RESTRICTED  WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  TN/TF/M/15 
10 October 2006 
 (06-4860) 
Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation  
  
 
  
SUMMARY MINUTES OF THE MEETING 
 
Held in the Centre William Rappard
 
on 24-26 July 2006  
 
Chairman:  Mr. Tony Miller (Hong Kong, China) 
 
 
1. The Chairman  said that the  meeting  sought to accomplish two main objectives: (i) consider 
the Chair's report to the TNC, and (ii) provide de legations with an additio nal opportunity to advance 
the Negotiating Group's (NG) agenda - both in te rms of offering new input and reacting to the 
contributions previously received. This was wher e he would like Members to focus on, as he saw 
more benefit in advancing the Group's substan tive agenda than spending time on stock-taking 
obligations. Members would also again be invited to issue the customary ad hoc invitation to relevant 
international organizations to attend th e next formal meeting.       
2. The agenda was adopted . 
A. CONSIDERATION OF THE CHAIRMAN 'S REPORT TO THE TNC 
3. The Chairman  invited delegations to consider his repor t to the TNC. Copies of the relevant 
text had been circulated as JOB(06)/228. Looking at the document, Members would find it to make 
three main points: 
  (i) There had been significant advances in Memb ers' work, thanks to the continued efforts of 
everybody on board. Members had moved from pr esenting and discussing initial proposals to an 
intensified stage of refinement and consolidation which enabled a first delineation of common ground. 
They had done that in an exemplary spirit of constr uctive exchange and cooperation, demonstrated by 
the impressive number of co-sponsorships which had b ecome the norm rather than the exception. This 
progress was also reflected in the Secretariat's compilation document, whose ninth revision evidenced Members' substantive contributions on all elements of the mandate – many of them already in textual-
form - and which disclosed the impressive track reco rd of the Group.  The document had come to be 
the basis of Members' work, both in terms of what had been achieved so far and where one needed to 
go from there.  
  (ii) At the same time, Members clearly had a significant amount of work still ahead of them. 
That was why his report spoke of work in progress  when referring to the compilation document and 
the reason for its emphasis on the proposals marking progress as opposed to agreement .  And that was 
also why there was reference to it being without prejudice to Members' right to put forward new 
contributions. It reflected the reality of this not being the end of the process, but rather an interim 
assessment, with the door remaining open for a dditional input Members might wish to make. 
 TN/TF/M/15 
Page 2  
 
   (iii) The third message was perh aps less visible and more indirect.  He did not want the report 
to be a major road marker but rather saw the Group continuing its core negotiating business and 
spending its time not on "mile-stone language" but on the substantive work that had to be advanced. 
 4. That was what his report sought to capture. And that was what he wished Members to 
consider. As a Chair's report, it was obviously presen ted on his own responsibility.  At the same time, 
he firmly believed in the Member-driven and agre ement-oriented tradition of the Group which he saw 
as a key to its success. This was why he wished to  share the report with Members and why he had 
wanted to make its consideration an item on the ag enda.  With those words of introduction, he would 
open the floor for reactions on his report. 
  
5. The Chairman
 said that the discussions on the matter, by  their absence, seemed to have come 
to an end.  He appreciated the fact that no dele gation seemed to have any objections to his report. 
  B. C
ONTRIBUTIONS ON THE AGREED AGENDA OF THE NEGOTIATING GROUP  
6. The Chairman  said that delegations were invited to  make additional contributions on the 
agreed agenda. Work on its various elements had continued since the last session, resulting in a 
number of additional contributions. Most of those pa pers had reached the NG at a rather late stage, 
leaving delegations with little time to prepare. Th at was why he wished to provide for informal 
reaction time, allowing Members to freely raise ques tions and obtain clarification at the unofficial 
level when discussing those contributions for the first time. The NG had already adopted that 
approach at its last meetings with positive results.   
7. This informal exchange would then be followe d by a formal one, providing Members with an 
opportunity to present statements they wished to make for the record, both with respect to new 
submissions and proposals previously received. This practice avoided re petition and allowed for a 
focus on each paper without having to engage in a complex set of jumps from formal to informal 
mode and back again. He wished to maintain the previously applied arrangement where presentations 
of proposals were considered formal despite ta king place under the informal chapeau.  The initial 
reactions to those papers would remain in formal and therefore off the record.   
8. Another – more recent – tradition he wished to continue was an emphasis on the issues of 
technical assistance and capacity building (TA&CB) and Special and Differential Treatment (S&D).  
Contributions on them would therefore be taken up first. After that, the NG would address the GATT 
Article-related submissions.  Time would also be accorded for input from the participating 
international organizations.  With those words of in troduction, he wished to move into substance and 
into informal mode .   
9. The representative of Paraguay  introduced communication TN/TF/W/137, on behalf of 
Armenia, Canada, Chile, China, Ecuador, the EC, Georgia, Guatemala, Honduras, Japan, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, Mexico, Moldova, Nicaragua, Pakistan , Peru, Sri Lanka, the Dominican Republic, 
Switzerland, and Uruguay .  The communication was based on the elements contained in submissions 
W/31, W/82 and W/95 as well as on the ideas which had been expressed in the framework of the 
many meetings which had been held with a view  to preparing and improving document JOB(06)/221, 
which had been presented at the last informal meeting of the NG.  
10. The new contribution picked up to a great extent the text contained in JOB(06)/221, while 
also introducing some modifications in response to requests of delegations wh ich had been made in 
constructive spirit in the context of meetings the co -sponsors had organized with a view to exchanging 
ideas on the suggested  mechanism.  The presented third-generation text intended to contribute to the 
fulfilment, in time and in form, of the requirement  of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration to move 
towards negotiations based on text.  The sponsors of  the proposal were convinced that despite their  TN/TF/M/15 
 Page 3 
 
 
  differences, trade facilitation brought gains to all Members. That was the common denominator which 
prompted a large number of delegations from the de veloped and the developing world to seek a valid, 
fair and balanced response to the question of how to ensure that S&D and TA&CB within the 
framework of the future trade facilitation Agreem ent would allow each Member to really enjoy the 
full application of the measures agreed upon.  
11. The suggested architecture responded appropriately to that question for the following reasons:  
12. First, it was fully in line with the modalitie s contained in Annex D of the Doha Work 
Programme and made it possible for those modalities to be reflected in the final result of the negotiations. 
13. Second, it suggested a solid basis for the im plementation of a special and differential 
treatment mechanism which was balanced and consis tent and dealt in an ad equate manner with the 
interrelationship between the elem ents contained in Annex D. 
14. Third, the proposal offered sufficient flexib ility so that each Member could take on 
commitments gradually, consistent with its capac ities, and without having to take on commitments 
that went beyond its capacities. 
15. Fourth, it established the basis for a gradual a pplication of the trade facilitation commitments 
so that the whole Membership could arrive at full implementation of the Agreement. 
16. Fifthly, it made it possible for each Member to ge t technical assistance so as to be able to 
assess its capabilities and be able to develop plan s that would make it possible to acquire the 
capacities required to implemen t the measures decided upon. 
17. Sixth, it governed in a concrete, rational and precise way the provision and administration of 
technical assistance and capacity building. 
18. Structure and content of the proposed mechan ism had already been explained by Switzerland 
when introducing JOB(06)/221.  According to this  presentation, the suggest ed mechanism envisaged 
two phases which took place between the signing of the single undertaking and the entry into force of the Agreement. First, the self-assessment of the capacities to implement trade facilitation obligations 
and second, on the basis of this self-assessment, th e notification of the measures for which a Member 
needed more time for implementation and of th e measures for which the Member was lacking 
capacity and would need technical assistance in addition to time.  
19. As at the moment of the signing of the singl e undertaking the capacity self-assessment would 
not yet have taken place, some delegations had the impression that the sequencing of the phases 
would imply signing on something they did not know.  While it was true that, at the moment of 
signing, not all parameters were known, the subs tance of what Members were signing on was well 
known. The proposed mechanism built on the idea that , at one moment in time, all Members would 
implement all measures. At the moment of signi ng the Agreement all those measures would be 
known. What was not known at the moment of signing was the extent and timing of the measures Members were going to implement through their ow n means, as well as the volume, terms and 
conditions of technical assistance that would be necessary to implem ent these measures.  
20. Furthermore, the load of uncertainty about the way the negotiated obligations would be 
implemented was the same for all Members.  While some would argue that, when signing, they would have difficulties to sell the Agreement at home wi thout knowing when their major trading partners 
would implement which measure, and others wo uld say that, when signing, they would have 
difficulties to sell this at home without knowing which technical assistance they would receive, the TN/TF/M/15 
Page 4  
 
  sponsors of the proposed mechanism would argue that – all in all - the latter were better off than the 
former in the sense that the proposed implementa tion mechanism was built in a way that included a 
lot of flexibilities and allowed for tailor-made impl ementation. To achieve an overall balance for all 
Members, the Mechanism also foresaw that Member s would take some base-line commitments. These 
commitments would consist of complying, from the en try into force of the Agreement, with a number 
of provisions. These provisions would be those which were simple to implement and would not 
require any technical assistance, and those wh ich countries were currently implementing. 
21. What was the purpose of the multilateral dialogue and did the sponsors need it? As the 
implementation of trade facilitation measures was of utmost importance to all traders, the sponsors 
considered it important that all Members had an opportunity before the entry into force of the 
Agreement to get acquainted with the implementation schedule of the other Members. This dialogue 
was viewed as an opportunity to raise questions  and enhance the transparency in the process. 
22. At the time of entry into force, all provisions with which a Member was already complying, 
the base-line commitments as well as those provisions  a Member decided himself to comply with 
from day one, would enter into force. 
23. As a continuation of the capacity self-assessment, Members would proceed to formulate 
capacity building plans for those measures they not ified to require capacity building and technical 
assistance. These capacity building plans would be estab lished together with the donor and, in certain 
cases, the implementing agency. The next step was the notification of those capacity building plans 
and, in particular, the indication of the time frames necessary to implement the notified measures. At that moment in time, all implementation periods of  all measures contained in the agreement would be 
settled. The proposed mechanism foresaw that, duri ng the implementation period, there would be a 
review by the committee of the progress in the implementation on a periodic basis. 
24. The verification of the capacity acquisition w ould essentially be done by the implementing 
Member. But, if this was so agreed between th e parties involved – the implementing Member, the 
donor and the implementing agency – the capacity asse ssment could be a joint assessment. If at least 
one of those parties was of the view that capacity had not been acquired, then the matter had to be 
brought to the TF Committee which would then review the matter on a case-by-case basis. The 
proposed mechanism concluded with the notification of capacity acquisition, the point in time from 
which the notified measure would become applicable. 
25. With respect to the key elements of technical  assistance and capacity building (part C of 
JOB(06)/221), the sponsors wished to underline th at the operational part of TA&CB was dealt with 
most prominently during the phases of capacity sel f-assessment, the formulation of capacity building 
plans and the implementation phase. In part C, the sp onsors dealt, in addition to the operational parts, 
with general principles regarding TA&CB. They had taken their inspiration from the previously 
tabled proposals and, more particularly, from W/95 tabled by the African Group. It also asked Members to handle TA&CB in a manner that was cons istent with the principles of good practices of 
the Paris Declaration on Aid effectiveness and the OECD/DAC guidelines on Harmonizing Donor 
Practices for effective Aid delivery. Both refe rences contained best practices in the field of 
international cooperation activities. The Paris Declar ation had been signed in Paris in March 2005 by 
about 100 governments from devel oped, developing and least-devel oped countries. The Declaration 
stressed the importance of aid effectiveness and provided a certain number of guidelines on how to 
reach this enhanced effectiveness. It dealt w ith aspects of ownership, the alignment of the 
implementation with the partner countries’ prio rities, systems and procedures helping them to 
strengthen their institutional capacities, elimination of duplication of effort s and rationalising donor 
activities to make them as cost effective as po ssible, resulting in orientation and accountability.  TN/TF/M/15 
 Page 5 
 
 
  26. The OECD/DAC guidelines dealt with very simila r issues while being a bit more operational. 
These guidelines had been established taking into account the lessons learned from the regular 
reviews of donor practices as well as the many enqu iries in a large number of developing countries. 
27. The joint platform for cooperation and coordi nation was proposed in response to what had 
been suggested in communications by a number of delegations in terms of there being a need for a 
coordination mechanism for TA&CB. It was not a duplication of the TF Committee (TFC). Rather, 
the idea was for this platform to be operated by the TFC, with it however having a more focused 
function. It should promote international transp arency, cooperation and coordination of technical 
assistance in the field of trade facilitation, bringing  together donor Members and recipient members, 
relevant international organisa tions, regional groupings as well as any other intergovernmental 
organisation with a role to play. A role might al so be provided for the private sector in such 
transparency and coordination efforts. The joint plat form could also help to ensure, if necessary, the 
coordination of assistance between donors and recipients  so that potential gaps were filled. Unlike the 
TF Committee, the idea was that the pa rticipants in this joint platform, other than Members, should be 
in a position to actively participate and interact in the discussions. The joint platform would then 
report to the TFC. 
28. This was what JOB(06)/221 proposed in terms of content and structure of the suggested 
mechanism. It was a living document, as was TN /TF/W/137, which equally represented "work in 
progress". That was not mere rhetoric. Rather, it fa ithfully reflected the pluralistic and inclusive 
methodology that had been applied since the work be gan.  This was witnessed by the modifications 
introduced in W/137 compared to JOB(06)/221 in res ponse to a request made by several delegations.  
Those modifications were the following:  
29. In paragraph 1, an express reference had been  added to Annex D of the 2004 July package 
which aimed at indicating that the suggested me chanism was geared towards materialising the 
modalities established therein. 
30. In paragraph 2 of part I, di fferent delegations had requested the introduction of the following 
sentence" In particular, co-sponsors are of the view  that legal aspects of this proposal need to be 
further elaborated in the course of the negotiatio ns."  The sponsors wished to make it general 
knowledge that they were working, with the help of  experts, to see whether the suggested mechanism 
was viable from a legal point of view and, if that were not to be the case, the aspects which could pose a problem would be revised.   
31. In part II, paragraphs 2 and 8, footnotes had been included stating that the rights and 
obligations stemming from the suggested mechanism would be extended to Armenia, Georgia, the 
Kyrgyz Republic and Moldova.  As  Members woul d recall, those Members had requested such an 
inclusion and now supported the communication as well. 
32. In part II, paragraph 5, upon the request of ma ny delegations, the scope and objectives of the 
multilateral dialogue was spelled out, introducing the fo llowing words: "For the sake of transparency 
and predictability" so as to ensure that such a multilateral dialogue did not have an inquisitive 
character and did not seek to oblige Members to alter their notifications.  It was merely a forum where 
the Members could have an open exchange of views on the contents of the notifications. 
33. Also, in part II, paragraph 5, it was now indicated that the notification to be carried out by the 
developing countries and LDCs woul d have to be presented one m onth before the holding of the 
multilateral dialogue so as to give sufficient time fo r Members to be informed on the content of the 
notifications made and to prepare themselv es appropriately for the multilateral dialogue. TN/TF/M/15 
Page 6  
 
  34. In part II, a new paragraph 10 had been added in  which it was said that the notifications made 
by Members would be part and parcel of the Agr eement. With this addition the sponsors sought to 
strengthen the binding aspects of the notifications carried within the frame work of the future 
Agreement on trade facilitation.  
35. All delegations which had ta ken part in the improvement  of the proposed mechanism 
deserved thanks. The sponsors really hoped that, in th e future, all delegations would continue to offer 
their useful and constructive coope ration.  Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova were welcome 
as new co-sponsors. Their sponsorship gave strong s upport to the work and to the negotiations.  They 
enriched the debate which took place within the framework of the discussions of the group of co-
sponsors. 
36. With the formal presentation of document TN /TF/W/137, the sponsors had come to a very 
important stage in the work aimed at setting up  an implementation mechanism for the future 
Agreement on trade facilitation, but their work did not stop here. On the contrary, the sponsors would 
continue working as much on the improvement of th e suggested mechanism as on the development of 
aspects which, even if related to th e mechanism, were not directly part of the integral stages.  Such 
was the case for the Committee on Trade Facilitation. Within the framework of the future activities, 
the co-sponsors of the document hoped to be able to continue relying on the support of all Members. 
37. Paraguay was particularly satisfied with th e very strong support given to communication 
W/137. The current 21 sponsors demonstrated th e clear commitment of an important group of 
Members, large and small, develope d or developing, to globally improve the structures that serve to 
support trade.  
38. The representative of Switzerland
 co-introduced W/137, adding comments on one particular 
issue that had been discussed at the last meeting.  When discussing JOB(06)/221, some delegations 
had raised a few questions on the legal structure of  the document. The sponsors had answered that 
work had been concentrating more on the content th an on the legal issues and that they were aware 
that future work had to be done. 
39. In the meantime, the sponsors had consulted lega l experts and had held a meeting dedicated to 
the issue. However, those findings had not yet been  introduced into the new document.  That would 
be done in subsequent revisions of the communicati on according to the findings of the legal experts. 
Generally speaking, the experts were of the view that the approach taken in the communication was 
feasible, but that some adjustments could be us eful.  On the issue of "binding" international 
organisations into the mechanism, they found that th e current formulation should be revised and that 
the formulation should be close to the one contained in Annex D. 
40. The sponsors would continue to work on the issu e and come back with a revised text after the 
Summer break.  But the general thrust of the mechanism would remain unchanged.  
41. The representative of Chinese Taipei  introduced submission TN/TF/W/141, explaining that it 
represented a revision of earlier contributions W/ 62 and W/118 in third generation (text-)form. 
42. The proposal took into account the comments ma de by Members on the previous papers and  
also made reference to the existing text of the TBT and Customs Valuation Agreements. It was very 
simple.  Chinese Taipei considered it timely to rea lly look into the details of the text proposal to 
establish a committee on trade facilitation. 
43. Trade Facilitation was a long-term process and wo uld need to be revised accordingly in order 
to achieve the same goals in the future as Me mbers reached consensus and agreement on the  TN/TF/M/15 
 Page 7 
 
 
  negotiations.  When it came to the implementation phase, Chinese Taipei had identified some of the 
issues and challenges that had to be f aced and tackled within the Committee.  
44. The issues and challenges such as the use of international standards, the application of risk 
management techniques and, for example, the pr ovision of technical assistance and capacity building 
were discussed in a very focussed manner now. 
45. The textual proposal was divided into two parts.  The first part was about how to establish the 
Committee.  Here, it was proposed that the Co mmittee should carry out such responsibilities as 
assigned to it under this Agreement or by Members.  The WTO Secretariat should act as the secretariat to the Committee.  
46. The second part suggested that the Committee should establish working parties or other 
bodies as may be appropriate, which shall carry out such responsibilities as may be assigned to them 
by the Committee in accord ance with the relevant provisions of the Agreement. It was a very simple 
proposal and Chinese Taipei would appreciate reactions. 
47. The representative of the Philippines
 introduced JOB(06)/230 on behalf of the Core Group of 
Developing Countries on Trade Facilitation (CGDCTF) , explaining that the communication built on 
key elements from TN/TF/W/81 submitted by a Gro up of Latin American delegations, TN/TF/W/82 
submitted by a group of Asian de legations, TN/TF/W/95 submitted by the African Group, and 
JOB(06)/221 - now TN/TF/W/137 – which had been jo intly submitted by a group of developed and 
developing Members and presented by Paraguay and Switzerland.   
48. Through the communication, the CGDCTF sought to substantively contribute to the 
negotiations on trade facilitation, especially with respect to implementing and making operational the 
mandate in Annex D of the July 2004 Framework to ensure that the principle of special and 
differential treatment would be fully reflected  in the negotiated outcome, and to link the 
implementation of trade facilitation obligations  by developing and least-developed Members, 
including low-income economies in transition, to  the provision of technical assistance and capacity 
building support. 
49. The proposal built on and revised the structure of the proposed text contained in JOB(06)/221 
(subsequently issued as TN/TF/W/137) and incor porated key elements re garding S&D and TA&CB 
that had already been made in previous submi ssions as well as new elements deemed to be of 
importance so as to require inclusion in the revised structure.  
50. The text also laid out in a preamble some ge neral principles on S&D, taken from Annex D of 
the July 2004 Framework and from Annex E of  the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration. All 
provisions were to be incorporated into the text of  a final TF Agreement as integral parts thereof. The 
text also contained operational prov isions with respect to the classification and categorization of new 
TF obligations, their applicability and the linkage to  the provision of TA&CB with respect to their 
implementation. A schematic for the text was contained in Annex A.  
51. Provisions relating to the establishment and functions of a new WTO Committee on Trade 
Facilitation, other than references th ereto, were not dealt with in the text. In that connection, the Core 
Group also welcomed the presentation by Chinese Ta ipei regarding the establishment of a Committee 
on trade facilitation.  The Core Group proposal went  into further detail on the specific technical 
assistance and capacity building support unit under the auspices of a trade facilitation committee. 
52. The communication was, however, without prejudi ce to individual Member's final positions 
and progress in other areas of the negotiations.  Th e trade facilitation negotiations were operating in a TN/TF/M/15 
Page 8  
 
  special Shangri-La state, irrespective of the state of  play in other areas of th e negotiations. In addition, 
the proposal was a work in progress. Input and comments would be welcome.   
53. The preamble of JOB(06)/230 built on certain  key provisions of A nnex D and Annex E. 
Special attention was paid in the textual proposal's preamble to the third paragraph relating to special 
consideration and attention  to be provided to least developed Members. 
54. Throughout the text there was reference to low- income economies in transition as a result of 
the Core Group's support of the intervention by Mol dova at the last session regarding the need of low-
income economies in transition for TA&CB. The ca veat, however, was that there was some general 
concern that that would not lead to the crea tion of any new sub-categories of countries. 
55. As regards the small and vulnerable economies (S VEs), they were well taken into account as 
part of the developing-country group. With that  caveat, the reference to low-income economies in 
transition could be taken as part of the textual pr oposal, or could be addr essed equally well in the 
proposal presented by Paraguay relatin g to footnoting the availability of the benefits accorded to 
developing countries to certain other countries, such as low-income economies in transition.  
56. One of the key features he would like to draw  immediate attention to was contained in 
paragraph 1, relating to the provisions on technical  assistance and capacity building, which were 
meant to be immediately applicable after the signi ng of the Trade Facilitation Agreement. There were 
certainly some legal issues here, as had already been mentioned, and the Core Group welcomed any 
constructive approaches to ensure that all provisi ons on technical assistance and capacity building 
were indeed made obligatory and binding upon entry into force of the Agreement.  They should be 
encouraged to be implemented even on a non-bind ing basis upon signing of the Agreement and prior 
to its entry into force.  
57. The Core Group had noted the interplay of even ts as to when the entry into force of the 
Agreement would come into place upon the submission of  ratifications or instruments of ratification 
being submitted by a certain number of Members.  
58. The next element in 1 bis was the establishment of a Trade Facilitation Technical Assistance 
and Capacity Building Support Unit (TFTACBSU) which directly addressed the development 
dimension of the Doha Development Round and the particular development dimension of a future 
trade facilitation Agreement.  Enabling the Trade Facilitation Committee or a unit within the Trade 
Facilitation Committee to specifically address TA&CB would be important from the perspective of 
many developing and least-developed countries. 
59. The next stage would be the capacity self- assessment.  This would be undertaken by 
developing and least-developed Members, incl uding low-income economies in transition, 
immediately after the signing of the Agreement. 
60. With respect to the notification procedure for obligations, the schematic set out on page 11 
might be of benefit for the discussion.  The basic understanding was that there would be a Class A of trade facilitation measures and obligations which w ould consist of mandatory obligations.  They 
would be contained in a pre-agreed closed list of  obligations. While the Core Group paper focussed on 
S&D and how TA&CB would be provi ded, it was very important to emphasize that the building of 
the TA&CB obligations was premised on the existe nce of a pre-agreed closed list of mandatory 
obligations which were trade facilitation measures that developed, developing and least-developed 
country Members had agreed to be beneficial a nd representing win-win measures that would facilitate 
trade and improve trade flows in order to achieve  developmental objectives and respond to the needs 
of all countries to improve more rapidly the flow of goods through various procedures.  TN/TF/M/15 
 Page 9 
 
 
  61. The importance of the pre-agreed closed list was that it would define for everybody what 
measures were involved in a future trade facilitation Agreement. Page 12 defined that there would be 
certain types of obligations which were Class B . Measures falling under Class B would be trade 
facilitation measures which, after intensive discussions  and debate, would be agreed to represent win-
win measures and be desirable over time, but could,  for the purpose of the future trade facilitation 
Agreement, only be undertaken from an evolutionary  perspective and would not be legally binding 
but would represent a best-endeavour obligation.  This  would have to involve a pre-agreed closed list 
of obligations.  Therefore, discussing all trade facilitation measures falling under Class A and Class B 
was important from a developmental prospective. 
62. Not mentioned but implied by the suggested structure was a certain type of obligation, some 
kind of unmentioned Class C, which would relate to trade facilitation measures and obligations that 
had been proposed, but that, after discussions, been c onsidered not to fall within  the ambit of a future 
trade facilitation Agreement. They would neither be  mandatory nor best endeavour but presumed to 
be excluded from a future trade facilitation Agreement. 
63. There were two categories of Class A obligations, both of them representing mandatory 
obligations that had been pre-agreed to become  part of a binding trade facilitation Agreement. 
64. The first category would involve immediate implem entation after entry into force of a future 
Agreement for obligations already undertaken by developed, developing and least-developed 
Members which did not need any technical assistance or capacity building.  There would be a sub-category of such obligations which each Member mi ght self-determine to require a transition period. 
There was therefore the provision for the notifica tion for such types of obligations which would 
require a transition period.  
65. The second category, Category 2, by default would contain all other trade facilitation 
measures deemed mandatory and falling under Cl ass A, which required some form of capacity 
acquisition. There was a difference compared to what  had been presented by Paraguay in that regard 
when introducing W/137.  The Core Group proposal had adopted more of the African Group approach 
in differentiating between measures requiring a transition period and those requiring no capacity 
acquisition. By default, everything else from the mandatory obligations list would automatically fall 
into the deferred implementation Category 2, wher e the capacity acquisition would have to undergo 
various steps, including formation of a capacity  building implementation plan and a period and 
subsequent verification of the acquisition of such  capacity. It was not exactly a completely positive 
list, but was not completely a negative list either.  Rather, it was an attempt to balance the approaches 
presented in earlier papers. 
66. After the identification of all measures which were mandatory and best endeavour and after 
the signing of the TF Agreement, the proposal envi saged the establishment of a TFTACBSU within 
three months of signing the Agreement.  The Co re Group believed that early establishment of the 
Support Unit would greatly assist in ensuring the en try into force of the Agreement and of the S&D 
and TA&CB component. 
67. Also integral to the Core Group proposal was the express obligation that developed Members 
establish modalities for TF TA&CB (paragraph 20) and that such modalities be notified to the WTO 
Secretariat Specific Unit on TA&CB within a certain number of months from signing. While 
imposing some obligations on develo ped Members, this represented a faithful reflection of Annex D 
and an important trade-off in exchange fo r the entry into force of commitments.  
68. 
The next step would be paragraph 2's requirem ent that capacity self-assessment by developing 
and least-developed Members, including low-income  economies in transition, be undertaken for 
purposes of identifying which mandatory obligations they would self-determine to fall under Category TN/TF/M/15 
Page 10  
 
  1.  Developing countries would have identified cer tain mandatory TF measures to be immediately 
implementable or to be immediately implementable with a limited transition period. 
69. There would be the counter-part provision for tec hnical assistance and capacity building to be 
provided upon request pursuant to paragraphs 22 and 23.   Such assistance would be provided within a 
fixed timeframe no later than X months from the date of receipt of the request. 
70. After the self-assessment process which would identify a country's Category 1 obligations, 
there would be a notification procedure of Categor y 1 obligations which woul d include those subject 
to a transition period under paragraphs 3 and 7(i) .  The notification would be made to the TA&CB 
Support Unit. There would be a timeframe of no la ter than X months from the conclusion of the 
capacity self-assessment which would have been undertaken with the necessary TA&CB.  
71. Among the Category 1 obligations that had thei r own timeframe and that immediately came 
into effect or had been identified with a specific timeframe before they came  fully into effect, the 
more important category would fall under the require ment set out in paragraph 6 to prepare capacity 
building plans for the so-called Category 2 obligations .  This had to start within a fixed number of 
months from receipt of the support from donors.  
72. The TA&CB to develop the capacity building plan  must be provided consistent with the 
paragraph 24 elements.  Paragr aph 24 of the submission built strongly on the elements provided in 
W/137.  The TA&CB also had the cross-obligation to be provided no later than X months from the date of receipt of the request for TA&CB. This addressed many of the prior interventions and 
comments on how to assure that TA&CB would be  forthcoming to developing countries, least-
developed countries or low-income economies in tran sition making such requests.  That would be the 
mechanism to ensure that those requests were complied with and that assistance was given. 
73. Paragraph 7 dealt with the important notificati on of the full capacity building plan that had 
been developed by a Member with assistance from donor countries.  The notification had to be 
provided to the TACBSU of the WTO's TF Co mmittee which identified expressly the trade 
facilitation obligations that would become eff ective based on such capacity building plans. 
74. The steps to be undertaken, and the specifi c and clear-cut implementation period had no 
particular time limit as this would depend on the nature of the measure being implemented, the 
donors, the implementation agencies involved, th e TA&CB delivery benchmarks, as well as on other 
relevant data.  
75. In response to comments relating to the invol vement of international organisations and 
implementation agencies, a small textual revision had been inserted, building on W/137. It made 
reference to international organisations, to the exte nt feasible and possible, which covered the issue of 
making legally binding the phraseology in the Trade Facilitation Agreement of the WTO in relation to 
international organisations who were  not part of the organisation. 
76. In paragraph 12 and subsequent  paragraphs, Members would see how the entry into force of 
the Agreement took place together with the implem entation of the capacity building plan based on the 
implementation period arrived at in consultation with the Members involved, starting within X 
months from receipt of the donor support. The TA &CB to implement capacity building consistent 
with paragraph 26 would be provi ded no later than a certain numbe r of months from the date the 
request was received. 
77. Paragraph 13 provided for periodic reviews of the implementation of the capacity building 
plan. Paragraph 14 contained the a ll-important verification of capac ity acquisition at the end of the 
implementation period.  Also here, it was not a matter  of automatic time limit expiration. Rather, the  TN/TF/M/15 
 Page 11 
 
 
  actual verification of the capacity acquisition was ar rived at after discussions within the group as well 
as a reflection of many interventions made at previous  meetings relating to the need to verify capacity 
acquisition rather than mere expiry of ti me limits for the implementation period. 
78. In paragraphs 15 and 15 bis, there was a provision similar to W/137 regarding the possibility 
of a continued lack of capacity as determined by  implementing Members which would trigger certain 
forms of Secretariat assistance and verification as well as a report and recommendation by the WTO 
to the Committee on TF for appropriate action. Here , again, there was provision for a specific time 
limit of X years and months for such a verification procedure. 
79. Then there was a requirement to notify the TA Committee Support Unit of the acquisition of 
such capacity for the so-called Category 2 obligatio ns no later than six months from the date the 
capacities were actually acquired at the end of the verification process. The notification should 
include a date for the start of the implementation of  the Category 2 obligation. To balance the interest 
of developed and developing-country Members a nd those still acquiring capacity, there was an 
automatic presumption of capacity acquisition within six months after the verification of such acquisition irrespective of the provision of the noti ce if there was a failure to provide the notice six 
months after the end of the capacity building implementation period. 
80. Thereafter, the Category 2 obligation took full e ffect and dispute settlement provisions would 
become fully in force and effective with the cavea t that, on first instance, DSU utilisation was only a 
last resort after consultations, good offices, conciliati on or mediation mechanisms had been attempted. 
There was also the caveat that developing or least-developed Members, including low-income 
economies in transition, shall not be brought by an y other Member to dispute settlement proceedings 
under the Dispute Settlement Understanding in order to  enforce compliance with obligations that such 
developing or least-developed Members, including low-income economies in transition, were not yet obliged to implement.  
81. Paragraph 11(ii) dealt with the structure, architecture and applicability of TF obligations 
immediately applicable upon the entry into force of th e Agreement but relating to a closed list of trade 
facilitation measures. Paragraph 11(iv) equally set out  a closed list of obligations that had to be 
defined in order for the type of archit ecture to be effective and operational. 
82. Paragraph 11(v) was devoted to least-devel oped Members who should not be required to 
implement any of the obligations under sub-paragraphs (ii), (iii) and (iv) unless their requests for the 
provision of TA&CB support during the course of the negotiations, including prior and up to the 
signing of the Agreement was provided and there were  clear provisions for LDCs relating to special 
attention and priority for TA&CB after the signing an d entry into force of the Agreement, including, 
but not limited to, the provision of an additional time period as appropriate. 
83. With respect to the Joint Platform for Cooperation and Coordination which also picked up  
from W/137, this was work-in-progress.  It was mean t to be a constructive contribution to the work 
already done by the group that had presented W/137 as well as to the proposals of the African Group, 
the ACP countries as well as the group of delegatio ns who had presented W/95.   Any suggestions or 
comments to further improve the submission would be welcome.  
84. The representative of Korea
 presented proposal W/138 on behalf of Korea and Singapore .  
Since the proposal had already been circulated as  an advance copy and discussed, he would mainly 
focus his introduction on the improvements made based  on Members' comments.  The role of a Single 
Window had been clarified.  The Single Window woul d only be in charge of the distribution of data 
received from traders.  The new proposal excluded  the coordinating role of the Single Window which 
had been proposed in an earlier version to allevi ate Members' administrative burden.  Secondly, a 
second bullet was inserted as a new provision.  It pr ohibited participating authorities and agencies TN/TF/M/15 
Page 12  
 
  from re-asking for documents or data from traders af ter they had already been submitted to the Single 
Window.  With that provision, traders' rights were  more clearly guaranteed.  Lastly, reflecting on 
other Members' comments on the need for some  flexibility in adapting the Single Window, the 
provision in the sixth bullet had been newly inserted in order to guarantee that the Single Window was introduced in a progressive manner, taking into acc ount each Member's administrative capacity.    
85. The representative of Korea
 introduced a proposal on risk management (TN/TF/W/140) on 
behalf of Switzerland, Singapore, Chinese Taipei and Korea , expressing his appreciation of Singapore 
having decided to co-sponsor it as well.  
86. In preparing this third generation proposal, the sponsors had tried to improve the earlier 
second generation proposal TN/TF/W/99, reflecti ng other Members' comments. The proposal 
identified the minimum common denominator or common features of various possible risk 
management systems. As many Members had menti oned in prior meetings, it was not easy to identify 
what could really be Members' obligations conc erning risk management. It was true that risk 
management encompassed a wide range of measure s and there were variations among Members with 
respect to applying risk management techniques. It would not be possible to harmonise the risk 
management systems Members adopted. Therefore,  what was proposed was to establish, through 
WTO provisions, some minimum basic features that should be common to all Members' risk management systems. 
87. There were two key denominators that Korea proposed as Members' obligations. These were 
specified in the first and second bullets of the text proposal. First, the authors proposed the 
establishment of a risk management system wher e Members concentrated on the examination of 
higher risk goods and facilitated th e movement of low risk goods. 
88. Secondly, it was proposed that, in applyi ng risk management, Members should apply 
appropriate selectivity criteria. Examples for possible selectivity criteria were listed in the third bullet. 
89. In addition to the two key common denominators, it was also proposed in the fourth bullet to 
use relevant international standards where app licable. The Revised Kyoto Convention and the WCO 
Risk Management Guidelines were examples in that context. 
90. The fifth bullet proposed that risk management procedures should not be used as or have the 
effect of creating disguised discrim ination and obstacles to trade. This provision was particularly 
important since unfair, discriminatory applicatio n of risk management techniques could impose 
unnecessary extra burdens on traders. Some Members had raised concerns in prior meetings about the 
use of the word "disguised" in the legal context.  However, it was a commonly used term in other 
WTO provisions, such as, for example, in GATT Article XVI. 
91. The last bullet specified the possible areas where risk management procedures could be 
applied. Pre-arrival processing, post-clearance audit and authorised traders were some of the examples for a possible application. 
92. The representative of China
 introduced a proposal on post- clearance audit submitted by Korea 
and China (TN/TF/W/134), explaining that it built on a previously submitted proposal (TN/TF/W/49).  
93. With the rapid growth of international trad e volumes and traders' demands for facilitation 
measures, customs authorities were confronted with pressures of how to balance effective control and 
limited administrative resources and to guarantee cust oms compliance while providing facilitation.  It  
was a critical issue to be tackled.  Post-clearance audit was one of the practical matters to address the 
problem. It was one of the integrated parts of  customs risk management. In China's customs 
experience, adopting post-clearance audit in practice could be beneficial both to customs and traders.  TN/TF/M/15 
 Page 13 
 
 
  It not only contributed to efficient fulfilment of customs control, reducing administrative expenses 
and providing chances of reviewing traders comply ing with the customs requirements, but it also 
allowed traders to enjoy the benefits of accelerat ed exit clearance, lowered trade costs and a better 
trade environment. 
94. With the adoption of post-clearance audit, cust oms officials were entitled, after the release of 
the goods, to examine account-related books and r ecords, customs clearance documents, relevant 
commercial documents, etc. as well as import and expor t goods kept by companies involved directly 
or indirectly in international trade. 
95. There were two methods to implement post-clearan ce audit: regular audit and targeted audit. 
A regular audit was conducted on a regular basis according to auditing programmes set forth by 
customs which focused on companies' internal accounting and management . A targeted audit was 
performed on the basis of a risk analysis and assessment focussing on selected traders and 
commodities with high risk. 
96. The results of post-clearance audit were fed back  timely to the relevant customs unit for the 
purpose of analysis and for taking further actions to  ensure effective customs control. If the results 
were positive, facilitation measures were granted to the compliant. Otherwise, penalties would be 
award to the non-compliant. 
97. It was understood that measures similar to th e ones proposed possibly existed in Members' 
customs practices. China's and Korea's proposal did no t constitute any prejudice to existing or further 
proposals on the matter. 
98. The representative of Korea  co-introduced the proposal, saying that post-clearance audit was 
very important in that it made risk manage ment operational. It was a good example of risk 
management in practice. 
99. The first bullet of the proposal addressed post-clearance audit carried out on the basis of risk 
analysis results.  The targeted audit system menti oned in the second paragraph clearly showed that it 
was performed based on risk management. 
100. As a co-sponsor of the proposal, and the propo sal on risk management, Korea wished to 
emphasise that risk management was closely linke d with other trade facilitation measures such as 
post-clearance audit, authorized traders system  and pre-arrival processing. For the successful 
implementation of risk management, the application of the proposed measure in this area was very 
important.  
101. The representative of Canada  introduced proposal TN/TF/W/ 136 jointly submitted by Canada 
and Switzerland.  It was based on an earlier submission on the matter (TN/TF/W/84).  What the 
sponsors tried to achieve was to have a commitmen t that would require Members to allow importers 
to obtain the release of a good prior to meeting all the requirements if they provided a guarantee in the 
form of a surety, a deposit or cash; some kind of instrument that provided the importer with the possibility of releasing the good while the customs authorities had the possibility to secure that the 
importer, even if he obtained the release of th e good, would subsequently meet all the Member's 
import requirements. 
102. Paragraph 1 set the standard.  However, there we re circumstances where, even if an importer 
was ready to provide a guarantee of a monetary kind to obtain the release of a good, a Member should be authorised to not permit the release of the good.  The proposal contained a footnote explaining 
those circumstances.  The sponsors saw this in the context of an Agreement of trade facilitation where 
the provisions of GATT Articles XX and XXI would apply.  TN/TF/M/15 
Page 14  
 
  103. This would cover most circumstances, including those that related, for example, to ensuring 
the enforcement of measures related to sanitary and phytosanitary measures or requirements or 
requirements related to technical standards. If, for example, an importer wished to import a good, and 
there were questions on the part of the custom  authorities whether the good constituted a danger or 
represented a challenge in terms of safety, every body would recognise that it was legitimate for a 
customs authority to not authorise the immediate release of the good even if a guarantee had been 
provided until that administration was fully satisfied  that that good met all the safety requirements. 
104. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the proposal essentially pr ovided a bit more specificity as to some of 
the broad principles that should govern the system to be put in place by Members. The guarantee should be essentially limited to an amount recently calculated to ensure comp liance with a Member's 
import requirement.  If, for example, for the import of a widget, valued at $100, Members imposed a 
guarantee of $1 million, it might exceed the reasonabl e level.  Having some disciplines to limit it to 
what was reasonable in ensuring import requirements, including payment of duties, was therefore useful. The fourth point was that, once the guara ntee was no longer necessary, it should be cancelled. 
105. The representative of Switzerland
 co-introduced the proposal, explaining that the second 
paragraph was meant to be for special cases.  Ex amples for Switzerland were instances of strong 
suspicion of a consignment contai ning counterfeit. In those cases, it was not allowed to release the 
good before the matter had been addressed. Other examples included situations were important 
documents were missing such as certificates for en dangered species or endangered goods. All of them 
were very specific and limited cases.  The paragraph did not meant to allow the release of goods in a 
discretionary manner or based on discretionary criteria.  
106. The representative of Korea  introduced proposal TN/TF/W/139 on the issue of release times 
of goods. Since the proposal had already been circul ated as an advance copy and discussed before, the 
presentation would concentrate on the improvements made ever since.   
107. In the first bullet, a new phrase "in a consistent  manner" was inserted to ensure objective and 
consistent measurement.  Secondly, the WCO Ti me Release Study was mentioned as the only 
international instrument as a basis for this measur ement.   At present, the WCO Time Release Study 
was the only comprehensive and widely-accepted intern ational guideline suitable for this purpose.  It 
provided the necessary flexibility to address implemen tation concerns expressed by Members such as 
on the scope of a measurement.  Comments and input were welcome. 
108. The representative of Pakistan  introduced document W/135, saying that there were positive 
things happening in Pakistan, such as its GDP growth .  Last year, it had amounted to 8.4 per cent, the 
second highest after China.  This year, it had been ov er 7 per cent.  That had been happening the last 
three or four years.  One of the reasons for that was Pakistan's exceptional rate of growth in trade 
volumes.  It more than doubled in the last four  years.  The background for that was Pakistan's 
engagement in the area of trade facilitation and what it had achieved over the last four of five years in 
that area.  The person who would be covering the remaining part of the presentation had conceived 
the project and carried it through.  
109. Pakistan was happy to avail itself of this opportunity to share its experience regarding 
customs reforms and automation in Pakistan.  In Paki stan, the structure was su ch that it involved the 
Ministry of Finance and the Central Board of Re venue.  The Central Board of Revenue collected 
essentially four taxes, customs, sales tax, income tax, and federal excises.  About 72 per cent of 
federal receipts were collected by customs at the im port stage.  This did not mean that it was all 
customs duty, but inclusive of other taxes, like sales tax and income tax.  Therefore, of the USD11.83 
billion that were collected during the current year for tax receipts, USD8.51 billion were collected by 
customs.  Like all other customs administrations, Pakistan enforced a number of other laws besides its own.  In the case of Pakistan, 27 other laws were enforced by customs.     TN/TF/M/15 
 Page 15 
 
 
  110. Like any developing country, Pakistan had carried out a self/analysis before going into 
automation. There had been multiple windows for ev erything.  For example, a vessel calling into 
Pakistan had to file 27 different documents to  8 various government departments including three 
offices of customs.  For a cargo clearance, there were numerous customs offices, depending on whether one was importing or temporary importing.  Th erefore, the client had to decide which office 
to go to.  There had been a complete paper envi ronment and not a very effective database.  The 
clearance procedure had been very complex.  Ever y goods declaration that was cleared by customs 
had to have 34 signatures and 62 verifications.  Multiple copies of paper, along with multiple 
mandatory documents had to be submitted and each decl aration had to be carried from desk to desk by 
the declarant.  That led to numerous problems, including in the area of integrity.   
111. With respect to clearance speed in terms of the time the cargo was spending at the port before 
it was released into the economy, 50 per cent of the cargo would leave the port by the eleventh day 
after it had arrived into the country, which had a huge repercussion on the economy. Just-in-time 
inventories, etc., were just not possible.  Business had problems.  In terms of customs clearance times, 
in the sense of the time for which purely customs was responsible in that the filed document was 
completed, by the fifth day after the document had been filed to customs, 50 per cent of the 
declarations were being cleared.  Therefore, Pakistan realized that it had to do more.  
112. The country had had a fragmented kind of a customs.  Various customs offices had, by and 
large, their own systems, had at times their own so ftware.  As a result, one could get different values 
at different customs stations, and slightly differe nt procedures. There was no integrated system.  
Every time one needed some statistics, it took a very  long time to find out what had really happened.  
And, most of the time, there was no sharing of information between vari ous customs formations. 
There had also been certain integrity issues.  
113. In February 2002, Pakistan decided to embark  on a serious customs reform and automation 
program and set up broad principles for itself in that regard. Pakistan had thought that, since it would be doing customs reforms in 2005/2006, Pakistan must  create a system that was absolutely paperless.  
It had to be web-enabled, it should be on-line with all domestic stakeholders in the supply chain, and 
on-line with domestic regulatory authorities and adva nce information of cargo, crew and passengers.  
Pakistan had to have a risk management system .  Pakistan thought that nobody knew customs better 
than customs itself.  Therefore, th e initiative must come from customs itself.  It was a pretty tall order 
at that time but Pakistan decided to start working on it. 
114. So, from February 2002 for about four years, Pakistan worked on the system developing new 
business procedures, legislation, an enabling envir onment, software, hardware, sites, construction, 
training of people, and on 23 March 2005, Pakistan launched PaCCS.  To date , Pakistan had a single 
window.  The 27 different paper documents going to various departments by vessels were a single 
electronic document, filed over the web with a machin e then throwing those bits of information to the 
servers of other departments that n eeded that bit of information.   
115. Detailed meetings had been held with various other stakeholders  and it had been decided what 
it was that Pakistan really needed and what it di d not need.  Things were simplified.  For cargo 
clearance, it had become a single electronic document, available on the Web.  One could file it from anywhere in the country.  All one needed to know was the Web address of customs.  It was a 
paperless virtual environment.  That meant that, from any part of the country, it was a virtual 
collectorate.   One could interact with customs and get th e work done.  It was a self-assessment.   
116. As for clearance speed, 70 per cent of the declar ations filed to customs were cleared within 
five minutes.  84 per cent were cleared in less than thirty minutes and only 7 per cent of the 
declarations needed more than 24 hours to get cl eared.  If Pakistan compared the new automated TN/TF/M/15 
Page 16  
 
  process with the one it had earlier, it saw that it w as able to finish work much quicker to date.   By the 
time one had started, one was almost finished.  
117. The system was an integrated one. All shipping  lines, exporters, clearing agents, terminal 
authorities and various customs offices nationwide were connected to the single servers.  As a result, 
all licensing, warehousing and related faciliti es were happening on-line in real time. 
118. The biggest real breakthrough Pakistan had been  able to make was in terms of integrity 
issues.  They just disappeared.  It was something Pa kistan was very happy with.  It was amazing.  For 
businesses, it had reduced the cost of doing business.  Just-in-time inventory was possible.  A lot of 
trade and industry was strongly supportive of PaCCS  because the extra inventories they had had to 
maintain for ten or fifteen days had come down to thr ee or four days within one year of operation.  It 
had also reduced clearing agency charges.  Before, the clearing agent used to charge a percentage of 
the value of the consignment as their clearing agencies charges.  That had simply become a flat rate 
because they just had to name a HS code and an exemption.   
119. Handling expenses had been reduced as well.  Pakistan had had a 100 per cent examination 
and assessment regime.  No container left the por t without being interfered with and assessed by 
customs.  Due to the introduction of risk management system for purposes of imports, Pakistan’s 
examinations had dropped to four per cent.  Fo r purposes of exports, Pakistan’s examinations had 
dropped to two per cent from 100 per cent.   
120. The port charges were equally lower.  There was no unreceipted expense and there was better 
cash flow for the trade because they got their cargo ou t faster and when they were exporting, they got 
their duty drawbacks faster, allowing them to im prove their cash flows.  There was also more 
predictability and transparency.  The procedures were simplified. When creating PaCCS (2003-2004), 
Pakistan had been mindful of the need to create a system which would in future be compatible with 
ISPS, CSI, and IC3 initiatives that would be coming in the future.  Therefore, efforts had been made 
to standardize it.  Pakistan took the revised Kyoto Convention and tried to build on it.  As a result, almost everything had become standardized.  There were only a few things left.  Essentially, what 
made the process work and what represented the basic backbone of the system was an integrated 
tariff.  Before, there had been a customs duty and a sale s tax for every HS code.  Pakistan's current 
tariff system had the entire regulation of the government against every HS Code on a single sheet.  That sheet was available to the public on the Web.  That was the basic enabler that allowed to perform 
that kind of automation so that declarations coul d be filed that fast.  The problem with creating 
TARIP, which was probably one of the toughest things Pakistan had to do in the context of the 
reform, was that it took a lot of time to translate all the countries' laws against HS Codes and put it on 
a sheet.  By the time one had done that, it was alr eady outdated.  Therefore, the only way to maintain 
such a structure was to bring all regulatory author ities onto the same server, so that, whenever they 
were changing the law, the changes were reflected in real time. Otherwise one could not maintain it.  
That was something Pakistan was still struggling w ith because not all government departments were 
very good with HS codes and translating all thei r policies versus HS codes required continuously 
supporting other government offices.  But Pakistan ha d brought them all on the same platform.  They 
had user IDs.  Therefore, whatever they were doi ng, they were doing it straight from their offices into 
the system and whatever they did not understand c ould be helped with. One had to connect with the 
terminal operators.  They were very happy with that because they had certain real estate and when 
100 per cent of the consignments ha d to be grounded and examined they had very little utility and 
their three ports were limited.  Therefore, when examinations or interference by customs to cargo was 
reduced to 4 per cent from 100 per cent, the three ports dynamically increased.   As a result, the 
terminal operators were very happy with that as we re the shipping lines.  ACCESS was the rest of the 
system.  It was were one was doing things like goods  declarations, payments and the like.  The banks 
were on-line.   TN/TF/M/15 
 Page 17 
 
 
  121. When speaking of an integrated tariff, was what really meant was an integrated policy.  It was 
the complete picture of regulations for imports and exports into Pakistan, covering import tariff rates, 
the duty drawback rates.  If one connected to Pakistan ’s site and went to TARIP – it was available to 
the public.  If one wanted to know anything, one coul d search it. For example, if one wanted to import 
2901 into Pakistan and find out what would be requi red, the system would show all 2901 items.   The 
system allowed to select the commodity and was therefore a good tool for planning.  The system 
provided information on things such as customs duti es, sales tax, advance income tax or mandatory 
document requirements.  In case the authorities need ed something from the applicant, he would be 
contacted.  The system also showed the details requi red in the declaration.  There were some things 
which would automatically pop up as according to th e HS Code as soon as a declaration to customs 
was filed. For example, if one wanted to import a car, the system would ask for engine numbers, 
chassis numbers, etc.  It would ask for priority and grade.  It would further ask for the physical form, 
whether it was empowered or not.  For each HS Code, this was the information that would have to be presented.  The general restrictions were nil. 
122. With respect to import conditions, the system s howed exemptions.  For instance, if one was 
importing something from China, it would list the exemption of customs duty under this exemption 
scheme.  If one clicked this, one could read the scheme and check whether one qualified. The 
complete information about any HS Code, whether for imports or exports to or from Pakistan, was 
available.  All of that was happening in real ti me.  The system updated itself all the time as changes 
came in.  
123. With respect to INTRA, one could not mainta in that kind of a structure unless one got all 
regulatory authorities onto the same platform.  This  was a structure by which everybody was on-line 
and working on-line.  So far, in the last year si nce the system had become operational, 90,343 goods 
declarations had been cleared. 
124. In terms of revenue, Pakistan had collected over 30 billion rupees, that was about USD500 
million.  Pakistan had cleared 222,675 containers with  the total number of on-line users of the system 
having been 13,700 across the nation.  
125. As for lessons learnt, through the reform process, Pakistan learnt not to try to re-invent the 
wheel.  It was better to learn from other people from what they had already done and try to adopt the best international practices.  Pakistan had always been looking at them whenever legislative changes 
were needed.  Pakistan was always looking at Ne w Zealand's customs act and tried to adopt things 
from there.  Pakistan had very keenly followed over the past 2-3 years the CMR as it was being 
created by the Australians.  The basic guiding light was the revised Kyoto Convention.  While 
Pakistan was looking at everybody else, it always  aimed for the standards of the revised Kyoto 
Convention.  The other lesson Pakistan had learnt w as that automation was more than putting a PC on 
each desk because most of the time that enhanced just customs cont rols but not facilitation because 
one was just adding another process to an already co mplex process.  One had to do much more than 
just put a PC on the table.  It had also proven not to  be useful to look at the existing law and then try 
to create a business process.  Rather, a business proce ss had to be created before the law was written.  
As a result of this, Pakistan changed one-third of  the Customs Act in 2003-2004.  There had been a 
tremendous number of rules that had changed as a resu lt.  Another lesson was not to change the team 
during the game.  Pakistan felt that, especially in developing countries, there was a problem with 
continuity.  In Pakistan, the reform had been dr iven by the same team fro m its conception to the 
implementation, including the software developmen t.  Consultations had proven to be essential as 
well. Much had been learnt from the shipping lines and the terminal operators.  Pakistan had actually 
learnt the shipping business itself to design a su itable system.  No-one knew customs more than 
customs itself.  Therefore, the initiative had to come from in-house.  It was also essential to adopt best 
practices.  TN/TF/M/15 
Page 18  
 
  126. As for the future, Pakistan planned to roll out the project. Currently, it was a pilot project.  
Pakistan essentially had three gates through which all cargo flew in at the three container terminals.  
The pilot project had been working for the past one  year on one container terminal.  On 14 August, 
the project was rolled out to the other two containe r terminals.  PACCS would be handling about 60 
per cent of the country's cargo.  By June 2007, Pakist an intended to extend it to the airports.  As a 
result, Pakistan was now working on getting advanced passenger information and manifests from 
airlines as well.  Pakistan was also working on G- to-G communications.  Pakistan had recently signed 
an agreement with the United  States. In terms of IC3,  Pakistan was now working on the possibility of 
inter-machine communication. The moment a cont ainer entered into a Pakistani port with the 
destination of the United States, machines could actua lly talk to each other.  Pakistan was able to 
provide them with whatever information they requi red so they could risk screen it at their end and 
make it an integrated system.  Pakistan was also negotiating with the Government of China to start a 
customs communication so that their export information could be shared.  
127. To log on to the system, no special arrangement was necessary.  By way of example, he 
would provide delegations with an  online demonstration.  One could see from the screen that Pakistan 
had received advance cargo information.  Looking at the vessels that would be calling to Pakistan the 
next day, one could see that information had been  received straight from the shipping lines.  Since 
there was an EDI connection with the terminal opera tor, the information was updated in real time, the 
moment the vessel touched the port. Although the legal requirement was only to provide the 
information twenty-four hours in advance, most people were giving information days in advance 
because it was actually much more convenient fo r them.  They just threw XML messages from 
wherever their offices were in the worl d once they had booked their cargo.   
128. Since Pakistan had this information in advance, Pakistan’s system started a risk assessment on 
it and by the time the vessel arrived, a mach ine passed those handling codes for the risky 
consignments to the terminal operator.  Customs was operating 24/7.  Therefore, the moment each box came off the port, if there was an examinati on request, the shipment was straight away grounded 
by the terminal operator.  The moment it was ground ed, Pakistan knew that the box was at a particular 
location and the work was allocated to a cu stoms person who then checked the box.   
129. Pakistan had passed legislation whereby any box coming into Pakistan had to have a copy of 
the packing list and invoice inside the container.  Th is made examination of the container possible at 
any time.  It was not necessary that a goods declar ation had been filed.  Whenever a shipment was 
deemed risky, it would be inspected.  Since this  interfered with the supply chain at places, an 
alternative had been given by Paki stan to people who felt that this was causing undue hardship in their 
supply chain.  There was a site  where the supplier could just provid e that information electronically 
without the requirement of interfering with the container.  The system provided images of the packing list and invoice in case a goods declaration had not b een filed yet.  When the goods declaration would 
be filed, Pakistan already knew things like the exact quantity and the value. The machine would 
simply compare if the trader was saying the same thing Pakistan was already aware of.  That was how 
it was possible to release 70 per cent of the consignm ents within five minutes of them being filed to 
customs. 
130. The representative of Barbados
 re-introduced proposal W/129, informing that there were 
additional co-sponsors.  In addition, a few minor chan ges had been made, leading to the circulation of 
a revision with document number TN/TF/W/129.Rev.1.   
131. Members would recall that, at the last informal  session of 10 and 11 July, Barbados had 
presented W/129 on behalf of the Small and Vulner able Economies (SVEs) of Papua New Guinea, 
Solomon Islands, Fiji and Barbados. It had been sai d that the submission had been crafted along four 
main areas: (i) an introduction to some of the cons traints which SVEs might face; (ii) the suggested 
legal drafting language; (iii) ideas for S&DT; and (i v) specific suggestions for TA and CB which  TN/TF/M/15 
 Page 19 
 
 
  would be necessary to implement the possible obligation for national and/or regional enquiry points. It 
had been noted that all of the current co-spons ors had also supported the ACP paper on CB and TA 
and proposal W/129 should also be read in light of  that. However, it was as important to present ideas 
on specific suggested obligations as it was to deal  with the structure of a possible TF Agreement 
which was why the co-sponsoring SVEs had decided to  table a paper on a particular issue at that 
juncture. 
132. The sponsors had asked the TFNG to examine th e proposal from three angles: that of the 
specific issue of enquiry points; the regional appro ach to the implementation of enquiry points and the 
provision of TA and CB from a regional perspectiv e; and whether there might be other possible 
obligations where a regional approach could be adopted. 
133. On the first issue, there seemed to be some recognition within the NG that enquiry points 
could be a useful and practical initiative which woul d serve the interests of the host country and the 
region and those governments and traders seeking in formation on the TF structure of those countries. 
It could help to enhance transparency and pred ictability and increase knowledge of the practices and 
expectations of governments and traders. 
134. Despite those recognised benefits there were so me considerations that must be taken on 
board. This was where the current proposal for a re gional approach to the implementation of enquiry 
points- as an option- became relevant. 
135. The current negotiations on TF had the possibility to go beyond the strict and sometimes 
academic view of trade reality which plagued some  of the other longstanding negotiations currently 
conducted. The TF mandate and th e discussions held since 2004 had recognised the constraints for 
certain developing countries and the need for a gr eat degree of TA and CB to assist with the 
implementation of any possible recommendations. This practical approach must be further widened to 
the issue of whether all of the suggested proposals for a TF Agreement were suitable for 
implementation by all countries. In the Caribbean, there were many countries with populations below 
100 000 people and with only one or two points of en try. It was feasible and economically logical to 
conclude that there could be scope for some of those countries to forego some TF obligations when 
seen through the prism of a cost-benefit analysis. There had to be a careful examination of the types of 
obligations which would lend themselves to a re gional approach as there were clearly some 
obligations which should be taken up by all WTO members.  
136. The central thesis in the proposal was that if these SVEs or developing countries were 
involved in a customs union (such as that in the Cari bbean) or in an RTA and FTA, there should be an 
option- a flexibility- to adopt certain measures at the regional level either within the scope of an 
existing regional institution or the creation of a new body to implement.  As the WTO was an 
organisation of members, the obligations, whatever they might be, would remain with the individual 
WTO member and not with the Customs Union or the regional organisation. 
137. In the case of enquiry points, the case for a regional approach as an option was clear and 
practical. In the CARICOM, which consisted of a number of small economies with a small population 
and limited capacity, both financia l and infrastructural, it might be better to have a single regional 
enquiry point where the customs legislation and pr ocedures of all members of the customs union were 
collated and made available upon any request. Th is did not preclude individual countries from 
developing national enquiry points but simply atte mpted to be both forward looking and flexible in 
affording small economies and ot her developing countries in simila r situations the possibility of 
pooling resources and capacity and developing a re gional mechanism to provide information and 
respond to queries. The proposal also suggested that if a country was part of this regional enquiry 
point system it would be under no further obligatio n to develop a national enquiry point (unless it 
chose to do so).  TN/TF/M/15 
Page 20  
 
  138. A number of the SVEs had tabled similar proposals on TBT, SPS and TRIPS, recommending 
a regional approach to notifications, analysis et c. and those had been favourably received. The 
sponsors of W/129 therefore suggested the followi ng language which borrowed from the previous 
submissions by other delegations on the subject as well as from the aforementioned proposals by 
SVEs: “Establish enquiry points at the national le vel or in the case of SVEs/developing countries 
involved in a Customs Union, FTA/RTA, the option of the establishment of enquiry points at the 
regional level, to provide relevant  information on trade procedures to trade.' `Members and the WTO, 
within its competence, shall provide technical and financial assistance at mutually agreed terms to SVEs/developing countries to support the establishm ent, modification and maintenance of these 
national and/or regional enquiry points.'   
139. As recommended, the sponsors had put forward some ideas for S&DT such as the need for 
longer implementation periods to implement any requirement on enquiry points. They had also developed some ideas for TA and CB and saw the possib ility of this assistance be ing targeted at both 
the national and regional levels, given that the respective countries party to a Customs Union or 
RTA/FTA must still have the capacity to be able  to service and benefit from a regional approach. 
Those were suggestions based on what the co-sponsor s envisaged to be required to effectively adopt 
national and/or regional enquiry points. 
140. The co-sponsors had indicated their readiness to  remain open to discuss any concerns or 
suggestions other delegations might have but had also asked the NG to see the proposal in light of the 
SVEs Work Programme, the TF mandate and, more  importantly, as a possibility to confront the 
recognised capacity limitations of some  SVEs and developing countries. 
141. The paper had found additional authors from the OECS countries in the Caribbean since its 
first introduction. It was now co-sponsored by Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Fiji, 
Grenada, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, St . Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines.  
142. The changes in the Rev.1 document were very minor. In paragraph 5 of the proposal, second 
line, the terminology "governments" had been change d to "Member states". In paragraph 8, first line 
the word "might" was changed to "should". In pa ragraph 10, a new bullet 2 had been added under the 
proposals for technical assistance and capacity build ing requirements. The main idea, the possibility 
of a regional approach to trade facilitation with sp ecific reference to enquiry points, remained the 
same in the latest revision.  
143. Thanks were due to the World Bank, the Ca ribbean Regional Negotiating machinery and the 
EC for the funding and organisation of a seminar wh ich was held in Barbados from which the ideas 
for the document emanated.  
144. The representative of St Kitts and Nevis
 co-introduced the proposal, echoing the words and 
sentiments expressed by Barbados. For small economi es like St Kitts, the proposal was particularly 
important. As Members knew, small economies suffer ed from lack of adequate resources for full 
implementation of obligations which might flow from the Agreement on TA. The co-sponsors were 
aware of the benefits to be reaped from impl ementation and had therefore presented the proposal 
which would allow for the pooling of resources direct ed at bridging capacity gaps arising out of the 
implementation of the Agreement. The proposal was a simple one, but very important and worthy of 
support.    
145. The Chairman  moved the meeting back into formal mode , offering the floor to delegations 
wishing to make statements for the record.    TN/TF/M/15 
 Page 21 
 
 
  146. The representative of Ecuador  said that there had been important progress in the negotiations 
under the single undertaking concept, the objective of which was to facilitate trade among Members 
with clear, transparent and predictable standards in the context of Annex D, which contained the 
framework of modalities for the work of the NG.  
147. An important element in the negotiations was the dispositions on S&D and TA&CB for 
developing countries. In that respect, Ecuador had co-sponsored the proposal made by several 
Members on the implementation mechanism which enab led developing countries to comply with the 
norms adopted in those negotiations. 
148. Ecuador wished to make some preliminary re marks on the proposals presented by the EC and 
Chinese Taipei on the subject of pre-shipment inspections.  
149. The main proposals on the subject were cont ained in documents TN/TF/W/46 of 9 June, 
TN/TF/W/90 of 4 April and TN/TF/W/108 of 6 June  2006, which sought to clarify and improve the 
understanding of Article VIII of GATT 1994. Ecua dor shared the assessment expressed in those 
communications that a key aspect in determining th e validity for using pre-shipment inspections or 
equivalent measures lied in the effectiveness of di spositions on S&D that would be adopted in the 
future under the Trade Facilitation Agreement. 
150. Ecuador currently had five companies that pr ovided pre-shipment inspection services through 
contracts between the state and the private company.  That had been a dissuasive factor to prevent bad 
business practices and, more generally, had facilita ted foreign trade. Activities flowing from those 
services were monitored and audited by customs and were subject to observation by other oversight 
bodies, which ensured the accountability, the procedures and the results. 
151. The room document of the International Fede ration of Inspection Agencies (IFIA) which had 
been circulated by Switzerland at the last inform al meeting of the Negotiating Group, set forth an 
interesting description of the development in pre- shipment inspection services and the ways in which 
the different national programmes functioned in their different stages in keeping with the 
requirements of various developing countries. 
152. Ecuador believed that solid, effective and m odern customs systems were the best ways to 
facilitate trade. However, it also believed that c onditions must be in place to ensure that those 
objectives could be achieved. That was why it was n ecessary to have a serious and continuous process 
for capacity building so that one could rise to the challenge of globalisation by doing the following: 
153. First, it was necessary to have specific S&D treatment, TA&CB and financial assistance 
programmes for the implementation of systems, da ta bases and risk control mechanisms for the 
valuation of goods as well as cargo scanning systems,  checks on destinations and other measures 
which could guarantee the fulfilment of the objectives of security, protection of financial risks and  
tax collection and import taxes.   
154. It was also necessary to have transition periods with periods of not less than four years for a 
possible elimination of PSI systems during which ti me countries could have implemented alternative 
systems. 
155. As a result of the negotiations, it was hoped that the inspection systems would remain in place 
for a sufficient time period to enable to determine th e statistical basis for certain goods so as to correct 
distortions.  TN/TF/M/15 
Page 22  
 
  156. Finally, with respect to the elimination of pr e-shipment inspection, developing countries that 
so required should be fully able to control their customs operations using alternative systems such as 
risk profiling data bases and goods checking systems. 
157. Ecuador hoped that those ideas would be a wa y forward through an open and constructive 
dialogue as Members dealt with this important issue which was of interest to Ecuador and which was 
under negotiation in the WTO.   
158. Ecuador asked for this statement to be ci rculated as a working document so that all 
delegations could read it. 
159. The representative of Turkey
 recalled that, it was, among others, Turkey’s basic objective in 
the transit area to effectively address the challenges Turkey's exporters faced. Turkey planned to come 
up with a specific paper on the transit culture and the allocation of permits at the next meeting.  
160. In addition to possible benefits that could be  derived from discussions on transit, Turkey was 
of the view that there was merit in touching upon tr ansit cultures and the way they had been delivered 
with special emphasis. Turkey was in the process of finalising the paper and aiming to circulate it well in advance of the next session of the NG. Turkey would be consulting with other Members to seek 
their support. 
161. The representative of the Philippines, speaking on behalf of the Core Group
 of developing 
countries, expressed his satisfaction with the discu ssions taken place during the informal session and 
advised the NG of the proposal of the Core Group with the qualification that it was work in progress and that the sponsors were continuing the dialogue  to improve and further enhance the proposals on 
S&D, technical assistance and capacity building. 
162. The Core Group also wished to take the opport unity to formally commend the Secretariat and 
the Chair for their continued practice of transp arency and inclusiveness in all the areas of the 
negotiations regarding trade facilitation. 
163. The Group further wished to emphasize the importance of moving to discussions on the 
specific list of measures and agreeing on the closed list of trade facilitation measures that could 
potentially be part and parcel of a future trade facilitation Agreement. 
164. Taking into account developments in the othe r areas of the negotiations, the Core Group 
wished to emphasize that the trade facilitation nego tiations remained part and parcel of the Single 
Undertaking and that, in line with the DG's recommendation which would be confirmed in the 
General Council on 26 July, the ne gotiations would be suspended across the board of the whole DDA, 
pending further notice. In that vein, the Co re Group emphasised the importance of the trade 
facilitation negotiations. However, it also noted th at they were part and parcel of the Single 
Undertaking and that no progress coul d and should be made in this area of the negotiations in line 
with the suspension to be announced at the General Council. 
165. The representative of the European Communities
 wished to draw attention to a statement 
made the previous day by Commissioner Mandelson in  which he underlined the need, in the wake of 
Monday's events, to restore confidence in and bolster support for the DDA. In particular, 
Commissioner Mandelson had suggested giving renewe d focus to measures that would be especially 
beneficial for developing countries. 
166. In that context, he had proposed continuing to work on the Aid for Trade package, the new 
Integrated Framework and on trade facilitation, gi ven its strong development focus and its obvious  TN/TF/M/15 
 Page 23 
 
 
  links to the Aid for Trade agenda.  Commissioner Mandelson's statement was available on the Europa 
server of the European Commission. 
167. The representative of Nigeria  commended the participants and the Chairman for the active 
participation and engagement sin ce the beginning of the meetings. T hus far, this participation and 
spirit portrayed the current mood. With a sense of re sponsibility, Nigeria wished to recall the outcome 
of the informal TNC meeting of 24 July where the Director General had called for a time-out to 
review the situation, examine other available opti ons and review positions. He had stated that, in 
practical terms, this meant that all work in a ll negotiating groups should be suspended. The same 
applied to the deadlines that the various Groups were facing. 
168. Although the General Council was yet to meet to re visit the issue and to give legal effect to 
the status, the basis and the legality of Members'  work perhaps required interpretation based on the 
scenario that one was continuing.  It required further clarification. 
169. The Chair's timely guidance was very important because the matter had raised serious 
concerns in various capitals. Nigeria was encouraged  by the participation of experts from capital and 
therefore had not wanted to raise the issue the day before.  It was a dilemma and Nigeria really sought 
the Chair's guidance, particularly in terms of what was the current situation an d the appropriate course 
of action which might be desirable but at the sa me time in line with the current stalemate. 
170. The representative of India  wished to associate his delegation with the statements made by the 
Philippines and Nigeria. The Chairman of the TNC had indicated that all work in all negotiating 
groups was to be suspended.  India felt that trad e facilitation, being one of  the negotiating groups and 
part of the Single Undertaking, should also be susp ended. One could resume in whole or in part when 
the Membership desired.  India hoped that the r esumption would take place sooner rather than later 
but looked to the Chair's guidance on that matter. 
171. The representative of Cuba  recalled that Director-General Lamy had suggested that there was 
a possibility of suspending work for all negotiatin g groups.  He had also said this at his press 
conference, after having listened to the present ministers and to the other delegations, which 
informally approved the suggestion of suspending all work. Following that, the TNC Chair said that 
the only committees that would continue working w ould be the regular ones and delegations' meetings 
and negotiations in the DSB because they were  not part of the Single Undertaking.  
172. Since it was not known yet what would happe n at the upcoming General Council meeting 
where Members might or might not officially approve the recommendation, it was a time when 
Members would be discussing what would be d one with those issues under the Doha Agenda. 
173. It was really important for Cuba to adhere fu lly to the statements made by the Philippines and 
by India. Like others, Cuba believed that the Negotiating Group had carried  out a tremendous amount 
of work and had produced some very positive outco mes. One should emphasise all the work that had 
been done in the area of S&DT which already on its  own represented a very important step forward 
and a new systemic component for improving all wo rk on S&D. However, it was important that the 
issue, as had been agreed, be maintained w ithin the context of the Single Undertaking. 
174. The previous TF Chair, the Ambassador of Ma laysia, had made a report prior to Hong Kong 
in which he raised the controversia l question of setting a special date, taking this out of the context of 
the Single Undertaking.  Cuba maintained its positi on that the particular topic be kept within the 
scenario. However, Cuba took note of what had been said by the delegate of the EC on the question of 
trying to put forward a development package including Aid for Trade.  It was perhaps too early to take 
a stance on trade facilitation, but Cuba had taken note of the EC proposal.  TN/TF/M/15 
Page 24  
 
  175. The representative of Venezuela
 wished to echo what had been said by the Philippines, 
Nigeria, India and Cuba.  An understanding had been  reached on the suspensi on of the negotiations. 
One had to note that the TF NG was a part and pa rcel of the Single Undertaking.  Therefore, 
Venezuela understood that work should probably be suspended in the Group. 
176. However, Venezuela took note of the proposal made by a Member on redefining the Single 
Undertaking.  But obviously, this was a decision that  laid outside the ambit of the TFNG and even, to 
a certain extent, outside the ambit of the General Council because the basis of the negotiations was the 
Doha Mandate.  One should not go against the prin ciple of the Single Undertaking.  An agreement 
had been reached on the suspension of negotiations and this should also prevail for the TFNG.  
177. The representative of Kenya  said that his delegation fully supported the statements by the 
Philippines on behalf of the Core Group, Nigeria,  India, Cuba and Venezuela, especially on the 
commitment to see a positive outcome of the di scussions under the Doha Development Agenda. 
178. Kenya also shared the appreciation of the work that had been done by the TFNG on 
advancing the trade facilitation agenda and agreed on  the need to suspend further negotiations in this 
Negotiating Group since it was expected to be part of the Single Undertaking. 
179. Kenya further wished to echo its own commitmen t and that of other developing countries to 
trade facilitation, which was important.  Kenya appr eciated the stewardship with which Members had 
led the group and the way Member s had conducted discussions.  When the suspension was lifted, the 
work Members had done would not go to waste. 
180. The representative of Chile  said that for Chile, trade facilitation was a crucial issue.  Chile 
was very committed to a solution that would lead to  an Agreement on trade facilitation. However, the 
negotiations took place in the TNC and there, the Ch airman had suspended all negotiations. That was 
why one had to calm down and think things over duri ng the summer. It was not one single group that 
could decide what could be done about the Single  Undertaking because it im plied a change in the 
mandate and in the whole Doha Agre ement. Chile would not want to go against what had been said by 
the EC.  But it was the TNC that would have to take  the decision on this.  That would have to be done 
after August after the summer break. 
181. The representative of Indonesia  associated his delegation with the statement by the 
Philippines with regard to the suspension of the negotiations. He requested guidance from the Chair 
on the matter. 
182. The representative of the United States  said that the US did not disagree with most of what 
had been said the morning. It was helpful to hear the value placed on the trade facilitation negotiations 
which seemed to be getting greater and greater.  That was a reflection of the hard work that had been 
going on over the last few years.  The US shared those views. 
183. The United States also shared the views expressed  by Nigeria, Kenya and others that TF was 
certainly part of the Single Undertaking and there wa s no mandate of any kind to  take it out.  As Chile 
had said, those sorts of issues were not for the TFNG to discuss.  The US was in terested in the Chair's 
answer to Nigeria's question because it also w ondered under what mandate the Group continued to 
have the meeting. The United States had enjoyed the meeting.  It had been interesting, but the US 
would appreciate a clarification of the matter. If it had something to do w ith the General Council not 
meeting until the following day, that would be helpful to know.  That was also why the US had not brought its negotiator from capital.  
184. The representative of Cost Rica
 commended the Chair for his work  and leadership in the TF 
negotiations. Costa Rica had been a staunch supporte r of a trade facilitation Agreement and wished an  TN/TF/M/15 
 Page 25 
 
 
  ambitious agreement that would be beneficial to all Members. Taking into account the decision taken 
by the TNC to suspend negotiations, Costa Rica felt that it was not up to the TFNG to decide what the 
future would be for the work that still had to be done .  That was a decision that had to be taken by the 
General Council formally.  
185. The representative of Trinidad and Tobago  acknowledged that the TF Negotiating Group had 
worked assiduously and in a very pos itive manner under the Chair's leadership and with the support of 
the Secretariat. However, the TF negotiations were  part of the Single Undertaking and given the 
announcement by the Chair of the TNC on Monday, the TFNG's work was quite questionable at the 
point.  Trinidad and Tobago's assumption was that since Members has brought in capital-based experts for the meeting, one should not waste their ti me and the resources invested to get them there. 
But, like Nigeria, Trinidad and Tobago  wished to have the Chair's guidance on how to proceed 
thereafter. 
186. The representative of Argentina
 said that delegates had started to touch upon an issue that was 
well beyond the concerns of this particular nego tiating group. Argentina also wished to state its 
position on the link of the TFNG with the Single U ndertaking. Like other delegations, Argentina 
understood that negotiations had been suspended.  The exact words used by DG Lamy were that "all 
issues were on hold".  On that basis, Argentina w ould not object to having continued the meeting of 
the TFNG, it being understood that since the meeti ng had started on Monday, it would be a courtesy 
and deference to delegations that had come wi th experts from capitals and to international 
organisations that had come all the way to hold the meeting.  From a formal point of view, Members 
had not yet formally adopted any decision on the questi on.  But this could of course have some impact 
on Argentina's overall position as all issues under th e Single Undertaking were suspended now and 
trade facilitation was obviously part of the Single Undertaking. 
187. The representative of Uruguay  said that this was a very impor tant topic for Uruguay. Uruguay 
had been very much involved in the process of the TF Negotiating Group. The Chairman of the TNC 
suspended all negotiations and, therefore, Uruguay ag reed that it was not impossible to divide the 
Single Undertaking, since the mandate for the TF negotiations came from Ministers in Doha. If one 
suspended this, one suspended all ne gotiations. This would be formally  and officially recognised by 
the General Council the following day and not by the TFNG.  
188. The representative of Malaysia  associated her delegation with the statement made by the 
Chair of the Core Group on the issue of the mandate  of the NG and the fact that the announcement 
was made by the DG, to be endorsed tomorrow by the General Council, that all work under the DDA 
was being suspended.  Malaysia also wondere d what mandate the TFNG had to continue the 
negotiations at the moment.  Malaysia believed th at the TFNG was one of the negotiating groups that 
would have benefited devel oping countries and hoped that the pause w ould be used usefully to at least 
identify the technical assistance and capacity bui lding needs of developing countries. Perhaps 
Members could work on their own on that. 
189. The representative of Mexico  supported the statements ma de by Chile, Costa Rica and 
Uruguay. But Mexico also wished to point out, as had been said by the Director General at the 
informal of heads of delegations on Monday, ho w important it was to maintain what had been 
achieved to date. The DG had invited the Chairs of  the negotiating bodies to take stock of what had 
been achieved in each negotiating group so far.  Mexico wondered how one  could achieve that 
objective which was really of interest to everybody.  
190. The representative of Cuba  said that Members had done outstanding work in the TFNG. The 
Ambassador of Malaysia had also played a very im portant role and left a very positive mark on the 
Group.  Perhaps if one had been a little more dir ect, one could have avoided all the comments made. 
When people talked together they understood one an other. A lot of delegations, including Cuba, were TN/TF/M/15 
Page 26  
 
  worried about what was going to happen, and what was going to be the status of the TFGN's work.  
The General Council was the body to state a position.  It was the understanding of many that, so far, 
one had not yet formally approved in the General Co uncil the decision and not really decided what to 
do.  It was not up to the TFNG to take a decision.  
191. Members had worked very hard in the TF group over the past and it would be a pity not to 
include in the Chair's report ever ything that had been achieved in the past three days. That was why 
Cuba fully agreed with Mexico along the lines of what the Director-General  had requested to do, 
namely to prepare a detailed report that would ser ve as a sound basis for the future work of the NGs 
once they picked up again, at a time decided in due course. With the Chair's support and cooperation, Cuba would be happy if one could include in deta il everything that had been done in the TFNG, all 
the work Members had accomplished.  Many delegati ons seem to feel that the work done was formal 
and should be taken into account, at least until th e General Council pronounced itself on the decision 
of the TNC.  
192. The Chairman
 explained that the Chairman of th e TNC had asked to see all Negotiating 
Group Chairs immediately prior to Monday's informal  Heads of Delegations meeting. He had made 
the point to DG Lamy that the TFNG had started its meeting with the discussions being in progress, 
and the Group being half way through discussing one particularly interesting paper. He had sought 
Lamy's permission to continue the meeting, bear ing in mind that many delegations had flown in 
capital-based officials for the meeting, making the poi nt that, rather than wasting those resources, it 
would be sensible to allow the meeting to contin ue.  The permission had therefore been sought to 
continue the present meeting, pending the mee ting of the General Council on Thursday, and DG 
Lamy had granted that permission in his capacity as TNC Chair.  That was why the present meeting 
had continued.  
193. In terms of the report, DG Lamy had asked all NG Chairs to furnish a report on the state of 
play within their groups. In the TFNG, Members had already had an opportunity to look at the terms in which he would be reporting to the TNC – or now to the General Council- on Monday.  His GC 
report would be in exactly those terms.  The cove ring note also carried with it all of the progress 
which had been achieved over the last couple of days.  He trusted that all Members would be satisfied 
with that. 
194. With that, he wished to pass the floor ove r to contributions from the participating 
international organisations. Wo rk had continued amongst all of them in support of the TF 
negotiations, especially on the important area of co st implications where several projects had been 
initiated.  
195. The representative of the World Bank
 said that everybody knew that the World Bank was a 
big supporter of the TF negotiations.  The Bank ge nuinely believed that an Agreement on trade 
facilitation was good news for everybody.  He woul d not talk about the benefits of a Trade 
Facilitation Agreement and trade facilitation but rath er cover something that had been echoed as a 
concern many times in the NG meetings.  This relate d to the fact that, whilst many delegations 
believed that trade facilitation was a good news agenda , there were genuine concerns about the costs 
involved in agreeing to any new commitments and the question of how difficult some of those might be to implement. As part of the Bank's trade f acilitation support programme, the Bank had done some 
work in recent months to try and provide some an swers that might clarify the issue for Members.  
196. He would offer a quick overview of what the project involved, the progress achieved to date, 
some of the key issues the Bank had identified – and there were some surprises for Members and 
some of the partners – draw some conclusions  and look at what the next steps would be.  TN/TF/M/15 
 Page 27 
 
 
  197. In terms of the Bank's role in this, Annex D was fairly clear in providin g a role for the World 
Bank and the other international organisations both during and after the negotiations.  The project was 
part of the Bank's support during the negotiations. To  try and provide some information on the real 
costs that Members might face in terms of looking at a new trade facilitation Agreement, the Bank had done six country case studies and looked at the pr obable costs and implementation difficulties that 
might be associated with a new WTO TF Agreement.  
198. In doing so, the Bank had received generous f unding support by the EC, by DFID from the 
UK and, earlier, by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which led in part to the work. The methodology was fairly simple. The Bank had join ed in a partnership with the World Customs 
Organisation and the International Monetary Fund to undertake those studies and also worked very 
closely with the WTO Secretariat, UNCTAD and w ith the OECD in determining the focus and the 
methodology that the Bank would use. The proj ect therefore represented a good case study of the 
cooperation between the Annex D or ganisations in general.  It had been done in partnership 
particularly with the WCO and the IMF.  A team of  experienced trade facilitation specialists had been 
sent to each of the countries. And the Bank had deve loped an assessment tool to help undertake the 
work.  It was based on the W/43, the compilation document prepared and regularly updated by the 
WTO Secretariat. 
199. The Bank was in the process of preparing individual reports for each of the countries.  They 
only did six countries for the time being, but the conclusions they reached would be of interest to everyone and define the dimensions of the task fo r all Members. Those reports were currently being 
checked and discussed with the countries.  It was the Bank's intention to prepare over the summer a 
consolidated report with cost tables and detailed information that the Bank would share with all 
Members of the Negotiating Group. It was also its inten tion to turn the tool used for the process into a 
self assessment tool and made that available for all Members. 
200. In terms of the scope, it was very comprehensive.  The study looked at all the costs and 
implementation difficulties that countries were likely to face.  One of the things he wanted to stress 
very strongly was that those diagnostic studies we re not general TF diagnostics. They were studies 
associated specifically and quarantin ed just to the proposals being put  forward in the TF Negotiating 
Group. They did not look at trade facilitation in the general sense. For example, the Bank was not 
looking at port reform because this was not subject to proposals that had been put forward in Geneva. 
The Bank had based it on its assessment tool wh ich in turn was based on the WTO compilation 
document. It therefore represented an assessment of  a country's readiness to implement proposals that 
were on the table in Geneva. The project focu ssed on customs but also covered other border 
management agencies.  The Bank consulted in each country very widely with the private sector as 
well. Therefore, the work was very broad in scope, but focussed specifically on the negotiating 
agenda. 
201. So far, the Bank had done details assessments in Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Paraguay, Senegal, 
Egypt.  On Monday, the Bank would start the fina l one for this round in the Philippines.  Among the 
key issues that the Bank had identified there were  some which had reinforced the Bank’s initial 
hypothesis in some ways while in some ways they  had not.  Talking informally to negotiators in 
Geneva, he had been informed about their concerns  about issues that were on the negotiating agenda 
and how difficult they might be to implement.  In  several cases, they represented countries the Bank 
had worked with.  Some of the concerns were about implementing things that had already been 
implemented. 
202. What the Bank had discovered many times thr ough its work and what probably was not a 
surprise to a lot of negotiators was that sometimes,  Geneva negotiators did not  have absolute detailed 
knowledge about the operational issues in customs in  their own countries.  Therefore, one of the TN/TF/M/15 
Page 28  
 
  Bank’s hypotheses in putting together the project was to test whether or not those things were as 
difficult to do and as expensive as some people had suggested during the Geneva discussions.  
203. What the Bank had found was that the needs and priorities, whilst differing from country to 
country, showed a lot of commonality.  The difficult  things to implement were difficult everywhere. 
Likewise, the easy things to implement were easy  everywhere. The majority of the proposals were 
considered very positive. Most of the customs pe ople and also the trade entities the Bank talked to 
were of the view that the proposals discussed in Geneva would make a difference and were very 
positive. There was absolute agreement in that respect. 
204. Also, many people in the countries the Ba nk worked in saw a new Agreement as a 
tremendous catalyst for change and improvement.  They felt a new Agreement to be important in 
creating a sense of momentum and developing the political will necessary to make some of those 
changes and improvements happen. 
205. The Bank also found that the proposals on the tabl e to date contained ve ry few news things.  
Almost all of the measures on the table were currently considered to be part of a best practice or good 
practice in modern customs and border manageme nt.  Many countries were in the middle of a 
modernisation plan that incorporated almo st all of the proposals on the agenda.  
206. Most importantly, and that was an issue that so metimes seemed to be lost in the negotiations, 
no country was starting from scratch. All countries were  in the middle of modernisation plans and all 
had received significant donor support for it.  Theref ore, when there was a new Agreement, it would 
not be necessary to start from scratch. Many of th e proposed measures were well under way with a lot 
of progress made already.   
207. All of the countries the Bank had worked with maintained websites containing most of the 
required information for a new Agreement in one WTO language. They all had formal mechanisms 
for appeal in place. All utilised some form of risk  management and cargo selectivity. This was not to 
suggest that the job was done. The systems were  far from perfect and they would benefit from 
technical assistance. But they were already in place.  
208. All countries accepted some form of security by way of a bond or bank guarantee and 
released goods prior to the final resolution of an y discrepancies or other requirements. They all 
provided advice on tariff classification in advance of  importation. In some cases, this was not done 
formally in the way it had been proposed in Gene va, but all countries offered advice.  A given tariff 
classification ruling might not be binding and it might not have an extensive validity period, but it 
existed and the skills to make the classifi cation decision were existent as well.  
209. All of the countries the Bank visited had fairly extensive IT systems in place for 
import/export processing and, interestingly, all of them possessed most of the technical knowledge 
necessary to do so.  This was not to suggest they di d not need technical assistance, but there were a lot 
of skills already available within the border ma nagement agencies. And all of those countries had 
established post clearance audit units despite that bei ng considered to be a particularly difficult thing 
to do.  They might not be functioning perfectly, but a start had been made.  
210. What the Bank also found was that many of the identified implementation challenges and 
barriers did not lend themselves to resolution by th e provision of technical assistance or financing, 
regardless of its quantity and quality. They were simply barriers that were not sensitive to technical 
assistance. For example, the Bank found that in mo st situations, there was great competition between 
government agencies operating at the border and not a great sense of spirit of cooperation and 
information sharing. Sometimes, government agencies competed with each other. That could not be 
fixed by technical assistance.  TN/TF/M/15 
 Page 29 
 
 
  211. The relationship between the private and the publ ic sector had turned out to be rather 
adversarial and needed to be improved. This was al so an area that was not particularly sensitive to 
technical assistance.  
212. The Bank found that revenue maximisation was a major focus and absolutely dwarfed all 
other concerns. Trade facilitation often was a very small issue. For most of the customs and border 
management agencies, revenue was their main game. A change in focussing on trade facilitation 
would require a change in mindset, which equall y did not lend itself to technical assistance. 
213. In many of the countries the Bank had been working in, there was a very low level of 
voluntary compliance and it was a reasonable approach in many cases for customs and border agencies to be very suspicious about the tradi ng community. There was a technical assistance aspect 
of that, but in many cases, it did not lend itself to being resolved by technical assistance alone. 
214. The Bank also found that, in some of the c ountries the Bank had been working in for the 
study, there was an underdeveloped private sector . The banking infrastructure was not there, 
information and communication technology would limit the options for electronic single window, for example. And the customs broking community was also not particularly well organised or 
professional. But, most importantly, in many cases, there was a lack of political will and commitment 
for the necessary reforms.  That could also not easily be fixed just by TA. 
215. The Bank also found that customs was typica lly far ahead of other border management 
agencies. Customs all used IT syst ems, they already had some form of risk management. They usually 
had some form of active cooperation with nei ghbouring countries. Where donor support had been 
provided, customs had received the bulk of it. Customs always attempted to measure their 
performance, perhaps not perfectly, but they did a ttempt it. There had been examples with the WCO's 
time release study. That had always been initiate d by customs, not by other border management 
agencies. Customs typically understood the trade facilitation agenda. The other agencies that the Bank 
interviewed had not even heard of it in so me cases. Customs was ahead of the curve. 
216. Most importantly, customs already had agreed in ternational instruments and some blueprints 
for reform that they could work from. Other ag encies did not typically enjoy that same level of 
blueprint and did not have international inst ruments that they could base their work on. 
217. With respect to conclusions, the Bank had f ound that the WTO trade facilitation agenda was 
typically welcome, and that both the private sector and public sector were ve ry positive about it.  It 
was generally in line with their existi ng modernisation plans and strategies.  
218. The Bank had found that the suggestion that this  was going to require millions and millions of 
dollars of support over a long time was probably not true if one was talking about mere compliance 
with a new Agreement. If one wa s talking about massive reform of  trade facilitation incorporating 
everything that a country might want to do, it w as a different matter. But the current negotiating 
agenda did not require a fortune to implement.  The Bank would distribute a final report on this after 
the summer which would include cost estimates.  
219. There were some exceptions.  Electronic singl e windows could be expensive if one took the 
Singapore model.  The costs would depend of th e nature of the Single Window and the specific 
wording. One-stop border stations between different  countries could also involve quite an extensive 
amount of technical assistance and financing. It w ould depend in part on where the negotiations were 
going.  But those two were the only high-cost items the Bank had been able to identify. 
220.
 Technical assistance was needed, particularly in certain areas. Most of the countries the Bank 
had visited had suggested that they could use assistan ce in legislative drafting. All of them suggested TN/TF/M/15 
Page 30  
 
  they needed assistance to develop new administrativ e systems and procedures, to, for example, make 
the informal process of tariff classification advices a formal and binding process. 
221. Most of them saw that there was benefit and th at technical assistance was probably needed to 
migrate to later versions of the IT systems they  currently had, although, from what the Bank had seen 
so far, all countries would comply with the IT provisions of a new Agreement already. 
222. Risk management training and assistance would be required, particularly to try and work on 
improving compliance and changing the control mindset to  one of facilitation. It was a simple fact that 
most of the customs officials the Bank talked to believed that letting any goods enter without inspection was a wrong thing to do.  That had to be changed.  There was also  a wrong believe that TF 
could adversely impact on revenue collection whereas  all the evidence, not only by the Bank but also 
by other organizations working in customs reform , suggested that trade facilitation reforms would 
resolve in increased revenue. 
223. There was some assistance required in terms of activities-based costing methodologies. If one 
was looking at rationalising fees and charging fees to the cost of provision of service, most countries did not really know what it cost to provide speci fic services. One would know, for example, how 
much it cost to run the whole customs department, but allocating fees and calculating on the basis of 
those fees was rather difficult. Technical  assistance would be needed there. 
224. The Bank also believed that the trade facilitati on agenda in the WTO could not be seen in 
isolation from wider reform and mo dernisation efforts. As a result,  the technical assistance that 
Members might provide in terms of assisting with implementing this should not displace the technical 
assistance already being provided for wider modernisa tion efforts. It was important for that to be 
coordinated and coherent in the way it was delivered. 
225. The Bank had found that there were many sim ilar needs across countries.  That meant that 
there was potential for looking at solutions that had some economies of scale. For example, if seventy 
countries needed assistance with risk management, it could make sense to put a lot of effort into 
developing one very good package which could then be customised for the needs of many countries 
so that it was not necessary to re-invent the wheel sixty or seventy times. There was real value in that.  
226. The Bank also thought that SDT will have to ta ke into account individual circumstances of 
members, such as the level of sophistication of the private sector. In some countries, for example, the 
information and communication technology infrastructure might not allow at the present time the full automation of all border stations, particularly those that had small border stations in remote areas. 
And one had to take into account revenue implications.  At the moment, the Bank had seen many fees 
that were simply taxes and probably did not comply already with the current rules, let alone with the 
new Agreement. And each country faced its own geogr aphical considerations which had to be taken 
into account in terms of flexibility. 
227. The next step for the Bank was to finalise thos e reports and distribute them to all countries 
that had been involved.  The Bank would prepare a consolidated report and would distribute it to all 
Members.  The Bank tried to make that available so  that it could be shared with capital officials as 
well. It would be made available in all official languages. 
228. At the moment, the Bank was in the process  of converting the assessment tool it had 
developed based on the W/43 into a self-assessment tool, which would be made available in the 
official languages and distributed to everybody so that Members could use it in capital. At the moment, the Bank was talking with a range of donors  to develop a new stage of the process which 
would involve training officials from each country on how to conduct the self-assessment process.  
The idea was to take the further look at sub-re gional training programmes where the Bank brought in  TN/TF/M/15 
 Page 31 
 
 
  a range of officials and talk to them about those cost studies and train them in the use of the self-
assessment tool. They could then go home and work with their own constituencies to look at costs and 
implementation challenges on a country-by-country basis. 
229. That was a summary of where the Bank was with  the study at the moment. The next steps 
were to put it together into a consolidated report whic h would be of benefit to all Members, but also to 
the international organisations in terms of looki ng at how the technical assistance would possibly roll 
out in the future. It should also provide some definitive figures, or at least ranges of figures.  While the exact figures would be specific for the investigat ed country only, Members should still be able to 
draw some inferences from the figures that had been collected for other countries. 
230. The representative of Barbados
 wondered whether there were any trade facilitation proposals 
on the table which, although they might be objectivel y important and useful, might not be that useful 
to small countries that had very limited import a nd exportation regimes and where Members imported 
and exported such a limited range of products and limited quantity of products that the benefits of 
incorporating some of those trade facilitation pr oposals might be outweighed by the cost of 
implementing them. Had there been any assessment  conducted of that question or had Members 
expressed any preliminary ideas on those issues? 
231. The representative of India  congratulated the World Bank on an excellent study.  India had 
one question. Did the World Bank sense that the impr ovements, simplifications or changes made were 
just done on an ad hoc basis or haphazardly, or w as it always part of an overall defined objective in 
terms of time and specificity? 
232. The representative of Sri Lanka  expressed thanks for the World Bank's presentation and 
recalled that Sri Lanka had been one of the benefici aries of the exercise that the Bank had carried out. 
233. Since the launch of the TF negotiations, one of  Sri Lanka's concerns was to understand where 
they stood on implementation issues, what the asso ciated costs where and what the kind of TA&CB 
required.  The World Bank team had visite d upon request.  Its views, assessments and 
recommendations had been very useful. There had also  been a number of other activities in Sri Lanka 
by UNCTAD and the OECD during the last year.  All those efforts had resulted in Sri Lanka's key 
capital-based stakeholders being better informed  on issues under discussion in Geneva and on what 
sort of national effort would be required. 
234. As a result of the World Bank mission to Colo mbo on needs and implementation issues, and 
the report recently received, a core group estab lished under the World Bank Negotiating Support 
Project was currently examining them.  Those find ings not only assisted Sri Lanka in assessing where 
they stood and their readiness to implement the pro posals, but also in designing and implementing Sri 
Lanka's overall customs modernisation strategy.  Sr i Lanka placed great value on those findings. Its 
TA&CB needs and its scope had been clearly identified. The report  recognised in a number of places 
the importance of continued donor support for Sri La nka to put in place certain facilitation measures 
in line with the proposals tabled in Geneva.   
235. What had clearly been mentioned as important was the political will.  In Sri Lanka, the 
political will was there.  Sri Lanka had vision and on-going reform programmes, but there were 
several serious constraints in terms of resources,  human resources and various other infrastructure 
requirements. Sri Lanka therefore wished to con tinue working with the World Bank and other donors 
to improve its trade facilitation systems.  
236. The representative of Kenya  thanked the World Bank for a very good presentation.  Looking 
at the insights it had revealed, one saw that, in ma ny cases, customs was ahead, but often, they were 
implementing only some aspects of the trade f acilitation agenda. The question arose how Members TN/TF/M/15 
Page 32  
 
  ensured synergy between Geneva and the capitals.  He  recalled Cuba's point a bout feeling orphaned in 
light there not being enough representation in the Gene va meetings.  Also, at the moment, even some 
delegations which were part of the Core Group di d not have representation in the room. And this 
against the background that sub-Saharan Africa  was the part of the world which had the highest costs 
of facilitation. How could Members ensure that what  they did actually led to an improvement over the 
current situation?  The question was not the TF Ag reement. It was easy for everybody to fulfil the 
letter of the TF Agreement, but the question Keny a asked itself was whether it would make a big 
difference for them. Would it lead to less costs, and to economic developm ent? Developing countries 
were looking for the Agreement to be the basis fo r improving their economies, for ensuring that the 
costs went down and that they got better integrated  into the world economy. That was really the big 
question that had to be addressed.  Unless that was done, there might be a beautiful document, but it 
would not make a difference for any developing country.  
237. Kenya also had a question about the sampling methodology. Rwanda was among the 
countries that were being studied as well as Senegal.  A lot of work had gone into those countries. It 
was part of a reform and modernisation process. What was going to happen? What about other 
countries where that kind of reform and modernisati on had not been initiated yet? If one had chosen to 
study those countries, the conclusions would have been different.  
238. There was also the issue of what  to do with other agencies who should really contribute to a 
great extent to the success of trad e facilitation at the country level. Customs might be ahead of other  
agencies.  What did Members do with those othe r areas which might not even be amenable to 
TA&CB. Those were the difficult questions Members had to address. 
239. The representative of Mexico
 congratulated the World Bank for its interesting presentation 
and thanked the  Bank for the work it was doing with the six member states of the organisation.  It 
would be extremely important to look at this, study it closely and see the methodologies the World Bank pursued.  He wondered which version of the Secretariat's compilation had been followed.  
240. One would have to look at the whole context under review within the NG.  In particular, 
Members should try to look at aspects such as regul atory issues, questions related to transit etc that 
went beyond customs. All of those other aspects the World Bank had studied had not really been looked at so far at the level they would deserve . Since the methodology the Bank had described would 
be very useful and could serve as a reference or  a benchmark in future assessments for the future 
Trade Facilitation Agreement, it would be very impor tant for the World Bank and all other Annex D 
organisations if they also could take part in a broader study that would raise other aspects.  For 
instance, the OECD had a lot of experience on re gulatory issues, UNCTAD had much experience in 
transit agreements and other organisa tions might have expertise in othe r fields.  He mentioned this as 
one was only talking about a study on customs and not really looking at the system as such or the regulatory issues involved.  One was not looking at the overall context, but only looking at TF in the context of GATT Articles V, VIII and X.  Perhaps th at was the reference that should be used for the 
methodology, but also for future assessments when ever one dealt with trade facilitation issues. 
241. The representative of Costa Rica
 thanked the World Bank for the hard work and its support of 
the negotiations. Costa Rica wished to know to what extent the implementation of the trade 
facilitation measures in those countries had been ba sed on international commitments being bilateral, 
regional or multilateral and if there was a sen se in those countries that those international 
commitments could help to improve the implem entation process of trade facilitation measures. 
242. The representative of Canada  expressed appreciation of the World Bank presentation.   TN/TF/M/15 
 Page 33 
 
 
  243. Like many others, Canada was extremely disappointed with the suspension of the 
negotiations. It was a missed opportunity.  That be ing said, with no need to reopen a debate, the 
decision was not up to the TFNG.  It was taken at a higher level and one had to take it as it was.  
244. What Canada took away from the World Bank's presentation was that, perhaps one could try 
to see a bright side to it and explore whether ther e was an opportunity offered by the pause to do 
something useful, individually or collectively.  In that context, he wished to make reference to the 
capacity self-assessment as something that everyb ody had recognized as important throughout the 
negotiations.  It was generally accepted that this w as not always easy.  Many countries needed help in 
that regard. What the World Bank had done through those pilot projects was very welcome.  Canada 
also appreciated the announced development of ne w tools for the capacity sel f-assessment process. In 
light of that, it would be useful to try to improve those self-assessments or assist countries to take up 
that opportunity to conduct a capacity self-assessmen t. It was useful for ge tting ready for whenever 
the negotiations resumed.   
245. Setting the negotiations aside, what was eviden t from Pakistan's presentation and its national 
experience paper was that countries were worki ng very hard towards adopting trade facilitation 
measures, moving ahead with customary reform.  The capacity self-assessment was extremely useful 
in that context as well. Whether negotiations were su spended or not, Canada w ould continue its effort 
and was ready to make its contribution to help developing countries with conducting their capacity 
self-assessment and then implement further trade facilitation measures.  Ca nada hoped that Members 
could take up all the good work by the World Ba nk and by other international organisations and 
capitalise on that while not negotiating. 
246. The representative of Tunisia  commended the World Bank for its presentation. He wished to 
comment on the study being made and put it in a cont ext that might be of interest to delegates.  
247. The trade facilitation process was not a singular pr ocess; it was linked to other reforms. It was 
only really of interest if it followed a general l ogic of reform. For example, if one took the case of 
Tunisia, a lot of work had been done in the past te n years in the field of trade facilitation supported by 
the World Bank.  A lot of work was also financed by the EU on the management of ports. Those 
programmes made it possible for trade facilitation programmes to really develop. 
248. The process of trade facilitation was a very particular one, as Tunisia's case demonstrated.  
Tunisia implemented an association agreement with the EU for nearly ten years. Tunisia was coming 
to the end of that agreement and had noticed th at facilitation was a dynamic process. At the outset, 
Tunisia has been following an offshore/onshore lo gic according to which export was facilitated more 
than import.  But at the moment, in order to ex port, Tunisia had to import a lot and was therefore 
seeking to facilitate imports much more, not only at  ports but also for the sourcing and just-in-time 
issues which were crucial for newly immerging coun tries to be able to really be competitive. 
249. He therefore had a question on the study. The choi ce of countries was a rather interesting one.  
Neither Tunisia nor Morocco had been chosen. But he could refer to Egypt which could perhaps be 
considered close to Tunisia.  It was not particular ly the case of Tunisia, but the information on Egypt 
could perhaps be used for assessing the situ ation in Tunisia to a certain extent. 
250. What was even more interesting was that t hose tools that would be developed made it 
possible for countries to self-assess th eir efforts in the field of trade facilitation. That was important 
and he wished the World Bank to include those c ountries in setting up and developing those tools.  
That would be very interesting so that one could really adjust those tools to each situation in each 
given country. TN/TF/M/15 
Page 34  
 
  251. The representative of Korea
 raised a question regarding TA . The presentation had shown that 
the key issue identified regarding TA was that some measures were not sensitive to technical 
assistance and that issues such as political will, the mindset and competition among agencies were 
very relevant. This matched Korea’s experien ce, which had shown for those factors to be  very 
important for reform.  The political will was a key factor.  Therefore, if one wanted to ensure a 
successful implementation of the reform, TA was just a complimentary factor, not a main one.  The 
presentation had shown that it was necessary to have the right internal environment to implement the 
reforms.  What was the Bank's assessment on the TA activities, their role and responsibility?  How 
could one identify and legally capture what TA activity represented a good framework for the 
implementation mechanism for the Agreement that would emerge at the end of the TF negotiations?  
Korea still wondered whether this was an interactive activity.  Internal information with strong will 
was a very important factor.  How could one link th e inside and the outside activity for a successful 
implementation?  
252. Korea wished to thank the Chair for continuing the negotiations.  One certainly had to follow 
the high level decision making, but until the fina l decision was taken, it was a good suggestion to 
show that the TF negotiations were good and useful .  It had also given Korea the opportunity to 
present its new four proposals. Korea might have been disappointed if that had not been possible 
because a capital delegation had come for that purpose.   But also more generally, the continuation was 
very helpful and a good suggestion - and motivation - for the future. 
253. The representative of the World Bank  wished to respond to questions raised.  
254. Barbados' comment that some of the things th at were currently on the agenda might have 
limited benefits and applicability to, for example,  small island states was something that had been 
mentioned several times to the Bank over the last y ears in respect to those negotiations.  The Bank did 
not really find too many examples where that was actually the case. One should just have a look at some of the very practical things that were on th e table. For instance, whether one was importing into 
Barbados into an EU member state or the Un ited States, the ability to appeal against the 
administrative decision taken by customs was fairly  important. The scale, the size of the importation 
might be different, but the ability to do that was equally relevant.   If Members were deciding to make 
an investment decision, the capacity to receive an  advanced binding ruling on tariff classification was 
equally relevant, regardless of the size of the eco nomy. When going through the proposals that were 
on the table, one would not find many that we re not universally applicable. Obviously the 
implementation scales would be different, and the emphasis and priority that Members might want to 
put on them. The sequencing of the events or the act ivities might also be different, but pretty much 
everything on the agenda at the moment was particul arly useful and fairly practical.  Therefore, the 
World Bank was very happy with the scale, scope a nd content of the proposals put forward so far. Of 
course there were differences. For example, some Me mbers said that they would like to use customs 
brokers and would like to make it mandatory becau se their private sector was so underdeveloped that 
it was the only way they could guarantee a level of compliance. That was an argument that had been 
put forward by some countries and there might be di fferences across the spectrum there. But generally 
speaking, the World Bank was of the view that those proposals were important.  
255. Barbados had raised another issue that was quite  critical to the negotiations. It was not just 
about what was useful for one's country, but also ab out it being useful for one's private sector within a 
country to have those provisions available in the c ountries they traded with. That was quite important. 
256. As for India's question about the scale, scope a nd coherence in terms of ongoing reforms, that 
was something that varied enormously. Some of  those reforms had come about because donors had 
supplied them. They wanted to do something and therefore it was done. Some of them came about 
because there was a wide all-encompassing public sect or reform programme that had a customs and 
border management component. It was different ev erywhere. But generally speaking, all of the  TN/TF/M/15 
 Page 35 
 
 
  countries the World Bank had worked in did have a reform and modernisation plan. It was usually 
very broad, not necessarily focussed on the Geneva agenda, but it did incorporate it.  There was an 
attempt to achieve coherence.  That coherence see med to have been better in those cases where there 
was a large donor-funded activity which had been part  of that process.  Sri Lanka, for example, had 
had a reform and modernisation programme in place for many years and had been making progress. 
The problem was they had unfortunately not r eceived an enormous amount of donor support. 
Therefore, while the plan had been strong, the intentions very good and momentum for change good, they had not been recipients of massive donor support  so far. Therefore, they had not been able to 
implement all the things they would like. But certain ly, they had demonstrated that they could use the 
limited assistance they had received very well. 
257. Kenya's statement was very important.  How to  ensure that the Trade Facilitation Agreement 
really delivered dividends for a country in terms of integration, trade expansion and the like was a 
critical question. In the World Bank's view, the WT O trade facilitation agenda was not a panacea nor 
was it the complete story. It was a sub-set of things Members would do to improve their trade performance. One of the real benefits was a hidden one because it was not just the measures that were 
on the agenda as such. They would also be a catalys t for change because they would generate, or at 
least contribute to generating, the political suppor t and commitment for change, which would attract 
donor and government attention on an important area of  trade facilitation.  There were therefore also 
wider benefits of those measures.  
258. With respect to Kenya’s comment about the Bank's sampling and the choice of countries it 
used, that was always a difficult issue. The World Bank could only take a handful of countries.  Its 
rationale for doing it was quite simple. The Bank did not pick countries just because it knew that they 
would be good.  In fact, in some cases, the World Bank chose countries because it knew it was not 
doing much work there.  There was no such thi ng as the World Bank picking countries they were 
happy with. The Bank chose countries that did not have a big Trade Facilitation  programme at the 
moment.  Countries also self-selected themselves by their Geneva delegates pus hing hard for them to 
be picked.  The World Bank tried to chose different countries from different regions. There was no 
way of objectively doing that. The Bank had to pick si x countries and did so as best as it could.  It had 
done so across the spectrum from very small landlocke d, least-developed countries to ones that were 
moving towards middle income countries.  The Bank tr ied to be as representative within the sample of 
the six as it could. 
259. Mexico had raised the point about the importance of the methodology that the World Bank 
had been working on and that the Annex D organisati ons had a lot of expertise in the area and should 
take this further. The World Bank would finalise th e self-assessment tool and make it available after 
the summer. There was a bit of work  associated with doing that so th at it was easier to use. Members 
had also mentioned the OECD, UNCTAD and others that  were not directly involved in the particular 
project. They had also been extraordinarily activ e in terms of supporting the negotiations and done 
their own diagnostics, particularly in those areas wh ere they had a comparative advantage.  The Bank 
was working in a coherent fashion and trying to add value where it could. 
260. With respect to Costa Rica's point on whethe r the work that had been going on in those 
countries and their reform programmes were based on international agreements and the like, the 
answer was that this was the case.  All of the things that were on the negotiating agenda were 
consistent with international norms and best practi ce approaches as were the issues that were driving 
reforms in each of the countries the World Bank ha d studied. Some of them were done because they 
were part of a requirement of a regional trade agreem ent or the like. But generally speaking, they were 
done because they were part of the suite of good practice approaches for modern customs and border 
management administration.  Whether there was an Agreement or was likely to be an Agreement in 
Geneva or not, most of the countries were worki ng on a reform programme anyway, regardless of the 
outcome of the negotiations would continue to  work on that.  The World Bank supported the TN/TF/M/15 
Page 36  
 
  negotiations so strongly because it believed that they  would be a catalyst for further improvement and 
would attract government and donor attention to th e issue.  The Bank also thought that the actual 
agenda was a meaningful and useful one. 
261. On Canada's point that Members had expressed their disappointment with suspension of the 
negotiations and the fact that it would be great to continue with the self-assessment, the Bank wished 
to inform that it was going to finish the work it had started on the exercise in any case.  The Bank 
would be working on the self-assessment tool, completing the reports, which would then be 
distributed to all Members after the summer.  Th e Bank encouraged all Members to use those tools 
that the World Bank would make available to Me mbers for an on-going process of self-assessment. 
Self-assessment was not done only once. As the nego tiations moved, it had to continue.  It was a 
dynamic process.  
262. The Bank agreed with Tunisia's point about there being much work to be done that was not 
necessarily associated just with th e Geneva process.  That was why he had made the point in the 
presentation that this was not the complete agenda .  Any technical assistance that would flow from it 
in terms of implementation should not take away the emphasis away  from wider reform issues that 
were likely to also be useful in terms of expanding trade. 
263. With respect to Korea's point, the World Bank was of the view that political would was an 
important factor.  The Bank was not suggesting that there should not be technical assistance 
associated with this. Sometimes the f act that there was technical assistance could assist to create the 
political will and commitment. What the World Bank were highlighting simply was that some of the barriers to implementation did not lend themselves  to technical assistance. Therefore, just putting 
more technical assistance on the table would not necessarily overcome all barriers to implementation.  
264. The representative of Nigeria
 commended the World Bank for its comprehensive and 
articulate presentation. Although Nigeria was not listed in the study, it could draw some pertinent inferences from the insight provided. Reference w as made to Rwanda and Senegal, but Nigeria's 
situation was not completely the same as except fo r Senegal and Nigeria belonging to the same 
regional axis of the West African Sub Region. Nigeri a regretted the absence of its expert from capital, 
particularly from the customs, who would have been  able to share some thoughts in terms of what was 
presently the status in Nigeria. Nigeria hoped for such participation to be facilitated for future 
meetings. 
265. The customs operations varied from country to c ountry.  In Nigeria, for instance, customs was 
placed under the domain of the ministry of finance w ith the focus on revenue collection. In most cases 
they set a target,  which was the timing or was seen as the motivation in terms of how far they could 
go in achieving the particular target. Th e orientation was not trade facilitation per se  but rather how 
much revenue could accrue to the government. 
266. The other aspect important to Nigeria was the collaboration with other agencies that were 
saddled with the responsibility of trade facilitation. There were several such agencies where one could 
observe competition in terms of who handled what, a nd who was [superior] in terms of responsibility.  
That was a challenge for most of the developing countries, particularly for Africa's sub-Saharan 
countries. 
267. One should of course be mindful of regional pr ogrammes and integration.  That had to be 
factored into the broader perspective of trad e facilitation work. Nigeria had simplified some 
procedures and trade document procedures which s hould be aligned to international standards and 
expedited trade transactions so as to provide a common basis for measures that should be applied by 
different countries and by different regions.  In doing so, Nigeria had observed the need for all  TN/TF/M/15 
 Page 37 
 
 
  stakeholders to come together to be able to iden tify some of the difficulties being encountered in the 
course of implementing some of their respective obligations. 
268. It had equally been noted that there was an absen ce of public/private pa rtnership or that the 
relationship was not one of cordiality. What the priv ate sector perceived of the public sector was quite 
different from what the public sector perceived of  the private sector. Regrettably, the issue of 
corruption could equally come into focus. In most cases, the officials responsible for trade facilitation 
could easily be corrupted even by those in the business sector just to ensure that they were able to 
have their way.  The issue had to be addressed in terms of how to re-orientate customs officials and 
officials of other border agencies in terms of how they addressed their responsibility. 
269. It had rightly been mentioned that the issue of technical assistance went beyond 
implementation. If obligations of an Agreement were  to be implemented, the issue of political will 
and determination on the part of those saddled with  such responsibility had to be addressed.  Matters 
like will, remuneration, security training and, re-o rientation would go a long way in trying to shape 
their focus in terms of how to adjust to the modern realities of modernised customs operations. 
270. When talking about trade facilitation, one shoul d not concentrate all efforts on customs alone. 
Rather, one should try to see what was happening in other agencies that were equally involved in 
trade facilitation work. Nigeria would be interested if it, or the sub-region,  could be taken into 
consideration in terms of assessing the difficulties th at obstructed the achievement of the objective of 
trade facilitation.  
271. The representative of Pakistan  said that the World Bank's analysis was quite incisive of the 
situation prevailing on the ground.  He sought th e Bank's comments on a perception that might exist 
that, whenever assistance was received by deve loping countries for various programmes, it was 
perhaps not as flexible as it had to be because the countries that received assistance actually received a 
particular product.  The consultants and the techni cal assistance coming with the financial assistance 
always advocated a particular product which might not necessarily work for that country. 
272. The representative of the World Bank  said that the Bank agreed with Nigeria. There was real 
potential for solutions in the process, particularly in respect to TA at the regional level.  And the Bank 
was not the only one to think that. The WTO Secr etariat, for example, c onducted regional workshops. 
The Bank participated in them whenever it could, as did UNCTAD and the OECD.  They all had participated in regional workshops where they could so that one could build a coalition for reform that 
crossed borders in countries that, for example, shared a common language or were working in 
regional trading groups.  That was important. 
273. While the funding was not yet there, it was the Bank’s intention to get the self-assessment 
tool and the related training of officials done on a regional basis. The Bank was currently talking to a 
range of donors on the matter. In some cases, the re gions might well decide to do the assessment, or to 
at least collate the results of the assessment so th at they had a regional picture of their needs and 
priorities. 
274. The competition between agencies was an importa nt issue. The Bank was not suggesting that 
the negotiations be just held for customs. That  was never the intention and was not within the 
mandate. What the Bank had done when doing their studies was to look at customs because most of the work and most of the provisions related to cu stoms. But the Bank had also looked at the other 
agencies and their contribution. An Agreement coul d make a contribution in that regard because it 
required some of those organisations to cooperate. So me of the things would have to be achieved on a 
cross-ministries level. That was important. TN/TF/M/15 
Page 38  
 
  275. Integrity was certainly an issue as was remunera tion for government officials. It was not just 
customs.  The purpose of the study was to look specif ically at the provisions on the table so far.  It 
was never designed to be an all-encompassing refo rm and modernisation strategy.  The Bank was 
looking at those provisions and trying to cost th em and their implementation difficulties.  It was 
quarantined to that. 
276. Pakistan’s comments were interesting.  The cr iticism that the donors were interested in supply 
and not in hearing what the demanders want was of ten levelled.  There was sometimes the suspicion 
that the Bank came in with a pre-set solution or ser ies of solutions.  From his experience in the Bank, 
but also with the WCO as well as from what he  had heard from the colleagues from the other 
international organisations, he could say that that was not true. In fact, it was probably less true now 
than ever before.  Actually, there was some relu ctance from the donors to deliver something that the 
clients did not want.  In the World Bank, one of the biggest difficulties he had was hiring consultants 
that were not aligned with a particular product.  For instance, with respect to IT, it was difficult to find 
a good consultant that could be used for project d esign that did not have a particular linkage or 
preference for certain IT products. But apart from that , he did not think it was true. The aid  providers 
did listen, or at least attempted to listen.  Like everybody, the Bank probably came with a 
philosophical position, but it tried and based its work on internationa l standards and best practice.  
The Bank did everything it could to avoid putting forward products, particul arly commercial products, 
that the recipient governments did not want.  The Bank typically responded to requests for assistance and designed its work accordingly in very cl ose cooperation with the recipient government.  
277. The Chairman
 announced that both Pakistan's and th e World Bank's PowerPoint presentations 
would be available on the WTO website on the trade facilitation TA section.  
278. The representative of UNCTAD  said that UNCTAD was very grateful to have had the 
opportunity to be associated with the negotiating process on Trade Facilitation. Over the last two 
years, UNCTAD had undertaken a number of regional events accompanying the process, not only as an exercise to inform or educate capital-based e xperts on what was happening in Geneva but also to 
provide a linkage between the Geneva-based nego tiators and the capital experts.  UNCTAD had 
therefore always made a point in inviting Geneva-bas ed experts to its regional events in the capitals. 
This had also be done in cooperation with th e WTO on a number of WTO-organised events. 
279. UNCTAD had provided a set of technical notes which Members could find on the UNCTAD 
website.  They covered some of the issues raised in  the current meeting such as examples of costs of 
particular measures and the way they had been implemented in specific countries. Those activities 
were part of a broader set of trade facilitation-related, technical assistance activities.  UNCTAD was 
particularly looking at the development of cohe rent and integrated TF solutions for individual 
countries which went beyond what was being negotiate d in Geneva but where the elements of those 
negotiations were an integral part.  
280. The second broader element was customs automation. UNCTAD was very satisfied and proud 
to report that the UNCTAD AS YCUDA system was now implemented in 85 countries, both 
developed and developing.  A lo t of WTO Members were users of the ASYCUDA System in one 
form or another.  
281. All those activities had been undertaken as a coope rative effort particularly with the Annex D 
organisations, but not exclusively with them.  UNCTAD had always tried to keep a regional 
perspective in its activities and had therefore cooperated and coordinate d very closely with 
organisations such as COMESA, APEC and others. 
282. UNCTAD would continue its capacity building programme, subject to the availability of 
funding. In that context, he wished to raise th e question of the self-assessment exercises which should  TN/TF/M/15 
 Page 39 
 
 
  be undertaken independent of the way the nego tiations might continue. UNCTAD had received a 
number of requests for assistance  in the self-assessment exercise but would require donor support 
which it looked forward to receiving in an adequate manner. 
283. In that context, he wished to recall the existence of a multi-donor trust fund within UNCTAD 
which was open for contributions from the donor community, bearing in mind not only the 
expectation that multilateral negotiations might resu me but also reflecting the intrinsic value of 
coherent and integrated TF programmes as had been  mentioned on various occasions.  Thanks were 
due to those who had contributed to the multi-donor trust fund, mainly the governments of Sweden 
and Spain who were the main contributors to those activities. 
284. The representative of the OECD  said that the OECD had been very pleased to accompany the 
process with studies and other work and would certa inly continue to do so in terms of economic 
analysis, trying to document the benefits and the co sts of trade facilitation, as the OECD had already 
done a year ago with a series of studies that had already been presented, and with respect to the 
different types of barriers which the trade facilita tion negotiations were trying to overcome.  The 
OECD would be glad to help in any way it could to sustain the process no matter when, where and in 
what form the negotiations resumed. 
285. Responding to a point made by Mexico about th e experience of Annex D organisations with 
regulatory tools, in particular the experience of  the OECD, she recalled that the OECD had been 
working on regulatory surveys. Economic surveys had been carried out of OECD Members for years. 
The same had also started for some non-member  countries. Some Members might know about the 
regulatory survey of China currently under way.   In addition, the OECD had undertaken, in 
cooperation with APEC, the establishment of a re gulatory self-assessment checklist.  It was not 
limited to trade facilitation but looking at the overa ll regulatory framework of a country as far as it 
impacted on its institutions, its competition policy and, what concerned the OECD most in that 
context, the openness of its markets. The self-as sessment checklist had been approved by the highest 
bodies of the OECD and of APEC and would be check ed for the first time in Vietnam at the next 
APEC meeting where a number of APEC countries, some also being OECD countries, would present 
self-assessment reports on their regulatory frame work and environment using the regulatory self-
assessment checklist. Two of the countries were H ong Kong China and the United States. If Members 
were interested in more insight s about self-assessment checklists th ey might wish to look towards 
APEC.  
286. The other point she wanted to make was an a nnouncement with respect to an event that the 
OECD would be organising in September. The OECD Development Cooperation and Trade 
Directorates, in cooperation with the Governme nt of Cameroon, was going to hold a regional 
symposium on trade facilitation in Yaoundé, Cameroon on September 27th and 28th. The aim was to 
enable stakeholders in Western Africa and Cent ral African countries, including customs and trade 
experts, donors, international orga nisations and private sector representatives, to hold discussions on 
an informal basis on a number of important issues re lated to trade facilitation.  Emphasis was placed 
on practical experience with regard to costs and ch allenges in trade, instruments and approaches that 
could be used to assess countries' needs and lack of  capacities, lessons to be learned with regard to 
formulating and implementing reform as well as  introduction of TA&CB. The conference was hoped 
to promote a national and regional dialogue on those issues which were of great importance to the 
negotiations, reform facilitation and donor assistance.  It was part of the OECD's effort to assist 
Members in identifying their needs and priorities an d identify the cost of possible measures as well as 
to ensure that TA&CB were effective, operational and coherent.  Special attention was paid to how 
one could implement the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, specially as related to trade facilitation. The OECD wanted to explore the di fferent avenues for implementing, monitoring and 
evaluating mechanisms for TA&CB and was also seeking to assess the outcome of the aid and the TN/TF/M/15 
Page 40  
 
  implementation of reforms. The forum would be held  in French and English with formal invitations 
and a detailed programme being send out to delegations of c oncerned countries next week. 
287. The Chairman
 observed that this had brought the Group to the end of the discussions on the 
main agenda item.  
288. At this stage in the negotiations, it was worth taking stock.  Work was proceeding very well, 
thanks to the continued efforts of everybody on board. Looking back on the beginning of his 
chairmanship and comparing the situation at that tim e with the current state-of-play, he saw himself 
on fairly safe grounds in saying that work had progressed very steadily.  The NG had come a long 
way since the Sixth Ministerial Meeting and made  noticeable headway on all fronts. Members were 
all to be congratulated on what they had achieved since Hong Kong. 
289. So where did one stand? He considered it no ex aggeration to say that the Group had entered a 
new phase of work.  Members had moved from presenting and discussing initial proposals to an intensified stage of refinement and witnessed a beginning of a convergence of minds. There was a 
clear change of gear, perhaps not always noticed  by everybody and not necessarily lending itself to 
front-page coverage, but very tangible on the ground.  
290. Trade Facilitation might not always be headlin e news, but the TFNG had managed to produce 
advances that reflected the constructive spirit whic h had become a hallmark of the Group, and which 
had again been witnessed at the current meeting.   One could now discern the emerging results of a 
genuinely Member-initiated exercise of consolid ation that had seen both a convergence of ideas and 
the first delineation of a common ground. 
291. Substantive proposals had been received on all elements of the mandate, many of them 
already in text-based form. Members had lived up to  Annex E's call for a move into focussed drafting 
mode without cutting back on its equal demands for a balanced advancement. Progress was also made 
on the other Hong Kong recommendations with the c ontinuation of the national experience sharing 
and reinforced efforts in the crucial areas of TA&CB and S&D.  Members had managed to advance 
work by tabling substantive, and partly alr eady text-based, proposals, bringing progress on S&D, 
technical assistance and capacity building  much  closer to the work on the other pillars. 
292. Having said that, and having recognised that this  was a very positive development, one should 
also be honest and recognise that more work still had to be done to bring those elements fully up to 
par with the rest. Renewed and intensified effo rts on S&D and TA&CB would therefore be a clear 
priority for the future. 
293. One common positive aspect of all contributions was their backing by broad Member 
alliances of all levels of development, which evidenced of support from developed and developing 
countries alike. These were reflect ed in the Secretariat's compilation document which had come to be 
a basis for the Group's work; a work which clearl y remained work in progress. With additional 
contributions still on the way and existing ones yet to be refined and lifted above the bar of universal 
acceptance, the comprehensiveness and specificity of  the document clearly recorded the advancement 
of work and the bridge-building initiatives unde rway. He therefore hoped that Members would 
continue to build bridges.  One n eeded both the vision of the bridge-builder and his willingness to find 
the right balance between form and function, amb ition and flexibility in moving things forward. 
294. He would urge Members that, as they continued to build bridges, they looked for simplicity 
and elegance of design and left embellishment aside.  One had to have a bridge which was simple and 
elegant enough to carry the traffic that had to go across it. One did not need to embellish it too much.  TN/TF/M/15 
 Page 41 
 
 
  295. That was roughly the state-of-play. The next question was where to go from here. Under 
normal circumstances, that would be easy to say. Se tting aside for the moment the events of the last  
days, there was little doubt in his mind that there was still a significant amount of work to do.  
296. Notable progress had been made, textual propo sals were now on the table but one was not 
dealing with an agreed text. Proposals would still ha d to be refined and modified until consensus was 
achieved. There were two distinct tasks which neve rtheless would be not necessarily quite so distinct 
as the discussion moved forward. There had to be a discussion on what was in and what was out in 
terms of commitments.  And there also had to be the hard nitty-gritty work of polishing the final text, 
the exercise of drafting.  
297. As far as he was concerned, that would be done  in continuation of the Member-driven nature 
of the exercise to date. He firmly believed that one  should continue in that vein. It had worked very 
well for everybody, it had served well so far and he believed that the consensual approach was right 
for dealing with the drafting of the type of commitm ents.  There was no need for a particular external 
stimulus. He also recalled Members'  points about not wanting the Chair to interfere too much with the 
process. 
298. It was difficult in the light of events to fo recast how things would move from here until the 
end of the negotiations.  He did not believe that  the differences in the wider negotiations were 
unbridgeable or that any Member would simply walk  away from what was alr eady on the table.  He 
trusted that common sense would ultimately preva il and that the negotiations would resume sooner 
rather than later. In the meantime, he thanked Me mbers for carrying the work forward. Until the next 
time the Group would meet, he would urge that Members keep the faith. He certainly would not be 
discouraging any Member from informal contacts ove r the coming months.  One had something very 
good and he had every intention of working to ensure that Members secured it. Particular thanks were 
due to the Members who had offered fresh food for thought in terms of eith er papers or comments 
over the last days.  
299. The Negotiating Group took note  of the statements made. 
C. AD HOC ATTENDANCE OF RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS , INCLUDING THE 
IMF,  OECD,  UNCTAD,  WCO  AND THE WORLD BANK, AT THE NEXT MEETING OF THE 
NEGOTIATING GROUP  
300. The Chairman  suggested inviting relevant internati onal organizations, including the IMF, 
OECD, UNCTAD, WCO and the World Bank to attend th e next formal meeting of the NG on an ad 
hoc basis, as provided for in the Work Plan. 
301. It was so agreed . 
D. OTHER BUSINESS  
302. The Chairman  raised the issue of the Group's next meeting.  Members would have noticed 
that the present meeting had brought the NG to the end of its predetermined meeting schedule.  While 
events were difficult to forecast at the moment, he had nevertheless consulted with the Secretariat on 
possible meeting dates, which had shown for there to be an empty slot for the time of 13 and 
14 September. Members might wish to bear those in mind and mark them in their diaries in anticipation of what might or might not happen. He asked whether Members could agree on that.  TN/TF/M/15 
Page 42  
 
  303. It was so agreed
.  
304. The meeting was adjourned . 
__________