RESTRICTED  WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  TN/C/M/25 
20 July 2006 
 (06-3507) 
Trade Negotiations Committee 
1 May 2006  
 
 
 
MINUTES OF MEETING 
 
Held in the Centre William Rappard  
on 1 May 2006  
 
Chairman: Mr. Pascal Lamy (Director-General)  
 
Subjects discussed : Page  
 
1. Statement by th e Chairman.....................................................................................................1  
2. Reports by the Chairpersons of th e Bodies Established by the TNC...................................5  
3. Statements by participants..................................................................................................... 10 
 
1. Statement by the Chairman 
1. The Chairman  said that Members would recall that at the informal Heads of Delegation 
meeting on 24 April, they had reviewed recent progr ess in the negotiations and considered the next 
appropriate steps in their process.  His statement at the informal Heads of Delegation meeting had 
been circulated in document JOB(06)/127.  He beli eved that Members had had a good meeting.  They 
had collectively faced up to the fact that they woul d not be able to establish modalities in agriculture 
and non-agricultural market access (NAMA), or reach an agreement on the Regional Trade 
Agreements (RTA) Transparency Mechanism, by Apr il 30.  They had faced those facts squarely, but 
not sensationally.  Expressions of disappointment from delegations had been heard, but not 
recriminations or attempts at blame shifting.  Instead, Members had engaged in a constructive 
discussion and showed a high level of convergence on how to move forward in the most efficient and 
practical manner which he believed was very important  for the nature of the process in Geneva.  This 
was encouraging for the work ahead.  It was also encouraging that political commitment to conclude 
the negotiations successfully had been reaffirmed in many quarters since the previous week.  
Members had had a disappointment which they had to acknowledge, but not a disaster.  They had already moved to convert disappointment into determination.   
2. In the previous week, Members had also had th e opportunity to listen to the analysis of the 
Chairs of agriculture, NAMA and rules as well as their proposals for the next stage of the 
negotiations.  From their interventions, it was clear that some hard work had been undertaken over the 
previous weeks by all delegations and officials, bot h in Geneva and in capitals, even if Members were 
still some way from where they had hoped to be.  The other areas of the negotiations were also 
making progress.   
3. There was little doubt in his mind that the following weeks would place a significant strain on 
all delegations, but as they had agreed, they would now have to be on-call on a permanent basis.  He 
was sensitive to the capacity concerns and constrai nts of smaller delegations and to the extent 
possible, Members should make every effort to organise work with this concern in mind.   TN/C/M/25 
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  4. What was imperative now was to make significant progress on key issues as quickly as 
possible, so that agreement could be reached on modalities in agriculture and NAMA rapidly, being clear that it was now a question of weeks rather than months.   
5. All Members knew that the Round consisted of a much wider range of issues than just 
agriculture and NAMA.  The priorities and ambitions  of delegations ranged across the full negotiating 
agenda of the Single Undertaking, as well as the other areas of the DDA.  At the same time, Members 
also knew that establishing modalities in agriculture  and NAMA was necessary to unlock other issues.  
He said that the negotiations should move as a convoy,  but some ships were in front and there were 
reasons for this.  In setting the April deadlines in  Hong Kong, Ministers had established this sequence 
which both the mandate and the logic of the ne gotiations required delegations to respect.   
6. He wished to briefly highlight a few points on agriculture and NAMA.  On agriculture, work 
had already intensified since the Chair reported to the informal Heads of Delegations meeting.  The 
Chair had held intensive consultati ons using reference papers, and a number of delegations had made 
constructive proposals.  Although there was still much  to be done in a short time, it was encouraging 
that delegations now appeared ready to  engage fully in this process.   
7. After the substantive discussions that had take n place on export competition, Blue Box, Green 
Box, the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) and tropical products, Members urgently needed more 
work and more texts on Special Products (SPs) and sen sitive products, so that the impact of cuts in 
tariffs could be translated into a quantum of in creased market access, which was what Ministers 
should negotiate.   
8. On NAMA, the Chair had been consulting wide ly with delegations.  Although it was clear 
that agreement on core modalities still remained elusive, he had understood that there was a 
willingness among delegations to engage in the intens ive process envisaged by the Chair.  This was 
fundamental for a successful outcome.  Good technical  work had taken place on paragraphs 8 and 6 of 
Annex B of the July 2004 Decision, but the limited number of developing countries which would have 
to implement formula cuts still had to work on simu lations in order to determine the specific lines 
which they wished to shield from the formula reduction.   
9. In the area of rules, and specifically RTAs, the Chair had provided Members with a concise 
report at the informal Heads of Delegation meeting,  in which he had emphasized that Members were 
close to an agreement on a decision on RTA tran sparency.  However, two areas of divergence 
remained, one regarding the bodies or body that would apply this transparency mechanism and the other regarding the scope of the transparency mech anism.  He urged delegations to re-double their 
efforts in assisting the Chair in bringing this im portant negotiation to a successful conclusion.   
10. He wished to turn briefly to the other areas of  the negotiations.  On anti-dumping, subsidies 
and countervailing measures, including fisheries subs idies, a large number of new proposals had been 
received since the previous meeting of the Group: 22 new papers on anti-dumping,  five new papers on 
subsidies disciplines and four new papers on fish eries subsidies.  The Chair had decided that 
additional time to advance the work of the Group was needed in order to be prepared to table a 
Chairman's text by the summer break should conditions be appropriate.  He had scheduled a further dedicated session on subsidies for the end of the month.   
11. In the services negotiations, serious progress was being made.  Twenty plurilateral meetings 
had taken place since the previous TNC, gatheri ng groups of requesting and requested Members, 
based on 22 collective requests submitted in accord ance with the Hong Kong Declaration.  Another 
round of request-offer meetings, plurilateral as well as  bilateral, had been scheduled for mid-May, so 
as to keep the momentum and expedite the overall process of the services negotiations.    TN/C/M/25 
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12. In the area of special and differential (S&D) treatment, Members had continued their 
consideration of the remaining Agreement-speci fic proposals and had also began work on the 
outstanding issues which was a good sign.  However, progress had been rather limited with most Members sticking to their earlier positions.  As far as duty-free quota-free market access for least-
developed countries (LDCs) was concerned, stakeholde rs were working in order to operationalise the 
decision Members had taken at Hong Kong.   
13. In the trade facilitation area, negotiations con tinued to progress well.  Two new important 
proposals at the previous meeting dealing with S& D treatment and capacity building had ensured that 
all three pillars of these negotiations were bei ng addressed in a balanced and mutually supportive 
way.  The negotiations were moving towards text-ba sed drafting, as had been requested by Ministers 
in Hong Kong.   
14. On trade and environment, there had been a good start to the process of examination of 
products in the Special Session with technical wo rk launched.  Another technical discussion around 
mid-May had been agreed to keep the process on track.   
15. In TRIPS and dispute settlement, he said th at Members should quickly develop a more 
complete picture of the issues that could be the basis of a final agreement in the negotiations.   
16. On cotton, a previous meeting of the Sub-committe e had been held the previous Friday and he 
understood that a useful discussion of the Cotton-Four (C4) proposal had taken place.  On the development assistance aspects of cotton, at present, he could inform Members that progress in this 
area was in positive evolution.  As a follow up to th e July 2004 Decision, and in line with instructions 
given to the Director-General by Ministers in Hong  Kong, he would be maki ng a mid-term progress 
report in his capacity as Direct or-General to the 15 May mee ting of the General Council.   
17. On preference erosion, the Secretariat had organized a seminar on the erosion of preferences 
in the areas of agriculture and NAMA on 3 April.  The discussions at that meeting had helped shed 
more light on the substance of the issue and on other recent work undertaken on preference erosion, 
including by other institutions.  Clearly, this issue remained on the table in the on-going work of the 
agriculture and NAMA groups.  While the contours of this issue were becoming more apparent, work 
now needed to be concentrated on discussing po ssible solutions to address this issue.   
18. To complete the picture, he wished once again to review progress in some of the other areas 
of work under the Doha Developmen t Agenda (DDA), even if they were not strictly speaking under 
the TNC.  On Aid for Trade, the two-track process co ntinued to move forward.  The first track, which 
was his own consultations, had reaffirmed the strong commitment among donors, as well as 
multilateral and regional agencies, to mobilizing si gnificant additional resources for Aid for Trade.  
Regarding the second track – the Task Force on ope rationalizing Aid for Trade – the Task Force had 
now met three times, and discussed delivery mech anisms and monitoring, as well as definitional 
issues, the scope of Aid for Trade, current flows and future trends.  The Task Force had broadly 
consulted with multilateral financia l and development agencies, regi onal development banks, relevant 
UN agencies as well as various groups of Members,  including non-residents during the Geneva week.  
After this intensive period of consultation and f act-finding, the next step would be to examine the 
linkage between these issues, and how they might  fit together into a coherent whole.   
19. On the Integrated Framework (IF), work had in tensified among the different stakeholders of 
the Task Force on the Enhancement of the IF.  Me mbers were hopeful that the Task Force would be 
submitting recommendations soon to the IF Mana ging Body, the IF Working Group and to the 
members of the IF Steering Committe e.  All these bodies were due to  meet in the second week of 
May.   TN/C/M/25 
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  20. On issues related to small economies, it was important that Members continued to pursue the 
aim of providing responses to these issues in releva nt areas of the negotiations, in particular 
agriculture and NAMA.  There had been some hopeful signs of constructive thinking in this respect.  
In addition, work was continuing under the Work  Programme in the Dedicated Session of the 
Committee on Trade and Development, whose Chair w ould report to the General Council later in the 
month.  He also understood that some good progr ess had been made the previous week at the 
Dedicated Session's most recent meeting.   
21. Over the broad scope of the DDA, the picture was by no means a bleak one.  The fact 
remained, however, that all this effort and progress c ould be put at risk if ne gotiators failed to unlock 
the modality issues.   
22. He provided an update on his work on implemen tation, in his capacity  as Director-General, 
further to the reports he had made at the February and March meetings of the TNC.  In keeping with 
the Hong Kong Ministerial Decision, he had con tinued his consultative process on all outstanding 
implementation issues under paragraph 12(b) of the D oha Ministerial Declaration, without prejudice 
to the positions of Members.  In this process, he ha d been assisted by a number of the Chairpersons of 
concerned WTO bodies acting as his Friends and two of his Deputy Directors-General, Valentine 
Rugwabiza for trade-related investment measures  (TRIMs) and Rufus Yerxa for the issues of 
geographical indications (GIs) extension and the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).   
23. On the issue of GI extension, DDG Yerxa had held a further dedicated consultation on 13 
April to complete the earlier discussions held on 16,  21 and 23 March of the compilation of the points 
and questions that delegations had identified as n eeding attention.  Delegations had completed their 
discussion of the remaining 38, out of the total of 91, issues and questions.  While much of the discussion had been repetitious, some of the questions  raised had enabled Members to explore certain 
issues in greater depth than previously.  At the e nd of the meeting, DDG Yerxa had said that he would 
be informally in contact with individual delegations  to sound out where delegations felt they were and 
what should be the next steps in the consultative process.   
24. On the issue of TRIPS-CBD, Mr. Yerxa had been  in touch with interested delegations and 
further open-ended consultations ha d been convened for the end of the present week, on 4 and 5 May, 
with a view to exploring how to move forward on the key issues.  He would report again on this 
matter at a later stage.   
25. On all the other implementation issues – the othe r TRIPS issues, Balance of Payments (BOP), 
Market Access, TRIMs, Customs Valuation, Safegua rds and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), the 
situation had not evolved significantly since his last  report.  In many of those areas, the ball was 
essentially in the court of the proponents.  He beli eved that the time was fast approaching when 
Members would need to agree among themselves whic h issues still to actively pursue.  He did not 
believe that there was much point in expending scar ce time on issues which, in practice if not in a 
formal sense, had either lapsed, been overtaken by  events or reached the limit of possible progress or 
in re-activating issues which had become inac tive with the tacit acceptance of Members.   
26. He was hopeful that in his next report on all outstanding implementation issues under 
paragraph 12(b), he would be able to reflect progress  in at least some areas.  But as all delegations 
knew, any Chair could only report the convergence achieved by Members.   
27. Before concluding his introductory statement, he  wished to repeat that this was and would 
remain a negotiation among Members.  As it was they who held the key to the success of the 
negotiations, he urged each and every one to engage directly with each other at every level.  He did 
not believe that Members had lost the opportunity to  produce positive results, but they had no more  TN/C/M/25 
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time to spare.  Members had now to focus their effo rts on working intensively, continuously and in an 
effective manner on a text-based negotiating process, which was solidly anchored in Geneva.  He 
reiterated the collective responsibility to ensure an inclusive, bottom-up, transparent and participatory 
process.  Members would not get there by the work of magic, but by their collective determination 
and effort to breach remaining gaps and find consensu s.  This, in his view, remained doable, but only 
if a sense of urgency, which he felt was not always shared by all, started appearing in each and every 
delegation.   
28. The Trade Negotiations Committee took note  of the Chairman's statement.   
 
2. Reports by the Chairpersons of the Bodies Established by the TNC 
 
29. The Chairman  noted that written reports had been circulated in the following official 
documents: 
 Negotiating Group on Market Access     TN/MA/18/Rev.1  Special Session of the Council fo r Trade in Services   TN/S/27 
 Negotiating Group on Rules      TN/RL/17 
 Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Environment  TN/TE/15  Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Development  TN/CTD/15  30. He also noted that the Ambassador Gillermo Valles, Chairman of the Negotiating Group on 
Rules was chairing a meeting of that Group and th at Ambassador Ali, Chairman of the Special 
Session of the Committee on Trade and Environment w as not in Geneva.  However, both Chairs had 
circulated their written reports.   
31. Ambassador Falconer (New Zealand), Chairman of the Special Session of the Committee on 
Agriculture , said that what he had said in the informal Heads of Delegation meeting still stood.  The 
key message was simple and straightforward – Member s had failed to meet the deadline they had set 
themselves for full modalities.  It was a source of considerable regret and the responsibility now was 
to make the requisite progress as quickly as possible.  He believed it was fair to say that Members had 
made progress up until the end of April.  He c ould randomly cite some examples including the 
progress made on the Blue Box to move from a ce iling of 5 per cent to 2.5 per cent as a working 
hypothesis.  However, that degree of progress had not been enough to get Members to full modalities 
and that was the reality of the situation.   
32. The important message he wished to convey w as that it was not business as usual, post 30 
April.  What Members needed to do, which he w as pleased to see was their will, was to work even 
more intensively than before in order to get to  full modalities as quickly as possible.  His group had 
adopted a Work Programme in order to advance this .  He believed the group had, through a kind of 
cycle of three two-weekly meetings, the basis for operating a transparent process in a way that was 
conducive to making progress in an efficient way.  This would be done through the vehicle of the 
reference papers that the group had been using.  He hoped that through th ese reference papers, the 
group would gradually build consensus and produce,  texts upon which decisions could be made.   
33. He said that while the group was using the pr ocess of reference papers working through to 
texts, the papers were only a vehicle – a device to get Members to where they needed to be.  As he 
had said at the Special Session meeting the previous  Friday, the reference papers were like a mirror 
for Members' work.  If Members did not like what wa s in the mirror, they should not blame the mirror 
maker but take a look at the person – the face that was reflected in the mirror.   TN/C/M/25 
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  34. He believed nobody needed a programme of work  defined by the Chair to know what had to 
be done.  Everyone knew what the key issues and di fferences were.  Even if Members had not been 
ready to bridge those differences, it was not a myst ery as to how they would actually do it.  His two 
key messages were, firstly, he believed the time fo r over negotiating were past.  There had been a lot 
of padding in negotiating positions which, considering that Members had missed their deadline, it was 
time to get rid of.  Members needed to become more serious about their bottom lines.  Secondly, 
whatever delegations did in Geneva  – which had to be the centre of the momentum and gravity for 
progress – could not work in isolation.  Geneva c ould not operate as a bubble.   It would only operate 
with political input into the process to ensure that delegations made the ultimately political decisions 
that would allow progress to be made.  This political  engagement was absolutely fundamental.  It had 
to be worked through the instrument of the processes that Members had in place in Geneva.  
Delegations could not afford to and should not make the mistake of assuming that some kind of 
Geneva technical process was a substitute for political  engagement and political decisions in the few 
weeks that they had to do the job.   
35. Ambassador Stephenson (Canada), Chairman  of the Negotiating Group on Market Access
, 
said that he had circulated a written report and had little to add to it.  His report had provided a fair 
assessment of where Members stood in terms of the production of full modalities – or  where they did 
not stand.  He had presented the current state of th e negotiations in a tabular form and he wished to 
draw attention to the middle column.  The middle column represented the agreed modalities and it 
was visually interesting for its long white spaces – its blankness.  He believed that was the best 
representation he could give of the current state of play.   
36. His report, in the cover note, had also provided his best guess on how to proceed over the next 
six weeks to try to produce full modalities.  The negotiating group had endorsed a Work Plan which 
essentially provided that the group would spend the first two or three weeks trying to agree the modalities that modulated or provided an alternativ e to the application of the formula for specific 
Members.  It would then turn its attention in a second phase to those modalities that established the 
level of ambition in the NAMA negotiations.  It re mained to be seen whether Members would bring 
new instructions from capital to the negotiations th at would permit them to move from their existing 
and well rehearsed positions to exercise some flexib ility, realism and commitment to an outcome this 
year.   
37. Using the analogy of an ice hockey game, he sa id his Montreal ice hockey team had lost and 
now stood on the verge, like Members, of elimina tion from further play.  They were one loss away 
from having their season, like Members, ended.  He would say that his score card report indicated that 
Members were now in overtime.  The game had e nded in a scoreless draw, which had not been too 
surprising because all players on the ice were playing goal tender.  It was not impossible to score from 
that position, but it was highly improbable and would prevent Members from finishing the game in 2006.   
38. Ambassador Fernando de Mateo Venturini (Mexico), Chairman of the Special Session of the 
Council for Trade in Services , said that he had circulated his written report in document TN/S/27.  He 
had focused on the encouraging progress that had been made during the fi rst round of plurilateral 
request-offer services negotiations which had take n place four weeks back.  During that round, 22 
collective requests had been made and 20 plurilate ral meetings held, enabling a large number of 
experts from capitals to meet and clarify technical aspects of the requests.  Equally important, a large 
number of bilateral request-offer meetings had ta ken place on the margins of the plurilaterals.   
39. Members had reported to him that those meetings had been highly constructive and 
informative, going even further than the most optimistic expect ations.  However, all Members 
realized that a plurilateral process alone could not  guarantee substantive results.  The Bible pointed 
out that "by their deeds you shall know them" while  Don Quixote had said to Sancho that "the proof  TN/C/M/25 
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of the pudding is in the eating".  Members would only know whether they had a fully-baked result 
when revised offers were submitted on 31 July, in accordance with the Hong Kong Declaration.   
40. Therefore, until end July, Members should no t only maintain momentum and the positive 
atmosphere of the first round of plurilateral meetings, but also accelerate their efforts to refine and improve the offers.  At the same time, they shou ld continue work on GATS rules in all areas, in 
particular domestic regulation, the implementati on of LDC modalities, and on the S&D issues that 
had been referred to the Special Se ssion by the General Council.   
41. He wondered how Members would accomplish all of that.  For a start, a second round of 
plurilateral request-offer talks was planned for the period of 15-23 May.  This  would allow a further 
exchange of questions and views on the plurilatera l requests, helping to bridge the gaps between 
requesting and requested Members.  During this sam e period, a large number of bilateral request-offer 
meetings were also planned.   
42. In order to build on the success of the first round of plurilateral request-offer meetings, it was 
very important that a large number of experts from capitals attended the Ma y meetings.  All Members 
knew that the negotiations with their own regulat ors and relevant authorities were as or more 
complicated than those held in Geneva if not mo re so.  Members needed, therefore, much more 
awareness from regulators and other authorities regard ing what was at play in these negotiations.   
43. Although Members would have the opportunity of  having another round of services meetings 
in the third week of June, they should resist the temptation to backload diffi cult issues closer to the 
July deadline for revised offers.   
44. Members knew that services negotiations did not take place in a vacuum.  They had heard 
from the Chairs of the other negotiating groups of the arduous challenges ahead, in particular in 
NAMA and agriculture.  What the Chairs and the Ch airman had suggested in terms of beginning a 
Geneva-based process with continuous text-based ne gotiation was a clear signal of the intensification 
of the negotiations in those other key areas.  But it also pointed to the need to reinforce Members' 
commitment, in this very labour-intensive area of th e negotiations, to move ah ead substantially in the 
May meetings, regardless of the results in the ot her areas.  Members would have the opportunity 
subsequently to make any necessary adjustments.   
45. Ambassador Ahmad (Pakistan), Chairman of the Special Session of the Council for TRIPS
, 
said that as had been indicated in his report to the TNC last March, he had initiated a process of 
intensified consultations on how to best proceed with  the work prior to the next formal meeting of the 
Special Session, scheduled for 12-13 June.  The cons ultations he had initiated the previous week with 
some delegations had proven useful.  While ther e seemed to be some modest signs of potential 
flexibility, there had also been the view that little momentum could be expected in the discussions for 
the time being, given the situation regarding the ov erall negotiation.  He said that negotiations in his 
group were like a cricket game.  On  the fifth day of a test match, the game became interesting.  
However, for the time being, he did not way which way work in his group would go. 
46. Ambassador Saborio Soto (Costa Rica), Chairman of the Special Session of the Dispute 
Settlement Body , said he would be providing a written report on the Special Session's activities since 
the last TNC meeting1.  He therefore only wished to briefly take stock of where Members stood 
overall in these negotiations.   
47. Over the previous few months, a number of  delegations had put forward revised and 
improved contributions, building on earlier di scussions, including informal processes among 
Members.  He appreciated the efforts of delegations  in bringing back to the Special Session the results 
                                                      
1 Subsequently issued in document TN/DS/16. TN/C/M/25 
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  of their informal work as early as possible.  He be lieved that this had allowed the Special Session to 
move forward constructively towards its objective of  being fully engaged in text-based discussions by 
the summer.  This process was still ongoing and some  delegations continue d to be engaged in 
informal work with the intention of submitting revi sed contributions to the Special Session, hopefully 
by its next meeting.   
48. The Special Session had had useful initial discu ssions of the revised contributions which 
should provide it with a solid basis to work from in the following months.  It also seemed clear to him 
that further work was required on all these issues to br ing the group closer to substantive agreement.  
The Special Session had before it a number of improved legal texts, but there were still gaps to bridge, 
and the revised contributions did not necessarily reflect major evolutions in that respect.  Participants 
would therefore need to remain very actively engaged in the following months, as they moved 
towards actually agreeing on clarifications and improvements to the Dispute Settlement Understanding.  He therefore requested them to be full y prepared to intensify th eir efforts in this last 
stage of their work.   
49. Ambassador Burhan Gafoor (Singapore), Chai rman of the Special Session of the Committee 
on Trade and Development , said that the Special Session had focused on the eight remaining Category 
I Agreement-specific proposals.  The eight proposals related to four issues:  (i) Article 3.5 of the 
Agreement on Import Licensing; (ii)  Article 10.3 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) Agreement; (iii) Article XVIII of GATT 1994; and (iv) the Understanding in Respect of Waiver s of Obligations under GATT 1994.   
50. In the discussion of the Agreement-specific pr oposals, he had been encouraged by a few 
developments.  First, a very constructive mood had prevailed among Members.  Second, Members 
had generally shown flexibility.  Third, the prop onents had shown flexibility by agreeing to use the 
last language considered instead of their origin al proposals as the starting point for discussions.  
Finally, Members had been willing to engage in a text-based negotiation and this process had resulted 
in revised language for some of the proposals.   
51. At the same time, it was clear that there were  still some deep differences amongst Members 
on some of the Agreement-specific proposals.  Wh ile Members generally accepted that developing-
country Members should be provided necessary flex ibilities to address their constraints, some had 
stressed that blanket exemptions from commitments we re unacceptable.  As a result, there was a need 
for continued informal consultations on some of the proposals under Category I.   
52. The LDCs had raised the issue of the implementation of the duty-free quota-free market 
access decision adopted at Hong Kong.  They had indicated that the modalities of the decision should 
be a matter for negotiations in the Committee on Trade and Development in Special Session 
(CTDSS).  However, some other Members stated that they were not in a position to agree to further 
negotiations in the Special Session, but that instead this was an implementation issue to be dealt with 
in the regular session of the Committee on Trade and Development.  Given the divergences, he had 
urged delegations to undertak e consultations amongst themselv es and to try and reach an 
understanding.   
53. With regard to the Category II proposals, most of the Chairpersons of the various bodies to 
whom the proposals had been referred had indicat ed that progress on the proposals had not been 
forthcoming because of a lack of engagement amongst Members.  It was clear that much work remained to be done by interested  Members if any real progress was to  be made on these proposals.   
54. The Special Session had also been mandated to  resume work on all other outstanding issues, 
including on the cross-cutting issu es, the monitoring mechanism and the incorporation of S&D into 
the architecture of WTO rules.  On this cluster of issues, the discussions at the Special Session's  TN/C/M/25 
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previous meeting had primarily focused on the est ablishment of a monitoring mechanism.  While 
some Members believed that the Monitoring Mechanism should allow the evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the S&D provisions, many were divi ded on what the structure and elements of such a 
mechanism should be.   
55. The fact that the CTDSS had been able to resume its discussion on all outstanding issues was 
in itself a positive development.  Nonetheless, there c ontinued to be deep differences of views on this 
cluster of issues.  This would require Members to  crystallise their own views and continue informal 
discussions amongst themselves.  As Chairman, he had told Members that he did not have any 
solutions to propose or impose.  He would be st rictly guided by what Members themselves could 
agree in a truly bottom-up process.   
56. As for future work, he would continue with  text-based consultations on the Agreement-
specific proposals in an attempt to narrow the existi ng differences.  He would also continue the work 
on all outstanding issues.  In this regard, informal  consultations had been scheduled for the following 
week and formal meetings were scheduled for June and July.   
57. In conclusion, he said that it was important th at the work of the Special Session kept pace 
with the other areas of negotiations.  He therefore urged Members to devote attention to these issues 
even as they focused on the other issues, so that the unfinished bu siness of the CTDSS could finally 
be finished.  He said the work of his group was lik e removing weed from the garden by hand in spring 
time.  It was tedious work and for every weed re moved, several sprung up quickly at different places 
in the garden.  He believed that what his group needed was not a manual weed remover but a lawn 
mower and he urged all dele gations to provide the necessary support needed.   
58. Mr. Miller (Hong Kong, China), Chairman of  the Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation , 
said that since his last report to the TNC, the Negotiating Group had met once in formal session on 5 
and 6 April.  The main purpose of that meeting had been to advance the consensus building process 
with respect to the tabled proposals and pave the wa y for July.  This had been greatly facilitated by 
the emerging results of a Member-initiated exercise  of consolidation, which had seen both a merging 
of ideas and a first delineation of common ground.   
59. Progress had been made in more clearly defining the matters at stake, with discussions based 
on a framed universe of issues.  There had also been  considerable evidence of a growing convergence 
of minds, and this had allowed for a new concentr ation on the operational side of the suggested 
commitments.  While further work would be need ed, he was confident that the Group was well on the 
way to an even more focussed consideration of the ma tters at hand.  This view had been reinforced as 
much by the fair degree of comfort, which he had detected, with much of the substance of what was 
being proposed, as by the clear appreciation he had sensed within the Group for further work on 
refining the detail.   
60. One area of particularly valuable advance had b een on technical assistance and S&D.  Hopes 
for progress had materialized in the form of two s ubstantive proposals from the developing countries.  
In offering concrete suggestions in text-based fo rm, the suggestions had managed to move the S&D 
leg ahead of other elements in terms of comprehe nsiveness and specificity of form.  However, there 
was still work remaining ahead.  The road to July was clearly a challenging one, and one that required 
everybody's full support.   
61. Using a bridge-building analogy, he said that Members would need both the vision of the 
bridge-builder and the willingness to find the righ t balance between form and function in moving 
things forward.  The next opportunity the Group had to move a bit closer towards achieving this goal 
was the upcoming May meeting.  D esigned to take place in an informal, but open-ended setting, it 
would allow for a recapitulation of previous discu ssions, with a view to identifying further common 
ground.  In preparing for the meeting, he would suggest a focus on the open questions, which had TN/C/M/25 
Page 10  
 
  emerged from the previous meeting.  He looked to all delegations to maintain the constructive 
attitude, which had become the hallmark of this gr oup, in pushing the process urgently forward.   
62. The Trade Negotiations Committee took note
 of the reports by the Chairpersons of the bodies 
established by it.   
3. Statements by participants 
63. The representative of Australia  said that the failure by Members to complete modalities for 
agriculture and NAMA by the scheduled deadline of 30 April was a failure which required reflection, 
engagement and action at the political level.  The stakes were too high for any other response.  An 
important deadline had been missed.  There wa s now very little time before the window of 
opportunity to conclude the Round began to close.   
64. It was true that Members had made some progress over recent months.  However, they should 
not fool themselves that this was anywhere near enough.  They had continued to evade the hard 
political decisions that would be required to br ing the Round to a close.  They had to now face 
squarely the prospect that the Round would stall completely.  If that happened, the Round might be 
lost.  Members needed to reflect deeply on what this would mean.  For Australia, this would be 
something of immense significance and regret.   
65. Opportunities of the sort provided by multilateral rounds were hard fought because they 
helped fuel economic growth and pr osperity and because they were a necessary part of the rules-based 
trading system.  The failure of this round would be  a real setback to the multilateral system.  He 
assumed that this was a view that most at the present meeting shared.   
66. What was so disappointing was that, despite the f act that the essential elements for concluding 
the Round were now well understood and close at ha nd, Members still seemed to lack the necessary 
political will to forge the necessar y compromises to realize this historic opportunity.  Time was 
critically short but Members still had a chance to avoid failure.   
67. Over the following few weeks, Members needed to  do two things in particular.  First, they 
needed to intensify further their negotiating effort s.  He wished to express his full support for the 
Chairman's efforts to intensify work and for th e proposals from the Chairs of the agriculture and 
NAMA negotiating groups on how to do this.  In ag riculture, Members should intensify negotiations 
by moving them to a more structured and continu ous basis.  This process would allow Members to 
more easily identify and address blockages in the ne gotiations.  As part of this process, all Members 
should start to deal with real interests and positions , not tactical posturing or ideological rhetoric.  
Members should aim to move as quickly as possible to a full text-based negotiation.  Australia, 
working with its Cairns Group colleagues, and with  all Members, would contribute to this process 
with total commitment.   
68. Second, Members should reaffirm and strengthen their political commitment to conclude this 
round.  Leaders and Ministers needed to be actively and continuously involved in support of these negotiations if they were to be br ought to a successful conclusion.   
69. To conclude this round, Members would need to  make very substantial further progress in the 
agriculture negotiations to secure  the necessary ambition.  Breaki ng the current gridlock in the 
negotiations meant first and foremost movement in agriculture to deepen domestic subsidy cuts and 
deliver substantial market access improvements.  It also meant moving ahead in NAMA and as soon 
as Members could on services trade liberalization and the rules agenda.    TN/C/M/25 
 Page 11 
 
 
70. Bringing these areas of the negotiations forward a nd together in a way which met the interests 
of all would be a considerable cha llenge.  It would require very subs tantial political will.  He wished 
to make it clear that there was no political cons tituency for a Doha round which was based on low 
ambition.  Members had an opportunity now to lock in real and effective reform of EU and US farm 
policy and it would be a major historical mistake if they missed this opportunity.  Equally, Members 
had the opportunity to secure meaningful market access improvements for agriculture, manufactures 
and services.  This was vital to securing the de velopment objectives of the Doha mandate.   
71. Members stood on the threshold of an historic opportunity.  They had for the first time the 
chance to deliver on the growth and development promise they had made when they had established the WTO.  Central to this, they had at hand the chance to make a major step forward to reform 
fundamentally world agricultural trade.  They had the prospect of concluding the first multilateral 
round under the universal WTO system.  He cautioned that it should not be said of the WTO that its membership was now too numerous, or that its me mber governments' commitment to liberalization 
and development was too weak.  To conclude an ambitious multilateral r ound of negotiations would 
require courage from now onwards.   
72. In conclusion, he said that at this critical  time in the Round, Members should not allow 
themselves to be distracted by criticism or recrim ination.  Everyone, Ministers and officials alike, 
would be judged by their actions in this final period of the Round.  However, Members should be 
clear on one central point as they took up their respective tasks: how they responded over the following few weeks would have profound implications for the Round and for the trading system for years to come and for their governments collectiv ely to sustain economic growth, development and 
the creation of decent jobs and living conditions fo r all.  The time was almost up for Members to 
deliver on the DDA.  He said that it should not be recorded in history that Members failed this important responsibility to the developing world. 
73. The representative of Japan
 regretted that Members had not able to meet the deadline of 
establishing the modalities by the end of April.  It  had been his hope that respective Members could 
have made additional efforts and he believed this was necessary.   Japan was willing to make a 
tremendous contribution to the successful conclusion of the Round by the end of the year.  This was a 
development round and therefore the outcome, thr ough expansion of trade, had to lead to the 
development of the developing countries which c onstituted the majority of the membership.  Due 
account should particularly be take n of the LDCs because many of them only had one or two products 
to export.  How to step up the capacity building effo rts for LDCs should also be a focal point in this 
Round.   
74. Sixty years ago, Japan had been under devast ation from war.  However, through friendship 
and trade with respective countries it had been able to recover and achieve development.  Japan was 
therefore keen to provide similar opportunities to  all Members.  At the Hong Kong Ministerial 
meeting, Japan had announced its  Koizumi Development Initiative.  There were many people around 
the world living on less than a dollar a day and who did not have access to clean water supplies.  How 
this Round would make a contribution to such peopl e was important.  He agreed with the Chairman 
that the disappointment should be turned into de termination and that political will was required.  
Members knew what the sticking points were and he believed that it was possible to overcome the 
stalemate.  There were Members making request s and receiving requests; those with offensive 
interests and defensive interests and exporting and im porting countries.  He said that the stronger side 
– those requesting or with an offensive or with exporting interest should first make their concessions 
in order for further moves and progress to be in th e negotiations.  Japan had areas in which it had an 
offensive interest and those where it had defensiv e interests and it had to make concessions on its 
offensive side.  Members had to strike a balance amongst all pillars in agriculture, NAMA, services 
and development.  The balance was important fo r all these sectors so as to surmount the current 
situation.   TN/C/M/25 
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  75. He said people engaged in sport not as a hobby but for the interests of their respective nations.  
Therefore, they should not only obey the rules but al so respect other countries – the other players in 
the game.  In this sense, the negotiation was not a battle but rather like a game of sport.  He 
emphasized that Japan had been able to achieve its development because of trade.  It would therefore 
make concessions where it could and particularly ha d to protect its trade inte rests.  There should be 
proposals as a starting point for further movement.  At the political level, Japan was keen to continue 
to be fully engaged and he pledge d his country's support for the envisaged on-going Geneva process.   
76. The representative of the United States
 said that the present meeting was an important 
opportunity to take stock of where Members were and,  more importantly, to identify very clearly what 
they needed to do to achieve the goals set out by Ministers, first in Doha and reaffirmed in Hong 
Kong.   
77. He would not belabour the point of where Members were, or more precisely, where they were 
not.  His delegation shared the disappointment of  others that negotiators had not achieved the 
objectives that Ministers in Hong Kong had set out for them to achieve by the end of April.   
78. This situation was more than a matter of disappointment.  Missi ng the April 30 deadline 
raised serious questions about the Members' colle ctive commitment to the Doha goals of significant 
liberalization and reform of trade in the presen t year.  In the case of the United States, its 
determination to conclude the DDA negotiations successf ully before the end of the year remained as 
strong as ever.  Its objective of ambitious results also remained undiminished.   
79. He said that no one should be lulled into thinki ng that the negotiations and the negotiators' 
jobs of selling the results to their respective domest ic constituencies would be easier if they all just 
lowered their sights.  It would not.  Members c ould only achieve success if the negotiations produced 
significant, new market opportunities for trade in  agricultural products, manufactured goods, and 
services.  In all three areas, there should be si gnificant improvements from the actual conditions that 
currently existed in the markets and not just cu ts on paper.  The United States was prepared to 
negotiate an agreement that met that standard.  De veloping countries, most of all, needed such a 
result.  They would be the biggest losers if Members failed.   
80. His delegation strongly supported the processes th at the Chairman and the Negotiating Group 
Chairs had put forward.  Ambassadors Portman a nd Schwab would affirm this support in their 
meetings with Members in Geneva  over the following two days.   
81. His delegation particularly agreed that it would be dangerous in the extreme to back load all 
the tough decisions to the end of July either through a decision to do that or through inaction.  The end 
of July was not the conclusion of the DDA.  Memb ers had agreed at Hong Kong that it would be the 
start of the final negotiations.   
82. Members could bring the DDA to a successful conclusion by the end of the year if they stayed 
focused on the job at hand and made the necessary decisi ons.  They needed to do  this in the following 
weeks.  Members did not have the luxury of  postponing decisions on agricultural and NAMA 
modalities until the end of July.  By the end of July , Members needed to start to see the shape of the 
overall package, and they could not do that if they put off those two essential files.   
83. Once Members had the modalities in place – even  so-called "full modalities" – they still had 
an enormous amount of work to do.  First, each Me mber would have to prepare its line-by-line tariff 
schedules in agriculture and NAMA.  This would take even the strongest teams two to three months to 
prepare.  But this was not the end of the nego tiating process; it was the beginning of the final 
negotiating process.    TN/C/M/25 
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84. There would have to be negotiations to ge t satisfactory balances among countries and in 
relation to the other parts of the DDA, especially in  agriculture, where there were multiple forms of 
flexibility that cumulatively could have a huge impa ct on what new access was provided.  Similarly, 
when the revised services offers were submitted by July  31 – and he urged all Members to take that 
deadline seriously – Members faced another very  detailed negotiating process to obtain the final 
outcome for services.  This would take months.   
85. In other areas of the negotiations, such as th e various rules areas and trade facilitation, 
Members should have solid draft texts by the end of July that garnered sufficient consensus among 
Members to serve as the basis for negotiating the fi nal agreements in those areas.  But since they 
would be drafts, there would be s ubstantial negotiating left to do in those areas as well after July.   
86. Negotiators needed not to be complacent about the tasks before them.  Ministers had been 
aware of the time needed to comple te those steps when they had agr eed to April 30 as the deadline.  
Even the assumption that Members could complete a ll of those post-modality steps after April 30 had 
been optimistic, and in some peoples' minds, bordering on the unrealizable.   
87. Members therefore had an enormous challenge facing them in the days ahead.  He wondered 
whether Members could rapidly reach agreement on the modalities for agriculture and NAMA even as 
they intensified the negotiations in the other area s of the DDA  He wondered also whether Members 
could shift immediately to the next stages of those negotiations before the end of July once they had 
met the challenge of modalities.  He had laid out th is daunting outline of work, which he said was not 
a comprehensive one, not to dishearten everyone, but to stress the urgency of completing work soon 
on the modalities for agriculture and NAMA.   
88. In recent weeks, a lot of hand wringing and jeremiads over whether the DDA was doomed to 
failure and whether the attention of the major pl ayers was turning elsewhere had been seen.  He 
cautioned Members to beware of the self-fulfilling pr ophecy.  He asked them to heed the warnings, 
but also to prove the lamentators and the commentators wrong.   
89. In conclusion, the United States remained firmly  committed at the very highest level to the 
success of the DDA.  There should be no doubt what soever that the United States was prepared to 
exercise the will, devote the resources, provide th e leadership, and work with the rest of the 
membership to achieve the strong agreement this year that all had signed up for at Doha and Hong 
Kong.   
90. The representative of Brazil , on behalf of the G20 , expressed concern that the April 30 
deadline for modalities had been missed.  Negotiators  had not been able to fulfil their Ministers 
instructions and the expectations of the DDA had been postponed again.  This could not be taken 
lightly.  However, for the G20, this situation was not a source of discouragement.  Quite to the contrary, the Group was still determined to firmly engage in a concentrated collective effort to 
achieve full modalities well before the summer.   
91. Concerning the negotiating process, the Group was comfortable with the different formats of 
meetings that had been undertaken so far.  The Ag riculture Chair had been very helpful in conducting 
the negotiating process in a transparent and inclus ive way, respecting the bottom-up approach that 
conferred legitimacy to the process.  He could count  on the G20 to continue working constructively 
on all issues and to revisit its own proposals, whic h were a sound basis for agreement, as well as other 
Members’ proposals as might be necessary to cont ribute toward securing progress and acceptable 
convergence.   
92. He reaffirmed the G20's commitment to an outco me for the Round compatible with its main 
objective – development.  The Round would be succes sful only if it resulted in benefits for all 
Members, in a fair and equitable manner.  As many developing countries including LDCs enjoyed TN/C/M/25 
Page 14  
 
  more and in many cases their only comparative adva ntage in agriculture, substantial reductions in 
distortions in agriculture trade and substantial improvement in market access – while recognizing 
rural development and livelihood and food security needs of developing countries  – were essential 
elements for the realization of the development mandate of the Round and the achievement of an 
ambitious and balanced outcome.  It was for this very reason that agriculture was the engine of the 
Round.   
93. Only through an ambitious outcome could Members deliver on the development objectives of 
the Round.  It was essential that the main subsid izers improved their proposals on domestic support.  
Their current offers in market ac cess did not provide an adequate b asis for achieving the results that 
all Members were striving for.  He appealed to the developed countries to make such a decision 
promptly.   
94. On domestic support, reductions should lead to e ffective and substantial cuts in all forms of 
support and in the overall levels of trade-distorti ng domestic support which should be complemented 
by disciplines on the Blue Box to ensure that such  payments were truly less trade distorting than the 
aggregate measure of support (AMS), and on the Green Box to ensure that the fundamental criteria of 
minimal or non-trade distortion was met.   
95. On the market access pillar, the tariff reduction formula remained the main element to achieve 
substantial improvements in market access.  The number and treatment of sensitive products should 
allow for substantial improvement in market access for all products.  Discussions so far had indicated 
delegations’ disposition to look for a hybrid approach that could provide a solution to the treatment of 
sensitive products.  The G20 was prepared to discuss  these proposals and to contribute to arriving at a 
satisfactory solution to the issue of sensitive products.   
96. He wished to reiterate that S&D treatment remained  an integral part of all the three pillars of 
the agriculture negotiation.  On the market access pillar he recalle d the G20 proposal which had been 
premised upon developing-country commitments bei ng less than two-thirds of the cut to be 
undertaken by developed countries.  The G20 also  welcomed the G33 contribution on SPs and the 
SSM.  The situation of large rural poor populatio ns in developing countries should be a central 
concern in the discussion of market access modaliti es, based on the criteria of food and livelihood 
security and rural development needs.   
97. In export competition, as Members had agreed that all forms of export subsidies would be 
eliminated by 2013 with a substantial part by the end of the first half of the implementation period, the 
next step was to work on their elimination as scheduled and on disciplines which could meet the 
requirement of parallelism.   
98. The G20 remained committed to an outcome from the Round that included substantial 
resources for Aid for Trade, free market access for LDCs in accordance with the Hong Kong 
Declaration, effective action on commodities and tropical products of particular importance for 
developing countries, and specific flexibility provisi ons for recently-acceded Members.  Concerns of 
small, vulnerable economies should also be effectiv ely addressed.  Any outcome in agriculture should 
also include a substantial result in cotton, in li ne with the aspirations of the African exporting 
countries.   
99. He reaffirmed the G20's commitment to an  ambitious, pro-development outcome of the 
negotiations with a view to attaining the objectiv es of the Doha Round within the shortest possible 
timeframe.   
  TN/C/M/25 
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100. Speaking on behalf of Brazil , he said he wished to make brief references to some central 
issues for Brazil in the negotiations beyond agriculture.   First, he informed delegations that Minister 
Celso Amorim was in Geneva and would be having a series of m eetings to demonstrate Brazil’s 
commitment to an ambitious outcome of the Ro und and to assess the current situation in the 
negotiations.   
101. In NAMA, Brazil supported the Chair's efforts to move ahead in the negotiations.  He 
highlighted Brazil's commitment to the NAMA 11 wh ich he believed was a gr oup that could have a 
central contribution to a successful NAMA negotiation.   
102. Regarding services, Brazil was pleased with the results of the first cluster of plurilateral 
consultations.  It was going to participate activel y in the meetings in May, including with capital-
based officials.  Brazil also attach ed importance to the results in domestic regulation and together with 
other countries, it would be making a fu rther contribution in this area.   
103. On rules, Brazil considered anti-dumping a centr al issue in the negotiations.  His delegation 
hoped that the Chair would engage in further wide consultations on the proposals on the table so that 
Members could create a sound basis for moving toward s a consolidated text.  The issue of fishery 
subsidies was also important to Brazil and it wish ed to see significant results in this area.   
104. On TRIPS-CBD, Brazil, together with India and other countries attached significant 
importance to concrete results in th is area in the context of a balanc ed outcome of the Round.  He said 
Members should re-double their efforts in the consultati ons to arrive at that outcome.  In this context, 
he believed it was important to count on flexibility fr om all sides so that Members could arrive at that 
result.  Brazil was working on a concrete propo sal to move these negotiations to a successful 
conclusion and would submit it soon.   
105. On Aid for Trade, Brazil supported the efforts of the Aid for Trade Task Force under the 
guidance of the Swedish Permanent Representative.  Brazil was confident that Members would arrive 
at a successful result which would be a contribution to the development objective of the Round.   
106. Finally on development, all Members knew that this was central to the Round including all 
those aspects of development that he had highlighted in the G20 statement, in all market access areas 
and in all the other areas of the Round.  Brazil was also committed to implementing duty-free, quota-free market access for LDCs.   
107. The representative of the European Communities
 said that convening the TNC meeting on 
labour day had signalled that Members had a lot of  work ahead and preciously little time.  Members 
were entering a crucial stage of the DDA negotiations – the make or break stage.  Time was running 
out.  Without a comprehensive agreement on modalit ies and beyond, by the summer break, the Doha 
Round might well enter into a long winter sleep.   
108. But there was much more at stake than the search of success for Geneva ambassadors.  
Failure of the Round would be a severe blow to the rules-based multilateral trading system and a 
severe blow to a great many developing countries wh ich had invested heavily in expectation of a 
genuinely development round.  The European Communiti es were ready to live up to this expectation.  
His delegation needed a round that unlocked the door to development across the full range of 
economic activity –  agriculture, goods and services.  It wished for a round with sufficient ambition 
across the board and sufficiently balanced to satisfy  all those who wished to see freer trade, new 
market openings and substantially stronger multilateral rules.  This challenge could still be met.  The 
European Communities had invested heavily in launching and nurturing the Round.  It was not 
prepared to let success slip away at this critical moment.  Collectively, Members had to step up the 
pressure and be prepared to engage in a conti nuing negotiating process with a firm commitment to 
succeed.  This would not only require long days and nights of negotiation, but also a preparedness to TN/C/M/25 
Page 16  
 
  give and take – a preparedness to compromise.  Th e European Communities were prepared to do both.  
Political will and determination to succeed by ev eryone would be required as well as a preparedness 
to accommodate each others' genuine political red lines.   
109. Missing the April 30 deadline had been a disappoi ntment, but some encouraging signals of 
strong commitment to succeed had been heard from various quarters.  The fact that Ministers 
Nakagawa of Japan and Vaile of Australia were pa rticipating in the present TNC meeting was such a 
signal.  He said that other Ministers might be passing through Geneva in the following days, yet 
others had shown further engagement in recen t statements.  Commissioner Mandelson had done so 
repeatedly in the past few days.  The missed April 30 deadline had brought a new sense of urgency, an 
enhanced political commitment and an unprecedented inte nsification of the Geneva process.  With the 
right mix of continuous and intensified technical  work, genuine negotiation on core issues and 
continuous political involvement, he was convinced that a comprehensive deal  could be done before 
the summer break.  This would require a breakthrough for modalities by mid-June and sufficient progress on the other issues than agriculture and NAMA .  Delegations would need to have sufficient 
comfort on the overall picture of the Single Undertaking.   
110. He agreed with the Chairman  that since Hong Kong, good progress had been made, be it 
insufficient.  In agriculture, while  more work would be needed on such issues as treatment of sensitive 
products, SPs, Blue Box and export co mpetition, one had a clearer idea where the trade-offs might be 
between domestic support, export co mpetition and market access.  But much remained to be done to 
find the right exchange between market access in  agriculture and NAMA.  The blank spaces in 
NAMA Chair's report were quite revealing in this respect.  While nobody underestimated the crucial 
role of agriculture in this Round, nobody should forget  that the share of agricultural products in trade 
in goods by developing countries was around 11 per cent today.  In other words, there were large 
benefits to reap by developing countries in indus trial goods and in services.  While South-North trade 
remained important, South-South trade had taken an  increasingly larger share of developing countries 
trade.  He sometimes had the impression in the NAMA discussions that delegations spent much more 
time on the exceptions than on the opportunities.  He  agreed with the Agri culture Chair that the 
Geneva process could further clear the underbrush of  the negotiations.  In agriculture, the devil was in 
the detail.  It might also work out options on th e core issues but the actual trade offs would need 
active involvement of Ministers and some of the major actors, including th e European Communities, 
had a specific responsibility in this.  Commissioners  Mandelson and Fischer Boel were prepared to 
take their share in these responsibilities.   
111. He had been encouraged by the plurilateral sessions  in the previous services cluster.  A strong 
participation, including from capital-based offici als, had been seen.  Members should keep up the 
momentum and make a further step in the May cluste r, and try to have some more precise perspective 
of the quality of the revised offers during the month of June.   
112. Trade facilitation was one of the more promising areas of the negotiations with much benefit 
to reap, both for developed and developing countries.   For the European Communities, strengthening 
rules was an important part of the DDA.  It strongl y believed in a balance between trade liberalization 
and rules, hence the importance of making real progress in this area in the following few months.  He 
urged the Rules Chair to come up as early as possible with his consolidated text.   
113. The Chairman had used the analogy of a c onvoy.  At the start of the negotiations, 
implementation issues had been leading the convoy.  They were now at the back.  There were various 
implementation issues of great interest to the membership.  For the European Communities, the 
extension of the GI protection to products other th an wines and spirits was of crucial importance and 
constituted an essential element of the market a ccess package.  The Eu ropean Communities had 
shown readiness to compromise without any effect so far.  Partners had no difficulty in asking ever 
more of the Communities in agriculture but showed li ttle readiness in engaging in one of the very few  TN/C/M/25 
 Page 17 
 
 
offensive areas of the Communities.  At this stage of the negotiations, he would have expected more 
engagement.  On the question of the register for wines and spirits, which was a mandated negotiation, 
Members were still nowhere.   
114. On development-related issues, he believed that at the end of the day there would be genuine 
S&D treatment in agriculture, NAMA,  services and rules, notwithstanding the work that still had to be 
done.  However, he was convinced that the outcome would be completely satisfactory for those that 
were looking for a development result in the core i ssues of this Round.  Members should now build on 
what had been agreed, in the first instance a st epping stone on cotton in the Hong Kong Declaration 
where Members should fulfil the expectations which had been put on them by a number of developing 
countries.  His delegation's view was that as part of the modalities package,  a clearer picture was 
needed on the decision on duty-free quota-free mark et access for LDCs and on the coverage of the 
exceptions which had been decided at that time.   
115. In conclusion, he said that the Europ ean Communities was strongly committed to 
complimenting the various development components of  the DDA with an effe ctive and additional Aid 
for Trade package and would fully play its part in the Aid for Trade Task Force and when it came to 
committing additional funding for trade-related assistance.   
116. The representative of Benin , on behalf of the African Group , said that it was clear that 
negotiators had not achieved the objective of deve loping modalities as required by Ministers in Hong 
Kong.  In the circumstances, they had no choice but  to redouble their efforts and commitment, above 
all their political commitment, since at the technica l level the various elements and indicators that 
could deliver the promised results were known,  available, measurable and demonstrable.   
117. He reiterated the Group's comm itment to achieving the objec tives set forth in the Doha 
Declaration, the July 2004 Decision and the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration – the three essential reference documents for Members' work.  This commitment and readiness of African countries had 
been reaffirmed by the African Trad e Ministers in Nairobi on 14 April.   They expected in return that 
the Round would effectively tackle the issue of deve lopment and take genuine account of the concerns 
and needs of the developing countries.  He wished to recall some of these concerns.   
118. It had to be borne in mind that these concerns were real and answering them would help to 
enhance the participation of the African countries in  international trade, promote their development 
and combat poverty.  These were not hollow propo sals, but requests that came from the field and 
sought to remedy problems of everyday life, to im prove the economic situati on in different countries, 
and to promote development so that African countries could participate fully in international trade.   
119. On agriculture, the Group wished to stress th e need for substantial reductions in domestic 
support that distorted international trade in agricu ltural products, elimination of all forms of export 
subsidies by 2013 as agreed in Hong Kong, with due a ttention to the interests of the countries that 
were net importers of agricultu ral products and LDCs, and securi ng substantial improvement in 
market access.   
120. It was also essential that account was taken of  the work that was currently under way 
regarding long-standing preference erosion, whic h should be treated appropriately by seeking and 
providing for appropriate mechanisms.   
121. The Group also wished to stress the importance of ensuring that developing countries and 
LDCs were able to use an SSM for the duration of  the reform period, which would cover all products 
of interest to them and which would be triggered on the basis of quantity and price criteria.  The 
Group recalled its recent proposals that had been made  as a contribution to th e negotiations on review 
and clarification of the Green Box and on food aid wh ich was a joint proposal with the LDCs.  It also TN/C/M/25 
Page 18  
 
  stressed that S&D treatment had to be cross-cutting in nature and should cover the three pillars of the 
agricultural negotiations.   
122. The Group urged the Agriculture Chairman to con tinue organizing the technical work that he 
began over the previous weeks on the basis of refe rence documents devoted to each specific topic of 
the negotiations.  This was a useful approach, and wo uld help to focus the discussions and ensure their 
transparency.   
123. On cotton, the African Group wished to highlight  its vital importance and the need to ensure 
the specificity recommended by the Ministers in  Hong Kong in addressing this topic.  In this 
connection, the Group supported the proposed elem ents of modalities submitted on 1 March by the 
co-sponsors of the Sectoral Initiative in Favour of  Cotton as a contribution to the development of 
modalities for the substantial reduction of domestic support that distorted international trade in cotton.  
In order to ensure coherence between the trad e and developmental aspects, it was important to 
introduce a mechanism for dealing with income dec lines in the cotton sector in the form of a safety 
net until the end of subsidies, as recommended in  the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration.   
124. On NAMA, the Group had taken note of the report by the NAMA Chairman and commended 
him for intensifying the work.  It was essential that  the negotiating process should lead to a result that 
stimulated industrialization in Africa while also meeting the aspirations of the Doha Round.   
125. Regarding addressing the exceptions and other technical matters, the concerns of Africa had 
to be taken into account.  For example, the African Group wished to make it clear that the fact that 
certain African countries were not required to appl y the formula should not serve as an argument for 
denying them the flexibilities they n eeded to diversify their industrial  base.  Africa did not oppose the 
non-mandatory sectoral approach, but sectors so defined should not limit Africa's efforts at 
industrialization.  The Group believed that it was a dvisable to consider the sectoral approach only 
after having assessed the impact of the formula on the Doha mandate.   
126. The Group agreed with the Chairman that the negotiating process should be Geneva-based.  
This process should be inclusive and should follow th e bottom-up approach.  It was also important to 
ensure that it did not penalize small delegations.  The Group therefore recommended that participation 
should be based on equitable representation at all le vels of the negotiations, with small delegations 
included and with consultations in accordance with the work plan put forward by the Chairman.   
127. On services, the African Group's modest contri bution to the current request-offer process was 
due to a number of constraints such as the scarcity of studies on the sectors that had already been liberalized, problems in identifying sectors of strategi c interest, and insufficient technical capacity and 
resources to conduct the analyses and investigatio ns needed for a true national assessment.  The 
Group wished to recall in this connection that mode 4 was of fundamental importance and in the current context, there was a need for rebalancing, bearing in mind that this mode of services supply 
had been the orphan of the Uruguay Round.   
128. On trade facilitation, the Group welcomed the large number of proposals submitted by 
Members to clarify and improve relevant aspects of Articles V, VIII and X of GATT 1994.  Future 
commitments in the trade facilitation area should fo cus on measures that were vital to the economic 
development of developing count ries and LDCs, and measures which should also be possible to 
implement.  In this connection, adequate S&D treatment provisions, appropriate technical assistance 
and capacity building, identification of the needs a nd priorities of different Members, and the cost 
implications of various measures, were essential elements on which Members should reach agreement 
before the negotiations got to drafting stage.    TN/C/M/25 
 Page 19 
 
 
129. The representative of South Africa , on behalf of the NAMA 112, said that the NAMA 11 was 
a new group consolidated in its current form at th e Hong Kong Ministerial Conference.  It represented 
a sizable proportion of the world's population and in pa rticular of industrial workers in the developing 
world.   
130. The group was committed to working constructiv ely and creatively with the rest of the 
membership to reach agreement on modalities in ag riculture and NAMA by the new implicit deadline 
of June or July.  It would do so in the spirit of the Chairman's call to find an appropriate landing zone 
for the triangle of issues that would give effect to  the developmental mandate agreed at Doha.  As a 
group focusing on NAMA it would in particular de vote its energies to seeking an appropriate 
developmental outcome on this issue.   
131. In searching for an appropriate landing zone on NAMA, the group would be guided by the 
principles outlined in papers submitted on  flexibilities in documents TN/MA/W/65, 
WT/COMTD/W/145 – Reclaiming Development – and TN/MA/W/68.   
132. First, the group would need to carefully assess the impact of various proposals on formula 
cuts, coefficients and flexibilities on its own industrial sectors.  It had to be borne in mind that the 
members of the group all had vulnerable industrial secto rs that nevertheless had potential to contribute 
to growth, development and indus trialization and also provided employment to a significant number 
of people who would otherwise be consigned to unemployment.   
133. The group believed that it was important to estab lish certainty about the impact of the tariff 
cuts of particular formula and coefficient proposals.   In other words, once the numbers had been run, 
and modalities had been agreed on this basis, th e same methodology should apply in all future 
processes such as scheduling.  The statistical b asis and methodology should remain unchanged.   
134. As Members proceeded to full modalities, the gr oup would be guided by paragraph 24 of the 
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration which had mandate d that there should be a comparably high level 
of ambition in market access for agriculture and NAMA.  The group's position, which had been 
elaborated in the papers referred to above, was that , because agriculture was the most distorted sector 
and because it was crucial to most developing countries' efforts to promote development and 
industrialization, the biggest adjustments had to ta ke place in the agricultural sectors of developed 
countries.  In addition, the principles of less th an full reciprocity and S&D treatment meant that 
developed countries had to bear a proportionately larger burden of adjustment than developing 
countries.   
135. In making any offers or commitments on NAMA,  the group would be weighing these against 
the value to its economies of proposals both in agriculture and the reduction of tariff peaks and 
escalations on industrial products of export interest  to developing countries in developed-country 
markets.  With regard to the first aspect, its be nchmark would be the G20 proposals on agriculture.  It 
would judge all offers by the degree to which th ey delivered on the proposals, and would tailor its 
own offers on NAMA accordingly.   
136. The group could already say on the basis of these principles that some ultra-ambitious 
proposals for formulae and coefficients fo r developing countries on NAMA would require 
corresponding proposals on agricultural market access that were much more ambitious than even the 
G20 proposals.  These proposals were, even at this point in the negotiations, well off the radar screen 
of the landing zone.  At the other extreme, exis ting proposals from the major developed players in 
agricultural market access did not, in the group's view, provide a sufficient basis to advance the 
negotiations in NAMA.   
                                                      
2 Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Braz il, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Namibia, Philippines, 
South Africa and Tunisia. TN/C/M/25 
Page 20  
 
  137. The group was prepared to move but it was comm itted to moving forward proportionately.  It 
did not believe it would be fair to expect it to  move further on NAMA than the major developed 
countries were prepared to move on agriculture.  The group was looking for an ambitious result that 
delivered on the Doha developmental mandate.  It wa s prepared to make its contribution to achieving 
that result within the new proposed timeframes, but  the membership had to recognize that it could 
only afford to make a proportional contribution.  He wished to refer to an old adage often used in the 
negotiations in South Africa.  He said that both the chicken and pig needed to make sacrifices to 
produce a bacon and egg breakfast but their sacrific es were of a different order and magnitude.  A 
deal would only be possible in this Round if the countries in the NAMA 11 group were not asked to make a pig sacrifice to gain chicken feed.   
138. The representative of Mauritius
, on behalf of the ACP Group , said that the ACP Group 
continued to remain engaged in the negotiations and to working towards a successful and balanced 
outcome.  Such an outcome should comprise an adeq uate response to the de velopment dimension of 
the Doha Work Programme.  This meant that tangi ble development results should be evident in the 
overall outcome, starting from within each negotiati ng area, including S&D treatment, long-standing 
preferences, the special situation of LDCs, cotton, small ec onomies, commodity issues, technical 
assistance and capacity building.   
139. The priority areas of the Group included:  (a) ma rket access for products of export interest to 
ACP countries;  (b) balanced rules that provide d their countries policy space to pursue development 
policies most suited to their levels of development a nd needs; and  (c) obligations to be undertaken by 
ACP countries should be proportional and commensurat e with their levels of development.   
140. He wished to highlight the Group's concerns in  three areas of the negotiations; agriculture, 
including cotton, NAMA and Aid for Trade.  On  agriculture, the Group wished to express its 
appreciation to the Agriculture Chair for the manner in which he had been steering the negotiations at 
this critical juncture and in particular for his commitment to promoting a multilateral process.  His 
initiatives to inject new momentum in the negotiati ons, including through his reference papers and 
fortnightly cycles of consultations in various formats, had the ACP Group's support.  The Group 
believed that the mode of reference papers proposed  by the Chair would allow for structured, focused 
and constructive discussions and would hopefully l ead to initial draft texts for modalities.   
141. The Group wished to reiterate that for the moda lities to be acceptable, they should include all 
issues of vital interests to ACP countries.  The Group was encouraged by the reassurances given by 
the Agriculture Chair that all issues would be addr essed and none would be re legated.  Any attempts 
to establish less than full modalities,  in which the concerns of the ACP could be excluded, would not 
be conducive to a productive and acceptable outcome.   
142. The Doha Round had to result in a win-win situa tion for all and not only a selected few.  The 
ACP Group therefore called for and expected balan ced progress and results in the negotiations on 
market access, domestic support, export comp etition, including on the S&D components.  In 
particular it sought meaningful outcomes on key issues for the ACP, inter-alia , the tariff reduction 
formula for market access, SPs, SSM, cotton, co mmodities, long-standing preferences, duty-free 
quota-free market access for LDCs and net food-impor ting  developing countries (NFIDCs) related 
issues.   
143. Despite the reassurances given by  the Agriculture Chair that Members had to secure full and 
not partial modalities, the Group was concerned by the lack of parallel progress in the discussions on 
preferences.  All Members were aware that this  was a vital issue for AC P countries, which were 
amongst the most vulnerable.  This issue could no longer be relegated in the negotiations.  The Group 
had appreciated the Agriculture Chair's efforts in stimulating discussions on this topic and it was ready to engage constructively with other negotia ting groups and players to ensure that Members  TN/C/M/25 
 Page 21 
 
 
delivered on paragraph 44 of the July 2004 Decisi on mandate.  In this respect, the Group looked 
forward to the Chair's reference paper on long-s tanding preferences to advance the negotiations.   
144. On the issue of cotton, while fu lly endorsing the recent proposal of the C4 countries, the ACP 
Group wished to reiterate its call that the trade -related aspects of the cotton initiative should be 
implemented expeditiously, ambitiously and specifically  as had been agreed in the July 2004 Decision 
and in Hong Kong.   
145. On NAMA, the various elements of modalities on which the NAMA Chair had been 
consulting were of direct interest to the Group.  For some of its members who would be applying the 
formula, less than full reciprocity in the appli cation of the formula and the paragraph 8 flexibilities 
were important elements and should be fully respect ed.  Further, some of its members were covered 
by paragraph 6 and had been calling for greater flexibility and policy space with regard to the 
conditions embodied in that paragraph.  The Gr oup hoped that Members would give favourable 
response to its request.  The Group was also supportiv e of efforts to find solutions to the problem 
faced by small, vulnerable economies.   
146. The issue of preference erosion in the NAM A negotiations was central to the Group and 
concerns had already been expressed on numerous occasi ons with regard to the disastrous effect that 
an ambitious formula or sectoral initiatives going beyond  the formula in certain sectors of interest to 
the Group, such as fish and fish products and textile s and clothing, could have  on the economies of its 
members by eroding substantially their preferential access.  The Group was seriously concerned that 
the issue of non-reciprocal preferences was still divi sive.  It had already demonstrated its constructive 
spirit by moving on its initial position and tabling a proposal to identify the most vulnerable products 
to preference erosion.  The Group was seeking a solution which would allow countries affected to 
manage the transition.  Without a satisfactory soluti on to this problem in the modalities, it would be 
difficult for members of the Group to support the m odalities.  It was the concerted position of the 
Group that only full modalities with comprehensive covera ge of all issues would be acceptable.  This 
position had recently been articulated by African Trade Ministers meeting in Nairobi.   
147. With respect to Aid for Trade, the Group wished  to underline the need for the programme to 
be comprehensive and holistic in nature.  An Ai d for Trade package should not be conditional on the 
adoption of increased commitments to trade liberaliz ation.  In this regard, the ACP Group intended to 
submit to the Task Force its concept paper on Aid fo r Trade.  The Group considered that an effective 
Aid for Trade package should be demand-driven, we ll-targeted, predictable, sustainable, non-debt 
increasing and able to secure additional resources fo r trade-related economic adjustments as well as to 
address trade-related supply-side constraints acros s the board.  The Group hoped that the Task Force 
would come forward with timely recommendations.  It also thanked the Director-General for his 
initiatives with the relevant multilateral instituti ons and hoped they would prove fruitful.   
148. In conclusion, the ACP Group wished to emphasi ze the need for a bottom-up approach and a 
transparent and inclusive negotiating process to ensu re political ownership of the process and the final 
outcome.  The Group would not accept a fait-accompli  in any aspect of the negotiations.  To prevent 
this from happening, it would work closely with  the Chairman, negotiating group Chairs and the 
membership, while bearing in mind the capacity cons traints of its small dele gations which would be 
further exacerbated as the negotiations entered a more intensive mode.   
149. The representative of Indonesia , on behalf of the G33 , said that missing the April 30 deadline 
for establishing modalities in agriculture and NAMA had proved once again to those outside the WTO 
how difficult and sensitive these issues were for many Members.  Members should not view the 
situation merely from a trade or commercial perspe ctive, but most essentially from a social, political 
and development dimension, especially for deve loping countries.  The G33 was now even more 
committed to achieving full and balanced modalities before the summer break.   TN/C/M/25 
Page 22  
 
  150. As the Group had stated on many occasions, agriculture was of critical importance to 
developing countries who had subs istence and resource poor producers, structurally vulnerable 
agriculture, rural poverty and food insecurity.  Fo r the G33, food security, livelihood security and 
rural development were the core of the develo pment dimension and therefore should be fully 
addressed as an integral part of the modalities and outcome of the agriculture negotiations.   
151. He associated his Group with the statement by Brazil for the G20 that S&D treatment, 
including SPs and SSM remained an integral part  of all the three pilla rs of the agriculture 
negotiations.  In addition, the G33 wished to em phasize that the situation of large rural poor 
populations in developing countries should be a ce ntral concern in the discussions on the market 
access pillar.  Consequently, the in terests of a few exporting countries to gain market access could not 
be allowed at the expense of hundreds of m illions of poor subsistence farmers.   
152. On process, the Group welcomed the multilatera l approach and the different formats of 
meetings that the Agriculture Chair was undertakin g.  The Group had always been supportive of 
transparency, inclusiveness and a bottom-up approach  in the negotiating process.  It viewed the 
current process of engaging all Members as being th e most favourable approach to ensuring a truly 
multilateral result.  The Group also welcomed effort s to accelerate the process and to better focus the 
discussions based on reference papers.  This approach  provided a good starting point for eventual text 
based negotiations on modalities.   
153. Turning to substance, like others, the G33 was concerned about the lack of progress in the 
agriculture negotiations.  In particular, it was con cerned by positions taken by its negotiating partners, 
some of whom were attempting to undermine th e agreement reached under the July 2004 Decision 
and by Ministers in Hong Kong on the issues of SPs and SSM.   
154. In this regard, the G33 wished to emphasize that  it would be difficult for it to join a consensus 
on modalities in agriculture which did not provide  adequate comfort on SPs and SSM.  The G33 
understood that every issue was linked and that a ll three pillars should be addressed satisfactorily.  
The G33's determination and efforts to focus on th e issues of SPs and SSM since the beginning of the 
negotiations did not mean it was not concerned about  the other critical issues.  The G33 therefore 
urged key Members, especially the major subsidizers, to improve their proposals.   
155. Speaking on behalf of Indonesia
, he said that his delegation shared the Chairman's concern 
that although a lot of effort had been made, little progress had been achieved.  To move the 
negotiations forward, Indonesia welcomed the Chairman's initiative to accelerate the negotiating 
process.  However, it should not be forgotten that the process should be transparent, inclusive and 
bottom up.   
156. He wished to underline some basic elements  which in his delegation's view should be 
considered if Members were to meaningfully concl ude the negotiations at the end of the year, with 
development as its core.   
157. On agriculture, he associated his delegation with th e statement by Brazil on behalf of the G20.   
158. On NAMA, Indonesia supported the views of the NAMA 11 as had been expressed by South 
Africa.  It had already been stated by many members of the NAMA 11 that fulfilment of paragraph 24 of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration would re quire developed countries to lead the way by 
ensuring a high level of ambition in agriculture.  He wished to refer briefly to two principles in this 
area.  Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments meant that developing countries should 
undertake lesser cuts in their industrial tariffs co mpared to developed countries.  This had to be 
reflected in a way that there would be differentia ted coefficients between developing and developed 
countries.  With respect to flexibilities for developing countries, Indonesia's view was that  TN/C/M/25 
 Page 23 
 
 
flexibilities, including paragraph 8, were stand-alone provisions that could not be traded-off with the 
tariff reduction formula.   
159. On services, there had been a high engageme nt in the plurilateral requests process.  
Indonesia's view was that the plurilateral process was complementary to th e bilateral request-offer 
negotiations and should not supersede it.  He wished  to underscore that the results of the services 
negotiations should be balanced between  market access and rule making.   
160. Indonesia had interests in rules, TRIPS and the trade and environment negotiations.  His 
delegation had been encouraged by the progress made in identifying issues to be further clarified and 
improved in the anti-dumping and subsidies ar eas as had been mandated in the Hong Kong 
Declaration.  It looked forward to the circulation of a consolidated text as a basis for the final stage of 
negotiations which the Chair had proposed to prepare before the summer break.   
161. On fisheries subsidies, his delegation wished to see the negotiations in tensified in parallel 
with the negotiations on anti-dumping and subsidies.  Si nce this issue was an integral part of the rules 
negotiations, Indonesia wished that the overall progress in the rules negotiations should be balanced.   
162. Indonesia had followed the negotiations on TRIPS and trade and environment.  While noting 
the much intensified process on these issues, his dele gation's view was that considerable divergences 
still existed among Members.  Indonesia's position was that the interests and needs of developing 
countries with regard to the development dimension should be taken into account in each area of the 
negotiations.   
163. The representative of India  said that his delegation shared the disappointment at the lack of 
progress and agreed with the Chairman that Member s should engage more forcefully to achieve an 
ambitious outcome.  However, intensification of e ngagement should not mean merely repeating the 
same things more frequently.  In the following we eks, whether Members would be able to make 
progress would depend on a collective recognition of  some fundamental principles, which included 
adherence to the letter and spirit of the mandate a nd a determination to ensure that the development 
dimension of the Round was more than mere words.  In the past few weeks, his delegation had noted 
that on a number of issues, developed countries appear ed to be reluctant to make the same level of 
sacrifices as they expected from developing count ries.  An ambitious outcome could not be seen 
merely in terms of the extent of market opening in  developing countries.  If this Round was to have a 
meaningful development dimension, the sensitivities and expectations of deve loping countries had to 
be amply recognized.   
164. In no sector were the sensitivities and expectati ons more significant than in agriculture.  
Despite its well known problems of a structural natu re in agriculture, on which two-thirds of its 
population was dependent, India had tried to be as constructive as possible in the agriculture negotiations.  Through the G20 and the G33, Indi a had articulated its positions, concerns and 
expectations from the negotiations.  At this late st age in the negotiations, India was concerned that a 
consensus on the core issues continued to elude Me mbers.  While on the one hand Members were yet 
to see meaningful progress on the central issues of effective cuts in agricultural subsidies and 
enhanced market access in developed countries, on the other, the focus seemed to have shifted to 
opening the markets of developing countries.  He said that if this was going to be the tenor of discussions in the following few weeks, it would not re quire an astrologer to predict the outcome.  If 
Members were to move towards a successful conclu sion of the negotiations, they had to recognize 
that the fundamental issues that needed to be  addressed were the trade distortions caused by 
developed countries' subsidies and limited market ac cess in developed countries due to their stringent 
and often opaque tariff regimes.  A satisfactor y outcome on SPs and SSM would be an essential 
ingredient of the final package.   TN/C/M/25 
Page 24  
 
  165. To achieve a pro-development outcome in NAMA,  due recognition had to be accorded to the 
ground realities and future industria l development needs of all devel oping countries.  Regrettably, 
some of the proposals on the table did not refl ect the sensitivities of the industrial sectors of 
developing countries.  It was his delegation's belief that allegiance to the mandate, both in letter and 
spirit, was the only way forward towards a benefi cial outcome of the NAMA negotiations for all 
Members.   
166. On services, positive engagement had been witn essed since Hong Kong, particularly in the 
recently held first round of plurilate ral meetings.  However, it appeared  to his delegation that some of 
the assessments of the situation had tended to bor der on the euphoric.  Members should not lose sight 
of the fact that these positive signals had to be transl ated into meaningful offers in July 2006 and that 
the final result had to constitute a balanced outcome which provided comfort to all participants.  In his 
delegation's view, such a package would need to include the following elements:  a market access 
package that reflected a true balance between th e aspirations of all participants;  the existing 
asymmetries in commitments, especially for mode 4 categories de-linked from commercial presence, had to be addressed upfront in the revised offers in July;  development of meaningful disciplines on 
domestic regulation before the end of the Round, covering all elements  of Article V1:4, which was an 
important complement to effective market access;  and the development dimension had to be at the 
heart of the negotiations, which would includ e fully preserving the flexibility for individual 
developing countries under Article XIX, mean ingful implementation of LDC modalities, S&D 
treatment provisions and targeted technical assistance.   
167. He expressed his delegation's appreciation to the Chairman for intensifying the dedicated 
consultations on the TRIPS-CBD re lationship and on GI extension.  The consultations on the TRIPS-
CBD relationship had helped to narrow the differe nces on how to introduce a disclosure requirement 
and the intensity of developing Members' concern on this issue was more apparent.  His delegation 
had also been encouraged by the constructive a pproach of a number of developed countries on this 
issue, and was waiting for some other developed count ries to move to a constructive mode as well.  
This should strengthen Members' r esolve to deliver on the mandate in paragraph 39 of the Hong Kong 
Declaration within the July time-limit.  In accord ance with the Chairman's reiteration at the present 
meeting to move to text-based negotiations in all ar eas, and as had been referred to by Brazil in its 
statement, Brazil and India were preparing a text on insertion of a disclosure requirement in the TRIPS Agreement.  His delegation also looked fo rward to the related consultations by DDG Yerxa 
later in the week.  He associated his delegation w ith the statements by Brazil for the G20, Indonesia 
for the G33 and South Africa for the NAMA 11.   
168. The representative of Mexico
 said that from the Chairperson's reports, it was clear that the 
present meeting was not a celebration, although, as the Chairman had said, neither was it a disaster.  He wished to refer to document TN/C/W/39, wh ich contained a communication by the Ministers 
responsible for trade of Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.  These were four countries which were 
committed to free trade, and which had far-reachi ng integration agreements among them and with 
other countries, both develo ped and developing.   
169. These four countries were fully aware that if the Doha Round was a success, the preferences 
which they granted each other would be affected, as would those granted to them by their trading 
partners.  In Mexico's case, more than 90 per cent of  exports were destined for countries with which it 
had far-reaching integration agreemen ts.  Nevertheless, it knew that what was at stake in the Doha 
Round went far beyond the reduction in its preferences.  What was really at stake was the very health 
of the multilateral trading system itself.  As the Ministers of these four countries had said, despite 
their critical importance, these agreements were im perfect substitutes for an ambitious multilateral 
round.    TN/C/M/25 
 Page 25 
 
 
170. Throughout the Round, only two factors had been maintained:  first that the Round would end 
in 2006, and, second, that the level of ambition woul d continue to be high.  However, with the passage 
of time, this was becoming increasingly difficult and protectionist voices seemed to be growing.  At the present time, Members had to be particularly careful as to how they proceeded.  They should 
maintain their priorities and all make in creasing efforts to salvage the process.   
171. In practical terms, one particular message shoul d be clearly conveyed:  although there was not 
much sense in establishing a new de adline for the modalities, it should be clear that any new deadline 
could not be mixed up with the deadlines for Chair' s texts in other areas, such as rules and trade 
facilitation, or for the request-offer process in ser vices.  The widest possible gap should be left 
between each procedural step.  In this respect , not much time remained for modalities, and if 
Members were going to achieve them what was require d were enormous efforts at the technical level 
and also the courage to take difficult political deci sions.  They had to be prepared for this.   
172. Finally, he wished to reiterate that his de legation firmly believed that the development 
dimension in this Round would be  found in particular through greater market access for goods and 
services from developing countries, and rules which w ould ensure this access.  In this respect, he 
wished to reaffirm Mexico's commitment to the Hong Kong Declaration to grant duty- and quota-free 
market access to LDCs.  In addition, the Ministers of the four countries he had referred to earlier had 
committed their countries to working towards the establishment of an effective Aid for Trade 
programme.  On the other hand, Mexico believed that continuing conceptual discussions on development had not led anywhere over the past thir ty years and it could not see how this would be 
different in the future – this discussion was simply  sterile.  The line which divided success and failure 
in this Round was extremely thin, and Mexico belie ved that it was now time to show that Members' 
commitment to the multilateral trading syst em was more than mere rhetoric.   
173. The representative of Zambia
, on behalf of the LDC Group , said that the Group agreed with 
the Chairman's assessment of the state of play in th e negotiations and that it was time to change gear.  
The overall outcome of the DDA negotiations woul d have an impact on most developing countries 
especially the least-developed, and therefore it w as in the interest of the Group to follow and 
participate in all areas of the negotiations  so as to safeguard its interests.   
174. He wished to remind Members of the issues of  interest to the LDCs.  On agriculture, the 
LDCs looked to the establishment of an SSM for developing countries that was simple, based on both volume and price triggers and which would also be  accessible to them.  The Group did not subscribe 
to the notion that the use of the SSM should be li nked to a Member's level of liberalization.   
175. Regarding its joint submission with the African Group on food aid, the LDC Group's 
expectation was that any disciplines that would be developed should not have the effect of hindering 
the delivery of food to those in need.  He wished  to reiterate the important role that recipient 
governments should maintain in food aid operations and that this should be explicitly reflected.  
Additionally, and as had been highlighted in its joint submission, effective disciplines should be 
established to deal with displacing effects of non-emergency food aid.   
176. With respect to cotton, the Group looked to an urgent solution to the trade-related aspects of 
this initiative in accordance with the July 2004 D ecision mandate and the decision by Ministers in 
Hong Kong.   
177. The LDC Group hoped that the NAMA modalities would address its interests and concerns 
relating to paragraphs 9, 10 and 15 to ensure that the outcome was supportive of the development 
efforts of countries in the Group.   
178. The Group wished to have an opportunity to discuss the issue of defining implementation 
modalities of the duty-free quota-free market access co mmitment for all LDCs for at least 97 per cent TN/C/M/25 
Page 26  
 
  product coverage and the development of simplified and transparent rules of origin.  Members were 
not yet at the point of implementation and the Gr oup wished to reiterate that the modalities for 
implementation of duty-free quota-free market access needed to be negotiated in the CTDSS.  The 
Group also believed that it was important that th e negotiating groups on NAMA and agriculture were 
kept informed of these negotiations.   
179. On Aid for Trade, the Group wished to reiterate  that an Aid for Trade package should not be 
conditional to the adoption of increas ed commitments to trad e liberalization.  It was of the view that 
an effective Aid for Trade package should be demand -driven, predictable, effective, sustainable, non-
debt increasing and able to secure additional res ources for trade-related economic adjustments and 
address trade-related supply-side constraints.  Discu ssions were underway in the Task Force regarding 
the scope of Aid for Trade.  However, in light of  the low participation of LDCs in global trade and 
their lack of competitiveness, it was important that  the scope included elements such as domestic 
productivity enhancement, human resources development, diversif ication of production base and 
enhancing value addition, transfer of technology,  investment in infrastructure and institutional 
reforms.  As a contribution to the identification of the needs and gaps, the LDCs had presented an 
outline on a value chain analysis as a to ol for identifying needs and gaps.   
180. On services, the LDC Group looked to the implementation of the 2003 Modalities for the 
Special Treatment for Least-Developed Countries.  To this end, it had presented a paper on a 
mechanism to implement the modalities and looked forward to a favourable consideration by all 
Members.   
181. On trade facilitation, the Group had noted that  the negotiations had reached an advanced 
stage.  However, it wished to st ress that it was important that Memb ers abided by the commitments in 
paragraphs 4 and 5 of Annex D of the July 2004 Decision and paragraphs 5 and 6 of Annex E of the 
Hong Kong Declaration relating to  identification of needs and priorities, technical assistance and 
support for capacity building.  At the last Negotiating Group's session, the LDC Group had 
emphasized that it was important to consider the cost implications of the various potential trade 
facilitation measures, and equally to address the assurance of adequate technical and financial 
assistance during the negotiations and implementation phases.   
182. Finally, he said the bottom-up and all-inclus ive approach that the Chairman had been 
emphasizing should be allowed to continue.  Howe ver, between the present meeting and July, there 
would be mounting pressure on all Members to make cr edible progress.  In light of this, the need to 
ensure that all continued to be on board could no t be over-emphasized.  Representation of all interest 
groups at all consultations, whether in room D, E, or  F, particularly with the Chairs of the negotiating 
bodies, needed to be as inclusive because Members we re at a stage where all issues would need to be 
addressed.  He agreed with Mauritius that no issue should be relegated if Members were to have a 
productive and balanced outcome that  would be acceptable to all.   
183. The representative of Burkina Faso
, on behalf of the Cotton-Four Countries (C4)3, said that 
the C4 were somewhat wary of the outcome of th e negotiations because of its potential impact on 
their development.  Consequently, they wished the negotiations to be completed as soon as possible 
with due attention to the concerns of poor and vuln erable countries.  This meant that Members needed 
to speed up their discussions, including in the cotton ar ea, if they were to deliver full modalities at the 
same time as for agriculture in general.   
184. It was with this in mind that the C4 had submitted a proposal on 1 March on elements of 
modalities for substantial reduction of domestic support as had been instructed by Ministers in Hong 
Kong.  The proposal had been approved by African Trade Ministers during their fourth session in 
                                                      
3 Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali.  TN/C/M/25 
 Page 27 
 
 
Nairobi from 12-14 April 2006.  On this occasion, Mini sters had stressed the need to deliver full 
modalities on cotton, including substantial reducti on of domestic support and the introduction of a 
mechanism that would enable cotton-producing African  countries to address the fluctuations in cotton 
prices on the international market.   
185. He recalled that the proposal of the C4 had tw o main components.  On reduction of general 
support measures, they had proposed a formula th at established a correlation between the general 
result in agriculture and the result for cotton.  Th e proposal also sought an implementation period for 
cotton three times shorter than the period to be d ecided for agriculture.  The proposal was in keeping 
with the mandate of the July 2004 Decision and the decisions contained in the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Declaration, paragraph 11,which set out that: "Members agree that the objective is that, as an outcome 
for the negotiations, trade distorting domestic su bsidies for cotton production be reduced more 
ambitiously than under whatever general formula is  agreed and that it should be implemented over a 
shorter period of time than generally applicable .  We commit ourselves to give priority in the 
negotiations to reach such an outcome."   
186. The second component of the proposal concerne d setting up a task force to come up with 
proposals for the introduction of a mechanism to d eal with income declines in the cotton sector, in 
conformity with paragraph 12 of the Hong Kong Declaration.   
187. To ensure scrupulous compliance with the decision taken by Members in Hong Kong, the C4 
had drafted a proposal for operationalizing the decisions relating to cotton.  They wished to be entirely 
certain that a decision on cotton would in no way prejudice the future outcome of the agricultural 
negotiations of which, they acknowledged, cotton was apart.  Therefore, the various elements of the 
proposal had been developed in relation to a final outcome of the negotiations on agriculture.  The 
proposals established a principle where the mandate to address cotton ambitiously, expeditiously and 
specifically would be fulfilled whatever the outcome in agriculture might be.   
188. The negotiating process required that Members now  moved forward on the basis of texts.  
The C4 urged all trading partners involved in the cotton issue to follow this path, with a view to 
reaching a compromise.  All of elements were on the table.  There was no better moment than the 
present, to meet and move ahead on this issue that w as very crucial to their countries.  It was time for 
Members to truly show the world that the WTO was capable of taking the necessary decisions and 
giving the overall negotiations a fresh impetus.  It was the C4's hope that  all Members would act 
urgently to find effective and appropriate solutions to the cotton issue.   
189. The representative of China  said that China was concerned about the temporary setback to 
complete the job foreseen by Ministers in Hong Kong – to reach modalities on agriculture and NAMA 
at the end of April and make significant progress in all other areas of DDA.  This was a difficult time for the Round.  However, Members should not allow the sense of pessi mism to prevail, and their job 
had thus become more urgent.  In a spirit of ha rd work and perseverance and with a strong sense of 
urgency, Members should be able to achieve the ultimate objectives of WTO in general and of the 
Round in particular.   
190. Like other Members, China had been working closely with the Chairs of negotiating bodies 
for progress in the different areas, including i ssues related to possible formulae, flexibilities for 
developing and recently-acceded Members in agricu lture and NAMA.  His delegation had noted that 
Members had responded to the Chairman's call and began to change gears and work with a much 
stronger sense of urgency.  As a result, there were  more papers on the tabl e, better understanding of 
the key elements and clearer ideas about how the pr ocess should be handled so as to produce efficient 
and balanced results.  
 TN/C/M/25 
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  191. He wished to make some remarks firstly, on th e negotiating process.  In a complex endeavour 
like the DDA, it was natural that many delegations were faced with the question of allocation of 
resources for effective participation and optimum results.  While various compositions of negotiating 
formats involving certain players could be useful and necessary, it was also clear that progress made 
in certain informal contacts had to be brought ba ck to the multilateral forum for all to consider.  
Hence, the major challenge was a balance between the need for efficient results on the one hand and 
fair participation on the other.  His delegation ca lled upon the Members concerned to continue to bear 
this aspect in mind and to spare no efforts in multila teralizing the process as well as the results in a 
timely and steadfast fashion.   
192. On agriculture, he associated his delegation with the statements by Brazil on behalf of G20, 
and Indonesia on behalf of G33.  There had been ev idence of intensified work on all three pillars of 
export competition, domestic support and market acces s.  New papers had been tabled and more 
simulations were being carried out to clarify the impact of the choices that Members faced.  The Agriculture Chair deserved credit for his unremitting e fforts in leading the negotiations and providing 
opportunities for multilateral consultations on many of those crucial issues.  The Secretariat had also 
done a very useful job in preparing the technical ground and providing necessary assistance to 
Members.  The Chair's reference papers on the Bl ue and Green Boxes had generated lively debates, 
which could lead to further preparation of possible texts in those areas.  But more efforts by key players were needed to move on the cuts and disciplines on trade-distorting domestic support if 
Members were to achieve the objectives of the ne gotiation.  The discussions on market access should 
lead to progress on the level of cuts and treatment  of sensitive products, as well as SPs.  The SSM and 
SPs represented an important part of the mandate  and should be advanced as soon as possible.  His 
delegation's view was that the G33 papers on t hose issues were legally sound and technically 
reasonable and could be used as important refere nce for Members' future work.  His delegation 
appreciated the efforts by the Chair to hold consultations on recently-acceded Members and 
encouraged him to prepare a reference paper on this  issue in order to address these Members' specific 
concerns.   
193. On NAMA, his delegation wished to reiterate th at sectors of export interest to developing 
countries should be excluded neither from form ula cuts nor from further liberalization because it 
would simply run counter to the ma ndate and could lead to negative  chain reactions.  His delegation 
believed that the gaps between Me mbers' positions on the issue of coefficients could be narrowed if 
the principle of S&D and less than full reciprocity  could be properly reflected and if there was 
comparably progress in the agriculture negotiations.   
194. His delegation had taken note of the construc tive work done and new momentum which had 
recently emerged in the negotiations on trade in ser vices.  China believed that the bilateral process 
should be placed at the centre of the negotiations, although the voluntary plurilateral approach could be helpful if Members were well prepared and su fficient opportunities were provided for exchange of 
views among capital-based experts.  Substantive of fers should be made by  developed Members in 
such areas as mode 4, maritime transport and MFN exemptions which were of great interest to developing Members.  Requests for market access to developing countries, including recently-acceded 
Members, should be in line with the development ne eds of these Members and take into account the 
current level of trade liberalization in these countries.   With regard to rules in services, his delegation 
looked forward to a timely completion of the negotia tions, particularly on domestic regulation, based 
on the mandate in the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration.   
195. The results of the rules negotiations were of  paramount importance for the establishment and 
strengthening of a fair and equitable internationa l environment for trade and were of fundamental 
interest to all Members.  In order to tighten di sciplines on anti-dumping, key elements such as normal 
value, back-to-back investigations, prohibiti on of zeroing, price undertakings, review and 
transparency should be dealt with as priorities in the negotiations.    TN/C/M/25 
 Page 29 
 
 
196. On development, concerted efforts should con tinue to be focused first and foremost on the 
outstanding S&D Agreement-specific proposals to  make them more accurate, effective and 
operational.  Concerns of sma ll and vulnerable economies should be duly treated specifically and 
practicably on a case by case basis without creating a sub-category.  The decision by Ministers at Hong Kong on duty-free quota-free market access for pr oducts originating in LDCs should be fully 
implemented.  The issue of cotton also needed to be  dealt with properly and in this respect, the work 
of the Taskforce on Aid for Trade was very important. Given its direct impact on development, negotiations should be launched at an early date  on the relationship between TRIPS Agreement and 
the CBD.  The idea of differentiation and categor ization of developing countries could further 
complicate the process and was not operational prac tically, and should therefore be rejected by 
Members.   
197. In conclusion, he said that Members had to face the challenges ahead squarely, and his 
delegation was ready to work closely with all par ticipants in the DDA to make real progress toward 
the establishment of modalities in agriculture and NAMA and progress on the negotiations in all other 
areas in the following weeks.  In light of the achie vements so far, his delegation was prepared to 
engage positively in the negotiations on either refe rence papers or negotiatin g texts.  China believed 
that a strong and dynamic multilateral trading system w as in the fundamental interest of all Members.  
China therefore hoped that with concerted efforts by  all Members, they could overcome the obstacles 
facing them and achieve their ultimate goal of co mpleting the Round by the end of the year.   
198. The representative of Canada
 said that Canada supported the approach that the Chairman had 
described and the work programmes se t out by the Chairs.  It also believed that Members were in need 
of a more intensive, continuous process in order to ta ke the negotiations forward.  More specifically, it 
would be necessary to move towards text-based ne gotiations.  The texts, as had been mentioned 
before, would not come from heaven, but rather fro m all Members.  Members could not afford to 
delay any longer moving to this  phase of the negotiations.   
199. At the informal Heads of Delegations' meeting,  the Chairman had stated the fact, which was 
now the case, that Members would miss the April 30 deadline to agree on negotiating modalities in 
agriculture and NAMA.  The Chairman had also st ated that the time was not ripe for Ministerial 
involvement and that the present meeting would be an  "ordinary" TNC.  Canada agreed with all of 
this with one slight caveat.  While the present meetin g might be an ordinary TNC, Members had to be 
clear that it was happening at a crucial time.  An American philosopher and writer Elbert Hubbard had 
once said that the line between failure and success was so fine that one scarcely knew when one had 
crossed it.  Canada believed that as Members work ed with renewed determination in the following 
weeks to agree to negotiating modalities, they mi ght well be standing on that very line.   
200. A lot had also been said in th e previous days and weeks regarding the need for further 
political direction and more political will.  She said that Members could not and should not use this as 
an excuse.  All Members realized that more work needed to be done, in Geneva, before Ministers 
could have the tools they needed to give negotiators  further direction.  Canada was ready to work in 
that spirit, and fully subscribed to another piece of  wisdom by Hubbard, that the best preparation for 
good work tomorrow was to do good work today.   
201. The representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela  said that as a small delegation, his 
country used alliances as a means of increasing and leveraging its position in the WTO and in this 
respect it gave its full support to the statements by Indonesia for the G33, Brazil for the G20 and 
South Africa for the NAMA 11.  Venezuela's partic ipation in these alliances was intended to achieve 
a balanced and fair outcome for deve loping countries in the negotiations.  
 TN/C/M/25 
Page 30  
 
  202. Venezuela supported the intensification of work  in the negotiations, because it believed this 
was necessary in order to ensure inclusiveness.  Venezuela believed inclusiveness meant not only 
transparency and participation, but also ensuring the essence of the single undertaking – all the issues 
under negotiation were relevant.   
203. At the informal meeting on 24 April, the Chairm an had mentioned his belief that there was a 
discrepancy between perception and reality about the modalities and that this was causing a problem 
in the negotiations.  His delegation took this to  mean that although the modalities were political 
decisions, to wait for the technical work to be do ne in Geneva before taking the political decisions 
would be an error.  It believed that the political component was not absent from the work in Geneva;  
it was indeed present in the negotiations.  Inclusiv eness meant that the political component had to be 
present in the negotiations, and the modalities pro cess had to be fundamentally Geneva-based.  It 
would be wrong to think this process did not invo lve taking political decisions, which would be over-
mystifying the role of Ministers.  However, if th e political decisions were not ripe, delegations would 
be heading down the wrong track.   
204. In addition, there seemed to be some confusi on about the level of ambition when some people 
talked about core modalities.  Modalities were not just determined just by figures, but also by all the 
other components, such as non-tariff elements, fl exibilities and other components.  His delegation 
would thus warn against improper sequencing, as  had been mentioned by other delegations.  
Sequencing was necessary, but all on the same piece of paper.  It was important for the work programmes set out by the Chairs to reflect this appropriately.   
205. Finally, baseball was played in Venezuela rather than soccer.  In  the game of baseball, there 
were two particular situations.  First, when one team was much be tter than the other team, the game 
ended earlier, although he did not believe that wa s the case in the work in WTO at present.  The 
second situation was when the teams were tied at the end of the game.  In this case, extra time was 
played, which was a kind of sudden death situatio n rather particular to baseball, because the home 
team always had the last chance to balance out the result.  He hoped that the developing countries 
were the home team in this Round.  Unfortunately, th is rather particular scenario could also lead to 
fairly boring results, as the players got more and more  tired, and less and less able to break the tie.  In 
this case, what typically happened was that the fans  started to leave the stadium while the players 
continued playing for hours, which was a fairly pathetic result.   
206. The representative of Kenya
 associated his delegation with the statements by Benin on behalf 
of the African Group, Mauritius on behalf of the ACP and Indonesia on behalf of the G33.  The 
reports by the negotiating group Chairs and by the Chairman had reflected the modest progress that 
Members had made since the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference.  As a result, Members had not been 
able to establish modalities in agriculture and NAMA by the end of April as had been instructed by 
Ministers.  While Kenya would continue to support  the Chairs to ensure progress and agreed to the 
proposed processes by the Chairs of agriculture and NAMA, it believed that what was crucial at the 
moment was for Members to show flexibility in orde r to achieve the desired results.  The change in 
the process should therefore be matched by the willingness of Members, particularly the major 
players, to be flexible on the main issues.  Since there had been an understanding that the negotiations 
would be Geneva-based, his delegation expected the Chai rs to play a catalytic role to ensure that the 
texts produced in the process would contain elemen ts that met the expectations of all.   
207. He wished to comment on a few specific issues c ontained in the reports by the Chairs.  On 
agriculture, his delegation agreed that there was a ne ed to intensify the nego tiations and move into a 
continuous mode of work in a more structured Geneva-based negotiating process.  In this regard, it 
appreciated and supported the programme of work pr oposed by the Chair for the following six weeks.  
In particular, his delegation noted the recognition by the Chair that a resolution of the outstanding 
issues would only come from the negotiated comp romises among Members.  The participatory  TN/C/M/25 
 Page 31 
 
 
involvement of the entire membership at this delicat e stage of the negotiations was crucial in ensuring 
an outcome that was politically acceptable to all Memb ers.  The reference papers had proved to be an 
effective tool of focusing and guiding discussions  on the various issues under negotiation.  His 
delegation was encouraged that the Chair intende d to issue reference papers on all issues under 
negotiation.  This was crucial given that the obj ective was to achieve full modalities on all issues 
agreed upon by Ministers in Hong Kong.  However,  his delegation urged that  the reference papers 
should be circulated well in advance of the schedul ed meetings to enable adequate preparation by 
small delegations.   
208. Kenya expected the process to produce balanced and real progress  across the three pillars of 
the agriculture negotiations including on aspects of  S&D treatment for developing countries.  In 
particular, SPs and the SSM should be an integral pa rt of the outcome of the negotiations as had been 
agreed by Ministers in Hong Kong.   
209. On NAMA, his delegation agreed with the Chai r that Members should focus their work on 
exceptions and outstanding technical issues and leav e the question of ambition to be resolved as a 
second step.  His delegation believed that this w ould afford Members the opportunity to deal 
sufficiently with the issues of inte rest to developing countries and LDCs and not wait to deal with 
these issues towards the end of the negotia tions in a “pressure cooker” manner.   
210. While no Member doubted the value of liberalization, there needed to be a good degree of 
sensitivity over its pace and developing countries need ed to have much say in terms of the pace and 
extent of that liberalization.  This was not what his delegation was witnessing in the NAMA negotiations.  Kenya expected that all developing  countries, including those who would be exempt 
from making tariff reductions through the formula, would not only qualify for flexibilities provided 
under the principles of less than full reciprocity but also S&D treatment.  These flexibilities were 
necessary to stimulate industrialization and diversif ication of their economies.  His delegation had 
taken note of the NAMA Chair's statement regarding the middle column representing agreed modalities.  While this might be true for some issu es, it might not be the case for paragraph 6, on page 
7 of his report.   
211. On trade facilitation, it was important that equal progress was achieved on all elements of the 
mandate.  Kenya was concerned that while Member s had had intensive discussions on the proposals 
relating to the trade facilitation measures, there had been little emphasis on the issue of technical 
assistance and capacity building.  Me mbers needed a clear and concrete framework for the delivery of 
technical assistance and capacity building in line w ith the mandate before moving to the next phase of 
discussions.   
212. With respect to services, his delegation noted th e intensification of negotiations through the 
plurilateral approach.  It wished to emphasis that the informal and voluntary nature of the plurilateral 
process should be preserved and be complimentary to  the bilateral approach, which was the main 
method of the services negotiations.  Kenya was keen  to see real market openings reflected in the 
revised offers to be submitted by Members, particular ly in modes 1 and 4 which were of interest to it.  
On domestic regulation, his delega tion had taken note of the progress achieved so far and it requested 
Members to ensure that the disciplines develope d should not constrain the ability of countries to 
regulate and introduce new regulations in order to m eet national policy objectives.  In this regard 
sufficient flexibility and policy space for developi ng countries should be embodied in any necessary 
disciplines to be developed.   
213. Although there could be prospects of concludi ng some Agreement-specific proposals in the 
CTDSS, Kenya believed that Members should atte mpt to look at the possibility of establishing a 
development framework which could be an answer to  most of the Agreement-specific proposals.  His 
delegation urged the Chair of the CTDSS to allocate some time in future to discuss this issue.   TN/C/M/25 
Page 32  
 
  214. On simplification and improvement of disciplin es and procedures on provisions applying to 
RTAs, his delegation had taken note of the signi ficant developments regarding the transparency 
mechanism.  However, differences still existed on the bodies to be entrusted with the implementation 
of the mechanism.  Kenya believed that the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) 
should handle RTAs established under GATT Artic le XXIV and GATS Article V, while the CTD 
should handle those established under the Enabling Clause.   
215. On Aid for Trade, Kenya agreed with the statem ents by Benin and Mauritius on behalf of the 
African Group and ACP Group respectively.  However, he wished to add that Aid for Trade should not be used as bait for commitments towards liber alization as had been argued in a paper titled "Now 
is the Time"
4.  It should remain a vehicle for deliverin g development outside the negotiations.   
216. As an athletic country, Kenya believed that negotiations were not like running a sprint but 
more like a marathon, and despite the failure of Memb ers to sprint as had been expected, the marathon 
was still on.   
217. The representative of Switzerland  said that missing the end of April deadline did not mean the 
failure of the Round of negotiations, nor that Memb ers would be unable to conclude it by the end of 
the year.  Nevertheless, missing the deadline was a serious warning signal to Members to redouble 
their efforts at every level.  His delegation ther efore agreed with the approach proposed by the 
Chairman – an on-going negotiating process to prep are texts.  This process had already begun 
seriously in agriculture and was probably the most promising path.  His dele gation believed it was not 
necessary to set any new deadlines, and that it was more important to make the most progress possible 
in Geneva, in particular on the most technical issues which worked poorly in political arbitration.  
Delegations should prepare the ground for their Minist ers, who would be called upon to take the most 
difficult decisions, in particular on the issues in the triangle.  However, process was one thing and 
conditions for success something else.  The best process would never succeed if Members did not 
have the political will to make decisions – something which had manifestly not been present thus far.  
All Members had to change their attitude considerably, and show flexibility and realism as soon as 
possible without which all the efforts would remain in vain.   
218. In his report, the Chairman of the Negotiating Group on Market Access had stated that the 
level of ambition for NAMA could only be determined once the level of ambition in agriculture was 
known.  If only for practical reasons, it was true that these two issues could not be dealt with simultaneously.  However, it would be illusory to believe that an outcome in agriculture would 
automatically solve the NAMA dossier.  The establishment of balance between NAMA and 
agricultural market access was not a simple matter.  A solution could not be improvised at the last 
minute.  For this reason, the NAMA negotiating grou p could not put the level of ambition on the back 
burner while waiting for salvation to come from agricu lture.  Finally, he said that his delegation's 
positions on substantive issues could be found in it s statement to the TNC at the 28 March meeting.  
His delegation's view on the situation in the ne gotiations had not changed since then, which was 
something it regretted.   
219. The representative of Chile
 supported the statement by Braz il on behalf of the G20.  His 
delegation appreciated the efforts by the Chairman and the General Council Chairman to ensure that 
the Ministerial mandate to agree on modalities in  agriculture and NAMA by 30 April was complied 
with.  However, it was the Members who were respons ible for the fact that this was not the case, 
although the share of responsibility differed across the membership.  Since the launch of the Doha 
Round, Members had logged a series of unmet deadlines, so this latest failure was part of a long list 
but now the time factor had become more critical.  The number of outstanding issues was considerable and only a few months were left fo r Members to reach agreement on each and every one 
                                                     
 
4 Issued in document TN/C/W/39.  TN/C/M/25 
 Page 33 
 
 
of them.  In this respect, his delegation wished to recall that the Round was much more than just 
agriculture and NAMA.  There were a whole series of equally important areas, such as rules and trade facilitation, where real negotiation had only barely begun.  Unblocking the situation in agriculture and 
NAMA was therefore a necessary pre-condition, but not  sufficient alone, to a conclusion of the Doha 
Round in terms acceptable to all Members.   
220. The conclusion that could be drawn from th is analysis was obvious, but probably bore 
repetition – full modalities in agriculture and in NAMA  were needed within the following six or, at 
the most, eight weeks.  This was necessary not onl y to be able to move on to the submission of 
schedules of concessions, but also in order to create  the necessary political conditions for starting real 
negotiations in the other areas of the Round.   
221. Chile agreed with the Chairman's recommendati on that the negotiations in agriculture and 
NAMA be intensified.  However, it believed that si mply intensifying work in terms of meeting more 
frequently and longer would not lead to the moda lities.  Although many more meetings would be 
required throughout the following few weeks, negotiators  would not be able to make the best use of 
them if they did not have more flexible and less defensive mandates.  The problem thus far was not 
that negotiators had not been me eting enough, but rather that their capitals had not been willing to 
take the necessary political decisions.  There had been much repetition of positions and very little 
negotiation, and his delegation hoped that the ser ious time constraints now facing Members would 
make it possible to change this trend.   
222. To conclude, he wished to recall briefly what  was at stake.  If the Round failed or was 
postponed indefinitely, there woul d be a serious erosion of the credibility of the WTO and the 
multilateral trading system.  There would also be a proliferation of preferential agreements, many of 
them probably inconsistent with multilateral rules.   In addition, there would be more use, and 
increasing abuse, of the Dispute Settlement System, which would be called upon to legislate in areas 
which could not be settled by means of negotiation.  And finally, protectionist trends would become 
more acute, which could already be seen in many parts of the world.   
223. The representative of Thailand
 said that her delegation agreed with the assessments by the 
Chairman and the Chairs on the negotiations.  Thailand was disappointed that modalities on 
agriculture and NAMA had not be achieved by the end of April deadline as had been instructed by 
Ministers.   
224. It was now incumbent upon Members to move into intensive, continuous, and text-based 
negotiations with a view to narro wing down divergences and prepari ng draft texts for Ministers to 
finalize modalities at the earliest opportunity, preferably  by mid-June.  It would be too risky to wait 
until the summer break.  Bearing in mind that the pr iority agreed in Hong Kong had been establishing 
modalities in agriculture and NAMA, failure to do so before July would adversely affect advancement 
of other issues.  She urged the Chairs to come up with more reference papers that took account of 
Members' real interests and concerns and put all th e key elements together in a balanced way.   
225. Thailand was committed to completing the Doha Round by 2006 with highly ambitious 
results.  It believed that the right level of amb ition on the triangle issues could serve as a crucial 
benchmark to achieving these goals.   
226. Her delegation wished to emphasize that agricu lture was the engine of the negotiations since 
the outcomes from the agriculture negotiations enco mpassed developmental aspects and would deliver 
real benefits to all developing countries.  Members should exert effort to find a compromise on the 
key issues which comprised, in her delegation's vi ew, cuts in domestic support, disciplines on Blue 
Box and Green Box support, the tari ff reduction formula, and the treat ment of sensitive products.  All 
other issues in the agriculture negotiations were linked to these core issues and would be agreed upon 
in relation to them.   TN/C/M/25 
Page 34  
 
  227. She said that Members could be encouraged to  explore and proceed with peripheral issues 
although the direction of the core issues remained  unclear.  However, she cautioned that such an 
approach could result in the negotiations being cl ouded with so much conditionality and exceptions 
that eventually the outcome of the negotiations on the peripheral issues could limit room to move 
ambitiously on the core issues themselves.  It was therefore vital that Members attached importance to 
the core issues.   
228. The hard work of Members would not bear fruit if they still held their cards close to their 
chests.  Major players in particular, should show greater political will and determination to conclude 
the Round.  In this regard, her delegation agreed with the Agriculture Chair that the hard work in 
Geneva would not yield substantial results if th ere was no political input.  This input had to be 
genuine and not rhetoric.  The major players s hould uphold a high ambition and take the lead by 
making ambitious offers and not wait for others to move first.  They should contribute to the Round 
by challenging each other towards a high am bition in the other areas in the DDA.   
229. In this connection, she wished to caution that although small group meetings to bridge 
differences among Members could help move the Round forward, they had to respect the principle of 
transparency and inclusiveness.  The results of such meetings should be incorporated in the 
multilateral process in sufficient time for Member s to substantially engage in the process. 
230. The representative of El Salvador
, referring to the Chairman's remarks on small and 
vulnerable economies, said she wished to reite rate that her delegation was working very 
constructively on this issue, in line with the manda tes established in the Doha Ministerial Declaration, 
the July 2004 Decision and the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration.   
231. Her delegation agreed with the Chairman on th e importance of continuing to work towards 
finding responses in agriculture an d NAMA, in line with developments  in the work on modalities.  
However, her delegation wished to stress the impor tance of the other areas of negotiations where it 
had also submitted proposals with a view to accommoda ting its legitimate needs.  In all of these areas 
of negotiation, El Salvador was committed to making a contribution to the Round, in line with its 
level of development and which took into account its  legitimate needs.  In addition, it was fully 
committed to finding solutions to these needs without creating a new category of Members as had been agreed by Ministers.  El Salvador could not imagine a development round without the concerns 
of small economies being taken care of  in a proper and effective manner. 
232. Finally, her delegation agreed that a sense of ur gency would be needed if the Round was to be 
concluded.  It also supported the statement by Indonesia on behalf of the G33. 
233. The representative of Cuba
 supported the statements by Brazil on behalf of the G20, 
Indonesia on behalf of the G33, Mauritius on behalf  of the ACP, Benin on behalf of the African 
Group and South Africa for the NAMA 11.  His delegation regretted that, once again, just as in the four years since the Doha Ministerial, Members had missed yet another deadline in the agreed 
calendar.  They were running a real risk of not meeting the fundamental objective of concluding the 
Doha Round by December.   
234. His delegation agreed with the Chairman that the intensity of work had to be stepped up, 
although that would not be enough to reach the objectiv e.  What would really be needed was still 
missing – the political will of all parties to the negotia tion.  In this respect, agriculture continued to be 
the key issue for progress.  The reduction of dom estic support and an increase in market access 
continued to be prerequisites if results were to be  achieved which benefited all parties, in particular 
developing countries.  The final results in agriculture  had to reflect, in line with the mandate, a clear 
and appropriate development dime nsion in all areas, with flexibilities for developing countries, 
including SPs and SSM.  For this reason, his dele gation wished to express its concern at certain  TN/C/M/25 
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proposals which aimed to limit the flexibiliti es mandated by Ministers in Hong Kong to the 
implementation period for the results of the Round.   
235. The development dimension also included, am ong others things, agreeing on specific cross-
cutting proposals which were precise, effective a nd operational, seeking solutions to the issue of 
preference erosion, giving effect to the decisions in favour of LDCs, solving the cotton issue, as well 
as addressing the specificities and difficulties of small and vulnerable economies and NFIDCs.  
Progress was also needed on transfer of technology, and trade, debt and finance.  The development 
dimension also meant equitable rules and commitme nts which enabled developing countries to have 
policy space which was commensurate with their needs and levels of development.   
236. Within the development dimension, the imba lances and disadvantages faced by developing 
countries which stemmed from the Uruguay Round Agreements should not be overlooked, in 
particular the inequalities in level of market acce ss and domestic support in agriculture and NAMA.  
This was the reason why developing countries could not  be expected to offer more market opening in 
NAMA and services while similar market opening was still awaited since the Uruguay Round.  A balance had to be struck among the three main ar eas of negotiation.  Like others, his delegation 
believed that the proposals on agriculture by the ma jor developed countries were insufficient and well 
below the level of ambition which they had put forward themselves and which had been taken on 
board by developing countries in NAMA and ser vices.  This required rebalancing.   
237. In conclusion, he said that while it was true that there had been certain improvements in 
transparency and inclusiveness, there was still mu ch to do to guarantee the real and effective 
participation of all delegations in the process, so as to ensure that the results duly reflected the 
interests of all.   
238. The representative of Malaysia
 said that despite efforts by all Members, they had not achieved 
modalities in agriculture and NAMA by the end of April deadline.  This meant that they had even less 
time in which to negotiate the many outstanding issues, and yet they had to be mindful of the fact that 
they had to conclude the DDA before the end of th e year.  However, it was important to note that 
Members had continued to engage with the objective of concluding the negotiations at the end of the 
year.   
239. Members should individually, and collectively consider ways in which they could contribute 
to their collective endeavour to concluding the DDA negotiations success fully by the end of the year.  
They should examine where they could each show flexibility.   
240. Malaysia supported the intensification of the negotiations and that the Chairs should be 
encouraged to produce texts to serve as the basi s for the negotiations.  This would help reduce 
rhetorical arguments and focus instead on the subs tantive elements of modalities.  But, Members 
should also be mindful that the establishment of modalities would not be the end of the negotiations 
on NAMA and agriculture.  Country schedules would still need to be worked out and negotiated.  This was where each country's commitments would be sp elt out.  Thus, the negotiations on modalities need 
not finalize the last detail.  On the other hand, Me mbers would need to set aside time to attend to 
country schedules.  The negotiating process should be centered in Geneva.  This would ensure 
transparency and inclusiveness.  The NAMA and agriculture modalities needed to be agreed well 
before end of July.  Going by what by had been ag reed to in Hong Kong, the end of July agenda was 
already a crowded one.  However, agriculture an d NAMA would determine the level of ambition of 
the Round.   
241. The representative of Costa Rica
 thanked the Chairs of the negotiating groups for their efforts, 
which had made the work of delegations easier and which his delegation hoped would enable them to 
progress towards greater levels of convergence and to reach agreement.  However, Members had 
come to the end of April without reaching agreem ents on modalities, which w as serious, because they TN/C/M/25 
Page 36  
 
  were running the risk of not having sufficient ti me to conclude the Round successfully in the present 
year.  His delegation therefore agreed with the Chairman on the need to  work intensively and 
continuously.  July should not be thought of as a deadline;  instead, delegations should focus on 
achieving results in the following weeks becau se July would probably be too late.   
242. A lack of results at the end of year would be a serious failure for the multilateral trading 
system as a whole, but it would also mean that developing countries in particular would lose the 
possibility of reaching higher levels of economic grow th through trade and thus not be able to achieve 
greater levels of development.  Different studies had confirmed that greater levels of liberalization led 
to greater benefits for developing countries.  Although Members had not met their end of April 
objective, they had recently started text-based wo rk in NAMA and agriculture, which was positive.  
This technical work had made it possible to put into  perspective the elements of the negotiations on 
which more work was needed so th at modalities could be achieved.   
243. Costa Rica believed that the key to success wa s high levels of ambition in all areas of 
negotiation, and in the three pillars in agriculture in particular.  Unless the results in market access 
were truly ambitious and not curtailed by excessive  flexibilities, the results in other areas would not 
be satisfactory.  The areas of domestic support and market access required far better offers by certain 
Members.  Costa Rica also believed that the path  in NAMA was not much easier.  A high level of 
ambition was also needed in this area, with limited flexibilities for those who really need them.  In the 
area of development, Costa Rica believed that ambi tious results in market access for all developing 
countries would be the greatest contribution of the Round, which was perhaps not the view of everyone.   
244. In sports, there were a number different princi ples which applied, and which were matched in 
the area of trade.  To win, one needed to make e fforts and to persevere, and it was often necessary to 
recognize that today's sacrifice would yield success in the future.  It was also important to use the 
advantage which each competitor had.  Greater ef forts in the areas where the competitor had an 
advantage was probably what led to success.  Theref ore, it was not appropriate, not in trade nor in 
sport, to change the rules, such as by limiting the number and type of participants in a competition, 
thereby allowing a 300kg Sumo wrestler to win the 1 00 metres race as an example.  Such a situation 
would be unfair both to real competitors and to th ose who won unfairly.  Furthermore, to achieve a 
high level of competitiveness, it was important to be able to compete with other good competitors, 
which was the only way to be able to move on from th e category of amateur.  It was also not allowed 
to use banned substances, both in sport and in tr ade.  Doping, like subsidies, was prejudicial, 
introducing a serious element of unfairness for other competitors.  In the Round, the following weeks 
would be crucial, and Costa Rica believed that good  results could only be achieved by following the 
sporting principle of fair play.  
245. The representative of Colombia
 said that her delegation's pos ition was reflected in document 
TN/C/W/39, which it had co-sponsored with Chile, Mexico and Peru.  Her delegation thus supported 
the statements by Mexico and Chile, and that by Costa Rica.   
246. As she had the honour of being Chairman of the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB), she 
wished to mention that the th ree last TPRB reviews, which had involved three very different 
economies – the United Arab Emirates, China and the United States – had shown that open economies 
yielded benefits for their populations.  She was men tioning this because of what had been said at the 
present meeting.  In all the statements thus far, th e common denominator had been that they all set out 
clearly what the others were expected to do, with the exception of three or f our, such as the European 
Community, Mexico, Chile and Costa Rica, which ha d referred to what they were willing to do. 
  TN/C/M/25 
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247. The European Communities had said that more time had been spent on talking about 
exceptions than opportunities and that it was prepar ed to be open to compromise.  This was good 
news, and had been matched by the United States, which had said that a real result from the Round 
would be better market access.  In this sense, th e two leaders of the process had a meeting of minds.  
The United States had also said that, if the Round failed, the biggest losers would be the developing 
countries.  Her delegation agreed with this , as had Mexico Chile and Costa Rica.   
248. The other statements had all indicated that the other Members had to make compromises, 
while those who were making the statements did not .  These statements included those by Benin for 
the African Group, South Africa for NAMA 11, Ma uritius for the ACP, Indonesia for the G33 and 
Zambia for the LDCs.  These Members were seek ing solutions on SPs, safeguards, commodities, 
long-standing preferences, policy space, S&D, and a definition of Aid for Trade which would help 
them avoid disastrous effects in their economies if  the fishery, textile and clothing sectors were 
opened.  She had not heard a single objective whic h had not been defensive from these Members;  
rather they were asking everyone else to make c oncessions in their favour which put an end to the 
problems of the developing world.   
249. The present meeting did not give rise to optimism,  because there appeared to be a problem.  A 
large majority of Members did not want to contribute in the Round.  Developed countries might reach agreement, but she wondered what could be done about this other group.  Like Switzerland, her 
country believed flexibilities could be used, but only if there were compromises and it was ready to 
discuss this, if everyone else participated.  Exac tly when the modalities would be agreed was not 
important;  it was more important that everyone be involved, and be both contributing and receiving.   
250. At the present meeting, the only product menti oned was the banana, which was curious, as if 
there was some kind of different problem with this  product compared to others.  Colombia did not 
believe that this constituted a problem which s hould be brought to the TNC, because it was just 
another product in the negotiations like the others, which might be subject to certain flexibilities, but 
not to over-proportioned cons iderations.  If the banana was to be  brought to this committee, then her 
country would also bring sugar, which was a product of importance to it.   
251. The representative of Singapore
 said that it was unfortunate that Members had not been able 
to reach full modalities in agriculture and NAMA despite the best efforts of the two negotiating 
groups.  It was also unfortunate that they had not ab le to have a Ministerial gathering in Geneva, as 
had been hoped initially.  While Members had missed a deadline, they had to look forward and in this 
regard he wished to make a few observations.   
252. First, Members had no choice but to refocus and intensify their efforts to reach full modalities 
in the limited time remaining.  This would require a lot of technical work to be done in the following 
few weeks.  As the Chairman ha d outlined, Members had to be in continuous text-based negotiations 
to complete the agriculture and NAMA modalities well before the July deadlines  for other issues such 
as services and trade facilitation.   
253. Secondly, technical work was important.  Howe ver, technical work was not a substitute for 
political leadership.  Ultimately, Members needed po litical will and leadership to bring the Round to a 
successful close.  The final level of ambition fo r the Round was fundamentally a question of politics, 
not mathematics.  In particular, the key players need ed to display political leadership at this crucial 
moment.  It had been through an act of leadership by the major players that the Round had been launched in 2001.  Members needed this same leve l of political will and leadership.  If they delayed 
the Round beyond 2006, there would be conseq uences for the credibility of the WTO and the 
multilateral trading system.  
 TN/C/M/25 
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  254. Thirdly, there was no doubt that agriculture was central to the success of the DDA.  However, 
in working to have a good outcome in agriculture, Members should also work to have a good outcome 
across all other DDA issues, including NAMA, services and trade facilitation.  Good outcomes in other areas of the DDA would also facilitate a good outcome in agriculture.   
255. The representative of Chinese Taipei
 said that although his delegation shared the 
disappointment that Members had missed the end of April deadline for concluding agriculture and 
NAMA negotiating modalities, it agreed with the wo rk programmes by the Agriculture and NAMA 
Chairs respectively to continue intensive negotiations with a view to reaching a consensus on the 
modalities.   
256. His delegation also agreed with the decision not to set a new deadline at the current stage of 
the negotiations, with the understanding that modali ties should be established well before the end of 
July.  His delegation's view was that if negotiatin g modalities could be finalized as soon as possible, it 
should still be possible to finish the Round by the end of the year.   
257. His delegation agreed with the Chairman that  progress in agriculture and NAMA would be 
the key to unlocking the other negotiating issues.  It also agreed that the levels of ambition in 
agriculture and NAMA might also determine the levels of ambition in the other issues.  He wished to 
stress that Members could not afford to wait for agriculture and NAMA to progress before they started to seek solution or progress for the other issues. To illustrate this, he said Members should 
maintain the momentum gained from the first roun d of plurilateral request-offer approach in the 
services negotiations.  Members should also accelera te movement in other important areas, such as 
trade facilitation and rules, to text-based negotiations.   
258. The representative of Ecuador
 said that her delegation regretted that Members had not been 
able to agree on modalities in agriculture and NAMA by 30 April.  Ecuador urged them to continue 
with their efforts, and it believed that political will from the main trading partners in particular was 
necessary so that what had been ag reed in Doha was not lost, thereby putting pay to its development 
expectations.   
259. In agriculture, Ecuador hoped to see substantial progress in the three pillars, in particular 
market access and in this respect it shared the vi ew expressed by Brazil on behalf of the G20.  For 
Ecuador, complying with the mandate of paragra ph 43 of Annex A of the July 2004 Decision for 
fullest liberalization of tropical produc ts and alternatives was fundamental.   
260. On preference erosion, which several delega tions had referred to, Ecuador welcomed the 
statement by Mexico that what was at stake in the Round went beyond the granting of preferences.  In 
this respect, Ecuador supported non-trade and non- tariff solutions which affected other developing-
country Members.  The recent seminars and documen ts prepared in the WTO had shown that it was 
possible to identify a small number of products a nd countries that were affected by preference 
erosion.  In this regard, Ecuador  believed that what was agreed in Aid for Trade was a means of 
getting around this problem in the Round.  Trad e liberalization on an MFN basis would bring about 
greater benefits for developing countries than main taining preference margins.  Ecuador thus fully 
supported the joint statement by Chile , Colombia, Mexico and Peru.   
261. Ecuador also had an interest in the TRIPS-CBD issue, and it supported the statement by India 
on the need to make the issue of disclosure of or igin part of a possible amendment to the TRIPS 
Agreement.  On the rules negotiations, Ecuador  believed it was essential to make progress on anti-
dumping and also on fisheries subsidies, which wa s a very competitive sector for it.  On services, 
Ecuador hoped to see concrete offers on sectors a nd modes of supply of interest to developing 
countries, and not just on those of interest to th e main exporters, and also progress on rule-making so 
as to give a proper balance to the negotiations.    TN/C/M/25 
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262. In conclusion, she said that Ecuador continued to be committed to an ambitious outcome in 
the Round which would guarantee de velopment benefits and real market access, particularly in 
agriculture.   
263. The representative of Bulgaria  said that his delegation agreed with the Chairman that 
Members should move to intensive, continuous and text-based negotiations.  However, his delegation 
did not agree that such negotiations should only be concentrated on agriculture and NAMA.  Some 
delegations seemed to believe that  Members should intensify the negotiations in order to quickly 
move towards modalities in agriculture and NAMA a nd make it possible for the other issues to be 
resolved by July.  The Chairman had said that Members had to concentrate on modalities which were 
necessary to unlock other issues.  As far as his delega tion was concerned, this was not true for GIs.  
Geographical indications had not been among tho se other issues which would have to wait for 
modalities in agriculture and NAMA.  In order for his delegation to agree to undertake any 
commitments under modalities in its schedule, it wished  to have clarity on GIs in particular on the 
extension of the additional protection to products other then wines and spirits.   
264. The consultations under the auspices of the Dir ector-General had only underlined that there 
were issues that bore on market access within the GIs package.  His delegation did not believe that the 
consultations had fulfilled the mandate from Hong K ong for intensification.  They had not been 
focused enough and result-oriented to allow Member s to conclude that they had intensified the 
discussions.  In conclusion, his delegation agreed to a continuous and text-based negotiation not just 
in agriculture and NAMA, but also on GIs so that Me mbers could arrive at what had been mandated at 
Hong Kong – appropriate solutions.   
265. The Chairman  said that he would take Bulgaria's view s on board in his consultations on GIs.  
Members were aware that the ma ndated character of some of th ose consultations was still under 
discussion.   
266. The representative of Argentina  supported the statements by Brazil on behalf of the G20 and 
by South Africa on behalf of the NAMA 11.  Many delegations had mentione d that development was 
the central commitment of the Round, and his delega tion agreed with this.  In this context, his 
delegation believed that it was up to the developing countries to evaluate if the Round would 
effectively deliver the necessary development com ponent.  This component had to be sufficiently 
flexible to be able to satisfy a ll developing Members, and in this respect, his delegation believed that 
the orientation of the NAMA 11 statement had been precise in this area of the negotiations.   
267. Despite what had been stated by some dele gations at the present meeting, his delegation 
believed that the exceptions were not limited onl y to NAMA.  Safeguards under Article 5 of the 
Agriculture Agreement, reference prices, sensitive products, the pivot, ad-valorem  equivalents, 
specific duties and tariff rate quotas (TRQs) were some of the exceptions sought in agriculture by 
some developed Members.  This made it difficult to assert that, with four boxes, two safeguards and 
every type of exception to the rules that were ba sically sought by some developed countries, the 
agriculture framework was compatib le with the original mandate "to establish a fair and market-
oriented trading system".  It was also from this systemic point of view, in agriculture, that his 
delegation would evaluate the development component in the Round.   
268. The representative of Paraguay  supported the statement by Brazil on behalf of the G20.  He 
said that, for his country, the negotiations should lead  to greater market opening, in particular in 
agriculture.  His delegation was concerned at the wa y things were going in the negotiations in this 
area, which, far from promoting further trade libera lization, was slowly heading towards more barriers 
to market access, not only in developed countries, but  also in developing countries.  If this was to be 
the result of the Doha Round, Paraguay believed th at, instead of promoting development through 
trade, the Round would become an obstacle to the promotion of its agricultural exports and it could 
not accept this.   TN/C/M/25 
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  269. For this reason, Paraguay urge d developed countries to meet their existing commitments and 
not to look for pretexts to sink the negotiations .  It also urged developing countries to limit the 
exceptions and flexibilities to those which were stri ctly necessary to look after disadvantaged rural 
sectors and to mitigate the effects of the liberaliza tion measures adopted in the Round, avoiding most 
of all damaging other developing countries.   
270. He wished to recall what had been set out in paragraph 35 of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration, which had set an objective of allo wing the fuller integrati on of small, vulnerable 
economies into the multilateral trading system.  As a member of this group of countries, Paraguay did 
not see how this objective could be fulfilled given th e way in which the negotiations were going.  He 
wished to recall that his country had a completely open economy with fully bound tariffs at 
comparatively low levels.  In consequence, it had th e moral authority to expect the removal of tariff 
and non-tariff barriers which complicated the placeme nt of its reduced range of export products.  It 
was in this way that it could obtain better integra tion into world trade and face up to the disadvantage 
of being a landlocked developing country.  Otherw ise, Paraguay and many other countries with or 
without small economies were not willing to give mo re than they had already given in exchange for 
meagre or inexistent benefits.   
271. On this note, he would conclude his stat ement by recalling paragraph 1 of the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration, where it had been set out that one of the objectives of the negotiations was to ensure "that the system plays its full part in pr omoting recovery, growth and development."  His 
delegation hoped that, in the few weeks ahead dur ing which progress should be made on modalities, 
the objective of development would be present in th e minds of all delegations and that it would be 
seen in their acts, not only in their words.   
272. The representative of Pakistan
 said that the reports by the Chairs had shown that Members 
had not moved much further than where they had been  at Hong Kong.  It was regrettable.  This had 
been despite the fact that it had been clear for some time who had to do what to enable forward 
movement.  Unfortunately, none of those had taken up the challenge, neither had Members been able 
to move in concert as Ministers had agreed at Davos.   
273. Since Members had a fairly good diagnosis of what was holding them back, it was clear that 
they would not be able to move unless they found a way to resolve those issu es.  He wished to be 
more specific.  In agriculture, there were two key issues.  First, the offers on the table on market 
access were not sufficient and would have to be impr oved substantially to enable forward movement.  
Secondly, on domestic support, there would have to be  actual cuts and not just paper cuts and all the 
major subsidizers had to do much more than what they had so far agreed to.  Through press reports, 
major players had been indicating their willingness to offer more, but in the negotiations they had not 
put forward any fresh proposals.  Although his de legation supported the re ference papers process 
initiated by the Agriculture Chair, it believed that this process could run aground if the key players did 
not indicate what they were willing to contribu te in the key areas of market access and domestic 
support to move the process forward.   
274. In NAMA, the pace of negotiations had been ra ther slow but it was inching forward.  His 
delegation believed that enough progress had been ma de on the issue of calculating the base rate for 
the application of the formula.  However, on the tw o other key issues of coefficients and flexibilities, 
not much progress had been made because major ec onomies were making unrealistic demands.  While 
they were guarded about what they could offer on agriculture market access and domestic support, 
their demands on the Swiss formula coefficients wh ich were to be in sight of each other were 
unrealistic.  The proposals to have two coeffici ents of 6 and 30 for de veloped and developing 
countries respectively had been based on objective cr iteria, fully met the ambition of the Doha Round 
and took account of developmental concerns.  Thr ough such coefficients developing countries would 
be contributing more than develope d countries in terms of tariff cuts.  However, in the final results  TN/C/M/25 
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there would not be an absolute harmonization of tariffs but some difference to enable developing 
countries maintain some tariff rates for their indust rial development and as a source of much needed 
revenues.   
275. In services, it was his delegation's view that  since Hong Kong and after the plurilateral 
process had started, there had been good progress.   However, any ambitious outcome would depend 
upon the results achieved in agriculture and NAMA.   
276. In the rules area, although his delegation had not seen any major flexibility from a major 
economy to close the loopholes in the Agreement on Anti-dumping, it believed that an acceptable 
result could be achieved on the basis of many cons tructive proposals before the negotiating group.  On 
transparency in RTAs, his delegation believed that  good progress had been made and an agreement 
could be worked out.  However, it was concerned that  in the area of fisheries subsidies Members had 
not made adequate progress.   
277. It was clear that any successful outcome of the negotiations would depend upon the 
leadership role of major players.  So far they had not  been very forthcoming.  If they were really as 
committed as they had been when the Round had been  launched, they needed to move where they 
knew they had to.  Finally, his delegation hoped th at what had not be achieved by the end of April 
would be done by end of June to enable Member s conclude the Round by the end of the year. 
278. The Trade Negotiations Committee took note  of the statements.   
__________