WT/DS617/3  
 
6 September 2023  
(23-5951) Page: 1/5 
  Original: English  
 
UNITED STATES  – ANTI -DUMPING MEASURE ON OIL COUNTRY TUBULAR GOODS  
FROM  ARGENTINA  
REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL  BY ARGENTINA  
The following communication, dated 1 September 2023 , from the delegation of Argentina  to the 
Chairperson of the Dispute Settlement Body, is circulated pursuant to Article 6.2 of the DSU.  
 
_______________  
 
 
On 19 May 2023, the Government of the Republic of Argentina ("Argentina") requested consultations 
with the United States of America ("U nited States") pursuant to Articles 1 and 4 of the Understanding 
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), Articles 17.2 and 17.3 of the 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
("Anti -Dumping Agreement"), and Article XXIII:1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
1994 (GATT 1994), concerning the final anti -dumping ("AD") measure imposed on oil country tubular 
goods ("OCTG") from Argentina as well as concerning certain prov isions of the United States' 
legislation regarding cumulation of imports in assessing injury caused by imports in AD and 
countervailing duty ("CVD") investigations.  
The consultations took place in Washington, D.C. on 6 July 2023 and failed to resolve the m atter.   
I.  Identification of the Measures  
The following measures appear to be inconsistent with the United States' obligations under certain 
provisions of the Anti -Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994.  
A.  The Definitive Anti -Dumping Measure on Oil Countr y Tubular Goods ("OCTG") from Argentina  
This request concerns the definitive AD measure imposed by the United States on OCTG from 
Argentina pursuant to the preliminary and final AD determinations issued by the U.S. Department 
of Commerce ("USDOC"), and the  United States International Trade Commission ("USITC"), and the 
resulting AD order issued by the USDOC, following AD investigations by the USDOC and the USITC 
on imports of OCTG from Argentina, Mexico, the Russian Federation and CVD investigations on 
imports of OCTG from Russia and South Korea.  The USDOC's AD order on OCTG from Argentina 
was published in the Federal Register  on 21 November 2022.1  The AD order imposes definitive AD 
duties on OCTG from Argentina based on USDOC's calculation of a final weighted -average AD margin 
of 78.30 percent for Siderca S.A.I.C. ("Siderca") and all other Argentine exporters of subject 
merchandise, with cash depo sits (pursuant to the USDOC preliminary and final AD determinations) 
effective starting from May 11, 2022. The definitive AD measure on OCTG from Argentina is based 
on a number of intermediary determinations that are equally part of this request such as in  
particular:  
• The USITC determination to commence the preliminary phase injury investigations, notice 
of which was published in the Federal Register on 13 October 2021. See Oil Country Tubular 
Goods From Argentina, Mexico, Russia, and South Korea: Institu tion of Anti -Dumping and 
 
1 Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, Mexico, and the Russian Federation: Antidumping  Duty 
Orders and Amended Final Affirmative Antidumping Duty Determination for the Russian Federation , 87 Federal 
Register 70,785 (November 21, 2022).  WT/DS617/3  
 
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  Countervailing Duty Investigations and Scheduling of Preliminary Phase Investigations , 86 
Federal Register 56,983 (Oct. 13, 2021).  
• The USDOC determination to initiate the investigation into alleged dumping. See Oil Country 
Tubula r Goods From Argentina, Mexico, and the Russian Federation: Initiation of Less -Than-
Fair-Value Investigations, 86 Federal Register 60,205 (Nov. 1, 2021).  
• The USITC's preliminary determination that there was a "reasonable indication that an 
industry in th e United States is materially injured by reason of imports of oil country tubular 
goods from Argentina, Mexico, Russia, and South Korea." See Oil Country Tubular Goods 
from Argentina, Mexico, Russia, and South Korea , 86 Federal Register 67,491 (Nov. 26, 
2021). 
• The USDOC's preliminary affirmative determination in the AD investigation of OCTG from 
Argentina. See Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina: Preliminary Affirmative 
Determinations of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Critical Circumstances, Postp onement 
of Final Determination, and Extension of Provisional Measures, 87 Federal Register 28,801 
(May 11, 2022).  
• The final affirmative less -than-fair-value ("LTFV") determination with respect to OCTG from 
Argentina issued by USDOC and published in the F ederal Register on September 29, 2022. 
See Oil Country Tubular Goods From Argentina: Final Affirmative Determination of Sales at 
Less Than Fair Value and Final Negative Determination of Critical Circumstances , 87 Federal 
Register 59,054 (September 29, 2022 ). 
• The USITC's consolidated views published in Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, 
Mexico, Russia, and South Korea , Inv. Nos. 701 -TA-671-672 and 731 -TA-1571-1573 (Final), 
USITC Pub. 5381 (November 2022) ("Views of the Commission").  
• The USITC's fi nal injury determination as published in the Federal Register  on November 18, 
2022. See Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, Mexico, Russia, and South Korea , Inv. 
Nos. 701 -TA-671-672 and 731 -TA-1571-1573 (Final), 87 Federal Register 69,331 (Nov. 18, 
2022).  
This panel request relates to the definitive AD measure on OCTG from Argentina and further includes 
any notices, annexes, decision memoranda, orders, amendments, or other instruments issued by 
the United States in connection with that measure.  
B.  Section 771(7)(G) of the United States Tariff Act of 1930  
This request also concerns on an "as such" basis Section 771(7)(G) of the United States Tariff Act 
of 1930, codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(G), which is the U.S. statutory provision covering 
cumulatio n for determining material injury. In particular, 19 USC § 1677(7)(G) provides that the 
USITC shall cumulatively assess the volume and effect of the subject merchandise from all countries 
with respect to which: (a) petitions seeking imposition of either an  AD or a CVD were filed on the 
same day, (b) AD or CVD investigations were initiated on the same day; or (c) when both (a) and 
(b) are satisfied. As a result, the USITC is required to cross -cumulate the effect of imports even 
when such imports are not simu ltaneously subject to an AD investigation or a CVD investigation.  
This panel request relates to all the amendments, replacements, implementing acts or any other 
related measure in connection with the legal provision referred herein.  
II.  Legal Basis  
Argent ina is concerned that the above -identified measures appear to violate the United States' 
obligations under the AD Agreement and the GATT 1994 as described below.  
A.  The Anti -Dumping Measure on OCTG from Argentina  
The United States' AD measure on OCTG from  Argentina appears to be inconsistent with a number 
of provisions of the AD Agreement and the GATT 1994.   WT/DS617/3  
 
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  Argentina's panel request concerns the application for the antidumping investigation and the related 
decision of the USDOC to initiate the antidumpin g investigation.   
Argentina's request also concerns several aspects of the injury determination of the USITC such as 
in particular the cumulation of imports for purposes of the injury analysis, the examination of the 
volume and price effects of the dumped  imports, the overall impact of the dumped imports on the 
state of the domestic industry, and the causal link between the alleged dumped imports and the 
injury found to exist.  
The measure appears to be inconsistent with the following provisions of the AD A greement and the 
GATT 1994, such as:  
Initiation  
1. Articles 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, and 6.6 of the AD Agreement because the USDOC failed to 
properly examine the evidence on the record and to determine, based on the evidence on 
the record, that there was suffic ient evidence to justify initiation of the investigation and 
that the application had the degree of support necessary to be considered to have been 
made by or on behalf of the domestic industry.  
Cumulation  
2. Articles 3.1 and 3.3 of the AD Agreement becaus e the USITC cumulated imports from 
Argentina with those from sources that were not simultaneously subject to an AD 
investigation.  
3. Articles 3.1 and 3.3 of the AD Agreement because the USITC cumulated imports from 
Argentina with imports from Mexico, Russi a, and South Korea without properly examining 
whether the conditions of competition with respect to imports from Argentina justified their 
cumulation with imports from other sources.  
4. Articles 3.1 and 3.3 of the AD Agreement because the USITC cumulated i mports from 
Argentina with imports from Korea even though imports from Korea were already subject to 
AD duties that had been imposed in 2014 such that any impact of these imports was 
addressed and remedied already.  
Volume of imports and price effects  
5. Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement because the USITC's examination of volume and 
price effects of dumped imports is based on an examination that includes imports that are 
not subject to a simultaneous AD investigation, such as imports from Korea, whi ch were only 
subject to a simultaneous CVD investigation.  
6. Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement because the USITC failed to undertake an objective 
examination based on positive evidence regarding the conditions of competition that had a 
substantial impact on demand and supply considerations in the OCTG market in evaluating 
the import volumes.  
7. Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement because the USITC failed to undertake an objective 
examination based on positive evidence of the volume of imports i n light of constraints on 
import volumes, such as the application of Section 232 quota measures on imports of OCTG 
from Argentina, during the period of investigation.  
8. Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement because the USITC's determination regarding 
purported underselling fails to objectively examine and take into account the implications of 
price adjustment mechanisms in Tenaris' long term contracts.  
9. Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement because the USITC's determination regarding 
purported pric e effects (including purported lost sales and lost revenue) was not based on 
an objective examination of positive evidence since it was based on information that was 
demonstrated to be inaccurate or otherwise lacking in probative value.  WT/DS617/3  
 
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  10. Articles 3.1 an d 3.2 of the AD Agreement because the USITC failed to make any 
determination regarding whether subject imports prevented prices for the domestic like 
product from increasing.  
11. Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement because the USITC's determination re garding 
purported price effects of subject imports failed to take into account Tenaris' use of a "one 
price" approach of selling its product at the same price regardless of the origin of the product.  
12. Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement because the USITC generally failed to make an 
objective examination based on positive evidence relating to the purported price effects of 
subject imports.  
Injury and Causation  
13. Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the AD Agreement because the USITC's final determina tion of injury 
considered both dumped imports and imports not subject to a simultaneous AD investigation 
while examining the impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry, and thus including 
in the analysis the impact of imports from Korea which were o nly subject to a simultaneous 
CVD investigation.  
14. Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the AD Agreement because the USITC generally failed to undertake 
an objective examination of the record evidence and make a determination based on positive 
evidence relating to it s evaluation of all of the relevant economic factors and indices on the 
record having a bearing on the state of the industry.  
15. Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the AD Agreement because the USITC failed to undertake an objective 
examination of the record evidence  which showed that any lost sales or lost revenues were 
due to non -price factors and not due to the purported price -effects of subject imports.  
16. Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement because the USITC's final determination of 
causation included the i mpact of both dumped imports and imports not subject to a 
simultaneous AD investigation as a result of the cumulation with imports from Korea which 
were only subject to a simultaneous CVD investigation.  
17. Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement because of the USITC's failure to demonstrate that 
subject imports are causing the alleged injury to the domestic industry.  
18. Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement because of the USITC's failure to ensure that injury 
caused by known other factors was not attr ibuted to the dumped imports in light of the 
evidence on the record. In particular:  
a. because the USITC failed to undertake an objective examination of the record 
evidence which showed that any lost sales or lost revenues were due to non -price 
factors and  not due to the purported price -effects of subject imports;  
b. because the USITC erroneously attributed the positive performance of the domestic 
industry in the first half of 2022 to the effects of the filing of the petitions, rather 
than to the conditions  of competition and prevailing OCTG market forces; and  
c. because the USITC failed to undertake an "objective examination" of the record 
evidence of the relevant economic factors that were injuring the domestic industry 
other than dumped imports, and faile d to base its determination on "positive 
evidence" related to (1) the impact of alleged underselling, and (2) other known 
factors such as the global oil and gas supply dynamic, the COVID -19 pandemic, 
intra-domestic industry competition stemming from Tenari s' role as the largest U.S. 
OCTG producer and its unique business operations and pricing policy that differed 
from the business models of U.S. producers, the U.S. distributors' inventory buildup, 
and supply constraints, including labor shortages and the pr icing of hot -rolled coil, 
the primary input for welded OCTG.  WT/DS617/3  
 
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  General  
19. Articles 1 and 18.1 of the AD Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994 because the United 
States imposed the AD measure on OCTG from Argentina in apparent violation of the 
provisions  of the AD Agreement identified above.  
B.  Section 771(7)(G) of the United States Tariff Act of 1930  
Section 771(7)(G) of the United States Tariff Act of 1930 is the U.S. statutory provision covering 
cumulation when determining material injury that is codi fied at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(G). Section 
1677(7)(G) requires the USITC (1) to cumulatively assess the effects of dumped imports with the 
effects of imports not subject to a simultaneous AD investigation when such imports are subject only 
to CVD investigatio ns and not to simultaneous AD investigations, or (2) to cumulatively assess the 
effects of subsidized imports with the effects of imports not subject to a simultaneous CVD 
investigation when such imports are subject only to AD investigations and not to sim ultaneous CVD 
investigations.  
By requiring such cross -cumulation in certain situations, Section 1677(7)(G) results in the inclusion 
of non -dumped imports or non -subsidized imports (as the case may be) in the assessment of (i) the 
increase in volume of dumped or subsidized imports (as the case may be) as well as their effect on 
domestic prices, (ii) the impact of dumped or subsidized imports (as the case may be) on the 
domestic industry, and (iii) the causal link between dumped or subsidized imports (as the case may 
be) and injury.  
Argentina considers that Section 771 (7) (G) of the United States Tariff Act of 1930 appears to be 
inconsistent as such with  
1. Article 3.3 of the AD Agreement because it requires in certain situations the cumulation of 
import s from sources that are not subject to a simultaneous AD investigation.  
2. Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the AD Agreement because it requires in certain situations the 
inclusion of imports not subject to a simultaneous AD investigation in the context of an 
exami nation of volume and price effects.  
3. Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the AD Agreement because it requires in certain situations the 
inclusion of imports not subject to a simultaneous AD investigation in the examination of the 
impact of dumped imports on the stat e of the industry.  
4. Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement because it requires in certain situations the 
inclusion of imports that are not subject to a simultaneous AD investigation in the 
determination of the existence of a causal link between dumped imports and the injury found 
to exist.  
III.  Conclusion  
Argentina is concerned that the AD measure on OCTG from Argentina, as well as Section 771(7)(G) 
of the United States Tariff Act of 1930, appear to be inconsistent with the relevant obligations of the 
United States under the AD Agreement, and the GATT 1994.  
The United States' measures appear to nullify or impair the benefits accruing to Argentina directly 
or indirectly under the cited agreements.  
For the reasons set forth above, Argentina respectfully requests that a panel be established, 
pursuant to Article 4.7 and Article 6.2 of the DSU, Article XXIII of the GATT and Article 17.4 of the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement by the Dispute Settlement Body, with standard terms of reference as set 
forth in Article 7.1 of the DSU to examine this matter.  
Argentina asks that this request be placed on the agenda for the meeting of the Dispute Settlement 
Body to be held on 19 September 2023.  
__________