Ministry for Primary Industries 
Standards 
Animal & Animal Products 
Animal Imports Team 
PO Box 2526, Wellington 6140 
animalimports@mpi.govt.nz  
 
Risk Management Proposal  
 
Commercial Poultry Hatching Eggs & 
Specific-Pathogen-Free Chicken Eggs 
 
       
11 June 2012 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
Ministry for Primary Industries 
Standards 
Animal & Animal Products 
Animal Imports Team 
PO Box 2526, Wellington 6140 
animalimports@mpi.govt.nz  
 
 
 
Ministry for Primary Industries 
Pastoral House 
25 The Terrace 
PO Box 2526 
Wellington 6011 
New Zealand 
 
Tel: 64 4 894 0100 
Fax: 64 4 894 0733 
     
Animal Imports 
Animal & Animal Products 
Standards  
 Contents Page 
 
Risk Management Proposal for Commercia l Poultry Hatching Eggs & Specific-
Pathogen-Free Chicken Eggs 1  
Purpose 1 
Background 2  
Objective 2 
Commodity Definition 2 
Recommendations for Identified Risk Organisms 3 
Avian Influenza Viruses 4 
Avian Paramyxovirus 1 (APVM-1/Newcastle Disease) 7 
Salmonella 8 
Ornithobacterium Rhinotracheale 9 
Hepesvirus (Big Liver & Spleen Disease) 9 
Turkey Specific Diseases 10 
Mycoplasma 10  
Turkey Rhinotrachietis Virus (TRTV) 10 
Lymphoproliferative Disease 11 
Duck Specific Diseases 11 
Duck Virus Enteritis 11 
Duck Virus Hepatitis 12 
Goose Parvovirus and Muscovy Duck Parvovirus 12 
Reovirus of Muscovy Ducks (DRV) 13 
Avian Chlamydiosis 14 
Post Arrival Quarantine Requirements 15  
Risk Management Proposal for Comm ercial Poultry Hatching Eggs & 
Specific-Pathogen-Free Chicken Eggs 
 
Purpose 
 
The purpose of this document is to: 
 
Show how options for the management of risk organisms have been assessed; and 
Provide recommendatio
ns for import require ments for the generic Import Health 
Standard (IHS) for commercial poultry hatching eggs and specific-pathogen-free (SPF) 
chicken eggs. 
 
The IHS (the “standard”) for commercial poultry hatching eggs and SPF eggs from chickens 
has been developed under Section 22 of the Biosecurity Act 1993. The Ministry for Primary Industries and Forestry (MPI) is seeking stakeholder feedback on the risk management options presented in the standard.   
For a detailed analysis of potential hazards and management options refer to:  
 I
mport Risk Analysis: Hatching eggs from chickens (Gallus gallus) from the European 
Union, Canada, the United States of America, and Australia , 28 January 2009 (IRA 
2009) ( http://www.biosecurity.govt.nz/files/regs/imports/risk/hatching-eggs-eu-ra.pdf ) 
 Import Risk Analysis: Hatching eggs of domestic ducks (Anas platyrhynchos domesticus and Cairina moshata) from the European Union, Canada, the United States of America, and Australia. February 2012 (IRA 2012) 
 Import Risk Analysis: Turkey Meat, May 2010 (IRA 2010) (http://www.biosecurity.govt.nz/files/biosec/consult/draft-ra-turkey-meat.
 pdf) 
 Import Risk Analysis; Turkey rhinotracheitis virus in turkey hatching eggs from the 
United Kingdom sourced from TRT- vaccinated flocks, February 2004 (IRA 2004) 
 Import Risk Analysis; Avian paramyxovirus type 1 in hens’ hatching eggs 2001 (IRA 
2001) (http://www.biosecurity.govt.nz/files/re gs/imports/risk/avian-paramyxovirus-
ra.pdf) 
 
Risk Management Proposal for Commercial Poultry Hatching Eggs & Specific-Pathogen-Free Chicken Eggs 11 June 2012 
COMEGIC.GEN  
 
Background 
Import of chicken hatching eggs from Australia, Canada, USA, and Great Britain is currently 
allowed under individual IHS’s. There are IHS’s for turkey hatching eggs from the United Kingdom and Australia, Canada and Northern Ireland.  As there is no new risk analysis for 
turkey hatching eggs, measures hav e been extrapolated from the IRA 2009. 
 
No imports of duck hatching eggs are currently allowed. The recently completed IRA 2012 means that duck eggs can now be included in an IHS for commercial hatching eggs.   
Import of SPF eggs for
 laboratory use into New Zealand from Australia is allowed under a 
separate standard, (IHS for the Importation of Specific Pathogen Free Eggs chicken eggs for laboratory use into New Zealand from Australia). Because of the similarities in the commodities, the requirements can be included in the new standard for hatching eggs. The current standard for SPF eggs contains measures beyond those required to meet New Zealand’s appropriate level of protection.  
 
In accordance with current MPI processes,
 the standard will contain generic import 
requirements. These are the rules to manage the biosecurity risk of importing live hatching 
eggs from any approved country and in doing so, meet New Zealand’s appropriate level of 
protection.  
 
The generic standard will serve as the basis for country-to-country (bilateral) negotiations 
with those countries. MPI and the Veterinary Authority of the exporting country will negotiate the content of the Veterinary Certificate to determine how the requirements of the IHS will be met. Negotiations will take into account the disease status in the exporting country, the national systems, legislation and standards in the exporting country for regulation of the 
poultry industry, and the capabilities and preferences of the Veterinary Authority. Negotiation will be limited to countries considered in a current risk analysis.  With the generic standard, a Guidance Document will also be issued by MPI, which will provide approved and prescribed test information and the bilaterally-agreed format for 
Veterinary Certification for trade in hatching eggs. This certificate will be used to import 
consignments of hatching eggs from the countries specified.
  
 
Objective 
The objective is to manage all biosecurity risks posed by the import of poultry hatching eggs and SPF eggs for laboratory use, consistent with New Zealand’s domestic legislation and international obligations.  
 
Commodity Definition 
The commodities are: 
 
 hatching eggs of chickens (Gallus gallus ) ducks ( Anas platyrhynchos domesticus  
and Cairina moshata ) and turkeys ( Meleagris gallopavo ), sourced from poultry 
breeding flocks compliant with the standards described in Chapter 6.4 of the  
World Organisation for Animal Heath (OIE)  Terrestrial Animal Health Code 
2011 (the Code) (or equivalent),  
 
And 
 
 2 
 eggs, (fertile or infertile) from chickens in a SPF flock. A SPF flock is one which 
meets the minimum requirements of Section 5.2.2 "Chicken flocks free from 
specified pathogens for the production and quality control of vaccines" of the European Pharmacopoeia. 
 
The eggs will be clean when collected, unwashed and have intact (uncracked) shells. They will be collected separately from dirty and broken or cracked eggs. Hatching eggs should be cleaned and sanitised as soon as possible after collection using an approved sanitising agent, in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions.  
Recommendations for Identified Risk Organisms 
 
(The requirements for risk organisms are located in Part C of the IHS) 
The biosecurity risks associated with the importation of hatching eggs have been examined 
in the document IRA 2009 and IRA 2012 
Risk management measures were justified for th e following 4 risk organisms associated with 
imported chicken hatching eggs: 
 Avian influenza viruses 
 
Type 1 avian paramyxoviruses 
 Salmonellae  
 Ornithobacterium rhinotracheale 
Risk management measures were justified for th e following 4 risk organisms associated with 
duck hatching eggs (in addition to those identified for chicken hatching eggs): 
 Duck virus enteritis 
 Goose and Muscovy Duck parvoviruses (Muscovy ducks and their hybrid breeds 
only) 
 Reovirus infection of Muscovy ducks (Muscovy ducks and their hybrid breeds only) 
 Avian chlamydiosis 
Risk management measures are currently in place for the following risk organisms from 
imported turkey hatching eggs: 
 Avian influenza viruses 
 Type 1 avian paramyxoviruses 
 Salmonella gallinarum-pullorum  
 Mycoplasma iowae 
 Mycoplasma meleagridis 
 Turkey rhinotracheitis virus (TRT) 
Risk Management Proposal for Commercial Poultry Hatching Eggs & Specific-Pathogen-Free Chicken Eggs 11 June 2012 
COMEGIC.GEN  
 Lymphoproliferative disease of turkeys  
(Note: the removal of TRT measures is explored in this document)  
Risk management measures are proposed for the following 2 additional risk organisms 
from turkey hatching eggs: 
 Salmonella arizonae 
 Ornithobacterium rhinotracheale 
The Guidance Docume
nt will tabulate the specific Code  and The OIE Manual of Diagnostic 
Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals (the Manual ) Article numbers when required; 
these will not be included in the standard itself.   
 
Diagnostic tests listed in the standard will be those prescribed for international trade in the Manual , unless otherwise stated. All MPI approved tests will be tabled in the Guidance 
Document for the standard. Diagnostic tests will only be approved after consultation with MPI 
Investigation and Diagnostic Centre (IDC)
 laboratory experts. To approve tests MPI IDC 
require species and tissue validity, specificity and sensitivity information as compared for those tests prescribed for international trade. Tests must be considered valid for diagnostic purposes in the species being tested, and appropriate for surveillance for the identified risk organism.   
It should be
 noted that for each risk organism , risk management requirements are specified 
in the IHS as one or more of the following:  
Freedom from clinical signs Country/zone/compartment freedom and residency requirements; Premise freedom and residency requirements; 
Vaccination; 
Test options; Pre export isolation (PEI) and post arrival quarantine (PAQ); Treatment options.  
 
 
 Avian influenza viruses  
Analysis 
Notifiable avian influenza (NAI) refers to infection of poultry with any influenza A virus of H5 
and H7 subtypes or any avian influenza (AI)  virus with pathogenicity above limits set in 
Chapter 10.4 of the Code .  
 
NAI has not been detected through serological screening in New Zealand caged/barn layers, broilers or pullet-rearer farms. There has been detection of antibodies to H5 viruses on three 
free range layer farms but no evidence of ongoing virus circulation. Low pathogenicity AI 
(LPAI) (including low pathogenicity NAI (LPNAI) strains have been isolated from wild New Zealand waterfowl.   The wide range of LPAI strains (including LPNAI) isolated from wild waterfowl in New Zealand means risk management measures cannot be justified for LPAI (including LPNAI). 
Risk management measures can be justified for HPNAI.  AI was not specifically examined in the duck hatching egg IRA as it is deemed appropriate to apply the same measures recommended for chicken hatching eggs. The pre-export recommendations are consistent with the Code, with the addition of post arrival quarantine 
and testing.  
 4 
 
The measures in the current chicken hatching egg IHS include sanitising eggs, serological sampling of parent birds, parent flocks being resident in the country of export for at least 60 
days and being at least 25 km from any premise where AI has been reported within the last 6 
months. Birds must not have been vaccinated.  The Code  recommendations should be adopted where possible. This will give greater 
flexibility by allowing imports from recognis ed free countries, zones or compartments.  
 
 
The major changes to align with the Code  will be: 
 
To recognise compartment or zone freedom from AI, rather than the requirement for 
geographical separation and prescribing the timing and frequency of testing prior to egg collection as in the current IHS 
 To allow vaccination of birds when surveillance is carried out in accordance with the 
Code  guidelines. Ideally a DIVA (Differentiating Infected from Vaccinated Animals) 
vaccine should be used. 
Reflecting consideration
 of the potential impact of HPAI on the domestic poultry industry, 
particularly the export trade in hatching eggs and day-old chicks, retention of post-arrival quarantine of imported poultry hatching eggs could be required to meet New Zealand's appropriate level of protection against this avian disease.  The quarantine period can be reduced from 60 day s to around 28 days. Virus isolation or 
direct ribonucleic acid (RNA) detection such as reverse transcriptase polymerase chain 
reaction (RT-PCR) allows earlier testing of birds, without maternal antibody interference (as seen with serological testing). Virus isolation or RNA detection methods involve swabbing birds, rather than blood sampling, so sampling is easier in younger birds and less invasive. Twenty one days would be sufficient time to allow the virus to have disseminated amongst hatchlings and clinical signs to develop. The Code  lists the incubation period to be 21 days, 
although the onset of disease is usually sooner. Hatchlings could be tested at 21 days and then released on receipt of negative test results. If serological methods are used, maternal antibodies can be detected for up to four weeks so testing could not take place until after this time. Serological testing could be undertaken after 4 weeks of age, with release on receipt of negative results. 
 
The Manual lists virus isolation as the prescribed test for international trade, however for 
surveillance purposes (unless birds are vaccinated) serology (listed in the Manual  as an 
alternative test) is more likely to be used and is a more practical and less expensive. For post arrival quarantine, the testing options could include an MPI approved RT-PCR, which will allow earlier testing of birds post hatch. PCR is not an OIE prescribed or alternative test, but 
is widely used for AI testing and is a faster and less expensive option than viral culture and 
isolation. Pooled samples for PCR can be used to reduce the number of tests required.  
Recommendation 
Pre-export measures for hatching eggs should be in accordance with the Code  Chapter, with 
the addition of post arrival quarantine measures as described above.  Measures are justified for HPNAI viruses. Parent birds must be kept isolated from all other birds prior to and during the egg laying period in the exporting country. Sufficient testing of the parent flock must be undertaken to show freedom from HPNAI. The parent flock must 
have been kept in an HPNAI free establishment for at least 21 days prior to and at the time of 
the collection of the eggs. Parent birds may be vaccinated if the Code  measures are followed 
for differentiating vaccinates infected with AI from those where sero-conversion is due to vaccination. Ideally a DIVA vaccine should be used.  
Risk Management Proposal for Commercial Poultry Hatching Eggs & Specific-Pathogen-Free Chicken Eggs 11 June 2012 
COMEGIC.GEN  
 
Chicks must be hatched in quarantine in New Zealand and test negative for HPNAI before release. Testing should be as described in the Manual  using OIE prescribed or alternative 
tests, or an MPI approved test (eg. RT-PCR). Viral detection methods such as virus isolation or RT-PCR eliminate interference from maternal antibodies so testing can be conducted after the incubation period, 21 days after hatching. Al ternatively serology for antibody detection 
can be conducted after maternal antibodies wane at approximately 4 weeks of age. 
 6 
 
 
 
 Avian paramyxovirus 1 (A PVM-1/Newcastle disease)  
Analysis 
APMV-1 is classified in the IRA 2009 as a hazard in chicken hatching eggs and risk 
management measures are justified. The IRA fo r duck hatching eggs did not specifically 
examine Newcastle disease (ND) as it is assumed that risk mitigation measures proposed for chicken eggs would also be appropriate. However, it should be noted waterfowl are highly resistant to clinical manifestations of Ne wcastle disease (ND). Ducks may shed APVM-1 for 
months after exposure and may not have a detectable antibody titre. The use of virus isolation or direct RNA detection methods (e.g. RT-PCR), rather than serology, is therefore the preferred test method for ducks.
1 
 The current measures for hatching eggs from chickens include sanitising eggs, serological 
sampling of parent birds, parent flocks being resident in the country of export for at least 60 days and being at least 25 km from any premise where ND has been reported within the last 
6 months. Birds must not have been vaccinated with a live vaccine during the 3 months prior 
to egg collection. 
 
The Code  recommend
ations should be adopted where possible. This will give greater 
flexibility by allowing imports from recognis ed free countries, zones or compartments.  
 The major changes to align with the Code  and the recommendations in the IRA 2009 are: 
 To recognise compartment or zone freedom from ND, rather than the requirement for 
geographical separation and prescribing the timing and frequency of testing prior to 
egg collection as in the current import health standard  
 To allow live lentogenic vaccines (as described in the IRA 2010),  
Reflecting consideration of the potential impact of ND on the domestic poultry industry, 
particularly the export trade in hatching eggs and day-old chicks, it was decided that retention of post-arrival quarantine of imported poultry hatching eggs was required to meet New Zealand's appropriate level of protection against this disease.  
The quarantine period can be reduced from 60 to 28 days from hatch. The use of virus 
isolation or direct RNA detection methods (e.g. RT-PCR) allows earlier testing of birds, without risk of maternal antibody interference (as seen with serological testing). Twenty-one days from hatch is considered sufficient time to allow any potential dissemination of ND amongst hatchlings and for clinical signs to develop. The Code  lists the incubation period to 
be 21 days although the onset of disease is usually sooner. Birds could be sampled at 21 days post-hatch and released when negative results are received.   Alternatively birds can be sampled by serology after maternal antibodies have waned at around 4 weeks of age, with release on receipt of negative results. 
 
Recommendation 
Pre-export measures for hatching eggs should be in accordance with the Code Chapter, with 
the addition of the post arrival quarantine measures described above. This will allow 
importation of hatching eggs from a country, z one or compartment free of APMV-1. Live ND 
vaccination of parent flocks will continue to be allowed, if the vaccine contains a lentogenic, APMV-1 vaccine strain, where sequence analysis of the F0 gene has demonstrated no more than two basic amino acids between residues 113 and 116 and no phenylalanine at residue 
                                                 
Risk Management Proposal for Commercial Poultry Hatching Eggs & Specific-Pathogen-Free Chicken Eggs 11 June 2012 1 N. H. Christensen, Review of Risk Analysis: Hatching eggs of domestic ducks  
COMEGIC.GEN  
117, in accordance with the provisions of the Manual , and the flock is tested and shown to be 
free of ND. 
 
Eggs should be hatched in quarantine in New Zealand, a sample of hatched chicks and a 
representative pooled sample of any dead chicks and unhatched eggs should be subjected to testing for APMV-1 using either the OIE prescribed test (virus isolation from tracheal and cloacal swabs) or an  alternative MPI approved test (e.g. RT-PCR). Testing for virus or antigen, negates the need to test after maternal antibodies have waned, so testing can be carried out at 21 days, with release from PAQ when negative results are received. 
Alternatively serology can be conducted after 28 days of age with release on receipt of 
negative results. It should be noted serology may not be reliable in ducks and it is preferable to use either virus isolation or direct viral antigen detection in this species.
2 
 
 
 
 Salmonella  
Analysis 
Risk management measures for  S. Gallinarum-Pullorum  in chicken hatching eggs are 
justified in the IRA 2009. It is deemed appropriate to apply the same risk management 
measures for the importation of duck hatching eggs.   
Similarly, th
e IRA 2009 justifies risk management measures for Salmonella Typhimurium DT 
104 and Salmonella Enteritidis phage type 4 .  However, more recent analysis (IRA 2010) 
concludes that paratyphoid salmonellae should not be considered a potential hazard in imported poultry eggs as exotic serotypes associ ated with poultry overseas are likely to be 
no more pathogenic than serotypes recognised to be present in New Zealand.  Although S. arizonae  is not considered to be a risk in chicken hatching eggs, the IRA 2010 
describes evidence that this organism is rec ognised to be vertically transmitted in turkey 
eggs so should be considered a risk in hatching eggs of this species.  The Code  describes measures for fowl typhoid ( Salmonella Gallinarum) and pullorum 
disease (Salmonella Pullorum) for importation of hatching eggs.  
 
The current IHS has the following requirements: 
 
All flocks from which eggs were obtained are certified free of Salmonella Pullorum . 
Non-specific measures included the require ment that during the 28 days prior to 
collection of eggs, the birds in the flock of origin were inspected and found to be free 
from clinical evidence of infectious diseases including amongst others, fowl plague 
(highly pathogenic avian influenza) and salmonellosis; and that none of these diseases had existed in the flock of origin  during the previous 6 months. 
 
The IRA 2009 recommends; 
 
Testing birds in the parent flock to ensure that they do not carry infection and importing eggs only from flocks recognised as free of infection. Importing from flocks monitoring for Salmonella as per Chapter 6.5 of the Code , with an 
assurance this testing has not identified S. Gallinarum-Pullorum , S. Typhimurium DT 104 
and S. Enteritidis.  
 
  
                                                 
2 N. H. Christensen, Review of Risk Analysis: Hatching eggs of domestic ducks  
 8 
Recommendation 
Birds in the parent flock should be monitored for Salmonella as described in the Code  
requirements for monitoring poultry breeding flocks for Salmonella.  
Assurance must be provided that poultry hatch ing eggs come from breeding establishments 
where this testing has not identified Salmonella Gallinarum-Pullorum. 
  Assurance must be provided that turkey hatching eggs come from breeding establishments 
where this testing has not identified Salmonella arizonae or Salmonella Gallinarum-Pullorum. 
 
 
 
 Ornithobacterium rhinotracheale  
Analysis 
The IRA 2009 states that for countries other than Australia, O. rhinotracheale  is a risk in 
chicken hatching eggs and risk management measures are justified. It is assumed that this 
risk estimation is applicable to hatching eggs of ducks and turkeys.  
There are no specific measures in t
he current IHSs for chicken and turkey hatching eggs for 
O. rhinotracheale . This may be because it was first identified as a disease-causing organism 
in 1993. Non-specific measures included the requirement that during the 28 days prior to collection of eggs, the birds in the flock of origin were inspected and found to be free from clinical evidence of infectious diseases. The list of diseases did not include O. rhinotracheale.  
 
Recommendation 
Serological testing should be conducted at a sufficient level in the parent flock to show the 
flock is free of O. rhinotracheale. The IRA 2009 stated that sero-prevalence in an infected 
flock could be expected to be 50-95% so a smaller sample size can be considered.  A sample size of 16 would detect a sero-prevalence of 25% with 99% confidence.  
Eggs can be imported without measures from countries consdiered by MPI as free of  O. 
rhinotracheale such as Australia.   
 
 
 
 Hepesvirus (Big li ver & spleen disease)  
Analysis 
There are measures in the current IHS for chicken hatching eggs from Australia and the 
United Kingdom for big liver and spleen disease. The current measures are testing 240 birds 
in the parent flock by agar immunodiffusion test within 30 days of egg collection.   The IRA 2009 lists the hepesvirus causing big liver and spleen disease in the hazard list as not infecting eggs. It is concluded the organism is  not vertically transmitted so no measures 
are justified in the updated IHS. 
 
Recommendation 
The requirement for testing of the flock of origin for big liver and spleen disease prior to 
collection of eggs can be removed.  
 
Risk Management Proposal for Commercial Poultry Hatching Eggs & Specific-Pathogen-Free Chicken Eggs 11 June 2012 
COMEGIC.GEN  
 
Turkey Specific Diseases 
 
 
  Mycoplasma  
Analysis 
There are measures in the current IHS for chicken hatching eggs for Mycoplasma 
gallisepticum  and M. synoviae . These organisms have been described in New Zealand so 
these measures will be removed.  
 The IRA 2009 states Mycoplasma iowae  is a hazard in chicken hatching eggs from countries 
other than Australia, however no measures are recommended as the requirement for 
chickens to come from flocks managed as per Chapter 6.4 in the Code  would make the entry 
assessment negligible.  
 For turkey hatching eggs  Mycoplasma meleagridis  is considered a risk and in the absence of 
further analysis Mycoplasma iowae  should also be considered a risk in this commodity. 
 
Recommendation 
The requirement for testing of the flock for Mycoplasma spp.  prior to collection of eggs can 
be removed from all species of hatching eggs with the exception of Mycoplasma meleagridis  
and Mycoplasma iowae  infection of turkeys.  
 
 
 
 Turkey rhinotrachietis virus (TRTV)  
Analysis 
There are measures in the current IHS for turkey hatching eggs for TRTV. From the United 
Kingdom, birds must either come from vaccinated parent flocks, or the parent flock must test negative for TRTV within 30 days of egg collection to confirm with 99% confidence of detecting a prevalence of 5% that the flock is sero-negative. From other countries the requirement is 10% of the parent flock must be  tested as sero-negative.  Additionally any 
respiratory disease in hatchlings during the post-arrival quarantine period must be tested for TRTV. The certification requires no clinical signs of TRTV, including drop in egg production in the parent flock.  The IRA 2004 acknowledges the likelihood of TRTV being present in turkey hatching eggs to 
be very low, particularly from vaccinated birds. The recommended measures were to require 
the parent flock to show no clinical signs of TRT in the immediate period prior to, or during egg collection. In case of any outbreak of respiratory disease in quarantine, affected birds must be tested for TRTV isolation using tracheal organ culture and/or PCR.  
The IRA 2009 concludes the risk estimate is negligible for pneumoviruses and no risk 
management measures are necessary in the commodity chicken hatching eggs. The discussion also examines turkey hatching eggs, with the conclusion drawn there is no conclusive evidence for vertical transmission. The risk estimate was concluded to be negligible. 
 
Recommendation 
 10 
No specific risk management measures are required for poultry hatching eggs as there is no 
conclusive evidence that TRT is vertically transmitted. The parent poultry flock must be healthy as described in the commodity definition. 
 
 
 
 Lymphoproliferative disease  
Analysis 
There are measures in the current turkey hatching eggs IHS’s for lymphoproliferative disease 
of turkeys. The current measures are limited to an owner’s declaration that there has been no evidence of this disease during the rearing period. Lymphoproliferative disease is a rare neoplastic syndrome of turkeys reported in Israel and Europe.   
Recommendation 
Given the very rare reports of this disease, the high health status required of parent flocks and the non-specific nature of the current measure, it is proposed this measure is removed.  
 
Duck Specific Diseases 
 
 
 
 Duck virus enteritis  
Analysis 
Duck virus enteritis (DVE) has not been reported in New Zealand. Vertical transmission of 
DVE has been recognised, although more recent reports suggest DVE virus may be excreted only on the surface of the egg from infected carriers. Risk management measures are justified. 
 
The risk management options presented in the IRA 2012 include: 
importing eggs from flocks in countries where DVE has not been recognised without restriction,  vaccination against DVE could be prohibited in flocks supplying eggs for export,  eggs derived from flocks where virus isol ation or PCR has demonstrated freedom from 
DVE could be considered eligible for import, imported eggs could be hatched under secure post-arrival quarantine conditions in New Zealand and material from embryos, dead-in shel l chicks, or hatchlings could be tested 
for DVE by virus isolation or PCR. 
 
No definitive diagnostic tests are available for DVE. Investigation of illness or mortality in 
post-arrival quarantine would detect infection.  
Recommendation 
As per the commodity definition and general requirements for the commodity all eggs must 
be sourced from flocks kept in accordance with the standards described in Chapter 6.4 the 
Code . The eggs must be disinfected.  
 Eggs can be imported from countries where DVE is not recognised (such as Australia) without measures for DVE. 
 
Eggs from countries with DVE must be: 
Either 
Risk Management Proposal for Commercial Poultry Hatching Eggs & Specific-Pathogen-Free Chicken Eggs 11 June 2012 
COMEGIC.GEN  
sourced from unvaccinated flocks that have been demonstrated to be free of DVE by 
virus isolation, PCR or an approved MPI test.  
Or 
hatched under quarantine conditions in New Zealand and material from embryos, dead-in-shell chicks, and hatchlings be tested for DVE by virus isolation or PCR.  
 
  Duck virus hepatitis  
Analysis 
Duck virus hepatitis (DVH) has not been reported in New Zealand. Vertical transmission of 
DVH has not been recognised. Eggs will be disinfected and sourced from flocks kept in accordance with the standards described in chapter 6.4 of the Code . Surface contamination 
or contamination of the egg containers will be avoided by following the measures described in the Code . 
 The IRA 2012 concludes that DVH is not a hazard in the commodity.  The Code has recommended measures for DVH. These are: 
Have been disinfected in conformity with the standards referred to in Chapter 6.4.; 
Come fro
m establishments  and/or hatcheries which are recognised as being free from 
DVH and fro
m hatcheries which comply with the standards referred to in Chapter 6.4.; 
Were shipp
ed in clean and unused packages. 
 
Recommendation 
DVH is not considered a hazard in the commodity. Sufficient risk mitigation is provided by the 
requirement to comply with Chapter 6.4 of the Code  (Biosecurity in Poultry Production). 
 
 
 
 Goose parvovirus and M uscovy duck parvovirus  
Analysis 
Goose parvovirus (GPV) and Muscovy duck parvovirus (MDPV or Derzsy’s disease) has not 
been reported in New Zealand. The disease only affects geese and Muscovy ducks 
(including some hybrids). The disease is known to be vertically transmitted. Risk management measures are justified.   Options presented in the IRA 2012 are: 
 
1. Eggs from duck species that are neither  Muscovy nor their hybrids could be imported 
without sanitary measures. 
2. Muscovy duck eggs could be imported without restrictions from countries known to be 
free from GPV or MDPV 
3. Eggs could be imported from duck flocks that are maintained as closed flocks and in 
which the disease has not occurred for several years (3-5 years is suggested) 
4. Donor ducks could be kept separate from other ducks for at least 3 weeks, while eggs 
are being collected and the donors could be tested serologically before going into 
isolation and again 3 weeks after the end of the isolation period, with negative results. 
5. Imported eggs could be hatched in isolation in New Zealand and the hatchlings mixed 
with sentinel sero-negative New Zealand Muscovy ducklings. A representative sample of imported and sentinel birds could be tested serologically with negative results at the end of the quarantine period of at least 3 weeks. 
 
 12 
Option 3 describes the establishment of a compartment for disease freedom. This would 
require the exporting country’s veterinary authority and MPI to approve a biosecurity plan.  
Option 4 would require certification that the pre-export isolation facility had an appropriate 
biosecurity plan in place and that the facilities were acceptable for isolation. Additionally the consignment would be delayed, or would li kely have been imported and incubating while 
results of the second testing were collected. Given the eggs will be hatched in post-arrival quarantine, pre-export isolation with testing before and after egg collection is not required. 
 
Recommendation 
Risk management measures should only apply to  Muscovy ducks and their hybrids. Muscovy 
duck eggs could be imported without restriction from countries free of GPV and MDPV. 
 
Where the country of origin can not be deemed as free of MDPV and GPV imported hatching 
eggs of Muscovy ducks (and their hybrids) should be hatched within post-arrival quarantine in New Zealand with a representative sample of hatchlings tested with negative results at least 3 weeks after hatching. If serology is used it would be necessary to wait until maternal antibodies have waned prior to testing, which could be greater than 4 weeks post hatching. Using a virus detection method, such as PCR would negate the need to have sentinel birds 
housed with the flock and remove any maternal antibody interference. 
 
 
 
 Reovirus of Muscovy ducks (DRV)
Analysis 
Duck reovirus of Muscovy ducks (DRV) has been recognised in South Africa, France, Israel, 
and China. It has not been recognised in New Zealand and is considered to be a risk in imported hatching eggs from Muscovy ducks or their hybrids.  
 
Options presented in the IRA are:  
1. Eggs from duck species that are neither  Muscovy nor their hybrids could be imported 
without sanitary measures. 
2. Muscovy duck eggs could be imported without restrictions from countries known to be 
free from DRV 
3. Eggs could be imported from duck parent flocks that are maintained as closed flocks 
and in which the disease has not occurred for several years (3-5 years is suggested) 
4. Donor ducks could be kept isolated from other ducks for at least 3 weeks, while eggs 
are being collected and the donors could be tested serologically before going into 
isolation and again 3 weeks after the end of the isolation period, with negative 
results.  
5. Imported eggs could be hatched in isolation in New Zealand and the hatchlings mixed 
with sentinel sero-negative New Zealand Muscovy ducklings. A representative sample of imported and sentinel birds could be tested serologically with negative 
results at the end of the quarantine period of at least 3 weeks. 
 
Option 3 describes the establishment of a compartment for disease freedom. This would require the exporting country’s veterinary authority and MPI to approve a biosecurity plan.  Option 4 would require certification that the facility and procedures had an appropriate 
biosecurity plan in place and that the facilities were acceptable for isolation. Additionally the 
consignment would be delayed, or would li kely have been imported and incubating while 
results of the second testing were collected. Given the eggs will be hatched in quarantine, pre-export isolation with testing before and after egg collection is not required. 
 
Risk Management Proposal for Commercial Poultry Hatching Eggs & Specific-Pathogen-Free Chicken Eggs 11 June 2012 
COMEGIC.GEN  
Recommendation 
Risk management measures should only apply to  Muscovy ducks and their hybrids. Muscovy 
duck eggs could be imported without restriction from countries free of DRV.  
 
Where the country of origin cannot be deemed as free of DRV imported hatching eggs of Muscovy ducks (and their hybrids) should be hatched within post-arrival quarantine in New Zealand with a representative sample of hatchlings tested with negative results at least 3 weeks after hatching. If serology is used, it would be necessary to wait until maternal 
antibodies have waned prior to testing, alternatively a virus detection method could be used, 
such as PCR. This would negate the need to have sentinel birds housed with the flock. 
 
 
 Avian chlam ydiosis  
Analysis 
The available evidence indicates that serovars C and E of Chlamydia psittaci  are not present 
in New Zealand and are considered a risk in duck hatching eggs.  There are no measures in 
the Code  for chlamydiosis in poultry. 
 Options presented in the IRA are:  
Duck eggs could be imported without restrictio
ns from countries where chlamydiosis has 
not been reported in commercial ducks. Eggs could be imported from flocks that are maintained as closed flocks and in which 
ongoing surveillance has demonstrated freedom from C. psittaci . Donor ducks could be 
kept isolated from other ducks for at least three weeks before eggs are collected, and 
the donors tested serologically for exposure to C. psittaci  before going into isolation and 
again three weeks after the end of the collection period, with negative results. Imported eggs could be hatched in isolation in New Zealand and a representative 
sample of chicks could be tested serologically with negative results.  Any dead 
hatchlings or dead-in-shell chicks could be examined to detect the presence of C. 
psittaci  using histochemical staining of liver and spleen impression smears. 
 
Recommendation 
Duck hatching eggs can be imported without restriction from countries where chlamydiosis 
has not been reported in commercial ducks. 
For hatching eggs imported from countries not free of chlamydiosis in ducks,  
Either 
Eggs could be imported from flocks that are maintained as closed flocks and in which 
ongoing surveillance has demonstrated freedom from C. psittaci . 
OR 
Imported eggs could be hatched in isolation in New Zealand and a representative 
sample of chicks could be tested serologically with negative results.  Any dead 
hatchlings or dead-in-shell chicks could be examined to detect the presence of C. 
psittaci  using histochemical staining of liver and spleen impression smears. 
 
  
 
 14 
Risk Management Proposal for Commercial Poultry Hatching Eggs & Specific-Pathogen-Free Chicken Eggs 11 June 2012 
COMEGIC.GEN  
 
 
Post Arrival Quarantine Requirements 
 
Analysis 
The current IHSs for hatching eggs require post arrival quarantine in a facility approved to 
the MPI standard for avian transitional facilities (154.02.05). This includes a requirement for 
HEPA filtration of exhaust air. The current quarantine period is required to mitigate risk of AI 
and ND incursion from hatching eggs. The H EPA filtration requirement was based on 
potential for ND to be spread via the airborne route. This is discussed in the IRA 2001, appendix 1, where it was concluded the potential for APMV-1 to spread via the airborne route was not proven and the need for HEPA filtration was not justified. 
 
If the quarantine facility is separated by a suitable buffer zone (such as 100 metres) from other poultry or concentrated avian populations, then the requirement for HEPA filtration could be removed. If birds will be housed in close proximity to other poultry or other concentrations of avian species, or there is not a suitable buffer zone against uncontrolled 
land use, the requirement for HEPA filtration should remain. 
 SPF eggs will come from flocks that have undergone testing as prescribed in the European Pharmacopoeia ( Ph. Eur.)  Chapter 5.2.2, Chicken flocks free from specified pathogens for 
the production and quality control of vaccines. This prescribes testing requirements which are sufficient to demonstrate freedom from the identified risk organisms (with the exception 
of Ornithobacterium rhinotracheale). The eggs must be used within a transitional approved to 
MPI standard for avian transitional facilities (154.02.05) or MPI Standard for transitional facilities for biological products (154.02.17). SPF eggs, any egg products and any resultant chicks used in a transitional facility for biological products must be destroyed, triple bagged and incinerated at the conclusion of all work.