WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
27 September 2023  
(23-6467) Page: 1/591 
Trade Policy Review Body  
5 and 7 June 2023  Original: English/ anglais /inglés  
French/français/francés  
Spanish /espagnol/ españo l 
 
TRADE POLICY REVIEW  
EUROPEAN  UNION 
MINUTES  OF THE MEETING  
Addendum  
Chairperson: H.E. Mr Saqer Abdullah Almoqbel ( Kingdom of Saudi Arabia)  
This document contains the advance written questions  and additional questions by 
WTO Members , and replies provided by  European  Union .1 
 
 
Organe d'examen des politiques commerciales  
5 et 7 juin 2023  
EXAMEN DES POLITIQUES COMMERCIALES  
UNION EUROPÉENNE  
COMPTE RENDU DE LA RÉUNION  
Addendum  
Président : S.E.  M. Saqer Abdullah Almoqbel (Arabie Saoudite , Royaume de ) 
Le présent document contient les questions écrites communiquées à l'avance par les 
Membres de l'OMC, leurs questions additionnelles, et les réponses  fournies par  Union européenne .1 
 
 
Órgano de Examen  de las Políticas Comerciales  
5 y 7 de junio de 2023  
EXAMEN DE LAS POLÍTICAS COMERCIALES  
UNIÓN EUROPEA  
ACTA DE LA REUNIÓN  
Addendum  
Presidente: Excmo.  Sr. Saqer Abdullah Almoqbel (Arabia Saudita , Reino de la ) 
En el presente documento figuran las preguntas presentadas anticipadamente por escrito  y 
las preguntas adicionales de los Miembros de la OMC,  así como las respues tas facilitadas por  
Unión  Europea .1 
 
_______________   
 
1 In original language only/En langue originale seulement /En el idioma or iginal solamente . WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Contents  
GUATEMALA  ................................ ................................ ................................ .....................  4 
UNITED  KINGDOM  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............  6 
UNITED  KINGDOM – FOLLOW -UP QUESTIONS  ................................ ...............................  26 
CANADA  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........................  29 
SINGAPORE  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................  40 
ECUADOR  ................................ ................................ ................................ .......................  42 
PHILIPPINES  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................  67 
THAILAND  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................  84 
THAILAND – ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS  ................................ ................................ ..........  92 
AUSTRALIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................  97 
JAPAN  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..........................  106  
JAPAN – FOLLOW -UP QUESTIONS  ................................ ................................ ................  112  
CHINESE  TAIPEI  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..........  117  
NORWAY  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................  121  
HONG KONG, CHINA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 122  
CHINA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..........................  129  
COLOMBIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...................  182  
ISRAEL  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........................  196  
BRUNEI DARUSSALAM  ................................ ................................ ................................ . 207  
ARGENTINA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................  209  
CHILE  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........................  250  
MAURITIUS  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................  266  
NEW  ZEALAND  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............  269  
DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  ................................ ................................ ................................  274  
COSTA  RICA  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................  281  
UNITED  STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........  289  
SWITZERLAND  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............  334  
BRAZIL  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........................  345  
INDIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..........................  362  
INDIA – ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS  ................................ ................................ ...............  414  
INDIA – ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS  ................................ ................................ ...............  421  
UKRAINE  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................  450  
UKRAINE – ADDITIONAL QUESTION  ................................ ................................ ............  460  
HONDURAS  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................  461  
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 462  
PARAGUAY  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...................  471  
PARAGUAY – ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS  ................................ ................................ ....... 488  
SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF  ................................ ................................ ......................  490  
SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF – ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS  ................................ ..........  493  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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TÜRKIYE  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................  496  
PAKISTAN  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................  499  
KAZAKHSTAN  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...............  501  
BANGLADESH  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...............  502  
RUSSIAN  FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ ................................ . 505  
ICELAND  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................  527  
INDONESIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................  529  
INDONESIA – ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS  ................................ ................................ ...... 543  
EL SALVADOR  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...............  553  
MALAYSIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................  558  
URUGUAY  ................................ ................................ ................................ .....................  574  
SOUTH AFRICA  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............  581  
TUNISIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ .......................  591  
 
  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 GUATEMALA  
Consultas de Guatemala sobre los documentos presentados por la Secretaría de la Organización 
Mundial del Comercio, WT/TPR/G/442  y WT/TPR/S/442 , relacionados con el Examen de 
Políticas Comerciales de la Unión Europea.  
 
Signatura del documento: WT/TPR /G/442 Informe de la UE  
Sección: 2 EL COMERCIO Y EL ENTORNO ECONÓMICO.  
2.1 El entorno económico y la política macroeconómica de la UE, párrafo 2.4.  
"2.4. La repercusión de la pandemia dio lugar a un deterioro del mercado laboral, pero las medidas 
de polít ica de la UE y de los Gobiernos nacionales lograron contener la recesión. En 2019, el empleo 
en la UE alcanzó un máximo sin precedentes en términos absolutos y la tasa de desempleo se situó 
en su nivel más bajo desde 2000. Durante la pandemia, con el uso g eneralizado de planes de 
conservación del empleo se logró que muchos empleados mantuvieran sus puestos de trabajo. Como 
resultado, la tasa de desempleo solo registró un aumento moderado, del 6,8% en 2019 al 7,2% 
en 2020. En consonancia con la mejora de la situación económica, el mercado laboral empezó a 
recuperar fuerzas y la tasa de desempleo disminuyó al 7% en 2021 y, según las previsiones, 
descenderá aún más en 2022, al 6,2%. A pesar del difícil entorno y de las subsiguientes conmociones 
derivadas de la guerra de agresión de Rusia contra Ucrania, se prevé que el mercado laboral de la 
UE muestre resiliencia y que la tasa de desempleo aumente moderadamente hasta situarse en 
alrededor del 6,5% en 2023 y luego se reduzca al 6,4% en 2024."  
 
1. Se le agradecerí a a la UE indicar si conoce y ¿cuáles son los planes de conservación del empleo 
que hicieron posible mantener los puestos de trabajo? así como señalar ¿cuáles fueron los sectores 
más beneficiados?  
 
Reply: All EU Member States adopted extraordinary measures  to soften the consequences of the 
COVID -19 pandemic on the labour market. In particular, countries have relied heavily on short -time 
work schemes and similar job retention measures. The EU contributed to these efforts by 
establishing a new instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an 
emergency (SURE).  
 
Short -time work schemes are public programmes aimed at avoiding excessive job destruction during 
downturns. They allow firms experiencing economic difficulties to reduce temporarily the working 
hours of their employees, who in turn receive public income support compensating (at least partly) 
for the hours not worked. Their main purpose is to protect the job match, thereby limiting the 
long-term consequences of a transitory shock. Shor t-time work schemes are used in case of external 
events hampering business activities (e.g. technical accidents, natural disasters, bad weather 
affecting works in construction or agriculture, causes of force majeure ), and transitory business 
downturns (e.g . temporary reduction in turnover or orders).  
 
For a detailed overview, including on the use of short -time work schemes by sectors (table 3.2 
on p. 84), see Chapter 3 of the Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe 2020 by the 
European Commission (202 0) which is publicly available at the official website of the EU at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=23268&langId=en . 
 
Sección: 3 POLÍTICA COMERCIAL MULTILATERAL Y BILATERAL.  
3.1 La agenda comercial multilateral de la UE, párrafo 3.12.  
"Facilitación de las inversiones para e l desarrollo  
3.12. Dada la contribución de la facilitación de las inversiones al programa de desarrollo, la UE 
atribuye gran importancia a las negociaciones en el marco de la Iniciativa relacionada con la 
Declaración Conjunta sobre la Facilitación de las I nversiones para el Desarrollo. Considera que el 
futuro acuerdo podría beneficiar a todos los Miembros de la OMC, en particular a los países en 
desarrollo, cuando traten de atraer inversión extranjera directa y reducir el "déficit de inversiones" 
actual a f in de alcanzar los ODS. El acuerdo incluirá disposiciones sobre trato especial y diferenciado 
en las que se reconozca la necesidad de apoyar la creación de capacidad en los países en desarrollo. 
La UE está decidida a finalizar con éxito el proceso ya en 20 23, de manera que este acuerdo pase a 
ser un resultado de la CM13."  
 
2. Al hacer referencia al déficit de inversiones, podría la UE indicar en qué sectores han pensado 
invertir para alcanzar los ODS.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Reply: By establishing investment facilitation as a pill ar of its investment policy, the EU intends to 
improve conditions for sustainable investment in all sectors of the economy. Sustainable investment 
in turn will help closing the funding gap for achieving the SDGs. Besides our FTAs, the EU launched 
the Globa l Gateway initiative that is the EU's contribution to narrowing the global investment gap 
worldwide. The Global Gateway is also fully aligned with the UN's Agenda 2030 and its Sustainable 
Development Goals, as well as the Paris Agreement. It will boost EU smart, clean and secure 
investments in digital, energy and transport sectors and to strengthen health, education and 
research systems across the world. For more information please visit EU website: Global Gateway 
(europa.eu)  
 
Signatura del documento: WT/TPR/S/442  
 
Sección: 2 RÉGIMEN DE COMERCIO E INVERSIÓN  
2.1 Marco General  
 
3. En general, Guatemala agradece a la UE indicar sobre su política de renegociación de los 
acuerdos bilaterales de inversión y la existencia de un Capítulo de Inversión en los acuerdos 
comerciales negociados.  
 
Reply: The EU has only recently started negotiating its bilateral investment agreements and none 
are in force yet (except FTAs that include invest ment liberalisation provisions). Member States who 
maintain bilateral investment protection agreements with 3rd countries may re -negotiate their older 
treaties pursuant to Regulation EU 1219/2012 establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral 
investm ent agreements between Member States and third countries.  
 
The scope of investment chapters included in trade agreements of the Union is decided on a 
case-by-case basis, and may contain either investment liberalisation provisions only (e.g. FTAs with 
Japan , Australia, New  Zealand ), or investment liberalisation and investment protection disciplines 
(e.g. agreements with Canada, Mexico and Chile).  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 UNITED  KINGDOM  
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S442)  
1 ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
1.2.5.  Employment trends, including gender   
Paragraph 1.27  
UK Question 1:  Could the EU please explain whether it has adopted any trade -related policies, 
measures, and/or programmes to promote and increase women's access to trade -supported 
employment?  
 
Reply:  In line with the EU Gender Equality Strategy 2020 -2025 and the EU Gender Action Plan 
(GAP) III , the EU continues to actively promote gender equality and women's empowerment through 
its trade policies. The EU promotes gender equality through a number of channels: multilaterally, 
for example in the WTO or the Internationa l Labour Organisation (ILO), bilaterally through free trade 
agreements and unilaterally through the Generalised Scheme of Preferences. The EU continues to 
gather gender -disaggregated data to ensure that trade -related aspects of gender are adequately 
addres sed in trade agreements and to holistically assess the gender impact in trade initiatives.  
 
UK Question 2 : One of the key objectives of the Gender Equality Strategy 2020 -2025 is closing the 
gender pay gap. Could the EU please explain what action it is taking and what progress has been 
made to close the gender pay gap in employment supported by exports?  
 
Reply:  In March 2014 the European Commission adopted a Recommendation on strengthening the 
principle of equal pay between men and women through transpar ency. The text of the 
Recommendation is publicly available at the official website of the EU at: https://eur -
lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014H0124 . 
 
In March 2020, the Commission published the EU Gender Equality Strategy 2020 -2025. The 
objective of closing gender gaps in the labour market, in all types of employment, is addressed by 
the Strategy and the measures envisa ged therein. The text of the Strategy is publicly available at 
the official website of the EU at:  
https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52020 DC0152 . 
 
As one of the first deliverables of the Strategy, the European Commission presented on 4  March  2021 
a proposal for a directive to strengthen the application of the principle of equal pay for equal work 
or work of  equal value between men and women through pay transparency and enforcement 
mechanisms. The proposal is publicly available at the official website of the EU at: https: //eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52021PC0093 . This directive was adopted on 
24 April 2023 and will enter into force by June. It will provide for more transparency in pay settings 
and effective enforcement of the equal pay principle between women and men, as well as improve 
access to justice for victims of pay discrimination. Pay transparen cy measures set out in the directive 
will encourage employers to review their pay settings and allow them to address hidden pay 
discrimination which may have reflected unconscious biases. In the long run, companies that apply 
fair and equal pay will be mor e attractive for workers, regardless of their gender or other grounds.  
 
The European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan calls to halve the gender employment gap by 2030. 
This will be paramount to progress on gender equality. Moreover, the European Pillar  of Social Rights 
highlights equal opportunities and access to the labour market, fair working conditions, and social 
protection and inclusion. Principle 2 of the Pillar specifically addresses gender equality, and principle 
3 equal opportunities.  
 
A wide range of EU initiatives support the employment and social inclusion of women. For example, 
the European Care Strategy, which has a strong gender component. Insufficient access to quality 
and affordable formal care services is one of the key drivers of gend er inequality in the labour 
market. The European Commission presented on 7  September  2022 the European Care Strategy to 
ensure quality, affordable and accessible care services across the EU. The strategy is publicly 
available at the official website of the  EU at:  
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_5169   
 
The European Commission launched a campaign to challenge gender st ereotypes on 8  March  2023. 
This EU -wide campaign tackles gender stereotypes affecting both men and women in different WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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spheres of life, including career choices, sharing care responsibilities and decision -making. It is 
publicly available at the official web site of the EU at:  
https://end -gender -stereotypes.campaign.europa.eu/index_en .  
 
On 5 March  2020, the European Commission published a report on the implementation of the EU 
Action Plan 2017 -2019 on tackling the gender pay gap through a holistic approach of 24 action points 
distributed under eight main strands of action. The implementation of the most action points 
continues. The report i s publicly available at the official website of the EU at:  
https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2020 -03/com -2020-101_en.pdf .  
 
Regarding the gender pay gap in employment supported by exports, the figures cited in the report 
are the latest available data.  
 
2 TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
2.1 General framework  
Paragraph  2.4 
UK Question 3 : Regarding the EU's Digital Strategy, could the EU please explain what steps it has 
taken to address information gaps between online platforms, on the one hand, and regulators, 
research communities and users, on the other, in order to support targeted and proportionate 
regulatory interventions ? 
 
Reply: The Digital Services Act itself comprises harmonized procedural rules, which should facilitate 
societal oversight over digital services and online platforms. It incorporates a whole -of-society 
approach that has been recognized as a global benchma rk, including in UNESCO's draft guidelines 
for regulating digital platforms. By imposing wide -ranging transparency obligations on digital 
services, civil society organisations, researchers and citizens can perform research and make 
informed choices – returning agency over online content moderation.  
 
The Digital Services Act also incorporates, for those services designated as very large online 
platforms and very large online search engines, a risk assessment framework. Their compliance with 
DSA obligations will also be subject to oversight by independent, third -party auditors. A novel data 
access regime for researchers, applicable to those designated services, should in this regard facilitate 
our common understanding of the risks associated with the algorith mic organisation of online 
content.  
 
To render these procedural rules effective, the Digital Services Act provides for effective enforcement 
by public authorities. In this way, the Digital Services Act opens the solution space for specific 
societal risks, precisely by addressing the information gap.  
 
Paragraph 2.25  
UK Question 4:  Could  the EU please  explain  how it will ensure  current  and future  digital  regulations,  
including  cybersecurity  schemes,  do not lead to unjustified  data localisation?  
 
Reply : The EU cloud market remains open to all providers that provide their services in line with 
applicable legislation, irrespective of their origin. However, it is essential that data can be stored and 
processed securely in Europe. Highly sensitive procurement  programmes may therefore, as is the 
case in other countries, pose specific requirements to ensure the security of data. Increasingly, 
international cloud providers are taking measures to offer guarantees on data localisation, and other 
organisational and legal measures to avoid exposure to foreign laws with extraterritorial effect. For 
international as well as European providers, the soon -to-be-published EU Cloud Rulebook will provide 
transparency as a one -stop-shop for better navigating the EU cloud regul atory landscape. At the 
request of the Commission, the European  Union  Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) is currently 
preparing a candidate EU Cloud Security Certification Scheme (EUCS), which the Commission can 
afterwards adopt by means of an implementing a ct (following the procedure outlined in the EU 
Cybersecurity Act). In this context, the Commission will ensure that the scheme is compliant and 
fully aligned with EU law, international commitments and WTO obligations.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 2.3.2.1.2 Updates of existing RTAs an d ongoing negotiations  
Paragraph 2.35  
UK Question 5 : In relation to the negotiation with Japan on cross -border data flows, could the EU 
please indicate whether any member of Cross -Border Privacy Rules (CBPR ) will be required to agree 
a separate data regime for EU data?  
 
Reply: The EU refrains from replying to questions concerning ongoing negotiations whose outcome 
is not decided yet. At the same time, the EU recalls that the applicable requirements for inte rnational 
transfers of personal data are not governed by trade agreements but set in the relevant EU data 
protection legislation, notably in chapter V of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). 
Pursuant to the GDPR, these requirements include requir ements applicable to onward transfers of 
EU personal data. Such onward transfers need to be based on instruments ensuring that the level 
of protection guaranteed by the GDPR is not undermined in case of onward transfer of data.  
 
2.4 Investment regime  
2.4.1  Regulatory framework  
Paragraph 2.66  
UK Question 6:  Could the EU please indicate whether it would look to consider an EU -wide investment 
promotion agency in the future?  
 
Reply: Within the review period (2019 Q4 – Dec 2022) the EU has announced no new policy 
regarding an eventual EU level investment promotion agency.  
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1 Measures directly affecting imports  
3.1.1  Customs procedures, valuation, and requirements  
3.1.1.1  Recent and Future Developments  
Paragraph 3.9  
UK Question 7 : Could the EU please share detail on both the timeline for the publication of a proposal 
on a new customs framework and the process for considering proposals submitted by businesses 
and other stakeholders for customs framework reform?  
 
Reply: The European Commission has adopted the EU customs reform proposal on 17  May 2023. 
The legislative proposals will now be sent to the co -legislators, the European Parliament and the 
Council of the European  Union , for agreement. Further information is to be found in https://taxation -
customs.ec.europa.eu/customs -4/eu-customs -reform_en   
The Commission has considered the proposals by stakehol ders as in any other legislative process. A 
public consultation was organised during the impact assessment. The Commission has also been 
open to accept any spontaneous position paper by organisations and has held several meetings with 
the associations that  are part of the Commission expert group "Trade Contact Group".  
3.1.4  Other charges affecting imports  
3.1.4.1  VAT  
Paragraph 3.67  
UK Question 8 : In relation to the VAT in the Digital Age initiative, could the EU please explain what 
consideration there ha s been of the burden on SMEs from mandatory e -invoicing and of the potential 
for mandatory invoicing to reduce the VAT gap, as this only applies to cross -border transactions that 
are typically not subject to VAT?  
 
Reply:  Businesses engaged in cross-border transactions will get a net benefit from the introduction 
of digital reporting requirements (e.g. because of the removal of other reporting obligations and 
automation of processes). These benefits are smaller for micro and small entities, but still positive. 
It is possible that specific businesses, such as SMEs that are only operating domestically, might incur 
costs higher than the benefits they would obtain.  For an intra -EU digital reporting system to be 
effective, all business -to-business tra nsactions should be covered by the reporting obligation. It is 
estimated that Member States will recoup up to EUR  11 billion  in lost VAT revenues a year in the 
next 10 years.  
 
It has to be noted that the VAT in the Digital Age initiative imposes digital re porting requirements 
based on e -invoicing for intra -EU transactions only. While e -invoicing will be the default method to 
document transactions, Member States will still have the possibility for domestic transactions to WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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allow invoices on paper or other for mats, provided that the transactions are not covered by a 
reporting obligation. Member States will have the option (not the obligation) to impose digital 
reporting requirements on domestic transactions, but, if they do so, the reporting should be based 
on e-invoicing. This is in order to reduce the number of divergent reporting systems, hence reducing 
fragmentation in the EU. In the same vein, the proposal also mandates Member States to accept 
e-invoices issued according to the European standard on electron ic invoicing and the list of its 
syntaxes pursuant to Directive 2014/55/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council.  
 
3.1.4.2  Excise  
UK Question 9 : Could the EU please provide an update on the Energy Tax Directive since the end 
of 2022?  
 
Reply:  Discus sions are ongoing among the Member States. The future Spanish Presidency has the 
intention to make substantial progress in view of a possible adoption before the end of 2023.  
 
3.3 Measures affecting production and trade  
3.3.2  Standards and other technical requirements  
3.3.2.2 Technical requirements and European harmonised standards  
Paragraph 3.173  
UK Question 10:  Could  the EU please  explain  how it plans  to review its approach to qualitative and 
quantitative testing of pharmaceuticals on import into the EU?  
 
Reply:  There is currently no plan to review the EU approach to qualitative and quantitative testing 
of pharmaceuticals on import into the EU.  
 
UK Quest ion 11 : Could the EU please explain how it plans to ensure that the new 
European  Pharmaceutical Legislation will uphold IP protections for third -country innovators in 
consistent, predictable, and transparent ways?  
 
Reply:  The proposed changes concern regul atory incentives for medicinal products (data protection, 
market protection and market exclusivity) under the pharmaceutical legislation (Directive 
2001/83/EC[2], Regulation (EC) No 726/2004[3], Regulation (EC) 141/2000[4] and Regulation (EC) 
1901/2006[5]) . This  reform does not affect the intellectual property (IP) rights in the EU, such as 
(patents, trademarks, copyright, supplementary protection certificates). This means that the EU will 
continue to offer a globally competitive system of IP incentives for  the innovators in the 
pharmaceutical field.  
 
For further details, please refer to the Frequently Asked Questions on the revision of the 
pharmaceutical legislation Q&A: Revision of the Pharmaceutical legislation (europa.eu).  
 
3.3.2.3  Conformity system and  market surveillance  
Paragraph 3.186  
UK Question 12 : Could the EU please explain whether the market surveillance system for compliance 
with EU regulations also covers compliance with national regulations (for aspects without 
EU regulation)?  
 
Reply:  The mar ket surveillance system for compliance with EU regulations (Reg. 2019/1020) covers 
EU harmonisation legislation. In addition, the General Product Safety Directive 
(Directive  2001/95/EC) regulates the general safety requirements for all consumer products and 
provides for obligations and powers of the Member States as concerns dangerous products. 
EU Member States regulate market surveillance for products not subject to EU regulations.  
 
3.3.3  Sanitary and Phytosanitary Requirements  
Paragraph  3.194  
UK Question 13 : Could the EU please explain the outcomes for animal welfare that are expected as 
a result of the Farm to Fork Strategy?  
 
Reply:  Animal welfare is a central element of the Farm to fork strategy as there is no sustainable 
animal production wit hout ensuring a high level of animal welfare.  
 
Since the current legislation was adopted, science on animal welfare has considerably evolved. 
Taking into consideration the new science and the outcomes of the fitness check of the current EU WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 animal welfare rules, the Commission is set out to present, by Q3 2023, four legislative proposals 
on animal welfare concerning: Welfare of kept animals, Protection of animals during transport, 
Slaughter and killing, Animal welfare Labelling. The legislative proposals wi ll include provisions to 
phase out and finally prohibit the use of cages in farming, as committed to in the reply to the 
European Citizens' Initiative "End the cage age"; it will also include new species -specific rules for 
additional species.  
 
With this initiative the Commission intends to address the important scientific updates on animal 
welfare available since the adoption of the current legislation in certain cases older than 20 years 
and to address a more sustainable approach in animal productio n. Furthermore, the planned reform 
will try to respond to the increasing ethical concerns of the citizens in the area of animal welfare.  
 
Paragraph  3.198  
UK Question 14 : Could the EU please explain what role an animal welfare label might play in the 
planne d revision of EU legislation, and what are the expected animal welfare benefits?  
 
Reply:  A study on animal welfare labelling https://op. europa.eu/en/publication -detail/ -
/publication/49b6b125 -b0a3-11ec-83e1-01aa75ed71a1/language -en identified several problems 
related to the current situation. The proliferation of labelling schemes with animal welfare claim s in 
some Member States do not allow consumers to make informed choice. On the other hand, there 
are many Member States where consumers have no possibility to express their preferences for 
higher animal welfare standards than the EU legislation. Existing a nimal welfare labels are based on 
different methodologies and standards, and most of the time structured along national lines. An EU 
animal welfare label would aim at providing reliable and harmonised food information to consumers 
on animal welfare and ens ure a better level playing field among business operators, while preventing 
a fragmentation of the internal market.  
 
In terms of animal welfare benefits, an EU animal welfare label would aim at creating economic 
incentives to business operators to implemen t animal welfare standards that goes beyond the 
minimum legal requirements.  
 
3.3.4  Competition Policy  
Paragraph 3.209  
UK Question 15 : The report states that the European Commission is in the process of undertaking 
an extensive review of existing legislation and regulation on competition. Could the EU please clarify 
when it intends to complete its "extensive review of existing legislation  and regulation on 
competition"?  
 
Reply:  The European Commission continues its extensive review of competition regulations, 
guidelines and notices , to ensure that all enforcement instruments are up -to-date, fit for current and 
future challenges. For instan ce, two Horizontal Block Exemption Regulations are currently under 
review. Furthermore, the Commission currently reviews the Technology Transfer Block Exemption 
Regulation and the accompanying Technology Transfer Guidelines to determine whether the 
Commiss ion should allow that Regulation to expire, prolong its duration or revise it in order to take 
account of market developments that have occurred since its adoption. The Commission is also 
currently evaluating the framework for the implementation of Article s 101 and 102 TFEU provided 
for in Regulation 1/2003 and its implementing Regulation 773/2004. On 27  March  2023, the 
Commission announced that it has launched the process of drafting Guidelines on the application of 
Article  102 TFEU to exclusionary abuses.  All these projects have different envisaged deadlines.  
 
Paragraph 3.213  
UK Question 16 : The report  states  that on 8 December  2022,  the European  Commission  adopted  
two regulations  extending  the period  of validity  of the horizontal  block exemption  regulati ons on 
research  and development  and on specialization  agreements  (together,  HBERs).  The HBERs  were 
due to expire  on 31 December  2022 and the Commission  prolonged  them until 30 June 2023.  Could 
the EU please clarify whether it plans to further extend or rep lace the Horizontal Block Exemptions 
past 30  June 2023?  
 
Reply:  On 1 March  2022, the Commission published drafts of the revised R&D and Specialisation 
Block Exemption Regulations (together 'HBERs ') and Horizontal Guidelines for stakeholder 
comments. The HBERs were due to expire on 31  December  2022 and the Commission has prolonged WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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them until 30  June 2023 in order to take full account of the feedback received in response to the 
public consultation o n the draft regulations. At this stage, no further extension is planned.  
 
3.3.5  State trading, state -owned enterprises, and privatization  
Paragraph 3.225  
UK Question 17 : The report states that during the review period, two EU Member States had 
privatisati on plans. Could the EU please: a) clarify which two EU Member States had privatisation 
plans; and b) provide further information on these privatisation plans?  
 
Reply: Croatia and Romania have privatisation plans. The following links provide further informa tion 
Croatia: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST -10687 -2021-ADD-1/en/pdf  
 
• See Component 2.4 on "improving the management of state asset" (pages 130 -135 of the 
annex to the Council Implementing Decision on the approval of the assessment of the recovery and 
resilience plan for Croatia). Component 2.4 also includes measures to improve SOE governance in 
Croatia , Roman ia: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST -12319 -2021-ADD-1/en/pdf  
 
• See target measure number 122 on listing of at leas t 15% shares of Hidroelectrica (page 153 
of the annex to the Council Implementing Decision on the approval of the assessment of the recovery 
and resilience plan for Romania). In addition, see measure number 443 on listing/leasing/ 
restructuring at least 3 central state -owned companies in the field of energy and transport (page  516 
of the annex to the Council Implementing Decision on the approval of the assessment of the recovery 
and resilience plan for Romania.  
 
3.3.6  Government Procurement  
Paragraph  3.238  
UK Question 18 : Paragraph 3.238 mentions that the Circular Economy Action Plan envisages the 
introduction of mandatory Green Public Procurement (GPP) criteria. Could the EU please confirm 
whether it has a list of GPP criteria it would like to make mandator y in the future? If so, is there an 
indicative timeframe for implementing such new criteria?  
 
Reply:  The timeframe for the definition of such mandatory requirements in downstream acts varies 
according to the legislative proposal. For instance, under the new regulatory framework for batteries 
the Commission will have 48 months after the entry into force of the Regulation to adopt a delegated 
act establishing minimum values for the electrochemical performance and durability parameters that 
portable batt eries of general use shall attain. After the adoption of this delegated act, the 
Commission will have 12 months to adopt the delegated act establishing award criteria for 
procurement procedures for these batteries.  
 
3.3.7  Intellectual Property Rights  
3.3.7 .2 Copyright and related rights  
UK Question 19 : Could the EU please share detail of the impact assessment of the copyright reform 
package and explain how it is going to affect non -EU artists, producers and broadcasting 
organisations?  
 
Reply: The Commission  carried out an ex-ante impact assessment of the copyright reform in 2016. 
This impact assessment was supporting the legislative proposals concerning the Directives on 
copyright in the Digital Single Market (Directive (EU) 2019/790) and on online TV and ra dio 
programmes (Directive (EU) 2019/789). The impact assessment is available at https://digital -
strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/impact -assess ment-modernisation -eu-copyright -rules.  
 
Both directives were adopted in 2019, and Member States had until 7  June 2021 to transpose them 
into national laws. Under Article  30(1) of Directive (EU) 2019/790, the Commission is required to 
carry out a review of the Directive no sooner than 7  June 2026. Under Article  10(1) of Directive (EU) 
2019/789, the Commission is required to carry out a review of the Directive no sooner than 
7 June 2024. The Commission has not a ssessed the effects of the copyright reform yet, since the 
deadlines for the evaluation of the directives have not yet elapsed.  
 
The Commission will carry out both reviews in due time in cooperation with Member States.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 3.3.7.3  Industrial Property  
3.3.7.3. 3 Trademarks  
UK Question 20 : Could the EU please provide information on the level of (EU) domestic demand they 
have judged for the creation of schemes protecting non -agricultural GIs?  
 
Reply:  The European Commission conducted a public consultation during 1 2 weeks between 29  April 
and 22  July 2021 via the EU Survey online system in 24 EU languages. The consultation received 
182 responses from 28 countries, including from 18 EU Member States. Accordingly, a vast majority 
of respondents (92.3%) saw the need fo r an EU -wide initiative to improve the protection of 
geographical names or indications for craft and industrial products. Only 3.8% of respondents saw 
no need for such initiative. Finally, seven respondents expressed no specific view on the matter.  
 
More g enerally, please refer to the Impact assessment report on geographical indication protection 
for craft and industrial products accompanying the Commission's proposal for a Regulation on 
geographical indication protection for craft and industrial products, available at: https://single -
market -economy.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022 -
04/SWD_2022_115_1_EN_impact_assessment_part1_v2.pdf . In particular, please consult 
sections  1 (Introduction) and 2 (Problem definition), which include various references to the EU 
domestic demand and hyperlinks to the stakeholder consultation process.  
 
3.3.7.3.5 Geographical indications  
UK Question 21:  Could the EU please provide information on the proposal for a Regulation on GIs, 
in particular how it will "achieve a higher level of protection for the registered names, especially 
online"?  
 
Reply:  The p roposal for a Regulation on GIs addresses protecting GIs on the internet notably in the 
administration of the Domain Names System (DNS). GIs are an intellectual property right and 
therefore they deserve adequate protection in the dispute resolutions system s which are today 
mostly limited to trademarks. The proposal  includes specific provisions on disputes between GIs and 
EU country -code top -level domain names (ccTLDs), including alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
procedures. The scope of the GI protection  will also apply to domain names infringing GIs. New 
provisions aim to ensure that the ADR procedures of ccTLDs registries established in the Union 
recognise GIs as a right that can be invoked in these procedures. The proposal aims to harmonise 
GIs protect ion in ADR at least at the EU level. Concerning GI enforcement online, the proposal also 
contains new obligations for providers of intermediary services aiming to tackle illegal content online 
in breach of GI rights. The measures against illegal content on line are introduced in the Digital 
Services Act.  
 
3.3.7.3.5 Geographical indications  
Paragraph 3.271  
UK Question 22:  Could the EU please provide more information on its assessment of how the new 
legislation will impact the uptake of GIs across the EU and the rural economy, when it is adopted?  
 
Reply:  The overall goal of the reform is to facilitate the take up of GIs across the EU. While the 
production of quality agricultural products is a strength of European agriculture, there are 
geographical imbalances when it comes to the number of registered GIs across the EU in Member 
States. The GI proposal will focus on encouraging take -up in those Member States where the use of 
GIs is under -exploited. An objective is to increase the number of registered GIs for eac h lower -user 
EU Member State by improving the existing legal provisions and providing for a simplified and 
streamlined set of rules while also strengthening certain elements of GI protection, notably by 
empowering producer groups. Legal streamlining will a lso expand the scope of GIs to cover all 
agricultural products according to WTO Agriculture Agreement definition and also simplify a selection 
of geographical names as GIs to better align with challenges faced in the low -and medium -GI-user 
EU Member States .  
 
UK Question 23 : Could the EU please explain whether the proposal for Regulation on GIs for wine, 
spirit drinks and agricultural products will provide opportunities for non -EU producer groups to 
enforce intellectual property rights on behalf of their me mbers? If there is different treatment for 
EU-producer groups and non -EU producer groups could the EU please provide further explanation?  
 
Reply:  The EU cannot adopt and impose rules for third countries on producer groups. The proposal 
for Regulation on GIs does not contain any specific provisions regarding non -EU producer groups. WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Rules, including powers and responsibilities of producer groups will only be applicable to producer 
groups operating within the EU. However, in the EU, Member States are responsible to ensure an 
adequate protection in the EU's territory, of GIs both of EU origin and of third country origin if they 
are protected in the EU. D etailed information on rules and enforcement are set up in Regulation (EU) 
No. 2017/625 (on official controls), Regulation (EU) No.  1151/2012 (on quality schemes for 
agricultural products and foodstuffs) and, Regulation (EU) No.  2019/787 (on spirit drinks) . In 
addition, in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 608/2013 the customs authorities of the Member 
States may act at the border and detain goods suspected of infringing GIs.  
 
Paragraph 3.272  
UK Question 24 : The report states that direct application GIs ar e listed on eAmbrosia and FTA GIs 
on the GIView portal. However, GIs protected under the EU's agreement with China appear to be 
listed on eAmbrosia. Could the EU please explain if it has any intention to change how its registers 
work, or to consolidate reg isters in one place? Could the EU please explain if there is some other 
reason the Chinese GIs are listed on eAmbrosia?  
 
Reply:  The eAmbrosia database is composed of the electronic registers of geographical indications 
established by Regulation (EU) No.  1308/2013, Regulation (EU) 2019/787 and Regulation (EU) 
No. 1151/2012. The geographical indications registered in accordance with the requirements, forms 
and procedures established in the relevant legal bases are entered into the registers. Chinese GIs 
were included in the eAmbrosia register as a part of an agreement between the European  Union  and 
China on protection of geographical indications. Inclusion of these GIs was done in accordance with 
Article  11(2) of Regulation (EU) 1151/2012 which foresees a poss ibility to include in the eAmbrosia 
geographical indications from third countries that are protected in the EU under an international 
agreement to which the EU is a party. No changes are foreseen in the near future regarding 
consolidation of eAmbrosia and GIview. eAmbrosia will remain a legal register of the names of 
agricultural products and foodstuffs, wine, and spirit drinks that are registered and protected across 
the EU and GIview will be the database for all GIs protected at European  Union  level, incl uding GIs 
protected through bilateral and international agreements.  
 
3.3.7.3.6.2 Clinical trial data  
UK Question 25 : Could the EU please provide more information on what changes will be made to the 
IP system as a result of the EU's pharmaceutical strategy?  
 
Reply:  The proposed changes concern regulatory incentives for medicinal products (data protection, 
market protection and market exclusivity) under the pharmaceutical legislation (Directive 
2001/83/EC[2], Regulation (EC) No 726/2004[3], Regulation (EC) 14 1/2000[4] and Regulation (EC) 
1901/2006[5]). This reform does not affect the intellectual property (IP) rights in the EU, such as 
patents, trademarks, copyright, supplementary protection certificates.  
 
For further details, please refer to the Frequently Asked Questions on the revision of the 
pharmaceutical legislation Q&A: Revision of the Pharmaceutical legislation (europa.eu).  
 
[1]  Reform of the EU pharmaceutical legislation (europa.eu) . 
[2]  https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32001L0083 . 
[3]  EUR-Lex – 32004R0726 – EN – EUR-Lex (europa.eu) . 
[4]  https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32000R0141 . 
[5]  https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32006R1901 . 
 
3.3.7.4  Enforcement  
UK Question 26 : Could the EU please explain how often the EUIPO -administered Enforcement 
Database is updated by the Observatory?  
 
Reply:  Users and rightholders update the information on the IP Enforcement Portal (IPEP), former 
Enforcement Database. This information is refreshed in the portal daily.  
 
Concerning the trademarks and designs uploaded by rightholders from TM View and DesignView into 
the tool, the information is automatically updated when accessing IPEP.  
 
The EUIPO is responsible for its user management, maintenance, security and continuous 
improvement of the tool.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.1 Agriculture  
4.1.2  Agricultural policy  
4.1.2.2  CAP strategic plans  
UK Question 27 : Could the EU please explain the outcomes for animal welfare that are expected as 
a result of the new Common Agricultural Policy?  
 
Reply:  The new CAP will continue to support the transiti on towards more sustainable agriculture 
with increased ambition for animal welfare, in line with the Green Deal objectives and the Farm to 
Fork strategy. The objective of the new Common Agricultural Policy in terms of animal welfare is to 
encourage farmers  to improve the welfare of farm animals by talking commitments to observe 
animal -friendly practises that go beyond the minimum legal requirements. Result indicators have 
been established in Regulation 2021/2115 on CAP strategic plans.  
 
GOVERNMENT REPORT (G 442)  
1 INTRODUCTION  
Paragraph 1.2  
UK Question 28 : Noting that the EU's 2021 trade strategy highlights the importance of developing 
"a more strategic approach to international regulatory cooperation", could the EU please explain 
what steps, in addition to the new Standardisation Strategy, it has taken to develop a wider strategic 
approach to international regulatory cooperation?  
 
Reply:  The latest Commission flagship actions envisaged by the Green Deal Industrial Plan where 
the Commission announ ced its intention to conclude Net -Zero Industrial Partnerships covering 
net-zero technologies which could include green partnerships, energy dialogues and other forms of 
existing bilateral contractual arrangements, as well as potential synergies with relev ant Member 
States' bilateral agreements with third countries. Furthermore, the European Critical Raw Materials 
Act envisages Strategic Partnerships with third countries related to raw materials and to achieve 
greater synergies between Strategic Partnership s and Member States' cooperation with relevant 
third countries.  
 
Already ongoing international regulatory cooperation activities include:  
 
- engagement in the OECD work strand on International Regulatory Cooperation;  
- negotiating and implementing free tra de agreements which include regulatory cooperation 
activities and in particular EU -Canada Regulatory Cooperation Forum, EU -UK Regulatory 
Cooperation Committee;  
- Mutual Recognition Agreements on Conformity Assessment (Switzerland, Canada, the US, 
Australia, New  Zealand , Japan),  
- Trade and technology Council with US and India;  
- Regulatory Cooperation Committee and Digital Partnership with Japan; as well as  
- digital partnerships with Singapore and the Republic of Korea . 
 
3 MULTILATERAL AND BILAT ERAL TRADE POLICY  
3.1 The EU's multilateral trade agenda  
3.1.2  WTO response to global challenges  
c. Trade and Environment & Climate  
Paragraph 3.29  
UK Question 29 : Could the EU please provide further information on how initiatives on trade & 
climate should  work together to reach outcomes, for example, the WTO CTE, relevant joint initiatives 
at the WTO (TESSD, DPP, FFSR), the Coalition of Trade Ministers on Climate, and the proposed G7 
Climate Club? How does it see the interaction between these trade initiat ives and ongoing 
international dialogues on decarbonisation, for example the Glasgow Steel Breakthrough and the 
Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminium?  
 
Reply:  Climate change is a global problem that requires a global solution. The more coop eration 
there is, the more effective our tools will be.  
All the initiatives mentioned in the question aim to contribute to tackling the climate challenge from 
a different angle, but with international cooperation in mind. However, to use our resources wis ely, 
we must ensure these initiatives avoid overlaps and focus on specific issues identified in their 
creation.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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For example, the Coalition of Trade Ministers on Climate has, at its core, the ambition to show that 
trade can positively contribute to climat e action through political -level inclusive cooperation. This is 
complimentary to the technical work of the TESSD, DPP, and FFSR. The G7 Climate Club aims to 
advance industrial decarbonization, focusing on hard to abate sectors. The Global Arrangement on 
Sustainable Steel and Aluminium is advancing work on developing a common methodology and 
sharing relevant data for assessing the embedded emissions of traded steel and aluminium. Once 
these initiatives advance, we can see how to cross -fertilize their work in to outcomes.  
 
3.2 The EU's bilateral agenda  
3.2.1  Bilateral trade agreements  
Paragraph 3.32  
UK Question 30 : Could the EU please explain whether it has analysed the changes in trade with 
partners after preferential trade agreements were implemented? Does the EU have evidence that 
such agreements lead to increased and more stable trade with preferential countries compared with 
other trading partners?  
 
Reply:  The changes in trade with partners having preferential agreements with the EU has been 
regularly monitored and published in the EU's FTA implementation reports. The past editions, 
showing larger trade increases with the preferential partners vis-a-vis non-preferential partners can 
be found here:  
 
https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/enforcement -and-protection/implementing -and-enforcing -eu-
trade-agreements/previous -versions -eus-fta-implementation -reports_en .  
 
The last report shows that although extra -EU export with preferential partners grew faster than with 
non-preferential partners (after exclu ding trade with the UK, which has been affected by different 
factors), the same was not true for our imports in 2021. This was, however, due to already high – 
and mounting – commodity prices, which were imported primarily from non -FTA countries:  
 
Implementing and enforcing EU trade agreements (europa.eu) .  
 
a. Europe and its neighbours  
Paragraph 3.41 
UK Question 31:  Could the EU please explain h ow plans to reassure its partners in the WTO that 
state interventions will not adversely affect foreign investors – and that any acquisitions of foreign 
investment by Member States will be done in complianc e with WTO principles?  
 
Reply:  Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 14December  2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (FSR) is consistent with the 
EU's international obligations and notably the WTO  Agreement  on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (SCM  Agreement ). Specifically, Article  44(9) of the FSR sets out that no action shall be 
taken under this Regulation which would amount to a specific action against a subsidy within the 
meaning of Article  32.1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and granted by 
a third country which is a member of the World Trade Organisation. Subsidies that are not covered 
by the SCM  Agreement  can be investigated and redressed, if required, under the FSR. 
 
All assessments under the FSR [FWP] are to be based on objective criteria related to the presence 
of foreign subsidies in accordance with Article  3 FSR and their potential or actual distortive effects 
on the EU internal market in view of the indicato rs as specified under Article  4 FSR.  
 
Acts adopted by the Commission under the FSR are subject to potential review by the Court of 
Justice of the European  Union  in accordance with Article  263 TFEU. In this regard, any natural or 
legal person may institute  proceedings against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct 
and individual concern to them if they consider that the Commission has exceeded its prerogatives 
in the application of the FSR.  
 
b. Africa  
Paragraph 3.44  
UK Question 32 : Could the EU please explain whether it intends on negotiating any further bilateral 
investment facilitation agreements?  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 16 - 
 
  
 Reply:  Yes, the EU intends to negotiate further bilateral Sustainable Investment Facilitation 
Agreements (SIFAs) with interested partner countrie s, focusing on Africa.  
 
c. Asia 
Paragraph 3.48  
UK Question 33 : Could the EU please provide detail on its expected timelines for the GI Agreement 
with India? Is there a completion date the parties are aiming for?  
 
Reply: The EU is currently negotiating a bilateral agreement with India in view of protecting 
geographical indications. So far there were 3 rounds of negotiations, and both Parties are committed 
to the positive outcome of the process and to a rapid conclusion. It is not however poss ible to 
estimate exactly when that will be.  
 
d. Pacific  
Paragraph 3.50  
UK Question 34:  Could the EU please explain how it ensures the trade and gender equality provisions 
within the EU's agreement are considered in the implementation of the wider trade agr eement and 
objectives?  
 
Reply:  Article  1.5.2 of the free trade agreement between the European  Union  and New  Zealand  
stipulates that the agreement shall be an integral part of the overall bilateral relations as governed 
by the Partnership Agreement on Relat ions and Cooperation between the European  Union  and its 
member states and New  Zealand , and that it shall form part of the common institutional framework. 
The institutional framework of the free trade agreement covers all matters of the agreement, 
including  gender provisions. According to the institutional provisions, each Party may refer any issue 
relating to the implementation, application and interpretation of the agreement to the relevant 
committee. The functions of these committees include, inter alia, to consider ways to further 
enhance trade and investment between the Parties, to supervise and facilitate the implementation 
and application of the agreement, and to consider and discuss any matter of interest relating to an 
area covered by the agreement. The foreseen institutional framework thus grants sufficient 
possibilities to consider gender equality related matters in the implementation of the free trade 
agreement, including the rights of Maori women on the side of New  Zealand . 
 
e.  Latin America and the Caribbean  
Paragraph 3.53  
UK Question 35:  Could the EU please provide an update on the technical work to finalise the 
EU-Mercosur Agreement? How does the EU intend to make sustainable development provisions of 
the agreement enforceable?  
Reply: Outstanding technical issues in the EU -Mercosur Agreement are mainly related to the legal 
revision of the texts. The provisions of the Sustainable Development Chapter are enforceable under 
international law. A specific dispute resolution mechanism is f oreseen for disputes under the Chapter.  
Paragraph 3.56   
UK Question 36 : Could the EU please explain if the 11 Central American GIs protected in June 2022 
passed through opposition procedures in the EU? If so, where was this opposition procedure 
publicised ? 
 
Reply:  On 23  June 2022, the EU -Central America Association Council decided to add 10 names from 
El Salvador  and one from Costa  Rica to the list of geographical indications protected in the EU under 
the agreement establishing the Association between the European  Union  and its Member States, on 
the one hand, and Central America, on the other ( OJ L 216, 19.8.2022, p. 22 –26). That decision 
was preceded by opposition procedures in the EU, which were publicised in the Official Journal of the 
European  Union  on 28  December  2021 ( OJ C 522, 28.12.2021, p. 20 –21) and 6  December  2021 
(OJ C 489, 6.12.2021, p. 10 –11), respectively.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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5 SUSTAINABILTY  
5.1 The EU's actions on climate change and enviro nmental protection  
5.1.1  Overview of the actions on climate change and environmental protection  
Paragraph 5.5  
UK Question 37:  Could the EU please provide information on why international aviation is included 
in the European Commission's modelling of the ta rget for the EU to reach net zero greenhouse gas 
emissions by 2050 but not maritime transport?  
Reply:  This is incorrect. Section  4.1 of the  LTS in -depth analysis  describes how also the international 
maritime sector was addressed in the scenario analysis.  
Paragraph 5.7  
UK Question 38:  Could the EU please explain how it expects the CBAM to take into account other 
countries with similarly high carbon prices?  
 
Reply:  
The CBAM Regulation ensures that carbon prices effectively paid in a third country will be de ducted 
from the number of CBAM charge due, after the end of the transitional period.  
 
During the transitional period starting in October 2023, importers of goods covered by the Regulation 
will notably have to report on direct and indirect emissions as wel l as on the carbon price possibly 
paid in the country of origin.  
 
The European Commission is open to dialogue with its international partners on how to take into 
account the carbon price paid by their exporters for goods under the scope of the CBAM Regula tion, 
so as to better understand their carbon pricing mechanisms and most effectively take them into 
consideration after the end of the transitional period.  
 
As an example, UK exports entering the EU will be subject to CBAM. Nevertheless, the CBAM charge 
will take into account the carbon prices paid in the country of production and will deduct it from the 
adjustment. Consequently, as long as the effective carbon price of the UK -ETS is at least the same 
as the EU -ETS carbon price, UK originating goods will n ot be subject to CBAM adjustment. This will 
bring the border adjustment to zero, and this is also true for electricity. However, the embedded 
emissions of these goods will have to be reported.  
 
We welcome your recent public consultation covering different policy measures aiming at addressing 
the issue of carbon leakage, including a UK CBAM.  
 
UK Question 39 : Could the EU please share details of the impact assessment it has undertaken on 
the impact of the implementation of CBAM and expansion of ETS on third c ountries to date?  
 
Reply:  The European Commission published an impact assessment accompanying the draft 
legislative proposal on the CBAM in July 2021 ( link).  
 
The European Commission will present before the end of the transitional period a report on the 
application of the Regulation (cf. Article  30 of the Regulation). The Commission will monitor the 
functioning of the CBAM with a view to evaluating the impacts and possible adjustments in its 
application.  
 
Paragraph 5.8  
UK Question 40:  Could they EU please explain if there are any concerns on the c ompetitiveness 
levels of EU Steel products in markets outside the EU once free allocations are withdrawn? Are there 
any plans to include these markets into market access agreements? Does the EU foresee export 
rebates working alongside the CBAM?  
 
Reply:  The EU has set a very ambitious goal of becoming climate neutral by 2050 and of reducing 
its emissions by 55  % by 2030. It is now setting in place a regulatory framework to achieve this 
goal. Our high targets will require increasing the effectiveness of all i nstruments aiming at reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions and will necessarily have an impact on the availably of free allowances, 
which are a less effective instrument than CBAM to incentivise decarbonisation and avoid carbon 
leakage. Thus, CBAM will be phas ed in as EU ETS free allocations are phased out.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 18 - 
 
  
 The CBAM Regulation does not foresee export rebates. The Regulation foresees a smooth transition 
from free allocation of EU ETS allowances to CBAM. This should give time, legal certainty, and 
predictability  for both EU and third country business to plan green investments and adjust to different 
circumstances. As for any EU regulation, we will monitor the impact through the implementation.  
 
Finally, our impact assessment demonstrates that competitiveness is not severely affected by CBAM. 
Short term export losses will be compensated by import substitution and higher demand in the 
internal market. More information on the impact of CBAM on the steel sector can be found in the 
impact assessment accompanying the R egulation, viewed at:  https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A52021SC0643 .  
 
UK Question 41 : Could the EU please update on the progress of its separate new emissions trading 
system set up for fuel distribution for road transport and buildings, preliminarily agreed in 
December  2022?  
 
Reply:  The revised ETS Directive establishes a new emissions trading system (ETS 2) for emissions 
from fuels used in buildings, road transport and industry currently outside of the EU Emissions 
Trading System (ETS). The Directive was formally adopted on 10  May and will enter into force shortly 
after publication in the Offic ial Journal of the EU.  
 
The European Commission is now working on the implementation of the revised ETS Directive 
through various implementing and delegated acts. This covers the new system's framework – among 
other, the auctioning and the monitoring and reporting rules. Notwithstanding, the ETS 2 will become 
operational only in 2027 (or in 2028 if a safeguard mechanism in the event of exceptionally high 
energy prices becomes activated and postpones the start of the system by one year).  
 
Paragraph 5.12  
UK Question 42 : Could the EU please provide information on the methodology they are using to 
create their deforestation risk benching marking tool for producer countries?  
Reply:  The deforestation risk benchmarking system will be based on an objective and tran sparent 
assessment, taking into account the latest scientific evidence and internationally recognized sources. 
The assessment of the Commission must primarily take into account  criteria stipulated by 
Article  29(3). The assessment may also take into account  other criteria as described in Article  29(4) 
of the Regulation.  
5.1.3  Decarbonising Energy and Sustainable Transport  
Paragraph 5.25  
UK Question 43 : Could the EU please explain how the targets are being monitored and measured to 
ensure the benefits are bei ng realised under the Fit For 55 Package?  
 
Reply:  The Fit for 55 package was presented by the European Commission in 2021 to deliver on the 
medium -term target  of a 55% reduction in CO2 -emissions in 2030 compared to 1990 with a view to 
climate neutrality in 2050. Several of the targets presented in 2021 were made even more ambitious 
in 2022 as part of the REpowerEU plan.  
 
With the REPowerEU Plan the Commission proposed to increase the 2030 renewable energy  target  
to 45%. In March 2023 negotiations among EU co -legislators ended with an agreement to increase  
the target to at least 42.5% in 2030 with the aim to reach 45%. The Commission also proposed to 
raise the E U's 2030 energy efficiency target  to 13 % compared to a 2020 scenario. Negotiations 
among EU co -legislators ended in March 2023 with an agreement for an energy efficiency target 
of 11.7% in 2030.  
 
The newly agreed renewable energy and energy efficiency tar gets are binding at an EU -level. 
Member States shall therefore set national contributions to meet these targets collectively in their 
10-year National Energy and Climate Plans , covering the period 2021 to 2030 and define a 
strategy, policies and measures t o achieve them. The Commission assesses these plans to ensure 
that the national targets are sufficient collectively to satisfy the EU targets.  
 
Monitoring is also supported through the annual State of the Energy Union report  (Article  35 of 
the Governance Regulation 2018/1999) which includes a range of supplementary reports. WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Furthermore , the aggregate assessment of progress  (Article  29 of the Governance Regulation), 
which is based primarily on the progress reports every two years, also contributes to monito ring.  
 
The ReFuelEU Aviation proposal sets the minimum binding sustainable aviation fuels (SAF) targets 
for aviation fuel suppliers with a dedicated sub -target for synthetic fuels. In the Commission 
proposal, fuel suppliers will have reporting obligations  towards their national competent authorities 
and to the European  Union  Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). On the basis of their reported data, EASA 
will publish a report. Member States will be in charge of the enforcement.  
 
The FuelEU Maritime Regulation set s increasingly stringent targets to reduce the annual average 
GHG intensity of energy used by ships. Companies are obliged to continuously monitor and report 
the emission factors of the energy used onboard, which will be checked by independent verifiers an d 
recorded in the FuelEU Database managed by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). 
Member States are responsible for the enforcement. The Commission has to evaluate and regularly 
report the results, including shipping's contribution to the EU climate  goals.  
 
5.2 Sustainability, fairness, and inclusiveness  
5.2.1  Gender equality and women's economic empowerment   
Paragraph 5.42  
UK Question 44:  The paragraph provides details of four Intellectual Property SME Helpdesks financed 
by the EU in China, Latin America, South -East Asia, India which assist EU SMEs. Could the EU please 
provide further information on the utilisation and successes of their S ME Helpdesks compared to the 
forecasted expectations?  
 
Reply:  The International Intellectual Property (IP) SME Helpdesks (China, South East Asia, Latin 
America and India) have achieved the following objectives. They have improved the awareness of 
EU SMEs a bout IP rules and their capacity to manage and protect their IP abroad. They have also 
provided the services requested and facilitated contacts with external providers and/or authorities. 
Finally, they have strengthened the links between EU SMEs and compan ies in the target markets. 
On 27  March  2023, the impact of the action shows over 15,000 stakeholders directly involved and 
7,830 queries received (the China Helpdesk being particularly efficient with over 2,500 queries 
answered, more than 98% of them withi n 3 working days, while the Latin America Helpdesk reached 
83% of the queries answered within 1 day); 501 trainings and 7,549 people trained (the China 
Helpdesk having been able to train twice the target number of staff); 585 matchmaking events (the 
South -East Asia Helpdesk alone carrying out over 200 of them); 147 case studies/real life examples 
on IP practices and six -monthly policy feedback reports produced by each helpdesk covering the 
latest developments of the IP system in each of the territories cove red by the action. They have 
been, in general, proactive in searching cooperation with relevant stakeholders (e.g. the EEN). The 
India Helpdesk, launched in November 2020, was able to reach comparable results to the existing 
International Helpdesks.  
 
5.2.3  Small and Medium Sized enterprises (SMEs)  
Paragraph 5.3.7   
UK Question 45 : Some SMEs find that the cost of sending small orders can be higher than the sale 
value. Could the EU please explain if it is evaluating any trade facilitation options to address this 
issue to ensure customers in the EU benefit from goods from small businesses globally?  
 
Reply:  Overall, the implementation of the VAT e -commerce package went smoothly, without major 
operational problems. However, in the early stages of impleme ntation, the Commission received 
several complaints from citizens about fees they had to pay to postal operators for completion of 
customs formalities for parcels from third countries. Therefore, the imposition of excessive postal 
fees by certain operators  was identified as an issue that required urgent attention and, to help 
address the issue, the Commission made a firm commitment to stakeholders to take action. To help 
provide more transparency in relation to postal fees charged by operators, the 
Commissi on requested information on the fees charged by national Universal Service Providers for 
postal services, which was collated in a table and published on the Commission's  website . The 
Commission also advised traders that consumer legislation requires information on price and any 
additional charges to be provided to consumers upfront and in a transparent manner so tha t the 
consumer can make a fully informed purchasing decision. The Commission also formally contacted 
certain Members States whose Universal Service Providers for postal services appear to charge 
excessive fees. Furthermore, the Commission also contacted al l other Member States asking them 
to confirm the fees that their national postal service providers charge and to clarify how the fee is WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 considered proportionate to the services rendered. The Commission is currently evaluating the 
replies and will endeavour  to ensure that Member State's national postal operators charge fees that 
are proportionate to the service rendered.  
 
UK Question 46 : Could the EU please explain the next stages of developing the Access2Markets 
platform?  
 
Reply:  The Directorate -General fo r Trade of the European Commission launched the Access2Markets 
platform in October 2020 offering a free, one -stop shop source of information about trade. Since the 
launch, the Directorate -General for Trade has developed the platform gradually, adding relev ant 
information for its over 4.5  million  users. For example, The Rules of Origin Self -Assessment tool 
(ROSA) has been updated and the Access2Markets platform now covers the key information for 
135 export markets. In addition, through this gradual developme nt, new interactive modules have 
been added such as the MyTradeAssistant for Services and Investment tool, the Access2Procurement 
tool and a new interactive tool to reflect restrictive measures imposed on EU exports to Russia and 
Belarus was added in 2022.  The Directorate -General for Trade continues to develop the 
Access2Markets platform in a gradual manner in order to offer users the most up to date key 
information they need for their trading activities and to keep users informed on our upcoming 
training a ctivities.  
 
Paragraph 5.3.9  
UK Question 47 : In relation to the SME strategy that was adopted on 10  March  2020, based on the 
SME Performance Review, could the EU please explain if the new strategy is working, or what lessons 
are there to learn when implementing a SME strategy in the future?  
 
Reply:  The SME Strategy contains a number of actions in support of small - and medium -sized 
enterprises. All these actions have been either already implemented or implementation has started. 
The strategy has given  a new impetus to SME policy in the EU, also in view of the fact that many 
principles of SME policy are still guided by the Small Business Act from 2008, revised in 2011, but 
needed upgrading and reorientation. Results are positive, even in light of the pa ndemic and the 
Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the economic situation stemming from this.  
The annual SME performance review (SPR)  looks in more general terms at how SMEs are doing in 
Europe and how SME policy initiatives help companies, respectively how policy implementation 
evolves. The SPR, produced since 2008 when the Small Business Act was adopted, provide s a 
continuous benchmark for the economic performance of companies and the performance of SME 
policy.  
5.2.5  Gender equality and women's economic empowerment  
Paragraph 5.46  
UK Question 48:  Could the EU please give examples of implementation activities which  it has carried 
out with partners to date, to address the constraints faced by women in trade and promote women's 
economic empowerment?  
 
Reply:  The EU promotes gender equality through a number of channels and activities. For instance, 
the European  Union  and the International Trade Centre, in January 2022, launched the project on 
Developing a Gender -Lens Framework for the work of the WTO. The project provided suggestions 
on how gender considerations can be integrated into the current structure of th e WTO and Members' 
domestic policies, and underscored the importance of harmonising concepts, objective criteria and 
data collection. These suggestions are published on  
https://www .shetrades.com/outlook/resources/0/publications .  
 
On bilateral level, there are also several implementation activities. For instance, the EU and Canada 
have adopted a Trade and Gender Recommendation in the context of the Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement (CETA) that seeks to recognize the importance of making trade policies and 
trade agreements more gender -responsive. Based on this, the EU and Canada for example organised 
a webinar on the role of ge nder and responsive standards.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Paragraph 5.48  
UK Question 49:  Could the EU please provide specific examples where it has worked with 
stakeholders at the multilateral level and how this has impacted its work?  
 
Reply:  The EU engages actively with governmen tal as well as non -governmental stakeholders at 
the multilateral level. Overall, meaningful stakeholder engagement and regular consultations 
continues to inform the EU's work globally, at multilateral fora, but also at regional and country 
levels. Engaging  with all groups, including those in marginalised and vulnerable positions, is essential 
for the EU to be aware of emerging risks and opportunities, and to respond through relevant 
measures for impact in any specific context.  
 
An example of multilateral en gagement, at the 67th Session of the UN Commission on the Status of 
Women in New York this year, as per the standard practice for the EU we included civil society 
representatives in the EU's delegation. We facilitated consultations and meetings with women's civil 
society organ isations including on the EU's position in negotiations for conclusions of the session. 
We also ensured that a diverse range of stakeholders, including academia, civil society and private 
sector representatives from within and outside Europe were included as panellists in side -events 
organised by the EU.  
 
Attendance of the EU Ambassador for Gender and Diversity to the Delphi forum in which she spoke 
about gendered disinformation is another example of the way the EU engages with different 
stakeholders. The different forms of multi -stakeholder collaborations have enabled the EU to gain a 
better understanding of diverse views and challenges of different interlocutors and thus enabled 
development of policy frameworks that take these into account.  
 
6 ENFORCEMENT  AND RESPONDING TO TRADE DISTORTIVE PRACTICES  
6.4 The EU's public procurement policy  
Paragraph 6.18  
UK Question 50:  Could  the EU please  explain  how it plans  to ensure  its public  procurement  market  
for digital  and cloud  services  will remain  open and transpa rent for third country  cloud  service  
suppliers?  
 
Reply:  The EU has committed itself under international agreements (such as the Agreement on 
Government Procurement and bilateral Free Trade Agreements with Procurement Chapters), to grant 
access to its publi c procurement market for certain works, supplies, services and economic operators 
of several third countries. Accordingly, the EU public procurement directives provide, for public 
buyers in the EU, to accord to the works, supplies, services and economic op erators of the signatories 
to those agreements treatment that is no less favourable than the treatment accorded to the works, 
supplies, services and economic operators of the EU, in so far as these are covered by these 
agreements.  
 
ENISA is currently prepa ring a candidate EU Cloud Security Certification Scheme, which the 
Commission can afterwards adopt by means of an implementing act (following the procedure 
outlined in the EU Cybersecurity Act). In this context, the Commission will ensure that the scheme 
is compliant and fully aligned with EU law, international commitments and WTO obligations.  
 
8 DEFENDING THE EU'S INTERESTS AND VALUES  
8.1 Investment Screening   
Paragraph 8.3  
UK Question 51 : Could the EU please explain if it is committed to a sector -agnostic approach to 
investment screening? Will the EU share best practice on its screening framework for FDI?  
 
Reply:  The FDI Screening Regulation (EU) 2019/452 established a framework for the s creening of 
FDI in the EU which allows the Commission and Member States to identify, assess and mitigate 
potential risks for security or public order in relation to FDI. The Regulation applies to all sectors.  
 
The Commission is currently working closely w ith Member States to implement the cooperation 
mechanism and exchange best practices.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 9 EXTERNAL IMPACTS OF THE EU'S INTERNAL POLICIES  
9.1 Digital services and online platforms  
Paragraph 9.2  
UK Question 52 : The Digital Markets Act (DMA) refers to avoiding  fragmentation in the internal 
market; however, it does not preclude Member States from imposing further obligations on providers 
of core platform services for matters falling outside the scope of the DMA and it is without prejudice 
to the application of n ational competition rule. Could the EU please explain what steps it is taking to 
prevent inconsistency?  
 
Reply: The concentration of power in large gatekeeper platforms is a global phenomenon. The 
benefits of a successful introduction of fair behaviour, an d contestable markets, is to safeguard 
long-term innovation. This is why EU -level market regulation is required for precisely those largest 
players. This regulatory framework complements a continued, rigorous enforcement of competition 
law. This does not m ean that the DMA does not harmonise: it is a single market, harmonisation 
instrument that foresees a role for national authorities to help in the enforcement of the DMA, which 
is the priority, and it prevents national governments from adopting rules applic able to the same 
gatekeepers for the same purposes, i.e. safeguarding the fairness and contestability of the digital 
sector. The harmonisation effect of any European rule is limited to the scope and objectives pursued 
by that rule. The Commission is in con tact with Member States to ensure that any draft legislation 
respects these harmonising and efficiency principles. The Commission has the powers to act against 
national laws that overlap with or contradict European rules, against their harmonising effect. 
Furthermore, the DMA itself provides for a mechanism of cooperation and coordination with 
enforcement authorities applying national competition rules, which aims to ensure that objectives of 
the DMA are not undermined.  
 
Paragraph 9.4  
UK Question 53 : The D igital Services Act allows law enforcement agencies or profit -seeking industry 
organisations to apply for the status of a trusted flagger, the notices of which must be treated with 
priority. As each Member State assigns different rights and responsibilitie s to its police force, could 
the EU please explain what steps it is taking to prevent inconsistencies?  
 
Reply:  The role of trusted flaggers is restricted to illegal content. The Digital Services Act does not 
define what is illegal: il refers to existing d efinitions of illegality in the national legislation of the EU 
Member States, in compliance with Union law. Trusted flaggers need to have the necessary expertise 
and accuracy as regards a given type of illegality –regardless of their public or private natu re. The 
status of trusted flagger has to be awarded subject to harmonised criteria laid out in the 
Digital  Services Act, and this status can be revoked if the conditions are no longer fulfilled. Trusted 
flaggers in this regard are bound to transparency – precisely to ensure public oversight of their work. 
In all of these points, it should be recalled that the Digital Services Act is a single market, 
harmonisation instrument. Finally, in order to ensure consistency among the practices followed by 
the differe nt Digital Services Coordinators, the Commission will be able to issue guidelines.  
 
Paragraph 9.6  
UK Question 54 : The European Parliament and Council, along with the European Commission, 
provisionally agreed the EU 'Chips Act' on 18  April. Could the EU ple ase provide more detail on the 
proposed monitoring and crisis response mechanism, and explain to what extent the EU has 
considered potential impact on third countries should they seek to direct output or EU based fabs 
and/or introduce export controls? This  includes adverse impact on third party critical national 
infrastructure (electricity grids, utilities, transport) or supply chains of critical economic importance.  
 
Reply:  The mechanism for monitoring and crisis response of the EU Chips Act pursues 
two objectives. First, to increase the understanding of the semiconductor value chain and enable 
anticipating disruptions through monitoring and information exchange. Second, to allow a 
coordinated response to shortages and ensure supply to critical sectors, s uch as health, defence or 
energy. To that end, the EU Chips Act provides that the Commission and Member States should 
carry out strategic mapping and monitoring of the semiconductor sector and provides how the EU 
will respond to risks of serious disruption s in the supply of semiconductors through an alert and 
coordination mechanism and a set of exceptional crisis response measures.  
 
The EU Chips Act does not foresee an immediate and automatic use of measures that result in a 
re-direction of output of EU bas ed fabs or export control. The use of the exceptional crisis response 
measures provided in the EU Chips Act – namely information requests, priority rated orders and WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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common purchasing – requires a crisis activation through a decision of the Council of the E U. The 
use of each crisis tool will be decided after careful consideration of necessity and proportionality, in 
coordination with the EU Member States and international partners. The EU will cooperate with 
third countries to seek cooperative solutions to a ddress disruptions of the semiconductor supply 
chain. Such cooperation would allow to discuss possible adverse impacts of crisis response measures.  
 
9.2 Single Market for goods  
Paragraph 9.7  
UK Question 55 : Noting the reference in the EU Standardisation Strategy to the promotion of 
international cooperation on standards, could the EU please provide detail on its policy on mutual 
recognition of conformity assessment bodies and markings to support international trade, including 
any criteria for selection of third countries with which to negotiate mutual recognition agreements?  
 
Reply:  
The EU has mutual recognition agreements of conformity assessment with developed countries 
dating back to 1998 -2002, which can be categorised as follows : 1) tr aditional MRAs – comprising 
only recognition of conformity assessment results (Australia, New  Zealand , Japan, the US, Canada); 
2) enhanced MRAs in which the partner country has regulatory requirements equivalent to those of 
the EU (Switzerland, Israel); 3)  "best standards" MRAs in which both the EU and the partner country 
apply the same international requirements (EU -US MRA on marine equipment). These MRAs also 
vary somewhat in terms of their sectoral scope (e.g. telecoms, maritime equipment, electromagneti c 
compatibility, low voltage etc.).  
 
UK Question 56:  SMEI measures are focussed on the effective operation of the Single Market, though 
in a crisis supply chains running across Single Market frontiers are likely to be the cause of significant 
disruption. Could the EU please explain if plans to open engagement channels at each stage of the 
SMEI framework with third countries in respect of goods entering shortage, enabling discussion of 
shortage management plans to ensure greater awareness and coordination – and enabling practical 
bilateral steps to remove emerging obstacles as quickly as possible?  
 
Reply:  The European Commission's proposal for a Single Market Emergency Instrument, provides 
that the Commission shall, where appropriate, enter into consultation s or cooperation, on behalf of 
the Union, with relevant third countries, with particular attention paid to developing countries, with 
a view to seeking cooperative solutions to address supply chain disruptions, in compliance with 
international obligations.  This shall involve, where appropriate, coordination in relevant international 
fora. The Commission's proposal is currently subject to the legislative process with a view of being 
adopted in the near future.  
 
UK Question 57:  Measures to require economic operators to provide information or prioritise orders 
are likely to disrupt trade with third countries. Could the EU please explain what principles would 
guide decisions about imposing such requests/requirements? Would such de cisions be made only 
after alternative steps for managing shortages have been exhausted? How does the EU propose to 
take account impacts on third countries before imposing such requests/requirements? Where the EU 
takes decisions to prioritise orders – will the EU notify these as export restrictions?  
 
Reply:  The specific provision of the SMEI proposal regarding the priority rated orders (Article  27) 
provides 1) legal protection to companies that have accepted the request and are subject to EU 
Member States c ontractual obligations, and 2) the possibility to companies to refuse the request in 
duly justified cases such as serious risk of economic burden that would also cover liability vis -à-vis 
third parties under third countries contractual obligations.  
 
Any d ecision to prioritise an order would be taken on an individual basis and will concern a specific 
economic operator. Thus, such a measure would not be a measure of general application and it 
cannot be assimilated to an export restriction.  
 
With respect to Article  24 of the SMEI proposal concerning information requests, the decisions, which 
may be taken under this provision, would not interfere with any pre -existing or future contractual 
obligations for the supply of goods. The provision on information reque sts is exclusively focused on 
the exchange of information between economic operators and the Commission, subject to specific 
conditions and criteria laid down therein. Therefore, the potential activation of this provision cannot 
disrupt trade flows. The de cisions for priority rated orders and information request shall be regarded WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 as last resort measures for response to a single market emergency. The Commission proposal is 
currently subject to the EU legislative process.  
 
UK Question 58:  The building of stra tegic reserves during the SMEI vigilance phase is likely to place 
strain on supply chains. Could the EU please explain how it will judge 'proportionate strain' on supply 
chains, and to what extent will the effect on global supply and goods access be consid ered before 
requiring reserves to be built up within the Single Market?  
 
Reply:  Article  12 of the SMEI Proposal, which concerns strategic reserves lays down a multi -tiered 
mechanism, which is essentially based on information exchange between the Member Sta tes as well 
as on a best endeavour obligation for the Member States to start building up strategic reserves of 
goods, which may become crisis relevant. Where the building up of strategic reserves can be 
rendered more effective by streamlining among Member States, the Commission may draw up 
individual targets per Member State taking into account certain elements. Only as an ultimate stage 
of the process, a Member State may be obliged to build up reserves. The proposal lays down a 
general obligation for the C ommission to ensure that the building up of strategic reserves does not 
create a disproportionate burden on the fiscal capacity of the Member State in question.  
 
The principle of proportionality is thus embedded in the different assessments that the Commi ssion 
is required to carry out at various stages of the mechanism. More specifically, due regard is taken 
inter alia to the potential sources of alternative supply as well as the stocks which are held by 
economic operators and any efforts on their side to increase the availability of the concerned goods. 
Furthermore, when determining whether to adopt a decision requiring one or more Member States 
to build up their strategic reserves by a set deadline, the Commission is required to establish certain 
elements  explicitly listed in paragraph 6, including the risk of grave imperil to the Union's 
preparedness in the face of an impending threat of a Single Market emergency in the absence of 
such strategic reserves. Thus, the global nature of the supply chains will be taken into consideration 
when deploying this mechanism and when determining which is the more appropriate level.  
 
Finally, a coordinated approach towards the constitution of strategic reserves among the Member 
States has the potential of actually allevi ating the burden on the global supply chains as it would 
contribute to a streamlining of the demand.  
 
The Commission proposal is currently subject to the EU legislative process.  
 
UK Question 59:  Could the EU please explain what consideration it has given to the notification of 
any QR measures implemented by Member States through the emergency phase to the WTO, as 
well as strengthened processes for such notification beyond the SMEI emergency phase  (a broader 
learning from COVID -19)? 
 
Reply:  The SMEI proposal does not lay down any provisions, which may serve as a legal basis for 
the adoption of any export surveillance, export authorization or any other generally applicable 
measures restricting the e xport of goods outside of the EU. Article  2(6) of the SMEI proposal 
explicitly indicates that the application of the mechanisms under the SMEI are without prejudice to 
the application of Regulation (EU) 2015/479 of the European Parliament and of the Counci l. The 
Commission proposal is currently subject to the EU legislative process.  
 
9.4 Common agricultural policy  
Paragraph 9.27  
UK Question 60 : Could the EU please explain if it intends for any of the new elements of product 
specifications (social, environme ntal and economic sustainable undertakings) to become compulsory 
requirements in the future?  
 
Reply:  The Regulation establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products 
in 2021 introduced a new provision for wines and agricultural pro ducts. This provision states that 
the product specification may contain a description of the contribution of the designation of origin or 
geographical indication to sustainable development. The proposal for a regulation on GIs also 
provides that producer g roups may agree to include sustainability undertakings in the product 
specification on a voluntary basis that go beyond good practices in terms of social, environmental 
or economic undertakings. Regardless, the European Commission may in the future define 
sustainability standards in different sectors and lay down criteria for recognition of existing 
sustainability standards.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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9.5 Customs and trade facilitation  
Paragraphs 9.28. & 9.29  
UK Question 61 : Sections 9.28 and 9.29 outline the introduction of a Single  Window Environment 
for customs, could the EU please indicate the date that is being targeted for the B2G aspect of 
the SWE-C? 
 
Reply: The B2G dimension of the EU Single Window Environment for Customs will be fully 
implemented in the EU by 2031.  
 
UK Questi on 62:  Could the EU please explain what work is being undertaken to ensure consistency 
in application of customs checks within and across Member States?  
 
Reply:  Under the Common Risk Management Framework provided for in Article  46 of the Union 
Customs Code, the Member States are required to implement common risk criteria and standards 
for customs controls, within and across Member States, and to exchange risk information. The 
Commission and the Member States have put in place too ls to support a common operational 
approach, including the Customs Risk Management System for sharing of risk information, and the 
Import Control System (ICS, currently transitioning to the new ICS2), as well as common operational 
guidance.  
 
Under the Cus toms Control Equipment Instrument – a dedicated funding EU programme for the 
purchase of modern equipment – the Commission is supporting the continuous efforts of the customs 
authorities to equip their border crossing points in an adequate and equivalent m anner which also 
contributes to harmonised customs controls.  
 
Paragraph 9.32  
UK Question 63 : Section  9.32 outlines the OSS simplifications scheme for collecting VAT. Could the 
EU please explain what work is being undertaken to prevent instances of VAT bein g paid twice (at 
point of sale and point of importation) despite IOSS being correctly set up?  
 
Reply:  Following the introduction of the Import One -Stop Shop (IOSS) on 1  July 2021, double 
taxation, arising under certain circumstances, was identified as an i ssue that required urgent 
attention. Two primary causes of double taxation were identified as a result of:  
 
1. the non -communication of the supplier's IOSS number because the postal operator was unable 
to transmit the IOSS number  
2. some Member States not  being in a position to validate the IOSS number in a full customs 
declaration (H1)  
 
In this regard, the Commission facilitated a meeting of experts from both tax and customs 
administrations to discuss possible solutions to address the issue of double taxation. Following that 
meeting, and without prejudice to solving the core and fundament al causes of double taxation, which 
have since been resolved, the Commission devised a short -term solution to address the issue of 
double taxation. The solution, which reflected the view of delegates who participated in the joint 
meeting of VAT and customs  experts, was unanimously agreed at the VAT Committee. VAT 
Committee guidelines  on how regularise double  taxation in the IOSS VAT return were subsequently 
published on 28  February  2022.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 UNITED  KINGDOM  – FOLLOW -UP QUESTIONS  
UK Question 4:  Could the EU please explain how it will ensure current and future digital regulations, 
including cybersecurity schemes, do not lead to unjustified data localisation?  
 
EU Reply:  The EU cloud market remains open to all providers that provide their services  in line with 
applicable legislation, irrespective of their origin. However, it is essential that data can be stored and 
processed securely in Europe. Highly sensitive procurement programmes may therefore, as is the 
case in other countries, pose specific r equirements to ensure the security of data. Increasingly, 
international cloud providers are taking measures to offer guarantees on data localisation, and other 
organisational and legal measures to avoid exposure to foreign laws with extraterritorial effect . For 
international as well as European providers, the soon -to-be-published EU Cloud Rulebook will provide 
transparency as a one -stop-shop for better navigating the EU cloud regulatory landscape. At the 
request of the Commission, the European  Union  Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) is currently 
preparing a candidate EU Cloud Security Certification Scheme (EUCS), which the Commission can 
afterwards adopt by means of an implementing act (following the procedure outlined in the EU 
Cybersecurity Act). In this co ntext, the Commission will ensure that the scheme is compliant and 
fully aligned with EU law, international commitments and WTO obligations.  
 
UK Follow -up Question : Could the EU please set out how data sensitivity levels will be defined for 
the purpose of EUCS?  
 
EU follow -up reply : The identification of sensitive data will be determined through the risk 
assessments that individual organisations (consumers and providers) must carry out. The security 
assurance level is to be set in accordance with the organis ations' determined risk tolerance and in 
line with the definition of each assurance level. The EU -internal processes to finalise the contents 
and prepare the adoption of the EU Cloud Security Certification Scheme (EUCS) are still ongoing.  
 
UK Question 56:  SMEI measures are focussed on the effective operation of the Single Market, though 
in a crisis supply chains running across Single Market frontiers are likely to be the cause of significant 
disruption. Could the EU please explain if plans to open engagemen t channels at each stage of the 
SMEI framework with third countries in respect of goods entering shortage, enabling discussion of 
shortage management plans to ensure greater awareness and coordination – and enabling practical 
bilateral steps to remove emer ging obstacles as quickly as possible?  
 
EU Reply:  The European Commission's proposal for a Single Market Emergency Instrument, provides 
that the Commission shall, where appropriate, enter into consultations or cooperation, on behalf of 
the Union, with rel evant third countries, with particular attention paid to developing countries, with 
a view to seeking cooperative solutions to address supply chain disruptions, in compliance with 
international obligations. This shall involve, where appropriate, coordinati on in relevant international 
fora. The Commission's proposal is currently subject to the legislative process with a view of being 
adopted in the near future.  
 
UK Follow -up Question:  Could the EU please clarify whether engagements with third countries to 
coordinate shortage management plans, as well as exchanging evidence and trade flow information, 
will be a core activity of the advisory group, as well as of the Commission, taking place at each stage 
of the framework? Does the EU propose to establish any fo rmal mechanisms in partnership with 
third countries to establish suitable information exchanges?  
 
EU follow -up reply : The European Commission's proposal for a Single Market Emergency 
Instrument foresees consultations with third countries to address supply chain disruptions.  
 
UK Question 57:  Measures to require economic operators to provide information or prioritise orders 
are likely to disrupt trade with third countries. Could the EU please explain what principles would 
guide decisions about imposing such requests/requirements? Would such decisions be made only 
after alternative steps for managing shortages have been exhausted? How does the EU propose to 
take account impacts on third countries before imposing such requests/requirements? Where the EU 
takes d ecisions to prioritise orders – will the EU notify these as export restrictions?  
 
EU Reply:  The specific provision of the SMEI proposal regarding the priority rated orders (Article  27) 
provides 1) legal protection to companies that have accepted the reques t and are subject to EU 
Member States contractual obligations, and 2) the possibility to companies to refuse the request in WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 27 - 
 
duly justified cases such as serious risk of economic burden that would also cover liability vis -à-vis 
third parties under third cou ntries contractual obligations.  
 
Any decision to prioritise an order would be taken on an individual basis and will concern a specific 
economic operator. Thus, such a measure would not be a measure of general application and it 
cannot be assimilated to an export restriction.  
 
With respect to Article  24 of the SMEI proposal concerning information requests, the decisions, which 
may be taken under this provision, would not interfere with any pre -existing or future contractual 
obligations for the supply of goods. The provision on information requests is exclusively focused on 
the exchange of information between economic operators and the Commission, subject to specific 
conditions and criteria laid down therein. Therefore, the potential activati on of this provision cannot 
disrupt trade flows. The decisions for priority rated orders and information request shall be regarded 
as last resort measures for response to a single market emergency. The Commission proposal is 
currently subject to the EU leg islative process.  
 
UK Follow -up Question:  Could the EU please clarify whether supply chain disruptions to 
third countries would be taken into account when deciding to request order prioritisation? Could the 
EU also clarify how the impact on economic operators of information requests will be considered – 
bearing in mind the impact such administration can have on their operation at a time of potentially 
significant strain?  
 
EU follow -up reply : The Commission proposal for priority rated orders p rovision provides that 
when deciding to request order prioritisation, the Commission's decision shall be based on objective 
data showing that such prioritisation is indispensable to ensure the maintenance of vital societal 
economic activities in the Single  Market. The objective data refers to any reliable information that is 
available to the Commission at the time. Information requests can be sent to economic operators 
after a number of implementing acts, which will all contain an assessment of the necessit y and 
proportionality of the request, including its effect on the economic operators concerned.  
 
UK Question 58:  The building of strategic reserves during the SMEI vigilance phase is likely to place 
strain on supply chains. Could the EU please explain how it will judge 'proportionate strain' on supply 
chains, and to what extent will the effect on global supply and goods access be considered before 
requiring reserves to be built up within the Single Market?  
 
EU Reply:  Article  12 of the SMEI Proposal, which c oncerns strategic reserves lays down a multi -tiered 
mechanism, which is essentially based on information exchange between the Member States as well 
as on a best endeavour obligation for the Member States to start building up strategic reserves of 
goods, wh ich may become crisis relevant. Where the building up of strategic reserves can be 
rendered more effective by streamlining among Member States, the Commission may draw up 
individual targets per Member State taking into account certain elements. Only as an ultimate stage 
of the process, a Member State may be obliged to build up reserves. The proposal lays down a 
general obligation for the Commission to ensure that the building up of strategic reserves does not 
create a disproportionate burden on the fiscal c apacity of the Member State in question.  
 
The principle of proportionality is thus embedded in the different assessments that the Commission 
is required to carry out at various stages of the mechanism. More specifically, due regard is taken 
inter alia to the potential sources of alternative supply as well as the stocks which are held by 
economic operators and any efforts on their side to increase the availability of the concerned goods. 
Furthermore, when determining whether to adopt a decision requiring  one or more Member States 
to build up their strategic reserves by a set deadline, the Commission is required to establish certain 
elements explicitly listed in paragraph 6, including the risk of grave imperil to the Union's 
preparedness in the face of an impending threat of a Single Market emergency in the absence of 
such strategic reserves. Thus, the global nature of the supply chains will be taken into consideration 
when deploying this mechanism and when determining which is the more appropriate level.  
 
Finally, a coordinated approach towards the constitution of strategic reserves among the Member 
States has the potential of actually alleviating the burden on the global supply chains as it would 
contribute to a streamlining of the demand.  
 
The Commissio n proposal is currently subject to the EU legislative process.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 28 - 
 
  
 UK Follow -up Question:  Could the EU please clarify whether supply chain disruptions to 
third countries would be taken into account when deciding to request Member State stockpiling?  
 
EU follo w-up reply : Article  11(7) of the proposal provides that the Commission shall seek to ensure 
that the building up of strategic reserves does not create a disproportionate strain on the supply 
chains of the goods of strategic importance.  
 
UK Question 59:  Could the EU please explain what consideration it has given to the notification of 
any QR measures implemented by Member States through the emergency phase to the WTO, as 
well as strengthened processes for such notification beyond the SMEI emergency phase (a broader 
learning from COVID -19)? 
 
EU Reply:  The SMEI proposal does not lay down any provisions, which may serve as a legal basis 
for the adoption of any export surveillance, export authorization or any other generally applicable 
measures restricting the ex port of goods outside of the EU. Article  2(6) of the SMEI proposal 
explicitly indicates that the application of the mechanisms under the SMEI are without prejudice to 
the application of Regulation (EU) 2015/479 of the European Parliament and of the Council . The 
Commission proposal is currently subject to the EU legislative process.  
 
UK Follow -up Question:  While SMEI does not lay down provisions allowing Member States to apply 
export restrictions, we note that Article  19(1) of the SMEI requires Member States  to notify the 
Commission of any crisis -relevant draft measures restricting free movement of goods. We note that 
at present, Member State QR measures showing as active through current WTO notifications may 
no longer be active, while we are aware of others which have not been notified. Could enhanced 
notification requirements under Article  19(1) be used to ensure QR notifications relevant to EU 
Member States are issued in a timely way?  
 
EU follow -up reply : The notification system foreseen in Article  19 of the proposal applies only to 
the intra -EU free movement restrictions during Single Market emergencies.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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CANADA  
SECTION I: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE SECRETARIAT REPORT  
 
1. ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
1.2 Recent Economic Developments  
1.2.5 Employment trends, including gender  
Page 22, paragraph 1.27  
This report describes the employment statistics and how men and women are treated in the trade 
industry. It outlines that the EU has a wide gender gap and women also had a lower wage premiu m.  
 
Question 1:  Could the EU clarify what programs or policies will be implemented or establish in order 
to promote and close the gap between men and women in trade?  
 
Reply: In March 2014, the European Commission adopted a Recommendation on strengthening the 
principle of equal pay between men and women through transparency. The text of the 
Recommendation is publicly available at the official website of the EU at: https: //eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014H0124  
 
In March 2020, the European Commission published the EU Gender Equality Strategy 2020 -2025. 
The objective of closing gender gaps in the labour market, in a ll types of employment, is addressed 
by the Strategy and the measures envisaged therein. The text of the Strategy is publicly available 
at the official website of the EU at:  
https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0152  
 
As one of the first deliverables of the Strategy, the European Commission presented on 4  March  2021 
a proposal for a directive to strengthen the application of the principle of equal pay for equal work 
or work of equal value between men and women through pay transparency and enforcement 
mechanisms. The proposal is publicly available at the official website of the EU at: https://eur -
lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52021PC0093 . This directive was adopted on 
24 April 2023 and will enter into force by June. It will provide for more transparency in pay settings 
and effective enforcement of the equal pay principle between women and men, as well as improve 
access to justice for victims of pay discrimination. Pay transpar ency measures set out in the directive 
will encourage employers to review their pay settings and allow them to address hidden pay 
discrimination which may have reflected unconscious biases. In the long run, companies that apply 
fair and equal pay will be m ore attractive for workers, regardless of their gender or other grounds.  
  
The European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan calls to halve the gender employment gap by 2030. 
This will be paramount to progress on gender equality. Moreover, the European Pill ar of Social Rights 
highlights equal opportunities and access to the labour market, fair working conditions, and social 
protection and inclusion. Principle 2 of the Pillar specifically addresses gender equality, and 
principle  3 equal opportunities.  
 
A wid e range of EU initiatives support the employment and social inclusion of women. For example, 
the European Care Strategy, which has a strong gender component. Insufficient access to quality 
and affordable formal care services is one of the key drivers of ge nder inequality in the labour 
market. The European Commission presented on 7  September  2022 the European Care Strategy to 
ensure quality, affordable and accessible care services across the EU. The strategy is publicly 
available at the official website of t he EU at:  
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_5169  
  
The European Commission launched a campaign to challenge gende r stereotypes on 8  March  2023. 
This EU -wide campaign tackles gender stereotypes affecting both men and women in different 
spheres of life, including career choices, sharing care responsibilities and decision -making. It is 
publicly available at the official  website of the EU at:  
https://end -gender -stereotypes.campaign.europa.eu/index_en  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 30 - 
 
  
 On 5 March  2020, the European Commission published a report on the implementation of the EU 
Action Plan 2017 -2019 on tackling the gender pay gap through a holistic approach of 24 action points 
distributed under eight main strands of action. The implementation continues of the most action 
points. The report is publicly  available at the official website of the EU at:  
https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2020 -03/com -2020-101_en.pdf  
 
Question 2:  Also, if the EU has plans to promote women in the trade industry, are Indigenous 
Peoples being considered for the programs and policies?  
 
Reply: Promoting indigenous people, including access to economic opportunities, is the EU Member 
States' competence and outside of the scope of the EU common trade policy.  
 
However, the EU structural funds programme for Finland "Innovation and Skills Finl and 2021 -2027" 
recognises the importance of culturally sensitive support for the indigenous Sami people. The 
programme acknowledges also that the use of traditional knowledge of the Sami people is essential 
in adapting traditional livelihoods to changing c ircumstances and that the ability of local 
communities, including the Sami indigenous people, to adapt to climate change in the Arctic region 
needs to be developed. The part of the programme funded from the European Regional Development 
Fund (ERDF) include s a specific objective focused on promoting climate change adaptation and 
disaster risk prevention with activities supporting the adaptation of livelihoods to climate change, 
including nature tourism and other ecosystem -based businesses, as well as traditi onal and Sami 
industries. The Sami people can also participate and benefit from all five specific objectives funded 
from the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) focused on employment promotion, lifelong learning and 
inclusion.  
 
2. TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
2.3 Trade Agreements and Arrangements  
2.3.3 Other Agreements and Arrangements  
Page 44, paragraph 2.51  
The report states that "In November 2022, the European Union also entered into a Digital Partnership 
with the Republic of Korea, and ag reed on a set of non -binding Digital Trade Principles. The European 
Union is also planning to conclude a Digital Partnership and an agreement on Digital Trade Principles 
with Singapore. The parties expect that these Digital Trade Principles will complement  the 
WTO negotiations on e -commerce."  
 
Question 3:  How does the EU see its Digital Trade Principles complement the ongoing WTO 
negotiations on e -commerce?  
 
Reply: The Digital Trade Principles represent a common commitment to open digital markets which 
are competitive, transparent, fair, and free of unjustified barriers to international trade and 
investment. The text of the Digital Trade Principles concluded with the Republic of Korea and with 
Singapore is available online: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/help -exporters -and-
importers/accessing -markets/goods -and-services/digital -trade_en . The D igital Trade Principles 
build on the disciplines currently under discussion as part of the WTO negotiations on e -commerce.  
 
2.4 Investment Regimes  
2.4.1 Regulatory Framework  
Page 44, Paragraph 2.53   
It is noted that "the European Union adopted in March 2 019 a regulation to establish a common 
framework for the screening of FDI for reasons of security and public order.91 The regulation started 
applying on 11 October 2020, and it seeks, inter alia , to address concerns regarding FDI on assets 
deemed critical to EU interests. The regulation provides for a set of minimum requirements for the 
functioning of national screening mechanisms and for a cooperation mechanism to share 
information."  
 
Question 4:  Has there been any increase in the percentage as well as tot al numbers of investments 
that have been screened associated with the adoption of this regulation?  
 
Reply:  The implementation of Regulation (EU) 2019/452 was accompanied by an increased number 
of EU Member States setting up national FDI screening mechanism s. Hence, it can not be excluded 
that the number of screened investments has increased.   WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 31 - 
 
Question 5:  Is the EU aware of any impact on quarterly FDI associated with the coming into force 
of this regulation?  
 
Reply : We are not aware of such impact.  
 
Page 45, paragraph 2.56  
It is noted that "the European Union adopted in December 2022 a regulation to deal with the effects 
of foreign subsidies on the internal market (i.e. subsidies by a third country) and ensure a level 
playing field for all companies/invest ors. The regulation seeks to identify and address situations 
where a company receiving foreign subsidies causes distortions to the internal market through, 
inter alia, its participation in EU public procurements" . 
 
Question 6:  Can the EU elaborate on the r easons or experiences with subsidized investors that led 
to the creation on this new regulation?  
 
Reply: On 12  January  2023, the Foreign Subsidies Regulation ('FSR') entered into force. The FSR 
closes a regulatory gap: aid granted by EU Member States is su bject to close scrutiny under EU  State 
aid rules, whereas subsidies granted to companies active in the EU by non -EU countries went largely 
unchecked until now. With this Regulation, we are creating fair conditions for all companies active 
in the EU. Anyone doing business in the EU will be subject to the same rules when they are in receipt 
of subsidies.  
 
This new and comprehensive set of rules was needed as we have seen evidence of foreign subsidies 
distorting the EU internal market. In particular, fol lowing the adoption of the White Paper to launch 
a discussion on the subject and propose ideas for a new instrument, the Commission conducted an 
extensive consultation process with stakeholders, which is summarised on the public website of the 
initiative  (Trade & investment – addressing distortions caused by foreign subsidies (europa.eu) ). 
The Commission received 150 contribution s on the White paper from European businesses, industry 
associations, Member State authorities, third country stakeholders, law firms, academics, trade 
unions, NGOs and citizens. The replies to the public consultation, which are summarised at: 
foreign_subsidies_white_paper_2020_summary_public_consultation.pdf (europa.eu) , as well as the 
submissions  (Trade & investment – addressing distortions caused by foreign subsidies (europa.eu )) 
on the Inception Impact Assessment, published on 6  October  2020, and the targeted consultations  
that the Commission conducted with stakeholders in the sectors that are most harmed by distortive 
foreign subsidies, pointed to evidence that subsidies granted by third countries, while not a new 
issue, have gained prominence as a policy tool around the world in recent years:  
 
· Firstly, we have observed a steady rise of subsidy measures being used globally since the 
2008-2009 financial crisis, many of which are still in use today.  
 
· Secondly, more and more companies have approached us with complaints about their 
competitors having access to cheaper foreign financing, under preferential rules, a financing that is 
often not available to them even if they are present and active in a given third country.  
 
· Thirdly, we have be en provided with examples that foreign subsidies may give companies an 
unfair advantage when they compete in Europe, thereby distorting fair competition and a level 
playing field, in particular in the case of acquisitions of EU targets, winning bids in pub lic procurement 
contracts as well as in some other economic activities.  
 
This information, combined with the general lack of transparency regarding foreign subsidies in a 
number of foreign jurisdictions, were considered as important factors that increase the risk of 
distortions in the EU caused by foreign subsidies, and ultimately served as an impetus for the 
adoption of the FSR.  
 
2.4.2 Other aspects of the European  Union 's foreign investment regime  
Page 47, Paragraph 2.66:  It is noted that "each EU member  State has an Investment Promotion 
Agency, but there is no agency at the EU level" . 
Question 7:  Does the EU have any plans to establish a common, EU -wide investment promotion 
agency?  
 
Reply: Within the review period (2019 Q4 – Dec 2022) the EU has announce d no new policy 
regarding an eventual EU level investment promotion agency.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 3. TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURES  
3.1 Measures Directly Affecting Imports  
3.1.1 Customs Procedures, Valuation, and Requirements  
3.1.1.1 Recent and Future Developments  
Page 50, paragraph 3.10  
The report states that "The European Union also commissioned a report called Putting More Union 
in the European Customs, with 10 recommendations, mainly to address how to manage electronic 
commerce and EU -wide risks" . 
 
Question 8:  Has a decision been taken on the potential implementation of those recommendations?  
 
Reply:  The European Commission adopted the customs reform proposal on 17  May, taking into 
account those recommendations. Further information can be found in https://taxation -
customs.ec.europa.eu/customs -4/eu-customs -reform_en . 
 
The legislative proposals will now be sent to the co -legislators, the European Parliament and the 
Council of the European  Union , for agreement.  
 
3.1.4 Other Charges Affecting Imports  
3.1.4.2 Excise  
Page 73, paragraph 3.75  
It is noted that  minimum excise duty rates in the EU have not been updated since 1992, thus the 
Commission launched a public consultation process in April 2022 in the context of the evaluation of 
Council Directive 92/84/EEC. We understand the Commission is expected to pre pare an evaluation 
report in the second quarter of 2023.  
Question 9: Canada would like to inquire as to the status of this evaluation.  
 
Reply: Commission services continue to work on the evaluation of Directive 92/84/EEC on the 
approximation of the rates of excise duty on alcohol and alcoholic beverages. A planned adoption 
date will be indicated in due course.  
 
Box 3.4 Main changes in alcohol excise duties, 2020 -22  
Page 74, Box 3.4 Main changes in alcohol excise duties, 2020 -22 
Canada notes the significa nt changes in alcohol excise duties in recent years. Notably, the reduced 
rates of excise duties for small independent producers of beer was also extended to small 
independent producers of wine and other fermented beverages (i.e. produced from fruit), the self-
certification of independent small producers of alcoholic beverages, among others. Canada notes 
that the EU continues to provide preferential treatment to on products produced in the autonomous 
regions of Madeira and the Azores (Portugal); Guadeloupe,  French Guiana, Martinique and Reunion 
(France).  
 
Question 10 : How can foreign like -products benefit from these preferential treatments?  
 
Reply:  Member States may apply reduced rates of excise duty to alcoholic beverages produced by 
independent small pro ducers provided that the requirements set up in the Council 
Directive  92/83/EEC have been fulfilled. Independent small producers of alcoholic beverages from 
third countries can equally benefit from these reduced rates in the Member State of consumption 
when the mentioned requirements have been fulfilled.  
 
Specific measures for the EU outermost regions are allowed, on the basis of Article  349 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European  Union  (TFEU), due to their competitive disadvantage triggered 
by their remoteness, insularity, small size, difficult topography and climate and economic 
dependence on a few products. Alcoholic beverages producers located in the French and Portuguese 
outermost regions face higher production costs compared to  counterparts elsewhere. The reduced 
rates allowed for some alcoholic beverages producers compensate for the higher production cost, 
and as a result of these characteristics, do not undermine the integrity and the coherence of the 
European  Union  legal orde r, including the internal market and common policies.  
 
Question 11:  Canada would also be interested in know if similar preferential treatment is 
maintained in Greece for "ouzo".  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 33 - 
 
Reply:  On the basis of Article  7 of Council Directive 92/84/EEC, the Hellenic Republic may apply a 
reduced rate of excise duty to ethyl alcohol  consumed in the departments of Lesbos, Chios, Samos, 
the Dodecanese and the Cyclades and on the following islands in the Aegean: Thasos, 
Northern  Sporades, Samothrace and Skiros.  
 
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.2 Standards and other techn ical requirements  
3.3.2.1 Standards  
Page 104, paragraph 3.169  
It is noted that the structure of the membership of the ESOs (CEN, CENELEC, ETSI) has meant that 
national standardization bodies have a limited role in the decision -making process when developin g 
a European standard and that, to address this issue, the Commission has published a proposal to 
amend the governance structure of ESOs.  
 
Question 12:  Given that the membership of CEN and CENELEC are the national standardization 
bodies (for CEN) and nati onal electrotechnical committees (for CENELEC) while ETSI's membership 
comprises entities from the private and public sectors (including national standardization bodies), is 
it expected that the governance structure of only ETSI will change?  
 
Reply: No. Regulation (EU) 2022/2480 amending Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 as regards 
decisions of European standardisation organisations concerning European standards and European 
standardisation deliverables applies equally to all European Standardisation Organisati ons. Thus, 
CEN CENELEC and ETSI, the ESOs, are all equally concerned.  
 
Question 13:  What is the status, next steps, and timelines relating to the amendment of the 
governance structures of the ESOs?  
 
Reply:  As written in the Regulation EU 2022/2480 mention ed above, the three ESOs have until 
9 July 2023 to amend their internal rules.  
 
3.3.3 Sanitary and phytosanitary requirements  
Page 109, Paragraph 3.194  
It is noted the EU foresees to integrate environmental considerations in the assessment for import 
tolerances for pesticides not approved in the European  Union . 
 
Question 14:  Can the EU please explain at what point during the assessment of the import tolerance 
that environmental considerations (of a third country) would take place and who would be 
responsible within the European  Union  for conducting such an assessment?  
 
Reply:  The evaluation of the import tolerance would follow the same criteria in relation to those 
environmental issues that are considered of global concern than the ones used for the placing of 
plant protection products on the market set in Regulation (EC) No 1 107/2009. It the risk assessment, 
conducted by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), concludes that there is no unacceptable 
risk to bees, the import tolerance could be granted.  
 
Adverse effects of clothianidin and thiamethoxam on bees are directly li nked to the intrinsic 
properties of those substances. Therefore, the risks for bees from outdoor uses of these substances 
are unlikely to be limited to the European  Union . 
 
If the EU considers an environmental risk assessment necessary, this will be based upon 
environmental endpoints that are based on most recent science and compared to the environmental 
exposure based on supporting evidence provided by the respective third country.  
 
3.3.6 Government procurement  
Page 120, paragraph 3.238  
This section notes that the Commission has developed new voluntary green public procurement 
(GPP) criteria for several sectors to facilitate the uptake of such criteria in tender documentation. 
Previously, Section  3.229. (page 118) stated that 2021 data shows h eavy reliance on the lowest 
price as the sole award criterion in several EU member states, in which more than 80% of the 
number of procedures were awarded based on the lowest price criterion.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 34 - 
 
  
 Question 15:  For the EU member states that prioritize the lowe st price as the sole award criterion, 
has the EU observed whether this reliance on the lowest price as the sole award criterion conflicts 
with the voluntary application of green public procurement criteria?  
 
Reply:  EU Directive 14/2014 refers to 'most eco nomically advantageous tender' as the overriding 
concept, the most economically advantageous tender should be assessed on the basis of the best 
price-quality ratio, which should always include a price or cost element. such assessment of the 
most economical ly advantageous tender could also be carried out on the basis of either price or cost 
effectiveness only. The Commission does not have information as to the  direct link between the use 
by public by of the lowest price criterion as the sole award criterion and the non -use of GPP criteria.  
 
Question 16:  If so, how does the EU intend to address potential administrative barriers to the 
application of GPP criteria (including impact on overall rates of GPP uptake) within these member 
states?  
 
Reply:  The European Commission is promoting the use of GPP in all Member States through various 
actions with the ambition that public purchasers develop purchasing practices more in line with 
sustainable development issues.  
 
3.3.7 Intellectual Property Rights  
3.3.7.3 Industrial Property  
3.3.7.3.4 Designs  
Page  127, paragraph  3.269  
Per the Secretariat Report, the EU Commission adopted two package proposals to modernize its 
legislation on design protection. This included an exception to "allow reproducing original designs 
for repair purposes of complex products".  
 
Question 17:  Could the EU provide more information on this repair exception included in its 
proposed amendments to its industrial design law?  
 
Reply:  The Proposal for a Directive on the legal protection of designs (recast) approximates the 
design laws of the Member States regarding an exception for repair. This exception applies to the 
repair of a complex product to restore its original appearance where the product incorporating the 
design or to which the  design is applied constitutes a form -dependent component part of a complex 
product. A transitional period of 10 years has been proposed for designs already granted before the 
entry into force of the Directive. The repair clause already contained in the Co mmunity Design 
Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 (applicable to EU designs at European  Union  level) is proposed to be 
adapted accordingly. In addition, in line with the case -law of the CJEU, in order to ensure that 
consumers are able to make an informed decision b etween competing products that can be used for 
the repair, the repair clause cannot be invoked by the manufacturer or seller of a component part 
who have failed to duly inform consumers about the commercial origin of the product to be used for 
the purpose of the repair of the complex product.  
 
4. TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.1 Agriculture  
4.1.3.2 Internal market support  
Page 147, paragraph 4.58:  
The Secretariat report mentions the adoption of the EU Directive 2019/633 on unfair trading 
practices in business -to-business relationships in the agricultural and food supply chain, prohibiting 
certain unfair trading practices described in Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the directive (Directive 2019/633 
– Unfair trading practices in business -to-business relationships in the  agricultural and food supply 
chain – EU monitor).  
Enforcement powers listed in Article  6 of the EU Directive 2019/633 provide capacity in investigating, 
intervening and sanctioning buying commercial entities established outside the Union who's 
partaking in unfair trading practices.  
Question 18:  Since the implementation of the EU Directive 2 019/633 on unfair trading practices in 
business -to-business relationships in the agricultural and food supply chain, has the European  Union  
or one of its Member States intervened in sanctioning an unfair agriculture trading practice that it 
was made aware of? If so, could the EU provide an overview of the unfair trading practice that 
examined as well as any action that was taken?  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 35 - 
 
Reply:  The European Commission has no enforcement powers under Directive 2019/633. Member 
States have designated national authorities for the enforcement of their national transposition laws. 
The overview of national enforcement authorities is available on the w ebpage of the European 
Commission (link: https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common -agricultural -policy/ag ri-food-supply -
chain/unfair -trading -practices_en#keyrulesofthedirective ).  
 
National enforcement authorities are required to publish annual reports of their enforcement 
activities. By way of example, the report of the Sp anish enforcement authority for the year 2022 
can be consulted on the following link:  
https://www.aica.gob.es/Data/UPLOAD/Informe_Actividad_AICA_a_31_ de_diciembre_de_2022_v2
.pdf  
 
Enforcement authorities investigate the unfair trading practices listed in Article  3 of 
Directive  2019/633. Because of the minimum harmonisation nature of the Directive, Member States 
can ch oose to list and investigate additional unfair trading practices on top of those of the Directive.  
 
4.1.4 Export subsidies  
Page 148, paragraph 4.66:  
The Secretariat report mentions that the European  Union  did not grant export subsidies during the 
review pe riod. However, even if there are currently no programs for financing the export of 
agricultural products at the EU level, most Member States operate programs that may provide export 
financing for agricultural products.  
 
Question 19 : How does the EU ensure  that its Member States' export financing schemes remain 
compliant with the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export Competition?  
 
Reply:  All EU Member states are members of the WTO. All EU Member states are obliged to ensure 
the application and implementati on of EU acts, which ratify and implement obligations undertaken 
by the European  Union  in the context of the WTO.  
 
Specifically, Article  18(2) of the WTO  Agreement  on Agriculture  , as further detailed in paragraph 4 
of WTO document G/AG/2 of 30  June 1995 and the Annex  to the WTO Ministerial Decision of 
19 December  2015 on export competition (WT/MIN(15)/45 -WT/L/980), require the European  Union  
to make certain notifications to the WTO. In order to comply with these requirements, the 
European  Union  has adopted EU secondary legislation, including Commission Implementing 
Regulation 2017/1185 of 20  April 2017, which requires certain information from Member States, 
notably information relating to domestic support and export competition. Provisions concerning the 
notifications to be made by Member States to the Commission for these purposes are laid d own in 
Article  14 of the latter Commission Implementing Regulation. Compliance by Member States is 
ensured by monitoring and enforcement by the European Commission, including, if necessary, 
through infringement proceedings before the EU judicature.  
 
4.3 Fo restry  
Page 158, paragraph 4.111  
The report indicates that the EU's new Regulation on deforestation -free products would require 
products to be (i)  "deforestation -free" (produced on land that was not subject to deforestation or 
forest degradation after 31  December  2020); (ii)  produced in compliance with national laws 
("legality"); and (iii)  accompanied by due diligence statements in order to ensure products on the 
EU market are "deforestation -free".  
Question 20:  How it will be assured that EU domestic prod uction is "deforestation -free"?  
 
Reply:  EU domestic production is subject to the same obligations of the Regulation as products 
coming from third countries, including submission of a due diligence statement prior to the placing 
on the market.  
 
Question 21 : At what stage of domestic EU production will due diligence statements be provided 
and to which government entity will they be provided? This question particularly pertains to 
agricultural products (e.g. soybeans) that are not covered under the EU Timber Regulation.  
 
Reply: Due diligence statements must be submitted through the Information System foreseen by 
the Regulation by operators and traders before placing relevant products and commodities on the WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 36 - 
 
  
 EU market or exporting them. Competent authorities designated by EU Member  States for the 
application and enforcement of the Regulation will have access to the due diligence statements.  
 
4.5 Services  
Page 165, paragraph 4.148  
The report states: "The fragmentation of the services sector has wider economic effects as services 
play an important role as inputs into other sectors of the economy with manufactured products 
increasingly offered jointly with services."  
 
Question 22:  Can the EU confirm that this is in reference to mode 5 supply of a service as defined 
by the European Par liament? If so, has the EU developed, or plans to develop, rules, regulations, or 
taxonomies for mode 5 delivery of a service?  
 
Reply: The EU has no plans to develop rules, regulations, or taxonomies for mode 5 delivery of a 
service, for which there is no agreed definition. Currently, data collection in the EU covers the four 
modes of supply as defined in the GATS.  
 
4.5.1 Financial Services  
4.5.1.2 Regulatory Developments  
4.5.1.2.4 Sustainable and Digital Finance  
Page 175, paragraph 4.193  
It is noted that in April 2022, the Council agreed to a Commission proposal to establish clear rules 
for environmentally sustainable bonds (green bonds), pending discussions with Parliament. The 
Commission also aims to clarify the operations of Environmental, Social a nd Governance (ESG) 
rating providers and transparency on the characteristics and methodology of ESG ratings, and is 
planning to propose legislation during 2023 based on an impact assessment. In June 2022, the 
European Parliament and Council agreed to a Com mission proposal for a Corporate Sustainability 
Reporting Directive (CSRD) introducing obligations for companies to report on European 
Sustainability Reporting Standards.  
 
Question 23:  It is understood that in addition to the Corporate Sustainability Repo rting Directive 
(CSRD), in February 2022 the EU also adopted a proposal for a Corporate Sustainability Due 
Diligence Directive (CSDDD), which if adopted would be applied in tandem with the CSRD. Under 
CSDDD, companies would be required to undertake due dil igence on environmental impacts along 
their supply chains.  Can the EU outline how the due diligence requirements under the CSDDD would 
be coordinated with other regulations requiring environmentally oriented due diligence, such as the 
EU Regulation on Defo restation free products?  
 
Reply:  The Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) proposal aims at fostering 
sustainable and responsible corporate behaviour and to anchor human rights and environmental 
considerations in companies' operations an d corporate governance. The new rules will ensure that 
businesses address adverse impacts of their own operations, operations of their subsidiaries, and 
including in their value chains inside and outside Europe.  
 
The EU Regulation on Deforestation free pro ducts has a very specific objective and its requirements 
and impacts will complement the general duties under the CSDDD initiative. It imposes specific 
conditions for placing relevant commodities on the EU market. This is a more targeted regime, 
including a marketing prohibition. Furthermore, the Deforestation Regulation applies to all operators 
placing the relevant products on the market, including EU and non -EU companies, irrespective of 
their legal form and size.  
 
Both instruments will apply in parallel and are complementary. The CSDDD proposal will establish a 
common denominator for large EU companies irrespective of their industry sector, an EU -wide 
standard. The Regulation is the more specific rule (lex specialis) compared to CSDDD (lex generalis). 
Accordingly, to the extent that provisions of the CSDDD proposal address a provision of the 
Regulation that pursues the same objectives and provides for more extensive or more specific 
obligations, the provisions of the Regulation will apply to those specific  obligations.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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4.5.2 Transport Services  
4.5.2.4 Maritime transport services and port services  
Page 181, paragraph 4.225  
It is noted that in 2017, the Commission included support to maritime and inland ports in the 
"General Block Exemption Regulation".  
 
Question 24:  Under this exemption, is it possible for State Members to support, without 
Commission approval, port infrastructure, access infrastructure, or dredging undertaken by 
domestic -based EU operators in other countries?  
 
Reply:  No, General Block Exemption Regulation  (GBER) applies to aid for EU ports. The GBER does 
not allow aid from an EU Member State to the port authority/operator of a port located in that 
Member State, for projects in third countries. GBER for ports is indeed "proje ct-based" and not 
"operator -based". The authority/port operator in the European  Union  receiving GBER aid is of course 
not precluded from operating/investing in non -EU ports.  
 
SECTION II: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE EU REPORT  
 
3. MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL TRADE POLICY  
3.3.2 Trade -related cooperation  
Page 15, paragraph 3.64  
The report states that the EU -US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) "announced digital initiative 
projects with the partner countries Kenya and Jamaica" . 
Question 25:  What are the goals and objectives of each project and what are the main actions 
planned to achieve them?  
 
Reply:  The aim of the announced projects are to support these countries  in developing secure digital 
infrastructure that underpins their e conomic prosperity, bridges the digital divide and meets their 
development needs. The support for these and other projects will focus on advancing and prioritizing 
high-quality ICTS infrastructure projects in line with the principles set for the joint EU -U.S. taskforce 
on public financing for secure and resilient connectivity and ICTS supply chains in third countries 
(see p. 24, point 4 in the EU-U.S. Joint Statement of the second Trade and Technology Counci l, 
which took place on 16  May 2022, in Paris -Saclay, France (link at: eu-u-s-joint-statement -of-the-
trade-and-technology -council.pdf (europ a.eu) ). 
 
5. SUSTAINABILITY  
5.1 The EU's Actions on Climate Change and Environmental Protection  
5.1.3 Decarbonising Energy and Sustainable Transport  
Page 22, paragraph 5.24  
This section notes that, in the area of transport, a Revised Clean Vehicles Directive was adopted in 
June 2019 to promote clean mobility solutions in public procurement tenders, stating that the 
directive defines "clean vehicles" and sets national targets for their public procurement.  
Question 26:  What, if any, interaction is there regarding the application of voluntary GPP criteria 
and the Clean Vehicles Directive? With regard to public procurement, does the Directive supersede 
any applicable GPP criteria  for road transport?  
 
Reply:  The Clean Vehicles Directive sets national targets in the form of a minimum share of clean 
vehicles in the aggregate public procurement in each Member State over two 5 -year periods 
(2021 -2025 and 2026 -2030), while leaving full flexibility in the way the effort is shared within each 
Member State; it does not directly set rules for individual procurement procedures. The relevant GPP 
criteria for road transport were amended in 2021 to ensure full harmonisation with the Clean Vehicl es 
Directive, in particular on greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions; however, EU GPP criteria also cover 
aspects that are not addressed in the Clean Vehicles Directive, such as noise, lubricants and 
management; it should also be noted that the Directive sets l egal obligations for the procurement 
of clean vehicles, while the use of GPP criteria is voluntary.  
 
5.2 Sustainability, fairness and inclusiveness  
5.2.3 Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs)  
Page 24, paragraph 5.36  
This report states that the EU supports SMEs and their participation in international and domestic 
trade.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 38 - 
 
  
 Question 27:  Could the EU expand on how and in which way SMEs are actively supported in order 
to promote and grow their opportunities in domestic and international markets?  
 
Reply:  The EU has in place various instruments to support SME internationalisation, which differ 
considerably in terms of approach and objectives. They range from support networks for general 
information and advice to financial assistance and IT tools, as well a s portals and helpdesks providing 
information on the regulatory requirements for international trade. Some instruments exclusively 
target SMEs, whereas for others, SMEs feature in just one of several support areas.  
 
Some examples of the EU contribution fo r instruments specifically targeting SME internationalisation 
are: 
• IPR SME Helpdesk for China, Southeast Asia, Latin America, and India Intellectual Property 
Helpdesk (europa.e u) 
• Enterprise Europe Network (EEN) http://een.ec.europa.eu/  
• EU4Business: From Policies to Action www.oecd.org/daf/psd/eurasia  
• EU SME Centre in China http://eusmecentre.org.cn/   
 
The EU increased its efforts to raise awareness of SMEs on trade agreements and to provide them 
with user -friendly, up -to-date information so SMEs can make the most of the negotiated out comes. 
Notably the European Commission has done so through the launch in October 2020 of its online 
Access2Markets portal and the negotiation of specific SME chapters in EU free trade agreements. 
The online Access2Markets portal provides European businesse s, and SMEs in particular, with 
up-to-date, hands -on data for their import and export activities. Since its launch, the portal has 
had 3.7 million  users, with 72% from the EU. We trained more than 8000 SMEs and multipliers on 
Access2Markets in two years. Dedicated SME chapters in more recent free trade agreements play a 
key role in raising awareness and addressing specific SME challenges related to trade policy, such 
as access to information.  
 
While trade promotion is the competence of Member States, business associations or trade 
promotion authorities (TPOs), the EU also continued supporting related activities, including by way 
of guidance, outreach , dedicated online tools or help desks and centres catering to SME's needs.  
 
Creating the best possible framework conditions and high -quality regulation for SMEs is a 
Commission priority. The Commission is therefore mainstreaming SMEs into all its policie s (such as 
the transition pathways, better regulation but also into communications such as the Single Market 
at 30 communication) and continues to support SMEs in a variety of ways, for instance by 
implementing the 2020 SME strategy for a sustainable and d igital Europe. For example, the InvestEU 
SME window is mobilizing close to 7  billion  EUR in investments in SMEs. The Recovery and Resilience 
Facility (RRF) also provides support to SMEs. The national Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRPs) 
approved by the Eur opean Council so far all include measures to support SMEs. The Enterprise 
Europe Network co -financed by the European Commission provides advice and tailored support to 
SMEs to help them, among others, to grow faster, find new commercial partners and benefi t from 
the opportunities offered by the internal market.  
 
5.2.5 Gender equality and women's economic empowerment  
Page 26, paragraph 5.45  
This section discusses the EU support and inclusion of women in trade by promoting its involvement 
in the WTO and the signing of the 2017 Buenos Aires Joint Declaration on Trade and Women's 
Economic Empowerment.  
Question 28:  Can the EU give any specifics concerning how these measures will be achieved?  
 
Reply:  The EU is committed to supporting the inclusion of the gender and trade dimension in the 
WTO. To examine how trade and gender considerations interact, the European  Union  and the 
International Trade Centre, in January 2022, launched the project on Developing a Gender -Lens 
Framework for the work of the WTO. The project  produced papers and webinars and provided 
suggestions on how gender considerations can be integrated into the current structure of the WTO 
and Members' domestic policies, and underscored the importance of harmonising concepts, 
objective  criteria and data collection. The results are published on 
https://www.shetrades.com/outlook/resources/0/publications . They constitute valuable resources 
that can  be used to implement the work on gender and trade at the WTO going forward and deserve 
further scrutiny and discussion by WTO members, the WTO Secretariat and other interested 
stakeholders.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 39 - 
 
Question 29:  Other than public international support, are there a ny programs, subsidies, policies, 
etc. being put in place to implement these goals?  
 
Reply:  The EU promotes gender equality through a number of channels: multilaterally, for example 
in the WTO and the International Labour Organisation (ILO), bilaterally through Free 
Trade  Agreements and unilaterally through the Generalised Scheme of preferences.  In addition, the 
Action Plan on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in External Relations 2020 -2025 
promotes gender equality and women's empowerment through all external action of the 
European  Union . 
 
9. EXTERNAL IMPACTS OF THE EU'S INTERNAL POLICIES  
9.1 Digital Services and Online Platforms  
Page 32 paragraph 9.1  
The report states that "The Regulation on European data governance and amending Regulation (EU) 
2018/1724 (Data Governance Act) seeks to increase trust in data sharing, strengthen mechanisms 
to increase data availability and overcome technical obstacles to the reuse of data" . 
 
Question 30:  How will the Act and amending Regulation achieve their objectives?  
 
Reply:  The Data Governance Act (DGA) is a cross -sectoral instrument that aims  to boost the 
development of trustworthy data sharing systems. In particular, it aims to make more data available 
by regulating the re -use of publicly held, protected data, by boosting data sharing through the 
regulation of novel data intermediaries and by  encouraging the sharing of data for altruistic 
purposes. Furthermore, as provided in the DGA, the European Commission will establish the 
European Data Innovation Board to facilitate the exchange of best practices on data sharing, and in 
supporting and pri oritising the development of cross -sectoral interoperability standards.  
 
9.3 Single Market in Services  
Page 34, paragraph 9.11  
The report states that the "European Commission issued a number of reform recommendations to 
Member States and pointed to potent ial economic benefits that would stem from reducing regulatory 
and administrative barriers that hamper cross -border services trade and investment in the single 
market".  
 
Question 31:  Can the EU expand on the reform recommendations it provided to its Member  States? 
What regulatory and administrative barriers is the EU seeking to remove (i.e. are they seeking to 
improve regulatory transparency; harmonise service regimes amongst Member States)?  
 
Reply:  The 2021 reform recommendations target several groups of p rofessions: architects, civil 
engineers, accountants, lawyers, patent agents, real estate agents and tourist guides. The focus is 
on these groups of professions due to their economic importance, their role in innovation and their 
contribution to vital econ omic ecosystems, as well as due to the potential gains from reforming 
regulations in these sectors. The aim was to assist Member States in better targeting their regulatory 
reforms achieving the highest economic payoffs from the reforms and provide additio nal political 
support to implement the reforms.  
 
The reform recommendations are based on a thorough assessment of the national regulatory 
frameworks applicable to the seven professions in focus. In addition to a detailed qualitative analysis, 
the overall r estrictiveness of national regulations is estimated using a composite indicator, developed 
in 2017, which builds on the OECD Product Market Regulation (PMR) methodology, to assess the 
cumulative burden of multiple regulatory requirements.  
 
The types of reg ulatory requirements covered by the indicator include: (1) regulatory approach: 
activities reserved to holders of specific qualifications, protection of title; (2) qualification 
requirements: years of education and training, mandatory state exam, continuou s professional 
development obligations, etc.; (3) other entry requirements: compulsory membership or registration 
in professional body, limit to the number of licences granted, other authorisation requirements, etc.; 
(4) exercise requirements: restrictions  on forms of company, shareholding and voting requirements, 
restrictions on joint exercise of professions, incompatible activities, etc.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 40 - 
 
  
 SINGAPORE  
PART I:  QUESTIONS REGARDING THE SECRETARIAT REPORT  
 
QUESTION 1:  
1.3.2 Trends and patterns in FDI (extra -EU) 
Page 29 (Para 1.39)  
We note that the EU's trends in FDI over the review period mirrored world flows, which saw a 
significant downturn in FDI due to the pandemic in 2020, and a subsequent rebound or recovery 
in 2021. However, the EU's recovery lagged world levels, in part due to slower improvement of 
mergers and acquisitions. Could we understand if there are further factors that have contributed to 
the lagged recovery in FDI?  
 
Reply:  The EU is not aware of the cont ribution of other factors than those mentioned in Para  1.39 
of the Secretariat Report.  
 
QUESTION 2:  
4.5. Services  
Page 165 (Para 4.145 -4.146)  
The WTO Secretariat Report notes that the EU's progress in removing restrictions has remained 
limited overall and that the Single Market for services remains fragmented. Different authorization 
schemes remained the most prevalent barriers in place, and for the majority of sectors, such 
schemes had declined little by 2017, although a relatively consistent i mprovement in the availability 
of electronic procedures was identified. The study found it noteworthy to highlight the large diversity 
of regulatory approaches across sectors and Member States, which seems to offer scope for learning 
and further regulatory  simplification. Could the EU share whether there are plans to remove 
restrictions and standardise regulatory approaches across Member States?  
 
Reply:  The Commission launched a priority process of addressing jointly with Member States 
barriers to free move ment of services in the sectors that are both economically important and 
exhibiting lower levels of integration such as construction, wholesale and retail, professional services 
and tourism services. For more information on the future outlook and initiativ es in the services area, 
please consult European Commission's Communication 'Single Market at 30' (COM(2023) 162), 
available at: https://single -market -economy.ec.e uropa.eu/publications/single -market -30_en  
 
PART II:  QUESTIONS REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT REPORT  
QUESTION 3:  
5.1 The EU's actions on climate change and environmental protection  
Page 18 (Para 5.4)  
The report notes that "th e EU intends to further pursue dialogue and cooperation regarding the 
implementation of the EU's autonomous sustainability instruments". Could the EU clarify what these 
instruments are, and their implementation timelines?  
 
Reply:  In this instance we refer  to autonomous sustainability tools that we develop to implement 
European Green Deal. The EU has been a role model for transparency of its European Green Deal 
measures through public consultations, impact assessments and outreach from early regulatory 
process and implementation stages in different fora in the EU and outside (in Brussels, through the 
EU delegations in partner countries, in the WTO in Geneva and via bilateral dialogues).  
 
The EU has engaged in the WTO and bilaterally with countries and tried to address their concerns as 
far as possible while maintaining objectives pursued by its policies.  
 
The EU will continue dialogue and engagement with its trading partners including for  the measures 
that entered into force and ensuing implementing acts and decisions, in the WTO and bilaterally.  
 
The implementation of the EGD is tracked on a dedicated website: Delivering the European Green 
Deal (europa.eu)  where all relevant information can be found.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 41 - 
 
QUESTION 4:  
5.2.2 Promoting sustainability  
Page 24 (Para 5.35)  
The report states that the EU would be "proposing to (its) FTAs partners to include a new Sustainable 
Food Systems chapter". Could the EU elaborate on what the Sustainable Food Systems chapter is 
envisioned to include, and whether the EU plans to inc lude this chapter in its new and/or existing 
FTAs?  
 
Reply:  The Commission Communication of April 2021 on Trade Policy Review: an open, sustainable 
and assertive trade policy (COM(2021) 66 final) states that: in addition to providing for ambitious 
trade an d sustainable development chapters, the sustainability dimension will continue to be 
reflected in many other aspects of the EU's trade and investment agreements. The Agreements 
support the diffusion of clean and more efficient production methods and techno logies and create 
market access opportunities for green goods and services. In addition, they provide an essential 
platform to engage with EU partners on climate change, biodiversity, circular economy, pollution, 
clean energy technologies including renewab le energy and energy efficiency and on the transition to 
sustainable food systems.  
 
The text of the Chapter on sustainable food systems, that are being included in the Agreements that 
are being negotiated or concluded after the date of this Communication are published and can be 
consulted under:  
https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu -trade -relationships -country -and-region/negotiations -and-
agreements_en .  
 
QUESTION 5:  
9.1 Digital Services and online platforms  
Page 33 (Para 9.5)  
The EU Government's Report notes that the Commission has issued a modernised set of model 
contractual clauses for transfers of personal data to controllers and processors outside the European 
Economic Area (EEA). Has the Commission recognised or endorsed model contractual clauses 
developed by other non -EEA Members or regional organisations as valid transfer mechanisms  of 
personal data into the EU? If not, is the EU Commission willing to consider recognising or endorsing 
these model contract clauses in the future, and what factors would it take into consideration?  
 
Reply:  Many data protection legal frameworks around the  world provide for the possibility to adopt 
model contractual clauses for international transfers. This is an area where increasing convergence 
is being observed. In that context, the EU is working with several international partners to build on 
commonalit ies between different sets of model clauses to further facilitate data transfers between 
different jurisdictions and/or regions. Such work is ongoing, for example, between the EU and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).  
 
QUESTION 6:  
Page 33  (Para 9.6)  
In the development of new legislative initiatives, how do the co -legislators of the EU ensure that 
these new legislations do not create additional barriers to trade for foreign suppliers and 
manufacturers?  
 
Reply:  EU law -making follows a strin gent evidence -based Better Regulation process , which inter alia 
involves comprehensive assessment of the impact of the env isaged measures, including on trade.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 42 - 
 
  
 ECUADOR  
I. PREGUNTAS CON RESPECTO AL INFORME DE LA SECRETARÍA WT/TPR/S/442  
A. Preguntas sobre el entorno económico y de política arancelaria:  
1. Página 19, Subtitulo 1.2.2 Gobernanza económica, dirección de las políticas y reformas en la 
UE, párrafo 1.16 "La Unión Europea ha establecido 6 estrategias prioritarias para potenciar su política 
económica que entre otras cosas busca lograr la plena recuperación de la pandemia de COVID -19; 
dar prioridad a las medidas que aceleren la transición a una sociedad más justa, más saludable, más 
verde y más digital; y fortalecer la economía para que sea más resiliente y sólida."  
 
Pregunta 1:  
De los programas implementados para dar cumplimiento a las estrategias establecidas, ¿nos podrían 
indicar cuáles son los programas que se han completado (en todas sus etapas) y a qué estrategias 
están relacionados dichos programas? Asimismo, ¿se podría indicar si los resultados de estos 
programas han cumplido con las expectativas establecidas por la UE?  
 
Reply:  The six priorities mentioned under Subtitled 1.2.2 concern the overall policy strategy of the 
European Commission under President von der Leyen for the period 2019 -2024. As such it is difficult 
to summarise the state of implementation of all of them. However most of the actions undertaken 
so far by the Commission to deliver on these priorities are mentioned in the WTO Trade Policy Review 
– Government Report. For example, section 2.1 of that report deals with the most relevant measures 
undertaken by the Commission to deliver on the priority "An Economy that works for the people" 
and 5.1 of that report outlines all the measures taken by the EU to deliver on the priority "European 
Green Deal". In addition, it is possible to access the annual activity report of the European 
Commission at this link: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication -detail/ -/publication/d73b364e -c180-
11ed-8912-01aa75ed71a1/language -en These reports reflect the yearly initiatives of the EU to 
deliver on its priorities. Finally, it is possible to follow the rollout of the European Commission's 
actions on the six priorities at this link: https://commission.europa.eu/strategy -and-
policy/priorities -2019-2024_en#ref -6-commi ssion-priorities -for-2019-24.  
 
2. Página 20, subtítulo 1.2.3 Políticas monetaria y cambiaria, párrafo 1.21. "debido al aumento 
de la inflación en 2022, en particular, el BCE aumentó los tipos de interés en julio, septiembre, 
noviembre y diciembre de 2022, después de no haberlos elevado en 11 años."  
 
Pregunta 2:  
¿Cuáles son las principales causas de la inflación en la UE? ¿Hay algún motivo en particular para que 
el impacto de la inflación se haya registrado de mane ra especial con respecto a varios bienes de 
consumo masivo, como medicamentos? ¿Hay una evaluación sobre la incidencia en la inflación del 
conflicto Ucrania – Rusia, los precios de la logística internacional o el impacto de la pandemia?  
 
Reply:  EU and euro  area inflation has been driven by an unparalleled sequence of negative external 
economic shocks since early 2021. Given the global nature of these shocks, the EU is hardly an 
exception.  
Consumer goods have been affected particularly by the supply -demand m ismatches that were 
characteristic of the pandemic. On the one hand, the pandemic and lockdowns lead to tenacious 
supply side disruptions ("bottlenecks") worldwide; on the other hand, compositional shifts in 
household spending behaviour, as consumers redir ected their spending from unavailable items 
(mostly services) to available ones (mostly goods) and adjusted to the pandemic contingency 
(e.g.,  by purchasing home office equipment), led to strong demand -side pressures. Russia's 
unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine has substantially aggravated inflationary pressures, 
driving up prices of energy commodities, in particular natural gas, and of food.  
Recent Commission analysis on inflation during the pandemic and inflation drivers can be found 
here:  
• Euro area inflation shaped by two years of COVID -19 pandemic (May 2022):  
 https://economy -finance.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022 -05/ip172_en_chapter_i.pdf  
• Technical note on inflation in the euro area  (March 2023):  
 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/62958/inflation -note.pdf  
 
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 43 - 
 
3. Página 22, subtítulo 1.2.5 Tendencias del empleo, incluidas  las cuestiones de género, 
párrafo  1.27: "La importancia del comercio, en particular de las exportaciones, para apoyar el 
empleo en la UE es significativa; se estima que en 2019, un total de 38,1 millones de puestos de 
trabajo de la UE se basaban en las ex portaciones extracomunitarias, lo que representa más del 18% 
del empleo total de la UE. Además, los salarios de los empleos basados en las exportaciones eran 
un 12% más elevado que los de otros puestos de trabajo. Sin embargo, se podía observar una 
brecha de género en el empleo basado en las exportaciones, ya que el 38% de esos puestos de 
trabajo los ocupaban mujeres y un 62%, hombres, y las mujeres tenían una prima salarial menor, 
del 8%, frente al 11% en el caso de los hombres."  
 
Pregunta 3:  
¿Nos podrían remitir la estructura, por sectores de la economía, de los empleos ligados a 
exportaciones, y la participación de mujeres y hombres porcentualmente en cada sector o industria? 
¿Es posible contar con información sobre las políticas públicas / decisi ones que pudieron haber sido 
adoptadas para fomentar el empleo en el sector exportador (tema de interés para eventualmente 
tomar elementos aplicables en otros países)?  
 
Reply:  The data could be found in the following publications:  
• Gender patterns of EU exports: jobs and wage differencials, available at Circabc (europa.eu) . 
 
More important than ever: employment content of extra -EU exports, available at : 
https://circabc.europa.eu/ui/group/50a0487d -086a-4a75-a1ff-92bdd2ec2c4b/library/628961d7 -
1870-4113-9724-ed2bbf19ea84/details .  
 
4. Página 62, subtítulo 3.1.3.1 Tipos aplicados, párrafo 3.41. "El número de derechos no 
ad valorem  siguió siendo significativo, en torno al 10% de todas las líneas, lo que repercutió en los 
promedios globales" . 
 
Pregunta 4:  
¿Nos podrían remitir los aranceles equivalentes ad valorem  de las líneas arancelarias que presentan 
aranceles no ad valorem ? 
 
Reply: The EU does not calculate the ad valorem  equivalents for the non -ad valorem  tariffs, because 
there is no consensus in WTO on the methodology to be used. The EU invites Ecuador to contact the 
WTO Secretariat for the tariff items concerned, since the WTO Secretariat calculated them for the 
purposes of the trade policy review.  
 
5. Página 63, subtítulo 3.1.3.1 Tipos aplicados, párrafo 3.42 "Existen diferencias considerables 
entre los promedios arancelarios globales correspondientes a los productos agropecuar ios y no 
agropecuarios, pues el promedio de los aranceles agrícolas (14,9%) triplica con creces el de los 
aranceles no agrícolas (4,3%). La utilización de aranceles no ad valorem, es decir, específicos, 
compuestos, mixtos, componentes agrícolas, derechos a dicionales y precios de entrada, es frecuente 
en el sector agropecuario."  
 
Pregunta 5:  
¿Cuál es la razón para el mantenimiento sostenido de picos arancelarios en promedio más altos en 
los productos alimenticios? ¿Se considera el impacto de los picos aranc elarios elevados, combinado 
con la amplia política de subsidios que concede la UE, sobre los socios comerciales en desarrollo, 
que tienen economías dependientes de ingresos por exportaciones al mercado europeo de productos 
agrícolas y alimentos procesados?  
 
Reply:  The EU has only a limited number of tariff peaks, which were accepted and bound as part of 
the Uruguay Round Agreement. Moreover, the EU has concluded and continues to negotiate 
ambitious FTA agreements to reduce agricultural tariffs in bilateral trade. Finally, the EU is the 
world's largest importer of agricultural products, with imports of more than 172  billion  in 2022.  
 
6. Página 65, subtítulo 3.1.3.2 Nomenclatura, tipos consolidados y concesiones, párrafo 3.44: 
"Durante el período objeto de examen, la Unión Europea actualizó periódicamente su nomenclatura 
arancelaria, a saber, la Nomenclatura Combinada 3. (NC), y realizó modificaciones sustanciales para 
aplicar los cambios del SA 2022 de la OMA el 1 de enero de 2022".  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 44 - 
 
  
 Pregunta 6:  
¿Cuál es el procedimiento que se siguió para adoptar la Séptima Enmienda del Sistema Armonizado 
(SA 2022)? Por favor podrían especificar la metodología de trabajo, decisiones ante instituciones 
supranacionales y sustento normativo, de ser el caso.  
 
Reply: When the draft HS2022 WCO Council Recommendation was presented for adoption to the 
WCO Council in June 2019, the EU position in the WCO Council was established in application of 
Art. 218(9) TFEU. By its decision of 18  June 2019, the EU Council decided to support th is draft 
Recommendation. This decision was not published but can be found on the Council website under 
document 10232/19 . 
As regards th e implementation of this WCO Recommendation, it is incorporated in the annual 
CN Regulation in application of Council Regulation 2658/87 . The CN 2022 Regulation incorporates 
the HS2022 Recommendation in full, in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1832  of 
12 October  2021 amending Annex  I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 on the tariff and 
statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff.  
7. Página 72, subtítulo 3.1.4 Otras cargas que afectan a las importaciones, párrafo 3.61: "Las 
otras cargas principales que gravan las importaciones en la Unión Europea son el impuesto sobre el 
valor añadido (IVA) y los impuestos especiales percibidos en frontera. Si bien siguen siendo los 
principales impuestos indirectos, regidos por un sistema com ún a nivel de la Unión, los Estados 
miembros pueden aplicar otras cargas indirectas sobre las importaciones, aunque son bastante 
limitadas".  
 
Pregunta 7:  
En relación con la metodología de cálculo de impuestos y aranceles, podrían remitirnos en detalle 
(en hoja de cálculo, de preferencia) la estructura de la carga impositiva en un bien específico -por 
ejemplo, para la importación de banano - desde un país sin acuerdo comercial con la UE y que por 
este motivo debe ser grabado por varios impuestos de ley como el arancel NMF, IVA, etc. Esta 
información con respecto a un producto permitirá comprender de mejor manera la forma en la que 
se registran dichos impuestos y sus bases imponibles en la UE.  
 
Reply:  Ecuador is invited to consult the Access2Markets database a vailable at 
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access -to-markets/en/home  which provides information on the tariff 
applied as well as other import requirements .  
 
B. Apoyo y promoción a las exportaciones:  
8. Página 94, subtítulo 3.2.4 Apoyo y promoción de las exportaciones, Párrafo 3.128 
"Recientemente se ha ampliado el portal para abarcar diversos sectores y el mecanismo de ventanilla 
única con miras a resolver los obstáculos al acceso a los mercados a los que se enfrentan los 
exportadores de la UE".  
 
Pregunta 8:  
¿Dónde se puede obtener más información del funcionamiento, beneficios y servicios implementados 
en la ventanilla única? ¿Hay un contacto o co ntactos específicos para que usuarios puedan efectuar 
consultas sobre la ventanilla por correo electrónico, teléfono o correo normal?  
 
Reply: Further information about the functioning of SEP can be found on DG TRADE website:  
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access -to-markets/en/content/single -entry-point-0  
Any questions/enquiries can be addressed by email to the following email address:  
trade-single -entry-point@ec.europa.eu  
 
C. Normas técnicas:  
9. Página 107, subtítulo 3.3.2.1 Normas, párrafo 3.167 "El Reglamento (UE) 2019/515 (adoptado 
en marzo de 2019) entró en vigor en abril de 2020 y sustituyó el Reglamento (CE) n.º764/2008, en 
vigor desde 2010. El nuevo Reglamento tiene por objeto simplificar la aplicación del reconocimiento 
mutuo de las mercancías que ya se comercializan l egalmente en otro Estado miembro de la UE 
mejorando los procedimientos de control y la transparencia".  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 45 - 
 
Pregunta 9:  
¿El Reglamento UE 2019/515 es únicamente para las mercancías originarias de los Estados Miembros 
de la UE o dentro de su alcance también se encuentran productos que son exportados por terceros 
países al territorio aduanero de la UE y que son comercializados dentro de ésta entre los Estados 
Miembros?  
 
Reply:  Regulation 2019/515 applies to all goods that are placed on the EU market, i rrespective of 
their origin. In particular, the origin of goods is not relevant for the definition of 'lawfully marketed'. 
What is important is whether the goods comply with the technical rules in one of the EU Member 
States (if there are rules regarding t he specific goods) and whether they made available to end users 
in that Member State. If they fulfil both criteria, the goods can benefit from the principle of mutual 
recognition.  
 
The requirement of the origin of the goods is only relevant when the goods  are lawfully marketed in 
an EFTA State that is a Contracting Party to the EEA Agreement. These states are Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway. The goods that are lawfully marketed in these states must also originate 
from a state that is one of the Contracti ng Parties to the EEA Agreement. More precisely, they must 
originate in an EU Country or in Iceland, Liechtenstein or Norway.  
 
10. Página 107, subtítulo 3.3.2.1 Normas, párrafo 3.168 "(¼) en febrero de 2022 la Unión Europea 
puso en marcha una nueva estrate gia de normalización titulada "Establecer normas mundiales para 
apoyar un mercado único de la Unión resiliente, ecológico y digital (¼)".  
 
Pregunta 10:  
¿Podría la Unión Europea indicar a través de qué medios y procedimientos las estrategias de 
normalizaci ón se comunican a terceros países?  
 
Reply:  
All EU -related standardisation policies, including requests for standards, are publicly available on the 
DG GROW Standards website:  
https://single -market -economy.ec.europa.eu/single -market/european -standards/standardisation -
policy_en . 
Furthermore, under Article  8 of Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 on European standardisation, the 
Commission must adopt an 'annual Union work programme for European standardisation'. This 
document is published in the Official Journal of the European  Union  and lis ts all policy areas where 
the European Commission will ask for standards. The latest annual programme can be found at:  
https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52023XC0313%2801%29 .  
 
D. Medidas sanitarias y fitosanitarias:  
11. Página sub título 113, 3.3.3 Prescripciones sanitarias y fitosanitarias, Párrafo 3.193 "Esos 
Reglamentos se complementan con otros instrumentos jurídicos de la UE que contienen 
prescripciones que deben aplicarse en toda la Unión Europea y abarcan, entre otras cosas, la higiene 
de los alimentos y los piensos, el etiquetado, los materiales y el embalaje en contacto con los 
alimentos, los aditivos de alimentos y piensos, los organismos modificados genéticamente (OMG), 
los alimentos orgánicos y los residuos de sustancias farmacológicamente activas (utilizadas en 
medicamentos veterinarios), plaguicidas y contaminantes".  
 
Pregunta 11:  
Se agradecerá recibir información con respecto a los "otros instrumentos jurídicos" aludidos en el 
informe, en particular si éstos contienen o pueden contener también disposiciones en relación con 
etiquetado, los materiales y el embalaje en contacto con los alimentos, los aditivos de alimentos y 
piensos, los organismos modificados genéticamente (OMG), los alimentos orgánicos y los res iduos 
de sustancias farmacológicamente activas. ¿Esas disposiciones que deben aplicarse para la UE son 
también obligatorias para los países miembros de la OMC y terceros países que exporten al mercado 
europeo? ¿Cuándo se hallan en etapa de elaboración, dic has regulaciones que afecten a terceros 
países serían notificadas la OMC para recepción de comentarios de socios comerciales?  
 
Reply:  
Detailed and up -to-date information on the EU SPS legislation and the different policy and legislative 
initiatives can be found on the official website of the European Commission,  Health and Food Safety 
(europa.eu) . WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 46 - 
 
  
 The aim of the food safety legislation of the European  Union  is a high level of health protection which 
applies in a non -discriminatory manner whether food or feed is traded on the internal market or 
internationally.  
 
All the relevant legislation is notified to the WTO following the recommended procedures for 
implementing the transparency obligations of the WTO agreements.  
 
12. Página 113, subtítulo 3.3.3 Prescripciones sanitarias y fitosanitarias Párrafo 3.194. "Esa 
Estrategia también establece objetivos de la UE con el fin de reducir el uso de plaguicidas (y su 
riesgo), antimicrobianos y fertilizantes químicos para 2030".  
 
Pregunta 12:  
Dentro del objetivo de la UE de reducir el uso de plaguicidas y su riesgo: ¿Se tiene contemplado 
llevar a cabo análisis de riesgo concluyentes para las sustancias cuya reducción de uso tendría 
impacto en los sus socios comerciales de la UE? ¿Nos podrían in dicar la razón por la que la Comisión 
aplica el Límite mínimo de detección (0,01 ppm) cuando el EFSA da a conocer que el análisis de una 
sustancia no es concluyente? ¿En qué etapa de su trabajo la EFSA evalúa la información y sustentos 
remitidos por tercer os países con respecto al análisis de una sustancia?  
 
Reply:  
The reduction targets for pesticides that are set out in the EU Farm to Fork strategy are applicable 
to the European  Union  only. 
 
The process for setting MRLs in the EU is provided for by the EU MRL Regulation (Regulation (EC) 
No 396/2005), whose main objective is consumer health protection. MRLs can only be established if 
the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) has confirmed that they are safe for consumers. This 
requires that a minimum of supp orting data is provided in line with the EU data requirements, 
allowing EFSA to reach a conclusion on the safety of the MRL. If such supporting evidence is lacking 
or insufficient, EFSA cannot conclude that the MRL is safe. In case EFSA cannot conclude on the 
safety of an MRL, this may indeed lead to the lowering of that MRL to the Limit of quantification for 
a given substance.  
 
Information received from third countries can be considered in the framework of the assessment of 
import tolerance applications. I n fact, in case a third country considers the setting of an MRL in the 
EU necessary to meet the need of international trade, it can submit an application for an import 
tolerance with the required supporting evidence, including the GAP used by that third co untry. Those 
data will then be duly assessed by one EU Member State and by EFSA and, if the proposed MRL is 
justified and safe for consumers, this can be established in the EU.  
 
The burden of providing the above -mentioned relevant information and data reli es onto applicants 
(which can be third countries) having a direct or indirect commercial interest in placing the product 
on the market and – therefore – in actively contributing to risk assessment procedures. Risk 
assessment is carried out in an independen t manner and applicants cannot influence its outcome.  
 
EU MRLs that were established based on import tolerance applications as well as those based on 
Codex. MRLs can be maintained also for substances not approved in the EU, as long as those MRLs 
are safe f or European consumers and well supported by data.  
 
13. Página 113, subtítulo 3.3.3 Prescripciones sanitarias y fitosanitarias, Párrafo 3.194 "Se 
considera que la Estrategia es un componente fundamental del Pacto Verde Europeo y tiene algunas 
repercusiones en el régimen sanitario y fitosanitario de la UE. La Estrategia, que identifica esferas 
de acción para lograr que el sistema alimentario de la UE sea sostenible, comprende un plan de 
acción para el período 2020 -2024 que prevé, entre otras cosas, la reforma  de la legislación sobre 
aditivos de los piensos, plaguicidas, materiales en contacto con los alimentos, protección 
fitosanitaria, bienestar animal y normas de comercialización para los productos agropecuarios y 
pesqueros (incluida la acuicultura). (¼) Esa  Estrategia también establece objetivos de la UE con el 
fin de reducir el uso de plaguicidas (y su riesgo), antimicrobianos y fertilizantes químicos para 2030, 
y prevé la integración de consideraciones ambientales en la evaluación de las solicitudes en mat eria 
de tolerancia en las importaciones con respecto a los plaguicidas no aprobados en la Unión Europea".  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 47 - 
 
Preguntas 13:  
¿En base a qué normativa se sustentan las "consideraciones ambientales" aludidas en el informe? 
¿Se aplica solo la normativa europea o  también la internacional, y cuál prevalece en caso de que 
haya conflicto entre las dos normativas? ¿De qué manera la UE ha tenido en cuenta a sus socios 
comerciales en la definición de la política del Pacto Verde, en particular en el programa de la Granja  
a la Mesa?  
 
Reply:  
Plant protection products and their residues are regulated in the EU by Regulation (EC) 
No 1107/2009 and Regulation (EC) No 396/2005. Both Regulations are complementary and are 
implemented in a coordinated manner to achieve the protective effect for the use of plant protection 
products. The Regulations integrate the principles of the General Food Law Regulation (EC) 
No 178/2002 and more broadly the Treaty of the Functioning of the European  Union . Environmental 
protection is fores een in the EU Regulatory framework, and this is applicable to pesticide residues.  
 
Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 and Regulation 178/2002 foresee that, when taking risk management 
decisions, all the factors relevant to the matter under consideration shall be taken into account. This 
includes environmental factors when read together with Article  11 of the Treaty of the Functioning 
of the European  Union  requires that 'environmental protection requirements must be integrated into 
the definition and implementation  of the Union's policies and activities'.  
 
WTO members are not prevented from taking measures necessary to ensure the protection of animal 
or plant health or the environment provided that those measures are not applied in a manner which 
could constitute a  means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
international trade.  
 
The EU considers that lowering the maximum residue levels (MRLs) for clothianidin and 
thiamethoxam to the limit of quantification (LOQ) is necessary to fulfil its legitimate objective and 
that there is no alternative that would be less trade restrictive and equally contribute to the objective 
pursued.  
 
[1] An example of an endpoint could be the LD 50 for honeybees from a laboratory test according to a 
Test guideline internationally agreed via the OECD.  
 
14. Página 113, subtítulo 3.3.3 Prescripciones sanitarias y fitosanitarias, Párrafo 3.194 "Según se 
anuncia en la Estrategia, la Comisión tiene previsto presentar en 2023 un nuevo marco legislativo 
para los sistemas alimentarios sostenibles con el fin, entre otras cosas, de incorporar la sostenibilidad 
a todas las políticas relacionadas con los alimentos, y una propuesta para fijar objetivos de reducción 
del desperdicio de alimentos a nivel de toda la UE".  
 
Preguntas 14:  
¿La polí tica de reducción de desperdicios comprendería también a alimentos importados o sólo a los 
producidos a la UE? ¿En caso de aplicar a productos importados, se ha previsto la notificación a la 
OMC y eventuales consultas con socios comerciales?  
 
Reply:  
The legislative proposal for the setting of EU -level targets for food waste reduction intends to set 
targets obliging EU Member States to reduce food waste generated in their respective territories.  
 
The proposal does not address food waste generated outside of  the EU.  
 
15. Página 114, subtítulo 3.3.3 Prescripciones sanitarias y fitosanitarias, Párrafo 3.196 
"Tres organismos de la UE siguen apoyando la labor de la Comisión en esta esfera: i) la Autoridad 
Europea de Seguridad Alimentaria (EFSA); ii) la Agencia Eu ropea de Medicamentos (EMA); y iii) la 
Agencia Europea de Sustancias y Mezclas Químicas. La EFSA es el organismo de la UE encargado de 
prestar asesoramiento independiente a la Comisión acerca de la inocuidad de los alimentos sobre la 
base de testimonios ci entíficos  …" 
 
Preguntas 15:  
¿Hay algún indicador que informe si se han tomado en cuenta de antemano las observaciones y 
datos de terceros en los procesos de evaluación de riesgo de EFSA, y en especial hasta qué punto 
dichos criterios pudieron modificar, o  no, los resultados de las evaluaciones de ESFA? ¿Qué socios WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 48 - 
 
  
 comerciales son los que más contribuyen con información que se toma en consideración en la 
evaluación de riesgo y definición de LMRs?  
 
Reply:  
Comments and EFSA's replies to comments are published as an annex to the relevant scientific 
output in the EFSA Journal . Comments and subsequent EFSA replies are available to the public, who 
can check how a comment has been considered. EFSA is currently working to develop a corporate 
indicator related to the impact of consultations on EFSA's work.  
16. Página 114, subtít ulo 3.3.3 Prescripciones sanitarias y fitosanitarias, Párrafo 3.197 "La Unión 
Europea aplica prescripciones sanitarias y fitosanitarias para la entrada en la Unión Europea de 
animales, productos reproductivos, productos de origen animal, subproductos anima les, productos 
compuestos, alimentos y piensos de origen no animal y plantas (¼). En general, estos productos 
deben ir acompañados de certificados sanitarios o fitosanitarios para entrar en el mercado de la UE 
y están sujetos a control a su llegada a un pu esto de control fronterizo de la UE. Además, algunos 
productos deben ser originarios de terceros países, que son aprobados por la Comisión y, en algunos 
casos, de un establecimiento aprobado, para ser vendidos en el mercado de la UE".  
 
Pregunta 16:  
¿Nos p odrían indicar con más detalle a qué se refiere el siguiente texto: "Además, algunos productos 
deben ser originarios de terceros países, que son aprobados por la Comisión y, en algunos casos, 
de un establecimiento aprobado, para ser vendidos en el mercado de la UE"?  
 
Reply:  
For certain food (mainly products of animal origin) import is only allowed when the third country is 
listed. Article  3 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/2292 lays down for which food this 
provision applies. Third countries can  be listed at their request if they can provide evidence of the 
absence of certain animal diseases transmitted through food and there is a competent authority in 
place that can reliably verify compliance of the imported food with EU food safety requirement s, 
including a control plan for pharmacologically active substances, pesticides and contaminants in 
food. 
 
In addition, for certain food (often the same food as for the listing of the country, the foods for which 
this applies are laid down in Article  13 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/2292) the competent 
authority of a third country must provide a list of establishments that produce according to EU food 
safety requirements (e.g. applying a HACCP system). Such listing of establishments is required for 
verification purposes in particular since only certain establishments in a country may manufacture 
food according to EU requirements (listed) while others may not (food for other markets, not listed).  
 
17. Página 114, subtítulo 3.3.3 Prescripciones sanitar ias y fitosanitarias, Párrafo 3.197 "Antes de 
la importación, las empresas también deben presentar una notificación previa al puesto de control 
fronterizo de la primera llegada a la Unión Europea, presentando, por conducto del Trade Control 
and Expert Syst em (TRACES), un "documento sanitario común de entrada", que incluirá referencias 
al certificado sanitario o fitosanitario correspondiente. Los controles en frontera se planifican sobre 
la base de este registro".  
 
Pregunta 17:  
Mientras el Sistema TRACES pr ocesa la notificación previa del "documento sanitario común de 
entrada" en el país de la UE de primera llegada, ¿los demás países de la UE retienen las 
importaciones de un mismo producto que desea ingresar a su territorio hasta que se concluya el 
análisis en el primer país de llegada? ¿Estos controles en frontera son los mismos que se realizan en 
el sistema RASFF o en que difieren?  
 
Reply:  
The border control system of the EU is organised in such a way that all border control posts (BCPs) 
apply the same rule s. For example, where intensified official controls are implemented for a certain 
category of products coming from the same establishment of origin, all the EU BCPs apply the same 
investigations and detain the consignments at the border until the results a llow to decide if the 
consignment can be released.  
All the details on intensified official controls (as your question seems to refer to them) can be found 
in Regulation (EU) 2019/1873:  
https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32019R1873 .  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 49 - 
 
18. Página 115, subtítulo 3.3.3 Prescripciones sanitarias y fitosanitarias, Párrafo 3.200 "En la 
actualidad, cinco frutas (bananos, cocos, duriones, dátiles y piñas) están exentas del certificado 
fitosanitario".  
 
Pregunta 18:  
¿Cuál es el procedimiento que seg uir para que otros productos, aparte de las cinco frutas, puedan 
también tener la excepción del certificado fitosanitario?  
 
Reply:  
Any request from a National Plant Protection Organisation for a deletion from the list of regulated 
plants, plant products and other objects subject to phytosanitary certificate would need to 
accompanied by a scientific pest risk assessment demonstrating that the relevant commodity would 
not pose any risk in relation to the introduction or spread of regulated quaranti ne pest. Such dossier 
would then be submitted to scientific opinion by the Union's relevant risk assessment body 
(i.e. EFSA – the European Food Safety Authority). Subsequently, the regulatory follow -up of the 
EFSA opinion is done by the Commission and the Member States through the relevant Standing 
Committee, where a possible draft legal act for adaptation of the list of regulated plants, plant 
products and other objects can be voted, and subsequently adopted by the Commission and 
published in the Official Journal.  
 
The requesting NPPO will be kept updated on the progress/result of the dossier.  
 
19. Página 115, subtítulo 3.3.3 Prescripciones sanitarias y fitosanitarias, Párrafo 3.201 "Si la EFSA 
concluye que la tolerancia en la importación es inocua para los  consumidores y no plantea una 
preocupación ambiental, puede concederse dicha tolerancia".  
 
Pregunta 19:  
¿Se podría explicar o detallar los criterios para determinar cuándo una tolerancia es inocua y no 
plantea una preocupación ambiental?  
 
Reply:  
The eval uation of the import tolerance follows the same criteria in relation to those environmental 
issues that are considered of global concern as those used for the placing of plant protection products 
on the market set in Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009. If the ri sk assessment concludes that there is 
no unacceptable risk to bees, the import tolerance may be granted.  
 
Adverse effects of clothianidin and thiamethoxam on bees are directly linked to the intrinsic 
properties of those substances. Therefore, the risks for bees from outdoor uses of these substances 
are unlikely to be limited to the European  Union . 
 
If the EU considers an environmental risk assessment necessary, this will be based upon 
environmental endpoints[1] that are based on most recent science and compared to the 
environmental ex posure based on supporting evidence provided by the respective third country.  
 
[1]  An example of an endpoint could be the LD 50 for honeybees from a laboratory test according to a 
Test guideline internationally agreed via the OECD.  
 
20. Página 116, subtítulo 3.3.3 Prescripciones sanitarias y fitosanitarias, Párrafo 3.204 "Los 
Estados miembros de la UE son responsables de la aplica ción de la legislación sanitaria y fitosanitaria 
de la UE, incluidos los controles de las importaciones en las fronteras, y la Comisión audita su 
actuación a este respecto por conducto de la DG SANTE. Las autoridades competentes de los Estados 
miembros de la UE realizan controles, a la llegada al primer puesto de control fronterizo de la UE, 
de los envíos de animales, productos de origen animal y plantas y productos vegetales".  
 
Pregunta 20:  
En caso de existir algún inconveniente con la mercancía importada  en los controles en frontera 
(gestionada a través del Sistema TRACES) ¿son dichos inconvenientes también notificados a la 
Autoridad Sanitaria del país de origen de la mercancía? ¿Cómo se verifica el cumplimiento de LMRs 
bajo régimen de autorización de eme rgencia, en particular respecto a la prohibición de circulación 
de esos productos fuera del miembro de la OMC que concede la autorización?  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 50 - 
 
  
 Reply:  
According to Art.  5 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1873, if the coordinated performance of intensified 
official controls reveal the same type of infringement on three consignments coming from the same 
establishment of origin, the competent authority of the third country are immediately notified by 
official letter.  
 
All the details can be found in Regulation  (EU) 2019/1873: https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32019R1873 . 
 
In addition, in accordance with the provisions of Article  66(5)(d) of the Official Controls Regulation 
(Regulation (EU) 2017/625), in the event of a refusal of entry of a consignment due to an issue 
encountered during border controls, the third country of origin of that consignment is notifi ed via 
means of the TRACES system of the rejection and the measures taken that are recorded in the 
relevant entry document issued by the EU border control authorities.  
 
A condition for the receipt of the aforementioned notification through the TRACES syste m is that the 
third country authority officials have access inside TRACES. With respect to Ecuador, the following 
authorities have access in TRACES with several officials connected, which grants them visibility over 
all entry documents issued for consignme nts exported to the EU from Ecuador: (1) Agencia de 
Regulación y Control Fito y Zoosanitario (AGROCALIDAD) and (2) Subsecretaría de Calidad e 
Inocuidad (SCI).  
 
The EU Member State granting the emergency authorisation has to put the necessary official contr ols 
in place to ensure – in case a national temporary MRL was established - that the product remains on 
the national territory.  
 
21. Página 116, subtítulo 3.3.3 Prescripciones sanitarias y fitosanitarias, Párrafo 3.204 "Los 
controles de importación y su fre cuencia se basan en análisis del riesgo y, en algunos casos, pueden 
aplicarse con carácter temporal o con una frecuencia definida previamente a las mercancías 
procedentes de determinados países. En la actualidad, la Unión Europea aplica controles en fronte ra 
temporales, que son objeto de examen periódico, a determinados alimentos y piensos de origen no 
animal (por ejemplo, cacahuetes, té, pimientos) procedentes de 24 países, y controles con una 
frecuencia reducida a 68 productos (por ejemplo, flores cortada s procedentes de determinados 
países de África y América Latina)".  
 
Pregunta 21:  
¿Nos podrían indicar cuánto tiempo durará la vigencia de los controles temporales en frontera y qué 
entidad define los parámetros para que se apliquen controles temporales a un determinado producto 
y a un país o región en particular?  
 
Reply:  
According to Art.  6 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1873, the coordinated performance of intensified official 
controls shall end when the following conditions are met:  
 
1. an uninterrupted sequence of at least 10 satisfactory results in the coordinated performance 
of intensified official controls has been recorded in TRACES; and  
2. the total weight of the consignments referred to in point (i)  reaches at least 10 times the 
weigh t of the initial consignment which triggered the measure.  
 
All the details can be found in Regulation (EU) 2019/1873: https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CE LEX:32019R1873  
 
22. Página 116 subtítulo 3.3.3 Prescripciones sanitarias y fitosanitarias, Párrafo 3.205 "Además 
del RASFF, la Unión Europea cuenta con otros dos sistemas de alerta: el Sistema de Información 
sobre Enferme dades Animales (sistema ADIS), para compartir información sobre brotes de 
enfermedades infecciosas de los animales; y el Sistema europeo de notificación de interceptaciones 
en materia de fitosanitaria (EUROPHYT), para compartir información sobre las interc eptaciones de 
organismos nocivos en las plantas y los productos vegetales importados".  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 51 - 
 
Pregunta 22:  
¿Las Autoridades Sanitarias de terceros países tienen acceso a la información especializada de ADIS 
y EUROPHYT, a más al sistema RASFF?  
 
Reply:  
RASFF  notifications are available in real time on the webpage https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/rasff -
window/screen/search . The search function allows to choose a period of time, detailed hazards or 
specific countries of interest. The authorised users, as designed by the competent authorities of the 
country, are able to access to all the information related to their country.  
 
The EU collects data in ADIS based on Regulation (EU) 2020/2002  (https://eur -
lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2020/2002/oj ). A selected set of data from ADIS is published on 
SANTE  webpage: https://food.ec.europa.eu/animals/animal -diseases/animal -disease-information -
system -adis_en  which include summary tables and distribution map 
e.g. https://food.ec.europa.eu/syste m/files/2023 -05/ad_adns_outbreaks -per-
disease_weekly_0.pdf  or https://food.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023 -05/ad_adns_outbreaks -per-
disease_weekly -map_0.pdf . The rest of the dat aset is not publicly available, instead it is restricted 
access reserved for the MS competent authorities. Please note that this page is in the process of 
being re -deigned and the data presented, and the links could change in the following months.  
 
On the  plant health side, the EUROPHYT for import interceptions does no longer exist and is 
since 2020 replaced by the TRACES system where import non -compliances can be consulted. The 
relevant third country authorities can consult the results/refusals of EU impo rt inspections of 
commodities certified by their own authorities, but not those from other countries.  
 
23. Página 116, subtítulo 3.3.3 Prescripciones sanitarias y fitosanitarias, Párrafo 3.206 "...  durante 
el mismo período, la Unión Europea planteó 26 preo cupaciones comerciales específicas sobre MSF 
aplicadas por otros Miembros de la OMC, y los Miembros de la OMC plantearon 32 preocupaciones 
comerciales específicas sobre MSF aplicadas por la Unión  …" 
 
Preguntas 23:  
¿Qué acciones ha llevado adelante la UE p ara resolver las preocupaciones comerciales presentadas 
por países miembros de la OMC desde varios años atrás, como las relativas a los límites máximos 
de residuos de ciertos pesticidas?  
 
Reply:  
All trade concerns raised by WTO member countries are always duly considered and taken into 
account by the EU. The EU provides detailed replies in writing explaining the rationale for its 
proposals and decisions and keeps a transparent approach with its trading partners. When 
appropriate, the EU takes action,  modifying some of its proposals to respond to issues raised by 
other WTO member countries.  
 
For example, a draft Regulation updating MRLs for pyriproxyfen is expected to be adopted in 
September 2023. The draft Regulation was notified to the WTO -SPS Commit tee on 23  February  2023 
in G/SPS/N/EU/618. A request was received not to lower the MRL for bananas, which was at a safe 
level, pending the submission of a full import tolerance request. The request was supported by 
Colombia and Ecuador. As concrete data fr om a first residue trial was submitted with specific plans 
for further generation of data, along with support from the producing countries, the EU decided to 
grant the request and maintain the MRL for bananas, pending the submission of an import tolerance 
request.  
 
E. Contratación pública  
24. Página 122, subtítulo 3.3.6 Contratación pública, párrafo 3.228. "Según los datos disponibles 
más recientes, en 2016 -2019 el 25,7% de los contratos de cuantía inferior a EUR 200 millones fueron 
transfronterizos (contra tación directa e indirecta), y el 74,2% de la cuantía contratada se adjudicó 
a proveedores nacionales. En los contratos de cuantía superior a EUR 200 millones, el 32,6% de la 
contratación fue transfronteriza (contratación directa e indirecta) y el 67,4% de  la cuantía contratada 
se adjudicó a proveedores nacionales".  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 52 - 
 
  
 Pregunta 24:  
¿Existe bajo la legislación europea la obligación de que una empresa extranjera deba adquirir 
domicilio legal en el territorio europeo una vez que haya sido seleccionada su oferta, con miras a la 
firma y suscripción de un contrato público?  
 
Reply:  There is no such obligation under European public procurement law.  
 
25. Página 124, subtítulo 3.3.6 Contratación pública, párrafo 3.236. "El Reglamento (UE) 
2022/2560, que tiene por objeto corregir a las distorsiones causadas por las subvenciones 
extranjeras en el mercado interior, se adoptó en 2022. (…) En tales casos, los proveedores que 
participen en las licitaciones estarán obligados a notificar a la Comis ión todas las contribuciones 
financieras extranjeras de valor superior a EUR 4 millones por tercer país que hayan recibido en los 
tres años anteriores. Si, después de haber realizado una investigación, la Comisión determina que 
un proveedor ha recibido sub venciones que distorsionan el mercado único, puede prohibir la 
adjudicación de un contrato a ese proveedor, salvo que este proponga compromisos que corrijan 
plenamente la distorsión causada. También se pueden imponer multas por incumplimiento, 
aportación d e información incorrecta o engañosa, omisión de la notificación o elusión."  
 
Pregunta 25:  
¿Podría la UE explicar si las disposiciones del Reglamento consideran criterios de especificidad para 
definir el alcance de las subvenciones extranjeras a proveedore s que operen en el mercado de la 
UE, de conformidad con la definición y alcance establecidos en los artículos 1 y 2 del Acuerdo sobre 
Subvenciones y Medidas Compensatorias?  
 
Reply:  Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 specifies in its Article  3(1) that "a foreign sub sidy shall be 
deemed to exist where a third country provides, directly or indirectly, a financial contribution which 
confers a benefit on an undertaking engaging in an economic activity in the internal market and 
which is limited, in law or in fact, to one  or more undertakings or industries."  
 
Pregunta 26:  
En relación con el artículo 4 del Acuerdo sobre Contratación Pública de la OMC, ¿podría la UE detallar 
si esta normativa cumple con el principio de no discriminación?  
 
Reply:  Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 co mplies with the principle of non -discrimination. It lays down 
rules and procedures for investigating distortive foreign subsidies granted to economic operators 
engaging in an economic activity in the internal market, irrespective of the nationality or orig in of 
the economic operator. It therefore applies equally to EU and non -EU economic operators. At the 
same time with regard to subsidies granted by EU Member States, the EU maintains a sophisticated 
and effective system of State aid control, aiming at ensu ring fair conditions for all undertakings 
engaging in an economic activity in the internal market. This State aid control system prevents 
Member States from granting State aid that unduly distorts competition in the internal market.  
 
26. Página 124, subtít ulo 3.3.6 Contratación pública, párrafo 3.237, "La Comisión ha publicado un 
Aviso actualizado con orientaciones sobre la contratación pública en materia de innovación, que, sin 
ser vinculantes jurídicamente, sugieren un enfoque por etapas de la contratació n en materia de 
innovación, desde la evaluación de las necesidades hasta la ejecución del contrato, y dan ejemplos 
de buenas prácticas."  
 
Pregunta 27:  
¿La Unión Europea tiene planeado incorporar en su marco normativo a disposiciones vinculantes 
sobre compra pública en materia de innovación?  
 
Reply:  Currently, the provisions of the 2014 Public Procurement Directive offer several tools to 
facilitate the purchase of innovation. There is currently no evidence that these mechanisms need to 
be strengthened. Therefore, the Commission has no intention to incorporate into Public Procurement 
Directive binding provisions on public procurement in the field of innovation.  
 
27. Página 124, subtítulo 3.3.6 Contratación pública, párrafo 3.238. "La Comisión ha elaborado  
recientemente criterios de contratación pública ecológica voluntarios para varios productos o 
sectores, como los ordenadores, los teléfonos inteligentes o el transporte por carretera, con el fin 
de facilitar su adopción en los pliegos de condiciones de la s licitaciones" . WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 53 - 
 
Pregunta 28:  
¿Tiene la UE mecanismos para aplicar los referidos criterios con miras a dar preferencia a la 
incorporación de criterios ecológicos en los procesos de compra pública, a pesar de que no sean de 
uso obligatorio? De ser afirmativa la respuesta, ¿cómo evitar que dichos mecanismos y criterios se 
utilicen de forma que discrimine, directa o de forma encubierta, entre proveedores que oferte 
productos o servicios similares?  
 
Reply:  The EU green public procurement (GPP) criteria are developed to facilitate the inclusion of 
green requirements in public tender documents. While the adopted EU GPP criteria aim to reach a 
good balance between environmental performance, cost considerations, market availability and ease 
of verif ication, procuring authorities may choose, according to their needs and ambition level, to 
include all or only certain requirements in their tender documents. The EU GPP criteria are regularly 
updated to ensure that they reflect the most recent technologic al and market development. The EU 
Public procurement Directives of 2014 provide that environmental considerations must be applied in 
accordance with principle of non discrimination and transparency. Green public procurement criteria 
are developed on the ba sis of objective and non discriminatory requirements.  
 
F. Políticas comerciales por sectores  
28. Página 140, subtítulo 4.1 Agricultura, Párrafo 4.2 "El sector agrícola sigue desempeñando un 
papel importante en la Unión Europea en lo que respecta al empleo , el comercio y el apoyo a las 
políticas. En 2020, la agricultura y la ganadería (incluida la caza) representaron el 1,6% del valor 
añadido bruto de la UE, y un 2,1% adicional de dicho valor correspondió a la fabricación de productos 
alimenticios, bebidas y productos de tabaco, sin incluir otras partes de la cadena de valor como la 
venta al por mayor y al por menor o la hostelería. 1 El valor total de la producción agrícola aumentó 
de EUR 378.000 millones en 2019 a EUR 401.000 millones en 2021  ...". 
 
Pregunta 29:  
¿Se ha evaluado la contribución de los trabajadores migrantes en la producción agrícola de la UE, 
tanto en número de puestos de trabajo como en porcentaje del valor añadido? ¿Qué mecanismos 
existen para la efectiva protección de los derechos laborales y de otro tipo de esos trabajadores?  
 
Reply : EU agriculture is a significant relay for seasonal workers. As definitions of different types of 
workers (mobile, EU born/non -EU born, third country, migrant workers etc.) with different 
employment cat egories (part -time, full time, seasonal, platform, self -employed, declared, 
undeclared) vary, the EU does not have exact figures. The EU has started the implementation of the 
new CAP in January 2023. The CAP payments are now linked to the compliance of cer tain European 
labour law provisions. Under this new social conditionality mechanism, labour authorities in EU 
countries will need to inform agricultural paying agencies at least once a year on the results of their 
own controls.  
 
The new mechanism covers di rectives on :  
- Transparent and predictable employment conditions;  
- On-farm safety and health.  
 
As the social conditionality mechanism is created for the first time, an evaluation of its functioning 
by the Commission is foreseen after two years of impleme ntation. The EU Single Permit Directive 
ensures that non -EU nationals working in the EU are not exploited as they are guaranteed equal 
treatment with EU nationals in terms of for instance working conditions, including pay, health and 
safety, trade union me mbership, social security, education and vocational training and tax benefits. 
The Directive is publicly available at the official website of the EU at:  
https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/?qid=1552639212905&uri=CELEX:32011L0098 .  
 
National authorities of individual EU Member States, labour inspectorates and courts, for example, 
enforce the rules. In addition, the European Labour Authority helps EU Member States and the 
European Commission to ensure that EU rules on labour mobility and social security coordination 
are enforced in a fair, simple and effective way, including through coordinating and supp orting 
concerted and joint inspections.  
 
Pregunta 30:  
¿Se cuenta con una estimación o proyección del porcentaje máximo de la producción agrícola de la 
UE que puede transformarse en orgánica, con desglose de renglones productivos, y dentro de qué WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 54 - 
 
  
 lapsos? ¿ En qué medida la producción orgánica local aportará a cubrir las necesidades de seguridad 
alimentaria?  
 
Reply:  Within the context of the European Green Deal (2019), which aims for climate neutrality 
by 2050, both the Farm to Fork strategy (2020) for a fair , healthy and environmentally sustainable 
food system and the Biodiversity strategy (2020) for bringing nature back into our lives include the 
target of "at least 25% of the EU's agricultural land under organic farming by 2030 and a significant 
increase in  organic aquaculture". This compares to a share of 9.1% in 2020. Most of the area under 
organic farming in the EU is currently dedicated to permanent grassland (42%), followed by green 
fodder (17%), cereals (16%), and permanent crops, such as fruit, olives  and vineyards (11%). 
Despite significant growth, organic animal production still accounts for a small share of total EU 
animal production, between 1% and 7% depending on the sector. The expectation is that the 
demand for organic products will continue to develop in a balanced manner compared to the current 
situation. It is not expected that progress towards the achievement of the 25% objective at EU level 
will in and by itself have any negative impacts on the EU's food security.  
 
29. Página 153, subtítulo 4.1.3.2 Sostenimiento del mercado interior, Párrafo 4.50 "En 2020, la 
ayuda brindada en la Unión Europea a través de programas operativos en el sector de las frutas y 
hortalizas ascendió a EUR 1.700 millones, lo que representó un aume nto del 11% con respecto al 
promedio registrado en el período 2015 -2019, y esta se destinó principalmente a inversiones, 
regímenes de calidad y medidas ambientales."  
 
Pregunta 31:  
¿Se cuenta con una evaluación general del impacto en el monto de la produc ción del sector, de los 
recursos empeñados en las medidas ambientales, durante los últimos años? ¿Qué objetivos 
ambientales concretos se promovieron con los programas y cuál fue el porcentaje de efectividad?  
 
Reply:  Data on the fruit and vegetables operati onal programmes, including expenditure, 
implemented by recognised producer organisations are publicly available on the Europa website. In 
addition, the Commission carried out in 2022 a synthesis study of national strategies for sustainable 
operational prog rammes in the fruit and vegetables sector for the period 2013 -2018.  
 
30. Página 155, subtítulo 4.1.3.2 Sostenimiento del mercado interior, Párrafo 4.57 "…  El 
Reglamento prevé ciertas flexibilidades para autorizar provisionalmente el uso de sustancias no 
ecológicas y no autorizadas en la producción ecológica en terceros países "  
 
(Nota del Ecuador: En el documento en inglés se habla de sustancias no "organic". La traducción al 
español como "ecológicas" no parece la más adecuada.)  
 
Pregunta 32:  
¿Respecto a q ué terceros países se han adoptado excepciones en cuanto al uso de sustancias 
permitidas en la producción de orgánicos?  
 
Reply:  To date, no temporary authorisation has been granted to third countries.  
 
31. Página 164, subtítulo 4.2.2 Ayuda interna, párrafo 4.89: "Desde 2021, el apoyo a la pesca y 
la acuicultura se cofinancia a través del Fondo Europeo Marítimo, de Pesca y de Acuicultura (FEMPA), 
(…) El FEMPA proporciona financiación para programas nacionales aprobados por la Comisión y 
cofinanciados por los Estados miembros, y los programas aportan, en promedio, hasta el 50% de 
los costos admisibles (los porcentajes oscilan entre el 40% y el 100% en función de las diversas 
actividades admisibles). Estos programas también pueden incluir ayudas  para el sector de la 
acuicultura, en consonancia con los planes estratégicos nacionales plurianuales de desarrollo del 
sector"; y,  
Párrafo 4.90: "Las prioridades de ayuda del FEMPA se centran en i) la pesca sostenible y la 
conservación de los recursos bio lógicos marinos; ii) la acuicultura sostenible y la transformación y 
comercialización de productos de la pesca y la acuicultura; iii) la economía azul sostenible y las 
comunidades pesqueras y acuícolas; y iv) el fortalecimiento de la gobernanza internacion al y la 
gestión sostenible de los océanos.103 También se prevén fondos para el desarrollo sostenible de las 
regiones ultra periféricas"  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 55 - 
 
Pregunta 33:  
¿Qué mecanismos de control tiene la Unión Europea para asegurar que los subsidios otorgados bajo 
el crite rio de sostenibilidad no produzcan desviaciones de recursos ni fomenten indirectamente 
acciones que contribuyan a la sobrepesca y sobrecapacidad?  
 
Reply:  EU subsidies are provided under the European Maritime Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund 
(EMFAF). To avoid  harmful effects of these subsidies, the EMFAF Regulation includes a list of ineligible 
operations (e.g. building new fishing vessels, increasing the power of fishing vessels) and a set of 
conditions to prevent harmful effects, including indirect effects ( e.g. certain investments can be  
supported only in segments of the fishing fleet without structural overcapacity).  
 
32. Página 167, subtítulo 4.3 Silvicultura, párrafo 4.109 "Las importaciones de madera y 
productos de la madera en la Unión Europea se rigen por el Reglamento de la UE sobre la madera 
que establece los requisitos de diligencia debida para que los operadores puedan impedir la 
comercialización de madera ilegal en el mercado, aplicables a productos nacionales e importados".  
 
Pregunta 34:  
¿Puede la Unión Europea explicar cómo se realiza el control sobre los requisitos de debida diligencia 
a los productos nacionales? ¿Estos controles se realizan antes o con posterioridad a la 
comercialización de los productos?  
 
Reply:  Domestic operators and traders will need to submit in the Information System due diligence 
statements confirming the legality and the deforestation -free element before placing, making 
available or exporting relevant commodities or products from the market. Checks c an be carried out 
after but also before products are placed on the market, if the relevant product presents such a high 
risk of non -compliance with the regulation to require immediate action.  
 
33. Página 167, subtítulo 4.3 Silvicultura, párrafo 4.110 "El r eglamento propuesto abarcaría la 
madera, así como productos como el cacao, el café, el aceite de palma, el ganado bovino o la soja, 
cultivados en superficies anteriormente boscosas y desforestadas después de diciembre de 2020".  
 
Pregunta 35:  
¿Bajo qué con sideraciones y sobre la base de qué parámetros la UE ha considerado incluir a dichos 
productos en el reglamento de libre deforestación? ¿Cada cuánto tiempo se revisarán los productos 
que están sujetos a la normativa? ¿Se incluiría tanto a productos sin pro cesar como a productos 
terminados?  
 
Reply: The goal of the Regulation is to curb deforestation and forest degradation associated with 
the EU's consumption and production. The choice of the relevant commodities and products included 
in the Regulation's scop e was based on a sound impact assessment that looked at commodities with 
the highest EU embodied deforestation. In the context of the review of the Regulation, Article  34(2) 
and (3) requires the European Commission to carry out an impact assessment to revi ew the need 
and feasibility of including other commodities -including maize - within the scope of application. 
Art. 34(5) also empowers the Commission to amend the list of relevant products covered by the 
Regulation included in Annex  I. At this stage, it is  too early to determine which other commodities 
and products will be included in the scope of the Regulation.  
 
34. Página 168, subtítulo 4.3 Silvicultura, Párrafo 4.111 "El nuevo reglamento propuesto sustituye 
y deroga al Reglamento sobre la madera y se ba sa tanto en dicho Reglamento como en el 
Reglamento FLEGT, que en 2020 fueron objeto de un control de adecuación. El reglamento propuesto 
exigiría que los productos fueran i) "libres de deforestación" (producidos en tierras que no hayan 
sido objeto de defor estación o degradación forestal después del 31 de diciembre de 2020); 
ii) producidos de conformidad con la legislación nacional ("legalidad"); y iii) acompañados de una 
declaración de diligencia debida. Por consiguiente, se consolidarían y reforzarían los sistemas de 
diligencia debida y vigilancia, ya existentes en el Reglamento sobre la madera, con respecto a la 
condición jurídica de la madera, pero añadiendo el requisito de que los productos sean "libres de 
deforestación". Se seguiría considerando que la madera abarcada por una licencia FLEGT cumple el 
requisito de legalidad".  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 56 - 
 
  
 Pregunta 36:  
¿Se notificará a la OMC el reglamento para que los productos sean "libres de deforestación", debido 
a que al exigirse una declaración de debida diligencia se considera  que son requisitos para los 
productos y por tanto incumbe al ámbito del Acuerdo de Obstáculos Técnicos al Comercio?  
 
Reply : The Regulation sets mandatory due diligence rules for any company intending to place the 
commodities and products in the scope of the regulation on the EU market or to export such products 
from the EU. The EU does not intend to notify the Deforestation R egulation to the TBT committee.  
 
Having said this, the EU has been extremely transparent to the WTO Members through the legislative 
process and has presented the Deforestation Regulation and provided the possibility for trading 
partners to raise their con cerns on several occasions in the WTO Committee on Trade and 
Environment (CTE). It will also inform the CTE once the final text of the Regulation is available in 
the Official Journal of the EU. The EU will also organise a dedicated information session on t he 
Deforestation Regulation during the WTO Trade and Environment Week on the 14th of June.  
 
35. Página 193, subtítulo 4.5.2.4 Servicios de transporte marítimo y servicios portuarios, 
Párrafo  4.226. "En caso de aprobarse, la reforma propuesta de la Directi va sobre fiscalidad de la 
energía podría eliminar las exenciones fiscales a los combustibles que se utilizan en la navegación 
acuática intra -UE, y la reforma propuesta del Régimen de Comercio de Derechos de Emisión (RCDE) 
que forma parte del paquete de med idas "Objetivo 55" podría aplicar de manera progresiva, 
hasta2026, la inclusión en ese régimen de las emisiones de los grandes buques (a partir de 5.000 
toneladas brutas), con lo que posiblemente se abarcaría el 100% de las emisiones correspondientes 
a los viajes intra -UE y las producidas mientras los buques están atracados328, y el 50% de las 
emisiones derivadas de los viajes entre la Unión Europea y terceros países.  
 
Pregunta 37:  
¿Se ha evaluado el impacto de la medida en el costo de los fletes para países que enfrentan retos 
logísticos por su situación geográfica, desastres naturales y limitaciones de infraestructura? ¿Hay un 
mecanismo o canales de diálogo para discutir situaciones como las descritas con terceros países?  
 
Reply:  The Commission always  evaluates the impact of its legislative proposals. In the Impact 
Assessment carried out for the revision of the ETS Directive which also informed the extension of 
the system to the maritime sector, the environmental and economic impact of the measure was 
evaluated. This included the global perspective of international maritime transport which also 
established that third countries could benefit from the energy efficiency improvements induced by 
carbon pricing, should vessels operate globally. The sector wil l also benefit from EU support for? 
innovation.  
 
The EU considers that all sectors need to contribute to decarbonisation and decided to cover its fair 
share of international shipping emissions (50%). The EU measures for the sector will be kept under 
review  to ensure its consistency with possible measures adopted at international level under the 
auspices of IMO.  
 
The EU also collaborates with third countries at both bilateral and regional levels, including in areas 
such as sustainable transport or climate re silience. These could also be the channels for such a 
dialogue.  
 
II. PREGUNTAS SOBRE EL INFORME DE LA UNION EUROPEA WT/TPR/G/442  
36. Página 1, Subtítulo 1. Introducción, párrafo 1.3 "La nueva estrategia se basaba en la apertura, 
la sostenibilidad y la firmeza. …"  
Pregunta 38:  
¿Cómo se conjuga el Pacto Verde y las barreras no arancelarias que éste establece, con el concepto 
de autonomía estratégica abierta, en particular respecto al pilar de apertura?  
 
Reply:  
Combined reply to quest ions 38 and 39  
The EU's trade policy focuses on openness, sustainability and assertiveness, in line with the Trade 
Policy Review Communication of February 2021: openness makes us more competitive and is the 
bedrock of our long -term prosperity; sustainabili ty reflects our responsibility to future generations 
and transition to a net -zero economy; assertiveness enhances our ability to deal with growing risks 
in a rapidly changing environment.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 57 - 
 
Over the last two years we have made important strides in stepping u p our commitment on 
sustainability, including by fighting climate change and environmental degradation. In this context, 
we have put forward several autonomous tools including CBAM and instruments on deforestation, 
forced labour and due diligence. We devel op our environmental and climate action policies in a way 
that achieve the environmental objectives set in the international commitments (including under 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs), the UNFCCC and the Sustainable Development 
Goals) and mi nimises impact on trade. The EU is very conscious about the potential relevance of 
these measures for the EU's trading partners and provides transparency and engages in a dialogue 
with stakeholders and partner countries affected.  
 
Beyond cooperation and di alogue, the promotion of efforts to decarbonise and fight biodiversity loss 
are also prioritized via technical assistance and green investments under the Global Gateway.  
 
Pregunta 39:  
¿Contempla el concepto de autonomía estratégica el pilar de sostenibil idad y los retos sociales y 
económicos que enfrentan los socios comerciales en desarrollo de la UE?  
 
Reply:  
See reply to question 38.  
37. Página 8, Subtítulo 3.11 Reforma de la OMC, literal a. Solución de diferencias, párrafo 3.5: 
"Ninguna reforma de la OMC es más importante o urgente que aquella que permita lograr el objetivo 
identificado en el documento final de la CM12 de tener un "sistema de solución de diferencias 
plenamente operativo y que funcione debidamente" para 2024. La UE participa constructiv amente 
en los debates sobre la reforma."  
 
Pregunta 40:  
¿En la perspectiva de la citada referencia a la CM12, que comentarios tiene la UE con respecto al 
"sistema de solución de diferencias y el procedimiento arbitral multipartito de apelación provisional 
(PAMAP / MPIA)?  
 
Reply: Dispute settlement reform is a key priority for the EU, and the EU is engaging constructively 
in ongoing dispute settlement reform discussions, with a view to having a fully and well -functioning 
system by 2024, as mandated by MC12. The MPIA and discussions with the view to having a fully 
and well -functioning dispute settlement system are complementary. The MPIA is not meant to reform 
the WTO dispute settlement system. The MPIA aims at preserving a fully and well -functioning dispute 
settlement system among its participants for as long as a long -lasting solution to the Appellate  Body 
impasse is not found. It ensures that MPIA participants can benefit from a binding resolution of trade 
disputes in the WTO (avoiding the so -called appeals "into the void") and it safeguards the right to 
appeal review before highly qualified and independent and impartial appeal arbitrators. The MPIA 
highlights the importance that many WTO Members place in the rules -based trading system and in 
a fully -function ing (binding and two -tier) dispute settlement system, showing the need for a 
long-lasting solution to the Appellate  Body blockage. Moreover, MPIA participants have provided for 
certain procedural improvements in the MPIA to enhance efficiency of appeal pro ceedings. These 
improvements could be considered in dispute settlement reform discussions.  
 
38. Página 10. Subtítulo 3.11 Reforma de la OMC, b. Comercio Electrónico, párrafo 3.15: "Además 
de la labor plurilateral relativa al comercio electrónico, la UE sig ue decidida a mantener la moratoria 
multilateral sobre la imposición de derechos de aduana a las transmisiones electrónicas. Opina que 
el comercio digital debe estar libre de derechos de aduana a fin de facilitar la adopción generalizada 
de tecnologías dig itales, que son fundamentales para el crecimiento económico tanto de los países 
desarrollados como de los países en desarrollo, su capacidad de innovar y la prosperidad de sus 
ciudadanos."  
 
Pregunta 41:  
En virtud del impulso que la UE viene dando al comer cio electrónico, ¿cuáles son las acciones que 
ha desarrollado, además de la moratoria multilateral sobre la imposición de derechos de aduana, 
para facilitar el uso del comercio electrónico para la exportación a la UE de las mercancías de países 
en desarrol lo? 
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Reply:  
E-commerce is a key driver for economic growth, in developed and developing countries alike. In 
order to ensure that digitalisation unlocks opportunities and creates new jobs in developing 
countries, the EU has strongly stepped up its international digital cooperation. In December 2021, 
the EU launched Global Gateway, our new global connectivity strategy. It is our offer to partner 
countries to respond to today's global challenges. It is sustainable, comprehensive, rules -based, 
human -centric, geographically adapted and in line with the SDGs and the Paris Agreement. Digital 
is one of the five key entry points of Global Gateway. More than 10% of our external action budget 
for 2021 to 2027 will prioritise actions in digital. Furthermore, ne w EU digital legislation and in 
particular the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act are instruments that harmonise the 
laws of the 27 EU Member States in relation to digital services. They facilitate the cross -border 
provision of digital servic es, regardless of whether these are provided by undertakings that are 
headquartered inside or outside the EU . 
 
39. Página 9, Subtítulo 3.1.1. Reforma de la OMC, b. Comercio Electrónico, párrafo 3.7: "En junio 
de 2022, la UE desempeñó un activo papel en la CM12 para llegar a un histórico Acuerdo sobre 
Subvenciones a la Pesca que cumplía la meta 14.6 de los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible de las 
Naciones Unidas (ODS 14.6). El Acuerdo prohíbe las subvenciones concedidas a buques u operadores 
que practiquen la pesca ilegal, no declarada y no reglamentada (pesca INDNR), prohíbe las 
subvenciones a la pesca de poblaciones sobreexplotadas si no existen medidas apropiadas para 
restablecer esas poblaciones, prohíbe las subvenciones a la pesca en las zonas no regula das de alta 
mar e incluye disposiciones de gran alcance en materia de transparencia".  
Párrafo 3.8. "Ya están en marcha los procedimientos internos de la UE para aceptar el Acuerdo y 
para lograr que entre en vigor cuanto antes. A fin de ayudar a los países  en desarrollo a aplicar el 
nuevo Acuerdo, la UE apoya el nuevo Mecanismo de Financiación para la Pesca de la OMC. La UE 
está decidida a participar constructivamente en las negociaciones que se sigan celebrando para 
llegar a un acuerdo global sobre las sub venciones que contribuyen a la sobrecapacidad y la 
sobrepesca"  
 
Pregunta 42:  
¿Cómo asegura la Unión Europea que esos contingentes no erosionen las preferencias arancelarias 
que tiene la UE a favor de los países con los que mantiene un Acuerdo Comercial? ¿ Cómo se 
compensaría si se llega a producir una posible erosión de dichas preferencias? ¿Cómo esa apertura 
de contingentes cumple con los estrictos requisitos de importación (con relación a sobrecapacidad y 
sobrepesca, y otros estándares) que tiene la Unión  Europea en materia pesquera y ambiental?  
 
Reply:  When determining the level of the Autonomous Tariff Quotas (ATQs) for fisheries products, 
the EU takes the input from various sources, such as the EU industry and its Member States. The 
quotas are establish ed so to remedy the low level of self -sufficiency of the raw materials on the 
internal market and the imported materials have to undergo a sufficient transformation in the EU in 
order to benefit from tariff reductions. Even if the ATQs are an autonomous EU  measures, the EU is 
aware of the potential impact for its preferential trading partners. The EU will conduct an impact 
assessment in the near future to analyse, among other issues, whether the fishery products imported 
under autonomous measures comply wit h the sustainability standards which are promoted by the 
EU in other existing trade arrangements, such as FTAs.  
 
40. Página 12, Subtítulo 3.1.2 Respuesta de la OMC a los desafíos mundiales, c. Comercio y medio 
ambiente y clima, párrafo 3.26: "En el marco d e los Debates Estructurados sobre el Comercio y la 
Sostenibilidad Ambiental se  puede contribuir examinando cómo pueden diseñarse las medidas y 
políticas climáticas relacionadas con el comercio para que maximicen el impacto ambiental y 
climático y limiten a l mismo tiempo las repercusiones en el comercio; estudiando enfoques para 
facilitar el acceso a los bienes y servicios ambientales; identificando medidas de política comercial 
que puedan favorecer la transición a una economía circular que haga un uso efici ente de los recursos; 
y estudiando la forma de aumentar la transparencia de las subvenciones y de intercambiar mejores 
prácticas en la creación de subvenciones favorables para el medio ambiente de conformidad con las 
normas pertinentes de la OMC"  
 
Pregunta 43:  
En el marco de la implementación y seguimiento al Acuerdo Comercial Multipartes entre Ecuador y 
la Unión Europea, y específicamente dentro del Subcomité de Comercio y Desarrollo Sostenible 
(donde se abordan los asuntos ambientales de comercio ), ¿podría promoverse el intercambio de WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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experiencias para conocer las subvenciones favorables para el medio ambiente de las que se habla 
en este apartado del informe?  
 
Reply:  The exchange of experiences on environmental matters between the EU and Ecuador within 
the TSD Committee under the Multi -Party Trade Agreement between Ecuador and the 
European  Union  is an important factor to achieve joint objectives. This type of discussi on already 
exists in the context of the TSD Committee.  
41. Página 19, Subtítulo 4.1. Apoyar el crecimiento inclusivo de los países en desarrollo, 
párrafo  4.4. "El SGP de la UE está siendo objeto de examen porque el Reglamento actual expira el 
31 de diciemb re de 2023. La finalidad del examen es mantener las características fundamentales 
del sistema actual sobre la base de sus resultados satisfactorios, constatados en una evaluación a 
mitad de período independiente realizada en 2018 y en la evaluación de impa cto que respaldó la 
propuesta de SGP para después de 2023 preparada por la Comisión. Las mejoras específicas tienen 
por objeto responder mejor a las necesidades cambiantes de los países en desarrollo y reforzar el 
impacto social y ambiental del sistema. La  Comisión Europea propuso un nuevo reglamento el 
22 de septiembre de 2021.17 La propuesta se encuentra actualmente ante el legislador de la UE y 
se adoptará oportunamente para aportar previsibilidad y estabilidad a los beneficiarios y a las 
empresas."  
 
Pregunta 44:  
¿Con relación al propósito de reforzar el impacto social y ambiental que se produce en los países en 
desarrollo, se tiene previsto analizar programas o actividades de apoyo en dichos renglones con 
respecto a los países con los cuales la UE mant iene Acuerdos comerciales bilaterales, como el 
Ecuador?  
 
Reply:  One of main priorities  of the EU in relation to its partner countries is enhancing climate and 
environment action on green productivity and innovation. It intends to increase the implementatio n 
of circular economy and bio -economy policies with the participation of main public and private actors 
with a social and gender -balanced approach. It also advances the implementation of green 
innovation and circular economy practices with the private sect or, local authorities, and higher 
education system while improving long -term strategies and climate adaptation plans through local 
authorities. This is one of the main priorities of the EU's Multiannual Indicative Program for Ecuador, 
but also for the enti re Andean region as well as one of main objectives sought by the Trade and 
Sustainable Development part of our Trade Agreement.  
 
42. Página 19, Subtítulo 4.2. Ayuda para el Comercio, párrafo 4.5. "La UE considera que la Ayuda 
para el Comercio es un instrum ento crucial para apoyar la  integración de los países en desarrollo en 
la economía mundial, la reducción de la pobreza y el desarrollo sostenible. La Ayuda para el Comercio 
de la UE y los Estados miembros se basa en la estrategia conjunta de Ayuda para el Comercio 
de 2017, y tiene cinco prioridades fundamentales: i) reducir la fragmentación, integrar los 
instrumentos de desarrollo y potenciar el efecto palanca de la Ayuda para el Comercio a través de 
una distribución más informada y coordinada; ii) aumentar  la repercusión —aprovechando al máximo 
los instrumentos en las políticas exteriores de la UE —; iii) incrementar la atención a los aspectos 
sociales y medioambientales de la sostenibilidad y el crecimiento económico inclusivo; iv) adoptar 
un enfoque más di ferenciado respecto de los países, centrándose más en los PMA; y v) mejorar el 
seguimiento y la información. El último Informe de Situación de la UE sobre la Ayuda para el 
Comercio (2022) salió a la luz en diciembre de 2022.18 La información también orient a la 
participación de la UE en la vigilancia de la iniciativa de Ayuda para el Comercio a nivel mundial. 
Durante el octavo Examen Global de la Ayuda para el Comercio realizado en la OMC en julio de 2022, 
la Comisión Europea coorganizó dos actividades ademá s de las organizadas por los Estados 
miembros de la UE, con oradores en sesiones adicionales"  
 
Pregunta 45:  
Al ser Ecuador y otros dos países andinos socios comerciales de la UE en un Acuerdo Comercial 
Multipartes, ¿se consideran nuevos programas o estrategias específicas que apoyen a esos países, 
a través de la promoción del comercio, a la reducción de la pobre za y el desarrollo sostenible en sus 
territorios?  
 
Reply:  The EU's cooperation assistance aimed at promotion of trade, sustainable development and 
social programes only for Ecuador amounts to €40  million  for years 2021 -2024. Priority areas include 
support  to sustainable trade and investments and consist on promoting sustainable supply chains WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 and strengthening the business and investment climate. Moreover, it plans also to improve the 
productivity and competitiveness of SMEs and cooperatives with a special focus on sectors with high 
social impact and export development promoting public -private partnership, while minorities and 
vulnerable groups fully enjoy and exercise their equal economic, labour, and social rights  
 
43. Página 19, Subtítulo 4.2. Ayuda para el Comercio, párrafo 4.7 "La Ayuda para el Comercio de 
la UE es un instrumento para lograr resultados en el marco de la iniciativa Global Gateway.19 Se 
trata de una nueva estrategia puesta en marcha en diciembre de 2021 con el fin de movilizar 
inversiones por un total de EUR 300.000 millones durante el período 2021 -2027. En consecuencia, 
la Ayuda para el Comercio de la UE está cada vez más impulsada por instrumentos innovadores de 
reducción del riesgo para catalizar las inversiones del sector privado. Esto se hace principalmente a 
través de operaciones de financiación combinada (es decir, una combinación de donaciones de la UE 
con préstamos o capital de entidades de financiación públicas y privadas) y garantías financieras. 
En consonancia con los objetivos g eopolíticos de la UE y su compromiso con la Agenda 2030, la 
estrategia Global Gateway tiene por objeto impulsar las inversiones inteligentes, limpias y seguras 
en los sectores digital, energético y del transporte, así como potenciar los sistemas de salud, 
educación e investigación en todo el mundo para apuntalar una recuperación mundial duradera y 
promover al mismo tiempo valores universales y normas rigurosas, la buena gobernanza y la 
transparencia."  
 
Pregunta 46:  
Sobre la iniciativa global Gateway, ¿se t iene previsto diseñar un mecanismo de "debida diligencia" 
en cuanto a sostenibilidad social, económica y ambiental para los inversionistas y socios privados 
europeos?  
 
Reply:  The Global Gateway stands for sustainable and trusted connections that work for p eople and 
the planet, and therefore, applies equally to European investors. European investors are obliged to 
comply with environmental, economic and social sustainability as per the EU regulations on the 
matter. Mechanisms of compliance, due diligence and  monitoring are already in place to ensure all 
investments are aligned to these sustainability criteria. Indeed, the Global Gateway partnerships 
principles are directly linked to ensure this social, economic and social sustainability, such as the 
promotion  of democratic values and high standards, good governance and transparency, equal 
partnerships, green and clean, security focused and catalyzing private sector investments  
 
44. Página 20, Subtítulo 5.1. Medidas de la UE para combatir el cambio climático y proteger el 
medio ambiente, párrafo 5.4. "La UE es consciente de que si desea hacer frente a problemas 
mundiales como la lucha contra el cambio climático, la pérdida de biodiversidad, la contaminación o 
la promoción de una producción y un consumo más soste nibles, es necesario aumentar la 
cooperación con terceros países. En los casos en que las políticas del Pacto Verde Europeo tienen 
una dimensión externa, la UE mantiene conversaciones con sus interlocutores. La UE se asegura de 
que su asistencia externa pr omueva activamente una actuación eficaz y ambiciosa en lo que respecta 
al clima y el medio ambiente y la integración de ambos aspectos en otras esferas. Sus políticas 
climáticas y ambientales se elaboran de conformidad con las normas de la OMC y la transpa rencia 
es total en lo que respecta a las medidas climáticas y ambientales de la UE a sus interlocutores 
comerciales a nivel bilateral, por ejemplo en el contexto de los acuerdos comerciales, así como en 
la OMC. La UE ha hecho numerosas exposiciones sobre l as políticas que pueden repercutir en el 
comercio en el Comité de Comercio y Medio Ambiente de la OMC y en otros comités, y seguirá 
haciéndolo en el futuro. El objetivo es colaborar desde una etapa temprana con nuestros 
interlocutores para comprender sus p osibles preocupaciones y ver cómo tenerlas en cuenta al 
formular las políticas, así como para evitar posibles repercusiones o efectos desfavorables para el 
comercio internacional de mercancías afectadas por la legislación de la UE, haciendo al mismo tiempo  
que se comprendan mejor las normas que se aplican en el mercado de la UE. La UE se propone 
proseguir el diálogo y la cooperación en relación con la aplicación de los instrumentos de 
sostenibilidad autónomos de la UE"  
 
Pregunta 47:  
Las nuevas exigencias del Pacto Verde Europeo generan preocupaciones, retos y dificultades para el 
sector exportador ecuatoriano (como para otros países en desarrollo). Sin embargo, Ecuador está 
abierto al diálogo y la cooperación con miras a encontrar mod alidades de implementación y períodos 
de transición en cuanto a la aplicación de las disposiciones del Pacto, en lo que concierne a los 
productos ecuatorianos. ¿Qué coordinación a nivel político y especializado, y qué programas o 
actividades de cooperación  tiene previstas la Unión Europea para que sus políticas climáticas y WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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ambientales se lleven a efecto tomando en cuenta el impacto económico y social que puedan tener 
en los países en desarrollo?  
 
Reply: For Green Deal measures that are moving towards imple mentation, the EU will continue to 
engage with trading partners in the following key areas: (1) Outreach and awareness -raising: make 
sure the measure adopted is understood (inside and outside the EU). This outreach is being done 
both in Brussels and in thi rd countries (via e.g., EU delegations), as well as in multilateral settings 
such as the WTO. We are also looking at developing material that can be used (e.g., information 
platforms, FAQs, etc.), (2) Tools to facilitate the implementation and compliance w ith the regulations 
(e.g., guidelines, databases, etc.) and (3) Capacity building: where possible, we will need to look, 
together with partner countries, at concrete needs, and identify funding, often in collaboration with 
International Organisations.  
 
For Ecuador specifically, the EU is a major provider of technical and financial support aimed at helping 
the country adapt domestic regulations to EU legislation in several fields. The Multi -annual Indicative 
Programme (MIP) for Ecuador includes under Priorit y area 1 the following: Support to sustainable 
trade and investments (EU trade agreement, Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, EU 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT) and also by the TEI Green Deal Ecuador – Economic green 
recovery through cir cular and bio -economy, contributing to Sustainable Growth and Green Deal EU 
policies. The AAP 2023 Part II (under preparation) will provide the first EU -Ecuador Forest 
Partnership (through a TEI approach of approx. EUR  12 million  contribution) aiming at re ducing 
deforestation and fostering commercialisation of bio economy products. Among the main objectives 
it will promote traceability of bio commerce products and value -chain development free from 
deforestation. Improve local capacities on forest fires prev ention and early warning systems; 
enhance agro -forestry research and sustainable forest management; strengthening scientific 
research with European universities on forest biodiversity; restoration of degraded forests and 
deforested or abandoned agricultura l lands.  
45. Página 20, Subtítulo 5.1.1 Panorama general de las medidas para combatir el cambio climático 
y proteger el medio ambiente, párrafo 5.7 El Mecanismo de Ajuste en Frontera por Carbono (MAFC) 
22 es una medida climática destinada a reducir las emi siones mundiales de gases de efecto 
invernadero evitando el riesgo de fuga de carbono y apoyando una mayor ambición en la mitigación 
del cambio climático, todo ello respetando las normas de la OMC. El MAFC igualará el precio del 
carbono de los productos na cionales y el de los importados y hará que los objetivos climáticos de la 
UE no se vean contrarrestados por el traslado de la producción a países con políticas menos 
ambiciosas.  
 
Pregunta 48:  
¿Se ha evaluado el impacto que tendrá el Mecanismo de Ajuste en  Frontera sobre el comercio con 
socios en desarrollo, que dependen de la exportación a la UE de productos primarios?  
 
Reply:  The EU has carefully assessed the potential impact and given careful consideration, in 
particular to LDCs. Our studies show that ex ports from LDCs to the EU in the sectors covered by the 
CBAM are limited.  
 
The EU has built in a transitional period in CBAM, which will give trading partners, including 
developing countries, time to prepare. To take into account of their specific needs, the EU will 
continue to support Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in targeted ways, such as through technology 
transfer, technical and financial assistance, with the objective of developing industrial production 
structures that are compatible with long -term global climate objectives.  
 
The EU will thereby continue in its role as one of the biggest contributors to climate financing in 
developing countries and LDCs. The EU is determined to help developing countries and LDCs making 
this transition but has to ma ke sure that it does so in a WTO compatible manner, without bending 
the existing multilateral rules.  
 
It should be added that CBAM  does not target countries but applies to goods of certain sectors. 
These are treated individually on their own merits (carbon emissions and carbon price paid).  
 
The EU Commission, in conjunction with the European External Action Service and EU Delegations  
around the world, will launch an information campaign, featuring online seminars, physical events, 
distribution of guidance documents, and direct assistance, aimed at assisting third country operators WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 and importers to the EU in performing all new obligati ons required by the CBAM regulation and its 
secondary legislation. The campaign will start mid 2023 upon the approval of the implementing act 
concerning the reporting rules applicable in transitional period. This will continue through 
autumn  2023 thus supp orting all relevant actors for the entry into force of the regulation in 
October  2023.  
 
As part of the review report to be prepared by the Commission before the end of the transitional 
phase, the Commission will evaluate and report on the impact on countri es with special interest to 
the least developed countries and on the effects of the technical assistance given (see to that effect 
Article  30 of the Regulation).  
 
46. Página 22, Subtítulo 5.1.1. Panorama general de las medidas para combatir el cambio 
climá tico y proteger el medio ambiente, párrafo 5.12. "El 6 de diciembre de 2022, el Parlamento 
Europeo y el Consejo llegaron a un acuerdo político provisional sobre un Reglamento de la UE sobre 
la deforestación, que allanó el camino para la adopción definitiva  del Reglamento a principios 
de 2023. Su objetivo es frenar la deforestación y la degradación forestal impulsadas por la UE. Al 
promover el consumo de productos "libres de deforestación" y reducir los efectos de la UE en la 
deforestación y la degradación f orestal a nivel mundial, el nuevo Reglamento reducirá las emisiones 
de gases de efecto invernadero y la pérdida de biodiversidad a nivel mundial y hará que el consumo 
se minimice, con lo que disminuirá el comercio de productos procedentes de cadenas de sum inistro 
vinculadas a la deforestación o la degradación forestal, aumentando al mismo tiempo el comercio 
de productos sostenibles. La propuesta forma parte de un plan más amplio de medidas para luchar 
contra la deforestación y la degradación forestal, expue sto por primera vez en la Comunicación de 
la Comisión de 2019 titulada "Intensificar la actuación de la UE para proteger y restaurar los bosques 
del mundo" . 
 
Pregunta 49:  
Bajo la premisa que se menciona en el preámbulo del Reglamento, de proteger el medio ambiente, 
luchar contra el cambio climático y la pérdida de la biodiversidad, y tomando en cuenta el principio 
de responsabilidad compartida pero diferenciada, ¿contempla la legislación europea algún 
mecanismo adicional al establecido en el Reglament o, con el fin de incentivar a los países que tienen 
bosques primarios que eviten la deforestación y la degradación forestal?  
 
Reply : The EU designs it environmental and climate action policies in a way that achieve the 
environmental objectives set in the i nternational commitments (including under Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements (MEAs), the UNFCCC and the Sustainable Development Goals) and 
minimises impact on trade.  
 
The EU is supporting its partner countries through development cooperation to ensure their supply 
chains are deforestation -free and is stepping up its support. Support will depend on the specific 
situation, and will aim at the promotion of protection, rest oration and sustainable use of forests but 
also of sustainable agriculture, supply chain transparency and other relevant areas. Policy dialogue 
with other large consumer markets to promote similar policies will also be essential to achieve the 
ultimate goa l of halting global deforestation.  
 
The EU is collectively the biggest provider of Official Development Assistance in the world, providing 
over EUR 50billion a year to help overcome poverty and advance global development. We also 
continue to support partn er countries in their green transition, in line with our international 
commitments. Through the EU's Global Instrument (Neighbourhood, Development and International 
Cooperation Instrument – NDICI), we have so far committed about EUR  27.8 billion  in support  of 
climate objectives in our partner countries for the period of 2021 -27. 
 
Pregunta 50:  
La nueva regulación de deforestación de la Unión Europea podría crear barreras para pequeños 
agricultores, así como costos de producción adicionales que deberán ser a sumidos por los 
productores ecuatorianos. ¿Se tienen previstos programas de cooperación por parte de la Unión 
Europea que faciliten la transición y adaptación de las cadenas productivas que serán afectadas por 
las exigencias derivadas del cumplimiento de l a nueva reglamentación?  
 
Reply : See response to the question 49.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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47. Página 22, 5.1.1 Panorama general de las medidas para combatir el cambio climático y 
proteger el medio ambiente, párrafo 5.13 "Además, en la esfera de la lucha contra la contaminación, 
la Comisión Europea adoptó el Plan de Acción "Contaminación cero" en mayo de 2021.29 El principal 
objetivo es ofrecer orientaciones para integrar la prevención de la contaminación en todas las 
políticas pertinentes de la UE, incluidas las políticas comerci ales y los acuerdos de libre comercio, y 
reducir la contaminación del aire, el agua y el suelo a niveles que ya no se consideren perjudiciales 
para la salud y los ecosistemas naturales, que respeten los límites soportables para nuestro planeta 
y que creen así un medio ambiente libre de sustancias tóxicas".  
 
Pregunta 51:  
¿Cómo la UE determina los "límites soportables" de sustancias tóxicas para el planeta en lo referente 
a suelo, agua, aire, tanto con respecto a la UE como, eventualmente, a sus socios comerciales? 
¿Esos límites se irían modificando o ajustando a través de algún mecanismo, y se verían reflejados 
en algún punto en la política comercial de la UE, en especial en las exportaciones  
 
Reply:  The EU has set limit values for pollutants in various pieces of legislation. In general, all 
Commission proposals are underp inned by an impact assessment which also makes reference to the 
scientific evidence that is used to derive limit values or environmental quality standards.  
 
For air quality, the Ambient Air Quality Directives 2008/50/EC and 2004/107/EC set air quality 
standards to be achieved throughout the territory of EU Member States. In October 2022, the 
Commission has made a proposal to revise this Directive, including stricter air quality standards, 
taking into account the updated WHO Air Quality Guidelines which wer e published in 2021.  
 
For water quality, the Water Framework Directive 2000/60/EC and in particular the related 
Environmental Quality Standards Directive 2008/105/EC as amended by 2013/39/EU sets such 
standards for many pollutants. Also this legislation is  currently under review and the Commission 
has published a proposal which is based on the latest scientific evidence has been used when making 
the proposal.  
 
For soil quality, such limit values do not exist yet in EU legislation but the Commission is curre ntly 
working on a Soil Health Law which will consider the feasibility of setting up a mechanism for 
establishing soil quality limit values.tandards on pollution such as the ones mentioned above are 
regularly reviewed in the light of scientific and technica l progress and revised in accordance to the 
Better Regulation Guidelines of the Commission. In this context, trade aspects are analysed, e.g. in 
the impact assessment, where relevant.  
 
48. Página 22, 5.1.1 Panorama general de las medidas para combatir el cambio climático y 
proteger el medio ambiente, párrafo 5.15 El nuevo Plan de Acción para la Economía Circular31 se 
adoptó en 2020 y tiene por objeto acelerar el cambio transformador que requ iere el Pacto Verde 
Europeo.32 En el marco del nuevo Plan de Acción para la Economía Circular, la Comisión Europea 
adoptó en marzo y noviembre de 2022 dos conjuntos de iniciativas para hacer que los productos 
sostenibles sean la norma en el mercado de la U E.33 La piedra angular de las medidas es la 
propuesta legislativa de un Reglamento sobre diseño ecológico para productos sostenibles34, cuyo 
objetivo es abarcar mejor las cuestiones relacionadas con la circularidad de los productos, como la 
durabilidad y l a reparabilidad, y abordar la huella de carbono y ambiental de los productos, entre 
otros aspectos.  
 
Pregunta 52:  
¿Se cuenta con previsiones en el Plan de Acción para la Economía Circular a fin de evitar que los 
países en desarrollo absorban a través del comercio, bienes no degradables, con alto contenido de 
energía gris y contaminante en el largo plazo?  
 
Reply:  The Circular Economy Action Plan ( Circular economy action plan (europa.eu) ) provides 
indications on how the EU plans to support a global shift to a circular economy, including for instance 
by ensuring that Free Trade Agreements reflect the enhanced objectives of the circ ular economy 
and stepping up outreach activities, including through European Green Deal diplomacy and Circular 
Economy Missions. The EU is taking action to ensure that its trade does not cause environmental 
impacts elsewhere, e.g. the Waste Shipment propos al (Proposal for a new regulation on waste 
shipments (europa.eu) _to ensure that EU does not export its waste challeng es to third countries. 
The EU also supports developing countries' transition to a circular economy through technical and WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 financial assistance at global, regional and country level. Circular economy features  as a priority or 
sub-priority in 26 Multi -annual Indicative Programmes (MIPs) for the period 2021 -2027,  
 
49. Página 22, 5.1.1 Panorama general de las medidas para combatir el cambio climático y 
proteger el medio ambiente, párrafo 5.18 El proyecto de Reglamento sobre la reducción de los límites 
máximos de  residuos (LMR) de las dos sustancias neonicotinoides Clotiadinia y Tiametoxam es el 
primer reglamento que aplica la Estrategia "de la granja a la mesa"36 a los alimentos importados 
en lo que respecta a los residuos de plaguicidas. Los aspectos ambientales  en los que se centra este 
Reglamento se refieren a la protección de los polinizadores. Se trata de una cuestión de interés 
mundial, que va más allá de las fronteras nacionales y no puede resolverse únicamente mediante 
medidas en el nivel de la UE  ...". 
 
Pregunta 53:  
¿Qué criterios y planteamientos de socios comerciales se han tenido en cuenta en la prohibición de 
las sustancias neconicotinoides Clotiadinia y Tiametoxam? ¿Se tiene pensado evaluar el impacto de 
la medida con relación a las poblaciones de po linizadores en la UE, en el futuro? ¿Si es así, cuándo?  
 
Reply:  All outdoor uses for clothianidin and thiamethoxam in the EU were prohibited already in 
May 2018 due to their toxicity for bees and other insect pollinators. The approval to use these 
substances only in permanent greenhouses later expired in January 2019 and April 2019, 
respectively.  
 
Promoting the generation and implementation of more sustainable alternatives to chemical 
pesticides is a key element for a global transition towards more sustainable food systems. The EU is 
funding several research projects under the Horizon Europe programme dedicated to find 
alternatives to chemical pesticides and combinations of tools and technologies for integrated pest 
management, including several inno vative low -risk products.  
 
The causes of pollinator decline are multifactorial. According to the Intergovernmental Science -Policy 
Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES)[1], a clear consensus exists regarding the 
fact that both wild and managed bees are exposed to pesticides  (mainly through nectar and pollen, 
in the case of the neonicotinoids), and that the range of sub -lethal effects is quite broad. Based on 
the current knowledge, reducing the use of neonicotinoids is an effective action to tackle pollinators 
decline. Althou gh the EU is setting up several schemes to monitor pollinators (see related actions in 
the EU Pollinator Initiative[2]), it will not be possible to measure the impact of one single measure 
on this decline.  
 
With regards to Regulation (EC) No 2023/334 lowering the maximum residue levels for cl othianidin 
and thiamethoxam, extensive communication action has been caried out in the preparation phase 
of this measure, including a specific seminar destined for third countries in January 2021, 
conferences, all relevant multilateral fora, including Code x, and in various bilateral meetings.  
 
In addition, the EU funds several programmes to assist third countries to comply with EU legislation 
and to build capacity and knowledge, such as the new Agrinfo programme (managed by COLEAD, 
the Committee Linking Ent repreneurship Agriculture and Development), further the existing Fit for 
Market and Plantwise Plus programmes to name only a few examples. The EU also organises specific 
training courses related to plant health, integrated pest management and food safety i n relation to 
pesticide residues.  
 
[1]  IPBES (2016). The assessment report of the Intergovernmental Science -Policy Platform on 
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services on pollinators, pollination and food production. S.G. Potts, 
V. L. Imperatriz -Fonseca, and H. T. Ngo (eds). Secretariat of the Intergovernmental Science -Policy 
Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, Bonn, Germany. 552 pages. 
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3402 856. 
[2] https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -
content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2023%3A35%3AFIN&qid=1674555285177 . 
 
50. Página 29, Subtítulo 5.2.5. Igualdad de género y empoderamiento económico de las mujeres, 
párrafo 5.48: "El Plan de Acción para la Igualdad de Género y el Empoderamiento de las Mujeres en 
la Acción Exterior 2021 -2025 (GAP III), en consonancia con la Estrat egia para la Igualdad de Género 
2020-2025, hace de la promoción de la igualdad de género una prioridad de todas las políticas y  
medidas externas; ofrece una hoja de ruta para trabajar conjuntamente con las partes interesadas WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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a nivel nacional, regional y mu ltilateral; intensifica las medidas en esferas temáticas estratégicas; 
pide a las instituciones que den ejemplo y vela por la transparencia de los resultados."  
 
Pregunta 54:  
En el marco de la igualdad de género y el empoderamiento económico de las mujeres en el exterior, 
¿existen programas de cooperación implementados por la Unión Europea para fomentar la igualdad 
de género y el empoderamiento femenino en los sectores comerciales de exportación de sus socios 
comerciales? ¿De qué manera ha aplicado o  aplicará el Plan y la hoja de ruta, con respecto al 
Ecuador? ¿Cuáles son los canales de cooperación establecidos o por establecer, y se orientan al 
sector público y/o al privado?  
 
Reply:  The EU's work on gender equality in its external relations is guided  by the EU Gender Action 
Plan III (GAP III) and its Country Level Implementation Plans (CLIPs). These are implemented within 
the EU's Multiannual Implementation Plan (MIP), which lays out the priority areas the EU's country 
level work is focused on.  
 
One o f the thematic priorities of the GAP III is "strengthening economic and social rights and 
empowering girls and women". The actions promoted under this priority area include actions on 
decent work, equal pay, labor rights, transition to formal economy, redu cing labor market 
segregation, supporting women entrepreneurs and women led businesses and on women's 
leadership. The actions include also promoting gender equality through trade policy, including 
through the EU's engagement in the World Trade Organisation  and its work on Aid for Trade.  
 
Furthermore, in its trade relations, the EU promotes its trade agreements to include the ILO 
conventions relevant to gender equality in employment i.e. equal remuneration and 
non-discrimination (ILO Conventions 100 and 111)  as well as provisions on trade and gender 
specifically.  
 
In Ecuador, the MIP and CLIP include actions on strengthening the business and investment climate, 
in particular the application of the Multi -Party Trade Agreement between the EU and Ecuador in orde r 
to facilitate EU investment in Ecuador, improving exporting capacities of Ecuadorian SMEs as well as 
improving the productivity and competitiveness of SMEs and cooperative with a special focus on 
sectors with high social impact and export development pro moting public -private partnership. The 
objectives include also support to the implementation of circular economy and bio -economy policies 
with the participation of main public and private actors with a social and gender balanced approach.  
 
51. Página 25, S ubtítulo 5.2.1 Protección de los derechos humanos y promoción de los derechos 
laborales, párrafo 5.32. El Reglamento (UE) 2017/821 (el denominado Reglamento sobre los 
minerales de zonas de conflicto)59 establece obligaciones en materia de diligencia debida  en la 
cadena de suministro por lo que respecta a los importadores de la Unión de estaño, tantalio, 
wolframio y oro. Se adoptó en 2017 y sus prescripciones operativas en materia de diligencia debida 
se aplican desde el 1 de enero de 2021.  
 
Pregunta 55:  
¿Se tiene previsto ampliar el alcance de la Regulación sobre "debida diligencia" del Reglamento (UE) 
2017/821 a otros minerales más allá del estaño, tantalio, wolframio y oro?  
 
Reply:  By 2023 and every three years thereafter, the Commission shall review th e functioning and 
effectiveness of the Conflict Minerals Regulation. To this end a study was launched in 
September  2022 and is currently ongoing. The study will be the basis for the report to the Parliament 
and the Council on the functioning and effectiven ess of the Regulation.  
 
52. Páginas 32 y 33, Subtítulo 6.3 "Control de las ayudas estatales en la UE"  
 
Pregunta 56:  
¿Toma la UE medidas para minimizar el impacto de sus subsidios en socios comerciales en desarrollo 
con escaso nivel de industrialización?  
 
Reply: EU State aid rules aim to limit possible distortions of competition and trade between EU 
Member States. Only if a State aid is compatible with the functioning of the internal market, it can 
be approved by the European Commission or be subject to a  block exemption. State aid compatibility WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 requires the measures to be designed in a manner that is the least distortive for trade. Therefore, 
any impact on trade outside the EU is necessarily also limited.  
 
53. Páginas 40 y 41, Subtítulo 9.4 "Política Agrí cola Común"  
Pregunta 57:   
Partiendo del hecho de que, según el Acuerdo de Agricultura, las ayudas contempladas el Anexo 2 
del Acuerdo son no distorsionantes, ¿toma la UE alguna medida para evitar que haya efectos 
negativos no deseados / esperados de sus ayudas internas sobre la producción y el comercio con 
terceros países?  
 
Reply:  The EU has been steadily reforming its domestic agricultural support towards the 
non-distortive aid under Annex  2 of the Agreement on Agriculture (Green Box) as from 1992, in full 
commitment to the WTO trade liberalisation goals. Currently over 85% of its agricultural spending 
is administered as non -trade distortive Green Box support. Despite enlargement from EU  15 to EU  28 
and doubling the number of farmers receiving support, total agriculture spending remained stable 
since 2000. Over the same period, total support as percentage of VoP (value of production) has 
decreased continuously.  
 
In its commitment to reform and its practical implementation, the EU is the leader among the  
WTO Members, and few have followed its example. The EU is calling upon its trading partners to 
take the necessary measures to reform in order to avoid any undesirable/expected negative effects 
on its domestic aid on production and trade with third countri es. 
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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PHILIPPINES  
Matrix of Questions from the Philippines  
PART I: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE SECRETARIAT REPORT  
I. ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
Para 1.20 (Page 20)  
1.20. In January 2020, the ECB began a review of its monetary strategy policy that was finalized 
in July 2021. This review made a number of changes from the previous strategy to enable the 
ECB to better adapt to structural changes in the economy, including  adopting a symmetric 2% 
inflation target instead of the "below but close to 2%" inflation target while confirming the 
medium -term orientation of monetary policy; modifying the HICP to have full inclusion of 
owner -occupied housing over time; and acknowledg ing that especially forceful or persistent 
monetary policy measures would be required when the economy is close to the lower bound on 
interest rates.  
 
Question 1:  
Please share information on plans by the ECB of a possible reevaluation, if any, of its mone tary 
policy strategy, which it recently finalized (in July 2021), including the 2 % inflation target 
considering a very challenging international environment i.e., growing geopolitical tensions and 
its deep effects on the EU's energy imports, trade value ch ains, asset/financial products exposure 
as well as economic headwinds with rising inflation and the persistent impact of the 
pandemic  driven recession.  
 
Reply:  In July 2021, the ECB published the outcome of its monetary policy strategy review 
launched in J anuary 2020. This review has been the second review of the ECB monetary policy 
strategy and it took place 18 years after the first one that was conducted in 2003. As part of the 
2021 strategy review, the ECB Governing Council announced its intention to per iodically assess 
its monetary policy strategy, with the next assessment expected to take place in 2025. Hence, 
the strategy adopted by the ECB in 2021 remains the ECB's monetary policy framework in the 
current challenging economic conditions and the ECB ha s remained committed to ensure that 
inflation returns to the 2% medium -term target adopted in 2021. To this aim, the ECB has 
normalised its monetary policy over the past months and has, in particular, raised its policy rates 
by 375bps since July 2022.  
 
Para 4.170 (Page 170)  
4.170. Following the start of the war in Ukraine, the European  Union  prohibited all transactions 
with the Central Bank of the Russian  Federation  related to the management of the Bank's reserves 
and assets and froze the assets of a numbe r of commercial banks. It also banned 10 Russian and 
4 Belarusian banks from making or receiving international payments using SWIFT.  
  
Question 2:  
What has been the EU's experience in the implementation of these restraining measures? Have 
these measures gi ven rise to unintended consequences on the EU's banking system or economy?  
 
Reply:  Sanctions have considerably limited Russia's political and economic options, by causing 
major financial strain and degrading Russia's industrial and technological capacity. That is 
particularly true for the prohibitions mentioned in the question. EU sanctions are fulfilling their 
three objectives: degrading Russia's military capability to wage its war of aggression against 
Ukraine, depriving Russia from the revenues it is fin ancing the war with, and imposing costs on 
Russia's economy. Sanctions are having an impact on all three. While the impact is already 
evident, the effect of sanctions grows over time, further eroding Russia's industrial and 
technological base. Their full e ffectiveness will be felt over the medium to long -term. The EU's 
financial sector has very limited exposure to Russia. After more than one year into the full -scale 
invasion of Ukraine by Russia, the EU's banking, insurance and capital markets sectors have 
proven resilient.  
 
II.  TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
Para 2.2 (Page 31)  
2.2.  The European  Union  has the exclusive competence of the customs union and common 
commercial policy (i.e. trade policy vis -à-vis non -EU countries) pursuant to the Treaty on the WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 68 - 
 
  
 Functioning of the European  Union  (TFEU). The common commercial policy comprises four main 
areas: t rade in goods and services, the commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct 
investment (FDI), and public procurement. The European  Union  also has the exclusive 
competence to conclude international agreements with third countries in the area  of trade, as it 
does in any other areas of exclusive competence. The process for the conclusion of a trade 
agreement has not changed since the last Review.  
 
Question 3:  
How does the EU balance the protection of intellectual property rights with the promo tion of 
competition and innovation in its commercial policies, particularly in the context of international 
trade agreements and negotiations?  
 
Reply:  The EU regularly assesses its domestic legal framework on intellectual property as well as 
the objectives  related to intellectual property in the global context. For more details, please see 
the IP Action Plan  of November 2020.  
 
Para 2.43 (Pages 41 -42)  
 
2.43. In September 2021, the Commission submitted to the Parliament and the Council a proposal 
for a regulation for a new GSP scheme. The proposal seeks to renew the GSP scheme for the 
period 2024 -34, which except for its EBA component, is set to expire on  31 December  2023 under 
the current GSP regulation (Regulation (EU) 978/2012, in place since 2012). The proposed 
regulation maintains the main characteristics of the GSP scheme and its three components but 
seeks to make some specific changes to better reac h the intended beneficiaries, and support EU 
environmental objectives. It proposes, inter alia, to (i)  lower the internal product graduation 
threshold for the standard GSP to ensure preferences are granted to those in greater need; 
(ii) remove the economic  vulnerability criterion under the GSP+ arrangement; (iii)  increase the 
number of ratified international conventions from 27 to 32 for the GSP+ (including the Paris 
Agreement); (iv)  extend the application of international conventions on environmental and g ood 
governance to all GSP beneficiaries (not only GSP+ as is currently the case); (v)  require an action 
plan for the implementation of the conventions under GSP+ to improve compliance; and 
(vi) establish urgent procedures for the withdrawal of preferences in cases of grave violations of 
the GSP relevant conventions. The legislative process is ongoing, but it is expected that the 
Parliament and the Council will adopt the new regulation by late 2023. Once adopted, it will replace 
the existing one and the new GSP system would enter into force on 1  January  2024.  
 
Questions 4:  
How does the EU see the effectiveness of the GSP scheme among GSP+ beneficiary countries 
(Armenia, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Ca pe Verde, Kyrgyz  Republic , Mongolia, Pakistan, 
Sri Lanka , and Uzbekistan) in attaining the EU's sustainable development objectives?  
 
Reply:  The GSP has been effective in advancing its core objectives of supporting poverty 
eradication and sustainable development in beneficiary countries. The GSP+ arrangement in  
particular allows for in -depth cooperation with beneficiaries with regards to their sustainable 
development and international standards on human rights, labour rights, environmental and 
climate protection, and good governance. The current legislative revi ew of the GSP Regulation 
offers an opportunity to finetune the scheme and respond to developments in the field of 
international standards – this has been reflected in the Commission proposal for a revised 
Regulation, which for example includes an updated l ist of GSP -relevant international conventions 
to include the Paris Agreement, the Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities, as well 
as ILO conventions on labour inspection and tripartite consultation.  
 
Question 5:  
Please share updates on the ongoing trialogue negotiations among the Parliament, the 
Commission and the Council on the finalization of the new GSP regulation. What are the points of 
convergence and divergence among the three EU institutions on the proposed  new GSP 
regulation? How does the Commission seek to achieve a consensus on divergent views? What are 
the 3 institutions' non -negotiable elements in the new GSP regulation?  
 
Reply:  The – legislative process is advancing well, with compromise solutions in s ight on a large 
number of issues. The final political agreement is yet to be achieved, in particular on the more WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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1 https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CONSIL:ST_16270_2022_INIT&qid=1676374639444&from=EN .  sensitive issues for both the European Parliament and the Council. There is a common 
commitment to reach an agreement by June 2023.  
 
Question 6: 
If the new GSP regulation is not adopted, the standard GSP and GSP+ arrangements will cease 
to apply on 1  January  2024. Please share information on the alternative scenario which is being 
considered (i.e., interim application until a regulation is final ized). We note that there was an 
earlier proposal from the European Council 1 to extend the GSP+ scheme until 31  December  2025. 
Those countries wishing to continue to benefit from the GSP+ arrangement from 1  January  2026 
shall submit a request to that effe ct before that date.  
 
Reply:  The EU is committed to ensure continuity of the GSP and therefore finalize the legislative 
process in summer 2023. The EU also aims to ensure smooth transition of GSP+ beneficiaries to 
any new conditions under the new GSP post 2024. Therefore, the transitional provisions in the 
initial Commission proposal and elaborated in the Council mandate will most likely be part of the 
final GSP Regulation.  
 
Question 7:  
In ensuring an inclusive process of consultations among GSP+ stakehold ers, please share the 
views of the European business community with respect to the proposed new GSP regulation.  
 
Reply:  The preparation of the GSP Review and the Commission proposal for a new GSP regulation 
post-2023 included a wide public consultation, in cluding respondents from across civil society,  
including business, non -governmental organisations, and beneficiary countries. A summary of the 
views expressed is available  in the impact assessment report accompanying the Commission 
proposal in Annex  B1 Con sultations Report which can be accessed through the Commission 
website h ere.  
 
III. TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
Para 3.168 (Page 104)  
 
3.168. During the review period, the European  Union  identified standardization as a key strategic 
tool to achieve its objectives under the European Green Deal, as well as under its new digital, 
industrial, and trade strategies. To complement these strategies (and as provided in its Industrial 
Strategy), th e European  Union  launched in February 2022 a new strategy on standardization 
entitled "Setting global standards in support of a resilient, green and digital EU single market". 
Under this new strategy, the European  Union  identifies six areas of action for t he short, medium, 
and long term: (i)  address standardization existing needs in strategic areas and anticipate new 
ones; (ii)  improve governance and ensure inclusive participation in the European standardization 
system; (iii)  strengthen the role of the Euro pean Union  in shaping international standards; 
(iv) support innovation to identify new standardization needs; (v)  promote the training of the 
future generation of standardization experts; and (vi) ensure the EU standardization system is 
aligned with EU pol icy objectives and values. In addition, during the review period the 
European  Union  continued its work in promoting the development of environmental 
(e.g. hydrogen, critical raw materials in batteries) and digital standards (e.g. artificial intelligence, 
cybersecurity, and chips).  
 
Question 8:  
How did the standards on critical raw materials for batteries affect the local industry, market and 
overall trade? What countries are the major sources of these critical raw materials?  
 
Reply:  Major originating count ries for critical raw materials in 2022 were: USA, South  Africa , 
China, Australia, UK and Russia.  
 
Para 3.238 (Page 120)  
3.238. The Commission has developed new voluntary green public procurement (GPP) criteria for 
several sectors, including for computers,  smartphones, and road transport, to facilitate the uptake 
of such criteria in tender documentation. Though envisaged by the Circular Economy Action Plan, 
no mandatory GPP criteria have been introduced so far. Other new projects related to green WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 government  procurement include the Farm to Fork Strategy (sustainable food systems), Level(s) 
(sustainable building), and Renovation Wave (renovation of buildings).  
 
Question 9:  
Based on the Secretariat Report, it mentioned that other new projects related to green 
government procurement include Level(s) (sustainable building) and Renovation Wave 
(renovation of buildings). Could the European  Union  kindly explain the key features and 
challenges confronted (if any) in these new green government procurement projects?  
 
Reply:  The voluntary GPP criteria for buildings are being revised with the primary objective of 
aligning the criteria set with the latest policy development and, in particular, with Level(s). Part 
of the revision is to assess expanding the scope also to co ver schools and social housing. The 
revision is one of the actions announced in the Renovation Wave initiative, and the criteria are 
planned to be ready by the end of this year. Such criteria will be developed on an objective and 
non-discriminatory basis. The Commission's legislative proposals concerning the revision of the 
energy efficiency Directive and the energy performance of Buildings Directive make direct 
reference to Level(s) as the assessment and reporting format for whole -life carbon. The 
construc tion product Regulation proposal requires reporting the global warming potential for 
construction products to support the use of Level(s).  
 
Para 3.239 (Page 120)  
3.239. Regarding the use of social criteria in government procurement, the European  Union  has 
published good practice cases and a guideline on inclusion of social considerations, and has 
adopted a Directive on accessibility criteria for products and services.  
 
Question 10:  
According to the Secretariat Report, the EU uses social criteria in governm ent procurement. What 
are the main features, best practices, and challenges in incorporating social considerations in its 
public procurement system?  
 
Reply : The contracting authorities and entities in the EU are free in their choice of award criteria 
in line with the rules set out in the Public Procurement Directives, which can include also socially 
responsible criteria. The Commission has published in May 2021 the "Buying Social" guide, to 
provide public buyers with clear and concrete indications on this k ind of issues, and to encourage 
them to make their procurements socially responsible. (Buying Social – A guide to taking account 
of social considerations in public procurement – Second edition (20 21/C 237/01) " 
 
Para 3.255 (Page 124)  
3.255.  Currently, technical inventions can be protected in Europe either by national patents, 
granted by the competent national IP authorities in EU countries (National Patent Offices  (NPOs)) 
or by European patents granted centrally by the EPO. The granted European patent is a "bundle" 
of individual national patents. Reforms are under way in order to create a unitary patent that 
provides uniform patent protection across participating E U member States. The "unitary patent 
system" is expected to be launched in June 2023 (see details below).  
 
Question 11:  
How would the implementation of the unitary patent system affect current holders of patents 
issued by EPO and NPOs?  
 
Reply:  The unitary patent system consists of two Regulations ((EU) 1257/2012 and (EU) 
1260/2012) implementing enhanced cooperation in the field of unitary patent protection and an 
Agreement on a Unified Patent Court (UPCA), setting up a single and specialised pa tent 
jurisdiction. The new system is expected to start operating on 1  June 2023, initially covering 
17 EU Member States that have ratified the UPCA. In these Member States, the UPC will have 
exclusive jurisdiction over disputes relating to unitary patents ('European patents with unitary 
effect') registered under the above -mentioned Regulations and to classical European patents (a 
patent granted under the provisions of the EPC, which does not benefit from unitary effect by 
virtue of Regulation (EU) No 1257/2 012).  
 
The exclusive jurisdiction of the UPC for classical European patents is, however, subject to 
exceptions during a transitional period of seven years (Article  83 UPCA). During this period, 
actions concerning classical European patents may still be br ought before national courts or other WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 71 - 
 
competent national authorities. In addition, holders of classical European patents may opt out 
from the UPC's jurisdiction. The launch of the unitary patent system does not affect the holders 
of national patents.  
 
Para 3.266 (Page 124)  
3.266. A EUIPO report on Green EU trade marks shows a trend towards use of terms that can be 
said to be related to the protection of the environment and sustainability in trademark registration, 
with an increasing share of such filings by  non-EU owners. It also shows that SMEs play an 
important role in bringing "green" goods and services to the marketplace.  
 
Question 12:  
What are Green EU Trademarks, and how do they support the European  Union 's goals of 
promoting sustainable development and environmental protection through intellectual property 
rights? Additionally, what are the requirements and procedures for obtaining a Green EU 
Trademark, and how are they different from other types of trademarks?  
 
Reply:  As defined in our s tudy, a Green EUTM is a trade mark which contains at least one of the 
904 terms defined by EUIPO experts as being relevant for the environment and sustainability in 
its Goods & Services specification. Examples of such "green expressions" include "solar hea ting", 
"carbon monitoring" or "photovoltaic". The methodology for detecting the presence of such green 
expressions is explained in detail in the Annex  of the report, starting on p. 36.  
 
The finding that Green EUTMs have been increasing both in absolute te rms and as a proportion of 
all EUTMs in recent years is a reflection of innovation in environmental protection, mitigation and 
sustainability by companies both in the EU and from non -EU countries. Increasingly, consumers 
and governments demand that product s brought to market do not harm the environment, and 
businesses are responding to this need by creating new environmentally relevant products and 
services and, as is the case with all new products and services, protecting the relevant brands by 
registering  trade marks.  
 
From a legal perspective, Green EUTMs are just like any other EUTMs and are subject to exactly 
the same rules. There are thus no special requirements or procedures for registering a Green 
EUTM. As stated above, what makes it "green" is the p resence of one of the identified terms in its 
Goods & Services description.  
 
IV. TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
Para 4.49 (Page 144)  
Temporary private storage aid (PSA) was also opened for butter, SMP, cheese, certain bovine 
meat, and sheep and goat meat durin g 2020 in response to the COVID -19 pandemic. Such storage 
was supported for periods of between two and six months depending on the product, with uptake 
varying. Initially estimated at around EUR  80 million , total interventions ultimately amounted to 
less t han EUR  30 million , according to notifications made by the European  Union . In 2022, the 
Commission opened PSA for pigmeat.  
 
Question 13:  
Please share more information on the EU's arrangement with private cold storages operators 
participating under the PSA  initiative. Specifically, does EU also manage the outflow movement of 
goods stored in the cold storage warehouses under the PSA initiative? If yes, what are the factors 
considered or triggers before EU decides to authorize the outflow movement at a specif ic point in 
time?  
 
Reply:  Private storage aid is regulated in articles 17 -18 of the CMO regulation 
(Regulation  1308/2013),and the rules adopted for its implementation.  In order to balance the 
market and to stabilise market prices, the EU can provide suppo rt to private sector operators in 
paying for the cost of storage of their products for a determined period of time during which the 
products must be stored. This temporarily reduces the impact of short -term oversupply. Currently 
aid can be granted for priv ate sector storage in sectors as listed in Article  17 CMO. EU does not 
own the products stored therefore it does also not manage the release of the products from the 
storage. EU only compensates part of the storage costs while the products are temporarily 
withdrawn from the market.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 72 - 
 
  
 The duration of the storage period is established in advance at the signing of the contract for 
private storage.  
 
Para 4.58 (Page 147)  
4.58. In April 2019, Directive (EU) 2019/633 on unfair trading practices in business -to-business 
relationships in the agricultural and food supply chain was adopted. This Directive prohibits certain 
unfair trading practices used by buyers in the agricultur e sector, inter alia, those relating to late 
payments, late order cancellations, unilateral changes in conditions, or acts of commercial 
retaliation. This is completed by an additional set of practices that are prohibited only if they have 
not been unambig uously agreed between buyer and seller beforehand.  
 
Question 14:  
Please share more information on the EU's guidelines on preventing and resolving unfair trade 
practices, e.g., price manipulation by traders.  
 
Reply:  Directive (EU) 2019/633 is a minimum harm onisation directive. Member States can choose 
to introduce more protective provisions against unfair trading practices in their national 
transposition laws. Member States are required to designate national authorities for the 
enforcement of their national transposition laws. National enforcement authorities can receive 
complaints from affected suppliers, launch investigations, and sanction the operators that breach 
the rules. The European Commission has no enforcement powers against unfair trading practices . 
 
An overview of the enforcement authorities designated by Member States can be found on the 
webpage of the European Commission (link: https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common -
agricultural -policy/agri -food-supply -chain/unfair -trading -practices_en#keyruleso fthedirective).  
 
National enforcement authorities are required to cooperate with each other and with the 
Commission. National enforcement authorities publish annual reports of their enforcement 
activities. By way of example, the report of the Spanish enfor cement authority for the year 2022 
can be consulted at the following link:  
https://www.aica.gob.es/Data/UPLOAD/Informe_Actividad_AICA_a_31_de_diciembr e_de_2022_
v2.pdf .  
 
Para 4.67 (Page 148)  
4.67. As a response to disruptions in grain supplies resulting from the war in Ukraine, Hungary 
introduced export restrictions of cereals for food security reasons in March 2022, e xtending them 
multiple times before repealing them as of 20  January  2023. For any export (including to the 
European  Union ) of certain grains, soybeans, and sunflower seeds, exporters had to submit a 
request indicating volume and prices for the Minister for  Agriculture to approve or reject the 
request, exercising a "right of first refusal at market price" in case of danger to the public supply 
or food security. The restriction did not affect humanitarian aid and transit cargo. No request was 
rejected.  
 
Quest ion 15:  
What is the EU's specific timeline on its policy to regulate export of aforementioned agricultural 
products? Aside from geopolitical factor, what are other considerations of EU which can trigger 
extension or re -issuance of export regulations?  
 
Reply: The EU does not have any export restrictions to third countries for grains, soybeans, and 
sunflower seeds in place. Any export restriction would need to be compliant with the 
WTO Agreement .  
 
In the EU, export restrictions between Member States are proh ibited, except when such 
restrictions are justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or public security, the 
protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants, the protection of national treasures 
possessing artistic, historic or archa eological value or the protection of industrial and commercial 
property (see Article  34 and 36 of the TFEU).  
As regards the measure introduced by Hungary on 5  March  2022 (Government Regulation 
83/2022) following the declaration of 'state of emergency in Hungary', it was withdrawn on 
20 January  2023.  
 
Please refer to G/AG/N/EU/77 and its revisions.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Para 4.110 -4.111 (Page 158)  
4.110. Going beyond these regulations affecting trade in illegally cut timber, the European 
Parliament and the Council, in December 2022, reached a provisional agreement on a regulation 
proposed by the Commission in 2021, aiming to prevent deforestation an d forest degradation 
associated with commodities and products placed on or exported from the EU market. It focuses 
on minimizing the use of products from supply chains associated with deforestation or forest 
degradation, and increasing demand for "deforest ation-free" products. The proposed regulation 
would cover wood as well as products such as cocoa, coffee, oil palm, cattle, or soya grown on 
former forest areas that were deforested after December 2020.  
4.111. Replacing and repealing the EUTR, the propose d new regulation builds on both the EUTR 
and FLEGT regulations, which both underwent a fitness check evaluation in 2020. The proposed 
regulation would require products to be (i)  "deforestation -free" (produced on land that was not 
subject to deforestation o r forest degradation after 31  December  2020); (ii)  produced in 
compliance with national laws ("legality"); and (iii)  accompanied by due diligence statements. It 
would therefore build on and strengthen the existing due diligence and monitoring systems 
conta ined in the EUTR regarding the legal status of timber but adding the requirement of products 
being "deforestation -free". Wood covered by a FLEGT license would continue to be considered as 
having met the legality requirement.  
 
Question 16:  
The upcoming imp lementation of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) as well as 
the recent European Parliament's approval for the Deforestation Regulation require imposition of 
verification and traceability measures within and outside the EU. The Deforestation Reg ulation 
likewise obligates companies' submission of due diligence reports guaranteeing the origin of 
imported products. How will the EU ensure that such measures will not lead to trade disruptions? 
The transition period of 18 -24 months may not be enough fo r the EU's trading partners and EU 
small companies to comply with the requirements. How will the EU address said concerns?  
 
Reply: The EU has been extremely forthcoming on the Carbon Boarder Adjustment Mechanism 
through public consultations, impact assess ments and outreach from an early regulatory 
processes and implementation stages in different fora in the EU and outside (in Brussels, through 
the EU delegations in partner countries, in the WTO in Geneva and via bilateral dialogues). Such 
transparency help s traders to factor in the upcoming legislation. In addition, we have built in a 
transitional period in CBAM, which will give trading partners, including developing countries, time 
to prepare.  
 
To take into account their specific needs, the EU will continu e to support Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) in targeted ways, such as through technology transfer, technical and financial 
assistance, with the objective of developing industrial production structures that are compatible 
with long -term global climate obj ectives.  
 
The EU Commission, in conjunction with the European External Action Service and EU Delegations 
around the world, will launch an information campaign, featuring online seminars, physical events, 
distribution of guidance documents, and direct assi stance, aimed at assisting third country 
operators and importers to the EU in performing all new obligations required by the CBAM 
regulation and its secondary legislation. The campaign will start mid 2023 upon the approval of 
the implementing act concernin g the reporting rules applicable in transitional period. This will 
continue through autumn 2023 thus supporting all relevant actors for the entry into force of the 
regulation in October 2023.  
 
Para 4.118 (Page 159)  
4.118. In February 2022, the Commission a dopted new Guidelines on State Aid for climate, 
environmental protection and energy as spelled out in the European Green Deal to facilitate 
achieving the Deal's objectives, specifying 14 potentially compatible types of specific aid 
measures. On 20  July 2022, the Commission also amended the state aid Temporary Crisis 
Framework (Section  3.3.1.2) to include measures aimed at accelerating the roll -out of renewable 
energy and some aimed at decarbonizing industrial processes, as outlined in the REPowerEU Plan. 
Detailed data on state aid provided to the energy transition were not yet available. In 2020, the 
total state aid expenditure for environmental protection including energy savings amounted to 
nearly EUR  80 billion . 
 
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Question 17:  
The EU adopted its latest T emporary Crisis and Transition Framework on 09  March this year, to 
foster support measures in sectors which are key for the transition to a net -zero economy, in line 
with the Green Deal Industrial Plan. The Green Deal Industrial Plan likewise includes prop osals to 
relax EU Member States government subsidy rules and repurpose existing funds to support clean 
technology and green industries. The said move was seen as a response to US' green subsidies 
under the US' Inflation Reduction Act. How will the EU guara ntee that its own green subsidies 
scheme will be aligned with the WTO rules? [Note: outside the review period]  
 
Reply:  The EU's stringent and directly enforceable State aid control regime, ensures that any 
subsidies granted by its Member States are made in  full compatibility with WTO rules.  
 
The Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework itself contains rules to this effect. As such there 
are explicit clauses prohibiting State aid being granted subject to clauses conditioning it directly 
or indirectly on the  origin of products or equipment, including requirements for the beneficiary to 
purchase domestically -produced products in the legislation. Any aid that may be related to export -
related activities to third countries or to Member States which would be direc tly linked to the 
quantities exported, aid contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods, or aid to 
establish and operate a distribution network or to cover any other expenditure linked to export 
activities are equally prohibited.  
 
Para 4.130 (Page 162)  
4.130. To establish a new regulatory framework for competitive decarbonized gas markets, the 
Commission adopted proposals for a new Gas Market and Hydrogen Directive and Regulation to 
recast the current Directive and Regulation for the gas  market to also include renewable gas and 
hydrogen. These efforts are linked to the Hydrogen Strategy, which contributes to the European 
Green Deal and builds on the new Industrial Strategy as well as the European  Union 's recovery 
plan by ensuring hydrogen  can play a role in decarbonizing the economy. Outlining the need for 
international cooperation, the strategy aims to establish a regulatory framework and to incentivize 
supply and demand in "lead markets", while also establishing infrastructure with 
non-discriminatory access to make widespread use of hydrogen feasible, for example in transport.  
 
Question 18:  
What are the expected set of incentives for the supply and demand of renewable gas and hydrogen 
as a new regulatory framework for competitive decarbo nized gas markets to be established?  
 
Reply:  The EU's future renewable gas and hydrogen framework is still under negotiation by the 
co-legislators; the European Parliament and the Council. You can find the latest update on the 
evolving policy framework under this link: Hydrogen and decarbonised gas market package 
(europa.eu)  
 
Para 4.129 (Page 176)  
4.129. The development of infra structure for the provision of transport services also continues. 
The Trans -European Transport Network (TEN -T) defines major transport corridors and 
infrastructure, divided into a "core" and "comprehensive" network for efficient intra -European 
transport an d connecting the network to neighbouring countries. Policies to support the 
completion of the core network by 2030 (and the comprehensive network by 2050) by closing 
gaps and addressing bottlenecks, are under way. In 2019, the TEN -T regulation was amended to 
include network connections in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, the Republic of Moldova, and 
Ukraine. Following a review of the TEN -T policy in 2019, the Commission proposed a revised TEN -T 
regulation in 2021 (amended in 2022) that, inter alia, reflects po licy developments regarding 
emissions (the European Green Deal and the Climate Law) or sustainable mobility (Sustainable 
and Smart Mobility Strategy); includes measures related to interoperability, accessibility, urban 
nodes, and climate resilience; and pu ts additional emphasis on user services. According to the 
Commission, it is expected to be adopted towards the end of 2023. For the budget period 2021 -27, 
the Connecting Europe Facility, originally established in 2013, is one of the main programmes 
providi ng funding to build, develop, modernize, and complete the various trans -European 
networks, including transport networks. In addition, the Global Gateway initiative aims to mobilize 
up to EUR  300 billion  between 2021 and 2027 for investments in infrastructu re projects, including 
transport, incorporating key objectives of EU cross -cutting policies including those related to good 
governance and the environment.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Question 19:  
Can the EU provide the breakdown of the mobilized funds/investments per country and/o r per 
sector under the Global Gateway initiative? We note that funds will be mobilized until 2027 and 
the EU's current investments in Nairobi, Kenya and the Philippines.  
 
Reply: In 2022, several investment packages have been launched: Africa -EU Global Gat eway 
Investment Package[1] worth EUR 150 billion  of investment, the EU -ASEAN Investment Package[2] 
worth of EUR  10 billion , and Team Europe Initiatives unveiled during the Indo -Pacific Ministerial 
meeting[3] and the Sustainable Connectivity  Conference in Samarkand. Work is ongoing to 
formalize an EU -LAC Global Gateway Investment Agenda to be presented in July 2023 at EU -
CELAC Summit. Relevant and updated information can be tracked on the European Commission 
Global Gateway dedicated webpage[4].  
[1] EU-Africa: Global Gateway Investment Package (europa.eu)  
[2]  EU-ASEAN commemorative summit - Consilium (europa.eu)  
[3]  Commissioner Urpilainen highlights 'Global Gateway opportunities' at EU -Indo-Pacific Forum 
(europa.eu)  
[4]  Global Gateway (europa.eu)  
 
Para 4.186 (Page 173)  
4.186. Prior to the adoption of t he current CMU Action Plan, the reforms to the prudential 
regulation of investment firms mentioned in the previous Review were finalized in late 2019.262 
While the largest systemic investment firms continue to be authorized and regulated as banks 
(and are subject to the same capital, liquidity, and risk management rules), a more tailored 
prudential framework (including requirements) applies to the other investment firms in a way that 
is proportionate to their size, nature, complexity, risk profile, and busi ness model. While smaller 
investment firms that qualify as "small and non -interconnected" can be exempted from certain 
requirements, other firms are subject to capital requirements mirroring the risk they pose to 
clients, markets, and the firm itself. Medi um-sized or large firms that offer "bank -like" services 
and could still pose risks to financial stability could also remain subject to the banking rules without 
having to be authorized as banks, possibly at their supervisor's request.  
 
Question 20:  
Can the EU please cite examples of the "bank -like" services being provided by medium -sized or 
large investment firms?  
 
Reply : The identification of investment firms that are considered as posing risks to financial 
stability on a par with credit institutio ns, thereby justifying a similar prudential treatment, is 
notably based on the nature of their investment services and activities. An exhaustive list of nine 
(9) investment activities and services is provided under Annex  1 of MiFID (Directive 2014/65/EU) 
for the purpose of the investment firms' authorisation. Out of this list, activities n°3 (dealing on 
own account) and n°6 (underwriting of financial instruments and/or placing of financial 
instruments on a firm commitment basis) have been consi dered as being the most relevant in 
terms of scale, interconnectedness, and risks to the financial stability. Depending on their size, 
investment firms performing those activities may therefore be subject to the prudential 
requirements applicable to credit  institutions. This categorisation is established under the 
Investment Firms Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2019/2033).  
 
Para 4.216 (Page 179)  
4.216. Regulation (EC) 1008/2008 continues to set the framework for aviation services in the 
European  Union , and the  cap of foreign ownership of airlines at 49% remains in place. No 
restrictions on the operation of intra -EU routes are in place for EU carriers, while traffic with third 
countries continues to be regulated by a large number of air transport agreements of i ndividual 
EU member States with third countries and by EU comprehensive air transport agreements 
(CATAs) with key partners. EU CATAs provide for liberalization of direct connectivity and create a 
level playing field, covering fair competition, as well as s ocial and environmental matters. A CATA 
with ASEAN was concluded in June 2021, also covering fifth freedom rights, while the European 
Common Aviation Area Agreement (ECAAA), which entered into force in 2017, provides for full 
traffic liberalization.  
 
Question 21:  
The ASEAN -EU CATA was signed in October 2022 and is undergoing ratification in accordance with 
the respective procedures of the ASEAN Member States and the EU/EU Member States. What is 
the status of the ratification? What is the timeline for its operationalization?  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 76 - 
 
  
 Reply:  The ASEAN -EU CATA has so far been ratified by 3 EU Member States (Austria, Estonia and 
Ireland). In accordance with the Record of Statements made on the occasion of the signature of 
the Agreement, the ASEAN Member States and the  EU Member States intend, to the extent 
permitted by their respective applicable laws and regulations, to extend favourable consideration 
to applications for air services and operating authorisations by each other's air carriers on terms 
equivalent to thos e of the Agreement, on the basis of comity and reciprocity, as from the date of 
signature of the Agreement and until its entry into force.  
 
Para 4.219 (Page 180)  
4.219. In late 2020, the Commission adopted a package of proposals that include regulations on  
the implementation of the Single European Sky ("SES2+") as well as aviation safety replacing an 
earlier proposal from 2013 that had not advanced because of some diverging views among some 
member States. According to the Commission, the revised package aim s to achieve the same 
objectives as the earlier proposal but reflects recent developments in terms of policy and 
technology changes, including carbon neutrality targets emanating from the Paris Agreement and 
the European Green Deal. In particular, it aims to allow for the more flexible provision of air 
navigation services to help cut aviation emissions by defragmenting the European airspace and 
allowing for more efficient routing. It would also require air navigation service providers to draft 
and submit pe rformance plans for en route  air navigation services to the European  Union  Aviation 
Safety Agency. As a result, the package therefore also suggests amendments to the 2018 air 
safety regulation, which had replaced earlier regulations.  
 
Question 22:  
Please share information if there are specific incentives for air transport operators to encourage 
modernizing their air fleet to more technological advance and environmentally friendly airplanes.  
 
Reply : On the single European sky legislation, the EU legislator  has not decided yet whether at 
EU level air navigation charges should be modulated as to promote technological advancement of 
air transport operators. At national level this possibility exists already. The SESAR (Single 
European Sky Air Traffic Management  Research) project also offers financial incentives for 
airspace users that modernise their fleets by equipping them with SESAR ATM solutions, in 
particular those that are included in common projects regulations.  
 
Since carbon emissions are priced via the EU ETS on intra -EU flights and via CORSIA for external 
flights, consumption of kerosene entails costs which are higher than that of the kerosene itself. 
The carbon pricing in the EU is an incentive to modernize fleet and use more efficient aircraft, as 
well as use of Sustainable Aviation Fuels (SAF) those cost is significantly higher than fossil 
kerosene.  
 
The Airport Charges Directive (12/09/EC) allows the modulation of airport charges for 
environmental purposes. Modulations can target, for example, the re duction of noise and 
improvement of air quality at the airport community. Higher charges would be imposed on more 
polluting or nosier aircraft.  
 
Para 4.221 (Page 180)  
4.221. Maritime transport continues to be the means of transport for around 74% of extra -EU 
trade in volume in 2021. The Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy targets transport by inland 
waterways and short sea shipping to increase its market share by 50% by 2050, while short sea 
shipping also plays an important role in efforts to reduce GHG  emissions, and initiatives to promote 
such short sea shipping are in place.  
 
Question 23:  
What are the strategies/incentives offered by the European Commission to achieve EU Green Deal 
target of reducing transport -related greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 50% by 2050?  
 
Reply:  The EU's objective of being the first climate -neutral continent by 2 050 requires ambitious 
changes in transport. A clear path is needed to achieve a 90% reduction in transport -related 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.  
 
The European Commission adopted a set of proposals to make the EU's climate, energy, transport 
and taxati on policies fit for reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030, 
compared to 1990 levels.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 77 - 
 
Regarding maritime transport, the EU has put in place a basket of measures to address the 
emissions of the sector, aiming both at improving energy e fficiency of ships and maritime 
transport operations and uptake in the use of cleaner low -GHG intensity fuels. The EU Emission 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS) will be extended to the sector as of 2024, covering 100% of the 
intra-European emissions and 50% of the e missions to and from Europe. In addition, measures 
addressing the GHG intensity of the energy fuels used by vessels have been agreed under the 
FuelEU maritime regulation aiming for an uptake in the demand and consistent use of renewable 
and low -carbon fuel s. Other measures such as the Regulation for the deployment of alternative 
fuels (AFIR) will set mandatory targets for shore -side electricity supply in the maritime and inland 
waterway ports. Finally, other acts still under negotiation (revision of the Ene rgy Taxation 
Directive) could contribute to reach our climate goals by changing the minimum levels of taxation 
for fuels used in the maritime sector.  
 
Para 4.236 (Page 183)  
4.236. An evaluation of the 2017 abolition of roaming charges for customers travell ing 
occasionally within the European  Union  found significant positive effects for consumers. As the 
underlying competition dynamics in the sector have not changed and the abolition was set to 
expire in mid -2022, the rules have been extended until 2032. In addition, the chapeau  of 
Regulation (EU) 2022/612 tasks the Commission to review the retail price caps for international 
calls in the European  Union  (while not roaming) established in Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 and 
currently in place until 14  May 2024, and to assess whether further revisions in these caps are 
warranted.  
 
Question 24:  
What are the challenges encountered in abolishing the roaming charges among EU member states 
and what are the interventions currently being undertaken to address these?  
 
Reply : The roaming policy is a data driven regulatory intervention where solutions have been 
substantiated by data. The main challenge that the Regulation needed to address is striking a 
balance between ensuring cost recovery for operators providing wholesale i nbound roaming 
services and minimizing sustainability challenges for outbounder operators and MVNOs. The 
proper level for roaming wholesale caps was defined based on a detailed cost model developed.  
The roaming rules are regularly reviewed and the nationa l regulatory authorities monitor and 
supervise the implementation of the rules. The Body of European Regulators for Electronic 
Communications publish annual benchmarking and monitoring reports on international roaming, 
which are publicly available.  
 
PART II: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT REPORT  
I. INTRODUCTION  
Para 1.2 (Page 4)  
In February 2021, the EU set out its new trade strategy in the Trade Policy Communication ("2021 
Trade Policy Communication"). Responding to the challenges the EU faces and the political 
priorities of supporting the green and digital transitions, the new strategy was based on the 
concept of open strategic autonomy, designed to enhance the EU's ability to make its own choices 
and shape the world around it through lea dership and engagement; and which also reflects the 
EU's fundamental belief that addressing today's challenges requires more rather than less global 
cooperation.  
 
Question 25:  
How can the new trade strategy of the EU that was set out in February 2021 ("2021 Trade Policy 
Communication") and in support of green and digital transitions address issues/challenges in the 
digital world such as on CBDCs, virtual assets, online trade exc hanges, among others? Relatedly, 
what are the specific EU approaches/initiatives and proposed trade solutions on this matter?  
 
Reply:  The digital transformation is one of key enablers of sustainable development. Supporting 
Europe's digital transformation i s a priority both in internal and external policies including trade 
policy and instruments. As set out in the Commission strategy entitled An Open, Sustainable, and 
Assertive Trade Policy, the EU seeks the rapid conclusion of an ambitious and comprehensive  WTO 
agreement on digital trade, including rules on data flows, in full compliance with the EU's data 
protection framework, and provisions on enhancing consumer trust ensuring a high level of 
consumer protection, as well as explores the possibility of clos er regulatory cooperation with 
like-minded partners on issues of relevance for digital trade. The EU will use all in -built flexibilities WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 78 - 
 
  
  
2 European Commission Communication, REPowerEU Plan , COM(2022) 230 final, 18.5.2022 . 
3 Council Regulation Establishing a market correction mechanism to protect citizens and the economy 
against excessively high prices, adopted on 22  December  2022.  
4 Note that many governments are tackling costs of living more generally and policies to alle viate the 
income shock have also been focussing on other items, such as transport prices or rents.  in its trade agreements so that they are fit for purpose and respond to the new challenges relating 
to the green and di gital transition.  
 
II. TRADE AND THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
Para 2.5 (Page 5)  
Surging inflation is currently a key challenge eroding households' real disposable income. The 
harmonised consumer price inflation rate (HICP) reached 1.4% in 2019. Suppressed ec onomic 
activity due to the pandemic and falling energy prices pushed down consumer price inflation 
to 0.7% in 2020. Inflation started to increase from early 2021 as economic activity picked up and 
energy prices increased. The subsequent energy and commodit y price shock combined with supply 
chain disruptions caused by the Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine from early 2022 further 
fuelled price increases. As a result, inflation in the EU surged from 2.9% in 2021 to 9.3% in 2022 
– the highest in decade s. Inflation is expected to gradually decline to 7% in 2023 and then to 3% 
in 2024.  
 
Question 26:  
What are the government's measures to help address high inflation, including measures in 
alleviating the impact on vulnerable sectors?  
 
Reply:  While the responsibility for price stability in the euro area falls upon the European Central 
Bank, the new geopolitical reality established by Russia's aggression of Ukraine and the ensuing 
structural change in relative prices has triggered a strong poli cy reaction both at EU and national 
level. The policy reaction can broadly be divided into two sets of responses: a set of structural 
responses to make Europe independent from Russian fossil fuels (and fossil fuels more generally) 
on the one hand and a mor e immediate reaction to support vulnerable households and firms in 
coping with the fallout of the energy price shock, on the other. Structural measures, as notably 
laid out in the RePowerEU plan of 18  May 2022,2 aim to accelerate the diversification of ga s 
supplies (both geographically and by type of gas, e.g., liquefied natural gas or biomethane), and 
the transition to carbon -neutrality in the wider context of the green transition, while achieving 
energy efficiency gains. Investments and reforms take a ce ntral role in this plan. Further measures 
adopted in 2022 and directly pertaining to energy prices include a Council Regulation on an 
emergency intervention to address high energy prices (which comprises an inframarginal market 
revenue cap and a solidarity  levy for the fossil fuel sector), solidarity on gas purchases, a price 
cap on Russian oil (in agreement with the G7) and the establishment of a market correction 
mechanism to guard against excessively high gas prices (applicable from mid -February 2023).3 
Meanwhile, g overnments have implemented a large and diverse set of measures in reaction to 
the energy price shock and the "cost of living" crisis more generally.4 They include inducements 
to reduce energy consumption, interventions in the price -setting m echanism or transfers to 
households, in particular vulnerable ones, and firms that come under financial pressure because 
of the energy crisis (enabled by the Temporary Crisis Framework of State Aid measures).  
 
III. MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL TRADE POLICY  
Para 3.6.  Dispute Settlement (Page 8)  
3.6. While the EU's priority is finding a lasting multilateral solution to the Appellate  Body situation, 
in the meantime, the EU will continue to support the smooth operation of and foster participation 
in the Multi -party interim appeal arbitration arrangement (MPIA). The MPIA is an interim 
arrangement designed to preserve, in any WTO disputes amo ng participating WTO members, the 
right to a functioning two -tier and independent dispute settlement mechanism under WTO rules. 
The MPIA is open to all WTO members to join, for as long as the Appellate  Body is not able to 
function fully. Not only is the MP IA of use to regular users of WTO dispute settlement; more 
fundamentally, it signals commitment to a rules -based international trading system, with properly 
functioning WTO dispute resolution at its heart.  
 
Question 27:  
We would appreciate further informa tion on the effectiveness of the system, including its rate of 
delivering resolutions, as well as challenges encountered during the operation of MPIA. Apart from WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 79 - 
 
 
5 https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52022IP0276&qid=1682502840818   the 26 WTO Members (including Japan's recent membership), which other WTO Members have 
signifi ed their interest to join MPIA whether formally or informally?  
 
Reply:  The MPIA is contributing to the preservation of the rules -based system. There have been 
no appeals "into the void" among the MPIA participants and they have all preserved their access 
to a fully functioning dispute settlement system, despite the blockage of the Appellate  Body. 
Various disputes fell within the scope of the MPIA. Some of those disputes have been solved 
amicably. One case ( DS591: Colombia — Anti-Dumping Duties on Frozen Fr ies from Belgium, 
Germany and the Netherlands ) has been heard on appeal pursuant to the MPIA. The arbitration 
award was issued on 21  December  2022, within the 90 days deadline. In addition Türkiye and the 
EU agreed on similar procedures for arbitration und er Article  25 of the DSU in DS583 
(Turkey  — Certain Measures concerning the Production, Importation and Marketing of 
Pharmaceutical Products ). The award was issued to the parties on 21  July 2022. The swift issuance 
of these high -quality appeal awards confi rmed that, through the MPIA, appeal proceedings at the 
WTO can be managed in a focussed and efficient way while fully respecting parties' rights. Various 
WTO Members are currently considering joining the MPIA.  
 
Para 3.20 (Page 10)  
3.20.  The EU has been at the forefront of the work on the WTO response to the COVID -19 
pandemic, including through its participation in the Ottawa Group. In June 2021, the EU put 
forward in the WTO a comprehensive approach in relation to trade and health, which included 
elements such as trade facilitating measures, improved transparency, restraint from export 
restrictions, as well as expanding production capacity. Intellectual property was also part of this 
proposed broader solution. Following the 2022 MC12 outcome, the EU has actively participated in 
the various committees mentioned in the Ministerial Declaration on the WTO Response to the 
COVID -19 Pandemic and Preparedness for Future Pandemics through experience sharing sessions.  
 
Question 28:  
Intellectual property was ci ted as a part of a proposed broader solution to the COVID19 pandemic. 
What IP -related measures has the European  Union  taken in response to the outcomes of the 
12th Ministerial Conference (MC12) of the World Trade Organization (WTO)?  
 
Reply:  In 2021, the E U put forward a comprehensive approach in response to the COVID -19 
pandemic which included intellectual property. At MC12, the Decision on the TRIPS  Agreement  
was adopted. It provides that all developing country Members are eligible Members. The EU has 
not taken any further measures in this regard.  
 
Para 3.68 (Page 16)  
3.68. In its "Strategy for Cooperation with the Indo -Pacific", the EU announced the intention to 
develop Digital Partnerships with Japan, the Republic of Korea and Singapore. The Partnerships  
are flexible instruments going beyond dialogue and exchange of information in order to create a 
collaboration vehicle to deliver concrete deliverables, such as collaboration in the field of 
Research& Innovation, regulatory cooperation and mechanisms for c ollaboration in international 
fora. 
 
Question 29:  
The European Parliament adopted a resolution on Indo -Pacific Strategy in the area of trade and 
investment on 5  July 2022.5 The resolution likewise calls on the Commission to strengthen its 
partnerships an d linkages within the Indo -Pacific region and underlines the importance of the 
Digital Partnership Agreements as well as bilateral and regional trade agreements, and 
preferential schemes. Apart from these existing undertakings as well as ongoing FTA negoti ations, 
what are the plans of the EU Commission to adopt its own Indo -Pacific led Strategy?  
 
Reply:  The European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy adopted a Joint Communication on th e EU Strategy for cooperation in the 
Indo-Pacific  on 16  September  2021 ( EUR-Lex - 52021JC0024 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu) ). This 
Joint Communication describe the concrete actions to reinforce the strategic engagement with the 
Indo-Pacific region.  
 
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 80 - 
 
  
 V. SUSTAINABILITY  
Para 5.7 (Page 19)  
5.7. The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM ) is a climate measure aimed at decreasing 
global GHG emissions by preventing the risk of carbon leakage and by supporting increased 
ambition on climate mitigation, while ensuring WTO compatibility. The CBAM will equalize the 
price of carbon between domest ic products and imports and ensure that the EU's climate 
objectives are not undermined by production relocating to countries with less ambitious climate 
policies.  
 
Questions 30:  
What is the EU's methodology for calculating the embedded emissions on import ed products 
affected by the CBAM regulation?  
 
Reply:  The Regulation establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism 
(Regulation  2023/956) was published in the EU Official Journal on 16/05 ( link). The European 
Commission is now in a position, after consultation of the CBAM Committee, to adopt an 
Implementing act regulating the transition al period of CBAM starting on the 1st of October 2023 
and which notably specifies the reporting obligations for importers. The European Commission will 
publish the draft implementing regulation for feedback by stakeholders for a period of four weeks 
before the CBAM Committee renders its opini on on it.  
 
Information reported during the transitional period will inform the European Commission's work 
on the implementing acts to be adopted before the end of the transitional period, including in view 
of applying the elements of the calculation metho ds for embedded emissions set out in Annex  IV.  
 
Questions 31:  
What will be the EU's carbon crediting scheme for exporting countries who already have existing 
carbon pricing mechanism? Will these countries have an advantage in the implementation of 
CBAM?  
 
Reply:  The CBAM  Regulation ensures that a carbon price effectively paid by an exporter in a third 
country will be deducted from the number of CBAM certificates to be surrendered by EU importers, 
as from 2026. Any national carbon price effectively paid by a third country producer – be it a 
market price from an ETS or a carbon tax - may be deducted from the amount of CBAM certificates 
that have to be surrendered. Producers in third countries with an equivalent or higher carbon price 
will not pay any CBAM charge at all.  
 
Under the transitional period starting in October 2023, importers of goods under the scope of the 
Regulation will notably have to report on direct and indirect emissions and on the carbon price 
possibly paid by exporters from third countries. These reports wi ll inform the European 
Commission work on further implementing acts, notably regarding taking into account a carbon 
price paid in third countries (in line with Article  9 of the regulation).  
 
Questions 32:  
How will the revenues from CBAM be used to support  decarbonization efforts in developing and 
least-developed countries?  
 
Reply:  The CBAM is a climate measure and has not been designed with a view to generating 
revenues. Should EU's trade partners increase their climate ambition by decarbonising their 
industry or by introducing carbon pricing measures, CBAM revenues will decline. In the long run, 
they may even go to zero.  
 
We have built in a transitional period in CBAM, which will give trading partners, including 
developing countries, time to prepare.  
 
To take into account their specific needs, the EU will continue to support Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) in targeted ways, such as through technology transfer, technical and financial 
assistance, with the objective of developing industrial production stru ctures that are compatible 
with long -term global climate objectives.  
 
 
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 81 - 
 
Questions 33:  
To this end, the EU will continue in its role as one of the biggest contributors to climate financing 
in developing countries and LDCs. The EU is determined to help deve loping countries and LDCs 
making this transition. How does the CBAM align with WTO rules? How does the system address 
issues on discrimination and protectionism among foreign and domestic products and producers?  
 
Reply:  CBAM is an environmental policy tool  to support the EU's increased ambition on climate 
mitigation by preventing carbon leakage, while ensuring WTO compatibility.  
 
CBAM will ensure that an equivalent carbon price will be paid by domestic and imported products 
and has been designed to apply in  an even -handed manner that does not discriminate among 
products or countries.  
 
Article  216(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European  Union  states that "[a]greements 
concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union and on it s Member States". 
This obligation applies equally to the WTO  Agreement . Consequently, the EU always assesses the 
WTO compatibility of its legislation, including autonomous regulations.  
 
Questions 34:  
Please provide more information on the current text of the CBAM legislation including its covered 
sectors and target implementation. What are the flexibilities to be provided to developing and 
least-developing countries to transition to this mechanism? In particular, what kind of aid or 
technical assistance does the EU intend to provide?  
 
Reply:  The Regulation establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism 
(Regulation  2023/956) was published in the EU Official Journal on 16/05 ( link). The European 
Commission will now, after consultation of the CBAM Committee, adopt the Implementing act 
regulating the transitional period of CBAM starting on the 1st of October (specifying the reporting 
obligations for importers).  
 
In view of its adoption, it must be noted that the European Commission will publish the draft 
implementing regulation for feedb ack for a period of four weeks before the CBAM Committee 
renders its opinion on it.  
 
The EU Commission, in conjunction with the European External Action Service and EU Delegations 
around the world, will launch an information campaign, featuring online sem inars, physical events, 
distribution of guidance documents, and direct assistance, aimed at assisting third country 
operators and importers to the EU in performing all new obligations required by the CBAM 
regulation and its secondary legislation. The campa ign will start in spring 2023 upon the approval 
of the implementing act concerning the reporting rules applicable in transitional period. This will 
continue through autumn 2023 thus supporting all relevant actors for the entry into force of the 
regulation in October 2023.  
 
The CBAM does not distinguish between categories of third countries but applies to goods in 
certain sectors. Our studies show that exports from LDCs to the EU in the sectors covered by the 
CBAM are limited. The EU has built in a transiti onal period in CBAM, which will give trading 
partners, including developing countries, time to prepare. To take into account their specific 
needs, the EU will continue to support Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in targeted ways, such 
as through technology  transfer, technical and financial assistance, with the objective of developing 
industrial production structures that are compatible with long -term global climate objectives. To 
this end, the EU will continue in its role as one of the biggest contributors to climate financing in 
developing countries and LDCs. The EU is determined to help developing countries and LDCs 
making this transition but has to make sure that it does so in a WTO compatible manner, without 
bending the existing multilateral rules.  
 
As part of the review report to be prepared by the Commission before the end of the transitional 
phase, the Commission will evaluate and report on the impact on countries with special interest 
to LDCs and on the effects of the technical assistance given (see to that effect Article  30 of the 
Regulation).  
 
 
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 82 - 
 
  
 VI. ENFORCEMENT  
Para 6.2 -6.3 (Page 26)  
6.2. The EU maintains an active trade implementation and enforcement policy and has developed 
a number of measures and tools to ensure the defence of EU interests and the compliance by 
third countries with the obligations and commitments they have undertak en vis -à-vis the EU.  
 
6.3. On 24  July 2020, the European Commission created the position of a Chief Trade Enforcement 
Officer who steers and coordinates all EU actions in relation to the implementation and 
enforcement of the EU's trade policy, both for is sues related to market access and for issues of 
non-compliance with sustainability commitments by the EU's trading partners.  
 
Question 35:  
What is the EU's experience on trade enforcement and compliance with the creation of CTEO, 
particularly on the chal lenges and opportunities in managing cases and/or reaching/executing 
resolutions/sanctions with involved parties? What are the sanctions and penalties being imposed 
for non -compliance? How would the EU assess the CTEO's effectiveness? Can the EU provide 
relevant statistics/analytics on overall compliance by EU trade partners?  
 
Reply:  Since its launch, the Single Entry Point has received 88 external complaints on market 
access issues (in addition to 23 ex officio  complaints launched by the European Commissi on) and 
3 complaints on TSD issues. Following the assessment of the complaints received, 27 new barriers 
have so far been registered in as trade barriers. We have been trying to resolve the trade barriers 
mainly through a dialogue with our trade partners. In some cases we have resorted to either 
bilateral or multilateral (WTO) dispute settlement mechanisms or used the EU Trade Barriers 
Regulation instrument.  
 
Para 6.18 (Page 29)  
6.18.  The EU advocates for open international public procurement markets and h as opened its 
public procurement market for many goods and services from third countries. Closed procurement 
markets undermine competition and transparency, increase the costs of public goods and services 
for taxpayers in addition to the risk of corruption . By contrast, many EU companies are 
experiencing difficulties in getting access to third countries' procurement markets. In response, 
the EU is taking action to ensure a level playing field and to increase opportunities for EU 
companies. The International  Procurement Instrument entered into force on 29  August  2022. This 
new instrument confers the EU additional opportunities to engage with third countries in order to 
remove barriers affecting access to public procurement markets outside the EU. It will be o ne of 
the key market -opening tools for public procurement.  
 
Question 36:  
The Government Report mentioned that closed procurement markets undermine competition and 
transparency, increase the costs of public goods and services for taxpayers in addition to t he risk 
of corruption. May we know the benefits of liberalized government procurement markets and how 
domestic firms are protected from anti -competitive foreign corporate practices?  
 
Reply:  Liberalized government procurement markets bring more competition which means better 
value for money for contracting authorities and contracting entities. In addition, liberalization of 
public procurement markets helps incentivizing competitivity of the domestic industry and helps 
spreading the use of advanced technology . Regarding anti -competitive practices the EU has 
recently adopted a Foreign Subsidy Regulation to address this specific issue.  
 
PART III: OTHER QUESTIONS  
Questions 37:  
EU is one of the markets of the local electronics industry, and policies affecting EUs electronics 
industry may have significant impact on the activities and direction of the Philippine companies. 
Please provide updates on the proposed European Chips Act i ncluding the time for the approval 
of the Act.  
 
Reply:  The European Parliament and the Council of the European  Union , who are the 
co-legislators for the Chips Act, reached a political agreement on 18  April 2023. This political 
agreement is now subject to formal approval by the two institutions.  
 
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 83 - 
 
Questions 38:  
Could the EU explain how it determines government procurement practices which impair 
competition, particularly those involving conflict of interest or beneficial ownership?  
 
Reply: Under the EU Public Procurement Directives, conflicts of interest cover si tuations where 
staff members of the contracting authority or of a procurement service provider acting on behalf 
of the contracting authority who are involved in the conduct of the procurement procedure or may 
influence the outcome of that procedure have, d irectly or indirectly, a financial, economic or other 
personal interest which might be perceived to compromise their impartiality and independence in 
the context of the procurement procedure.  
 
EU Member States are obliged to ensure that contracting author ities take appropriate measures 
under national law to effectively prevent, identify and remedy conflicts of interest arising in the 
conduct of procurement procedures so as to avoid any distortion of competition and to ensure 
equal treatment of all economic  operators.  
 
Questions 39:  
How does the EU determine "best value of money" in government procurement and how is this 
considered in the award of contract?  
 
Reply: The EU public procurement buyers are given freedom in shaping the contract award 
method, prov ided the method is in a clear and unambiguous way presented (including the 
weighting of particular criteria, if various criteria are used) in the procurement documents (i.e. at 
the stage of the launch of a tender). Thus, the most economically advantageous tender may be 
chosen on the basis of price, costs (e.g. life -cycle costing), price or cost and quality. The latter 
may involve direct characteristic of a product of service, environmental or social aspects (linked 
to the subject -matter of a contract), inno vative characteristics, involved staff when justified, 
aspects of delivery conditions. A buyer may also decide to fix a price and award the contract on 
the basis of the quality criteria only.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 84 - 
 
  
 THAILAND  
Document  WT/TPR/G /442  
No. Page  
(Para)  Question  
1 7 
(3) Q18 
Are there any chapters or articles under Free Trade Agreements related to state -owned 
enterprises? In addition, does the European  Union  have any plans or strategies for those 
state-owned enterprises to benefit from free trade a greements? If yes, please provide more 
information.  
 
Reply:  Free trade agreements of the European  Union  generally contain provision on SOEs, 
under their own chapter. The objective is to provide for greater transparency, as well to 
ensure that SOEs respect commercial considerations and non -discrimination. For instance, 
the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with Armenia contains provisions 
related to state -owned enterprises (Art.  300, 302, 303, 304, 305) as well as the Economic 
Partnership Agreement with Japan (Chapter 13), the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement with Kazakhstan (Chapter 12), the Trade and Cooperation Agreement with the 
United  Kingdom  (Chapter 4) and the Free Trade Agreement with Viet  Nam (Chapter 11).  
SOEs are treaty in the same way as any other enterprise with regards to the overall benefits 
from TRADE Agreements.  
[https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/?uri =CELEX:22018A0126(01) ]  
[https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2014:261:FULL ] 
[https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu -trade -relationships -country -and-region /countries -
and-regions/japan/eu -japan -agreement/eu -japan -agreement -chapter -chapter_en ] 
[https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/E N/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22016A0204(01) ] 
[https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22020A1231(01) ] 
[https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2020:186:FULL ]  
2 14 
(3.50) Q19  
Does the EU have any plans to include these  issues e.g. gender equality, trade and fossil 
fuel subsidies reform, deforestation, and carbon pricing in the EU 's future FTAs? And if not, 
what are the factors that the EU takes into consideration to decide whether to include or not 
include them in any F TAs?  
 
Reply:  The EU communication "The power of trade partnerships: together for just and green 
economic growth " of June 2022 " sets out the EU 's new approach to trade and sustainable 
development, including for future FTAs. The document recalls issues cove red by TSD 
chapters e.g. gender equality. Moreover, it promotes a country specific approach, under 
which the EU and our FTA partners, on the basis of the areas defined in the ex-ante impact 
assessments, should consider negotiating and focusing on the key c ountry -based priorities. 
These priorities should be realistic and targeted to help deliver results. They should also be 
sufficiently flexible to be adapted over time as the sustainability situation evolves.  
3 19 
(5.1.1)  Q20  
The TPR Report Section  5.1.1 summarizes the EU 's actions on climate change and 
environmental protection. Most of those actions have significant impacts on other countries, 
especially developing countries and may be considered a breach of WTO regulations.  
(1) How does the EU int end to ensure WTO compatibility of its environmental standards, 
which have the same effect as trade barriers for third countries exporting to the EU market?; 
(2) In reaching the objective of environmental protection, should the process and choice of 
instru ments under the EU 's trade and climate policy be more inclusive of all countries 
concerned and prioritize cooperation over restrictions and rules and obligations?; (3) In 
order to mitigate the impact of these measures on third countries, how does the EU pl an to 
promote capacity -building and support technical assistance to third countries? And how will 
those countries be involved in designing such cooperation?; (4) Has does the EU take into 
account the level of development of developing countries, especially  the Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs), in the drafting of these environmental measures?  
 
Reply:  The EU designs it environmental and climate action policies in a way that achieve 
the environmental objectives set in the international commitments (including u nder 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs), the UNFCCC and the Sustainable 
Development Goals) and minimises impact on trade. Article  216(2) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European  Union  states that "[a]greements concluded by the Union are 
binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its Member States ". Consequently, the EU 
always assesses the compatibility of its legislation, with its international commitments.  
 
Conscious about the potential relevance for the EU 's trading partners and the need to comply 
with WTO rules, the EU has designed all its European Green Deal measures very carefully. 
The EU has also been a role model for transparency of its European Green Deal measures WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 85 - 
 
through public consultations, impact assessments and outreach  from an early regulatory 
processes and implementation stages in different fora in the EU and outside (in Brussels, 
through the EU delegations in partner countries, in the WTO in Geneva and via bilateral 
dialogues). The EU has engaged in the WTO and bilate rally with countries and tried to 
address their concerns as far as possible, while maintaining objectives pursued by its 
policies. The EU will continue dialogue and engagement with its trading partners including 
for the measures that entered into force and  ensuing implementing acts and decisions, in 
the WTO and bilaterally.  
 
Finally, while we are working on achieving these objectives internally in the EU, we are also 
supporting developing countries. The EU is collectively the biggest donor for internationa l 
aid in the world, providing over EUR  50 billion  a year to help overcome poverty and advance 
global development.  
 
We also continue to support partner countries in their green transition, in line with our 
international commitments. Through the EU 's Global Instrument (Neighbourhood, 
Development and International Cooperation Instrument – NDICI), we have so far committed 
about EUR  27.8 billion  in support of climate objectives in our partner countries for the period 
of 2021 -27. The support takes into a ccount the needs and priorities in each particular 
context.  
 
In December 2021, the EU launched the Global Gateway, a new strategy to mobilise 
investments totalling EUR  300 billion  over the period 2021 -27. In line with the EU 's 
commitment to the 2030 Agend a, the Global Gateway aims at boosting smart, clean and 
secure investments in digital, energy and transport.  
 
4 20 
(5.12)  Q21  
Thailand is one of many developing countries which stand to be heavily affected by the EU 's 
Regulation on Deforestation -Free Pro ducts. The EU recently added rubber and rubber 
products to the product scope list under the regulation in December last year and the TPR 
report (Section  5.12) indicates that the regulation will be adopted in early 2023. The draft 
regulation specifies that there will be an 18 -month transition period, meaning that Thailand 
has around one year and a half to inform and assist more than 1.7  million  households who 
are rubber farmers to adjust to this regulation. If such endeavour is not successful, the 
demand for  rubber products from these mostly small -scale farmers will be significantly 
reduced, affecting their income and livelihoods. Moreover, it is likely that the EU importers 
will request the required information under the regulation (e.g., the geolocation of the plot 
of land used in the production of rubber) well before its full implementation. Nevertheless, 
Thailand appreciates the close collaboration with the EU on this issue so far, but much more 
needs to be done concretely and quickly to mitigate the impac ts of the regulation on 
the million s of farmers who will be affected. How then will the EU tangibly help developing 
countries assist their farmers to adhere to the regulation? And how can the EU be certain 
that such assistance/cooperation will be successfu l well before the date of full 
implementation and application of the regulation?  
 
Reply:  The Deforestation Regulation foresees that the European Commission and EU 
Member States will step up their engagement with third countries, both producers and 
consumer  countries, through partnerships and cooperation mechanisms focusing on the 
conservation, restoration and sustainable use of forests, deforestation, forest degradation, 
and the transition to sustainable commodity production. The success of any initiative w ill 
depend on good cooperation between the EU, its Member States, and the third countries 
concerned.  
 
2 27 
(6.5) Q22  
Could the European  Union  (EU) provide explicit details on working approach of the Single 
Entry Point (SEP) established in November 2020, to coordinate and follow up the 
trade -related complaints brought by EU stakeholders, including its connection with the 
implementation of trade remedy regime by the EU?  
 
Reply:  When DG TRADE launched the Single Entry Point ( 'SEP') on 16  November  2020, it 
was with a twofold purpose. First, it was to simplify how to raise new potential trade barriers 
or breaches of sustainability commitments (under the TSD or GSP) with the Commission. 
With the SEP, there is now one point of contact for stakeholders to report such issues. 
Second, to ensure a more efficient assessment of new issues and follow -up process internally 
in the Director -General for TRADE (DG TRADE) within the European Commission. Under the 
guidance of the Chief Trade Enforcement Officer ( 'CTEO'), the SEP coordinates the 
assessment of the complaints and sets up 'case teams ', which consist of the experts relevant 
for the specific case.  
The SEP works on the basis of complaint forms – one related to market access issues and 
one on TSD/GSP -related issues. The complaint forms, which can be submitted directly on WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 86 - 
 
  
 A2M[1], are designed to p rovide DG TRADE with enough information to conduct a 
first assessment of the issue and decide on follow up action accordingly. If substantial 
information is missing from the complaint, the SEP will engage directly with the complainant 
and collect the lacki ng information.  
 
Once complete, the appointed case team will assess the complaint and suggest appropriate 
follow -up actions to solve the issue. If the SEP does not receive an official complaint, the 
European Commission still reserves the right to take act ion by its own initiative – the 
so-called ex -officio process. In some cases, the complaint leads to a registration of a new 
barrier to DG TRADE market access data base. These barriers will then be followed up with 
a view of resolving them via bilateral and /or multilateral channels. In other cases, the 
complaint will not lead to registration of a new barrier as the subject of the complaint had 
already been registered as a barrier earlier or as it was not deemed to be a barrier. The SEP 
does not handle compla ints filed under the trade remedy regime of the European  Union  (i.e. 
anti-dumping, anti -subsidy and safeguard regulations). The latter is managed by the Trade 
Defence department of DG TRADE (Directorate G).  
 
[1]  MA complaint form: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access -to-markets/en/contact -
form?type=COMPL_MA&referer=https%3A%2F%2Ftrade.ec.europa.eu%2Facces
s-to-markets%2Fen%2Fhome   
 TSD/GSP complaint form: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/acces s-to-
markets/en/contact -
form?type=COMPL_TSD_GSP&referer=https%3A%2F%2Ftrade.ec.europa.eu%2
Faccess -to-markets%2Fen%2Fhome   
3 28 
(6.15)  Q23  
Regarding the new Foreign Subsidies Regulation which will apply from 12  July 2023, could 
the EU elaborate how the Regulation be implemented to investigate the subsidies granted 
by non -EU governments to economic operators active in the EU, as well as the differences 
between the new Regulation and the existing One?  
 
Reply:  On 12  January  2023, the Foreign Subsidies Regulation ( 'FSR') entered into force and 
will start to apply on 12  July 2023. The FSR is a new tool and closes a regulatory gap, 
whereby subsidies granted by non -EU governments go currently unchecked, while subsidies 
granted by Member States are subject to close scrutiny. Under the new Regulation, the 
European Commission will have the power to investigate financial contributions granted by 
non-EU governments to companies active in the EU. If the European Commission finds  that 
such financial contributions constitute distortive subsidies, it can impose measures to 
redress their distortive effects. If the European Commission establishes that a foreign 
subsidy exists and that it is distortive, it will balance the negative eff ects of the subsidy 
(balancing test), in terms of the distortion, with positive effects of the subsidy to determine 
appropriate redressive measures or to accept commitments. With respect to the redressive 
measures and commitments, the Regulation includes a  range of structural or non -structural 
remedies, such as the divestment of certain assets or providing access to infrastructure.   
 
Document  WT/TPR/S/ 442 
No. Page  
(Para)  Question  
1 34 
(2.10)  Q1  
Please elaborate more in detail on the CBAM compliance protocol for the Thai exporters of 
the CBAM Target products.  
 
Reply:  Following the political agreement reached between the co -legislators in December 
2022, the European Parliament and the Council of th e European  Union  formally adopted 
the text of the CBAM Regulation on 18  April and 25  April 2023 respectively (link to Council 
press release ). After the CBAM Regulation is published  in the EU 's Official Journal and has 
entered into force, the European Commission will, after consultation of the CBAM 
Committee, adopt the implementing act regulating the transitional period of CBAM starting 
on the 1st of October 2023, which notably speci fies the reporting obligations for importers 
of CBAM goods.  
 
The European Commission will publish the draft implementing regulation in the course of 
June 2023 for feedback through a public consultation, for a period of four weeks before 
the CBAM Committee renders its opinion on it. Additional implementing acts, notably those 
applying the elements of the final methodology for the embedded emissions set out in 
Annex  IV of the Regulation, will also follow a similar consultation and adoption procedure, 
and will  be adopted before the end of the transitional period.  
 
The EU will continue discussing the CBAM and facilitate its implementation with all its trade 
partners bilaterally as well as multilaterally, including in the OECD and the WTO.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 87 - 
 
 
To engage closely wit h partners, the EU will start an outreach campaign in spring 2023 
upon the approval of the implementing act concerning the reporting rules applicable in 
transitional period. This awareness -raising exercise will continue through autumn 2023 to 
make sure tha t CBAM is well understood, thus supporting all relevant actors for the entry 
into force of the Regulation in October 2023 and beyond. The first CBAM report will have 
to be submitted by importers of CBAM goods in January 2024.   
2 34 
(2.10)  Q2  
Please elaborate in detail how to calculate and report the embedded emission for all 
products according to the CBAM Regulation.  
 
Reply:  Following the political agreement reached between the co -legislators in 
December  2022, the European Parliament and the Council of the European  Union  formally 
adopted the text of the CBAM Regulation on 18  April and 25  April 2023 respectively (link 
to Council press release ). After the CBAM Regulation is published in the EU 's Official 
Journal and has entered into force, the European Commission will, after consultation of 
the CBAM Committee, adopt the implementing act regulating the transitional period of 
CBAM starting on the 1st of October, which notably specifies the reporting obligations for 
importers, including on embedded emissions (both direct and indirect) on a quart erly 
basis.  
 
The European Commission will publish the draft implementing regulation through a public 
consultation for feedback for a period of four weeks before the CBAM Committee renders 
its opinion on it.  
 
Information reported during the transitional per iod will inform the European Commission 's 
work on the implementing acts to be adopted before the end of the transitional period, 
including on the final methodology and the elements of the calculation methods for 
embedded emissions set out in Annex  IV of th e Regulation.   
3 34 
(2.10)  Q3  
Does the embedded emission of target products under CBAM need to be verified by the 
Third-Party Verification Body?  
 
Reply:  As from 1  January  2026, after the end of the transitional period, declaration of 
embedded emissions by CBAM declarants will have to be verified by an EU accredited 
verifier (please see Article  8 of the Regulation). In the transitional period, starting in 
October 2023 and en ding on 31  December  2025, such verification obligation will not yet 
apply.   
4 34 
(2.10)  Q4  
If the embedded emission of the product under the CBAM regulation needs to be verified, 
would the EU CBAM accept the verification bodies accredited by the National  accreditation 
body of Thailand recognized under the IAF Multilateral agreement?  
 
Reply:  The CBAM is mirroring and complementing the EU Emissions Trading System 
(ETS). Under the EU ETS framework, an accreditation body of a third country cannot obtain 
a status of verifier. More specifically, Article  57(2) of European Commission Implementing 
Regulation (EU) 2018/2067 prevents an accreditation body from offering or carrying out 
any activities provided by a verifier. This would also not be in line with several other 
provisions in that Regulation and 'ISO 17011 ' concerning impartiality and independence 
of an accreditation body.  
 
Moreover, under the EU ETS only a national accreditation body duly appointed by a 
Member State in accordance with Article  4 of Accredita tion Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 
can accredit EU ETS verifiers according to Regulation (EU) 2018/2067 and ISO 14065. 
Third-country accreditation bodies are therefore not eligible to accredit EU ETS verifiers 
pursuant to Article  55(1) of Regulation (EU) 201 8/2067 and Accreditation Regulation (EC) 
No 765/2008. Article  67 of Regulation (EU) 2018/2067 (on mutual recognition of verifiers) 
is only applicable to EU based national accreditation bodies and EU based verifiers.  
 
That being said , accreditation of third -country verifiers under CBAM will be possible in the 
definitive regime starting on 1  January  2026. These verifiers will have to offer adequate 
guarantees of objectivity and impartiality. Such accreditation will only be operated by EU 
national accreditatio n authorities.  
 
The specifications relating to the accreditation process in the context of CBAM  are to be 
enshrined in secondary legislation to be developed and adopted in the course of the 
transitional period, (see Article  18(2) of the Regulation). Stakeholders will be consulted 
on this implementing act.   WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 88 - 
 
  
 5 34 
(2.10)  Q5  
If Thailand, by Thailand Greenhouse Gas Management Organization (Public Organization) 
(TGO) under the Ministry of Natural Resource and Environment, would like to develop the 
embedded emission certification system to response on CBAM, how does TGO develop t his 
system?  
 
Reply:  The European Commission encourages the Thai Ministry of Natural Resource and 
Environment to develop its work on calculation of embedded emissions in order to support 
the national operators of installation exporting goods in scope of the  CBAM.  
 
If it were to do it in line with the methods and principles set out in the CBAM Regulation, 
it could only be beneficial for Thai exporters of goods falling under CBAM Regulation. TGO 
can base its system on the approach that the European Commission  will develop for CBAM. 
The approach applicable for the calculation of embedded emissions to be reported during 
the transitional period, is currently being developed by the European Commission, with 
the assistance of an 'expert group '. This informal Group (i) assists the European 
Commission to complete methods for the monitoring, reporting, quantification and 
verification of embedded emissions of products in the sectors falling under the scope of 
the CBAM, and (ii)  contributes to the early preparation of im plementing acts, before 
submission to the CBAM Committee. The detailed rules on the elements of calculation 
methods as set out in Annex  IV to the CBAM Regulation will be enshrined in an 
implementing regulation to be adopted soon by the European Commission,  after consulting 
the CBAM Committee (Q3 2024) before October 2023. The European Commission will 
launch a public consultation of four weeks on the draft implementing regulation, open to 
all stakeholders in the course of June 2023 on 'Have your Say ' portal.  
 
The European Commission will launch an information campaign, featuring online seminars, 
physical events, distribution of guidance documents, and direct assistance, aimed at 
assisting third country operators and importers in performing all new obligations  required 
by the CBAM Regulation and its secondary legislation. This outreach campaign will start in 
the course of June, in parallel with the open public consultation on the draft implementing 
regulation referred to above. After this feedback period and fo llowing the consultation of 
the CBAM Committee, the European Commission will formally adopt this implementing 
act. The EU will also organise a technical briefing on CBAM in the WTO on 14  June 2023 
(during the WTO Trade and Environment Week). This awareness -raising exercise will 
continue through autumn 2023, thus supporting all relevant actors, considering that the 
first CBAM report will have to be submitted by importers of CBAM goods in January 2024.  
 
6 38 
(2.25)  Q6  
Thailand is well aware of the EU 's specific carve -outs for audiovisual services in the FTAs. 
May we ask whether these carve -outs have been affected by the digital and technological 
disruption?  
 
Reply:  The exclusion of audiovisual  services from the scope of liberalisation obligations in 
EU trade agreements obeys to the EU 's policy objective of protecting and promoting 
cultural diversity, in accordance with the principles of the 2005 UNESCO Convention on 
the Protection and Promotion  of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. The carve -out is 
technology -neutral and is not affected by developments in the ICT industry.  
 
7 44 
(2.51)  Q7  
Would the EU use these agreements as a precedent for the Digital Trade chapter of future 
FTA negotiati ons? 
 
Reply:  The Digital Trade Principles represent a common commitment to open digital 
markets which are competitive, transparent, fair, and free of unjustified barriers to 
international trade and investment. The text of the Digital Trade Principles concl uded with 
the Republic of Korea and with Singapore is available online:  
 
https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/help -exporters -and-importers/accessing -
markets/goods -and-services/digital -trade_en  However, the Digital Trade Principles are 
non-binding instruments that are distinct from binding rules that could be part of FTA 
negotiations.  
8 46 
(2.4.2)  Q8  
Please provide more information on the transparency rules for state subsidies in the 
Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with China (CAI). What are their scope and 
coverage, and how are the obligations expected to be carried out by the Partie s? 
 
Reply:  CAI is not in force and currently conditions are not met for its ratification. 
Nevertheless, under the agreement in principle, there is a publication obligation on 
subsidies in the committed services sectors, as well as a two -stage consultation WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 89 - 
 
mechanism between the Parties allowing to collect the necessary information to assess 
the negative effects of a subsidy on their investment interests. ' 
 
9 46-47 
(2.63 -
2.65)  Q9  
Thailand observes that there are investment protection provisions in FTAs/IPAs  for the 
establishment of permanent investment tribunals. Please provide an update regarding the 
implementation of these provisions. Thailand also observes that some FTAs/IPAs between 
EU and trading partners, e.g. Australia and New  Zealand , do not include such provisions. 
Please provide the reasons why these provisions are not included in certain FTAs/IPAs.  
 
Reply:  The decision on the scope of the negotiations is always taken on a case -by-case 
basis and therefore the EU may or may not negotiate investment p rotection provisions 
with its trading partners. Also, no IPA has entered into force because the ratification 
process has not been completed yet for any of these agreements.  
 
6 64 
(3.47)  Q10  
From the European  Union 's notification G/AG/N/EU/76 informing the EU administration of 
tariff quotas for calendar year 2022. Could the European  Union  update her progress on 
the consultation with other WTO Members regarding the allocation of their TRQ, in 
accordance with Article  XXVIII of the GATT  1994. Also , could the European  Union  provide 
further clarification on how the European  Union  intends to implement the new quota 
allocation for these TRQ products to ensure that the WTO Members receive an equivalent 
number of quotas to those received before to BREXIT ? 
 
Reply:  Up to now, the European  Union  has ratified agreements with Argentina, Australia, 
Cuba, Indonesia, New  Zealand , Norway, Thailand, USA. Negotiations have been concluded 
also with other partners and the agreements are undergoing the respective inter nal 
procedures for ratification. Consultations have been formally concluded with Switzerland 
and Chinese  Taipei . 
 
Following the logic adopted in case of past EU enlargements, the EU, jointly with the UK, 
proposed to WTO partners to apportion the EU -28 WTO TRQ concessions between EU -27 
and UK, based on trade flows data in the period 2013 -2015. The EU has conducted the 
negotiations in accordance with overarching principles of Article  XXVIII of GATT  1994. The 
EU was open to consider possible requests of modifi cation of the split for some TRQ 
volumes based on supporting data.  
 
Once an agreement with a Partner is ratified, the EU proceeds with its implementation. At 
the end of the exercise, the EU will notify the overall result of its Article  XXVIII negotiations 
to WTO.   
7 81 
(3.93)  Q11  
As the EU mentioned about "special monitoring clause in regulations " imposing measures 
to address fraud and circumvention, could the EU clarify such special monitoring clause 
for clearer understanding?  
 
Reply:  Special monitoring clauses in regulations imposing trade defence measures are 
aimed at addressing a higher risk of  circumvention taking the form of channelling of 
products from companies subject to higher individual duty rate or the residual duty rate 
by companies subject to lower individual duty rates. This risk is particularly deemed higher 
where:  
 
• the product conce rned is fungible and not branded; and  
• the difference between the individual duty rates and/or between the individual 
and the residual duty rate is significant.  
 
The companies with individual anti -dumping duties must present a valid commercial 
invoice conta ining a declaration as prescribed in the regulation imposing the measure to 
the customs authorities of the Member States.   
8 116 
(3.3.5)  Q12  
Please kindly provide information on the legislation, regulations, barriers, and solutions to 
develop and regulat e state -owned enterprises, especially the state objective and strategic 
direction.  
 
Reply:  The legislation and rules applicable to SOEs in Europe differ from Member State to 
Member State, depending on their legal and economic systems, as well as political 
considerations and sector -specific circumstances. At European  Union  level, the following 
key rules exist:  
 
- Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU with regard to Competition; Article  106 and 
Article  107 TFEU with regard to State Aid.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 90 - 
 
  
 - EU Merger Control Regulation (139/2004/EC)  
- Transparency Directive (Directive 2004/109/EC)  
- Article  18 of the TFEU and the Public Procurement Directive (2014/24/EU)[1] 
 
These provisions provide a relevant framework applicable to SOEs.  
 
Article  106 TFEU  
1. In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States 
grant special or exclusive rights, Member States shall neither enact nor maintain 
in force any measure contrary to the rules contained in the Treaties, in particular 
to those rules provided for in Article  18 and Articles 101 to 109.  
2. Undertakings entrusted with the operation of servi ces of general economic 
interest or having the character of a revenue -producing monopoly shall be 
subject to the rules contained in the Treaties, in particular to the rules on 
competition, in so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct the 
performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. The 
development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary 
to the interests of the Union.  
3. The Commission shall ensure the application of the provisions of thi s Article  and 
shall, where necessary, address appropriate directives or decisions to Member 
States.  
 
Article  37 
1. Member States shall adjust any State monopolies of a commercial character so 
as to ensure that no discrimination regarding the conditions under which goods 
are procured and marketed exists between nationals of Member States.  
 
The provisions of this Article  shall apply to any body through which a Member State, in 
law or in fact, either directly or indirectly supervises, determines or appreciably i nfluences 
imports or exports between Member States. These provisions shall likewise apply to 
monopolies delegated by the State to others.  
 
2. Member States shall refrain from introducing any new measure which is contrary 
to the principles laid down in paragra ph 1 or which restricts the scope of the 
articles dealing with the prohibition of customs duties and quantitative 
restrictions between Member States.  
3. If a State monopoly of a commercial character has rules which are designed to 
make it easier to dispose of  agricultural products or obtain for them the best 
return, steps should be taken in applying the rules contained in this Article  to 
ensure equivalent safeguards for the employment and standard of living of the 
producers concerned.  
 
[https://op.europa.eu/en/publication -detail/ -/publication/f6fcf330 -b731-4d53-8a75-
cdd4a2799fa6 ] 
[EUR-Lex - 32004L0109 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu) ]  
9 116 
(3.3.5)  Q13  
Please provide information on any tools and mechanisms to enhance th e value of 
state-owned enterprises in order to achieve the objective of establishing state -owned 
enterprises that operate commercially and socially in parallel. Additionally, please identify 
the agencies involved in these operations and explain their inter relationships among them.  
 
Reply:  The above -mentioned rules at EU level (please see response to question 9) provide 
a framework for SOEs , preventing e.g. distortions of competition, anticompetitive mergers 
or distorting State aid. They also ensure non -discrimination and fair and transparent 
procurement processes. This not only helps to run SOEs commercially but also, for 
instance, ensures transparency in financial transactions for specific services performed by 
SOEs.  
The agencies that may be involved in the application of these rules may be at EU level 
(e.g. The European Commission for rules on antitrust, EU merger control) but also at 
Memb er State level (e.g. National competition authorities for antitrust rules). For example, 
regarding antitrust, the Commission and the national competition authorities of the EU 
Member States cooperate in the context of the European Competition Network.  
[state-owned%20enterprises%20in%20the%20eu -KCBC16031ENN%20(1) ]  
10 116 
(3.3.5)  Q14  
Please provide further details on the legal provisions that apply to state -owned enterprises 
concerning non -discrimination, competition, and state aid, as well as please indicate 
whether there will be any plans or policies to amend or update these regulations in the 
future? 
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 91 - 
 
Reply:  Please see reply to question 10. Furthermore, state -owned enterprises are ruled 
by the competitive neutrality principle, as stated by Article  345 TFEU ( "The Treaties shall 
in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of p roperty 
ownership ") jointly with the "Transparency Directive ". 
 
EUR-Lex - 4301854 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu)  
EUR-Lex - 32014L0024 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu)  
EUR-Lex - 52012DC0209 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu)   
11 116 
(3.3.5)  Q15  
What are other sectors in addition to the energy, transportation, and utility sectors where 
the majority of ownership must be maintained by central and local governments of the EU 
member states? If any, why?  
 
Reply:  As per Article  345 of the  Treaty on the Functioning of the European  Union , EU law 
shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property 
ownership. As a result, the EU is neutral about privatisation policy in Member States and 
does not impose requirements of public ownership. It depends on each co untry and its 
context (e.g. for strategic importance, public interest or policy objectives). Sectors where 
SOEs may exist are, for instance: defence and aerospace, healthcare, postal services, 
telecommunications and education.   
16 127 
(3.270)  Q16  
Could the EU provide an update on the current status of a proposal for a regulation on GIs 
for craft and industrial products, as well as its expected date of implementation?  
 
Reply:  The EU is in the final phase of the legislative process concerning a new p roposal 
for a Regulation on geographical indications for craft and industrial products. The adoption 
and publication of the new regulation is foreseen by September 2023. The Regulation 
would enter into force on the 20th day after its publication in the Off icial Journal of the 
European  Union . The Regulation would apply as from the first day of the 
twenty -fifth month after its entry into force.  
 
17 165 
(4.5) Q17  
It can be seen that services accounted for 70% of the EU GDP and has remained essential 
to the E U economy. However, barriers to the progress of the EU Single Market for services 
still remain. Could the EU please elaborate what barriers are and how the EU intends to 
overcome them?  
 
Reply:  As underlined by the European Commission 's Communication 'Single Market at 30 ' 
(COM(2023) 162) 60% of the barriers that businesses report facing today are of the same 
type as were reported 20 years ago. Many of these barriers relate to national regulation 
as well as administrative practices, which have to be addressed  directly by Member States.  
The European Commission launched a priority process to address jointly with Member 
States barriers to the free movement of services in those services sectors that are both 
economically important and exhibiting lower levels of integration such as construction, 
wholesale and retail, professional services and tourism services. At the same time, the 
European Commission is working on the common electronic form for the declaration of 
posting of workers, the number one barri er to the cross -border provision of services 
reported by businesses. To further facilitate cross -border mobility for professionals, the 
European Commission will explore with Member States the possibility of using the tools 
such as the European Professional  Card and Common Training Principles more widely.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 92 - 
 
  
 THAILAND – ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS  
Document WT/TPR/G/ 442 
No. Page  
(Para)  Question  
1 22 
(5.25)  For the carbon credit trading system, could different sectors' carbon credits be traded or 
exchanged interchangeably?  
 
Reply: Under the EU Emissions Trading System, there is no distinction between allowances 
and all can be traded, banked or surrendered for compliance. The only exception is the 
aviation sector, where so -called EUAAs are issued, b ut also these aviation allowances 
allocated to the aviation sector can be used for compliance by other sectors and vice versa.  
 
The new system for road transport and buildings (ETS2) will be a separate system.  
 
2 22 
(5.25)   
- Could these regulations on the decarbonization of transport have an impact on international 
trade in terms of road and rail transport?  
 
Reply: Assessing the impact of these measures on international trade is premature at this 
stage. Nevertheless, it is worth noting th at the proposed EU legislation aiming at 
decarbonising transport, primarily target transport and mobility within the EU.  
 
3 22 
(5.25)   
Regarding the European Policy, which requires small cars to be zero -emission vehicles by 
2035 in order to meet the carbon emission reduction target and the sustainable transport 
goal, this could impose some burdens on the oil product business and affect market sales of 
oil products. Are there any measures in place to mitigate this type of impact?  
 
Reply: To achieve the  EU's increased climate ambition and to reach the climate neutrality 
target for 2050 requires ambitious actions in all sectors of our economy, and emissions from 
transport need to be reduced by 90% in 2050.  
 
This is a challenge, as transport alone is responsible for a quarter of EU greenhouse gas 
emissions and is the only major sector in the EU economy where emissions are still higher 
than in 1990. Road transport accounts for more than 70% of transport emissio ns, with cars 
and vans contributing the most.  
 
The revised CO 2 standards send the strong signal that the transition towards zero -emission 
mobility has already started and needs to accelerate:  as of 2035, emissions of all new cars 
and vans should be 100 % lower than in 2021.  
 
This transition requires a transformation along the entire value chain of the automotive sector 
and investments in and further deployment of zero -emissions technologies . 
 
4 22 
(5.25)   
Regarding European Aviation rules and regulations a imed at increasing SAF consumption. 
Please provide more information on the target of SAF blended in jet fuel, as well as which 
types of SAF are preferable for European countries (used cooking oil, crude palm oil (CPO), 
or ethanol (Alcohol -to-jet)). 
 
Reply:  The ReFuelEU Aviation regulation is currently in the legislative process and is expected 
be adopted by the end of 2023. As a result of the legislative process, the level of SAF targets 
was decided to be increased compared to the Commission proposal.  
 
The SAF targets that were provisionally politically agreed by the co -legislators (the Council 
of the EU and European Parliament), which are however subject to the formal approval are 
as follows:  
 
From 1  January  2025: 2% of SAF  
From 1  January  2030: 6% of SAF, including 1,2% of synthetic aviation fuels (increased to 
2% in 2032)  
From 1  January  2035: 20% SAF, including 5% of synthetic aviation fuels  
From 1  January  2040: 34% SAF, including 10% of synthetic aviation fuels  
From 1  January  2045: 42% SA F, including 15% of synthetic aviation fuels  
From 1  January  2050: 70% SAF, including 35% of synthetic aviation fuels  
 
As concerns the eligibility of SAF, the EU recognizes all the SAF conversion pathways certified 
by ASTM. The ReFuelEU Aviation Regulation will rely on the sustainability framework defined WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 93 - 
 
by the Renewable Energy Directive. Based on the provisionally politically agreement, the SAF 
types that are promoted are biofuels (with exclusion of feed and food crops), recycled carbon 
fuels and synthetic  aviation fuels (power -to-liquid fuels), which meet the requirements of the 
Renewable Energy Directive.  
 
5 22 
(5.25)   
Based on the European Green Deal, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) will 
be applied to the import of energy -intensive product s into the EU.  What potential impacts 
could CBAM have on the energy sector, particularly imports into the EU?  
 
Reply: The CBAM is an environmental policy tool designed to support the EU's increased 
ambition on climate mitigation by preventing carbon leaka ge. The CBAM mirrors the EU ETS 
– the intra -EU carbon pricing mechanisms – and ensures that EU producers and importers 
will pay an equivalent carbon price with regards to goods covered by the CBAM: iron and 
steel, cement, fertilisers, aluminium, electricit y generation and hydrogen. These sectors are 
indeed energy -intensive sectors, and those which were identified as the most at risk of carbon 
leakage.  
 
The European Commission will monitor the functioning of the CBAM with a view to evaluating 
its impact during the implementation phase. As part of further annual reports on the 
application of the instrument, the European Commission will also notably report on the trade 
flows and the embedded emissions of CBAM goods on the global market.  
 
 
Document  WT/TPR/S/ 442 
No. Page 
(Para)  Question  
1 34 
(2.12)   
Under an open, sustainable, and assertive trade policy for 2021 –2030, the European  Union  
updated its new industrial strategy in July 2021 in order to reduce dependencies on third 
countries for its value chains in strategic areas. In this regard, could the EU elaborate and 
specify more about the actions and measures that have been taken to dri ve the 
above -mentioned strategy and what the prioritized specific industrial products are to focus 
on under this strategy?  
 
Reply:  For the EU, dependencies refer to concentration of supply in a limited number of 
providers, sometimes a single one. Reduction  of dependencies and resilience can be 
achieved with increased diversification and substitutability across suppliers. Addressing 
dependencies is thus not about relying on the EU market; instead, for the EU openness to 
trade and international cooperation ar e essential parts of efforts to diversify sources of 
supply and address supply chain vulnerabilities. Reducing dependencies by diversification 
can take different forms, including raising the number of suppliers located in countries 
outside the EU.  
 
2 125 
(3.258)   
Does the standard essential patents (SEPs) apply to non -EU citizen?  
 
Reply: The proposed SEP Regulation applies to SEPs that are valid within the EU. The 
citizenship of the SEP holder is irrelevant.  
 
3 125 
(3.260)   
Please provide us with examples of the exceptions to supplementary protection certificates 
(SPCs) that have a wider scope of exception than patent rights.  
 
Reply: Under EU law, an SPC confers the same rights as conferred by the basic patent 
and is subject to the same limitations  and the same obligations. In 2019, the EU introduced 
an additional exception for SPCs for medicinal products (through Regulation  2019/933) 
that allows the following acts which would otherwise require the consent of the holder of 
the SPC:  
 
1. The making of a  product, or a medicinal product containing that product, for the 
purpose of export to third countries where there is no SPC protection or where SPC 
protection has expired, or  
2. The making of a product, or a medicinal product containing that product, no earl ier 
than 6 months before expiry of the SPC for the purpose of storing it in the Member State 
of making, in order to place the product on the market after the SPC has expired 
(stockpiling for day -1 entry)  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 94 - 
 
  
 This exception also covers related acts strictly ne cessary for the actual export or actual 
storing.  
4 157 
(4.108)   
- What is the EU's approach to develop IT systems for monitoring, tracking, and 
demonstrating timber products that are deforestation -free under the EUDR, especially in 
a manner to support small -scale homemaking enterprises producing the product of wood 
(such as kitchen utensils, home décor)?  
 
Reply: The European Commission is currently developing the Information System, which 
shall contain the due diligence statements made available pursuant to Art.  4(2). The 
Information System will include the functionalities listed in Art.  33(2). The European 
Commission will establish the rules for the functioning of the Information System, 
including rules for the protection of personal data and exchange of data with other 
IT systems, through an implementing ac t. The Information System will be developed 
through an inclusive and iterative process in which stakeholders will be consulted through 
the Deforestation Platform.  
 
- Is there any policy in the EU, such as reducing import taxes, trading through 
e-commerce, or the EU Single Window, to help entrepreneurs gain access to the 
European  Union 's timber trading market?  
 
Reply: On the EU Single Window Environment for Customs, it is scoped to facilitate trade 
for EU established economic operators, like importers.  
 
- Is it possible to link the EU Single Window and the ASEAN Single Window, and if so, 
how? 
 
Reply: No, it is not in the policy scope of the EU Single Window Environment for Customs 
to allow interfacing to third countries Single Windows.  
 
5 157 
(4.109)   
As per the regulations of EU -Deforestation, if exporting timber products are processed in 
different countries (such as processed timber from Thailand to China and then to the 
European  Union ), how will they be inspected along the way?  
 
Reply: Relevant products  entering the EU market from a third country and placed under 
the customs procedure 'release for free circulation' will be subject to the controls and 
measures laid down in Chapter 4 of the Deforestation Regulation.  EU importers will need 
to provide customs authorities with the reference number of the due diligence statement 
of the relevant commodity or product before the release for free circulation.  
 
6 158 
(4.110)   
The report does not mention rubber in the regulation on deforestation -free products; could 
you elaborate?  
 
Reply: Rubber and its derived products, along the other six relevant commodities, are 
included in the scope of the Regulation, as confirmed by Artic le 2(1) and Annex  I. 
 
7 158 
(4.111)   
When will the forms, requirements, and indicators of EUDR be defined and published?  
 
Reply: The Deforestation Regulation has been published on the Official Journal of the EU 
on 9th June. The Regulation will enter into force on 29th June. The final text can be found 
here: EUR-Lex - 32023R1115 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu)  
 
8 183 
(4.235)   
Referring to 4.235, the EU revised the recommended list of markets subject to ex ante  
regulation, in which only 2 markets (wholesale local access provided at a fixed location 
and wholesale dedicated capacity) are applied in accordance with the European 
Commission, Brussels, 18.12.2020 C (2020) 8750 final, Annex  to the Commission 
Recommendation on relevant product and service markets within the electronic 
communications sector susceptible to ex ante  regulation in accordance with Directive (EU) 
2018/1972 of t he European Parliament and of the Council of 11  December  2018 
establishing the European Electronic Communications Code.  
 
In this regard, please elaborate on the ex-post regulation of markets or services which 
are not specified in such an annex. Does that mean those service providers are not 
required to apply for a license granted by the competent authority, and how does the 
authority regulate them in practice?  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 95 - 
 
Reply:  An ex-post based regulation is not covered by the EECC  (Directive 2018/1972). 
The national regulatory authorities (NRAs) responsible for the telecoms sector do not carry 
out any ex-post regulation of undertakings (with the exception of few European authorities 
which combine the role of telecoms ex-ante regula tor and a competition authority, 
e.g. CNMC in Spain, ACM in the Netherlands). NRAs regulate ex ante , and only those 
undertakings which have a status of Significant Market Power.  
 
An ex-post regulation which would be based on regulation of undertakings' ma rket 
behaviour is carried out by the national competition authorities (NCAs) at the national 
level, and by the European Commission (Director -General for Competition) at the EU level. 
Such ex-post control is covered by Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on Functioning of 
the EU, as well as complementing national legislation. The European Commission and the 
NCAs are entrusted to carry out application of the EU competition rules and of the EU 
competition policy in all relevant markets, irrespective on the fact  of whether they are 
included into the list of relevant markets in the Recommendation C(2020)8750.  
 
Art.12 of the Directive 2018/1972 provides that Member States shall ensure freedom to 
provide electronic communication networks and services, subject to co nditions set out in 
that Directive. Undertakings intending to commence such activities based on general 
authorization, and can be obliged to provide to the NRA only very basic information (name, 
legal status, physical and web address, contact details, desc ription of networks/services 
and date of commencement of the operations. Member States should not impose any 
additional or separate notification requirements (Art.12). Therefore, no specific license is 
necessary to operate networks or provide electronic co mmunication services.  
 
Moreover, licensing is a term used in relation to use of radio spectrum. Licensing is needed 
as radio spectrum frequencies are a scarce resource. Every market player who intends to 
use licensed parts of radio spectrum has to apply fo r a license which can be granted on 
ex-ante basis irrespective of the fact of whether the market player is active on a relevant 
market which is included into the list of the relevant markets or not.  
 
9 183 
(4.237)   
Referring to 4.237 What kind of mechanis m do the EU members implement to identify or 
evaluate high -risk suppliers related to the toolbox of strategic and technical measures?  
 
Reply:  The EU 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox provides guidance on objective criteria, including 
technical and non -technical risk factors, to assess the risk profile of suppliers, notably and 
in particular non -technical risk factors include:  
 
- The likelihood of the supp lier being subject to interference from a non -EU country. 
Such interference may be facilitated by, but not limited to, the presence of the following 
factors:  
 
o a strong link between the supplier and a government of a given third country;  
o the third country's  legislation, especially where there are no legislative or 
democratic checks and balances in place, or in the absence of security or data protection 
agreements between the EU and the given third country;  
o the characteristics of the supplier's corporate owne rship;  
o the ability for the third country to exercise any form of pressure, including in 
relation to the place of manufacturing of the equipment.  
- The supplier's ability to assure supply.  
- The overall quality of products and cybersecurity practices of the sup plier, including 
the degree of control over its own supply chain and whether adequate prioritisation is 
given to security practices.  
 
The Toolbox also recommends adding country -specific information (e.g. threat 
assessment from national security services, e tc.). In this context, several Member States 
have spelled out complementary criteria in their legal framework linked to:  
 
- An offensive cyber/intelligence policy conducted by the country in which the 
supplier is located;  
- The supplier or its country of orig in being a threat to national and/or EU security.  
 
A few other Member States have also specified other criteria, such as:  
- Criteria laying down localisation requirements for the supplier;  
- Criteria linked to the likelihood of the supplier being involved in criminal activities.  
 
[1]  NIS Cooperation Group, Second report on Member States' progress in 
implementing the EU Toolbox on  5G Cybersecurity, 15  June 2023, digital -WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 96 - 
 
  
 strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/second -report -member -states -progress -
implementing -eu-toolbox -5g-cybersecurity . 
[2]  Huawei Designated Vendor Direction (publishing.service.gov.uk) . 
[3]  European Commission, Communication on Implementation of the 
5G cybersecurity Toolbox, 15  June 2023, C(202 3) 4049 final . 
 
10 184 
(4.240)   
Referring to 4.240, how does the EU implement the Digital Service Act for cross -border 
service providers that do not have a local presence in the EU territory and do not comply 
with the Digital Service Act?  
 
Reply: The Digital Services Act is an EU regulation, and therefore a legislative act of direct 
application to all intermediary services offered in the EU. In case a provider is established 
in a third country, but offers intermediary services in the EU, the Digital Se rvices Act 
requires that they designate a sufficiently mandated legal representative in the 
European  Union . The designated legal representative can be held liable for 
non-compliance with obligations under the Digital Services Act, without prejudice to the 
liability and legal actions that could be initiated against the provider of intermediary 
services.  
 
The supervision and enforcement of the Digital Services Act relies on a system of close 
cooperation among the national Digital Services Coordinators, which  are required to be 
independent, and between those and the European Commission. The European 
Commission has been entrusted the main role of monitoring and enforcing the Digital 
Services Act rules vis a vis the larger players, i.e. those that reach more tha n 45 million  
unique recipients in the EU and formally designated as very large online platforms or very 
large search engines.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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AUSTRALIA  
REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT – WT/TPR/S/442  
REPORT BY THE EU – WT/TPR/G/442  
 
QUESTIONS FROM AUSTRALIA  
 
Report by the Secretariat (WT/TPR/S/442)  
 
Note: questions on the European  Union  report are at the end of this document . 
 
2 Trade and Investment Regimes  
2.4 Investment Regime  
2.4.2 Other aspects of the European  Union 's foreign investment regime  
Page 44, Paragraph 2.53  
The report states that the European  Union  adopted in March 2019 a regulation to establish a common 
framework for the screening of FDI for reasons of security and public order. The regulation also 
provides for guide lines to identify FDI that is likely to affect security or public order and therefore 
should be screened. The criteria refer to the effects that a transaction could have on, for instance, 
infrastructure, technologies, and the supply of inputs deemed as cri tical to EU economic activities.  
Question 1  
Are security and public order considered separate concepts in the common framework? Is so, what 
is the difference between security and public order as envisaged in the common framework?  
 
Reply:  The terms 'security' and 'public order' are not defined in th e Regulation. Article  4 of the 
Regulation, however, specifies the factors for consideration when determining whether an FDI is 
likely to affect security and public order. These factors include the potential effects of the FDI on 
critical infrastructure, cr itical technologies, supply of critical inputs, access to sensitive information 
and the freedom and pluralism of the media. Aspects related to the investor are also relevant for 
this assessment, such as whether the foreign investor is controlled by a gover nment.  
 
The interpretation of the notions of security and public order should be consistent with the relevant 
international obligations of the EU under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and 
the EU's trade and investment agreements concluded  with third countries, as well as with the 
provisions of the TFEU on capital movements from third countries . 
 
Article  XIV bis (1)(b) of the GATS allows WTO members to take any actions which they consider 
necessary for the protection of their essential secu rity interests in one or more of the following 
three  situations: i) where they relate to the supply of services as carried out directly or indirectly for 
the purpose of provisioning a military establishment; ii) where they relate to fissionable and 
fusiona ble materials or the materials from which they are derived; and iii) where they are taken in 
time of war or other emergency in international relations.  
 
Article  XIV (a) of the GATS allows WTO Members to take measures necessary to protect public order. 
This exception may be invoked only "where a genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed to one 
of the fundamental interests of society".  
 
Pages 44 -47, Paragraphs 2.52 -2.66 
Question 2  
What is the average and median processing time of your screening process from when the application 
is submitted to when the final decision is made?  
 
Reply:  According to the Regulation Member States and the Commission shall notify the Member 
State undertaking the screening of their intention to provide comments  no later than 15 calendar 
days following the receipt of the notification of a transaction undergoing screening. The notification 
may include a request for additional information. Comments by Member States or opinions by the 
Commission shall be addressed t o the Member State undertaking the screening and shall be sent to 
it within a reasonable period of time, and in any case no later than 35 calendar days following receipt 
of the notification. In 2021 the average duration for Member States to provide the req uested 
additional information has been 22 calendar days with a range from 3 to 101 days.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Question 3  
What mechanisms do EU Member States have in ensuring foreign investors comply with imposed 
conditions?  
 
Reply:  Member States have different measures to en sure compliance with imposed conditions 
depending on their national legal framework. For more information on the national screening 
mechanisms please see https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/enforcement -and-protection/investment -
screening_en . 
 
3 Trade Policies and Practices by Measure  
3.3 Measures affecting production and trade  
3.3.6 Government Procurement  
Page 118, Paragraph 3 .229 
The report states that based on the 2021 data, there is a few select countries who show a heavy 
reliance on the lowest price as the sole award criterion, with more than 80% of the number of 
procedures awarded to the lowest price criterion.  
Question 4   
Can the EU please advise what other award criteria are considered by EU countries?  
 
Reply:  You will see under Indicator [5]: Award criteria  of the Public Procurement performance 
indicators indication of the proportion of  procedures awarded solely on the basis of price, indicating 
that the other also take into account quality. Quality is however can be assessed in combination with 
price in order to achieve the Best Price Quality Ratio (BPQR) for the proposals. Quality can be 
assessed through a number of factors, as indicated under Article  67 of Directive 2014/24/EU , such 
as "technical merit, aesthetic and functional characteristics, accessibility, design for all users, social, 
environmental and innovative characteristics and trading and its conditions".  
 
Page 119, Paragraph 3.233  
The report states that for public contracts below the relevant t hresholds, procuring entities can – 
but are not required to – publish relevant information on TED (Tenders Electronic Daily). It also 
references standard eForms for the publication of notices that are expected to become mandatory 
from October 2023.  
Questio n 5 
Can the EU share any further information on the percentage and value of public contracts that are 
published voluntarily on TED?  
 
Reply:  The Public Procurement Indicators Report  for 2020 provides information on contract award 
notices with values under 139 000 EUR  (the lowest threshold contemplated by the directives). In 
the report it is shown how 43.5% of the 217 688 contract award notices published in TED in 2020, 
were below 139 000 EUR. More details are available under the "Methodology" section of the 
aforementioned report.  
 
Question 6  
Can the EU share any further information on the standard eForms expected to be mandatory from 
October 2023? Do they have any relation to the implementation of the EU's WTO  Agreement  on 
Government Procurement (GPA) or FTA commitments?  
 
Reply:  There is no difference with eForms compared to the current notices that have to be use d in 
the EU. They both have an indication if the procurement is covered by the GPA.  
 
Question 7  
Will the eForms be mandatory for all EU public procurements? Will they gather any new or additional 
information from procuring entities in the EU and/or third countries?  
 
Reply:  eForms is only mandatory for all procedures above the EU thresholds. They can be used 
voluntarily below the threshold. The contract award notices collect aggregated information about the 
numbers of tenders received from outside EU/EEA co untries. The next release provides, if applicable, 
information on the Foreign Subsidies Regulation and the International Procurement Instrument.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Page 119, Paragraphs 3.234 -3.235  
The report outlines the new International Procurement Instrument (IPI) and re lated processes, 
thresholds and exemptions, including for third -country investigations and consultations. It notes that 
related measures can take the form of an exclusion or a score adjustment penalty for third -country 
tenderers from the relevant EU govern ment procurement procedures. The report also notes that the 
IPI aims at strengthening the international negotiating position of the EU in the area of government 
procurement and introducing limitations to participation in EU tenders for suppliers from non -EU 
countries that have adopted measures restricting access of EU suppliers to their government 
procurement market.  
Question 8  
Can the EU provide an update on its practical implementation of the IPI? Has it has already been 
utilised in practice, and have an y third -country investigations have been launched since it entered 
into force in 2022?  
 
Reply:  IPI Regulation (EU) 2022/1031 was published on 30  June 2022 and entered into force 
60 days thereafter. So far, no IPI investigation has been launched.  
 
Question  9  
Do the referenced consultations with third countries involve that country having a direct say in any 
related investigations? Will investigations or consultations be undertaken first during this process?  
 
Reply:  The consultation with third country concerned will be conducted in parallel to the 
investigation and should serve to eliminating or remedying any restrictive measures or practices and 
thereby improving the tendering opportunities for Union economic operat ors, goods and services 
regarding public procurement or concession markets in that third country.  
 
Question 10  
How were the relevant thresholds at which the IPI measures apply determined?  
 
Reply: The thresholds were determined with a view to, on the one h and, ensure effectiveness of 
the IPI measure and, on the other hand, to limit the overall administrative burden for contracting 
authorities and economic operators.  
 
Question 11   
Can the EU confirm the relationship between the IPI and the EU's WTO GPA and F TA commitments 
for government procurement that is not covered under those agreements?  
 
Reply:  Measures adopted under this IPI Regulation can apply to economic operators, goods or 
services from third countries that are not parties to the plurilateral WTO  Agreement  on Government 
Procurement or to bilateral or multilateral trade agreements concluded with the Union that include 
commitments on access to public procurement or concession markets, or to economic operators, 
goods or services from countries that are parties to such agreements but only with respect to public 
procurement procedures for goods, services or concessions that are not covered by those 
agreements.  
 
Page 119, Paragraph 3.236  
The report outlines Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 to address distortions c aused by foreign subsidies in 
the single market, as adopted in 2022.  
Question 12  
Can the EU outline how this Regulation on foreign subsidies relates to, or interacts with, the EU's 
WTO GPA and FTA commitments on government procurement?  
 
Reply:  The GPA an d FTA impact access to the EU public procurement market. Once an economic 
operator participates in the EU procurement procedures, the FSR applies to it under certain 
conditions. The nationality or origin of the economic operator is not relevant for the app licability of 
the FSR. The FSR shall not prevent the Union from exercising its rights or fulfilling its obligations 
under international agreements.  
 
Question 13  
How was the related threshold of EUR  250 million  selected?  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Reply:  The threshold was selected  among several options and based on internal data to ensure the 
right balance between focussing on the most distortive subsidies and minimising administrative 
burden for economic operators.  
 
Page 120, Paragraph 3.239  
The report states that the EU has publi shed good practice cases and a guideline on the inclusion of 
social considerations, and has adopted a Directive on accessibility criteria for products and services.  
 
Question 14  
Can the EU please advise if the guideline on the inclusion of social considerations is mandatory?  
 
Reply:  The guidelines have been developed to support public buyers on the inclusion of social 
considerations in public procurement. They are not mandatory.  
 
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.1 Agriculture  
4.1.3 Domestic support  
Page 139, Paragraphs 4.25 -4.26  
The Sec retariat's report notes that in order for farmers to be eligible for payments, farmers must be 
"active farmers" with certain minimum conditions in place. The Secretariat's report also notes that 
direct payments amounted to EUR  37.9 billion  in financial yea r 2021 (for claims made in 2020), of 
which decoupled payments accounted for approximately 88  per cent, benefitting 6  million  farms.  
Question 15  
How have member states operationalised the definition of "active farmer" in their Common 
Agricultural Policy Str ategic Plans? In particular, what are the criteria against which a 'minimum 
level of agricultural activity' is determined?  
 
Reply:  When determining who is "active farmer" , Member States should look solely at his/her 
agricultural activity itself, without, h owever, excluding the possibility of monitoring its minimum 
level through objective and non -discriminatory criteria such as: income tests, company object and 
inclusion of their agricultural activities in national or regional registers. Such criteria may be  
introduced in one or more forms chosen by Member States, including through a negative list 
disqualifying a farmer from being considered as an active farmer.  
 
For the 'active farmer' definition in their CAP Strategic Plans, most Member States have used the  
criterion of the inclusion in the national register (social security, farm register, VAT) and have set 
an exemption threshold to consider active farmers all those (presumably pluri -active) who received 
small amounts of direct payments for the previous yea r; the exemption threshold is mainly fixed at 
EUR 5 000. 
 
Other criteria used by Member States in their CAP Strategic Plans to determine a' minimum level of 
agricultural activity' include: income test (significance of agriculture in the farmer's overall ac tivity), 
company object (whether it is aimed at agriculture), minimum size (either physical or economic), 
minimum cost of maintenance, excluding people receiving a pension].  
 
Question 16  
Which EU member states determine minimum levels of agricultural acti vity based on farm to 
non-farm income ratios, labour inputs, or minimum stocking levels?  
 
Reply:  Non-farm income ratios, or in other words, income tests, are used by seven Member States 
(BE-Flanders, Bulgaria, Greece, Poland, Spain, Romania, Slovakia) in w hich this criterion applies to 
applicants at least when they cannot prove that their main company objective or principal activity is 
agriculture. Five Member States (Austria, Czechia, Cyprus, Hungary, Slovenia) provide an income 
test as an optional criteri on in the list of alternative criteria (i.e., it is enough for the farmer to meet 
at least one of the criteria to prove that he/she is 'active farmer').  
 
Regarding labour inputs on the farm, only Latvia has made this an optional criterion, i.e. one criteri on 
in the list of alternative criteria to define "active farmers".  
 
Regarding minimum stocking levels, nine Member States (Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Lithuania Latvia, 
Slovenia, Malta, Sweden, Ireland) have included a minimum number of livestock units as an optional 
criterion, i.e. as one criterion in the list of alternative criteria to define "active farmers").  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Question 17  
What proportion of direct payments that are considered "decoupled income support" within the 
meaning of paragraph 6 of Annex  2 of the Agreement on Agriculture are subject to recipients 
meeting the above -mentioned criteria?  
 
Reply:  The rules on active farmer concern most of direct support under the CAP. The spending 
related to the CAP in application as from 2023 will be included in the EU's future notifications.  
 
4.1.7 Domestic support levels  
Page 150, Paragraph 4.75  
The Secretaria t's report notes that Blue Box support remained unchanged and that member states 
continue to allocate around 11  per cent of their national ceiling to the voluntary coupled support 
(VCS) scheme – a production -limiting scheme based on fixed areas and yields or on a fixed number 
of animals (paragraph 4.41).  
 
Question 18  
Does the EU have plans to reduce the national ceilings for the provision of trade -distorting domestic 
support through the VCS scheme?  
 
Reply:  Considering criticism of the Blue Box types of dir ect support and little recognition for Blue 
Box role in the reform efforts over the years by Australia and other WTO Members, the current policy 
allows the coupled income support to be applied in respect of either Blue Box or Amber Box rules.  
 
As of 1  January 2023, with the new CAP reform, the VCS have been replaced with the Coupled 
Income Support (CIS). Within the framework of the current direct payments system, Member States 
may decide to grant coupled income support (CIS) in 19 potentially eligible agri cultural sectors and 
productions. To minimize the risk for distortion, Member States may only grant CIS subject to strict 
pre-conditions and limits. In particular, the aid may only benefit specific types of farming or specific 
agricultural sectors that are  particularly important for socioeconomic and/or environmental reasons 
and undergo certain difficulties (e.g. risk for decline, or of abandonment of production).  
 
The EU remains interested in discussing reductions to trade distorting domestic support on th e basis 
of contributions of all WTO Members, in particular the major Members. The EU will continue to 
respect the WTO agreed ceilings for trade distorting support.  
 
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.5 SERVICES  
4.5.1 Financial Services  
4.5.1.2 Regulatory Develop ments  
Pages 166 – 167, Paragraphs 4.151, 4.152, 4.154  
The report outlines the requirements and responsibilities outlines in the Digital Services Act (DSA) 
that entered into force on 16  November  2022.  
Question 19  
Can the EU provide more detail about the g overnance and oversight mechanisms of the DSA 
implementation, including the role of the European Commission, national Digital Service 
Coordinators, and the European Board for Digital Services?  
 
Reply:  The Digital Services Act itself comprises harmonized procedural rules, and provides for 
effective enforcement by public authorities, shared between the Commission – primarily responsible 
for platforms and search engines with more than 45  million  users in the EU – and Member States, 
responsible for  any smaller platforms and search engines according to the Member State of 
establishment. The Commission has the same investigatory and enforcement powers as it has under 
current competition rules, including the ability to impose fines. Member States will be required to 
designate Digital Services Coordinators by 17  February  2024 for supervising the digital services with 
less than 45  million  users that are established on their territory as well as Very Large Online 
Platforms and Very Large Online Search Engi nes in relation to non -systemic issues. These DSCs will 
also participate in the EU cooperation mechanism of the Digital Services Act. The Digital Services 
Coordinators will be independent authorities with strong requirements to perform their tasks 
impartia lly and with transparency – these requirements are harmonized by the Digital Services Act. 
The new Digital Services Coordinator within each Member State will be an important regulatory hub, 
ensuring coherence and digital competence. The Digital Services Co ordinators will cooperate within 
an independent advisory group, called the European Board for Digital Services, which can support WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 with analysis, reports and recommendations, as well as coordinating the new tool of joint 
investigations by Digital Services C oordinators.  
 
4.5.1.2.1 Banking Union  
Page 170, Paragraph 4.171  
The report notes limited progress was made regarding a common system for deposit protection (a 
European Deposit Insurance Scheme).  
Question 20  
Is the EU able to provide an update on progress in developing a deposit insurance scheme?  
 
Reply : The completi on of the Banking Union remains a policy priority of the European  Union . 
Significant progress has been made with the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
and the Single Resolution Mechanism, which are now fully operational. Moreover, another i mportant 
step on the road to Banking Union completion. has been taken with the adoption of a proposal to 
reform the EU Crisis Management and Deposit insurance (CDMI) framework on 18  April 2023.  
 
This will strengthen the existing bank crisis management fra mework, preserving financial stability 
and depositor confidence, maintaining market discipline, and fostering restructuring of the sector 
without recourse to public funding. The CMDI review could pave the way for next steps in completing 
the Banking Union,  in particular a European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS). This would further 
strengthen financial stability, reduce the link between the banks and the sovereign and increase the 
protection  of depositors.  
 
4.5.1.2.2 Insurance  
Page 171, Paragraph 4.179  
The report notes two proposals aimed at strengthening insurance frameworks are being considered 
by the European Parliament.  
Question 21  
Can the EU elaborate on the progress and effect of these proposals?  
 
Reply:  The Solvency II framework for the European  Insurance regulation has been applied 
since 2016. It was a major reform at the time and is widely regarded as a success.  
 
The ongoing review does not provide for a major overhaul but will support the European Green Deal 
and the Capital Markets Union. It targets to improve the integrated single market for insurance and 
addresses shortcomings in the supervision of cross -border activities.  
 
Moreover, the review seeks to ensure that Solvency II is applied in a simple manner for smaller, less 
complex insurers . And finally, in line with international standards, public authorities should have 
sufficient powers to prevent and address financial stability risks. Co -legislators are currently 
discussing the Commission proposal.  
 
4.5.1.2.4 Sustainable and digital fina nce 
Page 174, Paragraph 4.193  
The report notes that the EU aims to clarify Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) 
methodologies and rating providers by introducing new legislation in 2023.  
Question 22  
Is the EU able to provide an update on the scope o f this legislation, its potential impact on 
businesses, and its progress?  
 
Reply:  The EU has put in place the building blocks for a sustainable finance framework and 
stakeholders are now pointing out to the remaining market inefficiencies and regulatory ga ps, which 
have the potential to hinder the development of the EU sustainable finance market as well as the 
market integration. Many concerns have been raised with regards to the functioning of the ESG 
ratings market.  
 
As a result, and following a number of  consultations, studies and outreach, the Commission aims to 
adopt a Regulation on the operations of ESG rating providers, in 2023, to address the shortcomings 
identified with this market. The two main objectives of this intervention are to bring: (i)  increased 
clarity on ESG ratings methodologies, characteristics and objectives, and (ii)  increased clarity on the 
operations of ESG rating providers, in order to prevent and mitigate risks of conflicts of interest.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 103 - 
 
The Commission proposal is primarily based on the set of recommendations for ESG rating providers 
and regulators published by IOSCO in November 2021.  
 
Report by the European  Union  (WT/TPR/G/442)  
3.2.2 Trade -related cooperation  
Page 16, Paragraphs 3.68, 3.6 9, 3.70, 3.71, 3.72  
The report outlines the EU's Strategy for Cooperation with the Indo -Pacific and its digital partnerships 
with Japan, the Republic of Korea and Singapore.  
Question 23  
Can the EU provide more information about the principles, if any, that have been agreed t o in these 
partnerships in relation to platform and AI regulation?  
 
Reply:  
All three Digital Partnerships texts contain language on Artificial Intelligence: para 57 -60 of the EU-
Japan Digital Partnership text , para 65 -66 of the EU-Republic of Korea Digital Partnership  text and 
para 29 and 54 -56 of the EU-SGP Digital Partnership  text. Platforms regulation is also mentioned in 
para 63 -65 of the EU-Japan Digital Partnership text , para 67 -68 EU -ROK of the EU-Republic of Korea 
Digital Partnership  text and para 57 -59 of the EU-SGP Digital Partnership  text. The Commission 
publishes all relevant information on ongoing collaboration and deliverables in its Digital Partnerships 
on this webpage . 
 
Question 24  
Can the EU provide more information about what collaboration, if any, has progressed under these 
partnerships, in relation to platform and AI regulation?  
 
Reply: On 1 February  2023, an inaugural Digital Partnership Council was held with Singapore . The 
Commission publishes all relevant information on ongoing collaboration and deliverables in its Di gital 
Partnerships on this webpage . 
 
8 Defending the EU's Interests and Values  
8.3 Acting Against Economic Coercion  
Page 32, Paragraph 8.9-8.10 
The report states, in December 2021, the European Commission proposed a new legal instrument 
on the protection of the EU and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries. As a 
last resort, the regulation would enable the Union to co unteract the economic coercion.  
Question 25  
What actions would be permitted under this regulation to counteract economic coercion?  
 
Reply:  the proposal provides for the imposition of Union response measures to counteract economic 
coercion as a last reso rt, after other action under the instrument does not resolve the issue. The 
selection and design of any measure would be subject to a number of objective criteria. The scope 
of available Union response measures to counteract the economic coercion is still not a settled matter 
in the ongoing legislative procedure. The tentative scope includes e.g.:  
 
• non-performance of tariff concessions and the imposition of customs duties;  
• non-performance of obligations and the introduction or increase of restrictions on the 
importation or exportation of goods;  
• non-performance of applicable international obligations concerning the right to participate 
in tender procedures in the area of public procurement, as necessary, exclusion from 
public procurement o r tenders and applying score adjustments;  
• non-performance of obligations and the imposition of restrictions on trade in services;  
• non-performance of obligations with regard to trade -related aspects of intellectual property 
and imposition of restriction s on the protection of intellectual property;  
• non-performance of obligations and the imposition of restrictions on access of foreign 
direct investment;  
• non-performance of obligations with respect to financial services, as necessary, and the 
imposition of restrictions for banking, insurance, access to Union capital markets and other 
financial service activities;  
• non-performance of obligations and the introduction or increase of restrictions on the 
possibility to place on the market goods falling under the Union's sanitary and 
phytosanitary legislation and chemicals legislation ; 
• Withholding of EU funding.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 9 External impacts of the EU's internal policies  
Pages 32 – 33, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3 Digital Services and online platforms  
The report outlines legislation  relating to digital services and online platforms, including the Digital 
Services Act (DSA).  
Question 26  
Some European countries have legislation relating to specific forms of online harms, such as hate 
speech (i.e. Germany), as well as legislation rela ting more broadly to online safety (i.e. Ireland) . 
How are these laws expected to be managed in the context of the DSA?  
 
Reply: As an EU Regulation, the Digital Services Act applies directly and will supersede overlapping 
national laws that follow the same objective. As with any other EU Regulation, the DSA, too, is a full 
harmonisation instrument, which means that EU Member States cannot go beyond the Regulation in 
their national laws that follow the same objective.  
 
Question 27  
The Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act are referenced in this section in the context of 
external impacts of the EU's internal policies. Noting th at a number of instruments are still being 
implemented, can the EU provide greater clarity about the intended and observed impacts of these 
instruments outside of the EU? Further, can the EU provide any information about non -EU 
consultations, analysis, com parisons or considerations of external impacts?  
 
Reply:  Both the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act apply exclusively to the internal 
market of the EU, and both are based on the internal market legal basis, i.e. Article  114 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European  Union . The digital services providers that are covered by these 
rules need to be active in the EU. The designation of very large online platforms and very large 
online search engines under the Digital Services Act requires a strong local nexus, in the form of a 
threshold of at least 45  million  recipients of their services within the EU. The designation of 
gatekeepers under the Digital Markets Act similar requires at least 45  million  end users within the 
EU, and, additionally, at least 10 000 business users within the EU. Those gatekeepers also need to 
generate a turnover of EUR  7.5 billion  within the EU as an alternative to a very large market 
capitalisation of EUR  75 billion . Both the Digital Services Act and the Digital Marke ts Act respond to 
societal and economic concerns of the highest priority, and they do so in a way that optimises the 
necessary balancing of fundamental rights online. The latest draft of UNESCO's guidelines for 
regulating digital platforms incorporate the same architecture of the Digital Services Act, by focusing 
on risk -based and society -driven responses.  
 
9.4 Common Agricultural Policy  
Page 36, Paragraph 9.25  
The outbreak of COVID -19 and Russia's invasion of Ukraine has triggered a period of volatility in  
global agricultural markets. The report states that during the period under review the EU launched 
temporary exceptional measures to support and stabilise agricultural markets through this period of 
heightened volatility. These measures included providing  support to farmers facing increased input 
costs, including fertilisers.  
Question 28  
Can the EU please explain how farmers' eligibility to receive support is determined?  
 
Reply:  Several exceptional measures have been adopted between 2019 and end 2022 in response 
to COVID and the war in UA. Eligibility criteria for beneficiaries is set by the EU Member States, 
depending on the measure in question. As for the 500  million  EUR suppor t package mentioned in 
para 9.25, eligibility criteria are set in Articles 1(2) and 1(3) of the Commission Delegated Regulation 
(EU) 2022/467 of 23  March  2022 on providing for exceptional adjustment aid to producers in the 
agricultural sectors. As for the exceptional temporary EAFRD support to farmers and SMEs 
particularly affected by the COVID -19 crisis, Article  39b(3) of Regulation 1305/2013 stipulates th at 
the support had to be targeted the beneficiaries who were most affected by the crisis, and it was for 
the Member States to decide on relevant eligibility criteria for that purpose in their rural development 
programmes, based on available evidence. The s ame principle applied for the exceptional temporary 
EAFRD support to farmers and SMEs particularly affected by the impact of Russia's war against 
Ukraine (Article  39c(3) of Regulation 1305/2013), where beneficiaries further had to be engaging in 
activities  relating to circular economy, nutrient management, efficient use of resources or 
environmental and climate friendly production methods.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Question 29  
How long are the EU's temporary exceptional measures expected to remain in place?  
 
Reply:  All measures re lated to the COVID -19 pandemic and to Russia's war against Ukraine are of 
temporary nature and their validity varies from measure to measure. By now, all measures adopted 
in 2020 -2022 are expired.  
 
Question 30  
If the measures are expected to remain in pla ce for 2023, can the EU provide an estimate of how 
much support will be allocated to farmers?  
 
Reply:  No measures adopted in 2020 to 2022, i.e. until the end of the period of TPR, are currently 
in force.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 JAPAN  
Written Questions from Japan  
 
Report by the Secretariat (WT/TPR/S/442)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1 Measures directly affecting imports  
3.1.1 Customs procedures, valuation, and requirements  
3.1.1.1 Recent and future developments  
(Paragraph 3.7, page 49)  
Question 1:  
We would like to know if ICS2 is applied to goods, especially postal items containing goods, that go 
through the EU region just for the stopover purpose. If so, in case those goods are postal items, we 
understand ICS2 should be applied in a manner consistent  with the existing framework of the 
Universal Postal Union (UPU), namely the Universal Postal Convention. We understand that, 
according to the Universal Postal Convention, postal operators of originating countries, if required 
by those of destination count ries, send customs information (i.e. Electronic Advance Data) to the 
latter, but not to those of stopover countries. Specifically, Paragraph 2 of Article  8 stipulates that 
"Any security measures applied in the international postal transport chain ...  must be implemented 
without hampering worldwide mail flows or trade by taking into consideration the specificities of the 
mail network. Security measures that have a potential global impact on postal operations must be 
implemented in an internationally coordina ted and balanced manner, with the involvement of the 
relevant stakeholders". In this regard, for ensuring fair and transparent competition environment in 
the postal market, we would like to clarify how ICS2 can be consistent with the relevant articles of 
the Universal Postal Convention.  
 
Reply: Customs authorities of the EU Member States are responsible for the supervision of the 
Union's international trade, overall supply chain security, including ensuring the security and safety 
of the Union and its resid ents. These responsibilities are laid down in the Union Customs Code which 
was adopted by Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
9 October  2013 (hereafter UCC) and its delegated and implementing acts.  
 
The Import Control System 2 (hereafter ICS2) is ensuring compliance with these security 
requirements by the legal obligation to provide advance electronic data (ENS - entry summary 
declaration) via the ICS2 before arrival of any goods in the EU Customs area . This obligation covers 
for safety and security reasons all goods that will enter into the Union customs territory from any 
third country, including for transit and transshipment purposes and thus also includes goods 
transported by postal services.  
 
Customs authorities use ENS to analyse and detect security and safety risks with a view to take 
necessary control measures and to facilitate movement of legitimate trade. Wide range of illicit trade 
constitutes security and safety risks. In this context it mak es no difference whether these items are 
transported into the EU as freight, express or postal consignment(s). Therefore, all goods which 
enter into the EU customs territory have to be covered by ENS. This applies to goods for which the 
final destination i s the EU as well as for items passing through the EU customs territory for transit 
or transshipment purposes and for which the final destination is in a third country  
 
It is important to note that items of correspondence which are traditionally carried th rough postal 
channels, are exempted from the obligations to provide an ENS. This exemption however does not 
apply to goods and commercial items sent by post.  
 
The obligation to lodge the entry summary declaration lies primarily with the carrier (Article  127 
par. 4 UCC) but it can also be lodged by the importer or consignee or other person in whose name 
or on whose behalf the carrier acts (Article  127 par 4 UCC) or any person having the necessary data 
(Article  127 par 6 UCC).  
 
Considering that the EU has legislated these requirements and obligations for goods transported in 
the commercial supply chain to protect its security and safety interests, the UCC legal framework is 
not in conflict with the Universal Postal Convention. Al l goods, including those contained in postal 
consignments, are treated in the same way thus not leading to competitive disadvantages between 
freight, express and postal movements. By contrast, any waiver of such security and safety 
requirements for certain  categories of operators, such as postal operators, would create a security WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 107 - 
 
gap in the EU and may result in an uneven level playing field among operators with comparable 
business profiles.  
 
Moreover, these security and safety measures have been introduced by the EU 8 years ago, providing 
sufficient transitional time for all stakeholders to prepare for compliance with the obligation to 
provide ENS for goods that will enter or move through (transit and transshipment) the customs 
territory of the European  Union as of date of full application of ICS2 on 2 October 2023.  
 
3.1.6 Anti -dumping, countervailing, and safeguard measures  
(Paragraph 3.93, page 81)  
"The Commission has also carried out anti -circumvention and anti -absorption investigations in recent 
years to address these growing problems. "  
Question 2:  
Please share the details regarding what kind of act is indicated by anti -absorption.  
In addition, could the EU provide the information regarding the legal basis and the detailed measures 
of anti -circumvention  and anti -absorption investigations?  
 
Reply: The anti-absorption investigations are governed by Article  12 of Regulation 2016/1036 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 8  June 2016 on protection against dumped imports 
from countries not members of the European  Union . 
 
The purpose of the anti -absorption investigation is to check whether after the original investigation 
period and prior to or following the imposition of measures, export prices have decreased or that 
there has been no movement, or i nsufficient movement, in the resale prices or subsequent selling 
prices of the imported product in the Union.  
 
An example of an anti -absorption investigation can be found in the COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING 
REGULATION (EU) 2022/1233 of 18  July 2022 amending Imp lementing Regulation (EU) 2020/492 
imposing definitive anti -dumping duties on imports of certain woven and/or stitched glass fibre 
fabrics originating in the People's Republic of China and Egypt Publications Office (europa.eu) .  
 
Article  13 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 and Article  23 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 provide the 
legal basis for anti -circumvention investigations of anti -dumping and countervailing measures 
respectively. These provisions allow the EU to take action against economic operators in third 
countries or the EU tha t have changed their behavior following the imposition of anti -dumping or 
countervailing measures, causing a change in the pattern of trade between the EU and third 
countries. When the criteria laid down in Articles 13 and 23, resp., for establishing circu mvention 
are fulfilled, the Commission may decide to extend the anti -dumping or countervailing measures in 
place to imports from third countries where the circumvention takes place. Producers or EU importers 
of the product concerned that can show that they  have not circumvented the original measures in 
force, may be exempted from the extension of the measures. For more details, the EU reverts to 
the detailed presentations provided at the International Webinar on Trade Remedy 
Investigations  2022, organised b y Japan and to which the European  Union  was kindly invited.  
 
(Paragraph 3.93, page 81)  
"It also closely monitors price undertakings to ensure they are complied with properly" . 
Question 3:  
What is the ratio of undertakings offered by interested parties and the undertakings accepted by the 
Commission? Could the EU elaborate on the details of measures of monitoring for compliance with 
price undertakings?  
 
Reply:  Since 2019, the Commission received 31 undertaking offers, of which 8 (26%) were 
accept ed.  
 
Compliance with the terms of an Undertaking accepted by the Commission is subject to regular 
monitoring. The Commission enjoys wide discretion to withdraw an Undertaking if breaches of its 
terms are found. The detailed quarterly sales reports submitt ed by the producers are checked for 
conclusiveness and compliance with the MIP and any discrepancies are followed up. These sales 
figures are further matched with Member States' customs import statistics.  
 
Furthermore, an annual verification is carried out  at the producer's premises. At a general level, this 
verification entails a cross -check of the corporate and shareholder structure of the companies as WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 presented to the Commission against the factual situation. Further, the current organisation of the 
sales channels is examined with regard to the practicability and monitoring of the Undertaking. 
Similarly, it is looked at whether there have been any changes in the range of sales products. The 
same applies to any changes with regard to the different product types of the product concerned. In 
addition, the extent of other business relationships with the customers of the products concerned is 
examined as to whether they could give rise to unreasonable risks of subsequent reimbursement of 
the amounts originally paid for the products concerned. Finally, at sales transaction level, a 
reconciliation of the entries in the financial accounts with the information in the  sales reports takes 
place.  
 
3.3 Measures affecting production and trade  
3.3.6 Government procurement  
(Paragraph 3.227, page 117)  
Question 4:  
We understand that utility services are covered by the European  Union 's schedule to the GPA. 
Specifically, according to its Annex  7 to the GPA, drinking water, energy, transport and postal sector 
are excluded from t he scope of Annex  1 and Annex  2, but can be included in the scope of Annex  3. 
However, it is likely that some utility services (e.g. postal service) are not included in the scope of 
the schedule, even though they are operated by SOEs. We recognize some uti lity services markets 
have been liberalized, thus been subject to competition. Having said that, we would like to clarify if 
the European  Union  have a kind of explicit or implicit criteria for including/excluding specific utility 
services in the scope of t he schedule (i.e. Annex  3) to the GPA.  
 
Reply:  The EU's GPA coverage schedules can be found in Appendix  I to the GPA. It determines the 
extent to which the procurement of goods and services by various procuring entities of the EU is 
open to participation o f suppliers/economic operators originating in the other GPA Parties. EU policy 
is to open our procurement market for utilities as much as possible to international partners, subject 
to reciprocal opening of international partners' utilities markets to EU g oods, services and suppliers.  
 
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.3 Forestry  
(Paragraph 4.111, page 158)  
Question 5:  
Japan would like to request the EU to provide with the detailed explanation for the definition of 
"deforestation" and "forest degradation" regarding EUDR.  
 
Reply:  Art. 2(3) and (7) of the Regulation provide the definition of 'deforestation' and 'forest 
degradation'.  
Art 2 (3): 'deforestation' means the conversion of forest to agricultural use, whether human -induced 
or not;  
Art 2 (7) 'forest degradation' means structural changes to forest cover, taking the form of the 
conversion of:  
 
(a)  primary forests or naturally regenerating forests into plantation forests or into other 
wooded land; or  
(b)  primary forests into planted forests;  
 
These definitions rely to the extent possible on concepts developed at international level, in particular 
within the  Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO).  You can find the text here 
Texts adopted - Deforestation Regulation - Wednesday, 19 April 2023  
 
Report by the Government (WT/TPR/G/442)  
5. Sustainability  
5.1 The EU's actions on climate change and environmental protection  
5.1.1 Overview of the actions on climate change  and environmental protection  
(Paragraph 5.7, page 19)  
Question 6:  
In the context of the CBAM , how does the EU define "carbon leakage"? Does the EU consider that 
"carbon leakage" will always occur even when EU imports products that have the same or less carbon 
intensity than products produced in the EU? If not, has the EU considered exempting such  products 
from the CBAM?  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 109 - 
 
Reply:  Our approach to carbon leakage is spelled out in recitals 9 to 15 of the CBAM regulation. The 
CBAM is directed at the carbon content of imported products, not at third countries as such. The 
CBAM will take into account the actual emissions of individual producers in the production of CBAM 
goods imported into the EU. If a third country puts in place effective climate measures – including 
non-carbon pricing or regulatory measures – these will lead to a lower carbon content of the imported 
products, and thus to a lower border adjustment (i.e. a reduction on the number of CBAM certificates 
an importer will need to submit). It will also take into account efforts by EU trading partners to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions from indust rial production through carbon pricing mechanisms. 
More specifically, an importer may claim in its CBAM declaration a reduction in the number of CBAM 
certificates to be surrendered so that the carbon price paid in the country of origin for the declared 
embedded emissions can be taken into account.  
 
(Paragraph 5.1.2, page 20)  
Question 7:  
Japan would like to request the EU to provide with the detailed explanation for the definition of 
"forest degradation". And Japan would also like the EU to explain how the EU's regulation on forest 
degradation in EUDR will be secured the consistency with WTO trade rules.  
 
Reply:  Art. 2(7) of the Regulation (see Texts adopted - Deforestation Regulation - Wednesday, 19 
April 2023 (europa.eu) ) provides the definition of 'forest degradation' as  'forest degradation' means 
structural changes to forest cover, taking the form of the conversion of:  
 
(a)  p rimary forests or naturally regenerating forests into plantation forests or into other wooded 
land; or  
(b)  primary forests into planted forests;  ' 
 
This definition and the others contained in the Regulation rely to the extent possible on concepts 
developed at international level, in particular within the Food and Agricultural Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO). The objectives pursued by the Regu lation are the internationally recognized, 
public policy concerns of helping to fight against climate change and halting biodiversity loss linked 
to deforestation. The Regulation is designed to apply in an even -handed manner, i.e. equally to all 
commoditie s and to products produced inside as well as outside the EU. In addition, Article  216(2) 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European  Union  states that "[a]greements concluded by the 
Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its Membe r States". This obligation 
applies equally to the WTO  Agreement . Consequently, the EU always assesses the WTO compatibility 
of its legislation.  
 
5.1.2 Sustainable food systems  
(Paragraph 5.18, page 21)  
Question 8:  
(1) The draft regulation lowering the MRLs of the two active substances for the purpose of protecting 
pollinators outside the EU are clearly a deviation from the current MRL setting principles, which 
protect human life or health, as well as from the MRL in ternational harmonization trend. The 
environmental conditions in each country are different, and the use of pesticides is regulated by the 
authorities of each country based on scientific evidence in consideration of the environmental 
conditions in each cou ntry. By imposing the adopted measures, the EU should not make judgments 
about the appropriateness of the use of the specific pesticides under the specific conditions in 
third countries.  
(2) The draft regulation indicates that import tolerance may be set i f the applicant provides scientific 
evidence that the use of these two active substances does not adversely impact pollinators. Could 
the EU elaborate the process for setting on import tolerance?  
 
Reply: Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 and Regulation 178/2002 foresee that, when taking risk 
management decisions, all the factors relevant to the matter under consideration shall be taken into 
account. This includes environmental factors when read together with Article  11 of the Treaty of the 
Functioning of the Euro pean Union  which requires that 'environmental protection requirements must 
be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Union's policies and activities.  
 
The EU acknowledges that non -EU countries may face production conditions and pest press ures 
different from those in Europe. The EU would like to reiterate that the Regulation (EC) No 2023/334 
does not regulate the use of clothianidin and thiamethoxam by non -EU countries in their own 
territory.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 110 - 
 
  
 Moreover, recital 20 of the Regulation explains  that the legislation does not prevent imports from 
non-EU countries provided that:  
 
(1) the use of clothianidin/thiamethoxam does not lead to measurable levels of residues in the 
imported product; or  
(2) if the use of clothianidin/thiamethoxam lead to me asurable levels of residues, the evaluation 
of an application for import tolerances for the specific crop and under the specific conditions of use 
concludes that there is no unacceptable risk to pollinators.  
 
The evaluation of the import tolerance would follow the same criteria in relation to those 
environmental issues that are considered of global concern as those used for the placing of plant 
protection products on the market set in Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009. It the risk assessment 
concludes th at there is no unacceptable risk to bees, the import tolerance may be granted.  
 
Adverse effects of  clothianidin  and thiamethoxam on bees are directly linked to the intrinsic 
properties of those substances. Therefore, the risks for bees from outdoor uses of  these substances 
are unlikely to be limited to the European  Union . 
 
If the EU considers an environmental risk assessment necessary, this will be based upon 
environmental endpoints 1 that are based on most recent science and compared to the environmental 
exposure based on supporting evidence provided by the respective third country.  
 
(Paragraph 5.19, page 21)  
Question 9:  
Could the EU elaborate and clarify the necessary process and time schedule for a third country to 
be included in the list of approved thi rd countries?  
 
Reply: Concerning the process for listing third countries, in accordance with Article  5 of Commission 
delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/905 as regards the application of the prohibition of use of certain 
antimicrobial medicinal products in anim als or products of animal origin exported from third countries 
into the Union, the EU will elaborate an implementing Regulation setting up a list of approved third 
countries. The list will be elaborated on the basis of the guarantees to be provided by thir d countries 
in relation to compliance with the import requirements laid down in Article  3 of Commission 
delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/905. The EU will keep third countries duly informed of the 
developments on the listing process, including in ad hoc  meeti ngs. 
  
The EU would also like to underline that, in compliance with the EU's international obligations, the 
above -mentioned draft Implementing Regulation will be notified to the Secretariat of the WTO, 
Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Committee). Therefore, Japan will 
have the opportunity to comment on the draft implementing Regulation before it is adopted by the 
European Commission .  
 
Question 10:  
Considering the rearing period of animals as well as the period needed for relevant business sectors 
to prepare for the new rule, Japan request the EU that there should be a transitional period of at 
least 3 years before the delegated regulation is applied to third countries.  
 
Reply: Due account is being given by the EU to the need for third countries' concerned operators 
and competent authorities to take the necessary steps to comply with the EU requirements. In this 
respect, the conditions for entry into the Union of consignments of the concerned animals or products 
of animal origin shall only apply as from 24 months after the date of application of the implementing 
Regulation Referred to in Article  6 of Commission delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/905.  
 
Question 11:  
Japan believes that the impact of fosfomycin -resistant bacteria through imported livestock and 
fisheries products from third countries on the health of people in the EU has not been adequately 
assessed. Japan requests the EU to show sufficient scientific evidence, based on which the EU 
designated the antimicrobial to b e listed.  
 
 
1 An example of an endpoint could be the LD 50 for honeybees from a laboratory test according to a Test 
guideline internationally agreed via the OECD.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 111 - 
 
Reply: As regards Japan's concerns about the inclusion of fosfomycin in the EU list of antimicrobials 
or groups of antimicrobials reserved for treatment of certain infections in humans, the EU would like 
to clarify the following. Commission Impl ementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1255 (notified under 
G/SPS/N/EU/557) designating antimicrobials or groups of antimicrobials reserved for treatment of 
certain infections in humans was based on a scientific assessment using the criteria laid down in 
Commission  Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/1760 (notified under G/SPS/N/EU/478). The European 
Medicines Agency (EMA), in collaboration with experts from EU Member States, the European Centre 
for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the EU Food Safety Authority ( EFSA), performed that 
scientific assessment. EMA's evaluation was based on the scientific information available, using as 
reference guidance documents of international organisations, such as WHO and WOAH, while taking 
into account the EU context. The scien tific advice is publicly available:  
https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/documents/regulatory -procedural -guideline/advice -designation -
antimicrobials -groups -antimicrobials -reserved -treatment -certain -infections -humans/6 -veterinary -
medicinal -products_en.pdf  
 
As regards fosfomycin, EMA's scientific assessment found that this antimicrobial meets all of the 
criteria listed in the annex to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/1760. In the EU, 
fosfomycin is found to be an essential component of the limited avai lable treatments for serious, 
life-threatening conditions in humans. There is evidence of the potential for selection and likely 
significant transmission of resistance to phosphonic acids from animals to humans through 
commensal bacteria capable of transfe rring resistance to human pathogens if use in animals became 
established. EMA found no evidence for the need for fosfomycin to treat serious infections in animals 
in the EU.  
 
Further to this, the 7th revision of the WHO Medically Important Antibiotics List  proposes that in 
view of the evidence for the emergence of plasmid -mediated fosfomycin resistance genes in food 
animals and the limited options to treat life -threatening carbapenem -resistant Enterobacterales 
infections in humans, the class of Phosphonic a cid derivatives fulfils the Prioritization factor 2 (PF2) 
criterion and should be categorised as Highest priority critically important antimicrobial (HPCIA).  
 
Other  Question  
Question 12:  
Japan has a robust control system of radionuclides in food which pr events the distribution of food 
exceeding the Japanese maximum levels, conservatively set in the safe side, throughout food supply 
chains.  
 
Reply: All EU SPS measures are based on scientific risk assessment aiming to ensure the highest 
level of protection  of human health. Therefore, the review of the measures as regards the import of 
feed and food from Japan shall also be based on a sound technical and scientific justification.  
 
Question 13:  
Results of surveys in Japan and monitoring of imported food at d estination countries indicate health 
risk of food produced in Japan is negligible in the annual dose of radiation to both the people in 
Japan and foreign countries.  
 
Reply: Please refer to the reply to question 12.  
 
Question 14:  
Could the EU explain sufficient scientific evidence on the risk to human health by food from Japan if 
the EU maintains any import measures for Japanese food?  
 
Reply: Please refer to the reply to question 12.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 JAPAN – FOLLOW -UP QUESTIONS  
Report by the Secretariat (WT/TPR/S/442)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1 Measures directly affecting imports  
3.1.1 Customs procedures, valuation, and requirements  
3.1.1.1 Recent and future developments  
(Paragraph 3.7, page 49)  
Question 1:  
We would like to know if ICS2 is applied to goods, especially postal items containing goods, that go 
through the EU region just for the stopover purpose. If so, in case those goods are postal items, we 
understand ICS2 should be applied in a manner consistent with the ex isting framework of the 
Universal Postal Union (UPU), namely the Universal Postal Convention. We understand that, 
according to the Universal Postal Convention, postal operators of originating countries, if required 
by those of destination countries, send c ustoms information (i.e. Electronic Advance Data) to the 
latter, but not to those of stopover countries. Specifically, Paragraph 2 of Article  8 stipulates that 
"Any security measures applied in the international postal transport chain ...  must be implement ed 
without hampering worldwide mail flows or trade by taking into consideration the specificities of the 
mail network. Security measures that have a potential global impact on postal operations must be 
implemented in an internationally coordinated and bala nced manner, with the involvement of the 
relevant stakeholders". In this regard, for ensuring fair and transparent competition environment in 
the postal market, we would like to clarify how ICS2 can be consistent with the relevant articles of 
the Universal  Postal Convention.  
 
Reply: Customs authorities of the EU Member States are responsible for the supervision of the 
Union's international trade, overall supply chain security, including ensuring the security and safety 
of the Union and its residents. These responsibilities are laid down in the Union Customs Code which 
was adopted by Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
9 October  2013 (hereafter UCC) and its delegated and implementing acts.  
 
The Import Control System 2  (hereafter ICS2) is ensuring compliance with these security 
requirements by the legal obligation to provide advance electronic data (ENS - entry summary 
declaration) via the ICS2 before arrival of any goods in the EU Customs area. This obligation covers 
for safety and security reasons all goods that will enter into the Union customs territory from any 
third country, including for transit and transshipment purposes and thus also includes goods 
transported by postal services.  
 
Customs authorities use ENS to analyse and detect security and safety risks with a view to take 
necessary control measures and to facilitate movement of legitimate trade. Wide range of illicit trade 
constitutes security and safety risks. In this context it makes no difference whether th ese items are 
transported into the EU as freight, express or postal consignment(s). Therefore, all goods which 
enter into the EU customs territory have to be covered by ENS. This applies to goods for which the 
final destination is the EU as well as for ite ms passing through the EU customs territory for transit 
or transshipment purposes and for which the final destination is in a third country . 
 
It is important to note that items of correspondence which are traditionally carried through postal 
channels, are exempted from the obligations to provide an ENS. This exemption however does not 
apply to goods and commercial items sent by post.  
 
The obligation to lodge the entry summary declaration lies primarily with the carrier (Article  127 
par. 4 UCC) but it can al so be lodged by the importer or consignee or other person in whose name 
or on whose behalf the carrier acts (Article  127 par 4 UCC) or any person having the necessary data 
(Article  127 par 6 UCC).  
 
Considering that the EU has legislated these requirements and obligations for goods transported in 
the commercial supply chain to protect its security and safety interests, the UCC legal framework is 
not in conflict with the Universal Postal Convention. Al l goods, including those contained in postal 
consignments, are treated in the same way thus not leading to competitive disadvantages between 
freight, express and postal movements. By contrast, any waiver of such security and safety 
requirements for certain  categories of operators, such as postal operators, would create a security 
gap in the EU and may result in an uneven level playing field among operators with comparable 
business profiles.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 113 - 
 
Moreover, these security and safety measures have been introduced b y the EU 8 years ago, providing 
sufficient transitional time for all stakeholders to prepare for compliance with the obligation to 
provide ENS for goods that will enter or move through (transit and transshipment) the customs 
territory of the European  Union  as of date of full application of ICS2 on 2. October 2023.  
 
Follow -up question:  
We would like to know specific information on how the EU introduced security and safety measures 
eight years ago. Therefore, for the transparency purpose, we truly appreciate it if the EU could kindly 
share the relevant information (i.e. publicly available information such as website links), if any.  
 
The main information is available on our webpages:  
https://taxation -customs.ec.europa.eu/customs -4/customs -security/import -control -system -2-ics2-
0/ics2 -resources_en .  
In 2005 and 2006 security aspects were i ntroduced into the EU customs legislation (Regulation (EC) 
648/2005 EN•••, 1875/2006 EN•••) in response to the 11  September terrorist attacks in the 
United  States . The purpose of these measures went beyond addressing security threats and 
preventing terror attacks but also sought to improve the overall safety of the international goods 
supply chains in the new millennia. Thanks to these measures, EU customs authorities can fully 
ensure the protection of EU borders and its citizens ( Article  3 of the Union Customs Code EN•••) 
from illicit trade. Additionally, the measures seek to strike an appropri ate balance between customs 
controls and legitimate trade.  
 
The integral measures included:  
 
• the requirement to submit electronic data prior to the arrival of goods in the EU (the so -called 
Entry Summary Declaration – ENS, or also referred as advance cargo  information in WCO 
SAFE Framework of Standards) in order to analyse and identify security and safety risks 
before goods arrive at the external borders;  
• setting up an advance cargo information system (Import Control System – ICS);  
• the introduction of the A uthorised Economic Operator (AEO) programme;  
• deployment of a common risk management framework with controls based on electronic risk 
analysis techniques;  
• control focus on high -risk goods movements while identifying and facilitating cross -border 
movements o f goods involving legitimate trade.  
 
When the new regime first entered into force, new security threats emerged. The Transatlantic 
Aircraft Bomb plot in October 2010, where a shipment containing improvised explosive devices was 
found on -board of an airplan e transiting the EU towards the United  States , exposed certain structural 
weaknesses and gaps in the system.  
 
Consequently, the EU promptly decided to review the ICS and the entire risk management 
framework, focusing on reinforcing the structure and becomi ng more responsive, efficient, effective 
and adaptable to new emerging threats.  
 
In 2013, the EU adopted a new Customs Union Code which established additional advance cargo 
information requirements, which were further specified in the Commission Implementi ng Regulation 
(Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 of 24 November 2015 ) and Commission Delegated Regulation 
(Regulation (EU) 2015/2446 of 28 July 2015 ), subsequently amended to provide for a phased 
introduction of the entry summary dec laration requirements between 2021 and 2024. These 
requirements included obligations on the economic operators to submit to ICS2 the ENS for goods 
in postal consignments and establish the legal base for phased application of these requirements 
also on good s in postal consignments (under three ICS2 releases).  
 
In 2014 the European Council adopted the  Commission Strategy and Action Plan for better Customs 
Risk Managemen EN•••t, which provided the basis for additional legislative, IT and operational 
reforms.  
 
The cornerstone of the reform in the field of protection of safety and security is a complete overhaul 
of the ICS transforming it into a new large -scale advance cargo information programme underpinned 
by the ICS2, to be developed, deployed and operational between 2021 and 2025. It aims to further 
strengthen the "first line of defence " for customs.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 114 - 
 
  
 Other  Question  
Question 12:  
Japan has a robust control system of radionuclides in food which prevents the distribution of food 
exceeding the Japanese maximum levels, conservatively set in the safe side, throughout food supply 
chains.  
 
Reply: All EU SPS measures are based on scientif ic risk assessment aiming to ensure the highest 
level of protection of human health. Therefore, the review of the measures as regards the import of 
feed and food from Japan shall also be based on a sound technical and scientific justification.  
 
Question 13 :  
Results of surveys in Japan and monitoring of imported food at destination countries indicate health 
risk of food produced in Japan is negligible in the annual dose of radiation to both the people in 
Japan and foreign countries.  
 
Reply: Please refer to the reply to question 12.  
 
Question 14:  
Could the EU explain sufficient scientific evidence on the risk to human health by food from Japan if 
the EU maintains any import measures for Japanese food?  
 
Reply: Please refer to the reply to question 12.  
 
Follo w-up question:  
As Japan has repeatedly told the EU for the past several years, import measures on Japanese food 
has been imposed by the EU without adequate scientific evidence, which is arbitrary and 
discriminatory. Japan and the EU confirmed the cooperati on on reviewing the EU 's food import 
measures "based on scientific evidence on the risk to human health by food from Japan " in the Joint 
Statement of Japan -EU Summit in 2022. Accordingly, the EU has to explain scientific evidence on 
the risk to human healt h by food from Japan prior to its review of the measures.  At the same time, 
it is not acceptable for us if the EU persists in the current approach that imposes the measures on 
the food exceeding JML (Japanese Maximum level) despite they are neither to be d istributed nor 
exported under the Japanese robust control system. In fact, not a single non -compliance exceeding 
JML (100mq/kg) is detected at the EU border for the past 11 years and this obviously means that it 
does not make any difference in the risk to EU citizens whether the measures exists or not. In order 
to justify the maintenance of the measure, the EU is obliged to show by means of assessment of 
risk to human health that the intake of Japanese food causes significant increase in the annual dose 
of radiation by the EU citizens. This is what "based on scientific evidence on the risk to human health 
by food from Japan " in the Joint Statement actually means. We request the EU to fulfill the 
commitment confirmed in the Joint Statement and reach a decisio n to lift the remaining measures 
based on scientific evidence in the true sense of the word.  
 
Reply : 
Considering that this topic is on the agenda of the upcoming Japan -EU summit and preparations are 
ongoing, the EU will refrain from answering at this stage.  
 
Other  Follow -up Question  
(1) Regarding the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA), the scope of "critical products with digital elements" 
that require third -party conformity assessment is unclear and wide -ranging. This being the case, 
what are the EU Gov`s tho ughts on the need to provide guidelines for manufacturers?  
 
Reply:  The proposed Regulation requires manufacturers to undertake an assessment of the risks 
associated with their digital products. The compliance process with each of the applicable essential 
requirements is risk -based. This means that the extent to which manufacturers have to put in place 
technical solutions to comply with the essential requirements is linked to the risk associated with 
the product. For certain critical products (Class I of An nex III) manufacturers will be able to choose 
to either apply a harmonised standard (without involvement of any third party) or undergo 
third-party conformity assessment. Only a narrow list of critical products (Class II of Annex  III) will 
be subject to th ird-party conformity assessment. Class I only requires third party conformity 
assessment in cases where the manufacturer chooses not to apply a harmonized standard. Class II 
requires third party conformity assessment, but allows the manufacturer to choose between an 
assessment of the security properties of its product or an assessment of its quality system.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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The criteria for updating the list of critical products have been incorporated in the proposed 
Regulation. These take into account the fact that differe nt products with digital elements pose 
different risks to economy or society. As a result, while all products should be subject to the same 
essential requirements, some products require a higher level of conformity assessment than others.  
 
(2) In addition,  the absence of specific descriptions of existing international standards or EU 
harmonized standards regarding cybersecurity requirements makes it difficult for manufacturers to 
develop products which meet requirements. At a minimum, there may be a need to  synchronize 
specific international and EU standards before the start of the transition period. What are the EU 
Gov's thoughts on this?. What are the EU Gov`s thoughts on providing a longer transition period, 
along with support for small and medium enterpr ises to be able to acquire third -party conformity 
assessments?  
 
Reply:  The EU observes that the two -year transition period is a standard transition period to allow 
the development of harmonized standards. The proposal also includes a grandfathering clause 
according to which the products with digital elements that have been p laced on the market before 
the date of application of the new regulation shall not be subject to its requirements.  
 
The Commission is already taking now preparatory steps for the standardisation process, in parallel 
with the co -decision procedures. Relevant existing international and European standards are taken 
into account in this process.  
 
Harmonised standards will support the implementation of the proposed Regulation and international 
standards will be taken into account in the develo pment process thereof. As foreseen by the New 
Legislative Framework (NLF - the model provisions of the EU for product legislation), the harmonised 
European standards will provide a presumption of conformity with the essential requirements of the 
proposed R egulation. Furthermore, the proposed Regulation builds on the standard NLF model 
provisions for accreditation (Regulation 765/2008) and conformity assessment 
(Regulation  768/2008) and related (ISO -based) harmonised standards.  
 
In order to provide presumpti on of conformity, such standards have to be developed by the 
European  Standardisation Organisations and published in the Official Journal of the EU, in line with 
the European Standardisation Regulation (Regulation (EU) 1025/2012).  
 
The development of harm onised standards for the implementation of the proposed Regulation does 
not mean that all these standards need to be built from scratch. Pursuant to Standardisation 
Regulation, the EU takes into consideration international standards. The possibility for in ternational 
standards to provide for presumption of conformity will depend on the fact of whether these 
standards can ensure that the cybersecurity requirements as set out in the respective regulation are 
achieved. Furthermore, all other relevant standards  developed by that time should be taken into 
account, including those on the basis of other EU product legislation, such as Delegated Regulation 
(EU) 2022/30 under the Radio Equipment Directive (Directive 2014/53/EU).  
 
As regards the SMEs, these entities w ill also benefit from the horizontal cybersecurity requirements 
such as the creation of a level -playing field between businesses of all sizes as regards cybersecurity. 
The enhanced cybersecurity will also better protect their business from potential impact s of cyber 
threats and incidents.  
 
The potential impact of the proposed regulation on SMEs has been carefully analysed by the 
European Commission (see Impact assessment of the proposed Regulation available at:  
https://digital -strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/cyber -resilience -act-impact -assessment ).  
 
Likewise, the compliance burden has been taken into account when draftin g the proposal. For 
instance, the proposal follows a risk -based approach for both essential requirements and conformity 
assessment. Only a small share of products will be subject to mandatory third -party assessment 
(class II category of products as listed in Annex  III of the proposed Regulation). The European 
Commission is also preparing means to support SMEs in the implementation of the regulation, 
including through financial support programmes and guidance.  
 
(3) Similarly, other regulations being develope d by the EU Gov also include cybersecurity 
requirements. Does the EU Gov think that it is necessary to clarify the relationship among the CRA, WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 machinery regulations, AI regulations, and NIS2 directives —and to eliminate duplication of 
regulations?  
 
The EU c onsiders that the future interaction of the proposed Regulation with regulations already into 
force has been duly taken into account and addressed. In fact, Article  8 of the proposed Regulation 
regulates the relationship with the upcoming AI Act and Articl e 9 of the proposed Regulation 
regulates the relationship with the Machinery Regulation.  
 
As regards the interaction of the proposed (CRA) Regulation and existing cybersecurity legislation 
such as NIS2 Directive, the EU would like to clarify that the NIS2 Directive provides for supply chain 
security obligations for essential and important entities providing key services for the EU economy 
and society. It does not impose cybersecurity requirements of products. Furthermore, it does not 
cover software develope rs. The supply chain security requirements in NIS2 Directive would be 
incomplete without mandatory cybersecurity requirements for hardware and software that are part 
of the networks of critical entities. Hence, the proposed Regulation aims to complete an i mportant 
legislative gap.  
 
(4) Does the EU Gov have concerns regarding the implementation of the CRA in practice, given the 
short (24 hours) deadline for reporting vulnerabilities? In the NIS2 Directive, the initial reporting 
deadline for cyber incidents i s stipulated as 72 hours. Does the EU Gov plan to extend the deadline 
for vulnerability report to 72 hours?  
 
Reply:  The EU observes that the reporting obligations in NIS2 Directive only concern significant 
incidents and for services by the entities which are within in the scope of NIS2 Directive. It does not 
concern actively exploited vulnerabilities in products or inc idents having an impact on the security 
of a product, as is the case for the proposed Regulation.  
 
(5) It is unclear how to handle cases in which there is a cost associated with support for free OSS.  
 
Reply:  Open-source software is only covered by the proposed Regulation if it is distributed or used 
for commercial purposes, as indicated in the definition of Article  3(23) ( "Making Available "). In such 
respect, recital (10) of the proposal clarifies that "In order not to hamper innovation or research, 
free and open -source software developed or supplied outside the course of a commercial activity 
should not be covered by this Regulation. This is the case for software, including its source code and 
modified versio ns, that is openly shared and freely accessible, usable, modifiable and redistributable. 
In the context of software, a commercial activity might be characterized not only by charging a price 
for a product, but also by charging a price for technical support  services, by providing a software 
platform through which the manufacturer monetises other services, or by the use of personal data 
for reasons other than exclusively for improving the security, compatibility or interoperability of the 
software.  
 
(6) What are the EU Gov`s thoughts on concerns about vulnerability information being leaked from 
publicly disclosed SBOMs?  
 
Reply:  The proposed Regulation does not require publication of SBOM. Point 6 of Annex  II refers 
only to situations when the manufacturer choo ses to disclose SBOM; only if so decided by the 
manufacturer, the information as to where the SBOM is accessible would be part of the information 
provided to the user.  
 
(6) We would appreciate the EU Gov considering compatibility with similar schemes in ot her countries 
as well. Is it possible to provide an opportunity to negotiate with other countries for this purpose, 
with Japan 's participation?  
 
Reply:  Recital 67 of the proposed Regulation makes reference to the possibility for the EU to 
conclude bilateral (inter -governmental) agreements for the mutual recognition of conformity 
assessment with third countries.WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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CHINESE  TAIPEI  
PART I: REGARDING THE SECRETARIAT REPORT (WT/TPR/S/442)  
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 MEASURES AFFEC TING PRODUCTION AND TRADE  
3.3.1 INCENTIVES  
3.3.1.2 STATE AID  
Page 99 (Para 3.149)  
Currently, various state aid guidelines and regulations, including the GBER and the De minimis  
regulation, are undergoing review to be updated. The adoption of these two legal instruments is 
expected during 2023, according to the Commission. The review was launched following the 
completion of an evaluation – the "fitness check" – of the SAM reform launched by the Commission 
in 2019. This assessment found that some specific changes to these exemptions are needed to 
integrate the objectives of the European Green Deal and the European Industrial and Digital 
Strategies.  
 
Question(s):  
1. We noticed that  the Commission adopted new Temporary Crisis and Transition 
Framework(TCTF), and endorsed the amendment to the General Block Exemption Regulation(GBER) 
in March 2023. We would like to know how it will affect the EU's production and trade, particularly 
on net-zero industries. We would also like to know how the EU will avoid global subsidy race and the 
unlevelled playing field.  
 
Reply: The European Commission has adopted the Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework to 
foster support measures limited to thos e sectors which are key for the transition to a 
net-zero economy (sectors covered include batteries, solar panels, wind turbines, heat -pumps,  
electrolysers and carbon capture usage and storage), in line with the Green Deal Industrial Plan. The 
Temporary Cr isis and Transition Framework will help speeding up investment and financing for clean 
tech production. The aim is not , in any case, to build competitiveness at the expense of public 
subsidies. The Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework is only put in p lace for a limited duration.  
 
Page 108 (Para 3.188)  
In the area of international regulatory cooperation, the European  Union  has mutual recognition 
agreements (MRAs) for the acceptance of conformity assessment results with seven countries: 
Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, New  Zealand , Switzerland, and the United  States . These MRAs 
cover conformity assessments for selected products such as electrical and electronic equipment, 
telecommunication equipment, and toys. In some cases, these MRAs a lso provide for the mutual 
recognition of compliance with respect to the use of goods manufacturing or laboratory practices. 
During the review period, the European  Union  did not conclude any new MRAs and announced that 
the mutual recognition provisions for  medical devices under the MRA with Switzerland ceased to 
apply on 26  May 2021 (Section  2.3). 
 
Question(s):  
2. We would like to know the possible reasons that the EU did not conclude any new MRAs for the 
acceptance of conformity assessment results during the review period.  
 
Reply:  The EU has mutual recognition agreements of conformity assessment with a number of 
developed countries dating back to 1998 -2002. Our existing MRAs are related to the third -party 
certification system, and are based on the need for  similar conformity assessment systems in 
third countries, in particular the capacity to monitor conformity assessment bodies and guarantee 
their technical competence. This is why the EU has only signed a limited number of MRAs with 
partners whose "quality  infrastructure" is at a level comparable to that of the EU (i.e. Japan, the US, 
Canada, Australia, New  Zealand , Switzerland). For the time being the EU does not intend to conclude 
new mutual recognition agreements of conformity assessment with third count ries. 
 
3. Considering the EU has set new safety requirements for several products in recent years, such as 
medical devices and machinery products, we would like to know how the EU will make sure the 
sufficient capacity of its conformity assessment bodies, and the possibility of establishing new MRAs 
to assist stakeholders from the third countries in getting access to the certification services nearby, 
so as to provide products that are in compliance with the EU regulations.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Reply: The EU strives to ensure t hat there is sufficient capacity of conformity assessment bodies 
capable to perform conformity assessment in compliance with the new requirements. Specifically, in 
relation to the medical devices sector, the new amendments to the In -Vitro Diagnostic Medica l 
Devices Regulation adopted in January 2022 and to the Medical Devices Regulation adopted in 
March  2023, providing for an extension and a staggered approach for the transition periods to the 
new Regulations, as well as a number of additional non-legislative measures, will provide for a 
sufficient time to ensure capacity of conformity assessment bodies to certify compliance with the 
new requirements.  
 
In any case, taking into consideration the rigorous requirements for conformity assessment bod ies 
set in the new EU legislation, the establishing of new MRAs has not been considered as a viable 
option as this would require very rigorous conformity assessment systems in third countries.  
 
4. TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.4 energy  
4.4.3 Regulation of the  internal market  
Page 162 (Para 4.130)  
To establish a new regulatory framework for competitive decarbonized gas markets, the Commission 
adopted proposals for a new Gas Market and Hydrogen Directive and Regulation to recast the current 
Directive and Regulat ion for the gas market to also include renewable gas and hydrogen. These 
efforts are linked to the Hydrogen Strategy, which contributes to the European Green Deal and builds 
on the new Industrial Strategy as well as the European  Union 's recovery plan (Sect ion 3.3.1.1) by 
ensuring hydrogen can play a role in decarbonizing the economy. Outlining the need for international 
cooperation, the strategy aims to establish a regulatory framework and to incentivize supply and 
demand in "lead markets", while also estab lishing infrastructure with non -discriminatory access to 
make widespread use of hydrogen feasible, for example in transport.  
 
Question(s):  
4. Could the EU please elaborate on the new or revised measures to recast the current Directive and 
Regulation for the gas market?  
 
Reply: The EU's future renewable gas and hydrogen framework is still under negotiation with the 
Council and the European Parliament. You can find the latest update on the evolving policy 
framework under this link: Hydrogen and decarbonised gas market package (europa.eu) . 
 
5. Could the EU please elaborate on the action s to not only establish infrastructure with 
non-discriminatory access but to also make widespread use of hydrogen feasible?  
 
Reply: The EU's future renewable gas and hydrogen framework is still under negotiation with the 
Council and the European Parliament . You can find the latest update on the evolving policy 
framework under this link: Hydrogen and decarbonised gas ma rket package (europa.eu) . 
 
4.4.5 ENERGY SECURITY AND AFFORDABILITY  
Page 164 (Para 4.142)  
Following the energy market upheavals resulting from the Russian aggression against Ukraine, some 
member States also intervened in national markets (e.g. where operators were overburdened by 
operating losses resulting from low -cost delivery obligations in the wake of significantly increasing 
energy spot prices as long -term supply from Gazprom was interrupted). In addition, the European 
Markets and Securities Authority (ESMA) proposed temporary amendments to the rules regarding 
collateral in the trading of e nergy derivatives to avoid the emergence of a liquidity crunch. Some 
member States also took measures with respect to strategic infrastructure owned by Gazprom.  
 
Question(s):  
6. Does the EU have a plan to regularly review and assess its member States inte rvening measures 
to their national energy markets?  
 
Reply: Where appropriate,  the EU assesses conformity with the EU regulatory framework on a 
regular basis and will continue to do so.  
 
7. If yes, how does the EU plan to review and assess the aforementione d measures taken by its 
member States?  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Reply: The European Commission has a State aid control system that keeps support measures taken 
by its member States under constant review.  
 
PART II: REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT REPORT (WT/TPR/G/442)  
 
3 MULTILATERAL AND  BILATERAL TRADE POLICY  
3.2 The EU's bilateral agenda  
3.2.2 Trade -related cooperation  
Page 15 (Para 3.64)  
The most recent ministerial meeting of the TTC took place on 5  December  2022. In the area of trade, 
the TTC agreed at this occasion on the need to adv ance the transition to a low -carbon economy in 
a manner that is mutually supportive and to embark on a Transatlantic Initiative on Sustainable 
Trade.  
 
Question(s):  
8. Could the EU further explain on what kind of projects would there be under the Transatla ntic 
Initiative on Sustainable Trade?  
 
Reply: Through the Transatlantic Initiative on Sustainable Trade, the EU and US aim to build a 
structured and long -lasting bilateral engagement that promotes a more integrated and resilient 
transatlantic marketplace boosting bilateral trade and investment and reinforcing clean energy 
supply chains, and accelerates the transition to a climate neutral, nature positive and circular 
economy on both sides of the Atlantic.  
 
5 SUSTAINABILITY  
5.1 The EU's actions on climate c hange and environmental protection  
5.1.1 Overview of the actions on climate change and environmental protection  
Page 20 (Para 5.15)  
The new Circular Economy Action Plan (CEAP) was adopted in 2020 and aims to accelerate the 
transformational change required by the European Green Deal. Under the new CEAP, the European 
Commission adopted in March and November 2022, two packages of initiatives to make sustainable 
products the norm on the EU market. The cornerstone of the measures is the legislative proposal 
for a Regulation on Ecodesign for Sustainable Products (ESPR) that aims to better cover product 
circularity issues such as durability and reparability, and to address the carbon - and environmental 
footprints of products, amongst other aspects.  
 
Question(s):  
9. We have noticed the EU's Ecodesign for Sustainable Products (ESPR) is still under legislative 
process. The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu and the EU has 
exchanged relevant information through the bilateral i ndustrial policy dialogue platform. We 
expressed the interest in learning the possibility of adopting the mechanism of the future Digital 
Products Passports. In addition, it seems that the EU is going to run pilot projects on batteries and 
ICT products. Pl ease kindly share the progress on this.  
 
Reply: The Digital Product Passport is constituted by two components: (1) the DPP-system , i.e. the 
set of IT standards and protocols that will allow the full interoperability between different DPPs, and 
(2) the DPP-data, i.e. the information to be provided in each DPP.  
 
The DPP -system will rely on harmonised standards to be drafted by the European Standardisation 
Organisations (CEN/CENELEC/ETSI) on the basis of a standardisation request that the Commission 
is finalising. Standards will be developed in 8 different areas:  
 
1. Data carriers  
2. Unique identifiers  
3. Look-up mechanisms  
4. Access rights management  
5. Interoperability (semanthic, technical, organisational, data exchange protocol, data 
processing)  
6. Data storage  
7. Data authentication, reliability and integrity  
8. Data security and privacy  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 The DPP -data will be identified when developing delegated acts at product group level. Therefore, 
the content of the DPP for Product A may differ from the informatio n included in the DPP of Product 
B and so on. There is an ongoing project (the project acronym is CIRPASS), funded by the Digital 
Europe funding programme, that is currently working on the conceptualisation of how the future DPP 
should be designed (both fr om a system and data perspective) in order to work and be interoperable 
in three value chains: batteries, textile, and ICT products. This project will only develop the 
theoretical concept, whilst future research projects will be funded to prove the concept . 
 
10. Since the ESPR aims to cover the broadest possible range of products, we would like to know 
how the EU will ensure the ESPR would not cause unnecessary administrative burden and extra 
operational costs to the business.  
  
Reply: Any regulatory measu re that is proposed by the European Commission is subject to the rules 
and principles of the Better Regulation Guidelines (see https://comm ission.europa.eu/law/law -
making -process/planning -and-proposing -law/better -regulation_en ), including impact assessment, 
appropriate public consultation and the review of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board. The Regulatory 
Scrut iny Board oversees whether the proposal meets the "Better Regulation Guidelines" and pays 
particular attention to the appropriate assessment of administrative burden and extra operational 
costs to business.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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NORWAY  
TPR EU 2023. Questions fr om Norway  
 
Question 1  
Ch. 5 Sustainability  in the report (WT/TPR/442)  
5.1 The EU's actions on climate change and environmental protection (in particular 5.1.3, 
paragraph 5.20)  
The energy policy and legal framework of the EU has evolved considerably since the European Green 
Deal was tabled in 2019, with Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine being a significant driver. 
In the face of continued multiple challenges, geopolitica l as well as trade -related, the EU has shown 
determination to further accelerate the European Green Deal. Do you foresee particular trade policy 
or other challenges that need to be overcome for the EGD to be successfully and timely implemented 
as ambition and speed are increased?  
 
Reply:  The implementation of the EGD is tracked on a dedicated website: Delivering the E uropean 
Green Deal (europa.eu)  where all relevant information can be found.  
 
Question 2  
Paragraph 6.15, 8.1, 8.2  
The EU has recently developed several trade policy tools, notably on investments, public 
procurement, and f oreign subsidies, aiming to restore and secure the level playing field in the 
Internal Marked. Are yet more similar measures foreseen?  
 
Reply:  The Foreign Subsidies Regulation will start to apply on 12  July 2023.  
 
Question 3  
The president of the European Commission has announced a new Economic Security Strategy to be 
presented later this year. What could this strategy entail?  
 
Reply:  The Commission is currently working on the economic security strategy and will present it on 
21st June. The strateg y will set out the framework under which the EU is to pursue and build its 
economic security in a world where a partial shift from a rules -based order to a power -based one 
creates new risks, which we need to understand, assess, and address.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 HONG KONG, CHINA  
Written Questions from Hong Kong, China  
 
Trade Policies and Practices by Measure  
 
The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism  
(WT/TPR/G/442: Page 19, Paras. 5.7 & 5. 9) 
The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM ) is a climate measure aimed at decreasing global 
GHG emissions by preventing the risk of carbon leakage and by supporting increased ambition on 
climate mitigation, while ensuring WTO compatibility. The CBAM will equalise the price of carbon 
between domest ic products and imports and ensure that the EU's climate objectives are not 
undermined by production relocating to countries with less ambitious climate policies.  
 
Both proposals have been preliminarily agreed in December 2022 and must now be formally adop ted 
by the co -legislators: the European Parliament and the Council.  
 
Question 1:  
We note from paragraphs 5.7 and 5.9 of the Government Report that the CBAM has been 
preliminarily agreed in December 2022, which aims to eq ualise the price of carbon between d omestic 
products and imports for achieving the EU's climate objectives. We then note that the proposal has 
been recently adopted by the European Parliament (on 18  April 2023) and now pending final 
approval by the Council of the EU. We would like to know wh en and how the trade will be informed 
on the operation details of the CBAM (including its mechanism of calculation of carbon (emission) 
price and surrender of certificates), as it is of paramount importance to allow sufficient time for the 
trade to adjust to the new measures. And what measures will be or have been taken by the EU to 
ensure the "WTO compatibility" of the CBAM and its implementation measures.  
 
Reply:  Following the political agreement reached between the co -legislators in December 2022, the 
European Parliament and the Council formally adopted the text of the CBAM Regulation on 18  April 
and 25  April respectively ( press release ). After the CBAM Regulation is published in the EU's Officia l 
Journal and has entered into force, the European Commission will, after consultation of the CBAM 
Committee, adopt an implementing act regulating the transitional period of CBAM starting on the 
1st of October 2023 (notably specifying the reporting obligations for importers).  
 
In view of its adoption, the European Commission will publish the draft implementing act for feedback 
through a public consultation for a period of four weeks before the CBAM Committee renders its 
opinion on it. Addit ional implementing acts, notably those applying the elements of the final 
methodology for the embedded emissions set out in Annex  IV of the Regulation , will also follow a 
similar adoption procedure, including an open public consultation of all stakeholders . 
 
The EU will continue discussing the CBAM Regulation and the facilitation of its implementation with 
all its trade partners bilaterally as well as multilaterally, including in the OECD and the WTO. 
Outreach activities and awareness -raising sessions will also make sure that the CBAM Regulation is 
understood inside and outside the EU.  
 
The CBAM Regulation is an environmental policy tool to prevent carbon leakage and support the EU's 
increased ambition on climate mitigation, while ensuring WTO compatibility . The CBAM Regulation 
is a measure falling under the GATT rules which require that the objectives to be pursued must be 
environmental and non -protectionist. As it has been designed, the CBAM Regulation will apply in an 
even-handed manner that does not disc riminate among products or countries. Article  216(2) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European  Union  states that "[a]greements concluded by the Union 
are binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its Member States". This Article  applies full y 
to the WTO  Agreement . Consequently, the EU always ensures the WTO compatibility of its 
legislation.  
 
Deforestation Regulation  
(WT/TPR/G/442: Page 20, Para. 5.12)  
On 6  December  2022, the European Parliament and the Council reached a provisional politica l 
agreement on an EU Regulation on deforestation, paving the way for the final adoption of the 
regulation in early 2023. It aims to curb EU -driven deforestation and forest degradation. By 
promoting the consumption of "deforestation -free" products and reduc ing the EU's impact on global WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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deforestation and forest degradation, the new rules will bring down greenhouse gas emissions and 
global biodiversity loss and minimise consumption, and therefore decrease the trade of products 
coming from supply chains associa ted with deforestation or forest degradation, while increasing the 
trade of sustainable products. The proposal is part of a broader plan of actions to tackle deforestation 
and forest degradation first outlined in the 2019 Commission Communication on Steppi ng up EU 
Action to Protect and Restore the World's Forests.  
 
Question 2:  
We note from paragraph 5.12 of the Government Report that a provisional agreement on the 
deforestation regulation was reached in December 2022. We then note that the proposal has been 
recently adopted by the European Parliament (on 19  April 2023) and now pending final approval by 
the Council of the EU. We are interested in the assessment of the EU on the WTO compatibility of 
the deforestation regulation. Since the review mechanism under this regulation may extend its scope 
of application, we would like to know the type(s) of other commodities planned to be included under 
this regulation.  
 
Reply:  The objectives pursued by the Regulation are the internationally recognized, public pol icy 
concerns of helping to fight against climate change and halting biodiversity loss linked to 
deforestation. The Regulation is designed to apply in an even -handed and non -discriminatory 
manner, i.e. equally to all commodities and to products produced ins ide as well as outside the EU. 
Article  216(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European  Union  states that "[a]greements 
concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its Member States". 
This Article  applies fully to th e WTO  Agreement . Consequently, the EU always ensures the WTO 
compatibility of its legislation and its impact assessment is made public.  
https:// environment.ec.europa.eu/publications/proposal -regulation -deforestation -free-products_en  
 
In the context of the review of the Regulation, Article  34(2) and (3) requires the 
European  Commission to carry out an impact asses sment to review the need and feasibility of 
including other commodities -including maize - within the scope of application. At this stage, it is too 
early to determine which other commodities will be included in the scope of the Regulation.  
 
Trade Policies by Sector  
 
Fisheries Subsidies  
(WT/TPR/S/442: Pages 154 -156, Paras. 4.88-4.100; Page 157, Para. 4.105)  
(WT/TPR/G/442: Page 8, Para. 3.7 -3.8) 
The EU has played an active role in the WTO Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations. According to the 
reports, the EU is in the ratification process for the WTO  Agreement  on Fisheries Subsidies and is 
committed to constructively engaging in the continued negotiations to deliver a comprehensive 
agreement addressing subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing. It also continues to 
cooperate internationally to address Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing. Meanwhile, 
the EU remains one of the largest providers of fisheries subsidies.  
 
Question 3:  
We are pleased to learn that the EU's  internal procedures are already underway to accept the 
Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies. We also look forward to continuing working constructively with 
the EU in the negotiations on the outstanding issues. At the same time, it is noted that the EU 
remains  one of the largest providers of fisheries subsidies. We would appreciate it if the EU would 
share with us whether the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund, and other state aids 
provided by EU Members States to the fisheries industry are in fu ll compliance with the disciplines 
under the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies or any major changes to these support measures would 
be required.  
 
Reply:  The European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF) and other support for 
fisheries are key e nablers for sustainable fisheries and the conservation of marine biological 
resources, for food security through the supply of seafood products, for the growth of a sustainable 
blue economy and for healthy, safe, secure, clean and sustainably managed seas and oceans. The 
EU will implement the new disciplines under the Agreement of Fisheries Subsidies, and currently 
considering what adjustments are necessary in the relevant EU measures.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Financial Services – Banking Union  
(WT/TPR/S/442: Page 170, Para. 4.17 2) 
The European Central Bank (ECB) directly supervises 113 Significant Banks, holding almost 82% of 
banking assets in participating countries, while smaller banks are regulated by national authorities 
in close cooperation with the ECB. Banking licences for  all credit institutions established in the 
member States participating in the SSM are issued in line with harmonized prudential requirements 
(regarding capital, liquidity, internal risk management, and governance) by national competent 
authorities in clos e cooperation with the ECB, with licensed institutions able to operate throughout 
the Union. Regulatory approaches to licensing third -country bank branches differ across EU member 
States, using approaches treating them like subsidiaries, like branches, or using a mix of these 
approaches.  
 
Question 4:  
What is the foreign (i.e. non -EU) participation rate of the 113 "Significant Banks" directly supervised 
by the ECB? Please also share the highest rate and the lowest rate among EU member states.  
 
Reply:  We und erstand the question refers to the relative market share of non -EU affiliates (non -EU 
subsidiaries and non -EU branches) in each of the MS, there is publicly available data on the share 
of foreign affiliates as a percentage of total banking sector assets in  each EU Member State – see 
the chart below.  
 
 
Question 5:  
To what extent do regulatory approaches for third -country (i.e. non -EU) bank branches under 
national regimes differ among different EU Member States? In view that inconsistency in regulatory 
requirements is a kind of barriers to entry, is there any plan to harmonise the different approaches 
to facilitate foreign investment in the banking sector ?  
 
Reply:  Disparate requirements on third -country branches in each Member State create a patchy 
regulatory landscape, regulatory arbitrage risks and significant challenges for competent authorities 
to monitor properly the risks that result from the activities they conduct in the EU. The co -legislators 
are in the final steps of negotiating the banking package 
https://finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/banking -package_en that contains provisions on services 
provided by third country undertakings, either on a cross border basis or via third country branches.  
 
The Commission proposal, in summary, p rovides that undertakings wishing to provide banking 
services in an EU Member State from a non -EU country may continue to do so, but they will have to 
set up a local branch to ensure a minimum baseline of supervision and regulation in the EU. If they 
want to provide services across the EU, they will have to set up a subsidiary. This proportionate 
minimum framework for third country branches will ensure financial stability. This new framework – 
once adopted by the co -legislators – should comprise minimum com mon requirements on 
authorisation, prudential standards, internal governance, supervision and reporting.  
 
WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Financial Services – Capital Markets Union  
(WT/TPR/S/442: Page 174, Para. 4.189)  
During the review period, a number of new regulatory equivalence deci sions regarding capital 
markets were taken in the areas of auditing (South  Africa  and China), the classification of certain 
exposures to calculate capital requirements (Bosnia, North  Macedonia , Serbia, and the Republic of 
Korea), central securities deposit ories (the United  Kingdom , temporarily until June 2021), and 
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives (regarding markets (the United  States ), legal, supervisory, and 
enforcement arrangements (Australia; Brazil; Canada; Hong Kong, China; the United  States ; and 
Singapore), and central counterparties (the United  States , and the United  Kingdom  (temporarily, 
until 2025)).  
 
Question 6:  
Please provide details of the new regulatory equivalence decision in respect of Hong Kong, China 
regarding capital markets taken in t he areas of legal, supervisory and enforcement arrangements.  
 
Reply:  This equivalence decision  relates to various aspects of the margin ing and other risk mitigation 
techniques for uncleared OTC derivatives under the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
('HKMA'). With respect to a counterparty pair comprising an entity subject to HKMA margin rules 
and a counterparty subject to EMIR margin requirements, the EU counterparty may rely on these 
equivalence decisions and comply with HKMA margin requirements instead of EMIR margin 
requirements, subject to any requirements on scope and conditions. The decision covers operational 
risk mi tigation for non -centrally cleared derivatives, and margins non -centrally cleared derivatives.  
 
Air Transport Services  
(WT/TPR/G/442: Page 179, Para. 4.217)  
There are no EU -wide restrictions regarding the investment in and management of airports, but 
state ownership remains important both in some major airports as well as smaller and regional 
airports. Access by carriers to EU air transport services is in prin ciple non -discriminatory, but 
following the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2019/712, the Commission has a tool to assess practices 
distorting competition adopted by third countries or third -country entities, and to impose certain 
(proportionate) financial or operational redress measures in line with its international obligations.  
 
Question 7:  
Under what conditions would third -country air carriers be considered adopting practices distorting 
competition or threating to cause injury to air carriers based in the EU?  
 
Reply:  Regulation (EU) 2019/712 targets unfair competition practices by a third country or 
third-country entity which distort competition between Union air carriers and third -country air 
carriers and causing, or threatening to cause, injury to Union air carriers. Practices distorting 
competition are defined in Regulation (EU) 2019/712 as "discrimination and subsidies". Those 
practices might include, for example, situations where a Union air carrier is subject to differential 
treatment without objectiv e justification, imposed by a third country or a third -country entity. Such 
alleged unfair competition practices must be corroborated with factual, verifiable and thorough 
evidence, quantifying the injury or threat of injury to Union carriers and proving t hat the distortive 
practice is at the origin of this injury or threat of injury.  
 
Telecommunication Services – Cybersecurity  
(WT/TPR/G/442: Page 183, Paras. 4.237 -4.238)  
Around the time of approval of the EU Cybersecurity Act in 2019, expanding the mandate of the EU 
Agency for Cybersecurity, the Commission also published Commission Recommendation (EU) 
2019/534 regarding assessing cybersecurity risks of 5G networks and iden tifying possible measures 
to mitigate them. Following this recommendation and based on national risk assessments 
undertaken by member States, the member States' Cooperation Group on Network and Information 
Security published a coordinated risk assessment a nd developed a Toolbox of strategic and technical 
measures, as well as supporting actions to mitigate such risks.  
 
Based on the Toolbox, in mid -2020 nearly all member States were implementing (or planned to 
implement) measures to restrict access by high -risk suppliers, and most member States were 
implementing (or planning to implement) measures to (i)  control the use of managed service 
suppliers and equipment suppliers' 3rd line support; and (ii)  limit dependence on (a group of) 
individual suppliers. Accor ding to the Commission, a second progress report on the Toolbox's WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 implementation is being prepared. At the end of 2021, 13 member States had approved new, or 
amended existing, laws addressing risks related to high -risk vendors.  
 
Question 8:  
As regards "hig h-risk suppliers", is there a list available for public access? Are there any non -EU 
suppliers on the list? What are the criteria of identifying "high -risk suppliers"?  
 
Reply:  The EU 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox provides guidance on objective criteria, includ ing technical 
and non -technical risk factors, to assess the risk profile of suppliers, notably:  
 
- The likelihood of the supplier being subject to interference from a non -EU country. Such 
interference may be facilitated by, but not limited to, the presenc e of the following factors:  
 
o a strong link between the supplier and a government of a given third country;  
o the third country's legislation, especially where there are no legislative or democratic checks 
and balances in place, or in the absence of secur ity or data protection agreements between the 
EU and the given third country;  
o the characteristics of the supplier's corporate ownership;  
o the ability for the third country to exercise any form of pressure, including in relation to the 
place of manufactu ring of the equipment.  
- The supplier's ability to assure supply.  
- The overall quality of products and cybersecurity practices of the supplier, including the degree 
of control over its own supply chain and whether adequate prioritisation is given to secur ity 
practices.  
 
It is for Member States individually to carry out their assessment of risks related to suppliers, also 
taking into account the threat assessment by national intelligence services, and on this basis, to 
determine the appropriate scope of the  applicable restrictions.  
 
Question 9:  
What are the actual measures adopted to restrict access by "high -risk suppliers"?  
 
Reply:  The EU 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox recommends to national authorities to assess the risk profile 
of suppliers and apply restrictions, including necessary exclusions, to effectively mitigate the risks 
for key assets defined as critical or sensitive in the EU coordinated risk assessment report (i.e. core 
network functions, network management and orchestration functions, and a ccess network 
functions).  
 
The First Progress Report on the Toolbox implementation published in July 2020 https://digital -
strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/report -member -states -progress -implementing -eu-toolbox -5g-
cybersecurity provides a state of play of th e implementation of the Toolbox measures by 
Member  States, including on restrictions on high -risk suppliers. A second Progress Report on the 
Toolbox implementation is in preparation.  
 
Postal and Courier Services  
(WT/TPR/G/442: Page 184, Para. 4.242)  
International online retail platforms entered the parcel delivery market in some member States, 
according to the report mentioned above. Following the elimination of the exemption from import 
VAT on small parcels valued below EUR  22 in 2021, inbound packet  and parcel flow from outside the 
European  Union  decreased in most member States. The Commission expects the elimination of 
exemption from import VAT to incentivize consumers to shop more within the European  Union . It 
could also impact the structure of del ivery services as foreign companies having used individual 
parcels in the past could either rely on the Import One -Stop Shop or increase customs clearance in 
bulk coupled with the use of delivery services linked to online retail platforms or other local fu lfilment 
service providers. (See also Section  3.1.1.1 below)  
 
(WT/TPR/G/442: Page 49, Section  3.1.1.1, Para 3.5 & 3.6 ) 
New rules on e -commerce were implemented that contain procedures for the importation of 
low-value consignments, including removal of the import VAT de minimis  exemption. As explained 
in the previous Report, the legal changes were implemented through Commission Delegated 
Regulation (EU) 2019/1143 in 2019 but were applied only as of 1  July 2021. Th us, low -value 
consignments, i.e. those not exceeding EUR  22 that were previously imported free of VAT without WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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specific formalities, are now subject to an electronic customs declaration. However, in part to address 
concerns about fraud, the VAT exemption wa s removed, effective 1  July 2021, thus VAT is now 
collected on all shipments, including low -value consignments.  
 
To facilitate this change, the Import One -Stop Shop (IOSS) was introduced to simplify the 
declaration and payment of VAT for distance sales of low-value consignments dispatched from 
third territories and third countries. The IOSS can be used for imported goods not exceeding 
EUR 150 and it requires the registration of an electronic interface established in the European  Union , 
or an EU -established intermediary. Where the IOSS cannot be used, the European  Union  has 
introduced Special Arrangements that act as an alternative simplification. These Special 
Arrangements are tailored to postal operators and express carriers that complete declarations on 
behalf of customers.  
 
Question 10:  
Please provide statistics on the number of inbound packet and parcel flow to the EU  to illustrate the 
impact of elimination of the import VAT de minimis  exemption on small parcels valued below EUR  22 
with effect from 1  July 2021.  
 
Reply:  Until 1  July 2021, there were no precise statistics available at EU level on the import of 
consignments with a value not exceeding 22 EUR (the majority of all e -commerce consignments) and 
for postal consignments up -to 150€. The reason was that such low value consignments could be 
declared at import without being subject to a formal electronic customs declaration. Therefore, it is 
impossible to compare the imported e -commerce volumes before and after 1  July 2021. In the 
first six months afte r the implementation, approximately 2  billion  EUR of VAT was collected in 
relation to the import of low value consignments with an intrinsic value not exceeding 150€, of which 
approximately 700  million  EUR of VAT was related to the import of low value cons ignments with an 
intrinsic value not exceeding 22€.  
 
While there are no specific figures readily available to assess the exact effect of changes in VAT on 
small packet and parcel flows to the EU, reference can be made to UPU document 
CA C 3 2022.2 -Pres 4 (Trends and drivers of international postal exchanges) that allows to situate 
the effects also in relation to other factors (COVID -19, new remuneration models, consumer 
behaviour changes, changes in the network and replacement of international post by cargo  and 
domestic mail etc.).  
 
Question 11:  
While the Import One -Stop Shop (IOSS) has been established to facilitate traders' import declaration 
and VAT payment process, it is noted that to join the IOSS, a trader needs to register for VAT in at 
least one EU c ountry first, which could cost as much as EUR  8,000 annually. Does the EU have any 
plans to reduce such compliance burdens and costs, especially for MSMEs ?  
 
Reply:  Analysis has shown that the minimum one -off cost of obtaining a VAT registration in another 
Member State is EUR  1,200. In addition, the minimum ongoing cost, on a yearly basis, for VAT 
compliance in another Member State is EUR  8,000 for an average business. For SMEs the minimum 
ongoing cost associated with VAT compliance i s estimated to be in the region of EUR  2,400 per 
annum. It was precisely for this reason that the EU VAT e -commerce package introduced a number 
of new reforms, which were specifically designed to help reduce the compliance burden for smaller 
sellers who pr eviously might have faced administrative capacity issues in meeting their VAT 
compliance obligations in each MS where they sell goods . In terms of easing the compliance 
burden for smaller traders, the EU VAT e -commerce package provides various simplificati on options 
for traders to help minimise the need for multiple VAT registrations, thereby reducing the overall 
costs associated with VAT compliance and registration.  
 
One such simplification is the Import One -Stop Shop (IOSS), which was introduced on 1  July 2021. 
Smaller traders who opt to register for the IOSS do not need to register for VAT in each Member 
State in which their eligible supplies of imported goods to consumers take place. Instead, the VAT 
due on those supplies can be declared and paid in one single Member State (the Member State of 
identification) via the IOSS scheme. Traders who opt to register in the IOSS scheme can deal with 
their VAT compliance obligations in one language via the tax administration of the Member State in 
which they are reg istered, even though their sales are EU -wide. Suppliers and electronic interfaces 
who are not established in the EU need to appoint an intermediary to be able to use the import WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 scheme, unless they are established in a third country with which the EU has co ncluded a VAT mutual 
assistance agreement.  
 
Aside from the IOSS, the EU VAT e -commerce package also introduced measures to reduce the 
compliance costs for traders who make distance sales of imported goods via platforms. In this 
respect, the e -commerce pac kage provides for the deemed liability of marketplaces and platforms, 
where they facilitate distance sales of goods imported into the EU with an intrinsic value not 
exceeding EUR  150. Where the deeming provision applies, individual sellers on marketplaces do not 
have to register for VAT as the platforms will be responsible for paying the VAT due on supplies of 
goods made by underlying suppliers, where those supplies are facilitated by the platform. This 
measure reduces the compliance burden for smaller sell ers who operate via marketplaces as they 
no longer need to register for VAT in respect of those supplies.  
 
The EU VAT e -commerce package also introduced a simplification, known as the 'special 
arrangements', which is designed for postal operators, express carriers and other customs agents 
who normally fulfil the customs import declarations on behalf of the customer. This simplification 
can apply when neither the IOSS nor the standard VAT collection mechanisms are used. Where the 
special arrangements are use d, the customer pays the VAT to the declarant/person presenting the 
goods to customs. In this case, the supplier does not need to register for VAT in the Member State 
of importation, Instead, the person presenting the goods to customs will remit the VAT ac tually 
collected to the relevant customs/tax authority.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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CHINA  
PART I: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE Secretariat Report  
Page 9, Para 1  
The period under review was characterized by a major change in development and political goals 
and priorities led by the adoption of, inter alia, the European Green Deal, a Europe fit for the digital 
age, and a new political agenda to reinforce the European  Union 's global influence and leadership in 
the world. Policies and agendas under these strategies are expected to shape not only the political 
landscape but also impact many trade and investment policies. While many of these concrete 
measures are still a work in progress (e.g. the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, green 
taxation, and green government procurement), certain new measures have already been adopted 
(e.g. the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the Digital Markets Act (DMA)).  
Question 1:  
1. In the process of formulating specific measures on green taxation and green government 
procurement in the EU, what measures are relating to the small and medium -sized tech companies?  
 
Reply:  There are no measures at EU level focused on the link between green taxation and small and 
medium -sized technology companies. The report "Taxation in support of green transition: an 
overview and assessment of existing tax practices to reduce greenhouse gas emissions " (Taxation 
in support of green transition - Publications Office of the EU (europa.eu) ) has examined measures 
at national lev el and provides some examples of tax incentives that benefit SMEs. It should also be 
noted that the EU 's Recovery and Resilience Facility and REPowerEU provide an opportunity to extend 
the scope and use of environmental taxes. All measures, including with view to possible (indirect) 
links to SME tech companies, are available in the Council Implementing Decisions of the respective 
Recovery and Resilience Plans.  
 
Page 9, Para 4  
In February 2021, the European  Union  adopted a new trade strategy entitled An Open , Sustainable, 
and Assertive Trade Policy, which is articulated around the principles of open and fair trade but also 
seeks to achieve an "open strategic autonomy ".  
 
Question 2:  
2. Please elaborate on "open strategic autonomy " and clarify specific areas in the category of 
"strategic autonomy ".  
 
Reply:  As set out in the Commission strategy entitled An Open, Sustainable, and Assertive Trade 
Policy the concept of open strategic autonomy emphasises the EU 's ability to make its own  choices 
and shape the world around it through leadership and engagement, reflecting its strategic interests 
and values. The concept of "open strategic autonomy " therefore reflects the EU 's fundamental belief 
that addressing today 's challenges requires mor e rather than less global cooperation. It further 
signifies that the EU continues to reap the benefits of international opportunities, while assertively 
defending its interests, protecting the EU 's economy from unfair trade practices and ensuring a level 
playing field. Finally, it implies supporting domestic policies to strengthen the EU 's economy and to 
help position it as a global leader in pursuit of a reformed rules -based system of global trade 
governance. The concept of open strategic autonomy. It appl ies to all policy areas with where there 
is a need for the EU to reap the full benefits of an open global economy, exerting leadership for 
international cooperation and multilateralism, while at the same time taking the necessary measures 
internally and ex ternally to boost our resilience and protect our openness from abuse.  
 
Page 10, Para 9  
In the area of customs, new rules on e -commerce removed the VAT de minimis  exemption on imports 
of low -value consignments. Facilitating this change, the Import One -Stop Shop (IOSS) was 
introduced to simplify the declaration and payment of VAT for distance sales of these consignments. 
A number of IT systems for the facilitation of customs procedures continued to be implemented 
during the period and the remaining systems ar e expected to be operational by 2025…The number 
of tariff lines with non -ad valorem duties remained significant, at about 10% of all lines.  
Question 3 -4:  
3. Will the removal of the minimum VAT exemption for imports of low -value goods lead to 
restrictions in customs clearance for groups without IOSS numbers?  
 
Reply:  A specific customs declaration with a reduced dataset has been created for the import of 
consignments with a total value not exceeding €150. This concerns customs declarations for which WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 the IOS S was used, but also those for which the VAT remains to be collected upon import. As a 
result, there is no difference in the customs clearance formalities and no restrictions are foreseen 
for the goods declared without using the IOSS.  
 
4. "A number of IT systems for the facilitation of customs procedures continued to be 
implemente d". In what ways do such IT systems facilitate customs procedures in cross -border trade?  
 
Reply:  The objective of the deployment of the relevant IT systems is to digitalize customs procedures 
and hence to streamline and facilitate, amongst others, the entry of goods into the EU (safety and 
security), their release into free circulation in the EU, the ir transit through or export from the EU. 
For each of these procedures dedicated datasets have been established at EU level. All the relevant 
IT systems (national and Trans -European) supporting the implementation of the Union Customs 
Code must be deployed by end 2025. This will further optimize the customs processes and 
formalities, such as the processing of data provided prior to the arrival of the goods, allowing 
Customs to perform risk assessment in advance and release the goods in a more effective and 
efficient way.  
 
Page 10, Para 8  
Regarding foreign investment, in October 2020, the European  Union  implemented a common 
framework, which was adopted in 2019, for the screening of FDI for reasons of security and public 
order. In December 2020, the European  Union concluded an agreement in principle for a 
Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with China.  
Page 45, Para 2.54  
As of October 2022, 18 EU member States had an FDI screening mechanism in place, compared to 
15 at the time of the previous Review (2020), and 7 were in the process of adopting one.  
 
Question 5 -6: 
5. Please provide information on the implementation of the investment screening mechanism 
and on Member States that have established or are establishing FDI screening mechanism as well 
as on their legislation status and implementing agencies. Please also provide information on the 
annual screening number of transactions, rejected cases and the flow of foreign capital attracted by 
each Member State based on the investment source since 2019. What are the key considerations of 
the screening? How to ensure that the same standards are applied to foreign investment from all 
Members?  
 
Reply:  The European Commission publishes every year an annual report on the implementation of 
the FDI Screening Regulation to the European Parliament and to the Council. This report gives a 
state of play on FDI -related legislative developments in Member States as well as on the functioning 
of the EU cooperation mechanism on FDI screening. It provides also data on the number of  cases, 
the main sectors targeted, the origin of the ultimate investors, etc. Besides, it mentions the activities 
of the European Commission assisting Member States in information exchanges and exchanges of 
best practices. Non -discrimination among foreign (non-EU) investors is a key principle of the 
Regulation and the sole grounds for screening a foreign investment are risks assessed case -by-case 
to security and public order, regardless of the foreign investor 's origin.  
 
➢ The latest report is available here and the next report is expected to be published in the second 
half of 2023.  
 
6. Please describe the specific criteria and procedures of the FDI screening  framework and 
indicate whether the EU common framework constitutes an unreasonable trade restriction for other 
countries. How to define "threat to security and public order "? How to ensure that the increasing 
investment screenings  comply with the principles of fairness, openness and non -discrimination and 
do not affect normal business activities?  
 
Reply:  The EU FDI Screening Regulation lays down the criteria and procedure to be followed with 
very short deadlines. About 8 5% of the cases are closed within 15 calendar days. The FDI Screening 
Regulation is about identifying and addressing potential threats to security or public order, which 
may be caused by certain foreign investments without reducing the EU 's openness to FDI  or 
restraining the activities of foreign investors in the Union. In 2022, only 1% of the transactions were 
blocked by Member States, confirming that the European  Union  remains open to foreign direct 
investments and Member States only deny cases that pose very serious threats to security and public 
order. Non -discrimination among foreign (non -EU) investors is a key principle of the Regulation and WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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the sole grounds for screening a foreign investment are risks assessed case -by-case to security and 
public order , regardless of the foreign investor 's origin.  
 
The FDI Screening Regulation does not define the terms "security " and "public order ". However, 
Article  4 of the Regulation specifies the factors for consideration when determining whether an FDI 
is likely to affect security and public order. These factors include the potential effects of the FDI on 
critical infrastructure, critical technologies, supply of critical inputs, access to sensitive information 
and the freedom and pluralism of the media. Aspects relat ed to the investor are also relevant for 
this assessment. The interpretation of the notions of security and public order should be consistent 
with the relevant international obligations of the EU.  
 
➢ More information is provided in our Frequently Asked Questions . 
 
Page 10, Para 8  
Certain temporary measures on imports, e.g. suspension of certain duties, were  instituted to benefit 
Ukraine in response to the war.  
Question 7:  
7. In response to the Ukraine crisis and rising international food prices, what specific import and 
export measures has the EU taken for agricultural products? How are these measures imple mented 
and what are the effects? Are relevant policies consistent with WTO rules?  
 
Reply:  In response to Russia 's war against Ukraine the European  Union  has taken steps necessary 
to help Ukraine to exports its grains, oilseeds and other agri -food products  to the world and to the 
EU itself. On 4  June 2022, the EU introduced Autonomous Trade Measures granting all Ukrainian 
goods temporary one -year duty -free access to the EU market. This is in line with the EU 
commitments under the General Agreement on Tariff s and Trade 1994 ( 'GATT  1994'). Notably, 
Article  25 of the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine provides for the progressive 
establishment of a free trade area between the Parties in accordance with Article  XXIV of the 
GATT  1994. Further to tha t, Article  29 of the Association Agreement provides for the possibility of 
accelerating and broadening the scope of the elimination of the duties. Under the exceptional 
circumstances caused by Russia 's war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU considers it  necessary 
and appropriate to stimulate trade flows by granting Ukraine concessions in the form of temporary 
one-year trade -liberalisation measures for all products, in line with the main objective of the 
Association Agreement, i.e. the acceleration of the  elimination of customs duties on trade between 
the Union and Ukraine.  
 
Page11, Para 13  
In the area of technical barriers to trade (TBT), the European  Union  implemented some legislative 
changes that were adopted in 2019 to improve and strengthen the functioning of its TBT regime, 
notably regarding the application of the principle of mutual recognition, market surveillance, 
labelling, and online sales. During the review period, standardization gained more prominence. In 
2022, a new European Standardization Strategy was issued wherein standardization is identified  
as key strategic tool to achieve EU environmental, digital, and economic objectives.  
Question 8 -11:  
8. Please explain the specific measures of the newly implemented legislative changes. Have these 
measures been scientifically demonstrated with risk assessment and provided with appropriate level 
of protection? What is the impact of the newly implemented  legislative changes on EU Member 
States?  
 
Reply:  Regulation (EU) 2019/515 on the mutual recognition of goods (see: https://eur -
lex.europa.eu/legal -conte nt/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32019R0515&qid=1683106666030 ) applies 
since 19  April 2020 to non -harmonised goods lawfully marketed in a Member State. Its aim is to 
remove unjustified barriers to trade resulting from the divergen ces of national technical rules of EU 
Member States for non -harmonised goods by improving the application of the principle of mutual 
recognition. The proposal of the Commission was submitted to the European Parliament and to the 
Council following an indepe ndent study and was accompanied by an Impact Assessment 
(https://eur -lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SWD:2017:0471:FIN:EN:PDF ) 
 
The Commission will launch in 2023 an independent study in order to prepare by April 2025 an 
evaluation of the application of the Regulation and a report to the European Parliament, the Council 
and the European Economic and Social Committee (Ar ticle 14 of the Regulation).  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 The responsibility for market surveillance and for enforcing Union harmonisation legislation lies with 
the Member States. Their market surveillance authorities are required to ensure that the legislation 
is fully complied with . Regulation 2019/1020 on market surveillance and compliance of 
products  (https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32019R1020 ) updates the 
enforcement framework for the EU legislative acts that are included in its Annex. This covers 
essent ially all EU legislation with safety, environmental or other public interest requirements that 
affect the specifications and labelling of manufactured products other than food, feed, medicinal 
products for human and veterinary use, living plants and animal s, products of human origin and 
products of plants and animals relating directly to their future reproduction. The Regulation became 
applicable in 2021 (16  July for most provisions, whereas the EU Product Compliance 
Network  (including financing) was operat ional already in January 2021. Prior to presenting its 
proposal, the Commission undertook an Impact Assessment ( https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A52017SC0466 ), supported by an independent study. 
Implementation of Regulation 2019/1 020 is well underway. According to Article  42(3) of the 
Regulation, the Commission shall prepare an evaluation report on the implementation of its Article  4 
(according to which certain products may be placed on the EU market only if there is an economic 
operator established in the EU) in 2023. An independent study is being launched to prepare this 
evaluation report.  
 
9. Does the newly revised TBT regime bring implicit trade thresholds to other countries?  
 
Reply : The legislative changes were implemented in order to improve and strengthen the functioning 
of the internal market of the European  Union  in the area of free movement of goods. Any potential 
effects of these changes on trading partners have been assessed in the impact assessment carrie d 
out as a part of the process of preparing legislative changes.  
 
10. Please provide details on the system design and specific contents of the new European 
Standardization Strategy. What approaches will the EU take to ensure it is science -based and 
minimiz e its impact on trade?  
 
Reply:  The European Standardisation Strategy is not legislation. In relation to international trade, 
while confirming a strong global footprint of the European  Union  in international standardisation 
activities and a good track reco rd in translating international standards to European standards, the 
European Standardisation Strategy promotes a more strategic approach by the EU and its member 
states to international standardisation activities with the objective to more proactively sha pe 
international standards.  
 
11. With the continuous development of online transactions in international trade, please 
elaborate on what EU has done in TBT regime for online sales, and what the obligations and 
responsibilities are for trade participants?  
 
Reply:  Products offered for sale online or through other means of distance sales are deemed to be 
made available on the Union market if the offer is targeted at end users in the Union (Article  6 of 
Regulation (EU) 2019/1020). This means that market surve illance authorities are empowered to 
check and take the necessary actions in relation to such products in accordance with Regulation 
(EU) 2019/1020.When an online interface provides for delivery in the EU, accepts payment by EU 
consumers/end -users and uses  EU languages, then it can be considered that the operator has 
expressly chosen to supply products to EU consumers or other end -users. The physical delivery to 
end-users in the EU of a product ordered from a given online seller based outside the EU, includ ing 
by a fulfilment service provider, gives irrefutable confirmation that a product is placed on the EU 
market.  
 
The legal consequence is that, if the offer is targeted at end users in the Union, products offered for 
sale online or through other means of d istance sales need to comply with all applicable EU rules and 
can be subject to checks by market surveillance authorities pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2019/1 020. 
The economic operator offering the product for sale online or through other means of distance s ales 
is required to cooperate with the market surveillance authorities upon their request for compliance 
information or for other actions. If products are sold online, it is useful that the CE marking and any 
required warnings according to applicable legis lation are indicated in that website and visible before 
the end user is carrying out the purchase.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Page 11, Para 14  
In May 2020, the European  Union  adopted the Farm to Fork Strategy, which, inter alia, identifies 
the areas of action to achieve a sustainab le EU food system during the period 2020 -24, including 
possible reforms on feed additives, pesticides, plant protection, and animal welfare, as well as the 
establishment of a new legislative framework for sustainable food systems.  
 
Question 12 -14:  
12. Possible reforms on feed additives, pesticides, plant protection and animal welfare are 
mentioned in the Farm to Fork Strategy adopted by the EU. Please describe the purpose, direction 
and measures of the reform.  
 
Reply:  All the relevant up -to-date information in relation to the EU Farm to Fork strategy can be 
found at the following website: Farm to Fork Strategy (europa.eu) . 
 
13. Please explain how the F2F strategy is funded and the effect of implementation.  
 
Reply : Technical and financial assi stance from existing EU instruments, such as cohesion funds, will 
support the transition. The Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) and the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) 
will remain key tools to support the transition to sustainable food systems while ensuring a  decent 
living for farmers, fishers and their families.  
 
The Commission will also support Research and Innovation by funding projects on food, bioeconomy, 
natural resources, agriculture, fisheries, aquaculture and the environment as well as the use of 
digital technologies and nature -based solutions for agri -food. 
 
The Commission will monitor the transition to a sustainable food system, including progress on the 
targets and overall reduction of the environmental and climate footprint of the EU food system. It 
will collect data regularly, including on the basis of Earth observation for a comprehensive 
assessment of the cumulative impact of all actions in this strategy on competitiveness, the 
environment and health.  
 
14. Could the EU please provide information  on the implementation of the Code of conduct for 
Responsible Food Enterprises and marketing, and what are its implications for the production, 
marketing and import of agricultural products?  
 
Reply : The EU Code of Conduct on responsible food business and marketing practices is a Farm to 
Fork Strategy initiative that provides for voluntary pledging of ambitious commitments to accelerate 
the transition to a sustainable food system. The Code provides for seven aspirational objectives 
under which commitments can be pledged voluntarily by both associations and companies. This Code 
applies to its Signatories, which may be European associations, food business operators and other 
actors in – or related to – food systems which can meaningfully support a nd/or contribute to the 
aspirational objectives set out in the Code. The Code is applicable to all activities relating to the 
production, trade, processing, promotion, distribution and serving of food. Adherence to this Code 
is voluntary and is complementa ry to compliance with existing legal obligations. There are 
138 signatories to date. Since the Code is voluntary there are no implications on import of 
agricultural products, unless signatories made concrete commitments in relation to sustainable 
suppliers . However, the latter are not of a general nature but are part of a particular business 
relation.  
 
Page 11, Para 15  
A new Vertical Block Exemption Regulation and new Vertical Guidelines aimed at allowing 
undertakings to self -assess conformity with competit ion laws were also introduced.  
Question 15 -16:  
15. Are there criteria for enterprises self -assessment? Are these criteria clearly defined and 
transparent?  
 
Reply:  The Vertical Block Exemption Regulation and the new Vertical Guidelines provide a framework  
for self -assessment allowing undertakings to determine their compliance with EU competition rules 
for vertical agreements. The Vertical Block Exemption Regulation provides in a clear and transparent 
way a safe harbour where vertical agreements are block e xempted, provided they meet certain 
conditions. The Guidelines on Vertical Restraints accompany the VBER and provide guidance on how WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 134 - 
 
  
 to interpret and apply the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation and how to assess vertical 
agreements that fall outside the safe harbour of the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation.  
 
16. If the results of self -assessment conflict with the results identified by the EU, are there any 
corresponding measures for remedy?  
 
Reply:  It is the responsibility of undertakings to self -asses s compliance with the applicable 
competition rules. If the EU Commission is made aware of competition concerns related to a vertical 
agreement in contrast with the self -assessment of the companies involved, depending on the 
circumstances of each case, it m ay open an investigation. If, after its own investigation, it ultimately 
finds an infringement of EU competition rules, it can adopt a prohibition decision which may contain 
appropriate remedies (or a commitments decision).  
 
Page 11, Para 16  
Intellectual property rights (IPRs) remained of growing importance to the EU economy, both in terms 
of employment and contribution to GDP. Developments in the area of IPRs during the period include 
the issuance of new Guidelines on EU trademarks and on reg istered Community designs, as well as 
the adoption of two package proposals for the modernization of design protection legislation. 
Regarding geographical indications, two proposals – one for a Regulation on craft and industrial 
products, and one for a Reg ulation on wine, spirit drinks, and agricultural products – were adopted, 
as were quality schemes for agricultural products.  
Question 17 -19:  
17. Please describe the main contents of the new Guidelines on EU trademarks and on registered 
Community designs and explain the potential influence on future trademark and patent application 
registration.  
 
Reply:  Please, find here below the link with the main content of the Guidelines:  
Communication on changes _ GL 2023 main document.docx (europa.eu)  
 
It is important to note the cyclical na ture of the revision of the EUIPO Trade mark and Design 
Guidelines . One set of Guidelines does not usually radically alter the practice of the Office overall 
except in periods of Legislative Reform.  
 
On "the potential influe nce on future trademark applications ", more information can be found here: 
EU trade mark reform . The EU Commission is currently in the process of reviewing the present 
system  and this process will infl uence the future of the system.  
 
18. What are the main revisions of the new Guidelines on EU trademarks and on registered 
Community designs compared with the old ones?  
 
Reply:  Main revisions can be found clicking on the 'show modifications ' button, which  highlights the 
changes from one version to the next:  
EUIPO Guidelines (europa.eu)  
 
The EUIPO also produces mater ials to explain the changes from one version to the next such as 
webinars:  
EUIPO Academy Learning Portal - Catalogue (europa.eu)  
 
19. Are the two package proposals for the modernization of design protection legislation related 
to border protection by customs and, if so, could EU please describe the proposals and the expected 
timeline?  
 
Reply:  It is proposed to extend the scope of design  rights, like the scope of EU trade marks, to cover 
counterfeit goods in transit and other customs situations, permitting the holder of a registered EU 
design to prevent counterfeit products transiting through EU territory or being placed in another 
custom s situation without being released for free circulation.  
 
In performing customs controls, the customs authorities can make use of the powers and procedures 
laid down in Regulation (EU) No 608/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council, including at 
the request of the right holders. In particular, the customs authorities can carry out the relevant 
controls on the basis of risk analysis criteria.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 135 - 
 
As to the expected timeline, the two (package) proposals for a revised Regulation and Directive on 
industri al designs are currently being discussed in the Council of the European  Union  and the 
European Parliament. An adoption of the two package proposals is not likely before Q1 2024.  
 
Page 12, Para 20  
Developments during the period include the entry into force of adjustments to the regulatory 
framework for the posting of workers and the adoption of the DSA and the DMA in 2022. The DSA 
harmonizes the rules applicable to "intermediary services " in the int ernal market with the objective 
of ensuring a transparent, safe, predictable, and trusted online environment. It introduces due 
diligence requirements and systems for handling internal complaints, regulates online advertising, 
and exempts intermediary serv ice providers from liability regarding content, except in some 
circumstances; it furthermore contains additional rules for very large online platforms and online 
search engines. Separately, the DMA contains provisions aimed at restricting anti -competitive 
practices of certain "gatekeepers ", i.e. undertakings that provide core platform services.  
 
Question 20:  
20. What are the specific requirements of the DSA and the DMA for data access and data use? In 
what areas has the accountability of "gatekeeper " been strengthened?  
 
Reply:  The DSA  and the DMA both require the largest online platforms and search engines to provide 
more public transparency. This transparency is one of the ways in which these new rules increase 
oversight by society. In addition, the DMA prohibits the cross -use and com bination of data across 
different services provided by gatekeepers – absent user consent. The DMA also provides citizens 
as well as professional users of the largest gatekeeper platforms with certain access rights to the 
data that they generate through usi ng these platforms. These obligations increase the public 
accountability of gatekeeper platforms. The DSA imposes strict independence requirements for 
authorities involved in its enforcement in the EU, and transparency obligations also on actors such 
as trusted flaggers. The obligations are also without prejudice to the required compliance with the 
General Data Protection Regulation by all data processors and controllers.  
 
Page 12, Para 21  
Regarding digital financial services, a regulation on digital opera tional resilience of financial entities 
was adopted, while efforts to regulate crypto -assets continued.  
 
Question 21 :  
21. Please provide the name and link of the above -mentioned regulations on digital operational 
resilience of financial entities.  
 
Reply:  Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
14 December  2022 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector and amending Regulations 
(EC) No 1060/2009, (EU) No 648/2012, (EU) No 600/2014, (EU) No 909/2014 and (EU ) 2016/1011 
(Text with EEA relevance) – EUR-Lex - 32022R2554 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu) . 
 
Directive (EU) 2022/2556 of the European Parliament and of the Council  of 14  December  2022 
amending Directives 2009/65/EC, 2009/138/EC, 2011/61/EU, 2013/36/EU, 2014/59/EU, 
2014/65/EU, (EU) 2015/2366 and (EU) 2016/2341 as regards digital operational resilience for the 
financial sector (Text with EEA relevance) – EUR-Lex - 32022L2556 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu) . 
 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Markets in Crypto -assets, 
and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 – EUR-Lex - 52020PC0593 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu) . 
 
Page 12, Para 23  
During the review period, reforms in road transport services expanded certain rules to transport 
operators of small vehicles and amended rules applying to cabotage operations, worki ng conditions 
and requirements for drivers, and the posting of drivers. In the area of rail transport, reforms agreed 
under the fourth EU Railway Package in 2016 were phased in, while for air transport, the Commission 
approved a revised proposal to reform the "Single European Sky ", which also aims to address carbon 
emissions. Several air transport agreements were concluded or signed, among them a 
comprehensive EU air transport agreement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
In the area of  maritime transport, the reform affecting the provision of port services has been applied 
since 2019.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Question 22:  
22. Please describe the specific contents of rules governing the cabotage operations.  
 
Reply:  Under EU law, cabotage operations refer to th e transportation of goods or passengers within 
an EU Member state by a carrier established in another Member State.  
 
As regards the transport of goods, a haulier for hire or reward who is a holder of a Community 
license and whose driver, if he or she is a  national of a third country, holds a driver attestation, is 
only allowed to start performing cabotage operations in a Member State if he or she has previously 
carried out an international carriage, i.e. cross -border transport. This carriage may have its o rigin 
in a different Member State or in a third country.  
 
The haulier can then perform up to three cabotage operations within seven days of entering the 
Member State. Within this 7 day -period, a haulier may decide to carry out one, two or all 
three  cabotage operations in Member States other than the one of the incoming international 
transport. Hauliers can then either perform cabotage in one Member State only or in one or more 
Member States, but only one cabotage in each Member State that is not the Member State of the 
incoming international transport. Within the 7 day -period, each cabotage operation performed in a 
Member State other than the one of the incoming international transport has to be carried out within 
3 days of the unladen entry of the ha ulier into that Member State.  
 
A haulier is not allowed to carry out cabotage operations, with the same vehicle, in the same Member 
State within four days following the end of its cabotage operation in that Member State.  
 
As regards the transport of passen gers, any carrier who operates road passenger transport services 
for hire or reward and who holds a Community licence is in principle permitted without discrimination 
on grounds of the carrier 's nationality or place of establishment to operate cabotage ope rations. 
Regular coach and bus services cannot in principle be performed independently of an international 
service and are subject to the laws, regulations and administrative provisions in force in the host 
Member State regarding authorisations, tendering procedures, the routes to be operated and the 
regularity, continuity and frequency of services as well as itineraries.  
 
Page 13, Para 24  
Many member States implemented, or plan to implement, measures contained in a new toolbox to 
mitigate certain cybersecurity risks related to 5G, and some amended or implemented new laws 
addressing risks related to high -risk vendors.  
 
Question 23:  
23. Please provide information on the Member States mentioned above, the specific measures or 
laws implemented and the  high-risk vendors it targets. How to ensure that these measures or laws 
do not constitute discrimination against foreign companies?  
 
Reply:  Member States competent authorities within the NIS Cooperation Group, supported by the 
Commission and the EU Agenc y for Cybersecurity (ENISA), are working on the implementation of 
the EU 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox.  
 
The First Progress Report on the Toolbox implementation published in July 2020 provides a state of 
play of the implementation of the Toolbox measures by Mem ber States, including on restrictions on 
high-risk suppliers. A second Progress Report on the Toolbox implementation is in preparation.  
 
The measures recommended by the EU 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox are objective, non -discriminatory 
risk-based, do not target  individual countries or suppliers and in line with EU international 
obligations.  
 
Page 31, Para 2.4  
During the review period, the European  Union  embarked on a new development strategy under the 
European Green Deal (2019) with the aim of becoming a carbon -neutral economy by 2050.  
Question 24 -25: 
24. Please brief us on the specific measures and progress made in the development strategy.  
 
Reply:  The European Green Deal outlines a strategy to transform the EU into a modern, 
resource -efficient and competitive economy . WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 137 - 
 
The part of this strategy was to make the EU 's climate, energy, transport and taxation policies fit 
for reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030, compared to 1990 levels that 
is rolled out through several pieces of legislation s. Negotiations on these pieces of legislations are 
concluded, and the climate files will enter into force over the summer.  
 
Relevant legislation includes the strengthening of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), apply 
emissions trading to new sectors f or effective economy -wide climate action, and establish a Social 
Climate Fund to help ensuring that the transition leaves no -one behind. More precisely, it will deliver 
on the EU 's climate targets by:  
 
· Increasing the ambition of the Emissions Trading System (ETS) to 62% emissions reductions 
by 2030 compared to 2005 levels;  
· Extending carbon pricing under the existing ETS to maritime transport;  
· Introducing a new Emissions Trading System for the buildings, road transport sectors and fuel 
combu stion in industry not covered by the existing ETS, starting in 2027;  
· Increasing the aviation sector 's contribution to emission reductions through a strengthening 
of EU ETS for aviation, and implementing the global market -based measure CORSIA (Carbon 
Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation);  
· Establishing a Social Climate Fund to provide support to vulnerable households, 
micro -enterprises and transport users and ensure that no -one is left behind.  
 
In addition, Council and Parliament als o adopted legislation to:  
 
· Reduce emissions in domestic transport, buildings, agriculture, waste and small industrial 
installations by 40% by 2030 compared to 2005 levels under the revised Effort Sharing Regulation;  
· Introduce an EU target for net carbo n removals by natural sinks of 310  million  tonnes of CO2 
equivalent by 2030 and setting ambitious and fair targets for each Member State to reverse the 
decreasing trend of the EU 's carbon sink;  
· Require that all new cars and vans sold in the EU from 1  January 2035 need to be 
zero-emission vehicles.  
 
Finally, t he revised Renewables Directive (RED) and the recast of the Energy Efficiency Directive 
(EED) were adopted by the Parliament and the Council outside of the review period.  
 
For an indicative process up date on the Renewables Directive (RED) and revised targets under 
REPowerEU, please see the following link: https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/renewable -
energy/renewable -energy -directive -targets -and-rules/renewable -energy -directive_en . 
 
For an indicative process update on the Energy Efficiency Directive (EED ) and revised targets under 
REPowerEU, please see the following link: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/ press/press -
releases/2023/03/10/council -and-parliament -strike -deal-on-energy -efficiency -directive/ . 
 
25. How can the EU ensure that the strategy is implemented in a fair, open and transparent 
manner, instead of being impl emented as green protectionism?  
 
Reply:  We are dealing with an unprecedented climate and environment crisis that requires prompt 
action. We have set ourselves ambitious targets in the Paris Agreement and made commitments in 
the context of multilateral env ironmental agreements. This requires us to step up efforts to 
implement our commitments. The question is not if we do it, but when and how we design and 
implement them.  
 
The EU has developed it European Green Deal measures in a way that achieves environmen tal and 
climate policy objectives set in the international commitments and minimises impact on trade. 
Conscious of the potential relevance for the EU 's trading partners and the need to comply with 
WTO rules, the EU has designed all its European Green Deal measures very carefully and consistently 
with its international commitments and obligations. The aim has been to meet key criteria relevant 
from an external perspective. These include: measures are evidence -based and are underpinned by 
an impact assessment  and public consultations; measures are based on objective grounds, apply 
equally to domestic and imported products, and are not discriminatory; measures are not more 
burdensome than necessary and include transitional periods for businesses inside and outs ide the 
EU to adapt; wherever possible, measures are based on international standards; measures anchor WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 138 - 
 
  
 also the commitment of the EU to engage with trade partners in international fora to facilitate the 
implementation.  
 
In addition, it is also important to  note that the EU has been a role model for transparency of its 
European Green Deal measures through public consultations, impact assessments and outreach from 
an early stage in the regulatory processes in different for a, both in the EU and beyond (in Bru ssels, 
through the EU delegations in partner countries, in the WTO in Geneva and via bilateral dialogues). 
The EU has engaged in the WTO and bilaterally with countries and tried to address their concerns 
while preserving the objectives pursued by its polic ies. The EU will continue its dialogue and 
engagement with its trading partners including once the relevant measures enter into force and also 
in relation to implementing acts and decisions, in the WTO and bilaterally.  
 
Finally, the EU is collectively the biggest donor for international aid in the world, providing over 
EUR 50billion a year to help overcome poverty and advance global development. We also continue 
to support partner countries in their green transition, in line with our international commitmen ts. 
Through the EU 's Global Instrument (Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation 
Instrument – NDICI), we have so far committed about EUR  27.8 billion  in support of climate 
objectives in our partner countries for the period of 2021 -27. In De cember 2021, the EU launched 
the Global Gateway, a new strategy to mobilise investments totalling EUR  300 billion  over the 
period  2021-27. In line with the EU 's commitment to the 2030 Agenda, the Global Gateway aims at 
boosting smart, clean and secure inve stments in digital, energy and transport.  
 
Page 33, Para 2.9  
To support the implementation of its new trade strategy, in 2021 the Commission submitted 
proposals for regulations to the Parliament and the Council (Chart  2.2), including measures to 
counteract foreign practices considered as unfair or coercive.  
Question 26:  
26. How does the EU define unfair or coercive practices, are there universally accepted standards 
in this regard, and do es the EU follow these standards?  
 
Reply:  The anti -coercion  instrument, once in force, would provide for specific conditions which would 
guide the determination of the existence of economic coercion. The internal legislative process is 
still ongoing at this stage.  
 
The proposed conditions are as follows:  
 
• where a third country interferes in the legitimate sovereign choices of the Union or a Member 
State by seeking to prevent or obtain the cessation, modification or adoption of a particular act by 
the Union or a Member State  
• by applying or threatening to appl y measures affecting trade or investment  
 
Page 34, Para 2.10  
The proposed measures include:  
a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) for imports of certain goods (i.e. aluminium, 
cement, iron and steel, fertilizers, electricity, and hydrogen) (area of a ction No.  2). 
Question 27:  
27. Please explain whether CBAM constitutes a green trade barrier? Will the implementation scope 
of this mechanism extend to the downstream machinery and equipment of steel, aluminum, cement 
and other industries?  
 
Reply:  CBAM is  an environmental policy tool to support the EU 's increased ambition by preventing 
climate mitigation. CBAM  addresses greenhouses gas emissions embedded in a selection of imported 
goods listed in Annex  I of the regulation. These goods include iron and steel, cement, aluminium, 
fertilisers, electricity and hydrogen CBAM has been designed to cover a few sectors w hich are within 
the scope of the EU ETS and are at risk of carbon leakage.  
 
In the review report to be prepared by the European Commission before the end of the transitional 
period, the Commission will, amongst others, assess the possibility to extend the scope of CBAM, as 
well as the criteria to be used to identify goods to be included into the CBAM scope, based on the 
sectors at risk of carbon leakage.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Page 34, Para 2.11  
The regulation on foreign subsidies entered into force in January 2023 and will sta rt applying on 
12 July 2023.  
 
Question 28 -30:  
28. Article  32.1 of WTO  Agreement  on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM  Agreement ) 
clearly stipulates that no specific action against a subsidy of another Member can be taken except 
in accordance with the provisions of GATT  1994, as interpreted by this Agreement. Please clarify 
whether the EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation violate the principle of non -retroactivity of laws and 
Article  32.1 of SCM  Agreement ?  
 
Reply:  Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the Europe an Parliament and of the Council of 
14 December  2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (FSR) is consistent with the 
EU's international obligations and notably the WTO  Agreement  on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (SCM  Agreement ). Art icle 44(9) FSR specifies that no action shall be taken under the FSR 
which would amount to a specific action against a subsidy within the meaning of Article  32.1 of the 
SCM Agreement  and granted by a third country which is a member of the World Trade Organization.  
 
29. In terms of the legislative content, EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation does not apply to the 
trade in goods. What measures has the EU taken to prevent the regulation of enterprises involved 
in investment and public procurement from affecting the normal trade  in goods? How to determine 
companies that have received foreign subsidies are under the influence of anti -dumping and 
countervailing duties? Will the regulations have double or multiple effects, and what measures will 
the EU take to eliminate such effects ? In the relevant investigation of regulations, will the EU take 
the impact of the levied countervailing duties into consideration in the determination of the overall 
amount of foreign subsidies granted to companies, and will the countervailed subsidy prog rams be 
excluded in regime and regulation?  
 
Reply:  The FSR complements the rules set out in the SCM  Agreement . The assessment whether an 
alleged subsidy should be addressed under the relevant trade defence instruments or the FSR will 
depend on the circums tances of each subsidy and will be performed on a case by case basis, taking 
into account EU 's international obligations in accordance with Article  44(9) FSR.  
 
30. In terms of the legislative content, the initiation of investigation based on EU Foreign Sub sidies 
Regulation mainly depends on the discretion of the investigation authority. What effective measures 
does the EU take to ensure that the investigation is fair, non -discriminatory and does not violate the 
relevant requirements of National Treatment an d MFN treatment?  
 
Reply : The set -up of the FSR ensures that investigations are carried out in line with the NT and the 
MFN treatment obligations, without considering the nationality of the undertaking receiving a foreign 
subsidy.  
 
Page 39, Para 2.3.2.1.2  
Updates of existing RTAs and ongoing negotiations.  
Question 31:  
31. What are the provisions on the digital economy or e -commerce in the existing RTAs of EU and 
the ongoing negotiations? What are the main topics covered? What is the level of market opening?  
 
Reply:  The EU 's recently concluded Free Trade Agreement with New  Zealand , which can be found 
here: EU-New Zealand  (europa.eu) , is an example of a modern FTA entered into by the EU which 
includes rules on digital trade relating to cross -border data flows and personal data protection, a 
prohibition on customs duties on electronic transmissions, a  prohibition on requiring prior 
authorisation of electronically supplied services, provisions on electronic contracts, electronic 
authentication and trust services, electronic invoicing, a prohibition on requiring access to or transfer 
of source code, prov ision on the online protection of consumers, unsolicited direct marketing 
communications (spam), cooperation between the Parties, paperless trading and open internet 
access.  
 
Page 45, Para 2.55  
Of these transactions, about 29% were formally screened and 71 % were deemed ineligible or did 
not require formal screening. Of the transactions that were formally screened and had a decision 
issued, the majority were authorized with (23%) or without conditions (73%), and only 1% was WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 140 - 
 
  
 blocked. Applications were concent rated in four EU member States, which accounted for about 70% 
of them.  
Question 32 -33:  
32. According to the latest data, China is the third largest source country of investors in the EU 
in 2021, and about 17% of Chinese companies are subject to review whe n trading in the EU , which 
is higher than about 11% of the United  States  and 4% of the United  Kingdom . Does the EU adopt 
higher standards of screening for Chinese investors? Could the EU disclose the specific approval or 
rejection of Chinese -funded transac tions?  
 
Reply:  Under the EU FDI  regulation, Member States may maintain their existing screening 
mechanisms, adopt new ones or remain without such national mechanisms. Where national 
mechanisms are established, the Regulation provides for some key requirements of which 
non-discrimination  among foreign investors is one. According to Article  3 of the Regulation 
(EU) 2019/452 (the Regulation), rules and procedures related to screening mechanisms, including 
relevant timeframes, shall be transparent and not discriminate between third countries . In particular, 
Member States shall set out the circumstances triggering the screening, the grounds for screening 
and the applicable detailed procedural rules.  
 
The cooperation mechanism under the Regulation is subject to strict rules of confidentiality a s it 
concerns the security or public order of one or more Member States, or the functioning of an EU 
project or programme relevant for the security of the EU as a whole. Screening undertaken by the 
Member States is confidential and the EU cooperation shall  respect the same rules. Therefore, the 
Commission is not in a position to comment on individual FDI transactions.  
 
33. According to the latest data, about 96% of foreign investment transactions in EU Member 
States were approved directly or conditionally in 2021, with only 1% of transactions being blocked, 
involving foreign investment by Chinese companies in the EU . For example, Italy halted 
four transactions involving Chinese investors during the review process. What is the cause of the 
above situation? H ow to convince Chinese investors that there is no discrimination against Chinese 
investors in the review process?  
 
Reply:  The EU established a framework for foreign direct investments (FDI) screening to identify, 
assess and mitigate potential risks for se curity or public order in relation to FDI. Regulation 
(EU) 2019/452 (the Regulation), applies to all sectors and all third countries. It requires a case -by-
case assessment of all facts and circumstances to determine whether risk to security or public order  
arises.  
 
According to Article  3 of the Regulation, rules and procedures related to screening mechanisms, 
including relevant timeframes, shall be transparent and not discriminate between third countries.  
 
The Commission may issue an opinion if it considers that a given FDI is likely to impact the public 
order or security of more than one Member State or with regard to programmes or projects of EU 
interest; or if the Commission has information relevant for t he assessment from a security and / or 
public order perspective.  
 
Page 48, Para 3.3  
Some costs are charged to the holder of the goods in case of special circumstances such as customs 
services performed outside normal working hours or premises, exceptional  control measures, and 
the return, sampling, or destruction of goods.  
Question 34 -35:  
34. Please explain the basis and details of the charge.  
 
Reply:  Article  159 paragraph 2 of the Union Customs Code (Regulation (EU) 952/2013, hereinafter 
UCC) lays down that the EU Member States (hereinafter MS) shall ensure that official opening hours 
are fixed for the customs offices that are reasonable and appropriate, takin g into account the nature 
of the traffic and of the goods and the customs procedures under which they are to be placed, so 
that the flow of international traffic is neither hindered not distorted. According to Article  52 
paragraph 1 UCC, Customs authoritie s must not impose charges for the performance of customs 
controls or any other application of the customs legislation during the official opening hours of their 
competent customs offices. However, based on the 2nd paragraph of the same Article, Customs 
authorities may impose charges or recover costs where specific services are rendered, in particular 
the following:  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 141 - 
 
(a) attendance, where requested, by customs staff outside official office hours or at premises other 
than customs premises;  
(b) analyses or expe rt reports on goods and postal fees for the return of goods to an applicant, 
particularly in respect of decisions taken pursuant to Article  33 or the provision of information in 
accordance with Article  14(1);  
(c) the examination or sampling of goods for ve rification purposes, or the destruction of goods, 
where costs other than the cost of using customs staff are involved;  
(d) exceptional control measures, where these are necessary due to the nature of the goods or to a 
potential risk.  
 
35. Is there a unifie d standard for this charge at all ports in EU countries? If certain EU States 
charge unreasonably. Are there feedback mechanisms available to exporters in each country?  
 
Reply:  Given that the cost of goods, labour and services may be slightly different amo ng the EU 
Member States (hereinafter MS), the charges imposed by Customs authorities in order to cover 
those costs based on Article  52 paragraph 2 of the Union Customs Code, may also differ from MS to 
MS. Nevertheless, the MS must ensure that such charges are proportionate to the services rendered 
by the customs authorities. Therefore, where an economic operator judges that a MS charges 
disproportionate amounts in this respect, they may file a complaint through European Commission 's 
dedicated webpage . 
 
Please note that the European Commission and its MS maintain a published database  with the EU 
customs offices and their working hours; the database is updated regularly.  
 
Page 49, Para 3.7  
Pursuant to the European  Union 's Import Control System 2 (ICS2) Release 2 (Table  3.3), the new 
customs pre -arrival security and safety programme, imported goods arriving by air as of 
1 March  2023 will be required to submit advance cargo information to customs. Therefore, prior to 
the goods ' loading and arrival, the economic operator is required to submit a complete entry 
summary declaration. During the period July 2022 to February 2023, conformance testing was 
undertaken to verify conformity of all importers with the new system.  
Question 36:  
36. Please brief the implementation and effect of the EU's new customs pre -arrival security and 
safety programme.  
 
Reply:  Effective  and efficient risk management is crucial for Customs to achieve their objectives of 
protecting the society and facilitating legitimate trade. The ICS2 programme is a core elemen t of 
the 2014 EU Strategy and Action Plan for Customs Risk Management; it exemplifies the principle 
"Assess in advance – control where required " set in the 2020 EU Customs Action Plan.  
  
Aimed at strengthening the security of the supply chain by addressing identified gaps and 
establishing a more cohesive, effective and cost -efficient EU customs risk management at the 
external borders, the Import Control System 2 (ICS2) focuses on security and safety risks at the 
pre-loading and pre -arrival stages.  It is centred on acquiring data prior to the arrival of the goods 
(advanced cargo information), allowing the lodging and treatment of entry summary declarations 
(ENS), updating it as the goods move along the supply chain (multiple filings) and sharing dat a and 
relevant information among participating countries, in real -time, for risk analysis purposes.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 142 - 
 
  
  
 
 
You can find more information on the ICS2 programme on our webpages:  
 
https://taxation -customs.ec.europa.eu/customs -4/customs -security/import -control -system -2-ics2-
0_en 
https://taxation -customs.ec.europa.eu/customs -4/customs -security/import -control -system -2-ics2-
0/import -control -system -2-release -2_en 
https://taxation -customs.ec.europa.eu/customs -4/customs -security/import -control -system -2-ics2-
0/ics2 -resources_en  
 
All necessary technical documentation for the update of the EOs IT systems is found on CIRCABC:  
 
· CIRCABC groups ICS2 release 1  
· CIRCABC groups ICS2 release 2  
· CIRCABC groups ICS2 release 3  
 
Page 56, Para 3.31  
During the review period, there we re changes to both preferential and non -preferential rules of 
origin.  
Question 37:  
37. Please introduce the specific details of the changes in the rules of origin and the potential 
impact on international trade.  
 
Reply:  Please see under 3.32 the amendments regarding non -preferential rules of origin involving 
both technical adjustments and more substantial elements.  
 
There was no impact assessment on international trade but the changes comply with the general 
principle la id down in the ARO that non -preferential rules of origin should not themselves create 
restrictive, distorting or disruptive effects on international trade.  
WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 143 - 
 
For preferential origin, since the previous review, the main developments were new FTAs or EPAs 
that entered into force with their own unique rules of origin (see title 3.1.2.2. on page 57). The other 
long-standing agreements have not changed; thus, their preferential rules of origin remain as 
outlined previously. The only exceptions were the agreements with Ukraine, Overseas Countries and 
Territories (OCTs), and the underlying Regional Convention on pan -Euro-Mediterranean preferential 
rules of origin (PEM Convention), which have been revised (see page 58 of the TPR for more details).  
 
Page 71, Para 3.67  
Another recent development is the VAT in the Digital Age initiative.  
Question 38:  
38. Please describe the implementation and effect of the VAT in the Digital Age initiative.  
 
Reply:  The VAT in the digital age proposal: (1) promotes e -invoicing and introduces a near real -time 
digital reporting system for intra -EU cross -border commerce by 20 28; (2) introduces a deemed 
supplier rule from 2025 where an electronic interface facilitates supplies of short -term 
accommodation rental or passenger transport; and (3) improves the single VAT registration in EU 
and e -commerce rules.  
 
The VAT in the Digit al Age initiative will save businesses EUR  51 billion  in 10 years (2023 -2032). At 
the same time, it will bring Member States between EUR  135 billion  and EUR  177 billion  of additional 
VAT revenue in the same 10 -year period.  
 
Currently, the proposal is under discussion in the Council, and the implementation will start once it 
is adopted. More information on VAT in the digital age proposal can be found on the dedicated 
webpage:  
https://taxation -customs.ec.europa.eu/taxation -1/value -added -tax-vat/vat -digital -age_en  
 
Page 79, Para 3.88  
The European  Union  continued to be a significant user of trade remedies during the revie w period 
as new investigations of anti -dumping (AD) and anti -subsidy (AS)113 measures continued unabated 
despite the challenges of the COVID -19 pandemic (Chart  3.3). However, while the pandemic did not 
have an impact on the pace of investigations, there we re other impacts.  
 
Question 39:  
39. Please elaborate on the reasons for the increase of new anti -dumping and countervailing 
investigations measures during the pandemic.  
 
Reply:  AD and AS investigations are initiated when the EU receives a properly substa ntiated 
complaint from industry supporting allegations of injurious subsidisation or dumping. The following 
shows the evolution of new AD and AS investigations initiated over the last five years. The attached 
table shows that during the pandemic there was no increase in investigations initiated. On the 
contrary, the initiations decreased in 2020 and 2021 compared to 2019.  
 
2018  2019  2020  2021  2022  
10 16 15 14 5 
 
Page 79, Para 3.89  
Modernization of the European  Union 's TDIs  has occurred in recent years and was examined in the 
last two Reviews. However, since 2018 there have been few changes and the Commission has 
proceeded with operationalizing all the elements from that earlier initiative.  
Question 40:  
40. In the EU biodie sel case, the WTO Appellate  Body explicitly rejected the use of costs other 
than those on the exporter 's account to calculate normal value. With regard to Article  2.2. 1.1 of the 
ADA, the Appellate  Body stated that the cost records kept by exporters or pro ducers shall reasonably 
reflect the costs concerning the production and sale of the products under investigation. Although 
there is no restriction on "the sources of information or evidence that may be used to determine the 
cost of production in the countr y of origin ", the investigation authority shall ensure that such 
information is used to obtain the cost of production in the country of origin. Currently, when citing 
Article  2.6 (a), the EU has not taken any measure to obtain the cost of the country of or igin through 
reasonable adjustment of the price or cost in the third country. Please explain how EU 's relevant 
investigation practices are in conformity with the requirements of the Appellate  Body.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 144 - 
 
  
 Reply:  As the EU has clarified in several regulations imposing anti -dumping measures based on 
Article  2(6a), the EU considers that the provisions of Article  2(6a) are fully consistent with the 
European  Union 's WTO obligations and the Biodiesel jurisprudence. The  EU notes that the WTO 
Report on EU – Biodiesel did not concern the application of Article  2(6a) of the basic Anti -dumping 
Regulation, but the application of a specific provision of Article  2(5) of the basic Anti -dumping 
Regulation. In any event, WTO law a s interpreted by the WTO Panel and the Appellate  Body in EU – 
Biodiesel, does allow the use of data from a third country, duly adjusted when such adjustment is 
necessary and substantiated. Under Article  2(6a) it is only when significant distortions are fou nd to 
be present and to affect costs and prices in the exporting country that normal value is constructed 
by reference to undistorted costs and prices sourced in a representative country or by reference to 
an international benchmark. In any event, Article  2(6a) second subparagraph, 3rd indent of the basic 
Regulation also provides for the possibility to use domestic costs to the extent they are established 
not to be distorted.  
 
Page 80, Para 3.91  
The inclusion of social and environmental standards in the 20 17/18 amendments was a novel 
development whereby the Commission can take these into account when selecting an appropriate 
representative country to construct a non -distorted normal value and when calculating an injury 
margin.  
 
Question 41 -43: 
41. Please de scribe the purpose and considerations for the inclusion of social and environmental 
standards in the amendment s, and the effect to the calculation of injury margin. How to ensure that 
the implementation of these standards follow the relevant WTO rules?  
 
Reply: The purpose of the disciplines is to include all relevant domestic costs including costs related 
to compliance with environmental and social standards when calculating the injury margin for the 
application of the lesser duty rule. This in line with th e ADA, and Article  9.1 thereof in particular.  
 
42. Please provide the legal basis for determining whether a country has violated environmental 
standards. Are International Conventions like Montreal Protocol or Basel Convention also the basis?  
 
Reply:  The EU 's trade defence legislation does not contain any reference to or does not rely upon 
the notion of "violation of environmental standards by third countries ". 
 
43. How can the EU ensure that anti -dumping investigations do not become protectionist tools 
that discriminate against producers in other Members?  
 
Reply : The EU applies the trade defence instruments fully in line with WTO and EU legislation and 
ensures a non -discriminatory application of the rules by ensuring equal respect of the rights of all 
parties and its own obligations under the legislation.  
 
Page 81, Para 3.94  
In 2020, for the first time, the Commission imposed countervailing duties on goods produced in one 
country that received financial support, i.e. subsidies, from another country, so called cross -border 
financial support. Also in March 2022, the Commission countervailed preferential financing provided 
by China to Indonesia, as part of a complex sub sidy arrangement designed for export of stainless 
steel cold -rolled flat products to the European  Union . 
Question 44:  
44. The EU 's countervailing duties on so -called cross -border financial support runs contrary to 
Article  1.1 (a) (1) of the Agreement on Su bsidies and Countervailing Measures, which stipulates that 
financial support is provided by the government or public agency within the territory of a member 
(exporting member). Please explain the conflict between this countervailing practice and the 
requir ements of WTO rules.  
 
In addition, according to the logic of the European Commission, the economic and trade cooperation 
agreements between the EU and many countries and the transnational investment of EU enterprises 
may constitute cross -border subsidies and be subject to countervailing measures. Does EU believe 
that its exports under economic and trade cooperation agreements with third countries may involve 
actionable subsidies?  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 145 - 
 
Reply:  The EU refers to the relevant findings and conclusions contained in the Commission 
implementing regulations concerned:  
 
- COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2020/776 of 12  June 2020 imposing 
definitive countervailing duties on imports of certain woven and/or stitched glass fibre fabrics 
originating in the People's Re public of China and Egypt - OJ L 189, 15.06.2020  
 
- COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2020/870 of 24  June 2020 imposing a 
definitive countervailing duty on imports of continuous filament glass fibre products originating in 
Egypt – OJ L 201, 25.06.202 0 
 
- COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2022/433 of 15  March  2022 imposing 
definitive countervailing duties on imports of stainless steel cold -rolled flat products originating in 
India and Indonesia – OJ L 88, 16.03.2022  
 
Page 90, Para 3.122  
The modernization of the EU export control regime commenced in 2016 and resulted in a new 
regulation on dual -use export controls (Regulation (EU) 2021/821), which entered into force in 
September 2021 and replaced the previous regulation (Council Regulation (EC ) 428/2009) on the 
same subject (Table  3.17).  
Question 45 -46:  
45. Please brief us on the implementation of the new export control regulations.  
 
Reply:  The Commission and the EU Member States are currently working on the implementation of 
the EU Dual Use Export Control Regulation (EU/2021/821). In particular, the Commission recently 
published for comments new guidelines on the control of cyber -surveillance items and is working on 
new guidelines for export control authorities on the preparation of the E U annual report on dual -use 
export control.  
  
46. How does the EU ensure that export control regulations are implemented in an open, 
transparent and non -discriminatory manner and do not pose obstacles to normal business activities?  
 
Reply:  The implementat ion of dual -use controls falls under the competence of Member States ' 
competent authorities, which are bound by the principles of non -discrimination, openness and 
transparency of EU law and the EU Dual Use Regulation.  
 
Page 92, Para 3.129  
Most EU member St ates maintain at least one officially supported Export Credit Agency, with the 
exception of Cyprus, Ireland, and Malta.… Some member States have specific regulatory 
requirements for Export Credit Agencies while other mainly operate under EU and internation al 
guidelines or best practices.  
Question 47 -48: 
47. Cyprus, Ireland and Malta do not have an official Export Credit Agency (ECA ). What 
institutions, systems or policies are used for export credit, insurance and guarantee business in 
these three Member States?  
 
Reply : These countries do not report any State program or activity in the medium - to long -term 
export credits business i. e. "officially supported export credits " in the sense of the Arrangement on 
Officially Supported Export Credits. This is due to national policies and interests, as well as industrial 
structures. This implies that exporters from those 3 countries would need  to rely on cover and loans 
provided by private financial service institutions.  
 
48. What are the typical countries that have formulated specific regulatory rules for ECA outside 
EU and international standards? Compared with EU and international standards,  what are the 
particularities or differences between the specific regulatory rules formulated by these countries for 
ECA?  
 
Reply:  The rules and conditions concerning export credits are written down in the Arrangement and 
transposed into EU law through Reg ulation 1233/2011. In addition, there are differences amongst 
Member States ' policies on e.g. national content requirements and interests. Further information on 
these can be found on the websites of Member States ' respective export credit agencies.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 146 - 
 
  
 Page 93, Para 3.132  
As part of its trade policy, the European  Union  expressed that it would "explore options for an EU 
strategy for export credits ". 
Question 49:  
49. Please brief us on the implementation of all kinds of export credits and their effects?  
 
Reply : The European export credit strategy consists of two legs: 1) the enhanced coordination of 
export credits and other EU external financial tools, and 2) a potential EU export credit facility. We 
are currently in the exploratory phase for both legs. Therefo re, no export credits have so far been 
undertaken within this framework.  
 
Page 94, Para 3.134  
One of the cornerstones of the export credit framework is the Arrangement on Officially Supported 
Export Credits, as administered by the OECD, and incorporated into EU law through Regulation 
(EU) 1233/2011, including amendments. Although described as a "gentleman 's agreement " among 
the parties, the Arrangement is binding on member States through the above -mentioned Regulation.  
Question 50:  
50. After the Brexit, will the EU -level laws on export credit still apply to the UK ECA (UKEF)?  
 
Reply : Since the withdrawal of the United  Kingdom  from the European  Union , the United  Kingdom 's 
rules and regulations on export credits are a matter for the government of the United  Kingdom . 
 
Page 94, Para 3.135  
The sectoral understandings cover ships, nuclear power plants, civil aircraft, renewable energy, 
climate change mitigation and adaptation, water projects, and rail infrastructure. Prior to the latest 
amendments of the Arrangement, there was a Coal -Fired Electricity Generation Sector 
Understanding but now this has been incorporated as a prohibition in the Arrangement and as part 
of the Commission Delegated Regulation noted above, thus Export Credit Agenc ies cannot provide 
support for the export of new coal -fired electricity generation plants or parts thereof.  
Question 51 -52:  
51. Does the EU have special laws, policies or guidelines for export credits, insurance or 
guarantees for new energy projects? What  are the main contents?  
 
Reply:  The guidelines contained in the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits ( 'the 
Arrangement ') apply in the Union by virtue of Regulation (EU) No 1233/2011, in particular Annex  II 
(Articles 6 and 14 are particularly relevant for energy projects) . There are no additional EU level 
rules, guidelines, or framework that would bind EU Member States export credit agencies ' operations 
in this area. Nevertheless, all EU Member States share commitments at internati onal 
(Paris  Agreement,) and EU level (Green Deal). To reflect this, certain EU Member States developed 
their own legal frameworks at national level which, in some cases, prevent them from providing 
official export credits to projects in the fossil fuels en ergy sector. In addition, the Council of the 
European  Union  adopted conclusions in March 2022, in which all Member States expressed their 
intention to determine, in their national policies, science -based deadlines for ending officially 
supported export cre dits to fossil fuel energy sector projects (with the exception of a limited number 
of instances that are consistent with a 1.5°C warming limit and the objectives of the Paris 
Agreement).  
 
Besides this, certain EU Member States are part of other internation al initiatives on the relationship 
between export credits operations and climate goals (e.g. Export Finance For Future or E3F, 
COP26  Statement on International Public Finance).  
 
52. The revised Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits prohibits ECA from providing 
support for new coal -fired power station projects. Are there any changes in the support policy for 
existing coal -fired power station projects?  
 
Reply:  The new Arrangement rules agreed upon in October 2021 limit the provision of official  export 
credits for the supply of equipment to existing coal -fired electricity generation plants, to the cases 
where: a) the purpose of the equipment supplied is air pollution abatement, water pollution 
abatement, or CO2 emissions abatement and 2) the equi pment supplied induces neither an 
extension of the useful lifetime of the plant nor a capacity increase. This change does not reflect 
transactions that took place prior to its entry into force.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 147 - 
 
Page 95, Para 3.137  
The 2021 STEC Communication preserves the  main elements of the previous communications on 
the subject, i.e. it ensures that state involvement in export credits does not distort the market and 
creates a level playing field among the member State entities, but makes slight adjustments such 
as modif ying the eligibility criteria for SMEs, which in certain circumstances may benefit from state 
insurance. While under the 2012 STEC Communication, this possibility existed with regard to SMEs 
with an annual export turnover up to EUR  2 million , in the 2021 S TEC Communication the threshold 
has been increased to EUR  2.5 million . 
Question 53:  
53. The 2021 STEC Communication has raised the business turnover threshold of SMEs benefit ing 
from state insurance. What are the reasons for such an adjustment? Compared with its 2012 edition , 
what changes have been made to the short -term export credit insurance policy in the 2021 edition 
of STEC Communication?  
 
Reply:  The total annual export tur nover for SMEs (point 19.(b) of 2021 STEC) was increased to take 
into account inflation since its last calibration. Further adjustments to the 2021 STEC were of a 
targeted nature, not affecting the policy approach.  
 
Page 104, Para 3.168  
During the review p eriod, the European  Union  identified standardization as a key strategic tool to 
achieve its objectives under the European Green Deal, as well as under its new digital, industrial, 
and trade strategies (Section  2.1). In addition, during the review period th e European  Union  
continued its work in promoting the development of environmental (e.g. hydrogen, critical raw 
materials in batteries) and digital standards (e.g. artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and chips).  
Question 54 -55:  
54. The EU mentioned tha t it has set short -term, medium -term and long -term overall goals. 
Please provide further detailed information on the standardization strategy, such as the content of 
the plan, how it has being and will be implemented.  
 
Reply:  The EU standardisation strate gy is a fully transparent and openly accessible document, see 
https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/48598 . Its implementation is ongoing. An EU Chief 
Standardisation Officer was appointed, a High Level Forum for Standardisation was constituted and 
the various actions proposed in the Strategy are being tackled.  
  
55. Please describe the scope of application of these standards and their impact on the 
international flow of goods and services.  
 
Reply:  Measuring this is very difficult if not impossible. Neither the EU nor the European 
Standardisation Officer (ESO) keep any statistics on the influence of standards in trade.  
 
Page 105, Para 3.173  
In 2022, t he CEN and CENELEC issued 1,626 new European standards, of which 48% (or 791) were 
identical to international standards.  
Question 56 -57:  
56. Please explain the scope of international standards identified by the EU  
 
Reply:  In the frame of the EU 1025/2012 , the EU standardisation regulation, the EU identifies as 
international standards those developed by ISO, iEC and ITU.  
 
57. It is one of the basic principles of TBT  Agreement  to formulate national or regional standards 
based on international standards. Ple ase describe the main areas covered by 52% European 
standards (CEN and CENELEC) which are not identical to international standards, and what are the 
main considerations.  
 
Reply:  More than 74% of CENELEC standards are identical to IEC standards, while arou nd 34% of 
CEN standards are identical to ISO. See the publicly accessible CEN and CENELEC statistics, see CEN 
CENELEC in figures – Quarterly viewed at  
https://www.cencenelec. eu/stats/CEN_CENELEC_in_figures_quarter.htm   
 
The European standardisation process is responsibility of CEN CENELEC and ETSI . Only when it is 
not possible to act at international level the European standardisation organisations will draft a WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 148 - 
 
  
 purely European standard. The reason could be lack of interest at international level, or specific 
European legal requirements  
 
Page 105, Para 3.173  
Technical requirements are developed in parallel to standards at the EU and member State levels, 
but most of the regulatory acti vity takes place at the EU level, according to the Commission. For 
goods regulated at the EU level, technical requirements are established through EU legislation 
(i.e. regulations or directives)  … Manufacturers are responsible for demonstrating that their products 
comply with these requirements through the conformity assessment procedure provided in the EU 
legislation. These procedures vary with the product and may require the involvement of a third 
party.  
Question 58 -59:  
58. It is pointed out in this para graph that the technical requirements for goods regulated at the 
EU level are established through EU regulations (regulations or directives). Please introduce the 
situation that each Member State has established its own technical requirements for the same 
product, for example, for labeling, packaging, etc, in addition to the uniform legislation at the EU 
level?  
 
Reply:  The EU and its Member States have shared competencies in the area of internal market 
(Article  4 of the TFEU). This means that the EU and its Member States are able to legislate and adopt 
legally binding acts regarding internal market issues. However, Member States exercise their own 
competence only where the EU doe s not exercise, or has decided not to exercise, its own 
competence. Consequently, if the EU adopted product rules covering an area (for example, certain 
products, their labelling or packaging), Member States are not able to establish separate national 
rules in the same area.  
 
In order to promote the smooth functioning of the internal market and to ensure as much 
transparency as possible, national initiatives for the establishment of technical regulations that are 
outside harmonised EU legislation or that go  beyond harmonised EU legislation need to be notified 
to the Commission and to the other Member States through the "notification procedure " established 
by Directive (EU) 2015/1535. In order to allow also stakeholders and all interested parties to be 
inform ed about new regulatory initiatives at Member States ' level, the Commission has set up the 
Technical Regulations Information System (TRIS), a public database providing information on each 
notification procedure, updated daily, which can be accessed free of  charge.  
 
59. It is pointed out in this paragraph that manufacturers may require the participation of third 
parties in the conformity assessment process of products. Please describe the EU 's mechanism for 
third parties and how to coordinate with third part ies in the process of conformity assessment?  
 
Reply:  Conformity assessment is a responsibility of the manufacturer. However, if required by the 
relevant legislation, a third party must be involved in the conformity assessment procedure.  
There are three possibilities:  
 
— There is no third -party involvement.  This may concern the case where, according to the legislator, 
a declaration (accompanied by the relevant technical examinations and documentation) of the 
manufacturer is enough to ensure the conformity of the product(s) in question against the relevant 
legislative requirements. In this case the manufacturer himself carries out all required controls and 
checks, establishes the technical documentation and ensures the conformity of the production 
process.  
 
— Conformity assessment is performed with the involve ment of an accredited in -house conformity 
assessment body that forms a part of the manufacturer 's organisation. However this in -house body 
must not have any activities other than conformity assessment and must be independent from any 
commercial, design and  production entities (see for details Article  R21 of Annex  I of Decision No 
768/2008/EC). It has to demonstrate the same technical competence and impartiality as external 
conformity assessment bodies, through accreditation.  
 
— In some other cases the legis lator may consider the intervention of a third party i.e. an external 
conformity assessment body, necessary. Such a body must be impartial and fully independent from 
the organisation or the product it assesses (see also Article  R17(3) of Annex  I of Decisio n No 
768/2008/EC), it cannot engage in any activity that may conflict with its independence (see also WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 149 - 
 
Article  R21(2)(c) of Annex  I of Decision No 768/2008/EC) and thus it cannot have user or other 
interests in the product to be assessed.  
 
More information on the conformity assessment and notification of conformity assessment bodies is 
available in the Chapter 5 of the Blue Guide, which explains in details the conformity assessment in 
the general framework for EU product legislation. (https://eur -lex.europa. eu/legal -
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2022.247.01.0001.01.ENG)  
 
Page 106, Para 3.175  
Manufacturers not using such European harmonised standards must in certain cases show 
compliance with the product requirements by having recourse to a conformity asse ssment conducted 
by a third party.  
Question 60:  
60. Which institutions do the third parties refer to? Could the EU please provide a list of recognized 
third-party institutions?  
 
Reply:  The notified bodies are organisations designated by an EU member state (or, for some 
sectors, by a country with which the EU has concluded a mutual recognition agreement on conformity 
assessment) to assess the conformity of certain products before being placed on the market. These 
bodies carry out tasks related to conformity assessment procedures set out in the applicable EU 
legislation, when a third party conformity assessment is required. The European Commission 
publishes a list of such notified bodies at: https://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools -databases/nando/ . 
 
Page 109, Para 3.192  
In March 2021, the General Food Law was amended through the entry into application of Regulation 
(EU) 2019/1381253 (Transparency Regulation) to improve transparency and public participation in 
food ris k assessment and approval procedures of products.  
Question 61:  
61. Does the revision of the regulation support companies exporting food to the EU in food risk 
assessment and approval procedures? What are the specific rules?  
 
Reply:  Where EU law provides for prior authorisations for placing on the market food, feed and other 
food-related products (such as plant protection products or food contact materials), an EU risk 
assessment would need to be carried out in accordance with the applicable rules 
(authori sation/approval processes). Regulation (EU) 2019/1381 (viewed at: https://eur -
lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2019.231.01.0001.01. ENG), which 
amended the General Food law Regulation and other eight sectoral acts and which is applicable as 
of 27 March  2021, strengthens the transparency of the EU risk assessment process, including in the 
authorisatio n/approval processes. Any potential applicants for such authorisation/approval 
processes would need to comply with the applicable sectoral rules. EFSA is committed to ensure that 
all concerned business operators have all the information and support they ne ed to make a smooth 
transition to the new environment. More details about support services for potential applicants can 
be found here. EFSA has published detailed arrangements  for how the new rules and measures 
specified in the Transparency Regulation operate in practice.  
 
Page 110, Para  3.197  
In general, these goods must be accompanied by a health or phytosanitary certificates to enter the 
EU market and are subject to control upon their arrival at an EU border control post. The 
European  Union  participates in the International Plant Prote ction Convention (IPPC) ePhyto platform 
for electronic phytosanitary certification, which facilitates the electronic exchange of SPS -related 
documentation between participating countries.  
Question 62:  
62. Which countries have the EU exchanged ePhyto for electronic phytosanitary certification with? 
Regarding the above -mentioned  health or phytosanitary certificates, is the EU willing to compare 
and verify the relevant certificates issued by the Chinese govern ment online through a "single 
window " or other mechanisms, so as to realize intellectual connectivity?  
 
Reply:  As regards phytosanitary certificates, the interconnection of TRACES to the IPPC ePhyto Hub 
via a single connection for all Member States of the  European  Union  (EU), Switzerland and UK 
(Northern Ireland) allows TRACES to receive data of:  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 150 - 
 
  
 (1) electronic phytosanitary certificates (i.e. digitally signed XML which waives the requirement to 
present a phytosanitary certificate in paper form) and  
(2) phytosanitary certificates (i.e. XML of phytosanitary certificates which are not digitally signed 
and which require the consignment to be accompanied by a phytosanitary certificate in paper form).  
 
28 third countries are connected to the IPPC ePhyto Hu b and are actively transmitting to TRACES 
data of:  
 
· Electronic phytosanitary certificates: Argentina, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa  Rica, 
Dominican  Republic , Fiji, Guatemala, Israel, Jamaica, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, New  Zealand , 
Panama, Samoa, Senegal , South  Africa , Sri Lanka , Uganda, United  States . 
· phytosanitary certificates: Bahamas, Guyana, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Madagascar, 
Nepal.  
 
Considering the above, the connection of the system used by the Chinese government for the 
issuance of phyt osanitary certificates to the IPPC ePhyto Hub would instantly allow the direct 
transmission of data of those certificates to the EU via the established interconnection of TRACES to 
the IPPC ePhyto Hub. It is not foreseen to support any bilateral interconne ctions between TRACES 
and third countries ' certification systems.  
 
Furthermore, the interconnection of TRACES to the IPPC ePhyto Hub referred to above allows the 
EU, Switzerland and UK (Northern Ireland) to issue in, or through, TRACES electronic phytosan itary 
certificates for exports of plants and plant products and transmit them to any third country connected 
to the IPPC ePhyto Hub.  
 
Contrary to what applies for phytosanitary certificates, TRACES offers and supports bilateral 
interconnection with third c ountries ' certification systems for the exchange of health certificates. The 
online verification from EU authorities of health certificates issued by the Chinese government is 
only permitted on electronically signed data transmitted to TRACES via the afore mentioned 
interconnection.  
 
Page 112, Para 3.204  
Currently the European  Union  applies temporary border controls, subject to periodical review, to 
certain food and feed of non -animal origin (e.g. peanuts, tea, peppers) from 24 countries, and 
controls at a r educed frequency to 68 products (e.g. cut flowers from certain African and Latin 
American countries).  
Question 63:  
63. Could the EU provide a specific list of 24 countries, products and corresponding measures, as 
well as the scientific basis for implement ing the control? Is there a scientific assessment of the 
impact of trade and production? Have trading partners been informed of the relevant measures? In 
addition, the EU Executive Regulation No.  2022/2389 (EU) issued on  7 December  2022 stipulates 
that the inspection frequency of Chinese fresh pears will increase from 50% to 100% from 
1 January  2023. According to inquiry, during the 2021 -2022 period, Chinese fresh pears exported 
to Europe were not notified by the EU for phytosanitary reasons. Please explain the reasons for 
increasing the inspection frequency of Chinese fresh pears exported to Europe.  
 
Reply:  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/17931 lays down rules concerning the 
temporary increase of official controls and emergency measures governing the entry into the Union 
of certain food and feed of non -animal origin from certain third countries, based on the 
empowerments provided in Article  47(2) (b) and Article  54(4) (a) and (b) of Regulation (EU) 
 
1 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1793 of 22  October  2019 on the temporary increase 
of official controls and emergency measures governing the entry into the Union of certain goods from 
third countries implementing Regulati ons (EU) 2017/625 and (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council (OJ L 277, 29.10.2019, p. 89).  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 151 - 
 
2017/625 of the European Parliament and of Council2, as well as Article  53(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 
No 178/2002 of the E uropean Parliament and of Council .3 
 
Article  12 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1793 requires the Commission to review the lists 
set out in the Annexes on a regular basis, and not exceeding six months, in light of new information 
related to risks and  non-compliance.  
 
Several factors are taken into consideration during the assessment of information collected for 
possible amendments of Regulation (EU) 2019/1793. Case -by-case assessment is made depending 
on the origin /commodity/results of official controls/hazard/risks to human health/trade volume 
combination.  
 
The list of countries, products and corresponding measures are provided in Annexes of Commission 
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1793 taking into account latest amendments and available on 
EUR-Lex - 02019R1793 -20230216 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu) . 
 
More detailed description concerning regular reviews of that Regulation provided in Commission 
Notice on information related to risk s and non -compliance in the context of periodic reviews of 
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1793 which is available an EUR-Lex - 
52022XC0711(01) - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu) . 
 
The draft amending act, amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1793, after receiving a favourable opinion 
in the vote of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed (PAFF), is adopted by the 
Commiss ion and published in the Official Journal of the European  Union  (OJEU). In the period 
between receiving a favourable opinion of the PAFF Committee and before adoption by the 
Commission, the Commission informs the third country concerned by letter of the en visaged changes 
(e.g., inclusion/delisting from Annexes, changes to the frequency identity and physical checks) for 
the commodities listed in Annexes of the draft amending act. After publication in the OJEU a sanitary 
and phytosanitary (SPS) notification i s submitted by the Union to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).  
 
Currently commodities from China listed in Annex  I to Regulation (EU) 2019/1793 are:  
 
· Groundnuts and products derived from groundnuts due to possible contamination by aflatoxins 
with the fr equency of identity and physical checks, including sampling and laboratory analyses, set 
at 10% of consignments entering the Union.  
· Sweet peppers (Capsicum annuum) due to possible contamination by Salmonella with the 
frequency of identity and physical ch ecks, including sampling and laboratory analyses, set at 10% 
of consignments entering the Union.  
· Thea, whether or not flavoured due to possible contamination by pesticide residues with the 
frequency of identity and physical checks, including sampling and  laboratory analyses, set at 20% 
of consignments entering the Union.  
 
Xanthan gum from China listed in Annex  II to Regulation (EU) 2019/1793 due to possible 
contamination by residues of Ethylene Oxide with the frequency of identity and physical checks, 
including sampling and laboratory analyses, set at 20% of consignments entering the Union.  
 
 
2 Regulation (EU) 2017/625 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15  March  2017 on official 
controls and other official activities  performed to ensure the application of food and feed law, rules on animal 
health and welfare, plant health and plant protection products, amending Regulations (EC) No 999/2001, (EC) 
No 396/2005, (EC) No 1069/2009, (EC) No 1107/2009, (EU) No 1151/2012, (EU ) No 652/2014, (EU) 
2016/429 and (EU) 2016/2031 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulations (EC) No 
1/2005 and (EC) No 1099/2009 and Council Directives 98/58/EC, 1999/74/EC, 2007/43/EC, 2008/119/EC and 
2008/120/EC, and repealing Regu lations (EC) No 854/2004 and (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council, Council Directives 89/608/EEC, 89/662/EEC, 90/425/EEC, 91/496/EEC, 96/23/EC, 
96/93/EC and 97/78/EC and Council Decision 92/438/EEC (Official Controls Regulation) ( OJ L 95, 7.4.2017, 
p. 1). 
3 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28  January  2002 laying 
down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and 
laying down proced ures in matters of food safety (OJ L 31, 1.2.2002, p. 1).  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 152 - 
 
  
 Page 114, Para 3.218  
The Commission is, however, working on simplifying the procedure for specific categories of cases, 
through amendments in the Merger Implementing R egulation, its Annexes containing, inter alias, 
the notification forms and the Notice on Simplified Procedure.  
Question 64:  
64. According to this paragraph, the EU is revising the Merger Implementing Regulation, and its 
Annexes include relevant provisions on the application of declaration forms and summary 
procedures, with the aim of simplifying the handling procedures of specific types of cases. Please 
describe what types of cases the EU plans to simplify procedures and what changes will be made to 
the declaration forms and review procedures.  
 
Reply:  On 20  April 2023, the Commission adopted the 2023 Merger Simplification Package, which 
consists of a revised Implementing Regulation, Notice on Simplified Procedure and Communication 
on the transmission of documents.  
 
The package aims to simplify procedures for simplified cases, as well as for normal cases.  
 
When it comes to simplifie d cases, first, the 2023 Merger Simplification Package expands the 
categories of cases treated under the simplified procedure. Notably, in addition to the already 
existing categories, the Notice identifies two new categories of cases that can benefit from simplified 
treatment. These are cases where under all plausible market definitions, the individual or combined 
upstream market share of the merging parties is below 30% and their combined purchasing share 
is below 30%; and cases in which under all plausibl e market definitions the individual or combined 
upstream and downstream market shares of the merging parties are below 50%, the market 
concentration index ( 'HHI delta ') is below 150, and the company with the smallest market share is 
the same in the upstrea m and downstream markets.  
  
Furthermore, the revised Notice introduces four flexibility clauses, that provide the Commission 
discretion to treat certain types of cases under the simplified procedure that a priori  do not fall under 
any of the default categories for simplified treatmen t. These flexibility clauses apply for horizontal 
overlaps where the combined market shares of the parties to the concentration is 20 -25%;for 
vertical relationships where the individual or combined upstream and downstream market shares of 
the parties are 3 0-35%;for vertical relationships where the individual or combined market shares of 
the parties to the concentration do not exceed 50% in one market and 10% in the other vertically 
related market; and for joint ventures with turnover and assets between EUR  100 and 150  million  
in the EEA.  
 
The Notice also identifies categories of cases that can benefit from a "super -simplified " treatment, 
for which parties are invited to notify directly, after submission of a Case Team Allocation Request 
but without so called  "pre-notification contacts " with the Commission.  
 
Moreover, as regards the forms, the Implementing Regulation introduces a new notification form 
("tick-the-box" Short Form CO) for simplified cases. This form includes primarily multiple -choice 
questions a nd tables, and streamlined questions on both the jurisdictional and substantive 
assessment of cases. And also for normal cases the 2023 Merger Simplification Package provides for 
a reduction and clarification of information requirements in the notification  form (Form CO). This 
now includes clearer information on waiver possibilities, introduces tables for information on affected 
markets, and eliminates certain information requirements.  
 
Lastly, the 2023 Merger Simplification Package provides for the electro nic transmission of 
documents, including notifications.  
 
The date of entry into force of the 2023 Merger Simplification Package is 1  September  2023.  
 
More information on the Merger Simplification Package can be found on a dedicated webpage  and in 
a Q&A document . 
 
Page 120, Para 3.238  
The Commission has developed new voluntary green public procurement (GPP) criteria for several 
sectors, including f or computers, smartphones, and road transport, to facilitate the uptake of such 
criteria in tender documentation.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 153 - 
 
Question 65 -66:  
65. Please describe the implementation of voluntary green public procurement standards and the 
effects.  
 
Reply:  The EU GPP c riteria are developed by the European Commission to facilitate the inclusion of 
green requirements in public tender documents. These are recommendations therefore procuring 
authorities may choose or not, according to their needs and ambition level, to incl ude all or only 
certain requirements in their tender documents. The Commission does not have accurate data on 
the use by procuring authorities of these recommended criteria.  
 
66. How can the EU ensure that voluntary green public procurement standards do no t become 
new market access barriers and protectionist tools?  
 
Reply:  The basic concept of GPP relies on having clear, verifiable, justifiable and ambitious 
environmental criteria for products and services, based on a life -cycle approach and scientific 
evidence base. The recommended criteria are designed to avoid distortion of the single market and 
to ensure fair competition between all suppliers regardless of their origin.  
 
Page 123, Para 3.250  
Digital technologies have a strong impact on the development o f the copyright -intensive industry. 
On 9 March  2021, the European Commission presented a vision and avenues for Europe 's digital 
transformation by 2030, including a Digital Compass strategy that includes Digital Businesses as a 
focus. In the area of copyri ght, important legislative steps have been taken to create a single market 
for copyright -protected digital works.  
Question 67:  
67. Please provide the important legislative measures it has taken to create a single market for 
copyright -protected digital works.  
 
Reply : In 2019, the EU adopted Directive (EU) 2019/790 on copyright and related rights in the 
Digital Single Market – available at  
https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32019L0790&from=EN   
 
The directive aims to further harmonize copyright and related rights in the EU, in particular with 
regard to digital and cross -border uses of protected content. It lays dow n exceptions and limitations 
to copyright and related rights to allow, with appropriate safeguards, text and data mining, to 
facilitate digital and cross -border teaching activities, and the preservation and dissemination of 
European cultural heritage.  
 
The directive also aims at improving licensing practices and ensuring wider access to content. It 
introduces a press publisher 's related right for the online use of their press publications and new 
rules for the use of copyright -protected content by online co ntent sharing platforms. It also 
introduces new rules to ensure the fair remuneration of authors and performers.  
 
Page 125, Para 3.258  
Based on its 2017 Communication to the Institutions on Setting out the EU approach to Standard 
Essential Patents  ... 
Ques tion 68:  
68. Please describe the main contents of this approach and the legislative arrangement going 
forward.  
 
Reply:  A. The main contents of the Communication include the following:  
 
1. Transparency and predictability: The EU approach emphasizes the ne ed for transparency and 
predictability in the licensing of SEPs, including the disclosure of essential patents, licensing terms 
and royalty rates. It encourages SDOs to adopt clear and transparent policies for SEP licensing.  
 
2. The need for fair, reasonable, and non -discriminatory (FRAND) licensing terms: The 
Communication emphasizes the importance of FRAND licensing terms for SEPs, which should be fair, 
reasonable, and non -discriminatory to ensure that licensees can access essential technology at a 
reasonable cost, while also ensuring that patent holders are adequately compensated for their 
contributions.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 154 - 
 
  
 3. Predictable IPR enforcement: The Communication acknowledges the role of national courts 
and competition authorities and the importance of the  availability of injunctive relief for SEP owners, 
but also highlights the need to ensure that such relief should not be used to impose unfair or 
discriminatory licensing terms. It provides for a range of dispute resolution mechanisms, including 
mediation,  arbitration, and litigation. It also encourages the use of alternative dispute resolution 
methods to resolve SEP disputes more efficiently.  
 
4. The European Commission supports open -source solutions through funding from Horizon 2020 
and will continue to c ollaborate with stakeholders to promote an effective relationship between 
standardization and open source. The Commission will also fund studies to analyse the differences 
between the two processes and recommend solutions for collaboration between the comm unities.  
 
B. The legislative arrangement going forward: On 27  April 2023, the Commission introduced a 
proposal for a new regulatory framework on SEPs. The Commission 's proposals aim to improve 
transparency and predictability in SEP licensing, and limit tra nsaction costs. The draft SEP Regulation 
establishes mechanisms to more efficiently determine patent essentiality and FRAND licensing rates. 
The draft SEP Regulation proposes the creation of a 'Competence centre ' at the European  Union  
Intellectual Property  Office. This centre would administer the SEP register, databases and procedures 
for essentiality checks of SEPs and the FRAND determination. The competence centre would also be 
responsible for providing training, support and general advice on SEPs to SMEs  and raising 
awareness of SEP licensing.  
 
Page 148, Para 4.65  
The process of certifying the European  Union 's revised schedule including elimination of annual 
export subsidies commitment levels pursuant to the December 2015 Nairobi Ministerial Conference 
Decision on export competition, mentioned in the previous Review, remains pending.  
Question 69:  
69. Please explain why the process remains pending and when does EU expect to finalize the 
process.  
 
Reply:  The EU submitted the WTO the EU -28 Schedule (WTO number CLXXV) for certification at the 
WTO in October 2017 (WTO document G/MA/TAR/RS/506 plus addenda). Indeed, this Schedule 
reflects inter alia the EU commitments from the export subsidies part of the Nai robi Ministerial 
Decision on Export Competition (WT/MIN(15)/45) adopted at the MC10 in Nairobi in 
December  2015.Several members raised reservations on the certification of the Schedule. By end 
of 2019 all, but one member, had lifted their reservations. The  reservation by this member is 
unfortunately a misuse of the technical procedure of Schedule certification at WTO with a view to 
get leverage for different ongoing negotiations where it has an interest.  
 
Page 158, Para 4.114  
In 2021, the European Commission published the Fit -for-55 package  … The proposals relating to 
energy primarily focus on emission reductions through multiple channels such as, inter alia, phasing 
out coal, accelerating the roll -out of renewables, increasing energy efficiency, an d decarbonizing gas 
across various industries. The package also includes proposals to increase and broaden targets for 
emissions reductions; revise the Emissions Trading System, including expanding it to other sectors 
and complementing it with the CBAM; an d establish a Social Climate Fund to cushion the blow of the 
introduction of the emissions trading in the building and road transport sectors on the vulnerable.  
Question 70:  
70. On 18  April, 2023, the European Parliament voted to pass the adjustment bill of the carbon 
emissions trading system, and decided to bring the greenhouse gas emissions of the maritime sector 
into the carbon emissions trading system. Does the EU plan to bring the carbon emissions of inland 
ships into the carbon emissions trading syst em in the future?  
 
Reply:  The emissions from inland water transport are not part of the extension of the ETS scope 
applying to the maritime transport as of 2024. Any extension of the scope of the ETS would be 
subject to a new proposal from the Commission and a new legislative process. Emissions from inland 
water transport have been addressed in the past via targets to reduce GHG emission intensity of 
transport fuels under the Fuel Quality Directive. These targets will be integrated in the goals applying 
to the transport sector under the revised Renewable Energy Directive. Domestic navigation 
emissions from the inland water (and maritime) transport sector are also covered by the GHG 
emission targets for MS under the Effort Sharing Regulation.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 155 - 
 
Page 165, Para  4.146  
Different authorization schemes remained the most prevalent barriers in place, and for the majority 
of sectors, such schemes had declined little by 2017, although a relatively consistent improvement 
in the availability of electronic procedures was i dentified.  
Question 71:  
71. According to WTO Reference Paper On Services Domestic Regulation, what specific measures 
will the EU take to improve the transparency of approval plans and procedures for services?  
 
Reply:  While the existing authorisation and l icensing procedures for services in the European  Union  
are already in line with the disciplines of the Reference Paper on Domestic Regulation, the Union is 
constantly aiming at further improving those procedures and to reducing barriers to trade. For 
instance, the Commission launched a priority process of addressing jointly with Member States 
barriers to free movement of services in the sectors that are both economically important and 
exhibiting lower levels of integration such as construction, wholesale an d retail, professional services 
and tourism services. For more information on the future outlook and initiatives in the services area, 
please consult European Commission 's Communication 'Single Market at 30 ' (COM(2023) 162), 
available at: https://single -market -economy.ec.europa.eu/publications/single -market -30_en . 
 
PART II: QUESTIONS R EGARDING THE GOVERNMENT REPORT  
 
Page 5, Para 2.5  
Surging inflation is currently a key challenge eroding households' real disposable income.  
Questions 72:  
72. What plans and measures does the EU have to curb inflation? What are the outcomes?  
 
Reply : First, central banks in the EU have taken decisive measures to address inflationary pressures. 
In the euro area, the ECB has ended its net asset purchases under both the Pandemic Emergency 
Purchase Program (PEPP) and the Asset Purchase Program (APP) in 2022. It h as also raised its policy 
rates by 375bps between July 2022 and May 2023, with the ECB 's main policy rate (i.e. the deposit 
facility rate) now standing at 3.25%. The ECB also started to reduce its APP securities portfolio 
holdings in March 2023. Reflecting  the ECB 's intention to normalize its monetary policy instruments, 
the size of the Eurosystem 's balance sheet has declined in recent months. In Bulgaria, Denmark and 
in Sweden, the process of monetary policy normalisation has been similar to that of the EC B. In 
other EU Member States, central banks started to tighten their monetary policy stance earlier than 
the ECB and have increased their policy rates even more forcefully.  
 
Secondly, while the responsibility for price stability in the euro area falls upon  the European Central 
Bank, the Commission has emphasised the need to address the impact of surging energy prices. 
Given their fiscal cost, policy measures for this purpose should be temporary and should increasingly 
be targeted towards the most vulnerable  households. Income measures would in principle be 
preferable to price measures, as they preserve incentives for the energy transition. Hence, in 
March  2023, the Eurogroup stressed that fiscal policy in the euro area should facilitate the effective 
transmi ssion of monetary policy and that broad -based fiscal stimulus to aggregate demand was not 
warranted.  
 
Page 6, Para 2.9  
The EU is also revising its economic governance framework which aims to guide Member 
States in achieving their economic and fiscal policy objectives.  
Questions 73:  
73. What's the content and progress of the revision? What results has it achieved?  
 
Reply:  The central objective of these proposals is to strengthen public debt sustainability while 
promoting sustainable and inclusive growth in all Member States through reforms and investment. 
The reform will give more ownership to national governments, which w ill put forward and commit to 
their own medium -term fiscal and structural plans. The proposals aim to facilitate and encourage 
Member States implementing important reform and investment measures. Member States will 
benefit from a more gradual fiscal adjust ment path if they commit in their plans to a set of reforms 
and investment that comply with specific and transparent criteria. It will also strengthen monitoring 
and enforcement by simplifying the indicators used for surveillance and lower sanctions easier  to 
apply.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 156 - 
 
  
 A swift adoption of the new EU fiscal framework is a pressing priority to make Europe more resilient, 
by sustaining strategic investment for years to come and by reducing high public debt ratios in a 
realistic, gradual and sustained manner. The  current objective is to have Member States and the 
European Parliament adopting the reform by the end of 2023.  
  
Page 7, Para 3.2  
Accordingly, the EU has put WTO reform at the heart of its trade policy agenda in the 
review period and actively pursues its objectives.  
Questions 74 -75: 
74. Are there any further measures for the EU to advance WTO reform? If so, please elaborate.  
 
Reply:  The EU has been promoting WTO Reform during the review period and participates actively 
in all relevant processes and it wil l continue to do so. The EU 's latest contribution to the reform 
process is WT/GC/W/864 on Reinforcing the Deliberative Function of the WTO to Respond to Global 
Trade Policy Challenges.  
 
75. Does the EU believe that WTO reform requires adherence to true mul tilateralism? What need 
to be done to achieve the true multilateralism, rather than catering to or bending to the unreasonable 
demands of individual members?  
 
Reply:  The EU has outlined its vision for the WTO in its trade policy communication Trade Policy  
Review – An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy (COM/2021/66 final) as well as in the 
context of the ongoing process of WTO reform.  
 
Page 8, Para 3.6  
The EU will continue to support the smooth operation of and foster participation in the 
Multi -party interim appeal arbitration arrangement (MPIA) .  
Questions 76 -77:  
76. How will the EU continue to support the smooth operation of the MPIA? What 's the plan?  
 
Reply:  The MPIA  aims at preserving a fully and well -functioning dispute settlement system among 
its participants for as long as a long -lasting solution to the Appellate  Body impasse is not found. It 
ensures that MPIA participants can benefit from a binding resolution of trade disputes in the WTO 
(avoiding the so -called appeals "into the void ") and it safeguards the right to appeal review before 
highly qualified and independent and impartial appeal arbitrators. The MPIA highlights the 
importance that many WTO Members place  in the rules -based trading system and in a 
fully-functioning (binding and two -tier) dispute settlement system, showing the need for a 
long-lasting solution to the Appellate  Body blockage. Moreover, MPIA participants have provided for 
certain procedural im provements in the MPIA to enhance efficiency of appeal proceedings.  
 
As long as this interim arrangement is needed, the EU will take any necessary measures to support 
its proper operation, as intended by MPIA participants.  
 
77. What's the plan to enlarge the MPIA parties?  
 
Reply:  Any WTO Member is welcome to join the MPIA at any time, by notification to the DSB. The 
EU invites any WTO Member to join the MPIA , whether or not they have pending disputes that qualify 
for the MPIA. The MPIA aims at preserving a fully and well -functioning dispute settlement system 
among its participants for as long as a long -lasting solution to the Appellate  Body impasse is not 
found. It also highlights the importance that many WTO Members place in the rules -based trading 
system and in a fully -functioning (binding and two -tier) dispute settlement system . 
 
The MPIA  is proving to work very well. It has been tested in DS591: Colombia — Anti-Dumping 
Duties on Frozen Fries from Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands  in December 2022. A very 
similar procedure was used in a dispute between the EU and Türkiye ( DS583 : Turkey — Certain 
Measures concerning the Production, Importation and Marketing of Pharmaceutical Products ). The 
swift issuance of these high -quality appeal arbitration awards confirmed that, through the MPIA, 
appeal proceedings at the WTO can be managed in a focu ssed and efficient way while fully respecting 
parties ' rights. Various WTO Members are currently considering joining the MPIA. Japan became an 
MPIA Member in March 2023.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 157 - 
 
Page 9, Para 3.13 -3.15 
Question 78:  
78. Please describe the division of mandate betw een the EU and its Member States in the fields 
of digital economy and digital trade?  
 
Reply:  The Treaty on the Functioning of the European  Union  gives competence to the EU to legislate 
on matters relating to the functioning of the internal market, includin g on matters relating to the 
digital economy. Article  207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European  Union  sets out  the 
rules on EU trade policy. Trade outside the EU is an exclusive responsibility of the EU, rather than 
the national governments of member countries. This means the EU institutions make laws on in the 
fields of digital economy and digital trade, and nego tiate and conclude international trade 
agreements  
 
Page 10, Para 3.24  
In this context, transparency is one of the priorities, including transparency 's role in addressing food 
security challenges for example in relation to export restrictions, which can be detrimental to food 
importing countries.  
Questions 79:  
79. Please explain what transparency means here. What 's the plan to increase transparency in 
agriculture?  
 
Reply:  The majority of the export restrictions remain unnotified, a message repeated by all  
international organisations in the context of the current food security crisis.  
 
Transparency and effective monitoring of export prohibitions or restrictions are crucial for a 
predictable international trading environment and international food security.  
 
The rules related to the export restrictions need to be clarified. The restrictions when applied have 
to be notified and monitored.  
 
Page 13, Para 3.49  
Negotiations on data flows in the framework of the EU -Japan Economic Partnership Agreement, 
which cont ains an explicit review clause on data flows, were launched on 24  October  2022.  
Questions 80 -82:  
80. Please describe the "Data Flows Review Clause ". 
 
Reply:  The EU -Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) does not contain provisions on data 
flows. Against that background, a review clause was introduced in the agreement providing that the 
Parties shall reassess together the need for inclusion of provisions on the free flow of data at a later 
stage, i.e. within three years of the data of entry into force of the EPA . 
 
81. How does the "Data Flows Review Clause " safeguard individual privacy and data security?  
 
Reply:  The review clause does not address privacy or data protection, it only commits the Parties to 
the EPA to reassess the need for the inclusion of provisions on the free flow of data within three  years 
of the date of entry into force of the agreement.  
 
82. Will the EU continue to adopt this clause in future bilateral and multilateral agreements?  
 
Reply:  The outcome of future negotiat ions cannot be predicted at this point time. The EU is therefore 
not in a position to reply to this question.  
 
Page 15, Para 3.60  
The parties agreed to only finance their LCA manufacturers on market terms and provide R&D 
funding through an open and transpa rent process. The Cooperative Framework for LCA also 
established a working party, chaired by each party 's trade minister, tasked with analysing and 
addressing non -market practices of third parties in this sector.  
Questions 83:  
83. What is the latest devel opment of this framework? What are the main third parties in the 
framework?  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 158 - 
 
  
 Reply:  The EU -US Understanding on Large Civil Aircrafts of June 2021 allowed to overcome 
long-standing differences in order to avoid future litigation and preserve a level playing field between 
our aircraft manufacturers, while the EU and US work to prevent new differences from arising.  
 
The European Commission Directorate General for TRADE and the office of the US Trade 
Representative have been holding technical -level discu ssions, through exchanging questions on 
related programmes financed by governments, to ensure that any funding for research and 
development (R&D) for large civil aircraft to LCA producers apply open and transparent processes.  
 
The EU and US also exchange information on non -market practices, as endorsed by EVP Dombrovskis 
and USTR Tai on 4  December  2022. The next Ministerial -level meeting is expected to take place later 
in 2023, where the principals are expected to take stock of the work done so far.  
 
Page 15, Para 3.61  
Encouraged by resolving one of their most ardent trade conflicts, the EU and the US announced the 
beginning of a renewed transatlantic partnership at their bilateral summit on 15  June 2021. 
Strengthening trade, investment and technological co operation is a key priority of both parties in a 
multilateral and bilateral context.  
Question 84:  
84. Please elaborate on the TTC Working Group on Export Controls, its latest developments and 
impact on EU export control policies. Are there discriminatory m easures against third countries?  
 
Reply : The field of export controls is one of the ten themes of the EU -US TTC. There is a dedicated 
working group on it and discussion are country -agnostic and non -discriminatory. In particular, the 
EU is engaging with th e US Administration, including in the context of the Trade and Technology 
Council, to seek ways to promote multilateral rather than unilateral controls in line with the 
international trade rules, and to avoid undue disruptions to global supply chains. The EU considers 
that it is important to ensure that the application of export controls is transparent and equitable and 
based on objective criteria.  
 
Page 15, Para 3.62  
The objective of the TTC  is to enhance trade and investment, strengthen technological and industrial 
leadership, and boost innovation, by promoting emerging technologies and infrastructure, and 
encouraging compatible standards and regulations based on shared democratic values.  
Questions 85:  
85. In the EU 's view, how to prevent these measures, based on shared "democratic values ", from 
becoming disguised trade and investment restrictions contrary to the basic principles of the WTO, 
such as the principle of most -favoured -nation tre atment and trade liberalisation?  
 
Reply:  Both sides have repeatedly underlined the importance of an open and fair multilateral 
rules-based system that also firms the basis of the EU -US cooperation under the Trade and 
Technology Council. Our efforts within  the TTC therefore aim to strengthen and support the 
abovementioned objectives and encourage cooperation in other multilateral fora.  
  
Page 15, Para 3.64  
The EU and US will also continue on non -market economic policies and practices and on shared 
concerns  as regards economic coercion.  
Questions 86 -88: 
86. What are the specific connotations and external manifestations of economic coercion? How to 
determine that the conduct of a third country is "economic coercion "? How to ensure that its 
definition is not e xpanded or obscured in enforcement?  
 
Reply : The anti -coercion instrument, once in force, would provide for specific conditions which would 
guide the determination of the existence of economic coercion. The internal legislative process is 
still ongoing at this stage. The proposed conditions are as follows:  
 
- where a third country interferes in the legitimate sovereign choices of the Union or a Member 
State by seeking to prevent or obtain the cessation, modification or adoption of a particular act by 
the Union or a Member State  
- by applying or threatening to apply measures affecting trade or investment.  
Union legal acts are subject to judicial review.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 159 - 
 
87. This paragraph points out that the EU 's last resort against coercion is to take countermeasures. 
It's understood that the new regulation allows the EU to implement countermeasures immediately 
while protecting the interests of the EU and its Member States, with the risk of going beyond 
WTO rules. This means that the EU can decide for itself to counter the  "coerciing " countries 
designated by the EU unilaterally instead of resorting to the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO. 
Does the EU have any comment on this?  
 
Reply:  The anti -coercion instrument, once in force, would provide only for a response by the EU in 
a situation created by a third country that compromises the Union 's or Member States ' interests, 
and also those of economic operators. It is not about protectionism but about not tolerating economic 
coercion, it is preserving the legitimate policymaking  space of the Union and Member States and 
taking a stance against the issue of economic coercion.  
 
Establishing a dedicated instrument corresponds to the EU 's adherence to the rules -based system 
and the rule of law more generally. It is permitted by and c onsistent with international law. It ensures 
predictably, and therefore deterrence.  
 
Evidently, this instrument will not be a means to short circuit WTO dispute settlement. It will not be 
a means to impose countermeasures to respond to a manifest breach of  the WTO rules. There are 
multilateral rules on this, to which the EU is subject.  
 
88. How can the EU ensure that there are no double standards in defining economic coercion? If 
a third country adopts countermeasures against the fault of its member state, will the EU retaliate 
by identifying this move as "economic coercion "?  
 
Reply:  The anti -coercion instrument, once in force, would provide for specific conditions which would 
guide the determination of the existence of economic coercion. The internal legislative process is 
still ongoing at this stage. The anti -coercion instrument is n ot about retaliation but about responding 
to economic coercion. Establishing a dedicated instrument corresponds to the EU 's adherence to the 
rules-based system and the rule of law more generally. It is permitted by and consistent with 
international law. It  ensures predictably, and therefore deterrence. A legitimate countermeasure will 
not satisfy the conditions of the definition of economic coercion.  
 
Page 15, Para 3.65  
On 31  October  2021, as demonstration of renewed trust, the EU and the US jointly announced their 
intention to agree on a Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminium (GSA).  
Questions 89 -91: 
89. Is the GSA consistent with WTO rules, particularly Article  1 and 24 of the GATT  1994 and the 
Agreement on Safeguards? Is it a discrimi nation against other stakeholders, or does it constitute 
trade barriers for imported steel and aluminum products?  
 
Reply:  The Global Sustainable Arrangement (GSA) on steel and aluminium will encourage low -carbon 
intensity steel and aluminium production an d trade, and restore market -oriented conditions globally 
and bilaterally. Together, the EU and US will incentivize emission reductions in these 
carbon -intensive sectors. (Link to the text of the EU -US Joint Statement of 10  March  2023: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_23_1613 ). The EU respects its 
international commitments.  
 
90. Please de scribe the progress of the negotiation. How does the EU ensure that the arrangement 
achieves the desired results? Will similar agreements be concluded regarding other products in 
future?  
 
Reply:  On 10 March, President von der Leyen and President Biden rei terated the strong EU -US 
commitment to achieving an ambitious outcome for the Global Sustainable Arrangement (GSA) on 
steel and aluminium (GSA) negotiations by October 2023. (Link to the text of the EU -US Joint 
Statement of 10  March  2023:  
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_23_1613 ).  
The GSA is focused on steel and aluminium products.  
 
91. Please describe specific measures taken and to be taken by the EU, including jointly with other 
Members, to address the emission intensity of steel and aluminium production.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 160 - 
 
  
 Reply:  The Global Sustainable Arrangement (GSA) on steel and aluminium will encourage low -carbon 
intensity steel and aluminium production and trade, and restore market -oriented conditions globally 
and bilaterally. Together, the EU and US will incentivize emission reductions in these 
carbon -intensive sectors. ( Link to the text of the EU -US Joint Statem ent of 10  March  2023: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_23_1613 ).  
 
Page 16, Para 3.68  
In its "Strategy for Cooperation with the Indo -Pacific ", the EU announced the intention to develop 
Digital Partnerships with Japan, the Republic of Korea and Singapore. The Partnerships are flexibl e 
instruments going beyond dialogue and exchange of information in order to create a collaboration 
vehicle to deliver concrete deliverables, such as collaboration in the field of Research & Innovation, 
regulatory cooperation and mechanisms for collaboratio n in international fora.  
Questions 92 -93: 
92. Please describe the EU 's progress in forming digital partnerships with Japan, the 
Republic  of Korea and Singapore. What are the main issues and elements covered? What is the level 
of market openness? Please giv e examples to explain specific measures.  
 
Reply:  The Commission publishes all relevant information on ongoing collaboration in its Digital 
Partnerships on this webpage . So far Digital Partnerships with Japan, the Republic of Korea and 
Singapore have been agreed. You can find the text for the EU 's Digital Partnerships with Japan , the 
Republic of Korea  and Singapore  online on the aforementioned webpage.  
 
93. Is the aforementioned digital partnership agreement part of the RTA? Will WTO 
most-favoured -nation treatment apply?  
 
Reply:  The Commission publishes all relevant information on ongoing collaboration in its Di gital 
Partnerships on this webpage . The EU 's Digital Partnerships with Japan, the Republic of Korea and 
Singapore are not part of an RTA. They are non -binding in nature and do not include trade disciplines.  
 
Page 16, Para 3.69  
Key topics included in the scope of each Partnership comprise: semiconductors supply chain 
resilience; 5G/6G; cybersecurity; platform, data and AI regulation; digital trade; digital identity and 
digital signatures; closing the digital skills gap and digita l inclusion.  
Questions 94 -95:  
94. Please explain the main objectives, implementation measures and latest progress under each 
of these partnerships on topics such as semiconductor supply chain resilience, 5G/6G, cybersecurity, 
platforms, data and AI regulation, digital trade, digital identi ty and digital signatures, bridging the 
digital skills gap and digital inclusion.  
 
Reply:  The Commission publishes all relevant information on ongoing collaboration in its Digital 
Partnerships on this webpage . You can find the text for the EU 's Digital Partnerships with Japan , the 
Republic of Korea  and Singapore , as well as information on implementation measurers and the latest 
progres s, online on the aforementioned webpage . 
 
95. Please explain whether the implementation in the above areas under these partnerships will 
have a negative impact on non -partnership parties? Has a systematic and in -depth assessment been 
conducted?  
 
Reply:  The Commission publishes all relevant information on ongoing collaboration in its Digital 
Partnerships on this webpage . The EU 's Digital Partnershi ps with Japan, the Republic of Korea and 
Singapore are non -binding instruments and the impact on other non -partnership parties is not 
considered significant.  
 
Page 16, Para 3.74  
The pan -Euro-Mediterranean (PEM) Convention on rules of origin establishes common rules of origin 
(RoO) among the countries in the PEM zone in order to facilitate trade and the integration of supply 
chains within the area.  
Questions 96 -97: 
96. What are the substantive and procedural rules of the rules of origin stipul ated in the pan -Euro-
Mediterranean Convention?  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 161 - 
 
Reply:  An overview of the rules of origin in the PEM convention can be found here via the following 
links:  
https://taxation -customs.ec.europa.eu/customs -4/international -affairs/pan -euro-mediterranean -
cumulation -and-pem-convention_en https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access -to-
markets/en/content/pan -euro-mediterranean -convention -pem 
 
97. Do PEM rules of origin discriminate against third parties outside the  PEM model?  
 
Reply:  The PEM Convention contains rules of preferential origin applicable only among the PEM 
Contracting parties through a network of FTAs making reference to the PEM Convention. Third parties 
may become a Contracting Party to this PEM Convention upon written request, provided that the 
candidate country or territory has a free trade agreement in force with at least one of the Contracting 
Parties. This FTA should provide for preferential rules of origin (Article  5 of the PEM Convention).  
 
Page 16, Para 3.75  
In the context of the revision of the PEM Convention, the EU and a majority of PEM Contracting 
parties decided to start applying the new, modernised rules of origin in advance (the so -called 
transitional rules), pending the adoption and  entry into force of the revised PEM Convention.  
Questions 98:  
98. What are the main differences between the new modernised rules of origin and the old ones?  
 
Reply:  The new rules, which were endorsed by a large majority of PEM Contracting Parties, contain  
a significant number of improvements and simplifications as compared with the current PEM 
Convention. The rules have been modernised, simplified and are more flexible for almost all 
products. The new rules provide for an enabling clause to introduce elect ronic certification.  
 
Page 17, Para 4.2  
At unilateral level, the EU 's Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP ) removes import duties for 
products coming into the EU market from vulnerable developing countries. Under the standard GSP 
arrangement, the EU currently grants partial or full tariff reductions on around 66% of tariff lines 
to 11 countries.  
Questions 99:  
99. What are the criteria for GSP treatment granted by the EU to developing countries?  
 
Reply : The criteria for receiving GSP preferences are outlined in the GSP Regulation 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2012/978/2023 -01-01 They are different according to each GSP 
arrangements (standard GSP, the Special In  
 
Page 17, Para 4.3  
Under  the EU 's current GSP Regulation, all GSP beneficiary countries (including EBA beneficiaries) 
have to respect the principles of 15 core conventions on human and labour rights.  
Questions 100 -101:  
100. Are the EU 's requirements for GSP beneficiary countries  to fulfill obligations on human rights, 
labour rights and environmental protection based on the provisions of international conventions, or 
is the EU unilaterally linking GSP to these requirements?  
 
Reply:  All the EU GSP 's requirements on human rights, la bour rights and environmental protection 
are based on recognised international standards laid down in international conventions.  
 
101. What is the relationship between the GSP environmental protection requirements and 
the CBAM? Does this constitute a dual -obligation requirement for GSP -beneficiary developing 
countries?  
 
Reply:  The EU GSP Regulation entered into force on 1  January  2014 and thus does not refer to 
CBAM.  
 
Page 19, Para 5.7  
The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)22 is a climate measure aimed at decreasing 
global GHG emissions by preventing the risk of carbon leakage and by supporting increased ambition 
on climate mitigation, while ensuring WTO compatibility.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 162 - 
 
  
 Questions 102 -103: 
102. How can the EU ensure that its CBAM mechanism is  compatible with the WTO principles and 
rules? Please answer the following technical questions:  
（1）The EU CBAM allows products that have already paid a carbon price in the Member of origin to 
request a reduction in CBAM fees, so how does the EU determine the carbon price and calculate the 
reduction?  
（2）How does the EU determine the carbon emissions data of a product in the Member of origin? 
The EU ETS is calculated by production facility, while CBAM is based on exports. So how to ensure 
that imported prod ucts are accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products 
of EU origin?  
（3）Are institutions or persons in the Member of origin allowed to verify product emissions data?  
（4）The CBAM aims to prevent the risk of carbon leakage. How c an the EU ensure the effectiveness 
of CBAM in preventing carbon leakage when there are gaps among Members regarding emissions 
reduction efforts and green technologies? And how will the CBAM revenue be spent? Will it be used 
to support capacity building in developing Members?  
 
Reply:  Now that the Regulation establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism 
(Regulation  2023/956) was published in  the EU Official Journal on 16/05 ( link), the Commission is 
in a position to adopt the implementing act regulating the tra nsitional period of the CBAM, based on 
Article  35 of the CBAM Regulation, including the information to be reported as well as the format of 
the reporting. This act will notably detail rules on the elements of calculation methods for embedded 
emissions as s et out in Annex  IV to the CBAM Regulation. In view of its adoption, the 
European  Commission will launch a public consultation of four weeks, open to all stakeholders in the 
course of June 2023 on 'Have your Say ' portal. This implementing act will be accomp anied by 
Guidance documents.  
 
The objective of the transitional period is to collect data, as specified in the upcoming implementing 
act, with a view to defining a thorough methodology for the definitive period starting on 
1 January  2026. Analysis of the information gathered during that period will inform the implementing 
acts to be adopted in the course of that period.  
 
Before the end of the transitional period and based the information gathered, an implementing act 
reflecting the final methodology wi ll be adopted by the Commission on the basis of Article  7(7) of 
the CBAM Regulation. When actual emissions cannot be adequately measured, the embedded 
emissions will be determined by reference to default values that will be defined in the implementing 
act on methodology. It will follow the same procedure related to the implementing act regulating 
the transitional period, including an open public consultation of all stakeholders.  
 
Regarding the verification of reports on embedded emissions, the CBAM is mirro ring and 
complementing the EU ETS, it must be recalled that under the EU ETS framework, an accreditation 
body of a third country cannot obtain a status of verifier. More specifically, Article  57(2) of 
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/2067 preve nts an accreditation body from offering 
or carrying out any activities provided by a verifier. This would also not be in line with several other 
provisions in that Regulation and 'ISO 17011 ' concerning impartiality and independence of an 
accreditation body . 
 
Moreover, under the EU ETS only a national accreditation body duly appointed by a Member State 
in accordance with Article  4 of Accreditation Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 can accredit EU ETS 
verifiers according to Regulation (EU) 2018/2067 and ISO 14065. Third-country accreditation bodies 
are therefore not eligible to accredit EU ETS verifiers pursuant to Article  55(1) of Regulation 
(EU) 2018/2067 and Accreditation Regulation (EC) No 765/2008. Article  67 of Regulation (EU) 
2018/2067 (on mutual recognition of verifiers) is only applicable to EU based national accreditation 
bodies and EU based verifiers.  
 
In this respect , accreditation of international verifiers under CBAM will be possible in the definitive 
regime. These verifiers will have to offer adequate guarantees of objectivity and impartiality. Such 
accreditation will only be operated by EU national accreditation authorities.  The specifications 
relating to the accreditation process in the context of CBAM are to be enshrined in secondary 
legislation in t he course of the transitional period (see Article  18(2) of the Regulation).  
 
The CBAM  is a climate measure and has not been designed with a view to generating revenues. 
Should EU 's trade partners increase their climate ambition by decarbonising their industry or by WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 163 - 
 
introducing carbon pricing measures, CBAM revenues will decline. In the lon g run, they may even 
go to zero.  
 
The EU will continue in its role as one of the biggest contributors to climate financing globally 
continuing to support partners, in particular LDCs and neighbours in targeted ways, such as through 
technical assistance, te chnology transfer, extensive capacity building and financial support.  
 
103. We noted the statement that "CBAM will equalise carbon prices between domestic and 
imported products and ensure that the EU 's climate targets are not undermined by relocating 
produ ction to countries with less ambitious climate policies ", and action plans to "reduce trade in 
products from supply chains linked to deforestation or forest degradation, while increasing trade in 
sustainable products ". Does this mean that the EU will reduc e the free trade on energy -consuming 
goods? Are there any customs and border control measures involved? What are the obligations and 
responsibilities of importers?  
 
Reply:  The CBAM is a climate policy tool. It is there to help fight climate change by addr essing the 
risk of carbon leakage.  
 
The CBAM does not involve specific customs and border control that would impede trade. CBAM 
declaration will be due once a year (the first due in May 2027 covering the preceding calendar year).  
 
Under the transitional period starting in October 2023, importers of goods under the scope of the 
Regulation will have to report embedded emissions released in producing these goods. This 
transitional period will facilitate a careful, predictable and proportionate transition for  EU and non -EU 
businesses, and give trading partners time to prepare. Analysis of the information gathered during 
that period will inform the implementing acts to be adopted before 2026. The CBAM foresees, 
from 2026 and until 2034, a post -transitional peri od that will allow for a gradual phasing in of CBAM 
over time with a careful, predictable, and proportionate transition. During this period, importers will 
have to declare annually the quantity of goods and the amount of embedded emissions in the total 
goods they imported into the EU in the preceding year and surrender the corresponding amount of 
CBAM certificates.  
 
Page 19, Para 5.7 -5.8 
The CBAM will equalise the price of carbon between domestic products and imports and ensure that 
the EU 's climate objectives are not undermined by production relocating to countries with less 
ambitious climate policies.  
The EU Emissions Trading System puts a price on carbon and lowers the cap on emissions from 
certain economic sectors every year. The European Commissi on has proposed to lower the overall 
emission cap even further and increase its annual rate of reduction, to phase out free emission 
allowances for aviation and align with the global Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for 
International Aviation (CORSIA ) and to include shipping emissions in the EU ETS. To address the 
lack of emissions reductions in road transport and buildings, a separate new emissions trading 
system is set up for fuel distribution for road transport and buildings.  
Questions 104 -110:  
104. The CBAM requires importers to purchase carbon emissions allowances at the same price paid 
by EU producers under the EU ETS, but exempts specific countries (including Iceland, Liechtenstein, 
Norway and Switzerland which are already linked to the EU carb on market). Is this against the WTO 's 
principle of MFN treatment, and the "common but differentiated responsibility principle " of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change?  
 
Reply : CBAM  is designed to be compliant with WTO principles.  
 
The countries listed in Annex  III are exempted since the EU ETS applies to their territory or the 
emission trading system of the country is fully linked to the ETS. The carbon price paid on CBAM 
goods orig inating in these third countries is effectively charged on the greenhouse gas emissions 
embedded in those goods without any rebates beyond those also applied in accordance with the 
EU ETS. The CBAM Regulation empowers the European Commission to adapt the l ist of exempted 
countries delegated act should additional third country fulfill these conditions (set out in art 2(6) of 
the Regulation).  
 
Besides, the CBAM Regulation ensures that carbon prices effectively paid in a ny third country will be 
deducted from t he number of CBAM charge due, after the end of the transitional period. WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 164 - 
 
  
 Consequently, as long as the effective carbon price on CBAM goods originating from a third country 
is at least the same as the EU -ETS carbon price, these goods imported in the EU will not be subject 
to the CBAM adjustment, bringing the border adjustment to zero, similar to exempted countries 
listed in Annex  III of the Regulation.  
 
The CBAM is also in line with the "common but differentiated responsibility principle " of the UNFCCC. 
The Paris Agreement requires each of its Parties to reduce its emissions in a way that reflects its 
highest possible ambition, reflecting its common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances. The EU has respected its obligation to 
take the lead in reducing emissions. To continue to take the lead the EU needs to make sure that its 
ambitious efforts to reduce emissions within the EU are not undermined by carbon leakage.  
 
105. Does this mechanism allow only recognised third -party institutions to conduct carbon 
verification? Will local authorities of the exporting Member, such as third -party verification agencies 
in China, be recognised by the EU as third -party verification agencies?  
 
Reply : In line with answer above, the CBAM mirroring and complementing the EU ETS, it must be 
recalled that under the EU ETS framework, an accreditation body of a third country cannot obtain a 
status of verifier. More specifically, Article  57(2)  of Commission Implementing Regulation 
(EU) 2018/2067 prevents an accreditation body from offering or carrying out any activities provided 
by a verifier. This would also not be in line with several other provisions in that Regulation and 
'ISO 17011 ' concer ning impartiality and independence of an accreditation body.  
 
Moreover, under the EU ETS only a national accreditation body duly appointed by a Member State 
in accordance with Article  4 of Accreditation Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 can accredit EU ETS 
verifiers according to Regulation (EU) 2018/2067 and ISO 14065. Third -country accreditation bodies 
are therefore not eligible to accredit EU ETS verifiers pursuant to Article  55(1) of Regulation (EU) 
2018/2067 and Accreditation Regulation (EC) No 765/2008. Arti cle 67 of Regulation (EU) 2018/2067 
(on mutual recognition of verifiers) is only applicable to EU based national accreditation bodies and 
EU based verifiers.  
 
In this respect , accreditation of international verifiers under CBAM will be possible in the defi nitive 
regime. These verifiers will have to offer adequate guarantees of objectivity and impartiality. Such 
accreditation will only be operated by EU national accreditation authorities.  The specifications 
relating to the accreditation process in the contex t of CBAM are to be enshrined in 
secondary  legislation in the course of the transitional period (see Article  18(2) of the Regulation).   
 
106. In the process of carbon verification, the EU 's requirements for enterprise information 
disclosure may cover infor mation of commercial technology. Is there an interpretation of the level 
and requirement of information disclosure?  
 
Reply:  Principles of verification and content of verification report are set out in Annex  VI of the 
Regulation.  
 
The European Commission wi ll adopt in due time and before the end of the transitional period an 
implementing act for the application of these verification principles set on in Annex  VI and for the 
accreditation of verifiers . As for other implementing acts, the adoption procedure will include an 
open public consultation of all stakeholders.  
 
The Commission and competent national EU authorities will be bound by professional secrecy for all 
confidential information acquired (und er Art 13 of Regulation).  
 
107. Please explain how the CBAM meets the exceptions of Article  20 of the GATT for "measures 
necessary to protect the life or health of humans, animals or plants " and "measures related to the 
protection of exhaustible natural re sources ", as well as requirements in the Chapeau.  
 
Reply:  Under WTO law, WTO Members can adopt measures to protect the environment and human 
health and life as long as such measures fall under one of the established exceptions to GATT rules. 
These excepti ons ensure that the measures have a genuinely environmental (climate) and not 
protectionist objective and are applied in an even -handed manner to avoid that they constitute 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction to trade.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 165 - 
 
CBAM is an environmental policy tool to prevent carbon leakage and support the EU 's increased 
ambition on climate mitigation, while ensuring WTO compatibility. CBAM is a measure following the 
GATT rules which require that the objectives to be pursued must be environmental and 
non-protectionist. As it has been designed, CBAM will be applied in an even -handed manner that 
does not discriminate among products or countries.  
 
108. Does the EU 's inclusion of shipping emissions in the EU ETS without distinguishing developed 
and developing countries in terms of emissions reduction obligations violate the fundamental 
principles of "common but differentiated responsibilities " in international enviro nmental law?  
 
Reply:  By covering 50% of extra -EEA voyages, the EU takes due responsibility for half of the 
maritime traffic that connects the EU to the rest of the world, while providing impulse for more 
constructive progress at IMO level. As a matter of fact, in the UNFCCC context, the approach of 
covering 50% of emissions from incoming and outgoing voyages has been identified as one of the 
options for allocating maritime emissions from international voyages and as consistent with the issue 
of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities. Further information on 
the CBDR principle in the context of the ETS can be found here: EUR-Lex – 32023L0959 – EN – EUR-
Lex (europa.eu) " 
 
109. Does it violate WTO rules and create unfair competition for the EU to subsidize its businesses 
and users with fees collected ? If not, please explain why.  
 
Reply:  The CBAM is a climate measure and has not been designed with a view to generating 
revenues. Should EU 's trade partners increase their cli mate ambition by decarbonising their industry 
or by introducing carbon pricing measures, CBAM revenues will decline. In the long run, they may 
even go to zero.  
 
Revenues generated by CBAM will not in any way be used to subsidise businesses established in 
the EU.  
 
Besides, the EU will continue in its role as one of the biggest contributors to climate financing globally 
continuing to support partners, in particular LDCs and neighbors in targeted ways, such as through 
technical assistance, technology transfer , extensive capacity building and financial support.  
 
110. Will the EU 's introduction of a bill on carbon reduction in shipping lead to technical barriers 
when the global shipping industry does not have a mature carbon reduction technology yet? If not, 
please explain why.  
 
Reply:  Economically incentivising the reduction of maritime emissions does not lead shipping into 
technological, as there are a wide range of technologies and operational practices to reduce 
emissions, including the use of sustainable bio  and synthetic fuels which are considered to be 
zero emission in the EU ETS.  
 
Page 20, Para 5.14  
In the area of waste, in November 2021, the Commission adopted a proposal for a new regulation 
on Waste Shipment30, which aims to ensure that the EU does not e xport its waste challenges to 
third countries and supports a clean and circular economy.  
Questions 111 -113:  
111. Please update the progress of legislation. How is waste transported and disposed of within 
the EU? 
 
Reply:  The proposal for a new EU regulation on the shipment waste is currently discussed by the 
European Parliament and the Council of the European  Union . 
 
The current Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006  on the shipment of waste is applicable at present. This 
Regulation applies both to shipments of waste within the EU and to shipments of waste exported 
from the EU o r imported into the EU.  
 
112. How to determine a country has the capacity to receive and dispose of waste?  
 
Reply:  The proposal for a new EU regulation on the shipment waste foresees that waste exported 
from the EU shall be deemed to be managed in an environmentally sound manner, where it can be WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 166 - 
 
  
 demonstrated that the waste will be managed in accordance with human health and environmental 
protection requirements that are broadly equivalent t o the human health and environmental 
protection requirements laid down in the EU legislation. When assessing such broad equivalence, full 
compliance with requirements stemming from Union legislation shall not be required, but it should 
be demonstrated that  the requirements applied in the country of destination ensure a similar level 
of protection of human health and the environment than the requirements stemming from Union 
legislation. Annex  X of the proposed new Regulation includes conditions to be taken i nto 
consideration when assessing broadly equivalence of the conditions in third countries for managing 
waste.  
 
113. How does the EU determine that waste is hazardous or not?   
 
Reply:  Whether any given waste stream is identified as hazardous or non -hazardou s waste will 
depend on its composition and more specifically on whether it contains hazardous substances in an 
amount that will make the waste exhibit hazardous properties. In this regard, the definition of 
hazardous waste in Article  3(2) of Directive 2008 /98/EC states that "'hazardous waste ' means waste 
which displays one or more of the hazardous properties listed in Annex  III". 
 
Within the EU, the identification of hazardous and non -hazardous waste streams can be found in the 
"List of Waste " defined in De cision 2000/532/EC.  
 
Page 21, Para 5.18  
The draft regulation on lowering the maximum residue levels (MRLs) for the two neonicotinoid 
substances clothianidin and thiamethoxam, is the first regulation implementing the F2F Strategy on 
imported food in relation to pesticides residues.  
Questions 114:  
114. Is the EU Draft Regulation on the Reduction of Maximum Residue Levels of Two Neonicotinoid 
Substances Thiamethoxam and Thiamethoxam based on international standards, scientific basis or 
risk assessment?  
 
Reply:  Regulation (EC) No 2023/334 lowering the maximum residue levels for clothianidin and 
thiamethoxam is based on the principles set out in Regulation (EC) No 396/2005, in particular 
Article  14. 
 
The EU considers that there is considerable evidence of the adverse impacts of neonicotinoids on 
bees. Based on current knowledge, reducing the use of neonicotinoids is an effective action to tackle 
the decline in pollinators. According to the Intergovernmental Science -Policy Platform on Biodiversity 
and Ecosys tem Services (IPBES)4, a clear conse nsus exists regarding the fact that both wild and 
managed bees are exposed to pesticides (mainly through nectar and pollen, in the case of the 
neonicotinoids), and that the range of sub -lethal effects is quite broad.  
 
The European Food Safety Authority 's (EFSA) peer review of clothianidin5 and thiamethoxam6 risk 
assessment for  bees concluded that all outdoor uses on the examined crops led to the conclusion 
that there were high risks to bees or that it had not been demonstrated that risks were low.  
 
Page 22, Para 5.25  
A new legislative proposal on ReFuelEU Aviation56 that aims t o decarbonise the aviation sector by 
mandating supply of jet fuels blended with minimum shares of sustainable aviation fuels (SAF) and 
uptake of fuels by airlines departing from Union airports. The FuelEU Maritime legislative proposal 
sets the objective to  promote the uptake in the use of renewable, low -carbon fuels and low 
carbon -intensive energy options, in maritime transport, including additional requirements for 
zero emissions at berth, for both containerships and passenger ships.  
 
4 IPBES (2016). The assessment report of the Intergovernmental Science -Policy Platform on Biodiversity 
and Ecosystem Services on pollinators, pollination and food production. S.G. Potts, V.  L. Imperatriz -Fonseca, 
and H. T. Ngo (eds). Secretariat of the Intergovernmental Science -Policy Platform on Biodiversity and 
Ecosystem Services, Bonn, Germany. 552 pages. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3402 856. 
5 European Food Safety Authority; Peer review of the pesticide risk assessment for bees for the active 
substance clothianidin considering the uses as seed treatments and granules. EFSA Journal 2018;16(2):5177.  
6 European Food Safety Authority; Peer review of the pesticide risk assessment for bees for the active 
substance thiamethoxam considering the uses as seed treatments and granules. EFSA 
Journal  2018;16(2):5179.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 167 - 
 
Questions 115:  
115. When will the proposed legislation be implemented? What are the additional requirements for 
zero emissions at berths for container ships and passenger ships?  
 
Reply:  The FuelEU Maritime Regulation enters into force from 1  January  2025. This first year will 
correspond to the first reporting period where data is collected that will allow to calculate the yearly 
average greenhouse gas intensity of the energy used onboard ships.  
 
As far as the additional requirements for zero emissions at berth, for containerships and passenger 
ships, these will be applicable to these ship types when of 5,000 gross tonnage or above, to connect 
to Onshore Power Supply (OPS) whenever they are securely moored at berth. The application of the 
provision enters in force on 1 January  2030 in all ports covered by the Alternative Fuels 
Infrastructure Regulation (AFIR), and on 1  January  2035 for all ports which, despite not covered by 
AFIR, have decided to install OPS.  
 
Several exemptions apply, for cases of safety/emergency or  for ships using zero emission 
technologies while at berth, measured at the stack and covering both GHG and air pollutant 
emissions. Exemptions for connection to OPS are also possible in the case of insufficient 
infrastructure in the port or incompatibilit y of shore -connection equipment, these being however 
limited in time and number, in a logic of flexibility to all stakeholders in the first years of 
implementation.  
 
Page 25, Para 5.41  
The EU is preparing a SME Relief Package to help SMEs address, inter alia, issues related to supply 
chains bottlenecks. It will include the revision of the Late Payment Directive, measures to improve 
doing business in the Single Market and facilitating access to skills and finance.  
Questions 116:  
116. How will the EU promote the implementation of the SME Relief Package?  
 
Reply:  The implementation of the SME Relief package will be a common and Commission -wide effort. 
In order to ensure the implementation of the package, it will be promoted and monitored inter alia 
by: 
 
· the SME Envoy network with Member States representatives and European business 
associations as observers, which provide guidance to implement European SME policy;  
· the SME Assembly, the most significant event for SMEs in Europe;  
· multi- and bilateral s takeholder as well as ad -hoc meetings with stakeholders.  
 
In addition, the SME performance review monitors and assesses countries ' progress in SME policy 
and publishes comprehensive information on the performance of SMEs in EU countries and other 
partner c ountries.  
 
The implementation of the SME relief package also hinges crucially on the involvement of all 
stakeholders combined, i.e. European co -legislators such as the European Parliament and the 
European Council, and also Member States and regions.  
Page  25, Para 5.42  
The EU financed four international Intellectual Property SME Helpdesks (China, Latin America, 
South -East Asia, India) which assist EU SMEs and beneficiaries of EU -funded programmes by 
providing information and advice on intellectual property  and related matters.  
Questions 117 -118: 
117. What are the outcomes of this project?  
 
Reply:  The International Intellectual Property (IP) SME Helpdesks (China, South -East Asia, 
Latin America and India) have improved the awareness of EU SMEs about IP rules and their capacity 
to manage and protect their IP abroad. They have also provided the services requested and 
facilitated contacts with external providers and/or authorities and, finally, they have strengthened 
the links between EU SMEs and companies in the  target markets.  
 
On 27  March  2023, the impact of the action shows over 15,000 stakeholders directly involved 
and 7,830 queries received (the China Helpdesk being particularly efficient with over 2,500 queries 
answered, more than 98% of them within 3 work ing days, while the Latin America Helpdesk 
reached  83% of the queries answered within 1 day); 501 trainings and 7,549 people trained (the WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 168 - 
 
  
 China Helpdesk having been able to train twice the target number of staff) ; 585 matchmaking events 
(the South -East Asi a Helpdesk alone carrying out over 200 of them); 147 case studies/real life 
examples on IP practices and six -monthly policy feedback reports produced by each helpdesk 
covering the latest developments of the IP system in each of the territories covered by t he action. 
They have been, in general, proactive in searching cooperation with relevant stakeholders (e.g., the 
EEN).  
 
The India Helpdesk, launched only in November 2020, was able to reach comparable results to the 
existing International Helpdesks.  
 
118. How can enterprises benefit from the project?  
 
Reply:  The International Intellectual Property (IP) SME Helpdesks support IP capacity building along 
the full scale of IP practices. They provide free -of-charge, first -line support to European small and 
medium -sized enterprises (SMEs) on IP management, protection and enforcement covering 
six different regions including China, South East Asia, Latin America and India. Detail on the benefits 
from the project can be seen under EU reply to Q 117.  
 
Page 25 , Para 5.43  
Being a transparent trade authority is an important priority for the European Commission. 
Transparency is essential to ensure inclusiveness, legitimacy and accountability and facilitates a 
mutual understanding of policy by enhancing public trus t. A pro -active transparency policy is 
maintained through two main work strands: the publication of relevant documents and the 
systematic engagement with civil society. Draft negotiating directives, reports of negotiating rounds, 
initial EU text proposals,  reports of committees and dialogues as well as many other relevant 
documents are published. Regular public stakeholder events that include representatives of 
nongovernmental organisations, trade unions, business organisations and other groups, is part of 
the EU 's transparency measures.  
Question 119:  
119. Please explain what specific measures the EU has taken to maintain transparency by 
publishing relevant documents. For instance, what are the provisions, channels and working 
mechanism of the EU Court of Ju stice on issuing judgment documents to maintain transparency?  
 
Reply:  More generally, the Register of the Commission documents offers wide access to an ever 
growing number of documents that are proactively published or which can be requested. The 
Register  of Commission Documents was set up in 2001 in line with Article  12 of  Regulation (EC) 
No. 1049/2001  regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission 
documents. It contains do cuments or references to documents produced since 2001 as well as 
information related to activity, policy and decision -making of the Commission. The Register of the 
Commission documents was substantially revamped in 2022. It is also coupled with the exerci se of 
rationalisation of registers of the Commission in view of creating a single -entry point.  
 
The link to the Register of Commission Documents can be found here:  
 
- Register of Commissi on Documents (europa.eu) . 
 
As regards trade policy in particular, a vast amount of documents is proactively published on the 
website of the Directorate -Generate Trade. The following two links provide useful entry points t o the 
majority of documents published in this respect:  
Transparency in EU trade negotiations (europa.eu)  
EU Trade agreements (europa.eu)  
 
With respect to the Court of Justice of the European  Union , its judgments are published on its website 
in the languages of the European  Union  https://curia.europa.eu/ . Moreover, documents concerning 
the Court and the developm ent of the court system of the European  Union  are also published on its 
website such as here https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/P_64268/en/ .  
 
Page 28, Para 6.13  
Subsidies in the EU are regulated through State aid control managed by the European Commission, 
and in a way that is fully coherent with the applicable WTO rules  ... In addition, subsidies granted 
at the EU level, while not subject to the State aid approva l process, are designed to follow the same 
principles.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 169 - 
 
Question 120:  
120. Please explain in detail the main criteria used by the EU to assess the necessity, proportionality 
of subsidies and their impact on trade and competition.  
 
Reply:  The European  Union  considers several criteria to ensure that subsidies do not distort 
competition within the EU 's internal market. The Commission can declare aid compatible with 
Article  107(3) TFEU in principle only if it can establish that the aid contributes  to the attainment of 
one of the objectives specified, something which, under normal market conditions, the recipient 
firms would not achieve by their own actions. In this context, principles like necessity, incentive 
effect and proportionality will be con sidered. How this will be assessed more concretely is laid down 
in various guidelines, which are binding on the Commission. See for example the Communication 
from the Commission – Guidelines on State aid for climate, environmental protection and 
energy  2022, where the Commission balances the identified negative effects on competition and 
trading conditions of the aid measure with the positive effects of the planned aid on the supported 
economic activities, including its contribution to environmental protect ion and objectives of energy 
policy . 
 
Page 28, Para 6.15  
A new element of subsidy control is the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (EU) 2022/2560which will apply 
from 12  July 2023, six months after its entry into force  ...The European Commission will have the 
power to investigate financial contributions granted by public authorities of non -EU countries which 
benefit companies engaging in an economic activity in the EU and redress, if needed, their distortive 
effects.  
Questions 121 -128:  
121. Please explain the specific criteria for determining "foreign subsidy " (e.g. "when necessary " 
and "under other market conditions ") and the reasons. Is there any difference between the criteria 
applicable to state -owned enterprises and those to private enterprises as recipient of preferential 
government policies?  
 
Reply:  In accordance with Article  3 FSR, a foreign subsidy would exis t where a third country 
provides, directly or indirectly, a financial contribution which confers a benefit on an undertaking 
engaging in an economic activity in the internal market and which is limited, in law or in fact, to one 
or more undertakings or ind ustries.  
 
In accordance with Article  3(2) FSR, the notion of financial contribution, provided directly or 
indirectly be the state, includes financial contributions provided by the central government or public 
authorities at all other levels. It also inclu des financial contributions by a foreign public entity or a 
private entity if their actions can be attributed to the central government or the public authorities of 
the third country. This will be examined taking into account elements such as the character istics of 
the entity and the legal and economic environment prevailing in the State in which the entity 
operates, including the government 's role in the economy as far as foreign public entities are 
concerned or all relevant circumstances for private entit ies. 
 
122. In the case of concurrence of the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 and other 
existing EU legal regimes, which one would prevail and how to implement?  
 
Reply:  Art. 44 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 on foreign subsidies distorting the in ternal market 
("FSR") deals with the relationship of other instruments. In particular, the FSR shall not prevent the 
European  Union  from exercising its rights or fulfilling its obligations under international agreements. 
An investigation pursuant to the FSR will not be carried out and measures will not be imposed or 
maintained where such investigation or measures would be contrary to the European  Union 's 
obligations emanating from any relevant international agreement it has entered into. In particular, 
no action will be taken under the FSR which would amount to a specific action against a subsidy 
within the meaning of Article  32.1 of t he Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and 
granted by a third country which is a member of the World Trade Organisation.  
 
123. It's hard to identify foreign subsidies. So how to ensure that the review criteria are appropriate 
to prevent the unlimited expansion of discretion and unwarranted impacts on foreign investors?  
 
Reply:  The assessment under the FSR is based on objective criteria related to the presence of foreign 
subsidies in accordance with Article  3 FSR and its potential or actual di stortive effects on the internal 
market in view of the indicators included in Article  4 FSR.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 170 - 
 
  
 In addition, in accordance with recital 72, the acts adopted by the Commission under the FSR are 
subject to review by the Court of Justice of the European  Union  in accordance with Article  263 TFEU. 
In this regard, any natural or legal person may institute proceedings against an act addressed to 
that person or which is of direct and individual concern to them if they consider that the Commission 
has exceeded its pre rogatives in the application of the FSR.  
 
124. Foreign Subsidies Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 gives a broad definition of foreign government 
subsidies, on which the European Commission enjoys big discretion. How can the EU prevent abuse 
of rights by regulator s or third parties, such as the use of procedural measures to unduly interfere 
with public procurement procedures, thereby affecting the convenience and motivation of foreign 
investors to invest in the EU?  
 
Reply:  The FSR provides detailed rules on the ci rcumstances under which the Commission may act 
in case of alleged foreign subsidies. In particular, the Regulation introduces three tools:  
 
· A notification -based tool to investigate concentrations involving a financial contribution by a 
non-EU government, where the acquired company, one of the merging parties or the joint venture 
generates an EU turnover of at least €500  million  and the parties involved in the transaction were 
granted foreign financial contributions of more than €50  million  over the last 3 years;  
 
· A notification -based tool to investigate bids in public procurements involving a financial 
contribution by a non -EU government, where the estimated contract value is at least €250  million  
and the bid involves a foreign financial contr ibution of at least €4  million  per third country; and  
 
· A general tool to investigate all other market situations, such as greenfield investments, where 
the Commission can start a review on its own initiative (ex -officio).  
 
With respect to the two notification -based tools, the parties will have to notify ex-ante financial 
contributions received from non -EU public authorities prior to concluding a concentration or a public 
procurement procedure above the relevant thresholds. T he Commission can also request ad-hoc 
notifications for smaller concentrations and public procurement procedures if it suspects the 
existence of distortive subsidies.  
 
If the Commission establishes that a foreign subsidy exists and that it is distortive, it will balance 
the negative effects of the subsidy, in terms of the distortion, with positive effects of the subsidy to 
determine appropriate redressive measures or to accept commitments.  
 
125. How can the EU effectively assess the distortive impact of fi nancial contributions from non -EU 
government agencies to companies engaged in economic activity in the EU? How can the EU ensure 
transparency and fairness in its subsidy investigations into non -EU countries?  
 
Reply:  Please see the reply to Question 124 above.  
 
126. The EU 's investigation into distortive foreign subsidies in fact results in investment and trade 
barriers to non -EU Member s. Does it violate the WTO principle of non -discrimination and national 
treatment?  
 
Reply:  Please see the reply to questi on 30 above.  
 
127. Does the European Commission 's so-called investigation into unfair subsidies abide by the 
laws of EU member states? Is the opinion of relevant EU member states valued when measuring the 
"fair competition environment "? How is this investi gative mechanism coordinated with public 
procurement procedures?  
 
Reply:  The FSR sets out the applicable procedures of the investigation.  
 
128. What remedies are available to companies that are found to have received distortive 
subsidies? How can bidders of public procurement projects be compensated for losses if the judicial 
process conclusively proves that they did not accept subsidies or did not constitute a distortion to 
the EU single market?  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 171 - 
 
Reply:  As already indicated in the reply to Q123 above, the  acts adopted by the Commission under 
the FSR are subject to review by the Court of Justice of the European  Union  in accordance with 
Article  263 TFEU. In this regard, any natural or legal person may institute proceedings against an 
act addressed to that pe rson or which is of direct and individual concern to them if they consider 
that their rights have been breached.  
 
Page 28, Para 6.16  
In the EU, the industrial policy tools include the Important Projects of Common European Interest 
(IPCEIs) that aim to encourage cross -border cooperation among enterprises in a given sector in 
research and development and in pre -commercial industrial deployment.  
Questions 129 -130:  
129. Currently, the EU IPCEI mainly supports batteries, hydrogen energy and other fields. Wh at 
proportion does the amount of project funding account for R&D and pre -industrialization costs in 
practice?  
 
Reply:  Overall, the funding relates mostly to R&D, given that 'first industrial development ' still 
requires significant R&D content (see point 23  of the Communication from the Commission Criteria 
for the analysis of the compatibility with the internal market of State aid to promote the execution 
of important projects of common European interest) – this is assessed on a project by project basis.  
 
130. Is the IPCEI strictly restricted to companies from EU member states? Can Chinese companies 
registered in Europe have the chance to qualify for it?  
 
Reply : All companies legally operating in the Internal Market can in principle be eligible.  
 
Page 29, Para 6.18  
The EU advocates for open international public procurement markets and has opened its public 
procurement market for many goods and services from third countries  ... By contrast, many EU 
companies are experiencing difficulties in getting access to  third countries ' procurement markets. In 
response, the EU is taking action to ensure a level playing field and to increase opportunities for EU 
companies. The International Procurement Instrument80 entered into force on 29  August  2022. This 
new instrument confers the EU additional opportunities to engage with third countries in order to 
remove barriers affecting access to public procurement markets outside the EU. It will be one of the 
key market -opening tools for public procurement.  
Questions 13 1:  
131. Countries ' domestic legislation may differ on the scope of public procurement, and some non -
GPA economie s still in fact keep most of their public procurement markets open to foreign investors. 
So what is the necessity and rationality of introducin g international procurement instrument?  
 
Reply:  The EU procurement market is largely open to third -country operators. However, the access 
of EU businesses to various third country procurement markets is either closed or restricted. The 
underlying rational e for IPI is to provide the EU the possibility to negotiate with third countries to 
drop barriers to the access to their procurement markets and ensure level playing field for EU 
businesses.  
 
Page 30, Para 7.8  
The EU framework for the screening of foreign direct investment (FDI) was established by Regulation 
(EU) 2019/452. It has been fully applicable since October 2020. The cooperation mechanism created 
by the regulation allows all Member States and the Commission to collectively assess and address 
potenti al threats to security and public order deriving from FDI in the EU. The EU cooperation 
mechanism complements screening mechanisms of Member States at national level.  
Questions 132:  
132. Please explain what impact does this screening mechanism have on Memb er States ' 
investment in new -energy and other areas in Europe? Is it consistent with the principles of 
non-discrimination, transparency and predictability?  
 
Reply:  The aim of the Regulation (EU) 2019/452 (the Regulation), is to provide a European  Union  
framework for the screening of direct investments from non -EU countries on the grounds of security 
or public order. It establishes the possibility for EU Member State s to have transparent, predictable 
and non -discriminatory mechanisms for examining foreign direct investments on the grounds of 
security or public order.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 172 - 
 
  
 In 2021 of the cases formally screened the majority (73%) were authorised without conditions, 
which means that the transaction was approved without any additional action required from the 
investor. However, 23% of the decisions involved an approval with conditions or mitigating 
measures. In these cases, national screening authorities have negotiated cert ain actions, 
assurances, and commitments from the investors before approving the planned foreign direct 
investment. Finally, national authorities ultimately blocked transactions in only 1% of all decided 
cases, while for a further 3% the transaction was wi thdrawn by the parties.  
 
Page 31, Para 8.5  
The modernisation of the EU export control regime materialised with the entry into force of the 
updated EU Regulation 821/2021 (recast) on 9  September  2021.  
Questions 133:  
133. Please provide further explanation s on the reasonableness of tightening control over 
technology exports, in particular, how to define whether certain technology constitutes export in the 
form of "technical assistance ", whether the related regulations shall apply to R&D cooperation carried 
out by employees and teams from different countries within an MNC, and what will be the impact on 
such cooperation, joint research and commercial application of relevant technologies conducted by 
companies from various countries, including EU companies?  
 
Reply: The application of controls on export of dual -use items and technologies falls under the 
competence Member States ' competent authorities. For additional information on the EU approach 
to controls over intangible exports and technical assistance China  can consult the Commission 
Recommendation (EU) 2021/1700 of 15  September  2021 on internal compliance programmes for 
controls of research involving dual -use items.  
 
Page 31, Para 8.4  
The review of and, when required, the adoption of measures prohibiting or conditioning an 
investment within the scope of the regulation on grounds of security of public order is the ultimate 
responsibility of Member States. The Commission may address opinions recommending specific 
actions to the Member State where  the investment takes place, in particular when there is a risk 
that the investment affects security or public order in more than one Member State or projects and 
programmes of Union interest. The Commission reports annually on the implementation of the 
regulation.  
Questions 134 -136:  
134. In the enforcement of the regulation, are there any measures taken to balance the "security 
of public order " of the host country with the national treatment of foreign investors, as well as 
MFN treatment between different foreign investors?  
 
Reply:  Under Regulation (EU) 2019/452 (the Regulation), Member States may maintain their 
existing screening mechanisms, ad opt new ones or remain without such national mechanisms. 
Where national mechanisms are established, the Regulation provides for some key requirements of 
which non -discrimination among foreign investors is one. According to Article  3 of the Regulation, 
rules and procedures related to screening mechanisms, including relevant timeframes, shall be 
transparent and not discriminate between third countries. In particular, Member States shall set out 
the circumstances triggering the screening, the grounds for scree ning and the applicable detailed 
procedural rules.  
 
135. When reporting annually on the implementation of the regulation, does the EU pay attention 
to enforcement trends in different Member States? Are any measures taken to ensure consistency 
in enforcemen t standards in the EU as a single market?  
 
Reply:  Under the cooperation mechanism set up by Regulation (EU) 2019/452 (the Regulation), the 
Commission may issue an opinion if it considers that a given FDI is likely to impact the public order 
or security of  more than one Member State or with regard to programmes or projects of EU interest. 
However, the decision to authorise, prohibit or impose conditions regarding an investment remains 
with the Member State where the investment takes place.  
 
The Commission i n 2017 established a group of experts from Member States. Pursuant to Article  12 
of the Regulation, the group may discuss systemic issues relating to the implementation of the 
regulation. The objective of the group is to discuss issues relating to investme nt screening, share 
best practices and lessons learned, and exchange views on trends and issues of common concern 
relating to foreign investments.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 173 - 
 
136. How can the EU ensure that this regulation is not overused to restrict foreign investment from 
specific  countries and industries?  
 
Reply:  The aim of the EU FDI Screening regulation is to provide a European  Union  framework for the 
screening of direct investments from non -EU countries on the grounds of security or public order. It 
establishes the possibility for EU Member States to have transparent, predictable and 
non-discriminatory mechanisms for examining foreig n direct investments on the grounds of security 
or public order only.  
 
Page 31, Para 8.5  
The modernisation of the EU export control regime materialised with the entry into force of the 
updated EU Regulation 821/2021 (recast) on 9  September  2021.  
Questions  137-140: 
137. What are the provisions and restrictions of EU Regulation 821/2021 on the items subject to 
unilateral control by Member States? Are there country -specific policies? What is the basis for the 
review of export licences for each destination cou ntry?  
 
Reply:  Articles 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 22 and 23 of Regulation (EU) 2021/821 set out that measures 
taken by Member States in implementation of the Regulation should be published in the 
Official  Journal of the European  Union . 
 
Regulation 2021/821 do es not include any country -specific export control policy.  
 
See relevant considerations in Article  15 Regulation EU/2021/821.  
 
138. What is the approval rate of dual -use items exporting to China in each member state? How 
long will it take on average to get the licence in each member state? Are there restrictions at the EU 
level on the approval procedures in individual member states? Do the factors to be check vary for 
different destination countries?  
 
Reply:  According to the latest annual report, China w as the second top export destination for dual 
use items in 2020. The timeframe varies across Member States but we do not have precise figures. 
See relevant considerations in Article  15 Regulation EU/2021/821.  
 
139. China is the second largest destination f or EU 's dual -use items, but under EU Regulation 
821/2021, only three of the eight general licences apply to exports to China. Why are the other 
five general licences not applicable? Does this comply with WTO rules?  
 
Reply : General Export Authorisations aim at reducing the administrative burden on companies and 
authorities while ensuring an appropriate level of control of the relevant items to the relevant 
destinations.  
 
140. Does the export restriction agreement between the United  States , Japan and the Netherlands 
comply with relevant EU laws and regulations? Are there discriminatory measures against third 
countries? What impact does it have on the EU 's fulfilment of WTO obligations?  
 
Reply:  The question refers to an "export restriction ag reement " between the United  States , Japan 
and The Netherlands, but there is no such agreement.  
 
Page 33, Para 9.3  
The Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act together set out a first comprehensive rulebook 
for online platforms applicable across the whole of the EU. They build on the EU 's Platform -to-
Business Regulation, which started to apply during the review period, on 12  July 2020. The measures 
create a single set of rules for all digital services within the EU 's single market, through 
harmonising  27, increasingly different, laws in EU Member States into coherent EU wide legal acts, 
leading to both cost and time savings. They also create a level playing field and ensure equal 
treatment for all companies. Further, the Digital Services Act  and the Digital Markets Act address 
problems that are shared across the globe.  
Question 141:  
141. What specific provisions do the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act have on 
protecting data rights, consumer interests and a fair market enviro nment? How do they "address 
problems that are shared across the globe "?  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 174 - 
 
  
 Reply:  Both the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act respond to societal and economic 
concerns of the highest priority, and they do so in a way that optimises the necessar y balancing of 
fundamental rights online.  
 
The Digital Services Act puts the protection of all fundamental rights online at its core, by optimising 
the right to freedom of expression and information of all recipients of online platforms. It does this 
by requiring online platforms to put in place procedures to remove content that is clearly illegal, and 
to conduct risk assessments for both illegal content and major societal risks. At the same time, the 
Digital Services Act requires online platforms to have clear terms and conditions and to enforce these 
in a consistent manner. The Digital Services Act also facilitates societal oversight over digital services 
and online platforms. It incorporates a whole -of-society approach that has been recognized as a 
globa l benchmark. The Digital Services Act provides for effective enforcement by public authorities. 
The Digital Services Act at the same time restates the strict independence requirements that apply 
to such public authorities – in line with the EU Treaties and  Charter of Fundamental Rights. The 
latest draft of UNESCO 's guidelines for regulating digital platforms incorporate the same architecture 
as the Digital Services Act, by focusing on risk -based and society -driven responses, and by 
formulating strict indepe ndence requirements for public authorities.  
 
The Digital Markets Act responds to the concentration of economic power in online platforms and 
aims to ensure that markets in the digital sector are fair and contestable. It sets out a closed and 
clearly circum scribed list of clear and proportionate obligations for gatekeepers that operate 'core 
platform services '. The identification of the relevant gatekeepers is based on objective and clear 
criteria. The Digital Markets Act complements EU competition law, whic h will be enforced in parallel. 
Similar to the Digital Services Act, the Digital Markets Act establishes clear and proportionate rights 
and obligations that aim to give agency back to society in general and users of gatekeepers in 
particular, while also be nefiting gatekeepers through clear rules that are harmonised in all 27 EU 
Member States.  
 
Page 33, Para 9.4  
Enforcement of rights have also been strengthened. The Digital Markets Act, the Digital Services Act 
and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDP R) have been included in Annex  I to Directive (EU) 
2020/1828 on Representative Actions that will enter into application in June 2023. Accordingly, 
qualified entities designated by EU Member States pursuant to the latter directive will be able to 
bring lega l actions before national courts or administrative authorities on behalf of groups of 
consumers to seek injunctive measures and redress measures whenever traders infringe the 
provisions of the Digital Markets Act, the Digital Services Act or the GDPR that harm or may harm 
the collective interests of consumers.  
Question 142 -145: 
142. Please explain whether there is any prior approval requirements or elements for data 
cross-border flows under the GDPR mechanism.  
 
Reply:  The GDPR recognises that flows of personal data to and from countries outside the EU and 
international organisations are necessary for the expansion of international trade and international 
cooperation. At the same time, when personal data are transferred  from the EU to entities in 
third countries or to international organisations, the level of data protection ensured in the EU should 
not be undermined.  
 
The GDPR provides different instruments that can be relied on for cross -border transfer of personal 
data. This includes so -called adequacy decisions, i.e. decisions adopted by the European Commission 
recognising that a third country/international organisation offers a comparable level of protection to 
that in the EU. Once such a decision is adopted, persona l data can flow freely from the EU to that 
country/organisation, without being subject to any further conditions/approvals. If there is no 
adequacy decision, data exporters have to ensure that data protection safeguards are in place, 
e.g. in an instrument agreed with the data importer. The GDPR again offers different tools that can 
be used, from model contractual clauses adopted by the European Commission (which can be 
included in contracts with data importers on a voluntary basis to comply with the GDPR) t o 
tailor-made instruments developed by the exporter and importer and approved by national 
supervisory authorities (i.e. independent data protection authorities), such as tailor -made 
contractual clauses or binding corporate rules (for data transfers between  members of a corporate 
group).  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Finally, in specific cases, data can be transferred on the basis of certain statutory grounds (e.g. after 
obtaining consent of the individual or where the transfer is necessary on important grounds of public 
interest), with out the need to have a specific transfer instrument (e.g. a contract) with data 
protection safeguards in place.  
 
143. Please outline the standards and requirements to be met by enterprises for data to be 
exported, as well as the relevant authorities in the  EU for approval or supervision, and please 
describe the specific approval procedures for data to be exported.  
 
Reply:  For the available instruments (and their requirements) governing the cross -border transfer 
of personal data under the GDPR, please refer to the previous answer.  
 
The list of the supervisory authorities of the EU Member States can be found here: 
https://edpb.europa.eu/about -edpb/about -edpb/members_en . 
 
144. Under the GDPR mechanism, is the mandate clearly defined between the EU and its 
Member  States?  
 
Reply: The GDPR creates a unified and consistent approach to data protection compliance across all 
EU Member States through a common legal framework, which provides harmonised rules for data 
protection and mechanisms for cooperation and enforcement.  
 
We un derstand that this question refers to the enforcement of the GDPR. The monitoring and 
enforcement of compliance with EU data protection rules falls within the competence of national 
authorities, in particular the data protection authorities and courts. Und er the GDPR, any individual 
can lodge a complaint about the handling of his/her personal data with a national data protection 
authority (Article  77 GDPR). In addition, individuals have a right to an effective judicial remedy 
against a data protection authority under Article  78 GDPR. Article  78(1) provides the right to an 
effective judicial remedy against a legally binding decision of such an authority, whereas 
Article  78(2) GDPR provides a right to an effective judicial remedy when the autho rity does not 
handle a complaint or does not inform of the progress or outcome of a lodged complaint. Finally, 
individuals are entitled to initiate legal proceedings directly against the entities that handle their 
data (e.g. companies or public authorities , see Article  79 GDPR).  
 
145. According to the GDPR rules, when the EU determines, in the form of a European Commission 
decision, that a country, a particular region or industry of a country or an international organization 
can provide an adequate level of  data protection, personal data can be transmitted to the 
aforementioned national, regional or international organizations without additional authorization 
from the European  Union . Which countries or economies or region or industry or an international 
organization are on the "White list of third countries " under this mechanism? Please describe the 
criteria for being qualified on the white list and the progress made in implementing the provision.  
 
Reply : We understand that this question refers to the possibi lity for the European Commission to 
adopt a so -called adequacy finding (pursuant to Article  45 GDPR), which is one of the instruments 
provided under the GDPR to transfer personal data outside the EU. The effect of such a decision is 
that personal data can flow from the EU (and Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland) to that third country 
or international organisations without any further safeguard being necessary. In other words, 
transfers to the country/organisation in question are assimilated to intra -EU trans missions of data.  
 
Adequacy does not require the third country 's data protection system to be identical to the one of 
the EU, but is based on the standard of "essential equivalence " It involves a comprehensive 
assessment of a country 's/organisation 's data  protection framework, both of the protection 
applicable to personal data and of the available oversight and redress mechanisms. The 
European  data protection authorities have developed a list of elements that must be taken into 
account for this assessment,  such as the existence of core data protection principles, 
individual  rights, independent supervision and effective judicial redress 
(https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/items/6141 08/en) . 
 
The Commission has so far adopted 14 adequacy decisions (for Andorra, Argentina, Canada 
(commercial organisations), Faroe Islands, Guernsey, Israel, Isle of Man, Japan, Jersey, 
New Zealand , Republic of Korea, Switzerland, the United  Kingdom  and Uruguay). In addition, there 
is a pending adoption procedure for an adequacy finding for the EU -US Data Privacy Framework WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 (which would facilitate data transfers to companies in the United  States ) and adequacy talk s are 
ongoing with several countries.  
 
Page 33, Para 9.6  
In addition to the rules already adopted, several legislative initiatives are currently under 
consideration by the co -legislators of the EU, including on cybersecurity requirements for products, 
on semiconductor ecosystems, on artificial intelligence, a framework for European Digital Identity, 
on roaming, on fair access to and use of data and on AI Liability.  
Questions 146 -147: 
146. According to cybersecurity requirements, regulations should put open -source software under 
their control. What impact will these regulations have on technological innovation?  
 
Reply:  The Cyber Resilience Act proposal provides that "in order not to hamper innovation or 
research, free and open -source software developed or supplied outside the course of a commercial 
activity should not be covered by this Regulation. This is in particular the case for software, including 
its source code and modified versions, that is openly shared and freely accessible, usable, modifiable 
and redistributable. In the context of software, a commercial activity might be characterized not 
only by charging a price for a prod uct, but also by charging a price for technical support services, 
by providing a software platform through which the manufacturer monetises other services, or by 
the use of personal data for reasons other than exclusively for improving the security, compat ibility 
or interoperability of the software ". 
 
147. Please further clarify the definition of "products with digital elements " in the regulations on 
cybersecurity requirements.  
 
Reply:  According to the Cyber Resiliance Act  (CRA) Proposal , 'product with digital elements ' means 
any software or hardware product and its remote data processing solutions, including software or 
hardware componen ts to be placed on the market separately.  
 
Both final product and components placed on the internal market will fall under the scope of the 
CRA. For components, the manufacturers of those components will be subject to obligations relating 
to compliance with essential requirements concerning product features and vulnerability 
management. For the manufacturer integrating components developed by other operators, they will 
only have due diligence obligations relating to the integration of those co mponents and obligations 
of the likes of recording and documenting dependencies along the supply chain, i.e. software bill of 
materials (SBOM).  
 
Page 36, Para 9.25  
The EU has granted an exceptional and temporary derogation to allow the production of crops on 
land set aside within the EU, while maintaining full greening payments for farmers.  
Questions 148:  
148. Could EU justify the measure mentioned above in which producing crops on land set aside 
seems to contradict with the requirement of fallow to grant greening payment to farmers?  
 
Reply:  To alleviate market tensions due to the Ukraine, the Commission has adopted emergency 
measures for stabilising EU agricultural markets for 2022 and to boost EU crop supply avoiding any 
further disturbance on the m arket. The Commission has allowed Member States to derogate from 
certain greening obligations. The decision was adopted on 23  March  2022 allowing Member States 
to use fallow land under ecological focus area (EFA) obligation. This derogation was under Membe r 
States supervision but it was applicable temporarily for the year 2022 as an exceptional measure.  
 
The focus was to combine our environmental and food productivity objectives. The derogation 
granted was temporary (only for the year 2022) and limited sin ce it only concerned certain types 
of EFAs, notably fallow land and nitrogen -fixing crops that farmers may register as fallow land for 
production purposes. The rest of the greening requirements were still applicable.  
 
The derogations were meant only to ad dress the specific and extreme situation, and do not in any 
way signify a lesser commitment by the Commission to the objectives of the European Green Deal, 
the Farm to Fork Strategy, and the Biodiversity Strategy. On the contrary, the Commission called 
for a quick and robust implementation of these sustainability policies, as food system resilience is 
dependent on food system environmental, social and economic sustainability.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Page 36, Para 9.29  
Government -to-government (G2G) digital cooperation will suppor t the automated verification by 
customs of the non -customs formalities required for goods clearance, allowing partner competent 
authorities to properly monitor and control the quantities of authorised goods imported or exported 
at EU level  ... Business -to-government (B2G) digital cooperation will streamline clearance processes 
for traders when dealing with certain EU non -customs regulatory requirements by allowing them to 
provide data in one single portal in an individual Member State.  
 
149. What specific G 2G digital cooperation is launched?  
 
Reply:  Regulation (EU) 2022/2399  establishes the EU Single Window Environment for Customs 
(EU SWE-C) to streamline the electronic exchange of documents and information required for the 
goods clearance process. EU SWE -C is composed of three components, n amely the EU non -customs 
systems, the EU Single Window Certificate Exchange System (EU CSW -CERTEX) and the national 
single window environments for customs managed by EU Member States. EU CSW -CERTEX serves 
as the intermediary IT system that enables the exch ange of information between the other 
two components. The EU Single Window facilitates two types of exchanges: 
Government -to-Government (G2G) and Business -to-Government (B2G). The G2G digital 
cooperation pertains to the sharing of information between custo ms and EU non -customs systems 
without changing the submission rules for economic operators. This channel is already operational 
because EU CSW -CERTEX is connected and capable of exchanging information with most of the 
available Union non -customs systems li sted in the Annex  to Regulation (EU) 2022/2399. The G2G 
channel will become mandatory for all EU Member States starting March 2025.  
 
150. What exactly does "non-customs formalities required for customs clearance of goods " include?  
 
Reply:  These include al l the operations that an economic operator or competent authority is required 
to perform for the international movement of goods in compliance with EU sectorial legislation.  
 
151. Is there a clearly -defined list or scope of products for "authorised goods imported or exported 
with appropriate control at the EU level "? If so, how are the products on the list determined? Are 
access criteria and quotas determined based on TBT/SPS rules or other grounds?  
 
Reply:  Certain goods that enter the customs territory o f the European  Union  may be subject to 
non-customs requirements that impose restrictions on their quantities.  The EU competent authorities 
are responsible for monitoring and controlling the quantities of authorised goods that have been 
released by customs authorities throughout the Customs Union. To facilitate this process, Regulation 
(EU) 2022/2399 establishes an EU -wide 'quantity management ' functionality that enables authorities 
to automatically verify that quantities have not been depleted before permitting the release of goods, 
regardless of the EU Member State where the release has occurred. The Annex  to Regulation 
(EU) 2022/2399 specifie s the list of non -customs formalities that can be exchanged through the 
EU Single Window.  
 
152. What exactly does B2G digital cooperation include? Is it mandatory?  
 
Reply:  The B2G digital cooperation aims to establish a single -entry point for data at the national 
level, building on the existing G2G exchanges. In accordance with Regulation (EU) 2022/2399, this 
channel will be mandatory for a selected number of non -customs formalities by 2031.  This will enable 
economic operators to submit all border data  required for goods clearance directly to the national 
single window environments for customs, eliminating the need to separately submit data to both 
customs systems and Union non -customs systems.  
 
Page 37, Para 9.32  
To facilitate the release into free cir culation of low value consignments which are not subject to 
import duty, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/1143 of 14  March  2019 introduced a 
specific customs declaration with a reduced dataset.  
Question 153:  
153. What are the details of the speci fic customs declaration for low -value consignments?  
 
Reply:  The data requirements of the customs declaration for the release for free circulation of low 
value consignments subject to duty relief in accordance with Article  23(1) and 25(1) of Regulation 
(EC) No 1186/2009  are laid down in Annex  B of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2446  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 178 - 
 
  
 (UCC Delegated Act). The corresponding formats and codes to be used in relation to those data 
elements are defined in Annex  B of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447  
(UCC Implementing Act).  
 
PART III: OTHER QUESTIONS  
On 14  December  2022, the Office of the Council of the Europea n Union  Member States issued a 
press release entitled International Tax: Council Reaches Agreement on Minimum Tax Level for Large 
Companies, stating that EU Member States have unanimously agreed to impose a minimum 
corporate tax of 15% on large companies, and it is expected to introduce Pillar II into domestic laws 
before the end of 2023, with the IIR entering into force in 2024 and the UTPR in 2025.  
Questions 154 -155:  
154. What's the latest development of the domestic legislation of the EU Member States? In 
particular how is the effective tax amount calculated in Member States?  
 
Reply:  EU Member States have undertaken to transpose the Directive which implements the GloBE 
Model Rules into their national legal systems before 31  December  2023. The EU Directive follows 
closely the GloBE Rules, agreed by 138 Inclusive Framework members. The EU Member States have 
to design their national implementation framework in conformity with the Directive. If not, they 
would risk being brought before the European Co urt of Justice for having failed to comply with the 
requirements of the conformity check by the Commission. The rules provide for the calculation of 
the effective rate at which an MNE group pays tax per jurisdiction. It therefore follows that 
EU Member Sta tes will follow the same set of rules for carrying out this calculation.  
 
155. What does the EU Council think about the STTR rules?  
 
Reply:  The Council is not discussing the Subject -to-Tax-Rule. 
 
The Subject -to-Tax-Rule is a treaty -based rule and so far, bilateral tax treaties are negotiated by 
Member States without an involvement at Union level. The STTR allows developing countries to 
impose limited source taxation on a list of related party payments which are subject to tax below a 
minimum rate (9%) in r esidence states and under certain conditions. The Subject -to-Tax-Rule is 
integral part of the GloBE rules under the design of Pillar Two, as reflected in the Political Statement 
on "a Two -Pillar Solution to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digit alisation of the 
Economy " of 8 October  2021.  
 
With the technical assistance of the OECD Secretariat, the members of the BEPS Inclusive 
Framework are working intensively on the final design of the Subject -to-Tax-Rule, with a view to 
reach conclusions on the instruments of its legal framework, including a Multilateral Convention to 
facilitate a swift and consistent implementation of the Rule in relevant bilateral treaties.  
 
The Green Deal Industrial Plan officially presented by the European Commission on 1 February  2023 
and the Net -Zero Industry Act published on 16 March  2023 propose to relax the rules on state 
subsidies to businesses.  
 
Questions 156:  
156. Will the Green Deal Industrial Plan and the Net -Zero Industry Act impose unjustified trade 
restrictions on other countries on the grounds of the green transition? How to ensure that there is 
no discriminatory treatment to particular members?  
 
Reply:  The Green Deal Industrial Plan and the Net Zero Industry Act are consistent wit h the 
European  Union 's international commitments. The proposal of the Net Zero Industry Act foresees 
the same level of ambition in terms of sustainability from all public tenders and bidders in auctions 
for the net zero technologies listed in the Annex, ir respective of their origin.  Regarding future plans, 
the European  Union  notes that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective reviews.  
 
On 16  March  2023, the European Commission introduced the Critical Raw Materials Act (COM (2023) 
160) with a view to ensuring that the EU has access to safe, diversified, affordable and sustainable 
supplies of critical raw materials.  
 
Questions 157  
157. Does the Critical Raw Materials Act violate the WTO principles of Most favoured nation and 
rules of quantitative restri ctions? How can the EU ensure that its implementation of the Critical Raw WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 179 - 
 
Materials Act does not harm the supply chains of other members, or interfere with normal 
international business flows?  
 
Reply:  The European Commission proposal for a Regulation on Cr itical Raw Materials is in full 
compliance with the WTO principles. The Critical Raw Materials Act does not impose quantitative 
restrictions and does not aim to disrupt the supply chains of the WTO members. The aim of the 
Critical Raw Materials Act is to e nsure the security of a sustainable supply for critical raw materials 
for the European industry.  
 
On 16  March  2023, the European Commission introduced the Net Zero Industries Bill (2023/0081 
(COD)). The Bill proposes that at least 40 % of clean technologies  be produced in the EU by 2030 as 
part of its efforts to achieve its climate goals and enhance its energy independence. The eligible 
technologies include renewable energy, nuclear energy, carbon capture and storage, etc.  
 
Question 158:  
158. How can the EU ensure  that its subsidies for implementing the Net -Zero Industry Act do not 
harm the interests of other members or affect normal international trade, and are in line with the 
WTO's principle of non -discrimination?  
 
Reply:  The Net Zero Industry Act is consistent with the European  Union 's international commitments. 
Regarding future plans, the European  Union  notes that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective 
reviews.  
 
Question 159:  
159. Does this provision violate the basic WTO principle of free trade and  discriminate against third -
country products?  
 
Reply:  The Net Zero Industry Act is consistent with the European  Union 's international commitments. 
Regarding future plans, the European  Union  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are 
retrospective revie ws. 
 
In response to the European Commission 's "The Green Deal Industrial Plan ", €250 billion  
(RMB  1.84 trillion ) from existing EU funds would be earmarked to green industrial transition and 
accelerate industrial decarbonization in member states, including tax reductions and exemptions 
granted to enterprises that invest in zero -carbon technologies.  
 
Question 160:  
160. Does the EU 's large investment in zero -carbon technologies and industries, as well as tax relief 
measures for related enterprises, constitute specific subsidies and adversely affect relevant 
industries in other Members, thereby violates WTO rules on subsidies and coun tervailing duty?  
 
Reply:  The Net Zero Industry Act is consistent with the European  Union 's international commitments. 
When taking into account resilience, public buyers shall respect the Union 's international 
commitments.  
 
In recent years, Germany, France and other EU member states have issued anti -suit or anti -anti-suit 
injunctions in a number of cases involving standard essential patents. For instance: (1) in the Nokia 
v. Daimler Automotive and Continental case, on 11 July 2019, the First District Court of Munich, 
Germany issued a provisional injunction, prohibiting Continental from applying for an anti -suit 
injunction in order to directly or indirectly hinder Nokia 's exercise of its action rights in German 
infringement actions and requirin g Continental to withdraw its submission to the U.S. court. If 
Mainland violates this interim ban, it will face either a fine of €250 ,000 or detention of the violator 
for up to 6 months per case (cumulative detention shall not exceed 2 years in no case). ( 2) In the 
IPCom v. Lenovo case, in November 2019, the French court of first instance issued a temporary 
injunction, requiring Lenovo to immediately withdraw its application for a restraining order from a 
US court and ensure that no further restraining orde rs were applied for until the French court made 
a judgment on infringement. (3) In January 2021, in the case of Japanese IP Bridge Company v. 
Huawei Company, a regional court in Munich, Germany issued a temporary anti litigation order based 
on the applicat ion of Japanese IP Bridge Company, prohibiting Huawei Company from applying for 
an anti litigation order in Chinese courts without Huawei Company filing a lawsuit.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 180 - 
 
  
 Questions 161:  
161. We noted that courts of EU Member States have issued anti -suit injuncti ons or injunctions in 
a number of cases in recent years. Does this mean that the granting of anti -suit injunctions has 
become a judicial policy in the EU? What is the legal basis and main considerations for the issuance 
of these anti -suit injunctions? Will  it restrict the ordinary exercise of jurisdiction in other countries? 
What are the adverse effects on the litigation activities of rights holders? Will it undermine the 
IP right holder 's right to access remedies?  
 
Reply:  The EU rules on the granting of injunctions in cases relating to intellectual property rights are 
laid down in Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29  April 2004 
on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights. Regarding the jurisprudence o n anti -suit 
injunctions, the Court of Justice of the European  Union  has issued decisions on the possible issuance 
of anti -suit injunctions in two cases: C -158/07 (West tankers) and C ‑536/13 (Gazprom).  
 
Question 162:  
162. Please provide information on the followings: the rules, institutions and standards for the 
regulation of unsolicited commercial electronic message, as well as the application of relevant 
technologies and international cooperation; market competition rules, institutions and law 
enforcement  in the telecommunications and Internet sectors.  
 
Reply:  Article  13 of the ePrivacy Directive sets out that the use of automated calling and 
communication systems without human intervention (automatic calling machines), facsimile 
machines (fax) or electron ic mail for the purposes of direct marketing may be allowed only in respect 
of subscribers or users who have given their prior consent.  
 
Notwithstanding paragraph 1, where a natural or legal person obtains from its customers their 
electronic contact detai ls for electronic mail, in the context of the sale of a product or a service, in 
accordance with Directive 95/46/EC, the same natural or legal person may use these electronic 
contact details for direct marketing of its own similar products or services prov ided that customers 
clearly and distinctly are given the opportunity to object, free of charge and in an easy manner, to 
such use of electronic contact details at the time of their collection and on the occasion of each 
message in case the customer has not  initially refused such use.  
 
The relevant competent national authorities in the Member States are responsible for the 
enforcement of the provisions that transposed the ePrivacy Directive  
 
In the Domestic Support Notifications (DS:1) from 20115/2016 Marke ting Year to 2019/2020 
Marketing Year submitted by European  Union  (G/AG/N/EU/46, G/AG/N/EU/55, G/AG/N/EU/61, 
G/AG/N/EU/69 and G/AG/N/EU/79), the expenditure of "Income insurance and income safety -net 
programmes " in Green Box has increased by more than 10 t imes, from 33.2  million  euros to 
362.9  million  Euros. Unfortunately, EU did not provide details of the programmes, only referring to 
Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013.  
 
Question 163:  
163. Please explain how the programmes meet the requirements of Article  2, Paragraph 7 (a) - (d) 
of Annex  2 to the Agreement on Agriculture, and provide reasons for the substantial increase of the 
expenditure mentioned above.  
 
Reply:  EU Member States implemented the schemes towards the end of their programmed period, 
as they requ ired more time. The increase of the expenditure also shows the importance that Member 
States have put in this type of schemes by increasing their share in the total Rural Development 
payments.  
 
In the Domestic Support Notifications (DS:1) from 20115/2016 Marketing Year to 2019/2020 
Marketing Year submitted by European  Union  (G/AG/N/EU/46, G/AG/N/EU/55, G/AG/N/EU/61, 
G/AG/N/EU/69 and G/AG/N/EU/79), EU notified "Horizontal support in the Fruit and Vegetables 
sector -harvest insurance " and "National support me asures -Insurance subsidies " under the 
Non-Product -Specific AMS (Supporting Table  DS:9), in addition to the Wine harvest insurance 
notified under Non -exempt direct payments for specific products (Supporting Table  DS:6)  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 181 - 
 
Questions 164 -165:  
164. Please explain what crops the Fruit and vegetable harvest insurance applies and the reasons 
to put the insurance in Non -Product -Specific Amber Box.  
 
Reply:  Harvest insurance is one of the types of interventions which are available to sectoral 
beneficiaries under sectoral interventions provided for in Regulation (EU) 2021/2115, among others 
to the fruit and vegetables sector.  
 
Harvest insurance in the fruit and vegetables sector is part of the measures which may be 
implemented by recognised producer organisations t hrough their approved operational programmes. 
Producer organisations are recognised by EU Member States for one or several fruit and/or 
vegetables and their operational programmes apply to those products. The expenditure collected by 
the Commission are con solidated data per Member States Therefore, it is not possible to determine 
for which exact product the harvest insurance has been used. This explains why the harvest 
insurance refers to "non-product -specific Amber box ". 
 
165. How is the "National support measures -Insurance subsidies " implemented ？ What crops does 
the subsidized insurance applies and what loss does the insurance cover?  
 
Reply:  Harvest and production insurances are types of interventions available to beneficiaries of 
some o f the sectoral interventions (i.e. fruit and vegetables, wine, hops, olive oil and table olives 
and 'other ' sectors. If the scope (i.e. safeguarding producers ' incomes where there are losses as a 
consequence of natural disasters, adverse climatic events, diseases or pest infestations) and basic 
conditions (i.e. maximum ceilings) are established and regulated by EU legislation, it is up to Member 
States to ensure  that those requirements are respected and to establish implementing national rules 
if needed.WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 COLOMBIA  
INFORME DE LA SECRETARÍA – DOCUMENTO WT/TPR/S/442  
 
1 ENTORNO ECONÓMICO  
1.3 Evolución del comercio y la inversión  
1.3.1.2 Tendencias del comercio de serv icios 
1.38.  La Unión Europea presenta estadísticas experimentales sobre el comercio de servicios por 
modo de suministro. Los datos disponibles más recientes (2018) indican que la mayoría de las 
importaciones y exportaciones de servicios, casi el 60%, se re aliza mediante el modo 3, es decir, la 
presencia comercial. Así ocurrió en particular en el caso de los servicios de distribución y transporte. 
El modo 1, suministro transfronterizo, fue el siguiente más importante, con un 30% 
aproximadamente; en este caso  predominaron otros servicios prestados a las empresas (servicios 
de I+D, de contabilidad, jurídicos y de ingeniería) y los servicios de transporte. Luxemburgo fue el 
Estado miembro que más utilizó el modo 1 para las exportaciones, principalmente para el s uministro 
de servicios financieros  
 
Question 1:  
1. ¿Podría la UE explicar el término de experimentales utilizado para las estadísticas sobre el 
comercio de servicios por modo de suministro? ¿Existe algún proceso de medición oficial con 
estadísticas defini tivas? ¿Cómo trata la UE la recolección de información para los servicios del 
modo  4? 
 
Reply:  
a) Experimental statistics use new data sources and methods and have not reached full maturity 
in terms of harmonisation, coverage or methodology. Detailed explanations why mode of supply 
(MoS) are experimental statistics are provided under the below link:  
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/exp erimental -statistics/services -trade -by-modes -of-supply  
 
b) For the time being there are no official statistics on MoS. MoS becomes official statistics with 
the adoption of the Regulation (EU) 2019/2152 on European busines s statistics. The first official data 
transmissions for MoS data will be 2024.  
 
In February 2023 Eurostat published some national data on MoS – available in the Eurobase table 
(online data code: ext_ser_mos ). However, please note that these data are not official statistics, 
they are labelled as experimental and should  be used with caution.  
 
c) Eurostat in cooperation with the WTO have developed a simplified model to estimate the 
international supply of services by MoS. The current model and detailed methodological guidelines 
are provided in the European business statistics compilers guide for European statistics on 
international supply of services by mode of supply – 2021 edition  – please  see chapter 6 and 7.  
 
The consolidated Eurostat -WTO model stems from the efforts of the two organisations, in 
cooperation with several countries. It builds upon and combines the experience acquired through 
two complementary exercises:  
 
• The Eurostat simplified approach was developed by Eurostat in cooperation with WTO and 
several countries. It builds upon the MSITS 2010. Eurostat has also developed a mapping table to 
allocate FATS turnover (mode 3) by NACE to EBOPS items.  
• The WTO Trade in Services by Mode of Supply (TiSMoS) project  is an experimental dataset 
produced by the WTO and funded by the European Commission's Direc torate -General for Trade. 
TiSMoS covers 200 individual economies for the period 2005 -2017. The European  Union  aggregate 
is available from 2010 to 2017. The information is broken down by service sector and refers to the 
economies' trade with the rest of the  world.  
 
The starting point for this approach is the MSITS 2010 guidelines. The model uses data from ITSS 
(based on the EBOPS services classification) and FATS (based on the activities of the affiliates, 
reported according to the NACE classification). The estimations are complemented with other data 
sources (such as tourism statistics, trade by enterprise characteristics (TEC), services trade by 
enterprise characteristics (STEC) and structural business statistics (SBS)). The model allocates each 
EBOPS item in one or more modes.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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2 RÉGIMEN DE COMERCIO E INVERSIÓN  
2.1 Marco general  
En el párrafo 2.4 la Secretaria informa que: "Durante el período objeto de examen, la Unión Europea 
puso en marcha una nueva estrategia de desarrollo en el marco del Pacto Verde Eur opeo (2019) con 
el objetivo de convertirse en una economía neutra en emisiones de carbono para 2050. Este objetivo 
se hizo vinculante en julio de 2021 con la adopción y entrada en vigor del Reglamento por el que se 
establece el marco para lograr la neutral idad climática (Legislación europea sobre el clima).6 Además 
del Pacto Verde Europeo, la Unión Europea adoptó una estrategia digital (2020 y 2021) para 
maximizar los beneficios del progreso tecnológico y un nuevo programa político (2019) a fin de ser 
una " Europa más fuerte en el mundo" y reforzar su influencia y liderazgo mundiales.7 Estas 
estrategias, en particular el Pacto Verde Europeo, implican importantes cambios y coordinación en 
todos los sectores y esferas de política, y han dado lugar a que se exam inen diversas políticas de la 
UE, entre ellas, sus políticas agrícolas, energéticas, industriales y comerciales."  
 
Question 2:  
2. De acuerdo con el objetivo inmerso en la estrategia del Pacto Verde Europeo, que implican 
importantes cambios y coordinación en todos los sectores y esferas de política, entre ellas, sus 
políticas agrícolas, energéticas, industriales y comerciales, ¿Qué acciones concretas de contribución 
adelanta la UE para aquellos socios comerciales que presentan diferentes dificultades de 
implementar políticas que se ajusten a las nuevas exigencias ambientales?  
 
Reply:  The EU designs it environmental and climate action policies in a way that achieve the 
environmental objectives set in the international commitments (including under Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements (MEAs), the UN Framework Convention on Climate Chang e (UNFCCC) 
and the Paris Agreements, and the Sustainable Development Goals) and minimises impact on trade. 
Article  216(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European  Union  states that "[a]greements 
concluded by the Union are binding upon the instituti ons of the Union and on its Member States" . 
Consequently, the EU always assesses the compatibility of its legislation with its international 
commitments.  
 
Conscious about the potential relevance for the EU's trading partners and the need to comply with 
WTO rules, the EU has designed all its European Green Deal measures very carefully. The EU has 
also been a role model for transparency of its European Green Deal measures through public 
consultations, impact assessments and outreach from an early regulatory processes and 
implementation stages in different fora in the EU and outside (in Brussels, through the EU 
delegations in partner countries, in the WTO in Geneva and via bilateral dialogues). The EU has 
engaged in the WTO and bilaterally with countries and t ried to address their concerns as far as they 
allowed maintaining objectives pursued by its policies. The EU will continue dialogue and 
engagement with its trading partners including for the measures that entered into force and ensuing 
implementing acts an d decisions, in the WTO and bilaterally.  
 
Finally, while the EU is working on achieving these objectives internally in the EU, we are also 
supporting developing countries. The EU is collectively the biggest donor for international aid in the 
world, provid ing over EUR 50 billion  a year to help overcome poverty and advance global 
development. The EU also continues to support partner countries in their green transition, in line 
with our international commitments. Through the EU's Global Instrument (Neighbourh ood, 
Development and International Cooperation Instrument – NDICI), the EU has so far committed about 
EUR 27.8 billion  in support of climate objectives in partner countries for the period of 2021 -27. In 
December 2021, the EU launched the Global Gateway, a new strategy to mobilise investments 
totalling EUR  300 billion over the period 2021 -27. In line with the EU's commitment to the 2030 
Agenda, the Global Gateway aims at boosting smart, clean and secure investments in digital, energy 
and transport.  
 
2.3 Acue rdos y arreglos comerciales  
2.3.2.1.1 Nuevos ACR  
Unión Europea – Reino Unido (2021)  
2.25. En el comercio de servicios, la Unión Europea contrajo compromisos más amplios que los 
consignados en su lista anexa al AGCS, aunque mantiene reservas relativas a sec tores específicos, 
así como exclusiones para los servicios públicos y audiovisuales y determinados servicios de 
transporte. Además, los proveedores de servicios del Reino Unido ahora tienen que cumplir la 
reglamentación de la UE o la de los distintos Estad os miembros. En relación con el modo 4, la Unión 
Europea contrajo algunos compromisos relativos al movimiento de profesionales con determinados WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 fines empresariales (por ejemplo, personas trasladadas dentro de una misma empresa, proveedores 
de servicios con tractuales, personas en visita de negocios de corta duración). No se contrajeron 
compromisos en relación con el reconocimiento de las cualificaciones profesionales. Sin embargo, el 
ACR entre la UE y el Reino Unido establece un marco con directrices para la  negociación de futuros 
acuerdos de reconocimiento (caso por caso y para profesiones específicas). En cuanto al comercio 
digital, el Acuerdo prohíbe la aplicación de requisitos de localización de datos o revelación obligatoria 
del código fuente.  
 
Question 3:  
3. ¿Es posible conocer el alcance de los compromisos relativos al movimiento de profesionales 
con determinados fines empresariales que están señalados en el párrafo?  
 
Reply:  Information on trade agreements containing commitments concerning the temporary entr y 
and stay in the territory of the European  Union  of service providers and their categories can be found 
on the EU Immigration Portal: https://immigration -portal.ec.europa.eu/general -information/what -
category -do-i-fit_en  (under section 'International Service Providers'), while information on specific 
requirements per EU Member State can be accessed via the interactive map on  the home page of 
the Portal.  
 
Question 4:  
4. Si bien se informa que en el periodo no se contrajeron nuevos compromisos en relación con 
el reconocimiento de las cualificaciones profesionales, ¿puede la UE informar sobre los compromisos 
existentes al interi or de la Unión, como con países fuera de esta?  
 
Reply:  Recognition of qualifications in the EU is regulated by Directive 2005/36/EC, which sets out 
a system of automatic recognition for six medical professions and for architects, as well as a general 
system of recognition for other regulated professions and a system of recognition based on 
professional experience. In addition, the EEA agreement and the Free Movement of Persons 
Agreement with Switzerland extend the scope of Directive 2005/36/EC on the recogn ition of 
professional qualifications to Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. Furthermore, a mutual 
recognition agreement for architects was concluded in principle with Canada in 2022. This agreement 
is the first of its kind to be concluded by th e EU.  
 
2.4 Régimen de inversión  
2.4.1 Marco reglamentario  
2.58. La Unión Europea ha comenzado a negociar disposiciones sobre facilitación de las inversiones, 
ya sea como parte de acuerdos comerciales más amplios (por ejemplo, con países de la región de 
África Oriental y Meridional) o como acuerdos específicos sobre facilitación de las inversiones 
sostenibles (por ejemplo, con Angola). La Unión Europea también participa en la Iniciativa 
relacionada con la Declaración Conjunta sobre la Facilitación de las Inversiones para el Desarrollo 
de la OMC.  
 
Question 5:  
5. Podría la UE informar ¿cuáles son los componentes de un acuerdo sobre facilitación de las 
inversiones sostenibles y en qué se diferencian de los acuerdos tradicionales de inversión? Esto con 
el ánim o de indagar por las estrategias y posibilidades de integrar en nuestro actual acuerdo aquellos 
componentes que permitan la facilitación de una inversión sostenible, que se inscribe dentro de 
nuestra actual estrategia de desarrollo nacional.   
 
Reply:  The o bjective of a Sustainable Investment Facilitation Agreement (SIFA) is to help establish 
a more transparent, efficient and predictable business climate for investors. This includes making 
information on investment rules public and easily available, and redu cing delays in obtaining 
government permits and approvals. In terms of sustainability, the objective is to ensure that the 
parties' investment frameworks include and support sustainable development objectives, notably 
with regard to labour and environment.  The main difference between a SIFA and other investment 
agreements like FTAs or stand -alone investment protections agreements is that SIFAs do not include 
provisions on investment liberalization (i.e. market access, non -discrimination, performance 
require ments) and investment protection. A good example for the structure and content of a SIFA 
is the one negotiated between the EU and Angola.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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2.4.2 Otros aspectos del régimen de inversión extranjera de la Unión Europea  
2.66.  En el ámbito de la promoción de la s inversiones, la Unión Europea (y sus Estados miembros) 
siguió alentando la inversión en general y en determinados sectores, principalmente mediante 
donaciones e instrumentos financieros (sección 3.3.1). Cada Estado miembro de la UE tiene una 
agencia de p romoción de las inversiones, pero no existe una agencia a nivel de la UE. En el ámbito 
de la tributación, el tipo medio del impuesto sobre la renta de las sociedades de la UE (tipos máximos 
legales) se situó en el 21,2% en 2022. Ese mismo año, la Unión Eur opea adoptó un tipo mínimo 
efectivo del impuesto sobre las sociedades del 15% para las multinacionales con ingresos anuales 
superiores a EUR  750 millones, que se implementará a más tardar en diciembre de 2023 
(sección  3.3.1.3). Los Estados miembros de la UE también mantienen convenios para evitar la doble 
imposición con terceros países.  
 
Question 6:  
6. ¿Puede la UE informar o ampliar sobre sus estrategias de promoción de las inversiones si en 
ellas se contemplan incentivos u/y otro tipo de regulación que estimulen las inversiones de la UE en 
el mundo con empresas que cumplan políticas de ASG ( factores Ambientales, Sociales y de 
Gobernanza) en pro de promocionar inversiones orientadas a la consecución de los ODS en los países 
anfitriones, contribuyendo de esta forma a que las inversiones de la UE estimulen el desarrollo 
sostenible de los países receptores particularmente de la América Latina?  
 
Reply:  To help countries to attract greater financing from European investors and capital markets 
towards sustaina ble investments, the EU cooperates with partner countries in a number of fields. 
The EU offers technical assistance to develop credible sustainable finance policies and frameworks 
and promote sustainability -related financial instruments (green and other th ematic bond issuances) 
as key instruments to redirect international, EU and local private capital into sustainable investments 
in partner countries. Furthermore, the EU is working – in a Team Europe approach – towards 
supporting the growth of green bond ma rkets in partner countries through a Global Green Bonds 
Initiative under the lead of the European Investment Bank. The EU has launched the first green bond 
fund dedicated to Latin America, LAGREEN, through the Latin America Investment Facility. By 
investin g in green bonds and supporting new issuers with technical assistance, LAGreen's goal is to 
boost environmental and social benefits across the region and promote the transition to a green 
economy.  
 
3 POLÍTICAS Y PRÁCTICAS COMERCIALES, POR MEDIDAS  
3.1 Medidas que afectan directamente a las importaciones  
3.1.1.1 Evolución reciente y futura  
3.5. Se han puesto en aplicación nuevas normas sobre el comercio electrónico que contienen 
procedimientos para la importación de envíos de escaso valor, entre ellas la  supresión de la exención 
de minimis  del IVA de importación. Como se explicó en el informe anterior, los cambios jurídicos se 
introdujeron en 2019 en virtud del Reglamento Delegado (UE) 2019/1143 de la Comisión, pero no 
se aplicaron hasta el 1 de julio de 2021. Así pues, los envíos de escaso valor, es decir, aquellos cuyo 
valor no excede de EUR  22, que anteriormente se importaban libres de IVA sin formalidades 
específicas, están ahora sujetos a la presentación de una declaración electrónica en aduana. No 
obstante, en parte con el fin de atender las preocupaciones sobre el fraude, la exención del IVA se 
suprimió, con efecto a partir del 1 de julio de 2021, por lo que ahora el IVA se recauda sobre todos 
los envíos, incluidos los de escaso valor.  
 
Question 7:  
7. ¿Podrían ampliar la información respecto a la suspensión de la exención de minimis del IVA 
sobre la importación de envíos de escaso valor? ¿Cuáles son las ventajas identificadas?  
 
Reply:  On 1 July, the EU VAT e -commerce package came into application and introduced a number 
of amendments to the VAT rules governing the taxation of business -to-consumer (B2C) cross -border 
e-commerce activity in Europe. In relation to imports, the measures introduced by the EU VAT 
e-commerce package were designed to create a fairer and simpler system of taxation and to take 
action against e -commerce related VAT fr aud. One of the primary objectives of the e -commerce 
package was to level the playing field for EU established suppliers by addressing distortive rules that 
led to competition issues in the e -commerce market. In an effort to help level the playing field fo r 
suppliers of EU goods, the VAT exemption for the importation of small consignments not exceeding 
EUR 22 was abolished with effect from 1  July 2021. As a result, VAT is now due on all commercial 
goods imported into Europe from a third country or third ter ritory, irrespective of their value. 
Following the implementation of the EU VAT e -commerce package, the European Commission WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 conducted an ex-post evaluation of the first 6 months of application the package to assess its results. 
The results of the ex-post evaluation are included in Annex  6 of the Impact Assessment, 
accompanying the VAT in the Digital Age proposal, which was published on 8  December  2022. The 
initial results showcased the effect that the abolition of the EUR  22 exemption threshold has had on 
the collection of VAT. In the firs t 6 months of application of the EU VAT e -commerce package, 
approximately EUR  692 million  was directly generated as result of the abolition of the EUR  22 
threshold. This is a significant result as it represents new EU VAT that would not otherwise have 
been collected and helps to highlight how the package has allowed the European Commission to 
realise its aim of achieving a fairer and simpler system of taxation.  
 
3.6. Para facilitar ese cambio, se introdujo la ventanilla única de importación (IOSS) con el fi n de 
simplificar la declaración y liquidación del IVA sobre las ventas a distancia de envíos de escaso valor 
procedentes de terceros territorios y terceros países.5 La IOSS puede utilizarse para las mercancías 
importadas cuyo valor no exceda de EUR  150 y r equiere el registro de una interfaz electrónica 
establecida en la Unión Europea, o de un intermediario establecido en la UE. Para los casos en que 
no es posible utilizar la IOSS, la Unión Europea ha introducido regímenes especiales que constituyen 
otro med io de simplificación. Estos regímenes especiales se adaptan a los operadores postales y las 
empresas de transporte urgente que completan las declaraciones en nombre de los clientes.  
 
Question 8:  
8. ¿Podrían ampliar la información respecto a la ventanilla única de importación (IOSS)? ¿Cuál 
es el procedimiento?  
 
Reply:  The e -commerce package also introduced a number of simplification measures, including the 
Import One -Stop Shop (IOSS ), to help reduce the VAT compliance burden associated with the 
importation of low value goods – information on the EU VAT e -commerce package is available on 
the European Commission's VAT One -Stop Shop (OSS) Web portal . The IOSS is designed to help 
support the import side of e -commerce activity following the abolition of the EUR  22 low value import 
VAT exemption. The IOSS is an optional simplification that a pplies to distance sales of goods 
imported into the EU with an intrinsic value not exceeding EUR  150, excluding excise goods. Traders 
who opt to register for the IOSS do not need to register for VAT in each Member State in which their 
eligible supplies of imported goods to consumers take place. Instead, the VAT due on those supplies 
can be declared and paid in one single Member State (the Member State of identification) via the 
IOSS scheme. The VAT due on all eligible distance sales of imported goods can be  declared in a 
single monthly electronic VAT IOSS return, accompanied by a single payment to the Member State 
of Identification. Traders who opt to register in the IOSS scheme can deal with their VAT compliance 
obligations in one language via the tax admin istration of the Member State in which they are 
registered, even though their sales are EU -wide. Suppliers and electronic interfaces who are not 
established in the EU need to appoint an intermediary to be able to use the import scheme, unless 
they are esta blished in a third country with which the EU has concluded a VAT mutual assistance 
agreement.  
 
In terms of the IOSS process, IOSS goods are exempt from VAT upon importation into the EU, as 
customers who purchase from IOSS registered suppliers pay the VAT -inclusive price at the time of 
their online purchase. The supplier (seller) or, if applicable, his intermediary registers for VAT 
purposes in one Member State of his preference (Member State of identification), regardless of the 
Member State of importation . The VAT exemption on importation of IOSS goods is granted when the 
declarant provides the valid IOSS number of the taxable person supplying those goods to the 
customs authorities in the Member State of importation. The supplier's IOSS VAT identification 
number must be provided in the customs declaration. The relevant customs authority will make an 
automatic check of its validity against the IOSS VAT identification number database. This database 
is made available electronically to all customs authorities i n the EU and it contains all the IOSS VAT 
identification numbers issued by tax authorities in EU Member States. The database of IOSS VAT 
identification numbers is not public. If the IOSS number is valid and the intrinsic value of the 
consignment does not e xceed EUR  150, the customs authorities will not request the payment of VAT 
on low value goods imported under the IOSS. The customs authorities of the Member State of 
importation compile a monthly listing of the value of imports per IOSS VAT identification number 
and share it with the tax administration of the Member State of identification. Where the IOSS is 
used, the customer has certainty and transparency about the total price of the transaction and is 
not confronted with unexpected VAT costs when goods a re imported into the EU and delivered to 
their home address. The use of the IOSS further simplifies logistics as the goods can enter the EU 
and be released more flexibly for free circulation in any Member State, regardless of where the WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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transport of those g oods to the customer ends. For a more detailed description on the scope of the 
IOSS see Section  4.2 in the VAT explanatory notes  and Section  3 in the Importation and Exportation 
of Low Value Consignments - VAT e -commerce packa ge "Guidance for Member States and Trade" . 
 
Question 9:  
9. ¿Tiene la UE un mecanismo de seguimiento para evitar el comercio ilícito vía comercio 
electrónico? Si sí, ¿Cómo funciona?  
 
Reply:  All non -Union goods entering the customs territory of the EU have to be subject to advance 
cargo reporting, a so -called entry summary declaration. The objective of this reporting is to provide 
customs authorities with sufficient information prior to the a rrival of the goods in the EU to carry out 
risk analysis for security and safety purposes. The EU is gradually implementing a new electronic 
system that allows carriers and other economic operators holding necessary data (such as express, 
postal or logisti cs operators) to provide pre -loading and pre -arrival cargo information based on the 
same dataset regardless of the Member State. The goods are under customs supervision until they 
are released for free circulation or re -exported. The customs supervision of  the non -Union goods in 
the EU Member States is based on risk management, including the goods imported into the EU 
through e -commerce. It means that a common risk management framework is established at EU 
level, but its implementation lies with Member Stat es' customs authorities. The risk management 
aims to mitigate both fiscal and non -fiscal risks. Based on the risks identified, Customs can perform 
documentary or physical checks. To the extent possible, the physical checks are done in a 
non-intrusive way. Cooperation between Customs and other authorities (e.g. market -surveillance 
authorities) is done at national level by the Member States. In addition, unusual trade patterns can 
also be identified through the Commission's Surveillance system that collects t he data of all import 
declarations lodged in the EU.  
 
Monitoring of e -commerce trade is covered by the provisions of articles 55 to 56 of the 
Union  Customs code (UCC) implementing regulation 2015/2447 and its annexes 21 -01 to 21 -03. 
Data elements are extra cted from the customs declarations and collected. They relate mostly to the 
nature of the goods, their origin, their value and several fiscal information.  
 
3.7. De conformidad con la entrega 2 del Sistema de Control de la Importación 2 (ICS 2) de la Unión 
Europea (cuadro 3.3), el nuevo programa aduanero en materia de seguridad y protección previas a 
la llegada, para las mercancías importadas que lleguen por vía aérea a partir del 1 de marzo de 2023 
habrá que presentar a la aduana información anticipada sobr e la carga. Por consiguiente, antes de 
la carga y la llegada de las mercancías, el operador económico debe presentar una declaración 
sumaria de entrada completa. Durante el período comprendido entre julio de 2022 y febrero de 2023 
se realizaron pruebas de conformidad para verificar la conformidad de todos los importadores con 
el nuevo sistema. Además, está prevista para el 1 de marzo de 2024 la aplicación de la entrega 3 
del ICS 2 a las mercancías importadas por mar y vías navegables interiores, por carrete ra y por 
ferrocarril en los casos en que deba presentarse anticipadamente la misma información previa a la 
llegada.  
 
Question 10:  
10. ¿Podría la UE ampliar la información respecto al nuevo programa aduanero al que se hace 
referencia en el punto 3.7?  
 
Reply:  Effective and efficient risk management is crucial for Customs to achieve their objectives of 
protecting the society and facilitating legitimate trade. The Import Control System 2 (ICS2) 
programme is a core element of the 2014 EU Strategy and Action  Plan for Customs Risk 
Management; it exemplifies the principle "Assess in advance – control where required" set in 
the 2020 EU Customs Action Plan.  
Aimed at strengthening the security of the supply chain by addressing identified gaps and 
establishing a more cohesive, effective and cost -efficient EU customs risk management at the 
external borders, the ICS2 focuses on security and safety risks at the pre -loading and pre -arrival 
stages. It is centred on acquiring data prior to the arrival of the goods (advanced cargo information), 
allowing the lodging and treatment of entry summary declarations (ENS), updating it as the goods 
move along the supply chain (multiple filings) and sharing data and relevant information among 
participating countries,  in real -time, for risk analysis purposes.  
Please find more information at the following web sites:  
Import Control System 2 (ICS2) (europa.eu)  
ICS2 Resources (europa.eu)  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 3.8. En respuesta a la pandemi a de COVID -19, la Unión Europea estableció muchas medidas para 
aliviar la carga que pesaba sobre las aduanas y facilitar en mayor medida el flujo de mercancías. En 
general, se trataba de flexibilidades introducidas en 2020 utilizando el marco existente que  se 
referían a cuestiones tales como la ampliación de plazos, el uso de firmas digitales, la ampliación de 
los plazos para la modificación de declaraciones, el recurso a las disposiciones sobre el levante 
parcial de los envíos de equipos de protección indi vidual (EPI), la presentación de la prueba del 
origen preferencial (sección 3.1.2.2), la utilización de declaraciones simplificadas sin autorización 
previa, las medidas de identificación alternativas al precintado y el uso de regímenes de admisión 
temporal . 
 
Question 11:  
11. ¿Podrían ampliar la información respecto al uso de régimen de admisión temporal y explicar 
los beneficios en materia de comercio electrónico?  
 
Reply:  According to the EU law, the temporary admission is a special procedure where non-union 
goods intended for re -export may be subject to specific use in the customs territory of the 
European  Union , with total or partial relief from import duty and without being subject to any other 
charges or commercial policy measures. To the contrar y, goods bought online via e -commerce are 
destined to private persons' consumption within the EU customs territory and are not sent back after 
being subject to a specific use. These goods are, in most (if not all) cases, imported to be consumed 
in the EU, and therefore they are released for free circulation in the EU (code 4000). For this reason, 
in principle there are no links between the temporary admission procedure and e -commerce.  
 
3.3.7 Derechos de propiedad intelectual  
No sin antes agradecer las cifr as presentadas por la Unión Europea en sus informes oficiales y 
utilizados por la Secretaría al respecto de varias estadísticas sobre Propiedad Intelectual en la UE 
(por ejemplo, sobre el valor de la PI en el PIB, en el empleo, etc.), quisiéramos respetuos amente 
ahondar en algunos datos.  
Sobre la base de la información presentada, podría la Unión Europea proporcionar información 
detallada sobre:  
 
Question 12:  
12. El número total y el valor de los activos de propiedad intelectual a nivel de los Estados 
Miem bros de la UE (es decir: Número de patentes en vigor, marcas registradas, IG, diseños 
industriales, derechos de autor y obtenciones vegetales y su valor en la medida de lo posible).  
 
Reply:  This question is very wide and requires collection of extensive st atistics which also go beyond 
the EU competence. In the EU, intellectual property rights may be protected at the EU or the EU 
Member State level. As regards the EU level, for more information on the EU trademark and EU 
design, please see https://euipo.europa.eu/ohimportal/en/ . For information on geographical 
indications, please see GIview (tmdn.org) . For information on plant varieties, please see CPVO | 
Community Plant Variety Office (europa.eu) . 
 
Question 13:  
13. Indicar la nacionalidad de l os titulares de dichos derechos de propiedad intelectual (DPI), así 
como de los solicitantes de DPI, indicando si son nacionales de países miembros de la UE o 
extranjeros. Indicar la evolución de las participaciones (cuota %) de los nacionales y extranjero s de 
la UE a lo largo del tiempo.  
 
Reply:  This question is very wide and requires collection of extensive statistics which also go beyond 
the EU competence. In the EU, intellectual property rights may be protected at the EU or the EU 
Member State level. As regards the EU level, for more informatio n on the EU trademark and EU 
design, please see https://euipo.europa.eu/ohimportal/en/ . For information on geographical 
indications, please see GIview (tmdn.org) . For information on plant varieties, please see CPVO | 
Community Plant Variety Office (europa.eu)  
 
Question 14:  
14. Estadísticas de la Balanza de Pagos (BdP) de la UE sobre "Cargos por uso de propiedad 
intelectual", discriminando "pagos" (pagos) y "cobros" (recibos), así como su evolución en el tiempo. 
Desagregar los porcentajes de pagos y cobros (superávit o déficit) de la UE relativos a América 
Latina, a África y a ASEAN.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Reply:  Such information is not available.  
 
4 POLÍTICAS COMERCIALES, POR SECTORES  
4.2 Pesca  
4.2.4 Acuerdos internacionales y políticas conexas  
Question 15:  
15. ¿Podría la Unión Europea indicar de manera detallada su participación en Acuerdos 
Internacionales de Ordenación pesquera de la siguiente manera:  
i) Organizaciones regionales de ordenación pesquera RFMOs (están mencionados de manera somera 
en los informes,  pero un mayor nivel de detalle sobre cuáles son las nuevas OROPs a las que se ha 
unido la UE desde el último examen, y sobre planes para unirse a OROPs aun sin membresía de la 
UE, serían altamente valiosos);  
ii) Acuerdos regionales de ordenación pesquera RFMAs, y  
iii) Acuerdos de acceso bilateral en los que participa la UE (tanto como bloque como sus Estados 
miembros)?  
 
Reply:  Information on the EU's participation in RFMOs and RFMAs can be found here:  
Regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) (europa.eu)  
 
As regards bilateral access agreements involving the EU, they can be found here:  
Sustainable fisheries partnership agreements (SFPAs) (europa.eu)  
https://oceans -and-fisheries.ec.europa.eu/fisheries/international -agreements/northern -
agreements_en  
https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32015D1565  
 
INFORME DE GOBIERNO – DOCUMENTO WT/TPR/G/442  
 
3 POLÍTICA COMERCIA L MULTILATERAL Y BILATERAL  
3.1 La agenda comercial multilateral de la UE  
3.1.1 Reforma de la OMC  
b. Función de negociación  
ii) Negociaciones plurilaterales  
Comercio electrónico  
3.15.  Además de la labor plurilateral relativa al comercio electrónico, la UE sigue decidida a 
mantener la moratoria multilateral sobre la imposición de derechos de aduana a las transmisiones 
electrónicas. Opina que el comercio digital debe estar libre de derec hos de aduana a fin de facilitar 
la adopción generalizada de tecnologías digitales, que son fundamentales para el crecimiento 
económico tanto de los países desarrollados como de los países en desarrollo, su capacidad de 
innovar y la prosperidad de sus ciud adanos. La UE mantiene también su compromiso con la 
revitalización del Programa de Trabajo sobre el Comercio Electrónico, y en particular su dimensión 
de desarrollo, como se encomienda en la Decisión Ministerial de la CM12.  
 
Question 16:  
16. ¿Podrían ampliar la información respecto a la decisión de la UE de mantener la moratoria 
multilateral sobre la imposición de derechos de aduana a las transmisiones electrónicas? ¿Podrían 
enumerar los beneficios analizados para proponer mantener esta medida ? 
 
Reply:  The continuation of the multilateral moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions 
is critical for the digital economy. It supports all users and consumers of electronic transmissions, 
by keeping electronic transmissions free of any ex tra costs and promotes more choice for businesses 
and consumers. It also allows companies to offer and export their products or services at competitive 
prices, and ensures that all companies have access to a wide pool of customers. This is not only of 
benefit to the large digital companies of this world. Digital businesses – such as innovative software 
developers around the world, including in developing countries – tell us that customs duties on 
electronic transmissions would interfere with their ability t o scale regionally, which is crucial to their 
ability to grow, and hamper their ability to access regional and international markets. Numerous 
studies have shown that the imposition of duties tends to increase the cost of accessing the wide 
array of techno logies and data sources critical to growth and innovation, business operations, and 
the transfer of technology. In addition to the financial cost, the requirement to pay customs duties 
on electronic transmissions would impose a huge administrative burden o n companies – in order to 
enable authorities to collect customs duties, a reporting or tracking system would have to be 
established and followed by the companies. This would have a direct negative impact on all sectors WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 of the economy and likely be passed o n to consumers. Therefore, maintaining the moratorium on 
customs duties for electronic transmissions is of great importance to the development of digital trade 
and indeed all types of trade worldwide. By contributing to the effective digitalisation of the global 
economy, the moratorium contributes to worldwide growth and brings benefits to consumers 
worldwide, and this includes in developing countries.  
 
5 SOSTENIBILIDAD  
5.1 Medidas de la UE para combatir el cambio climático y proteger el medio ambiente  
5.1.1 Panorama general de las medidas para combatir el cambio climático y proteger el 
medio ambiente  
En el párrafo 5.7, se indica lo siguiente: "El Mecanismo de Ajuste en Frontera por Carbono 
(MAFC)  es una medida climática destinada a reducir las emisiones mun diales de gases de efecto 
invernadero evitando el riesgo de fuga de carbono y apoyando una mayor ambición en la mitigación 
del cambio climático, todo ello respetando las normas de la OMC. El MAFC igualará el precio del 
carbono de los productos nacionales y  el de los importados y hará que los objetivos climáticos de la 
UE no se vean contrarrestados por el traslado de la producción a países con políticas menos 
ambiciosas ". 
 
Question 17:  
17. El Parlamento Europeo aprobó el pasado 17 de abril, el texto del Reglamento que establece 
un Mecanismo de Ajuste por Carbono en Frontera, aplicable a la importación en el mercado único de 
la UE de un listado de productos intensivos en consumo de energía y liberación de gases de efecto 
invernadero. De acuerdo con la opinión expresada por algunos miembros de la Organización Mundial 
del Comercio, los principios de equidad y responsabilidades comunes pero diferenciadas y 
capacidades respectivas -rectores de la UNFCCC y del Acuerdo de París -, cada país tiene la 
flexibilidad regulatoria necesaria para adoptar las medidas que considere adecuadas para lograr las 
reducciones de emisiones en toda la economía. Teniendo en cuenta los efectos extraterritoriales de 
dicha reglamentación, tiene la UE prevista la forma en que garantizará un tratamiento No Menos 
Favorable al producto importado al aplicar criterios de equivalencia sobre las diferentes metodologías 
utilizadas para calcular las emisiones de producción; y asegurar  de esa manera que se otorgue el 
crédito apropiado para productos producidos en países con sus propios mecanismos de fijación de 
precios del carbono?  
 
Reply:  By mirroring the EU ETS, the CBAM ensures that an equivalent carbon price will be paid by 
EU produ cers and imported products. Consequently, imported products will get no less favourable 
treatment than domestic EU products. CBAM will take into consideration the "actual values" of 
emissions embedded in the CBAM imported goods, meaning that (i)  decarbonis ing decarbonisation 
efforts of all companies worldwide will be taken into consideration in order to reduce the level of 
adjustment, and (ii)  that carbon prices paid domestically will be deducted from the adjustment.  
 
Under the transitional period starting in October 2023, importers of goods under the scope of the 
Regulation will notably have to report on direct and indirect emissions and on the carbon price 
possibly paid by exporters from third countries. These reports will inform the European Commission 
work on further implementing acts, notably regarding taking into account a carbon price paid in third 
countries (in line with Article  9 of the regulation).  
 
The European Commission is open to receiving information from its international partners on the 
carbo n price paid by their exporters for goods under the scope of the CBAM Regulation, so as to 
better understand their carbon pricing mechanisms and most effectively take them into consideration 
after the end of the transitional period.  
 
En el párrafo 5.12, se  indica lo siguiente: "El 6 de diciembre de 2022, el Parlamento Europeo y el 
Consejo llegaron a un acuerdo político provisional sobre un Reglamento de la UE sobre la 
deforestación , que allanó el camino para la adopción definitiva del Reglamento a principios 
de 2023. Su objetivo es frenar la deforestación y la degradación forestal impulsadas por la UE. Al 
promover el consumo de productos "libres de deforestación" y reducir los efectos de la UE en la 
deforestación y la degradación forestal a nivel mu ndial, el nuevo Reglamento reducirá las emisiones 
de gases de efecto invernadero (…) ". 
 
El pasado 19 de abril, la propuesta normativa en cuestión fue aprobada por la plenaria del 
Parlamento de la UE. En el momento del presente envío (27.04.2023), solo rest a la aprobación 
formal por parte del Consejo de la UE.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Hasta el momento, las opiniones de los terceros países afectados no han sido tenidas en cuentas 
para la estructuración de la propuesta.  
 
Question 18:  
18. ¿Tiene previsto la UE invitar a participar act ivamente a los terceros países y demás partes 
interesadas en la elaboración de las regulaciones complementarias para la determinación de la 
clasificación de riesgo – país/región?  
 
Reply:  The European Commission is required under Art 29(5) to engage in a specific dialogue with 
all countries that are, or risk to be classified as, high risk, with the objective to reduce their level of 
risk. This dialogue will allow for an exchange of informa tion. The European Commission is currently 
developing the methodology that will underpin this assessment. Third countries and stakeholders 
will be duly informed about the methodology in the context of the Multi -stakeholder Deforestation 
Platform.  
 
Question  19:  
19. ¿Tiene previsto la UE invitar a participar activamente a los terceros países y demás partes 
interesadas en la elaboración de las guías sectoriales para las distintas cadenas de valor afectadas 
por la regulación?  
 
Reply:  Stakeholders will be duly informed  and consulted about the development of guidelines 
through the Multi -stakeholder Deforestation Platform and the informal focus groups.  
 
Question 20:  
20. ¿Cómo tiene previsto la UE evitar que los costos que implican la implementación de los 
sistemas de trazabilidad y debida diligencia recaigan únicamente en los productores y no sean 
reconocidos por el mercado de destino?  
 
Reply:  Given the cut -off date of 31  December  2020, the vast majority of current agricultural 
production will be considered deforestation -free under the Regulation. The requirements of the 
Regulation are aligned with the best practices already existing on the market. In addition, the EU is 
supporting its partner countries through cooperation and development to ensure their supp ly chains 
are deforestation -free and is stepping up its support.  
 
Question 21:  
21. Teniendo en consideración que resulta previsible que los costos serán trasladados al 
productor, ¿Qué ha previsto la UE para evitar que los pequeños productores y familias campesinas, 
quienes no están en la capacidad de implementar los sistemas de georreferenciación, trazabilidad y 
debida diligencia, sean excluidos de las cadenas de valor?  
 
Reply:  The EU is supporting its partner countries through cooperation and de velopment to ensure 
their supply chains are deforestation -free and is stepping up its support.  Widespread and free 
technology for geolocation – essentially mobile phones – will ensure that no technical obstacle gets 
in the way of smallholders when it comes  to selling their products to the EU market. The cut -off date 
aims to minimise the number of smallholders that are cultivating land whose produce cannot be sold 
on the EU market or exported from it. In addition, EU cooperation tools and programs will make the 
engagement with, the participation and the support of smallholders a priority, as foreseen in the 
Regulation.  
 
Question 22:  
22. En la medida en que diferentes países vayan implementando medidas de esta naturaleza, se 
necesitarán modelos de producción segmentados con el fin de cumplir con las exigencias de 
diferentes jurisdicciones, lo cual se traduce en el aumento de costos para los productores. ¿Qué ha 
previsto la UE para evitar la segmentación de los sistemas de producción en función del destino de 
exportación de los productos?  
 
Reply:  It is important to note that EU is developing its legislation in full transparency, and in 
consultation with stakeholders and interested parties. In addition, we cooperate with major 
consuming and producing countries, t o minimise leakage and encourage the adoption of similar 
legislation, ultimately preventing segmentation of production systems.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Question 23:  
23. En la implementación práctica del artículo 28, ¿habrán nuevos recursos de cooperación para 
apoyar a los produ ctores y cadenas de suministro?  
 
Reply:  Art. 28 foresees several tools and forms of cooperation between the EU and third countries. 
Any assessment related to the availability of new resources will be carried out on a case -by-case 
basis, according to the c ooperation tool deemed the most suitable for a specific country.  
 
Question 24:  
24. De los 7 productos sujetos a la reglamentación, 4 no se producen en la UE, a saber: aceite de 
palma, café, cacao, y caucho. En este contexto, ¿cómo puede la UE justificar que no se trata de una 
medida discriminatoria que no aplica en su territorio?  
 
Reply : One of the aims of the Regulation is to minimise global deforestation and forest degradation 
driven by the EU consumption. Therefore, the Regulation covers the commodities whose 
European  Union  consumption is the most relevant in terms of driving global d eforestation and forest 
degradation. An extensive review of scientific literature, namely of primary sources estimating the 
impact of EU consumption on global deforestation and linking that footprint to specific commodities, 
was carried out as a part of th e study supporting the Impact Assessment and cross -checked via 
extensive consultation with stakeholders.  
 
Close cooperation with partner countries will be of paramount importance for the fulfilment of the 
objectives of the Regulation and this is highlighte d in the legislation. For the EU's Multi -Annual 
Indicative Programme (MIP) for Colombia, environment and forests is a priority area. Among other 
things, the AL -INVEST Verde is a programme funded by the European  Union  to promote sustainable 
growth and job c reation in Latin America, which in Colombia comprises five projects including one 
related to the EU Deforestation regulation specifically.  
 
Question 25:  
25. En el marco del Acuerdo de París, cada país establece sus metas sobre las reducciones de 
gases de  efecto invernadero y sobre la expansión de cultivos en bosques. Cualquier estándar sobre 
deforestación y gases de efecto invernadero no puede establecerse de manera unilateral. ¿Cómo 
explica la UE la consistencia de esta nueva regulación con los estándare s derivados del 
Acuerdo  de París?  
 
Reply:  This Regulation is in line with the objectives of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. 
Combatting deforestation and forest -degradation is indeed an integral part of the work to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, en hance carbon sinks, and protect nature. Countries have also 
committed to Sustainable Development Goal 15.2, which foresaw a halt to deforestation by 2020. 
Since this target has not been met, urgent and ambitious action is needed.  
 
5.1.2 Sistemas alimentarios sostenibles  
En el párrafo 5.18, se indica lo siguiente: "El proyecto de Reglamento sobre la reducción de los 
límites máximos de residuos (LMR) de las dos sustancias neonicotinoides Clotiadinia y Tiametoxam 
es el primer reglamento que aplica la  Estrategia "de la granja a la mesa" a los alimentos importados 
en lo que respecta a los residuos de plaguicidas. Los aspectos ambientales en los que se centra este 
Reglamento se refieren a la protección de los polinizadores. Se trata de una cuestión de in terés 
mundial, que va más allá de las fronteras nacionales y no puede resolverse únicamente mediante 
medidas en el nivel de la UE. " 
 
Question 26:  
26. El Reglamento 396/2005 no hace referencia a criterios ambientales para la definición de 
límites máximos d e residuos (LMR) o tolerancias a la importación (TI). En este contexto, ¿Cuál es la 
base legal que le permite a la Comisión modificar los anexos II y V del Reglamento 396/2005 con 
base en criterios ambientales?  
 
Reply:  Plant protection products and residue s in or on those products are regulated in the EU by 
Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 and Regulation (EC) No 396/2005. Both Regulations are 
complementary and are implemented in a coordinated manner to avoid risks and hazards for 
humans, animals and the environ ment in  the use of plant protection products. The Regulations 
integrate the principles of the General Food Law Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 and more broadly the WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Treaty on the Functioning of the European  Union . Environmental protection is foreseen in the EU 
Regulatory framework, and this is applicable to pesticide residues.  
 
Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 and Regulation 178/2002 foresee that, when taking risk management 
decisions, all the factors relevant to the matter under consideration shall be taken into acc ount. This 
includes environmental factors when read together with Article  11 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European  Union  require that "Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into 
the definition and implementation of the Union's  policies and activities, in particular with a view to 
promoting sustainable development ".  
 
Question 27:  
27. El Reglamento UE 396/05 es un cuerpo normativo que busca (i)  garantizar un alto nivel de 
protección de la salud pública de los consumidores y la salud animal, (ii)  así como también eliminar 
barreras comerciales al interior del mercado único de la UE y facilitar el comercio internacional. 
Siendo ello así, ¿Cómo justifica la UE apartarse de la exposición alimentaria para la evaluaci ón del 
riesgo y, en su lugar, apelar a criterios ambientales para el establecimiento de LMR?  
 
Reply:  See reply to question 26.  
 
Question 28:  
28. Teniendo presente que el objeto del Reglamento 396/05, cuya modificación se buscaba, es 
garantizar un alto nivel de protección de la salud pública de los consumidores y la salud animal, ¿por 
qué razón la UE no notificó el Reglamento 2023/334 en el marco del Comité MSF de la OMC?  
 
Reply:  Since the lowering of the MRLs  in this particular case relates to environmental objectives, the 
EU found it appropriate to inform its trade partners via a notification under the WTO TBT  Agreement . 
Additionally, a communication for information was submitted to the Committee on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary measures.  
 
Question 29:  
29. ¿Considera la UE que para alcanzar los objetivos de política pública propuestos esta era la 
medida menos restrictiva al comercio? ¿Podrían compartir las evaluaciones de otras medidas que 
tuvieron en cuenta para  determinar que era esta la más adecuada para los fines propuestos?  
 
Reply:  WTO members are not prevented from taking measures necessary to ensure the protection 
of animal or plant health or the environment provided that those measures are not applied in a  
manner which could constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on international trade.  
 
The EU considers that lowering the maximum residue levels (MRLs) for clothianidin and 
thiamethoxam to the limit of quant ification (LOQ) is necessary to fulfil its legitimate objective which 
is to ensure that food and feed consumed in the EU do not contribute to the global decline of 
pollinators, independently of whether the product is produced in the EU or imported from non -EU 
countries. The EU considers and that there is no alternative that would be less trade restrictive and 
equally contribute to the objective pursued.  
 
The worldwide decline of pollinators is related to multiple factors, and the use of pesticides, and in 
particular neonicotinoids, is an important one. Therefore, the EU's actions related to neonicotinoids 
used as pesticides such as this Regulation are coordinated with other EU programmes and 
international activities such as:  
 
- The EU pollinators initiative[1] which integrates holistic action s on pollinators across different 
sectorial policies, addressing the main known causes for pollinator decline and strengthening the 
collaboration between all the actors concerned;  
- The active EU collaborations with the Food and Agriculture Organization o f the United Nations in 
its "Global Action on Pollination Services for Sustainable Agriculture"  and with the International Union 
for Conservation of Nature in projects to address the decline of pollinators.  
 
[1]  https://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/conservation/species/pollinators/policy_en.htm  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Question 30:  
29. Habida cuenta de que las sustancias activas C lotiadinia y Tiametoxam siguen estando 
disponibles en la UE por medio de las autorizaciones de emergencia de que trata el artículo 53 del 
Reglamento 1107/2009, ¿cómo justifica la UE la eliminación de TI para estas sustancias en el marco 
del principio de no  discriminación y trato nacional?  
 
Reply:  Please note that given the judgment by the European Court of Justice of 19  January  2023 in 
Case C -162/21[1], EU Member States cannot grant any  further emergency authorisations for plant 
protection products containing clothianidin and thiamethoxam . 
 
[1]  https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62021CJ0162  
 
5.2 Sostenibilidad, equidad e inclusión  
5.2.2 Promoción de la sostenibilidad  
5.35. Además de los capítulos sobre el comercio y el desarrollo sostenible, la dimensión de la 
sostenibilidad seguirá reflejándose también en otros aspectos de los acuerdos comerciales y de 
inversión de la UE. Esos aspectos apoyan la difusión de métodos y tecnologías de producción limpios 
y más eficientes, por ejemplo mediante la promoción del comercio de bienes y servicios ecológicos, 
el apoyo a la transición hacia economías neutras en lo que respecta al clima o la transición a sistemas 
alimentarios sostenibles proponiendo a los interlocutores de los acuerdos de libre comercio la 
inclusión de un nuevo capítulo sobre sistemas alimentarios sostenibles.  
 
Question 31:  
30. ¿Cómo se observa la implementación de la denuncia de la Carta de a energía en algunos 
Estados?  
 
Reply:  The Energy Charter Treaty is a multilateral investment protection treaty that protects 
energy -related foreign investments. Only investors based in a c ountry that is a Contracting Party to 
the ECT and whose investment is made in another Contracting Party of the ECT can claim protection 
under the Treaty. Several EU Member States (France, Poland, Germany) have notified their 
withdrawal from the ECT while o thers have expressed their intention to do so. Italy has withdrawn 
from the ECT as of 2016. Under the current version of the Treaty, pursuant to a sunset clause the 
ECT rules will continue to apply, for 20 years after withdrawal, to existing investments ma de in the 
withdrawing Contracting Party by investors of other Contracting Parties and to existing investments 
made in the other Contracting Parties by investors of the withdrawing Contracting Party.  
 
Question 32:  
31. ¿Cuál es el nivel de avance y compromi so de los diferentes Estados de la UE para incorporar 
compromisos del Acuerdo de Paris a los Acuerdos de inversión? ¿Mediante qué mecanismos?  
 
Reply:  Please note that under Regulation (EU) No.  1219/2012, Member States need the 
European  Commission's authorization open formal negotiations with a third country to amend or 
conclude a bilateral investment agreement. As part of the authorization, the European Commission 
may require Member States to include certain provisions to ensure that any  new agreement is 
consistent with the EU's investment policy, including provisions on climate change and clean energy 
transition in line with the Paris Agreement.  
 
Question 33:  
32. ¿Qué estrategia se está implementando por parte de la UE para que a pesar de la existencia 
de estos componentes de sostenibilidad dentro de los acuerdos de inversión, los Estados receptores 
de la inversión proveniente de la UE no se vean restringidos en su posibilidad de regular en pro de 
la defensa del medio ambiente y como con secuencia no se derive en controversias Inversor -Estado 
en tribunales internacionales?  
 
Reply:  Aside from dedicated sustainability provisions, EU investment agreements reaffirm the 
Parties' right to regulate to achieve legitimate policy objectives such as  the protection of the 
environment and climate change mitigation and adaptation. A corollary of the right to regulate is 
the clarification contained in the EU agreements that the commitments contained therein do not 
amount to a commitment from a Party not to change the legal and regulatory framework in a manner 
that may negatively affect the operation of investments or the investors' expectations of profits. 
Moreover, the protection standards have been recalibrated to offer protection against egregious acts  
of the State while ensuring that the necessary policy space to enact measures for the protection of WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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legitimate policy objectives is preserved. Additionally, EU investment agreements contain exceptions 
and safeguards that are aimed at preserving the necess ary policy space in specific situations, 
including exceptions on the non -discrimination obligation vis-a-vis environmental measures that are 
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health. Finally, the Investment Court System 
contained in EU ag reements ensures that any decision making is not driven by vested interests, as 
is often the case under the old style investor -to-state dispute settlement ( ISDS); instead there is a 
two-tier system in place for the adjudication of claims which allows appel late review and claims are 
decided by judges who are highly qualified and subject to strict ethic rules.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 ISRAEL  
Part I: Questions based on the Secretariat's report  
1 ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
1.2 Recent economic developments  
1.2.2 EU economic  governance, policy direction, and reforms  
Circular Economy Action Plan  
Questions:  
1. With respect to the draft Regulation on establishing a framework for setting ecodesign  
requirements for sustainable products and repealing Directive 2009/125/EC (ESPR), could the 
European  Union  elaborate on the interrelation between the ESPR and existing legislation, 
i.e., product -specific legislation and legislation governing horizontal as pects such as 
Regulation  1907/2006 on the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals 
(REACH), Regulation 1972/2008 on Classification, Labelling and Packaging of chemicals (CLP), 
Directive 2011/65/EU on the Restriction of Hazardous  Substances in Electrical and Electronic 
Equipment (RoHS), the draft Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence, the draft 
Regulation on Packaging and Packaging Waste, etc.?  
 
Reply: Coherence of ESPR  with existing and future sectoral legislation and policies is essential and 
was carefully worked out during preparation of the proposal.  
 
In the case of existing product –specific legislation , with the exception of some specific cases, 
the general princip le is that ESPR will only take the lead on regulating products when their 
environmental sustainability dimensions cannot or have not been fully and appropriately addressed 
by other instruments. If these dimensions are adequately addressed by other instrume nts, no action 
under this regulation is likely to be taken – unless to lay down key technical requirements in specific 
targeted areas, such as for the Digital Product Passport. In the case of existing chemicals 
legislation  (e.g. REACH/RoHS/CLP), the Commis sion proposal was very carefully prepared to avoid 
overlaps, and to ensure legal clarity, and will in particular enable aspects not dealt with under these 
pieces of legislation to be covered. In relation to packaging , overlap with the newly proposed 
Packag ing and Packaging Waste rules will be avoided as ESPR will only allow for the setting, where 
appropriate, of requirements on the packaging of specific  products covered by ESPR measures, and 
will not cover packaging as a stand -alone product. Finally, given that ESPR only covers 
environmental sustainability aspects, no overlap with the proposed Directive on Corporate 
Sustainability Due Diligence is foreseen.  
 
More information, including the impact assessment is available at : 
https://environment.ec.europa.eu/publications/proposal -ecodesign -sustainable -products -
regulation_en  
2. Could the European  Union  advise if an d how it intends to guide economic operators through 
the various requirements across the different pieces of legislation and lessen the resulting 
administrative burden on businesses?  
 
Reply:  The European Chemicals Agency supports businesses by providing dedicated guidance and 
support in relation to five pieces of legislation that currently come under its responsibilities. These 
are REACH, CLP, the legislation on biocidal products, prior informed consent, as well as on persistent 
organic pollutan ts. Moreover, it provides for the "EU Chemicals Legislation Finder", a database, which 
pulls together regulatory information, such as limit values, for more than 50 legal acts. For each 
piece of legislation, this tool provides for a summary of all the rele vant information, including the 
scope, obligations, exemptions, regulatory activities and lists of impacted substances:  
(https://echa.europa.eu/legislation -finder ) 
 
3. Could the European  Union  provide information on the process for the development of the 
Digital Product Passport, incl. in terms of cooperation with international partners and relevant 
stakeholders?  
 
Reply:  The Digital Product Passport is part of the Sus tainable Products Initiative. For more 
information, please refer to:  
https://single -market -economy.ec.europa.eu/industry/sustainabilit y/sustainable -product -policy -
ecodesign_en  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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4. With respect to the Digital Product Passport and the provisions on information requirements, 
could the European  Union  explain how it plans to guarantee the protection of confi dential business 
information, intellectual property, and know -how?  
 
Reply:  The ESPR  proposal has integrated concerns about confidentiality and competitiveness. 
Therefore, the DPP should rely, to the maximum extent technically possible, on information already 
provided and included in other databases. Access to information should be grante d depending on 
different "access rights", depending on the role of each stakeholder in the product value chain 
(need -to-know principle). Furthermore, to ensure data security, the DPP will have a decentralized 
architecture, which means that the ownership of  the data stays with the economic operator.  
 
5. Could the European  Union  advise on how the specificities of products and product groups will 
be taken into account when setting ecodesign requirements?  
 
Reply:  To take into account individual characteristics and specificities of products, rules will be set 
product by product. Just like it is currently done under the Ecodesign Directive and the Energy 
Labelling Regulation, policy measures will be based on a dedicated impact assessment. However, 
where sufficient  commonalities across certain products exist (such as electronic appliances or 
textiles), rules covering groups of products at a time may be set. Once set, rules will apply equally 
to all products placed on the EU market, regardless of their origin – produ ced in the EU or imported.  
 
2 TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIME  
2.3 Trade agreements and arrangements  
2.3.2 Regional and preferential agreements  
2.3.2.1.1 New RTAs  
Question:  
6. The EU and the UK have successfully reached a political agreement in principle on the 
Windsor  Framework. Could the EU tell us what sort of timeline is expected regarding 
implementation?  
 
Reply:  The implementation of the Windsor Framework has already started, with the adoption by the 
Joint Committee established under the Wit hdrawal Agreement of Decision 1/2023 on 24  March  2023. 
Several other measures, both of a legislative and non -legislative nature are already being taken and 
will be taken shortly by the EU and the UK, so as to give progressively full implementation to the 
various aspects of the Windsor Framework. It is foreseen that the totality of the measures agreed 
under the Windsor Framework would be implemented by the second half of 2025.  
 
2.3.3 Other agreements and arrangements  
Questions:  
7. The EU is continuing its work on developing digital standards alongside which it pursues further 
digital partnerships with countries like Japan and Singapore. Does that mean we can expect the EU 
to make further use of international standards in its approach to Artificial Intellige nce? Can the EU 
further elaborate which specific elements of these digital partnerships and principles might 
complement the WTO negotiations on e -commerce?  
 
Reply:  
Regarding AI standards:  
The work of the standardization organization is important for the  development of the EU international 
market and international trade. Formally, the European Standardisation Organisations (ESOs) are 
recipients of European Commission's standardisation requests. Thus, the ESOs are the organisations 
which develop standards to support the requirements of the European  Union  legislation. Standards 
developed by the ESOs, based on the procedure established in the European Standardisation 
Regulation (1025/2012) could become harmonised standards. The compliance with the EU 
harmoniz ed standards give presumption of conformity with the requirements of the EU legislation 
for all market players that place a product on the EU market or put it into service. ESOs work closely 
with the International Standardisation Organisations. Appropriate  agreements are in place between 
ESOs and International Standardisation Organisations (e.g. ISO/IEC) to ensure that, when 
appropriate, relevant international standards can be adopted or adapted by ESOs in their work. The 
proposal for the AI Act, in line wi th the well -established EU product safety legislation will importantly 
rely on standards. The AI standardization is relatively new field where collaboration between 
international and European level is particularly important. International standards on AI a re being WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 developed, for example in ISO/IEC SC42 and the ongoing work at the European level in 
CEN/CENELEC JTC -21 is closely following the developments in the SC -42. 
 
The Digital Trade Principles represent a common commitment to open digital markets which are 
competitive, transparent, fair, and free of unjustified barriers to international trade and investment. 
The text of the Digital Trade Principles concluded with the Republic of Korea  and with Singapore is 
available online: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/help -exporters -and-importers/acc essing -
markets/goods -and-services/digital -trade_en . The Digital Trade Principles build on the disciplines 
currently under discussion as part of the WTO negotiations on e -commerce.  
 
8. Could the European  Union  elaborate on  the concept of "Clean Tech/Net -zero Industrial 
Partnerships" as mentioned in the context of the Green Deal Industrial Plan and the Net -Zero 
Industry Act?  
 
Reply:  As part of the Green Deal Industrial Plan the Commission announced its intention to conclude 
Net-Zero Industrial Partnerships covering net -zero technologies, to adopt net -zero technologies 
globally and to support the role of EU industrial capabilities in paving the way for the global clean 
energy transition. The Commission and Member States may co ordinate the Partnerships within the 
Net Zero Europe Platform that will be established once the Net Zero Industry Act enters into force, 
discussing existing relevant partnerships and processes, such as green partnerships, energy 
dialogues and other forms o f existing bilateral contractual arrangements, as well as potential 
synergies with relevant Member States' bilateral agreements with third countries.  
 
9. Could the EU provide further details regarding the EU -US Trade and Technology Council (TTC), 
specifica lly with regard to the secure supply chains, emerging technologies and sustainable trade 
streams of work? Is the joint roadmap to develop common tools and standards for trustworthy 
artificial intelligence expected to impact the EU's approach being develope d under the AI Act?  
 
Reply:  The Trade and Technology Council has become a key channel for EU -US cooperation with the 
objectives as set out in its inaugural statement to (i)  coordinate approaches to key global technology, 
economic, and trade issues and (ii ) deepen transatlantic trade and economic relations, basing 
policies on shared democratic values. Work is ongoing in the areas of secure supply chains, emerging 
technologies, and sustainable trade under several working groups with details published on the EU's 
Futurium website: https://futurium.ec.europa.eu/en/EU -US-TTC.  
 
Already today, the EU and US have established a strong cooperation to address disruptions i n the 
semiconductor sector including through the creation of an early warning mechanisms and 
strengthening transparency on subsidies provided in the EU and US. Together through the TTC work 
is progressing also on mutually compatible standards for charging infrastructures for heavy duty 
vehicles and interoperability of charging infrastructure and smart grids. Furthermore, to emphasise 
the importance of the sustainability agenda of the TTC, the EU and US announced at the 3rd TTC 
Ministerial meeting their inte ntion to launch a new Transatlantic Initiative on Sustainable Trade to 
support our shared desire of tackling climate change and to advance our shared objective of 
achieving a green and sustainable future.  
 
As a matter of principle, and important to note is  that the Joint EU -US Trade and Technology Council 
Inaugural Statement of 29  September  2021 (point 5) explicitly states: "the cooperation and 
exchanges of the TTC are without prejudice to the regulatory autonomy of the European Union and 
the United States and should respect the different legal systems in both jurisdictions."  
 
The main aim of the joint AI roadmap is to achieve convergence on some key issues relating the 
implementation of our respective policy frameworks on artificial intelligence, and to advance 
collaborative approaches in international standards bodies related to Artificial Intelligence.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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2.4 Investment Regime  
2.4.1 Regulatory Framework  
& 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures affecting production and trade  
3.3.4 Competition Policy  
3.3.6 Government Procurement  
Regulation 2022/2560 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market  
10. Could the European  Union  elaborate on the definition of "financial contribution" and clarify 
which transactions would be covered by that concept?  
 
Reply:  The concept of financial contribution is set for th in Article  3(2) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 
on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market ("FSR"). More specifically, a financial contribution 
includes any direct transfer of funds or liabilities, such as capital injections, grants, loans, loan 
guarantees, fiscal incentives, the setting -off of operating losses, compensation for financial burdens 
imposed by public authorities, debt forgiveness, debt to equity swaps or rescheduling. In addition, 
the concept covers situations of foregoing of revenue that is otherwise due, such as tax exemptions 
or the granting of special or exclusive rights without adequate remuneration. Finally, the concept of 
financial contribution encompasses situations of provision of goods or services or the purchase of 
goods or services.  
 
11. Could the European  Union  elaborate on the differences between the Regulation on foreign 
subsidies and EU state aid law when it comes to the concept of "financial contribution" and 
transactions covered?  
 
Reply:  The concept of financial contr ibutions under the FSR bear similarities to the concept of 
transfer of State resources under State aid, in so far as it can involve both direct transfers of funds 
(in its various forms, see some examples in the reply to question 9 above) as well as cases o f 
revenue foregone (in its various forms). The most obvious distinction between the two is that the 
concept of state resources under EU State aid rules relates to resources granted by one of the EU 
Member States, whereas the concept of financial contributi on under the FSR relates to contributions 
granted by a third (non -EU) country.  
 
12. Could the European  Union  clarify in which cases financial contributions shall be deemed to be 
attributable to third countries?  
 
Reply:  In accordance with Article  3(2) FSR,  the notion of financial contribution includes financial 
contributions provided by the central government or public authorities at all other levels. It also 
includes financial contributions by a foreign public entity or a private entity if their actions ca n be 
attributed to the central government or the public authorities of the third country. This will be 
examined taking into account elements such as the characteristics of the entity and the legal and 
economic environment prevailing in the State in which t he entity operates, including the 
government's role in the economy as far as foreign public entities are concerned or all relevant 
circumstances for private entities.  
 
13. Could the European  Union  advise if it intends to provide guidance to economic operat ors in 
this respect?  
 
Reply: In accordance with Article  46 FSR, the Commission will publish, at the latest three years after 
entry into force, guidelines on certain concepts based on its experience with applying them. These 
include the criteria for determi ning a distortion, the balancing test, the criteria to request an ad-hoc 
notification and the assessment of a distortion in a public procurement procedure. In addition, in 
order to provide companies with more certainty early on, the Commission will clarify  the concepts 
of a distortion – both generally and in public procurement – as well as the balancing test at the latest 
one year after the start of application.  
 
14. Art. 44.9 of Regulation 2022/2560 reads that "[…] an investigation pursuant to this Regulat ion 
shall not be carried out and measures shall not be imposed or maintained where such investigation 
or measures would be contrary to the Union's obligations emanating from any relevant international 
agreement it has entered into". Could the European  Union please elaborate on this provision and 
how it will be applied in practice?  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Reply:  The FSR is consistent with the EU's international obligations and notably the WTO  Agreement  
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM). Article  44(9) FSR specifies that no action shall 
be taken under this Regulation which would amount to a specific action against a subsidy within the 
meaning of Article  32.1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and  Countervailing Measures and granted by 
a third country which is a member of the World Trade Organisation. Subsidies that are not covered 
by the SCM  Agreement  could therefore be investigated and redressed, if needed, under the FSR.  
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PR ACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures affecting production and trade  
3.3.2 Standards and other technical requirements  
3.3.2.1 Standards  
Question:  
15. We understand the EU is seeking to revise the decision -making process within the European 
Standardisation org anisations (ESO) through a proposal published in February 2022. The EU's 
revision wishes to see national standardisation bodies in an ESO like ETSI 
(European  Telecommunications Standards Institute) play a more important role. Will the EU ensure 
that such a  revision will not be done to the detriment of the input provided by private sector 
members?  
 
Reply:  
Regulation (EU) 2022/2480 amending Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 as regards decisions of 
European standardisation organisations concerning European standar ds and European 
standardisation deliverables applies equally to all European Standardisation Organisations, CEN 
CENELEC and ETSI. This regulation concerns only certain aspects of governance in the ESOs 
(notably, the voting system) and there is no consequen ce for the participation of private sector 
members, as the standardisation process and its values (openness, transparency, non -discrimination 
etc.) are not affected.  
 
3.3.2.2 Technical requirements and European harmonised standards  
Question:  
16. The EU ha s been developing a "new approach" to technical requirements. This new approach 
covers the area of Medical Devices and creates new conformity assessment procedure requirements 
for manufacturers under the MDR / IVDR regulation . Such requirements have proven  time consuming 
and burdensome for said manufacturers due to a lack of available Notified Bodies in the EU, 
inadequate transparency and accountability of the said Notified Bodies, lack of mechanisms to reduce 
the burden of proof and otherwise ease the conf ormity procedures for legacy products, etc. What 
steps is the EU taking, in addition to the recent amendment of the MDR adopted in March  2023, to 
ensure as smooth continuation of trade as possible of medical devices from the "old approach" to 
the "new appr oach"?  
 
Reply:  
The "New Approach" policy – established in 1985 and successively improved by the "New Legislative 
Framework" (see https://single -market-economy.ec.europa.eu/single -market/goods/new -
legislative -framework_en ) – was already applied in the previous Directives governing the medical 
devices sector in the EU since 1990. Actually, the new sectorial Regulations adopted in 2017 are 
based on the same policy and do not represent any substantial change with respect to th e basic 
elements of this kind of EU legislation, in particular on setting up "essential requirements" to be 
complied with by economic operators, with the support of voluntary European harmonised standards 
that contain specific technical solutions.  
 
The new  Regulations contain extremely important improvements in several requirements for medical 
devices in the EU with respect to the previous Directives (see https://health .ec.europa.eu/medical -
devices -new-regulations/overview_en ). As a matter of fact, the availability and capacity of notified 
bodies are not optimal yet, also due to the more complex procedure for designation and notificati on 
that was designed precisely to ensure the highest levels of technical competence and performance 
of notified bodies, as well as their full transparency and accountability.  
 
Taking into account the problems related to the smooth implementation of the new  Regulations, the 
EU adopted two acts to introduce a staggered extension of the transition periods from the previous 
Directives in particular for "legacy devices": Regulation (EU) 2022/112 amending Regulation (EU) 
2017/746 and Regulation (EU) 2023/607 amen ding Regulation (EU) 2017/745 (for more 
information, see : WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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https://health.ec.europa.eu/medical -devices-sector/new -regulations_en#extension -of-the-
transition -periods -provided -for-in-the-regulations ). 
 
In addition to these very significant legislative measures, the European Commission and the national 
competent author ities in the Medical Device Coordination Group (MDCG), in cooperation with the 
EU-wide sectorial stakeholders, are implementing and monitoring the actions described in the 
Position Paper MDCG 2022 -14 "Transition to the MDR and IVDR - Notified body capacity  and 
availability of medical devices and IVDs" (see https://health.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022 -
08/mdcg_2022 -14_en.pdf ), especially d esigned to enhance notified body capacity, access to notified 
bodies and manufacturers' preparedness in order to facilitate transition to the new Regulations and 
to avoid shortage of medical devices.  
 
Furthermore, other specific actions funded by the "EU4H ealth" Programmes 2022 and 2023 are 
currently under development, concerning notified bodies, support to SMEs, expert panels, orphan 
devices, market surveillance, governance, and innovation, etc.  
 
3.3.3 Sanitary and Phytosanitary requirements  
Question:  
17. The EU has a dynamic and evolving market when it comes to food products. With the 
development of new rules and "good food practises" being informed by the work undertaken by the 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), Israel would like to kno w if the EU is envisaging allowing 
interested third countries participation in EFSA's advisory forum as observers?  
 
Reply:  
According to Article  27 of the Regulation (EC) No178/2002, EFSA's Advisory Forum comprises 
representatives of the national food safety authorities of the EU Member States, Iceland and Norway. 
Observers from Switzerland and the EU Candidate Countries also attend Advisory Forum meetings. 
Publicly available information can be found here. 
 
3.3.6 Government Procurement  
Question:  
18. With respect to the Net -Zero Industry Act and t he provisions relating to public procurement, 
could the European  Union  provide further information on the concept of "sustainability and resilience 
contribution" (i.e., Art.  19 of the draft Regulation)?  
 
Reply:  The Net Zero Industry Act is outside of the scope of the Trade Policy Review, which are 
retrospective reviews. The Net Zero Industry Act aims at incentivising investments into net 
zero technologies that deliver on wider societal values linked to environmental sustainability, 
innovation, energy syste m integration and resilience.  
 
3.3.7 Intellectual Property Rights  
3.3.7.3.6 Undisclosed information and access to data  
Question:  
19. With new pieces of legislation such as the Data Act, how will the EU ensure it does not create 
a parallel regime to the GDPR?  
 
Reply:  The Data Act complements existing rights, in particular the right to data portability. The Data 
Act does not establish any measures that change or interfere with personal data protection 
legislation, and it is fully coherent with existing rules on the processing of personal data, including 
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Where there are mixed and inextricable datasets 
containing both personal and non -personal data, the data is to be treated as personal data.  
 
3.3.7.3 .6.1 Trade secrets  
Question:  
20. Some concerns regarding the protection of Trade Secrets within the EU's planned Data Act 
are still expressed by different industry representatives. Will the EU publish guidelines on how to 
best protect Trade Secrets once th e Data Act is finalised?  
 
Reply:  The Data Act proposal is currently being negotiated in the context of the official procedures 
of the EU legislative process, with the Council of the European  Union  and the European Parliament 
as co -legislators. Appropriate measures and safeguards to preserve trade secrets protection are 
among the topics under discussion in this framework.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.4 Energy  
4.4.1 Sustainable energy and climate  
Regulation establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism  
21. Questions:  
Could the European  Union  advise if it intends to hold outreach activities and issue guidelines and 
information material for third countries and third country manufacturers to expl ain the obligations 
resulting from the EU CBAM, both before the start of the transitional period (i.e., October 2023) and 
before the full roll -out of the CBAM (i.e., January 2026)?  
 
Reply:  To provide businesses and third countries with legal certainty and  stability, a monitoring and 
reporting system will apply from 1  October  2023 until the end of 2025, giving sufficient time for the 
administrative set up to be put in place. This transitional period will facilitate a careful, predictable 
and proportionate t ransition for EU and non -EU business, and give trading partners, including 
developing countries, time to prepare.  
 
The EU Commission, in conjunction with the European External Action Services and EU Delegations 
around the world, will launch an information  campaign, featuring online seminars, physical events, 
distribution of guidance documents, and direct assistance, aimed at assisting third country operators 
and importers in performing all new obligations required by the CBAM Regulation and its secondary 
legislation.  
 
The outreach campaign will start in Spring 2023 upon the approval of the implementing act 
concerning the reporting rules applicable in transitional period. This awareness -raising exercise will 
continue through autumn 2023, thus supporting all relevant actors for the entry into force of the 
Regulation in October 2023, considering that the first CBAM report will have to be submitted in 
January 2024. As a start the EU will organize a technical briefing on CBAM in the WTO on 
14 June 2023 (during th e WTO Trade and Environment Week).  
 
22. Could the European  Union  elaborate on its work on defining the methodology for calculating 
embedded emissions?  
 
Reply:  After the Regulation establishing a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is officially 
published in the EU's Official Journal and has entered into force, the European Commission will be 
in a position to adopt the implementing act regulating the trans itional period of the CBAM, based on 
Article  35 of the CBAM Regulation, including the information to be reported as well as the format of 
the reporting.  
 
The approach applicable for the calculation of embedded emissions to be reported during the 
transition al period, is currently being developed by the Commission, with the assistance of an expert 
group. This informal Group (i) assists the Commission to complete methods for the monitoring, 
reporting, quantification and verification of embedded emissions of pr oducts in the sectors falling 
under the scope of the CBAM, and (ii) contributes to the early preparation of implementing acts, 
before submission to the CBAM Committee.  
 
The detailed rules on the elements of calculation methods as set out in Annex  IV to the  CBAM 
Regulation will be enshrined in an Implementing Regulation to be adopted by the Commission, after 
consulting the CBAM Committee (Q3 2024) before October 2023.  
 
In view of its adoption, the European Commission will launch a public consultation of four  weeks, 
open to all stakeholders in the course of June 2023 on 'Have your Say' portal.  
 
This Implementing act will be accompanied by Guidance documents:  
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press -releases/2023/04/25/fit -for-55-council -adopts -
key-pieces -of-legislation -delivering -on-2030-climate -
targets/ https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press -releases/2023/04/25/fit -for-55-council-
adopts -key-pieces -of-legislation -delivering -on-2030-climate -
targets/ https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press -releases/2023/04/25/fit -for-55-council -
adopts -key-pieces -of-legislation -delivering -on-2030-climate -targets/  
 
23. Could the European  Union  advise if it expects to apply the same methodology during the 
transitional period and during the full roll -out of the CBAM?  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Reply:  The objective of the transitional period is to collect data, as specified in the upcoming 
implementing act, with a view to defining a thorough methodology for the definitive period starting 
on 1 January  2026. Analysis of the information gathered during th at period will inform the 
implementing acts that will apply during the definitive period .  
 
On the basis of Article  7(7) of the CBAM Regulation  as formally adopted by the co -legislators, an 
implementing act reflecting this new methodology will be adopted by the Euro pean Commission 
following the same procedure for the Implementing act regulating the transitional period (as outlined 
in the reply to question 19), including an open public consultation of all stakeholders.  
 
24. If the European  Union  expects the methodolog y to differ from one phase to another, could the 
European  Union  elaborate on the process that will lead to the formulation of methodology for the 
period of full application of the EU CBAM, incl. in terms of applicable internal decision -making 
processes and  stakeholder involvement?  
 
Reply:  The implementing acts will be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure. The 
CBAM committee composed of EU Member States will vote on the draft proposal of the 
European  Commission. The draft proposal will be pu blished for feedback from all interested 
stakeholders for a period of 4 weeks.  
 
25. Could the European  Union  advise on how default values will be set, and whether and how it 
intends to take account of third countries' considerations and suggestions in that  regard?  
 
Reply:  Default values methodology are set out in Annex  IV of the Regulation, and further 
implementing acts will be adopted before the end of the transitional period. The 
European  Commission will use the information gathered during the transition al period in view of 
adopting the implementing act defining the methods for calculating embedded emissions (under 
art 7 of the Regulation).  
 
26. Could the European  Union  elaborate on Arts. 2.12 and 9 of the EU CBAM Regulation, i.e., the 
possibility of conc luding agreements with third countries to take account of their carbon pricing 
mechanisms?  
 
Reply:  The CBAM Regulation ensures that carbon price effectively paid in a third country will be 
deducted from the number of CBAM certificates to be surrendered, a fter the end of the transitional 
period. Under the transitional period starting in October 2023, importers of goods under the scope 
of the Regulation will notably have to report on direct and indirect emissions as well as on the carbon 
price possibly paid in the country of origin.  
 
The European Commission is open to dialogue with its international partners on the carbon price 
paid by their exporters for goods under the scope of the CBAM Regulation, so as to better understand 
their carbon pricing mechanisms  and how to most effectively take them into consideration after the 
end of the transitional period.  
 
27. What would be the European  Union 's approach and when could such bilateral dialogue 
commence?  
 
Reply:  The European Commission has not yet initiated specific bilateral dialogue with EU trading 
partners. The reporting obligations applicable during the transitional period starting in Octobe r 2023 
will inform the European Commission on effective approaches to foster dialogue on how to take 
account of carbon pricing mechanisms in the context of the implementation of the CBAM.  
 
28. What purpose would such agreements serve? Does the European  Union envisage that 
compliance with the EU CBAM obligations would be streamlined for economic operators from 
third countries with which the European  Union  will conclude such agreements?  
 
Reply:  The full understanding of carbon pricing mechanisms  for goods co vered by the CBAM 
Regulation will allow the European Commission to consider possible simplifications, notably 
concerning how to take account of the carbon price paid by operators. This may take the form of 
concluding agreements with third countries and wil l also serve to inform the European Commission 
in view of its adoption of further implementing acts before the end of the transitional period.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 The review report to be prepared by the Commission before the end of the transitional period will 
also consider adjustments (simplifications) to be made with respect to taking account of the carbon 
price paid by exporters, in addition to the possibility of such agreements with third countries, in 
order to ensure a smooth implementation in the least trade -restrictive way for the definitive phase. 
In any case, before 1  January  2028, and every two years thereafter, the Commission will also 
present a report on the effective application of CBAM (see to that effect Article  30(6) of the 
Regulation).  
 
29. Could the European  Union  elaborate on how the scope of the EU CBAM may be broadened in 
the future, incl. on the criteria for identifying additional products to be covered?  
 
Reply:  A full review of CBAM's implementation will be undertaken before the end of the trans itional 
period. Using data collected during that period, the review will, amongst others, look carefully into 
the possibility of extending CBAM also to other goods and sectors (see to that effect Article  30(2) of 
the Regulation).  
 
4.5 Services  
Question:  
30. The EU expects companies to comply with some of its Digital Services Act obligations by 
summer 2023 and further obligations by February 2024. Such compliance can be complex and at 
times unclear. Does the EU plan on releasing guidelines to provide compani es, especially SMEs, with 
the necessary clarity so that they may fulfil their obligations?  
 
Reply : The Digital Services Act establishes a series of due diligence obligations that are tailored to 
the technical features, size and reach of online intermediar ies. These rules are clearly set out in the 
legislation and the relevant providers are preparing their compliance. For those services designated 
as very large online platforms and very large online search engines, the Commission as regulator 
maintains info rmal contacts with the relevant providers and other stakeholders to facilitate timely 
compliance with these procedural requirements.  
 
The DSA explicitly invites the Commission to issue guidelines in several aspects that may need 
further clarification as t echnologies evolve, such as protection of minors, cooperation with trusted 
flaggers or dark patterns. The Commission may at any point in time issue guidelines wherever this 
is considered opportune. Compliance of providers with the procedural rules in the D igital Services 
Act will necessarily evolve alongside technology and emerging systemic risks.  
 
Part II: Questions based on the European  Union 's report  
5 SUSTAINABILITY  
5.1 The EU's actions on climate change and environmental protection  
5.1.1 Overview of the actions on climate change and environmental protection  
European Green Deal & Zero Pollution Action Plan  
Questions:  
31. With respect to Commission Delegated Regulation 2023/707 amending Regulation (EC) 
No 1272/2008 as regards hazard classes and criteria for the classification, labelling and packaging 
of substances and mixtures, could the European  Union  explain how the Delegated Act will inform 
and impact downstream legislation and downstream sectors?  
 
Reply:  The Delegated Regulation 2023/707 is adding additional hazard classes to the CLP Regulation 
but has no direct effect on downstream legislation. Such downstream legislation (e.g., REACH, 
Cosmetics or toys legislation) would still need to be modified if it was concluded that regulatory 
actions need to be implemented for substances fulfilling the criteria related to the new hazard 
classes.  
 
32. Israel notes that some definitions and concepts in the Delegated Act remain unclear. Could 
the European  Union  provide information on the process for th e development of guidance documents?  
 
Reply:  A draft of an updated version of the CLP guidance to cover the new hazard classes is under 
preparation by the European Chemical Agency. The draft will then be discussed by an expert group 
in which experts from MS, industry and NGOS will be invited to participate. Then, the expert group 
of Competent Authorities and stakeholders for REACH and CLP (CARACAL) will be consulted for 
endorsement of the guidance.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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33. Could the European  Union  clarify whether and how stakeholders will be involved in this 
process?  
 
Reply:  As mentioned in the reply to Q30, a draft of the updated version of the CLP guidance will be 
prepared by the European Chemical Agency and later discussed by an expert group in  which experts 
from MS, industry and NGOS will be invited to participate. Then, the expert group of Competent 
Authorities and stakeholders for REACH and CLP (CARACAL) will be consulted for endorsement of 
the guidance.  
 
34. Could the European  Union  clarify whether it has set a time frame for issuing the guidance 
documents?  
 
Reply:  It is estimated currently that the relevant processes regarding the endorsement of the 
guidance could be finalized by Q2 2024.  
 
35. Could the EU provide an update on the revision of Regulation 1907/2006 on the Registration, 
Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH)?  
 
Reply:  A targeted revision of the REACH Regulation is one of the major deliverables of the 
Commiss ion's Chemicals Strategy for Sustainability that was adopted in 2020 (COM(2020)667 – 
https://ec.europa.eu/environment/pdf/chemicals/2020/10/Strategy.pdf ). This revision is currently 
under preparation, at an advanced stage, and a proposal is expected to be adopted by the 
Commission before the end of 2023. Following adoption, the parts of the package that will become 
subject to the co -legislati ve procedure will be sent to the European Parliament and the Council.  
 
36. Could the European  Union  provide information on the concepts of "safe and sustainable by 
design" and "essential use"?  
 
Reply:  The Commission proposes, in its Chemicals Strategy (se e Question 30), the horizontal 
essential use concept for chemicals legislation, considering that criteria should be defined that 
"ensure that the most harmful chemicals are only allowed if their use is necessary for health, safety 
or is critical for the fu nctioning of society and if there are no alternatives that are acceptable from 
the standpoint of environment and health". The Commission is currently developing criteria, 
involving the public and stakeholders, to define essential uses. A study supporting t he Commission's 
work on these criteria has recently been published: Supporting the Commission in developing an 
essential use concept - Publications Office of the EU (europa.eu)  
 
37. Could the European  Union  advise if, in the Impact Assessment that will accompany the 
proposal on the revision of REACH, there will be an assessment  of the impact of the proposed 
changes on international trade?  
 
Reply:  The Impact Assessment accompanying the targeted revision of REACH considers the social, 
environmental, and economic impacts on EU actors of the Commission proposal. Concerning the 
economic impacts, it assesses the impacts of the proposed measures on compliance costs but also 
on overall competitiveness.  
 
38. Could the European  Union  advise if the Impact Assessment will include an assessment of the 
impact of the introduction of new hazard  classes introduced via Commission Delegated 
Regulation  2023/707 in terms of REACH restrictions?  
 
Reply:  The Impact Assessment accompanying the targeted revision of REACH will include an 
assessment of the impacts of possible additional REACH restrictions for endocrine disruptors, 
PBT/vPvB (persistent, bioaccumulative and toxic/very persistent and very bioacc umulative, 
PMT/vPvM (persistent, mobile and toxic/very persistent and very mobile), substances with specific 
target organ toxicity, respiratory sensitisers and substances affecting the immune or neurological 
systems. This assessment is based on the estimat ed number of substances for which such hazards 
could be confirmed, relying on data from REACH registration dossiers.  
 
5.1.2 Sustainable Food Systems  
39. With respect to Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs) and Regulation 2023/344 on the 
two neonicotinoid substanc es clothianidin and thiamethoxam, if the objective of the EU is to ensure 
the EU does not contribute to the global decline of pollinators, why are the requirements restricted WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 to the import of food and feed only? Why does it not include other agricultural c ommodities such as 
cotton, propagation material and cut flowers – where these pesticides are also applied?  
 
Reply:  Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 sets MRLs only for food/feed products in its Annex  I. Other 
products are out of the scope of this Regulation.  
 
The EU is actively involved in several other coordinated actions to protect pollinators more generally, 
both in the EU and internationally:  
 
- The EU pollinators initiative1 which integrates holistic actions on pollinators across different 
sectorial poli cies, addresses the main known causes for pollinator decline and strengthening the 
collaboration between all the actors concerned.  
- The active EU collaborations with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
in its "Global Action on Pol lination Services for Sustainable Agriculture" and with the International 
Union for Conservation of Nature in projects to address the decline of pollinators.  
 
40. If the risk is to pollinators, why is there a limit of quantification set for products produc ed in 
greenhouses protected from pollinators? Is this not more trade restrictive than necessary?  
 
Reply:  Clothianidin and thiamethoxam are no longer approved for use in plant protection products 
in the EU. However, to facilitate trade, as specifically not ed in Recital 20 or Regulation (EC) 
No 2023/334, imports from third countries are not prevented provided that, provided that the use 
of clothianidin/thiamethoxam does not lead to measurable levels of residues in the imported product, 
or, in the situation w hen the use of clothianidin/thiamethoxam leads to measurable levels of 
residues, the evaluation of an application for import tolerances for the specific crop and under the 
specific conditions of use concludes that there is no unacceptable risk to pollinato rs. 
 
41. With respect to the use of emergency authorisations, the European  Union  has stated that "the 
purpose of an emergency authorisation is not to facilitate trade but rather to allow a Member State 
to address serious dangers for plant health". Yet, eme rgency authorizations are still being made for 
neonicotinoids that were, quote, "intended for export outside the EU".  How does this not contradict 
the stated aim of the European  Union  not to contribute to the global decline of pollinators?  
 
Reply:  Please n ote that given the judgment by the European Court of Justice of 19  January  2023 in 
Case C -162/212, Member States cannot grant any further emergency authorisations for products 
containing restricted neonicotinoids the treatment and sowing of seeds outdoors . The treatment of 
seeds for export only under emergency authorisations is not possible as indeed Article  53 of 
Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 provides that one of the conditions for such authorisation? Is a danger 
that cannot be contained by any other reasonable means. The interpretation of the Commission is 
that such a danger can be only in the EU so emergency  authorisations for export only are not 
possible, not only for neonicotinoids, but also for any other active substance.  
 
1 https://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/conservation/species/pollinators/policy_en.htm . 
2 https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62021CJ0162 .  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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BRUNEI DARUSSALAM  
GOVERNMENT REPORT (WT/TPR/G/442)  
Page 13  
3. MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL TRADE POLICY  
3.2 The EU's b ilateral agenda  
3.2.1 Bilateral trade agreements  
c. Asia  
3.46. In Southeast Asia, on 30  June 2019 the EU signed the Free Trade Agreement and the 
Investment Protection Agreement with Viet Nam. The EU -Viet Nam Free Trade Agreement entered 
into force on 1  August 2020 and establishes a free trade area between the EU and Viet  Nam and 
sets out the rules accompanying trade liberalization, in a manner mindful of high levels of 
environmental and labour protection and relevant internationally recognised standards an d 
agreements. The EU -Viet Nam Investment Protection Agreement is ratified by Viet  Nam and will 
enter into force once ratified by all EU Member States.  
 
3.47. In addition, the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement entered into force on 
21 November  2019. The EU -Singapore Investment Protection Agreement will enter into force once 
ratified by all EU Member States. The EU also continues negotiations for a free trade agreement with 
Indonesia , a process launched in September 2016.  
 
Question:  
1. The EU has trade agreements in place with Singapore and Viet  Nam  and is in the 
process of negotiating with Indonesia. What is the EU's short and long -term plans in 
improving economic engagement with the wider ASEAN bloc?  
 
Reply:  The EU is actively engaging economica lly with ASEAN and its member states. The EU 
continues negotiations for a free trade agreement with Indonesia and has also decided to re -launch 
negotiations for a free trade agreement with Thailand. In addition, the EU remains interested in 
further engagin g with ASEAN and its member states, including through the possible resumption of 
trade negotiations with Malaysia or the Philippines once the conditions are right. In the short and 
medium term, the EU will explore avenues to promote cooperation with the AS EAN region in areas 
of mutual interest such as digital economy, green technologies and green services and supply chain 
resilience. Negotiating an EU -ASEAN free trade agreement remains a common objective of both 
sides in the longer term.  
 
Page 14  
3. MULTILA TERAL AND BILATERAL TRADE POLICY  
3.2 The EU's bilateral agenda  
3.2.1 Bilateral trade agreements  
d. Pacific  
3.50. On 30  June 2022 the EU and New  Zealand  concluded the negotiations for a modern free 
trade agreement with several new important and ambitious pr ovisions. This is the first agreement 
reflecting the outcome of the EU's 2022 Trade and Sustainable Development review, with 
sanctionable commitments on the Paris Climate Agreement as well as the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) core labour standard s. Moreover, this is the EU's first trade agreement with a 
dedicated chapter on sustainable food systems, with provisions on gender equality and on trade and 
fossil fuel subsidies reform, also comprising unique commitments on circular economy, 
deforestatio n, carbon pricing, and protection of the marine environment.  
 
Question:  
2. Will the EU be using similar format and provisions for future FTAs that is modern and 
ambitious?  
 
Reply:  On 22  June 2022 the Commission did indeed unveil a new approach to trade agreements to 
promote green and just growth with the adoption of its Communication on "The power of trade 
partnerships: together for green and just economic growth". 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_3921 . In this Communication the 
Commission notably committed to further strengthen the enforcement of Trade S ustainable 
Development commitments in future agreements by proposing to EU trading partners to extend the 
general state -to-state dispute settlement compliance stage to the Trade and Sustainable 
Development chapter. Such a proposal was already made to New -Zealand immediately after the WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 adoption of the communication and New -Zealand accepted it. Similarly, the Commission will continue 
to propose a chapter on sustainable food systems in future EU trade agreements . 
 
Page 19  
5. SUSTAINABILITY  
5.1 The EU's actions on climate change and environmental protection  
5.1.1 Overview of the actions on climate change and environmental protection  
5.7. The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)  is a climate measure aimed at 
decreasing global GHG emissions by preventing the r isk of carbon leakage and by supporting 
increased ambition on climate mitigation, while ensuring WTO compatibility. The CBAM will equalise 
the price of carbon between domestic products and imports and ensure that the EU's climate 
objectives are not undermi ned by production relocating to countries with less ambitious climate 
policies.  
 
Question :  
3. Could the EU elaborate on how the carbon leakage can be measured/calculated 
particularly for non -EU countries?  
 
Reply:  As the EU has raised its climate ambition in the climate law adopted in 2021, it should be 
ensured that this is not undermined by carbon  leakage. Carbon leakage occurs when industries 
transfer polluting production to other countries with less stringent climate policies, or when EU 
products are replaced by more carbon -intensive imports. This can lead to an increase in the total 
global emiss ions, thus jeopardising the effectiveness of the EU's emission reduction policies.  
 
The main purpose of an EU CBAM is to help reducing carbon emissions globally by preventing this 
risk of carbon leakage. The CBAM Regulation will tackle this by ensuring tha t the carbon price of 
imports is equivalent to the carbon price of domestic production.  
 
In the EU, under the EU emissions trading system (EU ETS) sets a cap on the amount of greenhouse 
gas emissions that can be released from industrial installations in ce rtain sectors. Allowances must 
be bought on the ETS trading market, though a certain number of free allowances is distributed to 
industrial installations that are considered to be at significant risk of carbon leakage . That system 
has been effective in add ressing the risk of leakage, but it dampens the incentive to invest in greener 
production at home and abroad. The CBAM Regulation will progressively become an alternative to 
this. Sectors covered by the CBAM Regulation will see their free allocation gradua lly phased out as 
CBAM is phased in.  
 
The CBAM Regulation is not directed at third countries but takes action at the level of the EU by 
pricing the embedded greenhouse gas emissions of imported products in specific sectors, regardless 
of country of origin and with uniform conditions and incentives for GHG emission reductions that are 
equivalent to those of domestic producers. Where third countries have an effective carbon pricing 
policy in place, importers from those countries may apply for the carbon price  paid domestically to 
be discounted from their CBAM obligation. The transitional phase of the CBAM Regulation starting 
on the 1st of October until December 2025 will in this respect help collect information on carbon 
pricing policies of different countries  and adjust the implementation of CBAM for the definitive phase, 
starting on 1  January  2026, to better address the issue of carbon leakage where necessary.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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ARGENTINA  
Preguntas elaboradas en base al Informe de la Secretaría  
(Documento WT /TPR/S/442)e3  
• Párrafo 14: En materia de bienestar  animal, se lee: "As concerns sanitary and phytosanitary 
(SPS) measures, the European Union completed the implementation of the Plant Health Law, the 
Animal Health Law, and the Regulation on Official Controls, all adopted in previous years to simplify 
and harmonize its SPS regime. In March 2021, the European Union also amended the General Food 
Law to improve transparency and public participation in the risk assessment and approval procedures 
for products, and in January 2022 started applying updated rules ( adopted in 2018) on the 
manufacturing, trade, sale, and use of veterinary medicinal products, including on the use of 
antimicrobials. In May 2020, the European Union adopted the Farm to Fork Strategy, which, 
inter alia, identifies the areas of action to ac hieve a sustainable EU food system during the 
period  2020-24, including possible reforms on feed additives, pesticides, plant protection, and 
animal welfare, as well as the establishment of a new legislative framework for sustainable food 
systems".   
Pregun ta 1  
La UE se encuentra revisando su legislación de bienestar animal en las siguientes áreas: a nivel de 
granja, durante el transporte, en el sacrificio y etiquetado de bienestar animal. Las disposiciones 
actuales para el sacrificio establecidas en el Reg lamento (CE) 1099/2009 ya son vinculantes para 
los terceros países. ¿Cuáles serán las obligaciones de las otras áreas objeto de revisión (es decir a 
nivel de la granja, durante el transporte y el etiquetado de bienestar animal) para terceros países?  
 
Reply : Please note joint reply to Question 1, 2 and 3.  
 
Pregunta 2  
Teniendo en consideración las dificultades que una adecuación de la normativa de bienestar animal 
podría representar en términos estructurales, económicos y sociales (lo cual debería ser analiz ado a 
nivel local, dadas las diferentes realidades y escenarios productivos en cada punto geográfico), ¿en 
qué medida las acciones de política sobre las que se encuentra trabajando la UE consideran el 
aumento de los costos operativos y de inversión para te rceros países destinados a implementar 
estas medidas de bienestar animal?  
 
Reply:  Please note joint reply to Question 1, 2 and 3.  
 
Pregunta 3  
Asimismo, ¿no considera la UE que los periodos transitorios contemplados en las opciones de 
políticas (en algunos casos 5 años), podrían ser insuficientes para algunos terceros países, dada su 
situación económica, social y productiva particular?  
 
Reply to questions 1 -3: The European Commission is working towards presenting, in the 
autumn  2023, four legislative  proposals on animal welfare regarding: the welfare of kept animals, 
(including cats and dogs kept / bred for economic purposes), the protection of animals during 
transport, animal welfare labelling and the protection of animals at the time of killing. The  aim of 
revising the legislation will be to align it with the latest scientific evidence and make it easier to 
enforce, including by having more specific requirements for certain species and of animals. As we 
are in the process of the revision, with an ong oing impact assessment and analysing the recently 
adopted European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) scientific opinions, no final decision has been taken 
on possible measures and their applicability to imported products. The European Commission is 
looking at d ifferent possible policy options to ensure a higher level of animal welfare and to respond 
to European citizens' ethical concerns expressed in particular in European Citizen Initiatives such as 
the "End the Cage Age" calling for the phasing out of cages fo r certain species of animals such as 
laying hens. The potential economic and social impacts of future European Commission proposals 
are currently under study based on the data collected through dedicated studies and stakeholders' 
consultations.  
 
• Párrafo 3.194: Respecto de los sistemas alimentarios sostenibles dice: "Moreover, in May 2020 
the Commission adopted the Farm to Fork Strategy to support the ongoing reform process and the 
EU sustainability objectives.254 The Strategy is considered a key component  of the European Green 
Deal and has some implications for the EU SPS regime. The Strategy identifies the areas of action 
to achieve a sustainable EU food system and comprises an action plan for the period 2020 -24 that 
provides for, inter alia, the reform o f the legislation on feed additives, pesticides, food contact WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 materials, plant protection, animal welfare, and marketing standards for agricultural and fishery 
(including aquaculture) products. As part of this action plan, the Commission is also expected t o 
propose new legislation to extend the scope of the requirement on origin labelling, introduce a 
standardized mandatory front -of-pack nutrition labelling, and establish a sustainable food labelling 
framework to inform consumers about the sustainability as pects of food products. This strategy also 
sets EU targets for reducing the use of chemical pesticides (and their risk), antimicrobials, and 
fertilisers by 2030, and foresees to integrate environmental considerations in the assessment 
requests for import t olerances for pesticides not approved in the European Union. As announced in 
the Strategy, the Commission plans to present a new legislative framework for sustainable food 
systems in 2023 to, inter alia, incorporate sustainability in all food -related polic ies, as well as a 
proposal for the setting of EU -level targets for food waste reduction".  
Pregunta 4  
En el proyecto de marco legislativo para sistemas alimentarios sostenibles, ¿la Comisión Europea ha 
evaluado el impacto que dicho marco puede tener en el ámbito internacional en materia de las tres 
dimensiones del desarrollo sostenible: ambiental, económica y social?  
 
Reply:  The three dimensions of sustainability (environmental, social/health and economic) are taken 
into account when assessing the impact of  the different options on stakeholders. Imported products 
are part of some of the options that are analysed in the impact assessment.  
 
Pregunta 5  
¿Cómo espera la Comisión Europea implementar un sistema de etiquetado de sostenibilidad 
armonizado, siendo q ue existen diferencias sustanciales en las condiciones climáticas y de 
producción existentes entre los propios Estados Miembros de la UE y más aún con respecto a terceros 
países?  
 
Reply:  The sustainability labelling framework, which was announced in the Farm to Fork Strategy as 
a separate initiative, should be part of the framework legislation for sustainable food systems (FSFS). 
The aim of the framework would be to empower consumers to m ake sustainable food choices and 
stimulate consumer demand for sustainable foods, as well as to incentivise food business operators 
to improve progressively the sustainability of their food products. Given the framework nature of 
the FSFS, issues related t o the evaluation of the sustainability of food products would be considered 
later in the context of subsequent acts.  
 
Pregunta 6  
Para la propuesta de marco legislativo para sistemas alimentarios sostenibles, ¿la UE optará por un 
enfoque prescriptivo o bie n tendrá en cuenta los resultados obtenidos por los productores en terceros 
países?  
 
Reply:  The legislative framework for a Sustainable Food System aims to primarily function as a policy 
enabler, by establishing common definitions, general principles and o bjectives to underpin future EU 
food-related policies across the food system. A mixture of interventions to incentivise food system 
actors to make sustainable choices are also being considered, by means of overarching provisions 
governing sustainability la belling for foods and provisions on sustainable food public procurement. 
The framework aims to address all three dimensions of sustainability (environmental, social 
(including health) and economic). The framework legislation for sustainable food systems (F SFS), 
like any new EU policy measures, will be supported by an impact assessment, based on all available 
evidence collected including – but not limited to –literature review, surveys and studies from the 
entire world.  
 
Pregunta 7  
¿Qué aspectos de la soste nibilidad se solicitará ponderar a los productores en la propuesta de 
etiquetado de sostenibilidad que propondrá la UE?  
 
Reply:  The sustainability labelling framework would govern sustainability -related consumer 
information on food products related to the environmental, social and/or economic dimensions of 
sustainability.  
 
Pregunta 8  
¿Cómo espera la UE avanzar en una propuesta de etiquetado de sostenibilidad sin generar barreras 
no-arancelarias para terceros países?  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Reply:  Within the work on the impact assessment for the framework legislation for sustainable food 
systems (FSFS), compatibility with WTO rules and other international commitments is assessed and 
will be duly taken into account in the context of any decision.  
 
Pregunta 9  
¿Considerará la UE esquemas de reconocimiento de equivalencias con terceros países en su 
propuesta de etiquetado de sostenibilidad?  
 
Reply:  Given the framework nature of the framework legislation for a sustainable food system 
(FSFS), issues rela ted to the possible recognition of equivalence of third country schemes would be 
considered later in the context of subsequent acts.  
 
Pregunta 10  
Respecto del etiquetado de sostenibilidad que planea proponer la Comisión Europea, ¿quién se 
espera que cargu e con el costo de esta implementación? ¿Se está considerando seguir adelante con 
esta propuesta, en un contexto de aumento de la inseguridad alimentaria mundial y de excesiva 
volatilidad en el precio de los alimentos, conforme a los últimos informes de la Organización de las 
Naciones Unidas para la Alimentación y la Agricultura (FAO)?  
 
Reply:  Within the work on the impact assessment for the framework legislation for a sustainable 
food system (FSFS), impacts on costs for food business operators and on food p rices are assessed 
and will duly be taken into account in the context of any decision.  
 
• Capítulo 4.3 Forestry: acerca de la cuestión relativa a la Deforestación, en particular en los 
párrafos 4.107, 4.108, 4.109, 4.110, 4.111:  
4.107.  Forest policy is not explicitly mentioned in the EU treaties, but a number of shared 
competences, such as climate, environment, rural development, and disaster prevention, relate to 
forests, meaning that within these areas, forests and forestry do not fal l within the exclusive 
competence of member States. As key initiative under the European Green Deal, the Commission 
published an EU Forest Strategy for 2030 in 2021. The new strategy presents six areas of 
intervention covering sustainable forest use; prote cting, restoring, and enlarging EU forests; 
monitoring; research and innovation; forest governance; and the enforcement of existing 
regulations.  
 
4.108.  Support to the forestry sector, focusing on the environmental dimension, has been provided 
under the RD Ps and will be covered from 2023 under the CAP strategic plans (Section  4.1.2.2), while 
Horizon Europe provides support to research and innovation activities relevant for forestry.  
 
4.109. Imports of timber and timber products into the European  Union  are regulated by the EU 
Timber Regulation (EUTR) based on due diligence requirements for operators to prevent illegal 
timber to be placed on the market, applicable to domestic and imported products. According to the 
Forest Law Enforcement, Governance & Trade (F LEGT) regulation, imports of forest products from 
partner countries that voluntarily have become a FLEGT partner country (currently only Indonesia) 
require a FLEGT licence based on a nationally established verification system. To avoid administrative 
duplication, under the Timber Regulation such licences are considered as demonstrating compliance 
with national legal requirements and therefore sufficient for due diligence purposes under the EUTR.  
 
4.110. Going beyond these regulations affecting trade in ille gally cut timber, the European 
Parliament and the Council, in December 2022, reached a provisional agreement on a regulation 
proposed by the Commission in 2021, aiming to prevent deforestation and forest degradation 
associated with commodities and products  placed on or exported from the EU market. It focuses on 
creating a level playing field, minimizing the use of products from supply chains associated with 
deforestation or forest degradation, and increasing demand for "deforestation -free" products. The 
proposed regulation would cover wood as well as products such as cocoa, coffee, oil palm, cattle, or 
soya grown on former forest areas that were deforested after December 2020.  
 
4.111. Replacing and repealing the EUTR, the proposed new regulation builds on bo th the EUTR and 
FLEGT regulations, which both underwent a fitness check evaluation in 2020. The proposed 
regulation would require products to be (i)  "deforestation -free" (produced on land that was not 
subject to deforestation or forest degradation after 31  December  2020); (ii)  produced in compliance 
with national laws ("legality"); and (iii)  accompanied by due diligence statements. It would therefore 
build on and strengthen the existing due diligence and monitoring systems contained in the EUTR WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 regarding th e legal status of timber but adding the requirement of products being 
"deforestation -free". Wood covered by a FLEGT licence would continue to be considered as having 
met the legality requirement.  
Teniendo en consideración que para el Benchmarking (riesgo país) – Sistema de evaluación 
comparativa de los países de origen, la norma propuesta indica en su Artículo 27 que la identificación 
de países de bajo y alto riesgo o partes de los mismos se basará  en una evaluación objetiva y 
transparente por parte de la Comisión, y teniendo en cuenta la evidencia científica más reciente y 
fuentes reconocidas internacionalmente:  
 
Pregunta 11  
¿Cuáles serán las fuentes de información que utilizará la UE para la evaluación de los criterios, 
establecida en el Artículo 27?  
 
Reply:  Pursuant to Art.  29(3) of the Regulation (see Texts adopted - Deforestation Regulation - 
Wednesday, 19 Ap ril 2023 (europa.eu) ), the risk assessment will take into account the latest 
scientific evidence and internationally recognised sources. The European Commission is currently 
developing the methodology that will underpin t he country risk assessment. Third countries and 
stakeholders will be duly informed about the methodology in the context of the Multi -stakeholder 
Deforestation Platform.  
 
Pregunta 12  
Las fuentes de información y los criterios a evaluar, ¿serán definidos de  común acuerdo con el país 
a ser evaluado? ¿Los criterios y fuentesserán ajustados a cada realidad nacional?  
 
Reply:  The list of criteria is described in Article  29 of the Regulation, see Texts adopted - 
Deforestation Regulation - Wednesday, 19 April 2023 (europa.eu) . The assessment of the European 
Commission must take into ac count the criteria defined in Article  29.3 and may also take into account 
a range of other criteria described in Article  29.4. The methodology that will underpin the risk 
assessment is currently under development.  
 
Pregunta 13  
¿Cómo evaluará y verificará la UE la objetividad, veracidad, certeza o exactitud de la información 
que provean terceros países, y organizaciones de la sociedad civil?  
 
Reply:  Countries that are, or risk being classified, as high risk will have the opportunity to engage 
in a dialogue with the European Commission, according to Art.  29(5), see Texts adopted - 
Deforestation Regulation - Wednesday, 19 April 2023 (europa.eu) . In the context of this dialogue, 
third countries will have the opportunity to express their views on the assessment and provide 
further information.  
 
Pregunta 14  
¿Qué derecho a oposición y/o réplica tendrá un país a ser evaluado, en relación a las fuent es 
utilizadas y la evaluación realizada?  
 
Reply:  Art. 29(5) ( see Texts adopted - Deforestation Regulation - Wednesday, 19 April 2023 
(europa.eu) ) mandates the European Commission to engage in dialogue with countries that are, or 
risk to be classified, as high risk. This dialogue will allow third countries to express their views on 
the assessment and share further  information.  
 
Pregunta 15  
Respecto del criterio de evaluación "tendencias de producción de las materias primas pertinentes y 
de los productos pertinentes", teniendo en cuenta que actualmente existen enfoques, manejos y 
tecnologías que incrementan la produ cción (intensificación sostenible de la producción) sin necesidad 
de expandir la superficie agropecuaria, ¿cómo espera la UE vincular este criterio de evaluación a los 
enfoques basados en tecnologías y el buen manejo que permiten aumentar los rindes por he ctárea 
en agricultura y aumentar los índices productivos en ganadería?  
 
Reply:  Please note joint reply to question 15 and 16.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Pregunta 16  
Respecto del criterio de evaluación "degradación forestal": considerando que el Reglamento incluye 
una definición sob re degradación forestal que no está acordada ni consensuada internacionalmente, 
¿bajo qué condiciones y parámetros y en base a qué elementos se identificará, verificará y medirá 
objetivamente este criterio? ¿El concepto de "degradación forestal" se aplicar á para todos los 
productos o sectores incluidos en el reglamento o solo al sector de la madera y los productos 
fabricados o que contengan madera?  
 
Reply to Question 15 and 16:  The methodology underpinning the country risk assessment is 
currently being developed by the European Commission and will be presented in future meetings of 
the Multi -Stakeholder Deforestation Platform and other relevant meetings.  
 
Pregunta 17  
¿Cómo consi derará la UE las legislaciones de terceros países que permiten la "deforestación legal" 
bajo evaluaciones de impacto previas? ¿Qué criterios serán utilizados para evaluar las políticas, 
proyectos y normativas forestales de estos países? ¿Cómo evaluará la U E los beneficios 
medioambientales de esas políticas? ¿Cómo considerará los enfoques de "compensación" de la 
deforestación legal permitidos?  
 
Reply:  The list of criteria is described in Article  29 of the Regulation, see Texts adopted - 
Deforestation Regulation - Wednesday, 19 April 2023 (europa.eu) . The assessment of the European 
Commission must take into account the criteria defined in Arti cle 29.3 and may also take into account 
a range of other criteria described in Article  29.4. The methodology that will underpin the risk 
assessment is currently under development.  
 
Pregunta 18  
¿Qué criterios deberán cumplir las sanciones aplicadas por terceros países para ser consideradas 
suficientemente severas a fin de asegurar el "enforcement"  de las leyes nacionales?  
 
Reply:  Please note joint reply to question 18 and 19.  
 
Pregunta 19  
¿Qué criterios de transparencia aplicará la UE para evaluar la información disponible en materia de 
derechos humanos, derechos de las poblaciones indígenas y comu nidades locales sobre tenencia 
consuetudinaria de tierras (incluyendo el principio del "consentimiento libre, previo e informado", 
establecido en la Declaración de las Naciones Unidas sobre los Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas)?, 
¿Cuál será la información  verificable (documentación específica a presentar), y qué criterios o 
indicadores considerará la UE en su evaluación sobre estos aspectos?  
 
Reply to Question 18 and 19:  The list of criteria is described in Article  29 of the Regulation, see Texts 
adopted - Deforestation Regulation - Wednesday, 19 April 2023 (europa.eu) . The assessment of the 
Commission must take into account the criteria de fined in Article  29.3 and may also take into account 
a range of other criteria described in Article  29.4. The methodology that will underpin the risk 
assessment is currently under development. Stakeholders and third countries will be duly informed 
about it s specificities through the Deforestation Multi -Stakeholder Platform.  
 
Pregunta 20  
¿Qué tipo de acuerdos e instrumentos internacionales que aborden la deforestación o la degradación 
forestal y faciliten el cumplimiento de esta norma serán tenidos en cuenta ? 
 
Reply:  The list of criteria is described in Article  29 of the Regulation, see Texts adopted - 
Deforestation Regulation - Wednesday, 19 April 2023 (europa.eu) . The assessment of the European 
Commission must primarily take into account the criteria defined in Article  29.3 and may also 
consider a range of other criteria described in Article  29.4. Among the criteria in Article  29(4), the 
European Commission may also consider agreements and other instruments between third countries 
and the European  Union  and/or its Member States that address deforestation and forest degradation 
and facilitate compliance of relevant commodities and relevant products and their effective 
implementation. The methodology that will underpin the risk assessment, including how the criteria 
of Article  29(4) will be considered and their weight in the overall assessment of the level of risk, is 
currently under  development.  Stakeholders and third countries will be duly informed about its 
specificities through the Deforestation Multi -Stakeholder Platform.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Pregunta 21  
¿Cuál será la importancia relativa de cada tipo de acuerdo?, ¿Tendrá la misma validez o peso en l a 
evaluación los acuerdos establecidos a nivel de los Estados Miembro o prevalecerán los establecidos 
con el bloque por terceros países?  
 
Reply:  The list of criteria is described in Article  29 of the Regulation, see Texts adopted - 
Deforestation Regulation - Wednesday, 19 April 2023 (europa.eu) . The assessment of the 
European  Commission must take into account the criteria defined in Articl e 29.3 and may also take 
into account a range of other criteria described in Article  29.4. The methodology that will underpin 
the risk assessment is currently under development.  Stakeholders and third countries will be duly 
informed about its specificities  through the Deforestation Multi -Stakeholder Platform.  
 
Pregunta 22  
¿Qué tipo de prácticas deberán estar contenidas en estos acuerdos para considerar que cumplen con 
el Reglamento y favorecen su implementación?  
 
Reply:  The list of criteria is described in Article  29 of the Regulation, see Texts adopted - 
Deforestation Regulation - Wednesday, 19 April 2023 (europa.eu) . The assessment of the European 
Commission must take into account the criteria defined in Article  29.3 and may also take into account 
a range of other criteria described in Article  29.4. The methodology that will underpin the risk 
assessment is currently under development.  
 
Pregunta 23  
¿En qué consistirá el dialogo específico que promoverá la UE con países que exportan al mercado 
comunitario que podrían ser clasificados de "alto riesgo"? ¿Cómo y cuándo la UE definirá los países 
con los cuales establecerá este diálogo? ¿La UE dispondrá asimismo de un diálogo con los países 
que exportan al mercado comunitario que podrían ser clasificados de "mediano riesgo"?  
 
Reply:  The European Commission will engage in a dialogue with countries that are, or ris k being 
classified, as high -risk, pursuant to Art.  29(5) with the objective to reduce their level of risk. In the 
context of this dialogue, the country concerned may provide the European Commission with 
information on the measures taken to remedy this situ ation. High risk countries will be identified no 
later than 18 months after the entry into force of the Regulation, thus before the Regulation starts 
being applied. The risk -specific dialogue is foreseen only for countries that might fall within the 
high-risk category. The European Commission will engage with other producing and consuming 
countries, through the partnerships and cooperation tools defined in Art.  30. 
 
Pregunta 24  
¿Qué tipo de información deberá proveer el país en cuestión bajo el diálogo espe cífico de "alto 
riesgo", o eventualmente de "mediano riesgo"? ¿Cómo se elaborarán los mecanismos a través de 
los cuales se busca reducir el riesgo? ¿Quién los financiará? ¿Qué tipo de monitoreo de estos 
programas se prevé establecer?  
 
Reply:  The Regulation foresees a specific dialogue only with countries that are, or risk being classified 
as 'high risk'. The methodology for risk classification is currently being developed by the 
European  Commission. Stakeholders and third countries will be du ly informed about its specificities 
through the Deforestation Multi -Stakeholder Platform.  
 
Pregunta 25  
Con relación a los Acuerdos Multilaterales de Medio Ambiente (AMUMA) y particularmente en relación 
a la evaluación de las contribuciones determinadas a n ivel nacional sobre sus emisiones y secuestro 
de carbono y el uso del suelo en el sector agropecuario y silvicultura en el marco de uno de esos 
AMUMA, como lo es la Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático, ¿cómo 
prevé la UE evalua r a nivel bilateral los criterios establecidos en los AMUMAs?  
 
Reply:  The list of criteria is described in Article  29 of the Regulation, see Texts adopted - 
Deforestation Re gulation - Wednesday, 19 April 2023 (europa.eu) . The assessment of the European 
Commission must take into account the criteria defined in Article  29.3 and may also take into account 
a range of other criteria described in  Article  29.4. The methodology that will underpin the risk 
assessment is currently under development. Stakeholders and third countries will be duly informed 
about its specificities through the Deforestation Multi -Stakeholder Platform.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Pregunta 26  
¿Cómo pre vé la UE exigir que terceros países y terceras partes provean informaciones que no están 
previstas en losAMUMA?, ¿Qué beneficio tendrán los terceros países por proveer dicha información?  
 
Reply:  The list of criteria is described in Article  29 of the Regula tion, see Texts adopted - 
Deforestation Regulation - Wednesday, 19 April 2023 (europa.eu) . The assessment of the European 
Commission must take into account the criteria defined in Article  29.3 and may also take into account 
a range of other criteria described in Article  29.4. The methodology that will underpin the risk 
assessment is currently under development.  Information no t provided for in MEAs can be shared in 
the context of the dialogue that the European Commission will start with countries that are, or risk 
to be classified as, high risk. Sharing this information would benefit the overall assessment of the 
European Commi ssion and might contribute to the objective of reducing the level of risk of the 
country concerned.  Stakeholders and third countries will be duly informed about its specificities 
through the Deforestation Multi -Stakeholder Platform.  
 
Pregunta 27  
¿Qué tipo de informaciones serán solicitadas a los gobiernos del país evaluado?  
 
Reply:  Please note joint reply to question 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, and 33.  
 
Pregunta 28  
En cuestiones relativas a información brindada por terceros países, ¿cómo se determinará quién es 
una autoridad nacional competente?  
 
Pregunta 29  
Respecto de otras terceras partes interesadas, ¿cuáles son los criterios para determinar quiénes 
pueden ser consideradas terceras partes interesadas?  
 
Pregunta 30  
Respecto de los operador es, ¿la opinión de qué tipo operadores será tenida en consideración y cómo 
será medida su representatividad (por ejemplo, será por volumen de negocio)?  
 
Pregunta 31  
¿Cuáles serán las ONG consideradas "habilitadas" para emitir opinión?  
 
Pregunta 32  
¿Cómo s eleccionará la UE las instituciones o representantes de la sociedad civil a ser consultados?  
 
Pregunta 33  
Teniendo en consideración a los pueblos indígenas y las comunidades locales, ¿qué nivel de 
representatividad será requerido para considerar a un dete rminado colectivo como representativo?  
 
Reply to Questions 27 – 33: The methodology underpinning the country risk assessment is currently 
being developed by the European Commission and will be presented in future meetings of the 
Multi-Stakeholder Deforestation Platform and other relevant meetings.  
 
Pregunta 34  
¿Reconocerá  la UE como equivalentes las medidas medioambientales contra la deforestación 
adoptadas por terceros países exportadores que, aunque pudieran ser diferentes al Reglamento de 
la UE, cumplen los mismos propósitos? ¿Cómo reconocerá la UE las certificaciones e mitidas por esos 
terceros países?  
 
Reply:  All efforts to strengthen the sustainability of commodity production in partner countries are 
welcome. The more robust these standards become, and the more aligned they are with the 
requirements of the Regulation, the easier it will be for operators  to prove that the commodities they 
are importing are compliant with the Deforestation Regulation. Traceability protocols and schemes 
can be used by supply chain members to help their risk assessment to the extent the sch emes cover 
the information needed to comply with their obligations under the Regulation.  
 
• Capítulo 4.4 Energy, 4.4.1 Sustainable energy and climate: se abordan las cuestiones de 
Energía, Sostenibilidad y Ambiente. Puntualmente, en el párrafo  4.116, se puede leer: "In the 
revised Renewable Energy Directive, the European Union has also established a target for a WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 renewable energy share of at least 32% of gross final consumption by 2030. The Directive also 
establishes a minimum share per member S tate, applicable since 2021. In 2021, the Commission 
proposed to increase this target to 40%, with the REPowerEU Plan proposing to increase this target 
further (Section 4.4.5). At the same time, the biodiversity strategy aims to limit the use of whole 
trees, food, or feed crops for energy. In mid -2022, based on a Commission Delegated Regulation, 
labelling of investments in gas and nuclear power plants, subject to strict conditions, was included 
in the EU taxonomy for sustainable activities (Section 4.5.1.2. 4) that favour the transition to a 
carbon -neutral economy with effect from January 2023. At the end of 2022, the Council agreed to 
faster permit -granting processes for renewables (Section 4.4.5)"  
 
El Artículo 26.2 último párrafo de la RED II propone prevé que, a más tardar el 
1 de septiembre  de 2023, la Comisión revisará a partir de los mejores datos científicos disponibles 
los criterios establecidos en el acto delegado (Reglamento Delegado 2019/807) que determina las 
materias primas con riesgo elevado de c ambio indirecto del uso de la tierra (CIUT) para las que se 
observe una expansión significativa de la superficie de producción en tierras con elevadas reservas 
de carbono.  
 
Por su parte, el Reglamento Delegado 2019/807 que complementa la Directiva RED II incluye la 
variable del cambio indirecto del uso del suelo (ILUC, en sus siglas en inglés) concepto que ha sido 
ampliamente cuestionado por la Argentina al tratarse de un modelo que intenta medir las emisiones 
causadas por ILUC, ya que resulta difícilmente  medible y demostrable. El Reglamento establece una 
metodología indirecta para clasificar las materias primas para producir biocarburantes, biolíquidos y 
combustibles de biomasa y determinar su determina el nivel de alto riesgo de ILUC cuando se 
observa un a expansión global significativa de estos los cultivos de materias primas para producir 
biocarburantes que supere una expansión del 10% hacia tierras con elevadas reservas de carbono, 
esta materia prima se clasifica como alto riesgo de ILUC. Hasta ahora so lo el aceite de palma ha 
sido clasificado como materia prima de "alto riesgo de ILUC", con un valor de 40%. La soja se 
encuentra debajo del umbral con un valor de 8%.  
 
Pregunta 35  
Siguiendo los criterios ILUC establecidos en el Reglamento Delegado (UE) 20 19/807 que 
complementa la Directiva (UE) 2018/2001, ¿cuál es el estado actual de los debates sobre la posible 
revisión y su alcance? ¿Cuándo espera la Comisión presentar el informe final?  
 
Reply:  According to the Renewable Energy Directive (Directive (EU) 2018/2001), the EU is required 
to review the criteria for determining high ILUC -risk crops by September 2023. This opportunity will 
be used to also update the report on feedstock expansion.  
 
Pregunta 36  
El Reglamento Delegado 2019/807 de la Comisión entien de que "la metodología más apropiada, 
objetiva e imparcial en esta fase del proceso regulador se considera que es la basada en la posición 
global mundial con respecto a cada materia prima en particular, en lugar de un enfoque que 
discrimine entre países co ncretos". En ese respecto, ¿es posible para la UE introducir un "enfoque 
país específico para certificar materias primas de bajo riesgo de ILUC", es decir, determinar el nivel 
de ILUC teniendo en cuenta una expansión nacional significativa de estos cultivo s en lugar de una 
expansión global significativa, y que en la fase actual, el proceso normativo europeo ha evolucionado 
con respecto a 2019 y el enfoque de cada país prevalece sobre la posición global mundial, siendo el 
mejor ejemplo la normativa de la UE sobre certificación de la deforestación, que sigue un enfoque 
que distingue entre países concretos y, aún más, por zonas de producción? ¿Si una materia prima 
obtenida en una zona de producción específica cuenta con una certificación específica sobre 
defore stación, entonces cumple el reglamento específico que aplica el enfoque por países concretos, 
y este reglamento específico prevalece sobre el enfoque general?  
 
Reply:  Indirect land -use change (ILUC) occurs when the cultivation of crops for biofuels displac es 
traditional production of crops for food and feed purposes. Such additional demand increases the 
pressure on land and can lead to the extension of agricultural land into areas with high -carbon stock, 
such as forests, wetlands and peatland, causing addit ional greenhouse gas emissions. Given the 
global integration of the markets for agricultural commodities, these effects can take place anywhere 
in the world. The ILUC -risk of a food and feed crops therefore cannot not be determined at country 
level. Howeve r, measures can be taken to address ILUC by improving the way crops are grown. For 
this purpose, the EU's Renewable Energy Directive (RED) introduced the concept of low ILUC risk 
certification. Low ILUC certification addresses ILUC risks by requiring that the additional crop WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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demand for biofuel production is met by additional crop production, which is achieved due to 
productivity increases.  This approach still holds and is not related to the EU Deforestation Regulation.  
 
• Con relación al Mecanismo de Ajuste en Frontera al Carbono (CBAM, por sus siglas en inglés), 
en particularlos siguientes párrafos:  
o 2.9. To support the implementation of its new trade strategy, in 2021 the Commission 
submitted proposals for regulations to the Parliament and the Coun cil (Chart  2.2), including 
measures to counteract foreign practices considered as unfair or coercive.  
o 2.10. The proposed measures include: (…) a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) 
for imports of certain goods (i.e. aluminium, cement, iron and stee l, fertilizers, electricity, and 
hydrogen) (area of action No.  2); 
 
Y, teniendo en consideración al párrafo 4.114 "In 2021, the European Commission published the 
Fit-for-55 package, aiming to ensure EU policies align with the climate -related goals of the E uropean 
Green Deal and the Climate Law, which includes an intermediate target of 55% GHG emission 
reduction by 2030 and becoming climate -neutral by 2050 (Section 1). The package contains the 
Fit-for-55 communication as well as 16 energy - and climate -relate d legislative proposals that are 
currently in various stages of discussion. The proposals relating to energy primarily focus on emission 
reductions through multiple channels such as, inter alia , phasing out coal, accelerating the roll -out 
of renewables, in creasing energy efficiency, and decarbonizing gas across various industries. The 
package also includes proposals to increase and broaden targets for emissions reductions; revise 
the Emissions Trading System, including expanding it to other sectors and comp lementing it with 
the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism; and establish a Social Climate Fund to cushion the impact 
of the introduction of the emissions trading in the building and road transport sectors on the 
vulnerable. Member States will be required to  update their national energy and climate plans by  2023 
and 2024, and to publish a national Social Climate Plan" . 
 
Pregunta 37  
Con relación a los plazos de aplicación del mecanismo de Ajuste en Frontera al Carbono (CBAM , por 
sus siglas en inglés) previstos en la propuesta comunitaria y teniendo en cuenta la inexistencia de 
tiempo suficiente y la escasez de financiamiento para que los países en desarrollo puedan adaptarse 
a esta medida, ¿podría la UE informar si está cons iderando que el dinero recaudado a través del 
CBAM, o parte de él, sea destinado a un fondo para asistir a estos países en la implementación de 
medidas de adaptación y de mitigación climática, en vez de que vayan al presupuesto general del 
bloque?  
 
Reply:  The Regulation establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism (Regulation 2023/956) 
was published in the EU Official Journal on 16  May 2023 (Please find link: EUR-Lex - 32023R0956 - 
EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu) . The European Commission will, after consultation of the CBAM 
Committee, adopt an implementing act regulating the transitional per iod of CBAM starting on the 
1 October  2023 and which notably specifies the reporting obligations for importers. The 
European  Commission will publish the draft implementing regulation for feedback by stakeholders 
for a period of four weeks before the CBAM C ommittee (whose members are Member States 
representatives) renders its opinion on it.  
 
The CBAM is a climate measure and has not been designed with a view to generating revenues. 
Should EU's trade partners increase their climate ambition by decarbonising their industry or by 
introducing carbon pricing measures, CBAM revenues will decline. In the long run, they may even 
go to zero.  
 
The EU has built in a transitional period in CBAM, which will give trading partners, including 
developing countries, time to p repare. To take into account their specific needs, the EU will continue 
to support Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in targeted ways, such as through technology transfer, 
technical and financial assistance, with the objective of developing industrial produ ction structures 
that are compatible with long -term global climate objectives.  
 
To this end, the EU will continue in its role as one of the biggest contributors to climate financing in 
developing countries and LDCs. The EU is determined to help developing countries and LDCs making 
this transition but has to make sure that it does so i n a WTO compatible manner, without bending 
the existing multilateral rules.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Pregunta 38  
¿Podría la UE informar si, teniendo en cuenta estas dificultades, existe la posibilidad de que se 
celebren "acuerdos de reciprocidad" con países que ya implementan un  régimen de comercio de 
derechos de emisión, impuesto al carbono o mecanismo similar?  
En caso afirmativo ¿cuál sería el enfoque que se tendrá en cuenta?, Es decir, ¿se exigirá el mismo 
enfoque que el europeo, creando un "mercado" de derechos de emisión?  
En caso de que se puedan realizar estos acuerdos, ¿cuál sería el marco en el que deberían 
celebrarse? ¿Es decir, si deberían ser independientes de acuerdos que ya existen o se deberían 
enmarcar en un acuerdo marco previo de cooperación económica, TLC o aso ciación, y en tal caso, 
si se prevé un diálogo específico en la materia?.  
 
Reply:  Recognition of all third country approaches to reduce carbon emissions is built in CBAM. 
Regarding carbon pricing mechanisms, the CBAM  Regulation ensures that carbon prices effectively 
paid in a third country will be deducted from CBAM charge due, after the end of the transitional 
period. A carbon price could be paid under different mechanisms: a carbon emissions reduction 
scheme, in the  form of a tax, levy or fee or in the form of emission allowances under a greenhouse 
gas emissions trading system. If importers can prove, based on information from their third country 
producers, that a carbon price has already been paid in the country of production of the imported 
goods and that no compensation or rebate applies on export, the corresponding amount can be 
deducted from their final bill.  
 
During the transitional period starting in October 2023, importers of goods covered by the Regulation 
will notably have to report on direct and indirect emissions as well as on the carbon price which may 
be paid in the country of origin. These reports will inform the European Commission's work on further 
implementing acts, notably regarding taking into acco unt a carbon price paid in third countries (in 
line with Article  9 of the Regulation) . 
 
The European Commission is open to receive information from its international partners on the 
carbon price paid by their exporters for goods under the scope of the CBAM  Regulation, so as to 
better understand their carbon pricing mechanisms and effectively take them into consideration after 
the end of the transitional period.  
 
Pregunta 39  
¿Tiene previsto la Comisión Europea, sea a través de DG TAXUD u otro organismo que designe, 
institucionalizar algún tipo de diálogo con sus socios comerciales, para facilitar la aplicación de este 
mecanismo?  
 
Reply:  The European Commission, in conjunction with the European External Action Service and 
EU Delegations around the world, will  launch an information campaign, featuring online seminars, 
physical events, distribution of guidance documents, and direct assistance, aimed at assisting 
third country operators and importers to the EU in performing all new obligations required by the 
CBAM Regulation and its secondary legislation. The campaign will start mid 2023 upon the approval 
of the implementing act concerning the reporting rules applicable in transitional period. This will 
continue through autumn 2023 thus supporting all relevant act ors for the entry into force of the 
Regulation in October 2023.  
 
Pregunta 40  
Respecto de la tecnología que algunas industrias ya tienen en sus instalaciones con relación a la 
captura de carbono, ¿se tendrá en cuenta la emisión total de CO2 emitido o el ne to entre el emitido 
y capturado?  
 
Reply:  Now that the Regulation establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism 
(Regulation  2023/956) was published in the EU Official Journal on 16  May 2023 (please find link: 
EUR-Lex - 32023R0956 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu) ), the European Commission will, after consulting 
EU Member States (CBAM  Committee), adopt the implementing act regulating the transitional period 
of CBAM starting on the 1st of October 2023, which notably specifies the reporting obligations for 
importers of CBAM goods, including on how Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions removals for Carbon 
Capture and Storage (CCS) and Carbon Capture and Utilisation (CCU) can be deducted from the 
embedded emissions to be reported. The net effect due to carbon capture technologies will be taken 
into account in the embedded emissions methodology the  same way it is in the EU ETS.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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In view of its adoption, the European Commission will publish the draft implementing regulation in 
the course of June 2023 for feedback on the Have your say (europa.eu)  website, from all partner 
countries and stakeholders, for a period of four weeks before the CBAM Committee renders its 
opinion on it.  
 
The European Commission will use the information gathered du ring the CBAM regulation transitional 
period in view of adopting another implementing act defining the final methods for calculating 
embedded emissions (under Article  7 of the Regulation) before the end of the transitional period 
31 December  2025. The adop tion of this additional implementing act will follow a similar adoption 
procedure, including consultation of stakeholders.  
 
Pregunta 41  
¿Con relación a los "verificadores neutrales", sujetos que según la normativa tienen a su cargo 
verificar la información provista por los productores de terceros países a los importadores de la UE 
en relación a las emisiones por producto, deberán los mismos estar en la UE, o podrán las 
autoridades de aplicación de terceros países tener un rol en esta verificación ? 
 
Reply:  Accredited verifiers will not necessarily have to be established in the EU but will have to be 
accredited by EU national accreditation authorities. The specifications relating to the accreditation 
process in the context of CBAM are to be enshrine d in secondary legislation before the end of the 
transitional period (see Article  18(2) of the Regulation). Accreditation of international verifiers under 
CBAM will thus be possible in the definitive CBAM regime, as from 2026. These verifiers will have to 
offer adequate guarantees of objectivity and impartiality.  
 
• Acuerdos Regionales y Preferenciales (párrafo 2.3.2) 2.3.2.1.3 RTA enforcement y 2.38 
"During this period, the Commission also reviewed and updated its 2018 action plan  on the 
implementation and  enforcement of the Chapters on Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) in 
EU RTAs.  The new strategy was published in June 2022 and seeks to strengthen the role of TSD 
chapters and, more broadly, of EU RTAs in promoting "green and just economic growth".  To this 
end, the strategy identifies the following policy priorities: (i)  be more proactive in the cooperation 
with partners; (ii)  pursue a country -specific approach to identify TSD priorities; (iii)  extend 
sustainability considerations to other chapters of trade agreements; (iv)  improve the monitoring of 
the implementation of TSD commitments; (v)  reinforce the role of civil society; and (vi) strengthen 
the enforcement of TSD commitments by,  inter alia, extending the application of the RTA's dispu te 
settlement mechanism to these provisions. These priorities are to be integrated in ongoing and 
future negotiations. In this regard, the Commission indicates that the forthcoming EU -New Zealand  
RTA is the first EU RTA that foresees the possibility of tem porary sanctions (e.g. suspension of trade 
concessions) in case of non -compliance with a ruling regarding the violation of core 
TSD commitments (i.e. the ILO fundamental principles and rights at work, and the Paris Agreement 
on Climate Change)".  
Teniendo e n consideración que los capítulos de TSD (Comercio y Desarrollo Sostenible) permiten 
vincular los Acuerdos de Libre Comercio con otras iniciativas autónomas de la UE (como las iniciativas 
de debida diligencia, el Mecanismo de Ajuste de Carbono en Frontera,  el Reglamento de 
Deforestación, entre otros) que se aplicarán a todos los proveedores de la UE, tanto si su comercio 
está o cubierto o no por un Acuerdo de Libre Comercio:  
 
Pregunta 42  
¿Podría la UE precisar cuál es el vínculo entre los distintos instru mentos autónomos de la UE y los 
Acuerdos de Libre Comercio?  
 
Reply : The Free Trade Agreements concluded by the EU with its partners all contain provisions on 
the creation of Committees and dialogues. These Committees and dialogues can then serve as a 
forum  for cooperation on any trade related issues, including for example autonomous trade 
measures, provided that there is an agreement between the Parties.  
 
Pregunta 43  
¿Qué esquemas de cooperación tiene previsto aplicar la UE para ayudar a sus socios comerci ales a 
alcanzar las exigencias impuestas en la normativa autónoma para acceder al mercado de la UE? 
¿Cuál será, si lo hubiera, el tratamiento especial al que podrían aspirar los socios comerciales?  
 
Reply:  The EU already took action to help its trading par tners to comply with the most relevant 
European Green Deal legislation. The EU has been a role model for transparency of its WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 European  Green Deal measures through public consultations, impact assessments and outreach 
from early regulatory processes in diffe rent fora in the EU and outside (in Brussels, through the EU 
delegations in partner countries, in the WTO in Geneva and via bilateral dialogues). The EU has 
engaged in the WTO and bilaterally with countries and tried to address their concerns as far as the y 
allowed maintaining objectives pursued by its policies. The EU will continue dialogue and 
engagement with its trading partners including for the measures that entered into force and ensuing 
implementing acts and decisions, in the WTO and bilaterally.  
 
More importantly, the EU is collectively the biggest donor for international aid in the world, providing 
over EUR  50 billion  a year to help overcome poverty and advance global development. We also 
continue to support partner countries in their green transit ion, in line with our international 
commitments. Through the EU's Global Instrument (Neighbourhood, Development and International 
Cooperation Instrument – NDICI), we have so far committed about EUR  27.8 billion  in support of 
climate objectives in our partner countries for the period of 2021 -27.  
 
In December 2021, the EU launched the Global Gateway, a new strategy to mobilise investments 
totalling EUR  300 billion  over the period 2021 -27. In line with the EU's co mmitment to the 2030 
Agenda, the Global Gateway aims at boosting smart, clean and secure investments in digital, energy 
and transport.  
 
Pregunta 44  
¿Qué medidas de creación de capacidades y qué instrumentos de apoyos prevé la UE poner a 
disposición para a yudar en la implementación de los compromisos en materia de TSD?  
 
Reply:  Based on the particular context, country priorities and needs, the EU pays close attention to 
aligning its Aid for Trade to support implementation of commitments under trade agreement s. More 
than one third of global Aid for Trade in 2020 was provided by the EU and its Member States. A 
significant share of this is directly or indirectly supporting trade and sustainable development in 
partner countries, based on the priority area of "str onger focus on the social and environmental 
dimensions of sustainability, together with inclusive economic growth", of the EU Aid for Trade 
strategy of 2017.  
 
Pregunta 45  
¿Cómo prevé la UE implementar sistemas de monitoreo y sanciones por incumplimiento en el marco 
de los Capítulos de Comercio y Desarrollo Sostenible bilaterales, que no están en la esencia misma 
del compromiso asumido por los socios comerciales en el marco de Acuerdos Multilaterales 
voluntarios?  
 
Reply:  The multilateral agr eements in the field of labour or environment serve as a compass for 
sustainable development commitments in EU trade agreements. The firm anchoring of bilateral 
TSD commitments in the multilateral context makes the EU's TSD approach legitimate, credible an d 
effective, and ensures that TSD commitments reinforce global efforts. While cooperation and 
dialogue remain the watchwords for TSD, the EU now proposes the possibility of trade sanctions as 
a matter of last resort in instances of serious violations of co re TSD commitments. Moreover, the 
dispute settlement rules for TSD disputes ensure that the provisions of TSD chapters are 
implemented in a manner that promotes the coherence with the multilateral agreements and 
governance.  
 
• Párrafo 2.10, de la Sección 2 .2 Formulación y objetivos de la política comercial, se menciona, 
entre las medidas propuestas por la Comisión para apoyar la implementación de la nueva estrategia 
comercial de la UE, un instrumento anti -coerción para contrarrestar la coerción económica de  
terceros países a través de medidas que afectan el comercio o la inversión – Propuesta de la 
Comisión Europea COM (2021) 775 final.  
 
Pregunta 46  
¿Podría la UE comentar bajo qué disposición de los Acuerdos de la OMC se legitimaría la adopción 
de medidas restrictivas del comercio o de la inversión con fines anti -coerción?  
 
Reply:  The anti -coercion instrument concerns specific behaviour, notably econ omic coercion, which 
is not addressed by the WTO  Agreement .  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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As regards action under the instrument, any EU measure must and will be compatible with 
international law, of which the WTO  Agreement  is a part. Hence the instrument and action under the 
instrum ent will also be consistent with the EU's international obligations, among which feature the 
EU's WTO obligations.  
 
Evidently, this instrument will not be a means to short circuit WTO dispute settlement. It will not be 
a means to impose countermeasures to  respond to a manifest breach of the WTO rules. There are 
multilateral rules on this, to which the EU is subject.  
 
• Párrafo 2.11 se describe que el Reglamento (UE) 654/2014 modificado habilita a la UE a aplicar 
medidas compensatorias (suspensión de conces iones arancelarias) en caso de no llegarse a una 
recomendación final como resultado de la parálisis actual del Órgano de Apelación.  
Pregunta 47  
¿Cómo explicaría la UE la consistencia con el Artículo 23 del ESD de una suspensión unilateral de 
concesiones a nte la hipótesis de una determinación favorable a la UE, pero apelada por el Miembro 
demandado?  
 
Reply:  When making mandatory the use of the dispute settlement in the WTO, Article  23 of the DSU 
presupposes the functioning of that system. Without a function ing WTO dispute settlement process 
either through an effective appeal mechanism or an ad hoc  arbitration arrangement, Article  23 of 
the DSU  does not have the effect of allowing WTO Members to disrespect their WTO obligations and 
of prohibiting enforcement action by other WTO Members whose rights are infringed. This is where 
the updated Regulation 654/2014 makes a difference: the EU would alwa ys use to the maximum 
possible degree independent adjudication as way of dispute settlement, and would hold off any trade 
sanctions while this process is functioning. Where that process is blocked because there is no agreed 
ad hoc  arbitration appeal arrang ement, the EU is not prevented by Article  23 from insisting that its 
rights under the WTO  Agreement  be respected by the other party.  
 
Pregunta 48  
¿Cuál sería la posición de la UE ante un socio comercial que suspenda concesiones en el marco de 
una controve rsia pendiente de resolución final?  
 
Reply:  The same as the EU's position in the reverse scenario. It would depend on the reasons for 
the trading partner to suspend concessions. The EU would always use to the maximum possible 
degree independent adjudicatio n as way of dispute settlement. Therefore, a trading partner would 
not have reasons to suspend concessions where independent adjudication is available or made 
available by the parties.  
 
• Dentro de la Sección 2.3.2.1.3 Aplicación de los ACR, en particular en el párrafo 2.37 se 
mencionan medidas adoptadas por la UE para reforzar el cumplimiento de los compromisos asumidos 
por sus socios comerciales en el marco de los ACR y de cualquier otro acuerdo o arreglo comercial 
incluso a nivel multilateral, entre ellas, el establecimiento en 2020 de un "nuevo mecanismo de 
presentación de reclamaciones, la ventanilla única, por medio del cual las partes interesadas 
establecidas en la UE pueden presentar  reclamaciones por incumplimiento de los compromisos en 
materia de acceso a los mercados y sostenibilidad (de haberlos) contraídos en el marco de la OMC, 
un ACR o el régimen del SPG".  
Pregunta 49  
¿Puede la UE dar más precisiones sobre este nuevo mecanismo  de presentación de reclamaciones, 
en particular: qué partes interesadas pueden usarlo, procedimiento que deben seguir y tratamiento 
que se le da a la reclamación?  
 
Reply:  Under the guidance of the Chief Trade Enforcement Officer ('CTEO'), the Single Entry  Point 
(SEP) coordinates the assessment of the complaints that any EU business operator/organisation or 
Member State can submit and sets up 'case teams', which consist of the experts relevant for the 
specific case for which a complaint has been received. ( Please find link: Single Entry Point | 
Access2Markets (europa.eu) ) The SEP works on the basis of complaint forms – one related to market 
access issues and one on TSD/GSP -related issues. The complaint forms, which can be submitted 
directly on Access2Markets [1], are designed to provide the Directorate -General for Trade o f the 
European Commission with enough information to conduct a first assessment of the issue and decide 
on follow up action accordingly. If substantial information is missing from the complaint, the SEP 
will engage directly with the complainant and collect  the lacking information.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Once complete, the appointed case team will assess the complaint and suggest appropriate follow -
up actions to solve the issue. If the SEP does not receive an official complaint, the European 
Commission still reserves the right t o take action by its own initiative – the so -called ex -officio 
process.  
 
[1]  In some cases the complaint leads to a registration of a new barrier to DG TRADE market access 
data base. These barriers will then be followed up with a view of resolving them vi a bilateral and/or 
multilateral channels. In other cases, the complaint will not lead to registration of a new barrier as 
the subject of the complaint had already been registered as a barrier earlier or as it was not deemed 
to be a barrier.  
 
Pregunta 50  
A los fines de este mecanismo, ¿qué se entiende por "compromisos en materia de sostenibilidad" ? 
 
Reply:  Sustainability commitments refer to the commitments taken by the EU and its trading 
partners under the Trade and Sustainability Chapters of the bilateral  trade (and investment) 
agreements.  
 
• Párrafo 2.38 se menciona que "el ACR entre la UE y Nueva Zelanda, que entrará en vigor 
próximamente, es el primer ACR de la UE que prevé la posibilidad de imponer sanciones temporales 
(por ejemplo, la suspensión de co ncesiones comerciales) en caso de incumplimiento de una 
resolución relativa a la vulneración de los compromisos centrales en materia de comercio y desarrollo 
sostenible (es decir, los principios y derechos fundamentales en el trabajo de la OIT y el Acuerdo  de 
París sobre el cambio climático)."  
Pregunta 51  
¿Podría la UE explicar cómo funciona este mecanismo, en particular, qué concesiones comerciales 
pueden suspenderse y cómo se determina el nivel de suspensión de concesiones?  
 
Reply:  The EU will apply to TSD disputes the same dispute settlement rules that already apply to 
the other chapters of EU trade agreements. Therefore, it will apply the same kind of trade sanctions 
for TSD violations, for those violations that can lead to sancti ons as the last resort, as for other FTA 
violations. These consist of the temporary suspension of trade concessions, normally tariff 
preferences. TSD trade sanctions will be applied as a measure of last resort. They will be temporary 
and proportionate, tha t is, calculated in proportion to the nullification or impairment caused by the 
TSD violation.  
 
• Dentro de la Sección 3.1.6 Medidas antidumping, compensatorias y de salvaguardia, el 
párrafo  3.90 menciona que la principal legislación de medidas comerciales  correctivas de la UE no 
ha cambiado sustancialmente desde las modificaciones introducidas en 2017 y 2018.  
Pregunta 52  
¿Podría explicar si la constatación realizada por ese Grupo Especial en el asunto DS494 con relación 
al "método de ajuste de costos" es tenida en cuenta actualmente por la autoridad investigadora o si 
sigue aplicando dicho método?  
 
Reply:  The decision has been appealed by the EU and therefore is not final.  
 
• En el párrafo 3.91 se explica que en las modificaciones del Reglamento antidumping de base, 
introducidas en 2017 y 2018, se incluyeron normas sociales y medioambientales que la Comisión 
puede tener en cuenta al seleccionar un país representativo adecuado p ara reconstruir el valor 
normal no distorsionado y calcular el margen de daño.  
Pregunta 53  
Mientras las normas sociales aparecen expresamente mencionadas en el Reglamento antidumping 
de base, no es el caso de las normas medioambientales, ¿puede la UE pre cisar cuáles son esas 
normas medioambientales que la Comisión puede tener en cuenta?  
 
Reply:  Regarding multilateral environmental agreements the text is not exhaustive. For example, it 
could concern the commitments to reduce CO2 emissions under the Paris A greement.  
 
Pregunta 54  
¿Qué significa "valor normal no distorsionado" y qué relación existe, si es que hay alguna, entre el 
mencionado "valor normal no distorsionado" y el valor normal definido en el artículo 2.1 del 
Acuerdo  Antidumping?  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Reply:  The definition of normal value in the EU Anti -dumping legislation reflects that of the 
WTO ADA. There is no term 'undistorted normal value' in the EU anti -dumping legislation. The 
EU legislation provides for when it is not appropriate to use domestic pric es and costs in the 
exporting country to establish normal value due to the existence in that country of significant 
distortions which occur when reported prices or costs, including the costs of raw materials and 
energy, are not the result of free market fo rces because they are affected by substantial government 
intervention.  
 
Pregunta 55  
¿De qué manera se tienen en cuenta las normas sociales y ambientales al seleccionar un país 
representativo adecuado para reconstruir el valor normal no distorsionado?  
 
Reply: The issue of social and environmental standards in selecting an appropriate representative 
country is taken into account when there is more than one country (who have the available data 
allowing for the construction of normal value on the basis of undi storted prices and costs) from which 
to choose. Where it is relevant for the selection of the representative country, the EU takes into 
account the ILO conventions and relevant Multilateral Environmental Agreements ratified in the 
countries.  
 
Pregunta 56  
¿Considera la UE que el art. 2.6 bis. a), del Reglamento 2016/1036 es compatible con el art. 2.2 del 
Acuerdo AD? ¿Podría la UE explicar la eventual consistencia?  
 
Reply:  As the EU has clarified in several regulations imposing anti -dumping measures based on  
Article  2(6a), the EU considers that the provisions of Article  2(6a) are fully consistent with the 
European  Union 's WTO obligations.  
 
• Por otra parte, el art. 7.2 quinquies del Reglamento 2016/1036 prevé que cuando se 
establezca un precio indicativo se tendrán en cuenta los costos futuros que afrontará la industria de 
la Unión, durante el período de aplicación de la medida, resultantes de los acuerdos 
medioambientales multilaterales de los que es parte o de los Convenios de la OIT.  
Pregunta  57 
¿Cómo se asegura la UE de que el precio indicativo resulte comparable frente a terceros países cuya 
industria exportadora no cuenta con apoyo gubernamental para asumir los costos resultantes de 
medidas ambientales y laborales?  
 
Reply:  The target price,  which is a non -injurious price, is calculated in order to determine an injury 
margin. This is based on the full cost of production and a target profit. This cost of production 
includes costs incurred relating to compliance with multilateral environmental agreements and 
International Labour Organisation Conventions during the lifetime of TDI measures. This does not 
involve Government support.  
 
Pregunta 58  
¿Podría la UE explicar cómo operaría dicha disposición en el marco de un examen por expiración de 
medidas? (artículo 11 del Acuerdo Antidumping)  
 
Reply:  Please note that Question 58 and 59 are answered together.  
 
Pregunta 59  
En un examen por expiración de medidas, ¿la UE haría un nuevo cálculo del margen de dumping y 
del daño dejando fuera las consideraciones relativas a "costos futuros de la industria" o haría una 
actualización de tales costos para un nuevo período de cinco años?  
 
Reply:  In an expiry review, the EU calculates dumping and injury, on the basis of updated 
information, in order to establish whether or not dumping and injury is continuing or likely to, if the 
measures were to expire. This calculation is based on an update of all re levant costs. However, an 
expiry review cannot lead to a change in the level of the duties imposed.  
 
• En la Sección 2 Régimen de Comercio e Inversión, 2.2 Formulación y objetivos de la política 
comercial, en el párrafo 2.7 se menciona que la nueva políti ca comercial de la UE, está guiada por 
los principios del comercio justo y abierto, considerándolo instrumental para la prosperidad 
económica, aunque sigue un enfoque diferente en relación a sus interacciones con terceros países. WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Asimismo, en el párrafo 2. 9 y 2.10 agrega que para apoyar la aplicación de su nueva estrategia 
comercial, en 2021 la Comisión presentó al Parlamento y al Consejo propuestas de reglamentos en 
las que se incluían medidas para contrarrestar las prácticas extranjeras consideradas desle ales o 
coercitivas, entre las que enumera al Mecanismo de Ajuste en Frontera al Carbono (CBAM, por sus 
siglas en inglés) para las importaciones de determinadas mercancías.  
Pregunta 60  
¿Podría la UE comentar cómo conciliará esta capacidad autónoma de procu rar el cumplimiento de 
obligaciones bajo acuerdos internacionales, en especial, los Acuerdos Multilaterales de Medio 
Ambiente y los mecanismos multilaterales de revisión y cumplimiento acordados en cada uno de 
ellos?  
 
Reply:  The EU is developing environmen tal and climate action policies in a way that achieves the 
environmental objectives and minimizes impact on trade, all the while taking into account the EU's 
international obligations, including under Multilateral Environmental Agreements and WTO rules.  
 
Pregunta 61  
¿Cómo la UE conciliaría este nuevo principio -guía de su política comercial, y las propuestas de 
Reglamentos de Aplicación (como el CBAM, el Reglamento "Libre de Deforestación" y otros) en 
particular, con el principio de responsabilidades comune s pero diferenciadas y respectivas 
capacidades, adoptado a nivel multilateral en la Declaración de las Naciones Unidas de Río sobre el 
Medio Ambiente y el Desarrollo (1992) y asimismo reafirmado en la Agenda 2030 de las Naciones 
sobre el Desarrollo Sosteni ble (2015) y receptado en distintos acuerdos multilaterales, incluyendo 
la Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático  – CMNUCC - y su Acuerdo 
de París?  
 
Reply:  The EU is committed to fully respecting its international commitments. In  fact, Article  216(2) 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European  Union  states that "[a]greements concluded by the 
Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its Member States" . In line with its 
commitment to effectively implement the  Paris Agreement, reflecting the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in the light of different national 
circumstances, the EU is determined to implement policies and measures reflecting its highest 
possible a mbition in order to contribute to global efforts to limit temperature rise to 1.5C, and 
expects all parties to the Paris Agreement to do the same. The EU climate and environmental policies 
are also designed in compliance with the WTO rules.  
 
Besides, spec ifically regarding the CBAM, the EU has carefully assessed the potential impact on third 
countries, in particular LDCs. Our studies show that exports from LDCs to the EU in the sectors 
covered by the CBAM are limited. The design of the CBAM also took poten tial concerns on board, for 
example through a long transitional period. This comes in addition to significant financial support 
package and capacity building programmes assisting developing countries in their green transition.  
 
• En el párrafo 19 el informe indica que, en el período objeto de examen, la importancia de las 
políticas en materia de energía y clima cobró un nuevo impulso en la UE gracias al cambio hacia la 
energía renovable y con bajas emisiones de carbono, el refuerzo de la seguridad ene rgética y la 
reducción de las emisiones para lograr la neutralidad climática. El paquete de medidas "Objetivo 55" 
de 2021 aspira a armonizar estas políticas con los objetivos climáticos previstos en el Pacto Verde 
Europeo y la Legislación europea sobre el clima, lo que incluye objetivos de reducción de las 
emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero. El paquete de medidas contiene muchas iniciativas de 
política centradas en reducir las emisiones a través de diversos canales de la oferta y la demanda, 
por ejemp lo, complementando el Régimen de Comercio de Derechos de Emisión con el Mecanismo 
de Ajuste en Frontera al Carbono.  
Pregunta 62  
¿En qué medida considera la UE que la iniciativa de un Mecanismo de Ajuste en Frontera al Carbono 
(CBAM, por sus siglas en inglé s) cumple con las reglas de la OMC, en particular con las disposiciones 
del artículo II del GATT?  
 
Reply:  CBAM is an environmental policy tool to support the EU's increased ambition on climate 
mitigation by preventing carbon leakage, while ensuring WTO com patibility.  
 
CBAM will ensure that an equivalent carbon price will be paid by domestic and imported products. 
Article  216(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European  Union  states that "[a]greements  
concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its Member States" . WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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This obligation applies equally to the WTO  Agreement . Consequently, the EU always assesses 
the WTO compatibility of its legislation, including autonomous regu lations.  
 
Pregunta 63  
¿Podría la UE explicar cuál será el destino de los fondos que se recaudarían en concepto del CBAM?  
 
Reply:  In line with the answer to a previous question on revenues, it should be stressed again that, 
as a climate measure, the CBAM was not designed to generate revenues. Should EU's trade partners 
increase their climate ambition by decarbonising their industry or by introducing carbon pricing 
measures, CBAM revenues will decline. In the long run, they may even go to zero.  
 
To avoid new global dividing lines between partners with a low and high -carbon export structure, 
the EU will continue in its role as one of t he biggest contributors to climate financing globally 
continuing to support partners, in particular LDCs and neighbours in targeted ways, such as through 
technical assistance, technology transfer, extensive capacity building and financial support. The 
objective is to develop industrial production structures that are compatible with long term climate 
goals.  
 
Pregunta 64  
¿La UE prevé mecanismos y plazos más flexibles para los países en desarrollo en la implementación 
del Mecanismo de Ajuste en Frontera al Car bono?  
 
Reply:  The CBAM does not distinguish between categories of third countries but applies to goods in 
certain sectors. To provide businesses and third countries with legal certainty and stability, a 
monitoring and reporting system will apply from 1  October 2023 until the end of 2025, giving 
sufficient time for the administrative set up to be put in place. This transitional period will facilitate 
a careful, predictable and proportionate transition for EU and non -EU business, and give trading 
partners, in cluding developing countries, time to prepare.  
 
• En el párrafo 2.7 el informe explica que la UE es una firme defensora desde hace mucho 
tiempo del comercio abierto y equitativo, y lo considera fundamental para la prosperidad económica. 
Su nueva política s igue guiándose por esos principios, pero adopta un enfoque diferente respecto de 
las interacciones con terceros países. En ella, la UE propone aumentar su capacidad de actuar de 
manera autónoma, en caso necesario, para promover sus intereses en esferas est ratégicas. Este 
principio rector se denomina "autonomía estratégica abierta" y se define como la intención de la UE 
de cooperar multilateralmente en lo que pueda y de actuar de manera autónoma en lo que sea 
necesario. Con este nuevo enfoque, la UE se propo ne, entre otras cosas, abordar las crecientes 
preocupaciones que suscita la dependencia de la UE de terceros en determinados ámbitos 
considerados de importancia estratégica y las repercusiones en su capacidad de adoptar decisiones 
y hacer cumplir las oblig aciones de terceros en el marco de acuerdos internacionales.  
Pregunta 65  
¿En qué casos ha considerado la UE actuar de manera "autónoma"?  
 
Reply:  As set out in the European Commission strategy entitled "An Open, Sustainable, and Assertive 
Trade Policy" the concept of open strategic autonomy emphasises the EU's ability to make its own 
choices and shape the world around it through leadership and enga gement, reflecting its strategic 
interests and values. The concept of "open strategic autonomy" therefore reflects the EU's 
fundamental belief that addressing today's challenges requires more rather than less global 
cooperation. It further signifies that t he EU continues to reap the benefits of international 
opportunities, while assertively defending its interests, protecting the EU's economy from unfair 
trade practices and ensuring a level playing field. Finally, it implies supporting domestic policies to 
strengthen the EU's economy and to help position it as a global leader in pursuit of a reformed 
rules-based system of global trade governance.  
 
Concrete examples of autonomous actions include the Foreign Subsidies Regulation ('FSR') which 
entered into for ce on 12  January  2023. This new set of rules addressing distortions caused by foreign 
subsidies will allow the EU to remain open to trade and investment, while ensuring a level playing 
field for all companies operating in the Single Market. This Regulation  proposes new tools to 
effectively tackle foreign subsidies that cause distortions and undermine the level playing field in the 
internal market. Similarly, the EU is in the process of adopting a regulation on deforestation -free 
products. Once adopted and a pplied, the new law will ensure that a set of key goods placed on the WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 226 - 
 
  
 EU market will no longer contribute to deforestation and forest degradation in the EU and elsewhere 
in the world.  
 
Pregunta 66  
¿Podría explicar bajo qué criterios la UE determina la "im portancia estratégica" de terceros 
mercados? ¿Podría brindar ejemplos concretos al respecto?  
 
Reply:  There are multiple factors that can lead the EU to identify certain third country markets as 
strategic. Economic factors, such as the size of the market an d its growth perspectives are taken 
into consideration. But the role of these third countries markets in relation to the achievement of 
the strategic priorities of the EU (both economic and geopolitical), for instance as regards the green 
and digital trans ition together with their contribution to EU's open strategic autonomy also represent 
factors that need to be taken into account.  
 
Pregunta 67  
¿Podría indicar de qué manera la UE pretende hacer cumplir las obligaciones de terceros en el marco 
de acuerdos internacionales?  
 
Reply:  The EU can resort either to bilateral dispute settlement procedures in its bilateral trade 
agreements, or use the WTO dispute settlement mechanism with WTO member countries in so far 
as relevant obligations under the WTO  Agreement  are concerned.  
 
• En el párrafo 2.16 el informe refiere a la negociación de un acuerdo global sobre el acero y el 
aluminio sostenibles para abordar la cuestión de la sobrecapacidad en esas industrias y facilitar la 
reducción de las emisiones de carbono en sus procesos de producción.  
Pregunta 68  
¿En qué consiste el acuerdo mencionado?  
 
Reply:  The Global Sustainable Arrangement (GSA) on steel and aluminium will encourage low -carbon 
intensity steel and aluminium production and trade, a nd restore market -oriented conditions globally 
and bilaterally. Together, the EU and the US will incentivize emission reductions in these 
carbon -intensive sectors. (Link to the text of the EU -US Joint Statement of 10  March  2023: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_23_1613 ). 
 
Pregunta 69  
¿Cuándo entrará en vigor?  
 
Reply:  On 10  March  2023, President von der Leyen and President Biden reiterated the strong EU -US 
commitment to achieving an ambitious outcome for the Global Sustainable Arrangement (GSA) on 
steel and aluminium (GSA) negotiations by 31  October  2023.  (Link to the text of the EU -US Joint 
Statement  of 10 March  2023:  
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_23_1613 ). 
 
• En el párrafo 2.48 el informe indica que, en agosto de 2020, la UE y los Estados Unidos, su 
principal interlocutor comercial, acordaron reducir los derechos sobre una base NMF a un número 
limitado de productos de interés mutuo. En virtud de este acuerdo, la UE eliminaría los aranceles 
aplicad os a las importaciones de productos de langosta vivos y congelados (es decir, cuatro líneas 
arancelarias al nivel de 8 dígitos), a condición de que los Estados Unidos redujeran los derechos (a 
la mitad) sobre determinadas harinas de pescado preparadas, vaj illas de cristal, productos de 
tratamiento de superficie, cargas propulsoras, mecheros, y partes de mecheros (es decir, seis líneas 
arancelarias al nivel de 8 dígitos). Los compromisos de la UE también están supeditados a que los 
Estados Unidos no introduz can nuevas medidas contra la UE que socavarían los objetivos de "crear 
un comercio transatlántico más libre, justo y recíproco". Estas reducciones arancelarias entraron en 
vigor en diciembre de 2020. Se aplicaron retroactivamente a partir de agosto de 2020  y expirarán 
en julio de 2025.  
Pregunta 70  
¿Este acuerdo entre la UE y Estados Unidos tiene una vigencia limitada?, y en ese caso, ¿a qué 
condiciones está sujeta la prórroga del mismo?  
 
Reply:  On 10  March  2023, President von der Leyen and President Biden reiterated the strong EU -US 
commitment to achieving an ambitious outcome for the Global Sustainable Arrangement (GSA) on WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 227 - 
 
steel and aluminium (GSA) negotiations by October 2023. (Link to the text of the EU -US Joint 
Statement of 10  March  2023:  
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_23_1613 ). 
 
• En el párrafo 2.50 el informe indica que la UE y Canadá firmaron en junio de 2021 una 
asociación estratégica sobre las materias primas con miras a diversificar a sus proveedores y 
fortalecer sus cadenas de suministro. La asociación se basa en los diálogos bilaterales sobre las 
materias primas que se establecieron en el marco del ACR entre la UE y el Canadá. Más 
recientemente, en agosto de 2022, el Canadá y Alemania firmaron una declaración conjunta de 
intención relativa al establecimiento de una Alianza del  Hidrógeno entre el Canadá y Alemania para 
facilitar el comercio bilateral de hidrógeno, que prevé, entre otras cosas, que el Canadá exportará 
hidrógeno a Alemania para 2025.  
Pregunta 71  
¿En qué consiste específicamente el acuerdo para facilitar el comercio bilateral con Canadá en 
materia de hidrógeno?  
 
Reply:  To date, there is no specific bilateral agreement on trade of hydrogen between the EU and 
Canada.  
 
The report refers also to the strategic association (it should read strategic partnership) on  raw 
materials signed on 2021, building on the bilateral commodity dialogues/cooperation on raw 
materials established under the EU -Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). 
To date, neither the strategic partnership on raw materials signed on 2021, nor other bilateral 
commodity dialogues established under the CETA cover hydrogen.  
 
The EU is promoting the development of rules -based, transparent, and undistorted global hydrogen 
markets based on reliable international standards and certificatio n schemes. In this context, the EU 
is assessing together with Canada the potential for renewable hydrogen trade, e.g. via working 
groups or studies.  
 
• En el párrafo 3.6, el informe indica que se introdujo la ventanilla única de importación (IOSS) 
con el f in de simplificar la declaración y liquidación del IVA sobre las ventas a distancia de envíos de 
escaso valor procedentes de terceros territorios y terceros países. La IOSS puede utilizarse para las 
mercancías importadas cuyo valor no exceda de EUR  150 y r equiere el registro de una interfaz 
electrónica establecida en la Unión Europea, o de un intermediario establecido en la UE. Para los 
casos en que no es posible utilizar la IOSS, la UE ha introducido regímenes especiales que 
constituyen otro medio de simpl ificación. Estos regímenes especiales se adaptan a los operadores 
postales y las empresas de transporte urgente que completan las declaraciones en nombre de los 
clientes.  
Pregunta 72  
¿En qué casos no el posible utilizar la IOSS?  
 
Reply:  The scope of the special scheme IOSS is limited to distance sales of goods in consignments 
of an intrinsic value not exceeding 150 EUR at the time of supply, imported from third territory or a 
third country into the EU and dispatched or transported to cust omers in the EU. (Article  369l – 369 x 
of the Council Directive 2006/112/EC (VAT Directive)).  
 
In addition, goods subject to EU harmonised excise duty are excluded from the IOSS. These goods 
are typically alcohol or tobacco products according to Article  2(3) of the Council 
Directive  2006/112/EC (VAT Directive).  
Pregunta 73  
¿Podría indicar si este régimen se encuentra operativo en todos los Estados Miembro de la UE?  
 
Reply:  Yes, the IOSS is implemented in all Member States.  
 
• En el párrafo 3.7 el informe describe que la UE inició un proceso de consultas para reformar 
el marco aduanero con el fin concreto de crear un marco más sólido para proteger a los ciudadanos 
y el mercado único. Invitó a las empresas y demás partes interesadas a formular propuestas has ta 
el 14 de septiembre de 2022, tras lo cual está previsto que se presente una propuesta en el primer 
semestre de 2023.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Pregunta 74  
¿Podría indicar a grandes rasgos en qué consiste la reforma que planea realizar la UE al marco 
aduanero y cuáles son los pl azos previstos para el proceso de reforma?  
 
Reply:  The European Commission adopted the customs reform proposal on 17  May 2023. Further 
information can be found in https://taxation -customs.ec.europa.eu/customs -4/eu-customs -
reform_en . 
 
The legislative proposals will now be sent to the co-legislators, the European Parliament and the 
Council of the European  Union , for agreement.  
 
• En el párrafo 3.18 el informe indica que los Estados miembros de la UE ratificaron el Acuerdo 
sobre Facilitación del Comercio (AFC) de la OMC en 2015 y eran Pa rtes en él cuando entró en vigor 
en 2017. Desde el inicio del período objeto de examen y a lo largo de todo él, la Comisión y los 
Estados miembros apoyaron la aplicación y proporcionaron donaciones, asistencia técnica, apoyo 
para la creación de capacidad y  otras ayudas a los Miembros en desarrollo y los PMA Miembros de 
la OMC. La información más reciente sobre la asistencia y el apoyo prestados que se ha presentado 
al Comité de Facilitación del Comercio muestra que la UE ha ayudado a 139 países a través de 
iniciativas bilaterales o regionales. El gasto total presupuestado era de EUR  447 millones para 
iniciativas regionales y de EUR  368,4 millones para programas para un solo país. En las notificaciones 
presentadas durante el período 2017 -2021 se facilita info rmación detallada sobre la asistencia de 
los Estados miembros en materia de facilitación del comercio.  
Pregunta 75  
¿Podría describir en detalle en qué consistió la ayuda brindada?  
 
Reply : The EU and its Member States contribution to trade facilitation has fluctuated between 
EUR 200 and EUR  250 million  a year for the last three years for which data is available 2018 -2020. 
The European Commission gave itself a specific threshold for the Mult iannual Financial Framework 
(MFF) 2014 -20 to dedicate EUR  240 million  for trade facilitation over the time of the MFF. The 
cumulative value from 2014 -2019 was EUR  423,7  million , by far exceeding the commitment to WTO 
at a time of signature of the Trade Fac ilitation Agreement (TFA). The EU and its Member States have 
been providing aid for trade facilitation at global, regional and national level. At global level, the EU 
is one of the main contributors to the Trade Facilitation Support Program (TFSP), managed  by the 
World Bank. This programme was launched in June 2014 to assist developing countries in aligning 
their trade practices with the World Trade Organization Trade Facilitation Agreement (WTO TFA). 
The programme is designed to provide practical and deman d-driven assistance. Since inception, the 
program has provided TFA implementation support to almost 50 countries, most of which are least 
developed countries. The largest share of countries receiving support are in Sub -Saharan Africa. 
Support is also provi ded to fragile and conflict -affected countries. The TFA Tracking Tool [1] monitors 
progress towards meeting the TFSP's objective of helping countries improve alignment with the WTO 
TFA, as well as for countries to monitor and report on their own progress. Additional details of aid 
provided at regional and country level is provided in the following notification to the WTO: 
G/TFA/N/EU/2/Add.4 of 10  March  2023. Information about the substance of many of these 
interventions is also found in the EU 2022 Aid for Trade report. Please find link:  
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication -detail/ -/publication/c2814529 -8fce-11ed-b508-
01aa75ed71a1/language -en.  
 
[1]  Trade Facilitation Agreement Tracking Tool (tfacountrytrackingtool.org) . 
 
• En el párrafo 3.24 el informe indica que la legislación de la UE en materia de valoración en 
aduana no experimentó cambios significativos durante el período objeto de examen. Sin embargo, 
sí ha habido novedades en la orientación y la práctica de la valoración en aduana de la UE.  
Pregunta 76  
¿Podría indicar cuáles son esas novedades?  
 
Reply:  The developments referred to in paragraph 3.24 are detailed in paragraphs 3.25 and 3.26, 
which are reproduced below for convenience:  
 
In September 2020, the European Commission published a new Guidance documen t on customs 
valuation that provides explanations (not legally binding) on the application of Articles 128, 136, 
and 347 of the UCC IA. It clarifies the sale for export provisions under the transaction value and 
how payments for royalties and licence fees are to be taken into account for the customs value, WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 229 - 
 
among other things. This document was published in the European  Union 's Compendium of customs 
valuation texts.  
 
The Compendium contains all guidance concluded by the European  Union 's Customs Code 
Committ ee and the Customs Expert group – Customs Valuation Section, as well as summaries of 
the Court of Justice of the European  Union  judgements relevant for customs valuation. The guidance 
texts in the Compendium are of an explanatory nature and are not legally  binding. The aim of the 
Compendium is to support the member States' customs administrations and all interested parties in 
the uniform application of the EU customs valuation legislation. The Compendium is updated 
regularly, with the most recent version pu blished in July 2022.  
 
• En el párrafo 3.67 el informe indica que una novedad reciente es la iniciativa IVA en la era 
digital. La Comisión puso en marcha un proceso de modernización del IVA, en particular en materia 
de notificación y facturación electrónic a, tratamiento a efectos del IVA de la economía de plataformas 
y registro único a efectos del IVA en la UE. En enero de 2022 se inició un período de consulta pública 
y en diciembre de 2022 se adoptó una propuesta.  
Pregunta 77  
¿Podría indicar en qué consis te la propuesta, en qué medida afecta a los productos importados y 
cuando entraría en vigor?  
 
Reply:  The VAT in the Digital Age (ViDA) proposal is comprehensive package of reforms, which 
contains a number of connected measures that are designed to reshape and modernise the VAT 
system to the new realities of the digital era. These new measures embrace technology and are 
designed to ensure that the EU VAT system can make a more effective contribution to Member State 
budget, while simplifying the compliance bu rden for businesses. The ViDA proposal contains 
measures addressing three core pillars, namely (i)  Digital Reporting Requirements (DRR) and 
e-invoicing; (ii)  the taxation of the platform economy (passenger transport and short -term 
accommodation services); and a Single VAT Registration (SVR) in the EU. Please see the 
European  Commission's website  for more information in relation to the ViDA proposal.  
 
The first two pillars of the ViDA proposal, (i)  DRR/e -invoicing and (ii)  the taxation of the platform 
economy, do not affect the tax treatment of imported goods into the EU. However, the third pillar 
of the ViDA proposal, which is concerned with advancing the concept of a single VAT registration in 
the EU, includes measures that impact the application of the Import One -Stop Shop (IOSS) scheme. 
Although these particular measures do not impact the tax treatment of imports per se , they do 
improve the effective ness of the IOSS, which was first introduced on 1  July 2021 as part of the EU 
VAT e -commerce package. In this regard, the ViDA proposal aims to:  
 
- clarify that taxable persons who are registered to use the IOSS can make corrections to a 
relevant VAT retu rn up to the deadline of submission of that return.  
- further support and enhance VAT compliance in respect of certain imported goods by making 
the use of the IOSS mandatory for electronic interfaces, such as marketplaces and platforms, when 
they facilita te certain imports of goods to consumers in the European  Union . However, taxable 
persons who operate electronic interfaces and who exclusively facilitate domestic supplies in their 
Member State of establishment fall outside the scope of this measure.  
- better secure the correct use and the verification process of IOSS VAT identification numbers 
by conferring powers on the European Commission to adopt an implementing act to introduce special 
measures to prevent certain forms of tax evasion or avoidance. Such  special measures could involve, 
among others, linking the unique consignment number with the IOSS VAT identification number.  
 
The three measures listed above are expected to enter into force on 1  January  2025.  
 
• En el párrafo 3.84 el informe indica que l a UE los mecanismos de vigilancia para el hierro y 
acero y el aluminio que habían estado en vigor desde 2016 expiraron en mayo de 2020 y quedaron 
sustituidos por un sistema de supervisión descrito como un sistema ex post  basado en datos de 
importación real es comunicados mensualmente. También se indica que se adoptó la vigilancia 
retrospectiva de la Unión respecto a las importaciones de bioetanol en noviembre de 2020. Aunque 
el Reglamento expiró posteriormente, las importaciones de bioetanol siguieron siendo  objeto de una 
supervisión informal.  
Pregunta 78  
¿Podría indicar en qué consiste el mecanismo de supervisión ex post  para el hierro y acero que 
sustituyó al mecanismo de vigilancia vigente desde 2016?  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Reply:  Import monitoring of iron and steel falls under the provisions of articles 55 and 56 of the 
Union Customs Code (UCC)  implementing regulation 2015/2447 (and its ann exes 21 -01 to 21 -03). 
Data elements are extracted from the customs declarations and collected. They relate mostly to the 
nature of the goods, their origin, their value, their net mass and the date of acceptance of the 
concerned declarations.  
 
Pregunta 79  
¿Podría precisar en qué consiste el mecanismo de supervisión informal para el bioetanol?  
 
Reply:  Import monitoring of bioethanol falls under the provisions of articles 55 and 56 of the Union 
Customs Code (UCC)  implementing regulation 2015/2447 (and its ann exes 21 -01 to 21 -03). Data 
elements are extracted from the customs declarations and collected. They relate mostly to the nature 
of the goods, their origin, their value, their net mass and the date of acceptance of the concerned 
declarations.  
 
• El párrafo 3.236 indica que, el Reglamento (UE) 2022/2560, que tiene por objeto corregir a 
las distorsiones causadas por las subvenciones extranjeras en el mercado interior, se adoptó 
en 2022. Uno de los instrumentos que prevé el Reglamento afecta a los procedimiento s de 
contratación pública de cuantía estimada superior a EUR  250 millones. En tales casos, los 
proveedores que participen en las licitaciones estarán obligados a notificar a la Comisión todas las 
contribuciones financieras extranjeras de valor superior a E UR 4 millones por tercer país que hayan 
recibido en los tres años anteriores. Si, después de haber realizado una investigación, la Comisión 
determina que un proveedor ha recibido subvenciones que distorsionan el mercado único, puede 
prohibir la adjudicació n de un contrato a ese proveedor, salvo que este proponga compromisos que 
corrijan plenamente la distorsión causada.  
Pregunta 80  
¿Podría indicar la UE si ha habido casos concretos de investigaciones por subvenciones en materia 
de contratación pública bajo  el Reglamento (UE) 2022/2560? De ser así, ¿podría describir las 
conclusiones de las mismas?  
 
Reply:  Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 has entered into force on 12  January  2023, but it will start to 
apply only as of 12  July 2023. Consequently, no investigations under the Regulation have been 
initiated so far.  
 
• En el párrafo 3.238 el informe indica que la Comisión ha elaborado recientemente criterios de 
contratación pública ecológica voluntarios para varios productos o sectores, como los ordenador es, 
los teléfonos inteligentes o el transporte por carretera, con el fin de facilitar su adopción en los 
pliegos de condiciones de las licitaciones. Aunque se prevén en el Plan de acción para la economía 
circular, por el momento los criterios de contrataci ón pública ecológica obligatorios no se han 
introducido.  
Pregunta 81  
¿Podría describir en qué consisten los criterios ecológicos para la contratación pública elaborados 
por la Comisión Europea?  
 
Reply:  The recommended EU GPP criteria are developed to facilitate the inclusion of green 
requirements in public tender documents. While the adopted EU GPP criteria aim to reach a good 
balance between environmental performance, cost considerations, market availa bility and ease of 
verification, procuring authorities may choose, according to their needs and ambition level, to include 
all or only certain requirements in their tender documents. The criteria are not mandatory, public 
buyer can use them as a basis for their tenders.  
 
Pregunta 82  
¿Podría indicar si la UE prevé en el futuro la obligatoriedad de los mismos en los procesos de 
contratación pública?  
 
Reply:  No, there are no intention to make these recommended EU GPP criteria mandatory but the 
European Commis sion is envisaging to propose minimum mandatory green public procurement 
criteria and targets in sectoral legislation and phase in compulsory reporting to monitor its uptake.  
 
• En el párrafo 4.134 el informe indica que la UE tiene la intención de reforzar  la seguridad 
energética y la resiliencia a partir de una estrategia que aspira a diversificar el suministro de gas de WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 231 - 
 
la UE (así como otras fuentes de energía) apartándose del suministro de la Federación de Rusia, 
desarrollando el comercio de hidrógeno re novable y priorizando el ahorro y la eficiencia energéticos.  
Pregunta 83  
¿A partir de que acciones y/o herramientas la UE prevé diversificar el suministro de gas, así como 
también el desarrollo del comercio de hidrógeno renovable?  
 
Reply:  The REPowerEU Plan (COM(2022)230), which was published on 18  May 2022 sets out how 
the EU plans to save more energy, to produce more clean energy and to diversify its energy imports 
(i.e. natural gas and renewable hydrogen) more in future. For the latest, plea se see the following 
link:  
https://commission.europa.eu/strategy -and-policy/priorities -2019-2024/european -green -
deal/repowereu -affordable -secure -and-sustainable -energy -europe_en  
 
• En los párrafos 4.96 y 4.97 el informe indica que, como respuesta a la pandemia de COVID -19 
y la guerra de Ucrania, se establecie ron determinadas medidas a efectos de aumentar la flexibilidad 
para conceder ayudas relacionadas a las actividades pesqueras.  
Pregunta 84  
¿En qué consisten dichas flexibilidades para conceder ayudas relacionadas a las actividades 
pesqueras? ¿Aún continúan  vigentes? En caso afirmativo, ¿qué plazo se prevé para las mismas, y 
cómo se relacionan con el Acuerdo sobre Subvenciones a la Pesca de la OMC?  
 
Reply:  On 2  April 2020, the European Commission proposed measures to mitigate the 
socio-economic impact of the coronavirus in the fishery and aquaculture sectors. These additional 
measures provided flexibility under the European Maritime & Fisheries Fund (EMFF). Moreover, on 
19 March  2020, the European Commission adopted a specific Temporary Framework for State  aid 
measures to support the economy in the current COVID -19 outbreak. Section  3.1 of the Temporary 
Framework enabled Member States to provide support to economic operators active in the fishery 
and aquaculture sectors hit by the crisis up to a level of €1 20,000 – later increased to €345,000 – 
per undertaking. In all circumstances, aid under the Temporary Framework could only be granted in 
line with the EU's Common Fisheries Policy, i.e. the financing of activities that would have run 
contrary to the sustai nable use of ocean resources was excluded.  
 
Pregunta 85  
¿En qué instancia se encuentra en la UE el proceso de ratificación del Acuerdo sobre Subvenciones 
a la Pesca de la OMC, adoptado en la 12° Conferencia Ministerial de tal Organización en 
junio de 2022? 
 
Reply:  The EU acceptance procedure – on behalf of the 27 EU Member States – has several steps. 
The European Commission made a proposal in November 2022 (document COM(2022)582). The 
European Parliament gave its consent in a plenary vote on 19  April 2023. Finally, the Council of the 
European  Union adopted the Decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the EU, of the Protocol that 
contains the WTO  Agreement  on Fisheries Subsidies on 25  May 2023. The deposit of the instrument 
of the acceptance on behalf of the EU is expected to take place shortly t hereafter.  
 
• En el párrafo 4.107 el informe indica que, como iniciativa clave en el marco del Pacto Verde 
Europeo, la Comisión publicó en 2021 la Nueva Estrategia de la UE en favor de los Bosques 
para 2030. La Nueva Estrategia presenta seis esferas de intervención que abarcan el uso sostenible 
de los bosques; la protección, la restauración y la ampliación de los bosques de la UE; el 
seguimiento; la investigación y la innovación; la gobernanza forestal; y el cumplimiento de las 
normas vigentes.  
Pregunta 86  
¿Podría brindar más precisiones respecto de los objetivos buscados para cada una de las seis esferas 
mencionadas en el marco de la Nueva Estrategia de la UE en favor de los Bosques para 2030?  
 
Reply:  The EU Forest Strategy acknowledges and aims to boos t the entire sustainable forest 
bioeconomy that works in synergy with the EU's increased climate and biodiversity ambition. This 
includes promoting sustainable forest bioeconomy for long -lived wood products, ensuring 
sustainable use of wood -based resources  for bioenergy, promoting non -wood forest -based 
bioeconomy, including ecotourism and developing skills and empowering people for sustainable 
forest -based bioeconomy.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 232 - 
 
  
 In light of climate change and biodiversity loss there is an urgent need for adaptive fo rest restoration 
and ecosystem -based management approaches that strengthen the resilience of EU forests. 
Protecting, restoring and enlarging EU's forests is crucial to combat climate change, reverse 
biodiversity loss and ensure resilient and multifunctiona l forest ecosystems.  
 
Today the information concerning the status of forests in the EU, their social and economic value, 
as well as the pressures they face and ecosystem services they provide, is patchy. There are several 
scattered monitoring and reportin g mechanisms, but no strategic framework, which would bring 
these together and make it possible to comprehensively and jointly with Member States demonstrate 
that the EU is on the right track and that the forests can actually deliver on their multiple dema nds 
and functions. Strategic forest planning in all EU Member States at national and, where applicable, 
regional level, that is based on reliable monitoring and data, transparent governance and 
coordinated exchange at the EU level, is needed for the delive ry on the commonly agreed 
EU objectives can be ensured  
 
Research and innovation are key drivers in achieving the ambitious goals of the Strategy. Research 
and innovation will increase the effectiveness of enhanced sustainable forest management under 
chang ing climate conditions, amongst others, by reinforcing the knowledge on climate change 
impacts, contributing to a greater diversity of forests and genetic resources, and providing 
evidence -based and practically feasible guidance for climate change mitigati on and adaptation in 
line with biodiversity objectives.  
 
The European Commission will propose an EU forest governance system that promotes policy 
coherence and synergies between the different functions a sustainable and climate neutral 
European  economy re quires forests to deliver, and allow for an inclusive space for Member States, 
forest owners and managers, industry, academia and civil society to discuss forest policy matters, 
while avoiding overlapping structures. The Strategy finally describes how the EU will step up the 
implementation and enforcement of the EU acquis of relevance for forests and forest management 
issues.  
 
Please find more details about the Strategy here Forest strategy (europa.eu)  and here:  
Communication: New EU Forest Strategy for 2030 | European Commission (europa.eu) . 
 
• Párrafo 4.78 surge el total de ayuda a la agricultura, incluyendo las intervenciones a los precios 
de mercado, los subsidios, los pagos directos, entre otros: "According to the OECD, the total support 
estimate (TSE) (transfers to the agricultural sector in general) for the EU -28 remained broadly 
constant in nominal terms between 2018 and 2020, increasing marginally from 0.64% of GDP to 
0.66% of GDP. For the EU -27, it is estimated to stand at 0.67% of GDP in 2021, comp ared to an 
OECD average of 0.61%. This corresponds to more than 40% of the sector value added. The OECD 
estimates overall support to agriculture in terms of market outcomes, by estimating the total 
effective transfers to producers as a result of market pri ce interventions (including trade 
restrictions), subsidies, and direct payments, and taking stock of general services provided by the 
Government. These estimates are therefore not directly comparable with domestic support notified 
to the WTO."  
Pregunta 87 
Al respecto, ¿ha considerado la UE la eliminación a las intervenciones a los precios de mercado, 
teniendo en cuenta lo manifestado por la OCDE (OECD 2020, agro -food productivity - sustainability -
resilience policy framework: Revised framework) respecto los e fectos negativos que tienen en el 
medio ambiente los precios de mercado intervenidos?  
 
Reply:  Public intervention is part of the EU Common Agricultural Policy, which has been a subject of 
the reform process over the past decades and will surely continue t o evolve also in the years to 
come, to reflect the changes in the external and internal factors and needs of all the stakeholders, 
including agricultural producers, consumers, and society as a whole. Reforms of the CAP are subject 
to the agreement of the c o-legislators, the Council of the European  Union  and the 
European  Parliament, and will be carried out in compliance with all the relevant international 
commitments of the EU.  
 
Pregunta 88  
¿Considera la UE, como parte de sus medidas para combatir el cambio climático y proteger el medio 
ambiente, la eliminación de sus ayudas a la agricultura, atento lo reportado por la FAO respecto a WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 233 - 
 
la distorsión que dichas ayudas representan para el comerci o y de su efecto perjudicial para el medio 
ambiente?  
 
Reply:  Currently over 85% of EU farm support falls into the "Green box", compared to other major 
trading partners. Such support is not distorting trade, decoupled from production, and with no 
obligation to produce. This is the case for decoupled income support, investment aid, payments 
under environmental programmes (organic, animal welfare), payments under regional assistance 
programmes, general services. The EU payments granted to farmers are linked to clear 
environmental and climate mitigation requirements.  
 
The EU is the only major agricultural producing region which in the last 30 years has both increased 
production and levels of productivity while at the same time reducing – by over 20% – our 
greenhouse gas emissions, and, compared to other major producers,  has achieved better results in 
terms of reduced use of pesticides or antimicrobials.  
 
In 2019, the OECD published a report  "Evaluating the environmental impact of agricultural policies" . 
Decoupled payments were considered as the "least environmental harmf ul".  
 
The UN report on Repurposing agricultural support to transform food systems , also found that most 
of the support  to producers around the world mostly consists of price incentives, such as import 
tariffs and export subsidies, as well as fiscal subsidies which are tied to the production of a specific 
commodity or input. These subsidies are not only trade distortive, t hey also have a negative impact 
on the environment. This report is notably quoting the example of the CAP, showing how agricultural 
policy has been successfully used to diversify agriculture, through incentivized crop diversification.  
 
The EU has reformed substantially its policy and it is willing to contribute its share in reducing trade 
distortions in WTO, pending contributions of other major players, developed and developing alike. 
Our call is therefore for reforms of agricultural policies towards less t rade distortion, which is also 
friendlier for the environment and for the food security challenges: Green Box measures are in 
general terms better, both for the limitation of trade distortions and for the environmental impact. 
This should reinforce the nee d to deliver on the reform process of trade distorting policies towards 
more Green Box type of measures.  
 
Pregunta 89  
¿Ha realizado la UE o piensa realizar un estudio que cuantifique las emisiones contaminantes que se 
derivan de la producción agropecuaria  que realiza apoyada por subsidios agropecuarios?  
 
Reply:  The environmental impact of the CAP is regularly monitored, and all the reports are publicly 
available on Europa website:  
 
• Web page with highlights of the report: CAP performance: 2014 -20 (europa.eu)  
• Report: EUR-Lex – 52021DC0815 – EN – EUR-Lex (europa.eu)  
• Annex  with only graphs (including on CAP):  EUR-Lex - 52021SC0387 - EN - EUR-Lex 
(europa.eu)  
 
It appears that the EU is the only major agricultural producing region which in the last 30 years has 
both increased production and levels of productivity while at the same time reducing - by over 20% 
- our greenhouse gas emissions, and, compared to other major producers, has achieved better 
results in terms of reduced use of pesticides or antimicrobials. The reports highlight the positive 
effect on CAP subsidies on the sustainable management of natural resources and on climate changes 
and greenhouse emissi ons. Of course, there is still room for improvement: the decline in biodiversity 
on farmland slowed down but did not halt. Water quality, soil erosion and ammonia emissions remain 
an issue.  
 
This is why the new CAP 2023 -27 makes a stronger contribution to the goals of the European Green 
Deal, with enhanced environmental requirements and higher environmental and climate a mbitions.  
 
• Párrafos 4.78, 4.88, 4.107, 4.108, 4.109, 4.110, 4.111.  
En la última notificación DS1 de la Unión Europea (G/AG/N/EU/79) del 7 de julio de 2022 se observa 
que destinó 7.961,9 millones de euros en programas ambientales del párrafo 12 del Anexo  2 del 
Acuerdo sobre la Agricultura (AsA). Este monto de ayuda interna estaría vinculado a la última 
notificación DS2 de la Unión Europea (G/AG/N/EU/35) del 8 de febrero de 2017. En dicha notificación WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 DS2 solo se observa una referencia general al párrafo 1 2 del Anexo 2 del AsA en la que se incluyen 
5 puntos; i) Medidas agroambientales y clima; ii) agricultura orgánica; iii) pagos en el marco de 
Natura 2000 y de la Directiva Marco del Agua; iv) pagos a zonas con limitaciones naturales o 
limitaciones espec íficas de otro tipo; v) bienestar de los animales. Sin embargo, no se observa en la 
DS2 una descripción detallada de los programas -como dispone el párrafo 12 del Anexo 2 del AsA -, 
ni una desagregación del gasto por programas ambientales en la DS1.  
Pregunta 90  
¿Cuáles son las actividades o prácticas agrícolas subsidiadas por medio de los programas 
ambientales? ¿Podría describirlas?  
 
Reply : Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013, Articles 28 -33 describe the agricultural activities or measures 
supported through environmental programmes and reported under paragraph 12 of the AoA 
Annex  2. More details for each EU Member states can be found in their Rural  Development 
Programmes 2014 -2020 programming period:  
https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common -agricultural -policy/rural -development/country_en  
 
Pregunta 91  
En el caso de la producción de orgánicos, ¿Cuáles son los requisitos de acuerdo a la normativa 
europea para recibir el subsidio?  
 
Reply : Pursuant to Article  29 of Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013, support under the organ ic farming 
measure can be granted per hectare of agricultural area, to farmers who undertake, on a voluntary 
basis, to convert to or maintain organic farming practices and methods as defined in Regulation (EC) 
No 834/2007 and who are active farmers within the meaning of Article  9 of Regulation (EU) 
No 1307/2013, as applicable in the Member State concerned. Commitments under this measure are 
undertaken normally for a period of five to seven years and granted annually to compensate 
beneficiaries for all or pa rt of the additional costs and income foregone resulting from the 
commitments made. Support is limited to the maximum amounts laid down in Annex  II to 
Regulation  (EU) No 1305/2013.  
 
Pregunta 92  
¿Podría señalar cuál es el vínculo entre cada uno de los prog ramas ambientales y el objetivo de 
protección y conservación ambiental señalado en la normativa europea? Es decir, si se encuentra 
enmarcada en un programa ambiental específico y cuál sería su base científica.  
 
Reply:  Please see the Report from the Europea n Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on the implementation of the common monitoring and evaluation framework including an 
assessment of the performance of the common agricultural policy 2014 -2020:  
https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2021%3A815%3AFIN  
 
Pregunta 93  
¿Cuántos fueron los beneficiarios de cada uno de los programas ambientales en cada uno de los 
años dentro del período de análisis del actual TPR?  
 
Reply:  Please find information in the following table.  
 
Measure    2015  2016  2017  2018  2019  2020  2021  
M10 ( agro-
environmental -
climate)  number of 
contracts 
supported  543.742  1.233.904  1.570.035  1.618.508  1.641.104  1.655.683  1.614.297  
M11 (organic 
farming)  number of 
beneficiaries 
supported  36.653  80.377  101.154  107.43  97.605  120.452  117.459  
M12 (Natura 
2000 and 
Water 
Framework 
Directive)  number of 
beneficiaries 
supported  9.905  26.704  33.907  33.723  32.925  51.944  42.741  
M13 (areas 
facing natural 
constraints)  number of 
beneficiaries 
supported  282.431  350.268  454.143  409.32  444.178  361.753  400.45  
M14 (animal 
welfare)  number of 
beneficiaries 
supported  45.714  55.056  55.624  100.483  57.145  56.679  63.126  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 235 - 
 
Please note that these are multi -annual measures: the same contract/beneficiary may appear 
under several consecutive years. Adding up the annual values may lead to double counting.  
 
Pregunta 94  
¿Cuántas hectáreas se beneficiaron de los programas ambientales en cada uno de los años dentro 
del período de análisis del actual TPR?  
 
Reply:  Please find information about hectares supported:  
 
Measure  Activity  2015  2016  2017  2018  2019  2020  2021  
M10 (agri -
environment -
climate)  Cultivation 
practices – Soil 
cover, ploughing 
techniques, low 
tillage, 
Conservation 
agriculture  2.797.192  2.673.157  2.596.149  2.772.097  2.774.420  2.742.530  2.793.545  
M10 (agri -
environment -
climate)  Farm 
management, 
integrated 
approaches – 
Animal feed 
regimes, manure 
management  624.565  1.152.019  1.688.588  2.356.527  2.598.465  2.356.577  2.611.376  
M10 (agri -
environment -
climate)  Farm 
management, 
integrated 
approaches – Crop 
diversification, 
crop rotation  468.912  1.215.947  1.337.047  1.478.670  1.501.933  1.448.507  1.559.414  
M10 (agri -
environment -
climate)  Irrigation/drainage 
– Reduction of 
drainage, 
management of 
wetlands  19.129  84.133  100.86  108.12  101.406  98.981  78.102  
M10 (agri -
environment -
climate)  Irrigation/drainage 
– Reduction of 
irrigated areas 
and/or irrigation 
rate, irrigation 
techniques  24 3.424  4.171  3.496  5.768  4.776  5.413  
M10 (agri -
environment -
climate)  Management of 
inputs incl. 
integrated 
production 
(reduction of 
mineral fertilizers, 
reduction of 
pesticides) –  3.753.426  3.569.467  3.708.962  4.109.061  4.200.007  4.016.994  4.207.945  
M10 (agri -
environment -
climate)  Management of 
landscape, 
habitats, 
grassland, HNV 
farming – 
Creation, upkeep 
of ecological 
features (e.g. field 
margins, buffer 
areas, flower 
strips, hedgerows, 
trees)  1.377.367  1.308.341  1.303.611  1.292.980  1.296.283  1.320.273  1.299. 899 
M10 (agri -
environment -
climate)  Management of 
landscape, 
habitats, 
grassland, HNV 
farming - 
Maintenance of 
HNV arable and 
grassland systems 
(e.g. mowing 
techniques, hand 
labour, leaving of 
winter stubbles in 
arable areas), 
introduction of 
extensive grazing 
practices, 
conversion of 
arable land to 
grassland.  1.894.287  3.643.230  4.170.308  4.465.933  4.737.820  4.489.98 5 4.736.160  
M10 (agri -
environment -
climate)  others  1.027.535  1.004.081  1.059.901  1.122.912  1.301.930  642.156  1.531.134  
M11 (organic 
farming)    1.219.514  3.293.267  3.880.195  4.694.576  5.106.399  5.161.839  5.624.826  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 236 - 
 
  
 Measure  Activity  2015  2016  2017  2018  2019  2020  2021  
M12 (Natura 
2000 and 
Water 
Framework 
Directive)    122.682  597.391  710.27  636.833  664.95  1.038.791  1.093.363  
M13 (areas 
facing 
natural 
constraints)    26.217.797  16.309.924  17.205.880  16.080.485  19.302.071  18.455.982  18.772.288  
 
Please note that these are multi -annual measures: the same contract/beneficiary may appear 
under several consecutive years. Adding up the annual values may lead to double counting.  
 
Pregunta 95  
¿Cuánta producción, por producto -de acuerdo a la desagregación que realiza la UE en su notificación 
DS1-, se benefició de los subsidios por programas ambientales, en cada uno de los años dentro del 
período de análisis del actual TPR?  
 
Reply:  The Rural Development environmental programmes for 2014 –2020 programming period are 
not linked to output, product ion or quantity of final products. The primary objective of the 
environmental programmes was the preservation of high -value areas, pastures, grasslands, 
mountain areas.  
 
Pregunta 96  
Analizando cada programa en particular, ¿se excluye a algún tipo de productor o producto o región 
de los subsidios dados por cada programa ambiental? En caso afirmativo, ¿Cuáles?  
 
Reply:  The EU Member states have prepared their Rural Development Programmes  (2014 -2020) by 
taking into account their geographical, climatic, agricultural specificity and based on national 
scientific studies. The plans were then subject to detailed assessment by the European Commission 
services and only then approved. For each ind ividual Member state, please see:  
https://agricult ure.ec.europa.eu/common -agricultural -policy/rural -development/country_en .  
 
Pregunta 97  
El inc. B. del párrafo 12 del Anexo 2 del Acuerdo sobre la Agricultura indica que la cuantía del  pago 
se limitará a los gastos extraordinarios o pérdidas de ingresos que conlleve el cumplimiento del 
programa gubernamental.  
¿Cómo calcula la UE monetariamente el gasto extraordinario o la pérdida de ingreso que conlleva el 
cumplimiento de cada uno de lo s programas ambientales? ¿Se calcula a nivel individual, regional o 
está predeterminado? ¿Cómo se calcula el costo de producción ex ante  de la implementación de 
cada uno de los programas ambientales? ¿El subsidio es un pago único o está vinculado a algún 
criterio de variabilidad (por ejemplo, de acuerdo a la cantidad de producción, de ganado, de 
hectáreas, etc.)?  
 
Reply:  This information is contained in the individual Rural Development Programmes:  
https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common -agricultural -policy/rural -development/country_en .  
 
Pregunta 98  
¿Existe un método de control de los compromisos por parte del beneficiario de cada uno de los 
programas ambientales? En caso afirmat ivo, ¿podría detallarlos? ¿Podría indicar la tasa de 
incumplimiento detectada en las auditorías realizadas?  
 
Reply:  The EU has a shared management with its Member States when it comes to the 
implementation and control of the Rural Development programmes (2 014-2022). The controls are 
carried out by the national authorities by means of administrative and field controls, ex-ante and 
ex-post checks.  
 
As part of the annual clearance of accounts procedure, the European Commission services were 
carrying out confo rmity and financial audits in the Member states.  
Please see the legal basis for the controls:  
 
Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17  December  2013 
on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricul tural policy and repealing WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 237 - 
 
Council Regulations (EEC) No 352/78, (EC) No 165/94, (EC) No 2799/98, (EC) No 814/2000, (EC) 
No 1290/2005 and (EC) No 485/2008 . 
 
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 809/2014 of 17  July 2014 laying down rules for the 
applic ation of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with 
regard to the integrated administration and control system, rural development measures and cross 
compliance . 
 
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 640/2014 of 11  March 2014 supplementing 
Regulation  (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the 
integrated administration and control system and conditions for refusal or withdrawal of payments 
and administrative penalties applicable t o direct payments, rural development support and cross 
compliance . 
 
Please see for the non -compliance rates and controls carried out by the EU:  
https://commission.europa.eu/publications/annual -activity -report -2019-agriculture -and-rural-
development_en  
https://commission.europa.eu/publications/annual -activity -report -2020-agriculture -and-rural-
development_en  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/annual -activity -report -2021-agriculture -and-rural-
development_en  
 
Pregunta 99  
¿Existe algún tipo de auditoría o medición para evaluar el impacto ambiental de cada uno de los 
progra mas ambientales? En caso afirmativo, ¿podría detallarlas?  
 
Reply : Please see the Report from the European Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on the implementation of the common monitoring and evaluation framework including an 
assessment of the performance of the common agricultural policy 2014 -2020:  
https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2021%3A815%3AFIN . 
 
Pregunta 100  
 ¿Podría detallar la evaluación realizada mediante la que se ha determinado que estas medidas son 
la forma menos distorsiva de alcanzar los objetivos ambientales?  
 
Reply:  As a reminder, the majority of our CAP support (85%) qualifies as "green box". As suc h, EU 
support has no, or at most minimal, trade -distorting effects or effects on production, in line with 
Annex  2 of the WTO  Agreement  on Agriculture: this is the case for decoupled income support, 
payments under environmental programmes (organic, animal w elfare), payments under regional 
assistance programmes, general services. The EU would like to refer to the 2019 OECD report 
"Evaluating the environmental impact of agricultural policies"  in which Decoupled payments were 
considered as the "least environmen tal harmful".  
 
The environmental impact of the CAP is regularly monitored, and all the reports are publicly available 
on Europa website. See notably:  
 
• Web page with highlights of the report: CAP performance: 2014 -20 (europa.eu)  
• Report: EUR-Lex – 52021DC0815 – EN – EUR-Lex (europa.eu)  
 
Under the new CAP 2023 -2027, the indicators will be monitored through annual perfor mance reports 
and a biannual review of the performance of CAP Strategic Plans to assess the progress of 
EU countries in reaching their targets and the objectives set out in their CAP Plans.  
 
• Párrafo 4.88: "The European Union (including its member States ) remains one of the largest 
providers of fishery subsidies, estimated to having provided USD 3.8 billion of subsidies in 2018, or 
around 11% of global subsidies.100 Of these, USD 2 billion were estimated to be capacity -enhancing, 
including fuel subsidies.  A separate paper estimated the revenue forgone in terms of fuel taxes not 
collected due to fuel tax exemptions (see below) at EUR 1.1 billion in 2018 (around USD 1.3 billion). 
The European Commission pointed out that relevant rules do not allow capacity -enhancing support 
with limited exceptions (see below) and that it does not consider tax exemptions as subsidies."  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 238 - 
 
  
 Pregunta 101  
Respecto de la frase "that it does not consider tax exemptions as subsidies" , ¿podría la UE aclarar 
si la excepción a los impues tos al combustible es específica a la pesca o si abarca otros sectores (por 
ejemplo, aeronáutica comercial)?  
 
Reply:  The applicable legislation is the Energy Taxation Directive (Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 
27 October  2003 restructuring the European Community framework for the taxation of energy 
products and electricity EUR-Lex - 32003L0096 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu) ) This, in Article  14, 
among others, sets out the taxation for energy products supplied for use as fuel for the purpose of 
air navigati on other than in private pleasure -flying, and energy products supplied for use as fuel for 
the purposes of navigation within European Community waters (including fishing), other than private 
pleasure craft, and electricity produced on board a craft. Accord ingly, the fuel taxation rules are not 
specific for fisheries.  
 
• Párrafos 4.88, 4.95 y 4.98: "4.95 For the period 2014 -21, total support planned under the 
EMFF by member States amounted to EUR 7.8 billion, of which EUR 5.7 billion from the EMFF itself 
and EUR 2.2 billion from national sources.107 By the end of 2021, EUR 4.9 billion of EMFF funding 
had been committed, corresponding to 87.0% of the total EMFF funding available (under shared 
management), with support related to data collection, processing of fisheries and aquaculture 
products, productive investments in aquaculture, investments in control, implementation of local 
development strategies, and support for fishing ports accounting for nearly 58.8% of all 
commitments. The Commission expects all EMFF  funds to be committed by the end of 2023"; "4.98. 
Outside this framework but aligned to it, member States are allowed to provide certain state aid to 
the fisheries and aquaculture sector in certain situations (Section 3.3.1). Member States can provide 
state aid for certain types of subsidies covered by the fisheries State Aid Guidelines112, the Fishery 
and Aquaculture Block Exemption, or where they are considered de minimis aid (not exceeding 
EUR 30,000 per beneficiary over any period of three fiscal years  with a defined national cap per 
member State). These exclude subsidies not eligible under the EMFF regulation. They can also grant 
exemptions on indirect taxes of energy products used for inland water navigation (including inland 
fishing) and aquaculture.  State aid to the fisheries and aquaculture sector amounted to around 
EUR 49 million in 2019, broadly unchanged from 2014, but were significantly lower in 2020 with 
EUR 33.6 million."  
Pregunta 102  
Entendiendo a los subsidios al combustible como montos de d inero que brinda un país miembro de 
la UE y/o como un permiso a una empresa pesquera a pagar un precio inferior por el combustible. 
¿Podría la UE distinguir en qué casos sucede esto? ¿Es posible conocer a qué empresa pesquera en 
particular se le otorga el subsidio, qué tipo de subsidio recibe y qué país lo otorga, en caso de ser 
un país miembro?  
 
Reply:  The beneficiaries of EMFF and EMFAF are publicly available: Recipients of EU funding 
(europa.eu)  As noted in reply to question 101  the EU fuel tax measures are not specific to fisheries.  
 
• Párrafo 4.105: "In addition to the domestic EU IUU regulation (Section 4.2.1) and related 
regulations affecting market access (Section 4.2.3), the European Union also continues to cooperate 
internationally to address IUU fishing. Regardless of the location  of fishing, EU fishing vessels must 
carry an International Maritime Organization (IMO) identification number and those greater than 
12 metres (15 metres for certain vessels operating only nationally or locally) have to employ a 
satellite -based vessel moni toring system providing data on vessel location. The 
European  Commission has put forward a proposal to ratify the WTO Agreement on Fisheries 
Subsidies."  
 
Pregunta 103  
¿Podría la UE indicar si, más allá de su adhesión al Acuerdo sobre Subsidios a la Pesca en el marco 
de la OMC y su correspondiente proceso de ratificación, en la actualidad, alguno de los países 
miembros de la UE otorgan subsidios al combustible a barcos q ue pescan en alta mar? En caso 
afirmativo, ¿podría precisar cuáles son dichos países?  
 
Reply:  The full information regarding State aid measures of EU Member States, including for 
fisheries, is published regularly by the European Commission, and available online on this webpage: 
Scoreboard (europa.eu) . The latest, 2022 edition (regarding expenditure in 2021) is available on 
this link: A3 - State aid Scoreboard 2022_27032023 v2.docx (europa.eu) . 
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 239 - 
 
Preguntas elaboradas en base al Informe de Gobiern o 
(Documento WT/TPR/G/442)  
• El párrafo 5.18, se explica que "El proyecto de Reglamento sobre la reducción de los límites 
máximos de residuos (LMR) de las dos sustancias neonicotinoides Clotianidina y Tiametoxam es el 
primer reglamento que aplica la Estrat egia "de la granja a la mesa" a los alimentos importados en 
lo que respecta a los residuos de plaguicidas. Los aspectos ambientales en los que se centra este 
Reglamento se refieren a la protección de los polinizadores. Se trata de una cuestión de interés 
mundial, que va más allá de las fronteras nacionales y no puede resolverse únicamente mediante 
medidas en el nivel de la UE. El proyecto de Reglamento reduce los límites máximos de residuos 
(LMR) de las dos sustancias neonicotinoides Clotianidina y Tiametox am, de las que se sabe que 
contribuyen significativamente a la disminución de las poblaciones polinizadoras por sus propiedades 
intrínsecas, que provocan efectos desfavorables para los polinizadores con independencia de la zona 
geográfica en la que se util icen. El Reglamento incluye disposiciones de facilitación del comercio, 
que consisten principalmente en aplazar la fecha de aplicación del reglamento a 36 meses después 
de la entrada en vigor (en lugar de 6 meses, que es el período habitual previsto en las  normas de la 
OMC) y permitir que los productos comercializados antes de la fecha de aplicación permanezcan en 
el mercado hasta el final de su tiempo de conservación" . 
 
Reglamento (UE) 2023/334 por el que se modifican los anexos II y V del Reglamento (CE) 
396/2005 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo en lo que respecta a los límites máximos 
de residuos de clotianidina y tiametoxam en determinados productos.  
Con respecto a la sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia de la UE acerca de Asunto C -162/21 - Pesticide 
Action Network Europe e.a. de fecha 19 de enero de 2023, que refiere a la consulta realizada por el 
Consejo de Estado del Reino de Bélgica (Consejo) en marzo  del año anterior (2021) acerca de las 
autorizaciones de emergencia otorgadas por el gobierno belga en 2016 que autorizan, por una parte, 
la comercialización de productos fitosanitarios basados en sustancias activas prohibidas (clotianidina 
y thiametoxam) en la Unión Europea para el tratamiento de semillas y, por otra, la venta y la siembra 
de semillas tratadas con esos productos.  
 
Pregunta 104  
Siendo que el TJUE concluyó que las excepciones dispuestas por las autoridades belgas en 2018 
para el tratamiento  de semillas con clotianidina y/o thiametoxan para la siembra no se ajustan a la 
legislación de la UE, ¿qué otras alternativas de productos sugiere la Comisión Europea para los 
productores que necesitan de estas sustancias para la prevención de plagas de s u producción?  
 
Reply:  Alternatives to any active substance need to be evaluated case by case, taking into account 
several parameters, as crops, pests and environmental conditions. There is not a general 
recommendation on alternatives that would be useful f or all producers. However, existing knowledge 
is available on alternatives, as for example, the recent report of the European Academies Science 
Advisory Council (EASAC) on Neonicotinoids and their substitutes in sustainable pest control 
(ESAC  policy report  45, February 2023).  
 
Currently around 100 active substances with a known insecticide or acaricide function are still 
approved in the EU, 22 of these being micro -organisms. These substances could potentially and, 
subject to an in -depth assessment, be used to counter pests as an  alternative for thiamethoxam or 
clothianidin. Among these active substances is a further neonicotinoid, acetamiprid, and the 
insecticide flupyradifurone, which are authorised for use in Plant Protection Products in most EU 
Member States.  
 
In addition, 11  chemical substances or micro -organisms with a mode of action as insecticide or 
acaricide are currently under evaluation for their first approval and may also be useful to combat 
pests as an alternative for thiamethoxam or clothianidin.  
 
• Con relación a l os Pesticidas, el Proceso de renovación de sustancias y, en particular, el 
Glifosato, en el párrafo 3.201 se detalla lo siguiente: "For pesticides, only products containing active 
substances complying with the criteria under Regulation (EC) 1107/2009 can b e sold in the EU 
market or be used on food or feed of plant and animal origin. In this regard, the Commission 
indicates that MRLs are based on good agricultural practices following an EFSA risk assessment. If 
a risk is identified, the MRL application is re jected, and the levels are set at technical zero. In the 
absence of a specific MRL, a default level applies. Importers (or any other stakeholder) may request 
an "import tolerance" for substances not in the list of EU -approved substances, as well as for 
approved ones. If EFSA concludes that the import tolerance is safe for consumers and does not WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 240 - 
 
  
 present an environmental concern, the import tolerance can be granted. Certain contaminants in 
food and feed are also subject to maximum levels for several categorie s of products such cereals, 
infant food, lettuce, and milk Maximum levels for contaminants and residues of pesticides are 
updated regularly. In 2021, the Commission adopted 4 regulations amending the maximum levels 
for certain contaminants, and 22 regulati ons amending those for residues of certain pesticides."  
 
El 5 de diciembre de 2022, la Unión Europea publicó en su Diario Oficial, el Reglamento de Ejecución  
(UE) 2022/2364  por el que se modifica el Reglamento de Ejecución (UE) 540/2011 por lo que 
respecta a la ampliación del período de aprobación de la sustancia activa glifosato. A través del 
referido reglamento se extendió  la autorización del glifosato en la UE hasta el 
15 de diciembre  de 2023.  
 
Dicha prórroga se autorizó a la espera de que la EFSA  pueda completar su evaluación y adoptar una 
decisión final sobre la solicitud de renovación de la aprobación de la sustancia. El próximo mes 
de julio, la EFSA publicaría su informe peer review  con las conclusiones respecto de la evaluación 
científica del glifosato. Posteriormente y en base a las conclusiones del dictamen científico de la 
EFSA, la Comisión Europea debería presentar su propuesta legislativa para renovación de la 
aprobación o no aprobación de la sustancia del glifosato a nivel del Comité Perm anente de Animales, 
Plantas, Alimentos y Piensos (SCOPAFF).  
 
Pregunta 105  
En caso que la opinión de la EFSA sea similar a la del 2017, e indique que el glifosato no cumple los 
"criterios de peligro" establecidos en el Reglamento 1107/2009, siendo por lo tanto seguro su uso, 
y virtud del proceso de comitología, y de los distintos escenarios que podrían darse en el Comité de 
Apelación (voto positivo, no opinión y voto negativo), ¿cuál será la posición de la Comisión Europea 
ante un escenario de "no opinión"  a nivel de los Estados miembros? ¿Respetará la Comisión Europea 
el fundamento científico de la EFSA y apoyará la renovación de la sustancia?  
 
Reply:  The evaluation of the application for renewal of glyphosate as an active substance for use in 
plant protec tion products is still on -going. Therefore, we cannot comment on possible 
renewal/non -renewal of that active substance. Once the EFSA Conclusion on the peer review is 
available the European Commission will act in accordance with Article  14 of Regulation (E U) 
No 844/2012.  
 
• Respecto de los Organismos Genéticamente Modificados (OGM) y las Nuevas Técnicas de 
Reproducción Vegetal (NBT – New Breeding Techniques), el párrafo 3.202 menciona lo siguiente: 
"GMOs for cultivation, and for food and feed use are author ized at the EU level subject the 
Commission's approval, but EU member States may prohibit or restrict GMOs for cultivation under 
certain conditions.During the review period, the legal framework for the approval of GMOs was not 
subject to any change. In 202 2, the European  Union  authorized six GMO crops (two maize, 
two soybeans, one oilseed rape, and one cotton) and renewed one authorization (cotton), all used 
for food and animal feed.269In total, 19 new authorizations for GMO crops were issued between2020 
and end -2022 and another 7 were renewed, all for food and animal feed. Authorizations are valid 
for 10 years.  
 
El 29 de abril de 2021, la Comisión Europea publicó un "Estudio sobre Nuevas Técnicas Genómicas" 
(NGTs por sus siglas en inglés). El estudio elaborado por la Unidad de biotecnología de la DG SANTE, 
muestra que las NGTs tienen el potencial de contribuir a un sistema alimentario "más sostenible" 
como parte de los objetivos del Pacto Verde Europeo y la Estrategia de la Granja a la Mesa. 
Actualmente, la Comisión Europea está avanzando en la presentación de una propu esta 
legislativa  para las técnicas de cisgénesis y mutagéneis en plantas, que se iba a presentar el próximo 
7 de junio pero que debido a que no contó con opinión favorable en el Comité de Control regulador 
(RSB por sus siglas en inglés), debió ser pospuest a. 
 
La Comisión Europea tuvo que retrasar la presentación de la propuesta del marco regulatorio para 
las plantas producidas por mutagénesis y cisgénesis específicas y sus productos alimenticios y 
piensos, debido a que el informe evaluación de impacto no ev aluó de forma suficientemente 
exhaustiva el impacto en la confianza del consumidor, el sector orgánico, el medio ambiente y la 
salud, y no presentó una descripción general de los costos y beneficios.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 241 - 
 
Pregunta 106  
¿Cuál es el tiempo que considera la Unión  Europea para la revisión del informe de evaluación de 
impacto y cuál sería la opción de política recomendada por la Comisión Europea?  
 
Reply:  The European Commission has indicated in its 2023 work programme[1] that a legislative 
proposal on plants obtained by certain new genomic techniques (NGTs) would be tabled during the 
second quarter of 2023. The range of options considered in the impact assessment was outlined in 
the public consultation[2] questionnaire published on 29  April 2022 for comme nts until 22  July 2022. 
The European Commission has not decided yet which policy option or combination of policy options 
would be proposed; this will be decided with the adoption of the legal proposal.  
[1]  https://commission.europa.eu/strategy -documents/commission -work-programme_en   
[2]  https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better -regulation/have -your-say/initiatives/13119 -Legislation -for-
plants -produced -by-certain -new-genomic -techniques_en  
 
Pregunta 107  
En el entendimiento de que los criterios de trazabilidad y transparencia son cuestiones muy 
importantes a ser tenidos en cuenta en la evaluación de impacto de la Comisión Europea, ¿podría la 
UE precisar si la propuesta incluirá medidas sobre el etiquetado para las importaciones de los 
productos elaborados a partir de estas técnicas?  
 
Reply:  The European Commission has not decided whether and which labelling rules would be 
proposed; this will be decided with the adoption of the legal proposal.  
 
En febrero de 2023, el Tribunal de Justicia de la UE (TJUE) ha dictaminado que los organismos 
obtenidos mediante mutagénesis aleatoria 'in vitro" no deben estar cubiertos por las normas de la 
UE que rigen la comercialización de Organismos Modificados Gené ticamente (OGM). Dicha decisión 
del TJUE se produce en virtud del caso presentado por el grupo de agricultores franceses 
Confédération paysanne y otras asociaciones en 2015 ante el Consejo de Estado francés, relativo a 
un requerimiento judicial para que se  adopten medidas destinadas, a establecer la lista de las 
técnicas o los métodos de mutagénesis utilizados convencionalmente en varios usos y para los que 
se dispone de una amplia experiencia de utilización segura, que deben excluirse del ámbito de 
aplicac ión de la normativa francesa que se considera que transpone la Directiva 2001/18.  
 
Pregunta 108  
En tal sentido, ¿considerará la UE la Decisión judicial para la elaboración de las opciones de políticas 
que propondrá la Comisión Europea en su evaluación de impacto?  
 
Reply:  The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) clarified that organisms obtained by in vitro random 
mutagenesis techniques/methods are exempted from the current GMO legislation (judgment of 
7 February  2023, Case C -688/21 Confédération paysanne and Others). The current policy initiative 
on plants obtained by new genomic techniques does not include in its scope mutagenesis 
techniques/methods exempted from the application of the GMO legislation.  
 
• En el párrafo 5.19 se menciona que "Las medidas de aplicación del Reglamento sobre 
medicamentos veterinarios adoptado durante el anterior período objeto de examen fortalecerá la 
actuación de la UE en la lucha contra la resistencia a los antimicrobianos y promoverá una utilización 
prudente y responsable de los antimicrobianos. Estas medidas se han complementado recientemente 
con el  Reglamento Delegado  por el que se establecen l os criterios para la designación de los 
antimicrobianos que deben reservarse para el tratamiento de determinadas infecciones en las 
personas, así como un Reglamento de Ejecución  en el que se enumeran los antimicrobianos 
designados reservados para el tratamiento de determinadas infecciones en los seres humanos. 
Además, se modificó el Reglamento relativo a los  controles oficiales para garantizar que el marco 
único de los controles oficiales sea aplicable también a la disposición pertinente del Reglamento 
sobre medicamentos veterinarios" . 
 
Pregunta 109  
En vista de la próxima publicación en el Diario oficial de la UE del reglamento delegado relativo a la 
aplicación de la prohibición de determinados antimicrobianos del artículo 118 referente a las medidas 
para las importaciones de animales y productos animales procedentes de terceros países en el Diario 
Oficial de  la UE, ¿cuándo prevé la UE presentar el proyecto del acto de ejecución relativo a lista de 
los terceros países y regiones autorizados a exportar a la UE y el proyecto de reglamento de WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 ejecución sobre las garantías que se deberán incluir en el certificado sanitario oficial respecto de los 
medicamentos antimicrobianos?  
 
Reply:  The EU is pleased to inform Argentina that European Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 
2023/905 (Please find link: EUR-Lex - 32023R0905 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu) ) as regards the 
application of the prohibition of use of certain antimicrobial medicinal products in animals or products 
of animal origin exported from third countries into the Union was published in the Official Journal on 
4 May 2023 (OJ L 116, 4.5.2023, p . 1).  The European Commission is working on the 
two Implementing Regulations that are necessary for the application of Delegated 
Regulation  2023/905 as established in its Articles 5(1) and 6(1) (list of approved third countries and 
specific requirements on  the official certificates).  The EU will keep third countries duly informed of 
the developments for these implementing Regulations, including in ad hoc  meetings.  
 
The EU would also like to underline that, in compliance with the EU's international obligati ons, the 
above -mentioned draft Implementing Regulation will be notified to the Secretariat of the WTO, 
Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Committee). Therefore, Argentina will 
have the opportunity to comment on the draft implementing  Regulation before adopted by the EU .  
 
Pregunta 110  
En relación con el proyecto de reglamento de implementación sobre la lista de países o regiones de 
países autorizados a exportar a la UE, para la elaboración de la referida lista, ¿considerará la UE el 
comercio actual para establecer y publicar dicha lista y cuáles serán los requisitos y condiciones para 
que los terceros países sean incluidos en dicha lista?  
 
Reply:  The inclusion of third countries in the list will be decided on the basis of the guarantees to be 
provided by third countries as laid down in Article  5(2) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 
2023/905, according. The EU will keep third countries duly i nformed of the developments on the 
listing process, including in ad hoc  meetings.  
 
Pregunta 111  
En vista de la elaboración del acto de ejecución sobre las listas, ¿cuándo estima la UE consultar a 
los terceros países respecto a las garantías requeridas re specto a la aplicación del no uso de 
medicamentos veterinarios antimicrobianos, promotores de crecimiento y de rendimiento?  
 
Reply:  In order to facilitate third countries, the provision of the necessary guarantees to be included 
in the list, the European Commission will send a letter including a template to be completed by third 
countries. These guarantees shall take the form of a wri tten declaration issued by the relevant 
competent authorities in the third country. As mentioned in the reply to question 110, third countries 
will be duly informed of further developments on the listing process including in ad hoc  meetings.  
 
• Según el pá rrafo 6.13, "en la UE, las subvenciones se regulan mediante el sistema de control 
de las ayudas estatales gestionado por la Comisión Europea, y de manera plenamente coherente 
con las normas de la OMC aplicables. El régimen a nivel de la UE asegura que las subvenciones se 
autoricen con arreglo a criterios uniformes, tras una evaluación de su necesidad, su proporcionalidad 
y sus efectos en el comercio y la competencia. Como resultado, se reducen al mínimo los efectos de 
distorsión de las subvenciones y al mis mo tiempo se maximizan sus efectos positivos para los 
objetivos de política pública. Además, las subvenciones concedidas a nivel de la UE, aunque no están 
sujetas al proceso de aprobación de ayudas estatales, están concebidas para seguir los mismos 
princip ios". 
Pregunta 112  
Toda vez que dos Estados miembros (Alemania y Francia) han notificado el 77% de las ayudas 
estatales otorgadas en la UE, ¿puede la CE explicar cómo evaluó su necesidad, proporcionalidad y 
sus efectos en el comercio y la competencia?  
 
Reply: The assessment of the compatibility of an aid is fundamentally about balancing its negative 
effects on trade and competition in the common market with its positive effects in terms of a 
contribution to the achievement of well -defined objectives of comm on interest.  
 
• Teniendo en consideración el párrafo 6.16 "Las políticas industriales, incluido el aumento de 
las subvenciones, son cada vez más importantes en todo el mundo, incluso en la UE, para mitigar 
la repercusión de crisis temporales como la pandem ia y para hacer frente a desafíos más 
estructurales como la transición ecológica. En la UE, entre las herramientas de política industrial WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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existentes figuran los proyectos importantes de interés común europeo (PIICE), que tienen por 
objeto fomentar la coope ración transfronteriza entre las empresas de un sector determinado en las 
esferas de la investigación y el desarrollo y del despliegue industrial precomercial. La financiación 
de los PIICE no puede utilizarse para la producción masiva o las ventas comercia les, y la ayuda 
pública está sujeta al control de las ayudas estatales" y el párrafo 6.17 "Se prohíbe que la ayuda 
estatal esté condicionada por el origen de los productos o equipos, por ejemplo el requisito de que 
el beneficiario compre productos nacional es. Las disposiciones en materia de ayudas estatales 
también exigen que la ayuda se preste de manera no discriminatoria, de modo que todas las 
empresas reciban el mismo trato, con independencia de sus orígenes. Estas características tienen 
por objeto reduc ir al mínimo los efectos indirectos negativos de la política industrial, tanto en el 
mercado único de la UE como en la igualdad de condiciones a escala mundial" . 
Pregunta 113  
¿Puede la CE explicar si ha cuantificado los efectos de las subvenciones estatale s otorgadas por sus 
Estados miembros en sus importaciones y exportaciones con terceros países?  
 
Reply:  No such quantification is available. State control looks only at distortions between 
Member  States.  
 
Pregunta 114  
Toda vez que, en la Comunicación de la  Comisión Europea "Plan Industrial del Pacto Verde para la 
industria de las emisiones netas", esa institución afirmó que las subvenciones otorgadas por sus 
socios crean distorsiones en el mercado, ¿puede la CE explicar de qué manera sus subvenciones no 
causarían esos mismos efectos?  
 
Reply:  The Green Deal Industrial Plan builds on previous initiatives and relies on the strengths of 
the EU Single Market, complementing ongoing efforts under the European Green Deal and 
REPowerEU. It is based on four pillars: a predictable and simplified regulat ory environment, speeding 
up access to finance, enhancing skills, and open trade for resilient supply chains. The fourth pillar 
will be about global cooperation and making trade work for the green transition, under the principles 
of fair competition and op en trade, building on the engagements with the EU's partners and the work 
of the World Trade Organization.  
 
The European Commission will also protect the Single Market from unfair trade in the clean tech 
sector and will use its instruments to ensure that foreign subsidies do not distort competition in the 
Single Market, also in the clean -tech sector. State aid under the Temporary Crisis and Transition 
Framework remains based on principles of necessity, incentive effect and proportionality. Only in 
exceptio nal cases, higher support can be provided to individual companies, where there is a real risk 
of investments being diverted away from Europe. Proof must be provided of the subsidy for the 
equivalent investment.  
 
• Con relación a la Sección 9.4 Política Agr ícola Común, la recientemente aprobada Política 
Agrícola Común (PAC) para el periodo 2023 -2027 es una de las principales políticas de la UE, que 
otorga ayudas (subsidios) a los productores agropecuarios europeos, y que contará con un 
presupuesto estimado e n torno a los 55.000 millones de euros anuales para esquemas de apoyo a 
la renta.  
Pregunta 115  
Todavía perduran en el marco de la PAC subsidios que distorsionan el funcionamiento del mercado 
agrícola internacional, y que en un eventual contexto de precios internacionales a la baja podrían 
potencialmente agravarse, tal es el caso de los pagos acoplados por sectores. La PAC cuenta con 
otros instrumentos que son preocupantes por su efecto distorsivo. ¿Ha considerado la UE la 
posibilidad de ir eliminand o la aplicación de los pagos acoplados que son motivo de oposición de 
muchos terceros países expresados en los distintos ámbitos multilaterales?  
 
Reply:  The EU has been steadily reforming its domestic agricultural support towards the non -
distortive aid und er Annex  2 of the Agreement on Agriculture (Green Box) as of 1992, in full 
commitment to the WTO trade liberalisation goals. Currently over 85% of its agricultural spending 
is administered as non -trade distortive Green Box support. Despite enlargement from  EU15 to EU  28 
and doubling the number of farmers receiving support, total agriculture spending remained stable 
since 2000. Over the same period, total support as percentage of VoP (value of production) has 
decreased continuously.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 In its commitment to re form and its practical implementation, the EU is the leader among the 
WTO Members, and few have followed its example. The EU is calling upon its trading partners to 
take the necessary measures to reform in order to avoid any undesirable/expected negative e ffects 
on its domestic aid on production and trade with third countries.  
 
For the time being, the EU is not considering the elimination of coupled payments in its Common 
Agricultural Policy.  
 
• Con relación a cuestiones de Huella Ambiental y Declaraciones Verdes, el Párrafo 5.15 lee: "El 
nuevo Plan de Acción para la Economía Circular se adoptó en 2020 y tiene por objeto acelerar el 
cambio transformador que requiere el Pacto Verde Europeo. En el marco del nuevo Plan de Acción 
para la Economía Circular, la Co misión Europea adoptó en marzo y noviembre de2022 dos conjuntos 
de iniciativas para hacer que los productos sostenibles sean la norma en el mercado de la UE. La 
piedra angular de las medidas es la propuesta legislativa de un Reglamento sobre diseño ecológi co 
para productos sostenibles, cuyo objetivo es abarcar mejor las cuestiones relacionadas con la 
circularidad de los productos, como la durabilidad y la reparabilidad, y abordar la huella de carbono 
y ambiental de los productos, entre otros aspectos."  
 
Como parte del Pacto Verde Europeo, una de las acciones del Plan de Acción de Economía Circular 
es una propuesta para que las empresas justifiquen sus afirmaciones ambientales utilizando métodos 
"sólidos, basados en la ciencia y verificables", a través de la propuesta de Directiva para abordar 
declaraciones ambientales o "verdes" inexactas o engañosas para el consumidor. La Directiva 
propuesta establece nuevas reglas sobre cómo las empresas pueden comunicar los aspectos 
ambientales de sus productos o empres as a los consumidores a través de afirmaciones que hacen 
voluntariamente. Esto incluye reglas sobre cómo justificar y comunicar declaraciones ecológicas. Los 
Estados Miembro de la UE deben establecer organismos de evaluación que verifiquen y aprueben 
todas  las afirmaciones ecológicas y los sistemas de etiquetado ecológico antes de que se hagan 
públicos.  
Pregunta 116  
La propuesta de Directiva para abordar declaraciones ambientales o "verdes" inexactas o engañosas 
para el consumidor regula las declaraciones ambientales voluntarias; y se entiende que no obliga a 
los exportadores que suministran a la UE a incluir información medioambiental en los productos. Sin 
embargo, en el caso de que decidan hacerlo, ¿cómo se implementará el proceso de verificación para 
las declaraciones verdes procedentes de terceros países?  
 
Reply:  Please note joint reply to question 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121 and 122.  
 
Pregunta 117  
¿Planteará la UE esquemas de equivalencias con terceros países para el reconocimiento de 
declaraciones ve rdes?  
 
Pregunta 118  
¿Prevé la UE programas de cooperación internacional para la implementación de la Directiva 
propuesta?  
 
Pregunta 119  
¿Podría la UE brindar detalles y/o ejemplos respecto de qué aspectos comprendería el diseño 
ecológico?  
 
Pregunta 120  
¿Cuál sería el universo de productos abarcados?  
 
Pregunta 121  
¿Cómo abordaría la medición de la "huella de carbono" y "ambiental" de los productos?  
 
Pregunta 122  
¿Qué enfoques y metodologías aplicaría? ¿Se reconocerían los enfoques y metodologías de otros 
Miembros de la OMC?  
 
Reply to Questions 116 – 122: Please note that the European Commission's proposal for Green 
Claims Directive was adopted on 23  March  2023 and therefore falls outside of the scope of the Trade 
Policy Review. The pr oposal will be considered next by the EU co -legislators. All relevant information, WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 245 - 
 
including the latest developments, Q&As and the explanatory memorandum of the proposal are 
available at https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/circular -economy/green -claims_en .  
 
• Según lo informado en el párrafo 5.31, "El 23 de febrero de 2022, la Comisión adoptó una 
propuesta legislativa relativa a  una Directiva sobre diligencia debida de las empresas en materia de 
sostenibilidad. El objetivo de esta Directiva es fomentar un comportamiento empresarial sostenible 
y responsable y asentar las consideraciones ambientales y de derechos humanos en las act ividades 
de las empresas y la gobernanza empresarial. La propuesta sigue sometida al poder legislativo de 
la UE, y una vez hayan sido adoptadas, las nuevas normas harán que las empresas hagan frente a 
los efectos adversos de sus actuaciones, entre otras co sas en sus cadenas de valor, tanto dentro 
como fuera de Europe" . 
Pregunta 123  
Una vez que la norma sea adoptada, ¿cómo prevé la UE su implementación para empresas europeas 
con filiales fuera de Europa? ¿Se prevé que los operadores europeos acepten certificaciones locales 
de sus proveedores no europeos?  
 
Reply:  The proposal for a Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive is currently under 
negotiation with the EU co -legislators. As regards verifications, the European Commission proposal 
(which  is still subject to possible changes following the work of the co -legislators), requires that 
contractual assurances are accompanied by appropriate measures to verify compliance. For the 
purposes of verifying compliance, the company may refer to suitable industry initiatives or 
independent third -party verifications. Where measures to verify are carried out in relation to an SME, 
the EU company shall bear the cost of the independent third -party verification.  
 
Pregunta 124  
Es posible que la norma implique d esvío de comercio dado que las empresas podrían elegir dejar de 
hacer negocios con sus socios habituales o elegir relaciones más cortoplacistas para evitar la 
responsabilidad ( liability ) prevista por la normativa. ¿Cómo prevé la UE abordar esta situación, sobre 
todo en los sectores considerados por la UE de alto riesgo, como la agricultura?  
 
Reply:  The proposal for a Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive requires companies to 
conduct due diligence to prevent, mitigate and remedy adverse impacts. It fosters continuous 
engagement with business partners, including investment and support. Termination of business 
relationships are allowed as a last report action only, where no other engagement action, including 
investment and support would bear fruit. The proposal for a Directive is based on the international 
voluntary framework on responsible business conduct, and in fact it aims to strengthen engagement 
with value chain partners and lead to better and stronger trade.  
 
Pregunta 125  
¿Se prevé que la UE  proporcione apoyo financiero y técnico para terceros países en creación de 
capacidades y formación en diligencia debida, mecanismos de trazabilidad y reformas orientadas a 
la exportación? En caso afirmativo, ¿cuáles y cómo serán esas fuentes de financiami ento?  
 
Reply:  The European Commission may put in place supporting measures building on existing EU 
actions and tools to support due diligence implementation within the European  Union  and in 
third countries, including facilitation of joint stakeholder initi atives to help companies fulfil their 
obligations and support SMEs affected by the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive 
proposal. This may be further complemented by EU development cooperation instruments that may 
help third country governments  and upstream economic operators in third countries in addressing 
adverse human rights and environmental impacts of their operations and upstream business 
relationships.  
 
• En el párrafo 5.18, dentro de la Sección 5 Sostenibilidad – 5.1 Medidas de la UE para combatir 
el cambio climático – 5.1.2. – Sistemas alimentarios sostenibles se menciona que el proyecto de 
Reglamento sobre la reducción de los límites máximos de residuos (LMR) de las dos sustancias 
neonicotinoides Clotiadinia y T iametoxam es el primer reglamento que aplica la Estrategia "De la 
granja a la Mesa" a los alimentos importados en lo que respecta a los residuos de plaguicidas.  
Pregunta 126  
Entendiendo la preocupación por preservar la salud de las personas y la protección del medio 
ambiente y que la producción eficiente de alimentos requiere a su vez de soluciones tecnológicas 
acordes con las condiciones de producción, ¿cómo asegura la UE que  la reglamentación LMR esté 
basada en evidencia científica de conformidad con el artículo 5 del Acuerdo sobre la Aplicación de WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 246 - 
 
  
 las Medidas Sanitarias y Fitosanitarias de la OM  C? ¿Podría explayarse sobre la compatibilidad con 
reglas de excepción que se apl ican en el seno de la UE?  
 
Reply:  SPS measures, such as setting MRLs for pesticides, must be based on sufficient scientific 
evidence in accordance with the relevant provisions of the SPS  Agreement . The setting of MRLs in 
the EU is based on EFSA's risk asse ssment. The data requirements for active substances and plant 
protection products are set out in the European Commission Regulations (EU) No 283/2013 and (EU) 
No 284/2013. Emergency authorizations are derogations from the standard requirements for 
authoriz ation, but do not exempt the need to consider safety. When considering whether emergency 
authorizations can be granted, Member States must consider safety for human and animal health 
and the environment.  
 
• En el párrafo 5.25, 4to punto, contenido dentro d e la Sección 5 Sostenibilidad – 5.1 Medidas 
de la UE para combatir el cambio climático - 5.1.3. - Descarbonización de la energía y transporte 
sostenible, se presentan las propuestas legislativas "ReFuelEU Aviation" y "FuelEU Maritime".  
Pregunta 127  
¿Se es tá considerando debidamente en el marco de dichas iniciativas el importante papel que los 
biocombustibles líquidos pueden jugar en la "descarbonización" de ambos sectores (transporte, y 
energía)? ¿Podría dar precisiones sobre lo que se está trabajando al r especto?  
 
Reply:  The aviation industry is setting ambitious emission reduction targets, which increasingly rely 
on the use of sustainable aviation fuels (SAF). In spite of the strong and increasing interest of some 
airlines in sustainable aviation fuels, a ctual demand is very limited in the current market conditions. 
Many airlines' groups are still not engaging in concrete partnerships or contracts to boost their SAF 
use in the future, because in the current conditions the business case is rarely perceived as 
economically attractive. This is particularly the case in a market where the price gap between 
conventional fossil jet fuel and SAF is significant.  
 
Europe is a global leader in transport biofuel production, with a significant number of commercial 
plants in operation. Under ReFuelEU Aviation proposal, sustainable aviation fuels are defined as 
liquid, drop -in fuels, fully fungible with conventional aviation fuel and compatible with existing 
aircraft engines. For this purpose, sustainable aviation fuels p roduced from residues and waste 
bio-feedstock as well as synthetic aviation fuels meeting the sustainability requirements in 
Directive  (EU) 2018/2001 should be promoted.  
 
As far as decarbonisation of maritime transport is concerned, in particular in the c ontext of FuelEU 
Maritime, sustainable biofuels will play an important role, especially for the first 10 -15 years of 
implementation of the regulation. They can provide for blendable lower GHG intensity fuel options 
that can already be used in existing trad itional energy conversion/engines onboard ships. This 
technological compatibility aspects plays in favour of biofuels and, for the particular case of shipping, 
will provide for an immediate response for decarbonisation and compliance with the milder target s 
for GHG intensity reduction for the first 10 -15 years of application of the regulation.  
 
While clearly safeguarding against the use of food & feed crop biofuels, very much in line with EU 
renewable energy regulatory framework, the FuelEU regulation is ba sed on a technology neutral 
approach. To this end, sustainable biofuels which comply with the relevant EU sustainability criteria 
will be a natural choice for the first years of application of the regulation. Depending on their 
availability, biofuels, main ly biodiesels and bio -methane, will be naturally demanded for by operators 
looking to have blend -in/drop -in options for compliance.  
 
• Párrafo 5.18. Reglamento sobre la reducción de los límites máximos de residuos (LMR) de 
Clotianidina y Tiametoxam.  
Pregunta 128  
¿Podría explicar la m etodología que utilizó la UE para llevar adelante la evaluación de impacto 
ambiental con el objetivo declarado de reducir la merma mundial de polinizadores, a su juicio 
afectados por la clotianidina y el tiam etoxam?  
 
Reply:  The European Food Safety Authority's (EFSA) peer review of the pesticide risk assessment of 
clothianidin[1] and thiamethoxam[2] on bees concluded that there is no Good Agricultural Practice 
(GAP) for outdoor uses on the examined crops that  would not pose an unacceptable risk to bees. 
Therefore, there is no basis to conclude that use on crops that were not examined by EFSA would 
be safe for pollinators and that the existing MRLs could be maintained.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 247 - 
 
The EU agrees that the worldwide decline of pollinators is related to multiple factors, but the use of 
pesticides, and in particular neonicotinoids, is an important one. Based on the best available current 
knowledge, reducing the use of neonicotinoids is an effective action to tackle pollinators decline.  
 
According to the Intergovernmental Science -Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services 
(IPBES)[3], a clear consensus exists regarding the fact that both wild and managed bees are exposed 
to pesticides (mainly through nectar and pollen, in the case of the neonicotinoids) , and that the 
range of sub -lethal effects is quite broad. Therefore, the EU's actions related to neonicotinoids used 
as pesticides such as this Regulation are coordinated with other EU programmes and international 
activities such as:  
 
- The EU pollinators initiative[4] which inte grates holistic actions on pollinators across different 
sectorial policies, addressing the main known causes for pollinator decline and strengthening the 
collaboration between all the actors concerned.  
 
- The active EU collaborations with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
in its "Global Action on Pollination Services for Sustainable Agriculture" and with the International 
Union for Conservation of Nature in projects to address the decline of pollinators.  
 
[1]  European Food Saf ety Authority; Peer review of the pesticide risk assessment for bees for the active 
substance clothianidin considering the uses as seed treatments and granules | EFSA (europa.eu) . 
EFSA Journal 2018;16(2):5177.  
[2]  European Food Safety Authority; Peer review of the pesticide risk assessment for bees for the active 
substance thiamethoxam consid ering the uses as seed treatments and granules | EFSA (europa.eu) . 
EFSA Journal 2018;16(2):5179.  
[3]  IPBES  (2016). The assessment report of the Intergovernmental Science -Policy Platform on 
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services on pollinators, pollination and food production. S.G. Potts, V. L. 
Imperatriz -Fonseca, and H. T. Ngo (eds). Secretariat of the Intergover nmental Science -Policy 
Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, Bonn, Germany. 552 pages. 
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3402856 .  
[4]  https://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/conservation/species/pollinators/policy_en.htm  
 
Pregunta 129  
¿Podría brindar los datos utilizados para  determinar que el uso de clotianidina y thiametoxam es uno 
de los riesgos más relevantes que enfrentan los polinizadores en terceros países estableciendo un 
límite de cuantificación para ambas sustancias?  
 
Reply:  Please note that the EU would like to refer to the response to question 128.  
 
Pregunta 130  
¿Considera la UE que la medida adoptada es la medida menos restrictiva del comercio que podría 
haber adoptado para proteger a los polinizadores?  
 
Reply:  The EU con siders that lowering the maximum residue levels (MRLs) for clothianidin and 
thiamethoxam to the limit of quantification (LOQ) is necessary to fulfil its legitimate objective and 
that there is no alternative that would be less trade restrictive and equally contribute to the objective 
pursued.  
 
Please note that the EU would like to refer to the response to question 128 and in particular to the 
other EU measures taken to protect pollinators.  
 
• Párrafo 5.12, relativo al Reglamento sorbe deforestación: "El 6 de  diciembre de 2022, el 
Parlamento Europeo y el Consejo llegaron a un acuerdo político provisional sobre un Reglamento de 
la UE sobre la deforestación, que allanó el camino para la adopción definitiva del Reglamento a 
principios de 2023. Su objetivo es fren ar la deforestación y la degradación forestal impulsadas por 
la UE. Al promover el consumo de productos "libres de deforestación" y reducir los efectos de la UE 
en la deforestación y la degradación forestal a nivel mundial, el nuevo Reglamento reducirá las  
emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero y la pérdida de biodiversidad a nivel mundial y hará que 
el consumo se minimice, con lo que disminuirá el comercio de productos procedentes de cadenas de 
suministro vinculadas a la deforestación o la degradación fo restal, aumentando al mismo tiempo el 
comercio de productos sostenibles. La propuesta forma parte de un plan más amplio de medidas 
para luchar contra la deforestación y la degradación forestal, expuesto por primera vez en la 
Comunicación de la Comisión de 2019 titulada "Intensificar la actuación de la UE para proteger y 
restaurar los bosques del mundo"  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Pregunta 131  
Considerando que el Reglamento de Deforestación propuesto por la Unión Europea incluye una 
definición de "degradación forestal" que no está acor dada o consensuada internacionalmente, ¿bajo 
qué condiciones y parámetros y en base a qué elementos se identificará, verificará y medirá 
objetivamente este criterio?  
 
Reply:  The definition of 'forest degradation' relies on concepts developed at internation al level, 
notably within the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO).  
 
Pregunta 132  
¿Cómo considerará la UE en sus evaluaciones de impacto la legislación de terceros países que 
permiten la "deforestación legal"?  
 
Reply:  Deforestation and forest degradation have a dramatic impact on the livelihoods of the most 
vulnerable people, including indigenous peoples, who rely heavily on forest ecosystems and are the 
best defenders of forests. A product will need to be legal and de forestation free to be placed on the 
EU market. Covering both legal and illegal deforestation ensures that no product coming from a 
deforested land can be placed on the EU market even if in a certain area or country human rights 
and indigenous peoples' rig hts are not protected by law.  
 
Pregunta 133  
¿Qué criterios se utilizarán para evaluar las políticas, proyectos y normativas forestales de terceros 
países? ¿Cómo evaluará la UE los beneficios ambientales de tales políticas?  
 
Reply:  The list of criteria underpinning the risk classification process is described in Article  29 of the 
Regulation. The assessment of the European Commission must take into account the criteria defined 
in Article  29.3 and may also take into account a range of  other criteria described in Article  29.4. See 
Texts adopted - Deforestation Regulation - Wednesday, 19 April 2023 (europa.eu) . The metho dology 
that will underpin the risk assessment is currently under development.  
 
Pregunta 134  
Teniendo en cuenta que los operadores comerciales deben asumir la responsabilidad principal de 
garantizar los requisitos del Reglamento para demostrar que los prod uctos no provienen de la 
deforestación, ¿cómo garantizará la UE la transparencia del mecanismo de diligencia debida?  
 
Reply:  Operators bear the primary responsibility to establish, maintain, and review due diligence 
systems that will ensure the compatibili ty of relevant commodities and derived products with the 
main provisions of the Regulation. Commercial operators will be able to submit due diligence 
statements in the Information System, developed by the European Commission.  
 
Pregunta 135  
¿Qué bases, ind icadores y criterios deben tener en cuenta los operadores para evaluar con 
objetividad y precisión el desempeño de un tercer país en materia de cumplimiento de leyes, 
corrupción, adulteración de documentos y violaciones a los derechos humanos?  
 
Reply:  Operators and traders will have to prove that the products are both deforestation -free 
(produced on land that was not subject to deforestation or forest degradation after 
31 December  2020) and legal (compliant with the relevant legislation in the country of pr oduction). 
As regard the benchmarking system, that will help in the implementation of the Regulation, the list 
of criteria underpinning the risk classification process is described in Article  29 of the Regulation. 
The assessment of the European Commission must take into account the criteria defined in 
Article  29.3 and may also take into account a range of other criteria described in Article  29.4. The 
methodology that will underpin the risk assessment is currently under development.  
 
Pregunta 136  
¿Cómo verificará la UE el análisis realizado por los operadores comerciales? ¿Qué criterios se podrán 
utilizar para medir la objetividad de las conclusion es? 
 
Reply:  The assessment of due diligence and the verification of the compliance with the Regulation 
will be performed by Member states. Member States shall designate one or more competent 
authorities responsible for fulfilling the obligations arising fr om this Regulation.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Pregunta 137  
¿Cómo reconocerán la Comisión Europea, o las agencias aduaneras de los Estados miembros de la 
UE, los protocolos o esquemas de trazabilidad desarrollados por terceros países que exportan 
productos cubiertos por el Reglame nto al mercado de la UE (ya sea protocolos o esquemas 
desarrollados por el sector privado y su cadena de valor o a nivel oficial)?  
 
Reply:  Traceability protocols and schemes can be used by operators to help their risk assessment to 
the extent the schemes c over the information needed to comply with their obligations under the 
Regulation. Operators will still be required to exercise due diligence, and they will be held 
accountable for any breach.  
 
Pregunta 138  
¿Desarrollará la Comisión directrices sobre trazabilidad y diligencia debida para cada sector de 
materias primas y productos derivados cubiertos por la propuesta de Reglamento sobre 
Deforestación?  
 
Reply:  The European Commission is already gathering input and promoting dialogue amongst 
stakeholders through the Deforestation Multi -stakeholder Platform. The European Commission is 
also planning to publish a Frequently Asked Questions document that will answer to the most 
frequent and relevant questions raised by stakeholders. Guidance will be developed at a later stage.  
 
• Párrafo 3.24 relativa a la vinculación entre ayuda interna causante de distorsión del comercio 
con efectos negativos en la seguridad alimentaria, en donde se establece que "La UE seguirá 
promoviendo también las reformas de la ayuda interna causante de dist orsión del comercio, que 
puede afectar negativamente a la seguridad alimentaria". Al respecto, se destaca lo dicho por la FAO 
y PNUMA en su informe "The State of Food Security and nutrition in the world. Repurposing food 
and agricultural policies to make h ealthy dates more affordable" .  
Pregunta 139  
¿Cuáles son las medidas que la UE está dispuesta a adoptar, para implementar la reducción de ayuda 
interna y así promover la seguridad alimentaria?  
 
Reply:  The EU has been steadily reforming its domestic agricu ltural support towards the 
non-distortive aid under Annex  2 of the Agreement on Agriculture (Green Box) as of 1992, in full 
commitment to the WTO trade liberalisation goals. Currently over 85% of its agricultural spending 
is administered as non -trade disto rtive Green Box support. Despite enlargement from EU15 to EU  28 
and doubling the number of farmers receiving support, total agriculture spending remained stable 
since 2000. Over the same period, total support as percentage of VoP (value of production) has 
decreased continuously.  
 
In its commitment to reform and its practical implementation, the EU is the leader among the 
WTO Members, and few have followed its example. The EU is calling upon its trading partners to 
take the necessary measures to reform in o rder to avoid any undesirable/expected negative effects 
on its domestic aid on production and trade with third countries, and to improve food security.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 CHILE  
WT/TPR/G/442 - (UE report)  
3 MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL TRADE POLICY  
3.2.2 Trade -related cooperation  
"Key topics included in the scope of each Partnership comprise: semiconductors supply chain 
resilience; 5G/6G; cybersecurity; platform, data and AI regulation; digital trade; digital identity and 
digital signatures; closing the di gital skills gap and digital inclusion."  
Paragraph 3.69, page 16  
 
Question 1:  
In Paragraph 3.69 mentions digital inclusion. Chile would like to see if there is a work plan to close 
the digital skills gap and digital inclusion, and if so, what would this p lan be?  
 
Reply:  The Digital Decade Policy Programme  (DDPP) sets targets to increase the number of 
European citizens with at least basic digital skills to 80% and reaching 20  million  ICT professionals, 
as well as bridging the gender gap by 2030. The Commiss ion is supporting the achievement of these 
targets and the closing of the digital skills gap through policy actions and funding. The Digital Europe 
Programme  notably supports bachelor and master programmes as well as short -term training in key 
capacity are as, such as High Performance Computing, cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence and other 
emerging technologies. The Digital Education Action Plan 2021 -2027 sets out a long -term approach 
and vision for high quality, inclusive and accessible digital educatio n in Europe. The Digital Skills and 
Jobs Platform  is a one -stop-shop for digital skills in Europe, bringing together initiatives, resources 
and the digital skills community. It is also the home of the Digital Skills and Jobs Coalition , which 
tackles the di gital skills gap by bringing together Member States, social partners, companies, non -
profit organisations and education providers to raise awareness and encourage organisations to take 
different actions to support digital skills training. On 18  April, the Commission adopted two Proposals 
for Council Recommendations . The first supports Member States in the digital transformation of their 
education and training systems by addressing key factors such investments in connectivity, 
infrastructure, content and key  policy reforms. The second aims to support Member States in 
addressing common challenges related to the uptake of digital skills.  
 
Digital inclusion is a broad topic, and covers (at least) access to digital connectivity, data, devices 
as well as the skill s mentioned above. In addition, digital devices, tools and services need to be 
accessible to persons with disabilities. The DDPP sets targets to overcome the geographical digital 
divide, with a target of Gigabit connectivity for everyone in the EU by 2030.  Accessibility aspects of 
digital inclusion are covered by legislation (the Web Accessibility Directive and the European 
Accessibility Act in particular). Social pricing and provision of digital devices, e.g. to children in 
poorer families, are part of the  European Pillar of Social Rights (#20 Access to essential services), 
but are the competence of the individual Member States. There is no single plan that covers all these 
aspects, but the European Declaration on digital rights and principles, published in  January 2023 
(EU official journal (OJ) C23), presents the EU's commitment to a secure, safe and sustainable digital 
transformation that puts people at the centre, in line with EU core values and fundamental rights 
(EUR-Lex - 32023C0123(01) - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu) ). 
 
In addition to the EU's Digital Decade programme, in December 2021, the EU launched Global 
Gateway, our new global connectivity strategy. It is our offer to partner countries to respond to 
today's global challenges. It is sustainable, comprehensive, rules -based, human -centric, 
geographically adapted and in line with the SDGs and the Paris Agreement. Digital is one of the 
five key entry points of Global Gateway. More than 10% of our external action budget for 2021 
to 2027 will prioritize actions in digital.  
 
4 TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT  
4.1 Supporting inclusive growth in developing coun tries 
Paragraph 4.3., page 17  
"Under the EU's current GSP Regulation, all GSP beneficiary countries (including EBA beneficiaries) 
have to respect the principles of 15 core conventions on human and labour rights. In addition, the 
GSP+ arrangement requires countries to fulfil, ratify and effectively implement a total of 
27 international conventions covering core human and labour rights, environmental protection, and 
good governance. A central part of the EU's approach to GSP is to carefully monitor the benef iciary 
countries' respect of these conditionalities. In case of concerns in this respect, the EU engages with WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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the relevant beneficiary countries, and can as a last resort withdraw the preferences. The EU 
reported on the implementation of the scheme in 2020 16 and will publish a new report in 2023."  
 
Question 2:  
Favor informar ¿qué ocurre si un Miembro no logra alcanzar este nivel de protección, ambición o 
respeto? ¿Qué acciones va a tomar la UE?  
 
Reply:  In cases of concerns, the EU engages with the relevant beneficiary countries with a view to 
address any shortcomings, and can as a last resort withdraw the preferences.  
 
5 SUSTAINABILTY  
5.1 The EU's actions on climate change and environmental protection  
5.1.1 Overview of the actions on climate change and environmental protection  
Paragraph 5.12., page 20  
"On 6  December  2022, the European Parliament and the Council reached a provisional political 
agreement on an EU Regulation on  deforestation, paving the way for the final adoption of the 
regulation in early 2023. It aims to curb EU -driven deforestation and forest degradation. By 
promoting the consumption of "deforestation -free" products and reducing the EU's impact on global 
deforestation and forest degrad ation, the new rules will bring down greenhouse gas emissions and 
global biodiversity loss and minimise consumption, and therefore decrease the trade of products 
coming from supply chains associated with deforestation or forest degradation, while increasin g the 
trade of sustainable products. The proposal is part of a broader plan of actions to tackle deforestation 
and forest degradation first outlined in the 2019 Commission Communication on Stepping up 
EU Action to Protect and Restore the World's Forests"  
 
Question 3:  
Could the EU explain or give details of the measures to promoting the consumption of 
"deforestation -free" products?  
 
Reply:  To be placed on the EU market or exported from it, commodities and derived products 
covered by the Regulation need to be legally harvested and deforestation free. The Regulation will 
thus ensure that deforestation and forest degradation associated with the EU consumption of certain 
goods will diminish, ultimately promoting the consumption of deforestation -free goods. At t he same 
time, the EU is supporting its partner countries through cooperation and development to ensure 
their supply chains are deforestation -free and is stepping up its support.  
 
5.2 Sustainability, fairness and inclusiveness  
5.2.1 Protecting human rights  and promoting labour rights  
Paragraph 5.30., page 23  
"In September 2022, a legislative proposal was adopted to prohibit products made with forced labour 
to be placed on or exported from the EU market.58 The proposal covers all products, namely those 
made in the EU for domestic consumption and exports, and imported goods, without targeting 
specific products, companies, industries or geographies. The proposal builds on internationally 
agreed definitions and standards. It underlines the importance of close co operation with global 
partners. Once the proposal is adopted by the EU co -legislators, national authorities will be 
empowered to withdraw from the EU market products made with forced labour, following an 
investigation. According to the proposal, EU customs  authorities will identify and stop products made 
with forced labour at EU borders. The proposal is now with the EU co -legislators, the 
European  Parliament and the Council."  
 
Question 4:  
¿Cómo la UE piensa en identificar y detectar los productos, las piezas o partes de ellos, producidos 
con trabajo forzoso, siendo que pueden ser incluidos en una o varias secciones de la cadena de 
suministro?  
 
Reply:  The proposed legal act will be enforced by competent authorities appointed by the Member 
States and which will be endowed with the necessary powers and resources to carry out the 
investigations, including sufficient budgetary and other resources.  
 
The co mpetent authorities will have several tools at their disposal to carry out their work to identify 
the products made with forced labour: a database of forced labour risk areas and products, WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 guidelines, participation in the network of competent authorities a nd an information and 
communication tool.  
 
The work of the competent authorities in investigating whether a product was made in whole or in 
part with forced labour can be triggered by different elements such as submissions of information 
that a product is  made with forced labour, information included in the database, previous work of 
the competent authorities. In their assessment of the likelihood that the products were made with 
forced labour, the competent authorities will analyse the supply chain of the  product in order to 
focus on the economic operators as close as possible to where the risk of forced labour is likely to 
occur.  
 
Paragraph 5.31., page 23  
On 23  February  2022, the Commission adopted a legislative proposal for a Directive on corporate 
susta inability due diligence. The aim of this Directive is to foster sustainable and responsible 
corporate behaviour and to anchor human rights and environmental considerations in companies' 
operations and corporate governance. The proposal is still with the EU 's legislature, and the new 
rules once adopted will ensure that businesses address adverse impacts of their actions, including 
in their value chains inside and outside Europe.  
Question 5:  
Please elaborate on the obligations the Directive would create for non-EU companies that are part 
of the value chains of EU enterprises, and on companies outside the EU territory that are owned by 
EU persons, and please share how does the EU plan to ensure that these companies outside the EU 
will comply with the Directive ? 
 
Reply:  Non-EU companies that are part of the value chains of EU enterprises, and companies outside 
the EU territory that are owned by EU persons which do not operate in the EU and do not meet the 
EU turnover criterion established in Article  2 of the Cor porate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive 
proposal (hereinafter the CSDDD) would be out of the scope of the initiative. However, if they are 
part of the value chains of the EU companies under the scope, they will be indirectly affected, as the 
EU compa nies will have to carry out the due diligence obligations envisaged in the proposal and, 
therefore, will have to oversee and check that there are no existing or potential negative impacts, 
prevent them, mitigate them and bring them to an end, if that is th e case. For this reason, the 
CSDDD requires companies to conduct due diligence to prevent and mitigate adverse impacts and 
fosters continuous engagement, i.e. through investment into the value chain where necessary or via 
support to an SME business partner . It is envisaged that the European Commission may put in place 
supporting measures building on existing EU actions and tools to support due diligence 
implementation within the European  Union  and in third countries, including facilitation of joint 
stakehol der initiatives to help companies fulfil their obligations and support SMEs affected by the 
CSDDD. This may be further complemented by EU development cooperation instruments to support 
third country governments and upstream economic operators in third coun tries addressing adverse 
human rights and environmental impacts of their operations and upstream business relationships.  
 
Paragraph 5.33., page 24  
"In the Communication on Decent Work Worldwide60 of February 2022 the EU reaffirmed its 
commitment to champion decent work in cooperation with other countries. The EU promotes decent 
work across all sectors and policy areas in line with a comprehensive app roach that addresses 
workers in domestic markets, in third countries and in global supply chains (see section 5.2.1). " 
Question 6:  
¿Qué mecanismo va a permitir a la UE hacer esa identificación de trabajo decente y, en el caso de 
no cumplir un Miembro, ¿q ué va a hacer la UE?  
 
Reply:  The EU uses a variety of means to monitor decent work and to identify shortcomings. They 
include reports from the EU Delegations in non -EU countries, supervisory mechanisms (reports, 
observations or recommendations) of internat ional organisations such as the International Labour 
Organization, reports from other stakeholders defending workers' rights such as trade unions, or an 
EU single entry point for stakeholders who can launch a substantiated complaint for alleged 
non-complia nce with Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) provisions under the EU's free trade 
agreements (FTAs) or the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP). The EU also performs its own 
monitoring of commitments relating to e.g. the GSP or the TSD chapters of t he EU's FTAs.  
 
Depending on the policy area, instrument and context, the EU response can range from engagement 
and dialogue (through e.g. human rights or labour dialogues), cooperation and technical assistance WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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(through e.g. international partnerships, deve lopment projects or neighbourhood and enlargement 
policies) to dispute settlement (government consultations and panel of experts – in case of an alleged 
breach of a TSD commitment under an FTA), enhanced engagement and monitoring or, as a last 
resort, with drawal of trade preferences (under the EU's GSP in case of serious and systematic 
violations).  
 
5.2.3 Small and Medium Sized enterprises (SMEs)  
Paragraph 5.37, page 24  
"SMEs need a transparent, predictable and more certain global environment to make the most of 
trade opportunities. Thus, the EU encourages raising awareness and promoting the use of 
information platforms, such as the European Commission's Access2Markets platform64, to help SMEs 
understand and reap the benefits of international trade and of EU trade agreements".  
 
Question 7:  
In Paragraph 5.37 mentions the use of information platforms, such as the European Commission's 
Access2Markets platform, to help SMEs understand and reap the benefits of international trade and 
of EU trade agreements. In this regard, Chile would appreciate it if the European  Union  can give 
more details on which public agencies were participating in the development of this platform.  
 
Reply:  The Directorate -General for Trade of the European Commission developed the 
Access2Ma rkets platform and launched it on 13  October  2020. The Access2Markets platform 
replaced the two predecessor tools of the Directorate -General for Trade: Market Access Database 
and the EU Trade Helpdesk.  
 
5.2.5 Gender equality and women's economic empowermen t 
Paragraph 5.45, page 26  
"The EU is supportive of the inclusion of the trade and gender equality dimension in the WTO context. 
From the outset, the EU has been a strong proponent of the 2017 Buenos Aires Joint Declaration on 
Trade and Women's Economic Emp owerment. The EU has been a member of the informal working 
group (IWG) on trade and gender in the WTO since its creation in the autumn of 2020. In early  2022, 
the EU launched a project with the International Trade Centre that looks at applying a gender len s 
to the work of the WTO. In this context, four webinars have been organised on topics such as 
e-commerce, trade facilitation, investment facilitation and government procurement".  
Questions 8:  
In relation to the webinars that the EU has been organizing related to gender equality dimension in 
the WTO context ¿is there any webpage or reports from these webinars and where it could be found?  
 
Reply:  The reports that were discussed in the webinars are published and can be found here:  
1. A Gender A nalytical Framework to Guide the World Trade Organization Action on Women's 
Economic Empowerment: click here  
2. Developing a Gender Lens for E -commerce at the World Trade Organization: click here  
3. Developing a Gender Lens for Government Procurement at the World Trade Organization: 
click here  
4. Developing a Gender Lens for Investment Facilitation at the World Trade Organization: 
click he re 
5. Developing a Gender Lens for Trade Facilitation at the World Trade Organization: click he re 
 
Paragraph 5.47, page 26  
"Under the EU's Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP), the EU monitors respect by beneficiary 
countries for the principles of core international conventions on promoting women's rights and 
gender equality, notably the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women the Convention concerning Equal Remuneration of Men and Women Workers for Work of 
Equal Value, and the Convention concerning Discrimination in Respec t of Employment and 
Occupation".  
Question 9:  
In paragraph 5.47 it is mentioned that EU monitors respect by beneficiary countries for the principles 
of core international conventions on promoting women's rights and gender equality. Chile would like 
to ask to EU how this monitoring or supervision is carried out respect by beneficiary countries.  
 
Reply:  The EU engages in regular monitoring with GSP + beneficiaries based on their commitment 
to implementation of international conventions, including on human rights, such as the Covenant on 
Elimination of All Discrimination Against Women, as well as other relevant international conventions WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 and agreements  that touch upon the civil, social, and labour rights of women. The monitoring is 
conducted in regular monitoring cycles according to the GSP Regulation (EU) 978/2012, Article  13, 
through review of monitoring body reports, exchanges of information, civil s ociety consultations, 
and monitoring visits. The results of the monitoring are presented in regular reports according to 
Article  14 of the GSP Regulation.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442 - UE (WTO Secretary report)  
 
1 ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
1.1 Main features of the economy  
Paragraph 1.3, page 14  
"EU external trade in goods is dominated by imports of primary products and exports of machinery 
and transport equipment. Statistics on global value chains also demonstrate that sourcing was most 
prevalent from one EU member States to  another, thus further emphasizing the benefits of the single 
market."  
Question 10:   
Paragraph 1.3 emphasizes the importance of the Single Market for Global Value Chains. Considering 
the existence of an important trade agreement between Chile and the EU, h ow does EU see the 
possibility of incorporating Chile into these Value Chains, but not only as suppliers of raw materials, 
but as partners for the production of goods and services with greater value added?  
 
Reply:  The EU -Chile Advanced Framework Agreement (AFA) will further facilitate trade and 
investment between the EU and Chile, as compared to the already very favourable bilateral 
Association Agreement, currently in force.  
 
In addition to further liberalisation in goods and services and to the expanded co verage in public 
procurement, the AFA also contains a dedicated chapter for small and medium -sized enterprises 
(SMEs) to address the specific challenges of SMEs in international trade and investment activities. 
More than 98% of Chile's enterprises are SMEs . Hence, these provisions will be particularly helpful 
towards Chile's participation into the EU Single Market.  
 
Chile's SMEs will gain significantly from measures such as tariff elimination, simplified customs 
procedures and more compatible technical requ irements, which will lower export related costs per 
sold unit and allow SMEs with lower trade volumes to compete alongside larger companies on the 
EU Single Market. This will also enhance Chilean SMEs' ability to participate in supply chains, 
e-commerce, and public procurement and to provide services.  
 
1.2.5 Employment trends, including gender  
Paragraph 1.27, page 22  
"The importance of trade, in particular exports, in supporting EU employment is significant; in 2019, 
an estimated 38.1 million EU jobs were supported by extra -EU exports, i.e. more than 18% of total 
EU employment.33 Furthermore, jobs supported by exports paid 12% higher wages compared to 
other jobs.34 However, there was a gender gap in the employment supported by exports, as 38% 
of the jobs we re occupied by women and 62% by men, and women had a lower wage premium, 8%, 
compared to 11% for men".  
Question 11:  
In Paragraph 1.27, there is a mention of jobs occupied by women. Chile would like to ask if there 
has been an increase, since 2019 in the p articipation of women in jobs related to exports and, if 
there is an increase, how it was possible to increase those numbers, through some incentive, 
program, or other.  
 
Reply:  We cannot answer this question directly, as the last study we did on the links of trade and 
jobs occupied by women used 2019 data. However, the European Commission has been involved in 
initiatives in support of the employment and social inclusion of women:  
 
• In March 2020, the European Commission published the EU Gender Equality 
Strategy  2020-2025. The objective of closing gender gaps in the labour market, in all types 
of employment, is addressed by the Strategy and the measures envisaged therein. The text 
of the Strategy is publicly available at the official website of the EU at: https://eur -
lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0152 .  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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• On 5 March  2020, the European Commission published a report on the implementation of 
the EU Action Plan 2017 -2019 on tackling the gender pay gap through a holistic approach of 
24 action points distributed under eight main strands of action. The implementation 
continu es of the most action points. The report is publicly available at the official website of 
the EU at: https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2020 -03/com -2020-101_en.pdf .  
 
• In 2020, the EU launched the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) to make European 
economies and societies more sustainable and resilient. Besides fostering green and digital 
investments, one of the key objectives o f the facility is to promote women's labour market 
participation and reduce gender -based segregation in the labour market. The Facility has an 
overall budget of EUR  750 billion . More information is available at the dedicated RRF website  
:Recovery and Resilience Facility (europa.eu) . 
 
2 TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
2.2 Trade policy formulation and objectives  
Paragraph 2.6, page 32  
"The European Commission is in charge of formulating, coordinating, and implementing EU trade 
policy. During the review period, the European  Union  updated its trade strategy (and objectives) 
and took various steps to support its impl ementation. The new policy – An Open, Sustainable, and 
Assertive Trade Policy – was published in February 2021 following a public consultation process. The 
policy sets the European  Union 's priorities until 2030 and replaces the Trade for All Strategy that 
had been in place since 2015."  
 
 
Question 12:   
Paragraph 2.6, Table  2.1. "An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy 2021 -2030", stands out 
among the "Six areas of action", the one that states "2. Supporting the transition towards a greener 
economy and promoting value chains that are sustainable, and in line with EU standards". Chile 
would like to know how can this action contribute to developing a trade relationship that allows – 
especially with developing countries – to generate value chain s that encourage technology transfer 
of green technologies, as well as the production of goods and services with higher added value?  
 
Reply:  The Communication on an Open, Sustainable and Assertive sets out the role that the EU 
intends to play, multilateral ly, bilaterally and autonomously, in making trade more supportive of the 
green transition. In this regard, it is important to stress that the openness and sustainability pillars 
of the EU's trade strategy are largely intertwined:  
 
WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 − trade typically lowers  the emission intensity of production by boosting firms' productivity. 
Indeed, trade induces the expansion of more productive and cleaner firms that gain market 
shares;  
− trade also facilitates the diffusion of green goods, services and technologies and he nce 
contributes to the development of the green tech sector.  
 
Moreover, as the EU moves towards implementing its autonomous instruments in support of the 
green transition, it will actively work together with its partners. The EU will invest in dialogue and  
help with efforts to decarbonise via technical assistance and green investments under the Global 
Gateway (as announced in the Green Deal Industrial Plan Communication). In doing so, it will take 
into account the level of development of our partners.  
 
Para graph 2.12, page 34  
"In addition to the review of its trade policy, the Commission has updated its strategy in various 
areas to support the EU environmental and digital objectives, and adapt them to the most recent 
geopolitical developments, notably the wa r in Ukraine. Some of these strategies have implications 
for trade, such as the new energy (Section 4.4) and industrial strategies. Under the updated 
industrial strategy of 2021, the European Union seeks, inter alia, to reduce dependencies from third 
count ries for its value chains in strategic areas by diversifying suppliers, substituting inputs, and 
pursuing international alliances.23 These dependencies have been identified in energy -intensive 
(e.g. raw materials and chemicals), health (e.g. active pharmac eutical ingredients), and advanced 
technologies (e.g. semiconductors, lithium batteries, and hydrogen) sectors. During the review 
period, the European Union also updated its common agricultural policy (Section 4.1, Chart 2.2)."  
Question 13:  
Paragraph 2.12 . highlights that "Under the updated industrial strategy of 2021, the European Union 
seeks, inter alia , to reduce dependencies from third countries for its value chains in strategic areas 
by diversifying suppliers, substituting inputs, and pursuing interna tional alliances". Chile would like 
to clarify: does this "reduction of dependencies" mean that the possibilities of establishing value 
chains with countries outside the EU are diminishing?   
 
Reply:  For the EU, dependencies refer to concentration of supply in a limited number of providers, 
sometimes a single one. Reduction of dependencies and resilience can be achieved with increased 
diversification and substitutability across suppliers. Addressing d ependencies is thus not about 
relying on the EU market; instead, for the EU openness to trade and international cooperation are 
essential parts of efforts to diversify sources of supply and address supply chain vulnerabilities.  
 
Reducing dependencies by di versification can take different forms, including raising the number of 
suppliers located in countries outside the EU. "[P]ursuing international alliances" constitutes one 
form in which public policy can assist the diversification efforts of enterprises. H ence paragraph 2.12 
does not mean that  "the possibilities of establishing value chains with countries outside the EU are 
diminishing" . 
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1 Measures directly affecting imports  
3.1.5.1 Prohibitions and restrictions  
Paragraph 3.80, page 74  
"In 2020 and 2021, amendments were introduced to the Regulation on goods used for capital 
punishment, torture, or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, with a view to 
updating the competent authorities and the a pplicable destination countries. The Regulation on 
hazardous chemicals and the Regulation on wastes were amended to change the product coverage 
in their annexes, and the Regulation implementing the Kimberley Process certification scheme for 
diamonds was am ended three times to update the participants and competent authorities and to 
reflect the United  Kingdom 's withdrawal from the European  Union ." 
Question 14 :  
Regarding paragraph 3.80 about the amendments to the Regulation on goods used for capital 
punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, with a view to 
updating the competent authorities and applicable countries of destination. In this regard, Chile 
would like to know where can these modifications be found?  
 
Reply:  The amendments to the Regulation on goods used for capital punishment, torture or other 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment can be found in the following links:  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/621 of 18 February 2020 amending Annexes I and V 
to Regulation (EU) 2019/125  
 
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/139 of 4  December  2020 amending Annexes I and V 
to Regulation (EU) 2019/125 to take into account  the withdrawal of the United  Kingdom  from the 
Union . 
 
3.1.6 Anti -dumping, countervai ling, and safeguard measures  
3.1.6.1 Anti -dumping and countervailing duties  
Paragraph 3.88, page 79  
"The European Union continued to be a significant user of trade remedies during the review period 
as new investigations of anti -dumping (AD) and anti -subsidy (AS) measures continued unabated 
despite the challenges of the COVID -19 pandemic (Chart 3.3). Howe ver, while the pandemic did not 
have an impact on the pace of investigations, there were other impacts. One impact was on 
verifications due to travel restrictions, whereby the Commission changed to verifying company data 
by remote cross -checking by videoco nference in lieu of on -site visits. Another effect was the use of 
suspension provision during the pandemic, reportedly to address supply chain disruptions in one 
case. Nevertheless, trade remedies, or trade defence instruments (TDIs) as the European Union 
refers to them, continued to be an important trade policy tool. At the end of 2022, there were 178  AD 
and AS measures in place that supported 440,706 direct jobs."  
Question 15:   
In the understanding that according to what is stated in the report the Europe an Union  continued to 
use corrective trade measures during the period under review, maintaining investigations on anti -
dumping (AD) and anti -subsidy (AS) measures by applying flexibilities such as cross -verification via 
videoconference instead of on -site v isits. Chile would like to ask to EU if this flexibility in Defense 
Instruments has been considered for the post -Pandemic period.  
 
Reply:  In the post -pandemic period, the EU is resuming on -site verification visits as the various 
travel restrictions are lif ted in countries affected by investigations. The verification by video 
conference served its purpose during the pandemic but on spot visits are preferred. However, the 
EU may also consider a hybrid system with remote verifications in specific situations gi ven the overall 
effectiveness.  
 
3.3 Measures affecting production and trade  
3.3.2.2 Technical requirements and European harmonized standards  
Paragraph 3.175, page 105  
"Manufacturers that decide to use European harmonised  standards published in the OJEU are granted 
the presumption of conformity with the essential requirements in the EU legislation and in most 
cases allowed to use a self -certification procedure. If the product complies with these requirements, 
manufacturers  can issue an EU declaration of conformity whereby they declare the product meets 
the essential requirements in accordance with EU legislation and can affix the CE marking in the 
product. Manufacturers not using such European harmonised standards must in c ertain cases show 
compliance with the product requirements by having recourse to a conformity assessment conducted 
by a third party."  
Pregunta Question16:  
De acuerdo con lo señalado en el párrafo 3.175 sobre el uso del procedimiento de " autocertificación". 
Chile agradecería a la UE que pueda aclarar ¿en qué casos es posible utilizar dicho enfoque? ¿Deben 
estar necesariamente las normas UE armonizadas? ¿Existe alguna matriz de riesgos de estos 
productos que maneja la UE?  
 
Reply:  Self-certification can be used if the specific product legislation provides for it. The only 
module that does not include third party conformity assessment is module A. As a general rule, 
specific EU product legislation provides that when European harmonised standar ds exist and the 
manufacturers use them they will benefit from a less stringent conformity assessment procedure 
and namely, module A. Decision No 768/2008/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
9 July 2008 on a common framework for the marketi ng of products provides for a menu of modules, 
enabling the legislator to choose a procedure from the least to the most stringent, in proportion to 
the level of risk involved and the level of safety required.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 3.3.2.3 Conformity system and market surveilla nce 
Paragraph 3.189, page 108:  
"In addition to these MRAs, the European  Union  has an Agreement on Conformity Assessment and 
Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAAs) with Israel. The ACAA provides for the alignment of 
Israel's relevant legislation to that of the European  Union  for good manufacturing practices for 
pharmaceutical products. The European  Union  intends to conclude further ACAAs with candidate 
countries for EU membership, potential candidate countries, and EU neighbouring countries. 
Since  2019, p reparations to start negotiations have been ongoing for an ACAA with Ukraine."  
 
Pregunta Question 17:  
En relación al párrafo 3.189 sobre acuerdos de reconocimiento, Chile agradecería si la UE pudiera 
indicar si estos acuerdos son vinculantes o voluntarios  y si se han establecido en el marco de algún 
acuerdo comercial.  
 
Reply:  The Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAAs) 
with Israel is a protocol to the Euro -Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between 
the EU and Israel. It is a binding agreement. The ACAA with Ukraine that is currently under 
preparation will have the same structure, a binding protocol to the Association Agreement between 
the EU and Ukraine.  
 
3.3.3 Sanitary and phytosanitary requirements  
Paragraph 3.199, page 109 -110: 
"Regarding veterinary medicines, the European Union started applying in January 2022 Regulation 
(EU) 2019/6, which was adopted in 2018. The Regulation updates the rules on the manufacturing, 
trade, sale, and use of veterinary medicinal products and includes provisions to stimulate innovation 
in this area and regulate the use of antimicrobials. In this regard, both importers and domestic 
business are, for instance, subject to a prohibition on the use of antimicrobi al medicinal products in 
animals to promote growth or increase yield. The Commission indicates that this provision is not yet 
operational."  
Pregunta Question 18:  
En relación con el párrafo 3.199 del reglamento de medicamentos veterinarios, se indica que l a 
disposición sobre el uso de medicamentos antimicrobianos aún no está operativa. Chile agradecería 
si la UE pudiera aclarar ¿a qué se refiere con que no está aún operativa esta disposición? ¿Esto 
implica alguna desventaja para los productos importados en comparación con la producción 
nacional? Si se refiere a una aplicación parcial, ¿qué parte de la regulación aún no se ha 
implementado y cómo se asegura de que la falta de operatividad no afecte a las empresas de terceros 
países?  
 
Reply:  Regulation (EU) 201 9/6[1] on veterinary medicinal pr oducts provides for a wide range of 
concrete measures regarding the use of antimicrobial medicinal products in animals. Those measures 
are already fully applicable in EU Member States and are stricter and broader than the conditions 
required for goods to b e exported by third countries to the European  Union .  
 
With regard to the measures applicable to operators in third countries in respect of animals or 
products of animal origin exported to the European  Union , Article  118(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/6 
only refers to Article  37(5) and Article  107(2) of that Regulation. Those articles lay down, 
respectively, the prohibition on the use in animals of antimicrobials that have been reserved in the 
EU for the treatment of certain infections in humans (i.e. tho se designated in Commission 
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1255[2]) and on the use of antimicrobial medicinal products in 
animals for the purpose of promoting growth or to increase yield.  
 
Pursuant to Article  118(2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/6, the European Commission has adopted 
Commiss ion Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/905[3], which establishes detailed rules on the 
application of the provisions in Article  118(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/6.  
 
While Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/905 was published on 4  May 2023, its 
requirements are not applicable yet. The conditions for entry into the European  Union  of 
consignments of animals or certain products of animal origin intended for human consumption 
referred to in Article  1(2) of that Regulation will only apply as  from 24 months after the date of 
application of the implementing Regulation referred to in Article  6(1) of Commission Delegated 
Regulation (EU) 2023/905 . This period of time will help third countries' operators and competent 
authorities to take the necess ary measures to comply with the EU import requirements.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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The European Commission is working on the two Implementing Regulations that are necessary for 
the application of Delegated Regulation 2023/905 as established in its Articles 5(1) and 6(1) (list of 
approved third countries and specific requirements on the official certificates). The EU will keep third 
countries duly informed of the developments with regard to these implementing Regulations, 
including in ad hoc  meetings.  
 
The EU would also like to under line that, in compliance with the EU's international obligations, the 
drafts of the above -mentioned Implementing Regulations will be notified to the Secretariat of the 
WTO Agreement  on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. Therefore, Chil e will 
have the opportunity to comment on them before they are adopted by the European Commission .  
 
[1]  Regulation (EU) 2019/6 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11  December  2018 on 
veterinary medicinal products and repealing Directive 2001/82/EC (OJ L 4, 7.1.2019, p. 43)  
[2]  Commissio n Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1255 of 19  July 2022 designating antimicrobials or 
groups of antimicrobials reserved for treatment of certain infections in humans, in accordance with 
Regulation (EU) 2019/6 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 191, 20.7.2022, p. 58)  
[3]  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/905 of 27  February  2023 supplementing Regulation 
(EU) 2019/6 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the application of the 
prohibition of use of certain antimicrobial medicinal products in anim als or products of animal origin 
exported from third countries into the Union (OJ L 116, 4.5.2023, p.1)  
 
4 Trade Policies by Sector  
4.1 Agriculture  
Paragraph 4.1, page 133  
"The agricultural sector continues to play an important role in the European Union in terms of 
employment, trade, and policy support. Crop and animal production (including hunting) accounted 
for 1.6% of EU gross value added and the manufacturing of food products, beverages, and tobacco 
products accounted for an additional 2.1% of g ross value added in 2020, not including other parts 
of the value chain such as wholesale, retail, or catering. The total production value of agricultural 
products increased from EUR 378 billion in 2019 to EUR 401 billion in 2021. The share of crops in 
total production increased from 56.7% to 60.2%, driven by increases in wheat and maize production 
values, while the production value of live animals remained broadly stable and that of animal 
products increased marginally, with both declining as a share of tot al production (Table 4.1)"  
Question 19:  
According to paragraph 4.1, the total production value of agriculture increased from EUR  378 billion  
in 2019 to EUR  401 billion  in 2021, and the share of crop production in the total value increased 
from 56.7% to 60 .2%. This increase was mainly driven by the rise in production values of wheat 
and maize. In this regard, Chile would greatly appreciate it if the EU could provide information on 
what measures or factors contributed to the increase in production value of t hese crops.  
 
Reply:  The increase of value of production in 2021 is due to increase in global cereals prices, not 
the volume of EU wheat and maize production which was actually lower in 2021 compared to 2019.  
 
4.1.2 Agricultural policy  
Paragraph 4.8, page 1 34 
"The new CAP brings together the support via direct payments, internal market support, and that 
under the rural development scheme, incorporating the sustainability objectives of the 
European  Green Deal, the Farm to Fork Strategy referenced therein, and  the Biodiversity 
Strategy  2030. It aims to "ensure a sustainable future for European farmers, provide more targeted 
support to smaller farms, and allow greater flexibility for member States in adapting the measures 
to local conditions", according to the C ouncil."  
Paragraph 4.9, page 134 -135 
Reform (i)  significantly increases the focus on measures aiming to address challenges relating to the 
climate, the environment, and animal welfare (including a strengthened system of conditionality for 
direct payments);  (ii) introduces implementation and administrative changes; (iii)  makes 
adjustments to various measures; and (iv)  introduces a new concept of social European 
conditionality. Importantly, it introduces new CAP strategic plans (CSPs), by member State, 
combining the planning for all measures under the new framework (Section  4.1.2.2). Nevertheless, 
while increasing the focus on sustainability and finetuning the framework of support overall, it 
remains unchanged in terms of the level and composition of sup port it provides.  
Question 20:  
According to paragraphs 4.8 and 4.9, it is indicated that the CAP combines support through direct 
payments, internal market support, and the rural development scheme, incorporating the WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 sustainability objectives of the Europ ean Green Deal. This significantly increases the focus on 
measures aimed at addressing challenges related to climate, environment, and animal welfare, 
including a strengthened system of conditionality for direct payments. The CAP also introduces 
implementa tion and administrative changes, among others.  
 
In this regard, Chile would greatly appreciate it if the EU could explain how the CAP will address 
sustainable objectives and promote greater coherence between agriculture, trade, and Green Deal 
policies with out negatively impacting on competitiveness developing countries, considering the 
significant external dimension of the CAP reform.  
 
Reply:  The EU understands that Chile's question on the "external dimension of the CAP reform" 
concerns the possible standards applied to imports in the frame of Green deal and Farm to Fork. The 
EU is available to further explain its reply if this is not what Chi le means with this question.  
 
Sustainability is fundamental to long -term food security. We need more resilient and sustainable 
food systems now more than ever. The EU is a global player, and as the world's third largest importer 
of agri -food it can contrib ute to promoting sustainability in third countries. Therefore, we need to 
reflect on how to ensure that also imported agri -food products are produced sustainably.  
 
There are three areas of action to achieve this goal:  
 
· Multilateral fora (UN, Codex, WTO etc.) 
· Bilateral cooperation: the EU pursues targeted cooperation with partners who are willing to 
improve the sustainability of their local production. Hence, the Generalised Scheme of 
Preferences for low and lower -middle income countries and newer trade  agreements 
contain binding commitments to respect multilateral environmental agreements as well as 
includes a chapter on sustainable food systems (for example in the FTA Chile). The latter 
chapter will contribute to enhance cooperation in key areas such a s animal welfare, the 
use of pesticides and the fight against antimicrobial resistance.  
· Finally, autonomous EU measures, such as on deforestation [US and UK having similar 
proposals], CBAM or corporate sustainability due diligence. Whenever the EU consid ers 
applying such measures to imported products, this is done in full respect of WTO rules.  
 
A very important point is the strong EU commitment to step up its engagement with partner 
countries, especially developing countries, to assist producer countries where necessary. More 
generally, the EU with its Member States is the world's largest provider of Aid for Trade, 13% of 
which is targeting least developed countries specifically. EU policies and programmes for cooperation 
and development will continue to s upport developing countries in the transition to sustainable food 
systems.  
 
The Green Deal policies are necessary if we are all to reach our climate goals by 2030 and 2050. If 
only Europe has higher requirements for agriculture we will just outsource carbo n leakage to other 
parts of the world, defeating the purpose of UNFCCC Agreements, which are tackling a global 
challenge. All our measures are designed to be in line with WTO rules.  
 
Paragraph 4.10, page 134  
"The new CAP uses a more results -based approach compared to the previous policy, measuring 
overall progress towards defined targets as well as the 10 key objectives contained in the new CAP, 
and linking funding eligibility to results. While the 10 key objectives contained in the n ew CAP are in 
principle unchanged from the 9 objectives and 1 cross -cutting objective of the previous CAP, they 
play a more important role than previously, according to the Commission. Focusing on social, 
environmental, and economic goals, they are to (i) ensure a fair income for farmers; (ii) increase 
competitiveness; (iii) improve the position of farmers in the food chain; (iv) take action on climate 
change; (v) foster environmental care; (vi) preserve landscapes and biodiversity; (vii) support 
generation al renewal; (viii) facilitate vibrant rural areas; (ix) protect food and health quality; and 
(x) foster knowledge and innovation."  
Paragraph 4.16, page 136  
"Member States will have to allocate at least 25% of total allocations for direct payments to 
"eco-schemes". Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 spells out that member States are to define such 
voluntary schemes covering at least two objectives spelled out in Article  31, which would go beyond 
Good Agricultural and Environmental Conditions (GAECs), conditions set b y Union or national law, 
or other conditionality already contained in the Regulation. Farmers committing to adhere to WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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agricultural practices defined in these schemes related to climate and the environment, public and 
plant health, and animal welfare would then be eligible for a payment on all eligible hectares."  
 
Question 21  
According to paragraphs 4.10 and 4.16, the new policy adopts a more results -based approach 
compared to the previous one, taking into account the 10 key objectives contained in the new C AP. 
These objectives include ensuring a fair income for farmers, increasing competitiveness, and taking 
action on climate change, among others. Additionally, it is indicated that Member States will have 
to allocate at least 25% of total allocations for dir ect payments to "eco -schemes".  
 
In this regard, and as a result of the sustainable approach of the new CAP, Chile would appreciate 
it if the EU could comment on whether they expect EU farmers' production levels to be affected, 
mainly due to the decreasing use of pesticides, chemical fertilizers, and other sorts of agricultural 
inputs required in production, because of the eco -schemes.  
 
In this context, what kind of funds, measures, or subsidies do you plan to apply to support EU 
farmers in maintaining their  competitiveness in the market? Will these supports be general or specific 
to certain agricultural sectors? Furthermore, which actions are you considering to ensure that these 
support programs are aligned with WTO rules?  
 
Reply:  The European Commission tak es note of the various studies analysing possible effects of a 
few elements of the Farm to Fork and Biodiversity strategies on EU agriculture. The Commission 
welcomes their contribution to the debate on the changes to our food system. All these studies, 
including the one presented by the Commission, are however not able to assess the full impact of 
the two Strategies and predict the future. However, they can provide both the scientific community 
and policy makers with a valuable insight on the choice of pol icy tools to mitigate possible risks and 
drive the necessary innovation.  
 
The findings from all studies highlight similar impacts with reductions of EU greenhouse gases 
emissions and EU agricultural production, and increases in prices. Carbon leakage is also identified 
as a key challenge in the implementation of the strategies. The Farm to Fork Strategy provides a 
clear set of measures to mitigate such risk.  
 
The models used in all studies are not capable of accounting for the upcoming evolutions. This 
includes demand -side changes as a result of consumer behaviour. The Farm to F ork Strategy 
contains a series of measures to address information to consumers, as well as to curb food waste. 
On the supply -side, technology and innovation will also play a key role in improving productivity and 
a better use of natural resources. Finally,  the studies do not take account of the losses of agricultural 
production as a result of climate -induced extreme weather events and biodiversity loss while it is 
clear that the cost of inaction is higher.  
 
The findings reinforce the need for a real transfo rmation of our food system at EU and global level, 
in line with the Farm to Fork strategy. The Commission is committed to make this transition towards 
more sustainable food systems successful so that our food systems reduce their negative impact on 
climate  change and biodiversity loss, while ensuring that farmers and consumers can benefit from it 
and our long -term food security is safeguarded. The Commission is also committed to supporting 
farmers in this transition, and calls on Member States to mobilize t he instruments at their disposal 
under the new Common Agricultural Policy to do so. It is crucial that all parts of the food chain 
continue to invest and innovate, and the Farm to Fork Strategy, along with the CAP's budget of 
€387 billion , support that. Th e Commission will closely monitor agricultural production and prices 
throughout the implementation of the initiatives stemming from the strategies.  
 
The Commission has recently published an overview that summarises key elements of the 
28 approved Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) Strategic Plans that underpin the policy's 
implementation for 2023 -2027. The information provided here is based on data in the approved 
versions of the Plans by 31  December  2022 and updates the overview of the draft Strategi c Plans 
published in June 2022. It does not take into account any amendments which might be under 
assessment, following the approval of the Plans by the end of 2022. The overview aims to outline 
key elements and choices set out by the Member States in thei r Plans and responds to requests for 
information to summarise what the Plans contain and aim to deliver. It also highlights some 
examples which can serve as a further basis for exchanging of information and mutual learning. The 
information is not exhaustiv e. A Commission report on the 28 Strategic Plans is scheduled to be WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 published before the end of 2023, which will contain further analysis of how the Strategic Plans help 
achieve the CAP objectives. This report will be accompanied by a study, mapping and an alysing the 
28 CAP Strategic Plans more in detail.  
 
All EU support for agriculture is and will continue to be notified to the WTO in accordance with the 
WTO Agreemen t on Agriculture classification in its yearly DS1 notifications. For the interventions 
required to be compatible with Annex  2 to the Agreement on Agriculture or its Article  6.5, EU Member 
States are legally obliged to comply with the relevant obligations.  
 
4.1.2.1 The new framework for domestic support from 2023  
Paragraph 4.13, page 135 -136 
"Support provided as direct payments under the new CAP remains the main income support tool, 
but the measures funded differ slightly from those under the previous system . Direct payments are 
available for (i)  basic income support; (ii)  complementary redistributive income support; 
(iii) complementary income support for young farmers; and (iv)  schemes for the climate, the 
environment, and animal welfare ("eco -schemes"). In addition, there are direct payments for 
coupled income support and a crop -specific payment for cotton. Member States can continue to 
establish optional payment schemes for small farmers, outlined in their strategic plans, replacing all 
other direct payment s." 
Question 22:  
According to paragraph 4.13, it is indicated that direct payment remains the main income support 
tool. In this regard, Chile would appreciate it if the EU could explain the difference between basic 
income support and complementary redistributive income support. Additionally, could the EU explain 
if there are guidelines or standards for eco -schemes that farmers must adhere to ensure that any 
measure is approved to obtain additional direct payments?   
 
Reply:  The Basic In come Support for Sustainability (BISS) is a compulsory intervention taking the 
form of an annual decoupled payment per eligible hectare. Its "raison d'être" is t o provide a basic 
layer of income support to all active farmers and help ensuring a fair standa rd of living for the 
agricultural community. It is granted for each eligible hectare declared by an active farmer (in other 
words, the BISS is paid to all eligible hectares, irrespective of the physical farm size of the holding). 
Member States must impleme nt this scheme (no derogation possible). However, the size of the 
BISS budgetary allocation is at the discretion of Member States (i.e. Member States may choose 
what share of their respective Direct payments' envelopes they wish to allocate to the BISS).  
 
The Complementary Redistributive Income Support for Sustainability (CRISS) is also a mandatory 
intervention under the new CAP framework whose objective is to improve distribution of direct 
payments by redistributing income support from larger to small and medium -sized farms. Member 
States are to allocate at least 10% of direct payments' envelope to the CRISS. It takes the form of 
an annual decoupled payment per eligible hectare to farmers who are entitled to a payment under 
the BISS. The key difference is t hat it is paid only up to a certain maximum threshold (i.e. it is a 
sort of a "top up" for the "first hectares"; for instance, if the CRISS maximum threshold is set at 
30 hectares, a beneficiary farming 50 eligible hectares will receive the CRISS only for the first 30  ha, 
while he/she will receive the BISS for all the 50 hectares). Note that Member States may ask for a 
derogation from the minimum ring -fencing for the CRISS (i.e. allocate less than 10% to the CRISS 
or not implement CRISS at all) provided the y demonstrate that redistribution needs are sufficiently 
addressed via other tools financed by the EAGF (e.g. capping/degressivity, Payment to small 
farmers, Coupled income support etc.).  
 
As regards guidelines and standards EU Member are provided with a fact sheet with a list of practices 
(non-exhaustive) that could be supported with eco -schemes found here:  
https://agriculture.ec.europa .eu/system/files/2021 -01/factsheet -agri-practices -under -
ecoscheme_en_0.pdf .  
The Commission also closely works with EU Member States on the design, implementation and legal 
compliance of the eco -schemes. Commission guidel ines and standards on eco schemes are also 
based on the work of Joint Research Centre (European Commission's science and knowledge 
service).  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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4.1.7 Domestic support levels  
4.1.7.1 WTO notifications  
Paragraph 4.75, page 150  
"Notified levels of support remained broadly unchanged between 2013 and 2019 overall. However, 
compared to the latest available information during the previous Review for marketing year 2016/17, 
Green Box support increased by more than EUR 6 billion, prima rily driven by increases for structural 
adjustment assistance provided through resource retirement programmes as well as through 
investment aids, while Amber Box support declined by around EUR 1.6 billion (by around 
EUR 0.4 billion including de minimis) an d Blue Box support remained unchanged (Chart 4.1)."  
 
Question 23:  
According to paragraph 4.75, it is indicated that Green Box support increased by more than 
EUR 6 billion , primarily driven by increases for structural adjustment assistance provided through  
resource retirement programs as well as through investment aids. In this regard, Chile would 
appreciate it if the EU could explain the term "investment aids" and what kind of programs it 
considers. Additionally, what kind of programs were withdrawn to obt ain resources for structural 
adjustment assistance? Are these programs compatible with Annex  2 of the Agricultural Agreement?  
 
Reply:  "Structural Adjustment Assistance provided through Investment Aids"  or investment support 
under the rural development prog ramming may include the following measures and/or interventions: 
aid for farm modernisation; purchase of machinery: equipment, buildings and plantations (not 
annual plantations under rural development); aid for young farmers and generational renewal; 
investment in restructuring of semi -subsistence farming; reallocation of land, diversification of rural 
activity and quality schemes; setting –up support for producer groups and producer organisations; 
grubbing up of vineyards (not under rural development); nati onal restructuring programmes for the 
cotton sector (not under rural development). Beneficiaries cannot receive support for the same type 
of interventions and/or same actions from another instrument or programme. Details of these 
programmes can be found in  the following legal sources: Regulation (EU) 2015/2284 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation 1257/1999, Council Regulation 1698/2005, 
Council  Regulation 479/2008, Commission Regulation 1857/2006, Agricultural State Aid 
Guidelin es 2014/C 204/01, Council Regulation 637/2008, Commission Regulation 1535/2007, 
Commission Regulation  1998/2006 and Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council.  
 
Such interventions are designed in compliance with paragraphs 1  and 11 of Annex  2 to the 
WTO Agreement  on Agriculture.  
 
4.2 Fisheries  
4.2.1 Fisheries policy  
Paragraph 4.86., page 154  
"The proposal to revise the European Fisheries Control System to address deficiencies identified in 
a regulatory fitness and performance programme (REFIT) evaluation, and mentioned in the previous 
Review, has not yet been approved by the Parliament and Cou ncil.95 Aiming to prevent, deter, and 
eliminate illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, including the marketing of fish and fish 
products so obtained, the EU IUU regulation applies to all vessels, landings, or transhipments, as 
well as trade in  fish and fish products.96 The regulation establishing the European Fisheries Control 
Agency and the SMEFF regulation97 complement the system aimed at ensuring compliance with the 
rules of the CFP."  
Question 24:  
Could the EU give further details with rega rds to the measures adopted to prevent, deter, and 
eliminate IUU fishing, particularly those measures related to the marketing of fish and fish products?   
 
Reply:  The proposal to revise the European Fisheries Control System is under the legislative process  
by the Parliament and Council. The European Commission proposal aims at introducing the legal 
provisions for the compulsory use of digital solutions by EU importers as regards the existing catch 
certification scheme part of Council Regulation 1005/2008 (E U IUU Regulation), digital traceability 
(expanded to processed fishery products) on the market as well as harmonisation of the enforcement 
provisions, including serious infringements, at for a more even implementation at EU level.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 4.2.2 Domestic support  
Paragraph 4.90., page 154  
"EMFAF priorities support (i) sustainable fisheries and conservation of aquatic biological resources; 
(ii) sustainable aquaculture, processing, and marketing of fishery and aquaculture products; (iii) a 
sustainable blue economy and  fishing and aquaculture communities; and (iv) strengthening 
international ocean governance and sustainable management.103 Funds are also foreseen for the 
sustainable development of the outermost regions.104 These priorities differ in structure, but not 
fundamentally in substance, from the six priorities spelled out under the EMFF. In addition to the 
implementation of national programmes by national authorities, an estimated 13% of funds are 
directly managed by the Commission for technical and administrativ e assistance, including for 
market intelligence."  
Question 25:  
Could the EU give further details in the objectives and type of activities that are supported in the 
literals listed in this paragraph?  
 
Reply:  Objectives and types of activities of EMFAF can be found here:  
https://oceans -and-fisheries.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2021 -07/emfaf -faq_en.pdf . 
 
4.4 Energy  
4.4.1 Sustainable energy and climate  
Paragraph 4.114., page 158  
"In 2021, the European Commission published the Fit-for-55 package, aiming to ensure EU policies 
align with the climate -related goals of the European Green Deal and the Climate Law, which includes 
an intermediate target of 55% GHG emission reduction by 2030 and becoming climate -neutral 
by 2050 (Section  1).133 The package contains the Fit -for-55 communication as well as 16 energy - 
and climate -related legislative proposals that are currently in various stages of discussion. The 
proposals relating to energy primarily focus on emission reductions through mul tiple channels such 
as, inter  alia, phasing out coal, accelerating the roll -out of renewables, increasing energy efficiency, 
and decarbonizing gas across various industries. The package also includes proposals to increase 
and broaden targets for emissions reductions; revise the Emissions Trading System, including 
expanding it to other sectors and complementing it with the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism; 
and establish a Social Climate Fund to cushion the impact of the introduction of the emissions tradin g 
in the building and road transport sectors on the vulnerable. Member States will be required to 
update their national energy and climate plans134 by 2023 and 2024, and to publish a national 
Social Climate Plan.  
Question 26:  
Could the EU explain the Soci al Climate Fund they will establish to cushion the impact of the 
introduction of the emissions trading in the building and road transport sectors on the vulnerable? 
And how it will operate?  
 
Reply:  The new Social Climate Fund (SCF) will provide dedicated f inancial support to Member States 
to help vulnerable households, micro -enterprises and transport users that are particularly affected 
by the price impacts of the introduction of emissions trading in the buildings and road transport 
sectors, especially citi zens in energy or transport poverty.  
 
The SCF will start operating in 2026, before the start of the new emissions trading system for 
buildings, road transport and small industry. It will provide €65  billion  in funding. With Member 
States' national contrib utions agreed at 25% of the total estimated costs, the Fund will mobilise 
€86.7  billion . It will be exceptionally and temporarily financed by external assigned revenues 
generated from auctioning of the emission allowances with the intention to budgetise th e Fund in 
the post -2027 Multiannual Financial Framework.  
 
The SCF will be a plan -based and performance -based support instrument. Each Member State should 
submit its Social Climate Plan, following a comprehensive stakeholder consultation, by mid -2025 to 
the European Commission who will assess the Plans' relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and 
coherence. The payments will be made by the Commission upon successful achievement of concrete 
milestones and targets identified in the Plans.  
 
The Social Climate Plan s will include investments in energy efficiency measures, the renovation of 
buildings, the decarbonisation of heating and cooling in buildings and the uptake of zero -emission 
and low -emission mobility and transport. Examples include home insulation, heat p umps, solar 
panels, electric mobility or public transport. Pending the impact of the investments on reducing WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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vulnerable groups' emissions and energy bills, Member States will also be able to provide direct 
income support, amounting up to 37.5% of the Socia l Climate Plans.  
 
4.5 Services  
4.5.2 Transport services  
4.5.2.4 Maritime transport services and port services  
Paragraph 4.226., page 181  
"If approved, the proposed reform of the ETD could eliminate the tax exemptions for fuels used for 
intra-EU waterborne navigation, while the proposed reform of the ETS that forms part of the 
Fit-for-55 package could phase in, until 2026, the inclusion of emissions from large ships (of 
5,000  GT and more) into the system, possibly covering 100% of emissions from i ntra-EU voyages 
and emissions while at berth328, and 50% of emissions from voyages between the European Union 
and third countries."  
Question 27:  
Could the EU explain how it is going to apply the inclusion of the large ships in the EU -ETS? 
 
Reply:  Ships ab ove 5000 GT will be included in the ETS from 2024. The system will build over the 
already existing monitoring and reporting system from GHG emissions established under 
Regulation  2015/757. From the start of application of the ETS for the maritime sector sh ipping 
companies will need to report emissions from 100% of the intra -EU voyages, 50% of the voyages 
to and from the EEA to third countries and emissions at berth related to the ships under their remit. 
Shipping companies will need to surrender ETS allowan ces for 40% of these emissions in 2024, 70% 
in 2025 and 100% as from 2026. The Commission is currently working in the secondary legislation 
establishing the detailed rules for the inclusion of the maritime sector in the ETS.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 MAURITIUS  
Question 1 – Paragraph 18 of Secretariat Report  
In 2021, the Commission adopted an EU Forest Strategy for 2030 and in late 2022, the Council and 
the Parliament reached a provisional agreement on a regulation aiming to prevent deforestation and 
forest degradation.  
Can you EU clarify whether an assessment has been conducted on the impact of such a measure on 
developing countries?  
Does the EU foresee any tailor made financial and technical assistance package to mitigate the 
impact of such a measure o n trade?  
 
Reply:   
The Regulation is based on an Impact Assessment in which the European Commission considered a 
number of case studies analyzing potential impact, including on third countries. The regulation also 
foresees that the Commission and EU Member  States will step up their engagement with third 
countries, both producers and consumer countries,  through partnerships and cooperation 
mechanisms focusing on the conservation, on restoration and sustainable use of forests, on 
deforestation, on forest degr adation, and on the transition to sustainable commodity production.  
 
Question 2 – Paragraph 6 of Secretariat Report  
During this period, the Commission also reviewed and updated its 2018 action plan on the 
implementation and enforcement of the Chapters on T rade and Sustainable Development (TSD) in 
EU RTAs. The new strategy was published in June 2022 and seeks to strengthen the role of TSD 
chapters and, more broadly, of EU RTAs in promoting "green and just economic growth".  
 
To this end, the strategy identifi es the following policy priorities: (i)  be more proactive in the 
cooperation with partners; (ii)  pursue a country -specific approach to identify TSD priorities; 
(iii) extend sustainability considerations to other chapters of trade agreements; (iv)  improve t he 
monitoring of the implementation of TSD commitments; (v)  reinforce the role of civil society; and 
(vi) strengthen the enforcement of TSD commitments by, inter alia, extending the application of the 
RTA's dispute settlement mechanism to these provisions.  These priorities are to be integrated in 
ongoing and future negotiations. Can the EU indicate the necessity to incorporate dispute settlement 
provisions specific to TSD provisions within RTAs given that the WTO already has a dispute 
settlement body  
 
Reply :  
Following the TSD review communication of June 2022, the EU does not propose to our partners in 
RTAs negotiations a dedicated dispute settlement mechanism but subjects the TSD chapters to the 
horizontal dispute settlement mechanism of EU RTAs. The dispu te settlement mechanism will apply 
to any disputes arising under the TSD commitment, like for the other parts of RTAs, regardless of 
the existence of the WTO dispute settlement body.  
 
Question 3 – Paragraph 19 of Secretariat Report  
The importance of energy  and climate policies gained further impetus during the review period with 
the shift towards renewable and low -carbon energy, improving energy security, and reducing 
emissions to achieve climate neutrality. The 2021 Fit -for-55 package aims to align these p olicies 
with the climate -related goals of the European Green Deal and the Climate Law, which includes 
targets for GHG emission reductions. The package contains many policy initiatives that focus on 
emissions reduction through various channels from the dema nd- and supply -side, including 
complementing the Emissions Trading System with a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, or 
reforming energy taxation. Most recently, the REPowerEU plan aims to diversify the energy supply, 
save energy, and facilitate an increas e in clean energy generation. The Plan includes faster 
permitting rules for renewable energy projects and supporting the development of renewable 
hydrogen. A number of regulations established minimum storage levels for natural gas, voluntary 
gas demand red uction targets, and a cap for market revenues from electricity generation in 2022. 
Can the EU indicate the measures undertaken to mitigate the trade impact of the Carbon Border 
Adjustment Mechanism on small developing countries.  
 
Reply:   
The CBAM does not distinguish between categories of third countries but applies to goods in certain 
sectors. Our studies show that exports from LDCs to the EU in the sectors covered by the CBAM are 
limited.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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We have built in a transitional period in CBAM, which will give tr ading partners, including developing 
countries, time to prepare. To take into account their specific needs, the EU will continue to support 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in targeted ways, such as through technology transfer, technical 
and financial assi stance, with the objective of developing industrial production structures that are 
compatible with long -term global climate objectives.  
 
To this end, the EU will continue in its role as one of the biggest contributors to climate financing in 
developing co untries and LDCs. The EU is determined to help developing countries and LDCs making 
this transition.  
 
Question 4  
Does the EU foresee to provide specific and tailor made  financial and technical assistance to 
developing countries under FTAs or EPAs with which it is currently negotiating to support effective 
implementation?  
 
Reply:  
The EU is collectively the biggest donor for international aid in the world, providing over EUR 50billion 
a year to help overcome poverty and advance global development. The EU collective Aid for Trade 
supporting the negotiation and implementation of trade agreements in 2020 amounted to 
EUR 215 million . The EU also continues to support partner countries in their green transition, in line 
with our international commitments. Throug h the EU 's Global Instrument (Neighbourhood, 
Development and International Cooperation Instrument – NDICI), we have so far committed about 
EUR 27.8 billion  in support of climate objectives in our partner countries for the period of 2021 -27. 
In December 202 1, the EU launched the Global Gateway, a new strategy to mobilise investments 
totalling EUR  300 billion  over the period 2021 -27. In line with the EU 's commitment to the 
2030 Agenda, the Global Gateway aims at boosting smart, clean and secure investments in  digital, 
energy and transport.  
 
Question 5  
Has the EU assessed whether some of its autonomous regulations that will have a direct impact on 
trade are WTO compatible?   
 
Reply:   
The EU is bound by the WTO  Agreement . Consequently, the EU always assesses the  WTO 
compatibility of its legislation, including autonomous regulations.  
 
Question 6 – Para 3.286 of Secretariat Report  
Following the publication of the updated Guidance Communication clarifying the provisions of the 
IPRED as part of an overall comprehen sive package of measures to further improve the application 
and enforcement of IPR (the "enforcement package")in the previous review period, the Commission 
continued its work on enforcement through the activities of the Observatory, the preparation of the 
EU Toolbox against Counterfeiting as announced in the 2020 IP Action Plan and by further expanding 
public -private sector MoUs on online advertising and IPR and the sale of counterfeit goods on the 
Internet  
Could the EU elaborate more on the EU Toolbox agai nst Counterfeiting and how it will operate in 
practice?  
 
Reply:  
The EU Toolbox Against Counterfeiting was first announced in November 2020, in the IP  Action Plan, 
which identified the perseverance of counterfeiting in the EU as one of the main challenges. On that 
basis, the Commission has been gathering input from stakeholders including law enforcement 
authorities, IP right holders and different categories of intermediaries to identify the main points 
where action at EU level can be useful. The main calls made by the stakeholders related to 
cooperation, information sharing, proactivity of intermediaries, specific training of law enforcement 
officials, education and awareness, and support for SMEs.  
 
The legal landscape affecting intermediaries has  changed significantly with the entry into force of 
the Digital Services Act, which foresees measures that can help targeting and preventing the 
advertising and sale of counterfeits. And the revision of the NIS2 Directive on cybersecurity, affecting 
regist ries and registrars obligations related to domain names data accuracy and access. Hence, the 
upcoming toolbox to fight counterfeiting is an opportunity to highlight good practices, supporting WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 SMEs in enforcing their IP rights and promoting the use of new t echnologies to address 
IPR infringements.  
 
The objective of the EU Toolbox against counterfeiting will be to set out coherent, effective and 
coordinated action against counterfeiting, both online and offline. It aims to clarify the actions, 
measures and ro les which could be taken by right holders and intermediaries, online and offline, to 
fulfil their responsibilities in a spirit of mutual cooperation and information sharing; enhance 
cooperation between right holders, intermediaries and national and EU publ ic authorities; facilitate 
effective and efficient information sharing between all key actors; and promote innovation, 
development and the use of adequate tools and new technologies to prevent and detect 
counterfeiting activities. The initiative will build  on existing and pending EU legislative and policy 
initiatives.  
 
The initiative is planned for adoption in 2023.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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NEW ZEALAND  
REPORT BY THE WTO SECRETARIAT (WT/TPR/S/442)  
SECTION 4.4.1 Sustainable energy and climate  
WT/TPR/S/442, page 158, paragraph 4.114  
Section  4.4, paragraph 4.114 states that "In 2021, the European Commission published the 
Fit-for-55 package, aiming to ensure EU policies align with the climate -related goals of the European 
Green Deal and the Climat e Law, which includes an intermediate target of 55% GHG emission 
reduction by 2030 and becoming climate -neutral by 2050. The package contains the Fit -for-55 
communication as well as 16 energy - and climate -related legislative proposals that are currently in  
various stages of discussion. The proposals relating to energy primarily focus on emission reductions 
through multiple channels such as, inter alia , phasing out coal, accelerating the roll -out of 
renewables, increasing energy efficiency, and decarbonizing  gas across various industries" . 
 
Question 1:  
How does the EU intend to rationalise any inefficient fossil -fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful 
consumption in line with the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goal 12(c) and the G20 
commitment so as to contribute to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and avoid 
disadvantaging renewable energy uptake?  
 
Reply:  The European Green Deal Communication1 set out the objective that fossil fuel subsidies 
should end. The European Climate Law2 specified that in light of the objective of achieving climate 
neutrality by 2050 and in view of the international commitments under the Paris Agreement, 
continued efforts are necessary to ensure the phasing out of energy subsidies which are incompati ble 
with that objective, in particular for fossil fuels, without impacting efforts to reduce energy poverty. 
The Commission put forward its proposal3 to revise the Energy Taxation Directive as part of these 
efforts. The EU is also actively participating i n the WTO Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform initiative to use 
trade tools to contribute to delivering UN SDG 12(c).  
 
REPORT BY THE EUROPEAN UNION (WT/TPR/G/442)  
SECTION 3.1.1 WTO Reform  
WT/TPR/G/442, page 8, b(i)  paragraphs 3.7 and 3.8  
Agreement on Fisheries Sub sidies and SDG 14.6 in para 3.7: "The EU played an active role at the 
MC12 in June 2022 to reach a landmark Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies delivering on 
UN Sustainable Development Goal Target 14.6 (SDG14.6). The agreement prohibits subsidies to 
vessels o r operators engaged in illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, prohibits subsidies 
to fishing on overfished stock without appropriate measures being in place to rebuild the stock, 
prohibits subsidies to fishing on unregulated high seas, and incl udes far -reaching transparency 
provisions."  
 
Paragraph 3.8: "EU is committed to constructively engage in the continued negotiations to deliver a 
comprehensive agreement addressing subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing."  
 
Question 2:  
• New Zealand  would like to thank the European  Union  for its leadership in support of the 
fisheries subsidies negotiations. The EU played an active and key role in recent years, 
including at MC12, and we look forward to working constructively with the EU and  other 
Members in establishing further disciplines in relation to overcapacity and overfishing.  
• We also note that the EU is working to ratify the Fisheries Subsidy Agreement and we look 
forward to the EU depositing its "instrument of acceptance" once it has completed its internal 
processes.  
• Can the EU confirm that the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF) is 
consistent with the Fisheries Subsidies Agreement?  
• Given that the budget for the EMFAF is over 6  billion  euros for the 2021 -27 period, can the EU 
also confirm that the EMFAF is consistent with UN Sustainable Development Goal 14.6, 
particularly as it relates to overcapacity and overfishing?  
 
1 https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52019DC0640&from=EN .  
2 https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32021R1119 , Regulation (EU)  2021/1119 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30  June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving 
climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 .  
3 EUR-Lex - 52021PC0563 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu)  COM(2021) 563 final Proposal for a COUNCIL 
DIRECTIVE restructuring the Union framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity (recast) . WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 • Noting the EU's commitment to eliminating subsidies contributing to  fisheries overcapacity 
and overfishing, is there currently overcapacity in the EU's fishing fleets caused by previous 
programmes which the EMFAF will help to address?  
 
Reply: The European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF ) and other support for 
fisheries are key enablers for sustainable fisheries and the conservation of marine biological 
resources, for food security through the supply of seafood products, for the growth of a sustainable 
blue economy and for healthy, safe, secure, clean and sustainably managed seas and oceans.  
 
There are four priorities under the EMFAF:  
 
(1) fostering sustainable fisheries and the restoration and conservation of aquatic biological 
resources , 
(2) fostering sustainable aquaculture activities,  and processing and marketing of fishery and 
aquaculture products, thus contributing to food security in the Union , 
(3) enabling a sustainable blue economy in coastal, island and inland areas, and fostering the 
development of fishing and aquaculture commun ities, 
(4) strengthening international ocean governance and enabling seas and oceans to be safe, 
secure, clean and sustainably managed.  
 
The EU will implement the new disciplines under the Agreement of Fisheries Subsidies, and is 
currently considering what  adjustments are necessary in the relevant EU measures. Given the 
challenges of achieving the conservation objectives of the Common Fisheries Policy, support for fleet 
adaptation remains sometimes necessary with regard to certain fleet segments and sea bas ins. The 
EMFAF therefore allows payments for permanent cessation of fishing activities with strict conditions, 
to support better fleet management and to support the conservation and sustainable exploitation of 
marine biological resources, while aiming at a chieving a balance between the fishing capacity and 
the available fishing opportunities.  
 
SECTION 5.1 The EU's actions on climate change and environmental policies  
WT/TPR/G/442, page 18, paragraph 5.4  
Section  5.1 paragraph 5.4 states that "The EU is aware that if it wants to pursue global challenges 
such as combating climate change, biodiversity loss, pollution, or promoting more sustainable 
production and consumption, it needs to increase cooperation with third countries. In the cases 
where the European Gr een Deal policies have an external dimension, the EU is engaging with its 
partners. The EU makes sure that its external assistance actively promotes effective and ambitious 
climate and environment action and integration. The EU designs its climate and envi ronmental 
policies in line with the WTO rules and provides a full transparency on EU climate - and environmental 
measures to the EU trading partners bilaterally, including in the context of trade agreements, and 
in the WTO" . 
 
Question 3:  
We share the EU's a mbition to lift global sustainability and environmental standards in agricultural 
production. As a fellow champion of the multilateral system, how does the EU intend to ensure its 
policies support and strengthen the WTO?  
 
Reply:  The EU is one of the most active Members on the sustainability agenda in the WTO. It has 
led efforts to include language on environmental sustainability in the MC12 outcome document and 
will continue its efforts in this regard. It has recently put forward a submission that proposes  to 
enhance deliberative engagement, including on the nexus between trade and global environmental 
challenges (ref. WT/GC/W/864). The EU has been a role model for transparency of its 
European  Green Deal measures through public consultations, impact assessments and outreach 
from an early stage in the regulatory processes and implementation stages in different fora in the 
EU and outside (in Brussels, through the EU delegations in partner countrie s, in the WTO in Geneva 
and via bilateral dialogues). The EU will continue dialogue and engagement with its trading partners 
including once the measures enter into force and in relation to ensuing implementing acts and 
decisions, in the WTO and bilaterally .  
 
Question 4:  
A proliferation of unilateral trade measures for environmental and sustainability purposes risks 
excluding third countries, slowing technological progress and shared learning, fragmenting food 
trade, and risks potentially perverse environme ntal and food security outcomes. In order to avoid WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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these adverse outcomes, how does the EU plan to bring third countries along as it pursues its 
sustainability agenda?  
 
Reply:  The EU has been a role model for transparency of its European Green Deal measure s through 
public consultations, impact assessments and outreach from an early stage in the regulatory 
processes and implementation stages in different fora in the EU and outside (in Brussels, through 
the EU delegations in partner countries, in the WTO in G eneva and via bilateral dialogues). The EU 
has engaged in the WTO and bilaterally with countries and tried to address their concerns while 
preserving the objectives pursued by its policies. The EU will continue dialogue and engagement 
with its trading part ners including once the measures enter into force and in relation to ensuing 
implementing acts and decisions, in the WTO and bilaterally.  
 
SECTION 5.1.1 Overview of the actions on climate change and environmental protection  
WT/TPR /G/442, page 19, paragraph 5.7  
Section  5.1.1, paragraph 5.7, states that "The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is a 
climate measures aimed at decreasing global GHG emissions by preventing the risk of carbon 
leakage and by supporting increased ambi tion on climate mitigation, while ensuring WTO 
compatibility" . 
 
Question 5:  
New Zealand  appreciates the EU's efforts to increase global ambition on climate mitigation. However, 
there is a risk of fragmented and competing global approaches to addressing the  issue of carbon 
leakage. Has the EU given consideration to how the CBAM will interact with other 
plurilateral/multilateral initiatives, such as the G7 "Carbon Club"?  
 
Reply: The Climate Club is compatible with and complementary to CBAM. In fact, the EU we lcomes 
any initiatives that incentivise decarbonisation and welcomes the Climate Club as an inclusive 
initiative pursuing this objective.  
 
International collaboration on decarbonisation, including in Climate Club, will be necessary to fight 
climate change  effectively. Indeed, the more international cooperation we have, the more effective 
our tools will be. This Climate Club can prove a useful platform to accelerate the clean energy 
transition and move fast -forward to our climate goals, while addressing ris ks of carbon leakage.  
 
SECTION 5.1.1 Overview of the actions on climate change and environmental protection  
WT/TPR/G/442, page 20, paragraph 5.12  
Section  5.1.1 paragraph 5.12 states that "5.12. On 6 December 2022, the European Parliament and 
the Council r eached a provisional political agreement on an EU Regulation on deforestation27, paving 
the way for the final adoption of the regulation in early 2023. It aims to curb EU -driven deforestation 
and forest degradation" . 
 
Question 6:  
In the case of the EU's re cent Deforestation Law, how does the EU plan to recognise third countries' 
equally strong (but different) laws to protect forestry?  
 
Reply:  Relevant commodities and products within the scope of the Deforestation Regulation must 
be produced in accordance wi th the relevant legislation of the country of production. The 
Deforestation Regulation thereby expressly recognizes the role of third countries' laws to protect 
forestry.  
 
All efforts by third countries to strengthen the traceability and the sustainabilit y of commodity 
production are welcome. The more robust these systems become, and the more aligned with the 
requirements of the Regulation, the easier it will be for operators in the EU to prove that the 
commodities they are importing are compliant with the  Deforestation Regulation  
 
SECTION 5.1.2 Sustainable food systems  
WT/TPR/G/442, page 20, paragraph 5.17  
Section  5.1.2 paragraph 5.17 states that "The Commission is also carrying out preparatory work 
concerning the flagship initiative of the F2F strategy: the framework legislation for a Union 
sustainable food system. It will aim at accelerating and facilitating the transition to sustainability by 
establishing new foundations for future food policies" . 
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Question 7:  
In the case of the upcoming Sustainable Food System Framework, how does the EU plan to recognise 
third countries' equally good (but different) food systems?  
 
Reply:  The legislative framework for a Sustainable Food System will include common definitions, 
general principles and objectives to underpin future EU food -related policies across the food system. 
It will not directly address the issue of equivalence of third c ountries food systems.  
 
SECTION 5.2.5 Gender equality and women's economic empowerment  
WT/TPR/G/442, page 26, paragraph 5.45  
Section  5.2.5 paragraph 5.45 states that "The EU is supportive of the inclusion of the trade and 
gender equality dimension in the WTO context. From the outset, the EU has been a strong proponent 
of the 2017 Buenos Aires Joint Declaration on Trade and Women's Economic Empowerment. The EU 
has been a member of the informal working group (IWG) on trade and gender in the WTO since its 
creation in the autumn of 2020. In early 2022, the EU launched a project with the International 
Trade Centre that looks at applying a gender lens to the work of the WTO. In this context, four 
webinars have been organised on topics such as e -commerce, trade fa cilitation, investment 
facilitation and government procurement" . 
 
Question 8:  
New Zealand appreciates the EU's support for the inclusion of trade and gender equality dimension 
in the WTO. How will the EU ensure that this work is further mainstreamed into t he WTO and 
multilateral trading system?  
 
Reply:  The EU is committed to supporting the inclusion of the gender and trade dimension in 
the WTO. To examine how trade and gender considerations interact, the European  Union  and the 
International Trade Centre, i n January 2022, launched the project on Developing a Gender -Lens 
Framework for the work of the WTO. The project produced papers and webinars and provided 
suggestions on how gender considerations can be integrated into the current structure of the 
WTO and M embers' domestic policies, and underscored the importance of harmonising 
concepts,  objective criteria and data collection. The results are published on 
https://www.shetrades.com/outlo ok/resources/0/publications . They constitute valuable resources 
that can be used to implement the work on gender and trade at the WTO going forward and deserve 
further scrutiny and discussion by WTO members, the WTO secr etariat and other interested 
stakeholders.  
 
SECTION 8.3 Acting against economic coercion  
WT/TPR/G/442, page 32, paragraph 8.10  
Section  8.3, paragraph 8.10, states that "The aim of this instrument is to deter third countries from 
using economic coercion, and to dissuade them from continuing the economic coercion, if it occurs, 
by engaging with the third country concerned in various respects. As a last resort, the regulation 
would enable the Union to counteract the economic coercion" . 
 
Questions 9 :  
How will the EU safeguard against the possibility of negative consequences for the multilateral 
rules-based trading system arising from the use of this instrument?  
 
Reply:  The anti -coercion instrument, once in force, would provide only for a response b y the EU in 
a situation created by a third country that compromises the Union's or Member States' interests, 
and also those of economic operators. It is not about protectionism but about not tolerating economic 
coercion, it is about preserving the legitima te policymaking space of the Union and Member States 
and taking a stance against the issue of economic coercion.  
 
Establishing a dedicated instrument corresponds to the EU's adherence to the rules -based system 
and the rule of law more generally. It ensures  predictably, and so deterrence.  
 
Evidently, this instrument will not be a means to short circuit WTO dispute settlement. It will not be 
a means to impose countermeasures to respond to a manifest breach of the WTO rules. There are 
multilateral rules on th is, to which the EU is subject.  
 
The instrument could serve also as a platform for international cooperation, with those that view 
economic coercion as an issue, including in concrete cases when other countries might be affected WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 273 - 
 
by the same or similar coer cive measures affecting the EU or its Member States. The economic 
coercion is regrettably of concern not exclusively to the EU. Exchanges with some third countries 
confirm the position that economic coercion is an issue of broad concern and there is a shar ed 
understanding as to the need for an instrument.  
 
Questions 10:  
How will the EU ensure that possible countermeasures are consistent with WTO rules?  
 
Reply:  The anti -coercion instrument concerns specific behaviour, i.e. economic coercion, which is 
not addressed by the WTO  Agreement . As regards action under the instrument, any EU measure 
must and will be compatible with international law, of which the WTO  Agreement  is a part. Hence 
the instrument and action under the instrument will also be consistent with the EU's international 
obligations, among which feature the EU's WTO obligations.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 274 - 
 
  
 DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  
PREGUNTAS  
PAGE 11  
 
13. In the area of technical barriers to trade (TBT), the European  Union  implemented some 
legislative changes that were adopted in 2019 to improve and strengthen the functioning of its TBT 
regime, notably regarding the application of the principle of mutual recogniti on, market surveillance, 
labelling, and online sales. During the review period, standardization gained more prominence. 
In 2022, a new European Standardization Strategy was issued wherein standardization is identified 
as key strategic tool to achieve EU en vironmental, digital, and economic objectives.  
 
Question 1:  
Pregunta: ¿Podría la UE proporcionar más información sobre los cambios legislativos para 
mejorar y fortalecer el régimen OTC con respecto a los principales productos importados 
de la República Dom inicana?  
 
Reply:  TBT measures applied by the EU, such as technical regulations and conformity assessment 
procedures for marketed products for example, are applied in a uniform manner for domestic and 
imported products and are not country -based. As a general rule, standard s in the EU are voluntary, 
and therefore they do not constitute technical barriers to trade. The EU standardisation strategy is 
not a legal act and thus has no effect on the WTO TBT regime for any country. It is a strategy to 
improve the European standardi sation system for the EU.  
 
PAGE 34  
2.10. The proposed measures include:  
 
• An anti -coercion instrument to counteract economic coercion by third countries through 
measures affecting trade or investment (area of action No.  6);  
• A amechanism to address foreign  subsidies (i.e. subsidies by a third country) that distort 
the internal market, in particular through government procurement and subsidized 
investments (area of action No.  6);  
• A Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) for imports of certain goods 
(i.e. aluminium, cement, iron and steel, fertilizers, electricity, and hydrogen) (area of action 
No. 2);  
• The review of the generalized scheme of tariff preferences (area of action No.  2, 
Section  2.3.2.2); and  
• The ability to apply EU countermeasures to ensure the implementation and enforcement of 
international trade agreements (area of action No.  6).  
 
Question 2 : 
Pregunta: ¿Existe algún estudio de impacto comercial sobre los terceros países respecto 
a la aplicación de estas propuestas?  
 
Reply:  
a) For the anti -coercion instrument: The legislative proposal was accompanied by an impact 
assessment, which is available in English at the following link:  
https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -
content/EN/TXT/?uri=SWD%3A2022%3A656%3AFIN&qid=1651222453483  
 
b) There is an 'Impact Assessment Accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European  Parliament and of the Co uncil on Foreign Subsidies Distorting the Internal Market ' 
available. Please find following link:  
EUR-Lex - 52021SC0099 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu)  
 
c) CBAM: The European Commission published an impact assessment accompanying the draft 
legislative proposal on the CBAM in July 2021: Please find following link:  
EUR-Lex - 52021SC0643 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu)  
 
The EU has carefully assessed the potential impact and given careful consideration, in particular to 
LDCs. Our studies show that exports from LDCs to the EU in the sectors covered by the CBAM are 
limited. The design of the CBAM also took concerns on board, for example through a long transitional WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 275 - 
 
period. This comes in addition to significant financial support package and capacity building 
programmes assisting developing countries in their green transition.  
 
As part of the review report to be prepared by the Commission before the end of the transitional 
phase, it must also be stressed that the  Commission will evaluate and report on the impact on 
countries with special interest to the least developed countries and on the effects of the technical 
assistance given (see to that effect Article  30 of the Regulation).  
 
d) Preferences: Please find impa ct assessment available on DG Trade 's website here: Impact 
Assessments (europa.eu)  
and on GSP:  
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication -detail/ -/publication/706f539c -f0db-11eb-a71c-
01aa75ed71a1/language -en/format -PDF/source -221478841  
 
e) On the referred countermeasures, there is no impact study available.  
 
PAGE 34  
2.11.  As of January 2023, only the last proposal (the revision of the Enforcement Regulation) and 
the proposal on foreign subsidies had been enacted. The other proposed regulations were still under 
discussion with the Parliament and the Council.20 The regulation on foreign subsidies entered into 
force in January 2023 and will start applying on 12  July 2023 (Section s 2.4.1, 3.3.4, and 3.3.6).21 
The revision of the Enforcement Regulation entered into force on 13  February  2021 and seeks to 
address the possible inability to enforce EU rights due to the absence of a final ruling resulting from 
the blockage of dispute set tlement procedures at the multilateral or bilateral level. The regulation 
amends Regulation (EU) 654/2014 to enable the European  Union  to apply countermeasures 
(e.g. suspend tariff concessions) in these situations, and in particular when a third country br eaches 
its obligations under a WTO  Agreement  and the dispute settlement procedure is blocked because of 
the current inoperability of the Appellate  Body.  
 
Question 3:  
Pregunta: Además de la suspensión de las concesiones arancelarias, ¿qué otras 
contramedidas contiene el Reglamento por el que se modifica la UE n.º 654/2014?, y ¿qué 
medidas se han aplicado desde la fecha de su entrada en vigor?  
 
Reply:  Article  5 of the Enforcement Regulation lists the potential commercial policy measures, which 
the European  Union  may use in the situations identified in point 3.1. Originally, the list provides for 
the following:  
 
(a)Article  5(1)(a): the suspension of tariff concessions and the imposition of new or increased 
customs duties;  
(b)Article  5(1)(b): the int roduction or increase of quantitative restrictions on imports or exports of 
goods; and  
(c)Article  5(1)(c): the suspension of concessions in the area of public procurement.  
The 2021 amendment expanded the list to the following:  
 
(a)Article  5(1)(ba): the sus pension of obligations regarding trade in services and the imposition of 
restrictions on trade in services; this is subject to a mandatory prioritisation/hierarchy of steps. The 
European Commission would need to go through each category and conclude that measures are not 
possible before moving to the next category. The first category is those services where there is an 
authorisation at European  Union  level. The second is where there is ext ensive European  Union  
legislation. The third is where the information gathering exercise has shown the least interference 
with national legislation.  
 
(b)Article  5(1)(bb): the suspension of obligations with respect to trade -related aspects of intellectual 
property rights granted by a European  Union  institution or agency and valid throughout the 
European  Union , and the imposition of restrictions on the protection of such intellectual property 
rights or their commercial exploitation, in relation to right -holde rs who are nationals of the third 
country concerned. This range of possibilities corresponds largely to the first hierarchical step 
applicable to services.  
So far measures under Article  5(1)(a) have been applied in the form of increased ad valorem  custom 
duties on goods.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 PAGE 35  
2.13. The WTO and multilateral cooperation are critical components of EU trade policy. The 
European  Union  is a founding Member of the WTO24, and as the world's top trader, it plays a key 
role in the WTO's work and functioning. Duri ng the review period, it continued to actively contribute 
to the WTO's core functions and the regular activities of committees, including as one of the main 
donors for capacity -building and technical assistance through various funds, notably the 
Aid-for-Trade initiative.25 It promoted discussions and co -sponsored proposals/initiatives on, 
inter alia, domestic regulation of trade in services, e -commerce, investment facilitation, and 
transparency requirements in agriculture. More recently, it also sought to a dvance discussions on 
trade and environment and co -sponsored initiatives on a fossil fuel subsidy reform, plastics pollution 
and environmentally sustainable plastics trade, and trade and environmental sustainability. It 
participates in the Informal Working  Group on trade and gender and on MSMEs, and has 
co-sponsored ministerial declarations in both areas.26  
 
Question 4:  
Pregunta: ¿Puede la Unión Europea aplicar una política eficaz sobre cuestiones de genero 
y comercio para mejorar estas cuestiones?  
 
Reply:  From the outset, the EU has been a strong proponent of the 2017 WTO Buenos Aires Joint 
Declaration on Trade and Women 's Economic Empowerment. We are active in the Informal Working 
Group on trade and gender in the WTO since its creation in the autumn of 2020. To examine how 
trade and gender considerations interact, the European  Union  and the International Trade Centre, 
in January 2022, launched the project on Developing a Gender -Lens Framework for the work of 
the WTO.  The project produced papers and webinars and provided suggestions on how 
gender  considerations can be integrated into the current structure of the WTO and Members ' 
domestic  policies, and underscored the importance of harmonising concepts, objective 
criteria  and data c ollection. The results are published on 
https://www.shetrades.com/outlook/resources/0/publications . They constitute valuable resources 
that can be used to implement the work on gender and trade at the WTO going forward and deserve 
further scrutiny and discussion by WTO members, the WTO and other interested stakeholders.  
 
PAGE 54  
3.21. EU provisions on various TFA  elements are included in the UCC or its subsidiary legislation 
with varying degrees of developments and reforms ongoing (Section  3.1.1.3 for electronic 
systems/single window). With respect to advance rulings, the European  Union  has had binding tariff 
information (BTI) in place for many years. BTIs are issued by member State customs authorities 
and are valid for three years. Information on BTIs is shared among member States and with the 
public through the European Binding Tariff Information (EBTI) database. 23 A similar process is in 
place for the determination of origin through the Binding Origin Information (BOI) procedure 
although there is no electronic system and these are requested and issued in paper form. However, 
an IT system for the management of BOI  and Binding Value Information (BVI) (see below) is planned 
to be developed and become operational by 2025. In 2018, the Commission initiated exploratory 
consultations on the interests for BVI; it was followed by a feasibility study in 2020. It is expected  
that implementing regulations on establishing the BVI will be adopted in the second quarter of 2023, 
with the aim of making the BVI system operational by 2025 once the IT management system for 
BOI and BVI becomes available.  
 
Question 5:  
¿Podrían precisar cuáles acciones están tomando los países Miembros de la Unión Europea 
para asegurar que, para el segundo semestre del 2023, puedan adoptar las regulaciones 
necesarias para la efectiva implementación de información de valoración vinculante 
("BVI" por sus siglas en inglés)?  
 
Reply:  The legal provisions to implement the EU 's BVI will be included in the subsidiary legislation 
of the European  Union  Customs Code, the Implementing and Delegated acts. The Union Customs 
Code and its subsidiary legislation i s directly applicable in all M ember States. In addition to approval 
of the legal provisions, the proposed BVI also requires a dedicated IT system across the EU, which 
is currently being developed.  
PAGE 54  
3.22. The EU Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) Pr ogramme has been in place for over a decade 
and it continued to operate with more than 18,100 valid authorizations in 2022. There remain WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 277 - 
 
two types of AEO, one for customs simplification programmes (AEOC) and another for security and 
safety (AEOS), with the  possibility to have both AEOC and AEOS status. About half the authorizations 
are for AEOC (47%) and half for AEOC/AEOS combined (49%); only 4% are for AEOS.25 Once the 
AEO status is achieved, the benefits include fewer controls (both physical and document  based 
controls), prior notification and priority treatment, and Customs simplifications. At present, there is 
no mutual recognition with third countries for AEOC, but there is for AEOS. Mutual recognition 
covering the AEOS status has been concluded with C hina, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, the 
United  States , and most recently the Republic of Moldova, which entered into force on 
1 November  2022. The mutual recognition decision with Canada was signed on 28  October  2022 but 
will only become operational once the automatic data exchange is established, which is expected 
for 2023. Negotiations are currently ongoing with Türkiye and Singapore. These agreements only 
cover the AEO status for security and safety. As part of its efforts to facilitate  legitimate trade, the 
Commission plans further improvements of its trusted trader programme.26 For future agreements, 
the emphasis on monitoring the compliance with the respective programmes will be further 
enhanced, according to the Commission.  
 
Questio n 6:  
¿Cuáles son los planes de expansión y negociación de los acuerdos sobre este programa para los 
países en desarrollo y Menos Adelantados (PMA)?  
 
Reply:  Mutual recognition of trade partnership programmes is an important tool to enhance supply 
chain sec urity and to facilitate trade for legitimate and secure operators, through granting 
substantial, equal and reciprocal benefits to members of compatible programmes. Therefore, the 
European  Union  aims at achieving mutual recognition of trade partnership prog rammes with its 
important and like -minded trading partners.  
 
To enter into negotiations for mutual recognition of trade partnership programs, it is essential that 
both partners are signatory to the SAFE Framework of Standards and have a Customs -to-Busines s 
program in place including the security component as part of it. Besides, it is indispensable that both 
partners have fully implemented their equivalent respective programs. It is a critical condition that 
there is a legal base allowing to conclude mutua l recognition, to agree on data protection standards 
and that both parties agree on having automated data exchange regarding the validity of the AEO 
status holders. The partners also need to have a system of automated risk management, the ability 
to receiv e advance electronic information on cargo for risk analysis screening purposes, the ability 
to examine high risk cargo using modern technology before loading for export, the willingness to 
agree to conduct pre -load examinations upon reasonable request from  the other partner as well as 
the legal ability, willingness and capacity to share information on risk. Therefore, the EU does not 
plan negotiations based on the level of development of a country, but by the above mentioned 
criteria.  
 
PAGE 67  
3.56. In response to the war in Ukraine, the Commission passed a decision in July 2022, retroactive 
to 24  February  2022, to allow duty -free and VAT -free imports of certain goods destined to help 
Ukrainians. The goods, although not definitively listed, include those  provided free of charge to 
benefit persons fleeing the war in Ukraine (e.g. food, blankets, generators, and tents) imported by 
state organizations (public bodies) or charitable/philanthropic organizations approved by member 
State authorities.72 The Decisi on was in place until 31  December  2022 and applied to 18 member 
States for the alleviation of customs duties.73 In December 2022, 10 member States requested for 
its extension. The Commission examines member State requests and studies the possibility for a 
new Decision granting duty relief and VAT exemption on goods to be distributed or made available 
free of charge to persons fleeing the war in Ukraine and to persons in need in Ukraine.  
 
Question 7:  
Pregunta: Además de la suspensión de las concesiones ara ncelarias, ¿qué otras 
contramedidas contienen el Reglamento por el que se modifica la UE (UE) n.º 654/2014?, 
y ¿qué medidas se han aplicado desde la fecha de su entrada en vigor?  
 
Reply:  Article  5 of the Enforcement Regulation lists the potential commercial policy measures, which 
the Union may use in the situations identified in point 3.1. Originally, the list provides for the 
following:  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 278 - 
 
  
 (a) Article  5(1)(a): the suspension of tariff concessions and the imposition of new or increased 
customs duties ; 
(b) Article  5(1)(b): the introduction or increase of quantitative restrictions on imports or exports of 
goods; and  
(c) Article  5(1)(c): the suspension of concessions in the area of public procurement.  
 
The 2021 amendment expanded the list to the following:  
 
(a)Article  5(1)(ba): the suspension of obligations regarding trade in services and the imposition of 
restrictions on trade in services; this is subject to a mandatory prioritisation/hierarchy of steps. The 
Commission would need to go through ea ch category and conclude that measures are not possible 
before moving to the next category. The first category is those services where there is an 
authorisation at Union level. The second is where there is extensive Union legislation. The third is 
where th e information gathering exercise has shown the least interference with national legislation.  
 
(b)Article  5(1)(bb): the suspension of obligations with respect to trade -related aspects of intellectual 
property rights granted by a Union institution or agency and valid throughout the Union, and the 
imposition of restrictions on the protection of such intellectual property rights or their commercial 
exploitation, in relation to right -holders who are nationals of the third country concerned. This range 
of possibi lities corresponds largely to the first hierarchical step applicable to services.  
 
So far measures under Article  5(1)(a) have been applied in the form of increased ad valorem  custom 
duties on goods.  
 
PAGE 74  
3.79. Certain goods are prohibited or restricted  when imported into the European  Union  due to 
various regulations, but the majority emanate from international conventions designed to track or 
protect the movement of goods, i.e. hazardous chemicals, protected plant and animal species, 
wastes, etc. There were 15 categories of such goods in 2022, most of which had been notified by 
the European  Union  as quantitative restrictions (Table  3.11). There has not been any substantial 
changes as the same categories of products have had prohibitions or restrictions f or many years 
although there were minor amendments for product coverage, technical adjustments, etc. Further, 
a number of prohibitions or restrictions were imposed as sanctions in the context of the war in 
Ukraine (Section  3.1.7.1).  
 
Question 8:  
Pregunta: ¿Como han previsto que las restricciones cuantitativas, descritas en e1 párrafo 
anterior, se administren de manera no discriminatoria y se ajusten a las disposiciones del 
artículo XIII del GATT?  
 
Reply:  Any action under Regulation (EU) No 654/201 4 must be compatible with the EU international 
obligations.  Where the imposition of quantitative restrictions on imports from a particular 
WTO Member is allowed, the MFN obligation of Article  XIII obviously does not apply.  
 
PAGE 108  
3.3.3 Sanitary and phyt osanitary requirements  
 
Question 9:  
Pregunta: Con respecto a la iniciativa de la Granja a la Mesa  en el marco del Pacto Verde, 
podría la Unión Europea explicar con más detalle los esfuerzos realizados para sustentar 
con base científica las actuales modificaciones de varios de sus reglamentos, sobre todo 
los relacionados a LMR con tolerancia cero (como por ejemplo la reducción de los LMR 
para moléculas como Imazali, Clorotalonil y Mancozeb).  
 
Reply:  Imazalil  is an approved active substance in the EU for which maximum residue levels (MRLs) 
were reviewed by Regulation (EU) 2020/856 following a risk assessment by EFSA. It is not correct 
that the levels were established at the technical zero level of 0.01 mg/kg. MRLs were established 
based on Good Agricultural Practices (GAPs), provided they were safe for European consumers. For 
several fruits such GAPs were available and specific levels established. For mancozeb and all other 
substances falling into the group of dithiocarbamates currently a full review of all MRLs is ongoing 
which will also take into account natural background levels of substances inherent in plants that 
produce carbon disulfide. For chlorothalonil the European Food Safety Authority raised health WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 279 - 
 
concerns, therefore the approval for the substance was not renewed and all MRLs for this substance 
were lowered to the limit of determination.   
 
PAGE 110  
3.197. The European  Union  applies SPS -related requirements for the entry into the European  Union  
of animals, germinal products, products of animal origin, animal by -products, composite products, 
food and feed of non -animal origin, and plants. Requirements vary depending on the ani mal/product 
based on their risk for human, animal, and plant health, and have remained broadly the same for 
most of these goods since the previous Review. In general, these goods must be accompanied by a 
health or phytosanitary certificates to enter the EU  market and are subject to control upon their 
arrival at an EU border control post. In addition, some products are required to originate from 
third countries, which are approved by the Commission, and, in some cases, from an approved 
establishment to be so ld in the EU market. Prior to their import, businesses must also pre -notify the 
border control post of first arrival into the European  Union  by submitting through the 
European  Union 's Trade Control and Expert System (TRACES) a "common health entry document ", 
which will include the references of the corresponding health or phytosanitary certificate. Border 
controls are planned based on this registration. Consignments are allowed to enter the 
European  Union  subject to satisfactory documentary, identity, and p hysical checks (when required). 
The European  Union  participates in the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) ePhyto 
platform for electronic phytosanitary certification, which facilitates the electronic exchange of 
SPS-related documentation betwe en participating countries.  
 
Question 10 : 
Pregunta : ¿Cuáles terceros países intercambian con la UE los documentos relacionados 
con MSF mediante la plataforma ePhyto?  
 
Reply:  As regards phytosanitary certificates, the interconnection of TRACES to the IPPC ePhyto Hub 
via a single connection for all Member States of the European  Union , Switzerland and UK 
(Northern  Ireland) allows TRACES to receive data of:  
 
(1) electronic phytos anitary certificates (i.e. digitally signed XML which waives the requirement to 
present a phytosanitary certificate in paper form); and  
(2) phytosanitary certificates (i.e. XML of phytosanitary certificates which are not digitally signed 
and which require the consignment to be accompanied by a phytosanitary certificate in paper form).  
 
28 third countries are connected to the IPPC ePhyto Hub and are actively transmitting to TRACES 
data of:  
• Electronic phytosanitary certificates: Argentina, Cameroon, Chile, Co lombia, Costa  Rica, 
Dominican  Republic , Fiji, Guatemala, Israel, Jamaica, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, 
New Zealand , Panama, Samoa, Senegal, South  Africa , Sri Lanka , Uganda, United  States . 
• Phytosanitary certificates: Bahamas, Guyana, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Jord an, Madagascar, 
Nepal.  
Furthermore, the interconnection of TRACES to the IPPC ePhyto Hub referred to above allows the 
EU, Switzerland and UK (Northern Ireland) to issue in, or through, TRACES electronic phytosanitary 
certificates for exports of plants and plant products and transmit them to any third country connected 
to the IPPC ePhyto Hub.  
 
PAGE 113  
3.208. In February 2022, the European  Union  and the United  States  agreed to mutually recognize 
as equivalent the SPS standards in relation to the production and sale of bivalve molluscs 
(e.g. mussels, clams, oysters, and scallops). The agreement applies to two US states and two EU 
member States, and according to the Com mission, it will allow the two countries to resume bilateral 
trade in these products after 11 years.  
 
Question 11:  
Pregunta: ¿Cómo pueden consultar los miembros el documento correspondiente al 
presente Acuerdo de Equivalencia de Reconocimiento Mutuo?  
 
Reply:  The relevant document is Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/158 of 
4 February  2022 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1641 regarding imports of live, WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 280 - 
 
  
 chilled, frozen or processed bivalve molluscs, echinoderms, tunicates and marine gastropods for 
human consumption from the United  States  of America, OJ L 26, 7.2.2022, p. 1 –6. It can be found 
at the following link: EUR-Lex - 32022R0158 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu) . 
 
PAGE 146  
4.57. The new basic Regulation (EU) 2018/848 on organic produ ction and labelling described in the 
previous Review has applied since the beginning of 2022, one year later than initially anticipated. 
The Commission published a regulation containing lists of authorized products and substances for, 
inter alia, (i) plant protection products; (ii)  fertilizers, soil conditioners and nutrients; (iii)  certain 
feed material; (iv)  feed additives and processing aids; (v)  products for cleaning and disinfection; 
(vi) various food additives, other processing aids, or ingredients; a nd (vii) products and substances 
for use in organic production of wine.69 The Regulation allows for certain flexibilities regarding the 
temporary authorization of using non -organic or non -authorized substances in organic production in 
third countries.70 Th e expiry of recognized equivalence of a third country already established under 
the repealed Council Regulation (EC) 834/2007 has been extended to the end of 2026.  
 
Question 12:  
Pregunta No.  1: ¿Dónde pueden encontrar los miembros el documento oficial que anuncia 
el período de prórroga para el reconocimiento de la equivalencia a terceros países? ¿Existe 
un plan adicional para los países que no cumplan en el período establecido?  
 
Reply:  Please se e REGULATION (EU) 2020/1693 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL of 11  November  2020 amending Regulation (EU) 2018/848 on organic production and 
labelling of organic products as regards its date of application and certain other dates referred to i n 
that Regulation (OJ L 381 of 13.11.2020, p. 1) . (Please find at the following link at : EUR-Lex - 
32020R1693 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu) ). 
 
Question 13:  
Pregunta No.  2: Parte de los requerimientos de esta regulación es el relacionado con el 
tamaño de las unidades productivas y el valor económico a certificar, al respecto ¿ha 
contemplad o la Unión Europea la posibilidad de modificar estos requerimientos, teniendo 
en cuenta las diferentes realidades productivas de los terceros países?  
 
Reply:  The lists of authorised substances are defined in accordance with the objectives and 
principles of the EU legislation on organic production and labelling of organic products and reviewed 
accordingly. For an overview of the EU 's legislative framework on organic production and labelling 
of organic products, including relevant secondary acts,  please see at: Legislation (europa.eu)  
 
PAGE 159  
4.118. In February 2022, the Commission adopted new Guidelines on State Aid for clim ate, 
environmental protection and energy 142 as spelled out in the European Green Deal to facilitate 
achieving the Deal's objectives, specifying 14 potentially compatible types of specific aid measures. 
On 20  July 2022, the Commission also amended the stat e aid Temporary Crisis Framework 
(Section  3.3.1.2) to include measures aimed at accelerating the roll -out of renewable energy and 
some aimed at decarbonizing industrial processes, as outlined in the REPowerEU Plan. Detailed data 
on state aid provided to th e energy transition were not yet available. In 2020, the total state aid 
expenditure for environmental protection including energy savings amounted to nearly 
EUR 80 billion .143 
 
Question 14:  
Pregunta: ¿Podría la UE proporcionar más información sobre los 14 tipos potencialmente 
compatibles de medidas de ayuda especificas? ¿Como se seleccionaron?  
 
Reply:  The categories of aid concern for instance aid for the reduction and removal of greenhouse 
gas emissi ons, aid for clean mobility, aid for energy infrastructure as well as aid for the improvement 
of the energy and environmental performance of buildings. In the European Climate Law, the 
European  Union  has set binding and ambitious greenhouse gas emissions r eduction targets for 2030 
and 2050. In Regulation (EU) 2018/1999, the European  Union  has set out the European  Union 's 
2030 targets for energy and climate. In the Energy Efficiency Directive, the European  Union  has set 
binding energy efficiency targets for 2030. State aid may be necessary to contribute to the 
achievement of those European  Union  targets and related national contributions.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 281 - 
 
COSTA  RICA  
A. Informe de Gobierno  
Página 25, párrafo 5.39  
5.39 The Commission adopted on 10 March  2020 a new SME strategy, which builds on policy 
initiatives, such as the 2008 Small Business Act and the Competitiveness for Small and Medium 
Enterprises (COSME) programme. The SME Performance Review is one of the main tools that the 
European Comm ission uses to monitor the progress in the implementation of the SME strategy and 
the EU's Small Business Act (SBA). The report includes information about the performances of 
European SMEs and their size and structure.  
 
Question 1:  
Pregunta:  
• ¿Qué tipo  de medidas incorporaría ese paquete de alivio en relación con acciones directas de 
la Unión Europea sobre problemas relacionados con cuellos de botella en las cadenas de 
suministros?  
 
Reply: The SME Strategy aims at creating the best possible framework conditions for SMEs 
competitiveness. In particular, it would create the framework conditions for the twin transition 
(sustainability and digitalisation), the reduction of regulatory burden, and aims at improving access 
to markets and the access to finance. Several initiatives provide concrete help. For example, the 
InvestEU SME window facilitates small business access to investments. The Enterprise Europe 
Network provides advice and tailored supp ort to SMEs to help them, among others, to grow faster, 
find new commercial partners and benefit from the opportunities offered by the internal market and 
third countries. In addition, the European Commission is mainstreaming SMEs into all its policies 
such as the transition pathways for industrial ecosystems, better regulation but also the digital single 
market and the European Green Deal. These measures as well as the forthcoming SME Relief 
Package (under preparation) will contribute to create a better bu siness environment and thus will 
also play a role in tackling bottlenecks in supply chains.  
 
Página 33, párrafo 9.3  
9.3. The Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act together set out a first comprehensive 
rulebook for online platforms applicable a cross the whole of the EU. They build on the EU's Platform 
to-Business Regulation, which started to apply during the review period, on 12  July 2020. The 
measures create a single set of rules for all digital services within the EU's single market, through 
harmonising, increasingly different, laws in EU Member States into coherent EU wide legal acts, 
leading to both cost and time savings. They also create a level playing field and ensure equal 
treatment for all companies. Further, the Digital Services Act and  the Digital Markets Act address 
problems that are shared across the globe. Finally, the Digital Services Act creates a safer and more 
human -centric, innovative digital space in which the fundamental rights of all users of digital services 
and consumers' i nterests are protected. These acts represent a major step forward in improving the 
functioning of the EU's Single Market to the benefit of enterprises and consumers from both 
EU Member States and third countries.  
 
Question 2:  
Pregunta:  
• ¿Podría la Unión  Europea brindar información sobre cómo estas nuevas regulaciones podrían 
impactar las exportaciones de servicios digitales a la UE, en particular servicios relacionados con 
consultorías y software?  
 
Reply: The Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act are instruments that harmonise the laws 
of the 27 EU Member States. They facilitate the cross -border provision of digital services, regardless 
of whether these are provided by undertakings that are headq uartered inside or outside the EU. 
Both sets of rules apply in particular to so -called gatekeeper services or very large online platforms 
that intermediate between citizens and businesses online. Whether or not specific digital services 
are covered by the new regimes applicable to gatekeeper or very large online platforms depends on 
objective criteria related to the size of the online platform and the nature of the service concerned. 
However, all intermediation services, which may include consultancy and so ftware services, whether 
large or small, foreign or domestic, will benefit from 'passporting rights' and the intermediary liability 
exemption included in the Digital Services Act. In short, these new digital rules aim to facilitate the 
cross-border provisi on of digital services.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 B. Informe de la Secretaría  
Página 31, párrafo 2.4  
2.4. During the review period, the European  Union  embarked on a new development strategy under 
the European Green Deal (2019) with the aim of becoming a carbon -neutral economy by 2 050. This 
target became binding in July 2021 with the adoption and entry into force of the Regulation 
establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality (European Climate Law). In addition to 
the European Green Deal, the European  Union  adopted a D igital Strategy (2020 and 2021) to 
maximize the benefits of technological progress, and a new political agenda (2019) to become 
"stronger in the world" by reinforcing its global influence and leadership. These strategies, in 
particular the European Green D eal, imply significant changes and coordination across sectors and 
policy areas, and have led to the review of various EU policies including, inter alia, its agriculture, 
energy, industrial, and trade policies.  
 
Question 3:  
Pregunta:  
• ¿Podría la Unión Europea por favor brindar mayor detalle sobre cuáles anticipa que serían las 
implicaciones de la implementación del Pacto Verde Europeo para las salidas de Inversión Extranjera 
Directa?  
 
Reply:  The expected effects of implementing the Eur opean Green Deal investment plan are 
described on this website: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_20_24 . 
 
Página 4 1, párrafo 2.38  
2.38 During this period, the Commission also reviewed and updated its 2018 action plan on the 
implementation and enforcement of the Chapters on Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) in 
EU RTAs. The new strategy was published in June  2022 and seeks to strengthen the role of 
TSD chapters and, more broadly, of EU RTAs in promoting "green and just economic growth". To 
this end, the strategy identifies the following policy priorities: (i)  be more proactive in the 
cooperation with partners; (ii)  pursue a country -specific approach to identify TSD priorities; 
(iii) extend sustainability considerations to other chapters of trade agreements; (iv)  improve the 
monitoring of the implementation of TSD commitments; (v)  reinforce the role of civil society;  and 
(vi) strengthen the enforcement of TSD commitments by, inter alia, extending the application of the 
RTA's dispute settlement mechanism to these provisions. These priorities are to be integrated in 
ongoing and future negotiations. In this regard, the Commission indicates that the forthcoming 
EU-New Zealand RTA is the first EU RTA that foresees the possibility of temporary sanctions 
(e.g. suspension of trade concessions) in case of non -compliance with a ruling regarding the violation 
of core  TSD commitments (i.e.  the ILO fundamental principles and rights at work, and the 
Paris Agreement on Climate Change).  
 
Question 4:  
Pregunta:  
• ¿Cómo  está visualizando la Unión Europea establecer el mecanismo de refuerzo de aplicación 
de los compromisos e n comercio y desarrollo sostenible en acuerdos que ya están en vigor, y que 
tienen un enfoque colaborativo en sus títulos de Comercio y Desarrollo Sostenible, por lo que no 
están sujetos al mecanismo de solución de controversias?  
 
Reply:  The EU TSD review  adopted in June 2022 sets out how to further enhance the contribution 
of EU trade agreements to sustainable development, including strengthening of the implementation 
of the TSD chapters. Most action points of the TSD review can be deployed in existing tr ade 
agreements immediately. For instance, by improving the EU's own monitoring and implementation 
practices such as the revision of the Single Entry Point (SEP) Operating Guidelines, or setting country 
priorities, improving impact assessments, working more  and better with European Parliament, 
Member States and EU Delegations, and strengthen the role of EU civil society and EU Domestic 
Advisory Groups (DAGs). Some action points require the cooperation of the partner country 
(e.g.,  negotiate and implement roa dmaps, improve interaction between DAGs from both sides). The 
EU has already engaged in discussions in the regular TSD committees with trade partners with a 
view of reflecting these elements in the TSD implementation.  
 
  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Página  52, table 3.3  
 
Question 5:  
Pregunta:  
• ¿Podría la Unión Europea proporcionar información sobre el EORI, número de identificación de 
Operador Económico?  
 
Reply: Detailed information about the Economic Operators Registration and Identification number 
(EORI) in the EU, inc luding e -learning and guidance, could be found at the following link: Economic 
Operators Registration and  Identification number (EORI) (europa.eu) . 
 
Página 59, párrafo 3.37  
3.37 This led to the so -called "Transitional rules of origin applicable in the PEM area", which are 
being applied along with the PEM Convention rules. Overall, the transitional rules provide more 
flexibility and are less stringent, except for products containing sugar, the limitation of 
non-originating sugar is expressed in weight instead of value. The main changes include a move to 
full cumulation whereby several countries can contribute to the preferential origin criteria; thresholds 
for non -originating materials (tolerance) were increased from 10% to 15%; and the "direct 
transport" rule was relaxed. The transitional rules were adopted  in respect of 21  parties on 
7 December  2020 with an expected target date for implementation of 1  September  2021. As of 
1 September 2021, eight parties had implemented the new rules and the European Economic Area 
(EEA) had accepted them thereafter with ret rospective effect. Since that point in time, an additional 
five parties have adopted the changes. As of end -2022, the European  Union and 13 partners were 
applying the transitional rules and it was expected a number of others would apply it during 2023.  
 
Question 6:  
Pregunta:  
• ¿Podría la Unión Europea indicar los alcances y requisitos que deben cumplir los productos 
para beneficiarse de la disposición de acumulación total contenida en las reglas de origen transitorias 
del Convenio PEM?  
 
Reply:  The Transitional rules of origin are introduced with certain EU partners of the 
pan-Euro-Mediterranean region, running in parallel with the rules of the PEM Convention. The scope 
and conditions to benefit from full cumulation are provided by Articles 7(3) , 7(4), 7(5), 7(6) of these 
Transitional rules implemented as Appendix  A to the different protocols concerning the definition of 
"originating products" and methods of administrative cooperation. To implement these provisions, 
the Transitional rules of origin provide for supplier's declarations under their Article  29 and 
Annexes  VI and VII.  
 
WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Página 118, párrafo 3.229  
3.229. Based on 2021 data, resort to single sourcing varied across the European  Union from 28% 
of the number of procurement procedures in C yprus to 1% in Greece. Procurement procedures where 
only a single bidder submitted a bid varied from 50% of the number of procurement procedures in 
Poland to 9% in Malta. The data show heavy reliance on the lowest price as the sole award criterion: 
in Bulg aria, Cyprus, Czech  Republic, Estonia, Greece, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovak  Republic, 
and Sweden, more than  80% of the number of procedures were awarded based on the lowest price 
criterion.  
 
Question 7:  
Pregunta:  
- ¿Qué otros criterios se utilizan p ara la adjudicación de los procedimientos?  
 
Reply: Indicator [5]: Award criteria  of the Public Procurement pe rformance indicators specifies the 
proportion of procedures awarded solely on the basis of price, indicating that other criteria also take 
into account quality. The factors that are used to assess the "quality" can however variate. There 
are common criteri a such as "technical offer" and "technical value" (there are procurement 
procedures for equipment and other matters, resulting in technical specifications providing the 
criteria), as well as "environmental friendliness/impact" and "performance". There are also other 
criteria used that are more straightforwardly quantitative, such as the proposed "delivery date" and 
the "warranty/guarantee period". The aforementioned criteria are often used in combination. Just 
because "quality" is a criteria does not mean t hat "price" is not one of the criteria as well. There are 
often multiple criteria with different weights assigned to them in accordance to the nature of the 
contract. Even within criteria there can be further weighing being applied. For instance, with 
"quality", there are often weights for the different factors taken into consideration for assessing the 
"quality".  
 
Página 120, párrafo 3.240  
3.240 In response to the COVID -19 pandemic, the Commission published a guideline on existing 
flexibilities and options for emergency procurement under the Directives, such as the reduction of 
deadlines in case of open and restricted procedures, and recourse to direct award procedures.330 
The EU Joint Procurement Agreement, set up to procure medici nes to fight health emergencies, was 
extensively used during the pandemic, resulting in 12 joint procurement procedures and more than 
200 contracts with a totalchat value of EUR  13 billion.331 The Commission in 2022 also proposed a 
new draft Single Market Emergency Instrument under which, where the Commission has launched 
a procurement procedure on behalf of two or more member States in an emergency situation, 
member States' procuring entities cannot organize procurement procedures for goods and services 
already being procured by the Commission.332 
 
Question 8:  
Pregunta:  
- ¿Qué otras flexibilidades y opciones de contratación de emergencia se utilizaron en respuesta a la 
pandemia COVID -19? 
 
Reply:  In response to the COVID -19 pandemic and as part of the EU Va ccines Strategy[1] the EU 
also used A dvance Purchase Agreements (APAs) for the procurement of COVID -19 vaccines. APAs 
were concluded by the European Commission, on behalf of all 27 Member States, to secure 
Member  States' right to buy a specified number of vaccine doses in a set timeframe and at a given 
price. APAs included up -front EU financing to de -risk essential investments to increase the speed 
and scale of manufacturing successful vaccines. The up -front payments came from the Emergency 
Support Instrument (ESI) budget and were considered a s a down -payment on the vaccines that 
Member States purchase. The EU also resorted to Purchase Agreements (PAs) to procure COVID -19 
vaccines that had been authorised. In total 7 APAs and 3 PAs have been signed with 7 different 
vaccine manufacturers. The va ccines procured via APAs and PAs were partly made available by 
Member States for donations to non -EU countries.  
 
[1]  https://commission.e uropa.eu/strategy -and-policy/coronavirus -response/public -health/eu -vaccines -
strategy_en#:~:text=Objectives%20of%20the%20strategy, -
On%2017%20June&text=The%20objectives%20of%20the%20EU,leading%20the%20global%20soli
darity%20effort  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Página 123, párrafo 3.251  
3.251 As part of its 2020 IP Action Plan, the Commission provided guidance on Article  17 of 
Directive  2019/790. Article  17 provides that online content -sharing service providers need to obtain 
an authorization from right holders for the content uploaded on  their website. If no authorization is 
granted, they need to take steps to avoid unauthorized uploads. The guidance provides practical 
indications on the main provisions of Article  17, helping market players to better comply with 
national legislations in t heir implementation.  
 
Question 9:  
Pregunta:  
- ¿Cuáles son algunos de los resultados de la aplicación del artículo 17? Incluidas multas u otras 
medidas adoptadas por los proveedores de servicios.  
 
Reply: The European Commission is currently still monitoring the transposition of Directive (EU) 
2019/790 in Member States. At the time of writing, several Member States have transposed 
Article  17 only recently and a few of them have not notified a complete implementation of the 
Directive into their natio nal laws yet. A list of all available national transpositions is available here 
at https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/NIM/?uri=CELEX:32019L0790 . It is therefore too 
early to assess the specific results following the application of this provision.  
 
Nevertheless, according to public information, there are several online content -sharing service 
providers (OCSSPs) that have already concl uded several licensing agreements with rightholders. For 
instance, France's Regulatory Authority for Audiovisual and Digital Communication published a report 
last year informing that the main OCSSPs have deployed 'identification techniques' that 'overall m eet 
the expectations of rightholders', in particular in the audiovisual sector. It also indicates that the 
'main OCSSPs have concluded licensing deals with rightholders, mainly in the audiovisual sector'. 
The full report is available at : 
https://www.arcom.fr/nos -ressources/etudes -et-donnees/mediatheque/rapport -2022-de-la-mise-
en-oeuvre -de-la-mission -devaluation -des-mesures -de-protection -prises -par-les-fournisseurs -de-
services -de-partage -de-contenus . 
 
Finally, according to Article  30(1) of the Direc tive, the Commission is required to carry out a review 
of the whole Directive, including the implementation of Article  17, no sooner than 7  June 2026.  
 
Página 129, párrafo 3.280  
3.280. In the reporting period, the EUIPO carried out a number of studies high lighting the risks 
deriving from, and the economic impact of, counterfeiting and piracy in the European  Union. Notably, 
the joint EUIPO/OECD 2022 study on dangerous fakes quantitatively assesses the scope and trends 
of trade in counterfeit products that po se health, safety, and environmental threats. It finds that 
apparel products, automotive spare parts, optical and medical apparatuses, and pharmaceuticals 
are the most frequently occurring dangerous fakes. Postal parcels, driven by the rising popularity of  
e-commerce, were identified as the most common method of shipping dangerous fakes, thereby 
significantly complicating screening and detection processes and lowering the risk of detection and 
penalties.  
 
Question 10:  
Pregunta:  
- ¿Qué medidas está tomando la UE al respecto?  
 
Reply: Since the publication of the IP Action Plan in 2020, IP enforcement has been one of the 
European Commission's priorities to ensure that European can capitalise on its intellectual assets to 
boost recovery and resilience. Since then, the European Commission has developed a number of 
different initiatives which will contribute to mitigate the sale of IP -infringing goods.  
 
The European Commission continues to act as a facilitator in the industry -led initiative of 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with e -commerce marketplaces on the sale of counterfeit 
goods via the Internet. The MoUs help build cooperation between the signatories – rights holders of 
products for which counterfeit versions are often sold online, int ernet platforms and business 
associations – and contribute to the prevention of counterfeit goods being sold online. More 
information can be found here: Memorandum of understanding on the sale of counterfeit goods on 
the internet (europa.eu) . In parallel, the EU legal framework  in place enables mutual administrative 
assistance between the administrative authorities of the Member States, their cooperation with each WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 286 - 
 
  
 other and the European Commission (Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97). It lays grounds for 
cooperation between law e nforcement authorities allowing sharing information on breaches of the 
EU customs and agricultural legislation, including breaches of legislation applicable to intellectual 
property rights.  
 
The European Anti -Fraud Office OLAF has also been carrying out i nvestigations with regard 
counterfeit goods putting at risk the health and safety of EU consumers or the environment 
(COVID -19 related products, pesticides, alcoholic beverages, medicines, mechanical parts such as 
bearings and spare car parts).  
 
As well, t he Digital Services Act has been recently adopted. The DSA is a horizontal legislation which 
clarifies and upgrades the responsibilities of digital services providers, particularly online platforms. 
As such, it provides important tools to prevent both pira cy and the sale of counterfeits online, which 
are considered illegal content.  
 
Additionally, the European Commission is currently working on an EU Toolbox Against Counterfeiting 
for adoption in 2023, which will provide a framework for better protection on IPR rights, based on 
5 pillars:  
 
1. Fostering cooperation with all actors, incl uding law enforcement authorities, intermediaries 
and right holders  
2. Optimising legal proceedings  
3. Promoting new technologies and surveillance tools  
4. Empowering SMEs  
5. Fostering training and international cooperation  
Finally, the European Commiss ion is represented at the TFCIT, working on relevant topics such as 
Free Trade Zones and E -commerce.  
 
Página 131, párrafo 3.288  
3.288. IPR e nforcement at the European  Union's external borders is governed by Regulation 
(EU) 608/2013, and Commission Implemen ting Regulation (EU)  1352/2013 as amended by 
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/2035. The enforcement of IPRs by customs 
continues to be a priority for the Commission and for member States. At the external border of the 
European  Union, customs au thorities may suspend the release of, or detain, goods that are 
suspected of infringing, or are found to have infringed, IPRs. In most cases, customs authorities act 
upon applications from right holders. However, they may also act ex officio  if they have s ufficient 
grounds for suspecting that goods infringe an IPR. In such cases, they will notify the 
detention/suspension to the importer within one working day, and to the right holder on the same 
day or promptly thereafter. The right holder must submit an ap plication for action within four working 
days of receiving the notification. If no application is submitted within this period, the goods are 
released.  
 
Question 11:  
Pregunta:  
- ¿Quién cubre los perjuicios sufridos por el importador cuando no se presenta una solicitud en plazo?  
 
Reply: The deadlines provided for in the legislation are reduced to the necessary minimum in view 
of the need to maintain a proper balance between customs controls and facilitation of legitimate 
trade. If no application fo r action is received in reply to a notification of an ex officio  detention, the 
customs authorities shall grant the release of the goods or put an end to their detention immediately 
after completion of all customs formalities. Moreover, in the area of IPR enforcement, customs 
cannot act ex officio  in case of perishable goods, precisely to prevent possible damage to the 
importer.  
 
Página 158, párrafo 4.110.  
4.110. Going beyond these regulations affecting trade in illegally cut timber, the 
European  Parliamen t, and the Council, in December 2022, reached a provisional agreement on a 
regulation proposed by the Commission in 2021, aiming to prevent deforestation and forest 
degradation associated with commodities and products placed on or exported from the EU mark et. 
It focuses on creating a level playing field, minimizing the use of products from supply chains 
associated with deforestation or forest degradation, and increasing demand for "deforestation -free" WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 287 - 
 
products. The proposed regulation would cover wood as we ll as products such as cocoa, coffee, oil 
palm, cattle, or soya grown on former forest areas that were deforested after December 2020.  
 
Questions 12:  
Preguntas:  
Costa  Rica es un país que ha realizado un gran esfuerzo de inversión pública en evitar la 
deforestación. En este contexto, nos preocupa la aplicación práctica de esta regulación:  
 
• ¿Cómo va a garantizar la Unión Europea que esfuerzos país basados en métricas científicas 
sólidas no se vean invisibilizados creando nuevas métricas para valorar conceptos técnicos como 
deforestación, pérdida arbórea y degradación forestal solo para poner algunos ejemplos?  
• ¿Qué medidas tomará la Unión Europea para evaluar  el impacto de esta regulación y con base 
en qué líneas base? ¿Se medirá este impacto en términos de regeneración de bosque, no pérdida 
comercial?  
• ¿Se incluirá en la evaluación el impacto socioeconómico la producción agrícola de pequeña y 
mediana escala?  ¿Se medirá el impacto social por el aumento en el costo de estos bienes en los 
quintiles con menos ingresos?  
 
Reply:  The definitions included in the Regulation (see Texts adopted - Deforestation Regulation - 
Wednesday, 19 April 2023 (europa.eu) ) rely on concepts developed at international level, in 
particular within the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Art. 34(1) 
mandates the European Commission to assess the impact of the relevant commodities on 
deforestation and forest degradation no later than one year after the entry into force of the 
Regulation. As the assessment process has not started yet, it is t oo early to provide further details.  
 
Questions 13:  
Sobre la definición de la lista de países según riesgo:  
• ¿El "riesgo país" se determinará por país en general o con base en la información disponible 
para cada uno de los productos incluidos en la lista ? ¿Existe una lista clara de criterios a evaluar? 
¿Serán los mismos para todos los países? ¿Tiene la Unión Europea una base de datos general o se 
elaborará a partir de la información que alimenten los países?  
• ¿Cómo piensa la Unión Europea llevar a cabo e sta evaluación? ¿Utilizando un canal directo 
con los países? ¿Cuál sería ese canal? ¿Ministerios de Agricultura, Ambiente o Comercio Exterior?  
• ¿Utilizará la UE consultores externos para realizar esta evaluación?  
• ¿Cómo se definirán las fuentes de información válidas? ¿Qué bases de datos de geo -
referenciación se utilizarían? ¿Generará la Unión Europea su propio sistema o se utilizarán las bases 
oficiales de los países?  
• En general existen muchos estudios de diferentes fuentes sobre sostenibilidad en todas las 
áreas y sobre temas agrícolas y sostenibilidad. Sin embargo, no todos los estudios tienen una 
metodología válida seria y confiable. No pod rían considerarse información oficial estudios que 
contengan opiniones subjetivas de diversos actores. ¿Cómo definirá la Unión Europea información 
confiable? ¿Deberán los países asumir la carga de la prueba de todos los estudios cuestionables que 
existan p ara defenderse? ¿Habrá criterios mínimos que definan una fuente confiable?  
• ¿Cómo se hará la equivalencia entre la información país generada a partir de definiciones 
legales domésticas o criterios científicos utilizados a nivel doméstico para medir la def orestación y 
degradación de bosque y los establecidos por la Unión Europea, cuando los definiciones y criterios 
científicos de los países sean diferentes a las definiciones adoptadas por la UE en su regulación?  
 
Reply:  The list of criteria is described in Article  29 of the Regulation, see Texts adopted - 
Deforestation Regulation - Wednesday, 19 April 2023 (europa.eu) . The assessment of the 
European  Commission must take into account the criteria defined in Article  29.3 and may also take 
into account a range of other criteria described in Article  29.4. The methodology that will underpin 
the risk assessment is currently under development.  Stakeholders and third countries will be duly 
informed about its specificities through the Deforestation Multi -Stakeholder Platform.  
 
Questions 14:  
Sobre la trazabilidad de los productos que se exporten y los costos asociados a la 
implementac ión: 
• ¿La información o criterios que se pedirá a los productores locales, será analizada por la 
Unión  Europea o por terceras partes que la Unión Europea contratará?  
• ¿Cómo se va a garantizar que el costo de toda esta regulación no va a quedar sobre los 
pequeños y medianos productores? ¿Cómo se va a garantizar que el mercado va a reconocer WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 288 - 
 
  
 adecuadamente el costo de poner en práctica esta regulación? ¿Existe un estudio s obre la capacidad 
de los productores locales parte de la cadena de exportación de estos productos a la Unión Europea 
para absorber estos costos y de los potenciales impactos para la producción?  
• El plazo de implementación de la regulación es muy pequeño ¿ cómo va a asegurar la 
Unión  Europea que sus socios comerciales y sobre todo los productores tendrán tiempo suficiente e 
información disponible para cumplir con la regulación?  
 
Reply:  EU Member States' competent authorities will be in charge of verifying t he information 
provided by producers to evaluate the compatibility with the Regulation's requirements. The EU is 
committed to ensure that small and medium -sized producers are able to place their products on the 
EU market. Given the cut -off date of 31  Decem ber 2020, the vast majority of current agricultural 
production will be considered deforestation -free under the Regulation. The requirements of the 
Regulation are aligned with the best practices already existing in the market. Moreover, for SMEs 
operators a nd traders, the Regulation foresees a delayed entry into application, namely 24 months 
after the entry into force, to give SMEs companies more time to comply with its main provisions. 
Finally, the EU is supporting its partner countries through cooperation and development to ensure 
their supply chains are deforestation -free and is stepping up its support. Support will depend on the 
specific situation, and will aim at the promotion of protection, restoration and sustainable use of 
forests, as well as sustaina ble agriculture, supply chain transparency and other relevant areas.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 289 - 
 
UNITED  STATES  
Part I. Questions based on the Secretariat Report (WT/TPR/S/442)  
Page 35, Paragraph 2.14  
Q1: 
1. Please provide an update on the status of the EU's acceptance of the WTO Fisheries Subsidies 
Agreement. Is there an estimated timeframe for ratification?  
 
Reply:  The EU acceptance procedure has several steps. The European Commission made a proposal 
in November 2022 (document COM(2022)582). The European Parliament gave its consent in a 
plenary vote on 19  April 2023. Finally, the Council of the European  Union  adopted the Decision on 
the conclusion, on behalf of the EU, of the Protocol that contains the WTO  Agreement  on Fisheries 
Subsidies on 25  May 2023. The deposit of the instrument of the acceptance on behalf of the EU is 
expected to take place shortly thereafter.  
 
Page 31, Paragraph 2.4: The Secretariat Report describes the EU's new development strategy, 
including the Green Deal, Digital Strateg y, and new political agenda to become stronger in the world 
by reinforcing global influence and leadership. According to the Secretariat Report, some of these 
policies may imply significant changes across sectors and policy areas.  
Q2-3: 
2. Could the EU pro vide more detail on its review of EU trade policy to meet the goals of these 
new strategies?  
 
Reply: On 18  February  2021 the European Commission adopted a Communication entitled Trade 
Policy Review - An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy (COM (20 21) 66) This 
Communication sets out EU's trade strategy for the coming years. Reflecting the concept of open 
strategic autonomy, it builds on the EU's openness to contribute to the economic recovery through 
support for the green and digital transformations , as well as a renewed focus on strengthening 
multilateralism and reforming global trade rules to ensure that they are fair and sustainable. It 
highlights six areas that are critical to achieving the EU's objectives in the medium term: reform 
the WTO; supp ort the green transition and promote responsible and sustainable value chains; 
support the digital transition and trade in services; strengthen the EU's regulatory impact; 
strengthen the EU's partnerships with neighbouring, enlargement countries and Africa  and 
strengthen the EU's focus on implementation and enforcement of trade agreements, and ensure a 
level playing field. The new strategy underlines EU's commitment to strengthen the capacity of trade 
to support the digital and climate transitions. First, b y contributing to achieving the European Green 
Deal objectives. Second, by removing unjustified trade barriers in the digital economy to reap the 
benefits of digital technologies in trade. In addition, it emphasizes the need for the EU adopt a 
tougher, mor e assertive approach towards the implementation and enforcement of its trade 
agreements, fighting unfair trade and addressing sustainability concerns.  
 
3. Has the EU developed an analysis of expected changes to the policies listed in the report?  
 
Reply: The EU has an evaluation policy that covers all policy initiatives which are liable to have a 
significant impact on the economy, the environment, social issues or human rights. Individual policy 
initiatives are assessed ex-ante, before the Commission makes a  proposal to the Council. A few 
years after implementation has begun, the impact of the policy initiative is assessed in an ex-post 
evaluation.  
 
This applies to initiatives announced in the Trade Policy Review. It should be noted however that 
there has been no analysis of the impact of these measures taken as a whole. Rather, each initiative 
is evaluated individually. The analyses can be found online:  
https://policy.trade.ec.europ a.eu/analysis -and-assessment_en  
 
Page 36, Paragraph 2.19 through Paragraph 2.22: The Secretariat Report notes that the EU 
currently maintains 44 regional trade agreements, which include SPS and TBT provisions.  
Q4: 
4. Do regional and preferential agreements restrict signatories' ability to draft and implement 
TBT and SPS measures?  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Reply: Under regional and preferential agreements, signatories keep their ability to draft and 
implement SPS measures and technical regulations  in accordance with the SPS and TBT  Agreement  
and any other conditions agreed between the parties.  
 
Page 53, paragraph 3.18:  The Report highlights that EU member states have ratified the 
WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) and are supportive of its impl ementation. The TFA identifies 
de minimis  as a trade facilitative concept that provides benefits especially to small and medium sized 
enterprises. Under the TFA, Members are to provide, to the extent possible, exemption from customs 
duties and taxes and sh ould minimize the documentation required for the release of the shipment 
under the de minimis  threshold. In 2021, the EU removed the EUR  22 import VAT de minimis  
exemption. In March 2022, the EU Commission's Wise Persons Group of the Reform of the EU 
Custo ms Union recommended elimination of the EUR  $150 de minimis  exemption for low -value 
express shipments.  
Q5-6: 
5. Is the EU considering a decrease or the elimination of the EUR  $150 de minimis  exemption for 
low-value express shipments?  
 
Reply:  The European Commission has adopted an ambitious EU customs reform proposal on 
17 May 2023. This reform proposal proposes amongst others to abolish the current threshold 
whereby goods valued at less than €150 are exempt from customs duty. The legislative proposals 
will now be sent to the co -legislators, the European Parliament and the Council of the 
European  Union , for agreement. Further information is to be found in https://taxation -
customs.ec.europa.eu/customs -4/eu-customs - reform_en  
 
Follow -up to Question 5 : In your reply, you provided the following webpage link, https://taxation -
customs.ec.europa.eu/customs -4/eu-customs - reform_en , which includes the legislative texts for 
the EU 's custom reform proposal. This proposal indicates, among other things, that t he EU intends 
to abolish the current threshold whereby goods valued at less than €150 are exempt from customs 
duty (i.e., the EU 's de minimis  threshold). In the document titled, "Proposal for a COUNCIL 
REGULATION amending Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 as reg ards the introduction of a simplified 
tariff treatment for the distance sales of goods and Regulation (EC) No 1186/2009 as regards the 
elimination of the customs duty relief threshold ", the EU 's new proposal includes the adoption of a 
simplified bucket sys tem similar to one that Canada enacted in 2012. A summary of the products in 
the EU 's five -tier bucket system is provided in the Annex.  
 
1. Can you please explain how the EU assigned products to each ad valorem  tariff bucket?  
 
2. Can you please clarify whe ther there is a value threshold for goods that fall into the EU 's 
proposed simplified bucket system and what the proposed threshold is?  
 
3. If this proposal is adopted, please explain how the EU plans to implement the proposal so 
it is consistent with Arti cle 7.8.2d the TFA, which requires that Members shall provide, to the 
extent possible, for a de minimis  shipment value or dutiable amount for which customs duties 
and taxes will not be collected?  
 
Reply to Questions 1 (follow -up to Question 5):  
The reform proposes one tariff rate (bucket) for each Chapter of the Combined Nomenclature, 
regardless of the origin of the goods concerned.  
 
For the composition of the buckets, the most usual rates were chosen and, to place the different 
chapters in the buckets, the  following steps were taken:  
 
(i) each Chapter of the Combined Nomenclature was analysed to determine the ad valorem  import 
duty rates therein,  
(ii) if that Chapter had only one rate, all goods belonging to that chapter were placed in the 
corresponding b ucket,  
(iii) if the Chapter had several rates, all goods belonging to that chapter were placed in the bucket 
with the rate that appeared more often,  
(iv) where the Chapter had several rates and none of them prevailed, or the rates were not 
ad valorem , the Chapter was placed in the highest bucket.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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For the sake of completeness: goods subject top harmonized excise duties as well as goods which 
are subject to anti-dumping, anti -subsidy or safeguard measures, as well as goods contained in 
Chapters 73, 98 and 99 of the Combined Nomenclature are (due to their nature) excluded from the 
simplified duty calculation approach.  
 
As a result of this method, for many pro ducts the bucket rate reflects the actual rate. Some products 
have a lower or a higher rate under the bucket than under the normal calculation method, leaving 
the choice to the deemed importer whether to use the simplified system at a higher rate, or decla ring 
the full information at the actual MFN rate (Most -favoured Nation Tariffs), or claiming preferential 
rates. Importantly, it is a voluntary system, leaving it at the choice of the trader, whether the 
simplifications justify the slightly higher rate.  
 
Reply to Question 2 (follow -up to Question 5):  
There is no value threshold for goods that fall into the proposed simplified bucket system, which 
means that this system will be applicable to goods of any value as long as the qualify as a 
business -to-consume r transaction pursuant to the VAT concept of distance sale of imported goods.  
 
Reply to Question 3 (follow -up to Question 5):  
WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (2017) Art 7 (point 8.2) asks to 'provide, to the extent possible, 
for a de minimis  shipment valu e or dutiable amount, for which customs duties and taxes will not be 
collected. ' The qualifying phrase "to the extent possible " grants WTO Members policy space to not 
apply a de minimis  provision. The EU has such a de minimis  provision since 1983, last cha nged to 
150 EUR in 2008. The Commission considers this provision refers to expedited shipments, and not 
to the more recent increase in e -commerce trade. The 150  EUR threshold is abused and creates a 
loophole both in the EU and the Member States budgets and  regarding the controls for non -financial 
risks. The EU proposes an alternative, that includes simplified and expedite solutions (deliver duty 
paid) but closes the current loophole. It is therefore possible to facilitate trade while removing the 
duty-exemp t threshold.  
 
6. Does the EU intend to uphold its commitments under the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement 
related to de minimis  and reject the Wise Persons Group of the Reform of the EU Customs Union 
recommendation that the EUR  $150 de minimis  exemption for  low-value express shipments be 
eliminated?  
 
Reply:  The EU intends to uphold its commitments under the TFA. As regards further process on the 
customs reform proposal, which is outside the TPR review period, please refer to the reply to 
Question 5.  
 
Page 77 , paragraph 3.84: The EU continued to impose import licences on 10 categories of 
products, mainly for the administration of TRQs or quota regimes (2), surveillance regimes (2), or 
to monitor or control certain imports (6). The overall framework and the pro ducts subject to licensing 
did not change during the review period, although the surveillance mechanisms that were in place 
on iron & steel and aluminium since 2016 lapsed in May 2020. They were replaced by a monitoring 
system that is described as an ex-post system based on actual import data that are reported 
monthly. Retrospective Union surveillance was also adopted for imports of bioethanol in 
November  2020. Although the regulation later expired, imports of bioethanol continued to be 
informally monitored.  
Q.7-9: 
7. Can the EU provide additional information about the replacement for the surveillance 
mechanisms on steel and aluminium that lapsed in May 202 0? 
 
Reply: Import monitoring of steel and aluminium is covered by provisions of articles 55 and 56 of 
the UCC implementing regulation 2015/2447 (and annexes 21 -01 to 21 -03). 
 
8. Does the EU collect any preliminary import data on steel and aluminium?  
 
Reply : Not currently . 
 
9. What is the type of information being collected as part of the new monitoring system in place?  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Reply: Information extracted from 16 data elements of the customs declarations are collected. It 
relates mostly to the nature of the goods,  their origin, their value, their net mass and the date of 
acceptance of the declaration.  
 
Page 77, paragraph 3.85:  According to the Secretariat Report, "The EU has different licensing 
regulations in place with respect to each (Table 3.12). The regulations  have, for the most part, not 
changed substantially except for the TRQ and licensing regime for certain agricultural products. The 
licensing regime for timber (i.e., Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade (FLEGT)) remains 
operational only for Indonesi a, although the EU continues to negotiate additional Voluntary 
Partnership Agreements with other countries" . 
Q10-11: 
10. Does the EU plan to expand the licensing regime for FLEGT to countries other than Indonesia?  
 
Reply:  The TPR is a retrospective exercise. At this stage, it is too early to comment on any plans to 
expand the FLEGT licensing regime.  
 
11. Can the EU provide additional information about the Voluntary Partnership Agreements it has 
negotiated with other countri es? 
 
Reply: Voluntary partnership agreements have so far been signed with Indonesia, Ghana, the 
Republic of the Congo, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Liberia and Viet  Nam. Indonesia is 
the only country with the operating system and issuing FLEGT l icences. The EU has concluded 
negotiations with Honduras and Guyana. Negotiations are ongoing with the Ivory Coast, 
Democratic  Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Laos, Malaysia and Thailand.  
 
In compliance with article 20 (3) of the EU Timber Regulation (EUTR) and with article 9 of the Forest 
Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Regulation, the European Commission carried out 
a Fitness Check on the EUTR and FLEGT Regulation.  
 
The Fitness Check was aimed at assessing the implementation and functioning of  the EUTR and 
FLEGT Regulation and whether they were fit for their purpose of halting illegal logging and related 
trade. On FLEGT VPAs, the main findings are that the core objective of this instrument - to tackle 
illegal logging and associated trade global ly - has not been met. There has been no discernible 
advance of VPA partner countries over other producer countries in reducing the level of illegal 
logging, with the notable exception of Indonesia. The impact on the trade volumes of illegal timber, 
includ ing to the EU market, has been limited. After almost 20 years, only one VPA country out of 15 
being engaged in a VPA process with the EU has an operating licensing system in place. Positive 
results were however identified in terms of advancing stakeholder engagement with civil society, 
governance reforms, transparency, codes of conduct and social safeguards.  
 
Page 87, paragraph 3.117:  The Report outlines changes to the EU's export measures during the 
reporting period.  
12. Could the EU please provide an upda te on the legislative status of the Proposal for a Regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the European Council on shipments of waste and amending 
Regulations (EU) No 1257/2013 and (EU) No 2020/1056?  
 
Reply: [The proposal for a new EU regulation on th e shipment waste is currently discussed by the 
European Parliament and the Council of the European  Union . At present, the current Regulation  (EC) 
No 1013/2006  on the shipment of waste is applicable.  
 
13. Has t he EU considered the impact of the proposed regulation on restricting non -hazardous 
waste and scrap exports, which may limit access to low -carbon manufacturing inputs that are 
necessary to the supply chains of other member states?  
 
Reply: With the proposal  for a new Waste Shipment Regulation an impact assessment report has 
been published . The impact assessment report includes a description of the environmental, social 
and economic impacts, including impacts on small and medium enterprises and competitiveness, 
and an explicit statement if any of these are not considered significant. It als o includes a description 
of who will be affected by the initiative and how. The relevant documents can be viewed at: 
https://environment.ec.europa.eu/ publications/proposal -new-regulation -waste -shipments_en .  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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14. The proposed regulation's auditing requirements could prove burdensome for exporters, 
imposing additional financial and time -delay costs on them and their cu stomers in other markets, 
and in turn discourage exports and limit options for environmentally sound recovery. What steps will 
the EU take to ensure that the auditing requirements do not impose an additional burden on EU 
exporters and their customers in ot her markets?  
 
Reply: EU exporters have a responsibility to ensure that the waste that they export is managed 
sustainably in the facilities dealing with them in the countries of destination. The proposal for a new 
regulation on the shipment of waste therefo re foresees an obligation for EU exporting companies to 
guarantee that these facilities have been subject to an independent audit regime. Such audits will 
check a number of criteria which are essential to demonstrate that these facilities manage the waste 
question in an environmentally sound manner. EU companies exporting waste will only be entitled 
to export waste to facilities which have been successfully audited.  
 
A number of EU exporting companies have already implemented such audit schemes. This is als o 
common practice for exporters to guarantee transparency and traceability along their supply chain. 
The proposal would have a limited costs for companies but would provide them with assurance of 
the quality and environmentally sound treatment of their was te abroad. In order to avoid that the 
same facility is audited at multiple occasions, the proposal foresees that an EU exporting company 
could rely on an audit carried out by another EU exporting company. Additional measures to limit 
further the burden on EU exporting companies and the waste treatment facilities located outside the 
EU are also contemplated as part of the discussions of the proposal.  
 
This obligation for auditing will only apply three years after the entry into force of the Regulation, 
which  should provide sufficient time for the companies concerned to get prepared for it.  
 
Follow -up to Question 14. : The EU 's response mentions that audits will employ a number of 
criteria to demonstrate that facilities manage waste in an environmentally sound manner. According 
to Annex  X of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the European Council 
on shipments of waste and amending Regulations (EU) No 1257/2013 and (EU) No 2020/1056, the 
facility managing the waste in the country of d estination is required to establish and provide records 
of its waste management and waste shipment activities for the last five years.  
 
14/A When will a facility need to provide these records? For example, would it be five years after 
the implementation  date, or when the audit requirement enters into force?  
 
Follow -up Reply:  Records of the waste management and shipment activities by the f acility for the 
last five years before the date the audit is performed must be provided. Hence such records should 
be kept for the five last years before the entry into force of the new obligations on auditing.  
 
14/b Could the EU please elaborate on whethe r any additional measures are being considered to 
limit the burden on EU exporting companies and the waste treatment facilities located outside the 
EU?  
 
Follow -up Reply:  A key factor in the new Waste Shipment Regulation will be the digitalization of 
proce dures, whereby the Regulation will specify the conditions for third country public and private 
actors involved in shipments of waste to connect to the electronic exchange system, in order to 
facilitate the submission and decision -making regarding shipment that are subject to the notification 
procedure. A register of audited facilities is likely to be established and managed on EU level for the 
ease of reference of companies and authorities to identify audited facilities. This should also prevent 
duplicative  auditing.  
 
15. Legitimate trade in recycled commodities creates opportunities for economic growth and 
environmental sustainability by diverting end of life materials from landfills and providing high - 
quality, low carbon feedstock to manufacturing inputs.  Will the EU consider removing non - hazardous 
scrap materials, such as metals, that pose negligible risks to the environment and that international 
producers are reliant on from the scope of the regulation?  
 
Reply: Whether any given waste stream is identif ied as hazardous or non -hazardous waste will 
depend on its composition and more specifically on whether it contains hazardous substances in an 
amount that will make the waste exhibit hazardous properties. In this regard, the definition of WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 294 - 
 
  
 hazardous waste i n Article  3(2) of Directive 2008/98/EC states that "'hazardous waste' means waste 
which displays one or more of the hazardous properties listed in Annex  III". 
 
Within the EU, the identification of hazardous and non -hazardous waste streams can be found in t he 
"List of Waste" defined in Decision 2000/532/EC.  
 
Page 95, Paragraph 3.138 and Table  3.22: The Secretariat report states that "in 2020, there 
were 20 EU member States that reported officially supported export credits per the definition in 
Regulation (EU) 1233/2011". The United  States  notes than in Table  3.22 only the largest users of 
export credits were listed.  
Q16-17: 
16. Please provide the comprehensive list and data for all member States that reported officially 
supported export credits for years 2019, 2020, and if available 2021.  
 
Reply: Please see the table below, which was constructed on the basis of annual reports for the 
years 2019 and 2020. Data for 2021 have not yet been published. The figure on the aggregate 
nominal risk exposure for 2020 was corrected since the Commission annual report was published 
(there was one mistake in reporting).  
 
EU Member  State 
(code)  
in EUR million   Aggregate 
nominal  risk 
exposure (pure  
cover) 
31.12.2019  Nominal  value 
of officially 
supported loan 
portfolio (direct 
lending) 
31.12.2019  Aggregate 
nominal  risk 
exposure 
(pure  cover) 
31.12.2020  Nominal  value 
of officially 
supported loan 
portfolio (direct 
lending) 
31.12.2020  
AT  7,104  0 7,217  0 
BE  5,428  12 4,797  10 
BG  209 0 0 0 
CZ  3,350  1,486  2,971  1,168  
DE  87,914  18,183  85,022  14,768  
DK  7,930  1,264  6,295  1,223  
EE  4 0 4 0 
ES  11,768  2,903  11,396  2,631  
FI  25,489  7,165  22,408  7,561  
FR  59,174  12,737  59,635  12,648  
GR  0 0 0 0 
HR  161 0 168 9 
HU  1,639  61 1,617  42 
IT  58,860  36,801  58,991  37,317  
LU  562 0 508 0 
NL  23,232  0 26,009  0 
PL  1,225  733 1,040  688 
PT  829 0 572 0 
RO  81 0 81 0 
SE  30,123  7,286  32,010  6,904  
SI  123 0 109 0 
SK  507 231 197 297 
EU  325,712  88,861  321,047  85,266  
 
17. If available, please provide the percentage of program use by sector (e.g., agriculture, energy, 
manufacturing, transportation, etc.) for years 2019, 2020, and 2021.  
 
Reply: This data are not directly available to the European Commission but may be retrieved from 
the transparency exercise and comprehensive database put together by the OECD Secretariat based 
on the Participants' regular reporting, including by EU Member States, containing details on all 
transactions falling under the scope of the Arrangement (s o-called XCR1 reporting). As the 
information contained in the database is confidential among the Participants, we would encourage 
the US to use their own access to retrieve the information.  
 
Page 104, paragraph 3.167:  Pursuant to the Regulation 2019/515, m ember states that use 
existing technical regulations to restrict market access for products lawfully marketed in another 
member state must justify their position with technical and scientific evidence and must grant the 
economic operators affected an oppor tunity to provide comments.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 295 - 
 
Q18-19: 
18. How does the EU ensure member states are following WTO TBT obligations in situations where 
a member state attempts to restrict market access for products lawfully marketed in another 
member state?  
 
Reply : The mutual recognition principle ensures that any good lawfully sold in one EU member state 
can be sold in another. This is possible even if the good does not fully comply with the technical 
rules of the other EU member state (although there may be exceptions where p ublic safety, health 
or the environment are concerned). The principle stems from Articles 34 -36 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European  Union  and is further defined in Regulation (EU) 2019/515 on the mutual 
recognition of goods lawfully marketed i n another country. This Regulation defines the rights and 
obligations in relation to the mutual recognition principle for competent authorities and businesses 
when selling goods in another EU Member State. Article  5(11) of Regulation (EU) 2019/515 on the 
mutual recognition of goods provides for procedural guarantees in favour of economic operators 
aiming at avoiding arbitrary negative or restrictive decisions of the national competent authorities, 
notably their obligation to mention in such decisions t he technical and scientific data they considered, 
evidence that the decision is appropriate and does not go beyond what is necessary and the 
possibility to appeal. Moreover, according to Implementing Regulation of the 
Commission  2020/1668, negative or rest rictive national administrative decisions must be notified to 
the publicly available Information and Communication System for Market Surveillance (ICSMS) 
https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/icsms/ within 20 working days, for transparency purposes.  
 
19. Specifical ly, the United  States  has heard concerns regarding member state packaging, labeling 
and recycling rules that could result in products that legally entered the market in one member state 
being considered illegal in another member state. Can the EU provide a ny clarification on how it 
would address such conflicts?  
 
Reply: There are no notifications of negative or restrictive decisions in the ICSMS on the grounds 
that non -harmonised goods lawfully marketed in a Member State do not comply with national 
technical  rules on packaging, labelling and recycling. This is probably due to the fact that economic 
operators take the necessary measures to comply with these national technical rules before they 
place their products on the market of the Member State of destinati on in order to avoid marketing 
prohibitions or fines or they comply during the prior authorisation procedure.  
 
Page  104, paragraph  3.168:  The report notes that the EU is continuing to promote the 
development of environmental and digital standards as part of its wider standardization strategy. 
Q20-21 
20. The EU is proposing several horizontal regulations that would require new standards for a  
range of products (for example, the Artificial Intelligence Act and Cyber Resilience Act). The timelines 
for international standards development organizations to propose and adopt standards can be long. 
How will the EU work with international standards de veloping organizations to develop new standards 
when/if needed?  
 
Reply: For several horizontal regulations, the Commission intends to request the European 
Standardisation Organisations to develop harmonised standards taking into account existing 
internatio nal standards in line with the European Standardisation Regulation (1025/2012). Such 
harmonised standards will provide a presumption of conformity with the essential requirements of 
the horizontal legislation, such as the Cyber Resilience Act and the Artif icial Intelligence Act. 
Furthermore, alignment between standardisation activities at international and European level is 
ensured by relevant arrangements between the European Standardisation Organisation and 
international standardisation organisations.  
 
Follow Up to Question 20 : The reply states that alignment between ESOs and the ISO/IEC is 
"ensured by relevant arrangements ". Could the EU specifically identify the "relevant arrangements " 
that its reply is referencing?  
 
6. If the reply is referencing the Vi enna and Frankfurt Agreements, under which the ESOs and 
ISO/IEC can coordinate workstreams, these arrangements have drawn criticism from stakeholders 
that they have exacerbated the problem of long timelines, due to various internal bureaucratic 
challenges within the EU, and undermined the principles and procedures upon which WTO Members 
have agreed such standards must be based. As such, has the EU considered alternative mechanisms WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 296 - 
 
  
 by which to cooperate in the development of international standards (defined by TBT Committee 
Decision Principles) outside of the ISO and IEC frameworks?  
 
Follow -up reply:  First, the ESOs are private independent organizations bodies linked to the EC by 
a public -private partnership so the EC does monitor their international agreemen ts nor their 
international activities.  
 
As it is well known, for the EU the WTO TBT Committee Decision is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition to define an international standardisation body as we consider that being a treaty 
organisation (such as the different UN bodies) and/or operating under the national delegation 
principle is essential.  
 
7. Is it possible for the ESOs to participate in the work of non -European international standard 
developers?  
 
Follow -up reply : As noted above, the ESOs are pri vate and independent bodies linked to the EC 
by a public -private partnership. They have many cooperation agreements with international, regional 
and private standards developing organisations, completely independently from the regulators.  
 
21. Does the Co mmission or the ESOs have the ability to reference, in whole or in part, standards 
that are not developed in Europe?  
 
Reply:  In line with the European Standardisation Regulation (1025/2012), the references to 
harmonised standards have to be published by th e European Commission in the Official Journal of 
the European  Union . The European Standardisation Organisations have to take into account existing 
international standards. International standards can become European harmonised standards only 
if they are ad opted as European standards, not on their own. As harmonised standards they would 
have to go through the process of assessment against the relevant essential requirements in order 
to be able to provide presumption of conformity with the legislation.  
 
Page 104-105, paragraph 3.169:  The report notes proposed  amendments to the governance  
structure of  ESOs to ensure national standardization bodies are solely involved the decision -making 
process when developing a European standard.  
Q. 22 
22. European Commission Proposal COM (2022) 32 notes that European standards and European 
standardisation deliverables requested under Article  10(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 be 
taken exclusively by representatives of national standardisation bodies. What is the process for  
identifying and adopting European standards that were developed prior to the request under 
Regulation No 1025/2012?  
 
Reply:  It does not matter when the development of the standards was started, if they are included 
in a standardisation request and have no t been adopted formally by the ESOs before the 
standardisation request entered into force, then the new governance rules introduced by the 
amendment to Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 must apply.  
 
Page 105, Paragraph 3.173:  The Report delineates the product categories for which the "new" 
and "old" approaches to developing technical requirements are applied.  
Q. 23 -24: 
23. Can the EU provide further clarity on why the "old approach" of specifying technical regulations 
might be applied to product categories that normally fall under the "new approach"? For example, 
the 2022 revision of the Radio Equipment Directive which mandated the use of the USB -C charging 
standard for mobile phones and other devices (Directive (EU) 2022/2380).  
 
Reply: According to the New Approach, EU product legislation should be limited to setting out the 
essential health and safety requirements, however, essential requirements might also be 
supplemented in the legislation by a number of more specific requirements for certain c ategories of 
products. Such specific requirements in the legislation do not, however, render these pieces of 
legislation 'Old Approach' technical regulations.  
 
The 'Common Charger' Directive does contain certain specific requirements, but it could not be 
categorized as an 'Old Approach' legislation, because it does not include all the detailed technical 
requirements. The 'Common Charger' Directive empowers the Commission to set out more detailed WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 297 - 
 
requirements in delegated acts outside of the legislative proc edure, to ensure a minimum common 
interoperability between radio equipment and its charging devices, as well as to improve consumer 
convenience, to reduce environmental waste and to avoid market fragmentation.  
 
24. Please explain whether the EU has conside red, when the "new approach" under the NLF 
becomes the norm, how setting specific technical regulations for categories such as electronic 
products, medical devices, and machinery could hinder innovation and result in uncertainty for 
manufacturers?  
 
Reply: In the New Approach product legislation essential requirements may in certain cases be 
complemented with product specific requirements. It is sometimes necessary to ensure uniform 
application or the protection of public interests, such as the protection of  the environment. This does 
not mean, however, that a legislation that includes certain product requirements becomes a 
hindrance to innovation.  
 
Page  106, Paragraph  3.175:  The paragraph describes a process by which manufacturers who do 
not use harmonized s tandards can show compliance with the product requirements by having 
recourse to a conformity assessment conducted by a third party. Article  3 of Decision 768/2008 
similarly describes the requirements for achieving a presumption of conformity, "while maint aining 
the possibility of setting the level of protection by other means" . 
Q. 25 -27: 
25. Has the EU developed specific guidance for manufacturers or for conformity assessment bodies 
that will allow manufacturers or conformity assessment bodies to demonstra te compliance with 
regulatory requirements through alternative means?  
 
Reply: These are sector and product specific issues and there is no horizontal guidance on 
alternative means of demonstrating compliance. When manufacturers choose not to apply all the 
provisions given in a harmonised standard, and which normally would provide presumption of 
conformity, or where the harmonised standard does not exist, manufacturers need, on the basis of 
their own risk assessment, to indicate in their technical documentat ion how the compliance is 
reached or that relevant essential requirements are not relevant for the product.  
 
Follow Up to Question 25 . Without horizontal guidance on alternative means of demonstrating 
compliance, notified bodies undertake significant legal  and financial liability by certifying regulated 
goods that are produced to non -harmonized standards. This liability – and the increased delay and 
uncertainty in testing goods produced to non -harmonized standards - would appear to establish 
de facto barrie rs to the importation of imported goods that meet the essential requirements but that 
do not reference the European standard.  
 
8. Other than protection of domestic industry, please explain in detail why the EU refuses to  provide 
for a process for alternati ve means of demonstrating compliance?  
 
Follow -up reply:  EU harmonisation legislation is prescriptive as to the ends but not as to the means 
to achieve those ends. Besides that, it is also technology -neutral, meaning it does not prescribe the 
methods to be used to ensure compliance with the essential requirement. Therefore, it is not 
appropriate to qualify Union harmonisation legislation as protective of its own industry, because this 
approach allows openness to technological innovations:  
 
It is up to the ma nufacturer to choose whether to ensure compliance by relying on harmonised 
standards or by applying another different way or technology that deems the most appropriate for 
it. Manufacturers may choose to achieve compliance by relying on harmonised standard s, but this 
is neither the only way that they can choose, nor is reserved for 'domestic ' manufacturers.  
 
26. What mechanism exists for the Commission to consider and accept equivalent technical 
regulations?  
 
Reply: The EU has not considered and accepted equivalent technical regulations. Instead, the EU 
has concluded a number of mutual recognition agreements on acceptance of conformity assessment 
results (MRAs). More about these agreements can be found here. MRAs enable conformity 
assessment bodies (CABs) nominated by one Party to certify products for access to the ot her Party's 
market, according to the other Party's technical legislation. They provide for the mutual recognition 
between trading partners of mandatory test results and certificates for certain industrial products. WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 There is no implication that the regulati ons imposed on products by the Parties are to be equivalent, 
approximated or aligned.  
 
Follow Up to Question 26.  
9. The reply states that the EU "has not considered and accepted equivalent technical regulations ", 
but instead has concluded a number of MRAs with partner countries. Is there a mechanism other 
than the conclusion of MRAs whereby the EU is able to consider other international standards as 
equivalent for purposes of meeting technical regulations?  
 
Follow -up reply:  It is important to stress that EU harmonisation legislation for products does not, 
as a general rule, impose the use of harmonised standards. Only essential requirements are legally 
binding and manufacturers may apply whatever standards and tech nical specifications – however 
only harmonised standards which references are published in the OJEU provide a presumption of 
conformity. Some EU harmonisation legislation which relies on harmonised standards provides for 
certain alternatives or complementa ry means to harmonised standards for demonstrating 
compliance of a product or a service.  
 
Some of these alternatives are mandatory while others provide a presumption of conformity in a 
similar manner as harmonized standards. As a rule, these alternatives are foreseen as a fall -back 
option mainly for situations where harmonized standards do not exist (yet) and harmonised 
standards remain the preferred option.  
 
27. If no mechanism exists, how are Notified Bodies directed to "set the level of protection by 
other means"?  
 
Reply:  Notified bodies are conformity assessment bodies officially designated and notified and they 
take responsibilities of public interest in the areas for which they are notified. Notified Bodies are 
required to be able to demonstrate that they have the competences to perform the required 
conformity assessment and to issue the required attestation to certify that the regulatory 
requirements have been fulfilled, also in the (complete) absence of harmonised standards.  
 
If a third -party conform ity assessment is foreseen for a product in a EU product legislation, notified 
bodies, based on their expertise in their area of competence, are in charge to assess whether a 
product meets the essential requirements set out in the legislation.  
 
Follow Up t o Question 27 : The reply states that notified bodies "are in charge to assess whether 
a product meets the essential requirements set out in the legislation ". Without horizontal guidance 
or clear objective procedures for judging conformity, there is a signi ficant risk of arbitrary 
determinations or discrimination against imported products.  
 
10. What mechanisms, in the absence of horizontal guidance, exist to ensure that notified bodies do 
not discriminate against imported products?  
 
Follow -up reply:  It is n ot clear where would be the interest of the notified bodies to discriminate 
against imported products. Notified bodies provide their services on a very competitive market, 
independently of the origin of the product. Furthermore, manufacturers are free to c hoose any 
notified body that has been legally designated to carry out the conformity assessment procedure 
and pay for the services of notified bodies; the interest of the notified bodies is to attract as many 
clients and products as possible from other Mem ber States and from outside of the EU as well.  
 
Notified bodies are scrutinized by the notifying authorities in each Member State. Notifying 
authorities are governmental or public bodies, tasked with designating and notifying conformity 
assessment bodies under Union harmonisation legislation. Most often it is the national administration 
responsible for the implementation and management of the Union harmonisation act under which 
the body is notified.  
 
The assessment of a conformity assessm ent body seeking notification determines if it is technically 
competent and capable of carrying out the conformity assessment procedures in question, and if it 
can demonstrate the necessary level of independence, impartiality and integrity.  
 
Member States must verify the competence of the bodies seeking notification, based on the criteria 
laid down in the applicable Union harmonisation legislation in conjunction with essential WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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requirements and the conformity assessment procedure(s) in question. In general, the competence 
criteria set out in the Union harmonisation acts cover:  
 
— availability of personnel and equipment;  
— independence and impartiality in relation to those directly or indirectly concerned with the 
product (such as the designer, the manufacture r, the manufacturer 's authorised representative, the 
supplier, the assembler, the installer, the user);  
— technical competence of personnel that is relevant to the products and conformity assessment 
procedure in question;  
— maintenance of professional secr ecy and integrity; and  
— subscription to civil liability insurance, unless that liability is covered by the state under 
national law.  
 
Notifying authorities or accreditation bodies must carry out periodic monitoring to assess the 
continuity of the competence of notified bodies after they are notified.  
 
Page 106, Paragraph 3.175 : The report describes the process by which European Standardizing 
Organizations (ESOs) receive standards mandates from the Commission and produce standards to 
meet the Commis sion's essential requirements.  
Q. 28 -29 
28. Can the EU please describe what limitations in law or policy are placed on the ESOs in their 
development of harmonized standards? Where exactly are those limitations referenced?  
 
Reply:  The Regulation EU 1025/2012 on European standardisation lays the requirements for the EU 
requests for standards. Also, the annual EU work programme for European standardisation lists all 
the possible policy areas where requests for standards are likely to be issued the foll owing year. The 
standardisation process itself remains the responsibility of the standardisers.  
 
29. Are ESOs precluded in law or policy from referencing existing standards (such as through 
normative referencing)? If so, please explain the rationale behind  such restrictions.  
 
Reply: Harmonised standards have a legal effect and provide presumption of conformity to the 
relevant legislation. Thus, normative references should be made only to standards recognised by 
the EU – either international (ISO, IEC, ITU) or European standards. National standards (EU Member 
States or not) cannot be referenced.  
 
Follow Up to Question 29 : Question 29 requests the rationale for the bar against normative 
referencing of non -EU standards. The response simply reiterates that there  is a bar: "[N]ormative 
references should be made only to standards recognised by the EU – either international (ISO, IEC, 
ITU) or European standards. " 
 
11. Can the EU point to written law or policy prohibiting the reference of non -EU standards and 
explain  the rationale for such a prohibition?  
 
Follow -up reply:  The EU never stated that "non-EU standards " cannot be used as normative 
references in harmonised standards. It is important first of all to clarify that no category of standards 
called "EU-standards " exists; the EU does not develop or adopt standards. The EU can however 
request "European standards " to the European Standardisation Organisations (which have a 
membership going beyond the 27 EU Member States, so European standards are adopted by more 
countries than just the EU members) and give those standards a legal status in support of EU 
legislation, making them "harmonised standards ". The admissible use of normative references in 
those harmonised standards was clarified by the Commission in 2015, in t he SWD(2015) 205 final 
of 27/10/2015, "Vademecum on European standardisation in support of Union legislation and 
policies ", where it is stated that "As a general rule, reference should be made to EN or ISO/IEC 
standards ". It should be noted that such limit ation applies not to all parts of a harmonised standard, 
but only to those parts that will generate a legal effect (presumption of conformity). The rationale 
is that it is admissible to have to comply with European standards or with ISO -IEC international 
standards. in order to generate a legal effect within the EU, but that it would not be compatible with 
the legal sovereignty of the EU to have to comply with a national standard of a third country in order 
to generate this legal effect. It is important to n ote that also national standards from EU Member 
States are not admitted as normative references in harmonised standards.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 300 - 
 
  
 12. If the referenced standard is found by the ESO to be fit for purpose (and improves alignment of 
standards with trading partners), what objective is served by requiring the ESO to develop an 
entirely new standard?  
 
Follow -up reply:  The two main ESOs CEN and CENELEC, which develop ca. 96% of all harmonised 
standards, have themselves and autonomously adopted in June 2022 an internal bi nding guidance 
on the admissible normative references that can be used in harmonised standards. This guidance 
forbids the use of non -European or non -international standards as normative references in the parts 
of the harmonised standards that are meant to generate a legal effect. It is important to note that 
the Commission has always stressed that the use of normative references to other types of standards 
is admissible also in harmonised standards, as long as this is done in parts of the harmonised 
standar ds which will have no legal effect.  
 
Page  106, 3.179:  The report states that in June 2021, the EU issued a proposal for a new General 
Product Safety Directive regulation.  
Q. 30 -31: 
30. Can the EU provide an update on the legislative status of the proposal to revise the General 
Product Safety Directive?  
 
Reply: The General Product Safety Regulation was adopted on 30  April 2023 by the 
European  Parliament and on 25  April 2023 by the Council of the EU. The final adopted text is 
available here: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE -79-2022-INIT/en/pdf .  
It was published in the Official Journal of the European  Union  on the 23  May 2023, and can be viewed 
on the Eur -Lex website . It will enter into force on the twentieth day following that publicat ion. It will 
start applying 18 months after the date of entry into force.  
 
31. Under the new safety requirements and expanded scope of the revised General Product Safety 
Directive, has the EU considered the possible disproportionate financial burdens impos ed by the 
Directive on importers, particularly small businesses, as compared to domestic producers?  
 
Reply: The European Commission has duly evaluated the impact of the new rules of the proposed 
General Product Safety Regulation (GPSR) on the different economic operators in the impact 
assessment accompanying the legislative proposal.  
 
The rules imposed on economic operators, including for importers, have been assessed as 
commensurate to the role they play in the production and supply chain and proportionate to the aim 
pursued, which is to ensure a high level of safety for consumer products produced or imported into 
the EU. Moreover, rules applying to economic operators are also aligned in great part on provisions 
applying to products subject to EU harmonised legislation (for instance toys or electrical appliances). 
The new GPSR aims to ensure that all products on the EU market are safe irrespective of their place 
of production or type of supply chain. There is therefore no disproportionate financ ial burden 
imposed on importers compared to manufacturers.  
 
The final text of the GPSR sets out that in order for economic operators that are SMEs to be able to 
cope with the new obligations imposed by this Regulation, the Commission will provide practical  
guidelines and tailored guidance, for example a direct channel to connect to experts in the event of 
questions, taking into account the need to simplify and limit administrative burdens.  
 
Page 107, Paragraph 3.184:  The paragraph describes how the EA MLA i s recognized by the 
International Accreditation Forum (IAF) and International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation 
(ILAC). "Based on these arrangements, certain accreditation services delivered by EA MLA 
signatories are recognized by the signatories to the  ILAC and IAF mutual recognition arrangements." 
Further, the Blue Guide  notes that, when conformity assessment is required by regulation, 
authorities in EU member states may refuse to accept certification of conformity, even if the body is 
a signatory to the ILAC/IAF MRA/MLA.  
Q. 32 -37 
32. Are the processes and standards for recognition of non -EU accreditors elaborated anywhere 
in law or policy? If so, please identify in detail where such processes and standards can be located.  
 
Reply: Art. 11(2) of Reg. 765/2008 provides that "National authorities shall recognise the 
equivalence of the services delivered by those accreditation bod ies which have successfully 
undergone peer evaluation under Article 10, and thereby accept, the accreditation certificates of WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 301 - 
 
those bodies and the attestations issued by the conformity assessment bodies accredited by them". 
Article  10 on peer evaluation (t o be read in conjunction with the definition of art.  2(11) on National 
Accreditation Bodies) refers only to the National Accreditation Bodies of the EU Member States.  
 
Therefore, national authorities in the EU Member States do not have the obligation to ac cept 
(accreditation / conformity assessment) certificates from third countries.  
 
33. Does the fact that a non -EU accreditor is a signatory in good standing with ILAC/IAF, or with 
other recognized regional bodies, provide confidence in the quality and value  of accreditation?  
 
Reply:  The ultimate acceptance of conformity assessment attestations is decided by the public 
authorities in the regulatory sphere and, from an economic point of view, by industry users and 
consumers. The voluntary multilateral mutual recognition agreements betwe en accreditation bodies 
support and enhance trade. The requirements set out in Regulation 765/2008 affect the acceptance 
of non -European certificates and test results accredited by non -European accreditation bodies 
signatories to the ILAC/IAF MRA/MLA in th e following way. With regard to conformity assessment 
delivered in the voluntary sphere, the non -European conformity assessment body opting for 
accreditation may choose whether to resort to the service of a third country accreditation body 
signatory to the  ILAC/IAF MRA/MLA or rather to that of an accreditation body established in the 
Union. Non -European conformity assessment attestations issued under accreditation by non - 
European accreditation bodies can continue to be used on the European market but only in the 
voluntary sphere.  
 
Where conformity assessment is required in regulations, national authorities of EU Member States 
may refuse to accept test reports issued under accreditation by non -European accreditation bodies 
not complying with the EU requireme nts even though they may be signatories to the ILAC/IAF 
MRA/MLA. However, where government -to-government mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) 
between the Union and a third country in relation to conformity assessment are in place, national 
authorities of E U Member States shall accept the test reports and certificates issued by bodies that 
the foreign party has designated under the MRA for assessing conformity in the categories of 
products or sectors covered by the MRA.  
 
34. What other factors may member sta tes consider when determining whether to accept an 
attestation of conformity issued under accreditation by a non -European accreditor?  
 
Reply: Please see answer to the questions 32. and 33. above.  
 
35. Where are those criteria listed, if anywhere?  
 
Reply:  Please see answer to the questions 32. and 33. above.  
 
36. How is the guidance permitting member states to refuse to accept certifications made under 
ILAC/IAF accreditation consistent with MRA/MLA principle of mutual recognition among signatories, 
by which European certification and accreditation is recognized around the world?  
 
Reply: Please see answer to the questions 32. and 33. above.  
 
37. What limitations exist for foreign -based entities, operating in EU territory, to accredit, or 
otherwise atte st to the competence of certification bodies, with respect to voluntary standards or to 
foreign (non -EU) technical regulations?  
 
Reply:  Regulation 765/2008 foresees that each Member State may appoint only one single national 
accreditation body. Only the na tional accreditation bodies are allowed to perform accreditation of 
conformity assessment bodies on their territory. No other bodies may claim to provide such services, 
be it according to harmonised standards or non -harmonised standards. This provision is central to 
the functioning of accreditation in the EU and to the framework of accreditation set up by the 
Regulation. For more information please check the Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the 
European  Parliament and of the Council of 9  July 2008 setting out  the requirements for accreditation 
and market surveillance relating to the marketing of products at https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal - 
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32008R0765   and chapter  6 of the 'Blue Guide'  on the implementation 
of EU product rules 2022  2022/C 247 /01 at : https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal - WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 302 - 
 
  
 content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.C_.2022.247.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AC%3A2022%3A24  
7%3ATOC  
 
Follow Up to Question 37 : The reply states that "only the national accred itation bodies are allowed 
to perform accreditation of conformity assessment bodies on their territory. No other bodies may 
claim to provide such services, be it according to harmonized standards or non -harmonized 
standards ". The reply further directs read ers to Chapter 6 of the Blue Guide. However, Chapter 6 of 
the Blue Guide states that a "non-European conformity assessment body operating on the European 
market " may decide "if and where to get accredited ". Further, "the non -European conformity 
assessment body opting for accreditation may choose whether to resort to the service of a third 
country accreditation body not necessarily conforming to the new European requirements but 
signatory the ILAC/IAF MRA/MLA or rather to that of an accreditation body establ ished in the Union. 
Non-European conformity assessment attestations issued under accreditation by non -European 
accreditation bodies not fulfilling European requirements can continue to be used on the European 
market but only in the voluntary sphere ". (See Blue Guide, Chapter 6.7.2, p. 103.104). Therefore, 
contrary to the EU 's statement that no other national bodies may perform accreditation, the Blue 
Guide would appear to allow non -European CABs that have been accredited by ILAC/IAF to continue 
to certify g oods in the voluntary sphere. Furthermore, based on the Blue Guide, such CABs would 
appear to be allowed to continue to certify goods – whether in the voluntary or mandatory sphere – 
for third country markets.  
 
13. Can the EU please clarify whether there a re other rules or regulations restricting the ability of 
foreign accreditors to operate on EU territory, or whether Chapter 6.7.2 serves as the guiding 
provision?  
 
Follow -up reply:  It is confirmed that chapter 6 is the correct guidance on the general aspec ts of 
accreditation and specifically 6.7.2. explains the international aspects.  
 
14. What rules apply if Member States require more stringent requirements than those described in 
the Blue Book?  
 
Follow -up reply:  Accreditation in the EU is regulated by Regu lation (EC) 765/2008. The European 
legislation applies only in the territory of the EU Member States. Member States cannot deviate from 
the provisions of the Regulation.  
 
Page 109, Paragraph 3.192 : The Secretariat Report discusses the Animal Health Law (ad opted 
in 2016) that became fully applicable in April 2021 and deals with the prevention and control of 
transmissible animal diseases.  
Q. 38.: 
38. Please explain whether the EU plans to add additional attestations related to animal and animal 
product model certificates.  
 
Reply:  
The model animal health certificates, model official certificates and model animal health/official 
certificates for the entry into the Union of consignments of certain animals, germinal products and 
products of animal origin ref lect the relevant animal health requirements laid down, in particular in 
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/692 and other EU relevant legislation. Any change of 
those animal health requirements (that may need to be adopted by the Commission) would n eed to 
be reflected in these certificates. Therefore, considering the evolution of the rules in the light of new 
science, including its adaptation to evolving international standards, it is not excluded that additional 
or revised attestations related to an imals, germinal products and/or products of animal origin will 
need to be incorporated in the future into those model certificates (in order to be able to verify that 
relevant consignments are eligible for entering the Union).  
 
Pages 109, Paragraph 3.194 : According to the Secretariat report, the EU adopted the Farm to 
Fork Strategy with the goals of reforming the legislation on feed additives, pesticides, food contact 
materials, plant protection, animal welfare, and marketing standards for agricultural and fishery 
(including aquaculture) products. This strategy sets EU targets for pesticides reducing the use of 
chemical pesticides (and their risk) by 2030. This strategy also foresees to integrate environmental 
considerations in the assessmen t requests for import tolerances for pesticides not approved in the 
European  Union . The United  States  notes that this strategy is reducing pesticides availability and 
usage, often based on incomplete risk assessments and in adherence to a hazard analysis m odel. WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 303 - 
 
The United  States  also notes that the integration of environmental considerations in the assessment 
requests for import tolerances appears to undermine the competence of regulatory authorities in 
countries that export to the EU.  
 
Q. 39 -42.: 
39. In the EU, consumer risk assessments are often not finalized prior to proposing lower MRLs 
for active substances used for crop protection (often due to data gaps, etc.). This approach appears 
to be consistent with the adoption of provisional SPS measures, but d oes not appear consistent with 
adoption of rather than final, scientifically -justified SPS measures. We request that the EU. Please 
explain the EU's plan for collecting and analyzing the data needed those pesticide MRLs that have 
not yet been finalized.  
 
Reply: All measures taken on MRLs in the EU are based on a scientific risk assessment carried out 
by both an evaluating Member State and the European Food Safety Authority and using the most up 
to date science and evidence available. Obviously, science is u nder continuous development with 
new data and risk assessment methodologies becoming available. Therefore, the EU has the 
procedures in place to review any measure at any moment if this is necessary. This can be done on 
the basis of an application submitte d by an applicant and supported by the necessary evidence or 
triggered by an EU institution or a Member State. Certain review processes are set up by the 
MRL Regulation with a clear schedule and work programme. For example, the EU is currently carrying 
out a comprehensive review programme for existing MRLs. Around 450 substances have been 
reviewed so far. Details of the respective EFSA risk assessments can be found on the EFSA website. 
In addition, EFSA on a quarterly basis publishes in its website, the det ailed work programme 
(progress report) and its indicative time schedule for the substances to be reviewed.  
 
Before a measure is adopted by the EU it is notified through the WTO -SPS system and comments 
received from non -EU countries are taken into account.  
 
Follow up : Please clarify whether the EU intends to complete risk assessments that were not 
finalized due to the absence of data and/or high degree of uncertainty but for which decisions 
regarding pesticide authorization and MRLs were made.  
 
40. The time between the close of comment periods and the date when new MRLs are enacted in 
the EU can be very short, sometimes only a matter of days. Given this short interval, please explain 
how comments are meaningfully taken into account before policies are finaliz ed and enacted.  
 
Reply:  The EU studies carefully the comments received and discuss them with the EU Member States 
at the meetings of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed - 
Section  Phytopharmaceuticals, Pesticide Residues (SC PAFF). The EU would like to confirm that all 
comments received from non -EU countries are considered and discussed before any draft Regulation 
is adopted. Detailed replies are sent to all trading partners that su bmit comments. The 
European  Union  always provides a reply to all the comments submitted by another WTO Member on 
an EU notification and explains in detail the planned measures and their rationale.  
 
A recent example of how the comments received by Third Cou ntries were meaningfully taken into 
account before a policy was finalized and enacted is provided in the EU reply to question 54.  
 
Follow -up: Please provide additional information regarding the specific amount of time required for 
the EU to study carefully  the comments received and discuss them with EU Member States.  
 
41. For countries that maintain robust regulatory oversight of the use of pesticide in their 
territories, including managing negative effects on pollinators, how will the EU recognize the 
competence of these regulatory authorities when determining an import tolerance for a pesticide not 
approved in the EU due to environmental concerns?  
 
Reply: The EU appreciates other countries' understanding of the role that pollinators play in 
supporting the  ecosystem functions and food production worldwide and the robust regulatory 
oversight of the use of pesticide in their territories.  
 
The evaluation of the import tolerance would follow the same criteria in relation to those 
environmental issues that are c onsidered of global concern as those used for the placing of plant WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 304 - 
 
  
 protection products on the market set in Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009. If the risk assessment 
concludes that there is not an unacceptable risk to bees, the import tolerance could be granted . 
 
Adverse effects of clothianidin and thiamethoxam on bees are directly linked to the intrinsic 
properties of those substances. Therefore, the risks for bees from outdoor uses of these substances 
are unlikely to be limited to the European  Union . 
 
If the E U considers an environmental risk assessment necessary, this will be based upon 
environmental endpoints19 that are based on most recent science and compared to the 
environmental exposure based on supporting evidence provided by the respective third country . 
 
Follow up:  National competent authorities approve and authorize use of pesticides according to 
good agricultural practices (GAPs) such that pesticides are applied in a manner that does not 
negatively affect pollinators. Please explain the EU 's technical justification for assuming regulatory 
oversight regarding pollinator health outside of the EU.  
 
42. If such a pesticide is authorized for use in a specific market with a robust regulatory system 
and applied in a legal manner, why is an import tolerance not automatically granted for entrance 
into the EU?  
 
Reply:  
EU Maximum residue levels (MRLs), with which all products placed on the EU market have to comply, 
are set in line with the principles in Regulation (EC) No 396/2005. In particular, appli cations for 
setting a MRL based on a Good Agricultural Practice (GAP) undergo a risk assessment by the 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). The same criteria and process applies to applications based 
on a use in the EU, and those based on a use in a non -EU country, called import tolerances.  
 
Follow up : National competent authorities approve and authorize use of pesticides according to 
good agricultural practices (GAPs) such that pesticides are applied in a manner that does not 
negatively affect pollinator s. Please explain the EU 's technical justification for assuming regulatory 
oversight regarding pollinator health outside of the EU.  
 
Pages  109-110, Paragraph  3.194 : According to the Secretariat Report, "the Commission adopted 
the Farm to Fork Strategy to support the ongoing reform process and the EU sustainability 
objectives" and "As announced in the Strategy, the Commission plans to present a new legislative 
framewor k for sustainable food systems in 2023 to, inter alia, incorporate sustainability in all 
food-related policies, as well as a proposal for the setting of EU -level targets for food waste 
reduction" .1 
Q. 43. 
43. Please describe the new legislative framework f or sustainable food systems in 2023 to, 
inter alia, incorporate sustainability in all food -related policies, as well as the basis for the proposal 
for the setting of EU -level targets for food waste reduction.  
 
Reply: The legislative framework for a Sustainable Food System will primarily function as a policy 
enabler, by establishing common definitions, general principles and objectives to underpin future EU 
food-related policies across the food system. A mixture of interventions to incentivise food sy stem 
actors to make sustainable choices are being considered. Sustainable labelling and sustainable public 
procurement can play a key role in stimulating demand for sustainably produced foods. All 
three  dimensions of sustainability (environmental, social/h ealth and economic) will be covered by 
the scope of the framework.  
 
Many EU Member States have not yet taken sufficient measures towards reduction of food waste, 
thus not realizing clear environmental, economic and social benefits derived from restricting food 
waste generation. In order to ensure significant contribution towards the attainment of the 
UN Sustainable Development Goal, the measures to be taken by EU member states should be 
strengthened. In order to achieve results in the short term and to give  food business operators, 
consumers and public authorities the necessary perspective for the longer term, quantified targets 
for reduction of food waste generation to be achieved by EU Member States by 2030 are needed. 
The baseline  estimates  published  by Eurostat  can be viewed  at: WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 305 - 
 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics - 
explained/index.php?title=Food_waste_and_food_waste_prevention_ -
_estimates#:~:text=Household %20food%20waste%20represented%20more,million%20tonnes%  
20of%20fresh%20mass  
 
Page 110, Paragraph 3.197 : Under the EU's market access control mechanism, food and 
agriculture products and eligible establishments un dergo reviews to determine compliance with 
SPS-related requirements, and then are subject to a secondary approval process by the Standing 
Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed (SC -PAFF) at the EC level before approval is granted 
for products for sale  on the EU market.  
Q. 44 
44. What additional aspects of the market access request does the SC -PAFF consider, given that 
the relevant TBT and SPS requirements have already been determined by subject matter and 
regulatory experts?  
 
Reply: The Standing Commit tee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed (PAFF Committee) plays a key 
role in ensuring that Union measures on food and feed safety, animal health & welfare, controls and 
import conditions, as well as plant health are practical and effective. It delivers opini ons on draft 
measures that the Commission intends to adopt.  
 
The Commission consults the relevant committee depending on the policy area: food & feed safety, 
animal health & welfare and plant health, controls and import conditions etc. Committee members 
are national experts who represent EU governments and public authorities.  
 
The PAFF Committee is divided into 14 different sections. More information on the role of the PAFF  
Committee can be found on the Commission's website: https://food.ec.europa.eu/horizontal - 
topics/committees/paff -committees_en  
 
As an example, as concerns EU animal health area, general framework EU legislation, such as 
Regulation (EU) 2016/429 ( Animal  Health  Law) provides (among other) for the rules as regards the 
entry of animals, germinal products, and products of animal origi n into the Union from third countries 
and territories. Following these provisions, for certain matters (e.g. related to the technical 
implementation of relevant provisions) defined in that framework legislation (agreed through the 
co-decision process by th e European Parliament and the Council) the Commission is empowered to 
adopt implementing acts through the consultation of the PAFF Committee (references to Committee 
procedure as laid down in Article  266 of Animal Health Law).  
 
Page  110, Paragraph  3.198 : According to the Secretariat report, a health certificate to enter the 
EU is required for most animals, products of animal origin (intended for human consumption), animal 
by-products, non -shelf-stable composite products, and certain shelf -stable com posite products 
(i.e. products containing processed products of animal origin and plant origin). However, the 
United  States notes that the EU requires a composite product certificate and then a separate honey 
certificate requirement, even when there is a l ot of overlap in the two product groups.  
Q. 45.: 
45. Could the EC's DG for Health and Food Safety (DG SANTE) please share information as to 
what is the guidance provided to the EU border control posts (BCP) in administering or interpreting 
EC market access  for products containing honey?  
 
Reply:  From the public health point of view, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2292 
establishes the rules that composite products should follow depending on their shelf -stability and 
the category of the processed  product of animal origin. The rules are established in Articles 20, 21 
and 22 of the above mentioned Regulation. In the case of honey, taking into account that for that 
product there are no requirements on Annex  III of Regulation (EC) 853/2004, the rules to be 
followed are explained in the Q&A document (see questions 2.16 and 2.17 in the Q&As doc) that can 
be found at the following link:  
https://food.ec.europa. eu/system/files/2022 -07/ia_ic_composite -prods_qandas.pdf  
 
In summary, the health certificate foreseen in Chapter 45 of Annex  III to Commission Implementing 
Regulation(EU) 2020/2235 is required for natural honey component (not processed honey) when 
included in the composite products. According to import conditions for certain composite products, 
in the case of non -shelf stable composite products or composite products containing any quantity of 
meat products except gelatine,  collagen and highly refined products, or colostrum based products WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 they shall be accompanied by the certificate established in Chapter 50 of Annex  III to Commission 
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/2235 covering the processed products of animal origin oth er 
than natural honey, and the honey certificate in case they contain natural honey component. In the 
case of shelf stable composite products, the private attestation is required for the products of animal 
origin contained in the composite product and, if those products are containing natural (non - 
processed) honey, the specific certificate for honey. In the case that shelf stable composite products 
contain processed honey, no certificate for honey is requested, however, the food business operators 
importin g those composite products shall demonstrate, upon request, the origin of the honey, 
according to the requirements established in Article  6(4) of Regulation (EC) No 853/2004.  
 
Follow up to question 45:  
Article  6 (4) of Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 does not specify a recordkeeping period other than as 
"appropriate" . Section  414(b) of the FD&C Act directs FDA to issue regulations that establish 
requirements regarding the establishment and maintenance of records – for not longer than 
two years – by persons (excluding farms and restaurants) who manufacture, process, pack, 
transport, distribute, receive, hold, or import food.  
 
15. What does the EU deem an appropriate recordkeeping period and how does this protocol facilitate 
public health and consumer safety?  
Follow -up reply:  It is up to the competent authorities in the Member States to establish such a 
recordkeeping period that is based on traceability requirements. The period is obviously linked to 
the shelf life of th product, here honey, so to allow approp riate tracing should there be public health 
and consumer safety issues.  
 
16. How are bulk processed honey exports originating in the EU treated?  
 
Follow -up Reply:  
It depends on the importing country 's requirements. The Member States adapt their exporting  rules 
to the requests of importing countries. It should be underlined that the EU General Food Law forbids 
to export products that are not compliant with EU requirements, unless there is an agreement to do 
so with the authorities of the importing country to which EU goods would be exported (see Article  12 
of Regulation 178/20021). 
 
17. Can the EU please share data about the relative frequency of food business operators in the EU 
reporting the origin of honey upon request?  
 
Follow -up Reply : The European C ommission does not collect such data .  
18. If unable to sufficiently report "appropriate " recordkeeping, how many were sanctioned? What 
was the percentage of sanctioned shipments relative to overall trade?  
 
Follow -up Reply:  This information is not available to the Commission. Please see the above reply. 
19. If able to sufficiently report "appropriate " recordkeeping, how many years of records were the 
non-sanctioned actors able to provide?  
 
Follow -up Reply : Please see the above reply.  
 
Pages  110-111, Paragraph  3.199 : The Secretariat  report  notes  that the EU's Regulation  2019/6 
which was adopted in 2018, is not yet operational.  
Q. 46 -47.: 
46. Please clarify how compliance with this regulation and associated implementing regu lations 
will be verified and enforced for third countries.  
 
Reply:  In order to meet the requirements for exports to the EU laid down in Commission Delegated 
Regulation (EU) 2023/905, third countries may decide what are the most appropriate measures to 
be put in place taking into account their national context. The Europea n Commission is working on 
the two Implementing Regulations that are necessary for the application of Delegated Regulation 
(EU) 2023/905 as established in its Articles 5(1) and 6(1) (list of approved third countries and 
specific requirements on the officia l certificates). The list will be elaborated on the basis of the 
 
1 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliamen t and of the Council of 28  January  2002 laying 
down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and 
laying down procedures in matters of food safety; OJ L 31, 1.2.2002, p. 1 –24. WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 307 - 
 
guarantees to be provided by third countries in relation to compliance with the import requirements 
laid down in Article  3 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/905. Commission's contr ols in 
third countries will be conducted in accordance with Article  120 of Regulation (EU) 2017/625 .20 
 
The EU will keep third countries duly informed regarding the developments on the listing process, 
including in ad hoc meetings. The EU would also like t o underline that, in compliance with the EU's 
international obligations, the above -mentioned draft Implementing Regulations will be notified to 
the Secretariat of the WTO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the 
SPS Committee). Therefore, the United  States  of America will have the opportunity to comment on 
these acts before their adoption by the European Commission.  
 
47. Please describe how new residue requirements are implemented for products of animal origin. 
For example, are exporters requir ed to repeat the review process of administration programs (data 
package elements review and evaluation) for residue monitoring programs for each new addition or 
omissions on the EU list (Annex  1 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/808; Regulation (EEC) 
No 315/93 (Commission Regulation (EC) 1881/2006)) of its residue monitoring program?  
 
Reply: In reply to this question, the European Commission wishes to inform that all very useful 
practical information for the implementation of the requirements provided f or in Commission 
Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/229221 can be found in the guidance document "Guidelines on EU 
requirements for entry of animals and products of animal origin - Control plans for residues of 
veterinary medicines, pesticides and contaminants " that has been published on 08  February  2023, 
viewed at: https://food.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2021 -09/cs_vet -med-residues_animal -imports- 
non-eu_brochure_en.pdf .  
 
Methods of analysis used in the EU for the control of residues of pharmacol ogically active substances 
and to demonstrate the absence of such residues have to comply with the requirements provided 
for in Article  3 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/808 , in particular the 
requirements provided in points (2), (3) and (4) of that Article. Methods of analysis complying with 
these requirements are acceptable for us e by third countries. Third countries may follow the 
validation approach laid down in this Regulation or adopt alternative models which achieve the same 
level and quality of information on method performance characteristics. The transitional 
arrangements p rovided for in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/808 are also 
applicable to third countries.  
 
Exporters have to ensure that the food of animal origin exported to the EU complies with EU legal 
requirements. In case there is a change in EU require ments, exporters have to perform an 
assessment to verify if their control procedures in place continue to ensure compliance with the EU 
requirements. In case this would no longer be the case, they need to implement the necessary 
changes to ensure complianc e. 
 
Page 111, Paragraph 3.201 and Page 109, Paragraph 3.194 : The Secretariat Report states 
that, in the EU, pesticide MRLs are based on good agricultural practices following a European Food 
Safety Authority (EFSA) risk assessment. In the absence of a speci fic MRL, a default level applies. 
Importers (or any other stakeholder) may request an "import tolerance" for substances not in the 
list of EU -approved substances, as well as for approved ones.  
Q. 48 -52: 
48. Over the reporting period, how many applications for import tolerances has the EU received?  
 
Reply:  An overview table listing the import tolerances applications that were received and assessed 
at EU level during the period 2009 -2020 is provided on the European Commission website 
(https://food.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2021 -01/pesticides_mrl_guidelines_overview -it-table.pdf ). 
 
Follow up:  The document referenced by the EU contains the following chapeau: "This document is 
made available solely for the purpose of information. It has no legal value. The Commission declines 
all responsibility or liability whatsoever for errors or deficiencies in the overview table. Neither the 
Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is responsible with regard to the 
improper use of the document and its contents. Only the Official Journal of the European  Union  is 
authentic and produces legal ef fects. " 
 
We request that the EU respond directly to the original question and do so on behalf of the 
Commission for the date up to and including the reporting period for this TPR.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 308 - 
 
  
 49. Of those received, how many import tolerances have been granted?  
 
Reply:  An over view table listing the import tolerances applications that were received and assessed 
at EU level during the period 2009 -2020 is provided on the European Commission website 
(https://food.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2021 -01/pesticides_mrl_guidelines_overview -it-table.pdf ).  
 
That table also lists those that were assessed favourably and established in the EU legislat ion. 
 
Follow up to question 50:  The document referenced by the EU contains the following chapeau: 
"This document is made available solely for the purpose of information. It has no legal value. The 
Commission declines all responsibility or liability whatsoe ver for errors or deficiencies in the overview 
table. Neither the Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is responsible 
with regard to the improper use of the document and its contents. Only the Official Journal of the 
European  Union  is authentic and produces legal effects. " 
 
20. We request that the EU respond directly to the original question and do so on behalf of the 
Commission for the date up to and including the reporting period for this TPR.  
 
Follow -up Reply:  In replying to the specific questions raised in the Trade Policy review the 
Commission services follow the Commission 's internal procedures which require certain disclaimers 
on documents that were prepared by Commission services .  
 
50. On average, how long did the evalua tion process take to establish an import tolerance?  
 
Reply:  The evaluation of an import tolerance takes on average around 24 months, but this can vary 
depending on the complexity of the assessment.  
 
Follow up question : In the last three years, how often ha s the evaluation process taken less 
than 24 months?  
 
Follow -up Reply : Even in recent times, the evaluation of import tolerances took on average around 
24 months.  
 
Some variability may occur based on the quality of the dossier provided to apply for the impo rt 
tolerance, and due to the fact that the existing EU legal framework does not provide a 
specific  deadline for the first step of the evaluation (i.e., the evaluation of the application by an 
EU Member State).  
 
51. Given the diversity of agricultural produ cts that are produced outside of the EU under 
environmental conditions different from those in the EU, what is the relevance of EU good agricultural 
practices in determining the safe, efficacious use of pesticides in third countries?  
 
Reply:  The EU acknowl edges that third countries may face production conditions and pest pressures 
different from those in mainland Europe. Therefore, the EU legislation provides for the possibility to 
set MRLs for imported products to meet the needs of international trade and requires the 
consideration of good agricultural practices authorised in third countries, as well as of MRLs set by 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission.  
 
Follow up to question 51:  
21. Within the last the years, how often has the EU considered good agricultur al practices authorized 
in third countries to establish a pesticide MRL or import tolerance? If examples exist, please provide 
them.  
 
Follow -up Reply:  In the past years, the EU has established a number of MRLs based on good 
agricultural practices authorised in third countries, including MRLs based on import tolerance 
applications and Codex maximum residue levels (CXLs).  
 
An overview table listing the import tolerances applications that were received and assessed at EU 
level during the period 2009 -2020 is provided on the European Commission website 
(https://food.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2021 -01/pesticides_mrl_guidelines_overview -it-table.pdf ). 
The table also contains information concerning the number of import tolerance that were established 
in the EU in tha t same period.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 309 - 
 
Some recent examples of EU MRLs established based on import tolerance applications can be found 
in Commission Regulation (EU) 2023/10682 and Commission Regulation (EU) 2023/1633, 
recent  examples of EU MRLs established based on CXLs can be found in Commission Regulation (EU) 
2023/1069 .4 
 
52. Does the fact that a pesticide is not necessary or authorized for use in the EU indicate that it 
cannot be safely used anywhere else in the world? If not, how does the EU regulatory system account 
for this diversity of safely -produced products in its use of defaults versus adoption of existing 
international standards?  
 
Reply:  The EU acknowledges that third countries may face production conditions and pest pressures 
different from those in mainland Europe . Therefore, import tolerances can be granted to active 
substances not authorised in the European  Union  provided that the submitted information 
demonstrates that the MRLs to be set for those substances are safe to EU consumers and that the 
use of those pes ticides is safe to pollinators. Furthermore, Codex maximum residue limits are 
regularly implemented into EU legislation where an EFSA scientific assessment considers them safe 
for European consumers.  
 
Follow up to question 52:  National competent authoritie s approve and authorize use of pesticides 
according to good agricultural practices (GAPs) such that pesticides are applied in a manner that 
does not negatively affect pollinators.  
 
22. Please explain the EU 's technical justification for assuming regulator y oversight regarding 
pollinator health outside of the EU.  
 
Follow -up Reply : 
The EU would like to reiterate that EU Regulations on pollinator health does not require third 
countries to ban the use of the related active substances in their own territory an d therefore, the EU 
is not applying its policy related to pesticides extraterritorially. The EU 's objective is to ensure that 
food and feed consumed in the EU do not contribute to the global decline of pollinators, 
independently of whether the product is p roduced in the EU or imported from non -EU countries.  
 
The EU is not making any assumption on Regulations from third countries. As already indicated in 
the reply provided to the question 52, there is a possibility of requesting an import tolerance when 
the use of clothianidin/thiamethoxam leads to measurable levels of residues. This could be granted 
if the evaluation of the application concludes that there is no unacceptable risk to pollinators from 
the specific conditions of use on that specific crop, so f rom the GAP underlying the import tolerance 
request.  
 
Page  112, Paragraph  3.203 : The Secretariat  Report  describes  labelling  requirements  for all food 
products in the EU.  
Q. 53: 
53. Could the EU explain how it plans to work with member states to harmonize EU -wide measures 
on packaging and labelling, such as in the case of Ireland's Public Health (Alcohol) Bill?  
 
Reply: The Farm to Fork Strategy (viewed at: https://food.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2020 - 
05/f2f_action -plan_2020_strategy -info_en.pdf ) announced the European Commission's ambition to 
empower consumers to ma ke informed, healthy and sustainable food choices, through the revision 
of the EU food labelling rules under Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 on the provision of food 
information to consumers, including the labelling of alcoholic beverages. Preparatory work an d 
evidence gathering is ongoing before political decisions on the most appropriate way forward are 
taken.  
 
2 Commission Regulati on (EU) 2023/1068 of 1  June 2023 amending Annex  II to Regulation (EC) 
No 396/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards maximum residue levels for 
cyantraniliprole in or on certain products (OJ L 143, 2.6.2023, p. 27)  
3 Commission Regulation (EU) 2023/163 of 18  January  2023 amending Annexes II and III to Regulation 
(EC) No 396/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards maximum residue levels for DDT 
and oxathiapiprolin in or on certain products (OJ L 23 , 25.1.2023, p. 1)  
4 Commission Regulation (EU) 2023/1069 of 1 June 2023 amending Annex II to Regulation (EC) 
No 396/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards maximum residue levels for bixafen, 
cyprodinil, fenhexamid, fenpicoxamid, fen pyroximate, flutianil, isoxaflutole, mandipropamid, methoxyfenozide, 
and spinetoram in or on certain products (OJ L 143, 2.6.2023, p. 40).  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 310 - 
 
  
 In parallel, and in line with Europe's Beating Cancer Plan (viewed at: 
https://health.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022 -02/eu_cancer -plan_en_0.pdf ), the European 
Commission is concentrating its efforts on preparatory work and evidence -gathering to support a 
possible proposal on heal th warnings on labels of alcoholic beverages.  
 
Page 112, Paragraph 3.203:  The Secretariat Report notes that the EU applies requirements for 
materials used in food packaging.  
Q. 54-55: 
54. Given the importance of food safety, did the EU take existing food safety requirements for 
food packaging into account when developing reuse, refill, biodegradability, and recyclability 
requirements in the EU Packaging and Packaging Waste Regulation?  
 
Reply : The proposed Regulation on packaging and packaging  waste does not affect food safety 
requirements which are set out under other legislation. These requirements provide that materials 
and articles intended for contact with food must not release any constituents into food at levels 
harmful to human health, or change the composition, taste or odour of food in an unacceptable way. 
These requirements remain in place and also in the future, packaging must fully comply with these 
rules. Also, the stringent rules on the use of plastics and recycled plastics are un changed. Therefore, 
while the proposed Regulation on packaging and packaging waste sets explicit requirements for 
recycled content in plastic packaging, compliance with food safety legislation must be observed. The 
proposed Regulation includes an empowerme nt for the Commission to adapt the recycled content 
targets if they cannot be met, including if requirements on food safety would not allow the amount 
that the targets require. Similarly, the introduction of reuse targets does not lower hygiene 
requirement s; reuse will only be possible when it meets the present hygiene standards set out under 
the relevant legislation on food safety. Lastly, food safety legislation is considered lex specialis  under 
EU law, prevailing over the horizontal rules of the proposal on PPWR.  
 
55. In the development of food packaging requirements, does the EU consider the durability of 
packaging made from recycled feedstocks?  
 
Reply: Currently, the uptake of recycled co ntent in plastic packaging is low, but there is significant 
potential for recycling into high quality recyclates. Article  7 of the packaging and packaging waste 
regulation refers to the recycled content in plastic packaging; it has to be noted that this ar ticle 
contains empowerments which would allow the Commission to amend the minimum percentage of 
recycled content recovered from post -consumer plastic waste. According to the Commission study  
supporting the proposal , the proposed targets are feasible and achievable, without compromising 
safety of the materials or creating shortfalls in the supply of plastic recyclates.  
 
Page 112, Paragraph 3.204 : The Secretariat Report discusses the role of competent authorities 
in EU member States for ver ifying compliance at EU border control post (BCP) on the consignments 
of animals, products of animal origin, and plants and plant products.  
Q. 56: 
56. What measures has the Commission taken to ensure that all members states uniformly 
interpret this regulation and that exporters will not face disruption at the various BCPs?  
 
Pages 112, Paragraph 3.204 : The United  States  notes that U.S. exporters of honey -containing 
products face inconsistent scrutiny for low -risk products which are non -perishable or shelf -stable 
and contain no animal meat or dairy products. There seems to be a variation in how exemptions for 
confections, sauces, and other shelf -stable, low  risk products are interpreted according to EU 
regulations (EC Delegated Regulation 2021/630). U.S. exporters of these products are sometimes 
requested to provide "composite product" certificates and certificates attesting that fractional 
contents of honey  are traceable through their production with EU regulatory oversight. In other 
cases, these products are cleared without added scrutiny.  
 
Reply: The harmonisation of official controls at EU borders is ensured through an extensive and 
precise regulation, a number of guidance documents, regular meetings in Expert Groups and a 
dedicated network of experts in the Member States who exchange information on a daily basis.  
 
Follow -up to question 56: The aim of the TBT  Agreement  is to prevent the use of technical 
requirements as unnecessary barriers to trade. Standards, technical regulations, and conformity 
assessment procedures should be developed and applied on a nondiscriminatory basis, developed WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 311 - 
 
and applied transparently, and based on relevant international stand ards and guidelines, when 
appropriate.  
 
23. Can the EU please provide information on the exact purpose of establishing such documentation 
requirements for imported "foodstuffs containing natural honey " and how the required information 
will be used? What i s the scope of "foodstuffs containing natural honey "? 
 
Follow -up Reply:  Natural honey, as other products of animal origin, is subject to food safety rules 
(for instance the exporting country must have a residue plan for honey, not all the exporting 
countri es are authorised to export honey to the Union, an export certificate attesting the compliance 
with the EU rules is requested at the import). The required information is necessary for confirming 
that the imported honey meets the EU requirements.  
 
24. If th e requirements for foodstuffs containing natural honey apply to all imported food, will they 
also be applied to foodstuffs containing natural honey produced in EU Member States?  
 
Follow -up Reply:  EU producers are obliged to respect the EU rules when placin g honey and honey 
products on the EU market.  
 
25. If the requirements are limited to foodstuffs containing natural honey, the United  States  notes 
that there is no internationally recognized scientific evidence of risk associated with honey in 
comparison with other foods on a categorical basis. Given that such requirements are not required 
for other classes of foods and given that there is no internationally recognized scientific evidence of 
risk associated with foodstuffs containing natural honey products in comparison to other foodstuffs, 
please explain why the EU requires that U.S. exporters sometimes provide "composite product" 
certificates  or certificates attesting to the fractional contents of honey traceable through production?  
 
Follow -up Reply:  see the reply to question 23 . 
 
57. Please clarify the scope of low risk, non -perishable products that are exempted from providing 
a "composite pr oduct" certificate.  
 
Reply:  Please refer to the reply to question 58. 
 
58. Please describe the certification process trading partners should follow for confections, sauces, 
and other shelf -stable, low risk products that contain no animal origin products.  
 
Reply:  Shelf-stable composite products that do not contain colostrum -based products or processed 
meat other than gelatine, collagen or highly refined products referred to in Section  XVI of Annex  III 
to Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 are exempted fr om controls at border control posts in accordance 
with requirements laid down in Article  3(1) of Regulation 2021/630.  
 
The composite product official certificate referred in Chapter 50 of Annex  III of Commission 
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/2235 is re quired for composite products referred to in 
Article  20(2), points (a) and (b) of Regulation 2022/2292, with the exclusion of shelf -stable 
composite products that do not contain colostrum -based products or processed meat other than 
gelatine, collagen, or h ighly refined products of animal origin.  
 
As long as no specific requirements are laid down in Annex  III to Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 for 
honey, Article  20(2)(c) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/2292 does not apply to 
composite products that contain only processed honey as processed product of animal origin. The 
third country of production of the composite product containing processed honey must however have 
in place a residue monitoring plan for honey and consequently be listed accordingly in  Commission 
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2293. Furthermore, the food business operators importing 
those composite products shall ensure compliance with the requirements established in Article  6(4) 
of Regulation (EC) No 853/2004. The competent authorit ies can require the operator to provide 
evidence that those requirements are complied with.  
 
Where shelf stable composite products contain in their composition other processed products of 
animal origin (milk powder, gelatine, egg powder etc.), in addition to processed honey, the operator 
must provide private attestation as referred in Annex  V to Commission Implementing Regulation 
(EU) 2020/2235. Compliance with residue requirements can be included in that private attestation.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 312 - 
 
  
 Natural honey is not a processe d product of animal origin, the resulting product is not a composite 
product but a foodstuff containing natural honey. The requirements applicable to such product from 
public health perspective are thus laid down in Regulation (EC) No 852/2004. The natural  honey 
should be accompanied by a certificate in accordance with a model set out in Chapter 45 of Annex  III 
to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/2235 and should comply with the requirements 
established in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2293 for residues. Since foodstuffs 
containing only natural honey as product of animal origin are not considered composite products, 
they are not subject to Regulation (EU) 2021/630.  
 
Sauces are classified under CN 2103 in accordance with Council Regu lation (EEC) No  2658/87 
(CN nomenclature) and since this CN code is not included in Annex  of Regulation 2021/630 these 
shelf stable composite products are not exempted from BCP checks.  
 
More details can be found in questions and answers document regarding import of composite 
products into the EU at the following link:  
https://food.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022 - 07/ia_ic_composite -prods_qandas.pdf . 
 
Page  117-118, Paragraph  3.228:  According to the latest available dat a, in 2016 -2019, 25.7% of 
procurement below EUR  200 million  was cross -border (direct and indirect) and 74.2% of contracts 
in value were awarded to domestic suppliers. For contracts over EUR  200 million , 32.6% of 
procurement was cross -border (direct and ind irect) and domestic suppliers were awarded 67.4% of 
the contracts in value.  
Q. 59 -61: 
59. Can the EU explain how it determines the country of origin for this data?  
 
Reply: The Study on the measurement of cross -border penetration in the EU public procurement  
market  is available online. The study looks at both the cou ntry declared for the supplier in the 
Tenders Electronic Daily and data retrieved from the ORBIS database in order to retrieve further 
information on the companies in question.  
 
60. Does the cross -border procurement include procurement awarded to suppliers in other EU 
member states?  
 
Reply: The Study on the measurement of cross -border penetration in the EU public procurement  
market , under section "Cross -border procurement from a microeconomic perspective", defines 
"cross -border" to mean suppliers in a country other than that of the contracting authority whether 
independent or controlled by companies in another country (direct), and s uppliers located in the 
same country as the contracting authority but controlled by companies in another country (indirect). 
Therefore, it does include EU Member States other than the country of the contracting authority.  
 
61. What percentage of cross -border procurement is awarded to suppliers outside of the EU?  
 
Reply: The Study on the measurement of cross -border penetration in the EU public procurement  
market , estimated that 21% of EU27's direct cross -border procurement was awarded to suppliers 
outside of the EU, and 32% of indirect cross -border procurement awarded to suppliers outside of 
the EU.  
 
Page 118, Paragraph 3.229: Based on 2021 data, resort to single sourcing varied across the EU 
from 28% of the number of procurement procedures in Cyprus to 1% in Greece. Procurement 
procedures where only a single bidder submitted a bid varied from 50% of the number of 
procurement pro cedures in Poland to 9% in Malta. The data show heavy reliance on the lowest price 
as the sole award criterion. For example, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech  Republic , Estonia, Greece, 
Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovak  Republic , and Sweden, more than 80% of the num ber of 
procedures were awarded based on the lowest price criterion.  
Q. 62 -64: 
62. Can the EU explain what factors led to the high percentage of procurement procedures where 
only a single bidder submitted a bid in certain EU member states?  
 
Reply:  The singl e bids phenomenon itself has various reasons and it seems that they probably work 
in conjunction: market problem, buyers problem, subject matters of purchases, perception of the 
public procurement, etc.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 313 - 
 
63. Do the EU Directives on procurement require proc uring entities in all member states to post 
notices of intended procurement publicly within a specified period? If so, please provide detail  
information about the required specified periods that each intended procurement must be publicly 
notified and expla in how such specified periods provide interested suppliers enough time to prepare 
and submit a bid?  
 
Reply: When awarding public contracts, contracting authorities/entities are required to publish a 
contract notice as means of calling for competition. In s pecific cases and circumstances laid down in 
the Directives, contracting authorities/entities may award public contracts by a negotiated procedure 
without prior publication. Prior to a call for competition, contracting authorities/entities may make 
known t heir intentions of planned procurements through the publication of a prior information notice, 
but they are not required to do so. Under specific circumstances, a prior information notice can be 
used as a call for competition. The minimum time limits for t he receipt of a tender or a request to 
participate in a tender procedure are calculated with reference to the date on which the contract 
notice or prior information notice was sent. The applicable time limits vary with the different 
procurement procedures.  
 
64. Does the EU establish requirements for a procuring entity to verify with the supplier that it 
satisfies the conditions for participation and is capable of fulfilling the terms of the contract in the 
event it receives a tender with a price that is abn ormally lower than the prices in other tenders 
submitted?  
 
Reply: Under the EU Public Procurement Directives, contracting authorities/entities are obliged to 
require economic operators to explain the price or costs proposed in their tenders where those 
tenders appear to be abnormally low in relation to the works, supplies or services. This means that 
a contracting authority/entity is not allowed to (1) accept a tender that appears to be abnormally 
low without having first conducted this investigation, nor t o (2) reject a tender that appears to be 
abnormally low without having allowed the bidder to explain the low level of the price or costs. It 
should be observed however, that a possibility of a tender being abnormally low must be analysed 
in relation to the  objective conditions, not just in relation to tenders submitted by counter - 
competitors in the procedure at questions.  
 
Page 118, Paragraph 3.232:  All procurement carried out in the EU above specified thresholds 
must comply with the requirements of the EU  Directives on procurement that implement 
corresponding EU obligations under the GPA 2012. The applicable thresholds were updated with 
effect from 1  January  2022 (Table  3.29). For government procurement below the thresholds, 
national rules apply.  
Q. 65 
65. How does the Commission ensure that member states utilizing EU Recovery funds for 
WTO GPA-covered procurements implement procurement procedures in accordance with the GPA?  
 
Reply: The Member States transpose EU law set out in the Directives on public p rocurement into 
national law. The rules in the Directives are in line with the GPA. The contracting authorities or 
entities of the Member States are responsible for applying the rules on public procurement stipulated 
in national law transposing said Direct ives for all procedures in their scope, including those funded 
by EU Recovery funds. The Member States ensure oversight over the proper application of the rules, 
including by way of ensuring legal remedies. The Commission controls quality of transposition of the 
rules and may pursue infringements against a Member State when there is evidence of systematic 
breach of EU law.  
 
Q 66: 
66. How will the EU ensure that the final version of its Cybersecurity Certification Scheme for 
Cloud Services (EUCS) will not discriminate against the suppliers of another WTO GPA Party or create 
unnecessary obstacles to the participation of cloud service suppliers of another Party in covered 
procurements?  
 
Reply: ENISA is currently preparing a candidate EU Cloud Security Certifi cation Scheme (EUCS). 
The Commission underlines that all requirements under the EUCS will be compliant and fully aligned 
with EU law, international commitments and WTO obligations. Furthermore, EUCS is a voluntary 
scheme under the Cybersecurity Act.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 314 - 
 
  
 Q 67 
67. Does the EU Directives on procurement apply to procurements in France subject to the 
SecNumCloud certification? How does the Commission ensure that France's procurement of cloud 
services is implemented consistent with EU obligations under the GPA?  
 
Reply: The EU Directives on public procurement are designed to implement the EU obligations in 
the GPA, the exemptions laid down in Directives being fully consistent with the GPA.  
 
EU Member States transpose EU law set out in the Directives on public procurem ent into national 
law. The national law of Member States transposing these Directives apply, in principle, to the award 
of public service contracts for the provision of cloud services by contracting authorities.  
 
Nothing in these directives prevent the imp osition or enforcement of measures necessary to protect 
public policy, public morality, public security, health, human and animal life, the preservation of 
plant life or other environmental measures, in particular with a view to sustainable development, 
provided that those measures are in conformity with the TFEU.  
 
The European Commission monitors the implementation of EU law, and ECJ delivers judgement 
binding in EU Member States.  
 
Page  119, Paragraph  3.233  Use of the TED platform is mandatory for public contracts at or above 
specific thresholds. For public contracts below these thresholds, procuring entities can, but are not 
required to, publish relevant information on TED. Standard forms (eForms), developed for the 
publication of notices related t o planning, tendering, limited tendering with pre -notification, contract 
award, contract modification, and change or cancellation of contract notices, are expected to become 
mandatory from October 2023.  
Q. 68 -69 
68. Will eForms be posted on the TED platfor m? 
 
Reply:  Yes. They will replace the current  format.  
 
69. Will use of eForms be mandatory for all public contracts, or only for those at or above specified 
thresholds?  
 
Reply:  They are mandatory to be used for all public procurement procedures above the t hresholds. 
They can also be used voluntary below the thresholds.  
 
Page 119, Paragraph 3.235  The IPI empowers the Commission to conduct investigations into 
third-country procurement measures with the aim of determining whether such measures create 
access ba rriers for EU suppliers of goods or services in third -country government procurement 
markets. Depending on the results of the investigation and following consultations with the 
third country, the Commission can impose measures to limit access to the EU pub lic procurement 
market for suppliers from the third country. Specifically, IPI measures can take the form of an 
exclusion of third -country tenderers from the relevant EU government procurement procedure, or a 
score adjustment penalty that is applied to a t ender submitted by a supplier of the targeted 
third country. IPI measures apply to EU procurement of works and concessions equal to or over 
EUR 15 million  (net of VAT) and to goods and services equal to or over EUR  5 million  (net of VAT). 
EU procuring enti ties can be exempted from application of the IPI only if the bids from a third country 
subject to IPI measures meet the tender requirements or the exemption is justified by an overriding 
public interest reason. If the relevant third country is a Party to t he GPA 2012 or has a bilateral 
agreement with the EU, and the procurement is covered, the issue is to be resolved through the 
mechanisms contained in these agreements.  
Q. 70 -76 
70. Are investigations conducted by the Commission into third-country procurement measures 
published for public consumption?  
 
Reply: The IPI Regulation specifies which information concerning IPI  investigations will be made 
publicly available. This includes initiation of an IPI investigation, main findings of the investigation, 
suspension or termination of the procedure or imposition of IPI measures. Respective information 
will be published in the  Official Journal of the European  Union  (notices for initiation, suspension or 
termination or implementing act(s) for imposition of IPI measures) or otherwise made publicly 
available (like in case of a report setting out the main findings of the investigat ion). WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 315 - 
 
71. Can the EU please provide more information about how member states are instructed to 
consider a score adjustment penalty in tender processes?  
 
Reply: An implementing act imposing IPI measures will provide details of the measure imposed. It 
will specify the exact scope of application and in case of score adjustment measure it will specify the 
applicable level of the adjustment.  
 
72. Is this disclosed to potential suppliers during the procurement process?  
 
Reply:  The details of the applicable IPI me asure will be part of the implementing act imposing such 
measures and will be publicly available. In addition, contracting authorities and contracting entities 
shall include a reference to the application of IPI measures in the public procurement documents . 
 
73. Do these score adjustments apply to all tenders that a third country bids on or are 
determinations on score adjustments made for individual procurements?  
 
Reply: An implementing act imposing IPI measures will provide details of the measure imposed. It 
will specify the exact scope of application.  
 
74. How is the EU ensuring that member states and their GPA -covered procuring entities are 
educated on the exemptions from the IPI for GPA -covered procurements?  
 
Reply: The non -application of the IPI to cove red procurements is an issue of the scope of the 
application of the IPI Regulation as such and not an issue of applicability of individual IPI measures. 
In other words, there cannot be an IPI measure limiting access to EU public procurement markets 
that wo uld apply to covered procurement as this would be in breach of the IPI Regulation. As there 
cannot be IPI measures applicable to covered procurement, there is no question of exempting any 
GPA-covered tenders from the application of IPI measures.  
 
75. Are these exemptions automatic, or must procuring entities apply for the exemptions for each 
tender?  
 
Reply: See reply to the question above - as there cannot be IPI measures applicable to covered 
procurement, there is no question of exempting any GPA-covered  tenders from the application of 
IPI measures.  
 
76. If a third country is GPA party, what types of issues would need to be resolved?  
 
Reply:  Issues relating to discrimination of EU bidders, goods, or services. In case a third country is 
a Party to the WTO  Agreement  on Government Procurement or has concluded a trade agreement 
with the Union that includes provisions on public procurement and there are allegations as to 
restrictive practices relating to public procurement covered by market access commitments 
undertaken by that third country towards the Union, the EU should follow the consultation 
mechanisms or dispute settlement procedures set out in those agreements.  
 
Page 125, para 3.258: The Secretariat's Report states that "the Commission continues to attach 
importance to removing unnecessary barriers in the market for the licensing of standard essential 
patents (SEPs)."  
Q. 77 
77. From the Commission's perspective, what "unnecessary barriers" exist in the EU "in the 
market for the licensing of" SEPs?  
 
Reply: Barriers can include a variety of issues that may prevent companies from accessing or 
licensing SEPs, such as disagreement ove r the appropriate royalty rate, the scope of the license, the 
validity of the SEP or a lack of clarity about which patents are essential for implementing a particular 
standard. Some other possible barriers can include:  
 
• Hold-out: potential SEP licensee r efuses to pay the licensing fees to extract better terms from 
the SEP holder or waiting for the patent to expire.  
• Hold-up: SEP holder overcharges for licensing, taking advantage of the fact that companies 
have already invested in implementing the standar d and have little choice but to pay the requested 
fees. WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 316 - 
 
  
 • Royalty Stacking: SEP licensee pays multiple royalties for different SEPs incorporated into a 
single product. The cumulative cost of licensing all of the relevant patents can make the product 
commer cially unviable.  
 
Follow up to Question 78  
26. Rate, scope, and terms all seem to be integral aspects of any negotiation for the licensing of 
SEPs (and in fact are necessary to concluding any license). How does the Commission distinguish an 
unnecessary asp ect of a negotiation of a licensing of a SEP from a necessary aspect of such a 
negotiation?  
 
Follow -up Reply : Unnecessary aspects of a negotiation may include factors that don't affect the 
execution of the license agreement or the parties' rights and obli gations. These might involve the 
individual assumptions of the parties, considerations of unrelated business operations, or details that 
don't impact the license's use, scope or rate.  
 
In essence, necessary aspects are those that directly influence the val ue, execution, or terms of the 
license. Anything not contributing to defining the relationship between the licensor and licensee, or 
that doesn't impact the practical use or cost of the license, can be considered unnecessary.  
 
Page 125, para 3.258:  The Sec retariat's Report states that "[b]ased on its 2017 Communication 
to the Institutions on Setting out the EU approach to Standard Essential Patents, the Commission 
currently strives to improve transparency and predictability in SEP licensing by encouraging i ndustry - 
led initiatives in the most affected sectors" . 
Q. 78 -81 
78. From the Commission's perspective, what are "the most affected sectors"?  
 
Reply: The 2017 Communication identifies several sectors that are likely to be affected by SEP 
licensing issues. In particular, SEPs are deemed particularly prevalent in the information and 
communication technology (ICT) sector. The Commission identified this sector as having the highest 
potential for SEP licensing issues, given the large number of SEPs that may be n ecessary to 
implement a given technology standard.  
 
The 2017 Communication notes also that SEPs are becoming increasingly important in the 
automotive sector for the development of connected and autonomous vehicles, which rely on a range 
of standardised tec hnologies, including wireless communication, sensors, etc.  
 
Moreover, the Commission also noted that SEPs would be essential to the development of devices 
in the Internet of Things (IoT) sector, which rely on a range of wireless communication standards to 
ensure interoperability and efficiency.  
 
Follow up to questions 78 -81:  
27. Can the EU provide further context as to when, and to what extent, it expects that the SEP 
licensing issues associated with the most affected sectors will rise to a level in which they present 
significant difficulties or inefficiencies affecting the functioning of its internal market?  
 
Follow -up Reply : The exact timeframe and extent of these issues would depend on a variety of 
factors, including the pace of technological innovation, changes in market dynamics, the legal and 
regulatory environment, and the strategies of the patent holders and licensees. The 
2017 Communication outlines the importance of SEPs, the issues with the current SEP licensing 
environmen t, and the need for improvements, rather than providing specific predictions or timelines 
about future impacts on different sectors.  
 
79. In which of those sectors has the Commission encouraged industry -led initiatives?  
 
Reply: The Commission's 2017 Communication identifies several initiatives where it encourages 
industry -led solutions, such as:  
 
• Standardisation: The Commission encourages industry -led standardisation that promotes 
transparency and predictability in SEP licensing, including the devel opment of industry standards 
that incorporate clear and transparent licensing terms.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 317 - 
 
• Licensing Platforms: The Commission encourages the creation of licensing platforms that 
provide a one -shop-stop for SEP holders and licensees, simplifying the licensing process and 
reducing transaction costs.  
• Mediation and Arbitration: The Commission encourages the use of mediation and arbitration 
to resolve disputes over SEP licensing, providing an alternative to litigation and promoting a more 
efficient and cost -effective resolution process.  
• Patent Pools: The Commission supports the creation of patent pools, which allow SEP holders 
to license their patents collectively and provide licensees with greater access to essential patents 
and lower transaction costs.  
 
Follow  up to Question 79  
28. Are there key distinctions between a "licensing platform " and a "patent pool " (e.g., the 
2017 Communication does not detail differences)?  
 
Follow -up Reply : Yes, a patent pool is a consortium of patent owners who agree to aggregate th eir 
patents into a package, which they then license collectively. On the other hand, a licensing platform 
acts like a marketplace where individual patent holders list their patents for potential licensees to 
negotiate and acquire licenses independently and  without collective agreement. Thus, while patent 
pools involve cooperative patent licensing, licensing platforms allow for flexible, independent patent 
licensing transactions.  
 
80. Please describe the Commission's latest efforts to "improve transparency a nd predictability in 
SEP licensing" . 
 
Reply:  On 27  April 2023, the Commission introduced a proposal for a new regulatory framework on 
SEPs. Commission's proposals aim to improve transparency and predictability in SEP licensing, and 
limit transaction costs. The draft SEP Regulation establishes mechanisms to more efficiently 
determine patent essentiality and FRAND licensing rates. The draft SE P Regulation proposes the 
creation of a 'Competence centre' at the European  Union  Intellectual Property Office. This centre 
would administer the SEP register, databases and procedures for essentiality checks of SEPs and the 
FRAND determination. The compete nce centre would also be responsible for providing training, 
support and general advice on SEPs to SMEs and raise awareness of SEP licensing.  
 
81. Please describe any other efforts, besides encouraging industry -led initiatives, by the 
Commission to improve  transparency and predictability in SEP licensing.  
 
Reply:  The Commission has issued the "Guidelines on the application of Article 101 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union to technology transfer agreements" (2014/C 89/03). These 
guideline s provide detailed guidance on the application of EU competition law to technology transfer 
agreements, including those involving SEPs. The guidelines are currently under review to reflect the 
developments that have occurred since the adoption of the guide lines in 2014.  
 
The Commission has launched several investigations into alleged abuses of SEPs by patent holders. 
For example, in 2018, the Commission fined Qualcomm EUR  997 million  for abusing its dominant 
position in the market for 3G baseband chipsets.  
 
Page  125, para 3.260:  The Secretariat's Report states that "[w]hile no 'unitary SPC' existed as of 
end-2022, optimizing the supplementary protection certificates (SPC) system to make it more 
transparent and efficient is one of the goals[.]"  
Q. 82 -83: 
82. Please describe the Commission's latest efforts to make the SPC system "more transparent 
and efficient" . 
 
Reply: SPC protection in the EU is currently only available at national level and fragmented, with 
diverging decisions in up to 1 in 4 cases across Member States and difficulties monitoring the status 
of SPCs due to lack of a single access point.  
 
The now proposed S PC reform includes the creation of a unitary SPC, complementing the unitary 
patent that will enter into force on 1  June 2023, as well as a centralised procedure for the granting 
of national SPCs . Moreover, a single register will be created, serving as a single, transparent, access 
point for monitoring information about and the status of SPCs.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 318 - 
 
  
 83. What steps were taken to provide meaningful opportunities for interested stakeholders to 
submit inpu t regarding these efforts and SPC policy in general in the EU?  
 
Reply:  From 8  March to 5  April 2022 interested parties could provide feedback to Commission's Call 
for Evidence . Moreover, in 2020 there was a dedicate survey to Member States on SPC transparency. 
The Commission also conducted earlier consultations in which interested parties c ould submit their 
views: on the evaluation of the EU SPC system (which took place between 12  October  2017 and 
4 January 2018) and as part of a legal study (between 22  May and 23  June 2017).  
 
Last, the Commission has held several bilateral meetings with sta keholders over the  years.  
 
Page  127, para 3.269:  The Secretariat's Report states that "[o]n 28  November  2022, the 
Commission adopted two (package) proposals to modernize its legislation on design protection" . 
Q. 84: 
84. Please elaborate on the current status of those proposals and, in particular, the exception for 
"reproducing original designs for repair purposes of complex products" . 
 
Reply:  The two Commission (package) proposals for a revised Regulation and Directive on industrial 
designs have  been transmitted to the Council of the European  Union  and the European Parliament 
for adoption under the ordinary legislative procedure. In the Council, the Commission presented the 
Initiatives package on 19  December  2022. Since then, the two proposals ha ve been discussed in the 
Council Working Group on Intellectual Property with the Member States. In the European Parliament, 
a first exchange of views was held at the end of April in the Committee on Legal Affairs. The vote in 
Plenary is planned for Novembe r this year.  
 
The proposal for the introduction of a repair clause into the Directive approximates the design laws 
of the Member States by removing design protection as concerns the use of protected designs for 
the purpose of repair of a complex product so  as to restore its original appearance where the product 
incorporating the design or to which the design is applied constitutes a form -dependent component 
part of a complex product. For designs already granted before the entry into force of the Directive, 
a transitional period of 10 years has been proposed. The repair clause already contained in the 
Community Design Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 (applicable to EU designs at Union level) is proposed 
to be adapted accordingly.  
 
Page  127, Paragraph  3.271 : The Secr etariat report states the proposal aims to increase 
geographical indications (GIs) across the EU to benefit the rural economy.  
Q. 85: 
85. Has the EU performed a study of the impact of GIs on the rural economy? If so, could the EU 
please provide it?  
 
Reply: EU does not have such study. There is a chapter on rural areas in the Commission Staff 
working document " Evaluation of geographical indications and traditional specialities guaranteed 
protected  in the EU" that can be viewed  at: https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common -agricultural -
policy/cap -overview/cmef /products -and-markets/geographical -indications -and-traditional - 
specialities -guaranteed -protected -eu_en . The Evaluation support study on geographical indications 
and traditional specialities guaranteed protected in the EU prepared by the contra ctor can be found 
at the same link.  
 
The European Commission has also prepared a counterfactual analysis touching upon rural areas 
"Causal estimates of Geographical Indications' effects on territorial development: feasibility and 
application ", which  can be viewed  at: 
https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC124769  
 
Page 128, Paragraph 3.273 : The United  States  notes the Commission has sought to include a 
comprehensive section on geographical indications (GI) protection for agricultural products in the 
more recent generation of free trade agreements (FTAs).  
Q. 86 -88: 
86. Please explain how the criterion for the list of GIs to include in FTAs is determined.  
 
Reply:  The EU GI list to be protected in trade agreements is established in consultation with the 
EU Member States through official channels and exchanges.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 319 - 
 
Follow up to question 86 -88: 
29: Is there a mech anism for trading partners with existing exports of relevant products into an 
EU FTA engaged country to consult on the process of GI recognition that may disrupt or eliminate 
longstanding trade of such products into the EU FTA engaged country?  
 
Follow -up Reply : Each agreement concluded by the EU is the outcome of the negotiations between 
the trading partners. In the EU, protection of GIs through trade/bilateral agreements is preceded by 
a due process, including an opposition procedure and identification of  prior rights. It is the 
prerogative of EU 's trading partners to run a due process in their territory.  
 
30. For particular products that have been recognized as common names in a variety of forums, 
such as existence of a Codex standard and legal rulings, a re there mechanisms in place to ensure 
that: (1) GI recognition in a EU FTA does not violate prior rights; (2) common names do not 
inappropriately receive GI protection in a EU FTA; and (3) interested persons have notice of, and 
opportunity to oppose or to  seek cancellation of, any GI protection that is sought or may be granted 
as part of the EU negotiation of FTAs that include GI protection for agricultural products?  
 
Follow -up Reply : First of all, the fact that a GI name is subject to a specific  Codex Ali mentarius  
standard or is listed in dictionaries, websites, etc does not imply that the name should be considered 
as a common or generic term. Generic status in a given territory can only be assessed with regard 
to the perception of the consumers on that te rritory. In the EU, the relevant public is comprised 
mainly of the reasonably well -informed members of the public and/or customers who may purchase 
the product or a like product.  
 
In the EU, protection of GIs through trade/bilateral agreements is preceded by a due process, 
including an opposition procedure and identification of prior rights.  
 
87. We also note the EU -New Zealand  Trade Agreement referenced in paragraph 3.273 provides 
the opportunity to add more GIs in the future. Does the EU have a process for adding GIs in the 
future?  
 
Reply:  The process for adding GIs will be similar as explained above (see reply to Q86) – the Parties 
jointly decide on the procedure on how to add additional GIs in the future. Article  18.33 (3) of the 
EU-New Zealand  Free Trade Agreement covers the modalities of this procedure.  
 
88. Is there a process to remove GIs from the list of GIs protected th rough the EU -New Zealand  
Trade Agreement if they are identified as common names?  
 
Reply: The provisions of the EU -New Zealand  Free Trade Agreement jointly agreed between the 
Parties regulate on how to assess the genericness of the term (see Article  18.34 ( 5), (6) and (7)). 
In any event, as stipulated by the Article  18.39 (4) a GI may only be cancelled by the Party in which 
the good originates.  
 
Pages 141 -142, Paragraph 4.32 : The Secretariat report indicates that from 2020 to 2022 EU 
member states had to all ocate 30% of their ceilings annually for direct payments for "agricultural 
practices beneficial for the climate and the environment" (greening) to farmers who observed 
practices related to crop diversification, maintenance of existing permanent grassland, and having 
an ecological focus area on at least 5% of arable land for holdings with more than 15 ha of arable 
land, or "equivalent practices" . 
Q. 89 -91 
89. Please elaborate on how the EU defined "crop diversification" , "maintenance of existing 
permanent gr assland" , "ecological focus area" , and "equivalent practices" . 
 
Reply:  Farmers received the green direct payment if they complied with three mandatory practices 
that benefit the environment (soil and biodiversity in particular).  
 
· Crop diversification: a greater variety of crops makes soil and ecosystems more resilient.  
· Maintaining permanent grassland: grassland supports carbon sequestration and protects 
biodiversity (habitats).  
· Dedicate 5% of arable land to areas beneficial for biod iversity: ecological focus areas (EFA), 
for example trees, hedges or land left fallow that improves biodiversity and habitats.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 320 - 
 
  
 Crop diversification  
Farms with more than 10 ha of arable land had to grow at least two crops, while at least three crops 
were r equired on farms with more than 30 ha. The main crop could not cover more than 75% of the 
land. There were exemptions to the rules, depending on the individual situation. For instance, 
farmers with a large proportion of grassland, which is in itself enviro nmentally beneficial.  
 
Maintenance of permanent grassland  
The ratio of permanent grassland to agricultural land was set by EU countries at national or regional 
level; from a reference year 2012, there was a annual monitoring and the ratio can decrease abov e 
a margin of a 5% ). Moreover, EU countries designated areas of environmentally sensitive permanent 
grassland. Farmers could not plough or convert permanent grassland in these areas.  
 
Ecological focus  areas Farmers with arable land exceeding 15 ha must ha ve ensured that at least 
5% of their land is an EFA in order to safeguard and improve biodiversity on farms.  
 
Please refer to EU Regulation 1307/2013 where the definition of these practices can be found.  
 
90. Please also explain how the EU determined that the definitions it has provided in response to 
Question 36 would provide adequate environmental benefit to justify "greening" payments.  
 
Reply: The 'green direct payment' (or 'greening') is part of direct income support which is only 
granted if farmers ado pted or maintained farming practices . These latter were defined at EU level 
and implemented across EU by all farmers where applicable. This provided a contribution to EU 
environmental and climate goals. Through greening, the EU rewarded farmers for preserv ing natural 
resources and providing public goods, which are benefits to the public that are not reflected in market 
prices. EU countries had to allocate 30% of their income support to 'greening'.  
 
More detailed information can be found on Report from the C ommission on the implementation of 
the ecological focus area obligation under the green direct payment scheme (EUR -Lex - 
52017DC0152 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu)  
 
91. Please also explain how the requirement for greening payments has changed since the end of 
the transition period in 2022.  
 
Reply: The approach to provide support to farmers to carry out practices beneficial for 
environmental and climate has substantially changed in the current CAP programming 
period  2023-2028. The new CAP framework includes a ne w delivery model, which is a major 
innovation of this programming period:  
 
· New Strategic approach with more subsidiarity and flexibility for MS. MS have prepared 
specific intervention approaches for all objectives, including the environment and climate ( called 
newly eco -schemes which are part of the direct payments).  
· Stronger focus on performance to ensure that the CAP plans deliver on the specific objectives, 
with a genuine "results -based approach".  
· the new delivery model requires EU Member States am ong others to design an intervention 
strategy, including an enhanced conditionality (a set of compulsory standards and requirements), 
set of interventions for the environment and climate, as well as minimum budgetary allocations for 
environment and climate -related actions in direct payments (25% of financial allocations for eco - 
schemes).  
 
Contrary to the previous standard "greening" practices, eco -schemes are adapted to national 
context. The EU -wide legal framework leaves flexibility to Member States while  ensuring a level 
playing field and ambition of eco -schemes. Member States have the flexibility to customize the eco - 
schemes to specific national environmental and climate needs to ensure a meaningful contribution 
to EU environmental and climate objective s in their specific context. This is a key move away from 
the approach taken with the greening direct payments.  
 
Page  143, Paragraph  4.42: The Secretariat report indicates that the majority of voluntary coupled 
support goes to animal sectors, with more than 70% of support provided under this scheme going 
to beef and veal (38.8%), dairy products (21.4%), and sheep and goat meat (12.8%).  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 321 - 
 
Q. 92: 
92. Have any of the EU member states conducted studies of the effects of voluntary coupled 
support on the specific sectors identified in paragraph 4.42? If so, please share the results.  
 
Reply: The Commission is not aware of Member State specific studies carried out on the effects of 
voluntary coupled support. However, in the CAP Strategic Plans the Member Sta tes have proposed 
support interventions for coupled income support for 2023 -2027 based on available data in the 
SWOT and needs assessment, justifying the difficulties and importance of the sectors supported. 
The CAP Strategic Plans are further subject to t he performance monitoring and evaluation provisions 
laid down in Regulation (EU) 2021/2115, including regarding interim and ex post  evaluations.  
 
Pages 145 -146, Paragraph 4.53 : Table  4.6 includes a list of market support measures taken in 
response to the C OVID -19 pandemic.  
Q. 93 -94 
93. Are all of these market support measures now closed, or are some measures still in operation?  
 
Reply:  All market support measures referred to in Table  4.6 are closed.  
 
94. If some are still in operation, please identify the m easures still in operation and explain which 
products or sectors they support, as well as the value of the support for the current year.  
 
Reply:  All market support measures referred to in Table  4.6 are closed.  
 
Page  144, Paragraph  4.48: The Secretariat report states that intervention purchases were opened 
at set prices for butter and skim milk powder for the first time since 2009 due to the COVID -19 
pandemic, but that no intervention purchases were made in 2020, 2021, and 2022 for animal 
products. In G/AG/N/EU/79, in the market price support table spanning pages 11 and 12, the EU 
reports zero eligible production for skimmed milk powder and beef, but 2,350 thousand tons of 
eligible production for butter. Many readers would consider butter an an imal product.  
Q. 95 -96 
95. Please explain the discrepancy in the Secretariat's report versus G/AG/N/EU/79 in relation to 
butter.  
 
Reply: The information in paragraph 4.48 of WTO secretariat report is correct. No intervention 
purchases were made in 2020, 20 21, and 2022 for animal products.  
 
Nevertheless, the US is reminded that the EU always includes the entire production for a product for 
which intervention is opened in its calculation of Market Price Support in supporting table DS:5. 
Whether any quantities  are actually bought in or not, this does not influence the quantity used to 
calculate the market price support in supporting table DS:5.  
 
As stated in the WTO secretariat report, no quantity of any animal product was bought into 
intervention. The data in DS:1 notification G/AG/N/EU/79 is also correct, because the intervention 
was opened during the reporting period. The EU included the entire butter production as eligible for 
the purposes of Market Price Support calculation.  
 
It is the EU's understanding th at the according to relevant rules of Annex  3 to the WTO  Agreement  
on Agriculture, any WTO member should include its entire production whe never  a product  is eligible 
for market price support, irrespective of whether the support is actually granted or not . 
 
96. Did member states offer to purchase skim milk powder at intervention prices, but received no 
bids? 
 
Reply:  Please refer to the reply for question 95  above.  
 
Pages  144-145, Paragraph  4.49: Table  4.5 includes figures for private storage aid from 2019 
to 2022. The figures for skimmed milk powder reference price (Euro per ton) and aid for storage 
in 2020 (tons) do not seem to match with the figure the EU reported for skimmed milk powder 
private storage on page 23 of G/AG/N/EU/79.  
Q. 97: 
97. Is the difference due to the way the information is being presented? Please explain.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 322 - 
 
  
 Reply: The EU has included on page 23 of its DS:1 notification G/AG/N/EU/79, the expenditure for 
Private storage of butter (C OVID  related measure in accordance with Regul ation 2020/597) incurred 
for the period from 16/10/2019 until 15/10/2020.  
 
The data contained in table 4.5 of the WTO SEC report for 2019 –2022 does not coincide with the 
Budget years used by the EU.  
 
Page  153, Paragraph  4.83:  The Common Fisheries Policy ( CFP) set a deadline to end overfishing 
by 2020. According to the recently published Commission report, Common  Fisheries  Policy – State 
of Play, responses by stakeholders to the Commission's 'Call for Evidence' on the functioning of the 
CFP revealed that "i mplementation, control, and enforcement of the CFP was insufficient" . 
Respondents also noted that overfishing and management of shared fish stocks remain key 
challenges.  
 
Q. 98: 
98. Please comment on what measures the EU is pursuing to overcome these chall enges presented 
by the respondents on the functioning of the CFP, including its implementation, control, and 
enforcement, and the ongoing issues with overfishing and management of shared fish stocks.  
 
Reply: The CFP includes a variety of fisheries management measures, including limits of fleet 
capacity, catch limits and specific conservation measures. These rules have been developed based 
on the best available scientific advice, aiming to ensure the conservation and sustainable exploitation 
of fishe ries resources. All EU fishing vessels, large and small, have to comply with the applicable 
rules and regulations.  
 
The CFP has already delivered excellent results in many fisheries. In particular, is has contributed 
to eliminating overfishing for the fish  stocks managed with Total Allowable Catches (TACs) in the 
North East Atlantic. In the Mediterranean, since 2015 the fishing mortality (F) has been constantly 
decreasing even if there are still challenges ahead.  
 
In February 2023, the Commission adopted a Communication and an accompanying technical 
document to report on the implementation of the CFP since its last reform in 2013. That 
Communication shows that all the tools to address the challenges are available in the existing 
legislative framework, and th at what is needed is swifter and better implementation, and compliance. 
Therefore, the Communication identifies some areas within the CFP where further data, assessment 
and reflection is necessary and proposes to launch a new phase of discussion with all r elevant 
stakeholders to facilitate collaboration, clarify governance, and ensure that all the stakeholders 
involved do the necessary efforts to ensure a full implementation of the policy. This approach, aimed 
at increasing trust between all parties, is at the heart of the 'Pact for Fisheries and Oceans' introduced 
by the Communication.  
 
Page  159, Paragraph 4.114  
Q. 99 -101 
99. Please provide more detail on the Social Climate Fund. Can the EU provide insight into what 
factors are considered in determining whi ch households are "vulnerable" under the revised ETS and 
eligible for financial assistance?  
 
Reply : The definitions of vulnerable households, micro -enterprises and transport users are included 
in the Regulation establishing the Social Climate Fund (SCF).  
 
• 'vulnerable households' means households in energy poverty or households, including low 
income and lower middle -income ones, that are significantly affected by the price impacts of the 
inclusion of greenhouse gas emissions from buildings within the scop e of Directive 2003/87/EC and 
lack the means to renovate the building they occupy;  
• vulnerable micro -enterprises' means micro -enterprises that are significantly affected by the 
price impacts of the inclusion of greenhouse gas emissions from buildings or r oad transport within 
the scope of Directive 2003/87/EC and that, for the purpose of their activity, lack the means either 
to renovate the building they occupy, or to purchase zero - and low -emission vehicles or to switch to 
alternative sustainable modes of transport, including public transport, as relevant;  
• vulnerable transport users' means individuals and households in transport poverty, but also 
individuals and households, including low income and lower middle -income ones, that are 
significantly affected  by the price impacts of the inclusion of greenhouse gas emissions from road WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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transport within the scope of Directive 2003/87/EC and lack the means to purchase zero - and low - 
emission vehicles or to switch to alternative sustainable modes of transport, incl uding public 
transport.  
 
The social landscape varies widely among European countries. Therefore, the definitions of 
vulnerable groups (as well as the definitions of energy and transport poverty) are relatively broad 
and give Member States flexibility to ta rget the measures funded from the SCF to their national, 
regional and local context. Member States will be required to analyse the effects of the introduction 
of emissions trading in the buildings and road transport sectors and, on this basis, identify the  
vulnerable groups in their Social Climate Plans.  
 
100. Which, if any, member states have updated their national energy and climate plans and 
published a national Social Climate Plan?  
 
Reply:  In accordance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 of the European Par liament and of the Council 
(Governance Regulation), Member States submitted their integrated national energy and climate 
plans by 31  December  2019. Further information on the submitted plans can be found here: National  
energy and climate plans (europa.eu) . Member States are  due to submit a draft update of their 
integrated national energy and climate plans by 30  June 2023, and the final one by 30  June 2024.  
 
According to the Regulation establishing the SCF, Member States should submit their Social Climate 
Plans by 30  June 2025. 
 
101. Are member states required to update these national plans on an annual basis?  
 
Reply : The final integrated national energy and climate plans are submitted by 31  December  2019 
and subsequently by 1  January  2029 and every 10 years thereafter. The up dates will take place by 
30 June 2023, and subsequently by 1  January  2033 and every 10 years thereafter.  
 
The Social Climate Plans, due by 30  June 2025, will cover the whole duration of the Fund from 2026 
to 2032. However, it will be possible to amend a pl an where it is no longer achievable or needs to 
be significantly adjusted. Notably by 15  March  2029, each Member must assess the appropriateness 
of its Plan in view of the actual direct effects of the introduction of emissions trading in the buildings 
and road transport sectors, scheduled for 2027.  
 
Page 159, paragraph 4.116 : The Secretariat's report notes the revised Renewable Energy 
Directive (RED) with a footnoted reference to Directive (EU) 2018/2001. The United  States  notes 
that this was in reference to RED's revisions (RED II) in 2018; however, revisions to RED II were 
announced as part of the Fit -for-55 package released in 2021. The United  States  is concerned that 
new trade requirements on the same affected commoditi es were drafted prior to the full 
implementation of RED II, including transposing by member states as well as release of RED II's 
final operational guidance on biomass sustainability.  
Q. 102: 
102. Please explain the process the EU took to consider and corr ect any trade -related impacts 
experienced by industry as a result of RED II, despite it not being fully implemented, prior to the 
drafting revisions to RED II under the Fit -for-55 package.  
 
Reply: The EU's RED II rules apply in the same manner to biomass t hat is sourced in the EU or 
imported from third countries. Under the EU's better regulation framework, the RED III proposal 
was subject to a public consultation process to which all stakeholders, including from third countries, 
could contribute. RED III fa lls outside of the review period of this exercise and has not yet been 
adopted. The legislative process can be followed via this link: Renewable energy directive  
(europa.eu) . 
 
Part II. Questions based on the Government Report  (WT/TPR/G/442)  
 
Page 6, Paragraph 2.8:  Some discussion of potential use of remaining NGEU/REPowerEU  funds 
under the amended Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework of the EU state aid rules in the 
context of the Green Deal Industrial Plan could also be relevant here.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Q. 103: 
103. Please provide detailed information about the potential use of remaining  NGEU/REPowerEU 
funds under the amended Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework of the EU state aid rules in 
the context of the Green Deal Industrial Plan.  
 
Reply: In 2020, the EU unveiled the "Next Generation EU" (NGEU) recovery plan with the aim to 
support the recovery of EU countries from pandemic and foster the green and digital transitions of 
the EU economy as well as to offer social and employment support. Detailed information about the 
use of the NGEU/REPowerEU funds are available at their dedicate d websites: NextGenerationEU  
(europa.eu ) and REPowerEU: affordable, secure and sustainable energy for Europe (europa.eu)  
respectively . 
 
Under the Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework, the origin of the funds is irrelevant (be it 
NGEU/REPowerEU) or purely "national".  
 
Page  10 Paragraph  3.24: According to the Government Report, "The EU remains fully engaged in 
the discussions on the implementation of the MC12 Ministerial Declaration. In this context, 
transparency is one of the priorities, including transparency's role in addressing food securit y 
challenges for example in relation to export restrictions, hich can be detrimental to food importing 
countries. Further work on improving transparency across the board in agriculture is necessary. The 
EU will also continue to push for reforms of trade di storting domestic support, which can adversely 
impact food security. A new approach in the agricultural negotiations post MC12 is needed: 
integrating issues of food security, environment, climate, poverty and sustainable production" . 
Q. 104-105: 
104. Please explain what the EU is doing to discourage the use of trade distorting measures such 
as export restrictions within its member states.  
 
Reply: Trade policy is an exclusive competence of the EU (Article  3 of the TFEU) which means that 
any action aiming at export restriction towards third countries can only be taken at European  Union  
level. The European Commission is the executive authority in charge of ensuring the implementation 
of the EU regulations and decisions in this area. It has both formal and infor mal instruments at its 
disposal, including infringement proceedings, diplomatic letters and others.  
 
In the EU, export restrictions between Member States are prohibited, except when such restrictions 
are justified on grounds of public morality, public poli cy or public security, the protection of health 
and life of humans, animals or plants, the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic 
or archaeological value or the protection of industrial and commercial property (see Article  34 and  36 
of the TFEU).  
 
105. Please explain what measures are being implemented by the EU to encourage transparency 
and notification of export restrictions within the member states?  
 
Reply:  The EU constantly implements transparency measures through the European Co mmission's 
implementing powers.  
 
Page 11, Paragraph 3.26: According to the Government Report, "Trade and Environmental 
Sustainability structured Discussions can contribute by considering how trade related climate 
measures and policies can be designed in a way that maximises environmental and climate impact 
at the same time limiting impacts on trade; explore approaches for facilitating access to 
environmental goods and services; identify trade policy actions that can contribute to transition to 
resource effi cient and circular economy; and exploring the ways to enhancing transparency on 
subsidies and exchange best practices in design environmentally positive subsidies in conformity 
with relevant WTO rules" . 
Q. 106 
106. Please provide detailed information about the additional ideas that the EU is considering for 
discussion under the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions (TESSD) to 
identify climate solutions and promote circular economy approaches.  
 
Reply: In order to adva nce the work on the circular economy in the WTO, we first need to identify 
where trade has the most prominent role. In that regard, the work carried out by co -facilitators of 
the circular economy working group under TESSD and the WTO secretariat to map the  trade role in 
circularity is a useful first step.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Page 11, Paragraph 3.29: According to the Government Report, "The EU is also one of the 
initiating members (together with Ecuador, Kenya and New Zealand) launching the Coalition of Trade 
Ministers on Clima te. The Climate Coalition was officially launched during the World Economic Forum 
Annual Meeting in Davos on 19 January 2023. The coalition establishes a high -level political dialogue 
providing guidance on how trade and trade policies can help respond to t he climate crisis, sustainable 
development and contribute to the just transition" . 
Q. 107 
107. Please provide detailed information about the EU's strategic plan for the Coalition of Trade 
Ministers on Climate, what areas of work does the EU consider appropriate for discussion by this 
Coalition?  
 
Reply: The Coalition priorities of work are identified in its launch statement, viewed at: 
https://www.tradeministersonclimate.org/ . For 2023, we would like to focus on the Coalition's  
engagement with climate and finance Ministers that will focus on building a shared understanding 
on priorities and challenges for advancing climate action and the role of trade in it. 
 
Page 13, Paragraph 3.48 : The EU relaunched negotiations on a comprehensive free trade 
agreement with India on 17  June 2022 and launched separate negotiations with India for an 
Investment Protection Agreement and an Agreement on Geographical Indications.  
Q. 108 
108. Please explain how the EU ensures the granting of geographical indications (GI) protection 
does not violate prior rights, ensures that common names do not receive GI protection, and ensures 
that interested persons have  notice of, and opportunity to oppose or to seek cancellation of, any GI 
protection that is sought or may be granted as part of these negotiations.  
 
Reply: One of the EU objectives in case of bilateral GI negotiations is to adapt to the negotiating 
Parties ' interests, meanwhile safeguarding prior rights, such as trade marks. This is a long -standing 
EU approach and any interested party will have the right to oppose the protection in the EU of an 
Indian GI in the framework of a public consultation, which is a gain the approach followed in all the 
EU bilateral GIs negotiations. Equally, a public consultation procedure will also be carried out in India 
with regard to the EU GIs proposed for protection under the agreement.  
 
Page  18, Paragraph  5.4: The EU states it  has had early engagement with partners to understand 
any trade -related potential concerns and see how those concerns could be addressed in the policy 
design in an effort to avoid any adverse implications or impacts for international trade in goods 
potenti ally affected by EU legislation.  
Q. 109: 
109. Please provide examples of how recent pending EU legislative measures were modified in 
response to specific concerns shared by trading partners about potential adverse impacts on their 
international trade.  
 
Reply: The EU has been listening to the trading partners since the start of its legislative process, 
including public consultations, impact assessment stage etc. The legislative proposals that received 
the most significant interest are on Carbon Border Adjust ment Mechanism (CBAM) and on 
deforestation. The EU has integrated the concerns of the trading partners at different stages of the 
legislative process. For example, both proposals include long transitional periods of up to two years. 
In addition, to avoid s lowing down import processes, the EU has set up a yearly compliance cycle 
for CBAM, instead of checks at the border every time goods are entering the EU market. One more 
example is a 'cut -off date' of 31  December  2020 for deforestation or forest degradatio n, foreseen in 
the Deforestation Regulation, ensuring that it is a forward -looking measure, minimising disruption 
for smallholders, and facilitating implementation via satellite images.  
 
Page 18, Paragraph 5.4: According to the Government Report, "The EU i s aware that if it wants 
to pursue global challenges such as combating climate change, biodiversity loss, pollution, or 
promoting more sustainable production and consumption, it needs to increase cooperation with 
third countries. In the cases where the Eur opean Green Deal policies have an external dimension, 
the EU is engaging with its partners" . 
Q. 110 
110. What barriers has the EU faced in implementing the external dimensions of the 
European  Green Deal?  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Reply:  The EU will seek to ensure that the measures adopted are well understood inside and outside 
the EU, and help economic operators comply with them. In that sense the EU will create tools to 
facilitate the implementation and compliance with the regulations (e.g., guidelines, databases, 
capacity  building needs etc.).  
 
Page 19, paragraph 5.6; page 21, paragraph 5.20; page 22, paragraph 5.25 : The 
Government Report notes that the "Fit for 55" package consists of climate, energy, and transport 
legislation to accomplish EU goals to reach net zero by 2 050 as well as net greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction by at least 55 % by 2030. Russia's unprovoked attack on Ukraine has led to further 
revisions to the European Green Deal and Fit for 55 legislative proposal. The United  States  supports 
the EU's effort to reduce its emissions and the influence of Russia on its energy markets. However, 
the United  States  is concerned that the biofuels derived from crop -based feedstocks continue to be 
restricted under Fit for 55 in meeting the EU's renewable energy targets. Th is includes caps on corn - 
based ethanol as well as corn - and soy -based sustainable aviation fuels (SAF). These restrictions  are 
limiting feedstock options, which could unintentionally hinder development of SAF, and does not 
recognize the full production pr ocess of corn -based ethanol in the United  States . Additionally, the 
lack of additional feedstocks could hinder the ability to transition away from Russian energy sources.  
Q. 111-112: 
111. Please explain how the EU considers the sustainably produced fuel an d food co -products during 
the U.S. corn -ethanol production process within this determination. In particular, please answer this 
question specifically with regard to distillers grains and corn distillers oil (used for animal feed); 
biogenic carbon dioxide ( used in the food production process); and fuel ethanol to displace fossil 
fuels.  
 
Reply: Sustainable biofuels are among other things eligible for counting towards the targets for 
renewable energy set out in the Renewable Energy Directive (Directive (EU) 2018/2001). The 
Directive differentiates between different types of biofuels. Detailed rules are set out in 
Articles  25-31 of that Directive which can be viewed at: EUR-Lex - 32018L2001 - EN - EUR-Lex 
(europa.eu)  
 
112. Please explain how the use of increased yields per acre of U.S. corn and soybeans affect the 
EU's decision to limit crop -based biofu els. 
 
Reply:  The EU does not limit the production or use of crop -based biofuels as such. Instead, the EU 
limits the contribution of such fuels when determining the share of renewable energy. Detailed rules 
are set out in Article  26 of the Renewable Energy Directive (Directive (EU) 2018/2001 which can be 
viewed at: EUR-Lex - 32018L2001 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu) . 
 
Page  19, Paragraph  5.8: According to the Government Report, "The EU Emissions Trading System 
puts a price on carbon and lowers the cap on emissions from certain economic sectors every year. 
The European Commission has proposed to lower the overall emission cap even further and increase 
its annual rate of reduction, to phase out free emission allowances for aviation and align with the 
global Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) and to include 
shipping emissions in the EU ETS. To address the lack of emissions reductions in road transport and 
buildings, a separate new emissions trading system is set up for fuel distribution for road transport 
and buildings" . 
Q. 113: 
113. What is the EU doing to ensure that the financial burden of ETS is equitably distributed?  
 
Reply: The EU ETS in its design ensures that the carbon price is distributed cost -effectively as 
participants in the system can trade emission allowances, leading to emissions reductions be ing 
carried out where they cost the least. The EU ETS supports the sectors that are subject to the carbon 
price in their transition by mandating, following the recent revision, that Member States spend 100% 
of auction revenues in a list of climate and ener gy purposes, including address social aspects in 
lower - and middle -income households. The ETS promotes an equitable distribution of funds among 
EU Member States by distributing 10% of the total quantity of allowances to be auctioned amongst 
certain Member States for the purpose of solidarity, growth and interconnections. The ETS also 
promotes an equitable distribution by financing a Modernisation fund which supports investments to 
modernise energy systems and improve energy efficiency in Member States with lower GDP 
compared to the EU average. The latest revision of the ETS Directive reinforced the volume of the 
Modernisation Fund and increases the number of Member States eligible for it. The existing ETS also 
includes various other rules to ensure equitabil ity. For example, there are several exceptions to the WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 327 - 
 
full surrendering of the allowances in the maritime transport sector, such as for ice -class ships and 
transport activities between certain islands. In addition, a new ETS has been established in this 
revision to cover buildings, road transport, and additional sectors. a Social Climate Fund will be set 
up to address any social impacts that arise from this new system and particularly aims to address 
the impact of carbon pricing on vulnerable citizens and m icro-enterprises.  
 
Page 19, Paragraph 5.9: According to the Government Report, "Both proposals have been 
preliminarily agreed in December 2022 and must now be formally adopted by the co -legislators: the 
European Parliament and the Council" . 
Q. 114-118: 
114. Please provide an update on the formal adoption and implementation of the ETS and CBAM 
proposals.  
 
Reply: Now that the Regulation establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism 
(Regulation  2023/956) was published in the EU Official Journal on 16  May 2023 ( link), the 
European  Commission will, after consultation of the CBAM Committee , adopt the Implementing act 
regulating the transitional period of CBAM starting on the 1st of October 2023 which specifies the 
reporting obligations for importers.  
 
In view of its adoption, it must be noted that the European Commission will publish the draft 
implementing regulation for feedback for a period of four weeks before the CBAM Committee (whose 
members are representative of Member States) renders its opinion on it. 
 
115. Please provide information on the CBAM methodology for the calculation of direct and indirect 
emissions.  
 
Reply: Regarding the process, please refer to the reply to question 114. 
 
The objective of the transitional period is to collect data, as  specified in the upcoming implementing 
act, with a view to defining a thorough methodology for the definitive period starting on 
1 January  2026. Analysis of the information gathered during that period will inform the implementing 
acts to be adopted in the  course of that period.  
 
Before the end of the transitional period and based on the information gathered, an implementing 
act reflecting the final methodology will be adopted by the Commission on the basis of Article  7(7) 
of the CBAM  Regulation . It will follow the same procedure related to the implementing act regulating 
the transitional period, including an open public consultation of al l stakeholders.  
 
116. How will the EU ensure that CBAM will not encourage resource shuffling?  
 
Reply: CBAM is a measure to address the risk of carbon leakage applies rules on goods imported 
into the EU. It does not apply to goods produced for other markets . However, CBAM is part of a 
broader approach to encourage decarbonisation of production across the world. In addition, as from 
the gradual introduction of CBAM with financial adjustment as from 2026, the European Commission 
will continuously monitor the a pplication of the CBAM in view of identifying practices of 
circumvention, including by way of market surveillance or on the basis of any relevant source of 
information, and launch an investigation whenever necessary (see Article  27 of the Regulation).  
 
117. How did the EU identify target economic sectors? Please explain why the EU is only considering 
an explicit price on carbon under the CBAM.  
 
Reply: In its initial phase, the CBAM has been designed to cover selected sectors which are within 
the scope of  the EU ETS and are at risk of carbon leakage. It has been designed in a way that would 
allow it to be extended in the future, to cover additional sectors and products.  
 
Sectors have been selected with the objective of ensuring the environmental integrity and 
effectiveness of the CBAM, and the mitigation of the risks of carbon leakage. In particular, the criteria 
we have relied on are: i) relevance of sectors in terms of emissions; ii) the sector's exposure to a 
significant risk of carbon leakage; and iii) the need to balance broad coverage in terms of GHG 
emissions while limiting complexity and administrative effort.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 328 - 
 
  
 As a result, iron and steel, cement, aluminium, fertilisers, electricity and hydrogen are the initially 
selected sectors where the CBAM shoul d apply. It will also include some precursors, and some 
downstream products of the above -mentioned sectors.  
 
CBAM will be reviewed at the end of the transitional period to assess if additional goods and sectors 
within the ETS could be added to its scope by  2030 at the latest. The same criteria mentioned above 
will be used for this assessment. The scope of CBAM will not be extended to sectors outside the 
EU ETS. 
 
CBAM will take into account the actual emissions of individual producers in the production of CB AM 
goods imported into the EU. If a country puts in place effective climate measures –including non - 
carbon pricing measures - these will lead to a lower carbon content of the imported products, and 
thus to a lower border adjustment or no adjustment at all. If importers can prove, based on 
information from their third country producers, that a carbon price has already been paid in the 
country of production of the imported goods and that no compensation or rebate applies on export,  
the corresponding amount can  be deducted from their final bill. If the price paid is equivalent to the 
EU carbon price under the EU ETS, the border adjustment would be zero.  
 
118. Please explain how the CBAM is WTO consistent.  
 
Reply: CBAM  is an environmental policy tool to prevent carbon leakage and support the EU's 
increased ambition on climate mitigation, while ensuring WTO compatibility.  
 
CBAM will ensure that an equivalent carbon price will be paid by domestic and imported products 
and will thus be non -discriminatory and compatible with WTO rules and other international 
obligations of the EU.  
 
As it has been designed, CBAM will be applied in an even -handed manner that does not discriminate 
among products or countries. Article  216(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European  Union  
states that "[a]greements concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union and 
on its Member States". This obligation applies equally to the WTO  Agreement . Consequently, the EU 
always  ensures the WTO compatibility of its legislation, including autonomous regulations.  
 
Page  20, Paragraph  5.12: As noted in paragraph 5.4, the EU has made numerous presentations 
on environmental policies with potential trade impacts to the WTO Committee on Trade and 
Environment and other WTO committees. Based on preliminary analysis, the EU proposed regulation 
on deforestation contains elements that appear to be covered by the WTO  Agreement  on Technical 
Barriers to Trade.  
Q. 119-124: 
119. Will the EU notify the regulation under the TBT  Agreement  so that WTO Members and 
stakeholders will be informed of these important, trade -significant regulatory changes and provided 
a meaningful opportunity to submit comments before the regulation is finalized and further 
implementing regulations are developed?  
 
Reply: The Regulation sets mandatory due diligence rules for any company intending to place the 
commodities and products in its scope of the regulation on the EU market or to export such products 
from the EU. The EU d oes not intend to notify the Deforestation Regulation to the TBT committee. 
Having said this, the EU has been extremely transparent to the WTO Members through the legislative 
process and has presented the Deforestation Regulation and provided the possibili ty for trading 
partners to raise their concerns on several occasions in the WTO Committee on Trade and 
Environment (CTE). It will also inform the CTE once the final text of the Regulation is available in 
the Official Journal of the EU. The EU will also org anise a dedicated information session on the 
Deforestation Regulation during the WTO Trade and Environment Week on the 14th of June.  
 
Follow -up to Questions 119 -124: 
31. The United  States  requests that this measure be notified as a Technical Barrier to Trade. While 
the United  States  appreciates the opportunities the EU had provided to learn more about the policy 
related to this measure, we look forward to an opportunity to comment on the m easure and for 
those comments to be taken into consideration.  
 
Reply : As previously replied, the EU does not consider this measure falling under the TBT 
agreement, see the response to question 119.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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120. Please explain how costs and burdens associated with the due diligence requirements in the 
proposed regulation on deforestation are justified for Members whose production systems have a 
negligible impact on global deforestation.  
 
Reply: The Regulation is designed to apply in an even -handed ma nner to all commodities and to 
products produced inside as well as outside of the EU. Given the cut -off date of 31  December  2020, 
the vast majority of current agricultural production will be considered deforestation -free under the 
Regulation. The requireme nts of the Regulation are aligned with the best practices already existing 
in the market.  
 
121. Please explain how the proposed regulation on deforestation will be applied to goods both 
produced and sold in the EU.  
 
Reply:  The Regulation is designed to app ly in an even -handed and non -discriminatory manner, 
i.e. equally to all commodities and to products produced inside as well as outside the EU. Goods 
produced and sold in the EU will need to be deforestation -free, legally harvested according to the 
relevant  laws of the country of production and covered by a due diligence statement.  
 
122. How will the EUDR support a "level playing field" for small and medium enterprises?  
 
Reply: EU experience with the EU Timber Regulation and the findings of the Fitness Check  and 
Impact Assessment indicate that SMEs are perfectly capable of exercising due diligence to ensure 
their sustainability of their supply chains, which are often simpler than those of larger corporations 
or built on longstanding business relationships. In  addition, SMEs will benefit from a range of special  
provisions in the regulation e.g. a longer adaptation period, lighter reporting obligations, and will be 
assisted in complying with their due diligence obligations.  
 
123. Given the difficulties in verify ing highly technical data relating to the origin of commodities 
across multiple supply chains, what analysis has been done to suggest that due diligence 
requirements and inspection rates will have tangible impacts on the reduction of deforestation?  
 
Reply:  The Deforestation Regulation is based on a sound Impact  Assessment , where different policy 
options to curb deforestation and forest degradation provoked by the EU's consumption of certain 
commodities and derived products have been evaluated.  
 
124. Please explain how the proposed regulat ion on deforestation will be applied to derived 
products.  
 
Reply : Derived products, whose HS code is included in Annex  I of the Regulation, will be subject to 
the same provisions as the relevant commodities covered by the Regulation. The Regulation foresee s 
that the list of products may be amended regularly. The first review of the product scope will be 
within two years of the entry into force.  
 
Page 21, Paragraph 5.19 : The Government Report notes implementing regulatory updates on the 
EU's Regulation on V eterinary Medicinal Products. The United  States  thanks the EU for its continued 
efforts to notify trading partners of regulatory policy changes throughout its process. However,  we 
continue  to seek clarification  that addresses  our concerns  regarding  the implementation of Article  118 
of EU regulation 2019/6 and assurance that trading partners will continue to have the flexibility to 
utilize official controls and techniques necessary to achieve domestic public health objectives. Please 
provide a new timelin e for the implementation of these measures that considers the lifespan of 
different animal species and the shelf and storage life of products already in the supply chain. Please 
also explain how entry requirements for animals and products of animal origin are limited to what is 
reasonable and necessary to achieve the EU's appropriate level of protection.  
Q125 -127: 
125. Should the EU add or remove antimicrobials authorized for use in products of animal origin, 
please describe the process that the EU intends  to use for amending and updating the listing of 
designated antimicrobials to be reserved for treatment of certain infections in humans.  
 
Reply:  The list of antimicrobials included in the annex of Commission implementing regulation (EU) 
2022/1255 will be k ept under continual review in the light of new scientific evidence or emerging 
information. The process for any modification of the implementing regulation (including its annex) 
is the same as the one followed for the establishment of the implementing regu lation. The process WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 includes a scientific assessment led by the European Medicines Agency (EMA) based on the criteria 
laid down in Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/1760 (notified under G/SPS/N/EU/478), 
a public consultation and notification for co mments to the Secretariat of the WTO  Agreement  on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.  
 
126. Please provide the scientific evidence used by the EU to determine the human health risk 
posed by veterinary use of antimicrobial drugs not iden tified as medically important for humans, 
specifically with respect to when such drugs are used for animals' growth promotion or to increase 
yield.  
 
Reply: In the context of stepping up the efforts to curb antimicrobial resistance and preserve the 
efficacy of antimicrobials for human and animal health purposes, it is widely acknowledged in a 
number  of international  guidelines  and standards  that the use of antimicrobials  for growth  promotion 
needs to be phased out. The EU recalls that Principle 12 of  the Code of practice CXG 61 -200522 
provides  that "Antimicrobial  agents  that are not considered  medically  important  should  not be used 
for growth promotion unless potential risks to human health have been evaluated through  
procedures consistent with the Guidelines for Risk Analysis of Foodborne Antimicrobial resistance  
(CXG 77 -201123)". The EU is not aware of such risk assessments co nducted by the United  States . 
 
Follow up:  The responsibility for conducting an assessment of risk falls on the party imposing the 
measure and the United  States  is not aware of the EU conducting such a risk assessment. As such, 
our original question stands and we request a response.  
 
22  CODE  OF PRACTICE  TO MINIMIZE  AND CONTAIN  FOODBORNE  ANTIMICROBIAL  RESISTANCE  
CXC 61-2005,  rev. 2021. 
23  GUIDELINES  FOR RISK ANALYSIS  OF FOODBORNE  ANTIMICROBIAL  RESISTANCE  CXG 77-2011. 
 
127. Please clarify how the EU will consider equivalent regulatory systems that achieve the same 
public health objectives as the EU's system.  
 
Reply:  In order to meet the requirements for exports to the EU laid down in Commission Delegated 
Regulation (EU) 2023/905, third countries may d ecide what are the most appropriate measures to 
be put in place taking into account their national context.  
 
Page  32, Paragraph  9: The Government Report refers to "several legislative initiatives that have 
been finalized in the review period" relating to d igital services and online platforms.  
Q. 128-132: 
128. What role (if any) does copyright protection play in these initiatives?  
 
Reply: The Digital Services Act (DSA) is a horizontal legislation and it does not modify the existing 
specific rules on copyrigh t. Recital 11 of the DSA clarifies that the Regulation is "without prejudice 
to Union law on copyright and related rights", including Directive 2001/29/EC on copyright and 
related rights in the information society, 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellec tual property 
rights, and (EU) 2019/790 on copyright in the Digital Single Market. This is also supported by 
Article  2(4)(b) DSA. However, according to Article  3(f) and recital 12 of the DSA the concept of 
"illegal content" should be understood as encompas sing the non -authorised use of copyright 
protected material online.  
 
Follow -up to questions 128 -132:  
32. Notwithstanding that the Regulation is "without prejudice " to copyright and related rights, the 
DSA also addresses measures encompassing the non -autho rized use of copyright protected material 
online. To what extent will the more specific requirements set forth in the DSA with respect to the 
non-authorized use of copyright protected material online still apply to copyright holders covered by 
the copyrigh t aquis?  
 
Follow -up Reply: In general terms, the DSA leaves unaffected existing copyright legislation, which 
continues to apply, as provided for in its article 1(5) and recital 11. The DSA establishes a framework 
for the conditional exemption from liabilit y of providers of intermediary services. In particular, 
Article  6 defines the conditions under which hosting service providers are not liable for the 
information or content stored at the request of a recipient of the service. As for Article  17 of the 
Directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market (DSM Directive), it regulates specifically the WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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liability of 'online content sharing -service providers ' (as defined in Article  2(6) of the DSM Directive) 
as regards the use of copyright protected  content.  
 
In addition, the DSA introduces due diligence obligations applying to intermediary services, and 
more specifically to providers of hosting services including online platforms, e.g. notice and action 
mechanisms, statement of reasons. These provis ions apply to providers of hosting services as 
regards copyright protected content, except where specific copyright acquis, such as the 
DSM Directive, applies.  
 
33. The EU reply only addresses one of four initiatives outlined in the government report. What  role 
does copyright protection play in the remaining three initiatives: DMA, DGA, and the 
Modernisation  Directive?  
 
Follow -up Reply:  
The Digital Markets Act (DMA ) is a general regulatory framework, without prejudice to the 
copyright acquis, that seeks to ensure contestability and fairness of digital services and markets, by 
imposing a number of upfront obligations on the very largest 'gatekeeper ' online platforms.  
Article  6(12) DMA imposes an obligation on gatekeepers to put in place "fair, reasonable and 
non-discriminatory general conditions of access, which should also include an alternative dispute 
settlement mechanism ". This provision applies to designated soft ware application stores, online 
social networking services and online search engines and may, amongst others, benefit press 
publishers in their relationship with gatekeeper online platforms – where it concerns general 
conditions of access. This provision c omplements the specific rights granted by Article  15 of the DSM 
Directive. In addition, as clarified in Article  8 DMA, gatekeepers need to ensure effective compliance 
with the DMA, and in this context Recital 70 clarifies that gatekeepers should be preclud ed from 
unlawfully claiming a copyright on application programming interfaces in order to avoid compliance 
with interoperability obligations under the DMA.  
 
The Data Governance Act (DGA)  establishes rules concerning the voluntary share and availability 
of data across the EU. Recital 17 clarifies that the DGA does not the affect the intellectual property 
rights, including copyright, of third parties. Moreover, recital 29 establishes that the online 
content -sharing services should not be covered by the Act.  
 
The Directive on better enforcement and modernisation of Union consumer protection rules (EU) 
2019/2161 ("Modernisation Directive") does not contain provisions relevant to copyright protection.  
 
129. Could you please provide information about how the digit al services initiatives will protect 
copyright for researchers and research outputs?  
 
Reply:  The DSA does not contain any specific provision on copyright protection for researchers and 
research outputs; the general copyright rules apply. The DSA will, howe ver, make the fight against 
copyright infringements more efficient, in particular on very large online platforms and very large 
online search engines.  
 
Follow -up to question 129:  
34. To the extent the DSA requires platforms to provide copyright protected data to researchers 
(e.g., see Article  40), how will the copyright interests in such data be protected, including with 
respect to derivative works prepared by researchers that may result from such data?  
 
Follow -up Reply:  
The DSA contains no specific rules  on copyright in relation to vetted researchers ' access under 
Article  40.  
 
Recital 97 specifies that all requests for access to data under that framework should be proportionate 
and appropriately protect the rights and legitimate interests […] of the very large online platform or 
of the very large online search engine and any other parties. The Commission is empowered to adopt 
a delegated act to lay down the technical conditions under which providers of very large online 
platforms or of very large onli ne search engines are to share data (Article  40(13)). The aim is also 
to design an easy, practical and clear process for data access, which will protect the rights and 
interests of those involved – while containing adequate safeguards against abuse.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 35. The EU reply only addresses one of four initiatives outlined in the government report. How will 
the remaining three initiatives – DMA, DGA, and the Modernisation Directive – protect copyright for 
researchers and research output?  
 
Follow -up Reply:  
The DMA d oes not deal with this issue and is therefore not relevant in the present context, as it is 
primarily about interplay between the DSA, in particular Article  40, and respective copyright acquis.  
 
Recital 17 of the Data Governance Act makes it clear that the  intellectual property rights of 
third parties should not be affected by this Regulation.  
 
130. How is the copyright aquis (Secretariat Report, pg. 123, Section  3.3.372) impacted by the 
Digital Services Act?  
 
Reply: As explained in our reply to Question 12 8, according to Article  2(4) (b) and recital 11, the 
DSA is without prejudice of the existing acquis on copyright, and both are complementary. 
Nevertheless, the DSA only came into force on 16  November  2022, so it is still very premature to 
assess the exact  impact of the acquis in it. Moreover, Article  91 (1) establishes that by 
17 November  2025, the Commission shall evaluate and report on the way the DSA interacts with 
other legal acts. 
 
131. How does the guidance on Article  17 of Directive 2019/790 (Secretariat Report, pg. 123, 
para 3.251) define the provisions for online service providers in the Digital Services Act?  
 
Reply: The definition of "online content -sharing service provider" contained in Article  2 of the DSM 
Directive is narrower than the d efinition of "online platform" under the DSA. Within its scope, 
Article  17 of Directive 2019/790 will apply, and the guidance will remain relevant, unaffected by the 
DSA. Outside the scope of Article  17 of Directive 2019/790, the guidance will not be relev ant, and 
the rules of the DSA will apply.  
 
Indeed, the guidance on Article  17 applies to online content -sharing service providers as defined in 
Article  2(6) (1) of the DSM Directive. An online content -sharing service provider is defined as an 
information s ociety service provider of which the main or one of the main purposes is to store and 
give the public access to a large amount of copyright -protected works or other protected subject 
matter uploaded by its users, which it organises and promotes for profit -making purposes. 
Article  2(6) (second paragraph) lays down a non -exhaustive list of providers of services and/or 
services that are not online content -sharing service providers within the meaning of the Directive 
and hence are excluded from the application of Article  17. 
 
In order to fall within the definition of an online content -sharing service provider and the scope of 
the regime in Article  17, a service provider must cumulatively meet each requirement of the 
definition:  
 
- be an information society service, as defined in Article  1(1)(b) of Directive (EU) 2015/15357;  
- have as its main or one of its main purposes:  
 
· to store and give the pub lic access to o a large amount of copyright -protected works or 
other protected subject matter  
· uploaded by its users,  
· which it organises and promotes for profit -making purposes.  
 
The service provider needs to 'store and give the public access' to the co ntent stored. The concept 
of 'store' refers to content storage that is more than temporary, and 'give the public access' relates 
to access to the content stored, which is given to the public. The information society service also 
needs to 'organise and prom ote the content uploaded by users for profit -making purposes'.  
 
132. What exceptions or limitations for research are envisioned by Article  17 of Directive 2019/790 
(Secretariat Report, pg. 123, para 3.251)? How are these exceptions or limitations affected by the 
digital services initiatives?  
 
Reply: Article  17(7) and 17(9) provide that any action undertaken together by service providers 
and rightholders does not lead to the unavailability of content, which does not infringe copyright or WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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related rights, incl uding because of the application of any exception or limitation. Such non -infringing 
use is often referred to as 'legitimate use'. In addition, Article  17(7) also provides that the Member 
States must ensure that users in each Member State are able to rely on the existing exceptions or 
limitations for quotation, criticism, review and use for the purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche 
when uploading and making available content generated by users on online content -sharing services. 
Lastly this reference to  exceptions also cover existing research exceptions in the EU acquis when 
implemented by Member States. The exceptions and limitations in Article  17 of Directive 2019/790 
are not affected by the DSA.  
 
Page 34, 9.9:  The Report states that the Commission pro posed a regulation on machinery safety 
on 21  April 2021 to deal with the risks stemming from digitalisation, such as interconnectivity or 
machine learning, and bring legal certainty for economic operators and environmental benefits by 
allowing digital inst ructions and documentation. The co -legislators, the European Parliament and 
Council, are discussing the proposal to reach a compromise in the upcoming months.  
Q. 133: 
133. Could the EU provide an update on the legislative development of the regulation on machinery 
safety?  
 
Reply : The political agreement on the machinery regulation was reached on 15  December  2022. 
The final publication and entry into force (20 days after publication) are expected in July 2023. The 
new machinery regulation will  apply after a transitional period of 42 months, hence from 
January  2027.  
 
Part III. Other  
Q. 134: 
It is noted that the EU's excise tax rules for distilled spirits permit some member states to provide 
preferential tax rates for certain domestically produced spirits under "derogations" from the general 
excise tax rate. In July 2020, the Commission adopte d legislation, that went into effect on 
1 January  2022, retaining the derogations.  
 
134. Can the EU explain how the derogations that the Commission adopted in July 2020 are 
consistent with its commitment under GATT Article  III, paragraph 2, which mandates non- 
discriminatory treatment of imports concerning internal taxes?  
 
Reply: Member States may apply reduced rates of excise duty to alcoholic beverages produced by 
independent small producers provided that the requirements set out in the Council 
Directive  92/83/EEC have been fulfilled. Independent small producers of alcoholic beverages from 
third countries can equally benefit from these reduced rates in the Member State of consumption 
when the mentioned requirements have been fulfilled.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 SWITZERLAND  
Report by the Secretariat (WT/TPR/S/442)  
 
3.1    Measures directly affecting imports – 3.1.3 Tariffs  
Paragraph 3.59 indicates that tariffs have been suspended on certain nitrogen fertilizer inputs until 
17 June 2023 and that an evaluation will take place by 17  May 2023 with a view to possible 
extension.  
 
Question 1 : Could the EU indicate whether the duty suspension will be extended and for how long?  
 
Reply:  Any modification of the EU's Common external tariffs is decided upon by  the Council, and as 
of the cutoff date for this submission no decision has been taken whether to prolong or not the tariff 
suspension.  
 
3.1    Measures directly affecting imports – 3.1.4 Other charges affecting imports  
 
According to paragraph 3.75 the Co mmission is planning to update the minimum excise rates for 
alcoholic beverages and an evaluation report will be elaborated in the second quarter of 2023.  
 
Question 2 : Could the EU indicate when the report will be finalized and published and in which 
direction go its main recommendations?  
 
Reply:  Commission services continue to work on the evaluation of Directive 92/84/EEC on the 
approximation of the rates of excise duty on alcohol and alcoholic beverages. A planned adoption 
date will be indicated in due c ourse.  
 
In paragraph 3.76, the evaluation report regarding the Tobacco Taxation Directive shows that there 
is a need to modify the directive to improve the proper functioning of the internal market and also 
to strengthen the level of health protection.  
 
Question 3: As the EU Commission is currently finalizing its assessment on the revision of the 
Directive, could the EU indicate more precisely when it plans to present its legislative proposal and 
what are its main elements?  
 
Reply:  The revision of Directive 2011/6 4/EU on the structure and rates of excise duty applied to 
manufactured tobacco is currently being finalised. It aims to ensure the proper functioning of the 
internal market by adapting the rules to new developments and market trends, updating minimum 
excise duty rates, and closing possible loopholes in the EU excise system.  
 
Commission services continue to work on this important proposal contributing to the ambitious goals 
of Europe's Beating Cancer Plan. A planned adoption date will be indicated in due cou rse.  
 
Box 3.4 (Main changes in alcohol excise duties, 2020 -22) mentions certain exemptions from 
harmonized excise duty for products used in the manufacture of food supplements.  
 
Question 4 : Could the EU provide more details on these exemptions and their rationa le? 
 
Reply:  Article  27(1)(f) of Directive 92/83/EEC set up that Member States shall exempt alcohol and 
alcoholic beverages when used directly or as a constituent of semi -finished products for the 
production of foodstuffs, filled or otherwise, provided that  in each case the alcoholic content does 
not exceed 8,5 litres of pure alcohol per 100 kg of the product for chocolates, and 5 litres of pure 
alcohol per 100 kg of the product for other products. Thus, goods which have been exempted by a 
Member State are n o longer excise goods in the sense of Directive 92/83/EEC.  
 
3.1.1.4 Trade facilitation  
Para. 3.22: As part of its efforts to facilitate legitimate trade, the Commission plans further 
improvements of its trusted trader (AEO) programme.  
 
Question 5 : What imp rovements and trade facilitating measures is the EU planning to introduce 
and in which time frame?  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Reply:  It is intended to further improve the benefits and facilitation. The identified challenges, as 
well as strengthening elements under the current AEO c oncept which should be maintained in the 
future and which will be beneficial for other simplifications, are intended to be addresses in the 
context of the customs reform. Target implementation date is 2025.  
 
3.1.2 Rules of origin  
Para. 3.31: The EU has int roduced flexibilities for proofs of preferential origin in the context of the 
COVID -19 pandemic, including (i)  acceptance of copies, either in paper or electronic form; 
(ii) retrospective issuance of certificates; and (iii)  greater use of approved exporter  status. These 
measures are still in force.  
 
Question 6 : Are these measures temporary or does the EU intend to maintain these facilitations in 
the long term?  
 
Reply:  The measures introduced at the moment of the CoViD -19 pandemic are temporary. The 
sanitar y crisis created an unexpected need to accelerate the process of digital exchange of customs 
documents among customs administrations and economic operators. Several countries, including 
some EU Member States, have devised digital solutions to prevent custo ms administration staff and 
customs participants from exposing themselves to unnecessary risks through contact with infected 
persons or contaminated paper documents. In this context, a project (the e -PoC initiative) on the 
digitalisation of proofs of origi n has been launched in parallel with legal initiatives. In the 
pan-Euro-Mediterranean region, these measures will substitute the measures introduced during the 
COVID -19 pandemic.  
 
3.1.2.1 Non -preferential  
Para. 3.32: The EU's non -preferential rules of origin are set out in Articles 60 -61 of the UCC and 
further expanded upon in Articles 31 -36 of the UCC Delegated Act (UCC DA), including Annex  22-01. 
Multiple trade measures such as the EU safeguard measures a s well as the proposed Carbon Border 
Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) will define the origin of a good according to the non -preferential 
rules of origin of the EU.  
 
Question 7 : Is the EU planning to provide further guidance to economic operators on the applica tion 
of its non -preferential rules of origin?  
 
Reply:  The guidance on the application of non -preferential rules of origin was updated in March  2022 
and published on the Europa website: Guidance on non -preferential rules of origin.pdf (europa.eu) .  
 
Para. 3.33: These amendments have not been notified to the Committee on Rules of Origin as of 
October 2022.  
 
Question 8 : When will the EU notify these amendments to the Committee on Rules of Origin?   
 
Reply:  No notification of these amendments is to be done to the Committee on Rules of Origin since 
Article  5(2) of the ARO does not provide for a man datory notification of amendments brought to a 
Member's non -preferential rules of origin during the transition period.  
 
3.1.6 Anti -dumping, countervailing, and safeguard measures  
3.1.6.2 Safeguards  
Question 9 : Para. 3.105:  Why is the currently on-going review regarding steel safeguard measures 
(EUR-Lex - 52022XC1202(01) - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu) ) not mentioned?  
 
Reply:  the currently ongoing review has not been mentioned in the report only because the report 
was internally prepared just days before the date of publication of the current review.  
 
Question 10 : When will the outco me of the review be notified to the WTO?  
 
Reply:  The outcome of the review investigation will be notified to the WTO around end of May or 
early June 2023. Like in all previous safeguard -related investigations, the Commission will give 
WTO members the poss ibility to discuss the proposal in the framework of consultations.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 3.1.7 Other measures affecting imports  
Para. 3.110: Referring to the Joint EU -US Statement on a Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel 
and Aluminium (And REPORT BY EUROPEAN UNION Para. 3 .65/3.66 ):  
 
Question 11 : What is the timeline of the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminium?  
 
Reply:  On 10  March, President von der Leyen and President Biden reiterated the strong EU -US 
commitment to achieving an ambitious outcome for the Global Sustainable Arrangement (GSA) on 
steel and aluminium (GSA) negotiations by October 2023. (Link to the text of the EU -US Joint 
Statement of 10  March  2023:  
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_23_1613 ).  
 
According to the Joi nt EU -US Statement on a Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and 
Aluminium the arrangement will be open to any interested country that shares the commitment to 
achieving the goals of restoring market -orientation and reducing trade in carbon intensive st eel and 
aluminium products.  
 
Question 12 : When will countries be able to participate to the arrangement? Which conditions need 
to be fulfilled in order to participate in the arrangement?  
 
Reply:  The Global Sustainable Arrangement (GSA) on steel and alumini um will be open to all 
partners demonstrating commitment to countering non -market excess capacity and reducing 
carbon -intensity in these sectors. (Link to the text of the EU -US Joint Statement of 10  March  2023: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_23_1613 ).  
 
Question 13 : What is the link between the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminium 
and the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) on the one hand and US trade -related 
measures on the other?  
 
Reply:  The reference to "US trade -related measures" in t he question is not specific and potentially 
very broad, hence no accurate response can be provided. The Global Sustainable Arrangement (GSA) 
on steel and aluminium and the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) will be mutually 
supportive.  
 
Question  14: Will the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminium put an end to the 
US Sections 232 measures on steel and aluminium imports and the EU safeguard measures on steel 
imports?  
 
Reply:  The Global Sustainable Arrangement (GSA) on steel and alum inium will need to provide a 
permanent solution to the US Section  232 measures on steel and aluminium and to re -establish 
normal and undistorted transatlantic trade in the sectors.  
 
Question 15 : How will the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Alum inium reduce 
carbon -intensity in the identified sectors and how will it interact with other similar initiatives?  
 
Reply:  The Global Sustainable Arrangement (GSA) on steel and aluminium should encourage 
low-carbon intensity steel and aluminium production an d trade, and restore market -oriented 
conditions globally and bilaterally. Together, the EU and US intend to incentivize emission reductions 
in these carbon -intensive sectors. (Link to the text of the EU -US Joint Statement of 10  March  2023: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_23_1613 ). 
 
3.2.3 Export prohibitions, restrictions, and licensing  
Para. 3.118: The COVID -19 pandemic has shown the importance of maintaining trade flows in times 
of crisis and to avoid trade restrictions, as they create domino effects in global supply chains. In the 
first half of 2020, various member States imposed export rest rictions on COVID -related products on 
an individual basis. These uncoordinated measures have had an impact both on trade between 
member States and on the EU's trade with third countries.  
 
Question 16 : What measures has the EU put in place to prevent these situations in the future? 
Which measures have not been notified to the WTO and when will the notification to the WTO be 
made?  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 337 - 
 
Reply:  The measures in question were adopted on the basis of exceptions applicable under the EU 
Treaties allowing the imposition of measures necessary for the protection of human health. All trade 
agreements, including also the internal market rules in the EU Treaties, contain such exceptions. 
The EU has in the meantime proceeded to the adoption of legislation that can be activated in the 
event of shortages in such a way that the imposition of restrictions on trade between Member States 
can thereby be made no longer necessary. Likewise, the imposition by the EU of shortage 
management measures, including possibly restrictions on the e xportation to third countries can have 
the effect of national level measures by Member States, restricting exports outside the EU, no longer 
being necessary and/or EU law taking precedence.  
 
3.3.4 Competition policy  
Para. 3.221: The Secretariat's report st ates that DG Competition launched a Joint Technology 
Competition Policy Dialogue in the context of the EU -US Trade and Technology Council. The report 
adds that the published joint statement reaffirms the intention to cooperate in the competition policy 
area, including on enforcement issues in general and in technological sector specifically.  
 
Question 17 : Do the parties intend to develop on the basis of this technological specific cooperation 
a wider cooperation agreement in the form of second generation agreement?  
 
Reply:  The EU -US Joint Technology Competition Policy Dialogue is a self -standing dialogue  between 
the European Commission, the US Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the 
US Department of Justice. It does not prejudge the possibility of a second generation EU -US 
competition cooperation agreement.  
 
3.3.5 State trading, state -owned enterprises, and privatization  
Para 3.223: Para 3.223 states that "In certain EU member States, subcentral governments are also 
(majority and minority) shareholders of enterprises, which can raise the number of entities with 
state participation to mor e than 1,000. Consolidated and comparable data at the EU level in this 
area remain limited (see below), and the most recent estimates publicly available were presented in 
the previous Review. In this regard, the Commission indicated that it is planning to undertake work 
on SOEs by EU member States and sector this year" .  
 
Question 18 : Will the work undertaken by the commission include subcentral state trading and / 
or state owned enterprises? When does the Eu envisage to complete the work? Will the EU publi sh 
the outcome of the work?  
 
Reply:  The work on SOEs is ongoing. The EU will provide information on the outcomes when they 
become available.  
 
3.3.6 Government procurement  
Para. 3.236  (Para. 6.19 in EU Report):  
Question 19 : Is the EU planning to apply the  Foreign Subsidies Regulation also within the scope of 
application of the Agreement on Government Procurement?  
 
Reply:  The FSR applies to foreign subsidies that cause or risk causing a distortion in a public 
procurement procedure. It applies to all public procurements organised in the MS enumerated in 
Article  2(3) of the FSR. Investigations under can cover any economic op erator, whether EU or 
non-EU that has received foreign financial contributions. Consequently, the FSR applies also to 
economic operators coming from countries party to the GPA and public procurements that fall within 
the scope of application of the GPA.  
 
4.1. Agriculture  
Para. 4.8: According to the EU, the new CAP aims to "ensure a sustainable future for European 
farmers, provide more targeted support to smaller farms, and allow greater flexibility for member 
States in adapting the measures to local conditi ons".  
 
Question 20 : May the EU elaborate on what kind of new or adapted measures beyond the Small 
Farmers Scheme allow for more targeted support to smaller farms?  
 
Reply:  The CAP supports the setting -up of producer organisations, producer groups or any ot her 
forms of cooperation constituted at the initiative of producers to 10% of the annual marketed WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 production (turnover) of those entities, during their first to 5 years. The CAP also supports at 50% 
producer organisations which implement operational progra mmes.  
 
Para. 4.11: The report by the Secretariat points out that the new CAP links funding to results 
("outputs"), rather than compliance. On its website, the EU informs that the "CAP legislation lays 
down a common set of indicators as part of a new perfor mance, monitoring and evaluation 
framework".  
Question 21 : May the EU provide additional information on what kind of indicators are used in order 
to link funding to results?  
 
Reply:  The Commission has introduced in Annex  I of Reg. EU 2021/2115 a set of indicators, 
including 44 result indicators linking CAP interventions to the specific objectives laid down in Article  6 
of Regulation (EU) 2021/2115. Information on the planning and rep orting of output and result 
indicators can be found in the " Cover note on output and result indicators" , available under this link: 
https://agriculture. ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023 -02/pmef -cover -note-indicators_en_0.pdf . 
Further details on each of the indicators can be found in "Result fiches" available under this link: 
https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023 -02/pmef -result -indicators_en.pdf .  
 
These result indicators will allow th e Commission to measure the progress of Member States in the 
implementation of their CAP strategic plans, comparing annually realised and planned targets under 
the result indicators (see reply to Q21).  
 
To assess the contribution of the CAP to its objectiv e, the Commission will use impact indicators and 
evaluation. Further details on impact indicators can be found in a dedicated document avaible under 
this link:  
https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023 -02/pmef -context -impact -indicators_en.pdf .  
 
Question 22 : What kind of methodology does the EU apply in order to assess whether member 
States have reached the t argets?  
 
Reply:  Member States planned annual milestones and a target for the programming period for each 
of the result indicators relevant to their intervention logic. They can be found under a dedicated 
dashboard, available under this link :  
https://agridata.ec.europa.eu/extensions/DashboardCapPlan/result_indicators.html .  
 
Each year on 15  February (year N) Member States will send to the Commission the Annual 
Performance Report for the previous year (N -1) including the realised value under the result indicator 
in financial year N -1. It will be compared to the planned milestone for that year to assess the 
progress of Member States towards targets.  
 
Question 23 : Can the EU elaborate member State does not reach the targets?  
 
Reply:  Every year the Commission will compare planned and realised milestones and discuss with 
Member States in an annual review meeting discrepancies for all result indicators.  
 
In 2025, 2026 and 2027, Member States will need to justify any deviation beyond 35%, 35% and 
25% respectively for a subset of 22 result indicators marked as 'PR' in Annex  I of Regulation (EU) 
2021/21 15. If necessary, Member States will be asked to put in place an action plan to remedy the 
situation. If Member States fail in designing and/or implementing these action plans, this can lead 
to financial consequences for the performance review in 2025 and 2027.  
 
Para 4.14: The report by the Secretariat states that the rate on the steps taken in case new CAP 
foresees the possibility for member States to define additional criteria for farmers to receive 
payments under the eco -schemes.  
 
Question 24 : How do me asures under the echo -schemes differ from the payments under the rural 
development scheme?  
 
Reply:  It is possible to design eco -schemes that go beyond commitments programmed under 
Article  70 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 or the other way round, depending o n the articulation 
between Article  31 and Article  70 chosen by Member States. According to the mentioned Regulation, 
measures under the echo -schemes and under the rural development commitments should respect WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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the 'no double funding' principle. The relevant provisions do not allow Member States to design 
identical commitments under these provisions. In order to comply with Articles 31 and 70, MS must 
ensure that there are: i) no overlapping areas or practices foreseen by the commitments; ii) no 
overlapping pr actices but overlapping areas foreseen by commitments ( the practices foreseen under 
the commitments are carried out on the same area but they are of a different nature); iii) no 
overlapping areas but overlapping practices foreseen by commitments (practice s included in 
eco-schemes and AECC interventions are of the same nature but quantitatively different). 
Eco- chemes are financed from the direct payments budget (EAGF) and paid annually. On the other 
hand, commitments under rural development interventions a re design on a multi -annual basis and 
are funded from EAFRD.  
 
Question 25 : What criteria does the EU apply in order to determine whether a specific measure 
falls under the eco -scheme or under the rural development scheme?  
 
Reply:  It is the Member State wh o chooses whether a specific intervention is designed as an 
eco-scheme or as a rural development intervention. This is done in the CAP Strategic Plans, which 
are drafted by the Member States following the requirements under Article  31 (for eco -schemes) 
and Article  70 (for rural development interventions) and approved by the Commission.  
 
Question 26 : According to Article  31 of Regulation 2021/2115, the support for a particular 
eco-scheme can take the form of payments additional to the basic income support. May the EU 
provide additional information on how the amount of a payment for a specific measure under the 
eco-schemes is determined?  
 
Reply:  The support level for different commi tments under the eco -scheme shall take into account 
the level of sustainability and ambition. The Member States define and justify the range of support 
levels. Besides sustainability and ambition, the justification should also consider the uncertainty on 
the uptake of eco -schemes and the risk of un -used funds. The amount of payments in any given 
year needs to comply with paragraphs 5 or 6 of Annex  2 to the WTO  Agreement  on Agriculture and 
shall not be related to or based on the type or volume of production undertaken by the producer in 
any year after a base period. Support for a particular eco -scheme shall take the form of an annual 
payment for all eligible hectares covered by the commitments and shall be granted as either 
payments additional to the basic in come support or payments compensating for the additional costs 
incurred and income foregone as a result of the commitments made.  
 
The setting of a payment on the Article  31(7)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 does not require the 
MS to provide a detailed c alculation. MSs need instead to provide an explanation and, pursuant to 
Article. 31(8), show that the level of the payment reflects the level of ambition of the practices 
included in the eco -schemes. The payment levels should be adequately related to the e nvironmental 
output expected to be provided by the eco -schemes in relation to the environmental challenges, the 
needs identified and the targets set in the CSP. Eventually, the aim of payments under 
Article  31(7)(a) is to provide enough incentives to farme rs to carry out specific practices beneficial 
for the environment, climate and animal welfare. In addition, the payments are designed in 
compliance with WTO Green Box provisions.  
 
Para 4.14 : The report by the Secretariat highlights that the new CAP introdu ces mechanisms for 
compliance with social conditionality. The failure to comply with this type of conditionality (as well 
as with the compliance with basic standards for good agriculture and environmental conditions) by 
farmers and other beneficiaries will  be met with administrative penalties.  
Question 27 : How does the EU control whether farmers and other beneficiaries comply with the 
social conditionality?  
 
Reply:  The national authorities of the Member states are responsible for controlling the respect b y 
farmers and other beneficiaries of the social legislation covered by the mechanism of social 
conditionality. When an infringement to this legislation is found by the national/regional competent 
body, these national authorities inform the Paying Agency of  the CAP which possibly applies the 
penalties in the form of reduction of CAP payments. The Commission supervises the good functioning 
of the mechanism by its monitoring and conducting of audits of the CAP implementation by 
Member  States.  
 
Question 28 : May  the EU provide additional information on what kind of administrative penalties 
and consequences are conceivable in a case of failure to comply with the social conditionality?  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Reply:  The above -mentioned penalties are calculated by the Paying Agency taking into account the 
severity, extent, duration, reoccurrence and intentionality of the infringement. They range from a 
reduction of 1% to 100% of the CAP payments received on the basis of these criteria.  
 
Question 29 : What internal process is undertaken in o rder to determine the administrative penalty 
in a specific case?  
 
Reply:  The authority in charge of controlling the respect of the social legislation communicates the 
results of the control to the CAP Paying Agency, which calculates and applies the possib le penalty.  
 
Question 30 : Do farmers and other beneficiaries need to inform about their compliance with the 
social conditionality ex ante  in order to be eligible for payments? If yes, what kind of information 
needs to be provided?  
 
Reply:  No, the mechanism of social conditionality, like conditionality, is not an eligibility 
requirement. It is verified ex-post.  
 
Para 4.25:  
Question 31 : Are payments under the Small Farmers Scheme also subject to both conditionalities, 
i.e. the one referrin g to the basic standards for good agricultural environmental conditions and the 
one referring to social conditions? If not, what is the rationale behind that decision?  
 
Reply:  Conditionality applies to all farmers.  
 
Para 4.41:  The report states that three member States have received a Commission approval to 
exceed the maximum percentage allowed for voluntary coupled support.  
Question 32 : Can the EU elaborate on the reasons for these exceptions? Furthermore, the report 
informs that Malta made use of a derogation allowing Member States to use up to EUR  3 million  for 
the voluntary coupled support scheme. May the EU provide additional information on this derogation? 
What kind of criteria must be fulfilled in order for this derogation to apply?  
 
Reply:  With regard to the first question, it should be recalled that Art.  53(4) of 
Regulation  1308/2013 (the CAP 2013 -2022) allowed to exceed the 13(+2)% budgetary ceiling for 
Voluntary Coupled Support, provided that the EU Member States concerned clearly demonstrat ed 
the need for such an excess as per Art.  55 of that Regulation. For example, the need to sustain a 
certain level of a specific production due to lack of alternatives; and/or a need to provide a stable 
supply to the local processing industry; or similar. Such an increased allocation was subject to 
approval by the Commission by way of an implementing act. Accordingly, three EU Member States 
(Belgium, Finland, Portugal) had in the past such higher coupled support allocations. As per a 
derogation in Art.  96(2) of Regulation 2021/2115, these EU Member States may also decide to use 
more than the maximum percentage allowed in general for Coupled Income Support in order to 
maintain the historical levels of support to their sectors in difficulty. Still, the resulti ng percentage 
shall not exceed the budgetary ceiling (in percentage of the direct payments budget) that the 
Commission had approved for Voluntary Coupled Support in respect of claim year 2018.  
  
For the case of Malta, the derogation is related to article 9 6(5) of Regulation 2021/2115. Since the 
maximum allowed for coupled income support is defined in percentage of the total allocations for 
direct payments, for EU Member States with very small allocations for direct payments, this 
percentage would lead to an  insignificant and thus ineffective budget. Therefore, EU Member States 
may choose to use up to EUR  3 million  per year for Coupled Income Support instead of the 
calculation based on the percentage of direct payments.  
 
4.2.1 Fisheries policy  
Paras 4.83 – 4.86: "According to the FAO, most of the commercially important fish stocks in the 
Mediterranean and the Black Sea continue to be overfished, while around 27% of assessed fish 
stocks in the Northeast Atlantic were fished at biologically unsustainable levels in  2019."  
 
Question 33 : Is the EU planning to take additional measures, in order to bring fishing activities on 
a sustainable level, especially to prevent fishing of overfished stocks?  
 
Reply:  Every year, the EU adopts conservation measures taking into acco unt scientific advice. In 
particular, it adopts measures on the fixing and allocation of fishing opportunities for certain stocks WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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and groups of fish stocks applicable in the Mediterranean and Black Seas, including certain conditions 
functionally linked to those fishing opportunities, as appropriate. The current measures are detailed 
in Council Regulation (EU) 2023/195 of 30  January  2023:  
 
https://eur -lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/195/oj . Measures are adapted or updated every year, in 
accordance with the scientific advice.  
 
In the Mediterranean and Black Seas, fisheries is characterised by multispecies fisheries and many 
stocks shared with third countries. Therefore,  intensive work under the GFCM, is key and the EU is 
playing a leading role for the adoption of significant decisions, most notably the establishment of 
five fully -fledged multiannual management plans. These plans translated in the adoption of catch 
limits  for deep water shrimps in the Ionian Sea, Levant Sea and the Strait of Sicily (including a 
fishing effort regime of hake) and catch limits for the blackspot seabream in the Alboran Sea. A 
GFCM long -term management plan for small pelagics in the Adriatic w as agreed to provide high 
long-term yields consistent with MSY, with reduced catch limits in 2023 for anchovies and sardines, 
and a freeze of capacity for pelagic trawlers and purse seiners. The GFCM also continued the 
implementation of the multi -annual pl an for demersal stocks in the Adriatic, establishing a maximum 
fishing effort limit for both bottom and beam trawlers, to achieve the MSY target in 2026 for all key 
stocks. It also adopted harvest limits for red coral and a cap on fishing effort for common  dolphinfish 
in international waters of the Mediterranean. The EU is also supporting the implementation of all the 
measures and the new GFCM 2030 Strategy:  
https://ec.europa.eu/ commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_6842 . 
 
Para 4.88:  "The European Union (including its member States) remains one of the largest providers 
of fishery subsidies, estimated to having provided USD 3.8 billion of subsidies in 2018, or 
around  11% of global subsidies. Of these, USD 2 billion were estimated to be  capacity -enhancing, 
including fuel subsidies. A separate paper estimated the revenue forgone in terms of fuel taxes not 
collected due to fuel tax exemptions (see below) at EUR 1.1 billion in 2018 (around USD 1.3 billion). 
The European Commission pointed o ut that relevant rules do not allow capacity -enhancing support 
with limited exceptions (see below) and that it does not consider tax exemptions as subsidies."  
Question 34 : Could the EU explain why it does not consider tax exemptions as subsidies?   
 
Reply:  A tax measure, depending on its design and effect, for example if it relates to a narrow sector 
of the economy, could be a (specific) subsidy under the SCM  Agreement , and would fall under the 
relevant disciplines. Where a measure is widely available withi n an economy, it would not be 
considered as such. In such a situation distortion in the allocation of resources is presumed not to 
occur.  
 
4.4 Energy  
Para. 4.120 : It is stated that "During the review period, the composition of primary energy 
production co ntinued to shift towards renewables, which accounted for 41% of total primary energy 
production in 2021. (…) while the share of energy generated from all fossil fuels declined" . and that 
"It was too early to identify trends in changes of the composition fo llowing the war in Ukraine" .  
 
Question 35 : Even if the trends in changes are not yet identifiable in terms of energy production 
and taking into account the current situation in Ukraine, does the EU expect to reach its target for a 
renewable energy share o f at least 32% of gross final consumption by 2030 stated in 
paragraph  4.116 by current policies or will there be needed additional measures?  
 
Reply:  The National Energy and Climate Plans submitted in 2020 by the 27 Member States included 
their respective contribution to the EU renewable energy target. Together, these national 
contributions already amounted to at least 33.1%, above the binding EU target of 32%. Under its 
"fit for 55" -package and in reaction to Russia's war against Ukraine, the European Comm ission 
proposed to increase the EU's renewable targets under the revised Renewable Energy Directive 
(RED III) and in the context of REPowerEU  further. This new target comes with a range of new or 
enhanced sub -targets and measures which will need to be transposed and implemented at national 
level in addition to current policies to deliver on the additional ambition level. In March 2023, the 
Council and the EP found an informal agreement to raise the RES share to 42.5% by 2030 with an 
indicative top -up of 2.5% to achieve 45%. This agreement still needs to be formally agreed by both 
institutions, however. RED III falls outside of this exercise's re view period. The latest legislative 
developments can be followed here: Renewable energy directive (europa.eu) .  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Para 4.133 : It is stated that tax expenditures for fossil fuels accounted for 20% of total subsidies 
in 2020.  
Question 36 : Do the EU or its Member States consider to reform these tax expenditures in the 
context of their climate policies?   
 
Reply:  The European Green  Deal Communication23 set out the objective that fossil fuel subsidies 
should end. The European Climate Law24 specified that in light of the objective of achieving climate 
neutrality by 2050 and in view of the international commitments under the Paris Agre ement, 
continued efforts are necessary to ensure the phasing out of energy subsidies which are incompatible 
with that objective, in particular for fossil fuels, without impacting efforts to reduce energy poverty. 
The Commission put forward its proposal25 to revise the Energy Taxation Directive as part of these 
efforts. The EU is also actively participating in the WTO Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform initiative to use 
trade tools to contribute to delivering UN SDG 12(c).  
 
Para  4.144 : It is written that "in recent FTAs and to varying degrees, the European Union covered 
trade in raw materials and energy goods for the climate transition" and that "According to the 
Commission, further alignments of the Energy and Raw Materials chapter towards the objectives of 
the Euro pean Green Deal continue" . 
Question 37: Has the EU already evaluated these provisions and their environmental impact?  
 
Reply:  Energy and raw materials (ERM) chapters of FTAs are constantly aligned with the priorities 
set in the EU Green Deal and in relate d legislation.  
 
These chapters are also part of the overall sustainability impact assessment (SIA) conducted on free 
trade agreements, to evaluate the potential economic, environmental, social and human rights 
effects of a trade agreement. SIAs can help promote environmen tal protection, and support the 
better integration of women, vulnerable populations, and small businesses into the global economy, 
as well as address growing concerns from civil society.  
 
4.5 Services  
Para. 4.147 : An assessment of restrictions in 7 profess ions in the Single Market showed that 
restrictions had increased in some Member States.  
Question 38:  How does the EU intend to address a trend of increased restrictions for regulated 
professions in the single market?  
 
Reply:  The Commission will continue addressing restrictive regulatory framework for professional 
services in Member States by issuing recommendations to Member States, as part of the European 
Semester, to encourage and support Member States reforms.  
 
The Commission will also monitor correct transposition of the Proportionality Test Directive (Directive 
(EU) 2018/958) by Member States, which establishes rules for proportionality assessments to be 
conducted by EU Member States before adopting new professional regulations or amending existing 
regulations.  
 
Para. 4.152 : The DSA creates new obligations for all intermediary service providers to report to 
national authorities.  
Question 39 : How does the EU intend to limit costs of reporting to national authorities for smaller 
services providers and S MEs?  
 
Reply:  The Digital Services Act introduces an asymmetric system of due diligence obligations that 
places the more significant responsibilities on those intermediary services that pose systemic societal 
risks. Small service providers are therefore inherently exclu ded from performing, for example, 
mandatory annual risk assessments subject to external auditing. Where it concerns responding to 
orders issued by relevant national authorities, the Digital Services Act moreover formalizes 
procedures for what is an existin g obligation, i.e. to respond. The Digital Services Act rather sets 
harmonized requirements for what constitutes a valid order to act against illegal content, making it 
 
23 https://eur -lex.euro pa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52019DC0640&from=E . 
24 https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32021R1119 , Regulation (EU) 
2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30  June 2021 establishing the framework for 
achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 . 
25 EUR-Lex – 52021PC0563 – EN – EUR-Lex (europa.eu) COM(2021) 563 final Proposal for a COUNCIL 
DIRECTIVE restructuring the Union frame work for the taxation of energy products and electricity (recast) . WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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easier for all parties involved including smaller intermediary services to understand w hen they are 
required to act. The same applies to the notification of criminal offences; the Digital Services Act 
streamlines the process whereby the provider of hosting services notifies that relevant authorities 
upon becoming aware of grave offences. Mic ro and small enterprises are exempted from the 
provisions in the Digital Services Act that apply to online platforms, including the specific obligations 
for online marketplaces.  
 
Para. 4.154  The Commission established a mechanism to intervene directly on d isinformation in 
the context of a crisis. The Commission had already agreed with large platforms on a "strengthened 
code of practice on disinformation".  
Question 40 : In which future contexts does the Commission foresee to use the newly -established 
mechani sm to intervene directly on disinformation?  
 
Reply:  Whereas future events cannot be foreseen, it should be stressed that the Digital Services 
Act only provides for the exceptional possibility to require designated providers to put in place further 
risk mit igation measures in the event of the most extreme crisis, those that jeopardize public health 
or public security. It cannot be excluded that such measures may be required also in the area of 
disinformation, if it would be considered that the measures poten tially already in place would not be 
sufficient in view of the extraordinary nature of the crisis at hand. The choice of the specific actions 
to be taken will remain with the relevant provider.  
 
Para. 4.162:  
Question 41 : Is the withdrawal of the Services E-card project the end of EU -level efforts to facilitate 
even more internal movement of services providers?  
 
Reply:  The objective of the European services e -card proposal was to reduce administrative burdens 
for businesses operating cross -border. This objective is still very relevant today. The Commission 
will continue its work to facilitate free movement of services p roviders through other tools: guidance 
to Member States, enforcement actions where necessary and other targeted initiatives such as 
devising together with Member States on voluntary basis the common electronic form for the 
declaration of posting of workers . 
 
Section  4.5.1.2  (Financial regulatory framework) Questions 42 -44: Lead: FISMA, Asoc: TRAD B2  
Question 42:  On the whole, how did the financial regulation adopted in the last few years, including 
equivalence regimes, perform in achieving the goal of an in tegrated and resilient single market for 
financial services?  
 
Reply:  The EU has adopted measures to strengthen and modernise the EU financial sector, further 
build the banking union and develop the capital markets union, as well as important aspects relat ed 
to sustainability and the impact of climate change on financial stability.  
 
Over the last few years, the EU equivalence policy has proved to be an effective tool in promoting 
market integration, while preserving financial stability, supporting regulato ry convergence, and 
fostering cooperation. Equivalence has brought benefits in terms of improving cross -border business 
conditions, overall supporting cross -border financial flows.  
 
Para. 4.192 EU Taxonomy :  
Question 43 : What is the expected external impac t on the development of sustainable finance of 
the Taxonomy regulation? Is the Commission carrying out monitoring efforts in that regard?  
 
Reply:  Large EU companies may perform economic activities not only at EU, but also at global level. 
As such, they ma y apply the Taxonomy Regulation to claim that their activities and assets held in 
third countries are environmentally sustainable under the Taxonomy Regulation. Similarly, EU banks 
and financial institutions may finance investments in third countries and c laim that their financial 
assets are environmentally sustainable under the Taxonomy Regulation.  
 
The reporting of key performance indicators (KPIs) under the Taxonomy Regulation by non -financial 
companies has just started in 2023. The reporting of KPIs by financial institutions will start in 2024. 
It's therefore premature to assess the external impact of the Taxonomy Regulation at this stage.  
 
The European Commission will monitor any external impacts with the help of the EU Platform on 
Sustainable Finance a nd the European Supervisory Authorities. Interoperability of the EU Taxonomy WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 with third country taxonomies and the easy application of EU Taxonomy in the context of 
third country activities are high on the EU's policy agenda. As member of the International  Platform 
on Sustainable Finance (IPSF), the EU is actively involved in global discussions on the interoperability 
of taxonomies.  
 
Para .4.195 Fintech:  
Question 44 : What is the expected impact of the recent regulatory changes for digital finance on 
the development of fintech firms and start -ups within the EU?   
 
Reply:  Supporting the digital transition in the EU is a key priority for the Commission. Key legislative 
initiatives that have been agreed by the European Council and European Parliament include the 
Markets in Crypto Assets Regulation (MiCA), and the Digital Ope rational Resilience Act (DORA).  
 
Forthcoming regulatory initiatives, including a regulatory proposal on access to data in finance, will 
create opportunities for smaller firms such as fintechs to develop and offer new and innovative 
services to customers in  a secure manner. The Digital Finance Strategy  outlines the objectives and 
the expected impact the regulatory changes for digital finance  will have.  
 
Report of the European  Union  (WT/TPR/G/442)  
 
Paragraph 6.15, page 87 of the Report of the European  Union  (WT/TPR/G/442) states that the 
"European Commission will have the power to investigate financial contributions granted by public 
authoriti es of non -EU countries which benefit companies engaging in an economic activity in the EU 
and redress, if needed, their distortive effects" . We are aware that under the Foreign Subsidies 
Regulation the Commission will conduct a balancing test of the positi ve and negative effects of a 
foreign subsidy when deciding whether to impose redressive measures and the nature of those 
redressive measures.  
Question 45 : Could the EU explain what policy objectives it considers relevant with regard to the 
broader positiv e effects of a foreign subsidy and how the EU plans to assure non -discrimination in 
the application of its balancing test?  
 
Reply:  The Commission considers the positive effects of the foreign subsidy on the basis of the 
evidence about positive effects sub mitted during the investigation. The Commission will publish 
guidelines regarding 'the application of the criteria for determining the existence of a distortion 
according to Article 4(1)' as well as concerning 'the application of the balancing test in acco rdance 
with Article  6' (Art.  46 FSR).  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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BRAZIL  
Questions based on EU's Report (WT/TPR/G/442)  
 
Page 7 – 3.1.1 WTO Reform – Paragraph 3.4 – The EU welcomes in particular that the MC12 
outcome document identifies WTO reform as a fundamental interest and contains a political 
commitment to discussions with a view to having a fully and well -functioning dispute settlement 
mechanism by 2024. The EU remains determined to push forward with WTO reform across the 
three  core functions (disp ute settlement, negotiation, and deliberation) of the organization in 
preparation for MC13.  
Question 1:  Please indicate in EU's view what measures could be implemented in order to ensure 
a fully and well -functioning dispute settlement mechanism.  
 
Reply:  To ensure a fully and well -functioning dispute settlement mechanism, the EU considers that 
meaningful reform is needed. The EU supports a reform that preserves the core features of the 
dispute settlement system. Such reform must guarantee WTO Members' right  to a binding, two -tier 
and independent and impartial dispute settlement mechanism under WTO rules must be guaranteed. 
Moreover, the EU supports that promote efficiency of the system and less resource -intensive 
proceedings, by focusing disputes and streaml ining procedures, without prejudice to the parties' 
rights, due process and quality of reports.  
 
Page 8 – 3.1.1  WTO Reform – Paragraph 3.5 – No WTO reform is more critical or urgent than 
delivering on the aim identified in the MC12 outcome document of hav ing a "fully and 
well-functioning dispute settlement system" by 2024. The EU is constructively engaged in reform 
discussions. Time before 2024 is tight. The EU believes that reform discussions should be focused 
on identifying solutions for a limited set of  issues that require improvement with a view to reaching 
agreement no later than MC13.  
Question 2:  What does the EU consider to be the critical issues that must be addressed in order to 
reach consensus by the MC12 deadline on 2024?  
 
Reply: Dispute settlem ent reform is a clear priority for the EU, and we treat the 2024 objective 
agreed in MC12 very seriously. In order to have a fully and well -functioning dispute settlement 
system, a meaningful reform is needed, and the EU is fully engaged in ongoing discuss ions on 
Dispute Settlement reform. In that context, it is critical to ensure that the system is binding, two -tier 
and that adjudication is independent and impartial.  
 
Page 10 and 11 – 3.1.2  WTO response to global challenges – 3.24 – It's mentioned "The EU will 
also continue to push for reforms of trade distorting domestic support, which can adversely impact 
food security".  
Question 3:  With due consideration to concerns about possible reducti on of agriculture output as a 
consequence of restrictive producing practices within "Farm to Fork" and "Green Deal" policies, with 
collateral trade -limiting impacts, how the EU understands it will both improve food security and 
address trade distortions in  this context?  
 
Reply:  Firstly, there is no antagonism between "Farm to fork" and "food security", quite the 
contrary.  
 
The impact of climate change is increasingly visible: extreme climatic events, land degradation, 
deforestation and desertification continued apace. Agriculture is a victim of climate change but also 
a contributor to the damage. Food systems account for a quarter of global GHG emissions. 90% of 
deforestation is the result of agricultural expansion, and 60% of biodiversi ty loss is also due to 
agriculture.  
 
Such climatic events jeopardise or hamper food production, which has wide -reaching implications 
for food supplies around the world. Food systems need to deal with shocks, like high energy and 
commodity prices and supply  chain bottlenecks that we are currently experiencing, and become 
sustainable, productive and resilient to respond to climate change and environmental degradation.  
 
Sustainability of the food systems, from "Farm to Fork", is the way forward to accommodate global 
food security in the long run. So "Farm to Fork" and "Green Deal" are part of the answer to food 
security and not part of the problem. This is why the EU will continue its transformation towards WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 resilient and sustainable agricultural systems, in lin e with the sustainable development goals as well 
as climate and environmental goals.  
 
Secondly, as regards domestic support, 85% of EU farm support falls into the "Green box". Such 
support is non -trade distorting, decoupled from production, and with no obl igation to produce. The 
payments granted to farmers are linked to clear environmental and climate mitigation requirements.  
 
In 2019, the OECD published a report "Evaluating the environmental impact of agricultural policies". 
Decoupled payments were consid ered as the "least environmental harmful".  
 
This highlights the need to deliver on the WTO reform process of trade distorting policies towards 
more Green Box type of measures, which can deliver on reducing trade distortion and also bring 
environmental bene fits. 
 
Page 18 – 5.1 The EU's actions on climate change and environmental protection – 5.4 – Global 
challenges  
Question 4:  Could the EU elaborate on which forms of cooperation it intends to pursue within the 
scope of CBAM as well as the regulation regardin g deforestation -free products? Will such programs 
be discussed with third countries? Will they be implemented before the aforementioned regulations 
enter into force, which would help to minimize potential negative trade impacts?  
 
Reply:  The Regulation est ablishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism (Regulation 2023/956) 
was published in the EU Official Journal on 16/05 ( link). The EU has built in a transitional period in 
CBAM starting in October 2023, which will give trading partners, including developing countries, time 
to prepare for the definitive period, as from 2026.  
 
The European C ommission will, after consultation of the CBAM Committee, adopt an Implementing 
act regulating the transitional period of CBAM starting on the 1st of October 2023 and which notably 
specifies the reporting obligations for importers. The European Commission will publish the draft 
implementing regulation for feedback by stakeholders for a period of four weeks before the CBAM 
Committee (whose members are Member States representatives) renders its opinion on it.  
 
The EU Commission, in conjunction with the Europe an External Action Services and EU Delegations 
around the world, will launch an information campaign, featuring online seminars, physical events, 
distribution of guidance documents, and direct assistance, aimed at assisting third country operators 
and impo rters to the EU in performing all new obligations required by the CBAM Regulation and its 
secondary legislation. The campaign will start mid 2023 upon the approval of the implementing act 
concerning the reporting rules applicable in transitional period. Th is will continue through 
autumn  2023 thus supporting all relevant actors for the entry into force of the regulation in 
October  2023.  
 
As for the deforestation -free products regulation, it contains a specific article on cooperation 
(Art. 30), an extraordinary case which confirms how central close cooperation with partner countries 
for the EU is. Art.  30 foresees that the Commission and EU Member States will step up their 
engagement with third countries, both producers and consumer countries, throu gh partnerships and 
cooperation mechanisms focusing on the conservation, restoration and sustainable use of forests, 
deforestation, forest degradation, and the transition to sustainable commodity production.  EU 
cooperation tools and programs will make the engagement with, the participation and the support 
of smallholders a priority, as foreseen in the legal text of the Regulation. Also, stakeholders will be 
duly informed and consulted about the development of guidelines through the Multi -stakeholder 
Defores tation Platform and the informal focus groups.  
 
Finally, it is also important to note that the EU has been a role model for transparency of its 
European  Green Deal measures through public consultations, impact assessments and outreach 
from an early regulat ory processes in different fora in the EU and outside (in Brussels, through the 
EU delegations in partner countries, in the WTO in Geneva and via bilateral dialogues). The EU has 
engaged in the WTO and bilaterally with countries and tried to address their concerns as far as they 
allowed maintaining objectives pursued by its policies. The EU will continue dialogue and 
engagement with its trading partners including for the measures that entered into force and ensuing 
implementing acts and decisions, in the WT O and bilaterally.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Question 5:  Could the EU please elaborate on how it considers that the benchmarking system 
included in its proposed measure can be reconciled with Article  I of the GATT?  
 
Reply:  CBAM is an environmental policy tool to support the EU's increased ambition on climate 
mitigation by preventing carbon leakage, while ensuring WTO compatibility.  
 
The benchmarks that CBAM refers to are those that are in place in the context of the EU ETS free 
allocation system to address the risk of carbon leakage. For CBAM goods these benchm arks will be 
entirely phased out by 2034.  
 
CBAM will ensure that an equivalent carbon price will be paid by domestic and imported products 
and will thus be non -discriminatory and even handed towards trading partners and economic 
operators from third count ries. 
 
It will take into account the actual emissions of individual producers in the production of CBAM goods 
imported into the EU. If a country puts in place effective climate measures –including non -carbon 
pricing measures - these will lead to a lower carb on content of the imported products, and thus to a 
lower border adjustment or no adjustment at all. The CBAM will not be applied on top of carbon 
prices charged in third countries, if a carbon price is effectively paid abroad and not rebated on 
export.  
 
Article 216(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European  Union  states that "[a]greements 
concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its Member States". 
This obligation applies equally to the WTO  Agreement . Consequentl y, the EU always assesses the 
WTO compatibility of its legislation, including autonomous regulations.  
 
Page 19 – 5.1 The EU's actions on climate change and environmental protection – 5.4 – Global 
challenges  
Question 6:  Did the EU conduct any assessment or investigation on the concrete risks posed by 
carbon leakage or can the EU point to any studies identifying concrete occurrences of the 
phenomenon ?  
 
Reply: The European Commission published an impact assessment accompanying the draft 
legislative proposal on the CBAM in July 2021  (link). Our approach to carbon leakage is spelled out 
in recitals 9 to 15 of the CBAM regulation.  
 
The CBAM is directed at the carbon content of imported products, not at third countries as such. The 
CBAM will take into account the actual emissions of individual pr oducers in the production of CBAM 
goods imported into the EU. If a third country puts in place effective climate measures – including 
non-carbon pricing or regulatory measures – these will lead to a lower carbon content of the imported 
products, and thus t o a lower border adjustment (i.e. a reduction on the number of CBAM certificates 
an importer will need to submit). It will also take into account efforts by EU trading partners to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions from industrial production through carbon pr icing mechanisms. 
More specifically, an importer may claim in its CBAM declaration a reduction in the number of CBAM 
certificates to be surrendered so that the carbon price paid in the country of origin for the declared 
embedded emissions can be taken into  account . 
 
The transitional phase of CBAM starting on the 1st of October 2023 until December 2025 will help 
collect information on carbon pricing policies of different countries and adjust the implementation of 
CBAM for the definitive phase, starting on 1  January  2026, to better address the issue of carbon 
leakage where necessary.  
 
Question 7:  Did the EU conduct any assessment or studies to support the implicit claim that its 
climate policies are more ambitious than those of third countries?  
 
Reply:  We are not sure how this question is relevant for the TPR. Having said that, in the 
European  Green Deal, the EU committed to becoming the first climate neutral continent  by 2050 
and the Green Deal is the blueprint to achieving it.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 348 - 
 
  
 Question 8:  Does the EU consider that carbon pricing is the only climate policy tool available to 
help reduce GHG? If not, would the EU consider allowing for some sort of compensation of CBAM 
duties for imports originating in countries with different, but no less effective climate policies than 
the EU?  
 
Reply:  CBAM  will take into account the actual emissions of individual producers in the production of 
CBAM goods imported into the EU. If a country puts in place effective climate measures –including 
non-carbon pricing measures - these will lead to a lower carbon conten t of the imported products, 
and thus to a lower border adjustment or no adjustment at all. Besides, the CBAM will not be applied 
on top of carbon prices charged in third countries, if a carbon price (either in the form of an emissions 
trading system or car bon taxes) is effectively paid abroad and is not rebated on export. If importers 
can prove, based on information from their third country producers, that a carbon price has already 
been paid in the country of production of the imported goods and that no co mpensation or rebate 
applies on export, the corresponding amount can be deducted from their final bill. If the price paid 
is equivalent to the EU carbon price under the EU ETS, the border adjustment would be zero.  
 
Question 9:  Does the EU have any plans to  put into place programs to transfer technology and/or 
offer financial support to promote a transition to more sustainable production methods in 
third countries? If so, can the EU provide further details, including on the schedule of such support 
measures and how they compare with the support being provided to European producers under the 
several funds created to assist in the adaptation to the ETS?  
 
Reply:  In order to reach the Paris Agreement's targets, we need to transform completely the way 
we produce,  transport and consume energy worldwide, and only a major acceleration in clean energy 
innovation can help achieving the green transformation. Putting those innovative technologies on 
the market will require huge public and private financing.  
 
The EU – the largest provider of public climate finance in the world – is supporting green 
transformation in developing countries. In 2021, over 54% of the funding for developing countries, 
worth EUR  23 billion , was dedicated to either climate adaptation or cross -cutting action involving 
both climate change mitigation and adaptation initiatives.  
 
However, public financing is not sufficient to reach the Paris objectives, and ultimately the private 
sector will have to finance most of the investment in R&D for green techn ologies. Therefore, the 
relevant public policies need to ensure that the incentives for investment in innovation are 
maintained and enhanced to mobilise private spending.  
 
Those policies include an effective and adequate protection of IPR, which provide i ncentives for 
taking the risk of investing in new technologies, stimulate the diffusion of technology, by sharing the 
information about the inventions publicly and help raising funds necessary for scaling up the 
production, in particular by SMEs. Without I PR there is no innovation, and without innovative green 
technologies we can not fight the climate crisis.  
 
The European Commission supports the development and adoption of climate technologies through 
the UNFCCC Technology Mechanism, including through its Technology Executive Committee and the 
Climate Technology Centre & Network (CTCN). The EU and its Member States are the largest 
contributors to the CTCN, having provided almost 40% of all funding since the start of the initiative 
in 2013 (USD  36 million  of the total USD  93 million ).  
 
For example, the CTCN has helped fund the development of Brazil's Intended Nationally Determined 
Contribution (INDC), provided technical assistance for Brazil's development of a circular economy 
roadmap, and supported the inte rnationalization of the Brazilian hydrogen energy research and 
development network.  More information available here:  https://www.ctc -n.org/ctcn -
countries/br?f%5B0%5D=country_search_result_content_type_facets%3Aproject .  
 
Question 10:  CBAM discriminates between exporting countries according to their adoption of an 
emission trading system  equivalent to the one adopted by the EU. The mechanism may also impose 
higher carbon -related costs to imported goods than those imposed on products from the EU. May 
the EU kindly elaborate on how it has ensured compatibility of CBAM with the WTO  Agreement s?  
 
Reply:  Countries listed in Annex  III of the Regulation are exempted, since the EU ETS applies to 
their territory or the emission trading system of the country is fully linked to the ETS. The carbon WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 349 - 
 
price paid on CBAM goods originating in these third c ountries is effectively charged on the 
greenhouse gas emissions embedded in those goods without any rebates beyond those also applied 
in accordance with the EU ETS. The CBAM Regulation empowers the European Commission to adapt 
the list of exempted countrie s delegated act should additional third country fulfill these conditions 
(set out in Article  2(6) of the Regulation).  
 
The CBAM Regulation ensures that a carbon price effectively paid by an exporter in a third country 
will be deducted from the number of CB AM certificates to be surrendered by EU importers, as from 
2026. Any national carbon price effectively paid by a third country producer – be it a market price 
from an ETS or a carbon tax - may be deducted from the amount of CBAM certificates that have to 
be surrendered. Producers in third countries with an equivalent or higher carbon price will not pay 
any CBAM charge at all.  
 
Under the transitional period starting in October 2023, importers of goods under the scope of the 
Regulation will notably have to rep ort on direct and indirect emissions and on the carbon price 
possibly paid by exporters from third countries. These reports will inform the European Commission 
work on further implementing acts, notably regarding taking into account a carbon price paid in third 
countries (in line with Article  9 of the regulation).  
 
Page 20 – 5.1.1  Overview of the actions on climate change and environmental protection – 
5.12 – EU Deforestation -Free Regulation  
Question 11:  How does the EU guarantee that the choice of the prod ucts covered by the regulation 
on "deforestation -free" and the intended classification of countries are consistent with basic 
principles of multilateral trading rules?  
 
Reply:  The EU always assesses the compatibility of its legislation with the WTO rules. The Regulation 
is designed to apply in an even -handed manner to all commodities and to products produced inside 
as well as outside the EU. The choice of products covered by the Regulation is based on an extensive 
review of scientific literature, nam ely of primary sources estimating the impact of EU consumption 
on global deforestation and linking that footprint to specific commodities. Similarly, the deforestation 
risk benchmarking system will be based on an objective and transparent assessment, takin g into 
account the latest scientific evidence and internationally recognized sources.  
 
Question 12:  Could the EU elaborate on how the proposed extraterritorial ruling will not be 
trade-distorting?  
 
Reply:  The objectives pursued by the Regulation are the internationally recognized, public policy 
concerns of helping to fight against climate change and hal ting biodiversity loss linked to 
deforestation. The Regulation is designed to apply in an even -handed manner to all commodities 
and to products produced inside as well as outside the EU.  
 
Question 13:  How would the EU ensure that such proposed regulation is not more trade -restrictive 
than necessary to achieve its policy objectives?  
 
Reply:  The objectives pursued by the Regulation are the internationally recognized, public policy 
concerns of helping to fight against climate change and halting biodiversity l oss linked to and 
non-discriminatory manner, to all commodities and to products produced inside as well as outside 
the EU. In addition, Article  216(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European  Union  states 
that "[a]greements concluded by the Union a re binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its 
Member States". This obligation applies equally to the WTO  Agreement . Consequently, the EU always 
assesses the WTO compatibility of its legislation, including autonomous regulations.  
 
Question 14:  Will incentives be provided by the EU for deforestation -free suppliers?  
 
Reply:  The Deforestation Regulation is part of a broader plan of actions to tackle deforestation and 
forest degradation first outlined in the 2019 Commission Communication on Stepping u p EU Action 
to Protect and Restore the World's Forests. The EU pursues a comprehensive approach in which 
supply - and demand -side measures complement each other. It also involves, among other 
measures, multilateral engagement and dialogue with consumer and producer countries.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 350 - 
 
  
 Combatting deforestation will go hand in hand with creating incentives for a transition toward more 
sustainable use of the natural resources, and contributing to preserving more intact forests, boosting 
market opportunities for sustain able products.  
 
The EU is supporting its partner countries through development cooperation to ensure their supply 
chains are deforestation -free and is stepping up its support.  
 
Page 20 – 5.1.2  Sustainable food systems – 5.17 – The Farm to Fork (F2F) Strate gy 
Brazil would like to express its concern that, according to a preliminary version of the impact 
assessment that will accompany the Commission draft, the FSFS policy is based on the assumption 
that products imported from third countries are less sustaina ble than the ones produced in the EU.  
Question 15:  Since this assumption is being incorporated in the design of a policy that is expected 
to have significant impact on developing countries' exports to the EU, can the EU to present the 
scientific evidence supporting this assumption?  
 
Reply:  All the initiatives are accompanied by an impact assessment  (gathering evidence to support 
policymaking) that assesses the impact of various options on stakeholders. There are also 
consultation activities along the legislative process. At the end of the process, the impact 
assessments are published.  
 
Question 16:  Also on the FSFS, it seems that methodologies to define minimum sustainability 
requirements and the characteristics of sustainable labelling will be defined  in tertiary legislation (via 
comitology).  
 
Reply:  The sustainability labelling framework, which was announced in the Farm to Fork Strategy 
as a separate initiative, should be part of the framework legislation for a sustainable food system 
(FSFS). Within the work on the impact assessment for the FSFS, a number of policy options are 
considered for sustainability labelling. Several of these options entail the creation of a harmonised 
EU sustainability label, the presentation and substantiation rules of which  would be specified later in 
subsequent acts.  
 
Question 17:  How does the EU plan to engage with third countries during the draft and legislative 
processes of all FSFS -derived legislation that can impact their exports to the EU?  
 
Reply:  During the preparato ry process, two public consultations have been carried out; one in the 
context of the inception impact assessment which run from 28  September to 26  October  2021 and 
one general public consultation which run from 28  April until 21  July 2022. Both consultati ons were 
open to all stakeholders, citizens, including from third countries.  
 
The EU will also comply with all the applicable WTO notification requirements, when the proposal 
has been tabled.  
 
Question 18:  How the harmonization principle and the international standard setting bodies 
guidelines and recommendations are considered in this project of transition toward sustainable food 
systems?  
 
Reply:  FSFS project will take into account the relevant internation al standards, guidelines and 
recommendations and are based on scientific risk assessments.  
 
Question 19:  How important is it to have a robust and consistent scientific basis for implementing 
a transition to sustainability, establishing new foundations for future food policies? How does the EU 
intend to do it?  
 
Reply:  The proposal for a legislative framework for sustainable food systems does not provide for  
sustainability analysis for which scientific basis would be required; it will include definitions, ge neral 
principles and objectives to underpin future food -related policy making.  
 
Question 20:  How the Commission intends to accelerate and facilitate the transition to sustainability 
and establishes new foundations for future food policies supported by sani tary and phytosanitary 
requirements, without considering a worldwide spectrum solid scientific basis and the guidelines 
from the international references Organizations for SPS issues?  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 351 - 
 
Reply:  The EU is committed to take into account available scientific evidence and promote 
consistency between international technical standards and the future legislation, while ensuring that 
the high level of protection of public health, animal health and welfare, plant health and environment 
is not reduced.  
 
Page 21 – 5.1.2  Sustainable food systems – 5.18 – draft regulation on lowering the maximum 
residue levels (MRLs) for the two neonicotinoid substances clothianidin and thiamethoxam.  
Question 21:  Can the EU explain the rationale for introducing an EU level mea sure with likely trade 
restricting impacts to pursue an environmental objective outside the borders of the EU, in light of 
WTO rules?  
 
Reply:  WTO members are not prevented from taking measures necessary to ensure the protection 
of animal or plant health o r the environment provided that those measures are not applied in a 
manner which could constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on international trade.  
 
The EU considers that lowering the maximum residue le vels (MRLs) for clothianidin and 
thiamethoxam to the limit of quantification (LOQ) is necessary to fulfil its legitimate objective and 
that there is no alternative that would be less trade restrictive and equally contribute to the objective 
pursued.  
 
Quest ion 22:  Have the EU made assessments attesting actual decline in the population of 
pollinators in other areas and climates outside Europe?  
 
Reply:  A clear consensus exists regarding the fact that both wild and managed bees are exposed to 
pesticides (mainl y through nectar and pollen, in the case of the neonicotinoids), and that the range 
of sub -lethal effects is quite broad. As reported by the Intergovernmental Science -Policy Platform 
on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES)[1], "wild pollinators have declined in occurrence and 
diversity  (and abundance for certain species) at local and regional scales in North West Europe and 
North America. Although a lack of wild pollinator data (species identity, distribution and abundance) 
for Latin America, Africa, Asia and Oceania preclude any genera l statement on their regional status, 
local declines have been recorded" . 
 
[1] IPBES (2016). The assessment report of the Intergovernmental Science -Policy Platform on 
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services on pollinators, pollination and food production. S.G. Potts, 
V. L. Imperatriz -Fonseca, and H. T.  Ngo (eds). Secretariat of the Intergovernmental Science -Policy 
Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, Bonn, Germany. 552 pages. 
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3402856 . 
 
Question 23:  In paragraph 20 of the preamble of the adopted regulation, it is indicated that an 
import tolerance may be set if the applicant provides scientific evidence that the use of these 
two active substances does not adversely impact poll inators. What kind of evidence will be required 
in the application process, and by what criteria the unacceptable risk to pollinators will be measured? 
If an import tolerance is granted to a third country, would this value also apply to the product in 
question imported into the EU from other third countries?  
 
Reply:  The evaluation of the import tolerance would follow the same criteria in relation to those 
environmental issues that are considered of global concern as those used for the placing of plant 
protection products on the market set in Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009. If the risk assessment 
concludes that there is not an unacceptable risk to bees, the import tolerance may be granted.  
 
Adverse effects of clothianidin and thiamethoxam on bees are directly linked to the intrinsic 
properties of those substances. Therefore, the risks for bees from outdoor uses of these substances 
are unlikely to be limited to the European  Union . 
 
If the EU considers an environmental risk assessment necessary, this wil l be based upon 
environmental endpoints[1] that are based on most recent science and compared to the 
environmental exposure based on supporting evidence provided by the respective third country.  
 
An import tolerance, once it has been established in the EU legislation, applies to all food/fee d placed 
on the market regardless of the country of origin.  
[1]  An example of an endpoint could be the LD 50 for honeybees from a laboratory test according to a 
Test guideline internationally agreed via the OECD.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Page 21 – 5.1.2  Sustainable food systems – 5.18 – EU Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs) policy to 
achieve environmental outcomes in third countries . 
Question 24:  What are other regulations currently being discussed within the EU on the use of 
MRLs to achieve environmental out comes in third countries?  
 
Reply:  As announced in the EU Farm to Fork Strategy, the EU has committed to take into account 
environmental objectives when deciding about setting maximum residue levels for substances no 
longer approved in the EU due to environ mental concerns of global nature, while respecting WTO 
standards and other international obligations. As explained, the EU addresses this matter on a case 
by case basis, considering and reviewing the position of each particular active substance, founded 
on the best available scientific evidence and ensuring that its measures are not more trade restrictive 
than necessary to achieve their objective.  
 
The review of MRLs for other neonicotinoids, e.g. imidacloprid, and Persistent, Bioaccumulative and 
Toxic (PBT ) substances, e.g. quinoxyfen and lufenuron, may be considered in the future.  
 
Page 23 – 5.2.1  Protecting human rights and promoting labour rights – EU's GSP  
Question 25:  In paragraphs 5.26 and 5.27 the EU frames the GSP program within its efforts to 
promo te and protect human rights. Paragraph 5.27, in particular, mentions the Commission's 
proposal for a new EU GSP Regulation to apply from 2024. Could the EU explain the main criteria of 
the new legislation for access to preferences, including the requiremen t of acceptance, by beneficiary 
countries, of the devolution of migrants?  
 
Reply:  The Commission Proposal for a new GSP Regulation intends to reinforce the scheme's 
contribution to the respect of human rights protection in beneficiary countries.  
 
The pro posal extends negative conditionality (that is, no serious and systematic violations) for all 
beneficiary countries to environmental and good governance conventions in addition to core human 
and labour rights conventions listed in the Regulation.  
 
The prop osal includes two new international instruments on human rights (the Convention on the 
Rights of People with Disabilities and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict), in addition to the previously listed ones. It 
also proposes two new labour rights conventions (ILO Conventions No.  81 on Labour Inspection and 
No. 144 on Tripartite Consultation), in addition to the current 15 core human and labour rights 
UN/ILO conventions.  
 
The prop osal adds exports of goods made by internationally prohibited child labour and by forced 
labour, including slavery and prison labour, as a ground to withdraw the preferences.  
 
The following international conventions/agreements are proposed for inclusion in  the list:  
 
• Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children 
in Armed Conflict (2000)  
• Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2007)  
• Convention on Labour Inspection No.  81 (1947)  
• Convention on Tripartite Consultations No.  144 (1976)  
• The Paris Agreement on climate change (2015) [Note: it replaces the Kyoto Protocol]  
• United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (2000)  
 
The Proposal also introduces a withdrawal crit erion related to readmission of own nationals by 
beneficiary countries. Orderly international migration can bring important benefits to the countries 
of origin and destination of migrants and contribute to their sustainable development needs.  
 
Page 28 – 6.3 EU State aid control  
In paragraph 6.13, the EU states that EU level state aid control rules ensure that subsidies are 
granted in full consistency with WTO rules and that, as a result, any distortive effects of subsidies 
are minimized while maximizing the ir positive effects for public policy objectives. The EU also 
acknowledges that since 2020 several flexibilities in said rules were granted (paragraph  6.14) and 
that industrial policy and subsidization have increased (paragraph 6.16).  
Question 26:  Can the  EU elaborate on what tools and instruments it has available or intends to 
introduce to ensure that the substantial increase in the level of subsidization under several programs WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 353 - 
 
(REPowerEU, Green Deal Industrial Plan, Chips Act, Temporary Crisis and Transi tion Framework, 
Net-Zero Industrial Act among others) coupled with a loosening of the state aid rules will not lead 
to an increase in the distortive effects of subsidies?  
 
Reply:  Grants and loans can be made available by the Union to Member States under s trictly defined 
conditions and circumstances to achieve the REPowerEU objectives under the Recovery and 
Resilience Facility. In turn, once a Member State uses such financial support to grant aid, it must 
comply with the State aid rules and it becomes subje ct to the relevant notification and approval 
requirements regarding its compatibility with the TFEU. When the Member States have discretion in 
allocating EU funds, the State aid rules apply, and when this is not the case, mechanism are in place 
to ensure c onsistency of any EU funding programme with State aid rules.  
 
The Commission continues to enforce State aid control during the current crisis. It has issued 
temporary rules, most recently in the form of the Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework, to 
allow Member States to better address the effects of the current crisis on their respective economies. 
These crisis rules are temporary in nature and do not alter the main requirement that aid can only 
be granted exceptionally and subject to strict safeguard s. Under the Framework, aid must be aimed 
either at remedying a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State (under 
Article  107(3)(b) TFEU) or facilitating the development of certain economic activities or of certain 
economic areas (under Article  107(3)(c) TFEU. Such aid can only be declared compatible if it is 
appropriate, necessary (incentive effect), proportionate and if its impact in terms of distortion of 
competition and effect on trade is limited.  
 
The Temporary Crisis and Transition Framewor k is set to expire at the end of 2023 for most 
provisions, and at the end of 2025 for the remainder.  
 
Question 27:  Does the risk of a so -called "subsidy war" with other financially resourceful Members 
represent a concern for the EU?  
 
Reply:  In its recent WTO communication "Reinforcing the deliberative function of the WTO to 
respond to global trade policy challenges"  (WT/GC/W/864), the European  Union  has expressed 
concerns about the growing tensions in international trade, lack of transparency  and subsidy races. 
The EU has proposed to enhance deliberations among WTO Members on a number of key issues 
affecting global trade, including on State intervention in support of industrial sectors. The aim of the 
deliberations should be to provide more tr ansparency, to consider the design of measures, and to 
consider the positive and negative spill -overs on developing countries.  
 
Question 28:  What is the implication of the EU´s existing and planned programmes, including those 
related to the green transitio n, for the EU´s positions on agricultural and industrial subsidies in the 
WTO negotiating pillar?  
 
Reply:  The EU is committed to fulfilling its international commitments, as notably signed in UNFCC 
and UN Convention on Biological Diversity, including Targ et 18 of the Kunming -Montreal Global 
Biodiversity Framework regarding subsidies harmful for biodiversity.  
 
In its recent WTO communication "Reinforcing the deliberative function of the WTO to respond to 
global trade policy challenges" (WT/GC/W/864), the European  Union  has proposed to enhance 
deliberations among WTO Members on a number of key issues affecting global trade today, including 
on State intervention in support of industrial sectors. While the improvement of WTO rules may be 
a possible outcome in the longer term, the more immediate focus of deliberations should be on 
achieving a better understanding of the interface between trade and state intervention in support of 
industrial sectors and on identifying possible gaps in the curr ent rules. The aim of the deliberations 
should be to provide more transparency, to consider the design of measures, and to consider the 
positive and negative spill -overs on developing countries.  
 
As far as WTO agricultural negotiations are concerned, refor ming trade -distorting support, remains 
important in terms of disciplines and transparency. We see this discussion also as part of the 
necessary integration of food security and sustainability aspects. The EU has reformed substantially 
its policy and it is willing to contribute its share in reducing trade distortions in WTO, pending 
contributions of other major players, developed and developing alike. Building resilience of 
agriculture productions and policies should be our goal. Our call is therefore for re forms of 
agricultural policies towards less trade distortion, which is also friendlier for the environment and for WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 354 - 
 
  
 the food security challenges: Green Box measures are in general terms better both for the limitation 
of trade distortions and for the environ mental impact. This should reinforce the need to deliver on 
the reform process of trade distorting policies towards more Green Box type of measures.  
 
Page 32 – 8.3 Acting against economic coercion  
In paragraph 8.10, the EU states that the aim of the propos ed regulation on the protection of the 
EU and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries is to deter third countries from 
using economic coercion and to dissuade them from continuing the economic coercion, if it occurs. 
As a last resort, t he regulation would enable the Union to counteract the economic coercion. 
Economic coercion refers, according to the EU, "to situations where a third country is seeking to 
pressure the Union or an EU Member State into making a particular policy choice by a pplying or 
threatening to apply measures affecting trade or investment against the Union or an EU Member 
State".  
The same paragraph goes on to claim that the rationale for the instrument, including in relation to 
the permissibility of response measures as  a last resort, lies in general international law (…) which 
allows countermeasures in response to internationally wrongful acts (rather than specifically in the 
WTO Agreement ). With that in mind:  
Question 29:  Could the EU please clarify whether it intends to resort to the WTO Dispute Settlement 
System in the likely event that whatever "measures affecting trade or investment" relate to or is 
inconsistent with one of the covered agreements?  
 
Reply:  The anti -coercion instrument concerns specific behaviour, notably economic coercion, which 
is not addressed by the WTO  Agreement . Therefore, the Union cannot seek redress before the 
WTO dispute settlement for the issue of the economic coercion. This being said, it is indeed possible 
that the coercive measure affecting trade or investment is (also) at variance with the 
WTO Agreement . In that case, and for the sole purpose of establishing the latter, recourse to WTO 
dispute settlement is an option.  
 
Question 30: Does the EU consider the requirement to only pursue countermeasures as a last resort 
to mean that authorization for such measures from the DSB will have to be sought by the 
European  Union  before introducing such measures?  
 
Reply:  No, the EU does not. T he requirement of considering Union response measures as a last 
resort reflects the series of steps applicable. First and foremost, the function of the instrument is 
deterrence. Second, in cases of ongoing economic coercion, the Union would need to make a 
determination that there is economic coercion and would engage with the third country concerned 
with a view to obtain the cessation of the coercion and where so decided to request reparations for 
the injury caused. There will be always a space for dialogue , negotiations, mediation, and even 
independent arbitration, should the third country engages also in good faith. Only where none of 
these actions is successful, the Union may consider response measures to counteract the economic 
coercion.  
 
Economic coerci on is a specific issue which is not addressed by the WTO  Agreement , though. Rather 
the EU is acting under general international law. Therefore, the Union is not required to involve the 
DSB if it were to consider response measures.  
 
Question 31:  What relati onship, if any, does the EU see between the proposed regulation on 
economic coercion and article 23 of the DSU, in particular paragraphs 1, 2(a) and 2(c)?  
 
Reply:  None. The scope of application of Article  23 of the DSU is set in the opening clause on 
"1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment 
of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of 
the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide b y, the rules and procedures of this 
Understanding" . 
 
The anti -coercion instrument concerns specific behaviour, notably economic coercion, which is not 
addressed by the WTO  Agreement  but rather by international law more generally.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 355 - 
 
Questions based on EU's Report by the Secretariat (WT/TPR/S/442)  
 
3.1.3.3 Tariff rate quotas – Paragraph 3.50  
"The use of TRQs has not shown any particular trends, as about 30% of agricultural TRQs are fully 
utilized, comparable to the previous Review, and about 25% have not  been used at all (i.e. 0% fill 
rate); the overall average fill rate was 39%."  
Question 32:  Considering that TRQs  are necessary to allow a minimum market access for certain 
products, are there plans to reform procedures and references to allow for greater use of TRQs by 
agricultural exporting countries?  
 
Reply:  The EU does not plan any reform of the management system  for any of its TRQs. The use of 
the different TRQs as well as their fill rates are influenced by the prevailing economic conditions.  
 
Question 33:  Considering that the overall average fill rate of TRQs in Agriculture was 39%, that 
only 29% of the TRQs wer e fully utilized and that 25% of them were not used at all (Table  3.8), and 
bearing in mind that Bali's Understanding on Tariff Rate Quota Administration Provisions of 
Agricultural Products threshold is of 65%, was (were) there any instance(s) in which the  underfill 
mechanism established in Annex  A of said Decision could have been made operational by the EU?  
 
Reply:  The EU legislation on TRQs management is fully in line with the provisions of the Bali 
Ministerial Decision on TRQ management. The EU notes tha t many TRQs managed on a "first -come, 
first-served" basis have low fill rates. According to the provisions of the Bali Decision, it is up to 
importing WTO members , to decide on the usefulness to activate the Bali's underfill mechanism.  
 
Question 34:  Does t he EU have any information regarding the general causes for the rather modest 
fill rate of its TRQs? Could the European  Union  explain why "a fairly significant number, 25%, 
(of TRQs) were not utilized at all (zero fill rate)"?  
 
Reply:  Please see replies to question 33 . Moreover, after successive reforms of its agricultural policy, 
prices of EU agricultural products are aligned with global market prices, making them internationally 
competitive. As a result, a number of TRQs have become less economically interesting.  
 
Question 35:  Has the EU considered the negative contribution of the reference quantity required 
by Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/760 to the underfill of some quotas, like, in the 
case of Brazil, the natural turke y and boneless chicken TRQs?  
 
Reply:  The reference quantity requirement as laid down in Article  9 of Regulation (EU) 2020/760 
provides that for certain tariff quotas EU importers can ask licences for a quantity equal or lower to 
the average quantity import ed in the last two 12 -month periods, and that in any case they could not 
ask for more than 15% of the total quantity available for the relevant tariff quota.  
 
The reference quantity requirement does not have any effect on the exporters' side, which means 
that – in theory – a single exporter alone could fill all the quantity available under a given tariff 
quota, as long as it finds a sufficient number of importers on the EU side.  
 
To be noted that to fill a tariff quota it is sufficient to find only 7 EU imp orters with a reference 
quantity equal to 15% of the total available quantity (15% * 7 = 105%).  
 
Moreover, as a safeguard measure and with a view to ensure the full use of tariff quotas, if after the 
9th month of the TRQ period the quota is not exhausted, all operators can apply for quantities 
exceeding their reference quantity requirement (Article  9(8) of Regulation (EU) 2020/760).  
 
3.1.6.1.1 Regulatory and policy developments – Paragraph 3.91.  
Question 36:  Regarding the consideration of environmental and social obligations when calculating 
the injury margin, Brazil notes that Article  VI of GATT/1994 establishes as the general objective of 
an anti -dumping measure "to offset or prevent dumping". Even in the context of the "lesser duty 
rule", Article  9.1 of t he Anti -Dumping Agreement clearly establishes the removal of injury to the 
domestic industry as its purpose. How does this this calculation methodology complies with the 
purposes set forth in GATT/1994 and in the Antidumping Agreement for antidumping measu res? 
Question 37:  Which article of the Anti -Dumping Agreement provides the basis for including costs 
associated with social and environmental obligations in the calculation of the injury margin?  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Reply to Questions 36 and 37 : The purpose of the disciplines  at hand is to include all relevant 
domestic costs including costs related to compliance with environmental and social standards when 
calculating the injury margin for the application of the lesser duty rule. This in line with the ADA, 
and Article  9.1 ther eof in particular.  
 
Question 38:  Could the European  Union  detail exactly what social and environmental obligations 
are taken into account for calculating the injury margin? How is its effect calculated on the amount 
of the anti -dumping measure to be impose d? 
 
Reply:  See below, Question 38, 40 and 41 replied to together . 
 
Question 39:  Could the European  Union  share how interested parties in trade defense 
investigations have been addressing these clauses? Are there any ongoing administrative procedures 
and judicial reviews within the EU challenging the inclusion of such costs?  
 
Reply:  The producers in the EU ha ve the choice, at the time of providing their questionnaire replies, 
to claim and provide positive evidence for the existence of such actual and future costs. All interested 
parties have the right to comment in the course of the investigation on the method ology used for 
calculating the costs in question. To the Commission's knowledge, the inclusion of the costs in 
question are currently not subject to judicial reviews.  
 
Question 40:  The 2018 "modernization package" introduced environmental and social standa rds 
into specific aspects of the investigations carried out by the EU. Could the EU give further 
explanations on how the target price used to establish the injury margin (i.e. the theoretical price 
under the assumption of no dumping/subsidy) reflects produ ction costs of applying social and 
environmental standards? How the costs of applying social and environmental standards are 
calculated?  
 
Reply:  See below . 
 
The document points out that only in specific circumstances the target price used to establish the 
injury margin (i.e. the theoretical price under the assumption of no dumping/subsidy).  
 
Question 41:  The modernized TDI rules allow for EU companies' production costs to reflect the cost 
of applying social and environmental standards?  
 
Reply to Q 38, Q40 a nd Q41:  
Article  7(2d) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 stipulates that 'when establishing the target price, actual 
cost of production of the Union industry, which result from Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 
and protocols thereunder, to which the Union i s a party, and of ILO Conventions listed in Annex Ia, 
shall be duly reflected. Moreover, future costs, which are not covered in paragraph 2c, which result 
from these agreements and conventions, and which the Union industry will incur during the period 
of the application of the measure pursuant to Article 11(2), shall be taken into account'.  
 
Regarding multilateral environmental agreements the text is not exhaustive. For example, this 
concerns costs from the EU Emission Trading Scheme or the commitments to r educe CO2 emissions 
under the Paris Agreement. By contrast, the ILO Conventions concerned are explicitly listed in 
Annex  Ia and are the following:  
 
1. Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, No 29 (1930)  
2. Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, 
No 87 (1948)  
3. Convention concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to 
Bargain Collectively, No 98 (1949)  
4. Convention concerning Equal Remuneration of Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal 
Value, No 100 (1951)  
5. Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, No 105 (1957)  
6. Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, No 111 
(1958)  
7. Convention  concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, No 138 (1973)  
8. Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst 
Forms of Child Labour, No 182 (1999)  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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The effect is calculated by taking into account the actual costs incurred but also future costs, during 
the lifetime of the mea sures resulting from compliance with these standards.  
 
3.1.6.1.1 Regulatory and policy developments – Paragraph 3.92.  
Question 42:  What methodology and criteria are intended to be adopted for the evaluation of the 
effectiveness of trade defense measures?  
 
Reply: The evaluation of the effectiveness of the EU's trade defense measures will take place in  2025 
and the methodology and criteria will be determined then.  
 
Question 43:  Has the European  Union  already conducted a review of the effectiveness of its trad e 
defense measures? If so, could the European  Union  share the methodology and criteria adopted, 
and, if possible, inform where such an assessment could be accessed?  
 
Reply:  In July 2020, the European Court of Auditors published a report of its audit of the EU's Trade 
defence policy. The report concluded that the Commission successfully enforces the EU's trade 
defence policy. The report can be found here:  
Special report 17/2020: Trade defence instruments: system for protecting EU businesses from 
dumped and subsidised imports functions well (europa.eu) .  
 
3.1.6.1.1 Regulatory and policy developments – Paragraph 3.93.  
Question 44:  How does the EU identify and classify products subject to high risk of circumvention?  
 
Reply: The risk of circumvention of the measures arises from company and produ ct specific factors 
as well as from other economic factors. Company -specific factors include exporters' production 
capacities, their worldwide corporate structure and the organisation of their sales channels. 
Product -specific factors include, amongst other s, product specific price sensitivity/demand elasticity, 
product homogeneity, a high number of exporters and significant differences in individual duty rates. 
Known overcapacities, for example, are considered as further economic factors contributing to the  
risk of circumvention.  
 
Question 45:  Which agency or body is responsible for monitoring the practice of circumvention?  
 
Reply:  The Commission carries out monitoring of the effectiveness of existing measures under its 
sole responsibility for the imposition of trade defence instruments. In addition to initiating 
anti-circumvention investigations, it also shares information on poten tial fraud with OLAF and the 
competent authorities of the EU Member States. In return, it receives relevant information from 
these authorities, which in turn is examined on any indications of circumvention of measures.  
 
Question 46:  What criteria are adopt ed for identifying the practice of circumvention in the context 
of monitoring?  
 
Reply:  The Commission's monitoring approach is based on regular analysis of the evolution EU 
imports of products subject to measures in terms of volumes and prices at export co untry and 
individual exporter level. The trends observed are assessed in the light of company and 
product -related and other economic factors as well as any risk information that is received 
from OLAF, Member States and Union industry.  
 
Question 47:  Is this  monitoring made at the request of the domestic producers, ex officio, or both?  
 
Reply:  The Commission independently monitors measures based on an unbiased, risk -based base. 
Should any substantiated risk information be received from the Union industry, the scheduled 
monitoring activities will be adjusted accordingly.  
 
Question 48:  Could the EU share how effective this monitoring has been in identifying the practice 
of circumvention, preferably indicating numbers of cases identified?  
 
Reply:  During the last 5 years, the Commission has initiated 17 cases (counting by product, country 
and measure type). It is also worth noting that follow -up of monitoring results should not be limited 
to the initiation of anti -circumvention investigations alone. Pr actices that undermine measures can 
be effectively tackled by, for example, sharing fraud information with OLAF and Member States' 
enforcement authorities triggering targeted investigations into irregular trade practices identified.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 3.1.6.2. Safeguards  
Question 49:  According to Article  7.2 of the WTO  Agreement  on Safeguards, in case the measure 
is extended for more than 4 years, evidence must be presented that the domestic industry is 
adjusting. In what terms is this evidence required from the domestic indu stry by the 
European  Union ? Is there a list of elements that must be presented or a model adjustment plan to 
be observed by the domestic industry?  
 
Reply:  The Commission refers to section 3.2 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 
2021/1029 of 24  June 2021 amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 to 
prolong the safeguard measure on imports of certain steel products. The Commission also confirms 
that under its domestic legislation there is not an exhaustive list of elements that the domestic 
industry must present or a particular model of adjustment.  
 
Question 50:  Brazil noted that global overcapacity for steel products was raised as an " unforeseen 
development" under Article  XIX of GATT/1994 in the process leading to the imposition of the existing 
measure on this type of product. Given that this problem dates back to the 1970s, and has been 
particularly acute since the 2008 global financia l crisis, how does the European  Union  characterize 
the unpredictability of this factor?  
 
Reply:  The Commission refers to the findings of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body in the case 
European  Union  – Safeguard Measures on Certain Steel Products (DS595), in particular to 
sections  7.3.2.1. and 7.3.2.2. where the Panel confirmed the European Commission's determination 
that the increase in overcapacity was correctly established as an unforeseen development in line 
with the WTO  Agreement  on Safeguards.  
 
Questio n 51:  Considering that the global production overcapacity for steel products, and even its 
latest deepening, has been going on for more than a decade, how is it possible to establish a causal 
relationship between this factor and a sudden and recent increas e in European imports under 
Article  2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards?  
 
Reply:  The Commission refers to its findings in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 
2018/1013 of 17  July 2018 imposing provisional safeguard measures with regard to imports of 
certain steel products; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) of 31  January  2019 imposing 
definitive safeguard measures against imports of certain steel products and Commission 
Implementing Regulation (EU) of 12  January  2023 amending Implementing Regulation  (EU) 
2019/159 imposing a definitive safeguard measure on imports of certain steel products following a 
report adopted by the World Trade Organization's Dispute Settlement Body, where it set out the 
relevant findings related to this question.  
 
3.3.2.2 Tec hnical requirements and European harmonized standards – Paragraph 3.180  
Question 52:  The EU made 261 new TBT -related notifications. In this sense, article 2.9.1 
TBT Agreement  establishes that Members notifications "shall take place at an early appropriate 
stage, when amendments can still be introduced and comments taken into account". Since last TPR, 
EU has issued several notifications related to pesticides. Could UE inform how the comments received 
are taken into account? Would EU offer some examples of dr aft technical regulations that were 
modified due to comments received during the period established by notifications?  
 
Reply:  The European Commission reviews all comments received by other members in the 
framework of the TBT agreement. One way the EU strives to demonstrate how it takes these 
comments into account is by providing and making public detailed answers to the comments  
received. An example of a measure that was improved with the input received through TBT enquiry 
point is G/TBT/N/EU/918.  
 
3.3.3 Sanitary and phytosanitary requirements – Paragraph 3.206  
Question 53:  The document mentions "(…) WTO Members raised 32 STCs on  SPS measures applied 
by the European Union, of which almost half were related to MRLs of pesticides or maximum limits 
of contaminants". Does the EU consider that this considerable number of STCs can indicate the bloc's 
lack of compliance with internationa l standards, guidelines and recommendations for setting MRLS?  
 
Reply:  Under the SPS  Agreement , WTO Members have the obligation to notify, at an early stage, 
any proposed SPS regulation that may have a significant effect on trade of other Members and are 
not based on relevant international standards. The EU transparency practices and procedures are WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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fully in line with the WTO rules. This is well -reflected in the volume of EU notifications, the 
well-organised interaction amongst EU players (European Commission , EU Delegations, Member 
States (MSs) and stakeholders), and the intensive regulatory dialogue between the EU and other 
WTO Members.  
 
The EU made 257 new SPS -related notifications, which almost half were concerning MRLs. In this 
regard, paragraph 5 (b) of Annex  B of SPS  Agreement  establishes that Members notifications 'shall 
take place at an early stage, when amendments can still be intr oduced and comments taken into 
account'.  
 
Question 54:  Since last TPR, EU has issued several notifications related to pesticides. Could EU 
confirm that when such notifications were made, amendments could still be introduced? Would EU 
offer some examples o f draft sanitary measures that were modified due to comments received during 
the period established by notifications?  
 
Reply:  The EU studies carefully the comments received and discusses them with the EU Member 
States at the meetings of the Standing Commit tee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed – 
Section  Phytopharmaceuticals, Pesticide Residues (SC PAFF). All comments received from non -EU 
countries are considered and discussed before any draft Regulation is adopted.  
 
For example, a draft Regulation updating MRLs for pyriproxyfen is expected to be adopted in 
September 2023. The draft Regulation was notified to the WTO -SPS Committee on 23  February  2023 
in G/SPS/N/EU/618. A request was received not to lower the MRL for banana, which was at a safe 
level, pending the submission of a full import tolerance request. The request was supported by 
Colombia and Ecuador. As concrete data from a first residue trial was submitted with specific plans 
for further generation of data, along with support from the producing countr ies, the EU decided to 
grant the request and maintain the MRL for bananas, pending the submission of an import tolerance 
request.  
 
3.3.4. Competition policy  
Question 55:  It would be useful to receive information on what are the current Guides and 
Guidelines on Competition Law and Policy that the Commission is working on. In EU's view, what is 
the difference between "Guides" and "Guidelines"?  
 
Reply:  The Commission adopts interpretative text facilitating the application of EU competition rules. 
They help to provide for transparency and legal certainty with regard to the Commission's 
enforcement practice. They can have different titles, such a communications, guidelines or n otices. 
Currently, the Commission is working on the revision of its notice on market definition, on its 
guidelines on the applicability of Article  101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European  Union  
to horizontal cooperation agreements and on Guidel ines on the applicability of Article  102 of the 
TFEU to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings.  
 
3.3.4 Competition policy – Paragraph 3.212.  
Question 56:  Could you please give us more detail on how the self -assessment conformity 
mechanism o n Vertical Block Exemptions applies in practice?  
 
Reply:  In order to determine whether a vertical agreement qualifies for block exemption, it is 
necessary to calculate the market shares of the parties involved (to verify compliance with the 30% 
market shar e threshold) and to check whether the agreement contains certain severe restrictions of 
competition that are listed in the block exemption regulation ('hardcore' restrictions). These include, 
for instance, resale price maintenance and territorial and custo mer restrictions. If any hardcore 
restrictions are present, the agreement cannot benefit from the block exemption and will have to be 
assessed individually under Article  101(1) and Article  101(3) (using the guidance provided in the 
Vertical Guidelines). No n-compliance with the block exemption does not create any presumption of 
a competition law infringement.  
 
3.3.4.1 Competition policies during emergencies – Paragraph 3.215.  
Question 57:  Does the non -intervention policy for targeted actions in this case ap ply irrespectively 
of any competition analysis?  
 
Reply:  In general, the non -intervention policy is designed to provide legal certainty and promote 
efficiency by allowing parties to engage without the need for extensive competition analysis. WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 However, the ap plication of such policy often relies to a case -by- case assessment in which 
competition analysis is not completely disregarded.  
 
3.3.4.5 Sector inquiries and reports – Paragraph 3.220.  
Question 58:  How does the Commission decide on which sector it will co nduct specific inquiries?  
 
Reply:  Where the trend of trade between Member States, the rigidity of prices or other 
circumstances suggest that competition may be restricted or distorted within the common market, 
the Commission may conduct its inquiry into a particular sector of the economy or into a particular 
type of agreements across various sectors.  
 
4.1.2 Agricultural policy – Paragraph 4.8  
Question 59:  Could the EU provide information on how CAP with sustainability claims goes away 
from trade -distorting support measures?  
 
Reply: See reply to question 61 . 
 
Question 60:  Could the EU provide information on how this support will not favor the production in 
places with less agricultural aptitude, which hence will negatively affect the environment?  
 
Reply: See reply to question 61 . 
 
Question 61:  How the EU intends to apply t hese support measures considering that those measures 
are needed to keep artificially viable the economic aspects of the activity and this should not be 
considered sustainable?  
 
Reply:  The EU will to reply to questions 59 -61 together, as they are linked wi th CAP support which 
falls under Green box, and the new environmental requirements.  
 
The majority of our CAP support (85%) qualifies as "green box". As such, EU support has no, or at 
most minimal, trade -distorting effects or effects on production, in line  with Annex  2 of the 
WTO Agreement  on Agriculture: this is the case for decoupled income support, investment aid, 
payments under environmental programmes (organic, animal welfare), payments under regional 
assistance programmes, general services.  
 
The CAP 2 023-27 supports agriculture in making a much stronger contribution to the goals of the 
European Green Deal, and financial support to farmers is linked to stricter environmental 
requirements. Each EU country is obliged to ensure a higher ambition in environ ment and climate 
action compared to the previous programming period; and to contribute to the Green Deal targets. 
Beneficiaries of the CAP have their payments linked to a stronger set of mandatory requirements. 
For example, on every farm at least 3% of ara ble land is dedicated to biodiversity and non -productive 
elements, with a possibility to receive support via eco -schemes to achieve 7% of such areas. 
Wetlands and peatlands are also protected. At least 25% of the budget for direct payments is 
allocated to eco-schemes, providing stronger incentives for climate -and environment -friendly 
farming practices and approaches (such as organic farming, agro -ecology, carbon farming, etc.) as 
well as animal welfare improvements. At least 35% of funds for rural developme nt are allocated to 
measures to support climate, biodiversity, environment and animal welfare. 40% of the CAP budget 
has to be climate -relevant and strongly support the general commitment to dedicate 10% of the EU 
budget to biodiversity objectives by the e nd of the EU's multiannual financial framework period.  
 
4.1.3.1 Direct payments – Paragraph 4.42  
Question 62:  The most supported sectors in 2021 were the three mentioned animal -related sectors. 
These sectors are highly supported due to a multiplicity of pr ograms (260 measures) or due to 
market conditions?  
 
Reply : Those sectors have been supported as they have been identified by the Member States as 
important and undergoing certain difficulties, such as difficult market conditions. Livestock 
production gener ally has high costs and low profitability across the Member States.  
 
4.1.3.2 Internal market support – Paragraph 4.47  
Question 63:  About public intervention, which will be the quantitative limitations, for eligible 
products, in 2023 and 2024?  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Reply:  2023 a nd 2024 fall beyond the scope of this exercise. However, the EU can confirm that the 
quantitative limits for eligible products, subject to buying in at fixed price,  that are explicitly 
mentioned in paragraph 4.47 of the report of the WTO Secretariat, apply  also in 2023 and 2024.  
 
Question 64:  In the case of government support for private storages, are these private storages 
accounted for the Public Stock Holding notification in WTO?  
 
Reply:  Support for private storages is reported in supporting table DS:8 a s 'other product -specific 
support'.  
 
4.1.6 Market access – Paragraph 4.70  
Question 65:  Is there any intention to simplify non -ad valorem  duties, particularly in the near 
future?  
 
Reply:  The EU does not consider that its tariff structure needs simplification. The EU's import regime 
for agricultural products is fully transparent and predictable as set out in the EU's WTO schedule.  
 
4.5 Services  
Question 66:  Which authority is responsible f or the enforcement of the "Digital Markets Act" (DMA)?  
 
Reply:  The European Commission is the sole enforcer of the DMA. A joint team in the 
Directorates -General for Competition (DG COMP) and Communications Networks, Content and 
Technology (DG CONNECT) is r esponsible for the implementation and enforcement of the DMA.  
 
Question 67:  What is exactly the role of National Competition Authorities and the 
European  Competition Commission in the enforcement of the "Digital Markets Act"?  
 
Reply:  The DMA foresees a rol e for national authorities to assist the Commission in the enforcement 
of the DMA, and provides for a mechanism of cooperation and coordination between the European 
Commission and the enforcement authorities applying national competition rules.  
 
Question 6 8: The definition of "Gatekeepers" in the DMA seems rather subjective with terms such 
as "considerable impact on the internal market" and "have a well -established position in their 
operations". Will the Commission give additional guidance on how these term s will apply in practice?  
 
Reply:  The DMA establishes a set of clearly defined objective criteria to identify "gatekeepers"  There 
are three main criteria that bring a company that provides a core platform service within the scope 
of the DMA:  
 
1. A size that impacts the internal market:  when the company achieves a certain annual turnover 
in the European Economic Area (EEA) and it provides a core platform service in at least three EU 
Member States;  
2. The control of an important gateway for business users towards final consumers:  when the 
company provides a core platform service to more than 45  million  monthly active end users 
established or located in the EU and to more than 10,000 yearly active business users established 
in the EU;  
3. An entrenched and du rable position:  in the case the company met the second criterion during 
the last three years.  
More information can be found here : Q&A: DMA: Ensuring fair and open digital mar kets (europa.eu) . 
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 INDIA  
Questions based on secretariat Report (WT/TPR/S/442)  
 
WT/TPR/S/442, Pg. 13, Para - 24 Regarding telecommunications, the European Electronic 
Communications Code (EECC) entered into force in 2020 and continues to be transposed by some 
member States. The abolition of roaming charges for customers travelling occasionally within the 
European  Union  was evaluated and extended until 2032, while newly established termination rat es 
for intra -EU calls are being phased in until 2024. Many member States implemented, or plan to 
implement, measures contained in a new toolbox to mitigate certain cybersecurity risks related to 
5G, and some amended or implemented new laws addressing risks  related to high -risk vendors. 
Complementary to these efforts, the new Directive on the Security of Network and Information 
Systems (NIS 2) replaced an earlier Directive and will be transposed by member States by 
mid-October 2024.  
Question 1:  
The EU is req uested to explain the cybersecurity risks associated with 5G and how the new toolbox 
mitigates those.  
 
Reply:  As 5G will play a key role in our digital economy and society in the years to come, we need 
to ensure that 5G networks are cybersecure and resilie nt against increasing cyber threats and 
incidents. The risks associated with 5G have been identified and analysed in detail by Member States, 
with the support of the Commission and EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), in the EU coordinated 
risk assessment published in October 2019. The report identifies the main threats and threats actors, 
the most sensitive assets, the main vulnerabilities (technical and non -technical) and a number of 
strategic risks associated with 5G networks. The report presents five ri sk scenarios with 
nine concrete risks, linked to insufficient security measures; the 5G supply chain; the 
modus  operandi  of main threat actors; interdependencies between 5G networks and other critical 
systems; and end user devices.  
 
To mitigate these risks , the EU 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox recommends a set of comprehensive 
measures that should be taken by all Member States and by the Commission. The EU 5G Toolbox 
covers strategic and technical measures and notably recommends Member States to:  
 
- Strengthen security requirements for mobile network operators (e.g. strict access controls, 
rules on secure operation and monitoring, limitations on outsourcing of specific functions, etc.);  
- Assess the risk profile of suppliers, and as a consequence, apply relevant restrictions, including 
necessary exclusions, for suppliers considered to be high risk, for key assets defined as critical and 
sensitive in the EU coordinated risk assessment (i.e. core network functions, network management 
and orchestration funct ions, and access network functions);  
- Ensure that each operator has an appropriate multi -vendor strategy to avoid or limit any major 
dependency on a single supplier (or suppliers with a similar risk profile), ensure an adequate balance 
of suppliers at nat ional level and avoid dependency on suppliers considered to be high risk.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442, Pg. 13, Para - 24: Regarding telecommunications, the European Electronic 
Communications Code (EECC) entered into force in 2020 and continues to be transposed by some 
member States. The abolition of roaming charges for customers travelling occasionally within the 
European  Union  was evaluated and extended until 2032, while newly established termination rates 
for intra -EU calls are being phased in until 2024. Many member St ates implemented, or plan to 
implement, measures contained in a new toolbox to mitigate certain cybersecurity risks related 
to 5G, and some amended or implemented new laws addressing risks related to high -risk vendors. 
Complementary to these efforts, the n ew Directive on the Security of Network and Information 
Systems (NIS 2) replaced an earlier Directive and will be transposed by member States by 
mid-October 2024.  
Question 2:  
The EU is requested to explain how high -risk vendors are identified and what is t he criteria used.  
 
Reply:  
The EU 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox recommends to national authorities to assess the risk profile of 
suppliers and apply restrictions, including necessary exclusions, to effectively mitigate the risks for 
key assets defined as critica l or sensitive in the EU coordinated risk assessment report (i.e. core 
network functions, network management and orchestration functions, and access network WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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functions). To this end, the EU 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox provides guidance on objective criteria, 
including technical and non -technical risk factors, to assess the risk profile of suppliers, notably:  
 
- The likelihood of the supplier being subject to interference from a non -EU country. Such 
interference may be facilitated by, but not limited to, the pr esence of the following factors:  
 
o a strong link between the supplier and a government of a given third country;  
o the third country's legislation, especially where there are no legislative or democratic checks 
and balances in place, or in the absence of security or data protection agreements between the EU 
and the given third country;  
o the characteristics of the supplier's corporate ownership;  
o the ability for the third country to exercise any form of pressure, including in relation to the 
place of manufacturing of the equipment.  
- The supplier's ability to assure supply.  
- The overall quality of products and cybersecurity practices of the supplier, including the degree 
of control over its own supply chain and whether adequate prioritisation is given to security practices.  
 
It is for Member States individually to carry out their assessment of risks related to suppliers, also 
taking into account the threat assessment by national intelligence services, and on this basis, to 
determ ine the appropriate scope of the applicable restrictions.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442, Pg. 13, Para - 24: Regarding telecommunications, the European Electronic 
Communications Code (EECC) entered into force in 2020 and continues to be transposed by some 
member States. The  abolition of roaming charges for customers travelling occasionally within the 
European  Union  was evaluated and extended until 2032, while newly established termination rates 
for intra -EU calls are being phased in until 2024. Many member States implemented , or plan to 
implement, measures contained in a new toolbox to mitigate certain cybersecurity risks related to 
5G, and some amended or implemented new laws addressing risks related to high -risk vendors. 
Complementary to these efforts, the new Directive on the Security of Network and Information 
Systems (NIS 2) replaced an earlier Directive and will be transposed by member States by 
mid-October 2024.  
 
Question 3:  
The EU is requested to provide the details of the new Directive on the Security of Network and 
Information Systems (NIS 2).  
 
Reply:  As a result of an extensive and detailed consultation with Member States and stakeholders, 
as well as an impact assessment process, the Commission proposed in December 2020 a revised set 
of rules aiming to address the de ficiencies of the current NIS Directive, to adapt it to the current 
needs and make it future -proof.  The Directive on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity 
across the Union (NIS 2 Directive) entered into force on 16  January  2023. Member States will now 
have until October 2024 to transpose the Directive into national law.  
 
The revised NIS Directive covers medium and large -sized entities from more sectors based on their 
criticality for the economy and society and, at the same time, leaves s ome discretion to Member 
States to identify smaller entities with a high security risk profile.  NIS2 strengthens security 
requirements with a list of focused measures including incident handling and crisis management, 
supply chain security, vulnerability h andling and disclosure, cybersecurity testing, and the use of 
cryptography, and, where appropriate encryption.    The Directive introduces more stringent 
supervisory measures for national authorities, stricter enforcement requirements and aims at 
harmonisin g sanctions regimes across Member States.  It also enhances the role of the NIS 
Cooperation Group in shaping strategic policy decisions on emerging technologies and new trends, 
increasing information sharing and cooperation between Member State authorities.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442, Pg. 16, Para - 1.9 – The European  Union 's reliance on imported energy products 
also had a particular influence on several parts of its economy. Imports of higher -priced energy 
products affected the trade balance and the wider economy as the value of imported energy more 
than doubled since mid -2021 before falling slightly in fourth quarter 2022 (Chart  1.2). The 
composition of imports in value terms has changed; pre -pandemic, energy products accounted for 
about 15% of imports, whereas in second  quarter 2022 it was over 22%, reflecting price 
developments. While the imported value of energy products has increased significantly since 2019, 
the volume remained relatively stable.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Question 4:  
The EU is requested to provide the break -up of trends in en ergy imports referring to coal 
(HS 270111, HS 270112, HS 270119), crude petroleum (HS 2709), natural gas (HS 271111, 
HS 271121), and electrical energy (HS 271600).   
 
Is there a pressure of shifting the usage from less polluting fuels (natural gas) to more polluting 
fuels like coal?  
 
Reply:  
In 2022, coal generated 18% of the electricity consumed in the EU  (or 429 TWh) compared 
to 16% (or 418 TWh) in 2021. Nevertheless, already by the end of 2022, we saw coal use in the EU 
decreasing, indicating that the coa l phase out process in the EU has not been interrupted, and no 
Member State has put into question their coal phase out commitment.  
 
Find below links to the tables with the trends in energy imports referring to the different materials 
mentioned:  
 
Solid fossil fuels: Statistics | Eurostat (europa.eu)  - Data refer to country of origin. Intra -EU data 
are als o included, but you can see that in the split of origins.  
 
- Crude oil: Statistics | Eurostat (europa.eu)  
Data refer to country of origin. Intra -EU data are also included, but you can see that in the split of 
origins.  
- Natural gas: Statistics | Eurostat ( europa.eu)  
Data refer to country of origin. Intra -EU data are also included, but you can see that in the split of 
origins.  
- Electricity: Statistics | Eurostat (europa.eu)  
Data refer to country of last consignment.  
 
Question 5:  
How has the Ukraine -Russia conflict impacted or influenced it?   
 
Reply: The EU imported in 2021 still 40% of its coal from Russia, followed by the US, Australia, 
Colombia and Canada. After the EU's sanctions against Russian coal imports in early 2022, more 
coal became imported fr om the US, Australia, Colombia and Canada but also from new sources in 
Africa, Latin America and Asia.  
 
Question 6:  
Where does the EU see itself in meeting the NDC under the UNFCCC?  
 
Reply: The EU is well on track towards achieving its 2030 NDC, as you ca n see in our latest progress 
report: Climate Action Progress Report 2022 (europa.eu) . 
 
WT/TPR/S/442; Page 17; Para 1.10:  
 
Moving towards a deeper or strengthened fiscal integration has been a long -term undertaking of the 
European  Union  and one that is still a work in progress. Certain EU fiscal rules have been in place 
since the early 1990s through the Maastricht Treaty, i.e. the requirements for member States to 
keep their government deficits below 3% of GDP and the debt -to-GDP ratio below 60%. Since 1997, 
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has expanded upon this by monitoring and coordinat ing national 
fiscal and economic policies for deficit and debt criteria, so as to prevent excessive government 
deficits. As noted in previous Reviews, regulations in the so -called "Six Pack" and "Two Pack" further 
strengthened certain fiscal measures durin g the eurozone crisis, which have led to better 
coordination of economic policies and strengthened budget surveillance.  
 
Question7:  What are "Six Pack" and "Two Pack" regulations as referred above?  
 
Reply:  The "Six -Pack" describes a set of European legisla tive measures to reform the Stability and 
Growth Pact and introduces greater macroeconomic surveillance. They are a set of five regulations 
and one directive that entered into force in 2011. The measures aim at strengthening the procedures 
to reduce public  deficits and address macroeconomic imbalances. The Two -Pack comprises 
two Regulations designed to further enhance economic integration and convergence amongst euro WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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area Member States. The Regulations build on and complement the Six -Pack reforms to the Sta bility 
and Growth Pact, the European framework for fiscal surveillance, and the European Semester for 
economic policy coordination.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442, Pg. 17, Para - 1.11 - The changing economic environment in response to the 
pandemic and the war in Ukraine has had a profound impact on the fiscal landscape. Part of the 
pandemic response involved significant support measures (Section  3.3.1), but there has also been 
increased coordination between EU and member State policies, not only among member State s as 
was the case previously. Various supports at the EU level, combined with additional national support 
measures, have led to rising debt -to-GDP ratios, i.e., around 90%, which were last seen in the 
2008-09 financial crisis.  
Question 8:  
The changing glob al economic environment owing to the two abovementioned factors has had a 
profound impact on the fiscal landscape in the EU.  India would like to understand what measures 
were taken by the EU to undertake rationalization of government spending/expenses.  
What other macro economic variables have been stressed under this twin crisis besides the rising 
debt-to-GDP ratio?  
 
Reply:  
Inflation and interest rates have increased, besides general government balances. Debt -to-GDP 
ratios have benefited from high inflation in the short term, but the impact of inflation on public 
finances could be more challenging in the medium -term.  
 
Economic challenges that were evident prior to the pandemic, including the need to strengthen 
potential growth, to accelerate the twi n transition in a fair way and to improve resilience, coupled 
with demographic developments, will increase the demands on public finances in the medium term. 
In this context, Member States have been advised to adopt fiscal policies that aim at preserving 
debt sustainability as well as raising growth potential in a sustainable and inclusive manner, thus 
also facilitating the task of monetary policy. Maintaining a high level of public investment, while 
reducing debt -to-GDP ratios in a sustained manner, reinfo rce the need to prioritise expenditure and 
build fiscal buffers. On 24  May 2023, the European Commission recommended to the Council of the 
EU to adopt country -specific recommendations for each EU Member State, with a view to coordinate 
EU fiscal policy in this direction.  
 
The EU is in the process to reform its fiscal framework to strengthen debt sustainability and promote 
the reform and investment necessary to increase economic growth and resilience. The Commission 
as adopted legislative proposals on 26  April 2023 and is engaging with the Council of the EU and the 
European Parliament to have the legislation adopted by the end of the year.  
 
Question 9:  
How has the private sector performed in the post -pandemic recovery period of 2022 and the first  half 
of 2023 ? 
 
Reply:  
According to the latest Spring forecast, the EU economy is set to be on a higher real GDP growth 
path than previously projected. The volume of output by end 2024 is expected to be around 6% 
above the pre -pandemic level and around 5% above the pre -war level. However, it is set to remain 
almost 2% below the output that was projected before the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine 
(in the Winter 2022 interim Forecast).  
 
Private consumption is still below pre -pandemic level in 2022 although slig htly. On the contrary, 
GFCF registered a more dynamic comeback reading 2.1% higher in 2022 than in 2019. Moreover, 
the inclusion of very volatile growth data for Ireland in the two quarters before the pandemic mask 
a much quicker recovery of the rest of EU  economies, which surpassed the pre -pandemic level 
already in 2021 and stepped up to a 4.6% higher GFCF level in 2022. Looking at the investment to 
GDP ratio, in 2022 this is 1.2 pp. higher than 2019 for the total investment.  
 
After returning to pre -pande mic volume in 2022, private consumption and investments are expected 
to support growth in 2023 and 2024. Private consumption is set nevertheless set to remain subdued 
in 2023 and rebound more vigorously in 2024. Continued erosion of workers' purchasing pow er and 
larger debt repayments are holding consumption back. As inflation loosens its grip on households' 
budgets, employment continues to expand and wages accelerate, growth of real disposable income WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 366 - 
 
  
 of households is set to gain strength, leading to a rebo und in private consumption in 2024. The 
household saving rate is also expected to decrease slightly further, close to the rate recorded before 
the pandemic and to its long -term average. Private investment is set to be more dynamic, as healthy 
balance sheet s, strong profits, positive countershock in the EU terms -of-trade and the continued 
support of the RRF, more than offset the headwind of tiger financing conditions and softening 
demand.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442, Pg. 18, Para - 1.13 – Reforming the European  Union 's economic governance 
framework, i.e., the promotion of sound fiscal policies and coordination of economic policies, 
advanced during the review period. The Commission launched a review process in February 2020, 
and a communication on proposed reform was issu ed in November 2022. The overall goal of the 
proposed reform is to facilitate effective economic surveillance through a new common framework. 
The Communication, in which discussions are ongoing among stakeholders, outlines an improved 
governance architectu re and a number of other changes that will have an impact on key economic 
policy issues. The main elements are (i)  national plans based on an expenditure rule as a single 
operational indicator; (ii)  more gradual adjustment supported by reforms and investme nt; (iii)  a 
focused and streamlined surveillance framework, including for the operation of enforcement 
procedures; and (iv)  a more risk -based surveillance framework, with adjustment paths that ensure 
that high debt ratios are on a plausibly and continuousl y declining path.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442, Pg. 18 & 19, Para - 1.15 – The European Semester continued its coordination 
and surveillance of economic and social policies throughout the review period. Periodic discussion 
and coordination of economic, social, and budgeta ry plans of member States have allowed greater 
monitoring and identification of potential macroeconomic imbalances. In response to the COVID -19 
pandemic, the European Semester was impacted by the activation of the escape clause of the SGP 
in March 2020, wh ich allowed member States to temporarily deviate from the normal budgetary 
requirements. As of the end of 2022, these temporary deviations were still in place and would 
continue to apply in 2023, and be deactivated as of 2024. The European Semester has bee n adapted 
to work alongside other new instruments that were created as part of the pandemic response, 
i.e., the Recovery and Resilience Facility's plans, during 2022. Moreover, in 2022, the 
European  Semester also coordinated the response to the war in Ukra ine and its impact on energy 
markets. As a consequence, recommendations were agreed for taking action in terms of energy and 
fiscal policy measures. The European Semester is expected to continue as the overarching 
framework but be adapted to the emerging c onsensus following the economic governance review.  
 
Question 10:  
The EU is requested to provide details of the enforcement mechanisms and surveillance mechanisms 
for tracking any deviation from the commonly determined goals by the national governments – 
especially socio -economic parameters, like labour law, domestic vio lence, crime etc.  
How does the EC enforce any violation of the commonly determined roles?  
 
Reply:  
In the face of the current geopolitical reality and complex economic and social challenges, the EU 
seeks to build a robust and future -proof economy that secur es competitiveness and long -term 
prosperity for all. For an integrated approach across all policy areas to increase productivity, 
resilience, fairness and sustainable growth, the European Semester provides the policy coordination 
framework, embedding also implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) and EU 
funded cohesion policy programmes.  
 
· The annual European Semester country reports provide a comprehensive view of each 
country's performance and specific challenges across a wide range o f policy areas and corresponding 
indicators. They serve as analytical underpinning for country -specific policy recommendations 
addressed by the Council to individual Member states calling them to address key challenges and – 
where relevant – any existing o r emerging macroeconomic imbalances.  
 
· Each year, after multilateral scrutiny and endorsement by the heads of state, the Council of 
the European  Union  adopts the country -specific policy recommendations with a view to guiding 
national policy -making for the coming 12 -18 months. Progress towards addressing the 
recommendations is tracked through regular reporting and assessment.  
 
· In the context of the RRF , Member States had to ensure that the investment and reforms 
included in their national plans address "all or a significant subset of challenges identified in the WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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relevant country -specific recommendations". Payments under the RRF are conditional on the 
fulfilment of milestones and targets related to the effective enforcement of the reforms and 
investments.  
 
As regards fiscal policy more specifically, the EU fiscal framework – the Stability and Growth Pact - 
contains a gradual system of financial sanctions that, however, have been used only to a very limited 
extent.  
 
· For euro area Member States, the current legislation includes a system of deposits and fines 
in case of deviation from prudent fiscal policy and in case of excessive deficit. The introduction  of 
swifter sanctions and reverse qualified majority voting for Council decisions in the last revision of 
the fiscal framework reinforced the role of the Commission.  
 
· In addition to the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, EU funding can be suspended – even 
must in some circumstances - in case of non -compliance with the EU's fiscal framework under the 
macroeconomic conditionality of structural funds.  
 
· On 26  April 2023, the Commission presented legislative proposals to implement the most 
comprehensiv e reform of the EU's economic governance rules since the aftermath of the economic 
and financial crisis. While the proposals provide Member States with more control over the design 
of their medium -term plans, they also put in place a more stringent enforce ment regime to ensure 
Member States deliver on the commitments they undertake in their medium -term fiscal -structural 
plans.  
 
Question 11:  
What is the impact on the third countries regarding the noncompliance of national governments to 
the EC's commonly de termined goals?  
 
Reply:  The European Semester is the framework for integrated surveillance and coordination of 
economic and employment policies across the European  Union . As such, it does not involve non -
Member States. For details, please see https://commission.europa.eu/business -economy -
euro/economic -and-fiscal-policy -coordination/european -semester_en .  
  
WT/TPR/S/442, Pg. 19, Para - 1.16.  The European  Union  has set out its common Policy 
Objectives and Priorities for 2020 -2024, which identify its political goals or top priorities. Several of 
these policy objectives have an impact on the E uropean  Union 's economic policy direction, including 
ensuring a full recovery from the COVID -19 pandemic; prioritizing actions that accelerate the 
transition to a fairer, healthier, greener, and more digital society; and strengthening the economy 
to make i t more resilient and robust. As part of this policy direction, six broad strategic priorities 
have been identified, each with a number of plans, sub -components, strategies, or agendas that 
contribute to the overall objective:  
1. An economy that works for p eople – Ensuring social fairness and prosperity;  
2. A Europe fit for the digital age – Empowering people with a new generation of technologies;  
3. A stronger Europe in the world – Reinforcing responsible global leadership;  
4. Promoting our European way of life – Protecting citizens and values;  
5. A European Green Deal – Striving to be the first climate -neutral continent; and  
6. A new push for European democracy – Nurturing, protecting and strengthening democracy.  
Question 12:  EU is requested to provide t he details of its initiatives taken under the 'Europe fit for 
the digital age' objective and how it is reflected in its bilateral or multilateral trade agreements.  
 
Reply:  The following initiatives fall under the "Europe fit for the digital age" objective : Digital 
Services Act, Digital Markets Act, European Chips Act, European Chips Act, European Digital Identity, 
Artificial Intelligence, European data strategy, European Industrial Strategy, Contributing to 
European Defense, Space and EU -US Trade and Techn ology Council. While not all of these initiatives 
are relevant for trade policy, as is the case for all WTO Members, EU's trade policy is guided by its 
domestic legislative framework. EU's position in its bilateral and multilateral trade agreements reflect  
its domestic legislative framework which is fully aligned with EU's international obligations.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442; Page 22, Para 1.2.5:  
Comparable to the situation of other economic benchmarks, EU employment showed similar trends 
during the review period with a slight downturn in 2020 due to the pandemic, and a subsequent 
improvement in 2021 (Table  A1.1). The increase in 2021 was significant as the employment rates WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 in a majority of member States (16 of 27) exceeded pre -pandemic levels and reached 73 .1% of the 
working age population, the highest number in more than a decade.29 Data for 2022 so far indicate 
continuation of this trend, as the employment rate reached 74.7% in the third quarter of 2022.30 
The unemployment rate dropped to 6% in November 20 22, the lowest level since recording began 
in 2000. The economic recovery has had an overall positive effect on employment with the EU labour 
market improving significantly. There are still significant variations among the member States with 
the lowest une mployment rate at 2.8% (Czech  Republic ) and the highest at 14.8% (Spain) in 2021, 
and total hours worked and hours per employee lagged, and thus had not yet reached pre -pandemic 
levels as of the end of 2021. Much of the growth was in public sector employme nt, 
i.e., administration, education, health, and social work.  
Question13 : It calls for women's rights and empowerment and makes the mainstreaming of gender 
equality also a priority for the EU's external relations. Through the EU's digital strategy and 
sustainable growth, the EU seeks to ensure women's equal access to the potential of digital 
technologies. How does the EU plan to measure and show progress using quantitative indicators?  
 
Reply:  
The EU's work on gender equality in its external relations is gui ded by the EU Gender Action Plan III 
(GAP III). One of the thematic priority areas of the GAP III is on gender equality in the digital 
transition, and it includes a number of quantitative indicators to measure progress on this. These 
indicators can be foun d in the staff working document 'Objectives and indicators to frame the 
Implementation of GAP III', which accompanies the GAP III. The indicators include:  
 
- Number of women's organisations and networks with increased capacity to participate in 
discussion s on gender -responsive ICT policies and plans  
- Number of actions, taken by partner government, which contribute to the development of 
legal or regulatory frameworks governing online abuse, violence and bullying  
- Number of people with access to Internet with EU support (disaggregated by sex, geographic 
region, urban/rural, age group, and type of connection, i.e. mobile or fixed)  
- Number of people who have benefited from institution or workplace -based vocational 
education and training/skills development interventions supported by the EU  
- Number of digital start -up enterprises led by women who benefit from financial support and/or 
training.  
 
Question14 : Is GAP III dynamic and inclusive to learn from what is very much an evolving area of 
practice, and to c ontinue to gather best practices and to develop new methods to measure 
transformative change over the coming years. Also, as it reiterates the aim for 85% of its 
development projects to contribute to gender issues by 2025, the mainstreaming target first 
appeared in the Commission's Gender Action Plan for 2016 -2020, with an initial aim of hitting 85% 
by 2020. However, only 64.25% of new projects had gender equality as one of their objectives, as 
released by EC. GAP III is a very ambitious project, EU may out line its strategy on how to tackle 
gender equality in individual countries/ Member States?  
 
Reply:  
The GAP III is a very ambitious policy for gender equality in the EU external action, aligned to the 
EU Gender Equality Strategy, which presents policy objec tives and actions to make significant 
progress by 2025 towards a gender -equal Europe.  
 
The GAP III 85% target has also been included in the EU's external relations funding regulation 
for 2021-2027 (NDICI -GE), under which EU's external relations programs are funded and 
implemented. In 2021, 70% of the actions adopted in 2021 were gender responsive (marked as G1 
or G2 as per the OECD DAC gender equality policy marker), showing progress towards the 85% 
target. For external action, under the GAP III each of the EU Delegations also have a Country Level 
Implementation Plan (CLIP), under which they ensure the country level implementation of the 
GAP III.  
 
Within the EU, the EU Member States are guided by the EU Gender Strategy (2020 -2025), which 
released  its third report in March taking stock of where the EU and its Member States stand on 
gender equality. It also highlights the EU's achievements under the strategy and gives inspiring 
examples from the Member States and EU -funded projects in these areas.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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WT/TPR/S/442; Page 24, Para 1.34:  
More recently, in 2022, trade with the Russian  Federation  was noticeably impacted by the war in 
Ukraine and resulting sanctions and related measures. In 2021, the Russian  Federation  was the 
European  Union 's third -largest p artner for imports, and the fifth largest for exports with a growing 
bilateral trade deficit. Based on partial year 2022 data (February -September), EU exports to the 
Russian  Federation  have fallen significantly, from 4% to 1.8% of total extra -EU exports co mpared 
to the same period in 2021, with all product categories showing significant declines except for 
vegetable products, which increased slightly.43 The most significant declines were precious stones 
and metals, including gold, which fell by over 70%; an d computers, telephones/cell phones, motor 
vehicles and their parts, and aircraft, which declined the most in overall value terms.44 It is 
noteworthy that most of these categories had a relatively high incidence of sanctions applied 
compared to other categ ories. On the other hand, imports rose in value terms, due to higher energy 
prices, by 73% in 2021 over 2020, and then peaked in March 2022. Thereafter, there was a steady 
decline in imports from the Russian  Federation  for the remainder of 2022; this in pa rticular 
concerned declines for imported coal, natural gas, petroleum oils, fertilizers, and iron and steel.  
Question 15 : How does the EU trade policy plan to address the present Supply Chain disruptions 
for both agri and non -agri products?  
 
Reply:  
Since 2020 supply chains have been confronted to a number of crisis and disruptions – the latest 
the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine – which have created tensions in our economies and 
revealed vulnerabilities, in particularly related to lack of diversi fication of sources for certain inputs, 
and to unreliability of certain logistic routes.  
 
• The EU believes that the best insurance policy for our supply chains is to rely on a diversity of 
key suppliers and related industrial capacities. In many cases, e .g. of certain minerals, it is not 
possible to find significant supplies in the EU. Relying on a diversity of partners, and building strong 
links with them whenever possible, will be key for security of supply.  
• In other cases, it will be possible to sour ce and to build capacities in the EU, which adds to 
the overall security of supply. Each situation will need to be looked at on the basis of the principle 
of diversified sourcing.  
 
The EU is not going to close to the world in our search for resilience. We are convinced that economic 
openness is a strength. For instance, the Covid -19 crisis, where the EU was the number one exporter 
of vaccines, showed that EU openness was essential for developing and ramping up vaccine 
production in Europe – for the EU, and for the world at large.  
 
What the EU intends to do is strengthen the fundaments of the fabric of trade, so that trade continues 
to flow in times of growing international tensions. For this, we want to improve the transparency of 
supply chains, increase div ersification of vulnerable supplies, and work for closer partnerships with 
our key trade partners.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442, Pg. 31, Para - 2.4. - During the review period, the European  Union  embarked 
on a new development strategy under the European Green Deal (2019) with the aim of becoming a 
carbon -neutral economy by 2050. This target became binding in July 2021 with the adoption and 
entry into force of the Regulation establishing the framew ork for achieving climate neutrality 
(European Climate Law).6 In addition to the European Green Deal, the European  Union  adopted a 
Digital Strategy (2020 and 2021) to maximize the benefits of technological progress, and a new 
political agenda (2019) to bec ome "stronger in the world" by reinforcing its global influence and 
leadership.7 These strategies, in particular the European Green Deal, imply significant changes and 
coordination across sectors and policy areas, and have led to the Review of various EU p olicies 
including, inter alia, its agriculture, energy, industrial, and trade policies.  
 
Question 16:  EU is requested to provide the details of its Digital Strategy and how it is reflected in 
the EU's trade relations with other WTO members.  
 
Reply:  The fo llowing initiatives fall under the "Europe fit for the digital age" policy programme: 
Digital Services Act, Digital Markets Act, European Chips Act, European Chips Act, European Digital 
Identity, Artificial Intelligence, European data strategy, European In dustrial Strategy, Contributing 
to European Defense, Space and EU -US Trade and Technology Council. While not all of these 
initiatives are relevant for trade policy, as is the case for all WTO Members, EU's trade policy is 
guided by its domestic legislative  framework. EU's position in its bilateral and multilateral trade WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 agreements reflect its domestic legislative framework which is fully aligned with EU's international 
obligations.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442; Page 33, Para 2.8:  
Regarding the multilateral trading system, the new strategy reflects the key role that the WTO 
continues to play in EU trade policy. The strategy describes the reform of the WTO as one of the 
European  Union 's key priority actions (objective No.  2 and area of action No.  1), and includes a 
dedicated Annex  in this Regard. It also stresses the importance for the European  Union  of taking a 
leading role in the development of trade rules in the WTO on, for example, fossil fuel subsidies and 
digital trade, to advance its green and digital transition s. 
 
Question 17: Digitization faces a wide range of issues, such as differences in the presence of critical 
infrastructure; inappropriate Regulation related to data privacy and localization, cyber security and 
data flows; in underlying capabilities (e.g., basic education) to adapt, adopt and use new 
technologies; and in other non -digital elements (e.g., consumer protection for digital transactions). 
The EU digital transition may soon find serious international obstacles without aiming for a global 
inclusive  digital trade approach. How will the EU promote an inclusive global digital economy that 
considers the differences in capabilities of different partners? Further, how will the EU ensure that 
its norms do not become a barrier to digital trade?  
 
Reply:  
The EU is conscious of these challenges and is responding to them by promoting a human -centric 
approach to digitalisation. We have the frameworks and tools to support that approach. In addition 
to the normative framework set out by the EU's Digital Compass, i n December 2021, the EU has 
launched Global Gateway, our new global connectivity strategy. It is our offer to partner countries 
to respond to today's global challenges. It is sustainable, comprehensive, rules -based, 
human -centric, geographically adapted an d in line with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
and the Paris Agreement, the legally binding international treaty on climate change. Digital is one 
of the five key priority sector of Global Gateway. More than 10% of our external action budget 
for 2021 to 2027 will prioritise actions in digital. For example, under the Global Gateway, we have 
the EU -India Connectivity Partnership1 that aims to do joint work on regulation, support private 
investment in digital infrastructure and more.  
 
Question 18:  The EU claims its objectives at the WTO are to: keep the world's trading system fair, 
predictable and based on common rules. However, Un der the emergency use approvals, the EU 
permits dual MRLs - a higher one for domestic producers under derogation and another - lower one - 
for imported products. This violates the core principles of "Non-Discrimination " and "National 
Treatment " of the WTO Par allelly; it also violates Article  2.3 of the SPS  Agreement  (arbitrary and 
unjustifiable discrimination between members). Rejection of exported consignments by the EU 
applying the hazard -based MRL of ≤0.01 ppm produces serious consequences on agricultural 
production, price and farmers outside the EU countries. Does the trade policy address the above 
concern?  
 
Reply:  
The EU would like to refer to G/SPS/GEN/1896 and G/SPS/GEN/1970.  
 
The purpose of an emergency authorisation is to allow an EU Member State to a ddress serious 
dangers for plant health for which there are no better alternatives. Emergency authorisations are 
issued by EU Member States, in special circumstances, for a limited period of time (not exceeding 
120 days) and for controlled use on specific crops. The aim is to contain an imminent danger that 
cannot be contained by any other reasonable means.  
 
If the use of the authorised product results in residues in food and feed above the EU MRLs, the 
authorising EU Member State may exceptionally allow t he placing on the market of food/feed in its 
own territory provided that the food or feed does not constitute an unacceptable risk. This provision 
has rarely been used in practice. Food containing residues of substances authorised under the 
emergency autho risation above the EU MRL must stay on the territory of the EU Member State which 
granted such an authorisation. These products cannot be traded with other Member States or non -EU 
countries.  
 
 
1 EU-India Connectivity Partnership .  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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The vast majority of emergency authorizations relate to plant p rotection products containing EU 
approved active substances, and to cases for which serious plant health risks relate to e.g. minor 
crops for which regular authorisations have not yet be granted.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442;Page -34, Para -2.9: 
To support the implementati on of its new trade strategy, in 2021 the Commission submitted 
proposals for regulations to the Parliament and the Council (Chart  2.2), including measures to 
counteract foreign practices considered as unfair or coercive.  
One of the proposed measures include "Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) for imports 
of certain goods (i.e. aluminium, cement, iron and steel, fertilizers, electricity, and hydrogen) (area 
of action No. 2)"  
Question 19.  To comply with the CBAM, some developing countrie s, especially the Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs), will need support to incorporate green technologies in their production processes 
and reduce related CO2 emissions. For example, Mozambique's Exports to the European  Union  2019 
in selected sectors likely to be considered in the CBAM.20 is more than 1  billion  USD, and it is the 
12 most exposed countries in terms of aggregated value of exports (billion $). (UNCTAD, 2021, 
https://unctad.org/publication/european -union -carbon -border -adjustment -mechanism -
implications -developing -countries ).  
Complying with CBAM may be more challenging for some developi ng and LDCs than developed 
countries. Does the EU think that CBAM may put these countries in a disadvantageous position while 
exporting to the EU?  
 
Reply:  The EU has carefully assessed the potential impact and given careful consideration, in 
particular to LDCs. Our studies show that exports from LDCs to the EU in the sectors covered by the 
CBAM are limited. The design of the CBAM also took concerns on board, for example through a long 
transitional period. This comes in addition to significant financial supp ort package and capacity 
building programmes assisting developing countries in their green transition. It should be added 
that CBAM does not target countries but applies to goods of certain sectors. These are treated 
individually on their own merits (carbo n emissions and carbon price paid).  
 
The EU will continue in its role as one of the biggest contributors to climate financing in developing 
countries and LDCs. The EU is determined to help developing countries and LDCs making this 
transition but has to mak e sure that it does so in a WTO compatible manner, without bending the 
existing multilateral rules.  
 
The EU Commission, in conjunction with the European External Action Service and EU Delegations 
around the world, will launch an information campaign, featuring online seminars, physical events, 
distribution of guidance documents, and direct assistance, aim ed at assisting third country operators 
and importers to the EU in performing all new obligations required by the CBAM Regulation and its 
secondary legislation. The campaign will start mid 2023 upon the approval of the implementing act 
concerning the repor ting rules applicable in transitional period. This will continue through 
autumn  2023 thus supporting all relevant actors for the entry into force of the regulation in 
October  2023.  
 
As part of the review report to be prepared by the Commission before the e nd of the transitional 
phase, it must also be stressed that the Commission will evaluate and report on the impact on 
countries with special interest to the least developed countries and on the effects of the technical 
assistance given (see to that effect A rticle 30 of the Regulation).  
 
WT/TPR/S/442, Pg. 34, Para - 2.11 - As of January 2023, only the last proposal (the revision of 
the Enforcement Regulation) and the proposal on foreign subsidies had been enacted. The other 
proposed regulations were still unde r discussion with the Parliament and the Council.20 The 
Regulation on foreign subsidies entered into force in January 2023 and will start applying on 
12 July 2023 (Sections 2.4.1, 3.3.4, and 3.3.6). The revision of the Enforcement Regulation entered 
into force on 13  February  2021 and seeks to address the possible inability to enforce EU rights due 
to the absence of a final ruling resulting from the blockage of dispute settlement procedures at the 
multilateral or bilateral level. The Regulation amends Regulation (EU) 654/2014 to enable the 
European  Union  to apply countermeasures (e.g. suspend tariff concessions) in these situations, and 
in particular when a third country breaches its obligations under a WTO  Agreement  and the dispute 
settlement procedure  is blocked because of the current inoperability of the Appellate  Body. 
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Question 20:  
The European  Union  is requested to clarify how its Enforcement Regulation is consistent with the 
WTO rules, particularly the Dispute Settlement Understanding.  
 
Reply:  
The Enforcement Regulation is consistent with the WTO rules, particularly the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding because it applies only in situations in which WTO rules do not stand in the way of 
the adoption of measures under that regulation. This includes s ituations in which a dispute under a 
bilateral trade agreement has concluded and allows the EU to impose measures. It includes 
situations in which Article  XXVIII of the GATT or corresponding provisions elsewhere in the 
WTO Agreement  grant a right to the wi thdrawal or suspension of commitments. It includes situations 
in which Article  8 of the Safeguard Agreement allows the suspension of obligations. It lastly includes 
situations where the EU has conducted dispute settlement proceedings under the WTO's disput e 
settlement system to a point where the EU is allowed to suspend obligations and impose measures 
to induce the other party's compliance with its non -respected WTO obligations.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442, Pg. 34, Para - 2.10 -The proposed measures include:  
 
• a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) for imports of certain goods (i.e. aluminium, 
cement, iron and steel, fertilizers, electricity, and hydrogen) (area of action No.  2). 
 
Question 21:  
The European  Union  is requested to clarify why its carbon border adjustment mechanism should not 
be regarded as a unilateral trade measure and how it is consistent with the WTO  Agreement s.  
 
Reply:  
CBAM is an environmental policy tool to prevent carbon leakage and support t he EU's increased 
ambition on climate mitigation, while ensuring WTO compatibility.  
 
CBAM will ensure that an equivalent carbon price will be paid by domestic and imported products 
and will thus be non -discriminatory and compatible with WTO rules and othe r international 
obligations of the EU.  
 
As it has been designed, CBAM will be applied in an even -handed manner that does not discriminate 
among products or countries. Article  216(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European  Union  
states that "[a]gre ements concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union and 
on its Member States". This obligation applies equally to the WTO  Agreement . Consequently, the EU 
always assesses the WTO compatibility of its legislation, including autonomou s regulations.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442, Pg. 45, Para 2.56 - In addition, the European  Union  adopted in December 2022 
a regulation to deal with the effects of foreign subsidies on the internal market (i.e. subsidies by a 
third country) and ensure a level playing field for all companies/investors. The Regulation seeks to 
identify and address situa tionswhere a company receiving foreign subsidies causes distortions to the 
internal market through, inter alia, its participation in EU public procurements, or the acquisition of 
an EU company or assets affecting the market structure (Sections 3.3.4 and 3. 3.6). The Regulation 
entered into force on 12  January  2023 and will apply from 12  July 2023.98  
Question 22:  
The European  Union  is requested to clarify how its Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the 
European  Parliament and of the Council of 14  December  2022 on fo reign subsidies distorting the 
internal market is consistent with its obligations under the WTO, particularly the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.  
 
Reply:  Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
14 December  2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (FSR) is consistent with the 
EU's international obligations and notably the WTO  Agreement  on Subsidies and Coun tervailing 
Measures (ASCM). Article  44(9) FSR specifies that no action shall be taken under this Regulation 
which would amount to a specific action against a subsidy within the meaning of Article  32.1 of the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measur es and granted by a third country which is a 
member of the World Trade Organisation.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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WT/TPR/S/442; Page 48; Para 3.1:  
The EU Customs Union is a unique structure as the Union has exclusive competence on customs 
legislation and legal acts, but it is the mem ber States that implement the legislation, and operate 
and oversee the movement of goods into and out of the single market.1 The customs authorities of 
the 27 member States have their own officials, electronic systems, and working methods to allow 
the entr y and import into the customs territory of the Union and the exit and export from this 
territory, of goods on a daily basis. Although they have national competences, there is increasing 
coordination and harmonization at the EU level, in particular through new electronic systems 
(Section  3.1.1.3). The European Council, the European Parliament, and the European Commission 
all have roles in ensuring customs cooperation between and among the member States.  
Question 23:  The Communication on trade mentions import s only in the context of increasing 
standards and not in the context of how imports benefit EU consumers and processors. A strategic 
approach to importing should be present in the current Review. Previous approaches to EU trade 
policy and free trade agreem ents (FTAs) recognized the importance of imports. The current Review 
does not incorporate the EU's Raw Materials Initiative, which aims to secure access to critical raw 
materials to support the EU's industry. A key question for the next five years is how t he EU can 
establish strong partnerships involving trade, investment, financial support and other elements of 
cooperation with countries where many key raw materials and other critical products are located, 
including in Africa. What is the EU's approach to imports?  
 
Reply:  
The European Commission adopted on 16th  March  2023 a package with a comprehensive approach 
to secure a resilient, sustainable supply of critical raw materials. This involves both an increased EU 
contribution and increased, more diversified  imports. Through strengthened international 
engagement, the EU intends to diversify and integrate sustainable supply and value chains. With a 
view to building mutually beneficial long -term relationships with resource -rich countries, the EU will 
seek win -win partnerships in full complementarity with the Global Gateway strategy. While these 
partnerships should contribute to the diversification of the EU's raw materials supply chain, they 
should equally enhance the sustainability and value addition in the pro duction of these resource in 
developing and emerging countries.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442, Page 50, Para -3.10: Regarding the EU's policy direction on customs, a strategic 
foresight document was issued in 2020, The Future of Customs in the EU 2040, in which possible 
future long -term visions were presented along with a number of scenarios (Box 3.1).8 According to 
the initiative, it was issued to stay updated with rapidly changing world developments so that the 
European  Union  can adapt and anticipate future changes. The E uropean  Union  also commissioned a 
report called Putting More Union in the European Customs, with 10 recommendations, mainly to 
address how to manage electronic commerce and EU -wide risks.  
Question 24:  EU is requested to explain its report 'Putting More Union in the European Customs' 
and the steps taken to manage electronic commerce. Are the recommendations also incorporated 
in the EU's Free Trade Agreements?  
 
Reply:  
The Commission adopted the customs reform proposal on 17  May, taking into account those 
recommendations. Further information can be found in : 
https://taxation -customs.ec.europa.eu/customs -4/eu-customs -reform_ en.  
 
The legislative proposals will now be sent to the European Parliament and the Council of the 
European  Union  for agreement, and to the European Economic and Social Committee for 
consultation.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442; Page 53, Para 3.1.1.4; Para 3.18:  
EU member States ratified the WTO  Agreement  on Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in 2015 and 
were parties to the TFA when it entered into force in 2017. The Commission and member States 
have been supportive of implementation and h ave provided grants, technical assistance, 
capacity -building, and other support to developing and LDC  WTO Members since the beginning and 
throughout the review period.17 The latest information on assistance and support submitted to the 
Committee on Trade Facilitation shows that the European  Union  has supported 139 countries 
through bilateral or regional i nitiatives. Total budgeted spending was EUR  447 million  on regional 
initiatives and EUR  368.4  million  on single -country programmes. Notifications during the 
2017-21 period provide details on member State trade facilitation assistance.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Question 25: As per Article  7.6.1 of the Trade Facilitation Agreement, 'Members are encouraged to 
measure and publish their average release time of goods periodically and consistently, using tools 
such as  inter alia , the Time Release Study of the World Cus toms Organization'. In this context, are 
the EU and its Member States measuring and publishing the average release times periodically and 
consistently and if so, where can these be located? If not, is there any specific timeline by which the 
EU and its Mem ber States propose to publish the average release times of goods on a periodic and 
consistent basis?  
 
Reply:  Within the framework of the Customs Union Performance voluntary project (CUP), the EU, 
in close cooperation with the EU Member States, has develope d indicators that measure the 
performance of the EU Customs Union in various areas. The processing time performance is 
evaluated by measuring the percentage of import declarations submitted under standard procedure 
that are cleared electronically within  a specified time range. The related indicators measure 
the percentage of import declarations under standard procedures, of which the processing time 
is ≤ 5 minutes, between 5 minutes and 1 hour, within 12 hours, within 48 hours, and beyond 
48 hours . The proc essing time is the time needed by customs authorities to process said declarations 
from the moment of acceptance as defined in Article  172 of the Customs Code to the release of the 
goods for the declared procedure as defined in Article  194 of the UCC.  
 
The distribution of processing times is measured annually in the EU according to the above 
methodology – which is specific and different from the Time Release Study of the WCO. Based on 
the annual data provided by the Member States, a CUP Annual Report is pre pared (sensitive); the 
aggregated data at EU level is however available at the Customs Facts and Figures website: Customs 
are business friendly (europa.eu) . 
 
WT/TPR/S/442; Page55; Para 3.28:  
In response to those findings, the Commission and member States have elaborated common 
financial risk criteria (FRC ) to be applied by member States when controlling goods for release for 
free circulation. The decision establishing the FRC was adopted in 2018 and started to be 
implemented in 2019. One of the criteria aims at addressing the risk of undervaluation and inc ludes 
the methodology and findings identified during common actions and joint investigations. The 
purpose of the criteria is that they have to be applied by all the member States and they define a 
level of risk, which will guide the decision to carry out a  control or not. It is thus a first attempt 
towards a systematic common approach on risk -based controls covering the risk of undervaluation 
fixed in law.  
Question26:  
Please elaborate on common financial risk criteria (FRC) and its implications.  
 
Reply:  The Commission Implementing Decision laying down measures for the uniform application 
of customs controls has been adopted by the Commission in May 2018 and it establishes the common 
financial risk criteria and standards (FRC).  
 
The FRC Decision aims to harm onise Member States' procedures for risk analysis and selection of 
imports for controls. The FRC Guidance complements the FRC Decision and has been endorsed in 
December 2019.  
 
The FRC Decision indicates a series of financial risk criteria and indicators t o be used by the Member 
States for the selection for control of customs declarations. They thus allow the Member States to 
electronically flag transactions that present a potential financial risk and that require further scrutiny 
or control action. Both th e FRC Decision and the FRC Guidance are "sensitive" documents that are 
not available to the public and only made available for customs risk management experts in the 
Member States on a "need -to-know" basis.  
 
Question27:  
"The purpose of the criteria is that  they have to be applied by all the member States, and they 
define a level of risk, which will guide the decision to carry out a control or not."  
Concerning the above statement, how the level of risk is determined?  
 
Reply:  The FRC Guidance provides explana tions on how to implement the FRC. It describes the risk 
areas and how to combine the several risk indicators to identify the relevant level of risk. Both the 
FRC Decision and the FRC Guidance are "sensitive" documents that are not available to the public WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 375 - 
 
and only made available for customs risk management experts in the Member States on a 
"need -to-know" basis.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442; Page 57; Para 3.35:  
Although the various agreements contain unique preferential rules of origin, there are a number of 
common elements that the European  Union  uses in most of its agreements (Box 3.2). It continues 
to use all the different types of list rules, but in recent FTAs these rules have been simplified and 
made more flexible, allowing more non -originating input to reflect  new economic realities and 
integration of industry with the global value chains, while ensuring that significant processing is 
conducted in a Party.  
 
Question28:  
Please elaborate on the significant processing used in the context of the above paragraph.  
 
Reply:  
In order to boost preference utilization, rules of origin have been simplified in recent agreements. 
The EU template, which serves as a basis for rules of origin negotiations, has been determined after 
stakeholder consultations. However, the specif ic RoO in each agreement are the result of intense 
negotiations with our Trading Partners and therefore cannot be fully harmonised.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442, Pg.70, Para - 3.66: The Commission has undertaken a number of initiatives to 
address VAT fraud, in particular as it relates to e -commerce, during the review period. Two directives 
from February 2020 promote cooperation between member State tax authorities, require 
information from payment service providers, and establish electronic standard forms for data 
transmis sion in order to make improvements in the detection of e -commerce VAT fraud. FN88 
Importantly, they establish the Central Electronic System of Payment Information (CESOP), which 
is a centralized database to store the required information and make it availa ble to Member State 
authorities. According to the Commission, the transmission of data must start on 1  January  2024.  
 
Question 29:  EU is requested to provide the details of the Central Electronic System of Payment 
Information (CESOP). Is the EU considering  interoperability of the system with such system in other 
countries?  
 
Reply:  The Central Electronic System of Payment Information (CESOP) is still being implemented 
by the Member States and the Commission according to the specifications described in the C ouncil 
Regulation (EU) 2020/283 of 18  February  2020. The specification does not foresee an 
interoperability of CESOP with similar systems from third countries.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442; Page 84, Para 3.1.6.2; Para 3.102:  
The safeguard measure on steel remained in place during the review period although it was 
examined for prolongation in January 2021 on request of several EU member States. The remedy in 
place at that time was the imposition of TRQs, with an increase of the  quota volume by 3% annually, 
and an out -of-quota duty rate of 25% on 26 steel product categories. The Review showed that the 
industry continued to decline or worsen, losses ensued, and the safeguard measures remained in 
place for three years. The Review r esulted in keeping the measures in place, with an annual TRQ 
growth rate of 3%, for an additional three years, i.e. until 30  June 2024, but to also conduct an 
additional investigation that could terminate the measures after two years, i.e. by 30  June 2023 
 
Question 30:  Following the latest Review of the Safeguard Steel investigation Case Safe009R6, 
Steel products (certain) Indian exports cannot be considered a threat for trade diversion into the EU 
market. Resultantly, the threat of market diversion due to the US Section  232 measure does not 
exist, and so could safeguard measures imposed on India, therefore, be terminated alternatively. 
Could the Commission progressively liberalize the quotas at 5% for India as was determined during 
the initial investigation ?  
 
Reply:  The Commission is assessing, in the framework of the ongoing review investigation initiated 
in December 2022, whether the safeguard measure should be terminated by 30  June 2023. In the 
event the measure is not terminated as a result of this inve stigation, the Commission will assess 
whether the level of liberalization currently in place (4%) is appropriate. The level of liberalization 
will thus be determined by the analysis carried out by the investigation.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 376 - 
 
  
 Question 31:  What are the chances that the Steel safeguard investigation by EC against 
third countries involved to be terminated one year earlier than its current end date of 30  June 2024?   
 
Reply:  The Commission cannot speculate on the outcome of the ongoing review investigation. Any 
proposal will be based on the facts and evidence available to the Commission in the framework of 
the review investigation.  
 
Question 32:  Which practical steps have been implemented to increase transparency in SME 
chapters of New Generation EU trade agreements to h elp SMEs grow their businesses?  
 
Reply:  Dedicated SME chapters in more recent EU trade agreements play a key role in helping SMEs 
ripe their benefits. SME Chapters are meant to raise awareness and address specific SME challenges 
related to trade policy, s uch as access to information. More specifically, dedicated SME chapters in 
EU trade agreements provide for a number of practical steps to further increase transparency for 
SMEs, notably through information sharing. In addition, the SME chapters provides fo r dedicated 
SME contact points tasked with ensuring that SME interests and perspectives are reflected in the 
implementation of the respective agreements.  
 
There are currently two EU trade agreements in force (with Japan and the UK) with a dedicated SME 
chapter while the agreement with Canada includes a joint SME Recommendation which content -wise 
mirrors the provisions in SME chapters.  
 
Question 33:  What all measures do the Commission used to respond to trade defence measures 
imposed on the EU by third countries?  
 
Reply:  The Commission services monitor all trade defence investigations and measures by third 
countries targeting EU exports. It intervene s as an interested party in the framework of an 
investigation, with technical submissions at the various stage of an investigation (i.e. initiation, 
provisional and definitive determinations) or participation in hearings. In case any measures are 
considere d unjustified, the Commission may challenge them at the WTO.  
 
Question 34:  Concerning  "the review showed that the industry continued to decline or worsen, 
losses ensued" . Is there any method or process through which the documents/sources based on 
which the  decisions made by the Commission, even at the overdue stages of the investigations, are 
anyhow accessible to the affected party?  
 
Reply:  The information relied upon by the Commission in its determinations is composed of the 
information received from inte rested parties such as submissions, rebuttals, questionnaire replies, 
etc. Such information is filed in the case file (TRON). In addition, the Commission also gathers 
information on its own in the course of the investigation. In its determinations the Comm ission refers 
to the source(s) of information it relies upon to ensure transparency. Therefore, regardless of what 
type of information the Commission uses, they are accessible to interested parties (either via the 
case file, or via the references provided in the determinations).  
 
WT/TPR/S/442; Page 99, Para 3.3.1.2;Para 3.148:  
State aid is governed by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European  Union  (TFEU) 
(Articles  107-109), as well as various regulations and guidelines of general and sectoral applicat ion 
adopted to a large extent following the State Aid Modernisation (SAM) reform of 2012 to 2014.  State 
aid is in general prohibited under the TFEU, and allowed only under certain conditions subject to 
prior notification to and approval by the European Com mission. Only approved state aid can be 
implemented. To be approved, state aid must comply with certain criteria to ensure it is compatible 
with the functioning of the internal market.185 Certain categories of state aid are exempted from 
the requirements o f prior notification if they meet the conditions under Commission Regulation (EU) 
651/2014, known as the State Aid General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER), or Commission 
Regulation (EU) 1407/2013, known as the De minimis  regulation. Both regulations were  to expire 
in December 2020 and have been extended until December 2023  
 
Question 35:  Does the EU trade policy respect common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR)? 
In support of this, trade rules must enable developing countries to 'leapfrog' over car bon-intensive 
development. Finally, climate -related trade policies must not disadvantage developing countries due 
to their developing status.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 377 - 
 
Reply:  
The EU is committed to fully respecting its international commitments. In fact, Article  216(2) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European  Union  states that "[a]greements concluded by the Union 
are binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its Member States".  
 
In line with its commitment to effectively implement the Paris agreement, reflecting th e principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in the light of different national 
circumstances, the EU is determined to implement policies and measures reflecting its highest 
possible ambition to contribute to global  efforts to limit temperature rise to 1.5C, and expects all 
parties to the Paris Agreement to do the same. The EU policies including climate policies are also 
designed in compliance with the WTO rules.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442; Page106;Para 3.175:  
Manufacturers that decide to use European harmonized standards published in the OJEU are granted 
the presumption of conformity with the essential requirements in the EU legislation and in most 
cases allowed to use a self -certification procedure. If the pro duct complies with these requirements, 
manufacturers can issue an EU declaration of conformity whereby they declare the product meets 
the essential requirements in accordance with EU legislation and can affix the CE marking in the 
product. Manufacturers no t using such European harmonized standards must in certain cases show 
compliance with the product requirements by having recourse to a conformity assessment conducted 
by a third party.  
Question 36:  
How is this self -certification procedure regulated?  
 
Reply : EU product (sectoral) legislation provides for the conformity assessment procedures the 
manufacturer has to follow including self -certification procedure.  
 
Conformity assessment is a responsibility of the manufacturer. However, if required by the relevan t 
legislation, a third party must be involved in the conformity assessment procedure (more information 
under Chapter § 5.1 of the Blue Guide on the implementation of EU product rules, https://eur -
lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52022XC062 9(04)).  
 
Question 37:  
Please elaborate on the scope and jurisdictions of the third parties involved in the conformity 
assessment.  
 
Reply:  Notified bodies are conformity assessment bodies which have been officially designated and 
notified by their national authority of the EU Member States to carry out the procedures for 
conformity assessment within the meaning of applicable Union harmonisat ion legislation when a 
third party is required. They are called 'notified bodies' under EU legislation. Notified bodies take 
responsibilities in areas of public interest and, therefore, must remain accountable to the competent 
national authorities. To be e ligible a body must be a legal entity established on the territory of a 
Member State and, thus, come under its jurisdiction (more information under Chapter § 5.2 of the 
Blue Guide on the implementation of EU product rules ( https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52022XC0629(04 )). 
 
Question 38:  
EU is requested to provide information regarding the specific cases where the declaration of 
conformity by manufacturers that their product meets the essential requirements following EU 
legislation is insufficient, and compliance is to be shown by having recourse to conformity 
assessment conducted by a third  party.  
 
Reply:  Whether the conformity assessment procedure is "self -certification" or it involves a 
third party, depends on the relevant sectoral legislation. Annex  I of the Blue Guide on 
the implementation of EU product rules (https://eur -lex.europa.eu/l egal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52022XC0629(04)) refers to an indicative list of such sectoral 
legislation.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442, Pg. 107, Para.3.183  – 
3.183. Under the EU accreditation framework, each EU member State must have only one 
accreditation body, whi ch must be a member of the EA and have passed EA peer evaluations. 
National accreditation bodies must conduct their activities in accordance with the principle of WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 378 - 
 
  
 non-competition. Based on this principle, they cannot provide accreditation services across t he 
border (with some exceptions), and conformity assessment entities can only request accreditation 
to the national accreditation body of the EU member State where they are located. National 
accreditation bodies of all EU member States are signatories to t he EA MLA, and therefore once a 
conformity assessment entity has been accredited in one EU member State its accreditation is 
recognized as equivalent in all EU member States and any other EA MLA (multilateral agreement of 
mutual recognition) signatory.  
Question 39:  
EU is requested to confirm if national accreditation bodies of countries outside the EU can be a 
signatory to the EU MLA and get recognized for offering accreditation services in the EU.  
 
Reply:  EA MLA is not operated by the EU, but by the EA (Eu ropean Cooperation for Accreditation). 
The The EA members can be signatories of the EU MLA. More information on EA membmership and 
EA MLA can be found at: https://european -accreditation.org/ea -members/criteria -for-membership/  
and https://european -accreditation.org/mutual -recognition/the -ea-mla/.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442, Pg. 107, Para. 3.184  – 
3.184. The EA MLA is recognized by the International Acc reditation Forum (IAF) and International 
Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation (ILAC). Based on these arrangements, certain accreditations 
services delivered by EA MLA signatories are recognized by the signatories to the ILAC and IAF 
mutual recognition arra ngements.  
Question 40:  
EU is requested to elaborate upon whether the accreditation services delivered by the signatories to 
the ILAC and IAF mutual recognition arrangements are recognized by the EA MLA signatories within 
the EU.  
 
Reply:  The voluntary multi lateral mutual recognition agreements between accreditation bodies 
support and enhance trade. The requirements set out in Regulation 765/2008 affect the acceptance 
of non -European certificates and test results accredited by non -European accreditation bodie s 
signatories to the ILAC/IAF MRA/MLA in the following way. With regard to conformity assessment 
delivered in the voluntary sphere, the non -European conformity assessment body opting for 
accreditation may choose whether to resort to the service of a third country accreditation body 
signatory to the ILAC/IAF MRA/MLA or rather to that of an accreditation body established in the 
Union. Non -European conformity assessment attestations issued under accreditation by 
non European accreditation bodies can continue t o be used on the European market but only in the 
voluntary sphere.  
 
Where conformity assessment is required in regulations, national authorities of EU Member States 
may refuse to accept test reports issued under accreditation by non -European accreditation bodies 
not complying with the EU requirements even though they may b e signatories to the ILAC/IAF 
MRA/MLA. However, where government -to-government mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) 
between the Union and a third country in relation to conformity assessment are in place, national 
authorities of EU Member States shall acce pt the test reports and certificates issued by bodies that 
the foreign party has designated under the MRA for assessing conformity in the categories of 
products or sectors covered by the MRA.   
 
WT/TPR/S/442, Pg. 108, Para. 3.188  – 
3.188. In the area of international regulatory cooperation, the European  Union  has mutual 
recognition agreements (MRAs) for the acceptance of conformity assessment results with 
seven  countries: Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, New  Zealand , Switzerland, and the United  States . 
These MRAs cover conformity assessments for selected products such as electrical and electronic 
equipment, telecommunication equipment, and toys.In some cases, these MRAs also provide for the 
mutual recognition of compliance with respect to the use of goods  manufacturing or laboratory 
practices. During the review period, the European  Union  did not conclude any new MRAs and 
announced that the mutual recognition provisions for medical devices under the MRA with 
Switzerland ceased to apply on 26  May 2021 (Secti on 2.3). 
Question 41:  
EU is requested to provide information regarding the scope of conformity assessment activities 
covered by the EU'S MRAs for which the results of another country are accepted in the EU and if 
there are exclusions concerning any conform ity assessment activity.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 379 - 
 
Reply:  
The MRAs that the EU has concluded with third countries are instruments that provide for acceptance 
in the EU of certificates issued by conformity assessment bodies from third countries demonstrating 
conformity with EU man datory legal requirements for certain products such as radio -equipment and 
electromagnetic compatibility, and vice -versa. The MRAs do not exclude or include any specific 
conformity assessment activity, but instead provide for recognition of certificates is sued by 
conformity assessment bodies that have been recognised by the parties to the MRA.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442; Page 109, Para 3.3.3  
Most SPS legislation in the European  Union  is coordinated and developed at the EU level. This 
legislation is vast and comprehensiv e in covering food safety and animal and plant health. It has 
been gradually reformed since 2013 to simplify and build a system covering the entire food chain.  
The EU SPS legal framework comprises legislation of general application, as well as of product - and 
issue-specific, for food safety, and animal and plant health. The main SPS regulations of general 
application are (i)  Regulation (EC) 178/2002 (General Food Law); (ii)  Regulation (EU) 2016/429 
(Animal Health Law); (iii)  Regulation (EU) 2016/2031 (Plant  Health Law); and (iv)  Regulation (EU) 
2017/625 on Official Controls.251 During the review period, and as part of the reform process, the 
European  Union  completed the implementation of the Plant Health Law, the Animal Health Law, and 
the Regulation on Official Controls, all three adopted during the period 2016 -19. 
Question 42:  As per the Secretariat report, the farm and fork strategy 'foresees to integrat e 
environmental considerations in the assessment requests for import tolerances for pesticides not 
approved in the European Union'. Does the EU agree that setting import tolerances of pesticides 
must consider the different environmental conditions in diffe rent countries and that the domestic 
environmental regulations of one Member may be less effective in another Member based on these 
different environmental conditions?   
 
Reply:  
The EU acknowledges that different countries may face different production cond itions and pest 
pressures. However, adverse effects of clothianidin and thiamethoxam on bees are directly linked 
to the intrinsic properties of those substances. Therefore, the risks for bees from outdoor uses of 
these substances are unlikely to be limited  to the European  Union . 
 
As announced in the Farm to Fork Strategy, the EU has committed to take into account 
environmental aspects when deciding about MRLs for substances no longer approved in the EU, 
while respecting WTO standards and other international  obligations. This concerns environmental 
concerns of a global nature, such as the decline of pollinators and insects, or the presence of 
substances that are persistent, bioaccumulating and toxic. The global decline of pollinators is such 
an environmental concern that transcends national boundaries.  
 
Import tolerances for specific substances can be submitted and will be evaluated. If the EU considers 
an environmental risk assessment necessary, this will be based upon environmental endpoints[1] 
that are based on most recent science and compared  to the environmental exposure based on 
supporting evidence provided by the respective third country.  
 
[1]  An example of an endpoint could be the LD 50 for honeybees from a laboratory test according to a 
Test guideline internationally agreed via the OECD.  
 
Question 43:  Further, what kind of scientific evidence the EU proposes to use while integrating 
environmental consideration at the time of assessment of requests for import tolerances for various 
pesticides?  
 
Reply:  The EU would like to refer to the answer to question 42.  
 
Question 44:  The EU's hazard -based approach to pesticide regulation and its "precautionary 
principle" implementation diverges from the science -based risk assessment method. Does the EU 
propose re -evaluating its approach and using science -based methods of setting import tolerances?  
 
Reply: The EU has never used a hazard based approach when establishing maximum residue lev els 
for pesticides and is not planning to do so. On the contrary, all MRLs are established on a basis of a 
thorough science based risk assessment carried out by both an evaluating Member State and the 
European Food Safety Authority as foreseen by the EU MR L Regulation.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Question 45:  In the case of nicotine, in a recent scientific study conducted by EFSA in 
February  2023, the authority has concluded that the existing MRL for tea at 0.6 mg/kg does not 
pose risks for EU consumers. Despite this fact, the EU pro poses to reduce the MRL of nicotine in tea 
to 0.5 mg/kg based on monitoring data on the basis of the As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) 
principle. How does the EU justify the use of monitoring data and ALARA principle to lower the MRL 
when there is a specific scientific opinion in place by the EFSA suggesting otherwise?   
 
Reply:  With a view to protecting vulnerable groups, such as children and the unborn, MRLs in the 
European  Union  are set at the lowest achievable level consistent with good agricultura l practices for 
each pesticide.  
 
In the case of the recently proposed lowering of the temporary EU MRL  for nicotine in teas, the EFSA 
opinion referred to in the question concluded that the existing MRL for nicotine in teas is safe, but 
did not provide any indication that such MRL should not be lowered. The decision of lowering the 
existing MRL was taken ba sed on the available monitoring data, which demonstrated that the new 
level proposed was achievable.  
 
Question 46:  For pesticides whose MRLs are set to the limit of quantification (LoQ) based on 
non-approval of the active ingredient at the EU level, the Me mber States can still issue emergency 
authorizations for producers in their jurisdiction to use that pesticide. Does the EU agree that this 
dispensation is discriminatory against producers in third countries who are not given equal tolerance 
to these pesti cides in case they intend to export to the EU?  
 
Reply:  The EU would like to refer to the answer to question 18.  
 
Question 47:  Could the EU provide an update on the implementation of the EU legislation on 
veterinary medicinal products (Regulation (EU) No 20 19/6), its release date for the final 
antimicrobials list, clarification on the expectations of compliance with the new requirements and 
the transition period offered. Could the EU also share information on how the list of antimicrobials 
reserved for human  use would be maintained to ensure fair, transparent, and science -based risk 
assessment?  
 
Reply:  
Antimicrobials or groups of antimicrobials reserved for treatment of certain infections in humans are 
laid down in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022 /1255[1]. This list will be kept unde r 
continual review in the light of new scientific evidence or emerging information. The process for any 
modification of the Implementing Regulation (including its annex) is the same as the one followed 
for the establishment of the Implementing Regulation. The process includes a scientific assessment 
led by the European Medicines Agency (EMA) based on the criteria laid down in Commission 
Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/1760[2] (notified under G/SPS/N/EU/478), a public consultation and 
notification for comments to the Secretariat of the WTO  Agree ment on the Application of Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures.  
 
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/905[3] is published in the Official Journ al of the 
European  Union . The European Commission is working on the two Implementing Regulations that 
are necessary for the application of Delegated Regulation 2023/905 as established in its Articles  5(1) 
and 6(1) (list of approved third countries and spec ific requirements on the official certificates).  
 
Article  8 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/905 links its entry into application to the date of 
application of the Implementing Regulation referred to in Article  6(1) of that Regulation (24 months 
after th e date of application of the implementing act). The EU will keep third countries duly informed 
of the developments with regard to these Implementing Regulations, including in ad hoc  meetings.  
 
[1]  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1255 of 19  July 2022 designating antimicrobials or 
groups of antimicrobials reserved for treatment of certain infections in humans, in accordance with 
Regulation (EU) 2019/6 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 191, 20.7.2022, p. 58) . 
[2]  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/1760 of 26  May 2021 suppl ementing Regulation (EU) 
2019/6 of the European Parliament and of the Council by establishing the criteria for the designation 
of antimicrobials to be reserved for the treatment of certain infections in humans (OJ L 353, 
6.10.2021, p. 1) . 
[3]  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/905  of 27 February  2023 supplementing Regulation 
(EU) 2019/6 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the application of the WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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prohibition of use of certain antimicrobial medicinal products in animals or products of animal origin 
exported from t hird countries into the Union (OJ L 116, 4.5.2023, p.1) . 
 
Question 48:  Will the EU consider the sanitary status/epidemiological situation of third countries 
when applying Article  118 to prohibit antimicrobials?  
 
Reply:  
The EU would like to stress that Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/905 does not prevent 
third countries from using antimicrobials for growth promotion/yield increase or antimicrobials 
reserved for treatment of certain infections in humans listed in  implementing Regulation (EU) 
2022/1255.  
 
However, in the event that such uses of antimicrobials have taken place, the animal(s) concerned, 
or products derived therefrom should not be exported to the Union. EMA's evaluations were made 
in the context of th e EU regulatory framework, taking into account WHO and WOAH 
recommendations as well as available scientific evidence.  
 
Question 49:  Regarding adopting Maximum Residue Levels for plant protection products, the EU 
has consistently been adopting MRLs  lower than those considered safe by the Codex Alimentarius.  
 
Reply: With a view to protecting all population groups, including vulnerable groups, such as children 
and the unborn, MRLs in the European  Union  are set at the lowest achievable level consistent  with 
good agricultural practices for each pesticide. In case a risk for consumers in the EU is identified for 
a Codex MRL, a lower MRL may be established in the European  Union . 
 
The European  Union  is the only Codex member transparently raising reservation s and 
communicating within the meetings of the Codex Committee on Pesticides Residues (CCPR)every 
time when it is not in a position to adopt a new Codex MRL. The European  Union  also provides 
scientific reasons for its reservations. To increase transparency  and predictability in international 
trade, the European  Union  strongly encourages other Members to do likewise.  
 
Question 50:  In which stages of its risk assessment does the EU consider the standards, guidelines 
and recommendations of the Codex Alimentari us? Do other WTO members perform relevant 
scientific studies and risk analyses when setting MRLs? If so, are these studies transparently referred 
to in the relevant Regulation when published in the European  Union 's official journal?  
 
Reply:  
The EU has a th orough system for risk assessment of pesticides, where maximum residue levels 
(MRLs) can only be established if the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) has confirmed that 
they are safe for consumers. The main objective of the EU MRL Regulation is consume r protection.  
 
Relevant EU legislation requires that where international standards exist, they are to be taken into 
consideration in the development or adaptation of food law. More specifically, the MRL Regulation 
(Regulation (EC) 396/2005) stipulates tha t pesticide MRLs set at international level by the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission should be considered when EU MRLs are being set, taking into account 
corresponding good agricultural practice. As a consequence, EU MRLs are regularly and 
systematically align ed with Codex MRLs (CXLs), provided that these CXLs are higher than existing 
EU MRLs, are related to commodities for which the EU sets MRLs, and are acceptable in terms of 
consumer protection, supporting data and extrapolation rules.  
 
In case a third coun try considers the setting of an MRL in the EU necessary to meet the need of 
international trade, it can submit an application for an import tolerance with the required supporting 
evidence, including the GAP used by that third country. Those data will then be duly assessed by 
one EU Member State and by EFSA and, if the proposed MRL is justified and safe for consumers, it 
can be established in the EU. When EU Regulations setting MRLs based on import tolerances are 
published, reference to the EFSA opinion conc luding on the safety of those MRLs is transparently 
referred to in the Regulation. Any study that may have been used by EFSA to perform its risk 
assessment is transparently referred to in the EFSA opinion.  
 
Question 51:  It is seen that the European  Union  (EU) farm to fork it is targeting half the use of 
chemical pesticides by 2030 and making it legally binding for the member countries. However, 
European Commission's data shows that in the past 10 years, pesticide consumption in the EU has WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 registered a pheno menal growth of 34%. It has increased from 2,60,665 tons in 2012 to 3,49,993 
tons in 2021. With this Regard,  
 
a. How does the EU plan to address this anomaly between the objective and the reality on the 
ground?  
b. What measures are envisaged by the EU in its agriculture sector where the number of 
pesticides is getting smaller but the intense use of select pesticides increasing, which has an impact 
on agriculture and the environment?  
 
Reply:  
The intention of the Farm to Fork strategy is to reduce the use and risk of pesticide use. Thus there 
is no conflict with the figures quoted, with a gradual move from higher risk chemical pesticides to 
lower risk substances and biocontrols. In many cases t hese lower risk substances are used in higher 
volume. IN the calculation of the use and risk weightings are given to different categories of 
pesticides to encourage the use of lower risk substances and using this Indicator there is a  significant 
decrease i n Europe since figures were recorded in 2011. Details of the indicator can be found at the 
following link; Harmonised risk indicators (europa .eu). 
 
The European Commission is taking steps to encourage and facilitate the bringing to the market of 
low risk alternatives, and to encourage the use of Integrated Pest Management as a strategy to 
manage pesticide redu ction.  
 
For example it has recently simplified the data requirements for micro - organisms as Pesticides ; 
Micro -organisms (europa.eu) . 
 
There are currently ongoing discussion with Council and Parliament on a Proposal for a new 
Regulation on the Sustainable Use of plant protection products, with IPM at its core. This can be 
found at;  
SUR Proposal R1 - version for RSC meeting clean LW (004) - additional changes from table (003) 
(europa.eu) . 
 
Question 52:  The Europea n Union 's Draft Commission Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 of the 
European Parliament regarding maximum residue levels for clothianidin and thiamethoxam in or on 
certain products aims at addressing the impacts of the use of these pesticides on pollinators. Whi le 
the global environmental challenges need actions from the global community, this approach does 
not include intruding into the policy -making of the other members, not least when there is no 
evidence. The use of clothianidin and thiamethoxam does not impa ct the honey bee population in 
any of the WTO member countries. Imposing restrictions on their use by the EU is creating trade 
barriers. In this respect, more than 20 member countries in each TBT and SPS committee have 
urged the EU to withdraw the Regulati on. Would the EU indicate when it will withdraw this 
Regulation?  
 
Reply:  
As announced in the EU Farm to Fork Strategy, the EU has committed to take into account 
environmental objectives when deciding about setting maximum residue levels for substances no 
longer approved in the EU due to environmental concerns of a global nature, while respecting WTO 
standards and other international obligations. In February 2023 it has done so by adopting 
Commission Regulation (EU) 2023/334. There is no intention to withdra w the Regulation which was 
notified to the TBT Committee on 6  July 2022 (G/TBT/N/EU/908) and communicated for information 
to the SPS Committee. All comments received were duly considered and replied to.  
 
The EU would like to clarify that this Regulation does not require non -EU countries to ban the use of 
clothianidin and thiamethoxam in their own territory. The EU's objective is to ensure that food and 
feed consumed in the EU do not contribute to the global decline of pollinators, independently  of 
whether the product is produced in the EU or imported from third countries.  
 
With regard to possible trade impacts, the Regulation postpones the application date to 36 months 
after entry into force (instead of 6 months, which is the standard period giv en in the EU). It allows 
products placed on the market before the application date to remain on the market until the end of 
their shelf life. The Regulation will therefore become applicable only at the beginning of 2026, giving 
importers time to adjust.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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WT/TPR/S/442, Pg. 109, Para. 3.194  – 
3.194. Moreover, in May 2020 the Commission adopted the Farm to Fork Strategy to support the 
ongoing reform process and the EU sustainability objectives. The strategy is considered a key 
component of the European Green D eal and has some implications for the EU SPS regime. The 
strategy identifies the areas of action to achieve a sustainable EU food system and comprises an 
action plan for the period 2020 -24 that provides for, inter alia, the reform of the legislation on fee d 
additives, pesticides, food contact materials, plant protection, animal welfare, and marketing 
standards for agricultural and fishery (including aquaculture) products. As part of this action plan, 
the Commission is also expected to propose new legislatio n to extend the scope of the requirement 
on origin labelling, introduce a standardized mandatory front -of-pack nutrition labelling, and 
establish a sustainable food labelling framework to inform consumers about the sustainability 
aspects of food products. This strategy also sets EU targets for reducing the use of chemical 
pesticides (and their risk), antimicrobials, and fertilizers by 2030, and foresees to integrate 
environmental considerations in the assessment requests for import tolerances for pesticides  not 
approved in the European  Union . As announced in the strategy, the Commission plans to present a 
new legislative framework for sustainable food systems in 2023 to, inter alia, incorporate 
sustainability in all food -related policies, as well as a propos al for the setting of EU -level targets for 
food waste reduction.  
Question 53:  
EU is requested to provide information on whether it has any existing labelling framework concerning 
sustainability in food products, and if yes, how would the new framework buil d upon the existing 
framework.  
 
Reply:  
The currently applicable EU legislation related to food sustainability labelling is in particular 
composed of the food information to consumers (FIC) Regulation[1], which includes some general 
rules applicable to all food information including sustainabi lity-related information, and the nutrition 
and health claims Regulation[2], which includes specific rules fra ming nutrition and health claims.  
 
In addition, the following recent European Commission proposals are related to sustainability 
labelling but still have to be negotiated and adopted by the European Parliament and Council:  
 
- The proposal for a Directive amending Directives 2005/29/EC and 2011/83/EU as regards 
empowering consumers for the green transition through better protection against unfair practices 
and better information[3], which proposes to expand the list of practices that are considered as 
misleading consumers to create a safety net for all environmental claims and sustainability trust 
marks, quality marks or equivalent covering environmental or social aspects or both that are made 
on all products, including food products;  
 
- The proposal for a Directive on the substantia tion and communication of explicit environmental 
claims (Green Claims Directive)[4], which proposes a set of rules framing environmental claims on 
all products, including food products.  
 
The framework Commission proposal for a sustainable food system should entail a sustainability 
labelling framework to govern the provision of food information to consumers on the different 
dimensions of sustainability, the environmental, the social and the economic ones. It would 
complement the above mentioned rules.  
 
[1]  Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Co uncil of 25  October  2011 on 
the provision of food information to consumers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1924/2006 and (EC) 
No 1925/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Commission Directive 
87/250/EEC, Council Directive 90/496/EEC, Commission Dire ctive 1999/10/EC, Directive 
2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Commission Directives 2002/67/EC and 
2008/5/EC and Commission Regulation (EC) No 608/2004 Text with EEA relevance – OJ L 304, 
22.11.2011, p. 18 –63. 
[2]  Regulation (EC) No 1924/2006 of the European Parlia ment and of the Council of 20  December  2006 
on nutrition and health claims made on foods – OJ L 404, 30.12.2006, p. 9 –25. 
[3]  COM(2022) 143 final, dated 30.3.2022.  
[4]  COM(2023) 166, dated 22.3.2023.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442, Pg. 110, Para. 3.196  – 
3.196. Three EU agencies continue to support the work of the Commission in this are a: (i)  the 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA); (ii)  the European Medicines Agency (EMA); and (iii)  the WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 384 - 
 
  
 European Chemicals Agency. The EFSA is the EU agency responsible for providing independent 
advice to the Commission regarding food safety based on scientific evidence. The EMA is the EU 
agency responsible for evaluating the applications for marketing authorizations for certain human 
and veterinary medicines regulated at the EU level to be sold in the European  Union  and for making 
a recommendation to the Commission, which is ultimately responsible for their approval. The EMA 
also has monitoring and advisory functions. The European Chemicals Agency is the EU agency 
responsible for providing scientific/technical support to the Commission regarding the de velopment 
of EU legislation on chemicals, as well as for preparing the corresponding implementing legislation.  
Question 54:  
EU is requested to provide information on the market authorization process for human and 
veterinary medicines to be sold in the EU a nd whether EMA is responsible for permitting the 
marketing of medicines at the EU or Member States.  
 
Reply: The market authorization process for human and veterinary medicines in the EU is a process 
that involves EMA, the European Commission, and national competent authorities (NCAs) in each 
Member State.  
 
EMA is responsible for the centralized authorization procedure for human medicines, which means 
that it evaluates and approves medicinal products that are intended to be marketed throughout the 
EU. The ce ntralized procedure is mandatory for certain types of medicines, such as those for the 
treatment of HIV/AIDS, cancer, and diabetes.  
 
EMA is also responsible for coordinating the evaluation of veterinary medicines through the 
centralized procedure. This pro cedure is mandatory for veterinary medicinal products based on novel 
therapies, growth promotors and new active substances. Furthermore, a company may, on a 
voluntary basis, choose to apply for a centralised marketing authorisation for all products for whi ch 
if no other marketing authorisation has been granted withing the Union.  
 
For medicines that are not subject to the centralized procedure, the marketing authorization can be 
obtained through a decentralized procedure: the mutual recognition, the subseque nt recognition, or 
the national procedure. The decentralized procedure involves simultaneous submission of an 
application to multiple NCAs. The national procedure involves submitting an application to a single 
NCA in a Member State. A mutual recognition pr ocedure is applied when first a national marketing 
authorisation has been obtained in one member state and subsequently the same application is 
made in one or more additional Member States. A subsequent recognition procedure is the case 
where after a mutua l recognition procedure the marketing authorisation holders submit the 
application to one or more additional member states.  
 
In all cases, the applicant must demonstrate the quality, safety and efficacy of the medicine. 
Demonstration of the quality, safety  and efficacy can be done by:  
 
- submitting a comprehensive set of data, including results from clinical trials and pharmacological 
and toxicological studies,  
- demonstration of bioequivalence with an already in the EU authorised medicinal product,  
- a letter of access to the quality, safety and efficacy documentation of an in the EU authorised 
medicinal product,  
- based upon bibliographic data demonstrating the  safety and efficacy of the product and product 
own quality data.  
 
The evaluation process involves a rigorous scientific assessment of the data by the relevant 
regulatory authorities and may include consultations with scientific committees and experts.  
 
Ultimately, the decision to grant a marketing authorization is made by the regulatory authority 
responsible for the procedure, whether that is the European Commission or an NCA. Once a medicine 
is authorized, it can be marketed in the EU and its Member Stat es. 
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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WT/TPR/S/442; Pages 117 -120, Para 3.3.6   
Based on the most recent data available, in 2020, total general government procurement 
expenditure on works, goods, and services in the European  Union  (excluding utilities) amounted to 
EUR 2,388  billion  (above and below sustainability thresholds), or about 13.7% of GDP.310 The total 
value of government procurement in the European  Union  for 2020 as published on Tenders 
Electronic Daily (TED), the online platform used for the publication of procurement -related 
information at the EU level, which includes defence and utilities (above government procurement 
thresholds), was about EUR  800.54  billion , 3% more than in 2019.  
 
According to the latest available dat a, in 2016 -19, 25.7% of procurement below EUR  200 million  
was cross -border (direct and indirect), and 74.2% of contracts in value were awarded to domestic 
suppliers.311 For contracts over EUR  200 million , 32.6% of procurement was  cross-border (direct 
and indirect312) and domestic suppliers were awarded 67.4% of the contracts in value.  
 
Based on 2021 data, resort to single sourcing varied across the European  Union  from 28% of the 
number of procurement procedures in Cyprus to 1% in Greece.314 Procurement proc edures where 
only a single bidder submitted a bid varied from 50% of the number of procurement procedures in 
Poland to 9% in Malta. The data show heavy reliance on the lowest price as the sole award criterion: 
in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech  Republic , Estonia, Greece, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovak  Republic , 
and Sweden, more than 80% of the number of procedures were awarded based on the lowest price 
criterion.  
 
Question 55:  The Commission Foreign Subsidies Regulation will apply on 12  July 2023. Which new 
rules will EC apply on checking industrial subsidies granted by foreign non -EU governments?  
 
Reply:  
Under the FSR, the Commission will have the power to investigate financial contributions granted 
by non -EU governments to companies active in the EU. If the C ommission finds that such financial 
contributions constitute distortive subsidies, it can impose measures to redress their distortive 
effects.  
 
The Regulation introduces three tools:  
 
· A notification -based tool to investigate concentrations involving a financial contribution by a 
non-EU government, where the acquired company, one of the merging parties or the joint venture 
generates an EU turnover of at least €500  million  and the parties involved in the transaction were 
granted foreign financ ial contributions of more than €50  million  over the last 3 years;  
 
· A notification -based tool to investigate bids in public procurements involving a financial 
contribution by a non -EU government, where the estimated contract value is at least €250  million  
and the bid involves a foreign financial contribution of at least €4  million  per third country; and  
 
· A general tool to investigate all other market situations, such as greenfield investments, where 
the Commission can start a review on its own in itiative ( ex-officio ). 
 
With respect to the two notification -based tools, the parties will have to notify ex-ante financial 
contributions received from non -EU public authorities prior to concluding a concentration or a public 
procurement procedure above th e relevant thresholds. The Commission can also request ad -hoc 
notifications for smaller concentrations and public procurement procedures if it suspects the 
existence of distortive subsidies. Pending the Commission's review, the concentration in question 
cannot be completed and the investigated bidder cannot be awarded the contract.  
 
If the Commission establishes that a foreign subsidy exists and that it is distortive, it will balance 
the negative effects of the subsidy, in terms of the distortion, with posi tive effects of the subsidy to 
determine appropriate redressive measures or to accept commitments. With respect to the 
redressive measures and commitments, the Regulation includes a range of structural or 
non-structural remedies, such as the divestment of certain assets or providing access to 
infrastructure. In case of notified transactions, the Commission can also prohibit the subsidised 
concentration or the award of the public procurement contract to the subsidised bidder.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 WT/TPR/S/442; Page -123, Para -3.250;Para 3.252:  
Digital technologies have a strong impact on the development of the copyright -intensive industry. 
On 9 March  2021, the European Commission presented a vision and avenues for Europe's digital 
transformation by 2030, including a Digital Compass strategy that includes Digital Businesses as a 
focus. In the area of copyright, important legislative steps have been taken to create a single market 
for copyright -protected digital works.344 In June 2021, the deadline for the implementatio n of 
two recent directives expired: (i)  the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (Directive 
(EU) 2019/790); and (ii)  the Directive on Television and Radio Programmes (Directive (EU) 
2019/789). Implementing acts were notified by a majority of  member States. The Commission also 
published several reports with a focus on the online/digital environment  
 
The Commission also made available two studies mapping the challenges and opportunities for 
cultural and creative sectors in the digital decade an d a study on copyright and new technologies . 
 
Question 56.  Are EU Copyright laws sufficient to address the challenges posed by new technologies 
like generative AI?  
 
Reply:  
The current copyright rules, including Directive (EU) 2019/790 on copyright and rel ated rights in the 
Digital Single Market (hereafter, the 'DSM directive'), already provide a solid framework for 
balancing the protection of rights with the development of AI. For the uses of 'training data', the 
current copyright regime provides that the developer of an AI solution must obtain the consent of 
the rightholder for the use of his works, unless an exception to copyright applies. This was confirmed 
by a recent study commissioned by the Commission and published in March 2022 on "Copyright and 
New technologies", available here:  
https://digital -strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/study -copyright -and-new-technologies  
 
The DSM directive introduced text and data mining (TDM) exceptions that apply to AI training. It is 
in particular the exception in Article  4 ("commercial TDM exception") that is relevant for the 
purpose d of the training of AI. This provision allows to carry  out TDM for commercial purposes but 
gives copyright holders the possibility to explicitly prohibit TDM on their works (opt -out), thus 
preserving a balance between the rights of copyright holders and AI technology developers.  
 
The Commission is currently m onitoring new developments and the challenges they may create for 
EU copyright rules.  
 
Question 57.  Are there any provisions to deal with large language models (LLMs) challenges like 
ChatGPT and other Generative AIs?  
 
Reply: Under the Commission proposal  for the AI Act (of April 2021) General Purpose AI systems 
(GPAIs) are not expressly regulated but GPAIs that are capable of high -risk use cases have to fulfil 
the obligations of high -risk AI systems like any other AI system.  The Council of the Eur opean  Union  
adopted its General Approach  on 6 December  2022 and proposes to regulate GPAI separately from 
other AI systems. The European Parliament's position  is to be adopted in June and would propose 
broader obligations for GPAI, especially for foundatio n models.  After the adoption of the Parliament 
position in June, the co -legislators will discuss the different approaches. The adoption of the rules 
could be expected at the end of 2023, beginning of 2024.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442; Page125; Para 3.258. :  
As part of i ts Digital Single Market Strategy and 2020 IP Action Plan, the Commission continues to 
attach importance to removing unnecessary barriers in the market for the licensing of standard 
essential patents (SEPs). Based on its 2017 Communication to the Instituti ons on Setting out the 
EU approach to Standard Essential Patents, the Commission currently strives to improve 
transparency and predictability in SEP licensing by encouraging industry -led initiatives in the most 
affected sectors. In support of such efforts,  the Commission published several studies including (i)  a 
Pilot study for assessment of Standard Essential Patents; (ii)  a Landscape study of potentially 
essential patents disclosed to the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI); (iii)  a 
study on "Making the rules: The governance of Standard Development Organizations and their 
policies on Intellectual Property Rights"; and (iv)  a study on the relationship between open source 
software and standard setting.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Question 58:  
Concerning the Standard Essential Patents (SEPs), how the essentiality of future declarations and 
already declared patents is determined and regulated?  
 
Reply:  The essentiality of patents declared to Standard Development Organizations (SDOs) such as 
the European Telecommunication s Standards Institute (ETSI) is determined through a process called 
"essentiality declaration" . Patent holders are required to disclose their potentially essential patents 
to the SDO and declare whether they are willing to license those patents on fair, re asonable, and 
non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms.  
 
On 27  April 2023, the Commission introduced a proposal for a new regulatory framework on SEPs. 
Commission's proposals aim to improve transparency and predictability in SEP licensing, and limit 
transaction co sts. The draft SEP Regulation establishes mechanisms to more efficiently determine 
patent essentiality and FRAND licensing rates. The draft SEP Regulation will apply to all standards 
that will be published by SDO's after its entry into force. Existing stan dards will be covered to the 
extent established on the basis of a delegated act to be adopted by the Commission.  
 
A key element of the draft SEP Regulation is the "Competence centre", to be established at the 
European  Union  Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO). One of the tasks of the Competence centre 
would be to administer 'essentiality checks' of registered SEPs through independent evaluators to 
determine whether registered SEPs are in fact standard essential. According t o the draft SEP 
Regulation, these essentiality checks would be conducted based on a randomised sampling from 
SEP portfolios as well as after a proposal of up to 100 registered SEPs annually from any single SEP 
holder or implementer.  
 
Question 59:  
Please el aborate on the mechanism; how the declared essential patent is monitored or cross -checked 
concerning the declaration of essentiality by the IPR/Patent holder?  
 
Reply:  According to the draft SEP Regulation, evaluators are called upon to assess the essentia lity 
of registered SEPs against the standard for which they are registered. Essentiality checks are limited 
to one SEP from the same patent family. The evaluator must summarize the outcome of the 
essentiality check and the reasons for it in a reasoned opin ion or, in the event of peer assessment, 
in a final reasoned opinion that is not legally enforceable.  
 
The competence centre chooses on a yearly basis a sample of registered SEPs from various patent 
families from each SEP holder and with relation to each s pecified standard. Micro and small 
businesses with registered SEPs will be exempt from the yearly sampling procedure. The draft SEP 
Regulation provides for the development of a common methodology for evaluating the essentiality 
of patents by the European C ommission in consultation with relevant stakeholders to ensure 
transparency and predictability in the essentiality evaluation process.  
 
The competence centre will inform SEP holders of selected SEPs for essentiality checks. SEP holders 
can submit a claim c hart, additional technical information, and translations of the patent within the 
established time limit. The centre will publish the list of selected SEPs, and if a SEP has already 
undergone essentiality checks, the previous result will be used for the de termination of the 
percentage of successfully passed essentiality checks per SEP holder and registered standard.  
 
Each SEP holder and implementer can suggest up to 100 registered SEPs annually for essentiality 
check regarding each specific standard. The co mpetence centre assigns the SEPs to evaluators from 
a roster and provides them with access to complete documentation without disclosing their identity 
to SEP holders. The competence centre serves as the intermediary between evaluators and SEP 
holders for c ommunication. If there is a failure to follow formal or procedural requirements or the 
code of conduct, the competence centre may review and maintain or revoke the results of the 
examination or peer evaluation, subject to appeal, upon request or on its own  initiative within one 
month from the publication of the reasoned opinion or final reasoned opinion.  
 
Stakeholders can submit written observations to the competence centre on the essentiality of 
registered SEPs  selected for sampling. The competence centre will communicate the observations 
to the SEP holder who can respond to it.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 The essentiality examination shall be conducted thoroughly allowing for feedback from the relevant 
SEP holder. The evaluator must cons ider any information provided by the SEP holder and issue their 
reasoned opinion to the competence centre within six months. If the evaluator suspects that the 
SEP may not be essential, the competence centre will notify the SEP holder and give them a chanc e 
to respond. The opinion will include details about the SEP and evaluator, the relevant standard, the 
examination procedure summary, the result, and the reasons behind it. The competence centre will 
inform the SEP holder of the evaluator's opinion.  
 
If the competence centre informs the SEP holder that the evaluator believes the SEP may not be 
essential to the standard, the SEP holder may request a peer evaluation before the deadline to 
submit its observations. The competence centre will then appoint a peer  evaluator to consider all 
information submitted by the SEP holder and the initial evaluator. If the peer evaluation confirms 
the initial evaluator's preliminary conclusions, the competence centre will inform the SEP holder and 
invite it to submit observat ions. The peer evaluator will consider the observations and provide a final 
reasoned opinion to the competence centre within three months.  
 
The competence centre will record the outcome of the essentiality check and peer evaluation in the 
register and reas oned opinion in the database. The essentiality check result will apply to all SEPs 
from the same patent family. The centre will publish in the register the percentage of SEPs per SEP 
holder and per specific registered standard that passed the essentiality test. 
 
Question 60:  
Is there any process to update the essentiality as declared by the holder concerning the prosecution 
history of the patent/Application?  
 
Reply:  According to the draft SEP Regulation, the SEP holder shall update the information in the 
register and database to reflect relevant changes in relation to its registered SEP by notifying the 
competence centre within 6 months from the change occurring. This also includes any changes 
related to essentiality.  
 
Question 61.  What are the major barrie rs in the market for licensing standard essential patents 
(SEPs) identified by the studies mentioned above?  
 
Reply:  Barriers can include a variety of issues that may prevent companies from accessing or 
licensing SEPs, such as disagreement over the appropr iate royalty rate, the scope of the license, the 
validity of the SEP or a lack of clarity about which patents are essential for implementing a particular 
standard. Some other possible barriers include:  
 
Hold-out: potential SEP licensee refuses to pay the licensing fees to extract better terms from the 
SEP holder or waiting for the patent to expire.  
 
Hold-up: SEP holder overcharges for licensing, taking advantage of the fact that companies have 
already invested in implementing the standard and have litt le choice but to pay the requested fees.  
 
Royalty Stacking: SEP licensee pays multiple royalties for different SEPs incorporated into a single 
product. The cumulative cost of licensing all of the relevant patents can make the product 
commercially unviable.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442, Page -126, Para -3.266:  
A EUIPO report on Green EU trade marks shows a trend towards use of terms that can be said to be 
related to the protection of the environment and sustainability in trademark registration, with an 
increasing share of su ch filings by non -EU owners. It also shows that SMEs play an important role 
in bringing "green" goods and services to the marketplace.  
Question 62 . Is there any EU study showing that Green trademarks encourage consumers to buy 
products protected under Gree n Trademarks?  
 
Reply:  
"The EUIPO is the European  Union  Intellectual Property Office responsible for managing the EU trade 
mark and the registered Community design. In its analysis of February 2023 "Green EU trade marks 
– 2022 update" , the EUIPO  concluded that "environmental considerations are becoming increasingly 
important for brand owners filing trade mark applications and for consumers who buy the resulting 
products and services ."  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Question 63 . Can the EU mention some of the major challenges the SMEs and other firms face to 
adopt and promote green trademarks?   
 
Reply: There are no particular difficulties for SMEs to register green trade marks. There are general 
difficulties for them to access the IP system, including trade mark registration, b ut those difficulties 
are not specific to green trade marks.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442, Page -128, Para -3.273:  
Given the importance of GIs for the European  Union 's external trade, the Commission has sought to 
include a comprehensive section on GI protection for agricul tural products in the more recent 
generation of FTAs. As a consequence, a large number of EU and third -country GIs are now protected 
through bilateral and regional agreements. For example, the EU -New Zealand  Trade Agreement has 
been concluded and, once ent ered into force, it will protect the full list of EU wines and spirits (close 
to 2,000 names) and 163 of the most renowned EU food GIs. In return, 23 wines and spirits from 
New Zealand  will be protected in the European  Union . The Agreement also foresees th e opportunity 
to add more GIs in the future.  
Question 64.  If any GI -protected product imported under any FTA is infringed in the EU, what is 
the procedure to file a complaint?  
 
Reply: In the EU, it is the responsibility of Member States to ensure adequate protection in the EU's 
territory, of GIs both of EU origin and of third country origin. Member States are obliged to have 
procedures in place to ensure the effectiveness and appropriateness of official controls and other 
official activities across their te rritories. In case of suspicion of non -compliance, the competent 
authorities of the Member State perform investigations in order to confirm or to eliminate that 
suspicion. Where necessary, actions shall include intensified official controls on goods and op erators 
and/or the official detention of goods. Where the non -compliance is established, the Member State 
shall take the necessary action to determine the scope of non -compliance, to establish 
responsibilities, to ensure that the non -compliance is remedied  and to prevent further occurrences 
of such non -compliance. Infringements of the established rules are subject to effective, dissuasive 
and proportionate penalties at Member States' level throughout the Union. The European 
Commission verifies the Member St ates' control procedures, which include inter alia in situ  controls 
and audits. Detailed information on rules and enforcement are set up in Regulation (EU) 
No. 2017/625 (on official controls), Regulation (EU) No.  1151/2012 (on quality schemes for 
agricultural products and foodstuffs) and, Regulation (EU) No.  2019/787 (on spirit drinks). In 
addition, in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 608/2013 the customs authorities of the Member 
States may act at the border and detain goods suspected of infring ing GIs.  
 
Question 65.  Are there any provisions for protecting imported GI products (craft and industrial 
products) in the proposal adopted by the Commission on 13  April 2022?  
 
Reply: Non-European craft and industrial GIs will be protected in the EU throug h multilateral or 
bilateral international agreements that protects these names or that includes the mutual protection 
of such names, or if they make an application that complies with the requirements of the regulation 
on geographical indications for craft and industrial products. Also, under the proposal for protection 
of crafts and industrial products, applicants from third countries will be able to apply for GI protection 
in the EU by directly submitting an application for registration to the European  Union Intellectual 
Property Office . More information on the proposal and relevant provisions can be found in this link: 
Geographical indications for craft and industrial products (europa.eu) . 
 
WT/TPR/S/442; Page 159, Para 4.116:  
In the revised Renewable Energy Directive, the European  Union  has also established a target for a 
renewable energy share of at least 32% of gross final consumption by 2030.138 The Directive also 
establishes a minimum share per member State, applicable since 2021. In 2021, the Commission 
proposed to increase this target to 40%139, with the REPower  EU Plan proposing to increase this 
target further (Section  4.4.5). At the same time, the biodiversity strategy aims to limit the use of 
whole trees, food, or feed crops for energy.140 In mid -2022, based on a Commission Delegated 
Regulation, labelling of investments in gas and nuclear power plants, subject to strict conditions, 
was included in the EU taxonomy for sustainable activities (Section  4.5.1.2.4) that favour the 
transition to a carbon -neutral economy with effect from January 2023.141 At the end of 2022, the 
Council agreed to faster permit -granting processes for renewables (Section  4.4.5).  
Question 66:  The EU is a leader in developing a green taxonomy, but still, more than the EU budget 
is needed to tackle climate change. The significan t increase in climate finance that a developing WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 country would need for its climate transition requires substantial regulatory action and cooperation, 
including benchmarks for transition finance. The joint India -EU Roadmap to 2025 contains elements 
that sup port such cooperation on climate finance. Public finance cannot be the only answer to the 
need for climate finance. India and other countries need to attract private finance. Are there any 
plans to cooperate with developing countries on benchmarks for tran sition financing?  
 
Reply:  The successful experience of Paris -aligned and Climate transition benchmarks has proven 
that these are useful tools in reorienting capital flows towards effective ESG investment strategies. 
The European Commission will explore th e feasibility of an "ESG benchmark", taking into account 
the evolving nature of sustainability indicators and the methods used to measure them. The EU, 
with EU implementing partners (agencies and development finance institutions) in a Team Europe 
approach provides to partner countries a coordinated offer of demand -driven technical assistance to 
support a conducive sustainable finance environment. This includes the development of sustainable 
finance frameworks (e.g. taxonomies, disclosure requirements, green  labels and standards, such as 
benchmarks), including on transition finance.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442, Pg. 166, Para - 4.151 - As part of a digital services package proposed by the 
Commission to establish a single market for digital services, the Digital Services Act (DSA) entered 
into force on 16  November  2022, complementing the Digital Markets Act, which entered into force 
on 1 November. The DSA harmonizes the rules applicable to "intermediary services" in the internal 
market with the objective of ensuring a transpar ent, safe, predictable, and trusted online 
environment. Except in certain circumstances, intermediary services are exempt from liability as for 
content hosted on their platforms. The DSA prohibits EU member States from forcing intermediary 
services to moni tor third -party content while introducing due diligence obligations regarding 
transparency for such services. Under the DSA, very large online platforms (VLOPs) and very large 
online search engines (VLOSEs), will be subject to special rules (see below) and  will be directly 
supervised at the EU level, by the European Commission, with national "digital service coordinators" 
responsible for enforcing the DSA in respect of other intermediary services. The Act also establishes 
an advisory European Board for Digi tal Services composed of national digital services coordinators 
and foresees establishing rules on penalties.  
Question 67:  
The EU is requested to inform what are the circumstances in which intermediary services are exempt 
from liability for content hosted on their platforms.  
 
Reply:  The Digital Services Act confirms the existing approach and framework to the conditional 
liability exemption regime of intermediary services in the EU. Providers of different types of 
intermediary services covered by the Digital  Services Act will continue to be exempted from liability 
for third -party illegal content, subject to certain conditions. This 'intermediary liability exemption' is 
conditional upon the relevant provider acting expeditiously to remove or disable access to illegal 
content upon obtaining knowledge of awareness thereof. The Digital Services Act in addition clarifies 
that voluntary, own initiative investigations, conducted diligently and in good faith, shall not 
automatically lead providers of intermediary serv ices no longer to qualify for the exemption. All of 
this applies to illegal content that is clearly defined in national laws that comply with EU laws, or 
directly in harmonised EU laws. The Digital Services Act also introduces different due diligence 
obligations for intermediary services, including online platforms. The intermediary liability exemption 
is not conditional on compliance with these due diligence obligations.  
 
Question 68:  
Does the advisory European Board for digital services also have the participation of foreign digital 
companies? What are the functions of this Board apart from establishing rules on penalties?  
 
Reply:  The role and structure of the European Board for Digital Services are set out in 
sections  61-63 of the DSA: text of the Digital Services Act . Participation in the European Board for 
Digital Services is restricted to the national Digital Servic es Coordinators of the EU Member States, 
and possibly other competent authorities of EU Member States. All of these authorities are subject 
to strict independence requirements emanating from EU law and confirmed in the Digital Services 
Act. Experts may be invited to participate in the meetings of the European Board for Digital Services.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442, Pg. 168, Para - 4.158 - The DMA contains provisions aimed at restricting 
anti-competitive practices, although the proposed legislation is considered not to be p art of 
competition policy.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Question 69:  
Could the European  Union  inform why measures pertaining to anti -competitive practices in this 
context are not considered a part of competition policy?  
 
Reply:  The EU legislators explain that the Digital Markets Act is needed to complement EU 
competition law in order to safeguard the functioning of the EU's internal market. So -called core 
platform services provided by the largest 'gatekeeper' are not necessarily dominant in competition 
law terms whereas they threaten innovation and contestability in a fast -moving area. Indeed, the 
EU legislator explains in the text of the Digital Markets Act  (recital  5) that: 'the market processes 
are often incapable of ensuring fair economic outcomes with regard to core platform services. 
Although Articles 101 and  102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European  Union  (TFEU) apply 
to the conduct of gatekeepers, t he scope of those provisions is limited to certain instances of market 
power, for example dominance on specific markets and of anti -competitive behaviour, and 
enforcement occurs  ex post  and requires an extensive investigation of often very complex facts on 
a case by case basis. Moreover, existing Union law does not address, or does not address effectively, 
the challenges to the effective functioning of the internal market posed by the conduct of 
gatekeepers that are not necessarily dominant in compe tition-law terms'. Competition law will 
continue to be enforced in parallel to the Digital Markets Act. The EU will leverage its combined 
resources, including in some cases the investigative support of national authorities competent for 
the enforcement of national competition rules. The Digital Markets Act also incorporates an EU -wide 
coordination mechanism that brings together all relevant authorities in the EU, including national 
competition authorities through the European Competition Network.  
 
WT/TPR/S/ 442, Pg. 173, Para - 4.186 – While smaller investment firms that qualify as "small 
and non -interconnected" can be exempted from certain requirements, other firms are subject to 
capital requirements mirroring the risk they pose to clients, markets, and the f irm itself. 
Medium -sized or large firms that offer "bank -like" services and could still pose risks to financial 
stability could also remain subject to the banking rules without having to be authorized as banks, 
possibly at their supervisor's request.  
Quest ion 70:  
What are the criteria based on which an investment firm can be classified as "small and 
non-interconnected" and what specific requirements can such firms be exempted from?  
 
Reply:  Article  12 of the Investment Firm Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2019/2 033) lays down an 
exhaustive list of conditions that need to be met for investment firms to qualify as "small and 
non-interconnected". Their balance sheet should for example not exceed EUR  100 million .  
 
Both the Investment Firm Regulation and the Investme nt Firm Directive (Directive (EU) 2019/2034) 
list several exemptions for the requirements applied to such small and non -interconnected 
investment firms. Investment firms qualifying as small and non -interconnected may for example 
only need to comply with fi xed minimum capital requirements.  
 
Question 71:  
What are the services that are classified as "bank -like" services? Is this categorization present in EU 
laws?  
 
Reply: The identification of investment firms that are considered as posing risks to financial st ability 
on a par with credit institutions, thereby justifying a similar prudential treatment, is notably based 
on the nature of their investment services and activities. An exhaustive list of nine (9) investment 
activities and services is provided under An nex 1 of MiFID (Directive 2014/65/EU) for the purpose 
of the investment firms' authorisation. Out of this list, activities n°3 (dealing on own account) and 
n°6 (underwriting of financial instruments and/or placing of financial instruments on a firm 
commitm ent basis) have been considered as being the most relevant in terms of scale, 
interconnectedness, and risks to the financial stability. Depending on their size, investment firms 
performing those activities may therefore be subject to the prudential require ments applicable to 
credit institutions. This categorisation is established under the Investment Firms Regulation 
(Regulation (EU) 2019/2033).  
 
WT/TPR/S/442, Pg. 175, Para - 4.194 -The Digital Finance Strategy builds on the 2018 Fintech 
Action Plan and has four objectives: (i)  tackle fragmentation in the Digital Single Market; (ii)  ensure 
the regulatory framework facilitates digital innovation; (iii)  establish a common financial data space WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 to promote data -driven innovation; and (iv)  address other risks by ensuring a level regulatory 
playing field for existing and new financial services.  
Question 72:  
Could the European  Union  explain how the Digital Finance Strategy intends to achieve the specific 
goals that have been listed above? What is the meaning of common financial data space? Does it 
imply sharing all or any specific financial data across existing and new financial serv ices? 
 
Reply:  The Digital Finance Strategy outlines the legislative and non -legislative initiatives proposed 
to achieve the four specific priorities.  
 
To achieve the first priority (removing fragmentation in the Digital Single Market), the Commission 
will focus on enabling EU -wide interoperable use of digital identities. This objective is being achieved 
through the Commission's legislative package to strengthen the EU's anti -money laundering and 
countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) rules adopted  in July 2021 and the Commission 
legislative proposal for a framework for a European Digital Identity adopted in June 2021.  
 
To achieve the second priority (adapting the EU regulatory framework to facilitate digital innovation) 
the EU adopted a DLT Pilot Regime regulation in May 2022. The EU adopted the Markets in Crypto 
Assets regulation (MiCA) which is due to become law in 2024.  
 
The third priority is establishing the European financial data space, which will create broader access 
to public and private data in the Union. The European financial data space is focused on the sharing 
of specific financial data across the financial sector. It consists of three objectives: facilitating access 
to publicly disclosed financial reporting on EU companies and invest ments; enabling access to data 
in finance ("open finance"); and facilitating the sharing of supervisory data sharing. The 
first objective is addressed in the Commission's legislative proposal for a regulation on the European 
Single Access Point. The second  objective will be addressed by a forthcoming legislative proposal on 
financial data access ("open finance") in mid -2023, alongside the planned review of the 
Payment  Services Directive (PSD2). The third objective is addressed by the actions in the 
Supervis ory Data Strategy published by the Commission in December 2021.  
 
The fourth priority (Addressing the challenges and risks associated with digital transformation) is 
being achieved by the monitoring of the existing EU legal framework to safeguard and protec t 
consumers in line with competition rules.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442, Pg. 184, Para - 4.242  – International online retail platforms entered the parcel 
delivery market in some member States, according to the report mentioned above. Following the 
elimination of the exe mption from import VAT on small parcels valued below EUR  22 in 2021, 
inbound packet and parcel flow from outside the European  Union  decreased in most member States 
(Section  3.1.1.1). The Commission expects the elimination of exemption from import VAT to 
incentivize consumers to shop more within the European  Union . It could also impact the structure 
of delivery services as foreign companies having used individual parcels in the past could either rely 
on the Import One -Stop Shop or increase customs clearance in bulk coupled with the use of delivery 
services linked to online retail platforms or other local fulfilment service providers.  
Question 73:  
Could the European  Union  explain how the elimination of exemption from import VAT could impact 
the structure of delivery services in more detail?  
 
Reply:  "Regarding the import consignments with a value not exceeding €22, from a customs 
perspective, we have noticed a significant increase in import declaration for low value consignments. 
However, withing the review cycle (2019 Q4 -December 2022) there was no impact assessment done 
on how the elimination of exemption from import VAT may impact the structure of delivery services".  
 
Question 74:  How is incentivizing consumers to shop more within the European  Union  consistent 
with EU's national treatment commitment for retail and courier services under the GATS?  
 
Reply:  The EU does not incentivise consumers to shop more within its borde rs. It strives to maintain 
a well -functioning Single Market, where products can freely circulate and consumers are able to 
compare the offer and prices between Member States. The principle of free circulation of goods 
(Art. 28 TFEU) applies also to importe d goods which have been released for free circulation after 
payment of the import duty to which they are liable. The elimination of the exemption from import WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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VAT aimed to reduce VAT fraud and to streamline the collection of direct taxes through 
administrat ive simplification measures. This policy is in line with EU's commitments under the GATS.  
 
QUESTION BASED ON GOVERNEMENT REPORT  
 
WT/TPR/G/442; Page6; Para 2.8:  
Following Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU has launched the REPower EU Plan 
withthe objective to end the EU's dependence on Russian fossil fuels. The plan aims at fostering 
energy savings, diversification of energy supplies and accelerated roll -out of renewable energy. The 
Recovery and Resilience Fund is at the core of the implement ation of the REPower EU. Member 
States are to integrate a dedicated REPower EU chapter in their Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRPs) 
if they seek to benefit from this additional source of funding.  
Question 75:  
Please elaborate on the considerations of other nations (Developing nations and least developed 
countries) involvement in the REPower EU Plan.  
 
Reply:  The REPowerEU Plan has been accompanied by a Strategy for an EU external energy 
engagement, which lays o ut how the EU plans to support and accelerate the energy transition across 
the globe, including in developing and least developed countries. Please see link:  
https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/energy -strategy/strategy -eu-external -energy -engagement_en .  
 
WT/TPR/G/442; Page 8: Para 3.6:  
While the EU's priority is finding a lasting multilateral solution to the Appellate  Body situation, in the 
meantime, the EU will continue to support the smooth operation of and foster participation in the 
Multi-party interim appeal arbitration arrangement (MPIA). The MPIA is an interim arrangement 
designed to preserve, in any WTO dispute s among participating WTO members, the right to a 
functioning two -tier and independent dispute settlement mechanism under WTO rules. The MPIA is 
open to all WTO members to join, for as long as the Appellate  Body is not able to function fully. Not 
only is t he MPIA of use to regular users of WTO dispute settlement; more fundamentally, it signals 
commitment to a rules -based international trading system, with properly functioning WTO dispute 
resolution at its heart.  
 
Question 76:  
Please explain the procedures r egulated and monitored through Multi -party interim appeal 
arbitration arrangement (MPIA).  
 
Reply:  The MPIA is in essence a political commitment, open to all WTO Members for as long as the 
WTO Appellate  Body remains unable to function fully, to conclude, in  any WTO disputes between 
them, appeal arbitration agreements in accordance with Article  25 of the DSU. The relevant 
procedures are contained in the MPIA communication ( JOB/DSB/1/Add.12).   
 
Question77:  
What are the rules and principles governing the smooth functioning of MPIA?  
 
Reply:  The thrust of the MPIA is to preserve the right of its participants to a binding and two -tier 
dispute settlement system, within the WTO, despite the blockage of Appellate  Body appointments. 
The MPIA participants agree not to appeal panel reports "into the void", while preserving their right 
to appeal through appeal arbitration. Appeal arbitration replicates, in the context of appeal 
arbitration under Article  25 of the DSU, t he core rules and procedures applicable to appellate review 
before the Appellate  Body. That said, the MPIA also incorporates certain novelties, designed to 
enhance the procedural efficiency of appeal proceedings and make it more feasible to respect the 
90-day period for deciding upon an appeal.  The outcome of MPIA appeals – the appeal arbitration 
awards – are binding on the parties and enforceable through relevant provisions of the 
Dispute  Settlement Understanding (Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU).  
 
Question 78: 
By what mechanisms/procedures were the transparency, smooth functioning, and protection of 
other parties' interests regulated through MPIA?  
 
Reply:  In order to ensure the smooth functioning of proceedings, MPIA arbitrators may take 
appropriate organiza tional measures (such as decisions on page limits, time limits and deadlines as 
well as on the length and number of hearings required. 13) and/or substantive (such as an exclusion WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 of claims based on the alleged lack of an objective assessment of the facts pursuant to Article  11 of 
the DSU). All the proposed measures must be without prejudice to the procedural rights and 
obligations of the parties and due process. The availability of administrative and legal support to 
arbitrators also contributes to the smo oth functioning of proceedings.  
 
As for other parties' interests, those are protected in a similar manner as in proceedings before the 
Appellate body. Third participants enjoy the same rights as in Appellate  Body proceedings, 
irrespective of whether they a re, themselves, participants in the MPIA. Rule 24 of the Working 
Procedures for Appellate Review shall applies mutatis mutandis . 
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Pg. 9, Para - 3.13 - The plurilateral WTO Joint Statement Initiative on 
e-commerce remains the EU's priority in t he area of digital trade. Within this Joint Statement 
Initiative, 87 WTO members, representing a mix of developed, developing and least -developed 
countries, are conducting negotiations on trade -related aspects of electronic commerce. The 
COVID -19 pandemic highlighted the importance of digital economy and its huge opportunities by 
lowering the costs for businesses – particularly micro -, small and medium sized enterprises (MSMEs) 
– to access and participate in global markets. A global set of rules an d commitments on digital trade 
within the WTO framework could greatly help to unlock these opportunities, particularly for the 
developing and least developed countries.  
Question 79:  
India requested the EU to respond to how the COVID -19 pandemic highlighted  the importance of 
the digital economy and its huge opportunities by lowering the costs for businesses – particularly 
micro -, small and medium -sized enterprises (MSMEs) – to access and participate in global markets.  
As the MSMEs are not universally defined and have differentia endowments in the capital, turnover 
and labour -based definition – what are the most common endowments used across developing and 
LDCs?  
 
Reply:  In the EU M SMEs are defined as below:  
 
• micro ente rprise: fewer than 10 employees and an annual turnover (the amount of money 
taken in a particular period) or balance sheet (a statement of a company's assets and liabilities) 
below €2  million . 
• small enterprise: fewer than 50 employees and an annual turno ver or balance sheet below 
€10 million . 
• medium -sized enterprise: fewer than 250 employees and annual turnover below €50  million  
or balance sheet below €43  million .  
 
EU is not best positioned to comment on criteria defining MSMEs across different develop ing and 
LDCs countries. We suggest to refer to definitions used by individual national governments or 
multilateral organisations such as World Bank, ADB, IMF or UNDP.  
 
Question 80:  
In the context of e -commerce, the EU is requested to explain how the MSMEs  would have equal 
access/participation in the global market to benefit from - the situation of a stark digital divide.  
 
Reply:  For MSMEs, irrespective of their exact size, digital tools enable them to manage transactions 
at a distance, deliver goods in more efficient way, facilitate access to financing and engage with 
customer s. 
 
Smaller companies often have no resources to concl ude the transaction when it requires staff having 
to travel across the world multiple time to negotiate the transaction, sign the contract and follow up 
on efficient delivery. With digitization all these steps can be done online using different digital too ls 
(virtual communication tools, e -contracts, e -signatures, online shipment tracking) and enable 
MSMEs to take part in transactions they would not be able to participate otherwise.  
 
Question 81:  EU is requested to provide post -COVID growth data in digitali zation and digital trade.  
 
Reply:  EU is not sure to what period is India referring as "post -COVID" and for what region is would 
this request apply. We are not sure how is this question relevant in the TPR review but would like 
to refer to relevant statisti cs of international organisations such as OECD, UNCTAD and the WTO.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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WT/TPR/G/442;Page -9;Para -3.15:  
In addition to the plurilateral work on e -commerce, the EU remains committed to maintaining the 
multilateral moratorium on custom duties on electronic trans missions. The EU is of the view that 
digital trade should be free of customs duties in order to facilitate the widespread adoption of digital 
technologies, which are key for the economic growth of both developed and developing countries, 
their ability to i nnovate and the prosperity of their citizens.  
Question 82:  The EU seeks a multilateral moratorium on customs duties on electronic 
transmissions. However, the EU often seeks a carve -out for its audio -visual sector in its GATS 
commitments and bilateral agre ements. Such carve -outs are also the ask of those seeking to end 
the moratorium. How does the EU reconcile this seemingly contradictory position?  
 
Reply:  For the EU, there is no contradictory position. The EU does not take commitments in the 
audio -visual services sector as part of its endeavour to preserve and promote cultural diversity, in 
accordance with the principles of the UNESCO Convention. Unlike th ose WTO members who oppose 
the multilateral moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions, the EU's approach to 
audiovisual services is not related to the collection of customs duties and does not aim to increase 
revenues.  
 
Question 83:  Please provide the EU view on the scope and the definition of "electronic 
transmissions" in the context of "multilateral moratorium on customs duties on electronic 
transmissions".  
 
Reply: In terms of what the moratorium covers, the EU is of the view that it appli es to all electronic 
transmissions, meaning all digital content that is transmitted electronically, including books, music, 
video, or software that might previously have been delivered on a physical support, as well as newer 
types of activities such as a l ive online lesson or training session. The moratorium does not 
distinguish between different categories of electronic transmissions and, in our view, there is no 
reason to do so, particularly given the fast developing digital economy and trade.  
 
Question 8 4: 
Could the European  Union  please inform that when it mentions, "EU is of the view that digital trade 
should be free of customs duties", does that imply no custom duties on electronic transmission, as 
well as physical delivery of goods ordered online or o nly electronic transmission?  
 
Reply:  The EU considers that the moratorium applies to all electronic transmissions.  
 
Question 85:  EU is requested to provide the provisions related to internal taxes on electronic 
transmission.  
 
Reply:  Value Added Tax (VAT) is a consumption tax that is applied to nearly all goods and services 
that are bought and sold for use or consumption in the EU. The EU has standard rules on VAT. More 
information can be found here: VAT rules and rates: standard, special & reduced rates - Your Europe 
(europa.eu) . 
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Pg. 15, Para - 3.64 -The most recent ministerial meeting of the TTC took place 
on 5 December  2022. In the area of trade, the TTC agreed at this occasion on the need to advance 
the transition to a low -carbon economy in a manner that is mutually supportive and to embark on 
a Transatlantic Initiative on Sustainable Trade. Continued cooperation on investment screening and 
on export controls, including as regards sanction -related restrictions of exports to Russia by 
intensifying information exchange was also agreed. The EU and U S decided to continue work to 
facilitate transatlantic trade giving impetus to expansion of existing mutual recognition agreements 
for marine equipment and the pharmaceutical sector, explore sectorial conformity assessment for 
example in the area of machin ery or promote the use of digital tools to facilitate bilateral trade and 
investment. The EU and US will also continue on non -market economic policies and practices and 
on shared concerns as regards economic coercion. In the area of technology, the TTC pre sented a 
joint roadmap to develop common tools and standards for trustworthy artificial intelligence, 
launched cooperation on quantum and tech for public good, agreed on an early warning mechanism 
and increased transparency commitments for public support i n the semiconductor sector and 
announced digital initiative projects with the partner countries Kenya and Jamaica.  
Question 86:  EU is requested to provide its digital projects with Kenya and Jamaica.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 396 - 
 
  
 Reply:  The aim of the announced projects is to support  these countries in developing secure digital 
infrastructure that underpins their economic prosperity, bridges the digital divide and meets their 
development needs. The support for these and other projects will focus on advancing and prioritizing 
high-quality ICTS infrastructure projects in line with the principles set for the joint EU -U.S. taskforce 
on public financing for secure and resilient connectivity and ICTS supply chains in third countries 
(see p. 24, point 4 in the EU -U.S. Joint Statement of the s econd Trade and Technology Council, 
which took place on 16  May 2022, in Paris -Saclay, France).  
 
WT/TPR/G/442; Page16; Para 3.66.:  
The aim of the GSA is to address shared challenges in the global steel and aluminium sector, 
stemming from global non -market e xcess capacity as well as the carbon intensity of the industries. 
The GSA is intended to become a multilateral effort and is open to interested countries that share 
the commitment of the EU and the US to restore market orientation and reduce trade in carbo n-
intensive steel and aluminium products.  
Question 87:  
Please elaborate on the international standards and best practices to monitor the carbon intensity 
of the global steel and aluminium industries.  
 
Reply:  The Global Sustainable Arrangement (GSA) on steel and aluminium should encourage 
low-carbon intensity s teel and aluminium production and trade, and help restore market -oriented 
conditions globally and bilaterally. Together, the EU and US intend to incentivize emission reductions 
in these carbon -intensive sectors. (Link to the text of the EU -US Joint Stateme nt of 10  March  2023: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_23_1613 ). 
 
Question 88:  
Please elaborate on the procedures to regulate the participation of other parties to restore market 
orientation.  
 
Reply: The Global Sustainable Arrangement (GSA) on steel and aluminium will be open to all 
partners demonstrating commitment to countering non -market excess capacity and reducing 
carbon -intensity in these sectors. (Link to the text of the EU -US Joint Statement of 10  March  2023: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/sta tement_23_1613 ). 
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Pg's. 16, Para - 3.72 -The Digital Partnerships have non -binding Digital Trade 
Principles as a key deliverable. The Digital Trade Principles with the Republic of Korea were signed 
on 30  November 2022, and the one with Singapore on 31  January  2023. The Digital Trade Principles 
with Japan are expected to be adopted in the near future.   
 
Question 89:  EU is requested to explain the implications of non -binding Digital Trade Principles 
with the Republic of Korea .  
 
Reply: The Digital Trade Principles represent a common commitment to open digital markets which 
are competitive, transparent, fair, and free of unjustified barriers to international trade and 
investment. The text of the Digital Trade Principles concluded with the Republic of Korea  is available 
online: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/help -exporters -and-importers/accessing -markets/goods -
and-services/digital -trade_en .  
 
WT/TPR/G/442; Page17; Para 4.1:  
At a unilateral level, the EU's  Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP) removes import duties for 
products coming into the EU market from vulnerable developing countries. Under the standard GSP 
arrangement, the EU currently grants partial or full tariff reductions on around 66% of tarif f lines to 
11 countries. The Special Incentive Arrangement for Sustainable Development and Good 
Governance (GSP+) grants mostly duty -free treatment to essentially the same 66% of tariff lines 
after application and a positive assessment by the EU. In 2022 t here are eight GSP+ beneficiaries. 
The "Everything But Arms" (EBA) arrangement under the EU's GSP gives Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) tariff -free, quota -free access to the EU market for all products except arms and ammunition. 
46 LDCs benefit from the E U's EBA in 2022; in 2021 over EUR  22 billion  of imports into the EU from 
LDCs used EBA preferences, or 66% of all goods imported from LDCs.  
Under the EU's current GSP Regulation, all GSP beneficiary countries (including EBA beneficiaries) 
have to respect t he principles of 15 core conventions on human and labour rights. In addition, the 
GSP+ arrangement requires countries to fulfil, ratify and effectively implement a total of 
27 international conventions covering core human and labour rights, environmental p rotection, and WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 397 - 
 
good governance. A central part of the EU's approach to GSP is to carefully monitor the beneficiary 
countries' respect of these conditionalities. In case of concerns in this respect, the EU engages with 
the relevant beneficiary countries, an d can as a last resort withdraw the preferences. The EU 
reported on the implementation of the scheme in 202016 and will publish a new report in 2023.  
 
The EU GSP is undergoing a review since the current regulation expires on 31  December  2023. The 
review ai ms to maintain the key features of the current scheme, building on its success as evidenced 
in a 2018 independent mid -term evaluation and in the impact assessment for the Commission 
proposal for GSP post 2023. Targeted improvements aim to better respond to  the evolving needs of 
developing countries and reinforce the scheme's social and environmental impact. A new regulation 
was proposed by the European Commission on 22  September  2021. 17 The proposal is currently 
before the EU legislator, and is to be adopt ed in time to provide predictability and stability to 
beneficiaries and business.  
 
Question 90:  As there is still no approval by the Council and Parliament to pass the Commission's 
proposed regulation on GSP, it creates a worrying prospect for all countrie s benefiting GSP who look 
to the EU for support in promoting trade. In the absence of a common position, will the Commission 
consider prolonging the current system like a rollover mechanism until a new regulation emerges?  
 
Reply: The EU will aim to ensure that there is no break in GSP benefits due to internal processes.  
 
Question 91:  Whether the Council and Parliament also view the same stand as the Commission 
regarding the new general threshold to bring down to 47% from 57%.  
 
Reply: The mandates of the European Parliament and the Council both include a reduction of the 
general product graduation threshold to 47%.  
 
Question 92:  Why is the EU making GSP+ so highly conditional? The obligation being proposed by 
the EU are too onerous , particularly demanding ratification of various conventions and agreements. 
Does the EU not think that this is coercive?  
 
Reply: The conditionalities in the EU GSP  linked to international conventions and agreements 
correspond to internationally agreed standards and Sustainable Development Goals. The 
conditionalities are calibrated to the needs of different beneficiaries – there are no ratification 
requirements for s tandard GSP and EBA beneficiairies, which benefit from the scheme only based 
on economic criteria. Conversely, for GSP+ beneficiaries who wish to make further commitments, 
there is a ratification requirement along with a commitment to effective implementat ion.  
 
WT/TPR/G/442; Page -18;Para -5.4: 
The EU is aware that if it wants to pursue global challenges such as combating climate change, 
biodiversity loss, pollution, or promoting more sustainable production and consumption, it needs to 
increase cooperation w ith third countries. In the cases where the European Green Deal policies have 
an external dimension, the EU is engaging with its partners.  
 
Question 93:  WTO members from every continent and across the developed –developing country 
spectrum have raised conce rns on the EU Green Deal policies, primarily on these dimensions:  
 
• extra-territorial application of EU regulations  
• making regulatory and policy choices for third countries, impinging on their sovereignty  
• lack of WTO compatibility  
 
How would the EU re spond to these criticisms?  
 
Reply: We are dealing with an unprecedented climate and environment crisis that requires prompt 
action. We have set ourselves ambitious targets in the Paris Agreement and made commitments in 
the context of multilateral environmental agreements. This requires us to step up efforts, 
internationally and through national policies, to implement our commitments. The EU has developed 
it European Green Deal measures in a way that achieves environmental and climate p olicy objectives 
set in the international commitments and minimises impact on trade.  
 
Conscious of the potential relevance for the EU's trading partners and the need to comply with 
WTO rules, the EU has designed all its European Green Deal measures very ca refully and consistently WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 398 - 
 
  
 with its international commitments and obligations. The aim has been to meet key criteria relevant 
from an external perspective. These include: measures are evidence -based and are underpinned by 
an impact assessment and public cons ultations; measures are based on objective grounds, apply 
equally to domestic and imported products, and are not discriminatory; measures are not more 
burdensome than necessary and include transitional periods for businesses inside and outside the 
EU to ad apt; wherever possible, measures are based on international standards; measures anchor 
also the commitment of the EU to engage with trade partners in international fora to facilitate the 
implementation.  
 
Finally, it is also important to note that the EU h as been a role model for transparency of its 
European  Green Deal measures through public consultations, impact assessments and outreach 
from an early stage in the regulatory processes in different fora, both in the EU and beyond (in 
Brussels, through the E U delegations in partner countries, in the WTO in Geneva and via bilateral 
dialogues). The EU has engaged in the WTO and bilaterally with countries and tried to address their 
concerns while preserving the objectives pursued by its policies. The EU will con tinue its dialogue 
and engagement with its trading partners including once the relevant measures enter into force and 
also in relation to implementing acts and decisions, in the WTO and bilaterally.  
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Pg. 19, Para - 5.5 to 5.9  - The adoption of  the Climate Law on 9  July 2021 sets 
a legally binding target for the EU to reach net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 as well as 
to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 compared to 1990 levels. This 
allowed the EU to adopt and submit to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) in December 2020 an updated and significantly enhanced Nationally Determined 
Contribution in line with the Paris Agreement, confirming Europe's commitment to lead in global 
climat e action.  
On 14  July 2021, the Commission proposed a package of climate, energy and transport legislation, 
the "Fit for 55" package, to accomplish this transformational change across the EU's economy and 
society – matched by commitment to a socially fair t ransition, which leaves no one behind.  
The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is a climate measure aimed at decreasing global 
GHG emissions by preventing the risk of carbon leakage and by supporting increased ambition on 
climate mitigation, while en suring WTO compatibility. The CBAM will equalize the price of carbon 
between domestic products and imports and ensure that the EU's climate objectives are not 
undermined by production relocating to countries with less ambitious climate policies.  
The EU Em issions Trading System puts a price on carbon and lowers the cap on emissions from 
certain economic sectors every year. The European Commission has proposed to lower the overall 
emission cap even further and increase its annual rate of reduction, to phase out free emission 
allowances for aviation and align with the global Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for 
International Aviation (CORSIA) and to include shipping emissions in the EU ETS. To address the 
lack of emissions reductions in road transport an d buildings, a separate new emissions trading 
system is set up for fuel distribution for road transport and buildings. Both proposals have been 
preliminarily agreed in December 2022 and must now be formally adopted by the co -legislators: the 
European Parli ament and the Council.  
Question 94:  
India requests the EU to respond to how exactly the EU intends to achieve net zero and a sustainable 
global environment with the application of CBAM.  
 
Reply:  The European  Union  is determined to ensure that its declared greenhouse gas reduction 
targets, required to keep the temperature goals of the Paris Agreement are implemented in practice. 
This is why the European  Union  is engaged to finalise soon a legislative package to redu ce net 
greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030, compared to 1990 levels ("Fit -for-55" package).  
 
The CBAM is part of a broader set of measures under the EU Green deal which are complementary 
and mutually -reinforcing. The measure is in particular closely linked to the revised EU Emissions 
Trading System (ETS), as free allowances granted under the EU ETS in the sectors covered by the 
CBAM will be gradually phased out under a non -linear trajectory during a 9 -year period starting 
in 2026. In those sec tors, the CBAM will be symmetrically phased -in while free allowances are 
phased out.  
 
The CBAM will support reaching global climate change objectives by reducing the risk that the 
European efforts to address climate change are offset by carbon leakage, by incentivising 
third country producers to reduce their carbon footprint and by incentivising third countries to adopt 
national carbon pricing policies.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 399 - 
 
Question 95:  
When the CBAM  leads to the introduction of taxation, leading to a price enhancement and, thereby, 
loss of competitiveness of the trading partners?  
 
Reply:  The CBAM is a climate policy tool with the objective of preventing carbon leakage, as opposed 
to a tax measure. As  CBAM will apply to the carbon content of goods, efforts to reduce emissions 
will lead to a reduction in the level of the border adjustment. Furthermore, carbon price paid abroad 
(in the form of a cap -and-trade system or a carbon tax) may be credited again st the CBAM charge. 
The CBAM will be introduced gradually providing maximum predictability for investors and 
businesses in the EU and outside and we are committed to ensuring that it is implemented in the 
least trade -restrictive way.  
 
The CBAM will start a pplying with financial adjustment in 2026. As of 2026, the CBAM will start 
applying gradually to the products covered and in direct proportion to the reduction of free 
allowances allocated under the EU ETS for those sectors, ensuring that importers are tre ated in an 
even-handed manner compared to EU producers.  
 
The CBAM is designed to treat foreign producers in a manner equivalent to domestic producers, and 
not distort competition.  
 
Question 96:  
Specifically, use of taxation of domestic and third parties,  is it a solution for reduction of global GHGs 
and climate mitigation?  
 
Reply:  The EU uses a comprehensive mix of policy tools to address climate change. Carbon pricing 
is an essential instrument for a comprehensive strategy to reduce global greenhouse gas  (GHG) 
emissions and mitigate climate change. These measures are applied in a non -discriminatory way.  
 
Question 97:  
Has the Ukraine -Russia conflict impacted the EU's NDCs? How does the EU plan to meet the altered 
targets under the new challenge which has emerged from the conflict?  
 
Reply:  Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has not led the EU to revise its climate objectives 
and the European Green Deal.  
 
The European Climate Law has set into law the goal set out in the European Green Deal for Europ e's 
economy and society to become climate -neutral by 2050. The law also sets the intermediate target 
of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030, compared to 1990 levels.  
 
Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine prompted the Europea n Commission to present the 
REPowerEU plan setting out a series of measures to rapidly reduce dependence on Russian fossil 
fuels and fast forward the green transition, while increasing the resilience of the EU -wide energy 
system.  
 
Question 98:  
How is the EU planning to use the tax collected (government revenues) to achieve a global reduction 
in GHGs? Is the EU planning to create an EU -based green Industries funding like the Montreal Fund?  
 
Reply:  It should first be stressed again that, as a climate mea sure, the CBAM was not designed to 
generate revenues. Should EU's trade partners increase their climate ambition by decarbonising 
their industry or by introducing carbon pricing measures, CBAM revenues will decline. In the long 
run, they may even go to zer o.  
 
To avoid new global dividing lines between partners with a low and high -carbon export structure, 
the EU will continue in its role as one of the biggest contributors to climate financing globally 
continuing to support partners, in particular LDCs and n eighbours in targeted ways, such as through 
technical assistance, technology transfer, extensive capacity building and financial support. The 
objective is to develop industrial production structures that are compatible with long term climate 
goals.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 400 - 
 
  
 Questi on 99:  
The EU is requested to explain how it CBAM  measures a tax collected breaching EU bound levels 
tariffs, a WTO compatible measure. The EU is further requested to list how the CBAM is a 
WTO-compatible measure.  
 
Reply:  The CBAM is not a tax measure or a protectionist instrument. It is there to help fi ght climate 
change by addressing the risk of carbon leakage. It will be applied in an even -handed manner in a 
way that does not constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination for third country producers, or 
a disguised restriction to trade.  
 
CBAM is an environmental policy tool to prevent carbon leakage and support the EU's increased 
ambition on climate mitigation, while ensuring WTO compatibility.  
 
CBAM will ensure that an equivalent carbon price will be paid by domestic and imported products 
and wi ll thus be non -discriminatory and compatible with WTO rules and other international 
obligations of the EU.   
 
As it has been designed, CBAM will be applied in an even -handed manner that does not discriminate 
among products or countries. Article  216(2) of th e Treaty on the Functioning of the European  Union  
states that "[a]greements concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union and 
on its Member States". This obligation applies equally to the WTO  Agreement . Consequently, the EU 
always e nsures the WTO compatibility of its legislation, including autonomous regulations.  
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Pg. 17, Para - 4.2.- At unilateral level, the EU's Generalised Scheme of 
Preferences (GSP) removes import duties for products coming into the EU market from v ulnerable 
developing countries. Under the standard GSP arrangement, the EU currently grants partial or full 
tariff reductions on around 66% of tariff lines to 11 countries. The Special Incentive Arrangement 
for Sustainable Development and Good Governance ( GSP+) grants mostly duty -free treatment to 
essentially the same 66% of tariff lines after application and a positive assessment by the EU. 
In 2022 there are eight GSP+ beneficiaries. The "Everything But Arms" (EBA) arrangement under 
the EU's GSP gives Leas t Developed Countries (LDCs) tariff -free, quota -free access to the EU market 
for all products except arms and ammunition. 46 LDCs benefit from the EU's EBA in 2022; in 2021 
over EUR  22 billion  of imports into the EU from LDCs used EBA preferences, or 66% o f all goods 
imported from LDCs.  
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Pg. 23, Para - 5.26 and 5.27. - EU trade policy helps to promote and protect 
human rights around the world. The EU's broader set of policies and actions in this respect includes 
various trade policy instruments such as the EU's unilateral trade preferences (GSP) (see 
section  4.1), bilateral and regional free trade agreements and trade impact assessments and 
evaluations.  
Under the GSP, the EU monitors respect for the principles of core international conventions on  human 
rights by beneficiary countries. In September 2021, the Commission adopted the legislative proposal 
for a new EU's GSP Regulation to apply as from January 2024, reinforcing support for the promotion 
of international standards in GSP beneficiary coun tries, including by adding new international human 
rights instruments and by rendering the export of goods made by internationally prohibited child 
labour and by forced labour a ground to possibly withdraw trade preferences.  
 
Question 100:  
Reading from par agraphs 4.2, 5.26 and 5.27 can the EU explain how the EU ensure the meeting of 
its commitments under the UNCTAD 1972 Agreements on Special and Differential Treatment, S&DT? 
To quote:  
Furthermore, the General Assembly, in resolution 2820 I (XXVI), paragraph  7 (a) urged the 
Conference at its third session to appeal to preference -giving countries which had not yet done so 
to implement their offers under the generalized system of preferences in favour of developing 
countries; and to pursue efforts in a dynamic context for further improvements of these preferential 
arrangements. (UNCTAD, 1973)  
(https://unctad.org/system/files/official -document/td180vol1_en.pdf ).  
 
India would like a response on the increased use of labour laws beyond the ILOs mandated ones in 
the GSP trade of the EU. India seeks a response from the EU for increased focus on Sustainability, 
Environment and social issues which are difficult to meet as developing countries and the LDCs need 
longer periods of transitions.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 401 - 
 
Reply:  Among the EU GSP's core objectives is the support for sustainable develo pment, including 
human and labour rights, environment and climate, and good governance. The GSP Regulation 
includes relevant ILO fundamental conventions only, which are mandated as such by the ILO. The 
GSP Regulation offers several transitional periods (fo r example for LDCs graduating from LDC status 
and out of EBA; for countries graduating to Upper Middle Income status and out of standard GSP) 
which aim to ensure smooth transition.  
 
WT/TPR/G/442; Page 19, Para 5.1.1:  
The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism  (CBAM) is a climate measure aimed at decreasing global 
GHG emissions by preventing the risk of carbon leakage and by supporting increased ambition on 
climate mitigation, while ensuring WTO compatibility. The CBAM will equalize the price of carbon 
between domestic products and imports and ensure that the EU's climate objectives are not 
undermined by production relocating to countries with less ambitious climate policies.  
Question 101:  With CBAM certificates based on actual embedded emissions, the EU would p rotect 
against carbon leakage while incentivizing third -country exporters to move towards cleaner 
production processes in the supply chain.  
Does the EU plan to allocate the proceeds generated from the CBAM certificates to the developing 
countries and the L DCs to enhance their capacities to address carbon emission reduction in the 
supply chain and transparently set apart its Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Foreign Aid 
for the economic development of such countries so as to avoid double counting whi le financing such 
countries under its commitment under the Paris Agreement?  
 
Reply:  It should first be stressed again that, as a climate measure, the CBAM was not designed to 
generate revenues. Should EU's trade partners increase their climate ambition by decarbonising 
their industry or by introducing carbon pricing measures, CBAM revenues will decline. In the long 
run, they may even go to zero.  
 
To avoid new global dividing lines between partners with a low and high -carbon export structure, 
the EU will re main one of the biggest contributors to climate financing globally and will continue to 
support partners, in particular LDCs and neighbours in targeted ways, such as through technical 
assistance, technology transfer, extensive capacity building and financi al support. The objective is 
to help develop industrial production structures that are compatible with long term climate goals.  
 
Question 102:  How would the EU ensure giving Special and Differential treatment to the developing 
and least developed countries to factor in their national circumstances, specificities and the potential 
negative impacts of the CBAM on their economic development?  
 
Reply:  The CBAM does not distinguish between categories of third countries but applies to goods in 
certain sectors. Our studies show that exports from LDCs to the EU in the sectors covered by the 
CBAM are limited. Exempting categories of third countries from the  scope of the new mechanism 
would undermine the CBAM's long -term sustainability. It would give a wrong incentive for investing 
in clean technologies, and adaptation costs for LDC exporters would be higher in the end.  
 
We have built in a transitional perio d in CBAM, which will give trading partners, including developing 
countries, time to prepare. To take into account their specific needs, the EU will continue to support 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in targeted ways, such as through technology transfer,  technical 
and financial assistance, with the objective of developing industrial production structures that are 
compatible with long -term global climate objectives.  
 
To this end, the EU will continue in its role as one of the biggest contributors to clima te financing in 
developing countries and LDCs.  
 
Question 103:  How the EU will ensure that during the phase -in of the CBAM and the corresponding 
phase -out of the free allowances (from its Emission Trading Scheme), its imports from 
third countries are not a fforded less favourable treatment than the goods produced domestically 
within its member states.  
 
Reply: The CBAM ensures that an equivalent carbon price will be paid by domestic and imported 
products and will be non -discriminatory and even handed towards trading partners and economic 
operators from third countries.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 402 - 
 
  
 It will take into account the actual emissions of individual producers in the production of CBAM goods 
imported into the EU. If a country puts in place effective climate measures –including non -carbon 
pricing measures - these will lead to a lower carbon content of the imported products, and thus to a 
lower border adjustment or no adjustment at all.  
 
If importers can prove, based on information from their third country producers, that a carbon price 
has already been paid in the country of production of the imported goods and that no compensation 
or rebate applies on export, the corresponding amount can be deducted from their final bill. If the 
price paid is equivalent to the EU carbon pri ce under the EU ETS, the border adjustment would be 
zero. 
 
Question 104:  It is stated in the Q&A of CBAM on the EU's website that "EU importers will be able 
to use default values (even once the definitive system has kicked in) on CO2 emissions for each 
product to determine the number of certificates they need to purchase".  
How are the default values calculated especially taking into account the data from secondary sources 
representing embedded emissions in various goods?  
 
Reply:  Now that the Regulation esta blishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism 
(Regulation  2023/956) was published in  the EU Official Journal on 16/05 ( link), the Commission is 
in a position to adopt the implementing act regulating the transitional period of the CBAM, based on 
Article  35 of the CBAM Regulation, including the information to be reported as well as the form at of 
the reporting. This act will notably detail rules on the elements of calculation methods for embedded 
emissions as set out in Annex  IV to the CBAM  Regulation. In view of its adoption, the European 
Commission will launch a public consultation of four weeks, open to all stakeholders in the course 
of June 2023 on 'Have your Say' portal. This implementing act will be accompanied by Guidance 
documents.  
 
The objective of the transitional period is to collect data, as specified in the upcoming implementing 
act, with a view to defining a thorough methodology for the definitive period starting on 
1 January  2026. Analysis of the information gathered during th at period will inform the 
implementing acts to be adopted in the course of that period.  
 
Before the end of the transitional period and based the information gathered, an implementing act 
reflecting the final methodology will be adopted by the Commission o n the basis of Article  7(7) of 
the CBAM Regulation. When actual emissions cannot be adequately measured, the embedded 
emissions will be determined by reference to default values that will be defined in the implementing 
act on methodology. It will follow th e same procedure related to the implementing act regulating 
the transitional period, including an open public consultation of all stakeholders.  
 
Question 105:  CBAM does not apply to goods originating in certain countries and territories. 
Section  A in Annex  II to the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing 
a carbon border adjustment mechanism (dated 14.07.2021) provides a list of countries and 
territories that have been excluded from the scope of the CBAM. There are four Members  and 
five territories where this regulation shall not apply. Section  B of Annex  II is empty.  
Could the EU explain what provisions of the WTO  Agreement s it relies on for proposing exclusion 
and exemptions of such countries from the CBAM?  
 
Reply:  CBAM will n ot apply to goods originating in the third countries and territories listed in point  1 
of Annex  III.  
 
These countries are exempted since the EU ETS applies to their territory or the emission trading 
system of the country is fully linked to the ETS. The ca rbon price paid on CBAM goods originating in 
these third countries is effectively charged on the greenhouse gas emissions embedded in those 
goods without any rebates beyond those already applied in accordance with the EU ETS. The CBAM 
Regulation empowers t he European Commission to adapt the list of exempted countries delegated 
act should additional third country fulfill these conditions (set out in art 2(6) of the Regulation).  
 
Besides, the CBAM Regulation ensures that carbon prices effectively paid in any third country will 
be deducted from the number of CBAM charge due, after the end of the transitional period. 
Consequently, as long as the effective carbon price on CBAM goods originating from a third country 
is at least the same as the EU -ETS carbon price,  these goods imported in the EU will not be subject WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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to CBAM adjustment, bringing the border adjustment to zero, similar to the exempted countries 
listed in Annex  III of the Regulation.  
 
WT/TPR/G/442; page -19; Para -5.7: 
The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is a climate measure aimed at decreasing global 
GHG emissions by preventing the risk of carbon leakage and by supporting increased ambition on 
climate mitigation, while ensuring WTO compatibility. The CBAM will equalize the pric e of carbon 
between domestic products and imports and ensure that the EU's climate objectives are not 
undermined by production relocating to countries with less ambitious climate policies.  
Question 106:  Since CBAM is a climate measure, why is the EU not fa ctoring in the principles of 
"Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities", given that these principles 
are long -settled in the International Environmental Law?  
 
Reply : The CBAM respects the EU's international commitments. The Pa ris Agreement requires each 
of its Parties to reduce its emissions in a way that reflects its highest possible ambition, reflecting 
its common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different 
national circumstances . The EU has respected its obligation to take the lead in reducing emissions. 
To continue to take the lead the EU needs to make sure that its ambitious efforts to reduce emissions 
within the EU are not undermined by carbon leakage.  
 
The EU has also carefu lly assessed the potential impact and given careful consideration, in particular, 
to the needs of LDCs. The design of the CBAM has taken potential concerns on board, for example 
through a long transitional period to allow importers to adjust.  
 
Finally, the EU is supporting developing countries to implement the Paris Agreement goals. The EU 
is collectively the biggest donor for international aid in the world, providing over EUR 50billion a 
year to help overcome poverty and advance global developm ent. 
 
We also continue to support partner countries in their green transition, in line with our international 
commitments. Through the EU's Global Instrument (Neighbourhood, Development and International 
Cooperation Instrument – NDICI), we have so far comm itted about EUR  27.8 billion  in support of 
climate objectives in our partner countries for the period of 2021 -27.  
 
In December 2021, the EU launched the Global Gateway, a new strategy to mobilise investments 
totalling EUR  300 billion  over the period 2021 -27. In line with the EU's commitment to the 
2030 Agenda, the Global Gateway aims at boosting smart, clean and secure investments in digital, 
energy and transport.  
 
Question 107:  Why did the EU not allocate the revenues collected under CBAM with the non -EU 
exporting members to increase their climate mitigation and adapt ation capacities since that is one 
of the objectives of the EU Green Deal?  
 
Reply:  In line with the previous answers on the revenue generated by CBAM, it should again be 
stressed that, as a c limate measure, the CBAM was not designed to generate revenues.  
 
The EU will continue in its role as one of the biggest contributors to climate financing in developing 
countries and LDCs and will continue to support LDCs in targeted ways, such as through t echnology 
transfer, technical and financial assistance, with the objective of developing industrial production 
structures that are compatible with long -term global climate objectives.  
 
Question 108:  The EU ETS covers the production of various chemicals, in cluding bulk organic 
chemicals. Yet, the production of fertilizer is not covered by the EU ETS insofar as the production of 
bulk organic chemicals does not cover it. However, the CBAM extends to nitrogen fertilizer 
HS code 3102 and compound fertilizer HS c ode 3105. How does the EU address these issues, which 
suggests that the CBAM has a protectionist orientation?   
 
Reply:  GHG emissions from the production of ammonia and nitric acid are covered by the ETS, 
without any production capacity threshold. Ammonia a nd nitric acid are essential inputs to the 
production of nitrogen -containing fertilisers. In the EU, most of the fertiliser production takes place 
on sites where ammonia and nitric acid are produced. Therefore, fertiliser production is covered by 
the EU ET S and producers of fertilisers need to pay for the carbon costs. This is even the case if the 
final fertiliser production takes place outside the production of ammonia and nitric acid, as the carbon WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 costs related to their production are passed through the value chain. Therefore, the CBAM will thus 
cover these goods by design (i.e. ammonia, nitric acid and the fertilisers produced from them).  
 
Question 109:  The EU ETS and CBAM have different perfluorocarbon (PFC) emissions treatments 
for secondary aluminium.  Furthermore, the CBAM requires importers to pay for PFCs in processed 
aluminium products, whereas EU ETS only considers CO2 emissions. How does the EU explain this 
variation in EU ETS and CBAM designs, which could disadvantage non -EU firms using aluminium  
scrap as input or exporting processed aluminium products? Such measures suggest that the CBAM 
has a protectionist orientation.  
 
Reply:  Next to CO2 emissions, PFCs emissions are only relevant for primary aluminium production. 
For secondary aluminium produc tion, only CO2 emissions are relevant. As the EU ETS refers to 
activities, not goods, a distinction is thus made between primary and secondary aluminium 
production.  
 
However, the CBAM scope refers to goods and not processes. Aluminium -containing CBAM good s, 
as listed in Annex  I of the CBAM Regulation, could be using primary or secondary aluminium. 
Therefore, the relevant emissions listed are both PFCs and CO2.  
 
As indicated in previous answers, the European Commission will specify under the implementing a ct 
the information to be reported as well as the format of the reporting during the transitional period. 
This act will notably detail rules on the elements of calculation methods for embedded emissions as 
set out in Annex  IV to the CBAM Regulation.  
 
This act will notably specify provisions for aluminium and make clear that reporting on PFC emissions 
for secondary aluminium is not necessary. Similarly, the declaration of embedded emissions under 
the definitive CBAM period starting in 2026 will not require t he declaration of PFCs emissions for 
secondary aluminium and therefore will not be subject to the CBAM obligation.  
 
WT/TPR/G/442; Page -19; Para -5.8: 
The EU Emissions Trading System puts a price on carbon and lowers the cap on emissions from 
certain economic sectors every year. The European Commission has proposed to lower the overall 
emission cap even further and increase its annual rate of reduction, to phase out free emission 
allowances for aviation and align with the global Carbon Offsetting and R eduction Scheme for 
International Aviation (CORSIA) and to include shipping emissions in the EU ETS.  
 
Question 110:  The EU ETS applies to installations based on their minimum capacity or thermal 
input thresholds. However, CBAM is designed for all goods imported into the specified sectors and 
identified by CN codes. If an exporter is an EU local firm, it may be exempt un der the EU ETS, but 
it is liable to pay the CBAM price as an exporter. How are these measures severely impacting MSMEs 
in the third countries WTO -compliant?  
 
Reply:  The ETS indeed includes capacity thresholds for some activities, but not for all. For examp le, 
there are no capacity thresholds for the production of primary aluminium, ammonia and nitric acid. 
In general, CBAM goods are produced in large installations. Therefore, it can be assumed that the 
large majority of such producers in the EU fall under t he ETS even in cases where there are capacity 
thresholds.  
 
As from 2027, smaller industrial installations will be covered by carbon pricing through the new ETS, 
which will cover emissions from fuel combustion used for buildings, transport and additional s ectors, 
including manufacturing ("ETS2").  
 
Similarly, we also do not expect a significant number of small installations in third countries would 
fall under the same threshold set for the EU ETS. The reports gathered in the transitional period will 
allow th e European Commission to complement the existing analysis.  
 
The rationale for not including a similar threshold in the CBAM Regulation was to avoid potential 
circumventions and the additional complexity of determining production capacities (not just actual  
production) in third countries.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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WT/TPR/G/442; Page 20, Para 5.12:  
On 6  December  2022, the European Parliament and the Council reached a provisional political 
agreement on an EU Regulation on deforestation, paving the way for the final adoption of the 
regulation in early 2023. It aims to curb EU -driven deforestation and forest degradation. By 
promoting the consumption of "deforestation -free" products and reducing the EU's impact on global 
deforestation and forest degradation, the new rules will bring down greenhouse gas emissions and 
global biodiversity loss and minimize consumption, and therefore decrease the trade of products 
coming from supply chains associated with deforestation or forest degradation, while increasing the 
trade of sustainable products. The proposal is part of a broader plan of actions to tackle deforestation 
and forest degradation first outlined in the 2019 Commission Communication on Stepping up 
EU Action to Protect and Restore the World's Forests.  
Question 111:  Could the EU provide fur ther information on the latest EU Deforestation Free 
Regulation (EUDR) developments and the planned implementation timelines?  
Will the EU engage in further consultation with third countries, particularly developing producing 
countries, before the final app roval of the proposed legislation, given that EUs common assessment 
criteria and benchmarking system disregard the local conditions and legislative efforts to fight 
deforestation, and recalling the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities an d 
Respective Capabilities (CBDR –RC) is not being considered.  
 
Reply:  The Regulation will enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in 
the Official Journal of the European  Union , indicatively planned for June 2023. Operators an d traders 
will need to comply with the Regulation's provisions 18 months from the entry to force, namely at 
the end of 2024. SMEs operators and traders will have more time to adapt to the Regulation's 
requirements, as the entry into application for them is  foreseen 24 months after the entry into force.  
 
Close cooperation with partner countries will be of paramount importance for the fulfilment of the 
objectives of the Regulation and this is highlighted in the legislation. The EU is supporting the partner 
countries through development cooperation to ensure their supply chains are deforestation -free and 
is stepping up its support. Art.  29(2) mandates the Commission to conduct the benchmarking 
assessment no later than 18 months after the entry into force of th e Regulation. The Commission 
will notify countries in due time about the assessment. Countries that are, or risk to be classified as, 
high risk will be consulted through a specific dialogue, where they will have the opportunity to share 
information on meas ures taken to remedy the situation.  
 
Question 112:  The due diligence requirements for deforestation place trade barriers to market 
entry for smallholders that need the financial and technological means for compliance. Does the EU 
plan to include clauses for preferential sourcing from smallholders, financial support, and 
technological guidance? Will this regulation support the Leaving No One Behind (LNOB) principle 
proposed in the 2030 Agenda of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)?  
 
Reply:  The EU is supporting the partner countries through cooperation and development to ensure 
their supply chains are deforestation -free and is stepping up its support. Widespread and free 
technology for geolocation – essentially mobile phones – will ensure tha t no technical obstacle gets 
in the way of smallholders when it comes to selling their products to the EU market. The cut -off date 
aims to minimise the number of smallholders that are caught cultivating land whose produce cannot 
be sold on the EU market or  exported from it. In addition, EU cooperation tools and programs will 
make the engagement with, the participation and the support of smallholders a priority, as foreseen 
in the legal text of the Regulation.  
 
Question 113:  WTO members have Afforestation an d National Forestry Policies, which govern the 
forest cover management across their territory. Why does the EU believe that applying its 
deforestation law extra -territorially at a product or commodity level is a better option to stop 
deforestation than WTO  members taking a country -level macro view?  
 
Reply:  The Deforestation Regulation is designed to apply in an even -handed manner, i.e. to all 
commodities and to products produced inside as well as outside the EU. This is a measure taken by 
the EU to help prevent climate change and biodiversity loss and it has  been developed in compliance 
with the EU's international commitments, including trade agreements, and WTO requirements in 
particular. With this Regulation, the EU takes its responsibility for deforestation and forest 
degradation caused by EU consumption a nd production. Commodities and products falling within the 
scope of the Regulation will need to be deforestation -free to be allowed on the EU market. They will 
also need to be legally harvested, thus complying with the relevant laws of the country of produ ction. WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 The more robust these national policies are in terms of tackling deforestation and forest degradation, 
the easier it will be for operators in the EU to prove that the commodities they are importing are 
compliant with the Deforestation Regulation.  
 
Question 114:  The EU Deforestation -free Commodities legislation will widely impact small and 
marginal farmers, farm workers, mainly women in developing countries, and MSMEs in the EU 
trading partners' territories. What studies did the EU undertake to conclu de that near -certain 
socioeconomic deprivation of underprivileged segments of the economies was an acceptable 
outcome of pursuing its policy goals?  
 
Reply:  The Regulation is based on an Impact Assessment 
(SWD_2021_326_1_EN_impact_assessment_part2_v2.pdf (europa.eu) ) in which the European 
Commission considered a number of case studies analyzing potential impa ct, including on 
third countries of different policy measures to achieve the goal of the Regulation. The EU wants to 
ensure that no technical obstacle gets in the way of smallholders when it comes to selling their 
products to the EU market. The cut -off dat e aims to minimise the number of smallholders that are 
caught cultivating land whose products cannot be sold on the EU market or exported from it. In 
addition, EU cooperation tools and programs will make the engagement with, the participation and 
the suppo rt of smallholders a priority, as foreseen in the legal text of the Regulation.  
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Pg. 20, Para - 5.16, 5,17 & 5.19 – The Farm to Fork (F2F) Strategy adopted 
in May 2020 is the EU's contribution to the global transition towards sustainable food systems. It 
aims to ensure food security, nutrition and public health, access to sufficient, safe, nutritious, 
sustainable food for all, and this while having a neutral or positive environmental impact. To achieve 
the transition, the Strat egy's action plan sets out both regulatory and non -regulatory initiatives, 
including the EU Code of Conduct on responsible food business and marketing practices that entered 
into force in July 2021.  
The Commission is also carrying out preparatory work conc erning the flagship initiative of the F2F 
strategy: the framework legislation for a Union sustainable food system. It will aim at accelerating 
and facilitating the transition to sustainability by establishing new foundations for future food 
policies. The t ransition towards sustainable food systems has to be supported by sanitary and 
phytosanitary requirements responding to key challenges.  
The implementing measures for the Regulation on Veterinary Medicinal Products adopted during the 
previous review period will strengthen the EU action in fighting antimicrobial resistance (AMR) and 
promote a prudent and responsible use of antimicrobials. These measures have been supplemented 
recently by the Delegated Regulation setting the criteria to designate antimicrobial s to be reserved 
for treatment of certain infections in humans, as well as an Implementing Regulation listing the 
designated antimicrobials to be reserved for treatment of certain infections in humans. Furthermore, 
the Regulation on Official Controls was a mended to ensure that the single framework for official 
controls is also applicable to the relevant provision of the Veterinary Medicinal Products Regulation . 
Question 115:  
As indicated here, the European Commission is carrying out preparatory work concern ing the 
flagship initiative of the F2F strategy; India would like to understand the structure of notifications 
henceforth on the EUs sustainable food system?  
 
Reply:  All the sanitary and phytosanitary legislation adopted in the framework of the F2F strateg y 
will be notified to the WTO following the recommended procedures for implementing the 
transparency obligations of the SPS  Agreement  (Article  7). 
 
Question 116:  
Would it be like the SPS notification up until now, the EU also notifies along with individual  members, 
or would such notifications only be at the Union level - as a sustainable food system can only exist 
if the coverage is for a larger area?  
 
Reply: The sanitary and phytosanitary legislation adopted in the framework of the F2F strategy will 
be not ified by the European Commission, which is the EU Notifying Authority responsible for 
implementing the notification requirements of the SPS  Agreement . 
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Pg. 20, Para - 5.18 - The draft regulation on lowering the maximum residue 
levels (MRLs) fo r the two neonicotinoid substances clothianidin and thiamethoxam, is the 
first regulation implementing the F2F Strategy on imported food in relation to pesticides residues. 
The environmental aspects targeted by this regulation relate to the protection of p ollinators. This is WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 407 - 
 
an issue of global concern, which goes beyond national boundaries and cannot be solved through 
actions at the EU level alone. The draft regulation is lowering the maximum residue levels (MRLs) 
for the two neonicotinoid substances clothi anidin and thiamethoxam, known to contribute 
significantly to the decline of pollinator populations because of their intrinsic properties that lead to 
adverse effects on pollinators independent of where they are used geographically. The regulation 
includes  trade facilitating provisions, mainly to postpone the application date of the regulation to 
36 months after entry into force (instead of 6 months, which is the standard period foreseen by 
WTO rules) and to allow products placed on the market before the ap plication date to remain on the 
market until the end of their shelf life.  
 
Question 117:  
The lowering of the maximum residue levels (MRLs) for the two neonicotinoid substances clothianidin 
and thiamethoxam and it believes that issue of global concern, whic h goes beyond national 
boundaries and cannot be solved through actions at the EU level alone.  
Given the understanding, why doesn't it raise the MRL concerns for the two neonicotinoid substances 
at the CODEX level?  
 
Reply:  During the 53rd meeting of CCPR in  2022, the EU presented reservations to all the proposed 
Codex MRLs (CXLs) for clothianidin and thiamethoxam based on environmental reasons of global 
nature, specifically their contribution to the global decline of pollinators. At the meeting, the EU 
propo sed that the CXLs would advance only at Step 5 (instead of Step 8, omitting Steps 6 and 7 of 
the procedure) to allow time for Members to consider this issue, which was not agreed by other 
Members[1]. 
 
[1]  https://www.fao.org/fao -who-codexalimentarius/sh -
proxy/en/?lnk=1& url=https%253A%252F%252Fworkspace.fao.org%252Fsites%252Fcodex%252FM
eetings%252FCX -718-53%252FREPORT%252FFINAL%252520REPORT%252FREP22_PR53e.pdf  
 
WT/TPR/G/442; Page -21; Para -5.18.  
The draft regulation on lowering the maximum residue levels (MRLs) for the two neonicotinoid 
substances clothianidin and thiamethoxam, is the first regulation implementing the F2F Strategy on 
imported food in relation to pesticides residues. The environmental aspects targeted by this 
regulati on relate to the protection of pollinators. This is an issue of global concern, which goes 
beyond national boundaries and cannot be solved through actions at EU level alone.  
Question 118:  The EU has enacted this regulation to protect pollinator health in third countries, 
not in its territory. What studies did the EU undertake to conclude that its trade partners were either 
incapable or unwilling to address the issue of pollinator health?  
 
Reply:  the EU has banned all outdoor uses of neonicotinoid s on its territory already in May 2018 
due to their toxicity for bees and other insect pollinators. The EU approval for use of these substances 
only in permanent greenhouses later expired in January 2019 and April 2019, respectively.  
 
The EU would like to reiterate that Regulation (EC) No 2023/334 does not regulate the use of 
clothianidin and thiamethoxam by non -EU countries in their own territory. However, food containing 
residues of the substance may not contain residues of those substances above the maxi mum residue 
levels (MRLs) when imported into the EU.  
 
A clear consensus exists regarding the fact that both wild and managed bees are exposed to 
pesticides (mainly through nectar and pollen, in the case of the neonicotinoids), and that the range 
of sub -lethal effects is quite broad. The EU would like to refer to the report by the Intergovernmental 
Science -Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES)[1], in particular "wild 
pollinators have declined in occurrence and diversity (and abundance for certain species) at local 
and regional scales in North West Europe and North America. Although a lack of wild pollinator data 
(species identity, distribution and abundance) for Latin America, Africa, Asia and Oceania preclude 
any general statement on their regional status, local declin es have been recorded" . 
 
[1] IPBES (2016). The assessment report of the Intergovernmental Science -Policy Platform on 
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services on pollinators, pollination and food production. S.G. Potts, 
V. L. Imperatriz -Fonseca, and H. T. Ngo (eds). Secretariat of the Inter governmental Science -Policy 
Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, Bonn, Germany. 552 pages. 
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3402856 . 
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 WT/TPR/G/442; Page No 23 , Para 5.2.1:  
EU trade policy helps to promote and protect human rights around the world. The EU's broader set 
of policies and actions in this respect includes various trade policy instruments such as the EU's 
unilateral trade preferences (GSP) (see sectio n 4.1), bilateral and regional free trade agreements 
and trade impact assessments and evaluations.  
Under the GSP, the EU monitors respect for the principles of core international conventions on human 
rights by beneficiary countries. In September 2021, the Commission adopted the legislative proposal 
for a new EU's GSP Regulation to apply as from January 2024, reinforcing support for the promotion 
of international standards in GSP beneficiary countries, including by adding new international human 
rights instr uments and by rendering the export of goods made by internationally prohibited child 
labour and by forced labour a ground to possibly withdraw trade preferences.  
The EU's free trade agreements are typically linked to the human rights "essential elements" c lause 
contained in the political framework agreements with these countries, enabling the parties to take 
appropriate measures in case of breaches by the other party. The European Commission conducts 
human rights impact assessments as a key element of its s ustainability impact assessments of the 
EU's ongoing trade negotiations, including through ex post  evaluations of the EU's existing trade 
agreements.  
Question 119:  What information the EU companies may ask their Indian partners in the supply 
chain to give information or adhere to the requirement?  
 
Reply:  The EU GSP  Regulation (No 978/2012) establishes obligations for the beneficiary countries 
to meet the specific requirements laid down therein to benefit from GSP preferential trade 
preferences.  
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Pg's. 24, Para - 5.36 and 5.37 - The EU actively supports the participation of 
SMEs in international trade and in the EU's internal market. SMEs are the backbone of the EU 
economy, providing jobs and growth opportunities. Out of the 675,000 EU companies, who export 
outside the EU, 94% were SMEs and their exports amounted to 31% of the total value of EU exports 
in 2020.  
 
SMEs need a transparent, predictable and more certain global environment to make the most of 
trade opportunities. Thus, the EU encourages raising awareness and promoting the use of 
information pla tforms, such as the European Commission's Access2Markets platform, to help SMEs 
understand and reap the benefits of international trade and of EU trade agreements.  
 
Question 120:  
How does the EU expect to treat SMEs from third countries equally?  
 
Reply:  Dedicated SME Chapters in most recent EU trade agreements make it easier for SMEs on 
both sides to engage in bilateral trade. Under the SME Chapter the EU provides a specific website 
with information relevant to third -country SMEs seeking to access the EU market, including links to 
government authorities with useful information for doing business and a database with import 
requirements at product level. This is particularly useful for third -country SMEs as key import 
requirements such as applicable t ariffs, taxes and rules of origin are quickly displayed, in one go, 
for each product.  
 
Question 121:  
The EU's average definition of MSMEs is double of the Indian MSMEs in terms of annual turnover. 
Regarding the number of employees, the MSMEs in the EU have  an upper limit of 249 employees, 
while this criterion is not used for defining the Indian MSMEs. These differences are similar across 
Micro, Small, and medium firms when taken separately . 
The EU is requested to provide clarification on how it proposes to address the differential legislated 
endowment capacities;  
 
Reply: The most recent evaluation of the SME Definition[1] investigated the co -existence of different 
definitions and the impact this might have on EU SMEs. It concluded that, in general, the 
co-existence of different SME definitions within the EU key trade partners does not seem to be an 
important issue for the competitiveness of the EU SMEs when operating in an international context.  
 
There is no universal definition of what constitutes an SME[2]. A study of the World Bank showed 
that, although there is significant variance in the definitions used worldwide, around a third of the 
countries covered micro, small and medium enterprise s as having up to 250 employees . [3],[4] WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 409 - 
 
Developing countries use similar  criteria as in the EU Definition, but often with different ceilings as 
the SMEs are usually smaller in those countries. [5] 
 
There are similarities also between the SME definition used by the World Bank and the EU SME 
Definition, however, the employment ceiling used by the World Bank (up to 300 employees) differs 
from EU practice .[6] 
 
When looking at the EU key trade partners (such as the US, Japan or China), there are significant 
differences between their SME definition and the European one, the most important being higher 
ceilings and the use of a sectoral approach.  
 
With cer tain countries applying higher ceilings in their SME definitions, this may thus result in 
granting the SME status to companies that would be considered large companies according to the 
EU Definition. Hence, in international context an EU SME could face com petition from bigger non -EU 
companies that enjoy advantages reserved to small businesses in their country.  
 
[1]  https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents -register/detail?ref=SWD(2021)279&lang=en . 
[2]  See Crehan (2020) for an in -depth discussion of SME definitions around the world. Crehan, P., 
Reflections on a Revision of the Definition of the EU SME, Gavigan, J. editor(s), Publications Office of 
the European  Union , Luxembourg, 2020, ISBN 978 -92-76-28301 -0 (online) . 
[3]  46 (mainly developed countries) out of 132 economies were considered in the study.  
[4]  Kushnir, K., Mirmulstein, M.L. and Ramalho, R 'Micro,  Small, and Medium Enterprises Around the 
World: How Many Are There, and What Affects the Count?' World Bank IFC, 2010.  
[5]  For example, in Indonesia, medium -sized companies can have up to 100 employees, and in Thailand 
medium sized companies can have between 50 and 200 employees depending on the sector. 
(N. Ikasari, T. Sumransat, U. Eko, R. Kusumastuti, "Access of Small and Medium Enterprises to 
Finance in Rural Areas: Case of Indonesia and Thailand", International Journal of Economics and 
Management Engineering, 2016) . 
[6]  Gentrit Berisha, Justina Shiroka Pula, "Defining Small and Medium Enterprises: a critical review", 
Academic Journal of Business, Administration, Law and Social Sciences, March 2015.  
 
Question 122:  
What measures are being taken under the India -EU FTAs to address such issues?  
 
Reply:  While negotiations with India are still ongoing, the free trade agreement with India is 
foreseen to include a SME Chapter that will make it easier for SMEs on both sides to engage in 
bilateral trade. The SME Chapter is meant to increase SMEs' awareness of  the benefits of the 
agreement and will increase the transparency for the rules and procedures applicable to the bilateral 
trade, notably through information sharing.  
 
WT/TPR/G/442; Pages 26 -27, Para 6:  
Implementation and enforcement of trade policy is a k ey priority for the EU, as set out in the 2021 
Trade Policy Communication. In a world of geopolitical, economic and environmental transition, the 
EU's openness to trade and investment must be coupled with its ability to effectively defend its 
interests and  enforce its rights, notably with a view to ensuring a level playing field both within the 
EU and globally. This includes our renewed multilateral and bilateral agenda as well as making the 
best use of existing rules and structures around the newly created  Chief Trade Enforcement Officer 
(CTEO) and closing the gap in our toolbox for dealing with new challenges, including competitive 
distortions (as well as sustainability and security concerns). To this end, the Foreign Subsidies 
Regulation (section 6.3) and  the International Procurement Instrument (section 6.4) and are now 
in place.  
 
Question 123:  How would FTA agreements between EU and third countries help in the removal of 
Technical barriers to trade (TBT) and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, and  how would 
they help avoid deviation from internationally -agreed standards?  
 
Reply:  FTA agreements between EU and third countries re -enforce the TBT disciplines of the 
WTO TBT agreement and the enforcement mechanisms. They also provide for additional consultation 
possibilities in order to prevent or solve technical barriers to trade. They furthermore promote the 
use of internationally agreed standards.  
 
The free trade agreements (FTAs) negotiated by the EU include chapters on Technical Barri ers to 
Trade (TBT) and on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures, which continue to be based on 
international standards and do not change the EU's import legislation. In this regard, the objective WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 of FTAs is to facilitate trade by establishing fair, bal anced, transparent and predictable import 
conditions and approval procedures. Also these are based on international standards. Regarding 
SPS, FTAs also contribute to: (1) building mutual understanding and trust on the regulatory, control 
and approval syste ms of the parties; (2) pursuing the pragmatic application of EU -wide export 
authorisation processes (single entity), since the legislation is harmonized at EU level; and 
(3) establishing structured regular dialogues and cooperation through bilateral Commit tees. 
 
WT/TPR/G/442; Pages 29 -31, Para 6.4:  
On 13  October  2020, the European Commission launched the Access2Markets online portal to help 
in particular SMEs to export goods, services and procurement beyond the EU's borders. It also 
facilitates trade for ec onomic operators in third countries trading with the EU or wanting to do so. It 
does so by providing information on product and country specific tariffs, taxes, import formalities, 
rules of origin, statistics or trade barriers. The portal responded to requ ests from stakeholders to 
explain EU trade agreements and their many advantages in detail. It serves both companies that 
already trade internationally and those that are only starting to explore opportunities in foreign 
markets.  
 
Question 124:  What effect would the EU's access to public procurement in third countries create 
on small businesses of the third country?  
 
Reply:  We believe that that the European  Union 's effort to provide correct information on its trade 
agreements has a beneficial effect on any business that may be concerned, including small 
businesses of third countries.  
 
WT/TPR/G/442; Page No 31, Para 8.1 & 8.2:  
The EU framework for the screening of foreign direct investment (FDI) was established by Regulation 
(EU) 2019/452. It has been fully applicable since October 2020. The cooperation mechanism created 
by the regulation allows all Member States and the Commission to collectively assess and address 
potential threats to security and public order deriving from FDI in the EU. The EU cooperation  
mechanism complements screening mechanisms of Member States at national level.  
The regulation applies to all sectors of the economy and is not subject to any thresholds concerning 
the value of the investment.  
The review of and, when required, the adoption of measures prohibiting or conditioning an 
investment within the scope of the regulation on grounds of security of public order is the ultimate 
responsibility of Member States. The Commission may address opini ons recommending specific 
actions to the Member State where the investment takes place, in particular when there is a risk 
that the investment affects security or public order in more than one Member State or projects and 
programmes of Union interest. The Commission reports annually on the implementation of the 
regulation.  
 
Export controls  
The modernization of the EU export control regime materialized with the entry into force of the 
updated EU Regulation 821/2021 (recast) on 9  September  2021.  
The new regul ation represents a comprehensive system upgrade where all provisions have been 
amended to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of controls. This includes updated definitions 
and control parameters, harmonization, simplification and digitalization of li censing, enhanced 
information -sharing, and cooperation with third countries. 8.7. The new regulation introduces a basis 
for EU autonomous controls, allowing the EU to make its own decisions regarding human rights 
controls on cyber -surveillance technologies , and for a coordination of national controls on emerging 
technologies. In this sense, the new regulation establishes a human security dimension that allows 
for an EU mechanism for human rights end -use controls on cyber -surveillance exports. The 
mechanism builds on a mandatory and prescriptive consultation procedure resulting in the 
publication of an EU watch list of items and destinations subject to control. The mechanism is 
supported by due diligence requirements for exporters to be developed in consultat ion with industry 
and civil society.  
 
Question 125:  Will the EU's FDI  screening mechanism enable a member state to block investment 
from third countries to the EU?  
 
Reply:  Under Regulation (EU) 2019/452 (the Regulation), Member States may maintain their 
existing screening mechanisms, adopt new ones or remain without such na tional mechanisms.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 411 - 
 
The EU established a framework for foreign direct investments (FDI) screening to identify, assess 
and mitigate potential risks for security or public order in relation to FDI. The Regulation applies to 
all sectors and all third countri es. It requires a case -by-case assessment of all facts and 
circumstances to determine whether risk to security or public order arises.  
 
The Commission may issue an opinion if it considers that a given FDI is likely to impact the public 
order or security o f more than one Member State or with regard to programmes or projects of EU 
interest; or if the Commission has information relevant for the assessment from a security and / or 
public order perspective.  
 
However, the decision to authorise, prohibit or impo se conditions regarding an investment remains 
with the Member State where the investment takes place.  
 
Question 126:  On export control, whether the Commission plans to give technical assistance to 
third countries to develop their legal frameworks to suppor t their capacity to implement and enforce 
control.  
 
Reply:  The Commission already provides assistance to third countries in the area of export control 
through the so -called EU Partner to Partner (P2P) Export Control Programme on dual -use goods. 
The EU P2P Programme helps implementing roadmaps defined with partner countries to jointly tackle 
challenges through the delivery of technical assistance, hands -on trainings and exchanges of best 
practices. The programme covers legal, licensing and enforcement aspect s of strategic trade 
controls.  
 
WT/TPR/G/442; Page 32; Paras 8.9 to 8.11:  
In December 2021, the European Commission proposed a new legal instrument on the protection of 
the EU and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries.  
The aim of this  instrument is to deter third countries from using economic coercion, and to dissuade 
them from continuing the economic coercion, if it occurs, by engaging with the third country 
concerned in various respects. As a last resort, the regulation would enable the Union to counteract 
the economic coercion. Economic coercion refers to situations where a third country is seeking to 
pressure the Union or an EU Member State into making a particular policy choice by applying or 
threatening to apply measures affecting  trade or investment against the Union or an EU Member 
State. Third countries may resort to coercion to bring about a change of policy in the EU in areas 
falling under domestic prerogatives. The rationale of the instrument, in terms of both standing 
agains t economic coercion and the permissibility of response measures as a last resort, lies in 
general international law which outlaws interventions in the internal or external affairs of other 
states and which allows countermeasures in response to internationa lly wrongful acts (rather than 
specifically in the WTO  Agreement ). 
 
The Commission proposal is currently before the EU co -legislators, for consideration and approval, 
within the ordinary legislative procedure. A decision on its adoption is expected in 2023 . 
 
Question 127:  Does EU's proposed trade weapon of 'Anti -coercion" will be an effective trade 
deterrence, or does it want to utilize it as a trade irritant? Whether the EU will employ this instrument 
is based on the assumption that the hostile third country will not retal iate or it is conscious that this 
could trigger a chain of retaliatory measures against EU.  
 
Reply:  The anti -coercion instrument is designed to function primarily as a deterrent. It is neither 
designed, nor conceived to be an irritant. It is about protect ing legitimate interests in case of 
economic coercion by a third country. First and foremost, the function of the instrument is 
deterrence. Second, in cases of ongoing economic coercion, the Union would need to make a 
determination that there is economic c oercion and would engage with the third country concerned 
with a view to obtain the cessation of the coercion and where so decided to request reparations for 
the injury caused. There will be always a space for dialogue, negotiations, mediation, and even 
independent arbitration, should the third country engage also in good faith. Only where none of 
these actions is successful, the Union may consider response measures to counteract the economic 
coercion. Retaliation to Union response measures would not be per mitted legal action.  
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Pg's. 33, Para - 9.3 -The Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act 
together set out a first comprehensive rulebook for online platforms applicable across the whole of 
the EU. They build on the EU's Platform -to-Business Regulation, which started to apply during the WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 412 - 
 
  
 review period, on 12  July 2020. The measures create a single set of rules for all digital services 
within the EU's single market, through harmonizing 27, increasingly different, laws in EU Member 
States i nto coherent EU wide legal acts, leading to both cost and time savings. They also create a 
level playing field and ensure equal treatment for all companies. Further, the Digital Services Act 
and the Digital Markets Act address problems that are shared acro ss the globe. Finally, the Digital 
Services Act creates a safer and more human -centric, innovative digital space in which the 
fundamental rights of all users of digital services and consumers' interests are protected. These acts 
represent a major step forw ard in improving the functioning of the EU's Single Market to the benefit 
of enterprises and consumers from both EU Member States and third countries.  
 
Question 128:  EU is requested to provide the details of provisions protecting the fundamental 
rights of all users under the Digital service act and digital market act. Whether these acts provide 
any penal provisions?  
 
Reply:  The Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act aim to create a safer digital space where the 
fundamental rights of users are protected and to establish a level playing field for businesses.  
 
The Digital Services Act significantly improves the mechanisms  for the removal of illegal content and 
for the effective protection of users' fundamental rights online, including the freedom of speech. It 
includes for instance measures to counter illegal goods, services or content online (such as a 
mechanism for users  to flag such content and for platforms to cooperate with "trusted flaggers"), 
effective safeguards for users, including the possibility to challenge platforms' content moderation 
decisions, due diligence obligations for platforms and a ban on certain type s of targeted advertising 
on online platforms (when they target children or when they use special categories of personal data, 
such as ethnicity, political views, sexual orientation).  
 
The Digital Markets Act's ban of unfair practices by gatekeeper compani es will result in benefits for 
users that help to protect their fundamental rights, including opening up the possibility for business 
users to offer consumers more choices of innovative services, better interoperability with services 
that are alternatives to those of gatekeepers, easier possibilities for consumers to switch platforms 
if they wish so, and better protection of their data.  
 
The DSA and the DMA do not include any penal provisions.  
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Pg. 34, Para - 9.11- During 2020 -2022, work contin ued to ensure an ambitious 
implementation of the EU services legislation, including the EU Services Directive (2006/123/EC), 
the Professional Qualifications Directive (2005/36/EC) and the Proportionality Test Directive ((EU) 
2018/958). The European Commiss ion issued a number of reform recommendations to Member 
States and pointed to potential economic benefits that would stem from reducing regulatory and 
administrative barriers that hamper cross -border services trade and investment in the single market.  
 
Question 129:  
Could the European  Union  please share the recommendations provided to member states setting 
out the potential economic benefits of reduced barriers? What steps did the EU take to expand the 
professional services sectors with automatic EU -wide re cognition if recognized in any member state 
from the existing seven services sectors?  
 
Reply:  The 2021 Communication COM(2021) 385 final contains the detailed reform 
recommendations that target several important groups of professions: architects, civil en gineers, 
accountants, lawyers, patent agents, real estate agents and tourist guides. The focus is on these 
groups of professions due to their economic importance, their role in innovation and their 
contribution to vital economic ecosystems, as well as due to the potential gains from reforming 
regulations in these sectors. The aim was to assist Member States in better targeting their regulatory 
reforms and achieving the highest economic payoffs from the reforms, and to provide additional 
political support to  implement the reforms.  
 
The reform recommendations are based on a thorough assessment of the national regulatory 
frameworks applicable to the seven professions in focus. In addition to a detailed qualitative 
analysis, the overall restrictiveness of national regulation is estimate d using a composite indicator, 
developed in 2017 which builds on the OECD PMR methodology, to assess the cumulative burden of 
multiple regulatory requirements.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 413 - 
 
The types of regulatory requirements covered in the assessment include: (1) regulatory approach : 
activities reserved to holders of specific qualifications, protection of title; (2) qualification 
requirements: years of education and training, mandatory state exam, continuous professional 
development obligations, etc.; (3) other entry requirements: co mpulsory membership or 
registration in professional body, limit to the number of licences granted, other authorisation 
requirements, etc.; (4) exercise requirements: restrictions on forms of company, shareholding and 
voting requirements, restrictions on jo int exercise of professions, incompatible activities, etc.  
 
From the 7 groups of professions covered by the 2021 Communication COM(2021)385, only 
architects are covered by EU -wide automatic recognition system and only if they meet the minimum 
training requ irements set out under Professional Qualifications Directive (Directive 2005/36/EC, as 
amended). A cross -border access to other regulated professions from the group is covered by 
EU-level non -automatic recognition rules. Please note that under EU law Membe r States are not 
bound to recognize the recognition decisions of other Member States. There is currently no plan to 
cover all regulated professions from these 7 groups with EU wide automatic recognition.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 414 - 
 
  
 INDIA – ADDITIONAL  QUESTIONS  
I. Questions by India on the Trade Policy Review of EU from the Trade Policy Review 
Report prepared by the EU (WT/TPR/G/442)  
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Pg. 9, Para - 3.15 –  
Background: In addition to the plurilateral work on e -commerce, the EU remains committed to 
maintai ning the multilateral moratorium on custom duties on electronic transmissions. The EU is of 
the view that digital trade should be free of customs duties in order to facilitate the widespread 
adoption of digital technologies, which are key for the economic growth of both developed and 
developing countries, their ability to innovate and the prosperity of their citizens. The EU also 
remains committed to the reinvigoration of the Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, and 
particularly its development dimension,  as instructed in the MC12 ministerial decision.  
 
Question 1:  Could the European  Union  please inform that when it mentions "EU is of the view that 
digital trade should be free of customs duties", does that imply no custom duties on electronic 
transmission as well as physical delivery of goods ordered online or only electronic transmission?  
 
Reply:  In terms of what the moratorium covers, the EU is of the view that it applies to all electronic 
transmissions, meaning all digital content that is transmitted electronically, including books, music, 
video, or software that might previously have bee n delivered on a physical support, as well as newer 
types of activities such as a live online lesson or training session.  
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Pg. 11, Para - 3.26- 
Background:  Trade and Environmental Sustainability structured Discussions can contribute by 
considering how trade related climate measures and policies can be designed in a way that 
maximises environmental and climate impact at the same time limiting impacts on trade ; explore 
approaches for facilitating access to environmental goods and services; identify trade policy actions 
that can contribute to transition to resource efficient and circular economy; and exploring the ways 
to enhancing transparency on subsidies and exchange best practices in design environmentally 
positive subsidies in conformity with relevant WTO rules.  
 
Question 2 : What type of approaches is EU looking at? Do these include recognition of qualifications 
of professionals/workers in environment and re lated sector and facilitation of their mobility or is it 
limited to MA through Mode -3?  
 
Reply:  In the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions, the EU agreed to 
explore opportunities and possible approaches for promoting and facilitat ing trade in environmental 
goods and services to meet environmental and climate goals, including through addressing supply 
chain, technical and regulatory elements. So far, the discussions did not address the issue of 
recognition of qualifications of profe ssionals/workers in environment and related sector and 
facilitation of their mobility, specifically. Neither did they focus on MA through Mode -3. 
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Pg. 11, Para - 3.33- 
Background : The EU has Association Agreements with Georgia, Republic of Mol dova and Ukraine. 
These agreements include Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas which cover trade 
liberalization and approximation with the EU acquis in selected areas, notably Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT), Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (SPS) , customs, procurement and services. On 
23 June, the European Council decided to grant candidate country status to Ukraine and the 
Republic  of Moldova, and recognise European perspective of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and 
Georgia.  
 
Question 3 : What be nefits does the candidate country status bring in from the perspective of 
Services? How does it impact trade in services with the EU?  
 
Reply : Obtaining the candidate country status is the first step in the process of joining the EU 
(accession). The subseq uent step is when the candidate moves on to formal membership 
negotiations, a process that involves the adoption of all established EU law and implementation of 
judicial, administrative, economic and other reforms necessary for the country to meet the cond itions 
for joining. When the negotiations and accompanying reforms have been completed to the 
satisfaction of both sides, the country can join the EU. The main benefit for those countries in terms WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 415 - 
 
of trade in services thus relates to the longer -term prospe ct of being part of the EU's single market 
in services.  
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Pg. 27, Para - 6.4- 
Background:  On 13  October  2020, the European Commission launched the Access2Markets online 
portal to help in particular SMEs to export goods, services and procurement  beyond the EU's borders. 
It also facilitates trade for economic operators in third countries trading with the EU or wanting to 
do so. It does so by providing information on product and country specific tariffs, taxes, import 
formalities, rules of origin, statistics or trade barriers. The portal responded to requests from 
stakeholders to explain EU trade agreements and their many advantages in detail. It serves both 
companies that already trade internationally and those that are only starting to explore opp ortunities 
in foreign markets.  
 
Question 4: Can EU provide details on how a third country access this portal? Does the portal 
provide details on goods/services in demand in EU?  
 
Reply:  Any interested party can access the portal at the following website:  
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access -to-markets/en/home  
However, the website does not provide information on goods/services in demand in the EU.  
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Pg. 29, Para - 6.18- 
Background:  The EU advocates for open international public procurement markets and has opened 
its public procurement market for many goods and services from third countries. Closed procurement 
markets undermine competition  and transparency, increase the costs of public goods and services 
for taxpayers in addition to the risk of corruption. By contrast, many EU companies are experiencing 
difficulties in getting access to third countries' procurement markets. In response, the  EU is taking 
action to ensure a level playing field and to increase opportunities for EU companies. The 
International Procurement Instrument80 entered into force on 29  August  2022. This new instrument 
confers the EU additional opportunities to engage with  third countries in order to remove barriers 
affecting access to public procurement markets outside the EU. It will be one of the key 
market -opening tools for public procurement.  
 
Question 5:  Could EU list out specific service sectors/sub sectors which EU has reserved for 
domestic companies? EU is also requested to provide details of thresholds above which market is 
open and other specific requirements for example local experience requirement etc which 
international companies have to comply in order to acce ss EU public procurement market.  
 
Reply: The EU promotes non -discrimination, transparency and equal treatment in public 
procurement. Within the framework of the WTO and through its bilateral relations, the 
Union  advocates an ambitious opening of the inter national public procurement and concession 
markets. International market access commitments undertaken by the Union towards third countries 
in the field of public procurement require equal treatment of economic operators from those third 
countries for any procurement covered by those commitments. There are no specific requirements 
applicable to international companies. The applicable thresholds for the EU coverage for its GPA 
commitments can be consulted under: https://e -gpa.wto.org/en/ThresholdNotification/FrontPage . 
Similar thresholds are used for EU's bilateral commitments in the field of public procurement. 
Economic operators from third countries, which do not have any agreement providing for the opening 
of the EU procurement market, or whose goods, services and works are not covered by such an 
agreement, do not have secured access to procurement procedures in the EU and may be excluded.  
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Pg. 34, Para - 9.11- 
Background: During 2020 -2022, work continued to ensure an ambitious implementation of the EU 
services legislation, including the EU Services Directive (2006/123/EC), the Professional 
Qualifications Directive (2005/36/EC) and the Proportionality Test Directive ((EU) 2018/958). The 
European Commission issued a number of reform recommendations to Member States and pointed 
to potential economic benefits that would stem from reducing regulatory and administrative barriers 
that hamper cross -border services trade and investment in the single market.  
 
Question 6:  Could the European  Union  please share the recommendations provided to member 
states setting out the potential economic benefits from reduced barriers? What are the steps t aken 
by EU to expand the professional services sectors that have automatic EU wide recognition if 
recognized in any one member state?  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 416 - 
 
  
 Reply: The 2021 Communication COM(2021) 385 final contains the detailed reform 
recommendations that target several importa nt groups of professions: architects, civil engineers, 
accountants, lawyers, patent agents, real estate agents and tourist guides. The focus is on these 
groups of professions due to their economic importance, their role in innovation and their 
contribution  to vital economic ecosystems, as well as due to the potential gains from reforming 
regulations in these sectors. The aim was to assist Member States in better targeting their regulatory 
reforms and achieving the highest economic payoffs from those reforms , and to provide additional 
political support to implement them.  
 
The reform recommendations are based on a thorough assessment of the national regulatory 
frameworks applicable to the seven professions in focus. In addition to a detailed qualitative analys is, 
the overall restrictiveness of national regulation is estimated using a composite indicator, developed 
in 2017 which builds on the OECD PMR methodology, to assess the cumulative burden of multiple 
regulatory requirements.  
 
The types of regulatory requi rements covered in the assessment include: (1) regulatory approach: 
activities reserved to holders of specific qualifications, protection of title; (2) qualification 
requirements: years of education and training, mandatory state exam, continuous profession al 
development obligations, etc.; (3) other entry requirements: compulsory membership or registration 
in professional body, limit to the number of licences granted, other authorisation requirements, etc.; 
(4) exercise requirements: restrictions on forms of  company, shareholding and voting requirements, 
restrictions on joint exercise of professions, incompatible activities, etc.  
 
From the 7 groups of professions covered by the 2021 Communication COM(2021)385, only 
architects are covered by EU -wide automatic recognition system and only if they meet the minimum 
training requirements set out under Professional Qualifications Directive (Directive 2005/36/EC, as 
amended). A cross -border access to other regulated professions from the group is covered by 
EU-level no n-automatic recognition rules. Please note that under EU law Member States are not 
bound to recognize the recognition decisions of other Member States. There is currently no plan to 
cover all regulated professions from these 7 groups with EU wide automatic  recognition.  
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Page 34 , Paragraph 9.15  
Background: As regards financial services, since 2019, the European Commission proposed and 
agreed with the co -legislators on a number of important pieces of financial services legislation , in 
order to continue building a single market for capital, support the resilie nce of the financial system 
during and its recovery from the COVID -19 crisis, and deliver on its action plans on sustainable and 
digital finance.  
Question 7 - EU may shed more light on the significant changes made in the financial services 
legislation and how the new legislation is likely to affect the presence of foreign service providers in 
the financial services sector in EU.  
 
Reply:  The European Commission has largely delivered on the individual actions announced in its 
Capital Markets Union Action Pla n. The list of agreed initiatives can be found here.  
 
The 2018 Sustainable Finance Action Plan identified key activities to reorient capital flows towards 
sustainable investments, manage financial risks related to environmental issues, and increase 
related transparency, with the Strategy for Financing the Transition t o a Sustainable Economy 
building on and complementing it since July 2021. In 2020, the Commission published a Digital 
Finance Strategy for the EU until 2024, to support the digital transformation of finance, while 
regulating its risks. This includes the es tablishment of a framework regulate crypto ‑asset markets 
(MICA).  
 
These provisions contribute to making EU markets more resilient, supporting green and digital 
transformations, safeguard financial stability and integrity while ensuring that EU markets rema in 
open and preserve a level playing field with non -EU providers.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 417 - 
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Page  33, Paragraph : 9.3 –  
Background: The Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act together set out a 
first comprehensive rulebook for online platforms applicable across the whole of the EU. They build 
on the EU's Platform -to-Business Regulation, which started to apply during the revie w period, on 
12 July 2020. The measures create a single set of rules for all digital services within the EU's single 
market, through harmonising 27, increasingly different, laws in EU Member States into coherent EU 
wide legal acts, leading to both cost and  time savings. They also create a level playing field and 
ensure equal treatment for all companies.  Further, the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets 
Act address problems that are shared across the globe. Finally, the Digital Services Act creates a  
safer and more human -centric, innovative digital space in which the fundamental rights of all users 
of digital services and consumers' interests are protected. These acts represent a major step forward 
in improving the functioning of the EU's Single Marke t to the benefit of enterprises and consumers 
from both EU Member States and third countries.  
Question 8 -Are there measures under the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act which 
impose any additional compliance, presence or regulatory requirements for foreign service providers 
providing services in the EU market? If yes, EU is requested to share t he details.  
 
Reply:  The DSA applies in the EU single market, without discrimination, including to those online 
intermediaries established outside of the European  Union  that offer their services in the single 
market. When not established in the EU, online intermediaries will have to appoint a legal 
representative, as many companies already do as part of their obligations in other legal instruments. 
At the same time, online intermediaries will also benefit from the legal clarity of the liability 
exemptions a nd from a single set of rules when providing their services in the EU. Further information 
regarding obligations on service providers under the DSA is set out here : Questions  and Answers: 
Digital Services Act (europa.eu) . 
 
Information regarding the obligations on "gatekeeper" companies under the DMA is set out here:  
Q&A: DMA: Ensuring fair and open digital markets (europa.eu) . 
 
II. Questions by India on the Trade Policy Review of EU from the Trade Policy Review 
Report prepared by WTO Secretariat  (WT/TPR/S/442)  
 
WT/TPR/S/442, Pg . 166, Para - 4.151  
Background: - As part of a digital services package proposed by the Commission to establish a 
single market for digital services, the Digital Services Act (DSA) entered into force on 
16 November  2022, complementing the Digital Markets Act, which entered into force on 
1 November. The DSA harmonizes the rules applicable to "intermediary services" in the internal 
market with the objective of ensuring a transparent, safe, predictable, and trusted online 
environment. Except in certai n circumstances, intermediary services are exempt from liability as for 
content hosted on their platforms. The DSA prohibits EU member States from forcing intermediary 
services to monitor third -party content while introducing due diligence obligations rega rding 
transparency for such services. Under the DSA, very large online platforms (VLOPs) and very large 
online search engines (VLOSEs), will be subject to special rules (see below) and will be directly 
supervised at the EU level, by the European Commission , with national "digital service coordinators" 
responsible for enforcing the DSA in respect of other intermediary services. The Act also establishes 
an advisory European Board for Digital Services composed of national digital services coordinators 
and fore sees establishing rules on penalties.  
Question 9:  The EU is requested to share the circumstances in which intermediary services are 
liable for content hosted on their platforms.  
 
Reply:  The Digital Services Act confirms the existing approach and framework  to the conditional 
liability exemption regime of intermediary services in the EU. Providers of different types of 
intermediary services covered by the Digital Services Act will continue to be exempted from liability 
for third -party illegal content, subjec t to certain conditions. This 'intermediary liability exemption' is 
conditional upon the relevant provider acting expeditiously to remove or disable access to illegal 
content upon obtaining knowledge of awareness thereof. The Digital Services Act in additi on clarifies 
that voluntary, own initiative investigations, conducted diligently and in good faith, shall not 
automatically lead providers of intermediary services no longer to qualify for the exemption. All of 
this applies to illegal content that is clear ly defined in national laws that comply with EU laws, or 
directly in harmonised EU laws. The Digital Services Act also introduces different due diligence 
obligations for intermediary services, including online platforms. The intermediary liability exemptio n 
is not conditional on compliance with these due diligence obligations.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 418 - 
 
  
 WT/TPR/S/442, Pg. 168, Para - 4.158  
Background: - The DMA contains provisions aimed at restricting anti -competitive practices, 
although the proposed legislation is considered not to be  part of competition policy.  
Question 10:  Could the European  Union  inform as to why measures pertaining to anti -competitive 
practices in DMA are not considered a part of competition policy? How are measures related to 
competition in DMA harmonised with the  competition policy?  
 
Reply:  Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the corresponding national competition rules concerning 
anticompetitive multilateral and unilateral conduct as well as merger control have as their objective 
the protection of undistorted competit ion on the market. The DMA pursues an objective that is 
complementary to, but different from that of protecting undistorted competition on any given 
market, as defined in competition -law terms, which is to ensure that markets where gatekeepers 
are present are and remain contestable and fair, independently from the actual, potential or 
presumed effects of the conduct of a given gatekeeper covered by the Regulation on competition on 
a given market. Indeed, so -called core platform services provided by the larg est 'gatekeeper' are 
not necessarily dominant in competition law terms whereas they threaten innovation and 
contestability in a fast -moving area. The EU legislator explains in the text of the Digital Markets Act  
(recital 5) that: 'the market processes are often incapable of ensuring fair economic outcomes with 
regard to core platform services. Although Articles 101 and  102 of the Treaty on  the Functioning of 
the European  Union  (TFEU) apply to the conduct of gatekeepers, the scope of those provisions is 
limited to certain instances of market power, for example dominance on specific markets and of 
anti-competitive behaviour, and enforcement o ccurs ex post  and requires an extensive investigation 
of often very complex facts on a case by case basis. Moreover, existing Union law does not address, 
or does not address effectively, the challenges to the effective functioning of the internal market 
posed by the conduct of gatekeepers that are not necessarily dominant in competition -law terms'. 
The EU will leverage its combined resources, including in some cases the investigative support of 
national authorities competent for the enforcement of national competition rules. The Digital Markets 
Act also incorporates an EU -wide coordination mechanism that brings together all relevant 
authorities in the EU, including national competition authorities through the European Competition 
Network.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442, Pg. 173, Para - 4.186  
Background: While smaller investment firms that qualify as "small and non -interconnected" can be 
exempted from certain requirements, other firms are subject to capital requirements mirroring the 
risk they pose to clients, markets, and the firm itself. Medium -sized or large firms that offer 
"bank -like" services and could still pose risks to financial stability could also remain subject to the 
banking rules without having to be authorized as banks, possibly at their supervisor's request.  
Question 11:  What is the criteria based on which an investment firm can be classified as "small 
and non -interconnected" and what are the specific requirements that such firms can be exempted 
from?  
What are the services that are classified as "bank -like" s ervices? How are these determined?  
 
Reply: The identification of investment firms that are considered as posing risks to financial stability 
on a par with credit institutions, thereby justifying a similar prudential treatment, is notably based 
on the natu re of their investment services and activities. An exhaustive list of nine (9) investment 
activities and services is provided under Annex  1 of MiFID (Directive 2014/65/EU) for the purpose 
of the investment firms' authorisation. Out of this list, activities  n°3 (dealing on own account) and 
n°6 (underwriting of financial instruments and/or placing of financial instruments on a firm 
commitment basis) have been considered as being the most relevant in terms of scale, 
interconnectedness, and risks to the financi al stability. Depending on their size, investment firms 
performing those activities may therefore be subject to the prudential requirements applicable to 
credit institutions.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442, Pg. 175, Para - 4.194  
Background: The Digital Finance Strategy builds on the 2018 Fintech Action Plan and has 
four objectives: (i)  tackle fragmentation in the Digital Single Market; (ii)  ensure the regulatory 
framework facilitates digital innovation; (iii)  establish a common financial data space to promote 
data-driven innovation; and (iv)  address other risks by ensuring a level regulatory playing field for 
existing and new financial services.  
Question 12:  Could the European  Union  explain the meaning of common financial data space? Does 
it imply sharing of all or any specific financial data across all those interested in its use? Is the access 
to data available on non -discriminatory basis to foreign service suppliers as well?  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Reply:  The Digital Finance Strategy outlines the legislative and non -legislative initi atives proposed 
to achieve the four specific priorities. To achieve the first priority (removing fragmentation in the 
Digital Single Market), the Commission will focus on enabling EU -wide interoperable use of digital 
identities. This objective is being ach ieved through the Commission's legislative package to 
strengthen the EU's anti -money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) 
rules adopted in July 2021 and the Commission legislative proposal for a framework for a European 
Digital Id entity adopted in June 2021.  
 
To achieve the second priority (adapting the EU regulatory framework to facilitate digital innovation) 
the EU adopted a DLT Pilot Regime regulation in May 2022. The EU adopted the Markets in Crypto 
Assets regulation (MiCA) wh ich is due to become law in 2024.  
 
The third priority is establishing the European financial data space, which will create broader access 
to public and private data in the Union. The European financial data space is focused on the sharing 
of specific fina ncial data across the financial sector. It consists of three objectives: facilitating access 
to publicly disclosed financial reporting on EU companies and investments; enabling access to data 
in finance ("open finance"); and facilitating the sharing of sup ervisory data sharing. The 
first objective is addressed in the Commission's legislative proposal for a regulation on the 
European  Single Access Point. The second objective will be addressed by a forthcoming legislative 
proposal on financial data access ("o pen finance") in mid -2023, alongside the planned review of the 
Payment Services Directive (PSD2). The third objective is addressed by the actions in the 
Supervisory Data Strategy published by the Commission in December 2021.  
 
The fourth priority (Addressing the challenges and risks associated with digital transformation) is 
being achieved by the monitoring of the existing EU legal framework to safeguard and protect 
consumers in line with competition rules.  
 
Given that the legislation on the Europe an financial data space has not been adopted, it is not 
possible to clarify the specific scope or content.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442, Pg. 175 , Paragraph 4.197 : The market for transport services in the 
European  Union  is generally open but certain restrictions remain in  place. Restrictions to trade in 
transport services vary significantly across member States but are on average slightly lower than 
those in other OECD countries, and they increased marginally between 2018 and 2021 , in many 
instances related to horizontal p olicy changes. Intra -European Economic Area (EEA) services trade 
restrictiveness for transport services is consistently significantly lower than that for trade with third 
countries. The regulatory restrictiveness for non -EU FDI in transport services (as we ll as its three 
sub-components: air, surface, and maritime transport services) was in 2019 lower for all EU member 
States compared to the corresponding average restrictiveness of third -country FDI in non -EU 
OECD  Members.  
Question 13 - European  Union  is requ ested to share details of new measures which increased 
restrictiveness of trade in transport services between 2018 and 2021 and the rationale for 
introducing these new measures.  
 
Reply:  The EU would like to express reservations regarding the assessment th at restrictions to trade 
in transport services have increased marginally between 2018 and 2021. In the absence of a specific 
indication of the measures in question, the EU is not in a position to provide more details on these 
measures and comment on the ra tionale for introducing them.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442, Pg. 184 , Paragraph 4.242 : International online retail platforms entered the 
parcel delivery market in some member States, according to the report mentioned above. Following 
the elimination of the exemption from import VAT on small parcels valued below EUR  22 in 2021, 
inbound packet and parcel flow from outside the European  Union  decreased in most member States 
(Section  3.1.1.1). The Commission expects the elimination of exemption from import VAT to 
incentivize con sumers to shop more within the European  Union . It could also impact the structure 
of delivery services as foreign companies having used individual parcels in the past could either rely 
on the Import One -Stop Shop or increase customs clearance in bulk coupl ed with the use of delivery 
services linked to online retail platforms or other local fulfilment service providers (Section  3.1.1.1).  
Question 14: Could the European  Union  confirm if elimination of exemption from import VAT 
creates a non -level playing field between domestically produced and imported products received 
through parcel? How does the elimination incentivise consumers to shop more within the EU?  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Reply:  On 1 Jul y, the EU VAT e -commerce package came into application and introduced a number 
of amendments to the VAT rules governing the taxation of business -to-consumer (B2C) cross -border 
e-commerce activity in Europe. In relation to imports, the measures introduced b y the EU VAT 
e-commerce package were designed to create a fairer and simpler system of taxation and to take 
action against e -commerce related VAT fraud. To help create a fairer system of taxation for 
e-commerce traders, a primary objective of the e -commerc e package was to level the playing field 
for suppliers of EU goods by addressing distortive rules that led to competition issues in the 
e commerce market. Prior to 1  July 2021, commercial goods that were imported from a third country 
into the EU benefitted  from a VAT exemption on import, when the value of those goods did not 
exceed EUR  22. This exemption created a distortion in competition in the e -commerce sector as 
traders who sold goods that were already in the EU at the time of sale did not benefit from  such a 
VAT exemption. Therefore, in an effort to help level the playing field for suppliers of EU goods, the 
VAT exemption for the importation of small consignments not exceeding EUR  22 was abolished which 
effect from 1  July 2021. As a result, VAT is now due on all commercial goods imported into Europe 
from a third country or third territory, irrespective of their value.  
 
Since abolishing the exemption threshold, sellers of imported goods not exceeding EUR  22 no longer 
enjoy an unfair advantage over selle rs of EU goods. This measure has helped to restore competition 
in the e -commerce sector as consumers are no longer incentivised to purchase low value goods from 
outside the EU. Following the implementation of the EU VAT e -commerce package, the Commission 
conducted an ex-post evaluation of the first 6 months of application the package to assess its results. 
The results of the ex-post evaluation are included in Annex  6 of the Impact Assessment, 
accompanying the VAT in the Digital Age proposal, which was published on 8  December  2022. The 
initial results showcased the effect that the abolition of the EUR  22 exemption threshold has had on 
the collection of VAT and how it has helped to level the playing field between sellers of EU goods 
and sellers of imported goods. In the first 6 months of application of the EU VAT e -commerce 
package, approximately EUR  692 million  was directly generated as re sult of the abolition of the 
EUR 22 threshold. This is a significant result as it represents new EU VAT that would not otherwise 
have been collected and helps to highlight how the package has allowed the Commission to realise 
its aim of achieving a fairer and simpler system of taxation.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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INDIA – ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS  
Questions based on Secretariat Report (WT/TPR/S/442)  
 
WT/TPR/S/442, Page -80, Para -3.91 
The inclusion of social and environmental standards in the 2017/18 amendments was a novel 
development whereby the Commission can take these into account when selecting an appropriate 
representative country to construct a non -distorted normal value and when calculating an injury 
margin.  
 
Question1:  
a) Please give the title of the 2017/18 a mendments and the rationale for introducing these 
amendments.  
b) How does the Commission measure social and environmental standards while selecting 
an appropriate representative country?  
c) What are the parameters that the Commission evaluates while determ ining the social 
and environmental standards?  
d) Please provide instances where the Commission has selected an appropriate 
representative country based on social and environmental standards.  
 
Reply:  
1(a) The legislative changes were:  
REGULATION (EU) 2017 /2321 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 
12 December 2017 amending Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 on protection against dumped imports 
from countries not members of the European  Union  and Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 on protection 
against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European  Union . 
 
Regulation (EU) 2018/825 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30  May 2018 amending 
Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of 
the Europ ean Union  and Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European  Union , 
OJ L 143, 7.6.2018, p. 1.  
 
1(b) and (d) join reply:  The issue of social and en vironmental standards in selecting an 
appropriate representative country is taken into account when there is more than one possible 
suitable country from which to choose. Where it is relevant for the selection of the representative 
country, the EU takes in to account the core ILO conventions and relevant Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements ratified in the countries.  
 
This criterion was applied in the expiry review:  
 
· COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2019/687 of 2  May 2019 imposing a 
definitive anti -dumping duty on imports of certain organic coated steel products originating in the 
People's Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article  11(2) of Regulation (EU) 
2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council.  
 
1(c) The issue arises in the context of calculating the injury margin. The effect is calculated by 
taking into account the actual costs incurred as well as future costs, during the lifetime of 
the measures resulting from compliance with these standards. Article  7(2d) of Regulation (EU) 
2016/1036 stipulates that ' when establishing the target price, actual cost of production of the Union 
industry, which result from Multilateral Environmental Agreements, and protocols thereunder, to 
which the Union is a part y, and of ILO Conventions listed in Annex Ia, shall be duly reflected. 
Moreover, future costs, which are not covered in paragraph 2c, which result from these agreements 
and conventions, and which the Union industry will incur during the period of the appli cation of the 
measure pursuant to Article 11(2), shall be taken into account'.   
 
WT/TPR/S/442, Page -82, Para -3.93 
Another element that was emphasized as part of EU policy during the review period was addressing 
fraud and circumvention through improved trade enforcement. To address some of these issues, the 
Commission continued to include a special monitoring clause in  regulations imposing measures, in 
particular for those with a high risk of circumvention. Special monitoring has become more common, 
and by end -2021 there were 54 TDI measures subject to such monitoring. The Commission has also WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 carried out anti -circumvent ion and anti -absorption investigations in recent years to address these 
growing problems. It also closely monitors price undertakings to ensure they are complied with 
properly.  
 
Question 2:  
a) Please explain the anti -circumvention law. Under the EU law, ho w is circumvention 
determined?  
b) Please explain how the special monitoring mechanism for circumvention is practically 
implemented.  
 
Reply:  
2(a) The legislation related to anti -circumvention can mainly be found in Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8  June 2016 on protection against dumped imports 
from countries not members of the European  Union  ('the basic Regulation'), and in particular 
Articles  13 thereof.  
 
Circumvention is defined in the basic Regulation as a chang e in the pattern of trade between 
third countries and the European  Union  or between individual companies in the country subject to 
previously imposed anti -dumping or anti -subsidy measures and the European  Union , which stems 
from a practice, process or work for which there is insufficient due cause or economic justification 
other than the imposition of the duty, and where there is evidence of injury or that the remedial 
effects of the duty are being undermined in  terms of the prices and/or quantities of the like product, 
and where there is evidence of dumping in relation to the normal values previously established for 
the like product.  
 
Once an investigation establishes that circumvention is taking place, the pre viously imposed 
anti-dumping or anti -subsidy duties may be extended to imports from third countries of the like 
product, whether slightly modified or not, or to imports of the slightly modified like product from the 
country subject to the original measures , or parts thereof.  
 
2 (b)  A special monitoring clause applicable to a measure, due to an increased risk of circumvention 
identified at the time of its imposition, will result in the monitoring of that measure being a priority 
in the planning of regular mo nitoring activities.  This applies regardless of whether specific risk 
information is available at the given moment. Monitoring activities are primarily based on the 
analysis of public statistical trade data and internal customs declaration data to establis h the 
evolution of EU imports of products subject to measures in terms of volumes and prices at the level 
of exporting countries and individual exporters. This trend analysis may be supplemented by the 
evaluation of external trade data from exporting and t ransit countries. The trends identified are 
assessed in the light of company, product -related and other economic factors as well as any 
additional risk information received from the European Anti -fraud office (OLAF), EU Member States 
and the European  Union  industry. Observations which appear to be suspicious will be further 
discussed with the European  Union  industry and OLAF or the competent Member States' authorities 
in order to arrive at a common assessment and to propose appropriate follow -up measures, s uch as 
launching an anti -circumvention investigation or investigations into fraud.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442, Page -81, Para -3.94 
In terms of policy direction, the European  Union  has increasingly focused its efforts in recent years 
on addressing what it considers compl icated or opaque subsidy practices in third countries. In 2020, 
for the first time, the Commission imposed countervailing duties on goods produced in one country 
that received financial support, i.e. subsidies, from another country, so called cross -border financial 
support. Also in March 2022, the Commission countervailed preferential financing provided by China 
to Indonesia, as part of a complex subsidy arrangement designed for export of stainless steel 
cold-rolled flat products to the European  Union . To further address this issue and as part of its efforts 
to reform the WTO, the European  Union  issued a concept paper and made other proposals to improve 
the multilateral trading system in which a few of these relate specifically to trade remedies, including 
the need to address the most trade -distorting types of subsidies and to improve coverage of the 
activities of SOEs, in particular how subsidy rules apply.  
 
Question 3:  Please explain the compliance of these actions with WTO law . 
 
Reply: The EU refers to the  relevant findings and conclusions contained in the European Commission 
implementing regulations concerned and considers that they are compliant with WTO law:  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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· COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2020/776 of 12  June 2020 imposing 
definitive countervailing duties on imports of certain woven and/or stitched glass fibre fabrics 
originating in the People's Republic of China and Egypt - OJ L 189, 15.06.2020 . 
 
· COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2020/870 of 24  June 2020 imposing a 
definitive countervailing duty on imports of continuous filament glass fibre products originating in 
Egypt – OJ L 201, 25.06.2020 . 
 
· COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2022/433 of 15  March  2022 imposing 
definitive countervailing duties on imports of stainless s teel cold -rolled flat products originating in 
India and Indonesia – OJ L 88, 16.03.2022 . 
 
WT/TPR/S/442, Page -97 Para -3.143  
Support measures under these funds can take the form of grants or direct payments, and financial 
instruments such as loans, guarantees, and equity.  
 
Question 4:  
1. Please explain how the European  Union  monitors the use of these funds . 
 
Reply:  Please see also the replies provided for question 5 a) and b).  
 
The European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) in shared management finances the expenditure 
referred to in Article  5(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/21168 being:  
 
(a) measures regulating or supporting agricultural markets laid down in Regulation (EU) 
No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council;  
 
(b) the European  Union 's financial contribution to interventions in certain sectors as referred to in 
Title III, Chapter III, of Regulation (EU) 2021/2115;  
 
(c) interventions in the form of direct payments to farmers under the CAP Strategic Plan referred 
to under Article  16 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2115;  
 
(d) the European  Union 's financial contribution to information and promotion measures for 
agricultural products on the internal market of the Union and in third countries which are undertaken 
by Member States a nd which are selected by the European Commission;  
 
(e) the European  Union 's financial contribution to the specific measures for agriculture in the 
outermost regions of the European  Union  laid down in Regulation (EU) No 228/2013 and to the 
specific measures  for agriculture in favour of the smaller Aegean islands laid down in Regulation 
(EU) No 229/2013.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442, Page -98, Para -3.144  
In the agricultural sector, in addition to the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, 
support continues to be f inanced by the European Agriculture Guarantee Fund (EAGF) (Section  4.1), 
which is the main source of support for this sector.  
 
Question 5:  
a) Please give details of these funds, including the form of payment.  
b) Please explain how the European  Union  monitors the use of these funds.  
 
Reply:  a) The Member States make the payments to all beneficiaries through their national paying 
agency/agencies) (PAs), which implement the various support and intervention measures (direct aid 
and market support): the P As receive the applications from the agricultural economic operators, 
verify their entitlements and the amounts due and pay them. The Member States are subsequently 
reimbursed by the EAGF.  
 
The EAGF local IT system AGREX calculates the amounts to reimburse  after controls and 
interventions. Every month the Directorate -General for Agriculture and Rural Development of the 
European Commission reimburses to the Member States the amounts thus calculated by AGREX and 
this not later than the third working day of th e second month (= n+2) following the month in which 
the expenditure and assigned revenue were effected by the PAs.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 The charging to the European  Union  budget is done through the accounting regularisation of 
expenditure and assigned revenue declared by the M ember States and executed by the 
European  Commission. It is done within two months from receipt of the EAGF Declarations of 
Expenditure. In this phase the eligible expenditure and assigned revenue by budget sub -item is 
accounted for in AGREX. The eligible expenditure is subsequently charged by budget item into the 
European Commission's accounting system ABAC.  
 
b) In accordance with Article  37(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116, the EAGF expenditure may be 
financed by the European  Union  only if it has been effe cted by accredited paying agencies and if it 
has been effected in accordance with the applicable European  Union  rules or as regards types of 
intervention referred to in Regulation (EU) 2021/2115:  
 
- it is matched by a corresponding reported output; and  
- it has been effected in accordance with the applicable governance systems, not extending to the 
eligibility conditions for individual beneficiaries laid down in the relevant CAP Strategic Plan.  
 
In accordance with Article  11(1) of Regulation (EU) 2022/12 8 "… expenditure and assigned revenue 
declared by paying agencies in respect of a given month shall correspond to payments and receipts 
actually effected during that month.  
 
The EU has a shared management with its Member States when it comes to the implementation and 
control of the Rural Development programmes (2014 -2022). The controls are carried out by the 
national authorities by means of administrative and field controls, ex-ante and ex-post checks. As 
part of the annual clearance of accounts procedure, the European Commission services carry out 
conformity and financial audits in the Member states.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442, Pg. 136 & 141, Para: 4.14, 4.16 & 4.32:  
4.14. The new CAP intr oduces certain changes regarding the eligibility for payments, with many 
details to be defined in national CSPs under a common framework. The new CAP strengthens 
requirements for compliance with basic standards for good agriculture and environmental condit ions. 
It adds the requirements in place for obtaining the "greening payments" under the old CAP to the 
former rules on "cross -compliance" to receive any direct payments, referring to these augmented 
rules as "conditionality" for receiving direct payments. Member States then define additional criteria 
for farmers to receive payments under the "eco -schemes", with a similar mechanism in place 
regarding rural development. According to the Commission, this new "green architecture" provides 
more opportunities to reward farmers willing to provide public goods. The new Regulation (EU) 
2021/2115 also introduces mechanisms for compliance with social conditionality (relating to working 
and employment conditions or employer obligations). Member States have been given ad ditional 
time to establish them by January 2025. The failure to comply with these two types of conditionalities 
by farmers and other beneficiaries will allow for the application of administrative penalties.  
 
4.16. Member States will have to allocate at lea st 25% of total allocations for direct payments to 
"eco-schemes". Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 spells out that member States are to define such 
voluntary schemes covering at least two objectives spelled out in Article  31, which would go beyond 
Good Agricultur al and Environmental Conditions (GAECs), conditions set by Union or national law, 
or other conditionality already contained in the Regulation. Farmers committing to adhere to 
agricultural practices defined in these schemes related to climate and the enviro nment, public and 
plant health, and animal welfare would then be eligible for a payment on all eligible hectares.  
 
4.32. Until 2020 and during the transition period, member States still had to allocate 30% of their 
national ceilings annually for direct pay ments for "agricultural practices beneficial for the climate 
and the environment" (greening). These funds were disbursed to farmers entitled to a payment 
under the BPS or the SAPS and which observed, on all their eligible hectares, either certain specific 
practices or "equivalent practices" (in seven member States during 2020). The specific practices 
related to crop diversification, maintenance of existing permanent grassland, and having an 
ecological focus area (EFA) on at least 5% of arable land for holdi ngs with more than 15 ha of arable 
land. 
 
Background: As per the new framework for Domestic Support under 2023, member states will have 
to allocate at least 25% of total allocations for direct payments to "eco -schemes". Farmers 
committing to adhere to agri cultural practices defined in these schemes related to climate and the 
environment, public and plant health, and animal welfare would then be eligible for a payment on WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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all eligible hectares. Member States define additional criteria for farmers to receive p ayments under 
the "eco -schemes", with a similar mechanism in place regarding rural development. Also under the 
"Greening Payments" until 2020 and the transitional period, farmers adhering to agricultural 
practices beneficial for the climate and the environ ment were entitled to a direct payment on all 
eligible hectares.  
 
In this regard, India seeks the following details from the EU:  
 
Question 6 : How do the two schemes namely the "eco -schemes" and "greening payments" differ 
from each other? Please elaborate.  
 
Reply:  Though the goal of supporting farming practices reducing impact on environment and climate 
is similar, these interventions are very different. Greening consists of three standard practices across 
the EU with a national standard premium. The EU rules on greening were relatively long, detailed 
and prescriptive – because they contain not only the essence of the three basic agricultural practices 
concerned but also all the detail of how these can be implemented differently in the highly varie d 
circumstances of Member States. This detail included lists of options, exemptions and coefficients. 
The approach was intended to balance the need for common elements with that for a certain 
flexibility in implementation, but it has nonetheless been criti cised for perceived rigidity, complexity 
and lack of adaptation of national context.  
 
Eco-schemes give more autonomy to Member States to define the actual content of environmental 
and climate actions supported that are rewarded with a compensatory payment (income foregone 
and additional costs) or in the form of a top -up to the basic income support in accordance with the 
rules of the WTO  Agreement  of Agriculture. Member States have to make one or more eco -schemes 
available, but farmers will have the freedom to participate or not. Member States have the flexibility 
to customize the eco -schemes to specific national environmental and climate needs to ensure a 
meaningful contribution to EU environmental and climate objectives. Farmers need to subscribe to 
one or more eco -schemes, according to the national rules set, and to comply with the commitments 
to receive the premia. The 158 eco -schemes set out in the 28 CAP Strategic Plans include a wide 
range of practices to cope with different environmental and climate ob jectives. This is a key move 
away from the approach taken with the Greening direct payments whereby Member States 
implemented a common set of practices with detailed rules set at EU level and applicable to all 
eligible farmers receiving direct payments.  
 
Two of the previous Greening practices (protection of permanent pastures and ban of ploughing 
pastures in Natura 2000 areas) have been moved to the new conditionality. Conditionality is a 
system of linkage between area - and animal -based CAP payments (in P illar I or Pillar II) and a 
range of obligations. When recipients of these payments (mainly farmers, but sometimes other land 
managers) do not meet the obligations, the payments may be reduced. These obligations originate 
either in CAP legislation (in the case of "standards for good agricultural and environmental 
condition"  – GAEC) or in non -CAP directives and regulations (in the case of "statutory 
management  requirements" – SMRs2). All the GAEC standards and some of the SMRs are 
environmental – concerning climate change, water, soil, and biodiversity/landscapes.  
 
Question 7:  Whether the support under the "Greening Payments" has been continued under the 
new CAP?  
 
Reply:  The support to Greening has been carried on until 2022 that was a transition year between  
the two CAP programming periods. Eco -schemes apply from 2023, the first year of implementation 
of new CAP 2023 -2028.  
 
Question 8: What is the additional criterion defined by member states, for farmers to receive 
payments under the eco -schemes?  
 
Reply:  To be eligible to eco -schemes, farmers need to respond to the definition of active farmers as 
set out by the Member States within the framework of legislation and have eligible agricultural areas 
also according the legal framework which is the Regulation (EU)  2021/2115 of the 
European  Parliament and of the Council of 2  December  2021 establishing rules on support for 
strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the Common agricultural policy 
(CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultur al Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD). This Regulation is commonly referred WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 as SPR ("Strategic Plans regulation"). An area is eligible for eco -schemes if it meets the definition of 
eligible hectare as laid down by the Member States, as referred to in Article  4, paragraph 4 of the 
SPR. The criteria of eligible hectare in Article  4(4) will be defined in detail by the Member States.  
 
For payments that are set in line with Article  31(7)(a) of SPR, in the f orm of a supplement to the 
basic income support, the beneficiaries have to necessarily receive the basic income support (BISS 
with or without payment entitlements) on the eligible area. In case of "compensatory payments", 
receiving the basic income support  is not a precondition for up taking eco -schemes. However, in all 
cases the beneficiary must be an active farmer and the area has to be eligible to direct payments 
according to provisions of Article  4, paragraph 1, point c) as defined by the Member State.  
 
On top of these two basic eligibility criteria relative to the farmer and the area, each eco -scheme 
has a set of commitments that farmers have to observe. An eco -scheme can consist of one or several 
commitments (agricultural practices) beneficial for the  climate, the environment, animal welfare and 
antimicrobial resistance. The commitments included in each eco -schemes by Member States are the 
specific requirements that farmers must commit to carry out on the eligible area.  
 
The 158 eco -schemes set out in the 28 CAP Strategic Plans include a wide range of agricultural 
practices to cope with different environmental and climate objectives. Member States have 
significant flexibility in the design of practices within their eco -schemes on the condition that they  
address the environmental, climatic and animal welfare needs identified in the CAP strategic plan, 
they are in line with the overall intervention strategy of the CAP plan, and they go beyond the 
"baseline" requirements defines in Art.  31(5) of SPR (condit ionality and other national legislation).  
 
Question 9: Will the producers of commodities that are covered under the EU Deforestation 
regulation benefit from the eco -schemes?  
 
Reply:  Eco-schemes are voluntary de -coupled schemes. Any active farmers or groups of active 
farmers which make commitments to observe agricultural practices beneficial for the climate, the 
environment and animal welfare and combatting antimicrobial resistance ca n accede to the scheme 
under the conditions set out in Regulation (EU) 2021/2115, and as further specified in the 
CAP Strategic Plans of the EU Member States.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442; Pg. 142, Para: 4.35:  
The Young Farmers Scheme continued to apply until 2020 and d uring the transition period, providing 
additional payments to farmers aged 40 or below and who are setting up for the first time (or 
recently have set up) an agricultural holding. Seven member States and two regions applied 
additional eligibility criteria relating to certain skills and training. Member States can grant these 
payments for between 25 and 90 hectares per farmer, at a value of between 25% and 50% of a 
reference payment per hectare.  
In this regard, the EU is requested to elaborate on the followi ng: 
 
Question 10: Please indicate the total number of beneficiaries and their per farmer average size of 
landholdings.  
 
Question 11: Under the scheme, which EU members had the highest number of beneficiaries 
in 2022?  
 
Reply:  Joint reply to questions 10 and 11:  
 
The information provided by the EU is for the whole programming period 2014 -2022: In terms of 
number of beneficiaries supported for the whole programming period (implemented up to 2025), 
the planned output based on the  latest adopted rural development programmes is 
2 375 000 beneficiaries for EU27. The EU Member State with the highest number of planned 
beneficiaries is France, with 468 500 beneficiaries (for the same period). Please find figures in the 
following table:  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 427 - 
 
Planned output (2014 -2022 programming period, implemented up to 2025)  
Based on the latest adopted rural development programmes on 1  June 2023 
Country  Nr of beneficiaries (holdings) receiving start up aid young farmers 
(sub-measure 6.1)  
FR 468.541  
PL 417.868  
GR 336.000  
IT 256.502  
ES 254.343  
RO 175.226  
AT 114.178  
PT 82.982  
BG 53.360  
HU 48.335  
SI 32.301  
FI 27.198  
LT 24.221  
BE 23.337  
HR 13.508  
CZ 12.907  
SK 11.446  
SE 6.472  
EE 5.530  
LV 5.030  
CY 3.200  
LU 1.293  
DE 795 
MT 490 
EU27  2.375.063  
 
Question 12: Can a beneficiary avail the scheme multiple times before attaining the age of 40?  
 
Reply:  The answer is yes. The duration of the support (maximum number of years a young farmer 
could apply, given that the application is o n annual basis), can be maximum 5 years . 
 
Question 13: What are the "additional eligibility" criteria relating to certain skills and training 
implemented by the seven member states and two regions for providing payments to farmers?  
 
Reply:  According to the new CAP regulation, a young farmer must have "appropriate training and/or 
skills" (to be defined by Member State). The criterion regarding appropriate training and/or skills 
has been proposed in order to attract qualified and motivated yo ung people in the sector, who on 
the one hand would be capable to tangibly contribute to the sustainable farming and vitality of rural 
areas in the EU, while on the other hand earn decent living out of farming. With this objective, 
Member States can provid e additional criteria as long as these criteria are not discriminatory and 
serve the objective  (i.e. some Member States request some specific training such as on new 
technologies, digital skills or entrepreneurship, some refer to soft skills such as collab oration, 
cooperation and networking, other Member States provide flexibility on the timing, allowing to have 
it split over two or more years etc.).  
 
Question 14: How is the EU planning to support its young farmers under the new CAP?  
 
Reply:  Generational re newal is a priority under the new Common Agriculture Policy (CAP). One of 
the nine objectives of the CAP 2023 -2027 is to " To attract and sustain young farmers  [...]". 
CAP 2023-2027 provides for several interventions specifically for young farmers, to be ta ilored to 
the national conditions by the Member States in their Strategic Plans. An amount equal to at least  3% 
of every EU Member State direct payment envelope must be used to support young farmers who set 
up a farm. This support may be granted as income support, investment support or start -up aid for 
young farmers (only 50% of relevant investment support would be counted towards this target).  
 
A significant number of Member States propose to allocate funding beyond the required 3% including 
Malta: 21,7%; Greece: 7,7%; Croatia: 5.3%; Lithuania: 4,7%; Portugal: 4,2% and France: 3,03%.  
 
Strategies to benefit young farmers generally include combination of several interventions:  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 428 - 
 
  
 • The Complementary Income Support for Young Farmers (CISYF) is a voluntary  intervention 
under Direct payments providing enhanced income support to young farmers who are newly set up 
for the first time and who are entitled to basic income support.  
• The support is granted in the form of an annual payment per eligible hectare or annual lump 
sum. 
• Installation of young farmers, of new farmers and rural business start -up is a voluntary type 
of intervention under CAP 2023 -27 Rural Development pillar, which aims to provide immediate 
start-up support to farmers/businesses who want to set up.  
• Support can also include grants, loans or guarantees to help the development of rural 
businesses or to support the provision of advice on how best to enter farming.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442; Pg. 143, Para: 4.41  
All member States, except Germany, apply the V CS scheme, a production -limiting scheme applying 
annual payments based on fixed areas and yields or on a fixed number of animals.50 On average, 
member States allocate around 11% of their national ceiling to this scheme, with a number of 
member States revie wing this allocation during the review period as permitted following changes 
outlined in the previous Review. However, the levels of support allocated to the scheme have not 
changed fundamentally from the previous Review, with 10 member States still alloca ting the 
maximum percentage allowed (13%), three having received a Commission approval to exceed this 
maximum, and Malta using a derogation allowing member States to use up to EUR  3 million  for the 
scheme, resulting in 57.2% of its national envelope being allocated to the scheme in 2022. As 
in 2021, 11 member States made use of the option to apply an additional top -up of up to 2% for 
protein crops to increase their VCS ceiling of 13% (+2%) in 2022 (Table  4.4). 
 
In this regard, the EU is requested to provide  details of the following:  
 
Question 15: Why was Malta granted a derogation under the VCS resulting in 57.2% of the national 
envelope as compared to the maximum (13%) of the national ceiling under this scheme? How long 
will Malta have access to this deroga tion? 
 
Reply:  This derogation to the general rule for the maximum percentage of the direct payment 
envelope that may be allocated to coupled income support is laid down in Article  53(5) of 
Regulation  1307/2013 for the VCS in 2014 -2022, and in Article  96(5) of Regulation 2021/2015 for 
coupled income support (CIS) in the years 2023 -2027. It establishes that Member States may decide 
to allocate up to EUR  3 million  per year instead of respecting the general rule, and this provision has 
been made wi th a view to Member States with very small direct payment envelopes such as Malta, 
which has a very small area receiving direct payments.  
 
Question 16: What products are covered under the VCS scheme availed by Malta?  
 
Reply:  The VCS as well as the CIS is s upporting the dairy, beef and sheep sectors and tomatoes.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442; Pg. 143, Para: 4.43:  
 
In addition to the VCS scheme, the European  Union  continued to provide payments for cotton in 
Bulgaria, Greece, and Spain. Payments are limited to a maximum base  area and are calculated using 
a fixed yield and reference amounts (lower in 2021 and 2022, compared to 2020).  
 
In this regard, the EU is requested to elaborate on the following:  
 
Question 17: In Domestic Support Notification, EU notifies VCS scheme as Blue box support, does 
the EU intend to continue the VCS scheme under the new CAP? If not, does the new CAP include 
any other blue box programme to replace VCS?  
 
Reply:  Please see the reply to question 18. The EU is finalising its DS:2 notification where I ndia will 
be able to find information on the Blue Box measures envisaged in the new CAP.  
 
Question 18: In response to the Committee on Agriculture AGIMS ID 92071, the EU stated that it 
will discontinue the blue box support and shift to the Amber box. How d oes the new CAP address 
the EU's position on the blue box support?  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 429 - 
 
Reply:  The New CAP does not discontinue the use of Blue Box support. For the particular case of 
Coupled Direct Payments, the Member States have the legal possibility not to design their 
interventions in accordance with the requirements of Article  6.5 of Annex  2 to the WTO  Agreement  
on Agriculture. In this case, those interventions will be notified as Amber Box.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442; Pg. 144, Para: 4.47:  
Council Regulation (EU) 1370/2013 determines  measures on fixing certain aids and refunds related 
to the common organization of the markets in agricultural products. It defines reference thresholds 
for a number of sectors56 as well as related public intervention prices to be used when public 
interven tion in a specific sector is opened. It defines quantitative limitations per public intervention 
period (defined in Regulation 1308/2013), with limitations for 2020 and 2021 set at 3  million  tonnes 
of common wheat, 50,000 tonnes of butter, and 109,000 tonn es of skimmed milk powder (SMP). 
Except in certain circumstances, public intervention is usually carried out by tendering with the 
intervention prices acting as maximum price.  
 
In this regard, the EU is requested to address the following:  
 
Question 19: How is this measure notified under domestic support ? 
 
Reply:  Public intervention is notified as an Amber Box measure in supporting table DS:5 in annual 
DS:1 notifications (please see the latest for 2019/2020 in G/AG/N/79).  
 
Question 20: How are the quantitati ve limitations per public intervention period, reference 
threshold for sectors, and intervention prices determined?  
 
Reply:  Public intervention can work through a fixed price mechanism or through tenders and 
quantities and prices depend on which of these t wo mechanisms applies. The fixed price mechanism 
means that the EU sets a fixed price at which a certain quantity of any one type of product will be 
bought. This acts as a price floor that helps to prevent the market price falling below a sustainable 
level. The tender mechanism means that operators offer a certain price and quantities below a price 
decided by the EU after bids were made, are bought at the price offered by operators. Quantitative 
limits for public intervention are therefore in advance set on ly for products with are subject to 
intervention through fixed price mechanism (wheat, butter, SMP). These quantitative limits are set 
in Article  3 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1370/2013 of 16  December  2013 and are also referred to 
in para 4.47 of the Rep ort form the WTO Secretariat. For products subject to intervention through 
tender the prices and quantities will set by the European Commission during the tender procedure.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442; Pg.145, Para: 4.53 and Table  4.6 
In response to the COVID -19 pandemic, the European  Union  also adopted a number of derogations 
from provisions of Regulation 1308/2013 and flexibilities in the implementation of existing market 
support programmes (Table  4.6). In addition, member States established a large number of su pport 
schemes targeted at the economy at large (and covering the agricultural sector) or the agricultural 
sector itself, of varying size, in the context of the temporary state aid framework in response to 
COVID -19 (Section  3.3.1).61 In 2020, total state ai d expenditure to agriculture, fisheries, and 
aquaculture amounted to approximately EUR  6.3 billion  for the EU -27 and the United  Kingdom , a 
slight increase compared to earlier years.  
 
In this context, could the European  Union  provide details on the followin g: 
 
Question 21: What has been the state aid expenditure on the agriculture sector (excluding fisheries 
and aquaculture) for the EU -27? 
 
Question 22: Are these pandemic -response measures still in force?  
 
Question 23: What has been the total increase in product -specific support compared to the levels 
stated in EU's last DS:1 notification ( marketing year 2019/2020) as a result of these measures on 
potatoes, fruits, vegetables, wine, milk and milk products, table olives and olive oil?  
 
Question 24: When does the EU plan to submit its DS:1 notification notifying these measures?  
 
Reply: Joint reply to Questions 21, 22, 23 and 24:  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 430 - 
 
  
 The EU has provided the amounts of the additional support, including state aid, granted to the 
farmers in order to com pensate for the losses caused by the COVID pandemic.  
 
The EU has reported the amounts (COVID measures) incurred during financial year starting in 
October 2019 until October 2020. The EU is currently working on DS:1 in relation to 2020/2021 
Financial, where  the amount of the COVID - related support will also be duly notified. Once the 
notification is available, India could compare the share of the COVID measures reported 
in 2019/2020 and 2020/2021.  
 
In May 2022, the EU announced that it will phase out the CO VID Temporary Framework. The COVID 
Temporary Framework was not extended beyond 30  June 2022 for most of the tools provided. To 
avoid a cliff -edge effect and to allow sufficient time for the roll -out and implementation especially of 
the recovery tools set o ut in sections 3.13 and 3.14, those sections of the COVID Temporary 
Framework have a later expiry date. Section  3.13 offers the possibility for Member States to provide 
specific investment support until 31  December  2022 and section 3.14 allows for solvency  support 
measures 31  December  2023.  
 
Even if the Covid Temporary Framework has expired for most of the sections, sections 3.13 and 3.14 
had a longer duration. Section  3.13 covers investments to ensure recovery and it was due to expire 
in December 2022. The  section is now prolonged until December 2023 with the same rules.  
 
The reasons for the prolongation are explained in recitals 3 and 4 of the last amendment  
(https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.C_.2022.423.01.0009.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AC%3A2022%3A42
3%3ATOC ). 
 
WT/TPR/S/442; Pg. 158, Para: 4.110:  
Going beyond these regulations affecting trade in illegally  cut timber, the European Parliament and 
the Council, in December 2022, reached a provisional agreement on a regulation proposed by the 
Commission in 2021, aiming to prevent deforestation and forest degradation associated with 
commodities and products plac ed on or exported from the EU market. It focuses on creating a level 
playing field, minimizing the use of products from supply chains associated with deforestation or 
forest degradation, and increasing demand for "deforestation -free" products. The proposed  
regulation would cover wood as well as products such as cocoa, coffee, oil palm, cattle, or soya 
grown on former forest areas that were deforested after December 2020.  
 
Background:  The European Parliament and the Council, in December 2022, proposed a 
"Deforestation Regulation" to prevent deforestation and forest degradation associated with 
commodities and products placed on or exported from the EU market. It focuses on creating a level 
playing field, minimizing the use of products from supply chains associ ated with deforestation or 
forest degradation, and increasing demand for "deforestation -free" products. The proposed 
regulation would cover wood as well as products such as cocoa, coffee, oil palm, cattle, or soya 
grown on former forest areas that were def orested after December 2020.  
 
In the context of Deforestation Regulation, could the EU elaborate on the following:  
 
Question 25: What is the share of imports in domestic consumption for  covered commodities 
namely coffee, palm oil, rubber, cattle, soy, coco a, and timber in 2021?  
 
Reply:  The EU data available is the following figures on EU imports for the following commodities 
during 2021:  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 431 - 
 
  Year  2021  2021  
PRODUCT 
(Codes)  PRODUCT (Labels)  QUANTITY_IN_100KG  VALUE_IN_EUROS  
01 LIVE ANIMALS  270.129  646.355.111  
0901 Coffee, whether or not roasted or decaffeinated; 
coffee husks and skins; coffee substitutes 
containing coffee in any proportion  28.939.181  8.237.168.679  
1201 Soya beans, whether or not broken  146.324.763  6.660.802.868  
1511 Palm oil and its fractions, whether or not refined 
(excl. chemically modified)  59.512.126  5.269.908.587  
1801 Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or roasted  16.347.533  3.903.319.689  
40 RUBBER AND ARTICLES THEREOF  62.848.841  23.576.260.480  
4403 Wood in the rough, whether or not stripped of 
bark or sapwood, or roughly squared (excl. 
rough -cut wood for walking sticks, umbrellas, 
tool shafts and the like; wood in the form of 
railway sleepers; wood cut into boards or beams, 
etc.) 98.324.569  723.053.039  
Source:  ESTAT . 
Question 26: Does the EU consider the fact that its historic contribution to deforestation is much 
more than developing countries while framing its due diligence requirements that impose a burden 
on exporters to the EU? In this regard, how does the EU commit to the "Common But Differentiated 
Responsibilities", the fundamental principle of UNFCCC and Paris Agreement under its Regulation?  
 
Reply:  With this Regulation, the EU aims to take responsibility as one of the main consumer markets. 
The Regul ation tackles the issue of deforestation and forest degradation from both consumers and 
producers' perspective: as long as there is demand for products coming from supply chains related 
to deforestation and forest degradation, even the best developments in  producing countries will not 
suffice, as there will always be too much pressure on the supply side to meet the demand. In 
addition, Art.  30 of the Regulation foresees that the European Commission and EU Member States 
will step up their engagement with thi rd countries, both producers and consumer countries, through 
partnerships and cooperation mechanisms focusing on the conservation, restoration and sustainable 
use of forests, deforestation, forest degradation, and the transition to sustainable commodity 
production.  
 
Question 27: Please explain the compliance of this regulation with Article  4.2 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture (AoA) . 
 
Reply:  The EU always assesses the WTO compatibility of its legislation, including autonomous 
regulations. Article  216(2) of th e Treaty on the Functioning of the European  Union  states that 
"[a]greements concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its 
Member States" . This obligation applies equally to the WTO  Agreement  on Agriculture.  
 
Question 28:  Did the EU consider any other less trade -restrictive measures to achieve the stated 
objective under the Regulation?  
 
Reply:  The Deforestation Regulation is based on a sound Impact Assessment, in which the 
European  Commission evaluated different policy options to curb EU's contribution to deforestation 
and forest degradation associated with consumption of certain commodities. The objectives pursued 
by the Regulation are the internationally recognized, public policy concerns of helping to fight aga inst 
climate change and halting biodiversity loss linked to deforestation. The Regulation is designed to 
apply in an even -handed and non -discriminatory manner, to all commodities and to products 
produced inside as well as outside the EU. In addition, Artic le 216(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European  Union  states that "[a]greements concluded by the Union are binding upon the 
institutions of the Union and on its Member States" . This obligation applies equally to the 
WTO Agreement. Consequently, the EU always assesses the WTO compatibility of its legislation, 
including autonomous regulations.  
 
Question 29: How does the EU consider the capacity challenges faced by farmers of developing 
countries in complying with the deforestation regulation?  
 
Reply: The cut -off date aims to minimise the number of smallholders that are caught cultivating 
land whose produce cannot be sold on the EU market or exported from it. Widespread and free WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 432 - 
 
  
 technology for geolocation – essentially mobile phones – will ensure th at no technical obstacle gets 
in the way of smallholders when it comes to selling their products to the EU market.  The engagement 
with the participation and the support of smallholders will be a priority for EU cooperation tools and 
programs.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442 ; Pg.146 and 148, Para: 4.54, 4.64:  
As a response to market disturbances resulting from the war in Ukraine, the Commission allocated 
EUR 500 million  (EUR 350 million  of which from the reserve for crises in the agricultural sector). 
Aiming to improve food s ecurity, member States were allowed to support farmers pursuing either 
(i) circular economy, (ii)  nutrient management, (iii)  efficient use of resources, or (iv)  environmental 
and climate -friendly production methods, with payments to be made by 30  September  2022. They 
were also authorized to allocate up to EUR  1 billion  from national sources for these interventions.  
 
4.64. In 2022, Regulation (EU) 2022/1033 also allowed for the provision of exceptional temporary 
support to farmers and SMEs engaged in process ing, marketing, or developing agricultural products, 
and affected by the impact of the war in Ukraine. Such support would be paid out in a lump sum, 
during 2023, of not exceeding EUR  15,000 per farmer and EUR  100,000 per SME for activities 
contributing to food security or addressing market imbalances, and would have to support 
beneficiaries to pursuing goals related to (i)  a circular economy, (ii)  nutrient management, (iii)  the 
efficient use of resources, or (iv)  environmental and climate -friendly productio n methods.76 This 
support complements similar exceptional measures against market disturbances. Total exceptional 
temporary support cannot exceed 5% of total EAFRD contributions to RDPs for 2021 -22. 
 
Background : Para 4.54 and 4.64 mentioned that the EU made provisions for supporting the farmers 
and SMEs affected by the impact of the war in Ukraine. As per Regulation (EU) 2022/467, the 
Commission allocated EUR  500 million  (EUR 350 million  of which was from the reserve for crises in 
the agricultural sector ). Aiming to improve food security, Member States were allowed to support 
farmers pursuing either (i)  circular economy, (ii)  nutrient management, (iii)  efficient use of 
resources, or (iv)  environmental and climate -friendly production methods, with payments  to be 
made by 30  September  2022. They were also authorized to allocate up to EUR  1 billion  from national 
sources for these interventions. However, Regulation (EU) 2022/1033 also seems to provide support 
to farmers and SMEs affected by the impact of the wa r in Ukraine with similar goals as mentioned 
in Regulation (EU) 2022/467. This support complements similar exceptional measures against 
market disturbances. Total exceptional temporary support cannot exceed 5% of total EAFRD 
contributions to RDPs for 2021 -22. 
 
In this context, the EU is requested to address the following:  
 
Question 30: What is the difference in the support given under Regulation (EU) 2022/1033 and 
Regulation (EU) 2022/467 as the response to market disturbances resulting from the war in Ukra ine? 
 
Question 31: Further, provide details on the number of beneficiaries (farmers and SMEs) supported 
under these programs in 2022 -23. 
 
Question 32: What are the specific 'exceptional' measures enacted by the EU against market 
disturbances? What is the quantum of actual expenditure under these measures?  
 
Reply: Joint reply to Questions 30, 31 and 32:  
 
Exceptional measures against market disturbances enacted between 2019 and December 2022, are 
based on the following regulations: 2020/591, 2020/592, 2 020/593, 2020/594, 2020/599, 
2020/601, 2020/1275, 2020/975, 2021/95, 2021/2026, 2022/1225 and 2022/467.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442; Pg. 139, Para 4.28:  
As a response to the COVID -19 pandemic, the Commission introduced certain derogations from 
some rules for checks rela ting to direct payments, rural development, and certain market measures 
in 2020, and put similar measures in place in 2021 and 2022.38 Commission Implementing 
Regulation (EU) 2020/531 allowed for higher advances for CAP payments.  
 
In this regard , could the  EU elaborate on the following:  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 433 - 
 
Question 33: India seeks details of the derogations introduced for checks relating to direct 
payments.  
 
Question 34: Whether these derogations will be available under the new CAP?  
 
Reply:  Joint reply to Questions 33 and 34 : 
 
The derogations introduced for checks related to direct payments are explained in detail in the 
following Regulations: Commission Implementing Regulations (EU) 2020/532, (EU) 2021/725, and 
(EU) 2022/1216.  
 
The derogations are related to:  
 
- the quantity of the filed checks ( ex-ante and ex-post): decreased number of the classical physical 
checks during the years where the derogations applied but increased after the COVID years.  
 
- methods of control: substitute of the on -the-spot checks by any rel evant documentary evidence, 
including geotagged photos etc.  
 
- timing of the controls (later date during the year).  
 
These derogations did not impede the quality of the controls carried out by the EU Member States.  
The derogations are of temporary nature as a response to the COVID pandemic. These derogations 
are not available under the new CAP.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442; Pg. 148, Para 4.67:  
As a response to disruptions in grain supplies resulting from the war in Ukraine, Hungary introduced 
export rest rictions of cereals for food security reasons in March 2022, extending them multiple times 
before repealing them as of 20  January  2023.80 For any export (including to the European  Union ) 
of certain grains, soybeans, and sunflower seeds, exporters had to su bmit a request indicating 
volume and prices for the Minister for Agriculture to approve or reject the request, exercising a "right 
of first refusal at market price" in case of danger to the public supply or food security. The restriction 
did not affect hum anitarian aid and transit cargo. No request was rejected.  
 
Considering the above, could the EU provide answers to the following:  
 
Question 35: How the measure met the conditions required under GATT Article  XI (General 
elimination of quantitative restrictio ns) namely i) essentiality of the products, ii) criticality of the 
shortages of covered products and iii) temporariness of the export restriction.  
 
Reply:  
i. The sectors covered by the regulation represent around 40% of the total agricultural output 
of Hun gary, they all contribute to basic food supply of the population.  
 
ii. The 2022 production of the sectors covered by the regulation fell by 40% compared to the 
5-year-average, especially maize – which is one of the most important crop – production fell by  63% 
compared to the 5 -year-average. Maize production in 2022 amounted to 2,8  million  tons, compared 
to the usual 7 -9 million  tons in normal years. 2022 maize production could not cover the 5  million  
tons of internal consumption of Hungary.  
 
iii. The meas ure was in effect from 0 AM 6  March  2022 until 10AM 20  January  2023  
 
Question 36: Whether the EU has given an advance notification for this measure? If not, provide 
reasons for the delay.  
 
Reply:  The EU prepared the notification as soon as it was practically possible in view of the EU's 
internal procedures. Indeed, the notification was submitted after adoption of the legislation but 
considering the trade restrictions were never applied, this notif ication was intended to inform about 
the intention contained in the legislation rather than about actual restrictions. The EU would like to 
repeat its answer to CoA question AGIMS 101090: This is the first export restrictions notification 
ever submitted by  the European  Union . Instead of hiding information, the EU wanted to be 
transparent and share its own struggles with this measure. The EU would also like to note that many WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 434 - 
 
  
 of other Members' export restrictions that were actually applied recently remain un -notified to 
the WTO.  
 
Question 37: What was the impact of the measure on trade in the products concerned?  
 
Reply:  The measure did not have any impact on trade flows. The aim of the measure was to monitor 
the market movements. The state did not intervene i n the [internal] market in any form.  
 
Question 38: Indian seeks elaboration on the due consideration that it has given to the effects of 
the export restriction on importing Members' food security.  
 
Reply:  Due consideration was given to the effects of the e xport restriction on importing Members' 
food security: There were no restrictions on the movement of goods, the state did not intervene in 
the internal market in any form. The aim of the measure was solely to monitor the market. This aim 
has been fulfilled  without causing disturbance on the market.  
 
WT/TPR/S/442; Pg. 112, Para 3.203:  
The European  Union  requires specific labelling for all food products (imported or locally produced) 
to be sold in the EU market, including products sold online. Label requirements are described in 
Regulation (EU) 1169/2011, and include information about the ingredients and their content, 
allergens, and in some cases the food's country of origin or place of provenance (e.g. fresh, chilled, 
frozen meat of swine, sheep, goats, and poultry). Certain food products are subject to additional 
labelling requirements for safety and tr ansparency reasons, and include GMOs, food for infants and 
young children, fishery products, beef, and wine and spirits. The European  Union  also applies 
requirements for the materials used in food packaging (i.e. materials intended to come into contact 
with food).  
 
In this context, could the EU provide details on the following:  
 
Question 39: What are the current applicable labelling requirements for products produced from 
and containing GMOs?  
 
Reply:  In the EU, only GMOs that are authorised in accordance wi th Directive 2001/18/EC or 
Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 (if the scope also covers food and feed), can be placed on the EU 
market. Labelling of GM products that have been authorised to be placed on the market is 
mandatory. Regarding food and feed , any ingre dient that is, contains or is produced from a GMO 
needs to be indicated as such, through writing 'genetically modified', 'contains genetically modified 
(name of the organism or ingredient)' or 'produced from genetically modified (name of the 
organism)' in the ingredients list or in a footnote to it (Articles 12 & 13 (food) and 24 & 25 (feed) of 
Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003).  
 
Additionally, special characteristics or properties have to be indicated (Articles 13 (2, 3) (food) 
and 25 (2 lit. c, 3) (feed) of R egulation (EC) No 1829/2003).  
 
Other products  need to be labelled if they are or contain GMOs, but not if they have been produced 
from GMOs (Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, Article  4 (6)). For pre -packaged products, the words 
'This product contains genetica lly modified organisms' or 'This product contains genetically modified 
[name of organism(s)]' appear on a label; for non -pre-packaged products offered to the final 
consumer the words 'This product contains genetically modified organisms' or 'This product c ontains 
genetically modified [name of organism(s)]' shall appear on, or in connection with, the display of 
the product.  
 
Labelling obligations apply irrespective of whether the product originates in the EU or is imported 
from outside the EU. Labelling requ irements don't apply to traces of authorised GM material of 0.9% 
(per ingredient) regarding food and feed as well as products intended for direct processing 
(Articles  12 & 24 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, Article  4 (7, 8) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 , 
Article  21 (3) of Directive 2001/18/EC), provided that these traces are adventitious or technically 
unavoidable. Regarding other products, e.g. seed, no tolerance threshold has been introduced so 
far. 
 
Question 40: How do the labelling requirements of th e products derived from GMOs differ for the 
purposes of human consumption and non -human consumption?  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 435 - 
 
Reply:  Labelling of GM food (for human consumption) and GM feed (for non -human consumption) 
does not differ, see the answer to Question 39. Labelling requ irements also apply to GMOs that are 
not destined for consumption (e.g. ornamental flowers), see the answer to Question 39 (at 'other 
products').  
 
[No India Q41]  
 
Questions based on Government Report (WT/TPR/G/442)  
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Pg. 5, Para - 2.2  
Decisive and coordinated policy actions at national and EU level in response to the COVID -19 
pandemic helped alleviate the negative impact of the pandemic -related shock. To highlight some 
key policy actions, the European Cen tral Bank announced a EUR  750 billion  pandemic emergency 
purchase programme (PEPP) with an additional EUR  600 billion  added later. The EU also redirected 
up to EUR  65 billion cohesion funds to help Member States tackle the COVID -19 crisis. The 
European  Investment Bank (EIB) Group put in place a EUR  25 billion  pan-European guarantee fund 
and provided loans up to EUR  200 billion  for companies with a focus on small and medium -sized 
enterprises (SMEs) throughout the EU. The EU activated the general escape claus e under the 
Stability and Growth Pact to accommodate exceptional government spending in response to the 
pandemic. The EU also established an instrument to support temporary unemployment schemes 
throughout the crisis, the "Support to mitigate Unemployment R isks in an Emergency" (SURE).  
 
Question 42:  European  Union  may provide further details, including the nature of the concession 
granted and conditions to be met, in respect of EUR  25 billion  pan-European guarantee fund loans 
up to EUR  200 billion  for compan ies with a focus on small and medium -sized enterprises (SMEs) 
throughout the EU? What was the mechanism of the selection of entities and disbursal of this 
amount?  
 
Reply: The European Guarantee Fund (EGF ) was set up in May 2020 by the EIB Group with 
contributions from 22 EU Member States, but with no direct contribution of the EU budget. The EGF 
provides equity, loans, securitisation investments and guarantees, and often works through financial 
intermedia ries to make more financing available for small and medium companies, mid -caps and 
corporates. Participating countries provide guarantees and are represented in the EGF Contributors' 
Committee. The Contributors' Committee decides on the availability of gua rantees upon proposal by 
the EIB. Information about the EGF can be found under the following link: European Guarantee Fund 
(eib.org) . 
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Pg. 5, Para - 2.5  
Surging inflation is currently a key challenge eroding households' real disposable income. The 
harmonized consumer price inflation rate (HICP) reached 1.4% in 2019. Suppressed economic 
activity due to the pandemic and falling energy prices pushed down co nsumer price inflation to 0.7% 
in 2020. Inflation started to increase from early 2021 as economic activity picked up and energy 
prices increased. The subsequent energy and commodity price shock combined with supply chain 
disruptions caused by the Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine from early 2022 further fuelled 
price increases. As a result, inflation in the EU surged from 2.9% in 2021 to 9.3% in 2022 – the 
highest in decades. Inflation is expected to gradually decline to 7% in 2023 and then to 3% i n 2024.  
 
Question 43:  What trade -related measure has the EU taken to control inflation?  
 
Reply:  In principle, it is the European Central Bank (ECB) who is responsible for policies addressing 
inflation in the Eurozone and the national central banks for the EU Member States outside of the 
Eurozone. Inflation is not one of the EU trade policy direct ai ms. 
 
However, there exist some links between inflation and trade policy. Namely:  
• Open trade contributes to price stability by ensuring that consumers access more goods at 
lower prices. Over the period 1993 -2013, trade agreements implemented by the EU low ered the 
aggregate consumer price index by 0.24%, allowing EU consumers to save 24  billion  euro per year. 
With 42 trade agreements now in place, the EU has one of the largest global networks of FTAs. They 
cover 44% of our trade which translates into more t han a  trillion  Euros of Europe's worth of trade 
and a substantial contribution to price stability. The EU intends to continue expanding this network 
notably via the recently concluded negotiations for an FTA New  Zealand  or via modernising the FTA 
with Chil e. WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 • In 2022 -2023, following the surge in prices and the need to deprive Russian government of 
means for financing the invasion of Ukraine, sanctions on Russian oil (precisely the price cap) were 
designed with the aim of keeping the price of oil under cont rol. So far, it has been a success, as 
higher quantities of Russian oil are supplied than last year worldwide, which puts downward pressure 
on oil prices (and consequently on other prices).  
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Pg. 6, Para - 2.8  
Following Russia's war of aggress ion against Ukraine, the EU has launched the REPowerEU Plan with 
the objective to end the EU's dependence on Russian fossil fuels. The plan aims at fostering energy 
savings, diversification of energy supplies and accelerated roll -out of renewable energy. T he RRF 
would be at the core of the implementation of the REPowerEU. Upon approval of the Commission's 
proposal, Member States would have to integrate a dedicated REPowerEU chapter in their Recovery 
and Resilience Plans (RRPs).  
 
Question 44:  EU may please p rovide the trends in the last decade of consumption of fossil fuels. EU 
has taken certain measures for reducing the consumption and dependence on fossil fuels, including 
under REPowerEU Plan. What has been the outcome of the implementation of those measure s? 
 
Reply:  The trends in the consumption of fossil fuels in the last decade(s) are as follows:  
 
· Renewables share in the energy mix increased from 6% to 18% between 2000 and 2021.  
 
· In 2021, oil remained the principal energy source accounting for 32% of the energy mix 
despite a progressive decrease over the last 2 decades from a 40% high.  
 
· The coal share in the energy mix drastically fell from above 25% to 11% over the last 
3 decades but slightly rebounded in 2021 and 2022 linked to gas -to-coal switch, primarily for 
electricity production.  
 
· Natural gas share in the energy mix progressively increased from 20% to 24% between 2014 
and 2021.  
 
The REPowerEU  Plan included an 'EU Save Energy Communication' with simple and immediate 
behavioural changes to save energy ahead of critical winter months, while reducing energy bills. The 
European Commission also proposed measures to 'Save gas for a safe winter', incl uding a proposal 
for a Regulation on EU Coordinated Gas Demand Reduction Measures with a target of 15% gas 
demand reduction.  
 
Overall, the EU has reduced its gas demand by 18% from August 2022 to March 2023, compared to 
the previous 5 years' average over t hat same period, which corresponds to 52.8 bcm of gas, and 
most Member States achieved the 15% target. The extension of the demand reduction measures 
will allow the EU to save another 60 bcm of gas over the next 12 months, which is more than the 
gas volume s we still foresee to import from Russia in 2023, both pipeline and LNG.  
 
The pace of new renewable energy installations has accelerated. Installed wind and solar capacity 
increased by 16% between 2021 and 2022, saving approximately 11 bcm of gas. In 2023,  installed 
capacity could further increase by 17% and displace approximately 13 additional bcm of gas.  
 
In the longer term, we have achieved political agreements on various legislative files relevant for 
reducing consumption and dependence on fossil fuels.  For instance, the revised Energy Efficiency 
Directive includes a binding reduction target of 11.7% for final energy consumption in 2030. A higher 
target of 42.5% of the EU's energy mix to come from renewable sources by 2030 was also politically 
agreed in the revised Renewable Energy Directive, with an aspiration to reach 45%.  
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Pg. 10, Para - 3.19 
Contributing towards development is a critical challenge of the WTO agenda. The EU considers 
development to be a cross -cutting issue as an area for p olicy deliberation. It is imperative that the 
WTO finds new ways to support the efforts of those developing countries that face particular 
difficulties in integrating into the global trading system. Improving the deliberative function in key 
committees, in cluding the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD), and making them a forum 
for meaningful policy discussions could help identify how the WTO can support integration in global 
value chains as well as the process of regional integration and industrializat ion. Particular attention WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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should be given to Least Developed Countries, including to ensure a smooth transition in the case 
of graduation.  
 
Question 45:  What new ways have been adopted by the EU to support the efforts of those 
developing countries that fac e particular difficulties in integrating into the global trading system? 
Whether such support is extended without conditions? If not, what kind of conditions does the EU 
require the partner country to fulfil.  
 
Reply:  The EU Aid for Trade Progress Report 2022 illustrates that around 40 % of global Aid for 
Trade is provided by the EU with its Member States (EUR  22.9 billion  in 2020). This was an increase 
of more than 25 % from the year before and has been steadily growing  over the last decade. In line 
with the EU Aid for Trade strategy of 2017, the support is provided through an approach which is 
results -driven and integrated when it comes to aid and investment for trade, making the most of 
the wide range of EU policy tool s available in order to increase their overall impact on growth and 
poverty reduction. The focus is on creating more and better jobs and on countries in the greatest 
need. Developing countries further benefit from the EU's Generalised Scheme of Preferences , which 
supports integration into the global trading system by reducing or fully removing import tariffs for 
vulnerable developing countries. The EU GSP has three arrangements: the standard GSP and 
Everything But Arms provide preferential treatment based o nly on economic development criteria. 
The GSP+ is a special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance 
available to standard GSP beneficiaries who make commitments regarding the effective 
implementation of international conventio ns. Further information on the EU GSP and conditionalities 
is available in WT/TPR/G/442, Page 17, Paragraph 4.2, and online here  
https://polic y.trade.ec.europa.eu/development -and-sustainability/generalised -scheme -
preferences_en  
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Pg. 11, Para - 3.32  
The EU has in place 42 preferential trade agreements with 74 partners. In 2021, EU trade with 
preferential partners amounted to EUR  1,891  billion  covering 44% of its external trade. EU exports 
to those countries reached EUR  1,049  billion  and EU imports from them amounted to 
EUR 841 billion . Adding trade with partners that the EU has concluded negotiatio ns on agreements 
with, but where the agreements are in the process of being adopted or ratified (3.4%), the share of 
EU preferential trade in its total external trade would rise to 47.4%. EU trade in services with 
preferential partners saw a trade surplus of EUR  91 billion  in 2020 down from EUR  106 billion  in 2019 
but still almost three times as much as the EU surplus with all trading partners (i.e.,  EUR 33 billion  
in 2020, down from EUR  50 billion  in 2019) . 
 
Question 46:  EU Trade surplus with FTA partners has been significantly higher than that with all 
trading partners. For example, in services, it is 3 times higher with FTA partners than all trading 
partners. EU may provide the details of trade volumes, and trade surplu s for the EU (in goods and 
services separately) with each trading partner for the year just before FTA was entered into force 
and in the year 2022.  
 
Reply:  Most recent data on trade in goods show small surplus for the trade with EU partners with 
preferenti al trading agreements in place in 2022 (please see the table below). It sum 74 bilateral 
trade balances, of which 29 were negative and 45 positive. The following bilateral balances were 
taken into account: Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Ba hamas, Barbados, Belize, 
Bosnia -Herzegovina, Botswana, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa  Rica, 
Dominica, Dominican  Republic , Ecuador, Egypt, El  Salvador , Eswatini, Faroe Islands, Fiji, Georgia, 
Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, I celand, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, 
Jordan, Kosovo, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mexico, the 
Republic  of Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, North  Macedonia , 
Norway, Palestine , Panama, Papua New  Guinea, Peru, Samoa, San Marino, Serbia, Seychelles, 
Singapore, Solomon  Islands , South  Africa , South Korea, St Kitts and Nevis, St  Lucia, St  Vincent  and 
the Grenadines , Surinam e, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Türkiye, Ukraine, 
United  Kingdom , Viet Nam, Zimbabwe.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Table. EU goods trade with preferential partners, 2022  
Reporter  Partner  Product  Goods Export 
Value (Mio EUR)  Goods Import 
Value (Mio EUR)  Goods balance 
Value (Mio EUR)  
EU27 Extra EU27  all 2 572 720  3 002 095  -429 375  
EU27 Preferential trade 
agreements in place  all 1 253 808  1 178 451  75 356  
EU27 Other partners  all 1 318 913  1 823 644  -504 731  
Source:  Eurostat Comext Easy Comext (europa.eu) . 
The most recent data on trade in services data are available for 2021 only. Here, the EU recorded 
negative bilateral balances with 22 pre ferential partners and 51 positive balances. The same partners 
were taken into account as in the case of goods, with the exception of Kosovo.  
 
Table. EU trade in services with preferential partners  
Reporter  Partner  Service  Services Export 
Value (Mio EUR)  Services Import 
Value (Mio EUR)  Services 
Balance Value 
(Mio EUR)  
EU27 Extra EU27  all 1 067 147  944 868  122 280  
EU27 Preferential trade 
agreements in place  all 531 754  394 190  137 563  
EU27 Other partners  all 535 394  550 677  -15 284  
Source:  Eurostat bop_its6_tot, bop_fdi6_geo https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/balance -of-
payments/data/database . 
Question 47:  How does the EU pr opose to help FTA partners impacted adversely by the EU's climate 
measures like CBAM, MRL, and Deforestation?  
 
Reply:  EU has developed its European Green Deal measure in a way that achieves environmental 
and climate policy objectives set in the international commitments and minimises impact on trade. 
Conscious about the potential relevance for the EU's trading partners, we have so far committed 
about EUR  27.8 billion  in support of climate objectives in our partner countries for the period 
of 2021-27 through the EU's Global Instrument (Neighbourhood, Development and International 
Cooperation Instrument - NDICI). In Decembe r 2021, the EU launched the Global Gateway, a new 
strategy to mobilise investments totalling EUR  300 billion  over the period 2021 -27. In line with the 
EU's commitment to the 2030 Agenda, the Global Gateway aims at boosting smart, clean and secure 
investmen ts in digital, energy and transport. For example, the EU funds several programmes to help 
non-EU countries to adapt to EU legislation in relation to pesticide residues such us Agrinfo and Fit 
for Market (by COLEAD), Plantwise Plus (by CABI) and BTSF (Speci fic training courses relate to plant 
health, integrated pest management and food safety). These and other capacity -building initiatives 
are part and parcel of the EU's engagement to facilitate the implementation of climate measures. 
The EU's free trade agr eements provide a framework for cooperation, that may stimulate/initiate 
discussions on environmental and climate measures and their impact on trade and sustainable 
development. However, climate measures react to unprecedented climate and environmental cri ses 
requiring prompt action while free trade agreements are meant for indefinite application. Moreover, 
not all trade partners are impacted by the EU's measures in the same way. As a result, the EU's 
engagement to facilitate the implementation of climate m easures also takes place outside the 
framework of FTAs.  
 
Question 48:  Which of EUs FTAs has human rights "essential clause"? How does 
European  Commission conduct human rights impact assessment as a key element of its 
sustainability impact assessment of the  Eu's ongoing trade negotiators?  
 
Reply:  The respect for human rights constitutes an essential element of EU association or political 
framework agreements with partner countries, under which trade agreements are typically 
concluded. In the absence of such broad framework agreements, the EU policy is to include human 
rights clauses in free trade agreements. These are the so -called "essential elements" clauses, the 
violation of which enables the EU to terminate or suspend fully or partially the agreements, in  
accordance with Article  60 of the Vienna  Convention  on the Law of Treaties. A thorough analysis of 
the impact of agreements on Human Rights is included both in ex-ante and in ex-post impact 
assessments.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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WT/TPR/G/442, Pg. 15, Para - 3.63  
Throughout the TTC process, the EU and US welcome and facilitate dialogue with business, trade 
unions, consumer organizations, and environmental and other non -government organizations. The 
TTC working groups organise many events with stakeholders and publi sh feedback on the EU's online 
discussion platform, Futurium. Furthermore, a tripartite Trade and Labour Dialogue was set up 
during the second TTC ministerial meeting in spring 2022, which brings together representatives of 
trade unions, businesses and gov ernment and which had its inaugural meeting in September 2022. 
Its objective is to explore ways to promote internationally recognised labour rights, including the 
eradication of forced labour and child labour.  
 
Question 49:  Can the EU provide the list of g oods produced in its territory using forced labour? 
How serious is this problem in the EU? Is this an issue in services too? Is there no legislation in the 
EU to deter the use of forced labour? If there are laws in this regard, have these failed to deliver ? 
The forced labour issue is not a trade issue but a social problem and has many dimensions. How 
does the EU deal with it at present?  
 
Reply:  Forced labour takes place on every continent in the world and is present in sectors such as 
services and domestic  work, manufacturing, constructions, agriculture, etc.1 According to the 
ILO 2012 Global Estimate of Forced Labour, the Regional Factsheet for the European  Union2, 
880,000 people were found to be in forced labour in the EU. Forced labour appeared in a ra nge of 
industries and economic sectors, in line with those mentioned above.  
 
The EU is already very active in promoting decent work and freedom from forced labour through a 
variety of internal and external policies, and international partnerships, includin g in the ILO, World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and G7. For instance, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights explicitly 
prohibits forced labour, an d the EU has a several pieces of legislation in place or in preparation that 
address this issue (e.g. Directive 20 11/36/EU on human trafficking; Directive 2009/52/EC providing 
for minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of illegally staying 
third-country nationals or the Commission's proposal for a directive on corporate sustainability due 
dilige nce). Furthermore in 2021, the European Commission and the European External Action Service 
issued guidance to assist EU businesses in taking appropriate measures to address the risk of forced 
labour in their operations and supply chains, based on internat ional standards.  
 
The continued existence of forced labour illustrates, however, the need for additional measures, also 
aimed at products. The European Commission therefore proposed to complement this set of existing 
and pending measures with legislation t hat specifically prohibits the placing of forced labour products 
on the EU market. 
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Pg. 17, Para - 4.2  
At the unilateral level, the EU's Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) removes import duties 
for products coming into the EU market from  vulnerable developing countries. Under the standard 
GSP arrangement, the EU currently grants partial or full tariff reductions on around 66% of tariff 
lines to 11  countries. The Special Incentive Arrangement for Sustainable Development and 
Good Governance  (GSP+) grants mostly duty -free treatment to essentially the same 66% of tariff 
lines after application and a positive assessment by the EU. In 2022 there are eight GSP+ 
beneficiaries. The "Everything But Arms" (EBA) arrangement under the EU's GSP gives Le ast 
Developed Countries (LDCs) tariff -free, quota -free access to the EU market for all products except 
arms and ammunition. 46  LDCs benefit from the EU's EBA in 2022; in 2021 over EUR  22 billion  of 
imports into the EU from LDCs used EBA preferences, or 66%  of all goods imported from LDCs.  
 
Question 50:  At present EU grants partial or full tariff reductions on around 66% of tariff lines to 
11 vulnerable developing countries under GSP. How many countries out of these 11 avails GSP?  
a) What is the % preferential access for these 11 countries?  
b) How many other countries could benefit from GSP if they wish to avail GSP?  
c) What have the trade volumes and trade surplus (goods and services separately) been with 
these countries in the last 10 years?  
 
 
1 wcms_854733.pdf (ilo.org) . 
2 wcms_184975.pdf (ilo.org) . WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Reply:  Currently, there are 11 standard GSP benefi ciaries, who receive partial or full tariff reductions 
on 66% of tariff lines, 46 Everything But Arms beneficiaries, who receive full tariff suspension for all 
products except for arms, and 8 GSP+ beneficiaries, who receive full tariff suspension on 66% of  
tariff lines. The product coverage of the standard GSP and GSP+ arrangements is listed in Annex  V 
of the GSP Regulation, with reduction in tariffs for standard GSP according to Article  7 of the GSP 
Regulation. GSP benefits cover goods only and do not cove r services. Annex  I of the GSP Regulation 
(EU) No 978/2012 identifies all countries eligible for GSP benefits, if they meet the economic 
development conditions set out in the Regulation. The average trade/ value of imports which used 
GSP preferences (goods  only, as services are not included in GSP) for 2019 -2021 (within the scope 
of the current TPR) for standard GSP beneficiaries was around EUR  179 million /26.6  million . As the 
GSP offers trade preferences unilaterally, data on trade balance is not considere d in this context. 
Further information on the utilisation of standard GSP preferences will be available in the next 
GSP report to the European Parliament and the Council expected later in 2023.  
 
Question 51:  At present EU grants partial or full tariff redu ctions on around 66% of tariff lines to 
8 developing countries under GSP+.  
a) How many countries out of these 8 avail GSP+?  
b) What is the % preferential access for these 8 countries under GSP+?  
c) How many other countries could benefit from GSP+ if the y wish to use this scheme?  
d) What have the trade volumes and trade surplus (goods and services separately) been with 
these countries in the last 10 years?  
 
Reply:  Eight current GSP+ beneficiaries benefit from and use the full tariff suspension on 66% of 
all tariff lines. All standard GSP beneficiaries who meet the criteria set out in Article  9 of the GSP 
Regulation EU) No 978/2012 can apply for the GSP+ arrangement. The product coverage of the 
standard GSP and GSP+ arrangements is listed in Annex  V of the GSP Regulation, with reduction in 
tariffs for standard GSP according to Article  7 of the GSP Regulation. The average trade value / value 
of imports which used GSP preferences (goods only, as services are not included in GSP) for 
2019-2021 (within the scope  of the current TPR) for standard GSP beneficiaries was around 
EUR 33.7 million/ 10.1  million . As the GSP offers trade preferences unilaterally, data on trade 
balance is not considered in this context. Further information on the utilisation of GSP+ prefere nces 
will be available in the next GSP report to the European Parliament and the Council expected later 
in 2023.  
 
Question 52:  As stated, 46 LDCs benefited from the EU's EBA in 2022; in 2021 over EUR  22 billion  
of imports into the EU from LDCs used EBA pre ferences, or 66% of all goods imported from LDCs. 
Does this number of 66% cover EBA alone or does it include nil MFN, other schemes, FTA etc. Have 
all these 46 countries fulfilled, ratified, and effectively implemented a total of 27 international 
conventio ns as the scheme requires? What have been the trade trend volumes in these 46  countries 
(goods and services separately) and what has been the trade surplus for Europe, in  2010, 2015, 
2020 and 2022?  
 
Reply:  There are 46 LDCs that benefit from the EU's EBA i n 2022; in 2021 over EUR  22 billion  of 
imports into the EU from LDCs used EBA preferences, or 66% of all goods imported from LDCs. This 
number concerns goods imported using EBA preferences only. Goods imported under MFN 
zero duties and other schemes are no t included in this number. The EBA covers only goods; services 
are not included. EBA beneficiaries are not required to ratify the 27 GSP -relevant conventions in 
order to access the scheme. The average trade value /value of imports which used GSP preference s 
(goods only, as services are not included in GSP) for 2019 -2021 (within the scope of the current 
TPR) for EBA beneficiaries was around EUR  62.5 million /26.3  million . As the GSP  offers trade 
preferences unilaterally, data on trade balance is not considered in this context. Further information 
on the utilisation of EBA preferences will be available in the next GSP report to the 
European  Parliament and the Council expected later in  2023.  
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Pg. 17, Para - 4.3 
Under the EU's current GSP Regulation, all GSP beneficiary countries (including EBA beneficiaries) 
have to respect the principles of 15 core conventions on human and labour rights. In addition, the 
GSP+ arrangement r equires countries to fulfil, ratify and effectively implement a total of 
27 international conventions covering core human and labour rights, environmental protection, and 
good governance. A central part of the EU's approach to GSP is to carefully monitor t he beneficiary 
countries' respect of these conditionalities. In case of concerns in this respect, the EU engages with WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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the relevant beneficiary countries, and can as a last resort withdraw the preferences. The EU 
reported on the implementation of the scheme  in 202016 and will publish a new report in 2023.  
 
Question 53:  Is it not too onerous for a GSP beneficiary country to comply with such stringent 
conditions? How have GSP beneficiary countries responded? Does the EU not consider it necessary 
that access to  LDC be allowed?  
 
Reply:  LDCs have full and open access to the EBA preferences, with no pre -conditions. At the same 
time, all GSP beneficiaries are expected to respect the principles of 15 core international conventions 
on human and labour rights, accordin g to international agreements and standards and in contribution 
to their sustainable development. This means that in exceptional cases and as a measure of last 
resort, the EU can withdraw these additional preferences in case of serious and systematic viola tions 
of these principles. Thus, the access to EBA preferences remains based on economic conditions only 
(LDC classification), but engagement and progress is possible in case of concerns of serious and 
systematic violations of key conventions. EBA benefici aries have largely enjoyed the preferences. 
For three EBA beneficiaries, the European Commission set up Enhanced Engagement due to concerns 
on the respect of the principles of these core conventions. For one EBA beneficiary, the EU decided 
on a partial wit hdrawal of the preferences due to these concerns.  
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Pg. 17, Para - 4.5 
To support developing countries' integration into the world economy, poverty reduction and 
sustainable development, the EU views Aid for Trade (AfT) as a crucial tool. EU and Member States' 
AfT is based on the 2017 joint AfT Strategy, with five overarching  priorities: (i)  reducing 
fragmentation, integrating development tools, increasing leverage of AfT through better informed 
and coordinated delivery; (ii)  scaling up impact – making the most of instruments across EU external 
policies, (iii)  stronger focus o n social and environmental sustainability and inclusive economic 
growth; (iv)  a more differentiated approach to countries, with increased focus on LDCs; and 
(v) improved monitoring and reporting. The most recent EU Aid for Trade Progress Report (2022) 
was launched in December 2022.18 The reporting is also informing the EU's participation in the 
monitoring of the AfT initiative globally. During the eight Global Review of AfT at the WTO in 
July 2022, the European Commission co -hosted two events in addition to  those organised by EU 
Member States and with speakers in additional sessions.  
 
Question 54:  How does the EU achieve the objectives of unconditional, untied Aid For Trade while 
prioritizing the national development priorities of recipient countries? It app ears that EU Aid for 
Trade comes with several conditions, including as contained in terms of priorities mentioned in 
para 4.5. How does the EU ensure adherence to the recommendation of Aid For Trade task force of 
WTO, the Accra Acord and the Paris Declarat ion on the effectiveness of aid for trade?  
 
Reply:  As laid out in the EU Regulation 2021/947 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development 
and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) – Global Europe, and in accordance with the 
international commitments of the European  Union  in relation to the Busan Partnership Agreement 
for Effective Development Cooperation, reaffirmed at the Nairobi High Level Forum in 2016 and 
recalled in the Consensus, the Union should apply, in the context of its Official Development  
Assistance (ODA) and across all aid modalities, the development effectiveness principles, namely 
ownership of development priorities by developing countries, a focus on results, inclusive 
development partnerships, transparency and mutual accountability as  well as alignment and 
harmonisation. In that regard, it is important that national development strategies include broad 
consultative processes in line with the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, in 
particular when those serve as a b asis for programming. These principles are equally operationalized 
in the delivery of EU Aid for Trade, the first strategy for which was formulated in 2007 as a response 
to the recommendations of the AfT task force of the WTO.  
 
Question 55:  Could the EU pr ovide the details of Aid for Trade figures for the last 10 years with the 
breakup of loans and grants?  
 
Reply:  The EU Aid for Trade (AfT) Progress Report 2022 provides details and breakdowns of the 
support provided. In 2020, the latest year for which ther e is data, AfT from the EU including its 
Member States totalled EUR  22.9 billion . 37% of this was in the form of grants and 63 % in the form 
of loans). The report reviews data back until 2011, and it is found that while proportions have 
fluctuated from year  to year, there is no overall trend in one direction or the other. In 2011, the 
share of grants was 48 %, and at the half -decade mark of 2016 it was 38 %.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Question 56:  What criteria are used for treating aid as "aid for trade"?  
 
Reply:  Aid for Trade supports developing countries' efforts to better integrate into and benefit from 
the global rules -based trading system, implement domestic reform and make a real economic impact 
on the lives of their citizens. It is part of overall Official Development Assistance of grants and  
concessional loans that are targeted at trade -related programmes and projects.  
 
More specifically, the EU put forward a short definition of Aid for Trade in its 2017 updated Joint 
Strategy on Aid for Trade, which states : 'Aid for trade is assistance provided to support partner 
countries' efforts to develop economic capacities and expand their trade as leverage for growth and 
poverty reduction (…) It covers a wide range of areas including trade policy -making, trade -relate d 
regulations and standards, economic infrastructure (e.g. energy, transport, telecoms) and 
productive capacity building in export -oriented sectors such as agriculture, fisheries and 
manufacturing''. Moreover, as the EU explains in that updated Strategy, t he EU and its 
Members  States provide Aid for Trade to: '… help developing countries and particularly Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs) integrate into the rules -based global trading system and use trade more 
effectively to boost growth and reduce poverty''.  
 
The Aid for Trade scope includes nearly 100 OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
purpose codes, a 5 -digit code used for recording information on the purpose (sector of destination) 
of individual aid activities. Purpose codes identify the specific a rea of the recipient's economic or 
social structure that the transfer is intended to foster. Please find link:  
(http://www.oecd.org/dac/aft/aid -for-tradestatisticalqueries.htm ). 
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Pg. 17, Para - 4.4  
The EU GSP is undergoing a review since the current Regulation expires on 31  December  2023. The 
review aims to maintain the key features of the current scheme, building on its success as evidenced 
in a 2018 independent mid -term evaluation and in the impact assessment for the Commission 
proposal for GSP post 2023. Targeted improvements aim to better respond to the evolving needs of 
developing countries and reinforce the scheme's social a nd environmental impact. A new regulation 
was proposed by the European Commission on 22  September  2021.17 The proposal is currently 
before the EU legislator, and is to be adopted in time to provide predictability and stability to 
beneficiaries and business . 
 
Question 57:  Does the imposition of these conditions of ratification of the international convention 
on human rights and standards on a GSP beneficiary not in the spirit of DFQF scheme and Ministerial 
mandate to provide unilateral market access to LDCs?  Has the EU consulted the Beneficiaries on this 
and if yes, what has been the outcome?  
 
Reply:  Under the current proposal for a revised GSP, LDCs continue to have open access to the EBA 
arrangement, providing full tariff suspension on all products except a rms, based on economic criteria 
only (LDC classification). There are no ratification conditions for EBA beneficiaries to access the 
preferential treatment. Negotiations on the final text are on -going. The European Commission 
conducted an open public consul tation in preparation of the review, including participation from 
beneficiary countries. The results can be consulted here: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better -
regulation/have -your-say/initiatives/2136 -Towards -the-future -Generalised -Scheme -of-
Preferences -legal-framework -granting -trade-advantages -to-developing -countries/public -
consultation_en .  
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Pg. 18, Para - 4.7  
EU AfT  is a tool to deliver on the Global Gateway.19 Launched in December 2021 it is a new strategy 
to mobilize investments totalling EUR  300 billion  over the period 2021 -27. Accordingly, EU AfT is 
more and more driven by innovative de -risking tools to catalyse private sector investment. This is 
done primarily through blending operations (i.e., a combination of EU grants with loans or equity 
from public and private financiers) and financial guarantees. In line with the EU's geopolitical 
objectives and commitment to the 2030 Agenda, the Global Gateway strategy aims to boost smart, 
clean and secure investments in digital, energy and transport, and to strengthen health, education 
and research systems across the world to underpin a lasting global recovery while promot ing 
universal values and high standards, good governance and transparency.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Question 58:  Investments are very distinct from an aid given on the recipient ownership basis with 
the recipient's own priorities rather than the commercial interest of the investo r. Why does the EU 
treat an investment done with the objectives of commercial consideration is treated as aid for trade?  
 
Question 59:  Whether the aid for trade figures mentioned in para 4.6. include investment figures? 
If this is the case, what is the br eakup for grants, loans, and investments?  
 
Reply:  Joint reply to Questions 58 and 59:  
 
As mentioned in response to Question 55, and as reported in the EU Aid for Trade (AfT) Annual 
Progress Report of 2022, EU AfT in 2020 (the latest year for which we have data) consisted of grants 
(37%) and loans (63 %). Reporting on EU AfT comprises exclusively Official Development Assistance 
(ODA). In other words, non -ODA investments are not included in these figures. Non -ODA 
investments are also not replacing traditional AfT, which has been growing continuously – in 2020 
alone, EU AfT grew by 25 % from the previous year. EU AfT in the form of grants has also grown in 
absolute numbers. However, in line with the Global Gateway and the EU AfT strategy, AfT can be an 
instrument  to support partner countries in mobilizing additional capital, such as from private sources, 
in line with national priorities and development effectiveness principles.  
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Page -22, Para -5.24 
In the area of transport, a Revised Clean Vehicles Di rective was adopted in June 2019 to promote 
clean mobility solutions in public procurement tenders, providing a boost to the demand and further 
deployment of low - and zero -emission vehicles. The directive defines "clean vehicles" and sets 
national targets for their public procurement. It applies to different means of public procurement, 
including purchase, lease, rent and relevant services contracts. In December 2020, the Commission 
adopted the Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy, setting the vision and  announcing measures 
to reduce transport emissions by 90% by 2050 in line with the European Green Deal goals.  
 
Question 60:  
1. Please give details on the strategies used to promote clean vehicles under the Revised Clean 
Vehicles Directive, including any su bsidies given to the producers, consumers, intermediaries or any 
other person, whether legal or natural.  
 
Reply:  The revised Clean Vehicles Directive sets minimum national targets for the share of clean 
vehicles in the aggregate public procurement in each Member State, over two 5 -year periods 
(2021 -2025 and 2026 -2030); separate targets are set for light -duty vehicles (i.e. cars & vans), 
urban buses, and trucks; for urban buses, a sub -target for zero -emission vehicles is also set, equal 
to half the overall t arget for clean vehicles. The Directive sets the targets, but it leaves large 
flexibility to the Member States in terms of how they distribute the effort on their territory, and what 
instruments they put in place to ensure the objectives are met. As an exa mple, if a Member State 
has a target of 45% clean buses for the first period, and the total number of urban buses procured 
over that time is 1.000, of which 500 in one city, 300 in a second city and 200 in a third one, they 
might meet the target by requiri ng each city to meet the 45% threshold, or they might decide to set 
a 90% target for the first city and no target for the other two, or any other combination leading to 
at least 450 of the 1.000 procured buses to be clean. The Directive does not prescribe or contain 
rules on the use of subsidies; however, Member States may fix financial incentives at national level, 
in compliance with relevant EU competition and State aid rules.  
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Page -22, Para -5.25 
Under the Fit for 55 Package, several legisla tive initiatives were proposed in July 2021 on the 
decarbonisation of transport:  
 
 A new legislative proposal on ReFuelEU  Aviation56 that aims to decarbonise the aviation sector 
by mandating supply of jet fuels blended with minimum shares of sustainable aviation fuels (SAF) 
and uptake of fuels by airlines departing from Union airports. The FuelEU Maritime57 legislative 
propo sal sets the objective to promote the uptake in the use of renewable, low -carbon fuels and low 
carbon -intensive energy options, in maritime transport, including additional requirements for 
zero emissions at berth, for both containerships and passenger ship s. 
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Question 61:  
Please give details on the strategies used to promote the use of renewable, low -carbon fuels and 
low-carbon -intensive energy options, in maritime transport under the FuelEU Maritime57 legislative 
proposal.  
 
Reply:  The FuelEU  Maritime regulation requires ships to reduce the greenhouse gas intensity of the 
energy used onboard, in relation to a calculated reference value, starting from more mild, 2% 
and 6%, for 2025 and 2030, respectively, and up to 62% and 80%, for 2045 and 205 0, also 
respectively. To this end, renewable, low -carbon fuels and low carbon -intensive energy options, are 
promoted through a goal -based/ technology neutral framework, where the different options are 
assessed on a life -cycle/Well -to-Wake basis. Renewable and low carbon synthetic fuels, or advanced 
biofuels, are promoted in view of their contribution for the greenhouse gas intensity of the energy 
used onboard.  
 
For the specific case of Renewable Fuels of Non -Biological Origin (RFNBOs), so called green synth etic 
fuels, owing to their potential for scalability and deep decarbonization, but also recognizing the 
challenges of deploying and ramping -up production, the FuelEU Maritime includes a multiplier of 
"2" for the use of such fuels until 2033, with the energ y used form RFNBOs effectively counting 
twice for compliance. In addition, a sub target of 2% can be applied from 2034 if, in 2031, the share 
of RFNBOs in the reported marine fuel mix consumption for that year is below 1%.  
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Page -27, Para -6.9 
The European Commission is successfully implementing the changes to the EU's basic antidumping 
and anti -subsidy legislation introduced in December 2017 and June 2018 respectively. This was 
confirmed in a report of the European Court of Auditors issued in J uly 2020 publishing the findings 
of an audit of the EU's application of the trade defence instruments. In 2020 and 2021, the 
European  Commission implemented a number of recommendations in that report which further 
strengthened the response to the challenge s posed by unfairly traded imports, including the 
treatment of confidential data in investigations, increasing awareness of the instruments among 
stakeholders as well as improved monitoring of the effectiveness of measures.  
 
Question 62:  
a) Please explain the organizational structure of DG Trade.  
 
b) Are there different divisions/bodies within the DG Trade that separately conduct the 
dumping/subsidization and injury determination?  
 
c) Amending Regulation (EU) 2018/825 permits the Commission to depart from t he lesser duty 
rule if there are 'distortions on raw materials'.  
 
I. Please list out the instances where the Commission has departed from the lesser 
duty rule on account of distortions on raw materials.  
II. What information does the Commission rely on to a ssess whether there are 
distortions on raw materials in the market of the exporting country? Please provide 
examples of investigations conducted by the commission.  
III. How does the commission assess the 'target price' for computing the injury 
margin?  
IV. Please explain how European  Union  calculates the 'injury margin' and the 
'non-injurious price'.  
 
a) Does DG Trade initiate anti -dumping and/or countervailing investigations suo moto? If 
yes, please give details of the law under which suo moto investigation s are initiated.  
b) Does the European  Union  have a sampling of a 'domestic industry' when there is a large 
and fragmented number of domestic producers in anti -dumping investigations? If yes, what 
is the procedure?  
c) Does the European  Union  conduct a "publ ic interest" examination in anti -dumping 
investigations? If yes, what are the factors that DG Trade considers while making a public 
interest examination? How does DG Trade gather evidence for conducting a public interest 
examination?  
d) Who conducts the pu blic interest test? Is it the investigating team or a separate setup?  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 445 - 
 
e) Have there been any instances where DG Trade has recommended non -imposition of 
anti-dumping duty on grounds of public interest, despite a determination that there exists 
dumping and i njury?  
f) Were any imposed anti -dumping investigations reviewed during the last three years?  
g) In Sunset Review Investigations, what are the parameters that the DG Trade considers 
to determine whether cessation or revocation of anti -dumping duty is likely to lead to the 
continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury?  
h) In Sunset Reviews, does DG Trade extend the original duty, or does DG Trade compute 
a new duty? If a new duty is computed, please provide the details of the method for 
calculating t he revised duty.  
i) W.r.t abovementioned question no. 11, if a new duty is imposed, then does the 
European  Union  apply the Lesser Duty Rule in imposing a new duty?  
 
Reply:  
62 (a) The Directorate -General for Trade of the European Commission (DG TRADE) is co mposed of 
705 number of staff, out of which around 200 colleagues posted in 57 EU Delegations across the 
world. It is headed by Sabine Weyand, Director -General. The DG has three Deputy Director Generals 
and eight Directorates with dedicated responsibilitie s for the following areas:  
 
· Multilateral Affairs, Strategy, Analysis, Evaluation  
· Asia (I), Services and Digital Trade, Investment and Intellectual Property  
· Africa, Caribbean and Pacific, Asia (II), Trade and Sustainable Development, Green Deal  
· The Americas, Agriculture and Food Safety  
· Neighbouring Countries, Industry, Goods, Regulatory Cooperation and Public Procurement  
· Enforcement, Market Access, SMEs, Legal affairs, Technology and Security  
· Trade Defence  
· Resources, Inter -Institutional Relat ions, Communications and Civil Society  
 
Please find additional information and a link to the organisational chart under Trade (europa.eu) . 
 
Q 62 (b) Directorate G within DG TRADE deals with Trade defence investigations. It is comprised of 
five Units, four of which deal with investigating activity. For each investigation, there is a team 
dedicated to investigating dumping/subsidisation and a separate team dealing with injury issues.  
 
Q 62 (c):  
I: The cases where the European C ommission has modulated the lesser duty rule on account of 
distortions on raw materials are:  
Mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate from Russia  
Electrolytic chromium coated steel (ECCS) from China  
Fatty Acid from Indonesia  
 
II: Information alleging the raw material distortions in the exporting country is provided initially by 
the complainant in AD investigations. The information must relate to distortions as follows: dual 
pricing schemes, export taxes, export surtax, export quota, export prohibition, fis cal tax on exports, 
licensing requirements, minimum export price, value added tax (VAT) refund, reduction or 
withdrawal, restriction on customs clearance point for exporters, qualified exporters list, domestic 
market obligation, captive mining if the price  of a raw material is significantly lower as compared to 
prices in the representative international markets. This list can be amended if the OECD 'Inventory 
on export restrictions on industrial raw materials', or any OECD database, which replaces this 
inventory, identifies other types of measures.  
 
III and IV: In accordance with Article  7(2c) of the basic anti -dumping Regulation, for establishing 
the target profit, the Commission takes account of the following factors: the level of profitability 
before the increase of imports from the country concerned, the level of profitability needed to cover 
full costs and investments, research and development (R & D) and innovation, and the level of 
profitability to be expected under normal conditions of competition. Su ch profit margin should not 
be lower than 6 %  
 
(a) The European Commission can initiate investigations ex -officio in accordance with Article  5 of 
the EU's Basic anti -dumping regulation.  
(b) Sampling is applied when necessary in anti -dumping investigations in accordance with Article  17 
of the basic anti -dumping regulation which states:  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 446 - 
 
  
 "In cases where the number of Union producers, exporters or importers, types of product or 
transactions is large, the investigation may be limited to a reasonable number of p arties, products 
or transactions by using samples which are statistically valid, on the basis of information available 
at the time of the selection, or to the largest representative volume of production, sales or exports 
which can reasonably be investigate d within the time available".  
 
(c) The EU's Union interest test is conducted in accordance with Article  21 of the Basic anti -dumping 
regulation. The European Commission takes into account relevant information submitted by 
interested parties and is based on  an appreciation of all the various interests taken as a whole, 
including the interests of the domestic industry and users and consumers. Parties are invited to 
cooperate in the investigation in the Notice of Initiation which sets out deadlines for submitt ing 
relevant information.  
 
(d) The Union interest test is conducted by the investigating team dealing with injury aspects of an 
investigation.  
 
(e) The EU terminated the investigation on imports of white phosphorus, also called elemental or 
yellow phosph orus, originating in the Republic of Kazakhstan (Official Journal L 43, 14.02.2013) on 
the basis of the Union interest test.  
 
(f) Please refer to the EU's semi -annual reports to the WTO along with the notifications under 
Article  16(4) of the WTO Anti -Dump ing Agreement of preliminary and final AD actions.  
 
(g) The European Commission determines the likelihood of recurrence of dumping and injury by 
examining the production capacity and spare capacity in the exporting country, the market situation 
in that cou ntry, the attractiveness of the Union market for the exporting producers, the likely price 
levels of imports from the exporting country in the absence of anti -dumping measures, and their 
impact on the Union industry.  
 
(h) and (i) The European Commission d oes not calculate a new duty in expiry reviews. If all 
conditions are met to extend the measures, the original duty rate is continued for a further period. 
Only where an interim review has been requested in conjunction with an expiry review can the duty 
rate be changed. In the context of such an interim review the issue of the lesser duty rule is 
examined if there is evidence presented of significant raw material distortions in the country of 
export.  
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Page -27, Para -6.10 
In keeping with its com mitment to be firm on unfair trade, the European Commission used its 
anti-subsidy legislation to tackle increasingly complex unfair subsidy arrangements of 
third countries, which were harming some EU manufacturing industries.  
 
Question 63:  
a) Please list all instances where the European  Union  has imposed a countervailing duty on 
transnational/foreign subsidies.  
b) What are the different types of transnational/foreign subsidies under the EU's anti -subsidy 
regime?  
c) What is the provision in the EU's la w that deals with transnational/foreign subsidies?  
d) Does the EU exemptions from CVD for subsidies granted to the renewable energy sector?  
e) Does DG Trade initiate countervailing investigations suo  moto? If yes, please give details of 
the law under which suo moto investigations are initiated.  
f) Does the European  Union  have a sampling of a 'domestic industry' when there is a large and 
fragmented number of domestic producers in countervailing investi gations? If yes, what is the 
procedure?  
g) Does the European  Union  conduct a "public interest" examination in countervailing duty 
investigations? If yes, what are the factors that DG Trade considers while making a public interest 
examination? How does DG T rade gather evidence for conducting a public interest examination?  
h) Have there been any instances where DG Trade has recommended non -imposition of 
countervailing duty on grounds of public interest, despite a determination that there exists 
subsidization and injury?  
i) If a new duty is imposed in a countervailing duty review case, then does European  Union  apply 
the Lesser Duty Rule in imposing a new duty?  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 447 - 
 
Reply:  With regard to Questions 63 (a), (b) and (c), the European  Union  would like to highlight that 
the reference to transnational/foreign subsidies may be misinterpreted and misleading. There exists 
no concept of transnational or foreign subsidies. If India refers to those situations where the financial 
contribution is provided indirectly by a foreign g overnment, this situation is no different from all 
other instances of subsidization provided directly by that government or indirectly through public 
bodies or private bodies entrusted or directed by that government. If India refers to these situations 
of indirect subsidization where the financial contribution is provided by a foreign government, full 
details of the subsidies countervailed and the legal framework are set out in the attached regulations 
which are the only EU cases concerning transnational su bsidies.  
 
· COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2020/776 of 12  June 2020 imposing 
definitive countervailing duties on imports of certain woven and/or stitched glass fibre fabrics 
originating in the People's Republic of China and Egypt - OJ L 189, 15.0 6.2020 . 
 
· COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2020/870 of 24  June 2020 imposing a 
definitive countervailing duty on imports of continuous filament glass fibre products originating in 
Egypt – OJ L 201, 25.06.2020 . 
 
· COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2022/433 of 15  March  2022 imposing 
definitive countervailing duties on imports of stainless steel cold -rolled flat products originating in 
India and Indonesia – OJ L 88, 16.03.2022 . 
 
63 (d) The EU legislation does not contain exemptions from subsidies  granted to the (renewable) 
energy sector . 
Q 63 (e) The European Commission can initiate countervailing investigations ex -officio in accordance 
with Article  15 of the Basic anti -subsidy regulation.  
 
Q 63 (f) Sampling is applied when necessary in countervai ling investigations in accordance with 
Article  27 of the basic anti -subsidy regulation which states:  
 
"In cases where the number of Union producers, exporters or importers, types of product or 
transactions is large, the investigation may be limited to a r easonable number of parties, products 
or transactions by using samples which are statistically valid, on the basis of information available 
at the time of the selection, or to the largest representative volume of production, sales or exports 
which can reas onably be investigated within the time available."  
 
Q 63 (g) The EU's Union interest test is conducted in accordance with Article  31 of the Basic 
anti-subsidy regulation. The European Commission takes into account relevant information 
submitted by interest ed parties and is based on an appreciation of all the various interests taken as 
a whole, including the interests of the domestic industry and users and consumers. Parties are 
invited to cooperate in the investigation in the Notice of Initiation which sets  out deadlines for 
submitting relevant information.  
 
63(h) There have been no instances where the European Commission did not impose countervailing 
measures on the basis of the Union interest test.  
 
63(i) In anti -subsidy reviews, the applicability of the  lesser duty rule depends on the type of 
proceeding. In expiry reviews, the lesser duty rule is normally not assessed. In interim reviews, 
whether the lesser duty rule becomes relevant depends on the scope. For instance, if the lesser duty 
rule did not app ly or did apply in the investigation setting the duty, the scope could be precisely 
whether the lesser duty rule should or should not apply further to a lasting change in the 
circumstances.  
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Page -28, Para -6.12 
In addition, and in response to the trade -related challenges affecting the steel industry, notably after 
the introduction of the US Section  232 tariffs on steel, the EU imposed a safeguard measure on 
imports of certain steel products in February 2019. The objective of this me asure was to protect the 
Union steel industry notably from the negative effects that the trade diversion stemming from 
US Section  232 would cause, in particular in a context of increasing worldwide overcapacity and of 
an increase of trade defence and trade  restrictive measures in third countries.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Question 64:  
a) The WTO Panel, in DS 595 has held that the EU's safeguard measures are in contravention of 
the provisions of the Agreement on Safeguards; however, the EU continues to maintain the 
safeguard measures . Please explain how the maintenance of the safeguard measure despite the 
WTO Panel's decision is legally valid.  
b) Which authority conducts the investigation and which is the responsible authority for 
implementing the results of those investigations (such  as the imposition of a safeguard duty)?  
c) What are the types of safeguard measures applied by DG Trade?  
d) Which authority does the consultation before the imposition of a safeguard measure? Is it 
possible that the quantum/form of a safeguard measure ca n be changed after consultation?  
e) In case the European  Union  is retaliating against the imposition of a safeguard measure by 
another country, in which manner the European  Union  calculates the quantum of retaliation?  
f) Does the European  Union  levy safegu ard duty in the form of a quantitative restriction or in 
the form of a duty or a tariff rate quota?  
 
Reply:  
a) Please refer to Regulation (EU) 2023/104, whereby the European Commission implemented 
the WTO Panel Report in dispute DS595.  
 
b) Please refer to the Regulation (EU) 2015/478. The European Commission conduct the 
investigations. The European Commission imposes safeguard measures via a Commission 
Implementing Regulation.  
 
c) The European  Union  applies safeguard measures according to what is foreseen i n the 
Regulation (EU) 2015/478. Safeguard measures can take various forms, like increased customs 
duties or quotas.  
 
d) The European  Union  applies safeguard measures according to what is foreseen in the 
Regulation (EU) 2015/478. The European Commission con sults the national authorities in the 
advisory Committee on Safeguard.  The measures provided for in the Commission Implementing 
Regulation should be in accordance with the opinion of the Committee on Safeguards established 
under Article  3(3) of Regulation (EU) 2015/478.  
 
e) It is not a standard practice of the European  Union  to retaliate against the imposition of 
safeguard measures.  
 
f) The European  Union  applies safeguard measures according to what is foreseen in the 
Regulation (EU) 2015/478. Safeguard mea sures can take various forms, like increased customs 
duties or quotas.  
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Pg. 31, Para - 7.10  
Additionally, new provisions on procurement forbid awarding and maintaining already awarded 
contracts to Russian nationals, Russian companies, companies owned for more than 50% by Russian 
nationals or companies or steered by them and when such persons are involved as subsidiaries or 
subcontractors in contract implementation for more than 10 % of the contract value. The provision 
includ es a list of exceptions Member States may decide to confer to contracts of their public buyers. 
EU sanctions against Russia also include other measures with less direct links to trade.  
 
Question 65:  Can the EU illustrate a certain situation of such economi c coercion faced by it that 
necessitated proposing such a new legal instrument? Can the EU elaborate on the international 
wrongful act referred to here and provide details of General International law where the rationale of 
this instrument lies?  
 
Reply: The necessity of creating this legal instrument lies in both the prevalence of economic 
coercion in the world and the powers and procedures for adopting measures regulating trade or 
investment under the EU Treaties, as in force since 1  December  2009. The ins trument makes it 
possible inter alia to respond to economic coercion by adopting countermeasures, without for that 
purpose alone undergoing a full legislative procedure internally. The instrument, once adopted, will 
refer to the rules and principles of (customary) international law on which it relies. This includes the 
prohibition on intervention or that on interference in the affairs of another country, which economic 
coercion can contravene. This also includes the rules on state responsibility for wrongful acts, notably 
the right to respond  by way of countermeasure. Details of the latter are since 2001 codified in the WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 449 - 
 
International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts. All 
of the above and also illustrative examples of economic coercion were inc luded in the "Impact 
Assessment Report" that accompanied the European Commission's legislative proposal of 
8 December 2021.  
 
WT/TPR/G/442, Pg. 36, Para - 9.28 
Each year, the Customs Union facilitates the trade of more than EUR  3.5 trillion  worth of goods. 
Efficient customs clearance and controls are essential to allow trade to flow smoothly while also 
protecting EU citizens, businesses and the environment. The "EU Single Window Environment for 
Customs" (EU SWE -C) is designed to provide quicker and more effic ient sharing of electronic data 
between national customs administrations and EU regulatory authorities across policy domains.  
Question 66:  With these TF measures, how has release time been reduced in the EU over the years? 
Whether EU produces Time Release Study (TRS)? How is it disseminated?  
 
Reply:  The "EU Single Window Environment for Customs" facilitates two types of exchanges: 
Government -to-Government (G2G) and Business -to-Government (B2G). The EU Single Window 
Environment for Customs established by Reg ulation (EU) 2022/2399 mandates G2G exchanges from 
March 2025 and B2G exchanges for a selected number of non -customs formalities from 2031.  
 
Expected benefits in terms of time savings were assessed in the Impact Assessment prepared in 
relation to the legi slation:  
 
- For G2G exchanges, expected time gains are significant, with customs authorities saving 
between 30 -45 minutes per relevant declaration and non -customs authorities saving between 
2-5 minutes (see Impact Assessment).  
 
- For B2G exchanges, potenti al time savings were estimated through business cases and 
interviews: gain of 5 -10 minutes per relevant customs declaration to customs authorities and 
1-2 minutes to non -customs authorities. Economic operators are expected to benefit from much 
larger time savings due to the significant improvements in their business processes for lodging 
customs and non -customs data (see Impact Assessment).  
 
Regarding the measure of processing times by Customs authorities in the EU, allow us to refer to 
the answer to Questi on 25: the processing time performance is evaluated in the EU through our 
own performance measurement indicators, different from the time release study methodology. 
(Member States may independently calculate/publish TRS estimates).  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 UKRAINE  
Ukraine is very grateful to the European  Union  for standing with Ukraine, and for its  solidarity with 
the people of Ukraine in the face of the unprecedented, illegal, and terrifying  Russia's aggression 
against Ukraine.  
 
PART I: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE Secretariat Report (WT/TPR/S/442)  
1 ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
1.3 Developments in trade and investment  
1.3.1.2 Trends in services trade  
Page 26 (Para 1.35)  
The Report informs about the recovery of service trade in 2021. In particular, it states, that after a 
contraction in 2020, EU services exports increased by 16% and imports by 4% from 2020 levels. 
The slower recovery on imports is attributed to the travel sector, which had not yet recovered to 
pre-pandemic levels in 2021. On the export side, tr avel services had also not recovered, but other 
sectors such as transport services and telecommunications, computer, and information services 
exceeded historic levels and overcompensated for the lower level of travel services.  
Question:  
1. Would the EU, p lease, inform about most recent trends in its services trade, if respective statistics 
for 2022 are available?  
 
Reply:  
Trade in services continued strong recovery in 2022. Export of extra -EU services grew by 22%, while 
import by 19%. Following the ease in  pandemic restrictions, both import and export of travel services 
more than doubled when compared to 2021. Import and export of transport and travel services 
recorded highest gains in 2022 and outperformed other sectors in their contribution to the growing  
surplus on extra -EU trade in services.  
 
2 TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
2.2 Trade policy formulation and objectives  
Page 32 (Para 2.6)  
According to the Report, "The European Commission is in charge of formulating, coordinating, and 
implementing EU trade policy".  
Question:   
2. Ukraine would appreciate if the EU could kindly clarify whether any exceptions are envisaged in 
the EU trade poli cy that allow individual Member States to introduce unilateral trade or trade related 
measures.  
 
Reply:  Article  24(2) of Regulation 2015/478 on common rules for imports and Article  10 of 
Regulation 2015/479 on common rules for exports provide exceptional circumstances in which 
Members may adopt or apply quantitative restrictions.  
 
Pages 32-33 (Para 2.7)  
The Report informs, that while remaining guided by the principles of open and fair trade the new 
policy of the EU follows a different approach regarding i nteractions with third countries. Under this 
policy, the European  Union  intends to enhance its capacity to act autonomously, if needed, to pursue 
its interest in strategic areas. This guiding principle is referred to as "open strategic autonomy" and 
is further defined as the European  Union 's intention of "cooperating multilaterally wherever [it] can" 
and "acting autonomously wherever [it] must". Through this new approach, the European  Union  is 
seeking to, inter alia, address growing concerns regarding the E U dependency on third parties in 
certain areas deemed of strategic importance and the impact on its ability to take decisions, and to 
enforce third parties' obligations under international agreements.  
According to Chart  2.115 one of the objectives of the E U's trade policy is to increase the 
European  Union 's capacity to pursue its interests and enforce its rights, autonomously if needed.  
Questions:  
3. Would the EU, please, provide examples of autonomous actions that can be taken under its new 
approach regarding interactions with third countries?  
 
Reply:  Concrete examples notably include the Foreign Subsidies Regulation ('FSR') which entered 
into force on 12  January  2023. This new set of rules addressing distortions caused by foreign 
subsidies w ill allow the EU to remain open to trade and investment, while ensuring a level playing 
field for all companies operating in the Single Market. This Regulation proposes new tools to WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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effectively tackle foreign subsidies that cause distortions and undermine the level playing field in the 
internal market. Similarly, the EU is in the process of adopting a regulation on deforestation -free 
products. Once adopted and applied, the new law will ensure that a set of key goods placed on the 
EU market will no longer co ntribute to deforestation and forest degradation in the EU and elsewhere 
in the world.  
 
4. What areas are deemed of strategic importance?  
 
Reply:  There is not an exhaustive list of areas that are considered of strategic importance of the 
EU. The identification of strategic areas is the result of a case -by-case analysis and can evolve over 
time. 
 
5. Under what legal grounds and in what cases "must" the EU act autonomously?  
 
Reply:  The legal grounds for autonomous actions are contained in the Treaty on European  Union  
(TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European  Union  (TFEU). According the principle of 
conferral (Article  5 TEU), the EU can only act within the limits of the competences conferred upon it 
by the EU Member States. There are no predefined circumstances under which the EU "must" act 
autonomously. Rather, autonomous acts are adopted to achieve certain policy objectives (e.g. the 
EU Green Deal).  
 
6. How does this new approach correspond to the EU's exclusive competence of common commercial 
policy and take into account trade agreements concluded by the EU with third countries?  
 
Reply:  This approach corresponds the to the EU's exclusi ve competence for common commercial 
policy because trade -related autonomous acts are adopted at EU level only. These trade measures 
apply to third countries irrespective of trade agreements already concluded, although aid for 
compliance with those trade me asures for FTA partners is possible.  
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1 Measures Directly Affecting Imports  
3.1.1 Customs procedures, valuation, and requirements  
3.1.1.4 Trade facilitation  
Page 54 (Para 3. 22)  
The Report mentions the EU's two types of Authorised Economic Operator, one for  customs 
simplification programmes (AEOC) and another for security and safety (AEOS), and informs about 
mutual recognition agreements in this area.  
Questions:  
7. Ukraine would appreciate if the EU could sha re information about the key benefits of the mutual 
recognition agreements covering the AEOS  status . 
 
Reply:  The following MRA benefits proposed by the EU to its MRA partners, include:  
 
• Fewer security and safety related controls;  
• Recognition of busines s partners during the application process;  
• Business continuity mechanism;  
• Priority treatment at customs clearance;  
• Future MRA benefits.  
 
All benefits are specified in the MRA agreement.  
 
8. What preliminary steps have to be taken by both sides to reach an  agreement or a decision?  
 
Reply:  
Step 1: comparison of legislation  
Step 2: identification of potential reciprocal benefits that can be given through MRA  
Step 3: determination of compatibility of legislation and identification of any divergences o r gaps  
Step 4: assessment of how to address identified gaps / divergences in legislation  
Step 5: comparison of implementation of legislation in practice  
Step 6: determination of compatibility of implementation of the AEO programme  
Step 7: assessment of how  to address identified gaps / divergences of the AEO programme 
implementation  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Step 8: identification of steps to take  
 
9. Does the EU have any preconditions for the conclusion of such kind of  agreements?  
 
Reply:  Obtaining an AEO  mutual recognition with the EU is a long process with several pre -conditions 
to be fulfilled (compatibility of the AEO legislation, assessment of the AEO programmes in practice 
and concrete impact and benefit for the EU businesses). The AEO programme of a n interested 
country should be reasonably mature (being implemented for a year at least). In addition, it is a 
critical condition that there is a legal base allowing to conclude mutual recognition, to agree on data 
protection standards and that both partie s agree on having automated data exchange regarding the 
validity of the AEO status holders.  
 
3.1.4 Other charges affecting imports  
3.1.4.1 VAT  
Page 70 (Para 3.64)  
The Report states that the EU VAT Directive has undergone various modifications in recent ye ars 
with an intentional shift of payment collection from the member State of the supplier to the member 
State of the consumer. This in part removes some distortions or incentives with respect to 
establishing presence in lower tax jurisdictions and has allo wed greater diversity and flexibility in 
VAT rates through recent amendments. The most significant changes were implemented in 
April 2022 and include (i)  expanding the list whereby reduced VAT rates may apply; (ii)  removing 
the possibility to apply lower V AT to goods and services deemed detrimental to the environment 
(by 2030 or 2032); and (iii)  expanding the application of derogations and exemptions to all 
member  States.  
 
Question:  
11. Could the EU, please, provide the web -link where updated Annex  III to the EU VAT Directive 
№ 112 ( with amended list of goods for which reduced VAT rates may apply) is available?  
 
Reply:  Below you find the web -link where updated Annex  III to the EU VAT Directive № 112 is:  
https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:02006L0112 -
20220701&qid=1683202239790#tocId586   
 
3.1.4.2 Excise  
Page 72 (Para 3.72)  
Under the Report, Council Directive 2008/118/EC on the general arrangements for excise duty is set 
to be replaced by the new Council Directive (EU) 2020/262 (recast) as of 13  February  2023.  
Question : 
12. Would the EU kindly inform for which excise duty taxpayers the mechanism (procedure) of excise 
duty reimbursement is provided according to the Council Directive (EU) № 2020/262 that sets the 
general arrangements for excise duty taxation?  
 
Reply:  In Directive (EU) 2020/262 laying down the general arrangements for excise duty, different 
reimbursement situations for excise duties previously paid are foreseen. The procedures and 
conditions for the reimbursements to be applied are defined by the competent authorities of the 
Member State at issue.  
 
For instance, for movements of excise goods under Chapter V Section  2 (movement of goods 
released for consumption in one Member State and moved to another to be delivered there for 
commercial purposes) the reimbur sement of the duties previously paid at the Member State of 
dispatch is possible following the payment of duties due at the Member State of destination. In such 
case the concerned operator will need to request the refund to the competent authorities and fo llow 
the procedures and conditions laid down by them.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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3.3 Measures affecting production and trade  
3.3.7 Intellectual property rights  
3.3.7.4 Enforcement  
Page 130 (Para 3.282)  
The Report tells that enforcement of IPRs  in the digital environment remained a topic of particular 
interest in the reporting period. EUIPO publications addressed topics related to the misuse of 
e-commerce platforms, including related business models through vendor accounts; social media; 
online copyright infringement in the music, film, and TV sectors; domain names and cybersquatting; 
advertisement on IPR -infringing websites; online payments; and novel technologies such as AI and 
automated content recognition including with regard to their use in  fighting IPR infringement.  
Question:  
10. Would the EU kindly specify what steps have been taken to improve IPRs enforcement in the 
digital environment?  
 
Reply:  Since the publication of the IP Action Plan in 2020, IP enforcement has been one of the 
Commis sion's priorities to ensure that European can capitalise on its intellectual assets to boost 
recovery and resilience. Since then, the European Commission has developed a number of different 
initiatives which will contribute to mitigate the sale of IP -infringing goods on the internet:  
 
1. Digital Services Act – The DSA  is an horizontal legislation which clarifies and upgrades the 
responsibilities of digital services providers, particularly online platforms. As such, it 
provides important tools to prevent both piracy and the sale of counterfeits online, which 
are conside red illegal content.  
2. Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the sale of counterfeit goods on the internet – 
the European Commission acts a facilitator to the industry -led cooperation under the MoU, 
through which IP right holders and e -commerce marketplace s commit to work together to 
prevent the sale of counterfeits online and monitor the impact of the cooperation through 
key performance indicators. More information can be found here: Memorandum of 
understanding on the sale of counterfeit goods on the internet (europa.eu) . 
3. Memorandum of Understand on Online Advertising and IPRs – the Commission also 
facilitates the cooperation under another industry -led MoU which focuses on restricting the 
placement of legitimate advertisement on websites and mobile apps which infringe IPRs. 
The ultimate goal of this MoU is to cut the stream of revenue that IPR -infringing websites 
get from the placement of ads, which in turn could be used to finance larger criminal 
operations. More information can be found here: Memorandum of understanding on online 
advertising and IPR (europa.eu)  
4. International Cooperation in the OECD Taskforce on Countering Illicit Trade – the 
European  Commission is represented at the TFCIT, working on relevant topics such as Free 
Trade Zones and E -commerce.  
 
Additionally, the Commission is currently working on an EU Toolbox Against Counterfeiting  for 
adoption in 2023, which will provide a framework for better protection on IPR rights, based on 
5 pillars:  
 
1. Fostering cooperation with all actors, including law  enforcement authorities, intermediaries 
and right holders  
2. Optimising legal proceedings  
3. Promoting new technologies and surveillance tools  
4. Empowering SMEs  
5. Fostering training and international cooperation  
 
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.1 Agricul ture 
4.1.2 Agricultural policy  
Page 134 (Para 4.8)  
The Report notes, that the new Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), applied as from 1  January  2023, 
brings together the support via direct payments, internal market support, and that under the rural 
developm ent scheme, incorporating the sustainability objectives of the European Green Deal, the 
Farm to Fork Strategy referenced therein, and the Biodiversity Strategy 2030. It aims to "ensure a 
sustainable future for European farmers, provide more targeted suppor t to smaller farms, and allow 
greater flexibility for member States in adapting the measures to local conditions".  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Question:  
13. Could the EU, please, elucidate what greater flexibility in adapting the measures according to 
local conditions is provided for the EU Member States under the new CAP?  
 
Reply:  The 2023 -2027 CAP is delivered through national programming tools, the CAP Strategic 
Plans, designed according to the 10 specific objectives set in Regulation (EU) 2021/2115. This 
legislation est ablishes common requirements for their content (e.g., evidence -based design, toolbox 
of instruments, basic environment/climate standards, and mandatory financial allocations) and 
approval process by the Commission. Focusing on the performance, the legislat ion takes into account 
that there is no 'one -size-fits-all' solution, given the Member States' differences in farming 
structures, farming systems, climatic and environmental conditions, and other circumstances. Thus, 
the elaboration of the details of inter vention strategies for each specific objective, combining 
different instruments, stays with the Member States, to be tailored to their specific needs. An 
overview of the approved CAP Strategic Plans (link:  approved -28-cap-strategic -plans -2023-27.pdf 
(europa.eu))  provides more information on Member States' choices.  
 
Page 135 (Para 4.11)  
The Report states, tha t the revised CAP for the period 2023 -27 is spelled out in three new 
regulations. The first, Regulation (EU) 2021/2115, outlines the areas of, and mechanisms for, 
support to agriculture and establishes a requirement for member States to prepare CSPs based on 
an analysis of strengths and weaknesses, setting out targets, conditions, and the allocation of 
resources to achieve them. Schemes supporting rural development are incorporated into the same 
regulation. The second, Regulation (EU) 2021/2116, revised the  rules for the financing, 
management, and monitoring of the CAP, linking funding to results ("outputs" outlined in the CSPs), 
rather than compliance. The third, Regulation (EU) 2021/2117, amended the framework for the 
common market organization, quality sc hemes, geographic indications for wine products, and 
measures for agriculture in outermost regions.  
 
Question:  
14. Would the EU kindly inform how the mechanism for supporting rural development will be 
implemented in accordance with the revised CAP for the period 2023 -27? 
 
Reply:  The 2023 -2027 CAP is delivered through national programming tools, t he CAP Strategic Plans  
(see also an answer to the question on para 4.8). Outside farming and forestry, the Plans include 
support aimed at strengthening socio -economic fabric and developing businesses in rural areas 
according to the identified needs. This is done mainly through the mandatory instrument for 
integrated local development (LEADER) and in complementary manner with other EU funding. The 
local development strategies designed under LEADER are to address various community, territorial 
and social issues. Besides LEADER, so me Member States programmed their CAP Plans to address 
the identified needs through infrastructure and basic services investments, cooperation (e.g. for 
social enterprises, basic social, health, educational and mobility services) or by supporting start -ups 
for young farmers and new farmers linked to agriculture and forestry and/or business start -up of 
non-agricultural activities in rural areas. An overview of the approved Plans (link:  approved -28-cap-
strategic -plans -2023-27.pdf (europa.eu))  provides more information on Member States' choices.  
 
4.1.4 Export subsidies  
Page 148 (Para 4.66)  
According to the Report , "No programmes for financing the export of agricultural products exist at 
the EU level, but most member States operate some programmes for general export financing that 
may cover agricultural products".  
 
Question:  
15. Could the EU, please, comment on ef fect of the above -mentioned programmes, being operated 
by most the EU Member States and providing general export financing, on competition in agricultural 
market?  
 
Reply:  The EU provides detailed information on all export financing programmes in the yearly Export 
Competition Questionnaire ( G/AG/W/125 for the year 2021., while the ECQ for 2022 is awaiting 
publication) . Some EU Member States as notified, do operate export financing programmes which 
do not exclude agricultural products. It cannot be ther efore excluded that some amount of 
agricultural products could have benefited from such programmes. Nevertheless, all EU agricultural 
export financing support needs are provided in accordance with the Nairobi Decision on Export WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Competition (WT/MIN(15)/45, WT/L/908), in particular, with its paragraph 15. Therefore, the trade 
distorting effect of those programmes is very negligible.  
 
4.5 Services  
Regulatory developments  
Page  166 (Para 4.15 1)  
The Report informs that the Digital Services Act establishes an adv isory European Board for Digital 
Services composed of national digital services coordinators.  
Questions:  
16. What is the state of play with respect to the appointment of digital services coordinators under 
the Digital Services Act in the EU Member States?  
 
Reply:  EU Member States have until 17  February  2024 to appoint their digital services coordinator 
under the Digital Services Act. The Commission services maintain close contacts with all Member 
States to facilitate this process. Member States are progres sing on setting up the necessary 
structures for ensuring national coordination between the relevant authorities and the future digital 
services coordinator.  
 
17. How many EU Member States have appointed digital services coordinators so far?  
 
Reply:  1 MS has appointed the coordinator by law and published the information, while the other 
MS are having their national law prepared or discussed by respective legislative bodies.  
 
18. Is there an agreed position within the EU on which kind of existing national a uthorities (personal 
data, telecom ones etc.) should be seen as the most suitable for the role of a digital services 
coordinator?  
 
Reply:  The Member States are free to decide which authority is best placed to act as digital services 
coordinator. This is subject to the requirement that all authorities involved in the future enforcement 
of the Digital Services Act respect the independence and  professional secrecy requirements – 
including but not limited to the Digital Services Coordinator. The Digital Services Act in this regard 
also requires that the digital services coordinator has sufficient technical expertise to adequately 
supervise all p roviders of intermediary services established in their territory. At the same time, the 
Member States have flexibility when it comes to a decision on which authority should be the Digital 
Services Coordinator, depending on national experiences and historic al set -up. In this regard, the 
future DSCs vary from telecommunications or media authorities to consumer protection, competition 
or data protection authorities.  
 
PART II: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE REPORT  BY THE EUROPEAN UNION  
(WT/TPR/G/442)  
3 MULTILATERAL AN D BILATERAL TRADE POLICY  
3.1 The EU's multilateral trade agenda  
3.1.1 WTO Reform  
Page 7 (Para 3.4)  
The Report indicates that the EU remains determined to push forward with WTO reform across the 
three core functions (dispute settlement, negotiation, and de liberation) of the organisation in 
preparation for MC13.  
Question:  
19. Ukraine shares the view that WTO Members could steer the discussions on WTO Reform towards 
realistic and meaningful outcomes in view of the approaching MC13. At the same time, we feel there 
is a lack of discussion regarding the liberalization of market access for goods. Ukraine would 
appreciate if the EU could share its vision of the possibility of market access negotiations within 
the WTO.  
 
Reply: During the review period, in the context of the trade and health discussions, the EU has 
supported liberalization of market access for relevant goods, however the MC12 outcome has shown 
that there was no convergence among WTO Members on liberalization of m arket access for goods.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 3.1.2 WTO response to global challenges  
b. Agriculture and Food Security  
Page 10 (Para 3.23)  
According to the Report "Addressing the food security concerns was a key priority for the EU for 
MC12 and will continue to play a crucial  role in the preparations for MC13" . 
 
Questions:  
20. Could the EU, please, kindly elaborate on the possible practical outcomes in the area of 
agriculture and ensuring global food security that could be achieved by WTO Members at MC13?  
 
Reply:  Given the cu rrent food security context and the need to reform in agriculture, the EU sees a 
need to have outcomes in agriculture at MC113. The focus could be on a food security package, 
which, on the  one hand, could include at least advancement on the work on export restrictions and 
transparency, and,  on the other hand, results on the implementation of the MC12 food insecurity 
declaration. Moreover, the  reform of trade distorting domestic support (including for cotton) and 
further discussions on public  stockholding wi ll need to consider their impact on food security. The 
aim should be reform towards less  trade distorting support and providing the right incentives in 
terms of food security and sustainability targets.  
 
The EU believes that a new approach to agricultural negotiations is needed. Such approach should 
integrate the relevant aspects of food security, environment, climate, poverty reduction and 
sustainable production.  
 
21. Which negotiating pillar is more likely to gain multilateral consensus?  
 
Reply:  Agriculture will be one of the core topics at MC13. The membership will need to show a 
certain level of convergence if it wants to have successful outcomes on agriculture at MC13. The 
WTO membership has to be pragmatic in terms of ambitions and cont ent of the possible outcomes. 
The EU will be constructively engaged in the negotiations towards MC13.  
 
3.2 The EU's bilateral agenda   
3.2.1 Bilateral trade agreements  
a. Europe and its Neighborhood  
Page 1 1 (Para 3. 33) 
The EU has provided Ukrainian exporter s with an unprecedented level of support during the full -scale 
russian invasion, by abolishing customs duties on Ukrainian imports listed in the EU -Ukraine 
Association/Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (AA/DCFTA). Nevertheless, in 
mid-April 2023,  several neighboring EU Member States (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria) 
unilaterally introduced a ban on importing main types of Ukrainian agricultural produce. In response 
to a concern expressed by certain EU Member States, the European Commission  has also started to 
prepare urgent restrictive actions for certain types of Ukrainian food exports to those countries.  
Question:  
22. Keeping in mind the steps made to address problems faced by local European farmers because 
of the Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, Ukraine would very much appreciate if the EU 
could answer if there is any chance that the EU may consider going back to the tariff and non -tariff 
restrictions -based food trade model (codes 1 –24 HS) that is stipulated by the AA/DCFTA, instead of 
using trade protectionist instruments?  
 
Reply:  In June 2022 the EU adopted autonomous trade measures that removed tariffs and quotas 
for all products originating in Ukraine. These measures are on track to be renewed in June 2023 with 
a validity for another year. The exceptional preventive measure restricting the placing on the market 
in 5 Member States of Ukrainian wheat, mai ze, rapeseed and sunflower seed is a temporary measure 
to alleviate the exceptional logistical challenges including a lack of storage for grain in bordering 
Member States caused by a massive increase of imports from Ukraine. Ukrainian grain can still 
transit the 5 Member States to third countries or be placed on the Union market in the other 
22 Member States.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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5 SUSTAINABILTY  
5.1 The EU's actions on climate change and environmental protection  
Page 18 (Para 5.1)  
The Report informs that, the European Commissi on tabled an agenda in late 2019 to become the 
world's first climate neutral continent by 2050. The European Green Deal, which is based on that 
target, is a comprehensive plan to make the EU's economy and society ready for a climate neutral 
future.  
On 18  April 2023, the European Parliament adopted the rules for the EU Carbon Border Adjustment 
Mechanism (CBAM). According to the rules, importers of metals, electricity, cement, aluminum, 
fertilizers, and hydrogen are required to report, starting 1  October  2023, on the amounts of direct 
and, in some cases, indirect CO2 emissions.  
However, Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine is grinding on, and most exporters of the 
mentioned products continue to sustain substantial losses of production facilities and suff er from a 
blockade of Ukrainian sea ports and the limited throughput capacity of other routes.  
Questions  
23. Would the EU, please, inform if there is any possibility for a temporary suspension of compliance 
with these CBAM requirements?  
 
Reply:  In the co ntext of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, the European Commission 
will pursue a close dialogue with Ukrainian authorities on the implementation of the CBAM 
Regulation. While CBAM includes a provision to tackle exceptional and unprovoked situa tions with 
destructive consequences on the economic and industrial infrastructure, the application of this 
provision to specific situations will need to be assessed closer to the time of the end of the transitional 
period in December 2025.  
 
As an EU candid ate country and as a Contracting Party of the Energy Community, Ukraine is also 
already committed to shape its legal framework in line with EU climate acquis, including the adoption 
of carbon pricing mechanisms equivalent to the EU ETS. The Regulation prov ides that when 
production has already been subject to the EU ETS through its application to third countries or to a 
carbon pricing system that is fully linked with the EU ETS, no CBAM has to apply to goods imported 
into the Union.  
 
24. Does abiding by the CBAM rules enable countries with the EU candidacy status to access EU 
green industry modernization funds?  
 
Reply:  CBAM  is not directed at third countries but at the embedded carbon emissions of imported 
products in specific sectors. There is no direct link between CBAM and access to EU funds. These are 
separate policies.  
 
6 ENFORCEMENT AND RESPONDING TO TRADE DISTORTIVE P RACTICES  
6.3 EU State aid control  
Page 28 (Para 6.13)  
Under the Report, "Subsidies in the EU are regulated through State aid control managed by the 
European Commission, and in a way that is fully coherent with the applicable WTO rules. The EU -level 
regime ensures that subsidies are authorised according to uniform criteria, following an assessment 
of their necessity, proportionality and effects on trade and competition. As a result, any distortive 
effects of subsidies are minimised while maximising their pos itive effects for public policy objectives. 
In addition, subsidies granted at the EU level, while not subject to the State aid approval process, 
are designed to follow the same principles".  
Questions  
25. Have the EU assessed effects of its subsidy policy on competition and trade activity of economic 
operators from developing countries, those governments are unable to provide such level of state 
aid as in the EU?  
 
Reply:  EU State aid rules aim to limit possible distortions of competition and trade between E U 
Member States. Only if a State aid is compatible with the functioning of the internal market, it can 
be approved by the European Commission or be subject to a block exemption. State aid compatibility 
requires the measures to be designed in a manner that is the least distortive for trade. Therefore, 
any impact on trade outside the EU is necessarily also limited.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 458 - 
 
  
 26. What measures have been taken by the EU to minimise distortive effects of subsidies granted, 
for example, with the aim of the green transitio n or in emergencies, and to provide fair competition 
in trade for businesses?  
 
Reply:  The Commission continues to enforce State aid control during the current crisis. It has issued 
temporary rules, most recently in the form of the Temporary Crisis and Tra nsition Framework, to 
allow Member States to better address the effects of the current crisis on their respective economies. 
These crisis rules are temporary in nature and do not alter the main requirement that aid can only 
be granted exceptionally and sub ject to strict safeguards. Under the Framework, aid must be aimed 
either at remedying a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State (under 
Article  107(3)(b) TFEU) or facilitating the development of certain economic activities or of certain 
economi c areas (under Article  107(3)(c) TFEU. Such aid can only be declared compatible if it is 
appropriate, necessary (incentive effect), proportionate and if its impact in terms of distortion of 
competition and effect on trade is limited. The Commission has als o adopted specific rules to allow 
Member States to support the green transition, in particular the Climate, Energy and Environmental 
Aid Guidelines (CEEAG) and the most recent amendments to the General Block Exemption Regulation 
(GBER). These rules follow the same safeguards.  
 
Page 28 (Para 6.15)  
The Report mentions the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (EU) 2022/256079, which is a new element 
of subsidy control aiming to close a legislative gap and restore the level playing field in 
concentrations, public procu rement and other market situations. Its application will start from 
12 July 2023 and then the European Commission will have the power to investigate financial 
contributions granted by public authorities of non -EU countries, which benefit companies engaging  
in an economic activity in the EU and redress, if needed, their distortive effects. The Report explains 
that, until now, subsidies granted by non -EU governments to economic operators active in the EU 
went largely unchecked, while subsidies granted by the EU Member States are subject to close 
scrutiny.  
 
Questions  
27. Would the EU kindly inform more about above -mentioned new power of the 
European  Commission and clarify the procedure/methology  of holding investigations with respect to 
"financial contributions granted by public authorities of non -EU countries, which benefit companies 
engaging in an economic activity in the EU"?  
 
Reply: Under the FSR, the Commission will have the power to investi gate financial contributions 
granted by non -EU governments to companies active in the EU. If the Commission finds that such 
financial contributions constitute distortive subsidies, it can impose measures to redress their 
distortive effects.  
 
The Regulation  introduces three tools:  
 
· A notification -based tool to investigate concentrations involving a financial contribution by 
a non -EU government, where the acquired company, one of the merging parties or the 
joint venture generates an EU turnover of at least €500 million  and the transaction 
involves a foreign financial contribution of more than €50  million ; 
· A notification -based tool to investigate bids in public procurements involving a financial 
contribution by a non -EU government, where the estimated contract value is at least 
€250 million  and the bid involves a foreign financial contribution of at least €4  million  per 
third country; and  
· A general tool to investigate all other market situations, where the Commission can start a 
review on it s own initiative (ex -officio) or it request an ad -hoc notification for smaller 
concentrations and public procurement procedures.  
 
With respect to the two notification -based tools, the parties will have to notify ex-ante financial 
contributions received fro m non -EU public authorities prior to concluding a concentration or a public 
procurement procedure above the relevant thresholds. The Commission can also request ad-hoc 
notifications for smaller concentrations and public procurement procedures if it suspect s the 
existence of distortive subsidies. Pending the Commission's review, the concentration in question 
cannot be completed and the investigated bidder cannot be awarded the contract.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 459 - 
 
The general investigation tool would allow the Commission to start inve stigations on its own initiative 
(ex-officio). This would cover other types of market situations, such as greenfield investments or 
concentrations and public procurements below the thresholds.  
 
If the Commission establishes that a foreign subsidy exists an d that it is distortive, it will balance 
the negative effects of the subsidy, in terms of the distortion, with positive effects of the subsidy to 
determine appropriate redressive measures or to accept commitments. With respect to the 
redressive measures an d commitments, the Regulation includes a range of structural or 
non-structural remedies, such as the divestment of certain assets or providing access to 
infrastructure. In case of notified transactions, the Commission can also prohibit the subsidised 
conce ntration or the award of the public procurement contract to the subsidised bidder.  
 
28. What instruments might the European Commission use for redressing distortive effects of such 
financial contributions?  
 
Reply:  As mentioned in the reply to Q27 above, with respect to the redressive measures and 
commitments, the Regulation includes a range of structural or non -structural remedies, such as the 
divestment of certain assets or providing access to infrastructure. In c ase of notified transactions, 
the Commission can also prohibit the subsidised concentration or the award of the public 
procurement contract to the subsidised bidder.  
 
29. Could the EU also confirm that such new control measure would not create additional p ressure 
to trade?  
 
Reply:  The purpose of the FSR is not to impose additional pressure on trade activities, but rather to 
close a regulatory gap: aid granted by EU Member States is subject to close scrutiny under EU State 
aid rules, whereas subsidies grante d to companies active in the EU by non -EU countries went largely 
unchecked until now.  
 
Page 28 (Para 6.16)  
The Report points out that "Industrial policies, including increased subsidisation, have become more 
prominent around the world, including in the EU,  to alleviate the impact of temporary crises such as 
the pandemic and to address more structural challenges such as the green transition".  
Question:  
30. Could the EU, please, share its view concerning possible ways of resolving the problem of 
increased sub sidization at the multilateral level, in particular in the WTO, to mitigate its distortive 
effects for international trade?  
 
Reply: In its recent WTO communication "Reinforcing the deliberative function of the WTO to 
respond to global trade policy challen ges" (WT/GC/W/864), the European  Union  has proposed to 
enhance deliberations among WTO Members on a number of key issues affecting global trade today, 
including on State intervention in support of industrial sectors. While the improvement of WTO rules 
may be a possible outcome in the longer term, the more immediate focus of deliberations should be 
on achieving a better understanding of the interface between trade and state intervention in support 
of industrial sectors and on identifying possible gaps in the  current rules. The aim of the deliberations 
should be to provide more transparency, to consider the design of measures, and to consider the 
positive and negative spill -overs on developing countries.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 UKRAINE – ADDITIONAL QUESTION  
REGARDING THE ANSWER, PROVIDED BY THE EU TO UKRAINE 'S ADVANCE WRITTEN 
QUESTION NUMBER 2 (RD/TPR/1562)  
Ukraine expresses its gratitude to the EU for the provided answers to advance written questions.  
With reference to the EU 's reply to Ukraine 's question number 2 we would like to receive further 
clarification.  
 
The first subparagraph of paragraph 2 of Article  24(2) of Regulation 2015/478 on common rules 
for imports provides for possibility of adoption or application by Member States of prohibition s, 
quantitative restrictions or surveillance measures on grounds of public morality, public policy 
or public security, the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants, the 
protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or arc haeological value, or 
the protection of industrial and commercial property.  
 
Article  10 of Regulation 2015/479 on common rules for exports also lists public morality, public 
policy or public security, or of protection of health and life of humans, animals and plants, of 
national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value, or of industrial and 
commercial property, as grounds for possible adoption or application of quantitative restrictions on 
exports by a Member State.  
 
Question 1:  
Would the EU, please, inform about the grounds for the prohibitions on imports of agricultural 
products imposed by certain individual Member States in early May 2023?  
 
Reply:  The European  Union  thanks Ukraine for its question and stresses the initiatives and e fforts 
in the recent months by the European  Union  and its Member States to further liberalise trade in 
goods originating in Ukraine. In that respect, the European  Union  recalls the adoption of Regulation 
(EU) 2023/1077 of 31  May 2023 which liberalises for another year all imports into the EU of 
products originating from Ukraine.  
 
The EU is not aware of any import prohibitions currently applicable by any Member State and recalls 
Commission Implementing Regulation 2023/1100 of 5 June 2023 which has been adop ted precisely 
to address acute practical difficulties and logistical bottlenecks on the ground and to facilitate the 
flow of goods trade from Ukraine in the Union and the rest of the world through its land borders 
with Ukraine.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 461 - 
 
HONDURAS  
Informe de Gobierno  
Párrafo 5.8.  
En su Informe, se indica que el Régimen de comercio de derechos de emisión de la UE, fija un precio 
del carbono y reduce cada año el límite de las emisiones procedentes de determinados sectores 
económicos.  
 
Question 1:  
Podría indicar la UE, cual es el procedimiento para fijar el precio y reducir el límite?  
 
Reply:  Setting the price and lowering the cap are two different things. Setting the price is done by 
the market based on the demand and supply of allowances. Allowances  are offered in auctions where 
participants can submit bids and a price occurs. The European Commission is not involved in 
price-setting.  
 
By contrast, the cap is laid down in legislation and corresponds to the EU's environmental ambition. 
At present, the  legislation prescribes that the cap in 2030 is 62% below 2005 -emissions. The 
legislation also sets the cap trajectory, i.e. the annual percentage with which the cap is lowered (the 
so-called 'linear reduction factor'). The ordinary legislative procedure i s used to amend the relevant 
legislation, i.e. the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) Directive. More information can be found 
here:  Emissions cap and allowances (europa.eu) .  
 
Informe de la Secretaría  
Párrafo 3.164  
Question 2:  
Favor indicar como la tributación ecológica contribuye a la promoción de un crecimiento sostenible  
y como se alienta a las empresas y a los consumidores a comportarse de una manera más respetuosa 
con el medio ambiente?  
 
Reply:  Taxes can play a n important role to influence the behaviour of consumers and users by 
reducing the consumption of goods and services with a specific negative impact on the environment 
or on health for example. This is achieved through a price signal due to the introductio n of the tax. 
It is generally considered that the application of these taxes is a win -win policies because they have 
a positive impact on the environment and/or health while having a less negative impact on growth 
(and employment) compared to other taxes, namely direct taxes.  
 
The concept of using taxation to correct negative externalities such as pollution is credited to the 
economist Arthur C. Pigou. Pigouvian taxes intend to tackle externalities resulting from market 
failures.  
 
A negative externality rep resents a market failure because the supply and demand in the market 
are unable to integrate the social cost associated and therefore prices are not properly fixed. This 
would result in an inefficiently high quantity of traded goods. Imposing a tax on the 
externality -generating good can correct the externality. If the tax rate is set equal to the marginal 
external damage it would bring that external cost into the transaction, ensuring that the buyer pays 
the full marginal social cost of the good. Thus, the incentive provided by the tax ensures that the 
market produces the efficient level of the good (in the absence of any other uncorrected market 
failures).  
 
Examples of externalities are CO2 emissions, other emissions, noise, congestion, water pollution, air  
pollution, plastic waste. In economic terms, an environmental tax is efficient when it increases the 
cost until the marginal cost for the firm of emitting pollution is equal to the marginal environmental 
benefit of the additional abatement the tax induces . WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 462 - 
 
  
 KOREA, REPUBLIC OF  
PART I: Questions Regarding the Secretariat Report  
 
Page 35 (Para 2.13)  
2.13. The WTO and multilateral cooperation are 
critical components of EU trade policy. The 
European  Union  is a founding Member of the WTO, 
and as the world's top trader, it plays a key role in 
the WTO's work and functioning. During the review 
period, it continued to actively contribute to the 
WTO's core functions and the regular activities of 
committees, incl uding as one of the main donors for 
capacity -building and technical assistance through 
various funds, notably the Aid -for-Trade initiative. 
It promoted discussions and co -sponsored 
proposals/initiatives on, inter alia, domestic 
regulation of trade in servi ces, e -commerce, 
investment facilitation, and transparency 
requirements in agriculture. More recently, it also 
sought to advance discussions on trade and 
environment  and co -sponsored initiatives on a 
fossil fuel subsidy reform, plastics pollution and 
environmentally sustainable plastics trade, and 
trade and environmental sustainability. It 
participates in the Informal Working Group on trade 
and gender and on MSMEs, and has co -sponsored 
ministerial declarations in both areas . Question 1  
In its recent proposa l at the WTO, the EU has suggested 
the idea of reinforcing deliberation in the CTE to deal 
with key environmental measures affecting trade, for 
example the CBAM of the EU, which is of major concern 
to domestic exporters. the Republic of Korea  believes 
that for the CTE to carry out this function effectively, 
the scope and process of discussions should be 
carefully designed to fulfill the needs and concerns of 
relevant Members. Could the EU share its thoughts on 
how this process could be designed and how it w ill be 
deliberated in the CTE, where all Members participate?   
 
Reply:  
There is an increasing interest of Members for 
environment and climate to figure more prominently on 
the WTO agenda given the urgency of the climate and 
environmental challenges.  
 
The EU proposes to reinforce deliberation on global 
environmental challenges in the Committee on Trade 
and Environment (CTE). The objectives are: enhanced 
transparency, coordination and policy dialogue on 
trade -related environmental measures (for EU these 
could be CBAM, Deforestation regulation, packaging 
directive etc.). We suggest early information exchanges 
on measures and discussions on the design of 
measures that maximise climate and environmental 
benefits while minimising trade -restrictive impacts, 
similarly to what the EU has already been doing on the 
European Green Deal.  
 
More thematic deliberations in the CTE could also be 
considered. The paper makes some suggestions, 
including having discussions on methodologies for 
calculating embedded emissions i n the internationally 
traded goods, but the list is by no means exhaustive. It 
will be up to Members in the CTE to propose and agree 
the topics. Given the interlinkage between 
development and environmental challenges, it would 
also be important to reinforc e the capacity of 
developing countries in terms of their participation, but 
also identify means to support them in the challenges 
faced in complying with trade -related climate and 
environmental measures.  
 
The EU also sees room for closer committee 
coordin ation between the CTE and other relevant 
bodies (e.g. TBT, SPS, SCM and Agriculture).  
 
Page 104 (Para 3.168)  
3.168. During the review period, the 
European  Union  identified standardization as a key 
strategic tool to achieve its objectives under the 
Europea n Green Deal, as well as under its new 
digital, industrial, and trade strategies 
(Section  2.1). To complement these strategies (and 
as provided in its Industrial Strategy), the 
European  Union  launched in February 2022 a new 
strategy on standardization enti tled "Setting global 
standards in support of a resilient, green and digital 
EU single market".213 Under this new strategy, the 
European  Union  identifies six areas of action for the 
short, medium, and long term: (i)  address 
standardization existing needs in  strategic areas Question 2  
'Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA)' i ncludes clauses 
regarding corporate sustainability due diligence; 
incorporation of one or more permanent magnets to 
ensure that a data carrier is present on or in the 
product; and environmental footprints. How will CRMA 
differentiate itself from other regu lations such as 
'Regulation concerning Batteries and Waste Batteries'; 
'CBAM (Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism)'; 
'Regulation establishing a framework of measures for 
strengthening Europe's semiconductor ecosystem (the 
EU Chips Act)'; or 'Regulation esta blishing a framework 
for setting ecodesign requirement for sustainable 
products', which also include similar obligations such as 
product passport and carbon footprints, among others?  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 463 - 
 
and anticipate new ones; (ii)  improve governance 
and ensure inclusive participation in the European 
standardization system; (iii)  strengthen the role of 
the European  Union  in shaping international 
standards; (iv)  support innovation to iden tify new 
standardization needs; (v)  promote the training of 
the future generation of standardization experts; 
and (vi) ensure the EU standardization system is 
aligned with EU policy objectives and values. In 
addition, during the review period the 
European  Union  continued its work in promoting the 
development of environmental (e.g. hydrogen, 
critical raw materials in batteries) and digital 
standards (e.g. artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, 
and chips).214  Also, is there any possibility of overlapping areas 
among those regulatio ns and other similar acts or 
regulations?  
 
Reply:  The aforementioned regulations differ in terms 
of their scope and requirements, which are proportional 
to the environmental objectives to be achieved by the 
individual proposals. The CBAM focusses on carbon  
pricing and its scope does not contain CRMs currently – 
the aim of the environmental footprint in the CRMA 
proposal would not be to ensure carbon pricing but to 
create transparency on the market through a 
declaration. The Chips Act focusses on the 
semicon ductor value chain, but not including materials 
production, there are no overlaps. The Ecodesign 
proposal created a framework for setting product level 
requirements, which can also contribute to materials 
efficiency and circularity. The requirement propose d on 
magnet containing product and footprint complement 
this framework, as no such specific requirements 
currently exist.  
 
Page 106(Para 3.177)  
3.177. In addition, labelling and other marking 
requirements may apply to certain non -food 
products, regardless of whether they are subject to 
the CE mark.231 These requirements apply equally 
to both imported and locally produced goods based 
on health, saf ety, or environmental considerations, 
and include energy rating labels, safety labels for 
toys and chemicals substances, and markings for 
waste from electrical and electronic equipment 
(WEEE) for electrical appliances. Labelling 
requirements also apply to textiles, footwear, and 
cosmetics.232 Since July 2021, plastic cups and 
certain sanitary and tobacco products are also 
subject to a single -use plastic marking based on 
waste management and environmental 
grounds.233  Question 3  
Recent EU legislations in the  fields of waste 
management and recycling facilitation, including the 
SUPD, do not include "disposable products made of 
paper" in its scope. However, as most disposable 
products made of paper are plastic coated, they should 
also come under the SUPD's regul atory scope. If plastic 
coated papers are not covered by the SUPD, then 
biodegradable plastics should, in the same vein, be 
excluded from SUPD's regulatory scope, or granted 
exceptional status. Could the EU provide its position on 
this matter?  
 
Reply:  
Article 3(2) of the SUP Directive  defines a 'single -use 
plastic product ' as "a product that is made wholly or 
partly from plastic and that is not conceived, designed 
or placed on the market to accomplish, within its life 
span, multiple trips or rotations by being returned to a 
producer for refill or re -used for the same purpose for 
which it was conceived ". Notably, this definition does 
not set any threshold for plastic content below which a 
product would not be considered a single -use plastic 
product. Therefore, products made of plastic coated 
paper are in scope of the SUP Directive. The SUP 
Guidelines  elaborate on this point in section 2.2.1. by 
stating that "when a plastic coating or lining is applied 
to the surface of a  paper - or board -based or other 
material to provide protection against water or fat, the 
final product is considered a composite product 
composed of more than one material of which one is 
plastic. In this case, the final product is seen as being 
made partl y of plastic. Hence, single -use paper - or 
board -based products with plastic coating or lining are 
partly made of plastic and fall within the scope of the 
Directive ". 
 
The definition of 'plastic ' laid down in Article  3(1) of the 
SUP Directive does not exclu de biodegradable plastics. 
Recital 11 of the Directive actually states that the 
definition of plastics should "cover polymer -based 
rubber items and bio -based and biodegradable plastics 
regardless of whether they are derived from biomass 
or are intended to biodegrade over time. "  
The reasons to treat biobased, biodegradable and 
compostable plastics as conventional (fossil -based, 
non-biodegradable) plastics have been the following:  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 464 - 
 
  
 1. No commonly agreed technical standards was 
available to certify that a spe cific plastic product is 
properly biodegradable in the marine environment and 
will, if littered, indeed biodegrade in a timeframe 
sufficiently short no to cause harm to the environment.  
2. There was a push for reuse, against single use 
model.  
 
A review is foreseen in the SUPD to reassess the 
situation by July 2027.  
 
Question 4  
Our industry is of the view that EU Member States' 
giving different treatment to the export of 
biodegradable plastics (for example, while Italy and 
Germany promotes usage of biodegrad able plastics, 
other members like France regulates their usage) lacks 
coherence and hinders predictability for the business 
environment. In this respect, does the EU have any 
plan to address this coherency issue?  
 
Reply:  
The Commission has adopted a policy framework on 
biobased, biodegradable and compostable plastics 
(COM(2023)682) (see  Communication – EU policy 
framework on biobased, b iodegradable and 
compostable plastics (europa.eu) ) setting the 
conditions under which these plastics can deliver 
overall environmental benefits. This is a non -binding 
instrument aiming at improving the understanding of 
these plastics and guiding the market in order to avoid 
any possible future unsustainable evolution. The 
Commission is of the view that a common 
understanding across the EU on the use of these plastic 
materials will also facilitate the single market and 
prevent differences at national level fragmenting the 
market.  
 
Page 127 (Para 3.269)  
On 28  November  2022, the Commission adopted 
two (package) proposals to modernize its legislation 
on design protection. Based on the 2020 IP Action 
Plan, they are designed to  simplify and streamline 
the procedure for the EU -wide registration of a 
design, harmonize procedures, and ensure 
complementarity with national design systems, and 
allow reproducing original designs for repair 
purposes of complex products.  Question 5  
Could  the EU share its experience on how it dealt with 
and overcame backlash from the completed vehicle 
industry, raised during the modernization process of its 
design protection legislation?  
 
Reply:  The proposed revision of the EU legislation on 
design protection is based on a comprehensive 
evaluation of the functioning of the design protection 
systems in the EU, involving a series of economic and 
legal studies, and extensive public consultations, 
including specifically on the issue of design protection 
for spare parts. Both the Economic Review of Industrial 
Design in Europe (2015) and the Legal Review on 
Industrial Design Protection (2016) advocated for the 
introduction of an EU -wide repair clause. Th e first 
public consultation confirmed that the existing market 
fragmentation in the EU remains a serious problem for 
a majority of replying businesses, causing disruption of 
trade and competition, as well as significant legal 
uncertainty and unpredictabili ty. Solid economic 
research showed that the introduction of an EU -wide 
repair clause promises to bring substantial savings to 
consumers. Given that protection for repair spare parts 
also conflicts with the essential role and function of 
design law, and res ults in foreclosure of competition 
and the creation of captive markets, the proposed 
removal of design protection is strongly supported by 
independent spare parts manufacturers and 
distributors, insurance companies, academia, and 
consumer organisations. It  is also considered to be 
consistent and complementary with the EU Motor WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 465 - 
 
Vehicle Block Exemption Regulation in the field of 
antitrust, the aim of which is to ensure effective 
competition in the vehicle spare parts, service and 
repair markets. The interests  of vehicle manufacturers 
have been taken into account and balanced equitably 
in the context of the proposed repair clause to become 
part of the new Design Directive. Its scope of 
application is explicitly limited to form dependant 
replacement parts only. The clause also involves an 
explicit duty to inform about the commercial origin of 
the repair parts. Finally, it shall have (unlimited) instant 
legal effect only for the future, while safeguarding 
protection of existing design rights for a transitional 
period of 10 years.  
 
Question 6  
Could the EU provide more detail on the EU -wide 
'repair -clause', specifically on how the EU will limit the 
protection of spare parts design? For example, will its 
registration be prohibited by stipulating it in the 
design -related law as an exception to protection? Or 
will the term of protection be reduced? Or will the 
registration be made possible but have the protection 
of spare parts design considered an "exception to 
protection" for specified situations?  
 
Reply: The purpose of design protection is to grant 
exclusive rights to the appearance of a product, but not 
a monopoly over the product as such. Protecting 
designs for spare parts for which there is no practical 
alternative would lead in fact to a product monopoly. In 
order  to ensure a smooth functioning of the internal 
market and fair competition therein, it has been 
proposed to open up the spare parts aftermarket for 
competition through the insertion of a repair clause in 
the proposed recast Design Directive. It approximat es 
the design laws of the Member States by removing 
design protection as concerns the use of protected 
designs for the purpose of repair of a complex product 
so as to restore its original appearance where the 
product incorporating the design or to which th e design 
is applied constitutes a form -dependent component 
part of a complex product. For designs already granted 
before the entry into force of the Directive, a 
transitional period of 10 years has been proposed. The 
repair clause already contained in the Community 
Design Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 (applicable to EU 
designs at Union level) is proposed to be adapted 
accordingly. The intended effect of such repair clause is 
to make design rights unenforceable. Therefore, it is 
placed among the available defenc es to design right 
infringement.  
 
Also, could the EU provide its plan to regulate 'the 
criteria for determining a clear and visible indication on 
the product and in another appropriate form, etc.'? Will 
it be regulated through subordinate statutes or 
delegated to each Member State's law?  
 
Reply:  The provisions on the information obligation of 
the manufacturer or seller of a component part of a 
complex product in the two package proposals aim to 
partly codify the case -law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union  in the Joined Cases C -397/16 and 
C-435/16, Acacia v. Audi AG and Porsche, 
paragraphs  85 and 86. It is therefore understood that 
the required information of consumers about the 
product 's commercial origin "in another appropriate 
form" could also be done, for example, through a clear 
and visible indication on the product 's packaging, in the WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 466 - 
 
  
 catalogues or in the sales documents. Unless it is still 
preferred during the ongoing legislative process to 
further specify the information obligation, any fur ther 
interpretation and specification of the criteria 
established in the provisions on the manufacturer's 
information obligation will be incumbent on the Courts.  
 
Question 7  
 
Could the EU share the current status of the subsequent 
legislation process after the adoption at the 
Commission last November? When does the EU expect 
this whole legislation process could be completed?  
 
Reply:  After the adoption of the two Commission 
(package) proposals for a revised Regulation and 
Directive on industrial designs on 28  November  2022, 
the proposals have been transmitted to the Council of 
the European  Union  and the European Parliament for 
adoption under the ordinary legislative procedure. I n 
the Council, the Commission presented the Initiatives 
package on 19  December  2022. Since then, the 
two proposals have been discussed in the Council 
Working Group on Intellectual Property with the 
Member States. In the European Parliament, a 
first exchang e of views was held at the end of April in 
the Committee on Legal Affairs. The vote in Plenary is 
planned for November this year. This will be followed 
by the trilogues between the Parliament, the Council, 
and the Commission. An adoption of the two package  
proposals is, therefore, not likely before Q1 2024.  
 
 
PART II: Questions Regarding the Government Report  
 
Page 8 (Para 3.9)  
3.9. While the success of the fisheries agreement 
has breathed some oxygen into the system, there 
are more WTO rules in need of mo dernisation. The 
EU considers that work on level playing field issues, 
including on industrial subsidies is fundamental to 
making the WTO fit for current challenges. In view 
of the increasing importance of industrial policy, it 
is important to reinforce th e deliberating function 
in the WTO on how to address distortions arising 
from a wide range of state interventions, including 
subsidies and activities of State -owned 
enterprises. While state interventions can be an 
appropriate tool to contribute to importan t public 
objectives, such as the climate transition, the state 
interventions should be designed so as to avoid or 
minimise negative spill over effects on trading 
partners.  Question 8  
There are several industrial policy proposals in the WTO 
at the moment, where the EU is looking for 
reinforcement of the deliberation function to address this 
issue. Would the EU be considering the possibility of 
1) the revival of non -actionable subsidies, 
2) justification of Member's subsides to address their 
policy g oals and 3) the weakening of existing WTO rules?  
 
Reply:  
While the improvement of WTO rules may be a possible 
outcome in the longer term, the more immediate focus 
of deliberations should be on achieving a better 
understanding of the interface between trade and state 
intervention in support of industrial sectors and on 
identifying possible gaps in the current rules.  
 
The three issues would fit well in the deliberations and 
the EU is prepared to discuss them in due course.  
 
Page 19 (Para 5.6)  
 
On 14  July 2021, the Commission proposed a 
package of climate, energy  and transport 
legislation, the "Fit for 55" package, to accomplish 
this transformational change across the EU's 
economy and society -matched by commitment to 
a socially fair transition, which leaves no one 
behind.  Question 9  
 
As part of its "Fit for 55" p ackage the EU has aligned its 
policies with its climate change objectives. Could the EU 
explain when the revised ETD (Energy Taxation 
Directive: 2003/96/EC) amended in July 2021 will come 
into force? And where would we be able to find relevant 
information?  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 467 - 
 
Reply:  
At present, the EU Member States are discussing the 
Commission proposal based on a Council Working Party 
compromise proposal. We cannot anticipate any date for 
an agreement.  
 
Relevant information on the Commission proposal can 
be found in: Revision of the Energy Taxation Directive 
(europa.eu) . 
 
Page 19 (Para 5.7)  
The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism 
(CBAM )22 is a climate measure aimed at 
decreasing global GHG emissions by preventing 
the risk of carbon leakage and by supporting 
increased ambition on climate mitigation, while 
ensuring WTO compatibility. The CBAM will 
equalise the price of carbon between dome stic 
products and imports and ensure that the EU's 
climate objectives are not undermined by 
production relocating to countries with less 
ambitious climate policies.  Question 10  
 
Could EU explain its efforts and specific plans to ensure 
that the operation o f CBAM is compatible with WTO rules 
and does not include discriminatory elements against 
foreign companies?  
 
Reply:  
CBAM  is an environmental policy tool to prevent carbon 
leakage and support the EU's increased ambition on 
climate mitigation, while ensuring WTO compatibility.  
 
CBAM will ensure that an equivalent carbon price will be 
paid by domestic and imported products an d will thus be 
non-discriminatory and compatible with WTO rules and 
other international obligations of the EU.  
 
As it has been designed, CBAM will be applied in an 
even-handed manner that does not discriminate among 
products or countries. Article  216(2) of  the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European  Union  states that 
"[a]greements concluded by the Union are binding upon 
the institutions of the Union and on its Member States ". 
This obligation applies equally to the WTO  Agreement . 
Consequently, the EU alway s assesses the WTO 
compatibility of its legislation, including autonomous 
regulations.  
 
Page 23 (para 5.31)  
5.31. On 23  February  2022, the Commission 
adopted a legislative proposal for a Directive on 
corporate sustainability due diligence. The aim of 
this Directive is to foster sustainable and 
responsible corporate behaviour and to anchor 
human rights and environmental consideration s in 
companies' operations and corporate governance. 
The proposal is still with the EU's legislature, and 
the new rules once adopted will ensure that 
businesses address adverse impacts of their 
actions, including in their value chains inside and 
outside Eu rope.  
 Question 11  
There are some concerns that although the intention of 
the "EU Directive on corporate sustainability due 
diligence" is to better protect human rights and the 
environment, this can lead to more excessive 
intervention in business activiti es than is needed. Also, 
it might act as a trade barrier to developing countries 
that have different standards than the EU. Does the EU 
have specific plans to review these kinds of concerns?  
 
Reply:  
The proposal for a Directive on corporate sustainability 
due diligence (hereinafter the CSDDD) sets out a 
harmonised, ambitious, and at the same time balanced 
and proportionate approach. The burden on companies 
has been specifically adapted to account for their size, 
resources available, and risk profile. In thi s regard, 
companies will only have to take appropriate measures 
that are commensurate with the likelihood of adverse 
impacts and the degree of severity.  
 
It should be noted that the CSDDD is neither a trade nor 
a product -based instrument aimed at imposing import 
bans in the EU. The proposal requires that those 
companies that fall within its scope conduct due 
diligence activities in order to prevent, mitigate and 
remedy adverse impacts. Moreover, the CSDDD fosters 
continuous engagement, including through inv estment 
into the value chain where necessary and to support an 
SME business partner. Termination of business WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 468 - 
 
  
 relationships is only allowed as a last resort action if no 
other engagement activities, including investment and 
support, would bear fruit. Finall y, the due diligence duty 
is aligned with international voluntary standards (the 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
and the OECD Responsible Business Conduct standards). 
The interests of partner countries have been taken into 
account when d esigning the proposal, and it is therefore 
likely to lead to stronger engagement in business 
relationships, and therefore also better and stronger 
trade relations.  
 
Page 28 (Para 6.15)  
A new element of subsidy control is the Foreign 
Subsidies Regulation (EU) 2022/256079 which 
will apply from 12  July 2023, six months after its 
entry into force. The notification requirements for 
concentrations and public procurement procedures 
will apply from 12  October  2023. The proposal 
aims to close a legislative gap and restore the level 
playing field in concentrations, public procurement 
and other market situations Until now, subsidies 
granted by non -EU governments to economic 
operators active in the EU went largely unchecked, 
while subsidies granted by EU Member States are 
subject to close scrutiny. The European 
Commission will have the power to investigate 
financial contributions granted by public authorities 
of non -EU countries which benefit companies 
engaging in a n economic activity in the EU and 
redress, if needed, their distortive effects.  
 (While we understand that the EU's intention is to 
strengthen the fair competition environment in its 
internal market by introducing the FSR, there are 
concerns that the regu lation may affect free economic 
activities. the Republic of Korea  requests the EU to 
consider the following points in its implementation 
stage.)  
 
Question 12  
It would be helpful to relieve the administrative burden 
on companies if the Commission could com e up with a 
guideline to clarify how the thresholds regarding the 
amounts of financial contributions mentioned in the 
Annexes are to assessed and, in particular, what specific 
situation constitutes "de minimis" or the "unlikely to 
distort" thresholds under  Article  4 of the Foreign 
Subsidies Regulation. Also, could the Commission 
develop clear criteria for establishing links between 
financial contributions and the potential for distortive 
effects?  
 
Reply:  
It is important to distinguish between notification 
thresholds under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR) 
and the respective reporting obligations within the 
two ex-ante tools that will be determined in the 
respective notification forms, which are annexed to the 
implementing regulation. The n otification thresholds are 
defined in Article  20 FSR for the purposes of 
investigations under the concentration ex-ante tool and 
in Article  28 FSR for the purposes of investigations under 
the public procurement ex-ante tool. Those thresholds 
are comprehens ive, and undertakings should consider all 
received financial contributions when checking whether 
they have reached them. The reporting obligations will 
be clarified in the notification forms, which will 
accompany the Implementing Regulation, and are 
planne d to be adopted and published prior to 
12 July 2023.  
 
On the question of the development of clear criteria, in 
accordance with Article  46 FSR, the Commission will 
publish, at the latest three years after entry into force, 
guidelines on certain concepts based on its experience 
with applying them. These include the criteria for 
determining a distortion, the balancing test, the criteria 
to request an ad -hoc notification and the assessment of 
a distortion in a public procurement procedure. In 
addition, in order to provide companies with more 
certainty early on, the Commission will clarify the 
concepts of a distortion – both generally and in pu blic 
procurement – as well as the balancing test at the latest 
one year after the start of application.  
 
Question 13  
Our industry is concerned that the current legislation 
does not specify the scope of the undertakings that WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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companies with reporting obligat ion have to consider. 
Hence, this leaves open the possibility for all companies 
within a corporate group to have benefitted from the 
"financial contribution from the government", causing 
excessive burden to an extensive portfolio of companies. 
Could the EU  narrow down and clarify the scope of the 
subsidiaries subject to the aforementioned reporting 
obligation?  
 
Reply:  
Article  1(2) FSR stipulates that the FSR applies to an 
undertaking, including a public undertaking which is 
directly or indirectly controlled  by the State, engaging in 
an economic activity in the EU internal market. The text 
further stipulates that an undertaking acquiring control 
of or merging with an undertaking established in the 
Union or an undertaking participating in a public 
procurement procedure in the Union is considered to be 
engaging in an economic activity in the internal market. 
For the purposes of determining which entities within a 
group would be considered as one undertaking, regard 
should be given to the general notion of undert aking as 
used in other EU competition instruments. In other 
words, all entities under a common source of control 
(which can be exercised jointly by several 
entities/persons) constitute one undertaking.  
 
Question 14  
Articles 6(3) and 7(3) of the draft imple menting 
regulation require undertakings to update their 
notification if there are "material changes in the facts" 
or the emergence of any "new relevant information". Is 
there any existing case or forecast guideline that 
specifically define "material change s" and "new relevant 
information"?  
Also, to ensure fair treatment among undertakings 
subject to investigations, could the EU Commission 
further clarify the criteria for requesting and granting 
pre-notification waiver requests under section E of the 
Concen tration Annex  and section F, and specify the time 
limit in Implementing Regulation(article 18)?  
 
Reply:  
The Commission is still in the process of finalising the 
Implementing Regulation and the accompanying 
notification forms and aims to adopt and publish t hose 
texts prior to the start of application of the FSR on 
12 July 2023.  
 
PART III: Other Questions  
 
Question 15  
 
What is the legislative schedule for the EU Batteries Regulation and for the delegated or implementing acts? 
Regarding the delegated or implementing acts, what is the specific plan for the process of gathering opinions 
from relevant industries?  
 
Reply:  
The Batteries Regulation will have to be formally adopted by the co -legislators before it can be published and 
enter into force. The regula tion itself (see EU agrees new law on more sustainable and circular batteries 
(europa.eu) ) includes legal deadlines for the Commission to adopt numerous implementing and delegated 
acts, as well as dates for entry into force of sustainability requirements for new batteries and other provisions 
related to end of life management of waste batteries. The Commission intends to meet all its legal d eadlines 
for the adoption of all the necessary legislation to complete the regulatory framework for batteries in the EU. 
The Commission will be consulting stakeholders (both EU and international) as part of the process of 
preparation of these implementing and delegated acts, in line with our better regulation policy.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Question 16  
According to Croatia's Aliens Act (Official Gazette 133/2020) Article  113*, there are certain requirements in 
terms of contingent employment of Croatian citizens and gross salary amounting to 1.5 times the average 
gross salary paid in the Republic of Croatia, in order for a foreign company to hire a third -country national. 
With regard to the requirements, there are concerns that they might create unnecessary barriers to fore ign 
investment. Could the EU elaborate on its relevant position?  
 
* (1)-2. at least three Croatian citizens are employed permanently and full -time in a company, branch 
office or representative office of a foreign company on jobs other than procurator, memb er of the 
management board or supervisory board, and their gross salary corresponds to at least the amount 
of an average gross salary paid in the Republic of Croatia in the previous year according to the official 
data published by the state administration authority competent for statistics . 
(1)-3. his gross salary corresponds to at least the amount of 1.5 average gross salary paid in the 
Republic of Croatia in the previous year according to the official data published by the state 
administration authority c ompetent for statistics.  
 
Reply:  
The cited Croatian law, "Aliens Act ", provides for a number of situations, where a work permit can be issued 
without applying the cited requirements in Article  113. This would include Croatia 's specific commitments in 
GATS  and in commitments on other international agreements.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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PARAGUAY  
1. Informe del Gobierno (WT/TPR/G/442)  
3.1.1 Reforma de la OMC  
b.  Funcion de negociacion  
i) Negociaciones multilaterales  
3.9. Si bien el éxito del Acuerdo sobre la Pesca ha insuflado algo de aliento en el sistema, hay m ás 
normas de la OMC que es necesario modernizar. La UE considera que la labor sobre las cuestiones 
relativas a la igualdad de condiciones, en particular sobre las subvenciones in dustriales, es 
fundamental para lograr que la OMC pueda responder a los desaf íos actuales. Habida cuenta de la 
creciente relevancia de la pol ítica industrial, es importante reforzar la funci ón de deliberaci ón en la 
OMC sobre la manera de abordar las di storsiones derivadas de una amplia gama de intervenciones 
estatales, incluidas las subvenciones y las actividades de las empresas de propiedad estatal. Aunque 
las intervenciones estatales pueden ser una herramienta apropiada para contribuir a la consecuci ón 
de objetivos p úblicos importantes, como la transici ón clim ática, deben dise ñarse de forma que eviten 
o minimicen los efectos indirectos negativos en los interlocutores comerciales.  
 
Question 1:  
Preguntas:  
a) ¿Qué contribuciones está dispuesta a re alizar la UE para asegurar la "igualdad de condiciones" 
en las subvenciones agrícolas, en atención a que la UE es el cuarto mayor proveedor de subsidios 
distorsionantes del comercio y la producción de productos agropecuarios, de conformidad con las 
notific aciones más recientes disponibles?  
 
Reply:  Reforming trade -distorting support remains crucial in terms of disciplines and transparency. 
This is also a part of the necessary integration of food security and sustainability aspects in the 
agricultural negotia tions. The EU has been steadily reforming its domestic agricultural support 
towards Green Box as of 1992 in full commitment to the WTO trade liberalisation goals. Currently 
over 85% of the EU's agricultural spending is administered as non -trade distortive Green Box 
support.  
 
Despite enlargement from EU15 to EU28 and doubling the number of farmers receiving support, 
total agriculture spending remained stable since 2000. Over the same period, total support as 
percentage of VoP (value of production) has decre ased continuously. In its commitment to reform 
and its practical implementation, the EU is the leader among the WTO Members, and few have 
followed its example.  
 
The EU has reformed substantially its policy and it is willing to contribute its share in reduc ing trade 
distortions in WTO, pending contributions of other major players, developed and developing alike.  
 
Building resilience of agriculture productions and policies should be the goal. The EU calls therefore 
for reforms of agricultural policies towards  less trade distortion, which is also friendlier for the 
environment and for the food security challenges.  
 
c. Función de vigilancia y deliberación  
3.17. Al mismo tiempo, hay un margen de mejora considerable en lo que respecta a la transparencia 
y al funcionamiento eficaz de los órganos de la OMC. En este contexto, la UE ha presentado una 
propuesta sobre la elaboración de directrices para los consejos y comités de la OMC en los que los 
Miembros plantean y abordan preocupaciones comer ciales5 y ha copatrocinado la propuesta sobre 
el cumplimiento de las prescripciones en materia de notificación en la esfera del comercio de 
mercancías.6 La UE sigue decidida a trabajar activamente con otros Miembros para mejorar la 
eficiencia y el funciona miento de los órganos de la OMC mediante el mantenimiento de debates en 
comités específicos, así como en el Consejo General.  
 
Question 2:  
Preguntas:  
a) En atención al reconocimiento de la UE que existe un margen considerable en lo que respecta 
a la transp arencia, ¿qué medidas se encuentra implementando la UE para poder contribuir con sus 
obligaciones bajo el documento G/AG/2 de presentar sus notificaciones en materia de Agricultura 
dentro del plazo de 90 días de la finalización del calendario para la prese ntación parcial de sus 
ayudas internas? Recordamos que, en la actualidad, la UE lleva un atraso desde 2020 para la 
presentación de sus notificaciones en materia de subsidios agrícolas.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 b) Con relación al documento circulado por la UE bajo sigla WT/GC/W/77 7/Re.6, la UE propone, 
entre otros, que "si un Miembro recibe preguntas escritas sobre una preocupación comercial, 
normalmente deberá responder por escrito en un plazo de 60 días naturales contados desde la 
distribución de las preguntas escritas", ¿qué mec anismo se encuentra implementando la UE para 
poder dar respuestas completas a las preguntas presentadas por distintos miembros por escrito en 
el marco de los Comités Regulares y que tras varias reuniones de los Comités no reciben respuestas? 
Por ejemplo, e l documento G/GEN/SPS/2076 circulado por el Paraguay y otros miembros el 
2 de noviembre de 2022 que sigue aguardando respuesta 7 meses después.  
 
Reply:  
a) The EU is aware of its obligations under document G/AG/2 to submit its notifications on agriculture 
within 90 days of the end of the timetable for partial submission of its internal support. The EU DS:1 
notification for 2019/2020 marketing year, in WTO terminology is called 2019 but it covers the 
budget year that ends on 31/12 -2020.  
 
b) The l ast four EU DS:1 notifications have been submitted with a deadline of maximum 16 months 
after the end of the budget year. As the EU has explained in several Regular Committees on 
Agriculture during the last two years, this will be changed with the new comm on agricultural policy 
(CAP) – reform in force since 1  January  2023. The EU will change its internal reporting methods, 
and from DS:1 notification covering budget year 2023, i.e. 2022/23 marketing year, the EU intends 
to be able to submit the DS:1 notifica tion within 12 months after the end of the budget year. The 
EU encourages all other members to look into their way of collecting data and see whether they can 
reduce the period for submitting their DS:1 notifications.  
 
The EU TBT Enquiry Point registers a ll comments received by email on EU notifications and 
dispatches them to services responsible for the draft measure. The EU TBT Enquiry Point strives to 
provide the answers within the 60 days' period.  
 
3.18. Aparte de la labor relativa a la mejora del fun cionamiento práctico de los órganos de la OMC, 
la UE estima que es necesario un debate de políticas más significativo en torno a los problemas 
apremiantes más importantes en materia de política comercial para contribuir a lograr la 
convergencia. Por citar unas pocas esferas: el nexo entre el comercio y el clima; abordar las 
intervenciones estatales causantes de distorsión; y buscar nuevas formas de apoyar a los países en 
desarrollo que se enfrentan a dificultades para integrarse en el sistema mundial de com ercio y en 
las cadenas de valor mundiales.  
 
Question 3:  
Preguntas:  
a) Más allá del debate que se pueda dar, ¿qué mecanismos propone la UE para que el resultado 
de los debates pueda ser tenido en cuenta? ¿Cómo es esto compatible con las medidas unilaterale s 
con implicancia comercial que aplica la UE?  
 
Reply:  In its Communication entitled Trade Policy Review – An Open, Sustainable and Assertive 
Trade Policy the European Commission outlined its strategic priorities for the coming years. This 
strategy builds o n the EU's openness to contribute to the economic recovery through support for the 
green and digital transformations. It also outlines a renewed focus on strengthening multilateralism 
and reforming global trade rules to ensure that they are fair and sustai nable and that they address 
the most pressing issues of our times such as, for example, the nexus between trade and climate 
change. This is why the EU takes an active part in the debate that takes place on these themes at 
the WTO. In addition, the TPR Comm unication also announces that where necessary, the EU will 
take a more assertive stance in defending its interests and values, including through new tools. The 
work done at the multilateral level should however not be seen as being in opposition with the 
autonomous measures that the EU is taking in full conformity with its international obligations, 
notably at the WTO. The two avenues should rather be seen as complementary tools to reach the 
EU's strategic objectives set out in the TPR Communication.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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3.1.2  Respuesta de la OMC a los desafíos mundiales  
a. Comercio y salud  
3.21. En el informe del Gobierno, se expresa que en la CM12, los Miembros de la OMC convinieron 
también en una Decisión Ministerial relativa al Acuerdo sobre los Aspectos de los Derechos de  
Propiedad Intelectual relacionados con el Comercio (ADPIC) de la OMC que contiene una serie de 
aclaraciones y prevé una exención de determinadas obligaciones establecidas en el Acuerdo sobre 
los ADPIC a fin de permitir que los Miembros de la OMC que cumpl an determinadas condiciones 
autoricen a una empresa a producir y exportar vacunas contra la COVID -19 de manera rápida y 
simplificada sin el consentimiento del titular de la patente. La UE ha seguido participando en este 
importante y difícil debate y ha des empeñado un papel decisivo en el logro de este resultado.  
 
Question 4:  
Preguntas:  
a) ¿Podría la UE explicar en más detalle el impacto de la implementación de la exención para 
producir y exportar vacunas contra la COVID -19, y si pudiera facilitar información con respecto al 
número de licencias autorizadas bajo este esquema a la fecha?  
b) ¿Podría indicar la UE cuantas de las referidas autorizaciones se han concretado con empresas 
de la región América Latina, y si existen mecanismos de cooperación en  marcha para la región?  
 
Reply:  
a) During the period of application of the export authorisation system of Covid -19 vaccines 
(30 January to 31  December  2021), the EU has authorised exports for 3,477 requests, for a total of 
over 1.2  billion  of finished dos es of vaccines. These authorisations were only applied to high income 
countries and upper -middle income countries. The exports of COVID -19 vaccines to low -middle 
income countries and least developed countries were exempted from authorisation procedures. In  
addition, the EU kept in place humanitarian exemptions. These covered countries in the COVAX AMC 
list, goods purchased through COVAX, UNICEF an PAHO with COAX participating countries. Donations 
and sale under Advanced Purchase Agreements by EU MS were als o exempted.  
 
b) Authorisations (excluding exempted countries) covered 61 countries for over 1.2  billion  doses and 
drug-substances to make 1  billion  doses. Most received number of doses outnumbering total 
population.  
 
b. Agricultura y seguridad alimentaria  
3.24. La UE sigue participando plenamente en los debates sobre la aplicación de la Declaración 
Ministerial de la CM12. En este contexto, la transparencia es una de las cuestiones prioritarias, 
incluida su función en la solución de los problemas de segurid ad alimentaria, por ejemplo en relación 
con las restricciones a la exportación, que pueden perjudicar a los países importadores de productos 
alimenticios. Es necesario seguir trabajando en la mejora de la transparencia en todos los ámbitos 
de la agricultur a. La UE seguirá promoviendo también las reformas de la ayuda interna causante de 
distorsión del comercio, que puede afectar negativamente a la seguridad alimentaria. Se necesita 
un nuevo enfoque en las negociaciones sobre la agricultura después de la CM12 : que integre las 
cuestiones de la seguridad alimentaria, el medio ambiente, el clima, la pobreza y la producción 
sostenible.  
 
Question 5:  
Preguntas:  
a) A pesar de la afirmación de que la UE "seguirá promoviendo" las reformas de ayuda interna 
causante de distorsión del comercio, la UE no ha tenido propuestas sobre reformas de la ayuda 
interna causante de distorsión del comercio desde la Conferencia Ministerial de Buenos Aires en 
diciembre de 2017, ¿qué iniciativas o ideas concretas promoverá la UE para reformar este tipo de 
ayuda?  
b) ¿Cómo  pretende la UE promover un nuevo enfoque de las negociaciones sobre la agricultura de 
manera consistente con el mandato del Art.  20 y con el párrafo 3 del Considerando del Acuerdo 
sobre Agricultura?  
 
Reply:  The EU does  not see the link of the question from Paraguay with the subject and related 
period of the current Trade Policy Review exercise. The EU will be happy to discuss agriculture reform 
negotiating issues with Paraguay within the appropriate forum – Committee on  Agriculture in Special 
Session (CoA SS). In this context, the EU, unquestionable leader in reforming its agricultural 
spending towards non trade -distortive support, looks forward to join forces with Paraguay to WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 convince the rest of the Membership into fol lowing through and appropriately reform their trade 
distortive policies.  
 
c. Comercio y medio ambiente y clima  
3.26. En el marco de los Debates Estructurados sobre el Comercio y la Sostenibilidad Ambiental se 
puede contribuir examinando cómo pueden diseñar se las medidas y políticas climáticas relacionadas 
con el comercio para que maximicen el impacto ambiental y climático y limiten al mismo tiempo las 
repercusiones en el comercio; estudiando enfoques para facilitar el acceso a los bienes y servicios 
ambient ales; identificando medidas de política comercial que puedan favorecer la transición a una 
economía circular que haga un uso eficiente de los recursos; y estudiando la forma de aumentar la 
transparencia de las subvenciones y de intercambiar mejores práctic as en la creación de 
subvenciones favorables para el medio ambiente de conformidad con las normas pertinentes de 
la OMC.  
 
Question 6:  
Preguntas:  
a) Considerando que a UE coincide en que la OMC debe ayudar a responder a los desafíos 
urgentes de cambio cli mático y la sostenibilidad ambiental, ¿puede la UE explicar por qué su foco al 
discutir subsidios en el marco de los Debates Estructurados sobre el Comercio y la Sostenibilidad 
Ambiental es es transparencia y diseño de subvenciones favorables y no en reduc ción de subsivios 
dañinos? En especial considerando compromisos en la materia en otros foros como el Marco mundial 
Kunming -Montreal de la diversidad biológica.  
 
Reply:  The EU engages actively in the work of the TESSD including 'discussions on the 
environme ntal effects and trade impacts of relevant subsidies and the role of the WTO in addressing 
these' as set out in paragraph 6 of the 2021 TESSD Ministerial Statement. A necessary first step is 
to identify the relevant subsidies, and for that purpose increase d transparency and better 
information regarding subsidies and support measures is needed. The appropriate design of 
subsidies is a key element in achieving policy objectives such as environmental sustainability while 
minimising negative trade spill -over ef fects. The EU is committed to the Kunming -Montreal Global 
Biodiversity Framework including Target 18 regarding subsidies harmful for biodiversity. In the 
TESSD the EU had presented its ongoing internal work on identifying and eliminating environmentally 
harmful subsidies, and it is committed to take forward this important work.  
 
5. Sostenibilidad  
5.1 Medidas de la UE para combatir el cambio climático y proteger el medio ambiente.  
5.4. La UE es consciente de que si desea hacer frente a problemas mundiales como la lucha contra 
el cambio clim ático, la p érdida de biodiversidad, la contaminaci ón o la promoci ón de una producci ón 
y un consumo m ás sostenibles, es necesario aumentar l a cooperaci ón con terceros pa íses. En los 
casos en que las pol íticas del Pacto Verde Europeo tienen una dimensi ón externa, la UE mantiene 
conversaciones con sus interlocutores. La UE se asegura de que su asistencia externa promueva 
activamente una actu ación eficaz y ambiciosa en lo que respecta al clima y el medio ambiente y la 
integraci ón de ambos aspectos en otras esferas. Sus pol íticas clim áticas y ambientales se elaboran 
de conformidad con las normas de la OMC y la transparencia es total en lo q ue respecta a las medidas 
climáticas y ambientales de la UE a sus interlocutores comerciales a nivel bilateral, por ejemplo en 
el contexto de los acuerdos comerciales, as í como en la OMC. La UE ha hecho numerosas 
exposiciones sobre las pol íticas que pue den repercutir en el comercio en el Comit é de Comercio y 
Medio Ambiente de la OMC y en otros comit és, y seguir á haciéndolo en el futuro. El objetivo es 
colaborar desde una etapa temprana con nuestros interlocutores para comprender sus posibles 
preocupa ciones y ver c ómo tenerlas en cuenta al formular las pol íticas, as í como para evitar posibles 
repercusiones o efectos desfavorables para el comercio internacional de mercanc ías afectadas por 
la legislaci ón de la UE, haciendo al mismo tiempo que se com prendan mejor las normas que se 
aplican en el mercado de la UE. La UE se propone proseguir el di álogo y la cooperaci ón en relaci ón 
con la aplicaci ón de los instrumentos de sostenibilidad aut ónomos de la UE.  
 
Question 7:  
Preguntas:  
a) La UE menciona como objetivo colaborar desde una etapa temprana con los interlocutores así 
como las presentaciones realizadas en el Comité de Comercio y Medio Ambiente de la OMC. ¿Podría 
la UE aclarar cómo son tenidos en cuenta los comentarios de los miembros tanto para las medidas 
"presentadas en el CCMA" como las notificadas de acuerdo a los compromisos en materia de Medidas 
Sanitarias y Fitosanitarias como de Obstáculos Técnicos al Comercio. En especial considerando el WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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poco tiempo entre el fin de periodo de consultas y  la toma de decisiones de la UE sin modificaciones 
a pesar de recibir varios comentarios.  
 
Reply:  It is important to note that the EU has been a role model for transparency of its 
European  Green Deal measures through public consultations, impact assessment s and outreach 
from an early regulatory processes in different fora in the EU and outside (in Brussels, through the 
EU delegations in partner countries, in the WTO in Geneva and via bilateral dialogues). The EU has 
engaged in the WTO and bilaterally with i ts partner countries and tried to address their concerns as 
far as they allowed maintaining objectives pursued by its policies.  
 
Through this engagement the EU has been listening to the trading partners since the start of its 
legislative process, includin g during public consultations, impact assessment stage etc. The 
legislative proposals that received the most significant interest are CBAM and Deforestation. The EU 
has addressed the concerns of the trading partners at different stages of the legislative p rocess (as 
far as possible while maintaining the objectives pursued). For example, given the need to adapt to 
the legislation by our trading partners, both proposals include transitional periods of up to two years. 
In addition, to avoid slowing down import  processes, the EU has set up a yearly compliance cycle 
for CBAM, rather than at the border,  instead of checks at the border every time goods are entering 
the EU market . One more example is a 'cut -off date' of 31  December  2020 for deforestation or forest 
degradation, foreseen in the Deforestation Regulation, ensuring that it is forward -looking legislation, 
minimising disruption for smallholders, and facilitating implementation via satellite images.  
 
The EU will continue dialogue and engagement with its tra ding partners including for the measures 
that entered into force and ensuing implementing acts and decisions, in the WTO and bilaterally. We 
want to ensure that our trading partners understand our regulations and are able to comply with the 
requirements.  
 
5.1.1. Panorama general de las medidas para combatir el cambio climático y proteger el 
medio ambiente  
5.7. El Mecanismo de Ajuste en Frontera por Carbono (MAFC) es una medida clim ática destinada a 
reducir las emisiones mundiales de gases de efecto invern adero evitando el riesgo de fuga de 
carbono y apoyando una mayor ambici ón en la mitigaci ón del cambio clim ático, todo ello respetando 
las normas de la OMC. El MAFC igualar á el precio del carbono de los productos nacionales y el de los 
importados y har á que los objetivos clim áticos de la UE no se vean contrarrestados por el traslado 
de la producci ón a pa íses con pol íticas menos ambiciosas.  
 
Question 8:  
Preguntas:  
a) ¿Cómo son tenidos en cuentas principios del derecho internacional ambiental como e l de 
Responsabilidades Comúnes pero Diferenciadas y Capacidades respectivas en este tipo de medidas? 
En especial cuando se apliquen a miembros en desarrollo o menos adelantados con mínimas 
emisiones históricas.  
b) ¿Cómo tiene en cuenta este mecanismo otras  políticas de mitigación nacionales distintos a la 
tarificación de carbono?  
c) ¿Tiene prevista la UE un mecanismo de acceso a mercados preferencial para productos con 
huellas de carbono menores a los de la UE?  
d) ¿Cómo y cuándo planea la UE notificar esta medida a la OMC? ¿Brindará suficente tiempo para 
que los miembros realicen comentarios? ¿Cómo son tenidos en cuenta estos comentarios en el 
proceso de toma de decisiones de la UE?  
 
Reply:  
(a) The CBAM  respects the EU's international commitments. The Paris Agreement requires each of 
its Parties to reduce its emissions in a way that reflects its highest possible ambition, reflecting its 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabiliti es, in the light of different 
national circumstances. The EU has respected its obligation to take the lead in reducing emissions. 
To continue to take the lead the EU needs to make sure that its ambitious efforts to reduce emissions 
within the EU are not un dermined by carbon leakage.  
 
Besides, the EU has carefully assessed the potential impact of the CBAM and given careful 
consideration, in particular to LDCs. Our studies show that exports from LDCs to the EU in the sectors 
covered by the CBAM are limited. The design of the CBAM is therefore considered to be taking 
potential concerns on board, for example through a generous transitional period. This comes in WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 addition to significant financial support package and capacity building programmes assisting 
developi ng countries in their green transition.  
 
The European Commission, in conjunction with the European External Action Service and EU 
Delegations around the world, will launch an information campaign, featuring online seminars, 
physical events, distribution o f guidance documents, and direct assistance, aimed at assisting 
third country operators and importers to the EU in performing all new obligations required by the 
CBAM regulation and its secondary legislation. The campaign will start mid 2023 upon the appro val 
of the implementing act concerning the reporting rules applicable in the transitional period. This will 
continue through autumn 2023 thus supporting all relevant actors for the entry into force of the 
regulation in October 2023.  
 
(b) The CBAM will take  into account the actual emissions of individual producers in the production 
of CBAM goods imported into the EU. If a country puts in place effective climate measures –including 
non-carbon pricing measures - these will lead to a lower carbon content of the i mported products, 
and thus to a lower border adjustment or no adjustment at all. The CBAM will not be applied on top 
of carbon prices charged in third countries, if a carbon price (either in the form of an emissions 
trading system or carbon taxes) is effec tively paid abroad and not rebated on export. If importers 
can prove, based on information from their third country producers, that a carbon price has already 
been paid in the country of production of the imported goods and that no compensation or rebate 
applies on export, the corresponding amount can be deducted from their final bill. If the price paid 
is equivalent to the EU carbon price under the EU ETS, the border adjustment would be zero.  
 
(c) The CBAM applies on actual carbon content in goods in certa in sectors, it is not targeting specific 
countries.  
 
The CBAM is designed to take full account of the actual emissions embedded in imported goods. In 
the transition phase from 2026 to 2034, the CBAM will apply to the difference between the actual 
emission s of the imported goods minus the emissions covered by free ETS allowances that apply for 
the same goods produced in the EU. This will ensure an equal treatment for EU - and imported goods. 
Hence by design, no CBAM certificates will have to surrendered for products with lower carbon 
footprints than those in the EU as set by the relevant emissions benchmark under the ETS, and 
taking into account the gradual phase -out of free ETS allowances.  
 
We have built -in a transitional period in CBAM, which will give tra ding partners, including developing 
countries, time to prepare. To take into account their specific needs, the EU will continue to support 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in targeted ways, such as through technology transfer, technical 
and financial assis tance, with the objective of developing industrial production structures that are 
compatible with long -term global climate objectives.  
 
(d) The EU has informed WTO Members through the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment 
recently following the publicatio n of the Regulation 2023/956 establishing a carbon border 
adjustment mechanism: EUR-Lex - 32023R0956 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu) . The EU will continue 
to inform the Committee on Trade and Environment, in line with the principle of transparency, the 
various stages of EU legislative process.  
 
5.12. El 6 de diciembre de 2022, el Parlamento Europeo y el Consejo llegaron a un acuerdo pol ítico 
provisional sobre un Reglamento de la UE sobre la deforestaci ón, que allan ó el camino para la 
adopci ón definitiva del Reglamento a principios de 2023. Su objetivo es frenar la deforestaci ón y la 
degradaci ón forestal impulsadas por la UE. Al promover el  consumo de productos "libres de 
deforestaci ón" y reducir los efectos de la UE en la deforestaci ón y la degradaci ón forestal a nivel 
mundial, el nuevo Reglamento reducir á las emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero y la p érdida 
de biodiversidad a niv el mundial y har á que el consumo se minimice, con lo que disminuir á el 
comercio de productos procedentes de cadenas de suministro vinculadas a la deforestaci ón o la 
degradaci ón forestal, aumentando al mismo tiempo el comercio de productos sostenibles. La 
propuesta forma parte de un plan m ás amplio de medidas para luchar contra la deforestaci ón y la 
degradaci ón forestal, expuesto por primera vez en la Comunicaci ón de la Comisi ón de 2019 titulada 
"Intensificar la actuaci ón de la UE para proteger y r estaurar los bosques del mundo".  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 477 - 
 
Question 9:  
Preguntas:  
a) ¿Cómo tiene en cuenta la UE las dimensiones social y económica del desarrollo en esta 
medida?  
b) ¿Cómo puede ser considerada consistente con los compromisos de no discriminación teniendo 
en cuenta la elección de commodities?  
c) ¿Cómo es compatible el reglamento europeo con las legislaciones nacionales y las 
contribuciones nacionalmente determinadas?  
 
Reply:  The European Commission has designed this Regulation with the goal of halting deforestation 
and forest degradation but also to ensure social and economic development, including indigenous 
peoples and local communities who depend heavily on forest ec osystems. Given the cut -off date of 
31 December  2020, the vast majority of current agricultural production will be considered 
deforestation -free under the Regulation. Moreover, the requirements of the Regulation are aligned 
with the best practices already existing in the market. The EU is also supporting its partner countries 
through development cooperation to ensure their supply chains are deforestation -free and is 
stepping up its support. Support will depend on the specific situation, and will aim at the promotion 
of protection, restoration and sustainable use of forests but also of sustainable agriculture, supply 
chain transparency and other relevant areas. The fact that the Regulation includes a specific article 
on cooperation confirms how central close cooperation with partner countries is for the EU.  
 
The Regulation is an autonomous measure taken by the EU to protect the environment, developed 
in compliance with the EU's international commitments, including trade agreements, and 
WTO requirements.  With this Regulation, the EU takes its responsibility as one of the main consumer 
markets. One of the aims of the Regulation is to minimise global deforestation and forest degradation 
driven by the EU consumption. Therefore, the Regulation covers the commoditie s for which 
European  Union  consumption is the most relevant in terms of driving global deforestation and forest 
degradation. An extensive review of scientific literature, namely of primary sources estimating the 
impact of EU consumption on global deforesta tion and linking that footprint to specific commodities, 
was carried out as a part of the study supporting the Impact Assessment and cross -checked via 
extensive consultation with stakeholders. This Regulation is in line with the objectives of the 
Paris Agreement on Climate Change. Combatting deforestation and forest -degradation is indeed an 
integral part of the work to reduce GHG emissions, enhance carbon sinks, and protect nature.  
 
National legislation aiming at halting deforestation and strengthening tra ceability and sustainability 
of commodity production in partner countries has a key role in the implementation of the Regulation. 
The more robust national legislation becomes, the easier it will be for operators in the EU to prove 
that commodities they are  importing are compliant with the Deforestation Regulation.  
 
5.1.2 Sistemas alimentarios sostenibles  
5.18. El proyecto de Reglamento sobre la reducción de los límites máximos de residuos (LMR) de las 
dos sustancias neonicotinoides Clotiadinia y Tiametoxam  es el primer reglamento que aplica la 
Estrategia "de la granja a la mesa"36 a los alimentos importados en lo que respecta a los residuos 
de plaguicidas. Los aspectos ambientales en los que se centra este Reglamento se refieren a la 
protección de los polin izadores. Se trata de una cuestión de interés mundial, que va más allá de las 
fronteras nacionales y no puede resolverse únicamente mediante medidas en el nivel de la UE. El 
proyecto de Reglamento reduce los límites máximos de residuos (LMR) de las dos sus tancias 
neonicotinoides Clotiadinia y Tiametoxam, de las que se sabe que contribuyen significativamente a 
la disminución de las poblaciones polinizadoras por sus propiedades intrínsecas, que provocan 
efectos desfavorables para los polinizadores con indepen dencia de la zona geográfica en la que se 
utilicen.37,38 El Regla mento incluye disposiciones de facilitación del comercio, que consisten 
principalmente en aplazar la fecha de aplicación del reglamento a 36 meses después de la entrada 
en vigor (en lugar de 6 meses, que es el período habitual previsto en las normas de la OMC) y 
permitir que los productos comercializados antes de la fecha de aplicación permanezcan en el 
mercado hasta el final de su tiempo de conservación.  
 
Question 10:  
Preguntas:  
a) ¿Podría la UE identificar el estudio científico que identifica a estas sustancias como causantes 
de la disminución de los polinizadores?  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 478 - 
 
  
 b) ¿Podría la UE aclarar como esta medida tiene en cuenta el principio de no discriminación 
teniendo en cuenta las auto rizaciones de emergencia de las que se benefician los productores 
europeos?  
c) ¿Podría la UE aclarar como las autorizaciones de emergencia otorgadas por sus miembros es 
consistente con el objetivo perseguido por la medida?  
d) ¿Podría la UE aclarar cómo son  tenidas en cuenta las caracteristicas particulares en terceros 
mercados en el análisis, así como las buenas prácticas agrícolas destinadas destinadas a minimizar 
el riesgo de exposición y con este el riesgo para los polinizadores?  
e) ¿Podría la UE indicar  cual es el riesgo para los polinizadores en el uso en ambientes controlados 
como invernaderos de estas sustancias?  
f) Dado el escaso tiempo transcurrido entre el final del plazo para presentar comentarios y la 
aprobación sin modificaciones en la instancia  técnica de la UE y la remisión de respuestas a los 
miembros que presentaron comentarios meses después, ¿podría la UE aclarar cómo son tenidos en 
cuenta los comentarios recibidos?  
 
Reply:  a) According to the Intergovernmental Science -Policy Platform on Bio diversity and Ecosystem 
Services (IPBES)[1], a clear consensus exists regarding the fact that both wild and managed bees 
are exposed to pesticides (mainly through nectar and pollen, in the case of the neonicotinoids), and 
that the range of sub -lethal effects is quite broad. There is signific ant evidence and rather broad 
agreement on the highly negative impacts of sub -lethal effects. The IPBES report highlighted that in 
the areas where sufficient data are available (North West Europe and North America) the decline of 
wild pollinators is eviden t. Even though no specific studies for Africa and Asia exist, this does not 
indicate that the problem observed in the regions for which data are available is not affecting those 
regions. Perfect knowledge is not a precondition to act on the protection of t he environment.  
 
[1]  IPBES  (2016). The assessment report of the Intergovernmental Science -Policy Platform on 
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services on pollinators, pollination and food production. S.G. Potts, 
V. L. Imperatriz -Fonseca, and H. T. Ngo (eds). Secretariat of the Intergover nmental Science -Policy 
Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, Bonn, Germany. 552 pages. 
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3402856 . 
 
Reply:  b) and c) Please note  that given the judgment by the European Court of Justice of 
19 January  2023 in Case C -162/21[1], Member States cannot grant any further emergency 
authorisations for products containing restricted neonicotinoids.  
 
[1]  https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62021CJ0162 . 
 
Reply:  d) In the situation when the use of clothianidin/thiamethoxam leads to measurable levels of 
residues, non -EU countries might consider submitting an application for an import tolerance for the 
specific crop and under the specific conditions of use. The eva luation of the import tolerance would 
follow the same criteria in relation to those environmental issues that are considered of global 
concern as those used for the placing of plant protection products on the EU market set out in 
Regulation (EC) No 1107/20 09. If the risk assessment concludes that there is not an unacceptable 
risk for bees, the import tolerance could be granted.  
 
Reply:  e) The European Food Safety Authority's (EFSA) peer review of the pesticide risk assessment 
of clothianidin[1] and thiamethoxam[2] on bees concluded that there is no Good Agricultural Practice 
(GAP) for outdoor uses on the examined crops that would not pose an unacceptable risk to bees. 
For indoor uses a case -by-case assessment is necessary. Non -EU countries might consider 
submitting an application for an import tolerance for the specific crop and  under the specific 
conditions of use, as explained in the answer to point d).  
 
[1]  European Food Safety Authority; Peer review of the pesticide risk assessment for bees for the active 
substance clothianidin considering the uses as seed treatments and granules. EFSA 
Journal  2018;16(2):5177.  
[2]  European Fo od Safety Authority; Peer review of the pesticide risk assessment for bees for the active 
substance thiamethoxam considering the uses as seed treatments and granules. EFSA 
Journal  2018;16(2):5179.  
 
Reply:  f) The EU has carefully studied the comments receiv ed concerning notification 
G/TBT/N/EU/908. Those comments were also shared with the EU Member States in preparation of 
the meeting of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed – 
Section  Phytopharmaceuticals, Pesticide Residues (SC PAFF), hel d on 26 -27 September  2022[1].  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 479 - 
 
[1]  The Agenda and Summary Report of th e Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed 
Section  Phytopharmaceuticals – Pesticide Residues 26 – 27 September  2022 is available in 
https://food.ec.europa.eu/horizontal -topics/committees/paff -committees/phytopharmaceuticals_en  
with the Comitolog y register code Pesticide Residues – C20401 . 
 
9. EFECTOS EXTERNOS DE LAS POLÍTICAS INTERNAS DE LA UE  
9.1 Servicios digitales y plataformas en línea  
Según el informe de la secretaria, el Reglamento relativo a un mercado único de servicios digitales 
(Reglam ento de Servicios Digitales) se refiere a los intermediarios y plataformas en línea, como los 
mercados en línea, las redes sociales, las plataformas de intercambio de contenidos, las tiendas de 
aplicaciones y las plataformas de viajes y alojamiento en líne a. Creará un espacio digital más seguro 
en el que estarán protegidos los derechos fundamentales de todos los usuarios de los servicios 
digitales. Junto con el Reglamento de Mercados Digitales, su objetivo es proteger a los ciudadanos 
y sus derechos fundame ntales en línea.  
Question 11:  
Pregunta:  
a) ¿Podría la UE indicar si la protección de los derechos fundamentales estaría restringida a los 
ciudadanos de la UE o si está protección a "todos los usuarios de los servicios digitales" seria de 
carácter trasfro nterizo, aplicable a cualquier plataforma de servicios digitales establecido en la UE?  
 
Reply:  The Digital Services Act (DSA) and the Digital Market Act (DMA) form a single set of rules 
that apply across the whole EU. They have two main goals:  
 
· to create a safer digital space in which the fundamental rights of all users of digital services 
are protected;  
 
· to establish a level playing field to foster innovation, growth, and competitiveness, both in the 
European Single Market and globally.  
 
The Digital Services Act significantly improves the mechanisms for the removal of illegal content  and 
for the effective protection of users' fundamental rights online, including the freedom of speech. The 
aim of the Digital Services Act is to harmonise conditi ons for the provision of intermediary services 
across the internal market, while allowing consumers and other recipients of the services to have 
increased choice. Business users, consumers and other users are considered to be 'recipients of the 
service' fo r the purpose of the regulation.  
 
The DSA (and the DMA) respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised by 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European  Union , to the benefit of users or recipients of 
digital intermediary servic es established or located in the European  Union  (irrespective of their 
nationality), without having regard to where the providers of those intermediary services have their 
place of establishment.  
 
The DSA and DMA are a first -of-a-kind regulatory toolbox g lobally and set an international 
benchmark for a regulatory approach to digital services. The EU is hopeful that the principles 
established in those regulations will resonate globally in order to achieve the highest level of 
protection of fundamental right s. In that regard, it is worthy to underline that the approach taken 
by the EU is reflected in the draft global UNESCO guidelines for regulating digital platforms. This 
approach involves optimizing all fundamental rights online, including through strict in dependence 
requirements for public authorities, risk assessments for systemic risks and a ban on general 
monitoring obligations for platforms.  
 
2. Informe de la Secretaria (WT/TPR/S/442)  
Grafico 6.1 – importaciones  
Question 12:  
Preguntas:  
a) ¿A qué se deb ió la reducción de las importaciones de productos alimenticios del 2.5% del total de 
las importaciones en 2018, al 2.3% del total de las importaciones en 2021?  
 
Reply:  Extra -EU import of prepared food, beverages and tobacco (SITC 0+1) increased 
between  2018 and 2021 in nominal terms. It was the fast -growing import of other goods (for 
example machinery, chemicals, transport equipment) that made the share of food products slightly 
lower in  2021.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 480 - 
 
  
 Parrafo 3.42  
Question 13:  
Preguntas:  
a) En atención a que los aranceles del sector agropecuario continúan siendo tres veces superiores a 
los de los productos no agropecuarios, y el significativo número de líneas arancelarias sujetas a 
derechos no ad Valorem , ¿Podría la UE explicar que contrib uciones está dispuesta a realizar en las 
negociaciones de acceso a los mercados en Agricultura para dar cumplimiento al mandato del Art.  20 
del Acuerdo?  
 
b) ¿Podría la UE explicar la necesidad de continuar un régimen complejo de aranceles únicamente 
para l os productos agropecuarios y las dificultades que enfrenta para la implementación de un 
régimen únicamente de aranceles ad Valorem ? 
 
Reply:  
(a) The multilateral trade negotiations in general, not only on market access, have been at an 
impasse for several years now. The EU is working towards reinvigorating the negotiating function of 
the WTO, together with its monitoring and dispute settlement functions, as part of efforts to reform 
the organization.  
 
(b) The EU's import regime for agricultural products is transparent and predictable and is set out in 
the EU's WTO schedule. These tariffs were negotiated and agreed with the membership during the 
Uruguay Round. Therefore, any changes would only occur as the result of comprehensive market 
access neg otiations.  
 
Párrafo 3.49  
Question 14:  
Pregunta  
a) ¿Podría la UE indicar cuando planea modificar su listado de compromisos para reflejar la exclusión 
del Reino Unido del acceso a los contingentes arancelarios? Hasta la fecha, la UE solo lo ha realizado 
por notificación MA:1, indicando los arreglos alcanzado s con el Reino Unido pero sin certeza jurídica 
a los efectos de la OMC.  
 
Reply:  The EU is still negotiating in the framework of Article  XXVIII of GATT  1994 with 
WTO Members following the withdrawal of UK from the EU. As soon as these negotiations are 
concluded the EU will submit to WTO the adjusted commitments for certification.  
 
Párrafo 3.50  
Question 15:  
a) En atención a que la tasa media global de utilización de 39% de los contingentes arancelarios, 
¿qué medidas se encuentra implementando o considerand o implementar la UE para modificar la 
administración de los contingentes subutilizados, en línea con la Decisión de Bali sobre contingentes 
arancelarios?  
 
Reply:  The EU legislation on TRQs management is fully in line with the provisions of the Bali 
Ministe rial Decision on TRQ management. The EU notes that many TRQs managed on a "first -come, 
first-served" basis have low fill rates. After successive reforms of its agricultural policy, prices of EU 
agricultural products are aligned with global market prices, m aking them internationally competitive. 
As a result, a number of TRQs have become less economically interesting. Finally, according to the 
provisions of the Bali Decision, it is up to third countries to decide on the usefulness to activate the 
Bali underfi ll mechanism.  
 
3.3.1.1. Subvenciones a nivel de la UE  
Question 16:  
Preguntas:  
a) El informe de la Secretaria reconoce que a nivel de la UE la mayor parte de las subvenciones 
se conceden a la agricultura, en atención al mandato de reducir progresiva y sust ancialmente los 
subsidios agrícolas, y que estos generan una competitividad artificial que conlleva a una 
sobreutilización y sobreexplotación de recursos naturales, ¿Qué reformas se encuentra 
implementando la UE para reducir la dependencia de sus agriculto res en lo que respecta a los 
casi 100 mil millones de dólares otorgados al sector?  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 481 - 
 
Reply:  As mentioned in reply to question 1a, the EU has been steadily reforming its domestic 
agricultural support towards the non -distortive aid under Annex  2 of the Agreem ent on Agriculture 
(Green Box) as of 1992, in line with WTO agricultural reform  goals. Currently over 85% of the EU's 
agricultural spending is administered as non -trade distortive Green Box support. Despite 
enlargement from EU15 to EU28 and doubling the number of farmers receiving support, total 
agriculture spending remained stable s ince 2000. Over the same period, total support as percentage 
of VoP (value of production has decreased continuously.  
 
The CAP is a key tool in unlocking agriculture's potential to fight climate change. An estimated total 
of €104bn (or 25%) of CAP funding for the 2014 -20 period went towards actions relevant for the 
climate, such as:  
 
• reducing greenhouse gas emissions by encouraging improved livestock management and 
breeding, as well as investing in manure storage and treatment;  
• increasing carbon sequest ration and storage through measures and investments in areas 
such as soil protection and forest restoration; and  
• helping farmers adapt to the challenges brought by climate change through investments and 
advice on new methods and technology.  
 
Through these measures, agricultural emissions declined by 21% between 1990 and 2017, without 
reducing production levels.  
 
The common agriculture policy (CAP) 2023 -27 entered into force on 1  January  2023. It takes further 
steps towards achieving a green a nd sustainable system of agriculture in the EU. It includes a more 
simplified, flexible, and targeted approach; strengthened environmental conditions and standards to 
be met by farmers; an expanded set of voluntary environmental actions available to farmer s, 
through eco -schemes and rural development policy. In the new programming period, the EU is 
further stepping up its environmental ambition, and strives to shape the agricultural sector in a way 
that not only ensures EU's food security, but also is enviro nmentally sustainable. The common 
agricultural policy places good environmental practice at the heart of agriculture and forestry in the 
EU, ensuring that the protection of the planet and the production of food can go hand in hand.  
 
The CAP 2023 -27 include s strengthened support for climate change mitigation, contributing to the 
Green Deal's climate action goal of achieving net zero greenhouse gas emissions across the EU 
by 2050.  
 
In its commitment to reform and its practical implementation, the EU is the le ader among the 
WTO Members, and few have followed its example. The EU is calling upon its trading partners to 
take the necessary measures to reform in the direction of non -trade distortive support . Equally, the 
EU encourages the Membership, including Parag uay, to reform its agricultural policies in the direction 
of environmental sustainability.  
 
Parrafo 3.192  
Question 17:  
a) Hemos realizado una búsqueda de las publicaciones de EFSA relativas a las evaluaciones de 
autorizaciones de emergencia y sólo hemos e ncontrado 18 dossiers (8 correspondientes a 2018 y 
10 correspondientes a 2021) relativos a las aprobaciones de emergencia de neonicotinoides. Podría 
la Unión Europea indicar: ¿Si estos dossiers corresponden a la totalidad de las evaluaciones de 
autorizacio nes de emergencia que ha realizado EFSA?  
 
Reply:  The European Commission gave indeed two mandates to EFSA to verify for a limited number 
of emergency authorisations whether they were justified. For further information, please see our 
website:  
https://food.ec.europa.eu/plants/pesticides/approval -active -substances/renewal -
approval/neonicotinoids_en . 
Please note that given the judgment by the European Court of Justice of 19  January  2023 in 
Case C-162/21 ( https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62021CJ0 162), 
Member States cannot grant any further emergency authorisations for products containing restricted 
neonicotinoids.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 482 - 
 
  
 Párrafo 3.201  
Question 18:  
a) ¿En qué casos EFSA puede evaluar la necesidad de otorgar o mantener  una autorización de 
emergencia?  
c) ¿Cuántas veces puede un Estado miembro renovar una autorización de emergencia? ¿Existe 
un número límite de renovaciones?  
d) ¿Qué uso da la Unión Europea [la Comisión?] a la información técnica del dossier brindada por 
los Estados miembros al conceder una autorización de emergencia?  
e) ¿Por qué los sustentos presentados por los Estados miembros en sus dossiers no son 
justificación suficiente para que EFSA realice una revaluación de los LMR ? 
f) En qué momento se realiza la evaluación de EFSA: ¿al momento en que se solicita una 
autorización de emergencia a un Estado miembro, o cuando éste ya ha aprobado la autorización de 
emergencia?  
g) ¿Cómo explica la Unión Europea que esté justificada una autorización de emergencia inclusive 
en los casos en que existen alternativas (químicas o no químicas) altamente efectivas?  
Nos remitimos a las evaluaciones realizadas en 2021 por EFSA de las autorizaciones de emergencia 
otorgadas por Alemania, Bélgica, Croacia, Dinamarca , Eslovaquia y España para las sustancias 
activas Thiametoxham, Clothianidin e Imidacloprid en el cultivo de remolacha azucarera.  
h) ¿Por qué se justifican las autorizaciones de emergencia para usar ciertas sustancias activas 
cuando EFSA observa que, para determinada combinación de cultivo/plaga, "su uso no es/puede no 
ser necesario cuando se utiliza la BPA de rotación de cultivos"?  
 
Nos remitimos a los ejemplos de las evaluaciones de EFSA  de 2021 sobre las autorizaciones de 
emergencia para las sustancias Thiametoxham, Clothianidin e Imidacloprid otorgadas por Bélgica 
(para la combinación remolacha azucarera/Ag riotes lineatus y Tipula sp);  Dinamarca (para la 
combinación azúcar, forraje y re molacha energética /Atoma ria linearis, Peg omya hyoscyami, Thr ips 
angusticeps); y Eslovaquia (para la combinación remolacha azucarera/Aphids , Atom aria linearis y 
Chaetocnema tibial . 
 
i) ¿Qué consecuencias tiene para un Estado miembro que EFSA considere que no está justificada 
la autorización de emergencia?  
Notamos que, en el caso de Rumania, la autorización de emergencia para las sustancias activas 
Thiametoxham, Clothianidin e Imidacloprid, para la combinación Maíz/Tan ymecus dilaticollis fue  
considerada por EFSA como no justificada en 2018 y, sin embargo, una nueva autorización fue 
otorgada por Rumania en enero de 2022.  
j) En los casos en que los Estados miembros no remiten la información necesaria a EFSA para 
determinar si la autorización de emergencia está justificada ¿existe alguna consecuencia como, por 
ejemplo, un mayor escrutinio o sistema de control para las autorizaciones de emergencia otorgadas 
por dicho Estado miembro con posterioridad a la evaluación de EFSA?  
 
Notamos, por ejemplo, que en relación c on las sustancias activas Thiametoxham, Clothianidin e 
Imidacloprid, no hubo remisión de la información necesaria por parte de Croacia en 2021 para 
remolacha azucarera/Alp hididae; d e Bulgaria en 2018 para maíz y girasol/Tany mecus dilaticollis y 
Agriotes sp p.; y de Hungría en 2018 para maíz/Tanyme cus dilaticollis, Agri otes spp., y Melont hina 
melonthina y gira sol/Agriot  
 
Reply:  
a) and c) Article  53 of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 allows Member States to grant authorisations 
for products containing active subs tances not approved in the EU. These authorisations can only be 
granted for a period not exceeding 120 days, for a limited and controlled use provided such use is 
necessary because of a danger that cannot be contained by any other reasonable means and 
consumer safety must be ensured. Granting of emergency authorisations are the responsibility of 
the Member States and do not need the European Commission's approval.  
 
EFSA verified, on two requests of the European Commission, whether a limited number of emergency 
authorisations granted by a number of Member States were justified. Based on the outcome of the 
assessment by EFSA and the reaction of the EU countries concerned, the European Commission 
adopted two decisions requiring two countries not to grant emergency authorisation in accordance 
with Article  53(3) for certain uses of these neonicotinoids for future seasons. For further information, 
please see the European Commission's website .[1]  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 483 - 
 
Please note that given the judgment by the European Court of Justice of 19  January  2023 in 
Case C-162/21[2], Member States cannot grant any further emergency authorisations for products 
containing restricted neonicotinoids.  
 
[1] https://food.ec.europa.eu/plants/pesticides/approval -active -substances/renewal -
approval/neonicotinoids_en .  
[2] https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62021CJ0162 .  
 
Reply:  d) In the mandates on emergency authorisations, the Commission asked EFSA to con sider 
the technical information provided by Member States when verifying the justifications for these 
authorisations.  
 
Reply: e) and f) So far, the European Commission has mandated EFSA after the emergency 
authorisation was granted by the Member State as A rticle 53 of regulation (EU) No 1107/2009 does 
not foresee that Member States notify the European Commission before issuing the authorisation. 
The European Commission however mandated the EFSA to develop fit -for-purpose protocols for 
evaluating emergency a uthorisations starting with a protocol for insecticides and acaricides by 
May 2025. Protocols for other types of pesticides will follow at a later date. Once available, these 
protocols will also help Member States in their evaluations.  
 
Reply:  g) and h) Th e reasons why EFSA considered these emergency authorisations justified can be 
found in the respective technical reports on the EFSA website .[1] 
 
[1]  https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/news/neonicotinoids -efsa-assesses -emergency -uses-sugar -beet-
202021  
 
Reply:  i) The consequences for non -justified emergency authorisations are described in Article  53(3) 
of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009. In 2020, the European Commission adopted two decisions 
requiring two EU Member States not to grant emergency authorisations in accordance with 
Article  53(3) for certain uses of neonicotinoids for future seasons. Commission Implementing 
Decision (EU) 2020/152 of 3  February  2020 prohibited one of the Member States to repeat only the 
granting of auth orisation under Article  53(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 for plant protection 
products containing the active substances clothianidin or imidacloprid for use on Brassica napus  
against the pests Phyllotreta  spp. or Psylliodes  spp. The emergency authoris ations granted by that 
Member State in 2022 were either for different active substances or different crops.  
 
Reply:  j) In such cases, the European Commission may ask the Member State to provide further 
information or decide to ask EFSA for another opinion in case there is a specific need to do so (e.g.  if 
there is further repetition of the measure). In the event that an emergency authorisation is not 
considered justified, the consequences outlined in point (i)  above may apply. Independently of any 
mandate s ent by the European Commission to EFSA, all Member States need to include all relevant 
information, including justifications, in the online notification tool. Guidance on what information is 
needed for these notifications is given in the relevant guidance document. All Member States are 
subject to periodical audits by the European Commission during which a check of the emergency 
authorisation process can be done. More info on the EU audit programme can be found on the 
European Commission's website[1]. 
 
[1]  https://food.ec.europa.eu/horizontal -topics/official -controls -and-enforcement/health -and-food-
audits -and-analysis_en . 
 
Parrafo 4.2  
Question 19:  
a) Si la agricultura rerpesenta menos del 4% del empleo de la UE, ¿por que considera la Comision 
se deben mantener niveles tan elevados de subsidios?  
b) El informe de la secretaria mantiene que la productividad de los factores en el sector agrícola 
continuo en tendencia ascendente, ¿en que medida es esta productividad sostenida por susbsidios?  
 
Reply:  
a) The EU supports its agricultural sector in accordan ce with its political priorities and with the 
relevant international trade rules.  
 
b) As mentioned in reply to question 1a, the EU is an unquestioned leader in reforming its domestic 
agricultural support towards the non -distortive aid under Annex  2 of the Agreement on Agriculture WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 (Green Box) as of 1992, in full commitment to the WTO trade liberalisation goals. Currently 
over 85% of the EU's agricultural spending is administered as non -trade distortive Green Box 
support.  
 
Parrafo 4.4  
Question 20:  
a) A que factores son atribuibles el aumento de las exportaciones agrícolas de la UE? Que rol 
juegan los subsidios a la producción en dicho aumento?  
 
Reply:  As seen from the latest ES 2 notification, the EU export levels did not increase significantly. 
However, the  increases could be well explained with recent food crises, food supply disruptions 
caused by the war in Ukraine, and price inflation of major agricultural goods. In this way the EU 
contributes to the reduction of risks related to regional and global food supply shortages.  
 
Question 21:  
Parrafo 4.10  
a) Teniendo en cuenta que los subsidios distorsionantes al comercio son los mas daninos al medio 
ambiente, como compatibiiliza la UE el objetivo de acturar contra el cambio climatico  con la ayuda 
de sostenimiento de precios que otorga a sus agricultores?  
 
Reply:  Any responsible agricultural policy needs to reconcile various objectives. Please note that 
the EU market price support is notified correctly in the annual notifications in relation to total 
production of relevant products, no matter whether any public pu rchases actually take place. In 
practice, public intervention prices currently act as safety net levels for farmers rather than measures 
which induce production. The public market price support is very rarely made operational.  
 
The total EU support for ag riculture amounts to approximately 81  billion  Euro (DS:1 
notification  2019-2020). The trade -distorting support or the total current AMS amounts to 
5.3 billion  Euro. Therefore, the support in question is less than 6.5% of the total support and also 
around t he same percentage of the total AMS commitment level.  
 
The price support represents a negligible share of the whole EU agricultural support. The EU 
agricultural policy during the period under review met in full the climate objectives set in the EU 
climate  change -related policies and programmes. The new EU common agricultural policy reduces 
even further the trade -distortive support measures and provides for a new set of climate -friendly 
and "greening" support measures.  
 
In its commitment to reform and its p ractical implementation, the EU is the leader among the 
WTO Members, and few have followed its example. The EU is calling upon its trading partners to 
take the necessary measures to reform in the direction of non -trade distortive support, and to 
improve fo od security.  
 
Question 22:  
Trade  
Preguntas  
a) ¿Podría la Unión Europea proporcionar una lista de las sustancias activas (en combinación con el 
producto pertinente) para las cuales exige un LMR que no está armonizado con el Codex? Con 
respecto a estas sust ancias, podría la Unión Europea indicar ¿cuántas autorizaciones de emergencia 
y cuántas tolerancias de las importaciones se han concedido?  
b) ¿Cuántas solicitudes de tolerancias de las importaciones se han presentado? ¿Cuántas han sido 
denegadas?  
c) ¿podría la Unión Europea indicar qué información es requerida a los Estados miembros sobre las 
acciones llevadas adelante para confinar a su territorio los productos tratados con sustancias no 
autorizadas en la Unión Europea y que se han beneficiado de aut orizaciones de emergencia?  
d) ¿podría cada Estado miembro de la UE explicar qué tipo de información brinda para cumplir con 
dicho requisito?  
e) Podría la Unión Europea indicar qué artículos específicos del GATT son aplicables para el 
establecimiento de los  LMRs bajo "otros factores específicos"?  
 
Reply:  (a) and (b)  The full list of MRLs that are established in the EU is publicly accessible via 
the EU Pesticide Database ( https://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/pesticides/eu -pesticides -
database/start/screen/mrls ). In accordance with the WTO -SPS Agreement , the EU communicates to WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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its trading partners all of its intended measures lowering MRLs, including for cases when the newly 
proposed MRLs are not harmonised with existing Codex MRLs. An overview table listing the import 
tolerances applications that were received and assessed at EU level during the period 2009 -2020 is 
provided on the Euro pean Commission website ( https://food.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2021 -
01/pesticides_mrl_guidelines_overview -it-table.pdf ). 
 
Reply:  (c) and (d) The enforcement of the official controls for the provisions of the EU regulations 
on pesticides, is the responsibility of EU Member States, and must be performed in accordance with 
the existing EU legislation on that matter. T he EU conducts specific audits in the Member States to 
verify whether suitable control systems are in place for this purpose. As regards emergency 
authorisations see the reply to Question 18.  
 
Reply:  (e) The applicability of the WTO  Agreement s depends on t he content of the measures.  
 
Parrafo 3.206  
4.5. Servicios  
Evolucion de la reglamentacion  
4.151. Como parte de un paquete sobre los servicios digitales propuesto por la Comisión para 
establecer un mercado único de servicios digitales, el Reglamento de Servicios Digitales, que entró 
en vigor el 16 de noviembre de 2022, vino a complementar el Reglamento de Mercados Digitales, 
en vigor desde el 1 de noviembre.195 El Reglamento de Servicios Digitales armoniza las normas 
aplicables a los "servi cios intermediarios" en el mercado interior con el objetivo de garantizar un 
entorno en línea transparente, seguro, previsible y fiable. Salvo en determinadas circunstancias, los 
servicios intermediarios están exentos de responsabilidad en lo que respecta al contenido alojado 
en sus plataformas. El Reglamento de Servicios Digitales prohíbe que los Estados miembros de la 
UE obliguen a los servicios intermediarios a vigilar el contenido de terceros, al tiempo que introduce 
obligaciones de diligencia debida en  lo que respecta a la transparencia para esos servicios. En virtud 
de esa Ley, las plataformas en línea de muy gran tamaño y los motores de búsqueda en línea de 
muy gran tamaño estarán sujetos a normas especiales (véase infra) y serán supervisados 
directam ente a nivel de la UE por la Comisión Europea. Habrá "coordinadores de servicios digitales" 
en los países, que se encargarán de hacer cumplir la Ley en lo que se refiere a otros servicios 
intermediarios. La Ley también establece la Junta Europea de Servici os Digitales, integrada por 
coordinadores de servicios digitales nacionales, y prevé el establecimiento de normas sobre 
sanciones.  
 
Question 23:  
Preguntas:  
a) ¿Podría la explicar la UE en más detalle que institución o instituciones integrarian los 
"coordinadores de servicios digitales" y la Junta Europea de servicios digitales?  
b) ¿Podría indicar la UE el tipo de sanciones que se preven en está reglamentacion y los 
mecanismos que tendrian a disposicion los usuarios en la practica para implementar dicho 
reglamento?  
 
Reply:  a) Member States will be required to designate one or more competent authorities by 
17 February  2024, and to appoint a single 'Digital Services  Coordinator' (DSC) from among those, 
where applicable. The Digital Services Coordinator and possible other competent authorities shall be 
responsible for supervising the digital services with less than 45  million  users that are established 
on their territ ory as well as for supervising designated very large online platforms (VLOPs) and very 
large online search engines (VLOSEs) that are established on their territory, but only in relation to 
non-systemic issues. These DSCs will also participate in the EU coo peration mechanism of the Digital 
Services Act. The Digital Services Coordinators will be independent authorities with strong 
requirements to perform their tasks impartially and with transparency – these requirements are 
harmonized by the Digital Services Act. The new Digital Services Coordinator within each Member 
State will be an important regulatory hub, ensuring coherence and digital competence. The Digital 
Services Coordinators will cooperate at EU -level within an independent advisory group, called the  
European Board for Digital Services, which can support with analysis, reports and recommendations, 
as well as coordinating the new tool of joint investigations by Digital Services Coordinators.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Reply:  b) The European Commission has the same investigator y and enforcement powers as it has 
under current competition rules, including the ability to impose fines. In cases of non -compliance, it 
can also demand that VLOPs and VLOSEs implement measures to ensure compliance, and it can 
require them to draw up acti on plans.  
 
3.1.4 Otras cargas que afectan a las importaciones  
3.1.4.1 IVA  
3.67. Según el informe de la secretaria, otra novedad reciente es la iniciativa El IVA en la era 
digital.89 La Comisión puso en marcha un proceso de modernización del IVA, en partic ular en 
materia de notificación y facturación electrónica, tratamiento a efectos del IVA de la economía de 
plataformas y registro único a efectos del IVA en la UE. En enero de 2022 se inició un período de 
consulta pública y en diciembre de 2022 se adoptó u na propuesta.  
 
Question 24:  
Preguntas:  
a) ¿Podría la UE indicar cuáles fueron las principales determinaciones de la propuesta adoptada 
en materia fiscal en el era digital?  
b) De igual manera y si fuera factible, ¿podría indicar la UE los montos estimados de perdida de 
recaudacion fiscal debido a la evasion fiscal en el ambito digital y las posibles soluciones que estima 
implementar?  
 
Reply:  a) The current regulatory framework governing Value Added Tax (VAT) is fragmented and 
unharmonized, which results in additional compliance costs for businesses  that operate in different 
Member States. This fragmented framework also creates barriers within the single market. Control 
mechanisms in place for reporting intra -Community supplies are outdated and, therefore, not 
effective in fighting intra -EU fraud. Fu rthermore, the current legislative framework governing VAT is 
not adapted to new realities of doing business in the digital era. In some cases, this causes 
distortions of competition, most notably for traders operating in the passenger transport and 
short-term accommodation sectors. Finally, despite the successful implementation of the 
e-commerce package in July 2021, traders who make certain supplies of goods still need to hold 
multiple VAT registrations in the Member States where VAT is due, which adds to  the burden and 
costs associated with VAT compliance for such traders.  
 
To help address these issues, the VAT in the Digital Age (ViDA) proposal contains a number of 
connected measures that are designed to reshape and modernise the VAT system to the new r ealities 
of the digital era. These new measures embrace technology and are designed to ensure that the 
EU VAT system can make a more effective contribution to Member State budget, while simplifying 
the compliance burden for businesses. By introducing a har monised e -reporting system for 
cross-border business -to-business supplies, traders will be able to automatically report each sale to 
the tax authorities and will no longer have to make lengthy tax returns throughout the year, thereby 
reducing the burden an d costs associated with VAT compliance. At the same time, Member States 
will have immediate access to the data they need to act on suspicious transactions, which will help 
to reduce the VAT gap going forward. The current distortions in the passenger transp ort and 
short-term accommodation sectors will be removed by ensuring that intermediary platforms 
operating in those sectors collect and remit the VAT due in respect of supplies of services in those 
sectors when the underlying supplier would not ordinarily charge VAT. This will ensure that traditional 
operators will no longer be at a disadvantage as VAT will be charged on all such supplies when the 
services are provided via a platform. Finally, the range of supplies within the scope of the One -Stop 
Shop (OSS ) suite of simplifications, along with other improvements to VAT framework, will help to 
advance the concept of a single VAT registration in the EU by further reducing the instances in which 
a trader is required to register for VAT purposes in multiple Mem ber States. Please see the European 
Commission's website  for more information in relation to the ViDA proposal.  
 
Reply:  b) The total tax revenue loss is known as the 'VAT gap'. In 2020, according to the latest 
available 2022 VAT Gap report , Membe r States lost €93  billion  in VAT revenues, primarily caused by 
sub-optimal VAT collection and control. A significant part of this loss is due to missing trader 
intra-Community (MTIC) fraud. It is not possible to precisely determine the amounts of revenues 
lost due to tax evasion in the digital sphere as, in addition to MTIC fraud, the VAT gap comprises 
many other different elements, including revenues lost to domestic VAT fraud and evasion, VAT 
avoidance, bankruptcies and financial insolvencies, as well as miscalculations and administrative 
errors. Conservative estimates suggest that one quarter of the missing revenues can be attributed 
directly to VAT fraud linked to intra -EU trade. The VAT system is not only prone to fraud but has WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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also become increasingly complex and burdensome for businesses. In particular, the 30 -year-old 
VAT rules for cross -border trade are not adapted to doing business in the digital age, thus calling for 
reflection on how technology can be used to reduce administrative burdens and rela ted costs for 
businesses and at the same time fight tax. As noted above, the VAT in the Digital Age (ViDA) proposal 
contains a number of connected measures that are designed to reshape and modernise the VAT 
system to the new realities of the digital era. T hese measures include the introduction of a new 
harmonised e -reporting system for cross -border supplies in the EU, which will allow Member States 
to have immediate access to the data they need to act on suspicious transactions, thereby helping 
to reduce th e VAT gap going forward.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 PARAGUAY – ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS  
1. Informe de la Secretaria (WT/TPR/S/442)  
14. En cuanto a las medidas sanitarias y fitosanitarias (MSF), la Uni ón Europea complet ó la aplicaci ón 
de la Legislaci ón sobre Sanidad Vegetal, la Legislaci ón sobre Sanidad Animal y el Reglamento relativo 
a los Controles Oficiales, adoptados en a ños anteriores para simplificar y armonizar su r égimen 
sanitario y fitosanitario. En marzo de 2021 la Uni ón Europea tambi én modific ó la Legislaci ón 
Alimentaria General para mejorar la transparencia y la participaci ón del p úblico en los 
procedimientos de evaluaci ón del riesgo y aprobaci ón de los productos, y en enero de 2022 empez ó 
a aplicar normas actualizadas (adoptadas en 2018) sobre la fabricaci ón, la comercializaci ón, la venta 
y la utilizaci ón de medicamentos veterinarios, incluido el uso de antimicrobianos. En mayo de 2020 
la Uni ón Europea adopt ó la estrategia "De la Granja a la Mesa" que, entre otras cosas, iden tifica 
esferas de acci ón para lograr que el sistema alimentario de la UE sea sostenible durante el 
período 2020-2024, con inclusi ón de posibles reformas con respecto a los aditivos de los piensos, 
los plaguicidas, la protecci ón fitosanitaria y el biene star animal, as í como el establecimiento de un 
nuevo marco legislativo para los sistemas alimentarios sostenibles.  
 
Preguntas:  
a. ¿Cuáles serán los principales puntos o cambios a ser propuestos considerando que se 
menciona que el plan de acción para el periodo 2020 -2024 prevé, entre otras cosas, la reforma de 
la legislación sobre aditivos de los piensos, plaguicidas, materiales en contacto con los alimentos, 
protección fitosanitaria, bienestar animal y normas de comercialización para los productos 
agrope cuarios y pesqueros (incluida la acuicultura), y se menciona en el enfoque de la granja a la 
mesa, y si las propuestas o puntos a ser revisados incluirán a productos OMG u OGM?  
 
Reply:  Detailed and up -to-date information on the EU SPS legislation and the different policy and 
legislative initiatives can be found on the official website of the European Commission, Health and 
Food Safety (europa.eu) . All the relevant sanitary and phytosanitary legislation are notified to the 
WTO following the recommended procedures for implementing the transparency obligations of the 
SPS Agreement  (Article  7). 
 
b. Considerando los enfoques adoptados por la UE, ¿Qué acciones ha tomado o prevé tomar 
teniendo en cuenta que las medidas y políticas podrían influir en seguridad alimentaria, debido a 
restricciones que pueden afectar sustancialmente a países exportadore s de productos agrícolas, y 
específicamente con países integrantes del MERCOSUR?  
 
Reply:  The EU is committed to take into account available scientific evidence and promote 
consistency between international technical standards and the future legislation, wh ile ensuring that 
the high level of protection of public health, animal health and welfare, plant health and environment 
is not reduced.  
 
European  Union  and its Member States provide numerous trainings and e -learning opportunities to 
improve the knowledge and implementation of EU rules covering food safety, plant, animal, and 
One Health.  
 
Detailed and up -to-date information on the EU SPS legislation and the different policy and legislative 
initiatives can be found on the official website of the European Com mission, Health and Food Safety 
(europa.eu) . All the sanitary and phytosanitary legislatio n relevant for international trade are notified 
to the WTO following the recommended procedures for implementing the transparency obligations 
of the SPS  Agreement  (Article  7) by the European Commission, which is the EU Notifying Authority 
responsible for i mplementing the notification requirements of the SPS  Agreement . 
 
3.194. Adem ás, en mayo de 2020, la Comisi ón adopt ó la estrategia "De la Granja a la Mesa" para 
apoyar el proceso de reforma en curso y los objetivos de sostenibilidad de la UE.254 Se consi dera 
que la Estrategia es un componente fundamental del Pacto Verde Europeo y tiene algunas 
repercusiones en el r égimen sanitario y fitosanitario de la UE. La Estrategia, que identifica esferas 
de acci ón para lograr que el sistema alimentario de la UE se a sostenible, comprende un plan de 
acción para el per íodo 2020 -2024 que prev é, entre otras cosas, la reforma de la legislaci ón sobre 
aditivos de los piensos, plaguicidas, materiales en contacto con los alimentos, protecci ón 
fitosanitaria, bienestar an imal y normas de comercializaci ón para los productos agropecuarios y 
pesqueros (incluida la acuicultura). Como parte de este plan de acci ón, se espera tambi én que la 
Comisi ón proponga nueva legislaci ón para ampliar el alcance de las prescripciones de etiquetado WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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indicativo del origen, introduzca el etiquetado nutricional obligatorio en la parte frontal del envase y 
establezca un marco de etiquetado de los alimentos sostenibles para informar a los consumidores 
sobre los aspectos de los productos alimenti cios relacionados con la sostenibilidad. Esa Estrategia 
tambi én establece objetivos de la UE con el fin de reducir el uso de plaguicidas (y su riesgo), 
antimicrobianos y fertilizantes qu ímicos para 2030255, y prev é la integraci ón de consideraciones 
ambientales en la evaluaci ón de las solicitudes en materia de tolerancia en las importaciones con 
respecto a los plaguicidas no aprobados en la Uni ón Europea. Seg ún se anuncia en la Estrategia, la 
Comisi ón tiene previsto presentar en 2023 un nuevo marco l egislativo para los sistemas alimentarios 
sostenibles con el fin, entre otras cosas, de incorporar la sostenibilidad a todas las pol íticas 
relacionadas con los alimentos, y una propuesta para fijar objetivos de reducci ón del desperdicio de 
alimentos a ni vel de toda la UE.  
Preguntas:  
a. ¿Cuáles son los principios o bases científicas sobre las que está fundamentado el "pacto verde 
europeo" y si se consideran otras medidas distintas al mismo que tiene solidez a partir de datos o 
bases científicas?  
 
Reply:  All legislative initiatives are accompanied by an impact assessment  (gathering evidence to 
support policymaking) that assesses the impact of various options on stakeholders. There are also 
consultation activities along the legislative process. At the end o f the process, the impact 
assessments are published.  
 
b. ¿Qué medidas adicionales ha implementado o pretende implementar la UE a fin de que las 
decisiones o normas derivadas de la aplicación de pacto verde y el enfoque de sistemas alimentarios 
sostenibles impacten de forma negativas a los países exportadores de productos y subproductos 
vegetales?  
 
Reply:  EU SPS measures will continue to be based on a risk assessment in line with the WTO 
SPS Agreement  and will continue to aim to high level protection of human, animal and plant life and 
health. All the relevant measures will be notified to the WTO Members.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF  
PART I:  QUESTIONS REGARDING THE SECRETARIAT REPORT  
CHAPTER NUMBER AND TITLE  
Page 107 (Para 3.3.2.2)  
The European  Union  is one of the most frequent users of the TBT specific trade concerns (STC) system. It 
has raised so far the largest numbers of STCs after the United  States  and it is followed by Canada and China. 
It is also the main WTO Member subject to STCs, followed by China, the United  States , and India. During the 
review period, WTO Members raised 41 new STCs related to EU TBT measures, as well as 14 other recurrent 
concerns raised for the first time prior to October  2019 (e.g. labelling requirements for wi ne, and maximum 
residue levels (MRLs) for pesticides). The European  Union  raised 78 STCs on TBT measures against other 
WTO members in the TBT Committee  
Questions:  
1. Considering the European  Union  is one of the most frequent users of the TBT STCs, what are  the 
prenciples used as basis to raise specific trade concerns? are there any efforts taken before raising concerns 
against WTO member states at the TBT committee  
 
Reply:  
Before each WTO TBT committee, the EU consults with its Member States and industry in order to establish 
the list of specific trade concerns to be raised. In case a third country notifies a draft measure in accordance 
with its WTO obligation, the EU will first convey its comments in the written procedures, before raising them 
within the TBT Committee as an STC. In case a draft measure is imminent or is already applied, the EU may 
decide to address the STC directly in the TBT committee. Bilateral contacts may be undertaken in parallel.  
Page 105 and 107 (Para 3.3.2)  
3.173. Technica l requirements are developed in parallel to standards at the EU and member State levels, but 
most of the regulatory activity takes place at the EU level, according to the Commission. For goods regulated 
at the EU level, technical requirements are establish ed through EU legislation (i.e. regulations or directives). 
EU technical legislation is designed according to two long -established approaches: the "new approach" 
(integrated into the NLF) and the "old approach".  
 
3.174. Manufacturers can use European harmo nised standards as a tool for compliance. European harmonised 
standards are developed broadly in the same way as other European standards225, but are designed to 
support the implementation of EU legislation under the "new approach"226, and as such are base d on a 
product's essential requirements. After a European harmonised standard is published by the ESO, the 
Commission will publish it as an Implementing Act in the Official Journal of the European  Union  (OJEU) if it 
meets the terms of the standardization r equest. In 2022, about 13% of all European standards were published 
as harmonized ones (Table  A3.2), and it took on average close to 16 months between the ESOs' approval of 
the request for a European harmonised standard and its publication in the OJEU.227  
 
3.175. Manufacturers that decide to use European harmonised standards published in the OJEU are granted 
the presumption of conformity with the essential requirements in the EU legislation and in most cases allowed 
to use a self -certification procedure.22 8 If the product complies with these requirements, manufacturers can 
issue an EU declaration of conformity whereby they declare the product meets the essential requirements in 
accordance with EU legislation and can affix the CE marking229 in the product. M anufacturers not using such 
European harmonised standards must in certain cases show compliance with the product requirements by 
having recourse to a conformity assessment conducted by a third party.  
 
Questions:  
2. What are the main differences between technical requirements and Standards in relation to EU 
technical legislation?  
 
Reply:  Essential requirements are set in technical regulations and they define the results to be attained, or 
the hazards to be dealt with, but do not specify the techni cal solutions for doing so. Although no detailed 
manufacturing specifications are included in the essential requirements, the degree of detailed wording differs 
between different Union harmonisation acts with the intention to be precise enough to create le gally binding 
obligations that can be enforced, to facilitate the setting up of standardisation requests by the Commission 
to the European standardisation organisations (ESOs) in order to produce harmonised standards, but also to 
enable the assessment of c onformity with those requirements, even in the absence of harmonised standards 
or in case the manufacturer chooses not to apply them.  
 
Technical specifications for products meeting the essential requirements set out in Union harmonised 
legilationare are el aborated in harmonised standards. Harmonised standards are technical specifications for 
repeated or continuous application, with which compliance is not compulsory, adopted by the 
European  Standardisation Organisations on the basis of a request made by the  Commission for the application 
of Union harmonisation legislation. Products manufactured in compliance with harmonised standards benefit 
from a presumption of conformity with the corresponding essential requirements of the applicable 
Union  harmoniation le gislation, and, in some cases, the manufacturer may benefit from a simplified 
conformity assessment procedure.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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More information is available in the Blue Guide  Chapter 4.1.2. Conformity with the essential requirements: 
harmonised standards.  
 
3. What is the legal status of harmonized standards? Is it still of a voluntary nature, or  has it become 
mandatory under the rules of the New Legislative Framework NLF (new approach)?  
 
Reply:  The recourse to harmonised standards referenced in the OJEU and which give a presumption of 
conformity remains voluntary. Manufacturers can choose whether or not to apply such harmonised standards 
or parts thereof. However, if manufacturers choose not to apply a harmonised standard, they must 
demonstrate that the products are in conformity with essential requirements by the use of other means of 
their own choice (for example by means of any existing technical specifications including all other available 
standards).  
 
4. As mentioned in item 3.175, "the manufacturers granted the presumption of conformity with the 
essential requirements in the EU legislation and in most cases allowed to use a self -certification procedure", 
In what other cases might the manufacturers not be granted the presumption of conformity? Examples for 
these cases would be preferable?  
 
Reply:  As explained above, if manufacturers choose not to apply a harmonised standard, they must 
demonstrate that the products are in conformity with  essential requirements by the use of other means of 
their own choice (for example by means of any existing technical specifications including all other available 
standards). If the manufacturer applies only a part of a harmonised standard or the harmonise d standard 
does not cover entirely all relevant essential requirements, the presumption of conformity exists only to the 
extent the harmonised standard corresponds to the essential requirements. For that reason it is necessary 
that each harmonised standard  contains clear and correct information on legal (essential) requirements 
covered.  
 
Compliance with harmonised standards is, according to certain Union harmonisation acts, an option having 
effect on the applicable conformity assessment procedure, and somet imes opens the possibility for conformity 
assessment without the intervention of a third party or for a larger choice of procedures.  
 
More information is available in the Blue Guide  Chapter 4.1.2.3 Presumption of conformity.  
 
Page 105 (Para 3.3.2.2)  
EU technical legislation is designed according to two long-established approaches: the "new approach" 
(integrated into the NLF) and the "old approach".223 Under the "new approach", the scope of the legislation 
is limited to the "essential" requirements (i.e. minimum requirements based in general on health, sa fety, and 
performance reasons) of a product, while under the "old approach" the legislation includes all specific technical 
requirements. The European  Union  has developed directives for 27 product categories based on the "new 
approach" and for some 700  individual products based on the "old approach"224; together they cover most 
manufacturing goods. The "old approach" is used for, inter alia, vehicles, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and 
cosmetics, while the coverage of the legislation under the "new approach" i ncludes construction products, 
electrical and electronic products, medical devices, machinery, and toys. All imported and domestically 
produced goods must comply with the corresponding requirements to be sold in the EU market. Manufacturers 
are responsible  for demonstrating that their products comply with these requirements through the conformity 
assessment procedure provided in the EU legislation. These procedures vary with the product and may require 
the involvement of a third party.  
 
Questions:  
5. Would  the EU kindly provide a detailed description on the process of preparing technical regulations, 
highlighting the relationship between the Standards references in legislations, specifying the time frame for 
each stage of the procedure?  
 
Reply:  The Old appr oach (Chapter 1.1.1), the 'New Approach' and 'Global Approach' (Chapter  1.1.3.) and 
the New Legislative framework are explained in detail in the Blue Guide . You will also find information about 
the Conformity with the essential requirements: harmonised standards (Chapter 4.1.2.). The EU legislative 
process is complex, and it generally takes between 2 and 5  years to adopt technical regulations. The time of 
the procedure depends on technical and political complexities of a given EU legislation.  
 
Also, for the development of harmonised standards there used to be no fixed timeframe. However, in the 
more recent EC requests for standards to the ESOs (CEN CENELEC a nd ETSI) a deadline is given. It could 
vary from 18 months to 3 years.  
 
6. Does the EU publish all relevant updates on regulations instituting the products legislation and release 
the necessary guidelines so as to ensure an effective implementation?  
 
Reply:  All amendments to EU product legislation are published in the OJEU. The Blue Guide , revised in 2022, 
helps clarify the different aspects of EU product rules aligned with the New Legislative Framework, such as 
toys, measuring instruments, radio equipment, low voltage electrical equipment, medical devices, fertilising 
produ cts. It explains the obligations of economic operators, the European conformity assessment system, the WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 accreditation of laboratories and conformity assessment bodies, the CE marking, and market surveillance. 
This contributes to a better understanding of EU  product rules and facilitates their more uniform and coherent 
application across sectors and throughout the single market.  
7. In the assessment of EU approach, would the EU consider the risks of products when elaborating the 
applicable propotional confor mity assessment procedures?  
 
Reply : The legislator selects from the menu of conformity assessment modules/procedures (laid down under 
Decision No 768/2008/EC ) the most appropriate one(s) in order to address the specific needs of the concerned 
sector . The least onerous modules should be selected taking into account the type of products and hazards 
involved, the impact on the p rotection of public interests, the economic infrastructure of the given sector, the 
methods of production etc. Where possible a choice of inspection, certification, and/or quality assurance 
modules should be provided.  
 
Conformity assessment procedures are equivalent from a legal point of view but not technically identical in 
terms of methods. Their application in the sectoral legislation aims at providing high level of confidence as 
regards the conformity of products to the relevant essential requirements.  
 
The intention of the modules as laid down in the Decision No 768/2008/EC is to allow for a limited number of 
possible procedures. Nevertheless, the choice offered needs to be sufficiently varied in order to be applicable 
to the widest range of products co ncerned. More information in the Blue Guide , Chapter 5. Conformity 
assessm ent. 
 
PART II:  QUESTIONS REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT REPORT  
Reference No., title and date of law, decree, regulation, etc.  
Description and specific information  
Questions:  
PART III:  OTHER QUESTIONS  
Reference No., title and date of law, decree, regulation, etc.  
Description and specific information  
Questions:  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF – ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS  
PART  I:  QUESTIONS  REGARDING  THE  SECRETARIAT  REPORT  
3.1.6  ANTI -DUMPING,  COUNTERVAILING,  AND  SAFEGUARD  MEASURES  
Page 79 (Para 3.1.6)  
3.1.6.1 Anti -dumping and countervailing duties  
3.88. The European  Union  continued to be a significant user of trade remedies during the review period as 
new investigations of anti -dumping (AD) and anti -subsidy (AS) measures continued unabated despite the 
challenges of the COVID -19 pandemic (Chart  3.3). However, while the pand emic did not have an impact on 
the pace of investigations, there were other impacts. One impact was on verifications due to travel 
restrictions, whereby the Commission changed to verifying company data by remote cross -checking by 
videoconference in lieu of  on-site visits. Another effect was the use of suspension provision during the 
pandemic, reportedly to address supply chain disruptions in one case. Nevertheless, trade remedies, or trade 
defence instruments (TDIs) as the European  Union  refers to them, con tinued to be an important trade policy 
tool. At the end of 2022, there were 178  AD and AS  measures in place that supported 440,706 direct jobs.  
 
Question 1:  
- Considering the COVID -19 pandemic is not as active as in 2021, is the European  Union  still using  the 
process of verifying company data by remote cross -checking by videoconference in lieu of on -site visits. If 
Yes, can you please elaborate the process adopted to verifying company data by remote cross -checking by 
videoconference. If No, what are the ch ange in the process adopted to verify company data post COVID -19? 
 
Reply:   
As the various travel restrictions are lifted, the EU is resuming on -spot verification visits as was the situation 
prior to the COVID -19 pandemic. There is no change to the process of on-spot verification procedures post 
COVID.  
 
3.1.1 CUSTOMS PROCEDURES, VALUATION, AND REQUIREMENTS  
Page 50 (Para 3.10)  
3.1.1.1 Recent and future developments  
3.10. Regarding the EU's policy direction on customs, a strategic foresight document was issu ed in 2020, The 
Future of Customs in the EU 2040, in which possible future long -term visions were presented along with a 
number of scenarios (Box 3.1). According to the initiative, it was issued to stay updated with rapidly changing 
world developments so t hat the European  Union  can adapt and anticipate future changes. The European  Union  
also commissioned a report called Putting More Union in the European Customs, with 10 recommendations, 
mainly to address how to manage electronic commerce and EU -wide risks.  
 
Question 2  
With specific emphasis to the report on The Future of Customs in the EU 2040, How might emerging 
technologies such as drones and biometric identification transform customs procedures in the EU?  
 
Reply:   
The European Commission (Directorate -General TAXUD) is managing the Customs Control Equipment 
Instrument (2021 -2027), a new EU programme designed specifically to support the customs authorities in 
their mission to protect the financial and economic interes ts of the EU and its Member States, to ensure 
security and safety within the EU and to protect the EU from illegal trade while facilitating legitimate business 
activity. The programme has a budget of around €1  billion  euros for the period 2021 -2027 and fin ances the 
transparent purchase, maintenance and upgrading of relevant and reliable state of -the-art customs control 
equipment that is secure, safe and environmental -friendly.  
 
The programme finances any customs control equipment including innovative detection technology and 
control equipment, that has one or more of the following customs control purposes: non -intrusive inspection; 
indication of hidden objects on humans; radiation detection and nuclide identification; analysis of samples in 
laboratories; sampling and field analysis of samples; handheld search. Equipment can be used at any Border 
Crossing Points (BCPs) and customs laboratories.  
 
PART II: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT REPORT  
Page 28 (Para 6.15)  
6.15. A new element of su bsidy control is the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (EU) 2022/256079 which will apply 
from 12  July 2023, six months after its entry into force. The notification requirements for concentrations and 
public procurement procedures will apply from 12  October  2023. The proposal aims to close a legislative gap 
and restore the level playing field in concentrations, public procurement and other market situations Until 
now, subsidies granted by non -EU governments to economic operators active in the EU went largely 
unchecked, while subsidies granted by EU Member States are subject to close scrutiny. The European 
Commission will have the power to investigate financial contributions granted by public authorities of non -EU 
countries which benefit companies engaging in an ec onomic activity in the EU and redress, if needed, their 
distortive effects.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Questions  
3. How does the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (EU) 2022/256079 impact businesses operating within the 
European  Union  (EU), particularly those that may receive foreign su bsidies?  
Reply:   
The Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR) aims at improving the level playing field and competition in the EU 
internal market and is addressing the distortive effects caused by foreign subsidies so that businesses 
operating in the EU compete on fair terms.  
 
4. How will the regulation impact businesses and trade relations between the EU and other countries?  
 
Reply:   
As stated in the reply before, the FSR aims at improving the level playing field and competition in the EU 
internal market by addressing the distortive effects caused by foreign subsidies so that businesses operating 
in the EU can compete on fair terms. Subsidies granted by EU Member States are already subject to a strict 
control under EU state aid rules. However, foreign subsidi es granted by third countries and that distort the 
internal market are not subject to the strict control under EU state aid rules.  
 
5. How does the regulation fit into the broader trend of increasing regulatory scrutiny of foreign 
investment and trade, bot h within the EU and globally?  
 
Reply:  In recent years, foreign subsidies appear to have distorted the EU's internal market, including by 
providing their recipients with an unfair advantage to acquire companies or obtain public procurement 
contracts in the EU to the detriment of fair competition. The FSR addresses such distortions, closes a 
regulatory gap, and includes new tools to effectively tackle foreign subsidies that cause distortions and 
undermine the level playing field in the EU's internal market.  
 
Page 35 (Para 9.4)  
9.4 Common agricultural policy  
9.20. During the review period, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) continued on the path towards market 
orientation and away from trade -distorting support measures. The new CAP is a modernised policy, wi th a 
strong emphasis on results and performance.  
9.21. For the years under review (2021 and 2022), the transitional legislation was put in place bridging the 
gap between the current CAP and the new legislation. On 2  December  2021, the agreement on the refo rm of 
the Common Agricultural Policy was formally adopted. The Common Agricultural Policy 2023 -2027, as well as 
the new legislation started applying on 1st January  2023. It consists of three regulations: CAP Strategic Plan 
Regulation, CAP Horizontal Regula tion, CAP Common Market Organisation Regulation. It is important to note 
that the regulations repeal all remaining export subsidy provisions, which means that the EU no longer has 
any legal base for granting any export subsidies in the agricultural sector.  
 
Question 6.   
How does the CAP intersect with other policies and initiatives, such as environmental regulations and climate 
change mitigation efforts?  
 
Reply:   
The European  Union 's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) intersects with other policies and initiatives, including 
environmental regulations and climate change mitigation efforts. Over time, the CAP has undergone reforms 
to align with the EU's broader goals, such as the European Green Deal. Here are some key intersections:  
 
1. Environmental Regul ations: The CAP has increasingly integrated environmental regulations to promote 
sustainable farming practices and protect natural resources. It includes measures to preserve biodiversity, 
protect water quality, and promote sustainable land management. For  instance, the CAP encourages farmers 
to adopt environmentally friendly practices like crop diversification, agroforestry, and the creation of 
ecological focus areas (EFAs) to support biodiversity. It is also important to note that all CAP support is 
condi tional on the respect of statutory environmental regulations.  
 
2. Climate Change Mitigation: The CAP recognizes the importance of agriculture in climate change mitigation. 
It aims to support farmers in reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and adapting t o climate change. This 
involves promoting sustainable farming techniques that minimize carbon emissions, such as precision 
farming, organic farming, and efficient use of fertilizers. Additionally, the CAP encourages the development 
of renewable energy sour ces and bioenergy production on farms by supporting farm level investments.  
 
3. Circular Economy and Waste Management: The CAP promotes the principles of the circular economy by 
encouraging sustainable resource management and waste reduction in the agricu ltural sector. It supports 
initiatives for the efficient use of resources, such as reducing food waste, recycling agricultural by -products, 
and promoting the use of organic waste for biogas production and fertilisation.  
 
4. Research and Innovation: The CAP  collaborates with EU research and innovation programs to advance 
sustainable farming practices, environmental technologies, and sustainable food systems. Funding is allocated 
to projects that aim to develop and implement innovative solutions for sustainab le agriculture, resource 
efficiency, and climate change adaptation.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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5. Green Deal targets: Drawing up their CAP Strategic Plans, Member States had to take account of the 
analysis, objectives and targets of key EU environmental and climate laws (and plans s temming from these) 
listed in Annex  XIII of the CSP Regulation and were asked to spell out the contribution of their Plans to the 
specific EU -level ambitions of the two EU strategies of the European Green Deal.  
 
Key CAP -relevant targets from the legislation in question concern (among other things) the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions and ammonia emissions to air, the land -based sequestrati on of carbon, 
achievement of good status of water bodies, and favourable conservation status of designated habitats and 
species. The targets are either present in the legislation itself or are established in various national or regional 
plans – including N ational Energy and Climate Plans, River Basin Management Plans (in relation to water 
quality and quantity), Prioritised Action Frameworks (in relation to biodiversity) and others.  
 
Member States will have to review and update their CAP Strategic plans when  this is necessary to align them 
to changes to the relevant legislation, for example to reflect the upgraded ambitions of the Effort Sharing and 
LULUCF legislation in light of the EU's reduction and climate neutrality objectives.  
 
The EU Green Deal strateg ies in question are the Farm to Fork Strategy and the EU Biodiversity Strategy for 
2030. These strategies include different non -binding EU -level targets which are particularly relevant to the 
CAP and relate to the areas covered by its specific objectives. The targets (2030, except for the broadband 
for which target year is 2025) involve the following:  
 
- reducing the risk and use of chemical pesticides by 50% (compared to 2015 -2017);  
- reducing nutrient losses from agriculture by 50%, while ensuring that th ere is no deterioration in soil fertility 
(compared to 2012 -2014/2015);  
- achieving a coverage of organic farming of at least 25% of total agricultural area (compared to 2018);  
- bringing at least 10% of agricultural area under high -diversity landscape fea tures (compared to 2015/2018);  
- reducing by 50% the sale of antimicrobials (compared to 2018); ensuring 100% access to fast broadband 
internet in rural areas.  
 
PART III:  OTHER QUESTIONS  
Reference No., title and date of law, decree, regulation, etc.  
Description and specific information  
Questions:  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 TÜRKIYE  
THE GOVERNMENT REPORT (WT/TPR/G/442)  
5. SUSTAINABILTY, 5.1 The EU's actions on climate change and environmental protection, 
5.1.1 Overview of the actions on climate  change and environmental protection, pg. 19, 5.7 
The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)  
It is stated in the Government Report that "The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is a 
climate measure aimed at decreasing global GHG emissions by preve nting the risk of carbon leakage 
and by supporting increased ambition on climate mitigation, while ensuring WTO compatibility. The 
CBAM will equalize the price of carbon between domestic products and imports and ensure that the 
EU's climate objectives are not undermined by production relocating to countries with less ambitious 
climate policies" .  
 
Questions:  The European  Union  (EU) argues that Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM ) is 
designed in alignment with both the World Trade Organization (WTO) law and the Paris Agreement. 
However, the compatibility of CBAM with the multilateral climate and trade regimes is a controversial 
topic.  
 
Question 1 . Against this backdrop, in what w ays it is designed to secure the compatibility with the 
WTO rules and would not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail and to minimize the likelihood of trade disputes or 
retaliat ion by trading partners? In addition, could information kindly be provided on whether the 
possible carbon price competition in the world due to CBAM poses a risk for global carbon pricing?  
 
Reply:  CBAM is an environmental policy tool to support the EU's i ncreased ambition on climate 
mitigation by preventing carbon leakage, while ensuring WTO compatibility.  
 
CBAM will ensures that an equivalent carbon price will be paid by domestic and imported products 
and will thus be non -discriminatory and compatible wit h WTO rules and other international 
obligations of the EU.   
 
Article  216(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European  Union  states that "[a]greements  
concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its Member States". 
This obligation applies equally to the WTO  Agreement . Consequently, the EU always assesses 
the WTO compatibility of its legislation, including autonomous regu lations.  
 
The EU welcomes multilateral initiatives to develop common approaches to decarbonisation (notably 
via the OECD Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches, G7 Climate Club, IMF proposal for 
an International Carbon Price Floor (ICPF)). Intern ational coordination is key to make individual 
efforts more effective. These ongoing initiatives can complement CBAM and are compatible with it.  
 
However, the EU considers that international cooperation should not prevent countries from taking 
immediate ac tion to address the climate emergency and decarbonise their economy and reduce 
global greenhouse gas emissions as fast as possible. CBAM may provide a further incentive to 
achieve coordinated carbon pricing approaches globally.  
 
Question 2.  On the other ha nd, could you please elaborate on how can CBAM be compatible with 
the provision of the Paris Agreement, which recognizes the principle of Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDRRC) the of countries in combating climate change?  
 
Reply:  The CBAM respects EU's international commitments. The Paris Agreement requires each of 
its Parties to reduce its emissions in a way that reflects its highest possible ambition, reflecting its 
common but differentiated responsibilities and r espective capabilities, in the light of different 
national circumstances. It is precisely because of this principle that the EU has, as a developed Party, 
demonstrated leadership with ambitious climate polices, including a commitment to reach climate 
neutr ality by 2050. The EU has respected its obligation to take the lead in reducing emissions. To 
continue to take the lead the EU needs to make sure that its ambitious efforts to reduce emissions 
within the EU are not undermined by carbon leakage.  
 
The EU has  carefully assessed the potential impact on third countries and given careful consideration, 
including to LDCs. The design of the CBAM therefore takes potential concerns on board, for example WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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through a transitional period that gives sufficient time to econ omic players to get familiar with the 
system and ready for its entry into force.  
 
The EU is the largest global provider of climate finance in the world and will continue to support 
third countries in their transition to a climate neutral future, including  through financial support 
package and capacity building programmes.  
 
Question 3.  Could it be said that CBAM  is the most effective method to fight the threat of carbon 
leakage in a world of global value chains (GVCs)?  
 
Reply:  Carbon pricing is a necessary tool to address climate change. Providing the appropriate price 
signals that ensure emission reductions will  be crucial to implement the polluter pays principle and 
to incentivise economic actors to adopt cleaner production processes. The EU already has a mature 
internal carbon -pricing model – the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS). It has been a major success 
in supporting emission reductions and it will remain the EU's central instrument.  
 
As the EU increases its ambition by strengthening the ETS and extending it to more sectors of the 
economy, it faces the risk of production relocating to countries with less a mbitious policies, which 
would not help to bring greenhouse gas emissions down. This is why we need a Carbon Border 
Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which will tackle the problem of carbon leakage by making the price 
of carbon between domestic products and imp orts equivalent.  
 
The most efficient way to address carbon leakage in globalised value chains would be a global price 
on carbon – and some initiatives that the EU supports could get us closer to this. However, the 
international community is still far away from such an achievement and all Parties to the 
Paris Agreement have to take their responsibilities in the meantime.  
 
5. Sustainability, 5.1 The EU's actions on climate change and environmental protection  
5.1.1 Overview of the actions on climate change and  environmental protection pg. 20, 
5.14 
It is stated in the Government Report that " the Commission adopted a proposal for a new regulation 
on Waste Shipment, which aims to ensure that the EU does not export its waste challenges to 
third countries and suppor ts a clean and circular economy". The draft foresees same measures for 
the trade of different types of wastes and same monitoring and inspection measures are required 
for the trade of both hazardous wastes and wastes that are used as a raw material like fe rrous scrap 
with an aim to support clean and circular economy.  
 
Questions:  
Question 4 . Türkiye would like to ask information to the EU on the negative environmental impact 
of ferrous scrap justifying the need for the implementation of additional requiremen ts in the draft? 
What constitutes the basis for imposing certain measures to monitor and when necessary restrict 
trade of ferrous scrap for environmental protection concerns?  
 
Reply:  The proposal for a new EU regulation on the shipment waste covers all waste, with the aim 
to guarantee that all wastes shipped within the EU, as well as those exported from the EU, are 
managed in an environmentally sound manner.  
 
The treatment and processing of all types of waste could possibly generate environmental and pub lic 
health challenges. The use of waste (including ferrous metal waste) as feedstock by an industry is 
no exemption, as it can be the source of pollutants affecting negatively air or water quality, as well 
as producing CO2 emissions. In addition, the treat ment of waste generates residual waste, which 
themselves require a specific treatment, to avoid that they end up for example on open dumpsites 
or are burnt in open air. The proposal for a new EU regulation on the shipment waste provides the 
necessary tools  to avoid that such adverse impacts occur for waste shipped within the EU or exported 
from the EU.  
 
Question 5 . Türkiye would like to ask whether similar  additional  monitoring and auditing 
requirements  will be  introduced for the EU member states as well? 
 
Reply:  Waste treated in the EU is subject to comprehensive rules designed to protect the 
environment and human health. In addition, waste treatment facilities in the EU are, according to 
EU legislation, subject to regular inspections and enforcement  measures, which are carried out by WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 national competent authorities in the EU Member States. The EU waste legislation therefore provides 
a framework for EU Member States to verify that conditions are fulfilled within the Union to ensure 
environmental sound management of waste.  
 
The proposal for a new EU regulation on the shipment waste includes provisions which are designed 
to ensure that waste exported outside the EU is managed in the countries of destination in conditions 
that are "broadly equivalent" to E U conditions. In the absence of legally -binding requirements at the 
international level on inspection or enforcement, the proposal therefore contains auditing 
requirements in waste treatment facilities in third countries, based on similar requirements as t hose 
applying in the EU.  
 
THE SECRETARIAT REPORT(WT/TPR/S/442)  
2. Trade and Investment Regimes, 2.3.3 Other agreements and arrangements, pg. 44, 
2.51 
It is stated in the Secretariat Report that "The European Union and Japan concluded in May 2022 a 
Digital Partnership to promote cooperation on issues of importance to the digital economy, such as 
artificial intelligence, 5G technologies, the semiconductor industry, and the facilitation of digital 
trade. In November 2022, the European Union also entered into a  Digital Partnership with the 
Republic of Korea, and agreed on a set of non -binding Digital Trade Principles.88 The European  Union 
is also planning to conclude a Digital Partnership and an agreement on Digital Trade Principles with 
Singapore. The parties e xpect that these Digital Trade Principles will complement the 
WTO negotiations on e -commerce" . 
 
Question 6:  In the paragraph, it is stated that the EU's Digital Partnership Agreements aim to 
constitute non -binding principles that are complementary to the W TO negotiations on e -commerce. 
Could the EU provide detailed information about specific commitments of the Union's Digital 
Partnership Agreements? In which ways, will these DPA's complement WTO negotiations on 
e-commerce?  
 
Reply:  The Digital Trade Princip les represent a common commitment to open digital markets which 
are competitive, transparent, fair, and free of unjustified barriers to international trade and 
investment. The text of the Digital Trade Principles concluded with the Republic of Korea  and with 
Singapore is available online:  
https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/help -exporters -and-importers/accessing -markets/go ods-and-
services/digital -trade_en .  
The Digital Trade Principles build on the disciplines currently under discussion as part of the WTO 
negotiations on e -commerce.   
 
3. Trade Policies and Practices by Measure, 3.1. Measu res directly affecting imports, 3.1.6 
Anti-dumping, countervailing, and safeguard measures, 3.1.6.2. Safeguards, pg. 85, 3.105  
It is stated in the Secreteriat Report that "After adjudication of the steel safeguard in the DSB, on 
24 August  2022 the European  Union  informed interested parties of planned implementation of the 
measures. It was the Commission's intention to amend or supplement the steel safeguard regulation 
(Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159) based on submissions and input from 
interested parties. On 13  January  2023, the Commission published Commission Implementing 
Regulation (EU) 2023/104 whereby it implemented the panel report" . 
 
Question 7: Could the EU explain how it made the measure consistent with the WTO rules without 
any cha nge in the essence of the measure considering the Panel found that the measure is 
inconsistent with those rules in particular regarding increase in imports and threat of serious injury, 
which are key requirements for imposing a safeguard measure?  
 
Reply:  The EU refers to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/104 of 12  January  2023 
(link) amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 imposing a definitive safeguard measure 
on imports of certain steel products following a report adopted by the World Trade Organization's 
Dispute Settlement Body, whereby i t brought the steel safeguard measure into conformity with the 
relevant WTO rules following the DSB ruling in the dispute DS595.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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PAKISTAN  
Question  
1. How does the EU plan to implement trade and climate actions, such as border carbon 
adjustments, in an effective and fair way, considering the priorities of its partners, which often 
include industrial development, and considering the knock -on effects on supply chains involving 
low-income countries (LICs)?  
 
Reply: The CBAM does not distin guish between categories of third countries but applies to goods in 
certain sectors. The EU has carefully assessed the potential impact and given careful consideration, 
in particular to LDCs. Our studies show that exports from LDCs to the EU in the sectors  covered by 
the CBAM are limited.  
 
As regards the implementation of CBAM, to provide businesses and third countries with legal 
certainty and stability, a monitoring and reporting system will apply from 1  October  2023 until the 
end of 2025, giving sufficien t time for the administrative set up to be put in place. This transitional 
period will facilitate a careful, predictable and proportionate transition for EU and non -EU business, 
and give trading partners, including developing countries, time to prepare.  
 
The EU Commission, in conjunction with the European External Action Services and EU Delegations 
around the world, will launch an information campaign, featuring online seminars, physical events, 
distribution of guidance documents, and direct assistance, aim ed at assisting third country operators 
and importers in performing all new obligations required by the CBAM Regulation and its secondary 
legislation.  
 
The outreach campaign will start in Spring 2023 upon the approval of the implementing act 
concerning the  reporting rules applicable in transitional period. This awareness -raising exercise will 
continue through autumn 2023, thus supporting all relevant actors for the entry into force of the 
Regulation in October 2023, considering that the first CBAM report wi ll have to be submitted in 
January 2024.  
 
More generally, the EU is supporting developing countries to implement the Paris Agreement goals. 
The EU is collectively the biggest donor for international aid in the world, providing over EUR 50billion 
a year to help overcome poverty and advance global development.  
 
We also continue to support partner countries in their green transition, in line with our international 
commitments. Through the EU's Global Instrument (Neighbourhood, Development and International 
Cooperation Instrument – NDICI), we have so far committed about EUR  27.8 billion  in support of 
climate objectives in our partner countries for the period of 2021 -27.  
 
In December 2021, the EU launched the Global Gateway, a new strategy to mobilise investments 
totalling EUR  300 billion  over the period 2021 -27. In line with the EU's commitment to the 2030 
Agenda, the Global Gateway aims at boosting smart, clean and secure investments in digital, energy 
and transport.  
 
Question  
2. How can the EU ensure  adequate support for LICs to develop common monitoring, reporting 
and verification frameworks to support the reduction of carbon in trade?  
 
Reply:  The EU Commission, in conjunction with the External Action Services and EU Delegations 
around the world, wil l launch an information campaign, featuring online seminars, physical events, 
distribution of guidance documents, and direct assistance, aimed at assisting third country operators 
and importers to the EU in performing all new obligations required by the CB AM regulation and its 
secondary legislation. The campaign will start mid 2023 upon the approval of the implementing act 
concerning the reporting rules applicable in transitional period. This will continue through 
autumn  2023 thus supporting all relevant ac tors for the entry into force of the regulation in 
October  2023.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 More generally, Climate action forms also part in our bilateral cooperation programmes, which could, 
depending on national priorities, support the efforts of our partner countries towards de carbonisation 
and/or carbon pricing. The EU already plays an important role in contributing to green transition 
outside of its borders, in our Neighbourhood and enlargement countries, and will continue with its 
support in this respect. The EU will continue  to be one of the biggest contributors to climate financing 
worldwide and is determined to support accelerating the global green transition through supporting 
green projects and the introduction of carbon mitigation mechanisms by our international partners . WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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KAZAK HSTAN  
REPORT BY THE EUROPEAN UNION  
5.1 The EU's actions on climate change and environmental protection  
Page 19, para.  5.7.  
The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM ) is a climate measure aimed at decreasing global 
GHG emissions by preventing the risk of carbon leakage and by supporting  increased ambition on 
climate mitigation, while ensuring WTO compatibility. The CBAM will equalise the price of carbon 
between domest ic products and imports and ensure that the EU's climate objectives are not 
undermined by production relocating to countries with less ambitious climate policies.  
 
Question 1  
Please explain how the EU ensures that the CBAM would not create any new signific ant challenges 
for exporters of carbon -intensive products, as well as would not change the structure of the goods 
flow and the conditions for competitive advantage in the world's largest market.  
 
Reply:  The Regulation establishing a carbon border adjustme nt mechanism  (Regulation 2023/956) 
was published in the EU Official Journal on 16th May 2023 ( link).  
 
The EU has built -in a transitional period in CBAM starting in October 2023, which will give trading 
partners, including developing countries, time to prepare for the definitive period, as from 2026.  
 
The European Commission will, aft er consultation of the CBAM Committee, adopt an implementing 
act regulating the transitional period of CBAM starting on the 1st of October 2023 and which notably 
specifies the reporting obligations for importers. The European  Commission will publish the dr aft 
implementing regulation for feedback by stakeholders for a period of four weeks before the CBAM 
Committee renders its opinion on it.  
 
The EU Commission, in conjunction with the External Action Services and EU Delegations around the 
world, will launch an information campaign, featuring online seminars, physical events, distribution 
of guidance documents, and direct assistance, aimed at assisting third country operators and 
importers to the EU in performing all new obligations required by the CBAM regula tion and its 
secondary legislation. The campaign is expected to start mid 2023 upon the approval of the 
implementing act concerning the reporting rules applicable in transitional period. This will continue 
through autumn 2023 thus supporting all relevant a ctors for the entry into force of the regulation in 
October 2023.  
 
REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT  
3.3.1.1 Subsidies at the EU level  
Page 99, para 3.147.   
In the area of energy, total subsidies (at the EU and member State levels) for all types of energy 
(fossil fuels, nuclear, and renewables) rose between 2020 and 2021 from EUR  173 billion  to 
EUR 184 billion , which was mostly due to an increase in energy dem and as economic activities began 
to recover according to a recent report by the European Commission. The report further estimates 
an increase in the amount of such subsidies reflecting the rise in energy prices.  
 
Question 2  
Please explain if the EU can con firm that such energy subsidies would not lead to trade distortions.  
 
Reply : The EU Member States must report every two years on their progress towards national 
objectives, and policies and measures, to phase out energy subsidies, in particular for fossil  fuels, 
as part of their integrated climate and energy progress reports.  
 
The Commission methodology for collecting data and reporting on energy subsidies relies on the 
broad definitions of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) of t he WTO. 
Due to their nature (for example support to households), these energy subsidies are unlikely to have 
any direct trade impact.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 BANGLADESH  
Reference:  Trade Policy Review Report by the Secretariat (WT/TPR/S/442), Dated: 11  April 2023.  
 
1. Under paragraph 2.43 (page 41), it was mentioned that in September 2021, the Commission 
submitted a proposal for a regulation for a new GSP scheme to the Parliament an d the Council which 
seeks to renew the GSP scheme for the period 2024 -34, except for its EBA component. In the 
proposed regulation, some specific changes have been suggested including removing the economic 
vulnerability criterion under the GSP+ arrangement , increasing the number of ratified international 
conventions from 27 to 32 for the GSP+ including the Paris Agreement, extending the application of 
international conventions on environmental and good governance to all GSP beneficiaries etc. It is 
also men tioned, that once adopted, it will replace the existing one and the new GSP system would 
enter into force on 1  January  2024. Moreover, it is also mentioned in footnote 75 that if the new 
regulation is not adopted, the standard GSP and the GSP+ arrangements  will cease to apply on 
1 January  2024.  
 
Concern:  It is essential to have automatic safeguard provision (Article  29) in the new 
GSP regulations in such a manner that it does not create trade barriers and diminishes the objective 
and principles of GSP regulations.  GSP+ is applicable for vulnerable economy, in that case, the 
provision of safeguard measures would likely be an obstacle for  some countries like Bangladesh as 
well.  
 
So, Bangladesh requests EU to review the proposed provision of reducing the threshold level.  
 
Question 1:  We understand the EU GSP aims to help boost the economies of the beneficiary 
countries, reducing poverty, c reating jobs, and better integrating into the global economy by 
exporting their products to EU. In this connection what is the value addition of ratifying new or more 
conventions to avail the GSP by the developing countries ?  
 
Reply:  The EU GSP aims to ass ist developing countries in their efforts to reduce poverty and promote 
good governance and sustainable development. The GSP promotes internationally recognized values 
by requiring all GSP beneficiary countries to respect fundamental human and labour right s and 
international standards on environmental protection and good governance. This way, the EU GSP 
contributes to economic growth that is sustainable.  
 
Question 2:  How EU can facilitate easier acces to GSP+ for graduating countries like Bangladesh 
conside ring their challenges after graduation?  
 
Reply:  The EU will continue to support Bangladesh throughout and after LDC graduation, including 
through our Aid for Trade directed towards boosting trade and sustainability.  
 
The EU remains committed to ensure tha t the GSP+ arrangement remains attractive and feasible 
for potential beneficiaries, including those graduating from LDC. The legislative process for a new 
GSP Regulation is still underway and it is not possible at this stage to say how the co -legislators ( the 
European Parliament and the Council of the European  Union ) will address any challenges faced by 
graduating countries.  
 
2. Rules of Origin (Page 56)  
 
Under paragraph 3.31 it is mentioned that the rules of origin are maintained by the European  Union  
for non-preferential and preferential trade both of which have been changed during the review 
period. Moreover, like many other policy areas, certain aspects of rules of origin were impacted by 
the COVID -19 pandemic and the European  Union  adjusted policy acco rdingly.  
 
Question 3: LDCs are  currently benefiting from Preferential Rule of Origin. Whether the EU is 
planning to maintain this flexibility in its future trade policy?  
 
Reply:  The EBA  scheme removes tariffs and quotas for all imports of goods (except arms and 
ammunition) coming into the EU from least developed countries (LDCs). LDC's will only leave the 
arrangement when they lose their status as 'Least Developed Country' as defined by the 
United  Nations, but only after a three year transition period.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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The European Commission will renew the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) as of 2024 
because the current regulation is set to expire on 31  December  2023. In the legal proposals, the 
structure of the current GSP (EBA for LDC's, standard GSP and GSP+) is maintained to address the 
diverse trade and development needs of different groups of developing countries. The applicable 
rules of origin are laid down in the Union Customs Code and the l egal acts adopted in accordance 
with the powers conferred by that Code, in particular Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 
2015/2446 19 and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 . 
 
3. Economic relevance of IPRs  
 
Under the paragraph 3.247 (Page -122) it is mentioned that the European  Union  contributed 
actively to discussions and work in the TRIPS Council. In particular, it made important contributions 
to COVID -19-related agenda items, including a Proposal for a Waiv er from Certain Provisions of the 
TRIPS  Agreement  for the Prevention, Containment and Treatment of COVID -19 and IP Measures in 
the Context of COVID -19. Moreover, it is also mentioned that the European  Union  submitted 
comprehensive reports on its technical cooperation activities under Article  67 of the 
TRIPS  Agreement  and on incentives provided to the private sector to transfer technology to LDCs 
under Article  66.2, and it co -sponsored contributions to TRIPS Council discussions relating to, 
inter alia, makin g MSMEs competitive, IP for investment/financing/funding, public -private 
collaborations in innovation, and women and intellectual property.  
 
Question 4: How will the EU's trade policy address the issues of technonogy transfer in the priority 
areas, includi ng public health and agriculture, for LDCs under TRIPS  Agreement ?  
 
Reply:  Comprehensive reports submitted by the EU to the WTO list a number of technical 
cooperation activities under Article  67 of the TRIPS  Agreement  and information on incentives 
provided  to the private sector to transfer technology to LDCs under Article  66.2.  
 
In 2021, the EU launched the Global Gateway, a new European strategy to boost smart, clean and 
secure links in digital, energy and transport sectors and to strengthen health, educa tion and research 
systems across the world. Between 2021 and 2027, Team Europe, meaning the EU institutions and 
EU Member States jointly, will mobilise up to €300  billion  of investments for sustainable and 
high-quality projects, taking into account the nee ds of partner countries, including health and 
agriculture, and ensuring lasting benefits for local communities. Partnering with the private sector 
will leverage critical technologies, transfer of technology, capital and expertise.  
 
Global Gateway will prio ritise the security of pharmaceutical supply chains and the development of 
local manufacturing in third countries, including LDCs. The COVID -19 pandemic revealed weakness 
but health issues extend beyond the pandemic. Thus, Global Gateway will also facilita te investment 
in infrastructure and the regulatory environment for the local production of medicine and medical 
technologies. This will help integrate fragmented markets abroad and promote research and 
cross-border innovation in healthcare, helping to over come diseases such as COVID -19, malaria, 
yellow fever, tuberculosis or HIV/AIDS.  
 
The EU and its Member States are committed to give collectively between 0.15% and 0.20% of the 
EU Global National Income (GNI) to Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in the shor t term and 0.20% 
by 2030.  
 
Question 5: How will the EU collaborate with the Developing Countries and LDCs to strengthen its 
regulatory capacity and support the growth of MSMEs in making them sustainable and competitive?  
 
Reply:  More than one third of glob al Aid for Trade (EUR  22.9 billion  in 2020) comes from the EU 
with its Member States. Strengthening partner countries' regulatory capacity is included under 
Category 1 of Aid for Trade, "Trade Policy and Regulations" (totalling EUR  659 million  in 2020), an d 
supporting the growth of MSMEs is included under Category 4, "Building Productive Capacity" 
(totalling EUR  13.3 billion  in 2020). Stemming from the EU Aid for Trade strategy of 2017, the EU 
has a target to increase its share of Aid for Trade going to LDC s, which will include support to value 
chain development, supporting services (such as banking and transport), trade facilitation, among 
other areas.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 4. Sustainable Energy and Climate  
 
Under the paragraph 4.118. it is highlighted that, in February 2022, the Commission adopted new 
Guidelines on State Aid for climate, environmental protection and energy as spelled out in the 
European Green Deal to facilitate achieving the Deal's objectives , specifying 14 potentially 
compatible types of specific aid measures.  
 
There are many vulnerable countries including Bangladesh in terms of climate change and this issue 
is considering the major concern of them for its high cost of management. World Bank report has 
said that, the impressive economic growth of Bangladesh was backed by its decades of systematic 
investments in climate resilience and disasters preparedness. Though Bangladesh has recognized as 
a global leader in climate change adaptation a nd disaster preparedness but, the country is 
continuously facing severe and increasing climate risks.  The cost of climate change is very high and 
loss may be estimated at about 1.5% of GDP. One-third of agricultural GDP of Bangladesh may be 
lost due to cli mate variability and extreme events and around 13.3  million people may become 
internal migrants in next 30 years due to climate impacts on agriculture, water scarcity, and rising 
sea levels, with higher impacts on women. In case of a severe flooding, GDP c ould fall significantly 
and the costs of environmental degradation and natural disasters are predicted to rise over time, 
compounded by higher heat, humidity, and health impacts.  
 
Question 6:  Is there any plan for cooperation on green transformation and re lated technology to 
help reduce adverse impacts of climate change on developing countries including LDCs?  
 
Reply: The EU is supporting developing countries to implement the Paris Agreement goals. The EU 
is collectively the biggest donor for international aid in the world, providing over EUR 50billion a year 
to help overcome poverty and advance global development.  
 
We also continue to support partner countries in their green transition, in line with our international 
commitments. Through the EU's Global Ins trument (Neighbourhood, Development and International 
Cooperation Instrument – NDICI), we have so far committed about EUR  27.8 billion  in support of 
climate objectives in our partner countries for the period of 2021 -27.  
 
In December 2021, the EU launched the Global Gateway, a new strategy to mobilise investments 
totalling EUR  300 billion  over the period 2021 -27. In line with the EU's commitment to the 
2030 Agenda, the Global Gateway aims at boosting smart, clean and secure investments in digital, 
energy and transport. In Bangladesh, the EU's Multi -annual Indicative Programme (MIP) 
for 2021-2027 has Green Inclusive Development as one of three priority areas.  
 
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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RUSSIAN  FEDERATION  
EU response to all questions by the Russian  Federation : In light of Russia's war of aggression 
against of Ukraine, the European  Union  does not engage in business -as-usual activity in the WTO 
with the delegation of the Russian  Federation . This means that the European  Union  will refrain from 
engaging directly w ith the Russian  Federation  in the context of the EU Trade Policy Review.  
 
 
TRADE POLICY REVIEW – 
REPORT BY THE EUROPEAN UNION  
1 INTRODUCTION  
Page 4, para 1.1. The report states in the very first paragraph: "In the three years since its last 
Trade Policy Review, the European  Union  (EU)'s trade policy has continued to operate in a very 
challenging international environment. Geopolitical tensions have been on the rise, most recently 
with the Russian  Federation 's illegal and unjustified war of aggressi on against Ukraine, with 
spill-over effects affecting nations around the world".  
 
Question № 1 
First of all, Russia makes the strongest protest against the qualification of Russia's actions as war or 
aggression. Since the WTO is not a proper plac e for political discussions, Russia will not touch on 
this issue further. However, our position in this regard has been and remains fundamental and 
never -changing. Spill -over effects mentioned by the EU are exclusively due to EU and its alliances 
unlawful prohibitions and restrictions in trade and finance areas.  
 
Russia would like to know whether the EU is conscious of the contribution of the EU itself to the 
trade and economic problems that are discussed throughout the Report and that are mistakenly 
(and q uite deliberately) linked to Russia.  
 
Page 4, para 1.2: The Report states that "the new strategy was based on the concept of open 
strategic autonomy, designed to enhance the EU's ability to make its own choices and shape the 
world around it through leaders hip and engagement; and which also reflects the EU's fundamental 
belief that addressing today's challenges requires more rather than less global cooperation".  
 
Question № 2 
Could the EU elaborate more on the means the EU uses or plans to use to achieve the desired 
"engagement" to "shape the world around it"?  
Is the extraterritorial unilateral imposition of scientifically questionable environmental "standards" 
onto producers of certain goods willing to supply goods to the EU is an example of such 
"engagement"?  
 
Question № 3 
How does the EU's belief in the need of more global cooperation to address today's challenges coexist 
with the bloc's import substitution polici es, in particular in light of the EU Critical Raw Materials Act 
(CRMA) proposed in March 2023?  
 
Page 4, paras.  1.3 – 1.4: The Report states that "[t]he new strategy was underpinned by 
openness, sustainability and assertiveness", and that "[e]verything pos sible must be done to sustain 
the benefits of cooperation and avoid a protectionist spiral". It further states that "[t]he EU has 
remained committed to the WTO", and that EU's efforts "will hopefully give a new impetus to the 
continuous efforts to strength en the multilateral trading order" . 
 
Question № 4 
The EU's officials regularly declare the bloc's openness and commitment to global rules -based trade. 
According to the EU, "[t]he WTO remains a vital institution; the guarantor of rules-based open trade 
and a guardrail against the risk of an increasingly fragmented economic order".1 Yet, at the same 
time, according to the new trade strategy "An Open, Sustainable, and Assertive Trade Policy" 
adopted by the EU in February 2021, the E U seeks to achieve an "open strategic autonomy" and will 
 
1 WT/GC/W/864 . WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 506 - 
 
  
 "act autonomously if needed". In other words, the EU seeks to "set [its] own rules of the game"2 
when it comes to sensitive trade and economic areas.  
 
The EU's officials justify the use of certain trade tools as a "necessary evil" [against, ironically, 
unilateral measures of other states].3 Instead of resolving trade disputes in accordance with the 
WTO rules, the EU develops and implements unilateral and unauthorized by the international trade 
law "anti-coercion" measures.4 
 
Additionally, in (likely) violation of the WTO rules and contrary to the principle of technological 
neutrality, the EU restricts imports of certain products based on unilaterally set environmental 
"standards".5 
 
Moreover, unde r the guise of "economic sovereignty", the EU pursues import substitution policies 
and favours certain WTO Member states in circumvention of the WTO rules on free trade 
agreements .6 
 
Can the EU please explain the coexistence of these two features – suppor t for the WTO and 
simultaneous disregard for the spirit and letter of the WTO agreement?  
 
Question № 5 
Could the EU explain in which way does the EU's development of unilateral and unauthorized by the 
international trade law mechanism of "anti -coercion" measures help avoid the creation of the 
protectionist spiral?  
 
Question № 6 
Could the EU elaborate what efforts does it make to avoid a protectionist spiral, and whether the EU 
succeeds in avoiding it, given the EU's active participation in a "green" subsidy race with other 
WTO Members?  
 
2 TRADE AND THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
2.1 The EU economic environment and its macroeconomic policy  
Page 5, para 2.3 : Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine poses new challenges to the EU 
economy. The invasion has implied renewed disruptions in global supply chains, fueled commodity 
price surge and inflation, and heightened uncertainty.  
Page 5, para 2.5 : The subsequent energy and commodity price shock combined with supply chain 
disruptio ns caused by the Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine from early 2022 further fuelled 
price increases. As a result, inflation in the EU surged from 2.9% in 2021 to 9.3% in 2022 – the 
highest in decades. Inflation is expected to gradually decline to 7 % in 2023 and then to 3% in 2024.  
 
Question № 7 
Russia would appreciate information as to whether the EU has calculated the effects of its anti -
Russian illegal unilateral restrictive measures on energy prices in the EU or the world markets.  
 
Can the EU provide official statistical data and the other evidence that would demonstrate the direct 
effect of "the Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine" on the  
(1) EU economy,  
(2) global supply chains disruptions,  
(3) commodity prices and  
(4) infla tion?  
 
Question № 8 
Could the EU confirm that such "new challenges to the EU economy  … renewed disruptions in global 
supply chains, fueled commodity price surge and inflation, and heightened uncertainty" were a direct 
 
2 Speech by Commissioner Thierry Breton: Sovereign ty, self -assurance and solidarity: Europe in today's 
geopolitics. 5 September  2022.  
3 Ibid. 
4 See, e.g. Council of the EU. Trade: political agreement on the anti -coercion instrument 
(28 March  2023) . 
5 See, e.g. EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism.  
6 See, e.g. The White House. The United  States  and European  Union  To Negotiate World's First 
Carbon -Based Sectoral Arrangement on Steel and Aluminum Trade ( 31 October  2022); See also REUTERS U.S. 
lays out possible critical raw materials agreement with EU – Hande lsblatt ( 23 March  2023).  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 507 - 
 
result of Russia's actions,  rather than the unilateral restrictive measures against Russia implemented 
by the EU itself (including in the spheres of energy, agriculture, payments and logistics)? Please, 
explain the rationale.  
 
2 TRADE AND THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
2.1 The EU economic  environment and its macroeconomic policy  
Page 6, para 2.7:  On the other hand, several crucial EU policy actions will support economic growth 
in the coming years. In 2020, the EU unveiled its Next Generation EU2 (NGEU) recovery plan with 
the aim to support  the recovery of EU countries from pandemic and foster the green and digital 
transitions. Financial support under the NGEU reaches EUR  750 billion  and it is channelled through 
seven programmes in the form of grants (EUR  390 billion ) and loans (EUR  360 billion). The Recovery 
and Resilience Facility (RRF) represents the bulk of the NGEU effort comprising close to 90% of the 
total budget. According to the RRF, Member States applying for financial support, have to submit 
national recovery and resilience plans s etting out their reform and investment agenda up to 2026.  
 
Question № 9 
Please list all programmes under NGEU  and specify the amounts of funds allocated to each of them. 
Please provide a description of the programmes and the amounts of funds dedicated to the "green 
transition" and to the "digital transition" and sources of these funds.  
 
Question № 10 
Could the EU confirm that its industrial subsidies, including those aimed to support recovery from 
the pandemic and foster the green and digital transitions, are consistent with the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures?  
 
Page 6, para 2.8: Following Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU has launched the 
REPowerEU Plan with the objective to end the EU's dependence on Russian fossil fuels. The plan 
aims at fostering energy savings, diversification of energy supplies and accelerated r oll-out of 
renewable energy. The RRF would be at the core of the implementation of the REPowerEU. Upon 
approval of the Commission's proposal, Member States would have to integrate a dedicated 
REPowerEU chapter in their Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRPs).  
 
Question № 11 
What trade measures are taken or envisaged under the REPowerEU Plan? Could the EU confirm that 
these measures are consistent with the WTO agreements and the EU's obligations in the WTO?  
 
Question № 12 
Can the EU confirm  that these measures are aimed at reducing the EU's dependence on fossil fuels 
supplied exclusively by Russia, and that they would not create any trade barriers or competition 
distortions for the third countries?  
 
Question № 13 
Is our understand ing correct that the EU instructs its entities not to supply services to Russian energy 
companies, including in the spheres of payments, distribution, logistics, with a view to "end the EU's 
dependence on Russian fossil fuels"? If so, can the EU explain ho w are such instructions consistent 
with the EU obligations under GATS?  
 
3 MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL TRADE POLICY  
3.1 The EU's multilateral trade agenda  
3.1.1 WTO Reform  
Page 8, para 3.5:  No WTO reform is more critical or urgent than delivering on the aim  identified in 
the MC12 outcome document of having a "fully and well -functioning dispute settlement system" by 
2024. The EU is constructively engaged in reform discussions. Time before 2024 is tight. The EU 
believes that reform discussions should be focuse d on identifying solutions for a limited set of issues 
that require improvement with a view to reaching agreement no later than MC13.  
 
Question № 14 
How does the EU plan to make its "anti -coercion" mechanism (which will supposedly allow for the 
unilateral imposition of increased customs duties, restrictions in the field of services or public 
procurement, etc.) compatible with the dispute settlement system to be reinvigorated at the 
multilateral level?  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 3.2 The EU's bilateral agenda  
Page 7, para 3. 31: The Report states that the "EU's efforts concentrated on strengthening bilateral 
partnerships; creating the conditions to support the security, resilience, and stability of supply 
chains; creating new opportunities for businesses through diversificatio n of imports, exports and 
investments; and supporting sustainable development".  
 
Question № 15 
How does the EU's policy aimed at the "diversification of imports […] and investments" comply with 
the bloc's declared "openness"?  
 
b. Negotiating func tion 
a. Dispute settlement  
Page 8, para 3.6:  While the EU's priority is finding a lasting multilateral solution to the 
Appellate  Body situation, in the meantime, the EU will continue to support the smooth operation of 
and foster participation in the Multi -party interim appeal arbitration arrangement (MPIA). The MPIA 
is an interim arrangement designed to preserve, in any WTO disputes amo ng participating 
WTO members, the right to a functioning two -tier and independent dispute settlement mechanism 
under WTO rules. The MPIA is open to all WTO members to join, for as long as the Appellate  Body 
is not able to function fully. Not only is the MP IA of use to regular users of WTO dispute settlement; 
more fundamentally, it signals commitment to a rules -based international trading system, with 
properly functioning WTO dispute resolution at its heart.  
 
Question № 16 
As stated in the paragrap h: "the Appellate Body is not able to function fully". In light of this 
observation, could the EU please elaborate on the rationale behind its decision to appeal to the 
Appellate  Body in late August 2020 (when the AB was already inoperable)?.  
 
(i) Multilat eral negotiations  
Page 8, para 3.7 and 3.8:  The EU played an active role at the MC12 in June 2022 to reach a 
landmark Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies delivering on UN Sustainable Development Goal 
Target  14.6 (SDG14.6). […]  
The EU's internal procedures are  already underway to accept the agreement and to have it enter 
into force as soon as possible. […] The EU is committed to constructively engage in the continued 
negotiations to deliver a comprehensive agreement addressing subsidies that contribute to 
overc apacity and overfishing.  
 
Question № 17 
Please elaborate on the changes made in the EU policy in order to implement the provisions of the 
WTO Agreement  on Fisheries Subsidies.  
 
Question № 18 
Which measures would ensure that the fisheri es subsidies do not contribute to overcapacity and 
overfishing, taking into account that, according to the Secretariat's Report "the EU (including its 
member States) remains one of the largest providers of fishery subsidies, estimated to having 
provided US D 3.8 billion  of subsidies in 2018, or around 11% of global subsidies"?  
 
Question № 19 
Please elaborate on the progress of ratification of the WTO  Agreement  on Fisheries Subsidies in 
the EU. What is the estimated timeline for this process to be completed?  
 
(ii) Plurilateral negotiations  
Page 9, para 3.14:  The EU therefore continues to play a constructive role with a view of driving 
these negotiations towards a high -standard and commercially significant outcome building on 
existing WTO agreements  and frameworks. The EU welcomes the positive negotiating momentum 
and the substantial progress made to date in the negotiations. A positive outcome in the negotiated 
areas will deliver important benefits including boosting consumer confidence and supporti ng 
businesses trading online.  
 
Question № 20 
Could the EU share their view on how many WTO Members should participate in the JSI's negotiations 
on e-commerce for achieving critical mass and a high -standard outcome?  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 509 - 
 
Question № 21 
What e fforts did the EU make to involve new participants into these negotiations?  
 
3.2 The EU's bilateral agenda  
Page 11, para 3.31 : The Report indicates that " the EU continued to pursue an active bilateral trade 
agenda in an increasingly difficult internationa l environment affected by the COVID -19 pandemic, 
Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and rising protectionism".  
 
Question № 22 
Russia would like to know whether the EU classifies anti -Russian illegal unilateral restrictive 
measures as protectionist measures.  
 
3.2.2 Trade -related cooperation  
Page 15, para 3.65:  On 31  October  2021, as demonstration of renewed trust, the EU and the US 
jointly announced their intention to agree on a Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and 
Aluminium (GSA) .  
 
Question № 23 
The US has started discussions on a Global Arrangement on Sust ainable Steel and Aluminium with 
a number of countries, including the EU. This agreement as reported by the media envisages, in 
particular, the abolition of steel and aluminum safeguard duties for products originating in the EU 
and provides for other benef its and advantages in mutual trade. Could the EU explain how it 
reconciles this agreement with the GATT Articles I and XXIV and the rules under the Agreement on 
Safeguards?  
 
Page 16, para 3.66:  The aim of the GSA is to address shared challenges in the glob al steel and 
aluminium sector, stemming from global non -market excess capacity as well as the carbon intensity 
of the industries. The GSA is intended to become a multilateral effort and is open to interested 
countries that share the commitment of the EU an d the US to restore market orientation and reduce 
trade in carbon -intensive steel and aluminium products.  
 
Question № 24 
How does the EU plan to turn the GSA into a "multilateral effort", if it is open specifically to 
"interested countries that s hare the commitment of the EU and the US"? How does such an effort 
align with the interests of the other 162 WTO Members?  
 
5 SUSTAINABILTY  
5.1 The EU's actions on climate change and environmental protection  
Page 18, para.  5.2: The European Green Deal seek s to transform the EU into a modern, 
resource -efficient and competitive economy where there are no net emissions of greenhouse gases 
by 2050, economic growth is decoupled from resource use, and no one is left behind in what will be 
a just transition.  
 
Ques tion № 25 
The European Green Deal, as umbrella legislation, is packed with a large number of strategies and 
proposals on a wide range of topics (see Annex  to the Green Deal). To implement the Green Deal, 
the EU uses state interventions in the mar ket in various forms, including trade restrictions and 
industrial subsidies. It appears that, while the aim is that "no one is left behind" within the EU, the 
EU turns to "green protectionism" practices at the expense of the other WTO Members. In other 
words, it appears that the EU aims to maintain and enhance competitiveness of its domestic 
industries under the guise of environmental and climate goals and sustainability. Could the EU really 
confirm that it will avoid green protectionism and minimize negati ve effect of its so -called "green" 
measures on WTO Members?  
 
Page 18, para.  5.4: EU claims that it "designs its climate and environmental policies in line with 
the WTO rules and provides a full transparency on EU climate - and environmental measures to the 
EU trading partners bilaterally, including in the context of trade agreements, and in the WTO".  
 
Question № 26 
Despite its claim of full transparency of the EU climate - and environmental measures, some 
questions posed by WTO Members, including th e Russian  Federation , regarding the European Green 
Deal, in particular the EU CBAM, still remain unanswered. When will the EU provide its answers to WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 written questions dated 8 October  2021 circulated in documents G/MA/W/172 and G/C/W/800 on 
Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism? When will the EU address questions posed to the EU during 
the Committee on Market Access meeting in March and October 2022 on the same topic as well as 
in the Committee on TBT on the elements of the Green Deal?  
 
5.1.1 Overview of the actions on climate change and environmental protection  
Page 19, para.  5.7: The report states: "The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is a 
climate measure aimed at decreasing global GHG emissions by preventing the risk of carbon leakage 
and b y supporting increased ambition on climate mitigation, while ensuring WTO compatibility" . 
 
Question № 27 
While the EU presents its CBAM  as "a climate measure", its legislators consider that the EU CBAM is 
aimed, in particular, at "leveling the playing field" and "stopping unfair competition". How does the 
EU explain and reconcile such different views?  
 
Question № 28 
Could the EU  describe the meaning of "the risk of carbon leakage" and explain whether the alleged 
risk currently exists?  
 
Question № 29 
If the EU considers that the "risk of carbon leakage" exists, please provide scientific evidence 
confirming it and describ ing its magnitude. Please indicate whether scientific evidence includes 
consideration of the non -anthropogenic causes of climate change and explain whether and how the 
EU takes it into account in designing its trade policy measures under the Green Deal.  
 
Question № 30 
Please explain whether and how the risk magnitude of "carbon leakage" is correlated to the level of 
trade restrictiveness of the CBAM?  
 
Question № 31 
According to the UNCTAD report "A European Union Carbon Border Adjustment  Mechanism: 
Implications for Developing Countries", the value of the EU CBAM in mitigating climate change is 
limited as it would reduce only 0.1% of global CO2 emissions. This very modest reduction of global 
emissions comes with a high price, especially fo r some WTO Members, including several developing 
countries. The UNCTAD report states that the CBAM will negatively affect exports of certain 
carbon -intensive products, and increase a welfare gap between developed and developing countries. 
With a CBAM based  on a carbon price of $44 per tonne, the income of developed countries would 
rise by  $2.5 billion , while that of developing nations would fall by $5.9  billion . These numbers are 
helpful to understand the problem that the CBAM will create; however, they are  outdated. A welfare 
gap is likely to be much bigger for several reasons, including the increase of the carbon price. As of 
February 2023, the price of carbon in the EU ETS has exceeded 100 euros per metric ton of CO2. 
With this understanding of the CBAM's  negative impact, could the EU explain whether and how the 
trade restrictiveness of its CBAM is kept at a minimum?  
 
Question № 32 
The CBAM will be introduced progressively from 2026 to 2034 to the same extent that free 
allowances will be reduced in the relevant sectors of EU ETS. As new sectors will be included under 
the CBAM, the volume of free allocations for covered EU industries will decrease. Please explain, 
how does the EU plan to ensure the WTO -compliance of this instrument?  
 
5.1.2 Sustain able food systems  
Page 20, para.  5.16: The Farm to Fork (F2F) Strategy adopted in May 2020 is the EU's contribution 
to the global transition towards sustainable food systems. It aims to ensure food security, nutrition 
and public health, access to sufficie nt, safe, nutritious, sustainable food for all, and this while having 
a neutral or positive environmental impact. To achieve the transition, the Strategy's action plan sets 
out both regulatory and non -regulatory initiatives, including the EU Code of Conduc t on responsible 
food business and marketing practices that entered into force in July 2021.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Question № 33 
EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) makes up almost 30% of the overall EU budget. About 
387 billion  euros are provided under the CAP in 2021 -2027, with 40% of the CAP budget being 
climate -related in 2023 -2027.7 Such enormous investments into the agricultural sector will 
significantly affect competitiveness of domestic EU producers, access conditions to  the EU market, 
as well as the overall state of competition in the global agricultural markets. Subsidies under the 
Farm to Fork Strategy could be considered as trade -distorting, especially since they might be 
provided "on top" of the already existing trad e distorting agricultural support in the EU.  
 
Please, elaborate on the source of subsidies provided under the Green Deal and the Farm to Fork 
strategy. Can the EU confirm that the realization of the EU CBAM is one of the sources for such 
subsidies?  
 
TRADE POLICY RESPONSE TO CRISIS  
7.2 Sanctions  
Page 30, para 7.5:  The EU also adopts restrictive measures – 'sanctions' – that are an essential 
tool in the EU's common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and through which the EU can intervene 
where necessar y to prevent conflict or respond to emerging or current crises. Some of these 
measures concern trade, with those against Russia being one example.  
7.6. Since Russia's recognition of the non -government -controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk 
oblasts in  Ukraine on 21  February  2022 and its unprovoked and unjustified military aggression 
against Ukraine on 24  February  2022, the EU has imposed a series of new sanctions against Russia, 
Belarus and Ukraine non -government controlled areas. They add to existing measures imposed on 
Russia since 2014 following the annexation of Crimea and the non -implementation of the Minsk 
agreements.  
 
Question № 34 
How does the EU's ban on export of dual -used goods and technologies to the Russian  Federation , 
specified i n Annex  I to the EU Regulation 2021/821, commensurate with the EU's WTO obligations, 
including with respect to the general elimination of quantitative restrictions (Article  XI of the 
GATT  1994)? 
 
Question № 35 
How does the EU's ban on export of d ual-used goods and technologies to certain persons in the 
Russian  Federation , specified in Annex  I to the EU Regulation 2021/821, commensurate with the 
EU's MFN obligations (Article  I of the GATT  1994)? 
 
Page 30, para 7.7: "Sanctions include targeted restrictive measures (measures against individuals) 
and economic sanctions, and are accompanied by diplomatic measures. The aim of the economic 
sanctions is to impose severe consequences on Russia for its actions and to effective ly thwart Russian 
abilities to continue the aggression. The relevant trade measures have been notified to the WTO". 
(footnotes omitted).  
 
Question № 36 
Russia would like to know if it is the EU's position that the notification turns illegal meas ures into 
legal ones?  
 
Question № 37 
Russia would appreciate information as to how the EU reconciles the "economic sanctions" with 
Article  23 of the DSU prohibiting unilateral measures.  
 
Page 30, para 7.8:  As mentioned in the report, "the EU sa nctions target goods, services and 
technology with the aim to reduce the war capacity of Russia, and do not target food and agricultural 
products, as food security and affordability are a key priority for the EU and its Member States, just 
as it is for our  international partners. EU sanctions explicitly exclude food and foodstuffs (except 
alcoholic beverages, cigarettes), goods that are primarily for consumers and 
health/pharmaceuticals. Moreover, there are no restrictions of any kind on nitrogen and phosph orus 
fertilisers, which account for 85% of the fertiliser market. The tariff rate quotas (TRQs) on potassium 
(potash) fertilisers imply that EU imports do not exceed average annual EU imports from 
Russia  2017-2021. There are no sanctions on Russian exports  of food or fertilizer to global markets 
 
7 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2020 -09/future -cap-and-green -deal_en_0.pdf .  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 and no limitations stem from EU sanctions with respect to transport and transactions regarding food 
and fertilisers from Russia to third countries".  
 
Question № 38 
The Report states that 'the EU sanctions do not target food and agricultural products' and that 'there 
are no sanctions on Russian exports of food or fertilizer to global markets and no limitations stem 
from EU sanctions with respect to transport and transactions regarding food and fertilisers fr om 
Russia to third countries'.  
In fact, Russian exporters of food and fertilizers are facing the following hardships due to the EU's 
sanctions:  
− increased import tariffs,  
− blocked payments, including due to the disconnection of the Russian Agricultural  Bank 
(RusAg) from SWIFT,  
− blocked/frozen assets and accounts of the Russian companies, as well as individuals (such 
as top -management of such companies), involved in (or related to) the production and 
transportation of food and fertilizers,  
− bans of the use of foreign seaports,  
− restrictions and bans imposed with respect to the freight and road transport, as well as the 
provision of insurance, reinsurance and legal services, that represent an integral part of food and 
fertilizers export processes,  
− disruptions in supplies of agricultural machinery and its parts, as well as with respect to its 
maintenance,  
− blocking of the Togliatti -Odessa ammonia pipeline.  
All of these factors result in increased transaction costs and represent de facto  quantitative 
restrictions on Russian supplies of food and fertilizers, which altogether lead to uncontrollable 
respective price hikes and global food shortages.  
 
In light of the above outlined indisputable facts, how can the EU justify its followi ng claim: 'there 
are no sanctions on Russian exports of food or fertilizer to global markets and no limitations stem 
from EU sanctions with respect to transport and transactions regarding food and fertilisers from 
Russia to third countries'?  
 
Question № 39 
How does the EU assess the impact of its restrictions imposed with respect to the Russian grain, 
fertilizers and the other agricultural products on the global food security?  
 
Question № 40 
The EU's unilateral restrictive measures and,  in particular, actions by certain EU Member states also 
took a great toll on the developing and least -developed countries. Even the free -of-charge transfer 
of Russian fertilisers (262,000 tonnes) with humanitarian aims  to the poorest countries is being 
carried out with great difficulties and delays due to sanctions.  
 
Given that the EU proclaims food security as its 'key priority', how does it justify the detrimental 
effect its sanctions imposed against Russia have on the developing and the least developed  
countries?  
 
Question № 41  
Countries of the European  Union  are among the major recipients of grain through the Black Sea 
grain initiative (Initiative), while it should be the developing countries, and especially 
least-developed and economically vulnerable countries in food insecure regions, benefiting from 
these grain supplies.  
 
In fact, 10 countries of the EU with the population of about 333 mln people accumulated over 
10,3 mln metric tons of grain delivered under the  Initiative, while some of the most food insecure 
countries, such as Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Yemen and Afghanistan, with the total population of about 
360 mln people, have received almost 10 times less (1,3 mln tons of grains). According to the latest 
FAO-WFP outlook 2023, these countries are among the hunger hotspots in the world, with some of 
them facing high levels of acute food insecurity. 8 This is also true for Libya, Sudan, Lebanon, 
 
8 https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP -
0000142656/download/?_ga=2.55066664.2080201297.1680265768 -1315134428.1676041680 .  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Pakistan, Somalia, Djibouti, and many other hunger affected countries,  that should be among the 
major beneficiaries.  
 
Could the EU please explain how its policy on building grain stocks in the Union contributes to the 
acute food insecurity problems across the globe?  
Can the EU please comment on the fact that its Member Stat es are the major beneficiaries of the 
grain deal, instead of the less developed and most affected countries?  
 
8.3 Acting against economic coercion  
Page 32, para 8.10:  … The rationale of the instrument, in terms of both standing against economic 
coercion an d the permissibility of response measures as a last resort, lies in general international 
law which outlaws interventions in the internal or external affairs of other states and which allows 
countermeasures in response to internationally wrongful acts (rat her than specifically in the 
WTO Agreement ). 
 
Question № 42  
Can the EU confirm that the anti -coercion instrument is governed by "general international law" 
"rather than specifically the WTO  Agreement "?  
 
Could the EU elaborate on the conformity of such unilateral application of trade -restrictive measures 
under the anti -coercion instrument with its WTO obligations?  
 
Page 36, 9.25. […] Also, the EU has taken several measures to support the farmers following the 
price volatility, the increased prices of inputs, including fertilisers etc., due to Russia's war of 
aggression against Ukraine.  
 
Question № 43  
Russia would appreciate information as to whether the EU has calculated the effects of its 
anti-Russian ille gal unilateral restrictive measures on price volatility.  
 
TRADE POLICY REVIEW – REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT  
1 ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
1.1 Main features of the economy  
Page 12, para 19: The importance of energy and climate policies gained further impetus during 
the review period with the shift towards renewable and low -carbon energy, improving energy 
security, and reducing emissions to achieve climate neutrality. The 2021 Fit -for-55 packa ge aims to 
align these policies with the climate -related goals of the European Green Deal and the Climate Law, 
which includes targets for GHG emission reductions. The package contains many policy initiatives 
that focus on emissions reduction through variou s channels from the demand - and supply -side, 
including complementing the Emissions Trading System with a Carbon Border Adjustment 
Mechanism, or reforming energy taxation. Most recently, the REPowerEU plan aims to diversify the 
energy supply, save energy, a nd facilitate an increase in clean energy generation. The Plan includes 
faster permitting rules for renewable energy projects and supporting the development of renewable 
hydrogen. A number of regulations established minimum storage levels for natural gas, voluntary 
gas demand reduction targets, and a cap for market revenues from electricity generation in 2022.  
 
Page 16, para 1.8:  The economic upturn in 2021 was aided by coordinated monetary and fiscal 
policy measures aimed at turning the recovery into susta ined economic growth. On the other hand, 
global developments still had an important impact, i.e. supply side constraints were still prevalent 
and affected commodity prices, energy in particular, leading to higher inflation, which reached 2.9%. 
In early 202 2, the war in Ukraine created further pressures on the supply side, including rising prices 
and greater uncertainty. Inflation reached a high of 11.1% in November 2022, mainly due to a sharp 
rise in energy prices, which reached a high of 42% as part of Har monised Index of Consumer Prices 
(HICP).  
 
Question № 44  
How does the EU justify the continued application of the unilateral restrictive measures, particularly 
in the energy sphere, in light inter alia of the rising inflation rates in the Union and other pa rts of 
the world?  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
1.3 Developments in trade and investment  
Page 24, para 1.34: According to the Report " in 2022, trade with the Russian Federation was 
noticeably impacted by the war in Ukraine and resulting sanctions and related measu res". This is 
followed by a description of the negative effects on EU trade, affecting a wide range of goods. It is 
concluded: " It is noteworthy that most of these categories had a relatively high incidence of 
sanctions applied compared to other categories ".  
 
Question № 45  
Is Russia's understanding correct that the EU's anti -Russian illegal unilateral restrictive measures 
have made a significant contribution to the negative effects on EU trade?  
 
1.3.1.2 Trends in services trade  
Page 31, para 2.4: During the review period, the European  Union  embarked on a new development 
strategy under the European Green Deal (2019) with the aim of becoming a carbon -neutral economy 
by 2050. […]  
 
Question № 46  
Trade policies within the Green Deal f ramework are based on the assumption that human activity 
connected to consumption of carbon containing products like oil, gas etc. has substantially 
contributed to climate change. However, there is a growing number of research on 
non-anthropogenic influence of climate change. This fact questions the adequacy of trade restriction 
mechanism based on one -sided approach to scientific reasoning of the global warming effect, 
implying that "human -made" CO2 emissions are the primary cause of g lobal temperature changes. 
Meanwhile countries that rely on carbon -intensive exports will be disproportionately affected. 
Welfare losses due to the EU's border tax alone in developing countries like Egypt, Mozambique and 
Türkiye  range between $1  billion  to $5 billion , which are significant relative to their GDP. Potential 
Russia's losses could amount to $3.8  billion  in the first year of CBAM implementation, $8.7  billion  
in 2030. In general terms, this measure could lead to a widening income inequality and w orsening 
welfare distribution between rich and poor economies.  
 
Can the EU clarify who will bear the price to pay if a mistake occurs? How would the EU justify the 
global trade distortions resulting from the Green Deal framework if the root of the problem  is falsely 
identified?  
 
2. TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
2.1 General Framework  
Page 32, para 2.6, Chart  2.1: The European Commission is in charge of formulating, coordinating, 
and implementing EU trade policy. During the review period, the European  Union  updated its trade 
strategy (and objectives) and took various steps to support its implementation. The new policy – An 
Open, Sustainable, and Assertive Trade Policy – was published in February 2021 following a public 
consultation process. The policy sets the  European  Union 's priorities until 2030 and replaces the 
Trade for All Strategy that had been in place since 2015.  
 
Question № 47  
Could the European  Union  please identify the support measures aimed to increase the level of 
digitalization?  
 
2.2 Trade polic y formulation and objectives  
Page 32, para 2.6, Chart  2.1: The European Commission is in charge of formulating, coordinating, 
and implementing EU trade policy. During the review period, the European  Union  updated its trade 
strategy (and objectives) and to ok various steps to support its implementation. The new policy – An 
Open, Sustainable, and Assertive Trade Policy – was published in February 2021 following a public 
consultation process. The policy sets the European  Union 's priorities until 2030 and repla ces the 
Trade for All Strategy that had been in place since 2015.  
 
According to the Secretariat, to "[s]hape global rules for a more sustainable and fairer globalization" 
is one of the three EU's objectives under the new trade policy strategy named "An Op en, Sustainable, 
and Assertive Trade Policy". Further, Area 2 of action under the new strategy implies "[s]upporting 
the transition towards a greener economy and promoting value chains that are sustainable, and in 
line with EU standards" . 
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 515 - 
 
Question № 48  
As mentioned in the Report to "[s]hape global rules for a more sustainable and fairer globalization" 
is among the three objectives of the new trade policy strategy of the EU. However, over the past 
few years the EU has implemented a number of regulations reg arding post -pandemic economic 
recovery plans, "green transition" and unilateral restrictive measures. Could the EU elaborate how 
those measures, characterized by the excessive government intervention, contribute to the 
mentioned objective of the new policy  of the EU.  
 
Could the EU also clarify in which way does its import substitution policy, e.g. implemented through 
the proposed CRMA, contribute to the achievement of " a more sustainable and fairer  globalization"?  
 
Question № 49  
Concerning Area 2 of action under the new strategy please clarify, which specific "EU standards" 
does the EU refer to?  
 
Pages 32 – 33, para 2.7: The Secretariat's Report states that "the European  Union  intends to 
enhance its capacity to act autonomously, if needed, t o pursue its interest in strategic areas. This 
guiding principle is referred to as "open strategic autonomy" and is further defined as the 
European  Union 's intention of "cooperating multilaterally wherever [it] can" and "acting 
autonomously wherever [it] m ust"." 
 
Question № 50  
Could the EU please specify in what instances, under what conditions and in what spheres of interest 
the EU will implement the mentioned "autonomous" approach and in which cases it would stay 
committed to the "multilateral" one? What would be the factors the EU will base its decision upon?  
 
Question № 51  
What kind of trade -related measures may be employed under the "autonomous" approach?  
Please explain the compliance of these measures with WTO law.  
Does the "autonomous" approach mean  that in certain cases the EU will disregard the basic WTO 
principle of multilateralism and its rules?  
 
Page 33, para 2.8:  The report states: "Regarding the multilateral trading system, the new strategy 
reflects the key role that the WTO continues to play in EU trade policy. The strategy describes the 
reform of the WTO as one of the European  Union 's key priority actions (objective No.  2 and area of 
action No.  1), and includes a dedicated Annex  in this regard. It also stresses the importance for the 
European  Union  of taking a leading role in the development of trade rules in the WTO on, for 
example, fossil fuel subsidies and digital trade, to advance its green and digital transitions."  
 
Question № 52  
Could the EU provide further information on its vision of t he development of trade rules in the WTO 
on fossil fuel subsidies? Could the EU elaborate on how multilateral rules on fossil fuel will advance 
green and digital transition?  
 
Page 33, para 2.9, 2.10:  To support the implementation of its new trade strategy,  in 2021 the 
Commission submitted proposals for regulations to the Parliament and the Council (Chart  2.2), 
including measures to counteract foreign practices considered as unfair or coercive.  
The proposed measures include:  
• an anti -coercion instrument to counteract economic coercion by third countries through measures 
affecting trade or investment (area of action No.  6)16 […]  
 
Footnote 16: European Commission Proposal COM(2021) 775 final.  
Question № 53  
The EU is to adopt The Anti -Coercion Instrument which empowers the Union to "apply trade, 
investment or other restrictions", including increased customs duties and restrictions on the market 
access,9 in case there is merely a threat or an attempt by a third country "to interfere 'in the 
 
9 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press -releases/2023/03/28/trade -political -agreement -on-
the-anti-coercion -instrument/ .  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 516 - 
 
  
 legitimate sovereign choices of the Union or a Member State".10 The EU posits that this mechanism 
"is in line with international law"11 and demonstrates "adherence to a rules -based approach" .12 
 
Does the adoption of this instrument entail that instead of bringing the disputes to the WTO, the EU 
will act at its own discretion and "sanction" states allegedly engaged in "coercion"? If so, could the 
EU explain how such line of action would align with the EU's allegation that "the WTO and the 
multilateral trading system are the focus for the EU trade policy"? Would such practice comply with 
the EU's commitments under the WTO  Agreement ? 
 
Question № 54  
Which trade -related instruments the EU plans to use t o counteract "unfair" foreign practices? Which 
body shall be responsible for identifying whether a practice is "fair" or not? What are the legal criteria 
of "fairness"?  
 
Question № 55  
The final European Commission Proposal on economic coercion (footnote 16  of the Report) explains 
that economic coercion, inter alia, implies a situation where a third country is merely seeking to 
pressure the Union or a Member State. Could the EU elaborate how these attempts of coercion will 
be identified? Can the EU confirm t hat in accordance with this instrument both actions and intentions 
of the third states will be "punished"?  
 
Page 34, para 2.12: The Secretariat's Report states that "the European  Union  seeks, inter alia, to 
reduce dependencies from third countries for its value chains in strategic areas by diversifying 
suppliers, substituting inputs, and pursuing international alliances" . 
 
Question № 56  
Which trade and investment distortions does the EU expect to provoke when intervening the market 
to redu ce dependencies? What efforts will the EU undertake to mitigate such distortions when 
"diversifying suppliers" and "substituting inputs"?  
 
2.3.3 Other agreements and arrangements  
Page 44, para 2.50: The Secretariat reports that "[t]he European Union and Ca nada signed in 
June 2021 a strategic partnership on raw materials with a view to diversifying their suppliers and 
strengthening their supply chains" . 
 
Question № 57  
Could the EU please comment on the scope of this partnership? Which trade -related measures does 
this partnership entail?  
 
Question № 58  
Are there any terms or conditions for concluding such partnerships? Are those partnerships typically 
coupled with RTAs, or can they be signed independently?  
 
Question № 59  
Are such partnerships limited to raw m aterials only, or may they be focused on other types of goods? 
Does the EU plan to sign other strategic partnerships with other partners and/or focusing on other 
goods?  
 
2.4 Investment regime  
2.4.1 Regulatory framework  
Page 44, para 2.53: According to the Report: "With a view of promoting consistency regarding FDI 
screening, the European Union adopted in March 2019 a regulation to establish a common framework 
for the screening of FDI for reasons of security and public order. The regulation started applying on 
11 October 2020, and it seeks, inter alia , to address concerns regarding FDI on assets deemed 
critical to EU interests. The regulation provides for a set of minimum requirements for the functioning 
of national screening mechanisms and for a cooperation mechanism to share information. The 
regulation also provides for guidelines to identify FDI that is likely to affect security or public order 
and therefore should be screened. The criteria refer to the effects that a transaction could have on, 
 
10 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A -9-2022-0246_EN.html#_section1 .  
11 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press -room/20230327IPR78506/anti -coercion -
breakthrough -on-trade -tool-to-protect -eu-from-economic -blackmail .  
12 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_6642 .  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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for instance , infrastructure, technologies, and the supply of inputs deemed as critical to EU economic 
activities."  
 
Question № 60  
Can the EU elaborate which FDI, in its view, poses problems from a security/public order perspective 
and can therefore be banned by the European Commission?  
 
Question № 61  
According to the Executive Vice -President and Commissioner for Trade, Valdis Dombrovskis: "At a 
time of mounting security challenges, in particular Russia's unprovoked war of aggression in Ukraine, 
it is crucial to h ave our strategic trade and investment controls instruments up and running. … The 
EU remains open to foreign investments, but this openness is not unconditional."13 
 
At the same time, according to the second Report on the screening of Foreign Direct Investments, 
issued by the European Commission in September 2022:  
"as for the origin of the ultimate investor, in the 414 cases notified to the European Commission 
in 2021, the five main countries of origin were the USA (40%), the UK (10%), China (7 %), th e 
Cayman Islands (5 %) and Canada (4 %). Russia accounted for less than 1.5% of the cases.14 In 
other words, already in 2021 Russia's FDI accounted for the very minority of cases brought before 
the Commission.  
 
Can it therefore be concluded that the situa tion in Ukraine is used as a pretext by the EU to tighten 
up investment screening policy and its' security/public order argumentation is quite deliberately and 
groundlessly linked to Russia?  
 
Para. 2.56: In addition, the European  Union  adopted in December 2022 a regulation to deal with 
the effects of foreign subsidies on the internal market (i.e. subsidies by a third country) and ensure 
a level playing field for all companies/investors. The regulation seeks to identify and address 
situations where a company  receiving foreign subsidies causes distortions to the internal market 
through, inter alia, its participation in EU public procurements, or the acquisition of an EU company 
or assets affecting the market structure (Sections 3.3.4 and 3.3.6). The regulation  entered into force 
on 12  January  2023 and will apply from 12  July 2023.  
 
Question № 62  
How will the EU establish the fact of internal market distortion by a company receiving foreign 
subsidy? Please provide examples of respective cases.  
 
3.1.6 Anti -dumpin g, countervailing, and safeguard measures  
3.1.6.1 Anti -dumping and countervailing duties  
Page 79, para 3.88:  The European  Union  continued to be a significant user of trade remedies 
during the review period as new investigations of anti -dumping (AD) and ant i-subsidy (AS)113 
measures continued unabated despite the challenges of the COVID -19 pandemic (Chart  3.3). 
However, while the pandemic did not have an impact on the pace of investigations, there were other 
impacts. One impact was on verifications due to tr avel restrictions, whereby the Commission 
changed to verifying company data by remote cross -checking by videoconference in lieu of on -site 
visits. Another effect was the use of suspension provision during the pandemic, reportedly to address 
supply chain di sruptions in one case. Nevertheless, trade remedies, or trade defence instruments 
(TDIs) as the European  Union  refers to them, continued to be an important trade policy tool. At the 
end of 2022, there were 178 AD and AS measures in place that supported 440 ,706 direct jobs.  
 
Question № 63  
Since the paragraph describes the pandemic's impact on the investigations, which changes occurred 
in the EU legislation regulating the application of anti -dumping and countervailing measures as an 
aftermath of the pandemic? Please, elaborate.  
 
Page 79, para 3.89:  The Report states: "Modernization of the European  Union 's TDIs has occurred 
in recent years and was examined in the last two Reviews. However, since 2018 there have been 
few changes and the Commission has p roceeded with operationalizing all the elements from that 
earlier initiative. The Commission's work on trade remedies during the review period focused on 
 
13 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_5286 .  
14 https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52022DC0433 .  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 carrying out investigations and implementing the legislative changes from 2017 and 2018, utilizing 
new tools due to the pandemic and implementing recommendations from the European Court of 
Auditors' (ECA) audit on TDIs in 2020."  
 
Question № 64  
Could the EU further elaborate what "few changes" have occurred since 2018? With regards to the 
statement "new too ls due to the pandemic and implementing recommendations from the 
European  Court of Auditors' (ECA) audit on TDIs in 2020", could the EU elaborate which new tools 
are envisioned? Which tools would the work of the European Commission in the sphere of trade 
remedies be focused on?  
 
3.1.6.1.1 Regulatory and policy developments  
Page 80, para 3.90:  The European  Union 's main trade remedy legislation for anti -dumping and 
countervailing measures, known as the "basic anti -dumping Regulation" and the "basic anti-subsidy 
Regulation", have not substantially changed since the significant amendments of 2017 and 2018, as 
outlined in the previous Review.115 There has only been a small amendment to each due to a clause 
in the 2018 amendments that required the Commis sion to review the pre -disclosure period up until 
June 2020 with a view to changing the length of time. Thus, a Regulation was issued on 4 June 2020 
making amendments to Articles 19 and 29, respectively, of the two basic Regulations to establish a 
pre-disclosure period of four weeks where the Commission announces whether it will impose 
provisional AD and AS duties.  
 
Question № 65  
In accordance with Article  2.6.2(c) of EU Regulation 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 8  June 2016 ("Bas ic Regulation"), "[w]here the Commission [of the EU] has 
well-founded indications of the possible existence of significant distortions as referred to in point (b) 
in a certain country or a certain sector in that country, and where appropriate for the effec tive 
application of this Regulation, the Commission [of the EU] shall produce, make public and regularly 
update a report describing the market circumstances referred to in point (b) in that country or 
sector" . As it was explained by the EU Commission, taki ng into account the provision of 
Article  2.6.2(c) of Basic Regulation, on 23rd October 2020, it published a report on significant 
distortions in the economy of the Russian  Federation . 
 
The report focuses on the analysis of the Russian economy. The report is divided into parts: on the 
horizontal factors allegedly distorting the Russian market, on the markets for production factors and 
on individual industries.  
 
How does Article  2.6.2(c) of Basic Regulation together with the mentioned report comply wi th 
Articles  2.2 and Article  2.2.1.1 of Agreement on Implementation of Article  VI of GATT?  
 
Question № 66  
Article  2(6a)(b) of the basic anti -dumping Regulation states:  
 
Significant distortions are those distortions which occur when reported prices or costs,  including the 
costs of raw materials and energy, are not the result of free market forces because they are affected 
by substantial government intervention. In assessing the existence of significant distortions regard 
shall be had, inter  alia, to the poten tial impact of one or more of the following elements:  
 
— the market in question being served to a significant extent by enterprises which operate under 
the ownership, control or policy supervision or guidance of the authorities of the exporting country;  
— state presence in firms allowing the state to interfere with respect to prices or costs;  
— public policies or measures discriminating in favour of domestic suppliers or otherwise influencing 
free market forces;  
— the lack, discriminatory application or inadequate enforcement of bankruptcy, corporate or 
property laws; — wage costs being distorted;  
— access to finance granted by institutions which implement public policy objectives or otherwise 
not acting independently of the state.  
 
Article  7(2a) of the  basic anti -dumping Regulation states:  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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When examining whether a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove 
injury, the Commission shall take into account whether there are distortions on raw materials with 
regard to the product co ncerned.  
 
For the purposes of this paragraph, distortions on raw materials consist of the following measures: 
dual pricing schemes, export taxes, export surtax, export quota, export prohibition, fiscal tax on 
exports, licensing requirements, minimum export price, value added tax (VAT) refund reduction or 
withdrawal, restriction on customs clearance point for exporters, qualified exporters list, domestic 
market obligation, captive mining if the price of a raw material is significantly lower as compared  to 
prices in the representative international markets.  
 
Does the EU legislation provide any boundary between "significant distortions" and "distortions on 
raw materials"?  
Can the same situation be simultaneously considered a "significant distortion" and a "distortion on 
raw materials"?  
 
Page 80, para 3.93: Another element that was emphasized as part of EU policy during the review 
period was addressing fraud and circumvention through improved trade enforcement. To address 
some of these issues, the Commission continued to include a special monitoring clause in re gulations 
imposing measures, in particular for those with a high risk of circumvention. Special monitoring has 
become more common, and by end -2021 there were 54 TDI measures subject to such monitoring. 
The Commission has also carried out anti -circumvention  and anti -absorption investigations in recent 
years to address these growing problems. It also closely monitors price undertakings to ensure they 
are complied with properly.  
 
Question № 67  
Which legal acts regulate special monitoring?  
 
3.1.6.1.2 Trends in usage  
Page 82, para 3.95:  Since the inception of the WTO, the European  Union  has been one of the top 
users of AD and AS measures121, ranking third overall in AD since 1995, and second for AS. During 
the last three -year period, the European  Union  ranked fif th among WTO Members as a user of AD 
and third in AS, thus ranking slightly lower relative to other Members due both to lower usage by 
the European  Union  and a higher number of initiations by other WTO Members.122 The 
European  Union  has also been an increa sing target for trade defence measures from third -country 
users. It has responded by taking a role in defending EU industries that have been the target of such 
investigations through various tools used such as registering as an interested party, diplomatic  
response, raising the matter in the respective WTO Committee, or possibly filing a case before 
the DSB. 
 
Question № 68  
Which sectors of the EU economy are affected by the current AS and AD measures?  
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1.6.1.1 Reg ulatory and policy developments  
Page 80, para 3.90:  The European  Union 's main trade remedy legislation for anti -dumping and 
countervailing measures, known as the "basic anti -dumping Regulation" and the "basic anti -subsidy 
Regulation", have not substantiall y changed since the significant amendments of 2017 and 2018, as 
outlined in the previous Review.115 There has only been a small amendment to each due to a clause 
in the 2018 amendments that required the Commission to review the pre -disclosure period up unt il 
June 2020 with a view to changing the length of time. Thus, a Regulation was issued on 4 June 2020 
making amendments to Articles 19 and 29, respectively, of the two basic Regulations to establish a 
pre-disclosure period of four weeks where the Commissio n announces whether it will impose 
provisional AD and AS duties.  
 
Question № 69  
Article  2(6a)(b) of the Basic Regulation states:  
 
Significant distortions are those distortions which occur when reported prices or costs, including the 
costs of raw materials and energy, are not the result of free market forces because they are affected 
by substantial government intervention. In assessing the existence of significant distortions regard 
shall be had, inter  alia, to the potential impact of one or more o f the following elements:  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 520 - 
 
  
 — the market in question being served to a significant extent by enterprises which operate under 
the ownership, control or policy supervision or guidance of the authorities of the exporting country;  
— state presence in firms all owing the state to interfere with respect to prices or costs;  
— public policies or measures discriminating in favour of domestic suppliers or otherwise influencing 
free market forces;  
— the lack, discriminatory application or inadequate enforcement of ban kruptcy, corporate or 
property laws; — wage costs being distorted;  
— access to finance granted by institutions which implement public policy objectives or otherwise 
not acting independently of the state.  
Article  7(2a) of the Basic Regulation states:  
When  examining whether a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove 
injury, the Commission shall take into account whether there are distortions on raw materials with 
regard to the product concerned.  
For the purposes of this paragraph, distortions on raw materials consist of the following measures: 
dual pricing schemes, export taxes, export surtax, export quota, export prohibition, fiscal tax on 
exports, licensing requirements, minimum export price, value added tax (VAT) refun d reduction or 
withdrawal, restriction on customs clearance point for exporters, qualified exporters list, domestic 
market obligation, captive mining if the price of a raw material is significantly lower as compared to 
prices in the representative internat ional markets.  
 
Does the EU legislation provide any boundary between "significant distortions" and "distortions on 
raw materials"?  
Can the same situation be simultaneously considered a "significant distortion" and a "distortion on 
raw materials"?  
 
3.1.6.2  Safeguards  
Page 84, para 3.103:  Thereafter, in March 2022, the Commission adjusted the TRQ volumes to 
take into account an import ban on steel that was put in place on products from Belarus and the 
Russian  Federation  as a result of sanctions. The quota al locations to these countries were reallocated 
to other suppliers subject to the safeguard measure. Further, in April 2022, the Commission made 
further examinations to incorporate certain EPA countries within the scope of the safeguard measure 
as they were previously excluded due to provisions of the EPA. This resulted in one EPA country, 
South  Africa , being brought under the safeguard measure for three steel product categories as from 
1 May 2022. Other adjustments were made to the country coverage in Decemb er 2020 for the 
United  Kingdom  in response to Brexit and in May 2022 as Ukraine was temporarily removed from 
the safeguard measure.  
 
Question № 70  
The paragraph explains that the European Commission adjusted the TRQ volumes to take into 
account the import ban on steel that was put in place on products from Belarus and the 
Russian  Federation . As of today, the safeguard measure is expected to be in force until 
30 June 2024.  
Does the EU deem it foreseeable for the purposes of application of the safeguard meas ure that the 
import ban on steel products from the Russian  Federation  will be in place until 30 June 2024?  
 
Question № 71  
As stated above, the European Commission decided to adjust the TRQ  volumes to take into account 
an import ban on steel that was put in place on products from Belarus and the Russian  Federation  
as a result of sanctions. At the same time, as it can be seen in its recent practice, in anti -dumping 
proceedings the European Co mmission considers that the sanctions' scope, modulation, and/or 
duration are unpredictable (see, for instance, recital 167 of the Commission Implementing 
Regulation (EU) 2022/2068 of 26  October  2022).  
Please explain why the sanctions' predictability is d eemed sufficient to adjust the TRQ volumes within 
the safeguard measure and insufficient to be taken into account when the European Commission 
decides whether to extend an anti -dumping measure?  
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1.7 Other measure s affecting imports  
3.1.7.1 Sanctions (on imports and exports)  
Page 85, para 3.108: There has been a significant increase in the number of sanctions regimes, 
restrictive measures, and legal instruments put in place, largely as a result of the war in Ukrai ne. 
Thus, the majority of new measures impact trade and the movement of persons or capital to/from WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Belarus, the Russian  Federation , and the territories outside the government's control. As the war 
has carried on, the number and scope of the restrictive mea sures have increased significantly. Not 
only do measures include the more traditional actions like freezing assets, travel bans, import/export 
prohibitions or restrictions, and arms embargoes, but they have been expanded to include 
prohibiting access to ex port credits and guarantees, air space, port facilities, and services and 
technology.  
Question № 72  
How does the EU justify the ban on export of certain goods to Russia in light of Articles I and XI of 
the GATT  1994?  
 
Question № 73  
How does EU's restricti ons on export of goods to certain persons set forth in the Council Regulation 
No 833/2014 of 31  July 2014 (version of 27/04/2023) commensurate with the WTO law?  
 
Question № 74  
How does EU's restrictions on the export of services to certain persons set fort h in the Council 
Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31  July 2014 commensurate with the GATS provisions?  
 
Question № 75  
How does the EU justify the prohibitions and restrictions imposed on Russia, including the freeze of 
assets, in light of its WTO obligations?  
 
Question № 76  
The European Commission explains that the "asset freeze" with respect to a number of Russian 
natural persons and entities extends to intellectual property rights. Could the EU elaborate on the 
consistency of prohibitions and res trictions imposed on Russian intellectual property rights holders, 
particularly with respect the EU obligations to grant IP protection stipulated in TRIPS Articles 1, 2, 3 
and 4, as well as in the basic international treaties in the sphere of IP (the Paris  Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works)  and the treaties governing international registration systems (the Patent Cooperation Treaty, 
the Madrid Agreement on internation al registration of trademarks and the Hague Agreement on 
international registration of industrial designs) ? For example, in cases when the European Patent 
Office, the European  Union  Intellectual Property Office or national intellectual property offices in 
EU Member -states "freeze" all the registration procedures in respect to all categories of applications 
for registration of IP rights by Russian applicants, as well as refuse to register new IP rights.  
 
Question № 77  
Could the European  Union  provide more details of what are the benefits of anti -Russian unilateral 
restrictive measures for citizens of its Member States?  
 
Question № 78  
Russia would appreciate information as to how the EU ensures the absence of negative economic 
effects from anti -Russian unilateral restrictive measures [sanctions] for third countries. Has the EU 
undertaken any concrete measures to ensure the absence of the mentioned negative economic 
effects? If yes, Russia would appreciate if the EU pinpoints any of those concret e measures and 
describes their positive effects.  
 
3.3.4 Competition policy  
3.2.5 Export finance, insurance, and guarantees  
Page 94, para 3.136.  In line with its policy initiatives such as the European Green Deal and 
commitments under the Paris Agreement, the European  Union  has increased its environmental 
dimension in many areas, including export credits. The OECD Recommendation on Common 
Approaches for Officially Supported Export Credits and Environmental and Social Due Diligence 
requires identification of  potential environmental impacts and to follow certain guidelines when 
screening export credit applications so as to not have a negative impact on the environment. All 
20 EU Export Credit Agencies reporting under Regulation (EU) 1233/2011 have reported com pliance 
with this Recommendation. Furthermore, some member States have gone beyond OECD 
Recommendations or Understandings to require a higher level of scrutiny for environmental impact 
or have joined the E3F (the Export Finance for Future) coalition. Nine EU member States are 
signatories to the E3F and have pledged their support to end official trade and export finance for 
thermal coal -related infrastructures and review ways to phase out similar measures for the fossil -fuel 
sector.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Question № 79  
Are there a ny support measures that ECAs suggest for ESG/ eco -friendly companies? Can the EU 
confirm that these support measures are not trade -distorting?  
 
Page 113, para 3.211: A new Regulation (2022/2560) on foreign subsidies distorting the internal 
market, adopted  in November 2022, aims at ensuring a level playing field and confers upon the 
Commission the power to investigate sources of financial means granted by non -EU governments to 
undertakings active in the territory of the Union. In the competition area, the R egulation introduces 
a notification -based tool under which undertakings have to notify ex ante  the financial contributions 
received from a non -EU government prior to concluding a concentration (mergers, acquisitions, joint 
ventures, etc).  
 
Question № 80  
Would the fact of having financial contributions received from a non -EU government be a violation 
of EU competition law? If yes, in what cases?  
 
3.3.4.1 Competition policy during emergencies  
Page 114, para 3.215:  Regarding the war in Ukraine, the ECN publish ed a statement announcing 
that it will not intervene when specific and targeted actions are taken to mitigate the disruptions 
created by the war. Nevertheless, the ECN noted the need to sustain market prices, especially for 
products of an essential nature.  
 
Question № 81  
Can the EU clarify how exactly does the ECN determine whether 'specific and targeted actions' are 
'taken to mitigate the disruption created by the war'? Can the EU confirm that such rhetoric is not 
used as a cover -up for the ECN to turn a blind eye to cert ain anti -competitive behavior by the EU 
companies?  
 
3.3.4.2 Anti -competitive agreements and abuse of a dominant position  
Page 114, para 3.216: Competition enforcement action of the Commission and national 
competition authorities relating to anti -competiti ve agreements and abuse of a dominant position 
continues to be based on Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU and Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003, as 
well as sector -specific rules. Most cases are investigated or submitted by the competition authorities 
of the me mber States. The Commission opened infringement proceedings against 22 member States 
in 2021 for not incorporating into national law the so -called ECN+ Directive further strengthening 
the role of national competition authorities in enforcing EU competition  law.286 Currently, 
23 member States have fully transposed the ECN+ Directive, 2 have partially transposed it, and 
2 have not yet adopted any implementing measure.  
 
Question № 82  
How are powers divided between the Commission and national authorities in the  matter of 
investigating cases of violation of EU competition law?  
 
3.3.7 Intellectual property rights  
3.3.7.1 Economic relevance of IPRs  
Page 122, para 3.247.  During the review period, the European  Union  contributed actively to 
discussions and work in the TRIPS Council. In particular, it made important contributions to 
COVID -19-related agenda items, including a Proposal for a Waiver from Certain Provisions of the 
TRIPS  Agreement  for the Prevention, Contai nment and Treatment of COVID -19 and IP Measures in 
the Context of COVID -19. In the context of the former discussions, the European  Union  contributed 
a proposal and participated actively in the negotiations among a small group of Members. The 
European  Union  also submitted comprehensive reports on its technical cooperation activities under 
Article  67 of the TRIPS  Agreement  and on incentives provided to the private sector to transfer 
technology to LDCs under Article  66.2, and it co -sponsored contributions to T RIPS Council 
discussions relating to, inter alia, making MSMEs competitive, IP for investment/financing/funding, 
public -private collaborations in innovation, and women and intellectual property.  
 
Question № 83  
Could the EU specify what actions aimed at fig hting COVID -19 pandemic in LDCs have been taken 
pursuant to Article  66.2 of the TRIPS  Agreement ? 
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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4.3 Forestry  
Page 158, para 4.110: Going beyond these regulations affecting trade in illegally cut timber, the 
European Parliament and the Council, in Decembe r 2022, reached a provisional agreement on a 
regulation proposed by the Commission in 2021, aiming to prevent deforestation and forest 
degradation associated with commodities and products placed on or exported from the EU market. 
It focuses on creating a l evel playing field, minimizing the use of products from supply chains 
associated with deforestation or forest degradation, and increasing demand for "deforestation -free" 
products. The proposed regulation would cover wood as well as products such as cocoa, coffee, oil 
palm, cattle, or soya grown on former forest areas that were deforested after December 2020.  
 
Question № 84  
The EU declares that, with the objective of decreasing deforestation around the world, it introduces 
mandatory due diligence rules for a ll operators and traders that prevent companies from selling into 
the EU market a number of commodities, including palm oil, beef, timber, coffee, cocoa, rubber and 
soy. The rules also apply to a number of derived products such as chocolate, furniture, pri nted paper 
and selected palm oil based derivates (e.g., used in personal care products).15 
 
The law will require companies to produce a due diligence statement showing that their supply chains  
are not contributing to the destruction of forests before they sell goods into the EU – or they could 
face hefty fines.16 
 
These rules directly affect imports into the EU, with some WTO Members stating that they could be 
forced to completely cut down their exports of, for instance, palm oil into the EU market.17 
 
These new regulations seem 'suspicious' in terms of their compliance with the WTO rules for the 
following reasons: (1) the new law, by implication, grants preferences to some domestic (EU) 
producers (for example, domestic producers of alternative oils and commodities, other than palm 
oil, such as rape, sunflower and olive oils, as well as some producers of processed products, such as 
chocolate); (2) second, the law prescribes the way in which a product has to be produced in the 
exporting country, and also r equires exporters to prevent deforestation along the supply chain, which 
is difficult to ensure, provided that it involves multiple countries.  
 
Could the EU, please, confirm that these rules do not create unnecessary obstacles to imports of 
certain commod ities and processed products, as well as elaborate on the legitimacy of the trade 
policy objective behind the law and the requirements to this end imposed on exporting members?  
 
4.4.1 Sustainable energy and climate  
Page 159, para 4.117:  The Horizon Europe  programme for research and innovation replaced the 
Horizon 2020 framework (Section  3.3.1.1) and continues to promote energy and climate -related 
research. The programme allocates approximately EUR  15.1 billion  for research and development in 
the areas of c limate, energy, and mobility for the period 2021 -27.  
 
Question № 85  
Could the EU confirm that its subsidies under the Horizon Europe programme are consistent with 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and explain how it ensures WTO 
consis tency?  
 
Page 159, para 4.118: In February 2022, the Commission adopted new Guidelines on State Aid 
for climate, environmental protection and energy142 as spelled out in the European Green Deal to 
facilitate achieving the Deal's objectives, specifying 14 po tentially compatible types of specific aid 
measures. On 20  July 2022, the Commission also amended the state aid Temporary Crisis 
Framework (Section  3.3.1.2) to include measures aimed at accelerating the roll -out of renewable 
energy and some aimed at decarb onizing industrial processes, as outlined in the REPowerEU Plan. 
Detailed data on state aid provided to the energy transition were not yet available. In 2020, the 
 
15 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press -releases/2022/12/06/council -and-parliament -strike -
provisional -deal-to-cut-down -deforestation -worldwide/?utm_source=twitte r&utm_campaign=Press+ -
+ENVI+press .  
16 https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/eu -agrees-law-preventing -import -goods -linked -
deforestation -2022-12-06/.  
17 https://www.re uters.com/markets/commodities/malaysian -urges -palm-oil-producers -boost -
cooperation -after-eu-rules-2023-01-12/.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 524 - 
 
  
 total state aid expenditure for environmental protection including energy savings amounted to  nearly 
EUR 80 billion . 
 
Question № 86  
What specific measures and mechanisms to accelerate the introduction of renewable energy and 
decarbonizing industrial processes are included in the state aid Temporary Crisis Framework? Please 
provide more detailed in formation.  
 
Question № 87  
According to para.  12 at page 11 of the Report, the Temporary Crisis Framework was adopted "in 
response to the war in Ukraine". How does the EU explain the direct cause -and-effect relationship 
between the Temporary Crisis Framewor k adoption and the "response to the war in Ukraine"?  
 
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.4.2 Production, consumption, and trade  
Page 161, para 4.122:  According to the Commission communication Save Gas for a Safe Winter, 
the geographic composition of EU gas impor ts shifted significantly during 2022, as imports of liquified 
natural gas (LNG) and certain pipeline gas increased. LNG imports during the first half of 2022 were 
24.3 billion  cubic metres (bcm) higher compared to the same period a year earlier (of which 3  bcm 
from the Russian  Federation ), while pipeline imports from the Russian  Federation  fell by 28 bcm as 
those from other sources increased by 14 bcm. By the third quarter of 2022, the composition of total 
gas imports (pipeline and LNG) had changed signific antly from the third quarter of 2021, with the 
share of imports from the Russian  Federation  having declined from 43% to 16% and the share of 
LNG imports having increased from 18% to 39% over the same period.148 Initiatives to foster 
further LNG imports are  under way (Section  4.4.4).  
 
Question № 88  
As the Report states, over 2022 the EU countries significantly reduced pipeline imports from Russia. 
As a result, the prices of natural gas hit record highs in 2022. The similar natural gas prices volatility 
happened during 2021. The EU imports of LNG incr eased at an all -time high. However, over 2022, 
the European prices of natural gas were seven times more expensive than, for instance, in the US 
and other gas producing countries.  
 
Could the EU please explain how this surge in prices will influence the EU policy in antidumping 
proceedings, when the EU investigating authorities apply price adjustments?  
 
Page 161, para 4.123:  As from 5  December  2022, the European  Union  no longer allowed the 
import of seaborne crude oil from the Russian  Federation , while the import of refined petroleum 
products from the Russian  Federation  has been prohibited (with limited exceptions) since 
5 February  2023.149 Since 5  December  2022, trans porting such oil as well as insuring vessels 
carrying such crude oil by European firms are also prohibited unless the purchase price of the oil is 
below a maximum price set by the Commission in line with G7 Price Cap Coalition decisions first 
taken on 2  December  2022.  
 
Question № 89  
How does the price cap on the petroleum and petroleum products originated in the 
Russian  Federation  comply with the WTO rules and principles, including the principle of 
non-discrimination?  
 
4.4.4 Relations with third countries  
Page 163, para 4.133: The report states: Overall, energy subsidies were broadly stable between 
2019 and 2020 where they reached EUR  173 billion , but increased in 2021 according to preliminary 
data, as energy subsidies for renewable sources of energy increas ed, as did subsidies for "all 
energies" (either not allocatable or related to energy efficiency). More than half of total energy 
subsidies in 2020 were for energy production (including transmission and storage), and about one 
third for all types of energy demand. Income and price support for renewable energies (mostly 
feed-in tariffs and premiums) and tax expenditures for fossil fuels accounted for 41% and 20% of 
total subsidies in 2020. During 2022, 15 member States reduced VAT rates on gas, electricity, o r 
transport fuels.   
 
Question № 90  
Could the EU explain how it ensures that energy subsidies are WTO compliant?  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Page 163, para 4.134:  The European  Union  published a Communication on the EU External Energy 
Engagement in a Changing World, linking various obj ectives. To strengthen energy security and 
resilience, it aims to diversify the EU's gas supply (as well as other energy) away from the 
Russian  Federation , develop renewable hydrogen trade, and prioritize energy savings and efficiency. 
It also spells out t he objective of leading the global green and just energy transition, including by 
promoting renewable technologies and efficiency abroad with funding from the Global Gateway 
initiative, and to develop raw material value chain partnerships with third countr ies to ensure 
diversity of supply of critical raw materials. It also foresees support to Ukraine and other countries 
regarding the effects of the war in Ukraine.  
 
Question № 91  
According to the Report, one of the objectives of the EU Communication on the E U External Energy 
Engagement in a Changing World  is "to develop raw material value chain partnerships with third 
countries to ensure diversity of supply of critical raw materials".  
 
On 16 March  2023, the European Commission presented the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) 
proposal. The CRMA proposal aims to ensure that, by 2030, the Union's annual consumption of 
strategic raw materials will not be dependent on a single third country for more than 65% of its 
supply of any such material. Thereby, "special  consideration" will be given to countries with which 
the Union has established a Strategic Partnership on raw materials , which, along with the 
discouragement of imports from the currently predominant suppliers translates into the violation of 
the MFN regi me and may involve de facto  application of quantitative restrictions .  
 
Could the EU comment on the compliance of the proposed CRMA with the relevant WTO norms , 
including on MFN and quantitative restrictions on imports (Articles I and XI of the GATT  1994)? 
Can the EU explain how it plans to avoid violating WTO rules?  
 
Question № 92  
What is the nature of these "strategic partnerships"? Could the EU clarify their scope and trade 
implications? Which trade -related measures do these "strategic partnerships" envi sage?  
 
Question № 93  
Please provide an exhaustive list of these "strategic partnerships". Please elaborate on the 
compatibility of such "strategic partnerships" with Article  XXIV of the GATT  1994. 
 
Question № 94  
The proposed CRMA regulation aims to increase the EU's processing capacity so as to enable the 
production of at least 40 % of its annual consumption of strategic raw materials. This seems to be 
a clear import substitution policy. Furthermore, the CRMA may also be the cause of overcapacity 
that would distort global markets.  
 
Is our understanding of the nature of the EU's actions correct? Would the EU please clarify their 
compliance with the WTO law?  
 
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.5.1 Financial services  
Page 170, para 4.170:  Following the start o f the war in Ukraine, the European  Union  prohibited all 
transactions with the Central Bank of the Russian  Federation  related to the management of the 
Bank's reserves and assets221 and froze the assets of a number of commercial banks. It also banned 
10 Russ ian and 4 Belarusian banks from making or receiving international payments using SWIFT.  
 
Question № 95  
The measures specified by the Secretariat represent unprecedented and egregious violations by the 
EU of international law and the WTO law in particular. How does the EU justify these prohibitions 
under the MFN treatment under the GATT and GATS?  
 
4.5. Services  
4.5.1. Financial services  
4.5.1.2.4 Sustainable and digital finance  
Page 175, para 4.193:  In April 2022, the Council agreed to a Commission proposal to establish 
clear rules for environmentally sustainable bonds (green bonds), pending discussions with 
Parliament. The Commission also aims to clarify the operations of Environmental, Social and WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Governance (ESG) rating providers and transparency on the characteristics and methodology of ESG 
ratings, and is planning to propose legislation during 2023 based on an impact assessment. In 
June 2022, the European Parliament and Council agreed to a Commiss ion proposal for a Corporate 
Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) introducing obligations for companies to report on 
European Sustainability Reporting Standards.  
 
Question № 96  
Does the EU have any plans to introduce a unified methodology for providin g ESG ratings and to 
adopt a single rating scale?  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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ICELAND  
Question 1  
- What is the participation of women in the economy of the European  Union ?  
 
Reply:  The most recent EU annual statistics on employment, including the level of employment by 
gender, is available at the official website of the EU at:  
https://ec .europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/lfsi_emp_a/default/table?lang=en .  
In 2022, the EU employment rate for women (from 20 to 64 years) stood at 69.3% . 
 
Further gender statistics for the EU from fields such as education, labour market or earnings which 
are particularly important for measuring differences in the situation between women and men in the 
society and economy are available at the official website of the EU at:  
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics -explained/index.php?title=Gender_statistics . 
 
The Gender Equality Index by the European Institute for Gender Equality (E IGE) – a tool to measure 
the progress of gender equality in the EU in six core domains of work, money, knowledge, time, 
power and health – is available at the official website of the EIGE at: https://eige.europa.eu/gender -
equality -index/2022 . 
 
Question 2  
- Have specific barriers that limit women's participation in trade been identified?  
 
Reply:  To better understand women's participation in trade, the Direc torate -General for Trade 
completed a study with the International Trade Centre in 2019 titled 'From Europe to the World: 
Understanding Challenges for European Businesswomen'. The study collected information on 
women's participation in extra -EU trade and th e challenges they face as exporters and importers in 
agriculture and manufacturing sectors in 12 EU Member States.  
 
The study found that women were under -represented in extra -EU trade in the sectors analysed. 
Women -led companies tend to be smaller, which partially explains the challenges they face. The 
study found that both women and men -led companies report scarcity in legal, 
marketing/communication, IT/digital, and language skills, but women -led companies are more likely 
to be negatively affected. Women -led companies are also less likely to identify commercial banks as 
the most important source of funding, with significant disparity compared to men -led companies. 
Both skills and finance -related challenges impact women more, irrespective of size. The study  did 
not identify any trade barriers with a gender dimension. The study is available online 
(https://intracen.org/media/file/5841 ). 
 
Question 3  
- Has the European  Union implemented any specific measures to encourage women's 
participation in trade and promote women's entrepreneurship, or are such measures being 
developed?  
 
Reply:  The European  Union  is committed to advancing women's entrepreneurship . The overall 
aim is to support women to become entrepreneurs, better exploit their interests, motivations and 
choices, and facilitate policies and initiatives that help them achieve their full potential. This policy 
is part of the EU SME Strategy for a su stainable and digital Europe,  the New Skills Agenda, the 
Digital Education Action Plan, and specifically the Gender Equality Strategy 2020 -2025. In particular, 
we empower and support women entrepreneurs with three different types of actions: 
1. Awareness -raising initiatives coupled with training, mentoring, and coaching; 2. improving access 
to finance and business networks; and 3. increased efforts to measure women's entrepreneurship 
activities, as well as their drivers and barriers.  
 
Question 4  
- Are the e ffects of trade policy on women and men measured and monitored, and if so, how?  
 
Reply:  Ex ante  and ex post  evaluations carried out by Directorate -General for Trade contain a 
dedicated gender analysis. Sustainability Impact Assessments in support of the ne gotiations of trade 
agreements for instance with Chile, Australia and New  Zealand  include a gender impact analysis and 
the Sustainability Impact Assessment for India, which is currently being drafted, will also include a 
gender impact analysis. The gender impact analysis contains an assessment, based on the UNCTAD WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Trade and Gender Toolbox, of the impact on women in their roles as workers, entrepreneurs, traders, 
and consumers. For further information, please refer to the following website:  
https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu -trade -relationships -country -and-region/making -trade-
policy_en#making/analysis/policy -evaluation/sustainability -impact -assessments/  
 
Furthermore, after a trade agreement has been implemented and enough time has passed to gather 
an adequate amount of eviden ce the EU is carrying out an ex post  evaluation (for more information 
see: https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/policy -making/analysis/policy -evaluation/ ). WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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INDONESIA  
WRITTEN QUESTIONS FROM INDONESIA  
 
PART I: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE SECRETARIAT REPORT  
2.2 Trade policy formulation and objectives  
Page 32 Chart 2.1 an Open, Sustainable, and Assertive Trade Policy 2021-30 
Questions:  
1. According to Chart 2.1, the EU supports economic digitalization and trade in services. Could the 
EU elaborate on the policy 's implications for the EU 's negotiations with its partner countries on 
Free Trade Agreements (FTA), particula rly on Trade in Services?  
 
Reply:  The EU ensures that its domestic policies to support economic digitalisation as set out in the 
EU's digital decade programme. The main goals are to achieve a digitally skilled population and 
highly skilled digital professi onals; secure and sustainable digital infrastructures; to support the 
digital transformation of businesses and the digitalisation of public services. More specifically, to 
support the digital transformation of businesses and public services, the Union incl uded in recently 
negotiated EU free trade agreements modern rules on digital trade, with disciplines applying to all 
economic sectors and responding to the specific challenges of the digital economy. For example, the 
imposition of customs duties on electro nic transmissions and the mandatory disclosure of source 
codes are prohibited, while provisions with trust -enhancing rules (such as on electronic trust 
services, electronic contracts, spam and consumer protection) are included.  
 
2. Could the EU elaborate o n the policy that the EU has implemented regarding the digitalization 
of trade in services, and which service sectors are being supported by that policy?  
 
Reply:  The following website provides an overview of EU digital policy. Many of these legislative and  
policy initiatives, such as initiatives relating to promote digital skills or proposals relating to digital 
trust services, have applications across the board to the provision of all digital services in the EU. 
Others, such as the Digital Services Act app ly principally to online intermediary service providers or 
so-called online platforms.  Policies | Shaping Europe 's digital future (europa.eu)  
 
2.3 Trade a greements and arrangements  
2.3.1 WTO  
Page 35 Para 2.14  
In the area of negotiations, the European Union was actively engaged in MC12. Its main focus areas 
were trade and health, WTO reform, e -commerce, fisheries subsidies, food security, and 
trade-distortin g policies in agriculture. The European Union is also taking the necessary steps to 
ratify the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies.  
 
Question:  
3. According to the Report, "The European Union is also taking the necessary steps to ratify the 
Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies ", could UE provide additional information on "the awaiting 
final decision " status in ratify the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies on European Parliament 
official website, and when will EU submit acceptance of the Agreement to the WTO?  
 
Reply: The EU process had been finalised, and on 8 June 2023 the EU – on behalf of the 27 EU 
Member States - deposited its instrument of the acceptance of the WTO Agreement on 
Fisheries  Subsidies.  
 
3.1.5 Import prohibitions, restrictions, and licensing  
3.1.5.2 Import Licensing  
Page 77 Para 3.85 and 4.86  
The European Union has different licensing regulations in place with respect to each (Table 3.12). 
The regulations have, for the most part, not changed substantially except for the TRQ and licensing 
regime f or certain agricultural products. The licensing regime for timber, i.e., Forest Law 
Enforcement Governance and Trade (FLEGT), remains operational only for Indonesia, although the 
European Union continues to negotiate additional Voluntary Partnership Agreem ents with other 
countries.  
 
The Integrated System for Managing Exports and Import Licences, or Système Intégré de Gestion 
de Licences (SIGL), provides a system of licensing for certain EU imports, i.e., aluminum, steel, WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 textiles, and wood. However, due to the expiry of surveillance of aluminium and steel, it ceased to 
cover these products as of 15 May 2020. According to its mandate, it facilitates the prior surveillance 
documents and licenses and allows importers to obtain quota fill levels.  
 
Questions:  
4. Referring to page 77 para 3.85 and 3.86, could the EU explain how it ensures that its import 
licensing system remains simple, transparent, predictable, and efficient in use, in accordance 
with the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, and also avoidin g using the license system 
to block or delay the import of certain types of products especially in agricultural products?  
 
Reply:  The European Union ensures the transparency, efficiency and predictability of its import 
licensing practices via the use of th e Access2Markets website of the European Commission: Guide 
for import of goods | Access2Markets (europa.eu)  and Welcome home page | Access2Markets 
(europa.eu) . For any product selected by the user, the website offers detail explanations of the 
legislation in force and details the requirements for importing the corresponding goods in the EU. 
This system is always available to commercial operators all over the world. Finally, because of the 
previously mentioned and due to the fact that all import licensing procedures appl ied by the EU 
customs authorities, having being notified to the relevant WTO body, are in accordance with the 
provisions WTO import licensing procedure.  
 
5. Could the EU provide further details the existing procedures in obtaining import licenses for 
alumi num and steel products as by 15 May 2022 SIGL no longer cover these products?  
 
Reply:  The prior surveillance system has been replaced by post surveillance or so -called monitoring, 
without licencing based on actual imports (and not intention of imports as f or the prior surveillance).  
 
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.2 Fisheries  
4.2.1 Fisheries Policy  
Page 153 Para 4.83 and 4.85  
The CFP aims to restore and maintain fish stocks at sustainable levels by 2020 and it also applies to 
aquaculture. According to the Commission, fisheries in the European Union have become more 
sustainable but fisheries resources require further protection. According to the FAO, most of the 
commercially important fish stocks in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea contin ue to be overfished, 
while around 27% of assessed fish stocks in the Northeast Atlantic were fished at biologically 
unsustainable levels in 2019.  
 
The European Union manages fish stocks in accordance with the principle of maximum sustainable 
yield and the annual establishment of total allowable catches (TACs) under multi -annual 
management plans. All catches of regulated species (regarding size or TACs) have to be landed in 
Union ports and counted against the quotas, with the use of caught undersized fis h regulated as well 
(landing obligation). The latest agreement on fishing rights in the Atlantic, the North Sea, the 
Mediterranean, and the Black Sea for 2022 sets limits for over 200 commercial fish stocks, and that 
for the Baltic Sea for 10 fish stocks. Technical regulations to ensure targeted fishing and avoid 
undesired catches are spelled out in Regulation (EU) 2019/1241.  
 
Questions:  
6. In regards to the status of stocks in the in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea addressed in 
Para 4.2.1 It seems desp ite the conservation measures applied in both waters, the status of 
stocks appears to be overfished. Referring to that condition, how can the EU create existing 
Fisheries Management to ensure assessed fish stocks are in a sustainable condition?  
 
Reply : In areas like the Mediterranean or in tropical waters, fisheries are multispecies and mixed 
and situation can arise that some stocks overfished and some others in good condition. Furthermore, 
the Mediterranean basin and its stocks are shared with non -EU count ries. However, the situation 
has significantly improved in the last years, as a result of improving governance and protecting 
biodiversity in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.  
 
Every year, the EU adopts measures on the fixing and allocation of fishing opportunities for certain 
stocks and groups of fish stocks applicable in the Mediterranean and Black Seas, including certain 
conditions functionally linked to those fishing opportunities, as appropriate. The current measures 
are detailed in Council Regulat ion (EU) 2023/195 of 30 January 2023: https://eur -WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 531 - 
 
lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/195/oj . Measures are adapted or updated every year, in accordance with 
the best ava ilable scientific advice.  
 
In the Mediterranean and Black Seas, fisheries is characterised by multispecies fisheries and many 
stocks are shared with third countries. Therefore, intensive work under the General Fisheries 
Commission for the Mediterranean (G FCM), is key and the EU is playing a leading role for the 
adoption of significant decisions, most notably the establishment of five fully -fledged multiannual 
management plans. These plans translated in the adoption of catch limits for deep water shrimps in  
the Ionian Sea, Levant Sea and the Strait of Sicily (including a fishing effort regime of hake) and 
catch limits for the blackspot seabream in the Alboran Sea. A GFCM long -term management plan for 
small pelagics in the Adriatic was agreed to provide high long-term yields consistent with MSY, with 
reduced catch limits in 2023 for anchovies and sardines, and a freeze of capacity for pelagic trawlers 
and purse seiners. The GFCM also continued the implementation of the multi -annual plan for 
demersal stocks in the Adriatic, establishing a maximum fishing effort limit for both bottom and 
beam trawlers, to achieve the MSY target in 2026 for all key stocks. It also adopted harvest limits 
for red coral and a cap on fishing effort for common dolphinfish in internatio nal waters of the 
Mediterranean. The EU is also supporting the implementation of all the measures and the new 
GFCM  2030 Strategy: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/det ail/en/ip_22_6842 . 
 
7. Within the context of fisheries management in the EU, could the EU elaborate further on the 
mechanism under multi -annual management plans? How has this approach been implemented 
in the EU, and what  results has it produced?  
 
Reply:  The multiannual approach to fisheries management reflects the specificities of different 
fisheries at sea basin level. Multi -annual management plans (MAPs) usually cover multiple stocks 
where those stocks are jointly explo ited and are based on the following mechanisms:  
 
• Targets of fishing mortality (expressed in ranges of FMSY, i.e. a range of values provided in 
the best available scientific advice, where all levels of fishing mortality within that range 
result in MSY in the long term with a given fishing pattern and under current average 
environmental conditions without significantly affecting the reproduction process for the 
stock in question),  
• Conservation reference points (expressed in MSY Btrigger and Blim, which ar e the spawning 
stock biomass reference points provided in the best available scientific advice below which 
there may be reduced reproductive capacity in the stock. Below these points, the MAPs 
require the adoption of remedial measures to ensure rapid retur n of the stock concerned to 
levels above those capable of producing MSY.  
 
Page 154 Para 4.87  
Changes regarding environmental sustainability in the overall policy framework of the 
European  Union also affect the fisheries sector. The European Green Deal call s for a sustainable blue 
economy, and the Farm to Fork Strategy refers to sustainable fish and seafood production. In 2021, 
the Commission adopted new guidelines for a more sustainable and competitive EU aquaculture, 
reflecting the priorities of the Europe an Green Deal and the Farm to Fork Strategy.  
Question:  
8. In relation to what is indicated in paragraph 4.87, Indonesia would appreciate it if the EU could 
share more details regarding new guidelines for a more sustainable and competitive EU 
aquaculture which the Commission adopted in 2021?  
 
Reply : The guidelines for a more sustainable and competitive EU aquaculture cover all issues that 
are relevant for the sustainable development of aquaculture in the EU. In particular, the guidelines 
have t he following objectives i) building resilience and competitiveness of the EU aquaculture sector, 
ii) ensuring the participation of the EU aquaculture sector in the green transition, iii) fostering social 
acceptance and improved consumer information on EU a quaculture activities and products, and 
iv) increasing knowledge and innovation in the EU aquaculture sector.  
 
The guidelines identify 13 areas where further work is needed to promote the sustainability, 
competitiveness, and resilience of EU aquaculture. The guidelines provide concrete 
recommendations to the Commission, Member States, aquaculture producers and other relevant 
actors, such as NGOs. Those recommendations include the development of guidance and good 
practices on different aspects of aquaculture activities.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 4.2.2 Domestic Support  
Page 154 Para 4.89  
Since 2021, support to fisheries and aquaculture is co -funded via the European Maritime, Fisheries 
and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF), which replaced the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund 
(EMFF).102 The EMFF continues to support activities under its 2014 -20 operational programmes 
until the end of 2023. For the period 2021 -27, the EMFAF has a budget of EUR 6.1 billion, supporting 
the CFP, the maritime policy, and the agenda for ocean governa nce. EMFAF provides funding to 
national programmes approved by the Commission and co -funded by member States, with such 
programmes providing on average up to 50% of eligible costs (with those percentages varying 
between 40% and 100% for various eligible ac tivities). These programmes can also include support 
for the aquaculture sector in line with the multi -annual national strategic plans to develop the sector.  
Questions:  
9. Referring to para 4.89 page 154, could the EU elaborate further on the allocations of the funds 
managed by the EMFAF? How does EMFAF determine which EU states are eligible to receive the 
funds? And could the EU elaborate further on the category of the beneficiary of these funds?  
 
Reply:  The EMFAF is programmed for 2021 -2027 with a budget  of €6.108 billion.  
 
The programme management is divided between 'shared management ' and 'direct management ': 
• shared management –  €5.311 billion is provided through national programmes co -financed 
by the EU budget and EU countries  
• direct management – €797 million is provided directly by the Commission.  
 
Under 'shared management ', the EMFAF is administered through national programmes approved by 
the Commission. In this case, EU countries outline in their programmes the best way for them to 
fulfil the o bjectives of the fund. They identify actions in line with their national strategy and select 
the eligible projects in line with their own criteria. However, the EMFAF Regulation sets out a list of 
operations not eligible for support, thus preventing any ha rm to the sustainability of fisheries. 
Moreover, certain investments and compensation schemes for the fishing fleet are subject to strict 
conditions to ensure they are consistent with the  conservation objectives of the Common Fisheries 
Policy.  
 
Under 'direct management ', the Commission directly administers the fund through work programmes 
adopted by the EMFAF Committee, which comprises a group of experts designated by EU countries.  
The information regarding the recipients of EU funding is available on -line: https://oceans -and-
fisheries.ec.europa.eu/funding/recipients -eu-funding_en  .  
 
10. Following Indonesia 's question above, as a beneficiary of EMFAF 's funds, is there any 
categorization for beneficiary according to areas of fishing activities? Is there any categorization 
for beneficiaries of fishing activities inside EU 's jurisdiction waters and outside EU 's jurisdiction 
waters?  
 
Reply:  The EMFAF does not have a geographical scope but focuses on the added value of innovative 
projects that contribute to the sustainable use and management of aquatic and maritime resources. 
There is no categorization for benefici aries of fishing activities inside EU 's jurisdiction waters and 
outside EU 's jurisdiction waters.  
 
Page 155 Para 4.92  
As a result, the EMFAF  regulation spells out, for each of the four priorities, specific objectives and 
conditions for which support can be granted. At the same time, the EMFAF regulation contains an 
extended list of activities that are not eligible for funding, including a numb er of capacity -enhancing 
measures such as support to increase fishing capacity, the construction of new ports or auction halls, 
market interventions to support fish prices, or direct restocking. Certain exceptions to supporting 
the investment in fishing ve ssels, or the (temporary) cessation of fishing activities, remain foreseen 
where they contribute to sustainable fishing, energy efficiency, or promoting the adjustment of 
fishing capacity, with support to these activities not exceeding 15% of the total Uni on support.  
Questions:  
11. Ss mentioned in para 4.92 that "the EMFAF regulation contains an extended list of activities that 
are not eligible for funding, including a number of capacity -enhancing measures such as support 
to increase fishing capacity " Can the EU explain further what kind of support provided to increase 
fishing capacity? Further, can the EU also clarify the financial support in measures to increase 
fishing capacity is still given by the member states?  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Reply : Under the EMFAF the listed invest ment on fishing vessels can be supported and these are 
subject to strict conditions and safeguards to avoid any harmful effect. Increase of the gross tonnage 
of a fishing vessel is allowed only for the purposes of improving safety, working conditions or en ergy 
efficiency, that is not for increasing its ability to catch fish.   
 
12. For the extension of fishing activities that are not eligible for funding under EMFAF scheme, 
please explain the maximum allocation of 15% from the total EU 's funds in the last p ara, do the 
activities that are deemed to be not eligible for funding actually still receive funding allocation?  
 
Reply:  The EMFAF Regulation sets out a list of operations not eligible for support, thus preventing 
any harm to the sustainability of fisherie s.  
 
Moreover, certain investments and compensation schemes that are eligible under the EMFAF for the 
fishing fleet are subject to a financial capping (they cannot exceed 15% of the budget allocated to 
each Member State) to avoid crowding out resources fro m actions with more added value. Such 
schemes are subject to strict conditions to avoid unintended harmful effects on marine resources.  
 
13. Is there any EMFAF support that is targeted to fuel support or direct and non -direct financial 
support to vessels w hich fishing activities took place beyond EU 's jurisdiction?  
 
Reply : There is no fuel support under EMFAF.  EMFAF supports actions regarding energy transition 
of the fishing sector. For example:  
 
• feasibility studies on new technology,  
• energy efficiency  audits,  
• development, test and trial of new technology, and  
• improvement of energy efficiency through better hydrodynamic, gear efficiency and 
alternative fuels.  
 
Support for engine replacement is subject to strict conditions to avoid unintended harmful  effects 
on marine resources. General EMFAF support is not conditioned whether fishing activity takes place 
beyond the EU 's jurisdiction.  
 
14. Is there any EMFAF support targeted to small scale or artisanal fishers? If there 's any, can EU 
also give the pe rcentage from the total support allocated to small scale or artisanal fishers?  
 
Reply : The EMFAF Regulation defines 'small-scale coastal fishing ' as fishing carried out by fishing 
vessels smaller than 12 metres and which do not use towed fishing gear (i.e. trawled gear). It 
represents nearly 75% of all fishing vessels registered in the EU and nearly half of all employment 
in the fisheries sector. T herefore, it plays an important socio -economic role in local coastal 
communities.  
 
In this context, the EMFAF has a specific focus on small -scale costal fishing:  
 
- Projects related to small -scale coastal fishing can be supported with a rate of public aid of 100%, 
except for projects related to i) the first acquisition of a fishing vessel by a young fisher, ii) the 
replacement or modernisation of an engine and iii) the increase in volume of a fishing vessel. The 
maximum rate for these projects is 40%.  
- Member States must take into account the specific needs of small -scale coastal fishing in their 
EMFAF programmes, and describe therein the actions required for its development.  
- Member States must endeavour to introduce simplified procedures for small -scale coastal fishing 
businesses applying for EMFAF support.  
 
It is not yet possible to provide data as regards the total amount of the support allocated to 
small -scale coastal fishing, as implementation of the various programmes is only starting now.  
 
4.3 Forestry  
Page 158 Para 4.110 (on Secretariat Report) and Page 20 Para 5.12 (on Government Report)  
Both reports note that the European Parliament and the Council reached a provisional political 
agreement on an EU Regulation on deforestation, which are based  on the Commission proposal 
(COM(2021)0706). The proposed regulation would cover six products: wood, cocoa, coffee, oil palm, 
cattle, and soya.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Questions:  
15. In this context, Indonesia would like to understand better the underlying scientific rationale o f 
the regulation aforementioned, especially the process determining the six relevant products 
mentioned in Annex 1 of the Commission proposal (COM(2021)0706). A closer look at both the 
research results and raw data from Pendrill et al. (2020), which propos al has cited, however, 
reveals some gaps and shortcomings.  
 
Could the EU explain why in determining the relevant products of the above deforestation 
regulation, the EU uses primary scientific rationale that does not incorporate the deforestation 
data of se veral major EU trading partners, e.g., the United States, China, and Switzerland?  
 
Reply:  The aim of the Regulation is to minimise global deforestation and forest degradation driven 
by the EU consumption. Therefore, the Regulation covers the commodities wh ose Union consumption 
is the most relevant in terms of driving global deforestation and forest degradation. An extensive 
review of scientific literature, namely of primary sources estimating the impact of EU consumption 
on global deforestation and linking that footprint to specific commodities, was carried out as a part 
of the study supporting the Impact Assessment  and cross -checked via extensive consultation with 
stakeholders.   
 
16. The affected industries potentially need to collect geolocation (GPS) references of millions of 
farmers and smallholders in over 70 countries. This work can start once there is cl arity from the 
EU on the definition and consequences of low -risk, medium -risk, and high -risk countries.  
a) Could the EU elaborate on the details of the proposed risk classification of the deforestation 
legislation?  
b) Could you please mention whether the EU has designated an institution to be in charge of 
geolocation data analysis and verification? Are they capable of detecting fraud, given that 
there will be millions of geolocation data points from all over the world?  
c) Could you also mention  who is in charge of determining the correct geolocation coordinates 
of agricultural land or forest products and submitting them to the EU? Farmers/landowners 
directly or through intermediaries (traders/importers)?  
d) Is it necessary for a country to seek permission and send geolocation data to the EU before 
expanding agricultural product planting in a forest area?  
e) How does the EU address the costs of implementing geolocation technology that 
smallholders must bear? Will the EU assist the aforementioned s mall farmers?  
 
Reply : The risk classification of countries does not affect the obligation to provide geolocation data 
for commodities and derived products placed or exported from the Union market.  
 
As regards benchmarking, t he European Commission is curre ntly developing the methodology that 
will underpin the assessment of the risk of deforestation (high, standard and low) . Third countries 
and stakeholders will be duly informed about the methodology in the context of the Multi -stakeholder 
Deforestation Plat form.  
 
EU competent authorities will verify if the geolocation data provided is correct and refer to areas 
that have not been deforested after the cut -off date. Operators and traders that place or make 
available relevant commodities or products on the Uni on market will need to submit the geolocation 
coordinate within the Information System, the digital environment foreseen by Art. 33.  
 
Widespread and free technology for geolocation – essentially mobile phones – will ensure that no 
technical obstacle gets in the way of smallholders when it comes to selling their products to the EU 
market. The EU is supporting the partner countries through cooperation and development to ensure 
their supply chains are deforestation -free and is stepping up its support. EU coop eration tools and 
programs will make the engagement with the participation and the support of smallholders a priority, 
as foreseen by the Regulation.  
 
17. In many countries, there are many market intermediaries between the producers and entities 
placing th e relevant products on the EU market.  
 
a) Has the EU studied and anticipated the level of awareness of these intermediaries regarding 
their understanding of what is required for data collection, storage, and transfer?  
b) How does the EU mitigate stakehold ers' potentially limited awareness of this technology?  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 535 - 
 
Reply : All relevant areas were studied in the Impact Assessment . The EU has been working in close 
contact with all interested partner countries and stakeholders to make sure that they are aware of 
the requirements and available technology tools, and continues to do so, including through the 
specific Defor estation Platform set up for this purpose, and numerous specific outreach initiatives 
and events also in partner countries. New projects have been set up too.    
 
18. Failure to perform such obligation and unsuccessful attempt to provide this set of extensi ve 
documents and evidences will directly be followed by the inability of this products to enter the 
EU market. Could the EU further elaborate the scientific evidence of using the deforestation -free 
policy as the only approach to achieve its climate -related  goal, rather than applying a less trade 
restrictive approach to achieve the same objective?  
 
Reply : The Deforestation Regulation is based on a sound Impact Assessment, in which the 
European  Commission evaluated several policy options to achieve the objective of halting 
deforestation and forest degradation associated with the EU consumption of certain commodities 
and minimizing negative spillovers.  
 
19. Since this regulation set strict tracea bility requirements linking the commodities to the farmland 
where they were produced, how does the EU ensure that this rule would not generate an 
unnecessary barrier to trade?  
 
Reply : The objectives pursued by the Regulation are the internationally recognized, public policy 
concerns of helping to fight against climate change and halting biodiversity loss linked to 
deforestation. The Regulation is designed to apply in an even -handed and non -discriminatory 
manner to all commodities and products produced inside, as well as outside the EU. The Regulation 
was developed in compliance with EU 's international commitments, including trade agreements, and 
WTO requirements. It relies on concepts developed at international level, and specifically on the 
work of the FAO, to define what is to be considered a "forest " or "deforestation " under the Regulation.  
 
20. As this policy will impact the small and medium enterprises (SMEs), have the capacity challenges 
faced by SMEs in complying with this regula tion been considered?  
 
Reply : EU experience with the EU Timber Regulation and the findings of the Fitness Check and 
Impact Assessment indicate that SMEs are perfectly capable of exercising due diligence to ensure 
sustainability of their supply chains, whic h are often simpler than those of larger corporations or 
built on longstanding business relationships.  
 
In addition, SMEs will benefit from a range of special provisions in the regulation e.g. a longer 
adaptation period, lighter reporting obligations, and will be assisted in complying with their due 
diligence obligations.  
 
Page 158 Para 4.111  
Replacing and repealing the EUTR, the proposed new regulation builds on both the EUTR and FLEGT 
regulations, which both underwent a fitness check evaluation in 2020. T he proposed regulation would 
require products to be (i) "deforestation -free" (produced on land that was not subject to 
deforestation or forest degradation after 31 December 2020); (ii) produced in compliance with 
national laws ( "legality "); and (iii) accom panied by due diligence statements. It would therefore 
build on and strengthen the existing due diligence and monitoring systems contained in the EUTR 
regarding the legal status of timber but adding the requirement of products being 
"deforestation -free". Wood covered by a FLEGT license would continue to be considered as having 
met the legality requirement.  
Questions:  
21. Indonesia would like to have an understanding on the European Union 's Deforestation Regulation 
regarding on benchmarking system. The para  4.111 stated that "a FLEGT license would continue 
to be considered as having met the legality requirement ". Would Indonesia be impacted by the 
assessment in benchmarking system which Indonesia is the only country that has implemented 
FLEGT? If yes, how do es European Union assess it?  
 
Reply : The FLEGT license will ensure compatibility with the legality requirement of Art. 3 of the 
Regulation. The Commission will then carry out an assessment to determine if countries fall within 
the low -risk or high -risk cat egories. The list of criteria underpinning the risk classification process is 
described in Article 29 of the Regulation. The assessment of the Commission must take into account WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 the criteria defined in Article 29(3) and may also take into account a range of  other criteria described 
in Article 29(4).  
 
22. On the matter of "deforestation -free", there is no consensus definition on "deforestation " 
globally, how does European Union justify "deforestation -free" criteria comprehensively?  
 
Reply : The definitions inc luded in the Regulation rely on concepts developed at international level, 
in particular within the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO).   
 
4.4 Energy  
4.4.1 Sustainable energy and climate  
Page 158 Para 4.112  
The Secretariat notes that EU continues its efforts of sustainable economic transformation, with the 
key objectives consist of completing internal market while ensuring the fundamental shift towards 
an energy efficient, cost -effective, and reliable system base d on renewable and low carbon energy, 
improving energy security, reducing emissions, and achieving climate neutrality by 2050.  
Questions:  
23. The European Union has sent notification of the European Parliament and Council draft regulation 
2021/0367 on Was te Shipment. This regulatory proposal establishes multiple regulatory stages 
for waste shipments within, to, and from the EU. There are indications of discriminatory practices 
in the proposed draft regulation, in which the EU establishes various excessive administrative 
requirements for waste export activities to countries outside the EU and OECD. Could the EU 
explain how the regulation complies with WTO non -discrimination principles?  
 
Reply : The Commission proposal for new rules on waste shipment maintains the strong 
implementation of the controls under the Basel Convention, including the prohibition to export 
hazardous waste from the EU to non -OECD countries. The proposal further includes a new regime 
applying to the export of non -hazardous waste,  that will in practice strengthen further the conditions 
under which non -hazardous waste can be exported outside the EU. The Commission proposes neither 
a blanket ban nor one -sided trade restrictions, but rather will require evidence from the importing 
countries and from the EU exporting companies that the waste will be managed sustainably when it 
is shipped abroad, according to objective and transparent criteria that equally apply to EU waste 
operators.  
 
The current Waste Shipment Regulation (WSR) already stipulates that waste can only be exported 
outside the EU if it is managed at destination in an environmentally sound manner, to conditions 
that are broadly equivalent to the EU 's.  
 
The proposed measures are stricter for export of waste to non -OECD countr ies. This stems from the 
assumption that OECD countries generally have higher waste management standards and practices, 
compared to non -OECD countries. When adhering to the OECD, each country has to undergo a 
screening process whereby their waste managemen t regime and legislation is subject to scrutiny by 
the OECD Secretariat and OECD members, which guarantees that their standards and practices 
comply with minimum requirements for waste management. This is not the case for non -OECD 
countries. The distinctio n between OECD and non -OECD countries is also enshrined in international 
and EU law on waste shipment: the Basel Convention bans the export of hazardous waste from 
OECD countries to non -OECD countries.  
 
24. Could the EU also ensure that the regulation does  not create unnecessary trade barriers?  
 
Reply : The current WSR already stipulates that waste can only be exported outside the EU if it is 
managed at destination in an environmentally sound manner, to conditions that are broadly 
equivalent to the EU 's.  
 
The lack of detailed provisions and mechanism to implement have led to weak enforcement - that's 
what the new WSR is trying to remedy.  
 
The proposal lays down transparent, non -discriminatory and proportionate criteria to demonstrate 
that exported waste is m anaged in an environmentally sound manner.  
 
The new requirements on the export of waste will apply three years after the entry into force of the 
new Regulation, leaving enough time for all relevant actors to adapt to the new regime.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Page 158 Para 4.114  
In 2021, the European Commission published the Fit -for-55 package, aiming to ensure EU policies 
align with the climate -related goals of the European Green Deal and the Climate Law, which includes 
an intermediate target of 55% GHG emission reduction by 2030 a nd becoming climate -neutral by 
2050 (Section 1).  
Question:  
25. The purpose of Fit -for-55 package is to align EU polices with climate change goals. On that note, 
how would European Union take into account the different capacities of EU trade partners to 
meet EU 's environmental targets?  
 
Reply: The Fit -for-55 package is a set of domestic measures laying out the EU path towards climate 
neutrality by 2050 through the ambitious 55% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions goal by 2030 
under the European Green Deal . The EU is committed for its policy and legislative framework to be 
fully compliant with all its international commitments.  
 
The EU also knows that it cannot tackle the global environmental and climate challenges alone. 
Therefore, as the European Green D eal measures move towards implementation, the EU is 
continuing to engage with trading partners in the following key areas: (1) Outreach and 
awareness -raising: make sure the measure adopted is understood (inside and outside the EU). This 
outreach is being d one both in Brussels and in third countries (via e.g., EU delegations), as well as 
in multilateral settings such as the WTO. We are also looking at developing material that can be 
used (e.g., information platforms, FAQs, etc.), (2) Tools to facilitate the implementation and 
compliance with the regulations (e.g., guidelines, databases, etc.) and (3) Capacity building: where 
possible, we will need to look, together with partner countries, at concrete needs, and identify 
funding, often in collaboration with In ternational Organisations.  
 
4.5 Services  
Page 166 Para 4.152  
The Secretariat mentioned that the enterprises classified as micro and small are exempt from many 
of these rules applying to services or platforms, unless they are designated as VLOPs.  
Question:  
26. According to this paragraph, micro and small enterprises  are given flexibility. Given the 
disparities in progress among the 27 EU member countries, it is possible that there are 
differences in the definition or scale that qualifies a company as an MSMEs. How does the EU 
bridge this gap?  
 
Reply: Micro enterprise s as well as small enterprises are exempted from most of the obligations of 
the Digital Services Act applicable specifically to online platforms, including the provisions applicable 
to online platforms that allow the distance conclusion of contracts betwee n consumers and traders. 
The European Union has a harmonised definition of MSMEs. According to the Annex to 
Recommendation 2003/361/EC  concerning the definition of micro, small and medium -sized 
enterprises, the category of micro and small enterprises (SMEs) is made up of enterprises which 
employ fewer than 50 persons and which have an annual turnover not exceeding EUR 10 million, 
and/or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding EUR 10 million.  
 
Page 168 Para 4.160  
(…) It also introduced a requirement for workers posted in another member State for more than 
12 months (a period that can be extended to 18 months) to have access to the same  legal terms 
and conditions of employment as those under national employment contracts.  
Question:  
27. Indonesia notes that the regulatory reform allows workers to extend their stay by up to 
18 months for certain positions. Is there a possibility that this  regulation will be extended to 
employees from third countries (non -member states)?  
 
Reply: Directive (EU) 2018/957 amending Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in 
the framework of the provision of services includes a provision on long -term posting. According to 
this provision, the employer of a posted worker has to guarantee additional terms and conditions of 
employment once the period of posting exceeds 12 months or 18 months following a motivated 
notification submitted by the service pro vider.  
 
The provision on long -term posting is not directly applicable to third -country nationals. It may be 
applicable to third -country nationals who could be posted from an EU Member State to another EU WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Member State provided that they are employed by a s ervice provider established in a Member State 
and who are lawfully and habitually employed in that Member State.  
 
28. Under what conditions can this arrangement applied to a non -member state?  
 
Reply : Directive 96/71/EC, as amended by Directive (EU) 2018/95 7, regulates the right of 
undertakings established in an EU Member State (home Member State) to post their own workers 
temporarily to the territory of another Member State (host Member State) for the purpose of 
providing services there. Under these rules, posted workers who temporarily work in a host Member 
State have the right to receive, inter alia, the remuneration and all its mandatory elements of that 
host Member State.  
 
Directive 96/71/EC does not apply to non -EU Member States. If Indonesia wishes to  adopt similar 
provisions to the ones of Directive 96/71/EC, it should take into account that posting rules regulate 
the posting of workers from the perspective of a Member State receiving the posted workers and 
not that of the home Member State. This mean s that any similar rules should cover the workers 
temporarily posted to Indonesia by an undertaking established in another country.  
 
4.5.1 Financial services  
4.5.1.1 Overview  
Page 169 Para 4.168  
The ECB 's first climate stress test estimated potential losse s of around EUR 70 billion to the banks 
included in the assessment, in case of a disorderly transition to a low -carbon economy. It stressed 
that this assessment likely understated actual climate -related risks due to a variety of factors. It 
also found that  most banks do not yet sufficiently consider climate risks in credit risk assessment or 
stress tests.  
Questions:  
29. Going forward, how will the EU plan on taking the climate stress test further?  
 
Reply : Within the EU prudential framework, the first step to is to establish a common understanding 
of what the stress testing framework should be. For this purpose, the EBA i s being empowered by 
the 2021 Banking Package – currently still under negotiation in Parliament and Council - to specify 
reference methodologies for the assessment of the impact of ESG risks on the financial stability of 
institutions, including scenario st ress testing. Based on uniform criteria, banks ' stress test on ESG 
risks will also be complemented by supervisory stress testing. Common methodologies jointly 
defined by the EBA, EIOPA and the ESMA will be the basis for supervisory stress tests. The ECB an d 
joint ECB/ESRB are also working in this field and will continue on a regular basis in future, especially 
to further enhance data, measurement and methodologies as well as expand the scope of financial 
exposures covered.  
 
30. Does the EU think that the ou tput of the said stress test will affect EU 's commitment to its trading 
partner in the near future?  
 
Reply: The outputs of the stress tests are key to inform a risk -based decision making process in 
banks, notably in terms of banks ' governance, business str ategy and internal capital allocation. It is 
also crucial to inform supervisory assessments. A risk -based assessment of the strategy of a bank 
is not connected to considerations related to trading partners.  
 
PART II: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT REP ORT 
3.1.1 WTO Reform  
(ii) Plurilateral negotiations  
Page 8 Para 3.10  
The plurilateral initiatives (on domestic regulations, e -commerce and investment facilitation for 
development) have played an important role in enabling WTO members to work on new rules and 
the finalisation of the ongoing open plurilateral Joint Statement Initiatives (JSIs) negotiations on 
investment facilitation for development and e -commerce are of strategic importance for the 
credibility of the system.  
Question:  
31. Regarding the sec tion 3.10. on the Secretariat Report, what is EU 's consideration to negotiate 
domestic regulations and e -commerce in the plurilateral initiatives while as we know that issues 
already discuss on multilateral 's track on Working Party on Domestic Regulations and Work 
Programme on E -Commerce?  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Reply : The EU is of the opinion that plurilateral initiatives are key to establishing rules needed for 
modern trade amongst WTO Members and, hence, to contributing to the negotiating function of the 
WTO. The plurilateral n egotiations on services domestic regulation are without prejudice to the 
mandate pursuant to GATS Article VI.4, which remains to be fulfilled by the WTO Membership. The 
plurilateral negotiations on e -commerce are without prejudice to the work undertaken un der the 
Work Programme on e -commerce.  
 
9 EXTERNAL IMPACTS OF THE EU 'S INTERNAL POLICIES  
9.1 Digital Services and online platforms  
Page 32 Para 9.1  
The Regulation on a Single Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act) 98 concerns online 
intermediaries and platforms, such as, online marketplaces, social networks, content -sharing 
platforms, app stores, and online travel and accommodation platforms. It will create a safer digital 
space in which the fundamental rights of all users of digital services are protected. Together with 
the Digital Markets Act, its goal is to safeguard citizens and their fundamental rights online.  
Questions:  
32. Regarding paragraph 9.1 point 3, it has been stated in the report that the focus of the EU Digital 
Service s Act is on online intermediaries and platforms, such as online marketplaces. Could the 
EU elaborate on the differences between the measures being implemented in the non -digital 
services sector and the digital services sector?  
 
Reply : The European Union 's rules first and foremost ensure that the European Union 's common 
values, and our universal human rights, apply equally online and offline. The focus of the EU 's Digital 
Services Act is to establish a common set of rules regarding online intermediaries ' obligations and 
accountability across the EU single market, thus opening up new opportunities to provide digital 
services across borders to EU and non -EU providers, while ensuring a high level of protection to all 
users.  
 
33. Does it also impose new measures or restrictions for non -EU countries in the service sectors 
classified as Digital Services?  
 
Reply:  The Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act are instruments that harmonise the laws 
of the 27 EU Member States. They facilitate the cross -border provision of digital services, regardless 
of whether these are provided by undertakings that are headquartered inside or outside the EU. 
Both sets of rules apply in particular to so -called gatekeeper services or very large online platforms 
that inte rmediate between citizens and businesses online. Whether or not specific digital services 
are covered by the new regimes applicable to gatekeeper or very large online platforms depends on 
objective criteria related to the size of the online platform and th e nature and type of the service 
concerned. In short, these new digital rules aim to facilitate the cross -border provision of digital 
services.  
 
PART III: GENERAL QUESTIONS  
Agriculture  
Question:  
34. In December 2022, and then extended for one year until 1 5 December 2023, the EU revoked 
the approval of glyphosate usage. What is the scientific evidence for the policy, since the 
peer-review evaluation is not yet been conclusive among international experts?  
 
Reply: The EU has not 'revoked ' the approval or use of glyphosate.  
 
On 2 December 2022, the Commission adopted a Regulation  to extend the approval of glyphsoate 
for a period of 1 yea r (i.e until 15 December 2023) to provide the time necessary to complete the 
assessment required in order to take a decision on renewal of its approval.  
 
The renewal review is currently being finalised. EFSA is expected to deliver its Conclusion on the 
peer review in early July 2023, after which the Commission will put forward a renewal report and a 
draft Regulation to the EU Member States, on whether the approval of glyphosate can be renewed, 
or not. Discussions will then take place in the Standing Committ ee on Plants, Animals, Food and 
Feed (PAFF Committee) prior to a vote by the Member States on the Commission 's proposal.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Please see the glyphosate webpage on the Commission 's website for full details and for updates on 
the renewal procedure:  
https://food.ec.europa.eu/plants/pesticides/approval -active -substances/renewal -
approval/glyphosate_en  
 
35. Indonesia  is one of the world 's largest coffee producers, and the European Union is one of 
Indonesia 's export destinations. Indonesia believes that the EU 's most recent maximum limit of 
Glyphosate MRLs could create a trade barrier, particularly for Indonesian coffe e products. 
Indonesia requested responses to the following questions:  
 
a) Clarification on the appropriate level of protection (ALOP);  
b) Scientific evidence used to modify Glyphosate MRLs;  
c) Risk assessment results; and  
d) SPS Agreement harmonization obligations.  
 
Reply: Food products placed on the EU market must comply with Regulation (EC) 396/2005 for 
maximum residues levels (MRLs) of pesticides. The existing EU MRLs for glyphosate are in place 
since 2013, when Regulation (EC) 293/2013 amended Regulation (EC) 396/2005. This means that 
Indonesia has ensured compliance with the existing MRL for glyphosate on coffee for 10 years now.  
 
Those existing MRLs will be reviewed once the procedure for the renewal of the approval of the 
substance ha s been finalised and will be based on a risk assessment carried out by the European 
Food Safety Authority as described in Article 12 of Regulation (EC) 396/2005.  
 
The results of the review will be duly notified to the trading partners of the EU, in the fra me of the 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement of the WTO.  
 
36. Indonesia is aware that the EU has set a new maximum limit for MRLs clothianidin and 
thiamethoxam, citing environmental concerns, specifically a decrease in the number of bees and 
pollin ators, which could jeopardize global biodiversity, the environment, and sustainable 
development. Indonesia requested clarification on the legal basis, scientific justification, and 
relevance for determining MRLs for the purpose of preserving the environmen t rather than 
human health issues, given that the intended policy must be consistent with the SPS Agreement.  
 
Reply : WTO members are not prevented from taking measures necessary to ensure the protection 
of animal or plant health or the environment provided that those measures are not applied in a 
manner which could constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discr imination or a disguised 
restriction on international trade. Such measures shall not be more trade restrictive than necessary 
to fulfil a legitimate objective such as the protection of the environment. The EU considers that 
lowering the MRLs for clothianid in and thiamethoxam to the limit of quantification LOQ is necessary 
to fulfil its legitimate objective and that there is no alternative that would be less trade restrictive 
and equally contribute to the objective pursued.  
 
The EU considers that there is c onsiderable evidence of the adverse impacts of neonicotinoids on 
bees. Based on the current knowledge, reducing the use of neonicotinoids is an effective action to 
tackle pollinators decline. According to the Intergovernmental Science -Policy Platform on 
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) [1], a clear consensus exists regarding the fact that 
both wild and managed bees are exposed to pesticides (mainly through nectar and pollen, in the 
case of the neonicotinoids), and that the range of sub -lethal effects is quite broad.  
 
The Europea n Food Safety Authority 's (EFSA) peer review of clothianidin [2] and thiamethoxam [3] 
risk assessment for bees concluded that all outdoor uses on the examined crops led to the conclusion 
that there were high risks to bees or that it had not been demonstrated that risks were low. 
Therefore, there is no basis to conclude that use on crops that were not examined by EFSA would 
be safe for pollinators and that the existing maximum residue levels (MRLs) could be maintained.  
 
Since the lowering of MRLs for clothianidin and thiamethoxam is related to environmental objectives, 
the EU  found it appropriate to inform its trade partners via a notification under the WTO TBT 
agreement. Additionally, a communication for information was submitted to the Committee on 
SPS measures.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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[1] IPBES (2016). The assessment report of the Intergovernmental Science -Policy Platform on 
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services on pollinators, pollination and food production. S.G. Potts, 
V. L. Imperatriz -Fonseca, and H. T. Ngo (eds). Secretariat of the Intergovernmental Science -Policy 
Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, Bonn, Germany. 552 pages. 
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3 402856  
[2] European Food Safety Authority; Peer review of the pesticide risk assessment for bees for the active 
substance clothianidin considering the uses as seed treatments and granules. EFSA Journal 
2018;16(2):5177.  
[3] European Food Safety Authority; Peer review of the pestici de risk assessment for bees for the active 
substance thiamethoxam considering the uses as seed treatments and granules. EFSA Journal 
2018;16(2):5179.  
 
37. Furthermore, the European Union 's MRL threshold has also resulted in the suspension of our tea 
export s to the EU. Why does the European Union adhere to a higher standard than CODEX? Is 
this policy applicable to domestic tea producers as well?  
 
Reply:  
It is an EU policy to align EU MRLs with Codex MRLs (CXLs) provided that:  
 
· the EU sets MRLs  for the commodity under consideration;  
· the current EU MRL is lower than the CXL.  
 
The EU is not including Codex MRLs into the EU Regulations in the following circumstances:  
 
· if toxicological data are not available at EU level or are available but not  yet assessed at EU 
level, and/or  
· if the proposed CXL is not safe for European consumers [1], and/or  
· if the proposed CXLs  are not sufficiently supported by data as required according to the FAO 
manual or other agreed requirements, and/or if the CXL is not acceptable to the EU with 
respect to areas such as supporting data, and extrapolations, as well as environmental issues 
of global nature (such as the decline of pollinators or the accumulation of persistent 
bioaccumulative and toxic substances in the environment).  
 
EU MRLs apply to all food and feed consumed in the EU independently of whether the product is 
produced in the E U or imported from non -EU countries  
 
[1] Including an assessment that the Codex residue definition ensures an equivalent level of protection.  
 
38. We believe that both Indonesia and the European Union recognize that palm oil is an important 
part of world 's oil industry, and that palm oi l is one of Indonesia 's most important export 
products to the European Union market. However, Indonesia encounters challenges with the 
implementation of RED II and its Delegated Regulations, which have adverse impact on our palm 
oil trade. In light of this , Indonesia is seeking the European Union 's clarification on how the 
implementation of such policy in line with WTO principles and applied in non -restrictive and 
non-discriminative manner.  
 
Reply : This question seems closely related to the ongoing WTO pro ceedings, in which Indonesia and 
Malaysia have challenged provisions included in the Renewable Energy Directive and its Delegated 
Regulations. As the WTO litigation is still ongoing, any comments and discussions at this stage could 
compromise the integrity  of the process.  
 
Forestry  
39. The implementation of Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism will require "Competent Authority " 
to assess the report of the listed certain importation products. Could European Union give update 
on the regard of the establishment of respective "Competent Authority " in EU member states?  
 
Reply: Under the Regulation establishing a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, Member States 
are responsible for appointing the authorities that will be responsible for carrying functions and 
duties specified in the Regulation. As soon as all Member States will have appointed their respective 
responsible authority, the Commission will publish the list in the Official Journal. The information will 
also be made readily available on the relevant w ebpages of the European Commission.  
 
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Industry  
40. Indonesia seeks a clarification regarding the proposed Sustainable Products Regulations 
approved by the European Commission in March 2022 whereby the EU is considering several 
industries to implement digi tal product passports un 2026 including for apparel, batteries, and 
consumer electronics.  
 
Reply : The Digital Product Passport (DPP)  is a new tool introduced which will make information 
available to actors along the entire value chain and significantly enh ance the end -to-end traceability 
of a product. The economic operator placing the product on the market will be responsible for 
introducing the information in the DPP. In some cases, this information is already requested by other 
legislations or already ava ilable to the economic operators. The DPP should help consumers make 
informed choices by improving their access to product information, allow other value chain actors 
such as repairers or recyclers to access relevant information, and enable competent natio nal 
authorities to perform their duties. To take account of the nature of the product and its market, the 
information to be included in the product passport will be carefully examined on a case -by-case basis 
when preparing product -specific rules. It may in clude information such as the environmental 
footprint of a product, information useful for recycling purposes, the recycled content of a certain 
material, information about the supply chain, etc. Dedicated security and privacy protocols will be 
developed t hrough the standardisation process. Moreover, access to information will be granted on 
a 'need-to-know ' basis. Different stakeholders will have access to different sets of information, based 
on access rights defined in the delegated acts for each product group regulated. To ensure that the 
product passport is flexible, agile and market -driven and evolving i n line with business models, 
markets and innovation, it will be based on a decentralised data system, set up and maintained by 
economic operators. Regarding batteries, the proposal for the Battery Regulation introduced the 
concept of a battery passport (an d database) . By January 2026, manufacturers, importers, and 
distributors of industrial and electric vehicles (EV) batteries would be required to have a unique 
digital passport for each individual battery (identified through its serial number) placed on the  
market. It would consist of a combination of static information (fixed at the moment of placing the 
battery on the market) and dynamic data generated throughout its use to facilitate reuse and 
refurbishment. By that date the European Commission shall also  set up a battery information 
database consisting of a public part (B2C) accessible after purchase, a restricted part (B2B), a 
compliance part (B2G) and an online portal giving access to those three parts. The teams 
developing the battery passport and the DPP are working in close contact with the 
intention to use as far as possible the same standards and solutions.  
 
41. How will the EU ensure that the aforementioned regulation does not create an unnecessary 
barrier to trade and is consistent with the WTO TB T and TF Agreements?  
 
Reply : The ESPR is designed to be compatible with WTO -rules and so will the secondary legislation 
adopted under the ESPR framework. Any economic operator, including from a third country  wishing 
to place products on the EU market will  be able to do so, regardless of origin, if they comply with 
these rules.  
 
 
 
 
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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INDONESIA – ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS  
ADDITIONAL WRITTEN QUESTIONS FROM INDONESIA  
REGARDING THE SECRETARIAT REPORT  
4.4 Energy  
4.4.1 Sustainable energy and climate  
Page 158 Para 4.112  
The European Union continues its efforts of sustainable economic transformation as initially spelled 
out in the first EU Strategy for Sustainable Development in 2001, and most recently deepened in 
the European Green Deal and the Climate Law as well as the REPowerEU Plan. The key objectives of 
the European energy policy consist of completing the internal market while ensuring a fundamental 
shift towards an energy -efficient, cost -effective, and reliable system based on renewable and 
low-carbon energy, improvi ng energy security, reducing emissions, and ultimately achieving climate 
neutrality by 2050.  
 
Questions  
1. Indonesia notes that, based on the Green Deal Industrial Plan, the European Union intends to 
enact the Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework (TC TF) for State Aid, one of which 
regulates an enhanced investment support scheme for the production of strategic net -zero 
technologies (e.g., electric vehicles), including the possibility of providing higher subsidies.  
 
Reply : Until 31 December 2023, the Te mporary Crisis and Transition Framework enables Member 
States to cushion the economic impact of Russia’s aggression of Ukraine and to (i) grant limited 
amounts of aid to companies affected by the current crisis; (ii) ensure that sufficient liquidity remain s 
available to businesses; (iii) compensate companies for the additional costs incurred due to 
exceptionally high gas and electricity prices; and (iv) incentivise additional reduction of electricity 
consumption. Until 31 December 2025, Member States may gr ant aid to foster the transition to a 
net-zero economy. Thus, aid may be granted to (i) accelerate the roll -out of renewable energy, 
storage and renewable heat relevant for REPowerEU and (ii) decarbonise industrial production 
processes. In addition, Member  States may also grant aid to accelerate investments in key sectors 
for the transition towards a net -zero economy, enabling  investment support for the manufacturing 
of strategic equipment, namely batteries, solar panels, wind turbines, heat -pumps, electrol ysers and 
carbon capture usage and storage as well as for production of key components and for production 
and recycling of related critical raw materials.  
 
2. Please explain the TCTF regulation and provide clarification that the subsidy measures is in 
accordance with WTO provisions, particularly those concerning subsidies and performance 
requirements.  
 
Reply : On 9 March 2023, the Commission adopted the Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework 
to foster support measures in sectors which are key for the transition to a net -zero economy, in line 
with the Green Deal Industrial Plan and WTO provisions.  
 
The EU f ully respects its WTO obligations. This is ensured by its State aid control regime, which 
specifically excludes Member States from implementing subsidies prohibited under the Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.  
 
This general principle is al so contained in the Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework, which in 
its point (53) expressly excludes State aid subject to clauses conditioning it directly or indirectly on 
the origin of products or equipment, such as requirements for the beneficiary t o purchase 
domestically -produced products, as well as aid for export -related activities to third countries or to 
Member States which would be directly linked to the quantities exported, aid contingent upon the 
use of domestic over imported goods, or aid to  establish and operate a distribution network or to 
cover any other expenditure linked to export activities.  
 
GENERAL QUESTIONS  
CARBON BORDER ADJUSMENT MECHANISM (CBAM)  
Questions:  
3. Please explain whether the CBAM policy is an internal measure or a borde r measure.  
 
Reply:  The CBAM is a border adjustment mechanism which applies to relevant imported products. 
It is justified by the EU’s ambitious climate objectives and the need to prevent the risk of carbon WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 leakage i.e due to companies based in the EU movin g carbon -intensive production abroad to escape 
stringent EU climate policies such as the EU’s carbon pricing system (EU ETS) or production being 
replaced by imports with higher embedded emissions .  
 
4. When the carbon tax will be collected? Before the prod uct enter the EU market or after it?  
 
Reply : The CBAM is not a tax but an environmental policy tool. In the definitive period starting in 
2026, EU importers – who will need to be authorised as CBAM declarants – will submit each year a 
CBAM declaration cont aining information on the quantity and associated emissions of goods imported 
during the preceding calendar year (the first declaration will be required in May 2027 covering the 
preceding year). The CBAM declarant will need to surrender CBAM certificates c orresponding to the 
value of greenhouse gas emissions embedded in the declared goods after deducting the carbon price 
already effectively paid by the third country operator. Along the year, by the end of each quarter, 
the CBAM declarant will have to ensure  that the number of CBAM certificates on its account in the 
CBAM registry at the end of each quarter corresponds to at least 80 % of the embedded emissions 
in all goods it has imported since the beginning of the calendar year. Purchasing can thus take plac e 
after the good has entered the EU market and surrendering will always take place later.  
 
As mentioned in Art. 2 para 1 of the CBAM  Regulation, it applies to goods listed in Annex I originating 
in a third country, where those goods, or processed products (…).  
 
5. What is the basis decision or rationale for product listed in Annex I?  
 
Reply : To ensure equivalent treatment between EU - and imported goods, the CBAM only applies to 
goods which are subject to the EU carbon pricing mechanism (the EU ETS). Furthermore, it was 
decided to set up the CBAM with a first and limited set of products, which are the most at risk of 
carbon leakage and as set out in Annex 1. In particular, the criteria we have relied on are: 
i) relevance of sectors in terms of emissions; ii) sector 's exposure to significant risk of carbon 
leakage; and iii) the need to balance broad coverage in terms of GHG emissions whil e limiting 
complexity and administrative effort.  
 
6. Will the EU Commission expand the product list in Annex I after the CBAM Regulation is 
implemented? Please explain.  
 
Reply : By the end of the provisional phase of the CBAM (end 2025), the Commission will  undertake 
a full review of the implementation of the CBAM. Using data collected during that period, the review 
will, amongst others, look carefully into the possibility of extending CBAM to other goods and sectors 
covered by the EU ETS (see to that effect  Article 30(2) of the CBAM Regulation).  
 
Art. 2 para 2 CBAM Regulation: The Commission shall adopt implementing acts  laying down 
detailed conditions for the application of the CBAM to such goods (…)  
 
7. When will the EU Commission adopt the implementing ac t for the CBAM application?  
 
Reply:  The CBAM Regulation foresees that several delegated and implementing acts will be adopted 
for the application of the CBAM. The first draft implementing act has been published for feedback  on 
13 June 2023 (deadline: 11 July 2023). It will contain all the reporting rules applicable for the 
transitional phase.  
 
Other implementing acts of the CBAM Regulation will be adopted during the transitional phase and 
prior to the start of the definite p hase in 2026. We will keep WTO Members informed at each stage, 
as we did for publication in the official journal and informing of the open consultation on the first  draft 
implementing act.  
 
Art. 2 para 12 CBAM Regulation: The Union may conclude agreements  with third countries or 
territories with a view to taking into account carbon pricing mechanisms in such countries or 
territories for the purposes of the application of Article 9.  
 
8. Please explain the EU's considerations in establishing an agreement wit h third countries to 
recognize carbon pricing mechanisms in those countries.  
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9. Is there any other way for the EU to recognize third -country carbon systems besides an 
agreement?  
 
Replies to 8 and 9:  
Such agreements are not a pre -requisite for importers to claim  a reduction of the CBAM obligation 
equivalent to the carbon price that they have effectively paid in the country of origin for the declared 
embedded emissions. The CBAM Regulation ensures that a carbon price effectively paid in a 
third country will be deducted from the number of CBAM certificates to be surrendered, after the 
end of the transitional period.  
 
Under the transitional period starting in October 2023, importers of goods under the scope of the 
Regulation will notably have to rep ort on direct and indirect emissions as well as on the carbon price 
paid in the country of origin, where relevant.  
 
The European Commission is open to dialogue with its international partners on the carbon price 
paid by their exporters for goods under the scope of the CBAM Regulation, so as to better understand 
their carbon pricing mechanisms and how to most effectively take them  into consideration after the 
end of the transitional period.  The full understanding of carbon pricing mechanisms  for goods 
covere d by the CBAM Regulation will allow the European Commission to consider 
possible   simplifications, notably concerning the carbon price paid by operators, and inform the 
European Commission in view of its adoption of further implementing acts before the end  of the 
transitional period.  
 
Art. 3 number 33 CBAM Regulation: 'operator ' means any person who operates or controls an 
installation in a third country;  
 
10. Please explain and specify who is the operator.  
 
Reply:  
Article 3(31) of the final CBAM Regulation  defines an 'operator ' as any person who operates or 
controls an installation in a third country. This concerns national operators of installations exporting 
goods in scope of the CBAM Regulation into the EU.  
 
Art. 7 para 1 and para 2 CBAM Regulation: Embe dded emissions in goods shall be calculated  
pursuant to the methods set out in Annex IV. For goods listed in Annex II only direct emissions  
shall be calculated and taken into account.  
 
Where the actual emissions cannot be adequately determined,  as well as  in the case of 
indirect emissions, the embedded emissions shall be determined by reference to default values  in 
accordance with the methods set out in point 4.1 of Annex IV.  
 
11. Please explain the basis of methodology used to calculate the embedded emiss ions.  
 
Reply:  
The European Commission published for feedback  (deadline: 11 July 2023) the draft implementing 
regulation setting out the detailed reporting requirements for the transitional period, including the 
methodology for calculating embedded emissions. By the end of the transitional period in 2025, the 
Commiss ion will assess the methodology for the calculation of indirect emissions in light of the data 
it has collected and will finalise the methodology for the definite period starting in 2026 in a new 
implementing regulation. The methodology for calculating emb edded emissions was elaborated with 
the assistance of an expert group (where some trading partners were observers), and it was 
designed in such a way as to ensure equivalent treatment between EU producers covered by the 
EU ETS and third countries ' exporter s covered by the CBAM.  
 
12. Is there any international standard that can be used as a parameter of the methodology?  
 
Reply:  The European Commission published for feedback  (deadline: 11 July 2023) the draft 
implementing regulation setting out the detailed reporting requirements for the transitional period, 
including the methodology for calculating embedded emissions.  
 
To allow all third country operators sufficient time to adapt, the draft implementing regulation 
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 systems to which an operator is subject. Until end of 2024, alternative methods to the one specified 
in the draft im plementing regulation may be used under some conditions set in Article 4(2): (1) a 
carbon pricing scheme where the installation is located; (2) an emission monitoring scheme at the 
installation which can include verification by an accredited verifier; or ( 3) compulsory emission 
monitoring schemes.  
 
The methods for calculating embedded emissions largely rely on established approaches for 
reporting emissions, notably under the UNCC framework, and largely refers to international 
standards (notably ISO norms), as deemed suitable methods.  
 
13. Does the use of the same international standard by a third country imply that the third country 
has met the CBAM regulation? If no, please explain the reason for accepting it.  
 
Reply : The European Commission published for feedback  (deadline: 1 1 July 2023) the draft 
implementing regulation setting out the detailed reporting requirements for the transitional period, 
including the methodology for calculating embedded emissions. This draft act set out the reporting 
standards to meet in the reports on embedded emission from imported CBAM goods for the 
transitional period. The reporting requirements on the embedded emissions mirror those under the 
ETS.  
 
As indicated in the previous reply, to allow all third country operators sufficient time to adapt,  the 
draft implementing regulation establishes several reporting flexibilities.  
 
The transitional phase was designed to collect information, notably in view of establishing the final 
methodology for the definitive period.  
 
14. Please explain the direct and  indirect emissions in detail.  
 
Reply : During the transitional phase  starting on 1 October 2023, for monitoring purposes, importers 
will be required to report both direct and indirect emissions for all goods falling under the scope of 
CBAM.  
 
Direct emissions cover the emissions generated during the production processes of CBAM goods, 
including from the production of heating and cooling. Direct emissions from some precursors and 
some downstream products listed in the CBAM Regulation are also in cluded.  
 
Indirect emissions cover the production of electricity that is consumed during the production 
processes.  
 
During the definite phase starting on 1 January 2026, CBAM will only apply to direct emissions for 
the goods listed in Annex II of the CBAM R egulation. In practice, this means that only exporters of 
cement and fertilisers will have to declare both direct and indirect emissions.  
 
To ensure that our trading partners understand the requirements under CBAM, including on direct 
and indirect emissio ns, the EU Commission, in conjunction with the External Action Services and EU 
Delegations around the world, will launch an information campaign, featuring online seminars, 
physical events, distribution of guidance documents, and direct assistance, aimed a t assisting 
third country operators and importers to the EU in performing all new obligations required by the 
CBAM Regulation and its secondary legislation. The campaign will start upon the approval of the 
implementing act concerning the reporting rules ap plicable in transitional period. This will continue 
through autumn 2023 thus supporting all relevant actors for the entry into force of the regulation in 
October 2023.  
 
15. Please provide the example of actual embedded emissions determination for complex goods, as 
mentioned in Annex IV.  
 
Reply : As part of its information campaign, once the implementing act on the transitional period is 
adopted, the Commission will notably pr oduce a guidance document for third country operators on 
the reporting requirements set out by CBAM and the implementing act. The guidance document will 
provide several examples, illustrating how the embedded emissions of complex goods should be 
estimated.  
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16. Please explain how the default values were determined.  
 
Reply : Where actual emissions for CBAM goods cannot be adequately measured, the embedded 
emissions will be determined by reference to default values. The methodology for setting the default 
values is set out in Annex IV of the CBAM Regulation.  
 
The use of default values for the purpose of reporting during the transitional period is possible for 
the first three reporting periods and can be used for the whole reporting period for input materials 
or subprocesses relatively minor ( -20%) compared to total emissions. Default values will be made 
available by the European Commission before the start of the transitional phase.  
 
By the end of the transitional period in 2025, the Commission will assess the default values in light 
of the data it has collected and will finalise the methodology in an implementing regulation for the 
definite period starting in 2026.  
 
Art. 10 para 5 CBAM Regulation: The operator shall: (a) determine the embedded emissions 
calcula ted in accordance with the methods set out in Annex IV, by type of goods produced at the 
installation referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.  
 
17. Is the exporter required to provide data or information on carbon emissions?  
 
Reply : From the start of th e transitional period of the CBAM on 1 October 2023, importers (reporting 
declarants) will need to report information on the goods imported, in accordance with the CBAM 
Regulation. Third country operators should accordingly communicate to reporting declara nts the 
embedded emissions of the goods as well as any carbon price paid. As indicated in a previous answer, 
the European Commission will provide guidance, as part of its information campaign.  
 
Art. 18 para 1 CBAM Regulation: Any person accredited in accor dance with Implementing Regulation 
(EU) 2018/2067 for a relevant group of activities shall be an accredited verifier for the purpose of 
this Regulation.  
 
18. Please mention, who are the accredited verifiers based on EU 2018/2067?  
 
19. Based on the EU's response to the preceding question, is it possible that the EU will recognize 
third-country verifiers?  
 
Reply (18+19): Starting with the definite period in 2026, and in accordance with Article 8 of the 
CBAM Regulation, importers will have to ensure that th e information they have provided on 
emissions embedded in their products is verified by an accredited verifier. Under Article 18 of the 
CBAM Regulation, accredited verifiers within the EU which verify greenhouse gas emissions under 
the EU Emissions Trading  System (EU ETS) will also become accredited verifiers for the CBAM.  
 
Accredited verifiers will not necessarily have to be established in the EU, but they will necessarily 
have to be accredited by EU national accreditation authorities. The EU will adopt s econdary 
legislation by the end of the transitional period laying out the conditions under which an EU national 
accreditation authority can accredit a third country verifier. Accreditation of international verifiers 
under CBAM will thus be possible in the definitive CBAM regime, as from 2026. These verifiers will 
have to offer adequate guarantees of objectivity and impartiality.  
 
DEFORESTASI FREE PRODUCT  
Questions 20 -39: Lead ENV/Asoc Trade C4  
Art. 1 para 1 DFP Regulation: This Regulation lays down rules re garding the placing and making 
available on the Union market as well as the export from the Union of relevant products, as listed in 
Annex I.  
 
20. What is the basis decision of product list in annex 1?  
 
Reply : Derived products listed in Annex I were selected as these are most relevant in terms of the 
impact of the EU consumption on deforestation and forest degradation. Detailed Impact Assessment 
results are publicly available.  
 
21. After the DFP Regulation im plemented, will it be expanded to other product?  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Reply : In the context of the second review of the Regulation, Article 34 (2) and (3) foresee that the 
Commission shall present an impact assessment evaluating, among other elements, the need and 
feasibility of extending the scope of the regulation to further commodities, including maize, and to 
amend or extend the list of relevant products in Annex I. The assessment on the products included 
in Annex I will pay specific attention to the inclusion of biofuels. The product scope will be adapted, 
if needed, based on the latest scientific data (it could be either expanded or the other way round).   
 
Art. 2 number 4 DFP Regulation: Forest Definitions  
 
22. How the EU determine the definition of forest? On what basis?  
 
Reply : The definitions included in the Regulation rely on concepts developed at international level, 
in particular within the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO). According to 
Art. 2 (4), forest means land spanning more than 0,5 hectares with trees higher than 5 metres and 
a canopy cover of more than 10%, or trees able to reach those thresholds in situ, excluding and that 
is predominantly under agricultural or urban land use.  
 
Art. 2 number 7 DFP Regulation: Forest Degrad ations Definitions  
 
23. How the EU determine the definition of forest degradation? On what basis?  
 
Reply : The definition s included in the Regulation rely on concepts developed at international level, 
in particular within the Food and Agricultural Organizat ion of the United Nations (FAO). Pursuant to 
Art. 2 (7), forest degradation means structural changes to forest cover, taking the form of the 
conversion of: a) primary forests or naturally regenerating forests into plantation forests or into 
other wooded la nd; or b) primary forests into planted forests.  
 
Art. 2 number 28 DFP Regulation: Geolocation Definitions ‘geolocation’ means the geographical 
location of a plot of land described by means of latitude and longitude coordinates corresponding to 
at least on e latitude and one longitude point and using at least six decimal digits; for plots of land 
of more than four hectares used for the production of the relevant commodities other than cattle, 
this shall be provided using polygons with sufficient latitude and  longitude points  to 
describe the perimeter of each plot of land  
 
24. Please explain why the EU specify polygons as the geolocation method for locating a plot of land?  
 
Reply : Polygons have been identified as the best method to report the geolocation for p lots of lands 
of more than four hectares, thus ensuring the traceability requirements foreseen in the Regulation.  
 
25. How about the other method for locating a plot of land? Will it be accepted? If not, please explain 
why. 
 
Reply : As deforestation is link ed to land -use change, monitoring deforestation requires a precise link 
between the commodity or product placed on or exported from the EU market and the plot of land 
where it was grown or raised. Requiring the plot of land or farm where the commodity has been 
produced allows for the use of satellite images and positioning – widely available and free -to-use 
digital tools – to check whether a product or commodity is compliant or not. Geographic information 
on the plot of land and satellite monitoring is a fi eld-tested combination that has proven in the past 
to be able to curb deforestation in a given area and is expected to boost the effectiveness of the 
policy intervention, while also making fraud in supply chains more complicated and easily detected.  
 
Art. 2 number 15 DFP Regulation: Operator Definitions 'operator ' means any natural or legal person 
who, in the course of a commercial activity, places relevant products on the market or exports them.  
 
26. Please specify the operator definition. Whether it inclu des a producer, distributor, exporter, 
importer, etc.  
 
Reply : Pursuant to Article 9 on Information requirements, operators and traders will need to provide 
the geolocation of all plots of land where the relevant commodities that the relevant product 
contai ns, or has been made using, were produced. Plot of land can be located by means of latitude 
and longitude coordinates corresponding to at least one latitude and one longitude point and using 
at least six decimal digits. For plots of land of more than four hectares used for the production of WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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the relevant commodities other than cattle, this shall be provided using polygons with sufficient 
latitude and longitude points to describe the perimeter of each plot of land.  
 
27. Could a third -country exporter be designated as an operator under this regulation?  
 
Reply : According to Article7, where a natural or legal person established outside the Union places 
product on the market, the first natural or legal person established in the Union who makes such 
relevant p roducts available on the market shall be deemed to be an operator within the meaning of 
the regulation.   
 
Art. 2 number 40 DFP Regulation: 'relevant legislation of the country of production ' means the laws 
applicable in the country of production concerning the legal status of the area of production in terms 
of:  
 
(a) land use rights;  
(b) environmental protection;  
(c) forest -related rules, including forest management and biodiversity conserva tion, where 
directly related to wood harvesting;  
(d) third parties’ rights;  
(e) labour rights;  
(f) human rights protected under international law;  
(g) the principle of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC), including as set out in the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples;  
(h) tax, anti -corruption, trade and customs regulations.  
 
28. Please explain the correlation of each relevant legislation of the country of production to 
determine such product as deforestation free.  
 
Reply : Commodities and derived products placed or made available on the Union market need to be 
not only deforestation -free but also legally produced in accordance with the relevant legislation of 
the country of production. Compliance with the legislation listed in Article 2(40) is necessary to 
ensure the legality element of the commodities and goods placed or made available on the Union 
market.  
 
29. What is the purpose of the relevant legislation of the country of production to be taking into 
account in determine  such product as deforestation free?  
 
Reply : Commodities and derived products placed or made available on the Union market need to be 
not only deforestation -free but also legally produced in accordance with the relevant legislation of 
the country of produc tion. Compliance with the legislation listed in Article 2(40) is necessary to 
ensure the legality element of the commodities and goods placed or made available on the Union 
market.   
 
30. What is the basis on determine the scope of relevant legislation of the country of production?  
Art. 9 para d: the geolocation of all plots of land where the relevant commodities that the relevant 
product contains, or has been made …  
 
Reply : Commodities and derived products placed or made available on the Union market need to be 
not only deforestation -free but also legally produced in accordance with the relevant legislation of 
the country of production. Compliance with the legislation listed in Article 2(40) is necessary to 
ensure the legality element of the commodities and  goods placed or made available on the Union 
market.   
 
31. How does the EU ensure the security of third -country geolocation data?  
 
Reply : The Information System and, subsequently, its interconnection with the EU Single Window 
Environment for Customs will be aligned with the relevant and applicable provisions in terms of data 
protection.  
 
Art. 29 para 2: Country benchmarking  
32. When will the EU Commission adopt the implementing act for EU DFP country benchmarking?  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Reply : As per Article 29 (2) of the Regula tion, on 29 June 2023, all countries shall be assigned a 
standard level of risk as default . The list of countries presenting a low or high level of risk will be 
published according to the procedure referred to in Art. 36(20) and no later than 30 December 2 024. 
The list of countries may be reviewed, and updated if appropriate, as often as necessary in light of 
new evidence, as foreseen by Art. 29(2) . 
 
33. What are the criteria for implementing country benchmarking?  
 
Reply : The list of criteria underpinning t he risk classification process is described in Article 29 of the 
Regulation. The assessment of the Commission must take into account the criteria defined in 
Article  29(3) and may also take into account a range of other criteria described in Article 29(4).  
 
34. What is the basis for three -tier country benchmarking?  
 
Reply : The benchmarking system is designed to help Competent Authorities in planning and carrying 
out their checks, Art. 16(8), (9), and (10) introduce a minimum level of checks that competent 
authorities must perform according to the level of risk of countries: 3% for standard risk countries, 
9% for higher risk countries, and 1% for low -risk countries.  
 
35. What is the rate of deforestation and forest degradation, as well as the rate of agricultural land 
expansion for relevant commodities, so that a country is classified as high risk or low risk?  
 
Reply : The methodology for the county benchmarking is currently being developed by the 
Commission, but the criteria are already defined in t he Regulation.    
 
36. What is the basis of EU giving that rating system?  
 
Reply : The benchmarking system aims at assisting Member States’ competent authorities in tailoring 
their checks on commodities covered by the Regulation. The level of risk of a country or part thereof 
is directly related to the obligation to carry out a minimum number of checks, as foreseen by 
Article  16(8), (9) and (10).  
 
37. Can the EU provide scientific evidence for that rating system in terms of deforestation and forest 
degra dation?  
 
Reply : The methodology for the county benchmarking is currently being developed by the 
Commission. It will be based on an objective and transparent assessment analysis, taking into 
account the latest scientific evidence and internationally recogni sed sources, pursuant to Article  29. 
Third countries and stakeholders will be duly informed about the methodology in the context of the 
Multi-stakeholder Deforestation Platform.  
 
38. How does the EU calculate the rate of deforestation and forest degradati on, as well as the rate 
of agricultural land expansion for relevant commodities?  
 
Reply : The methodology for the country benchmarking, which will also include specifications on the 
calculation of the rate of deforestation and forest degradation, is current ly being developed by the 
Commission. It will be based on an objective and transparent assessment analysis, taking into 
account the latest scientific evidence and internationally recognised sources, pursuant to Article  29. 
Third countries and stakeholders will be duly informed about the methodology in the context of the 
Multi-stakeholder Deforestation Platform.  
 
39. How does the EU ensure that the due diligence mechanism does not create unnecessary trade 
barriers, particularly for smallholders, or impede ma rket access for certain commodities and not 
discriminating the importers?  
 
Reply : The Regulation is designed to apply in an even -handed and non -discriminatory manner to all 
commodities and to products produced inside as well as outside the EU. The EU is su pporting the 
partner countries through cooperation and development to ensure their supply chains are 
deforestation -free and is stepping up its support. Widespread and free technology for geolocation – 
essentially mobile phones – will ensure that no technic al obstacle gets in the way of smallholders 
when it comes to selling their products to the EU market. The cut -off date aims to minimise the 
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market or exported fr om it. In addition, EU cooperation tools and programs will make the 
engagement with, the participation and the support of smallholders a priority, as foreseen in the 
legal text of the Regulation.   
 
CBAM Regulation  
 
40. Indonesia has note and closely monitor EU Regulation on Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism 
and Deforestation Free Products, has the EU considered any other alternative measures in order 
to contribute emission reduction abroad?  
 
Reply : The European Union is determined to ensure t hat its declared greenhouse gas reduction 
targets, required to keep the temperature goals of the Paris Agreement are implemented in practice. 
This is why the European Union is engaged to finalise soon a legislative package to reduce net 
greenhouse gas emis sions by at least 55% by 2030, compared to 1990 levels ("Fit -for-55" package). 
The CBAM is only one of a broader set of measures under the EU Green deal which are 
complementary and mutually -reinforcing. The CBAM is an environmental policy tool designed to 
support the EU's increased ambition on climate mitigation by preventing carbon leakage. It is an 
integral element of the EU’s objective to reduce net emissions by at least 55% by 2030 compared 
to 1990 levels. The CBAM complements and reinforces the EU ETS – the intra -EU carbon pricing 
mechanisms – and ensures that EU producers and importers will pay an equivalent carbon price with 
regards to goods covered by the CBAM: iron and steel, cement, fertilisers, aluminum, electricity 
generation and hydrogen. A main  focus of the CBAM is therefore to contribute to reducing emissions 
within the EU. It may also encourage third countries’ efforts to achieve their own NDC and in creating 
lead markets for decarbonised products.  
 
41. Could you also explain the CBAM emission  certification procedures and the mechanism for 
implementing them to businesses and smallholders in developing countries that are still 
undergoing the green transition?  
 
Reply : The impact of CBAM on SMEs is expected to be limited. Due to economies of scal e, CBAM 
goods are largely produced by large operators. The contribution of processes taking place in SMEs 
to Embedded emissions of specific CBAM goods are estimated to be relatively low and easier to 
establish. The transitional period will allow the Europe an Commission to monitor the exact impact 
of the CBAM reporting requirements on SMEs. Furthermore, the Commission will finalise by the end 
of the definite period the reporting methodology, which will focus on the most emission intensive 
production steps.  
 
The EU will continue to provide financial support through the EU budget to least developed countries, 
and it will provide technical assistance to support developing countries and least developed countries 
adapting to the CBAM.  
 
42. Can the EU describe its efforts to assist third -country emissions reductions, particularly in 
developing and least -developed countries?  
 
Reply : The EU and its Members States are the biggest contributors to development aid – 
EUR 50 billion a year - to help overcome poverty and adv ance global development, and help our 
partners with green transition. We will continue to support partner countries in their green transition, 
in line with our international commitments. Through the EU’s Global Instrument (Neighbourhood, 
Development and In ternational Cooperation Instrument - NDICI), we have so far committed about 
EUR 27.8 billion in support of climate objectives in our partner countries for the period of 2021 -27.   
 
In December 2021, the EU launched the Global Gateway, a new strategy to mob ilise investments 
totalling EUR 300 billion over the period 2021 -27. In line with the EU’s commitment to the 2030 
Agenda, the Global Gateway aims at boosting smart, clean and secure investments in digital, energy 
and transport.  
FOREIGN SUBSIDIES REGULATION  
 
Art. 1 para 1 FSR: This Regulation lays down rules and procedures for investigating foreign subsidies 
that distort the internal market and for redressing such distortions.  
 
43. What are the differences between foreign subsidy  regulation and WTO subsidies?  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Reply : Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
14 December  2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (FSR) is consistent with the 
EU’s international obligations and notably t he WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (SCM Agreement). Article 44(9) FSR specifies that no action shall be taken under the FSR 
which would amount to a specific action against a subsidy within the meaning of Article 32.1 of the 
SCM Agree ment and granted by a third country which is a member of the World Trade Organization.  
 
44. Please explain in detail how the EU determines when the EU's internal market is distorted by 
foreign subsidies.  
 
Reply : As set forth in Article 4(1) FSR, a distortion in the internal market shall be deemed to exist 
where a foreign subsidy is liable to improve the competitive position of an undertaking in the internal 
market and where, in doing so, that foreign subsidy act ually or potentially negatively affects 
competition in the internal market.  
 
In its analysis on distortion, the Commission can rely on a number of indicators, including:  
 
· the amount of the foreign subsidy;  
· the nature of the foreign subsidy;  
· the situ ation of the undertaking, including its size and the markets or sectors concerned;  
· the level and evolution of economic activity of the undertaking on the internal market;  
· the purpose and conditions attached to the foreign subsidy as well as its use on the 
internal market  
 
45. Why was domestic injury not considered when determining market distortion?  
 
Reply : The focus under the FSR will fall on assessing, in line with Article 4 FSR, whether a foreign 
subsidy is liable to improve the competitive position of an undertaking in the internal market and 
whether, in doing so, that foreign subsidy actually or potentially negatively affects competition in 
the internal market. In this regard, taking into account the indicators, mentioned in the reply to 
question 44  above.  
 
Cosmetics Industry  
Please provide and explain the regulations governing cosmetic product export provisions.  
 
Reply:  The provisions in Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 (Cosmetics Regulation) apply to cosmetic 
products placed on the EU market. It is th e responsibility of the EU cosmetic manufacturers to ensure 
that their products intended for export comply with the requirements applicable in third countries.  
46. How is the implementation of product exhibitions in the European Union as an opportunity for  
Indonesian cosmetics to enter the European Union market?  
 
Reply : The Cosmetics Regulation does not regulate products displayed at exhibitions. Specific rules 
for fairs, exhibitions and other events may be adopted and implemented by Member States.  
 
 
 
 
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EL SALVADOR  
Pregunta 1  
En el apartado 3.1 Medidas que afectan directamente a las importaciones, subsección, 3.1.1 
Procedimientos y requisitos aduaneros, y valoración en aduana, párrafo 3.1, en el cual la UE expresa 
como se efectúa el modelo de entrada y salida de mercancía fuera  del territorio de la UE, sin 
embargo, se consulta ¿cómo realizan el comercio de mercancías originarias de los Estados Partes de 
la UE?, ¿Cómo aplican a dichas mercancías originarias las diferencias entre sus tasas de impuestos 
a la importación?, ¿Qué Docu mentos de importación emplean para el comercio interno de mercancía 
originaria de los Estados Partes?  
 
Reply: According to the Treaty on the funct ioning of the European  Union  (TFEU), t he Union shall 
adopt measures with the aim of establishing or ensuring the functioning of the internal market, in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaties. The internal  market shall comprise an area 
without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods is ensured in accordance with the 
provisions of the Treaties. The European  Union  shall comprise a customs union which shall cover all 
trade in goods and which sha ll involve the prohibition between Member States of customs duties on 
imports and exports and of all charges having equivalent effect, and the adoption of a common 
customs tariff in their relations with third countries. Moreover, customs duties on imports and 
exports and charges having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States. This 
prohibition shall also apply to customs duties of a fiscal nature. In addition to the above, quantitative 
restrictions on imports - exports and all measures ha ving equivalent effect shall be prohibited 
between Member States. Regarding products coming from a third country, they shall be considered 
to be in free circulation in a Member State if the import formalities have been complied with and any 
customs duties or charges having equivalent effect which are payable have been levied in that 
Member State, and if they have not benefited from a total or partial drawback of such duties or 
charges.  
 
On taxation, the TFEU lays down that no Member State shall impose, dire ctly or indirectly, on the 
products of other Member States any internal taxation of any kind in excess of that imposed directly 
or indirectly on similar domestic products. Furthermore, no Member State shall impose on the 
products of other Member States any  internal taxation of such a nature as to afford indirect 
protection to other products.  
 
Pregunta 2  
En el apartado 3.1.2 sobe Normas de Origen, numeral 3.1.2.2 sobre Normas de Origen Preferenciales 
se menciona que se espera implementar el Sistema de Regist ro de Exportadores REX a otros 
acuerdos en el futuro. Se consulta a la Unión Europea si entre sus prioridades se encuentra la de 
implementar el sistema REX para El Acuerdo de Asociación UE -América Central y cuánto tiempo 
puede ser el plazo para poner en vi gencia el referido sistema en Centroamérica a fin de poder iniciar 
esta nueva modalidad de auto certificación de origen de las mercancías dentro del Acuerdo, ¿cuáles 
son los requisitos que deben cumplir los exportadores de Centroamérica para ser incluidos en el 
sistema REX a corto plazo?  
 
Reply: Such a change as suggested in the question – i.e. in moving from the current system of 
Approved Exporters to a system based on Registered Exporters (REX) – would only be possible 
through a broader review and moderni sation of the EU – Central America Association Agreement, 
due to the fact that the text on the Rules of Origin in the EU – Central America Association Agreement 
is fixed and cannot be modified (for example through a Decision of the EU – Central America 
Association Council). That said, the EU would be supportive of moving towards a REX system with 
Central America when the opportunity arises.  
 
Pregunta 3  
Con base en los cambios adoptados en 2019 para el funcionamiento del régimen de OTC, ¿Cuáles 
son los cambi os más sustanciales en relación en la aplicación del reconocimiento mutuo y el 
etiquetado?  
 
Reply: The relevant changes can be found in the following two EU regulations: (i)  Regulation (EU) 
2019/515 on the mutual recognition of goods (see: Search results - EUR-Lex (europa.eu) applies 
since 19  April 2020 to non -harmonised goods lawfully marketed in a Member State; and 
(ii) Regulation 2019/1020 on market surveillance and compliance of products 
(EUR-Lex - 32019R1020 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu).  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 The aim  of Regulation 2019/515 is to remove unjustified barriers to trade resulting from the 
divergences of national technical rules for non -harmonised goods by improving the application of 
the principle of mutual recognition. Regulation 2019/515 sets the procedu ral rules to be applied by 
Member States on non -harmonised goods lawfully marketed in a Member State. If in the Member 
State of destination there is no prior authorisation procedure, the goods may be immediately placed 
on the market until a negative decisi on (Article  5 paragraph 3 of the Regulation) or a temporary 
suspension decision (Article  6 of the Regulation) is adopted. If there is a prior authorisation 
procedure, the economic operator must wait until the authorisation is granted. Member States have 
the possibility to assess whether legitimate public interests (such as public health, public safety, 
protection of the environment or the consumer, etc.) covered by the national technical rules are 
adequately protected and only in case they are not adequatel y protected, the placement of the goods 
on the market may be prohibited or restricted. Regulation 2019/515 also offers procedural 
guarantees to economic operators that the negative or restrictive decision is not arbitrary.  
 
Regulation 2019/1020 updates the  enforcement framework with the aim to complement and 
strengthen existing provisions in European  Union  harmonisation legislation concerning compliance 
of products. As concerns labelling, it provides that the authorities in charge of the control on products  
entering the European  Union  market shall suspend the release of a product for free circulation if:  
 
- the product bears a CE marking or other marking required by the European  Union  law 
applicable to it which has been affixed in a false or misleading manne r 
- the product is not marked or labelled in accordance with the European  Union  law applicable 
to it. 
 
Preguntas 4 y 5  
En relación con la aplicación de la legislación sobre Sanidad Vegetal y Animal, ¿qué impacto ejerce 
sobre los no miembros de la UE?  
 
¿Se podría contar con acceso a las normas adoptadas en 2018 sobre la comercialización, la venta y 
la utilización de medicamentos veterinarios?  
 
Reply Question 4:  Detailed and up -to-date information on the EU SPS legislation and the different 
policy and legis lative initiatives can be found on the official website of the European Commission, 
Health and Food Safety (europa.eu) . 
 
The aim of the animal and plant legislation of the E uropean  Union  is a high level of health protection 
which applies in a non -discriminatory manner whether goods are traded on the internal market or 
internationally.  All the relevant sanitary and phytosanitary legislation are notified to the WTO 
following th e recommended procedures for implementing the transparency obligations of the 
SPS Agreement (Article  7). 
 
Reply Question 5:  The European Commission maintains an up -to-date dedicated web page, which 
shows the exact publicly available status of each of the d elegated or implementing acts stemming 
from Regulation (EU) 2019/6: https://ec.europa.eu/food/animals/animal -health/vet -meds -med-
feed/implementation_en . 
 
Pregunta 6  
¿Qué instituciones intervinieron en el proceso de construcción de la Política Agrícola Común (PAC) 
que entró en vigencia en enero 2023?  
 
Reply:  The European Commission regularly consults civil dialogue groups  and agricultural 
committees  to best shape law and policies governing agriculture. Expert groups provide input to the 
European Commission, such as the agricultural market task force  on unfair trading practices.  
 
The European Commission carries out impact assessments  when planning, preparing and proposing 
new European legislation , examining a need for EU action and the possible impacts of available 
solutions. They are a key part of the EU's better regulation agenda . Impact assessments for 
agriculture and rural development took place in 2003 (mid -term review), 2008 (health check – 
SEC(2008) 1885 ), 2011 (CAP towards 2020 – SEC(2011) 1153 final ), and 2018 (support for strategic 
plans post 2020 – SWD(2018) 301 final ). 
 
The EU's Court of Auditors  also plays a major role in  supervising expenditure in agriculture.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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The European Commission regularly publishes public opinion reports (also called Eurobarometer) on 
Europeans' views on agriculture and the CAP . The Eurobarometer surveys, run in all EU Member 
States, provide valuable information on citizens' perception of the CAP. This includes awareness of 
the support provided throug h the CAP, its performance, quality matters, environment, the 
importance of the CAP etc.  
 
Pregunta 7  
¿Se podría tener acceso a la adopción del Reglamento de Servicios Digitales y el Reglamento de 
Mercados Digitales en 2022?  
 
Reply: All EU legislation is accessible online on https://eur -lex.europa.eu/homepage.html . Please 
find the link to the Digital Services Act  and the Digital Markets Act  in Spanish.  
 
Preguntas 8, 9 y 10  
Capítulo 2: Régimen de Comercio e Inversión  
2.2 Formulación y objetivos de la política comercial, Párrafo 2.7  
¿Podría la Unión Europea brindar claridad en qué consiste el enfoque diferente en las interacciones 
con terceros países con forme a la nueva política comercial que se indica en el informe?  
¿Podría la Unión Europea brindar claridad en qué consiste el "actuar de manera autónoma para 
promover sus intereses en esferas estratégicas" conforme a la nueva política c omercial que se indica 
en el informe?  
 
¿Posee la Unión Europea un plan para adaptar los Tratados Comerciales Internacionales ya vigentes 
al enfoque de su nueva política comercial?  
 
Reply: As set out in the European Commission strategy adopted in 2021 and e ntitled Trade Policy 
Review:  An Open, Sustainable, and Assertive Trade Policy  the concept of open strategic autonomy 
emphasises the EU's ability to make its own choices and shape the world around it through leadership 
and engagement, reflecting its strategic interests and values. In terms of interaction with third 
countries, the co ncept of open strategic autonomy reflects the EU's fundamental belief that 
addressing today's challenges requires more rather than less global cooperation. It also sets out that 
the EU will continue defending its interests, protecting the EU's economy from  unfair trade practices 
and ensuring a level playing field which can also imply the use of autonomous measures which will 
always be taken in accordance with EU's international commitments, notably at the WTO. Following 
this approach does therefore not requ ire revising existing international trade treaties.  
 
Pregunta 11  
Pág. 115.  
A este respecto, los importadores y las empresas nacionales, por ejemplo, están sujetos a la 
prohibición del uso de medicamentos antimicrobianos en animales para fomentar su creci miento o 
aumentar su rendimiento. La Comisión indica que esta disposición todavía no está operativa.  
En lo correspondiente a este apartado, ¿Cuándo se estima entrará a ser operativa la disposición?  
 
Reply:  The European Commission Delegated Regulation (EU ) 2023/905[1] is published in the Official 
Journal of the European  Union . The European C ommission is working on the two Implementing 
Regulations that are necessary for the application of Delegated Regulation 2023/905 as established 
in its Articles 5(1) and 6(1) (list of approved third countries and specific requirements on the official 
certificates).  
 
Article  8 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/905 links its entry into application to the date of 
application of the Implementing Regulation referred to in Article  6(1) of that Regulation (24 months 
after the date of application of the implementing act). The EU will keep third countries duly informed 
of the developments with regard to these Implementing Regulations, including in ad hoc  meetings.  
 
[1]  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/905 of 27  February  2023 supplementing Regulation 
(EU) 2019/6 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the application of the 
prohibition of use of certain antimicrobial medicinal products in animals or products of animal origin 
exported from third countries into the European  Union  (OJ L 116, 4.5. 2023, p.1)  
 
Preguntas 12 y 13  
Pág. 116. 3.205.  
Respecto a los siguientes Sistemas de Alerta: Sistema de Alerta Rápida para Alimentos y Piensos 
(RASFF ), el Sistema de Información sobre Enfermedades Animales (sistema ADIS), y el Sistema WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 europeo de notificación de interceptaciones en materia de fitosanidad (EUROPHYT). ¿Se tiene algún 
procedimiento para compartir información sobre el producto que implique una alerta?, ¿Se podría 
indicar brevemente cuál es el proceso que se realiza para publicar la alerta?  
 
Reply:  RASFF  notification summaries are publicly available in real time on the webpage 
https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/rasff -window/screen/search . The search func tion allows to choose a 
period of time, specific hazards or countries of interest. The authorised users, as designated by the 
competent authorities of the country, are able to access to all the information related to their 
country.  
 
On the plant health sid e, the EUROPHYT for import interceptions does no longer exist and since 2020 
is replaced by the TRACES system where import non -compliances can be consulted. The relevant 
third country authorities can consult the results/refusals of EU import inspections of  commodities 
certified by their own authorities, not these from other countries.  
 
The EU collects data in ADIS based on Regulation (EU) 2020/2002  (https://eur -
lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2020/2002/oj ). A selected set of data from ADIS is published on the 
webpage of Directorate -General for Health and Food Sa fety (SANTE): 
https://food.ec.europa.eu/animals/animal -diseases/animal -disease -information -system -adis_en  
which include summary tables and distribution map e.g. 
https://food.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023 -05/ad_adns_outbreaks -per-disease_weekly_0.pdf  or 
https://food.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023 -05/ad_adns_outbreaks -per-disease_weekly -
map_0.pdf . The rest of the dataset is not publicly available unless using the restricted access 
reserved for the Member States competent authorities. Please note that this page is in the process 
of being re -deigned and the data presented and the links could change i n the following months.  
 
Informe del Gobierno  
Preguntas 14, 15 y 16  
¿Qué instituciones estuvieron involucradas en la construcción del Plan de Acción para la Igualdad de 
Género y el Empoderamiento de las Mujeres en la Acción Exterior 2021 -2025 (GAP III)?  
 
¿Qué institución es la coordinadora o que promueve la Estrategia para la Igualdad de 
Género  2020-2025?  
 
¿Qué elementos se han incluido en la política comercial para promover la igualdad de género?  
 
Reply:  The Gender Action Plan III  is a Joint communication by the European Commission and the 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy  which was welcomed through 
EU Presidency Conclusions  of 16 December  2020. Drafting was led by European Commission in close 
consultation with EU Member States, EEAS, civil society organisations, partner governments, and 
international organisations (UN entities, International Finance Institutions among others). The 
different parties contributed to the drafting of the document th rough meetings and through 
responses to a survey conducted during the process.  
 
Reply:  Achieving a Union of Equality has to be a joint undertaking by all stakeholders. This includes 
action by EU institutions, Member States, and also by representatives of t he civil society, social 
partners and the private sector. The European Commission is taking the necessary actions to deliver 
on the objectives of the Strategy and ensure that gender equality is treated as a priority. The key 
actions presented in the Strate gy are regularly updated and supplemented, their implementation 
monitored and progress, including examples of practice in the EU Member States, is being reported 
on an annual basis .  
 
Reply:  Promoting gender equality and women's economic empowerment is a priority for the 
European Commission and for EU trade policy. The EU has  been a strong proponent of the 2017  WTO 
Buenos Aires Joint Declaration on Trade and Women's Economic Empowerment, and we are active 
in the Informal Working Group on trade and gender in the WTO. The Directorate -General for Trade 
of the European Commission has also funded a project of the International Trade Centre that helps 
to better understand how to apply a gender lens to the work of the WTO.  
 
EU trade agreements contain commitments related to the implementation of fundamental ILO 
conventions targeting non-discrimination in employment (including the ratification and 
implementation of ILO Conventions 100 and 111 on equal remuneration and non -discrimination). In WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 557 - 
 
June 2022, the EU concluded negotiations for a comprehensive trade agreement with New  Zealand  
that includes specific trade and gender equality provisions. The modernised EU - Chile trade 
agreement, which was politically concluded in December 2022, also includes trade and gender 
equality provisions.  
 
Under the EU's Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP), the EU monitors respect by beneficiary 
countries for the principles of core international conventions on promoting women's rights and 
gender equality, notably the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, and the  ILO Conventions 100 and 111 on equal remuneration and non -discrimination.  
 
Also, ex ante  and ex post  evaluations of trade agreements carried out by the European Commission 
(Directorate -General for Trade) contain dedicated gender analyses.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 MALAYSIA  
GOVERNMENT REPORT  
 
Page 4 -6 
2  Trade and The Economic Environment  
2.1   The EU economic environment and its macroeconomic policy  
2.5  Surging inflation is currently a key challenge eroding households' real disposable income. The 
harmonised consumer price inflation rate (HICP) reached 1.4% in 2019. Suppressed economic 
activity due to the pandemic and falling energy prices pushed down consumer price inflation to 0.7% 
in 2020. Inflation started to increase from early 2021  as economic activity picked up and energy 
prices increased. The subsequent energy and commodity price shock combined with supply chain 
disruptions caused by the Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine from early 2022 further fuelled 
price increases. As  a result, inflation in the EU surged from 2.9% in 2021 to 9.3% in 2022 – the 
highest in decades. Inflation is expected to gradually decline to 7% in 2023 and then to 3% in 2024.  
 
2.7 On the other hand, several crucial EU policy actions will support econo mic growth in the 
coming years. In 2020, the EU unveiled its Next Generation EU2 (NGEU) recovery plan with the aim 
to support the recovery of EU countries from pandemic and foster the green and digital transitions. 
Financial support under the NGEU reaches EUR 750 billion  and it is channelled through seven 
programmes in the form of grants (EUR  390 billion ) and loans (EUR  360 billion ). The Recovery and 
Resilience Facility (RRF) represents the bulk of the NGEU effort comprising close to 90% of the total 
budget . According to the RRF, Member States applying for financial support, have to submit national 
recovery and resilience plans setting out their reform and investment agenda up to 2026.  
 
2.8. Following Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU has l aunched the REPowerEU 
Plan with the objective to end the EU's dependence on Russian fossil fuels. The plan aims at fostering 
energy savings, diversification of energy supplies and accelerated roll -out of renewable energy. The 
RRF would be at the core of th e implementation of the REPowerEU. Upon approval of the 
Commission's proposal, Member States would have to integrate a dedicated REPowerEU chapter in 
their Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRPs).  
 
Questions:  
1. What are the other initiatives undertaken by t he EU (if any) on the supply side, in resisting 
inflation, other than reviewing the monetary strategy?  
 
Reply:  While the responsibility for price stability in the euro area falls upon the European Central 
Bank, the Commission has emphasised the need to add ress the impact of surging energy prices. 
Given their fiscal cost, policy measures for this purpose should be temporary and should increasingly 
be targeted towards the most vulnerable households. Income measures would in principle be 
preferable to price me asures, as they preserve incentives for the energy transition. Hence, in 
March  2023, the Eurogroup stressed that fiscal policy in the euro area should facilitate the effective 
transmission of monetary policy and that broad -based fiscal stimulus to aggregat e demand was not 
warranted.  
 
2. The ideas of Next Generation EU2 (NGEU), Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) and 
REPowerEU Plan are interesting. We would welcome further clarification on the mechanism, 
governance and execution of these plans. Does the EU Council have oversight and power to decide 
for any plans, and even overrule likewise for any diverging objective? Will the EU Council allow 
extreme advocacy or even lobbying and how do you deter unhealthy practices, if any?  
 
Reply:  As per regulation (EU ) 2021/241 and (EU) 2023/435 Member States prepare recovery and 
resilience plans (RRP) that set out a coherent package of reforms and investment initiatives to be 
implemented up to 2026 to be supported by the RRF. These plans are then assessed by the 
Commi ssion and approved by the Council. Based on the criteria set out in the regulation, the 
Commission assesses the recovery and resilience plan submitted by the Member States. The Council 
then considers the Commission's assessment and adopts an implementing d ecision by qualified 
majority.  
 
Under the RRF, the funds are disbursed to the Member states in instalments that are linked to the 
achievement of a set of pre -agreed milestones and targets. For each payment, the Member States 
submit evidence that the agree d milestones and targets have been reached. The Commission WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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assesses this evidence and publishes a preliminary assessment on which it asks the opinion of the 
Economic and Financial Committee. The Council only gets consulted on the RRP or a payment request 
once the Commission issued a positive assessment. In exceptional circumstances where one or more 
Member State disagree with the positive assessment of the Commission, they may request that the 
President of the European Council refers the matter to the next European Council. After the opinion 
of the EFC the Commission will adopt the decision on disbursement under the "examination 
procedure" of comitology, which involves an approval by Member States. If the Member State has 
not satisfactorily implemented the m ilestones and targets, the Commission will not pay all or part of 
the financial contribution to that Member State.  
 
3. What would be the energy procurement strategy once the Ukraine -Russia conflict ends. Would 
the EU revert to the pre -conflict arrangement?   
 
Reply : Following Russia's war of aggression, the EU established with REPowerEU a plan to phase 
out Russian fossil fuels as soon as possible and well before 2030. Consequently, several Member 
States have invested in new LNG infrastructure and the EU keep s readjusting and re -orientating its 
energy system. One cannot speculate what a possible end to the conflict could mean for the EU's 
future orientation of energy imports. The EU will certainly avoid entering again into an energy import 
dependence from a si ngle supplier as before the war, however.  
 
4. The subsequent energy and commodity price shock combined with supply chain disruptions 
caused by the Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine from early 2022 further fueled price 
increases. Would an end to the conflict bring back the energy and commodity price to previous 
levels?  
 
Reply:  Most energy prices like electricity price, gas price, oil price, and coal price are now back to 
levels in the upper range of where they were in mid -and-late-2021 – before Ru ssia's war against 
Ukraine. Energy policies of the EU have already helped energy market fundamentals to steady and 
price levels to go back close to the situation in 2021, where demand increased after COVID and 
supply was lagging due to COVID lockdown halt on storages and investment into production 
capacities). The end of the conflict would reduce uncertainty and supply risks, possibly resulting 
inless tightened markets and less pressure on prices.  
 
Page 18 -22 
5  Sustainability  
5.1    The EU's actions on climate change and environmental protection  
5.1.3     Decarbonising Energy and Sustainable Transport  
5.23 The proposal for the REPowerEU Plan includes complementary short, mid and long -term 
initiatives in view of phasing out the use in the EU of all Russia n fossil fuels as soon as possible. 
Measures include those relating to gas storage, reduction of demand for gas and electricity. In 
addition, it proposes to increase the EU's renewable energy and energy efficiency targets and to 
accelerate the permitting p rocedures for renewable energy deployment under the 'Fit for 55' 
proposals.  
 
Questions:  
5. The Ukraine -Russia conflict seems to have resulted in unsettling commitment for certain 
European countries to adhering to green and clean energy objectives. Energy security agenda seems 
to be back in the limelight. Would the deadlines for fossil fuel phase out/down be delayed?  
 
Reply:  After Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, REPowerEU has been developed to ensure 
that the EU will manage to secure its energy supply in the short term while becoming climate -neutral 
in the long -term. The REPowerEU plan relies on a fast implementation of all Fit for 55 proposals and 
achieving higher targets for renewables and energy efficiency. In the new reality, the EU's gas 
consumption is expected to reduce at a faster pace, reducing thereby further the role of gas as a 
transitional fuel. However, shifting away from Russian fossil fuels will also require targeted 
investments for security of supply in gas infrastructure to ensure  that available gas flows smoothly 
across the Union. Similarly, very limited changes are needed to oil infrastructure alongside 
large scale investments in the electricity grid and an EU -wide hydrogen backbone. That said, the 
Union continues to work on its objectives to phase out Russian fossil fuels well before 2030 and to 
deliver on climate neutrality by 2050.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 6. Would EU entertain a revival on nuclear energy, particularly small modular reactors (SMRs) 
as a complementary measure in addition to RE (or REPo werEU) initiative?  
 
Reply:  Article  194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European  Union  (TFEU) states that energy 
is a shared res ponsibility between EU Member States and the EU. However, each Member State has 
the right to decide the conditions for exploiting its own energy resources, choose between different 
energy sources and decide the general structure of its energy supply.  
 
Page 23  
5.2  Sustainability, fairness and inclusiveness  
5.2.1   Protecting human rights and promoting labour rights  
5.30  In September 2022, a legislative proposal was adopted to prohibit products made with 
forced labour to be placed on or exported from th e EU market. 58 The proposal covers all products, 
namely those made in the EU for domestic consumption and exports, and imported goods, without 
targeting specific products, companies, industries or geographies. The proposal builds on 
internationally agreed  definitions and standards. It underlines the importance of close cooperation 
with global partners. Once the proposal is adopted by the EU co -legislators, national authorities will 
be empowered to withdraw from the EU market products made with forced labou r, following an 
investigation. According to the proposal, EU customs authorities will identify and stop products made 
with forced labour at EU borders. The proposal is now with the EU co -legislators, the 
European  Parliament and the Council.  
 
Question:  
7. Please elaborate how the EU would verify that the products were made with forced labour.  
 
Reply:  Under the Commission's proposal for a regulation to prohibit products made with forced 
labour on the EU market, competent authorities from EU Member States wil l carry out investigations 
on specific products and impose bans on those found in breach of the prohibition. In carrying out 
the investigations, competent authorities will examine all the information available to them. This 
includes: independent and verifi able information on risks that forced labour has been used in the 
production process; information on market surveillance and compliance of products shared by other 
Member States; submissions made by third parties including civil society; information on whe ther a 
company carries out forced labour due diligence in its operations and supply chains. The investigative 
process will be carried out in two phases. In a preliminary phase, the authorities assess if there are 
well-founded reasons to suspect that produc ts are likely to have been made with forced labour. If 
they determine that there is a substantiated concern of forced labour, they will proceed to the 
investigation phase. Competent authorities may carry out all necessary checks and inspections, 
including investigations in third countries provided that the economic operators and the third country 
governments concerned do not raise objections. Competent authorities will in all phases have to 
follow a risk -based approach, focusing their enforcement efforts on  the economic operators involved 
in the steps of the value chain that are closer to where the risk of forced labour is likely to occur and 
taking into account the size and economic resources of the economic operators, the quantity of 
products concerned, as  well as the scale of suspected forced labour. The European Commission will 
support implementation by setting up support tools such as a network of competent authorities, 
implementation guidelines and a public database with an indicative list of forced lab our risks in 
specific geographic areas or with respect to specific products based on verifiable information 
provided by credible sources. Member States' customs authorities will rely on the decisions from 
competent authorities to identify the products conc erned and carry out controls for imports and 
exports at the EU borders.  
 
Page  24-25 
5.2    Sustainability, fairness and inclusiveness  
5.2.3     Small and Medium Sized enterprises (SMEs)  
5.41  The EU is preparing a SME Relief Package to help SMEs address, inter  alia, issues related to 
supply chains bottlenecks. It will include the revision of the Late Payment Directive, measures to 
improve doing business in the Single Market and facilitating access to skills and finance.  
 
Question:  
8. We would ap preciate if the EU can elaborate further on the SME Relief Package – to whom it 
is intended for, relevant criteria for application and when it would be available.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Reply:  The SME Relief package is planned for adoption in September 2023. It will comprise a set of 
concrete measures tailored to supporting European SMEs and to set out an SME -specific enabling 
framework along the following key areas:  
 
· Tackling late payment via the revision of the Late Payment Directive. The aim is to foster a 
better payment cu lture in the business environment. To achieve this, the revision intends to bring a 
better balance between freedom of contract and fairness in negotiations, while empowering SMEs to 
enforce their rights. At the same time, a stronger emphasis will be put on  enforcement of the rules 
and on the payment behaviour of the public sector, since public authorities have to set the good 
example. Synergies with other policies i.e. public procurement are also being explored. The potential 
of digital tools will also be e xploited.  
 
· Making it easier to business in the Single Market: Entrepreneurs need clear legislation that is 
easy to implement and avoids disproportionate costs. Tools such as the "fit for future" platform and 
filtering initiatives based on their relevance for SMEs will be more important than ever.  
 
· Facilitating access to skills.  
 
Page 32 -35 
9 External Impacts of The Eu's Internal Policies  
9.3  Single Market in Services  
Questions:  
 
9. We would appreciate if the EU could indicate the strategies to  enforce new legislative 
frameworks regulating the Markets in Crypto -Assets (MiCA) and digital operational resilience (DORA) 
by all firms?  
 
Reply : The European Supervisory Authorities: European Banking Authority (EBA), the European 
Insurance and Occupatio nal Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA), will develop draft technical standards and guidelines which will contribute to the 
implementation and enforcement of the MiCA and DORA provisions. Moreover, in accorda nce with 
MiCA, relevant competent authorities shall exchange information and cooperate in investigation, 
supervision and enforcement activities. In accordance with DORA, to enable competent authorities 
to fulfil supervisory roles by acquiring a complete ov erview of the nature, frequency, significance 
and impact of ICT -related incidents and to enhance the exchange of information between relevant 
public authorities, including law enforcement authorities and resolution authorities, a robust 
ICT-related inciden t reporting regime whereby the relevant requirements address current gaps in 
financial services law has been established.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT  
Page 12  
SUMMARY  
19.     The importance of energy and climate policies gained further impetus during the review period 
with the shift towards renewable and low -carbon energy, improving energy security, and reducing 
emissions to achieve climate neutrality. The 2021 Fit -for-55 package aims to align these policies 
with the climate -related goals of the European Green Deal and the Climate Law, which includes 
targets for GHG emission reductions. The package contains many policy initiatives that focus on 
emissions reduction throug h various channels from the demand - and supply -side, including 
complementing the Emissions Trading System with a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, or 
reforming energy taxation. Most recently, the REPowerEU plan aims to diversify the energy supply, 
save e nergy, and facilitate an increase in clean energy generation. The Plan includes faster 
permitting rules for renewable energy projects and supporting the development of renewable 
hydrogen. A number of regulations established minimum storage levels for natur al gas, voluntary 
gas demand reduction targets, and a cap for market revenues from electricity generation in 2022.  
 
Questions  
10. How will the EU via REPowerEU Plan enforce the cap for market revenues from electricity 
generation in 2023?  
 
Reply : Please be  informed that it is for the EU Member states to implement the inframarginal 
revenue cap at national level.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 11. We would appreciate if your side could elaborate on development of renewable hydrogen 
especially on the mobility and storage of such renewable h ydrogen.  
 
Reply : The EU's de -carbonisation package falls outside of the exercise's review period. For an update 
on the latest developments, please consult the following link: Hydrogen and decarbonised gas 
market package (europa.eu) . 
 
Page 22  
1  ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
1.2  Recent economic developments  
1.2.5  Employment trends, including gender  
1.25.   Comparable to the situation of other economic benchmarks, EU employment showed similar 
trends during the review period with a slight downturn in 2020 due to the pandemic, and a 
subsequent improvement in 2021 (Table  A1.1). The incre ase in 2021 was significant as the 
employment rates in a majority of member States (16 of 27) exceeded pre -pandemic levels and 
reached 73.1% of the working age population, the highest number in more than a decade. Data 
for 2022 so far indicate continuation  of this trend, as the employment rate reached 74.7% in the 
third quarter of 2022. The unemployment rate dropped to 6% in November 2022, the lowest level 
since recording began in 2000. The economic recovery has had an overall positive effect on 
employment with the EU labour market improving significantly. There are still significant variations 
among the member States with the lowest unemployment rate at 2.8% (Czech  Republic ) and the 
highest at 14.8% (Spain) in 2021, and total hours worked and hours per empl oyee lagged, and thus 
had not yet reached pre -pandemic levels as of the end of 2021. Much of the growth was in public 
sector employment, i.e. administration, education, health, and social work.  
 
1.26.     According to several studies, EU policy response to  the pandemic, in particular job retention 
schemes, at the EU and member State levels, has contributed favourably to the employment 
situation and the recovery of the labour market has been more responsive compared to earlier 
recessions. A 2022 IMF report c ites a mitigation factor of 2.5 percentage points in unemployment or 
4 million  workers in 2020 in the eurozone, due to various job retention schemes, i.e. short -term 
work, furlough, and wage subsidy schemes. While some of these schemes existed pre -pandemic , all 
EU member States responded with new schemes or adjustments during the pandemic. Many 
schemes were temporary and some have already been lifted; however, others are permanent and 
may still act as a buffer in the EU job market. At the beginning of the p andemic, an estimated 20% 
of the euro area workforce was covered by some type of job retention scheme; this had fallen to an 
estimated 1.6% as of end -2021. At end -2022 these job retention scheme supports returned to pre -
crisis levels of about 0.3%.  
 
1.27.    The importance of trade, in particular exports, in supporting EU employment is significant; 
in 2019, an estimated 38.1  million  EU jobs were supported by extra -EU exports, i.e. more than 18% 
of total EU employment. Furthermore, jobs supported by exports paid 12% higher wages compared 
to other jobs. However, there was a gender gap in the employment supported by exports, as 38% 
of the jobs were occupied by women and 62% by men, and women had a lower wage premium, 8%, 
compared to 11% for men.  
 
Questions:  
12. What are the initiatives undertaken by the EU to ensure more women participation in the 
workforce?  
 
Reply : In March 2020, the European Commission published the EU Gender Equality 
Strategy  2020-2025. The objective of closing gender gaps in the labour mark et, in all types of 
employment, is addressed by the Strategy and the measures envisaged therein. The text of the 
Strategy is publicly available at the official website of the European  Union  at: 
https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0152  
 
As one of the first deliverables of the Strategy, the European Commission presented on 4  March  2021 
a proposal for a directive to strengthen the application of the principle of equal pay for equal work 
or work of equal value between men and women through pay transparency and enforcement 
mechanisms. The proposal is publicly available at the official website  of the European  Union  at: 
https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52021PC0093  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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This directive was adopted on 2 4 April 2023 and will enter into force by June. It will provide for more 
transparency in pay settings and effective enforcement of the equal pay principle between women 
and men, as well as improve access to justice for victims of pay discrimination. Pay tr ansparency 
measures set out in the directive will encourage employers to review their pay settings and allow 
them to address hidden pay discrimination which may have reflected unconscious biases. In the long 
run, companies that apply fair and equal pay wil l be more attractive for workers, regardless of their 
gender or other grounds.  
 
The European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan calls to halve the gender employment gap by 2030. 
This will be paramount to progress on gender equality. Moreover, the European  Pillar of Social Rights 
highlights equal opportunities and access to the labour market, fair working conditions, and social 
protection and inclusion. Principle 2 of the Pillar specifically addresses gender equality, and 
principle  3 equal opportunities.  
 
A wide range of EU initiatives support the employment and social inclusion of women. For example, 
the European Care Strategy, which has a strong gender component. Insufficient access to quality 
and affordable formal care services is one of the key drivers o f gender inequality in the labour 
market. The European Commission presented on 7  September  2022 the European Care Strategy to 
ensure quality, affordable and accessible care services across the EU. The strategy is publicly 
available at the official website of the EU at:  
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_5169  
 
The European Commission launched a campaign to challenge gender stereotypes on 8  March 2023. 
This EU -wide campaign tackles gender stereotypes affecting both men and women in different 
spheres of life, including career choices, sharing care responsibilities and decision -making. It is 
publicly available at the off icial website of the EU at:  
https://end -gender -stereotypes.campaign.europa.eu/index_en  
 
13. Please describe the productivity level in the employm ent before and after the pandemic. What 
are the strategies undertaken to boost productivity in the selected sectors?  
 
Reply : In 2020, real labour productivity per person dropped, while real labour productivity per hour 
worked increased. This was due to th e outbreak of the COVID -19 pandemic resulting in sharp drops 
in GDP and in hours worked while employment in persons declined less markedly due to government 
support schemes put in place in EU Member States. These developments were followed by marked 
increa ses in both indicators in 2021 and 2022 so that pre -pandemic levels were exceeded.  
 
Data showing how the COVID -19 pandemic in 2020 impacted the overall growth trends of labour 
productivity per hour worked, per person and real GDP per capita as well as addi tional indicators on 
total employment per capita and hours worked per employed person are available at the official 
website of the EU at:  
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics -
explained/index.php?title=Productivity_trends_using_key_national_accounts_indicators  
 
Investment in research and development, including diffusing new knowl edge and technologies, and 
investment in the skills of the EU workforce are the main strategies to boost productivity across all 
economic sectors.  
 
Page 36  
2 TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
2.3       Trade agreements and arrangements  
2.3.2    Regional and preferential agreements  
2.3.2.1  Reciprocal preferences  
2.19   Free trade agreements, or regional trade agreements (RTAs) as they are referred to in 
the WTO, are a key component of the EU trade policy.36 With 44 RTAs currently in place, the 
European  Union  has the largest network of RTAs in the world (Chart  2.3). This network covers 
76 economies, including some of the main EU trading partners (e.g. Switzerland and the 
United  Kingdom)37, and accounted for about 44% of the European  Union 's total merchandise trade 
in 2021.38 
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Questions:  
14. We would appreciate if the EU can share about any plans to expand its RTAs with others in 
the Asia Pacific/Far East.  
 
Reply:  The EU has concluded negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement with New  Zealand  and its 
signature is expected to take place in the c oming weeks. The EU currently also has negotiations 
ongoing with Australia, India and Indonesia. In addition, on 15  March  2023 the EU and Thailand 
announced the relaunch of FTA negotiations. The EU also remains interested in further engaging 
with ASEAN and  its member states, including through the possible resumption of trade negotiations 
with Malaysia or the Philippines once the conditions are right. In the short and medium term, the EU 
will explore avenues to promote cooperation with the ASEAN region in ar eas of mutual interest such 
as digital economy, green technologies and green services and supply chain resilience. Negotiating 
an EU -ASEAN free trade agreement remains a common objective of both sides in the longer term.  
 
15. Currently, what are the incent ives provided for new investments after 31  October  2014?   
 
Reply:  It is not clear what this question refers to.  
 
Page 44  
2 TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
2.4          Investment Regime  
2.4.1       Regulatory Framework  
2.52.  Foreign investment (as well as investment between EU member States) is governed by the 
TFEU and permitted in EU member States without restrictions based on the principles of freedom of 
establishment and free movement of capital (and payments), excep t when deemed necessary for 
public policy, public security, health reasons, or other overriding reasons in the general interest, as 
recognized by CJEU jurisprudence.  
 
Questions:  
16. What is the level of commitment of Other Government Agencies (OGA) and Pe rmit Issuing 
Agencies (PIA) in the EU in providing preferential benefits to AEO companies?  
 
Reply:  Article  38(1) UCC lays down a general condition saying that the AEO status is granted by 
customs authorities following consultation with other competent aut horities to primarily ensure 
avoiding duplication of controls by customs and OGA/PIA.  
 
The information exchange between national authority responsible for civil aviation security and 
customs authorities has been formalised by Article  35(4) UCC IA, in the way that if the applicant for 
AEOS has been already approved as a known consignor or regulated agent a duplication and 
re-examination of the same areas and operations should be excluded for security and safety.  
 
17. What are the conditions or limitations f or third countries to register as Authorised Economic 
Operator for Customs (AEOC)?  
 
Reply : EU AEO status may be obtained only by a company established in the territory of the EU and 
complying with the legal requirements. AEOC (customs simplifications) offe rs benefits related to 
easier admittance to customs simplifications to an AEOC authorised company. It is not foreseen that 
AEOC holders get benefits from mutual recognition agreements (MRA) with third countries. Those 
benefits are granted to AEOS holders.  
 
18. How effective and efficient are the AEO Programme in the movement of goods and how 
receptive are companies in the EU towards this programme?  
 
Reply : The latest statistical data show that AEOs  represent about 75% of the volume and value of 
import into the EU.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Page 44 - 45 
2 TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
2.4          Investment Regime  
2.4.1       Regulatory Framework  
2.53.    In accordance with these derogations, some EU member States maintain sc reening 
mechanisms, as well as other types of requirements, which led to different investment regimes 
across the European  Union .90 With a view of promoting consistency regarding FDI screening, the 
European  Union  adopted in March 2019 a regulation to establ ish a common framework for the 
screening of FDI for reasons of security and public order.91 The regulation started applying on 
11 October 2020, and it seeks, inter  alia, to address concerns regarding FDI  on assets deemed 
critical to EU interests.92 The regulation provides for a set of minimum requirements for the 
functioning of national screening mechanisms and for a cooperation mechanism to share 
information.93 The regulation also provides for guidelines  to identify FDI that is likely to affect 
security or public order and therefore should be screened. The criteria refer to the effects that a 
transaction could have on, for instance, infrastructure, technologies, and the supply of inputs 
deemed as critical  to EU economic activities.  
 
2.56.     In addition, the European  Union  adopted in December 2022 a regulation to deal with the 
effects of foreign subsidies on the internal market (i.e. subsidies by a third country) and ensure a 
level playing field for all c ompanies/investors. The regulation seeks to identify and address situations 
where a company receiving foreign subsidies causes distortions to the internal market through, 
inter alia, its participation in EU public procurements, or the acquisition of an EU company or assets 
affecting the market structure (Sections 3.3.4 and 3.3.6). The regulation entered into force on 
12 January 2023 and will apply from 12  July 2023.  
 
Questions:  
19. What minimum requirements does the March 2019 regulation provides for the f unctioning of 
national screening mechanisms?  
 
Reply:  Regulation (EU) 2019/452 provides in Article  3 for some key requirements for national 
screening mechanisms, including:  
 
· transparency of rules and procedures;  
· non-discrimination among foreign investor s; 
· confidentiality of information exchanged;  
· the possibility of recourse against screening decisions, and;  
· measures to identify and prevent circumvention by foreign investors.  
 
20. What guidelines does the March 2019 regulation provides to identify F DI that is likely to affect 
security or public order?  
 
Reply:  The terms 'security' and 'public order' are not defined in the Regulation. Article  4 of the 
Regulation however specifies the factors for consideration when determining whether an FDI  is likely 
to affect security and public order. These factors include the potential effects of the FDI on critical 
infrastructure, critical technologies, supply of critical inputs, access to sensitive information and the 
freedom and pluralism of the media.  Aspects related to the investor are also relevant for this 
assessment, such as whether the foreign investor is controlled by a government.  
 
21. What will be the implications of the March 2019 regulation to the foreign investors interested 
in investing in EU countries?  
 
Reply : The regulation establishing a framework for the screening of FDI  in the EU allows the 
Commission and Member States to identify, assess and mitigate potential risks for security or public 
order in relation to FDI but it does not oblige Member States to establish a national screening 
mechanism. The European Commission ma y issue an opinion if it considers that a given FDI is likely 
to impact the public order or security of the European  Union . Member States may issue comments 
if they consider a FDI likely to affect their security or public order. However, the decision to au thorise, 
prohibit or impose conditions regarding an investment remains with the Member State where the 
investment takes place.  
 
The implications for foreign investors will depend on whether or not a Member State has established 
a national screening mechan ism, the scope of such legislation and the nature of the planned WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 566 - 
 
  
 investment. A foreign investor planning to invest in an EU country that has implemented FDI 
screening legislation might have to apply for the authorisation of the investment with the national  
authority of the country in which the investment will take place and follow the national procedure to 
obtain such an authorisation.  
 
22. What impact could the December 2022 regulation have on the EU public procurement 
processes?   
 
Reply : Regulation (EU) 2 022/2560 on Foreign Subsidies Distorting the Internal Market (FSR) gives 
the European Commission powers to investigate financial contributions granted by foreign 
governments to companies operating within the EU and which may thus create internal market 
distortions.  
 
Under the FSR, companies must notify foreign financial contributions in public procurement 
procedures if the following thresholds are met:  
 
1. the estimated value of the public procurement is at least EUR  250 million ; and  
2. the economic operat or was granted financial contributions of at least EUR  4 million  per 
third country in the last three years.  
 
Upon the submission of a notification or declaration by a company participating in a public 
procurement procedure, the European Commission will exa mine whether financial contributions from 
non-EU countries enable the company to submit a tender that is unduly advantageous in relation to 
the works, supplies or services concerned. In such cases, the Commission may adopt a decision that 
the public contra ct may not be awarded to the company that has received the foreign subsidies.  
 
The FSR entered into force on 12  January  2023 and will apply to public procurement procedures 
initiated on or after 12  July 2023. As of this date, the European Commission may also initiate 
ex officio investigations into procurement procedures not meeting the thresholds above where there 
is a suspicion of foreign subsidies distorting the EU internal market. Ex officio  reviews in to public 
procurements are limited to awarded contracts. Prior notifications or declarations by companies in 
the context of public procurement procedures are not required until 12  October  2023.  
 
Page 47  
2 TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
2.4        Investment regime  
2.4.2    Other aspects of the European  Union 's foreign investment regime  
2.65     At the multilateral level, the European  Union  is participating in discussions under the UN 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) to reform the Investor -State  Dispute 
Settlement (ISDS) mechanism and establish a Multilateral Investment Court. In the long term, the 
European  Union  expects that this Court will replace the mechanisms for dispute resolution included 
in its trade and investment agreements at the EU le vel, and is of potential application to all existing 
BITs at the member State level. The European  Union  has also been engaged in the discussions to 
modernize the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), notably its ISDS mechanism. The ECT comprises 
53 signatories, inc luding the European  Union  and all of its member States except for Italy, and it 
provides for a multilateral framework to promote cooperation and facilitate commercial relations in 
the energy sector. In June 2022, the ECT parties reached an agreement in pri nciple for a new ECT. 
The text amending the ECT was to be adopted during the Energy Charter Conference in 
November  2022, but its adoption was subsequently postponed. Prior to the conference, some EU 
member States announced their intention to withdraw from the ECT as they considered its reform 
was not aligned enough with their environmental objectives. In 2021, the CJEU ruled that the ECT 
could not be used in intra -EU disputes. The Commission states that it has recently proposed the 
conclusion of a subsequen t agreement to EU member States to address the risk of a conflict between 
the ECT and the EU Treaties.  
 
Question:  
23. Besides a normal dispute resolution mechanism to iron out disputes and anomalies, does the 
EU has an alternative dispute resolution mechan ism?  
 
Reply:  In addition to the Investment Court System (ICS), the EU also provides for an alternative 
dispute resolution mechanism for investor -state dispute settlement under its trade and investment WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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agreements. This alternative option is the Mediation Mechanism for I nvestor -to-State Disputes, 
which allows recourse to mediation in investment disputes at any time on a voluntary basis.  
 
Page 70  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1 Measures directly affecting imports  
3.1.4     Other charges affecting imports  
3.1.4.1  VAT  
3.64.   The EU VAT Directive has undergone various modifications in recent years with an intentional 
shift of payment collection from the member State of the supplier to the member State of the 
consumer. This in part removes some disto rtions or incentives with respect to establishing presence 
in lower tax jurisdictions and has allowed greater diversity and flexibility in VAT rates through recent 
amendments. The most significant changes were implemented in April 2022 and include 
(i) expanding the list whereby reduced VAT rates may apply; (ii)  removing the possibility to apply 
lower VAT to goods and services deemed detrimental to the environment (by 2030 or 203284); and 
(iii) expanding the application of derogations and exemptions to all m ember States.85 A number of 
VAT border facilitation measures were also implemented during the period in response to the 
e-commerce package. The removal of the VAT exemption on low -value consignments was 
implemented in July 2021 along with the establishment  of the IOSS and Special Arrangements 
systems for their collection (Section  3.1.1.1).  
 
Questions:  
24. We would appreciate if the EU could elaborate on the reforms carried out on the VAT system 
and its relation in increasing the revenue collection.  
 
Reply : On 1 July, the EU VAT e -commerce package came into application and introduced a number 
of amendments to the VAT rules governing the taxation of business -to-consumer (B2C) cross -border 
e-commerce activity in Europe. In relation to imports, the measures in troduced by the EU VAT 
e-commerce package were designed to create a fairer and simpler system of taxation and to take 
action against e -commerce related VAT fraud. One of the primary objectives of the e -commerce 
package was to level the playing field for EU  established suppliers by addressing distortive rules that 
led to competition issues in the e -commerce market. In an effort to help level the playing field for 
suppliers of EU goods, the VAT exemption for the importation of small consignments not exceeding  
EUR 22 was abolished which effect from 1  July 2021. As a result, VAT is now due on all commercial 
goods imported into Europe from a third country or third territory, irrespective of their value. 
Following the implementation of the EU VAT e -commerce packag e, the Commission conducted an 
ex-post evaluation of the first 6 months of application the package to assess its results. The results 
of the ex-post evaluation are included in Annex  6 of the Impact Assessment, accompanying the VAT 
in the Digital Age proposal, which was published on 8  December  2022. The initia l results showcased 
the effect that the abolition of the EUR  22 exemption threshold has had on the collection of VAT. In 
the first 6 months of application of the EU VAT e -commerce package, approximately EUR  692 million  
was directly generated as result of t he abolition of the EUR  22 threshold. This is a significant result 
as it represents new EU VAT that would not otherwise have been collected and helps to highlight 
how the package has allowed the Commission to realise its aim of achieving a fairer and simpl er 
system of taxation.  
 
The e -commerce package also introduced a number of simplification measures, including the Import 
One-Stop Shop (IOSS) and Special Arrangements, to help reduce the VAT compliance burden 
associated with the importation of low value go ods – information on the EU VAT e -commerce package 
is available on the Commission's VAT One -Stop Shop (OSS) Webportal . These simplifications were 
designed to help support the import side of e -commerce activity following the abolition of the EUR  22 
low value import VAT exemption.  
 
If Member States choose to apply reduced VAT rates, this will have a potential negative impact on 
tax revenue since they deviate fro m the principle of collecting VAT at the standard rate. For this 
reason, the amended legislation on VAT rates that took effect in April 2022 contains some safeguards 
to avoid a considerably negative budgetary impact. For example, Member States are obliged to limit 
their choice of applying reduced or super -reduced (lower than 5%) VAT rates as well as an exemption 
with the right to deduct input VAT to supplies of goods or services covered in a certain maximum of 
points in Annex  III to the EU VAT Directive. Ho wever, it must be pointed out that the decision to 
apply reduced VAT rates is at the discretion of the Member States, which also administer the WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 corresponding tax revenues. As a consequence, only the Member States can assess the 
corresponding budgetary impa ct. 
 
25. How will the reformed VAT system help to promote growth in the EU?  
 
Reply:  On 1 July, the e -commerce package came into application and introduced a number of 
amendments to the VAT rules governing the taxation of business -to-consumer (B2C) cross -border 
e-commerce activity in Europe. In response to the explosive growth in e -commerce activity and a 
fragmented regulatory framework for the collection of VAT on e -commerce supplies, the VAT 
e-commerce package introduced a number of VAT and customs related  reforms to help navigate the 
complications presented by the modern global economy and to modernise and simplify the collection 
of tax on e -commerce transactions.  
 
The most noteworthy amendments include the extension of the scope of the Union and non -Union  
Mini One -Stop Shop (MOSS) schemes to become broader Union and non -Union One -Stop Shop 
(OSS) schemes. Under the e -commerce package, the VAT exemption for the importation of small 
consignments not exceeding EUR  22 was abolished and new simplification measur es known as the 
Import One Stop Shop (IOSS) and Special Arrangements were introduced to support the collection 
of VAT on distance sales of goods imported into the EU in consignments with a value not exceeding 
EUR 150. The new rules also provide for the dee med liability of marketplaces and platforms, where 
they facilitate certain supplies of goods, thus bolstering compliance as it streamlines the VAT 
obligations of thousands of underlying sellers by deeming the marketplace as the person liable to 
declare and  pay the VAT due on certain supplies of goods.  
 
The main aim of the e -commerce package was to create a fairer, simpler and more harmonised 
system of taxation by removing legislation that created competitive distortions and by introducing 
new simplification s to simplify and increase compliance, thereby making it easier and less costly for 
businesses, especially SMEs, to expand and grow their business in the EU.  
 
The reformed rules on VAT rates allow Member States to use them in a more targeted way to pursue 
their policy objectives, such as promoting certain economic sectors. Given that the decision to apply 
reduced VAT rates is at the discretion of the Member States, only those can assess the extent to 
which corresponding measures make sense in terms of promo ting economic growth.  
 
26. Will the reformed EU VAT system raise effectiveness in increasing tax revenue?  
 
Reply : Following the implementation of the EU VAT e -commerce package, the Commission 
conducted an ex-post evaluation of the first 6 months of applic ation the package to assess its results. 
The results of the ex-post evaluation are included in Annex  6 of the Impact Assessment, 
accompanying the VAT in the Digital Age proposal, which was published on 8  December  2022. The 
initial results showcased the effect that the abolition of the EUR  22 exemption threshold has had on 
the collection of VAT. In the firs t 6 months of application of the EU VAT e -commerce package, 
approximately EUR  692 million  was directly generated as result of the abolition of the EUR  22 
threshold. This is a significant result as it represents new EU VAT that would not otherwise have 
been collected and helps to highlight how the package has allowed the Commission to realise its aim 
of achieving a fairer and simpler system of taxation.  
 
Given that the decision to apply reduced VAT rates is at the discretion of the Member States, only 
those can assess as to whether such measures can contribute to raise the effectiveness in increasing 
tax revenue.  
 
27. What is the expected effect of these reforms on carousel fraud?  
 
Reply:  The recent reform of the VAT system with the adoption of the e -commerce package does not 
specifically target carousel fraud (B2B) but rather e -commerce fraud (B2C). Recently added 
provisions for VAT administrative cooperation and exchange of information between tax and customs 
authorities as well as the reporting of cr oss-border payments in the Central Electronic System of 
Payment information (CESOP) can assist the investigation of fraudulent networks. This is achieved 
by providing insights in the money flows as well as in the attempts of fraudsters to hide/obscure 
transaction chains introducing exports and imports.  
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Page 73  
3  TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1  Measures directly affecting imports  
3.1.4  Other charges affecting imports  
3.1.4.2  Excise  
3.77.   The European  Union  launched a review of the Energy T ax Directive in 2021 in order to better 
align energy taxation with energy and climate policies and this included proposals that would amend 
certain aspects related to energy excise duties (Section  4.4.1). Public consultation and feedback 
have been finalize d and a proposal for a revised directive has been circulated. As of end -2022, 
discussions were ongoing among member States in the Council with a view to agreeing to a 
compromise proposal.  
 
3.78.  Member States have recently made adjustments in terms of en ergy excise taxes in response 
to the energy crisis and pursuant to the EU Communication on "Security of supply and affordable 
energy prices". A number of proposals are contained in the Communication, among them a 
recommendation to lower taxes as one way to  alleviate the high cost of energy. According to 
one study, as of October 2022, 12 member States have reduced excise duties on petrol to a level 
lower than what it was a year ago; a similar situation occurred with respect to the excise duty on 
diesel fuel.  One member State, Hungary, has lowered the excise duty on petrol below the minimum 
rate. 
 
Question:  
28. If the conflict in Ukraine ends and European countries revert steadily to pre -conflict energy 
levels, would the EU Commission also publish a new commun iqué on "Security of Supply and 
affordable energy prices"?  
 
Reply : Following Russia's war of aggression, the EU established with REPowerEU  a plan to phase 
out Russian fossil fuels as soon as possible and well before 2030. Consequently, several Member 
States have invested in new LNG infrastructure and the EU keeps readjusting its energy system. 
One cannot speculate what a possible end to the conflict could mean for the EU's future orientation 
of energy imports. The EU, however, will avoid at all costs entering again into an energy import 
dependence from a single supplier as before the war.  
 
Page 96  
3  TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3        Measures affecting production and trade  
3.3.1     Incentives  
3.139. Subsidies are granted at the EU level as well as at the member State level through state aid 
to promote business activities and achieve EU policy objectives in various areas.169 The 
European  Union  notifies both categories of subsidies on a regular basis to the WTO in accordance 
with Article  25.1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and Article  XVI:1 of 
the GATT  1994. The most recent notification providing info rmation on subsidies at the EU level was 
submitted in July 2021 and was followed by 27 addenda, each referring to an EU member State.  
 
Questions:  
29. Does the EU offer special incentives or privileges to attract best talent?  
 
Reply : The EU does not grant and is not aware of such incentives to attract talent offered by the 
Member States.  
 
30. Are there tax incentives offered to attract investments?  
 
Reply: Tax incentives granted by Member States can be allowed under State aid control rules, for 
instances for regional development. However, any tax incentives program would need to comply 
with EU's international obligations, including under the ASCM.  
 
31. What are some examples of the initiatives implemented by the EU to support businesses 
during the COVID -19 pandemic?  
 
Reply : On 6  April 2020, the Commission announced  that financing of an estimated €8  billion  would 
be made available to provide immediate financial relief to small and medium -sized enterprises across 
the EU. In December 2020, the Commission found  that the creation of a €25  billion  Pan-European WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Guarantee Fund , managed by the European Investment Bank  to support companies affected by the 
coronavirus, was in line with EU state aid rules . The Fund is expected to mobilise up to €200  billion  
of additional financing to support businesses affected by the coronavirus outbreak in participating 
Member States.  
 
Additionally, the State Aid Temporary Framework was adopted on 19th March  2020 to enable 
Member States to use the full flexibility foreseen under State aid rules to support the economy in 
the context of the coronavirus outbreak. As announced i n May 2022, the State aid COVID Temporary 
Framework will not be extended beyond the current expiry date of 30  June 2022, with some 
exceptions. In particular, investment and solvency support measures may still be put in place until 
31 December  2023. Investm ent support was originally possible until 31  December  2022 but has now 
been extended to coincide with the expiry date of solvency support. In addition, the Temporary 
Framework already provides for a flexible transition, under clear safeguards, in particula r for the 
conversion and restructuring options of debt instruments, such as loans and guarantees, into other 
forms of aid, such as direct grants, until 30  June 2023.  
For examples and further information, see the list of measures implemented under the Covid  TF: 
State_aid_decisions_TF_and_107_2b_107_3b_107_3c.pdf (europa.eu) . 
 
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3 TRADE POLICIES A ND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3        Measures affecting production and trade  
3.3.1     Incentives  
3.140. During the review period and in response to the COVID -19 pandemic, the European  Union  
implemented specific initiatives to support businesses to mitigate the negative effects of the 
pandemic (e.g. Coronavirus Response Investment Initiatives) and also provided further flexibilities 
regarding state aid to facilitate access to liquidity and other support measures (e.g. loans and 
guarantees) for eligible benefi ciaries (i.e. Temporary Framework for State Aid). Some state aid rules 
and guidelines are also undergoing review.  
 
Question:  
32. What are some examples of the initiatives implemented by the EU to support businesses 
during the COVID -19 pandemic?  
 
Reply : On 6 April 2020, the Commission announced  that financing of an estimated €8  billion  would 
be made available to provide immediate financial relief to small and medium -sized enterprises across 
the EU. In December 2020, the Commission found  that the creation of a €25  billion  Pan-European 
Guarantee Fund , managed by the European Investment Bank  to support companies affected by the 
coronavirus, was in line with EU state aid rules . The Fund is expected to mobilise up to €200  billion  
of additional financing to support businesses affected by the coronavirus outbreak in participating 
Member States.  
 
Additionally, the State Aid Temporary Framework was adopted on 19th March  2020 to enable 
Member States to use the full flexibility foreseen under State aid rules to support the economy in 
the context of the coronavirus outbreak. As announced i n May 2022, the State aid COVID Temporary 
Framework will not be extended beyond the current expiry date of 30  June 2022, with some 
exceptions. In particular, investment and solvency support measures may still be put in place until 
31 December  2023. Investm ent support was originally possible until 31  December  2022 but has now 
been extended to coincide with the expiry date of solvency support. In addition, the Temporary 
Framework already provides for a flexible transition, under clear safeguards, in particula r for the 
conversion and restructuring options of debt instruments, such as loans and guarantees, into other 
forms of aid, such as direct grants, until 30  June 2023.  
 
For examples and further information, see the list of measures implemented under the Covi d TF: 
State_aid_decisions_TF_and_107_2b_107_3b_107_3c.pdf (europa.eu) . 
 WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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Page 103  
3  TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3  Measures affecting production and trade  
3.3.1  Incentives  
3.3.1.3  Taxation  
3.164.  In May 2021, the European Commission published a communication entitled "Business 
Taxation for the 21st Century" that identifies actio ns and priorities to achieve a comprehensive and 
modern business tax system.207 The communication proposes inter  alia the development of an EU 
common legal framework (i.e. EU single rulebook) for corporate tax. As part of the European Green 
Deal (Section  2), the European  Union  is also promoting the development of green taxation, which 
includes taxes on energy, transport, pollution and resources.  
 
Questions:  
33. We would appreciate if the EU could elaborate more (only pertinent points) on the 
development of  green taxation.  
 
Reply:  Environmental taxation is a powerful tool in steering the behaviour of producers and 
consumers by increasing the cost of activities that cause pollution or harm the environment. In other 
words, taxation makes consumers and produce rs consider and bear the social costs of their activities, 
known as "negative externalities", in accordance with the 'polluter pays' principle (i.e. polluters bear 
the costs of their pollution including the cost of measures taken to prevent, control and re medy 
pollution and the costs it imposes on society). With a careful design that takes into account their 
distributional impact so that low -income households do not face greater financial impacts than 
high-income households, environmental taxation can help achieve the ambitious environmental 
targets.  
 
The main legislative proposal of the European Commission as part of the Fit for 55 package relates 
to the revision of the EU's Energy Taxation Directive which lays down rules for the taxation of energy 
products  used as motor fuel, heating fuel and electricity. The EU's proposal for a revised common 
framework for energy taxation – the Energy Taxation Directive or ETD – can play a central role in 
guiding initiatives by the Member States.  
 
EU Member States are disc ussing the Commission proposal based on a Council Working Party 
compromise proposal. Please consult our website page on Green Taxation (europa.eu)  and on the 
Revision of the Energy Taxation Directive (europa.eu).  
 
Some Member States have environmental taxes such as carbon taxes or taxes on plastic, waste, 
etc. However, these taxes are not harmonised at EU level.  
 
34. How would development of green taxation changes the tax scenari o in the EU?  
 
Reply : Taxation initiatives at both EU and Member State level can help the EU reach its climate 
policy goals by encouraging a switch to cleaner energy, more sustainable industry and more 
environmentally friendly choices. At the same time they  can bring new revenues that can be used 
to support vulnerable households and companies in their green transition.  
 
While labour taxation will likely continue to play a crucial role, environmental taxation could also 
play a more prominent role both in gen erating some additional revenue (at least in the short to 
medium -term) and influence behaviour towards more sustainable economies and societies. 
Currently however, environmental taxes (i.e. energy, transport, pollution and resource taxes) 
contributed aroun d 5.5% of total tax revenue in the EU -27 in 2021. The share of environmental 
taxes in the overall tax mix has been decreasing in 2021. Within the category environmental taxation 
(which includes energy, transport and pollution/resource taxes), the lion's sh are is taken up by 
energy taxation, followed by transport taxes and pollution and resource taxes across the EU -27. 
 
35. Does that mean that the current taxation system will be massively restructured?  
 
Reply : As part of a broader policy mix, green taxation  initiatives at both EU and Member State level 
can help the EU to reach its environmental policy goals by encouraging a switch to cleaner energy, 
more sustainable industry and greener habits. By setting a price for social costs, altering 
decision -making an d incentivising behavioural changes by companies and people, this action can 
help mitigate resource waste and damage to the environment.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 Next to initiatives at the EU level, green taxation initiatives are undertaken at Member States level. 
Taxation initiatives at both EU and Member State level can help the EU reach its climate policy goals 
by encouraging a switch to cleaner energy, more sustainable industry and more environmentally 
friendly choices.  
 
Environmental taxation is still underused in many Member States. Environmental taxes (i.e. energy, 
transport, pollution and resource taxes) contributed only around 5.5% of total tax revenue in the 
EU-27 in 2021. Some Member States have shifted some of the tax burden away from labour taxation 
to environmen tal taxation, but revenues from labour taxes remain significantly greater than 
environmental tax revenues in most Member States.  
 
At this moment there are no specific plans to introduce harmonised green taxes.  
 
36. What were the challenges faced in the ini tiative to migrate to green taxation, especially the 
commitments towards compliance?  
 
Reply:  The introduction of environmental policies, including tax policies, is often a delicate political 
issue and public acceptability considerations influence their ado ption.  
 
For an overview of past initiatives for revising the Energy Taxation Directive please consult the 
impact assessment that accompanied the European Commission proposal ( SWD(2021)641 available 
on eur-lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52021SC0641).  
 
37. What is the acceptance rate towards the green taxation development scheme and how it is 
reflected in the EU G DP?  
 
Reply : Ambitious environmental policies should have solid safety nets and be accompanied by social 
measures, while the impact of any new taxes depend largely on how Member States design their 
broader tax systems and decide to allocate revenues. Well -designed environmental taxes, when 
accompanied by other reforms, can promote employment, economic growth and social fairness, as 
reflected in the longstanding view that Member States should shift taxation from labour to 
environmental taxes.  
 
Revenues from environmental taxes constitute only a small and declining share of the overall tax 
revenue. In 2021, they accounted for only 2.2 % of GDP in the EU. This may indicate a potential to 
strengthen their use notably in areas beyond energy taxation (e.g. natural  resources) and where 
significant challenges can be observed.  
 
For more information, please consult the impact assessment that accompanied the Commission 
proposal (SWD(2021)641 available on : 
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52021SC0641.  
 
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3  TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3  Meas ures affecting production and trade  
3.3.7  Intellectual property rights  
3.3.7.3  Industrial property  
3.3.7.3.6 Undisclosed information and access to data  
3.3.7.3.6.1 Trade secrets  
3.274. Trade secrets are protected under the Directive on the Protection of Undisclosed Know -How 
and Business Information (Trade Secrets) Against Their Unlawful Acquisition, Use and Disclosure 
(the Trade Secrets Directive). The 2020 IP Action Plan tasks the Commission to promote data access 
and sharing, while safeguarding legitima te interests, via clarification of certain key provisions of the 
Trade Secrets Directive (2016/943) and a review of the Database Directive (96/9/EC).  
 
3.275. In February 2022, the Commission proposed new rules on who can use and access data 
generated in the European  Union  across all economic sectors, in the form of a Data Act. Among 
other things, the aim is to ensure respect for trade secrets in the context of data sharing between 
businesses, public sector bodies, or consumers. According to t he proposal, trade secrets shall only 
be disclosed if all necessary measures are taken to preserve their confidentiality. The proposal does 
not affect the legal protection of trade secrets and clarifies that the Database Directive sui generis 
protection do es not apply to databases containing data generated by a connected product or related WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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service. The Commission has published a study on the legal protection of trade secrets in the context 
of the data economy.  
 
Questions:  
38. When will the Data Act as prop osed by the Commission on who can use and access data 
generated in the EU be enforced?  
 
Reply:  The Data Act proposal is currently being negotiated in the context of the official procedures 
of the EU legislative process, with the Council of the European  Union  and the European Parliament 
as co-legislators. The date of application of the Data Act is a mong the topics under discussion in this 
framework.  
 
39. According to the proposed Data Act, will health regulatory bodies be allowed to access/request 
the import prices of pharmaceutical products as one of the measures to promote data access and 
sharing?  
 
Reply:  The described situation is not regulated under the Data Act. With regards to 
business -to-government data sharing, the Data Act proposal allows certain EU public sector bodies 
to request access to private sector data on the basis of an exceptional need to use such data, such 
as a public emergency. The private sector entity has to comply with the request if the appropriate 
conditions under the Data Act are met.  
 
40. In some countries with established medicine price transparency, retail pharmaceutical  prices 
are shared to the public. Does this contravene the proposed rules?  
 
Reply:  The Data Act proposal does not contain rules that would contravene with such transparency 
obligation. Data made available pursuant to the Data Act is not to be considered 'o pen data'.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 URUGUAY  
POLÍTICA COMERCIAL MULTILATERAL Y BILATERAL:  
01.   En el informe de la UE, en el en el párrafo 3.24 se indica que " Se necesita un nuevo enfoque 
en las negociaciones sobre la agricultura después de la CM12: que integre la s cuestiones de la 
seguridad alimentaria, el medio ambiente, el clima, la pobreza y la producción sostenible ". ¿Podría 
la UE brindar mayores detalles con respecto a la manera en que podrían incorporarse las cuestiones 
relativas al "medio ambiente", el "cli ma" y la "producción sostenible" en las negociaciones sobre la 
agricultura post CM12? En particular, se agradecería contar con ejemplos concretos que permitan 
ilustrar el pensamiento de la UE sobre cómo podrían ser considerados dichos factores en las 
cuest iones atinentes a los pilares de ayuda interna y acceso a los mercados del Acuerdo sobre la 
Agricultura.  
 
Reply: As DG Ngozi said earlier this year, " it has become a WTO imperative to contribute to solutions 
to food and energy insecurity, the climate crisi s, sustainability issues, pandemic preparedness, 
economic recovery and persistent developmental challenges ", and "we cannot afford to have an 
MC13 that does not deliver".  
 
The UN report on Repurposing agricultural support to transform food system finds that today, most 
of the support to producers around the world mostly consists of price incentives, such as import 
tariffs and export subsidies, as well as fiscal subsidies whi ch are tied to the production of a specific 
commodity or input. These subsidies are not only trade distortive, they also have a negative impact 
on the environment. Independent studies (OECD 2019 study) converge to conclude that fully 
decoupled payments are  among the least environmentally harmful support policies.  
 
The WTO has therefore a crucial role to play in "repurposing". Although the Green box was not 
necessarily designed to represent environmentally friendly policies, the Green Box as it stands is an  
immediately available policy tool to implement the "repurposing" of agricultural subsidies towards 
sustainable agriculture and "green box" measures.  
 
The environmental sustainability is another argument in favour or reforms away from trade distorting 
support. EU will continue to push for such direction of reforms towards Green box measures, 
including in the preparations of MC13.  
 
In that respect, members could reflect together on the possible bridges between agricultural 
negations and international commitments such as the Paris Agreement and Montreal Framework 
(target 18 on eliminating harmful subsidies), and move towards sustainable food system.  
 
02.   El párrafo 3.45 del Informe de la Secretaría, se hace referencia a las negociaciones  en virtud 
del artículo XXVIII abiertas por la Unión Europea y el Reino Unido a raíz del Brexit, indicándose que 
"en diciembre de 2022, se seguía negociando con un Miembro (…)".  Sin embargo, en la reunión del 
Consejo de Mercancías del 3 -4 de abril de 2023,  la UE informó que su delegación había suscrito 
formalmente acuerdos con nueve Miembros, inicialado acuerdos de principio con otros dos Miembros, 
y avanzado en las negociaciones hasta el punto de encontrarse cerca del cierre de las mismas con 
la mayoría de l resto de los participantes. Teniendo en cuenta lo anterior, así como el hecho de que 
la UE ha afirmado que mantuvo negociaciones y/o consultas como parte de este proceso bajo 
artículo  XXVIII con un total de 22 Miembros de la OMC, ¿podría la UE explicar c uántos son y en qué 
situación se encuentran los Miembros con los que no ha suscrito formalmente acuerdos definitivos 
ni inicialados acuerdos de principio, pero con los que tampoco estaría negociando, según se 
desprende del párrafo 3.45 del informe?  
 
Reply:  Paragraph 3.45 of the Secretariat's report refers actually to two different issues: on one hand 
it addresses the ongoing Article  XXVIII GATT  1994 negotiations following the modification of 
concessions on all the tariff -rate quotas included in the EU Sched ule CLXXV as a consequence of the 
United  Kingdom 's withdrawal from the European  Union ; on the other hand, it addresses the pending 
process of certification of the EU28 Schedule CLXXV, which is due to one Member's reservation. The 
information provided on th e occasion of the meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods of 
3-4 April 2023 as regards the ongoing Article  XXVIII GATT  1994 negotiations remains valid. Up to 
now, the European  Union  has signed agreements with Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, 
Indonesia, New  Zealand , Norway, Thailand and the United States. It has concluded negotiations with 
China, Egypt and Pakistan, and the relevant agreements are undergoing the respective internal WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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approval procedures. Consultations have been formally concluded w ith Switzerland and 
Chinese  Taipei . The discussions are still ongoing with other partners.  
 
03.   En el párrafo 3.49 del Informe de la Secretaría, se afirma que " a raíz de la concertación del 
acuerdo con el Reino Unido y de las modificaciones propuestas de  su Lista, la Unión Europea excluye 
de todos sus contingentes arancelarios existentes en el marco de la OMC las mercancías originarias 
del Reino Unido ". Sin perjuicio de lo acordado en el artículo 33 del Acuerdo sobre Comercio y 
Cooperación entre la UE y e l Reino Unido, ¿podría confirmar la UE su intención de establecer de 
manera inequívoca en su Lista de Concesiones en la OMC que excluirá de todos sus contingentes 
arancelarios existentes en el marco de la OMC las mercancías originarias del Reino Unido?  
 
Reply: Following the United  Kingdom 's withdrawal from the Union, the European  Union  notified the 
WTO membership in its communications G/ SECRET/42 and G/SECRET/42/Add.2 of its intention to 
modify its current concessions by apportioning all tariff -rate quotas  as they are reflected in 
Schedule  CLXXV of the European  Union . Further to these notifications, the European  Union  entered 
into negotiations and consultations with all the Members having rights under GATT Article  XXVIII in 
relation to the modification of concessions with respect to the above -mentioned tariff -rate quotas. 
To date, these negotiations are ongoing. The Eu ropean  Union  will be in the position to submit for 
certification a new Schedule of Commitments, which will include all the changes following the 
United  Kingdom 's withdrawal from the Union as well as the exclusion of the United  Kingdom  from 
the EU  WTO tarif f quotas, when these negotiations have been finalised.  
 
04.   En el párrafo 4.72 del Informe de la Secretaría, se establece que " en general, siguen en vigor 
124 contingentes arancelarios de la OMC (para campañas de comercialización o años civiles o 
estacio nales) y se ha propuesto la eliminación de un pequeño número de contingentes arancelarios 
[en virtud de la salida del Reino Unido de la UE] ". A juicio de la UE, ¿cómo pueden los Miembros de 
la OMC asegurar un acceso al mercado de la UE en condiciones no me nos favorables a las existentes 
antes de enero de 2021 para los productos con respecto a los cuales se ha propuesto la eliminación 
de los contingentes arancelarios correspondientes, a la luz de lo establecido en el Artículo XXVIII del 
GATT  1994? El párrafo  4.72 también indica que "por lo general, las importaciones procedentes del 
Reino Unido están excluidas de los contingentes arancelarios". ¿Podría la UE confirmar que, en todos 
los casos, las importaciones procedentes del Reino Unido están excluidas de sus  contingentes 
arancelarios existentes en el marco de la OMC?  
 
Reply: Following the United  Kingdom 's withdrawal from the Union, the European  Union  notified the 
WTO membership in its communications G/ SECRET/42 and G/SECRET/42/Add.2 of its intention to 
modif y its current concessions by apportioning all tariff -rate quotas as they are reflected in 
Schedule  CLXXV of the European  Union . Further to these notifications, the European  Union  entered 
into negotiations and consultations with all the Members having right s under GATT Article  XXVIII in 
relation to the modification of concessions with respect to the above -mentioned tariff -rate quotas. 
To date, these negotiations are ongoing. The European  Union  will be in the position to submit for 
certification a new Schedul e of Commitments, which will include all the changes following the 
United  Kingdom's withdrawal from the Union, when these negotiations have been finalised. The 
WTO Members will continue to have access to the EU market in line with the concessions as reflec ted 
by the new Schedule of Commitments.  
 
The EU confirms as well that Article  33 of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the 
European  Union  and the United  Kingdom  of Great Britain and Northern Ireland contains a specific 
provision on the mutual excl usion from the access to WTO tariff quotas ( Publications Office 
(europa.eu) ). 
 
SOSTENIBILIDAD:  
05.   En el párrafo 5.18 del Informe de la UE, se hace referencia al Reglamento sobre la reducción 
de los límites máximos de residuos (LMR) de la clotianidina y el tiametoxam como primer ejemplo 
de la aplicación de la Estrategia "de la granja a la mesa" a los alimento s importados en lo que 
respecta a los residuos de plaguicidas. Asimismo, la UE señala que esta es " una cuestión de interés 
mundial, que va más allá de las fronteras nacionales y no puede resolverse únicamente mediante 
medidas en el nivel de la UE ". Anterio rmente, en el párrafo 5.4, la UE indica que " es consciente de 
que si desea hacer frente a problemas mundiales (…) es necesario aumentar la cooperación con 
terceros países " y que, " en los casos en que las políticas del Pacto Verde Europeo tienen una 
dimensi ón externa, la UE mantiene conversaciones con sus interlocutores ". ¿Cómo justifica 
jurídicamente la UE la consideración de factores distintos a los relativos a la inocuidad alimentaria WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 en el proceso de fijación de LMR, teniendo en cuenta que la norma princ ipal y específica en materia 
de LMR de plaguicidas en alimentos y piensos de la UE, que es el Reglamento N° 396/2005, define 
a los LMR en su artículo 3(d) como: " el límite legal superior de concentración de un residuo de 
plaguicida en alimentos o piensos e stablecido de conformidad con el presente Reglamento, basado 
en las buenas prácticas agrícolas y la menor exposición del consumidor necesaria para proteger a 
todos los consumidores vulnerables "? ¿Cómo consideró la UE en su proceso decisorio a los LMR 
estab lecidos por la Comisión del Codex Alimentarius para las sustancias clotianidina y tiametoxam 
en diferentes productos agrícolas? ¿Podría la UE explicar de qué manera ha tomado en cuenta las 
políticas y medidas aplicadas por las autoridades competentes de te rceros países en su territorio 
para promover un uso seguro y respetuoso con el medio ambiente y la biodiversidad de las 
sustancias clotianidina y tiametoxam?  
 
Reply:  Plant protection products and their residues are regulated in the EU by Regulation (EC) 
No 1107/2009 and Regulation (EC) No 396/2005. Both Regulations are complementary and are 
implemented in a coordinated manner to achieve the protective effect for the use of plant protection 
products. The Regulations integrate the principles of the General Fo od Law Regulation (EC) 
No 178/2002 and more broadly the Treaty of the Functioning of the European  Union . Environmental 
protection is foreseen in the EU regulatory framework and this is applicable to pesticide residues.  
 
We know that currently environmental  issues are not included in the Codex Committee of Pesticides 
Residues risk management principles for setting Codex MRLs. As a consequence, we consider that 
those Codex MRLs do not achieve the appropriate level of protection for pollinators and are able to  
meet the EU's environmental objectives. Furthermore, the EU fully agrees on the importance of 
international standards and in particular the role Codex Alimentarius plays in this respect. The EU 
will therefore continue to engage actively in Codex Alimentar ius as it did in the past.  
 
The EU would like to reiterate that EU Regulations on pollinator health do not require third countries 
to ban the use of the related active substances in their own territory and therefore, the EU is not 
applying its policy rela ted to pesticides extraterritorially. The EU's objective is to ensure that food 
and feed consumed in the EU do not contribute to the global decline of pollinators, independently of 
whether the product is produced in the EU or imported from non -EU countries .  
 
The EU has not evaluated environmental policies and measures implemented by the competent 
authorities of third countries. The possibility of requesting an import tolerance when the use of 
clothianidin/thiamethoxam leads to measurable levels of residues  remains. Such an import tolerance 
could be granted if the evaluation of the application concludes that there is no unacceptable risk to 
pollinators for the specific crop and under the specific conditions of use included in the import 
tolerance.  
 
06.   ¿Cómo evaluaría la UE la "cooperación con terceros países" en este caso, teniendo en cuenta 
que, pese a las preocupaciones y comentarios presentados por una veintena de Miembros en los 
Consejos y Comités relevantes de la OMC y a nivel bilateral, el Reglamento  de marras ha sido 
adoptado sin modificaciones que busquen atender dichas preocupaciones y comentarios? ¿Podría la 
UE confirmar que sus Estados Miembro no han brindado autorizaciones de emergencia para el uso 
de las sustancias clotianidina y tiametoxam des de la adopción de la sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia 
de la UE (TJUE) del 19 de enero de 2023 en el asunto C 162/21? ¿Podría la UE informar si, pese a 
las importantes preocupaciones sistémicas presentadas por numerosas delegaciones con respecto a 
este pr imer ejemplo de la aplicación de la Estrategia "de la granja a la mesa" a los alimentos 
importados en lo que respecta a los residuos de plaguicidas, es intención de la UE aplicar medidas 
similares para otras sustancias activas? En caso afirmativo, ¿podría la UE informar para cuáles 
sustancias?  
 
Reply:  As indicated in the Commission Regulation (EU) 2023/334, the EU proposes a 36 -month 
deferral of the application date to allow third countries to adapt their good agricultural practices to 
the new rules. In addition, since 2020, the EU has explicitly and w idely communicated[1] to 
third countries the announcements made in the EU Green Deal[2] and the Farm to Fork Strategy[3], 
about its intention to take into account environmental aspects when deciding about MRLs for 
substances no longer approved in the EU, while respecting WTO standards and other international 
obligations. In these Communications, the E U also indicated that the lowering of the existing MRLs 
for clothianidin and thiamethoxam would be envisaged. It was also already communicated that 
similar measures could be prepared for another neonicotinoid (imidacloprid), and two active 
persistent, bio -accumulative and toxic substances (quinoxyfen and lufenuron).  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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To the European Commission's knowledge, Member States have not provided emergency 
authorisations for the use of clothianidin and thiamethoxam since the adoption of the judgment of 
the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) of 19  January  2023 in case C 162/21.  
 
[1] Through information provided in the WTO SPS Committee, specific seminars and information 
sessions for third country representatives, dedicated bilateral meetings with third countries, EU 
funded programmes and training activities under the Foreign policy instruments and raising the topic 
in international forums (such as the Joint FAO/WHO Meeting on Pesticide Residues, CODEX 
Alimentarius) . 
[2]  Communication on the European Green Deal, COM(2019) 640 final, p. 12 . 
[3]  Communication on a Farm to Fork Strategy, COM(2020) 381 final, p. 18 . 
 
EFECTOS EXTERNOS DE LAS POLÍTICAS INTERNAS DE LA UE:  
07.   El párrafo 9.22 del Informe de la UE, se establece que "la nueva PAC será un instrumento clave 
para hacer realidad las ambiciones de la Estrategia 'de la granja a la mesa' y la Estra tegia sobre 
Biodiversidad". Teniendo en cuenta que el otorgamiento de niveles elevados de subsidios a los 
productores europeos parece ser condición necesaria para que estos cumplan con los requisitos 
impuestos por la UE a través de diversas medidas que bus can implementar en la práctica dichas 
Estrategias, y teniendo en cuenta también que la UE parece estar buscando que los mismos 
requisitos se apliquen a la producción en terceros países, estableciendo condicionalidades para el 
acceso a su mercado a través d e las llamadas "cláusulas espejo", ¿cómo evalúa la UE que se podría 
asegurar condiciones de competencia equilibradas (o un "level playing field") entre los productores 
de sus Estados Miembro y los productores de los países en desarrollo y menos adelantados , teniendo 
en cuenta que estos países no cuentan con los recursos financieros necesarios para proveer niveles 
de subsidios que puedan equiparar los recibidos por los productores europeos?  
 
Reply:  First, the EU would like to clarify that the subsidies to Eu ropean producers are not "a 
necessary condition for them to meet the requirements imposed by the EU" . All Farmers in the EU, 
receiving CAP support or not, have to respect strict environmental requirements, called statutory 
management requirements. They inc lude some EU rules on animal welfare and on the environment 
(Directive on the use of nitrates , Water Framework Directive, Directive on the conservation of wild 
birds, Directive on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora ). From a leg al 
point of view, the CAP is not a means to compensate farmers for these high safety and environmental 
standards, which have to be respected by all EU operators (even if they do not benefit from the 
CAP). Rather, the CAP provides a safety net for farmers ( decoupled income support, in line with 
Annex  2 of the Agreement on Agriculture). The CAP is not paying farmers to respect these legal 
standards, but is reducing payments for farmers not observing them. Nevertheless, it is true that 
farmers may receive supp ort from the CAP for measures that go beyond current legal minimum 
requirements.  
 
Sustainability is fundamental to long -term food security. We need more resilient and sustainable 
food systems now more than ever. The EU is a global player, and as the world' s third largest importer 
of agri -food it can contribute to promoting sustainability in third countries, multilaterally, bilaterally, 
and via autonomous measures.  
 
All imports in the EU must comply with relevant EU regulation and standards. Under certain 
circumstances as defined by WTO rules, it is necessary for the EU to require that imported products 
comply with certain production requirements, but not all of them. The legitimacy of applying 
production requirements to imports is based on the need to prote ct the global environment or to 
respond to ethical concerns. Whenever the EU considers applying such measures to imported 
products, this will be done in full respect of WTO rules, notably the principle of non -discrimination 
and proportionality, aiming at a voiding unnecessary disruption of trade.  
 
These policies are necessary if we are all to reach our climate goals by 2030 and 2050. If only Europe 
has higher requirements for agriculture, we will just outsource carbon leakage to other parts of the 
world, de feating the purpose of our Green Deal objectives, which are tackling a global challenge. All 
proposed measures are in line with WTO rules, which acknowledge the right to regulate, under 
certain strict conditions, on process and production methods which are  necessary for the protection 
of human, animal or plant life or health, conservation of exhaustible natural resources, or based on 
ethical grounds.  
 
A very fundamental point is the strong EU commitment to step up its engagement with partner 
countries, espe cially developing countries, to assist producer countries where necessary. EU policies WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 and programmes for cooperation and development will continue to support developing countries in 
the transition to sustainable food systems. To this end, the EU will cont inue in its role as one of the 
biggest contributors to climate financing in developing countries and LDCs.  
 
The EU with its Member States is the world's largest provider of Aid for Trade, 13% of which is 
targeting least developed countries specifically. T he EU funds several specific programmes that can 
help farmers in third countries to find suitable alternatives, and to comply with EU regulatory 
requirements (such as: the EU Sustainable Cocoa Initiative, the "Fit for market" programme, the 
"Plantwise+" pr ogramme, the "Better Training for Safer Food" (BTSF), etc.).  
 
AGRICULTURA:  
08.   En el párrafo 4.3 del Informe de la Secretaría, se afirma que " en 2022, Europa se enfrentó a 
unas condiciones meteorológicas muy secas y, según el Observatorio Europeo de la S equía, a 
principios de septiembre el 33% del territorio de la UE estaba en situación de 'advertencia' (al 
experimentar un déficit de humedad del suelo) y el 26% estaba en 'alerta' (estrés en la vegetación 
causado por el déficit de humedad del suelo y de ve getación). De acuerdo con el Observatorio 
Mundial de la Sequía, los cultivos más afectados fueron el maíz, las habas de soja y el girasol ". 
¿Podría la UE compartir información sobre las medidas concretas adoptadas en su territorio para 
hacer frente a las d ificultades derivadas de la sequía, así como para prevenir o minimizar el impacto 
de situaciones similares a futuro?  
 
Reply:  In 2022, the European Commission services (the Director -General for Agriculture and Rural 
Development) did not adopt any emergency measures in response to the drought that impacted 
some EU regions.  
 
09.   En el párrafo 4.10 del Informe de la Secretaría, se subraya que " en la nueva PAC se utiliza un 
enfoque más basado en los resultados con arreglo al cual se miden los avances globales realizados 
hacia la consecución de metas definidas, así como de los 10 objetivos clave en ella establecidos, y 
se vincula el derecho a obtener financiación a los resultados ". ¿Qué evaluación hace la UE con 
respecto a los niveles de contribución ef ectiva de la PAC, en los últimos años, a los objetivos relativos 
a: "iv) actuar contra el cambio climático"; "v) fomentar la protección del medio ambiente"; y 
vi) "preservar los paisajes y la biodiversidad"? ¿Podría la UE facilitar el acceso a los estudios  o 
evaluaciones pertinentes?  
 
Reply:  The European Commission constantly assesses the effectiveness of the CAP in reaching its 
environmental targets:  
 
• a wide array of environmental data is included in the comprehensive set of indicators 
(https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/cap -my-country/performance -agricultural -policy/cap -
indicators_en ) collected under the com mon monitoring and evaluation framework - CMEF 
(https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common -agricultural -policy/cap -overview/cmef_en ); 
 
• a complementary set of 28 agri -environmental indicators 
(https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/agriculture/agri -environmental -indicators ) further tracks the 
integration of environmental concerns into the CAP;  
 
• as part of the CMEF, evaluations and external studies on environmental sustainability 
(https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common -agricultural -policy/cap -
overview/cmef/sustainability_en ) are carried out by independent experts on behalf of the 
European  Commission.  
 
Among these studies you can find many on the CAP's impact on three referenced objectives, like 
the: 2021 Evaluation of the CAP on climate cha nge and greenhouse gas emissions 
(https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common -agricultur al-policy/cap -
overview/cmef/sustainability/evaluation -cap-climate -change -and-greenhouse -gas-emissions_en ), 
the 2021 Impact of the CAP on biodiversity, soil and water (natural resources) 
(https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common -agricultural -policy/cap -
overview/cmef/sustainability/impact -cap-biodiversity -soil-and-water -natural -resources_en ), 
the 2017 Payments for agricultural practices beneficial for the climate and the environment 
(https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common -agricultural -policy/cap -
overview/cmef/sustainability/payments -agricultural -practices -beneficial -climate -and-
environment_en ), and the 2019 Impact of the CAP on habitats, landscapes, biodiversity WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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(https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common -agricultural -policy/cap -
overview/cmef/sustainability/impact -cap-habitats -landscapes -biodiversity_en ). 
 
MIPYMES:  
10.   En el punto 5.38 del Informe de la UE se indica que la nueva generación de acuerdos 
comerciales regionales (ACR), ahora incluye disposiciones específicas sobre MIPYMES. ¿Podría la 
Unión Europea indicar si ha recopilado evidencia sobre el impacto de los ACR en las MIPYMES, el 
valor de las exportaciones que podr ía atribuirse a ellas, así como los desafíos de las MIPYMES en la 
utilización de los ACR y los beneficios potenciales que los ACR pueden tener?  
 
Reply: In 2020, around 93% of total EU exporting companies were SMEs contributing to around  31% 
of the total va lue of EU exports in the same year .1 Free trade agreements matter not only for SMEs 
that export directly but also for those that are indirectly involved in global supply chains. However, 
often SMEs face challenges to access international markets, such as:  access to information (such 
as, laws and regulations in foreign markets, different national technical standards, difficult 
paperwork) or easy and stable access to third country markets (the cost of entering new markets 
weighs more heavily on SMEs than on larger firms). FTAs address these challenges, notably via 
dedicated SME chapters, and help SMEs by, inter alia, elimination of tariff and non -tariff barriers, 
setting a predictable regulatory framework, providing enhanced information for SMEs, setting -up 
institutional mechanisms to detect problems in FTA implementation etc.  
 
It should also be noted that the impact of trade agreements on SMEs is systematically assessed in 
each evaluation. This is true both for ex-ante impact assessments and sustainability i mpact 
assessments, and for ex-post evaluations.  
 
11.   En relación con el paquete de recomendaciones sobre MiPymes (INF/MSME/4/Rev.2) adoptado 
por el Grupo Informal sobre MIPYME de la OMC, y en particular el anexo 4 sobre inclusión de las 
MIPYMES en el des arrollo regulatorio; ¿podría la UE indicar si existe algún mecanismo para consultar 
a las MiPymes a la hora de desarrollar nuevas regulaciones?  
 
Reply:  Under Article  11 of the Treaty on European  Union  (TEU), the European Commission has a 
duty to carry out broad consultations with interested parties in order to ensure that EU action is 
coherent and transparent. According to the EU's better regulation guidelines2 and toolbox3, 
stakeholder consultation,  including SMEs, is a formal process, by which the European Commission 
collects information and views from stakeholders about its policies (for impact assessments, 
evaluations and fitness checks).  
 
When SMEs are affected by a policy initiative, the SME dim ension should be a clear part of the 
consultation strategy .4 All public consultations of legislative initiatives must allow respondents to 
identify themselves as individual SMEs (by size) or as organisations representing SMEs. In addition 
to public consultations, consultation activities may involve targeted actions  such as round table 
discussions, focus group meetings, hearings targeting SME representatives, SME panel consultations 
or specific consultations – carried out with the assistance of the Enterprise Europe Network – aimed 
at providing inputs into the 'SME t est'.5 The impact assessment report needs to reflect the analysis 
of the input received from the SME community as well as how SME specific input has been taken 
into consideration.  
 
 
1 Eurostat TEC database (tables ext_tec01, ext_tec03, ext_tec10) . 
2 https://commission.europa.eu/la w/law -making -process/planning -and-proposing -law/better -
regulation/better -regulation -guidelines -and-toolbox_en . 
3 https://commission.europa.eu/law/law -making -process/planning -and-proposing -law/better -
regulation/better -regulation -guidelines -and-toolbox/better -regulation -toolbox_en . 
4 Better regulation Toolbox, Tool #52 – Consultation strategy ( https://commission.europa.eu/law/law -
making -process/planning -and-proposing -law/better -regulation/better -regulation -guidelines -and-
toolbox/better -regulation -toolbox_en ). 
5 The SME Test – the analysis of the pos sible effects of EU legislative proposals on SMEs - is a 
mandatory part of an impact assessment ( Better Regulation toolbox - Tool #23 ). The SME test consists of four 
steps that are applied in a modular way: (1) identification of affected businesses; (2) consultation of SME 
stakehol ders; (3) assessment of the impact on SMEs; (4) minimising impact on SMEs. Careful assessment of 
the impacts of European Commission proposals on SMEs aims to ensure that action is targeted, achieves its 
objectives and does not add unnecessary costs.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 PESCA:  
12.   En el punto 4.87 del Informe de la Secretaría se indica que los cambios relativos a la 
sostenibilidad ambiental realizados en la política general de la Unión Europea afectan al sector 
pesquero. Teniendo en cuenta la adopción del Acuerdo sobre Subsidios a la Pesca de la OMC el 
17 de junio de 2022, ¿podría la UE indi car los cambios internos que se tendrían que realizar para la 
efectiva implementación del Acuerdo?  
 
Reply:  The European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF) and other support for 
fisheries are key enablers for sustainable fisheries and the cons ervation of marine biological 
resources, for food security through the supply of seafood products, for the growth of a sustainable 
blue economy and for healthy, safe, secure, clean and sustainably managed seas and oceans. The 
EU will implement the new disc iplines under the Agreement of Fisheries Subsidies, and is currently 
considering what adjustments are necessary in the relevant EU measures.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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SOUTH AFRICA  
PART I: QUESTIONS REGARDING SECRETARIAT REPORT  
 
SUMMARY  
Page 9, Paragraph 1  
1. The EU is in the process of adopting a new, more ambitious EU strategy on adaptation to 
climate change. Please explain how these efforts may affect international trade. More specifically:  
 
a) What environmental standards does the EU plan to use as a basis to determine  compliance 
for domestic and imported products?  
b) Has the EU consulted domestic and foreign producers to determine ability to comply  with these 
standards, and, if so, what were the results?  
c) Does the EU intend to notify proposed standards to  the WTO?  
d) Has the EU conducted risk assessments on the effectiveness of various approaches,  including 
voluntary approaches that would reward producers for environmental stewardship?  
 
Reply:  
• The new EU Adaptation Strategy from February 2021 does not se t compliance standards for 
products, and thus does not change the terms of trade or access to EU market.  
• The Strategy does not set out adaptation -linked standards for products.  
• As no standards have been proposed, no notification is necessary.  
• The A daptation strategy/policy does not set specific approaches to reward producers for good 
climate adaptation/resilience stewardship.  
 
For more information, please refer to the following website: EU Adaptation Strategy (europa.eu) .  
 
SUMMARY  
Page 9, Paragraph 4  
2. The EU has adopted an  Open, Sustainable and Assertive EU Trade Policy? What do  all these 
elements  mean for trade policy  and how will they assist the EU to remain open to trade and 
invest ment?  
 
Reply:  
The concept of Open Strategic Autonomy reflects the EU's desire to chart its own course on the 
global stage, shaping the world around us through leadership and engagement while preserving our 
interests and values. It foresees making the best  possible use of the opportunities of our openness 
and global engagement, while assertively defending our interests, both internally and externally.  In 
essence, the EU will continue to work with partners to advance this positive agenda, but will work 
auton omously when it must.  
 
In the concept of 'open strategic autonomy', the first word is 'open'. The EU is and will remain a 
champion of openness and global cooperation, a global economic power and a leader on sustainable 
growth. For further explanations, please refer to the text of the Communication at:  https://eur -
lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52021DC0066 .  
 
SUMMARY  
Page 11, Paragraph 15, read with Page 34, Paragraph 2.11, and Page 45 paragraph 2.56  
3. The Regulation on Foreign Subsidies, which entered into force in January 2023 to investigate 
subsidies granted by third countries, by considering their spe cific impact in the internal market. 
However, the EU makes significant resort to subsidies - not only in the agriculture sector, but also 
in the industrial, manufacturing and services sectors.  
What is the intended purpose of the regulation? How does the E U plan to address other Members ' 
concerns with its own subsidies, especially in agriculture?  
 
Reply:  
On 12  January  2023, the Foreign Subsidies Regulation ('FSR') entered into force. The FSR closes a 
regulatory gap: aid granted by EU Member States, includi ng in the agriculture sector, is subject to 
close scrutiny under EU State aid rules, whereas subsidies granted to companies active in the EU by 
non-EU countries went largely unchecked until now. With this Regulation, we are creating fair 
conditions for all  companies active in the EU. Anyone doing business in the EU will be subject to a 
specific scrutiny when they are in receipt of subsidies.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 2 TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
2.2 Trade policy formulation and objectives  
Page 33 -34, Paragraphs 2.9 -2.10 
4. Can the  EU explain its Anti -Coercion Instrument, its intended objective and indicate the type 
of foreign practices by third countries that it considers as unfair or coercive.  
 
Reply:  
The Anti -Coercion Instrument (ACI) is a response to the rising problem of econom ic coercion, and 
aims to protect the Union's and Member States' interests and right to make sovereign choices. It 
provides a means to act in situations where any non -EU country unduly interferes in the policy 
choices of the Union or its Member States by ap plying or threatening to apply measures affecting 
trade or investment.  
 
The primary objective of the ACI is deterrence. The instrument will, therefore, be the most successful 
if there is no need to use it. The entry into force of the instrument is itself e xpected to deter economic 
coercion.  
 
Nevertheless, if a third country resorts to coercion, the ACI  provides a way to address this coercion 
with a view to bringing it to an end. The instrument allows the Union to formally identify instances 
of economic coercion and to respond to individual cases, first and foremost through dialogue and 
engagement with t he coercing country (i.e. political dialogue, negotiations, mediation, arbitration, 
adjudication), but also – as a last resort – through countermeasures.  
 
The ACI provides a framework for the Union to also pursue its right to reparations for the injury 
caused by the economic coercion, in line with standard principles of international law. At the same 
time, the instrument strengthens international coordination of efforts to deal with economic coercion 
by helping to develop international frameworks for its pr evention and elimination.  
 
'Economic coercion' under the agreed Regulation refers to a situation where a third country is seeking 
to pressure the Union or a Member State into making a particular choice by applying, or threatening 
to apply, measures affecting trade or investment. Such practices unduly interfere with the legitimate 
policymaking space of the EU and its Member States and undermine the EU's open strategic 
autonomy. Whether a third -country measure fulfils those conditions (so that it trigg ers the 
instrument) would be determined on a case -by-case basis.  
 
This definition of coercive practices by foreign countries thus is not related to the concept of 
"unfairness" as the question asks, unless of course, one considers action that is illegal und er 
international law as also normatively unfair.  
 
2 TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
2.2 Trade policy formulation and objectives  
Page 34, Paragraph 2.10  
5. Can the EU provide details on its Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), its key 
elements, scope of  sectors to be covered in the Regulation, extended future scope, and implications 
for WTO rules. Can the EU also explain what the implications could be for countries that are major 
exporters and provisions entailed therein for developing countries that wou ld require time to develop 
the requisite capacity.  
 
Reply:  
The CBAM is an environmental policy tool designed to support the EU's increased ambition on climate 
mitigation by preventing climate leakage. The CBAM mirrors the EU ETS – the intra -EU carbon prici ng 
mechanisms – and ensures that EU producers and importers will pay an equivalent carbon price with 
regards to goods covered by the CBAM: iron and steel, cement, fertilisers, aluminum, electricity 
generation and hydrogen. In the future, the scope of the C BAM may be extended to cover additional 
sectors which are already covered by the EU ETS.  
 
The CBAM entered into force on 17  May 2023. It will start with a transition period starting in 
October  2023 and lasting until end of 2025, where the obligations for i mporters will be limited to 
reporting the direct and indirect emissions of CBAM goods imported into the EU. From the start of 
the definite period in 2026, importers will have to submit an annual CBAM declaration through the 
CBAM registry, and purchase and surrender CBAM certificates corresponding to the imported WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 583 - 
 
emissions of CBAM goods. A carbon price effectively paid by the third country operator will be 
deducted from the CBAM certificates to be surrendered.  
 
The EU designs its policies in line with its i nternational commitments, including WTO rules. CBAM 
will be applied in an even -handed manner that does not discriminate among products or countries. 
The EU has carefully assessed the potential impact of the CBAM and given careful consideration, in 
particul ar to least developed countries. The design of the CBAM is therefore considered to be taking 
potential concerns on board, for example through a generous transitional period. This comes in 
addition to significant financial support package and capacity build ing programmes assisting 
developing countries in their green transition. The EU will also provide technical assistance to support 
developing countries and least developed countries adapting to the CBAM and to facilitate the 
recognition of any carbon pricin g mechanism.  
 
2 TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
2.2 Trade policy formulation and objectives  
Page 34, Paragraph 2.12  
6. Could the EU elaborate on its  renewed Industrial Policy Strategy, 2021 "Building a stronger 
Single Market for Europe's recovery" and clarify  how policies can prevent market distortion. How will 
the Green Deal Industrial Plan support the objectives of the European Green Deal?  Does EU believe 
that its renewed Industrial Policy Strategy,  2021 has been successful in achieving its purpose?  
 
Reply:  
The Green Deal Industrial Plan is based on four pillars:  
• A predictable, coherent and simplified regulatory environment, which supports the quick 
deployment of net -zero manufacturing capacities;  
• Faster access to sufficient funding, by boosting investments while avoiding the fragmentation 
of the Single Market;  
• Skills, by ensuring that the European workforce is skilled in the technologies required by the 
green transition; and  
• Open trade for resilient supply chains, based on cooperation with th e EU's partners to ensure 
diversified and reliable supplies and fair international competition.  
 
As to how will the Green Deal Industrial Plan support the objectives of the European Green Deal, 
please note the following:  
 
Europe is determined to become cli mate-neutral by 2050. To achieve these objectives, the 
availability of green technologies and products, such as photovoltaic cells, wind turbines, heat 
pumps, hydrogen electrolysers, batteries and carbon capture and storage equipment will need to be 
secure d.  
 
The Green Deal Industrial Plan is tackling this issue by creating an attractive environment for 
net-zero investments, so that the EU manufacturing capacity for these products is strengthened and 
demand satisfied.  
 
2 TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
2.4 In vestment regime  
2.4.1 Regulatory framework , Page 44, Paragraph 2.53  
7. Why has the EU adopted special legislation on the screening of FDI from state -owned 
enterprises (SOEs)? Does this legislation cause discrimination against SOE's? Will it impede normal 
investment and trade ? 
 
Reply:   
Regulation (EU) 2019/452 aims at identifying and addressing potential threats to security or public 
order, which may be caused by certain foreign investments without reducing the EU's openness to 
FDI or restraining the activities of foreign investors in th e Union.  
 
The Regulation defines a foreign investor as a natural person of a third country or an undertaking of 
a third country, intending to make or having made a foreign direct investment and is not limited to 
SOEs.  
 
Article  4 of the Regulation specifie s the factors for consideration when determining whether an FDI 
is likely to affect security and public order. These factors include the potential effects of the FDI on WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 critical infrastructure, critical technologies, supply of critical inputs, access to se nsitive information 
and the freedom and pluralism of the media. Aspects related to the investor are also relevant for 
this assessment such as whether the foreign investor is controlled by a government.  
 
Non-discrimination among foreign (non -EU) investors is a key principle of the Regulation and the 
sole grounds for screening a foreign investment are risks assessed case -by-case to security and 
public order, regardless of the foreign investor's origin.  
 
2 TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
2.4 Investment regime  
2.4.2 Other aspects of the European  Union 's foreign investment regime  
Page 46, Paragraph 2.61  
8. In the the Achmea ruling , the European Court of Justice (ECJ) interpreted investor -state 
dispute Settlement (ISDS) provisions as incompatible with EU law. Although the Achmea ruling 
applies only to bilateral investment agreements between countries that are Member States of the 
EU, the case's reasoning may be applied to agreements between the EU or EU Member States and 
third countries. What is the impact of the Achmea judgement on investment agreements with 
non-EU countries?  
 
Reply:  
"The Ruling of the European Court of Justice in ca se C‑284/16 ("Achmea Ruling") does not concern 
investment agreements with third countries. In essence, it is about ensuring the full and effective 
application of EU law in all EU Member States.  
 
The question the ECJ had to answer was whether an EU Member s tate may bring proceedings against 
another EU Member State before an arbitral tribunal whose jurisdiction the other Member State has 
undertaken to accept. The ECJ held that under the TFEU, such provisions cannot be applied because 
they may not be resolved in a manner that ensures the full effectiveness of EU law in the arbitral 
proceedings."  
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1 Measures directly affecting imports  
3.1.3 Tariffs  
3.1.3.1 Applied rates  
Page 61, Table  3.5 
9. As per Table  3.5, kindly provide information on the tariff lines which have non -ad valorem  
tariffs with no Ad valorem  equivalents (AVEs)?  
 
Reply :  
The EU invites South  Africa  to contact the WTO Secretariat for the tariff items concerned as the 
mentioned Table  3.5 was prepar ed by them. The EU would like to remind South  Africa  that there is 
no consensus on the methodology to be used in the calculation of AVEs.  
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1 Measures directly affecting imports  
3.1.4 Other charges affecting impor ts 
3.1.4.2 Excise  
Page 73, Paragraph 3.77 
10. Can the EU provide the details and key elements of the new comprehensive legislative  
framework for energy and climate change policies which it has adopted?  
 
Reply:  
Details on the EU's energy and climate polici es under the European Green Deal can be found under 
the following comprehensive link: A European Green Deal (europa.eu) .  
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures affecting production and trad ePage 96 -98, Paragraph 3.1.4.1 -3.1.6, 
Tables  3.24 and 3.25  
Question 11  
11. Numerous funds are provided through support measures in the form of grants, direct 
payments, and financial instruments such as loans, guarantees, and equity. In addition to these 
funds, the European  Union  maintains several other funds intended to support entrepreneurs and WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 585 - 
 
businesses activities in general and in various areas such as research and innovation, climate and 
digital transition, and recovery and resilience . Can the EU provide a list of such funds and their 
intended objectives.  
 
Reply:  
An overview of the funding opportunities financed by the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial 
Framework  and NextGeneratio nEU by heading , cluster, and programme or fund can be found at the 
following website: EU funding programmes (europa.eu) .  
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures affecting production and trade  
3.3.1 Incentives  
3.3.1.2 State aid  
Page 99, Paragraph 3.3.1.2  
12. There is reference to both subs idies and state aid in the document. What are the differences 
between subsidies and state aid?  
 
Reply:   
State aid is governed by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European  Union  (TFEU) 
(Articles  107 – 109) Article  107 TFEU  generally prohibits State aid unless exceptionally justified. 
State aid is defined as an advantage in any form  whatsoever conferred by the State to undertakings 
on a selective basis. Therefore, subsidies granted to individuals or general measures open to all 
enterprises are not covered by this prohibition and do not constitute State aid (examples include 
general t axation measures or employment legislation). To be State aid, a measure needs to have 
these features:  
 
• there has been an intervention by the State or through State resources which can take a 
variety of forms (e.g. grants, interest and tax reliefs, guaran tees, government holdings of all or part 
of a company, or providing goods and services on preferential terms, etc.);  
• the intervention gives the recipient an advantage on a selective basis, for example to specific 
companies or industry sectors, or to comp anies located in specific regions ; 
• as a result, competition has been or may be distorted;  
• the intervention is likely to affect trade between Member States.  
 
State aid compatibility must be in line with EU's international commitments under WTO.  
 
Page 99, Paragraph 3.3.12  
13. What is the InvestEU Programme and how will it catalyse private investments in EU priority 
areas, and what types of projects would be supported by this programme.  
 
Reply:  
The InvestEU Programme supports sustainable investment , innovation and job creation in Europe. 
It aims to trigger more than €372  billion  in additional investment over the period 2021 -27. It will 
bring together, under one roof, the European Fund for Strategic Investments and 13 other EU 
financial instruments. It involves fourm main policy areas: sustainable infrastructure; research, 
innovation and digitalisation; SMEs; social investment and skills.  
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures affecting production and trade  
3.3.2 Standards and other technical requirements  
3.3.2.1 Standards  
Page 104, Paragraph 3.169  
14. The EU has identified standardization as a key strategic tool to achieve its objectives under 
the EU Green Deal, as well as its new digital, industrial and trade strategies and in Febru ary 2022 
launched a  new Standardisation Strategy ''Setting Global Standards in support of a resilient, 
green, and digital EU single m arket '.' We note however that EU standards are developed 
by three (3) private standardization organisations. How is standar dization achieved, and what 
happens when no EU standards are available?  
 
Reply:  
EU standards are developed by CEN CENELEC and ETSI. CEN is the equivalent of ISO, 
i.e., multi-sectorial, CENELEC the equivalent of IEC for electrotechnical standardisation, and  ETSI WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 that deals with telecommunication standardisation. CEN and CENELEC are based on the national 
delegation principle (their members are the national standardisation bodies) and have special 
agreements with ISO and IEC respectively to try to have the gre atest coherence between European 
and international standards. ETSI has an open membership model and has agreements with the 
most relevant global fora and consortia. As European standards are always voluntary (with very few 
exceptions), if there are no Euro pean standards available the manufacturer has the choice of what 
other standard to apply to fully comply with the legislation (mandatory) and its essential 
requirements.  
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures affecting production and trade  
3.3.3 Sanitary and phytosanitary requirements  
Page 108 -113, Paragraph 3.190 -3.208  
15. Must high shares of extra EU imports of agricultural goods be subject to annul frequent 
changes in SPS regulations? Could a more stable regime be implemented?  
 
Reply:  
The EU SPS measures are based on risk asssesment and aim to protect human, animal and plant 
health and life. Detailed and up -to-date information on the EU SPS legislation and the different policy 
and legislative initiatives can be found on the official web site of the European Commission, Health 
and Food Safety (europa.eu) .  
 
All the relevant EU  sanitary and phytosanitary legislation are notified to the WTO following the 
recommended procedures for implementing the transparency obligations of the SPS  Agreement  
(Article  7). 
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures affecting production and trade  
3.3.3 Sanitary and phytosanitary requirements  
Page 109, Paragraph 3.191  
16. Can the EU explain EU Regulation 2021/405 on composite products and its implications. More 
specifically:  
 
a) What change it introduces to the rules applicable to imports of composite products into the  EU,  
b) the process to have an approved establishment accredited, and  
c) Has the EU conducted a risk assessment that informs the amendment, effectiveness of the 
approach, as well as whether such rule(s) is/are pro portionate to the risk presented by composite 
products?  
 
Reply:  
Detailed explanations can be found in the questions and answers document regarding import of 
composite products into the EU at the following link:  
https://food.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022 -07/ia_ic_composite -prods_qandas.pdf  
 
More specifically, Regulation 2021/405 is just putting together different lists of third Countries 
authorised to export to the EU certain animals and goods intended for human consumption, adding 
where necessary, their status vis a vis residue monitoring plans presented to the Commission.  
 
Please note t hat those obligations, not only for residues, were already in place.  
 
Regarding the process for approving an establishment this is already defined in Article  148 of 
Regulation (EU) 2017/625 and it is up to the Competent Authorities of a third Country to gr ant the 
respect of that Article.  
 
The EU did not conduct a risk assessment regarding the risk presented by composite products, 
however the new applicable rules are based on the EFSA's scientific opinion "on public health risk 
represented by certain composi te products containing food of animal origin" .51 
 
 
51 https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/2662 . WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures affecting production and trade  
3.3.3 Sanitary and phytosanitary requirements  
Page 109, Paragraph 3.194  
17. The From Farm to Fork proposal states that 40% of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
should contribute to climate action. Does the EU intend to increase CAP funding to meet these goals 
or will the EU shift funding from existing programs?  
 
Reply:  
The European Commission has committed to spend  at least 25% of the Multiannual Financial 
Framework for the period 2021 -2027 in climate -related actions, to which the Common Agricultural 
Policy contributes with a 40% of its overall budget for the period 2021 -2027, following Article  100 
of Regulation (EU ) 2021/2115   
(https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021R2115 ). 
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 M easures affecting production and trade  
3.3.4 Competition policy  
Page 113, Paragraph 3.3.4  
Question 18:  
18. The EU is currently in the process of undertaking an extensive review of existing legislation 
and regulation on competition, calling for strong and effective competition policy and highlighting 
the role it can play in achieving targets related to green, digital, and resilient single market. What 
are the highlights of the series of proposed changes to the EU's competition policy?  
 
Reply:  
In 2021, the European Commission has adopted a Communication on a competition policy fit for 
new challenges, which frames the important role of competition policy for Europe's path towards 
recovery, the green and digital transitions, and for a resilient Single Market. The Communication 
highlights the in -built ability of competition policy to adapt to new market circumstances, policy 
priorities and customer needs. The European Commission continues its extensive review of 
competition regulations, guidelines and notices, t o ensure that all enforcement instruments are 
up-to-date, fit for current and future challenges, and complement its existing toolbox. For example, 
on 10  May 2022, the Commission adopted a new Vertical Block Exemption Regulation accompanied 
by the new Verti cal Guidelines which inter alia included clarifications as to the assessment of vertical 
agreements in the platform economy and online sales restrictions. Moreover, on 1  June 2023, the 
Commission adopted two revised Horizontal Block Exemption Regulations accompanied by Horizontal 
Guidelines which include a chapter covering the application of antitrust rules to agreements that 
pursue a sustainability objective. Currently, the Co mmission is working on the revision of its notice 
on market definition, and it reviews the Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation and the 
accompanying Technology Transfer Guidelines to determine whether the Commission should allow 
that Regulation t o expire, prolong its duration or revise it in order to take account of market 
developments that have occurred since its adoption. The Commission is also currently evaluating 
the framework for the implementation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU provided for in  
Regulation  1/2003 and its implementing Regulation 773/2004. Finally, on 27  March  2023, the 
Commission announced that it has launched the process of drafting Guidelines on the application of 
Article  102 TFEU to exclusionary abuses.  
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PR ACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures affecting production and trade  
3.3.5 State trading, state -owned enterprises, and privatization  
Page 117, Paragraphs 3.224 -3.225  
19. The EU does not maintain a common legal framework specific to state owned enterprise 
(SOEs) operations and governance as SOEs are regulated at the national level by EU member States, 
but are subject to EU rules on non -discrimination, competition, and state aid. Does the EU intend to 
develop a common SOE framework in the future? What is the number  of EU SOEs operating both 
nationally and abroad  and in which sectors ?  
 
Reply:  
State -owned enterprises have a significant role in certain sectors in many EU member states. They 
are particularly active in network sectors and play an important role in the life of EU citizens and 
businesses. For further details, please see the following reference.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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 European Comm ission (2016). "State -Owned Enterprises in the EU: Lessons Learnt and Ways 
Forward in a Post -Crisis Context". Institutional Paper 31.   
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures affecting production and trad e 
3.3.6 Government procurement  
Page 120, Paragraph 3.238  
20. Can the EU please elaborate on what the voluntary green public procurement criteria are and 
which sectors these criteria will appl y to? 
 
Reply:  
The basic concept of green public procurement (GPP ) relies on having clear, verifiable, justifiable 
and ambitious environmental criteria for products and services, based on a life -cycle approach and 
scientific evidence base.  
 
Having common criteria reduces considerably the administrative burden for economic operators and 
for public administrations implementing GPP.  
 
Since 2008, the Commission has developed more than 20 common GPP criteria (e.g. furniture; 
cleaning products; co mputers; data centers; buildings: paints and varnishes, etc). The priority 
sectors for implementing GPP were selected through a multi -criteria analysis including: scope for 
environmental improvement; public expenditure; potential impact on suppliers; poten tial for setting 
an example to private or corporate consumers; political sensitivity; existence of relevant and 
easy-to-use criteria; market availability and economic efficiency. The criteria are regularly updated.  
 
The GPP criteria are based on data from  an evidence base, on existing ecolabel criteria and on 
information collected from stakeholders of industry, civil society and Member States. The evidence 
base uses available scientific information and data, adopts a life -cycle approach and engages 
stakeho lders who meet to discuss issues and develop consensus.  
 
The GPP approach is to propose two types of criteria for each sector covered: 1) the core criteria are 
those suitable for use by any contracting authority across the Member States and address the ke y 
environmental impacts. They are designed to be used with minimum additional verification effort or 
cost increases. 2) the comprehensive criteria are for those who wish to purchase the best 
environmental products available on the market. These may require  additional verification effort or 
a slight increase in cost compared to other products with the same functionality.  
 
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.1 Agriculture  
4.1.2 Agricultural policy  
Page 135, Paragraph 4 -10 
21. Can the EU please elaborate on the more results -based approach of its  updated  CAP and how 
this approach compares to the previous policy approach.  
 
Reply:  
The new Common Agricultural Policy, agreed by the European Parliament and the Council in 
June 2021, is based on a more flexible performance an d results -based approach that takes into 
account local conditions and needs, while increasing the EU's ambitions in terms of sustainability. In 
line with the shift to a more performance based approach for implementing policy, the CAP Strategic 
Plans also i nclude a set of indicators with associated targets, which capture the expected effect of 
the interventions in response to the specific needs of each Member State. A first analysis of the CAP 
strategic plans including expected results can be found  here: 
https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023 -06/approved -28-cap-strategic -plans -2023-
27.pdf . 
 
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.1 Agriculture  
4.1.6 Market access  
Page 149, Paragraph, 4.70  
22. The use of non -ad valorem  tariffs, i.e. specific, compound, mixed, agricultural components, 
additional duties, and entry prices, is prevalent in the agricultural sector. Can the EU explain the 
reasons for maintaining usage of non -ad valorem  rates for agricultural products? Does the EU have WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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any plans to replace the non -ad valorem  duties in agricultural products in order to increase 
transparency in trade?  
 
Reply:  
The EU's import tariffs for agricultural products are fully transparent  and predictable, as set out in 
the EU's WTO schedule. These tariffs were negotiated and agreed with the WTO membership during 
the Uruguay Round. Changes would only occur as a result of comprehensive and successful market 
access negotiations.  
 
4 TRADE POL ICIES BY SECTOR  
4.2 Fisheries  
4.2.3 Market access  
Page 156, Paragraph 4.101  
23. Tariffs on fish and fishery products have remained unchanged since the previous review.  Can 
the EU explain the reasons for maintaining high tariffs for fisheries?  
 
Reply:  
Even though the EU tariffs on fishery products and seafood have remain unchanged, in practice most 
of the seafood imported to the EU benefits either from tariff suspensions/quotas, or from preferences 
granted to third countries in free trade agreements and arra ngements. The fisheries sector is 
sensitive both for the EU fishermen and for the EU processing and preserving industry to maintain 
their competitiveness.  
 
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.3 Forestry  
Page 157 -158, Paragraph 4.107 -4.111  
24. Can the EU provide d etails on its EU Forest Strategy for 2030,  its key elements, scope of 
sectors to be covered in the Regulation, extended future scope, and what the possible implications 
could be for countries that are major exporters.  
 
Reply:  
The EU Forest Strategy acknowledges and aims to boost the entire sustainable forest bioeconomy 
that works in synergy with the EU's increased climate and biodiversity ambition. This includes 
promoting sustainable forest bioeconomy for long -lived wood products, ensuring s ustainable use of 
wood -based resources for bioenergy, promoting non -wood forest -based bioeconomy, including 
ecotourism and developing skills and empowering people for sustainable forest -based bioeconomy.  
 
In light of climate change and biodiversity loss th ere is an urgent need for adaptive forest restoration 
and ecosystem -based management approaches that strengthen the resilience of EU forests. 
Protecting, restoring and enlarging EU's forests is crucial to combat climate change, reverse 
biodiversity loss an d ensure resilient and multifunctional forest ecosystems.  
 
Today the information concerning the status of forests in the EU, their social and economic value, 
as well as the pressures they face and ecosystem services they provide, is patchy. There are seve ral 
scattered monitoring and reporting mechanisms, but no strategic framework, which would bring 
these together and make it possible to comprehensively and jointly with Member States demonstrate 
that the EU is on the right track and that the forests can ac tually deliver on their multiple demands 
and functions. Strategic forest planning in all EU Member States at national and, where applicable, 
regional level, that is based on reliable monitoring and data, transparent governance and 
coordinated exchange at t he EU level, is needed for the delivery on the commonly agreed EU 
objectives can be ensured  
 
Research and innovation are key drivers in achieving the ambitious goals of the Strategy. Research 
and innovation will increase the effectiveness of enhanced sustainable forest management under 
changing climate conditions, amongst others, by reinforcing the knowledge on climate change 
impacts, contributing to a greater diversity of forests and genetic resources, and providing 
evidence -based and practic ally feasible guidance for climate change mitigation and adaptation in 
line with biodiversity objectives.  
 
The Commission will propose an EU forest governance system that promotes policy coherence and 
synergies between the different functions a sustainabl e and climate neutral European economy 
requires forests to deliver, and allow for an inclusive space for Member States, forest owners and WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
- 590 - 
 
  
 managers, industry, academia and civil society to discuss forest policy matters, while avoiding 
overlapping structures .  
 
The Strategy finally describes how the EU will step up the implementation and enforcement of the 
EU acquis of relevance for forests and forest management issues.  
You can find more details about the Strategy here Forest strategy (europa.eu) . 
 
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.5 Services , Page 166, Paragraph 4.151  
25. Services dominate the EU economy, accounting for roughly 70% of GDP and a similar share 
of its employment.  We note that EU services trade recovered more slowly than goods trade.  
 
a) Why is that?  
 
b) In what manner does the digital services package, comprised of the Digital Single Market, 
Digital Finance Strategy, Digital Servi ces Act (DSA), Digital Markets Act, and the strengthened Code 
of Practice on Disinformation, contribute towards integrating the services markets in the EU?  
 
c) The EU is digitalising at a rapid speed, but some regions and countries and firms within them 
are not digitalising at the same pace. How will the EU Digital Package support efforts t o address the 
global digital divide  to ensure a  global inclusive digital trade approach ? 
 
Reply:  
a) The EU has not conducted comprehensive research on this issue. Howeve r, this is likely related 
to the restrictions introduced during the COVID -19 pandemic to the movement of people, which 
lasted for a considerable period of time, and which affected trade in services (e.g. tourism) more 
heavily than trade in goods. Moreover,  it is also likely that the statistics reflect the COVID -19 related 
bottlenecks that affected the transport sector, in particular maritime transport services . 
 
b) The European  Union 's digital services rules reflect the fact that Europe's societies digitise  
unabatedly. These rules first and foremost ensures that the European  Union 's common values, and 
our universal human rights, apply equally online and offline. The Digital Decade initiative and the 
Digital Rights and Principles put people at the centre of d igitisation. Harmonised digital rules that 
apply across all 27 Member States are an important building block for making sure Europe's rules 
are effective and can achieve that human -centric approach. The Digital Services Act and the Digital 
Markets Act in t his regard ensure the free flow of information and services across borders. Safety 
for citizens and innovation opportunities for businesses optimise citizens' collective ability to not only 
impart but also receive information. The Digital Services Act refl ects a universal principle, one of 
restoring citizen agency over online content moderation, and is precisely part of a human -centric 
and whole -of-society approach to digitisation.  
 
c) The EU's 2 030 Digital Compass: the European way for the Digital Decade  and the Digital Decade 
Policy Programme 2030 strategy detail EU's strategy towards digital transformation.  
 
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.5 Services  
4.5.2 Transport services  
Page, 176 Paragraph 4.199  
26. The EU has developed several new initiatives, which include: the Global Gateway, Critical Raw 
Materials Club, a Clean Tech/Net -zero Industrial Partnerships, what is the purpose of these initiatives 
and how does each benefit other countries  partnering in these  initiatives based on collaboration, 
mutual interest, and stronger economic and political relations.  
 
Reply:  
In December 2021, the EU launched the Global Gateway, a new strategy to mobilise investments 
totalling EUR  300 billion  over the period 2021 -27. I n line with the EU's commitment to the 
2030 Agenda, the Global Gateway aims at boosting smart, clean and secure investments in digital, 
energy and transport. As for the Critical raw materials club the idea is to partner with like -minded 
countries willing t o strengthen global supply chains. The Commission will reach out to all potential 
partners to set up this alliance. The objective of Clean Tech/Net -Zero Industrial Partnerships 
promoting the adoption of clean technologies globally and supporting the role o f EU industrial 
capabilities in making the global clean energy transition possible.  WT/TPR/M/442/Add.1  
 
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TUNISIA  
Partons du la conviction que le renforcement de la coopération avec l'Union Européenne est une 
constante de la politique étrangère de la Tunisie et  un choix stratégique irréversible qui se justifie, 
de jour en jour, par les intérêts économiques, humains et culturels partagés, nous saurions grés si 
la délégation de l'UE nous éclaire au titre des points suivants:  
 
1. La première question est en rapport  avec le système des préférences généralisées de l'Union 
Européenne SGP régis par le règlement (UE) 978/2012 du 25 octobre 2012 , notamment, les critères 
d'éligibilité et les délais de révision de la liste des pays bénéficiaires du SGP; nous demandons des 
clarifications sur la relation et l'interdépendance entre les différentes catégories du système 
européen des préférences généralisées, identifiées par le règlement (UE) 978/2012 du 
25 octobre  2012 à savoir:  
 
• le régime général;  
 
• le régime spécial d'encouragement au développement durable et à la bonne gouvernance, 
dit "SPG+ "; 
 
• le régime spécial en faveur des pays les moins avancés, dit "initiative tout sauf les armes ". 
 
La Tunisie a déposé d epuis quelques années une demande pour bénéficier du régime spécial 
d'encouragement au développement durable et à la bonne gouvernance, dit "SPG+ ", estimant 
remplir tous les critères d'éligibilité de ce régime, n'a jusqu'à présent, été retenue dans la liste des 
pays bénéficiaires du SGP européen.  
 
Reply:  The EBA arrangement is available to all least developed cou ntries according to 
UN classification. The EBA arrangement has no interdependence with other GSP arrangements. The 
list of EBA beneficiaries is established in Annex  IV of the GSP Regulation. Standard GSP (the general 
arrangement) is available to all eligib le developing countries as indicated in Annex  I of the GSP 
Regulation (EU) 978/2012, which meet the economic criteria set in Article  4 of the GSP Regulation. 
The list of standard GSP beneficiaries is established in Annex  II of the GSP Regulation. GSP+, the  
special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, is available upon 
application and positive assessment, to standard GSP beneficiaries which meet the criteria set out 
in Article  9 of the GSP Regulation. The list of GSP+ benefi ciaries is established in Annex  III of the 
GSP Regulation. The lists of GSP beneficiaries are reviewed by 1 January of each year. Further 
information on the EU GSP and conditionalities is available in WT/TPR/G/442, Page 17, Paragraph  4.2 
and online here https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/development -and-sustainability/generalised -
scheme -preferences_en .  
 
2. La deuxième question est relative aux difficultés d'accès au marché de l'UE suite à l'utilisation 
par ses pays membres, à la fois de réglementations nationales et de réglementations 
communautaires en matière des normes techniques et de me sures sanitaires et phytosanitaires.  
 
Nous considérons que le chevauchement des règlementations n'a pas favorable à la transparence 
de la politique commerciale de l'Union européenne et a été source d'obstacles majeurs pour le 
développement des exportations  des produits industriels et agricoles tunisiennes vers le marché de 
l'Union Européenne.  
 
Reply:  The large majority of SPS legislation in the European  Union  is coordinated and developed at 
the EU level. Detailed and up -to-date information on the EU SPS legislation and the different policy 
and legislative initiatives can be found on the official website of the European Commission, Health 
and Food Safety (europa.eu) . 
 
All the sanitary and phytosanitary legislation relev ant for international trade are notified to the WTO 
following the recommended procedures for implementing the transparency obligations of the 
SPS Agreement ( Article  7) by the European Commission, which is t he EU Notifying Authority 
responsible for implemen ting the notification requirements of the SPS  Agreement . 
 
__________