RESTRICTED  WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  WT/DSB/M/225 
8 March 2007 
 (07-0944) 
Dispute Settlement Body 
23 January 2007  
 
 
MINUTES OF MEETING 
 
Held in the Centre William Rappard  
on 23 January 2007  
 
Chairman:  Mr. Muhamad Noor Yacob (Malaysia) 
  
 Prior to the adoption of the agenda
, the item concerning the Panel Report in the case on: 
"United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dump ing Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from 
Argentina: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DS U by Argentina" was removed from the proposed 
agenda following the United States' decision to appeal the Report.  
  Subjects discussed
: Page  
 
1. Surveillance of implementation of recommendations adopted by the DSB.........................2  
(a) United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropr iations Act of 1998:  Status report by 
the United States .............................................................................................................. ...........2  
(b) United States – Anti-dumping measures on certain hot-rolled steel products from 
Japan:  Status report by  the United States...................................................................................5  
(c) United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act:  Status report by  
the United States .............................................................................................................. ...........6  
(d) Mexico – Definitive anti-dumping measur es on beef and rice:  Complaint with 
respect to rice:  Status report by Mexico.....................................................................................6  
(e) Mexico – Tax measures on soft drinks and othe r beverages:  Status reports by Mexico ...........7  
2. Implementation by the European Co mmunities of the recommendations and 
rulings of the DSB in relation to "European Communities – Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas" and related subsequent WTO 
proceedings .................................................................................................................... ............7  
(a) Statements by Honduras, Ni caragua and Panama.......................................................................7  
3. United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000:  
Implementation of the recommenda tions adopted by the DSB ............................................9  
(a) Statements by Canada, the Eur opean Communiti es and Japan...................................................9  
4. Statement by Ecuador regarding the European Communities' regime for  
the importation, sale and distribution of bananas ...............................................................11  
5. United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916:  Implementation of  
the recommendations adop ted by the DSB...........................................................................12  
(a) Statement by Japan ............................................................................................................. ......12  WT/DSB/M/225 
Page 2  
 
  6.
 Mexico – Definitive countervailing measures on olive oil from the European 
Communities.................................................................................................................... ........14  
(a) Request for the establishment of a pa nel by the European Communities.................................14  
7. Korea – Anti-dumping duties on imports of certain paper from Indonesia......................14  
(a) Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Indonesia:  Request for the establishment of  
a panel........................................................................................................................ ...............14  
8. United States – Measures relating to zeroing and sunset reviews ......................................15  
(a) Report of the Appellate Body and Report of the Panel.............................................................15  
 
 1. Surveillance of implementation of recommendations adopted by the DSB 
(a) United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropr iations Act of 1998:  Status report by the 
United States (WT/DS176/11/Add.50) 
 (b) United States – Anti-dumping measures on certain hot-rolled steel products from Japan:  
Status report by the United States (WT/DS184/15/Add.50) 
 (c) United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act:  Status report by the United States 
(WT/DS160/24/Add.25) 
 (d) Mexico – Definitive anti-dumping measures on beef  and rice:  Complaint with respect to rice:  
Status report by Mexico (WT/DS295/13/Add.1) 
 (e) Mexico – Tax measures on soft drinks and other beverages:  Status reports by Mexico 
(WT/DS308/16) 
 
1. The Chairman
 recalled that Article 21.6 of the DSU required that "unless the DSB decides 
otherwise, the issue of implementation of the re commendations or rulings shall be placed on the 
agenda of the DSB meeting after six months follo wing the date of establishment of the reasonable 
period of time pursuant to paragraph 3 and shall remain on the DSB's agenda until the issue is 
resolved".  He proposed that the five sub-items to which he had just referred be considered separately. 
(a) United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropria tions Act of 1998:  Status report by the 
United States (WT/DS176/11/Add.50) 
2. The Chairman  drew attention to document WT/DS176/ 11/Add.50, which contained the status 
report by the United States on progress in the impl ementation of the DSB's recommendations in the 
case concerning US Section 211 Omni bus Appropriations Act of 1998. 
3. The representative of the United States  said that his country had provided a status report in 
this dispute on 11 January 2007, in accordance with Artic le 21.6 of the DSU.  As noted in the report, 
during the previous congressional session, the US  Congress had been considering a number of 
legislative proposals that would implement the DSB' s recommendations and rulings in this dispute.  
The new US Congress had convened earlier in January  2007.  The US administration would work 
with that Congress with respect to appropriat e statutory measures to resolve this matter. 
4. The representative of the European Communities  said that with the entry of the new US 
Congress, pending bills concerning implementation of  the WTO ruling on Section 211 had now been 
declared moot.  As a consequence, the EC was in  a situation where the very first step in the  WT/DSB/M/225 
 Page 3 
 
 
  implementation process, which was the introduction of a bill in the US Congress, had not even been 
taken even though the deadline for implementation ha d expired more than four years ago.  At the 
present meeting, the EC had heard again that the US administration would work with the US Congress 
to implement the DSB's ruling and recommendations.  The EC hoped that this new Congress would 
realise the widespread damaging effects that a pe rsisting non-compliance with the TRIPS Agreement 
had on the interests of the United States and on the whole trade community by undermining the 
authority of that agreement and the objective of en suring efficient protection of intellectual property 
rights worldwide.  Refusing, on foreign policy grou nds, the specific licence that would have allowed 
the renewal of the registration of the Havana Club mark had also sent the wrong message.  He noted 
that the renewal would not have granted ownershi p rights, but would have only preserved the status 
quo and would have let US courts d ecide who was the legitimate owner of that mark.  Therefore, the 
EC invited the United States to reconsider its positio n, in light of its seriously damaging effects. 
5. The representative of Cuba  said that on 2 February 2007 five years would elapse since the 
adoption of the DSB's rulings and recommendations in th is dispute.  Incidentally, this period of time 
corresponded to just under half the time of the exis tence of the WTO.  Since then the United States 
had proved itself to be a flagrant non-complier, tryi ng to make Members accustomed to its detrimental 
practice of submitting laconic, repetitive and non-subs tantial status reports with no indication as to 
when it would comply with its WTO obligations.  Cuba  recalled that this dispute was one of the three 
longest-standing disputes on the DSB's agenda.  In all three cases, settlement was dependent upon the 
United States, the only Member to show an irrevere nt reluctance towards observance of its obligations 
under the WTO Agreements.  The US attitude sent out  very negative signals to other WTO Members 
and called into question the effectiveness of the di spute settlement system.  At the same time, it 
undermined the balance between the rights and oblig ations, the equality among the parties and the 
predictability of the multilateral trading system.  As Cuba had reported on previous occasions, the 
continued application of Section 211 – which ha d been declared inconsistent with the TRIPS 
Agreement and with WTO rules and principles – had given rise to the arbitrary and illegal decision of 
the US Patent and Trademark Office to reject the a pplication to renew the registration of the Havana 
Club trademark filed by the Cuban company that ow ned it, and which would merely have maintained 
the status quo of this trademark.  However absurd it might seem, the sole purpose of this decision was 
to favour political and commercial interests of the Bacardi rum company, which endeavoured to usurp 
the Havana Club trademark, thereby putting at ri sk hundreds of US entrepreneurs who owned more 
than 4,000 trademarks registered in Cuba a nd the future of multilateral intellectual property 
agreements.  Indeed, as soon as the decision of the US Patent and Trademark Office had been made 
public, Bacardi had announced that it would begi n manufacturing rum under the Havana Club brand 
name.  Its purpose was to deceive consumers w ho acquired the product on the US market by taking 
advantage of the recognized prestige of the Havana  Club brand and its clear association with Cuba, 
thereby selling a product which was not  of Cuban origin nor comparable  in terms of quality to the rum 
marketed worldwide by the Cuban-French join t venture Havana Club International.   
6. He said that despite unsuccessful US attempts to deny the fact, this dispute was indeed related 
to this trademark and all the attendant circumst ances.  The content of Section 211 and events 
subsequent to its adoption had only proved this.  Its objective was to deprive Cuban right-holders and 
their successors, including foreign companies with in terests in Cuba, of the recognition and enjoyment 
in the US territory of their rights regarding prope rly registered and protected trademarks and brand 
names, thus preventing the legitimate owners fro m defending such rights in the US courts and from 
renewing the registration of their trademarks in that country.  Cuba, once again, called upon the 
United States to repeal the illegal Section 211 and to  give constructive consid eration to the concerns 
and claims expressed month after month by several DSB Members.  The United States should be mindful of possible repercussions of its negligent acts.  
7. The representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
 said that his country thanked 
Cuba for its statement, which it fully endorsed.  His country considered Cuba's complaint to be WT/DSB/M/225 
Page 4  
 
  legitimate. This had been demonstrated by th e DSB when Section 211 had been found to be 
inconsistent with the WTO Agreements and the WTO fundamental principles.  His country also noted 
the status report submitted by the United States, wh ich once again highlighted the United States' lack 
of interest in complying with the Panel's r ecommendations. In its reports, the United States had 
insisted that no other country was so strongly protective of intellectual property rights.  His country, 
however, found it difficult to reconcile the US stat ement with the present situation.  A commitment 
was one thing – living up to that commitment was anot her.  For almost five years, the United States 
had not made any serious efforts to implement the DSB's rulings and recommendations, which had 
condemned Section 211 for not respecting the obliga tions of national treatment and most-favoured-
nation treatment.  At this point again, the United St ates could do no better than submit a status report, 
which, but for the date of circulation, was absolute ly identical to the report submitted in the previous 
month and actually to all the status reports th at had been submitted over almost two years.  
8. Failure to respect these core principles of the TRIPS Agreement, several years after the 
WTO's finding that Section 211 was WTO-inconsiste nt had sent the message that the disciplines of 
the TRIPS Agreement could be ignored.  This was inevitably damaging, especially since it came from 
one of the main promoters of that Agreement.  To  make matters worse, the recent decision of the US 
administration to refuse the specific licence that woul d have allowed the renewal of the registration of 
the Havana Club mark, had once again sent the wrong message.  The renewal would not have given 
away or granted rights.  It would have only preser ved the status quo and thus  would have allowed the 
US courts to decide, in pending proceedings, who w as the legitimate owner of that mark. Even more 
worrying was the US explanation that this deci sion had been made on foreign policy grounds.  
Ownership of intellectual property rights must be deci ded in courts on the basis of the rule of law and 
free from the interference of political considerations.  If this US policy were to be followed by other 
countries, it would seriously undermine the efforts to promote rules-based protection of intellectual property rights worldwide.  His country, therefore, invited the United States to reconsider its position 
in the light of its seriously damaging effects, and urged the United States, the only WTO Member that 
systematically failed to comply with the DSB's ru lings under the TRIPS Agreement, to bring itself 
into compliance with its obligations.  
9. The representative of Brazil
 said that while his country wished to thank the United States for 
its 50th status report and the statement made at the present meeting, it could not escape making some 
points of systemic nature in relation to the lack of  compliance in this dispute.  Brazil did not question 
the United States' reaffirmed intention and dispos ition to comply with the DSB's recommendations in 
this dispute.  Nonetheless, it was only natural that  Members were concerned about the credibility of a 
dispute settlement system when overly long period s of non-compliance such as in this case had no 
other consequences than monthly di plomatic statements.  This situ ation was particularly serious 
because of the greater responsibilities the United States bore, as one of the major users of the system.  
Brazil therefore, invited, the United States to make an extra effort in order to bring itself promptly into 
conformity with the applicable multilateral rules.  
10. The representative of China  said that first, his country thanked the United States for its status 
report and its statement.  However, China  wished to  express its systemic concerns with the protracted 
implementation process in this dispute.  China a ppreciated the efforts made by the United States 
during the past five years aimed at implementing the DSB's rulings, but unfortunately there was no indication when the matter would be resolved to the satisfaction of the parties to the dispute and other 
Members.  China believed that prompt and full implementation of the DSB's rulings and 
recommendations was one of the major cornerstones of the WTO dispute settlement system.  In the 
meantime, the prompt implementation in this disput e was not only beneficial to other Members, but 
also to the United States, who was an active advocat e of intellectual property rights in all forums.  
Therefore, China again urged the United States to fully implement the decision of the DSB in this 
dispute as soon as possible.    WT/DSB/M/225 
 Page 5 
 
 
  11. The representative of India  said that his country wished to thank the United States for their 
situation report and its statement.  However, Indi a noted that there was no substantive change in the 
situation report. India, therefore, felt compelled yet again to stress that the principle of prompt compliance with rulings and recommendations of the DSB appeared to be missing in this dispute. 
This was a matter of great systemic concern, since almost five years had elapsed from the adoption of 
the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this case.   India again urged the parties to this dispute 
to inform the DSB as to how they intended to fulfil the objective of prompt settlement.  
12. The representative of Bolivia
 said that his delegation had been commenting on this issue for 
several months and yet the position of the United St ates, as reflected in its status reports, had not 
changed in any way that might enable a settlement to be reached.  This, as his delegation had stated 
previously, undermined the credibility of the multilate ral trading system and, in particular, the DSB 
because of the systematic nature of the failure to co mply with the decisions and rulings of the DSB.  
Bolivia was also concerned about the implications that this could have on the intellectual property 
regime under the TRIPS Agreement.  This case had been ongoing for more than five years, with a 
clearly damaging effect on one developing country.  Bolivia, once again, wished to urge the 
United States to comply with the DSB's rulings and strongly hoped that in the coming year it would 
be possible for this matter to be removed from th e DSB's agenda once a satisfactory settlement had 
been reached  for all those adversely affected Members.  
13. The representative of Uruguay  said that her delegation thanked United States for its status 
report. Uruguay shared the systemic concerns th at had been expressed by previous speakers with 
regard to the importance that Members should prom ptly comply with the WTO recommendations in 
order to preserve the balance between the rights and obligations and to preserve  the credibility of the 
system.  That was why Uruguay hoped that the Unite d States would take the necessary measures so as 
to comply with the DSB's recommendations.  
14. The representative of the United States  said that in response to the suggestion that the US 
compliance record was poor, the facts simply did not support that assertion.  Indeed, the record 
showed that the United States had fully complied w ith WTO rulings in the vast majority of its 
disputes.  As for the remaining few, the United States was actively working towards compliance.  
Regarding the comment made concerning a par ticular trademark registration, none of the 
recommendations or rulings of the DSB in this proceeding related to the renewal of specific 
trademarks.  That comment, therefore, did not re late to "the issue of implementation of DSB 
recommendations and rulings" in this matter.  
15. The DSB took note  of the statements and agreed  to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting. 
(b) United States – Anti-dumping measures on certain hot-rolled steel products from Japan:  
Status report by the United States (WT/DS184/15/Add.50) 
16. The Chairman  drew attention to document WT/DS184/ 15/Add.50 which contained the status 
report by the United States on progress in the impl ementation of the DSB's recommendations in the 
case concerning US anti-dumping measures on certain hot-rolled steel products from Japan. 
17. The representative of the United States  said that his country had provided a status report in 
this dispute on 11 January 2007, in accordan ce with Article 21.6 of the DSU.  As of 
23 November 2002, the US authorities had addresse d the DSB's recommendations and rulings with 
respect to the calculation of anti-dumping margins in the hot-rolled steel anti-dumping duty 
investigation at issue in this dispute.  Details  were provided in document WT/DS184/15/Add.3.  The 
US administration would work with the new C ongress, which had convened in January 2007 with WT/DSB/M/225 
Page 6  
 
  respect to the recommendations and rulings of the DS B that had not already been addressed by the US 
authorities by 23 November 2002. 
18. The representative of Japan
 said that his country noted the statement made by the United 
States along with its latest status report.  Ho wever, it was very regrettable that, although the 
legislation that the United States had stated woul d implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings 
had been introduced in the last US Congress in May 200 5, it had failed to pass that legislation.  As 
Japan had repeatedly stated before the DSB, a full and prompt implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB was essen tial for maintaining the credibility of the WTO 
dispute settlement system.  Japan recalled that the Un ited States had stated, in its most recent report, 
that the "Administration continues to support speci fic legislative amendments that would implement 
the DSB's recommendations and rulings".  Japan wi shed to renew its strong hope that the US 
administration would accelerate its efforts to work with the US Congress and implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings as soon as possible. 
19. The DSB took note
 of the statements and agreed  to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting. 
(c) United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act:  Status report by the United States 
(WT/DS160/24/Add.25) 
20. The Chairman  drew attention to document WT/DS160/ 24/Add.25, which contained the status 
report by the United States on progress in the impl ementation of the DSB's recommendations in the 
case concerning Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act. 
21. The representative of the United States  said that his country had provided a status report in 
this dispute on 11 January 2007, in accordance with Ar ticle 21.6 of the DSU.  The US administration 
would work closely with the new US Congress, whic h had convened this mont h, and would continue 
to confer with the EC in order to reach a mu tually satisfactory resolution of this matter. 
22. The representative of the European Communities  said that the EC's position regarding this 
dispute was well known, and did not require repetition be it in bureaucratic language or poetry.  The 
EC wished that this item be removed from the DSB agenda, but that would require action from the 
United States, and such action had not yet taken place.   The EC remained prepared to work with the 
United States to seek a mutually satisfactory solutio n to this dispute and hoped that a solution could 
be identified in the near future. 
23. The DSB took note  of the statements and agreed  to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting. 
(d) Mexico – Definitive anti-dumping measures on beef and rice:  Complaint with respect to rice:  
Status report by Mexico (WT/DS295/13/Add.1) 
24. The Chairman  drew attention to document WT/DS295/ 13/Add.1, which contained the status 
report by Mexico on progress in the implementati on of the DSB's recommendations in the case:  
"Mexico Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef a nd Rice:  Complaint with respect to Rice". 
25. The representative of Mexico  said that his country had submitte d a status report contained in 
WT/DS295/13/Add.1, which was the last report to be presented regarding this dispute.  Mexico 
believed that it had complied with its obligations  following the withdrawal of its anti-dumping 
measures in respect of rice.  This had been notified by the Ministry of Trade.  However, pursuant to 
the agreement between Mexico and the United Stat es contained in WT/DS295/15, his country was 
open to discussions with the United States regarding this matter.    WT/DSB/M/225 
 Page 7 
 
 
  26. The representative of the United States  said that his country thanked Mexico for its status 
report.  As it had been previously stated, the Un ited States was pleased that Mexico had revoked the 
anti-dumping measure on rice, which had implemente d the DSB's recommendations and rulings with 
respect to that measure.  The United States was also pleased that Mexico had amended its Foreign 
Trade Law to address the DSB's recommendations and rulings.  As it had been stated at the 
19 December DSB meeting, the United States wa s currently studying those amendments.  The 
United States had some questions with respect to certain amendments, and e xpected to be in touch 
with Mexico in the near future to discuss them.  Again, the United States appreciated the steps Mexico 
had taken, and looked forward to discussing its questions with Mexico. 
27. The DSB took note  of the statements. 
(e) Mexico – Tax measures on soft drinks and ot her beverages:  Status reports by Mexico 
(WT/DS308/16) 
28. The Chairman  drew attention to document WT/DS308/ 16, which contained the status report 
by Mexico on progress in the implementation of  the DSB's recommendations in the case concerning 
Mexico's tax measures on soft drinks and other beverages. 
29. The representative of Mexico  said that as under the previous agenda sub-item, Mexico was 
presenting its first and final status report regarding this matter.  Thus Mexico had complied with its 
obligations by withdrawing its measu re that was subject to this dispute, as explained in its status 
report.  
30. The representative of the United States  said that his country wished to express its appreciation 
for Mexico's efforts to repeal the beverage tax and to comply with the DSB's recommendations and 
rulings.  The United States looked forward to the benefits this might bri ng for sweeteners trade 
between the two countries. 
31. The DSB took note  of the statements. 
2. Implementation by the European Communiti es of the recommendations and rulings of 
the DSB in relation to "European Communiti es – Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas"1 and related subsequent WTO proceedings 
(a) Statements by Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama 
32. The Chairman  said that this item was on the agenda of the present meeting at the request of 
Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama and invited the re presentatives of the respective countries to speak. 
33. The representative of Honduras  said that his country again referred to its prior statements on 
this issue.  As previously noted, his country, an  original complainant in  the Bananas III case, had 
already held Article 21.5 consultations regarding the EC's continuing non-compliance with the rulings 
in the Bananas III case.  Honduras regretted that the consultations and all informal efforts since then 
had failed to resolve this matter.  The commercial circumstances that originally had given rise to 
Honduras' Article 21.5 consultation re quest continued to be of serious  concern to his country.  The 
latest data available shown that Honduras had su stained the second-highest decline in both volumes 
and market share since the banana regime had fi rst come into effect.  They also showed, by 
comparison, that ACP shipments to the EC had been increased by 20 per cent, or 150,000 mt, over 
2005 levels, with at least another 20 per cent ACP increase expected in 2007, and even larger ACP 
gains expected in 2008, when the EC had opene d its market to unlimited duty-free ACP access.  
                                                      
1 WT/DS27. WT/DSB/M/225 
Page 8  
 
  Given that trade distortions in the EC's marketplace were escalating so rapidly, and relief remained so 
imperative, Honduras had taken positive note that a growing number of Members now shared its 
commercial and legal concerns in this dispute,  and was seeking prompt relief.  Honduras looked 
forward to working in conjunction with affected su ppliers on additional steps now required to deliver 
substantial, near-term access improvements.  As those efforts progressed, his delegation wished again 
to make clear that Honduras reserved all its rights in the Article 21.5 proceedings. 
34. The representative of Nicaragua
 said that her country, once again, referred to its previous 
statements on this matter and, at the present meeting,  wished to make a brief statement.  Her country 
followed with special interest the ongoing consulta tions requested by Ecuador under Article 21.5 of 
the DSU.  Having already participated in the Artic le 21.5 consultations on th e EC's banana regime, 
Nicaragua's substantial trade interest in this  dispute was firmly established.  Those earlier 
consultations, together with various informal discussi ons that had been held since that time, had failed 
to resolve the dispute.  The absence of a settlement  to this dispute meant that Nicaragua's banana 
industry, which provided thousands of jobs for the c ountry's rural population, continued to be denied 
any prospect of entering the EC's banana market.  Consequently, in the event that further efforts 
should be made to resolve this issue during the time that remained under Ecuador's consultations, 
Nicaragua reiterated that it maintained its substantia l trade interest in this dispute and any such efforts 
should include Nicaragua as well all other Members who had participated in previous Article 21.5 
consultations.  If the concerns whic h Nicaragua and others had raised in the past with regard to the 
EC's compliance were not addressed promptly and fully, Nicaragua would join other Members in 
reserving all its rights under Article 21.5 of the DSU to  protect its substantial trade interest regarding 
this matter.  
35. The representative of Panama  said that, month after month, the EC had continued to claim 
that MFN access had not been adversely affected  by the US$4.30/box tariff advantage given to ACP 
bananas over bananas from Panama and other Latin American countries.  New information from the 
EC continued to prove otherwise.  The share of  ACP countries was increasing more rapidly than 
expected.  In November 2006, ACP shipments to  Europe had been up 50 per cent compared with 
November 2005. Figures for 2006 were expected to show  an ACP growth rate of at least 20 per cent, 
which had exceeded traditional MFN rates by a factor of more than two.  Total ACP volumes for the 
entire 2006 period were expected to exceed 2005 leve ls by 150,000 mt.  Almost all of this new 
volume, 140,000 mt, had been sold by ACP suppliers  out of quota and under the MFN tariff, which 
had clearly demonstrated how unnecessary the curr ent preferences were.  The EC licensing system 
data confirmed that in January 2007 ACP volumes were already 35 per cent higher than in January 
2006.  Even if the 2007 ACP volumes were to increase by 20 per cent instead of 35 per cent in relation to 2006 levels, such grow th would still mean increases in ACP volume of at least 340,000 mt 
in relation to 2005 levels.  Statistics confirmed that developing country MFN suppliers could not 
aspire to maintain access in the face of ACP volum e increases of this magnitude.  In 2006, traditional 
MFN suppliers had lost 3 per cent of their market share and saw the value of their imports to fall by 
more than US$650 million.  The fall in the value of imports from Panama was expected to exceed 
US$70 million in 2006.  Under current ACP growth rates, all or almost all MFN suppliers would 
experience greater losses in 2007 than in 2006, and it was likely that such losses would escalate out of 
control in 2008, when ACP countries gained unlimited and duty-free access to th e EC.  It was for that 
reason that Panama had participated in the ongoing Ar ticle 21.5 proceedings with a view to bringing 
this unnecessary and ever-increasing injury to an end before it was too late. 
36. The representative of Brazil
 said that her country thanked Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama 
for raising this matter once again.  Brazil was particularly concerned about the systemic implications 
of this situation that the WTO faced regarding th e so-called "bananas dispute".  Although a new tariff 
level for MFN bananas had been provisionally defi ned and applied by the EC, for the moment, no 
definitive tariff regime for MFN bananas had been es tablished.  The tariff applied by the EC had not 
been rebound yet. This created a situation of un certainty and unpredictability for MFN suppliers.   WT/DSB/M/225 
 Page 9 
 
 
  Brazil was not challenging preferential schemes gr anted by the EC to other banana exporting 
Members.  However, the MFN suppliers were entitle d to a clear and transparent set of rules that 
would allow for predictability concerning market ac cess conditions to the EC.  In this regard, Brazil 
urged the EC to take the necessary actions in or der to rebind a definitiv e tariff only regime for 
bananas. 
37. The representative of the European Communities  said that the EC wished to refer to its prior 
statements on why this matter was not an "implement ation issue" covered by Article 21 of the DSU.  
The EC remained open to addressing the concerns of  Latin American suppliers in relation to its 
import regime in the appropriate fora.  The EC was well aware of the importance of the banana 
industry for Latin American countries, as well as AC P countries, and had always taken these interests 
into consideration.  The EC had always been a nd remained committed to maintaining access to the EC 
market by all banana supplying countries. Accordi ng to the data on overall MF N imports available to 
date, the EC had succeeded in this.  Those data gave no reason to believe that such access was not 
maintained. The new EC tariff had thus far resu lted in the increase in imports from both MFN and 
ACP suppliers as compared to previous years.  The EC was committed to maintaining MFN access to 
the EC market.  According to the statistics availa ble thus far, such access had increased as compared 
to access in previous years (by 8.7 per cent as comp ared to 2005, and 6.3 per cent if compared to 
2003-2005).  The EC commitments did not includ e a commitment to "gua rantee specific market 
shares" but only equivalent market access.  The EC had always favoured and remained to favour a 
negotiated solution with interested MFN suppliers on the import regime for bananas, including on the 
question of rebinding.  The EC still hoped that MFN suppliers opted for continued exploration of an 
agreed solution that would address the in terests of all suppliers involved.  
38. The DSB took note  of the statements. 
3. United States – Continued Dumping and Subsid y Offset Act of 2000:  Implementation of 
the recommendations adopted by the DSB 
(a) Statements by Canada, the European Communities and Japan 
39. The Chairman  said that this item was on the agenda of the present meeting at the request of 
Canada, the European Communities and Japan.  He then invited the respective representatives to 
speak. 
40. The representative of Canada  said that while his country appreciated the steps the 
United States had taken towards implementing the ru lings and recommendations in this dispute, the 
United States had only prospectively repealed the Byrd Amendment.  Anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties collected up to 30 September 2007 could still be disbursed to US producers 
under the terms of this legislation.  As such, Cana da believed that the US claim – made in its last 
status report from over eleven months ago – that it had "taken the actions necessary to implement the 
rulings and recommendations" in this dispute was not accurate.  Canada, therefore, called on the 
United States to resume the submission of status  reports and to repeal the Byrd Amendment. 
41. The representative of the European Communities  said that the EC was still waiting for a 
convincing explanation as to how the United States c ould claim to have taken all steps to implement 
the DSB's ruling in this dispute while continuing to distribute to its industry the collected anti-dumping and countervailing duties.  In November 2006, the United States had distributed more than US$380 million to its industry.  This was the high est amount distributed thus far under the CDSOA 
and this even though anti-dumping and countervailing duties collected on goods from Canada and 
Mexico were no longer distributed.  It brought the total amount distributed since the enactment of the 
legislation at more than US$1.6 billion.  These transfers of duties to US industry were WTO-incompatible and should have stopped by 27 D ecember 2003.  As long as these continued, the WT/DSB/M/225 
Page 10  
 
  United States would be in breach of Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 32.1 of 
the SCM Agreement and full implementation would s till have to be delivered.  The EC, therefore, 
again asked the United States if and what steps it inte nded to take to stop the transfer of anti-dumping 
and countervailing duties without further delay.  Th e EC also renewed its call on the United States to 
abide by its clear obligation under Article 21.6 of  the DSU and to submit implementation reports in 
this dispute. 
42. The representative of Japan
 said that his country had to reiterate its disappointment that the 
United States, once again, had not submitted a status report this month regardless of Japan's statements made at the previous DSB meetings.  Despite the enactment of the Deficit Reduction Act 
of 2005, the United States continued distributions under the CDSOA and, more disturbingly, the total 
amount of the latest distribution made only a few months ago had much increased from the previous 
year.  In light of the DSB's discussions thus fa r, WTO Members except for the United States shared 
the view that, as long as this situation did not ch ange, the United States had not fully implemented the 
DSB's recommendations and rulings.  The United St ates had to immediately stop illegal distribution 
under the CDSOA regardless of the sources of duti es collected.  Japan urged the United States to 
provide its status report and comply fully with  the DSB's recommendations and rulings as soon as 
possible.  Japan reserved all the rights under the DSU until full implementation by the United States. 
43. The representative of Brazil
 said that his country was grateful to Canada, the EC and Japan 
for raising this issue again.  At the previous re gular DSB meeting in December 2006, Brazil had posed 
a question to the United States.  Brazil was and con tinued to be truly interested, as were many other 
WTO Members, in obtaining a reasoned explanation from the United States on why WTO-
inconsistent disbursements under the Byrd Amendm ent would become WTO-co mpatible immediately 
upon the entering into force of the Deficit Reduc tion Omnibus Reconciliation Act almost one year 
ago.  He recalled that this legislation, among othe r provisions, had established a prospective repeal for 
the Byrd Amendment with no real effect before late 2007.  In December 2006, as had been the case 
before, the United States had simply stated that "[ it] ha[d] taken all actions necessary to implement 
the DSB's recommendations and rulings in these disputes" .  It was clear that this answer was, to say 
the least, insufficient, in particular for Members, like Brazil, that had gone through protracted, costly 
and burdensome litigation with the United States on this illegal measure.  At a minimum, the 
United States should provide a far more elaborate view on the reasons that should make Members believe that compliance had been achieved in Fe bruary 2006.  Brazil, once again, urged the 
United States to, at least, explain in sufficient deta il the rationale behind its statement of compliance. 
44. The representative of Thailand
 said that, first, his country thanked Canada, the EC, and Japan 
for once again bringing this matter before the DS B.  As stated during previous DSB meetings, 
Thailand strongly viewed that the United States' continued disbursement of funds under the CDSOA 
meant that the United States had not taken the actions necessary to implement the rulings and 
recommendations in this dispute.  In other words,  Thailand did not believe that the United States had 
brought itself into conformity with its oblig ations under the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the 
Subsidies Agreement.  Therefore, Thailand repeat ed its call for the United States to cease these 
WTO-inconsistent disbursements, to repeal the Byrd  Amendment with immediate practical effect, and 
to resume providing status reports until such acti ons had been taken and this matter had been fully 
resolved. 
45. The representative of India  said that his country thanked Cana da, the EC and Japan for raising 
this issue at the DSB yet again. In spite of India's exhortations at previous meetings, India was still to 
receive a response from the United States to its long-st anding question as to how they squared up their 
compliance obligations with the continued disbur sement of collected anti-dumping and countervailing 
duties to their industry, almost fours years after they  should have stopped.  The latest data available in 
the CDSOA Annual Report of the US Customs and Border Protection for the fiscal year 2006 had 
only proved India's point that the United States was not in compliance with its WTO obligations.  In  WT/DSB/M/225 
 Page 11 
 
 
  spite of this, all the United States had done was to re iterate its indefensible position. Such unilateral 
action was indeed regrettable as it undermined the WT O dispute settlement system.  India, therefore, 
again urged the United States to inform the DSB of  the steps it proposed to take to ensure full 
compliance, and reiterated its request that the Unite d States resume submitting status reports in this 
dispute.   
46. The representative of China  said that his country thanked and supported Canada, the EC and 
Japan for raising this matter at the present meeti ng.  China shared the views expressed by previous 
speakers that the implementation issue had not been r esolved in this dispute within the framework of 
Article 21 of the DSU.  China believed that full and prompt implementation was critically important 
to the credibility and efficiency of the dispute settle ment system.  Should the prospective repeal of a 
WTO-inconsistent measure be treated as equal to immediate compliance, the legal requirements of the 
DSU on compliance with the DSB's recommendations and rulings would be greatly undermined.  
Therefore, China wished to join previous speakers in urging the Un ited States to comply fully and 
promptly with the DSB's rulings. 
47. The representative of the United States  said that, as the United States had already explained at 
previous DSB meetings, the US President had signed the Deficit Reduction Act into law on 
8 February 2006.  That Act included a provisi on repealing the Continued Dumping and Subsidy 
Offset Act of 2000.  Thus, the United States had ta ken all actions necessary to implement the DSB's 
recommendations and rulings in these disputes.  T hose Members who had inscribed this item on the 
agenda of the present meeting were, of course, free to do so, but the United States failed to see what 
purpose would be served by further submission of  status reports repeating the progress the 
United States had made in the implementation of the DSB's recommendations and rulings.  In 
response to the question whether it was the position of the United States that it had already implemented the DSB's recommendations and rulings in  these disputes, the United States was clear on 
this point:  with the enactment into law, on 8 Febr uary 2006, of the Deficit Reduction Act, the United 
States had taken all actions necessary to implemen t the DSB's recommendations and rulings.  Finally, 
the United States was surprised by the assertion that  the United States would not have implemented 
the DSB's recommendations and rulings until the last CDSOA distribution had been made.  Of course, 
such questions were for panels to decide. 
48. The DSB took note
 of the statements.  
4. Statement by Ecuador regarding the European Communities' regime for the 
importation, sale and distribution of bananas 
49. The Chairman  said that this item was on the agenda of the present meeting at the request of 
Ecuador and invited the represen tative of Ecuador to speak. 
50. The representative of Ecuador  recalled that, on 28 November 2006, his country had requested 
consultations under Article 21.5 of the DSU with the EC regarding its regime for the importation, sale 
and distribution of bananas.  Although, in Ecuador's view, recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU did not 
require prior consultations, Ecuador had requested such consultations pursuant to Article 4 of the 
DSU and Article XXII of the GATT 1994 with a vi ew to securing a negotiated and mutually 
satisfactory solution by means of this process – a process which could not, in any case, be protracted 
indefinitely.  Ever since late 1991 when the firs t consultations on the establishment of the Common 
Market Organization for Bananas had been held, Ec uador had called for rea listic and pragmatic free 
trade and competition conditions, which would take into  account the interests of all parties concerned.  
Ecuador had, therefore, considered that there we re important elements, such as those taken into 
consideration during the "good offices" process conduc ted by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Mr Støre, which needed to be addressed if  a solution were to be found to this issue.  
Furthermore, the parties involved in this disput e, which had been ongoing for more than a decade WT/DSB/M/225 
Page 12  
 
  now, must make a constructive contribution in the form of real and objective proposals, which would 
enable a satisfactory outcome to all.  In the same c onstructive spirit as that which had prevailed at the 
first meeting between parties and third parties in Geneva on 14 December 2006 and in order to 
maintain transparency in this process, Ecuador had requested that this item be included on the agenda 
of the present meeting in order to reiterate its co mmitment to securing a prompt negotiated solution to 
its legal concerns with regard to the current EC's regime for the importation, sale and distribution of 
bananas. 
51. The representative of the European Communities
 said that the EC welcomed Ecuador's 
willingness to continue exploring a negotiated solution to this dispute. The EC was ready to resume 
discussions at the earliest opportunity.  The EC hoped that other MFN suppliers would follow suit. 
52. The representative Brazil  said that his country thanked Ecuador for bringing this issue to the 
attention of the DSB once again.  As Brazil had st ated at a previous DSB meeting, the statements 
made on the implementation by the EC in the bana nas disputes confirmed the importance of this 
matter not only for the Members directly involved, but also for the WTO Membership as a whole.  All 
Members  would benefit from a thorough discussion of the issues raised by those disputes.  Therefore, 
Brazil would follow all new developments on this matter, hoping that a mutually satisfactory and 
definitive solution to the banana disputes would be reached. 
53. The representative of the United States  said that this was, unfortunately, the longest-running 
dispute in the history of the WTO.  In 2001, the EC had committed itself to shift to a tariff-only regime by 1 January 2006.  As one of the original complaining parties in the dispute that had led to 
the DSB's recommendations and rulings on bananas,  the United States had looked forward to the 
dispute finally being resolved at the start of the previous year.  The United States had heard assertions 
that the data shown that things  were going fine, at least for some.  But, the United States also 
continued to hear reports that the new regime ha d caused significant difficulty for MFN suppliers and 
market conditions for some were worsening.  The Unite d States believed the path to resolution of this 
long-standing dispute was through negotiations.  The United States urged the EC and all interested 
Members to engage in a meaningful dialogue towards that end. 
54. The DSB took note
 of the statements.   
5. United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916:  Implementation of the recommendations 
adopted by the DSB 
(a) Statement by Japan  
55. The Chairman  said that this item was on the agenda of the present meeting at the request of 
Japan and invited the represen tative of Japan to speak. 
56. The representative of Japan  said that his country had requested the inclusion of this item on 
the agenda of the present meeting, because Japan  wished to draw the DSB's attention to the 
regrettable consequence of the United States' par tial compliance with the DSB's recommendations in 
this dispute.  He recalled that in September 2000,  the DSB had adopted the Reports of the Panel and 
the Appellate Body that had found the 1916 Anti-Du mping Act to be inconsistent with the WTO 
Agreements.  The United States had repealed the Ac t in December 2004, three years after the expiry 
of the reasonable period of time.  The repeal was prospective only.  In the meantime, a lawsuit had 
been filed against a Japanese company under the Act in  the United States.  Eventually, as a result, the 
Japanese company had been forced to pay more  than US$35.7 million under the 1916 Anti-Dumping 
Act.    WT/DSB/M/225 
 Page 13 
 
 
  57. As Japan had mentioned in July 2006, this story demonstrated that, as a result of the 
grandfather clause, the United States' implementati on of the DSB's recommendations was partial and 
actually caused the nullification or impairment of be nefits accruing to Japan despite the United States' 
alleged completion of its implementation.  In r esponse, the Japanese company had sought to recover 
its damages attributed to the illegal 1916 Anti-Du mping Act by filing a lawsuit in Japan under a 
Japanese municipal law.  However, the adversary pa rty had made yet another legal move to file a 
motion for preliminary and permanent anti-suit injunctions  in a US District Court.  The District Court 
had granted this motion as it related to a prel iminary injunction.  The Japanese company had 
appealed, and this case was now before the Circuit Court.  Thus, instead of recovering the damage 
caused by the illegal 1916 Anti-Dumping Act, the Japanese company had been dragged into further 
litigation in the United States.  All the inconvenien ces caused to the Japanese company had originated 
from the US partial compliance with the DSB' s recommendations.  As Japan had recalled in 
July 2006, Article 3.7 of the DSU provided that "[ t]he aim of the dispute settlement mechanism was 
to "secure positive solution to a dispute".  The curre nt situation for Japan relating to this case was far 
from such a "positive solution".  Japan reiterated its  call on the United States to take appropriate 
action in good faith in order to secure a positive or satisfactory solution under the WTO dispute 
settlement system including in this case. 
58. The representative of th e European Communities  said that the EC had also brought a WTO 
dispute against the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 an d had also expressed its concerns at the DSB 
meetings on 24 November 2004 and on 19 July 2006 on the incomplete implementation of the DSB's 
ruling condemning the US legislation.  It had al ways been and it was still the EC's position that a 
proper solution to the dispute on the 1916 Anti-Dumpi ng Act had called for a repeal of the Act and a 
termination of the on-going court cases.  It was now more than five years after the expiry of the 
implementation deadline but the United States was still taking WTO incompatible actions in 
application of the 1916 Anti-Dumping Act.  He sai d that the EC fully supported Japan's position.  
59. The representative of the United States  said that his delegation noted Japan's statement and 
would refer Japan's comments to its authorities.  For now, the United States wished to reiterate several 
facts regarding the US court litigation to which Japan  had referred.  First, the court litigation in 
question was not itself covered by Japan's "as-su ch" challenge.  Moreover, it predated the DSB's 
recommendations and rulings in this dispute.  S econd, the court proceeding had revealed that the 
Japanese company in question had not only engaged in dumping, it had, in the words of the 1916 Act, 
done so with "the intent of destroying or injuri ng an industry in the United States."  The company's 
US competitor had been forced to close plants  and lay off employees during this period – and a 
manager for the Japanese company had stated that he was "very pleased" with that outcome.  Third, 
the court litigation had also revealed that the Japanese company in question had engaged in very 
troubling activity.  For example, to make it appear as if it was not engaged in dumping, the company 
had created secret rebates on its sales in the United States.  The company's lawyer had recognized that 
putting the rebate in writing would be "incriminating" and had urged the company's US subsidiary to 
falsify and destroy its business reco rds to conceal the secret rebat es, advice which the company had 
followed.  The United States noted that the US c ourt's decision to enjoin  the Japanese company from 
taking advantage of Japan's "claw-back" law was not related to the recommendations and rulings 
adopted in this dispute.  Finally, the repeal of the 1916 Act ensured that no new cases could be filed 
under the Act.  The United States of course would be pleased to confer with Japan with respect to any 
questions or concerns it had. 
60. The DSB took note  of the statements.  WT/DSB/M/225 
Page 14  
 
  6. Mexico – Definitive countervailing measur es on olive oil from the European 
Communities 
(a) Request for the establishment of a panel by the European Communities (WT/DS341/2) 
61. The Chairman
 recalled that the DSB had considered this matter at its meeting on 
19 December 2006 and had agreed to revert to it.  He then drew attention to the communication from 
the European Communities contained in document WT /DS341/2, and invited the representative of the 
European Communities to speak. 
62. The representative of the European Communities  said that, as it had been stated at the 
previous meeting, the EC had serious concerns about the full WTO compatibility of the countervailing 
measures imposed by Mexico on EC exports of o live oil.  In view of economic and systemic 
significance of this case for the EC, and since th ere was no movement on the Mexican side, despite 
repeated attempts to arrive at a mutually satisfact ory solution, the EC saw no other option than to take 
the next step and ask, for the second time, that a panel be established.  
63. The representative of Mexico  said that his country regretted that the EC had taken the 
decision to request the establishment of a panel.  However, Mexico wished to reiterate that it was 
open to continue working together to try to find a solution to this dispute.   
64. The DSB took note  of the statements and agreed  to establish a panel in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 6 of the DSU w ith standard terms of reference. 
65. The representatives of Canada , China , Norway  and the United States  reserved their 
third-party rights to participate in the Panel's proceedings. 
7. Korea – Anti-dumping duties on imports of certain paper from Indonesia  
(a) Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Indonesia:  Request for the establishment of a panel 
(WT/DS312/9) 
66. The Chairman  drew attention to the communicati on from Indonesia contained in document 
WT/DS312/9, and invited the representative of Indonesia to speak. 
67. The representative of Indonesia  said that his country's request for the establishment of an 
Article 21.5 panel had been circulated to Member s in document WT/DS312/9.  Indonesia very much 
regretted that this dispute had been unnecessarily pr olonged and that it had been forced to request the 
establishment of an Article 21.5 panel due to Kor ea's complete failure to implement properly the 
DSB's rulings.  Rather than implementing the ru lings properly, Korea appeared to have been 
concerned only with maintaining a WTO-inconsis tent anti-dumping measure in place for as long as 
possible.  Indonesia was deeply disappointed that Korea, an exporting country that was frequently 
subject to anti-dumping measures, had shown so little interest in implementing the Panel's rulings in a 
meaningful manner.  Because the continued imposit ion of this WTO-inconsis tent measure imposed a 
significant commercial burden on an important export industry, Indonesia had no choice, but to request further panel proceedings in this matter. 
68. Although Indonesia had a number of concerns with Korea's implementation of the DSB's 
rulings and recommendations, it had li mited its claims to the key issues in the dispute.  The primary 
issue before the compliance panel would be the manner in which Korea had implemented the DSB's 
rulings concerning the calculation, as part of the determination of normal value, of certain sales-
related expenses incurred by an affiliated reseller of the largest Indonesian exporter.  Had Korea 
properly implemented the Panel's findings and otherwise acted consistently with the Anti-Dumping  WT/DSB/M/225 
 Page 15 
 
 
  Agreement on this issue, th e result would have been de minimis dumping margins and hence 
termination of the measure for that exporter.  Ne vertheless, or perhaps it was more correct to say 
because of this, Korea had effect ively left its determination on this issue untouched.  Again, 
Indonesia strongly regretted that Korea had chos en this approach, but was confident that the 
compliance panel would rule that Korea had failed to implement properly the DSB's rulings and 
recommendations and had acted in consistently with the Anti-Dumping Agreement regarding this 
and the other issues raised in Indonesia's panel request. 
69. The representative of Korea  said that his country was disappointed to learn that Indonesia had 
decided to request the establishment of a panel unde r Article 21.5 of the DSU in this matter.  As 
Korea had explained previously, the Korean Tr ade Commission ("KTC") had undertaken a thorough 
process to implement the Panel's decision. Korea w as confident that any panel reviewing the KTC's 
implementation would find that there was no basis for claiming that the KTC's implementation was in any way inconsistent with Korea's obligations under the WTO Agreements.  On 17 August 2006, 
Korea and Indonesia had entered into an understa nding concerning the procedures for considering 
claims that might be raised by Indonesia under Ar ticle 21.5 of the DSU.  Paragraph 2 of that 
understanding provided that, "at the first DSB meeting at which Indonesia's request for the 
establishment of an Article 21.5 panel appears on th e agenda, Korea shall accept the establishment of 
that panel."  In accordance with that understanding,  Korea accepted  the establishment of the panel to 
consider Indonesia's request, subject to the proviso  that Korea reserved its rights to challenge the 
form, contents and sufficiency of Indonesia's request  and any or all of the individual claims stated 
therein. 
70. The DSB took note
 of the statements and agreed , pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU, to refer 
to the original Panel, if possible, the matter rais ed by Indonesia in document WT/DS312/9.  The Panel 
would have standard terms of reference. 
71. The representatives of China , the EC , Japan  and the United States  reserved their third-party 
rights to participate in the Panel's proceedings. 
8. United States – Measures relating to zeroing and sunset reviews 
(a) Report of the Appellate Body (WT/DS322/AB /R) and Report of the Panel (WT/DS322/R) 
72. The Chairman  drew attention to the communication from the Appellate Body contained in 
document WT/DS322/14 transmitting the Appellate Body Report on:  "United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews", which ha d been circulated on 9 January 2007 in document 
WT/DS322/AB/R, in accordance with Article 17.5 of  the DSU.  He reminded delegations that the 
Appellate Body Report and the Panel Report pertaini ng to this case had been circulated as unrestricted 
documents.  He noted that Article 17.14 of the DS U required that:  "An Appe llate Body report shall 
be adopted by the DSB and unconditionally accepte d by the parties to the dispute unless the DSB 
decides by consensus not to adopt the Appellate B ody report within 30 days following its circulation 
to Members.  This adoption procedure is without prejudice to the right of Members to express their 
views on an Appellate Body report".  
73. The representative of the United States
 said that his country welc omed the Panel Report being 
adopted at the present meeting. The Panel had correc tly noted its obligation to undertake an objective 
assessment of the matter before it and not to add to  or diminish the rights and obligations in the 
covered agreements – even where this involve d disagreeing with the Appellate Body.  The 
United States commended the Panel for its careful analys is of the text of the Agreement, read in its 
context.  In a comprehensive analysis, the Panel ha d looked at the issue of so-called "zeroing" in a 
number of contexts in anti-dumping proceedings.  The Panel had concl uded that only in one particular 
narrow context could the Anti-Dumping Agreement be r ead to require a Member to offset dumping by WT/DSB/M/225 
Page 16  
 
  an exporter or producer against non-dumped tran sactions.  In light of the Panel's thorough 
examination, the United States was deeply troubled by the Appellate Body's reasoning in this latest 
report, which had rejected the Panel' s interpretation, but based on infere nces rather than on the text of 
the Anti-Dumping Agreement.  Eight out of the nine anti-dumping experts who had served as 
panelists in recent "zeroing" disputes had conc luded that the Anti-Dumping Agreement did not 
prohibit zeroing outside the average-to-average contex t in investigations, and had so concluded on the 
basis of thoughtful and comprehensive reasoning.   
74. Regrettably, the Appellate Body had rejected th is analysis, without fully addressing its logic.  
Most importantly, in finding that zeroing was prohibi ted in all contexts, the Appellate Body had found 
that the findings of these experts did not even reflect a permissible interpretation of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement, a conclusion difficult to credit, given no t only the expertise of the panelists, but the fact 
that numerous Members had organized their an ti-dumping regimes on the basis of these 
interpretations, a fact the United States would allude  to further.  The United States would not detail 
the flaws in the Appellate Body's analysis here , but would be providing Members with a written 
critique of the report.  As an initial matter, how ever, the United States wished to make several 
observations.  First, in extending its zeroing findi ngs beyond the context of average-to-average 
comparisons in investigations, the Appellate Body had departed from agreem ent language and instead 
had relied on shifting, mutually c ontradictory rationales.  The Appellate Body's reliance on the phrase 
"product as a whole" in the EC's case on zeroing ha d given way to a relianc e on alleged requirements 
relating to "multiple comparisons" in Canada's cas e.  None of these phrases appeared in the Anti-
Dumping Agreement, and to the extent they had b een used in the past by  the Appellate Body in 
interpreting specific agreement language, that was in  the context of the phrase "all comparable export 
transactions," which appeared only in connectio n with average-to-average comparisons in 
investigations.  The Panel in this dispute had alr eady identified this flaw in the Appellate Body's 
reasoning, noting that "the Appellate Body does not  discuss why the fact that in the context of 
multiple averaging the terms 'dumping' and 'margi ns of dumping' cannot apply to a sub-group of a 
product logically leads to the broader conclusi on that Members may not distinguish between 
transactions in which export prices are less than normal value and transactions  in which export prices 
exceed normal value"  (Panel Report, para. 7.101).  Despite having this concer n called to its attention 
in the very report it was reviewing, the Appellate Body  had again declined to explain its leap of logic. 
75. Second, when it had demonstrated that a prohibition of zeroing in the targeted dumping 
context would render that methodology identical in  outcome to that of the average-to-average 
methodology, the Appellate Body's response was one that many Members might find alarming.  The 
Appellate Body had avoided this mathematical e quivalence by concluding that authorities may 
calculate margins under the "targeted dumping" provis ion of Article 2.4.2 based on a subset of export 
transactions.  The United States was not aware of any Member's authorities that had taken this position.  The United States had also noted the c ontradiction between the use of a subset of 
transactions in "targeted dumping" with the Appella te Body's conclusion that the terms "dumping" 
and "product" meant that all transac tions must be considered in average-to-average and transaction-to-
transaction comparisons.   
76. Third, when faced with the fact that prohib iting the calculation of margins on a transaction-
specific basis in assessment reviews would appear to require wholesale changes not only to retrospective duty systems, but also to prospec tive normal value systems, the Appellate Body had 
simply accepted that implication.  The United Stat es noted in this connection that the Appellate 
Body's reasoning called into question how a number of other Members, not limited to those with 
prospective normal value systems, were currently  conducting anti-dumping pr oceedings.  Finally, the 
United States noted that the sum total of the Appe llate Body's findings on the zeroing issue over the 
past several years called into question whether th e major users of the anti-dumping remedy began 
breaching that Agreement the very day it had gone into  effect in 1995.  This was a surprising result.  
Presumably the Members who had negotiated the Ag reement understood its meaning.  As already  WT/DSB/M/225 
 Page 17 
 
 
  noted, the United States would have further comments  on the Report, which it would be providing in 
writing. 
77. The representative of Japan  said that, at the outset, his country wished to express its sincere 
appreciation for the time and efforts devoted to this  case by the Appellate Body and the Secretariat.  
This case involved technical discussions of how to cal culate the margin of dumping and how to levy 
the anti-dumping duties.  But at its very core, th is case was about the dispute over the fundamental 
notion of "dumping" that defined the entire ope rations of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.  The 
Appellate Body had resolved this disp ute by finding that the Anti-Dumping  Agreement had been 
designed and structured so that:  (i) "the concept of 'dumping' and 'margin of dumping' pertained to a 
'product' and to an exporter or foreign producer"; (ii) "'dumping' and 'dumping margins' must be 
determined in respect of each know n exporter or foreign producer" "because dumping is the result of 
pricing behaviour of individual exporters or foreig n producers";  (iii) "anti-dumping duties can be 
levied only if dumped imports cause or threaten to cause material injury to the domestic industry";  
and (iv) the margin of dumping established for each exporter or foreign producer operated as a ceiling 
for the total amount of anti-dumping duties that could be levied. 
78. The Appellate Body had maintained that these concepts did not vary throughout the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement, and had held that "d umping" could be found to exist only for the 
"product", not for a type, model, category, or an individual transaction of the "product".  Thus these 
findings of the Appellate Body, together with its  findings in other previous zeroing cases, left little 
ambiguity with respect to the fundamental concep ts of "dumping" and "margins of dumping" and 
would provide "security and pred ictability" in the interpretati ons and implementation of the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement.  Building on these finding s and after carefully examining the arguments 
the parties had made, the Appellate Body had reach ed the conclusion that the zeroing procedures were 
as such WTO-inconsistent (i) in original investiga tions in the context of the transaction-to-transaction 
comparison method; (ii) in periodic reviews; and (i ii) in new shipper reviews.  The Appellate Body 
had further found that, in addition to specific periodi c reviews, by relying on the margin of dumping 
calculated using zeroing, the sunset reviews Japan  challenged were also WTO-inconsistent.   
79. Japan noted that the Appellate Body had furthe r observed in this report that the "targeted 
dumping" method contemplated in the Anti-Dumping Agreement could "unmask" such exceptional dumping by limiting its application to the prices of  export transactions falling within the pattern of 
such "targeted dumping".  This meant that "tar geted dumping" method would work to address such 
dumping without zeroing, suggesting that the genera l prohibition on zeroing would also cover these 
exceptional circumstances.  In short, the Appellate Body had completed works left unfinished in the 
previous zeroing cases and had deci ded that zeroing was prohibited in all circumstances whenever 
calculating the "margins of dumping".  While the Appellate Body had based its analysis on the definition of "dumping" set forth in Article 2.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994, it had also stated that these definiti onal provisions, "read in isolation, do not impose 
independent obligations".  Japan ha d some reservations in this obser vation. Japan stro ngly supported 
the adoption by the DSB of the Appellate Body Report and the Panel Report, as modified by the 
Appellate Body. 
80. The DSU provided that the adopted Appellate  Body Report "shall be [ ] unconditionally 
accepted by the parties to the dispute"(Article 17 .14).  The DSU further stated that "[p]rompt 
compliance with [DSB recommendations] was essential in order to ensure effective resolution of 
disputes" (Article 21.1) and directed the Member s to "comply immediately with the recommendations 
and rulings" (Article 21.3 of the DSU).  Japan also recalled that the DSU recognized that "all Members will engage in [the dispute settlement] pro cedures in good faith in an effort to resolve the 
dispute"(Article 3.10).  The United States continue d to apply zeroing in a variety of anti-dumping 
proceedings including periodic reviews, which ha d practical, commercial consequences in the real 
world of international trade.  Because the Appellate  Body had spoken, the United States was expected WT/DSB/M/225 
Page 18  
 
  to take action by bringing all of the challenged measures into compliance.  Japan strongly urged the 
United States to take these measures immediatel y to resolve this dispute once and for all. 
81. The representative of Norway
 said that his country welcomed the adoption of the Panel and 
the Appellate Body Reports in the case: "United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset 
Reviews".  Norway had participated as a third pa rty in this case and wished  to offer the following 
comments on the Appellate Body Report.  The issue of zeroing created a long-running conflict in the 
WTO.  Members had seen many reports on this issu e, starting with the "EC – Bed Linen" report and 
continuing with a number of cases against the United States.  It had long been clear that zeroing was prohibited per se  in "weighted-average-to-weighted-average" comparisons in original investigations, 
something which the Panel had set out in no uncerta in terms.  The Appellate Body Report before the 
DSB at the present meeting would, hopefully, settle once and for all the issue of zeroing by setting out 
that zeroing was also prohibited per se  in "transaction-to-transaction" comparisons
2  and in "weighted-
average-to-transaction" comparisons.3  The prohibition of zeroing was not just applicable to original 
investigations.  As held by the Appellate Body in  this case, the prohibition related to all instances 
where an investigating authority calculated or relied upon a dumping margin, be it in original 
investigations, periodic reviews ("assessment proceedings")4, new shipper reviews5 and in sunset 
reviews.6  Although "changed circumstances reviews" had not been directly addressed, the reasoning 
employed by the Appellate Body to condemn zeroing was equally applicable to such reviews.  While 
Norway was in general very satisfied with the Report of the Appellate Body, and supported its 
adoption, it wished to register its concern regard ing one element of the Report.  He referred to 
paragraph 140 of the Report, where the Appellate Body made a statement – not a finding – that:  
"...Article 2.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement  and Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994 are definitional 
provisions. [...]  [A]rticle 2.1 and Article VI:1, read in isolation , do not impose independent 
obligations."  Norway disagreed with this obiter dicta  of the Appellate Body, to the extent that it 
sought to present a general interpretation of the reach  of the two Articles.  While both provisions did 
provide a definition of dumping, Norway considered  that they did more than just that.  Both 
provisions stated that a product "is to be consid ered" as being dumped where certain conditions were 
met.  The language "is  to be  considered" imposed substantive requirements on investigating 
authorities by setting forth the conditions that must be  established before the authorities could treat a 
product as dumped.  Continuing the language of oblig ation, Article VI:1 also stated that due 
allowance "shall be made" for certain things when  the authorities compared export price and normal 
value.  Indeed, unless GATT Article VI:1 containe d independent obligations , there would be no 
obligations regarding the determination of  dumpi ng, and margins of dumping, in the GATT itself – a 
proposition that was both illogical and contrary to pr evious findings by panels and the Appellate 
Body.7  
82. Furthermore, with respect to Article 2.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Appellate Body 
stated in the "US – Hot-Rolled Steel" case:  "The text of Article 2.1 expressly imposes four conditions 
on sales transactions in order that they may be used to  calculate normal value:  first, the sale must be 
'in the ordinary course of trade'; second, it must be  of the 'like product';  third, the product must be 
'destined for consumption in the exporting country';  and, fourth, the price must be 'comparable.'"8  
The Appellate Body had gone on to find that th e United States' measure "does not rest on a 
permissible interpretation of the term 'sales in th e ordinary course of trade,'" in violation of 
                                                      
2 Appellate Body Report:  "US – Zeroing and Sunset", WT/DS322/AB/R, para 137. 
3 Ibid. paras. 133-135. 
4 Ibid. paras. 166 and 169. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. para. 186. 
7 For an example of a panel that found a separate violation of Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994 see Panel 
Report:  "US – 1916 Act" (EC ), para. 6.228.  This finding was upheld by the Appellate Body. 
8 Appellate Body Report:  "US – Hot Rolled Steel" , para. 165.  WT/DSB/M/225 
 Page 19 
 
 
  Article 2.1.9  In this report, the Appellate Body had in terpreted Article 2.1 "i n isolation", and had 
found no violation of any other provisions.  It w as thus clear from the findings of the Appellate Body 
in "US – Hot Rolled Steel" case that Article 2.1 did, indeed, impose i ndependent obligations. 
83. The Appellate Body had made no reference to its  previous report in paragraph 140 of this 
Report.  This might, perhaps, be explained by the f act that paragraph 140 dealt with a very particular 
issue, namely whether Article 2.1 and Article VI:1  imposed independent obli gations, in addition to 
those in Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2, regarding "simple zeroing" in "transaction-to-transaction comparisons" 
in original investigations.  In fact, after making its statement on Article 2.1 and Article VI:1, the 
Appellate Body had formally declined to address this  issue.  No doubt, the meaning of Article 2.1 and 
Article VI:1 would be clarified in future cases d ealing with the requirements of these provisions. 
84. The representative of Hong Kong, China  said that her delegation th anked the Appellate Body, 
the Panel and the Secretariat for their hard work on this very important case.  As Members were 
aware, this case concerned the practice of zeroing, which was one of the most contentious and frequently raised issues in anti-dumping disputes.  Hong Kong, China's stance on zeroing was well known and long standing.  Hong Kong, China considered that zeroing practice, irrespective of the 
comparison methodologies adopted, was inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement, whether it 
was used in the original investigations and subse quent reviews.  Hong Kong, China had participated 
in the proceedings of this case as a third party.  Hong Kong, China welcomed the comprehensive and 
final decision of the Appellate Body.  She noted  that the Appellate Body had reaffirmed the 
interpretations and reasoning of its previous zeroing decisions in relati on to original investigations and 
periodic reviews.  In addition, the clear rulings of the Appellate Body to outlaw zeroing in new 
shipper reviews and sunset reviews, which were new in the WTO jurisprudence, would certainly 
provide guidance to future cases.  The "fundament al disciplines" and "concepts" set out by the 
Appellate Body in para. 107-116 of the Appellate Body Report were par ticularly helpful in explaining 
why an across-the-board and coherent discipline on zeroing was both necessary and justified.  By 
now, there should not be any doubt left of the WT O-inconsistency of the zeroing practice, and all 
remaining disputes should be put to rest.  Th is development was welcome, and conducive to 
enhancing the stability and predictability of the mu ltilateral trading system.  With these observations 
and comments, Hong Kong, China supported the adop tion of the Report of the Appellate Body, and 
that of the Panel, as modified by the Appellate Body.  Hong Kong, China looked forward to a smooth and expeditious implementation of the recommendations of the DSB. 
85. The representative of th e European Communities
 said that the EC had a direct interest in this 
matter, as indeed many other Members, as it was now  awaiting US implementation of the rulings of 
its own Zeroing case (DS294) against the US.  In addition, another 40 measures where the United States had employed zeroing were part in  the DS350 consultation request.  The EC was 
grateful to the Appellate Body not  only for having reversed the Pane l's controversial findings, but also 
for a very comprehensive report which should once and for all solve the problem of zeroing in the 
calculation of margins of dumping.  The Appellate Body had maintained a c onsistent and coherent 
line on this issue, confirming on several occasions that  zeroing ran foul of fundamental obligations of 
the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which were to estab lish dumping in respect of an exporter and a 
certain product and to conduct a fair compar ison between the export prices and normal value. 
86. To the EC, these earlier decisions had already ma de clear that the practice of zeroing whether 
in original investigations or in reviews, whet her in transaction-to-transaction comparisons or in 
weighted-average-to-weighted -average comparisons was per se  WTO-incompatible.  And, it was 
regrettable that unlike the EC afte r the ruling in the "Bed Linen" c ase,  the United States had refused 
the draw the inevitable conseque nces of these earlier decisions. 
                                                     
 
9 Appellate Body Report:  "US – Hot Rolled Steel" , paras. 140, 158 and 240(d). WT/DSB/M/225 
Page 20  
 
  87. The Panel and the Appellate Body had now ri ghtly found that zeroing was one and the same 
practice regardless of the comparison methodology used  or of the type of investigation conducted.  
The Appellate Body had reasserted that this one a nd the same practice breached core obligations of 
the Anti-Dumping Agreement.  The EC trusted that  the outcome of this case would make it crystal 
clear to the United States that "the game is up" as regards zeroing, and that the only way of meeting 
its WTO obligations was to abandon this practice in both original investigations and reviews. 
88. The representative of Brazil
 said that although Brazil had not been a third party to this 
dispute, systemic interests compelled his delegation to say a few words.  First, he wished to express Brazil's great satisfaction with the conclusions arri ved at by the Appellate Body.  Brazil very much 
welcomed the reversal of the Panel's findings th at allowed for the use of "zeroing" in various 
anti-dumping procedures.  Brazil had had the oppor tunity, in the context of other disputes on 
"zeroing", to manifest its expectation that panels would deal with the matter in a manner that would 
prevent the United States from resorting to moving-targ et tactics in the implementation of the relevant 
DSB's rulings and recommendations.  Unfortunately, panels – to different degrees – had fallen short 
of Brazil's hopes.  As a consequence, Members we re regrettably forced to engage in unnecessary 
litigation with the United States.  At the present meeting, however, with the adoption of the 
comprehensive conclusions of the Appellate Body, the DSB told the United States that the room for 
manoeuvring to maintain the illegal "zeroing" meth odology did not exist any longer, if it had once 
existed. 
89. As Brazil had argued many times before, it was clear under the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
that "zeroing" was never permissible.  Paraphrasi ng the Appellate Body's many decisions on this 
issue, Brazil noted that "zeroing":  (i) inflated the margin of dumping for the product as a whole, 
(ii) might lead to an affirmative determinati on that dumping existed where no dumping would have 
been established in the absence of " zeroing", and (iii) this methodology enclosed an inherent bias that 
tainted any investigation or review.  "Zeroing" was,  by definition, the denial of the parameters of 
objectivity and fairness that permeated the wh ole Anti-Dumping Agreement and were expressly 
referred to in Article 17.6 thereof.  By resorting to "zeroing", an investigating authority's assessment 
of the facts could not be "unbiased and objective", t hus rendering the results of the investigation or 
review inconsistent with the WTO rules.  Brazil was glad to note that this rationale underlay the 
Appellate Body Report that the DSB would adopt at the present meeting.  To conclude, Brazil 
believed that, in good-faith and for the sake of the dispute settlement system's proper functioning, the 
United States should implement the recommendations in  this dispute in the broadest way possible and 
in the most expedited time-frame benefiting the whole Membership. 
90. The representative of Chile
 said that almost three years ago, the United States had stated 
before the DSB that "the US method, which t ook into account non-dumped transactions, ensured that 
the amount of duties collected equalled the actual dumping  practiced".  Panel Reports had, however, 
repeatedly concluded that this was not the case a nd that the "zeroing" methodology used by the US 
Department of Commerce was incons istent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement.  The result of this 
practice was that it allowed dumping to be "found" wh ere none existed and margins which did exist to 
be inflated.  The Appellate Body Report before the DSB at the present meeting would put an end to 
this discussion by categorically and definitively ruling that zeroing procedures were WTO-inconsistent irrespective of the comparison methodology and at all stages of an anti-dumping 
proceeding, including periodic and sunset reviews.  Chile had long supported th is position, given that 
not only did it have a systemic interest in the proper implementation of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, 
but also because it had been directly and adversely affected by such practices.  Chile hoped that the United States would adopt as soon as possible the necessary measures to prevent the US Department 
of Commerce from continuing to employ these procedur es.  This final blow should, moreover, lead 
the United States to join the consen sus in the negotiations on Rules with regard to the establishment of 
a specific prohibition in the Anti-Dumping Ag reement on the use of zeroing methodologies, as 
proposed by Chile and other Members.  WT/DSB/M/225 
 Page 21 
 
 
  91. The representative of Thailand  expressed his country's apprecia tion and thanked the Panel, the 
Appellate Body and the Secretariat for their wo rk on this case.  Thailand warmly welcomed the 
findings and conclusions of the Appellate Body Report.   Thailand had participated as a third party in 
this dispute due to its long-standing concern about the use of the zeroing methodology in 
anti-dumping proceedings.  In Thailand's view, the use of the zeroing methodology in any 
circumstances was inconsistent with both the spir it and the substance of GATT Article VI and the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement.  Thailand, therefore, fully  agreed with the Appellate Body’s findings and 
conclusions in this dispute.  It noted that this was the third report in the past year in which the 
Appellate Body had reiterated that zeroing in an y fashion was not permitted under the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement.  The three Reports of the Appellate Body , and in particular the one to be adopted at the 
present meeting, provided a thorough and coherent e xplanation of why this was so.  In Thailand's 
view, the Appellate Body had fully addressed all of th e arguments of the United States, not just in the 
proceedings before the Appellate Bo dy but also in its statements before the DSB.  Thailand trusted 
that the United States would fully implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings by completely 
abandoning the use of zeroing in all circumstances in its anti-dumping determinations.   
92. The representative of China  thanked the Panel and the Appellate Body as well as the 
respective Secretariats for their work towards resolving the dispute concerning the zeroing practice of 
the United States in anti-dumping determination.  China was pleased to note that findings of the 
Appellate Body in this case.  They brought additiona l clarity and certainty to the interpretation of the 
provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.  Thr ough compelling analysis, the Appellate Body had 
rightly confirmed that in determining margins of dumping in an anti-dumping investigation, the use of 
zeroing in the transaction-to-transaction methodology, in periodic reviews, in new shipper reviews, 
and in the sunset reviews was inconsistent with  a Member's obligations under the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement.  Thus, China strongly supported the a doption by the DSB of the Appellate Body Report. 
93. The representative of Korea  said that first of all, his country wished to thank the Panel, the 
Appellate Body, and the Secretariat for their time and efforts dedicated to the resolution of this 
dispute.  Korea deeply appreciated the correct judg ment of the Appellate Body that had rectified the 
problematic findings of the Panel in this highly co ntentious and repeated issue of zeroing.  Korea 
hoped that the Appellate Body Report would be re membered and referenced as a landmark judgment 
that had put an end to a series of disputes surr ounding the egregious practice called "zeroing".  The 
Appellate Body Report to be adopted at the presen t meeting was a clear and stern message that the 
practice of zeroing must cease to exist and Members who had practiced it must respect the letter and 
the spirit of the GATT and the Anti-Dumping Agreem ent.  To constitute a practice of dumping as 
defined in the Agreement, all incidents, high or lo w, advantageous or not, must be considered and 
counted.  Since the inception of GATT Article VI Members had agreed to resort to the trade 
restrictive measure only if such a concept was re spected.  Unfortunately, this fundamental concept 
had long been neglected by some Members, and no w, owing to the Appellate Body's finding, fairness 
and justice had been restored to the system.  Korea welcomed this.  The Appellate Body Report 
contained unequivocal messages regarding this fund amental aspect of the system.  Its brevity stood 
for its clarity and firmness.  Any attempt to circum vent the Appellate Body's finding or to replace the 
existing practice of zeroing by a new one with a similar effect must be denounced.  As long as the concept of dumping established by the Appellate Body stood firm, a distortion in a finding of 
dumping should not be allowed any more, no matter what type it was. 
94. Korea also noted that the Appellate Body ha d made a clear distinction between the duty 
collection system that might vary among Members and the calculation of dumping margin that should observe Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in  all procedures of all Members.  From that 
milestone, the zeroing practice which was inconsistent with the said Article and must stop once and for all.  In this regard, Korea wi shed to share the frustration of Jap an and Norway that the Appellate 
Body had declined to make any findings whethe r zeroing was condemned by Article 2 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement.  The Appellate Body had refused  to do so on the basis that Article 2 of the WT/DSB/M/225 
Page 22  
 
  Anti-Dumping Agreement was a definition clause, but since this clause was the very core element of 
the Anti-Dumping Agreement and zeroing was th e concept definition of anti-dumping,  Korea 
strongly believed that the Appellate Body should  have found that the practice of zeroing was not 
consistent with Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping Ag reement.  Korea believed that the Appellate Body 
had restored judicial consistency in the disput e settlement system of the WTO by correcting the 
misinterpretation of the Panel in this case.  The Appellate Body had established a clear discipline with 
respect to the matter at issue.  Korea expected th at all pending cases that dealt with the same issue 
would conclude in the same way as guided by the Appellate Body.   
95. The representative of Mexico
 said that his country welcomed the Report of the Appellate 
Body and hoped that the United States would take the necessary measures to abandon its zeroing 
practice.  This would enable WTO Members not to spend their resources in order to defend specific 
measures each time the United States had applied zeroing.  He noted that Mexico was currently participating in a dispute that involved such a pr actice, notwithstanding previous decisions adopted 
by the DSB, which had already established that zeroing was a practice that ran counter to the 
WTO Agreements.   
96. The DSB took note
 of the statements, and adopted  the Appellate Body Report contained in 
WT/DS322/AB/R and the Panel Report contained in WT/DS322/R, as modified by the Appellate 
Body Report. 
__________