RESTRICTED  WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  WT/DSB/M/207 
26 April 2006 
 (06-1913) 
Dispute Settlement Body 
17 March 2006  
 
 
 
MINUTES OF MEETING 
 
Held in the Centre William Rappard  
on 17 March 2006  
 
Chairman:  Mr. Muhamad Noor Yacob (Malaysia) 
 
Subjects discussed : Page  
 
1. Surveillance of implementation of recommendations adopted by the DSB.........................2  
(a) United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropr iations Act of 1998:  Status report by 
the United States .............................................................................................................. ...........2  
(b) United States – Anti-dumping measures on certain hot-rolled steel products from 
Japan:  Status report by  the United States...................................................................................5  
(c) United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act:  Status report by the 
United States .................................................................................................................. .............5  
(d) European Communities – Protection of trad emarks and geographical indications for 
agricultural products and foodstuffs:  Status  report by the European Communities .................6  
(e) United States – Measures affecting the cr oss-border supply of gambling and betting 
services:  Status report by the Unite d States...............................................................................7  
2. Implementation by the European Co mmunities of the recommendations and 
rulings of the DSB in relation to "European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of  Bananas"and related subsequent WTO 
proceedings .................................................................................................................... ............8
 
(a) Statements by Honduras, Ni caragua and Panama.......................................................................8  
3. United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000:  
Implementation of the recommenda tions adopted by the DSB ..........................................11  
(a) Statements by Canada, the European Communities and Japan.................................................11  
4. United States – Countervailing measures concerning certain products from the 
European Communities..........................................................................................................1 4 
(a) Statement by the Eur opean Communities.................................................................................14  
5. European Communities – Customs classifica tion of frozen boneless chicken cuts...........15  
(a) Statements by Brazil and Thailand ...........................................................................................15  
6. Mexico – Anti-dumping duties on steel pipes and tubes from Guatemala ........................17  
(a) Request for the establishment of  a panel by Guatemala ...........................................................17  WT/DSB/M/207 
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  7.
 Turkey – Measures affecting the importation of rice ..........................................................17  
(a) Request for the establishment of a panel by the United States .................................................17  
8. United States – Sunset reviews of anti-dumping measures on oil country tubular 
goods from Argentina........................................................................................................... ..19 
(a) Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Argentina:  Request for the establishment of 
a panel........................................................................................................................ ...............19  
9. United States – Measures affecting trade in large civil aircraft .........................................20  
(a) Initiation of the procedures for developing information concerning serious prejudice 
under Annex V of the SCM Agreement and designation of the representative referred 
to in paragraph 4 of that Annex ................................................................................................ 20 
 
 
1. Surveillance of implementation of recommendations adopted by the DSB 
(a) United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropr iations Act of 1998:  Status report by the 
United States (WT/DS176/11/Add.40) 
 
(b) United States – Anti-dumping measures on certain hot-rolled steel products from Japan:  
Status report by the United States (WT/DS184/15/Add.40) 
 (c) United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act:  Status report by the United States 
(WT/DS160/24/Add.15) 
 
(d) European Communities – Protection of tr ademarks and geographical indications for 
agricultural products and foodstuffs:  Stat us report by the European Communities 
(WT/DS174/25/Add.2 – WT/DS290/23/Add.2) 
 
(e) United States – Measures affecting the cross- border supply of gambling and betting services:  
Status report by the United States (WT/DS285/15) 
 1. The Chairman
 said that Article 21.6 of the DSU required that "unless the DSB decides 
otherwise, the issue of implementation of the re commendations or rulings shall be placed on the 
agenda of the DSB meeting after six months follo wing the date of establishment of the reasonable 
period of time pursuant to paragraph 3 and shall remain on the DSB's agenda until the issue is 
resolved".  He proposed that the five sub-items to which he had just referred be considered separately. 
(a) United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropria tions Act of 1998:  Status report by the 
United States (WT/DS176/11/Add.40) 
2. The Chairman  drew attention to document WT/DS176/ 11/Add.40, which contained the status 
report by the United States on progress in the impl ementation of the DSB's recommendations in the 
case concerning US Section 211 Omni bus Appropriations Act of 1998. 
3. The representative of the United States  said that his country had provided a status report in 
this dispute on 6 March 2006 in accordance with Artic le 21.6 of the DSU.  As noted in the report, 
several legislative proposals relating to S ection 211 that would implement the DSB's 
recommendations and rulings in this dispute had been  introduced in the current Congress, both in the 
US Senate and the US House of Representatives.  The US administration was working with the US 
Congress to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings.  WT/DSB/M/207 
 Page 3 
 
 
  4. The representative of th e European Communities  said that, once again, the United States 
could not but repeat its status report which basica lly had not changed for a year.  The United States 
was a key promoter of the TRIPS Agreement and remained strongly committed to pursue strong and 
non-discriminatory protection of intellectual property rights worldwide.  This stood in sharp contrast 
with the passivity of the United States when found in breach of its TRIPS obligations, not just in this 
case but also in the Section 110 dispute, which w ould be discussed later in the course of the present 
meeting.  Effective protection of intellectual property rights worldwide was essential for the development of international trade, which was a sh ared objective of the EC and the United States.  
Repealing bills were pending in the US Congress.  Their adoption would remove this discriminatory 
legislation that was driven by specific interest a nd would bring a satisfactory solution to this dispute 
in conformity with the shared objective. 
5. The representative of Cuba
 said that, once again, his country was reviewing the 
implementation of the DSB's recommendations in the dispute:  "United States – Section 211 Omnibus 
Appropriations Act of 1998".   He noted that this item had been on the DSB's agenda for more than 
four years and should really be called a non-comp liance review.  The United States had repeatedly 
submitted status reports which were identical except for the date and failed to indicate anything about 
the measures the United States should be taking in or der to comply with its WTO obligations.  The 
United States could not make any such statement simp ly because nothing was in fact being done other 
than deceiving and making a mockery of the DSB. 
6. It was quite clear that the United States was now protected by the "Understanding" reached 
with the EC, which set no deadline for US compliance with its obligations while guaranteeing that the 
United States would not be subject to retaliati on for non-compliance.  It had become customary 
practice to see the United States continually failin g to comply with its WTO obligations whilst 
questioning and putting pressure on other countries to honour their obligations.  This was a clear case 
of double standards.  Cuba wondered whether one c ould have faith in the multilateral trading system 
based on rules which required compliance and on the supposed equality of obligations for all 
participants when the attitude of one of its main acto rs was that of constant and blatant defiance.  By 
contrast, developing countries had gone out of their way to respect the principle of prompt compliance 
provided for in the DSU and had implemented the DS B's recommendations without delay, in spite of 
difficulties and  efforts. 
7. Cuba did not relinquish nor would it relinquish  its right to have recourse to the dispute 
settlement mechanism whenever it co nsidered this to be appropriate .  Cuba was concerned about the 
systemic implications of such understandings reached  by the parties since any decision taken by the 
DSB constituted an obligation on Members.  Compliance with such rulings was in the general interest 
and could not and must not be circumvented by any Member.  Cuba, once again, called upon Members to enforce the multilateral trade agreements  as well as their own decisions and requested the 
United States to comply immediately, unconditionally and without further delay with all of the DSB's 
rulings and recommendations, in particular those rela ting to the dispute in question by abolishing the 
unfair and discriminatory Section 211. 
8. The representative of China
 recalled that his delegation had ma de a statement on this matter at 
the previous DSB meeting and, due to systemic implications, wished to express continued concern 
about the lack of progress in this dispute.  He  recalled that the DSB had adopted both the Panel and 
the Appellate Body Reports pertaining to this dispute on 2 February 2002.  The Reports had 
concluded that Section 211 was inconsistent with US obligations under the relevant WTO 
Agreements.  Since then, more than four years ha d passed.  China appreciated the efforts made by the 
United States during these four years towards the implementation of the DSB's rulings, but regretted that concrete implementation measures were still not  in sight, and there was no indication when the 
matter would be resolved to the satisfaction of the parties to the dispute and other Members.  China 
noted that the measure taken by the United States in this dispute had nullified not only the interest of 
the EC under the WTO covered agreements, but also the interests of many other WTO Members, such WT/DSB/M/207 
Page 4  
 
  as Cuba, although it was not a party to this dispute.  It was true that every WTO Member had the right 
to recourse provided for under the dispute settlement  mechanism, but in practice for many developing 
countries it was a very heavy burden to do so.  Theref ore, it was understandable that Cuba expected to 
benefit from the full implementation of the DSB's ruli ngs in this dispute and paid attention to the 
pending implementation status.  In the meantime, th e prompt implementation in this dispute was not 
only beneficial for other Members, but also for th e United States, who was the advocate of intellectual 
property rights in other fora.  Besides, such delays  caused systemic concerns about the efficiency of 
the dispute settlement system.  China believed that  the WTO dispute settlement should constitute an 
effective and efficient system for trade disputes,  which would provide a degree of certainty and 
predictability in international trad e to all Members.  Once again, Ch ina wished to join the EC and 
Cuba in urging the United States to implement the decision of the DSB in this dispute as soon as 
possible. 
9. The representative of Brazil
 noted that, by stating twice in Articles 3.3 and 21.1 that prompt 
compliance was essential to the proper functioning  of the WTO and the maintenance of a proper 
balance between the rights and obligations of Memb ers, the DSU was absolutely clear that prompt 
compliance was one of the cornerstones of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.  Situations like 
the one faced by Members in the present case were  evidently not in line with that fundamental 
principle.  Moreover, non-compliance situations lack ing perspective of solution altered the carefully 
negotiated balance of rights and obligations to the detriment not only of the complaining party, but 
also to the whole Membership.  Brazil urged the United States to take the necessary and urgent steps 
to put an end to the violations found in this dispute. 
10. The representative of India  said that, as stated by his country in the past two DSB meetings, it 
was a matter of great concern to India that this item had been on the DSB's agenda for such a long 
period of time without any indication when the ma tter would be resolved.  Status reports being 
received on this agenda item had given no information about when the matter would be resolved. 
India reiterated that Members needed to reflect upon the systemic concerns regarding efficacy of the 
dispute settlement system. 
11. The representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela  said that his delegation wished to 
be fully associated with the statement made by Cuba since the US legislation in question was WTO-inconsistent.  His country had, in the past, express ed its concern about the lack of solid evidence 
before the DSB of any serious intention on the part of the United States to remedy the state of non-compliance.  His country was also concerned about the EC's decision not to request authorization to 
suspend concessions vis-à-vis  the United States for an indefin ite period.  The failure to act 
undermined the effectiveness of the TRIPS Agre ement and plunged Members into a state of 
uncertainty.  While it was true that the EC was s overeign in suspending c oncessions, this situation 
was a dangerous exercise of discr etion and had given rise to suspicion and distrust.  The continued 
non-compliance of the United States cast doubt on  the credibility of the DSU and the WTO 
Agreements.  It appeared that the United States w as assuming the unilateral right to comply with the 
DSU thus failing to recognize its obligation.  Th is undermined the sovereignty of both the DSB and 
the Appellate Body.  As had been stated at th e past two DSB meetings, such arbitrariness and 
discretion made other Members very reticent to wards negotiating and undertaking new commitments 
within the framework of the DSU or the Doha Round negotiations.  His country urged the United 
States to find a proper solution to this matter within the framework of the WTO Agreements. 
12. The representative of Canada
 said that his country thanked the United States for its status 
report in this case.  Like other Members, Canada c ontinued to be disappointed that the United States 
had not yet been able to bring itself into compliance with the DSB's recommendations and rulings.  The WTO dispute settlement mechanism was best serv ed when, in accordance with Article 21.2 of the 
DSU, Members met their obligations in a tim ely manner and in accordance with the DSB's 
recommendations.  At the same time, Members should not lose sight of Article 3.7 of the DSU, in 
which they had agreed that, "[a] solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent  WT/DSB/M/207 
 Page 5 
 
 
  with the covered agreements is clearly to be prefer red."  Indeed, Article 3.4 of the DSU provided that 
the rulings and recommendations of DSB "shall be ai med at achieving a satisfactory settlement of the 
matter...".  Members had the right, and every inte rest, to ensure that an y such settlements were 
consistent with the WTO Agreement.  However, wh ere they sought, at any stage of the proceedings, 
to settle their disagreements and disputes, parties to  a dispute should be encouraged in their efforts. 
13. The DSB took note  of the statements and agreed  to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting. 
(b) United States – Anti-dumping measures on certain hot-rolled steel products from Japan:  
Status report by the United States (WT/DS184/15/Add.40) 
14. The Chairman  drew attention to document WT/DS184/ 15/Add.40, which contained the status 
report by the United States on progress in the impl ementation of the DSB's recommendations in the 
case concerning US anti-dumping measures on certain hot-rolled steel products from Japan. 
15. The representative of the United States  stated that his country had provided a status report in 
this dispute on 6 March 2006, in accordance with Artic le 21.6 of the DSU.  As of 23 November 2002, 
the US authorities had addressed the DSB's recommendations and rulings with respect to the 
calculation of anti-dumping margins in the hot-rolled steel anti-dumping duty inv estigation at issue in 
this dispute.  Details were provided in document WT/DS184/15/Add.3.  The US administration 
continued to support specific legislative am endments that would implement the DSB's 
recommendations and rulings with respect to the US  anti-dumping duty statute, and was working with 
the US Congress to pass these amendments.  The US ad ministration would continue to work with the 
US Congress to enact legislation to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings. 
16. The representative of Japan  said that his delegation had noted the statement by the United 
States along with its latest status report stating that the US administration would continue to work with the US Congress to enact legislation H.R. 2473.  Japan renewed its strong hope that Bill 
H.R. 2473 would soon be approved in the US Congr ess.  Any further delay in implementation would 
undermine the credibility of the WTO dispute settleme nt system.  Japan would like to request, once 
again, that the United States make sincere effo rts to implement fully and promptly the DSB's 
recommendations and rulings. 
17. The DSB took note
 of the statements and agreed  to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting. 
(c) United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act:  Status report by the United States 
(WT/DS160/24/Add.15) 
18. The Chairman  drew attention to document WT/DS160/ 24/Add.15, which contained the status 
report by the United States on progress in the impl ementation of the DSB's recommendations in the 
case concerning Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act. 
19. The representative of the United States  stated that his country had provided a status report in 
this dispute on 6 March 2006, in accordance with Article  21.6 of the DSU.  As noted in the report, the 
US administration was working closely with the US Congress and was conferring with the EC in 
order to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of this matter. 
20. The representative of the European Communities  said that, once again, the EC wished to 
express its deep regret about the lack of progress by  the United States to solve this dispute.  He 
recalled that the Panel Report in th is dispute had been adopted in July 2001, but the United States had 
done little to address the problems arising from a piece of  legislation that violated intellectual property 
rights and hurt the interests of music creators.  The EC, therefore, called upon the United States to WT/DSB/M/207 
Page 6  
 
  take the necessary action to end the situation of non- compliance that had already lasted for too long.  
The EC reiterated its request to the United States to obtain inform ation on concrete initiatives of the 
US administration vis-à-vis  the US Congress.  Finally, the EC recalled that it had reserved its right to 
reactivate, at any point in time, the arbitration proceedings on retaliation. 
21. The DSB took note
 of the statements and agreed  to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting. 
(d) European Communities – Protection of trad emarks and geographical indications for 
agricultural products and foodstuffs:  Stat us report by the European Communities 
(WT/DS174/25/Add.2 – WT/DS290/23/Add.2) 
22. The Chairman  drew attention to document WT/D S174/25/Add.2 – WT/DS290/23/Add.2, 
which contained the status report by the Europ ean Communities on progress in the implementation of 
the DSB's recommendations in the case concerni ng protection of tradem arks and geographical 
indications for agricultural products and foodstuffs. 
23. The representative of the European Communities  stated that at the 20 January 2006 meeting,  
the EC had informed the DSB that the Europ ean Commission had proposed to the Council of the 
European Union a new regulation on geographical indications, which would implement the findings 
and recommendations of the DSB in this dispute.  As  stated in the status report already communicated 
to the DSB, this proposal was still under discussion w ithin the Council of the European Union and the 
European Parliament.  The EC was confident that the proposal would be adopted within the agreed 
reasonable period of time.  With regard to the concer ns raised by certain Members, he wished to refer 
to the clarifications provided by the EC at the 17 February 2005 DSB meeting.  In addition, the EC 
wished to note that the proposal was likely to unde rgo a number of changes in the course of on-going 
legislative procedure.  The EC expected that those changes would address the concerns expressed by 
other Members. 
24. The representative of the United States  said that his country thanked the EC for its status 
report concerning its proposed revised GI regulation, as well as for its statement.  As stated in past 
meetings, the United States wished to highlight its concerns that, in a number of respects, the 
proposed GI regulation appeared to introduce furt her encroachments on TRIPS-protected trademark 
rights beyond those in the current GI regulation.  Th ere also appeared to be a number of ways the 
proposed regulation would not provide  foreign nationals the same access to the EC GI system as EC 
nationals enjoyed.  This was the case both with r espect to the registration and protection of GIs and 
with respect to objections to the registration of EC GIs.  The United States also noted its continued 
concern about whether, under the proposed regula tion, all WTO Members would have even-handed 
access to the EC's GI registration system.  For inst ance, it appeared that only producers and processors 
might apply for a GI registration in the EC.  Yet, in some Members, producers and processors might not be in a position to own the GI in their country  of origin, and might not be permitted to establish 
the specifications of the GI.  The United States woul d welcome a dialogue with the EC to clarify that 
the proposed regulation would make GI registration available to nationals of Members whose system 
of GI protection differed from that of the EC.  Th e United States heard that the EC had mentioned that 
the proposed regulation might undergo a number of cha nges.  The United States expected that the EC 
would take the concerns that had just been outlined on trademark rights and the even-handed 
treatment of non-EC GI right holders into account in issuing  its final GI regulation. 
25. The representative of Australia
 said that her country thanked the EC for its status report in 
this case and for its statement made at the present m eeting on this matter.  Australia noted that this 
was the last regular DSB meeting before the expiry of the reasonable period of time for 
implementation in this dispute on 3 April 2006.  Aust ralia further noted that the EC's Agriculture and 
Fisheries Council was, as her country understood, to  consider adopting a revised GI regulation on 
Monday, 20 March 2006.  Australia looked forward to reviewing the revised regulation.  In terms of  WT/DSB/M/207 
 Page 7 
 
 
  its specific concerns, Australia recalled its comments made in relation to previous EC status reports 
on this matter.  Australia also joined the United States in welcoming the comments from the EC that 
the EC would undertake changes to the GI draft re gulation to take account of concerns raised 
previously by Australia on this case.  
26. The DSB took note  of the statements and agreed  to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting. 
(e) United States – Measures affecting the cross-bor der supply of gambling and betting services:  
Status report by the United States (WT/DS285/15) 
27. The Chairman  drew attention to document WT/DS285/ 15, which contained the status report 
by the United States on progress in the implementa tion of the DSB's recommendations in the case 
concerning US measures affecting the cross- border supply of gambling and betting services. 
28. The representative of the United States  stated that his country had provided a status report in 
this dispute on 6 March 2006, in accordance with Arti cle 21.6 of the DSU.  The US administration, in 
consulting with the US Congress, had been worki ng on appropriate steps to resolve this matter. 
29. The representative of Antigua and Barbuda  stated that his delegation wished to make a few 
comments in connection with the statement just ma de by the United States regarding the status of 
compliance with the DSB's recommendations and ruli ngs in this matter.  As his delegation had 
anticipated, the statement provided little in the wa y of useful information to the DSB and to his 
country as to when and how the United States would come into compliance with the DSB's 
recommendations and rulings.  With an implemen tation deadline approaching on 3 April 2006, less 
than three weeks from now, his delegation believed that  it might be forgiven for having some anxiety 
at a complete lack of information from the United States on this most important matter facing the 
small and delicate economy of Antigua and Barbuda.  This was his country's first experience with 
dispute resolution at the WTO, but his country had perhaps naively expected that the United States 
would wish to engage with Antigua and Barbuda on de vising an equitable solution to the dispute that 
would take into account the benefits accorded Antigua under the recommendations and rulings, but 
also reasonably and comprehensively address the c oncerns raised by the United States during the 
course of the dispute as its justification for prohi biting the provision of services from Antigua to US 
consumers. 
30. To great disappointment and in spite of numer ous attempts on his country's part, the United 
States had shown absolutely no interest in engaging with Antigua and Barbuda in this regard.  The 
official silence from Washington on this matter was deeply troubling.  What was equally troubling 
was what had actually been happening in the United States since his country had won its  hard-fought 
and costly dispute.  Legislation had indeed b een introduced in the US Congress addressing the 
difficult topic of remote and Internet gambling (H.R . 4411;  H.R. 4777).  In fact, two Bills had been 
introduced separately in the US Congress which were s ubstantively quite similar.  This legislation, 
one Bill entitled the "Unlawful Internet Gambling En forcement Act of 2005" and another entitled the 
"Internet Gambling Prohibition Act," was the only le gislation introduced into the US Congress since 
the determination of the reasonable period of time fo r implementation in the case under consideration.  
Unfortunately, each proposal was about as directly c ontrary to the recommendations and rulings of the 
DSB as could possibly be imagined.  Not only had these Bills done nothing to provide Antiguan operators with any access whatsoever to the vast American gambling market, but in fact each would 
further entrench the anti-GATS nature of US gambling law by expressly exempting from its 
application domestic internet gambling on horse racing.  Internet gambling conducted by Native 
American tribes and, most significant of all, Intern et gambling that occurred entirely within the border 
of a particular state.  His country had maintained  all along that the American prohibition was really 
based upon the cross-border nature of the services rather than any true "evils" associated with 
"remote" gambling and this pending legislation em phatically confirmed that his country was correct. WT/DSB/M/207 
Page 8  
 
  31. In addition to this legislation, Members s hould know that the ubiquitous American-based 
money transfer service, Western Union, had ceas ed in January 2006 providing money transfer 
services to and from Antigua and Barbuda.  Ironically then, his country, with a strong, tightly regulated and overseen financial services sector, an  enviable record of mutual assistance in 
cooperating with other countries around the globe to detect, deter and prevent financial crimes, and 
the only country to confront the United States ove r its anti-competitive gaming practices, was one of 
the very, very few countries in the entire world to  which one could not send or from which one could 
not receive funds via Western Union.  Finally, a ll Members were aware of the difficult questions 
facing many countries, particularly developing countri es, when considering the costs and benefits of 
signing on to a multinational trade organization such as the WTO.  Antigua had voluntarily complied 
with the demands of trading partners, including particularly the United States, based upon its 
commitments to its trading partners under the va rious WTO Agreements.  Some of these things had 
clearly had an adverse impact on its own efforts to  enrich and achieve some autonomy in its small 
economy.  But his country had been encouraged by  the dominant economies that this multilateral set 
of agreements would accrue to the benefit of a ll. That his country could compete with larger 
economies and, in the case of a dispute, achieve a fair and balanced heari ng which would provide it 
with a meaningful remedy despite its limited global economic consequence.  It was with considerable 
concern that his country had learnt that the US Trade Representative had used his country's weakness 
as an express reason why gaming and other interests in the United States should not be concerned about his country's victory at the WTO.  As reporte d on a website of an interest group in the United 
States, the USTR had assured the participants at a co nference held in late 2005 that "as they see it, the 
most Antigua can do is to levy tariffs on US imports  equal to the damage done by the US failure to 
comply with the WTO ruling.  Antigua is a tiny economy and imports little from the US.  Imposing additional duties would simply make Am erican goods more expensive there".
1  Further, at the same 
meeting, USTR representatives had been quoted as saying that "if the WTO does not agree [with 
American compliance efforts], the issue will likely be litigated for at least another year."2  His country 
believed that the time had come for the United Stat es to demonstrate whether it was willing to be a 
responsible stakeholder in the WTO.  Whether the WT O Agreements were to work for all, equally, or 
whether the WTO was indeed a "one-way street" fo r the large economies to further enrich themselves 
at the expense of lesser ones.  It was one thing to play by the rules on a purely literal basis, and quite 
another to play by the rules in order to attain the objectives the rules had been designed to achieve. 
32. The DSB took note  of the statements and agreed  to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting. 
2. Implementation by the European Communiti es of the recommendations and rulings of 
the DSB in relation to "European Communiti es – Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas"3and related subsequent WTO proceedings 
(a) Statements by Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama 
33. The Chairman  said that the above-mentioned item was on the agenda of the present meeting 
at the request of Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama .  He then invited the representatives of the 
respective countries to speak. 
34. The representative of Honduras  said that at the 17 February 2006 DSB meeting, the EC had 
stated that its new banana regime did not constitute  an implementation issue, pursuant to Article 21 of 
the DSU.  Honduras was surprised by  such an assertion given that it contradicted other statements 
made by the EC.  In its November 2005 press rele ase, the EC had linked the new measures to the 
                                                      
1 "An Overview of the WTO and Online Gambling", Carl Bechtold, 12 October 2006 
(http://www.ncalg.org/WTO%20Threat.htm, visited 30 October 2005." 
2 Idem  
3 WT/DS27.  WT/DSB/M/207 
 Page 9 
 
 
  agreements concluded with the United States and Ecuador in order to implement the recommendation 
in the Bananas – III dispute.  That press release read as follows:  "[i]n an effort  to put an end to the 
long-standing banana dispute, the EU agreed with  Ecuador and the United States in 2001 to move ... 
to a regime solely based on a tariff by 1 January 20 06." In 2002,  in a statement before the DSB, the 
EC had reiterated that link. As recorded in the minutes of the DSB meeting of 1 February 2002, the 
EC had confirmed that, in order to implement the recommendations resulting from the Bananas – III 
dispute, it would move to a tariff-only regime as of 1 January 2006.  The statement by Honduras was 
recorded in the minutes of the same meeting:   "The representative of Honduras expressed his 
country's expectation that in order to implemen t the Understandings on Bananas... the EC would not 
impose a prohibitive tariff that would make it im possible for Honduran bananas to enter the EC 
market. Honduras hoped that this agreement would be  honoured in good faith. ... Honduras wished to 
reserve its rights, including the right to request th at this matter be placed on the DSB agenda in the 
future." 
35. He noted that the EC had reaffirmed in other st atements that there was in fact a link between 
its new measures and the implementation of the DSB's rulings.  Given that the EC had often 
underscored this connection, Hon duras failed to understand this attempt to disassociate the two 
matters.  The EC had repeatedly insisted that this  new arrangement was fair  and WTO-consistent and 
that it clearly provided legal certainty.  If the EC was indeed convinced that this was the case, the 
logical thing would be for it to accept jurisdic tion under Article 21 of the DSU with no fear.  
Honduras was firmly convinced that where there was  disagreement as to the existence or consistency 
with a covered agreement of measures, such as th e measures adopted by the EC on 1 January 2006, 
there was no legal certainty.  In consultation with  other Members, Honduras continued to discuss its 
rights under Article 21.5 of the DSU and requested the DSB to support such efforts.  In accordance 
with the objectives set forth in Article 21 of the DSU, Honduras would continue to seek "prompt compliance" by the EC, whilst paying particular atten tion to its rights as a developing country, rights 
which were currently being violated. 
36. The representative of Panama
 noted that, in addition to the mistaken claim made by the EC at 
the 17 February 2006 DSB meeting, namely, that the matter concerning the EC's banana regime 
should not be categorized as an implementation issue, the EC had insisted that the matter under consideration should not even be discussed in the DSB.   Panama had to disagree with that statement. 
In order to remove the issue from the DSB's age nda, the EC had contended that Honduras, Nicaragua 
and Panama had already held Artic le 21.5 consultations on 19 January  2006 and had maintained that 
"if necessary", arrangements could be made to con tinue these consultations.  For the record, Panama 
wished to note the statement by the European  Commission made during the consultations in 
January 2006, which the EC had repeated in another c ontext, namely that:  (i) the EC did not have the 
power to change the existing arrangements;  (ii) the EC did not, in any case, consider that the new 
arrangement needed to be changed;  and (iii) as long as there was no clear sign of how the market was 
responding, the EC was not ready even to specify the bound MFN tariff. 
37. If the EC was suggesting that the DSB's surve illance must be replaced by the consultations 
that had been held previously, or that the possib ility of holding consultations in future had the same 
effect, the EC would have to state clearly wh ether its position had changed and explain why the 
consultations should prevent the DSB from carry ing out its surveillance function.  The EC 
maintained, moreover, that the DSB surveillan ce was not appropriate because a process was under 
way to monitor the impact of both the new MFN tari ff, which was more than double the previous one, 
and of the ACP quota.  For the record again, Panama  wished to note how the EC had conceptualized 
these monitoring procedures: (i) it might take years to complete these procedures; (ii) Latin America must show the damage caused at a later unspecified  date; (iii) the result obtained would by no means 
be certain, even assuming that Latin America could show the damage;  and (iv) while this ambiguous 
procedure was being developed, Latin America would not be able to resort to any kind of legal 
remedy. WT/DSB/M/207 
Page 10  
 
  38. Panama noted that the EC had stated that it was prepared to prevent the participation of 
Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama in the monitoring ex ercise because of the Article 21.5 consultations 
that had been held in January 2006. Panama could not imagine how the process, which merely 
involved checking information with the right to pa rticipate which depended on subjective criteria and 
with no legal framework could stop it from having recourse to the DSB.  Since the consultations and 
the monitoring exercises had failed, DSB surveillanc e had become a necessity.  Panama, a substantial 
supplier to the EC market, was already being harm ed by these inconsistent measures and the damage 
was expected to be even more serious in the coming months.  In order to ensure that its interests as a 
developing country did not suffer irreparable damage , it was absolutely essential for the DSB to help 
the countries in question to find the solution that was needed. 
39. The representative of the European Communities
 stated that the EC had, once more, listened 
carefully to the statements made by Honduras and Pa nama on this matter.  However, the EC had to 
insist on two points, which had been raised at the 20 January 2006 DSB meeting.  First, the EC did not consider the DSB meeting to be an appropriate  forum to discuss this matter.  The issues being 
raised at the present meeting had already been di scussed at length with Honduras, Nicaragua and 
Panama pursuant to the DSU consultations  held on 19 January at their request.  The EC was ready to 
engage in further discussions with the complainants in  that context, if necessary.  In addition, the EC 
had agreed to continue discussions with all interest ed MFN suppliers with the assistance of Minister 
Støre (Norway) and on the basis of the informati on drawn from the monitoring of the impact of the 
new MFN tariff.  A meeting had taken place on 16 February 2006 and the process was well underway.  
The EC regretted that Honduras, Nicaragua and Pa nama had thus far opted for the litigation route 
rather than dialogue. 
40. Second, the EC had to note, once more, its disagre ement with the categorization of this matter 
as an "implementation issue" relevant to Article  21 of the DSU.  The EC had already made its 
objection clear in the context of the WTO cons ultations held on 19 January.  The matter under 
discussion could not be considered an issue of  "implementation of DSB recommendations and 
rulings" in the sense of Article 21 of the DSU for two main reasons: (i) the EC had already amended 
the regime that had been found inconsistent with  the DSB's recommendations and rulings in the so-
called "EC – Bananas III" case (DS27) in accordance with  the recommendations of the Article 21.5 
Panel, which had been requested by Ecuador.  The new EC banana import regime introduced by 
Council Regulation 1964/2005 and in force since 1 Janua ry 2006 was, therefore, not "a measure taken 
to comply with" those recommendations and rulings.  In addition, the EC noted that Nicaragua and 
Panama had not even been parties to the EC – Bananas III proceedings; (ii) the arbitration Awards 
referred to by Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama had been issued pursuant to an "ad hoc" arbitration 
agreed in the context of the adoption of the D oha Waiver on the Cotonou Agreement, and not 
pursuant to the DSU provisions, and therefore the EC's  reaction to those awards was not a question of 
implementation of the DSB's rulings and recommendations.  The EC remained ready to address the 
issues raised at the present meeting and any other issues related to the new EC bananas import regime 
in the appropriate fora. 
41. The EC noted that Honduras and Panama had not expressed any interest thus far in 
participating in the monitoring and review process.   On the contrary, they seemed to have favoured 
the litigation route, which was their legitimate c hoice as WTO Members.  The door was open to any 
producer that was willing to engage  in "good faith" in the process.  However, the monitoring and 
review process and the WTO Panel proceedings could not be run in parallel with the same countries.  
Therefore,  Honduras, Nicaragua a nd Panama had to make a choice. 
42. The representative of the United States
 noted that as Members would know from the US 
statements made at two recent DSB meetings, the United States was monitoring this matter closely, and also had serious concerns a bout the EC's bananas regime.  Since the 17 February DSB meeting, 
the United States had also had the opportunity to di scuss this matter informally with a number of  WT/DSB/M/207 
 Page 11 
 
 
  interested Members.  The United States would again urge the EC to work with interested Members to 
reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of this dispute as expeditiously as possible. 
43. The representative of Honduras  said that his country had already expressed its point of view 
regarding the monitoring mechanism and thanked the EC for recognizing in its intervention, the rights 
of Honduras under Article 21.5 of the DSU. 
44. The DSB took note  of the statements. 
3. United States – Continued Dumping and Subsid y Offset Act of 2000:  Implementation of 
the recommendations adopted by the DSB 
(a) Statements by Canada, the European Communities and Japan 
45. The Chairman  said that the above-mentioned item was on the agenda of the present meeting 
at the request of Canada, the European Communities and Japan.  He then invited the representatives 
of the respective countries to speak. 
46. The representative of Japan  said that his country was disappointed and puzzled by the fact 
that the United States did not submit a status report to the DSB in the month of March regarding the 
implementation of the DSB's recommendations and rulings in this case, in accordance with 
Article 21.6 of the DSU.  Japan welcomed th e enactment by the United States of the Deficit 
Reduction Act of 2005, which included provisions to re peal the CDSOA.  This was an important step 
forward in a right direction.  However, the trans itional clause included in the repealing provisions of 
the CDSOA stipulated that duties collected on imports entered prior to 1 October 2007 would 
continue to be distributed to the US domestic indus tries.  As stated at the 17 February DSB meeting, 
Japan was concerned that the CDSOA had been repeal ed only in form, but that it would effectively be 
maintained while these disbursements would be made.  The United States had, therefore, failed to 
fully implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings .  At that DSB meeting, Japan had asked the 
United States to provide a sufficient explanation as to why the United States considered that the 
implementation of the DSB's recommendations and rulings had been completed.  Japan had also 
requested information on how actual disbursements would work under the transitional clause.  No 
explanation had been offered by the United States thus  far.  Japan wished to renew its request for a 
proper explanation by the United States.  In that light, Japan called for the United States to make 
further efforts to terminate the illegal distributio n under the CDSOA.  Until the CDSOA was repealed 
completely, Japan reserved all its rights under the DSU. 
47. The representative of the European Communities  stated that the EC, together with Canada 
and Japan, had requested the inscrip tion of this item on the agenda of the present meeting following 
the US failure to submit a status report on its pr ogress in implementation of the DSB's rulings and 
recommendations.  Despite US assertions to the cont rary during the previous DSB meeting, the issue 
of implementation of the DSB ruling had indeed not yet been resolved in the present dispute.  The 
adoption of provisions to repeal the Byrd Amendmen t was a significant and much welcome step in the 
right direction, but this repeal would not be e ffective before several years as duties collected on 
imports made before 1 October 2007 would still be transferred to the US competing industries.  As 
long as this transfer continued, the violation of Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and 32.1 
of the SCM Agreement would persist and the Unite d States would not be in compliance with WTO 
rules.  Article 21.6 of the DSU clearly provided tha t:  "Unless the DSB decides otherwise, the issue of 
implementation of the recommendations or rulings ... shall remain on the DSB's agenda until the issue 
is resolved".  It . also provided that "... the Member concerne d shall provide the DSB a status report in 
writing of its progress in the implementation of the recommendations or ruling s".  Both obligations 
clearly continued to apply and the EC regretted th at the United States had not responded to the calls 
by the EC and other Members during the previous  regular DSB meeting to continue submitting a 
status report on implementation.  In the absence of such a report, the EC asked the United States if, WT/DSB/M/207 
Page 12  
 
  and what steps, it intended to take to stop the transfer of anti-dumping and countervailing duties 
without further delay.  The EC also renewed its cal l on the United States to submit status reports in 
this dispute. 
48. The representative of Canada
 recalled that, at the previous DSB meeting, Canada and a 
number of other Members had noted their disagreemen t with one element of the status report of the 
United States with respect to the Byrd Amendment.   While Canada welcomed the prospective repeal 
of the Byrd Amendment, it also noted that this la test development had not brought the United States 
into compliance with its obligations under the WTO Agreement.  Accordingly, the matter remained 
unresolved under Article 21.6 of the DSU.  He noted  that the DSB should rema in seized of the issue, 
until such time as the Byrd Amendment and all dis bursements under it were fully terminated.  Canada 
and other Members had, therefore, urged the Un ited States to continue submitting status reports 
relating to the Byrd Amendment.  The United St ates had not done so.  The US position raised two 
concerns for Canada, and these had prompted its decision to request the inclusion of the Byrd 
Amendment  issue on the agenda of the present mee ting.  The first was a systemic concern.  As 
Canada had stated before, and as it had reiterated just now, as long as the issue rema ined unresolved 
among the disputing parties, under the DSU, the DS B ought to remain seized of the matter.  And, 
under the DSU, it was the responsibility of the Member found to have been in violation to provide regular reports on the status of its implementa tion.  The United States had not disputed the 
responsibility of the DSB in this respect.  Nor coul d it.  Article 21.6 of the DSU was clear on this 
issue.  So, as a general matter, the DSB must a ssert its right to be informed of the status of 
implementation in disputes where the issue remained unresolved. 
49. The second concern was specific to the facts of the Byrd Amendment dispute.  The issue did 
not simply involve assertions by the complaining Members that the United States remained in 
violation of its obligations under the WTO Agreemen t.  Rather, the terms of prospective repeal 
confirmed that the United States remained in violati on, and would remain in violation for some time 
to come.  The Byrd Amendment was still in force.  The United States did not dispute this.  Cash 
deposits collected until 30 September 2007, 15 months he nce, would be subject to disbursement.  The 
United States did not dispute this.  Disbursements under the Byrd Amendment that had been found illegal would nevertheless continue to be made l ong after 1 October 2007, th e ostensible date of 
repeal.  The United States did not dispute this.  In closing, he underlined th at Canada welcomed the 
passage of legislation to finally repeal the Byrd Amendment even if the repeal was prospective.  
Canada recognized the efforts by the US administ ration, certain members of the US Congress and US 
domestic groups to secure this repeal.  However, in light of the considerations that Canada and other 
Members had identified, Canada, once again, ca lled upon the United States to resume submitting 
status reports with a view to continuing to info rm all Members of the progress towards implementing 
the rulings and recommendations in this dispute. 
50. The representative of Chile
 said that there were unfortunately no new facts to report under 
this agenda item.  Chile wished to place on record its deep concern about the adverse effects of the 
current situation on the dispute settlement system, wh ich was based on rules agreed by all Members.  
Chile recognized the progress inherent in the US  adoption of measures to repeal the Byrd 
Amendment, but, given the length of time that would ta ke for the adverse effects of this legislation to 
cease, this could not be considered effective comp liance with the existing WTO rules.  The situation 
was clearly detrimental to the effective functioning  of the dispute settlement system, which was the 
very keystone of the multilateral trading system, a nd called its credibility into question.  Chile urged 
the United States to put an end to this situati on as soon as possible and expressed hope that Members 
would not have recourse to such practices in the fu ture once they would be required to comply with 
their WTO obligations. 
51. The representative of Brazil  said that his country thanked Canada, the EC and Japan for 
raising this issue at the present meeting.  This  was the appropriate forum to discuss a matter – 
compliance or non-compliance – that was of concern to  all Members.  Brazil shared the view of those  WT/DSB/M/207 
 Page 13 
 
 
  three Members that the "issue" ha d not been resolved in this dispute within the meaning of 
Article 21.6 of the DSU.  The repeal of the Byrd  Amendment was a significant  and welcome event, 
but the conditions under which such repeal woul d operate did not support the assertion that the 
United States had implemented the relevant DSB' s recommendations.  Brazil reiterated that there 
would be no full compliance on the part of the Un ited States until and unless all disbursements under 
the Byrd Amendment ceased.  As a consequence, th e co-complainants should not be deprived of any 
right conferred by the DSU with respect to this situation of non-compliance by the mere passing into law of the "Deficit Reduction Omnibus Reconciliation Act".  
52. The representative of Mexico
 stated that his country, as a pa rty to this dispute, wished to 
support the previous speakers.  This was an ongoing dispute and thus it was important for the DSB to 
continue to  follow the matter closely. 
53. The representative of Thailand  stated that his country wished  to join previous speakers in 
expressing disappointment that the United States ha d not submitted a status report on its outstanding 
implementation in the dispute:  "United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000" 
at the present meeting.  He, therefore, wished to affirm Thailand's views expressed previously during 
the 17 February 2006 DSB meeting, and urged the Un ited States to continue providing status reports 
in DSB meetings until it brought its actions into  full conformity with the DSB's rulings and 
recommendations in this dispute, and unt il this matter had been fully resolved. 
54. The representative of Hong Kong, China  said that her delegation th anked the EC, Canada and 
Japan for raising this item at the present meeting.  She expressed her delegation's disappointment and 
concern over the removal of this matter from agenda item 1 of the DSB meeting, and the 
discontinuation of the submission of status reports by  the United States on this item.  It was clear that 
a legislative provision providing for prospective rep eal of the WTO-inconsistent Byrd Amendment in 
October 2007, did not mean that compliance had alread y taken place.  To treat the prospective repeal 
of a WTO-inconsistent measure as equal to i mmediate compliance would greatly undermine any 
requirement under the DSU on prompt compliance.  It would, in fact, mean that a Member would be 
able to take whatever WTO-inconsistent measure it liked, so long as its legislation provided for the 
measure to expire after a certain period.  This ra ised serious systemic concerns, which WTO Members 
should not overlook.  Hong Kong, China, therefore,  requested that this item remain under agenda 
item 1 of the DSB meeting, and called upon the United States to continue to provide status reports on 
this item in order to ensure the effective surveillance by the DSB of the progress of implementation, 
until the Byrd Amendment was finally repealed. 
55. The representative of India  stated that since the United States had not achieved full 
compliance with the DSB's recommendations and rulings  in this matter, India was disappointed that 
the United States had preferred not even to provide a status report in the matter to this meeting.  As 
stated by India at the past DSB meetings, duties be ing collected on imports entering the United States 
would continue to be subject to disbursements unde r the repealed CDSOA in contravention of the US 
WTO obligations.  India preferred full compliance by the United States to suspending concessions 
under the covered agreements vis-à-vis   the United States under the aut hority obtained from the DSB.  
Until the United States fully complied with its obliga tions, India continued to reserve all its rights 
under the DSU, including the right to suspend concessions. 
56. The representative of Indonesia  stated that his delegation wished to join other Members in 
expressing concern over the failure of the United St ates to provide the status report in the Byrd 
Amendment case at the present meeting.  As he ha d stated at the previous DSB meeting, Indonesia 
and the United States had extended their bilatera l agreement on this case, on the understanding that 
the United States would soon implement the DSB's d ecisions.  However, to date, the United States 
had not achieved full compliance with the DSB's reco mmendations and rulings.  Therefore, like other 
Members, Indonesia once again wished to request that the United States fully comply with its WT/DSB/M/207 
Page 14  
 
  obligations by appealing the Byrd Amendment fo r the sake of the credibility of the multilateral 
trading system.  
57. The representative of China
 stated that his delegation wished  to join the previous speakers 
who had strongly urged the United States to comply fully and promptly with the DSB's rulings.  This was of critical importance to the credibility of the dispute settlement system.  
58. The representative of Korea
 stated that his delegation wished  to join previous speakers that 
this matter should remain on the DSB agenda until this dispute was finally resolved by complete 
elimination of disbursements.  Korea urged the Unit ed States to take an appropriate action to this 
effect. 
59. The representative of the United States  stated that as he had explained at the 17 February 
DSB meeting, the US President had signed the De ficit Reduction Act into law on 8 February 2006.  
The United States noted that a number of speakers at the present meeting welcomed that legislation.  
As Members were aware, that Act included a provision repealing the Continued Dumping and 
Subsidy Offset Act of 2000.  Thus, the United Stat es had taken all actions necessary to implement the 
rulings and recommendations in these disputes.  Theref ore, the United States had also failed to see 
what purpose would be served by the submission of  status reports repeating the progress that the 
United States had made in the implementation of the DSB's rulings and recommendations and rulings.  
The status was clear.  
60. The DSB took note  of the statements. 
4. United States – Countervailing measures co ncerning certain products from the 
European Communities  
(a) Statement by the European Communities 
61. The Chairman  said that the above-mentioned item was on the agenda of the present meeting 
at the request of the European Communities a nd invited the representative of the European 
Communities to speak. 
62. The representative of the European Communities  stated that, once more, the EC had deplored 
the fact that the United States had failed to submit a status report this time as well.  During the 
20 January DSB meeting,  the EC had expressed its di sappointment over that fact but apparently to no 
avail.  There was no doubt that this practice unde rmined the objectives of Article 21 of the DSU, 
namely to allow the DSB and WTO Members to su rvey the implementation progress of the relevant 
DSB's rulings and recommendations.  While deplor ing the US unwillingness to submit detailed status 
reports, the EC at the 28 November 2005 DSB mee ting and more recently at the 17 February 2006 
DSB meeting, had submitted a number of questions fo r which it wished to receive replies.  At both 
meetings the US representative had replied that hi s delegation would refer the questions to capital for 
review.  Unfortunately, no replies or clarifications had been given to the DSB thus far.  For the information of the DSB, the EC wished to rep eat that the USTR had reopened the Section 129 
proceedings in the DS212 case on 29 November 2005 a nd had given itself 180 days to complete the 
process.  EC firms and governments had already r eceived, and had replied to six questionnaires from 
the US authorities, and were in the process of replying  to three more.  Further to the questions raised 
at previous DSB meetings, the EC would be particul arly interested in receiving clarifications and 
replies concerning the estimated time-table regarding the issuance
. of preliminary findings from the 
Department of Commerce as well as more detailed in formation on the expected dates for the issuance 
of final findings in these proceedings.  In add ition, the EC expressed the hope to receive the 
preliminary findings soon and to be given the chan ce to submit comments.  The EC trusted that the 
United States would report on this exercise at each DSB meeting, and was confident that the US  WT/DSB/M/207 
 Page 15 
 
 
  authorities would implement the Article 21.5 panel's findings by repealing these very old, unjustified 
and WTO-incompatible measures without delay. 
63. The representative of the United States  recalled that his country had made a statement at the 
27 September 2005 meeting when the DSB had adopt ed the Article 21.5 Panel Report pertaining to 
this dispute.  At the meeting held on 28 N ovember, the United States had followed up on that 
statement with a report to the DSB on the status of its  implementation.  In that connection, he recalled 
that the second sentence of Article 21.6 of the DSU pr ovided that: "the issue of implementation of the 
recommendations or rulings may be raised at the DSB by any Member at any time following their adoption".  As the United States had stated at the previous DSB meeting in February, it would be 
happy to discuss with the EC their views on this issue.  With respect to the EC's request for 
information at the present meeting, it could inform  the EC that the Department of Commerce had 
received responses to the questions that had been i ssued to the respondents in the two proceedings and 
that the Department of Commerce was currently  in the process of analyzing those responses. 
64. The DSB took note
 of the statements. 
5. European Communities – Customs classifica tion of frozen boneless chicken cuts  
(a) Statements by Brazil and Thailand 
65. The Chairman  said that the above-mentioned item was on the agenda of the present meeting 
at the request of Brazil and Tha iland and invited the representativ es of the respective countries to 
speak. 
66. The representative of Brazil  stated that on 20 February 2006, the Arbitrator in the proceeding 
under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU had circulated his Award in the context of the dispute "European 
Communities – Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts" (DS269).  The Arbitrator 
had established a reasonable period of time of nine  months for the EC to implement the DSB's 
recommendations at issue.  The EC had until 27 June  2006 to meet this obligation.  Brazil welcomed 
the award and wished to highlight some key elem ents contained therein.  The Arbitrator had 
endorsed some principles already enshrined in previous awards, such as:  (i) the Members' 
discretion to determine their means of implementa tion;  and (ii) the recommendation that the 
implementing Member resorted, in  principle, only to means entirely within its lawmaking 
procedures in order to implement th e DSB's decisions.  These consider ations by the Arbitrator were 
necessary in view of the eccentric and inappropriate claim by the EC  that, as a pre-condition to any 
action within its domestic legal system, it would need to obtain a decision by the World Customs Organization (WCO) on the interpretation of a heading of the Harmonized System related to 
chicken meat.  In the EC's view, that step would account for 18 months out of the 26 months 
requested as the appropriate reasonabl e period of time.  On that poin t, the Arbitrator had affirmed 
that, although Members generally had discretion to select the means of implementation, "this 
prerogative is not without bounds", and "is not at  all the same as saying that 'anything goes'".  
(Paragraph 56 of the Award (WT/DS269/13, 20 February 2006). 
67. The Arbitrator had correctly concluded that th e consultation with the WCO "has the potential 
to create a perceived obstacle to the necessary impl ementation of the recommendations and rulings of 
the DSB in this dispute", since "such recommendati ons will not be implemented by a classification 
decision by the WCO" and since th e European Communities had stated  that it would not take any 
action internally until it received a WCO decision (Paragraph 55 of the Award).  According to the 
Arbitrator, "a finding of the WCO on tariff classificat ion in response to a request ... by the European 
Communities could have the effect of prolonging this dispute rather than contributing to its resolution 
through implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB" (Paragraph 55 of the 
Award).  However, more important was the note taken by the Arbitrator as to the actual intentions of the EC in this dispute.  The Arbitrator had regist ered that: "in response to my questions, the European WT/DSB/M/207 
Page 16  
 
  Communities declined to commit absolutely to im plementing the recommendations and rulings of the 
DSB irrespective of the content of a decision by the WCO" (Paragraph 54 of the Award).  That response spoke for itself.  Brazil was, of course, d eeply concerned with the degree to which one of the 
major players was committed to implementation of th e decisions arising out of the dispute settlement 
mechanism in this dispute.  Brazil considered that it would be very important for the system that the 
EC unequivocally clarify its position about the im plementation – until 27 June 2006 – of the DSB's 
recommendations in this dispute. 
68. The representative of Thailand
 stated that his country had join ed its co-complainant – Brazil –  
in welcoming the Award of the Arbitrator in the case:  "EC – Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts", which had been issued on 20 February 2006.  As noted, the Arbitrator had 
determined that the reasonable period of time for the EC to implement the DSB's  recommendations 
and ruling in this dispute was nine months until 27  June 2006.  Thailand wished to highlight an 
important issue that it considered to be of particul ar significance to the DSB,  which was that of the 
unconditional acceptance by WTO Members of the DSB' s rulings and recommendations.  The EC had 
argued that it would require 26 months for implementa tion in this case, and that 18 months of that 
period would be devoted to obtaining a cla ssification decision from the WCO "confirming the 
interpretation of [the [Harmonized System] provided by the panel and the Appellate Body".  On that 
point, Thailand had endorsed the Arbitrator's view that an implementing Member's proposed recourse 
to processes external to its legal system;  i.e. a decision by the WCO on the tariff classification of 
frozen boneless chicken cuts, should not be taken in to account to determine the period of time for 
implementation.  This was particularly true wh ere external recourse would hinder implementation, 
and was not even required in implementing Member's  domestic legal system.  As a result, Thailand 
commended the Arbitrator's decision to exclude 18 months from the determination of a reasonable 
period of time,  which the EC had  claimed necess ary for its WCO consultation procedures.  Thailand 
shared Brazil's concern about the f act that, as noted by the Arbitrator , the EC had declined to commit 
itself absolutely to implementing the recommendati ons and rulings of the DSB irrespective of the 
content of a decision by the WCO.  The EC had implied that it would condition its acceptance of the 
DSB's recommendations and rulings pending the review by the WCO of an issue already decided by the WTO.  Article 17.14 of the DSU clearly stated that Appellate Body reports, as the last stage in 
dispute settlement, must be accepted unconditionally by  the disputing parties.  Such acceptance was at 
the very heart of the DSU.  In that light, the stat ement made by the EC suggesting that the EC would 
condition its implementation of the DSB's rulings  and recommendations upon the verification by 
another international body should be  of concern to all WTO Members.  Thailand looked forward to a 
clear statement by the EC that it intended to implement unconditionally the DSB's rulings and recommendations by 27 June 2006. 
69. The representative of the European Communities
 stated that the EC was obviously 
disappointed over the fact that the Arbitrator ha d not accorded to it the full requested reasonable 
period of time.  The EC would ha ve preferred a much longer reasonable period of time that would 
have taken into account its intention to discuss th is issue in the appropriate instance of the WCO 
before taking concrete steps to adopt implementing m easures internally.  That would have been in line 
with the aim of uniform interpretation and app lication of the Harmonized System, recognition of 
obligations of WTO Members under other intern ational organizations, the presumption against 
conflicts and the principle that the choice of th e means of implementation was the prerogative of the 
implementing WTO Member.  The EC wished to state unequivocally that it was its intention to ensure 
that it would act in conformity with its WTO obl igations within the reasonable period of time 
accorded to it.  
70. The DSB took note  of the statements.  WT/DSB/M/207 
 Page 17 
 
 
  6. Mexico – Anti-dumping duties on steel pipes and tubes from Guatemala  
(a) Request for the establishment of a panel by Guatemala (WT/DS331/2) 
71. The Chairman  recalled that the DSB had considered this matter at its meeting on 
17 February 2006, and had agreed to revert to it.   He drew attention to the communication from 
Guatemala contained in document WT/DS331/2, a nd invited the representative of Guatemala to 
speak. 
72. The representative of Guatemala  said that in his country's view the DSB was one of the 
cornerstones supporting the structure of the multilatera l trading system and the critical element with 
regard to verifying Members' compliance with thei r obligations under the WTO.  He recalled that on 
17 February 2006, Guatemala had made its first request for the establis hment of a panel in the dispute 
under consideration.  At that time, Mexico had obj ected to the establishment of a panel, maintaining 
that it needed more time to analyse the re quest with the authorities in the capital, inter alia .  His 
delegation had since stood ready to hold discussions with a view to finding a mutually satisfactory 
solution to this dispute.  Unfortunately, no soluti on had been reached thus far and his delegation had 
instructions from the capital to move forward w ith the dispute settlement procedures, in accordance 
with Guatemala's rights under the WTO Agreements.  In  the light of the above, his country  reiterated 
its request for the establishment of a panel, pursu ant to the request in document WT/DS331/2, which 
had been circulated to all Members.  
73. The representative of Mexico  stated that his delegation regretted the fact that Guatemala had 
already decided to reiterate its request for the est ablishment of a panel.  Mexico believed that, in 
accordance with Article 6.1 of the DSU, the pane l would be established at the present meeting.  
Mexico's only alternative was to reiterate the ob servations which it had made to Guatemala in the 
course of the consultations.  As had been mentione d at the 17 February DSB meeting,  Mexico was 
open to continued dialogue with Guatemala to find a negotiated solution to this problem despite the 
fact that it had not managed to reach an agreemen t in consultations thus far.  Mexico welcomed 
Guatemala's expressed willingness to continue with discussions and hoped that this matter could be 
settled through dialogue. 
74. The DSB took note  of the statements and agreed  to establish a panel in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 6 of the DSU w ith standard terms of reference. 
75. The representatives of China , the European Communities , Honduras , Japan  and 
the United States  reserved their third-party rights to participate in the Panel's proceedings. 
7. Turkey – Measures affecting the importation of rice  
(a) Request for the establishment of a panel by the United States (WT/DS334/4) 
76. The Chairman  recalled that the DSB had considered this matter at its meeting on 
17 February 2006 and had agreed to revert to it.  He drew attention to the communication from the 
United States contained in document WT/DS334/4, a nd invited the representative of the United States 
to speak. 
77. The representative of the United States  stated that, as he had explained at the DSB meeting on 
17 February 2006, his country had serious concerns re garding Turkey's restrictions on the importation 
of rice.  Turkey required importers to purchase large quantities of domestic rice in order to be 
permitted to import rice under tariff-rate quotas.  Importers could not import rice without domestic 
purchases.  Turkey would not permit importation without an import licence and would not grant an import licence without domestic purchase.  These measure s,  which had restricted the import of rice to 
Turkey from the United States and many other Members,   appeared to be inconsistent with several WT/DSB/M/207 
Page 18  
 
  provisions of the WTO Agreements.  Therefore, the United States again requested that the DSB 
establish a panel pursuant to Article 6 of the DSU, w ith standard terms of reference, to examine the 
matters set forth in the US panel request. 
78. The representative of Turkey
 stated that first of all his delegation wished to thank the 
Chairman for his sincere efforts prior to the present meeting aimed at finding a common 
understanding on Article 12.10 of the DSU by brin ging the parties together.  Since November 2005, 
when the United States had firs t requested consultations with Tu rkey, discussions had proved positive 
and encouraging towards finding a mutually agreeable  solution.  On 17 February 2006, however, after 
the United States had requested the establishment of a panel, Turkey had became cognizant of the fact 
that its trading partner was willing to pursue a diffe rent track rather than to continue with the 
consultation process.  Turkey recognized that the cooperation between the parties could also continue 
during further dispute settlement stages, but Turkey's preference had always been to settle this matter 
mutually as early as possible.  With that feeling, Turkey had explored the ways to use the right of 
developing countries provided under Article 12.10 of the DSU.  Turkey would have wished that there 
was legal precedent on that, but unfortunately this i ssue had not yet been raised by Members.  Turkey 
believed that Members must shed some light on this matter and work out a common understanding to 
make that Article more operational for developing count ries.  This would also be in line with the spirit 
of the current development round of negotiations.  At this stage, Turkey regretted that the United 
States had decided to re-introduce its request for the establishment of a panel in this dispute.  Turkey 
looked forward to the Chairman's ruling on Article 12.10, which would set an important precedent that would affect future cases involving developing countries. 
79. The representative of India
 stated that his country wished to be associated with Turkey's 
request to make Article 12.10 more operational. 
80. The representative of the United States  stated that he wanted to comment briefly on Turkey's 
intervention.  It was regrettable that discussions with Turkey at both the technical and ministerial levels for the past five and a half years, had no t resolved this dispute and the United States had, 
therefore, requested a panel which the DSB would establish at the present meeting.  However, it was 
the long-standing position of the United States that discussions to reach a mu tually agreed solution 
could continue at any stage of dispute settleme nt proceedings.  He noted that the Turkish 
representative had referred to that possibility as we ll and indeed that had been referred to by a 
delegation under the previous agenda item as well.  And in fact a provision such as the last sentence 
of Article 12.7, the DSU contemplated that possi bility expressly.  The United States was certainly 
open to having further discussion w ith Turkey and was in fact aw aiting new ideas from Turkey as to 
how it would propose to resolve this dispute. 
81. The Chairman
 stated that for the information of the DS B, he wished to note that he had been 
in consultations with the parties on this matter over the past week a nd had explored with them various 
options for proceeding in light of the Turkish requ est under Article 12.10 of the DSU.  The situation 
had been made more difficult by the fact that ther e was no past practice in the DSB for dealing with 
Article 12.10 requests and no guidance in the text of  the DSU itself on how to proceed in the current 
circumstances in which Members found themselves – where, before the Article 12.10 request was 
filed with the Chairman, the complaining party had already requested the establishment of a panel, the 
DSB had considered the request once, and a second panel request was pending before the DSB.  By 
the evening of 16 March, it had become clear that hi s consultations with the parties had unfortunately 
not led to a mutually agreeable solution to this pa rticular issue, despite the good faith efforts on both 
sides.  Accordingly, with regard to the US request , he believed that, at the present meeting, the DSB 
would be obliged to follow the provisions of Article 6 of the DSU.  Given the timing of the request by 
Turkey, the situation in which Members found th emselves in these proceedings and the current 
circumstances in which Members found themsel ves, it was not his intention to rule per se  on the 
Turkish request at this point.  He would be r esponding in writing to the letter sent to him on this 
matter by Turkey on 27 February 2006.  WT/DSB/M/207 
 Page 19 
 
 
  82. The representative of Turkey  thanked the Chairman for his explanation.  His delegation 
wished to state for the record that  Turkey had not been aware of the fact that the consultations had 
been completed until the complainant, the United States,  had formally declared that, and the filing of a 
panel request was the only way for Turkey to b ecome aware of that.  As indicated during the 
consultations held in the course of the week, Turkey  wished to firmly state that it would go along with 
the Chairman's decision and would continue to co llaborate in the course of further proceedings.  
83. The DSB took note  of the statements and agreed  to establish a panel in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 6 of the DSU w ith standard terms of reference. 
84. The representatives of Australia , China , the European Communities , Korea  and Thailand 
reserved their third-party rights to pa rticipate in the Panel's proceedings. 
8. United States – Sunset reviews of anti-dumpi ng measures on oil country tubular goods 
from Argentina  
(a) Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Argentin a:  Request for the establishment of a panel 
(WT/DS268/16) 
85. The Chairman  drew attention to the communication from Argentina contained in document 
WT/DS268/16, and invited the repr esentative of Argentina to speak. 
86. The representative of Argentina  thanked for the opportunity to introduce the matter of 
disagreement concerning the measures adopted by  the United States to implement the DSB's 
recommendations in this dispute. Argentina did not wi sh to reiterate the content of its request for the 
establishment of a panel under Article 21.5 of the DSU and paragraph 2 of the bilateral understanding 
regarding procedures under Articles 21 and 22 appli cable to this dispute, contained in document 
WT/DS268/16, or to go over the details of the backgr ound to the dispute.  However, Argentina wished  
to highlight the following points.  In spite of its st atements before the DSB, the United States had not 
implemented the recommendations adopted in this dispute.  The recommendations adopted by the 
DSB had established that the United States brea ched its obligations under Article 11.3 of the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement when, in 2001, it had issued  a determination to continue imposing duties 
on imports of oil country tubular goods (OCTG) from Argentina as a result of the sunset review. 
87. The Anti-Dumping Agreement prohibited Members from maintaining anti-dumping duties for 
more than five years in the absence of strict co mpliance with the requirements of Articles 11.1, 11.3 
and 11.4 thereof.  In that respect, the Un ited States had implemen ted new procedures under 
Section 129 of the Uruguay Round Agreements  Act, as a result of which it had maintained that it had 
partly brought its measure into compliance with th e DSB's recommendations in the dispute.  The new 
determination of likelihood of  continuation or recurrence of dumping had been issued in 
December 2005.  The attempt by the United States to bring its determination into conformity with the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement 11 years after the imposition of the original order and five years after it 
should have been abolished was clear ly inconsistent with the rules and spirit of the WTO.  This had 
compounded in 2005 by the attempt to justify the determination of dumping, which should have 
expired.  Facts such as these deprived the multilatera l trading system of security and predictability and 
must not be permitted. Nevertheless, the factual basis developed in 2005 to justify the measure 
adopted in 2000 was inconsistent with the WTO Ag reements.  The basis lacked the evidence required 
by Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement to  determine the likeliho od of continuation or 
recurrence of dumping.  Furthermore, by carrying out the new determination procedures, the United States had breached significant obligations u nder Article 6 of the said Agreement.  In 2006, 
Argentina thus found itself in the absurd position of having to undergo the second  sunset review of the 
anti-dumping order on its exports of OCTG to the United States, when the DSB had already established that the 2000 sunset review was inc onsistent with the WTO obligations of the 
United States under the Anti-Dumping Agreement. WT/DSB/M/207 
Page 20  
 
  88. Moreover, the United States had not brought the "w aiver" provisions, contained in the Tariff 
Act of 1930 and the US Departme nt of Commerce Regulations, into conformity with the DSB 
recommendations and the WTO Agreements.  The consultations held in Washington on 
7 February 2006 and by teleconference on 22 February  2006 had failed to resolve the dispute.  Under 
these circumstances, Argentina had no choice, but to request the establishment of a panel under 
Article 21.5 of the DSU and paragraph 2 of the bilateral understanding rega rding the procedures under 
Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU applicable to this di spute, on the understanding that this would secure a 
positive solution thereto. 
89. The representative of the United States
 stated that his country was disappointed that 
Argentina was seeking the establishment of a pane l.  However, pursuant to the understanding with 
Argentina, which had been circulated in docum ent WT/DS268/14, the United States would accept the 
establishment of a panel at the present meeting.  As the United States had explained to Argentina 
during bilateral discussions, the United States had complied fully with the DSB's recommendations 
and rulings.  The United States was confident that th e panel would so agree.  The United States also 
would like to note that the USTR had directed the Department of Commerce to implement the 
determination conducted to bring the United Stat es into compliance with the recommendations and 
rulings of the DSB.  Inasmuch as Argentina ha d stated that its claim under Article 13 of the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement was premised on the fact th at USTR had not directed the Department of 
Commerce to implement, the United States considered  that Argentina's basis for making such a claim 
not longer existed. 
90. The DSB took note  of the statements and agreed , pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU, to refer 
to the original Panel, if possible, the matter ra ised by Argentina in document WT/DS268/16.  The 
Panel would have standard  terms of reference. 
91. The representatives of China , the European Communities , Japan  and Mexico  reserved their 
third-party rights to participate in the Panel's proceedings. 
9. United States – Measures affecting trade in large civil aircraft  
(a) Initiation of the procedures for developing in formation concerning serious prejudice under 
Annex V of the SCM Agreement and designa tion of the representative referred to in 
paragraph 4 of that Annex (WT/DS317/5) 
92. The Chairman  said that the above-mentioned item was on the agenda of the present meeting 
at the request of the European Communities.  He then drew attention to the communication from the 
European Communities contained in document WT /DS317/5, and invited the representative of the 
European Communities to speak. 
93. The representative of the European Communities  said that the EC had requested the inclusion 
of this item on the agenda of the present meeting in view of the position of the United States at the 
past two DSB meetings.  The United States had re sponded each time that it could not agree to the 
resumption of the Annex V process.  He stressed th at the reason for raising this point was that the 
United States had rejected the resumption of the in formation-gathering exercise in principle.  This 
position was not acceptable.  As the EC had stated at the previous DSB meeting, blocking the initiation of an Annex V process for reasons of inconve nience was not an option.  As had already been 
expressed at the previous meeting and on previous  occasions, the EC had repeatedly expressed its 
readiness to explore pragmatic solutions to variou s issues arising from this situation, including 
limiting the Annex V process in scope and time, and th e relationship with any Annex V in  the DS316 
case.  The United States had not indicated that it wo uld be interested in these discussions.  The EC 
would, therefore,  take action to preserve its rights.   The EC would request the facilitator to invite the 
United States to reply to those of the Annex V que stions to which the United States had refused to 
reply for alleged procedural reasons which were  now, in light of the new panel request and  WT/DSB/M/207 
 Page 21 
 
 
  establishment, without any basis.  The EC was by  no means seeking to rewrite Annex V of the SCM 
Agreement.  Rather, it was merely proposing a way to allow the facilitator to complete the existing 
factual record, ultimately for the benefit of the panel in  this dispute, despite US attempts to thwart the 
effectiveness of the Annex V procedure and thereby the Panel process. 
94. The representative of the United States  stated that it was unclear what the EC was attempting 
to accomplish by placing this item repeatedly on the agenda.  In fact, the more the EC had tried to 
explain its actions, the more it simply contradicted itself.  The United States could begin with the EC's 
labeling of its request as for the "initiation" of Annex V procedures , a phrase which could be found in 
the last paragraph of the panel request, which th e Secretariat had helpfully reproduced in the 
documents for the present meeting.  This was eviden tly an attempt to invoke  paragraph 2 of Annex V 
of the SCM Agreement, which provided for the DSB to  "initiate" a procedure to gather information on 
alleged subsidies.  However, the EC had made clear at the 14 March DSB meeting and again a few 
moments ago, that what it had really sought was not what it had written in its panel request, but 
something else entirely:  to "resume" the information-gathering procedures that had begun on 23 September 2005, and had ended on 22 December.  This was a very different matter, as Annex V 
did not contemplate the resumption of a completed information-gathering process.  In fact, it limited 
that process to a 60-day period. 
95. He then provided another example:  the EC had asserted at the 14 March DSB meeting that it 
could simply resume the Annex V process that had ended in December based on the rules developed for that process.  But the EC had ignored the fact that those rules – which r esulted from an agreement 
between the United States and the EC – did not allow this result.  The EC only required the 
submission of information on two occasions:  "at th e latest on 11 November 2005" for responses to 
initial questions and "at the latest on 22 December 2005" for responses to follow-up questions.  There 
was no obligation to answer Annex V questions af ter those dates, and no provision for resuming 
information gathering.  The EC shared this view, or at least it used to.  It had told the facilitator in a 
submission on 29 September that "the EC does not accep t" the concept that a party could "be required 
to continually provide updated information afte r the deadlines for production of documents and 
information."  The EC had now made clear that what it really sought was not to abide by the 
agreement it made with the United States, and not to  abide by the procedures set up by the facilitator, 
but instead to rewrite that agreement, and those rules, unilaterally. 
96. Most recently, the EC had asserted at the 14 Ma rch 2006 DSB meeting that "[t]here is no 
positive consensus rule to start an Annex V proce dure and the EC never took such a position."  In 
fact, at three successive DSB meetings, the EC had taken the position that initiation of Annex V 
procedures was not possible without agreement from the EC (WT/DSB/M/196, para. 45; WT/DSB/M/195, para. 24; WT/DSB/M/194, para. 52) .  For example, the EC had explained this 
position at the 31 August 2005 DSB meeting by asserti ng that "consistent with WTO jurisprudence, 
an Annex V procedure could not be initiated unilaterally by only one pa rty to a dispute, but required a 
meeting of the minds; an actual agreement between  the parties" (WT/DSB/M/196, para. 45).  What 
the EC had made clear at the 14 March DSB meeting was that what it really wanted was not to abide 
by the position that it had taken in the very recent past, or in fact even to describe that position 
accurately, but to try to rewrite the minutes of  the DSB meeting to suit its current objectives. 
97. In sum, the problem was not, as the EC had asserted at the 14 March DSB meeting, that it was 
unable to obtain information to which it was entitled.  As the United States had noted repeatedly, the 
United States had already provide d huge quantities of informati on on various NASA  and Defense 
Department programmes, and the EC had demonstrat ed no "entitlement" to obtain more.  Rather, the 
problem was that the EC was seeking to obtain someth ing to which it was not entitled; i.e. to resume 
the Annex V process to cover programmes that it could have included initially, but  had chosen not to.  
He then wished to review how  this point had been  reached.  As the EC had conceded at the 14 March 
DSB meeting, at the first DSB meeting to consider the DS317 panel request, the United States had 
alerted the EC that 13 programmes in the request had not been subject to consultations.  At that time, WT/DSB/M/207 
Page 22  
 
  at the EC's insistence, the par ties had been involved in negotiations to reach an agreement on 
procedures for the Annex V process in this dispute.  The time consumed by those lengthy negotiations 
had given the EC a chance to fix its defective pane l request.  But the EC had decided to do nothing, 
either before or during the Annex V process, to fi x its request.  The EC apparently regreted its 
inactivity now, and was seeking to rewrite the rules of the SCM Agreement, to rewrite the procedural 
agreement it had reached with the United States, and even to rewrite the minutes of three DSB 
meetings in an effort to "resume" the Annex V pro cess.  In so doing, it would unilaterally prolong that 
process beyond the 60 days provided in the SCM Agreement, and beyond th e 90 days that it had 
agreed upon with the United States.  The rules di d not provide what the EC sought and the United 
States was not in a position at the present meeting to agree to the EC's request. 
98. The representative of Canada
 recalled that, at the 14 March 2006 DSB meeting, the EC had 
stated that under the SCM Agreement, the in itiation of Annex V procedures by the DSB was 
automatic, upon request of a complaining Member.  Canada was pleased to note that the EC's position 
on this issue was now consistent with the plain language of Annex V.  He noted that Annex V, 
paragraph 2, required that "the DSB shall, upon reque st, initiate the procedure"  provided for in Annex 
V.  Nowhere in the SCM Agreement, or in the DS U, or in the entirety of the WTO Agreement, was 
there a suggestion that this "shall" was an exhortatio n rather than an obligation.  When a matter had 
been referred to the DSB and a Member requested an Annex V procedure, the DSB must initiate the 
procedure and designate a representative to facilitate  the information gathering process.  Nothing in 
the WTO Agreement gave any Member the right to bl ock initiation, or gave the DSB the authority to 
decline to initiate the procedure. 
99. The representative of Brazil  recalled that the same item had already been discussed at the 
14 March 2006 DSB meeting;  i.e. three days ago.  The issue underlying the EC's request, though, had a longer history, with the main actors ever changing their roles depending on who put the item on the DSB's agenda.  Brazil could not allow for the erosi on of the security and predictability that the WTO 
dispute settlement system was expected to ensure by  the deliberately erratic behaviour of two of the 
main players in this system.  Brazil could neithe r allow for any interpretation whereby, through the 
invention of additional conditions or requirements for the initiation of the Annex V procedures, WTO 
Members could attempt to deprive this important fact-finding tool of its usefulness for the development of a solid factual basis for the panel to render the most accurate verdict.  Brazil could not  
but regret that the United States and the EC had engaged in such a harmful exercise. 
100. Brazil wished to reiterate that the provisi ons of Annex V were clear and unconditional.  
Paragraphs 2 and 5 set out no additional require ment for the establishment of the fact-finding 
procedure but the request itself and the "referral of the matter to the DSB under paragraph 4 of 
Article 7 of the SCM Agreement".  As for the design ation of the facilitator, paragraph 4 of that Annex 
was even more straightforward:  "The DSB shall designate a representative to serve the function of facilitating the information-gathering process".  N one of the paragraphs mentioned included any 
reference whatsoever to a consensus rule.  Ther e was no need for mutual agreement between the 
parties to a dispute as a pre-condi tion for establishing the fact-finding procedure.  There was no need for 
designating the facilitator for the information-ga thering process.  The only requirements for the 
development of evidence under the mentioned procedur es were the request for the initiation of the 
process and the referral of the matter to the DSB under paragraph 4 of Article 7 of the SCM Agreement. 
101. The DSB took note
 of the statements. 
 
__________