WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
19 August 2010 
 (10-4383) 
Committee on Trade and Development  
  
 
  
DEVELOPMENTAL ASPECTS OF THE DOHA ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS 
 
Note by the Secretariat
 
 
Revision  
  
I.
 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... .1 
II. DEVELOPMENTAL ASPECTS OF THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 
NEGOTIATIONS ................................................................................................................... ..2 
A. AGRICULTURE .............................................................................................................................2  
B. NON-AGRICULTURAL MARKET ACCESS .....................................................................................8  
C. SERVICES ............................................................................................................................... ....15  
D. TRADE FACILITATION ...............................................................................................................18  
E. SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT ................................................................................21  
F. IMPLEMENTATION -RELATED ISSUES AND CONCERNS ..............................................................23  
G. RULES ............................................................................................................................... .........26  
H. TRADE -RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ..........................................31  
I. TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT ......................................................................................................32  
J. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING .................................................................................34  
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS .................................................................................................37  
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. In the context of paragraph 51 of the Doha Mi nisterial Declaration, WTO Members have been 
reviewing since October 2005 the developmental asp ects of the Doha Round of negotiations on the 
basis of a background paper prepared by the Secret ariat.  The usefulness of periodic updates to the 
paper has been widely recognized by Members.   
2. The present document is the fourth revision of the paper.  Like its predecessors, it addresses 
the developmental aspects in all the subject are as under negotiation in the Round.  In addition to 
providing a brief summary of the status of the nego tiations in each area, the paper highlights the broad 
parameters of the development dimension, identifies specific issues of interest to developing countries 
and describes the potential gains which could accrue  to developing countries from the conclusion of 
the negotiations.   WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
Page 2  
 
  3. This revised document has been prepared under the Secretariat's own responsibility.  It does 
not claim to provide an exhaustive coverage of a ll the developmental aspects raised in the course of 
the negotiations.  Nor should the paper be seen as an  attempt to prioritize issues, subjects or concerns 
raised by individual Members or groups of Members.   Finally, this paper does not prejudice the right 
of any Member to raise other concerns or views related to paragraph 51 of  the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration or the presentation below concerning the areas currently under negotiation in the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA). 
II. DEVELOPMENTAL ASPECTS OF THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 
NEGOTIATIONS 
A. A
GRICULTURE  
1. Parameters of the Development Dimension 
4. Agriculture plays an important role in the de velopment of many WTO Members.  For a large 
number of developing countries and least-develope d countries (LDCs), agriculture makes a significant 
contribution to their economies, including its direct  contribution to gross domestic production, export 
revenue and employment as well as to rural develo pment and livelihood security.  Although the share 
of agriculture exports in total world merchandise e xports is low, approximately 6 per cent in 2008, 
developing countries account for half of this agriculture trade.  Furthermore, the share of world agriculture exports originating from developing countries  has been steadily increasing over time, in 
particular since 2000.
1  
5. However, many of the world's agricultural produ cers are currently disadvantaged in the world 
trading environment because of high tariff barrier s and competition from producers that receive high 
levels of domestic or  export-related support.  Therefore, a re duction in protection and support can lead 
to important gains for developing country agricultur al producers.  The development aspects related to 
agriculture can thus be found in each of the three pillars of the agriculture negotiations – market 
access, domestic support and export competition. 
(a) Market access 
6. The market access pillar is arguably the most co mplex and intricate pillar of the agriculture 
negotiations.  Some Members see a link between mark et access and flexibilities, in particular that an 
increase in flexibilities (defensive inte rests) leads to a curtailing of ma rket access (offensive interests).  
Despite its complex nature, the market access pillar h as, arguably, the greatest potential to deliver real 
economic benefits to Members.  As tariff barrier s are reduced and access through tariff rate quotas is 
expanded in both developed and developing countries, increased market access opportunities will 
allow Members to improve welfare by expanding export volumes and revenues.  
7. A significant reduction in tariffs and the expansi on of tariff quotas, particularly in developed 
country markets, is being sought by many developi ng countries.  In addition, some Members also 
view the reduction of tariff escalation and the impl ementation of the long-standing commitment to the 
fullest liberalization of trade in tropical products as being key elements of the development dimension 
of the Doha Round.  At the same time, many developing countries are concerned about the likely 
impact of tariff reductions on rura l livelihood, and consequently on th eir food security concerns, in 
particular should domestic support levels remain hi gh in some other countries.  Accordingly, they 
argue for flexibility in the reduction of tariffs, esp ecially for Special Products and through the Special 
Safeguard Mechanism (SSM), which would provide the ability to increase tariffs when there is a 
decline in import price or an increase in import volumes.  Preference-receiving developing countries 
                                                      
1 Source:  WTO Secretariat.  Da ta excludes intra-EU trade.  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
 Page 3 
 
 
  and LDCs are also concerned that tariff reducti ons by preference-granting countries will result in 
significant preference erosion, especially since pref erential access arrangements play a vital role in 
terms of their ability to export and earn foreign exch ange, thereby contributing to the development of 
their economies.  However, there are also concerns  that the levels of flexibility sought by some 
negotiating groups would reduce the welfare gains that could arise from improved opportunities for 
trade between developing countries. 
(b) Domestic support 
8. Achieving reductions in the high levels of domest ic support is a key issue for most developing 
countries, since such policies distort the agricultu ral trading environment and contribute to lower 
world prices, including the decline of commodity pr ices.  This has a negative impact on producers not 
receiving subsidies, particularly those in developi ng countries, many of which are keen to see large 
reductions in trade-distorting support.   
9. Reform of domestic support is linked to the ma rket access pillar.  Some developing countries 
and LDCs argue that it would indeed be counter to development aims to expect them to further reduce 
their tariffs while other countries continue to main tain significant levels of spending on Amber and 
Blue Box subsidies.  They are concerned that further market openings could mean increased 
competition for their domestic producers from subs idized production in other countries.   
(c) Export competition 
10. Some Members have stated that export subsidies, of all kinds, are the most egregious form of 
trade-distorting support.  The use of export subsid ies ensures that there are more agricultural goods on 
world markets, resulting in lower world prices than  would otherwise be the case.  For non-subsidizing 
countries this means artificially high levels of co mpetition in both the domestic market and abroad.  
Thus, the removal of this form of artificial comp etition and price suppression would help to improve 
the ability of Members that do not use such progra mmes, particularly deve loping and least-developed 
Members, to compete.  
11. Most developing countries argue for the elimin ation of all forms of export subsidies, 
including in the form of export credits, non-genuine food aid or trade-distorting practices of exporting 
state trading enterprises (STEs).  However, there are also some concerns that the elimination of all 
forms of export subsidies may increase the cost of imported food products for some net-food importing developing countries.   
2. Status of the Negotiations 
12. At the end of 2008, the Chairman of the agriculture negotiations, New Zealand 
Ambassador Crawford Falconer, issued a further revision to the draft agriculture modalities, setting 
out the broad outlines for final commitments on cu tting tariffs and subsidies for farm goods and 
indicating a number of flexibilities for developing co untries and specific circumstances.  The revised 
text, TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4, captured progress made during that year and highlighted the remaining gaps 
on several issues.  The Chair al so issued three additional papers, TN/AG/W/5, TN/AG/W/6 and 
TN/AG/W/7, dealing with the selection of sensitiv e products, the creation of new tariff quotas, and 
the SSM for developing countries, which would allow these countries to raise tariffs temporarily in order to deal with import surges and price decreases.   
13. The latest draft modalities document, TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4, contains the parameters for 
Members' new concessions and commitments fo r market access, domestic support and export 
competition.  For most issues the modalities can be considered stable, with only a handful remaining 
to be resolved (see below).  In th e area of market access, the moda lities contain the specific levels of WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
Page 4  
 
  tariff reductions, including additi onal tariff reductions to address tariff escalation for example.  
Special and differential treatment (S&D) provisions set out the flexibilities for developing countries 
(e.g. Special Products) to take account of their con cerns relating to tariff reductions.  In the areas of 
domestic support and export competition, the draf t modalities sets out the specific parameters by 
which Members will reduce their trade-distorting dom estic support, including the application of new 
product-specific limits, and how all forms of export s ubsidies shall be eliminated in conformity with 
the Doha mandate.  Specific flexibilities for developing c ountries in these two pillars are also detailed.   
14. The four papers mentioned above have formed  the basis for the continued negotiation of 
modalities in agriculture under the guidance of the new Chairman, New Zealand Ambassador David Walker, who took over the agriculture negotiations in April 2009.   
15. Under the guidance of Chairman Walker, work  in the agriculture negotiations has been 
proceeding on a two-track approach.  The first track relates to the technical development of 
"templates" for the presentation of data required for the establishment of modalities and for the eventual scheduling of commitmen ts, based on draft modalities as contained in TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4.  
The second track relates to specific outstanding issues as indicated in the draft modalities and 
associated papers (i.e. TN/AG/W/5, TN/AG/W/6 and TN/AG/W/7).  Commonly referred to as the 
outstanding bracketed or other annotated issues, the Chairman has held consultations on each of those 
issues in an effort to find convergence amongst Members.   
16. Work on templates and base data has been very deliberate and is bei ng conducted in an open-
ended format.  Work has covered all three pilla rs, market access, domestic support and export 
competition, and has been divided into two "steps":   
(i) Step 1 concerns the identification a nd development of templates (including 
possible supporting tables) for the presentation of base data;  and 
(ii) Step 2 concerns the identification and development of templates (including 
possible supporting tables) for the presentation of DDA commitments. 
17. Significant effort has been devoted to work on St ep 1 across each of the pillars and work is 
well advanced.  This work has been underpinned by a considerable number of papers submitted by 
Members, with many having been amended or supe rseded through the course of discussion in the 
Negotiating Group.  Those submissions that remain  under discussion will need to be finalized and 
consolidated as part of the conclusion of the base data template work.    
18. Work on Step 2 has commenced with some Members making initial contributions to aid 
discussion.  A number of Members have indicated that they are working on developing "summary 
table" overview documentation to help guide work on the development of scheduling templates and 
supporting tables for specific elements in the respective pillars.   
19. The work on templates and base data is underst ood by all Members to be of an exclusively 
technical nature – the development of templates for the formatting of the presentation of necessary 
information, to be used when such presentation is  required or otherwise agreed.  Furthermore, it is 
recognized by all Members that this work is not  a substitute for work to wards the conclusion of 
modalities.  Indeed, given that work on draft form ats of scheduling templates and supporting tables is 
based on draft modalities provisions in TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4, it is not possible to complete all work on templates until modalities have been agreed. 
20. Some Members have raised concerns that the discussion of base data and templates may raise 
questions relating to substantive issues of interp retation of draft modalities issues.  Where such  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
 Page 5 
 
 
  situations have arisen, these questions have been dealt with separately from the template and base data 
discussions.  
21. Through the identification of base data requirements, Members also submitted national data 
essential for the calculation of base commitments, in cluding data on the total value of agricultural 
production and domestic consumption.  These submis sions have been subject to discussions amongst 
interested Members in order to verify the data submitted.   
22. On the second track of work, relating to the outstanding bracketed and otherwise annotated 
modalities issues, the Chairman held consultations on all such issues, and most notably, the SSM.  
The Chair's consultations have highlighted the extent to which different degrees of work are regarded.  
In some areas, Members' positions remain unc hanged from that of December 2008 with a solution 
requiring little more than a political decision.  In  other areas, such as the SSM, further technical 
analysis has been carried out by Members to facilita te continued discussion of the issues.  Negotiators 
also had a useful dialogue on the issue of tropical products and preference erosion. 
23. In his March 2010 stocktaking report (TN/AG/25), the Chair identified areas of progress 
made as well as the gaps which remain.  The Chairm an reported significant developments on the issue 
of Tropical Products and Long-Standing Preferen ces and Preference Erosion and noted that 
consultations continued amongst relevant Members in this regard.  
24. On the other issues that are bracketed or otherwise annotated in TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4, and 
related documents, namely the Bl ue Box, Cotton, Sensitive Products , the Tariff Cap, Tariff Quota 
Creation, Tariff Simplification, Special Products, and the SSM, the Chairman noted that, until now, 
Members have not been in a position to substantivel y resolve matters but that Members are continuing 
to look at ways to advance these issues. 
3. Specific Issues of Interest to Developing Countries 
25. Issues of interest to developing countries are included in all the three pillars of the 
negotiations.  The specific issues of interest to de veloping countries cover every aspect of market 
access.  Given the different situations in different developing countries their views are often different 
on specific issues.  The various positions include, inter alia : 
(a) Market access 
• Improved market access to developed countries;  
• Improved market access to other developing countries (South-South trade) but with less 
than full reciprocity in the negotiations, in cluding by having to undertake lesser tariff 
reductions and/or tariff quota expansion commit ments relative to those to be undertaken 
by developed countries; 
• Fullest liberalization of trade in tropical agricultural products and for products of 
particular importance to the diversificati on of production from the growing of illicit 
narcotic crops;  
• Addressing problems relating to preference erosion; 
• Addressing the issues of tariff escalation and the issue of tariff simplification; 
• Improving the administration of tariff rate quotas; 
• Lifetime of the existing special agricultural safeguard (SSG);  and WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
Page 6  
 
  • Appropriate S&D for developing countries, including the flexibility to designate an 
appropriate number of products  as Special Products guided by indicators based on the 
criteria of food security, livelihood security and rural development needs, and the establishment of a Special Safeguard Mechanism.   
(b) Domestic support  
• Substantial reductions in trade-distorting support in developed countries, in particular for 
cotton; 
• Enhanced Blue Box criteria to ensure that th is category of support is less distorting than 
Amber Box support; 
• Review and clarification of the Green Box criteria to ensure that such measures have no, 
or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects on production while ensuring that programmes of developing countries that meet this fundamental requirement are 
effectively covered;  
• Product-specific limits on the Amber Box and Blue Box to help prevent the accumulation 
of support on a few products;  and 
• Appropriate S&D, including lesser reducti ons in trade-distorting support and the 
flexibility to provide certain types of investment and input subsidies. 
(c) Export competition 
• Elimination of all forms of export subsidies; 
• Developing appropriate rules in respect of  short-term export credits, export credit 
insurance or guarantee programmes (export cred its, etc. with repayment terms of more 
than 180 days are to be eliminated), expor ting STEs, with special consideration for the 
monopoly status for STEs in developing countries, and on food aid, whilst ensuring that 
these disciplines have appropriate provisions fo r differential treatment of least-developed 
and net food-importing developing countries;  and 
• Appropriate S&D, including longer time frame s to eliminate all forms of their export 
subsidies (to those developing countries that  have reduction commitments in this area), 
extension of the provisions contained in Ar ticle 9.4 which provides an exemption from 
reduction commitments for certain types of  export marketing and transport costs. 
26. In addition to the issues of interest to developing countries highlighted above, S&D will 
include lower reduction rates and longer implementation periods for developing countries while LDCs 
will not have to undertake reduction commitments and will have full access to all S&D provisions.  
The Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration also prov ided that developed countries and developing 
countries in a position to do so will provide duty- and quota-free market access for at least 97 per cent 
of products originating from LDCs.
2   
27. Given the importance of cotton for a number of  developing countries, especially LDCs, it 
should be noted that cotton has its own specificity in the agriculture negotiations and also through the 
Sub-Committee on Cotton.  While being supported by a wide range of developing countries, the issue 
is being most actively pursued by the four proponents of the Sectoral Initiative on Cotton:  Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali (C-4).  The Hong Kong Ministerial Conference agreed that all forms of 
                                                      
2 Reference is made to the Decision on Measures in Favour of LDCs in Annex F of the Hong Kong 
Declaration on duty-free and quota-free market access for LDCs, which is treated in the section on "Special and 
Differential Treatment".  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
 Page 7 
 
 
  export subsidies for cotton would be eliminated by  developed countries in 2006, and that developed 
countries would give duty-free and quota-free ac cess for cotton exports from LDCs from the 
commencement of the implementation period.  Memb ers also agreed to the objective of reducing 
trade-distorting domestic subsidies for cotton pr oduction more ambitiously than under whatever 
general formula is agreed in the negotiations and that it should be implemented over a shorter period 
of time than generally applicable.  Since the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, the Sub-Committee 
on Cotton has continued its work with additional proposals from the C-4 proponents, including TN/AG/SCC/GEN/6 of 16 June 2006.  These proposals are reflected in the latest revision of the draft modalities (TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4).   
28. Cotton is also one of the bracketed or otherwise annotated issues in the documentation before 
the negotiating group on which the Chair of the agricu lture negotiations is unde rtaking consultations.  
All Members involved have emphasized that they  remain committed to finding a solution that 
addresses the issue of cotton "ambitiously, expediti ously and specifically", consistent with the 
commitments made at the Hong Kong Mi nisterial Conference in December 2005. 
29. It should also be noted that a number of recently acceded Members (RAMs) are concerned 
about the possible negative impact on their agricu ltural sectors of further significant market access 
commitments.  These Members argue that due to the significant commitments they undertook during 
their accession process their levels of border protection are already at very low levels, especially compared to the tariff levels of other, more advanced countries.   
30. Other issues of concern to various groups of  developing countries include monitoring and 
surveillance mechanisms to ensure the implementation of Members' commitments, low prices for 
commodities, the removal of tariff escalation, the el imination of tariff duties for commodity products 
under Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) schemes, the elimination of non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs) and the particular problems f acing small, vulnerable economies (SVEs). 
4. Possible Gains for Developing Countries 
31. Through the course of the agriculture negotia tions various modelling scenarios have been 
undertaken to assess the potential gains accruing from furt her liberalization of the agriculture sector.  
A recent study by the Peterson Ins titute for International Economics
3, based on a sample of 
22 countries (seven developed and 15 developing) which accounted for 73 per cent of world exports 
and 76 per cent of world imports in 2008, suggests th at the combination of agricultural tariff cuts in 
the Doha Round, new caps on tariff rate quotas, reduc tions in domestic subsidies and the elimination 
of export subsidies would increase imports from the world (by the 22 countries in the sample) by 
US$20.5 billion and boost annual world GDP by US$29.9 billion.4  
32. While the benefits from further agriculture re form will differ between Members depending on 
each Member's production and trade mix, it can genera lly be said that a successful conclusion of the 
negotiations would lead to considerable gains for de veloping countries.  Further reform of the world 
agriculture trading system would lead Members clo ser towards the long-term objective they agreed to 
during the Uruguay Round, namely to establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system.  
33. Substantial reductions of tariffs, along with a reduction of tariff peaks and tariff escalation, 
would result in increased market access opportuniti es.  Developed countries will be required to reduce 
their bound tariffs by at least 54 per cent on averag e, while developing countries' maximum average 
                                                      
3 Adler, Matthew, Claire Brunel, Gary Clyde Hufbau er and Jeffrey J. Schott (2009) "What's on the 
Table?  The Doha Round as of August 2009," Peterson Institute for International Economics, Working Paper 09-6, Washington, D.C.   
4 GDP gains are calculated based on e xport and import gains for each country. WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
Page 8  
 
  reduction will be 36 per cent.  With the gap be tween bound and applied tariffs generally low in 
developed country markets, deve loping countries should witness the development of new market 
access opportunities to developed countries.  Reductions  in developing country tariffs should also 
help to further stimulate South-South trade.  Additional tariff reductions for tropical products, 
including bananas, will assist producers and exporters of such products.  Overall, the tariff reductions 
will not only allow developing count ries to export products where they  have a comparative advantage, 
but would also allow for the diversification of production, including value-added processing, and 
export orientation. 
34. Although developed countries (and developing countri es) are able to shie ld some tariff lines 
from the full tariff formula cuts, where such flex ibility is used, new market access opportunities via 
tariff quotas will have to be provided.  Thus ne w specific market access opportunities will exist for 
even the most sensitive of products.  The reducti on of in-quota tariffs for existing tariff quotas, 
coupled with improved tariff quota administration re gimes will also facilitate benefits resulting from 
the reform process. 
35. Substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic  support and the elimination of all forms of 
export subsidies would make world prices more re alistic, reduce artificial competition and benefit 
exporters, especially in developing countries.  The be nefits of export subsidy elimination were clearly 
articulated in 2008 when the European Union (EU)
5 re-instated export subsidies for certain dairy 
products as a result of falling world prices.  This, in  turn, led the United States to follow suit, resulting 
in further downward pressure on international dair y prices.  This experience has shown that where 
such policies exist, they will be used. The eliminati on of export subsidies will help to assist in creating 
a more predictable and fair trading system.  At  the same time, appropriate S&D, including the 
flexibility to designate a number of products as 'special' and the establishment of a SSM, may 
alleviate some concerns that some developing c ountries have about the possible effect of tariff 
reductions on rural development, ru ral livelihood and food security.  Similarly, flexibility in the right 
to provide some agriculture support, as well as the flexibility to provide certain types of input and 
investment subsidies could help developing c ountries improve productivity, and consequently the 
earning capacity, of their agriculture sector.  At the same time, improved market access conditions on 
a more certain footing can help to increase infrastructure and investment, including foreign direct investment, and therefore increase and improve pr oduction and processing standards, employment and 
standards of living. 
B. N
ON-AGRICULTURAL MARKET ACCESS  
1. Parameters of the Development Dimension 
36. Trade in non-agricultural products accounts for mo re than 90 per cent of world trade in goods 
and encompasses key products of export interest to many developing countries.6  Approximately 
94 per cent of developing countries' merchandise e xports consists of non-ag ricultural products, of 
which more than 65 per cent corresponds to manufactures.7  Therefore, the non-agricultural market 
                                                      
5 On 1 December 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community  (done at Lisbon, 13 December 2007) entered into force.  On 
29 November 2009, the WTO received a Verbal Note (WT/L/779) from the Council of the Eu ropean Union and 
the Commission of the European Communities stating that, by virtue of the Treaty of Lisbon , as of 
1 December 2009, the European Union replaces and succeeds the European Community.   
6 Source:  WTO Secretariat.  The figure was estim ated using 2006-2008 data and excludes Intra-EU 
trade.  Exports under SITC-based product group "Other  products: Commodities and transactions not classified 
anywhere (including gold);  arms and ammunition" were considered part of non-agricultural products. 
7 Source:  WTO Secretariat.  The term "manufactur es" refers to SITC sections 5, 6, 7, 8 minus 
division 68 and group 891.  It excludes fish & fish products, as well as fuel and mining products.  The figure 
was estimated using 2006-2008 data and excludes Intra-EU trade.  Exports under SITC-based product group  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
 Page 9 
 
 
  access (NAMA) negotiations offer the promise of improved and more secure market access conditions 
(through new tariff reductions and bi ndings) for a large share of developing countries' exports in both 
developed and developing country markets.  Some major aspects of these are: 
• Improved access into developed country markets (North-South trade) :  The reduction or 
elimination of tariff peaks, high tariffs and tariff escalation that remained in developed 
countries from the Uruguay Round on products or iginating in developing countries would 
open up valuable new market access opportun ities.  In 2008, a little over half of 
developing countries' exports of non-agricultu ral products went to developed country 
markets. 8 
• Improved opportunities in other developing country markets (South-South trade) :  The 
importance of developing countries as markets for the exports of other developing countries has been consistently increasing over the past years.  While in the year 2000 
approximately 37 per cent of developing countries' non-agricultural exports were directed 
towards other developing countries, in 2008 the figure increased to more than 45 per 
cent.
9  Therefore, there is in principle a subs tantial interest in improving market access 
conditions to each other. 
• Improved market access for LDCs :  LDCs consider that improved market access, in the 
form of preferential duty-free/quota-free access, is key to their development goals.  At the 
Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, it was agreed that developed Members shall, and 
those developing country Members in a position to do so should, provide duty-free and quota-free market access for at least 97 per cent of products originating from LDCs.
 10   
37. Developing country Members in the NAMA ne gotiations have often called for flexibilities 
that would allow them to make lower tariff cuts or  exempt a number of tariff lines from new bindings 
or reduction commitments in order to take account of S&D and the principle of less than full 
reciprocity in reduction commitments.  Some of the main considerations underlying these arguments 
are listed below.   
• Preserving "policy space" :  Many developing country Memb ers consider they need to 
preserve a sufficient degree of flexibility in setting their import tariffs in a manner that would allow them to pursue their developmen tal goals, including industrialization and the 
diversification of their economies.  Others have noted that many developing countries 
have a large "binding overhang" (i.e. diff erence between the bound duties and the applied 
duties) and that tariff reductions will probably not cut into applied duties as a result of this 
Round.  The idea has also been mooted that , since some developing countries lack the 
institutional capacity to use trade remedies (i.e . safeguards, anti-dumping, etc.) they need 
to preserve high bound duties as a substitute instrument.  
• Protecting infant industries
:  Some developing countries consider that they should be able 
to retain tariffs to nurture infant industri es because they lack public funds to provide 
subsidies or other types of incentives for this  purpose.  Members have discussed the risks 
of excessive protection over extended periods in  terms of a potentially negative impact on 
development.  Others have noted that almost all Members have protected nascent industries at some stage of their development. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
 
"Other products: Commodities and tran sactions not classified anywhere (including gold);  arms and 
ammunition" were considered part of non-agricultural products. 
8 Source:  WTO Secretariat estimates. 
9 Source:  WTO Secretariat estimates. 
10 Reference is made to the Decision on Measures in Favour of LDCs in Annex F of the Hong Kong 
Declaration on duty-free and quota-free market access for LDCs, which is treated in the section on "Special and 
Differential Treatment". WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
Page 10  
 
  • Preventing the loss of tariff revenue
:  Dependence on import tariffs for government 
revenue has been cited by some developing countries as a reason for preserving applied 
tariffs at current levels.  While noting that it is desirable for a country to diversify its tax 
base over time, others consider that, since it is bound and not applied duties that are being 
negotiated, the risk of revenue loss for ma ny developing country Members is low.   
• Non-reciprocal preference erosion :  Many developing countries and LDCs have stressed 
their dependence on non-reciprocal preferences granted by developed countries for a significant share of their exports.  These Members consider that any further MFN liberalization should provide for a trade solu tion that takes into account this special 
situation, and that the NAMA modalities should not lead to a further marginalization and 
de-industrialization of their economies.  Other developing countries that do not benefit, or 
benefit to a lesser degree, from non-reciprocal  preferences have stressed the importance 
they attach to further MFN liberalization preci sely in the markets of the preference-giving 
countries.  They also note that non-reci procal preferences are autonomously granted 
outside the WTO system.  These Members consider that the emphasis should be on developing safety-net solutions for the pr eference-receiving countries which could be 
affected by MFN tariff reductions in the developed countries, but outside the NAMA 
negotiations (e.g. in the context of the Aid-for-Trade discussions).   
2. Status of the Negotiations 
38. Following a process of intensive meetings and c onsultations, the Chairman of the Negotiating 
Group on Market Access (NGMA) put forward in December 2008 a fourth revision of the draft  
modalities for non-agricultural products (hereaf ter referred to as the "draft NAMA modalities").
11  In 
this document, the Chairman laid out possible m odalities, included possible "landing zones" in some 
areas, and identified the main issues which remained outstanding.  He also issued a report describing 
the status of work of the Negotiating Group up to that point.12  Discussions resumed in the year 2009 
with an emphasis on the non-tariff barrier side of the mandate.  The latest report on the status of the 
negotiations was prepared by the Chairman in th e context of the March 2010 Stocktaking where he 
described the areas of progress and the remaining stumbling blocks.13  The draft NAMA modalities 
have not been adopted to date. 
39. With regard to the main tariff reduction moda lity, it was agreed at the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Conference to adopt a Swiss formula with coefficients  that satisfy the mandate in paragraph 16 of the 
Doha Declaration.  Ministers also reaffirmed at  Hong Kong the importance of S&D and less than full 
reciprocity in reduction commitments, including "paragraph 8 of the NAMA Framework14", as 
integral parts of the modalities.  In this regard , the draft NAMA modalities envisage that developing 
countries would be subject to a Swiss formula with a coefficient of 8 and that developing countries 
subject to the formula would be able to choose betw een 3 coefficients (20, 22 and 25) which would be 
tied to different flexibility options.  This "sliding scale" of contribu tions provides that the lower the 
coefficient (i.e. the bigger the reductions) the highe r the number of tariff lines that can benefit from 
"flexibility" and vice versa.  However, as will be explained below, most developing countries would 
not be subject to the Swiss formula.   
40. The draft NAMA modalities reflect the progress ma de in respect of the different flexibilities 
that have been proposed by participants and th at were contained in the 2004 NAMA Framework and 
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (i.e. for LDCs, Members with a low binding coverage, the SVEs, 
                                                      
11 TN/MA/W/103/Rev.3. 
12 JOB(08)/133. 
13 TN/MA/22. 
14 The 2004 NAMA Framework is contained in Annex B of document WT/L/579.  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
 Page 11 
 
 
  RAMs and developing countries appl ying the formula).  The tension around this point arises from the 
trade-off between ambition and flexibilities (partic ularly the flexibilities for developing countries 
applying the Swiss formula), as an in crease in the latter (defensive inte rests) leads to a curtailing of 
market access (offensive interests).  One agreed is sue worth highlighting is that LDCs are exempt 
from tariff reductions and are only expected to incr ease their bindings substantially, leaving it largely 
to them to decide on the level and coverage of these new bindings.   
41. The flexibilities for the developing countries applying the formula are contained in 
paragraph 7 of the draft NAMA modalities.  Pursua nt to this paragraph, developing country Members 
would be able to choose between three coefficients  (20, 22 and 25), two of which have alternative 
flexibilities attached to them involving either le sser reductions or full ex emptions for a limited 
number of tariff lines.  In other words, there are a total of five combinations  from which developing 
countries can choose.  This paragraph also provides certain country specific flexibilities that could be 
provided in addition to the standard flexibilities in orde r to take account of special situations, some of 
which remain controversial.  There is, in additi on, an "anti-concentration clause" which aims at 
safeguarding the commercial interests of exportin g countries heavily dependent on certain sectors 
(sometimes referred to as "niche " exporters) without substantially  limiting the benefits of the 
flexibilities to be utilized by developing country Members. 
42. Ministers at Hong Kong noted the concerns raised by SVEs and instructed the Negotiating 
Group to establish ways to provide flexibilities for these Members without creating a sub-category of 
WTO Members.  These flexibilities have now been  developed in paragraph 13 of the draft NAMA 
modalities, and may be applied by those Members who se value of total non-agricultural trade is less 
than 0.1 per cent of world trade as contained in  document TN/MA/S/18.  Instead of applying the 
Swiss Formula, these Members would, instead, have to  reduce their tariffs according to a four band 
target average approach.  Like in the previous case, certain country specific flexibilities have also 
been catered for. 
43. In what concerns the developing countries with  "low binding coverage" (i.e. those with a 
binding coverage of less than 35 per cent), speci al modalities have been proposed in paragraph 8 of 
the draft NAMA modalities.  Members have agreed to exempt these developing country Members from making tariff reductions through the Swiss form ula.  In exchange, these Members would be 
expected to contribute to the DDA by significantly increasing their binding coverage to either 75 or 
80 per cent depending on their present binding coverage .  They would then have to bind these tariff 
lines at an average which does not exceed 30 per cent.   
44. In respect of RAMs, the 2004 NAMA Framework recognized that these Members shall have 
recourse to special provisions for tariff reductions in order to take into account their extensive market 
access commitments undertaken as part of their accessi on to the WTO.  Paragraphs 18-20 of the draft 
NAMA modalities provide that RAMs would have to apply the modalities that correspond to them, as 
applicable.  In addition, these provisions would a llow RAMs applying the formula to benefit from an 
additional three years for staging their reductions .  Finally, 11 RAMs shall not be required to 
undertake tariff reductions beyond their accession commitments. 
45. Paragraph 7 of the 2004 NAMA Framework recogni zed that a sectoral tariff component was 
"another key element" to achieving the objectiv es of paragraph 16 of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration.  The sectoral tariff component of the negotiations is being pursued actively in an 
informal Member-driven process where fourteen sectors have been proposed for negotiation
15, 
                                                      
15 These are:  automotive and related parts;  bicycles and related parts;  chemicals;  
electronics/electrical products;  fish and fish products;  forestry products;  gems & jewellery;  hand tools;  open access to enhanced health care;  indust rial machinery;  raw material;  spor ts equipment;  textiles, clothing and 
footwear;  and, toys. WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
Page 12  
 
  including by some developing countries (e.g. gems and jewellery and raw materials).  Ministers at 
Hong Kong instructed the Negotiating Group to revi ew proposals with a view to identifying those 
which could garner sufficient participation to be r ealized and agreed that pa rticipation should be on a 
non-mandatory basis.  Some developing country Memb ers have indicated that  such initiatives may be 
to the detriment of small Members, as they would er ode even further their preferential margins in the 
major developed countries.  Some Members c onsider that sectoral initiatives are an essential 
component of the NAMA negotiations in order to achieve commercially meaningful market access, 
while others consider them to be voluntary and suppl ementary to the results of the Swiss formula.  
The Chairman of the Negotiating Group noted in hi s latest report that sectorals is an area where 
progress has been made insofar as substantial techni cal work has been done by the sponsors of such 
initiatives.
16  This is, however, an area that some Members clearly link to the overall ambition 
question. 
46. Another issue that has been discussed intensivel y is that of "non-reciprocal preferences". 
Ministers at Hong Kong instructed the NGMA to intens ify work on the assessment of the scope of the 
problem with a view to finding possible soluti ons.  Based on a study by the WTO Secretariat17, 
Members discussed which were the most relevant markets, products and Members that could be 
affected by this issue.  The draft NAMA modalities propose to delay the implementation of tariff cuts 
on a negotiated list of tariff lines in the EU and United States (US) – i.e. 9 equal annual rate 
reductions instead of 6, with a two-year grace period.   To further assist preference-receiving countries 
to adjust to the challenges that will arise from in creased competition, the draft NAMA modalities urge 
preference-granting countries, and other Members in  a position to do so, to increase their assistance to 
these Members through mechanisms such as the Enhan ced Integrated Framework (EIF) for LDCs and 
other Aid-for-Trade initiatives.  Preference-granting countries are also urged to simplify the rules of 
origin in their preferential schemes so that pr eference-receiving Members can make more effective 
use of them.  Finally, the draft NAMA modalities recognize that the proposed delayed implementation 
may disproportionately affect some developing Members who do not enjoy these non-reciprocal 
preferences (sometimes referred to as the "dispropor tionately affected countries" or "DACs").  In 
these cases, a mechanism was envisaged whereby the reduction of some specific tariff lines in the EU 
and the US markets would be implemented acco rding to the normal implementation period for 
developed countries (i.e. 6 annual cu ts equivalent to five years). 
47. Reducing or eliminating NTBs is considered  of high importance by many developing 
countries and LDCs.18  Ministers at Hong Kong recognized the need for specific negotiating NTB 
proposals and encouraged participants to make such  submissions as quickly as possible.  Annex 5 of 
the draft NAMA modalities compiled the 13 proposals which had been received by then, and paragraph 24 noted that seven of them merited "p articular attention".  A considerable number of 
meetings have been devoted in 2009 and 2010 to making progress on the NTB front.  Not only have 
revised proposals been submitted but, in a ddition, new proposals have been tabled.
19  This is a very 
complex area of work in which many developi ng countries and LDCs have had difficulties in 
identifying the NTBs affecting their exports.   
                                                      
16 TN/MA/22, paragraph 1.1. 
17 JOB(07)/80.  The study by the Secretariat determ ined 39 tariff lines in the EU (mostly fish and 
apparel) and 25 tariff lines in the US (practically all relating to apparel) appeared to be at the heart of the 
problem. 
18 See the LDC Group's proposal on rules of orig in (TN/CTD/W/30;  TN/MA/W/74;  TN/AG/GEN/20) 
and the Secretariat Note on non-tariff measures on products of export interest to LDCs 
(WT/COMTD/LDC/W/39 and Add.1/Rev.2). 
19 For an updated list of the NTB documentation, refe r to TN/MA/S/21/Rev.4.  In addition, see report 
by the Chairman of the Negotiating Group in TN/MA/22.  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
 Page 13 
 
 
  48. The Chairman noted in his March 2010 report that there were two main outstanding issues in 
the NAMA negotiations:  (i) the level of ambition and (ii) certain country specific flexibilities for developing countries applying the formula.
20  In respect of the former, the Chairman noted that some 
Members considered the draft NAMA modalities to be  unbalanced because of what they perceive to 
be an inadequate level of market access envisaged in some key markets and because of lack of clarity 
on the use of flexibilities.  He also noted that othe rs considered that the contributions expected from 
them in the draft NAMA package were already de manding and that the scope for additional market 
access would be limited, unless an additional price were  paid by the "demandeurs" either in NAMA or 
in the other negotiating areas.  In what concerns  the country-specific flexibilities, the Chairman 
considered the discussions were at different stag es and that more work would be required in the 
future.   
3. Specific Issues of Interest to Developing Countries 
49. Summarizing from the preceding section, the specifi c issues of interest to developing country 
Members are listed below.  It is noted that not all developing countries share the same views on some 
of these issues and, in some of them, they even may have conflicting views.   
• Bring down tariff peaks, high tariffs and ta riff escalation in developed country markets 
(improve access in developed country markets); 
• Bring down tariff peaks, high tariffs and ta riff escalation in other developing country 
markets (improve South-South trade); 
• Duty-free and quota-free access for LDCs while ensuring that LDCs are only required to 
increase their level of bindings and not to apply the formula or to participate in sectorals; 
• Reduce or eliminate NTBs; 
• Preserve "policy space"; 
• Provide adequate protection for infant industries;  
• Preserve unbound duties; 
• Address non-reciprocal preferences; 
• Prevent tariff revenue losses. 
4. Possible Gains for Developing Countries 
50. In recognition of benefits that accrue from appropriately designed trade liberalization 
measures, many developing country Members have  been reducing their import tariffs autonomously 
over the years.  Several of them have also libera lized in the context of customs unions and regional 
trade agreements.  Moreover, the importance of deve loping countries in intern ational trade has been 
growing.  Trade in manufactures – which is a sub set of the non-agricultural products that accounts for 
more than 65 per cent of world merchandise exports21– provides a good example: the share of 
developing countries' total manufacture exports in world exports of manufactures significantly 
increased to 47.9 per cent in 20 08 from 24.6 per cent in 1990.22  In other words, almost half of the 
value of world exports in manufactures in 2008 originated from developing countries. 
                                                      
20 TN/MA/22, paragraph 2.1. 
21 Source:  WTO Secretariat estimates.  The figure excludes Intra-EU trade. 
22 Source:  WTO Secretariat estimates.   WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
Page 14  
 
  51. Overall, the gains from NAMA liberalization have  been estimated by several institutions to 
range from US$54.2 billion to US$276.8 billion.
23  Most of these estimates are long-term, in the sense 
that they assess the impact following full adjustment and many of them have not taken into account the draft NAMA modalities.  One recent study estimated that the boost to global exports from concluding the Doha Round could range between  US$180 billion and US$520 billion annually and 
that the potential GDP gains could be between US$300 billion and US$700 billion annually, and well 
balanced between developed and developing countries.
24  However, evidence regarding short-term 
effects is scarce.  Furthermore, estimates need to be considered in light of the following:  first, they 
are based on scenarios which may diverge substantia lly from any final agreement reached.  Second, 
the models typically do not take proper account of factors such as growth effects, preferences, or 
supply-side constraints.  For example, in order to feel the full benefits of results in the NAMA 
negotiations, alleviation of supply-si de constraints is a necessary cond ition.  Moreover, it is important 
to note that the estimates of gains from opening up to  trade do not take into account any consideration 
of adjustment costs associated with increased trade competition. 
52. The gains that could accrue to individual devel oping countries would also differ depending on 
each country's comparative advantage as well as on the ex tent to which it will liberalize.  However, in 
general terms, both North-South and South-South trade are expected to expand as a result of the 
NAMA negotiations, with the corresponding effect on economic efficiency and growth.  Additionally, 
removing or reducing tariff escalation will give deve loping countries the opportunity to diversify their 
export base and to produce and export products w ith a higher domestic value-added component. 
53. A significant reduction of bound duties and an important increase in the number of bound 
duties (i.e. binding coverage) would be the two mo st obvious outcomes of a successful conclusion of 
the NAMA negotiations.  Under the proposed dr aft NAMA modalities, developed countries would 
have to slash all their dutiable bound duties which  ar e at, or very close to, their MFN applied levels. 
The result will be a significant reduction in the MFN applied duties for these Members.  Not only will 
the average of their bound duties be reduced by more  than 60 per cent on average (from an average of 
6.5 per cent to a new average of 2.4 per cent), but most of the remaining "water" will be squeezed out 
of their tariffs.25  The properties of the Swiss formula will translate into a result where no duty would 
be above 8 per cent.  While the 36 or so developi ng countries applying the formula would be able to 
protect to a certain degree their most sensitive sectors through the "Paragraph 7 flexibilities", they 
would nevertheless have to reduce the average of their bound duties by approximately 31.1 - 
36.2 per cent on average (from an average of 28. 6 per cent to a new average of 18.3 - 18.6  per cent), 
considerably reducing their binding overhang.  Many of these Members would also have to cut their 
MFN applied duties.  It should, however, be stres sed that these numbers are an estimate, because the 
actual results would largely depend on the flexibilit y option that would be chosen by each of these 
Members, as well as the specific products selected under the corresponding flexibility option.  Moreover, these figures do not take account of a dditional reductions that would result from sectoral 
and bilateral negotiations.   
54. Most of the remaining developing country participants would contribute to the Round by 
significantly reducing their binding  overhang and increasing their bindi ng coverage.  This would be 
                                                     
 
23 Piermartini, R. and Teh R. (2005).  "Demystifying Modelling Methods for Trade Policy", WTO 
Discussion Paper No. 10. 
24 Adler, Matthew, Claire Brunel, Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott (2009) "What's on the 
Table?  The Doha Round as of August 2009," Peterson Institute for International Economics, Working Paper 09-6, Washington, D.C.  See also Antoine Bouët and David Laborde Debucquet (2009) "The Potential 
Cost of a Failed Doha Round" IFPRI Discussion Paper 00886, and Yvan Decreux and Lionel Fontagné (2009) 
"Economic Impact of Potential Outc ome of the DDA" CEPII N° 2009-01.  
25 The term "water", or binding over-hang, refers to the difference between the bound and applied duty 
for a certain product.  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
 Page 15 
 
 
  the case of developing countries covered by the SV E and "low binding coverage" modalities, who 
would in practice not be required to reduced their MFN applied duties.  This, of course, unless they 
decide to cut them as part of their developmen t objectives.  Most of these developing Members will 
be able to retain, on average, a difference of mo re than 18 percentage points between their bound and 
applied duties with some of them retaining, in addition, the right to keep up to 25 per cent of their 
tariff lines unbound.  Finally, LDCs would not be  required under the draft NAMA modalities to make 
any contribution in terms of reducing their bound duties as they are only expected to substantially increase their number of bindings.  As a result, they would be able to retain a large degree of policy 
space.   
55. Another outcome of the NAMA negotiations is e xpected to be a significant improvement in 
the binding coverage levels whic h, along with a possible reduction in binding overhang, could 
enhance the predictability and transparency of th e trading environment.  This could be further 
reinforced by the requirement that bindings for most Members should only take the form of ad valorem  duties. 
56. Finally, the NAMA negotiations could also considerably improve the market access 
conditions of products origina ting in developing countries and LDCs through the vertical and 
horizontal NTB proposals which are being discussed, as well as the eventual results of bilateral-request offer negotiations taking place in this area. 
C. S
ERVICES  
1. Parameters of the Development Dimension 
57. Services production is the dominant economic activity  in virtually all countries of the world, 
regardless of their level of development.  The services sector represented 69 per cent of world gross 
domestic product (GDP) in 2008.26  Despite many country-specific factors such as natural resource 
endowments, the share of services tends to be positively related to the level of income or 
development.  This is due to a variety of factors,  including a propensity of individuals to spend more 
on services as their incomes grow and of the services content of production to increase with growing 
sophistication in industrial production.  For exampl e, in 2008, services were estimated to account for 
47 per cent of GDP in low income economies, 53 per cent in middle income economies, and 
73 per cent in high income economies.27  Compared to 1995, the proportion of GDP that is services in 
each income category has increased between 2 and 5 per cent.28 
58. Many traditional services, including distribu tion, construction, or social services are 
particularly labour-intensive.  Services thus tend to be an even more important source of employment 
– and employment creation – than the above figures suggest.  By the same token, given the sector's 
dominant role in total employment, productivity ga ins are essential for overall economic expansion 
and welfare.  Removing barriers to access and competition among services and service suppliers can lead to lower prices, better quality and a wider choice  for consumers.  Given their infrastructural role, 
services such as telecommunications, financial ser vices (including banking and insurance), business 
services, construction and transport are crucial in  shaping overall economic performance.  Logistics 
(packaging, storage, transport, inventories, admi nistration and management) are also an important 
component of the production and distribution chai n, and logistics costs may indeed constitute a 
particularly heavy burden for developing countri es, especially small economies, island economies, 
and landlocked economies.  In sum, there is a co mmon interest across countries at all levels of 
development in ensuring that their services infrastru cture underpins, rather than inhibits, internal 
                                                     
 
26 World Bank (2010), World Development Indicators. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
Page 16  
 
  economic performance and access to external markets.   The quality, availability and price of core 
producer services are key determinants of co mpetitiveness, and ultimately of growth and 
development.  
2. Status of the Negotiations 
59. The services negotiations are taking place on two broad fronts:  market access and 
rule-making (Emergency Safeguard Measures, Gove rnment Procurement, Subsidies and Domestic 
Regulation).  The market access segment consists of negotiations on new or improved commitments 
for inclusion in Members' schedules of specific commitments under the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS), and the re-negotiation of curre nt MFN exemptions as mandated by the Annex on 
Article II Exemptions.  Appropriate flexibility is to be provided to individual developing countries, 
which may open fewer sectors and liberalize fewer types of transactions in line with their 
development situation.   
60. The GATS does not recommend or prescribe temp lates for undertaking commitments.  Each 
Member is free to structure its commitments in line with its national policy objectives and constraints.  
However, in accordance with GATS Article XIX, Members have adopted specific instruments to 
guide the negotiations.  Among these are the 'Gui delines and Procedures for the Negotiations on 
Trade in Services', which, inter alia , recall that the negotiations aim to achieve progressively higher 
levels of liberalization and increase the participat ion of developing countries in services trade;  
reaffirm that the process of liberalization sha ll take place with due respect for national policy 
objectives, the level of development and the size of economies of individual Members;  require 
Members to give special attention to sectors and m odes of supply of export interest to developing 
countries;  and recognize the right of Members to re gulate and to introduce new regulations.  Special 
provision has also been made for LDC participation in the negotiations, affirming the need for greater 
flexibility in terms of the depth and coverage of LDC commitments, calling for particular attention on 
the part of other Members in opening up sectors of interest to LDCs, and emphasizing the importance of assisting LDCs to participate more effectively in international trade in services. 
61. The Negotiating Guidelines, which govern the negotiations on market access, establish the 
request-and-offer approach as the main negotiating method.  However, the request-and-offer process 
has only produced limited results so far:  as of  May 2010, only 71 Members (counting the EU as one) 
had submitted offers, including 31 re vised offers.  Members consider that much more remains to be 
achieved in the negotiatio ns to improve offers. 
62. At the Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong in 2005, Ministers urged all Members to 
participate actively in the negotiations towards achie ving a progressively higher level of liberalization 
of trade in services, with appropriate flexibility fo r individual developing countries as provided for in 
Article XIX of the GATS.  LDCs are not expect ed to undertake new commitments.  Ministers 
expressed their determination to intensify the nego tiations in accordance with agreed principles and 
the objectives, approaches and timelines set out in Annex C of the Ministerial Declaration with a view 
to expanding the sectoral and modal coverage of commitments and increasing their quality.  In terms 
of approaches, Ministers agreed, inter alia,  that in addition to bilateral negotiations, the request-offer 
procedure should also be pursued on a plurilateral basi s.  They also agreed to give due consideration 
to proposals on the trade-related concerns of sma ll economies, to develop methods for the full and 
effective implementation of the LDC Modalities, and to  provide targeted technical assistance with a 
view to enabling developing countries and LDCs to participate effectively in the negotiations. 
63. At the Ministerial meeting held in Geneva in July 2008, a services text indicated general 
support by Members for a waiver mechanism as the most  satisfactory means to en sure special priority 
to LDCs pursuant to Article IV:3 of the GATS, incl uding in sectors and modes of supply of interest to  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
 Page 17 
 
 
  them.29  Members are currently negotiating on the basis of a draft legal text of a waiver, circulated by 
the LDC group in early 2010.  There is overall ac ceptance of the waiver principle to implement 
special priority, but several Members have posed questions on the detail of the current draft text. 
64. The rule-making negotiations, which already started in 1995, are based on the mandates 
contained in Article VI:4 (Domestic Regulati on), Article X (Emergency Safeguard Measures), 
Article XIII (Government Procurement), and Artic le XV (Subsidies).  Pursuant to the Doha 
Declaration, they were integrated into the broa der agenda of the new round of negotiations.  On 
disciplines on domestic regulation under Article VI:4 , the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration called 
upon Members to develop text for adoption.  This resulted in a Chairman's text, issued in a room 
document in March 2009, setting out a draft disciplin es and containing a development section.  An 
annotated version of this text was issued in a furt her room document in April 2010, and is the basis of 
current discussions.  In the other rule-making area s, political differences overall have resulted in 
diverging levels of engagement by Members.  A c onsiderable effort was made last year to revive 
discussions, particularly through technical work, wh ich in subsidies led to the launch of a Work 
Programme for the Exchange of Information.  Deve lopment-related issues have been recognized in 
the technical discussions. 
3. Specific Issues of Interest to Developing Countries 
65. A broad range of developi ng countries have expressed their negotiating objectives and 
expectations in written submissions since the start of the services negotiati ons.  Over 40 per cent of 
the 150 proposals that have been tabled since November 2000 involve one developing country or 
more (this number excludes most proposals on so-called horizontal issues, but covers basically all 
proposals on sectors and modes of supply).  In total,  more than 30 developing country Members have 
voiced interest in at least one sector or mode of  supply under negotiation.  Relevant sectors include 
professional services, computer and related services, telecommunication services, audiovisual services, construction and related engineering services, distribution services, energy services, environmental services, financial services;  tourism services and transport services (including 
logistics).  
66. Movements of natural persons (u nder Mode 4) and, more recently, the cross-border supply of 
services (under Modes 1 and 2), have also attracted  attention.  Proposals on Mode 4, which plays a 
focal role for many developing countries, have incl uded a call for the harmonization of categories of 
service suppliers used in scheduling commitments, more commitments on lower-skilled workers, the 
reduction of barriers involving such matters as natio nality, residency and work permit requirements, 
tax treatment, wage parity requirements, and the dur ation of stay.  The emergence of "off-shoring" 
activities in recent years has turned  the spotlight on cross-border trade.  A number of developing 
countries have recently called for ambitious comm itments under both Modes 1 and 2 across a wide 
range of sectors, including business services, research and development services, computer services, management consulting services, call-centre services, and transfer of financial information and data.   
67. Developing-country Members are actively taki ng part in the plurilateral request-offer 
mechanism agreed to at Hong Kong.  Apart from bei ng recipients of many requests, some of them 
have also co-sponsored plurilateral requests for mark et access in areas of speci fic interest, such as the 
movement of natural persons, cro ss border supply of services, computer related services, construction 
and related engineering services, and the removal of  MFN exemptions.  At the meeting of the Special 
Session of the Council for Trade in Services held in May 2006, the delegation of Zambia submitted on 
behalf of the LDC Group a communication presenting their collective request in Mode 4 
(JOB(06)/155).  The LDC Group requests Members to make commitments in four categories of 
                                                     
 
29 Elements Required for the Completion of the Services Negotiations, Report by the Chairman 
(TN/S/34 of 28 July 2008). WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
Page 18  
 
  natural persons, with each category applying to a number  of specified sectors of export interest to this 
group.  
4. Possible Gains for Developing Countries 
68. Several studies have estimated, with a wide vari ety of research techniques, the income effects 
attributable to a reduction in services protection.  In  general, these gains have been found to dwarf the 
benefits expected to flow from further trade liberali zation in goods.  This is due to several factors.  
First, barriers in many services markets are highe r than existing barriers in goods trade, barring 
particular exceptions such as in the case of agricultu re.  Second, these barriers normally consist of less 
transparent and efficient measures – quotas and ot her non-revenue generating interventions – than 
tariffs in merchandise trade.  Third, as explained ab ove, the costs of services protection, in particular 
of infrastructure-related services, are spread across,  and impose deadweight losses on, a wide array of 
downstream user industries.   
69. Developing countries stand to gain considerably from liberalization of trade in services, both 
on the part of their trading partners and in terms of their own policy regimes.  Bearing in mind the 
nature of potential economy-wide gains from low-co st, high quality services, benefits to countries 
from their own liberalization can be considerable.  While there are obvious long-term gains associated 
with services liberalization, there are also adjustment costs involve d which may need to be addressed 
with assistance and capacity-building programmes.  Obviously much depends on domestic regulatory 
or institutional reforms to underpin  the viability and credibility of the new environment.  For example, 
the absence of clear and predictable market conditions may prompt potential investors to demand risk 
premiums that are not politically or socially acceptable.   If increased entry into financial sectors is not 
accompanied by adequate prudential supervision,  instability may ensue.  And the absence of 
well-designed universal service requirements may resu lt in new, unsustainable burdens being imposed 
on vulnerable groups or regions.  The pace, conten t and sequencing of liberalization programmes are 
thus key to avoiding unnecessary frictions and en suring the efficiency and viability of the new 
regimes.   
70. Even though governments can – and indeed do – initiate reforms of services sectors 
unilaterally, multilateral commitments under the GA TS can be an important catalyst for such 
liberalization and reform efforts.  On the one ha nd, services negotiations can help to improve export 
access in areas of developing country interest, such as the movement of natural persons, cross-border 
supply of services, or in specific sectors.  The GATS can also be used to secu re access to markets that 
are already open, and where developing countries ar e acquiring a comparative advantage, such as the 
cross-border trade of electronically delivered servi ces.  On the other hand, specific commitments can 
spur and promote investment in the unilaterally liberalized sectors, by making access to the market 
predictable, secure, and discrimination-free.  More over, specific commitments can be shaped to take 
into account eventual adjustment processes and to allow for the development of necessary regulatory 
frameworks.  
D. T
RADE FACILITATION  
1. Parameters of the Development Dimension 
71. Development considerations have been central to the WTO's work on trade facilitation right 
from the start.  Governments came to see trade fa cilitation as a fundamental element of their trade and 
growth policies and wished to advance related refo rms.  Having knocked down tariffs to an all-time 
low, they decided to address the remaining trade barriers on the non-tariff side.  As a result, trade facilitation is now widely considered a necessary complement to broader economic liberalization – 
essential to reap its full benefits.     WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
 Page 19 
 
 
  72. The significance of the development dimensi on is already reflected in the negotiating 
mandate.  Annex D of the General Council's 1 A ugust 2004 Decision (WT/L/579) contains several 
concrete references to that end.  The enhancem ent of technical assistance and capacity-building is 
listed as a specific negotiating goal.30  Paragraph 2 states that " the results of the negotiations shall 
take fully into account the principle of sp ecial and differential treatment for developing and 
least-developed countries " with it being recognized that " this principle should extend beyond the 
granting of traditional transition periods ...".  Most crucially, it equally holds that " the extent and the 
timing of entering into commitments shall be related to the implementation capacities of developing 
and least-developed Members ".  The mandate also assures that those Members " would not be obliged 
to undertake investments in infras tructure projects beyond their means ."  Even more far-reaching 
flexibility is granted to LDCs.  According to paragraph 3, they " will only be required to undertake 
commitments to the extent consiste nt with their individual development, financial and trade needs or 
their administrative and institutional capabilities ."  Development concerns are further reflected in the 
mandate's call for the identification of trade facilitati on needs and priorities as an integral part of the 
negotiating exercise.    
73. All of those aspects have been addressed in various negotiating proposals by the Membership, 
specifying their concrete relevance and ou tlining ways for their implementation.  
2. Status of the Negotiations 
74. Following intense negotiations on all elements of the mandate, Members agreed on 
circulating a draft consolidated text in Dece mber 2009 (TN/TF/W/165).  This marked a significant 
step forward in several respects.  
75. For the first time, Members were able to base their negotiations on a single text.  The 
availability of such a document added a layer of sp ecificity to their discussions and injected fresh 
momentum into the debate.  It a llowed delegations to focus their work on textual modifications as 
opposed to input in more general form.  Accord ing to a report by the Negotiating Group Chair, 
Members "now have a fairly good idea of what  the Trade Facilitation Agreement is likely to 
contain."31   
76. The draft consolidated text is clearly underst ood to require further work and is regularly 
updated to reflect the results of each negotia ting session.  A first review was initiated in 
February 2010 and concluded in March.  The circ ulation of a revised version (TN/TF/W/165/Rev.2) 
reflects the outcome of this work.  Further re views will be conducted ove r the course of future 
negotiating cycles.  
3. Specific Issues of Interest to Developing Countries 
77. Developing countries and LDCs have shown great interest in technical assistance and 
capacity building (TA&CB) aspects of the negotiations as well as in questions related to S&D.  Calls 
were made for related provisions to be precise , effective and operational.  Developing countries 
equally stressed the importance of allowing for the necessary flexibility in implementing the 
negotiations' results.   
                                                      
30 Annex D, paragraph 1. 
31 Report by the Chairman of the Negotiating Gr oup on Trade Facilitation to the TNC, TN/TF/7, 
paragraph 1. WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
Page 20  
 
  78. Regional approaches to trade facilitation were advocated by a number of small economies
32, 
especially with respect to implementing their obligations under the envisaged Trade Facilitation 
Agreement and with regard to the provision of TA &CB.  The identification of trade facilitation needs 
and priorities represents another issue of particular in terest to the developing Membership.  This led to 
the initiation of a large-scale asse ssment program by the WTO Secret ariat in close cooperation with a 
number of international organizations, especially the so-called "Annex D's".33  
79. Interests in the improvement and clarification of the relevant regulatory framework cover a 
broad range of issues.  For landlocked Members, tran sit matters are of particular relevance.  Other 
areas include measures to enhance transparency an d non-discrimination, reduce import/export-related 
fees and formalities, expedite the release and clear ance of goods and improve customs cooperation, to 
name just a few.  Common underlying objectiv es of the proposed initiatives are increased trading 
opportunities that take account of the particular needs of the developing world.   
4. Possible Gains for Developing Countries  
80. Lowering trade-related transaction costs can resu lt in a significant improvement in a country's 
ability to compete effectively in the global economy.  This has been widely recognized by developing 
countries and LDCs, which also acknow ledge the importance of trade fa cilitation for the attainment of 
their development objectives.  While pointing at th e need for TA&CB to respond to possible costs of 
implementing certain measures, developing and l east-developed Members have drawn particular 
attention to the benefits they foresee in terms of increasing the competitiveness of their small and 
medium-scale enterpris es.  This applies in particular to th e case of landlocked developing countries 
and LDCs, for which steps to facilitate transit tr affic along with facilitating their own cross-border 
trade can produce significant reductions of transit times.  (See, for instance, the improvements 
achieved for the Trans-Kalahari Corridor where tran sit between South Africa's Gauteng and Namibia's 
Walvis Bay port has been reduced from an aver age of four days to less than 48 hours).34  This allows 
for a marked reduction in their import costs and an  improvement in their export competitiveness on 
world markets.  
81. National experience papers, as well as numerous st udies that have been conducted by relevant 
international organizations that are collaborating with  WTO Members in this area, point to a range of 
benefits that can be realized by taking measures to facilitate trade, including faster clearance times35, 
improved revenue collection36, enhanced border controls and security, lower administrative costs, 
more trade and foreign investment, and enhanced competitiveness of domestic business in its home 
market as well as on export markets.  Developing countries also stand to benefit greatly from the 
aspired increase in transpar ency and predictability of the trading environment. 
                                                      
32 See, in particular, document TN/TF/W/129/Rev.2 from Barbados, Cuba, Fiji, Papua New Guinea and 
the Solomon Islands. 
33 The term refers to the IMF, the OECD, UNCTAD, the WCO and the World Bank.  It stems from the 
mentioning of those organizations in Annex D of the General Council's 1 August 2004 Decision to launch 
negotiations on trade facilitation. 
34 Sources:  http://www.tradeinvestafrica.com a nd USAID Southern Africa Global Competitiveness 
Hub. 
35 Trade facilitation reforms in Madagascar, for instan ce, led to overall time to import a container into 
the capital being cut by three weeks.  Customs clearance time was reduced to 72 h ours at Toamasina, through 
which 80 per cent of imports pass by value.  (Trading Across Borders, Case study Madagascar, World Bank 
Doing Business 2010). 
36 In Madagascar, for instance, customs receipts doubled as a result of a recent customs reform 
(Trading Across Borders, Case study Madagascar, World Bank Doing Business 2010).  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
 Page 21 
 
 
  E. SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT  
1. Parameters of the Development Dimension 
82. Special and differential treatment is an integr al part of the WTO Agreements and reflects a 
recognition of the diverse nature of the WTO's vast membership, asymmetry in their economic strengths and the need to ensure that economic gains from the trading system are well distributed 
among all Members.  While acknowledging that th e multilateral trading system has attempted to 
address some of their concerns through appropriate  S&D provisions, most developing countries feel 
that more needs to be done to enhance the eff ectiveness and operationalization of these provisions.  
One of the main concerns expres sed has been that S&D provisions are couched in best endeavour 
language and merely exhort Members to take certain steps, rather than making this action mandatory 
and binding.   
83. The development dimension of S&D can be best  gauged from the different submissions made 
by the proponents in the Comm ittee on Trade and Development (C TD) in Special Session.  The 
African Group, one of the main proponents on S&D, states that "special and differential treatment 
shall aim to address and resolve the imbalances be tween developed country Members and developing 
and ... to support developing and least-developed c ountry Members to undertake adjustments that are 
necessary for them to meaningfully benefit from th e agreements ... and to secure for them market 
access in the multilateral trading system that will facilitate their rapid economic development" (TN/CTD/W/3/Rev.2).  The African Group believes that such provisions are best operationalized 
when they are in the form of binding obligations.  Th e LDCs, which have also played a central role in 
this work, believe that developing country Member s, particularly the LDCs, "experience peculiar 
problems, which constrain their beneficial pa rticipation in the multilateral trading system" 
(TN/CTD/W/4).  They therefore feel that assuming the same types and levels of obligations as undertaken by other Members has prevented them from addressing their development challenges and 
from participating meaningfully in the internati onal trading system.  The LDCs argue that S&D 
provisions should provide them flexib ility to take measures to assist their domestic industries, and that 
they should be obliged to undertake only such commi tments or obligations th at are consistent with 
their trade, development and financial needs.   
2. Status of the Negotiations 
84. Of the 88 Agreement-specific proposals submitte d in the Special Session, mainly by the 
LDCs and the African Group, thirty-eight propo sals – the Category II proposals – were referred to 
other negotiating groups and WTO bodies. By 2003, 28 proposals had been agreed to in principle, but 
have yet to be adopted. They are contained in Annex C of JOB(03)/150/Rev.2.  At the Hong Kong 
Ministerial Conference in December 2005, Members adopted five remaining LDC Agreement-specific proposals.  The adopted texts of the five proposals are contained in Annex F of the Hong Kong Declaration.   
85. The five LDC proposals adopted at Hong Kong include the decision that developed-country 
Members shall, and developing-country Members decl aring themselves in a position to do so should, 
provide duty-free and quota-free (DFQF) market access for at least 97 per cent of products originating 
from LDCs.  Members are to also ensure that prefer ential rules of origin applicable to imports from 
LDCs are transparent and simple, and contribute to facilitating this market access.
37  The other 
adopted decisions in Annex F of the Hong Kong Declaration, inter alia , provide the LDCs flexibility 
in the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment M easures (TRIMs), simplification of the waiver 
                                                      
37 Cross reference with footnotes 2 and 10 in the "Agriculture" and "Non-Agricultural Market Access" 
sections respectively. WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
Page 22  
 
  process and improved coherence agreements with othe r international organizations to ensure more 
targeted technical assistance and capacity-building programmes. 
86. In addition, Ministers at Hong Kong instruct ed the Special Session as well as the bodies in 
which the Category II proposals are being addressed, to  complete the review of all the outstanding 
Agreement-specific proposals and report to the Ge neral Council with clear recommendations for a 
decision by December 2006.  The Special Session was also instructed to resume work on all other 
outstanding issues, including on the cross-cutting issues and to report on a regular basis to the General Council.   
87. In recent years, work in the Special Session has focused on the 16 remaining 
Agreement-specific proposals.  Members have been  able to make significant progress on six proposals 
on which text-based discussions have concentrated .  The discussions on Agreement-specific proposals 
are continuing based on the language last tabled by the Chair in an Annex to the reports made to the 
General Council and the Trade Negotiations Committ ee (TNC) in December 2009.  On the remaining 
ten proposals, significant divergences exist and, unles s Members are able to put forward new ideas or 
alternate language, progress will be difficult. 
88. During discussions on the Agreement-specific propo sals, the LDCs have continued to stress 
the need for quick and effective implementation of the DFQF decision.  In this context, the LDCs 
formally tabled two submissions in the Special Sessi on, one on rules of origin and the other on market 
access.
38  Since the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, a number of Members have provided 
information on the steps they are taking, or have  already taken, to implement the decision.   
89. While a number of elements have been raised as possibly forming part of the future work on 
cross-cutting issues, the Monitoring Mechanism is considered by most Members as an important step 
in the continuing review of the effectiveness and operationalization of the S&D provisions.  Members 
agreed to start work on the possible elements of th e Mechanism, including its possible scope, structure 
and functions.  To facilitate discussions, the Secr etariat compiled a paper containing all the earlier 
proposals made on the Monitoring Mechanism.  A ccordingly, in the past months Members have 
focused their work on fine-tuning the elements of the Monitoring Mechanism on  the basis of a Chair's 
non-paper.  More recently, the Chair tabled a revision of his non-paper which, based on work undertaken thus far, captures the areas of converg ence and divergence on different elements of the 
Mechanism.    
3. Specific Issues of Interest to Developing Countries 
90. In the context of the proposals tabled in the Special Session, it can be said that the specific 
issues of interest to developing countries, include the following: 
• Flexibility in the multilateral rules, which re flect their concerns and constraints;  
• Transitional arrangements linked to the ach ievement of developmental objectives; 
• Simplifying existing procedures, including for enhanced flexibilities and extended 
transition periods, so as to provide a timely an d effective response to particular concerns; 
• Less than full reciprocity in the commitments undertaken by developing countries; 
• Enhanced and targeted technical assistance and capacity-building programmes that would 
assist countries to implement WTO rules; 
• Measures that would provide additional and predictable market access for products of 
export interest to developing countries; 
                                                     
 
38 TN/CTD/W/30 and TN/CTD/W/31 respectively.  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
 Page 23 
 
 
  • Operationalization of the decision to provide duty free and quota free market access to the 
LDCs; 
• Making S&D provisions mandatory, in keeping with the concern expressed by many 
developing countries that most of these provi sions are not couched in binding language; 
• Improved coherence arrangements to ensure that flexibilities provided in the WTO rules 
are not diluted because of commitments mandated by other organizations. 
4. Possible Gains for Developing Countries 
91. While it is difficult to quantify the gains fro m the S&D work programme, mainly because of 
the lag between adopting and operationalizing any recommendation, it can be said that gains would 
accrue by making the S&D provisions more precise, effective and binding.  Clearly, in order to assist developing countries, especially the LDCs, the S&D provisions must respond to, and be reflective of, 
their concerns.  A number of developing country Members have said that commitments and obligations undertaken by them in the WTO have redu ced their flexibility to adopt, what in their view, 
are pro-development policies and measures.  In this  context, they have put forward a number of 
proposals which seek to enhance the existing flexib ility in the rules for them, and consequently 
provide them a certain degree of policy space.  They  have also sought simplification of cumbersome 
procedures and/or notification obligations, so that they can divert their resources to other developmental issues and areas.     
92. Developing country Members also consider trans itional time periods as an important element 
of S&D treatment; one that provides them with mo re time to conform with, or fulfil particular 
obligations.  However, many, if not all, of these  transition periods have expired and developing 
countries, especially the LDCs, are seeking a positive consideration of their requests for extension of 
these transition periods.  There are several proposals on the need for technical assistance to be more 
predictable and targeted to the development needs of developing countries and LDCs.  There are also 
a number of proposals that seek to improve coheren ce arrangements with other organizations in the 
delivery of such assistance.   
93. Once Members agree to establis h the Monitoring Mechanism, depending upon the agreed 
scope, it will serve as a useful forum to rai se and discuss specific concerns related to the 
implementation of S&D provisions and, perhaps, related issues. 
F. I
MPLEMENTATION -RELATED ISSUES AND CONCERNS  
1. Parameters of the Development Dimension 
94. Concerns arising from the implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements were raised by 
some developing countries shortly after the establishment of the WTO in 1995.  To them, the Uruguay Round Agreements were not  balanced and did not contain provisions that would facilitate 
their integration into the multilateral trading system.  In fact, there was the view that some of the 
Agreements, particularly the Agreement on Trad e-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) and the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures restricted the policy measures that could be 
implemented by developing countries to attract fore ign direct investment and to support their nascent 
domestic industries.  Concerns were also expressed about a wide range of issues, including the back 
loading of commitments under the Agreement on Te xtiles and Clothing.  There was the additional 
concern among small and economica lly-weak developing countries that the cost of implementing the 
Uruguay Round Agreements, particularly the Agreem ent on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) and the Agreement on Cust oms Valuation, was excessive as compared to 
benefits they had derived from th eir implementation.  Some developing countries also complained WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
Page 24  
 
  about the abuse of anti-dumping, safeguards and c ountervailing measures as well as standards, and 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures. 
2. Status of Work  
95. Issues relating to the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) are being discussed in  two forums, while work on the issue of 
geographical indications (GIs) extens ion is being done only in one forum.  Consultations on both the 
TRIPS implementation issues are being undertaken by the Director-General  in the context of 
outstanding implementation issues, pursuant to a mand ate in paragraph 12(b) of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration and paragraph 39 of the Hong Kong Minist erial Declaration.  In addition, work continues 
on the issue of TRIPS/CBD in the regular sessions of the Council for TRIPS, pursuant to 
paragraph 19 of the Doha Declar ation and paragraph 44 of the Hong Kong Declaration.  It may be 
recalled that in December 2005, Ministers at Hong Kong reiterated the instruction in the August 2004 
Decision to the TNC, negotiating bodies and other WTO bodies concerned to redouble their efforts to 
find appropriate solutions to outstanding implemen tation-related issues.  Ministers requested the 
Director-General, without prejudice to the positions of  Members, to intensify his consultative process 
under paragraph 12(b).  Specific mention of the issue of the relationship between the TRIPS 
Agreement and the CBD was added alongside that of GIs extension.  Ministers also instructed the 
Director-General to report to each regular meeting of the TNC and the General Council on the outstanding implementation issues. 
96. The Director-General reported to the regular m eetings of the TNC and of the General Council 
on the two TRIPS implementation issues.  In J une 2008, he circulated a written report on his 
consultations (WT/GC/W/591-TN/C/W/50).  The repor t indicated that the work continued to be 
characterized by different views on both the mer its of these two TRIPS issues and on whether it was 
agreed at Doha that this is part of the nego tiations and of the single undertaking.  Differences 
continue, including on whether these matters shoul d be addressed in the context of the modalities 
decision.   
97. In July 2008, a large number of Members tabl ed a draft modalities decision for TRIPS-related 
issues (TN/C/W/52 and Addenda 1-3), formally propos ing, as part of the single undertaking, to begin 
negotiations on GIs extension and a mandatory requir ement in TRIPS for the disclosure of the country 
providing/source of genetic resources, and/or associat ed traditional knowledge in patent applications.  
This proposal also linked these implementation-related issues to the GI register negotiations
39, arguing 
that all three TRIPS-related issues should be nego tiated together and advance in parallel.  A number 
of other Members rejected what they consider to be an artificial parallelism between distinct issues 
that, in their view, have their own terms of refere nce and merits, and in respect of which Members' 
interests vary considerably. 
98. Since March 2009, at the request of Members, the Director-General has personally led the 
consultations on GIs extension and TRIPS/CBD, which are conduc ted without prejudice to the 
positions of Members and which sets aside the qu estion whether or not there is a mandate for 
negotiations on these issues.  At two open-ended info rmal meetings held with the wider Membership 
to ensure transparency and incl usiveness in July 2009 and March 2010, the Director-General reported 
                                                      
39 The negotiations in the Special Session of th e Council for TRIPS on the establishment of a 
multilateral system for notification and registration of geog raphical indications for wines and spirits pursuant to 
Article 23.4 of the TRIPS Agreement and paragraph 18 of  the Doha Ministerial Declaration is treated in the 
section on "Trade-Related Aspect of  Intellectual Property Rights".     WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
 Page 25 
 
 
  that his consultations focused on technical issu es so that Members could understand each others' 
concerns better and that, while there had not been  convergence, differences were better illuminated.40 
99. With respect to GIs extension, a key issue on which positions remained profoundly divided 
was whether the current level of protection for GI s for products other than wines and spirits under 
Article 22 of the TRIPS Agreement was sufficien t for protecting such GIs and whether it was 
desirable and beneficial to broaden the scope of  enforceable rights that surrounded a GI once it was 
protected.  Other important issues concerned the im plications of extension for producers other than 
those located in the area identifie d by a GI that had been using the term in question in their own 
market and in third country markets, and the extent to which extension of the exceptions provisions of 
Article 24 would meet concerns in this regard.   
100. With respect to the relationship between  the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, the 
consultations built on the basis of the widely shared key underlying objectives, including on the avoidance of erroneous patents, securing complia nce with national benefit-sharing regimes and 
ensuring that patent offices have the available info rmation needed to make proper decisions on patent 
grant.  Divergence remained on how to achieve th ese objectives and on technical issues such as the 
legal character of misappropriation, measures othe r than the disclosure requirement to address 
misappropriation and access and benefit sharing, the legal scope of the national-based approach and 
the costs, burdens and legal certainty of a mandatory disclosure requirement. 
101. While positions remained essentially unchanged, the consultations have facilitated a more 
clear-cut identification of the points of divergen ce and convergence and of the key policy questions 
that remained to be decided.  In light of the di verging positions in the cons ultations on the outstanding 
TRIPS implementation issues, the Director-Gener al indicated he would consult further with 
delegations on how to take the work forward in this area.  
3. Specific Issues of Interest to Developing Countries 
102. Although raised under a number of agreements, the outstanding implementation issues can be 
broadly classified under four main headings: 
(a) Proposals intended to give longer transiti onal periods to developing countries to 
implement their obligations; 
(b) Proposals safeguarding the market access of developing countries and ensuring that 
they derive benefits under certain agreements; 
(c) Proposals intended to exempt developing countries from complying with obligations;  
and 
(d) Proposals requesting that developing countri es be provided with effective technical 
assistance. 
4. Possible Gains for Developing Countries 
103. Proponents of the various implementation-rela ted proposals have argued that they would 
derive economic and development benefits from them.  For example, some of the proposals are 
intended to safeguard the market access of deve loping countries by requiring developed countries to 
take account of their interests when applying contingency protection measures.  Proponents have said 
                                                     
 
40 See http://www.wto.org/english/news_e /news09_e/trip_27jul09_e.htm and  
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e /news10_e/trip_12mar10_e.htm WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
Page 26  
 
  that the proposals relating to technical assistance  would strengthen their human and institutional 
capacities and enable them to par ticipate effectively in the activities of standard-setting bodies.  To 
take another example, the proponents have said that the proposal on Article XVIII of the GATT 1994 
would assist them to implement programmes wh ich would put their economies on the path of 
sustainable growth and development.  
104. While useful clarificatory work on GIs exte nsion has been undertaken, positions remain 
divided on the impact of extens ion on developing countries.  Developing countries figure both among 
the proponents and opponents of extension.  Deve loping country and other proponents maintain that 
extension would provide stronger and more easily asserted protection of GIs for products other than 
wines and spirits and would thus also benefit deve loping country economies and exports.  As a result, 
extension would foster sustainable rural developmen t and the value added contingent on a GI would 
help create new and better opportunities for quality products, especially for smaller, developing 
country Members.  In response, de veloping country and other opponents have said that it had not been 
shown that the existing level of protection required for such GIs w as inadequate.  They have also 
argued that extension could not in itself make GIs fo r quality products a valuable marketing tool;  nor 
could GI protection guarantee market access.  The opponents have also raised concerns, inter alia , on 
the impact of any extension on producers not loca ted in the area designated by a GI, as well as 
questions related to administrative costs and bur dens.  The Secretariat circulated in May 2005 a 
factual compilation of the issues raised and views expressed on issues related to GI extension since the beginning of the Doha Work Programme (WT/ GC/W/546 - TN/C/W/25).  This document as well 
as the Director-General's reports to the two open- ended informal meetings in July 2009 and in 
March 2010 give a flavour of the debate  that has taken place on the matter. 
105. With regard to the issue of the relationshi p between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, the 
main argument made by developing countries is that the disclosure proposal would help prevent 
misappropriation of genetic resources and asso ciated traditional knowledge and aid greater 
transparency and fair and equitable benefit shari ng where such resources or knowledge are used in 
patented inventions.  Some others take the view th at the case has not been made that such a proposal 
is either necessary or appropriate in achieving the shared objectives in this area, which can be most 
effectively realized in other ways without invo lving the patent system.  In February 2006, the 
Secretariat had circulated an updated summary note of  issues raised and points made on this issue in 
the TRIPS Council (IP/C/W/368/Rev.1).  With regard to the Director-General 's consultations, which 
are reflected in his reports to the two open-ended in formal meetings in July 2009 and in March 2010, 
technical discussions are ongoing as to the merits of each proposal, including the one made in 
TN/C/W/52 (and Addenda 1-3) by a large group of  developing and developed countries on amending 
the TRIPS Agreement to include a disclosure require ment in patent applications aimed at avoiding 
erroneous patents and facilitating compliance with  national access and benefit-sharing regimes.  
Developing country proponents have said that a sa tisfactory outcome on the issue of the relationship 
between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD is criti cal for the development dimension of the Doha 
Work Programme. 
G. R
ULES  
1. Anti-Dumping and Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Including Fisheries 
Subsidies  
(a) Parameters of the de velopment dimension 
106. Developing country exports have been the s ubject of some 50 per cent of all anti-dumping 
investigations since 1995.  Developing country Members also are the main users of anti-dumping, accounting for nearly 60 per cent of all anti-du mping investigations since 1995.  A number of 
developing Members have sponsor ed or co-sponsored proposals aimed at tightening anti-dumping  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
 Page 27 
 
 
  rules, i.e., reflecting exporter interests.  On  the other hand, a number of developing Members 
(including some that have submitted proposals ai med at tightening anti-dumping rules) have 
cautioned against making the rules too difficult for developing country investigating authorities to 
implement, thereby reflecting their interests as users.   
107. Disciplines on subsidies are differentiated among developing country Members based on their 
level of development and certain other factors.  Th is diversity of current treatment is reflected in 
positions on various proposals concerning whether and how the subsidy disciplines of the Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) might be modified.  Finally, in the area of fisheries subsidies, developing Members point in general to the important role that fisheries can have for 
poverty alleviation, livelihoods and food security.  Concerning possible new disciplines on fisheries 
subsidies, some developing Members favour very st rict disciplines with few exceptions and limited 
S&D, while others seek broad exemptions from any new disciplines.   
(b) Status of the negotiations 
108. In November 2007, on the basis of the manda te from Ministers at Hong Kong, the Chairman 
of the Negotiating Group on Rules (NGR) tabled his first draft texts covering anti-dumping, subsidies 
and countervailing measures, and fisheries subsidies.  These were consolidated texts that addressed a 
wide range of issues in all of these areas, b ased on the proposals and discussions that had preceded 
them.  The texts contained specific proposed la nguage from the Chairman on the issues addressed, 
with no brackets or alternatives.  On fisheries subs idies, the Chairman's text took the form of an 
entirely new annex to the SCM Agreement, proposing a comprehensive set of new disciplines in this 
area.  These texts, which were discussed in detail duri ng 2008, all proved to be very controversial, and 
the gaps on the most politically sensitive issues were not narrowed through the discussions.  In 
December 2008, therefore, the Chairman circulated new, "bottom-up", texts on anti-dumping and on subsidies and countervailing measures, proposing speci fic language where in his view there was the 
greatest possibility for convergence,  and for the most sensitive issues replacing his former proposed 
language with square brackets summarizing the range  of positions of delegations.  For fisheries 
subsidies, such an approach was not possible as ther e is no pre-existing set of disciplines in this area.  
The Chairman thus circulated a roadmap for discussi on, containing a set of detailed questions on the 
major issues needing resolution.  The Group comple ted its discussion of these texts in early 2010, and 
has begun considering new proposals that have been  tabled in various areas of its mandate.   
(c) Specific issues of interest to developing countries 
109. Concerning anti-dumping, most proposals submitted since the beginning of the negotiations 
have been from a group of Members known as th e Friends of Anti-dumpi ng Negotiations (FANs), 
which includes a number of developing Members.   Developing and developed Members have also 
submitted proposals individually on various aspect s of anti-dumping and countervailing duty 
measures.  The general orientation of the FANs' pr oposals is to make the rules on using anti-dumping 
measures stricter, both in respect of the substan tive provisions (how dumping margins are calculated, 
and how injury and causation are established), and in  respect of duty application and investigative 
procedures.  A further set of proposals would intr oduce changes to the developing Member provision 
of the Anti-dumping Agreement (AD), to provide  flexibilities to developing Member users of 
anti-dumping, while making it more difficult to ap ply anti-dumping to devel oping Members' exports.  
These proposals reflect in part concerns that anti-dumping rules are becoming more demanding and 
that many developing country administrators have difficulty implementing them because of their cost 
and/or complexity.   
110. A final cluster of anti-dumping proposals/issu es with implications for developing Members 
have to do with transparency and due process in anti-dumping investigations.  While certain 
developing country Members express concerns over a lack of access to information in investigations WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
Page 28  
 
  to which their exporters are subject, others expr ess concern over the increased costs and burdens of 
any new procedures or mechanisms.  Proponent s on these issues, however, have stressed the 
importance that they attach to a high and consistent  standard of procedural fairness and transparency 
on the part of any Member making use of the anti-dumping instrument.  The 2008 Chairman's text proposes a number of specific chang es to the transparency and due pr ocess requirements.  In addition, 
two bracketed issues of particular relevance to de veloping Members are material retardation, which 
had been raised by a developing Member seeking to  make the provision apply to certain situations 
where a domestic industry already existed, and S& D/technical assistance, which is in brackets 
because the textual proposal on these issues was recei ved only after the first Chairman's text was 
released, and required further discussion.  
111. Regarding horizontal subsidies disciplines, the Chairman's 2007 and 2008 texts both contain 
far fewer proposed changes than in respect of anti-dumping, reflecting the considerably smaller 
number of textual proposals submitted in this area.  Of particular relevan ce to developing Members 
are proposed changes that would address government provision of goods or services at regulated prices, and as bracketed issues the determination of export competitiveness of products of developing 
Members, identification of market benchmarks  in respect of export credits, and successor 
undertakings in respect of export credits (the latte r two of which were the subject of proposals by a 
developing Member).  The texts also propo se codifying certain Ministerial decisions on 
implementation taken at Doha.  Concerning c ountervailing measures, the Negotiating Group is 
discussing the appropriateness of transposing to the countervail context certain possible changes in the 
AD rules (including regarding transparency and due process).  In addition, the Group has before it 
proposals from developing Members on verification systems for duty and tax rebate schemes, new 
subsidy allegations in on-going i nvestigations, pre-initiation consultati ons, use of facts available, and 
benchmarks for export finance in developing countries in the context of countervail investigations.   
112. Concerning fisheries subsidies, the main pr oponents of new, sector-specific disciplines 
comprise a group called "Friends of Fish", which includes a number of developing country Members.  
For the developing country proponents, the main concern is the artificial competitive advantage 
created by subsidies, which affect access to fish a nd contribute to the depletion of the resource.  Most 
Members (developed as well as developing) have stressed the need for effective S&D as part of any fisheries subsidies package.  Of particular concern in this regard are small-scale, artisanal fisheries 
and any subsidies thereto, as well as payments th at some developing Members receive from foreign 
governments for access to the fisheri es in their waters.  Aquaculture is another area of considerable 
interest to many developing country Members, whic h seek to ensure that any new disciplines would 
not interfere with these activities.  The 2007 Chai rman's text on fisheries subsidies proposed S&D 
provisions to address developing Memb ers' subsidies to different scales of fishing operations, and to 
address access payments.  In addition, the scope of th e text was limited to subsidies to marine capture 
fisheries (i.e., it did not extend to aquaculture ).  The Chairman's 2008 roadmap pursued these and 
other issues, which the Group discussed in detail du ring 2009.  Since then, new proposals have been 
tabled, inter alia,  by several groups of developing Member s seeking to redefine the S&D provisions 
in different ways.   
(d) Possible gains to developing countries 
113. An eventual clarification and improvement of any of the rules under negotiation will increase 
the predictability of the trading system to the be nefit of all Members.  Moreover, an appropriate 
balance of rights and obligations will permit de veloping countries to pursue their development 
objectives and at the same time guard against practices that have a negative impact on their trade.  In this regard, effective disciplines on the fisheries subsidies of the major subsidizing Members will 
benefit developing Members in terms of access to fisheries resources and in terms of reduced distortion of trade in fisheries products.  Another area where balance is crucial concerns trade-offs  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
 Page 29 
 
 
  between the costs and administrative burdens of the contingency protection system and its capacity to 
ensure fairness and transparency.   
2. Regional Trade Agreements 
(a) Parameters of the de velopment dimension 
114. In the WTO context, a regional trade agreemen t (RTA) constitutes a commitment to liberalize 
trade among a selective number of countries, hence on a preferential and discriminatory basis.  While 
RTAs can foster economic growth and development, such an outcome is not guaranteed.  It depends 
on various factors, most significantly the RTA's de sign and effective implementation.  Studies tend to 
show that ambitious RTAs among countries with open trade regimes tend to perform better than 
RTAs that are limited in scope, poorly implemente d and employed as an import substitution strategy, 
i.e. preferential liberalization behind high MFN tariffs.  The former type of RTA will minimize the 
risks of trade diversion and is likely to bring benefits in the form of an improved regulatory 
environment, enhanced investment flows and incre ased technology transfers.  Such benefits may be 
further enhanced provided that the RTA commitme nts are taken as a temporary step to further 
multilateral trade liberalization, thus benefiting over time third parties and the multilateral trading 
system as a whole.  RTAs based on an open tradi ng regime that envisage the gradual MFN extension 
of preferences are all the more important at a time when all WTO Members are engaged in an RTA race that inevitably amplifies the level of discriminat ion in international trade.  Clearly, the net losers 
of this race are those countries, mainly developing ones, that are left out of the preferential trading 
network being built around the major trading part ners.  Concerns are mounting over the defensive 
nature of many RTAs strategically designed at maintaining access to larger markets, locking out 
competition from other MFN suppliers and locking in i nvestment.  If such trends are sustained and not 
counterbalanced by a successful outcome of the Doha Round, the contribution of an ever-growing 
number of overlapping RTAs to the economic pr ogress of both parties and non-parties could be 
negative. 
(b) Status of the negotiations 
115. The aim of the negotiations in this area is to  clarify and improve WTO rules and procedures 
that apply to RTAs and to take into account RT As' development aspects.  The negotiations have 
proceeded on parallel tracks, considering "systemic"  and "procedural" issues.  With respect to the 
latter, the NGR has made very significant progr ess and a decision on a "Transparency Mechanism for 
Regional Trade Agreements" was adopted by the General Council on 14 December 2006 (WT/L/671).  
The mechanism clarifies and streamlines the existi ng transparency provisions contained in all the 
current WTO provisions on RTAs.  Its main objectiv es are to ensure coherence in the treatment of 
transparency across the relevant WTO provisions an d to enhance the provision of RTA information 
by simplifying Members' reporting obligations and complementing it with technical assistance for developing country Members.  The  decision also seeks to untangle the current deadlock in the WTO 
Committee on RTAs (CRTA) by shifting the focus of its modus operandi  from the legalistic 
examination of agreements (which was the nor m prior to the adoption of the Transparency 
Mechanism) to a more open transparency exerci se.  Recognizing the systemic importance of RTA 
transparency, the decision also applies to RTAs no tified under paragraph 2(c) of the Enabling Clause, 
although it preserves the CTD as the WTO body responsible for such RTAs.  
116. Discussions on systemic issues
 have not made as much progress as those on transparency 
issues.  Submissions by participants have focused  on the clarification of certain GATT Article XXIV 
provisions, most notably the "substantially all trade" (SAT) requirement, the length of RTAs 
transition periods and the inclusion of S&D pr ovisions in Article XXIV of the GATT 1994.  
Participants have indicated that the scope of any future work in this area should be comprehensive WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
Page 30  
 
  (with specific reference to Chair Roadmaps) and not lead to a dilution of current provisions.  It has 
been reiterated that text-based proposals are at  this point essential to advance the process.  
(c) Specific issues of interest to developing countries 
117. In light of the growing number of RTAs, both South-South and North-South, the scope of the 
these negotiations is of particular interest to de veloping countries since any outcome will affect the 
nature of their WTO obligations with respect to RTAs.  In the area of RTA transparency, there was 
consensus among NGR participants that given the systemic importance of the issues, any such 
mechanism should apply to all RTAs.  Thus, the Tr ansparency Decision clarifies, streamlines and 
enhances the existing reporting obligations under th e relevant WTO provisions.  Of interest to 
developing countries, in particular those availi ng themselves of the flexibilities offered by the 
Enabling Clause, is the extent to which the new m echanism adds to existing transparency obligations 
and whether it adequately addresses their capac ity constraints (see sub-paragraph (d)). 
118. The negotiations on RTA systemic issues aim at clarifying existing rules and have to date 
focused mainly on elements pertinent to Article  XXIV of the GATT 1994.  This Article does not 
contain any flexibility for developing countries and it is the only legal cover available to developing 
countries entering into RTAs with developed countries.  In light of the increasing number of 
North-South agreements, some developing countries have shown an interest in modifying existing 
provisions by including S&D.  As mentioned earlier,  the systemic discussions have focused on the 
concept of SAT, length of transition periods and S&D.  The question of flexibility for developing 
countries has been acknowledged on repeated occasions , though it has also been the opinion of most 
participants that this issue cannot be adequately  dealt with until a more concrete position on SAT and 
transition periods, among others, emerg es.  It should also be noted that of the submissions received, 
very few deal with the S&D question. 
(d) Possible gains to developing countries 
119. With respect to RTA transparency, the new Transparency Mechanism may have certain 
implications for developing countries and in par ticular for those availing themselves of the Enabling 
Clause.  The latter agreements will be subject to tr ansparency obligations on a par with RTAs notified 
under Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 and Article V of the GATS, thus adding new elements to what 
is current practice, i.e. a "Factual Presentati on" of the RTA prepared by the Secretariat.
41  However, 
while strengthening the transparency obligations , the Transparency Mechanism acknowledges the 
constraints that some developing countries may face in gathering the required reporting information 
and it provides for flexibilities with respect to th e reporting timeframes and for technical assistance.  
Of great significance to developing countries is th e improved access to RTAs-related information that 
will result from the operation of the mechanism.  Si nce practically all Members are engaged, or are 
engaging, in multiple RTAs, the need for adequa te transparency has become systemic in a 
fundamental sense. 
120. As for RTA systemic issues, it is generally accep ted that a developmental rationale exists for 
allowing developing countries to engage in pr ogressive asymmetric liberalization with selected 
partners.  However, if transition periods are t oo long or too many products are excluded from 
coverage, potential gains from RTAs  in terms of growth and devel opment will be foregone.  At the 
same time, it is important to ensure coherence bot h within the regional arrangement, as well as with 
the broader goals of the multilateral trading system.  Negotiations in this area can deliver important 
                                                      
41 Parties to RTAs notified under GATT Article XXI V and GATS Article V were previously required 
to submit a "Standard Format" which was essentially a su mmary of the agreement.  The Factual Presentations 
relieve Members of such responsibility thus benefiti ng all Members irrespectively of whether they are 
developed or developing country Members.  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
 Page 31 
 
 
  gains for developing countries by shaping the rules in  such a way as to reflect RTAs parameters that 
can better accommodate their deve lopment needs and constraints. 
H. TRADE -RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS42 
1. Parameters of the Development Dimension 
121. The negotiations regarding the establishment of  a multilateral system of notification and 
registration of geographical indications for wines an d spirits (hereinafter "multilateral system") form 
an integral part of the wider mandate of the DDA.  Article 23.4 of the TRIPS Agreement provides that 
"[i]n order to facilitate the protection of geographi cal indications for wines, negotiations shall be 
undertaken in the Council for TRIPS concerning the establishment of a multilateral system of notification and registration of geographical indica tions for wines eligible for protection in those 
Members participating in the system".  Paragraph 18, first sentence, of the Doha Declaration states 
that "[w]ith a view to completing the work star ted in the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (Council for TRIPS) on th e implementation of Article 23.4, we agree to 
negotiate the establishment of a multilateral system  of notification and registration of geographical 
indications for wines and spirits by the Fifth Sessi on of the Ministerial Conference", thus extending 
the mandate of Article 23.4 to cover also spirits. 
2. Status of the Negotiations 
122. Since 2002, a considerable amount of work h as been done, involving the tabling of position 
papers and proposals by delegations.  There are three proposals on the table:  a proposal from Hong Kong, China (TN/IP/W/8);  a "joint proposal" from Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Japan, Korea, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Chin ese Taipei, South Africa and the United States 
(TN/IP/W/10/Rev.2);  and a proposal from Albania,  Brazil, China, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, the 
EU, Georgia, Iceland, India, Indonesia, the Ky rgyz Republic, Liechtenstein, the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Pakistan, Peru, Sr i Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the ACP 
Group and the African Group (TN/C/W/52).  Co-sponsor s of the joint proposal consider that the 
proposal in TN/C/W/52 is beyond the mandate in Ar ticle 23.4 by requiring mandatory participation 
and by increasing the protection of geographical indications by attributing the status of prima facie 
evidence to terms on the register and restrictions on the use of exceptions.  The EU, Switzerland and other sponsors of TN/C/W/52, on the other hand, consider that the joint proposal, which proposes an 
information database, would be insufficient to fac ilitate the protection of geographical indications for 
wines and spirits and would therefore not meet the mandate.   
123. There are two major stumbling blocks.  The first is the extent to which the registration of a 
geographical indication by a Member, within the mult ilateral system, should crea te legal effects at the 
national level of another Member.  The second is about whether participation in the system should be 
voluntary or mandatory, including whether the legal effects under the system should apply to all WTO 
Members or only to those opting to participate in the system.  In addition to these two key issues, 
there are other points such as administrative and other burdens of a multilateral system – especially on 
developing countries and LDCs – S&D, and whet her the proposals on the table would modify the 
balance of rights and obligations in the TRIPS Agreem ent and respect the principle of territoriality.  In 
his 22 March 2010 report to the TNC (TN/IP/20), th e Chairman of the Special Session remarked that 
progress towards establishing a common basis for the final negotiating phase would involve exploring existing flexibilities in Members' national systems, a nd that to that end further technical work on how 
                                                     
 
42 The work undertaken by the Council for TRIPS on the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement 
and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) pursuant to paragraph 19 of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration is treated in the section on "Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns".    WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
Page 32  
 
  to implement the existing proposal at the nationa l level would be helpful in identifying common 
elements from which to construct a single text.   
3. Specific Issues of Interest to Developing Countries 
124. Since 2008 a large number of developing coun try Members have formally sponsored the 
modalities proposal in TN/C/W/52, arguing that the combination of a strong mandatory GI register 
with an extension to GIs for products other than wines and spirits would benefit developing country 
agricultural economies, as these none-wine and spir it products had hitherto been excluded from the 
benefits of additional GI protecti on.  Some other developing countries, namely those arguing that 
negotiations on extension are outside the Doha mandate, have sponsored or supported the joint 
proposal as the only one that respects the mandate of Article 23.4, arguing that its voluntary nature 
and the absence of legal effects at the national level make it the least burdensome for developing 
countries to implement.  
125. Discussion of S&D has recently intensified.  The point has been made that the need for it 
would depend, to a significant extent, on the nature and complexity of the basic notification and registration system to be chosen – which still re mains unclear.  Nonetheless, there has been some 
discussion of this issue.  The point has been wide ly made that the system should be efficient for 
developing countries, keeping in mind the burdens they are already bearing and the fact that the Doha Round is about development.  Some have argued that  the voluntary nature of the system proposed by 
the joint proposal constituted the most effective S& D.  Some others felt that it was unusual to have 
S&D in the form of optional participation, and wonde red what would be the nature of such treatment 
in a situation where a developing expected benefits from the facilitated GI protection flowing from its 
participation in the GI register, while some devel oped countries chose to opt out.  Other points made 
relate to:  the extent to which S&D in the paym ent of registration fees might be envisaged for 
developing countries and LDCs;  technical assistan ce to facilitate participation of developing 
countries in the system;  and transition periods for developing countries and, in the case of LDCs, the 
need to take account of their overall trans ition period under the TRIPS Agreement.  
4. Possible Gains for Developing Countries 
126. The question of possible gains to developing c ountries has been the subject of some debate 
among the participants in the negotiations.  Some ho ld the view that a multilateral system's ability to 
alleviate the costs for all producers in seeking prot ection worldwide by allowing them to gain legal 
standing in third countries via a centralized pro cedure would help developing country producers in 
particular, who have less resources to invest in  asserting such protection internationally.  Others 
consider that a system that would impose consid erable administrative bur den on developing countries 
would not necessarily save costs for GI owners and would, in any event, entail burdens that would more than offset any benefits developing countri es might obtain, especially as the mandate is for 
wines and spirits, of which most developing countries are not exporters.  It is, therefore, important 
that the system be simple and voluntary in nature and not entail new obligations. 
I. T
RADE AND ENVIRONMENT  
1. Parameters of the Development Dimension 
127. The negotiations under paragraph 31 of the Doha Declaration, undertaken with a view to 
enhancing the mutual supportiveness of trade and environment, and the negotiations under 
paragraph 28 on fisheries subsidies43, form the "environmental package" of the DDA negotiations.  
Paragraph 31 covers three aspects:  the relationship between existi ng WTO rules and specific trade 
                                                      
43 See the Section on "Rules".  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
 Page 33 
 
 
  obligations (STOs) set out in multilateral environm ental agreements (MEAs);  procedures for regular 
information exchange between MEA Secretariats and relevant WTO committees, as well as criteria for the granting of observer status;  and finally, th e reduction or, as appropriate , elimination of tariff 
and NTBs to environmental goods and services. 
2. Status of the Negotiations 
128. The Chair of the Committee on Trade and Environment in Special Session (CTESS) 
submitted a report to the TNC in March 2010 summarizing the state-of-play and the main proposals 
put forward under paragraph 31 of the Doha Declaration (TN/TE/19).   
129. As regards the relationship between WTO rules and STOs set out in MEAs, several ideas 
have been put forward in Members' proposals.   These include, for instance, emphasizing the 
importance of coordination at the national level and the value of national experience-sharing 
regarding the negotiation and implementation of STOs set out in MEAs;  reflecting the discussions of 
the CTESS on STOs set out in MEAs as part of the outcome under paragraph 31(i);  providing for the 
use of MEA expertise in the context of disputes involving MEA measures;  and providing technical 
assistance and capacity-building to developing count ry Members to implement STOs in MEAs in a 
WTO-compliant manner.  
130. With respect to the issue of collaborati on between the WTO and MEA secretariats under 
paragraph 31(ii), Members have explored aven ues for enhancing information exchange and 
cooperation by improving or consolidating existing practices and cooperation mechanisms.  Various 
suggestions were also put forward regarding crite ria for the granting of observer status to MEA 
secretariats in relevant WTO Committees.   
131. It is important to note that developing countri es have participated actively in the negotiations 
under paragraphs 31(i) and (ii) with  a number of them tabling submissi ons to clarify their positions or 
contributing to the discussion on a possible outcome in this area. 
132. With respect to negotiations in the area of  environmental goods and services, the CTESS 
work has focused on the identification of the univer se of environmental goods of interest to Members 
pursuant to the Chair's work programme.  In this  context, a number of delegations have made 
submissions identifying environmental goods of inte rest to them.  These goods were compiled in the 
latest Chair's report mentioned above.
 44   
133. Other key issues arising under the mandate, su ch as NTBs, S&D and technology transfer, 
remain on the table.  Further outcome-specific input s will be required from Members in order to make 
progress on these issues.   
3. Specific Issues of Interest to Developing Countries 
134. While positions and interests naturally vary am ong developing countries, some specific issues 
of interest to them can be discerned.  Many deve loping countries feel that  trade liberalization of 
environmental goods should offer opportunities for th em to increase exports of goods in which they 
have a competitive advantage.  On their part, proponents of lists have generally underlined the 
importance they attach to achieving a balanced outcome and identifying environmental goods of 
interest for all Members.   
135. Some Members have observed that the export inte rests of developing countries lie mainly in 
natural resource-based products.  Hence, the defi nition of environmental goods should cover such 
                                                      
44 See also document JOB/TE/3. WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
Page 34  
 
  products.  Furthermore, some concerns have been expressed regarding the existing asymmetries in 
production capacities, trading volumes and tariff st ructures for environmental goods.  A number of 
developing countries have questioned the benefits for them of liberalizing trade in environmental 
goods, commenting that most environmental goods propo sed thus far have multiple uses or consist of 
"high-tech" or "end-of-pipe" products of interest primarily to developed countries.  Other issues of 
concern to developing countries include the need to  facilitate technology transfer to the developing 
and least-developed Members and the manner in whic h NTBs, and the issue of S&D, will be taken 
into account in the negotiations. 
4. Possible Gains for Developing Countries 
136. There has been little substantive debate among pa rticipants in the negotiations on the specific 
gains that may accrue to developing countries from th e negotiations under paragr aphs 31(i) and (ii) on 
the relationship between MEAs and the WTO.  Ma ny developing countries have ratified the MEAs 
considered relevant in the present negotiations.  Th e mandate under paragraphs 31(i) and (ii) affords 
an opportunity to create positive synergies betwee n the trade and environment regimes, including 
through more efficient institutional cooperation.   
137. As regards paragraph 31(iii), some hold the view  that liberalization of environmental goods 
and services can be beneficial to trade, environmen t and development.  According to them, increased 
trade could result from the reduction or elimination of  tariffs and NTBs.  Moreover, it was noted that 
the negotiations could potentially assist developi ng countries in obtaining the resources and tools 
needed to address key environmental priorities.  Other Members, however, question the possible 
environmental benefits of some of the goods proposed  for liberalization, and feel that the development 
gains would be enhanced only if the goods subj ect to liberalization have an unambiguous 
environmental use.   
138. Some developing country Members have also ar gued for the retention of a certain level of 
policy space in determining which goods may he lp them meet their nationally prioritized 
environmental objectives.  In this context, they have also stressed that their national interests in these 
negotiations are mainly directed towards the bui lding-up and development of domestic production 
capacity in the provision of environmental goods and services.  This, in their view, would further 
contribute to their objective of achieving sustainable development. 
J. D
ISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING  
1. Parameters of the Development Dimension  
139. According to paragraph 30 of the Doha Minist erial Declaration, the negotiations on dispute 
settlement aim to "agree on improvements and clarif ications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU).  Under paragraph 47 of the Doha Declaratio n, these negotiations are not to be treated as part 
of a single undertaking.  A number of developing country Members highlighted in the early stages of the negotiations the need to have effective access to the dispute settlement procedures.  In this 
context, it was stressed that clarifications or  improvements to the DSU should not lead to any 
reduction in the access of developing country Member s to dispute settlement procedures.  Although a 
number of developing country Members have been active users of the dispute settlement procedures, 
others, in particular African and LDC Members, have  had much more limited participation to date.  
These Members highlighted in their proposals the significant constraints, including resource 
constraints, they face in having recourse to the co mplex and expensive (if outside counsel is used) 
procedures of the DSU. 
140. The interests of developing country Members in the DSU negotiations are, however, not 
limited to S&D, or indeed to developmental aspects  only.  The improvement and clarification of the  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
 Page 35 
 
 
  dispute settlement mechanism has an institutional di mension that goes beyond th e particular interests 
of developed or developing countries.  A stable, predictable and effective multilateral system to 
resolve trade disputes benefits the whole WTO membership.  Many proposals put forward by 
developing country Members therefore address system ic concerns and are not intended to secure any 
particular form of S&D.  Some of these propo sals may reflect concerns which are of special 
significance to developing country Members as u sers of the dispute settlement mechanism (for 
example, the enhancement of third party rights).  Others, however, reflect more general systemic 
concerns not intrinsically tied to  a developmental dimension.   
2. Status of the Negotiations 
141. Since the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, the work of the Special Session of the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) has been based on a Member-d riven, "bottom-up" approach to develop areas 
of convergence based on work in the previous phases of the negotiations.  
142. As a result of this work, in July 2008 the Ch airman of the Special Session circulated a 
document under his responsibility (JOB(08)/81), incl uding a consolidated draft legal text based 
primarily on revised drafting proposals submitted by Members.  The document also includes some 
suggestions by the Chairman on specific issues, b ased on the discussions.  Members have endorsed 
the draft legal text contained in this document as a basis for further work. 
143. The Chairman's document addresses the follo wing twelve issues, which constitute the 
substantive universe of DSU negotiations: 
(a) third party rights; 
(b) panel composition; 
(c) remand; 
(d) mutually agreed solutions; 
(e) strictly confidential information; 
(f) sequencing; 
(g) post-retaliation; 
(h) transparency and amicus curiae  briefs; 
(i) timeframes; 
(j) developing country interests, including S&D; 
(k) flexibility and Member control;  and 
(l) effective compliance. 
144. An initial discussion of all of these issues, ba sed on the draft legal text contained in 
JOB(08)/81, took place through a series of informal  consultations with interested delegations. 
Between autumn 2008 and May 2010,  the Chairman held ten weeks of negotiations.  During each 
week, the Chairman conducted informal consultations  with interested delegations over the course of a WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
Page 36  
 
  week, with an open-ended informal meeting of th e DSB Special Session at the end of the week to 
report on the work to the entire membership. 
145. In May 2010, the Chairman initiated a more intensive phase in the DSU negotiations, still 
based on the draft legal text in JOB(08)/81, and asking delegations to engage on the basis of the 
comments received in the previous phase.  The wo rk in this new phase is organized around group 
meetings in variable geometry depending on th e subject to be discussed, combining meetings 
convened by the Chair and time for meetings among dele gations.  This continues to be combined with 
regular reporting through  open- ended informal meetings of the DSB Special Session.   
3. Specific Issues of Interest to Developing Countries 
146. Given the systemic dimension of the clarifica tion and improvement of the DSU, virtually all 
issues under discussion could be said to be of relevance to developing countries as Members of the 
WTO and potential users of the DSU.  Developing country Members have made specific proposals in the context of a number of the twelve issues refl ected in JOB(08)/81, name ly:  developing country 
interests, including S&D;  effective compliance;   third party rights;  and transparency and amicus 
curiae briefs.  In addition, the proposals on timefra mes reflected in JOB(08)/81 contain various S&D 
elements. 
4. Possible Gains for Developing Countries 
147. A strengthened multilateral rules-based dispute settlement mechanism h as been heralded as 
one of the major achievements of the Uruguay Round.   The DSU is generally acknowledged to have 
served WTO Members well so far.  Indeed, almost 100 WTO Members (including almost 
70 developing countries) have particip ated, either as party or as third-party, in at least one dispute to 
date.  Since the dispute settlement procedures are in essence an instrument for the protection of 
Members' substantive rights and obligations unde r the WTO Agreements, it can be said that the 
immediate objective of improving and clarifying procedures under the DSU ultimately serves the 
long-term goal of enhancing the ability of WTO Member s, in particular developing country Members, 
to fully benefit from the trade opportunities they have negotiated in the WTO.    
148. The main benefits of improvements and clarifica tions to the DSU could be expected to come 
in the form of institutional strengthening of the mu ltilateral trading system and enhanced capacity for 
all Members to protect their interests in the WTO.  To the extent that developing country Members, 
especially smaller economies with limited political powe r to influence the behaviour of larger trading 
partners, may generally have more difficulty in  defending their interests effectively, such 
enhancements would especially benefit them.  A number of procedural improvements are under 
consideration, that may not have any particular developmental dimension, but that would also, if 
successfully negotiated, benefit developing country Me mbers as users of the system (for example, the 
establishment of remand authority, the clarifi cation of "sequencing" between compliance and 
retaliation procedures or the ela boration of procedures to address "post-retaliation" situations). 
149. Other proposals under consideration address the resource constraints highlighted by a number 
of developing country Members, in the form of e nhanced technical or financial support.  While they 
do not directly affect procedural steps in the dispute, they focus on ensuring that developing country Members have effective access to the procedures in the first place and the means to successfully go 
through a procedure.  Improvements designed to address these resource constraints could facilitate 
recourse to the procedures by developing country Members and enhance their ability to effectively 
defend their rights under the WTO agreem ents, as complainants or defendants.  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 
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  III. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
150. In an effort to assist Members with their discussion concerning paragraph 51 of the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration, this document has identif ied the key developmental aspects raised in the 
various negotiating bodies.  While the issues raised in  the paper vary according to subject area, it is 
clear that developing countries have  serious and pressing interests which they wish to see addressed in 
the Round.  These interests also change according to the subject area under discussion and reflect the 
very diverse interests of developing countries overall.  
151. Two conclusions stem from this document:  first, development issues suffuse all areas being 
negotiated, including in the market access and rule -making aspects of the negotiations.  Second, a 
large number of proposals already on the table ar e aimed at addressing the development aspects of 
each subject.  The possible gains to developing count ries would largely depend on the outcome of the 
ongoing negotiations and manner in which the vari ous proposals are operationalized after being 
adopted.  It is hoped that this paper helps Memb ers in their discussions and negotiations towards a 
successful conclusion of the Doha Development Round.  
 
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