RESTRICTED  WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  WT/TPR/G/220 
2 September 2009  
 
(09-4078) 
Trade Policy Review Body Original: Spanish 
   
 
  
 
TRADE POLICY REVIEW 
 
Report by 
 
CHILE 
 
 
  
Pursuant to the Agreement Establishing the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization), the policy statement by Chile is attached. 
 
 
Note: This report is subject to restricted ci rculation and press embargo until the end of the 
first session of the meeting of the Trade Policy Review Body on Chile. Chile WT/TPR/G/220 
 Page 3 
 
 
  CONTENTS 
 
  Page 
 
I. MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 4 
 (1) E XTERNAL SITUATION  4 
 (2) MONETARY AND EXCHANGE POLICIES  5 
 (3) F ISCAL POLICY  5 
 (4) O UTLOOK  6 
II. TRADE POLICY 7 
 (1) B ILATERAL INITIATIVES  8 
 (2) P ARTICIPATION IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION  10 
 (3) P ARTICIPATION IN APEC 11 
 (4) P ROCESS OF ACCESSION TO THE OECD 11 
 (5) D OMESTIC LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES  11 
 (6) C ONCLUSION  12 
 
 
 WT/TPR/G/220 Trade Policy Review 
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  I. MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
1. Chile's macroeconomic policy rests on three p illars:  (i) a monetary policy geared towards 
achieving inflation targets;  (ii) exchange flexibilit y;  and (iii) a prudent tax policy design, based on 
the structural surplus rule. 
2. Thanks to these policies and to the transparency  of its institutions, an open trade regime and 
sound banking systems, Chile has been able to maintain its stability and a reasonable economic 
growth rate despite the difficult external situati on created by the international financial crisis. 
(1) EXTERNAL SITUATION  
3. The international situation that has been  of crucial importance for Chile over the 
2003-2008 period can be divided into two stages: 
• 2004-2007:  favourable external environmen t with trade partners posting dynamic 
growth and favourable terms of trade (high copper price cycle); 
 
• 2008:  the world economic slowdown due to th e international financial crisis meant 
an adverse external setting with trade pa rtners recording sluggish growth, and a 
deterioration in the terms of trade. 
 
4. Indeed, the period between 2003 and 2007 witnessed a world growth cycle attributable 
fundamentally to strong performances by Asia's emerging economies in general and China and India 
in particular.  Such dynamism subs tantially boosted demand for raw mate rials.  This in turn generated 
massive commodity price increases as supply failed to  keep pace, giving rise to a very high copper 
price during the period. 
5. The international financial situation was itsel f also favourable during the 2003-2007 period.  
In that regard, the sovereign spread of emerging economies and of Chile narrowed considerably up to 
mid-2007. 
6. In the last quarter of 2008 the country was affect ed by the worst global financial crisis of the 
past 60 years.  The international economy underw ent unprecedented turmoil in 2008.  After growing 
3.8 per cent in 2007, the world product expanded by  a mere 2.1 per cent in 2008, according to 
International Monetary Fund figures.  This dow nturn in international economic activity was 
concentrated in the last quarter of the year and wa s the outcome of a combination of events.  The first 
was the global financial crisis in the United Stat es and Europe triggered by the bursting of the 
United States real estate bubble.  Th e crisis then rapidly spread to the real economy in the developed 
countries, ultimately causing international trade to contract. 
7. The spectacular slowdown in the world economy led to a steep decline in export prices.  In 
the fourth quarter of 2008, the terms of trade declin ed 25 per cent by comparison with the last quarter 
of 2007, affecting the value of exports to a sim ilar extent.  The above situation was compounded by 
an appreciable increase in international interest ra tes as well as restrictions on external indebtedness. 
8. Despite the deteriorating international situ ation in 2008, Chile's main macroeconomic 
indicators performed well during the period under re view.  The following table below shows the main 
indicators and compares the periods 1990-1996, 1997-2002, and 2003-2008. Chile WT/TPR/G/220 
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  Period Average GDP 
growth (%)  Average growth 
in domestic 
spending (%)  Average annual 
inflation (%)  Rate of 
investment 
(% of GDP)  Average 
unemployment 
rate (%)  Current 
account deficit 
(% of GDP)  
1990-96  7.8 8.5 14.8 22.1 7.2 -2.6 
1997-02  3.2 2.5 4.1 21.7 8.7 -2.1 
2003-08  4.7 7.4 3.9 25.6 8.6 1.6 
Source :  Central Bank of Chile. 
(2) MONETARY AND EXCHANGE POLICIES  
9. Monetary policy continued to be aimed at main taining the inflation rate within a band of 
2-4 per cent annually over a medium-term timeline of 18 to 24 months.  The Central Bank succeeded 
in keeping inflation low between 2003 and 2007.  Infl ation nevertheless fluctuated considerably in 
2008.  During the first three quarters of the year in flation rose to levels ev en above nine per cent 
owing to the international prices of cereals, dairy produce, and mainly of energy.  This pronounced 
external shock was quickly attenuated by the sudde n slowdown in the international economy in the 
closing months of the year.  Given the huge drop in the price of oil and its impact on the transport 
sector, inflation for December 2008 ended even lower than the same month in 2007. 
10. To offset the impacts of the international fi nancial crisis on the level of Chile's economic 
activity, and having brought  down the level of inflation, the Central Bank opted for an aggressive 
policy of monetary expansion during the first half of  2009.  This meant that the monetary policy rate 
(MPR) fell from 8.25 per cent in December 2008 to 0.5 per cent in July 2009 – one of the biggest rate 
cuts worldwide in 2009. 
11. Chile maintains a floating exchange rate system.  The Central Bank may intervene 
exceptionally in the foreign exchange  market in situations of extreme volatility and uncertainty, but 
such interventions must be consistent with th e inflation target, and the timeframes and amounts 
involved must also be explicitly determined. 
12. According to the Central Bank, the exchange rate  was constantly monitored at an equilibrium 
level for most of the period.  In April 2008, howe ver, the Central Bank decided to intervene in the 
foreign exchange market and announced a prog ramme to build up international reserves of 
US$8 billion.  At the same time, short and long-term  debt instruments were issued in the national 
currency with a view to neutralizing the monetary impacts of foreign currency purchases.  The Central 
Bank's intervention was prompted by a reassessment of the risks of a worsening in the external credit 
situation as a result of the possible spread of th e financial crisis to other countries.  It was 
consequently decided to purchase foreign exchange w ith a view to dealing with any possible external 
liquidity problems.  The Central Bank stated that the intervention was exceptional in nature and was 
in keeping with the floating exchange rate polic y as well as the scheme of inflation targets and was 
not intended to achieve an exchange rate level or range. 
(3) FISCAL POLICY  
13. One long-standing feature of Chile's public sector  has been the consistent practice of saving 
excess revenues accruing mainly from favourable term s of trade and increased economic activity.  
That savings has itself been the result of the or derly management of public finances in strict 
observance of the rule of structural balance.  This  reflects the medium-term fi scal outlook rather than 
the current fiscal position, which indicates the effectiv e balance.  In simple terms, the structural 
balance policy involves estimating the fiscal income th at would be obtained net of the effects of the 
economic cycle, and hence authorizing only such public  spending as is consistent with this level of WT/TPR/G/220 Trade Policy Review 
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  income.  In practice, this means saving during ec onomic highs, when revenues known to be of only a 
temporary nature are received, precisely so as to be able to spend in situatio ns when fiscal income 
drops or spending needs increase.  As a result of th e above, and in addition to careful and systematic 
management of surpluses, the main funds have been  growing over the years.  Thus, up to the last 
quarter of 2008, the Fondo de Reserva de Pensiones  - FRP (Pension Reserve Fund) and the Fondo de 
Estabilización Económica y Social  - FEES (Economic and Social Stabilization Fund) had 
accumulated US$2,507 and US$20, 211 million, respectively. 
(4) OUTLOOK  
14. Despite the seriousness of the international cris is, Chile is well prepared to cope with the 
international situation thanks to its  solid fundamentals, in particular, its fiscal solvency.  Besides, the 
country's financial system is duly regulated and capitalized, its macroeconomic institutions enjoy a 
high degree of credibility, and Chile follows an appropr iate monetary policy.  The country is currently 
benefiting from a combination of counter-cyclical pol icies - involving one of the world's biggest fiscal 
stimulus packages, and globally one of the most a ggressive monetary policy rate cuts.  Concurrently, 
a competitive real exchange rate is maintained. 
15. The macroeconomic authorities reacted promptly to  the crisis, which originated abroad, first 
addressing the initial problems caused by the liquidity  squeeze.  Anticipating negative figures for the 
last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009, the economic authorities then reacted with decisive 
and timely fiscal and monetary stimulus measures.  In early January, the tax authority announced a 
fiscal stimulus package for the year 2009 equivalent to 2.8 per cent of GDP.  This package was 
designed to put funds directly into the pockets  of the neediest families (thus generating a 
solidarity-based stimulus to consumption), minimize the effects of the crisis on the liquidity of small enterprises, stimulate employment by expanding public works budgets and providing subsidies for 
youth employment, and promote investment through tax cuts.  The fiscal stimulus plan has been accompanied by other measures such as the pro-cred it initiative and the employment agreement.  The 
pro-credit initiative is an attempt to encourage le nding to consumers and SMEs, to expand the capital 
market for large companies, and foster competition in the banking sector.  In furtherance of those 
objectives and as a result of an agreement betwee n employer and worker representatives, the 
Government has implemented a pro-employment ag reement that uses novel mechanisms to step up 
training and minimize layoffs. 
16. The coordination with which the economic aut horities reacted is worthy of note.  Since 
September 2008, the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance have implemented an effective and 
coordinated economic policy aimed at minimizing the real and financial impacts of the international 
crisis.  Unlike previous episodes of crisis, join t action by the two economic institutions made it 
possible to implement a counter-cyclical economic po licy that will help attenuate the effects of an 
adverse external environment on domestic activity and employment. 
17. The outlook for economic activity in 2009 is for a resumption of GDP growth in the second 
half of the year.  This would be explained by the lower 2008 benchmarks, as  well as the impact - 
already consolidated for the last two quarters of the year - of the economic plans being implemented by the Government and the effect of the Ce ntral Bank's aggressive interest rate cuts. 
18. In 2009 inflation will continue the downtrend star ted in late 2008.  In step with foodstuffs, 
basic services and transport, inflatio n has declined to half the level registered in November last, and 
will slip temporarily below the Central Bank's target range towards the end of the year. Chile WT/TPR/G/220 
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  19. According to the Central Bank's latest Monetary  Policy report available at the time of drafting 
this report (May 2009), the evolution of and outlook for the main economic variables are as follows: 
 2007 2008 2009f 
GDP  4.7   3.2   -0.75 to 0.25  
Domestic income   7.1   3.8   -2.8  
Domestic demand   7.8   7.4   -4.7  
Exports of goods and services   7.6   3.1   -1.7  
Imports of goods and services   14.9   12.9   -10.6  
Current account (% t of GDP)   4.4   -2.0   -1.8  
Copper price*  323   316   180 
Inflation   4.4 %   8.7 %   2.3 %  
f. Projected. 
* Cents per pound on the London Metal Exchange, average. 
Source :  Central Bank of Chile. 
II. TRADE POLICY 
20. The presentation of Chile's trade policy for th e six-year period 2003- 2009 builds on what was 
reported by the Government of Chile to the WTO at the time of the country's previous review (2003).  
Chile thus continues to be highly dependent on foreign trade as demonstrated by the trade in goods' share in GDP, which rose steadily from 44 per cent in 1990 to 69.6 per cent in 2008.  Consequently, Chile's trade policy maintains its objective of  improving and ensuring access for its goods and 
services to all markets, as well as encouraging dom estic and foreign investment.  With a view to 
liberalizing the economy, all available channels ha ve been used to give Chile's trade policy an 
outward orientation, including unilateral mark et opening and multilateral and bilateral trade 
negotiations. 
21. As stated in the previous review, under its policy of unilateral opening up, Chile's applied 
MFN tariff was unilaterally phased down from 11 pe r cent to six per cent between 1999 and 2003.  
Since 2003, this uniform overall tariff has been maintained unchanged as a six per cent ad valorem  
duty on imports, virtually without exceptions.  This low and uniform tariff is a distinctive feature of 
Chile's trade policy that makes fo r more efficient resource alloca tion by establishing the basis for 
non-differential treatment of the various production sect ors, and has also enabled Chile to negotiate 
preferential agreements with various countries. 
22. In addition to the above-mentioned six per cen t level under the policy of general unilateral 
opening up, two specific cases of liberalization deser ve special mention:  (1) in 2008 a zero per cent 
MFN tariff was established for certain capital g oods imports (machinery, vehicles, tools and 
equipment intended directly or indirectly for the production of goods or services);  and (2) in 
accordance with the bilateral co mmitment in the agreement between Chile and Canada, no import 
duties are levied on data-processing machinery and equipment, a benefit that is applied on an 
MFN basis with no requirement as to the origin or provenance of the products. 
23. Unilateral reduction has formed the basis for the outward orientation of this relatively small 
economy that is unable to influence its terms of tr ade, and the process of adopting such measures can 
be rapid and efficient as it depends solely on the co untry's will and is done at the pace dictated by its 
own needs.  On the other hand, unilateral liberaliz ation of this kind does not improve conditions of 
access to other markets. WT/TPR/G/220 Trade Policy Review 
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  24. Lastly, Chile's policy of opening up covers not just goods, but services and investments as 
well.  In both areas Chile has an open regime  which as a matter of general policy does not 
discriminate between nationals and foreigners.  Th is regime has been built into the free trade 
agreements signed by Chile and into its GATS commitments. 
(1) BILATERAL INITIATIVES  
25. Access to other markets cannot be achieved by way of a unilateral liberalization process.  
Chile has maintained and again re iterates that the best way to ach ieve this objective is through 
negotiations within the multilateral trading system, the liberalization of which falls within the scope of 
an international treaty that avoids discrimination a nd has an efficient dispute settlement mechanism.  
However, the pace of multilateral discussions is not rapid enough to reach the necessary consensus, 
given the diversity of interests of the participating Members.  A relatively small economy like Chile has very limited capacity to exert any influence in the resolution of these problems.  Bilateral 
initiatives are therefore useful as a supplementary  way of achieving substantial outcomes more 
expeditiously than would be possible at the mult ilateral level.  Bilateral negotiations provide a 
particularly effective alternative when they are conducted, as in the case of Chile, with all of the 
country's suppliers. 
26. Bilateral free trade agreements are by natu re limited in scope, and reciprocity in the 
liberalization processes involved is therefore a ke y element.  The signing of these preferential 
agreements is often criticized as giving rise to tr ade diversion.  Yet the possible impact of such 
diversion can be minimized by signing the greatest  possible number of agreements, naturally without 
prejudice to also realizing the outcomes of the mu ltilateral negotiations that are eagerly awaited in 
Geneva, even if those outcomes will hardly be able  to match the level of ambition of the bilateral 
agreements. 
27. It should be pointed out that despite some overlap amongst the objectives of the multilateral 
and bilateral agreements on some issues, th e main advantage or feature arises from the 
complementarity of the outcomes achieved in the different areas. 
28. Chile's strategy therefore regards the signing of  free trade agreements as a key element of the 
country's trade policy.  This is a way of expanding the markets of interest for Chile's exports.  During 
the previous review period from 1998 to 2003, Chile had negotiated new trade agreements and 
strengthened existing agreements wi th all of Latin America.  It had also negotiated free trade 
agreements with some of its main trading partne rs outside the region.  In 2003 Chile had signed 
eight preferential agreements with 39 partners, but  this number increased during the period now under 
review.  Up to the time of this report, Chile had c oncluded 21 agreements with  57 trading partners and 
the proportion of Chile's trade in goods with pref erential partners increased to 92 per cent of its 
overall trade (imports and expor ts, both MFN and preferential). 
29. The trading partners with which Chile has si gned new preferential trade agreements are the 
Republic of Korea (2003), the United States (2003) , the European Free Trade Association (EFTA, 
comprising Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein) (2003), China (goods (2005) and 
services (2008)), Panama (2006), Peru (2006), Colombia (2006), Japan (2007), Australia (2008) and Turkey (2009);  it has also signed a Trans-Paci fic Strategic Economic Pa rtnership Agreement known 
as P-4 (with New Zealand, Singapore and Brunei Da russalam (2005)) and a partial-scope agreement 
with India (2006).  Chile is currently at different  stages of trade negotiatio n processes with Malaysia 
and Viet Nam. Chile WT/TPR/G/220 
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  30. As can be seen from a comparison of the periods 1997-2003 and 2003-2009, by the year 2003 
there were already agreements with America and Europe.  The challenge facing Chile in 2003 was 
therefore to promote greater rapprochement with the economies in the Asia-Pacific region, and that 
strategy was gradually strengthened over the six-year period covered by this review. 
31. During the 1990s, Chile signed various Economic Complementarity Agreements (ECAs) with 
most of the countries in Latin America in the framework of the Latin American Integration 
Association (LAIA) and under the Enabling Clause.   Those agreements contain limited disciplines 
and regulate only trade in goods, of which the cove rage is all but complete, given the few existing 
exceptions.  Chile has endeavoured to further deve lop these ECAs with two countries in the region - 
Peru and Colombia - so as to build on the benefits  obtained in the goods trade by adopting new trade 
disciplines (such as access for and protection of foreign investments and cross-border trade in 
services) and updating the already existing disciplines. 
32. Some 51 agreements for the reciprocal promo tion and protection of investments have been 
concluded, and the question of investment has been  incorporated in eight free trade agreements.  
Besides, 42 air transport agreements and 16 doubl e taxation agreements have been negotiated. 
33. This policy of bilateral market opening is cons istent with the multilateral rules and reflects a 
development strategy based on an economy open to the world, competitive in terms of products and 
equitable in its performance.  It has helped to  reduce the external vulnerability of the economy, 
consolidate and extend access for Chile's goods and services to the leading world export markets, 
make the country more attractive to foreign investme nt, and diversify exports - all this on the basis of 
clear rules that guarantee predictability in trade relati ons.  This whole approach has been structured in 
accordance with the WTO regulatory framework. 
34. Despite the diversity of its trading partners, Chile strives to maintain coherence in its 
negotiations.  All new agreements to be conclu ded must therefore contain disciplines that are 
consistent with those of already existing agreemen ts.  This means, for example, agreeing that no 
products will be excluded, or excl uding only very few.  They contain traditional disciplines in the area 
of goods, services and investment as well as in ot her areas such as competition policy, intellectual 
property, government procurement, transpar ency, and dispute settlement mechanisms. 
35. In short, Chile believes that opening up bilatera lly is complementary to and fully consistent 
with the multilateral trading system, because it has b een demonstrated that preferential agreements, 
whether regional or bilateral, achieve liberaliza tion in less time, with broader scope and mostly 
without exclusions, than that needed for the players to fine-tune the outcomes of a negotiating round 
at the multilateral level. 
36. It should be made clear that although Chile has achieved trade liberalization via three parallel 
avenues (unilateral, multilateral and bilateral), and through the necessary complementarity between 
the bilateral and multilateral avenues, it is not wo rkable for a small country - which needs market 
opening in order to develop - to rely exclusively on  its own unilateral liberalization in order to achieve 
multilateralism. 
37. There is one particularly complex area of any nego tiation exercise, and that is rules of origin.  
The WTO can serve as a guide in providing negot iating guidelines, which should be designed to 
encourage simplification and to change traditiona l thinking as regards the considerable importance 
being attached today to discrimination as to the origin of a product.  It should be borne in mind that a 
product of foreign origin can make a significant contribution to a country's economy, but not if it is WT/TPR/G/220 Trade Policy Review 
Page 10 
 
 
  subject to discrimination.  Chile has therefore been a pioneer in adopting a highl y flexible approach to 
negotiating its rules of origin. 
38. One related aspect that in Chile's view w ould represent a step towards the objective of 
multilateralism would be a firm decision to work to wards convergence of bilateral agreements in the 
case of those countries that already have agreemen ts amongst themselves and have a broad universe 
of products from which tariffs have been removed.  There is an obvious need here to lay down criteria 
regarding multilateral cumulation rules. 
(2) PARTICIPATION IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION  
39. Chile is a founding member of the World Trade Organization and has always maintained an 
unwavering commitment to the multilateral trading system.  For Chile, the importance of the WTO 
lies in the fact that through its Agreements it est ablishes binding disciplines, which are implemented 
by way of the constant endeavours of its vari ous bodies.  Trade measures adopted by Members 
therefore remain subject to scrutiny by th em, in the light of the disciplines agreed. 
40. In connection with the foregoing, Chile is most appreciative of the periodic reports by the 
WTO Director-General to the Trade Policy Review  Body regarding measures which Members have 
been taking in the context of the economic and fi nancial crisis and whic h concern the multilateral 
trading system. 
41. Similarly, Chile attaches particular value to the activities of the Dispute Settlement Body, 
which safeguards effective compliance with the mult ilateral rules, thereby enabling all Members of 
the Organization to engage in open dialogue about the scope of the measures they discuss with a view 
to the prompt and effective settlement of any dispute that may arise.  In this new review period, Chile 
continues to be an active participant in the syst em, whether as a complainant, respondent or third 
party. 
42. Chile actively supported the initiatives for a ne w round of negotiations, welcoming the launch 
of the Doha Development Round and the clarificati ons made to the negotiating mandate at the Hong 
Kong Conference.  Chile likewise continues to suppor t the resumption by the WTO of efforts to arrive 
at the consensus needed to enable the Organization's highest b ody to fulfil its mandate successfully. 
43. The complementarity between the multilateral syst em and bilateral initiatives is reaffirmed, as 
the outcomes of the Round will bring improved access for Chile's export products to markets that are 
not preferential partners.  Besides, the topics to be negotiated in this de velopment round will settle 
important issues that bilateral preferential agreem ents have not been able to address, for example 
agricultural subsidies and the misuse of anti-dumping measures. 
44. Indeed, Chile is striving towards the following:  in the realm of agriculture, the elimination of 
export subsidies, substantial re ductions in trade-distorting dom estic support measures and the 
dismantling of tariffs and other barriers to market access;  as regards industrial goods, the elimination 
of tariff escalation;  the removal of fisheries subsidies;  improvements with respect to certain dispute 
settlement rules, and regarding the lacunae and ex cessive leeway allowed under certain provisions, 
which are leading to abusive practices in the imposition of anti-dumping duties;  and in services, greater access is being sought to the markets for prof essional services, sea and air transport, as well as 
information technology services. 
45. Chile has accordingly submitted various negotia ting proposals (individually or jointly with 
other Members) and has participated actively together  with other Members that share those interests, Chile WT/TPR/G/220 
 Page 11 
 
 
  such as the Cairns Group, the G-20 in agriculture , and the Friends of the Anti-Dumping Negotiations 
(FANs). 
(3) PARTICIPATION IN APEC 
46. Since 1994, Chile has been as a member of a nd active participant in the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.  In recent years, the Asia-Pacific region has become a priority 
of Chilean trade policy, and this was confirmed in 2004 when Chile was host economy and the venue 
of APEC forum activities. 
47. Initiatives have been launched in the APEC frame work to facilitate trade, including mutual 
recognition agreements and free trade agreements.  Chile has endeavoured to promote bilateral and 
sub-regional agreements as effective instrument s for deepening economic integration amongst the 
countries in the region.  Developed country APEC members have committed themselves to 
liberalizing trade in goods and services in the Asia-P acific region in 2010, whilst developing country 
members will do so in 2020.  Chile has undertaken  to liberalize its goods and services trade by 2010, a 
goal that has already been achieved as a result of the trade agreements signed by Chile, which have 
led to an average preferential tariff of about 1.3 per cent;  another contributing factor is that, with few 
exceptions, Chile maintains open regimes fo r trade in services and for investments. 
48. A clear illustration of the fact that APEC serves as a catalyst for economic and trade 
liberalization processes at both bilateral and multilateral level is the Statement by the Ministers Responsible for Trade (Singapore, July 2009) expressing support for the WTO multilateral trading 
system, the holding of the Seventh Ministerial Conf erence in Geneva, and lastly, urging that the Doha 
Development Round should be conc luded in 2010, as its outcomes will favour economic recovery. 
(4) P
ROCESS OF ACCESSION TO THE OECD 
49. In May 2007 the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Developm ent (OECD) invited 
Chile to begin a process of review of its public po licies and laws as well as their implementation, with 
a view to subsequent membership.  Since 1993 Chile has been participating with observer status in the 
work of some OECD committees, in particular its Trade Committee.  Even before the 2007 invitation, 
Chile had adopted various OECD recommendations, conventions and guidelines as part of its policy 
of modernizing the State, thus incorporating OE CD standards for the impr ovement of statistical 
measurement, the fight against bribery in international transactions, and accountability of 
multinational enterprises.  It is hoped that the pro cess of reviewing Chile's policies and the fulfilment 
of requirements will be complete d by late 2009 or early 2010 so that Chile will be ready for 
admission. 
(5) DOMESTIC LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES  
50. Law No. 19.912 (2003) adjusted various aspects of Chile's legislation in the light of the 
country's WTO commitments.  These included notifi cation of technical regulations and conformity 
assessment procedures (technical barriers to trade);  border measures that may be applied to enforce 
intellectual property rights;  and customs valuati on and the discontinuation of a customs clearance 
charge. 
51. Law No. 19.996 (2005) established the Industrial Property Tribunal, a body with special and 
independent status to hear and settle disputes rega rding objections to and nullity of industrial property 
rights and rights associated with plant varieties registered with the Servicio Agrícola y Ganadero  – 
SAG (Agriculture and Livestock Service). WT/TPR/G/220 Trade Policy Review 
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  52. In 2008 the National Congress approved the cr eation of Revenue and Customs Tribunals as 
judicial bodies independent of the regulatory agenci es.  They will be charged with settling disputes 
between taxpayers and the customs authorities in matte rs of classification, valuation, origin and the 
like.  They are expected to begin operating between 2009 and 2013. 
53. Pursuant to Law No. 19.914 (2003) Chile gra dually rolled back the import tax on luxury 
vehicles (which also applied to domestic vehicles)  until it was eliminated in 2007.  The reason behind 
the elimination was the commitment taken by Chile under its free trade agreement with the 
United States.  Based on the bilateral obligati on, the benefit was extended on an MFN basis. 
54. Special mention should be made of Law No. 20.285 on access to public information, enacted 
in April 2009 to regulate the principle of transpar ency of public functions, which is recognized under 
the Constitution.  The Law requires agencies of th e state administration to keep regularly updated 
versions of background documentation permanently av ailable to the public via their websites (active 
transparency);  it also imposes the duty to reply within specific timeframes to every request for 
information submitted by a citizen (passive transp arency).  To ensure compliance with those 
regulations, the law established a Transparency C ouncil to which citizens can turn if they are 
dissatisfied with the response from the branch of administration to which the request was addressed.  
This important step taken by the authorities will st rengthen the culture of transparency, which, as one 
of the guiding principles of the multilateral trading system, is vital to trade. 
(6) CONCLUSION  
55. Over the six years from 2003 to 2009, Chile h as pressed ahead with its strategy of further 
unilateral, bilateral and multilatera l opening up, as the country continues to promote an outward 
orientation as a key tool for achievi ng and sustaining economic recovery. 
56. Chile's participation in the WTO - not onl y in the Organization's regular work, but 
particularly in the Doha Development Round nego tiations - is an essential component of its trade 
strategy.  Chile hopes that ambitious results from the current Round will bring substantial new 
impetus for its domestic economy, create more and be tter jobs and generate e xports with higher added 
value. 
57. This is why Chile remains committed to the Doha Development Round and reaffirms its full 
determination to contribute to these negotiations, whether individually or in concert with other 
Members, so that they can conclude successfully in 2010. 
__________