WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
11 January 2010 
 (10-0086) 
  
  
 
  
TECHNICAL NOTE ON THE ACCESSION PROCESS 
 
Note by the Secretariat
 
 
Revision  
 
The present paper has been updated by the Secret ariat to reflect recent accessions.  This paper 
was originally produced in response to a request by the General Council for a Technical Note on the 
Accession Process (WT/GC/M/32). 
This paper contains information on complete d accessions.  Information on current accessions 
applications and Working Parties is contained in document WT/ACC/11 and subsequent revisions. 
_______________ 
 
 
 
    
 
     
 
    
 
This document has been prepa red under the Secretariat's own 
responsibility and without prejudice to the positions of Members and to their rights and obligations under the WTO  WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
 Page i 
 
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
I. OVERVIEW....................................................................................................................... .......1  
II. RELEVANT WTO PROVISIONS..........................................................................................3  
III. THE ACCESSION PROCESS ................................................................................................4  
1. General........................................................................................................................ ...............4  
(a) Procedures ..................................................................................................................... ............4  
(b) Status of Accession Working Parties.......................................................................................5  
2. Establishment of Working Party.............................................................................................9  
3. Collection of Factual Information .........................................................................................10  
(a) Memorandum..................................................................................................................... .....10  
(b) Copies of legislation .......................................................................................................... ......10  
(c) Data on applied duty rates ..................................................................................................... 11 
(d) Data on agricultural domestic support and export subsidies..............................................11  
(e) Data on services............................................................................................................... ........11  
(f) Questions and Replies.......................................................................................................... ...12 
(g) Examination of the trade regime ...........................................................................................12  
4. Negotiation of Terms of Accession ........................................................................................12  
(a) Rules.......................................................................................................................... ...............15  
- Transitional arrangements.....................................................................................................1 6 
(b) Market access for goods ........................................................................................................ .16 
- Schedule of Concessions and Commitments on Goods, tariff concessions ........................17  
- Sectoral initiatives........................................................................................................... ........24  
- Other Duties a nd Charges......................................................................................................2 5 
- Agricultural commitments .....................................................................................................25  
- Domestic Support............................................................................................................... .....26  
- Export Subsidies ............................................................................................................... ......28  
(c) Services ....................................................................................................................... .............29  
5. Completion of the Working Party Mandate.........................................................................32  
6. Adoption of Working Party Report by General Council, Entry into Force of 
Protocol of Accession .......................................................................................................... ....32  
7. Invocation of Article XIII of the WTO Agreement .............................................................33  
IV. LEAST-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES ..................................................................................33  
V. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ................................................................................................34  
VI. DISCUSSIONS ON THE ACCESSION PROCESS - RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS.................................................................................................................36  
  WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
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 I. OVERVIEW 
This Technical Note reviews the process of WTO accession and updates the information contained in 
document WT/ACC/10/Rev.3.  The aim of this pape r is to assist in the discussion of the accession 
process as a whole, rather than to provide  specific analysis of particular cases. 
Part II of this Note reproduces the relevant WTO provisions that govern the accession process – in 
particular Article XII of the Marrakesh Agreement Es tablishing the WTO.  Article XII states that "any 
State or separate customs territory possessing full au tonomy in the conduct of its external commercial 
relations and of the other matters provided for in this Agreement and the Multilateral 
Trade Agreements may accede to th is Agreement, on terms to be agreed between it and the WTO."  
While the terms of accession are decided on a case-by -case basis and are different for each Applicant, 
accessions are similar enough for patterns to emerge.    
Part III describes the modalities of the accession process.   The Secretariat, in consultation with WTO 
Members, has drawn up a set of procedures to be  followed during the accession process (outlined in 
documents WT/ACC/1, 4, 5, 8 and 9).1  This Note examines experien ce with their operation since the 
WTO Agreement entered into force on 1 January 19 95 using, as a reference point, the experience of 
Working Parties that have concluded their work.2 
The substantive phase of the accession process begins  with collection of factual information on the 
acceding government's trade regime.  This is based on a Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime submitted by the Applicant.  On the basis of this  document, Members examine the trade and legal 
regime of the Applicant, asking for clarifications or additional data where necessary, and identifying 
areas of possible inconsistency with the WTO Agre ements.  This examination continues through 
written exchanges of Questions and Replies be tween members of the Working Party and the 
Applicant.  As the information-gathering stage ad vances, the Secretariat is requested to prepare a 
Factual Summary of Points Raised – an informal  document summarizing discussions in the Working 
Party.  This document gradually develo ps into a draft Working Party Report. 
The next stage of the accession process, which often overlaps with the fact-finding stage, is the 
negotiation of the Applicant's terms of accession.  Negotiations fall into two main categories - 
negotiations on multilateral WTO rules, and b ilateral market access negotiations.   
Multilateral negotiations on WTO rules relate to goods (including systemic agricultural issues), 
TRIPS and systemic issues in services.  Acceding governments must be prepared to accept all the 
rules set out in the WTO Agreement.  Their oblig ations on rules are contained in the relevant 
"commitment paragraphs" of their Working Party Repo rts, which are incorporated by reference in the 
Protocols of Accession.  Sometimes commitments may be  recorded in the text of the Protocol itself.  
Annex 3 of Addendum 1 to this document reproduces the commitments on rules undertaken in completed accessions.  
Bilateral market access negotiations begin followi ng the Applicant's submission of offers on tariff 
concessions and specific commitments on services.  As  the negotiations advance, these initial market 
access offers are revised to take account of the requ ests of interested Members.  The results of the 
negotiations on goods are consolidated by the Secret ariat in a draft Goods Schedule.  Similarly, the 
results of the services negotiations are consolidated in  a draft Services Schedule.  This Note examines, 
in particular, the tariff concessions on agricultural and non-agricultural products of new Members.  
                                                     
 
1 See document WT/ACC/10/Rev.4/Add.1 (Annex 1) for a detailed list of documents dealing with 
accession to the WTO. 
2 Information on the status of ongoing Working Parties is contained in document WT/ACC/11 (and 
subsequent revisions). WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
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  It also surveys agricultural co mmitments on domestic support and export subsidies, as well as tariff 
rate quotas and special safeguard provisions.  With regard to services, this Note provides a synoptic 
overview of the specific commitments undertaken by  new Members.  A more detailed summary is 
contained in Annex 4 of A ddendum 1 to this document. 
Acceding governments usually hold plurilateral meeti ngs with interested members of the Working 
Party on issues related to agricultural support measur es and export subsidies.  Other technical areas of 
systemic interest, such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures and technical standards and regulations, may also be discussed in a plurilateral setting.  These meetings help paving the way for a 
multilateral Agreement on the systemic issues in ag riculture as well as in other areas, as needed. 
Transitional arrangements have been the subject  of considerable discussion in accession Working 
Parties.  The transition periods granted to original WTO Members during the Uruguay Round are not 
automatic to governments acceding under Article XII.  However, transitional arrangements have been 
granted in some accessions, in a limited number of areas and for specific periods of time, following submissions by Applicants of action plans detaili ng the steps that would be taken to ensure WTO 
conformity by the date of accession.  Transition pe riods have been extended more readily to least-
developed country (LDC) Applicants, allowing them greater flexibility for bringing their foreign trade 
regime into WTO conformity (see Annex 5 of  document WT/ACC/10/Rev.4/Add.1).     
The Protocol of Accession sets out the terms of accession agreed between WTO Members and the 
acceding government in a single package.  It incorporates the relevant commitment paragraphs of the Working Party Report, as well as the Goods and Serv ices Schedules.  All the obligations in this 
accession package are enforceable through the Dis pute Settlement Understanding of the WTO (see 
Annex 2 of document WT/ACC/10/Rev.4/Add.1).   
Part IV of this Note surveys the situation of LDC Applicants, which has been the subject of particular 
attention.
3  In December 2002, recognizing the special needs of acceding LDCs, the General Council 
adopted a Decision4 to facilitate and accelerate negotiations  with acceding LDCs in accordance with 
paragraph 42 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration5 and the mandate in paragraph 18(iii) of the WTO 
Work Programme on LDCs.6  The Decision contains Guidelines for simplified and streamlined 
accession procedures for LDCs, while reaffirming th e role of technical assistance and capacity 
building.  Representatives from all LDC Applicants par ticipate regularly in intensive training courses 
and seminars organised by the Secretariat.  In a ddition, the Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) for 
coordination and delivery of trade-related tec hnical assistance to LDCs links the WTO with 
UNCTAD, ITC, IMF, the World Bank and UNDP.   
Part V provides information on the technical co-operation activities of the WTO Secretariat, as well as 
those of national governments and other interna tional organisations.  The Secretariat provides 
technical assistance to all acceding governments on re quest, within the limit of available resources.  
All governments in the process of accession have re ceived such assistance in various forms –  
regional or Geneva-based courses or seminars; fo cussed assistance in the provision of information 
needed by the Working Party; assist ance in the drafting of legislation; tabling of offers; training 
courses, etc.  In addition, the Secretariat takes a ll possible steps to co-ord inate technical assistance 
related to accessions provided by other orga nisations and WTO Member governments.  
Part VI summarises the discussions on the process of accession to the WTO, which have taken place 
at Ministerial Conferences and at meetings of the General Council.  Specifically, the discussions have 
                                                      
3 See, for example, document WT/COMTD/LDC/W/44. 
4 WT/L/508. 
5 WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1. 
6 WT/COMTD/LDC/11.  WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
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 focused on the procedures laid down for accession under Article XII; the transparency and pace of the 
accession process; whether the fact-finding stage overburdens Applicants, particularly the smaller economies; the terms and conditions of accession, in  particular the availability of special and 
differential treatment and transition periods; th e special needs of acceding LDC Applicants; the 
provision and co-ordination of technical assistan ce; and the relationship between accessions and the 
multilateral trade negotiations. 
The Accessions dossier remains a major priority fo r the WTO.  Ongoing accessions are at different 
stages of the process and WTO Members would like to see these concluded as soon as possible.  On their side, the acceding governments are keen to pa rticipate in the work of the WTO as full and 
effective players.  This would also ensure that  these governments maintain the momentum of their 
domestic reform processes and that the evolution of do mestic reform remains consistent with evolving 
WTO rules and disciplines.  
II. RELEVANT WTO PROVISIONS 
Article XII of the Marrakesh Agreement Estab lishing the World Trade Organization deals with 
accession.  The full text of this provision reads as follows: 
"1. Any State or separate customs territory  possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its 
external commercial relations and of the ot her matters provided for in this Agreement 
and the Multilateral Trade Agreements may acced e to this Agreement, on terms to be 
agreed between it and the WTO.  Such acce ssion shall apply to this Agreement and 
the Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed thereto. 
2. Decisions on accession shall be taken by the Ministerial Conference.  The Ministerial 
Conference shall approve the Agreement on the terms of accession by a two-thirds 
majority of the Members of the WTO.  
3. Accession to a Plurilateral Trade Agreemen t shall be governed by the provisions of 
that Agreement." 
Perhaps the most striking feature of Article XII is its brevity.  It gives no guidance on the "terms to be 
agreed", these being left to negotiations between the WTO Members and the Applicant.  Nor does it 
lay down any procedures to be used for negotia ting these terms.  These procedures have evolved 
separately as will be discussed in the next part of this Note.  In this, it follows closely the 
corresponding Article XXXIII of the GATT 1947. 
A number of other WTO provisions are relevant to the accession process: 
- Article XVI:1 lays down that "Except as otherwise provided under this Agreement or 
the Multilateral Trade Agreements, the WT O shall be guided by the decisions, 
procedures and customary practices followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 and the bodies established in the framework of GATT 1947"; 
- Article XII:2 states that "Decisions on accession shall be taken by the Ministerial 
Conference", Article IV:2 makes it clear that "In the intervals between meetings of the 
Ministerial Conference, its functions sha ll be conducted by the General Council";  
- Article IX deals with decision-making.  On 15 November 1995 the General Council 
agreed to procedures regarding decision- making under Articles IX and XII of the 
WTO Agreement which clarified the relation between these two provisions (WT/GC/M/8, page 6); and 
- Article XIII, paragraphs 1 and 3, state that: 
"1. This Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annexes 1 and 2 
shall not apply as between any Member a nd any other Member if either of the WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
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  Members, at the time either becomes a Member, does not consent to such 
application. 
 [...] 3. Paragraph 1 shall apply between a Member and another Member which has 
acceded under Article XII only if the Member not consenting to the 
application has so notified the Minister ial Conference before the approval of 
the Agreement on the terms of accession by the Ministerial Conference";  
III. THE ACCESSION PROCESS 
1. General (a) Procedures 
The organization and pursuit of accession negotia tions in each Working Party follow a well-
established pattern based on procedures set out in a note by the Secretariat – document WT/ACC/1 of 
24 March 1995. These procedures were modelled on those followed by the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947, including the Complementary Procedures on Accession Negotiations agreed by the Council of GATT 1947 on 27 October 1993 (L/7317) and the statement by 
the Chairman of the Council of GATT 1947 on the Management of Accession Negotiations on 
10 November 1994 (C/COM/4).  Before issuing document WT/ACC/1, the Secretariat consulted 
extensively with interested WTO Members and t ook the views expressed into account.  During these 
consultations an understanding was reached that document WT/ACC/1 would not be submitted to the 
Ministerial Conference/General Council (hereinafter  referred to as the General Council unless specific 
reference to the Ministerial Conference is require d) or to individual Working Parties for formal 
endorsement but that it would be prepared as a pr actical guide for delegations of both WTO Members 
and acceding governments and not as a genera l policy statement on accession negotiations (see 
document WT/ACC/1, paragraph 2). 
Document WT/ACC/1 sets out the different stages in the accession process.  The General Council 
considers applications to accede under Article X II and decides on the establishment of a Working 
Party.  The essence of the multilateral work of th e Working Party begins w ith the submission of a 
Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime by the A pplicant government.  The Working Party first 
conducts a factual examination of the trade regime  of the acceding government on the basis of the 
Memorandum and the replies to Members' quest ions on the Memorandum.  At an appropriate 
moment, it moves on to negotiate the terms of accession, which relate to three main areas - WTO rules on goods, TRIPS and systemic issues in the area of services.  Bilateral market access 
negotiations on goods and services, between in terested Members and the acceding government, 
proceed in parallel to the multilateral work.  When  Agreement is reached, the Report of the Working 
Party, including a draft Decision and Protocol of A ccession, is forwarded to the General Council.  The 
Protocol - which brings together the single packag e of agreed commitments on rules, concessions and 
commitments on goods, and specific commitments on services - sets out the terms on which the 
Applicant is invited to join th e WTO.  The General Council adopts the Report and approves the draft 
Decision, when it accepts the Protocol, through a domestic ratification procedure, the acceding 
government becomes a Member of the WTO 30 days after notifying acceptance of the Protocol. 
Document WT/ACC/1 is supplemented by four Technical Notes by the Secretariat: 
− WT/ACC/4 - Information to be provided on Domestic Support and Export Subsidies in 
Agriculture.  This document is designed to  identify agricultural policy measures under 
the Agreement on Agriculture on which such information is required;  WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
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 − WT/ACC/5 - Information to be Provided on Po licy Measures Affecting Trade in Services.  
This document is designed to facilitate the d escription of policy measures relevant to the 
provisions of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS); 
− WT/ACC/8 - Information to be Provided on Policy Measures with Respect to SPS and 
TBT Issues.  This document is designed as a questionnaire to assist acceding governments in the provision of information, which will facilitate discussion on SPS/TBT issues; and 
− WT/ACC/9 (and Corr.1) - Information to be Provided on Implementation of the 
TRIPS Agreement.  Designed as a questionnair e, this document is prepared to assist 
acceding governments in the provision of information to facilitate discussion on TRIPS-related issues. 
The Accessions Division of the Secretariat has regular consultations with acceding governments, 
WTO Members and chairpersons on the programme of meetings and agenda of accession Working 
Parties. 
(b) Status of Accession Working Parties 
More than 50 governments have applied to acc ede under Article XII since the WTO Agreement 
entered into force on 1 January 1995.  A number of applications consisted of requests made earlier to 
accede to the GATT 1947, which were converted into re quests for accession to the WTO.  Pursuant to 
the decision adopted by the General Council on 31 January 1995, GATT 1947 Working Parties were 
converted into WTO Working Parties. 
Twenty-five of these have completed the accession procedures and have become WTO Members.  
These are, in the order in which they acceded: 
1. Ecuador; 
2. Bulgaria; 
3. Mongolia; 
4. Panama; 
5. Kyrgyz Republic; 
6. Latvia; 
7. Estonia; 8. Jordan; 
9. Georgia; 
10. Albania; 
11. Oman; 
12. Croatia; 
13. Lithuania; 
14. Moldova; 15. China; 
16. Chinese Taipei; 
17. Armenia; 
18. Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM); 19. Nepal;  
20. Cambodia;  
21. Saudi Arabia; 
22. Viet Nam; 
23. Tonga; 
24. Ukraine; and 
25. Cape Verde. 
 
Table 1, Timetable of Completed Accessions, provi des information on the dates of application, 
circulation of key documents, and the dates of access ion of the governments that have negotiated their 
WTO accession under Article XII.  It also presents a timeline of events between the presentation of 
the Memorandum (which marks the beginning of th e substantive part of the accession process) and 
accession.  The shortest accession process has overall taken 2 years and 10 months 
(Kyrgyz Republic), and the longest 15 years and 5 months (China).    
  WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
Page 6 Table 1:  Timetable of Completed Accessions7 
  Ecuador Bulgaria Mongolia Panama Kyrgyz Republic 
  Date Time Since 
Memo Date Time Since 
Memo Date Time Since 
Memo Date Time Since 
Memo Date Time Since 
Memo 
Application 09/1992  09/1986  07/1991  08/1991  02/1996  
Working Party Established 10/1992  02/1990  10/1991  10/1991  04/1996  
Memorandum 05/1993  07/1993  01/1992  06/1993  08/1996  
07/1993 2 months 07/1993 1 month 06/1993 1 year 04/1994 10 months 03/1997 7 months 1st Meeting of Working Party 
     5 months     
10/1994 1 year 05/1994 10 months 12/1994 2 years 05/1996 2 years 04/1998 1 year Draft Working Party Report 
 5 months    11 months  11 months  8 months 
07/1995 2 years 09/1996 2 years 06/1996 4 years 09/1996 2 years 07/1998 1 year Report Adopted by Working Party 
 2 months  2 months  5 months  3 months  11  months 
07/1995 2 years 10/1996 3 years 07/1996 4 years 10/1996 3 years 10/1998 2 years Report Adopted by Council 
 2 months  3 months  6 months  4 months  2 months 
01/1996 2 years 12/1996 3 years 01/1997 5 years 09/1997 4 years 12/1998 2 years Membership 
 8 months  5 months    3 months  4 months 
Total Time 3 years 4 months 10 years 3 months 5 years 6 months 5 years 1 month 2 years 10 months 
 
  Latvia Estonia Jordan Georgia Albania 
  Date Time Since 
Memo Date Time Since 
Memo Date Time Since 
Memo Date Time Since 
Memo Date Time Since 
Memo 
Application 11/1993  03/1994  01/1994  07/1996  11/1992  
Working Party Established 12/1993  03/1994  01/1994  07/1996  12/1992  
Memorandum 08/1994  03/1994  10/1994  07/1997  01/1995  
03/1995 7 months 11/1994 8 months 10/1996 2 years 03/1998 11  months 04/1996 1 year 1st Meeting of Working Party 
         3 months 
12/1996 2 years 11/1998 4 years 04/1999 4 years 02/1999 1 year 07/1999 4 years Draft Working Party Report 
 4 months  8 months  6  months  10  months  6 months 
09/1998 4 years 04/1999 5 years 11/1999 5 years 10/1999 2 years 07/2000 5 years Report Adopted by Working Party 
 1 month  1 month  1 month  6 months  6 months 
10/1998 4 years 05/1999 5 years 12/1999 5 years 10/1999 2 years 07/2000 5 years Report Adopted by Council 
 2 months  2 months  2 months  6 months  6 months 
02/1999 4 years 11/1999 5 years 04/2000 5 years 06/2000 3 years 09/2000 5 years Membership 
 6 months  8 months  6 months  2 months  8 months 
Total Time 5 years 3 months 5 years 8 months 6 years 4 months 4 years 1 month 7 years 10 months 
                                                      
7 In order of dated of WTO accession.  
   WT/ACC/10/Rev.4
 Page 7 
  Oman Croatia Lithuania Moldova China 
  Date Time Since 
Memo Date Time Since 
Memo Date Time Since 
Memo Date Time Since 
Memo Date Time Since 
Memo 
Application 04/1996  09/1993  01/1994  11/1993  07/1986  
Working Party Established 06/1996  10/1993  02/1994  12/1993  03/1987  
Memorandum 06/1996  06/1994  12/1994  12/1996  02/1987  
04/1997 10  months 04/1996 1 year 11/1995 11 months 06/1997 6 months 10/1987 8 months 1st Meeting of Working Party 
   10 months       
03/1999 2 years 08/1998 2 years 06/1997 2 years 07/1999 2 years 12/1994 7 years Draft Working Party Report 
 9  months  2  months  6 months  7 months  10 months 
09/2000 4 years 06/2000 6 years 10/2000 5 years 12/2000 4 years 09/2001 14 years Report Adopted by Working Party 
 3  months    10 months    7 months 
10/2000 4 years 07/2000 6 years 12/2000 6 years 05/2001 4 years 11/2001 14 years Report Adopted by Council 
 4  months  1 month    5 months  9 months 
11/2000 4 years 11/2000 6 years 05/2001 6 years 07/2001 4 years 12/2001 14 years Membership 
 5 months  5 months  5 months  7 months  10 months 
Total Time 4 years 7 months 7 years 2 months 7 ye ars 5 months 7 years 4 months 15 years 5 months 
 
  Chinese Taipei Armenia FYROM Nepal Cambodia Saudi Arabia 
  Date Time Since 
Memo Date Time Since 
Memo Date Time Since 
Memo Date Time Since 
Memo Date Time Since 
Memo Date Time Since 
Memo 
Application 01/1992  11/1993  12/ 1994  05/1989  12/1994  06/1993  
Working Party Established 09/1992  12/19 93  12/1994  06/1989  12/1994  07/1993  
Memorandum 10/1992  04/1995  04/19 99  08/1998  06/1999  07/1994  
11/1992 1 month 01/1996 9 months 07/2000 1 year 05/2000 1 year 05/2001 1 year 05/1996 1 year 1st Meeting of Working Party 
     3 months  9 months  11 months  10 months 
03/1998 5 years 03/1997 1 year 05/2002 2 years 06/2003 4 years 03/2003 3 years 01/2000 5 years Draft Working Party Report 
 5 months  11 months  11 months  10 months  9 months  6 months 
09/2001 8 years 11/2002 6 years 09/2002 3 years 08/2003 5 years 07/2003 4 years 10/2005 11 years Report Adopted by Working Party 
 11 months  7 months  5 months    1 month  3 months 
11/2001 9 years 12/2002 6 years 10/2002 3 years 09/2003 5 years 09/2003 4 years 11/2005 11 years Report Adopted by Council 
 1 months  8 months  6 months  1 month  3 months  4 months 
01/2002 9 years 02/2003 6 years 04/2003 4 years 04/2004 5 years 10/2004 5 years 12/2005 11 years Membership 
 2 months  10 months    8 months  4 months  5 months 
Total Time 10 years 9 years 3 months 8 years 3 months 14 years 11 months 9 years 10 months 12 years 6 months 
  
    
  WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
Page 8   Viet Nam Tonga Ukraine Cape Verde 
  Date Time Since 
Memo Date Time Since 
Memo Date Time Since 
Memo Date Time Since 
Memo 
Application 01/1995  06/ 1995  11/1993  11/1999  
Working Party Established 01/19 95  11/1995  12/1993  07/2000  
Memorandum 09/1996  05/1998  07/1994  07/2003  
07/1998 1 years 04/2001 2 years 02/1995 7 months 03/2004 8 months 1st Meeting of Working Party 
 10 months  11 months     
11/2004 8 years 03/2003 4 years 03/2004 9 years 06/2005 1 year Draft Working Party Report 
 2 months  10 months  8 months  11 months 
10/2006 10 years 11/2005 7 years 01/2008 13 years  12/2007 4 years Report Adopted by Working Party 
 1 month  6 months  6 months  5 months 
11/2006 10 years  12/2005 7 years 02/2008 13 years 12/2007 4 years Report Adopted by Council 
 2 months  7 months  7 months  5 months 
01/2007 10 years 07/2007 9 years 05/2008 13 years  07/2008 5 years Membership 
 4 months  2 months  10 months   
Total Time 12 years 12 years 1 month 14 years 6 months 8 years 8 months  WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
 Page 9 
 
 
  Working Parties are currently establishe d to examine the requests presented by: 
1. Afghanistan 
2. Algeria 
3. Andorra 
4. Azerbaijan 
5. Bahamas 
6. Belarus 
7. Bhutan 
8. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
9. Comoros, Union of the  
10. Equatorial Guinea  11. Ethiopia 
12. I.R. Iran 
13. Iraq 
14. Kazakhstan 
15. Lao People's 
Democratic Republic 
16. Lebanese Republic 
17. Liberia 
18. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
19. Montenegro 20. Russian Federation 
21. Samoa 
22. Sao Tomé and Principe 
23. Serbia  
24. Seychelles 
25. Sudan 
26. Tajikistan 
27. Uzbekistan 
28. Vanuatu 
29. Yemen  
 A Working Party has not yet been established to  examine a request from Syria (documents 
WT/ACC/SYR/1, 2 and 3 refer).  
Document WT/ACC/11, and subsequent revisions, contains information on the status of ongoing 
accessions (as of the date of the document)8. 
2. Establishment of Working Party 
Governments wishing to accede to the WTO as a State or as a separate customs territory write to the 
Director-General of the WTO, indicating that they wish to do so under Article XII of the Marrakesh Agreement.  The Director-General ve rifies these requests and  transmits them to the 
General Council, which normally considers them at it s next meeting.  At this stage, discussion in the 
General Council is usually gene ral in nature.  Normally, the acceding government presents its 
application, Members welcome this and the Ge neral Council establishes a Working Party with 
standard terms of reference: 
"to examine the application of the Government  of [name of Applicant] to accede to 
the World Trade Organization under Article  XII and to submit to the General 
Council/Ministerial Conference recomme ndations which may include a draft 
Protocol of Accession." 
These terms of reference are modelled on tho se previously used for GATT Accession Working 
Parties.  All Working Parties have been given the standard terms of reference. 
When the Working Party is established, it is sta ndard practice for the Chairman of the General 
Council to be given the authority to designate its chairperson after consultin g with the Applicant and 
members of the Working Party.  The Chairmanship  is not confirmed until an announcement has been 
made at the General Council under "Other business". 
Membership of the Working Party is open to all interested WTO Members.  In addition, all acceding 
governments can participate as observers in formal Working Party meetings.  This ensures that the 
multilateral part of the accession process is conducted in a transparent manner.  The size of Working 
Parties has varied considerably – from 17 Members (Tonga) to 61 Members (China).
 9 
The rules of procedure governing observer status for international intergovernmental organizations 
(IGOs) in the WTO provide that requests for observe r status from IGOs shall be considered on a case-
by-case basis by each WTO body to which such a re quest is addressed.  They further specify that 
                                                      
8 Information on ongoing accessions is al so available on the WTO website at 
http://www.wto .org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/acc_e.htm . 
9 For this calculation, the European Union and its me mber states (currently 27) are counted as one. WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
Page 10  
 
  IGOs accorded observer status in a particular WTO body shall not automatically be accorded such 
status in other WTO bodies.  Under the procedures,  IGOs that do not have the formal status of 
observers may attend meetings of accession Working Parties on an ad hoc  basis at the specific 
invitation of the Working Party concerned.  IGOs that wish to become observers in accession 
Working Parties make an application to the Workin g Party or parties concerned.  The following IGOs 
have obtained observer status in some acces sion Working Parties:  EBRD, EFTA, IMF, UN, 
UNCTAD, WIPO and World Bank.   
3. Collection of Factual Information  
The next phase in the process is one of fact-finding, designed to give WTO Members an 
understanding of the Applicant country or territory, its economy and, in particular, its trade regime. 
This phase is usually also one of mutual edu cation during which the Applicant gains a better 
understanding of the WTO and its requirements.  Th is process is inevitably demanding, especially on 
the Applicant, but is an essential preliminary to, and basis for, the negotiation of the terms of 
accession. 
(a) Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime 
The Applicant submits a Memorandum  describing in detail its forei gn trade regime and providing 
relevant statistical data for circulation to all WT O Members according to the outline format attached 
to document WT/ACC/1.  This outline has been  prepared based on the experience gained in 
GATT Working Parties, greatly expanded to re flect the coverage of the WTO Agreements. 
The preparation of the Memorandum requires a c onsiderable investment of resources from the 
Applicant.  As a result, acceding governments have  sometimes taken extended periods of time to 
prepare this document (see Table 1).  The presentation of a complete and accurate document, 
however, greatly facilitates the subsequent stages of the accession process.  Generally, the outline of 
the Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime provides the framework for the whole accession process. 
(b) Copies of legislation 
Document WT/ACC/1 states that laws and regulations  relevant to accession are to be made available 
to members of the Working Party at the same time  as the Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime.  
It goes on to state that "the customary practice in  this respect has been that the Applicant send a 
complete and comprehensive copy of the relevant laws and regulations to the Secretariat.  If the 
textual material is short, it should be entirely transl ated by the Applicant into one of the WTO official 
languages (English, French and Spanish), if it is long, the Applicant should provide a detailed 
summary in one of the official languages." 
The purpose of this arrangement is to enable Workin g Party members to check relevant sections of the 
Memorandum and to ensure that the laws and regula tions conform to WTO requirements.  As stated 
in document WT/ACC/1, only laws and regulations that are relevant to the particular accession 
process should be submitted. 
In practice, many laws and regulations are s upplied to the WTO after the Memorandum has been 
distributed, especially since many acceding govern ments are undertaking reforms which require major 
changes in their legislation.  Detailed summaries of laws and regulations are of limited use, as some Members have insisted that they need to receive the full text of laws and regulations relevant to 
accession in one of the WTO working languages.   
It has now become standard practice for Applicants  to submit "legislative action plans", outlining the 
legislative work programme underway, as well as targ et dates for implementation.  As the accession  WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
 Page 11 
 
 
  process advances, governments are regularly requested  to revise and update their legislative action 
plans. 
(c) Data on applied duty rates 
The procedures provide that copies of the Applican t's currently applicable tariff schedule in the 
Harmonized System (HS) nomenclature should be ma de available to members of the Working Party 
at the same time as the Memorandum on the Foreign Re gime.  Applicants are requested to supply this 
in electronic format. The expectation of WTO Memb ers has been that the applied rates would be 
taken as the base rates in the bilateral market ac cess negotiations on goods.  Members also request 
that import data be supplied in electronic format on a tariff line level, including a break-down by country. 
As these data are mainly used in the bilateral market access negotiations, in practice detailed 
information has often been provided to the WTO only once negotiations are about to begin. 
(d) Data on agricultural domest ic support and export subsidies 
Document WT/ACC/1 foresees that the Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime contains a 
description of the range of policies affecting forei gn trade in agricultural products.  In addition, a 
Technical Note by the Secretariat (WT/ACC/4) has been prepared "to allow acceding Governments to 
present factual information on their domestic support  and export subsidy measures actually in place in 
agriculture […] in a manner consistent with th e notification requirements of the Agreement on 
Agriculture". Document WT/ACC/ 4 indicates that information in the supporting tables should be 
provided "normally for each of the three most recent years". 
Document WT/ACC/4 has been drawn up in consultation with Members.  It sets out their expectations 
in this regard and provides deta ils on the information to be provided.  The supporting tables, which 
are usually revised over time as a result of discussi ons with Members, form the basis for the future 
commitments limiting subsidization of agricultural pr oducts to be included in the Goods Schedule.  
The preparation of the supporting tables containe d in document WT/ACC/4 involves a thorough grasp 
of complex WTO requirements and detailed technical work.  Working Party members have also made 
clear the importance that they a ttach to the full and accurate pres entation of support actually granted 
and not, for instance, of budgetary estimates.  It is therefore not surprising that these tables are sometimes presented at a fairly advanced stage of the accession process.  Acceding governments often hold plurilateral meetings, chaired by the Secretariat,  with interested WTO Members to assist in the 
revision of these tables.   
(e) Data on services 
The outline format attached to document WT/ACC/ 1 provides some guidance on the information, 
which should be included in the Memorandum on the Applicant's trade-related services regime.  The 
Secretariat has put together a Technical Note (WT/ACC/5) in consultation with Members, which is designed "to assist acceding Governments in submitti ng factual information on their policies affecting 
trade in services relevant to their economy". 
However, in practice, some Working Parties ha ve shown readiness to open negotiations on specific 
commitments to be included in the Services Schedule of the Applicant on the basis of a detailed offer, 
rather than a full response to document WT/ACC/5.  The response to document WT/ACC/5 is, in any 
case, aimed at helping Applicants put toge ther a services offer as soon as possible. WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
Page 12  
 
  (f) Questions and Replies 
The procedures outlined in document WT/ACC/1 provide that, following the circulation of the 
Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime, member s of the Working Party submit questions in 
writing.  The acceding government submits its repli es in writing, through the Secretariat, which 
consolidates them and arranges them by topic under the headings of the Memorandum.  The headings 
of the Memorandum provide the basic framework fo r the Questions and Replies documents; Members 
have posed questions on other topics in only a few instances. 
In a few cases, more than one round of questions and replies have taken place before the first meeting 
of the Working Party.  The number and diversity of questions have varied considerably from one 
accession to another.  
(g) Examination of the trade regime 
The first meeting of the Working Party is scheduled  once an adequate documentary basis is available 
(the submission of a Memorandum, followed by the ci rculation of a Questions and Replies document 
is essential).  Document WT/ACC/1 states that a mi nimum of four to six weeks should elapse between 
the formal circulation of the documentation in one of the three working languages (English, French 
and Spanish) and a meeting of the Working Party to allow adequate time for delegations to prepare.  
This amount of time has normally been provided. 
Document WT/ACC/1 foresees that at the firs t meeting, representatives from the Applicant 
government and members of the Working Party examine the Memorandum and the Questions and 
Replies provided, with a view to seeking any further clarifications that may be required in light of the various provisions of the WTO Agreements.  After the meeting, members of the Working Party 
submit their comments and questions raised during th e meeting, as well as any additional points that 
they may want to raise, in writing.  The A pplicant government provides written replies to the 
Members' questions and forwards them to the S ecretariat, which consolidates them into a single 
"Questions and Replies" document prior to formal ci rculation.  Further fact-finding meetings may be 
held as necessary before the Working Party begins to negotiate the terms on which the Applicant will 
accede.  The written Questions and Replies documents, distributed after each meeting of the Working 
Party, constitute a record of the discussions and are invariably channelled through the Secretariat.  In 
accordance with the agreed procedures set out in  document WT/ACC/1, at the conclusion of each 
meeting of the Working Party, the Chairman sums up th e state of play and next steps to be taken.    
The number of fact-finding meetings that have been held in each Working Party has varied 
considerably, depending on a number of factors, in cluding the interest generated by a particular 
accession, the complexity of the po licies examined and the adequacy of the information supplied.   
The practice has emerged since the circulation of document WT/ACC/1 of requesting the Secretariat, 
at an appropriate stage, to prepare a Factual Summa ry of Points Raised in order to consolidate the 
information contained in the Memorandum, the supplementary documents, and the Questions and 
Replies documents.  The Factual Summary is arranged  by topic following closely the headings of the 
Memorandum.  The purpose of this Summary is to facilitate the work of the Working Party, by 
summarizing the discussions contained in the written exchanges, identifying the points that require 
further clarification, and generally making the pr ocess more transparent.  The Factual Summary may 
be revised as necessary. 
4. Negotiation of Terms of Accession 
Once the fact-finding work is suffici ently advanced, the Working Party begins to negotiate the terms, 
on which the Applicant will accede to the WTO (in practice, the fact-finding and negotiating phases 
often overlap).  These negotiations proceed al ong two tracks – multilateral (on WTO rules) and  WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
 Page 13 
 
 
  bilateral (on market access).  The procedures set  out in document WT/ACC/1 contain fewer details 
concerning the negotiating phase of the process than about the earlier fact-finding phase and the last 
phase in which the results of the negotiation are formali sed and put into effect.  This is so because the 
main aim of this document is define the framewo rk for the negotiations between WTO Members and 
the acceding government.  Paragraph 12 of do cument WT/ACC/1 indicates that "when the 
examination of the foreign trade regime is far enough advanced, members of the Working Party may 
initiate bilateral market access nego tiations on goods and services and on the other terms to be agreed.  
It is understood that the fact-finding work on the foreign trade regime and the negotiating phase can 
overlap and proceed in parallel".   
Multilateral negotiations relate to the rules estab lished by the WTO Agreements, including rules on 
goods, TRIPS, and issues of general sy stemic interest relating to services.  At this stage of the process, 
the Factual Summary evolves into a draft Report of  the Working Party, which – in addition to the 
factual description – incorporates the specific terms of accession.  These terms are set out in the relevant Working Party Report's commitment paragra phs, which are incorporated by reference in the 
Protocol of Accession.  Sometimes the commitments are also contained in the text of the Protocol 
itself. 
Bilateral negotiations relate to the market acce ss negotiations on tariff concessions in goods and 
specific commitments in the services sectors.  The re sults of these negotiations are consolidated by the 
Secretariat into draft Goods and Services Schedul es.  Commitments on  agricultural domestic support 
and export subsidies are incorporated in the Goods Schedule. 
The following sections describe how the process h as worked in practice, by providing some 
information on the procedures followed and by analysing the terms contained in the Working Party 
Reports.   
The terms of accession of Applicants that have negotiated their WTO accession under Article XII are 
contained in the documents listed in Table 2 below. 
  
  WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
Page 14 Table 2  
Government Membership Date Working Party Re port Goods Schedule Services Schedule Protoc ol of Accession Gen eral Council Decision  
1. Albania 8 September 2000 WT/ACC/ALB/51 & Corr.1 Add.1 Add.2 & Corr.1, 2 WT/ACC/ ALB/53 & Corr.1 WT/ACC/ALB/52 & Corr.1 
2. Armenia 5 February 2003 WT/ACC/ARM/23 & Corr.1 Add.1 Add.2 WT/L/506 WT/L/506 
3. Bulgaria 1 December 1996 WT/ACC/BGR/5 & Corr .1 Add.1 Add.2 WT/ACC/BGR/7 WT/ACC/BGR/6 
4. Cambodia 23 April 2004 WT/ACC/KHM/21 Add.1 Add.2 WT/MIN(03)/18 WT/MIN(03)/18 
5. Cape Verde 23 July 2008 WT/ACC/CPV/ 30 Add.1 Add.2 WT/L/715 WT/L/715 
6. China 11 December 2001 WT/ACC/CHN/49 & Corr.1 
WT/MIN(01)/3 Add.1 
Add.1 Add.2 
Add.2 WT/L/432 WT/L/432 
7. Croatia  30 November 2000 WT/ACC/HRV/59 Add.1 Add.2 & Corr.1, 2 WT/A CC/HRV/61 WT/ACC/HRV/60 
8. Ecuador 21 January 1996 WT/L/77 & Corr.1 Add. 1 & Corr.1, 2 Add.2 WT/ACC/ECU/6 WT/ACC/ECU/5 
9. Estonia 13 November 1999 WT/ACC/EST/28 Add.1 Add.2 & Corr.1 WT/ACC/EST/30 WT/ACC/EST/29 
10. FYROM 4 April 2003 WT/ACC/807/27 A dd.1 Add.2 WT/L/494 WT/L/494 
11. Georgia 14 June 2000 WT/ACC/GEO/ 31 Add.1 Add.2 WT/ACC/GEO/33  WT/ACC/GEO/32 
12. Jordan 11 April 2000 WT/ACC/JOR/33 & Corr.1  Add.1 Add.2 WT/ACC/ JOR/35 WT/ACC/JOR/34 
13. Kyrgyz Republic 20 December 1998 WT/ACC/KGZ/26 & Corr.1 Add.1 Add.2 WT/ACC/KGZ/29 WT/ACC/KGZ/28 
14. Lithuania 31 May 2001 WT/ACC/LTU/52 Add.1 & Corr.1 Add.2 WT/ACC/LTU/54 WT/ACC/LTU/53 
15. Latvia 10 February 1999 WT/ACC/LVA/32 Add. 1 & Corr.1 Add.2 WT/A CC/LVA/35 WT/ACC/LVA/34 
16. Moldova 26 July 2001 WT/ACC/MOL/37 & Corr.1-4  Add.1 Add.2 WT/ACC/MOL/40 WT/ACC/MOL/39 
17. Mongolia 29 January 1997 WT/ACC/MNG/9 & Corr.1  Add.1 & Corr.1 Add.2 WT /ACC/MNG/11 WT/ACC/MNG/10 
18. Nepal 13 October 2004 WT/ACC/NPL/16 Add. 1 Add.2 WT/MIN(03)/19 WT/MIN(03)/19 
19. Oman 9 November 2000 WT/ACC/OMN/26 A dd.1 Add.2 WT/ACC/OMN/28 WT/ACC/OMN/27 
20. Panama 6 September 1997 WT/A CC/PAN/19 & Corr.1 Add.1 Add. 2 WT/ACC/PAN/21 WT/ACC/PAN/20 
21. Saudi Arabia 11 December 2005 WT/ACC/ SAU/61 Add.1 Add.2 WT/L/627 WT/L/627 
22. Tonga 27 July 2007 WT/ACC/TON/17 
WT/MIN(05)/4 Add.1 Add.2 WT/L/644 WT/L/644 
23. Chinese Taipei 1 January 2002 WT/ACC/TPKM/18 
WT/MIN(01)/4 Add.1 
Add.1 Add.2 
Add.2 WT/L/433 WT/L/433 
24. Ukraine 16 May 2008 WT/ACC/UKR/152 Add.1 Add.2 WT/L/718 WT/L/718 
25. Viet Nam 11 January 2007 WT/ACC/VNM /48 Add.1 Add.2 WT/L/662 WT/L/662 
* Listed in alphabetical order 
 
  WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
 Page 15 
 
 
  (a) Rules 
The decision to move to examine commitments in the area of WTO rules is taken once Working Party 
members are satisfied they have established an adequa te factual basis.  Progress in the other areas of 
the negotiations may also be a factor.  The negotia tions on rules are generally  conducted multilaterally 
in the Working Party although concerns on particular  issues may be settled bilaterally and brought to 
the Working Party for consideration in the shape of proposed texts.  
The main aim of the discussions on WTO rules is to  establish if the Applican t's regime conforms to 
WTO rules and, in particular, how it is to be br ought into conformity where necessary.  It is the 
position of some Members that acceding governments do not have the automatic right to the transition 
periods laid down in the WTO Agreements for orig inal Members of the WTO.  Article XII simply 
provides that accession shall be "on terms to be ag reed between [the Applicant] and the WTO" (see 
subsection on "Transitional arrangements" below).   
An issue that has been raised frequently in Working Parties is the application of Special and 
Differential Treatment provisions for developing  and least developed countries (LDCs) in the 
WTO Agreements.  The Guidelin es on LDCs' accession (document WT/L/508) state that provisions 
for Special and Differential Treatment are applicable  to all acceding LDCs (see part IV below).  In 
practice, the situation of each Applicant has been c onsidered on a case by case basis, while taking into 
account individual development, financial and trade needs.   
Each of the Protocols of Accessions, which follow a common format binds new Members to observe 
the rules contained in the Agreement establishing the WTO, as rectified, amended or otherwise 
modified as of the date that the relevant Protocol entered into force.  Each of these Protocols also 
binds the new Member to observe specific commit ments.  These specific commitments are generally 
set out in the commitment paragraphs of the releva nt Working Party Report (which are incorporated 
by reference in the Protocols).  Sometimes, they are also contained in the text of the Protocol itself.  
Both sets of commitments are integral parts of the Protocol and have the same status and legal effect.  They are enforceable through the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the WTO.  The entire package of 
Report, Protocol of Accessi on and Goods and Services Schedul es constitutes the conditions under 
which the acceding government is permi tted to join the WTO Agreement.   
The relevant commitment paragraphs of the Work ing Party Reports, which contain the terms of 
accession with respect to rules accepted by new Memb ers, are set out in full in Annex 3 of document 
WT/ACC/10/Rev.4/Add.1.  The Work ing Party Report of Ecuador, the first country to accede to the 
WTO under Article XII, incorporates 21 such commitm ent paragraphs.  Comparable figures for the 
other governments which have acceded are:  
Mongolia:  17 
Bulgaria:  26 Panama:  24 Kyrguyz 
Republic 29 
Latvia:  22 Estonia:  24 Jordan:  29 Georgia:  29 
Albania:  29 Oman:  26 Croatia:  27 
Lithuania:  28 
Moldova:  28 China:  82 Chinese Taipei:  63 Armenia:  39 
FYROM: 24 Nepal:  25 Cambodia:  29 
Viet Nam: 70 
Tonga: 29 Ukraine: 64 Cape Verde: 26 
Saudi Arabia:  59 
It should be noted that the early sections of Wo rking Party Reports (i.e. Economic Policies) are 
included in the Memorandum mainly, but not exclusively, as background information on the 
Applicant's foreign trade regime for the considerati on of the Working Party.  In these sections specific 
commitments have been required of some of th e acceding governments on the following subjects:  
foreign exchange and payments; investment regime ; state ownership and priv atisation; and pricing WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
Page 16  
 
  policies.  Moreover, China has undertaken co mmitments in two additional specific areas: non-
discrimination (including national treatment ) and balance of payments measures. 
It can also be noted that the commitment paragraphs can be of different types: 
- obligations to abide by existing WTO rules, sometimes specifying national measures 
to be amended in order to be brought in to conformity with WTO provisions, or 
sometimes elaborating on the WTO provisions  relating to the subject in question;  
- commitments not to have recourse to specific WTO provisions;  - specific identification of trans ition periods that may be used; 
- authorisations to depart temporarily from WTO rules or from commitments in the 
Goods Schedule;  
- obligations to abide by terms defined by the commitment paragraph and not contained 
in WTO Multilateral Agreements (e.g. time -frame for accession to Plurilateral 
Trade Agreements); and 
- statements of fact rather than actual commitments. 
- Transitional arrangements 
During the negotiation of commitments, Applicants  have sometimes explained the difficulties that 
they will have in achieving conformity with WTO requirements in specific areas and have requested 
transitional periods granting them time to bring th eir laws, regulations and practices into line after 
they accede.  This was more frequently the case in earlier accessions when applicants often expected 
to be accorded the same sort of transitional pe riods that WTO Agreements  accorded to original 
Members of the Organization.  However, Members ha ve pointed out that the transitional periods for 
original Members have now expired.  Their expect ation has been that new Members observe the rules 
from the date of their WTO accession.  Accordingly,  Applicants are encouraged to use the accession 
process to familiarize themselves with WTO rul es and adjust their legal, institutional, and 
administrative framework as the accession process advances.  Protocol commitments, therefore, 
usually provide that new Members will abide by their obligations fro m the date of their accession.  
Transitional arrangements have been granted in certa in accessions, generally in a limited number of 
areas and for specific periods of time.  The experi ence of governments that have negotiated their 
accession under Article XII of the Marrakesh Agreement shows that Members are not, a priori, opposed to transitional arrangements, but that Appli cants must demonstrate that they have done as 
much as possible to bring their sy stem in line with WTO requirements before making a request for a 
transition period.  Acceding governments normally pr esent an action plan and timetable showing what 
steps they have taken towards achieving conformity, what remains to be done and how and when they 
would expect to complete this process.  This i ssue is discussed and negotiated in the Working Party 
and becomes part of the terms to be included in th e Protocol.  The commitment paragraphs providing 
for transitional arrangements, as contained in the Applicants' Working Party Reports, are reproduced 
in Annex 5 of document WT/ACC/10/Rev.4/Add.1. 
Transition periods have been readily extended to  least-developed country (LDC) Applicants on the 
basis of detailed action plans.  The Guidelines on LDCs' accession (document WT/L/508) state that 
the transitional arrangements for eseen under the WTO Agreements "shall be granted in accession 
negotiations taking into account individual developm ent, financial and trade needs".  Some Members 
have urged further flexibility on this matter, especia lly in the case of sma ll, vulnerable economies (see 
part IV of this Note for a further discussion on the specifics of LDC accession). 
(b) Market access for goods 
Paragraph 13 of document WT/ACC/1 states that  the negotiations on concessions and commitments 
on goods and specific commitments on services may begin either on the basis of requests from WTO  WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
 Page 17 
 
 
  Members or on the basis of offers from the Applicant.   In practice, it is usually the Applicant that 
initiates the market access negotia tions by presenting initial offers  on goods and/or services.  The 
offers are generally circulated in WTO documents th rough the Secretariat.  In a few cases, Applicants 
have made their offer available to interested Members on request. 
Negotiations on tariffs and services are conducted bila terally with interested WTO Members.  The 
number of Members taking part in these negotiations varies considerably from one accession to 
another.  Bilateral Agreements recording the ag reed tariff concessions and specific commitments on 
services are signed and transmitted to the Secretariat.  After the conclusion of all bilateral negotiations, the Secretariat uses the signed Agreements, and the commitments resulting from the consultations on agricultural domestic support a nd export subsidies (see below), to prepare 
consolidated draft Goods and Services Schedules.   Paragraph 13(iii) of  document WT/ACC/1 adds 
that the draft Schedules on both goods and services are formally circulated to all members of the 
Working Party and reviewed multilaterally.  This provides an opportunity for WTO Members to verify that the concessions contained in the draft Schedules conform to the results of their bilateral 
negotiations with the acceding government.  It  also presents an opportunity to ensure that the contents 
are in accordance with the relevant WTO provisions. 
- Schedule of Concessions and Commitmen ts on Goods, tariff concessions  
The Schedule of Concessions and Commitment s on Goods (Goods Schedule) contains the 
concessions and commitments on tariffs made by the acceding government.  These take the same 
form as the Schedules of all other WTO Members – Part I containing most-favoured-nation tariff concessions (often referred to as "bindings"), Part  II containing any preferential tariff concessions, 
Part III containing any non-tariff concessions and Part IV containing commitments limiting 
subsidisation of agricultural products.  All WTO Me mbers must undertake most-favoured-nation tariff 
bindings and agricultural commitments but con cessions on the preferential tariff and non-tariff 
measures are seldom made.  None of the governments, which have completed their WTO accession processes, have made bindings in Part II of th eir Goods Schedules.  Only China, Chinese Taipei, 
Saudi Arabia, Viet Nam and the Ukraine have made  concessions in Part III of their Schedules.   
While Cape Verde's Schedule is in the HS 2007 nomenclature, FYROM, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, 
Viet Nam, Tonga and Ukraine use the HS 2002 nomen clature and Ecuador, Bulgaria and Panama the 
HS 1992 nomenclature. All remaining governme nts have their Schedules in the HS 1996 
nomenclature.  
Table 3 analyses the most-favoured-nation bindings that  the new Members have recorded in Part I of 
their Schedules.  It is divided into three part s - Table 3(a) on tariff concessions on agricultural 
products; Table 3(b) on tariff rate quotas (TRQs)  and special safeguard provisions (SSGs); and 
Table 3(c) on tariff concessions on non-agricultural products.  Calculations for the table have been 
made on the basis of the concessions contained in  the original Accession Goods Schedules and might 
therefore differ from figures published in other WTO documents due to subse quent modifications of 
Schedules.   
Pursuant to the Agreement on Agriculture, all tari ff lines in the agricultural sector have been bound.  
The simple average of new Member s' agricultural final bound rates (Tab le 3(a)) varies from a low of 
9.4 per cent (Albania and Croatia) to a high of 41.4 per cent (Nepal).  For a number of new Members the final bound rates are significantly lower than th e bound rates at the date of accession.  Bulgaria, 
the Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Jordan, Georgia, Cr oatia, Lithuania, Moldova, Chinese Taipei, FYROM, 
Saudi Arabia and Ukraine have also bound a number of items at non- ad valorem  rates.  The 
ad valorem  equivalent of these has not been calculated a nd has, therefore, not been included in the 
calculation of the simple average of tariff bindi ngs.  Most governments have listed and bound all 
agricultural items individually.  Mongolia, Panama and Latvia, however, have  listed and bound only 
some of their agricultural tariffs individually. Th e remaining items have been bound at a single rate WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
Page 18  
 
  (ceiling binding) in a head note.  For Mongolia, a ceiling rate of 20 per cent ad valorem, effective 
from the date of accession, has been applied to a ll items bound in the head note.  For Panama, the 
head note binding has been set at 40 per cent from the date of accession, and at 30 per cent after a five year implementation period.  Latvia has bound its agricultural products at a ceiling rate of 
50 per cent, effective from the date of accession, w ith the exception of the specific tariff items bound 
individually in the schedule.  The head note bindings  have been taken into account for the calculation 
of the simple averages of tariff bindings in Tables 3(a) and 3(c). 
Table 3(b) contains information on TRQs and SSGs.  About one half of all newly acceded Members 
have designated TRQs in Part I, Section I-B, of their Schedules.  Some have also designated SSGs 
(Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture).  
Table 3(c) shows that, in the non-agricultural sector , the simple average of final bound rates of newly 
acceded Members varies from 4.8 per cent (Chinese Taip ei) to 23.7 per cent (Nepal).  For a number of 
new Members the final bound rates are significantl y lower than the bound rates at the date of 
accession.  The Kyrgyz Republic, Jordan, Chin ese Taipei, FYROM and Viet Nam have bound a 
number of items at non- ad valorem  rates in the non-agricultural sector.  Again, the ad valorem  
equivalents of these have not been calculated and have not been included in the calculation of the 
simple averages.  Most governments have listed and bound all non-agricultural items individually.  
Mongolia, Bulgaria and Panama, how ever, have listed and bound only some of their non-agricultural 
tariffs individually, the remaining items being bound  in a head note.  For Mongolia and Panama the 
head note bindings in the non-agricultural sector ar e the same as the head note bindings in the 
agricultural sector (see above).  For Bulgaria a ceiling rate of 35 per cent ad valorem , effective from 
the date of accession, has been applied to all non-agricultural items bound in the head note.  The 
head note bindings have been taken into account fo r the calculation of the simple average of tariff 
bindings.  
   WT/ACC/10/Rev.4
 Page 19Table 3:  Market Access Concessions and Commitments in Goods of Members that have Acceded to the WTO under Article XII10 
Table 3(a): Agricultural Products – Bound Tariffs  
Distribution of ad valorem  tariff bindings (per cent) 
 Reduction commitments Simple average of 
ad valorem  tariff 
bindings (%) 0 (duty-
free) 0.1-5.0 5.1-
10.0 10.1-
15.0 15.1-
20.0 20.1-
30.0 30.1-
40.0 40.1-
50.0 50.1+ Share of non 
ad valorem  tariff 
bindings (%) Min. 
ad valorem  
duty Max. 
ad valorem  
duty 
Bound rate at accession 1995 26.2 0.0 2.0 1.4 9.0 28.5 44.5 6.9 5.1 2.4 0.0 5.0 95.0 Ecuador  
Final bound rate 2001 25.5 0.0 2.0 1.4 9.0 28.2 45.1 7.4 4.5 2.3 0.0 5.0 85.5 
Bound rate at accession 1997 52.3 0.1 2.5 5.5 3.8 7.2 10.6 17.1 1.3 38.1 15.8 0.0 135.0 Bulgaria  
Final bound rate 2005 35.5 5.0 6.6 9.3 10.3 2.4 13.1 9.9 0.9 28.6 15.8 0.0 98.0 
Bound rate at accession 1996 19.0 0.7 0.7 0.7 23.2 72.4 0.6 1.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 75.0 Mongolia  
Final bound rate 2005 18.9 0.7 0.7 0.7 23.5 72.4 0.6 1.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 75.0 
Bound rate at accession 1997 36.9 0.3 7.2 4.7 4.5 2.0 4.2 69.4 1.2 6.3 0.0 0.0 320.0 Panama  
Final bound rate 2007 27.7 0.3 7.2 4.8 5.1 6.0 70.0 1.1 0.8 4.5 0.0 0.0 260.0 
Bound rate at accession 1998 12.4 1.2 6.0 56.3 12.4 21.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 0.0 30.0 Kyrgyz 
Republic Final bound rate 2003 12.3 1.2 7.1 56.0 11.7 21.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 0.0 30.0 
Bound rate at accession 1999 35.8 1.5 1.6 16.7 9.6 2.4 5.9 2.9 57.5 1.5 0.4 0.0 100.0 Latvia  
Final bound rate 2008 34.6 2.1 1.6 19.0 9.1 3.2 3.5 5.3 54.3 1.3 0.4 0.0 55.0 
Bound rate at accession 1999 19.2 8.1 7.8 23.6 11.5 15.5 18.3 7.2 7.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 59.0 Estonia  
Final bound rate 2004 17.5 17.0 6.2 21.5 11.1 12.5 17.7 6.2 7.1 0.6 0.0 0.0 59.0 
Bound rate at accession 2000 25.8 0.9 13.1 11.9 12.2 10.5 46.2 1.0 0.0 3.5 1.0 0.0 200.0 Jordan  
Final bound rate 2010 23.7 0.9 13.1 12.7 15.5 23.6 29.2 0.9 0.0 3.5 1.0 0.0 200.0 
Bound rate at accession 2000 13.3 0.0 0.9 0.1 85.4 6.6 4.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.5 4.0 30.0 Georgia  
Final bound rate 2006 11.7 8.3 1.5 7.4 69.5 6.9 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.0 30.0 
Bound rate at accession 2000 10.8 0.4 17.8 59.4 3.4 18.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 Albania  
Final bound rate 2007 9.4 10.9 17.3 54.9 1.8 15.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 
Bound rate at accession 2000 28.1 0.0 6.9 5.2 76.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.2 10.3 0.0 5.0 200.0 Oman  
Final bound rate 2006 28.0 0.0 8.0 6.6 73.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.2 10.3 0.0 5.0 200.0 
Bound rate at accession 2000 13.0 13.0 24.6 13.1 15.9 9.7 3.7 3.8 3.1 3.2 18.3 0.0 90.0 Croatia 
Final bound rate 2007 9.4 15.1 27.4 15.5 16.4 8.7 2.4 4.4 0.1 0.0 18.3 0.0 55.0 
Bound rate at accession 2001 16.3 9.1 13.6 31.7 14.7 4.0 11.5 6.0 4.6 1.5 3.4 0.0 100.0 Lithuania 
Final bound rate 2009 15.2 9.7 13.7 31.9 16.1 5.2 12.2 4.0 3.4 1.0 3.0 0.0 100.0 
Bound rate at accession 2001 18.1 0.4 6.9 28.5 11.2 11.4 25.2 8.0 0.0 0.0 8.3 0.0 40.0 Moldova 
Final bound rate 2005 12.2 3.0 8.3 32.7 35.7 11.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.3 0.0 25.0 
Bound rate at accession 2000 20.6 2.7 9.4 14.3 16.5 14.7 26.1 8.6 3.1 4.6 0.0 0.0 74.0 China 
Final bound rate 2010 15.8 2.8 11.1 25.2 24.9 18.6 12.1 2.2 0.6 2.5 0.0 0.0 65.0 
Bound rate at accession 2002 17.2 22.9 16.5 10.9 8.3 18.4 12.1 1.6 0.7 3.8 8.6 0.0 800.0 Chinese 
Taipei Final bound rate 2011 15.3 24.6 15.9 11.5 10.3 17.6 9.9 1.5 0.1 3.8 8.6 0.0 500.0 
Bound rate at accession 2003 14.7 1.3 0.4 1.0 97.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.0 Armenia 
Final bound rate 2003 14.7 1.3 0.4 1.0 97.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.0 
Bound rate at accession 2003 13.7 31.0 16.1 7.7 7.2 6.1 6.8 6.1 7.7 2.6 10.1 0.0 60.0 FYROM 
Final bound rate 2007 11.3 34.0 15.9 8.2 8.7 6.7 7.7 5.1 4.3 0.6 10.0 0.0 60.0 
                                                      
10 To improve cross-country comparability, tariff profiles are compile d at the HS 6-digit level product classification, which off ers a common structure that is not biased 
by the different levels of disaggregation in Members' national Ta riffs.  As a result of the HS 6-digit aggregation, double-coun ting may occur, which could affect the percentage 
distribution of tariff bindings (i.e. they may not necessarily add up to 100 per cent).  Minimum/maximum ad valorem  duties, however, are compiled at the level of the national 
nomenclature.  
  WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
Page 20 Distribution of ad valorem  tariff bindings (per cent) 
 Reduction commitments Simple average of 
ad valorem  tariff 
bindings (%) 0 (duty-
free) 0.1-5.0 5.1-
10.0 10.1-
15.0 15.1-
20.0 20.1-
30.0 30.1-
40.0 40.1-
50.0 50.1+ Share of non 
ad valorem  tariff 
bindings (%) Min. 
ad valorem  
duty Max. 
ad valorem  
duty 
Bound rate at accession 2003 50.1 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.3 0.7 3.6 3.6 77.4 12.0 0.0 10.0 200.0 Nepal 
Final bound rate 2006 41.4 0.0 0.7 2.3 0.4 4.2 28.7 33.7 21.4 8.5 0.0 5.0 200.0 
Bound rate at accession 2003 28.2 0.0 2.8 6.9 17.1 11.4 16.4 43.5 0.9 0.9 0.0 5.0 60.0 Cambodia 
Final bound rate 2011 28.1 0.0 2.8 7.1 17.6 11.2 16.4 43.1 0.9 0.9 0.0 5.0 60.0 
Bound rate at accession 2005 12.5 0.0 3.6  32.3 51.6 2.3 1.7 0.1 0.0 0.1 10.7 0.0 200.0 Saudi 
Arabia Final bound rate 2010 12.4 0.0 3.6  32.4 52.4 3.0 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.1 10.1 0.0 200.0 
Bound rate at accession 2007 22.4 6.9 16.0 16.9 7.8 13.7 10.8 20.5 3.2 4.0 0.0 0.0 150.0 Viet Nam 
Final bound rate 2014  18.5 6.9 17.2 20.7 9.8 14.6 14.9 11.8 1.6 2.5 0.0 0.0 135.0 
Bound rate at accession 2007 19.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.6 68.0 11.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 15 25.0 Tonga 
 Final bound rate 2007 19.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.4 83.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15 20.0 
Bound rate at accession 2008 20.8 0.0 13.7 13.0 9.1 9.1 41.00 9.4 2.0 2.9 0.0 0.0 57.0 Cape 
Verde Final bound rate 2018 19.2 0.0 18.4 17.4 1.6 29.6 19.4 8.8 1.9 2.9 0.0 0.0 55.0 
Bound rate at accession 2008 10.9 7.2 19.1 32.3 16.9 20.1 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.0 4.0 0.0 50.0 Ukraine 
Final bound rate 2013 10.7 10.7 19.1 32.3 17.6 19.4 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.7 0.0 50.0 
 
 
  WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
 Page 21 
 
 
  Table 3(b): Agricultural Products - Tari ff Rate Quotas and Special Safeguards  
 Number of Tariff Rate 
Quotas Number of Tariff Lines 
with Tariff Rate Quotas Tariff Lines with Special 
Safeguards 
Ecuador 14 17 
(HS 6 and 8 digit level) 0 
Bulgaria 73 90 
(HS 8 digit level) 21 
(HS 6 and 8 digit level) 
Mongolia 0 0 0 
Panama 19 57 
(HS 8 digit level) 6 
(HS 8 digit level) 
Kyrgyz Republic 0 0 0 
Latvia 4 4 
(HS 4, 6, 8 digit level) 0 
Estonia 0 0 0 
Jordan 0 0 0 
Georgia 0 0 0 
Albania 0 0 0 
Oman 0 0 0 
Croatia 9 9 
(HS 4, 6, 8 digit level) 0 
Lithuania 4 4 
(HS 4, 6, 8 digit level) 0 
Moldova 0 0 0 
China 10 46 
(HS 8 digit level) 0 
Chinese Taipei 22 117 
(HS 8 digit level) 32 
(HS 8 digit level) 
Armenia 0 0 0 
FYROM 1 1 
(HS 10 digit level) 0 
Nepal 0 0 0 
Cambodia 0 0 0 
Saudi Arabia 0 0 0 
Viet Nam 3 21 
(HS 8 digit level) 0 
Tonga 0 0 0 
Cape Verde 0 0 0 
Ukraine 1 1 
(HS 6 digit level) 0 
  
  WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
Page 22 Table 3(c): Non-agricultural Products – Bound Tariffs  
 
Distribution of ad valorem  tariff bindings (per cent) 
 Reduction commitments Simple 
average of 
ad valorem  
tariff bindings 
(%) 0 
(duty-
free) 0.1-5.0 5.1-
10.0 10.1-
15.0 15.1-
20.0 20.1-
30.0 30.1-
40.0 40.1-
50.0 50.1+ Share of non 
ad valorem  
tariff 
bindings (%) Min. 
ad valorem  
duty Max. 
ad valorem  
duty 
Bound rate at accession 1995 21.1 0.0 1.9 15.8 12.4 21.3 48. 2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 40.0 Ecuador 
Final bound rate 2001 21.1 0.0 1.9 15.8 12.4 21.3 48. 2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 40.0 
Bound rate at accession 1997 25.7 0.3 4.0 15.2 9.2 4.8 16. 6 49.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 40.0 Bulgaria 
Final bound rate 2005 23.6 1.8 5.9 18.2 15.3 3.4 5. 7 49.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 40.0 
Bound rate at accession 1996 19.2 0.6 0.0 1.1 19.7 74.5 3. 9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.0 Mongolia 
Final bound rate 2010 17.3 1.6 0.0 19.8 0.0 74.5 3. 9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.0 
Bound rate at accession 1997 31.6 1.2 3.7 4.6 6.1 12.8 5. 0 66.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 90.0 Panama 
Final bound rate 2011 22.9 2.2 3.6 18.7 4.6 2.6 68. 0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 81.0 
Bound rate at accession 1998 11.8 2.4 4.8 64.1 11.6 15.3 1. 2 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 Kyrgyz 
Republic Final bound rate 2005 6.7 22.5 10.5 58.9 7.8 0.0 0. 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 20.0 
Bound rate at accession 1999 10.8 3.4 9.1 59.3 18.0 6.8 2. 1 0.1 0.9 0.3 0.0 0.0 55.0 Latvia 
Final bound rate 2008 9.4 16.1 6.6 51.5 17.5 6.7 0. 3 0.0 0.9 0.3 0.0 0.0 55.0 
Bound rate at accession 1999 7.6 12.6 15.1 61.3 9.9 0.3 0. 8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.0 Estonia 
Final bound rate 2005 7.3 18.5 11.2 59.3 9.9 0.3 0. 8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.0 
Bound rate at accession 2000 19.2 3.0 20.1 11.2 6.8 12.8 43. 2 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 35.0 Jordan 
Final bound rate 2010 15.2 6.3 19.5 16.3 11.1 24.1 22. 7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 30.0 
Bound rate at accession 2000 10.2 1.3 22.6 1.6 73.8 0.6 0. 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 Georgia 
Final bound rate 2005 6.5 23.6 20.6 23.4 32.0 0.3 0. 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 
Bound rate at accession 2000 10.1 3.9 44.4 23.1 0.3 28.2 0. 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 Albania 
Final bound rate 2009 6.6 28.4 34.5 19.1 2.4 15.5 0. 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 
Bound rate at accession 14.7 1.5 0.9 2.7 92.7 2.2 0. 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 Oman 
Final bound rate  11.6 4.1 8.5 24.4 60.7 2.2 0. 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 
Bound rate at accession 2000 6.7 22.9 34.4 23.0 12.7 6.7 0. 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 38.0 Croatia 
Final bound rate 2005 5.5 26.5 36.9 22.9 13.3 0.3 0. 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 
Bound rate at accession 2001 8.7 24.5 7.0 31.9 28.4 6.7 1. 4 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 35.0 Lithuania 
Final bound rate 2009 8.4 24.5 7.1 36.0 24.7 6.7 1. 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.0 
Bound rate at accession 2001 11.1 22.7 11.7 31.4 7.5 11.9 6. 9 7.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 40.0 Moldova 
Final bound rate 2005 6.0 25.6 16.9 46.4 11.0 0.1 0. 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 
Bound rate at accession 2000 12.7 1.8 10.4 35.2 21.0 12.1 17. 7 1.3 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 61.7 China 
Final bound rate 2010 9.1 6.2 18.1 47.0 15.3 8.7 3. 9 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 
Bound rate at accession 2002 6.4 13.2 44.7 25.3 12.0 2.5 0. 9 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.0 106.0 Chinese 
Taipei Final bound rate 2011 4.8 29.0 39.9 21.0 7.8 0.7 0. 5 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.9 0.0 90.0 
Bound rate at accession 2003 7.7 38.6 7.6 10.4 43.4 0.0 0. 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.0 Armenia 
Final bound rate 2007 7.5 39.2 7.8 11.1 41.8 0.0 0. 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.0 
Bound rate at accession 2003 9.5 23.4 23.8 18.7 11.4 7.4 8. 9 6.5 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 32.2 FYROM 
Final bound rate 2012 6.2 36.2 20.3 21.2 13.9 7.5 1. 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 25.0 
Bound rate at accession 2003 39.4 0.1 1.2 0.7 1.4 2.4 20. 6 39.4 28.0 5.4 0.0 0.0 130.0 Nepal 
Final bound rate 2013 23.7 3.1 1.1 2.9 5.3 34.5 48. 6 3.5 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 60.0  
   WT/ACC/10/Rev.4
 Page 23Distribution of ad valorem  tariff bindings (per cent) 
 Reduction commitments Simple 
average of 
ad valorem  
tariff bindings 
(%) 0 
(duty-
free) 0.1-5.0 5.1-
10.0 10.1-
15.0 15.1-
20.0 20.1-
30.0 30.1-
40.0 40.1-
50.0 50.1+ Share of non 
ad valorem  
tariff 
bindings (%) Min. 
ad valorem  
duty Max. 
ad valorem  
duty 
Bound rate at accession 2003 17.7 0.7 0.0 28.9 29.9 17.0 8. 8 14.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 42.5 Cambodia 
Final bound rate 2013 17.7 1.0 0.0 28.8 29.7 17.1 8. 8 14.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 42.5 
 Bound rate at accession 
2005 10.9 1.7 9.8 32.2 55.2 1.1 0. 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 Saudi 
Arabia 
 Final bound rate 2015 10.5 5.6 6.6 34.4 53.0 0.4 0. 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 
Bound rate at accession 2007 13.1 12.7 25.8 19.4 12.4 11.2 11. 0 6.1 1.0 0.5 0.1 0.0 100.0 Viet Nam 
Final bound rate 2019 10.3 14.3 32.8 14.1 13.8 14.4 8. 5 1.3 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.0 100.0 
Bound rate at accession 2007 19.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.6 62.4 7. 0 1.8 1.3 0.0 0.0 15.0 45.0 Tonga 
Final bound rate 2007 17.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 53.0 47.0 0. 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.0 20.0 
Bound rate at accession 2008 17.7 0.1 21.3 20.5 9.7 12.1 22. 4 7.9 4.3 1.7 0.0 0.0 57.0 Cape Verde 
Final bound rate 2018 14.9 8.1 32.8 15.2 2.7 15.1 13. 2 7.6 3.9 1.3 0.0 0.0 55.0 
Bound rate at accession 2008 5.1 33.0 22.2 39.1 5.0 0.6 0. 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 Ukraine 
Final bound rate 2013 5.0 35.3 20.3 38.8 5.0 0.5 0. 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 
   WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
Page 24  
 
  - Sectoral initiatives 
Table 3 also shows the share of zero (duty-free) bindings made by new Members.  This reflects the 
fact that most of acceding governments have unde rtaken commitments commensurate with those of 
WTO Members participating in the so-called "zer o-for-zero" and "harmonization" sectoral tariff 
initiatives.   These tariff initiatives were negotiate d on a plurilateral basis during the Uruguay Round 
and led to an Agreement among the countries concerne d to bind their tariffs on products in a number 
of sectors
11 at zero and extend the benefits on an MFN ba isis.  Almost all acceding governments have 
formally joined the Information Technology Agreemen t (ITA).  Some have also participated either 
fully or partially in the Civil Aircraft Agreement.   Table 4 provides information on participation in 
sectoral initiatives. 
Table 4:  Sectoral Initiatives  
Sectors 
New Member 
(by date of 
accession) 
ITA 
Civil 
Aircraft Agreeme
nt 
Chemical 
Harmonization 
Pharmaceuticals 
Agricultural 
Equipment 
Construction 
Equipment 
Medical 
Equipment 
Paper 
Steel 
Toys 
Furniture 
Beer 
Distilled Spirits 
Ecuador                           
Bulgaria                          
Mongolia              
Panama              
Kyrgyz Rep.              
Latvia              
Estonia              
Jordan              
Georgia              
Albania              
Oman              
Croatia               
Lithuania              
Moldova              
China              
Chinese Taipei              
Armenia              
FYROM              
Nepal               
Cambodia              
Saudi Arabia              
Viet Nam              
Tonga              
Ukraine              
Cape Verde              
 
         
  Full coverage*   Significant coverage*   No coverage* 
     (approx. >75 percent of tariff 
lines)    
 
* Coverage refers to the binding at zero (o r 5.5/6.5 per cent in the case of the chem ical harmonization initiative) for correspon ding tariff 
lines. 
                                                      
11 An indicative list of the products included in th ese sectors is available from Annex 5 of document 
TN/MA/S/13.  WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
 Page 25 
 
 
  - Other Duties and Charges 
The WTO rules provide that if the customs duty on an item is bound in a Member's Schedule, then 
any "other duties and charges" (ODCs) on that item are also bound (Understanding on the Interpretation of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994) .  Governments may sometimes choose to levy 
such ODCs to provide government revenue and to protect domestic production.  These ODCs are 
levied on imported goods, but not on domestically produced goods and, therefore (like customs 
duties), directly affect access to markets.  WTO Members have shown that they are particularly 
interested in obtaining full information about an y ODCs, ensuring their removal, and obtaining 
binding at zero in the Goods Schedules of acceding go vernments.  The removal of ODCs entails a loss 
of revenue for the government and some Workin g Party Reports indicate that they have been 
incorporated in the customs duty or into internal  taxes applicable to both imported and domestically-
produced goods.  While most acceding governments ha ve agreed to eliminate any existing ODCs and 
to bind them at zero in their Goods Schedules,  in a limited number of cases – Chinese Taipei, 
Saudi Arabia, and Cape Verde – there have been exce ptions to the general rule that ODCs be bound at 
zero. 
- Agricultural commitments  
Acceding governments need to conform to the framework established through the Agreement on 
Agriculture for making commitments in respect of domestic support and export subsidies.  
The Secretariat has prepared a Technical Note (document WT/ACC/4) to guide acceding governments in the preparation of the initial set of supporting ta bles.  Although this information may be examined 
and further clarified on a bilateral basis, systemic  discussions relating to the definition of measures 
and the calculation of the value of domestic support and export subsidies will typically take place in 
plurilateral meetings between the acc eding government and interested Members.  As a result of these 
discussions, the acceding government will present a set of  final tables which forms the basis for future 
commitment levels in relation to the Total Aggr egate Measurement of Support (Total AMS) and 
Export Subsides, recorded in Part IV of the Sc hedule of Concessions and Commitments on Goods.  
The relevant supporting tables are also incorporated  by reference in Part IV of the Schedule.  
A summary of the commitments undertaken by g overnments, which have negotiated accession under 
Article XII of the WTO Agreement, is contained in Table 5. 
In presenting the initial information, document WT/ACC/4 indicates that acceding Governments 
should calculate the support "normally using the av erage of the most recent three year period".  
As accession negotiations take several years to a ccomplish, more recent data will normally become 
available in the course of an accession process.  Whereas a fixed period (1986-1988) was established 
for commitments on domestic support and export s ubsidies undertaken in the Uruguay Round, the 
base periods for Members acceding under Article XII of the WTO Agreement have been determined 
on an individual basis (see Table 5).  Although the base period for Bulgaria corresponds to that of the Uruguay Round, Bulgaria's Working Party Report no tes that "an earlier period than the most recent 
three year period was accepted by WTO Members only because the latter was not regarded as 
representative due to the United Nations embargo a pplied to the former Republic of Yugoslavia".  
A deviation from the most recent three-year peri od principle was also ag reed for Chinese Taipei 
(1990-1992).  However, Chinese Taipei also agreed  to reduce its Total AMS commitments over the 
period 1995-2000, i.e. prior to accession.  Thus , the final bound commitment level (year 2000) is 
20 per cent less than the Base Total AM S (1990-1992) for Chinese Taipei.   
Document WT/ACC/4 does not provide guidance with respect to the currency to be used in the 
preparation of the supporting tables.  The majority  of the governments acceding under Article XII 
have presented their supporting tables in national cu rrency.  In some accessions, however, it has been 
accepted that particular circumstances have warra nted the supporting tables and the corresponding WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
Page 26  
 
  commitments to be expressed in a foreign currency (US dollars or Euro) or in Special Drawing Rights 
(SDRs).       
- Domestic Support 
Domestic support measures in the "green box" should have no or at most minimal trade effects or 
effects on production.  Support provided for measures in this category is not limited nor subject to 
reduction commitments as long as the programmes meet the specific crite ria stipulated in Annex 2 of 
the Agreement on Agriculture.  Developing count ries providing support to programmes encouraging 
agricultural and rural development corresponding to Article 6.2 of the Agreement, may also exclude 
such support from any reduction commitments.   
Product-specific and non-product-specific domestic s upport falling within the "amber box" must be 
included in the Total AMS, unless the support can be considered de minimis  and thus be excluded 
from the calculation of a Member's Total AMS.  Article 6.4 of the Agreement establishes a de minimis  
percentage of 5 per cent for developed countries a nd 10 per cent for developing country Members.  
The Total AMS is calculated for each year of th e base period, and the average Total AMS over the 
three years constitutes an acceding Member's Base To tal AMS.  The Base Total AMS may be subject 
to a reduction commitment over an agreed impl ementation period.  The annual and final bound 
commitment levels recorded in Part IV of the Goods Schedule establish a ceiling on the new 
Member's "amber box" support in any given year in the future (Current Total AMS).   
Programmes extending direct payments under pr oduction-limiting programmes (i.e. "blue box" 
support) were not identified for any of the 25 ne w Members covered in Table 5.  For 15 of these 25 
new Members Base Total AMS was not identified.  Thus, all domestic support provided by these 15 
Members during the base period either satisfied the "green box" criteria, was provided in accordance 
with Article 6.2 (development programmes), or a ny type of "amber box" support provided did not 
exceed the de minimis  levels for such support.  In this respect, it should be noted that: 
− China agreed to include support through gove rnment measures meeting the criteria of 
Article 6.2 (development programmes) in its AMS, while having recourse to a de minimis  
exemption of 8.5 per cent for product-speci fic and non-product specific support (document 
WT/MIN(01)/3, paragraph 235);   
− Latvia negotiated a transition period (4 year s after accession) during which an amount equal 
to SDR 24 million would co nstitute Latvia's annual de minimis  exemption under 
Article 6.4(a) until 1 January 2003 (see paragraph 109 in document WT/ACC/LVA/32).  
Thereafter, Latvia would conform to the 5 per cent de minimis exemption for product-specific 
and non-product-specific domestic support;   
− Armenia has recourse to a de minimis  exemption of 10 per cent until 31 December 2008, 
applying a de minimis  level of 5 per cent thereafter; 
− Panama, Jordan, Oman, Nepal, Cambodia, Saudi  Arabia, Viet Nam, Tonga, and Cape Verde 
had recourse to a de minimis  level of 10 per cent (Article  6.2 and Article 6.4(b) of 
the Agreement on Agriculture);  
− Panama's Schedule contains a re ference to a supporting table deta iling the form and level of 
non-product specific support which is below the de minimis
 level and reserving Panama's 
right to use this support up to that level; 
− The Schedules of ten new Members (Bulgaria, Jordan, Croatia, Lithuania, Moldova, Chinese 
Taipei, FYROM, Saudi Arabia, Viet Nam, and Ukraine) specify their Base Total AMS and their Final Total AMS levels of "amber box" s upport.  In the case of FYROM, Viet Nam and 
Ukraine, the Base Total AMS was not subject to a reduction commitment; and  
− In addition to its reduction commitment, Chinese Taipei confirmed that support granted for 
tobacco and grapes production would be included in the AMS from the date of accession.    
   WT/ACC/10/Rev.4
 Page 27Table 5:  Agricultural commitments  
Member Year of accession Base period Currency De minimis  level Base total AMS (million) Final total AMS (million) Implementation period 
Ecuador 01/1996 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0 0 - 
Bulgaria 12/1996 1986-1988 Euro 5% 2,513 520 1998 
Mongolia 01/1997 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0 0 - 
Panama 09/1997 1991-1993 USD  10% 0 0 - 
Kyrgyz Republic 12/1998 1994-1996 KGS 5% 0 0 - 
Latvia 02/1999 1994-1996 SDR SDR 24 million until 
2003, 5% thereafter 0 0 - 
Estonia 11/1999 1995-1997 EEK 5% 0 0 - 
Jordan 04/2000 1994-1996 JOD 10% 1.5 1.3 2006 
Georgia 06/2000 1996-1998 GEL 5% 0 0 - 
Albania 09/2000 1996-1998 ALL 5% 0 0 - 
Oman 11/2000 1994-1996 OMR 10% 0 0 - 
Croatia 11/2000 1996-1998 Euro 5% 167.6 134.1 2004 
Lithuania 05/2001 1995-1997 USD  5% 118.2* 94.6* 2005 
Moldova 07/2001 1996-1998 SDR 5% 15.9 12.8 2004 
China 12/2001 1996-1998 RMB 8.5% 0 0 - 
Chinese Taipei 01/2002 1990-1992 TWD 5% 17.7 14.1 2000 
Armenia 02/2003 1995-1997 USD 10% until 2008, 5% 
thereafter 0 0 - 
FYROM 04/2003 1998-2000 Euro  5% 16.3 16.3 at accession 
Nepal 04/2004 1995/96-1997/98 NPR 10% 0 0 - 
Cambodia 10/2004 1998-2000 KHR 10% 0 0 - 
Saudi Arabia 12/2005 2001-2003 SAR 10% 3,711.9 3,218.3 2015 
Viet Nam 01/2007 1999 – 2001 VND 10% 3,961.59 3,961.59 - 
Tonga 07/2007 1996/97- 1998/99 TOP 10% 0 0 - 
Ukraine 05/2008 2004-2006 UAH 5% 3,043.4 3,043.4 - 
Cape Verde 07/2008 2003-2005 CVE 10% 0 0 - 
* de minimis  amount included in the calculation of AMS. 
Note: n.a. – not available WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
Page 28  
 
  - Export Subsidies 
The Agreement on Agriculture lays down that export subsidies maintained in the base period must be 
reduced and bound.   
The majority of new Members (Ecuador, Mongolia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Estonia, Jordan, Georgia, 
Albania, Oman, Croatia, Moldova, China, Chinese Ta ipei, Armenia, Nepal, Cambodia, Saudi Arabia, 
Tonga, Ukraine, Cape Verde) did not provide agri cultural export subsidies during the relevant base 
period and have bound these at zero in Part IV of their Schedules. 
Latvia, Lithuania, FYROM and Viet Nam provide d export subsidies during the base period, but 
agreed to eliminate them from the date of accession:  
− The Working Party Report of Latvia states that  "export subsidies had been provided in the 
base period for milk powder, canned milk, cheese, butter and rye in 1994, 1995 and 1996.  He 
also made clear that Latvia's intention was to increasingly direct its investment in agriculture 
towards programmes designed to improve the efficiency and competitiveness of Latvian 
agriculture and ensure its alignment with world requirements" (document WT/ACC/LVA/32, 
paragraph 107). 
− The Working Party Report of Lithuania states that "[t]he Government of Lithuania had 
provided export subsidies for beef, pork, pigs, butter, cheese, grain, flour, condensed milk and 
milk powder in 1995, beef, butter, condensed m ilk, milk powder, cheese, pork, grain and flour 
in 1996, beef, butter, condensed milk, milk powde r, cheese, pork, grain, vegetable oil, meat 
preserves and flour in 1997, beef, butter, conde nsed milk, milk powder, cheese, casein and 
other milk protein products, vegetable oil a nd preserved meat in 1998, and beef, butter, 
condensed milk, milk powder, cheese, casein a nd other milk protein products, and vegetable 
oil in 1999" (document WT/ACC/LTU/52, paragraph 149). 
− The Working Party Report of FYROM states that  "FYROM had provided subsidies to exports 
of sheep meat in 1998, but would agree not to provide agricultural export subsidies in the future" (document WT/ACC/807/23, paragraph 187). 
− The Working Party Report of Viet Nam states  that "Viet Nam had begun granting direct 
budgetary export subsidies in 1998.  Subsidies to ok the form of interest rate support; export 
bonuses; support to cover losses for enterprises exporting rice, pork, and coffee; and support 
to exports of vegetables and fruit. [...] The export bonus programme ha d been continued in 
2002, and extended to also cover beef and p oultry meat; fresh, dried and semi-processed fruit 
and vegetables; tea; peanuts; pepper; a nd cashew nuts" (document WT/ACC/VNM/48, 
paragraphs 363 and 365). 
 Bulgaria and Panama have undertaken export subsid y reduction commitments in Part IV of their 
Goods Schedules: 
− The Bulgarian Schedule sets out maximum levels of  export subsidies, to specific markets, by 
quantity and value for wheat and wheat flour; s unflower seed; specified fruits and vegetables, 
fresh and preserved; wine; tobacco; white ch eese; kashkaval (yellow cheese); specified live 
animals; specified meats; eggs; and "incorporated  products".  Transiti onal and final rates are 
provided.  A separate table excludes the granting of export subsidies to certain markets, and 
indicates that tobacco export subsidies shall onl y be granted in respect of oriental tobacco. 
− Panama's Schedule commits Panama to elimin ate its "Certificados de Abono Tributario" 
(CAT) on 31 December 2002, noting that the form of this export subsidy made it difficult to provide for its gradual phasing out and that ther efore no transitional provisions are laid down.  
Additional information on the CAT is contai ned in the Working Party's Report (document 
WT/ACC/PAN/19, paragraphs 52 and 53).  WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
 Page 29 
 
 
  (c) Services  
Negotiations on specific commitments in services usua lly begin after members of the Working Party 
have undertaken a multilateral examination of the services regime, generally based on information 
submitted in the outline format described in the S ecretariat's Technical Note (document WT/ACC/5) 
and in written replies to specific questions.  Many A pplicants have found it difficult to supply all the 
factual information requested and ha ve often been invited to directly  provide the Working Party with 
an initial offer on services.  The negotiations start in  earnest with the multilateral circulation of the 
Applicant's initial offer, which uses the establis hed format of a Member's Schedule of Specific 
Commitments on Services.  Negotiations then take place bilaterally with interested members of the 
Working Party, on the basis of the offer and requests from the Memb ers.  This process invariably 
leads to revisions of the offers, which are then circ ulated to members of the Working Party.  When it 
has received copies of all signed bilateral Agreemen ts, the Secretariat consolidates these Agreements 
into a draft Services Schedule and circulates the document to Members, for verification.  
The complexity of the services commitments means that any attempt to summarize them involves 
radical simplification.  Table 6 identifies whethe r the new Members have made specific commitments 
in 26 basic groups of services sectors.  This Tabl e demonstrates that new Members have not only 
accepted a high sectoral coverage, but that they ha ve usually made commitments in key sectors.  
It should be noted that the Table can only indicate whether or not commitments have been made, but 
not the depth of these commitments.  In particul ar, it does not reflect how many sub-sectors have 
actually been included and the type of Market A ccess and National Treatment limitations.  More in-
depth analysis of the commitments is available from Annex 4 of document WT/ACC/10/Rev.4/Add.1. 
  
  WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
Page 30 Table 6:  Sector Specific Commitments in Serv ices of Members that have Acceded to the WTO  
  Acceded 
  M e m b e r  Service 
Sector 
Ecuador 
Bulgaria 
Mongolia 
Panama 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
Latvia 
Estonia 
Jordan 
Georgia 
Albania 
Oman 
Croatia 
Lithuania 
Moldova 
China 
Chinese 
Taipei 
Armenia 
FYROM 
Nepal 
(LDC) 
Cambodia 
(LDC) 
Professional  
- legal                                         
- accountancy                                         
- taxation                                         
- architectural and engineering                                         
- medical                                         
Computer and related                                         
R&D                                         
Other business                                         
Communication  
Postal                                         
Courier                                         
Telecom: - value added 
                                        
- basic                                         
Audiovisual12                                         
Construction                                          
Distribution                                          
Educational                                          
Environmental                                          
Financial:  
- insurance                                         
- banking and other                                         
Health and social                                          
Tourism                                          
Recreational                                          
Transport:  
- Maritime transport                                         
- Air transport                                         
- Rail transport                                         
- Road transport                                         
TOTAL SECTORS 18 21 11 18 26 23 24 23 25 23 22 24 24 25 21 23 24 22 19 23 
Note: MFN Exemptions: all except Mongolia, Kyrgyz Republic and Oman. 
                                                      
12 Audiovisual services commitments have often been reflected in both the specific commitments in this sector and the list of MFN  exemptions.  
   WT/ACC/10/Rev.4
 Page 31  Acceded 
  M e m b e r  Service 
Sector 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Viet Nam 
Tonga 
Cape 
Verde 
Ukraine 
Professional  
- legal       
- accountancy       
- taxation       
- architectural and engineering       
- medical       
Computer and related       
R&D       
Other business       
Communication  
Postal       
Courier       
Telecom: 
- value added       
- basic       
Audiovisual13       
Construction        
Distribution        
Educational        
Environmental        
Financial:  
- insurance       
- banking and other       
Health and social        
Tourism        
Recreational        
Transport:  
- Maritime transport       
- Air transport       
- Rail transport       
- Road transport       
TOTAL SECTORS 24 25 22 21 25 
Note:  See document WT/ACC/10/Rev. 4/Add.1 (Annex 4) for a detailed summary of the specific commitments undertaken by new Member s. 
                                                      
13 Audiovisual services commitments have often been reflected in both the specific commitments in this sector and the list of MFN  exemptions. WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
Page 32  
 
  5. Completion of the Working Party Mandate 
When the negotiations in the areas of rules, dom estic support and export subsidies for agricultural 
products, and goods and services bilaterals are comp leted to the satisfaction of Members and the 
Applicant, the Working Party is in a position to finish its work under its mandate.  To do this, it completes its Report to the General Council/Ministe rial Conference.  Working Party Reports start 
with short introductory sections and referenc es to the documentation provided and go on to 
summarize the discussions held on WTO rules.  In each specific case where commitments have been 
negotiated and accepted by the Applicant, the Reports  contain texts laying down the details.  Reports 
conclude by making the recommendations called for in the terms of reference of the Working Party.  
All Reports so far adopted include as an annex dr aft Protocols of Accession setting out the terms on 
which the applicant should be invited to accede.  The Applicant's terms of entry form a single 
package, which must be agreed by the membership  and accepted by the Applicant as a whole.     
Most Protocols of new Members are similar although the standard text was amended in January 2001 
to bring it into line with other WTO Decision doc uments. The basic provisions have remained the 
same.  The common core provisions state that, upon its entry into force, th e Applicant accedes to the 
WTO Agreement pursuant to Article XII and there by becomes a Member of the WTO with the rights 
and obligations of membership.  The new Memb er is bound to observe the rules contained in 
the Agreement establishing the WTO, as rectified, am ended or otherwise modified as of the date that 
its Protocol enters into force.  The text common to all these Protocols is reproduced in Annex 2 of 
document WT/ACC/10/Rev.4/Add.1.   
The Working Party Report also annexes a draft General Council/Ministerial Conference Decision 
inviting the Applicant to accede to  the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO on the terms and 
conditions set out in the draft Protocol.  The texts of  the Decisions have all been identical (see Annex 
2 of document WT/ACC/10/Rev.4/Add.1).      
Accession Working Parties adopt their Reports, incl uding the whole accession package, by consensus 
in accordance with the usual WTO practice.  Duri ng the last meeting of the Working Party, the 
Report, including the Schedules on Goods and Services,  are adopted ad referendum — i.e. subject to 
approval by governments.  Once the adoption of th e Report is confirmed, it is submitted to the 
General Council or, if this is to meet soon, the Ministerial Conference. 
6. Adoption of the Working Party Report by  the General Council, Entry into Force of the 
Protocol of Accession 
The next stage is the adoption of the Report by th e General Council, and the adopting of the Decision 
forwarded to it in draft form by the Working Party.   
In adopting the Decision, WTO Members offer term s of accession to the Applicant. The Applicant 
also accepts those terms by accepting the Protocol.  WTO Members do not, therefore, need to sign the 
Protocol.  The Protocol specifies the date until wh ich it is open for acceptance by the Applicant, by 
signature or ratification. An authorized represen tative of the Applicant often signs the Protocol 
immediately after it has been approved on an ad re ferendum basis.  While a period of three to six 
months is usual, in practice it is the Applicant w ho proposes the length of time needed to complete its 
internal procedures and accept the terms.  A few acceding governments have requested an extension 
of the time-limit for acceptance, explaining their r easons for doing so.  In all these cases the General 
Council has agreed to the extension with very little discussion.  
The Protocol provides that Applicants become Me mbers of the WTO thirty days after accepting the 
Protocol of Accession.  This period is allowed in order to give WTO Members time to take any action 
necessary to apply the WTO Ag reement to the new Member.  WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
 Page 33 
 
 
  7. Invocation of Article XIII of the WTO Agreement 
In eight cases, WTO Members have invoked Article  XIII of the WTO Agreement (Non-Application 
of Multilateral Trade Agreements between Particular Members) prior to the decisions of the General 
Council to adopt the Report and open the Protocol of Accession for acceptance.  Three of these invocations are still in force – Armenia (document WT/L/501), China (document WT/L/429) and 
Moldova (document WT/L/395).  Invocations ha ve been withdrawn in the cases of Georgia 
(document WT/L/385), the Kyrgyz Republic (document WT/L/363), Mongolia (document 
WT/L/306), Armenia (WT/L/601 and Corr.1), and Viet Nam (WT/L/679).   
IV. LEAST-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
Currently, over 40 per cent of all acceding gove rnments are least developed countries (LDCs).  
Pursuant to paragraphs 9 and 42 of the Doha Declaration, much work has been undertaken to 
"facilitate and accelerate the accession negotiations w ith LDCs".  Efforts have been made to 
implement the Doha mandate and, in this regard, the adoption by the General Council of Decision on 
the Accession of LDCs ("LDC Guidelines")
14 has been an important achievement.   
In the area of market access, the LDC Guidelines st ipulate that Members are to exercise restraint in 
seeking concessions and commitments on trade in  goods and services from acceding LDCs, while 
acceding LDCs are expected to  offer access through reasonable concessions and commitments 
commensurate with their individual development, financial and trade needs.  In the area of WTO 
rules, the LDC Guidelines state th at the WTO's special and differential treatment provisions shall be 
applicable to all acceding LDCs, and that, based on identified needs, transitional arrangements – 
accompanied by action plans – shall be granted to enable acceding LDCs to implement their 
commitments and obligations effectively.  The acti on plans are to be supported by technical assistance 
and capacity building measures for acceding LDCs.  Accession to the Plurilateral Trade Agreements 
or participation in other optional sectoral market access initiatives shall not be a precondition for their 
accession to the WTO.  With regard to process, th e Guidelines identify general and specific measures 
to streamline the accession procedures and pro cesses for acceding LDCs.  The LDC Guidelines note 
that the good offices of the Director-General shal l be available to assist acceding LDCs and Working 
Parties Chairpersons.  The Guidelines call for targeted and coordinated technical assistance and 
capacity building measures to be provided, on a prior ity basis, to assist acceding LDCs at all stages of 
the accession process.  The assistance is to be provi ded by the WTO and the relevant multilateral, 
regional and bilateral de velopment partners.  
LDCs have higher average tariff bindings than othe r recently acceded Members.  Nepal has negotiated 
average final tariff bound rates of 41.4 per cent for agricultural and 23.7 per cent for non-agricultural 
products.  For Cambodia the corresponding averages are 28.1 per cent and 17.7 per cent, while the averages for Cape Verde are 19.3 per cent and 15.3  per cent respectively (see Table 3).  Nepal, 
Cambodia and Cape Verde undertook specific commitments under the GATS in 77, 94, 99 services sub-sectors. 
The adoption of the Guidelines has also signalled the willingness of WTO Members to show greater 
flexibility in approaching negotiations on WTO rules.   Nepal, Cambodia and Cape Verde have been 
given transition periods to implement various WT O Agreements, such as the Agreements on SPS and 
TRIPS and Customs Valuation (for details, see docum ent WT/ACC/10/Rev.4/Add.1, Annex 5).  The 
flexibility shown by Members has also been matched by efforts by the acceding LDCs themselves, 
which have provided precise plans for implemen ting WTO-related legislation and enforcement 
mechanisms.  Members have also agreed not to ma ke LDCs' accession contingent on participation in 
the so-called "zero-for-zero" and sectoral initiatives (see Table 4 above).  Commitments to accede to 
                                                     
 
14 Document WT/L/508. WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
Page 34  
 
  Plurilateral Trade Agreements have not been taken as a precondition for WTO accession.  Whereas 
provisions for Special and Differential Treatment have often been the subject of debate in the context 
of many Working Parties, the LDC Guidelines have indicated that Special and Differential Treatment, 
as set out in the Multilateral Trade Agreements , is fully applicable to acceding LDCs.   
In consultation with Members, the Secretariat has also streamlined the accession process for least-
developed countries.  The Secretariat has been ma ndated to prepare a Factual Summary of Points 
raised at an early stage of the process to gui de additional fact-finding LDCs' accessions.  Each 
Working Party meeting is conclude d with a detailed summary of inputs expected for the next meeting 
to ensure that the number of meetings is kept to a minimum.  For non-resident delegations, formal or 
informal Working Party meetings are usually sch eduled on the margins of Geneva Week to ease 
financial burden on these acceding LDCs.  To the exte nt possible, bilateral market access negotiations 
in goods and services have been carried forward by e-mail, videoconferences or by visits to the 
capitals of concerned parties.     
Special attention has been given to tech nical assistance for LDCs acceding to the WTO
15.  The Doha 
Ministerial Declaration, paragraph 42, instructs the Secretariat "to reflect the priority we attach to 
LDCs' accessions in the annual plans for technical assistance …".  The Guidelines have also 
emphasized the importance of "targeted and coordina ted technical assistance and capacity building".  
As a result, priority attention has been given to  LDCs in WTO Annual Technical Assistance Plans.  
Acceding LDCs have participated in over 600 activ ities since 2003.   The WTO has also provided 
acceding LDCs with a reference centre with computer  hardware and software, a link to the internet 
and training in the use of this technology.   
Technical assistance is being made available th rough the Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF).  
In response to the need for effective collaboration with other organizations and bilateral donors, the 
EIF has been set up as a partnership between multil ateral agencies (IMF, ITC, UNCTAD, UNDP, the 
World Bank and WTO), other agencies, bilateral donors and the LDCs themselves to ensure that 
LDCs' national trade policies are integrated into  their respective national development and poverty 
reduction strategies.  The EIF facilitates the coordi nated response provided by the various agencies 
and development partners, each in their own area of expertise, to the trade-related assistance and 
capacity-building needs identified by each of the LD Cs.  There are potential linkages between the EIF 
and accession, as the EIF can be utilised to identify,  prioritise and address the trade-related needs of 
acceding countries and contribute to their effective in tegration into the multilateral trading system.  
This has been the case of Cambodi a where the IF and the EIF have contributed positively to the 
accession process and post-accession.  Currently, Ethi opia, the Union of the Comoros, Lao PDR, 
Liberia, Sao Tomé and Principe, Samoa, Sudan, Vanua tu and Yemen are full beneficiaries of the EIF.  
Afghanistan and Bhutan are in the early stage of  the EIF process.  WTO Members have raised the 
issue of the importance of synergies between the EIF and the accession process in the Sub-Committee 
on LDCs16, in particular, the need to include a strong accession component in the EIF process of 
acceding LDCs that would include an  in-depth assessment of institutiona l and legislative needs related 
to the accession process.  The EIF also provid es a mechanism for follow-up in the post-accession 
stage.17  
 
V. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE  
It has been recognized from the outset that, gi ven the demands made by the accession process on 
Applicants, the provision of technical assistance from the earliest stages of the accession procedure is 
of critical importance.  The need for this assistance ranges from help in the preparation of 
                                                      
15 See, for example, document WT/COMTD/LDC/W/44. 
16 For a record of the meeting see document WT/COMTD/LDC/M/36. 
17 More information on the EIF is ava ilable at www.integr atedframework.org.  WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
 Page 35 
 
 
  documentation and in the negotiation of the terms of accession to the setting up of adequate legislative 
and administrative infrastructures to ensure that ne w Members become effective participants in the 
WTO as soon as possible.  Paragraphs 38-41 of the Doha  Ministerial Declaration reaffirm the need for 
co-ordinated and securely funded technical assistance.   
 - Secretariat  
Information on the technical assistance currently provided by the Secretariat, including assistance 
given to acceding governments, is summarised in an nual reports, which are made to the Committee on 
Trade and Development.  The most recent of these reports cover activities in 2008 (documents 
WT/COMTD/W/168 and 169/Rev.1).  In 2008, there were 497 technical assi stance activities - 86 
were regional events and 234 were national events.    
WTO technical assistance activities have been de livered on the basis of the biennial Technical 
Assistance and Training Plans (documents WT/COMTD/W/160 for 2008-2009; and WT/COMTD/W/170/Rev.1 for 2010-11). Acceding governments have benefited from focused 
national, regional and Geneva-based training and t echnical assistance.  In addition to national 
activities and technical missions to individual acced ing governments (up to three national activities 
per year for acceding LDCs), regional seminars are being organised for Africa, Arab and Middle East 
and the Central and East European, Central Asia and the Caucasus (CEECAC ) region.  The Geneva-
based Seminar on Accessions for all acceding government s, held in 2002 and 2004, is scheduled again 
for 2010.  Assistance is also provided to acceding governments during their visits to Geneva and by 
electronic means, including E-training on Accessions.  A Handbook on Accession to the WTO has been published and is also available electronically on the WTO website.
18 
To assist with the technical demands of the accessi on process itself, in accordance with the procedures 
laid down in document WT/ACC/1, the Secretariat may verify the consistency of the Applicant's 
Memorandum on its Foreign Trade Regime with the outlin e format attached to that document.  In this 
context, the Secretariat may make technical  comments to the Applicants concerned. 
For subsequent documentation the complexity of  the accession negotiations also requires acceding 
governments to provide highly technical data and information on specific sectors, such as tariffs, 
agriculture, TRIPS and services, as well as notifications, questionnaires or checklists on customs valuation, technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures and State-trading.  During 
missions, as well as from Geneva, the Secretariat assists in the compilation and submission of the necessary information in agreed fo rmats, such as those for replies to questions from WTO Members, 
market access offers, and tables of  support measures in agriculture. 
As part of their preparation for accession negotiations , Applicants also avail themselves, to the extent 
possible, of the WTO training courses (Geneva-based, regional and E-training).  Courses on trade policy, international trade law, the multilateral tr ading system and dispute settlement are organised 
alternatively in English, French and Spanish for developing economies' officials from both WTO 
Members or Observers.  
Applicants are also advised to use their Observer Status to follow WTO meetings, both those of other 
accession Working Parties and the various WTO Councils and Committees. 
 - WTO Members and Other Organisations  
Acceding governments also receive technical assist ance from bilateral, regional and multilateral 
development partners.  In this regard, the D oha Development Agenda Trade-Related Technical 
                                                     
 
18 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e /acc_e/cbt_course_e/signin_e.htm . WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
Page 36  
 
  Assistance and Capacity Building Database (TCBDB) has been established by the WTO jointly with 
the OECD to provide information on trade-rela ted technical assistance (period of coverage from 
2001).  It can be consulted to show beneficiary countries, donor countries, donor agencies or trade 
category.
19 
Individual WTO Members have frequently provid ed help to governments that have requested 
assistance.  They have supported Applicants with implementation issues related to ongoing domestic 
reform programmes (e.g. with the transition to market economy); with setting up of the necessary 
basic legal and institutional framework; as well as wi th fulfilment of the detailed requirements of the 
accession process itself. 
International organisations and specialized agencies, including the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (t he World Bank), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Developm ent (UNCTAD), the World Customs Organisation 
(WCO) and the World Intellectual Property Orga nisation (WIPO) have also provided support to 
acceding governments. 
UNCTAD delivers technical assistan ce to acceding countries by undertaking advisory missions and 
working directly with national negotiating teams;  assisting in the preparation of documentation 
required by the WTO accession negotiations; preparing analytical papers and briefings for national 
policy-makers; organising brainstorming meeti ngs and seminars; and disseminating trade policy 
information. 
The Cooperation Agreements between the WTO a nd the IMF and the World Bank provide a forum 
for consultations with a view to achieving greater  coherence in global economic policy-making.  The 
General Council has an item on its agenda deali ng with "Agreements between the WTO and the IMF 
and the World Bank".  The Secretariat has prepared a check-list of issues raised  by Delegations in the 
course of the discussions (WT/GC/W/140), which deals, inter alia , with cooperation in trade-related 
technical assistance and capacity-building.  These discussions are ongoing and a report on WTO Cooperation with the IMF and the World Bank is issued annually.
20  The Doha Ministerial 
Declaration also states that the WTO will continue to work with the Bretton Woods institutions for 
greater coherence in global economic policy-making (paragraph 5).21 
When the Secretariat develops technical assistance plans it tries to coordinate them, to the extent 
possible, with similar assistance being provided by individual Members and other international 
organisations so as to avoid duplication (see Part  IV above for information on the Enhanced 
Integrated Framework).  The sort of assistance that th e Secretariat provides is often, by its very nature, 
complementary to the help provided by national Go vernments and other organisations.  As provision 
of the Secretariat's assistance is demand-driven, it can also rely on the acceding government to 
identify the assistance which it needs.  Support is also available to acceding governments under the 
Aid for Trade initiative.  VI. DISCUSSIONS ON THE ACCESSION PROCESS - RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Discussions on the accession process itself, as distinct from discussions on the accession of individual 
governments, have been held on a number of occasions  in the WTO.  These include the Ministerial 
Conferences in Singapore (December 1996), Ge neva (May 1998), S eattle (December 1999), 
Doha (2001) and Geneva (2009).  Th e declarations adopted at three of these Ministerial Conferences 
(Singapore 1996, Geneva 1998 an d Doha 2001) contain a section on accessions.  Discussions on 
                                                     
 
19 http://tcbdb.wto.org . 
20 See document series WT/TF/COH/S. 
21 WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1.  WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
 Page 37 
 
 
  accessions have also taken place in General Counc il meetings (10 December 1998, 15 June 1999, 
8 May 2000, 20 October 2009 and 17 December 2009).  In 2002, the Sub-Committee on LDCs held 
discussions resulting in the General Council's adopting a Decision containing Guidelines22 aimed to 
facilitate and accelerate LDC accessions.  In  2009, the Sub-Committee on LDCs discussed LDC 
accessions on two occasions.  Numerous issues have b een raised in each discussion, and this Note 
summarises the main comments and suggestions. 23 
- Universal WTO Membership  
Many speakers have welcomed the large number of governments that have applied to join the WTO, 
saying that this demonstrates the viability of the sy stem, and also represents a challenge to the WTO 
and its evolution as a truly global organisation.  The more extensive the WTO's membership becomes, 
the greater the benefits for its Members and th e more global welfare would be increased.   
- The Applicant's situation  
It has been generally recognized that accession to  the WTO involves wide-ranging and often difficult 
legislative and executive action by acceding governme nts.  Many acceding governments have stressed 
the fact that accession would encourage and consolidate their own internal reform process and 
accelerate their economic development.  Many speakers have, therefore, emphasised the importance 
of bringing the acceding governments into the system as rapidly as possible.   
Each accession is a negotiation between the acceding government and WTO Members, and therefore, 
is to be treated on its own merits.  Conseque ntly, the balance in each accession should be to 
accommodate the special situation of the acceding gov ernment on the one hand, while maintaining the 
credibility of the WTO system on the other.   
- Accession Process  
The accession process is often seen as lengthy and too demanding for certain acceding governments.    
Many speakers have noted that accessions have been moving too slowly, some adding that the process should be simplified.   
Although many accessions have been completed si nce the first discussions on the accession process 
took place, it has been suggested that the numbe r of new Members should have been higher over 
recent years.  However, other speakers have acknow ledged that this does not necessarily mean that the 
procedure is not working.  Time could be used productively for preparing the Applicant's accession, 
and the pace of each individual accession has depended largely on the Applicant's willingness and 
capacity to meet the requirements of the system.     
Some speakers have said that the process has sufficient flexibility to  address the needs of individual 
acceding governments.  However, it appears generally agreed that the WTO sh ould look for ways to 
expedite the current accession processes so that Appli cants are not kept waiting longer than necessary.  
While certain organisational change s have already been implemented (fewer meetings, etc.), many 
speakers have stressed the importance of furthe r expediting the accession process while maintaining 
the integrity of the WTO system.  Care has been ta ken not to introduce two classes of Members, even 
though there have also been some procedural suggestions to do so.  
                                                     
 
22 WT/L/508. 
23 For details, see the records of these meetings:  WT/MIN(96)/ST/ series, WT/MIN(98)/ST/ series, 
WT/MIN(99)/ST/ series, WT/MIN(01)/ST/ series, WT/GC/M/32, WT/GC/M/40/Add.3, WT/GC/M/55, and WT/GC/W/485/Rev.1.  Also the Mi nisterial Declarations:  WT/MIN /(96)/DEC, WT/MIN/(98)/DEC/1, 
WT/MIN/(01)/DEC/1, as well as WT/MIN(03)/2 (Status Report by the Director- General). WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
Page 38  
 
  Speakers have been unanimous that, to preserve th e integrity of the system, accession should address 
technical issues and leave aside political criteria; Members need to foster negotiations on objective 
considerations.  It has been argued that Members have used the negotiations to resolve bilateral 
disputes not relevant to WTO accession, hence sometimes blocking accession negotiations.     
- Transparency  
The procedures put forward in documents WT/ACC/1, 4,  5, 8 and 9 have been generally welcomed as 
well-structured and transparent.  The view has al so been expressed, however, that ways should be 
found of keeping all Members informed of developments in individual accessions.   
Several delegations have called fo r enhancing the transparency of  the accession process.  Proposals 
have been made to enhance institutional mechan isms to provide acceding governments with the 
opportunity to express their views on the process.  Periodic progress reports on accession by the 
Director General have also been suggested. 
Other speakers have argued that the existing process and procedures provide for sufficient 
transparency.  In particular, accession Working Par ties and documentation are open to any Member or 
Applicant interested in the process, legislation is av ailable for review in the Secretariat, and questions 
and comments on the Applicant's documents are publishe d.   The status of bilateral negotiations is 
reported upon and is open for discussion at Working Party meetings.  
- Terms of Accession  
Some Members have pointed out that Article XII of  the Marrakesh Agreement, like Article XXXIII of 
GATT 1947, places no limits on the terms of accession which are to be developed through negotiation 
with current Members, and that the terms should gu arantee a balance of rights and obligations.  Many 
have said that the accession of new governments shoul d strengthen the system rather than weaken it, 
and that acceding governments must therefore dem onstrate their willingness to comply fully with 
WTO rules upon accession.  This requires meaningf ul commitments from Applicants as well as 
flexibility from Members. 
Some Members have said that acceding government s should observe a standstill on WTO-inconsistent 
measures and on tariff increases during accession.  Al so Applicants should not wait until completion 
of the negotiations to bring their legislation into conformity with the WTO. 
A number of different criteria have been suggested  for judging market access commitments, the most 
frequently cited being that these should be "comme rcially viable", "meaningful in trade terms", 
"meaningful", "fair", or "appropriate to the level of economic development of the Applicant".  Both 
the Singapore 1996 and Geneva 1998 Ministerial D eclarations call for "meaningful market-access 
commitments". 
A number of speakers have stressed that acceding gover nments should not be asked to undertake more 
stringent obligations than present WTO Members (o ften referred to as "WTO-plus" obligations).  
To do so, they have argued, would be an abuse of economic power.  Some have said that this applied 
especially to small island developing economies and LDCs. 
In this regard, it has been argued that claims fo r special and differential treatment for developing 
economies have sometimes not been granted, in partic ular in regard to transition periods foreseen in 
WTO Agreements for original WTO Members, relevant de minimis  agricultural support 
commitments, provisions on export subsidies, pro cedures for balance-of-payments consultations, and 
the Decision on net-food-importing developing countries.  WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
 Page 39 
 
 
  Some Members have said that there is no provision  for automatic granting of transition periods to 
acceding governments.  Transition periods contained in the WTO Agreements had been accorded to 
original Members to help them become accustomed to their new obligations and have already begun 
to expire.  Acceding Governments are in a different  position, as they have been familiar with the 
requirements of the WTO Agreement since the date of  its entry into force.  Some Members have said 
that they are not, a priori , opposed to transition periods, provided that there is a clear justification for 
them. 
Some speakers have said that membership of Pl urilateral Agreements (Agreement on Government 
Procurement and Civil Aircraft Agreement) should not be made a condition of accession to the WTO, 
as Article XII has clarified that the procedures fo r accession to these are quite separate from accession 
to the WTO itself. 
It has been recognised that there is no easy answer to the question of "WTO-plus".  Members are still 
adding to their commitments under the WTO and some order of reciprocity is therefore applicable. 
- Least Developed Countries  
Particular attention has been directed to the accession of LDCs.  Some have said that the accession 
procedures for these governments should be simp lified and accelerated, that the commitments 
demanded of these governments should take into acc ount their level of development, and that 
transition periods and special and differential treatment  were often appropriate.  Some have said that 
all existing WTO provisions regarding special and di fferential treatment for LDCs should be extended 
automatically and without negotiation to all LDCs acceding to the WTO. 
In this regard, attention has focused on the impl ementation of the General Council's Decision on the 
Accession of Least Developed Countries (the "Gui delines") of 10 December 2002 and its review in 
the Sub-Committee on Least-Developed Countries.  Members and acceding LDCs have reaffirmed their commitment to facilitate LDCs' accessions w ithin the framework of the 2000 LDC Guidelines.  
Members have agreed that the Dialogue between acceding LDCs and WTO Members, which was initiated in 2009, will continue in 2010 within the framework  of the Sub-Committee.    
- Technical Assistance 
The importance of technical assistance to acced ing governments has been generally recognised.  
Many speakers feel that such assi stance is essential for developing economies in general and for small 
island developing economies and LDCs in particular.  Yet tec hnical assistance cannot resolve all 
difficulties and must be considered alongside the capacity and willingness of Applicants.  While many 
Applicants have expressed their gratitude for the assist ance that they have received, others have also 
drawn attention to their specific needs.   
Early discussions have suggested that the WTO should take the lead in providing technical assistance, 
that UNCTAD also has a major role to play and th at international organisations should co-ordinate 
their efforts and their advice in this area.  It has been stated that the various sources of technical 
assistance need to be coordinated more effectiv ely, now that the requirements of accession are 
complicated and far-reaching.
24 
                                                      
24 See also the WTO website for current information on the status of technical cooperation activities:  
http://www.wto.org/english/tr atop_e/devel_e/tct_e.htm . WT/ACC/10/Rev.4 
Page 40  
 
  - Doha Development Agenda 
The importance of completing a maximum number of accessions before the conclusion of the current 
round of trade negotiations has been generally recogni zed.  It has been suggested that ways should be 
found to consider how government s, which have not yet acceded, could take part in the ongoing 
negotiations as effectively as possible.  Recogni zing the need to integrate acceding governments 
further into the negotiation process, the Doha Ministerial Declaration
25 (paragraph 48) states that 
"negotiations shall be open to [...] states and sep arate customs territories currently in the process of 
accession and those that inform Members, at a re gular meeting of the General Council, of their 
intention to negotiate the terms of their membersh ip and for whom an accession working party is 
established.  Decisions on the outcomes of the ne gotiations shall be taken only by WTO Members".26 
 
 
__________  
                                                      
25 WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1. 
26 Document TN/C/M/2, paragraphs 21-23, contains an understanding on the interpretation of 
paragraph 48 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, reached after consultations with delegations.