WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  WT/DS285/13 
19 August 2005 
 (05-3683) 
 Original:   English 
  
 
     
 
    
 
  
UNITED STATES – MEASURES AFFECTING THE 
CROSS-BORDER SUPPLY OF 
GAMBLING AND BETTING SERVICES 
 
 
 
ARB-2005-2/19 
 
    
 
   
Arbitration  
under Article 21.3(c) of the  
Understanding on Rules and Procedures  
Governing the Settlement of Disputes  
 
 
    
 
Award of the Arbitrator 
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann 
  WT/DS285/13 
 Page i 
 
 
  
I.
 Introduction................................................................................................................... ..............1  
II. Arguments of the Parties....................................................................................................... ......2  
A. United States ..................................................................................................................2  
B. Antigua ...........................................................................................................................6  
III. Reasonable Period of Time...................................................................................................... .10 
A. Preliminary Matters .....................................................................................................10  
1. Mandate ..........................................................................................................10  
2. The Measures to be Brought into Conformity ................................................10  
B. Factors Affecting the Determination of the Reasonable Period of Time under 
Article 21.3(c) ..............................................................................................................11  
1. Burden of Proof ..............................................................................................11  
2. Choice of Method of Implementation.............................................................11  
3. Particular Circumstances ................................................................................12  
4. Article 21.2 of the DSU ..................................................................................21  
5. Summary.........................................................................................................24  
IV. The Award ...................................................................................................................... ..........25  
 
 WT/DS285/13 
Page ii  
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED IN THIS AWARD 
 
Short Title Full Title and Citation 
Australia – Salmon Award of the Arbitrator, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of 
Salmon – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU  ("Australia – 
Salmon "), WT/DS18/9, 23 February 1999, DSR 1999:I, 267. 
Canada – Patent Term  Award of the Arbitrator, Canada – Term of Patent Protection – Arbitration 
under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS170/10, 28 February 2001, 
DSR 2001:V, 2031 
Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents Award of the Arbitrator, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical 
Products – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU  ("Canada – 
Pharmaceutical Patents "), WT/DS114/13, 18 August 2000, DSR 2002:I, 3. 
Chile – Price Band System Award of the Arbitrator, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures 
Relating to Certain Agricultural Products – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) 
of the DSU  ("Chile – Price Band System "), WT/DS207/13, 17 March 2003. 
EC – Bananas III  Award of the Arbitrator, European Communities – Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Arbitration under 
Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS27/15, 7 January 1998, DSR 1998:I, 3. 
EC – Hormones  Award of the Arbitrator, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones) – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , 
WT/DS26/15, WT/DS48/13, 29 May 1998, DSR 1998:V, 1833 
EC – Tariff Preferences Award of the Arbitrator, European Communities – Conditions for the 
Granting of Tariff Preference s to Developing Countries  – Arbitration under 
Article 21.3(c) of the DSU  ("EC – Tariff Preferences "), WT/DS246/14, 20 
September 2004. 
Guatemala – Cement I Appellate Body Report, Guatemala – Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding 
Portland Cement from Mexico ("Guatemala – Cement I "), WT/DS60/AB/R, 
adopted 25 November 1998, DSR 1998:IX, 3767. 
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II  Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages – 
Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS8/15, WT/DS10/15, 
WT/DS11/13, 14 February 1997, DSR 1997:I, 3 
Korea – Alcoholic Beverages Award of the Arbitrator, Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages – 
Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU  ("Korea – Alcoholic 
Beverages "), WT/DS75/16, WT/DS84/14, 4 June 1999, DSR 1999:II, 937. 
US – 1916 Act Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 – 
Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU  ("US – 1916 Act "), 
WT/DS136/11, WT/DS162/14, 28 February 2001, DSR 2001:V, 2017. 
US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services ("US – Gambling "), 
WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted 20 April 2005. 
US – Gambling Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply 
of Gambling and Betting Services ("US – Gambling "), WT/DS285/R, 
adopted 20 April 2005, as modified by Appellate Body Report, 
WT/DS285/AB/R. 
US – Hot-Rolled Steel  Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain 
Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of 
the DSU , WT/DS184/13, 19 February 2002 
   WT/DS285/13 
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US – Hot-Rolled Steel Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain 
Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan ("US – Hot-Rolled Steel "), 
WT/DS184/AB/R, adopted 23 August 2001, DSR 2001:X, 4697. 
US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy 
Offset Act of 2000 – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , 
WT/DS217/14, WT/DS234/22, 13 June 2003. 
US – Oil Country Tubular Goods 
Sunset Reviews  Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina  – Arbitration 
under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS268/12, 7 June 2005. 
US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act  Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright 
Act – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU  WT/DS160/12, 
15 January 2001, DSR 2001:II, 657. 
  WT/DS285/13 
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WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION  
AWARD OF THE ARBITRATOR  
 
 United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border 
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services 
 
Parties: 
 
Antigua and Barbuda 
United States 
  ARB-2005-2/19 
  Arbitrator:  
 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
1. On 20 April 2005, the Dispute Settlement Body (the "DSB") adopted the Appellate Body 
Report1 and the Panel Report2, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, in  United States – 
Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services .3  At the DSB meeting 
of 19 May 2005, the United States indicated its intention to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute and stated that  it would require a reasonabl e period of time in which 
to do so.
4 
2. On 6 June 2005, Antigua and Barbuda ("Antigua")  informed the DSB that consultations with 
the United States had not resulted in an ag reement on the reasonable period of time for 
implementation.  Antigua therefore requested that su ch period be determined by binding arbitration, 
pursuant to Article 21.3(c) of the  Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement 
of Disputes   (the "DSU").5 
3. Antigua and the United States were unable to agree on an arbitrator within 10 days of the 
matter being referred to arbitration.  Therefore, by letter dated 17 June 20056, Antigua requested that 
the Director-General appoint an arb itrator pursuant to footnote 12 to Article 21.3(c) of the DSU.  The 
                                                      
1Appellate Body Report, WT/DS285/AB/R. 
2Panel Report, WT/DS285/R. 
3WT/DS285/10. 
4WT/DSB/M/189, para. 47. 
5WT/DS285/11. 
6Antigua's letter was received on 20 June 2005. WT/DS285/13 
Page 2  
 
Director-General appointed me as arbitrator  on 30 June 2005, after consulting the parties.
7  I informed 
the parties of my acceptance of the appointment by letter dated 30 June 2005.   
4. Antigua and the United States have agreed that th is award will be deemed to be an arbitration 
award under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, notwithstanding the expiry of the 90 day period stipulated in Article 21.3(c).
8 
5. Antigua and the United States provided their writte n submissions to me on 12 July 2005.  On 
20 July 2005 I requested the United States, by letter, to  provide me with a copy of the 2006 schedules 
for the House of Representatives and the Senate.  An  oral hearing was held on 21 July 2005.  At the 
outset of that hearing, the United States informed  me that the 2006 schedules for the United States 
Congress are not yet available, but that the recess peri ods in 2006 were likely to be similar to those in 
the 2005 schedules.9  On 22 July 2005, in response to a question posed at the oral hearing, the United 
States informed me by letter that there is currently  one bill under consideration by the United States 
Congress related to the subject of internet gambling.10 
II. Arguments of the Parties 
A. United States 
6. The United States requests that I determine the "reasonable period of time" for 
implementation of the recommendations  and rulings of the DSB in this dispute to be 15 months from 
the date of adoption by the DSB of the Panel and Appellate Body Reports, until the end of 
July 2006.11 
7. The United States asserts that in the particular circumstances of this case, the legal form of 
implementation and the technical complexity of the measures require a reasonabl e period of time of at 
least 15 months.  Such a period is consistent with th e periods that have been determined in previous 
arbitrations under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU for implementation by legislative means, which is how 
the United States intends to implement the recommenda tions and rulings of the DSB in this case.  The 
United States also explains that, since the date of adoption of the Panel and A ppellate Body Reports in 
                                                      
7WT/DS285/12. 
8The 90 day period following adoption of the Panel and Appellate Body Reports expired on 
19 July 2005. 
9The United States included the 2005 schedules of both chambers of Congress as Exhibit US-9 to its 
submission. 
10The United States referred to H.R. 1422, the Student  Athlete Protection Act.  The United States also 
conveyed its understanding that a Senator is in the process of preparing an internet gambling bill to strengthen penalties for illegal gambling and limit the use of financial instruments in connection with internet gambling. 
11United States' submission, paras. 5, 8, 9, 14, 19, 35 and 36.  WT/DS285/13 
 Page 3 
 
 
this dispute, the executive branch  has been consulting internally with Congress and with domestic 
stakeholders on possible legislative action. 
8. The United States contests Antigua's argument th at, with respect to "non-sports" betting and 
gambling, the United States could implement through issuance of a presidential executive order.  According to the United States, the issue of executiv e orders is not relevant to my determination of 
the reasonable period of time because Antigua accepts  that implementation must, in any case, include 
some form of legislative action (if only with resp ect to "sports-related" betting and gambling).  The 
text of Article 21.3(c) refers to " a reasonable period of time" (emphasis added).  It follows that an 
arbitrator is to determine a single  reasonable period of time, which in  this case must be the reasonable 
period of time necessary for legislation .  That there is no basis in the DSU for an arbitrator to assign 
multiple reasonable periods of time for different fo rms of implementation is confirmed, argues the 
United States, by the previous arbitral awards that have considered multiple proposed forms of 
implementation, namely the awards in US – Hot-Rolled Steel and US – Oil Country Tubular Goods 
Sunset Reviews . 
9. The United States does not, in any event, accep t Antigua's proposed distinction between 
"sports" and "non-sports" gambling and betting.  The United States contends that no such distinction 
exists under any of the three federal statutes at issue in this dispute, namely the Wire Act, the Travel 
Act and the Illegal Gambling Business Act (the "IGB A").  For the same reason, the United States 
disputes that an executive order could be used in the manner suggested by Antigua, because an 
executive order may not contradict an existing statut e.  In addition, in this specific case, it is 
extremely unlikely that an executive order could achie ve the necessary clarification of the relationship 
between the Interstate Horseracing Act ("IHA"), on the one hand, and the Wire Act, Travel Act and 
the IGBA, on the other hand.  The United States points,  in this regard, to th e presidential statement on 
signing accompanying the bill enacting the Decemb er 2000 amendments to the IHA, which expressed 
the view that nothing in the IHA overrode previously enacted criminal laws.  The Panel in this dispute 
found that this statement was not sufficient to r esolve the ambiguity in the relationship, and the 
Appellate Body did not depart from this view.
12  The United States submits that if a presidential 
statement accompanying signature of a bill could not achieve the requisite clarity in the relationship 
between the relevant statutes, then a presiden tial executive order could not do so either.  
10. The United States emphasizes that it will use le gislative means to clarify the relationship 
between the IHA and the three pre-existing federal cr iminal statutes.  Referring to the Appellate Body 
Report in this dispute, the United States observes th at it must demonstrate "that—in the light of the 
                                                      
12United States' submission, footnote 6 to para. 9, referring to Panel Report, para. 6.597, and Appellate 
Body Report, para. 373(D)(v)(c). WT/DS285/13 
Page 4  
 
existence of the Interstate Horseracing Act—the Wi re Act, the Travel Act, and the Illegal Gambling 
Business Act are applied consistently with the requirements of the chapeau"
13 to Article XIV of the 
GATS.  Thus, "a reasonable legislative option would ha ve the effect of clarifying that relevant U.S. 
federal laws entail no discrimination between forei gn and domestic service suppliers in the application 
of measures prohibiting remote supply of gambling and betting services".14  Taking account of this 
objective, and in the light of the "multifaceted nature  of the obligation in the chapeau of Article XIV", 
there "will be ample room for reasonable and pr incipled disagreements among legislators as to 
precisely how to achieve such a clarificati on in the context of Internet gambling".15  The United States 
contrasts the complexities involved in implementati on in this dispute with the simple legislative 
change—to the length of patent  term—that was required in Canada – Patent Term , where the 
arbitrator determined the reasonable period of time for implementation to be 10 months.16   
11. The United States adds that the legislative exerci se will be further complicated by the fact that 
since 1997, the United States Congress has considered a wide range of legisl ative proposals aimed at 
internet gambling, none of which has been adopt ed.  The existence of this complex, and as-yet 
unresolved legislative debate mean s that the task of adopting compliance legislation will take longer 
due to the need to assess the potential impact of ea ch option on a variety of other proposed legislative 
changes.   
12. The United States argues that a 15 month implemen tation period is consis tent with previous 
arbitration awards under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU that have involved legisl ative change and refers, 
in particular, to the awards of the Arbitrators in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II , EC – Bananas III , 
and EC – Hormones.  Consistent with the approach taken in  those arbitrations, the United States 
underlines that it is not for Antigua to determine wh at type of legislative option the United States 
should choose, or that a less complex option could be enacted in less than 15 months. 
13. In support of its argument that a 15 month pe riod is necessary in order to implement the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute, the United States explains the process by 
which the United States Congress passes legislation.  Proposed legislation can only become law after 
it has been approved in identical form by both chambers of Congress—the House of Representatives 
and the Senate—and approved by the President of th e United States.  A bill passes through at least ten 
steps between the time that it is introduced and th e time that it is approved by both chambers.  The 
                                                      
13United States' submission, para. 11, referring to Appellate Body Report, para. 373(D)(v)(c). 
14United States' submission, para. 11. 
15United States' submission, para. 12. 
16United States' submission, para. 12, referring to Award of the Arbitrator, Canada – Patent Term, 
paras. 55-56.  WT/DS285/13 
 Page 5 
 
 
first step is introduction of the bill in Congress.  Generally, bills are referred to a committee, and 
possibly also to subcommittees, where public hearin gs will be conducted.  Then the bill goes through 
a "mark-up" process where changes and amendments are made before the subcommittee "reports" the 
bill to the full committee.  The committee may cond uct further study and hearings, and another mark-
up process follows before the relevant committee vot es on whether to "report" the bill to the full 
House.  If so, a detailed, section-by-section committ ee report is prepared and the bill is "reported 
back" to the House.  The bill is debated and am endments may be offered before the House votes on 
the bill.  The bill may be returned to the committee or, if passed by the House, must be referred to the 
Senate.  The Senate may approve the bill as received,  reject it, ignore it or change it.  Most bills 
passed by the Senate are not precisely the same as the bill referred by the House and, in such 
circumstances, a conference committee is organized  to reconcile differences between the House and 
Senate versions.  If the conference committee is able  to reach agreement on a single bill, a conference 
report is prepared, and this must be approved by both chambers, in identical form, before it can be 
sent to the President for approval.   
14. The United States stresses that the executive branch has no control over the procedures and 
timetable followed by Congress.  The United States declined, at the oral hearing, to estimate on a 
disaggregated basis the length of time that would be  necessary in this case for each one of the steps in 
its legislative process, noting that such time periods  vary widely and are, in many cases, determined 
on an ad hoc basis by the House of Representatives a nd/or the Senate.  The United States also 
explained, in response to questioning at the oral hear ing, that although the above procedure reflects, in 
practice, how Congress operates, the only two step s that are explicitly required under the United 
States Constitution are the approval of a bill by bo th chambers of Congress and the signature of the 
President. 
15. The United States adds that an important dete rminant of when a bill becomes law is the 
Congressional schedule.  Each Congress consists of  two sessions of one year each, and the United 
States is currently in the first session of the 109th Congress.  Sessions of Congress typically begin in January and end in October, November or December of the calendar year.  At present, the first session of the 109th Congress is scheduled to end on 30 Sept ember 2005.  The United States explains that 
most bills that become law are acted on only in the l ast weeks or months of the legislative session, and 
that a bill introduced in the first session of a Congress may be carried over to the second session.  According to the United States, these reasons explai n why I should not attach any significance to the 
15 measures already passed by Congress in the 109t h session, which Antigua cites as illustrative of 
how quickly the United States Congress can act .  These 15 measures will represent only a tiny 
fraction of all the laws that will be passed in th e 109th session.  Moreover, of these 15 measures, four 
dealt with disaster relief or emergencies, three we re legislative packages that had been thoroughly WT/DS285/13 
Page 6  
 
considered in a previous Congress or Congresses, four  dealt with the renewal of measures previously 
enacted but due to expire, and four involved  the naming of buildings and museum regents.
17  Thus, 
explains the United States, the rapidity with which th ese measures were passed in the first half of the 
109th session of Congress is not at all representative of  the ordinary workings of the United States 
legislative process.   
16. The United States argues that, given the complexity of the legislative task required in this 
case, the need to consider implementing legislation in a deliberate manner, and the other matters that 
will be under consideration durin g the remainder of the first session of the 109th Congress, the 
legislation implementing the recommendations and ru lings of the DSB will not be completed in the 
first session of the current Congress, but will instead need to be carried over into the second session, 
in 2006.  The United States suggests that, in th e same way that Congress is often spurred to pass 
legislation prior to the end of a legislative session, so  too is it prompted to pass legislation prior to a 
recess.  In the light of the fact that Congress will adjourn for its August recess in late July 2006, the 
United States suggests that this would be an appr opriate point at which to conclude the reasonable 
period of time for implementation in this dispute.   
17. As regards the application of Article 21.2 of th e DSU in this arbitration, the United States 
cautions me not to expand the scope of a proceeding under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU by acceding to Antigua's request to resolve any ambiguities in An tigua's favour and to ensure that the proposed 
method of compliance is consistent with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB and the 
provisions of the covered agreements.  The United St ates emphasizes that my task is to determine the 
shortest period possible within the legal system of  the United States, and that this determination 
cannot be affected by the fact that the complain ing party in the dispute is a developing country 
Member. 
B. Antigua 
18. Antigua requests that I determine the "reasonabl e period of time" for implementation of the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this di spute to be:  (i) as regards the provision of non-
sports related and horseracing gambli ng and betting services,  either immediately or not later than one 
month following the issuance of this award;  and (ii) as regards the provision of other sports-related gambling and betting services, six months from the da te of adoption by the DSB of the Panel and 
Appellate Body Reports, ending on 20 September 2005.
18 
                                                      
17United States' statement at the oral hearing. 
18Antigua's submission, para. 62.  WT/DS285/13 
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19. With respect to "non-sports related and hor se race gambling and betting services", Antigua 
observes that there is significant doubt that the Wire  Act, the Travel Act or the IGBA apply to the 
provision to United States consumers of such servi ces supplied from a foreign country in which such 
services are legal.  Antigua points to the fact that no court has held any of these laws applicable to 
non-sports betting services supplied by remote means, and that the opinions of experts on this subject 
are "decidedly equivocal".19  Moreover, according to Antigua, prior to March 1998 the United States 
Department of Justice publicly maintained that th e provision of gambling and betting services into the 
United States from foreign jurisdictions was not subj ect to federal prosecution.  Since this policy was 
shifted once, argues Antigua, it can be shifted back  to the pre-March 1998 position again.  Although 
such a shift could be effected on an informal b asis within the Department  of Justice and other 
agencies of the United States government, Antigua argues that it could be definitively accomplished 
through a presidential "executive order".  Executive  orders are orders or decrees given by the 
President of the United States to agencies of th e federal government such as the Department of 
Justice.  Antigua observes that th e power to issue executive orders forms part of the general executive 
powers of the President under Article II of the Un ited States Constitution, and that executive orders  
have been used by every President for a wide variet y of subjects.  Antigua refers to a study that has 
defined executive orders as "directives or actions by the President" that have the "force and effect of 
law" when "founded on the authority of the President derived from the Constitution or a statute."20   
20. Thus, concludes Antigua, with respect to the provision of non-sports related and horseracing 
gambling and betting services, the United States should implement the recommendations and rulings 
of the DSB by issuing an executive order to the agen cies of the United States government to the effect 
that:  (i) these services may be lawfully offered by Antiguan operators to consumers in the United 
States;  and (ii) all enforcement and related ac tion to the contrary should immediately cease and 
desist.  Antigua adds that executive orders can be  promulgated in a simple  and expedient manner, 
requiring only a matter of weeks, and that once si gned by the President, an executive order becomes 
law in the United States upon its publication in the Federal Register.   Given that executive orders are 
short and do not require the consent of anyone ot her than the President, Antigua submits that the 
                                                      
19Antigua's submission, para. 13, referring in footnote  25 to:  United States General Accounting Office, 
GAO/GCD – 96-28, Internet Gambling: An O verview of the Issues (December 2002) (Exhibit AB-17 submitted 
by Antigua to the Panel), pp. 12-16;  J. Rodefer, "Internet Gambling in Nevada: Overview of Federal Law Affecting Assembly Bill 466", published on 18 March 2003 on the website of the Department of Justice of 
Nevada, <www.ag.state.nv.us> (Exhibit AB-54 submitted by  Antigua to the Panel);  and J. Kelly, R. Mignin, 
and S. Saxman, "US Policy" in M. Balestra and A. Cabot (eds.), Internet Gambling Report: An Evolving 
Conflict Between Technology and Law , 8th ed. (River City Group LLC Publisher, 2005), p. 217. 
20Antigua's submission, para. 19, referring in footnote 37 to T.L. Branum, "President or King?  The Use 
and Abuse of Executive Orders  in Modern-Day America", Journal of Legislation , Vol. 28 (2002), p. 1 at 6, 
citing Commission on Government Operations, 85th Congress, "Executive Orders and Proclamations: A Study 
of the Use of Presidential Powers" 14 (Comm. Print 1957).  WT/DS285/13 
Page 8  
 
United States should be accorded only the briefest  practical period of time to issue the necessary 
order, namely immediately or in any event no less than one month after the issuance of this award. 
21. In response to questioning at the oral hear ing on the issue of executive orders, Antigua 
accepted that, in principle, the United States, as th e implementing Member, has discretion to decide 
how best to effect implementation.  Antigua added,  however, that if the United States chooses a more 
complicated and lengthy means of implementation, rath er than a shorter one that has been shown to be 
available, then this choice should have as a con sequence that the time period which the United States 
is afforded in order to pursue its legislative solution is shorter than it would otherwise be. 
22. With respect to the application of the Wire Ac t, the Travel Act and the IGBA to the provision 
of sports-related gambling and betting services, An tigua accepts that legislative action will be 
necessary for the United States to implement the reco mmendations and rulings of the DSB.  In this 
regard, Antigua again recognizes that the implementing Member may choose its method of 
implementation, but stresses that this choice is subject  to the proviso that the means chosen must be 
consistent with the relevant reco mmendations and rulings.  Antigua s ubmits that an arbitrator under 
Article 21.3(c) faced with a proposed method of complia nce that is not so consistent could take this 
factor into account in making his award.    
23. Antigua submits that, in general, the burden of proof is on the implementing Member, and 
emphasizes that the political sensitivity or contentiousn ess of a particular course of action is irrelevant 
to the determination of the reasonable period of time.
21  Equally irrelevant, submits Antigua, are the 
consideration by the legislature of various legislativ e options, the volume of legislation considered by 
the legislature, and the high percentage of bills that do not become law.22  On the other hand, Antigua 
urges me to take account of the flexibility that exis ts within the United States legislative system, as 
well as of the actions taken by the United States w ith respect to implementation since adoption by the 
DSB of the Reports in this dispute. 
24. In response to questioning at the oral hearing, Antigua confirmed that it agrees, in principle, 
with the United States' description of the process by  which legislation is enacted by the United States 
Congress.  Antigua stresses, however, that except for obtaining Congressional approval, none of the 
specific steps identified by the United States is requi red by law and none is assigned a required time 
period.  It follows that considerable flexibility is built into the United States legislative system.  
Antigua submits that the flexibility enjoyed by th e United States Congress ha s been recognized by 
                                                      
21Antigua's submission, paras. 30 and 31, referring in footnote 53 to Award of the Arbitrator, US – 
Section 110(5) Copyright Act , para. 42;  and Award of the Arbitrator, Canada – Patent Term , para. 58. 
22Antigua's submission, para. 31, referring in footnotes 57 and 58 to Award of the Arbitrator, US – 
Offset Act (Byrd Amendment ), paras. 53 and 59;  and Award of the Arbitrator, US – 1916 Act, para. 38.  WT/DS285/13 
 Page 9 
 
 
previous arbitrators, and is also illustrated by a su rvey of legislation adopted during the current, 109th, 
session of Congress.  According to Antigua, of  the 15 measures enacted into law through 
19 June 2005, two became law within a day of in troduction, the longest period from introduction to 
adoption was 91 days, and the average number of days from introduction to adoption was 43.27 days.
23  Antigua also points out that the amendment to  the IHA in 2000 took a mere five months to 
pass.24 
25. According to Antigua, legislation to bring the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the IGBA into 
compliance with the recommendations and rulings of  the DSB need not be complicated.  Antigua 
draws a contrast between certain public pronouncements made by the United States to the effect that implementation will be very simple, and its position in this arbitration, namely that implementation 
will be "technically complex".  In Antigua's view , the United States has failed to demonstrate any 
such complexity.  Accordingly, Antigua submits that there are no compelling reasons why the United 
States would require more than six months to im plement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB 
regarding the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the IGBA. 
26. Finally, Antigua invokes Article 21.2 of the DSU,  which provides for "particular attention" to 
be paid to "matters affecting the interests of developing country Members".  Antigua underlines the 
importance of a well-regulated cross-border gamb ling and betting service industry to the economic 
health and growth of Antigua, as well as the strain that this dispute has placed on Antigua's limited 
resources.  Antigua submits that I should rely on Article 21.2 of the DSU to resolve any ambiguities 
or uncertainties related to compliance in this case in favour of Antigua, and in this regard asks that I 
carefully scrutinize the efficacy of the United States'  proposed means of implementation.  In response 
to questioning at the oral hearing, Antigua emph asized that the United States legislative process is 
very flexible and does not include fixed time peri ods for each step in the process.  Accordingly, 
Antigua submits that in this case it would be proper  for me to use Article 21.2 to require the United 
States to be especially diligent and to use the flexibility inherent in its system to achieve rapid 
implementation.  In other words, Antigua asks me  to use Article 21.2 of the DSU in order to 
determine a shorter reasonable period of time fo r implementation than I might otherwise do. 
                                                     
 
23Antigua's submission, para. 54. 
24Antigua's submission, para. 54, referring in footnote s 94 and 95 to Sections 3001-3007 of Title 15 of 
the United States Code, H.R. 4942. WT/DS285/13 
Page 10  
 
III. Reasonable Period of Time 
A. Preliminary Matters  
1. Mandate
 
27. The Panel and Appellate Body Reports in this dispute were adopted by the DSB on 
20 April 2005 and, pursuant to Article 21.3 of th e DSU, the United States informed the DSB of its 
intentions with respect to implementation shortly thereafter.25  Article 21.3 of the DSU establishes 
that, when it is "impracticable" for a Member to comply "immediately" with the recommendations 
and rulings of the DSB, then that Member "shall have  a reasonable period of time in which to do so."  
The United States informed the DSB that it would re quire such a reasonable period of time in this 
dispute.   
28. My task as arbitrator in this proceeding is to determine such reasonable period of time, taking 
due account of the relevant provisions of the DSU, and, specifically, of the following directions set 
forth in Article 21.3: 
... The reasonable period of time shall be: 
... 
 (c) a period of time determined through binding arbitration 
...  In such arbitration, a guideline for the arbitrator 
should be that the reasonable period of time to implement panel or Appellate Body recommendations should not exceed 15 months from the date of adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report.  However, that 
time may be shorter or longer, depending upon the 
particular circumstances. (footnotes omitted) 
2. The Measures to be Brought into Conformity
 
29. Both the Panel and Appellate Body Reports in this dispute contained findings that the United 
States had acted inconsistently with  its obligations under the covered agreements.  More specifically, 
the Appellate Body upheld the Panel's finding that , by maintaining the following three measures, the 
United States acts inconsistently with its obliga tions under Article XVI:1 and sub-paragraphs (a) 
and (c) of Article XVI:2 of the GATS: 
                                                      
25Minutes of the DSB meeting held on 19 May 2005, WT/DSB/M/189, para. 47.  WT/DS285/13 
 Page 11 
 
 
- Section 1084 of Title 18 of the United States Code (the "Wire Act"); 
- Section 1952 of Title 18 of the United St ates Code (the "Travel Act");  and 
- Section 1955 of Title 18 of the United States Code (the "Illegal Gambling Business 
Act", or the "IGBA").26 
30. The Appellate Body also upheld, albeit for di fferent reasons, the Panel's finding that the 
United States had not demonstrated that its measures, found to be inconsistent with Article XVI of the 
GATS, satisfy the requirements of Article XIV of the GATS.27  Accordingly, the Appellate Body 
recommended that the DSB request the United Stat es to bring its inconsistent measures into 
conformity with its obligations under the GATS. 
B. Factors Affecting the Determination of the Reasonable Period of Time under 
Article 21.3(c) 
1. Burden of Proof  
31. Both of the parties to this dispute agree that  the United States, as the implementing Member, 
bears the burden of establishing that its proposed implementation period is a "reasonable period of 
time".28  I do not disagree with the principle that when an implementing Member seeks a reasonable 
period of time for implementation, then it is appr opriate for that Member to carry the burden of 
demonstrating the reasonableness of its proposal.29 
2. Choice of Method of Implementation  
32. Both the Appellate Body and the Panel found th at, due to ambiguity in the relationship 
between the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the IG BA, on the one  hand, and a federal civil statute 
known as the Interstate Horseracing Act (the "IHA")  on the other hand, the United States had not 
satisfied its burden of justifying the measures at  issue under the chapeau to Article XIV of the 
GATS.30  Referring to these findings, the United States indicates that it will seek to implement the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB by further cl arifying the relationship between these statutes.  
Antigua, on the other hand, believes that broader acti on is necessary.  Antigua submits that the United 
States can properly implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB only if, consistently with 
                                                      
26Appellate Body Report, para. 373(C)(ii);  Panel Report, para. 7.2(b)(i). 
27Appellate Body Report, para. 373(D)(vi);  Panel Report, para. 7.2(d). 
28Antigua's submission, para. 30;  United States' response to questioning at the oral hearing. 
29Award of the Arbitrator, US – 1916 Act , para. 33.  A similar sentiment was also expressed by the 
Arbitrator in EC – Tariff Preferences , at paragraph 27 of his award. 
30Appellate Body Report, para. 373(D)(v)(c);  Panel Report, paras. 6.599-6.600. WT/DS285/13 
Page 12  
 
the requirements of the chapeau  to Article XIV of the GATS, it removes any discrimination in the 
treatment of Antiguan suppliers of "remote" gamb ling and betting services, on the one hand, and the 
treatment of domestic suppliers of the same services, on the other.
31  To do so, argues Antigua, the 
United States will have to either grant market ac cess to Antiguan service providers or prohibit the 
supply of all domestic remote gambling services. 
33. It is not the role of an arbitrator under Artic le 21.3(c) to identify a particular method of 
implementation and to determine the "reasonable period of time" on the basis of that method.  Rather, 
the implementing Member retains the discretion to  choose its preferred method of implementation.32  
Nevertheless, it will be necessary for me to consid er certain aspects of the means of implementation 
proposed by each of the parties, as explained in more detail below. 
3. Particular Circumstances  
34. Article 21.3(c) requires that I determine the "reasonable period of time for implementation", 
establishes a guideline that this period "should not exceed 15 months", and directs that in fixing the 
relevant period I should have regard to "the particular circumstances" of this case. 
                                                      
31In this dispute, the Panel used the term "remote" supply to refer to: 
"any situation where the supplier, whether domestic or foreign , and the 
consumer of gambling and betting services are not physically together".  In other words, in situations of remote supply, the consumer of a service does 
not have to go to any type of outlet where the supply is supervised, be it a 
retail facility, a casino, a vending machine, etc.  Instead, the remote supplier 
offers the service directly to the cons umer through some means of distance 
communication.  Hence, cross-border  supply is necessarily remote, but 
remote supply amounts to "cross-border" supply only when the service 
supplier and the consumer are located in  territories of different Members. 
(Panel Report, para. 6.32;  original emphasis, footnote omitted) 
32See, for example, Awar d of the Arbitrator, EC – Hormones , para. 38;  Award of the Arbitrator, 
Australia – Salmon, para. 35;  Award of the Arbitrator, Korea – Alcoholic Beverages , para. 45;  Award of the 
Arbitrator, Chile – Price Band System , para. 32;  Award of the Arbitrator, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment ), 
para. 48;  Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Tariff Preferences , para. 30;  and Award of the Arbitrator, US – Oil 
Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 26.    WT/DS285/13 
 Page 13 
 
 
35. It is by now well established that a key dete rminant of the reasonable period of time for 
implementation is the nature of the implementing action that is to be taken.  Legislative action will, as 
a general rule, require more time than regulatory ru le-making, which in turn will normally need more 
time than implementation that can be achiev ed by means of an administrative decision.33  
36. In this arbitration, Antigua contends that th e United States can implement, in part, through 
executive action, and in part throu gh legislative action.  With respect  to what Antigua characterizes as 
the supply of "non-sports related and horseracing" gambling and betting services, Antigua argues that 
the United States can, and should, implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB through the issuance of an executive order by the United Stat es President that would clarify that the supply of 
such services from Antigua is not prohibited under the Wire Act, the Travel Act or the IGBA.
34  As 
regards the supply of "other sports-related" gambling and betting services, Antigua accepts that 
legislative change will be necessary in order to clar ify whether and how the Wire Act, the Travel Act 
and the IGBA apply to these activities. 
37. The United States maintains that I need not  address Antigua's arguments concerning 
implementation by executive order for at least three reasons.  First, and foremost, it is my role under 
Article 21.3(c) to determine a single reasonable period of time for implementation.  Since both parties 
agree that implementation by legislative means is re quired in this case, Antigua's argument that partial 
implementation could be achieved in  a shorter period of time is irrelevant.  For the United States, the 
only reasonable period of time that I am to de termine is the reasonable period of time for legislative  
implementation.  The United States points, in this respect, to two previous arbitrations in which a 
single reasonable period of time for implementation was determined, notwithstanding that the parties 
                                                      
33See, for example, Awar d of the Arbitrator, Australia – Salmon , para. 38;  Award of the Arbitrator, 
US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act , para. 34;  Award of the Arbitrator, Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents , 
para. 49;  Award of the Arbitrator, Canada – Patent Term , para. 41;  Award of the Arbitrator, Chile – Price 
Band System , para. 38;  Award of the Arbitrator, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) , para. 57;  and Award of 
the Arbitrator, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews , para. 26. 
34Specifically, Antigua argues that: 
... it is well within the power of the pr esident to issue an executive order to 
the agencies of the United States gove rnment to the effect that (i) these 
services may be lawfully offered by Antiguan operators to consumers in the United States and (ii) all enforcement and related action to the contrary, 
including (A) asset forfeitures, (B) restrictions on money transfers and use of 
financial instruments, (C) threats of federal prosecution by the DOJ against service providers to these industries, including advertisers, banks and credit 
card companies and processors, and (D) current pending prosecutions against 
persons operating these businesses, s hould in each instance immediately 
cease and desist. 
(Antigua's submission, para. 22;  footnote omitted) WT/DS285/13 
Page 14  
 
agreed that two different methods  of implementation were required.
35  Secondly, the United States 
rejects Antigua's distinction between the supply of  "non-sports related and horseracing" gambling and 
betting services, on the one hand, and the supply of  "other sports-relate d" gambling and betting 
services, on the other.  In the view of the United States, the three federal statutes at issue apply 
equally to, and prohibit, the supply of all forms of  remote gambling and betting services.  Thirdly, the 
United States contends that it is neither appropria te nor possible to achieve implementation in this 
dispute by means of a presidential executive order.  The order that Antigua contends the United States 
President should issue could not properly form the subject of an executive order.  Furthermore, the United States points out that it argued before the Panel that a presidential statement that accompanied the passage of the amendments to th e IHA made clear that nothing in that Act, as amended, overrides 
the previously enacted criminal laws relating to gambling.  Nevertheless, neither the Panel nor the 
Appellate Body considered that this presidential st atement was sufficient to resolve the ambiguity in 
the relationship between the IHA, on the one hand, a nd the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA, 
on the other.  Given that the presidential statement was not considered by the Panel or the Appellate 
Body to provide sufficient clarit y regarding this relationship, the United States submits that an 
executive order issued by the President would not do  so either.  For this reason, the United States 
emphasizes that the only means of implementation that will achieve the necessary clarification is 
legislative means. 
38. As I understand it, although there is no expr ess provision creating the power to issue 
executive orders, it is commonly accepted that the Un ited States President has the authority to issue 
such orders, and that such authority derives from the general executive powers vested in the President 
by Article II of the United States Constitution.
36  In practice, United States presidents do issue 
executive orders.  Nevertheless, the scope  of the authority to issue such orders, and the types of 
matters that may be dealt with by executive order, a ppear to be matters of some debate.  At the oral 
hearing, both parties agreed that the United Stat es President may not issue an executive order that 
contradicts an existing statute.  The parties disagr ee, however, on the issue of whether the Wire Act, 
the Travel Act and the IGBA, as they stand, prohibit the supply of "non-sports related and 
horseracing" gambling and betting services from Antigua to consumers in the United States. 
39. Neither the Panel nor the Appellate Body referre d to the distinction that Antigua now draws, 
namely between the United States' regulation of the supply of "non-sports related and horseracing" 
gambling and betting services, on the one hand, and its  regulation of the suppl y of "other sports-
related" gambling and betting services, on the other.  In response to a question at the oral hearing, 
                                                      
35Award of the Arbitrator, US – Hot-Rolled Steel ;  and Award of the Arbitrator, US – Oil Country 
Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews.  
36Antigua's submission, para. 17.  WT/DS285/13 
 Page 15 
 
 
Antigua acknowledged that neither report distingu ishes between types of gambling.  Moreover, it 
seems to me that the findings of both the Panel and the Appellate Body are based on the premise that 
each of the three statutes in question proh ibits a broad category of gambling activities.37 
40. In asking me to draw this distinction, therefor e, Antigua is effectively asking me to make a 
ruling concerning the meaning and scope of appli cation of United States municipal law.  I do not 
consider that it forms part of my mandate to do so, given that the findings of the Panel and the 
Appellate Body make no such distinction. 
41. Because I do not rule on whether the distinction asserted by Antigua exists, I need not, in this 
proceeding, resolve the issue of whether it is permis sible for an arbitrator under Article 21.3(c) of the 
DSU to determine more than one reasonable period of time for impl ementation.  I am not persuaded 
that the mere use of the indefinite article "a" in the phrase "a reasonable period of time" suffices, as 
the United States suggests, to establish definitively that  an arbitrator is authorized only to determine a 
single reasonable period of time for implementation in a dispute.  At the same time, conceptually, I 
have difficulty accepting that it may be possible to de termine, as Antigua seems to request me to do, 
two separate reasonable periods of time in respect of the same measure.38  I would not, however, want 
to exclude a priori, and without having carried out a thorough interpretative analysis of the relevant 
provisions of the DSU, the possibility that an arb itrator might be able to fix separate reasonable 
                                                      
37The Panel's explanation of the three federal laws is set out in paragraphs 6.360 to 6.380 of the Panel 
Report, and the Appellate Body's treatment of the three statutes is found in paragraphs 257-265 of the Appellate Body Report.  With respect to the Wire Act, the Pa nel observed that it prohibits "the use of a wire 
communication facility for, inter alia , the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers". 
(Panel Report, para. 6.362.  See also Appellate Body Report, para. 259)  As for the Travel Act, the Panel stated that it prohibits: 
... gambling activity that entails the su pply of gambling and betting services 
by 'mail or any facility' to the extent that such supply is undertaken by a "business enterprise involving gambling" that is prohibited under state law 
and provided that the other requirements in subparagraph (a) of the Travel 
Act have been met. 
(Panel Report, para. 6.370.  See also Appellate Body Report, para. 261) 
Lastly, the Panel explained that the IGBA prohibits: 
... gambling activity that entails th e conduct, finance, management, 
supervision, direction or ownership of all or part of such a business to the 
extent that such supply is undertaken by a "gambling business" that is prohibited under state law and provided that the other requirements in sub-
paragraph (b)(1) of the Illegal Gambling Business Act have been met. 
(Panel Report, para. 6.377.  See also Appellate Body Report, para. 263) 
38Essentially, Antigua is asking me to determine two separate reasonable periods of time for the United 
States to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulin gs regarding the Wire Act, two separate reasonable 
periods of time for the United States to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings regarding the Travel Act, and two separate reasonable periods of time for the United States to implement the DSB's 
recommendations and rulings regarding the IGBA. WT/DS285/13 
Page 16  
 
periods of time for separate measures.  It is tr ue that, to date, no arbitrator has done so.
39  Yet it is also 
true that, to date, no arbitrat or has been asked to do so. 
42. Having declined to rule on the distinction on which Antigua bases its assertion that the United 
States could undertake two separate methods of impl ementation, I need not consider the reasonable 
period of time that would be necessary for implementa tion by means of an executive order.  I turn, 
instead, to the question of the reasonable period of time needed for the United States to implement by 
legislative means. 
43. In response to a question at the oral hearing, Antig ua suggested that even if I were to consider 
that the United States enjoys the discretion to decide to implement by legislative means, rather than by 
means of an executive order, then the United States should be required to "pay the price" for having 
chosen a "complicated, more lengthy way" of impl ementing rather than another available method that 
would be shorter.  Thus, submits Antigua, I should reduce the reasonable period of time for legislative 
implementation.  Given that I do not rule on the di stinction on which Antigua bases its assertion that 
two separate means of implementation are possible in this case, I need not decide whether a Member's 
decision to opt for one means of implementation (leg islative) notwithstanding th at another, more rapid 
means of implementation has been demonstrated to be  available, could affect the determination of the 
reasonable period of time for implementati on under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU. 
44. Antigua and the United States agree that, as prev ious arbitrators have stated, the "reasonable 
period of time" under Article 21.3(c) should be "the shortest period possible within the legal system of 
the Member to implement the relevant recommendations  and rulings of the DSB", in the light of the 
"particular circumstances" of the dispute.40  Yet, it is useful to recall that the DSU does not refer to the 
"shortest period possible for implementation within the legal system" of the implementing Member.  
Rather, this is a convenient phrase that has been used by previous arbitrators to describe their task.  I 
do not, however, view this standard as one that stands  in isolation from the text of the DSU.  In my 
view, the determination of the "shortest period possi ble for implementation" can, and must, also take 
due account of the two principles that are expressly mentioned in Article 21 of the DSU, namely reasonableness and the need for prompt compliance.   Moreover, as differences in previous awards 
involving legislative implementation by the Unite d States have shown, and as the text of 
                                                     
 
39In Award of the Arbitrator, US – Hot-Rolled Steel , the Arbitrator determin ed a single reasonable 
period of time of 15 months (para. 40);  and in Award of the Arbitrator, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset 
Reviews, the Arbitrator determined a single reasonable period of time for implementation of 12 months 
(para. 53). 
40Award of the Arbitrator, Chile – Price Band System , para. 34 (quoting Award of the Arbitrator,  US – 
1916 Act , para. 32).  See also Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Hormones , para. 26;  Award of the Arbitrator, 
Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents , para. 47;  Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Tariff Preferences , para. 26;  and 
Award of the Arbitrator, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews , para. 25.  WT/DS285/13 
 Page 17 
 
 
Article 21.3(c) prescribes, each arbitrator must take account of "particular circumstances" relevant to 
the case at hand.  Strict insistence on the "shortest period possible for implementation within the legal 
system" of the implementing Member would, in my vi ew, tie an arbitrator's hands and prevent him or 
her from properly identifying and weighing the par ticular circumstances that are determinative of 
"reasonableness" in each individual case.41 
45. The United States raises, as a "particular circumstance" relevant to my determination, the 
complexity of the legislation that will be necess ary in order to implement the recommendations and 
rulings of the DSB in this case.  The United States c ontrasts the complexity of the task of eliminating 
discrimination in this case with the relative simplic ity involved in amending the statutory term of 
patent protection in Canada – Patent Term .42 
46. I agree with the United States that the legislativ e task faced by its Congress in this dispute is 
more complex than the one confronted by the Canadian Parliament in Canada – Patent Term .  I attach 
some significance to the fact that, as the United St ates explained at the oral hearing, the field of 
internet gambling is one that is highly regulated in  the United States.  A myriad of interconnected and 
overlapping laws apply to these activities, including state and federal laws, and criminal and civil 
                                                      
41With respect to the overriding principle of "reasonableness" I find it useful, like the Arbitrator in US – 
Hot-Rolled Steel  (para. 25), to refer to the Appellate Body's elaboration of the meaning of the word 
"reasonable", albeit in another context.  In its Report in US – Hot-Rolled Steel , the Appellate Body stated that 
the word "reasonable": 
… implies a degree of flexibility that involves consideration of all of the 
circumstances of a particular case.  What is "reasonable" in one set of 
circumstances may prove to be le ss than "reasonable " in different 
circumstances.  This suggests that what constitutes a reasonable period or a reasonable time under Article 6.8 and Annex II of the  Anti-Dumping 
Agreement , should be defined on a case-by-case basis, in the light of the 
specific circumstances of  each investigation. 
In sum, a "reasonable period" must be interpreted consistently with the 
notions of flexibility and balance that are inherent in the concept of 
"reasonableness", and in a manner that allows for account to be taken of the particular circumstances of each case. 
(Appellate Body Report, paras. 84-85) 
42In paragraph 12 of its submission, the United States quotes the following statement from 
paragraphs 55 and 56 of my award in Canada – Patent Term : 
In prescribing a precise result, that is, the duration of the minimum period of 
patent protection, Article 33 of the TRIPS Agreement is quite different from 
provisions which limit only marginally the discretion of the legislator, such 
as prohibitions of discrimination between imported and domestic goods or services.  Such discrimination can, of course, be eliminated in several ways, 
while a violation of Article 33 of  the TRIPS Agreement can only be 
remedied through one action, that is, by providing for the required minimum period of patent protection. 
Thus, with respect to the minimum period of patent protection, Article 33 of 
the TRIPS Agreement leaves no room for any legislative discretion or 
legislative choices . (emphasis added by the United States) WT/DS285/13 
Page 18  
 
statutes.  For this reason, a careful examination of  how proposed legislation will impact the existing 
regulatory regime will be a necessary part of the pr ocess of adopting implementing legislation in this 
dispute. 
47. I am also conscious of the fact that any legislation adopted by the United States will 
inevitably, as the Appellate Body Report demonstrat es, bear on questions of public morals and public 
order.
43  It seems to me that, within the field of pub lic morals and public orde r, only prohibitions are 
simple.  In other words, to the extent that the United States may consider authorizing any form of 
internet gambling or wagering, this will increase the co mplexity of any legislative solution.  The more 
such activities are authorized , the greater lengths the legislator will have to go to in order to ensure 
that sufficient safeguards are in place to make the system consistent with, and acceptable under, 
prevailing standards of public morals and public or der.  This is, in my view, separate from the 
question of contentiousness.  However, the United St ates has not, in this proceeding, explained in any 
precise manner how it intends to implement the reco mmendations and rulings of the DSB.  The few 
indications that it has given suggest that it is leaning more in the direction of "confirming" or "clarifying" the prohibitions on th e remote supply of gambling and betting services, rather than in the 
direction of authorizing, even in part, the supply of  such services.  In the absence of any more specific 
information from the United States on this issue, I do not consider the fact that the legislative activity 
called for in this case will inevitably touch on quest ions of public morals and public order to be a 
"particular circumstance" affecting my dete rmination of the reasonable period of time. 
48. The United States also submits that I should take  account of the fact that several previous 
Congresses have considered bills related to internet gambling, but that none of these bills has passed.  
The United States did not, however, provide me with any explanation as to the reasons why such bills 
have not been enacted into law.  I am, therefor e, unable to determine whether Congress' inability to 
pass previous bills was related to their complexity —a relevant particular circumstance—or to their 
contentiousness—something that would not constitute a relevant particular circumstance for purposes 
of my determination.
44 
                                                      
43Appellate Body Report, para. 373(D)(iii)(c). 
44Award of the Arbitrator, Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents, para. 60;  Award of the Arbitrator, US – 
Section 110(5) Copyright Act , paras. 41-42;  Award of the Arbitrator, Canada – Patent Term,  para. 58;  and 
Award of the Arbitrator, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment ), para. 61.  WT/DS285/13 
 Page 19 
 
 
49. As regards the specific details of the United St ates legislative process, the United States and 
Antigua agree on the basic steps involved.45  They also agree that the onl y steps that are required by 
law are the approval of a bill by both chambers  of Congress as well as presidential signature.  
Furthermore, both parties accept that there is no fi xed time frame attached to any one of the steps 
involved in the United States legislative process.  Finally, both parties accept that, as previous arbitrators have observed, there is a considerable degree of flexibility inherent in the United States 
legislative system.
46 
50. In my view, the need for prompt complian ce means that it is incumbent upon the United 
States to use the flexibility available in its legisl ative process to ensure rapid implementation.  The 
United States is not, however, obliged to have recourse to extraordinary legislative procedures.47 
51. The United States suggests that another "particular circumstance" that has a strong influence 
on the passage of legislation within the United St ates and that should, therefore, influence my 
determination in this proceeding, is the Congressiona l schedule.  The United States points out that the 
vast majority of legislation is passed near the end of a Congress.  Each Congress lasts for two years 
and consists of two sessions, each of which runs over one calendar year.  The United States Congress 
is currently in the first session of the 109th Congress.  Although the United States submits that it 
would be impossible to pass the necessary implementi ng legislation by the end of the first session of 
the 109th Congress, currently scheduled to end on 30 September 2005, the United States does not 
request that I fix the reasonable period of time to  coincide with the end of the second session of the 
109th Congress, at the end of 2006.  Rather, the Un ited States argues that, "much as the end of a 
Congressional session spurs legislative activity, the opportunity to pass legislation may be greater prior to a Congressional recess."
48  Thus, reasons the United States, it would be appropriate for the 
reasonable period of time for implementation to e xpire just before Congress begins its August 2006 
recess, as this would provide a concrete impe tus for passage of the necessary legislation. 
                                                      
45At the oral hearing Antigua indi cated that it accepts the descriptio n of the process provided by the 
United States, which is summarized supra, para. 13. 
46Award of the Arbitrator, US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act, para. 45;  Award of the Arbitrator, US – 
1916 Act , para. 39;  Award of the Arbitrator, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment ), paras. 63-64 and 74. 
47Award of the Arbitrator, Korea – Alcoholic Beverages , para. 42;  Award of the Arbitrator, US – 
Section 110(5) Copyright Act , paras. 32 and 45;  Award of the Arbitrator, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) , 
para. 43;  and Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Tariff Preferences , para. 42. 
48United States' submission, para. 35. WT/DS285/13 
Page 20  
 
52. I do not take the view that a legislature's schedul e is totally irrelevant to the determination of 
the reasonable period of time for implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.  
Rather, it seems to me that this is a circumstance  that may or may not be relevant depending on the 
particular case.
49  Thus, for example, in Canada – Patent Term  I did not consider Canada's 
parliamentary schedule to be determinative of the reasonable period of time in the circumstances of that case.
50  In this case, I do not attach much weight to this "particular circumstance", for the reasons 
that follow.  The United States h as taken the position that it would be appropriate for the reasonable 
period of time to expire just before Congress begi ns its August 2006 recess.  In response to a written 
request that I addressed to the United States prior to  the oral hearing, the United States informed me 
that the tentative 2006 Congressional Schedule is not  yet available.  The United States nonetheless 
indicated that in all likelihood the recesses taken by  Congress in 2006 will closely resemble those in 
the 2005 Schedule, which the United States has provided.51  I note, in this respect, that in addition to 
its August recess (the "Summer District Work Pe riod"), Congress takes a number of recesses of a 
week or more throughout the year.  In 2005, these in clude:  a "Presidents Day District Work Period" 
in February;  a "Spring District Work Period" in March/April around the time of Easter;  a "Memorial 
Day District Work Period" at the end of May/early  June;  and an "Independence Day District Work 
Period" around the time of the 4th of July.  In my view, the United States' argument that a recess period spurs legislative action must apply in the same way to these reces ses as it does to Congress' 
August recess and to the end of a session of Congr ess.  Thus, Congress has, throughout the year, a 
number of breaks that could serve to push forward the legislative process. 
53. Antigua emphasizes the speed with which the 109th Congress has passed legislation to date, 
pointing out that this Congress adopted 15 measures through 19 June 2005.
52  In Antigua's view, this 
illustrates why the United States needs no more than six months in order to achieve legislative implementation in this case.  The United States, how ever, argues that the rapidity with which these 
measures were passed in the first half of the 109t h session of Congress is not at all representative of 
the ordinary workings of the United States legisla tive process.  According to the United States, these 
15 measures represent only a tiny fraction of all the la ws that will be passed in the 109th Congress.  
Moreover, of these 15 measures, four dealt with disast er relief or emergencies, three were legislative 
packages that had been thoroughly considered in a previous Congress or Congresses, four dealt with 
                                                     
 
49Award of the Arbitrator, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment ), paras. 69-70. 
50Award of the Arbitrator, Canada – Patent Term , paras. 65-66. 
51Exhibit US-9 to the United States' submission. 
52According to Antigua, of these 15 measures:  "two became law within a day of introduction, the 
longest period from introduction to adoption was 91 days, and the average number of days from introduction to 
adoption was 43.27 days." (Antigua's submission, para. 54;  footnotes omitted)  WT/DS285/13 
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the renewal of measures previously enacted but due to expire, and four involved the naming of 
buildings and museum regents.53 
54. I find the rebuttal arguments of the United Stat es concerning the work of the 109th Congress 
to be persuasive.  Given that the 109th Congress h as only been in session for half a year, it follows 
that any law that it has adopted during that time mu st have been adopted in less than half a year.  
Taken in isolation, however, that fact is not probativ e of the average length of time that it takes to pass 
legislation, nor of the relationship between the c ontent of specific legislation and the length of time 
that is required for it to be passed .  In the absence of any additional  context that would allow me to 
evaluate the significance of the time taken to pass th e 15 measures cited by Antigua, I do not consider 
this to be a particular circumstan ce relevant to my determination. 
55. Antigua also points to the fact that the United States Congress took just five months to pass 
the 2000 amendments to the IHA.  I take note of this  fact.  Given that these amendments relate to the 
same field as the one in which the United States in tends to implement in this case, I consider it 
relevant that Congress was able to act  so expeditiously on a prior occasion. 
4. Article 21.2 of the DSU  
56. Antigua requests that, in making my determina tion, I apply Article 21.2 of the DSU and pay 
particular attention to Antigua's interests as a developing country Member of the WTO.  Antigua 
underlines the importance of the cross-border gamb ling and betting service industry to the economic 
health and growth of Antigua, as well as the strain that this dispute has placed on Antigua's limited 
resources.  Antigua suggests that I should rely upon Article 21.2 of the DSU in two ways.  First, I 
should use Article 21.2 to examine the consiste ncy of the United States' proposed means of 
implementation with the recommendations and rulings  of the DSB and with the covered agreements 
generally.  Secondly, Antigua submits that I should rely on Article 21.2 to require the United States to 
use the considerable flexibility that exists within its  legislative system to achieve implementation in a 
shorter period of time than I might otherwise do. 
                                                      
53United States' statement at the oral hearing. WT/DS285/13 
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57. The United States argues that Article 21.2 is no t relevant to my determination in this 
proceeding.  For the United States, Article 21.2 can be relevant in an arbitration to determine the 
reasonable period of time for impl ementation only when it is the implementing  Member that is a 
developing country.  This is because the task of an  Article 21.3(c) arbitrator is to determine the 
shortest possible period of time for implementati on within the legal system of the implementing 
Member.  The fact that the complaining Member may be a developing country cannot, in the view of 
the United States, have any impact on such a determination. 
58. Article 21.2 provides: 
Particular attention should be paid to  matters affecting the interests of 
developing country Members with respect to measures which have been subject to dispute settlement. 
59. On its face, this provision does not contain any limitation of the type suggested by the United 
States.  In other words, the text of Article 21. 2 does not expressly limit its scope of application to 
developing country Members as implementing, rather than as complaining, parties to a dispute.  Any 
such limitation, if it exists, must therefore be f ound in the context and/or object and purpose of this 
provision.
54 
60. Before considering relevant context for the interpretation of Article 21.2 of the DSU, 
however, I consider it useful to examine in further detail the words that are used in this provision.  
The provision requires that "particular attention" be pa id to:  (i) matters;  (ii) affecting the interests of 
developing country Members;  (iii) with respect to the measures at issue.  At first blush, it is not clear 
whether the word "matters" in Article 21.2 h as the same meaning as elsewhere in the DSU55, or 
whether it refers simply to the subject matter covered by Article 21.  In any event, it seems to me that 
Article 21.2 contemplates a clear nexus between the interests of the developing country invoking the 
provision and the measures at issue in the dispute, as well as a demonstration of the adverse affects of such measures on the interests of the de veloping country Member(s) concerned. 
61. Turning briefly to the context in the light of wh ich Article 21.2 must be interpreted, I note that 
the provision is located within Article 21, which is entitled " Surveillance of Implementation of 
                                                     
 
54I note that the Arbitrator in EC – Tariff Preferences identified, but did not decide, the issue of 
whether Article 21.2 might apply to developing country Members whose interests are affected by measures at issue in the dispute but which are not parties to the arbitration.  (Award of the Arbitrator, para. 59)  No such 
issue arises in this arbitration. 
55The Appellate Body has held, for example, that th e "matter" referred to in Article 7 of the DSU 
"consists of two elements:  the specific measures  at issue and the legal basis of the complaint  (or the claims )." 
(Appellate Body Report, Guatemala – Cement I , para. 72;  original emphasis)  WT/DS285/13 
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Recommendations and Rulings ".  The second paragraph of Article 21, like the first56, sets out a broad 
principle that guides and informs the more specific  paragraphs that follow, including Article 21.3.  
Given that Article 21 contains a number of additio nal paragraphs dealing with different aspects of 
surveillance and implementation, it seems likely that  Article 21.2 informs each of the subsequent 
paragraphs in a different manner.  Arguably, for example, Article 21.2 could constitute a legislative 
expression of a factor that is to constitute a "par ticular circumstance" to be taken into account under 
Article 21.3(c).  The last two paragraphs of Article  21 are also, as Antigua pointed out at the oral 
hearing, of potential use in interp reting the scope and role of Article 21.2.  Each of those provisions 
also deals with developing country Members of  the WTO at the stage of surveillance and 
implementation of DSB recommendations and rulings.57  Yet, contrary to Article 21.2, both 
Article 21.7 and Article 21.8 expressly apply to the developing country Members that brought the 
case, that is, to developing countries as complaining parties.   
62. The significance to be attached to this contex t, and the precise nature of the relationship 
between Article 21.2 and Article 21.3(c), are not issues th at need be resolved in this arbitration.  This 
is because, in my view, Antigua has not satisfied th e criteria expressly mentioned in Article 21.2.  In 
its submission, Antigua pointed out that its population, as well as its gross domestic product per 
capita, are tiny fractions of those of the United St ates.  Antigua also asserted that the "continuation 
and responsible further development of the well -regulated cross-border gambling and betting service 
industry in Antigua is critical to the economic health and growth of the country"58, and that the 
"prosecution of the Dispute has put considerable stress on the very limited resources available to 
Antigua."59  In response to questioning at the oral hearing, Antigua explained that, prior to 1998, the 
cross-border gambling and betting industry employed a significant percentage of the Antiguan work force, but that the number of active firms and employees now involved in the sector has shrunk significantly.  Antigua did not, however, provide specific data in support of these arguments.  Nor did 
Antigua seek to demonstrate any clear relationshi p between the decline of its industry and the 
measures which were subject to this dispute, that is, the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBA. 
                                                     
 
56Article 21.1 stipulates that "[p]rompt compliance with recommendations or rulings of the DSB is 
essential in order to ensure effective resolutio n of disputes to the benefit of all Members." 
57Paragraphs 7 and 8 of Article 21 provide as follows: 
7. If the matter is one which has been raised by a developing country 
Member, the DSB shall consider what further action it might take which 
would be appropriate to the circumstances. 
8. If the case is one brought by a developing country Member, in 
considering what appropriate action might  be taken, the DSB shall take into 
account not only the trade coverage of  measures complained of, but also 
their impact on the economy of developing country Members concerned. 
58Antigua's submission, para. 58. 
59Antigua's submission, para. 59. WT/DS285/13 
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63. In the absence of any more speci fic evidence or elaboration of the affected interests of 
Antigua and their relationship with the measures at i ssue, I am not persuaded that the criteria referred 
to in Article 21.2 have been satisfied.  For this r eason, I need  not consider further the issue of the 
precise relationship between paragra phs 2 and 3 of Article 21, nor how I might apply Article 21.2 so 
as to pay "particular attention" to the interests of Antigua in fixing the reasonable period of time for implementation by the United States in this dispute. 
5. Summary
 
64. The United States, as the implementing Member, bears the burden of persuading me that the 
15 month period that it proposes would constitute a "reasonable period of time" within the meaning of 
Article 21.3(c).  I accept as relevant "particular ci rcumstances" the following considerations raised by 
the United States:  (i) implementation will occur by le gislative means;  (ii) the task of implementing 
by legislation is complicated both by the objectiv e of eliminating, or clarifying the absence of, 
discrimination in the treatment of Antiguan a nd domestic service suppliers, and by the highly 
regulated nature of the field of internet gambling an d betting in which this objective must be achieved.  
I take note of, but attach little significance to, Congr ess' likely 2006 schedule.  Taken together, these 
factors do not, in my view, suffice to discharge th e United States' burden of persuading me that 15 
months would be a reasonable period of time for implem entation in this dispute, particularly given the 
acknowledged flexibility in the United States legislative process. 
65. I also accept as a relevant "particular circumstan ce" the fact that, as Antigua points out, the 
United States Congress passed the 2000 amendm ents to the IHA in only five months. 
66. I am not persuaded that several other factors invoked by the United States (to date, Congress 
has not been able to pass any of the bills relating to internet gambling that have been proposed) or 
Antigua (the asserted availability of partial implem entation through a presidential executive order, the 
fact that the 109th Congress has already passed 15 laws in approximately 6 months of work, or Antigua's status as a developing country Membe r) are properly characterized as particular 
circumstances relevant to my determination in this case. 
67. Lastly, I wish to observe that, in the four pr evious Arbitrations in which the issue of the 
reasonable period of time for implementation by legislative  means within the United States system  WT/DS285/13 
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arose, each arbitrator determined a different reasonable period of time, ranging from 10 to 15 
months.60 
IV. The Award 
68. In the light of what has been st ated above, I determine that the "reasonable period of time" for 
the United States to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute is 
11 months and 2 weeks from 20 April 2005, which was the date on which the DSB adopted the Panel 
and Appellate Body Reports.  The reasonable peri od of time will therefore expire on 3 April 2006. 
 
Signed in the original at Geneva this 28th day of July 2005 by: 
 
 
   
________________________ 
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann 
Arbitrator 
                                                     
 
60In US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act,  the Arbitrator determined that 12 months would be a 
reasonable period of time (para. 47);  in US – 1916 Act , the Arbitrator determined that 10 months would be a 
reasonable period of time (para. 45);  in US – Hot-Rolled Steel , the Arbitrator determined that 15 months would 
be a reasonable period of time (para. 40);  and in US – Offset Act  (Byrd Amendment),  the Arbitrator determined 
that 11 months would be a reasonable period of time for the United States to implement the recommendations 
and rulings of the DSB in that dispute (para. 83).