WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  G/ADP/W/449 
2 November 2005 
 
 (05-5156) 
Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices Original:   English 
  
 
TRANSITIONAL REVIEW MECHANISM PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 18 OF THE PROTOCOL ON THE ACCESSION 
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
 
Statement of the United States to the
 
Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices on 31 October 2005  
   Today we are here to begin the fourth annual review of China's implementation of its anti-
dumping regime under the Transitional Review Mechanism of China's protocol of accession.
1  The 
goal of these reviews is to provide Members an oppor tunity to examine and report on China's efforts 
to meet its obligations under the Anti-Dumping Agreem ent.  In the previous three reviews, the United 
States has voiced concerns about China's conduct of its anti-dumping actions, but also has noted that 
China has been incrementally improvi ng its compliance efforts.  Unfo rtunately, since the last review, 
China's efforts to meet its obligations appear to have shown little improvement.  China insists that its 
anti-dumping laws and regulations embrace the fundamental principles of transparency and fair 
procedures that form the core of the Anti-Dumping Ag reement, which in large part appears to be the 
case.  In practice though, China's conduct with re gard to the anti-dumping measures that it has 
imposed falls short of those fundamental principles.    One need only turn to the statement made by the United States last year in the transitional 
review before this committee
2 and note how the circumstances desc ribed then are largely unchanged.  
Last year, the United States raised serious concerns  about the availability of information from China's 
administering authority, the Ministry of Commerc e ("MOFCOM"), and its injury arm in particular, 
the Investigation Bureau for Industry Injury ("IBII").   As can be seen from the questions filed by the 
United States for this transitional review3, these problems persist today.  The MOFCOM public 
reading room still contains only a limited number of documents pertaining to a few of China's 
ongoing injury investigations.  Interested parties, including responding parties and officials of the US 
Government, continue to be frustrated in their a ttempts to obtain adequate  non-confidential versions 
of documents, such as Chinese industry responses to IBII questionnaires.  
  As the number of anti-dumping measures being imposed by China grows, there are a growing 
number of complaints by responding parties about  the quality of the non-confidential summaries 
China has made available.  Article 6.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires that non-confidential 
summaries of confidential documents must be in su fficient detail to permit a reasonable understanding 
of the substance of the information submitted in co nfidence.  As the United States pointed out last 
year, without access to confidential information submitted to MOFCOM, it is essential to responding 
parties to have comprehensive and informative non- confidential summaries in order to be able to 
mount an effective defence.  We have received ev er more frequent complaints that non-confidential 
                                                     
 
1 See, Article 18 of the Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China (WT/L/432, 23 
November 2001) 
  2 G/ADP/W/443, 29 October 2004  
3 G/ADP/W/446, 26 September 2005 G/ADP/W/449 
Page 2  
 
 summaries, when they are finally made available, contain insufficient factual information to permit 
development of effective arguments.    Furthermore, the United States continues to be  concerned that, in a growing number of cases, 
critical arguments or evidence put forward by interest ed parties have not been addressed adequately in 
either preliminary or final determinations.  This was a problem last year and still remains especially 
prevalent in injury determinations.  Similarl y, many of the conclusions MOFCOM reaches do not 
appear to be supported by adequate evidence.  In ma ny instances, either no evidence is cited at all, or 
the evidence cited is not available to anyone except th e administering authority.  As the United States 
stated last year, conclusory statements wit hout evidentiary support do not constitute "positive 
evidence".  In particular, details of the fact ual basis and reasoning supporting the investigating 
authority's decisions, as well as petitioners' allegati ons and briefs must be made available to all 
interested parties.      The United States again urges China to apply fair  procedures to all parties to an investigation 
as envisioned by the Anti-Dumping Agreement.  For i nvestigations and reviews, this includes, but is 
not limited to, timely access to administrators and fa vourable consideration of hearing requests, as 
embodied in Article 6.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreem ent.  We are concerned about continuing delays 
by MOFCOM in responding to requests to hold heari ngs submitted by interested parties, as well as 
continued use of private meetings, rather than hear ings open to all interested parties, as a principal 
means to obtain the views of parties.  The United St ates continues to urge that interested parties not 
present for such private meetings be quickly informed of matters discussed at such meetings, in 
accordance with Article 6.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.   As China's anti-dumping regime grows out of its infancy, new concerns are surfacing with 
regard to how China's customs authorities are coll ecting anti-dumping duties.  Until now, virtually all 
attention appears to have focused on the investiga tive process.  However, even the most objective and 
transparent investigation can be undermined by poor  interaction between the administering authority 
and the customs authorities who assess the anti-dumping duties at the border.  In a growing number of 
cases, the US government has received reports from responding parties of Chinese customs authorities 
either assessing anti-dumping duties on merchandise not subject to the measure, or imposing 
seemingly unreasonable burdens of proof before allo wing entry of  non-subject merchandise.  This 
situation is exacerbated by the apparent lack of uni form procedures for importers to resolve disputes 
when faced with such circumstanc es.  The United States urges China to put in place such procedures, 
as well as refine the process by which MOFCOM info rms Chinese customs officials at China's ports 
as to the precise merchandise subject to each ant-dumping measure and the anti-dumping duty rates applicable to each importer.  We call to China's attention in this regard Article 5.9 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement which provides that anti-du mping proceedings shall not hinder customs 
clearance.   Last year, the United States noted that China did not appear to have  notified all relevant 
legislation to the Committee and in particular, ask ed that China clarify which rules apply to its 
prosecution of anti-dumping actions.  The same problem persists this year - key pieces of China's 
legislation still appear not to have been notified to this Committee, leaving considerable uncertainty as 
to the rules being used by China to conduct its an ti-dumping actions.  Such lapses in notification only 
serve to compound the concerns about implementati on.  The United States urges China to clarify in 
detail to this Committee the full set of rules, regul ations and laws that currently govern its anti-
dumping regime. 
 
 The United States recognizes the efforts China h as made to develop a legal framework for its 
anti-dumping regime that takes into account the principles of transparency of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement.  With much of that framework now in place, China must focus its efforts on conducting 
its anti-dumping actions in a manner consistent with  that framework and in conformity with WTO  G/ADP/W/449 
 Page 3 
 
 
 rules.  The United States looks forward to seeing subs tantial improvements in the very near future and 
offers its assistance to China in pursuit of that goal.  
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