aid-for-Trade Task Force recommendations.7  Looking at the figures, the trend was one of 
increasing mainstreaming of Aid for Trade into EU de velopment operations.   She said that in fact 23 
out of the 27 member States had activities in the field of Aid for Trade and that 11 member States, including Sweden, had an operational strategy for Aid for Trade.  There was also a lot of work being 
done in other countries.  There was therefore an upward trend in terms of mainstreaming but she 
stressed that much work remained  to be done.  One of the important challenges that remained, which 
was also the case with regard to SIDA, was that Ai d for Trade was still not sufficiently mainstreamed 
into the policy dialogue that EU member States had with partner countries.  Collaboration between 
donors, which had been underlined in the Aid-fo r-Trade Task Force Recommendations, the Paris 
Principles, and also the EU Code of Conduct, had to  be improved in order to make the aid that was 
delivered efficient.  An important aspect of this was to increase the join t work relating to needs 
assessments and to improve the strategy formulation with regard to division of work in terms of 
delivery and evaluations.   
271. Turning to the regional level, she said that it wa s clear that this was an important area and, 
looking at EU figures, support for regional integration appeared to be capturing an increasingly 
prominent share of the EU Aid-for-Trade agenda.  Some member States, for example, had taken 
specific measures to address the regional level, such as creating specific teams focusing on regional 
problems.  Challenges also remained at the re gional level relating to regional needs.  Here, 
mechanisms needed to be improved that translated  those needs into effective and articulate demands 
for regional and sub-regional Aid for Trade to wh ich donors could respond.  There was also an 
obvious need to improve coherence between na tional and regional priorities and to improve 
coordination at the regional level,  both between donors and between partner countries.  Sweden gave 
high priority to results- and poverty-based Aid for Tr ade which was also the base line for the EU Aid-
for-Trade strategy.  Sweden and the United Kingdom had volunteered to lead work within the EU on 
strengthening the core focus and quality of Aid fo r Trade and she said mainstreaming of trade into 
national development plans could be better achieved by enhancing the understanding and 
implementation of Aid for Trade and developing met hods and toolkits to improve the efficiency of 
donors. 
272. With regard to the global level, she said that a nu mber of gaps in this area had been identified 
and listed in the Aid-for-Trade Task Force recommenda tions and that is was im portant to continue to 
refer to this list to ensure that all the gaps we re being addressed.  Important gaps that had been 
identified, for example, were the "lack of data on and analysis of trade policies and their impact on 
development" and "better data and statistics ar e a precondition for better understanding the process of 
globalization and its impact and fo r determining priorities for devel opment cooperation".  The current 
global economic crisis and the recent efforts with re gard to monitoring had revealed the importance of 
dealing with data gaps such as on subsidies, procurement policies, and non-tariff measures more 
generally, and their impact on exporte rs and developing countries, in order to know whether the right 
measures were being taken in terms of development cooperation.  Aid for Trade was very important to 
fill these data gaps. 
273. In conclusion, she said that the strongest in centive for mainstreaming trade was to show 
results on the ground and there had been many examples of how Aid for Trade could contribute to 
                                                     
 
7 WT/AFT/1, 27 July 2006. WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 50  
 
  growth, employment, and poverty reduction - and how a results-based approach in delivery would 
promote mainstreaming to a higher level.  As th e Aid-for-Trade Task Force had recommended, it was 
important to emphasize the need for concrete a nd visible results on the ground.  The Second Global 
Review and the importance of monitoring and eval uation had also provided strong incentives for both 
donor and partner countries to mainstream trade and to see it as a tool for development.  It also 
provided an incentive to advance the Aid-for-Trade agenda in their respective countries.  The Global 
Reviews could be used as a regular forum through wh ich all concerned could continue to learn from 
each others' experiences by showcasing what trade could do to reduce poverty  
274. Referring next to the Netherland's repl y to the OECD-WTO Aid-for-Trade donor 
questionnaire, the Moderator
 asked Mr. Johannes Smeets what th e Netherlands needed by way of 
engagement from developing countries to make  good on its commitment to spend at least 
€550 million per year on all categories of Aid for Trade? 
275. Mr. Johannes Smeets, Deputy Head, Internati onal Markets Division, Sustainable Economic 
Development Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands , said that the reason behind the 
Netherlands' pledge was the need for Aid for Tr ade to make a contribution to delivering the 
Millennium Development Goals, not only by encour aging sustainable economic growth, but also by 
improving the position of the poor.  He said that e ngagement by developing countries was crucial to 
achieving these goals and that growth and trade – as well as social sector polices – should be 
incorporated into developing countries' national povert y reduction strategies.  This would ensure that 
Aid for Trade remained demand-driven and involv ed civil society and the private sector.  The 
Netherlands fully supported the Enhanced Integrat ed Framework and believed that the EIF could be 
used to provide support to LDCs so they could ma instream trade in national development plans and 
into PRSPs.   
276. Engagement with developing c ountry governments on Aid for Trade should also be expanded 
to include the private sector, foreign investors and local entrepreneurs, who also had important roles 
to play.  In the Netherlands' Aid-for-Trade progr ammes, public-private partnerships were becoming 
increasingly important.  Corporate social responsib ility was essential for both the workforce and the 
environment in developing countries as well as for maintaining support for the globalization process.  
Aid-for-Trade activities which included corporat e social responsibility should help combat 
protectionism by promoting positive incentives for de veloping countries in their efforts to perform 
better in such areas as labour standards, climate and environment protection, and human rights.  
Success also depended on the engagement in developing  countries being reflected in targeted efforts 
by donor countries.  Good coordination at reci pient country level as well as at donor headquarters 
level was essential for better harmonizat ion and alignment of donor activities. 
277. The Netherlands attached great importance to its cooperation with other EU member States 
and other donors.  In this regard, the joint EU Aid -for-Trade strategy should help to ensure that the 
broad Aid-for-Trade agenda would be implemented more effectively in EU partner countries through 
a results-based approach that harmonized and coor dinated donors' efforts in accordance with the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.  The Netherlands  wanted to achieve concrete results through the 
EU Aid-for-Trade strategy but striving to be effective was not sufficient.  The demand-driven 
proposals that were expected from beneficiary count ries and regions needed to be properly supported 
by harmonization and coordination of procedures a nd efforts at donor headquarters level.  The 
Netherlands had therefore informed the EU Commi ssion that it was prepared to be involved in 
thematic working parties – that operated within sectors such as trade policy and regulations, business 
and other services, agriculture, transport and storage, energy generation, etc. – so that the EU Aid-for-
Trade strategy could contribute to more effectiv e and coordinated implem entation of both new and 
existing EU programmes.  One such example of this  was the EU-Africa partnership on infrastructure.  
Although many EU programmes were by nature  part of the EU Aid-for-Trade strategy 
implementation, an Aid-for-Trade coordination mech anism at headquarter level was still needed.   WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
 Page 51 
 
 
  Better coordination of donor programmes would also  stimulate engagement by developing countries 
and lead to a national consensus. 
278. The Moderator  then referred to the Aid-for-Tra de event held in Montego Bay8 and asked 
Ambassador Tucker, what had been done in Belize sin ce this event to leverage trade further into its 
national development strategy? 
279. Ambassador Adalbert Tucker, Ambassador for Fo reign Trade, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Foreign Trade, Belize , said that Belize was a small country that operated within the CARICOM 
region.  The technical expertise and other tools de monstrated at the Montego Bay meeting had been 
an important stimulus for Belize's national dialogue  and vision on Aid for Trade and the role trade 
should play in national development.  Belize was no w better able to appreciate what could be offered 
through regional cooperation.  Mainstreaming trade was crucial for Belize and it had been made clear 
at the Montego Bay meeting that issues such as pr oductivity, interactions between human beings – 
within a country, within a region, and in a broader,  global sense – also had to be taken into account.  
Belize therefore needed to look at several areas, at the same time ensuring that  it operated within the 
commitments of its regional relationships with in both the CARICOM and the Central American 
regions.  Taking all these factors into consideration and bearing in mind the specific requirements of 
Belize, a three-year Action Plan 2009-2012 had been set out to provide a systematic approach to achieve mainstreaming.  The Action  Plan incl uded an institutional aspect, the private sector, the 
regional partners and capacity building of human resources. 
280. Belize was also looking at how to target bilate ral programmes to build particular capacities 
which might not be directly trade-related but whic h provided the underpinning for a society that was 
intent on becoming more productive.  For Belize, a national public awarenes s campaign – led by the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs – had also played a crucial role in demonstrating the importance of 
mainstreaming trade into Belize's national strategies.   The issue of national public awareness had been 
written into a public project and the OECS (Organization for Eastern Caribbean States) had recently confirmed that it would be preparing a project document leading to a possible full scale project that 
could be replicated in other countries of how one geared up a country that had not previously had 
trade as its core element.  Working groups compo sed of representatives of ministries, the private 
sector and a consultant had also been used as me chanisms through which the specific elements of 
Belize's national development st rategy had been outlined. 
281. Addressing a final question to Mr. Paulo Kautoke of  the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, the 
Moderator
 asked what plans the Forum Secretariat had to  take the Aid-for-Trade work forward at a 
regional level with its member countries that faced particular constraints and challenges due to their 
geography and location. 
282. Mr. Paulo Kautoke, Representative to the WTO, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Deputy 
Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Tonga to the WTO , said that the Pacific was the 
smallest of the regional groupings and faced a num ber of challenges in taking advantage of the 
potential opportunities that trade liberalization might bring.  The Pacific Island countries (PICs) 
needed assistance to build their supply-side capacities in  order to engage meaningfully in international 
trade and, to this end, over the past few years ha d undertaken a number of initiatives to address their 
trade-related needs.  The Pacific Aid-fo r-Trade strategy, endorsed by Pacific ACP9 Trade Ministers at 
their meeting in Samoa on 15 and 16 June 2009, w as driven by the Pacific Plan for Strengthening 
Regional Cooperation and Integratio n for which there was now broad alignment with the regional 
plans of the Pacific's major development partners .  Its vision was "to create conditions necessary for 
achieving dynamic trade-related growth, promo tion of cultures and traditions, sustainable 
                                                      
8 Latin America and Caribbean Regional Review held in Montego Bay, Jamaica on 7 and 8 May 2009. 
9 The African, Caribbean an d Pacific Group of States. WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 52  
 
  management of resources, and part nership with neighbouring and worl dwide economies".  An integral 
part of the strategy, which aimed to provide a cost  effective and efficient way of delivering Aid for 
Trade in a timely and effective manner, were the pr inciples of ownership, alignment, harmonization, 
management for results and mutual accountability  as set out in the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness.  The vision would be achieved throug h four strategic goals which had been aligned to 
the categories outlined in the Ai d-for-Trade Task Force Recommendations, namely (i) to create a 
trade policy and regulatory environment that was conducive to achieving sustainable economic growth in PICs;  (ii) to overcome supply constrai nts in a manner that increa sed the private sector's 
contribution to development;  (iii) to upgrade infrastru cture in a way that stimulated trade integration 
and development;  and (iv) to integrate into regional and global market s through appropriate 
macroeconomic adjust ment measures.   
283. In order to achieve these goals, the PICs, with  the assistance of the Pacific Islands Forum 
Secretariat, were in the process of defining in greater detail four focal programmes aimed at improving their institutional capacity for trade policy and regulations, developing the productive 
capacity for trade, enhancing trade-related infrastru cture, and at promoting trade-related adjustments 
and other trade-related measures.  So far, eight regi onal project interventions had been identified with 
a total budget of approximately US$68 million.  Th is figure was expected to be higher if large 
infrastructure projects were also included.  In addition, there were currently 74 national project 
proposals with a combined funding of nearly US$110 million.  The list of national projects would be updated on a regular basis to reflect the e volving process regarding the identification and 
prioritization of a country's trade-related needs.   Project profiles for both regional and national 
projects had been prepared and were now being di scussed with specific development partners with a 
view to mobilizing Aid-for-Trade funds.  The PICs would continue to work on outlining in greater 
detail the expected outcomes of the projects in orde r to clarify the links between each individual 
project intervention and the achievement of higher regional objectives.   
284. While significant progress had been made, the im plementation of Aid for Trade in the Pacific 
had been challenging and there was still much work to be done to ensure that the PICs did not become 
Aid-for-Trade orphans.  In this regard, the PICs  urged the international community to support the 
Pacific Aid-for-Trade strategy and to provide assist ance for its implementation which would occur at 
both national and regional levels.  While pilot programmes were probabl y the most appropriate way to 
finance most of the national interventions, the PICs  were also considering establishing a Pacific Trade 
and Development Facility (PTDF), the aim of which was to channel Aid-for-T rade assistance to the 
Pacific Island countries efficiently and effectively in support of the Pacific Aid-for-Trade strategy.  
The PTDF would also enhance donor coordinati on in mobilizing Aid-for-Trade resources for 
strengthening supply capacities to the PICs. 
285. With respect to the sequencing of implementati on of the Pacific Aid-for-Trade strategy, the 
PICs would first need to ensure that the appropriate  institutional mechanisms were in place in order to 
absorb Aid for Trade and a system of national Aid -for-Trade focal points – with a mandate similar to 
those already up and running under the Enhanced In tegrated Framework – would be set up in this 
regard.  These focal points would liaise with the P acific Islands Forum Secretariat which had been 
mandated to manage regional Aid for Trade.  The ca pacity of the national focal points needed to be 
strengthened if they were to assess their country's trade-related needs and prepare project proposals that effectively addressed constraints.  Strong em phasis would be placed on developing the capacity to 
manage and monitor project implementation.  The PICs should make significant advances in respect 
to its Aid-for-Trade strategy but there was still much work to be done.  The elaboration of the Aid-for-
Trade strategy and the proposal to establish a trad e development facility was a significant attempt not 
only to help the beneficiaries but also to bridge the gap with development partners. 
286. 
The Moderator then opened the fl oor for comments.  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
 Page 53 
 
 
  287. The representative of Mali  said he wished to highlight some  technical aspects concerning the 
issue of obstacles to the strengthening of trade in a country's national devel opment strategy.  Mali had 
been able to develop its trade development po licy in coordination and with the cooperation of 
UNCTAD.  For effective planning, LDCs needed a medium-term financial fra mework.  Another point 
related to the principles of the Paris Declaration wh ich provided the basis for Aid for Trade, including 
the Integrated Framework, and he asked what place did those countries which had not signed or 
acceded to the Paris Declaration have in the implementation of the Integrated Framework?   
288. The Moderator  asked each of the panellists for a fina l word on how the mainstreaming agenda 
should be pursued in the future. 
289. Minister Udenwa  said that Nigeria had tried to improve  its non-oil exports over the years and, 
although it was now at an advanced stage in carry ing out reforms so that non-oil exports would 
overtake oil exports, it nevertheless needed support.  He stressed that Aid for Trade was not just 
important to developing countries a nd LDCs.  Industrialized nations should ensure that the Aid for 
Trade made available was to their own interest be cause LDCs or developing countries were a source 
of raw materials and a final destination of ma nufactured goods.  For world economic stability it was 
important to ensure that aid was directed at impr oving the national policies of developing countries 
and LDCs. 
290. Minister Prasidh  said that Aid for Trade and the D oha Development Agenda were like 
Siamese twins;  they shared one single heart and ne ither of them could exist alone.  For that reason, 
pressure should be exerted on both;  on the Aid-for-Trade side, to see how Aid for Trade could be developed using the EIF and other facilities such as the STDF or multi-donor trust funds, and, on the 
Doha Development Agenda (DDA) side, with rega rd to duty-free and quota-free market access for 
LDCs.  In respect to the latter, he referred to th e recent decision by the Council for Trade in Goods to 
waive for another ten years the requirement that some developing countries could extend preferential 
treatment to LDCs without having to give also the same treatment to other WTO Members.  His other 
message was that there needed to be a strong politic al will for change.  Aid for Trade had to be the 
tool through which further reforms could be made to advance the trade agenda and to reduce poverty. 
291. Ms. Horn af Rantzien
 said that, in her view, the Aid-fo r-Trade Task Force recommendations 
were the Paris Principles in practice and that a dhering to those recommendations would be a way of 
working along the lines of the basi c ideas behind the Paris Principles.  Spotlighting Aid for Trade as a 
tool for development was working and should conti nue.  But in order to continue support for the 
initiative, focus also needed to be developed on what  worked, both in terms of process and in terms of 
actual implementation of projects and programmes, to  show results and that Aid for Trade was an 
effective means for poverty reduction.  She sai d coherence between different policy areas was 
important, especially in a time of crisis, as was the need  to fill the data gap.  Sweden attached great 
importance to strengthening and continuing the pro- poor Aid-for-Trade approach.  The EIF and other 
instruments that had been mentioned during the discu ssion were also important to ensure that Aid for 
Trade worked at a country level. 
292. Ms. Honorio  stated that more detailed information regarding Peru's situation and the recent 
Aid-for-Trade event that had taken place in Lima10 was contained in the documents that Peru had 
distributed to participants.  An important additional tool that Peru used to map out and clearly identify 
its needs was its national strategy for building tr ade capacity which channeled the requirements of 
various sectors and set them in order of priority.  This had taken into account all thematic areas which 
had been deemed to be important and had been  accomplished with the assistance of multilateral 
agencies and organizations.  Aid for Trade was one of Peru's priority areas and Peru was taking full advantage of what it offered.  Improvements needed  to be made, however, because there were reforms 
                                                     
 
10 National Dialogue on Aid for Trade held in Lima, Peru on 3 March 2009. WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 54  
 
  underway that needed to be concluded.  One su ch example was the need to better distribute the 
benefits accruing from trade;  Peru had achieved eco nomic reforms which now had to be turned into 
social benefits and development, including poverty reduction. 
293. Ambassador Mwape
 emphasized that although the EIF wa s limited in terms of the resource 
capacity that it could provide to LDCs, it was inst rumental in leveraging additional Aid-for-Trade 
finances from bilateral cooperating partners over and above those available in the EIF Trust Fund.  
The EIF also assisted in ensuring country-ownershi p of projects and programmes by helping to set 
country's institutional frameworks in place and assess needs and priorities so that bilateral donors 
could direct their interventions accordingly. 
294. Briefly summing up the discussion, the Moderator  said that the impressive display of 
knowledge and experiences on Aid for Trade made it clear that Aid for Trade did work but that more 
resources and more work was needed.  It was also clear that discussion of the financing and other needs of developing countries for integration into gl obal markets was something that belonged at the 
WTO.  Three key outcomes of the session were that :  (i) Aid for Trade could respond to a country's 
vision with respect to its national growth strate gy;  (ii) that ownership went beyond national 
governments and that strategies needed to be built with  the participation of all stakeholders;  and (iii) 
that export-led growth could only be achieved through access to markets. 
VII. SESSION 6:  AID FOR TRADE – REGIONAL IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCES  
A. COMESA-EAC-SADC
 NORTH -SOUTH CORRIDOR  
295. The session began with the presentation of a short film on the North-South Corridor.11  The 
Moderator, Mr. Jon Snow, Channel Four News , described the Corridor as one of the most tangible 
and exciting projects associated with Aid for Trade and a testament of extraordinary cooperation both 
across and between continents.  He set out a nu mber of issues for discussion including what the 
Tripartite Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and East African Community (EAC)  Arrangement was trying to 
achieve with respect to the project;  how important the project was for prospective beneficiaries such 
as Zambia;  how important it would be in reducing the transport costs of commodities in the mining 
industry and exports of metals and concentrates;  the challenges faced by road transporters and 
improvements expected as a result of a successful conclusion of the project; and the support being provided by the African Development Bank to Aid fo r Trade in general and the North-South Corridor 
Pilot programme in particular. 
296. Mr. Juma Volter Mwapachu, Secretary General, East African Community
, stated that since 
2005, leaders of COMESA, SADC and EAC had met twice a year to see how best to coordinate their 
policies in making their economic spaces robust through trade facilitation, harmonization of 
regulatory systems, and unlocking their bureaucratic systems which sometimes contributed to the high 
costs of doing business.  In early 2008, the Tripar tite heads had agreed to bring these ideas to the 
political level in order to get commitment from thei r leaders.  This had led to the Tripartite Summit 
held in October 2008 in Kampala, Uganda where a number of Presidents from the region had agreed 
to fast-track their regional integration by moving from an informal relationship to a formal legally-
binding relationship which would come about thro ugh the creation of a free trade agreement (FTA) 
and then later a customs union.  He hoped that a meeting of Trade and Infrastructure Ministers, 
scheduled to be held in October 2009, would lead to  an agreement to create the FTA.  The idea was to 
unlock the great economic potential in the region of  which the North-South Corridor was a critical 
underpinning.  That was why the High Level Conferen ce had been held in Lusaka, Zambia in April 
2009.  At the Conference, pledges of US$1.2 billion by developed partners and US$1.5 billion by the 
                                                      
11 The film can be viewed at http://www.northsouthcorridor.org/mediastuff.php   WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  Development Bank of South Africa for projects and programmes directly related to the North-South 
Corridor had been made.   
297. Mr. Darlington Mwape, Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the WTO, Permanent 
Mission of Zambia , said that as a landlocked country the issue of transport was highly important to 
Zambia.  The costs of moving goods from producer s to the markets were high and to ensure 
competitiveness these costs needed to be reduced .  Since these costs could not be reduced 
independently by governments due to  goods having to cross borders, countries in the region needed to 
work together to harmonize procedures to reduce co sts.  In a broader context, if the supply-side 
constraints of least-development countries were not addressed, these countries would not be able to reap the benefits of a successful conclusion to the DDA negotiations.  For Zambia, there were few 
options for moving goods other than through the North-South Corridor.  With respect to in-country 
coordination, Zambia had had to begin coordinating more efficiently within the public sector.  There 
were currently 12 agencies working at the border;  coordination, therefore, was important in order to 
achieve the successful implementati on of the North-South Corridor. 
298. Mr. Nathan Chisimba, President, Chamber of Mines of Zambia
, said that the African copper 
belt had potential to produce large quantities of minerals and as a result the African Copper Belt 
generated much interest in the mining industry.  However, one key challenge was moving the raw 
materials into the mining locations and, in tu rn, moving the produce out of it.  The cost of 
transportation was very high.  Roads, railways a nd energy were major challenges.  Even during a 
boom in mineral prices, mining companies had realized that the existing infrastructure was 'bursting at the seams' as a result of the investment coming into th e region.  Infrastructure was a challenge even in 
good times.  What was convincing about the North-South Corridor project was that, for the first time, 
those in the region were working together.  In th e past, each country had acted alone which was not 
how business worked in the modern world and ho w the global economy was moving.  A programme 
that addressed policy reform at the same time as infrastructure rehabilitation and upgrade was 
attractive.  In the past, there had been statemen ts of intent but no demonstrable movement on the 
ground.  The kind of commitment that was being shown, and the hope that the projects would be 
successfully completed, had encouraged the Zamb ian private sector to give its full support. 
299. Mr. Barney Curtis, Executive Director, The Fe deration of East and Southern Africa Road 
Transport Association , indicated that over 80 per cent of mined goods were moved in and out of 
Zambia by road.  The trucking industry was also  fairly deregulated and provided that you were 
registered in your country, you were free to operate where you liked.  If the railway was unable to 
provide the service required by the market, then moving mining goods would remain primarily on the 
roads.  Some of the challenges included border de lays;  the number and excessive charges levied at 
road blocks;  infrastructure deficiencies;  road saf ety;  and the problem of the HIV pandemic.  He 
hoped that the North-South Corridor would a ddress these long outstanding issues and make a 
difference. 
300. Mr. Alex Rugamba, Coordinator, Infrastru cture Consortium for Africa (ICA), African 
Development Bank , said that the high level commitment that had been demonstrated by Heads of 
State with respect to the North-South Corridor had made it easier for partners to come on board.  
Priorities were locally defined and owned, and the partners' role was merely to accompany the process.  The majority of investments required addressing policy and regulator y issues which was best 
done through ownership and high level commitm ent.  The African Development Bank was 
responding in a number of ways.  First, through capacity building, private sector development, trade 
finance and addressing the supply-side constraint s of energy, transport, and information and 
communication technology (ICT).  Another was through project preparation, for example the NEPAD Infrastructure Project Preparation Facility which was enabling projects to be prepared to a bankable stage.  As coordinator of the ICA, he said that  one way partners were responding to the North-South 
Corridor and other similar initiatives was by worki ng together.  While there was good coordination on WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 56  
 
  the side of RECs, this had to be mirrored by pa rtners.  One vehicle through which this could be done 
was the ICA which was a platform through which th e donors worked.  There we re three main areas 
being addressed including the joint financing of project s, removal of policy and technical barriers and 
promoting private sector participation in infrastruct ure projects.  The ICA would also consider risk 
mitigation.   
301. Mr. Rick Scobey, Acting Director for Regi onal Integration, Africa Region, World Bank
, said 
that the potential of the North-South Corridor was unlimited.  It represented a transformative investment which highlighted not only a new approach to partnership with RECs but also a partnership with development organi zations that the World Bank wanted to support.  There were four 
unique features:  (i) it was African-led, not only by national governments but also by the RECs 
throughout East and Southern African;  (ii)  it presen ted a regional solution to a critical set of national 
problems which, at a time of a global financial crisis , was the way forward;  (iii)  there was an upfront 
recognition of the importance of balancing the hardwa re investments in roads, ports and railways, as 
well as soft investments in policy and administrative reforms;  and (iv) the programme represented a new model for working with development partners in the private sector.  With the North-South 
Corridor, the UK Department for International Devel opment (DFID) had taken the leadership role on 
the donor side and had worked behind the scenes to build a collaborative harmonized framework 
which followed the Accra Agenda for Action, i.e. that donors stop undertaking individual projects but come together in a more harmonized investment frame work.  That was made possible by the fact that 
the RECs had put in place a strong Secretariat which carried out a lot of analytical and investment 
ground work which enabled donors to come on-board .  The World Bank considered the North-South 
Corridor as a transformative investment that would reshape the dynamics of growth in Southern 
Africa. 
302. The Minister for Regional Integration and In ternational Cooperation of Zimbabwe, Pricilla 
Mushonga , gave some insight on the first shared customs post between Zimbabwe and Zambia which 
was expected to open in Septembe r 2009 and which formed part of the North-South Corridor project.  
She highlighted the fact that the project provided a new model and the ability to address poverty.  One 
of the major challenges that was being faced in th e region was informal trade, which largely involved 
women.  The one-stop border post 'Chirundu Model' had been used to integrate the aspect of informal 
traders by building, together with DFID, a centre  where informal traders would be assisted.  The 
'Chirundu Model' would also be replicated to develo p the Beitbridge crossing.  The first step was to 
address the 'soft issues'.  The North-South Corridor provided an opportunity for public and private 
partnerships to move beyond the trade facilitati on issues and address the broader issues related to 
development by mainstreaming trade into development issues.  
303. A lively discussion ensued with significant partic ipation from the floor.  One point made was 
the assertion that some 60 per cent of the additional cost of doing business arose out of the deficiencies on the soft-side of infrastructure,  with only 40 per cent arising from the hard 
infrastructure.  Addressing the problems associated with soft infrastructure was therefore important.  
One way was through the one-stop border post th rough the Aid-for-Trade initiative.  Another 
participant noted the need to ensu re inclusiveness in terms of guaranteeing that all countries in the 
specific region benefited.  In this context, it was mentioned that the North-South Corridor was a pilot 
which would be extended to other countries in the re gion.  The North-South Corridor was a first step 
in a long path on trade facilitation.  In a second phase,  there would be a focus on developing a further 
trade corridor, the 'Nakhala Corridor' which wo uld link Malawi and Mozambique.  Various 
interventions also stressed the importance of ensuring  comprehensive coverage in projects, i.e. to not 
just concentrate on the improvement of roads and ra il but also to include air transport where costs 
were high.  In this regard, the Tripartite task forc e was also looking at air transport within the region 
in order to liberalize airspace and reduce the cost of freight and passengers.    WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  304. To ensure sustainability, additional funds woul d need to be raised from beyond what was 
being provided by conventional Aid for Trade.   Greater political commitment was needed from 
Governments to set funds aside which could provide  additionality in funding various trade facilitation 
projects.  A challenge in this regard was bringing together financial institutions and other lenders who 
were accustomed to short-term lending and not proj ect funding.  Providing guarantees to these private 
players to fund such projects was also a challenge .  Sovereign bonds were now becoming key drivers 
in funding projects of the kind under the North-South Corridor.  Ensuring the involvement of the private sector, including SMEs, was also important in order to ensure buy-in in the various projects.  
In this context, the importance of public-private partnership was highlighted.  In the case of Zambia, 
the Sub-Committee of the Chamber of Commerce specifically looked at infrastructure and the Sub-
Committee's President regularly interacted with Go vernment and other players to ensure that the 
Chamber's agenda was factored into any initiativ es such as the North-South Corridor.  The Zambian 
Business Forum also provided a platfo rm for the private sector to full y integrate in such processes.   
305. The need to ensure buy-in from the population was felt to be critical to ensure a successful 
outcome by some speakers.  In this context, it was important to mobilize the population around the 
areas of improved infrastructure.  There was also a need for accountability, to provide transparency 
and to offer assurances.  This was something that COMESA-EAC-SADC had already put in place.  A Tripartite Trust Fund managed by the Developmen t Bank of South Africa had been set up through 
which all pledges and commitments could be chan neled.  A Steering Body comprising the Chief 
Executive Officers of COMESA, EAC, and SADC had been established and would be the main driver 
of the North-South Corridor projects.  In addition, there was also a Task Force at the functional level 
comprising the Infrastructure/Trade Directors of the Tripartite.   
306. In the view of some speakers, to ensure that the new infrastructure would be able to support 
the consequential traffic and not end up being dilapida ted after a short period of time, it was important 
to move cargo from the roads to the railways.  In  Zambia, for example, there were no rail networks 
near the mines and the Government was calling upon developers to lay railways.  Rail transportation 
was predominantly a "volumes game" and Zambia had taken the decision to become landlinked 
instead of landlocked.  As a result, the idea of regional trading blocks ha d been endorsed and had 
increased the volume of trade with neighbouring co untries.  The government had also invited the 
private sector to get involved in the railway links to  facilitate the increase in volume.  The investment 
currently required had been programmed, but had not materialized due to low commodity prices.  Other interventions made reference to ongoing rail projects including the extension of the Central 
Corridor from Lusaka (Isaka) to Kigali and Burund i, the upgrading of the Northern Corridor from 
Mombassa to Kampala and beyond, and the Lamo Corridor linking Lamo with Southern Sudan and 
Ethiopia.   
307. Questions on sustainability of the programme  in terms of renewing and maintaining 
infrastructure were raised.  In r esponse, it was noted that national road authorities were in place and, 
through fiscal measures, adequate resources could be  mobilized to ensure constant maintenance, 
upgrade and modernization of roads.  There was al so an initiative in place called 'transit road user 
chargers' led by SADC on behalf of the Trip artite alliance.  SADC was producing recommended 
guidelines for the region and many countries already had 'transit road user chargers' in place (US$10 
per 100km).  The problem was that the recomme nded charges contained in the guidelines (already 
adopted), had not been accepted by some Members.  The funds out of the road user charges were 
expected to go back into road  maintenance.  Unfortunately the RECs still did not have enough 
authority at the regional level to ensure th at maintenance occurred throughout the region. 
308. References were also made to energy generation,  in particular the Southern African Power 
Pool Master Plan, which linked Cape of Good hope to Tanzania;  the East African Power Pool, which 
linked the five EAC partner states;  and the East African Power Pool, which linked the EAC countries 
with Ethiopia and Sudan.  It was noted that the RECs were considering merging the two East African WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 58  
 
  plans as it made more economic sense.  Considerati on was also being given to looking at linking the 
Southern African Power Pool with  the East African Power pool so that when there was a deficit on 
one side, power could be released from the other.  It was hoped that the linkages would be in place by 
the end of 2010. 
309. In reply to questions on the on-going momentum on this project, it was noted that every two 
months the RECs held a video conference with deve lopment partners requesting details on the status 
of processing of individual projects, disbursement timelines, etc.  It was remarked that putting in 
timelines that were client-driven and demande d by the donors was the way to proceed.   
310. Comments were also made in relation to the several other trade corridors under development 
elsewhere in Africa, including the Abidjan-Lagos Corridor in West Africa and the CEMAC Transport 
Corridor in Central Africa.  The ECOWAS Secret ariat provided some information on the regional 
projects underway including the West Africa Powe r Pool Project, the Common Policy on Agriculture, 
the Common Industrial Policy, Regional Policy on Competition, Regional Policy of Investment.  
B. G
REATER MEKONG DELTA SUB-REGION  
311. The Session began with a short film which intr oduced the successful developments arising 
from cooperation in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS).12  The Moderator, Mr. Ganeshan 
Wignaraja, Principal Economist, Office of Regiona l Economic Integration, Asian Development Bank , 
recalled that the GMS Program had started in 1992 as one of AsDB's flag ship initiatives supporting 
trade and economic development in Asia's least- developed sub-regions, comprising Cambodia, the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Myanmar, 
Thailand, and Viet Nam.  The programme focuse d on financing and providing technical support for 
sub-regional projects and offered many lessons.  Th e purpose of the break out Session was threefold :  
(i) to discuss the impact and evolution of the GM S project and how it had enhanced trade in one of 
Asia’s least-developed regions; (ii) to examine prio rities and developments in the overall GMS project 
that had emerged since the 2007 Asia-Pacific Region al Review; and (iii) to discuss constraints and 
next steps forward in improving the financing and technical support of GMS projects. 
312. Mr. Cham Prasidh, Senior Minister and Minister of Commerce, Cambodia , said that 
Cambodia had received considerable benefits from th e GMS projects, in particular the infrastructure 
projects which had had a positive impact on econo mic development and poverty reduction.  An 
example was the Phnom Penh-Ho Chi Minh City Highway where there had been an increase of approximately 41 per cent per annum in trade passing through the Bavet/Moc Bai border between 
2003 and 2006.  New residences, s hops and leisure facilities had been established and travel time 
from Phnom Penh had been reduced by 30 per cent.  Transport and customs formalities had been 
simplified for cross-border trade between Cambodi a and Vietnam which, in turn, had eased the 
crossing of goods and persons.  Trade between the two countries had reached US$1.1 billion in 2008, 
an increase of 40 per cent from the previous year .  Both sides were committed to boosting trade 
further through deeper reform and the harmoniza tion of customs procedures under bilateral and GMS 
frameworks.  Of the challenges remaining, one included the need to link the Phnom Penh-Ho Chi 
Minh City Highway to other road networks.  Ports also needed to be upgraded. In addition, Cambodia 
still faced a lack of human capacity, technology and financial support to implement some GMS 
projects.  In the current economic crisis, it was essen tial for countries such as Cambodia to continue to 
benefit from Aid for Trade. 
313. Mr. Arjun Goswami, Head of Regional Coope ration Integration Group, South East Asia 
Department, Asian Development Bank , recalled that the strategic priorities of the GMS initiative 
concerned connectivity, competitiveness and comm unity.  There had been a huge increase in 
                                                      
12 Further information is available at: http://www.adb.org /GMS/default.asp   WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  connectivity (i.e. transport corridors) since the in itiative was launched in 1992.  On competitiveness, 
there had been many efforts to simplify and enha nce cross-border commerce, for example, through 
trade facilitation and the Cross-Border Trans port Agreement (CBTA), the GMS Business Forum 
(which allowed private sector input into sub-re gional investment) and through the promotion of 
agricultural exports.  With regard to the commun ity aspect, the GMS countries had jointly addressed 
shared concerns such as communicable disease cont rol, promoting safe migration, promoting the 
GMS as a single tourist destination, and building capacity for development management.   
314. The Asian Development Bank had a multifaceted ro le in the GMS initiative:  as financier, 
honest broker and coordinator/secretariat. By the end of the 2008, the AsDB had mobilized 
US$11 billion for 41 infrastructure projects in the GMS and US$208 million for 179 technical 
assistance projects.  Efforts had also been made to deepen partnerships with governments, donors, 
academia, civil society, and the private sector.  Implementation of the GMS initiative had led to 
benefits such as savings in travel time and costs,  increases in trade and border crossings, improved 
access to schools and safe water, and decreases in poverty.  With re gard to challenges for the GMS 
going forward, the current economic crisis was of concern.  There was a need for continued 
investments in infrastructure relating, for example, to multimodal transport (road and rail) and energy.  
There should also be an increased mobilization of private investments for the GMS programme, 
including through public-private partnerships. Tran sport corridors needed to be transformed into 
economic corridors, with towns a nd other development projects, and trade facilitation needed to be 
improved.  There should be an enhanced focus on  "soft" areas such as communicable disease control, 
sustainable tourism development, and flood and drought management. 
315. Mr. Oudet Souvannavong, Secretariat-General, GMS Business Forum Secretariat (GMS-BF) , 
said that in spite of the recent improvements in  the trade and investment regimes of the GMS 
countries, impediments were likely to persist.  Th ere was a need for the public and private sectors in 
the GMS to focus their collaborative efforts on a number of pressing concerns.  However, private 
sector organizations were not always consulted or  involved in the conceptualization, planning and 
implementation of Aid-for-Trade projects.  One of  the major achievements of the GMS Business 
Forum had been the organization of a series of GMS conferences and working groups, with the support of GMS governments, private investors, AsDB, the United Nations Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), and other development partners, to address the 
key concerns and issues related to trade and invest ment in the region.  The GMS conferences were a 
platform for public-private dialogue.  More genera lly, the GMS-BF was developing a needed public-
private partnership.  The GMS business community  had actively discussed ways by which it could 
help address the constraints to cross-border movement of goods in transit across the GMS.  As a result, the GMS-BF had proposed the creation of a GMS freight transporters' association at the regional level, which would perform the role of  harmonizing and coordinating the accreditation and 
licensing of transport operators using the GMS corri dors.  The GMS-BF had also proposed to develop 
a practical strategy for SMEs to participate in global value chains.  Since the lack of access by SMEs 
to credit for financing their exports was a major cons traint to their ability to participate in the export 
market, the GMS-BF saw the need to help them address this problem by the use of a scheme to 
encourage banks to lend to SM E exporters and export suppliers. 
316. Mr. Arin Jira, Chairman, ASEAN Business Advisory Council
, said that governments should 
be at the forefront of development strategies, whils t at the same time ensuring that industry had its 
say.  Given that it was the private sector that wa s involved in international trade, governments must 
ensure that the private sector was involved in the dialogue relating to trade.  GMS countries could 
benefit from pooling their resources and sharing thei r expertise since they shared common interests 
and should work towards developing a common vision.   Among the work still to be done in the GMS 
was the need to develop a credit financing scheme fo r SMEs.  More effort needed to be put into 
integrating GMS countries in value chains, thereby linking them to ASEAN and the global WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  marketplace. There should also be more focu s on developing tourism,  and human resource 
development should be pursued. 
317. Mr. Go Shimada, Director, Trade, Investment  and Tourism Division, Industrial Development 
Department, Japan Internati onal Cooperation Agency (JICA) , said that Aid for Trade accounted for 
over half of JICA’s total ODA loans.   Asia and Africa were the main  regions for JICA's Aid-for-Trade 
strategy.  Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vi etnam (CLMV) were JICA's main focus in the 
ASEAN region.  In particular, 52 per cent of JI CA's Aid-for-Trade related technical cooperation 
projects and capital grant aid went to CLMV.  The same was also true for JICA’s Yen loans of which 56 per cent went to CLMV.  In the GMS, assistance for building productive capacity was provided through technical cooperation and grant aid, while assistance relating to economic infrastructure was 
through loans.  Economic infrastructure was JICA's  major area of cooperation in the GMS, accounting 
for 100 per cent of ODA loans and 34 per cent of gr ant aid including technical cooperation. A large 
part of grant aid including technical cooperation we nt to building productive capacity.  JICA would 
continue its current endeavours to  mainstream Aid for Trade which was crucial for donor agencies 
and enabled them to link efficiently to the developm ent strategies of partner countries.  JICA would 
remain committed to Aid for Trade as its operational base. 
318. Li Guangling, Deputy Director-General , Ministry of Communications, China
, stated that the 
full and effective implementation of the Cross-Bo rder Transport Agreement (CBTA) between the 
GMS countries would provide many benefits.  Howe ver, some GMS countries still needed to improve 
their road and border crossing facilities.  Moreove r, although several annexes and protocols of the 
CBTA had been signed, only four countries had accep ted or ratified them.  Even the countries that had 
ratified the documents still had some difficulties in  implementation.  While all GMS countries should 
expedite the construction, impr ovement or upgrading of their roads and border crossing facilities 
within their own capacity,  the AsDB should contin ue its technical and financial assistance.  Other 
international or regional financia l institutions should be urged to provide technical and financial 
assistance and support to the GMS countries, particular ly the LDCs.  Other development partners and 
the private sector should also be encouraged to pa rticipate in the transport infrastructure development 
of the GMS.  Countries that had not yet ratified the annexes and protocols of the CBTA should be 
urged to do so as soon as possible.  All GMS countries should be urged to conform, where necessary, their relevant national legislation with the conten ts of CBTA and its annexes and protocols as soon as 
practicable.  The AsDB should continue its techni cal assistance and coordinating efforts in GMS 
economic cooperation as a whole and in CBTA-related matters in particular. 
319. Mr. Phillippe Allen, Minister-Counsellor, Aust ralian Agency for International Development 
(AusAID) , said that Australia’s development assi stance programme in the GMS included around 
US$150 million of transport and energy projects.  The objective of these project s was to create better 
conditions for trade in the subregion.  Support was delivered through partnerships with the AsDB and 
the World Bank.  Australia supported the CBTA.  In partnership with the AsDB, it was funding 
activities in support of greater cross-border trade, including the training of customs officials at border 
posts, the streamlining of paperwor k to be completed at border cro ssings, and the provision of border 
post ICT equipment.  It was also considering a multi-year funding arrangement to support the CBTA.  
In terms of the future direction of its infrastru cture support, Australia was investigating with the 
AsDB the feasibility of a major new bridge in th e Mekong Delta and a project to rehabilitate the 
national rail system in Cambodia. 
320. Mr. Hervé Gallepe, Manager, Commercial Capacity Development Programme, Agence 
Française de Développement (AFD) , said that AFD's strategy vis-à-vis  the GMS focused in particular 
on LDCs, assisting these countries to better integrate in to the region.  AFD contributed to projects in 
areas such as agriculture , agro-industry, natural resources and en ergy.  AFD had a focused approach 
with regard to Aid for Trade specifically, notab ly through its "Programme de Renforcement des 
Capacités Commerciales" (PRCC).  Through the PRCC,  trade-related support had been provided to  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  GMS countries, for example by helping to develo p the exports of Cambodian textiles or Laotian 
coffee.  AFD was also working with GMS countries to develop geographical indications and place value on their products internationally.  The GMS could benefit from encouraging synergies between 
firms, sharing techniques and experiences.  What might  already be done at national level in this regard 
could be broadened to the sub-regional level. 
321. In response to a question concerning what African countries could learn from the GMS, 
Mr. Prasidh
 suggested that the sharing of experiences woul d be useful.  He cited the example of rice 
cultivation, although at the same time  cautioned that different varieties of rice were grown in different 
parts of the world.  On a question concerning the relationship between the CBTA and the ASEAN 
agreements, a distinction was made between them by  Arjun Goswami and Li Guangling.  It was also 
suggested that the GMS pilot areas could give a push to the ASEAN process.  Regional cooperation 
and the synergies it brought about could yield importa nt benefits.  Corridors could yield big economic 
gains, but there was also a need for an appropria te enabling environment and a mechanism to address 
risks.  Public investments were crucial in themselve s, but could also stimulate private investments.  
Public-private partnerships were of fundamental im portance, and private sector participation must be 
encouraged.  Donor coordination in order to target projects to countries'/regions' needs – and to avoid 
overlap – was necessary, as was the importance of be neficiary country ownership.  Aid for Trade was 
a long-term story.  The GMS initiative began 17 year s ago and, like other Aid-for-Trade initiatives, 
must be properly nurtured to fulfil expectations in the long term. 
C. INFRASTRUCTURE AND INTEGRATION CORRIDORS IN LATIN AMERICA  
322. The Session began with a short film which in troduced the Mesoamerican Integration and 
Development Project.13  By way of introduction to the Session, the Moderator, Mr. Antoni 
Estevadeordal, Manager of In tegration and Trade, Inter-Ame rican Development Bank (IaDB) , said 
that integration in Latin-America was one of the ma in focuses of the IaDB's Aid-for-Trade efforts in 
the region.  The current trade agenda still requi red a lot of work, especially on the issue of 
convergence between the different regional trade agre ements.  This convergence work was even more 
complex than negotiating the agreements themselv es.  However, he said the Session would focus 
more on the hardware side.  In this regard, there was a clear need to develop infrastructure in the 
region.  Average cost of merchandise transport in Latin America were still on average over 50 per 
cent higher than costs in Europe.  Clearance cost s were also high and needed to be reduced. 
323. In her presentation, Ms. Karla Gonzáles Carvajal , Minister of Public Works and Transport, 
Costa Rica , explained that the Mesoamerica Project (MP)  – formerly the Plan Puebla-Panama – was a 
project to upgrade the transport infrastructure from Mexico to Colombia. She said that intra-regional 
trade in Central America was growing and infrastructure must be improved to keep up with this growth.  The MP included the improvement of ports  and airports in the region with the aim of 
improving port efficiency which on average was very lo w.  Road safety was a priority in the political 
agenda of Central America and central to the MP was the creation of an International Mesoamerican 
Road Network (RICAM).  The ai m of the RICAM was to devel op regional integration economic 
corridors, respect regional natural resources and decr ease travel times.  The RICAM would consist of 
four corridors, namely the Pacific Corridor, the A tlantic Corridor, the Inter-Oceanic Corridor, and the 
Tourist Corridor.  The Pacific Corridor would be mainly oriented towards merchandise transport 
connecting the principal development poles, and the Atlantic Corridor would promote regional 
economic development and tourism.  In addition, there would be significant investment made in 
improving customs along the corridor with the Inte rnational Merchandise Transit (TIM) project.  A 
pilot TIM plan between El Salvador and Honduras had reduced average border crossing times from 61 
minutes to eight minutes.  Another objective of th e MP was to move towards multimodal transport 
with the development of rail network in the region.   She added that infrastructure development was a 
                                                     
 
13 The film can be viewed at: http://www.proyectomesoamerica.org/  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  natural ally of regional trade agreements and fac ilitated the even distribution of gains from regional 
trade. 
324. Mr. Arturo Barrio, General Director of the Mesoamerican Project, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Mexico , explained that the Mesoamerica Project consisted of projects with social objectives 
(public health, sustainable environment, territorial information (natural disaster prevention) and social 
housing) and economic goals (road infrastructur e, energy (electricity and biofuels), 
telecommunications integration, customs moderni zation and competitiveness indicators).  The value 
added of the MP was political dialogue, regional in tegration, setting of common priorities, resource 
management (cooperation and fina ncing) and regional public goods.  In addition, it promoted 
ownership, coordination and participation. 
325. Mr. Flavio Soares Damico, Minister Coun sellor, Deputy Permanent Representative, 
Permanent Mission of Brazil, Geneva , said that the South American Regional Infrastructure 
Integration Initiative (IIRSA) aimed to achieve th e physical integration of 12 Latin American 
countries via the development of geo-economic ax es focusing on transport, telecommunications and 
energy.  IIRSA consisted of 10 axes of integr ation: Andean, Amazonas, Peru-Brazil-Bolivia, 
Capricorn, South Andean, South, Parana-Paragua y Waterway, Mercosur-Chile, Central Interocean 
and Guayana Plateau.  In order to fulfill its objec tives, a portfolio of 348 infrastructure projects, 
clustered in 41 project groups, had been set up wh ich comprised investments of US$38 billion.  A 
"Consensus Agenda" had been established which consis ted of 31 projects having the largest impact on 
regional physical integration which required an investment of US$6 billion. One example of the 
IIRSA was the Axis-Peru-Bolivia which would provi de a connection between Brazil (states of Acre 
and Rondônia) and Peru enabling the flow of pass engers and transport of commodities within this 
region and with regional and international markets,  including Asian markets.  The completion of the 
Axis-Peru-Bolivia was expected in 2010.  IIRSA had a three-level decision-making structure:  (i) an 
Executive Committee comprising plan ning and infrastructure ministers appointed by Governments 
which defined work strategy and approved action pl ans;  (ii) Technical Executive Groups comprising 
senior officials and experts appointed by Members, which was in charge of debating specific issues 
and multilateral actions;  and (iii) Technical Coor dination Committee comprised of representatives 
from the IaDB, CAF (Corporación Andina de Fome nto) and FONPLATA (Fund for the River Plate 
Bassin) acting as facilitators and coordinators of joint activities.   
326. Mr. Esteban Piedrahíta Uribe, Director Ge neral, National Planning Department, Colombia , 
informed that since the beginning of the 1990s Colo mbia had mainstreamed trade and integration into 
its development strategy.  Developing countries needed Aid for Trade but were only marginal 
recipients and what little Aid for Trade was received  needed to be used efficiently.  Without real 
market access Aid for Trade was worthless.  After r ealizing its inadequacy to cope with its trade 
growth, Colombia had embarked on a trade infrast ructure improvement project.  This had involved 
investment in road networks, airports, railroad netw orks and ports.  Colombia scored below average in 
its competitiveness indicators and Aid for Trade in the Latin America region was very low compared 
to the region's needs.  Of the Aid for Trade d estined for the Latin American region, Colombia 
received only nine per cent which was similar to th e amount destined for Bolivia, but half that of 
Peru.  Colombia participated in both the IIRSA a nd the MP and it had also put in place a programme 
to assist SMEs with their exports by post and was implementing an agreement on South-American 
roaming.   
327. IIRSA demonstrated that initiatives of this ki nd facilitated economic integration, reduced 
regional logistic production costs, facilitated access to areas of high productive potential, and took 
advantage of complementarity of existing geo-economi c spaces.  Challenges that had been highlighted 
included generation of infrastructure and logistics for a discontinuous territory, favouring territorial 
development planning, articulating infrastructure to ot her initiatives that were part of the development 
of productive systems, building a common agenda  of projects and actions oriented towards  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  integration, and guaranteeing balance of emphasis in  development of infrastructures for land, sea and 
river transport, energy and communications.  As a middle-income country, Colombia was not a large 
Aid-for-Trade recipient, but it supported special and preferential treatment for LDCs.  Challenges 
faced by developing countries were not very diffe rent from those faced by LDCs.  Aid-for-Trade 
flows should be increased while strengthening So uth-South cooperation and facilitating access to 
available Aid for Trade.  Guaran teed real market access for exports of developing countries was the 
main source of Aid for Trade. 
328. Mr. Rodolfo Rieznik, Director, Endesa S.A. , provided information on the Central American 
Electrical Interconnection System (SIEPAC - Sistema de Interconexion Electrica para America Central) project which concerned electrical regi onal integration and the creation of a regional 
wholesale electricity market (MER) in Central America.  The project involved the construction of a 
1,796 km long regional electricity interconnection line running from Panama to Guatemala and also 
the implementation of a regional optic fibre netw ork.  SIEPAC, which was a successful regional 
integration initiative with public and private sector  involvement as well as participation of multilateral 
financing organizations, w ould directly and indirectly develop regional and sectoral trade.  The 
inception of the MER in 2010 would be the first non-commercial productive integration action in the 
region.  The greatest challenge for SIEPAC was the difficulty experienced by governments to cede sovereignty in favour of integration.   Its benefits would include reduced prices and costs of electricity 
as well as increased efficiency, security and relia bility in energy generation and transport. 
VIII.  SESSION 7:  AID FOR TRADE – ASSESSING IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS  
329. The Session began with a short film which showcased an Aid-for-Trade success story in 
Belize where assistance to control an agricultu ral pest – the fruit fly – had opened market 
opportunities for papaya export to the United States.
14  The development of papaya and other fruit 
exports had generated income a nd employment opportunities in the agriculture and food-packing 
sector and employment opportunities had been created for low-skilled female labour.  
330. The Moderator, Mr. Mark Gawn, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Canada to the WTO and 
Integrated Framework Board Member , said that the film was illustrative and highlighted issues that 
needed to be addressed when assessing impact  and effectiveness of Aid for Trade which 
fundamentally was about people and their livelihoods.   He proposed that the Session therefore focus 
on the issues raised in the film, namely, how tack ling supply-side constraints could improve trade 
performance, generate economic grow th and employment – including for female workers –, and the 
importance of individual countries' commitment, and resulting economic value.  The aim of the 
discussion was therefore to provide a better understandi ng of what was being accomplished in the area 
of Aid for Trade, what the successes and failures were, and what lessons could be learnt.    
331. Responding to the Moderator's question about ODI 's work for SIDA (Swedish International 
Development Agency) and DFID (UK Department fo r International Development) on conceptualizing 
the links between Aid for Trade and poverty redu ction, Ms. Kate Bird, Overseas Development 
Institute (ODI) , highlighted how trade opportunities were experienced differently by people in 
different sectors and different parts of the country.  The focus of ODI's work had been on behind-the-
border constraints.  As an example of such a cons traint, she said that although international access to 
markets was generally improving, problems still existe d in the agricultural area, particularly for low-
income developing countries.  She highlighted the fa ct that Aid for Trade had the potential to address 
and reduce these constraints as was evidenced by the case studies that ODI had done which showed 
that Aid for Trade was in many ways delivering.  Further elaborating on the issue of process, she said 
that the first step was to identify the binding constr aint.  In other words, what was the barrier, what 
was stopping people from being able to access national markets and international markets.  Once that 
                                                      
14 The film can be consulted at: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/ webcas_e/trading_safely_e.htm  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 64  
 
  barrier had been addressed, the next step was to identify the proper entry po int and intervention.  
Should the intervention be at the national level, for example the Trade Swap in Cambodia, or was it to 
be a smaller project, focused on a particular sector and perhaps in a particular place.  It was also important to gauge what opportunities would be ava ilable to developing countries if those constraints 
were relieved.  If implemented properly in a sequenced manner, Aid for Trade could reduce 
constraints and allow people to capture those opportu nities.  It could increase income and government 
tax so that governments could spend money more effectively in the social sectors and compliment 
Aid-for-Trade activities.   
332. Ms. Bird concluded by giving examples of Aid-for-Trade projects studied by ODI.  In 
Lesotho, a programme in the textile and apparel sect or had created jobs, particularly for poor women 
who constituted 85 per cent of the workers, by enco uraging diversification and building the sector's 
productive capacity.  In Ethiopia, a trade marketing and licensing programme in the coffee sector had 
helped producers of three premium coffee varieti es to get higher and more stable prices.  In 
Cambodia, the Trade Swap was implementing a tr ade strategy which had mainstreamed poverty 
reduction by encouraging an 'all-of-government appro ach' for development in the trade area.  Various 
cotton case studies, including The Cotton Made In A frica Project, The Better Cotton Initiative, and 
the Lango Organic Cotton Project in North Uganda , had aimed to increase income of producers and 
provide them access to more stable markets.  Th e key message demonstrated by these projects was 
that Aid for Trade could work both in terms of reducing poverty and increasi ng the volume and value 
of trade.   
333. Focusing his next question on East Asia, the cr adle of the export-led model of development 
which had done so much to lift m illions out of poverty, the Moderator
 asked Shamika Sirimanne to 
share the results of UNESCAP's research.  He asked whether export growth in itself was enough, or  
did the broader national policy environment need  to be thought about when trade was being 
mainstreamed in international development, a nd whether accompanying measures were needed to 
ensure benefits were shared. 
334. Ms. Shamika Sirimanne, Chief, Trade Facilitation Section, Trade and Investment Division, 
UNESCAP , responded by saying that East Asia's export- led growth "miracle" was a classic example 
of trade delivering growth and then that growth delivering poverty reduction.  Basically, therefore, 
export trade was good for the poor.  However, th is export trade had not been achieved by 
mainstreaming trade, it had just happened;  it was a market-driven result.  She explained that East 
Asia was not a natural resource-based region.  The resource the region had in abundance was labour, 
and in the 1960s, when the "miracle" had started,  this was unskilled labour.  The export sector was 
naturally more intensive in unskilled labour.  It pr ovided better paid jobs fo r poor people which had 
led to a huge reduction in poverty.   
335. The research being done at UNESCAP showed that the situation had changed. The link 
between export growth and poverty was no longer so automatic. Trade or export growth did not 
automatically reduce poverty.  Much work still needed  to be done to reduce poverty.  Looking at East 
Asia, the export composition was now much more sk illed which meant that unskilled labour in terms 
of product was no longer being exported.  Poverty in the East Asia region was largely a rural agrarian 
phenomena;  exports did not touch the millions of rura l people's lives.  She said that in the East Asia 
Pacific region there were over 600 million people livi ng in abject poverty with below US$1 per day.  
And 70-80 per cent of the poor made a living out of agriculture.  So, to reduce poverty, the 
predicament of agriculture needed to be addressed.  Governments needed to mainstream not just any 
kind of trade but mainly pro-poor trade which had to have a focus on agriculture. Either exports had to 
go to agriculture, or agriculture had to release people to export sectors. She acknowledged that this 
was a challenge since it was not easy to mainst ream pro-poor trade strategies as it brought an 
additional complexity to mainstreaming trade in general.    WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  336. As an example, Ms. Sirimanne cited the case of India where 10-15 per cent of the world's 
vegetables were produced, but less than one per cent of the world's exports came from India.  For South Asia that figure was 40 per cent.  Half of agricultural produce was lost going from the farm to 
the local market.  Standards was also another barr ier.  Some of the quality standards were very 
prohibitive and there were numerous permits and certificates to be dealt with for clearance. Also a 
major hindrance was the lack of cooling facilities to move the produce from the farm to the port. In 
terms of process for exporting perishable products in the East Asia region, customs clearance was the 
easiest part.  Other constraints existed once the goods were on the ship.  One example was 
confinement.  If the products were perishable there was no value on the goods until the importer 
opened the consignment and verified that it was worth the price asked.  This meant that farmers could 
not get insurance or trade finan ce because consignments did not have a value.  She concluded by 
saying that Aid for Trade had a huge potential to address these constraints but that for export to reduce poverty for the region, the condition of  Asian agriculture had to be addressed. 
337. Mr. Pradeep Mehta, Secretary-General, CUTS
, continued the discussion on the linkage 
between trade and poverty drawing from a study by CUTS International which examined the issue in 
detail based on case studies from various countries.  He stated that several factors were involved in 
the linkage between trade, development and pove rty.  One of the issues addressed in the CUTS 
project was the impact of trade openness on deve lopment and poverty reduction.  The conclusion was 
that this depended entirely on different countries' sp ecific conditions.  It could not be homogenized, 
nor seen as one-size-fits all.  The project had outlin ed three conditions and complimentary policies of 
the East Asian Export success story.  To enable countries to exploit the synergies between trade 
development and poverty issues, complimentary polic ies such as human capital formation, social 
safety and infrastructure were very important.  
338. Referring to one particular case study from the proj ect, he informed that up until the European 
Union (EU) export bans in 1997, the EU had been th e largest export market for Tanzanian fish.  After 
the export bans, the EU had investigated the whole fish supply in East Africa and had rectified the 
constraints by helping three countries (Uganda, Tan zania and Kenya) set up facilities for testing and 
standardization. As a result, there was a marked improvement in fish exports from the East African 
region.  Another area on which the study had shed  light was what national governments themselves 
did in order to ensure that whatever aid they were  receiving – in terms of both technical assistance and 
money – was utilized efficiently and aligned to their own policy. Tanzania, for example, had a 
development strategy, which included a national invest ment policy, to encourage more investment in 
fish.  Royalties on fish exports with the government was directed exclusively towards fishery research 
and infrastructure development.  As a result, the fo reign exchange earnings on fish exports grew from 
US$62 million in 1996 to US$92 million in 2004.  By 2006 the fisheries sector in Tanzania contributed about ten per cent of GDP.  Aid for Trad e had a role in this success story through building 
the productive capacity of the fishery sector. Du ring 2000-2006, the fishery sector had received 
financial support of US$10.5 million.  This figure w as approximately 7.35 per cent of the total support 
given to building producti ve capacity in Tanzania.   In conclu sion, he said that one of the lessons 
learned from the study was that, whether by default or design, when donor support was directed to a 
specific sector in a comprehensive manner and on a long-term basis the result was likely to be 
positive.   
339. Addressing the linkages between export dema nd, gender issues and poverty reduction, 
Ms. Bansari Nag, Gender and Trade Initiative
, stated that trade openness itself did not eliminate 
existing inequalities in resources, power and d ecision-making between men and women.  She 
explained that failure to address these inequalities reduced the potential of those engaged in the 
production process and thus restricted trade.  Due to increasing competition in the area of 
international trade, the supply chain had b een expanding and production risk was now being 
transferred to the lower end of these chains.  As  the case of Belize showed, the lower end of the 
supply chain was in the informal sector where the majority of workers were women.  An economic WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  downturn could have an adverse effect on this sect or where the workers were already in a highly 
disadvantaged position in terms of resources, power and decision making.   
340. In the area of trade openness and in the contex t of the gender issues, challenges remained 
which varied in different sectors and for different countries.  In the mining sector in India, for example, a large number of young women had been  involved in the production process.  Most of 
them, however, remained vulnerable because they we re either "own account" workers or workers who 
had been hired on an unpaid family work basis.  The International Labour Organisation considered the 
young women work force as the most vulnerable since they did not have access to social security or 
other safety nets.   
341. Another problem identified was the disparity in wages between men and women which had 
serious repercussions in terms of access to fam ily health and food security.  The impact of an 
economic downturn had disproportionate ly affected the debts of wome n who were engaged in certain 
important sectors without any social security or access  to maternity and health benefits.  The rights of 
these women with regard to property, education and health was adversely affected.  She then referred 
to a 2008 UNCTAD report that stated that ODA investment towards social infrastructure – which 
included education, health, popul ation programmes and sanitation – had been increasing.  This was a 
positive sign since development encompassed human indicators.  Efforts to measure development 
should therefore include human development indicators. 
342. The Moderator
 then turned to the issue of monito ring and evaluation frameworks and asked 
the OECD to provide an overview of how result-based management – one  of the core principles of the 
Paris Principles on Aid Effectiveness – related to monitoring Aid for Trade. 
343. Mr. Frans Lammersen, Principle Administrator, Poverty Reduction and Growth Division, 
Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD , explained that management for development results 
was one of the five core principles of the Paris Declaration aimed at delivering aid more effectively.  The development community had been giving aid for over 30 years and the ongoing debate was 
whether aid was the solution to all problems, in wh ich case the volume of aid should be significantly 
increased, or whether it was the main problem, in which case all aid should be ended.  
344. Some economists argued for a more balanced approach when referring to accountability.   
Local solutions in local circumstan ces needed to be tested to see wh at worked best, and then, on that 
basis, move forward.  Discussions should be evid ence-based, focusing on where aid could really have 
an impact.  The decision by the Aid-for-Trade Task Force to use the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness as the guiding principles for the Aid- for-Trade initiative was very wise because the 
initiative was not only about money.  An important central component of the Paris Declaration was 
ownership.  In other words, developing countries sh ould own their development strategy and, in some 
countries, trade should be an important component of that strategy.  In other countries, trade was not an important component of the development strategy.  In post-conflict states, for example, the creation 
of peace was probably took precedence.   
345. Donors should take into account strategies identified by recipient countries as priority areas in 
need of trade-related capacity.  They also n eeded to harmonize procedures amongst themselves and 
try to build on recipient's existing procedures.  In other words, the essential component of the Paris Declaration was "Management for Development R esults".  To deliver development results, all 
stakeholders together – partners , donors and partner countries – needed to discuss priorities and how 
development aid could make a difference, and identif y targets to be achieved.  Evidence from field 
studies could be used to see what was really ha ppening on the ground, which programmes were most 
effective and which needed to be adjusted.    WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  346. Addressing the Moderator's question as to how UNECA planned to evaluate the impact of 
assistance to Africa, Mr. Stephen Karingi, Chief, Trad e and International Negotiations Section, Trade, 
Finance and Economic Development Division, UNECA  said that it was important not to forget some 
of the  principles that had come out of the 2007 Re gional Reviews of Aid for Trade because, at least 
for Africa, the regional dimension of Aid for Trade was crucial.  It was on this basis, therefore, that 
UNECA had decided to take the data and statisti cs produced by the OECD and try to asses what they 
meant for Africa. 
347. Mr. Karingi said the challenge lay in demonstrating the increase in Aid for Trade and 
determining whether it was having a positive impact and contributing to better trade performance. 
This question could be tackled at different levels .  First, how could UNECA coordinate the Aid-for-
Trade supply to the target beneficiary.  Second, iden tification of the impediments that made it difficult 
for Africa to trade.  And, third, tracking pos itive correlations between Aid-for-Trade supply and 
improvement in competitiveness.  It was also impor tant to determine whether there was a correlation 
between Aid for Trade in different sectors and chan ges in the logistics performance indices that were 
produced to measure the difficulties of trading with in Africa and between Africa and the rest of the 
world.  It was necessary to see from the indicators whether the impediments targeted by Aid for Trade 
were having a positive contribution towards impr oving African countries' trade performance. 
348. In conclusion, he said that the biggest challenge was to prove that in five or ten year's time 
current Aid-for-Trade supplies would have had a positive impact in reducing poverty.  Poverty 
reduction was not automatic.  It depended on how growth was distributed between different sectors 
taking into account what factors of production were being used at a given time. 
349. Responding to the Moderator's question on the issue of accountability of donor assistance to 
the European Parliament and EC member States, Ms. Liselotte Isaksson, Policy Advisor for Trade 
Development Issues, Directorate General for Devel opment and Relations with African, Caribbean and 
Pacific States, European Commission , said that the EC focused on reducing poverty, by working 
through the dynamics of markets rather than on trying to support poor people directly through 
projects.  Building schools in rural areas was one such example.  The EC had multiple internal 
systems for controlling disbursements of funds to en sure that expenditure was justified, especially 
when a large share was going on overheads.  The EC was also beginning to look at programme and thematic evaluations.  How the impact of Aid for Trade was monitored was still a challenge that one 
donor alone could certainly not deal with.  Ther e was therefore a need for common and shared 
monitoring efforts.  In moving forward, it was nec essary to look more closely at country- and region-
based monitoring.  In this respect, it would help if a clear difference was made between the 
monitoring of impacts of projects and programmes and the measuring of impacts of policies and strategies that were supposed to govern those pr ogrammes.  Although these issues were interlinked, 
they were not the same.  In conclusion, she said it was necessary to look at both the impact of 
programmes and the impact of policies and that th is could not be done if all were not working 
together to avoid conflicting policy.  
350. Following-up on the discussion on accountability a nd evaluation, Mr. Thomas Feidieker, 
Adviser, Globalization, Trade and Investment Di vision, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, Germany , said that for Germany measuring the precise impacts of Aid for Trade 
was of utmost importance.  Much needed to be done  to elaborate and fine-tune a set of indicators and 
the working hypothesis for further consideration was that donors and partners would need a set of 
indicators to evaluate Aid-for-Trade programmes a nd to measure trade capacity.  Only with positive 
results were donors able to justify and mobiliz e additional resources. From a partner-country 
perspective, the economic development goal was to ra ise trade performance.  In this area, the OECD 
country fact sheets on trade performance indicators needed further improvement and this could easily be achieved. WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 68  
 
  351. What was important and of particular interest  for developing countries was measuring trade 
capacity.  The term trade capacity encompassed, first,  the ability to make the most effective use of 
donor contributions, and, second a nd more important, the ability to use Aid for Trade as a powerful 
leverage to reorganize and optimize existing politi cal processes as well as to economize external and 
internal resources.  The aim was equally to raise th e capacity of the public and private sectors so that 
they could continuously and sustainably improve  their trade capacity and augment developing 
countries' ability to create and effectiv ely apply their own trade strategies. 
352. Referring again to the OECD country fact shee ts, he said there was a missing intermediate 
level.  The fact sheet was structured in five main  parts, namely, basic indicators, aid flows, trade 
mainstreaming and priorities of partners, trade polic y indicators, and trade performance. With respect 
to trade policy indicators, the fact sheet contained only a few indicators.  With regard to evaluation of 
Aid-for-Trade measures and measuring trade capacity, he noted that when obtaining indicators not 
every area had the same relevance.  He said that Aid-for-Trade flows, trade policy indicators, and 
trade performance should be at the center of the debate.   
353. The guiding principal for further elaboration of intermediate indicators was to cluster Aid-for-
Trade flows (inputs) by attaching flows to sector s below the single Aid-for-Trade categories (for 
example, in Trade Development – i.e. banking, bus iness support, fishery, forestry, industry, mining, 
tourism).  The next step was to link sectoral Aid-fo r-Trade flows with concrete fields of intervention 
(i.e. the processing and functional level of measures  – for example, public or private entities, and 
regional or national level).  This was the decisi ve area where intermediate indicators could be 
generated along impact areas of Aid-for-Trade flows such as, for instance, the regulatory 
environment, institutional and trade capacity, compe titiveness, and supply-side constraints.  Examples 
of impacts contributing to partner country-specific targets included the outcome level to be achieved 
in the field of economics (i.e. improvement of trad e performance and growth), and the outcome level 
in the social area (which included poverty reduc tion and gender aspects, including the creation of 
improved income-earning opportunities for disadvantag ed populations or in remote areas).  In 
conclusion, he said that additional efforts were n eeded to establish a set of distributional, poverty-
related and ecological indicators on the outcome leve l of development goals.  These needed to reflect 
pro-poor growth, income inequality, labour force, gender, and ecological aspects. 
354. The Moderator
 then asked the World Bank for its views on what it thought could be learnt 
from these evaluation studies and what lessons could be learnt for assessing impact and effectiveness 
of Aid for Trade. 
355. Mr. Bernard Hoekman, Director, Intern ational Trade Department, World Bank , said that, for 
the Bank, evaluation and assessment were a continuo us process which started with an ex-ante review 
regarding quality at entry in terms of projects.  Also extremely important was whether the diagnostic 
analysis was being done in the correct manner (e .g., were binding constraints being addressed?;  or, 
would the projects and project designs address the pr oblems that had been identified?).  The Bank 
answered such questions through a Mid-Term Re view Evaluation Mechanism within the framework 
of the Quality Assurance Group which monitored and ev aluated the pre-completion of projects so that 
the assessment of impact was made easier and necessary adjustments could be made before the project was completed.  This process was then followe d by an ex-post assessment from which one could 
learn, from experience, what worked and what did not work. The Bank had realized that its evaluation 
mechanism made it much easier to evaluate sp ecific projects as opposed to programmes, budget 
support, or technical assistance.  A lot of Aid for Tr ade, of course, dealt with technical assistance 
which made it more difficult to monitor impact wh ich, ultimately, would only happen after many 
years.  The implication, therefore, was that ther e was a need to design a specific evaluation framework 
which took this into account and which monitored over time what actually was the effect of the intervention.  The objectives of what was to be  achieved should be very clear in order to assess 
whether those objectives had been achieved, and if not, why not.  To dispel concerns about personal  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  responsibility that many people had, a key element was to de-personalize the assessment process.  
This could be done by creating what the Bank refe rred to as "a culture of evaluation" whereby no 
personal responsibility was attached to someth ing that was done or needed to be done.  
356. There was also a need to bui ld on the resources required to  collect data.  One necessary 
condition, for example, was to have a baseline ag ainst which outcomes could be measured and, once 
the project had been completed, the necessary resour ces available to collect the data that would assess 
whether progress had actually been made in  terms of what that baseline was.  
357. From an economist's point of view, Aid fo r Trade could be thought of as a production 
function meaning there were outputs which were going to  be a function of inputs.  As far as Aid-for-
Trade outputs were concerned, he said it was importa nt to make a distinction between "direct outputs" 
(e.g., what were the specific objectives of a partic ular project, which could range from reducing costs 
to diversifying exports to reduce the sensitivity of  the economy to shocks), and "outcomes of the 
direct output" (e.g., whether there was going to be  a reduction in poverty or more employment for 
women).  Many projects might, in general, be able  to achieve these broad objectives.  However, the 
outcome side of the equation was dependent very  much on complementary policies which included 
key elements such as the micro- economic framework, the business environment, and the investment 
climate.  It was important to have a broader view of  what needed to be done  and to be flexible in 
terms of attributing outcomes to particular projects.  However, as far as projects were concerned, the 
Bank's experience was that one needed to define up front what one was trying to achieve and then 
measure whether that actually had been achieved.  
358. The Moderator  then opened the floor for comments. 
359. The representative of Nepal  expressed puzzlement with regard to the conditions set by 
developed countries in relation to the financial ag reements for technical assistance arrangements.  
Nepal, for example, had a project whose expenditure  was as follows, 60 per cent went to the resource 
person;  11 per cent to each initial development;  th ree per cent for the project's goods process;  13 per 
cent for consultants;  and seven per cent was mis cellaneous, and he asked whether this provision 
helped reduce poverty and whether it helped supply-si de capacity?  He informed that Nepal's status 
had changed from a poor exporting co untry to a poor importing country.  Aid for Trade was a positive 
initiative for trade, debt and balance-of-payment probl ems.  It was also an initiative for integration 
and priority, but donors needed to look more closel y at the systems established to help alleviate the 
problems faced by developing countries. 
360. The representative of Kenya  said that, while Kenya appreciated the role that standards played 
in ensuring the quality of products for consumers, t hose standards turned out to be moving targets and 
complicated all the behind-the-border constraints that  were associated with trade in that sector.  He 
therefore asked how facilitating trade could be bala nced, while at the same time ensuring that it did 
not become a moving target that gave congruence to supply-side constraints. 
361. The representative of Sudan  said his comments related to the link between trade and poverty. 
What was currently happening was that trade libera lization was being linked with poverty and not just 
trade.  In addition, trade inputs were either linked to improving trade strategies and policies in totality 
or to improving the strategic trade of a commodity to  reach a higher value market.  With regard to the 
latter, he referred to a study that had shown that  for an orange exported from Chile to New York, 
five per cent of the cost was for the orange while 95  per cent related to the cost of transaction services 
that brought that orange from Chile to the New York market.  This implied that Chile was not 
exporting a good but rather a service.  If Africa was therefore going to benefit from higher value 
markets then services should be the area of attenti on, not the commodity itself.  African farmers were 
still locked in a low quality bracket, either from the producer side or the consumer side.  In order to 
push the whole business forward through Aid-for-Trade inputs, the Chilean experience could be used WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  as a lesson which showed how improved services had led to the success of products reaching higher 
value markets which in turn led to marked economi c growth comparable to neighbouring Argentina or 
Brazil.  It was imperative that Aid-for-Trade input s to African countries, especially to sub-Saharan 
Africa, were channeled to specific services that coul d improve the trade of goods so that they reached 
higher value markets. 
362. The representative of Uganda
 said that the term "supply-side constraints" had many 
components one of which he singled out as being inconsistencies in produc tion which came about 
largely as a result of market and commodity information.  Poor countries, especially the people in those countries, experienced abject poverty.  Si nce poverty levels were very high, many of the 
producers – who were also labourers – would want to  exploit any opportunity they could that put cash 
in their hands.  Most of the production units in th ese poor countries were not commercial, especially 
as far as agriculture was concerned.  Those produc tion units were mostly family-based and because of 
the high poverty levels the family would not focu s on one or two products but would try to produce 
anything that they thought would go into the markets.  Each product therefore became a poverty reduction opportunity depending on whether the market  was available or not.  For most of these 
countries, whose environment was conducive for growi ng almost anything, this was one of the main 
hindrances with regard to the potentia l for agricultural development.  As an example to illustrate this, 
he said that one year a family might want to pr oduce pineapples and the neighbour pawpaw.  Because 
the neighbour who was producing pawpaw had mana ged to sell his product to markets, the next 
season the other family would change from produci ng pineapples to producing pawpaw.  There was 
therefore a lack of focus – primarily because the information regarding markets and commodities was 
not available – which resulted in fluctuation of production levels.  Aid fo r Trade could address some 
of these constraints by ensuring that issues such as information, which could help stabilize developing 
countries' production levels, was available. 
363. The representative of Sierra Leone
 referred to Sierra Leone's te n years of civil war which had 
led to a strongest or winner-takes-all approach to the art of survival.  He asked what special or 
targeted intervention could Sierra  Leone – and indeed all countries emerging from similar situations – 
employ to motivate themselves and to contribute m eaningfully in poverty alleviation?  How could 
these countries bring about positive change or change  in attitude, which was Sierra Leone's current 
core request, to raise awareness that there was a linkage between Aid for Trade and poverty 
alleviation.  It was necessary to teach countries that poverty alleviation was a process and not a one-
off acquirement.  Wealth acquired overnight usually led to a very dangerous situation and end, the 
perfect example being the recently-concluded drug trafficking trials  in Sierra Leone. 
364. The representative of Finland  said that although the country fact sheets in the Aid-for-Trade 
at a Glance 2009 report showed that a tremendous am ount of work had gone into elaborating them, 
the issue now was what to do with those fact sheet s. Finland suggested that the indicators and fact 
sheets should be seen as a tool and an element to be  used in country-level dialogues on trade and aid 
issues.  He added that the actual value and usefuln ess of the indicator fact sheets would be determined 
on the basis of how they were used in those dialog ues.  However, he voiced the fear that the fact 
sheets might somehow have limited value added.  The second point was how to move forward if 
Members wanted to get serious about the impact of Aid for Trade.  Finland's suggestion was that not 
only should Members agree on the tracking of trade development but also on the refining of indicators to a more detailed level of analysis, mainly at th e country level.  He cautioned that continuing fine-
tuning at the global level created the risk of never fixing a monitoring framework and suggested that 
Members should all agree to a rough framework at the global level which would  result in moving monitoring to a country and regional level. 
365. Commenting on the link between Aid for Trade and poverty, Mr Masimiliano Cali, ODI
, said 
that the definition of Aid for Trade given by th e Aid-for-Trade Task Force, though not explicitly 
linked to poverty, showed that the final outcome  of any such initiative should be poverty reduction.  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
 Page 71 
 
 
  However, there was also inherent tension if that  outcome was taken as the direct measure of the 
initiative's success.  This had implications both in  terms of the allocation of Aid for Trade across 
sectors and countries and in terms of measuring the effectiveness of the in itiative.  When measuring 
Aid for Trade against poverty reduction, there was a risk of getting into a conundrum where there were so many mediated impacts that one actually lost  sight of Aid For Trade.  In its current work, 
ODI had taken a different perspective in that Aid for Trade offered the opportunity of looking at the 
impact on a number of certain direct measures of trade performance.  Economic  theory had taught that 
this then showed a clear link to growth and eventually to poverty reduction.   
366. ODI had therefore been looking at the impact of Aid-for-Trade facilitation which was a very 
specific category of Aid for Trade with respect to the cost of trading.  The cost of importing and 
exporting goods, as well as on the time of trading, were two important indicators of how countries 
were efficiently able to trade across borders.  Some fairly significant impact over a short time frame had been seen in this regard.  ODI had linked its  Aid-for-Trade facilitation work with the World 
Bank's work on indicators which had only been available over the last few years.  In the same way, some specific Aid-for-Trade interv entions, such as aid for economic in frastructure, could be linked to 
export performance, thereby linking specific expor t volumes and values in certain sectors.  In 
conclusion, she said that the link to poverty reduc tion was problematic and that the question was 
whether Aid for Trade should have a role to play in developing complimentary policies or measures 
which allowed increased trade and growth to translate into poverty reduction.  One clear policy in that 
respect was fiscal policy which was the traditional policy through which enha nced growth could be 
redistributed across sectors.  Whether Aid for Trade should play an active role or should have a focus 
in terms of developing complimentary measures remained an open question. 
367. The Moderator
 said that discussions during the Session ha d shown that a lot of work had been 
done over the last two years on linking Aid for Trade and development outcomes.  He highlighted the fact that this work had come from various sources and that, as a process, it would be useful to pull it 
all together so as to have at the next global revi ew of Aid for Trade a stronger sense of what the 
studies show.  He suggested that individual agenci es might consider and table their own experiences 
which would show the emerging rich evidence of wh at Aid for Trade could deliver.  A second theme 
that had been highlighted in the discussion, specifica lly in the context of the ODI's interventions, was 
that a rich assortment of indicators already existe d that, to the extent possible, could be used and 
developed.  However, the caveat introduced by Ge rmany – that at some point the intermediary 
linkages for which there were not necessarily good indi cators – should be recognized and reflected on.  
Ultimately, the link between the various interventi ons by both donors and recipients in terms of 
commitment and results would have to be made.   It  was therefore important to be able to indicate and 
understand what type of intervention gave what type of result. 
368. To summarize, he said it was useful to reflect  on why one was interested in monitoring and 
evaluation, and indicators?  One of the reasons was the demand put on the system and there was a 
need to be able to understand better what tools b est responded to those demands.  The only way of 
doing that was by learning from practice.  It was also necessary to understand where the best investments were to be made in Aid for Trade, be  it through capital made available through a bank, 
through grants, or through the time and energy spent by both donor and recipient countries.  All these 
were scarce resources and should not be squandered.  Finally, it was necessary to demonstrate results 
which showed what was being obtained through Aid -for-Trade investments.  He said the window was 
open and there was currently a great deal of inter est in Aid for Trade;  Members should therefore 
maximize this opportunity to use trade as a tool  to advance development and poverty objectives. 
IX. SESSION 8:  AID FOR TRADE – SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION EXPERIENCES  
369. The Moderator, Mrs. Valentine Rugw abiza, Deputy Director-General, WTO,
 recalled that 
South-South cooperation had not been a component of the First Global Review held in November WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 72  
 
  2007.  Although not a new trend in international coop eration, South-South cooperation was one of the 
promising future elements of the Aid-for-Trade work programme.  South-South cooperation had been 
taking place on all economic issues for many years.  China, for example, had carried out South-South cooperation for many decades;  Argentina had est ablished its Fund for Horizontal Cooperation in 
1992;  India's Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme had been used to channel 
technical assistance to more than 150 countries;  and Brazil and Chile's S outh-South cooperation was 
directed at immediate neighbouring developing coun tries.  All four countries had responded to the 
OECD questionnaire on South-South cooperation an d had provided valuable information which had 
enabled a dedicated chapter to be included in the Aid-for-Trade at a Glance 2009 report.  In order to 
better understand and grasp the grow ing importance of South-South cooperation in Aid for Trade it 
was her intention to ask the panellis ts to share their experiences and th e lessons they had learnt with 
regard to their specific South-South cooperation pr ogrammes and to provide some key messages on 
the way forward. 
370. Ambassador Alberto Dumont, Permanent Represen tative, Permanent Mission of Argentina, 
Geneva  said that South-South cooperation had been on Argentina's agenda for some 30 years arising 
originally from the 1978 United Nations Buenos Aires Action Plan.15  Argentina, together with other 
WTO members – particularly Brazil and Colombia – were firm advocates of Aid for Trade and South-
South cooperation and the need for in-depth examin ation of these issues, particularly within the 
framework of cooperation through triangular system s.  Argentina had submitted a document to the 
First Global Review reporting on technical assist ance and setting out Argentina's Aid-for-Trade 
systems.16  It had also participated in the recent Aid-for-Trade reviews held in Lima, Peru and 
Montego Bay, Jamaica.  Argentina was also an observer to the Standards and Trade Development 
Facility.  
371. The Argentine Fund for Horizontal Cooperation (FO-AR) had been created in 1992 and was a 
two-pronged cooperation system through which Argentina provided technical assistance to developing countries while, at the same time, Ar gentina's own experts were provided with an 
opportunity to improve their technical and professional  qualifications.   This two-way approach meant 
that solutions to human and material resources problems could be found in a collaborative manner 
taking into account different levels  of development.  The FO-AR was funded through the Ministry of 
Foreign Relations and International Trade.  Orga nizations such as the Organization of American 
States (OAS) and the International Organizati on for Migration (IOM) took part in FO-AR 
implementation activities by providing, inter alia , technical or medical assistance and funding for 
foreign nationals and experts to travel to Argentina for training.   
372. Since 1992, the FO-AR had organized in-country  seminars to address specific issues of 
interest to countries that had their own strategies; it had been involved in 2,600 aid projects; it had it 
had sent 400 Argentine experts to different countries; it had trained 500 foreign experts in Argentina;  
and it had worked with a range of industries fro m dairy production to fishing and forestry, in 
particular on SPS issues.  All this was very releva nt in the context of international standards and 
overcoming technical barriers to trade.  FO-AR's ke y cooperation partners within Argentina included, 
inter alia ,  the Secretariat for Agriculture, the Minist ry for Fisheries, the National Institute of 
Technology, the National Institute of Fishery Deve lopment, the National Drugs Agency and the Food 
Safety Agencies.  Although the priorities for Arge ntine aid had focused on Latin America and the 
Caribbean region, its cooperation also extended to  other regions such as Africa (e.g., in Angola, 
Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, and South Africa), and East ern Europe and Central Asia (e.g., in Ukraine, 
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan).  The FO-AR was also currently developing an 
indicator system within the framework of South- South cooperation and once the methodology for this 
                                                     
 
15 For more information on the Buen os Aires Action Plan see:   
http://tcdc2.undp.org/knowledge_base/bapa_english1.html  
16 WT/COMTD/AFT/W/5.  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
 Page 73 
 
 
  was in place Argentina would be able to engage in  an exchange of ideas with other countries that had 
undertaken this kind of work. 
373. Ambassador Dumont referred to Argentina's experience of triangular cooperation and noted 
that in 2001 Argentina had launched a triangular four-y ear project to provide expert support to Peru to 
help improve its animal health situation.  Financ ial support had been provided by Japan, and the FO-
AR had also worked hand in hand with the Per uvian International Trade Agency and Japanese 
International Development Agencies to implem ent the project.  The project had led to the 
development of human resources, the setting up of  laboratory and animal health resources within 
Peru, and the improvement of diagnostic capacities in  the Peruvian animal health service and animal 
health centre.   As a result of the programme Peru had been able to eliminate avian flu and to certify 
its products in line with international requirement s so that it could export to other countries, 
particularly Japan, the ANDEAN community, and countries in Central America.  Following the 
success of the programme, Argentina was now look ing to move forward on triangular cooperation 
with Brazil and the International Agriculture Developm ent Fund.  It was also working with Canada, in 
Haiti, to develop the "Pro-Huerta" programme whic h aimed to improve basic agriculture capacity in 
Haiti, and with Spain, Italy and Portugal to im plement projects in Portuguese-speaking countries in 
Africa.  Argentina was also working on health issues  in other areas of South America, the Caribbean 
and Africa.   
374. Argentina's objective was to improve technical  and productive capacity on the basis of each 
country's development priorities.  South-South coop eration was complementary to other Aid for Trade 
work.  Market access was important in this rega rd because if countries were unable to overcome 
technical barriers to trade and meet sanitary requiremen ts they would not be able to make the best use 
of their market access.  Argentina's work on tria ngular cooperation had had very positive results and it 
would welcome requests from other countries who might be interested in receiving such assistance. 
375. The Moderator  commented that there was obviously tremendous potential to develop the 
three-way triangular cooperation.  Moving to Brazil, she asked Pedro Luiz Carneiro de Mendonça to 
provide information on Brazil's experien ce relating to South-South cooperation. 
376. Mr. Pedro Luiz Carneiro de Mendonça, Unde r-Secretary for Economic and Technological 
Affairs, Ministry of External Relations, Brazil , recalled that the Aid-for-Trade at a Glance 2009 report 
had highlighted the importance of the regional dime nsion of Aid for Trade and said that South-South 
cooperation was one of the main drivers of Brazil's activities in this area.  In recent years increasing 
trade flows among developing countries had contribut ed to strengthening both the demand for and the 
supply of South-South cooperation.   Such cooperation benefited fro m a clear understanding of the 
opportunities and challenges facing other developing countries as well as from a deeper knowledge of 
local cultural, political and technological situations.  This was at the basis of a horizontal perception 
conducive to a good relationship that greatly facilitated the cooperati on and enhanced its 
effectiveness.   
377. Brazil was deeply committed to South-South c ooperation and was aware of its potential and 
impact.  Brazil's South-South cooperation had fo cused on capacity development and an assessment 
had shown that partner countries we re greatly benefiting from effectiv e technology transfer developed 
under similar socio-economic realities.  South-Sout h cooperation enjoyed the additional advantage of 
being easily reproduced.  The Second Regional Aid-fo r-Trade Review in Montego Bay, where Latin 
American and Caribbean Countries had had an opportunity to assess impacts of South-South 
cooperation, had highlighted the fact that Sout h-South cooperation was not another form of ODA 
since there were no conditionalities attached to it, nor  any restrictions to the possible transfer of 
technologies.  The projects carried out within th e framework of South-South cooperation were 
demand-driven and designed with the full particip ation of partners.  In financial terms, this 
cooperation might be limited but the proj ects had proved to be highly effective. WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 74  
 
  378. Turning to a concrete example of South-S outh cooperation, he referred to the Brazilian 
programme called "exports through postal services sy stem" (Exporta Faço), launched at the end of 
2000, through which thousa nds of SMEs in Brazil had been ab le to access over 200 markets abroad 
not previously available to them by using one of the 8,000 postal offices throughout the country.  During the programme's first year almost 7,000 postal deliveries had been completed and after nine 
years, nearly 68,000 deliveries were registered in Brazil's data base.  The programme had been 
replicated in Peru, and Brazil and Peru were working t ogether to take it to Urug uay.  It was hoped that 
in the near future other Latin American countri es would also benefit from this very simple and 
efficient programme.   Brazil was pleased to note th at the Universal Postal Union intended to expand 
the scheme to other continents as well.  Following th e success of the Exporta Faço programme and its 
potential for facilitating trade, it had also been includ ed as one of the priorities of the South American 
Regional Infrastructure Integration Initiative (IIRSA).   As part of its South-South cooperation 
activities, Brazil also sought to strengthen de veloping-country negotiati on knowledge and skills 
through the organization of courses and training wo rkshops on trade policies and trade negotiations 
directed to officials from South American and A frican countries.  One such event, organized in 
cooperation with UNCTAD and the WTO, had taken place in Geneva in 2005 and similar courses 
were now offered on an annual basis.  Brazil was also elaborating a project with the Agency for 
International Trade Information and Cooperation (AITIC) focused on capacity building related to 
trade policy and trade negotiations. 
379. Mr. Carneiro de Mendonça
 said that Brazil's South-South cooperation was not limited to 
Latin American countries.  In Asia, for exampl e, Brazil had established a cooperation programme 
with East Timor covering agriculture and education which had culminated in the creation in 2002 of a 
Centre for Vocational Training and Entrepreneuria l Development.  Brazil was increasingly involved 
with projects in Africa, in particular with rega rd to agricultural production and export capacity, and 
following President Lula da Silva's firm commitm ent to enhancing South-South cooperation, Brazil 
had been invited to participate in the recently-held 13th Annual Summit of the African Union.  Some 
of the projects that Brazil had been developing with its African partners included technical assistance 
initiatives in Benin and Mali in the context of th e Cotton Initiative which had focused on harvesting 
and processing of cotton.  In this regard, a Me morandum of Understanding had been signed by 
President Lula da Silva with the African Union which would enable Brazil to replicate the cotton 
programme in other countries in Africa.  President Lula da Silva had also reiterated Brazil's commitment to help Africa to carry out its own "Green" revolution proposing that a meeting of the 
African Agriculture Ministers be held in Brazil aime d at exchanging views on the steps to be taken to 
improve the situation of agriculture in the African continent.  In 2006, EMBRAPA
17, the Brazilian 
Agricultural Research Company had opened an office in Accra where a team of researchers had been 
carrying out surveys and providing assistance to various African officials.  In Angola, Brazil had established a Centre for Vocational Training and in October 2008, Veracruz had established in 
Mozambique its first international office.  The ma in thrust of this initiative was to transfer the 
expertise that Veracruz had accumulated as a world reference centre in the field of medical research.  The Agreement signed in Mozambique in 2008 al so foresaw the establishm ent of a plant for the 
production of retro-virus used for HIV treatment to which the Brazilian Government had so far 
contributed US$7 million and the whole process of tr ansfer of technology would take three years. 
380. Brazil had a portfolio of over 50 countries in  its South-South cooperation activities.  Its 
strategy did not envisage a fast expansion of the total number of activities or partners but rather 
sought to invest via a programme approach on projects which had large potential and a powerful 
impact on the participation of de veloping partners in world trade.  In this context, triangular 
cooperation had an important role to play in view  of its capacity to mobilize a greater amount of 
technical and financial resources from all partners  involved.  Brazil had up to now also approved 
triangular projects with at least 10 traditi onal donor countries and a nother 10 multilateral 
                                                     
 
17 Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária.  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  organizations.  It was open to tria ngular partnerships with international organizations as long as the 
same principles which guided Brazil's South-So uth cooperation were followed:  alignment, 
ownership, and equality.  Base d on its recent experience, Brazil was nevertheless aware of the 
challenges that needed to be addr essed in cases of triangular cooperation and he referred to a recent 
meeting held in Brasilia, jointly organized by th e Brazilian Cooperation Agency, the European Union 
and the German International Cooperation Agency, wh ich had allowed for a useful exchange of views 
on the difficulties relating to triangular cooperation.   Some challenges that had been highlighted 
included, for example, how to promote a clear di vision of responsibilities amon g the partners and how 
to mobilize both technical and financial res ources from the partners in a fair manner. 
381. Concluding on a positive but cautious note, he said that although the Aid-for-Trade at a 
Glance 2009 publication had reported that donors had met or were on the way to meeting their 2005 
Hong Kong pledges and that they were also commit ted to increase ODA levels in the short term, it 
should not be forgotten that the current economic cr isis had also increased the assistance needs of 
developing countries.  Future work on Aid for Tr ade therefore needed to focus on identifying best 
practice and on improving the efficiency of coopera tion programmes, bearing in mind the reality that 
resources would probably decline.  Brazil was of the view that promoting South-South cooperation 
could be a means to address developing countries' su pply-side constraints in a cost-efficient manner.  
As a result, ways should be sought to impr ove South-South cooperation by ensuring that 
commitments were made without the adoption of tr ade-distorting measures in response to the crisis, 
and making sure that the Doha Round was c oncluded in a development-oriented way. 
382. Mr. Marcelo García Silva, Head, OECD Depart ment, Directorate-General for International 
Economic Affairs, Chile , provided an overview of Chile's experience in South-South cooperation.  He 
noted that its success was due to three main elemen ts.  First, Chile had been pursuing a very open 
trade policy from a regional perspective, focusing on Latin America where it had tried to strike a 
balance among the different export sectors.  Sec ond, Chile had set up mechanisms and institutions 
abroad that enabled it to export effectively and develop cooperation capacities.  Third, Chile had 
developed the necessary legal structure, includi ng programmes and cooperation agreements, which 
enabled it to take these initiatives.  South-South cooperation was not new to Chile.  It had been 
engaged in the voluntary provision of assistance, training, triangular cooperation, seminars and 
traineeships for many years.  These actions help ed support other countries to develop sustainable 
capacity to improve exports – key objective of devel opment aid.  In this context, Chile had been 
actively involved in developing market access.   
383. With regard to its geographical development strategy, Chile first focused on its neighbour, 
Bolivia, where it had a strong commitment to as ymmetric and immediate openness to facilitate 
Bolivian exports to Chile's markets.   Its strategy then extended to  countries in Central America and 
the Caribbean, to countries where it had strategic interest, and to countries in Africa.  Referring to working from South-South cooperation towards Aid for Tr ade, he listed four main reasons for moving 
in this direction:  (i) international cooperati on had changed;  (ii) greater harmonization and 
effectiveness were needed;  (iii)  as pointed out in  the Paris Declaration, the process needed to be 
more demand-driven;  and (iv)  the current global ec onomic crisis.  LDCs needed to be encouraged to 
develop their export capacities and integrate into inte rnational trade. The good  practices developed by 
Chile through South-South cooperation in Latin Amer ica was a useful way to achieve that goal.  
384. As for the prospects of South-South cooperation, he said that Members needed to continue to 
work towards trade agreements that, inter alia , opened up markets, facilitated foreign direct 
investment, and linked countries better into the inte rnational supply chain.  While Chile provided 
South-South or triangular cooperation, at the same time it needed to meet its own structural needs;  Chile's cooperation was therefore provided on the u nderstanding that Chile could also meet its own 
strategic objectives.  There were also a number of challenges to overcome in connection with 
development cooperation.  These included raising aw areness, ensuring a greater regional balance in WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  the distribution of Aid for Trade, improving communication, involving the private sector, achieving a 
better coordination of aid, and ensuring that Aid fo r Trade was additional and complementary to other 
forms of aid.  Finally, he said that monitoring  and evaluation – including peer assessments – were 
important if Aid for Trade was to be improved. 
385. The Moderator
 then turned the focus of the discussion to Asia and invited Ms. Chai Xiaolin to 
provide information on China's experience in South-South cooperation. 
386. Ms. Chai Xiaolin Deputy Director General, De partment of International Trade and Economic 
Affairs, Ministry of Commerce, China , said that South-South cooperation was not a new phenomenon 
in China's international cooperation and had been a state policy for some time.  For over half-a-
century China had been providing assistance to other developing countries under a South-South 
cooperation framework. Trade-related activities (i.e. Aid for Trade) had long been an integral part of 
China's overarching foreign aid because China believe d that promotion of trade was not an end in 
itself but rather a way to meet a broader goal fo r partner countries' long-te rm economic growth and 
sustainable development.  Since 2000 China had impl emented more than 300 projects, exempted 374 
interest-free loans that had come to maturity fo r 49 countries, and had entered into debt relief 
arrangements for LDCs whose debts will have come to  term by the end of 2008.  In 2007 and 2008, 
China's Aid for Trade increased by 20 per cent and 30 per cent, respectively, compared with the 2002-
2005 period.  
387. Ms. Xiaolin provided concrete examples of assistance that fell into the categories of Aid for 
Trade.  In the area of trade-related policy develo pment, in 2007 China had helped design a Trade 
Development Plan for the Northern provinces in Laos which had contributed to the macro policy-
making process of both central and local government.  With regard to trade-related infrastructure 
building, China had built the Laos section of the highway from Kunming to Bangkok, a power station 
in Myanmar, and the Cambodian section of the GMS Information Highway.  All these projects had 
greatly enhanced the transportation, power s upply and communication capacity of the partner 
countries involved.   
388. China participated actively in the implementation of the Almaty Plan of Action for the 
landlocked and transit countries promoting trade facilitation, regional ec onomic development and 
alleviation of poverty.  With respect to trade capac ity, China had helped build a sugar factory in Mali, 
the Wanrong cement factory in Lao PDR, the Agricu ltural Technology Centre in the Philippines, and 
a fishery products' processing centre in Vanuatu.  These projects had contributed to the respective 
countries' export diversification and enhanced intern ational competitiveness in the global market.  In 
the area of technical assistance, China had trained 6,815 trade and economic professionals since 2000 
to share knowledge and transfer practical and ma nagement skills. China had shared its experience 
with WTO accession and implementation of commitme nts with Laos, Viet Nam and other countries. 
389. China promoted South-South trade through Fr ee Trade Agreements (FTAs) such as the 
ASEAN 10+1 FTA, FTAs between China and Pakistan , between China and Chile, and between China 
and Peru.  As a result, there had been a ma rked increase in trade volume among members. 
390. On trade financing, China had established well functioning mechanisms and had acquired 
some experience in this domain.  In the midst of  the current financial crisis, China had actively 
participated in the Global Trade Liquidity Pool  and had also made pledges to regional banks in Africa, 
Asia and Latin America.  Through the Sino-US  cooperation framework, the China Export-Import 
Bank had made available US$20 million for trade fi nancing.  The Sino-African Cooperation Forum 
launched in 2000 was another concre te example of South-South cooperation, putting trade in a much 
broader agenda for development.  The current plan of action due to be completed by the end of 2009, 
included doubling the 2006 volume of aid, provi sion of concessional loans of US$3 billion and 
concessional export credit of US$2 billion, debt re lief and duty-free and quota-free market access to  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  products from LDCs covering 97 per cent of their pr oducts, as well as establishment of three to five 
economic and trade zones in the African Continent. 
391. Turning to best practices and lessons learned,  China believed that the following factors lay 
very much at the heart of effective aid:  country  ownership with mutual respect;  time-bound delivery 
with tangible results;  satisfaction rating as a primar y indicator to measure the impact of aid;  and 
software and hardware support. 
392. On the way forward, China's own experience a nd the Second Global Review itself had shown 
that good results had been achieved.  The growi ng importance of South-South cooperation and Aid 
for Trade was therefore self-evident.  Nonetheless,  there were still gaps that warranted continued 
effort and, given the current economic crisis and the need for sustained growth and development, 
focus should be put on both short-te rm interventions and strategies th at would bring long-term benefit 
to partner countries.  Fighting against protectionism, maintaining open markets, increasing trade 
financing and mainstreaming trade in national economic plans were key to sustained economic 
development to continue addressing supply-side c onstraints through capacity building and supporting 
trade-related infrastructure.   
393. In conclusion, she noted that the Doha negotia tions were entering their end game after eight 
years of painstaking effort.  A successful conclusi on of the Round would serve as the most effective 
stimulus for the world community, boost the dema nd for goods and services, meet development goals 
and rebuild the world's confidence in the multilatera l trading system.  China would therefore like to 
call on all to follow the mandate, build on the achieve ments made so far and resolve remaining issues, 
and to conclude the Round in 2010. 
394. The Moderator then asked Ambassador Ujal Singh Bhatia  to explain the work that India was 
doing in the area of South-South cooperation. 
395. Mr. Ujal Singh Bhatia, Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the WTO, Permanent 
Mission of India to the WTO, Geneva , said that South-South cooperation had accelerated over the last 
few decades with the emergence of a number of developing economies as major players in the world 
trading system.  This was a significant and valuable  complement to the Aid for Trade provided by 
traditional OECD member-country donors and multila teral funding agencies. Advantages of South-
South cooperation included the fact that much of it took place in the immediate neighbourhood 
enabling a better appreciation of the challenges, requ irements, constraints and local specificities, and 
that it was less sensitive to external factors,  such as the current global recession.     
396. While India had been a provider of developmen t assistance since its independence in 1947, 
this had gained added momentum over the last decade  as a result of the accelerated growth of India's 
economy.  India saw South-South cooperation more in terms of a "partnership" rather than a "donor-recipient relationship".  While India could not offer grants in aid to match those of developed country 
donors, what it could offer was over six decades of development experience, and manpower skills and 
technology that were more appropriate to the geographical and ecological conditions of most 
developing countries.  In India's view, this type of assistance was more cost effective. 
397. South-South cooperation had traditionally been an  important pillar of India's foreign policy 
and its activities were directly in line with th e WTO Director-General's call that "countries need 
infrastructure, enhanced production capacity and trade -related training which is essential if trade is to 
be streamlined into development and poverty redu ction strategies in the developing world".  The 
Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (IT EC) programme, established in 1964, was the 
flagship instrument for channeling India's tec hnical assistance to around 158 partner countries and 
since that time India had provided over US$2 billion worth of technical assistance to developing countries.  Included in the ITEC programme were  (i) technical training programmes for capacity WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  building which focused, inter alia , on organizational entrepreneur ship, business development for 
SMEs and micro enterprises, industrial and infrastru cture project preparation and appraisal, business 
research methods, Intellectual Property Rights and im plications for SMEs, cotton cultivation in the 
"Cotton 4" countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Benin, and Mali); (ii) projects and project-related activities 
such as feasibility studies and consultancy services;  and (iii) deputation of I ndian exports.  Under 
ITEC and other similar schemes, every year aroun d 5,000 participants (of which some 1,500 were 
from Africa and 500 from Afghanistan) attended 2 00 courses in 43 select institutions, which were 
centres of excellence in their respective fields.
  
398. Ambassador Bhatia gave examples of the assistance provided by India in relation to 
infrastructure projects.  In Afghanistan, where I ndia's current level of assistance amounted to over 
US$1.3 billion – making it the sixth largest bilate ral donor to that country – India had funded the 
construction of a road from Zaranj to Delaram in  Southern Afghanistan and the construction of a 
220 KV Transmission Line from Pul-e-Khumri to Kabul .  In Nepal, over 310 small and large projects 
were currently being undertaken under the Indi a-Nepal Economic Cooperation Programme.  Some 
larger infrastructure projects in Nepal included inte grated check posts at four border check points, 
over 1,500 km of feeder and lateral roads in th e Terai, the Mahendranager-Tanakpur link road in 
Western Nepal, and cross-border rail links at five border locations.  In Bhutan, India was establishing 
several hydro power projects, highway projects and a cement plant near Nangalam and had also been 
involved in other large projects such as the constr uction of Paro Airport, the Bhutan broadcasting 
station, the electricity distribution system fo r Thimphu and Paro, and the Deothang-Rangia power 
transmission line.  In Myanmar, India had assisted in  the India-Myanmar "friendship" road as well as 
the upgrading of infrastructure at Sittwe Port.  Africa, too, where India's assistance programme was 
channelled through New Partnership for Africa's Development, Pan- Africa E-Network Project and 
Team-9 initiative, had also been the beneficiar y of several information technology and other 
infrastructure projects.  Over the next five years,  India proposed to undertake projects in excess of 
US$500 million in grants. 
399. India also extended concessional lines of credit.   The EXIM Bank of India, for example, 
currently had 117 operative lines of credit amounting to US$3.85 billion in 94 developing countries, 
including from Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).  
Between 2003-2004 and 2008-2009, India had extended lines of  credit amounting to US$2.15 billion 
to Africa and had decided to offer additional lines of credit over the next five years amounting to 
US5.4 billion, both bilaterally and to th e regional economic communities of Africa. 
400. India's bilateral South-South cooperation efforts were complemented by its regional 
cooperation, notably within the South Asian Asso ciation for Regional Coope ration/South Asian Free 
Trade Area  framework, India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue  Forum Trilateral development forum and 
India's proactive engagement in various regi onal and multilateral coopera tion groupings and fora. 
401. As far as the annual quantum of assistance was concerned, for the financial year April 2007-
March 2008 the volume of aid and loans extended by  India had been approximately US375 million, 
the largest recipients being Bhutan (US$162  million), Afghanistan (US$96 million), Nepal 
(US$ 22 million), and Bangladesh (U S$13 million), which were all LDCs. 
402. Ambassador Bhatia then responded specifically to the three key questions that had been 
addressed to the Session panellists.  First, what less ons could be learnt from Aid for Trade offered by 
South-South partners?  He said that, for India, th e most important lesson was that programmes should 
be responsive to partner countries' needs.  The IT EC programme, for example, was structured to be 
demand-driven or response-oriented with consider able importance being attached to the feedback 
received from stakeholders, i.e. participants a ttending training courses in India, the concerned 
institutions, Indian Missions abroad, ITEC alumni  groups, etc.  This was the same bottom-up and 
demand-driven approach that India also followed fo r infrastructure projects.  The feedback received  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  and the close consultation with pa rtners had helped in making impr ovements and fine-tuning various 
aspects of India's assistance to suit the requirements of partners. 
403. Second, how could existing trad itional donors and regional devel opment institutions support 
further South-South cooperation, notably at regional  level, through Aid-for-Trade activities?  He said 
that traditional donors and regional development in stitutions could support South-South cooperation 
by way of innovative measures for technical coope ration or assistance such as triangular cooperation 
arrangements under which, for example, Indian in stitutions provided training to candidates from 
developing countries with funding bein g made available by the traditional donors or institutions.  This 
strategy sought to leverage India's state-of-the-a rt institutions, that were equipped with technical 
prowess and human resource capabilities at competitiv e prices, to provide technical assistance to 
developing countries by way of net additionality over- and-above what was bei ng provided by India on 
a bilateral basis. 
404. Third, how could other South-South partners be encouraged to mainstream Aid for Trade into 
their development strategies?  He said that India did not wish to provide any prescriptive or one-size-
fits-all suggestions of South-S outh cooperation activities and that each country should be free to 
undertake its own activities with regard  to South-South cooperation in c onsultation with its partners in 
a demand-driven process.  India, for example, r esponded to specific requests from partners and had 
conducted special courses for developing countries at  various stages of accession to the WTO, the 
most recent of which had been held for CIS countries, Lao PDR, and Yemen. 
405. The Moderator  thanked the panellists for their present ations which she said had provided a 
great deal of very substantial information on wh at was being done with regard to South-South 
cooperation in different regions of the world.  It  was clear that this cooperation could take many 
varied forms and involve various sectors including trade facilitation, technical assistance, infrastructure, and financing for trade.  A compar ative advantage of South-South cooperation – which 
was not new – could be seen from the examples provided by the five countries.  The potential for the development of triangular cooperation had also been  well-illustrated and in her view it was now time 
to take stock of South-South cooperation in term s of the challenges involved, its impact, and its 
effectiveness.  The outcome and assessment of the Argentinean project in Peru on sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards were clear;  on the othe r hand, assessment of the impact and institutional 
capacity of Peru was something which could be fu rther explored.  She then opened the floor for 
comments. 
406. The representative of the Netherlands
 asked whether or not developing countries providing 
aid to other developing countries participated in donor coordination mechanisms in their respective 
countries?   
407. The representative of Zambia  said the North-South Corridor project in Africa was a practical 
example of Aid-for-Trade cooperation and that, in the context of that project, as well as at a country 
level, China was providing valuable South-South assistance to Zambia by, for example, committing to 
support the rehabilitation of part of the railway line between Zambia and Tanzan ia and construction of 
economic zones as a mechanism to diversify the econom y.  As a final point, he underlined the fact 
that South-South cooperation was critically important for growth and job creation. 
408. The Director-General of the Universal Postal Union (UPU ) noted that it was participating in 
the efforts to develop trade and to make best use of the opportunities made available by international 
trade.  He then referred to th e successful work of the Brazilian pos tal service and its Exporta Fácil 
programme for SMEs through which 10,000 SMEs in Brazil were able, for the first time, to have 
access to international markets.  With assistance from Brazil, the World Bank and the IaDB, other 
countries in Latin America were replicating the Braz ilian experience and, after a careful analysis of 
the outcomes of the export programme in terms of SMEs' ability to access new export markets, the WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  UPU itself had decided to repeat this experience in ot her parts of the world.  With this in mind, he 
said that UPU would soon be launching pilot project s in Asia, Thailand and Laos.  For these projects, 
UPU would need to bring together all partners  including postal operators , governments, regional 
organizations, customs, donors and, of course, th e WTO – in other words a South-South approach, 
based on successful regional level experiences a nd roles supported by technological solutions 
developed by UPU.  UPU hoped that this modest  but concrete contribution to Aid for Trade, 
particularly in the area of Sout h-South cooperation, would have imme diate tangible effects in terms of 
the development of SMEs and their capacity to expor t by giving them access to industrialized country 
markets.  The current economic crisis had clearly sh own that SMEs were very much the drivers of the 
economy and the aid offered by UPU and the posta l sector in the area of trade, exports and E-
commerce development should theref ore be supported and developed.  He hoped that within the 
framework of the Aid-for-Trade initiative the necessary support and partnerships, particularly at 
regional level, could be found to exte nd the Brazilian success story elsewhere.   
409. The representative of Japan
 asked whether developing countries providing aid to other 
developing countries were sharing informa tion on their success stories with OECD Development 
Assistance Committee  and other such fora.   
410. The Moderator  invited the panellists to respond to the questions that had been asked. 
411. In response to the questions from Japan and the Netherlands regarding coordination among 
donors and information sharing, Mr. García  said that in Chile there was good coordination with 
donors, particularly in the case of triangular cooperation which opened up the possibility of 
agreements with the European Union where there were also good possibilities for improved 
coordination.  Although South-South cooperation was one of the key thrusts in Chile's Foreign Trade 
Policy and was a cross-cutting theme for Chile in te rms of foreign aid, there was a need for specific 
Aid for Trade to be recognized.  Chile did not have a specific Aid-for-Trade strategy but the 
conceptual difference between South-South cooperati on – which was fairly broad, for example, in 
terms of technical assistance and awareness raising – and Aid for Trade, which was specifically aimed 
at improving export, needed to be underlined.  With  regard to exchange of information, one of the 
problems with South-South cooperation – and Aid for Tr ade in particular – was that a better exchange 
of information was needed.  To achieve this, th e information provided by donors and beneficiaries 
needed to be checked and a bette r effort to communicate the results of Aid-for-Trade studies and 
reports made so that all informati on could circulate more effectively. 
412. In reply to the question on donor coordination, Ambassador Dumont  said that Argentina's 
situation was similar to Chile's in that it had a number of bilateral agreem ents and there were no 
specific problems in terms of coordination with dono rs.  Argentina did not have a single window for 
Aid for Trade and looked at South-South coopera tion in very general terms as a framework for 
dealing with cross-cutting issues such as, for exam ple, human rights, trade facilitation and assistance 
for customs.  He said that perhap s what was needed was a more speci fic approach to Aid for Trade so 
that Argentina's expert knowledge on issues such as S PS, TBT, and customs issues could be offered in 
a more effective way.  On information exchange, th is was something he felt could be analysed.  He 
referred to the possibility of carrying out im pact assessment studies on the basis of common 
indicators, as mentioned by WTO Deputy Director-G eneral, and said that Argentina was currently 
working on the issue of both qualitative and quant itative indicators.  Once it had developed an 
indicator template, Argentina would share this with the beneficiary countries to see whether the 
indicators were effective and precise enough to fo rm the basis of, at least initially, a regional 
assessment mechanism – which could then perhaps be  extended – so as to improve the way in which 
Aid for Trade and subsequent financing was assessed. 
413. Ambassador Bhatia  said that the projects that India operated had to be demand-driven.  There 
was no formal horizontal process of consultation per se , but once a request for a particular initiative  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  had been received, India would carry out a pre-pr oject evaluation and would contact other donors to 
see what kind of programmes were already being impl emented.  On the issue of mainstreaming Aid 
for Trade, he said that if the idea was to have an a priori allocation of Aid-for-Trade funding within 
the overall South-South cooperation funding provided, that was not the way India structured its activities.  India's activities were based on recipient countries' demand, needs and preferences;  if Aid 
for Trade was what they wanted, then Aid for Trad e was what India would provide.  India was in a 
position to provide effective assistance in a number of  trade-related areas, including trade facilitation, 
technology, business skills for SMEs, etc., but the as sistance given depended on the priorities of the 
recipient countries. 
414. Ms. Xiaolin
 said that, with regard to donor coordination, China did not consider itself a 
traditional donor and its South-So uth cooperation provided to other developing countries was more a 
partnership which had already been in existence fo r a number of years.  Trade-related activities had 
long been an integral part of China's overarching foreign aid programmes beca use China believed that 
promotion of trade was not an end in itself but a way to meet a broader goal for the partner countries.  For China, effective coordination meant consu ltation between the donor and partner countries 
themselves so as to achieve country ownership and a demand-driven process.  Regarding the 
OECD/DAC information sharing process, she sa id that although China fully supported the 
transparency of aid programmes, as proposed by the monitoring and evaluation system of the DAC Committee, China wanted to make sure that it di d not add too much administrative cost.  In the 
absence of a clear definition of Aid for Trade and whether Aid-for-Trade initiatives should be 
mainstreamed into broader assistance programmes – which was still under discussion – she said that 
copies of some brochures providing information on  China's foreign aid programmes had been made 
available to participants.  As a final word, she sai d that China would like to continue its collaboration 
with African countries in the years to come. 
415. In reply to the question concerning donor coordination, Mr. Carneiro de Mendonça
 said that 
Brazil had no problem with coordi nation as long as the conditions set by Brazil were met.  He added 
that Brazil's international cooperation was different in  that Brazil looked at it as a partnership exercise 
and not an end in itself.  Unlike traditional do nor cooperation which tended to lean towards, for 
example, an occasional business scheme to sell good s and services, Brazil's South-South cooperation 
aimed to assist countries which, like Brazil, were striving for development. 
416. The Moderator  said that the exchange of experiences from different countries on their South-
South cooperation programmes had been very encouraging.  Summing-up the discussion, she said that 
three messages had emerged.  First, it was clear that  in the context of the current economic crisis the 
needs of developing countries had increased and that  more input was needed from partners in the area 
of Aid for Trade.  South-South cooperation was an increased and welcome development in this 
regard.  Second, coordination of a ll stakeholders at the country and regional level – including among 
donors and among South-South partners – clearly had a number of benefits, including with regard to 
the reduction of transaction costs which was particularly  pertinent in light of the current crisis.  And, 
third, the monitoring, collection of information,  and evaluation of Aid for Trade programmes was 
important.  
X. SESSION 9:  AID FOR TRADE – WAY FORWARD 
417. The Chairman, Ambassador Servansing, Perm anent Mission of Mauritius to the WTO and 
Chairman of the Committee on Trade and Development , stated that the Second Global Review had 
surpassed expectations and had generated lively de bate.  Discussions had covered global flows, 
regional and national aid flows and the role of pa rtner countries in establishing priorities when using 
such aid as an additional tool for their economic development. There had been lengthy discussion of 
the negative effects that the current financial crisis  might have on future Ai d-for-Trade flows and the 
fact that donors and partners should become more efficient in how they disperse and how they use WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  such aid;  the global downturn demanded that ev eryone became better at using limited resources. 
Good examples of Aid for Trade at work had been referenced which showed how it could be done and 
also how it could be done better.  The impact  Aid-for-Trade on trade performance and how the 
effectiveness of Aid-for-Trade could be improve d had been discussed and how these improvements 
could be measured by employing the right mix of indicators.  And, finally, the growing role that 
South-South cooperation played in Aid for Trade had been examined, as had the need for more 
involvement and engagement from the private sector.  It was evident that the Second Global Review 
had shown what progress had been made since the last review in 2007.  The Chairman opened the floor to delegations to comment.  
418. The representative of Barbados
, on behalf of the Group of Small, Vulnerable Economies 
(SVEs) , expressed appreciation for the contributions of the presenters and panellists.  The SVEs also 
wished to acknowledge and commend the Director-Gener al on the activist role that he continued to 
play in the Aid-for-Trade discussions and to recogni ze the important work done by the OECD and the 
regional development banks.  He said that althoug h the WTO's Aid-for-Trade agenda pre-dated the 
current financial and economic cris is, it had now emerged as one of the indispensable instruments 
through which the WTO would deliver on the developm ent agenda, particularly as it related to SVEs.  
This was even more important given that the full implications of the fina ncial crisis on countries' 
economies had not yet been felt.  Implications fo r SVEs, for example, included difficulty in accessing 
trade finance, fallen export volumes and receipts,  decreased remittances and tourism, increased 
unemployment and social dislocation and diminished  demand for products and services.  As a result, 
SVEs would require certainty and pr edictability in aid flows in the years to come and Aid for Trade 
was a crucial component of the development strategy  of SVEs.  As a member of the Aid-for-Trade 
Task Force, Barbados had been designated to represen t the interests of SVEs.  On behalf of the SVEs, 
a substantive document had been tabled that set out  the characteristics and systemic vulnerabilities of 
SVEs and that made a very strong and evidence- based case for the importance of Aid for Trade to 
those economies.18  The need for flexibilities to be conferred on SVEs was widely accepted and had 
been reflected in many areas of negotiations under the DDA.  However, if such flexibilities were to be 
truly effective and pro-development in focus and impact, they needed to be complemented with 
commitments to provide SVEs with a share of Aid-for-Trade resources that would support the 
implementation of the DDA. 
419. A number of studies undertaken by various inte rnational organizations  and think-tanks had 
clearly illustrated that SVEs required sustained and focused Aid for Trade to supplement their efforts 
to increase productive capacity and diversify exports.  Infrastructure and trade facilitation assistance 
was critical so that the small island, coastal a nd landlocked developing members of SVEs could 
effectively confront the distance between their respective markets and the main trading centres, 
continue development of skills base and social  capital, direct budget support and adjustment 
assistance, and help to further develop value adde d industries and strengthen agriculture, SPS, TBT 
and the intellectual property architecture.  It was also clear that SVEs would require assistance to 
confront the challenges of climate change. 
420. As was apparent from the two days of discu ssions, key to moving forward on the Aid-for-
Trade initiative was the need to wo rk collectively and to collaborate  on ensuring the effectiveness of 
aid.  The key elements envisaged in the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action should 
thus be complied with and, in so doing, developmen t partners must ensure long-term planning of aid 
disbursements, an increase in the harmonization of aid, greater ease in accessing aid and urgently 
enhance the delivery of aid to developing countri es.  The SVEs, as deve loping-country partners, 
therefore had the responsibility to continue to fu lly integrate trade in their national development 
strategies. 
                                                      
18 WT/AFT/W/18.  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  421. The SVEs had also taken note of the discussion on indicators and of the ongoing important 
work on this critical issue that was being done  under the auspices of the Committee on Trade and 
Development.  Also welcome, were the improvements that had been made to the Enhanced Integrated 
Framework.  Although not members of the EIF, SVEs  took a great interest in the diagnostic tool and 
action matrix that had been established within the EIF and believed they were interesting tools that 
could assist in determining specific needs of SVEs and the types of interventions required to address 
those needs.  In the context of moving forward on the Aid-for-Trade monitoring framework, Barbados 
proposed that the SVEs would be an important them atic focus for evaluating the impact of Aid for 
Trade and looked forward to continuing dialogue w ith the WTO on how this could be implemented in 
the future. 
422. Turning to the provision of aid for infrastructure, he said that studies had shown that in SVEs 
this could have a multiplier effect on the efficiency  and effectiveness of their economies.  The same 
was also true as regards aid for building productive capacity, especially in certain key sectors such as 
tourism, textiles and apparel.  He highlighted the f act that the projects that were being implemented in 
SVE regions demonstrated the positive impact a nd externalities of trade facilitation procedures – 
especially regional trade facilitation initiatives – and showed how important thes e trade, transport and 
energy corridors could be for na tional and regional economies.  The SVEs looked forward to learning 
from each other and to developing a compilati on of ideas and best practices to allow for the 
implementation of these kinds of programmes.  SVEs had taken note of the focus on the regional dimension for determining needs and delivering a ssistance and had confirmed that initiatives to 
support and strengthen regional integr ation were indispensable.  The need for financial assistance and 
capacity building to be focused on regional mechanis ms and regional organizations to allow them to 
effectively support the member states was a critical element that must be explored beyond the Global 
Review.  SVEs were also of the view that ch anneling aid to the competent regional financial 
institutions for disbursement to national entities w as an archetype that international development 
partners might wish to explore further.  It would be important to work with  development partners so 
as to create an effective machinery for accessing and delivering the funds in a manner that was 
simple, transparent and predictable.   
423. Also noted was the view that th ere needed to be an improvement in the involvement of the 
private sector and civil society in the determination of aid priorities and as major components of any monitoring and evaluation scheme.  SVEs would gi ve importance to further examining ways to 
effectively enhance private sector involvement at th e national, regional and global stage in the Aid-
for-Trade debate.  In this respect, SVEs had taken note of the future focus on private foundations as 
providers and partners of Aid for Trade.  This was an  area that SVEs were, in principal, interested in 
pursuing and note had been taken that some regiona l organizations – such as the IaDB – had already 
developed a "donor index", which would provide a useful tool for engaging with these philanthropic 
organizations.  SVEs were of the view that th is was a best practice that could be shared. 
424. SVEs also welcomed the move towards increas ed South-South and triangular cooperation and 
reaffirmed that within the SVEs Group there was much that could be learnt from each other.  Mechanisms should be established at the regional and gl obal level to facilitate this form of sharing of 
best practices. 
425. In conclusion, the SVEs reinforced that Aid for Trade was a complement to the development 
outcome of the Doha Development Agenda and that  its full implementation was not contingent on a 
completion of the Doha Round.  However, it was clear  that Aid for Trade was a key policy instrument 
for many developing countries, especially SVEs, to assist in the implementation of outcomes of the 
Doha Round and previous rounds of trade nego tiations, as well as new ec onomic and financial  
challenges.  Raising the profile of Aid for Trade and bringing the trade and aid communities together 
under the umbrella of the WTO was, in itself, a su ccess, but there was much more substantive work to 
accomplish.  In the tumultuous times ahead the key words of additionality, effectiveness and WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  predictability were paramount and must guide future  tasks.  SVEs looked forward to the day when 
there would be no need for any subject area called Aid for Trade but, until then, translating the ideas 
behind the concept into tangible results wh ich would benefit SVEs  should be ensured. 
426. The representative of Guyana
, on behalf of CARICOM , said that CARICOM countries were 
small, highly indebted, preference-dependent ec onomies and their efforts to use trade to spur 
development had been severely  handicapped by the current global economic downturn.  All 
Caribbean economies had experienced marked decr eases in their earnings from the export of goods 
and services and from remittances.  This had forc ed them to look for new, fresh and innovative 
approaches to deal with the daunting challenges which were well documented and included a high 
debt to GDP ratio, supply-side constraints, lim ited productive capacity, inadequate economic and 
trade-related infrastructure and falling commodity pr ices.  In this respect, CARICOM wished to 
express its appreciation to its deve lopment partners for support in  their efforts to meet such 
challenges.  He emphasized that these challenges were  far more than just trade-related and prompted 
the need for strategic policy inte rventions in key areas such as education, security and safety, 
macroeconomic stability and shoring up economic infrastructure.  The concept of Aid for Trade was 
predicated on the understanding that improved ma rket access opportunities did not automatically 
translate into exporters penetrating global markets.   The Aid-for-Trade initiative was therefore seen as 
a vital and promising tool to help CARICOM countries to meet their development objectives. 
427. He noted that, in 2006 for example, 57 per cent of CARICOM exports to the EU stemmed 
from just five commodities.  That export path was unsustainable because of heavy preference erosion, 
as witnessed by the changes in the EU import regimes in sugar, bananas and rum.  It was for that 
reason that, as members of the ACP Group, the Ca ribbean had fought for preference erosion treatment 
on selected export items in both NAMA and Agriculture.  Tangible proposals from development partners as to how they would deliver on these commitments were still awaited. 
428. Aggregate Aid-for-Trade flows to the Cari bbean had reached U$289 million between 2002 
and 2005 with a 10 per cent gain by 2007 to U$31 7 million.  In 2007, the Caribbean had received 
60 per cent more in Aid-for-Trade funds for producti ve capacity projects.  In light of a 2008 World 
Bank study on Aid-for-Trade indicators that had shown that some of the highest levels of potential demand for Aid for Trade were generated in countries from the CARICOM region, these flows fell well below the level required if Aid for Trade was to  have a meaningful role  in stimulating exports 
and in contributing to the development objectives of Caribbean countries.  
429. The Second Global Review provided an opportunity  to make a comprehensive analysis of the 
engagement of development partners  and their partner countries, and to highlight the extent to which 
Aid-for-Trade commitments were being fulfilled a nd effectively utilized in both the bilateral and 
regional contexts.  Full attention must be given to  issues of predictability, additionality and country-
ownership and to examining how these commitments  could be maintained and enhanced in the 
present context of economic crisis and liquidity cont raction.  In addition to evaluating the progress 
made since the 2007 Global Review, the CARICOM countries believed that the following issues had 
to be addressed:  sustainable economic development especially where gains made by countries such as 
those in CARICOM might have effectively been reve rsed by the global economic crisis;  the need for 
clear commitment from development partners on the likely and best flow of Aid-for-Trade funds 
based on each aid-receiving country;  and the need to build on the momentum created by the regional 
consultations that had already taken place and th e solid research on Aid for Trade which had been 
done in order to better able to work towards matc hing funds against project proposals.  With respect 
to the latter, CARICOM welcomed the data and an alysis provided by both the OECD and the WTO 
Secretariat. 
430. Referring to the recently-held Regional Conferen ce on Aid for Trade held in Montego Bay, 
Jamaica, he said that discussions had revealed that  many countries were con cerned that international  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  development partners had broadly considered the funds provided in support of social programmes, 
national budgets and general econo mic development initiatives as Aid fo r Trade.  Recipient countries, 
particularly those in the Caribbean, had been requ esting specific attention to those issues affecting 
trade development, for export diversification an d trade-related infrastructure.  As regards 
CARICOM's priorities, in their responses to the OECD-WTO Aid-for-Trade questionnaire, 
CARICOM member states had identified the follo wing five critical areas:  (i) competitiveness and 
private sector development;  (ii)  trade policy anal ysis, implementation and facilitation;  (iii) regional 
integration and cooperation;  (iv) network infrastructure;  and (v) ad justment and revenue implications 
arising from the implementation of trade agreemen ts.  Taking account of the importance of Aid for 
Trade, the CARICOM region had developed a ro admap defining its regional integration and 
cooperation processes, requirements for effective par ticipation in the multilateral trading system and 
the related human resource requirements.  In a number of disciplines CARICOM had developed a 
slate of specific needs and costed the interventions, thereby allowing to effectively engage with its 
development partners. 
431. With regard to the way forward on the Aid-fo r-Trade initiative, he proposed the following 
strategies:  (i) build on progress made so far;  (ii)  continue evaluation of the impact and effectiveness 
of Aid for Trade;  (iii) increase support to regiona l integration processes;  (iv) delivery of Aid for 
Trade through the use of regional financial intermed iaries and other mutually agreed facilities;  (v) 
greater participation in the design of Aid-for-Trade  interventions;  (vi) pursue additionality to bring 
pressure to bear on international development pa rtners to honour their commitments to the AfT 
initiative;  (vii) seek better ways to increase the participation of the private sector and planning 
agencies or those agencies involved in coordinating development assistance;  (viii)  stronger focus of 
development partners on capacity development of both  public and private sector institutions;  (ix)  
access of Aid-for-Trade funds, preferably in grant fo rm, bearing in mind that seven out of ten of the 
highest indebted countries on a per capita basis were  in the CARICOM region;  (x) predictability and 
consistency of Aid for Trade in accordance with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness;  and (xi) 
delivery of Aid for Trade, preferably in the fo rm of budget support at the national level.  He 
concluded by saying that CARICOM countries were defined as middle- and high-income developing 
countries and that it was highly probable that, on the basis of that definition, those countries would be excluded from access to Aid-for-Trade resources.  The global community must pay greater attention 
to the distinctive features of CARICOM countries. 
432. The representative of Zimbabwe
, on behalf of the ACP Group , said that the ACP Group 
recognized the importance of the review process of  Aid for Trade to enhance transparency and 
increase effectiveness in managing aid.  The ACP Group remained committed to playing an active 
role in shaping the Aid-for-Trade debate as well as  in identifying, designing and implementing Aid- 
for-Trade measures and making Aid for Trade work. 
433. In preparation for the Second Global Review of Aid for Trade, the ACP Group had held a 
two-day meeting in Geneva for senior officials fro m ACP member states to share their priorities and 
experiences – both national and regional – and devel op recommendations for the review process and 
the way forward.   The ACP Group recognized the key role international development partners played 
not only in providing Aid for Trade but also in enhancing aid effectiveness.  The ACP Group urged international development partners to:  (i) secure th e sufficiency and additionality of Aid for Trade to 
ACP countries, particularly the SVEs and LDCs, a nd to also mitigate the negative impacts of the 
global economic crisis;  (ii) ensure that trade adjustment programmes were fully and adequately 
funded for the entire reform cycle with sufficient front-loading to cover the immediate costs of 
liberalization;  (iii) proactively address Aid -for-Trade needs arising from changing trading 
environments, not least in the context of preference erosion, including the need for measures to facilitate diversification;  (iv) assist developing co untries in their efforts to  identify n eeds and design 
interventions;  (v) ensure that funding was availa ble to support both regional integration processes and 
national development priorities;  and (vi) ensure that monitoring and evalua tion mechanisms of Aid WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  for Trade measured the impact of Aid-for-Trade inte rventions and ensured that lessons learned were 
incorporated into new initiatives. 
434. As developing countries, the ACP Group carried  its share of responsibilities and recognized 
the need for ACP regions and member states to play a very active role in the identification, design and 
delivery of Aid-for-Trade measures.  The Group was called on to contribute to the design of Aid-for-
Trade interventions, monitoring (including through the effective use of existing tools such as the 
OECD database), the creation and operation of natio nal and regional institu tional mechanisms, and 
the systematic and effective inclusion of pr ivate sector operators.  Although some ACP Group 
members had already taken on these responsibiliti es, for example through important reforms at 
national level, firm assurances were yet to be ob tained from development partners that they would 
respond favorably and in a timely manner.  In ma ny cases, the response had not been as forthcoming 
as might have been useful and for the Aid-for-Trade initiative to be credible this was one aspect that 
should be addressed. 
435. The ACP Group agreed that Aid for Trade was an important vehicle through which to support 
developing and least-developed countries to bene fit from trade opportunities.  ACP countries were 
acutely aware of the links between Aid for Trade and bilateral, regional a nd multilateral negotiations 
on trade disciplines, including the DDA.  That said,  it was clear that effective progress on Aid for 
Trade was certainly an essential condition, but not a substitute, for the successful conclusion of the 
Doha Round. 
436. The representative of Zambia
, on behalf of the LDC Group , said that the Second Global 
Review of Aid for Trade was timely, particularly in the context of the current global financial and 
economic crisis, which had had adverse effects on LDCs.  The Second Review meeting was being 
held against a very different backdrop than the buoyant global economy that had accompanied the 
First Global Review in November 2007.  Least-Dev eloped Countries attached great importance to Aid 
for Trade considering it to be an effective vehicl e for the meaningful integration of their economies 
into the multilateral trading system.  At the begi nning of the Doha Round, it had become increasingly 
clear that for developing countries – and particular ly LDCs – to integrate into the global trading 
system, more was needed beyond be tter access to markets in the form of duty-free and quota-free 
market access and preferential trade rules.  A necessary complement was aid that would contribute to LDCs being able to defend their interests in inte rnational trade negotiations and enterprises being able 
to enhance their supply capacities and competitiven ess in order to effectively seize the market 
opportunities.  
437. In the context of moving from commitment to  implementation, he said that effective 
implementation of Aid for Trade required better c oordination between donors and recipients in order 
to provide a more reliable platform for discussions aimed at addressing specific gaps which might occur in the course of implementing Aid for Trade.  In allocating Aid-for-Trade resources, donors and 
agencies should be guided by priority needs, pr ojects and programmes identified by developing 
countries and LDCs, as well as by their potential me rit in relation to Aid-for-Trade objectives.  
Referring to the integration of trade in national and regional development strategies, LDCs were 
beneficiaries of the Enhanced Integrated Framewor k.  The purpose of the EIF was to strengthen the 
LDCs' trade capacity, including the ability to iden tify their trade needs and priorities for development 
support.  More specifically, the EIF was directed towards the objectives of supporting LDCs to mainstream trade into their national developmen t strategies, establishing broad-based consultation 
processes involving the private sector, civil society or ganizations and relevant government agencies to 
formulate trade strategies, develop action matrices, and formulate priority project proposals.   
438. On the relationship between the EIF and Aid for Trade, the LDC Group believed that the 
governance structure established under the EIF woul d be an essential foundation for strengthening the 
demand-side of Aid for Trade in LDCs.  The Group was of the view that Aid for Trade should cover  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  some trade capacity needs, particularly those id entified in the Diagnostic Trade Integration Studies 
that were not addressed under the EIF.  It should deal with, among other things, supply-side capacity 
building in the private sector development such as  production constraints.  He cited as examples 
diversification and marketing, export promotion; trade-related infrastructure – particularly physical 
infrastructure such as roads, ports, telecommunications, energy and electricity, water supply and 
sanitation – as well as technology transfer. 
439. He also stressed the importance of compleme nting national Aid-for-Trade strategies with 
regional strategies and said that if LDC producers we re to become competitive it was important that 
the costs of cross-border trade were dramatically reduced.  For many LDCs the cost of getting goods 
to markets were dependent on costs incurred beyond their borders.  For instance, the cost of 
transporting a container from a landlocked country in Africa to a seaport in another country was three 
to four times the cost of transporting that containe r to Europe from the seaport.  If LDCs were to use 
trade as an economic development tool they would have to reduce transport costs as advocated under 
the Trade Facilitation agenda.  This could best be achieved through regi onal and sub-regional 
cooperation.   
440. He then expressed the LDC Group's appreciation of the regional Aid-for-Trade projects that 
had materialized, including the North-South Corri dor project launched by COMESA, EAC and SADC 
to address infrastructure and energy challeng es, as well as the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) 
Programme, with support from the Asian Developmen t Bank and other donors, to implement high 
priority sub-regional projects in transport, ener gy, telecommunications, environment, human resource 
development, tourism, trade, private sector investment, and agriculture.  Although these projects 
would go a long way in helping to address the LDC' s serious trade-related concerns, the LDC Group 
wished to stress the need to replicate the program mes in respect of improvement of other priority 
regional transport and transit corridors, such as, fo r example, the Central Corridor from the Port of 
Dar es Salaam,  Tanzania to Rwanda and Burundi;  the Northern Corridor from Mombassa, Kenya to 
Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Re public of the Congo;  and the Lamu–Southern 
Sudan–Ethiopia Corridor.  
441. Regarding sustaining aid flows during the global economic downturn, he said it was 
important to recognize that developing countries – and LDCs in particular – were the most vulnerable 
to the current international financial and economic crisis in terms of its consequences.   The LDC 
Group believed that the only viable solution to the cu rrent situation was to have a firm commitment to 
the multilateral trading system, including the successful conclusion of the Doha Round.  The LDC 
Group hoped that the current crisis would not cont inue over a long period of time and negatively 
affect the flow of remittances, FDI and ODA whic h were important for supporting the economies of 
LDCs.  It was further hoped that the development partners would approach Aid for Trade with the 
understanding that the goal was to reduce poverty by helping developing countri es, particularly LDCs, 
adapt to and participate in global trade.  In this regard, Aid for Trade could help countries to use trade 
as an engine for growth, but this assistance had to  be recipient-driven and additional to existing 
development aid.  The LDC Group was concerned that the levels of Aid-for-Tra de flows seemed to be 
heavily leaning towards other beneficiaries instea d of the LDCs who were the poorest of the poor.  
Aid for Trade should also be free of economic c onditions, and must be adequate, predictable and 
complimentary to – and not a substitute for – better and fairer trade rules.   
442. Turning to assessing the effectiveness of Aid for Trade, it had been agreed that monitoring 
and evaluation were an important part of the aid effectiveness agenda as observed in the 
recommendations of the Aid-for-Trade Task Force.   The LDC Group believed that the evaluation of 
the performance of Aid for Trade should be guided by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, and 
applicable to all parties involved, mainly donors,  agencies and beneficiaries, including the private 
sector.  The involvement of the private sector and civil society was in line with many LDCs' economic 
reform processes in which previous business activitie s had been minimized or abdicated.  The private WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 88  
 
  sector was basically left to generate the economic  growth needed to achieve the poverty reduction 
targets.  It had also evolved institutional mech anisms of interaction a nd consultation with the 
government through organizations  which provided the main forum for public-private sector 
consultations on strategic issues pertaining to th e creation of sustainable conducive climate for 
economic growth and development, a nd more responsible business operations. 
443. In conclusion, he emphasized that the LDC Group honoured its cooperative responsibility in 
making Aid for Trade work for its respective count ries in accordance with th e agreed objectives and 
expectations.  The LDC Group believed that these objectives would better be met if all donors and 
international financial institutions in tensified their engagement with LD Cs in a spirit of partnership to 
ensure that trade opportunities were truly and fully harnessed for economic growth and poverty 
reduction in LDC economies. 
444. The representative of Egypt
, on behalf of the African Group , commended the efforts of the 
WTO and all other organizations in organizing th e Second Global Review.  The Review was being 
held at a time when African countries were sufferi ng from the far-reaching negative impact that the 
economic and financial crisis was having on their ec onomic growth and nationa l development plans.  
Aid for Trade was needed because many of the poorest countries had struggled to obtain global 
market opportunities due to their inability to produ ce or export efficiently.  Most African developing 
countries – and all African LDCs – had neither the di versity of exportable products nor the production 
capacity to take immediate advantage from improve d market access opportunities.  Thus, while it had 
been argued that trade barriers were of concern to trade, poor supply-side conditions had often been a 
more important constraint on the export performan ce in various regions of Africa.  Many African 
countries still needed resources to upgrade neces sary trade-related infrastructure in ports, 
telecommunications, customs facilities and institu tions.  The African Group expected that the 
outcome of the Second Global Review of Aid for Trade would represent a step forward in realizing the benefits of this initiative and believed that the coming period would be critical in shaping the Aid-
for-Trade initiative. 
445. The Group therefore agreed with the four ke y objectives of the Second Global Review and 
wished to highlight some other important elements.  With regard to moving from commitment to implementation, the African Group believed that the challenge ahead was to ef fectively move to the 
operationalization and implementation of Aid for Trad e.  This should be conducted in a manner that 
ensured developmental gains from the internationa l trading system on both the regional and national 
levels.  Effective implementation of Aid for Trad e required better coordination between donors to step 
up disbursement levels, as well as between donors and recipients in order to provide a platform to 
discuss priorities and specific gaps which may occur in the implementation of Aid for Trade.  With 
regard to integrating trade in national and regional development st rategies, he said that high level 
political commitment at the national level was crucial in order to spearhead and monitor implementation of agreed policy reforms to integrat e or mainstream trade in  the national development 
strategies.  Mainstreaming trade into overall national development plans and poverty reduction 
strategies therefore became an issue of urgent n ecessity.  Although trade liberalization and reform 
were necessary for generating res ources and growth to reduce poverty, they should be implemented 
together with complementary policy areas such as ma cro-economic, regulatory and structural policies.  
Given the fact that developing and least-develope d countries needed to raise their capacity to 
mainstream trade into their overall national deve lopment strategies, it was also essential that 
discussions on Aid for Trade focused on addressing possible solutions to this problem.  It was also 
important to promote wider experience sharing acr oss the regions to strengthen the alignment and 
harmonization of programmes and procedures of exte rnal development partners as well as to deepen 
the regional integration process.  In this respect, th e African Group very much appreciated the role of 
the RECs.  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  446. With regard to sustaining aid flows during th e global economic downturn, the African Group 
believed that the principles of secure, additional and predictable Aid for Trade were important for the 
sustainability of Aid for Trade, especially in the cu rrent period of economic downturn.  In that regard, 
effective and sustainable Aid for Trade would definite ly lead to mitigating the negative impacts of the 
global economic downturn for both sides.  To achie ve this objective, the following elements were 
necessary:  (i) Donor coordination.  Greater donor  and agency coordinatio n and harmonization of 
procedures – at both the local and global level – w as critical.  Trade-related programmes and projects 
should be more coherent, both in terms of operations and policy.  (ii) South-South cooperation.  
Technical cooperation among developing countries was a valuable tool to deliver effective results, 
due to better understanding of prob lems. The valuable technical expertise of the South could be 
channeled to project implementation th rough triangular schemes of cooperation. 
447. Turning to assessing the effectiveness of Aid for Trade, he said that evaluation of the 
effectiveness of Aid for Trade should be guided by  the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness which 
should be applicable to all parties involved ( donors, agencies and beneficiaries), including key 
principles such as country ownership, mutual acco untability, aligning aid to national development 
strategies, effective donor coordination, harmoniza tion of donor procedures, use of programme-based 
aid modalities, management for results, transparen cy, and predictable and multi-year commitments, 
which should be built into all programming.  The pr ivate sector, as an actor in the field, was well 
placed to identify trade-related problems and bottlen ecks.  An increased dialogue between the public 
sector and private entrepreneurs would improve effe ctiveness in assessment of Aid-for-Trade needs, 
in diagnostics, implementation, as well as in eval uation of the effectiveness in implementation.  
Measuring the impact of Aid for Trade was the only way to gauge and demonstrate empirically that 
the assistance was indeed working and positively influe ncing trade.  In order to facilitate the aforesaid 
measurement, it was prudent that the cumulative figures for ODA were disaggregated and that Aid-
for-Trade funds were clearly identified within  this overall donor funds disbursement channel. 
448. The representative of the United States  said that the US remained strongly committed to 
combining ambitious market opening results in th e DDA with providing the wherewithal that helped 
developing countries to take fullest advantage of  the openings created by the negotiations.  This 
commitment was evident from the US contribution of US$10.3 billion in Aid for Trade since 1999 – 
an increase of US$4.3 billion since the 2007 Global Revi ew.  Over the last four years, US work on 
Aid for Trade had moved from initial efforts to bring high level attention to the issue to concrete work 
on implementation on the ground.  It was clear that Aid for Trade was firmly established in the agenda 
for integrating developing countries into the global economy.  There was, of course, more work to do 
and because implementation and design of trade-rela ted assistance programmes primarily occurred in 
the field, what could be most effectively done  in Geneva should be carefully considered. 
449. Turning to the four main issues emphasized by the Director-General as areas for further work, 
the US believed that ways should be explored to ensure the continued participation of the private 
sector in the Aid-for-Trade process, including in Geneva-based activities.  On enhancing the regional 
aspect of Aid for Trade, the US viewed regional integration as an increasingly important element of both trade and trade-related assistance for many  countries, whether through RECs, free trade 
agreements or other vehicles.  As a result, the US was ramping up its involvement with RECs and 
increasing its regional assistance activities, including for tr ade.  With regard to South-South trade, the 
US considered that both South- South trade and development were increasingly being discussed and 
had the potential to offer treme ndous opportunities to countries. And,  finally, regarding evaluating 
impact, the US believed this to be an important and challenging area, particularly as many trade-
related programmes were part of larger agriculture , infrastructure or other projects.  For its part, 
USAID was currently conducting a study to determ ine how best to evaluate the trade-related 
programmes. WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 90  
 
  450. Bearing in mind all these points, the need to co ntinue work in several other areas, including 
areas that could be effectively covered in Geneva , should not be neglected .  Partners and donors 
needed to be encouraged to mainstream trad e in national development strategies or donor 
programmes.  Information on what was happening in the field needed to be brought to Geneva, 
perhaps through a series of meetings of the Committee on Trade and Development focusing on 
specific topics.  Trade-related elements of assistance programmes that might carry another label 
needed to be considered.  For example, the gl obal food security response would contain significant 
Aid-for-Trade components.  Finally, it should be remembered that good assistance went with good 
policies. 
451. The United States looked forward to consultations early in the autumn on the content of an 
Aid-for-Trade roadmap which would carry the work forward to the next global review and would 
participate actively in the de velopment of that roadmap. 
452. The representative of Germany
 said that he wished to focus his comments on four crucial 
areas, namely, (i) German contributions to trade-rela ted assistance;  (ii) current strengths and future 
programmatic approach of Germany's Aid for Trade;  (iii) the delivery mechanism of German Aid for 
Trade;  and (iv) the way forward and challenges for the ODA process. 
453. On German contributions to trade-related assist ance, he said that the joint EU Aid-for-Trade 
Strategy was the framework for, and determined th e parameters of, Germany' s future engagement in 
Aid for Trade.  Germany was fully supportive of the EU commitment to increase trade-related 
assistance (TRA) to €2 billion annuall y by 2010 and was committed to fulfill its role in that regard.  
Germany's contribution to TRA was based on the Ge rman share in the EU budget and the European 
Development Fund (both approximately 22 per cent).  Based on the pledge of  €1 billion made by EU 
member States, this translated  into a German TRA budget of €220 million per year as of 2010.  
Germany would also increase its contributions to th e wider Aid-for-Trade agenda (beyond TRA) in 
line with the general increase in ODA.  Aid for Tr ade played a major role in German development 
policy.  Internationally, Germany was the third la rgest bilateral donor of Aid for Trade (after Japan 
and the US), and within the EU, too, Germany w as the biggest bilateral donor of TRA and to the 
wider Aid-for-Trade agenda.  All in all, more than three-fifths of all Aid-for-Trade flows originated 
from bilateral donors.  In 2007 this amounted to US$15.8 million in bilateral funds, and 
US$9.6 billion in multilateral funds, of which US$2. 7 billion was from the EU.  To underscore this 
fact, he explained that during the period 2005-2007 Germany had increased its TRA from 
€160 million to €220 million.  In the same period the total volume of its Aid for Trade rose from 
€780 million to €1.2 billion and its main objective fo r the coming years was to stabilize Germany's 
TRA well above €220 million and to make its Aid -for-Trade contributions more predictable and 
stable and to ensure that funds were additional. 
454. With regard to the current strengths and futu re programmatic approach of Germany's Aid for 
Trade, he informed that the bulk of German Aid for Trade was delivered through bilateral 
development cooperation.  He underlined that that  there were no specific Aid-for-Trade funds, nor 
had Germany introduced any new channels of deliver y.  Germany's additional Aid for Trade would be 
delivered via the established procedures of bilatera l development cooperation.  Based on the relevant 
strategies of its partner countries, Germany had been aligning its support with partner priorities and, in 
this context, appreciated the fact that developi ng countries' ownership had been growing.  Trade 
orientation and trade development was a decisive  element in a country's path towards economic 
development and an indispensable pa rt of national development strategies or relevant sector strategies 
for areas such as industrial or agricultural developmen t.  The long-term challenge was to intensify the 
mainstreaming of trade in national development stra tegies and to keep efforts on track.  Trade was a 
multi-dimensional issue.  Germany therefore approached Aid for Trade in a holistic and 
comprehensive manner as a cross-cutting issue.  Its Aid for Trade, particularly measures in the trade 
policy and regulation and trade development cat egory, addressed various focal sectors, most  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  importantly private sector development, financia l market development, and economic policy reform, 
but also agriculture and food security and fisheries and forestry.   
455. Germany was well positioned to respond to a wide  range of trade-related needs.  Capacity 
development was at the centre of German development cooperati on where it had a long tradition, 
broad knowledge and specialized implementing agenci es for flexible delivery.  On various occasions, 
the provision of long-term assistance and their presence on the ground had enabled German 
development cooperation players to build the trust necessary for successful Aid for Trade in 
politically sensitive areas such as trade policy and trade negotiati ons.  The focus as well as the 
strength of German Aid for Trade in terms of ra ising developing countries' trade capacity was Trade 
Development and Building Productive Capacity.  A re cent analysis of the German Aid-for-Trade 
portfolio had highlighted some of the comparativ e advantages of German Aid for Trade, the most 
important being private sector development and ag ricultural development.  In these key sectors, 
German Aid for Trade typically addressed all asp ects, such as the development of business support 
services and institutions, banking and financial suppo rt, trade policy and administrative management, 
economic and trade reforms, as well as  rules, regulations and standards that needed to be met for trade 
development.  Capacity development and public a nd private institution building formed a particular 
comparative advantage of German development c ooperation in the various intervention areas of Aid 
for Trade.  The importance of capacity development had been clearly highlighted by partner countries in the OECD-WTO Aid-for-Trade questionnaire, as the Aid-for-Trade at a Glance 2009 report had 
confirmed.   
456. Regional integration was also an important stra tegy – particularly given the current economic 
crisis – to increase intra-regional trade and region al value chains.  Regional integration fostered 
stability and allowed countries to better shield th emselves against a volatile global economy.  In 
geographic terms – in line with the joint EU Ai d-for-Trade strategy – Germany would focus its 
increases in trade-related assistance on ACP countries,  especially countries in sub-Saharan Africa.  
Germany sought to increase intra-regional trade, thus  strengthening regional integration, and to help 
ACP countries implement the commitments arising fro m international and bilateral trade agreements, 
including EPAs.  While the bulk of German Aid for Trade was implemented at the national level in its 
partner countries, support for RECs had been increased.  In sub-Saharan Africa in particular, German 
development cooperation could build on a long-sta nding relationship with RECs such as EAC, SADC, 
and ECOWAS that dated back to the 1990s.  Sup port was provided in particular in the area of 
strengthening governance and orga nizational and management capacities in order to enable 
secretariats and commissions to bring regional integration processes forward.  Germany was currently 
working on refining its Aid-for-Trade approach and a strategy document would be launched in 2010.  
Two documents existed that provi ded a quantitative and programmatic analysis of the German Aid-
for-Trade portfolio:  BMZ
19, Discourse 013, "Shaping German Aid for Trade – Past Experience, 
Lessons Learnt, and the Way Forward"; and BMZ 2009, Special 160, "Monitoring German 
Contributions in Trade-Rela ted Development Cooperation". 
457. Turning to the third crucial area, namely the de livery mechanism of German Aid for Trade, he 
said that following the principles of the Paris Decl aration on Aid Effectiveness, German development 
policy sought to strengthen partner countries' owners hip.  The demand-driven formulation of needs by 
partners was therefore a pre-requi site for German development c ooperation to become involved.  
Germany encouraged partner countries to increase thei r efforts to include trad e issues in their poverty 
reduction strategies and implementati on plans and to develop, on that basis, their own trade policy 
that identified national priority export areas (regiona lly and internationally) and strategies to promote 
them.  As was the case for agricultural or industrial po licy, trade policy should form an integral part of 
a country's economic development strategy.  A trade -related needs assessment w as an integral part of 
                                                      
19 Bundesministerium Für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (German Federal Ministry for Economic 
Development Cooperation). WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  such a process and should be incorporated in the relevant strategies.  The bulk of German Aid for 
Trade was implemented via bilateral development c ooperation;  there was no separate Aid-for-Trade 
fund that could be accessed.  Therefore, if a partner co untry was in need of support in a specific trade-
related area and wished to receive German assistance, this should be brought up during the 
consultations between the German Government a nd the Government of the partner country.  The 
German Embassies and Missions would be pleased to  help with the initial contact.  In many cases 
officials from the BMZ were part of the Embassy staff and could provide further information about 
the procedures relating to Germ an development cooperation. 
458. Finally, on the way forward and challenges for the Aid-for-Trade process,  Germany wished to 
emphasize that much had been achieved since the start of the Aid-for-Trade process on the part of 
partner countries, donors and multilateral institutions .  The Aid-for-Trade at a Glance 2009 report 
documented these impressive achievements.  Aid for Trade was now clearly in the stage of 
implementation as trade became more and more ma instreamed in national or regional development 
strategies.  However, if Aid for Trade was to be  a success story, further improvement of monitoring 
and evaluation was needed.  The target should be to  enhance the quality of Aid-for-Trade measures.  
In the area of monitoring, additional efforts were  necessary on the part of donors and the OECD to 
complete the missing part of trade development activities.  Trade development was one of the most powerful tools within the Aid-for-Trade agenda for increasing partner countries' trade capacity and 
Germany therefore regarded improved monitoring of  trade development as indispensable.  As for 
indicators and the measuring of results, he said that the current country fact sheets provided a good basis for pushing the political process both at th e international and national levels.  Indicators 
contributed to mainstreaming trade in partner countri es' development agendas.  However, in the field 
of core evaluation of Aid-for-Trade activities and, more particularly, in the field of measuring trade 
capacity achievements, much needed to be done.  Germany attached great importance to making 
progress on the elaboration of indicators in order to  enable developing countries to better measure 
what had been achieved in trade capacity developm ent.  The policy hypothesis of Aid for Trade was 
that trade integration spurred growth and, among other things, reduced poverty, and it was on this 
promise that Aid for Trade had to deliver.  Hence,  in the years to come, mainstreaming trade in 
national development strategies as well as furthe r examining and clarifying the linkages between 
trade, economic development, and pro-poor  issues would rank high on the agenda. 
459. The WTO had an important role to play in monitoring Aid for Trade and in related 
awareness-raising and was indispensable in terms of  facilitating dialogue.  However, in view of the 
challenges to come, Germany considered it essen tial that partners and donors intensified the 
discussion and strove for a more inclusive process geared toward fruitful cooperation between the 
trade and development spheres.  From Germany's point of view, these features were key to future success.  One possible way of achieving this was to  enlarge the informal Aid-for-Trade Advisory 
Group.  The Advisory Group could, for example, be broadened to encompass representatives of 
multilateral institutions (WTO, OECD) and multila teral donors (World Bank, UNDP, UNCTAD, ITC, 
Regional Development Banks) and should, in par ticular, also include representatives of major 
developing-country groups and bilate ral donors (which provided three fifths of all Aid for Trade).  In 
the effort to achieve an inclusive process with partner countries, the OECD also had an important role 
to play.  The OECD's Development Cooperation Dir ectorate – in cooperation with the WTO – had the 
mandate to organize outreach events with repr esentatives of developing-country groups.  Among 
others, the topics of indicators selection and mainst reaming trade in national development strategies 
could be discussed from the perspective of the trade as well as the development community.  It was on 
this basis that Germany hoped to generate a dditional momentum for progress on the Aid-for-Trade 
agenda. 
460. The representative of Norway
 said that Norway had supported the Aid-for-Trade initiative 
from the beginning and had presente d its Government's Action Plan in 2007 during the First Global 
Review of Aid for Trade.  She said that the major part of Norway's cooperation was delivered through  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  multilateral agencies, and the Action Plan had th ree priority areas:  (i) good governance in trade 
matters;  (ii) women and trade;  and (iii) regional trade.  Norway believed that these areas were, and 
would continue to be, keys to success. 
461. The Second Global Review had been a wide-re aching and comprehensive exercise.  The 
regional dimension had been well-covered.  Comp rehensive cross-border infrastructure investments 
such as the three case studies presented that morn ing would unleash significant new trade flows and 
were particularly important to landlocked countri es.  At the same time, th e software infrastructure 
supplemented the hardware and could yield consider able gains.  A case in point was the project 
Norway had listed as a best practice, namely, cooperation in the SADC countries to overcome 
technical barriers to trade – SADCAS.  The priv ate sector and regional organizations also had a 
decisive part to play in the regional context, a nd there was need for a clearer division of labour to 
develop the best models for private-public partners hips.  The SADCAS project on standards was also 
an example of how to promote good governance in trade.  Good governance and the fight against corruption should remain at the core of the Aid-for-T rade agenda and instrumental in this regard was 
increased transparency and trade facilitation measur es.  Needless to say, a successful completion of 
the Doha Round would be the most important cont ribution to providing new market openings for 
products of interest to developing countries – and to  LDCs in particular.  Market access was the main 
vehicle; Aid for Trade was there to help it accelerate. 
462. One concrete link between Aid for Trade and th e DDA was to be found in the negotiations on 
trade facilitation.  Issues related to technical assist ance and capacity building were a crucial part of 
these negotiations.  The Global Review provided added information and hopefully comfort to 
negotiators, on the one hand through reinforcing th e understanding that a great deal of resources was 
going to trade facilitation, and, on the other hand, that partner countries were mainstreaming trade 
facilitation into their development plans.  Here, she wished to highlight that, with the exception of 
some very useful references made during Session 7 on assessing impact and effectiveness, the aspect of women and trade had received less attention th an it should have done.  Limited work had been 
done so far on the gender component of Aid for Tr ade and Norway strongly believed that it was 
necessary to focus more on both the effects of trade on the situation of women as well as the 
contribution of women to trade.  A stronger emph asis on gender-specific analysis and design of trade 
development programmes would im prove the agenda further. 
463. In conclusion, she said that Norway supporte d the call to strengthen the Aid-for-Trade 
initiative by reinforcing the country and regional component.  At the same time, improvement of 
monitoring and evaluation – with targets for indi cators and achievements – should be continued. 
464. The representative of Paraguay
, on behalf of the Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs) , 
expressed gratitude to the WTO for convening such an  important gathering of Ministers, government 
officials, international organizations and regiona l banks to assess what had been accomplished with 
the Aid-for-Trade initiative since 2007, and to  jointly outline the path for the future. 
465. He explained that the LLDCs were a heter ogeneous group of 31 developing countries from 
different regions of the world sharing the condition of being landlocked.  Su ch condition implied that 
LLDCs had weak institutional and productive capaciti es, were highly vulnerable to external shocks 
and suffered from remoteness from world markets.  Mo reover, they faced higher  transportation costs, 
were dependent on the physical, ec onomic and political conditions existing in their transit countries 
and were likely to be much more sensitive to econom ic conditions at the regional level because of the 
multitude of borders they share. 
466. The economic and financial crisis had hit deve loping countries hard and had exacerbated the 
vulnerability of the LLDCs.  As a result of the cr isis, these countries – many of which were single 
commodity exporters – had seen their revenues depl eted by falling world prices.  Many had been WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  crowded out of diminishing markets for trade and general finance and had been badly affected by 
lower remittances which, for some LLDCs, represented a significant share (more than 20 per cent) of 
their GDP.  The landlocked condition of these countr ies made it imperative for the LLDCs to attain 
levels of economic efficiency and competitiveness th at allowed for compensation for such condition.  
The Aid-for-Trade initiative was therefore critical in this context because it would allow the LLDCs 
to address structural weaknesses in their economic systems and institutions in preparation for the 
recovery. 
467. LLDCs had made important strides for a more effective engagement in the Aid-for-Trade 
initiative.  For example, in close collaboration w ith development partners, the LLDCs were working 
to identify and prioritize their trade needs and estab lish systems at the national and regional levels to 
enhance trade effectiveness.  A number of aspects which the LLDCs considered critical in moving 
ahead included a sustained effort from development pa rtners to steadily increase AfT flows within an 
overall expanding ODA portfolio.  The drying up of priv ate capital made it more urgent than ever not 
only to maintain, but to increase ODA, especially to vulnerable developing countries such as the LLDCs, in order to attract and keep investments in  the fundamental social and economic sectors of 
their societies in the face of the crisis.  LLDCs were committed to the attainment of the MDGs and 
considered ODA, including Aid for Trade, as a cr itical enabling factor to make this possible. 
468. LLDCs welcomed a more balanced distribution of Aid-for-Trade resources so as to avoid 
concentration in a few countries and allow for improv ements in the transparency and predictability of 
Aid-for-Trade flows.  This was imperative to enable  LLDCs to better integrate Aid for Trade in their 
planning processes to leverage the potential of tr ade for poverty reduction, and to improve the 
alignment and harmonization of Aid for Trade with development priorities at the country and regional 
levels.  The LLDCs also supported an enhanced focus on the regional dimension of Aid for Trade 
which it considered as critical for addressing th e comprehensive array of challenges faced by 
countries with no direct access to the sea. 
469. In conclusion, the Aid-for-Trade initiative constitu ted an important enabling factor that would 
allow developing countries to better integrate in th e world economy.  Fair and equitable trade rules 
and transparent and open markets continued to be  a priority, especially for developing countries, 
including LLDCs.  In this regard, she emphasized that the LLDCs attached great importance to the 
successful conclusion of the Doha Round in line with its overall development dimension as it was 
originally conceived.  In this regard, the LLDCs  reiterated their commitment to contribute to the 
success of the Doha Round and hoped that, together, WTO Members would soon be able to complete 
this endeavour. 
470. The representative of Canada
 said that the Second Global Revi ew had helped to keep focus 
and concentration on the Aid-for-Trade programme and had also made it possible for donors, partner 
countries and implementing agencies to have an ex change of information and experiences on what 
had been learnt and on good practices.  She said that  Canada remained determined to ensure that its 
aid was effective.  In this respect, since 2007 Canada had taken specific measures to enhance 
concentration, the effectiveness of its aid and the ov erall accountability of what it did.  All Canada's 
food aid had been untied since 2008 and all its de velopment aid would be untied by 2012-2013.  
Furthermore, 80 per cent of Canada's bilateral aid was concentrated on 20 countries.  On 20 May 
2009, the Canadian International C ooperation Minister had announced the three priority areas which 
would be the basis of Canada's work in the future :  (i) increasing food security, (ii) offering greater 
possibility to children and young pe ople, and (iii) promoting sustai nable and economic development. 
471. Turning to Aid for Trade more specifically, she said that Canada was actively engaged at the 
bilateral, regional and multilateral levels, and su pported Aid-for-Trade initiatives in Africa, the 
Americas and Asia.  According to the Canadian In ternational Development Agency's (CIDA) latest 
figures, Canada's Aid-for-Trade expenditure in financial year 2007-2008 had been CAD$500 million,  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
 Page 95 
 
 
  up from CAD$465 million in 2006-2007.  This represen ted approximately 17 per cent of CIDA's total 
aid.  Any increases were being drawn from Cana da's expanding aid envelope.  Additionality, 
therefore, was not coming at the expense of other sect ors.  She explained that Canada's Aid for Trade 
was primarily directed at building productive capacity , particularly in agriculture.  The World Bank 
had estimated that GDP growth from agriculture be nefited the incomes of poor people two to four 
times more than GDP growth in other sectors of the economy.  In this regard, Canada was looking at 
further assistance through agricultural development as part of its Food Security Strategy.  With its 
new strategy priority on sustainable growth in mind, Canada would support initiatives that sought to 
increase the growth rate of an economy, particularly  through the private sector, which generated nine 
out of ten jobs in developing countries.  Wit hout the capacity to produce competitively, countries 
would not have the prospect of exporting to begin with. 
472. Canada continued to view the EIF as a key in strument in facilitating national ownership of 
Aid for Trade in LDCs and had underlined its co mmitment by its initial pledge of $19.2 million over 
five years.  Canada saw the EIF as an important tool to prioritize trade-related programmes and projects for those countries that needed them the most .  Canada therefore looked forward to the timely 
implementation of the EIF initiative under an eff ective management system that focused on real 
development results. 
473. As a member of the G20, Canada had made  commitments towards maintaining an open 
trading system.  It was imperative that trade contin ued to flow and global markets remained open to 
mitigate the downward pressure on growth from the cu rrent global economic crisis.  Aid for Trade 
was now more vital than ever to helping devel oping countries cushion the effects of the economic 
downturn while at the same time building their productive and trade capacities so they could take 
advantage of the global market, particularly once growth resumed.  In order to facilitate trade flows, Canada had recently finalized a US$200 million cont ribution to support the International Finance 
Corporation's Global Trade Liquidity Program.  Canada was the first country to officially participate in this new World Bank-led initiativ e that brought together governments, private sector banks, and 
international finance and development institutio ns to support much-needed trade finance in 
developing countries. 
474. She then underscored Canada's belief that the Aid-for-Trade initiative could be complemented 
by a successful conclusion of the Doha Round.  Cana da continued to believe that a timely, ambitious, 
and balanced outcome in the Round was the most effe ctive way to realize trade's potential as a tool for 
development and to promote trade in goods and services by lower-income countries.  As a trading 
nation where one in three jobs depended on exports, Canada believed that trade held great potential 
for development and was prepared to do its part to  assist low-income countries build their productive 
and trading capacities so that they, too, could take  advantage of a wider global market.  The Aid-for-
Trade initiative was an essential mechanis m to help them in this endeavour. 
475. The representative of Senegal
 said that Senegal was grateful to the WTO for having organized 
the Second Global review of Aid for Trade and wished  to express satisfaction at the approach which 
had been taken in the course of the debate.  Se negal believed that the discussion had allowed for a 
great deal of progress to be made.  The discussions had started with an approach in terms of the 
quantity of aid given and received and had moved to evaluating the efficacy of that aid and the 
strategy by which it was being disbursed.  It was clear that the AfT debate had changed direction 
particularly if one compared the terms used in th e First Global Review held in 2007 and those that had 
been used in the course of the present debate.  Senegal welcomed this trend and believed that it 
responded to the desires of those countries that were aid beneficiaries. 
476. Turning to evaluation, he said that the first pr iority issue to be taken into account was the 
need to look at an effective correlation between th e quantity of aid received and the improvement of 
export capacity in beneficiary countries as well as th e increase or not in beneficiary country exports. WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  Throughout the last two days of discussion Senegal had sensed the importance that had been attached 
to the need to develop physical infrastructure in orde r to enhance the effectiven ess of aid.  In the past, 
donors had not attached much importance to this, fee ling rather that Aid for Trade should not concern 
infrastructure because it was something that should be covered by ODA.  The problem of infrastructure, however, was considerable.  It was de alt with to a certain extent during the First Global 
Review of Aid for Trade to the satisfaction of bene ficiary countries and especially LDCs, and this had 
particularly been the case, too, during the present Review.  
477.  Senegal welcomed the increasing stress bei ng placed on inter-regional trade and regional 
integration in general.  Despite the insistence of  Aid-for-Trade beneficiary countries, the regional 
aspect was not always one which had been given high priority by aid donors who often focused more 
on country programmes.  However, country progra mmes had not always given the results one would 
like to see, particularly with regard to LDC c ountry programmes.  These countries did not really 
respond to the stimulus of Aid for Trade in the way one would have liked.  This was usually the result 
of their weakness in terms of infrastructure, de velopment and competitiveness.  A solution to this 
could be in the organization of regional markets where those particular countries would be able to 
enhance their competitiveness and use economies of scal e to gain experience before going out into the 
wider world.  In the past donors had tended to do things the other way round by first trying to get LDCs integrated into world trade which they we re unable to do because LDCs could not meet the 
supply and competitiveness requirements.  As a result, country programmes had very mitigated 
results.  Senegal therefore encouraged aid donors to give greater and stronger support to RECs in their 
integration efforts.  This approach would boost the chances of success in country programmes, 
especially those in LDCs.  Senegal wished to place on record its satisfaction at the fact that these 
various concerns were now  being better taken into account in th e course of the current Aid-for-Trade 
Global Review.  The more long-term ambitious vi ewpoint of the Second Global Review was the way 
to go and was better than a figure- or quantity-based  approach that had been taken for the First Global 
Review.  Senegal appreciated the fact that Dir ector-General Lamy had urged that specific and 
effective Aid for Trade be provided and hoped that his initiative to promote development in general 
would be successful. 
478. The representative of Mali
 referred to the case of cotton.  As Members were aware, since 
2003, there had been unanimity with respect to th e sectoral cotton initiatives in the framework of the 
Doha Round for development.  More specifically , paragraphs 11 and 12 of the 2005 Hong Kong 
Ministerial Declaration had set priorities in order to  try to find a lasting solution to the very serious 
problem faced by cotton producers in developing count ries in general, and in Africa in particular.  
This had been the case particularly for the Cotton- 4 (C-4) countries – Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and 
Mali – particularly in light of distorting subsidies in the field of cotton.  At the end of 2005 the programme on Aid for Trade had been launched and,  in 2006, the Director-General had established a 
framework for a consultation mechanism for the bene fit of development aid in the cotton sector.  The 
cotton sector served as the first example of a specific illustration with respect to Aid for Trade which 
went above and beyond the trade aspect.  From 2006, this mechanism had regularly gathered together 
countries to stake stock of the reforms that were  being undertaken in terms of institutional and 
regulatory measures and had also assessed aid wh ich had been announced, mobilized and received 
from traditional donors.  The aim of this mechanism w as to look at flexibility with regard to the most 
vulnerable countries – which was what the African countries wanted – and also to assist these 
countries since trade rules would not be sufficient to re-launch their economies.  At the last session of 
this consultative mechanism, held  in November 2008, the African countries, through the C-4, had 
expressed very positive appreciation of progress made  in African countries since 2006 in the context 
of Aid for Trade with a specific focus on cotton.   
479. African countries had also had the opportunity to  express gratitude to the partners, now called 
non-traditional partners, in the framework of South-S outh cooperation pertaining to the cotton sector.  
In this respect, Mali wished to express thanks  to the representatives of emerging countries (i.e.  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  Argentina, Brazil, China, India, and Chile ) who had spoken in the Session on South-South 
Cooperation Experiences.  This, in terms of cotton, could also be taken as an example concerning the 
implementation of Aid for Trade.  As a follow-up to the cooperation agreement signed in November 
2008, the Brazilian Cooperation Agency had signed, in February 2009, an  ambitious cooperation 
programme with the C-4 countries.  Although the African countries had expressed concerns regarding 
the distorting effects caused by subsidies, the same countries had also admitted that efforts and 
headway had to be made at the regional level to enhance production and to undertake reforms.  In 
light of these significant needs, Brazil, together with other emerging countries (e.g., China and India), undertook to launch the cooperation programme with the aim of assisting the four countries to seek 
adaptive capacity focusing on biotechnology (e.g., the treatment of soils, seeds, plant growth) and 
strengthening the capacity of researchers, technicians, and producers to train them in innovative 
technology and to prepare dissemination tools in order to enhance the production of cotton in the C-4 countries.  Mali fully supported the statements ma de on behalf of the African and ACP Groups and 
had had the opportunity to work in a very active f ashion with those delegations.  In conclusion, Mali 
wished to extend its congratulations to the WTO Secr etariat, led by Director-General Lamy, and also 
to the OECD. 
480. The representative of Morocco
 congratulated Director-General Lamy and Deputy Director-
General Rugwabiza for the excellent way in which the Second Global Review had been organized and 
on the quality of the on-going work on Aid for Trade and the very considerable efforts that were being 
made to ensure that the initiativ e was successful.  The fruitful and ve ry high quality debates that had 
taken place over the last two days of the Global Review involving representatives of governments, 
leaders of international organizations and regiona l development banks were an indication of the 
success of the Aid-for-Trade initiative.   
481. He said that Morocco had been a member of the Aid-for-Trade initiative since it was launched 
in 2005 and had now moved on to set up its own National Aid-for-Trade Committee as recommended 
by the WTO.  That Committee wa s responsible for implementing th e Aid-for-Trade initiative within 
Morocco's borders.  All could acknowledge the fact that  Aid for Trade in a time of international crisis 
was a very important tool for developing countries and least-developed nations to use to improve and 
expand their exports and promote thei r trade to alleviate the impact of the crisis.  In this context, 
Morocco welcomed the renewed commitment of donor  countries to maintain  – and even increase – 
aid flows to beneficiary countries in order to assi st developing countries to prepare for post-crisis 
recovery.  Morocco had for some years been im plementing a development strategy based on major 
sectoral projects.  As part of this, it had recen tly set up a commercial strategy called Maroc Export 
Plus which entailed boosting and wi dening the range of Morocco's exports as well as concentrating on 
priority sectors, seeking out more attractive export markets, and offering support to enterprises whose 
work was export oriented.  In order to implement th is trade strategy, Morocco needed, as part of the 
Aid-for-Trade initiative, to have consistent and conti nued financial support from donors and technical 
support and assistance, as well as advice to help id entify trade-related obstacles and work out how to 
overcome them.   
482. In conclusion, he said that Morocco was convin ced that South-South cooperation was the best 
way of all for promoting regional trade.  In th is regard, Morocco supported, and was working to 
tighten, cooperation links with its African neighb ours and with other developing regions.  Morocco 
hoped to increase its mutually beneficial South-S outh cooperation with other countries based on an 
exchange of experience and the use of innovative m echanisms such as, for example, decentralized 
cooperation, partnerships between the private sectors and trade alliances as well as triangular 
cooperation. 
483. The representative of New Zealand  said that progress made over the past two years was 
significant both in increasing funds for Aid for Trade and also in mainstreaming trade in countries' 
development strategies.  However, one should not become complacent and in the current difficult WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 98  
 
  economic times efforts should be intensified to ensu re that Aid for Trade was effective and that it 
enabled developing countries to realize the opportu nities trade provided to advance their economic 
development and reduce poverty.  Protectionist pressures that w ould reduce the opportunities that 
developing countries enjoyed should also be avoi ded, and gains through a rapid and ambitious 
conclusion to the Doha Round of ne gotiations should be secured.   
484. The Government, elected in late 2008, had placed a greater emphasis on supporting 
sustainable economic development through New Zeal and's official development assistance, revising 
NZAID's mandate to reflect this.  This incr eased focus on broad-based sustainable economic 
development would include support for activities that  helped enable developing countries to expand 
their trade – by improving infrastructure and related services, stimulating private sector development, 
and improving market analysis and support.  In 2007, New Zealand had provided NZ$39.3 million in 
Aid for Trade, up 70 per cent from 2005.  Aid-for-Tra de funding would increase in both absolute and 
proportionate terms as New Zealand's overall ODA budget increased and greater emphasis was given 
to economic development activities.  Building the cap acity of developing countries to participate in 
trade remained critical.  This was particularly ev ident as regards the Pacific Island countries and New 
Zealand encouraged other donors not to lose sight of the needs of small vulnerable economies.  For its 
part, New Zealand was pursuing greater coordination amongst donors in the Pacific around trade-related activities, and examining wh at could be done better to deliver  concrete measurable results for 
businesses and individuals.  New Zealand encouraged  its partners to mainstream trade in their 
development strategies to help it, as a donor, to best respond. 
485. In conclusion, New Zealand hoped that the Second Global Review would help maintain 
momentum of what was a vital initiative. 
486. The representative of Mozambique
 expressed Mozambique's support of the statements made 
on behalf of the ACP, African and LDC Groups.  During the sessions over the past two days, the 
importance of Aid for Trade had been highlighted as had the need for LDCs to have a share in global 
trade in order to benefit from trade liberaliza tion and contribute to their economic and social 
development.  Many Members had also indicated that one of the most effective ways to realize the 
potential of trade as a tool for development and po verty reduction was through meaningful market 
access outcomes combined with  the necessary production capacity, investment attraction, 
development and improvement of tr ade-related infrastructures.  It was clear that countries such as 
Mozambique could not achieve these goals without th e assistance of development partners.  That was 
why Aid for Trade was a good initiative and its ma in objective should be to enable developing 
countries to use trade more effectively to achieve  their economic development objectives to promote 
growth and poverty reduction. 
487. Aid for Trade was very relevant for Mozambique .  It was needed to improve Mozambique's 
business environment in order to attract more inv estment which was critical for its development and 
to addressing supply-side constraints and increasing  its export competitiveness.  The private sector 
needed to be empowered in order to produce a nd export goods and services.  Mozambique also 
needed assistance to build the necessary capacity to negotiate and implement various trade agreements 
and to strengthen civil society an d public-private sector dialogue. 
488. Given the link between improved market access and the necessary supply capacity, Aid for 
Trade should be provided as an addition to the exis ting official development assistance and without 
conditionality.  In this regard, Mo zambique wished to stress the n eed for predictable Aid-for-Trade 
flows since this would help it to develop its plan s and realign them with those of the region.  A 
mechanism also needed to be found which coul d help identify and monitor more exactly the 
destination of funds and their use by countries.   Strengthening country ownership and enhancing 
management for results were essential to ensure  that expanding Aid for Trade delivered larger 
benefits to developing countries, particularly LDCs.  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  489. Aid for Trade was also vital for Mozambique to diversify production and exports so that it 
could respond to the opportunities that trade libera lization was creating.  Efforts must be made to 
ensure that Aid for Trade reach ed its objectives of promoting growth and poverty reduction, of 
addressing infrastructure bottlenecks, of establishing mechanisms that reflected national development 
priorities and strategies, and of assisting with regiona l integration and helping intra-African trade, for 
example as part of the North-South Corridor initiative. 
490. He concluded by saying that it was now time to move to effective implementation of Aid for 
Trade.  Mozambique was committed to the Aid-for-Trade initiative and would continue 
mainstreaming trade in its Poverty Reduction Stra tegies, including the updating of its Diagnostic 
Trade Integration Study and its action matrix unde r the EIF.  Mozambique would like to see WTO 
members and partners alike engaged in concre te actions and commitments for Aid-for-Trade 
implementation initiatives at both regional and natio nal levels.  A strong commitment would give an 
added impetus to the ambitious Aid-for-Trade ma ndate agreed at the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial 
Conference which aimed to help developing countri es build supply-side capacity and infrastructures 
to take advantage of multilateral trade.  In this regard, Mozambique looked fo rward to the expeditious 
conclusion of the Doha Round. 
491. The representative of Dominica , on behalf of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States20 
(OECS)  first of all wished to recognize and congra tulate the Director-General for his role in 
advancing the AfT agenda and to recognize the wo rk done by the OECD, regional development banks 
and other regional and international organizations in the lead up to the Second Global Review.  He 
also wished to associate the OE CS with the statements made by the ACP, SVE and CARICOM 
Groups.   
492. He then highlighted and reiterated several poi nts on the issue of Aid for Trade and the way 
forward.  The OECS Member States were among the smallest and most vulnerable Members of the multilateral trading system and, while they were classified as upper middle-income countries based on 
per capital Gross National Income (GNI), it was im portant to emphasize that they faced significant 
structural and capacity challenges to production and trade.  These challenges included high production 
and infrastructure costs, small markets, vulnerabilit y to external shocks, negative terms of trade and 
high external debt.  Economies of the OECS countri es were very open and we re largely dependant on 
what happened in the rest of the world.  The cu rrent global economic crisis had therefore exerted 
severe external shocks to the economic systems of the OECS and had had negative impacts on OECS Member States' balance of payments through downt urns in the tourism sector, FDI, and flows of 
remittances.  In addition, the OECS countries were confronted with the need to undergo 
comprehensive trade adjustment and economic repositioning in the face of increasing globalization, regional integration, economic interdependence and tr ade liberalization.  It was for these reasons that 
delivering on the promise of Aid for Trade was important to the OECS member states.  Aid for Trade was a means for the OECS to addr ess the challenges they faced in adjusting to the economic shocks 
from the current crisis, trade liber alization – including preference erosion – and to build medium- to 
long-term competitiveness of the productive sectors thereby translating the promise of increased 
market access into improved trade performance.  In that regard, the Aid-for-Trade at a Glance 2009 
report highlighted the priorities identified by OECS  member states in their responses to the OECD-
WTO Aid-for-Trade questionnaire which includ ed trade policy analysis, negotiation and 
implementation, competitiveness, regional integrati on, export diversification, adjustment costs, and 
infrastructure development.   
493. A critically important area that needed to be addressed at the national level was the 
mainstreaming of trade in national development stra tegies.  This had been recognized by each OECS 
                                                     
 
20 Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts  and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines. WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  member state and steps were being taken to address this issue.  Work was also currently ongoing on 
revising and updating the OECS Development Strategy.  There was also need to address the capacities of the OECS member states to identify and cl early articulate their needs, to design necessary 
interventions, and to effectively ab sorb the aid when it was received.  The role of the private sector 
was critical in this process and interventions were needed that prepared th e private sector to play 
multiple roles including as advocates, partners in desi gning interventions, and beneficiaries of aid.  In 
order to address these needs, Aid for Trade must be su fficient, additional, predic table, transparent, and 
must respond to the needs articulated by beneficiarie s.  Aid for Trade should be simple to access and 
any adjustment assistance facility should be delivered  in a timely manner.  The OECS would also like 
to see a component that addressed the high level of indebtedness of the region. 
494. The OECS did not perceive the outcomes of Aid for Trade as being compensation for loss of 
preferences.  Aid for Trade was also expected to  be reflective of outcomes in the DDA and therefore 
should result in the provision of a dditional financing (or new sources of funds) and not the "recycling" 
or repackaging of existing financing instruments.  Finally, Aid for Trade should be primarily in the 
form of grants and preferably through budgetary support mechanisms. 
495. In conclusion, the OECS looked forward to atta ining the objectives that had been set for the 
Second Global Review of Aid for Trade.  In partic ular, that there was a move from commitments that 
had been made to delivery and implementation;  that the existing and new donors ensured that aid 
flows were sustained and increased;  and that there was greater effectiveness in assessing and monitoring Aid for Trade at nationa l, regional and multilateral levels. 
496. The representative of Bangladesh
 congratulated the WTO for organizing the Review and 
expressed appreciation to Director-General Lamy for the successful coordination of the event.  
Bangladesh wished to fully associat e itself with the statement made by Zambia on behalf of the LDC 
Group.  Bangladesh recognized the importance of Ai d for Trade as a means to address the supply-side 
constraint in developing countries, especially LD Cs and he said that a Working Group on Trade-
related Technical Assistance had been constituted comprising representatives from public and private 
sectors to deal with the issue.  Bangladesh – toge ther with 27 LDCs – had completed the OECD-WTO 
Aid-for-Trade questionnaire in which some of their priorities had been identified to be put before 
appropriate donors in consultation with multi-stakeholders.  Banglad esh had recently joined the EIF 
and was committed to mainstreaming trade in its national development plans (i.e. PRSP).  Although 
this was a necessary step it was not sufficient.  If donors did not mainstream trade into their 
programmes, these efforts might not bear fruit.  Additionality of reserves was also an important 
element, but it should not come at the expense of so cial factors such as health, education, etc.  
Bangladesh was confident that additionality should be  available and available as a compliment to the 
DDA.  In this regard, he wished to highlight the importance of granting duty-free quota-free market 
access to LDCs as committed by Ministers in Cancún.  He then referred to the Global Trade Liquidity 
Program that had recently been launched and the US$50 billion of trade finance programmed over the 
next three years and said that, as the hardest hit Gr oup from the financial crisis, LDCs should benefit 
from this without conditionality.  In other words,  countries that were most deserving should receive 
the maximum.   
497. The representative of Chinese Taipei  said that Aid for Trade had been mainstreamed into its 
overall foreign aid strategy the details of which had recently been released in its White Paper on 
Foreign Aid Policy:  Progressive Partnerships and Sustainable Development.  Chinese Taipei's Aid-
for-Trade related projects focused on areas where it considered it had advantages and strengths, such 
as:  (i) in agriculture, by sending technical te ams abroad, financing agricultural infrastructure, 
providing vocational training;  (ii) in private sect or development, by encouraging strategic operation 
alliances and strengthening institutional capacity;  and (iii)  in information and communication 
technology, by assisting partner countries set up digital centres, and establish e-government.  The 
Chinese Taipei International Cooperation and Deve lopment Fund (ICDF) had therefore been given a  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  mandate to facilitate Aid-for-Trade  related projects.  For example,  in September and October 2008, 
the WTO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures had held a series of workshops 
covering good practices in SPS-related technical  cooperation, during which two ICDF projects 
(Papaya Export Promotion Project in Guatemala, and Pesticide Residue Testing and Training project in Panama) had been nominated as models for best pr actice.  Chinese Taipei also responded to Aid for 
Trade through cooperation with international organizations such as the AITIC (Agency for 
International Trade Information and Cooperation) and had made, and would continue to make, 
appropriate contributions in the different areas of the Aid-for-Trade in itiative.  Chinese Taipei 
remained committed to helping other developing Members participate in and benefit as much as 
possible from the multilateral trading system. 
498. The representative of France
 thanked the WTO Secretariat and the Director-General for 
recalling that the essential nature of Aid for Trade w as for the future of developing countries and for 
the most vulnerable amongst them.  He commended th e organization of the Second Global Review of 
Aid for Trade and the high quality work undertaken that had enabled countries to consolidate and 
reaffirm their commitments. 
499. France believed that Aid for Trade was a signifi cant pillar in supporting developing countries 
to further integrate into the trading system and to fight against poverty and accelerate economic and 
social development.  To demonstrate its reso lve and to strengthen its commitment, France had 
recently adopted a strategic Aid-for-Trade frame work supporting regional in tegration which gave 
priority to regional trade policies and development of  competitive supply side at national, regional and 
international level.  In addition, it showed that ot her aid flow channels should be explored – such as 
loans to the private sector – to sustain trade devel opment.   The strategic framework aimed to increase 
efforts by 50 per cent compared to 2002-2005.  The se efforts would, for example, lead to technical 
assistance reaching on average €150 million from 2010 onwards.  Fifty per cent of this increase would be allocated to ACP countries which was France's re sponse to the internati onal commitments of the 
European Union.  Overall, France’s global Aid for Trade would account for a minimum of 
€850 million per year from 2010 onwards.     
500. In conclusion, he said that in addition to concessional or grant Aid for Trade, support for 
developing trade required other instruments such as lo ans to the private sector, particularly to small- 
and medium-sized enterprises.  France was of the vi ew that these instruments would need to be further 
reviewed in-depth and invited partners to further highlight and define their needs taking into account 
the regional dimension of their development strategies. 
501. The representative of Australia
 said that Australia believed that international trade was a 
critical avenue to faster poverty reduction and de velopment.  No country had achieved strong and 
sustained economic growth – and thus rapid poverty reduction – without particip ating in international 
markets.  The global recession had highlighted the importance of trade to development and restoring international trade was crucial to achieving the M DGs.  Developing-country participation in global 
trade liberalization was one of the most effective wa ys of delivering developing  countries a better deal 
in world trade, encouraging development and redu cing poverty.  Australia strongly supported trade 
liberalization and continued to push for a successf ul conclusion to the Doha Round as soon as 
possible.  He said that, as leader of the Cairns  Group, Australia, had l ong supported international 
efforts to liberalize agricultural trade, particularly  through the elimination of trade distorting domestic 
support, export subsidies and barriers to market acces s.  Australia had also provided duty- and quota- 
free access for products from LDCs since 2003 and it urged other members of the international 
community to offer comprehensive and unqua lified duty- and quota-free access to LDCs. 
502. Trade liberalization alone, however, was not e nough to create opportunities for development.  
Although support for open markets and resisting prot ectionism had to be c ontinued, developing 
countries faced many challenges in realizing the bene fits of increased trade.  These countries needed WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 102  
 
  the capacity to translate the benef its from trade into real development outcomes.  Aid for Trade would 
help developing countries and LDCs become active par ticipants in, and reap the full benefits from, the 
multilateral trading system and the global economy .  He informed that Australian development 
assistance to improve countries' trade prospects now  represented about ten per cent of its overall aid 
programme and was expected to grow.  Now, more  than ever, it was vital that donor and partner 
countries worked together to maintain the momentum  of Aid for Trade.  Australia was committed to 
helping partner countries overcome barriers that cons trained their ability to benefit from global trade.  
In this respect, it had recently more than doubl ed its contribution to WTO development assistance 
activities to $2.5 million in 2009.  Australia was al so supporting a new trade and economic agreement 
in the Pacific region which would enhance the ability of Pacific Island economies to take advantage of 
existing or new market access opportunities in Aust ralia and other parts of the world as well.  
Australia's aim was that this new agreement, currently known as PACER Plus, would significantly 
improve the dividends to Pacific economies of th eir individual efforts to improve the trade and 
economic conditions within their countries. 
503. The global recession had heightened the focus of th e world on international trade.  With an 
extra 90 million people expected to remain in extr eme poverty as a result of the global recession, Aid 
for Trade was one of the best ways donors could he lp developing countries to facilitate recovery from 
the crisis and position them for growth and faster progress towards the MDGs.  Australia believed that 
continued trade liberalization, coupled with the implementation of appropria te measures to improve 
the domestic environment, would be critical to restoring confidence and growth to the global 
economy. 
504. The representative of Cape Verde
 said that Cape Verde attached great importance to the 
predictability and flexibility of ODA, while at th e same time ensuring sound, transparent, and 
responsible management of the resources made ava ilable to it by development partners.  It was 
equally crucial that in the new phase of Cape Ve rde's development, with  its graduation from the 
category of LDC, a new model and paradigm in relations with its part ners be developed and 
reinforced.  In this regard, five key areas for support stood out.  These included:  (i) improving the 
global trading system to make it fair; (ii) providing  special infrastructure financing;  (iii) supporting 
capacity building and capability upgrading;  (iv) facilitating institutional de velopment,  and (v) 
opening up the national policy space and allowing coun tries to lead their own development agenda. 
505. Cape Verde was a firm believer in trade and, as  a nation, had no option but to trade and to be 
active in the process of globalization.  As a small island developing state, with limited population and 
no resources, this was especially so in the area of services.  As part of its agenda for economic 
transformation, Cape Verde's target was to become  an international hub for services.  Cape Verde 
specifically needed additional resources to comple ment its efforts and to upgrade its capacity and 
national capabilities in order to integrate and compete e ffectively in the world economy.  It was in this 
light that Cape Verde conducted a DTIS, followed the processes, undertook the studies, and prepared 
an action plan which was approved by all stakehol ders.  It was still waiting for the support that was 
needed, especially from the EIF, with regard to the implementation of the DTIS Action Plan. 
506. Although Cape Verde was doing its best as far as  its economic transformation was concerned, 
there was a need for support if the gains of recent years were not to be lost.  Cape Verde continued to 
place a high value on Aid for Trade in the context of it being a viable policy response to the need to 
assist SVEs such as Cape Verde in building a nd increasing productive capacities and international 
competitiveness.  It was the only way that benefits  could be seized from market access opportunities.  
In this respect, Cape Verde recognized the need for a "scaling up" of aid given to ACP countries, 
particularly SVEs and LDCs, to ensure that Aid for Trade remained an important share of ODA and 
that the funding provided took into account both regiona l integration and country-specific priorities.  
Cape Verde wished to call upon all development partne rs to pay special attention – particularly given 
the current critical global economic situation – to  middle-income countries, especially lower middle- WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  income countries.  There was a need for an in ternational consensus on initiatives which would 
empower countries such as Cape Verde to liberat e their productive capacities.  These countries should 
therefore be supported to take ownership and lead their own development agenda.  In addition, it was 
incumbent on the global community to make sure that there was equity in the global trading system to 
ensure that trading was fair.   
507. The representative of Finland  said that the Aid-for-Trade initiative, launched only four years 
ago, had been a remarkable success, as testified by  the present Global Review meeting.  However, the 
Review also showed that much remained to be done .  Finland concurred with the conclusions of the 
Aid-for-Trade at a Glance 2009 report that maintain ing the momentum required reinforcing the local 
and regional dimensions of the initiative.  Aid-fo r-Trade dialogue should be conducted at the local 
level and should be fully integrated into the ex isting aid architecture and donor-partner coordination 
mechanisms at the country level.  Creating new bur eaucratic structures in the name of Aid for Trade 
should be avoided.  The economic consequences of  the financial crisis provided a challenge to 
maintain the positive trend in Aid-for-Trade funding,  but it was equally important to make the money 
work for the intended purpose.  Aid for Trade had to  work on the ground and had to be seen to work.  
One of the key questions was how public assistance  and public policies could induce private sector 
development and enhance competitiveness at the co mpany level, creating new jobs and reducing 
poverty.  It was therefore not only inputs that mattered (i.e. the money invested in Aid-for-Trade purposes) but what was crucial was output (i.e. the results that made a difference on the ground).  In 
this context, broad ownership and wide participation of key stake holders were vital for success.  
Bilateral donors, partner governments, private sector organizations and other non-state actors must be 
able to work in a productive partnership.  Th e initiative must not become an excessively agency-
driven administrative process without the participation of real business. 
508. Finland wished to congratulate the WTO Secretar iat for the work it had done jointly with the 
OECD and other international orga nizations and believed that the WTO should continue as an active 
promoter of Aid for Trade.  Periodic global reviews were a useful way of taking stock of progress 
achieved.  As Aid for Trade developed further, it was important that the agencies involved continued 
to focus on their core competencies.  At the same  time, organizations shoul d not be burdened with 
excessive oversight responsibilities.  Finland believed that the results of country-level activities could 
be usefully fed into the global review meetings  in the form of case studies and best practice. 
509. In conclusion, he informed that, in Septem ber 2008, Finland had launched a national Aid-for-
Trade Action Plan which built on the joint EU Aid-fo r-Trade strategy.  Implementation of the Finnish 
Action Plan was well underway and focused on areas in  which it had expertise to offer – such as 
information society, forestry, agriculture, as well as energy and environment.  Integrating developing 
countries better into the global trading system and helping them to benefit from global trade was now 
more important than ever and Fi nland would remain a committed partner in Aid for Trade to make 
this happen. 
510. The representative of Brazil
 said he wished to offer some comments on the way forward, 
based on the experiences that Brazil had been accumu lating since the First Global Review in 2007.  
He said that substantial progress had undoubtedly b een made over the past two years in efforts to 
monitor Aid for Trade.  The much higher respon se rate from partner countries to the OECD-WTO 
Aid-for-Trade questionnaire was a strong indicator that  partners were more e ngaged and that raising 
the profile of Aid for Trade was being successful.  Nevertheless, as the Aid-for-Trade at a Glance 
2009 report pointed out, only 52 per cent of countries ha d indicated that they had fully mainstreamed 
trade in their national development plans.  It was clear to Brazil that further engagement was not only 
needed in-country but also in Geneva.  Members'  more active participation throughout the whole 
process of the monitoring exercise could be achieved if delegations, in particular those from developing countries and LDCs, had the opportunity  to closely follow-up the quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of Aid-for-Trade flows.  Brazil co nsidered that enhanced transparency and debate, WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 104  
 
  including with regard to methodological issues, mi ght help to improve the quality of the monitoring 
mechanism.  Further technical discussion could have proved efficient so as to avoid, for instance, the 
difficulties that partner countries had to compare the CRS/OECD proxies with their own data.  The ongoing debate on aid effectiveness could not be tack led without an in-depth  understanding of the 
basis of the monitoring exercise, in order to improve its credibility. 
511. Turning to the regional level aspect of Aid for Trade, he expressed Brazil's appreciation for 
the treatment given to South-South cooperation un der Chapter 5 – Regional Dimension – of the Aid-
for-Trade at a Glance 2009 report.  Based on a specific OECD-designed questionnaire on South-South 
cooperation, four delegati ons had provided information on thei r South-South cooperation activities.  
Since the First Global Review, Brazil and other like-m inded delegations had been trying to clarify the 
distinctiveness of South-South cooperation.  The creation of a specific questionnaire on South-South 
cooperation constituted a remarkable  improvement for the Second Global Review.  In addition, Brazil 
and four other developing-country members (Arg entina, Chile, China and India) had had the 
opportunity to present their views and goals regard ing South-South cooperation.  Brazil wished to 
encourage other developing countries to engage in  South-South partnerships.  Developing countries 
faced similar technological, economic, social and poli tical difficulties and were in a better position to 
assist each other in a cost effe ctive manner.  South-South coope ration was a growing trend and a 
priority for the Brazilian Government.  In his speech es, President Lula da S ilva often made reference 
to it as a possible way for developing countries to overcome hunger and poverty.  Even though Brazil 
was somewhat constrained by resource-availab ility, it looked forward to increasingly establishing 
partnerships that could assist to further in tegrate developing countries in world trade. 
512. Finally, regarding the future level of Aid-for-Tra de flows, he said that, as the Aid-for-Trade at 
a Glance 2009 report had concluded, donors had met, or were on their way to meet, the 2005 Hong 
Kong pledges, which was to be duly praised.  Brazil was also pleased to note that there was a tendency among donors to scale up their commitments in  the short term.  However, as a result of the 
credit crunch, the economic crisis and the recent adoption of trade distorting measures by some 
members, it should not be forgotten that developing  countries' needs had also increased since 2008.  
Against this backdrop, Aid for Trade could be an im portant countercyclical measure, but needed to be 
understood in the context of a broader development ag enda.  Aid for Trade alone could not change the 
inequalities of the multilateral trading system.  Conc luding the Doha Round,  having development at 
its centre, with development-oriented rules and trade liberalization that took into account both the sensitivities and the interests of developing and l east-developed countries would, together with Aid 
for Trade, deliver the results. 
513. The representative of Argentina
 congratulated the WTO and the entire team for the excellent 
way in which the Second Global Review had been or ganized.  Argentina was also grateful to the 
OECD for publishing the second Aid-for-Trade at a Glance 2009 report and to the panellists who had 
participated in the eight working sessions.  During the two-day discussion, a series of very relevant 
issues had arisen which would assist in preparing a roadmap for 2009/2010.  In this regard, Argentina 
wished to highlight the following three questions.  Fi rst, in line with the slog an of the Second Global 
Review – Maintaining Momentum – future work should include how Aid for Trade could contribute 
to the development of productive capacity and the stre ngthening of the private sector, in particular for 
the benefit of small- and medium-sized enterprises.   This should help them better insert themselves 
into regional and worldwide markets, given the cu rrent worldwide economic and trade stagnation.  
Second, as the WTO Director-General had mentioned at the beginning of the Review, Argentina also 
believed that the regional dimension was very importa nt and that it should be included in the future 
work of Aid for Trade.  The regional implementati on experiences described in relation to the North-
South Corridor in Africa, Meso-America and ESA in Latin America and the Mekong-Delta in Asia 
were excellent examples of what Aid for Trade c ould contribute.  This regional component therefore 
needed to be included in the 2009/2010 Aid-for-Trade roadmap.  In conclusion, he said that Argentina  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  appreciated the opportunity to have a debate on Sout h-South cooperation and urged that that also be 
included in the 2009/2010 roadmap. 
514. The representative of Lesotho  said that he wished to associat e Lesotho with the statements 
made on behalf of the LDC, African and LLDC Groups.  It was gratifying to note that Aid for Trade was progressing steadily and perhaps gathering moment um and Lesotho hoped that this would be the 
case even in light of the current financial and econo mic crisis.  Trade would certainly contribute in 
some measure to recovery from the current crisis. 
515. For developing countries, addressing the supply-side constraints was key to being fully 
integrated into the multilateral trading system and Lesotho hoped that Aid-fo r-Trade resources would 
be additional and increased even in the midst of  the current financial and economic crisis.  
Conditionality should be minimal and easy to satis fy, but it would be preferable to have no 
conditionality at all.  He said that ODA had been highly concentrated and it was Lesotho's hope that, 
in contrast, Aid for Trade would be more evenly sp read and that there would be no marginalization, 
especially in regional Aid-for-Trade projects.  Physical and institutional infrastructure was not sufficient, especially for the LLDCs, and even  trade facilitation, although a necessary condition, 
would not be enough.  A one-stop border was not th e answer to everything and it was important to 
take into account the positive or negative attitude of  transit countries.  Transit countries should desist 
from causing uncalled for delays to goods in  transit;  every day of delay meant eroded 
competitiveness of the exporting landlocked countries. 
516. Referring to the soon to be la unched EIF, he said that more resources were required for the 49 
least-development countries and appealed to the co operating partners and to potential cooperating 
development partners to contribute handsomely to th e EIF to enable it to perform its primary function 
which was to:  (i) offer trade-related training and technical assistance;  (ii) mainstream trade in LDC's national policies;  and (iii) integrate LDC's trade into the multilateral trading system.  He concluded 
by saying that gender, youth and environment should be factored in to the design and implementation 
of Aid-for-Trade projects. 
517. The representative of Pakistan
 complimented the Director-General and his team for the high 
level of participation at the Sec ond Global Review.  Pakistan also welcomed the initiative to highlight 
the need of Aid for Trade and capital inflow to de veloping and LDC countries.  She said the timing of 
the Second Global Review was most appropriate.  Th e fact that world trade faced a nine per cent 
decline and world GDP was expected to decline by almost three per cent, meant there was a need for 
purposeful engagement between developed and developing countr ies that strengthened capacities 
around the globe.  Developing countries, in par ticular, were dependent on remittances and focus 
should be made on requirements a nd opportunities for effectively ma intaining inflow of FDI and 
tourism which were especially vulnerable to high instances of poverty. 
518. As regards Pakistan's trade policy, this was well integrated in the overall development and 
growth strategy of Pakistan's economy.  The Second Global Review provided an opportunity to 
partner countries for effective sel f assessment at the national leve l and for identifying the gaps 
between needs and resources at the global level.  Howe ver, a closer look at the analysis of responses 
suggested that more work was need ed to clarify the definition of Aid for Trade.  Countries had to 
make an extra effort to reconcile the OECD CRS da ta with national data.  In  this regard, the main 
problem faced by several countries was their inab ility to identify the trade component of each 
development project.  The current exercise had al so helped national governments to focus on their 
own aid information management systems.  The exerci se had definitely been useful in highlighting the 
importance of overall aid, in general, and Aid for Trad e, in particular.  It had identified several gaps, 
and Pakistan hoped that the exercise would lead to greater flow of resources to developing countries 
and LDCs. WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  519. Pakistan welcomed the formation of regional t echnical groups and was a member of the Asia-
Pacific Regional Technical Group (RTG).  As such, Pa kistan would continue to participate effectively 
in the RTG process not only through its Geneva office  but also through its active participation at the 
regional level.  The Second Global Review had highlighted the importance of areas such as 
availability of trade finance to small- and medi um-sized enterprises, in frastructure development 
needs, importance of South-South cooperation and public-private partnership.  Future work might 
focus more on case-by-case and county-by-country identification of impediments that were presently preventing the benefits of trade being fully realized .  Results had to be seen on a case-by-case basis, 
but countries could learn from best practices and inno vative approaches for public-private partnership.  
Aid for Trade needed to have identifiable target s and regional as well as country-specific monitoring 
indicators.  The WTO's involvement in this area had not only brought it under a spotlight but would 
be helpful in removing supply-side constraints.  Pakistan hoped that once the Doha Round was 
finalized countries would be in a better position to take advantage of the emerging opportunities.  In 
conclusion, Pakistan hoped that the exercise would u ltimately lead to greater ownership at the local 
level which it considered to be key for the success of all development initiatives. 
520. The representative of Singapore
 said that, against the sombre backdrop of the economic crisis, 
the Aid-for-Trade initiative had become more releva nt than ever, not only in mitigating the negative 
impact of the downturn on LDCs, but, more importa ntly, in helping position those countries for future 
recovery through long-term devel opment and structural adjustments to address their underlying 
economic vulnerabilities.  She said that, over the l ast few years, the Aid -for-Trade initiative had 
succeeded in raising awareness about the issue a nd in turning Aid for Trade into an essential 
component of development assistance.  It had also achieved, in a short time, remarkable success in 
increasing Aid-for-Trade resources and effectiveness in  delivery on the part of the donors, as well as 
fuller engagement from partner countries in their ow n Aid-for-Trade and development strategies.  The 
discussions over the past two days had served to emphasize the importance of maintaining this 
momentum.  Increases in concessional Aid for Trad e had to be maintained, especially during the 
current difficult economic period.  There had to be  sustained engagement and commitment from all 
stakeholders – from the partner countries themselves to further mainstream trade into their national 
development strategies and to take greater owne rship of their Aid-for-Trade activities, and from 
private sector partners in areas such as trade finance and investment. 
521. The Session on South-South Cooperation Experiences had been particularly interesting.  In 
the last few years, all had witnessed the economic transformation of developing countries such as 
Brazil, China and India.  Like others, Singapore w as pleased to note that thes e countries were playing 
an increasingly important role in supporting the Aid -for-Trade initiative.  As a small island state with 
no natural resources, Singapore had benefited immen sely from the technical assistance provided in its 
early years of independence.  The knowledge shared, together with the close cooperation of its trading 
partners, had enabled Singapore to develop its trade capacity so that it could compete effectively in 
global markets.  In turn, Singapore believed in sharing its knowledge and experience with fellow 
developing countries, and it was this belief that sh aped Singapore's commitment to the Aid-for-Trade 
initiative. 
522. Singapore supported the Aid-for-Trade initiative th rough various means, the most significant 
of which was the Singapore Cooperation Programme (S CP), established in 1992 to provide technical 
assistance to other developing countries.  As much as  80 per cent of the SCP activities were targeted, 
directly or otherwise, at enhancing the economic ca pacity of recipient countries to enable them to 
participate more effectively in the multilateral trad ing system.  In response to the current economic 
climate, Singapore had customized programmes to assist regional countries with policy responses to 
the global economic crisis.  Intra- and inter-regi onal trade, and boosting do mestic demand, were 
important aspects of a long-term solution.  One of the key pillars of the SCP was the Memorandum of 
Understanding with the WTO, signed in 1996, under which Singapore jointly organized trade 
capacity-building activities for other devel oping countries in the region and beyond.  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  523. Singapore was also a key supporter of greater regi onal integration as it saw this as an essential 
means of facilitating and integrating the lesser developed countries into the regional and global 
markets.  In this regard, Singapore was pleased to see that the regional dimension of Aid for Trade was gaining momentum and that there was grow ing recognition of the role regional economic 
integration could play as a catalyst for collective regional economic growth.  She noted, with great 
interest, the example provided by President Kuroda  of the AsDB on how economic corridors created 
under the Greater Mekong sub-Regional Project had reduced transport time on one route in the Lao 
PDR from three days to four hours.  This, together  with the other case studies discussed in Session 6, 
were examples of the immense potential benef its accruable through improving cross-border 
infrastructure, and of how regional integration could play a critical role in strengthening the 
competitiveness of developing countries in the multila teral trading system.  It was with this in mind 
that Singapore focused a large part of its technical assistance activities on the region. 
524. The initiative for ASEAN Integration, launched in  2000, was a key initiative with the aim of 
narrowing the development gap in ASEAN thr ough education and human capacity building.  
Singapore had witnessed how economic integration a nd regional cooperation could foster growth and 
development and would like to do what it could within  its means to ensure that ASEAN prospered as 
a region. 
525. To conclude, she said that Singapore remained  a keen supporter of the Aid-for-Trade 
initiative and was committed to helping fellow devel oping countries develop their trade potential.  
The Second Global Review had been very usef ul, especially in pin- pointing areas where 
improvements could be made and in highlighting co ncrete steps to maintain the momentum of the 
important initiative.  Special credit should be give n to both the WTO and the OECD for painstakingly 
preparing the partner country fact sheets wh ich would go a long way in facilitating greater 
coordination between donors and partner countries, and to promoting greater accountability as well as 
more effective monitoring.  Such feedback and recommendations would surely assist in developing a 
better approach towards operationalizing Aid for Trad e to maximize its effectiveness.  Singapore, for 
its part, would consider how it could improve upo n its own bilateral and regional Aid-for-Trade 
programmes to better complement and support the initiative. 
526. The representative of Japan
, congratulated the WTO Director-General and his staff for the 
success of the Second Global Review meeting.  Japan  wished to share what it thought would be a way 
forward based on the very good achievement made th rough the present Global Review.  First, Japan 
welcomed those donors who had already announced ne w contributions and invited other donors to do 
likewise.  Second, regarding the regional dimension,  LDCs were again playing an indispensable role 
and Japan expected these countries to continue in th e same vein.  LDCs should take full advantage of 
the tangible results of regional coordination such as the 17-year old GMS Corridor or the new North-South Corridor which had the potential of keeping a regional-approach momentum.  Third, on private- 
public partnership, he said that the public sector s hould take the lead, but that this lead should be 
accompanied by private sector involvem ent such as FDI and with input of  aid flows that could lead to 
real output.   
527. In conclusion, he said that a successful outcome  of the Doha Round and the importance of the 
conclusion of the DDA could not be emphasized enough.   Japan stressed that the synergy between the 
conclusion of the Doha Round and the promotion of Ai d for Trade would enable the current turmoil to 
be overcome and would result in growth getting back  on track.  In the area of Aid for Trade, Japan, 
for its part, would continue to implement its re cently announced contribution of US$12 billion over 
the next three years, without sacrificing its aid to other areas such as health and education. 
528. The representative of Nepal
 joined previous speakers in congratulating the WTO 
Director-General and his team for successfully organizing the Second Global Review of Aid for 
Trade.  Nepal appreciated, and supported, th e ideas put forward by Zimbabwe, Barbados, and WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 108  
 
  Paraguay on, respectively, LDC, SVE, and LLDC is sues.  Nepal was also a landlocked developing 
country located in South Asia and, like othe r LDCs and LLDCs, poverty reduction remained an 
overarching goal in its national de velopment agenda.  These were dul y reflected in Nepal's PRSP.  
Poverty reduction was also covere d by the integrated framework process and, in the context of the 
Aid-for-Trade initiatives, the aim was to achieve poverty reduction through trade-related growth.  
However, trade growth did not automatically gua rantee poverty reduction.  For this to happen, a 
suitable and enabling environment had to be created.  In this respect, the trade development agenda 
needed to be embedded with a production process th at had linkages at, for example, the level of 
farmers, small growers and producers.  In order to deliver on trade benefits, there was a need to focus 
on sectors – for example, labour – that could impact production.  Aid for Trade should therefore focus 
on improving supply-side capacity of LDCs by focusing on development infrastructure, product 
development and provision of trade support syne rgies such as SPS, TBT and trade facilitation 
measures.  And, in order to realize the quick win outcome of Aid-for-Trade, focus should therefore be given to development of product needs targeting th is market.  With this approach, other related 
services and development activities could be covere d by product development activities that would 
thus help to benefit the economic agenda and to achieve poverty reduc tion and, ultimately, the MDGs.  
Belize had been cited as an example of this appro ach where exports of papaya had been revived by 
improving product standards through interventions on insect  pest elimination.  This had also helped in 
establishing a good supply chain to the US market.  This example should be replicated.   
529. In conclusion, he said that focused attention should be given for the development of quality 
standards, product diversifications, and commerc ial production of specific products with potential 
and, from this, that trade facilitation and market acc ess issues should follow.  In this context, the Aid-
for-Trade initiative should also consider implemen ting investment projects and should dispense with 
the traditional idea of just implementing technical assistance projects that had failed to bring any substantial move to the trade development agenda. 
530. The representative of Switzerland
 said that, after having listened to the substantive debate, he 
wished to first of all recall the message given the previous day regarding the way forward.  That 
message was very clearly implementation, and the answer was, yes, implementation was possible.  
Second, Aid for Trade was not a stand-alone enterprise.  It would gain an enormous significance with the conclusion of the Doha Round.  For instance,  it would be essential to adopt the results of NAMA 
where the strong increase of South-South trade could be  observed.  In order for this to be optimized, 
adequate Aid-for-Trade measures would be required.   Third, Switzerland had always been supportive 
in the Doha Round of solutions which were adequate  for specific situations.  As a landlocked country, 
Switzerland understood and supported the LLDC initiative.   Finally, he expressed thanks to the WTO 
Director-General and his team for the successf ul organization of the Second Global Review. 
531. The representative of the United Kingdom
 echoed the thanks that had been expressed to the 
WTO Director-General and his team for delivering su ch an interesting Review.  He said it was evident 
that over the last few years enormous progress had been made in moving forward with the Aid-for-
Trade agenda.  The United Kingdom had been, and woul d continue to be, very active in the area of 
Aid for Trade and would try to push forward on new ideas and new approaches.  The previous day the 
UK had launched a new White Paper in which it committe d to spend at least £1 billion a year over the 
next three years to support trade and growth.  A key part of this strategy would be in the UK's support 
of Aid for Trade.  That support included UK's bila teral and multilateral contributions, but was a real 
step forward from the commitments made up to 2010 which the UK was very much on track to 
deliver as well.  Within that commitment a specifi c focus would be placed on a number of areas, 
including regional integration which the UK saw as critical and which was a key theme of the White 
Paper, particularly in respect of Africa.  A la rge contribution would therefore go towards building on 
progress that had already been seen, for example, in areas such as the North-South Corridor.  He 
reiterated the UK's support to trade finance and sai d that the White Paper also discussed how the UK 
wanted to respond to the financial crisis and the impact on the poorest countries.  The UK's  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  contribution towards trade finance was one example of  that and it would be looking to drive forward 
further contributions around that as part of the ongoing G20 process.   
532. Capturing some of the comments that had been  made regarding the future challenges around 
Aid for Trade and the way forward, he said "DRIVE " seemed to be an appropriate acronym.  "D" was 
for delivery.  It was clear that much progress had been made and many examples of success had been 
given and it was now time to move from plans to action and focus on implementation.  Key themes 
that had come out of the two-day discussions where mo re work was needed included:  mainstreaming;  
trade-related capacity building;  regional integratio n, with a very strong focus on infrastructure and 
infrastructure development;  trade facilitation, involv ing the private sector with a focus particularly on 
market development and public-private partners hips;  trade finance and issues around supporting 
countries through the downturn in accessing trade finance;  and adjustment questions.  Some 
interesting examples had emerged over the last two da ys of how to do this work well and that needed 
to be built on and driven forward to deliver.  "R" was for results.  Outcomes had been talked about but 
the poverty impact and, as Norway had mentioned, the gender impact from Aid for Trade needed to be visible.  A good monitoring and evaluation syst em was needed and these systems needed to be 
embedded through the national processes in country.  A lot of work had been done on this and there 
was probably more to do.  The UK, for example, w ould be committing to build a very evidence-based 
approach to Aid for Trade.  "IV" was for i nnovation.  Innovation meant new ideas and approaches, 
working differently, engaging partners differently and, in particular, building on ideas such as the 
North-South Corridor where people really pulled toge ther to work in very different ways.  And, 
finally, "E" for engagement.  This meant buildi ng new and different partnerships.  The WTO had 
already shown enormous leadership around the Aid-for-T rade agenda and should continue to play that 
leadership role.  Other stakeholders, including b ilateral donors and those who delivered much of the 
Aid for Trade, needed to be brought more into th e debate about what worked.  Different levels and 
ways of working, both within Geneva and at the regional and country levels, were needed.   
533. In conclusion, he said that the Second Global Re view had been a great success and all should 
be congratulated on what had been achieved.  The emerging results and good practice would now 
have to be built on.  In this regard, the UK – and, he was sure, other bilatera l donors, too - were very 
keen to continue discussions on the roadmap and the way forward and looked forward to delivery, 
results, innovation and effective engagement as the Aid-for-Trade initiative moved forward.   
534. The Chairman
 thanked all the speakers for their in terventions and for the excellent and 
interesting comments that had been ma de on the challenges that lay ahead.  
XI. SESSION 10:  AID FOR TRADE – LOOKING AHEAD 
535. The Director-General  said that the previous session had b een extremely useful not only with 
regard to hearing about experiences on how Aid fo r Trade was working in individual countries, but 
also with regard to suggestions about the way forward. 
536. One key aspect of the dialogue was that it had helped bring the trade practitioners and the 
development professionals closer.  In agricultural de velopment, for example, the aim was to increase 
the productivity of farmers so they could sell more food products, both domestically and across borders.  In infrastructure devel opment, the aim was for those food products to travel along the roads 
and railways or through the ports and airports whic h had been built.  Clearly, trade impinged on all 
sectors of the economy;  it was not a sector on its own – and it was this realization that was important.   
537. This fact also strengthened the case for ma instreaming trade into  national development 
strategies.  In the discussion over the last two days, how economic and social benefits could be 
accrued from trade opening provided trade was mainstre amed had been highlighted.  The reality was 
that trade pervaded the fabric of global society.   As UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon had said the WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 110  
 
  previous day, building more trade capacity was essential because trade could and must be part of 
efforts to stimulate a recovery.  And, as had also been said by one delegation earlier that day, Aid for 
Trade was now firmly established in the agenda for integrating developing countries into the trading 
system. 
538. The centerpiece of the Second Review had been  the joint OECD-WTO Aid for Trade at a 
Glance 2009 report.  This report showed that trade was being prioritized by partner countries in 
national development strategies;  that donors were offering more and better Aid for Trade and that 
new partners were becoming engaged in South-So uth cooperation.  Furthermore, the increase in 
allocation to Aid for Trade had been achieved without reducing resources to other development 
priorities such as health, education or environment.  Aid for Trade had grown by ten per cent per year 
between 2005 and 2007;  if non concessional aid from in ternational financial in stitutions was added to 
that the figure nearly doubled in value.   
539. A message which had come out of the Global Revi ew was the need to refine monitoring in 
understanding how Aid for Trade was working in tandem with other financial instruments, in 
particular those offered by the international financ ial institutions.  Not all supply-side or economic 
infrastructure constraints could or would be addr essed through an Aid-for-Trade response.  For 
instance, various examples of how grant financing had been blended with other financing instruments 
had been provided.   
540. He reiterated what he had said in his opening st atement, that if Aid for Trade was urgent in 
2007, it was essential today.  Momentum had to be ma intained and commitments met.  This implied 
an on-going role for the monitoring framework whic h the OECD was constantly refining.  It also 
meant refining methodology and reporting.  It was a fact that the activities of South-South partners, 
which had been reported today, and which were  growing in volume and importance, were not 
captured in the Aid-for-Trade numbers generated by the OECD.  This required some attention, since 
better coordination, which was what one was tr ying to achieve, was difficult without better 
information. 
541. The three break-out sessions on regional implementation experiences had highlighted the 
indispensable role of regional partners. Thr ough the work of the bilateral donors, regional 
development banks, RECs, and regional economic co mmunities, significant progress had been made 
on implementation.  He remained convinced that th e progress that had been achieved in strengthening 
the regional dimension of Aid for Trade needed to be built upon.  
542. During the course of that morning's discussion, one  had also learnt that Aid for Trade needed 
to factor in specificities; for example, those of  middle-income countries and the types of financing 
available to them; or those of landlocked countri es, small economies, remote islands or countries 
emerging out of conflict. 
543. Numerous interventions from the floor had fu rther reinforced the message that had been 
received during the monitoring exercise when 88 rep lies had been submitted from developing country 
members.  That message was that developing countri es were taking ownership of their own initiatives.  
Indeed, there seemed to be a pent-up demand which was being finally released.  This meant that Aid 
for Trade was maturing.  But at  the same time Aid for Trade was a long-term endeavour. WTO's 
partners had reacted well to the lead it had taken an d they should not be allowed to define their own 
roles in this process and to participate further.   
544. Aid for Trade was coherence in global economic  policymaking in action and it must happen 
at three levels.  At national level through constructive dialogue between governments and their 
development partners; at regi onal level between RECs and their member governments, with 
international financial institutions and donors;  and at multilateral le vel by keeping the spotlight on  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
 Page 111 
 
 
  Aid for Trade in the G8 which he would attend the fo llowing day, the G20, the annual meetings of the 
World Bank and the IMF, the annual meetings of the regional development banks, and so on.  Now 
that this momentum had been ge nerated it should be kept up and a common destination agreed on. 
545. As to what next, he said that at the 11 June meeting of the Committee on Trade and 
Development, he had noted that a framework needed  to be developed that would allow for a better 
coordination of efforts, mobilization of additiona l resources, enhancing politi cal ownership and better 
prepare the way forward.  In his view, there were  four very clear objectives which should inform the 
work going forward.   
546. First, he believed that the progress achieve d in strengthening the regional dimension  of Aid 
for Trade needed to be built upon.  In this respec t, regional partners includi ng the development banks 
and bilateral donors would be relied upon to take the lead in evolving clear and focused regional Aid-
for-Trade projects.  There was an opportunity to advance the Aid-for-Trade agenda by holding an 
ECOWAS Aid-for-Trade event in the autumn and he said he would be looking for similar opportunities in other regions.  He also noted th at the Islamic Development Bank, UNECE and UNDP 
had already agreed on a roadmap with the economies of Central Asia.  
547. Second, he believed that the role a nd contribution of the private sector
 in this initiative needed 
to be enhanced.  The private sector session held on the previous day had given much food for thought, 
particularly as far as the specific challenges of bri nging SMEs into the picture was concerned.  It had 
also underlined how imperative it was to respond to the pressing challenge of climate change, which 
could at the same time be a challenge but also an  opportunity to unleash investment opportunity.  The 
same could be said for helping meet internati onal standards as well as increasing access to energy.  
One suggestion which had particular ly resonated was that of build ing partnerships with private 
foundations to tap into their resources and capacities to  deliver effective and adequate Aid for Trade. 
Another suggestion was to focus bus iness involvement in a specific sector such as logistics which cut 
across a wide range of Aid-for-Trade activities. 
548. Third, evaluation work with specific focus on evaluating the impact  of Aid for Trade should 
continue.  Aid for Trade should develop as a community of best practice.  A first step in this direction 
was to inventory what was out there.  The second was to look at common frame works.  It was also 
necessary to measure not just inputs and outputs but  also tangible outcomes.  He strongly believed 
that as national budgets came under increasing pressure , so efforts to show the value of what was 
being done with evidence – based on reporting on out comes – needed to be stepped up.  As had been 
mentioned the previous day by President Kuroda  of the Asian Development Bank, in 1997 it had 
taken three days to pass goods from China to Thai land via Lao PDR;  in 2009, this time had been 
reduced to four hours.  If this was not a positive exampl e of Aid for Trade, then what was?  In order to 
move further on this, the WTO would as usual rely heavily on its partners.  The WTO itself neither 
had the mandate, nor the capacity to undertake its own evaluation of Aid for Trade. 
549. Lastly, he believed the active mobilization of additional resources  needed to be continued in 
particular from beyond 2010.  Donors had alread y given reasonably clear commitments up to 2010; 
more clarity was now needed about the post-2010 ho rizon.  Japan had given cause for optimism and 
the commitment they had offered of US$12 billi on over the period 2009-2011 was up US$2 billion in 
comparison with the commitment they had made for 2006-2008.  The announcement made the previous afternoon by Minister Thomas that the UK would spend around £1 billion a year over the 
next three years to enhance growth and trade in poor er countries was also satisfying.  The Netherlands 
had also indicated its commitment to spend at least €550 million per year on all categories of Aid for 
Trade and the French delegation had just announced  a minimum of €850 million per year from 2010 
(a 50 per cent increase as compared to the 2002-2005 benchmark).  This was, of course, over and 
above fulfillment of their existing commitments and he  encouraged other Members to follow this lead.  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 112  
 
  Mobilizing Aid-for-Trade resources would remain esse ntial to help developing countries be prepared 
to better exit the crisis, including by encour aging South-South Aid-for-Trade partnerships. 
550. These were some ideas which had come from the past two days of discussions; they were not 
entirely new but, what was more important, was for the Members to now discuss them and turn them 
into their own work plan.  He saw a critical ro le for the Committee on Trade and Development in 
ensuring continued success, but it was also important  to ensure that the views of the development 
partners were heard.   
551. He believed that all should refl ect on what had been said at the Second Global Review and try 
to come up with a work plan which would give dir ection and consistency, and which could also be fed 
into the Ministerial Conference in early December fo r its possible consideration.  In so doing, clarity 
in approach and commonality in purpose would ha ve been given, all of which were necessary 
ingredients to maintaining momentum on Aid for Trade. 
552. In conclusion, he mentioned that the Second Gl obal Review had taken place in the context of 
efforts to conclude the Doha Round.  As Cam bodian Trade Minister Cham Prasidh had said the 
previous day, "Aid for Trade and the Doha Round we re Siamese twins.  They could not be separated 
because they shared one heart."  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
 Page 113 
 
 
  ANNEX 
 
Annotated Agenda  
 
 
SECOND GLOBAL REVIEW OF AID FOR TRADE  
MAINTAINING MOMENTUM 
6 AND 7 JULY 2009 
ANNOTATED AGENDA 
 
 
The Second Global Review provides an opportunity to  give added impetus to the ambitious mandate 
on Aid for Trade, agreed at the WTO's Hong Kong  Ministerial Conference in 2005, which aims to 
help developing countries, and the least developed in  particular, to build the supply-side capacity and 
infrastructure they need to take advantage of trade opening and to connect with the global economy. 
 
The Second Global Review will evaluate progress made  since the First Review held in November 
2007 and scrutinize how Aid for Trade is being ope rationalized on the ground.  Progress in securing 
additional, predictable financing will be discussed  and views exchanged on how aid flows can be 
maintained against the backdrop of the global recession.   Central to this process is the examination of 
the conclusions from the three-tiered monitoring frame work which has been put in place:  tracking of 
Aid-for-Trade flows through the OECD Creditor Reporting System;  monitoring of mainstreaming 
and implementation through self-assessments ba sed on a joint OECD-WTO questionnaire;  and 
establishing the impact of Aid for Trade at a na tional level through appropr iate indicators.  The 
monitoring framework will be complemented with ca se studies across different regions to disseminate 
good practices with the underlying aim that Members disseminate them amongst themselves. 
 
Key Objectives : 
 
• Moving from commitment to implementation 
 
How is Aid for Trade making good on its promi se as the agenda moves from commitment to 
implementation at multilateral, regional and national level? 
 
• Mainstreaming trade in national and regional development strategies 
 
What are the obstacles encountered by partner coun tries in mainstreaming trade into national and 
regional development strategies?  How can this ma instreaming process be encouraged?  How can the 
Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) support th is process in Least-Developed Countries (LDCs)? 
 
• Sustaining aid flows during the global economic downturn 
 
What impact will the global economic downturn have on Aid-for-Trade flows? How can OECD 
donors be persuaded to engage long te rm through additional and predicta ble financing?  What role can 
emerging South-South partners play in Aid for Trade?  
 
• Assessing the effectiveness of Aid for Trade 
 
What conclusions emerge from the monitoring frame work for Aid for Trade and how is Aid for Trade 
working at a thematic level?  
 WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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6 JULY                
GLOBAL REVIEW OF AID FOR TRADE 
Day 1  
 
 
CONFERENCE ANNOUNCEMENTS 
 
8.50 a.m. – 9 a.m. 
 
Participants are requested to be present and seated in the meeting room for preliminary 
announcements.  
 
OPENING ADDRESS 
 
9 a.m. – 9.15 a.m. 
 
• Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General, UN 
 
 
SESSION 1 
 
AID FOR TRADE:  TH E GLOBAL OUTLOOK 
 
9.15 a.m. – 9.30 a.m. 
 
Global Aid-for-Trade flows grew in real terms by  approximately 20 per cent in 2007 compared to the 
2002–2005 baseline period established by the First Global Review.  Progress is being made in 
mainstreaming trade into national and regional de velopment strategies and development co-operation 
programmes.  The spotlight effect is  working, but how can this trend be  sustained in the context of the 
current global economic downturn?  This first sessi on will highlight key messages on the global Aid-
for-Trade outlook from the joint OECD-WTO report "Aid for Trade at a Glance:  2009".    Key questions include:  
• What trends are emerging in Aid-for- Trade flows and from the self-assessments 
completed by donors and partners? 
 
• What progress is being made in mainstrea ming trade into national and regional 
development strategies and donor de velopment co-operation policies? 
 
• Pascal Lamy, Director-General, WTO 
• Angel Gurría, Secretary General, OECD 
  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  SESSION 2 
 
AID FOR TRADE:  FROM COMMI TMENT TO IMPLEMENTATION 
 
9.30 a.m. – 11 a.m. 
 Regional Reviews of Aid for Trade were held in  2007 for the Latin America and Caribbean, Asia 
Pacific and Africa.  National and regional Aid-for- Trade Reviews held in 2008 and 2009 have shed 
further light on the supply-side capacity and infr astructure constraints partner countries face.  
Significant progress has been made in highlighting the Aid-for-Trade needs of partner countries.  This 
session will address the question of how these needs are being addressed? How is the Aid-for-Trade 
agenda making good on its promise as it moves fro m commitment to implementation at multilateral, 
regional and national level?   
 After presentations, time will be provided for qu estions.  The session will be chaired by the WTO 
Director-General, Pascal Lamy.    Key questions include: 
 
• What have the review meetings held since 2007 highlighted as the Aid-for-Trade needs 
of developing countries?   
 
• What progress is being made to address the Aid-for-Trade needs of developing 
countries?  
 
• How should the direction and delivery of Aid for Trade adapt to meet short-term crises 
and long-term challenges? 
 
• How can Aid for Trade help sustain the recent growth of developing countries and 
mitigate the effects of the current global economic downturn?   
 
• How is Aid for Trade being mainstreamed into multilateral and regional development 
strategies policies? 
 
• Robert Zoellick, President, World Bank  
• Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Managing Director, IMF  
• Helen Clark, Administrator, UNDP  
• Donald Kaberuka, President, African Development Bank  
• Haruhiko Kuroda, President, Asian Development Bank  
• Thomas Mirow, President, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development  
• Luis Alberto Moreno, President, In ter-American Development Bank  
• Waleed Al-Woheeb, Chief Executive Officer, Intern ational Islamic Trade Finance Corporation  
 
 WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  SESSION 3 
 
AID FOR TRADE:  ASSE SSING IMPLEMENTATION 
 
11 a.m. – 1 p.m. 
 This session will provide an opportunity for high level officials from OECD donors, emerging South-
South partners and representatives of multilateral and regional organizations to discuss progress in 
Aid-for-Trade implementation.  It will assess the impact of Aid for Trade in improving the trade 
performance of partner countries, with a particular em phasis on intra-regional trade.  The role that Aid 
for Trade can play in lessening the negative effects of the global economic downturn and laying the foundations for greater integration and co mpetitiveness will also be explored.   
 
The session will be organized as a facilitated discussi on moderated by Jon Snow , Channel Four News, 
United Kingdom and a general question and answer session.  Key questions include:  
• What impact has Aid for Trade had on the trade performance of developing countries, 
in particular on intra-regional trade?  In what ways could the effectiveness of Aid for Trade be improved?  How should Aid for Trade be directed so as to ensure it meets the 
needs of partner countries?   
 
• What is the impact of Aid for Trade and how can it be measured?   
 
• What impact is the global economic downturn likely to have on Aid for Trade?  What is 
the global and regional outlook for Aid for Trade? 
 
• How can emerging South-South partners become further engaged in Aid for Trade ?  
 
• Elizabeth Tankeu, Commissioner for Trade and Industry, African Union Commission 
• Louis Michel, Commissioner, Development and Humanitarian Aid, European Commission  
• Gareth Thomas, Minister of State for International Development, United Kingdom  
• Shintaro Ito, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Japan  
• Franklin Moore, Deputy Assi stant Administrator, USAID  
• Mohamed Ibn Chambas, President, ECOWAS Commission 
• Abdoulie Janneh, Executive S ecretary, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa  
• Kandeh Yumkella, Director General, UNIDO  
• Petko Draganov, Deputy Secretary-General, UNCTAD  
  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  SESSION 4  
 
AID FOR TRADE:  PRIVATE SECTOR PARTNERSHIP FOR 
GROWTH 
 
2.30 p.m. – 4.30 p.m. 
 Aid for Trade should support national and regional e fforts to stimulate sustained long-term economic 
growth.  Integral to that process is the private sect or.  Partnering with the private sector to create the 
appropriate conditions and incentives for growth sh ould be a core component of the Aid-for-Trade 
initiative.  Engagement of the private sector in Aid for Trade dialogues at national, regional and 
global level must be facilitated.  Against the backdrop of the current economic cr isis, one area where Aid for Trade can positively 
engage the private sector is by improving access to fi nance.  The crisis has reduced available liquidity 
in the banking sector and triggered a reassessment of  risk with negative impacts for the private sector 
in developing countries.  Particularly hard hit has be en the area of trade finance.  Difficulties in trade 
finance are symptomatic of broader constrai nts in access to credit for the business sector in 
developing countries.   
 
The session will be organized as a facilitated discussi on moderated by Patricia Francis, Executive 
Director, International Trade Centre, a nd a general question and answer session. 
 Key questions include:  
• How should the private sector be mainstrea med into national and regional development 
strategies?  How can the private sector voice be heard in Aid-for-Trade dialogues?   
 
• What long-term structural measures are need ed to improve the access of developing 
countries to finance, and in particular, trade fi nance? What is being done in this area as 
part of the Aid-for-Trade Initiative? 
 
• What impact is the crisis having on invest ment flows to developing countries?  How can 
Aid-for-Trade funding be used to leverage private sector investment? 
 
• Jacqueline Cote, Permanent Representative in Geneva, International Chamber of Commerce  
• Peter Jones, Chief Executive Officer , Africa Trade Insurance Agency  
• Toru Masutani, Head of Export Credit Agencies, Co mmodities and Trade Finance, Structured Finance 
Division, Tokyo Mitsubishi Bank 
• Naresh Mehta, Chief Executive Officer, Power Technics, Kenya  
• Vinod Kala, Managing Director, Emergent Ventures India Pvt. Ltd., India  
• Rosa Whitaker, President and Chief Executive Officer, The Whitaker Group   
• Arin Jira, Chairman, ASEAN Business Advisory Council 
• Timothy Turner, Director, Priv ate Sector Operations Depart ment, African Development Bank 
 WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 118  
 
  SESSION 5 
 
AID FOR TRADE:  MAINSTREAM ING TRADE IN NATIONAL AND 
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND COMPETITIVENESS 
STRATEGIES   
 
4.30 p.m. – 6.30 p.m. 
 In line with the Paris Principles on Aid Effectiven ess, to be successful, Aid-for-Trade strategies 
should be country-owned and country -driven.  Progress made in ma instreaming trade into national 
and regional development strategies will be review ed and the experiences of Members shared.  The 
role of the EIF as a tool for mainstreaming trade in  LDCs' development strategies will be highlighted.  
How donors are integrating trade into their assistan ce programmes will also be discussed.  The session 
will be organized as a facilitated discussion modera ted by Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz, Chief Executive, 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development and a general question and answer 
session. 
 Key questions include:   
• What progress is being made in mainstrea ming the trade agenda into donor and 
partner-country policies?   
 
• What obstacles must be overcome when integrating trade and competitiveness in 
national and regional development strate gies?  How can these obstacles be more 
systematically addressed? 
 
• 
Liliana Honorio, Coordinator for Cooperation, Ministry of Trade and Tourism, Peru  
• Achike Udenwa, Minister of Commerce and Industry, Nigeria  
• Darlington Mwape, Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the WTO, Permanent Mission of 
Zambia, Geneva 
• Cham Prasidh, Senior Minister and Minister of Commerce, Kingdom of Cambodia  
• Dorothy Tembo, Executiv e Director, Enhanced Integrated Framework  
• Adalbert Tucker, Ambassador for Foreign Trade, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, 
Belize  
• Paulo Kautoke, Representative to the WTO, Pacifi c Islands Forum Secretar iat, Deputy Permanent 
Representative of the Kingdom of Tonga to the WTO 
• Mia Horn af Rantzien, Deput y Director-General, SIDA  
• Johannes Smeets, Deputy Head, International Markets Division, Sustainable Economic Development 
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands  
 
6.30 p.m. – 8 p.m. 
 
World Economic Forum:  Global Trade Enabling Report 2009 Preview 
 
The Global Enabling Trade Report 2009 (http://www.weforum.org/getr ) measures and analyses the 
factors enabling trade in national economies around th e world.  The Report includes the latest data 
and rankings of the factors enabling trade in 121 industrialized and emerging economies, as well as 
the latest thinking and research from internationa l trade experts and industry practitioners.   
 
• Welcome remarks:   Alejandro Ja ra, Deputy Director-General, WTO 
• Opening remarks: Richard Samans, Managing Director, World Economic Forum  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
 Page 119 
 
 
   
During the preview, the co-editors of the Report,  Robert Z. Lawrence from Harvard Kennedy School 
and Margareta Drzeniek Hanouz from the World Economic Forum, will present key findings.  
Presentations will be followed by a question a nd answer session moderated by John Moavenzadeh, 
Senior Director and Head of Sustainable Mobility and Strategy, World Economi c Forum.  Journalists 
will also be invited to participate. 
 
WEF Cocktail Reception 
 
 
SIDE EVENTS – DAY 1  
12 noon – 1 p.m.  
 
Official Launch of the Global Trade Liquidity Program – Room W  
 
12 noon – 3 p.m.  
 
Third Open Day organized by the WTO Institute for Training and 
Technical Cooperation   WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 120  
 
   
 
7 JULY                    
GLOBAL REVIEW OF AID FOR T RADE              
Day 2  
 
SESSION 6 
 AID FOR TRADE: REGIONAL IM PLEMENTATION  EXPERIENCES
 
 
9 a.m. – 11 a.m. 
 This session will focus on how in practice the Aid- for-Trade agenda is being implemented across 
different regions.  Positive examples of Aid for Tr ade in action will be showcased.  Each case study 
will examine how priorities which emerged from the 2007 Regional Reviews of Aid for Trade are 
being addressed.  This session will be or ganized in parallel break out sessions
.  Participants in each 
break out session will be invited to draw conclusi ons from each case study as to how other constraints 
might be addressed.   
 
Simultaneous interactive break out sessions with the following themes are envisaged: 
 
COMESA-EAC-SADC North-South Corridor (Eng lish/French interpret ation) – Room W  
 
Moderator:  Jon Snow, Channel Four News, United Kingdom  
 
• Darlington Mwape, Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the WTO, Permanent Mission of 
Zambia, Geneva 
• Juma Volter Mwapachu, Secretary Ge neral, East African Community  
• Barney Curtis, Executive Director, The Federatio n of East and Southern Africa Road Transport 
Associations  
• Nathan Chisimba, President, Chamber of Mines of Zambia  
• Alex Rugamba, Coordinator, Infrastructure Consortium for Africa, African Development Bank  
• Rick Scobey, Acting Director for Regional Integration, Africa Region, World Bank  
 
Greater Mekong Delta sub-region (Eng lish/French interpretation) – Room E  
 
Moderator:  Ganeshan Wignaraja, Principal Economist, Office of Regional Economic Integration, Asian 
Development Bank  
 
• Cham Prasidh, Senior Minister and Minister of Commerce, Kingdom of Cambodia  
• Arjun Goswami, Head of Regional Cooperation Integration Group, South East Asia Department, Asian 
Development Bank, Manila  
• Oudet Souvannavong, Secretary General, GMS-BF Secretariat, Lao PDR  
• Arin Jira, Chairman, ASEAN Business Advisory Council  
• Go Shimada, Director, Trade, Investment and Tourism Division, Industrial Development Department, 
JICA  
• Li Guangling, Deputy Director-General, Ministry of Communication, People's Republic of China  
• Phillippe Allen, Minister-Counsellor, Australian Agency for International Development  
• Hervé Gallepe, Manager, Commercial Capacity Development Programme, Agence Française de 
Développement 
  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
 Page 121 
 
 
  Infrastructure and Integration Corridors in Latin America (Spanish/English interpretation) – Room D  
 Moderator:  Antoni Estevadeorda l, Manager of Integration and Tr ade, Inter-American Development 
Bank  
 
• Karla González-Carvaja l, Minister of Transport, Costa Rica  
• Arturo Barrio, Director General,  Mesoamerican Project, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexico  
• Flavio Soares Damico, Minister Counsellor, Deputy Permanent Repr esentative, Permanent Mission of 
Brazil, Geneva 
• Esteban Piedrahíta Uribe, Director-General, National Planning Department, Colombia  
• Rodolfo Rieznik, Director,  Endesa S.A.  
 
SESSION 7 
 AID FOR TRADE:  ASSESSING IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS  
 
 
11 a.m. –  1 p.m. 
 This session will focus on discussion of indicators devel oped to evaluate the impact and effectiveness 
of  Aid for Trade.  After an overview of the a pproach used and a discussi on of the initial results, 
experiences will be presented on tracking the impact  of Aid for Trade on the trade performance of 
individual countries.  The session will be orga nized as a facilitated discussion moderated by 
Mark Gawn, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Cana da to the WTO and Integrated Framework Board 
Member, and a general question and answer session.   
 
Key questions include:  
 
• What can the indicators tell us about the impact of Aid of Trade on the trade 
performance of individual countries?  
 
• What can the indicators tell us about how Aid for Trade is being directed at the priority 
needs of partner countries?  
 
• How can indicators be designed to evaluate  the impact of Aid for Trade at regional 
level? 
 
• How can the use of indicators and monitoring to measure the impact of Aid for Trade be 
further improved? 
 
• Frans Lammersen, Principal Administrator, Poverty Reduction and Growth Division, Development Co-
operation Directorate, OECD  
• Bernard Hoekman, Director, International Trade Department, World Bank  
• Thomas Feidieker, Adviser, Globalisation, Trade and Investment Division, Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, Germany  
• Liselotte Isaksson, Policy Advisor for Trade Development Issues, Directorate General for Development 
and Relations with African, Caribbean an d Pacific States, Eu ropean Commission  
• Kate Bird, Research Fellow, Ov erseas Development Institute  
• Stephen N. Karingi, Chief, Trade and International Negotiations Section, Trade, Finance and Economic 
Development Division, UNECA  
• Bansari Nag, Coordinator, Gender and Trade Initiative, India  
• Shamika Sirimanne, Chief, Trade Facilitation Section, Trade and Investment Division, United Nations 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific  
• Pradeep Mehta, Secretary General, CUTS, India  WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
Page 122  
 
   
SESSION 8 
 
AID FOR TRADE:  SOUTH-SOUT H CO-OPERATION EXPERIENCES 
 
2 p.m. – 3.30 p.m. 
 
This session will focus on the increasingly important ro le played by South-South partners in Aid for 
Trade.  Five WTO Members (Argentina, Brazil, Ch ile, China and India) responded to the joint WTO-
OECD South-South cooperation questionnaire in 2009.  This session will examine South-South 
cooperation strategies and examine how other South- South partner countries can be encouraged to 
mainstream Aid for Trade into their co-operation policies.  The session will be organized as a facilitated discussion moderated by Valentine Rugwab iza, Deputy-Director General, WTO, and a 
general question and answer session. 
 
Key questions include:  
 
• What lessons can be learnt from Aid for Trade offered by South-South partners?  
 
• How can existing traditional donors and reg ional development institutions support 
further South-Couth co-operation, notably at regional level, through Aid-for-Trade 
activities? 
 
• How can other South-South partners be enco uraged to mainstream Aid for Trade into  
their development strategies? 
 
• Alberto Dumont, Ambassador, Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of Argentina, Geneva 
• Pedro Luiz Carneiro de Mendonça,  Under-Secretary for Economic and Technological Affairs, Ministry 
of External Relations, Brazil 
• Chai Xiaolin, Deputy Director-General, Department of International Trade and Economic Affairs, 
Ministry of Commerce, People's Republic of China 
• Marcelo García Silva, Head, OECD Department, Directorate-General for International Economic 
Affairs, Chile  
• Ujal Singh Bhatia, Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the WTO, Permanent Mission of India to 
the WTO, Geneva  
 
SESSION 9 
 
AID FOR TRADE: WAY FORWARD  
3.30 p.m. – 5.30 p.m. 
 This session will be organized as an open session fo r Members and Observers to make comments and 
give short statements, including on the way forward.  The session will be chaired by 
Ambassador Servansing, Permanent Mission of Ma uritius to the WTO, Chairman of the Committee 
on Trade and Development.     WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 
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  SESSION 10 
 AID FOR TRADE:  LOOKING AHEAD   
 
5.30 p.m. – 6 p.m. 
 Closing remarks : Pascal Lamy, Director-General, WTO 
 
 
__________