WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION   
G/TBT/W/340 
7 September 2011 
 (11-4360) 
Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade  
  
 
 
REGULATORY COOPERATION BETWEEN MEMBERS 
 
Background Note by the Secretariat
1 
 
 
The WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Tr ade (the "TBT Committee") agreed at its 
Fifth Triennial Review in November 2009 to hold a Workshop  on Regulatory Cooperation between 
Members.2  The Workshop will be held on 8-9 Novemb er 2011, back-to-back with the Committee's 
regular meeting.  The present note is intended to  provide background information for Members' 
discussion. 
 
_______________ 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. Regulatory cooperation between Members can e nhance mutual understanding of regulatory 
systems. Moreover, it can build confidence betwee n trading partners thereby promoting regulatory 
convergence, including through mutual recognition. Wh en this process contributes to the avoidance of 
unnecessary barriers to trade, or reduction of the cost s associated with necessary barriers to trade, it 
also promotes the effective implementation of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(hereafter "the TBT Agreement"). 
2. This note provides information on the concept of regulatory cooperation in the context of the 
TBT Agreement and the work of the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (hereafter "the 
TBT Committee").  Section 2 is a short literature re view on the the economic rationale for regulatory 
cooperation; Section 3 highlights relevant disci plines in the TBT Agreement; Section 4 provides 
examples of regulatory cooperation between Member s; and, some discussion points for Members' 
consideration are provided at the end, in Section 5. 
II. THE CONCEPT OF REGULATORY COOPERATION 
A. GENERAL  
3. It is a matter of fact that diversity exists between Members' regulations.  Members regulate in 
different ways and towards a range of different goa ls.  Differences between Members with regard to, 
inter alia , political and legal systems, income levels, cultu res, or attitudes to risk aversion, may be at 
the root of such diversity.  Regulatory diversity  may also result from a lack of technical capacity 
know-how, or even data and appropriate tools to anal yze risks and formulate m easures.  Indeed, in the 
face of particular situations (e.g., geographical, climatic, infrastructural, technological) it may be 
                                                      
1 This document has been prepared under the Secret ariat's own responsibility and is without prejudice 
to the positions of Members and to their rights and obligations under the WTO. 
2 Fifth (2009) Triennial Review, G/TBT/26, para. 16(b). G/TBT/W/340 
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  necessary to regulate in a certain way – and in a wa y that is different from other countries. The TBT 
Agreement takes this into account and provides flexibility in this regard. 
4. Regulatory cooperation between Members is, in essence, about reducing unnecessary  
regulatory diversity; it is also about limiting or reducing the costs associated with necessary  
regulatory diversity.  Regulatory cooperation is prem ised on the notion that it is possible to remove 
unnecessary regulatory diversity and can even improve  Member's ability to achieve their legitimate 
policy objectives.  When fruitful, cooperation between Members – in various forms and 
configurations – can contribute to the reduction of unnecessary barriers to trade, and mitigate the 
economic impact of necessary barriers.  
B. T
HE CONCEPT  
5. Regulatory cooperation is a process by which officials from different governments cooperate 
in various forms, including by exchanging informa tion on rules and principles for regulating markets. 
More specifically, regulatory cooperation encompasses regular and direct engagement between 
government regulatory agencies and their foreign counterparts, the objectives of which include the 
formulation of more compatible and transparent re gulations, simplification and the lowering of trade 
barriers.   
6. Regulatory cooperation is about cooperation between governments. It may be described as:  
having a broad scope , taking place in various settings , in a range of mechanisms , and with varying 
levels of ambition  in different contexts . 
(a) Scope :  The scope of regulatory cooperation ac tivities is broad and includes bilateral 
or multilateral cooperation of both a formal and informal nature.  Some examples 
include the establishment of regulatory cooperation councils, in formation exchange, 
confidence building and enhancement of mutual understanding.  Training and 
technical assistance is also a form of co operation.  Regulatory cooperation may occur 
with respect to technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment 
procedures, among other areas.   
(b) Settings :  Regulatory cooperation takes place in  a range of different institutional 
settings, including within established intern ational organizations of a multilateral 
nature, as well as in the context of regional trade agreements.3 Alternatively, it may 
emerge outside formal international institu tions but within a framework agreed on by 
the respective governments (e.g. Transatla ntic Economic Council (TEC) between the 
European Union and the United States, or  regulatory co-operation initiatives in the 
APEC context).  Cooperation may also o ccur in international standardizing bodies 
through the multilateral process of developing standards.4  In some standardizing 
organizations and certain regulatory cooper ation settings, the private sector actively 
participates alongside regulators; this helps ensure that regulatory outcomes are market relevant.
5  Another form of cooperation is spontaneous governme nt networks.  
Initiatives may comprise agreements betw een regulatory agencies between two or 
                                                      
3 Slaughter, A.M. (2002):  "Global Governance Networks, Global Info rmation Agencies and 
Disaggregated Democracy" in:  Michigan Journal of International Law 24.   
4 Regulatory cooperation between governments can only be said to occur when governments actually 
participate in the process of setting standards.  While standardizing bodies do not regulate (standards are 
voluntary), cooperation between governments in the development stage of standards is important because 
resulting standards may be considered relevant by Members and used as a basis for (mandatory) regulation. 
5 Information from the private sector, particularly about how goods are traded through complex global 
supply chains, can be vital to techni cally sound and effective regulation.  G/TBT/W/340 
 Page 3 
 
 
  more nations but may also lead to multilateral arrangements with a broader 
membership.6   
(c) Mechanisms :  The formal mechanisms of regulatory cooperation include, inter alia , 
regulatory alignment, granting of equiva lence, mutual recognition, regulatory 
convergence and harmonization.  These mechan isms generally require some form of 
institutional or procedural frameworks, in cluding informal networks within which 
national governments and their subunits, as we ll as stakeholders and the wider public, 
can work together to build integrated systems for rule-making and implementation.7,8 
In this context, cooperation can be fac ilitated by 'functional similarities' between 
states – meaning that regulators in one count ry often have a functional counterpart in 
another country (for instance an identically named ministry or agency).  Similarities between legal frameworks, regulatory appr oaches and national infrastructure of each 
country may also be important.  Functioni ng domestic policy coordination is often 
cited as a prerequisite for utilizing th ese mechanisms of regulatory cooperation 
between Members.  In other words, govern ments that are better coordinated at home 
are generally better prepared to enga ge in regulatory co-operation abroad.
9,10  
(d) Ambition and context :  The level of ambition for a particular activity may be 
different depending on the contexts of the countries involved.  For example, 
regulatory cooperation between two major tr ading partners with strong economic ties 
may have the ambition of full harmoniza tion; whereas regulatory cooperation 
between two economies with very different regulatory systems may have a lower level of ambition, for instance that of increasing understanding and confidence-
building to facilitate trade. 
7. A common feature across all forms and degrees of regulatory cooperation is that it is a 
forward-looking process, aimed at the early identification of potential regulatory frictions.  In this way, potential unnecessary regulator y diversities can be avoided before  they become entrenched in 
national legislation and specific measures affecting trade.  Once a specific measure has entered into force, it is often "too late".  Effective coopera tion should function as a means of pre-empting trade 
concerns that arise between Members – concerns that might arise informally at a bilateral level, 
formally at the TBT Committee, or even in a dispute settlement context (DSU). 
C. T
HE ECONOMIC RATIONALE  
8. The basic economic rationale behind regulatory cooperation  between countries is that it 
facilitates trade by lowering costs to exporters; it reduces the number of situations where exporters are 
obliged to comply with multiple requirements in or der to access export markets.  Diverse standards 
                                                      
6 Section 4 of this paper provides examples of regulatory cooperation between Members. 
7 Jacobs, J.H. (1994):  "Regulatory Cooperation for an interdependent world:  issues for government" 
in:  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (1994), "Regulatory Cooperation for an 
Interdependent World", Paris:  OECD. 
8 Raustiala, K. (2002):  "The Architecture of International Cooperation:  Trans governmental Networks 
and the Future of International Law" in:  Virginia Journal of International Law 43-1.  
9 New Zealand has provided the TBT Committee with an example of its experience in establishing a 
new model for regulatory coordination, the "Regulators’ Forum".  The guiding objective is to promote better 
alignment and coordination across regulators, policy makers, and infrastructure bodies with a view to 
establishing a whole-of-governmen t approach to achieving good regulatory practice (G/TBT/W/294, 
28 October 2008). 
10 Metcalfe, L (1994a): "International policy co-ordination and public management reform" in:  
International Review of Administrative Science 60; and Metcalfe, L. (1994b):  "The weakest Links:  Building Organizational Networks for Multi-Level Regulation", in:  Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) (1994), "Regulatory Cooperation for an Interdependent World", Paris:  OECD. G/TBT/W/340 
Page 4  
 
  and technical regulations can undermine economies of  scale, and oblige exporters to bear costs in 
gathering information about regulati on in export markets.  Additional costs may also be imposed as a 
result of differing conformity assessment procedures and certification requirements.  These costs have 
negative implications for market access, trade a nd economic growth.  Regulat ory cooperation between 
Members can also enhance the transparency and pred ictability of regulation in export markets, which 
reduces uncertainty. 
9. Take, for instance, the case of the global automotive industry. Unnecessary regulatory 
diversity may exist between markets with respect to safety and environmental standards, as well as 
testing procedures.
11  Without compromising the objective of each country's measures, there may be 
opportunities for better alignment of regulation, whic h would save exporters significant cost, facilitate 
market access, and permit economies of scale in  production.  Some diversity may be necessary 
between Members' automotive regulations, for exampl e due to differences in geographic and climatic 
conditions.  However, once entrenched, longs tanding regulatory structures built around the 
configuration of domestic industry, such as in the automotive sector, are very costly to change.  This 
illustrates the importance of engaging early in re gulatory cooperation, as it may avoid costs further 
down the road. 
10. Indeed, in the context of the industrial market  access negotiations (NAMA) under the Doha 
Development Agenda, there are two textual propo sals on the table that both recognize the important 
contribution of automotive products to global eco nomic growth and development and the need to 
ensure that non-tariff measures in this area do not create unnecessary obstacles to international trade 
in automotive products.  Both proposals attempt to bring regulatory approaches in different countries 
closer, particularly in the area of recognition of conformity assessment results.12 
11. It has also been argued that some level of regulatory competition 's beneficial in that it 
incentivizes governments to develop the most efficien t and appropriate regula tions for their citizens 
and industries. The notion of regulatory compe tition is borne from the observation that not all 
regulations are created equal, and that government s compete with one another to supply the market 
with optimal and efficient welfare enha ncing regulations and legal structures.13 Sub-optimal 
regulations will be eliminated as market players "vot e with their feet", i.e.  businesses turn their back 
on countries with sub-optimal regulations.14  
                                                      
11 Ahearn R.J. (2009):  "Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation:  Background and Analysis", 
Congressional Research Service Report for the Congress; Eichbrecht, P.T., and Wilber, V.H. (2008):  
"Transatlantic Trade, the Automotive Sector:  The Role of Regulation in a Global Industry, Where We Have 
Been and Where We Need to Go, How Far Can EU-US Co-operation Go Toward Achieving Regulatory Harmonization", German Marshall Fund Academic Policy Re search Conference, 8-9 May 2008:  University of 
Michigan.   
12 These proposals are currently under discussion.  For more details, see the proposal from the 
European Union in "Agreement on Non-Tariff Barriers Pertaining to Standards, Technical Regulations, and 
Conformity Assessment Procedures  for Automotive Products" (TN/MA /W/118/Rev.2 and Corr.1) and a 
proposal from the United States and Canada in "Agreement on Non-Tariff Barriers Pertaining to Standards, Technical Regulations, and Conformity Assessment Procedures for Automotive Products" (TN/MA/W/139). 
13 The example underpinning this notion is the 'Delawar e effect'; whereby a larg e number of American 
public companies have incorporated in the State of Delaware, due to th at State's business friendly corporate 
governance regulations.  Therefore, one implication of regulatory competition is  that it could lead to a 'race to 
the bottom', whereby regulations are progressively ra tcheted down in different jurisdictions.  However, 
alternative interpretations of the theory suggest that first mover jurisdictions can actually attract business by 
developing more stringent regulations; the so-called 'Californi a effect', leading to a 'race to the top' [Esty, D. and 
Damien, G. (2000):  "Regulatory Co-opetition" in:  Journal of International Economic Law 2000 3(2); Vogel, D. 
(1995):  Trading Up:  Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy, Harvard University Press:  Harvard]. 
14 Esty, D. and Damien, G. (2000 footnote 13).  G/TBT/W/340 
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  12. However, regulatory competition may be an obstacl e to efficient regulation that is required to 
address market failures, including, trade-related transaction costs, environmental pollution and the 
inadequate development of quality infrastructure.15 For instance, in addressing global common goods 
problems, such as the environmental pollution (oz one depleting substances) , cooperation is often 
necessary to achieve a comprehensive solution (i.e .  avoiding a situation where one jurisdiction's 
regulations undermine the benefits ach ieved by another jurisdiction's regul ations).  In fact, it is argued 
that regulatory cooperation is a necessary condition for developing effi cient and effective regulations, 
in particular in contexts where cross-border re gulatory transactions costs and market failures are 
significant.16,17 
13. In sum, regulatory cooperation is about gove rnments taking a broader perspective on their 
regulatory approaches, and, guided by the TBT Agreement, actively seeking to avoid unnecessary 
regulatory diversity. 
III. REGULATORY COOPERATION AND THE TBT AGREEMENT 
14. A key objective of the TBT Agreement is the avoidance of unnecessary barriers to trade while 
recognizing the right of Members to pursue – throug h regulation – legitimate policy objectives.  As 
discussed above, this can be seen a contribution to the broader objective of reducing unnecessary 
regulatory diversity between Member s.  Although regulatory cooperation per se  is not mentioned in 
the TBT Agreement it is implicit in several provisions; some examples of how are listed below.18   
(a) International standards :  With respect to the use of international standards, Articles 
2.4 and 5.4 require Members to use releva nt international standards as a basis for 
their technical regulations and conform ity assessment procedures.  In addition, 
Article 2.6 requires Members to participate in  international standard-setting activities.  
Moreover, Paragraph G of Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement requires, inter alia , that 
standardizing bodies participate in interna tional standard-setting activities (within the 
limits of their resources).  Participation in  international standardizing and conformity 
assessment activities may be seen as a form of cooperation between governments.19  
In fact, almost by definition, an internati onal standard is the outcome of multilateral 
cooperation.  In this regard, the TBT Agreement recognizes the contribution which 
international standardization can make to the transfer of technology.20 
(b) Equivalence :  Other provisions of the TBT Ag reement promote cooperation between 
Members.  For instance, Members are requi red to give positive consideration to 
accepting as equivalent , technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures 
of other Members, even if these regulations and procedures differ from their own - 
provided that they are satisfied that these regulations and proce dures adequately fulfil 
the objectives of their own technical re gulations and conformity assessment 
procedures.21 
                                                      
15 Esty, D. and Damien, G. (2000, footnote 13); Ahearn R.J.  (2009):  "Transatlantic Regulatory 
Cooperation:  Background and Analysis", Congressi onal Research Service Re port for the Congress. 
16 Esty, D. and Damien, G. (2000, footnote 13). 
17 Sykes, A.O. (2000):  "Regulatory Competition or Regulatory Harmonization? A Silly Question?" in:  
Journal of International Economic Law 2000 (3)2. 
18 Articles 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 5, 6, 9, 10.1, and 11 of the TBT Agreement. 
19 It is noted, however, that not all stakeholders in standardizing activities are government officials. 
20 Eighth recital of the Preambl e of the TBT Agreement. 
21 Article 2.7 of the TBT Agreement.  In successi ve triennial reviews, the Committee has noted the 
importance of giving positive considera tion to accepting as equivale nt technical regulations  of other Members as G/TBT/W/340 
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  (c) Conformity assessment :  In the area of conformity assessment, the TBT Agreement 
recognizes that consultations may be necessar y for the mutual acceptance of results of 
conformity assessment procedures, and, in this respect, the Agreement encourages 
negotiations for the conclusion of such agreements.
22  The TBT Agreement also 
addresses cooperation at the regional and inte rnational level:  for instance, Members 
are encouraged to formulate and adopt international systems for conformity 
assessment and become members thereof or participate therein.23  In addition, the 
Agreement refers to the conclusion and notif ication of mutual recognition agreements 
for conformity assessment,24 and also refers to the possibility of having conformity 
assessment activities undertaken at the site of  the facilities of the applicant, and of 
receiving the mark of the system.25 
(d) Transparency :  The transparency provisions of the TBT Agreement may serve to 
trigger useful regulatory cooperation between Members.  Since the Agreement entered into force, over 13,700 notifications have been submitted by 111 WTO Members.  Discussion at Committee meetings , as well as in the margins of the TBT 
Committee meetings – in a bilateral or pl urilateral, formal or informal setting, 
promote cooperation between Members.  In addition, each WTO Member has an obligation to establish an "enquiry point " to answer reasonable enquiries from 
Members and interested parties.
26 
(e) The TBT Committee :  The TBT Committee was established with the explicit 
mandate of "affording Members the opportuni ty of consulting on any matters relating 
to the operation of this Agreement", and is itself a forum for multilateral 
cooperation.27  In particular, the Committee provides a forum, inter alia , to discuss 
trade concerns that arise between Members and that relate to technical regulations, 
standards or conformity assessment procedur es.  These "specific trade concerns" (or 
"STCs") generally involve proposed draft me asures (most of them notified to the TBT 
Committee) or to the implementation of  existing regulations.  Members have 
underlined the value of the Committee's discussions on STCs:  it provides an opportunity for a multilateral review that enhances the transparency and predictability in the application of standards, techni cal regulations and conformity assessment 
procedures.  These discussions can be considered as a form of regulatory cooperation in that they promote shared understandi ng of regulatory systems, and provide 
Members with feedback on ways in which their draft regulations could be amended 
so as to limit potential unnecessary barriers to trade.
28  Since the TBT Agreement 
entered into force, approximately 320 specifi c trade concerns have been discussed in 
the Committee.29  
(f) Technical Assistance :  Regulatory cooperation may have a training and capacity 
building aspect and therefore be linked to the implementation of Article 11 of the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
provided for under Article 2.7 of the TBT Agreement (see Second (2000) and Third (2003) Triennial Reviews 
(G/TBT/9, para.  38 and G/TBT/13, para. 12, respectively).    
22 Article 6 of the TBT Agreement. 
23 Article 9 of the TBT Agreement. 
24 Article 10.7 of the TBT Agreement. 
25 Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement. 
26 Article 10 of the TBT Agreement contains a number of provisions relevant to Enquiry Points. 
27 TBT Agreement, Article 13.1. 
28 Quick, R. (2008a):  "Regulatory Cooperation – A Subject of Bilateral Trade Negotiations or Even for 
the WTO?" in:  Journal of World Trade 42(3), p.  391-406. 
29 See G/TBT/GEN/74/series of documents.  G/TBT/W/340 
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  TBT Agreement.30  One example is the cooperation between Canada and Costa Rica.  
This initiative included inter alia  capacity building to understand and implement the 
TBT Agreement, to improve the standards development process of Costa Rica's national standards setting body, and to improve Costa Rica's national accreditation 
programme.
31   
IV. EXAMPLES OF REGULATORY COOPERATION BETWEEN MEMBERS 
15. In the TBT Committee, Members have stressed  the importance of regulatory cooperation in 
relation to Good Regulatory Practice (GRP) on sever al occasions, noting that regulatory cooperation 
between Members is an effective means of disseminating Good Regulatory Practice.32  Most 
regulatory cooperation initiatives appear to take  place among developed countries although there are 
examples of cooperation between deve loped and developing countries.  Without being exhaustive, the 
following paragraphs provide some illustration of regulatory cooperation between Members.33 
A. BILATERAL INITIATIVES  
16. Cooperation between the European Union and th e United States provides a useful example of 
regulatory cooperation.34  The objectives of this cooperation include the promoti on of better quality 
regulation, minimizing unnecessary regulatory diverg ences, minimizing trade frictions and increasing 
consumer confidence.  It is broad in scope.  It  includes different kinds of initiatives such as:  
regulator-to-regulator engagement; ad hoc informal information exchanges; structured dialogues and 
even binding government agreements (e.g., MRAs).  The dialogue takes place in three main areas:   
Regulatory Cooperation Roadmap (sectoral dialogues and sector-specific agreements – such as autos, drugs and medical devices); the US Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and European 
Commission dialogue on good regulatory practices (dealing with issues such as transparency, impact 
assessments, economic analyses); and, the Regulator y Cooperation Forum (senior-level platform for 
cross-cutting issues such as new technology, the saf ety of imported products or policy developments 
that may impact multiple authorities on each side).  Political oversight is provided through the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC).  Despite a number of accomplishments in many fields 
achieved over nearly two decades in US-EU regulator y cooperation, regulatory diversity remains in 
some areas, including in the field of chemicals.
35  
17. New Zealand and Australia provide another exam ple of cooperation.  Information of this 
cooperation was provided by New Zealand in 2008.36 New Zealand identified a "menu" of regulatory 
cooperation approaches that aim to facilitate tr ade and enhance regulatory compliance.  The 
approaches include mutual recognition arrangement s among which the arrangement with Australia 
(the Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrange ment - TTMRA) is the most advanced and 
comprehensive.  The TTMRA provides that goods th at can be legally sold in New Zealand can be 
                                                      
30 Article 11 of the TBT Agreement is on "Techni cal Assistance to Other Members".  See also 
recommendations in the Fourth (2006) Triennial Review (G/TBT/19, para. 18 in particular). 
31 Canada and Costa Rica in 2007 (G/TBT/W/283). 
32 Fourth (2006) Triennial Review (G/TBT/19, para. 18); The European Communities in 2005 
(G/TBT/W/254); Committee Meeting in 2006 (G/TBT/M 38, paras. 102-112); Brazil in 2006 (G/TBT/W267, 
paras. 5-6). 
33 A complete list of documents regarding regulator y cooperation submitted to the Secretariat can be 
found in Annex I. 
34 Presented at the TBT Workshop on Good Regulatory Practice in March 2008 TBT Workshop on 
Good Regulatory Practices in 2008 (G/TBT/W/287, paras. 82-88). 
35 Ahearn R.J. (2009, footnote 11); Quick, R. (2008b):  "Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation on 
Chemical – An Idealist's Dream?" Conference Paper, University of Michigan Conference on Systemic 
Implications of Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation and Competition, Ann Arbor 8-9 May 2008. 
36 New Zealand in 2008 (G/TBT/W/295). G/TBT/W/340 
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  legally sold in Australia and vice versa.  The special  feature of the TTMRA is that it is based on the 
principle of mutual recognition of equivalence of the respective regulatory regimes:  each side has 
confidence in the regulatory outcomes of the other.  This has led to deeper regulatory coordination, 
more aligned regulatory approaches and greater harmonisation. 
18. China and New Zealand have a Free Trade Ag reement (FTA) which establishes regulatory 
cooperation between the two countries.37 The FTA encourages the parties to harmonize technical 
regulations and standards through jointly developing standards, tec hnical regulations and conformity 
assessment procedures.  The FTA includes the Mutual Recognition Agreement on Electrical and 
Electronic Equipment (EEEMRA).  The EEEMRA concer ns electrical and electronic products that are 
subject to the China Compulsory Certification (CCC) system and to the requirements of New 
Zealand’s supplier’s declarations of conformity (S DoC).  The EEEMRA aims to facilitate the removal 
of unnecessary technical barriers through mutual rec ognition of standards and conformity assessment 
and regulator-to-regulator cooperation which includ es a joint committee on TBT in which the parties 
meet at least once a year. 
19. Israel has provided the Committe e with an example of how a small domestic market makes 
regulator cooperation particularly important.38  Israel uses a flexible approach which is designed, inter 
alia, to promote cooperation between regulators.  In its  bilateral agreements particular emphasis is put 
on direct regulator-to-regulator contacts usually betw een senior officials in charge of standardization 
and conformity assessment.  The bilateral agreemen ts specifically define responsibilities of senior 
officials in terms of finding answering to inquiri es of exporting companies concerned with technical 
barriers to trade.  In the TBT Committee, Israel  has emphasized the importance of giving space for 
informal cooperation between individuals in larger, formal agreements between countries. 
B. REGIONAL INITIATIVES  
20. Trilateral regulatory cooperation is taki ng place between Canada, Mexico and the 
United States in the context of the North Amer ican Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which has 
offered a forum for cooperation in several specific areas.39 The NAFTA approach to regulatory 
cooperation emphasizes the importance of regulator y convergence (including reduction of regulatory 
inconsistencies and redundancies), administrative simp lification, and the use of practical, science- and 
risk-based tools, to attain critical health, safety, environmental, and security goals in the least trade-
restrictive manner possible.  The cooperative activ ities encompass a wide variety of approaches that 
can be employed by regulators to collaborate with each other - from information sharing to 
negotiating equivalency agreements.  The appropriate approaches differ based on a number of factors.  
The availability of resources, the degree of regulati on already in place, and the level of technical and 
institutional capacity in each country are factors that are considered. It is noted that the three countries 
developed a voluntary "Regulatory Cooperation Framework"40 which aims to:  
(a) strengthen the cooperation through transparen cy in rulemaking process, exchange of 
best practices, and information sharing among regulators;  
(b) streamline regulations and regulatory processes through inter alia  joint analysis or 
evaluation of regulatory issues of mutual interest, information exchange on implementation approaches, and through existing working groups;  
                                                      
37 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Z ealand (2008):  "New Z ealand – China Free Trade 
Agreement" and New Zealand in 2008 (G/TBT/W/295). 
38 TBT Workshop on Good Regulatory Practices in 2008 (G/TBT/W/287, paras. 89-91). 
39 Canada, Mexico, and the United States in 2009 (G/TBT/W/317, 15 June 2009). 
40 http://www.spp-psp.gc.ca/eic/s ite/spp-psp.nsf/eng/00095.html    G/TBT/W/340 
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  (c) encourage compatibility of regulations, promote the use or adoption of relevant 
international standards, as well as domes tic voluntary consensus standards, in 
regulations, and eliminate redundant test ing and certification requirements.   
21. Cooperation between the three countries takes pl ace in a number of sectors including food 
and agriculture, automobiles, chemicals and energy.  In the energy sector, the Trilateral Agreement on 
Energy Science and Technology envisions num erous areas of cooperation which include inter alia  the 
exchange of information on scientific and technical de velopments.  In the area of energy efficiency, 
energy performance standards have been harmonized acro ss the three countries.  Finally, in the area of 
conformity assessment for telecommunications e quipment, a mutual recognition agreement was 
finalized between Mexico and the United States,  with Canada expected to join shortly. 
22. In the context of NAFTA cooperation, the United States-Mexico High-Level Regulatory 
Cooperation Council,41 and the United States-Canada  Regulatory Cooperation Council42 have been 
established with the aims, inter alia , of rendering technical regulations  more compatible, aligned and 
transparent, as well as simplification of regula tions including through public involvement and 
improved collaboration in the analysis of regulatory impacts. 
23. Another example of regional cooperation is th e Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) which is 
aimed at integrating the economies of the Asia -Pacific region.  Currently, Australia, Brunei 
Darussalam, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru , Singapore, the United States and Viet Nam are 
participants.  The TPP participants are currently seek ing to negotiate an agre ement that supports the 
wider liberalisation process in APEC consistent  with its goals of free and open trade and 
investment.43  The participants are negotiating a specifi c chapter on "Technical Barriers to Trade" 
which aims, inter alia , to increase and facilitate trade through furthering the implementation of the 
TBT Agreement and building on the work of APEC on standards and conformance.44  T h e  
participants are also negotiating a potential chapter on "Regulatory Coherence" which aims, inter alia , 
to encourage central coordination of regulatory pr ocesses, the use of good regulatory practices, and 
regulatory cooperation. 
24. In the area of standards development, the South Asian Regional Standards Organisation 
(SARSO) between the SAARC countries was established.45  This regional standards organization 
aims inter alia  to cooperate and coordinate standards development and conformity assessment to 
facilitate intra-regional trade.  As such it opera tes as a platform for information exchange on 
standards, regulation and conformity assessment.46 
                                                      
41 http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ default/files/omb/oira/irc/high-
level_regulatory_cooperation_coun cil-terms_of_reference_final.pdf 
42 http://www.borderactionplan-plandactionfront alier.gc.ca/psec-scep/rcc_tor-mandat_ccr.aspx 
43 For some more detail on the TPP, see for instance: " http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-
Relations/2-Trade-Relationships-and-Agreements/Trans-Pacific/index.php ". 
44 For more detail on APEC's Sub-Committee on Standards and Conformance (SCSC), see: 
"http://www.apec.org/Home/Groups/Committee-on- Trade-and-Investment/Sub-Committee-on-
Standards-and-Conformance"  
45 SAARC Members are:  Afghanistan, Bangladesh,  Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, India and 
Sri Lanka. 
46 http://www.saarc-sec.org/Agreements/69/   G/TBT/W/340 
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  25. The Gulf Standardization Organization (GSO) develops regional-wide  Gulf standards and 
Gulf conformity assessment procedures, with a view to promoting harmonization of technical 
regulations amongst Gulf Coope ration Council member countries.
47 
V. DISCUSSION POINTS 
26. The TBT Committee has agreed to exchange information on the different approaches to 
regulatory cooperation between Members that aim at, inter alia,  enhancing mutual understanding of 
regulatory systems and identifying, where possible, avenues for greater regulatory convergence.  The points below (non-exhaustive and in no particul ar order) are some suggested issues around which 
delegations may wish to focus discussions. 
(a) High-level commitment.  High-level political commitment supports domestic 
regulators initiatives to cooperate with other governments.   
(b) Start small and think strategically.  When harmonization, equivalence or mutual 
recognition is not feasible, even informal information exchanges may lead to a better 
understanding of different regulations a nd these efforts may contribute significantly 
to limiting unnecessary regulatory differences.  An initial approach based on informal 
dialogue can identify areas for deeper cooperation later. 
(c) Cooperation is particularly useful when looking ahead.  While work on existing 
regulations helps regulators to build  up relationships, cooperation at the development  
stage of regulations may yield the best returns in terms of reducing unnecessary regulatory diversities.  Cooperation on emerging issues offer an opportunity to prevent unnecessary diversity. 
(d) Similarity in regulatory regimes helps.   Regulatory compatibility enhances the 
chances of successful cooperation.  Compatibility depends, inter alia , on similar 
policy preferences regarding, for instance:   risk assessment, scientific evidence and 
regulatory objectives.  A degree of 'functional similarity' between regulatory arms of governments facilitates cooperation.  Conve rsely, when policy preferences differ 
across countries, the resulting heterogeneity may make cooperation more challenging.  
Lack of regulatory compatibility may explain the lower likelihood of regulatory cooperation among developed and developing countries.
48, 49 
(e) Coordination at home.  Effective coopera tion between Members needs to stand on a 
good foundation at home, in other word s:  good national coordination makes good 
international cooperation. 
(f) Resource constraints.  To achieve eff ective regulatory cooperation, adequate 
personnel and financial resources are need ed.  Resource limits may represent a 
particular challenge for developing countries.   
(g) Confidence.  Regulatory cooperation – particul arly in its deeper forms (e.g., MRAs) – 
may require a significant degree of confid ence between the cooperating governments.  
For instance, trust is needed for domestic regulators to accept the outcome of foreign 
product testing results.  Domestic regulators, however, remain accountable to their 
                                                      
47 GCC members are: United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait. In addition, 
Egypt has signed a Memorandum of Understanding on technical cooperation with the GSO to engage in harmonization activity. 
48 Mattli, W. (2001):  "The politics and economics of international institutional standards setting:  an 
introduction", Journal of European Public Policy (8). 
49 Nicolaïdis, K. and Egan, M. (2001) "Transnational market governance and regional policy 
externality:  why recognize foreign standards?", Journal of European Public Policy (8).  G/TBT/W/340 
 Page 11 
 
 
  own legislators.  Effective regulatory co operation will need to strike a balance 
between confidence placed on the processes and procedures of trading partners while maintaining accountability to domestic constituencies.  
50,51  
VI. LITERATURE 
(a) Ahearn R.J. (2009):  "Transatlantic Re gulatory Cooperation:  Background and 
Analysis", Congressional Research Service Report for the Congress. 
(b) Eichbrecht, P.T., and Wilber, V.H. (2008):  "Transatlantic Trade, the Automotive 
Sector:  The Role of Regulation in a Gl obal Industry, Where We Have Been and 
Where We Need to Go, How Far Can EU -US Co-operation Go Toward Achieving 
Regulatory Harmonization", German Marshall Fund Academic Policy Research Conference, 8-9 May 2008:  University of Michagan.  Available at:  http://www.fordschool.umich.edu/news/e vent_details/reg_c oop_and_comp_08/docu
ments/WilberPaper.pdf. 
(c) Esty, D. and Damien, G. (2000):  "Re gulatory Co-opetition" in:  Journal of 
International Economic Law 2000 3(2). 
(d) Jacobs, J.H. (1994):  "Regulatory Cooperation for an interdependent world:  issues 
for government" in:  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) (1994), "Regulatory Cooperation for an Interdependent World", Paris:  OECD. 
(e) Mattli, W. (2001):  "The politics and ec onomics of international institutional 
standards setting:  an introduction", Journal of European Public Policy (8). 
(f) Metcalfe, L. (1994a):  "International polic y co-ordination and public management 
reform" in:  International Review  of Administrative Science 60. 
(g) Metcalfe, L. (1994b):  "The weakest Links :  Building Organizational Networks for 
Multi-Level Regulation", in:  Organi zation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) (1994), "Regulatory Cooperation for an Interdependent 
World", Paris:  OECD. 
(h) Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand (2008):  "New Zealand – China 
Free Trade Agreement."  
(i) Nicolaïdis, K. and Egan, M. (2001) "T ransnational market governance and regional 
policy externality:  why recognize foreign st andards?", Journal of European Public 
Policy (8). 
(j) Nicolaidis, K. and Steffenson R. (2005)  "Managed Mutual Recognition in the 
Transatlantic Marketplace," in Law and Contemporary Problems (68). 
(k) Quick, R. (2008a):  "Regulatory Coope ration – A Subject of Bilateral Trade 
Negotiations or Even for the WTO?" in:  Journal of World Trade 42(3), p.  391-406. 
                                                      
50 Nicolaïdis, K. and Steffenson R. (2005) "Managed Mutual Recognition in the Transatlantic 
Marketplace," in The Future of Transatlantic Economic Relations, p.  147 cited form Ahear R.J. (2009):  
"Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation:  Background and Analysis", Congressional Re search Service Report for 
the Congress. 
51 Quick, R.  (2008, footnote 35). G/TBT/W/340 
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  (l) Quick, R. (2008b):  "Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation on Chemical – An 
Idealist's Dream?" Conference Paper, University of Michigan Conference on Systemic Implications of Transatlantic  Regulatory Cooperation and Competition, 
Ann Arbor 8-9 May 2008. 
(m) Raustiala, K. (2002):  "The Architect ure of International Cooperation:  
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future  of International Law" in:  Virginia 
Journal of International Law 43-1. 
(n) Slaughter, A.M. (2002):  "Global G overnance Networks, Global Information 
Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy" in:  Michigan Journal of International Law 
24. 
(o) Sykes, A.O. (2000):  "Regulatory Competiti on or Regulatory Harmonization? A Silly 
Question?" in:  Journal of Inte rnational Economic Law 2000 (3)2. 
(p) Vogel, D. (1995):  "Trading Up:  Consum er and Environmental Regulation in a 
Global Economy", Harvard University Press:  Harvard. 
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