WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  TN/RL/GEN/155 
22 April 2008 
 (08-1931) 
Negotiating Group on Rules Original:   English 
  
NEED FOR EFFECTIVE SPECIAL & DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT  
FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRY MEMBERS IN THE PROPOSED  
FISHERIES SUBSIDIES TEXT 
 
Submission by India and Indonesia
1 
 
 
 The following communication, dated 21 April 2008,  is being circulated at the request of the 
Delegations of India and Indonesia.  
_______________ 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
 Paragraph 28 of the Doha Ministerial Declara tion provides the mandate for negotiations in the 
area of fisheries subsidies, which inter alia  provides that participants sh all aim to clarify and improve 
WTO disciplines on fisheries subsidies.  The Declaration
2 adopted at the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Conference in December 2005 reaffirmed the Do ha mandate and provides further guidance for 
negotiations in its Annex D, which specifically em phasizes that appropriate and effective special and 
differential treatment for developing and least-devel oped Members should be an integral part of the 
fisheries subsidies negotiations, taking into account the importance of this sector to poverty reduction 
and livelihood and food security concerns.  
  The Chair's draft text on Rules (TN/RL/W /213) has added an Annex VIII on Fisheries 
subsidies to the Agreement on Subsidies and Count ervailing Measures, which has been intensively 
discussed from December 2007 to March 2008.  Many  developing countries ha ve made known their 
strong concerns on the draft text particularly on the provisions relating to grant of Special & 
Differential (S&D) Treatment to developing country Members and the conditionalities of fisheries 
management prescribed to avail the S&D treatment.    In this paper, we make a strong case for e ffective and unconditional S&D provisions in the 
Chair's text.  In Section II, we give a brief backgr ound of the nature of the marine fisheries in most 
developing countries.  In Section III, we analyze the text and explain why developing countries would 
have a problem in accepting the S&D provisions in th eir current form.  In Section IV, we provide a 
similar rationale for the difficulty in accepting Artic le V on Fisheries Management.  In Sections V and 
VI, we give our position on the Notification a nd Surveillance requirements (Article VI) and 
Transitional Provisions (Article VII).  We offer conc luding remarks in Section VII.  Finally, we have 
provided an Annexure, where amendments to the Chair's text on Fisheries Subsidies have been 
suggested.  
 
                                                     
 
1 This is without prejudice to India's or Indonesia’s position on these issues. It is also without prejudice 
to additional views or any future submissions by India or Indonesia on this or other aspects of S & DT for fisheries subsidies in any new disciplines. 
2 WT/MIN(05)/DEC , 22 December 2005. TN/RL/GEN/155 
Page 2  
 
  II.  BACKGROUND ON FISHERIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
 Most developing countries have large sections of  their population involved in fisheries.  More 
often than not, fishing is a means of livelihood in such countries, as opposed to its pre-dominantly commercial nature in developed countries.  Furt her, the fisheries sector is characterized by 
unpredictability and seasonality of catch, where prices obtained for catch on any given day can be 
highly uncertain.  Available evidence also suggests th at coastal fishing communities, in general, have 
lower levels of literacy, a lower sex ratio, and poor er conditions of housing, as compared to national 
averages.
3  Evidence also suggests that fishing commun ities are faced with a deteriorating quality of 
life as a result of pollution, sea erosion, increased pr essure on coastal lands, degr adation of the coastal 
environment and displacement. 
  In addition, the technology used for fishing in developing countries is also very basic, with 
large sections of the fishing community using u npowered boats or at best, vessels with minimal 
motorization (up to 10 Horse Power outboard motors).   For example, 44 per cent of the fishing vessels 
in India are unpowered, but contribute to less than 10 per cent of the marine fish production.  If the 
small motorized vessels (up to 10HP motors) are also taken into account, these, together with the 
unpowered vessels account for about 75 per cent of the vessels and 50 per cent of the fish production.  
Most of these vessels are up to 20m length overall.  Similarly, in Indonesia, 85 per cent of fishing 
vessels are small and traditional, operating mostly in  the territorial waters.  There are about 9,337 
unpowered vessels and 77,339 small motorized vessels, which form this small and traditional fleet.  
Most of these vessels are also about 20m in length. 
  The fishing infrastructure in most developi ng countries is under-developed and in need of 
large doses of state intervention.  For example, India has a long coastline of 8,118 sq. km and an 
Exclusive Economic Zone of 2 million sq. km.  Howe ver, there are only 6 major and 41 minor fishing 
harbours and 2,000 landing sites.  Most of the landing sites are rudimentary and in need of 
maintenance and repair.  Clearly, there is a need to  build more fishing harbours and landing sites.  
  It is therefore clear that developing countries need to protect the livelihood concerns of their 
poor fishermen and also take up major infrastructur e development.  Further, given the public good 
nature of the infrastructure and the involvement of  huge investments with long gestation lags, it is 
clear that the State would have to continue to sup port such activities.  Some of the possible marine 
fishery policies that developing countries need to  develop or are already implementing could be inter 
alia:  
 
1.  Mechanization of country craft and introduction of new mechanized boats 
2.  Taking up repair and maintenance of ex isting harbors and landi ng sites and beginning 
Greenfield projects for new harbours and landing sites.  Overall technological 
upgradation in the fishery sector.  
3.  Provision of training facilities.  4.   Support to small and artisanal fisher men through providing income support, fishing 
equipment and tax waiver on fuel. 
5.  Developing efficient mechanisms to preserve and market the catch.  
                                                     
 
 3 Rural Poverty among Coastal Fishers in India: Profile and Possible Interventi ons. Publication of International 
Fund for Agriculture (IFAD).  October 2003.   TN/RL/GEN/155 
 Page 3 
 
 
  6.  Putting in place effective management techniques on stock assessment of various 
species, using remote sensing to help such  assessment, development and conservation 
of fish stock, electronic tracking of vessels etc.   
 The rationale for the above steps is quite clear.  Small country craft do not operate beyond a 
few miles from the shore and spend much of th eir time in going to and from the fishing grounds. 
Consequently production per unit of effort is low.  Basic mechanization of fishing operations (for 
example, fitting of inboard or outboard motors of  about 10 Horse Power) would enable the fishermen 
to reach deeper into the territorial waters or into  areas in the EEZ contiguous to territorial waters and 
also to fish for longer hours, thereby enabling them to get out of the vicious cycle of poverty.   
 Given the above, it is evident that the Chair's text on fisheries subsidies will not only restrict 
the efforts of developing countries at formula ting and implementing public policies to address 
livelihood concerns of poor fishermen, it will also  hinder their efforts at building infrastructure. 
Moreover, it seems to be unfair to restrict the very subsidies that developed countries have historically 
given to their small and artisanal fisherme n and for developing their infrastructure.
4  
 
 Having analyzed the state of fisheries in many developing countries, it may also be kept in 
mind that most developing countries are Members of  the FAO, where they have subscribed to the 
various agreements such as the UN Fish Stocks  Agreement (FSA) and the Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries (CCRF).  They also have fi sheries management systems in place or are in the 
process of devising and operationalizing such systems.5  However, the FAO agreements are voluntary 
in nature, which gives developing countries the necessary comfort and flexibility.  Hence, committing 
to these systems irreversibly at the WTO is not only undesirable, but would also expose developing country regimes to being challenged thr ough the dispute settlement mechanism.   
 
III.  WHY THE CHAIR'S TEXT MILITATES AGAINST DEVELOPING COUNTRY 
INTERESTS 
 
 The Chair's text is basically a bottom-up appro ach and is organized as follows: Article I lays 
out the subsidies that are prohibited, Articles II a nd III are exceptions to the prohibition, Article IV 
deals with adverse effects, Article V lists th e components of a Fisheries Management system, 
Article VI deals with Notification issues, Article VII addressed the final and provisional measures and 
                                                     
 
 4 Even a demandeur for disciplines on fisheries subsidies such as Norway had a large subsidies 
programme until the 1980s to protect their small and ar tisanal fishermen.  Another demandeur, namely the 
United States continue to give fuel subsidies to fisheries to this date. According to the 2000 APEC study on 
fisheries subsidies, the United States extends ‘diesel and gasoline excise tax exemption’ to the fisheries sector 
since 1951. As per the U.S. Notification to the WTO (WT/CTE/W/80/Add.1, dated 21 September 1999), quoted in the APEC study, the United States  had forgone US$150 million per year in uncollected excise taxes on 
account of this scheme. The programme treats "fishermen comparably to farm ers in the provisions of a partial 
exemption from the motor fuel excise tax for fuel consumed in the course of business". Its objective is to 
"exempt non-highway users of diesel and gasoline from federal excise taxes". 
 5 For example, in India, responsibility for fisheries is spread over several agencies and Ministries at the 
Central and State levels. While the Central government is responsible for fisherie s in the exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ)—marine space beyond the territorial se a up to 200 nautical miles from the baseline—the 
responsibility for fisheries in the te rritorial waters—the marine space up to12 nautical miles (22 km) from the 
baseline—rests with the State governments. At the national level, the basic fisheries legislation is the Maritime 
Zones of India (Regulation of Fishing by Foreign Vessels ) Act, 1981. Fisheries within the 12-mile territorial 
limits are managed under the Marine Fishing Regulation Acts (MFRAs) of the coastal States, which regulate 
fishing vessels in the12-mile territorial sea mainly to  protect the interests of fishermen on board traditional 
fishing vessels. These MFRAs are basically the fisheries management systems, some of which need to be further 
fine tuned and need time to stabilize.  TN/RL/GEN/155 
Page 4  
 
  Article VIII deals with dispute settlement issues.  Out of these, the core concerns of developing 
countries are Articles I, II, III and V.  Let us see why. 
 
III.1  Proposed Prohibited Subsidies (Article I)  
 In general, any subsidy, except in the case of least-developed countries (LDCs), the benefits 
of which are conferred on any fishing vessel or fish ing activity affecting fish stocks that are in an 
"unequivocally overfished condition" is proposed to be  prohibited.  This includes subsidies to fishing 
activities in the territorial sea, EEZ and the high seas.  The legal/biological implications of 
"unequivocally overfished condition" need to be clar ified.  Unlike in the case of temperate waters, it 
can be argued that fish stocks in an “unequivoca lly overfished condition” may not exist in tropical 
waters.  We therefore suggest that the text be amended to reflect the situation in tropical 
fisheries.  
 III.2  General Exceptions (Article II) 
 
 Article II has listed general exceptions to th e prohibition and these apply to both, developing 
and developed Members.  These subsidies are proposed not  to be  prohibited for both developed and 
developing countries subject to the requirements of a comprehensive fisheries management system as 
listed in Article V.  Further, these subsidies can co ntribute to better fisheries management, to greater 
protection of the environment, to greater safety of fishing operations, and to better welfare of fishers 
and fishing communities.  In general, we have no opposition, in principle to the objective of 
environmental protection and conservation.  However,  a careful reading of the list above shows that 
most of the subsidies are likely to be granted in  developed countries, rath er than in developing 
countries, which are yet to build their fleets or deve lop their infrastructure.  Issues such as vessel or 
crew safety, early retirement, retraining or selec tive fishing techniques are predominantly associated 
with conditions of fishing in developed countries.  
 
III.3  Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Country Members (Article III) 
 
 The S&D treatment and its implications for de veloping countries are analyzed below.  One 
thing that must be noted here is that the ex emption from prohibited subsidies is available to 
developing countries only if they have an operationa l fisheries management system as prescribed in 
Article V.  
 
III.3.1  Inshore fishing vessels [III.2(a)] 
  The prohibited subsidies under Article I are proposed not to be prohibited for vessels 
engaging in fishing activities in inshore waters (which in this instance refer to the territorial waters - 
up to 12 nautical miles from the shore where the sove reignty of the coastal State applies).  There is a 
requirement to manage fisheries to ensure sustaina bility and a reference has also been made to the 
fisheries management measures referred to in Artic le V.  However, the following conditions have to 
be met for the non-prohibition: 
 
• Fishing should employ non-mechanized net-retrieval; 
• Fishing activities should be carried out on their own by fishworkers;  
• The catch should be consumed principally  by fishworkers and their families; 
• The activities should not go beyond a small profit trade;   TN/RL/GEN/155 
 Page 5 
 
 
  • There should be no major employer-employee relationship in the activities carried out.  
It will be clear from the above description of fisheries in developing countries that some of these 
conditions such as 'small profit trade' are not clearly  defined.  Others such as 'non-mechanized net 
retrieval', 'employer-employee relationship' and 'catch principally for self-consumption' will be 
difficult to meet.  Some of the boats can have basic mechanization for net-retrieval, particularly where 
the boats occasionally enter the EEZ after 2-3 miles off the coast.  Similarly, in many cases fishing 
operations are performed on employer-employee relati onship basis.  Elsewhere, there are a number of 
operations where fishermen have come together in small groups or formed a cooperative and financed 
the boat by pooling their savings and/or taking a loan.  Finally, the catch is rarely for self-
consumption.  Indeed, since this is their livelihood, the catch is principally for selling in the market so 
that the fishermen can run their homes and send their children to schools.  We would therefore like 
the conditions to be dropped and the referen ce to Article V should also be deleted.   
 
III.3.2  Capital Subsidies for infrastructure de velopment, income support and price support 
(Article III.2(b)(1)) 
 
 Capital subsidies for port infrastructure, fish  landing, storage or fish processing facilities; 
income support for fishers or fishing companies; a nd price support for fish from marine wild capture 
fishing are proposed not to be prohibited for deve loping countries  subject to the operation of a 
fisheries management system as described in Article V.   As described above, developing countries ar e at various stages of developing their 
infrastructures and need the flexibility to pursue their development goals.  Making the exception to 
the prohibition conditional on having a fisheries ma nagement system will restrict the policy space of 
developing countries.  Indeed, as we have argue d above, developed countries have already provided 
these very subsidies historically to develop their fi sheries sector, which in turn has landed us in the 
current situation of overfished waters.  Why then , should developing countries pay this 'management' 
tax without at least developing their fisheries sector?  We would therefore like conditionality of 
Article V to be dropped.  
 
III.3.3  Decked vessels up to 10 m or 34 ft in  length, or undecked vessels of any length 
[III.(2)(b)(2)] 
 
 There are broadly three types of subsidies th at are proposed to be permitted in this sub-
section:  (a) Capital subsidies for acquiring, constructing, repairing,  renewing, renovating, 
modernizing or modifying fishing or service vessels;  (b) operating costs subsidies, including license 
fees, fuel, ice, bait, personnel, social charges, in surance, gear and at-sea support of fishing or service 
vessels;  (c) subsidies to post-harvest activities such as landing, handling or processing activities for 
products of marine wild capture fishing; or s ubsidies to cover operating losses of such vessels and 
activities.  
 
 As is evident from the discussion in Section II and Section III.3.1 above, the restriction of 
10m would render most motorized vessels and many unpowered vessels ineligible to benefit from this 
exemption.  We would therefore like the length of th e decked vessels be raised to 24m and 
conditionality of Article V to be dropped.  
 
III.3.4  Larger decked vessels [III.(2)(b)(3)] 
 
 This sub-section permits  capital subsidies for acquiring, constructing, repairing, renewing, 
renovating, modernizing or modifying fishing or se rvice vessels (I.1 (a)) for other types of vessels, 
possibly larger ones, provided that such vessels would be used exclusiv ely for identified target stocks 
within their EEZ, where these stocks have been s ubject to prior scientific stock assessment, conducted TN/RL/GEN/155 
Page 6  
 
  in accordance with relevant international standards,  and where the assessment h as been subject to peer 
review in the relevant body of the FAO.  If the length of the vessel is raised to 24m as discussed 
above, we have no objection to this provision except that peer review provision should be 
dropped.  
 
III.3.5  Permission for subsidies for access rights in another developing country:  
 
 Subsidies to the fishing industry of a Member to access fisheries resources under the jurisdiction of another developing country Member (III.3) are proposed to be permitted as long as the 
acquired fishing rights are made public, and cont ain provisions to prevent overfishing based on UN 
Fish Stocks Agreement, CCRF and the Complian ce Agreement, and science-based stock assessment, 
regular assessment for management  and control measures, for vessel registries, for reporting of effort, catches and discards to the national authorities of the coastal State and to relevant international 
organizations.   
 This is a provision that puts a number of deve loping countries in a dilemma.  On the one hand 
is the dependence of a number of countries on th e revenues generated by access payments received 
mostly from developed countries.  On the other hand, developed countries would be permitted to 
subsidize their fishing fleets to fish in the waters  of developing countries.  This will basically allow 
developed countries to continue subs idizing most of their fishing activities.  This is because developed 
countries have created the present situation of overfi shed waters in their EEZ and have fanned out to 
look for fish stock in the EEZ of developing countries.  Given the importance of access fees to 
developing countries, we have no objection to the current text in Article III.3.  However, it must 
be explicitly mentioned that even developing countries have the right to access the waters of 
other developing countries.  
 
III.3.6  Fishing in International Waters:  
 
 We note that there is no explicit provision for any disciplines on fishing in the high seas or 
international waters.  We understa nd these waters to mean those beyo nd the EEZ.  Available evidence 
suggests that large scale fishing in international wa ters is carried out in an unsustainable manner, 
which has led to overfished waters in the major oceans and seas.  Not only that, the adjoining EEZ is 
also adversely affected.  We therefore suggest that there be an explicit mention of a notification 
requirement by those fishing in international waters.  
 IV.  FISHERIES MANAGEMENT (ARTICLE V) 
  For granting or maintaining any subsidy, the operation of a fisheries management system 
designed to regulate marine capture fishing is proposed either at the national or regional level.  It is 
proposed to be based on internationally-recognized  best practices for fisheries conservation and 
management.  These practices include UN Fish  Stocks Agreement, FAO Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries, FAO Compliance Agreement,  various FAO technical guidelines and plans of 
action, science-based stock assessment (which is propo sed to be peer reviewed by FAO or its regional 
bodies), and capacity and effort management measur es.  It is further proposed that it would be 
desirable to have fisheries management systems based on limited access privileges such as community-based rights systems, spatial or territorial rights systems, or individual quota systems, including individual transferable quota (ITQ) systems.  It is also proposed that an enquiry point to answer all reasonable enquiries about the fisheries ma nagement system shall be in place.  Such an 
enquiry point would also provide information on measures in place to address fishing capacity and 
fishing effort and the biological st atus of the fisheries in question. 
  Most developing countries have ratified the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and have adopted the 
1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and have embraced international best practices,  TN/RL/GEN/155 
 Page 7 
 
 
  in principle.  Many developing countries, including India already have a science-based stock 
assessment system.  They also have capacity (fleet rationalization) and effort management measures under implementation (mesh size regulations, closed areas, closed seasons, restriction on fishing gear, 
prohibition of destructive fishing methods, prevention of incidental take of turtles, etc).  Various 
measures such as resource-specific fleet developmen t programme (e.g. to harvest the estimated tuna 
potential) are expected to match fishing capacity w ith potential fisheries resources.  However, there 
are a number of measures that are yet to be adopted.  Moreover, many of the measures are yet to be included in domestic legislation
6.  We therefore propose that developing countries be given the 
flexibility to adopt the measures proposed in Ar ticle V and undertake domestic legislation at 
their own pace.  
 
V.  NOTIFICATION AND SURVEILLANCE (ARTICLE VI) 
 
 There are detailed notification and disclosur e requirements for subsidies that are not 
prohibited.  There is also a requirement of adva nce notification of any measure invoking Article II 
(General Exceptions) and Article III (S&D measures) .  If a subsidy is not notified that subsidy would 
be presumed to be prohibited and the subsidizing Me mber would have to demonstrate that the subsidy 
in question is not prohibited.  In the event of a dispute, the panel would seek advice from fisheries 
experts chosen by the panel in consultation with the parties.  The panel may also establish an advisory 
technical fisheries expert group or consult recogni zed and competent international organizations.  
 
 While we welcome the notification and su rveillance requirements, we feel that non-
notification need not be equated to a presumpti on of prohibition since non-notification could occur 
because of a number of administrative reasons (Article VIII.2 Dispute Settlement ).  Further, the 
requirement of advance notification will also be difficult to implement.  We therefore suggest that 
aforementioned presumption and the advan ce notification requirement be dropped.  
 
VI.  TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS  
Article VII requires that a subsidy programme wh ich has been established before the date of 
entry into force of the results of the Doha Round and which is inconsistent  with the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (Article 3.1( c) and Article I ) has to be notified to the 
Committee 90 days after the date of entry into force of these results (180 days for developing 
countries.  Further, these programmes have to be bo ught into conformity with the ASCM 2 years from 
the date of entry into force of the results of the DDA (4 years for developing countries).  While 
transitional provisions are acceptable, we suggest that the period given for conformity for 
developing countries should be raised from 4 to 10 years.  
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
 To summarize, a three tier S&D provision has b een proposed in Annex VIII.  Except for the 
proposed prohibited subsidies on transfer of fishin g or service vessels to third countries [I (b)] and 
subsidies conferred on any vessel engaged in IUU fishi ng [I (h)] all subsidies that are proposed to be 
prohibited are brought under S&D treatment for developing countries, subject to Article V.  
  The implication of the above S&D regime is  that even if a developing country Member 
subscribes to a fisheries management system, only three categories of fishing vessels can benefit from 
S&D provisions: inshore fishing vessels (mainly confin ed to territorial wate rs); decked vessels not 
greater than 10 m or 34 ft in length overall or und ecked vessels of any length; and fishing vessels that 
are used exclusively for specific ta rget stocks within their EEZs.  We have demonstrated above why 
                                                     
 
6 For example India is yet to adopt and implemen t a comprehensive legislation to manage its EEZ 
fisheries (it already has a comprehensive legislation to deal with foreign fi shing in the Indian EEZ). TN/RL/GEN/155 
Page 8  
 
  the S&D provisions will be difficult to invoke if the pr esent text is accepted.  We have also suggested 
amendments that will make the S&D provisions effective.      In the light of the above, and given the deve lopment priorities, food security and livelihood 
concerns of developing countries, we believe that effective special & differential treatment for small 
scale, artisanal fisheries in the new disciplines is essential.  We recognize and share the objective of 
the importance of management of fishery resources to wards sustainable fisheries and have undertaken 
resource management measures, including closed seas on fishing, regulation of mesh size, earmarking 
areas for fishing vessel.  Most developing countries are a signatory to UNCLOS and have also adopted various provisions of the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries even though the 
Code is voluntary.  Further, institutional and lega l mechanisms for manageme nt of fisheries are in 
place, which are also being constantly improve d and upgraded.  Prevention of IUU fishing, 
Management of fishing capacity, promotion of su stainability concept in fishing operations and 
checking over fishing are the main management objec tives in the marine sector.  We are willing to 
engage actively on this subject as on range of othe r issues impinging upon the nature and structure of 
any new disciplines in fisheries sector, special and differential treatment for developing countries, in 
accordance with the Doha mandate as elaborated  in Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration.  
    
 
 
  TN/RL/GEN/155 
 Page 9 
 
 
   
Annexure  
 
(Alternate text proposed by India and Indonesia)  
Additions are in bold letters and deletions are in strikethrough  
 
Article I  
 
Prohibition of Certain Fisheries Subsidies  
 
I.1 Except as provided for in Articles II and III, or in the exceptional case of natural disaster 
relief7, the following subsidies within the meaning of pa ragraph 1 of Article 1, to the extent they are 
specific within the meaning of paragrap h 2 of Article 1, shall be prohibited:  
  (a) Subsidies the benefits of which are conf erred on the acquisition, construction, repair, 
renewal, renovation, modernization, or any other modification of fishing vessels8 or 
service vessels9, including subsidies to boat build ing or shipbuilding facilities for 
these purposes.  
  (b) Subsidies the benefits of which are conferred on transfer of fishing or service vessels 
to third countries, including through the creation of joint enterprises with third 
country partners.  
  (c) Subsidies the benefits of which are c onferred on operating costs of fishing or service 
vessels (including licence fees or similar char ges, fuel, ice, bait, personnel, social 
charges, insurance, gear, and at-sea support);  or of landing, handling or in- or near-
port processing activities for products of marine wild capture fishing;  or subsidies to 
cover operating losses of such vessels or activities.  
  (d) Subsidies in respect of, or in the form of, port infrastructure or other physical port 
facilities exclusively or predominantly for activities related to marine wild capture 
fishing (for example, fish landing facilities, fish storage facilities, and in- or near-port 
fish processing facilities).  
  (e) Income support for natural or legal pers ons engaged in marine wild capture fishing.
 
  (f) Price support for products of marine wild capture fishing.  
 
 
                                                      
7 Subsidies referred to in this provision shall not be prohibited when limited to the relief of a particular 
natural disaster, provided that the subsidies are directly re lated to the effects of that disaster, are limited to the 
affected geographic area, are time-limite d, and in the case of reconstruction subsidies, only restore the affected 
area, the affected fishery, an d/or the affected fleet to its pre-disaster state, up to a sustainable level of fishing 
capacity as established through a scien ce-based assessment of the post-disaster status of the fishery.  Any such 
subsidies are subject to the provisions of Article VI.  
8 For the purposes of this Agreement, the term "fishi ng vessels" refers to vessels used for marine wild 
capture fishing and/or on-board processing of the products thereof.  
9 For the purposes of this Agreement, the term "servi ce vessels" refers to vessels used to tranship the 
products of marine wild capture fishing from fishing ve ssels to on-shore facilities;  and vessels used for at-sea 
refuelling, provisioning and other servicing of fishing vessels.  TN/RL/GEN/155 
Page 10  
 
   (g) Subsidies arising from the further transfer, by a payer Member government, of access 
rights that it has acquired from another Memb er government to fisheries within the 
jurisdiction of such other Member.10 
  (h) Subsidies the benefits of which are conferred on any vessel  engaged in illegal, 
unreported or unregulated fishing.11 
 I.2 In addition to the prohibitions listed in paragr aph 1, any subsidy referre d to in paragraphs 1 
and 2 of Article 1 the benefits of which are c onferred on any fishing vessel or fishing activity 
affecting fish stocks that are declared to be  in an over fished condition shall be prohibited.  
 
Article II  
 General Exceptions
 
  Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I, and subject to the provision of Article V:
 
  (a) For the purposes of Article I.1(a), subs idies exclusively for improving fishing or 
service vessel and crew safety shall not be prohibited, provided that:  
   (1) such subsidies do not involve ne w vessel construction or vessel acquisition;
 
 
  (2) such subsidies do not give rise to an y increase in marine wild capture fishing 
capacity of any fishing or service vessel, on the basis of gross tonnage, 
volume of fish hold, engine power, or on any other basis, and do not have the 
effect of maintaining in operation any such vessel that otherwise would be 
withdrawn;  and  
   (3) the improvements are undertaken to comply with safety standards. 
 
  (b) For the purposes of Articles I.1(a) and I.1(c) the following subsidies shall not be 
prohibited:  
 
  subsidies exclusively for:  (1) the adopti on of gear for selective fishing techniques;  
(2) the adoption of other techniques aimed at reducing the environmental impact of 
marine wild capture fishing;  (3) compliance with fisheries management regimes 
aimed at sustainable use and conservati on (e.g., devices for Vessel Monitoring 
Systems);  provided that the subsidies do no t give rise to any increase in the marine 
wild capture fishing capacity of any fishi ng or service vessel, on the basis of gross 
tonnage, volume of fish hold, engine power, or on any other basis, and do not have 
the effect of maintaining in operation any such vessel that otherwise would be 
withdrawn.  
 
 (c) For the purposes of Article I.1(c), subs idies to cover personnel costs shall not be 
interpreted as including:     
 
                                                      
10 Government-to-gove rnment payments for access to marine fi sheries shall not be deemed to be 
subsidies within the meaning of this Agreement.  
11 The terms "illegal fishing", "unreported fishing" and "unregulated fishing" shall have the same 
meaning as in paragraph 3 of the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal Unreported 
and Unregulated Fishing of the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization.    TN/RL/GEN/155 
 Page 11 
 
 
    (1) subsidies exclusively for re-education, retraining or redeployment of 
fishworkers12 into occupations unrelated to marine wild capture fishing or 
directly associated activities;  and  
   (2) subsidies exclusively for early retirement or permanent cessation of 
employment of fishworkers as a result of government policies to reduce 
marine wild capture fishing capacity or effort.   
  (d) Nothing in Article I shall prevent subs idies for vessel decommissioning or capacity 
reduction programmes, provided that:  
 
  (1) the vessels subject to such programmes are scrapped or otherwise 
permanently and effectively prevented fr om being used for fishing anywhere 
in the world;  
 
  (2) the fish harvesting rights associated  with such vessels, whether they are 
permits, licences, fish quotas or any other form of harvesting rights, are 
permanently revoked and may not be reassigned;  
   (3) the owners of such vessels, and the holders of such fish harvesting rights, are 
required to relinquish any claim associ ated with such vessels and harvesting 
rights that could qualify such owners and holders for any present or future 
harvesting rights in such fisheries;  and  
   (4) the fisheries management system in place includes management control 
measures and enforcement mechanisms d esigned to prevent overfishing in the 
targeted fishery.  Such fishery-speci fic measures may include limited entry 
systems, catch quotas, limits on fishing effort or allocation of exclusive 
quotas to vessels, individuals and/or groups, such as individual transferable 
quotas.  
  (e) Nothing in Article I shall prevent gove rnments from making user-specific allocations 
to individuals and groups under limited acce ss privileges and other exclusive quota 
programmes.  
 
Article III  
 
Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Country Members  
 
III.1 The prohibition of Article 3.1(c) and Article  I shall not apply to least-developed country 
("LDC") Members.  
 III.2 For developing country Members other than LDC Members:
 
 
 (a) Subsidies referred to in Article I.1 shall not be prohibited where they relate 
exclusively to marine wild capture fishing performed on a n inshore basis ( i.e.,  within 
the territorial waters of the Member ) with non -mechanized net -retrieval, provided 
that (1) the activities are carried out on th eir own behalf by fishworkers, on an 
individual basis which may include  family members, or organi zed in associations;  (2) 
the catch is consumed principally by th e fishworkers and their families and the 
                                                      
12 For the purpose of this Agreement, the term "fishworker" shall refer to an individual employed  
engaged  in marine wild capture fishing and/or directly associated activities.  TN/RL/GEN/155 
Page 12  
 
  activities do not go beyond a small profit trade;  and (3) there is no major employer
-
employee relationship in the activities carried out.  Fisheries management measures 
aimed at ensuring sustainability, such as the measures referred to in Article V, should 
be implemented in respect of the fisheri es in question, adapted as necessary to the 
particular situation, including by making use of indigenous fish eries management 
institutions and measures.  without deploying any of the internationally recognized 
destructive fishing methods, provided that  the activities are carried out by fish 
workers, on an individual basis or  organized in associations or on employment 
basis.  
 
  It is desirable that adequate measures for ensuring sustainability and to prevent 
environment degradation are adapted as n ecessary to the particular situation, by 
making use of indigenous fisheries ma nagement institutions and measures.   
 
 (b) In addition, subject to the provisions of Article V : 
 
  (1) Subsidies referred to in Articles I.1(d), I.1(e) and I.1(f) shall not be 
prohibited.   
 
  (2)  Subsidies referred to in Article I.1(a) and I.1 (c  ), shall not be prohibited 
provided that : they a re used exclusively for marine wild capture fishing 
employing decked vessels not greater than 10 meters or 34 feet in length 
overall, or undecked vessels of any length.  
 
   (i)  they are used exclusively for marine wild capture fishing 
employing decked vessels not greater than 24 meters or 82  feet in 
length overall, or undecked vessels of any length; and  
 
  (ii)  adequate measures for ensuring sustainability and to prevent 
environment degradation are adapted as necessary to the 
particular situation, by making use of indigenous fisheries 
management institutions and measures.   
 
  (3) For fishing and service vessels of  such Members other than the vessels 
referred to in paragraph (b ) (2), s ubsidies referred to in Article I.1(a)  shall not 
be prohibited provided that (i) the vessels are used exclusively for marine 
wild capture fishing activities of such  Members in respect of particular, 
identified target stocks within thei r Exclusive Economic Zones ("EEZ"), and 
(ii) those stocks have been subject to prior scientific status assessment 
conducted in accordance with relevant  international standards, aimed at 
ensuring that the resulting capacity does not exceed a sustainable level. and 
(iii) that assessment has been subject to peer review in the relevant body of 
the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization ("FAO")13. 
  
III.3 Subsidies referred to in Article I.1(g) shall not be prohibited where the fishery in question is 
within the EEZ of a developing country Member, provided that the agreement pursuant to which  the 
rights have been acquired is made public,  (i)  those stocks have been subject to prior scientific 
status assessment conducted in accordance with  relevant international standards, aimed at 
ensuring that the resulting capacity does not exceed  a sustainable level;  (ii) that assessment has 
been subject to peer review in the relevant body  of the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
                                                      
13 If the Member in question is not a member of the FAO, the peer review shall take place in another 
recognized and competent in ternational organization.    TN/RL/GEN/155 
 Page 13 
 
 
  Organization ("FAO")14 (iii) the agreement pursuant to which the rights have been acquired is 
made public, and  (iv) contains provisions designed to prev ent overfishing in the area covered by the 
agreement based on internationally-recognized b est practices for fish eries management and 
conservation as reflected in the relevant provisions of international instruments aimed at ensuring the 
sustainable use and conservation of marine species, such as, inter alia , the Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 
10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of  Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks ("Fish Stocks Agreement "), the Code of Conduct on Responsible 
Fisheries of the Food and Agriculture Organization ("Code of Conduct "), the Agreement to Promote 
Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the 
High Seas ("Compliance Agreement "), and technical guidelines and pl ans of action (including criteria 
and precautionary reference points) for the implemen tation of these instruments, or other related or 
successor instruments.  These provisions shall in clude requirements and support for science-based 
stock assessment before fishing is undertaken pursu ant to the agreement and for regular assessments 
thereafter, for management and control measures, fo r vessel registries, for reporting of effort, catches 
and discards to the national authorities of the host Me mber and to relevant in ternational organizations, 
and for such other measures as may be appropriate.   
 
III.4 Every Member deploying fishing vessels in th e international waters shall notify to the 
Committee and relevant international and regio nal fishery organisations the type and 
dimensions of the fishing vessels or service vessels being deployed, the quantity of catch 
removed and the measures adopted to ensure that the removal of fish from areas adjoining the 
EEZ boundary of any member shall not adversely impact the fishery within the adjoining EEZ 
of the other member (s).  
 
III.5 Members shall give due regard to the need s of developing countr y Members in complying 
with the requirements of this Annex, including the conditions and criteria set forth in this Article and 
in Article V, and shall establish mechanisms for, a nd facilitate, the provision of technical assistance in 
this regard, bilaterally and/ or through the appropriate in ternational organizations.   
 
Article IV  
 
General Discipline on the Use of Subsidies  
 
IV.1 No Member shall cause, through the use of an y subsidy referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of 
Article 1, depletion of or harm to, or creation of  overcapacity in respect of, (a) straddling or highly 
migratory fish stocks whose range extends into th e EEZ of another Member. or (b) stocks in which  
another Member has identifiable fish ing interests, including through user -specific quota allocations to 
indiv iduals and groups under limited access privile ges and other exclusive quota programmes.   The 
existence of such situations shall be determined taking into account available pertinent information, 
including from other relevant international organizations.  S uch information shall include the status of 
the subsidizing Member's impl ementation of internationally -recognized best practices for fisheries 
management and conservation as reflected in the re levant provisions of international instruments 
aimed at the sus tainable use and conservation of marine species, such as, inter alia , the Fish Stocks 
Agreement , the C ode of Conduct , the Compliance Agreement , and technical guidelines and plans of 
action (including criteria and precautionary reference points) for the imp lementation of these 
instruments, or other related or successor instruments.  
 
                                                      
14 If the Member in question is not a member of the FAO, the peer review shall take place in another 
recognized and competent in ternational organization.   TN/RL/GEN/155 
Page 14  
 
  IV.2 Any subsidy referred to in this Annex sha ll be attributable to the Member conferring it, 
regardless of the flag(s) of the vessel(s) involved or the application of rules of origin to the fish 
involved.  
 
Article V  
 
Fisheries Management15 
 
V.1 Any Member granting or maintaining an y subsidy as referred to in Article II or 
Article  III.2(b)  shall operate a fisheries management system regulating marine wild capture fishing 
within its jurisdiction, designed to prevent overfishing.  Such management system shall  could  be 
based on internationally-recognized best practices for fisheries management and conservation as 
reflected in the relevant provisions of internationa l instruments aimed at ensuring the sustainable use 
and conservation of marine species. such as, inter alia , the Fish Stocks Agreement , the Code of 
Conduct , the Compliance Agreement , technical guidelines and plans of action (including criteria and 
precautionary reference poin ts) for the implementation of these in struments, or other related or 
successor instruments.  The system shall include regular science-based stock assessment, as well as 
capacity and effort management measures, including  harvesting licences or fees;  vessel registries;  
establishment and allocation of fishing rights, or a llocation of exclusive quotas to vessels, individuals 
and/or groups, and related enforcement mechanisms;  species -specific quotas, seasons  and other stock 
management measures; vessel monitoring which could include electronic tracking and on-board 
observers;  systems for reporting in a timely and reliable manner to the competent national authorities 
and relevant international organizations  data on effort, catch and discards  in sufficient detail to allow 
sound analysis;  and research and other measures re lated to conservation and stock maintenance and 
replenishment.  To this end, the Member shall a dopt and implement pertinent domestic legislation and 
administrative or judicial enforcement mechanisms.  It is desirable that such fisheries management 
systems be based on limited access privileges16. 17.  Information as to the nature and operation of these 
systems, including the results of the stock assessmen ts performed, shall be notified to the relevan t 
body of the FAO, where it shall be subject to p eer review prior to the granting of the subsidy18.   
References for such legislation and mechanism, in cluding for any modifications thereto, shall be 
notified to the Committee on Subsidies and Count ervailing Measures ("the Committee") pursuant to 
the provisions of Article VI.4.  
 
V.2 Each Member shall maintain an enquiry poi nt to answer all reasonable enquiries from other 
Members and from interested parties in other Members concerning its fisheries management system, 
including measures in place to address fishing capacity  and fishing effort, and the biological status of 
the fisheries in question.  Each Member shall no tify to the Committee contact information for this 
enquiry point.   
                                                      
15 Developing country Members shall be free to implement and operate these management 
requirements on a regional rather than a national basis provided that all of the requirements are fulfilled in 
respect of and by each Member in the region.   
16 Limited access privileges could incl ude, as appropriate to a given fishery, community-based rights 
systems, spatial or territorial rights systems, or individual quota systems, including individual transferable 
quotas.   
17 Limited access privileges could incl ude, as appropriate to a given fishery, community-based rights 
systems, spatial or territorial rights systems, or individual quota systems, including individual transferable 
quotas.   
18 If the Member in question is not a member of the FAO, the notification for peer review shall be to 
another relevant international organization.  The specific information to be notified shall be determined by the 
relevant body of the FAO or such other organization.     TN/RL/GEN/155 
 Page 15 
 
 
   
Article VI  
 Notifications and Surveillance
 
 VI.1 Each Member shall, notify to the Committ ee in advance of its implementation any measure 
for which that Member invokes  and developing country Members sh all, to the extent possible, 
notify to the Committee prior to invoking any of  the provisions of Article II or Article III.2;  except 
that any subsidy for natural disaster relief19 shall be notified to the Committee without delay20.  In 
addition to the information notified pursuant to Article 25, any such notification shall contain 
sufficiently precise information to enable other Members to evaluate  comment upon  whether or not 
the conditions and criteria in the applicable provi sions of Article II or Article III.2 are met.  
 VI.2 Each Member that is party to an agreement pursuant to which fishing rights are acquired by a 
Member government ("payer Member") from another Member government to fisheries within the 
jurisdiction of such other Member shall publish that  agreement, and shall notify to the Committee the 
publication references for it.  
 VI.3 The terms on which a payer Member transfer s fishing rights it has obtained pursuant to an 
agreement as referred to in para graph 2 shall be notified to the Committee by the payer Member in 
respect of each such agreement.   
 
VI.4 Each Member shall include in its notifi cations to the Committee the references for its 
applicable domestic legislation and for its notificati ons made to other organizations, as well as for the 
documents related to the reviews conducted by those organizations, as referred to in Article V.1.  
 
VI.5 Other Members shall have the right to re quest information about the notified subsidies, 
including about individual cases of subsidization,  about notified agreements pursuant to which fishing 
rights are acquired, and about the stock assessme nts and management systems notified to other 
organizations  pursuant to Article V.1.  Each Member so requested shall provide such information in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 25.9.  
 
VI.6 Any Member shall be free to bring to the attention of the Committee information from 
pertinent outside sources (including intergovernme ntal organizations with fisheries management -
related activities, regional fisheries manage ment organizations and similar sources) as to  on any 
apparent illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing activities.  
 
VI.7 Measures notified pursuant to this Article sh all be subject to review by the Committee as 
provided for in Article 26.  
 
Article VII  
 Transitional Provisions
 
 
VII.1 Any subsidy programme which has been est ablished within the territory of any Member 
before the date of entry into force of the r esults of the DDA and which is inconsistent with  
Article 3.1(c) and Article I shall be notified to th e Committee not later than 90 days, or in the case of a 
developing country Member 180 days, after the date of entry into force of the results of the DDA.  
 
                                                      
19 As provided for in Article I.1 and footnote 77.  
20 For the purposes of this provision, "without delay"  shall mean not later than the date of entry into 
force of the programme, or in the case of an ad hoc  subsidy, the date of commitment of the subsidy.   TN/RL/GEN/155 
Page 16  
 
  VII.2 Provided that a programme has been notified pursuant to paragraph 1, a Member shall have 
two years, or in the case of a developing country Member four  ten years , from the date of entry into 
force of the results of the DDA to bring that progr amme into conformity with Article 3.1(c) and 
Article I, during which period the programme shall not be subject to those provisions.  
 
VII.3 No Member shall extend the scope of an y programme, nor shall a programme be renewed 
upon its expiry.  
 
Article VIII  
 
Dispute Settlement  
 
VIII.1 Where a measure is the subject of dispute settlement claims pursuant to Article 3.1(c) and 
Article I, the relevant provisions of Article 4 and of this Article shall apply.  Article 30 and the 
relevant provisions of this Article  shall apply to disputes arising unde r other provisions of this Annex.  
VIII.2  Where a subsidy that has not been notified as required by Article VI.1 is the subject of dispute 
settlement pursuant t o the DSU and Article 4, such subsid y shall be presumed to be prohibited 
pursuant to Article 3.1(c) and Article I.  It shall be  for the subsidizing Member to demonstrate that the 
subsidy in question is not prohibited.  
 VIII.3
 2  Where a further transfer of access rights as refe rred to in Article I.1(g) is the subject of a 
dispute arising under this Annex, and the terms of that transfer have not been notified as required by 
Article VI.3, the transfer shall be presumed to give rise to a subsidy.  It shall be for the payer Member 
to demonstrate that no such subsidy has arisen.  
 VIII.4 
3   Where a dispute arising under this Annex rai ses scientific or technical questions related to 
fisheries, the panel should seek advice from fisherie s experts chosen by the panel in consultation with 
the parties.  To this end, the panel may, when it  deems it appropriate, establis h an advisory technical 
fisheries expert group, or consult recognized and competent international organizations, at the request 
of either party to the dispute or on its own initiative.  
 VIII.5
 4   Nothing in this Annex shall impair the rights of Members to resort to the good offices or 
dispute settlement mechanisms of other internatio nal organizations or un der other international 
agreements.  
  
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