RESTRICTED  
  
WT/DSB/M/422  
 
3 April 2019 
(19-1966) Page: 1/9 
Dispute Settlement Body  
4 December 2018   
 
MINUTES OF MEETING  
HELD IN THE CENTRE W ILLIAM RAPPARD  
ON 4 DECEMBER  2018 
Chairperson: Ms. Sunanta Kangvalkulkij (Thailand)  
Table of Contents  
1   UNITED  STATES – CERTAIN MEASURES ON STEEL AND ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS  .........  1 
A.  Request for the establishment of a panel by India  ................................ ..............................  1 
2   UNITED  STATES  – CERTAIN MEASURES ON STEEL AND ALUMINI UM PRODUCTS  .........  2 
A.  Request for the establishment of a panel by Switzerland  ................................ .....................  2 
3   COSTA  RICA – MEASURES  CONCERNING THE IMPO RTATION OF FRESH AVO CADOS 
FROM MEXICO  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................  4 
A.  Request for the establishment of a panel by Mexico  ................................ ............................  4 
4   RUSSIAN  FEDERATION – ADDITI ONAL DUTIES ON CERTA IN PRODUCTS FROM THE  
UNITED  STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...............  4 
A.  Request for the establishment of a panel by the United  States  ................................ .............  4 
5   SAUDI  ARABIA – MEASURES C ONCERNING THE PROTEC TION OF INTELLECTUAL  
PROPERTY RIGHTS  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........  6 
A.  Request  for the establis hment of a panel by Qatar  ................................ .............................  6 
 
1  UNITED  STATES  – CERTAIN MEASURES ON STEEL AND ALUMINI UM PRODUCTS  
A.  Request for the establishment of a panel by India  (WT/DS54 7/8) 
1.1.  The Chairperson  recall ed that the DSB had considered this matter at its meeting on 
21 November 2018, and had agreed to revert to it. She then drew attention to the communication 
from India contained in document WT/DS547/8, and invite d the representative of Ind ia to speak.  
1.2.  The representative of India said that a t the 21 November 2018  DSB meeting , India had 
requested the establishment of a panel in this dispute regarding the US additional tariffs on certain 
steel and aluminium products of 25% and 10% respectively . At that DSB meeting, India had outlined 
some important points related to the dispute, which it would  not repeat at the present meeting . It 
was, however, India 's firm view that the US additional tariffs were inconsistent with US WTO 
obligations under the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards. India wished to refer to its 
statement made at the  21 November 2018 DSB meeting in respect of  the same Agenda item . She  
confirm ed that such statement  remain ed fully valid for the purpose s of the present meeting . She 
said that India note d that seven panels had been  established at the  21 November 2018 DSB meeting  
in relation to the same US measures and based on virtually identical legal claims. This collective 
resort to dispute settlement r eflect ed the serious concern of the Membership over US actions. It also WT/DSB/M/422  
 
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  reflect ed trust and confidence in the WTO as a forum for resolving international trade disputes.  India 
request ed the DSB, for the second time, to establish a panel to examine the matte r with standard 
terms of reference, as set forth in Article 7.1 of the DSU. As stated during the 21 November 2018 
DSB meeting , India  believed  that a single panel should be established under Article 9.1 of the DSU 
to examine the nine complaints in the "Unit ed States – Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium 
Products" disputes with China (DS544), India (DS547), the EU (DS548), Canada (DS550), Mexico 
(DS551), Norway (DS552), the Russian Federation (DS554), Switzerland (DS556) and Turkey 
(DS564), as all nine pa nel requests were related to the same matter.  India believed that i t would be 
appropriate to establish a single panel to examine these disputes, in particular  given the 
complainants ' willingness to coordinate and proceed in this manner. The plain reading of Article 9.1 
of the DSU provide d that a single panel shall be established, whenever feasible, for the examination 
of multiple complaints related to the same matter. These circumstan ces were met and , therefore , 
there was no valid reason to ignore the clear text of Article 9.1  of the DSU . 
1.3.  The representative of the United States  said that the United States  regret ted that India ha d 
moved forward with this second request for the establish ment of a panel.  As explained in its 
statement addressing  India's first panel request  at the 21 November 2018 DSB meeting , because 
the United States ha d invoked Article XXI of the GATT 1994, there was no basis for a panel to review 
India's claims of WTO -inconsistency. There was no finding a panel could make other than to note 
that the United States ha d invoked Article XXI.  If the WTO were to undertake to review an invocation 
of Article XXI, this would undermine the legitimacy of the WTO 's dispute settlement  system and 
even the vi ability of the WTO as a whole. The text of Article XXI was clear: each WTO Member ha d 
the right to determin e, for itself, what it considered was  in its own essential security interests. This 
had been the understanding of the United S tates for over 70 years, since the negotiation of the 
GATT . And that understanding ha d been shared by every WTO Member whose national security 
action was subject of complaint, including several WTO Members speaking at the  21 November 2018 
DSB meeting , such  as the E U, Canada, Russia, and others. India ha d requested that a single panel 
be established under Article 9.1 of the DSU to examine various matters on the Agenda of the present  
meeting, as well as the Agenda of the last DSB meeting of 21 November 2018 . The United  States 
did not agree.  For a single panel to be established to examine multiple complaints, the DSB must 
decide  to establish a single panel.  This would be  a decision t aken by the DSB by consensus. Because 
the challenged actions had been taken on the basis of US national security interests, the United 
States continued to see no basis for this dispute. Therefore, the United States did not agree to 
establish a single panel under Article 9.1.  
1.4.  The representative  of Brazil  said that his delegation wished to refer to its statements made at 
previous DSB meetings on this matter  for the purposes of this Agenda item and the next Agenda 
item. 
1.5.  The DSB took note of the statements and agree d to establish a panel in accordance with the 
provisions  of Article  6 of the DSU , with standard terms of reference.  
1.6.  The representatives  of the Kingdom of Bahrain , Brazil , Canada , China , Colombia , the 
European  Union , Hong Kong, China ; Iceland , Indonesia , Japan, Kazakhstan , Malaysia , Mexico , 
New Zealand , Norway , Qatar , the Russian Federation , the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia , Singapore , 
Switzerland , Chinese Taipei , Thailand , Turkey , Ukraine  and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela  
reserved their third -party rights to participate in the Panel's proceedings .  
2  UNITED  STATES  – CERTAIN MEASURES ON STEEL AND ALUMINI UM PRODUCTS  
A.  Request for the establishment of a panel by Switzerland  (WT/DS5 56/15) 
2.1.  The Chairperson  recall ed that the DSB had considered this matter at its meeting on 
21 November 2018, and had agreed to revert to it. She then drew attention to the communication 
from Switzerland contained in document  WT/DS556/15, and invite d the representative of 
Switzerland to speak.  
2.2.  The represen tative of Switzerland  said that his delegation wished to  refer to its statement made 
at the 21 November 2018  DSB meeting on this matter . Switzerland, like the other eight complainants 
in the disputes related to the same matter , firmly believe d that the add itional duties imposed by the 
United States on certain steel and aluminium products were inconsistent with US  obligations under WT/DSB/M/422  
 
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  the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards. The United States ha d argued that because it 
was invoking Article XXI of the GATT  1994, an examination of the complaints by a panel would have 
no basis. Switzerland disagreed with the US  position and consider ed that the mere invocation of 
Article XXI of the GATT 1994 d id not in any way limit the jurisdiction of panels. On the contrary,  it 
was appropriate and even essential that an invocation of  Article XXI of the GATT 1994 as a defence 
be examined within the framework of the WTO dispute settlement system. If such an examination 
were not possible, each WTO Member could unilaterally – merely by invoking Article  XXI of the GATT 
1994 – exclude from WTO dispute settlement measures that were nevertheless trade -related. Such 
an interpretation would undermine the multilateral rules -based system as a whole, to the detriment 
of all Members. He said that as his delegation  had stated at previous DSB meetings , solutions to the 
global problem of overcapacity in the steel and aluminium sectors  had to  be consistent with the spirit 
and letter of the WTO Agreements. Therefore, Switzerland request ed, for the second time, the 
establishment of a panel with standard te rms of reference. Switzerland note d that, at the 
21 November 2018 DSB meeting , the United States had refused to agree to the establishment of a 
single panel under Article 9.1 of the DSU to examine the nine complaints relating to the same matter . 
Switzerlan d believe d that the conditions for the application of Article 9.1 of the DSU ha d been met, 
and regret ted the US refusal. In any event, Switzerland  assume d that the panel established to 
examine its complaint w ould be composed  of the same individuals  like in  the case of the other panels 
established at the 21 November 2018 DSB meeting and at the present meeting  in the related 
disputes . Switzerland also assumed  that the timetable for the panel proce edings  would be 
harmonized, as provided for in Article 9.3 of t he DSU.  
2.3.  The representative of the United States  said that t he United States was disappointed that 
Switzerland ha d submitted a second panel request in this dispute.  As the United States  had explained 
in its statement addressing Switzerland 's first panel request  at the 21 November 2018 DSB meeting , 
because the United States ha d invoked Article XXI  of the GATT  1994, there was no basis for a panel 
to review Switzerland 's claims of WTO -inconsistency. As there was no finding a panel could make 
other than to no te that the United States had invoked Article XXI, the United States did not see any 
point to this request. I f the WTO were to undertake to review a Member 's invocation of Article XXI, 
and its assessment of its own essential security interests, this would undermine the legitimacy of 
the WTO 's dispute settlement system and even the viability of the WTO as a whole. The text of 
Article XXI was clear: each WTO Member ha d the right to determine, for itself, what it consider ed 
was in its own essential security in terests. This ha d been the understanding of the United States for 
over 70 years, since the negotiation of the GATT. And that understanding ha d been shared by every 
WTO Member whose national security action had been  subject of complaint, including several W TO 
Members who spoke at the last DSB meeting of 21 November 2018 , such as the EU, Canada, Russia, 
and others. In response to Switzerland’s reference to Article 9.3  of the DSU , that provision d id not 
contain any reference to DSB action and , therefore , did not authorize the DSB to take a decision on 
the matter of choosing panelists or on the harmonization of timetables. Therefore, the DSB need ed 
not and c ould not consider this issue at all . 
2.4.  The representative of  the European Union  said that at the 21 November  2018 DSB meeting, 
the DSB  had considered seven panel requests similar to the ones brought at the present meeting  by 
India and Switzerland. The EU , therefore , wished to make only a few points in relation to those  panel 
requests before the DSB at the presen t meeting . For the sake of efficiency, the EU would make only 
one statement in relation to both panel requests at this point. T he EU first wished to welcome India 
and Switzerland as part of the coalition of complainants for which the DSB  had established pa nels 
related to the same matter . The EU also did not see the need to repeat the statements which it had 
made in relation to its own related  panel request at the 21 November 2018 DSB meeting . This was 
even more so since the United States, the respondent in all these  disputes, had not truly sa id 
anything new either at the 21 November 2018 DSB meeting  or at the present meeting . This reflect ed 
positively on these disputes being ready for adjudication by the dispute settlement system. The EU 
looked forward to engaging in that process  and to the examination of the merits of the US 
arguments , inter alia regarding the justifiability and conditi ons of Article XXI of the GATT.  At the 
21 November 2018 DSB meeting , the DSB had  failed to expressly establish  a single panel, contrary 
to the last sentence of Article 9.1  of the DSU  whereby "a single panel should be established to 
examine [multiple] complaints [related to the same matter] whenever feasible ". This mean t that 
Article 9.3 of the DSU applie d by defau lt and automatically, and this was a "shall" provision not even 
addressed to the DSB, but self -executing and directly applicable.  Accordingly,  the same persons had 
to serve as panelists  and the timetable had to  be harmoni zed to the greatest extent possible . The 
EU count ed on the WTO Secretariat to fully implement this provision. Obviously, the two complaints WT/DSB/M/422  
 
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  brought by India and Switzerland at the present meeting also relate d to the same matter as d id the 
seven complaints for which the DSB had established p anels at the  21 November 2018  DSB meeting . 
2.5.  The DSB took note of the statements and agree d to establish a panel in accordance with the 
provisions of Article  6 of the DSU , with standard terms of reference.  
2.6.  The representatives of  the Kingdom of Bahrain , Brazil , Canada , China , Colombia , the 
European  Union , Hong Kong, China ; Iceland , India, Indonesia , Japan , Kazakhstan , Malaysia , Mexico , 
New Zealand , Norway , Qatar , the Russian Federation , the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia , Singapore , 
South Africa , Chinese Taipei , Thailand , Turkey , Ukraine  and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela  
reserved their third -party rights to participate in the Panel's proceedings . 
3  COSTA  RICA – MEASURES  CONCERNING THE IMPO RTATION OF FRESH AVO CADOS 
FROM MEXICO  
A.  Request for the establishme nt of a panel by Mexico  (WT/DS52 4/2) 
3.1.  The Chairperson  drew attention to the communication from Mexico contained in document 
WT/DS524/2, and invite d the representative of Mexico to speak.  
3.2.  The representative of Mexico  said that her delegation welcome d the opportunity at the present 
meeting to address the concerns raised by the measures adopted by Costa Rica on the importation 
of fresh avocados for consumption from Mexico. Mexico had held consultations with Costa Rica on 
26 and 27 April 2017 in order to  find a solution regarding the impact of the Costa Rican measures 
that restrict ed or prohibit ed the importation of fresh avocados for consumption from Mexico . These 
Costa Rican measures includ ed certain control, inspection and approval procedures . They als o 
included  the failure by Costa Rica to implement or recognize in its legal instruments certain 
obligations laid down in the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS Agreement) . Such obligations under the SPS Agreement inclu ded among others adaptation to 
regional conditions , including  in respect of  pest- or disease -free areas and areas of low pest or 
disease prevalence . Costa Rica  had failed to establish processes or practices that would ensure  the 
recognition  of such areas, and thus to render operational the concept of regionalization. 
Unfortunately, the consultations had failed to resolve th is dispute. Mexico believe d that the measures 
adopted by Costa Rica were inconsistent with that country's obligations under the SPS Agre ement 
and the GATT 1994 . Since Costa Rica h ad failed to resolve Mexico' s concerns during the  
consultations, Mexico  had no alternative but to request, at the present  meeting, the establishment 
of a panel with standard terms of reference  provided for in Article  7.1 of the DSU, to examine this 
matter and to clarify the issues raised.  
3.3.  The representative of Costa Rica  said that his country  wishe d to express its disappointment 
regarding Mexico's decision to request the establishment of a pane l in this matter . Costa Rica and 
Mexico had held consultations on 26 and 27 April 2017. The consultations had been  productive in 
that they had enabled the parties to exchange their views on the measures at issue. Costa Rica was 
open to continue  this dialog ue with Mexico so that both parties c ould work towards a mutually 
satisfactory solution without the need  to resort to dispute settlement proceedings. For these reasons , 
his country  was not in a position to accept the establishment of a panel at th e present  meeting.  
3.4.  The DSB took note of the statements and agree d to revert to this matter.  
4  RUSSIAN  FEDERATION – ADDITI ONAL DUTIES ON CERTA IN PRODUCTS FROM THE  
UNITED  STATES  
A.  Request for the establishment of a panel by the United  States  (WT/DS5 66/2) 
4.1.  The Chairperson  drew attention to the communication from  the United  States contained in 
document WT/DS566/2, and invite d the representative of the United  States to speak.  
4.2.  The representative of the United States  said that s everal WTO Members were unilaterally 
retaliating against the United States for actions it ha d taken pursuant to Section 232 that, as national 
security actions, were fully justified under Article XXI of the GATT 1994.  These Members, including 
Russia, were pretending that the US actions under S ection 232 were so-called "safeguards ", and WT/DSB/M/422  
 
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  further pretend ed that their unilateral, retaliatory duties constitute d suspension of substantially 
equivalent concessions under the WTO Agreement on Safeguards.  Just as these Members appear ed 
ready to undermine the dispute settlement system by throwing out the plain meaning of Article XXI 
and 70 years of practice, so too were they ready to undermine the WTO by pretending they were 
following WTO rules while taking measures blatantly against those rules.  The United  States  knew 
from the actions of many of these Members that they did not seriously believe that the US security 
measures under Section 232 were safeguards. Russia, for example, ha d not addressed whether its 
action was in response to an alleged "safeguard " taken as a result of an absolute increase in imports. 
If there had been  an absolute increase, the right to suspend substantially equivalent concessions 
under the Safeguard Agreement could  not be exercised for the first three years of the safeguard 
measure.  To be clear: Article XIX of the GATT 1994 could  be invoked by a Member to depart 
temporarily from its commitments in order to take emergency action with respect to increased 
imports. The United States, however, was not invoking Article XIX as a basis for its Section 232 
actions. Thus, Article XIX and the Safeguards Agreement were not relevant to the US actions under 
Section 232, and the United States ha d not utilized its domestic law on safeguards to take the actions 
under Section 232.  Because the United S tates was not invoking Article XIX, there was no basis for 
another Member to pretend that Article XIX should have been invoked and to use safeguards rules 
that were simply inapplicable.  The additional, retaliatory duties were nothing other than duties in 
excess of Russia 's WTO commitments and were applied only to the United States, contrary to 
Russia 's most -favoured -nation obligation. The United States w ould not permit its businesses, 
farmers, and workers to be targeted in this WTO -inconsistent way.  For the se reasons, the United 
States request ed that the DSB establish a panel to examine this matter with standard terms of 
reference.  
4.3.  The representative of the Russian Federation  said that her country  was disappointed by the 
decision of the United States to request the establishment of a panel with respect to Russia 's 
measures taken in accordance with Russian Government Resolution N 788 of 6 July 2018 "[o]n 
approval of rates of import duties with respect to certain goods originating from the United States 
of America ". That Resolution had been  adopted due to the applicatio n by the United States since 
23 March 2018 , of additional duties on certain steel and aluminium products originating , inter alia , 
from Russia. Russia believed  that the US duties were in essence safeguard measures. Their nature 
and the circumstances under which they were taken  left no doubt that these measures were in fact 
safeguards, irrespective of the way the United States characterize d them. By adopt ing Resolution 
No.788, Russia  had exercised its rights under Article 8 of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards to 
suspend the application of substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations under the 
GATT  1994 to trade with the United St ates. Russia believe d that its measures were fully justified 
and applied in accordance with WTO rules. Therefore, her country  was not in a position to agree to 
the establishment of a panel at the present meeting . 
4.4.  The representative of the  European Union  said that at the 21 November 2018 DSB meeting, 
the DSB  had considered  four panel requests of the United States that were similar to the one brought  
at the present meeting  against Russia. The EU had spoke n at the 21 November 2018 DSB meeting  
in relation to the panel request of the United States that related to the EU suspension of equivalent 
GATT obligations in response to the undeclared safeguard measures which the U nited States had 
taken  in support of its steel and aluminium industries. The EU welcome d the fact that Russia, like a 
number of other Members, had also resorted to its right to suspend equivalent obligatio ns vis -à-vis 
the United States.  The EU look ed forward to defending, before the panels, its right and the right of 
other Members to suspend equivalent obligations, and to defending the rules -based multilateral 
trading system.  
4.5.  The representative  of Brazil  referred to Brazil's  statements made at previous DSB meetings on 
this matter.  
4.6.  The DSB took note  of the statements and agree d to revert to this matter.  WT/DSB/M/422  
 
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  5  SAUDI  ARABIA – MEASURES C ONCERNING THE PROTEC TION OF INTELLECTUAL  
PROPERTY RIGHTS  
A.  Request  for the establishment of a panel by Qatar  (WT/DS5 67/3) 
5.1.  The Chairperson  drew attention to the communication from  Qatar contained in document 
WT/DS567/3, and invite d the representative of Qatar to speak.  
5.2.  The representative of Qatar  said that his delegation  had made statements at previous DSB 
meetings about the unlawful  measures imposed by Saudi Arabia that were aimed at the economic 
isolation of Qatar. Th ese measures violate d key pillars of WTO law, and impact ed the interests of 
other Members who trade d with Qatar.  Despite such disregard of international treaty commitments 
by Saudi Arabia and several of its neighbours , Qatar ha d persisted in seeking amicable solutions, 
and ha d called for rules -based adjudication at the WTO, and where applicable, by other international 
courts and tribunals. Continuing with those efforts, Qatar had sought consultations with Saudi Arabia 
regarding  this dispute on 1 October 2018. Indeed, since the start of Saudi Arabia 's attempts to 
economically isolate Qatar, Qatar ha d attempted to resolve the situation through dialogue and 
negotiation. Regrettably, and in line with its prior approach, Saudi Arabia h ad refused to engage in 
consultations  with Qatar . Regrettable, in the context of the WTO, t his violate d Saudi Arabia 's 
obligations  under the DSU. At the present meeting,  Qatar sought the  establishment of a panel to 
examine  Saudi Arabia 's failure to protect  intellectual property rights, including with respect to 
commercial -scale broadcast piracy that ha d been spreading throughout Saudi Arabia for more than 
one year. Not only ha d Saudi Arabia failed to protect the intellectual property rights affected by this  
broadcast piracy , it had, in fact, actively supported such piracy. The protection of intellectual 
property rights under the TRIPS Agreement was one of the key pillars of the single -undertaking set 
out in the covered agreements. The TRIPS Agreement guarant eed certain minimum levels of 
protection for various forms of intellectual property rights, and include d provisions on enforcement 
unique to an agreement aimed at protecting private rights. While the DSB ha d previously been 
notified of disputes regarding t he strength, scope and extent of protection of intellectual property 
rights, Qatar now face d an unprecedented situation where a WTO Member was not only failing to 
protect intellectual property rights, but was actively supporting and facilitating piracy of content that 
should be protected by copyrights. The present dispute was focused, in particular, on the piracy 
impacting beIN Corporation – a company registered under the laws of Qatar – and rights holders 
from around the world that license d their intellect ual property rights to beIN for Saudi Arabia and 
the Middle East and North Africa re gion, at great expense to beIN Corporation. beIN Corporation, 
along with its subsidiaries and affiliates, engage d in the business of broadcasting premium sports 
and enterta inment content. Soon after Saudi Arabia had severed diplomatic ties with Qatar and 
imposed measures targeting Qatar, a sophisticated broadcast pirate named "beoutQ " had begun to 
operate . beoutQ had taken beIN's copyrighted media content (along with beIN 's trademarks) without 
authorization, and had made it accessible on ten beoutQ sports channels, via the internet and 
satellite broadcasting, within the territory of Saudi Arabia and beyond. beoutQ set -top boxes, and 
subscriptions to the beoutQ pirate service , had been readily available throughout Saudi Arabia to 
those willing to enrich the pirates through the purchase of subscriptions at significant cost. In 
addition to the beoutQ channels, these devices provide d access to Internet Protocol Television 
("IPTV") applications which allowed beoutQ subscribers to view hundreds of proprietary television 
channels, and thousands of on -demand program mes, from around the world without the 
author ization of the rights holders. In sum, beoutQ was a sophisticated full -service commercial 
business, with a scale of operations that was possible only with extensive financial and technological 
resources, as well as support from the Saudi Government. Indeed, from the very beginning, there 
had been  indications that beoutQ had enjoye d support from the authorities in Saudi Arabia. beoutQ 
had openly advertised itself over Twitter, through the accounts of prominent Saudi nationals. 
Moreover, Saudi authorities across the country ha d organized public gatherings where the pirated 
content – including the FIFA 2018 World Cup – had been openly displayed and promoted. The 
representative of Qatar  said that beIN had made several unsuccessful attempts to seek remedies 
within Saudi Arabia 's domestic legal system. beIN 's efforts at obtaining the services of legal counsel 
in Saudi Arabia and to access the Saudi courts had been unsuccessful due to Saudi Arabia 's wider 
scheme of coercive economic measures against Qatar. Unable to access Saudi courts, beIN had also 
turned dir ectly to the Saudi Government for assistance. Despite multiple communications from beIN , 
which had set out extensive evidence of piracy by beoutQ and the involvement of prominent Saudi 
nationals, Saudi authorities had taken  no effective action against beou tQ. In particular, Saudi Arabia 
had violated its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement by, among other things, failing to provide 
for criminal procedures and penalties  in this dispute which  involv ed copyright piracy on a commercial WT/DSB/M/422  
 
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  scale. Saudi Arabia 's conduct raise d important concerns for many other Members, including those 
with businesses that ha d licensed their rights to beIN, as well as those with content creators whose 
rights were violated through the IPTV applications accessible on beoutQ set -top box es readily 
available in Saudi Arabia. To mention a few  examples, all FIFA 2018 World Cup  games , the National 
Football League 's 2018 Super Bowl, and numerous games of the English Premiere League ha d been 
pirated by beoutQ. And thousands of entertainment program mes owned by rights holders from 
around the world – and especially the United States and the E U – were available illegally and often 
for free on beoutQ set -top boxes. Saudi Arabia 's actions and omissions result ed in numerous gross 
violations of the TRIPS Agreement, and  cause d significant harm to Qatar and to other Members. 
Qatar request ed that  the DSB establish a panel to examine this matter , and encourage d other 
Members to join th is dispute as third parties.  
5.3.  The representative of  the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  said that his delegation regretted  that Qatar 
had requested a panel in this  matter which  had no legitimate connection to th e WTO or to compliance 
with WTO  rules.  Saudi Arabia wished to  reconfirm that it fully respect ed all obligations that appl ied 
under the WTO Agreements, including under the TRIPS Agreement. In this connection, Saudi Arabia 
diligently protect ed the legitimate rights of all owners of intellectual property that were properly 
registered in Saudi Arabia, and also t ook all possible action to protect against the infringement of 
intellectual property rights within its jurisdiction.  He regret ted that the following  obvious principle 
needed to be re -stated at the present meeting , namely,  that establishing and maintaining diplomatic 
relations between nation States was a fundamental exercise of State sovereignty, on which the W TO 
Agreements d id not and c ould not infringe. In this connection, his delegation wished to submit 
respectfully , for reference by all Members , that on 5 June 2017, Saudi Arabia had severed diplomatic 
relations with the complaining party in order to protect its essential security interests. Because 
rejecting formal State interaction was the defining element of severed diplomatic relations, the Sa udi 
Government w ould not engage with the complaining party in connection with the referenced matter.  
Furthermore, the Saudi G overnment consider ed that the severance  of diplomatic relations rendered  
impossible the conduct of any dispute settlement proce edings in this matter consistent with its 
essential security interests. As all Members kn ew, consistent with Article 73 of the TRIPS Agreement, 
nothing c ould require any government to engage in dispute settlement proce edings  in such 
circumstances of national s ecurity. Indeed, a panel ha d no power to make a finding in this matter, 
other than to recognize that Saudi Arabia ha d invoked Article 73 of the TRIPS Agreement.  In sum, 
his delegation wished to  submit strongly that the WTO was not, and c ould not be turned into, a 
venue to resolve national security disputes. Saudi Arabia simply w ould not engage in dispute 
settlement proce edings , or in any other international  interaction , with a party that it d id not 
recognize diplomatically due to an emergency in international relations, other than to assert its 
invocation of the national security exception under Article 73 of the TRIPS Agreement.  
5.4.  The representative of the Kingdom of B ahrain  said that his country  regret ted that this matter 
had been raised before the DSB. Bahrain did not believe that issues related to national security c ould 
be resolved within the WTO.  He noted that Saudi Arabia ha d invoked Article 73 of the 
TRIPS  Agreement . As such, there was no b asis for a panel to examine  the complainant 's claims.  
Therefore, Bahrain  support ed Saudi Arabia's re fusal to establish  a panel  in this dispute . 
5.5.  The representative of the  United States  said that a s the United States ha d observed  in prior 
DSB meetings, Members ha d understood, from the very beginning of the international trading 
system, that each WTO Member could  judge for itself what actions it consider ed necessary to protect 
its essential security interests. Similar to the points  that the United States had previously made at 
the present meeting  with respect to GATT Article XXI, it would undermine  the legitimacy of the 
WTO's dispute settlement system if a WTO panel were to undertake review of a Member 's invocation 
of Article 73  of the TRIPS Agreement and a Member 's assessment of its own essential security 
interests.  Issues of national security were inherently political in nature, and the text of Article 73, 
which parallel ed GATT 1994 Article XXI, establishe d that this provision was self-judging: every WTO 
Member ha d the right to determine, for itself, what was in its own essential security interests. To 
the extent that Saudi Arabia invoke d its essential security interests, there was no basis for a WTO 
panel to review the claims of WTO-inconsistency raised by Qatar. Nor was there any basis for a WTO 
panel to review an invocation of Article 73  of the TRIPS Agreement  by Saudi Arabia.  Under these 
circumstances, the United States consider ed the parties should resolve the issues raised in  this 
dispute outside the context of WTO dispute settlement.  WT/DSB/M/422  
 
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  5.6.  The representative  of Egypt  said that as  mentioned by Saudi Arabia, his country  wished to  
recall its indisputable right to take all measures deemed necessary for national security in line with 
Article XXI of the GATT 1994 and Article 73 of the TRIPS Agreement . This  constitute d an important 
element for safeguarding the rights of Saudi Araba in situations in which security reasons we re 
involved. Egypt wished  to reiterate that nothing in these Agreem ents oblige d a Member to provide 
information pertaining to its essential security interests to the WTO. In this regard, the issues raised 
in this dispute c ould no t be considered by t he WTO dispute settlement  system . 
5.7.  The representative  of Turkey  said that  Turkey's position on the application of security 
exceptions ha d been clear  and straightforward .  Members' actions or measures should always be 
consistent with WTO law. And security exceptions – and that' s exactly what they we re 
exceptions  - should not be applied out of context or in a way that w ould add pressure on to the 
multilateral trading system. His delegation  noted  with particular concern that an increasing number 
of Members would  base their actions on security exceptions. Turkey  believe d that this became even 
more relevant in light of the fact that Members  were looking  for ideas on how to preserve an d 
improve the multilateral trading system. Not only wa s this true for the future of the DSB but also 
for the future of the WTO. Turkey recognize d that n ational securi ty concerns of Members we re 
protected under Article XXI of the GATT  1994, allowing them to take measures that would otherwise 
be in breach o f their GATT  obligations. But his country also understood that the relevant WTO law 
allowed  except ions for extraordinary situations in international relations s uch as war or armed 
conflict. Turkey  did not support what could constitute an arbitrary use of security exceptions to 
justify actions not consistent with WT O law, especially those that might  have tr ade distorting or 
protectionist impact s, albeit implicitly. In conclusion, and in line with Turkey 's views expressed  at 
previous DSB meetings in relation to similar cases, Turkey believed that a WTO panel  had jurisdiction 
over the matter submitted at the present meeting.  Having said that,  Turkey had  also stated at 
previous DSB meetings, and wished to  reiterate at the present meeting, that Turkey support ed 
dialogue in achieving solution s to these matters. Turkey  hoped that Gulf countries, being close allies 
within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)  and sharing a common history not only among themselves 
but with countries beyond t heir region such as Turkey, would  find an am icable way to resolve this 
dispute . 
5.8.  The representativ e of the  European Union  said that his delegation  wished  to recall its position 
on some procedural aspects raised in the context of this dispute.  The EU note d that Qatar had 
requested that the panel be established with the standard terms of reference provided for in Article 
7.1 of the DSU. Pursuant to Article 7.1 of the DSU, these had to  be the terms of reference of the 
panel, unless the parties to the dispute agree d otherwise  within 20 days from the establishment of 
the panel. He said that t he EU noted the statements  regarding the panel's jurisdiction or authority 
over certain issues that m ight or might  not be raised in this dispute. If such issues indeed ar ose, 
these argument s could be raised  before the panel that w ould decide  on these issues , in accordance 
with its terms of reference.  
5.9.  The representative of  Qatar  said that a t the outset, Qatar reserve d its right  under the DSU to 
bring any dispute  under the covered agreements before  the WTO . The DSU required Saudi Arabia  
to engage in good faith during  the first stage of the dispute settlement process , i.e., consultations. 
But Saudi Arabia had refused to do so, citing the national security exemption of Article 73 of the 
TRIPS Ag reemen t. If Saudi Arabia had met  its DSU obligations, Q atar would not be hearing 
Saudi  Arabia's rationalization and defence  for the first time at the present meeting . It appear ed that 
Saudi  Arabia wishe d to defend its failure to protect intellectual proper ty rights by explaining  that this 
lack of protection  was necessary for the protection of Saudi Arabia 's essential security interests . 
Qatar fail ed to understand what, if anything, allowing  the unauthoriz ed broadcast of sports 
programming from around the world – or of any other programming, regardless of its content – had 
to do with "essential security interests ". To be clear, at issue in this dispute was not the censoring 
of any content that Saudi Arabia wishe d to remove from the airwaves and Internet. Ra ther, Qatar 
request ed that a panel be established to consider the unchecked piracy that ma de content readily 
available to those who ha d not compensated the rights holders, and the impact of such piracy on 
rights holders fr om Qatar and other WTO Members.  Such piracy, which ha d enriched the pirates 
through their commercial sales of subscriptions, ha d been actively facilitated and encouraged by the 
Saudi Government.  The concept of a WTO Member permitting, and in fact actively encouraging, the 
infringement of i ntellectual property rights in the name of national security raise d concerns that 
extend ed far beyond sports and entertainment broadcasting.  It raise d concerns for all Members with 
nationals that invest ed in fields that rel ied on intellectual property prot ection as a critical part of 
their business – for example, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, semiconductors, software, WT/DSB/M/422  
 
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  information technology, telecommunications, aerospace, automobiles, music, publishing,  
agriculture, and many others. Saudi Arabia 's recours e to national security in the context of this 
dispute, if successful, would create a grave danger to the international regime of international 
intellectual property protection . 
5.10.   The DSB took note of the statements and agree d to revert to this matter.  
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