RESTRICTED  WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  TN/S/M/28 
5 May 2008 
 
 (08-2118) 
Council for Trade in Services Special Session  
 
 
 
REPORT OF THE MEETING HELD ON 15 NOVEMBER AND 6 DECEMBER 2007 
 
Note by the Secretariat1 
 
 
1. The Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services held a formal meeting on 
15 November and 6 December 2007, chaired by Am bassador Fernando de Mateo of Mexico.  The 
agenda for the meeting, contained in document WTO/AIR/3114, was adopted. 
2. The delegation of Bolivia  took the floor on a point of order to oppose the direct reference in 
the first agenda item to a 'draft services text', wh ich in its view was inconsistent with the Council's 
practice of decision making by consensus provided fo r in Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement.  
Under that provision, a body was deemed to have decided by consensus on a matter submitted for its 
consideration, 'if no Member, present at the meeting when the decision is taken, formally objects to 
the proposed decision'.  In this respect, informal c onsultations had been held on the adoption of a draft 
services text.  Bolivia understood that some dele gations, in informal or formal mode, expressed 
specific doubts about this process.  Bolivia thought that all of the Members present should be heard, 
including smaller countries, and th at Members should be able to sa y no openly to proposals made in 
the group. 
3. Bolivia was not opposed to discussions being he ld.  However, the terms of reference under 
which the membership worked could not incorporat e elements that were not agreed by all.  
Discussions had to be a reflection of a common opinion .  Additionally, the benefits for some countries 
in other areas of the negotiations were scant or non existent and, for this reason, there were proposals 
to resume the discussions towards the middle of 2008. 
4. For Bolivia, agriculture was the engine drivin g the negotiations and, once results had been 
obtained in that area, it would be easier to see what could be done in services.  One of the only potentially positive outcomes for Bolivia  in the Round was in the area of tropical products.  However, 
any outcome would result from work in smaller m eetings in which Bolivia did not take part.  
Developed countries had had problems with most of  Bolivia's proposals, and Bolivia had obtained 
only two percent of what had been asked for initially .  If this were the only advantage that Bolivia 
could secure in the course of this developmen t Round, there was no reason for Bolivia hasty in 
services, given the situation in agriculture. 
5. The delegation of Bolivia agreed that the Chai rman had summarized correctly the sense of the 
October 10 meeting.  All Members present, including Bolivia, had agreed to continue the discussion.  However, it was not clear why the agenda referred to a 'draft text on services' when there was no 
agreement by Members to continue discussions in that direction.  For that reason, Bolivia hoped that 
future agendas would refer rather to 'outlines' or 'gui delines', in order to avoid confusion.  This would 
be vital in order to respect the pr inciple of consensus decision-making. 
                                                     
 
1 This document has been prepared under the Secret ariat's own responsibility and without prejudice to 
the positions of Members and to their rights and obligations under the WTO. TN/S/M/28 
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  6. Bolivia had a number of systemic questions.  How could the voice of weaker Members be 
taken into account if their statements of position were not fully taken into account?  The agenda 
reflected a mistaken interpretation of the past tw o meetings, and of decisions made at those two 
meetings.  Members had never agreed to a draft te xt on services.  What they had agreed to was an 
outline, and a continuation of discussions along those lines.  Bolivia was not against a dialogue or a 
continuation of discussions.  However, it was a problem of principle that there should be exceptions to 
rules of procedure and a sidelining of weaker WTO Members.  The delegation of Bolivia wished her 
statement to go on the record, and for it be known that, at this stage of the discussions, Bolivia 
opposed and would oppose a development of a draft text on services. 
7. The delegation of Venezuela
 supported the statement made by Bolivia.  No consensus or 
mandate existed for Members to start working on a ser vices text.  It was therefore not appropriate to 
continue drawing up a text.  The Chairman had prop osed at the 10 October meeting that consultations 
continue on the text.  That was not the same as st ating in the agenda that Members should work on the 
preparation of a draft services text.  As worded, it a ppeared as if a consensus decision had been taken 
by Members. 
8. The Chairman  repeated his conclusions from the 21 Se ptember meeting.  He had concluded 
that Members had asked him to carry out consu ltations on how a discussion of a services text should 
be carried out – firstly through consultations on  the potential content of the text, and then in 
establishing a timeframe.  He had also undertaken th at, in the weeks following the meeting, he would 
hold an open informal meeting to talk about this  issue, which he had done on October 10.  The 
Chairman thought that time should not be wasted on procedural and semantic  issues arising from the 
use of terms such as elements, outlines or texts.  He had taken note, however, of the statements made 
by Bolivia and Venezuela, and these would be recorded  in the minutes of the meeting.  He reiterated 
that at the last meeting he had wished to convey that  informal consultations would be held, and that he 
would submit an informal report on developments regarding the elements , outlines, or texts.  In this 
way, he believed Members should spare themselves an interminable discussion on procedural issues. 
9. The delegation of Argentina  agreed that Members should not waste time on procedural 
matters, but noted that sometimes questions of pr ocedure affected substance.  Despite what the 
Chairman had said in his summing up of the 10 Oct ober meeting, there were  two delegations which 
had stated specifically that they were opposed to the preparation of a 'text' on services.  Was this 
merely a semantic matter?  The WTO operated on the basis of consensus.  Perhaps there were nuances 
in the Spanish word for 'text' that required a differe nt term to be chosen.  In fact, one of the written 
proposals discussed in the consultations spoke inst ead of 'possible elements of a services text'. 
10. The delegation of Bolivia  agreed with the Chairman that Members should not get bogged 
down in a long procedural discussion.  She wanted si mply to reiterate the position of Bolivia in a 
formal way, and point out a mistake that could be corrected.  Bolivia had no problem with the Chairman's suggestion to switch to informal mode in order to report on the consultations.  What she 
asked for was that in future Members not refer to a services 'text'.  Bolivia had no problem with the 
Chairman's formulation of his conclusion at the meeting of 10 October.  But not all Members had 
agreed to developing a services text.  Perhaps some solution could be found.   
A. R
EVIEW OF PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATIONS , INCLUDING PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 15 OF THE 
GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND ORGANIZATION OF FUTURE WORK (INCLUDING A 
REPORT BY THE CHAIRMAN ON INFORMAL CONS ULTATIONS REGARDING THE PREPARATION OF 
A DRAFT SERVICES TEXT ) 
11. The Chairman  noted that delays in other areas of  negotiations were clearly affecting 
negotiations on services.  Nevertheless, he thought that  there was still much useful work that could be 
done, and no doubt proposals along these lines would be suggested.  Before opening the floor for  TN/S/M/28 
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  interventions, however, he wished to switch th e meeting to informal mode to report on his 
consultations on the preparation of the draft documen t referred to in the discussion that had just taken 
place. 
12. In accordance with the conclusions of the 28 September Council meeting, the Chairman had 
begun a series of consultations with a small group of Members on possible elements for a services 
text.  He had emphasized at the outset that these consultations would be transparent, inclusive, 
bottom-up, and would contain no surprises for any delegation.  At  a first consultative meeting on 
26 October, he had presented a list of possible elemen ts for discussion.  These elements were based on 
views expressed in his Enchilada consultations, an d in the open-ended informal Special Session held 
on 10 October.  These elements were:  a reaffirma tion of the Hong Kong Declaration, in particular 
Annex C;  an expression of a level of ambition in th e context of the single undertaking;  a date for 
tabling improved offers; a time-frame for the development of mechanisms pursuant to LDC 
modalities;  and GATS Rules and Domestic Regulation;  and market access. 
13. At a second meeting on 1 November, the discussion of possible elements for a services text 
had benefited from two contributions  from delegations:  one presented by the United States, and the 
other by Brazil.  As might be expected, there wa s convergence on certain elements and divergence on 
others.  At a third meeting held on 13 November, the United States presented a revised, more detailed 
version of its paper, on which discussion focussed .  The Chairman wished to emphasize that, 
throughout his consultations, discussion had focussed on elements of a possible services text, and not 
on actual text.  In the light of the last meeting, the future direction of the consultations needed to be 
assessed.  This concluded his report, and th e Chairman opened the floor for comments. 
14. The delegation of Brazil  stated that it was initially sceptical about the usefulness of adopting a 
'Chairman's text' in services.  Even when Member s had agreed on full modalities in agriculture and 
NAMA, these two negotiating areas would still be laggi ng behind services.  This was because services 
was area of the negotiations in which Members had already tabled revised offers, and had fruitful 
plurilateral request/offer talks.  Seen this way,  the services negotiations were a remarkable success 
story in a Round where some Members had been dragging  their feet in agriculture for over four years.  
Hence the very idea of a 'services text' looked biza rre, when 'lack of progress' and 'need for political 
guidance' would more properly re fer to other negotiating areas.  
15. Nevertheless, in a gesture of good faith, Brazil had agreed to discuss elements for a possible 
services text.  This was on the understanding that some  Members needed to give political visibility to 
the services negotiations to justify to their domestic  constituencies the difficult decisions they needed 
to make in other areas.  Before consultations ha d even started, however, the vast majority of the 
membership had stated clearly th at such a 'services text' should fully respect Annex C, as it was 
negotiated by Ministers in Hong Kong. 
16. After two meetings to discuss the elements for such a text, Brazil had the feeling that the 
process had backtracked.  Some Members were unash amedly trying to rewrite Annex C, using the 
argument that its provisions were just a 'floor', and that changes could be  made in order to 'improve it'.  
Those delegations seemed to forget that Annex C reflected a very delicate balance, a very thin 
compromise on some contentious issues which had al most resulted in the collapse of the Hong Kong 
Ministerial.  
17. Brazil was now confronted with a 'proposal' that stated:  (i) ambition market access in 
services should be comparable  to that in agriculture and NAMA;  (ii) a factual assessment of the 
market access negotiation should be made, reflecti ng the range of Members' views and providing a 
concise, non-attributed summary of the responses to  collective request; and, finally, to add insult to 
injury, (iii)  Members should undertake commitment s that reflected current levels of market access 
and national treatment, as well as provide new market access in sectors where trade impediments TN/S/M/28 
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  remained.  Any serious consideration of those propo sals, either individually or collectively, would 
lead Brazil to the conclusion that the whole negotiating process in services would be dramatically changed.  
18. For Brazil, the very idea of 'comparabilit y' between agriculture/NAMA and services was 
difficult to grasp.  First of all, bound commitments in services were not just the result of a negotiating 
process, but also the consequence of a prior domestic  process of regulation and liberalization.  To a 
large extent, trade in services had already been li beralized on the ground, even though the binding of 
this market openness depended on the multilateral ne gotiating process.  Trade in agriculture, in 
contrast, was largely distorted by subsidies, tariff peaks, tariff quotas, counter-cyclical payments, crop 
loans and other creatively-named measures.  Hence, ambition in agriculture meant slashing tariffs and 
subsidies.  In the end, could you compare the outcome in such negotiations with the binding of 
services commitments?  The proponents had not come forward with any methodology to do so.  
19. The proponents relied on the argument that servi ces, agriculture and NAMA formed a 'three-
pillar' structure of market access negotiations, as stated  in the Doha Declaration.  However, the Doha 
Declaration did not separate market access from rule-m aking;  to the contrary, in agriculture, market 
access and rules disciplines were explicitly linked.  In the context of a 'single undertaking', to follow 
this reasoning, it would be more appropriate to co mpare services not only to agriculture and NAMA, 
but also to trade facilitation, the review of S&D pr ovisions, and the rules negotiations.  Especially at 
this juncture, where attempts were being made to  legalize the practice of 'zeroing' in anti-dumping 
investigations, it would be advisable to include  the outcome of the rules negotiations to the 
'comparability exercise' proposed, since an outcome  on 'zeroing' could adversely affect effective 
market access.  
20. Furthermore, the idea of a 'factual assessment' could be particularly harmful to the whole 
process.  Members might well spend the next few months negotiating their 'common assessment' on how the collective requests had been met or not, especi ally if that assessment was to reflect the whole 
range of Members' views.  It would be a da unting task, assuming it was feasible, to convey the 
different views of 150 Members on 21 plurilateral re quests.  Members could be in a position where, 
once modalities in agriculture and NAMA were comp leted, they were still negotiating views rather 
than commitments.  Perhaps at that time, one coul d truly say that services were 'lagging behind'.  
21. Brazil failed to understand how a factual assessme nt in a consensus-based text would help 
move the negotiations forward.  Each Member ha d its own evaluation of the whole process and how 
their demands were or were not being met.  On ce modalities in agriculture and NAMA were in place, 
Members would be able, in a request-and-offer process,  to translate their assessments into final offers 
in all market access negotiations.  If a 'factual asse ssment' could help advance the negotiations, then 
perhaps demandeurs could undertake a factual assessment of US cotton subsidies, the European sugar 
regime, the tariff peaks in Japan and Switzerland, as well as in Brazil and Argentina, in order to 
convey all the Members' views, and hope that this  assessment would help ne gotiators to agree on the 
negotiating modalities. 
22. The delegation of Brazil further noted that Memb ers had been asked to agree to 'guidance' 
ensuring that the final commitments in services should reflect current levels of market access and national treatment, as well as provide new market access in sectors where trade impediments remained.  On its own, this proposal already looked like a 'benchmark in disguise'.  But taking a step 
further, it had to be examined in conjunction with the two previous suggestions on 'comparability' and 
'factual assessment'.  In terms of 'comparability', it was strange to ask for Members to bind their actual 
levels of liberalization in services – and even pr ovide new market access – when, on the other hand, 
some Members refused to bind, let alone lower, their levels of agricultural subs idies, which were high 
and distortive.  In such a comparison, Members would be required to cast in stone their market 
openness in services, while some Members would ha ve the 'policy space' to increase agricultural  TN/S/M/28 
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  subsidies, distort markets and do harm to rural live lihoods.  If one were to add the element of 'factual 
assessment' to this equation, it would be useful  to recall that, according to the latest OECD 
'Agricultural Outlook', the levels of expenditure  in domestic support in developed countries had 
increased in absolute terms. 
23. The proponents had put forward some interesting arguments to support their ideas.  One was 
that there was a logical relationship between all ne gotiating areas.  Second, an evaluation of services 
state-of-play was needed to take negotiating decisi ons further on.  Those arguments were true in 
themselves, but they did not support in any way the suggested actions.  There was an obvious relationship between all the negotiating areas.  This  was illustrated by the f act that Members were 
unable to present final offers before the comple tion of the modalities in agriculture/NAMA.  Once 
modalities were agreed, all Members would make thei r own evaluation to guide their next moves.  
Those evaluations, not only regarding services revise d offers but in other negotiating areas as well, 
would be properly reflected in the final stage of the request-and-offer process.  In this context, there 
would not be any single and universally applie d criteria for comparing and assessing different 
negotiating areas.  Each Member would apply its ow n criteria, according to its own national policy 
objectives and trade interest.  In this regard, furthe r requests and offers would be given and taken, and 
the overall result would reflect this balance.  
24. The paper to be presented by India and others on Mode 4 contained, to a large extent, these 
Members' assessment of the negotiations in that plurilateral request.  But the assessment was one 
made by India and others.  It was not imposed on the whole membership, nor suggested as a basis for 
a common understanding among it.  The assessment was ra ther an indication on how India and others 
might proceed in the Round vis-à-vis that request.  Perhaps many Members did not agree with that 
picture, but that was the understanding all Memb ers agreed to when drafting the Negotiating 
Modalities, when launching the D oha Round and when adop ting Annex C.  Those were the conditions 
Members agreed to negotiate services.  Those were  the conditions that some were willing to change 
now.  
25. It was important to mention that there was work  still to be done if Members wanted truly to 
enhance the negotiating process in services.  For in stance, Members could expedite the review of 
S&D proposals, as suggested by the African Gr oup, to develop a mechanism to monitor the 
achievement of goals stated in GATS Article IV
.  Furthermore, Members could work on the 
implementation of paragraph 10 of Annex C, regarding technical assistance.  Since, next week, the 
first 'Global Periodic Review on Aid for Trade' wo uld take place in the WTO, it would be a good 
opportunity for the Council for Trade in Services to  be involved with the Aid for Trade initiative, 
which would review and make reco mmendations to donors, recipients  and international agencies to 
make technical assistance more effective and responsiv e to development needs.  In short, there was 
still time to avoid a situation like the one experien ced in Hong Kong in 2005.  Perhaps this time the 
final outcome could be a total collapse of the negot iations.  Brazil concluded by recalling that 'those 
who cannot learn from the past are condemned to reliv e it', and feared that history this time would 
repeat itself 'not as a farce but as a tragedy'. 
26. The delegation of Egypt  stated that at the outset of the consultations on elements of a services 
text it and other developing count ry delegations had been assured by the Chairman and the proponents 
that the ultimate objective was to provide Members w ith clarity on the way forward, and to serve as a 
reaffirmation by all Members of the importance they attached to services as an essential component of 
the Round.  They were told that the contents of  such a text would not constitute a new negotiating 
mandate, nor a further framework of obligations un related to any existing negotiating mandate.  In 
this spirit, Egypt was one of the Members that ha d been constructively engaging with the Chairman 
and the wider membership in a collective effort to arrive at a text that would move the negotiations 
forward.  Unfortunately, and despite the fact that  these were the initial stages of the process, the TN/S/M/28 
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  signals received from the demandeurs of the text, and the contents of their contributions, suggested 
otherwise. 
27. Egypt insisted that any text reflect precisely th e specific modalities that were agreed at the 
Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in 2005, and set out in Annex C of the Ministerial Declaration.  These called for Members to undertake significant commi tments in sectors and modes of interest to 
developing countries – including on temporary cro ss-border labour movement.  Egypt confirmed that 
a text should set out timelines for Members to ma ke final market access offers and prepare their 
schedules of specific commitments.  Egypt also r eaffirmed the flexibility accorded to developing 
countries in GATS Article XIX, which called for progressive liberalization that took into account 
level of development, thus allo wing developing countries to open up fewer sectors, and place more 
conditions on foreign services supplie rs allowed into their markets. 
28. Egypt did not want to discourage any Member from coming up with ideas that would advance 
the negotiating process, but had thought it necessary, at this stage, to signal its strong concern at a 
widening gap between the positions of Members on this text, in terms of its content and objectives.  
The process was very delicate, and all Members had to use maximum efforts to keep it on the right 
track, so that Members could collectively attain the its  legitimate objectives.  Egypt would continue its 
constructive engagement in the coming days and weeks. 
29. The delegation of Uruguay
 said that it understood the importance, the limitations, and the 
difficulties in developing a document that, while fully respecting Annex C and all other mandates, 
would make it possible for Members to have suffici ent impetus to continue  the negotiating process 
once there was progress reco rded in agriculture and NAMA.  Uruguay did not think that the Council 
was the right place to develop a horizontal approach to the negotiations – all Members were aware of 
the natural process in which the level of ambition was closely linked in all three areas of market 
access.  Members were also aware that agriculture  was the locomotive, the driving engine of the 
Round.  Although there was no point in trying to reve rse sequence or reorder matters, it was also true 
that agriculture was not the sole engine in the R ound, pulling the train without reference to services 
commitments.  Members had done a lot of internal  work in preparing offers, which required great 
effort and coordination.  From that point of view, th e plurilateral work had proved very useful.  In the 
same way, there was still a great potential for bilateral technical work, which should not be 
disregarded when developing the text.  This way of  working could give very good results in terms of 
market access, without prejudice to the evaluation ca rried out in other areas of negotiations and the 
political guidelines that might be required. 
30. The delegation of the United States  said it was working hard to contribute as constructively as 
possible to the consultation process.  This week it ha d proposed an elements paper that tried to bring 
in the key aspects of both of the papers that had been presented thus far.  The United States was not 
working alone on this, but with a number of other Members who had a similar interest in seeing a successful outcome in the services negotiations.  There was a lot of work that remained to be done to 
move these elements towards a text.  However,  although significant differences remained, these 
involved only three of the ten elements contained in the paper.  There was a reasonable degree of 
convergence among Members on many aspects of the pape r, particularly those related to development 
aspects.  
31. A suggestion had been made that this exer cise was about pursuing a new mandate, a view 
with which the United States strongly disagreed.  The negotiating mandate included Annex C, a 
comprehensive instrument that could be applied in a number of different ways.  The mandate also 
included Article XIX, that contained elements such as progressive liberalization, reducing or 
eliminating impediments, and achieving effective im provements in effective market access.  It was 
difficult to imagine how to get to that point w ithout taking some positive action that created new 
market access by removing current limitations.  With  respect to the issue of  comparability, this cut  TN/S/M/28 
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  across the three market access negotiations inhere nt in the negotiations – services deadlines were 
inextricably affected by events in the other negotia tions.  It therefore seemed entirely appropriate that 
some aspects of comparability be considered.  Rega rding the question of a factual assessment, it was 
true in part that it would be very difficult to try to reflect accurately the views of every individual Member in some kind of a document.  A factual assessment could however reflect the fact that there 
was a lack of consensus, or that there was a si gnificant number of Members who felt that there was 
great concern about whether the negotiations could reach a successful outcome  based on their current 
status.  But when it came to a more Member-specifi c factual assessment, the approach taken by India 
and others regarding the Mode 4 submission was a more appropriate way of reflecting the views of 
individual Members or groups of Members.   
32. In connection with the market access elements th at were contained in the proposal from the 
United States and others, Brazil seemed to take a st ep further toward an actual text than had been 
taken so far, in that Brazil had raised the issue of whether 'should' or 'shall' should be used in 
reference to the binding of current practice.  The US paper did not contain such an element qualified 
by 'should' or 'shall', 'to the maximum extent possible'  or other.  That was a te xt element and that point 
had not yet been reached.  So far,  negotiations were only about the pr inciple of the objective – the text 
aspects were something that would come farther down the road. 
33. With respect to the agriculture negotiations, th e US delegation did not want to get into a 
detailed discussion of whether new market access w as being achieved or not.  This was not the 
appropriate place in which to address that issue.  However, from the perspective of the United States, 
it was actively and positively engaged in those ne gotiations, and had itself to negotiate within a 
specific range proposed by the Chairman, and in w ithin which there was new market access.  With 
respect to subsidies, the US view  was that the negotiations would lead to an actual reduction in 
subsidies extended to the US farmers.  It is not constructive to reargue those points. 
34. The delegation of Barbados (on be half of SVEs) stated at the outset that the delegation of 
Bolivia had not been able to secure instructions on ti me to subscribe to the present intervention.  SVE 
delegations wished to place on formal record their review of progress in the negotiations within the 
context of the ongoing exercise of the development of a services outcome.  As SVE delegations had 
previously indicated, they were prepared to engage constructively in such an exercise, although they were not proponents of a services text.  They believed that the preparation of a services outcome could be addressed where texts are being developed in other areas of the Doha agenda, and where 
concrete progress in agriculture and NAMA had been  registered.  In terms of timing, a possible 
services text should only be tabled after the release of final modalities in agriculture and NAMA. 
35. The process of developing a text had to be mu ltilateral, fully inclusive and transparent, with 
regular open-ended sessions.  The development of a text had moreover to respect the current 
architecture of the GATS and its positive list appr oach.  SVEs therefore would not support any 
attempts to introduce the notion of benchmarks w ithin these negotiations.  Nor were did they support 
the desire of some delegations that to establish a level of comparability among the services, 
agriculture and NAMA. 
36. The Hong Kong Declaration and Annex C contai ned the substantive guidelines and outcomes 
for the conclusion of the services negotiations through  specified objectives, approaches and timelines.  
As such, SVEs believed that the level of amb ition for the services negotiations has already been 
established, and was based on a very delicate balance.   With the suspension of the Doha negotiations 
in July 2006 prior to the tabling of a second round of revised offers on 31 July 2006, many of the 
intended objectives and timelines outlined remain unfulfilled. 
37. SVEs considered that there was a need to be cau tious in the preparation of a text in services, 
in order not to re-open the delicate balance achieved in the Hong Kong outcome through the TN/S/M/28 
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  negotiating process.  In this respect, the objectives of a services outcome at this stage had to be related 
to the unfinished business remaining from the July  2006 suspension, and had to take into account 
developments which have taken place since the Hong Kong Ministerial.  
38. Based on these general considerations, the el ements that SVEs considered feasible and 
desirable to include in a possible text in services were: 
(a) Dates for the tabling of revised offers and final schedules, which should reflect 
timeframes developed for the overall Round , and should be in accordance with the 
Hong Kong timelines, including through se quencing.  Revised timelines should also 
be developed for the operationalisation of LDC Modalities prior to the tabling of final 
offers as provided in para graph 11 e) of Annex C. 
(b) Developing country participation in services trade had to be facilitated through the 
liberalization of market access in sectors and modes of supply of export interest to them, particularly as reflected in their specific requests.  
(c) The process of liberalization had to take into account the level of development of 
individual Members both in overall and i ndividual sectors, and accord developing 
countries the flexibilities provided in Artic le XIX of the GATS for opening fewer 
sectors, liberalizing fewer transactions and ex tending market access in line with their 
development situation.  
(d) In the negotiations on domestic regulation, a factual account of the progress attained 
within the context of paragraph 5 of Annex C, and the mandate to develop disciplines 
on domestic regulation, needed to be registered. 
(e) Similarly for GATS rules, a factual account of the state of play needed to be reflected 
with regard for continued focu sed discussions in this area. 
(f) The provisions in paragraph 8 for Members to  give due consideration to proposals on 
trade-related concerns of small economies needed to be emphasized. 
(g) Inclusion of S&D proposals as well as technical assistance and capacity building 
provisions were also important elements. 
39. SVE delegations had a concerted interest in  seeing a balanced and successful conclusion to 
the Round, and reiterated their commitment to playi ng their part with other Members in this process. 
40. The delegation of Cuba
 supported the statement made by the ambassador of Bolivia and the 
delegation of Venezuela at the beginning of the mee ting.  Two Members who had the same status and 
rights as other Members had expressed serious concerns.  There was no reason why they should be 
disqualified in terms of the importa nce of what they had to say.  Cuba fully supported the points that 
they had made.  A number of proposals and documents had been presented by Members in the course of consultations organized by the Chair.  There was no point in discussing these proposals if other Members did not know their contents.  A discussion in closed and restricted circles was contrary to principles of transparency and inclusiveness in the negotiations.  The Chairman had said in the 
informal meeting of the Council on 10 October that  there would be no surprises for any delegation.  
At the present meeting however we had heard that  Venezuela and Bolivia were surprised that the 
work carried out on a document was not necessary, a nd was simply an attempt at moving faster than 
negotiations in agriculture.  This was illogical, ina ppropriate and unacceptable.  There was simply no 
more time to amplify on the elements of a document that would be a set of guidelines to conclude this  TN/S/M/28 
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  negotiation.  Cuba was asking the Chair to consid er this point, as many Members had previously 
done. 
41. The delegation of Morocco , on behalf of the African Group , said that it was prepared to 
continue negotiations on possible elements to be included on a possible 'something' on services.  Two 
papers including elements of a possible text had been tabled, including one prepared by a group of 
developing countries, which include d a number of African Members.  The document broadly reflected 
the position of the African Group on the principles underlying a possible services text.  The second 
paper, which had been proposed in  two versions, contained elements  that were unacceptable to the 
African Group.  Comparability of outcomes was one  problem.  This meant undertaking a factual 
assessment of market access and bou nd levels of liberalization in di fferent areas of the negotiations, 
including in areas other than agriculture and NAM A.  Since no convincing explanation had been 
given of how these elements woul d be dealt with, it would be a dangerous departure from the 
principles that ministers had already agreed on, in cluding those in the Hong Kong Declaration.  The 
respect of the architecture of existing instrument s, safeguards on flexibility for developing countries, 
special measures for LDCs, and fl exibilities proposed in the GATS rules negotiations – all these had 
to be taken on board.  All the instruments on wh ich the services negotiations are based required an 
improvement in terms of market access of interest  to developing countries, especially in Mode 4. 
42. Finally, it was the position of the African Group that, unless there was inclusion of the 
development dimension in S&D, the Group could not accept formally the text.  The development 
dimension was at the very core of the Doha Age nda, and included technical assistance.  It was very 
important to include a reference to the importanc e of technical assistance in any text on services. 
43. The Chairman  confirmed that S&D at had been added to  the proposed elements of a services 
text, as the eighth element, and had already formed part of the discussions on the text. 
44. The delegation of the European Communities  expressed surprise at the conclusion to be 
drawn from some other Members' interventions, incl uding that of Brazil, that a 'big success' had 
occurred in the services negotiations sometime in the past few years.  Turning to the paper submitted 
by the European Communities and others, he said that  the intention was to develop a services text to 
be adopted in parallel to the agriculture and NAM A modalities.  The aspect of timing was important, 
and needed constant review and, if necessary, adjust ment in light of the actual progress of the services 
negotiations.  There were three elements to whic h the European Communities attached particular 
importance:  comparability, market acce ss and assessment of the negotiations. 
45. On comparability, the European Communities said this concept was merely a reflection of the 
fact that Members were not negotiating in a vacuum, but in a broader context.  Services was one of 
the three market access areas of the DDA, and a majo r element for achieving a balanced outcome in 
the Round.  How could it be that this link was ac knowledged when it came to setting timelines, but 
not when it came to addressing the market access dimension? 
46. On market access, the European Communities had tried in the elements paper to set out how 
to achieve the objectives of progressive liberalization and effective market access that are indicated in 
GATS Article XIX.  The binding of current levels  of market access and national treatment, and the 
granting of new market access in specific areas, were two specific means to help achieve those 
objectives.  The collective requests tabled since Hong  Kong did in fact request the binding of current 
levels of liberalization and the granting of new mark et access.  This was an accurate indication of the 
membership's overall understanding of what should be  achieved in terms of market access in the 
negotiations.  Obviously, there was a need to ac knowledge that neither LDCs nor small economies 
were expected or asked to make such an effort.  As well, there was the need to acknowledge more 
generally the flexibility that developing countries benefited from, depending on their individual level TN/S/M/28 
Page 10  
 
  of development.  Both those aspects were clearly sp elled out in the list of elements contained in the 
EC paper. 
47. On assessment, the Euro pean Communities considered that  there was a need to assess the 
state of play – after six years of negotiations, two rou nds of offers,  and scores of meetings of bilateral 
and plurilateral market access negotiations.  These market access negotiations, conducted on a 
request/offer basis, were by nature diluted and disp ersed, due to the current situation the negotiations.  
Much had been said about mandates, but it was clear that Annex C was one of the bases for the 
services negotiations.  Obviously, th ere were other important referen ce points, starting with the GATS 
itself, but including also the other ministerial decl arations since the launching of the Round.  When 
preparing its paper, the European Communities had included, for each of the elements, the reference 
point from which it was drawn in order to make crystal clear that all the elements mentioned 
originated in work that had already been carried out in the services area. 
48. Finally, it was worth recalling that the text at  issue was intended to provide guidance at a 
political level for the next phase of the negotia tions.  There was another important means for 
providing, in parallel, such guidance: a minister ial signalling conference.  In such a conference 
Members could indicate, in more concrete terms, how the elements discussed in the text could be 
reflected in their next offers.  The European Comm unities would continue its efforts to organize such 
a ministerial conference. 
49. The delegation of Honduras
 said it was part of the SVE Group and wished to support what 
was stated by Barbados, and also put forwar d additional points.  When launching the new 
negotiations, Honduras had agreed to guidelines to be  followed in the negotiations.  Despite that, 
before the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, a te xt was proposed containing some very ambitious 
elements that threatened rights conferred on de veloping countries by the GATS and the mandate in 
the negotiations.  Despite efforts by developing coun tries, the final text – which became Annex C of 
Hong Kong Declaration – included ne w and ambitious provisions to further open up markets.  The 
plurilateral request/offer approach was introduced to intensify negotiations on market access.  Many 
developing countries submitted revised offers, overcom ing great limitations and difficulties.  It was 
not easy for them to identify the areas of economic inte rest and eliminate barriers.  Their will to make 
a constructive contribution was such that even Memb ers who up to that point opposed the holding of 
plurilaterals, took part in the four rounds held. 
50. Developing countries were now faced with a ne w phase of the negotiations.  They were now 
being told of the drafting of a text by a small number of Members, despite others having expressed 
their opposition.  In order to work constructively, Honduras emphasized that a services text could and 
should reflect only the progress obtained in market access, rules, and the remaining areas left outstanding after the Hong Kong Ministerial.  It was therefore important to respect the mandates 
established for the Round, and the structure of the ag reements.  In addition, it was vital to respect the 
flexibility enjoyed by developing countries when they assumed these commitments.  It should not be 
claimed once more that developing countries should give up the benefits offered in the GATS on 
flexibility, in order to liberalize their services mark ets and the priority given to products of special 
interest.  The negotiations had to be judged on the basis of outcome and on the agreement, as well as 
on the compliance with the agreed guidelines and procedures. 
51. The delegation of Malaysia
, speaking on behalf of ASEAN  members Brunei Darussalam, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam, reiterated points expressed 
by them at the 10 October Council meeting.  They were not a demandeur for a text in services, and 
did not have many elements to propose.  They would however have suggestions on areas of special 
interest, such as domestic regulation and ESM.  TN/S/M/28 
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  52. The GATS, the Negotiating Guidelines, a nd Annex C of the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Declaration provided solid and sufficient parameters  for the services component of the DDA. The text 
needed, therefore, to acknowledge clearly and re iterate that specific modalities for the services 
negotiations were already contained in document S/L/93 (Guidelines and Procedures for Negotiations 
on Trade in Services) and in Annex C of  the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration. 
53. The text would have to be comprehensive a nd balanced.  If Members were to respect the 
integrity of Annex C, the comprehensive covera ge and delicate balance negotiated in Hong Kong 
needed to be maintained.  In a ddition to market access, other ar eas such as domestic regulation, GATS 
rules (especially ESM), S&D and LDC modalities woul d need also to be addressed.  Members would 
also need to take into account the commitments already made by recently acceding Members (RAMs). 
54. Members had spoken of the need to ensure th at the level of ambition in services would be 
equal, comparable, commensurate, and so on, to that in agriculture and NAMA.  ASEAN could not 
accept such concepts in the services text. 
55. ASEAN reaffirmed paragraph 1 of Annex C on the objectives for Modes 1 to 4 and MFN 
exemptions.  More importantly, they reaffirmed the delicate balance in language that was so painfully 
negotiated in Hong Kong, and resisted  any effort to renegotiate it. 
56. On timelines, ASEAN reiterated that the ser vices text should follow the release of full 
modalities in agriculture and NAMA, and that a dead line for revised offers should respect the delicate 
sequencing achieved in Annex C.  This meant a time lag of around 90 days after agreement on 
agriculture and NAMA modalities.   
57. Prudence needed to be exercised in deciding when to issue the first draft of the text.  It was 
important that the services negotiations reach suffici ent maturity and convergence before a first draft 
be tabled that would garner support broad e nough to be the basis for further negotiations. 
58. With respect to references in the text to the plurilateral request/offer negotiations, and a 
proposed signalling exercise, ASEAN urged further refl ection.   References to the plurilaterals had to 
be handled appropriately, in view of the fact that  delegations were negotiating a multilateral text. It 
was clear moreover that results of a voluntary si gnalling exercise outside of the WTO context could 
not have a place in a multilateral text. 
59. ASEAN had used the word ‘delicate’ a number of times in its intervention. This was the 
reality in Hong Kong, and had remained so today be cause of subtle but persis tent efforts to undermine 
hard-won flexibilities under the GATS, including the f undamental nature of progressive liberalization 
as reflected in Article XIX.  However, ASEAN r eaffirmed its commitment to the process as long as it 
remained fair, just, transparent, and inclusive. 
60. The delegation of Singapore  noted that modalities on agriculture and NAMA were necessary 
to break the impasse in the Round.  Therefore it encouraged all Members, particularly the key 
Members, to contribute toward an agreement on mo dalities as soon as possible.  This would facilitate 
progress in services.  While modalities, and the ensuing schedules, on agriculture and NAMA were 
necessary to facilitate progress in the negotiations, they are not sufficient for the conclusion of the 
Round.  There were expectations for a good outcome on services.  Services was therefore integral to 
the final package.   
61. Services would influence the outcome in agricu lture and NAMA just as the ambition in those 
areas would be a determining factor in services.  In the context of the Round's single undertaking, all 
three issues are related.  Bearing in mind the se quence established in Hong Ko ng, all delegations had 
to contribute to a good outcome across all three issu es.  As part of its contribution, Singapore had TN/S/M/28 
Page 12  
 
  made comprehensive offers across many sectors, in cluding a majority of full commitments of 'None' 
entries in its initial and revised offers.  As alwa ys, Singapore would do its part and contribute to 
progress in services in a timely manner though its revised offer.  
62. Over the past few years, particularly after the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, a number 
of rounds of bilateral and plur ilateral negotiations in services had taken place, and initial and revised 
offers submitted.  These had been useful to unde rstand better Members' appr oaches and constraints in 
the area of services.  In particular, the indica tions and responses that Members had made in the 
plurilateral negotiations had been helpful in providi ng a general idea of the broad contours of future 
offers. 
63. Recognizing this progress, it was now time to take stock of the progress achieved on each 
aspect of the services negotiations as set out in Anne x C, and determine what guidance, if any, was 
needed to facilitate further progr ess on these issues.  In this connection, Singapore supported having a 
services text.  However, it was important that the drafting of a services text should not become an obstacle to having a good outcome in services.  The serv ices text was a means to an end, not an end in 
itself.  In this connection, it was important to find a common ground in the services text that could 
garner the consensus of all Members.  Elements had to be found that could bring Members together, 
not push them apart.  Having participated in th e various consultations on the services text, Singapore 
had a broad appreciation of elements that were doable,  and others which appeared  to be non-starters.  
It would be useful and efficient to focus on elements that were doable.  
64. Singapore saw the services text as having, for each relevant part of Annex C, two main 
elements:  (i) a factual reflection of the progress ac hieved, and (ii) guidance, if any, to facilitate 
further progress.  Three issues relating to th e services text merited further exploration. 
65. On market access, negotiations had taken place in  bilateral settings befo re Hong Kong, and in 
a bilateral and plurilateral settings thereafter.  Si ngapore had taken note of the suggestion to annex a 
non-attributable summary of responses to each plurilateral request to the services text.  However, it was doubtful whether discussions and responses made  in those settings should be annexed to a 
services text,  which was a multilateral document.  Instead of annexing the summaries, one perhaps 
more palatable approach was to adopt the followi ng general factual elements in the services text: 
(a) recall the various mandates relating to market access, including plurilateral 
negotiations in Annex C (e g. para 7 and 11 (b)); 
(b) note that pursuant to those provisi ons, groups of Members had presented 
22 plurilateral requests; 
(c) note that there has been a number of rounds of plurilateral (and bilateral) 
negotiations; and 
(d) finally, note that there were extensive di scussions and responses to the plurilateral 
requests. 
66. On the issue of guidance to facilitate furthe r progress, the text could call on or encourage 
Members to make efforts to reflect the responses th at they had made in plurilateral (and bilateral) 
settings in their next revised offe rs, taking into account the flexibilities for developing Members in the 
GATS.  There could also be a need for some Memb ers to address potential gaps that they might have 
identified, further to the responses made at  the plurilateral and bilateral meetings.  TN/S/M/28 
 Page 13 
 
 
  67. In tabling their next revised offers, Members w ould need to be guided by relevant provisions 
of the GATS, the Negotiating Guidelines and other services documents.  In this connection, some of 
the relevant guidance elements in Ar ticles XIX:1 and 4 of the GATS were: 
(a) achieving a progressively higher level of liberalization, 
(b) the reduction or elimination of the adverse effects on trade in services of measures as 
a means of providing effective market access, 
(c) promoting the interests of all participants on a mutually advantageous basis and 
securing an overall balance of  rights and obligations, and 
(d) increasing the general level of specific commitments undertaken by Members. 
68. One practical way to operationalize these elemen ts in Members' revised offers was for them 
to include a broader range of sectors, and deep er commitments for these sectors – with the aim of 
having, to the extent possible, full commitments or  'None' entries.  While some might consider the 
above elements from Article XIX not sufficiently specific or prescriptive with regard to their 
expectations on market access in services, one bene fit of drawing elements from the GATS was that 
they were agreed language.  In highlighting th ese guidance elements, Singapore fully recognized and 
would continue to flag the flex ibilities for developing countries contained in Article XIX:2, and in 
other services provisions and documents.  Although Singapore had highlighted certain provisions of 
Article XIX (namely XIX:1, 2 and 4) its intention was not to be selective.  The integrity, and the 
balance of rights and obligations, of the GATS and other documents had to be maintained in the 
services text. 
69. On the issue of GATS  rules  negotiations, Singapore recognized that  they were an integral part 
of the overall services negotiations.  As for market access, the factual section of the rules negotiations 
could, in a non-prejudicial manner, factually captu re what had taken place in GATS rules (emergency 
safeguard measures, government proc urement, subsidies) and domestic regulations.  At this stage of 
the negotiations, the guidance on these negotiations c ould be that found in A nnex C, paragraphs 4 
and 5.  On GATS rules, the text should emphasize the need to continue more focused discussions on 
these negotiations.  On domestic regulation, the text should recall that disciplines on domestic 
regulations should be develope d before the end of the current round of negotiations. 
70. On the issue of the timing  of the submission of revised offers, one option would be to have 
included in the services text the principle of X+90 da ys for the tabling of revised offers, X being the 
date of agreement on the agriculture and NAMA m odalities.  However, there could perhaps be a 
qualifier that this principle was open for discussion la ter if the circumstances required.  Obviously, if 
Members were faced with a quicker completion of the Round, they might have to look at a period 
shorter than 90 days.  Further to the above, the text  would also need to address appropriately other  
elements of Annex C, such as the implementation of LDC modalities. 
71. The delegation of India  noted that there had been interventions claming broad convergence 
between the two proposals for a services text.  This was not surprising, since most of the convergence 
text was anchored, as it had to be, in Annex C.  On the other hand, the issues of comparability and 
factual assessment had no reference in Annex C, nor in any other modalities agreed earlier.  Seen in 
that light, India did not think that the plurilate ral factual assessments produced by some Members 
could be used for guidance.  Ministers would not  be reading these lengthy documents, as negotiators 
already knew what had happened in the plurilatera l requests.  India agreed with Brazil on the 
comparability issue.  As for market access, India ha d not said no, but preferred to stay with what was 
in Annex C and the GATS, as well as in past m odalities that Members had already agreed to. TN/S/M/28 
Page 14  
 
  72. The delegation of Argentina
 said that, despite finding the services text unnecessary and 
perhaps a bad idea, had been participating constr uctively.  Argentina had tried to propose some 
elements.  However, it was very worried by the way in which the discussion was going, even though 
they were informal.  What Argentina had been saying a month and a half ago about the risks of starting negotiations on the basis of other negotiations , was in fact happening.  Argentina had modest 
resources and services negotiators and, instead of  continuing their work on offers, they had been 
completely bogged down in b ilaterals and plurilaterals. 
73. If it were thought to be a good idea to have a services text then, as Singapore suggested, it 
would be best to focus on what could really be ach ieved.  In this respect, the insistence on having a 
factual assessment of the plurilaterals was not very  feasible, particularly bearing in mind the time 
available.  Furthermore, the reiteration of elements that historically were rejected was not a 
constructive idea either, if the real goal was to have  a text that would help the negotiations.  Members 
had all the elements on the table to arrive at point  B:  they had the mandate, the agreements, and the 
requests.  A further point was limited resources.  If revised offers were to be  in accordance with the 
level of ambition of the Round, the best idea would be  to get down to work on these offers and stop 
wasting time with elements that c ould never be accepted.  It was th e case two years ago, and was the 
same six or seven years ago. 
74. The delegation of Panama
 said it was important to continue the work started in the area of 
services, so as to reach a concrete outcome in ma rket access and GATS rules.  Furthermore, Members 
had to recognize that they had to find a balance in  the negotiations to reach a satisfactory outcome.  In 
this light, Panama favoured results that mutually be nefited all Members instead of policies that would 
perpetuate distortions.  The point was to create new opportunities for trade, particularly for 
developing countries.  Therefore, Members had to take into consideration that, in NAMA and 
agriculture, the Chairs would come up with new proposals on modalities that would give horizontal momentum.  Therefore, services should not lag behi nd – they needed to go forward.  Panama was 
committed to the services negotiations.  Its delegati on participated in plurilateral initiatives such as 
shipping, maritime transport, and financial services,  with a view to more market access, and had 
received requests from various sides in strategic sector s.  Panama was confident that consultations by 
the Chairman on the level of ambition in services would take into account matters of vital importance to developing countries, thus pr oducing a balanced outcome in a future draft text and thereby 
concluding the work. 
75. The delegation of Japan
 noted at the outset that it was unimaginable for it to present to its 
ministers a set of documents in which the services co mponent was lacking.  In that light, it wished to 
make a couple of points.  First, it disagreed with Brazil with respect to the feasibility and desirability 
of a statement on comparability of ambition.  Second, Japan wished to  remind Members that 
assessment of the negotiations was a continuous t ask mandated by the Negotiating Guidelines agreed 
in March 2001.   
76. The delegation of Canada  looked forward to working on elements of a services text that 
would deal with market access in services and also  with the other important issues such as LDC 
modalities, domestic regulation and the rest of the full agenda.  It was important to have such a text to 
ensure that all of these issues were in a position to advance. 
77. Canada agreed with what had been said by the United States and the European Communities, 
but wished to focus on one point.  Canada had liste ned to the statement from Brazil with respect to 
agriculture, but did not have quite the same view.  For Canada, it was services that was lagging.  It 
was market access in services that was lagging in th e negotiations.  That was the issue that Members 
were trying to address.  Canada thought it would be  very useful to ensure that the Council – and 
senior officials and ministers also – understood how little progress had been made on the ground in 
services market access over the past tw o years since Hong Kong – in the last six years if you did the  TN/S/M/28 
 Page 15 
 
 
  count like the European Communities.  This was important because ministers would be required to 
take decisions with a full picture in front of th em as to the progress in each of the areas of the 
negotiations, and services was a critical element of th at calculation.  Canada thought that an objective 
assessment would demonstrate that services was lagging.  But even if it were thought that such a view 
could only be subjective, Canada thought that ministers needed nonetheless to understand areas of 
dissatisfaction and disappointment in the Round.  If  ministers simply said to each other that they 
thought that they had done enough in services, w ithout getting into the facts or detail of what was 
currently on the table, they would talk past each other.  That was a recipe for poor decisions on the 
Round as a whole.  This was a very important elem ent and something with which Canada would be 
working with others to advance in the future. 
78. The delegation of Chinese Taipei  noted that services was one of the three pillars of the Doha 
Round.  In this context, given the negotiation of modalities in agriculture and NAMA, it was difficult 
for the Chair to assess the state of play in services.  Nearly two years had gone by since the adoption 
of Annex C.  Negotiators needed  to take stock of what had b een done during this period.  The 
elements paper would not only serve as guidance for delegations' official work, but also increase the 
stability of the services negotiations, and help em phasize that services were as important as 
agriculture and NAMA.  The elements text had to  respect the mandate of the GATS and the precise 
objectives, clear approach and sequences for the conc lusion of negotiations laid out in Annex C, so 
that Members could ensure that the services outcome  would deliver on the de velopmental promise of 
the Doha Round.  The text needed also to contain a report on the state of play in services, in particular 
a factual assessment of negotiations in key services sectors and modes in the plurilateral negotiations.  
In the factual assessment Members could build up a picture of exactly where the gaps were and where 
work should be focused in the futu re.  On the question of comparability – it was clear that the level of 
ambition in services should be 'comparable' to that ac hieved in the other two market access pillars.  A 
balanced Doha outcome required real contributi ons from the whole membership on services market 
access.  In this context, negotiations had to be di rected to the reduction or the elimination of the 
adverse effects on trade in services as a means of providing effective market access, which was 
already are laid out in the Article XIX of the GATS.   The gap between commitments had to be closed.  
New market access had to be delivered. 
79. The delegation of Ecuador  noted that one of the principl es of the house was transparency.  
The process of negotiating a services text had to be inclusive and transparent, and any progress had to 
be discussed multilaterally.  Ecuador did not understand how some Members could be discussing 
concepts such as 'comparability' with respect to documents that Members, such as Ecuador, had not 
had a chance to review.  Ecuador was also worried about the possibility of re -opening negotiations on 
Annex C.  As mentioned in the Council meeting of  28 September Ecuador did not think that any new 
mandates for modalities were required, since it cons idered that the instructions for the services 
negotiating group were clearly established in the mandate of the July package and the Hong Kong 
Ministerial Conference.  New dates,  however, needed to be fixed. 
80. The delegation of Chile  supported the process of developing a text on services.  In this 
connection, it was necessary to have some kind of road map or document giving guidance to all 
Members on a successful conclusion of these negotiati ons.  The elements which the Chair mentioned 
at the outset had proved very useful, and they had been taken up in the delegations' written proposals 
during the informal consultations.  Both of the ma in text proposals were drawn up on a sound basis, 
providing a good basis for further work. 
81. It was clear that there were divergences.  In  those areas that seemed most contentious there 
appeared to be no elements allowing Members to r each a consensus.  The not ion of comparability, for 
example, was an inevitable political reality for all delegations, and the principle of a single 
undertaking meant that in some areas it would more  important for some and less for others.  For 
Chile, services was of central importance.  TN/S/M/28 
Page 16  
 
  82. With respect to a factual assessment of the plur ilateral process, a text on services would need 
to report on the work done over the past years, im plementing the mandate cont ained in paragraph 7 of 
Annex C.  Members needed to deliver an outline of the expected results of the plurilateral meetings, 
and at the same time undertake what was still left to be done in order to comply as far as possible with 
requests they had received. 
83. Finally, a text on services would not be credible  unless it referred to market access.  This was 
especially true considering that one of the distin ctive characteristics of the services negotiations was 
the large number of interests of delegations (bot h developed and developing)  in various services and 
ways of providing those services.  The best soluti on was to abandon fixed positio ns and build bridges, 
and this was expressed by Singapore very clearly.  Members had to act with realism.  Since there were 
textual elements that a large number of delegati ons could not accept, more constructive work was 
needed in order to achieve the negotiating goals.  Whatever document agreed to would be a valuable 
instrument.  It was important not to lose sight of th e fact that the important job was what Members did 
in capitals in making high-quality, more comprehensiv e offers, that included more sectors, more depth 
and a commitment to accord national treatment and MFN. 
84. The delegation of Venezuela
 wished to make two points.  First, Venezuela saw no point in a 
new text.  Second, if there were a text, then to be useful it should include far more than a few dates.  
The text needed to have substance, and not be a mere reinterpretation or repetition of the agreement 
on services in Annex C of the Hong Kong Declara tion.  Venezuela invited developing country 
Members present to ask themselves whether the pr oposals were of any use for them.  Were the 
proposals consistent with the objective of the self-pro claimed 'development' round?  As pointed out by 
it in making its reservation to Annex C of the Ho ng Kong Declaration in December 2005, Venezuela 
did not approve of elements that would go against its domestic interest or be  inconsistent with its 
national constitution and laws. 
85. The delegation of South Africa  agreed with the statement made by Morocco.  Like many 
Members, South Africa at the outset did not see the n eed for a text.  But in the spirit of taking the 
negotiations forward, South Africa had agreed to participate on the strict understanding that this 
participation would be in full accordance with the Annex C mandate.  Since then, the Chair had held 
two consultations – at the first, two texts were ta bled, and at the second the United States tabled a co-
sponsored text.  In the interim, there has been  a clear divergence of positions, and Members were 
nowhere nearer achieving what could be considered a break-through.  In the in terests of transparency, 
South Africa wished to point out that the devel oping country text introduced by Brazil and India was 
co-sponsored by Argentina, China, Indonesia, Morocco, Pakistan, Philippines, South Africa and 
Thailand.  
86. South Africa wished in particular to signal its opposition to the sectoral and modal assessment 
papers tabled by certain Members participating in  the plurilateral negotiations.  These papers were 
fundamentally flawed, in that they sought to refl ect an assessment that was grossly unbalanced.  If the 
purpose was to develop political guidance for minister s, then it was important that that the political 
guidance reflect an honest assessment.  In light of the plurilaterals sessions held so far, South Africa 
did not feel that the assessment presented would reflect  to ministers a complete and full picture of the 
progress or the lack of progress that has been made  in the services negotiations in market access, in 
sectors and modes of interest to developing countries as required by the mandate.  With respect to the 
proposed binding of existing market access and commitm ents that led to new trade flows – this was 
completely beyond the mandate of the negotiations , and South Africa would completely reject it. 
87. South Africa appealed to the proponents of the text  to adopt a pragmatic approach in terms of 
what they were seeking to achieve through it.  Singa pore had made a valid point when it said that the 
text was increasingly looking like an end in itself.   When it was proposed, the objective was always 
that the text would be a stepping stone to achieve  progress in the services negotiations.  This was not  TN/S/M/28 
 Page 17 
 
 
  just in terms of market access, but in all othe r aspects of the services elements that were under 
negotiation – particularly with regard to S&D tr eatment, LDC modalities, and the full flexibilities that 
developing country Members enjoyed.  South Afri ca sensed that some Memb ers were moving away 
from that objective, and that the text was increasingl y starting to look purely like a market access tool.  
Taken to an extreme, the text looked like an inst rument to lock in commitments where developing 
countries currently had the freedom to schedule in acco rdance with what they were comfortable with.  
88. The delegation of Switzerland  said that a services text was needed.  It was not a means in 
itself but a tool to lead Members where they had to go, and without this tool they might not arrive at their destination.  At Doha, Members agreed to negotiations on the three market access pillars in the 
Round.  What mattered at the end of the day was th at Members got to the finish line together.  The 
philosophical debate about whether Members were lagging behind or were ahead at this stage was 
somewhat irrelevant.  Either Members managed to put the puzzle together at the end of the day, or they didn't and then they would not have a Round.   That being said, Switzerland believed that the 
elements tabled by the United States were valuable  for the negotiations.  These elements were based 
on the existing instruments, such as the GATS, th e Guidelines and Procedures, the Doha Declaration 
and Annex C.  Switzerland felt well covered by these elements, and that they were helping to produce 
convergence among Members.  There might still be so me open issues to resolv e, but Members were 
heading in the right direction. 
89. There were some elements where there wa s still no agreement, such as comparability.  
Comparability was largely in the eye of the beholde r, and until everything was agreed then nothing 
was agreed.  It was a fact that Members had to  reach a balance between the three market access 
elements, and each had to make its own judgment.  Many Members had made comparisons with, for 
example, agriculture.  But it would be unfortunate to a rrive at a deal in agriculture only to find that the 
Round could not be concluded because of irresponsi ble behaviour in other areas such as services.  
Switzerland could follow others by saying that it wa s a good traveler with no fixed plans, and no real 
interest in arriving, but that was not the case.  Switzerland wanted to arri ve, and had a fixed plan. 
90. There was also a need for an assessment of the ma rket access state of play.  After six years of 
negotiations, there was a need to know where the nego tiations stood.  This could be done in different 
ways.  One way was taken before the Hong Kong Minist erial.  In paragraph 2 of Annex C, there is a 
reference to a Chairman's Report, where Member s expressed what they believed should be the 
sectoral and modal objectives.  Of course, this had to  be set alongside the principle contained in the 
negotiating Guidelines and Procedures that there could be no a priori exclusion of sectors or modes.  
An assessment had to take into account all views, and would be useful and indeed necessary for the 
process.  It could also be done simply and quick ly under the able leader ship of the Chairman. 
91. A second way to assess the state of play in market  access was to follow the example of India, 
China, Pakistan and others in their communi cation JOB(07)/175.  Other Members, such as 
Switzerland in its communication TN/S/W/61 on M ode 4, had undertaken a similar exercise.  
Switzerland was open on the methodology, but th e bottom line was that Members needed an 
assessment. 
92. Guidance was also going to be needed, and this as well was a point of divergence.  Consensus 
would be difficult, and the final decision might need to come from ministers.  Although some 
delegations had criticized elements for guidance pr esented by the United States, it was important to 
place these elements in their context, and read them  with the other elements presented.  In fact, the 
two elements lists had considerab le convergence.  Switzerland agreed with most others that the 
services text should also contain strong references to the LDC modalities' implementation.  It needed 
also to contain a deadline for tabling revised offers, as well as strong elements on rule-making 
(especially domestic regulation), and an accurate  representation of the GATS rules negotiations.  TN/S/M/28 
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  93. The delegation of Norway
 thought that the proposal to assess the situation in the services 
negotiations two years after Hong Kong made perfect  sense.  The problem w as that there was a huge 
difference between Members on the whys and hows of  creating such a services text.  For Norway, the 
text needed to include major elements including th e mandate, market access and rule-making.  On the 
mandate, the text needed to refer to Annex C as the basis of work, and make reference to Article XIX 
of the GATS, the Doha Declaration, and Negotia ting Guidelines, and the Hong Kong Declaration.  
The objective of the text had to be agreed – to pr esent the state of play of the services negotiations, 
and to provide further guidance, where appropriate, fo r the implementation of Annex C.  The text also 
needed to reflect the holistic nature of the Doha  Round, in the sense that ambitions in the market 
access negotiations for goods and services were commensurate with the reference to a single 
undertaking.  It was important as well to take note of the special situation of LDCs, and the need for 
flexibility for individual developing countries.  On ma rket access, a factual description of the state of 
play since Hong Kong was needed, identifying with out value judgment the progress, flexibilities and 
gaps in sectors and modes.  For Norway, it was im portant to find a way of capturing the progress 
made during almost two years of intensive work, w ith the plurilateral requests as the basis for the 
guidance.  The final element of the text needed to contain timelines for revised offers, the elaboration 
of LDC modalities, and deal with domestic regulation disciplines and GATS rules. 
94. The GATS was a fairly new agreement, devel oped in the Uruguay Round in order to extend 
the multilateral trading system to services.  It wa s now part of the Doha Development Agenda, with 
the goal of taking liberalization further by increasing  the level of commitments in schedules.  A gap 
between existing levels of libera lization and bindings in the GATS had increased considerably since 
the Uruguay Round.  It seemed to be a realistic ambiti on at least to try to narrow or even close this 
gap, while at the same time taking into account flexibility provided by the GATS, particularly for 
LDCs. 
95. The delegation of Hong Kong, China  said that, despite their differences on the elements under 
discussion, Members should not lose sight of the sp irit of trying to seek commonalities.  Differences 
remained and would perhaps continue to remain, but  the task was to narrow these differences so that 
they could reach the political level for significant policy guidance, in all three areas of the market 
access negotiations – services, agriculture and NAMA.  Singapore's was right to say suggest that 
leadership was needed in all th ree areas, although at the moment it was perhaps needed more in 
agriculture and NAMA.  Negotiations in other areas  were as important as in agriculture and NAMA.  
Hong Kong, China supported the drafting of a services text because it underlined the significance of 
services in the Round.  As well, it would provide a tool to assess and take stock of what had been 
achieved over the past two years of discussions.  In  that spirit, Hong Kong, China was open to the 
idea of a factual assessment of plurilateral discussi ons, and requests and offers in the Round.  As 
coordinator of two of the plurilateral request/o ffer groups – MFN exemptions and Logistics – Hong 
Kong, China could see the value in reporting what progress had been made in those two areas. 
96. It was important not to lose sight of the ultimate aim of the Round, which was enshrined in 
the existing structure and provisions of the GATS.  Article XIX established that the aim of market liberalization negotiations in each round was to increase the general level of specific commitments undertaken by Members.  There are many ways to reach that goal within the existing structure and 
architecture of GATS.  Hong Kong, China was open to  how this goal could be interpreted as long as 
the existing GATS provisions were respected.  In th at regard, Hong Kong, China associated itself with 
the statements of Chile and Singapore. 
97. The delegation of Pakistan
 said that it was one of the co-sponsors of the Brazil/India paper 
that listed elements to be addressed for a services  text.  For Pakistan, the exercise amounted to 
periodic review of Annex C elements in order to capture progress in various areas – including LDC modalities, technical assistance, and SVE concerns – and an update of the revised offers timelines.  
With respect to the three controversial areas, co mparability had been partially explained by some  TN/S/M/28 
 Page 19 
 
 
  demandeurs, but there was a need to know more ab out how it would actually be exercised.  Pakistan 
was concerned that comparisons needed to take in to account the flexibilities of developing countries 
exercised when they had red lines due to genuine sen sitivities.  As regards th e factual assessment of 
market access, a state of play reflecting non-attri butable responses did not pose a serious problem for 
Pakistan.  Regarding the binding of autonomous libe ralization, Pakistan felt that this concept was 
linked to comparability and that further discussions were needed. 
98. The delegation of Korea  noted that there were conflicting views on core issues concerning the 
services text.  In this regard, Korea wished to sh are some thoughts on process rather than substance.  
Since progress in agriculture and NAMA was not as gr eat as anticipated, there might be a need to 
adjust timing on services negotiations.  In this regard , Korea suggested that during the next few weeks 
delegations focus more on the factual assessment of the market access state of play.  After two years 
of negotiations, it was appropriate to  take stock of what has been achieved in terms of outcomes and 
efficiency.  The current approach taken by the co -sponsors of the plurilateral request offer groups, 
which is text-driven without attribution to particular  to particular Members, is appropriate, but Korea 
was open to any better alternative.  Once market access assessment were complete, Members would 
be able to take a fresh look at the services text, including market access guidance for future 
negotiations at the working and ministerial levels. 
99. The delegation of Mexico  supported the interventions by Singapore and Chile, which had 
taken the view that modalities being negotiated fo r agriculture and NAMA were necessary but not 
sufficient for a final package.  Mexico considered th at these texts, as well the text on services, were 
not an aim in themselves but a means to an end – the successful completion of the Round.  Successful 
completion meant achieving significant commitments on services in sectors of interest to each 
delegation.  For Mexico, services was an essential co mponent of the three market access pillars which 
underlay the single-undertaking. 
100. As a developing country, Mexico  saw important benefits in participating actively in the 
negotiations in services.  On the date for revised o ffers to be presented, Mexico thought that Members 
should respect the sequence indicated in Annex C of  the Hong Kong Declaration.  As for progress in 
negotiations on services, Mexico were convinced that , two years after the Ministerial in Hong Kong, 
it was necessary to take stock of where matters stood in relation to the objectives of Annex C, and 
how much was left to be done.  Like some other delegations, Mexico thought it natural for Members 
to compare results in the different areas of negotiatio ns.  Use of the term 'comparability' therefore was 
not to be condemned, but examined carefully. 
101. The delegation of Kenya  said it was not a demandeur for a services text, since in its view 
there was sufficient guidance from the existi ng mandates on services to lead to a successful 
conclusion of the services negotiations.  If there were a services text, however, it needed to respect the 
mandates, in particular Article XIX, the Guid elines and Procedures for Negotiations, the Doha 
Declaration and, in particular, Annex C. 
102. During the consultations on a services text, issues of great concern to Kenya had arisen.  In 
particular, some proposed elements attempted to go beyond the mandates guiding the services negotiations.  For instance, some delegations had point ed out that Article XIX had to be clarified in 
order to achieve the desired result.  There was even  a proposal that tried to interpret selectively the 
various paragraphs of Article XIX.  There ha d never been a shared understanding among Members 
that part of their work on a services text was to clarify Article XIX.   
103. Kenya also took issue with the notion of co mparability of ambition between services, and 
agriculture and NAMA.  Paragraph 20 of the Doha Declaration was very clear in terms of comparing the level of ambition only in agriculture and NAMA.   There was nothing in the mandates that spoke 
of comparability of levels of ambition in services with those in NAMA and agriculture.  With respect TN/S/M/28 
Page 20  
 
  to factual assessment, Kenya was not opposed in prin ciple to the concept, but wondered how such an 
assessment, for example on the results of the coll ective requests, could provide guidance to the 
broader membership.  Since many Members did no pa rticipate in the collective requests, it would be 
difficult to include a factual assessment of a pl urilateral request/offer process in a multilaterally 
agreed text.  
104. The delegation of Colombia
 said that it initially had agreed to consultations on a text on 
services.  However, it became apparent that, alt hough there was some consensus on basic elements, 
there was a very broad divergence between the differe nt groups of Members on some other elements.  
For now, Colombia thought the climate was not right to  agree to such elements quickly.   Colombia 
hoped to reach balanced results on the text, which would make it possible to close the negotiations 
successfully.  Therefore it was willing to suppor t compromise proposals for the text on services, 
enabling Members to get on with the real negotiations. 
105. The delegation of Bolivia  said it had listened to several in terventions mentioning the notion of 
balance.  Bolivia's preliminary view was that an y balance should focus on the positive results of the 
negotiations on services – if there were any such resu lts – for the developing countries.  The current 
Round was, after all, focused on development.   
106. The delegation of Hong Kong, China  wished to complete its intervention by mentioning 
domestic regulation, an outcome on wh ich was important to it.  Such an outcome was also consistent 
with the spirit of Article XIX, in that Members n eeded to reduce or eliminate the adverse effects of 
measures on trade in services as a means of providing effective market access.  Like Switzerland,  
Hong Kong, China also wished to see a strong refe rence to the implementation of LDC modalities in 
the services text. 
107. The delegation of the United States  wished to specify, with refere nce to its paper, that its aim 
was to complete the picture on Article XIX rather th an to cherry pick.  The United States had included 
specific language from Article XIX that was in th e paper presented by Brazil, and continued by 
including the balance of Article XIX.  The United States had also included an element concerning 
S&D proposals, was well as elements, already found in the Hong Kong Declaration, concerning LDCs 
and small economies. 
108. Since it was the end of the day, the Chairman  adjourned the meeting to a future date.  
109. In resuming the meeting on 6 December, the Chairman  said that Members had begun their 
discussion on 15 November in informal mode by hearing his Report on consultations held at the request of a group of Members.  His consultations had focused on two informal papers setting out the 
views of a number of delegations.  One paper w as entitled 'Elements for a Services Text', and the 
other 'Possible Elements for a Services Text'.  In  accordance with the subject matter covered in these 
two papers, he engaged in  consultations on proposals for a service s text.  After three consultations on 
the issues covered by these two papers , he had concluded in his report th at the future direction of the 
consultations needed to be assessed. 
110. In the discussion that had followed his Report, there were several points of convergence 
among Members on possible elements of a services text.  But there were other issues on which there was a serious difference of views.  In particular, while some Members argued for a services text containing (1) comparability of ambition between  services and agriculture/NAMA, (2) a factual 
assessment of the state of play in the services negotiations, and (3) guidance amounting to standstill 
plus new market access, others took exception to any in clusion of these elements in a services text.  In 
addition, some Members took issue with the char acterization of his consultations as focusing on a 
possible services text.  TN/S/M/28 
 Page 21 
 
 
  111. After a lengthy debate on his Report, the Chairm an said he wished to switch the meeting back 
to formal mode , and opened the floor for further interventi ons under the same agenda item.  He hoped 
to hear Members' views more generally on how  the negotiations had progressed over the past few 
weeks or months, and how delegations  could best move the process forwar d.  He wished also to draw 
delegations' attention to a series of JOB documents  circulated recently by the coordinators of 
plurilateral request/offer groups, a nd invited any delegation wishing to comment on them in its 
intervention to do so. 
112. The delegation of Canada  noted that, as the year drew to a close, Members found themselves 
potentially on the cusp of an important phase of th e negotiations.  One way or another, there was a 
sense that Members would be shifting gears in the New Year.  Canada had ta ken careful note of the 
conclusion of the previous week's  meeting of the TNC, that permanent attention was necessary to 
preserve the comforting nature of the single undertaki ng, and that the best way to do this was to move 
full steam ahead in all negotiating groups.  As a services demandeur with high ambition for all aspects 
of the single undertaking, Canada found it difficult to  state with much conviction that, two years after 
Hong Kong, it derived much comfort from where matters stood. 
113. If indeed Members were heading into 'the second half of extra time' in the Doha Round, then 
it was timely to put a bookend on the current ph ase of their work.  The Hong Kong Ministerial and 
Annex C were important landmarks for the services negotiations, and it was time to take careful 
measure of where it had brought Members.  With this objective in mind, Canada had prepared two 
communications reporting on progress in the negotiations: JOB(07)/203 reviewing progress on 
financial services, and JOB(07)/204 reviewing pr ogress on architecture and engineering services. 
114. In sharing its views with Members on these subjects, Canada was not claiming that services 
was ahead or behind other negotiating groups.  In f act, Canada fully shared the view that ambition 
was lagging in all areas.  Nor was Canada seeking to single out any particular Member – in crafting this communication it had tried very carefully to  respect the good faith that Members have shown 
throughout the multiple rounds of plurilateral negotia tions.  Canada was trying to make a point – that 
a reality check on services was very much in order.  A reality check that questioned whether it should 
be taken as an article of faith that services, in all sectors and modes, would in fact be there at the end 
of the negotiations.  A reality check that made it clear just what was on the table – for the time being – in this pillar of the single undertaking.  And a realit y check that would make it easier for officials at 
higher levels to determine just how services might fit into the game plan for the following year. 
115. Canada also took some inspiration from the content of JOB(07)/175, which had been 
circulated by India and a group of Members.  Paragraph 8 of that pa per contained a very generalized – 
and in Canada's view not quite accurate – account of  the state of play in the negotiations.  Canada 
thought there was much more nuanced and detailed in formation available, and this picture had started 
to emerge from the communications prepared by the friends groups coordinators.  Although the 
papers had been circulated at the last minute, and largely spoke for themselves, Canada wished 
nonetheless to make some general points about each. 
116. On financial services, Canada wished to high light the enormous importance that co-sponsors 
attached to the sector.  Meeting this request to the greatest extent possible, particularly deep 
commitments in Mode 3, was central to an acceptabl e Doha outcome for Canada.  As described in the 
paper, the response to date had not been overwhelm ing, since restrictions remained on the judicial 
form of establishment;  limitations on foreign equity  participation did not seem  to be improving;  the 
few Mode 1 and 2 improvements that had been di scussed would not do much to inspire Canada's 
industry;  and, in most cases, the outlook for comm itments fell below the existing level of openness.  
Throughout the discussions, it had been difficult to assess the real ambition of Members, as most signs of progress had been explicitly li nked to developments in agriculture. TN/S/M/28 
Page 22  
 
  117. On architecture and engineering, Canada had in fact been somewhat  pleased that there 
seemed to be some hope of commitments in response to the request.  However,  again, Canada wished 
to highlight that there looked to be a significant gap between the prospects for binding and existing practices. 
118. Overall, Canada thought that a handful of Me mbers were contemplating binding their existing 
practices for market access and national treatment, many Members envisaged commitments that fell 
significantly below this threshold, and that new lib eralization was a very scarce resource indeed.  One 
couldn't help but draw the conclusion that most Me mbers were falling well short of even the modest 
objectives in Annex C.  This was a reality check an d Members needed to own up to it.  Some would 
express great disappointment.  Some would claim that  this was what you got when you spent five 
years without making any significant progress on agriculture.  Others would do both.  But ultimately, 
Members had to make sure that everyone fully understood what might or might not be coming down 
the line in offers in 2008. 
119. These were Canada's own views, and it was impor tant to acknowledge that there was a range 
of interpretations even among the co-sponsors of the requests.  On this point, the Canadian delegation 
was reminded that a former Brazilian colleague used  to admonish it that 'no-one had a monopoly on 
the truth'.  The Canadian delegation was quite confid ent of its grasp of the facts, but fully expected 
different Members to have different perceptions.  But such divergences were the basis for future 
discussions.  In Canada's view, to the extent that th ere were dramatically different takes on the facts, it 
was much better to get those issues out into the open  now rather than tripping up on them in the 
following year. 
120. Canada noted that it had attached the c ontent of the plurilateral requests to its 
communications, and wished to explain why.  Th ese requests were mandated in Hong Kong and were 
prepared in close consultation amongst Members, ca pitals and with industry.  They represented the 
state of the art in terms of streamlined definitions  of commercially meaningful commitments.  And as 
such, there was value in them that Canada thought should be transparently shared with all Members.  
By going the route of submitting them as JOB documen ts, Canada hoped that they would be properly 
translated, further enhancing their accessibility to officials in capitals. 
121. In closing, Canada wished to acknowledge that it was fully aware of the importance of rule-
making in the negotiations.  Some very interes ting discussions had recently been held on domestic 
regulation, and Canada wished to recognize the cons tructive and diligent work that had been carried 
out by proponents of the safeguard proposals. 
122. The delegation of Brazil
 stated that it was not feasible to include a 'factual assessment' of the 
negotiations in market access in a chairman's text  in services.  It would be counterproductive and 
ultimately harmful to the whole negotiating process.  The fact that certain Members were circulating 
their own 'evaluations' of the plurilateral negotiati ons proved that Brazil was fully justified in its 
concerns. 
123. First, the documents presented were heavily bi ased towards the demandeurs' requests.  They 
failed to capture the degree of engagement and pr ogress achieved during the plurilateral meetings.  
Since each Member had its own schedule, its own regulations, and its different levels of sector 
bindings, a 'collective assessment' of their appro ach to the negotiations could not possibly convey a 
full and accurate picture of the Member's willingness to improve services schedules.  Moreover, since 
other negotiating areas of the Doha Round were lagging behind, particularly agriculture, where 
modalities have not yet been agreed, it was inconceiva ble that Members could reveal their final offers 
at this stage.  As a result, the documents just ci rculated did not provide a ny useful information or 
accurate analysis.  Instead they reflected poorly, or ev en distorted, the discussions in the plurilaterals.  TN/S/M/28 
 Page 23 
 
 
  124. Second, the presentation of the documents did not help the negotiating process.  In Hong 
Kong, plurilaterals were accepted, with reservati ons by some Members, as a complementary approach 
to the bilateral request-and-offer process, which wa s the main negotiating modality.  It was agreed 
that the plurilateral process would be a voluntar y exercise, with no records of the sessions, no 
presence of the Secretariat in the meeting room, and no formal circulation of requests.  Those 
procedures were agreed as confidence-building measur es, in order to give comfort for delegations to 
participate in the meetings, as well as to provide an informal setting to facilitate a frank exchange of 
views and discussion of technical issues.  With th e circulation of the 'eva luation' documents, the 
confidence among delegations had been undermined. 
125. Third, it was clear that no 'factua l assessment' could be part of a Chair's text.  It was obvious 
that the documents just circulated could not be used as a basis for a con sensus-based evaluation.  
Members could spend months or even years negotiating a 'common assessment' on how the collective requests had or had not been met, let alone how that translated into a level of ambition in the negotiations.  How should the views of 150 Members on 21 plurilateral requests be conveyed?  There 
was nothing 'factual' about these evaluations.  E ach Member had its own evaluation of the whole 
process, and of how their demands were or were  not being met.  The time would come when 
modalities in agriculture and NAMA were in place, wh en Members would be able to translate their 
assessments into final offers in all market acce ss negotiations, through the request-offer process.  
Brazil, for instance, had its own evaluation of the offers of many developed Members, especially in 
sectors and modes of supply of interest to developi ng countries.  Brazil also noted that some of the 
sponsors of plurilateral requests failed to comply w ith their own demands, through the use of 'creative 
scheduling', such as caveats in footnotes, changes in  classification, and cumbersome regulations that 
undermined effective market access in  sectors committed.  Although Brazil had its own evaluation, it 
did not intend to present it as a document, because it w ould be of no value for the negotiations.  Brazil 
intended rather to use its evaluation in the bila teral request-and-offer process, according to the 
Negotiating Guidelines and commensurate with the overall progress of the Round.  It was very 
harmful and counter-productive to try to convey any common assessment in a Chair's text.  Brazil 
thought that the level of confidence among delegations was already compromised by the circulation of those texts. 
126. Brazil understood that the circulation of the documents constituted a completely separate 
exercise, with no linkage with the consultations regarding a services text.  Brazil rejected those 
documents as input for the consultations on the Chai r's text, and they needed to be ignored.  If any 
relationship was sought to be established between those documents and the services text, then Brazil 
would not be in a position to join a consensus on any Chair's text, since it would clearly be outside the 
mandate contained in Annex C. 
127. The delegation of Cuba
 wished to comment on the organization of future work, and to read a 
joint statement on behalf also of Bolivia  and Venezuela .  The Chairman and some Members had taken 
the initiative to draft a document on services cont aining various elements.  Bolivia, Cuba and 
Venezuela did not believe at this stage that it was appropriate to take such a step.  The first step 
should have been to have reached an ag reement amongst Members on the need and the 
appropriateness of such a document.  In the WTO, decisions were taken by consensus, or a vote in 
exceptional circumstances, and there was no provision  to replace such a decision-making mechanism.   
128. No consensus existed on the preparation of th e document on services.  A legal justification 
was needed before Members could move ahead and, if this were not the case, then work on the 
document should cease.  It was unacceptable that Councils within the WTO dealt with the positions of different Members in different ways, and it coul d have negative consequences for the negotiations. 
129. The Chairman had progressed the work by proposing possible ingredients for a possible 
document.  There was a proposal by one Member, the United States, that touched on aspects on TN/S/M/28 
Page 24  
 
  which, apparently, there could never be agreement.   The proponents might wish to withdraw this 
proposal, or amend it.  But it was certain that if  the services negotiations had not made greater 
progress so far, it was because Memb ers wished this to be the case. 
130. Forcing developing countries to liberalize their tr ade regime went counter to the nature of the 
WTO, and ignored the true meaning of the GATS.  It made no sense for Members to request better 
offers from developing countries without being rea dy to accommodate their specific interests.  The 
rules governing services negotiations were clear and, so  far, had not been violated.  What was needed 
now was simply to modify the dates for the submi ssion of revised offers, and complete the modalities 
for the LDCs – the rest was already established very clearly.  For Bolivia, Cuba and Venezuela, a text 
going beyond these elements was neither necessar y nor acceptable.  The Round was close to a 
conclusion, and there could be no question of changi ng the mandate in order to establish benchmarks. 
131. The Chairman
 clarified that he had not himself taken any initiative, contrary to what had been 
suggested by the delegate of Cuba in his statem ent.  The initiative for a services text had come from 
some Members of the WTO, and their views deserved as much respect as those of other Members.  The Chair had undertaken consultations in response to a request by Members wanting a services text.  
These consultations had been undertaken transparen tly, with the Chair keeping all Members fully 
informed of progress.  Delegations were of course entitled to express their views on all aspects of this 
topic, including whether a services text was needed.  The Chair was simply trying to move delegations towards a successful conclusion of the services negotiations – the task for which he had 
been elected.  The Chairman noted that other matters also needed to  be discussed by delegations – for 
example, the implementation of LDC modalities and S&D proposals.  On these matters as well, the 
Chairman sought delegations' inputs on how to m ove forward.  He thanked Bolivia, Cuba and 
Venezuela for their joint statement on these issues.  
132. The delegate of the United States
 thanked the Chairman for his clarification of the services 
negotiating process.  Services, alongside agriculture , had been one of the built-in agenda items 
designated in the Uruguay Round to start in the year 2000.  After the launch of  the Doha Development 
Agenda, NAMA was added to the market access segment of the negotiations.  There was now a 
bigger market access package, consisting of three ar eas.  The United States agreed with Canada that 
the Chairman had been asked to hold consultations w ith delegations in order to prepare for 'near final' 
modalities in agriculture and NAMA.  The United States could not adopt these modalities unless there 
was a text on services, containing some clarity on  ambition in the services negotiations.  A services 
text was not, however, needed before the 'near final' modalities stage. 
133. The United States delegation was puzzled by the discussion so far.  All Members had a right 
to express their frustration about reactions to their requ ests.  Indeed, this is what India had done in its 
paper contained in JOB(07)/175.  Having reminded other delegations  of the significance of one 
particular mode of supply, India ha d gone on to give a detailed analysis of the state of play, noting, in 
particular, the positive response of a number of de veloping countries to most of the plurilateral 
requests made to them, and the inability of deve loped countries themselves to meet many of the 
requests made in key infrastructure sectors.  
134. The analysis done by India of the negotiations w as at a level of detail similar to that of the 
reports done by the co-sponsors of the plurilateral requests, and it was positive to have on the record 
that some delegations disagreed with the co-s ponsors' assessment.  The co-sponsors' reports had 
recognized that a few Members had indicated that th ey would be ready to move further and adjust 
their next offers.  But the vast majority of the r esponses received were lacking in any clarity, and in 
some cases did not even a indicate whether the plur ilateral request would be considered.  Although 
this scenario might be considered typical of this stage of the negotiations, the United States for one could not simply rely on the statement that once agriculture and NAMA modalities had been adopted 
everything would fall into place for services.  TN/S/M/28 
 Page 25 
 
 
  135. Several elements of the paper that the United States had tabled in the Chair's consultative 
process had been criticized.  However, many of th ese elements were reflected previously agreed 
principles contained in Articles IV and XIX:2 of the GATS, and in the Negotiating Guidelines and Procedures.  The United States and other dele gations were now working on transforming those 
elements into specific texts so that Members could analyze actual language in consultations to be held 
early in the new year. 
136. The United States, in addition to being among the co-sponsors of a number of plurilateral 
requests, was the coordinator of two of them on which it would make reports.  The objective of the 
reports was to set out clearly the nature of the res ponses received to the requests.  In this regard, it was 
important to note that it was solely for the request ors, and not the addressees, to determine whether or 
not the responses to the requests were satisfactory. 
137. The United States was the coordinator of both th e postal courier (incl uding express delivery) 
and the telecommunications plurilateral requests.  The postal courier and express delivery collective 
request was co-sponsored by four Members – the European Communities, Japan, New Zealand and 
the United States.  It was presented to twenty other Members.  Co-sponsors in these requests had 
deemed themselves recipients of the requests, and th e United States had indicated in the course of the 
negotiations where it could meet its own request.  The United States also took note that the Mode 4 collective request, put forward by exclusively deve loping countries, had not deemed themselves 
recipients of their own requests – notwithstanding  the fact that there were numerous south-south 
negotiations occurring in many different areas, and a lot of south-south trade taking place.  It was not 
clear why developing countries had decided that each others' markets were not important in the 
context of the plurilateral negotiations.   In express delivery and postal services, some recipients had 
come forward and made indications of where they could be flexible.  However, the United States was 
concerned about Mode 1 commitments, and in particular about Mode 3 restrictions on the scope of the 
requests within this sector.  It was also concerne d about other barriers in the sector, such as very 
restrictive equity limitations. 
138. In the case of telecommunications, 10 Members had co-sponsored the plurilateral request 
(Australia, Canada, European Communities, Hong Kong China, Japan Korea, Norway, Singapore, 
United States, Chinese Taipei), which was presente d to 22 other Members.  While cosponsors had 
received a few positive signals, there were some Me mbers who indicated that there would be no 
improvement in their offers.  Some said they were  not willing to bind even current openness, or who 
indicated they were not willing to reduce or elimin ate restrictions that remained in place even on a 
conditional or transitional basis.  
139. The United States looked forward to further discussion on the status of negotiations, and 
remained committed to working with trading part ners in a professional and conscientious manner, 
taking into account the sensitivities of devel oping countries as well as small and vulnerable 
economies.  The United States was al so interested in reflecting the interests of LDCs, and looking 
further into other concerns that have been rais ed, such as those put forward by delegations who 
considered themselves as recently acceding Members.  It was important to explore how the negotiations could be moved forwar d.  In the course of the Chair's consultations, the United States 
was open to exploring how the services negotiations – as one of the three market access pillars of this 
Round – could be moved forward, so that Members' stakeholders and constituen ts could indicate their 
support for the Round. 
140. The delegation of Turkey
 supported the Chairman's work in preparing a services text.  It 
believed that the issuance of such a text was in evitable under the circumstances,  and was willing to 
contribute to its elaboration.  A services text need ed to stay within the context of the Hong Kong 
Declaration – in other words it should not introduce new elements.  In this regard, an assessment of 
progress since Hong Kong was welcome.  However,  Turkey was opposed to annexing summaries of TN/S/M/28 
Page 26  
 
  plurilateral requests to these texts.  The summaries were one-sided and reflected only the views of co-
sponsors.  As for the introduction into the text of the concept of 'comparable ambition', this was not 
within the mandate and would seriously hi nder the advancement of the negotiations. 
141. The delegation of Bolivia
 wished to make a statement along the lines of that made by Cuba.  
Bolivia believed that transparency and non-exclusio n should guide Members' work and should be the 
basic principles of the negotiation.  In this respect , decision-making rules had to be taken into account.  
If Members did not adhere to the rules, this woul d diminish the credibility of the WTO, especially 
with respect to developing countries who wished to adhere to the rules.  The aim was to reach an 
agreement amongst all Members of the WTO in obser vance of the rules.  The desire of a few 
countries to liberalize in certain areas should not  be imposed on others.  The Round was a Member-
driven undertaking.  An informal meeting of the Council was not the ideal forum to discuss this 
fundamental issue.  Bolivia would be happy to ta ke the discussion to the General Council, but trusted 
that this would not be necessary.  The interests of  developing countries in services were often limited, 
and Bolivia did not see any clear trade-offs in othe r negotiations areas.  There was an insufficient 
balance between agriculture and NAMA.  Services  might further tip the balance too far in one 
direction, which would be unfavour able to developing countries who should, in principle, stand to 
benefit from the Round.  There was a need first to  discuss the possible real benefits, if any, of 
liberalization to date.  None were apparent.  Bolivia, as a developing country, had not obtained 
optimal results.  In some cases, what Bolivia had obtained was only the negative consequences of 
liberalization.  Bolivia was not prepared to m ove forward on the basis of obscure and unconvincing 
results without having secured progress in agricultu re and NAMA.  Since this issue had not been 
settled, Bolivia suggested that any othe r matters be discussed in formal mode. 
142. The Chairman  reminded Members that the meeting was now in formal mode, and that 
Members were discussing the review of the state of play of negotiations, including those related to 
paragraph 15 and organization of future work in ser vices.  A number of delegations, including Bolivia 
and Cuba, had taken the floor.  The points raised  came within the mandate of the Council, and 
discussions on these points should be pursued by it.   
143. The delegation of India  said that the services negotiations were of great importance to it.  
India has very substantially liberalized its servi ces economy, and continued to do so on a regular 
basis.  Its engagement in the negotiations had been proactive and constructive.  India, in its revised 
offer, had significantly responded to the requests ma de to it by its trading partners, and hoped to 
improve it further in the following year.  But Indi a's engagement could not remain one-sided – India 
had modest expectations from its trading partners in  a number of areas, especially in Modes 1 and 4.  
To date, these expectations had remained largely unfulfilled. 
144. As Members moved ahead in other areas of the single undertaking, it was crucial for India to 
obtain clarity and comfort on the areas of its interest.  The absence of clarity and comfort on these areas inevitably had an impact on the results achieve d in other areas.  In this context, India had 
expressed its willingness to engage on a services text.  De velopments so far on this issue had left India 
confused on where matters stood on this issue.  A nu mber of JOB documents had been tabled with the 
purpose of recording progress.  Such documents at best reflected the assessments of the proponents, 
and could not be construed as either factual or neut ral.  Incorporation of such assessments into the 
services text could not add to the credibility of that  document.  On the contrary, it would be counter-
productive and might have an adverse impact on the r esults of the negotiations.  India therefore urged 
the Chairman to ensure that, if the services text were to include an assessment of progress, such an 
assessment would be factual and neutral.  It shoul d not contain opinions not shared by the entire 
membership.  India wished to reiterate that the basis of the services text had to be Annex C, and nothing beyond that.  India would participate in the finalizing of the services text based on this clear understanding.    TN/S/M/28 
 Page 27 
 
 
  145. India wished also to underline the importance of  disciplines in domestic regulations.  Strong 
disciplines in domestic regulations were absolutely  essential in ensuring effective market access and 
in ensuring that the market access that was committed was not taken away through some other means.  
India found it very strange some Members, who were otherwise very aggressive on the issue of 
market access, took very different positions when  discussing provisions designed to enforce that 
market access through effective domestic regulations.  India hoped that the Chairman of the Working 
Party on Domestic Regulation would produce his text as early as possible, so that Members could enter into serious negotiations on that issue. 
146. On a final point, India hoped that the Secretariat was working on the proposal made by India 
at the last meeting for a Mode 4 seminar to take place during the next cluster.  
147. The delegation of Japan
 said that the topic of plurilateral negotiations was clearly mentioned 
in the Hong Kong Declaration, and was therefore with in the framework of current negotiations.  What 
Members said they required during the negotiations wa s transparency.  It was thus natural that many 
Members thought it imperative to take stock of the situation of plurilateral ne gotiations.  Coordinators 
had tried to be as impartial as possible in their re ports but it was understandable that others, especially 
recipients, might have totally diffe rent views.  Other Members were welcome to discuss the content of 
the reports that had been submitted, and in this  light changes to the reports could be made. 
148. Japan was the coordinator in two sectors – cons truction and maritime transport.  In these 
sectors, discrepancies still existed between request s and responses.  But there were achievements as 
well.  Four plurilateral meetings had been held  between April 2006 and September 2007, showing a 
positive approach by both requesting and recipients Members.  Some recipients had indicated that 
they were considering making new commitments, a nd this was very much to be welcomed and 
appreciated.   
149. The concept of a single undertaking meant that all the elements of the negotiations were in the 
end inseparable.  For Japan, an accord on rules and ser vices was indispensable for the final agreement.  
What was important was that the final agreement c ould not be attained at the very last moment.  
Services and rules therefore had to make progress along with agriculture and NAMA.  From this 
perspective, Japan commended the Chair's leadership in drafting a services text.  It was important to 
give as much input as possible in the preparation of  the services text, just as Members were trying to 
do in agriculture and NAMA.  But time was running out and, if not enough progress was made over 
the next few months, the opportunity would be missed.   
150. The delegation of Australia  emphasized how important services was to it, especially in light 
of Australia's recent change of government.  Like others, India for instance, Australia was looking for 
much greater clarity and comfort that there would be  a decent outcome in services.  For Australia, that 
meant acceptable outcomes in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4,  in both developing and de veloped countries.   
151. Comments had been made about the plurilateral re ports that had been put forward.  Australia 
had presented reports on both legal services and air transport services.  The plurilateral process had 
been a good process, and Australia appreciated th e engagement of all Members who have been 
involved in that process.  However, there was surely  a need for transparency and inclusiveness of the 
sort that was enhanced by progress reports.  Tran sparency and inclusiveness was important.  For 
Australia, the reports presented were fact-based  and objective.  Although such an judgment was 
always going to be in the eye of the beholder, Au stralia had taken a great deal of effort to be as 
objective and impartial as possible in the description of the status of the negotiations in those two 
sectors.  The reports made it very clear that the co-sponsors welcomed the continuing engagement of 
Members in dealing with these sorts of requests.   TN/S/M/28 
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  152. With respect to the issue raised  of the objective of these reports,  Australia wished to make it 
clear that Australia had confidence in the single unde rtaking.  Services and other areas would need to 
be fully reflected in the single undertaking, in acco rdance with the mandate and the agreements that 
were made in Doha and in Hong Kong.  The re ports were important factual assessments of the 
progress that had been made in the services negotiations.  Australia did not see them as inputs to the 
Chair's text on services – they were not part of that process. 
153. The delegation of the European Communities
 recalled the importance of having a clear 
indication of the level of ambiti on on services in order to conclude modalities for agriculture and 
NAMA.  That meant pursuing the process underway to develop guidance for Members, so that ministers would be able to judge what would be on the table on services in future revised offers when 
they sought to find an agreement on agriculture  and NAMA modalities.  The European Communities 
encouraged the Chairman to continue his consultati ons in January and February to ensure that the 
work on services progressed together with the wo rk on the other two market access areas of the 
negotiations, so that final guidance could be given on services when modalities were adopted. 
154. With respect to the papers that had been subm itted, it was timely to take stock, almost two 
years after Hong Kong, of where Members stood.  This was a natural element as part of the standing 
item on the Council's agenda on review of progress, and also in light of the consultations that the 
Chairman was undertaking to develop guidance.  To draw the picture of where the negotiations stood, 
it was useful to have a compilation of Members' view s.  This was also what appeared to have been 
done on Mode 4 in the document JOB(07)175, alth ough this document had confusingly been moved 
to point B of the agenda.   
155. The European Communities associat ed itself with the coordinators that had circulated reviews 
of progress in the various plurilateral requests th at the European Communities was co-sponsoring, 
namely financial services, telecommunications, postal courier services, maritime transport, 
construction, legal services, computer and rela ted services, air transport and architecture and 
engineering services.  As a coordinator of 4 plurila teral requests – in Mode 3, in distribution, energy 
and environmental services –the European Comm unities was circulating documents presenting the 
general views of co-sponsors on the progress in th ese sectors and modes of supply.  These reports 
were prepared on the basis of the interventions that were made in the various plurilateral meetings.  
Every attempt had been made to be factual, a nd in order to respect confidentiality no individual 
Members were named.  The documen ts sought to convey both a genera l evaluation of the answers that 
were provided, and more specific information on the answers to the different aspects of the requests.  
While the European Communities appreciated the en gagement of Members, cosponsors of the groups 
it was coordinating were disappointed that the responses so far showed little progress towards meeting the plurilateral requests.  In particular, the Europ ean Communities noted that in the sectors that it was 
coordinating, many recipients indicated that they  were not considering any improvements, binding of 
existing liberalization, or providing new market access opportunities.   
156. On distribution services, the report recalled that the lack of ambition was particularly 
disappointing in light of the shared understanding on the importance of an efficient distribution sector for the development of industrial and other ser vices sectors, both in developed and developing 
countries.  In distribution services, the European Communities noted that 9 out of 19 recipients had signalled little or no flexibility to make improved commi tments.  Another 5 recipients had not been in 
a position to provide any indications  at all.  In the environmental services sector, only half of the 
recipients had either existing commitments or o ffers.  Despite this situation, the European 
Communities noted that the possible improvements ou tlined by some recipients were usually very 
limited in their scope.  In the energy services sect or, the co-sponsors had recalled that energy was an 
important and thriving sector, and a basic element of economic well-being.  Yet half of the recipients 
had either stated that they would not make furthe r improvements, or were not in a position to provide 
any information at all.  In the Mode 3 discussions, while there was some engagement among  TN/S/M/28 
 Page 29 
 
 
  recipients, it was still disappointing that there wa s little movement towards reducing or removing 
horizontal limitations.  Only one recipient indicated  that it was considering redrafting the horizontal 
limitation in response to the request. 
157. The delegation of Argentina  was surprised that the reports appeared on the table 20 days after 
the adoption of the agenda, and 30 days after th e closure of the timeline for the submission of 
documents for the Council meeting.  Argentina w as especially surprised since, although it was a 
coordinator of one of the plurilateral groups , it had heard about the initiative only recently. 
158. Argentina welcomed Australia's statement that these reports were not inputs for the 
Chairman's document.  This was a key point.  Howe ver, it would be important to know how Australia 
and others wished to use these documents.  Argen tina understood the point that any Member at any 
point in the negotiations could make an assessment of how it saw the process in each and every sector 
of interest to them.  What Argentina did not understand was what was meant by the multilateral 
circulation of the documents, unless the inte ntion was to multilateralize the request.   
159. With respect to the content of the reports, Argentin a said that it appeared to reflect its point of 
view only to a very limited extent.  The reports did not reflect the enormous number of technical 
questions that were still without response in some of the sectors.  Argentina did not think that this was 
the appropriate place to be discussing these matters.   There were many delegations who did not take 
part in these requests.  There were subtle differences  between sectors, and there were factors emerging 
from bilateral meetings that were not appropriately  incorporated in these assessments.  Every Member 
had the right to make its own assessment and to publ icize this assessment according to any benchmark 
of assessment it wished to use.  Argentina had c oordinated a request on services that had to do with 
animal husbandry, and the evaluation of this request  should be reserved for each of the co-sponsors of 
the request.  It was important to respect the pos ition of the countries who received the requests.  
Argentina was not going to make any comments on the response to requests at the plurilateral 
meetings, but would have no proble m if recipients wished to come forward and consult with it. 
160. Members had spent a lot of time in the negotiati ons, which on many points were repetitive.  In 
2003, for example, a group of developing countries led by Peru proposed to review the progress in 
negotiations in connection with the effective implementation of the objectives established in 
Articles IV and XIX of the GATS, raising a number of questions in assessing the offers under Mode 4.  Argentina's reaction to these evaluations is  similar to the reaction of certain delegations at 
that time.  One delegation said that the questions  as formulated required value judgments which a 
Member could make for itself, and insisted that the document might be very useful as something 
which Members could apply voluntarily, for its own i ndividual use.  Other delegations felt that this 
matter was more useful in a bilateral context.  Th ey wondered how the evaluation could be used in a 
more multilateralized context.  The same Member  said that the proposal seemed to depart from a 
fundamental concept of the GATS, and the Council had to be careful in terms of what it could ask of 
the Secretariat in connection with this kind of eval uation.  Another Member said that it felt that the 
document would be most useful for individual use, but was not supportive of a collective exercise.  
Argentina agreed with these stat ements by the United States, Canada and Japan.  These evaluations 
and assessments were most useful for the individu al use of coordinators, but had no value in a 
multilateral process. 
161. The delegation of Egypt
 said that it had reservations on the inclusion of plurilateral requests 
in formal documents in a multilateral setting.  This practice did not conform to the spirit of the basic 
understanding governing the plurilatera l negotiations.  Egypt would have  expected that requests being 
submitted from a group of Members to another group of Members would not be put in a formal 
document without the consent of all Members involved in the plurilateral process.  It was to be hoped 
that this issue would not prove to be a step b ackward, and lead delegations to reconsider their 
approach to the plurilateral negotiations.  As for the principle of presenting individual or plurilateral TN/S/M/28 
Page 30  
 
  assessments in a horizontal sector manner, Egypt belie ved that there was nothing that should prevent a 
Member or group of Members from doing so at any time as a contribution from them on how they saw the negotiations progressing.  However, as prev iously stated, Egypt could not accept that the 
negotiating process take a direction that only addr essed the interests of a group of Members and not 
the wider membership.  Egypt did not support atte mpts to impose assessments or objectives that did 
not conform in letter and in spirit to existing manda tes.  Egypt would however remain constructively 
engaged in the process, including in the Chairman 's efforts to come up with a text on services. 
162. The delegation of Hong Kong, China
 was the coordinator of two collective requests, on 
logistics services and MFN exemptions.  While logi stics services were the backbone of the supply 
chain and economic development in every economy, the MFN principle was the cornerstone of the 
GATS, and a guarantor of the true value of mark et access commitments.  Hong Kong, China therefore 
placed much importance on these two areas, and had presented two reports to Members in the spirit of taking stock of progress since the Hong Kong Ministerial Meeting.  Recipient Members deserved thanks for their hard work in preparing for their responses, and their participation at the plurilateral 
meetings.  Although it was an important process contributing towards achieving the objective of 
progressive liberalization under the GATS, Hong K ong China understood that this was a voluntary 
process.   
163. On logistics services, responses were mixed.  Hong Kong, China was grateful to those 
Members who had indicated a willingness to make  a positive move in response to the request, 
particularly in respect of core freight logistics services.  However, it was disturbing to note the number of Members who had not been able to indi cate a response one way or the other.  Hong Kong, 
China appreciated Members' initiatives to seek technical  clarifications to the request, which covered a 
range of activities, and stood ready to clarify any remaining points with recipient Members. 
164. While the picture on logistics services was mi xed, that on MFN exemptions was clear but 
regrettably on the negative side.  Of the 165 MFN exem ptions that were targeted by the request, there 
were some positive indications on only 10 of them, in cluding on the part of co-sponsors.  This was not 
a very pretty picture.  Hong Kong, China called upon  recipient Members to reconsider their positions 
– especially those Members who had a relatively large number of MFN exemptions in key sectors.  There was also a need to review MFN exempti ons that had been in place for over 10 years. 
165. The presentation of the reports by Hong Kong, China was without prejudice to its position on 
the contents of the services text.  It had been par ticipating and would continue  to participate in the 
discussions on the text.  Services were important to Hong Kong, China.  Its aim was to achieve a good 
outcome in services through progressive liberaliza tion under Article XIX of GATS in both market 
access and rules, especially domestic regulations.  Substantive work had been done in domestic 
regulations, and Hong Kong, China joined the call for th e Chair to circulate soon a revised draft text.  
The reports presented today were not consensus repor ts in respect of the wider membership, and Hong 
Kong, China looked forward to discussing matters further with recipient Members.   
166. The aim of the GATS was to achieve progressive liberalization, and was built on a strong 
basis of consensus.  It was now time to look at the substance rather than form.  Hong Kong, China 
stood ready to support the Chairman in taking forw ard the process to achieve a higher level of 
liberalization in the Round. 
167. The delegation of Morocco
 attached great importance to the liberalization of trade in services,  
a very significant sector for its economy, and had made  an offer consistent with this view.  During the 
plurilaterals, Morocco had indicated that the sect ors where it would make new commitments had to 
take account of the offers others  had made.  For Morocco, there had been no encouraging indications 
about positive reactions to this re quest in the revised offers, a vi ew which might or might not be 
shared by other delegations.  Any Member or gr oup of Members was of course entitled to assess the  TN/S/M/28 
 Page 31 
 
 
  negotiations according to its priorities.  As a ma tter of principle, Morocco was not against the 
presentation of individual assessments reports, but had difficulty in having them included in a 
Chairman's text, which would be of a multilateral natu re and was supposed to reflect the views all.   
168. On behalf of the African group , Morocco wished to emphasize a very limited number of 
African countries had received collective requests, with the exclusion of the LDCs.  The African 
Group found it difficult and embarrassing to comment on a process in which most of its Members did 
not participate.  Any assessment on the part of co-sponsors should in no way oblige African Members 
to participate in a process to which they were not really a party.  The African Group could not 
therefore underwrite any participation or acceptan ce of any of the evaluations, which should not be 
transposed into the multilateral context. 
169. The delegation of Pakistan  said that services was an important area where further locking in 
of market liberalization in all four modes of supply could result in dividends for all.  With respect to 
the services text, Pakistan recognized the need expr essed by major trading Members that they needed 
more assurances on the services front in a concrete form on what was doable, and capture progress in 
market access and rules in an agreed text for services.  Pakistan had co-sponsored a paper listing 
possible elements for such a text.  
170. With respect to the summaries of the plurilateral negotiations, Pakistan could go along with 
the concept of non-attributable summaries of plurilate ral meetings appended to a chair's text, as long 
as these were short and factual, and made to capture progress.  Members had in fact been voluntarily sharing their can-dos with their trading partners bilaterally, plurilaterally and in the Chairman's 
'enchilada' consultations.  Having such information-sh aring exercises reflected as a part of the official 
documents of the Council went beyond Pakistan's comfort level.  On Mode 4, Pakistan had co-
sponsored India's paper with Thaila nd and Peru.  This paper had pointe d to the lack of positive signals 
by most developed Members on services offers in th at mode.  The paper, contained in JOB(07)/175 
underscored that the GATS recognized domestic regulati on in Mode 4 just as in the other modes.  As 
such, it clarified that proponents were not seeking an y commitments to relax migration regimes.  They 
asked only for transparency and predictability to WTO scheduled Mode 4 commitments, or temporary 
entry for service suppliers who had received a valid c ontract to supply a service in the sectors that had 
been scheduled.   
171.  On domestic regulation, Pakistan sought balan ced disciplines that ensured that regulations 
were transparent and trade-friendl y, and that service suppliers were locked out of markets through 
requirements with no ostensible purpose other than to restrict international trade. 
172. The delegation of New Zealand
 supported the general remarks made by earlier coordinators 
on the whys and wherefores for presenting this info rmation, irrespective of how this information 
might be used in any services text.  New Zealand, as coordinator of the private education collective 
services request, recognized that its report did not n ecessarily reflect the views of recipients, and did 
not claim to do so.  New Zealand had listened clo sely to responses, and believed its assessment to be 
fact-based, objective and respectful of confidentiality.   As a transparent view for all Members on what 
commercially meaningful commitments might l ook like, these reports served the purpose.   
173. Along with four other co-sponsors (two deve loped and four developing Members), New 
Zealand had sent the education request to 21 recipi ents.  The five co-sponsors also deemed themselves 
to be recipients of the request.  At this stage of the negotiations, the response remained unsatisfactory.  
Five recipients indicated no flexibility in meeting any element of the request, and few recipients had 
provided indications of any improvements in their next  offers.  Five out of 26 recipients would likely 
meet the request in full.  While appreciating the e ngagement of Members, the actual results could only 
be interpreted as disappointing.  Education service s was one of the least committed sectors in the 
GATS, and would remain so against this background. TN/S/M/28 
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  174. Concerns and interests expressed over the course of several plurilateral meetings included 
issues related to the state of education as a public  good, queries about the definitions of the category 
'other education', and caveats that offers were  conditional on progress in the other market access 
negotiations, notably agriculture.  In response, co-spo nsors indicated that they recognized the inherent 
link between services and NAMA, and had supporte d efforts that services negotiations progress in 
parallel with those other areas.  New Zealand rec ognized the need for governments to preserve policy 
space with regard to education, and thus had de veloped a narrow and targeted request focused on 
proven, commercially-meaningful activities that coul d be delivered successfully by the private sector.  
Additional information had also been provided to Members seeking clarification on definitions.  New 
Zealand noted that education services had become a major tradable service across a wide range of 
developed and developing countries,  offering not only economic but significant social and cultural 
benefits.  Liberalization in this  sector guaranteed in schedules o ffered development benefits by 
providing access to knowledge and expertise not otherwise available domestically. 
175. New Zealand hoped that Members would give fu rther consideration to more forthcoming 
responses in future offers.  New Zealand had co-s ponsored 11 requests other than education, and 
supported the views expressed by c oordinators on progress made in those groups.  New Zealand also 
supported the efforts of the Chairman in ensuring that services negotiations progress in line with other 
areas of the negotiations to which services was inherently linked. 
176. The delegation of Thailand
 had just received the reports of the coordinators, and reserved its 
right to comment on the contents, especially on the reports in the 18 sectors in which it had participated as a recipient.  Thailand wished to  express reservations on the approach taken in 
preparing the reports, which involved the sharing of  confidential information in written form in a 
multilateral setting.  This constituted a breach of confidentiality, and diminished the good will that 
had always existed in conducting the plurilateral negotiations.  What could be the purpose of the 
reports?  The requests were crystal clear to the reci pients.  The indicative responses were clear to the 
proponents.  Thailand's responses had gone beyond what  it would have been comfortable indicating in 
a more formal and open setting such as the Special  Session of the Council for Trade in Services.  
Thailand might have to re-examine its positions in light of the actions taken.  If the purpose of the 
reports was to reflect the demandeurs' desired leve l of ambition in a service text, then Thailand would 
join other like-minded Members to fight this to the end.  Australia's reassurance on this point was not 
necessarily on behalf of the other proponents.  Although Thailand knew full well the importance of 
services and investment to its economy, it questioned from the beginning the need for a services text, 
in light of Annex C's continued relevance.  There wa s plenty of good will.  What was needed most of 
all was refreshed deadlines for the submission of offe rs.  What the reports had done was to seriously 
prejudice the negotiating position and negotiating spirit of the Members. 
177. The delegation of South Africa
 had taken note of the reports that had been tabled under 
review of progress and, like other Members, questione d the need and, more importantly, the objective 
of the tabling of these assessments.  These assessm ents were biased in favor of the demandeur 
countries.  They clearly were not a factual statemen t of what had occurred in the plurilateral meetings 
thus far.  South Africa had agreed to go along with  the plurilateral process on the strict understanding 
that it would be a voluntary process that would respect  confidentiality, and that  it would be done in 
the spirit of advancing negotiations.  However, the ta bling of the reports was a breach of that spirit did 
not take Members any closer to the objec tives that they were seeking to achieve. 
178. Having glanced at some of the reports, it was clear  that they portrayed a very one-sided view 
of the facts.  Where these reports stated that demande ur countries felt that most or some recipients had 
not met with the request, this was could only be a purely subjective assessment.  South Africa's main 
concern was the potential use of these reports, a nd it seriously cautioned against any attempt to 
incorporate them into the Chairman's text on service s.  If such an attempt were made, South Africa  TN/S/M/28 
 Page 33 
 
 
  would have to seriously reconsider its participati on and support of the development of a Chairman's 
text.   
179. South Africa wished to add that certain developments in the domestic regulations 
negotiations, in particular statements made at th e last meeting, were not helping to advance the 
objectives of the membership.  Statements that Me mbers reserved the right to withdraw from the 
domestic regulations negotiati ons, or language to that effect, was clearly not in keeping with the spirit 
of the services negotiations. 
180. The delegation of Chile  pointed out the usefulness in enga ging in a review of progress 
achieved in the last two years, as a part of the plurila teral process.  In this respect, Chile observed that 
the reports circulated at the present meeting went in that direction.  The principles mentioned by 
certain delegations could not be cons idered to be violated.  The reports were factual and did not name 
names.  With respect to the responses to the elements  of the requests, Chile believed that there should 
be no cause for the concerns expressed by many dele gations with regard to these documents.  The 
documents were not meant to represent a consensus among Members.  They reflected the views of the 
individual or groups of Members who had a specific inte rest in a particular mode of supply or sector.  
It was not necessary for the reports to have the full approval of Members.   
181. Chile coordinated the request on computer services, and all Members had access to the 
document (JOB(07)/196).  The request embodied one of the main char acteristics of services 
negotiations, namely its cross-cutting nature.  Th e co-sponsors included deve loped and developing 
countries.  Another point about the request was that  the co-sponsors were rather optimistic, judging by 
the responses that were received during the many meetings.  It was hoped that the positive responses 
would be confirmed in upcoming offers.  Finally, Ch ile agreed with India that the development of 
disciplines in domestic regulations was a core issue,  and joined the call for a revised text as soon as 
possible. 
182. The delegation of Colombia  wished to speak first as the coordinator for the plurilateral 
requestors in tourism and travel-related services.  Colombia had distributed a document to the Council 
that described the importance of tourism, both fo r developing and developed countries and also for 
international economic transactions.  It also described  the main elements of the collective request that 
a group of Members addressed to some other Member s.  The document concluded by indicating that 
to date there had been no clear positive or negative response to the request.   
183. This situation was of great concern to co-sponsor s, and they hoped that in the near future 
recipients would provide more information.  Colomb ia encouraged recipients to read carefully the 
questions and the JOB document.  The tabling of  the JOB document had the objective of flagging 
tourism as one of the important sectors in these negot iations.  Co-sponsors of the request did not have 
the intention that the paper be used in any way diffe rent than as a report of the progress of a particular 
negotation.  They recognized that the tourism nego tiation was one of many being conducted.  Only a 
comprehensive review of all such  negotiations could allow a complete assessment of overall progress. 
184. Colombia wished to make some remarks on its own behalf.  It was seeking to do everything 
in its power to further the process of developi ng a text on services.  Genuine negotiations should 
begin, based on the request and offer of new entries,  or removal of restrictions, in its schedules of 
commitments on services.  The time had come to focu s on a date for presenting new offers.  Only an 
examination of these offers would enable delegati ons to make a true assessment of what Members 
were prepared to offer.  Colombia had co-sponsored four other plurilateral requests, in addition to the 
one on tourism, and hoped that  progress would be achieved ther e and in other areas of the 
negotiations such as domestic regulation.  Finally, Colombia considered that the scope and goals of 
the reports contained in the other JOB documents we re no different than those in the report presented 
by Colombia. TN/S/M/28 
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  185. The delegation of Korea
 commended co-ordinators for putting forward a comprehensive set 
of progress reports, which it was opportune for the C ouncil to have at this time.  It would help 
Members identify their current position on their jour ney in the universe of the services negotiations, 
and add impetus to future negotiations.  
186. Korea shared the view of other delegations that there remained a tremendous amount of 
homework to be done by Members.  Disappointingl y, the areas most behind included those in which 
Korea had the most interest, such as financial,  telecommunication, maritime, distribution, and 
construction services.  
187. Korea encouraged other Members to digest caref ully the message that the reports contained.  
To enhance the objectivity and transparency of the exercise, the engagement of as many Members as 
possible should be encouraged.  Korea reiterated the importance of achieving substantial progress in 
the services negotiations as a part of DDA single undertaking.  
188. The delegation of Norway  expressed its appreciation for the huge efforts of coordinators in 
putting together the reviews of progress.  At the end of 2007, some two and a half years after Hong 
Kong, it was very useful to have a stock-taking.  As co-sponsor of ten collective requests and recipient 
of seven, Norway found the reports particularly he lpful for its own stock-taking.  All Members no 
doubt were making similar assessments, and all reali zed how much impressions are in the eye of the 
beholder.  However, it was a fact that the gaps be tween existing levels of liberalization and bindings 
in the GATS has increased consid erably since the Uruguay Round.  For Norway, services was an 
important part of the market access negotiations, and overall of the Doha negotiations.  Members 
needed to move full speed ahead on the services ne gotiations to ensure that services stood strong in 
the final stages of the Doha Round. 
189. The delegation of Switzerland  thought it crucially important to have an ambitious services 
text.  It supported the initiatives of some Member s to assess the state of play in plurilateral 
negotiations, and wished to thank those Members fo r their effort.  The assessments put forward by 
these Members were in fact a valuable contribu tion to the discussion about the services text, and 
hopefully would push the services negotiations forward. 
190. At the same time, it was important to remember that the reports did not provide a full picture 
of the services negotiations.  They did not in part icular fully cover progress achieved in bilateral 
negotiations.  Switzerland's analysis of the pr ogress achieved in sectors where it had put forward 
requests bilaterally, like the assessments of plurila teral requests presented by Members today, showed 
that there was still a lot of work to  do if Members were to achieve an acceptable level of ambition in 
services negotiations.  Domestic regul ation was another key area in the negotiations.  Strong domestic 
disciplines were needed if Members were to achieve  effective market access at the end of the Round.  
Switzerland supported the early submission of an ambiti ous revised draft text on domestic regulation,  
and looked forward to intensified discussion in this area as well. 
191. The delegation of Uruguay  said that the reports circulated by coordinators of plurilateral 
request offer groups should be understood to reflect  exclusively the views of proponent Members in 
the relevant sectors and modes of supply.  Uruguay w ould examine the reports in this light, and shared 
the view of Australia that these reports were not part of a preparatory process for a possible Chairman's text on services. 
192. The delegation of Chinese Taipei
 drew Members' attention to document JOB(07)/195, which 
was a communication from Mexico on the review of progress on audiovisual service negotiations.  In 
the absence of the coordinator, Ch inese Taipei had been asked as a co-sponsor to report.  The report 
contained a summary of the state of play in the audiovisual service negotiations, with the collective 
request attached for ease of reference.  The review  of progress represented a general view of the co- TN/S/M/28 
 Page 35 
 
 
  sponsors of the collective requests, without prejudi ce to the positions of individual co-sponsors.  The 
co-sponsors appreciated the engagement of all reci pients, and hoped that future discussions would 
allow significant progress towards meeting the objec tives set out in the plurilateral request.  Of 
course, all co-sponsors were open to any different views that recipient Members might have.  Like 
other reports, the content of this one was self explanatory. 
193. In closing, Chinese Taipei stressed the importa nce and benefits that the liberalization of 
audiovisual services could bring to economic developm ent.  Six bilateral market access clusters and 
four bilateral meetings had been  held between April 2006 and September 2007.  Unfortunately, the 
results achieved so far had been far from encouraging.   Only two of 28 recipients indicated that they 
were prepared to undertake new or improved commitmen ts in response to the objective of the request.  
Two recipients signaled no or little flexibility to improve or make any commitments.  Eleven other 
recipients did not respond to the request at all,  including six who did not  attend the plurilateral 
meetings.  Chinese Taipei encouraged recipient Memb ers to engage more constructively in the future 
negotiating process. 
194. Two years after the Hong Kong Ministerial Decl aration, Chinese Taipei believed that the 
reports covering almost 20 services sectors could serve as a milestone for the negotiating journey 
undertaken so far.  The reports we re concise, did not name names, and tried to be as factual as 
possible.  There was no breach of confidentially – on  the contrary, the reports could give Members a 
flavor of how much or how little had been achieved so far, and a sense of urgency of how best to narrow the gaps between requests and offers.  Ch inese Taipei looked forward as well to continuing 
working with the Chairman on a services text that could accurately guide future work. 
195. The delegation of the Philippines
 said that the reports by the coordinators of the plurilateral 
request offer groups should not have been circ ulated.  Whether intended or not, this action by 
proponents would have a chilling effect on the plurilate ral negotiations.  In this regard, the Philippines 
associated itself fully with the statements made by Brazil, South Africa and Thailand.   
196. The delegation of the Philippines was confused as to the nature of these reports.  While it 
recognized that a few co-sponsors had associated th emselves with the statements made by their 
coordinators, it was puzzling to see references to  the general views of co-sponsors, as well as 
references to the documents as not being intended to  be consensus documents.  Co-sponsors needed to 
clarify whether these assessments were being made only by their coordinators in their capacities as 
coordinators, or on behalf of all co-sponsors, or only some of the co-sponsors.  If co-sponsors 
accepted these assessments then that fact should be stated clearly, or better yet co-sponsored by all.  
This would give Members an indication as to wh ether the documents were indeed accurate and 
reflective of the status quo, even if onl y from these perspectives of co-sponsors. 
197. It was important to reiterate that the services ne gotiations were incapable of being reduced to 
the mathematical exercise being undertaken by these reports.  For the Philippines, this was a 
derivative of benchmarking which Members soundly re jected in Hong Kong.  Demandeurs were again 
trying to review progress in services on the basis of addition and subtraction, which was inconsistent 
with the GATS principles of progressive liberalizat ion and fundamental flexibilities, particularly of 
developing country Members.  One report stated  that 19 out of 28 recipients had no existing 
commitments in the sector.  How many recipients w ould have needed to make commitments in order 
for demandeurs to accept sufficient progress:  20, 21,  22, 23 or the entire 28?  Another assessment 
stated that twelve recipients had signaled very  little or no flexibility to improve or make any 
commitments.  Would six recipients have been a better number for demandeurs, or not one single 
recipient? 
198. The reports were also devoid of context, a nd did not capture the legitimate nuances of 
Members' positions.  The clinical and statistical comment that ten recipients had indicated no TN/S/M/28 
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  intention of scheduling their sub-sector did not do ju stice to the rich debate and discussions that had 
taken place in many of these plurilateral groups over th e course of the last two years, including on the 
technical questions referred to by Argentina.  To  accept these out-of-context statements would be to 
accept benchmarking, as these statements did not take account of the principle of progressive liberalization and the fundamental flexibilities under  the GATS.  On the other hand, it was also a 
matter of concern to have assessments at the other ex treme, such as the one that stated: 'the overall 
assessment by co-sponsors regarding the responses received to the request is positive taking into 
account that only 2 recipients have indicated extrem e difficulties'.  In addition, the demandeurs should 
not have taken the responses of recipients as commitments carved in stone. 
199. There was also the difficult challenge of ba lancing the need for transparency and the 
protection of confidentiality.  Confidentiality issues had necessarily constrained co-sponsors from 
attributing any of the positive and/or negative indicat ions to specific recipients.  But this constraint 
also created another constraint, which was the resu lting lack of transparency and accuracy as to the 
facts being narrated by these reports.  There was thus a dilemma.  Recipients, and perhaps co-
sponsors, would certainly not agree to any attributio n.  On the other hand, transparency and accuracy 
could not be guaranteed without these attributions.  De legations could not therefore take the reports as 
gospel truth.  
200. While Canada had emphasized that the reports were not an attempt to characterize who was 
ahead and who was behind in the DDA negotiati ons, there had been some assertions about the 
absence of ambition among recipients.  The Philippi nes, along with many other developing Members, 
also wanted an ambitious outcome in services, partic ularly in modes and sectors of interest to them.  
The assessment of co-sponsors that there was an absence of ambition among recipients could not 
therefore be shared.  At the end of the day, this sh ared ambition had to be tempered by realism, and by 
the flexibilities enjoyed under the GATS.  Certai nly ambition in the negotiations could not be 
imposed by some on the many.  Although the circula tion of the reports could not be prevented, these 
documents had to be viewed in their proper contex t.  These reports had to recognize that plurilateral 
requests in accordance with paragraph 7(b) of Anne x C were carefully reviewed and considered in 
accordance with paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article XI X of the GATS, and the guidelines and procedures 
for the negotiations, and in the light of all other flexibilities enjoyed by Members.  The Philippines was therefore disappointed that this was not even acknowledged or addressed in most if not all of the 
reports.  The delicate balance in Annex C that wa s so painfully negotiated in Hong Kong should have 
been applied in the spirit in which Members accepte d the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration.  It was 
to be hoped that these reports were not calculated as  a means of unraveling Annex C.  Like others, the 
Philippines would resist any such effort to re negotiate the balance achieved in Hong Kong. 
201. The delegation of Singapore
 said that, while modalities and thereafter schedules on 
agriculture and NAMA were necessa ry to facilitate progress in the negotiations, they were not 
sufficient for the conclusion of the overall negotiati ons.  Bearing in mind the sequence established in 
Hong Kong, finalizing modalities in agriculture  and NAMA would still require Members to 
demonstrate sufficient progress across the board, including securing a good outcome in services and 
other areas such as rules.  As part of its cont ribution, Singapore had made  comprehensive offers 
across many sectors including a majority of full commi tments in its initial and revised offers.  As 
always, Singapore would do its part and contribute to the services process in its next revised offer.   
202. Singapore had provided its views on a possible services text, including its reservations on the 
suggestion of binding the current level of openn ess.  Without repeating those points, Singapore 
wished to touch on the reports that had just been circulated.  Singapore was a co-sponsor of a request 
and a recipient of nine other requests.  Like bila teral negotiations, the plurilateral process was an 
informal, trust-building exercise among the participants .  In this context, the plurilateral negotiations 
provided a platform for Members to flag their expor t interests to trading partners, and to understand 
better the balance of concessions that they expected to  obtain in areas of interest to them.  From what  TN/S/M/28 
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  Singapore had heard in the plurilaterals, for ma ny participants including Singapore, the overall 
balance of concessions did not rest exclusively within  services.  It was with this understanding that it 
had participated in the various plur ilateral negotiations.  Li ke others it reflected its own considerations 
and approaches in the relevant sectors and modes.  In a number of instances, Singapore had indicated the improvements that it would be prepared to include  in its revised offer.  However, it had made it 
clear that this was conditional on its trading part ners matching already good commitments and offers 
in the same sectors, other sectors of interest to Si ngapore, and also balanced against outcomes in other 
areas of the negotiations such as NAMA and in ru les such as anti-dumping.  In order to contribute 
positively to the efforts to move the discussions fo rward, the reports would need to encompass the 
inputs and concerns of all the participants, whether by  co-sponsor or recipient.  They probably needed 
to be improved so as to capture fully the contex t in which Members' comments or indications of 
potential improvements were made.  On the basis of the present discussion, and comments and future 
consultations that the Chairman might hold, Singapo re would leave it to Chairman's judgment as to 
how best to reflect the review of progress in the services negotiations.   
203. In its statement on 15 November, Singapore had also highlighted some ideas that could be 
included in a future services text.  Whatever was do ne for the services text should be something that 
brought Members together, and did not pull them apart.  For the sake of time, Singapore would not repeat the points made the 15 November statement.  However, it was important to repeat that in 
preparing and tabling the next revised offers, Memb ers should be guided by the existing provisions in 
the GATS, Negotiating Guidelines, Annex C and othe r services documents.  This was not the time to 
concoct new concepts for the negotiations. 
204. The delegation of China
 wished to confine its comments to  the 18 reports circulated that 
morning.  While individual Members or a groups  of Members were free to conduct a review of 
progress of the plurilateral negotiations on their own behalf, it was well known in the WTO that Members were not expected to cross a certain line that had already been drawn by Members formally or informally.  With the exception of two repor ts, one on MFN exemptions and another on tourism 
services, the other reports seemed to alter the prac tice that had been followed in the plurilateral 
negotiations, by attaching the plurilateral requests to  the papers.  In this regard China shared the 
concern of many Members about the possible ne gative impact on the process of the negotiations. 
205. China pointed out that the reports reflected the general views, or a general sense, of the co-
sponsors on the progress of the plurilateral negotiati ons.  The picture described in the papers was 
therefore partial.  The reports could also be biased a nd, for China, this was the case for at least two of 
the reports.  China also understood that the reports we re not intended to provide inputs to the so-called 
'factual assessment' element being debated in the Chair's consultation on a possible services text.  China did not support any attempt to include these reports in the services text. 
206. The delegation of El Salvador
 spoke as well on behalf of Honduras , Guatemala , Nicaragua , 
and the Dominican Republic .  All endorsed Barbados' statement on behalf of the small and vulnerable 
economies, in connection with reports on the collectiv e requests circulated yesterday.  In the first 
place, the reports merely reflected the view of the co-sponsors, and in many cases contained a subjective assessment of the importance and the reas ons for liberalizing the sectors in question.  
Similarly, there was a pre-judgment of the results of  the negotiations, and of the information provided, 
information which the recipients of the requests we re still considering.  This obviously put at risk 
efforts to consult domestically, and could be interp reted as a restriction on the way in which Members 
approached such requests under Article XIX of the GATS.  As regards the purpose of submission of 
the reports, it was of concern that there appeared to be an attempt to include collective requests in the 
multilateral context.  It was not accep table that the reports serve as a basis for a collective assessment,  
since they exclusively reflected the views of the re questors.  In addition, it was neither desirable nor 
even viable to produce a collective assessment of a plurilateral process, because it is was a very 
complex phenomenon.  Australia's remark to the eff ect that there was no link whatsoever between the TN/S/M/28 
Page 38  
 
  reports and a possible text on services was therefore welcome.  No evaluation of any Member or a few 
Members could alter the level of ambition and flexibilities contained in the existing negotiating 
mandates.  Similarly, it was not proper to have th e process depend upon the expectations of a limited 
number of Members.  Finally, delegations participat ed in a very constructive way in the collective 
requests in a manner reflecting certain agreed pr inciples, such as their confidential nature.  
Participation was conditioned on the respect for these principles.  It would be unfortunate for the 
reports to have a negative effect on this plurilate ral process in which, thus far, delegations had 
participated in good faith. 
207. The delegation of Indonesia
 recognized the importance of, and had been actively engaged in, 
the plurilateral process in the services negotiations .  Since the beginning of 2006 Indonesia had 
received 17 plurilateral requests.  A fourth round of plurilateral meetings had already been completed, 
and Indonesia had fully engaged in all of the plurilateral meetings.  This showed Indonesia's good will 
in the process of the plurilateral negotiations.   
208. Indonesia said that the reports by the coordi nators of the different plurilateral groups 
amounted only to the proponents' views.  Furtherm ore, in its view information related to the 
plurilateral process (like information in the bilate ral process) should only be circulated among those 
who were involved in the process.  The reports circul ated were biased, and distorted the discussions in 
the plurilateral process.  Therefore, Indonesia encour age the Chairman not to make any reference to 
these reports in his draft services text.  In this rega rd, Indonesia wished to ask the coordinators of the 
plurilateral groups what was the intention and use of these documents.   If the intention was to reflect 
the demandeurs' level of ambition in the services text , then Indonesia could not agree.  On this,  
Indonesia shared the views of Brazil, So uth Africa, Thailand and the Philippines. 
209. The delegation of Barbados  said that the statements made that day showed that the reports 
were not consensus-based, and represented the pers pectives of only some co-sponsoring delegations.  
As well, one coordinating de legation had stated that the reports should not be part of any input for a 
Chair's text, as they were a separate initiative.   Any delegation or gr oup of delegations had a 
legitimate right to conduct their own assessment a nd share their views with Members as a logical 
component of the negotiations.  However, like ot her Members, Barbados could not accept any report 
of the nature presented this morning as a basis for inclusion in any possible services outcome.  In any 
case, this would not be a constructive approach for a number of reasons.  A fissure would be created between the plurilateral negotiations, where only a lim ited number of Members were participants, and 
the overall multilateral process.  There were also co ncerns raised earlier by other Members regarding 
the process leading to and content of the repor ts.  Barbados recognized the significance that 
participating plurilateral Members ascribed to the process, but continued to attach primary importance 
to the bilateral request/offer approach.  While an important number of sectors had been covered in the 
reports, it was important that they not distract a ttention from other specific sectors which Barbados 
and no doubt others had identified in their own re quests.  Barbados looked forward to having its 
interest in other sectors appropriately addressed by its trading partners. 
210. The delegation of Mexico
 said that it would take a different viewpoint from many others that 
had spoken.  The discussion so far had been very co mprehensive.  The points of views of both sides 
had been heard, and a set of documents had been  submitted by coordinators of requestors in the 
plurilateral groups.  Members were tr ying to negotiate.  Argentina had pointed out that the reports had 
been submitted after the deadline for the submission for formal discussion, but no one was claiming 
that a formal discussion of the reports was taking place.   The majority of delegates had not even read 
them yet, which was natural given that they were ci rculated such a short time ago.  The reports were 
however documents which reflected the points of view of a large number of Members on what was 
happening in the negotiations and wh at offers they were seeking but had not yet found.  These views 
had of course to be assessed by each delegation.  Mexico, however, had worked very hard on the  TN/S/M/28 
 Page 39 
 
 
  audiovisual services report and had tried to be as f actual as possible.  In fact, Mexico had submitted 
very specific figures, while at the same being very careful not to breach confidentiality.   
211. For Mexico, it was now important to go beyo nd procedural consider ations and have a 
discussion on substance.  The reports clearly belonged  to the category of review of progress in the 
negotiations.  The important thing was to discuss whet her the reports reflected reality, and if they did 
not what were the reasons.  It was vital to cons ider what was going to happen with the plurilateral 
requests, and sooner or later this had to be considered by the Council.  These were discussions had to 
be held at some point. 
212. The delegation of Australia , said he had heard some extraordinary things that day – many of 
which were absolute nonsense.  First of all, it w as obvious that the reports reflected the general views 
of the co-sponsors.  Some had said they were thus not consensus documents.  However, at least in the 
case of requests co-sponsored by Australia, the repor ts had been heavily negotiated.  Australia 
supported them whole-heartedly, but they were gene ral views.  Individual Members all had their own 
individual assessments of the state of play, many of which were significantly more negative than what 
had been put on the table in these reports.  So it was over-stating things to assert that these were not 
consensus documents.  Co-sponsors had chosen to  have a communication from the coordinator, 
because that was the normal way in which progress had been reported in the plurilateral discussions.  
Australia rejected any suggestion that these repor ts were not supported by co-sponsors.   
213. Some delegations had also claimed that attach ing the collective requests to the reports was a 
breach of confidentiality, or that this was an attemp t to multilateralize the texts or to have a derivative 
of benchmarks.  The requests encapsulated what  to the demandeurs were commercially viable 
commitments in the relevant sectors.  All Members were entitled to that knowledge – it was not just 
the recipient Members who were allowed to know what sectoral demandeurs considered to be 
commercially viable commitments.  It was well know n that Members had had informal access to the 
information informally, and that it was on any number of websites.  Further, there had been no breaching of confidentiality at all, because none of the recipients had been identified by the co-
sponsors.  Thailand chose to identify itself as being a recipient out of 22 others, but none of the co-
sponsors said that.  Australia vigorously asserted th at the entire membership was entitled to an 
understanding of what had developed as a consensus picture of what a credible, commercially-viable 
commitment was in a particular sector.  Many r ecipient delegations had said that they had greatly 
benefited from the clarification and simplificati on of the process of understanding what demandeurs 
wanted.  Australia rejected the vi ew that only the delegations involve d in the plurilateral request offer 
process were entitled to that tool for their domestic consultation.  
214. On the issue of confidentiality, the delegate of  Australia struggled to imagine any other room 
in the house where delegations would be having a discussion about breaching confidentiality on the 
basis of these documents.  Imagine that Australia ha d stated in 'Room E' agriculture negotiations that 
the sensitive products market access modalities were  still insufficient to deliver a commercially 
relevant sheep meat outcome;  that discussions had b een held bilaterally with its major markets to see 
how much further they could go;  that these othe r Members had said they had given Australia an 
indication of how much further they could go;  an d that Australia had deem ed that insufficient and 
was disappointed with those indications.  Nobody in  Room E would have said that this was breaking 
any sort of confidence.  Cosponsors had simply said in the reports what they had heard.  They hadn't identified who they had heard what from.  They ha dn't even identified what had been heard.  Co-
sponsors had indicated where Members had indicated  that they might have room for movement.  
Some of those indications were from Members w ho said, for example, that they had a domestic 
consultation process underway in a particular sector  or mode.  These indications had nonetheless been 
included, with no expectation that it was going to r esult in progress.  But in such cases, the Member 
had indicated flexibility – even if it did not result in anything.  There were no breaches of confidence, 
and frankly other rooms in the house would be laughing at this concern.  If more ambassadors were in TN/S/M/28 
Page 40  
 
  the room, they would most certainly be laughing  at suggestions that Members were breaching 
confidence. 
215. The delegate of Australia said that his ambassa dor had stated that morning what in Australia 
would be called the 'bleeding obvious'.  That is, Aust ralia did not expect to see the reports attached to 
a services text.  In the discussion on a services text, there was a suggestion that there might be some 
narrative or factual assessments.  It was always cl ear that they would be consensus-based documents 
if they evolved, that this was a multilateral text, a nd that they would have to negotiated.  Co-sponsors 
had now chosen to put their assessment on the tabl e.  By definition, co-sponsors understood that the 
rest of the room was not going to agree to their uni lateral assessment being attached to a services text.   
216. The question now was to determine what might be the benefit of the reports.  It was futile to 
pretend that the reports were comp letely independent of the Chair's text.  They contributed to the 
context, to the stage in which delegations discussed a Chair's text.  The future of a single undertaking, 
as was made very clear in the TNC meeting, required comfort and clarity across all areas.  The reports showed that the collective requests and discussions here  and in the plurilaterals – partially reflected in 
these reports – showed that the collective requests and the technical discussions that had been held 
provided clarity and comfort to recipients.  For example, the co-sponsors had made assurances that in 
legal services they did not seek a right for appearan ce in local courts.  By contrast, co-sponsors had 
had little more than assurances that recipients unde rstood their requests.  The co-sponsors were now 
confident that recipients understood their demands.  The process has been eff ective in clarifying the 
scope of the requests, and in addressing technical questions.  There were maybe some questions still 
out there to be answered and that  was a legitimate criticism.   
217. The scope of each request was now well underst ood.  Where Australia had no comfort was on 
the clarity of the package that  would eventuate after agriculture and NAMA modalities had been 
finalized.  Co-sponsors had reported factually on what had been heard in the plurilateral meetings.  If 
they had understood, then they looked forward to further clarification from recipients – privately, 
outside the room.  If they were yet to hear the fu ll extent of Members' flexibility – and that would be 
perfectly understandable in this situation – then that was a discussion should now be taking place.  
There was a need to find a way to build comfort th at there was more to come – that there was a 
significant services contribution to the Doha Round in the offing.  In legal services, for example, out 
of 16 recipients there were indications of flexibility from only two.  Australia was a long way from being confident that there was going to be a satisfactory outcome to the Round. 
218. Services was particularly important for Austra lia's new government.  In Australia's top ten 
exports, the highest agricultural product was beef a nd it is was at number ten  – half the value of 
Australia's education exports which were at number  four, and its transport exports which were at 
number three.  Services was a serious business for Au stralia.  The more the delegation of Australia 
heard that day, the more it was glad that Aust ralia had gone down the pl urilateral track.  The 
plurilateral request offer negotiations had shone so me sun onto the market access negotiations, and it 
had cleansed the room of some serious misperceptions  as to the state of play on services.  There was a 
long way to go.  There was lots of potential for a services package to come together.  It was to be 
hoped that people had got a lot of added value in their hip pockets, ready to bring to the table at the appropriate time.  Australia underst ood that there would be an appropriate time.  But what was needed 
was to start talking about building the level of comfor t and clarity that demandeurs needed to go into 
horizontal discussions on modalities. 
219. The delegate of the United States
 said she was concerned about the view that somehow co-
sponsors were acting in bad faith by presenting their frustrations in the reports.  Some delegations had 
even taken the floor to insinuate that co-sponsor s had some kind of master plan to derail the 
negotiating process.  Yet the principle inspiration fo r tabling documents rather than making an oral 
statement was document JOB(07)/175 – in particular paragraph 8, which set out an account that was  TN/S/M/28 
 Page 41 
 
 
  diametrically opposed to the way the requestors perceive d reactions to the plurilaterals requests.  This 
had prompted some requestors to circulate a docum ent putting forward their views of their collective 
request, for which they had been admonished. 
220. The United States asked trading partners to understand its frustrations, just as it tried to 
understand those of other delegations .  Recipients had in some cases  not wanted to deal with the 
plurilateral request.  But delegations were here to negotiate, and someti mes they had to hear bad news.  
Some Members had circulated a document expressing their frustration to the reactions to their 
plurilateral request under Mode 4.  In the view of th e United States, they had not acted in bad faith or 
breached any confidence. 
221. The United States had taken great pains not to attribute anything to a particular Member.  The 
US delegation was unaware of some of the understand ings that had been mentioned.  Some Members 
who were not participating in th e plurilateral requests had been as king the United States what was 
happening in this process, and that they would like to see the collective request.  The collective 
requests were on various websites, and very easy to find.  It seemed logical, when circulating a document referring to responses to a plurilateral re quest nobody else had seen, to provide a copy of 
that plurilateral request.  In fact, many Members had heard the same elements raised in bilateral 
negotiations.  The document had been circulated as a JOB document, and not as a regular document 
that would be derestricted.  The United States regretted that this offended certain Members, but pointed out that it was exercising its right to ensure transparency so that all Member could understand 
what was being discussed.    
222. The United States said that if there were concer ns about hidden agendas, it would try, at the 
risk of further criticism, to be a lot more transp arent.  The United States was concerned about whether 
the services aspect of the three market access areas was actually headed towards failure.  The United 
States could not simply wait for the offers in order to judge ambition.  A text was needed to advance 
matters.  There needed to be some political co mmitment toward closing the gap between current 
practice and binding commitments, wherever Members fe lt they could do so and meet elements of the 
requests.  Guidance was also needed on taking positive  steps to remove impedi ments in order to create 
effective market access. 
223. The delegation of India
 said that he would present the document contained in JOB(07)/175 
under the next item of the agenda.  On the issue of confidentiality, India wished to clarify that when 
participating in the plurilateral discussions, no de mandeur, not even India, had put this type of 
document on its to-do list.  This was not the und erstanding.  Members had participated in the 
plurilateral requests with the understanding that ther e prevailed the same element of confidentiality 
that existed in a bilateral request/offer process.  I ndia had never heard of a bilateral request/offer being 
circulated multilaterally in a JOB document.  Plurila teral request/offers were simply an extension of 
bilateral request/offers.  They were mandated, but intended only for the requesting and requested 
Members.  Although some requests found their wa y onto public websites, the discussion here was 
about the WTO, and certain unwritte n conventions.  Even with respect to the 'Room E' discussions 
that Australia referred to, it was doubtful as to whet her these were being reflected in JOB documents.  
India did not question the right of a group of Me mbers to get together to express their views.  
However, when participating in the plurilaterals, many Members felt comfortable, and probably went 
beyond what had been agreed by capitals.  India understood and appreciated some of the co-sponsors 
who had taken care to be more objective than others.   
224. India said further that it could not agree to the assessments contained in the reports.  India 
could of course produce another assessment, in the form of a counter paper.  But India understood that 
the assessments in these reports were not going to be part of the services text.  The Chair would in that 
case be looking for information somewhere to put in the services text, which could come through 
these discussions or other documents. TN/S/M/28 
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  225. With reference to the Mode 4 paper containe d in JOB(07)/175, Members had focused on just 
one paragraph.  There was a lot more  to the paper, which India had trie d to make very constructive.  It 
was disappointing that one paragraph had unleashed 20 documents.  India was simply working on 
getting a justification for the supply of services under Mode 4.  The comment in the paper about some coordinators and co-sponsors not being able to meet their own requests raised an issue of credibility.  
Members having relatively closed markets were ba nging the table to say 'I demand this' of other 
Members that had fairly liberal markets.  Alt hough India could have co-sponsored a number of 
requests, it had chosen not to do so if it thought it couldn't meet the request.  For example, India chose 
not to co-sponsor the request in construction a nd related services because it didn't have construction-
related enterprises that had reached a critical mass a llowing them to participate in the global market.  
226. The delegation of Kenya
 said it had given its view under this agenda item at the last meeting.  
For this reason, it wished to restrict its interv ention to observations on the JOB documents that had 
been circulated.  Kenya shared the views of t hose Members who had expressed concerns about these 
documents.  While it recognized the right of Members to undertake individual assessments on any issue under discussion, including the plurilateral nego tiations, Kenya was concerned when individual 
assessments disrupted, as they did here, progress in the services negotiations.  When the meeting was 
adjourned in November, Members believed that disc ussion of this agenda item had been concluded.  
Kenya was concerned that some Members were now coming back to this agenda item.  Since the start of the services negotiations, some Members appeared to  believe that their views had to prevail in the 
negotiations, irrespective of what other Members' vi ews were.  This attitude was not helpful for the 
services negotiations.  Kenya had not yet been convi nced by the usefulness of circulating these 
assessments in the Special Session, and was very uncomfortable when assessments of plurilateral 
discussions became the focus of the Special Sessi on.  Kenya would have gr eat difficulty in accepting 
individual assessments, which were subjective in nature, as part of any services text. 
227. The delegation of the Philippines
 wished to react to some previous interventions.  With 
respect to the intervention of Mexico, the principal problem was not, in the view of the Philippines, an 
issue of substance.  The main issue, as pointed out  by many Members, was rather one of method and 
procedure adopted by co-sponsors.  However, beyond form and proce dure there was also a problem in 
the suggestion to discuss substance in the Special Se ssion.  The more appropriate forum would be the 
plurilateral groupings that were directly relevant to what was being reviewed by these documents.   
228. With respect to the intervention by Australia, the Philippines was confused by the attempt to 
clarify what was meant by the 'gen eral views of co-sponsors', and the statement that the reports were 
not consensus documents.  If a co-sponsor supported the particular assessment being made by the 
coordinator, then that particular co-sponsor should have lent its name to that particular document.  If 
the co-sponsor did not agree to what was contained in the assessment then th at co-sponsor owed it at 
least to the participants, if not to the entire me mbership, to make that particular position clear.  
Australia had said that some co-sponsors had initially taken a more negative view.  In that case, the 
rational course of action would be to subscribe to the assessment and then pe rhaps make an additional 
individual assessment indicating why it has a more ne gative view of the state of progress.  If that 
Member had a less negative view, then that co-spons or likewise owed it to recipients, if not to the 
entire membership, to reflect that particular view point or disagreement with the assessment made by 
the coordinator.   
229. With respect to the issue of confidentiality, it would be important at this point, on the 
assumption that the plurilateral process would resume at some future time, to lay down exactly what 
Members' expectations were in this respect.  In  the earliest plurilateral meetings, co-sponsors or 
coordinators drafted summaries that they emphasized  were informal and not for the record.  These 
summaries were not circulated to recipients, who did not request them.  This indicated that what was 
being said was not going to be disclosed to a broader group.  Also, on at least one occasion during a 
plurilateral negotiation, a non-requesting or non-requ ested Member was asked to leave the room.   TN/S/M/28 
 Page 43 
 
 
  There could be no clearer sign to indicate that this was an exclusive event among requested and 
requesting Members. 
230. The Philippines also found it difficult to understand the claim that the reports were circulated 
to respond to queries from non-participating Members.   Coordinators and other Members had always 
been transparent about the plurilateral negotiations during the Special Session of the Council.  It was 
disappointing that the co-sponsors had decided to  adopt such a divisive method to respond to 
particular questions of transparency.  A more acceptable procedure would have been to inform 
particular Members informally, or open up the negot iations in the plurilateral setting to all those who 
were interested in joining. 
231. Australia had drawn a parallel between what it was doing in services with what could be done 
in other negotiating forms.  However, there were no plurilateral negotiations per se  in the other 
forums that were of the same nature as the ones being undertaken in services.  In the analogy put 
forward by Australia, a delegate made its disclosur e in an oral interventio n.  However, under that 
analogy, the Philippines doubted whether negotia ting partners would be happy with Australia 
circulating a JOB document on behalf of the Cairns Group assessing or disclosing without any 
attribution some of the statements or negotiations being conducted in informal meetings with trading 
partners.  With respect to the 'sunlight' referred  to by Australia, the Philippines thought that this 
resulted especially from the engagement and flexibilit y of many developing Members in agreeing for 
the Chairman to conduct consultations on a service s text, notwithstanding their concerns and long-
standing position that there was no need for one.  Instead of cleansing the environment, the JOB 
documents were rain clouds, or maybe even storm cl ouds, depending on what the real intention of co-
sponsors was. 
232. The delegation of Argentina  said that, although it was calmer after the intervention of the 
ambassador of Australia, the recent intervention by  Australia revived a sense of nervousness.  The 
ambassador of Australia had said these documents we re not input for the Chair's text, and that they 
were 'not part of this process'.  That seemed  quite different from saying 'look at these documents 
attached to the Chairman's text, but don't pretend they are completely independent'.  There was an 
important difference between the tw o statements, and it would be impor tant to know which of the two 
was closest to the real intention of the co-sponsors of these documents.   
233. Furthermore, it would be interesting to know  what Mexico envisaged when it spoke of 
discussing substance.  A discussion of substance me ant that all 150 Members could be expected to 
express opinions on a meeting where only 30 or 40 Members were present.  If there was a need to 
reach a common evaluation between 150 Members on what happened during these meetings, what 
would be the deadline for the end of the discussion?  How would one go about organizing the discussion?  In the audiovisual group, for example, would developed countries who had so far refused to take commitments in this sector take a leading role?  How would that be reflected in an assessment?  In audiovisual, some delegations did not attend meetings because of lack of resources.  
Others did not go because for them it was a very sen sitive sector in which they were not willing make 
commitments.  How could these different motiva tions be reflected in the conclusions?   
234. Unfortunately, too many of these issues had not  been taken fully into account by those 
advocating this road to further the negotiations.  Argentina could understand the concern of some 
Members who were extremely interested in services in having an indication of the level of ambition.  
Unfortunately, the structure of negotiations did not ma ke this possible.  The only thing that Argentina 
had on the table at this meeting had nothing to do with what was stated in the reports.  All Argentina 
had on the table was its initial offer, and the structur e of negotiations did not make it possible to have 
it any other way.  It wasn't possible at Hong Kong , when there was yet another such attempt which 
also failed.  It seemed obvious to many delegations  that it was very difficult to go beyond what had 
been agreed in Annex C.  What was taking place constituted a very regrettable waste of time.  TN/S/M/28 
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  Members were talking about an ev aluation of what happened in plur ilateral meetings, instead of going 
into the substance of requests and offers.  If the in tention was to advance in the negotiations, then the 
text should be thrown into the waste paper b asket in order to concentrate on the essential. 
235. The delegate of Peru
 said that the present meeting was one  of the most hallucinating that he 
had ever participated in.  Argentina and others, su ch as Peru, had cried wolf so many times on this 
issue that people no longer listened.  If the reports  served some purpose, it was for them to have an 
idea of what happened during the plurilaterals.  Peru did not have enough time to go to all the 
plurilateral meetings.  It was difficult to know what should be done with the reports.  They would be 
sent to capital, though it was unlikely that anyone there would read them.  Peru had participated because it was a good way of at least finding out where it stood.   
236. Unfortunately this would not change the real s ituation of the negotiations.  As Argentina had 
said, the problem was much deeper.  It was a probl em of politics – there was no real commitment, and 
no real negotiation.  This was why the situation was so hallucinating.  Th e reports were neither 
compulsory nor important.  They were summaries of  what had happened.  Rarely had so much time 
been wasted on something that was not really harm ful, but that didn't bring much to the negotiation 
either.  This was regrettable, since Peru was comm itted to the negotiations, and wanted an ambitious 
result in the Round, above all in services.  To us e a literary metaphor, the negotiations that had begun 
as novel of realism, and had then progressed to an adve nture story, and were now a fairytale.  It was to 
be hoped that Members would not end up with a horror story.  
237. On the issue of confidentiality, the delegation of Brazil
 reassured Australia that everyone 
understood what this concept meant.  If you ha d several Members, and each said it would make a 
certain concession if something else happened, then  no special confidentiality agreement was needed 
to confirm that this information should remain conf idential.  How then could you report this to other 
Members?  If you reported that Memb er X said they might do this if they got that, then you would be 
breaching confidentiality.  If you said that the Member  X was going to make the concession, then you 
would not be factual.  If you said that the country  was not going to make the concession, then likewise 
you would not be factual.  That is why Brazil always said that this kind of assessment was almost 
impossible to make from a factual point of view.  It was not only a matter of subjectivity – there was simply a problem to report appropriately.   
238. Leaving aside the issue of conf identiality, there was also the qu estion – raised by Argentina – 
of the purpose of the reports.  Was it to inform the rest of the membership?  Was it because the 
membership was asking what was happening?  If that was the case, then it was basically a report, and 
needed to be placed where today's newspapers woul d eventually be put.  In fact, Members had heard 
the reports, and that was it.  The problem was that the only proponent or co-sponsor who said that the 
reports were really not meant as something else was the ambassador of Australia, who was then 
corrected.  If the reports were to be taken as cont ext for the Chair's paper, then they had obviously 
become something much more.  The real issue was whether it was useful to go on discussing the 
reports, and perhaps present counter-v iews.  However, the only way to be  factual was to transcribe the 
minutes of the plurilateral meetings.  In the ab sence of that, one could spend years discussing the 
reports.  It was important to have clarity on how to move forward.  It was clear that the reports could 
not properly serve as a basis for the Chairman's te xt.  They should not be appended to a Chairman's 
text, nor should they serve as a context for anything. 
239. The delegation of India
 said, for the record, that India was a co-sponsor of the requests on 
computer-related services, and on architecture and e ngineering services, and had written to each of the 
co-sponsors stating that India was not convinced of  the need for a detailed narrative in these areas.  TN/S/M/28 
 Page 45 
 
 
  240. The delegation of Bolivia  said that, in the absence of its ambassador, it reserved the right to 
come back to this subject at a later date, either in  this or another WTO forum.  For Bolivia, discussion 
of this item had not been concluded. 
241. The delegation of Australia  said that its last intervention was not a correction of the statement 
by its ambassador.  The Australian ambassador had sa id '[w]e don't see them as input to the Chair's 
text, they are not part of this process', and that stat ement stood.  The reports described the state of play 
with respect to the current agenda item in the Speci al Session of the Council.  They were not inputs 
into the services text.  They were, however, the r eason why a text with substantive political guidance 
was needed.  In sum, the reports indicated that at present the progress in the negotiations had been 
insufficient to provide balance to the Round.  The reports provided this indication in and of 
themselves, and at the moment when they were dr afted.  If Members wished to put them in the 
recycling bin at the end of the day, Australia had no problem.  Australia had no desire to come back to 
an ongoing discussion on the intricacies of each re port.  The reports had served their purpose if 
Members read, digested and conveyed them back to  capital, because the message that had to be sent 
capitals is that what was on the table at the moment was insufficient.  This in sufficiency – the lack of 
comfort and clarity that the demandeurs feel – is the why services text was needed.  The reports were 
not inputs to the services text, but provided the cont ext within which the services text was going to be 
discussed. 
242. The Chairman  said the length of the meeting underlined the importance of services in the 
single undertaking.  Were it not for that, the discussi on that day would not have  taken place, and could 
have been concluded very easily.  The negotiations  on services, as had been repeatedly said, did not 
take place in a vacuum.  They were linked to even ts occurring in other areas, especially agriculture 
and NAMA. 
243. Discussions had focused on a possible Chairman's text, and views ranged from various 
elements that might be included in that text, to no n acceptance of the possibility of having such a text 
at all.  On the whole, it was felt that it was not necessary to have a text on the services in the near 
future.  Members had been considering this unde r the item 'review of progress in negotiations' and 
various reports had been circulated.  The reports were submitted by coordinators on behalf of the co-
sponsors of the request/offer groups.  The opinions on  these reports were quite varied – ranging from 
the use of these reports as a possible contribution Chairman's text, to the clear and simple rejection of the documents.  
244. There was thus a discordance between the s ubstance and the procedure by which the 
sectoral/modal evaluations of the plurilateral request/o ffer talks had taken place.  This also meant that 
there was still much work for every one to do.  Although a great part of that activity would have to be 
done bilaterally or plurilaterally, there was also a lot to be done at the multilateral level.  The 
Chairman said he would proceed with consultations , which would include all the concerns expressed 
at the present meeting.  Before the end of the year he would hold a meeting of the 'enchilada' group, at 
the level of ambassadors, in order to consider th e way forward.  He would also hold an informal 
meeting to discuss the implementation of LDC Modalities and S&D issues on 17 December.  In January, he would hold a further informal meeting to  consult Members on all the concerns that have 
been expressed under the different agenda items.  
245. A representative of the Secretariat
 took the floor to clarify a point that had been raised by the 
delegation of India on the preparation for a Mode 4 symposium requested at a previous meeting.  
When the suggestion had first been made, there ha d been no conclusion on how to proceed.  The 
Secretariat wished to begin preparing a draft programme, for circulation to Members for their 
approval.  The Secretariat proposed organizing th e symposium along the lines of what had been done 
previously.  A symposium had been organized in April 2002, in which the WTO had financed the participation of speakers.  The procedure that had been followed at the time was to prepare a draft TN/S/M/28 
Page 46  
 
  programme and circulate it to Members for comments.  Once Members were happy with the 
programme, dates were agreed which would gi ve the Secretariat enough time to organize the 
symposium and mobilize the speakers.  The Secretar iat had organized subsequent seminars with other 
organizations, namely the World Bank and the Inte rnational Organization for Migration, in 2003 and 
2004.  What Members were now asking for seemed to be something similar to the 2002 symposium.  
If Members wished entrust the Secretariat with the task of preparing a programme, it would be very 
happy to do so.  The point was that the S ecretariat had not yet been asked to do that. 
246. The delegation of India
 confirmed that the Secretariat should go ahead and begin the 
organization of the symposium, along the lines of the 2002 model.  The idea was to make it back-to-back with the first cluster in the New Year.  Indi a wished to have speakers from industry, academia 
and even the World Bank to come and share the latest developments – where problems were, what the 
advantages were, and so on.  India would be happy to sit down with the Secretariat and work on the 
topics of the symposium, and the other Members were of course most welcome to comment. 
247.  The delegation of the United States
 thought that his topic would be taken up under 'other 
business', along with a proposal by the United States for a symposium on telecommunication, 
coinciding with the tenth anniversary of that agreem ent.  The United States had understood that India 
was going to address the symposium on Mode 4 under  'other business'.  The United States could not 
support the taking of a decision on the other symposium proposal had been discussed.  In sum, the United States did not, in the middle of negotiations, support the holding of a symposium restricted to a 
single mode of supply.  This had happened in 2002 , but the Doha Ministerial Conference had just 
occurred, and exchanges had happened since then.  The United States wished to understand better 
what was to be planned, and whether there was going to be an imbalance as a result of going along 
with funding for a symposium with respect to only one mode of supply. 
248. The Chairman
 suggested that the Council take note of the statements made and revert to this 
item at its next meeting.   
249. It was so agreed . 
B. PROPOSALS RELATING TO THE NEGOTIATIONS UNDER ARTICLE XIX OF THE GATS  
250. The Chairman said that it had been some time since the Special Session had held substantive 
discussion under this agenda item.  He noted that there were two documents for discussion under this 
item.  The first was a communication from China, I ndia, Pakistan, Peru and Thailand entitled 'Liberal 
Mode 4 Commitments:  A Win-Win for all Members', circulated as JOB(07)/175. 
251. The delegation of India  said that the paper was divided into five sections.  It discussed the 
Mode 4 state of play, where Mode 4 issues were in the plurilaterals, and the theoretical and empirical 
evidence in favour of liberalizing this mode of supply. 
252.  Mode 4 continued to be important, all the mo re so since the negotiations were approaching 
the end game and Members needed a sense of certainty and comfort about where they stood in the 
negotiations with respect to Mode 4.  The reas on was obvious, because Mode 4 offers on the table 
were not satisfactory.  There was an asymmetry both in the offers and in the actual commercial 
services trade that took place through Mode 4.  This  restricted India's ability to respond in full 
measure to the various requests put to it bilatera lly and plurilaterally.  Political reservations were 
understandable, as they existed in all societies and systems.  These challenges could be met more 
easily through work of this kind and in symposiums. 
253. Mode 4 continued to be a step child of th e services negotiations.  Within the plurilateral 
negotiations, there was relatively little progress – in sp ite of overwhelming evidence of the benefits of  TN/S/M/28 
 Page 47 
 
 
  trade in this mode.  The evidence in favour of liberalizing stemmed from trade models as well as 
demographic models.  Demographic models showed that it was inev itable that Mode 4 trade would 
take place, and would be likely to increase.  Deve loping countries had a comparative advantage in 
supplying some of the services through Mode 4 – esp ecially in semi-skilled areas and in areas such as 
commercial technology and information technology.  Trade models showed that this type of 
movement of people was not permanent, and that it en hanced global welfare gains.  Any restriction on 
this movement led to countries becoming worse off.  The underlying message was that overall welfare 
gains were possible when all factors of production we re used more efficiently in both developing and 
developed countries.  If there were barriers to the movement (including on investment) there would be 
losses.   
254. India added that in document TN/S/W/19, broad parameters for analyzin g Mode 4 offers had 
been indicated.  This work had been taken forward by certain Members indicating specific interests in 
Mode 4 commitments in documents TN/S//W/31 and JOB(04)/142, and the parameters for assessment 
of Mode 4 in revised offers in JOB(05)/131.   
255. India stressed that it was not referring here to mi gration or participation in labour markets.  
What was involved here was getti ng a contract, implementing it and coming back and trying to work 
out ways in which this could be facilitated both in the source and destination countries. 
256. The asymmetry in both commitments and trade in Mode 4 was well known.  The imbalance 
had not been corrected in the initial offers, in the revised offers, or in actual trade taking place.  
Disappointingly, the bulk of trade in services was sti ll in Modes 1 and 3.  Liberal offers in Mode 4 
would lubricate the whole service negotiation, allo wing Members to escape the low level equilibrium 
trap they were stuck in.  It would strengthen India's hands to come back with mo re liberal offers in the 
coming years, not just in this Round but also in  the next.  India was progressively liberalizing 
autonomously, and this certainly give it a boost.  India continued to engage in the negotiations, but 
there was a continued lack of satisfactory responses in  Mode 4.  This would tie India's hands, and put 
a question mark on an ambitious Round. 
257. The delegation of China , as a co-sponsor of document JOB(07)/175, said that Mode 4 was 
important to ensure a balanced and ambitious outc ome of the services negotiations.  First, Mode 4 
liberalization reflected the real interest of developing Members.  This was due to the factor endowment of developing country Members, who had a comparative advantage in providing some 
kinds of labour-intensive services to developed countries, involving such persons such as nurses, 
teachers, IT professionals, book-keepers, etc.  Removing restrictions on Mode 4 would play a 
significant role in trade expansion and welfare creation for developing economies.  The current 
situation of Mode 4 in services trade was quite di sappointing.  Only 1–2 percent of global services 
trade now took place under Mode 4.  This low sh are was not due to less demand for  services supplied 
through Mode 4.  The most important reason was th e lack of meaningful commitments and effective 
market access in this specific mode.  Certainly, commercial and meaningful liberalization of Mode 4 
from key developed Members where the demand for services in Mode 4 was increasing was crucial 
for this development Round.  As Ministers agreed  in Doha, the needs and interests of developing 
country Members had to be placed at the heart of th e Doha work programme.  If there were not more 
commercially meaningful Mode 4 commitments in revised offers from key developed Members, the 
Round could hardly be called a 'development' Round. 
258. The delegation of Thailand
 thanked India for presenting doc ument JOB(07)/175 on behalf of 
co-sponsors, including Thailand.  It was evident fro m the table attached to that document, and from 
past plurilateral and bilateral exchanges, that Thaila nd was a consistent propone nt of enhanced market 
access in Mode 4.  Indications received from tradi ng partners through differe nt negotiating channels 
regarding Mode 4 had not been encouraging, and had led to the preparation of this document.  
Thailand took the opportunity under the present age nda item to describe the state of play of the TN/S/M/28 
Page 48  
 
  Mode 4 negotiations, and to remind Members of th e guidelines and parameters they could use when 
preparing their next offers, in order to increase the mobility of services suppliers who are natural 
persons.   
259. Thailand wished also to respond briefly to co mments made by a Member on paragraph 68 of 
the document.  The approach taken by Thailand wa s to assess the overall plurilateral negotiations, 
with Mode 4 as a component.  Thailand did not wi sh to go into details, nor reveal any specific 
information given at past plurilateral meetings.  Th e submission had to be looked at as an attempt to 
define the right balance commitments in Mode 4 ex pected from trading partners, and the reciprocal 
concessions in other key sectors that Thailand and ot hers were prepared to undertake.  The main 
objective of the submission was to continue the multilateral discussions on Mode 4, building on past 
submissions by a group of Members listed on the last  page of the document.  Thailand believed that 
Members could and should use the Special Session more fully to express aspirations, and to assess 
progress in the negotiations.  Instead of trying to co me up with a 'factual assessment', Members should 
multilaterally share their views under the present age nda item.  The discussions would be recorded in 
the minutes, and each Member could then make reference to them for its own domestic purposes. 
260. The delegation of Pakistan
 thanked India for presenting the submission in JOB(07)/175.  As 
one of the co-sponsors, Pakistan urged the membership  to take a good look at the submission, to make 
better commitments in their forthcoming revised offers. 
261. The delegation of the United States  found it odd that the submission in JOB(07)/175 was 
introduced under Item B of the agenda, since its c ontent was very similar to a review of progress.  
There seemed to be a desire to disassociate the submission as much as possible from the other JOB 
documents that reflected co-sponsors' views of thei r own collective requests, which were described at 
length in paragraph 8 of the submission.  However, since delegations were free to present their papers 
as they wished, and to put whatever they wanted in those papers, the United States could not criticize 
the choice of these delegations.  However, US co mments on the paper from the previous agenda item 
still stood, and US comments should be understood to  apply to the discussion under both items A and 
B of the agenda. 
262. The submission in JOB(07)175 was useful.  It reflected the status of the negotiations on 
Mode 4, which interested co-sponsors of the pape r as well as other Members.  However some aspects 
of the paper, particularly paragr aph 8, were problematic.  The United States did not agree that a 
positive response had been received from the vast majo rity of recipients – on most elements of most 
requests they had not.  One could point, for example, to the various sectors highlighted in paragraph 8.  
The United States was disappointed also that th e paper had cast the negotiations in terms of 
developing countries versus devel oped.  This was not constructive, since some of the collective 
requests identified in paragraph 8 were co-sponsored by developed a nd developing countries.  It was 
odd that a request on Mode 4 was directed solely  to developed countries, especially given the 
enormous trade among developing countries under th is mode, and also that the co-sponsors did not 
deem themselves recipients.  This approach appeared to be divisive. 
263. The United States also noted that, while the pape r indicated that it did not intend to address 
labour and migration issues, some of the analyses th at had been put forward appeared to deal with 
labour as a factor of production.  This gave th e impression that Mode 4 was equivalent to labour 
mobility, when in fact Mode 4 was a relatively small sub-set limited to temporary movement by 
service suppliers, not labourers.  The United States did not dispute that labour mobility was an 
important factor of production, as was capital mob ility.  However, the GATS was not a labour market 
agreement, and one had to be careful to avoid c onfusing the economic effects of unrestricted labour 
flows with Mode 4 liberalization.  The United States  appreciated the interest of co-sponsors in putting 
these views forward, and would continue to study  them in relation to the negotiations, and the 
substance of the requests put forward in this mode of  supply.  The co-sponsors of  the paper were to be  TN/S/M/28 
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  thanked for giving the example in coming forward with  a state of play and a review of progress for the 
various other sectors that were referred to in the submission. 
264. The delegation of Australia  thanked the co-sponsors for their submission.  Although Australia 
had some differences of opinion with some views expressed in the paper, co-sponsors were to be 
thanked for continuing to push the importance of Mode 4 liberalization.  Australia was a long-
standing demandeur in Mode 4, and looked forward to a continui ng evolution and improvement in 
commitments by both developed and developing Members in this important mode of supply. 
265. The delegation of Canada  said that Mode 4 remained a priori ty for Canada in the negotiations,  
and it would continue to encourage all Members to  improve their commitments in this area.  The 
submission served a useful purpose in conveying th e views of Members on certain aspects of the 
negotiations.  Formal submissions such as this one  served to provide a reality check.  There were 
serious concerns looming in the services negotiati ons, and it was better to have these out in the open 
now, rather than at a possibly more crucial stage in the coming year.  Canada appreciated the table in the paper listing submissions relate d to Mode 4, although this was not meant to be exhaustive.  
Canada reminded Members of the many Mode 4 pa pers that Canada had submitted or co-sponsored: 
documents TN/S/W/32, 42, 46 and 47.  There was also a document S/CSS/W/48 which dated back to 
2001, and was an initial negotiating pr oposal on Mode 4.  On the subs tance of the submission, Canada 
had already responded in a way to pa ragraph 8, but noted the caveat a bout migration in paragraph 5 of 
the document.  Canada questioned how these points could be reconciled with some of the arguments 
in section 4 of the analysis. 
266. The delegation of the European Communities
 indicated that its comments should be linked to 
those it had made under the previous agenda item, par ticularly in light of paragraphs 6 to 8 of the 
Mode 4 paper.  The European Communities agreed with the paper that Mode 4 was an important 
aspect of the negotiations.  This w as true not only for developing Members but also for Members such 
as the European Communities, which had an interest  across the whole range of Mode 4 categories.  
These were not just limited to Mode 4 links to comm ercial presence, but also to the Mode 4 services 
categories delinked from this presence.   
267. The European Communities took note of the co-spo nsors' assessment on the state of play of 
the Mode 4 plurilateral negotiations.  However, the European Communities recalled that in its view it 
had fully engaged in the Mode 4 negotiations, a nd had deliberately made Mode 4 one of the key 
aspects of its offer.  The European Communities had proposed to take commitments with respect to all 
the different categories of Mode 4 service suppliers.  It proposed to do so without economic needs 
tests for a very large number of sectors, while also  extending considerably the period of stay of the 
service providers.  The European Communities of fer amounted to providing new market access 
(opportunities that did not exist at present), and that  required changes in the legislation of its member 
states.  The European Communities was interested to know if, in Mode 4 or other areas, such efforts 
were foreseen by other Members, in particul ar the proponents of the paper.  The European 
Communities was ready to engage further, but this was linked to the overall situation and some of the 
comments it had made on the previous item.  The European Communities was disappointed that its 
efforts had not been reflected in the paper.   
268. The European Communities took note of the co-s ponsors' remarks on the other plurilateral 
requests.  The European Commun ities was surprised to see the co -sponsors comments on the attitude 
they attributed to certain Members as deemed recipients, concluding that those Members did not lead 
by example in those sectors in which they co-sponsored  collective requests.  It was indeed surprising, 
since the co-sponsors of the Mode 4 paper had now  decided not to consider themselves deemed 
recipients and therefore who would not lead by exampl e, even though they had outlined in great detail 
the benefits and importance of Mode 4.  In the EC  view, this was regrettable if the objective was to 
boost the negotiations as had been suggested.  Th e European Communities also took note of the TN/S/M/28 
Page 50  
 
  corrigendum that had been issued by the proponents,  that qualified one of the sentences on the binding 
that was offered.  Still, the European Communities was interested to read in the submission of the 
positive response of a number of developing countri es to most of the plurilateral requests made to 
them.  It all depended, however, what the number w as.  According to the information available to the 
European Communities, summarized in the papers presented under the first part of the agenda, the 
number was very low. 
269. The delegation of the Philippines
 said it had always been a Mode 4 proponent as evidenced 
by its co-sponsorship of a number of papers listed in  the attachment to JOB(07)/175.   Regrettably the 
Philippines was not a participant in the Mode 4 pluril ateral negotiations, and did not wish to enter the 
debate around paragraph 8.  The Philippines wanted si mply to endorse the importance of Mode 4, and 
the arguments in the submission that liberalization in that mode of supply would be a possible win-
win situation for all Members.  Like Pakistan, the Philippines hoped that Members paid careful attention to the submission. 
270. The Philippines said that it understand that a communication from the European Communities 
and the United States would also be discussed unde r the present agenda item.  The Philippines had 
received the paper, was studying it, and reserved the ri ght to return to it in a more appropriate forum. 
271. The delegation of Mexico
 said it had made a request on Mode 4, and was interested in the 
submission contained in JOB(07)/175.  However, it did not agree with all of the points contained in it.  
Mexico had sponsored many other documents on the subject, and hoped for a positive result.   
272. The delegation of Switzerland  associated itself with the statement by Canada.  Canada's views 
reflected those of Switzerland with respect to the situ ation in Mode 4.  Instead of citing the papers it 
had co-sponsored, Switzerland instead reminded others that it had offens ive interests in Mode 4, and 
that it had tabled a paper on this topic contained in document TN/S/W/61.  Mode 4 was not a north–
south or a developed–developing issue.  All Member s could win from further liberalization of this 
mode of supply.   
273. The delegation of Nigeria  said that improvements in Mode 4 commitments was a cardinal 
objective that guided its participation in the servi ces negotiations, and for this reason wished to 
commend the sponsors of the submission.   
274. The delegation of Morocco  said that it was not a co-sponsor of the submission presently under 
discussion, but was a co-sponsor of the request on M ode 4.  Morocco shared the views expressed by 
India on this matter. 
275. The delegation of India  noted that the United States had refe rred to south-south trade, and had 
asked why the co-sponsors had not deemed themselves r ecipients of their own request.  India said that 
a choice had been made, and it was a choice open to  others.  Co-sponsors wanted more developing 
countries to join in, and to give them comfort the re quest was put out as it was.  It was also asked why 
co-sponsors didn't make their request to more developi ng countries.  It was true that south-south trade 
was increasing, including in Mode 4, but that vol ume was still miniscule.  The request was made only 
to those Members who represented major markets, and where liberal Mode 4 offers would make a 
significant difference. 
276. Canada and the United States had asked about paragraph 5 and economic analyses of labour.  
The problem was that most economic or trade models  dealt with labour as a factor of production, and 
not in terms of Mode 4.  Mode 4 represented te mporary movement, a subset of labour movement, and 
this was taken account of in paragraph 5.  Co-sponsors had sought inspiration from available 
economic models in order to show  that similar benefits could arise from liberalizing the temporary 
movement of people.  The logic was the same.  Most models spoke of movement, which included  TN/S/M/28 
 Page 51 
 
 
  temporary movement.  The delegati on of India could on a bilateral basis indicate further research 
papers and texts to Members interested  in clarifying this point further. 
277. India noted the criticism from the European Communities that co-sponsors of the Mode 4 
paper were not 'leading by example'.  The fact wa s that some co-sponsors had done so, while others 
had not.  Co-sponsors were not recipients by defi nition.  India also pointed to adverse comments 
about the placement of the submission under the second, and not first, Agenda item.  In so requesting, 
the co-sponsors of the submission had not intended ra ise controversy, and India was surprised by the 
reaction to paragraphs 6 to 8.  The intention of th e submission was simply to describe the efforts, at 
the bilateral and the plurilateral level, made by co-sponsors in the Mode 4 negotiations and the 
frustration they were facing.  This was a different  intention from that of the Members who had co-
sponsored the JOB documents.  The submission on Mode 4 was not a narrative, nor was it an 
assessment.  Rather, it was about Mode 4 and liberal commitments, and how they could feed into the 
overall negotiations.  One part of that process wa s plurilateral, but the scope of the co-sponsors 
submission was much wider than that. 
278. The Chairman , noting there were no further requests for the floor, invited Members to 
comment on a non-paper by the European Communities and the United States entitled 'Proposal for a 
Result under Paragraph 31(iii) of the Doha Minister ial Declaration', in document JOB(07)/193/Rev.1. 
279. The delegation of the European Communities  noted at the outset that its presentation followed 
discussions that had taken place the preceding week on the goods aspect of the proposal.  The proposal underscored the EC's commitment to achie ve an ambitious outcome on paragraph 31(iii) of 
the Doha Ministerial Declaration.  This provision mandated Members to enhance mutual 
supportiveness of trade and environment by reducin g or eliminating tariffs and non-trade barriers on 
environmental goods and services.  The proposal was timely, since there were a number of efforts and discussions aimed at addressing the challenges linked to climate change, and the proposal would be 
presented during the Bali trade ministerial dialogue that would take place on 8-9 December. 
280. The proposal envisaged a two-tier approach to achieve the ambitious goal of further 
liberalization of environmental services.  Under the first tier, a number of services areas could 
contribute to Members' efforts to address climate change.  Examples were given in the paper, such as:  services related to air pollution control and climate, services related to air purity control and testing, 
and other types of services related to construction of energy-efficient facilities.  The co-sponsors of 
the paper strongly urged Members involved in the plurilateral negotiations to take this into 
consideration when working on their future offers. 
281. The second tier of the proposal took another step  forward towards an even more ambitious 
and far-reaching result in this area, to be achie ved through an environm ental goods and services 
agreement.  In this agreement, all interested Members, including those not presently involved in the 
plurilateral negotiations, would undertake ambitious  commitments to liberalize environmental and 
other services that contributed to environmental goa ls, and goals related to the fight against climate 
change.  At this stage, and in the interests of  time, the co-sponsors simply wished to launch the 
proposal for an ambitious agreement addressing both goods and services.  The proposal would need to be further discussed and refined by interested Members. 
282. The delegation of Japan
 supported the proposals made by United States and the European 
Communities.  It was very important to tackle th e global environment issue.  At the UN high level 
meeting in September, the special envoy of the Prime Minister of Japan had proposed that each 
country should reduce or eliminate tariffs for produc ts which helped to reduce CO2 omissions.  Japan 
shared the ideas and values of the proposal, and wish ed to continue to participate and associate itself 
in the future discussions on it. TN/S/M/28 
Page 52  
 
  283. The delegation of the United States
 supported the introductory statement made by the 
European Communities.  Priority had to be give n to taking action on goods and services in order to 
address climate change and energy security.  The proposal provided WTO Members with an unprecedented opportunity to address seriously the global and environmental challenge of climate 
change.  By eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental goods and services, particularly 
those related to clean energy, Members could lower costs and increase the access to and use of these 
important products.  On the services side, work in the Special Session would of course relate also to 
the mandate set out in paragraph 31 of the Doha  Declaration.  The United States counted on the 
support of many Members in making the initiative a success. 
284. The delegation of the Cuba
 said it had serious concerns about the credibility of the proposal.  
The proposal had been inspired by the 'Report on International Trade and Climate Change' by the 
World Bank, an institution that had very little credibility  in the area of protection of the environment.  
Several reports had underlined the responsibility of the World Bank for environmental failures in 
mining and in other projects in Latin America, Asia  and Africa.  The impact of mining – encouraged 
by the World Bank – had been serious, from the soci al and environmental point of view, and through 
spillage of toxic chemical substances such as cy anide and mercury.  The World Bank had also 
contributed to the elimination of marine life, a nd had agreed to processes whereby populations had 
been harmed.  In some places, such as in Russia,  the participation of the World Bank might have 
mitigated provisionally some of the impact of oil extr action.  But on the whole, the participation of the 
World Bank had worsened the situation of indigeno us lands.  The disadvantages were much higher 
than the benefits.  There was also a defective decision-making process within the World Bank, where 
there was great pressure for granting money.  Mistak es in administration were not taken into account.  
The forestry policy of the World Bank was also defe ctive, and there was ample evidence of this on the 
internet. 
285. With respect to the list attached  to the proposal under discussion, Cuba noted that it was not 
negotiated with Members.  The list merely reflected the criteria of World Bank authors.  Further, there 
was no mandate for the main element of the propo sal, which was the agreement anticipated for the 
second stage.  There was a need to submit approach es that were guided by environmental concerns, 
not by trade and commercial aims.  In this respect , Cuba noted that the United States, with only 5 
percent of the world population, was responsible fo r 25 percent of greenhouse gases.  It was the main 
oil consumer, consuming almost ni ne times more than Canada, Germ any or Russia.  Also, the United 
States was the main gas and electricity consumer.  Overall it was the main global consumer of energy, 
according to US government data. 
286. The delegation of Colombia  said that the discussion linking services to specific environmental 
goods was premature.  The proposal under discussion had initially been presented in the Council for 
Trade and Environment.  One of the subjects still under discussion there was to determine which goods would receive special tariff treatment under paragraph 31 of the Doha Declaration.  The 
discussion on environmental services was premature,  because no approach had yet been agreed on 
how to determine the goods that would be subject to a special tariff. 
287. Colombia was also concerned about the second stage suggested in the proposal.  The legal 
consequences of this were not clear.  What woul d be the consequences of having a new agreement on 
environmental goods within the scope of the WTO?  Would the suggested new agreement be similar 
to the existing agreement on information technology?   Colombia could not accept that a link be made 
with the countries that will apply the formula cu ts in NAMA to make environment commitments 
possible. 
288. The delegation of Brazil
 said it had doubts on the motive for presenting this paper to the 
Council for Trade in Services.  The proposal had got  a lukewarm reception in the Committee on Trade 
and the Environment.  One aspect that was puzzli ng was that there appeared to be no place for  TN/S/M/28 
 Page 53 
 
 
  agricultural goods in the environmental list, purporte dly because the July Framework had the effect of 
excluding these goods from the scope of paragr aph 31(iii) of the Doha Declaration. 
289. The mandate under paragraph 31 provided for un ilateral liberalization, justified by the 
environmental benefits that would derive from it.  However, this was outside the normal logic of trade 
negotiations, in which Members exchanged concessions  so that everybody would be doing something 
good for the environment.  The difficulty was of co urse conceptual:  what was environmental, what 
was something that benefited the environment?  You could think of a few examples of goods about 
which most people would agree.  On many other g oods, however, the environmental claim could only 
be made in comparison to something else.  A small car was less harmful to the environment than a large car.  But obviously it was also more harmful th an a bicycle – so where did one draw the line?  
The same difficulty arose when it came to services.   Garbage collection was an environmental service, 
but it was less environmentally friendly than selectiv e garbage collection or, even better, recycling 
services. 
290. If Members had a commonly-agreed scientifically-based list of environmental goods drafted 
by consensus, it would be much easier to reach an ag reement.  This is not the approach that had been 
taken in the Special Session of the CTE.  Nor was it the approach previously, when there was a huge 
list with everything on it, including oil tankers.  The current list excluded everything from agriculture 
– even bio fuels.  In the case of agriculturally-frie ndly goods, there was an apparent need to protect 
production, especially in developed countries.  Ther e was thus a basic issue of credibility in the lists 
that had been presented so far, and in the appro ach which they presented.  The attempt to wrap up 
export interests under the environmental banne r was disingenuous.  It would not command a 
consensus.  A few Members could not claim to he lp the environment when the only products on the 
list were those of export interest to them, and wh en these Members insisted on imposing ever greater 
barriers to trade in environmental goods that were pr oduced by others.  In addition to the bio fuels, 
there was also complete exclusion of the products of  organic agriculture, which were two crucial areas 
in which there was much to be gained by trade liberalization. 
291. For several years, the debate in the Speci al Session of the Committee on Trade and the 
Environment had been about a 'triple win'.  Th e result would be good for the environment, good for 
trade and good for development.  The word developm ent did not however appear in current proposal.  
The only trade aspect that appeared was the expanding  trade opportunities for developed countries.  It 
was difficult to see how this would promote the desire d 'triple win' result.  The lack of consistency 
shown by the choice to include only products th at are exported by the developed countries was 
unhelpful.  The Special Session of the CTS had to th ink hard on whether this would be conducive to 
good results in the current negotiations, which were already very complicated. 
292. The delegation of Hong Kong, China
 supported paragraph 31 of th e Doha Declaration, and 
the objective of liberalizing environmental goods  and services.  Although Hong Kong, China was 
neither a co-sponsor nor a recipient of the plurilateral request on environmental services, it had looked 
carefully at its offer in this area, and found that it had met substantively if not fully the plurilateral 
request.  On the proposal under discussion, Hong Kong, China was not at this time comfortable with 
the idea of crossing the line and adapting the plurila teral discussions in services negotiations into a 
plurilateral agreement on environm ental goods and services.  These were brief initial observations.  
Hong Kong, China reiterated however its support of the objectives of liberalizing trade in 
environmental goods and services, and would continue to study the proposed approach. 
293. The delegation of Norway  welcomed the EC/US proposal, and fully shared the objectives and 
rationale behind it.  With respect to the servi ces component, Norway supported the way forward 
proposed in the paper and would work constructivel y on it.  Norway wanted an ambitious and far-
reaching result on environmental goods and services.  The proposal of negotiations on environmental TN/S/M/28 
Page 54  
 
  technologies and services agreements could have crucia l merits.  On the other hand, it also raised a 
number of issues that we would need time to consider. 
294. The delegation of South Africa
 said that his government took environmental protection 
extremely seriously.  However, the paper under disc ussion was premature in terms of its objectives, 
and for being tabled in the CTS Special Session.  In the Committee on Trade and Environment, there 
had not yet been agreement on an approach or on  what constituted an environmental good.  The 
proposal under discussion called for a reduction of ta riffs to zero, but on this there could be no 
agreement until there was full clarity on the cuts that would be required in the NAMA negotiations.  
Only then would South Africa be in a position to say what degree of 'water' had been retained in terms 
of its ability to reduce tariffs to zero, if at all.  On that basis, South Africa thought that the initiative 
was premature with respect to the goods aspect.  W ith regard to trade in services, South Africa would 
continue to engage in negotiations on environmen tal services.  Within the context of the services 
negotiations, however, South Africa could not accept as a fait accompli  that environmental services 
included those services that have been listed by the proponents of the paper. 
295. The delegation of Canada  welcomed the proposal presented by the United States and the 
European Communities, encouraged further work in the sector, and was willing to join with the co-
sponsors on further developing the services aspect of the paper. 
296. The delegation of Argentina , like those of Brazil, Colombia and Cuba, thought that the paper 
under discussion had more to do with trade than with  the environment.  It was not helpful to allow 
trade interests to masquerade as environmental goa ls.  For services, the situation was particularly 
complex.  Liberalization in some service groups could be good for the environment, whereas in 
others, such as air transport, Members may prefer  not to make commitments because of the adverse 
affects on the environment.  Members had to be cautious in approaching these issues. 
297. The delegation of Mexico  had problems with the proposal, but had not yet arrived at a final 
position.  There would need to be a discussion on how, procedurally, the proposal would be handled in the plurilateral process.  Mexico thought that th e paper was coming very late in the day, since  
Members were in the final stages of the negotiatio n.  This was something that should have been 
discussed in a different format.  The proposal seemed to be coming in through the back door. 
298. The delegation of Morocco
, speaking for the African Group , agreed on the importance of 
resolving climate change issues, and trade-related aspects of the environment.  However, there had 
been insufficient time to study the proposal unde r discussion, and have the collective views of 
Members.  At first reading, it seemed that the text had lost sight of some important elements.  One 
such element had been mentioned by Brazil – the absence of any development dimension in the text, 
and the absence of any reference to technology transfer , which was very important in this regard.  As 
well, there were are still technical difficulties rela ted mainly to definitions  of environmental goods 
and services, the relationship between environmen t protection and development objectives, and the 
balance between the two.  For these reasons, the A frican Group needed more time to fully assess the 
proposal.  
299. The delegation of Ecuador  said that it also had concerns about climate change, and agreed 
with the points made by Cuba, Colombia, Brazil,  Argentina and the African Group.  Ecuador had 
already said in the CTE meeting that it had issues with some of the elements, and the procedure of 
bringing this to committee when it ha d already been discussed elsewhere. 
300. The delegation of India  shared the concerns expressed by Brazil and others.  There had been 
no consensus reached on the paper in the Special Sess ion of the CTE, and for this reasons it was hard 
to understand the reason for discussing the paper at the present meeting.  What were Members meant 
to begin negotiations on?  There was a negotia tion in services presently taking place, and India  TN/S/M/28 
 Page 55 
 
 
  wanted to focus on that.  On first reading, the pro posal appear to be motivated by trade rather than 
environment concerns.  This might lead to the o pposite of environment protection.  India had strong 
reservations about this initiative. 
301. The delegation of Vietnam  said it was still assessing the implications of the paper with respect 
to its GATS commitments.  It wished nonetheless to draw attention to a reference in footnote 2 on 
page 2 to small and vulnerable economies.  Vietnam said  this reference needed clarification in light of 
Vietnam's position with respect to tariff cuts in the NAMA negotiations.   
302. The delegation of Mauritius  agreed with the points made by Brazil and some other developing 
countries, especially Morocco who spoke on behalf of the African Group.  The proposal under discussion was premature, since a number of things had to be clarified from a conceptual point of 
view.  The paper was also very partial, in the sen se that it took a developed country point of view 
focused on market access, neglecting other dimensi ons, notably technology transfer highlighted by 
Morocco.  There was a very delicate balance to be st ruck with respect to international treaties on the 
environment.  An 'equitable approach' had been ta ken in these treaties, a concept that had not been 
used in the proposal.  In sum, much thinking remain ed to be done on this topic and, and since nothing 
had yet been achieved in the field of goods, it was very  premature to consider this topic in the field of 
services. 
303. The delegation of Singapore
 said that the paper was topical in the context of the current 
debate on climate change.  From that perspective Singapore was stud ying the paper and would revert 
with comments later.  As a co-sponsor of envir onmental services, Singapore looked forward to a good 
outcome in that area.  However, as it had stated pr eviously in the Chairman's consultations, Singapore 
had reservations on the notion of binding current levels of access and new market openings.  
Singapore thought that the existing GATS provisions and Annex C provided sufficient guidance to achieve a good outcome in this and other sectors. 
304. The delegation of Venezuela
 said that it joined the 'near con sensus' (or at least that of Latin 
America) in the room on the paper under discussion.   It was hard to understand why the paper was 
being presented, and how one could define an environmental good or service.  In the end, only the 
Kyoto Protocol could give Members a guarantee on environmental services and goods. 
305. The delegation of the European Communities  wished to explain why the paper was submitted 
at the present meeting.  The subject covered environmental services, and the CTS Special Session was the forum where those services were discussed.  The European Commun ities had made it very clear in 
the Committee on Trade and the Environment that the paper would also be presented in the CTS 
Special Session – there was no hidden motivation or plan. 
306. On the services aspect, the Europ ean Communities said that the proposal was consistent with 
its interest in promoting the protection of the e nvironment globally, and with its position in a number 
of international forums, and with its current position in Bali.  On the question of timing, tier one was 
very much in line with the ongoing plurilateral negotiations.  The European Communities did not 
think the political timing was premature.  There wa s more focus on these areas at international level, 
and the hope was to kick off an effort to look mo re closely into the area of environmental goods and 
services, with the view to reaching a plurilateral agreement. 
307. The Chairman
 suggested that the Council take note of the statements made and revert to this 
item at its next meeting.   
308. It was so agreed . TN/S/M/28 
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  309. The Chairman
 suggested and Members agreed that discussion of the Agenda items C 
("Implementation of the Modalities for the Special  Treatment for Least-Developed Country Members 
in the Trade in Services Negotiations") and D ("Consideration of Proposals on S&D Treatment 
Provisions")  be deferred until the 17 December informal mee ting of the Special Session, to be devoted 
to development issues. 
310. Since there were no requests for the floor under Agenda items E ("Assessment of Trade in 
Services"), F ("Reports by Chairpersons") and G ("Other Business"), the Chairman adjourned the 
meeting. 
__________