WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  TN/RL/GEN/171 
17 January 2011 
 (11-0319) 
Negotiating Group on Rules Original:   English 
  
 
FISHERIES SUBSIDIES: 
NEW PROPOSALS REGARDING THE DISCIPLINE 
 
Communication from Japan
 
 
 
 The following communication, dated 17 January 2 011, is being circulated at the request of the 
Delegation of Japan.    
_______________ 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. At the WTO Doha Round (the Doha Developm ent Agenda), a series of negotiations is under 
way over various areas and there is the need to further accelerate the debate among Members, which 
is indispensable in order to complete the Round in  the year 2011.  To develop the discipline of 
fisheries subsidies is one of the items under the Rules Negotiations.  Under the Chairmanship of 
Ambassador Valles and Ambassador Francis, active discussions have been taking place from many positions among Members including Japan.   2. As the fisheries subsidies negotiation is the first attempt for the WTO to develop a discipline 
dealing with an environmental issue right from the beginning, the progress of the negotiation is not as 
mature as that of other negotiations.  This is al so due to the difficulty caused by the technical 
complexity of the fisheries issues.  The main and b asic issue for this negotiation that is still pending is 
to decide on what kinds of fisheries subsidies are to be prohibited because of their contributions to 
overcapacity and overfishing.  In addition, the na ture and the extent of such overcapacity and 
overfishing caused by subsidies and how such phe nomenon can be recognized and dealt with in the 
entire picture of global fisheries activities and fish eries management need to be fully taken into 
account in the development of the discipline.  3. Japan's view about the way to proceed nego tiations has been to examine the relationship 
between subsidies and overcapacity/overfishing based on evidence using specific real statistical data 
first, and then, consideration and adjustment of other core issues such as exceptions and conditions 
should be taken into account.  At the same time, Ja pan is fully aware of the current situation under 
which the Chairman and Members are required to intensify their work on text basis. 
 4. After having duly recognized the situation, Japan is hereby submitting its proposals in writing 
for making its position clear on the core issues of the discipline to be registered to the Rule 
Negotiations Group.  In order to express its positi on on the issues, Japan has taken two different 
approaches in this paper: i.e., a combination of  concept-based proposals and text-based ones.  
 5. For the purposes noted above, the followi ng section (Section II) includes brief notes on 
Japan's basic views and positions on the discipline of  fisheries subsidies.  In Section III, various 
elements of Japan's specific ideas and proposals of a conceptual nature are provided across the TN/RL/GEN/171 
Page 2  
 
  discipline.  Further elaboration by Japan and other Members would be necessary for these concept-
based proposals to be incorporated into the text.  Section IV includes explanatory notes about the text-
based proposals on core elements (i.e., Prohibitions , General Exceptions, and Special and Differential 
Treatment for Developing Country Members ("S&D" )).  To this document, Japan attaches the 
proposed text of the discipline, making a contrast  with the texts drafted by former chairman 
Ambassador Valles in 2007
1 ("the Chair's text of 2007").  Jap an believes that these proposals would 
contribute to the development of the discipline of th e fisheries subsidies in its parts and as a whole. 
 6. It should be noted that, although these propo sals are the reflections of Japan's views and 
positions on the discipline of fisheries subsidies, Japan reserves its right to further submit additional 
proposals which would add to or modify this document. 
 
II. JAPAN'S BASIC POSITION ON THE DISCIPLINE OF FISHERIES SUBSIDIES 
7. In submitting this document, Japan is reitera ting its basic position on fisheries subsidies.  
Japan has committed itself to the long-term conserva tion and sustainable use of fisheries resources 
and has made various kinds of efforts for this co mmon goal in many international fora.  Japan has 
scrapped at least one thousand of its fishing vessel s, thereby contributing to the significant reduction 
of world-wide fishing overcapacity.  As a partner in  the field of development of fisheries, Japan has 
also been cooperating with many developing countries for the development of their fisheries, in particular, with those of the Asia-Pacific region.  
8. Japan's basic position on fisheries subsidies is  based on a long history and a wide range of 
issues related to fisheries.  Not only the scientific  and technical aspects of fisheries and fisheries 
management, but also the socio-economic aspects  of fisheries and fish products for coastal 
communities are important based on their reality.  The discipline of fisheries subsidies should, 
therefore, take into account such socio-economic  aspects and the impact on the coastal communities 
which depend on fisheries, while trying to ensure th e long-term sustainability of fisheries resources.  
 9. In considering the discipline of fisheries subsid ies, the Members have to bear in mind the fact 
that subsidies do not a priori contribute to overcapac ity or overfishing.  Capacity-enhancing or effort-
enhancing effect, if any, caused by subsidies which was emphasized by some Members, is not as significant in its magnitude as was previously believed
2.  Also, the implementation of effective 
fisheries management can prevent the negative effect s on fisheries resources even if such enhancing 
effects are induced.  It should be also noted th at other factors, separate from subsidies, are 
contributing to overcapacity and overfishing.  In pa rticular, illegal, unreported or unregulated fishing 
("IUU fishing") activities significantly contribute to overfishing3.  These facts remind us that the 
global issues of overcapacity and overfishing sh ould effectively be addressed through a holistic 
approach to fisheries management and associated schemes.  
 10. If the discipline of fisheries subsidies is conf ined to a mere list of prohibitions, it will be of 
little use in solving overcapacity and overfishing, c ontrary to the anticipation of the international 
community.  At the same time, if the WTO proposes to tackle these issues solely by itself, it will not 
be effective in solving the problem.  Therefore, developing a workable and cooperative international 
framework through which Members' fisheries ma nagement can be improve d, using the subsidy 
discipline as a "leverage", would contribute to the lo ng-term sustainability of fisheries resources.  For 
                                                     
 
1 TN/RL/W/213 (Draft Consolidated Chair Texts of the AD and SCM Agreement) 
2 In the Working Documents submitted by Japan for October 2010 session, Japan introduced a set of 
statistical analyses that subsidies do not always lead to overcapacity or overfishing. 
3 The magnitude of IUU fishing is estimated to be between $10 billion and $23.5 billion annually.  See, 
Agnew DJ, Pearce J, Pramod G, Peatman T, Watson R, et  al. (2009) Estimating the Worldwide Extent of Illegal 
Fishing. PLoS ONE 4(2): e4570. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004570  TN/RL/GEN/171 
 Page 3 
 
 
  this purpose, fisheries management should not be limited to the condition of exceptions, but should 
constitute the conceptual backbone of the discipline.   For example, while remaining consistent with 
the provisions of the United Nations Conventio n on the Law of the Sea ("the 1982 UNCLOS"), 
cooperative frameworks with international fisheries organizations such as the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations ("FAO") a nd Regional Fisheries Management Organizations 
("RFMOs") need to be further explored.  
 11. At the same time, government subsidy pr ograms entail various policy objectives such as 
resource management, environmental conservation, crew safety and accommodation, and the social welfare of fishworkers.  The discipline should be car efully crafted so as not to obstruct the legitimate 
policy objectives of Members.  In addition, taking into account the nature of the Doha Development 
Agenda, particular attention should be paid to the development needs of developing Members.  When 
these perspectives are considered in the context of fi sheries, an appropriate balance between the basic 
rights and obligations of Members should be maintain ed in terms of the WTO rules and international 
fisheries management.   
 
III. CONCEPT-BASED PROPOSALS AND SUGGESTIONS 
(Basic principles and definitions)
 
 12. As reflected in the Ministerial Declarations , the basic purpose of the discipline of fisheries 
subsidies is to achieve and maintain the long-te rm sustainability of the fisheries resources by 
restricting overcapacity and overfishing
4.  It is not intended to deal with trade distortion effects.  This 
new particular aspect, which does not appear in ot her existing WTO rules, should be expressly laid 
down in the discipline in order to provide predictability and accountability.      13. It should also be noted that the discipline of fisheries subsidies is drafted as an Annex to the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("the SCM Agreement"), consistent with the 
mandate of the Doha Ministerial Declaration
5.  In developing the discipline in such a manner, the 
vertical relationship between the main body of th e SCM Agreement and the discipline of fisheries 
subsidies in Annex VIII, including its different objectiv es in particular, should be clarified in the text.  
In the Chair's text of 2007, refe rence to Annex VIII within the main  body of the SCM Agreement was 
made only in the prohibition part6 (i.e., Article 3.1(c)).  This is not sufficient because Annex VIII 
provides for not only rules on the prohibition of certain  forms of fisheries subsidies but also a set of 
comprehensive rules relating to fisheries subsidies.  This adds a new feature to the SCM Agreement.  
 14. On the one hand, since the discipline of fisheries subsidies is an Annex of the SCM 
Agreement, it is naturally assumed that the discip line should be subject to the basic concepts and 
principles of the SCM Agreement.  On the other ha nd, since the fisheries s ubsidies discipline deals 
with fisheries resource sustainability, differe nt provisions and prescriptions may therefore be 
necessary to address such difference.   In this sense, commonalities and disparities between the main 
body of the SCM Agreement and the fisheries subsid ies discipline should be carefully identified and 
sorted out, thereby maintaining a good balance betw een the WTO rules in general and the fisheries 
subsidies discipline.   
 
                                                     
 
4 In fact, "overcapacity" and "overfishing" are symbolic terms which reflect global concerns about the 
degradation of the overall status of fisheries resources in the world.  In both the Doha and Hong Kong 
Ministerial Declarations, the discipline of fisheries subsid ies is referred to also in the context of trade and 
environment. 
5 Paragraph 28 of the Declaration refers to the rule for negotiation including fisheries subsidies. 
6 See, page 43 (English document) of TN/RL/W/213 TN/RL/GEN/171 
Page 4  
 
  15. For example, the scope of fisheries subsidies in relation to overcapacity and overfishing is an 
outstanding issue in the negotiation.  The scope of fisheries subsidies need to be clearly and precisely 
defined so that they are applicable throughout th e discipline including prohibition and "actionability" 
clauses.  In any case, a technical disclaimer is ne cessary to exclude Member governments' activities 
which are an integral part of their fisheries mana gement so that they are not targeted under the 
discipline
7.  If a certain fisheries management system or scheme is regarded as a subsidy, the entire 
fisheries management regime of those Members would be ruined.  
 16. The scope of fisheries activities which fall with in the purview of the discipline should also be 
clearly defined.  In the discussions to date, cer tain convergences have been observed among Members 
on the point that the scope should be confined to ma rine wild capture fishing activities and that inland 
freshwater fishing as well as aquaculture is not in cluded.  However, the geographical coverage of 
marine wild capture fishing is not entirely clear.  In particular, whether or not it includes capture 
fishing activities in "internal waters
8" defined in accordance with the 1982 UNCLOS remains unclear.  
For the sake of clarity and predictability, Japan prop oses that capture fishing activities in the internal 
waters of coastal states should be excluded from the scope of the discipline of fisheries subsidies.   
 17. Considering the above-mentioned aspects, th e following points should at least be clearly 
defined in the text:   
 
 - The objectives of the discipline of fisheries subsidies 
 
 - The relationship between the main body of the SCM Agreement and its Annex VIII 
as a discipline of fisheries subsidies 
  - The scope of the subsidies to be covere d by the Annex (including the disclaimer that 
fisheries management is not deemed  as a subsidy in this context) 
  - The scope of fishing activities to be covered by the Annex   - The attribution of subsidies to the Memb er conferring them (Article IV.2 of the 
Chair's text of 2007) 
 
Since these points need to be applicable throughout the discipline, it may be appropriate to deal with 
these provisions together and place them at the beginning of the discipline, for example, under the title of "General Provisions".  These technical clarif ications will also be useful to avoid systemic 
problems concerning the interpretation and im plementation of the SCM Agreement and its 
Annex VIII. 
 (Prohibition)
 
 18. With regard to the prohibition of certain fish eries subsidies, Japan has provided specific text-
based proposals in the Attachment to this documen t.  Explanatory notes for these text-based proposals 
are described in Section IV.  
  
                                                     
 
7 In this context, the submission by Australia (T N/RL/GEN/167) proposed that "governmental activity 
directly associated with the creati on and implementation fisheries management systems...shall not be deemed to 
be subsidies." 
8 "Internal waters" are defined in Article 8 of the 1982 UNCLOS.    TN/RL/GEN/171 
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  (General Exceptions)  
 19. With regard to general exceptions, Japan has provided specific text-based proposals in the 
Attachment to this document.  Explanatory not es for these text-based proposals are described in 
Section IV.  
 
20. In this proposal, Japan intends to establish an exhaustive list of general exceptions.  However, 
a need may arise for additional general exceptions which have not been exp licitly covered herein.  
Furthermore, this positive listing approach might complicate matters and make the implementation of 
the discipline a burden to both the WTO and its Memb ers.  An alternative approach proposed by 
Canada
9 in 2008 (called " de minims "), which tried to accommodate such  policy needs in a simple and 
comprehensive manner, is still worth consideration.   21. One issue regarding general exceptions which is  not provided in the attached text but is 
presented as a concept is the possibility of provisional  limitations or suspensions of the application of 
the discipline against certain fishing types or Me mbers.  Fishing activities all over the world differ 
widely and numerous government programs are in pl ace to regulate or support these activities.  Since 
it is the first time for the WTO to deal with the discipline of fish eries subsidies, the knowledge and 
resources of the matter are, for the time being, limit ed.  At the early stages of the implementation, 
considerable confusion might arise among both the Members and the Secretariat.  Hence, the smooth and swift operation of the discipline cannot be fully guaranteed.  From a practical viewpoint, at least 
for a certain duration, it is therefore worth considering or even necessary to limit the application of the 
discipline to certain fishing types or to exempt the Members which do not have problems with their 
fisheries management from the application of  the discipline of fisheries subsidies.  
 (S&D treatments for developing country Members)
 
 
22. With regard to the S&D treatment for de veloping country Members, Japan has provided 
specific text-based proposals in the Attachment to this document.  Explanatory notes for these text-
based proposals are described in Section IV.  23. One issue which has not been provided in th e text but presented as a concept regarding S&D 
treatment is the classification of developing country Members into different categories.  In the Chair's 
text of 2007, developing country Members are classified only into two categories (i.e., least-
developed country ("LDC") Members and othe r developing country Members).  Further 
classifications should be considered in accordance with certain criteria .  With regard to marine wild 
capture fisheries, cat ches by developing country Members account for about 70% of the total catch in 
the world in weight
10.  Some developing country Members already possess considerable number of 
industrialized fishing vessels.  The types of fishin g activities and the degree of development of fishing 
activities in developing country Members also wi dely vary.  Given these facts, the further 
classification of developing country Members a nd differentiated treatment according to such 
classification would be fair and reasonable.   
24. At the same time, appropriate criteria require  further discussion and must be determined with 
the utmost care.  To this end, Japan, the Republic  of Korea and the Separate Customs Territory of 
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu ("Chin ese Taipei") jointly proposed in 2006
11 that the 
developing country Members whose weight-based share of marine wild capture fisheries is [X] % or 
                                                      
9 TN/RL/GEN/156 
10 According to FAO statistical data on marine capture fishing in 2008, non-OECD Members account 
for 70% in the total catch on a weight basis.  See, Table 1 of the Working Documents submitted by Japan during 
the October 2010 session.   
11 TN/RL/GEN/114/Rev.1 TN/RL/GEN/171 
Page 6  
 
  more be required to gradually phase out their subsid ies within a certain period.  Submissions by the 
Small and Vulnerable Economies ("SVEs") group in 2010
12 proposed an additional category of 
developing country Members according to their mari ne wild capture fishing production and the world 
NAMA trade share.  The proposal requested that similar treatment as LDC Members receive should 
be given to the Members in accordance with this new category.  In addition to the above-mentioned 
criteria, other factors such as the degree of economic  development and the tota l numbers or tonnage of 
certain fishing vessels registered in competent or ganizations of developing country Members should 
also be examined.  (General discipline / "Actionability")
 
 
25. With regard to the general discipline and "actionability," specific text-based proposals were 
tabled by Korea13, the USA14 and four developing country Members15.  Substantial and constructive 
discussions in this regard were held during sessions in December 2010.  Japan reserves the right to 
submit text-based proposals on Article IV of the Annex VIII, as necessary. 
 
26. In order to ensure the validity and effectiven ess of the discipline of fisheries subsidies, Japan 
will continue to cooperate with other Members.  As mentioned in the negotiation, Japan is particularly 
interested in the following points:    - On what grounds  the "standing" of "actionability" can be defined;   
 
 - What the technical criteria on which the status of certain fish stocks are assessed and 
determined are; 
  - What fisheries management instruments are referred to; 
 
 - In what manner the burden of proof should be distributed among the Members 
concerned;  and  
  - How the WTO and its relevant organi zations and mechanisms are utilized, in 
particular, how we can ensure that fisheri es expertise is incorporated in the process. 
 
(Fisheries management)
 
 27. Japan stresses in this document that fisher ies management is of particular importance in 
addressing overcapacity and overfishing.  If the discipline of fisheries subsidies reinforces the 
fisheries management of each Member and prom otes international cooperation, it will greatly 
contribute to sustainability of fisheries resources.  Fisheries management not only has an overriding 
power over capacity/effort-enhancing effects by subs idies but also is effective in reducing and 
eliminating the overcapacity and overfishing caused by the factors not related to the subsidies.  
 28. On the elements of fisheries management on which the application of general exceptions 
referred to in Article II of the Annex VIII could be based, specific text-based proposals were tabled by 
Norway
16, the USA and four developing country Members.   Japan reserves the right to submit text-
based proposal on Article V of the Annex VIII, as n ecessary.  In the light of their effectiveness for 
conserving fisheries resources, there should be adequa te prescriptions for fisheries management in the 
                                                      
12 TN/RL/GEN/162. 
13 TN/RL/GEN/168. 
14 TN/RL/GEN/165. 
15 TN/RL/GEN/163. 
16 TN/RL/W/231.  TN/RL/GEN/171 
 Page 7 
 
 
  discipline of fisheries subsidies.  At the same ti me, considering the different  nature and status of 
fishing activities and fish stocks, uniform standard s of fisheries management are neither necessary nor 
feasible.  In implementing fisheries management and under the review mechanism, certain discretion 
should be granted to the fisheries authorities of de veloping country Members, particularly for their 
small-scale fisheries.  Japan will cooperate with  other Members in developing appropriate and 
acceptable rules in this regard. 
 29. Japan has reiterated in this document that one  of the objectives of the discipline of fisheries 
subsidies under the WTO should be to encourag e cooperative framework to reinforce fisheries 
management in the world.  To this end, th e WTO and the FAO/RFMOs should coordinate their 
regimes to create a synergy of domestic and international fisheries management, as the WTO is, in 
itself, not a fisheries management organization.  One possible option is a "peer" review mechanism 
operated by the FAO or other competent organizations.  That said, Japan's intent is not to designate an 
authority outside the WTO, but to seek techni cal and scientific advice from groups composed of 
invited experts and the secretariats of the orga nizations.  The decision-making mandate would still 
reside within the WTO.   
 (Notification and surveillance,  and Transitional provisions)
 
 30. Of equal importance but less urgent items at this stage are notification and surveillance, and 
transitional provisions.  On the other hand, necessar y adjustments to these aspects should be made 
only at a later stage.  Japan believes that the ex isting provisions of the SCM Agreement should be 
applied in the systemic areas where the pecu liarities of fisheries are not prominent.  
 31. As has been repeatedly pointed out, mere ly listing prohibitions will not be effective for 
sustainability of fisheries resource.  Instead, th e discipline of fisheries subsidies under the WTO 
should provide a positive mechanism to reinforce fish eries management by the Members.  In this 
respect, the magnitude of IUU fishing in internatio nal fisheries should not be underestimated.  While 
developing the discipline in terms of sustainability of fisheries resources, the Rules Negotiation Group 
has not paid adequate attention to this issue.  In fact, the provisions related to IUU fishing are referred 
to only in Article I.1(h) in the Chair's text of 200 7, and it remains unclear how this prohibition will be 
able to be implemented effectively. 
 
32. In other words, the Chair's text of 2007 did not provide effective and strong  legal framework for prevention and eradication of IUU fishing activiti es.  IUU fishing could take advantage of legal 
flaws and fragmentations of international systems, and thus, continue to pose a threat to fisheries 
resources.  In the light of this, additional elem ents of appropriately strong measures against IUU 
fishing, including trade restrictions consistent with the WTO rules, should be considered.  Japan 
continues to consult with other Members on this matter.   
IV. EXPLANATORY NOTES ON THE TEXTUAL PROPOSALS ON CORE PARTS OF 
THE DISCIPLINE 
(Prohibition)
 
 
33. Japan does not believe that comprehensiv e and unconditional prohibitions of fisheries 
subsidies are appropriate for the purpose of conser vation and sustainable use of fishery resources.  
Nor is Japan convinced that the items mentioned in Article I.1 of the Chair's text of 2007 are 
appropriate for prohibition for all Members.  In any case, the fisheries subsidies to be prohibited 
should be decided by consensus within the Members.   However,  in order to help generating the 
bottom-up text, Japan is prepared to accept the proh ibition of certain subsidies which are relatively 
related to overcapacity and overfishing, while reserving the right to revert to its original conservative 
position, unless the modifications of the Chair's text of 2007 proposed therein are accepted.  TN/RL/GEN/171 
Page 8  
 
  34. Japan is specifically prepared to consider prohibition of subsidies on the following items, with 
modifications to the corresponding texts of the Ch air's text of 2007 and with appropriate general 
exceptions:     - vessel construction and repair; 
 
 - transfer of fishing vessels;    - certain forms of operating costs;   
 - price support;  and 
  - further transfer of fishing access rights.  To this effect, Japan has provided specific text-b ased proposals as are attached to this proposal 
document.  Explanatory notes for these text-based pr oposals are described in the following paragraphs 
(paragraphs 36-43).  35. Japan, however, maintains its position that the infr astructure (Article I.1(d) of the Chair's text 
of 2007), income support (Article I.1(e) of the Ch air's text of 2007), and the so-called "catch-all 
provision" (Article I.2 of the Chair's text of 2007) should be crossed out as there are no sufficient 
grounds for the prohibitions because neither in frastructure nor income support is related to 
overcapacity/overfishing.  On the contrary, they contribute to reducing overfishing
17.  Japan does not 
support such "catch-all provisions" as appeared in Ar ticle I.2 and some other proposals.  This is 
because: (1) the pre-determination of specific pr ohibitions is extremely difficult; (2) prohibitions 
could be sweepingly wide, encompassing every fish ing activity that inadve rtently catch endangered 
fish species; and (3) even subsidies which are necessa ry for the stock recovery of such fish species 
could be prohibited, as a result.         36. Vessel construction and repair (A rticle I.1(a) of Japan's proposal)
:  Japan is of the view that, 
as long as the registration and restrictions of fishi ng vessels by Members' authorities are appropriately 
established and administered, subsidies for vessel cons truction and repair do not lead to overcapacity.  
At the same time, Japan acknowledges the fact that overcapacity persists in increasing and that some 
Members lack effective systems for registration and control of fishing vessels.  Japan is therefore prepared to include this item in the prohibition, on the condition that the general exceptions proposed 
in paragraphs 45-47 are ensured.    
37. Transfer of fishing vessels (Article I.1(b) of Japan's proposal)
:  In principle, Japan does not 
consider it advisable to transfer fishing vessel s to other Members because it does not solve the 
overcapacity issue.  On the contrary, it even wor sens the situation because IUU fishing activities take 
advantage of the vulnerability of some Members' fisheries management capacities.  The Government 
of Japan requires the scrapping of its fishing v essels to prevent them from being reused when the 
vessels are withdrawn under the government decommissi on programs.  With due consideration of the 
situation, Japan supports this prohibition, on the condition that the necessary exceptions for the S&D 
treatments for developing country Members are secured (paragraphs 51 and 56).     38. Operating costs (Article I.1(c) of Japan's proposal)
:  Japan has serious concerns about the 
proposed prohibition of subsidies on "operating costs" in  Article I.1(c) of the Chair's text of 2007.  In 
                                                      
17 For example, ports are used for the inspections of fish landing, fishing vessels and gears.  They also 
facilitate collecting statistics data by fisheries authorities.  Such utilization of ports and their facilities in terms of 
fisheries management are recognized in the "FAO Agre ement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and 
Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing".     TN/RL/GEN/171 
 Page 9 
 
 
  practice and in real terms, supports to the operati ng costs do not necessarily contribute to overfishing 
when effective fisheries management is in place.  In fact, the Chair's text of 2007 lists an 
unreasonably far-reaching array of items to be rest ricted, extending to those that do not fall under 
operating costs.  Since consensus on the details of "operational costs" is not reached yet, Japan's 
original position to completely elim inate this sub-paragraph stands.  
 
39. However, if the scope of the operating costs is narrowed down to the "direct operating costs" 
of fishing activities such as fuel, ice, bait and gear s, and the necessary general exceptions (paragraphs 
48-50) are granted, Japan is prepared to maintain  prohibition of subsidies on these operating costs.  
Where "fuel" is concerned, Japan recognizes that this item has political implications that require 
careful consideration.  For the sake of clarity, Japan is against the prohibition of the latter half of this 
sub-paragraph ("… of landing, handling or in- or near -port processing activities for products of 
marine wild capture fishing; or subsides to cover operating losses of su ch vessels or activities ").  
Japan has expressed the following  reasons for this opposition in  the previous sessions of the 
negotiations:  (1) there is no conv incing evidence that every listed item contributes to overfishing;  
(2) some of them are not directed to fishworkers;  and (3) the social welfare of fishworkers is of 
paramount importance.    40. Price support (Article I.1(d) of Japan's proposal)
:  Japan is prepared to accept prohibition of 
subsidies on price support for products of marine wild  capture fishing in Article I.1(f) of the Chair's 
text of 2007 on the condition that each Member government's policies and measures to stabilize the 
supply of food to its nationals  are not hindered.  Every Member government assumes general 
responsibility for its domestic food security.   41. Transfer of fishing access rights (Article I.1(e) of Japan's proposal)
:  During the sessions in 
October 2010, Japan pointed out that the clear and exact intent of Article I.1(g) of the Chair's text of 
2007 has not been displayed and shared among Members.  The fundamental question raised by this 
sub-paragraph is whether this so rt of involvement by governments is regarded as a subsidy in a 
general context regardless of the de termination of prohibition.  Notwith standing this concern, Japan is 
prepared to consider accepting this sub-paragraph,  on the condition that:  (1) fishing access rights to 
the exclusive economic zones of developing country Members are exempted from the application of 
this sub-paragraph for any Member;  and (2) reciprocal provision of fishing access rights under 
bilateral fisheries agreements are considered  outside the scope of this sub-paragraph. 
 42. The reason for the former is a reflection of  the debate to date where developing country 
Members whose national incomes are considerably dependent on access fees derived from provision of their fishing access rights for other Members had strongly expressed their view that subsidies on 
transfer of fishing access rights to their exclusive economic zones should not be within the scope of 
the prohibition.  The reason for the latter is th e reciprocity of the fishing access rights agreement 
between geographically adjacent states.  The bila teral fisheries agreement between Japan and the 
Republic of Korea is an example where the fishing interests of both parties are coordinated on an equal footing.  The reciprocal provision of fish ing access rights under such reciprocal fishing access 
agreements is not within the scope of the prohibition in the Chair's text of 2007.  
 
43. IUU fishing (Article I.2 of Japan's proposal)
:  Although Japan is aware that the effectiveness 
of this prohibition is questioned by some Members,  Japan supports the inclusion of this item (i.e., 
subsidizations to fishing vessels engaged in IUU fish ing) into Article I for symbolic reasons.  In so 
doing, the international community's strong commitme nt against IUU fishing is reaffirmed.  In the 
proposal, we provided amendments to this provision so that the Annex VIII to the SCM Agreement is 
not construed as authorizing to facilitate IUU fish ing through the granting of  any subsidy under the 
SCM Agreement.    TN/RL/GEN/171 
Page 10  
 
  (General exceptions)
 
 44. With regard to general exceptions, Japan has consistently stated that the government measures 
necessary for their legitimate policy objectives should not be hindered.  Besides fisheries 
management, such policies also include enviro nmental conservation, safety and other labour 
standards, and the social welfare of coastal live lihoods.  Japan's proposal stipulates that all general 
exceptions are conditional on both fisheries management  and "actionability."  Therefore, the concerns 
about the impacts on fisheries resources are addres sed.  In considering general exceptions in this 
proposal, Japan believes that vessel scrapping prog rams and outplacement supports for fishworkers do 
not belong to the prohibition clause as they have no impact on fisheries resources.   
 
45. Vessel construction and re pair (Articles II.1(a) and II.1(b) of Japan's proposal)
:  Vessel 
construction and repair i nvolve two different dimens ions: one is the construc tion or acquisition of new 
vessels; the other is the repair, renewal, renovatio n or modernization of existing vessels.  Japan's 
proposal provides for general exceptions of diffe rentiated treatments based on the distinctions 
between them, which specify respective prescriptions in the following paragraphs and the Attachment 
to this document.  Besides the general requireme nts of fisheries management and "actionability," 
additional conditions on vessel specifications are crea ted for this exception so that fishing capacity 
does not increase significantly.    46. If a Member lacks the registration and restriction systems of fishing vessels, support for 
construction or acquisition of fishing vessels coul d pose concerns about overcapacity.  However, 
certain government programs that o ffer incentives to reduce fishing cap acity should be considered as 
exceptions.  Japan's proposal includes the same provi sion as mentioned in the joint proposal with the 
Republic of Korea and Chinese Taipei in 2007
18.  In this document, Japan  proposes that an exception 
is granted where the gross tonnage of the new vessel subject to the programs is not more than 50% of 
the sum of the gross tonnage of the withdrawn vessels in the same fishery category.  The vessels to be 
withdrawn in this context are scrapped or otherwi se permanently and effectively prevented from being 
used for fishing anywhere in the world.   47. With regard to repair, rene wal, renovation or modernization to existing fishing vessels, certain 
"policy spaces" which accommodate measures for va rious policy objectives are necessary, on the 
condition that such measures do not significantly in crease fishing capacity.  In practice, it is necessary 
for each Member government to take appropriate me asures for public policy needs in relation to the 
repair, renewal, renovation or modernization of existing vessels, including management of fisheries 
resources, preservation of marine environment, safety of crews and other labour  standards.  In this 
sense, Japan's proposal is essentially based on the pr evious joint proposal in 2007 mentioned above.  
First, support for repair, renewa l, renovation or modernization which does not increase any of the 
gross tonnage, fish holds and engine power of th e vessels should be permitted as general exceptions.  
Second, on the condition that there is no increas e of both fish holds and engine power, public 
assistance is allowed if the repair, renewal, renova tion or modernization is necessary for the purpose 
of:  (1) safety of crews and other labour standards;  (2) fisheries resource management including preservation of marine environment and mitigation of incidental catches;  and (3) measures necessary 
for compliance with international agreements.  Th e international agreements include not only the 
fisheries agreements at FAO and RFMOs but also  the legal frameworks of non-fisheries purposes, 
such as addressing climate change, under the United Nations.    48. Small-scale fisheries (Article II.2 of Japan's proposal)
:  An independent section for small-
scale fisheries is established in this proposal as a spec ific category of general exceptions.  This clause 
is applicable to both developi ng and developed country Members.  It reflects commonly observed 
peculiarities associated with small- scale fisheries, such as the lo cality of the utilized resources, 
                                                      
18 TN/RL/GEN/114/Rev.2  TN/RL/GEN/171 
 Page 11 
 
 
  vulnerability to natural and economic environment, and the socio-economic significances for coastal 
communities.  Given the above, small-scale fisheri es which satisfy the following conditions are 
exempted from the prohibitions of subsidies on bot h vessel construction/repair and operating costs: 
  - Fishing vessels not more than [X] gross tonnage and registered by the authorities, 
subject to the fisheries management system of the Member; 
  - Refrigerator used as a fish hold is not installed in the fishing vessels; 
  - The fishing vessels are operated within the exclusive economic zone of that Member 
and within the exclusive economic zone[s] of neighboring Member[s] in accordance 
with reciprocal fisheries agreement between them;  and 
  - Landing the catches (fresh products) ar e conducted at designated domestic ports, 
without calling at foreign ports or transshipping the catches at sea. 
 
49. Operating costs (Article II.3 of Japan's proposal)
:  With regard to the support for operating 
costs, in return for accepting the prohibition, ge neral exceptions should be established for Member 
governments to pursue their legitimate policy objectiv es.  We believe that these "policy spaces" are 
commonly necessary for both developed and developing country Members.  First, the Chair's text of 
2007 purports to make the relief of "natural disast er", such as typhoons and earthquakes, out of the 
range of the discipline.  But there are similar disast er-like phenomena which are not attributable to the 
responsibilities of fishworkers.  For ex ample, fluctuations or vanishments of fish stocks due to global 
environmental changes or other reasons are not ge nerally regarded as natural disasters but do have 
long and considerable impacts on fishworkers.  Similarly, human-induced disasters in natural 
environments as well as economic disasters due to  the global economic environment are sorts of 
external impacts which are out of fishworkers contro l.  Since each Member government is responsible 
for extending assistances to m itigate the socio-economic difficulties of their citizens when 
extraordinary incidents occur, the discipline should not obstruct these public interventions.  
 50. Second, as is explained in paragraph 47, a set of measures for fishworkers as an integral part 
of Member's fisheries management systems, including conservation and sustainable use of fish stocks, 
reduction of fishing capacity, and preservation of  marine environment including mitigation of 
incidental catches, should be exempted also from this type of prohibition.  Otherwise Member 
governments would lose their policy tools to realize th eir legitimate policy goals.  Third, as has been 
emphasized by many Members, ensuring the social welfare of fishworkers in coastal communities is 
undoubtedly indispensable and a non-negotiable s ubject.  These social supports should not be 
hindered simply because they are related to fisherie s and correspond to operational costs in a direct or 
indirect manner.    (S&D treatments for developing country Members)
 
 51. Differential treatment of LDC Member s (Article III.1 of Japan's proposal)
:  Taking into 
account the entire picture of the Doha Development Agenda, Japan is not against the exemption of 
basic discipline (Article I. 1 (a), (b), (c) and (d ) of Japan's proposal) for LDC Members.  Members, 
however, should be careful so that this treatment should not facilitate IUU fishing activities.  In the 
past, the insufficient fisheries management capac ities of certain flag states were abused by IUU 
fishing, thereby causing serious overfishing problems.  Therefore, any subsidy for  IUU fishing should 
not be justified for any Member including LDC Me mbers.  Consequently, Article I.2 of Japan's 
proposal, which originally appeared in Article I.1(h) of the Chair's text of 2007, is applicable to all 
Members.   TN/RL/GEN/171 
Page 12  
 
  52. For the same reason noted above, although Japan's proposal does not require LDC Members 
of fisheries management systems as conditioned unde r Article V of the Chair's text of 2007 in 
granting overall exceptions to them, as a minimum safe guard, application of the "actionability" clause, 
referred to in Article IV of the Chair's text of  2007, may be maintained in case a certain subsidy 
causes a resource problem.  However, since such a probl em is not likely to occur in a real situation, 
this does not place considerable burden on LDC Memb ers.  For the sake of policy coherence at a 
minimum level, Japan would like to seek acceptance of this idea by the Members concerned.   
 53. Differential treatment of non-LDC Members
:  With regard to the treatments of non-LDC 
Members, Japan proposes the follo wing specific flexibilities in paragraphs 54 and 55, while making 
further classification of developing Members as con ceptually suggested in paragraphs 23 and 24 of 
this document pending.  54. Flexibilities in the exclusive economic z one (Article III.2(a) of Japan's proposal)
:  In 
accordance with the "sovereign rights" over natural resources of the exclusive economic zones of 
coastal states19, which are codified in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, certain 
subsidies (i.e., vessel construction and repair, operating costs, and pr ice support) are not prohibited as 
long as fishing activities subject to government progr ams are confined within the exclusive economic 
zones of the developing country Members, on th e condition that both fisheries management and 
"actionability" are applicable to such treatment.  With this special treatment, developing country 
Members are able to pursue their development objectives in their exclusive economic zones. 
 
55. Flexibilities for small-scale fisheries (Article III.2(b) of Japan's proposal) :  Special treatment 
for small-scale fisheries including its specificati ons applicable to both de veloped and developing 
country Members are provided for in the general exce ptions section of Japan's proposal (Article II.2).  
In light of S&D, Japan proposes, as an additional tr eatment for the small-scale fisheries of developing 
country Members, that certain discretion be gi ven to the fisheries management required as a 
conditionality of exceptions.  This proposal reflect s the reality and difficulty of the fisheries 
management of developing Members whose capacities are constrained as well as the prominency of the socio-economic importance of small-scale fi sheries for coastal communities.  As for the 
improvement of fisheries management of developi ng country Members, Japan has been cooperating 
through various mechanisms in this  field and will continue to do so. 
 
56. Transfer of fishing vessels (Article III.3 of Japan's proposal):
  As noted in paragraph 37, 
Japan is supportive of this prohibition.  But r esponsible developing count ry Members may feel it 
necessary to receive fishing vessels from other Member s and/or to establish joint-venture projects in 
order to develop their fisheries.  In the light of  S&D, Japan therefore proposes an exception to this 
prohibition, on the condition that the Members con cerned have already joined relevant RFMO to 
implement with international fisheries manageme nt measures and to make such joint venture 
arrangements available in the public domain.  57. Transfer of fishing access rights (Article III.4 of Japan's proposal):
  Japan's proposal on the 
transfer of fishing access rights is not different from that of the Chair's text of 2007 in essence but 
intends to add clarity in terms for applicable Member s.  The Chair's text of 2007 is a reflection of the 
strong position of developing country Members such  as small island states whose national incomes 
are considerably dependent on access fees derived from provision of their fishing access rights for other Members.  Because in many cases payments of such fees are made by developed country 
Members, the exception in this context should be applicable to any Members in the interest of 
developing country Members.   
 
                                                     
 
19 In Part V of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a set of prescriptions including 
the conservation and utilization of living resources in exclusive economic zones is provided.    TN/RL/GEN/171 
 Page 13 
 
 
  58. Fisheries management on a regional basi s (Article III.6 of Japan's proposal) :  Japan is of the 
view that the footnote 84 of the Chair's text of  2007, which allows developing country Members to 
operate fisheries management on a regional basis ( not on a national basis), should be moved to the 
main operative part of the text, because it is related to rights and obligation for certain Members.  For 
this purpose, Japan proposes that this provision should  be established as a part of the S&D treatments 
for developing country Members, which may rec ognize a regional-based management to ensure 
compliance with requirements of fisheries management under Article V of the Chair's text of 2007.  This provision should be provided for on the condi tion that basic rights and obligations under the 
WTO rules and other international agreements which each Member is a party to are not affected by 
this provision.  
  TN/RL/GEN/171 
Page 14 
   
ATTACHMENT 
 
TEXTUAL PROPOSAL: ARTICLES I, II, AND III  
 
 
ANNEX VIII  
 
FISHERIES SUBSIDIES  
  
Article I
 
 
Prohibition of Certain Fisheries Subsidies  
 
I.1 Except as provided for in Articles II and III, or in the exceptional case of natural disaster 
relief77, the following subsidies within the meaning of para graph 1 of Article 1, to the extent they are 
specific within the meaning of paragrap h 2 of Article 1, shall be prohibited:  
  (a) Subsidies the benefits of which are conferred
 on the acquisition, construction, repair, 
renewal, renovation, modernization, or any other significant  modification of fishing 
vessels78 or service vessels79, including subsidies to boat building or shipbuilding 
facilities for these purposes.  
 
 (b) Subsidies the benefits of which are conferred  on transfer of fishing or service vessels 
to third countries, including through the creation of joint enterprises with third 
country partners.  
 
 (c) Subsidies the benefits of which are conferred  on direct  operating costs of fishing or 
service vessels ( e.g., including licence fees or sim ilar charges,  fuel, ice, bait and, 
personnel, social charges, insurance, gear, and at -sea support );  or of landing, 
handling or in - or near -port processing activities for products of marine wild capture 
fishing; or subsidies to cover operating losses of su ch vessels or activities . 
 
 (d) Subsidies in respect of, or in the form of, port infrastructure or other physical port 
facilities exclusively or predominantly for activities related to marine wild capture 
fishing (for example, fish landing facilities, fish  storage facilities, and in - or near -port 
fish processing facilities).  
  
(e)    Income support for natural or legal persons engaged in marine wild capture fishing.  
  ( df
) Price support for products of marine wild capture fishing.   
 
                                                      
77 Subsidies referred to in this provision shall not be prohibited when limited to the relief of a particular 
natural disaster, provided that the subsidies are directly re lated to the effects of that disaster, are limited to the 
affected geographic area, are time-limite d, and in the case of reconstruction subsidies, only restore the affected 
area, the affected fishery, an d/or the affected fleet to its pre-disaster state, up to a sustainable level of fishing 
capacity as established through a scien ce-based assessment of the post-disaster status of the fishery.  Any such 
subsidies are subject to the provisions of Article VI.  
78 For the purposes of this Agreement, the term "fishi ng vessels" refers to vessels used for marine wild 
capture fishing and/or on-board processing of the products thereof.  
79 For the purposes of this Agreement, the term "servi ce vessels" refers to vessels used to tranship the 
products of marine wild capture fishing from fishing ve ssels to on-shore facilities;  and vessels used for at-sea 
refuelling, provisioning and other servicing of fishing vessels.   TN/RL/GEN/171 
 Page 15 
 
 
   ( eg) Subsidies arising from the further transfer, by a payer Member government, of access 
rights that it has acquired from another Memb er government to fisheries within the 
jurisdiction of such other Member.80, 80bis  
  (
h) Subsidies the benefits of wh ich are conferred on any ve ssel engaged in illegal, 
unreported or unregulated fishing.  81 
 I.2  Nothing in this Annex shall be construed as  authorizing to facilitate, in particular 
through the granting of any subsidy referred to Article 1, illegal, unreported or unregulated 
fishing.81  In addition to the prohibitions lis ted in paragraph 1, any subsidy referred to  in paragraphs 1 
and 2 of Article 1 the benefits of which are c onferred on any fishing vessel or fishing activity 
affecting fish stocks that are in an unequivocally overfished  condition shall be prohibited.  
 
 
Article II  
 
General Exceptions  
 
 
II.1       Notwithstanding the provisions of Arti cle I.1(a), subject to the provisions of Articles IV 
and V, the following subsidies shall not be prohibited.  
 
(a) With regard to subsidies on the acquisit ion or construction of new fishing or 
service vessels, subsidies for the purposes of  reducing existing fishing capacity, 
where the gross tonnage of the new vessels is not more than fifty per cent of the 
sum of the gross tonnage of the withdraw n vessels in the same fishery category, 
provided that the withdrawn vessels are scrapped or otherwise permanently and 
effectively prevented from being used for fishing anywhere in the world.   
 
(b) With regard to subsidies on the repair , renewal, renovation, modernization or 
any other significant modification of existing fishing or service vessels, subsidies 
satisfying the following conditions.  
 
(1) There is no increase in any of gross tonnage, volume of fish hold and engine 
power of the fishing or service vessels; or  
 
(2) There is no increase in both volume of fish hold and engine power of the 
fishing  or service vessels, provided that such subsidies are granted:  
 
(i) for the purpose of improvement of v essel safety and accommodation for 
crews on-board;  
 
                                                      
80 Government-to-gove rnment payments for access to marine fi sheries shall not be deemed to be 
subsidies within the meaning of this Agreement.  
80bis This provision shall not apply to reciprocal prov ision of fishing access rights granted under a 
bilateral reciprocal fisheries agreement. 
81 The terms "illegal fishing" , "unreported or fishing" and " unregulated fishing" shall have the same 
meaning as in Article 1(e) of the Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate 
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, adopted by the Conference of the Food and Agricultural 
Organization of the United Nations at its Thirty-sixth Session in November 2009  paragraph 3 of the 
International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Elim inate Illegal Unreported and Unregulated Fishing of the 
United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization. . TN/RL/GEN/171 
Page 16  
 
  (ii)
 as a measure necessary for fisheries management, such as conservation, 
management and sustainable use of fish stocks including mitigation of 
incidental catches, reduction of fi shing capacities, and protection and 
preservation of marine environment; or  
 
(iii) as a measure necessary to ensu re compliance with international 
agreements of the United Nations and its relevant specialized agencies, 
and regional fisheries management organizations (“RFMOs”).  
 
II.2    Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles I.1 (a) and I.1 (c), subject to the provisions of 
Articles IV and V, subsidies for marine wild capture fishing activities that satisfy all the 
following conditions shall not be prohibited.  
 
(a) Such activities are conducted by a fishing vessel of not more than [X] gross 
tonnage [ note: [X] is specific numerical value to be decided by the Members ], 
registered to the relevant authority of the Member which entitles the vessel to fly 
its flag, subject to an appropriate fisheries management system of that Member;  
 
(b) Any refrigerator used as a fish hold is not installed in the fishing vessel;  
 
(c) The fishing vessel is operated within the territorial sea and the exclusive 
economic zone (“EEZ”) of the Member, and within the EEZ of another Member 
through reciprocal fishing access under th e bilateral agreement between them.  
 
(d) The catches are landed at domestic ports designated by the relevant authority, 
without calling at any foreign port or tran shipping the catches to another vessel 
at sea.  
 II.3      Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I.1 (c), subject to the provisions of Articles IV 
and V, the following subsidies shall not be prohibited.  
 
(a) measures to be implemented, in accord ance with the national legislation, 
programmes or plans of a Member, to mitigate socio-economic damages which 
are not attributable to fishworkers82, such as natural disaster and unexpected 
change of economic situation;  
 
(b) supports for fishworkers, as an integral part of the fisheries management of a 
Member, such as conservation, management and sustainable use of fish stocks 
including mitigation of incidental catch es, reduction of fishing capacities, and 
protection and preservation of marine environment;  
 
(c) measures necessary to ensure compliance wi th international agreements of the 
United Nations and its relevant specialized agencies, and RFMOs; or  
 
(d) measures necessary to ensure the so cial welfare of fishworkers.  
 
 
                                                      
82 For the purposes of this Agreement, the term "fishworker" shall  refer s to an individual employed in 
marine wild capture fishing and/ or directly associated activities.   TN/RL/GEN/171 
 Page 17 
 
 
  Article III  
 
Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Country Members  
 
III.1 Subject to the provisions of Article IV,  Tthe prohibition of Article 3.1(c) and Article s I.1 
(a), I.1 (b), I.1 (c) and I.1 (d)  shall not apply to least-developed country ("LDC") Members.  
 
III.2 Subject to the provisions of Article IV,  Ffor developing country Members other than LDC 
Members , which are listed in Attachment [Y] to this Annex:  
 
(a) Subsidies referred to in Articles I.1 (a), I.1 (c) and I.1 (d) shall not be prohibited, 
subject to the provisions of Article V, whe re they relate exclusively to marine wild 
capture fishing performed within the territo rial sea and the EEZ of the developing 
country Member.   
 
(b) For the purposes of Article II.2, deve loping country Members shall not be 
required to be subject to the provisions of Article V, provided that they shall 
endeavor to operate, to the extent possible, their fisheries management systems 
referred to in Article V, taking into co nsideration the nature of fisheries of that 
Member and the constraints of relevant fisheries management authority.  
 
III.3  Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I.1(b), subject to the provisions of Articles IV 
and V, subsidies for transfer of fishing or serv ice vessels to developing country Members shall 
not be prohibited, provided that:  
 
(a) both transferring Member and receiving Member which is a developing country 
Member are members of the same RFMO to be responsible for the management 
of fish stocks of the transferred vessels;  
 
(b) appropriate measures for conservation, management and sustainable use of fish 
stocks, including measures to prevent overcapacity and overfishing, are 
implemented by the receiving Member under the framework of the RFMO; and  
 
(c) arrangements necessary for such transfer,  including the arrangement to establish 
joint ventures, are made public.  
 
III.43 Subject to the provisions of Articles IV and V,  Ssubsidies referred to in Article I.1( eg) 
shall not be prohibited for any Member to provide  where the fishery in question is within the EEZ 
of a developing country Member, provided that the agreement pursuant to which the rights have been 
acquired is made public, and contai ns provisions designed to prevent overfishing in the area covered 
by the agreement based on intern ationally-recognized best practices for fisheries management and 
conservation as reflected in the relevant provisions of international instruments aimed at ensuring the 
sustainable use and conservation of marine species, such as, inter alia , the Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Manage ment of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks ("Fish Stocks Agreement "), the Code of Conduct on Responsible Fisheries of 
the Food and Agriculture Organization ("Code of Conduct "), the Agreement to Promote Compliance 
with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas 
("Compliance Agreement "), and technical guidelines and plans of action (including criteria and 
precautionary reference points) for the implementa tion of these instruments, or other related or 
successor instruments.  These provisions shall in clude requirements and support for science-based 
stock assessment before fishing is undertaken pursu ant to the agreement and for regular assessments 
thereafter, for management and control measures, fo r vessel registries, for reporting of effort, catches TN/RL/GEN/171 
Page 18  
 
  and discards to the national authorities of the host Me mber and to relevant in ternational organizations, 
and for such other measures as may be appropriate.   
 III.54
 Members shall give due regard to the need s of developing country Members in complying 
with the requirements of this Annex, including the conditions and criteria set forth in this Article and 
in Article V, and shall establish mechanisms for, a nd facilitate, the provision of technical assistance in 
this regard, bilaterally and/ or through the appropriate in ternational organizations.   
 
III.6 With regard to the fisheries within the EEZ of a developing country Member, that 
developing country Member shall be free to opera te the fisheries management system referred 
to in Article V, on a regional rather than a national basis, provided that all of the requirements 
under Article V are fulfilled in respect of and by each Member in the region.  This provision 
shall not be construed to confer any exemption fr om obligations of developing country Members 
under the international agreements  which they are parties to.  
 
__________