WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  WT/COMTD/57/Add.5 
27 June 2006 
 
 (06-3120) 
Committee on Trade and Development Original:   English 
  
 
GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES 
 
Communication from the European Communities
 
 
Addendum  
 
 
 The following communication, dated 21 June  2006, has been received from the European 
Communities and is being circulated at its request.  
_______________ 
 
 
THE EU'S GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES: 
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY 
BRAZIL, CHINA, INDIA AND PAKISTAN  
(WT/COMTD/57/ADDS. 1 - 4) 
 
Questions by Brazil (WT/COMTD/57/Add.1)
 
 
 
Question 1: Could the European Communities (E C) provide monthly and annual figures in 
value (in US$ or in Euros) and in quantity (kilos or tons) of imports covered by each 
arrangement in the EC's Generalized System of  Preferences (GSP) by country and by product 
(tariff line)?  If not, please justify the response.  In this context, Brazil would like to point out 
that GSP trade data is not available und er EUROSTAT and that the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Secretariat declared in a recent report that it 
"does not have access to detailed official data on preferential imports in the European Union 
(...)".1 
 
Answer: Given the size and the complexity of the data concerned, the EC can on bilateral 
request provide monthly and annual figures in value (in Euros) and in quantity (kilos or tons) of 
imports covered by each arrangement of the EU G SP by beneficiary and by product (tariff line).  
 
Question 2: How does the EC expect developi ng countries to verify whether they meet 
statistical requirements set by the Regulation No 980/2005?  In this regard, Brazil is especially 
concerned about requirements set by Article 14 of such regulation (graduation system) on 
removal of tariff preferences, which establishes th at data should be extracted from COMEXT 
(Eurostat) because the current system (nor the previous under special subscription) does not 
make GSP-covered products  information available. 
 
                                                      
1 [European Commission correspondence with the OECD Secretariat, 22 June 2004].  Trade Preference 
Erosion:  potential economic impacts.   OECD paper, 26 de abril de 2005.  TD/TC/WP(2004)30/FINAL, p.9. WT/COMTD/57/Add.5 
Page 2  
 
  Answer: The statistical requirements are set by the provisions of Article 14.6 of Council 
Regulation No 980/2005 under which tariff preferen ces shall be removed on the basis of the most 
recent COMEXT data.  The production of the COMEXT statistics on GSP trade is based on statistical 
data provided by EU Member States and collected by  Eurostat.  These data are available on bilateral 
request. 
 
Question 3: Tariff preferences for Brazilian products falling under Section IV of EC 
Regulation No 2658/87 (prepared foodstuffs;  beverages;  spirits and vinegar tobacco and manufactures tobacco substitutes) were removed.  Could the EC indicate the rationale behind 
this decision?  Did the EC conduct any research to v erify if Brazilian exports of products in that 
section actually surpassed the 15% threshold described in Article 14 of Council Regulation No 
980/2005 of 27 June 2005?  Could the EC pr ovide any supporting analysis or document? 
 
Answer: The average value of Community imports from Brazil included in Section IV (prepared 
foodstuffs;  beverages;  spirits and vinegar tobacco  and manufactures tobacco substitutes) and covered 
by the EU GSP general arrangement enjoyed by Brazil represented 22.4% of the value of the 
Community imports of the same products from all GSP beneficiaries over three consecutive years (2001-2003).  As this figure is above the 15% th reshold set by Article 14.1 of Council Regulation 
(EC) No 980/2005, tariff preferences for these products from Brazil had to be removed.  
 
Question 4: Why did the EC choose to use a gradua tion system (Article 14) that affects entire 
sections of the Harmonized System (HS)?  Ot her graduation systems of other GSPs are 
product-specific and therefore do not penalize developing countries on more than one item in which they developed export capability on a co mpetitive basis.  Brazil is mainly concerned 
about the graduation of section IV, which comprises chapters 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24 of the HS, once a few products that reach the 15% threshold, penalize a large group of other 
products that would have been able to enter the European market, had section IV not being 
graduated as a whole. 
 
Answer: The new GSP scheme including its graduati on mechanism has been designed to be 
simpler, more transparent and fully objective.  In particular, the previous 34 GSP-specific sectors set 
under the previous GSP regulation under Article 6.b)  are no longer utilised and have been replaced by 
the twenty-first sections of the Common Custom s Tariff (Article 6.b) of Council Regulation 
No 980/2005) which reflect the Harmonised System (HS) methodology.  
Question 5: Why did the EC decrease the graduation threshold of 25% (Article to 12.A of 
Regulation 2501/2001) to 15% Article 14 of regulation 980/2005)? 
 
Answer: The new GSP scheme including its graduati on mechanism has been designed to be 
simpler, more transparent and fairer.  Under the provisions of Article 12 of previous Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2501/2001, tariff preferences were  removed on the basis of three different criteria 
including share of preferential imports, developm ent index and export-specialisation index.  These 
complex criteria have been replaced with a si ngle straightforward criterion under the new GSP 
scheme, namely the share of the Community market  as expressed as a share of preferential imports.  
 
Question 6: What were the reasons for removing the mechanism of review of the graduation 
system in the current GSP regulation?  Will any alternative process be available, to a country 
whose specific section no longer exceeds the 15% limit?  If in 2007, Brazil no longer exceeds the 
15% threshold on section IV, how would it benefit from the GSP tariff rate in 2008? 
 
Answer: The revised GSP scheme is designed to be more stable providing predictability for 
importers and exporters.  As far as gr aduation is concerned, this impli es that as set by Article 14.3 of 
the Regulation No 980/2005, the removal of sec tions from the GSP scheme shall apply as from  WT/COMTD/57/Add.5 
 Page 3 
 
 
  1 January 2006 until 31 December 2008.  However,  as provided under Article 28.3 of the same 
regulation, the GSP Committee shall examine the e ffects of the current scheme, on the basis of a 
report from the Commission covering the period from 1 January 2006.  This report shall cover all 
preferential arrangements including changes in e xport trends and will be presented in time for 
discussion on the second GSP implementing regulation.  
 
Question 7: Could the EC provide background in formation on how the criteria to identify 
"vulnerable" countries such as "1 per cent of  GSP-covered imports to the Community" and 
"75% of total GSP imports" (Article 9.3(a) an d (b) of Regulation No 980/2005) were decided? 
 Answer: Countries requesting to benefit from the speci al incentive for sustainable development 
and good governance need to demonstrate that thei r economies are poorly diversified, and therefore 
dependent and vulnerable.  Poor  diversification and dependence is defined by Article 9.3 of 
Regulation No 980/2005 under which a vulnerable country is one:  
(a) that is not classified by the World Bank as a high income country during three 
consecutive years, and whose five largest sec tions of its GSP-covered imports to the 
Community represent more than 75% in valu e of its total GSP-covered imports, and 
(b) whose GSP-covered imports to the Community  represent less than 1% in value of 
total GSP-covered imports to the Community.  
Question 8: Could the EC provide background information on the criteria used to determine 
the sensitivity of products (Article 7)?  Could the EC provide any supporting documents?  
Answer: The EC takes decision regarding the sensitivit y of products after intensive consultation 
of EU Member States which take into account the situation of products of the respective Community 
industries.  The EC decisions are reflected within  the Annex II on the list of products included in each 
of the GSP arrangement of Counc il Regulation (EC) No 980/2005. 
 
* * * 
 
Questions by China (WT/COMTD/57/Add.2)
 
 
Question 1: Renewal mechanism for a product to reclaim the GSP treatment 
  Is there any renewal mechanism for a product, which is graduated from the scheme, to reclaim the GSP treatment in the future, if the product meets EC's current criteria to benefit 
from GSP treatment? 
 
 EC's new GSP scheme only prescribes the mech anism for graduation of a product, but 
there are no definite provisions as to how a pr oduct can reclaim the preferential treatment in 
the future.  This has affected the transparency and legal certainty of the new GSP scheme, which renders it difficult for exporters in the be neficiary countries to assess, in a predicable 
manner, the treatment of its products in the EC market. 
 
 It would be appreciated if the EC could de fine the renewal mechanism for a product so 
that the GSP treatment could be reclaimed. 
 
Answer: The revised GSP scheme is designed to be more stable providing predictability for 
importers and exporters.  As far as gr aduation is concerned, this impli es that as set by Article 14.3 of 
the Regulation No 980/2005, the removal of sec tions from the GSP scheme shall apply as from 
1 January 2006 until 31 December 2008.  However,  as provided under Article 28.3 of the same WT/COMTD/57/Add.5 
Page 4  
 
  regulation, the GSP Committee shall examine the e ffects of the current scheme, on the basis of a 
report from the Commission covering the period from 1 January 2006.  This report shall cover all 
preferential arrangements including changes in e xport trends and will be presented in time for 
discussion on the next GSP implementing regulation.   Question 2: Preferential rules of origin 
 
 In accordance with the provisions on rules of  origin in the new GSP scheme, the origin 
of a product could be decided, based on accu mulation, for countries which are parties to an 
entity of regional economic integration.  Si nce China is a member of the APEC and has a 
regional trade agreement with ASEAN, can Chin a's products enjoy GSP treatment based on 
origin accumulation within APEC and ASEAN-China? 
 
Answer: In order to foster regional integration, the existing rules of origin applying to imports 
under the GSP provide for the possibility of regiona l cumulation of origin between the members of 
regional groups.  At present, there are three re gional groups benefiting from regional cumulation:  
  - Group I: the Association of South-East Asean Nations –ASEAN (Brunei Darussalam, 
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippi nes, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam); 
  - Group II: the Central American Common Market – CACM (Costa Rica, Honduras, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, El Salvado r), and the Andean Community (Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela); 
  - Group III: -the South Asian Associa tion for Regional Co-operation – SAARC 
(Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka).   
 
Question 3: GSP-Plus arrangement 
 
 In EC's previous GSP scheme, there was sp ecial arrangement for countries which had 
taken effective steps to protect tropical rain forest s.  The products of tropical rain forests could 
enjoy tariff reduction by 15-30%.  Does the new GSP-plus arrangement contain similar 
provisions?  In cases where applications under the old GSP-plus scheme have not been fully 
processed, is there any transitional arrangement to continue processing of these applications? 
  China strongly encourages the EC to give  timely and appropriate consideration to 
application for the GSP-plus treatment, so as not to nullify the value of such arrangement. 
 
Answer: The new GSP scheme has been designed to be simpler and more transparent. In 
particular, it has been reduced to three arrangement s instead of the previous five and now includes: 
  - the general arrangement available to all developing countries and territories;  
 
 - the special arrangement for least devel oped countries “Everything but Arms” which 
remains unchanged, and  
  - the special incentive for sustainabl e development and good governance.  
 
 The third incentive provides that additional tariff preferences are granted on request to 
vulnerable and dependent countries wh ich have ratified and effectivel y implemented the sixteen core 
conventions on human and labour rights and seven ( out of eleven) of the conventions related the 
protection of the environment and good governance (section 2 of Council Regulation No 980/2005).  
  WT/COMTD/57/Add.5 
 Page 5 
 
 
   There is no transitional arrangement which w ould continue processing of the applications 
made under the previous GSP scheme for the special incentive for the protection of the environment.  
However, under the new special incentive for sustai nable development and good governance, out of 
the seven environmental conventions to be ratified and effectively implemented, two of them namely 
the Convention on International Trade in Enda ngered Species and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity both include provisions related to the protection of tropical forests. 
 
Question 4: Transparency 
 
 China urges the EC to enhance transparency of its policies in relation to GSP.  
Information on utilization by the beneficiar y countries of the GSP should be published 
regularly through official channels.     While the EC has published trade data on the Helpdesk website, data on products enjoying the preferential treatment provided for in the GSP scheme is not available.  Since 
graduation of a product is decided upon the sh are of trade value of that product from a 
particular country in the total value of that pro duct enjoying preferential treatment, the criteria 
for product graduation is not transparent.    For the sake of transparency, China exp ects the EC to publish periodically, through 
official channels, trade data of the products en joying GSP treatment and submit such data to 
the WTO.  We would like to propose that the EC make publicly available, by March each year, 
trade data of the previous year.  Data will include , inter alia , trade value of a product at the 
specific tariff lines level, margin of preference , and share of the product of each beneficiary 
country in the total value of EC's import  of that product under the GSP scheme.  
 
 Moreover, the Hong Kong Ministerial Decl aration has requested developed Members to 
provide duty-free and quota-free treatment to pro ducts originating from the least-developed 
countries.  We would like to know the percentage  coverage of products originating from the 
LDCs that are given duty free and quota-free treatm ent by the EC, both in terms of tariff lines 
and trade value.  
Answer: Given the size and the complexity of the data concerned, the EC can on bilateral 
request  provide monthly and annual figures in value (in Euros) and in quantity (kilos or tons) of 
imports covered by each arrangement of the EU G SP by beneficiary and by product (tariff line).  
  As far as the special arrangement for least developed countries is c oncerned and as provided 
by Article 12.1 of Council regulation No 980/2005,  all ‘dutiable’ products, without Chapter 93, arms 
and ammunition are included in the special arrange ment for least developed countries which grants 
duty-free and quota-free access to the EU market.  Fu ll liberalisation of sugar and rice will be phased 
in during a transition period.  As provided by Articles 12.2 and 12.4 of EU Council Regulation No 980/2005, duties on those produc ts are gradually reduced until duty-free access is granted for 
sugar at the latest by 1 July 2009 and for rice at the latest by 1 September 2009.  In the meantime, the 
EU has offered immediate and real market access to  the 50 least developed countries, through the 
creation of duty-free quotas for sugar and rice.  Thes e quotas have increased annually (Article 12.5 of 
EU Council Regulation No 980/2005).   Nine thousand seven hundred and seventy six products (tariff lines) imported from 
least-developed countries out of the 9840 tariff lines of the Common Customs Tariff in 2005 (i.e. a 
percentage of 99.4%) were covered by the ‘Everyth ing but Arms’ arrangement.  In trade value, this 
amount represented €15.88 billion in 2005.   
* * * WT/COMTD/57/Add.5 
Page 6  
 
  Questions by India (WT/COMTD/57/Add.3 )
 
 
Question 1: What are the "development, financia l [or] trade needs" of developing countries 
that the EC seeks to address under the Speci al Incentive Arrangement for sustainable 
development and good governance? 
 
Answer:   The special incentive arrangement for su stainable development and good governance is 
based on an integral and universally accepted con cept of sustainable development as recognised by 
the totality of international organisations and en dorsed in several international conventions and 
instruments.  Vulnerable developing countries which assume by their own volition special burdens 
and responsibilities due to the ratification and e ffective implementation of core international 
conventions on human and labour rights, on protecti on of the environment and on good governance, 
should benefit from additional tariff preferences.  
Question 2: What are the "development, financia l [or] trade needs" of those countries that 
qualify under the Special Incentive Arrangement that  are unique to that group of countries and 
which set them apart from those that do not qualify? 
 
Answer: What distinguishes these countries (benef iciaries of the GSP+) from other GSP 
beneficiaries is the fact that they have met the tr ansparent, objective criteria and standards (ratification 
and effective implementation) in accordance with th e relevant stipulations of the GSP regulation 
following an objective and transparent review, by  the Commission, based on specific benchmarks. 
 
Question 3: How has the EC addressed the ru ling adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB) in the EC – Tariff Preferences  case where the Appellate Body in paragraph 167 stated 
that differential GSP schemes should not c reate and "raise barriers to or create undue 
difficulties for the trade of other" WTO Me mbers, including developing countries? 
 
Answer: The EU has drafted its new GSP regulation in  full respect of its commitments under the 
WTO.  The GSP special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance does not impose unjustifiable burdens on any of the other WTO Members, including developing countries. 
 
Question 4: Can the EC clarify why it adopted a "closed list" approach to determine the 
beneficiary countries under the Special Incentive Arrangement, and whether such an approach 
is a positive response to the "development, financia l [or] trade needs" of developing countries? 
 Answer: The EU did not adopt a "closed list", as inte rpreted by the Appellate Body in the GSP 
case brought by India.  First, the current GSP regulation provides an objective and transparent 
mechanism under which GSP+ beneficiaries may be  selected.  Secondly, the current GSP regulation 
contains clear and objective prerequisites/criteria/st andards, on the basis of which GSP+ beneficiaries 
are to be selected.  Thirdly, the current GSP regulation provides an explicit mechanism for the 
removal of the GSP+ benefits, if the relevant c onditions and requirements are no longer being met.  
For all of these reasons, the new GSP+ system is in full conformity with the rulings and 
interpretations of the Appellate B ody in the GSP case brought by India. 
  As indicated above, vulnerable developing co untries which by their own volition assume 
special burdens and responsibilities due to the ra tification and effective implementation of core 
international conventions on human  and labour rights, environmental protection and good governance 
should benefit from additional tariff preferences.  These preferences promote further economic growth 
and thereby respond positively to the internationally  recognised need for sustainable development. 
  WT/COMTD/57/Add.5 
 Page 7 
 
 
  Question 5: Can the EC confirm that applications  from potential beneficiaries were in fact 
received as required under Article 10.1(a) of the EC Regulation, and whether the requirements 
of Article 10.1(b) were in fact met, in light of the fact that paragraph 3 of the EC notification 
WT/COMTD/N/4/Add.3 dated 29 March 2006 mentions only findings from international organizations including the UN and ILO as the basis of grant of GSP plus benefits to the 
identified countries?  
Answer: Yes, we can confirm that the conditions under Article 10(1) (a) and (b) were met in full. 
 
Question 6: Is the criterion to determine "vulnerability" that is used under Article 9.3(a) and 
(b), i.e. the percentage of GSP-covered exports to the EC, based on any set criteria or 
classification developed by any development agencies?  
Answer: In formulating the relevant criteria the Eu ropean Communities considered the relevant 
practices of a number of international organisati ons including the World Bank and the United Nations 
in connection to developing countries and economic vul nerability.  In addition, the criteria used are 
clear, objective and fully transparent.   
Question 7: What is the basis, under the WT O Agreement or other multilaterally agreement 
or set of criteria, for the use of the percentage of GSP-covered exports to establish the vulnerability of beneficiary countries? 
 Answer: We refer you to our previous response. 
 
Question 8: Can the EC confirm whether all of  its Members have ratified and effectively 
implemented all of the conventions that it has set out in Part A of Annex II of its GSP 
Regulation? 
 
Answer: What is at issue here are the tariff preferences granted to developing countries. 
Therefore, we do not see the relevance of this question to the current discussion. 
 
* * * 
 
Questions by Pakistan (WT/COMTD/57/Add.4)
 
 
Question 1:  The 'Special Incentive Arrangement for sustainable development and good 
governance' under the European Union's new Genera lized Scheme of tariff Preferences to run 
through 1 January 2006 – 31 December 2008, requi res that developing countries must ratify 
conventions in the field of human rights;  labo ur rights;  sustainable development and good 
governance in order to qualify for additional p references.  There is consequently no nexus 
between the 'economic advantages' accorded and the 'economic problems' faced by the 
recipients.  Rather the beneficiaries are required to assume legally binding commitments in the 
form of ratifying 27 conventions.  Would the EC  please clarify if this scheme is responding to 
'development needs' or imposing 'policy choices' on beneficiary countries?    
Answer: The EC does not agree with the statements of  Pakistan regarding the alleged lack of 
nexus or imposition of policy choices.  The new EC  GSP scheme fully complies with the stipulations 
of the Enabling Clause as interpreted by the WTO Appellate Body in the GSP case brought by India. 
 
 The EC wishes to stress that the special in centive arrangement for sustainable development 
and good governance is premised on an integral and universally accepted concept of sustainable 
development as recognised by international orga nisations and found in several international 
instruments and conventions.  WT/COMTD/57/Add.5 
Page 8  
 
   
 Vulnerable developing countries which by their own volition assume special burdens and 
responsibilities due to the ratification and effective implementation of core in ternational conventions 
on human and labour rights, environmental prot ection and good governance should benefit from 
additional tariff preferences. These preferences are designed to promote further economic growth and 
thereby to respond positively to the internationall y recognised need for sustainable development. 
 
Question 2:  The Appellate Body Report in paragraph 145 in the EC – Tariff Preferences  case 
stated that the GSP preferences must be "non-rec iprocal".  With respect to the special incentive 
scheme for sustainable development and good gov ernance, is the grant of preferences in return 
for the commitment to adhere to a set of treaties "non-reciprocal" within the meaning of the 
Enabling Clause?  Are GSP preferences not tempor ary privileges that may be withdrawn at any 
time?  Did the drafters of the 'Enabling Clause', have the objective of the exchange of these preferences against treaty obligations?  
 Answer: As indicated in our reply to question no 1, the special incentive arrangement for 
sustainable development and good governance aims at responding pos itively to special burdens and 
responsibilities assumed by vulnerable developing countries through the ratification and effective 
implementation of core conventi ons on human and labour rights, e nvironmental protection and good 
governance.  Vulnerable developing countries which have assumed these burdens should benefit from 
this special arrangement.  
 
 The EC wishes to state categorically that its  GSP preferences including the special incentive 
arrangement are non-reciprocal in line with the En abling Clause and the WTO rules.  Also, the EC 
wishes to state that according to the new GSP Re gulation and in line with the Enabling Clause as 
interpreted by the WTO Appellate Body in the GSP case brought by India, the preferential 
arrangements provided in the GSP Regulation may be  temporarily withdrawn in respect of products 
originating in a beneficiary country that does not fulfil the relevant criteria.  As stated in the GSP Regulation, the reasons for temporary withdrawal in clude serious and systematic violations of the 
principles laid down in the relevant conventions listed in Annex III so as to ensure that no beneficiary 
receives unfair advantage through c ontinuous violation of those conven tions.  For further information, 
the EC wishes to refer Pakistan to Article 16 of the GSP Regulation.  Question 3: Article 9 paragraph 3(b), Special Incentive Arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, states that a vulnerable country is one whose GSP-covered 
imports to the Community represent less than 1 p er cent in value of total GSP-covered imports 
to the Community.  A country may be a relatively high income country but fulfil the 
requirement of less than 1 per cent of the EC 's GSP imports and qualify while, a low-income 
country, but with 1.1 per cent of GSP covered expo rts to EC fails to qualify.  We would like EC 
to explain if this is an objective criterion? 
 
Answer: In relation to this question, the EC wishes to refer Pakistan to Article 3 of the GSP 
Regulation which provides that a beneficiary coun try shall be removed from the scheme when it has 
been classified by the World Bank as a high-income country.  Further, the EC wishes also to refer 
Pakistan to Article 9, paragraph 9(a) of the GSP Regulation which provides that  a vulnerable country 
is one that is not classified by the World Bank as a high-income country during three consecutive years.  Question 4: According to Article 9, the benefi ts under the Special Incentive Arrangement for 
sustainable development and good governance are confined to those that have ratified 14 of the specified 16 conventions in Annex III-A, and put them into effective implementation by 
31 October 2005.  If a developing country were to  subsequently ratify all of these conventions 
and effectively implement them such country would still not qualify for additional benefits  WT/COMTD/57/Add.5 
 Page 9 
 
 
  under the Arrangement.  This means that the list of beneficiary countries is limited only to those 
that ratify and effectively implement the necessa ry conventions.  In EC – Tariff Preferences, 
case the Appellate Body (paragraph 188) noted a similar feature of the Drug Arrangements, and 
stated that "such a 'closed list' of beneficiaries cannot ensure that the preferences under the Drug Arrangements are available to all GSP benefi ciaries suffering from illicit drug production 
and trafficking".  Would the EC please comment?     
Answer: According to Article 9 of the GSP Regulati on, the special incentive arrangement for 
sustainable development and good governance may be granted to vulnerable countries that have 
ratified and effectively implemented the conventions  listed in Part A of Annex III and have ratified 
and effectively implemented at least seven of th e conventions listed in Part B of Annex III.  
Consequently, the new GSP scheme is fully transparent premised on clear and objective 
prerequisites/criteria and mechanisms.   Further the revised GSP scheme is designed to be simpler and more stable providing 
predictability for importers and exporters.  Ho wever, as provided in Article 28.3 of the GSP 
Regulation, the GSP Committee shall examine the e ffects of the current scheme, on the basis of a 
report from the Commission covering the period from 1 January 2006.  This report shall cover all 
preferential arrangements including the special a rrangement for sustainable development and good 
governance and will be presented in time for discu ssion on the second GSP implementing Regulation. 
 
Question 5: With regard to Special Incentive Arrangement for sustainable development and 
good governance, why was a deadline of only a few months, given to applicant countries to ratify the outstanding treaties figuring in Part A of the Annex III?  If the EC had the genuine 
desire to assist countries achieve good govern ance and sustainable development, more time 
would have been given to other countries to me et those requirements.  This is particularly 
important in view of the serious impact that rati fication of some of the treaties would have had 
on the societies of the ratifying countries.   
 
Answer: The EC refers Pakistan to its reply to the previous question. 
 
Question 6: With respect to the requirement of Article 9 paragraph 1(a) of the special 
incentive arrangement for sustainable developmen t and good governance, on the basis of what 
criteria has the EC selected the conventions liste d in the Annex III- A, for ratification and 
effective implementation?  In particular the Un ited Nations considers seven conventions to be 
core human rights conventions, why has the EC in cluded the first six, but not the seventh core 
convention, namely convention on the Protect ion of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families? 
 
Answer: As referred above, the GSP special incentiv e arrangement responds positively to special 
burdens assumed by vulnerable developing co untries through the ratification and effective 
implementation of conventi ons covering, among others, fundamental  human rights.  The protection of 
internationally accepted fundamental human and labour rights is considered as an integral part of 
sustainable development and is a priority for the international community.  
  The special incentive arrangement’s approach  reflects this priority and the shared 
commitment to protect universally accepted f undamental human rights and common standards 
enshrined in conventions widely ratified and en dowed with strong and functioning reporting and 
monitoring mechanisms. 
 
__________