RESTRICTED   WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  TN/TF/M/5 
10 June 2005 
 (05-2466) 
Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation  
  
 
SUMMARY MINUTES OF THE MEETING 
 
Held in the Centre William Rappard
 
on 2-3 May 2005  
 
Chairman:  Mr. Muhamad Noor Yacob (Malaysia) 
  
 
1. The Chairman  said that the main purpose of the meeting was to provide delegations with an 
opportunity to make contributions on the agenda of the Negotiating Group (NG) – both in terms of 
offering new input and reacting to the contributions pr eviously received – as set out in the Work Plan 
adopted in November 2004.  Secondly, Members woul d be invited to admit relevant international 
organizations, including the IMF, OECD, UNCTAD,  WCO and the World Bank, to attend the next 
meeting of the Group on an ad hoc basis.   
2. The agenda was adopted .   
A. CONTRIBUTIONS ON THE AGREED AGENDA OF THE NEGOTIATING GROUP  
3. The Chairman  outlined the envisaged structuring of the meeting, explaining that the Group 
would first take up the newly submitted proposals befo re then reverting to the submissions previously 
received, which many delegations had indicated to require further study.  In doing so, Members would 
be given the opportunity to offer feedback both on the contributions received in February and on the 
papers submitted for the March meeting. Input ha d also been prepared by the participating 
international organizations, which again stood ready to  brief Members on their work in support of the 
negotiations, especially in the areas of technical assistance and identification of Trade Facilitation 
needs and priorities. Their contributions would be the third focus of attention in the Group's 
discussions under agenda item A.  As in the past, delegations would be free to address any aspects of 
the agenda in their interventions without being bound  by a particular sequence. Issues could therefore 
be taken up in a cross-cutting manner, covering multiple aspects at the same time.   
4. The representative of Mongolia  presented document TN/TF/W/28, informing that the Kyrgyz 
Republic had announced its inten tion of co-sponsoring the proposal, making it a joint communication 
by Bolivia, the Kyrgyz Republic , Mongolia and Paraguay.   
5. Mongolia wished to inform the Group that those co-sponsors had benefited from 
consultations that had been taking place since the last meeting, especially from a workshop organized 
by UNCTAD and chaired by the Ambassador of the Philippines.  Mongolia had also benefited from 
its informal consultations with the European Co mmunities and with the Japanese delegation, which 
had provided a lot of constructive assistance.  Th erefore, on behalf of the co-sponsors, Mongolia 
wished to thank UNCTAD, the Ambassador of the Philippines, the European  Communities and Japan 
for their contributions on which the proposal was built.    TN/TF/M/5 
Page 2  
 
 6. The proposal was straightforward and spoke dir ectly to the point. The sponsors had assumed 
that the additional proposals made by different Me mbers were very much complementary to what 
document TN/TF/W/28 proposed.  Mongolia and its pa rtners would be working together with the 
other proponents to combine the efforts and come up with a single document.   
7. The representative of Bolivia
 stressed the importance it repr esented for Bolivia to have 
Article V, which was part of the NG's mandate, to be  the subject of debate within the WTO.  After 
more than fifty years during which there had been  an increase in trade relations, new Members had 
joined the WTO and the disciplines had been adjust ed to technological changes and the modernization 
of the mechanisms and practices of the trade chain.  
8. In order to clarify and improve the multilateral provisions on freedom of transit, it was 
necessary to draw attention in a first phase to pr oblems and obstacles that affected countries whose 
territory was surrounded by land borders and for whom  the requirement to use maritime transit  to 
reach extraterritorial markets caused problems due to the distance and logistical requirements which 
created additional costs that affected their comp etitiveness.  Mentioning those problems in the second 
section of Bolivia's proposal was intended to be an introduction to specific proposals that were 
included in the third paragraph, which Bolivia wished to submit for discussion.  The proposal 
suggested that the duties and charges imposed on transit goods would be transparent and well known 
to commercial operators. Bolivia also suggested  mechanisms for a regular review with the 
participation of the sectors and authorities involved in  transit, both domestically and externally.   
9. Although it was necessary to have forei gn trade procedures, rationality, the use of 
international standards and simplification should pr evail and should become the basis for facilitating 
trade and avoiding any delays in customs clearan ce of transiting goods.  Rationality should also 
prevail in the documentation required, which should be limited to what was actually necessary.  One 
would expect that to be reduced in the future because of the increase of technological means which 
was becoming available to all players in charge of customs clearance as well as to users in general.  
That aspect should be reinforced through coordina tion between authorities and the private sector. In 
order to achieve that, some suggestions had also b een made in the area of technical assistance that 
should be taken into account.  
10. The representative of Korea  introduced communication TN/TF/W/34 on GATT Article V, 
which aimed at minimizing the burden on cargo in transit and in differentiating cargo undergoing 
transhipment.  Korea's previous communication TN/TF/W/18 had upheld that the principles of 
simplification, standardization, and transparency  should be embedded in th e relevant GATT Articles 
and should be applied effectively to all Member s.  Those principles should be applied to GATT 
Article V as well.  It was in that context that Korea sought more crystallized methods for 
incorporating those principles into that Article.   
11. As the volume of goods in transit was increasing, Korea found it essential to minimize border 
requirements for goods in transit and to simp lify the transit process for goods not undergoing 
transhipment.  Korea proposed for Members to cons ider reducing documentary  and data requirements 
for goods in transit.  In particular, Members mi ght use a commercial or transport document (e.g., 
commercial invoice, packing list, etc.) as the descrip tive part of the goods declaration, or even accept 
such documents as the goods declaration itself, as recommended in the Revised Kyoto Convention.   
12. Second, regarding transit goods with no tran shipment, Korea believed that such goods should 
be offered minimum requirements with respect to paperwork and fees since there was only a minimal 
risk of goods being released while admitting add itional inspection and security measures for goods 
undergoing transhipment.  Reducing the burdens and simplifying procedures would result in cost 
savings and increased efficiency, allowing for the best allocation of resources.    TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 3 
 
 
 13. To implement such measures, Korea suppor ted the idea of Members reviewing their 
documentary requirements and fees for non-transhippe d goods in transit, as well as those for goods in 
transit with transhipment.  To that end, assistan ce from appropriate interna tional organizations could 
be helpful on terms of guiding the review process and presenting best practices.  Korea stood ready to 
elaborate the proposal in detail and to accommodate Members' suggestions.   
14. Korea shared the concerns of landlocked a nd neighbouring transit Members, especially 
developing ones, as problems relating to transit al so impacted importing and exporting Members by 
increasing costs and causing delays on both sides.  In that regard, Korea remained supportive of 
efforts by those Members to increase transparency of transit and border re gulations, to establish 
streamlined administrative procedures and to furt her simplify border controls and procedures.   
15. The representative of the European Communities  said that the EC paper on transit was very 
much along the same lines as the other submissions ta bled on transit.  All those contributions intended 
to show that the right of freedom of transit estab lished in Article V was often absent in practice and 
that there was some scope for clarifying and improving the rules on Article V which had never been changed since 1948.   
16. Transit simplicity and efficiency was partic ularly important for landlocked developing 
countries (and the papers from Bolivia and others explained why), but it was also an issue for all other 
Members engaged in international trade.  If ther e was no freedom of transit, everybody suffered from 
cost and time delays and business was more expensive.   
17. In its analysis, the EC had consulted a number of  its trading partners and business federations 
representing both large companies and SMEs as to wh at were their major problems encountered in 
carrying out transiting trade. Among the problems that had been cited were in  particular:  lack of 
transparency and predictability as regards trans it rules and procedures and fees and charges;  
disproportionate transit requirements which were not in relation to the policy objective sought; the 
absence of any real regional cooperation between c ountries engaged in the management of transit 
regimes or transit corridors;  and the absence or non-use of international a nd regional standards for 
transit.  Those were examples of just some of the more commonly found problems which frustrated 
freedom of transit.   
18. Obviously the WTO was not a panacea for all of that and could not resolve all those 
problems.  Further liberalization in the GATS of transport services would obviously go some way to 
improve transit conditions.  Infrastructure developm ent by donors, by the World Bank and by others 
would go some way to address problems of inad equate infrastructure, which was also a major 
problem for countries' transit.  But nonetheless,  the WTO negotiations could address some of the 
problems through strengthened and im proved provisions of GATT Article  V.  In particular, the EC 
would advocate trying to elaborate provisions for gr eater transparency in each Member’s or each 
region's transit requirements and procedures.  Seco nd, it would be advisable to establish clearer 
provisions on the fees and charges that could be legi timately levied on transit operations since, under 
GATT Article VIII, any fees and char ges for transit operations should be strictly related to cost, be 
proportionate and not applied retroactively.   
19. There was also a good case for Members to si mplify, standardize and align with existing 
international and regional standard s the data and documentation requirements for goods in transit.  
The EC agreed with the proposal made by Bolivia , Mongolia, Paraguay and the Kyrgyz Republic that 
Members needed to see a much clearer dimension of non-discrimination in Article V between means 
of transport, between carriers, and between types of  consignments. There should also be more clarity 
as regards the choice of routes taken and the right  to choose on the part of transit operators.  TN/TF/M/5 
Page 4  
 
 20. The EC’s analysis and its proposals went very mu ch in the same direction as those of others, 
although the EC proposal was perhaps less prescriptive in terms of the precise solutions that could be 
found in the WTO.  The EC looked forward to discussing the various proposals in more detail.  
21. The representative of Switzerland
 introduced the joint submission by Paraguay, Rwanda and 
Switzerland on the improvement of elements relate d to transit.  Three countries – an LDC, a 
developing country and a developed country – from th ree continents had come together to elaborate a 
joint submission on transit. They shared the comm onality of being landlocked countries.  More than 
any explanation, that grouping was proof in itself that improving the situation related to transit was 
important to all countries irrespective of their state of development. 
22. Landlocked developing and least-developed count ries did not benefit from the same positive 
changes in terms of development than other developi ng countries. Statistics showed that export values 
for all developing countries had grown at growth rates of 3.2% from 1980-1990 compared to 2.9% for 
landlocked LDCs (LLDCs).  But what was more worrisome was that during 1990-1994, that growth rate increased to 8.7% whereas the corresponding ra te for LLDCs had dropped to 0.4%, raising the 
question of whether the situation of landlocked countries was hopeless.  
23. Many European landlocked countries such as Switzerland had demonstrated that it was 
possible to overcome geographical handicap and prospe r. There were some elements that had shown 
to be essential in that regard: the proximity to a large regional market; the economic relationship with 
that market; the development of ad equate national transpor t networks and efficient transport systems; 
the transparency and predictability of transit c ountries’ rules; the degree of coordination and 
cooperation and trust between the pa rties involved; the political will to implement adequate rules; 
bilateral and multilateral arrangements or agreements  between the neighbours; appropriate legislation 
to enforce penalties and sanctions and the promotion of industries and activities that were not sensitive to distance. Switzerland’s own experience with transit arrangements had been the starting 
point to examine a number of existing transit arrangements all over the world, involving also 
developing and least developed countries. 
24. It was interesting to note that there were common features to all transit arrangements 
examined. Those elements had been listed in the pape r. They constituted some kind of best practice of 
elements belonging to transit arrangements and s hould therefore be part of the improvement to 
Articles V, VIII and X. They included (i) Special pr ocedures for transit, (ii) Distinct requirements 
according to the risk involved and the special characteristics of goods, (iii) Common customs 
documentation and procedures, (iv) Limiting physical  inspections and controls, (v) International or 
regional customs guarantee system, (vi) Identif ication of consignments (sealing), (vii) 
Communication, Cooperation and Coordination between authorities, (viii) Cross-border vehicle regulations, (ix) Monitoring, including enhancing transparency and predictability, of the transit 
arrangement, and (x) Promotion of regional transit arrangements. 
25. Many developing countries, particularly l east-developed ones, would need special and 
differential treatment (SDT), based on their capaciti es to implement the mentioned proposals.  That 
was, for example, the case for tho se countries that had no or very little IT in place, or whose banking 
system was not sufficiently developed for customs to  require that transit shipments be covered by a 
bank guarantee. The implementation of those pr oposals would in many cases require that technical 
and financial assistance be exte nded to developing countries, more especially the least-developed 
ones, as envisaged in Annex D of the July pack age. The extent and timing of entering into 
commitments should be related to the implementa tion capacities of developing and least-developed 
Members.  For its part, Switzerland would make ever y effort to ensure support and assistance directly 
related to the nature and scope of the commitme nts in order to allow implementation. Further 
elements of SDT might be proposed at a future date. The modalities and funding for such technical 
assistance needed to be further explored.  TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 5 
 
 
 26. Countries might require technical assistance in the following areas: (i) training on the 
procedures of a transit arrangement; (ii) upgradi ng of systems such as ASYCUDA and others with 
transit modules introducing a certain degree of auto mation to transit procedures; (iii) technical 
assistance to install computerised risk assessmen t; and (iv) support for customs authorities and 
national financial institutions to put in place procedures to implem ent a functioning guarantee system. 
27. Finally, Switzerland also wished to share its own experience.  Switzerland formed part of a 
wider system encompassing Europe: The EU and all EFTA countries.  In the very large majority of 
cases when Switzerland was involved in international transit, the rules defined in two Conventions 
signed in 1987 between the European Community and the EFTA countries were applicable: One 
Convention established a common transit procedure, wh ile the other provided for the simplification of 
import, export and transit forma lities by introducing the Single Administrative Document (SAD). In 
the remaining cases the provisions under the TIR Convention applied.  
28. The most recent reforms of the system – the so-called European- and EFTA-wide "New 
Computerised Transit System" (NCTS) – tended to  bring customs towards the goods rather than 
presenting the goods to customs. The NCTS implied modern techniques such as fully computerised 
procedures; sampling based on risk management; colla boration between customs of the parties to the 
Convention as well as the private sector; and, most impor tantly, an atmosphere of mutual trust. Under 
that system, all information flows were electronic. The overall objective of the NCTS was to enhance the security of international movement of goods while facilitating the latter. 
29. The representative of Rwanda
 recalled the obstacles faced by landlocked countries and 
wished to share its ideas on what could be done at  the multilateral level in tackling some of those 
obstacles.   
30. Rwanda, which was not just a landlocked c ountry, but also a landlocked least-developed 
country, relied on mainly two commodities for exports.  Commodities already faced very low prices in the world market and that was exacerbated by th e fact that transport costs claimed about 50 per cent 
of the value of those exports.  As a result, comp ared to other countries whose transport costs were 
relatively low, Rwanda had not been able to e ffectively benefit from international trade.   
31. In addition, Rwanda's situation was further wo rsened by long foreign trade transactions.  The 
time taken at African customs was the longest in th e world, almost doubling the time taken in Latin 
America and Central and East Asia.  An average foreign trade transaction in Africa was estimated to involve twenty to thirty parties, forty documents and two-hundred data elements , thirty of which were 
repeated at least thirty times.   
32. Having carried out their own studies in Rwanda , Rwanda had found that reduction of border 
transactions and delays alone could reduce transport costs by about 20 per cent.  Rwandan traders had 
also informed that they faced increased costs fro m inconsistent weight li mitations that led to 
significant, unpredictable and opaque fines as we ll as inconsistent transport regulations that 
inconsistently restricted current loads below the capacities of the vehicles.   
33. Rwanda therefore believed that some of t hose problems could be addressed by way of 
clarifying and improving GATT Articles V, VIII and X.  That had been the motivation to share its experiences together with Switzer land and Paraguay, particularly given the different levels of 
development and the different geographical locati on.  Rwanda believed that Members could learn 
from each other and find solutions together, a nd therefore encouraged Members to examine the 
elements that were raised in Rwanda’s, Swit zerland’s and Paraguay’s paper such as the use of 
common simplified documents, special procedures for transit, limited physical inspection and 
controls, transparency and predictability of trans it arrangements, and the use of sealing and regional 
cooperation such as corridor arrangements.     TN/TF/M/5 
Page 6  
 
 34. Implementing those measures had high cost im plications. Therefore, the provisions of 
Annex D of the July package were reiterated. Technical assistance would be key in the implementation of those measures particularly where, as Switzerland had correctly pointed out, 
advanced IT was needed as well as an efficien t banking system for bank guarantees.  Also, the paper 
identified areas where technical assistance would be needed such as training on transit procedures, 
upgrading systems such as ASYCUDA, instrument s of computerized risk assessments and a 
functioning guarantee system.   
35. Rwanda also welcomed that Switzerland would make every effort to  ensure that such 
assistance was realized.  Rwanda also welcomed the other proposals on Article V, which were all very 
important. Rwanda would work with ot hers to improve that Article.   
36. The representative of Paraguay
 said that Trade Facilitation held immense value for all WTO 
Members.  It had even more relevance for those wh o were landlocked and therefore forced to transit 
goods from and to their territory through foreign countries whose legislation and practices were 
beyond their influence.  That pushed up the pri ces of landlocked countries' exports and imports and 
reduced their share of the international market. 
37. In Paraguay's opinion, every Member should pr omote the implementation of trade facilitation 
measures in its territory to the best of its ability .  Otherwise, even with the benefit of technical 
assistance, if the domestic political will was lacking,  it was difficult to undertake reforms capable of 
securing the freer flow of international trade in g oods. Paraguay was also of the view that every 
Member should participate actively in these and any other negotiations capable of providing benefits 
in that area. 
38. In order to achieve proper integration into a trade facilitation process at the domestic level, 
Paraguay had: (i) Approved a new Customs Code taking into account the recommendations of the 
WCO, the Kyoto Convention, the WTO rules and the Customs Codes of MERCOSUR and the EU, with a view to modernizing customs manageme nt, making it more transparent and giving it a 
professional dimension; (ii) adopted measures de signed to streamline customs transactions and 
clearance procedures; (iii) set up integrated c ontrol areas (ACI) in accordance with MERCOSUR's 
Recife Agreement.  In those ar eas, the customs authorities and other bodies carried out integrated 
health, migration and transport controls; (iv) estab lished a register of foreign trade operators and 
introduced parametered customs control processes in accordance with international recommendations 
and standards; (v) set up offices specializing in  deferred control as well as a technical customs 
inspection unit; (vi) taken steps to give effect to international land and river transit standards 
concerning community and regional customs control;  and (vii) introduced a single window for 
exports.  
39. At the regional level, Paraguay was seeking to promote trade facilitation measures through 
negotiations and actions developed both at MERCOSUR level and in the South American region, 
under the Initiative for Regional Infrastructure in So uth America (IIRSA). It w as also joining forces 
with others in the WTO in an effort to clarify and improve Articles V, VIII and X of the GATT, and 
was submitting two communications on transit at the present meeting. 
40. Paraguay had noted the scarcity of papers on Article V submitted at previous meetings, and 
was pleased to see the communications tabled now.   
41. The joint communication by Bolivia, Mongolia and Paraguay comprised a set of proposals 
designed to make goods traffic more fluid, fair and expeditious and less costly .  In Paraguay's opinion, 
the individual proposals should form part of a packag e to be adopted by Members.  Assistance should 
be sought, if necessary, for the implementation of  the proposed measures,  based on respect for 
conditions of SDT decided by the Group.  TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 7 
 
 
 42. The communication Paraguay had submitted with Rwanda and Switzerland presented a 
theoretical approach, aimed at creating a state of awareness of the special situation of landlocked 
countries and the disadvantages inherent in the lack of  a coastline.  It also sought to disseminate the 
experience gained in mitigating the adverse effects of the lack of direct access to the sea, on the 
understanding that that experience could point to wa ys of reducing the impact of geographical status 
on trade competitiveness. 
43. Regional and corridor arrangements were viab le alternatives for improving conditions of 
transit, especially in areas with infrastructur e deficiencies.  Successful experiences under those 
agreements had focussed on the practices specified in poi nt IV of the paper.  Paraguay considered that 
the Negotiating Group should seek to establish standa rds that promote arrangements of the kind 
referred to and the applicati on of the relevant practices. 
44. Within MERCOSUR, some significant steps were being taken to improve transparency, 
expedite customs clearance and control of goods , establish communication and coordination systems 
between customs authorities, and step up action to combat fraud.  However, much remained to be 
done. 
45. Paraguay considered that proper treatment of th e topic in the WTO frame work could help to 
accelerate adoption of trade facilitation measures, while  strengthening regional efforts.  It therefore 
urged WTO Members, especially those whose territo ry had to be used for transit by traders from 
landlocked countries, to endeavour to move those negotiations forward. 
46. Paraguay welcomed communication TN/TF/W/35 from the European Communities, which 
detailed the particular difficulties faced by traders w ith regard to transit and suggested measures to be 
adopted by Members in the framewo rk of the present negotiations with a view to overcoming some of 
those difficulties.  Paraguay shared the general vi ews expressed in the European document, which it 
would therefore like to co-sponsor.  
47. Lastly, Paraguay agreed with Korea that Me mbers should seek ways of creating disciplines 
that ensured the application of simplified cust oms and control procedures for goods in transit. 
48. The representative of Peru  introduced document TN/TF/W/30 which sought to adopt a 
practical approach to the review and assessment of Articles V, VIII and X of the GATT, with a view to improve those Articles or render them more ope rational.  As already pointed out on previous 
occasions, Peru was convinced that that was an ar ea in which concrete results could promptly be 
achieved, thus generating greater market access oppo rtunities for all develope d or developing-country 
Members of the WTO. 
49. The document had been drafted jointly by va rious Peruvian government bodies involved in 
trade facilitation:  the Ministry of Trade (MINCETUR), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Customs (SUNAT), and the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), which were currently engaged in a coordinated and systematic endeavour to make use of the opportunities generated by trade facilitation 
measures. 
50. As far as measuring the economic and trade bene fits of such measures was concerned – and 
although that was not the purpose of that first documen t by Peru – Peru believe d that objective criteria 
could perhaps be developed for meas uring customs release time both before a particular measure was 
applied and after its application, assessing the extent of the increase in trade flows once the measures 
had been implemented.  
51. Peru's proposal contained an important element.   Peru believed that it would be extremely 
useful to have an inventory of the trade facilita tion measures currently applied by Members, which TN/TF/M/5 
Page 8  
 
 could contain, inter alia , the trade facilitation measures being app lied, the beneficiaries of the applied 
measure, the sectors involved in their implementa tion, the rules on which the measure was based 
(Law, Supreme Decree, etc.), and the economic and tr ade-related outcomes of its application. Such an 
inventory would serve two purposes. 
52. First, it would provide an overview of the me asures in relation to each of the Articles under 
review.  That could include the main trade fac ilitation measures adopted by Members, which could 
then be grouped into three categories corresponding to each of the Articles.  That would give a picture 
of the situation with regard to the simplifica tion and streamlining of Members' trade flows and 
provide an understanding of Members' si tuations as regards trade facilitation. 
53. Second, on the basis of such information, deci sions could be taken on the following: (i) which 
measures currently applied by Members had to be en dorsed and encouraged by technical and financial 
cooperation activities and reflected in WTO provision s;  and (ii)  which new measures had to be 
adopted under WTO provisions for further developmen t by Members, with the backing of technical 
and financial assistance and cooperation. That me asure would be completed by a proposal to be 
introduced by China and Pakistan (TN/TF/W/29) on the identification of trade facilitation needs and 
priorities, particularly its section II:A:d.   
54. In Peru's opinion, trade facilitation and proper control of import and export operations were 
two indissoluble elements of any trade mechanism:   facilitating trade between Members while, at the 
same time, ensuring efficient control of that trade.  Such a balance was essential in the current context 
of global trade.  In that respect, technical and fi nancial cooperation was indispensable for Members to 
be able to develop or maintain trade facilitation measures. 
55. The second part of Peru's proposal concerned the measures that Peru considered to be most 
useful in GATT Articles V, VIII and X for achieving the objective of those negotiations, i.e., facilitate 
trade.  Some of the proposals clearly coincide d with proposals which Peru had co-sponsored and 
supported in previous meetings of the Group. 
56. The third part of the document concerned a matter of vast and fundamental importance: 
cooperation and technical assistance.  Peru, as a de veloping country, was committed to the successful 
outcome of the negotiations because of the techni cal assistance it had received. Peru was an obvious 
example of the way in which trade facilitation coul d help increase a country's trade flows and thereby 
contribute to its development.  Peru had r eceived support from various sources and bodies, and 
although it believed that it was necessary to carry on the work that had begun and that Peru would 
undoubtedly need more extensive cooperation in orde r to apply the measures to various specific areas 
relating to trade facilitation, Peru was already noting the practical results of the work that had been 
done. 
57. Peru therefore wished to reiterate that tec hnical and financial assistance and cooperation and 
capacity-building were essential elements of the trade facilitation work programme.  Those complementary processes were crucial to achievi ng proper and effective implementation of trade 
facilitation measures by Members. Technical and fi nancial assistance and cooperation must satisfy 
Members' needs for efficient and transparent impor t and export procedures which, at the same time, 
ensured the control required by customs administra tions.  To that end, technical and financial 
assistance and cooperation must seek to develop th e technical and infrastructural capabilities of each 
Member as well as to build such capabiliti es in areas where they were lacking. 
58. A detailed assessment of the current situa tion as regards the trade facilitation measures 
implemented by Members – whic h Peru believed could be done using the inventory it proposed, 
together with the list of needs and priorities me ntioned earlier – would enable their needs to be 
identified and prioritized.  That, in turn, would make  it possible to determine the kind of technical and  TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 9 
 
 
 financial assistance and cooperation that could be pr ovided, both by the more developed Members and 
by international organizations, in response to those needs. 
59. Peru believed that that was the only way to r espond to the genuine needs of Members and to 
move ahead towards the trade liberalization goals set in that Organization and especially in that 
Development Round. 
60. Lastly, Peru wished to stress the importance of having a compilation of the numerous 
proposals.   There were many areas of convergence that would be fairly simple to organize and consolidate in a table, which would help Members with their work which should begin without delay 
and which involved identifying concrete issues a nd achieving practical outcomes beneficial to all 
Members, especially the developing and least-developed ones. 
61. The Chairman
 said that it was in fact his intention to  consolidate the proposals to allow for a 
better overall view on what had been proposed.   
62. The representative of Hong Kong, China  introduced Hong Kong, China’s proposals for 
improving GATT Articles VIII and X (TN/TF/W/31 and TN/TF/W/32).   
63. Hong Kong, China was of the view that Article  VIII was most important in tackling trade 
facilitation.  Hong Kong, China’s prime objective w as to strengthen the Article to reduce the number 
of fees and formalities.  The focus of its proposal  for Article VIII was on formalities and requirements 
currently covered in paragraph 1(c) of Article VIII.   
64. The existing paragraph 1(c) of Article VIII merely stipulated that Members "recognize the 
need for"  minimizing the incidence and complexity of import and export formalities and for 
decreasing and simplifying import and export documen tation requirements, and did not elaborate on 
how that could be achieved.  To put the statemen t into action, Hong Kong, China’s proposal injected 
the principle of necessity and least-trade restrictivene ss into that paragraph.  It also introduced a self-
review mechanism for fees and formalities.   
65. The proposed self-review mechanism did not defi ne a standard period of time for periodic 
reviews but suggested they should be conducted at reasonable and regular intervals having regard to 
the circumstances of each case.   
66. Hong Kong, China did not envisage substantial costs for implementation or major problems 
of capacity.  Hong Kong, China did, however, appreciate that some Members might not be able to review all of their fees and formalities instantly if its proposal (a)(ii) came into force.  To that end, a 
reasonable time period might be provided to enable  Members to complete the first review.   
67. With respect to the suggested improvements of Article X, Hong Kong, China was of the view 
that, apart from necessity, transparency was a nother important principle.  Hong Kong, China’s 
proposal for Article X mainly served to clarify the time for publication of trad e regulations, called for 
electronic publication and for the establishment of  a mechanism for exch anges with the trade 
concerning administration of trade regulations.   
68. In that regard, Hong Kong, China envisaged th at its proposals for electronic publication of 
information and establishment of a mechanism for ex changes might cause implementation concerns to 
some Members.  Hong Kong, China saw great benefits  to traders if trade regulations were available 
electronically, such as on the Internet.  Many Me mbers had established websites for the dissemination 
of information to, and communication with, their community.  On the other hand, many Members had put in place different channels for exchanges with  traders.  It was therefore believed that an 
assessment of the capacity of Members concerned would give a clearer picture of the extent of the TN/TF/M/5 
Page 10  
 
 perceived problem and help find a solution.  Of course, technical assistance and/or a longer 
implementation period should be provided to thos e Members whose assessment revealed a lack of 
capacity to implement the two proposals.  It was hoped that the two proposals provided inputs for furthering discussions on how Articles VIII and X could be improved.     
69. The representative of Norway
 recalled that reference had been made by Norway at the March 
meeting to the need for standardization of documen ts and the information to be furnished at the 
customs clearance of goods.  The "Single Administra tive Document" had been highlighted, which was 
based on the UN Layout Key as an example of an efficient standardization of customs documents.  
That document had been used in Europe since 1988.  The Single Administrative Document (SAD) 
replaced approximately 70 different national documen ts used for imports, exports and transit purposes 
in 19 countries, and was now adopted by more than 30 countries. 
70. New Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland had agreed  that the idea of standardization should be 
followed up, and Norway was pleased to introduce a joint proposal on "Simplification, Reduction and 
Standardization of Trade Documents". 
71. The problems focused on in the proposal we re the number of documentation requirements 
which a trader or economic operator encountered when  dealing with international trade and transport 
of goods.  The problems were not only the documentati on required but also the language barriers.  In 
many cases, translation into languages the trader had little, or no knowledge of, were required.  That 
was an obstacle for all traders, but it made it partic ularly difficult for SMEs.  Norway believed that 
standardization of documents would give real "trade  facilitation" benefits.  It would simplify customs 
procedures and reduce costs and the use of human  resources at the customs clearance and other 
customs procedures related to border crossing and transit of goods. 
72. The proposal was self-explanatory. The importa nt words were simplification, reduction and 
standardization of documents.  In order to achie ve the results, the measure should go hand-in-hand 
with a standardization of data-elements.  It should also be mentioned, as Norway had done in many of 
its interventions in the NG, that the key word here should be, as in all other areas, transparency.  That 
was, and should be, a basic element for any new measures. 
73. Norway had also introduced the idea of estab lishing an international net-based "bank of 
documents" where the user could choose the lan guage for completing or printing the required 
documents.  With today's data technology and soft ware solutions, it should be possible to develop 
such a "bank of documents".  In fact, it was rea lly not that much different from websites where one 
could choose the language one wa nted to have displayed.  The obvious example was the WTO 
website where one could choose betwee n English, French and Spanish. 
74. Norway wished to emphasize the important role  of the use of the UN Layout Key in the 
standardization of customs documents within Euro pe, and the number of documents that had been 
developed on the basis of that instrument. 
75. The benefits of a simplification, reduction and standardization of trade documents were 
multiple.  Costs could be reduced for both traders and government agencies dealing with customs 
procedures and clearance of goods.  Transparen cy and predictability would be improved. 
76. The proposed measures would not be without cost s, but as the development of international 
standards in those areas would be carried out by in ternational organizations, the national costs should 
be kept at a fairly low level.  It should also be  mentioned that some standard documents had been 
developed and were in use so that there already ex isted some experience to build on.  The training 
would require some costs, but technical assistance from various donors might reduce them to an 
acceptable level.  TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 11 
 
 
 77. The goal was to contribute to greater efficien cy in trade which would benefit traders and 
governments.  It would redirect resources, both hum an and economic, to areas where they were more 
needed.  Norway believed that SMEs and developing  countries in particular would benefit from such 
an improvement, as the larger enterprises would normally have the resources available to tackle those problems. 
78. The representative of New Zealand
 said that the purpose of the co-sponsored proposal 
TN/TF/W/36 on "Simplification, Reduction and Standa rdization of Trade Documents" was to address 
the practical problem faced by traders that aro se from the variety and quantity of documentation 
required when importing or exporting a shipment.  Th e barriers that those co mplexities caused were 
particularly burdensome for SMEs which made up th e majority of New Zealand's traders as well as 
those of many developing countries. 
79. By simplifying and reducing customs documentatio n requirements, and by ensuring that all 
trading partners used document formats based on ex isting international standa rds, one could make a 
real and tangible improvement in the day-to-day activities of traders. 
80. In the paper that New Zealand had submitted previously (TN/TF/W/24), it was noted that 
existing GATT rules (Article VIII) recognized the need  to reduce fees and form alities associated with 
trade, but provided little guidance on how to do this .  In that paper New Zealand had suggested to 
look at practical ways to reduce and simplify current systems and requirements. 
81. The new paper (TN/TF/W/36) developed the id eas and concerns underlying New Zealand’s 
previous paper and provided some practical steps towards reducing current obstacles to trade.  In 
particular, getting all Members to commit to using existing standardized document formats such as the 
UN Layout Key for Trade documents would be a ve ry logical step towards achieving least trade-
restrictive documentation requirements. 
82. In terms of implementation costs, those shoul d be relatively low but the resulting benefits 
significant and easily achieved.  In fact, many Members, including some developing countries, already had documentation systems based on internati onal standards.  The main costs would be the 
resources and training needed to familiarize both traders and customs officials with new and 
simplified documentation.  Those international in struments had been developed by international 
agencies such as the WCO, UNCTAD and UNECE who had funding, training and expertise available 
for Members wishing to adopt their systems. 
83. Members would see that any outgoing implementation costs would be quickly recovered from 
the establishment of a more efficient, smooth, and transparent global trading system. 
84. The representative of Switzerland
 said that simplification and standardization of documents 
was also particularly relevant in the context of transit.  It was not surprising that the transit 
arrangements Switzerland and some other countries ha d with the European market had been replaced 
in 1997 by two Conventions.  One established a co mmon transit procedure while the other provided 
for the simplification of import, export and transit formalities by introducing the Single 
Administrative Document.   
85. Swiss exporters experienced difficulties in areas where no standardized documents existed.  
That was the case with veterinary, medical sanitary and phyto-sanitary certificates.  Swiss certificates had been refused in certain count ries because the heading of the document was misleading.  That 
example showed how important standardization w as and that further work was still needed.   
86. In Switzerland the Single Administrative Document had been steadily replaced by its 
electronic format and using EDI. That was an aim fo r all countries in the long run.  Switzerland and TN/TF/M/5 
Page 12  
 
 other donor countries had invested several years' work in the development of UN electronic 
documents.  A standard available to all countri es would greatly benefit all WTO Members.   
87. The representative of Singapore
 said that enhancing transparency, certainty and predictability 
in the application of border regulations and pro cedures were core objectives of GATT Article X.  One 
way in which border clearance could be exped ited was through the use of advance rulings. 
88. Knowing in advance how customs rules and regulations would be applied minimized 
unnecessary delays and costs for traders.  That woul d also benefit customs authorities by encouraging 
compliance by traders and by minimizing complaints and subsequent appeals. 
89. To date, a number of proposals had been made on the issue of advance rulings. Apart from 
highlighting the benefits of advance ruling programm es, they had also spelt out possible elements for 
such programmes.  They included suggestions to  have advance rulings for issues such as tariff 
classification, customs valuation and duty deferral. 
90. While there were benefits in advance rulings , Members who did not have such programmes, 
might have concerns that they might be difficult or  burdensome to implement.  Members might thus 
wish to have more information on those programmes. 
91. In Singapore’s paper, Singapore shared the main  procedural elements of its advance ruling 
programme.  Through that, Singapore hoped to provi de an example of how  a relatively simple 
advance rulings programme could be established. 
92. Since 2002, Singapore had put in place advance ruling programmes for goods imported under 
two of Singapore's bilateral Free Trade Agreem ents, i.e., the Japan-Singapore New-Age Economic 
Partnership Agreement and the US-Singapore Fr ee Trade Agreement.  However, although the 
Singapore Customs Authorities did not have the practice of issuing advance rulings prior to 2002, it 
was not uncommon for them to respond to informal enquiries from traders, as was the case in most 
countries. 
93. The main objective of Singapore’s advance ruling programme was to lay down clear and 
simple standard operating procedures upon which form al binding advance rulings could be processed 
and administered.  In that regard, Singapore had tr ied to develop procedural elements that struck a 
balance between providing predictability and certain ty to traders, on the one hand, and ensuring that 
Customs would not be overburdened, on the other. 
94. As Singapore’s advance ruling programme wa s put in place only in 2003, Singapore’s 
experience with that programme was rather limite d.  However, Singapore did want to share that 
experience with other Member countries, as that was an important issue for facilitating trade. 
95. Singapore also recognized that least-develope d countries and some developing countries 
might have difficulties implementing advance ruling programmes.  Special and Differential Treatment 
(SDT) should therefore be an integral part of any co mmitment in that area.  In that regard, Members 
might wish to discuss (i) The procedural elements and subjects that should be included in Members' 
advance rulings programmes.  For example, deve loping countries and least-developed countries might 
initially need to commit only to advance rulings fo r tariff classifications. (ii) Longer implementation 
time frames for developing and least-developed c ountries, and other phased-in approaches. (iii) 
Allowing developing and least-developed countries to implement more onerous obligations on a best 
endeavour basis. 
96. The procedural elements set out in the pape r would allow traders to benefit from greater 
certainty and predictability.  At the same time, it would also maintain some flexibility for customs,  TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 13 
 
 
 such as allowing rulings to be modified or revoked un der certain circumstances.  That was an example 
that Members could consider when examining the issue of advance rulings.  S&D treatment would 
have to be an integral part of any commitment in that area. 
97. The representative of China  said that the necessity to iden tify Members’ Trade Facilitation 
needs and priorities was not only highlighted in the modalities for the negotiations but also by a 
repeated call from Members to achieve a desirable result of the negotiations.  Based on the needs and 
priorities identified, it was of equal importance that Members had a clear idea of the current situation 
of their Trade Facilitation efforts.  Only when it was known what the problems were could Members 
know how to work them out.  It was based on the above considerations that China and Pakistan put 
forward their proposal on how to better identify Trad e Facilitation needs and priorities of Members in 
the negotiation process.   
98. It was proposed that Members use a general tool  to assess their needs and priorities as well as 
their current levels of Trade Facilitation.  When  conducting the assessment, due reference would be 
made to the work already done by other internationa l organizations in terms of the tools available.  
The result of the assessment should be taken as a ba sis for establishing the relevant Trade Facilitation 
rules, the arrangement of SDT and the provision of  technical assistance and capacity building support.  
However, given the comparatively late initiati on of the process, China suggested that the 
identification proceeded in parallel with technical  negotiations on specific GATT Articles with the 
identification process facilitating negotiations on specific rules proposed.   
99. The proposal for Members to use a general tool for the identification effort was to use 
comparatively standard criteria for assessment purposes to ensure a clear idea of the existing 
differences among Members in the area of Trade Facilitation.  By conducting the assessment with 
standard criteria, Members could have a better id ea of the feasibility of measures proposed and the 
effort that Members had to take to fully implem ent the eventual rules which could result from the 
negotiations.   
100. Concerning next steps of work with regard to the assessment pro cess, the proposal also 
contained a number of suggestions, such as settin g up a working group made up of international 
organizations concerned to give necessary assistan ce and support to devel oping and least-developed 
countries.   
101. China’s and Pakistan’s proposal was not exhaustive in that regard.  Comments from other 
Members were welcome.    
102. The representative of Pakistan  wished to share with the Group the thinking which had gone 
into the proposal sponsored with China.  
103. The importance of trade facilitation for all tradi ng nations, and in particular for developing 
and least-developed countries, was now fully accepted.  For that purpose, a number of proposals had 
been tabled so far.  Those we re mostly based on various country experiences and suggested a "best 
practice" approach.  However, in Pakistan’s vi ew, adequate attention had not been given to 
identifying all Member's needs and priorities. Unle ss that was done, any trade facilitation programmes 
might not be fully reflective of their best interests.   In order to develop consensus, everyone must 
know the scope of the negotiation. 
104. In Pakistan’s view, self-assessment was the best possible approach against likely demands.  
Every Member, with the help of diagnostic tool s available, must identify its needs for trade 
facilitation. The self-assessment pro cess would identify all the relevant areas of trade facilitation as a 
first step.  In some cases, it might not be easy fo r some Members to conduct such an assessment by 
themselves and they might need capacity building an d technical assistance for that purpose.  After the TN/TF/M/5 
Page 14  
 
 identification of all possible measures, Members wo uld cross-check with their existing system and 
practices.  The gap between desired measures and ex isting facilities would determine the needs of the 
Members. Once the whole universe of needs was on the paper, the Members could prioritize their needs.  The "needs and priorities" so identified th en could be compiled to assess the costs required to 
implement them.   As already agreed, commitments  undertaken in the trade facilitation area would be 
linked with the capacity building and availability of technical assistance. 
105. While making that proposal, Pakistan was mindful that much refinement could be brought 
through a constructive discussion by Members.   
106. The representative of the European Communities
 said that the EC paper joined the 
submissions by China and Pakistan, as well as by th e African Group, in trying to address the needs of 
many Members for technical assistance to carry out trade facilitation and customs reforms.   
107. Through the paper, the EC hoped to demonstrat e that the Communities took that aspect of the 
trade facilitation mandate very seriously and that even  in the absence of any trade facilitation rules or 
agreement, the EC gave priority already to provi ding technical assistance on trade facilitation as part 
of its development aid.  Since 2000, trade had been one of the six development priorities of the EC in 
its development policy and within that, trade fac ilitation and customs reforms had been in itself a 
priority area for trade-related assistance and capa city building.  And that was because the EC 
believed, as did other recipient countries, that tr ade facilitation measures were a fairly efficient and 
rapid way to stimulate trade and economic growth  and, in the long-term, poverty reduction.   
108. The EC document listed a number of examples  of the current range of trade facilitation 
programmes and projects the Communities were ca rrying out together with their development 
partners.  They ranged from very modest activitie s, such as a recent trade facilitation seminar in 
Shanghai that the EC had conducted together with the World Bank, to quite ambitious ones, such as 
the sixty million euro project the EC was engaged in in Egypt alone, aimed at working with Egypt to 
completely overhaul its customs administration in order to improve that partner’s export and trade 
performance.  The EC had also indicated in the Anne x of that document much of the work that the EC 
was carrying out in the ACP region, in Africa (partic ularly Sub-Saharan Africa), in the Caribbean and 
other parts of Asia.   
109. The document identified a number of the basic lessons and conclusions that the EC had drawn 
from the process of providing technical assistance in the area of trade facilitation.  The first and rather 
obvious was the importance of the political commitment  by both the donor and the recipient of aid to 
use that aid effectively to make a difference.  Related to that was the fact that programming the 
provision of technical assistance must be determined and driven by the needs and interests of the 
recipient country. In its technical assistance pr ogrammes, the EC responded to the requests and 
demands of recipient developing-country partners  and designed its programmes based on their own 
prioritization, their own requests.   
110. Another very important element in the success of development aid projects in that field was 
obviously cooperation and the degree of coordination between different donors, for example, between 
the Communities, the World Bank, the IMF, World Cu stoms Organization, US Aid and other bilateral 
donors.    
111. Equally important was the involvement of all actor s in trade facilitation.  It was not enough to 
design or carry out a programme simply in conjunction with a country's Ministry of Finance or Ministry of Trade.  There needed to be involvement  of all government departments who were affected 
or potentially affected by trade facilitation reforms.  There had to be also involvement of the local 
private sector, freight forwarders, importers, exporters  and carriers because at the end of the day they  TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 15 
 
 
 were the ones most obviously affected by change a nd they could give very practical advice to the 
government partners as to how to desi gn good quality measures and reforms.   
112. Another important element in the aid programming had been the proper sequencing of 
different trade facilitation measures.  The very firs t step was to carry out a needs assessment. In 
response to the paper tabled by China and Pakistan, which had also identified the same need, it should 
be said that there were now some quite useful and tried and tested diagnostic tools available, operated 
by the World Bank and the WCO to carry out need s assessments in countries to see what were the 
needs, where were the lacunae and therefore wh at facilitation measures could be introduced as a 
priority.  Having carried out the needs assessment,  the sequencing became very important.  In the 
EC’s experience, improving the transparency of re gulations and procedures was absolutely essential 
from the very start of any programme involving all interested parties from the private sector.  If there 
were only two things which any coun try would be well advised to do in order to facilitate trade, it 
would be those two things:  more transparency an d the more systematic involvement of the local 
private sector in the design and application of facilitation measures.   
113. The document also gave some indications of  the regional programmes that the Communities 
were involved in.  One example of that was the wo rk the EC did with its MERCOSUR partners.  One 
of the important policies on opening the nego tiations with MERCOSUR on a EU-MERCOSUR Free 
Trade Agreement, and one of the important elemen ts in that process was to work with MERCOSUR 
countries to encourage more functionable custom s unions and an effective single market in 
MERCOSUR comparable to the European single mark et. Trade facilitation obviously had been a very 
important aspect in that process.  The same approa ch mutatis mutandis would be taken in the EC’s 
work with the ACP countries.  The EC was now engaged in six negotiatio ns with different ACP 
regions to negotiate no later than 2008 a set of economic partnership agreem ents.  Agreements to 
promote cooperation and development and trade fac ilitation would be a very important component of 
those negotiations aimed first and foremost at improving the level of regional integration and 
economies of scale in the six ACP regions with whom the EC was working.  It was clear that 
improving transit regimes and transit corridors with in each of those regions was very important.   
114. There already was a very substantial aid e ffort underway from many other bilateral donors 
and multilateral organizations.  Perhaps the missing link was that there were no precise WTO commitments at that point which could give more precision and clearer agreed targets to which aid 
could be addressed.  Certainly, the EC saw the need in the future to increase the levels of assistance 
for trade facilitation.  The EC was committed to doing that and, as part of its contribution to meeting 
the UN Millennium development goals, the EC was pressing for an increase in ODA not only from 
the EC side but also the side of others to – among other things – increase the amount of aid available for improving the systems and infrastructure in Africa.   
115. With respect to infrastructure, it was the EC’s understanding that hard in frastructure, covering 
areas such as roads, ports and the like, was not part of that negotiation process. The EC would not 
favour the setting of any WTO rules which required Memb ers to build roads or por ts or railway lines.  
That was outside the cope of that work and not part of the process.  However, it was very clear that for 
countries to maximize the benefits of any WTO tr ade facilitation measure, im proving the supply side, 
the infrastructure capacity would be part of the solu tion.  And in that area, too, the EC was devoting 
considerable resources and effort. The paper gave some examples of the infrastructure projects the EC was involved in, which, although not part of that process, were essential for countries to really reap 
the gains of trade.   
116. Members had to think carefully about how to build the actual linkage between the discussions 
taking place in Geneva on the different GATT Articl es and on the other elements of the mandate and 
the fact that in parallel to that discussion, many Members were engaged in substantial programmes of 
technical assistance and capacity building.  It was not necessary to reinvent the wheel or to establish TN/TF/M/5 
Page 16  
 
 new elaborate structures within the WTO for the coordination of various aid efforts.  But, as 
recognized by China and Pakistan in their paper, Members had to think about some way to keep track of the work underway within the context of the Ge neva process.  Members also had to be confident 
that donors, recipients and international organizations  were carrying out technical assistance and that 
there was some kind of matching between the commitments which were progressively beginning to 
emerge and the aid being provided, which w as hoped to be increasingly aligned towards the 
commitments Members were talking about in the Negotiating Group.  The EC therefore encouraged 
others to also focus on how to most effectively build  that linkage in a way that improved transparency 
and allowed to verify that there was a degree of c oordination between that process and the aid process 
without creating new structures, which was really not the business of the WTO.   
117. The representative of Rwanda,
 speaking on behalf of the African Group , said that the African 
Group recognized the importance of trade facilitati on for the attainment of their development 
objectives through, inter alia , estimating the competitiveness of African enterprises, which mostly 
were ranked as small and medium ones.  Annex D represented a new paradigm as it entailed a direct 
linkage between the commitments to be undertaken  by developing countries and the provision of 
technical assistance and capacity-building support.  It was the expectation of the African Group that 
that commitment would be made both in letter and in spirit.  The proposal by the African Group was 
of a preliminary nature.  The Group intended to subm it more specific ones at a later stage.  For the 
moment, the document's objectives were the following:   (i) to share the Group's perspective on the 
mandate of Trade Facilitation;  (ii) to identify th e basis on which trade facilitation needs and priorities 
of African countries could be identified as well as the cost implications of any proposed measures;  
(iii) to set out S&D parameters as well the scope for inter-agency cooperation;  and (iv) to make 
preliminary observations on proposals submitted so far by other WTO Members.   
118. The African Group recognized that the identif ication of trade facilitation needs and the 
priorities of Africa must be undertaken urgently.  In  that regard, three events had recently taken place 
on the African continent and under the aegis of th e African Union which brought together customs 
experts in Addis Ababa from 4-6 April, and the Director-Generals of African Customs 
Administrations in Kigali from 18-28 April.  Th ose two events allowed for a better interaction 
between Customs administrations and economic cor porations of African countries.  The African 
Group aimed at identifying its trade facilitation need s and priorities on a more concrete basis as a 
result of the interaction between Customs administrations and business communities.  The Group would call upon international organizations to assist in  that process.  A number of proposals had been 
submitted so far, and some of them stretched the limit of the mandate of A nnex D and some others 
played down the cost implications of their implementation.  Members had to address the balance between ambition and cost implica tions of all proposals.  Finally, the African Group wished to see 
trade facilitation proposals that included SDT th at was legally binding, precise, effective and 
operational.  The African Group woul d submit specific proposals later. 
119. The representative of Djibouti
 wished to add to the statemen t by Rwanda to clarify what 
Djibouti expected to achieve through the negotiations  on Trade Facilitation.  The concerns of African 
and least-developed countries regarding the easing of human and financial resource constraints 
emerged as a major issue from the trade facilitation aspects of the July Package.  
120. The linkages between those resource constraints and technical barriers to trade, certification 
procedures and the like should be clarified so that African and least-developed countries could 
manage questions relating to trade facilitation. It was necessary to make clear that the modalities for 
negotiations on trade facilitation extend ed beyond mere customs procedures. 
121. S&D treatment provisions benefiting African and least-developed countri es had to be clearly 
identified and it one had to look into how their proper implementation could be guaranteed.    TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 17 
 
 
 122. Djibouti expected the organization of workshops  to enable negotiators involved in trade 
facilitation to understand the technical aspects of Ar ticles V, VIII and X of the GATT and to gain a 
general overview of the instruments, rules and trad e facilitation approaches that could help them to: 
(i) analyse and negotiate the technical aspects of Articles V, VIII and X of the GATT in the 
framework of the ongoing Doha Work Programme; (ii) examine the global approach to trade 
facilitation and its precise contribution to economic development in their respective countries; (iii) 
draw up a list of priorities to be considered with a view to future implementation of the results of the 
negotiations.  
123. Djibouti agreed with what the EC had said a bout the coordination of technical assistance 
through international institutions and donors. There should be no dilu tion of technical assistance and it 
was important to coordinate its donation to actually achieve results through that support. At the same 
time, while it was all very well to train customs offi cers, transporters and the private sector to work 
together, the existing infrastructure in a country could pose real problems when it came to transporting goods from one country to another,  problems countries often did not know how to 
resolve. Between the port of Djibouti, for instan ce, and Addis Ababa 800 km had to be covered, 
which took trucks three to four days because the ro ads were in bad shape. That was something that 
could not be ignored by saying it that it did not fa ll within the scope of the negotiations. It must be 
considered in the light of the negotiatio ns and in parallel with them.     
124. The representative of Switzerland 
said that during the March session, a number of delegations 
had voiced their disappointment that S&D had so far not been dealt with in a sufficiently precise and 
operational manner.  Certainly, it was not enough to assure developing countries of the proponents’ 
willingness to deal with S&D properly during the negotiations;  it was necessary to come up with 
concrete ideas. Switzerland had st arted its brainstorming on S&D in trade facilitation more than two 
years ago, especially since the modalities for negotiati ons existed as contained in Annex D of the July 
package. Yet, every time one tried to tackle the ma tter, it became clear how difficult it was to come up 
with effective ideas which would satisfy three diffe rent parties: (i) traders, which were looking 
forward to an ambitious outcome; (ii) developing countries, especially landlocked and least developed 
ones, who, in terms of competitiveness were also  interested in an ambitious outcome, but whose 
administrative and institutional capabilities might no t always be sufficient to undertake all desired 
trade facilitation measures; and (iii) donors, who need ed to assure that their limited resources were 
used in an effective manner and would benefit those countries who did not have the financial 
capacities to cope with the investme nts induced by the commitments. 
125. The aim of Switzerland’s intervention was to share some of those preliminary ideas on S&D 
and send the message to all delegations that Switzer land was very interested in discussing those ideas 
with interested delegations on a b ilateral basis or in small groups. 
126. Switzerland’s reflections on SDT in the negotiations started from three premises. 
127. First, flexibilities in WTO rules should contribute to the sustainable development of 
developing countries. Those flexibilities should be made available to tho se Members that were 
confronted with particular developm ent challenges, whilst ensuring that, a priori , no developing 
country was excluded from such flexibility.  
128. Second, the modalities for the negotiations on Tr ade Facilitation set some basic conditions: (i) 
Members recognised that S&D should extend beyond th e granting of traditional transition periods for 
implementing commitments; and (ii) in particular, the extent and the timing of entering into 
commitments shall be related to the implementa tion capacities of DC/LDCs.  Large differences 
existed amongst developing count ries as regards trade facilitation measures already implemented and 
their implementation capacities differed also. These were important factors to take on board when 
starting to operationalize S&D.  A country's partic ular situation should matt er: it was important to TN/TF/M/5 
Page 18  
 
 consider where they stood at the moment and wh at their capabilities were to implement the most 
urgent and the most efficient measures in terms of development.  Switzerland also believed that – as 
trade facilitation measures contributed very positively to the competitiveness of countries' exports – it 
was worth working towards an ambitious set of trade facilitation measures. 
129. Third, Switzerland understood from the discussions that took place in the preparatory phase 
of the modalities that some Members were ready to engage in the negotiations  with the confidence 
that implementing commitments and providing TA&CB would go hand in hand in cases where they lacked the financial resources and institutiona l capacities to implement the commitments by 
themselves.  But one was also repeatedly reminde d that the financial res ources to provide TA&CB 
were finite and dependent on the allocation of one’s parliament.  That was why it was necessary to 
find a mechanism which took the following two elem ents into account: (i) the specific needs of 
certain countries for certain support and (ii) donor s' capabilities to provide that support.  That 
mechanism had to be transparent and predictable. It  had to accommodate expectations and concerns of 
the trading community, of developing and least-dev eloped countries as well as of the donor countries. 
130. In addition to the definition of a transparent and predictable mechanism that effectively tied-
in TA&CB into the negotiations, three other esse ntial ingredients were required to make SDT 
operational. 
131. First, the assessment of the current situation (needs and priorities).  In Switzerland's view – 
which had been confirmed by all delegations – ass essing the needs and priorities of developing and 
least developed countries played a central part.  It  was absolutely essential to have an idea where 
countries currently stood with regard to their im plementation of trade facilitation measures. How else 
should one be able to assess the gap between what  was proposed as commitments and what was ahead 
of many Members?  Switzerland had already assisted in several expert meetings, seminars and workshops on trade facilitation. On those occasions, a ll continents had provided participants with a 
clear presentation on where they were.  Therefore,  that information on where countries stood existed, 
but it did not exist in a structured, consolidated a nd easily available form. In Switzerland's view, the 
absence of easily accessible information was also  the reason why the proposals on S&D in the 
submissions remained vague and could simply be seen  as a best guess.  With regard to the assessment, 
one should not lose sight that a number of countri es actually had master plans to implement various 
trade facilitation measures, which were very valuable  in that regard.  The WCO, the World Bank and 
UNCTAD had informed about their assessment tool s available or under construction. The WCO 
assessment questionnaire was now even a WTO doc ument (TN/TF/W/16). In Switzerland’s view, it 
was necessary to have as many countries as possible to do those assessments in the very short term. 
Switzerland would very much appreciate if delegati ons who had used that assessment tool could share 
their experience and wondered whether the interna tional organizations present could inform whether 
they had continued their work on a joint assessment tool that took on board the subjects on the table, 
as well as those which were contained in the Secretariat's compilation document G/C/W/434. 
132. Second, there was an equally central aspect: th e sequencing and inter-linkage of measures.  
Sometimes, only a combination of measures allowed to reap real benefits. Also, some advanced 
measures might require the prior implementation of other measures. Experienced international 
organizations could be of valuab le support to Members by helping them to organise those inter-
linkages and their sequencing. 
133. Third, taking into account Members’ high pr oductivity, Switzerland was confident that a 
shopping list of commitments, at least as a skel eton, should be ready by July.  Once Members 
disposed of the information under those three items, they could start work.  Switzerland had been thinking whether it could be of interest to define so me sort of modules or packages. The first objective 
would be that all countries subscribed to a basi c package (simple reforms that required essentially 
administrative measures). A limited number of ad ditional packages would then be defined, each  TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 19 
 
 
 package containing a certain number of increasingly demanding and more efficient measures (e.g., 
advance lodging, risk assessment and special procedur es for authorized traders) leading – in the last 
package – to more advanced m easures such as single window). Memb ers would be asked to comply 
early with the basic package but would schedule over time the date of effectiveness of more advanced 
packages. 
134. Those packages could serve as a kind of benchmark to assess where one stood in terms of 
implementation. Within those packages, countries  would have flexibility in terms of sequencing 
following their most urgent needs first. 
135. As a last point, Switzerland also wished to share with Members some very preliminary 
thoughts on the mechanism mentioned earlier.  In that regard, Switzerland sought an answer to 
questions such as how could each country's specific timing for entering commitments and TA&CB to 
be provided be multilaterally agreed or, how to monitor progress.   
136. It might be of interest to know that almost  identical questions arose when developing 
countries were assisted in coping with prudential regul ation and other internati onal financial norms (in 
the IMF/World Bank context). Donor practice in those cases was to provide funding for technical 
assistance based on action plans establi shed by the recipient country wh ich were then implemented as 
a series of interrelated modules with the periodic suppor t and review by the staff of the international 
institution.  
137. In its brainstorming, Switzerland had tried to transpose those existing mechanisms into the 
context of the Trade Facilitation negotiations.  Swit zerland was aware that there was a risk in sharing 
fairly new and preliminary ideas in a formal meetin g.  It was Switzerland’s intention to exchange 
views with as many interested delegations as po ssible. Switzerland’s views were not fixed and would 
evolve by discussions with other delegations. Switzerland wished Me mbers to consider its comments 
as elements for discussion. 
138. Countries would be asked to develop a tr ade facilitation programme reflecting the 
commitments of those negotiations, which woul d subsume an action plan for institutional 
requirements.  Financing would then be based  on each country's management plan for trade 
facilitation. Due regard would be paid to administ rative and financial constraints of each developing 
country and its access to grants and credits. Funding  would be sequenced according to the effective 
pace of implementation. 
139. In parallel, a coordination platform and mech anism could be determin ed between multilateral 
agencies active in the field of trade facilitation, donors providing assistance, and developing countries 
concerned.  That would involve agencies with th eir own proper financing such as the World Bank, as 
well as others that needed additional funding by donor countries.  The object of funding would be the measures contained in the packages.  Those measur es could be recorded as eligible for financing. 
140. It was necessary to think about a review mech anism. Report on progress could be part of the 
Trade Policy Review Mechanisms conducted under th e auspices of the WTO and/or other similar 
examinations.  Finally, rules would become effect ive for the country when, in the view of the 
Members, the country had acquired the capacity to administer efficiently those rules. 
141. Because each country faced different conditions  to implement trade facilitation measures, it 
was impossible to determine standard costs for a me asure.  Therefore, costs could only be determined 
in projects. Administrative capabilities and the timing of making financial resources available for TA&CB would determine the pace of implementation of those action plans. TN/TF/M/5 
Page 20  
 
 142. Switzerland wished to reiterate its interest in sharing and developing further those very 
preliminary ideas on development related issues in trade facilitation with all Members, preferably through bilateral exchanges of view.  
143. The representative of the Philippines
, speaking on behalf of the Core Group , assured the 
Group that the new proposals were studied and consid ered in the spirit of constructive engagement 
that had been prevailing.   
144. There were four proposals on Article V on fr eedom of transit and issues of concern to 
landlocked countries. Note had specifically been ta ken of the constructive proposal of Core Group 
Member Rwanda.  The Core Group also supported the proposal by Mongolia along with several other 
countries and its objectives of ensuring increasi ng trade flows for landlocked countries.  
145. Four proposals of a general nature had also b een noted specifically relating to technical and 
financial assistance and relating to needs assessm ent.  The Core Group particularly noted and 
supported the proposal of Peru for an inventory of  trade facilitation measures, and China's proposal 
for setting the focus of work on particular areas of Articles V, VIII and X, which were of common 
interest and emphasis in the importance of immediate trade technical and financial assistance in the 
self assessment work as contained in th e proposal by China and Pakistan.   
146. The Core Group wished to inform the Memb ership of the availability of document 
JOB(05)/64 containing questions and comments of the Core Group as a collation of the questions 
prepared by India, Kenya and the Philippines. It would be appreciated if written responses could be provided by the proponents.  Those questions and co mments related to the February proposals and the 
Group was tempted to prepare written questions an d comments relating to the March proposals, and 
the current proposals tabled at the May meeting.   
147. The Group wished to recall its proposal for a checklist or compilation of the various 
proposals. A list of the various measures in place in various countries would also be useful. That was 
related to the call by Peru for an inve ntory of trade facilitation measures.   
148. The Group also wished to mention with suppor t the African Group's paper on technical and 
financial assistance and the general caution it ha d mentioned about going beyond the scope of the 
negotiations being the clarification of Articles V, VIII and X.  The Group also supported the request 
of the African Group for more concrete tec hnical and financial assistance commitments to 
operationalize the various proposals for simplificati on and standardization of documents which would 
in the end provide for increased trade flows and de velopmental benefits for developing countries.   
149. The Core Group wished to also thank Switzer land for their other comments relating to the 
need for the importance of assessment sequencing and monitoring of progress, and the European 
Communities for their paper on technical and financ ial assistance, although the Core Group shared the 
view of the African Group that there should be mo re concrete technical and financial assistance 
resources for the negotiations.   
150. The representative of Uganda
 associated Uganda with the communication from the African 
Group (TN/TF/W/33), the statement by Rwanda on behalf of the African Group, as well as the 
statement by Zambia on behalf of the LDCs. 
151. Uganda shared the observations in paragra phs 3 and 4 of the proposal TN/TF/W/28 by 
Bolivia, Mongolia and Paraguay about the peculia rities of landlocked countries and the unnecessary 
costs they encountered as a result of transit requirements for both import and exports.  Uganda also noted that additional controls and other excessive  measures applied to transit goods and imposed 
burdensome costs to landlocked countries.  The effect  of those costs was that they led to increased  TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 21 
 
 
 transaction costs that were unfair, especially to SM Es, particularly in least-developed countries such 
as Uganda. 
152. Uganda also shared the view with the propone nts that traders in landlocked Members were 
faced with problems of unpublished transit charg es and regulations in neighbouring countries which 
were ever changing.  That not only created a lack of  transparency, but also a lack of predictability for 
traders. 
153. Uganda had also studied the proposal from the EC in TN/TF/W/35.  The proposal highlighted 
some of the issues that were of utmost concer n to Uganda as a landloc ked country and Uganda 
therefore supported the proposal.  However, Uganda wished to offer some additional, preliminary 
observations. 
154. In paragraph 2 of the second bullet, there was ne ed to clearly spell out that, in some cases, 
illegal roadblocks were used to le vy illegal fees.  Moreover, there were differences in charges levied 
on trucks transiting through another Member's territory and those charged on national trucks. 
155. In addition to the above, besides the requirement  that vehicles had to be transported with 
escorts, there were additional requirements that th e trucks also were in convoy.  That caused 
unnecessary delays as a sizeable number of trucks  had to wait before traders could move. 
156. Uganda proposed that the language referring to technical assistance and capacity building in 
paragraph 6 of the EC proposal be modified from "... that it is likely to be necessary " to reflect the 
practical realities for developing countries, partic ularly the least-developed amongst them.  In that 
regard, Uganda proposed that the sentence read, that  "the provision of technical assistance and support 
for capacity building is necessary  for developing countries, and particularly the least-developed 
amongst them". 
157. The representative of Kenya  wished to offer some suggestions on how to structure the 
discussions in the afternoon.  Quite a number of proposals had been introduced, and the Group would benefit from an interactive debate.  Therefore, Ke nya wished to encourage Members to submit their 
papers well in advance so that others could look at them, read them and then have a well-informed 
debate.   
158. Second, instead of commenting on Article V, going to Article X, and then returning to Article 
V, perhaps it would be possible to have a discussi on on every Article and then, once that was finished, 
move on to the another Article and finally take up  the last one, with the Group then looking at the 
cross-cutting issues through the three Articles.  That might help Members to have a more structured 
debate in the afternoon.     
159. The Chairman
 informed that some delegations planning to submit papers had actually 
approached him with the question of whether or not to table a submission if it was only possible to do 
so shortly prior to a meeting. He had encouraged th em to go ahead and come up with the paper so that 
the contributions could be available as early as possible.  
160. In terms of structuring the debate, the reas on for adopting the cross-cutting approach was 
well-known.  The intention had been to avoid a procedural battle over what issues should be 
addressed first (the Articles, S&D, or somethi ng else). He had understood everybody to be in 
agreement with proceeding that way.  But, if it was now the sense of Members that the Group should 
proceed along the lines suggested by Kenya, one coul d look into that. Members were therefore invited 
to structure their comments according to the subject s and Articles they related to when making their 
interventions in the afternoon, which would also make  it easier for the Secretariat to reflect that in the 
minutes.     TN/TF/M/5 
Page 22  
 
 161. The representative of Japan
 expressed strong support for the proposal made by Bolivia, 
Mongolia and Paraguay, which Japan wished to join as a co-sponsor.   
162. Although Japan was a sea-locked country rather than a landlocked country it was of the view 
that comprehensive proposals regarding Article V we re a constructive and balanced contribution to 
the negotiations.   
163. While most of the specific measures proposed in the paper were also relevant to clarification 
and improvement of Articles VIII and X, Japan w as of the view that landlocked Members faced 
unique challenges in engaging in international trade, due to the fact that they had to transit through 
territories of neighbouring countries when importi ng or exporting goods.  Those challenges included 
wide-ranging issues, such as, administrative procedur es regarding traffic in transit and the associated 
cost implications, bilateral rela tionships between a landlocked Me mber and its neighbours, and the 
like.   Members agreed that the WTO could not be the only means for tackling such challenges.  
However, it could be part of a solution for the challenges by focusing on the problems related to administrative procedures pertaining to traffic in tr ansit by clarifying and improving GATT Article V.   
164. As regards specific measures contained in the pr oposal, Japan was of the view that they had 
been carefully selected specifically with the aim to further improving the elements contained in 
Article V. Non-discriminatory treatment of traffi c in transit and cross-border cooperation among the 
relevant authorities were thought to be especia lly important elements for facilitating transit 
procedures.  It would be worth sharing experien ces on such issues among the Members, in order to 
better understand the problems and possible solu tions related to traffic in transit.   
165. Japan had also read with great interest the pr oposal by China and Pakistan.  Japan shared the 
view that, when proceeding with the negotiations  on trade facilitation, it was very important to 
continue efforts to identify developing Members' need s and priorities.  In that regard, they suggested 
that Members use a general tool to assess their needs and priorities.  Wh ile it might be difficult to find 
a single common tool, Japan realized that relevant international organizations  had already developed 
tools for that purpose, notably the checklist for trad e facilitation and time releas e survey developed by 
the WCO.  Japan believed that they were useful t ools, although, when discussing needs and priorities, 
Members should not only address customs procedures, but also those of other border agencies.  Japan 
looked forward to continuing discussions on those points.   
166. The representative of Cuba
 wished to react to some of the issues raised earlier.  Less than a 
year ago, the future of these negotiations was far from clear and many Members were seriously 
concerned at the prospect of developing countries ha ving to bear a disproportionate share of the costs 
of the reforms.  Cuba wondered to what extent it would be possible to establish a clear cost-benefit 
analysis which would allow Members to take an informed decision as to whether those negotiations 
should be initiated.  Many devel oping countries had been on the defensive as to the introduction of 
these negotiations.  That also explained the concerns that existed today. One must not forget the basis 
on which the balance had been established that enab led Members to launch the negotiations last year. 
167. The proponents of that time were precisely th e same as the current ones, as demonstrated by 
the avalanche of documents that had been tabled without allowing much time to react, and without 
being able to contribute in a pertinent manner.  
168. Cuba understood that developed countries' gove rnments were under heavy pressure from their 
business sector to initiate the negotations, since following the Uruguay Round tariff reductions, the 
losses incurred by companies at the border often exceeded the cost of the tariffs themselves.  
However, in terms of expectations, the developing c ountries were a step behind, or indeed many steps 
behind – as many steps as there were differ ences in their levels of development.  TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 23 
 
 
 169. Cuba's priority continued to be the dismantli ng of tariff barriers for basic export products, and 
how to overcome the technical barriers imposed on Cuba by consumers from the developed countries, 
all of which had turned Cuba's pa rticipation in the WTO into a real obstacle course. Adaptation to 
market access and entry conditio ns alone generated costs for developing countries, and hence 
increased their demand for technical and financia l assistance, technology transfer on concessional 
terms, and assistance in building up the capacity and the institutional base needed  to comply with the 
obligations contained in the WTO Agreements. 
170. For developing countries, trade facilitation solutions  could continue to be  found in bilateral, 
regional or subregional agreements.  For landlocke d developing countries, those negotiations were 
truly critical.  Not only did they face the same mark et access barriers as other developing countries, 
but they also had to pay higher transport costs to ship their goods to their destination, which caused a 
considerable addition to overall costs and seriously  undermined the competitiveness of their exports. 
171. Nevertheless, once the decision to launch the negotiations had been taken, it was in the 
interest of Members that they should take place in an environment of mutual understanding in order to 
create a space in which everybody stood to gain. 
172. The balancing formula was contained in the m odalities for negotiations in Annex D of the 
July Package.  Any proposal that disregarded the cost factor, the need for substantive and operative 
SDT within the meaning of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, and technical and financial assistance and capacity-building on the basis of binding provisions, would be in breach of the compromise 
solution that enabled those negotiations to be launched. 
173. Cuba was grateful for the recent contributions.  In particular, Cuba wished to thank the 
African Group for presenting briefly and clearly its  views on the process and for sharing its general 
assessment of the proposals, an assess ment with which Cuba agreed entir ely.  The issues raised by the 
African Group in paragraph 14 of its document TN/T F/W/33 should be given due consideration in any 
new proposal and in revising those that had already been submitted. 
174. Cuba also welcomed the proposal by Ch ina and Pakistan contained in document 
TN/TF/W/29.  One could indeed only make significa nt progress in the negotiations if Members first 
identified their needs and priorities and established a proper sequencing for their work. 
175. Finally, Cuba took note of Switzerland's inter est in the question of development and the type 
of SDT that it considered to be granted in the ar ea of trade facilitation. Cuba would be pleased to 
discuss those views when the Swiss proposal was circulated.  However, Cuba advised against 
bringing to the NG the discussions on cross-cutting is sues relating to S&D treatment that were already 
taking place in the Special Session of the Committ ee on Trade and Development.  Any decision 
adopted by the CTD on S&D would affect horizontally the work of all of the WTO negotiating bodies, including the Negotiating Group on Trade Fac ilitation.  Meanwhile, the work of the Group on 
SDT should not stray from the mandate contained in paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration 
and paragraph 2 of Annex D of the July Package. 
176. The representative of Kenya
 wished to offer some preliminary comments on the tabled 
proposals.  
177. The proposals on Article V touched upon an area of  interest to the majority of Members and 
not only to the landlocked ones. For instance, in th e case of Kenya, a large volume of exports transited 
through a number of countries before reaching their final destination.  The same applied for imports 
into the country.   TN/TF/M/5 
Page 24  
 
 178. With respect to the proposals on Article V s ubmitted by Bolivia, Mongolia and Paraguay, 
Kenya wished to hear the experiences of the sponsor s as to what could be the reasons for lack of 
cooperation and coordination with their neighbouring countries on the issues pertaining to transit and 
trade mentioned in paragraph 3.  Article V did not prevent Members from having agreements among 
neighbouring countries to regulate transit arising from mutual trade.   
179. In paragraph 4, the sponsors of the paper we re suggesting that those Members who had taken 
steps to streamline transport procedures punished their neighbours as it denied them the benefits 
arising from a transit trade.  It would be important for the sponsors to clarify that observation, because 
Kenya believed that those who undertook measures to streamline transit procedures provided useful 
experience and the incentives for their neighbour s to improve their transit procedures.   
180. On the issue of non-discrimination, the paper contained very interesting proposals with 
respect to the application of the national treatme nt principle on the modes of transport used for 
transiting goods.  Kenya would like the sponsors to clarify that point, since some of the issues were being discussed in the context of the services negotia tions.  It would be useful to know how they 
planned to reconcile that.      
181. On the issue of the periodic review of fees a nd charges, Kenya would like to hear from the 
sponsors what type of enforcement mechanisms they envisaged.   
182. With respect to the suggested introduction of a bonded regime, Kenya had a concern about 
the costs of implementing such a regime, including tracking of goods in transit.  That would pose 
great difficulties to countries with limited human and infrastructural capacities such as Kenya.   
183. Kenya would also like to touch on the proposal by Peru, which seemed to suggest a one-size-
fits-all approach as it lacked an S&D component.  The submission also failed to recognize the fact 
that countries such as Kenya faced a number of ch allenges such as infrastru ctural weaknesses, the 
need to safeguard customs revenue and to deal w ith pilferage and smuggling.  It also failed to 
recognize that Members were at different levels of implementing trade facilitation measures.  A one-
size-fits-all approach could not be the best way to do that.  It would be interesting to get Peru’s 
reaction to that, as they seemed to suggest that th e WTO rules on trade facilitation would be used to 
pressure Members to adopt relevant inte rnational instruments in that area.      
184. With respect to the submission by the EC, Kenya agreed with the EC that  some of the issues 
could have been best addressed elsewhere.  One ha d to take good care that work did not go beyond 
the scope of the mandate.    
185. With respect to the issue of simplifying data  and documentation requirements, it had to be 
taken into account that countries had different challe nges to face in that area.  In the case of Kenya, 
simplification of transit procedures and documenta tion had to take into account issues like revenue 
issues and infrastructure constraints.   
186. With respect to risk management, including au thorized trade schemes, Kenya would like to 
hear from the EC how a uniform risk management  for transit purposes would be adopted, given the 
different risk factors, and how could compliance by Members be enforced in a risk assessment 
scheme.  The EC proposal also mentioned the issue of  freedom of transit through the territory of each 
contracting party via routes most convenient for in ternational transit. Kenya did not share the EC’s 
understanding that the operator should have the choice of the route and the means of transport.  That 
point had been clarified in the background note by the Secretariat . 
It was in fact a restriction  in the 
sense that the duty to grant free trans it did not extend to all routes.    TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 25 
 
 
 187. As regards the submission by Paraguay, Rw anda and Switzerland, Kenya would like to 
mention that many of the proposals highlighted in  the paper where implemented in Kenya and other 
countries. Kenya, for instance, did not levy f ees or charges for customs services on transit goods.  
Goods in transit were also given priority when clearing through customs.  There were some areas 
Kenya had identified such as implementation of electr onic tracking of transit vehicles to ensure that 
the goods were conveyed speedily and efficiently.  Bu t such undertakings needed a substantial amount 
of resources.  The issue of resources was more important than multilateral rules.   
188. Many measures had also been implemented in the context of COMESA of which Rwanda 
was also a member.  It would be good to share th e experience of COMESA in that area with other 
Members. COMESA countries had implemented a broad range of common policy measures and 
instruments which facilitated transit trade.  Fo r instance, load limits had been harmonized, 
commercial carriers licensing and transit plates.  Ther e had also been a harmonization of road transit 
charges, the regional bond guarantee system, the road  customs transit declaration document and more.  
Those measures had gone a long way in facilitating tr ansit trade within the COMESA countries.   
189. However, Kenya recognized that Members had not reaped the maximum benefits from that 
initiative because of physical infrastructural weakne sses.  Therefore, Kenya believed that there was 
need for improvement in physical infrastructure in support of policy legislative and regulatory and institutional reforms.  Regarding Article V, the best  route would be through regional cooperation.   
190. The proposal by Hong Kong, Chin a on Article VIII sought to introduce a necessity test of not 
being more trade restrictive than necessary.  Since countries were at different stages of development, 
with different emphasis on various aspects of trade facilitation, that approach could merit further 
discussion rather than those proposals seeking commitments on numerous elements under 
Article VIII.  Kenya believed that the approach  proposed by Hong Kong, China would strike a 
balance between taking legitimate regulatory meas ures and simplifying procedures with a view to 
improve transit trade.   
191. On the proposal by Singapore on advance rulings, Kenya believed that that was an area that 
could facilitate transit trade. Kenya was not ques tioning the importance of advance rulings, but it had 
a problem whether that was within the mandate of  Article X.  Kenya would have difficulties in 
expanding the scope of Article X.    
192. The proposal by Pakistan and China was very interesting.  Where Kenya had a problem was 
when it suggested that the results of the assessmen t should be taken as a basis for establishing relevant 
trade facilitation rules and arrangement of SDT.  Fo r Kenya, the results of the assessment should be 
used as a basis for the provision of technical assistan ce and capacity building.  Kenya wished to hear 
from Pakistan and China whether their proposal on page 2 under section E was a suggestion for a 
working group made up of international organizations  to be set up to ensure the objectivity of the 
assessment. Kenya also wished to hear from Pakistan  and China whether that was actually within the 
mandate of the NG. Kenya had serious reservations about such a kind of suggestion.  There was a 
strong commitment by Members to provide technical assistance and capacity building in that area, and 
by suggesting what China and Pakistan did, it im plied that, once the needs and priorities had been 
identified, it would be left to the relevant interna tional organizations to ensure their implementation. 
Kenya recognized what the international organizati ons were doing, but it was also important that 
within the framework of the WTO, more technical  assistance and capacity building was provided for 
Members to implement issues related to trade facilitation.   
193. The representative of South Africa
 supported the proposals submitted by the African Group as 
well as some aspects of the proposals presented by China and Pakistan. TN/TF/M/5 
Page 26  
 
 194. The July package had launched negotiations on trade facilitation with a view to achieving the 
following, amongst others:  (i) clarification and impr ovement of relevant aspects of Articles V, VIII 
and X of the GATT;  (ii) enhancing technical assist ance and support for capacity building;  and (iii) 
cooperation between customs administration and ot her relevant authorities on customs compliance 
issues.   
195. The July package recognized that a need exis ted for countries to establish their needs and 
priorities in relation to trade facilitation.  That was a very important starting point because it then allowed a country to negotiate and agree to certain  proposals with the background knowledge of what 
the country’s needs were and whether they were being met by different proposals reviewed.  That 
exercise also allowed countries to ascertain what  exactly their capacity-building requirements were 
and which areas were more urgent than others.  It  was a given fact that whatever proposals were 
forwarded or whatever measures would be implemented in improving the administration of trade, a certain cost would be involved.  How much would those measures cost and how much capacity building would be required to ensure that countries were able to not only agree on the outcome of the 
negotiation but also to benefit both in the short-  and long-term were ques tions countries should be 
pondering and, ideally, every country should go into the negotiations with a clear understanding of 
where they stood in terms of measures that had been implemented and also what it might cost them to improve their administration of trade.  Countri es should, with the assistance and collaboration of 
institutions like the WCO, the World Bank, and othe r international organizations, proactively do work 
in that area.  A number of instruments, such as the Checklist had been developed by the WCO in 
helping to carry out that task.   
196. The July package made it very cl ear that capacity building must form an integral part of any 
agreement to be reached at those negotiations.  It fu rther stated that Members would not be required to 
take up commitments which were beyond their capacity to implement.   
197. While South Africa was appreciative of the work the EC did in the area of capacity building, 
capacity building had to be understood to mean a comp lete building of capacity to enable countries to 
effectively facilitate trade.  The scope of capacity building had to be expanded. A narrower definition 
of capacity building covering technical assistance an d training was not effective to fully address the 
problems faced in the facilitation of trade.  Sout h Africa believed that Members should keep an open 
mind in that regard and wait for the type of agre ement that would emerge from the exercise, which 
would determine the type of capacity building requir ed.  It was not advisable at the present stage to 
start discussing what should be in, and what should be excluded. 
198. Another worrying factor in that regard w as that some proposals did not commit any new 
funds but were aiming to divert funds from othe r areas which equally required such funds.   
199. South Africa did not believe that capacity buildi ng had to kick in once an agreement had been 
reached.  The reality was that ma ny countries needed assistance dur ing and after the negotiation into 
the implementation phase.  The following phases we re identified as phases where capacity building 
was required:  (i) during the negotiations (in the form of coordina tion and responses between capitals 
and Geneva-based negotiators, along the lines done in the framework of the World Bank project 
mentioned earlier) (ii) needs and cost analysis  (assist countries with instrument, tools and 
methodology to carry out that analysis);  and ( iii) implementation (once an agreement had been 
reached, to assist countries with ensuring the necessary capacity to implement effectively).   
200. The July package mentioned a number of intern ational organizations working in the field of 
trade facilitation.  Those organizations hade devel oped various useful tools and instruments in that 
field.  Countries might be spoiled for choice or i ndeed confused on which tool to use.  Different 
organizations were doing work in di fferent countries in the field of customs reform and modernization 
but South Africa was not sure if anyone had a complete picture of what was exactly being done and  TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 27 
 
 
 where.  It would be very useful for the donor comm unity if they were able to get the assurance that 
their money would be used effectively and that there was a coordinated approach in provision of 
capacity building that ensured that duplications were avoided.   
201. The different projects should be coordinated fro m a central body that would be able to not 
only monitor the progress of such projects, but also be able to access country needs and priorities.   
202. On that issue there were different views.  An  organization such as the WCO could play that 
role as negotiations mainly affected the customs ar ea and with the WCO being the authority in world 
customs issues it would make sense for the WCO to coordinate and monitor progress of the building 
of capacity in different customs administrations.  At the same time, it was recognized that the WCO 
and the WTO did not have the same membership a nd the fact that those were WTO negotiations, so 
that some people might argue that the WTO might be an appropriate body to carry out that function.   
203. The representative of Chinese Taipei  commented on the three new proposals by Bolivia, 
Mongolia and Paraguay (TN/TF/W/28), Korea (T N/TF/W/34) and the European Communities 
(TN/TF/W/35) aimed at improving and clarifying the existing provisions of GATT Article V. 
204. The proposals by Mongolia and the European Communities had many common elements.   
They both cited existing problems such as:  the lack of information and transparency; additional 
physical checks and excessive measures being app lied on goods in transit;  excessive and non-
standardized documentation requirements and proce dures;  a lack of coope ration and coordination; 
unpublished and unreasonably high transit charges; a nd, inadequate infrastructure.  Chinese Taipei 
had similar concerns.  Its traders, and particular ly its SMEs, also reported having to face the same 
obstacles and shortcomings relating to transit. 
205. Solutions proposed in the submissions incl uded:  improving transparency of transit 
requirement, procedures and charges;  introducing mo re effective disciplines on charges for transit;  
non-discrimination;  simplification and standardiz ation of documentation, data requirements and 
procedures applied both to goods and to means of  transport in transit;  and, co-operation and 
coordination between the agencies concerned.  Ch inese Taipei placed great importance on Mongolia's 
suggestions of self-imposed periodic reviews of tran sit formalities, fees and charges, and the use of 
international standards and instruments for transit formalities.  The European Communities also raised 
the important subject of "operationalizing" the exis ting commitments in Article V to grant freedom of 
transit via the routes most convenient for international transit.  That issue deserved to be explored in 
further discussion in the WTO, or in another inte rnational forum.  Chinese Taipei also supported the 
idea to clarify and improve terminology to reduce pe rceived uncertainty.  Ease of transit, for obvious 
reasons, was of great interest to landlocked WTO Members, many of whom were developing 
countries.  As Chinese Taipei believed that the measures proposed were able to accelerate and 
streamline transit procedures, it took those factors seriously. 
206. Korea's proposal was clear and precise.  It contained essentially two suggestions: (i) minimize 
border requirements and simplify procedures for goods in  transit, and (ii) accord to goods in transit 
not requiring transhipment a less burdensome trea tment than goods in transit that did require 
transhipment.  Chinese Taipei reviewed its own regula tions and found its system to be consistent with 
requirements in this respect.  Chinese Taipei was th erefore fully in agreement with the suggestions in 
Korea's proposal. 
207. Singapore's proposal was evidence of its own national experience in developing the 
programme of advance ruling procedures.  The proc edural elements in the proposal should provide a 
useful basis for Members intending to develop su ch a system.  A commitment by Members to the 
process of implementing advance rulings would certainly  enhance predictability in international trade. TN/TF/M/5 
Page 28  
 
 208. Advance ruling had been proposed and discussed  before.  Singapore's proposal represented a 
significant step forward.  In the meantime, Chinese Taipei would be very interested in having further 
details of Singapore's advance ruling programme, as  well as answers to the following questions: (i) 
Was the advance ruling programme applied only to  the two bilateral free trade agreements as 
mentioned, or was it applied overall to all traders?  (ii) What amount of human and financial resources 
had been invested in the programme? (iii) How did Singapore evaluate the performance of the 
programme since it had been establishe d? Chinese Taipei was also inter ested to (iv) know the detailed 
operation of advance ruling on valuation. 
209. Hong Kong, China's submission raised several essential points, such as transparency and 
publication of information, electronic publication of  information, consultation with traders with 
respect to Article X, and the necessity of trade re gulations with respect to Article VIII.  Chinese 
Taipei had a self-review mechanism for customs fees and charges and therefore agreed with the points 
made in Hong Kong, China's submission and suppor ted the proposals.  However, Chinese Taipei was 
interested to know the implication or  legal obligation of a necessity test. 
210. Peru's proposal was valuable, comprehensive, ve ry ambitious and reflected the modern trade 
practice.  Chinese Taipei shared most of ideas a nd placed great importance on the suggestions of the 
use of international instruments on Articles V and VIII. 
211. With respect to the proposal tabled by New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland, Chinese 
Taipei supported to use international standards as a basis for documentation and data requirements.  
Chinese Taipei was also interested in the id ea of a possible solution to establish a common 
international net-based "bank of document"  under an international organization. 
212. The proposals by the African Group, and China and Pakistan, would be very useful in the 
negotiations.  Both proposed identifying the need s and priorities of Memb ers, thus acknowledging 
that the subject should be treated as one item in A nnex D of the Doha Work Programme.  In order to 
better understand the proposals, Chinese Taipei w ould appreciate answers to the following: (i) How 
was it envisaged that the general tool developed by  various international organizations to assess the 
needs and priorities should be selected? (ii) How coul d the level of trade facilitation be defined? (iii) 
What time-frame was anticipated fo r the assessment period? (iv) Was the Working Group to be made 
up exclusively of the international organizations concerned or would it comprise Members? (v) What 
kind of Members would do the self assessment?  Would it be voluntary or compulsory? (vi)            Why should differences in levels of regional economic development between Members be taken into 
consideration when conducting the assessment? 
213. The representative of Egypt
 commented on four proposals.    
214. With respect to proposal TN/TF/W/28 on periodic review, Egypt sought more clarification 
and elaboration on such a review.  What was the ti me period proposed for such a review? Would it be 
notified to the WTO or would Members just carry it out on a self review basis? Egypt also sought 
more information on the envisaged benchmarks for the review.   
215. With respect to the second proposal introduced  by the European Communities, TN/TF/W/35, 
on the use of international standards, which had al so been mentioned by Mongolia, it would be very 
important to determine what was meant by "internatio nal standards".  One had to identify them and be 
clear to what extent Members in international or ganizations establishing such standards were obliged 
to apply those standards.   
216. The proposal made by Hong Kong, China in  TN/TF/W/31 on the two benchmarks for 
regulations, fees and formalities might be acceptable if implied on new regulations or fees.  But 
extending the proposal to previous and existing regulations, fees and formalities would be more  TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 29 
 
 
 demanding and impose a huge burden on the majority  of developing countries and least-developed 
countries because that implied regulatory reforms as a whole.   
217. Egypt welcomed and appreciated the ideas deve loped by Switzerland in its approaches to 
development related issues in trade facilitation, as the first comprehensive proposal on special and 
differential treatment.  There were, however, so me issues in the paper which required further 
clarification:  First, on the criteria that might be used to determine what particular development 
challenges meant, Second, on paragraph 2, section A, where it had to be clarified who was to define 
the benchmarks and what would be  used to determine those modalities.  Finally, in the context of 
introducing different packages, Egypt was of the view  that that idea required further examination as it 
might be helpful to have more than one package, each including different trade facilitation measures 
for developing, developed, and l east-developed countries with different implementation times, which 
were likely to vary from one country to another.     
218. The representative of Malaysia  wished to offer some initial and preliminary comments on 
some of the new submissions distributed for the pr esent session.  Malaysia wished to go through the 
papers more thoroughly with experts from capitals , particularly regarding the elements given on 
Article V.  Malaysia also wished to support the statement made by the Philippines as Chair of the 
Core Group.   
219. Malaysia agreed with the concept of the papers on Article V by  Paraguay, Rwanda, 
Switzerland, Mongolia and Bolivia, and believed that efforts in facilitating trade via transit were 
crucial to enhance and expedite trade.  Malaysia  would also like to highlight that for technical 
assistance programmes to be effective, it was importa nt particularly to take account of the various 
national legislations and rulings that were implemented in Member countries.  In Malaysia’s 
experience, the various agencies involved in transit ma tters had their own legisla tions and regulations.   
220. With respect to the communication from Hong Kong, China on Article VIII (TN/TF/W/31), 
Malaysia agreed with the need to improve GATT Article VIII to help expedite the movement of 
goods.  It was therefore important to  have a clear understanding of the meaning of various elements in 
all the proposals.  In that regard, Malaysia wished  to seek clarification on the criteria of "no more 
administratively burdensome or trade restrictive" and "an efficient manner".    
221. Regarding the idea proposed by Peru in docum ent TN/TF/W/30 of having an inventory of 
trade facilitation measures to assist in understanding the trade facilitation measures adopted by Members, Malaysia wished to seek clarification on how the result of the i nventory woul d provide a 
clear and substantive result as suggested in the pape r, speaking of "a picture of the situation with 
regard to the simplification and streamlining of Me mbers' trade flows and provide an understanding of 
Members' situations as regards trade facilitation." Did Peru see the proposed inventory mechanism to 
be different from the WCO self assessment Checklist?  If the inventory mechanism provided results or 
information above and beyond that Checklist, it woul d then be of benefit to Members to further 
analyse such proposal.    
222. With respect to the proposals made on Artic le X in the same paper, Malaysia sought 
clarification on what was meant by "official medi a" mentioned on page 3, which was found in the 
section on ensuring availability of information on cu stoms procedures to all Members in readily and 
promptly accessible official media.  On point 4 of the same page, Malaysia wished to reiterate that for rules and new regulations which needed to be  introduced and implemented, the time for 
implementation should be left to the discretion of the government authorities based on national 
interest.   TN/TF/M/5 
Page 30  
 
 223. Malaysia shared the ideas proposed in subm ission TN/TF/W33 by the African Group on trade 
facilitation which addressed needs and priorities and S&D treatment in trade facilitation for African 
countries.   
224. The representative of Sri Lanka
 welcomed the proposals submitted by the different groups 
from developing and developed countries, which reflected the common interest of the WTO 
Membership in the negotiations regardless of their level of development. However, some of those 
proposals needed in-depth examination to understa nd what they meant, such as the proposal on 
advance rulings.  It was also necessary to understa nd very precisely and accurately whether some of 
the disciplines, measures and rulings proposed by so me fell within Annex D of the July package.  
That required some time.    
225. Sri Lanka supported the proposal by China and Pakistan, and was considering cosponsoring 
it, subject to clearance from capital.  Sri Lanka agre ed with the basic idea a bout the need to identify 
Members’ needs and priorities, which could useful ly and meaningfully contribute to the technical 
negotiations.  It would be useful to understand the existing differences in the area of trade facilitation, 
and the feasibility of the measures being propo sed in Geneva, as well as to understand the S&D, 
technical assistance and capacity building requirement s.  The trade facilitation needs and priorities 
could vary from Member to Member.  The needs of landlocked countries,  for instance, were different 
from those of other countries.  While Sri La nka was also a sea-locked country, it was very 
sympathetic to the problems faced by landlocked countries due to their high transports cost and procedures they were facing.    
226. Sri Lanka was equally concerned by the length and the volume of the proposals and wanted to 
get on board before being left behind.    
227. The representative of Korea
 wished to comment on two points on Article V as well as on 
special and differential treatment.   
228. First, with respect to Article V, Korea supported the approach applied in the EC paper of first 
identifying transit problems and then proposing ways of addressing them.  Korea also held the view 
that simplification and standardization of documen ts, data requirements and procedures were a most 
important part of those proposals.  The suggested use of commercially available information and data 
was very much in line with Korea's own proposal as well.    
229. Korea had some other questions and some points it wished to see clarified.  For instance, the 
fifth bullet suggested that more effective disci plines on the level, nature and management of 
guarantees were required from transit operators.  Kor ea was of the view that that kind of guarantee 
was not very common in any kind of commitment.  Therefore, Korea sought clarification on the 
rationale of such a guarantee and its  operation in practice.  Korea also sought clarification on the next 
bullet of that document suggesting the providing of gui dance on the main elements of regional transit 
and their proper implementation.  Korea wished to know what kind of guidance was envisaged and 
what was proposed to be operated and implemented.   Explanation was also solicited on the proposed 
improved definition of "goods". Korea wished to know  to what extent it was intended to define this 
term, as that was closely related to the scope of the negotiations.   
230. With respect to the paper by Mongolia, Bolivia and Paraguay, Korea took full note of the 
obstacles faced by landlocked countries. Their prob lems could and should be duly and effectively 
reflected in the negotiations.   Clarification was sought on the second point of their proposal 
suggesting a periodic review of fees and charges imposed with respect to transit. What kind of 
obligation to conduct such a periodic review wa s envisaged?  Was it a permanent mechanism of 
review or some kind of voluntary or advisory r ecommendation?   The same question applied to the 
proposed "periodic meeting of neighbouring auth orities".  Korea also wondered what kind of  TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 31 
 
 
 international standards the sponsors had in mind when  suggesting their use.  As for the suggested  
coordination of document requirements for transit among relevant authorities, Korea wanted to know 
the precise meaning of "among relevant authorities".  Di d the proposal relate to relevant authorities in 
a specific country or relevant authorities of each Member?  Perhaps it depended upon the scope of the 
negotiations as well.  
231. With respect to the paper by Switzerland,  Paraguay and Rwanda, Korea sought more 
information on their proposal for some elements to be  considered to constitute best endeavour clauses. 
Were there any specific elements they had in mind?    
232. As for the EC's input on S&D treatment, Korea generally fully shared their approach. Since 
they were figuring out the needs and priorities of th e beneficiary Members, they were explaining their 
past experience to meet their needs and priorities.   That kind of approach should be applied when 
considering SDT.   
233. Korea also welcomed China's and Pakistan's pa per.  Korea had noted that paragraph 4 of 
Annex D listed needs and priorities as an integral part of the negotiations.  Therefore, that point 
should be duly reflected in the negotiations.  Identifying Members' trade facilitation needs and 
priorities and clarifying and improving Articles V, VIII and X of the GATT 1994 were not mutually 
exclusive but complementary goals. That identifi cation should therefore take place along with the 
process of clarifying and improving the relevant Articles.   
234. The process suggested in the paper for that id entification work seemed to be rather long. 
Korea therefore wondered whether the sponsors of th at paper had any specific time schedule in mind 
for that work.  It was crucial to take into account  the time period for concluding the negotiations.  
Korea also wondered about the meaning of having the general tool as suggested by China and 
Pakistan. Was it really realistic to figure out a general tool that could be applied to all aspects to SDT?  
With respect to the suggested establishment of so me sort of working group to deal with those 
problems, Korea wished to know more about its co mposition as well as the e nvisaged time period and 
what kind of international organization had been  envisaged.  The idea regarding the assessment 
process for Members with huge regional differences in economic development within their territories 
was interesting. Korea would like to know whether it was compatible with international commitments 
which could be applied to the country as a unit as op posed to an application at some kind of regional 
level.     
235. The representative of the European Communities  said that the EC supported the proposals 
made by other delegations on transit questions.    
236. With respect to the paper by Korea, the proposal  for government to rely, as far as possible, in 
transit operations as in other operations, on commerc ially available documents for information as 
recommended in the Revised Kyoto Convention, was pa rticularly interesting and useful.  That was a 
very simple procedural modification which was of little cost to any govern ment and would represent 
considerable savings to companies, particularly small- and medium-sized ones.    
237. The EC welcomed also the joint paper by Bolivia, Mongolia, Paraguay and the Kyrgyz 
Republic and agreed with its analysis.  The EC s upported their proposal that there should be a more 
clear commitment to non-discrimination between the or igin of goods in transit and the destination, 
and more freedom for transiting goods in terms of the routes to be chosen.  The EC also shared the proposal in the document that all Members carry out a periodic internal review of the fees and charges levied for transit operations.   
238. The paper by Paraguay, Rwanda and Switzer land was equally good.  The EC very much 
supported the ideas set out in that paper, and not ably its emphasis on the need for strength and TN/TF/M/5 
Page 32  
 
 provisions that could guide or ensure real re gional co-operation between  governments on regional 
transit regimes, notably sharing the facilities, delegate the competences, simplify regimes for 
perishable goods in transit, common rules standa rds information documentation and alike.  Those 
proposals were very sensible and did not entail any real cost to governments but would have enormous benefits for operators whic h could make a real difference.   
239. The proposal by Peru set out a very sensible set  of recommendations cove ring all of the three 
Articles, and was welcomed.   The papers by Hong Kong, China were also very good and useful.  On 
the question of the necessity test, the EC shared th e view that in the field of customs procedures or 
import and export administration, it was entirely norm al and legitimate that procedures should be no 
more burdensome than necessary.  That was a c oncept which was familiar from the Agreement on 
Import Licensing procedures and had been demonstrated to be quite a useful provision.  The EC also 
very much liked the proposal by Hong Kong, China that Members carry out a regular review of their 
procedures to see if the objectives which those proce dures were meant to address could be achieved in 
a less trade restrictive way.   
240. The same concept could also be found in th e paper by Bolivia, Mongolia and Paraguay, 
proposing a regular review to see if one could carry  out the same policies in a less trade restrictive 
manner.  It was a concept found in a number of existing WTO Agreements and transferred very well 
to the area of trade facilitation.   
241. The EC also agreed with the substance of the proposals by Singapore and believed that any 
improvement of Article X within the scope of th e negotiating mandate should cover advance rulings.  
It was about more transparency, more predictability in management of trade, which was what Article 
X was all about.  The EC was interested to note that Singapore only provided advance rulings in the 
framework of its Free Trade Agreements with the USA and Japan, and the EC would be curious to know whether Singapore regarded that as compatible with GATT Article XXIV.   
242. The EC also shared much of what was said in the papers by Norway, Switzerland and New 
Zealand on international standards.  Many ex isting WTO Agreements had as a kind of default 
provision the use of international standards, and the same principle ought to apply to customs and 
other import and export procedures.  It seemed to be  a matter of logic that  if all Members used 
international standards for their management of  border procedures, that would save money. Why 
should Members wish to design new data sets or  documents/forms? Standardized forms would save 
money for operators and companies which did not have to deal with different standards of procedures 
in all of their different markets or had to face diffe rent language difficulties.  Therefore, the thrust of 
the paper on simplification, suggesting the use of international sta ndards using WCO and UN 
instruments was very much shared.  The EC also  shared the comments by South Africa, suggesting 
giving some weight in the work to standards developed by the WCO.   
243. With respect to the China/Pakistan proposal, the EC agreed that Members needed to know 
where they stood in respect of their domestic levels of trade facilitation, and believed that there were 
already some diagnostic tools available both from the World Bank and the WCO, with UNCTAD also 
having a project in that respect.  Rather than start from scratch, Members could therefore use those already existing useful tools to determin e their own levels of facilitation.   
244. On the relationship between data assessment of  Members' levels and the work in the NG, 
Members should try to have the right articulation between those two processes.  Rather than allowing 
the individual assessments by each Member of their level to be the determining factor for what 
Members were negotiating, it had to be a two-way pr ocess.  Members had to have some sense of what 
was the level of ambition and the scope of what th ey were aiming for. Once Members had a slightly 
clearer idea of the scope of proposals, it was easier  to look domestically and see to what extent 
Members required additional assistance or help to meet those provisions.  It had to be a two-way  TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 33 
 
 
 street in the relationship between provisions that  Members might be negotia ting and the levels of 
assistance.   
245. With respect to the Pakistan/China paper, th e EC took the point that regional disparities in 
some Members could be important.  For very large countries that was an issue, but the EC was not sure that in the WTO to date that was creating great  difficulties in practice.  The EC’s experience in a 
number of WTO Agreements had been that Memb ers had managed those disparities within an 
individual country.   
246. The EC also shared much of the analysis c ontained in the proposal by the African Group, 
especially about the importance of trade facilitation for Africa and the particular needs of Africa.  
That was why the EC was committed in its own programming and efforts to meet the Millennium 
targets.  The EC would be focusing in particular on Africa and trade and infrastructure for Sub-
Saharan Africa to the amount of one billion per y ear purely for trade-related assistance.  The EC 
agreed with the analysis in that paper on the need  for assistance to go in parallel to the work Members 
were carrying out in Geneva.   
247. The EC, however, did not agree with the suggestion by the African Group that, in some 
respects, Members were trespassing beyond the scope of the mandate.  There was only one point in 
the EC paper which gave right to a question about the mandate, namely the proposal that work should 
improve the ability of countries to use internati onal payments and insurance systems.  The EC 
considered that to be a very good idea but equally had a real question of whether that was within the 
scope of the current mandate. In 1997-98 those matter s had been on the agenda but they had not been 
mentioned over the last few years.    
248. The EC very much appreciated the Swiss ideas on SDT.  It was time to start some 
brainstorming on what SDT provisions could be in pr actice.  The mandate on that from July last year 
did offer some interesting possibilities.  The EC  found some merit in the tiered approach that 
Switzerland had outlined, although it was important that  Members be very clear about the details in 
the sense of which provisions, which feature, and in which tier.  The EC did not necessarily agree 
with Switzerland's views that some of the proposals represented enormous costs.  Risk assessment, for 
instance, was a way of saving costs, not increasing th em.  But one would have to come back to that 
proposal and those ideas in more depth and the EC would certainly be doing that.   
249. The representative of Argentina
 said that  Argentina generally supported the objectives of the 
proposals tabled.  The communications from Peru, the African Group and China/Pakistan developed 
general ideas related to the overall picture of the ne gotiations and suggested certain lines of action, on 
the understanding that that would facilitate further work.  
250. Peru's proposal was very interesting. Peru took a practical approach and called for the 
preparation of an inventory of  existing facilitation measures, th e accruing benefits, the sectors 
involved and the resulting economic and commercial e ffects.  That would enable the situation of 
Members in that field to be evaluated. That was a very timely suggestion. 
251. Based on Argentina's reading of document TN/ TF/W/29, the same concern to evaluate the 
situation of every Member was shared by China an d Pakistan, which suggested certain lines of action 
regarding future work, particularly in paragraph II. A of the document, in order to promote a sort of 
self-assessment. 
252. The effective achievement of a degree of sta ndardization and harmonization in the area of 
trade facilitation would obviously require efforts along various lines by every Member, especially 
when they involved the adoption of measures to improve Articles V, VIII and X. TN/TF/M/5 
Page 34  
 
 253. Argentina shared that sense of realism and saw  it as an important component of Members' 
work, as was the need to focus on certain potential areas of negotiation in order to concentrate efforts 
and guarantee adequate progress. 
254. Note had been taken of the EC's comment about the scope of the obligations and the need to 
provide TA and CB being a two-way street and bei ng inter-related. That was a very reasonable and 
rational point.  
255. In Argentina's view, there were three pillars  that needed to be addressed: (i) the actual 
situation in each country with respect to trade fac ilitation.  Here, the China-Pakistan proposal added 
value in drawing attention to the situation of each individual country; (2) th e scope of the obligation 
or commitment that should be  undertaken; and (3) technical assistance required for their 
implementation. Clearly, technical assistance must be closely commensurate with the existing gap 
between the actual situation and the commitment to be undertaken. 
256. With respect to Article V, Argentina shared th e general objectives of all proposals referring to 
that area. Argentina had however a number of qu estions with respect to some of the measures 
suggested.  
257. First, Argentina shared Kenya's request for clarification regarding the national treatment 
element referred to by Bolivia, Mongolia and Pa raguay and the relationship with the services 
negotiations. Second, Argentina wondered whether th e national treatment requirement should apply to 
the selection of the routes taken by the transporters, or whether they would like that selection to rest 
entirely with the operators, as suggested by the EC, rather than be a choice to be made by the 
authorities.    
258. Korea's suggestion in TN/TF/W/34 for GATT Artic le V to make a distinction between cases 
involving transhipment and cases where that was not the case (with goods in transit with no need for 
transhipment benefiting from less burdensome customs requirements than goods requiring trans-
shipment) was interesting. Currently, Article V e xpressly called for no such distinction being made. 
There was some justification for including such a differentiation.  Korea appeared to suggest the 
introduction of two obligations in its bullet points of section II: (i) first, a general obligation to ensure 
that Members minimize the formalities for goods in transit.  In that connection, the question should be 
answered whether that obligation was not already cont ained in paragraph 3 of Article V (which stated 
that traffic in transit shall not be subject to unn ecessary delays or restricti ons) and in paragraph 4, 
which provided that the regulations imposed shall be reasonable.  Argentina also wished to know 
what would be the extent of the concept of mini mization. Would it merely boil down to accepting the 
transport document as equivalent to a customs declara tion?  (ii) second, with respect to the proposal to 
accord differential treatment to goods in transit th at did not require trans-shipment, there was some 
practical regional experience in that field (s uch as the LAIA's International Land Transport 
Agreement, Annex I), where the documentation for goods  in transit was limited to the international 
customs transit declaration to be submitted at th e customs office of departure, at intermediate 
checkpoints, and at the customs office of destinatio n.  However, the  implementation of that system 
required a series of sealing procedures to prevent hand ling of the goods at the intermediate stages.  
259. It was important to know the sc ope of Korea's proposal and the envisaged criteria for the level 
of regulation that would derive from it. Woul d it simply be a matter of simplification of 
documentation or was Korea thinking of regulations going beyond the concept of in transit goods? 
260. With respect to the proposal by Hong Kong, Ch ina (TN/TF/W/31) to include a necessity test 
to guarantee that the incidence of the formalities w as no more restrictive than absolutely necessary to 
achieve their legitimate objectives, Argentina had several questions.   TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 35 
 
 
 261. First, the scope of that suggestion was not very clear.  Paragraph 1(c) of Article VIII, to which 
the proposal related, referred to import formalities and documentary re quirements, and not to the trade 
regulations applied through those formalities or re quirements.  That was an important distinction 
which did not appear to be clearly defined in the Hong Kong proposal. 
262. Argentina also wished to know what was unders tood by "lower administrative burdens". Was 
that a concept that came from other Agreements  such as the one on Import Licensing? If so, how 
would those concepts be defined? Argentina furt her wished to know why the proposal adopted the 
"legitimate objective" as a benchmark, when according to the text of paragraph 1(c) a necessity test 
would have to be based on the proportional rela tionship between the forma lities and requirements for 
the application of specific regulations, whatever their objective might be. In Article VIII:c, the 
reference was not to regulations. Rather, the focu s was on the effect of the formalities. Would the 
needs test therefore be with respect to the effect  of the regulations? Hong Kong, China seemed to be 
suggesting to change the focus of Article VIII and to make the needs test of the regulation in terms of 
its legitimate objectives. Argentina therefore wonde red what the legitimate objectives were to which 
one had to refer. Hong Kong, China referred to comp lying with international standards or agreements, 
but it would seem that if a Member adopted a me asure that was contained in an international 
convention, it would meet the needs test. What would therefore be the reason for questioning a regulation? When being based on an internationa l standard, one would assume that it pursued a 
legitimate objective.    
263. Furthermore, clarification was sought as to how  the concept of "efficiency", listed as the 
second benchmark, was to be measured. If there wa s a benchmark in other WTO Agreements, that 
could perhaps be used. But so far, the scope of the concept of efficiency had not yet been determined. 
264. The representative of Australia
 appreciated the paper on GA TT Article V as Australia 
understood the importance of such issues, especi ally for landlocked developing countries. 
265. While Australia had limited experience with  transit issues facing landlocked countries, 
Australia considered the tabled proposals to be usef ul and positive.  Any rules negotiated in relation to 
transit should, however, be complementary with an ything negotiated in relation to Articles VIII and 
X. 
266. While Australia welcomed the submission by  Bolivia, Mongolia, Paraguay and the Kyrgyz 
Republic. Australia was puzzled by the proposition in paragraph 4 that Members introducing more 
streamlined transit procedures compared with others  might divert the flow of transit goods through 
their territory, depriving others of opportunities for economic development through the increased flow 
of trade.  This could be better turned around as an  encouragement on all such Members to adopt best-
practice procedures.  The proposal also advocated non-discrimination according to, inter alia , the 
particulars of the goods themselves.  While supporti ng the principle, Australia noted that different 
types of goods (e.g., hazardous goods) might requir e different treatment.  Similarly, modes of 
transport (such as heavy vehicles) might impose highe r costs on transited Members than other modes, 
necessitating different transit fees and charges.  Aust ralia noted the same comments would also apply 
to the EC paper on transit. 
267. Australia could go along with the proposal s uggested by Korea, which was consistent with 
current Australian customs' reduced documentation requirements for (non-transhipment) transit cargo, 
which needed only to be reported, with no entry required. 
268. With respect to the proposals submitted on GATT Articles VIII and X, Australia agreed with 
Hong Kong, China that the concept of trade regula tions not being more administratively burdensome 
or trade restrictive than necessary was a worthwh ile objective.  However, the appropriateness of 
introducing an explicit necessity test (and associated reasonableness tests) in that area would need to TN/TF/M/5 
Page 36  
 
 be considered closely.  GATT Article VIII already disciplined trade restric tive measures, subject to 
the exceptions provided, inter alia , by GATT Article XX(d) for measures relating to customs 
enforcement.  As those provisions would also pot entially apply to the same trade regulations falling 
under Article VIII, the legal implications of in troducing new necessity tests would need to be 
carefully considered. 
269. Australia welcomed Hong Kong, China's proposals on Article X, which were consistent with 
current Australian Customs practice, although Aust ralia noted that the measures referred to in 
paragraph 1 of Article X went beyond customs matters. 
270. Australia supported calls for a coordinated a pproach on technical assistance and capacity 
building in order to avoid duplication.  Assistance needed to be demand driven  and timely, and to take 
into account the ability of the receiving Member to utilise assistance in an effective manner. 
271. Australia welcomed the African Group paper an d considered that its raising of needs for 
technical assistance and capacity-building su pport during the negotiations was timely. 
272. Australia also considered that the EC's pape r was a useful additional demonstration of the 
amount of assistance that was already provided in that area. 
273. The proposals in the submission by China an d Pakistan were a welcome and useful 
contribution to the negotiations.  Australia supporte d the proposals for Secret ariat work.  Australia 
also saw value in promoting the idea of common standard "tools" to move the assessment of Members’ needs and priorities, and also noted th e work already underway by the WCO, the World 
Bank and others on that matter.  Australia was concerned, however, with any time-consuming 
negotiations on any multilateral standard tool or "general tool" as it was called in the paper. 
274. Another drawback of the paper was that it focu sed on the needs and priorities as identified by 
Members, without giving explicit consideration to in dustry/business needs.  Australia considered that 
focus should be on areas where great est trade benefits could be rea lized, and those areas might or 
might not be the same areas that individual Members identified. 
275. The representative of Turkey
 welcomed the proposals on how to clarify and improve freedom 
of transit under Article V and shared most of what had been proposed in those submissions.  
276. Turkey believed that restrictive implementation c ontrary to international standards in transit 
formalities had negative effects on Members' trade gains.  Therefore, Turkey attached great 
importance to revitalizing and enhancing the applicati on of Article V.  Turkey expected effective and 
sustainable measures from the negotiations, in partic ular with regard to non-discrimination in border 
procedures, the prohibition of unj ustifiable documentation and the pr ohibition of fees and charges not 
complying with the nature and the cost of the service rendered.   
277. To achieve a non-discriminatory application of transit matters, Turkey invited Members to 
consider acceding to international transit arrangements such as the UN 's TIR Convention, if they had 
not done so already.  Turkey had been applying that Convention for years as one of the major transit countries in the world.  Turkey also employed the Single Administrative Document as from 1996 in 
customs formalities.  It was intended to use it as a transit document as well when Turkey was a party 
to the Common Transit Conventio n of the European Communities .   
278. The representative of Jamaica
 associated her delegation with the statement by the Philippines 
on behalf of the Core Group.  TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 37 
 
 
 279. Jamaica was gratified by the additional propo sals that had come forward at the present 
meeting of the NG, and would like to thank all th e delegations that were, by those submissions, 
adding depth to the discussions in the NG. 
280. It was also noticeable that a number of the new proposals were from developing countries or, 
were reflecting considerable co llaboration between developing and developed countries.  That was 
commendable, and reflected the keen interest in that  subject area and the desire of Members to work 
together in order to achieve mutually beneficial results. 
281. All the new proposals were being studied in Kingston at that time and it was Jamaica’s 
intention to have fuller comments on those new propo sals in due course.  It was therefore hoped that 
whatever structure the discussions took, Members w ould still be allowed to return to the various 
issues, particularly bearing in mind that most of  the proposals had just been put before the NG. 
282. Jamaica welcomed the proposals on Article V.  Th ey had been long awaited.  Transit was an 
issue of great importance to Members, especially those which were landlocked. Jamaica therefore 
looked forward to streamlining those very useful  proposals so as to ensure the agreement on 
provisions which could be implemented and which benefited particularly those Members in the 
African region. 
283. Jamaica was also taking careful note of the proposal by Korea on making the distinction 
between transhipment and non-transhipment goods, thus allowing for different treatment. 
284. Note was taken of the proposals regarding trans it fees.  That fees should be transparent and 
non-discriminatory went without saying.  However, Jamaica would urge, once again, that caution be 
exercised on how Members approached the issue of  the kinds and amount of charges that were 
permissible. 
285. Jamaica also welcomed the proposals which dea lt with Trade Facilitation needs and priorities, 
SDT, and Technical Assistance and Capacity Build ing.  The submission by the African Group which 
encompassed all those elements was noteworthy and in that regard Jamaica would like to support the 
African Group, as Jamaica shared most of th e analysis outlined in that submission. 
286. Jamaica wished to emphasize that one of the r easons why the character of the mandate of the 
NGTF was unique was its specific inclusion of provisions for SDT that went beyond the traditional approach, that was, linking the commitments to be undertaken with, inter alia , technical and physical 
capacity to implement.  That meant that the fine tuning of trade rules on Trade Facilitation must go in 
tandem with systems modernization, institutiona l development and the upgrading of equipment, 
infrastructure and technology. 
287. The representative of Bolivia
 wished to offer some general r esponse to some of the comments 
made about the document Bolivia had co-s ponsored with Mongolia and Paraguay. 
288. With respect to the concern regarding paragraph 4 of that document, it should be said that the 
borders which countries such as Bolivia had to cross to get access to the coasts were quite distant 
from the economic centres of those countries.  Consequently, transit tended to generate a 
concentration of activities which created economic de velopments in those border areas.  That was 
why Bolivia had drafted the paragraph as it appeared. It was to say that neig hbouring countries which 
developed simplified procedures woul d also benefit through the development of their border areas 
which other countries had to cross.  That would generate economic devel opment in those regions, 
which at present, were a long way from the economic centres and from capitals.  Bolivia believed that 
landlocked countries in Africa and other regions would probably encounter a similar result.   TN/TF/M/5 
Page 38  
 
 289. The international formalities for internati onal transport were applied in the ANDEAN 
regulations and in the general framework within th e Southern Cone Agreement.  However, Bolivia 
believed that that should be stre ngthened and that it should be done in the WTO. That was why 
Bolivia had made the proposal.  The question was linked to the services negotiations, which were 
going on in parallel to the Trade Facilitation negotiations. 
290. Bolivia wished to clarify two further points.  Firs t, the fact that reference was not made to the 
transit of dangerous goods was a reflection of Bolivia’s wish to  establish a general framework. 
Obviously, Conventions in the United Nations and ot her organizations relating to the transport of 
dangerous or toxic goods would have to be respect ed. That would fall within the general framework 
of the procedures for the transit of goods. 
291. Another element that should be cl arified related to the route most convenient for international 
transit. Bolivia believed that the route selected shoul d be the choice of the operator and not that of the 
central administration.   
292. With respect to the issue of f ees and charges, there should be a periodic review of those fees 
and charges.  A mechanism for such review had therefore been proposed at the domestic level of 
landlocked countries. It was then proposed to ha ve periodic meetings of neighbouring Members’ 
authorities.  What Bolivia was proposing was a bilate ral or trilateral process, which would allow for a 
joint review of the situation w ith both the landlocked countries and their neighbours. It was a proposal 
Bolivia hoped to lead either to a recommendation or a requirement on the part of the countries.  It was 
not suggested at the present stage whether it shoul d be a recommendation or something more binding 
as that would depend on the results of the negotiations.   
293. As for the establishment of joint border cro ssings under border cooperation, Bolivia felt that 
this should be done as far as possible.  That woul d be the best mechanism,  which would facilitate 
transit and reduce costs. Procedures would be simplif ied and formalities shortened, and the procedures 
would be speeded up.  That was not an issue which should be resolved within the WTO, but 
nevertheless, Members had to involve internati onal organizations and had to look at bilateral 
agreements, which had some kind of political s upport. However, Bolivia believed that the WTO 
negotiations could produce a recommendation where by landlocked countries and neighbouring states 
could act. 
294. Bolivia had made considerable progress bilaterally at the sub-regional or regional level.  The 
results were becoming apparent on the ground.  It was, however, a lengthy process.  Therefore, strengthening of Article V would be very useful.  In order to benefit from that progress, which was 
not only made in Bolivia, but also in other la ndlocked countries, concrete proposals relating to 
Article V were required.  Bolivia was pleased that such a proposal had now been presented. Bolivia 
supported all those proposals, particularly that  of the European Communities which stressed the 
problems of landlocked countries, identified the principles which should guide the discussions, and proposed measures similar to the ones suggested in Bolivia’s ow n proposal of how to improve 
Article V.   
295. Bolivia agreed with Peru that Members n eeded a compendium of proposals that would 
present them in a systematic manner.  That work should also include a list of measures which were 
incompatible with Articles V, VIII and X in order to  provide additional clarity for the Group’s future 
debate to allow Members to proceed to a more specific stage of the negotiations 
296. The representative of Ecuador
 said that the proposals were sometimes rather difficult to 
process quickly.  The cooperation provided by the World Bank was very important as it enabled 
Members to react and provide input in real time.  Ecuador considered with sympathy the proposal of 
the landlocked countries, and landl ocked developing countries such  as Bolivia and Paraguay.    TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 39 
 
 
 Through such specific and concrete proposals, Me mbers could assist those countries, facilitate the 
transport of goods and allow them to conserve resources.  Any improvement of the interpretation or 
the understanding of the scope of Article V was we lcome without prejudice to any adjustment which 
would be made to those proposals.  Ecuador believed that the coherence of the measures and 
procedures adopted within the WTO and other inte rnational organizations would allow Members to 
improve and facilitate the trad e of landlocked countries.   
297. The responses received from sp ecific committees as a result of  the questions and requests 
emanating from small economies may lead to findi ng a practical solution to their problems.  The 
proposals made in document TN/TF/W/29 by China and Pakistan were important.  To achieve 
substantive results, it was necessary to have a clear understanding of the problems. A one-size-fits all 
approach for the evaluation of needs and prioriti es would not work as the needs and priorities would 
inevitably vary depending on the different degree s of implementation of the trade facilitation 
mechanisms.   
298. The proposal by Peru for an inventory was an interesting one, as it would make possible 
commitments more operational.   
299. The representative of Tanzania  wished to associate his delegation with the statement of 
Rwanda on behalf of the African Group and with th e statement to be made by Zambia for the LDC 
Group. 
300. Tanzania attached great importance to trade f acilitation.  The benefits were obvious, both for 
Tanzania and its neighbouring states, particularly t hose who were landlocked.  Tanzania would never 
feel comfortable if the users of its transit facilities were not happy with Tanzania’s services.  Tanzania 
invested a lot of time and efforts to modernize its trade facilitation facilities with the aim of improving 
the procedures and processes.  Tan zania was pleased about the successe s gained from that process and 
wished to express its thanks to those who had pr ovided support.  However, Tanzania was not fully 
satisfied since the country had not obtaine d a fully acceptable grade of performance.  
301. There was still significant room for improvement .  For that reason, Tanzania wished to 
support the proposal by China and Pakistan and other delegations regarding the need to identify trade 
facilitation needs and approaches.  That should m ove Members further ahead, even beyond customs 
matters.  While Tanzania was pleased with the c ontinued discussions on the specific Articles,   
Tanzania wished to stress the urgency of the matter.   It was therefore proposed that those discussions, 
whose duration was yet too impossible to define, s hould not prevent practical progress in parallel.  
Members should be encouraged to sponsor activi ties, including workshops, as part of effective 
capacity building measures, particularly for LD Cs and other developing countries as the Group 
continued to discuss the subject. 
302. The representative of Costa Rica  said that Article V of the GATT 1994 was an important 
element of the negotiations.  Costa Rica endorsed the proposals presented with a view to further 
expediting the movement of goods in transit.  La ndlocked countries faced far more difficulties than 
countries with access to the sea, and certainly stood to benefit most from clearer, more transparent and 
more predictable rules.  Nevertheless, there were other cross-border issues that affected all parties 
equally, and Members had to deal with them in the negotiations.  Landlocked-country Members also 
faced unnecessary costs and excessive  formalities and controls, and, in many cases, that clearly 
limited their ability to integrate further into the multilateral trading system.  Last week, Costa Rica 
had had the opportunity to take note of the signi ficant progress made by Paraguay during its second 
Trade Policy Review.  It was worth highlighting Pa raguay's attempts to improve its export processes, 
but in spite of individual efforts, improved rules were needed in that area to ensure that those efforts 
were not in vain.   TN/TF/M/5 
Page 40  
 
 303. As stated by the European Communities, the clarification and improvement of Article V must 
undoubtedly be considered in conj unction with the proposals relating to Articles VIII and X, since 
those proposals often pertained to many of the is sues identified in relation to Article V, such as 
transparency, predictability, fees and charges, pr ocedures, documentation and other import and export 
requirements, as well as cooperation between borde r agencies, among others.  Costa Rica believed 
that to be an approach that Members should take into account.  Naturally, there were elements that 
were specific to Article V but, in general, ther e were solutions that could be applied mutually. 
304. Costa Rica supported Singapore's proposal on a dvance rulings, which built on the proposals 
of Canada, Australia and the United States, and was pleased that they had explained their practice in 
that area.  Costa Rica supported the proposals ai med at ensuring that government institutions, 
particularly customs administrations, had the capacity  to publish advance rulings so as to guarantee 
implementation of a specific decision during a specific period, thereby avoiding as far as possible the 
legal uncertainty created by discretionary changes in troduced by governments.  Therefore, Costa Rica 
believed that the publication of ad vance rulings increased legal certainty for users, and that advance 
rulings fell within the field of application of GATT Article X.  With regard to the proposal on SDT , 
Singapore provided some ideas on how that could be  dealt with, taking the modalities into account, 
when it stated that SDT should involve longer implementation periods.  With respect to paragraph 12(c), Costa Rica would like to know how more onerous obligations  could be implemented 
on a best endeavour basis. 
305. Concerning the European Communities' proposal on technical assistance,  Costa Rica wished 
to express its thanks for their efforts, both w ithin and outside the scope of trade facilitation 
negotiations, e.g., financial assistance for infrast ructure, which went beyond the WTO mandate.  
Costa Rica would welcome similar proposals from other donors and international organizations.  
Costa Rica believed that in the efforts to establis h a solid technical assistance and capacity-building 
system, and to implement commitments on trade facilitation, Members must also take into account efforts already being undertaken in that area.  In that regard, Costa Rica wi shed to mention the work 
being done in the Central American  region and the cooperation Costa Rica had received from regional 
organizations and the European Communities.  Ho wever, the information on the region provided by 
the European Communities was inco mplete.  The five Central Amer ican countries had embarked on a 
process of economic integration in 1962, taking it a step further in 1997, when Costa Rica reactivated 
the process to form a customs union.  The European  Communities appeared to suggest that Costa Rica 
was not involved in that process, which was not the case. 
306. Costa Rica wished to thank Chin ese Taipei for having organized and invited Costa Rica to a 
trade facilitation round table held in its customs terr itory and invited other Members to sponsor further 
trade facilitation activities. 
307. Costa Rica shared the view expressed in paragraph 9 of the communication from the African 
Group that Members should work towards increasing th e participation of LDCs in the negotiations 
through strengthened technical assi stance activities.  Costa Rica believed that the identification of 
needs and priorities was a useful exercise that each  Member should undertake, as was confirmed in 
the communication from Rwanda, Paraguay and Switzer land in relation to needs under Article V.  
That purpose was also served by WCO and World Ba nk instruments.  However, Costa Rica believed 
that the process of  identifying needs and priori ties should not be disconnected from the negotiating 
process.  When Members knew what type of measures could be included in a future agreement, it was 
easier to ascertain what their needs and prioriti es were and what the costs of implementing the 
agreement could be.  In that connection, the pr oposals submitted by Peru, and by China and Pakistan, 
concerning an inventory or a general tool on need s and priorities were important, and should be given 
due consideration.  TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 41 
 
 
 308. With regard to the communication from the African Group, Costa Rica would like to know 
which of the proposals presented to date went beyond the negotiating mandate.  How could Members 
define S&D treatment when they did not know what  the extent of trade facilitation measures would 
be?  Costa Rica hoped that Members all undertook trade facilitation commitments and did their 
utmost to implement what was eventually agreed. 
309. With respect to the statement by Switzerland,  Costa Rica wished to express its concern over 
the use of the term "flexibilities" in addition to SDT.  In Costa Rica's opinion, SDT was a flexibility for the application of WTO rules and the rules to  be agreed on trade facilitation, which would be 
available to all developing countries.  The appr oach suggested by Switzerland in those discussions 
was the same as that suggested by the Chairman  of the CTD Special Session for examining S&D 
proposals in the Uruguay Round agreements.  Costa Rica opposed the shifting of discussions on S&D 
to negotiating groups since the manda tes were completely different. 
310. The representative of the United States
 joined others in their observation of the profound 
diversity of Members that had made submissions an d the good diversity of coalitions.  That spoke for 
the NG's work and the fact that Members we re engaging and looked forward to continued 
engagement.  The United States also welcomed many of  the questions that had been raised.  The US 
shared some of them.   
311. One theme of the present meeting the US was part icularly pleased about was the transit issue. 
The United States particularly welcomed the propo sal by Bolivia, Paraguay and Mongolia and shared 
its analysis.  The communication certainly targeted the problems. The US shared the great interest in 
strengthening the provisions of Article V.  The US delegation also wished to draw special attention to 
the intervention made by Rwanda when introducing their paper, as they included some very specific 
and on the ground information and figures.  The more Members could bring that type of on the ground figures and problems into their work, the better th e work would be. That was a second theme.  
312. The United States also wished to make special  note of Singapore's rulings proposal.  The 
United States shared the interest in that area. Singa pore's experience was particularly interesting as its 
regime only dated back three years.  
313. The United States also wished to comment on the proposal by Peru regarding Articles V, VIII 
and X and their mention of the need for an assessm ent of the current situation, which led to the 
submission by the African Group.  The US was pleased to see that submission, particularly its underscoring of the importance of the negotiations  and the fact that the African Members were 
stakeholders in those negotiations. 
314. One reminder the US had was to be a little  cautious about assumptions on costs and 
challenges, which led to the submission by China a nd Pakistan, which the US found very interesting, 
as it captured another theme the US wished to undersco re.  It was something the US had also raised in 
the past.  Like others, the United States underscored the need to undertake so me sort of assessments to 
provide a factual basis of needs, costs and, esp ecially, concrete information as it related to the 
proposals that had been made. 
315. The US also agreed with what Argentina ha d said about the three pillars. It was indeed 
necessary to look at the reality of each individual situa tion, to look at the scope of the results and at 
the needs related to technical assistance.  The pape r by Pakistan and China provided some shape to 
the work the US foresaw on an ongoing basis with regard to providing a factual assessment.  That 
would help everyone, both individually as well as collectively.  The US wished to work with 
Members as work proceeded to determine the best wa y.  The tools were there. Both the World Bank 
and the WCO had talked about that. It was important  to remember that many Members provided a lot 
of bilateral assistance.  In those efforts, they a ll had something to contribute in terms of factual TN/TF/M/5 
Page 42  
 
 information to support the work.  In short, th e US was very pleased with those submissions and 
looked forward to a continued engagement. 
316. The representative of Peru
 appreciated the new proposals, particularly those relating to transit 
under Article V. Peru was pleased  to see that some of the proposals had created a link among 
countries from different regions and different levels  of development.  Peru welcomed the document 
from Korea on facilitation and simplification of doc umentation (TN/TF/W/34) and agreed with its 
content, as well as that of the European Commun ities' document (TN/TF/W/35), which was also quite 
timely and helped to clarify many different issues. 
317. With respect to the joint pr oposal from Bolivia, Mongolia and Paraguay, Peru had some 
specific questions. A more detailed explanation w as sought on the third point concerning formalities 
for transit and the transport regime under customs control.  Peru would be interested in a more 
specific explanation.  In what way would such  a regime be devised? Was it envisaged to be 
multilateral or would each Member simply develop its own system on the basis of a common understanding, and would it apply to a ll goods with some specific selec ting criteria for the goods to be 
covered by that regime? 
318. As for number 4, documentation required for trans it, together with coordination, Peru agreed 
with the proposal and felt it to be appropriate, pr oviding that the coordination would be useful to 
facilitate trade and not create possible and inefficien cies of delays in the authorization by authorities 
of the transit of goods.  In section IV on concerns  of developing-country Members, Peru would like to 
highlight the need to increase and improve operations  on the borders, so as to avoid the illegal trade 
and the importance of having transfer of technolog y to improve operations for goods and transits.  
Peru agreed with those points and also s upported much of the content of the paper. 
319. The proposal from China and Pakistan in docum ent TN/TF/W/29 was considered with great 
interest.  Peru was of the view that work on th at matter should be undertak en in parallel with the 
negotiations, taking into account what had already been done by some international organizations, 
including the WCO.  Peru would like the propo sal from China and Pakistan to focus on work 
designed to assist in negotiations.  In that context,  Peru shared the comments recently made by Costa 
Rica regarding the vision of how to direct that work, as well as the comments made by Argentina on the three pillars.  
320. The document by the African Group was extremel y useful and very timely.  As for the 
proposal from Hong Kong, China, Peru supported virt ually all of the proposals contained in document 
TN/TF/W/31 on Article X. However, Peru had some concerns regardi ng that document and shared the 
concerns expressed by Argentina regarding the benchm arks and in particular, the need of criteria.   
321. Peru welcomed the positive comments made on its document and had some provisional 
comments it wished to make in response. Regard ing Malaysia's question on what Peru meant by 
"official means" in respect of Article X and whethe r it was the same way for other Articles, Peru felt 
that "official easily accessible means" were basical ly electronic means and the use of a web page, 
provided by the institutions in charge of trade fac ilitation, especially customs.  With respect to the 
entry into force of the regulations, it was up to the st ate that would take such decisions to say when a 
regulation entered into force.  What Peru was sugg esting was that the state took into account the needs 
of operators to have sufficient time to adjust to th e new rules and regulations, particularly when they 
introduced many changes to the regulations.  
322. The representative of Brazil
 said that the proposed acceptance of copies would actually be a 
step back in the process of modernization of one 's customs procedures.  Brazil was implementing a 
digital certification which guaranteed both the identifica tion of the trader and of the information set or  TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 43 
 
 
 submitted. In addition, Brazil required original pa pers, making that proposal difficult for Brazil to 
implement.   
323. As for the proposals for the establishment of  a Single Window, as presented by several 
delegations, Brazil wished to express its concern rega rding the creation of an additional bureaucracy.  
The Single Window should be based on the deve lopment of an IT device which might use an 
international electronic model for submitting inform ation, such as the WCO Customs Data Model.  
That would inhibit fraud and would r eally facilitate current procedures. 
324. Regarding the adoption of special procedures for authorized traders and advance rulings, 
Brazil supported those proposals and was currently implementing them.  
325. With respect to the proposal presented by the US and Australia on Article VIII, Brazil sought 
explanation on how the proposed review of  the fees was supposed to be implemented. 
326. Concerning the proposals for the establishment of an enquiry point presented by Japan, 
Korea, China and the EC, Brazil would like to associate itself with those proposals with a few 
reservations.  Brazil would be unable to implement it overnight, because of its restrictions in resources 
which might be needed.  To clarify that, Brazil wished to ask the proponents to present national 
experiences on the establishment of such mechanis ms.  Brazil would also like to suggest the 
possibility to establish more than one enquiry point, as already envisaged in the TBT and SPS 
Agreements. 
327. As for the proposals on the publication of judicial rulings, Brazil would like to request the 
proponents to list what kind of rulings would be s ubject to notification to the WTO.  In addition, 
Brazil would like to be informed of the number and nature of instances which might be available for 
traders to appeal to. 
328. Comments on the Article V-related proposals woul d be presented in due time, but Brazil gave 
them its sympathetic consideration. 
329. The representative of Korea  wished to respond to the questions raised by Argentina and 
Jamaica.  They raised the point that Article V did not distinguish between with or without 
transhipment. Korea was of the view that such a differentiation was necessary.  Korea interpreted the 
first paragraph of Article V to relate to the general definition of traffic in transit.  It said that goods 
should be "deemed to be in transit across the terr itory of a contracting party when the passage across 
such territory, with or without transhipment , (...) was only a portion of a complete journey.... ". Korea 
saw that as the general definition of traffic in tran sit.  The second paragraph of that Article clearly 
stated that there should be no distinction on matters su ch as the flag of the vessel, the place of origin 
and departure, entry and the like.   There were different interpretations of the views raised by 
Argentina and Jamaica. It was very useful to distinguish between two definitions of the two cases.  Korea's proposal provided for goods without transhipme nt to be considered as representing a lower 
risk compared to that of goods that underwent tran shipment in terms of goods being released into the 
country.  There was a low risk of smuggling and thus no need  for an additional inspection.  For those 
reasons, Korea found it reasonable that goods withou t transhipment should have only bare minimum 
transit requirements in terms of documents and fees.  Korea did not intend to  discriminate between the 
two cases. Rather, Korea proposed a more favourable consideration for the n on-transhipped goods, in 
the sense of a smoother more convenient way of proceeding.  In general, Korean customs did not require any paper work for cargo in transit by sea, which did not undergo transhipment.  With respect 
to transhipment goods, Korea required only three do cuments, namely inbound manifests, declaration 
forms for unloading and outbound manifests.  Furt hermore, inbound manifests and declaration forms 
for unloading were often filed at the same time.  That filing system not only saved time and costs but TN/TF/M/5 
Page 44  
 
 also expedited the outbound transit process.  More favourable consideration should be given to cargo 
not undergoing transhipment.  
330. The representative of Nepa
l welcomed the new proposals.  Ne pal attached importance to trade 
facilitation and was glad to note that a number of pr oposals had been tabled on Article V.  The current 
discussion indicated that the NG was moving into a good and positive direction.  Nepal attached 
importance to all proposals, including those by Mo ngolia and Paraguay, the African Group, China and 
Pakistan and others.  Specific comments w ould be provided at a later stage.  
331. The representative of the Dominican Republic  said that the contributions made constituted a 
highly valuable aid to fulfil the negotiating mandate. 
332. Of the 12 proposals, five referred to Article V,  while three mentioned or were exclusively 
concerned with improving Article XIII, and three were especially geared to including new elements in 
Article X of the GATT. Three other proposals dealt with principles and the proper preparation of the 
work to be carried out within that process. One proposal by China and Pakistan (TN/TF/W/29) set out 
interesting ideas and drew attention to the met hod of determining the needs and priorities of 
Members. Another proposal examined the scope  of the negotiations, th e treatment of cost 
implications, and SDT. A proposal by the Europ ean Communities (TN/TF/W/37) contained important 
explanatory information on technical assistance and capacity-building, for which the Dominican 
Republic was particularly grateful, because it gave  Members a better understanding of the EC's points 
of view and its readiness to help the developing countries on that specific point. 
333. The proposals that had particularly captured th e Dominican Republic's attention were those 
relating to Article V of the GATT. 
334. The situation described by Bolivia, Mongolia and Paraguay, and Rw anda and Switzerland 
concerning the position of landlocked countries might be valid in other cases, too.  Countries with 
different geographical conditions also suffered sim ilar problems of high transport costs, delays in 
receiving cargoes and other unfavourable consequences involving difficulties and obstacles created by excessive and inadequate procedures. For example, the schedules of maritime cargo routes sometimes 
resulted in cargo being put down at nearby por ts in a neighbouring country, even though both 
countries had outlets to the sea, and from there, th e goods were transferred by land to their final 
destination. 
335. In such cases, inadequate transit procedures might  lead to an increase in goods transport costs 
which created difficulties for the trading activity of the country to which the goods were consigned.  
336. The Dominican Republic therefore believed th at the improvement of certain elements 
contained in Article V, as proposed by Bolivia, Mo ngolia and Paraguay (TN/TF/W/28), could help to 
improve customs procedures for import or export transit traffic in those countries or in others placed in a similar position by particular geographical  or international traffic characteristics. 
337. The proposal by Paraguay, Rwanda and Switzer land (TN/TF/W/39) was also very important, 
because it called for the discussion of a set of common features that might affect the international 
trade of countries that did not have special arrangements for goods traffic. 
338. Regarding SDT, the Dominican Republic agr eed on the need for developing countries, 
especially the smallest and most vulnerable economies, to be able to rely on technical and financial 
assistance for the implementation of all the commitm ents that might emerge from those negotiations. 
339. With regard to the Korean proposal (TN/TF/ W/34), the Dominican Republic agreed that 
minimizing border requirements for goods in transit might help to facilitate transit, and that  TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 45 
 
 
 distinguishing between goods in transit with tran s-shipment and goods in transit without trans-
shipment, through the implementation of more simpli fied transit procedures would help to streamline 
not only the movement of goods in transit, but tr ading activities as a whole. In that context, the 
Dominican Republic agreed with the European Co mmunities' proposals (TN/TF/W/35) on liberalizing 
goods transit. 
340. The Dominican Republic was aware of the existence of numerous problems in the area of 
transit traffic, as enumerated in document TN/TF/W/ 35, and considered that the proposal to expand 
and clarify the rules could be very useful. 
341. The specific elements of the EC proposal whic h the Dominican Republic considered to hold 
much promise for the outcome of those negotiations  concerned transparency, greater discipline in 
respect of charges on goods in transit, simplifica tion and standardization of documents, assurance of 
non-discrimination, and cooperation between countries. 
342. The Dominican Republic also welcomed the pr oposal by China and Pakistan (TN/TF/W/29) 
concerning the next steps in the work of the Negotiating Group. The proposal established a methodology for future work on technical assistan ce and capacity-building and on how to assess the 
actual conditions affecting participants in those ne gotiations, what instruments were available, what 
the differences were and how far the Group should push its negotiating efforts in the immediate 
future. The Dominican Republic welcomed that as a very positive proposal, as it sought to introduce 
an element of methodology in the work to be done in the immediate future. 
343. Finally, the African Group's proposal (TN/TF/W/33) was a very important one.  The reference 
to technical and financial assistance, and in particul ar to the principle of SDT, was of key importance 
for achieving  effective results th at could be applied worldwide. 
344. All the proposals submitted so far were positiv e. Disagreement and confrontation had not 
been the outstanding feature of that NG.  
345. It appeared that Members all agreed on th e importance of modernizing the customs service 
throughout the world, particularly as regards the im provement of Articles V, VIII and X.  However, 
Members must not forget that technical and financial assistance was an important part of the 
negotiating mandate and must be kept in view in the course of the discussions. The Dominican 
Republic therefore attached great importance to the document submitted by the African Group, and 
encouraged the Group to continue developing its id eas which were also valid for other regions of the 
world, especially those with small and vulnerable economies. 
346. The representative of Indonesia
 said that Indonesia had long recognized the importance of 
trade facilitation as a means to improve flows of trade and investment.  Indonesia committed to 
continuously improve its trade f acilitation in order to enhance the competitiveness of its economy.   
347. With respect to Article V, before entering in to detailed deliberation on Article V, it was 
necessaryy to discuss the terms and definition of transit and transhipment.   
348. In Indonesia’s system, a distinction was made between transit and transhipment.  Customs did 
not impose duties for goods in transit provided that  conditions laid down by Customs were complied 
with and that any required security had been furn ished.  Nevertheless, Customs imposed duties and 
taxes for transhipment and conduc ted inspections of the goods.   
349. Although Indonesia was neither a landlocked nor a sea-locked country, it was fully aware of 
the importance of enhancing the flow of trade in landlocked countries. Therefore, Indonesia had also TN/TF/M/5 
Page 46  
 
 supported the statement by the Philippines on behalf of the Core Group.  Indonesia also supported the 
proposals from Rwanda, Mongolia, Bolivia and Paraguay.   
350. As for the submission from New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland on simplification, 
reduction and standardization of trade documents, Indonesia wished to agr ee on the significance of 
that issue.  Indonesia's Customs provided simp lified procedures for authorized consignors and 
consignees under Customs transit.  Indonesia’s Cust oms Law adopted interna tional standards relating 
to the simplification of export-import formalities a nd required data of customs documents.  In that 
regard, Indonesia believed that it was necessary to establish widely recognized standards during the 
negotiations.   
351. With regard to the EC paper TN/TF/W/35, Indonesia recognized that it was quite 
comprehensive as it captured and identified problems faced during transit.  With respect to the issue 
of unjustifiable restrictions on the means of tran sport, Indonesia wished to inform the Group that 
Indonesia's Customs Law did not distinguish betwee n the means of transport, because the importing 
goods in transit included the goods as well as means of transport.   
352. With respect to the proposed improvement of Article X requiring to consult interested parties, 
including the exporting countries, Indonesia wished to  inform that, based on its Customs law, internal 
consultations were already conduc ted with all stakeholders, be th ey associations of importers or 
exporters, prior to introducing draft regulations.  Indonesia believed that that system was already inclusive, since it enabled all interested parti es to comment or provide inputs to the proposed 
regulations.   
353. As for advance rulings, Indonesia wished to inform the Group that it had implemented the 
regulation on advance rulings as recommended by the WCO Decision on the introduction of 
programmes for binding pre-entry classification inform ation.  However, in order to further improve 
transparency and facilitate trade flows, the re gulation on advance rulings was currently being 
improved by strengthening the timing of the issuan ce, duration, automation and certainty, as well as 
publication.   
354. With regard to technical assistance and suppor t for capacity building, Indonesia wished to 
express its sincere appreciation to Members who had submitted papers on that important issue. 
355. Some problems confronted by Indonesia in the area of trade facilitation were inefficiency, 
lack of services due to existing structures and infrastructures and limited capacities of ports.  
However, Indonesia was confronted with many diffic ulties in improving its facilities due to the fact 
that Indonesia had general sea ports in 977 locations, and 27 airports.  One issue that Indonesia had to 
deal with urgently was establishing new facilities of  automation.  Indonesia believed that such a 
system would significantly improve trade facilitation in Indonesia.   
356. The representative of Pakistan
 was pleased with the interest shown by a large number of 
delegations in its proposal and appreciated their sup porting remarks.  Pakistan wished to offer some 
clarifications with China then answering the speci fic questions directed towards the Pakistan-China 
proposal.   
357. As already mentioned in the introductory st atement regarding the self assessment versus 
likely demands, Pakistan believed in  a "bottom-up" approach as it would be based on ground realities 
and would create ownership and master the po litical will required for any successful initiative. 
358. While a "bottom-up" approach was therefore s uggested, that was not to mean that Members 
should start from scratch disregarding the work done so far by the Group. All the proposals presently 
on the table would compliment and augment that self-assessment process.  TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 47 
 
 
 359. Similarly, Pakistan's proposal did not mean th at Members should stop what they were doing.  
What was envisaged was a process to take place in parallel to the examination of current or future 
proposals. Members had to involve themselves in a di agnosis of their trade facilitation needs.  That 
would shape up Members work on an ongoing basis. 
360. With respect to the question of how the needs were  to be identified, Pakistan was of the view 
that that could not be done magically.  No Member could pull out a list of its needs off the top of their 
head.  It would have to consult its trade and indus try, and take stock of its existing facilities.  For 
Pakistan, a need was the gap between where one st ood and where one wanted to go.  The next step 
would be to "prioritize" all those identified n eeds, keeping in view the whole national and 
international scenario and expertise by interna tional organizations such as the WB, WCO and 
UNCTAD. 
361. That would be followed by an analysis of the cost implications of every need.  Everybody 
agreed that commitments in trade facilitation woul d only be undertaken where developing and least-
developed countries were provided with the means to  cover those costs.  That was the aspect where 
Kenya had shown reservations. 
362. As for Argentina's comments, they were the b est articulate summary of Pakistan's proposal 
and future work of the Group.  Pakistan appreciat e the sensitivity attached to three pillars, which 
should be called "three pearls" for the pearls of wisdom.  Once those pearls were available to 
Members, they only needed a "string of consen sus" to make a beautiful piece of jewellery.  
363. The representative of China  agreed with the statement by Pa kistan and wished to offer some 
additional explanations on some specific issues ra ised by Members on the China/Pakistan paper. 
364. The submission, together with its introducti on and the comments, suggestions and questions 
by Members contributed to an important aspect of the work of the NG.  The proposal had several 
features, in addition to those already listed by Pakistan.  The July Package, as well as the Group’s 
work agenda, entailed that the identification of Trade Facilitation needs and priorities would be an 
integral part of the NG’s work. 
365. The paper represented one of the first concrete  efforts since the establishment of the NG to 
table written proposals on that aspect of the work. Pr oposals had already been made on how to clarify 
and improve GATT Articles V, VIII and X. Therefore,  China believed that, together with papers from 
others, it now seemed that the proposals on the ta ble covered almost all aspects of the Group’s 
agenda.  Looking at the first page of the China/Pa kistan document, Members would have a clear idea 
of what the five or six aspects of the work were.  
366. Another feature of the paper was its general na ture.  It did not intend to prescribe only one 
way to proceed with identifying trade facilitation need s and priorities.  Rather, the intention had been 
to share ideas with others. By working together, Members would hopefully be able to complete that 
part of the Group’s work. China was open-minded regarding suggestions fo r improvement, for other 
ways of accomplishing the job, and for new ideas of enabling the Group to accomplish that work 
more efficiently and with good quality. 
367. One feature of the China/Pakistan paper was that its authors recognized and respected the 
contributions and the work done so far by Members,  by the Secretariat and by other international 
organizations.   
368. With respect to the questions about the meaning of that general tool and how it could be 
applied to identify needs and priorities for different  issues of different Members, China was of the 
view that the general tool could be understood as a t ool package.  The tool would not be general, but TN/TF/M/5 
Page 48  
 
 specific. The idea was that, being aware that different needs and priorities existed among the 
participants and that some Members did not need a general tool as they had been able to table 
proposals on an individual basis and to identify their own needs and priorities, the level of needs and 
capacities and the level of trade facilitation diffe red among Members.  Therefore, some Members 
would need that.  The paper was an attempt to help those who might need that.  The reason for 
suggesting a general tool was the differences amongst  Members in that area. That was why the paper 
suggested to take geographic or regional differences  into account. In its efforts to identify the needs 
and priorities in China, for instan ce, China had found that the need s and priorities of the relatively 
well-advanced coastal areas were very different fro m those of other parts of China.  The needs and 
priorities of the customs in Shanghai were very  different from those in other Chinese regions.  
369. The needs and priorities amongst WTO Members were  also different.  Therefore, the question 
arose of how to set the level of obligations or th e nature of the rules that could accommodate as many 
Members as possible.  It was important to find a good balance so that those rules, provisions and 
agreements had a better basis to be implemented in the future, with as few difficulties as possible. 
370. Members should contribute to that and define th e nature of the tool, agree on what exactly it 
should be and how it should be used to advance that work.  
371. With regard to the issues of the Working Group that might be set up with the participation of 
international organizations, the intention was also  to see that, if there were Members who really 
needed the help of that Working Group to do the ass essment, Members might agree to establish it.  It 
was of course another possibility that such a Group would not be set up if there was no consensus by 
Members on its necessity.  
372. As for the composition of such a Working Group, China was open.  It might depend on the 
nature of the assessment to be carried out.  Perh aps one should draw on the experience of particular 
international organizations, such as the WCO, the World Bank, UNCTAD, OECD or others.  
Although, whether those organizations should be invited to join a working group – or at least some of 
them – was up for Members to consider and decide.  
373. Another question was how one should put to use the results of such an assessment or 
identification. Some Members had suggested that thos e results should not be used in rule-making, but 
rather that they should only be used for SDT for capacity building e fforts. China’s understanding of 
the rules might have a much richer connotation th an the Members raising that concern.  China 
understood their concern as it understood that the rules should not only cover obligations of 
developing Members or LDCs. Rather, the rules should also contain requirements and arrangements 
for SDT and for technical assistance and capacity build ing.  If the rules were comprehensive and, as 
mandated by the July Package, contained elemen ts of S&D, capacity building and technical 
assistance, why should such rules not be welcomed? Wh y should one be afraid of the formulation of 
such rules? 
374. Some Members had wondered whether a time fra me had been envisaged in the proposal for 
the work on identifying needs and priorities and how l ong it would take to finish the work.  That was 
a difficult question.  It should run in parallel with other work of the NG. On the one hand, there was the clarification and improvement of Articles VIII, X, V, and on the other hand, the need to identify priorities.  China saw that as an ongoing and dynamic process.  The end point might be by the time the Doha Round was wrapped up and Members had agreed on an Agreement on Trade Facilitation.  
375. But the work on the  identification of needs and priorities would never end.  By the time 
Members had an agreement on trade facilitation, so me Members would have new needs based on the 
Agreement and new priorities.  Therefore, it was ve ry difficult for the co-sponsors of the paper to 
prescribe a specific time line.  That work, as well as  other aspects of the work of that Group, were  TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 49 
 
 
 mutually reinforcing.  Therefore, China hoped th at Members would work together with them, and 
with the Chair to see that  efforts in that area would help work  in other areas of that Working Group. 
China was prepared to work very closely with othe rs to accomplish that task and fulfil the mandate. 
376. The representative of Singapore  replied to the question by Chinese Taipei as to whether 
advance rulings applied only to b ilateral FTA's or also extended to  the multilateral level that, while 
advance rulings were restricted to traders unde r the bilateral FTAs, Singapore customs authorities 
nevertheless, had been responding to traders from th ird countries.  There was a strong confinement to 
FTA partners on tariff classification, valuation and other customs methods through e-mails, letters and 
phone enquiries. 
377. With respect to Chinese Taipei’s second question about the amount of human and financial 
resources spent, Singapore wished to inform th at the additional amount of required human and 
financial resources had been minimum. As for th e third question of whether there had been any 
evaluation of performance since the establishment of the system, Singapore could report that a general 
evaluation had been carried out as part of the annu al customer service assessment.  There had been no 
specific assessment pursuant to the FTAs.  With respect to Chinese Ta ipei’s last question of whether 
Singapore’s programme applied only to tariff classifica tions or also to other subjects, the answer was 
that the programme was not restricted to tariff classi fication.  It also extended to other topics such as 
origin questions.  
378. With respect to the question by Costa Rica of how paragraph 12(c)  on S&D suggestions 
would be implemented, Singapore wished to reply th at a best-endeavour approach had been suggested 
as a possible S&D for Members' discussions.  That  suggestion was not carved in stone. Singapore 
wished to stress that the use of best endeavour lang uage was not new in the WTO.  It had also been 
used in the context of GATT Article 6.4 disciplin es or domestic regulations in accountancy services.  
As to its applicability in the Trade Facilitation context, Members could discuss various creative 
approaches such as framing best-endeavour provisions in the context of phased-in approaches and the 
like. Singapore looked forward to working with Members to ascertain how such S&D provisions 
could be operationalized. 
379. As for the EC’s question about the relati onship between Singapore’s advance rulings 
programme and GATT Article 24, Singapore would take  up that question in the CRTA as that was an 
RTA-related issue.  
380. The representative of Hong Kong, China  explained that HKC’s proposal TN/TF/W/31 to look 
at the necessity of trade regulations was a st ep forward from the existing paragraph 1:c of 
Article VIII.  Hong Kong, China considered it importa nt to operationalize paragraph 1(c) by injecting 
into it the principle of necessity.  The implic ation was that, when considering formalities and 
requirements, one had to put oneself in the shoes of traders and ask oneself whether a particular 
measure was really necessary. One should also ask whether a purpose could be achieved in a simpler 
way. It was equally important for importing Members to do the same for exports. 
381. Hong Kong, China had heard the concerns of  many Members about the need to preserve 
policy space for certain legitimate objectives and fo r "reasonableness".  Hong Kong, China’s proposal 
therefore aimed to achieve a balance between the principle of necessity and reasonableness. 
382. With respect to the requested explanation on the suggested two benchmarks, Hong Kong, 
China would like to clarify that the first benc hmark concerned the design of formalities and 
requirements. That concept had been put into prac tice in some of the WTO Agreements such as the 
TBT Agreement.  The second benchmark concerned th e application of formalities and requirements.  
For formalities and requirements surviving the necessity test, i.e., those remaining in force that were TN/TF/M/5 
Page 50  
 
 no more administratively burdensome or trade restri ctive than absolutely necessary, it was important 
to ensure also that they could be and act ually were applied in an efficient manner. 
383. The representative of Norway
 wished to sum up the main ideas behind Norway’s suggestion 
about the need for standardization of documentation in relation to transit.  The paper suggested to 
agree on the use of some of the already existing cen tralized document formats for exports and imports 
and transits of documents.  That s hould be available in several differ ent languages to ease the work of 
traders and customs.  
384. Second, in order to maximize the benefit of standardization of documents, Members should 
discuss further certain standardization of the da ta elements to be used in the documents. 
385. Third, the paper suggested the idea of a bank of standard documents that could be accessed by 
anyone in the language needed.  That idea had to be discussed further. 
386. The aim was to reduce the number of currently existing documents to make trade easier and 
more efficient for traders and government agencies i nvolved.  Norway firmly believe that that would 
reduce the costs involved in trading goods.  Norway would be pleased to meet with delegations to 
discuss and clarify any issues raised in Norway’s submissions. 
387. The representative of Korea  replied to the question from Argentina about the scope of the 
minimization for border requirements, in the sense of  whether it was confined to the documents or 
extended beyond that to other regulations that Kore a considered the main purpose to be minimization 
of documents and some fees.  It was up to Member s to include additional areas of regulations, if 
needed. 
388. With respect to the comments on the discrimination between transhipment or non-
transhipment, Korea had clearly mentioned that th ere was no intention to discriminate between cases 
with or without transhipment. But in many cases, equal treatment was not always the panacea for all 
methods in the world.  Rather, reasonable diffe rentiation was recommended to settle the problem.  
389. The representative of the European Communities  replied to the question by Egypt about what 
kind of international standards coul d be relevant in the transit area that some examples of that would 
be the Kyoto Convention which had standards for transit operations, the TIR Convention under the 
UN and the ATA Carnet system.  Those were the three examples of international standards or 
instruments which were relevant for transit regimes. 
390. As for Korea’s question about what kind of gu idance or commitments could be taken up in 
the WTO regarding the design or the implementation of regional transit regimes, that was an issue for 
negotiations. The EC was of the view that a co mmitment could be established in the WTO according 
to which, in setting up or implementing regional tr ansit regimes or corridors, Members involved in 
those regional arrangements should, to the extent possible, apply existing international standards 
applying to transit. Second, Members should engage  in aligning or harm onizing border procedures 
dealing within the transit in regions. Third, Members should obviously adopt a common documentation and documents for transit operations throughout the regional transit area. Those were 
the three examples of how the Eur opean Communities thought that there could be some provisions in 
the WTO to guide the uniform smooth implementation of regional transit systems.   
391. In response to Korea’s point about what th e EC was aiming at by suggesting that the 
definition of goods in Article V might need further cl arification, the EC wished to clarify that that 
suggestion had been made as a result of the EC's consultations with a number of landlocked developing-country colleagues, where a number of con cerns had been raised about transit operators in 
some cases being stopped because the customs did not re gard the personal belongings of the driver as  TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 51 
 
 
 falling under the definition of goods.  Therefore, ev en when the consignment on the back of the lorry 
was allowed freedom of transit, the operation w as stopped because the driver's personal belongings 
were not regarded as falling within the scope of goods and therefore did not enjoy transit freedom.  
That might seem like a small issue, but it could be  quite a big problem for truck operations in any 
transiting region. 
392. With respect to Kenya’s question about how the notion of risk assessment procedures could 
apply to transit, the EC was of the view that some  examples of how risk assessment would apply to 
transit included the choice between the procedur es for transhipped or non-transhipped document 
consignments as well as situations where Members ha d procedures for authorized traders, with risk 
assessment being applied and authorized traders in a transit situation benefiting from certain 
requirements being waved (such as the requireme nt to post a bond or security). Different risk 
assessment procedures applied in respect of the da ngerous goods or more c onventional cargos.  There 
were a number of situations where risk assessment applied to transit, as well as to customs and imports.   
393. Regarding Kenya's second question about authorized  traders schemes in relation to transit, the 
EC would at the next meeting make some propo sals on GATT Article VIII, which would include the 
concept of authorized traders.  Basically, what the European Communities m eant by that was the idea 
that within one's customs law or procedures, one  provided for more rapid and simplified customs 
release and clearance procedures for traders who had a very good track record of compliance with all 
of the laws and rules and a good record of complyin g with customs duties.  And typically, traders who 
could demonstrate their compliance record, would enter into an agreement or Memorandum of 
Understanding with the customs and as a result, th ey would be given more streamlined and simple 
procedures. There might be no physical inspection of  their goods, a faster lane for the release of their 
cargos or a dedicated lane, a prioritization in te rms of the processing of data, periodic payment of 
customs duties rather than on the basis of each import declaration and no need to post bonds or 
securities.  Those were the typical privileges given to authorized traders in retu rn for the high-level of 
compliance.  Those schemes existed in many Memb ers and should be encouraged because it created a 
virtual circle between compliance on one hand, and facilitation on the other.  The European 
Communities certainly thought that it would be usef ul in the WTO to establish that concept and to 
make sure that where countries operated authori zed traders' schemes, those schemes would be 
objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and available to small companies and not simply multinationals.   
394. As for Brazil’s question about what the European Communities meant by the idea to 
periodically review schedules of fees and charges, the EC had a fairly open-mind on how that would 
be done. As a question of good administration, the European Communities thought it was a perfectly legitimate idea that from time to time – that could be annually or every two years – Members would 
look at the fees and charges for different kind of customs treatment, including transit and see whether 
those fees and charges still reflected the actual costs of the operations.  Many Members did so already. 
395. As for Tanzania’s call to provi de workshops on trade facilitation in order to better explain the 
different proposals on those implications and along tho se lines, the EC wished to inform that, together 
with the World Bank, it was organizing a workshop on trade facilitation in Eastern Africa before the 
summer break.  The European Communities would also, together with the ASEAN Secretariat, 
organize a similar workshop in the th ird week of June in Manila on both the regional aspects of trade 
facilitation and the WTO agenda for ASEAN. 
396. With respect to Costa Rica’s claim of the EC having erred in not mentioning Costa Rica as 
being part of the Central American Customs Union,  the EC was happy to correct that and publicly 
reinstate Costa Rica within its customs union. TN/TF/M/5 
Page 52  
 
 397. The Chairman
 requested the Secretariat to prepare a co mpilation of all the proposals tabled so 
far on how to improve and clarify GATT Articles V, VIII and X in response to Members' requests for 
such documentation.  
398. Having exhausted the discussions on the new proposals, he suggested to turn to the 
contributions previously received.  
399. The representative of India  supported the statement made by the Philippines on behalf of the 
Core Group.  The proposals submitted by Members ha d enriched the discussions in the NGTF. India 
wished to comment on proposals TN/TF/W/18 – W/26.  
400. India supported the harmonization and standard ization of document formats proposed by 
Korea in document TN/TF/W/18, especially in the present situation where customs administrations 
were increasingly moving towards automation.  India be lieved that the availability of a standard set of 
data would considerably reduce trading costs.  It  would be useful if da ta harmonization was not 
restricted only for customs requirements but also  extended to meet the requirements of other 
government agencies.  India, however, recognized th at that required considerable technical work 
which could perhaps be achieved through the comp letion of the Customs Data Model currently under 
preparation in the WCO.  It was understood that that Model would also leave certain blank fields to meet some specific information requirements of individual countries. 
401. Korea’s proposal to accept commercially available information seemed to be somewhat 
contradictory to the proposal to harmonize document formats.  Once harmonization and standardization of document formats was achieved, there would not be a need for customs authorities 
to have another system of foregoing certain docum entation requirements when  relevant information 
was already available in a commercial transaction. Su ch a system would leave discretion to countries 
regarding information requirements on the basis of  their availability in commercial documents.  A 
standardized document format would serve as a st andard goods declaration.  India’s understanding 
was that such a goods declaration could not be dispensed with.   
402. With respect to Korea’s proposal to accept copi es of documents, India would like to clarify 
that while normally in India, original documents  were not required before clearance, customs 
authorities had the right to call for original documents  wherever required.  Original documents were at 
times required for customs control purposes.   In view  of that, India did not support that proposal as a 
binding commitment.  Instead, India could support a proposal for the clearance of goods not to be held 
up merely for want of original documents whenever possible.   
403. With respect to the proposal s to establish a Single Window for the submission of all 
documents and data to a single agency suggested by Korea (TN/TF/W/18) and Canada 
(TN/TF/W/20), India wished to make several points. India recognized the value of a single window in simplifying trade procedures.  However, that woul d require large additional resources in developing a 
system with full connectivity between all agenci es dealing with border clearance procedures. There 
would also be an attendant requirement of stan dardization and integration of additional data 
requirements for all other agencies.  In that regard , India proposed that, for developing countries, that 
should only be a best endeavor clause.  
404. India also requested clarification from Korea on its suggestion in paragraph 16 that "that 
‘single window’ agency would administer all inform ation on the document".  Would it mean that the 
single window agency was envisaged not only to suppl y information to other connected departments, 
but to also ensure final clearance of goods after obtaining clearance of all relevant agencies?   India 
would also like to know whether the single window ag ency was the expected channel to provide any 
further clarification/information that any agency ma y require from an importer.  India would also like  TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 53 
 
 
 Members to reflect whether there could be certain difficulties in that task on account of different 
confidentiality concerns of different agencies.   
405. As for the establishment and publication of aver age time required for clearance suggested by 
Korea, India broadly supported the concept of publis hing average release time of goods.  However, it 
was India’s experience that the release time differed at  different customs stations and, at times, even 
during different periods.  It would be India’s understanding that Members’ commitment would need 
to be limited to publishing average time of releas e for various important customs stations for past 
periods.  Members would themselves determine that release period.  That would serve only as an indicative time for clearance of goods rather than implying any commitments.   
406. A second connected proposal was to give trader s the right to ask the customs authorities the 
reasons for delay in clearance vis-à-vis  the notified processing time.  In view of India’s stated position 
with regard to publication of release time, Indi a’s understanding was that that proposed commitment 
could only be in terms of an administrative right and could not be in terms of any formalized legal 
commitment to clear goods within the notified standa rd time.  India would also propose that customs 
authorities should not be obligated to give a resp onse to each and every query – there could be 
occasions, when in view of certain sensitivities, that in formation would not be desirable to be given.   
407. Canada’s proposal to ensure cooperation between customs authorities and other interested 
agencies in coordinating border controls (TN/TF/W/ 20) was desirable and achievable at the domestic 
level. However, the proposal of integrated border controls through a single shared physical 
infrastructure between neighbouring customs services could involve sensitivities ranging from 
political to different degrees of border control based on different levels of duty rates, different levels 
of infrastructure and even different holiday period s.  On account of those considerations, India 
suggested that coordination between neighboring count ries could only be in terms of a best endeavor 
clause.   
408. With respect to the US proposal on clear ance against guarantees pending resolution of 
customs issues (TN/TF/W/21), India supported th e crux of the proposal that clearance of a 
consignment should not be held up in cases of likel y delays on account of some verification or other 
requirements. In such cases, goods should be allowe d to be released by securi ng duty through various 
forms of security. However, India would like to sound a note of caution that provision for release of 
goods against guarantees should not be available in those limited cases where prima facie goods were 
liable for absolute confiscation.  
409. India’s delegation, however, did not support a generalized commitment for releasing goods 
against bond and to collect duty later on. Such duty deferment could create fi scal difficulties as well 
as an increased administrative burde n to monitor outstanding payments.  India would also like to point 
out that in the proposal of Australia and Cana da (TN/TF/W/19), the words ‘Bond’ and ‘Security’ 
appeared to be used interchangeably (2nd bullet of paragraph 4 read w ith paragraph 7). India 
considered it useful to clarify that Members shoul d have the freedom to secure duty through various 
security instruments which could include, but would not only be limited to bonds (other forms could 
be cash deposit, bank guarantee or  other forms of security).  
410. As for the EC’s and Australia’s proposal on fees and charges imposed by customs and other 
agencies (TN/TF/W/23), India’s internal consultations  on that issue were not yet complete and hence 
India had only some preliminar y comments at the present stage. 
411. On the proposal for Members to review, and, if necessary, consolidate or reduce the number 
and diversity of their fees and charges, India held th e view that other than the suggestion for review of 
fees and charges, the other elements of that pr oposal could be onerous and not amenable to an 
objective application.  It was not clear what para meters could be adopted to "consolidate and reduce TN/TF/M/5 
Page 54  
 
 the number and diversity of fees and charges". Sim ilarly, India felt that the proposal to justify 
remaining fees and charges could be  onerous. India’s view was that only transparency of rates of fees 
and charges through their publication (in electronic or paper format) would be sufficient. 
412. India also felt that the proposal to establish a list of permissible fees and charges would be 
redundant once an obligation to publish fees and ch arges was established. India’s understanding was 
that all published fees and charges would be in th e permissible category, as they would be based on 
some notification or regulation. Hence, any add itional notion of "permissibility" would introduce a 
new legal test, which would be unwarranted. 
413. With respect to New Zealand's suggestion to gi ve Members and traders a right to comment on 
laws and decisions (TN/TF/W/24), India felt that th at commitment should not be too onerous and only 
be in broad terms as a commitment to publish dr aft procedures to invite comments of domestic 
stakeholders, take those into account in finalizing the procedures, and publish the finalized procedures 
in advance before they entered into force. As al ready stated, India did not support extending that right 
of prior comments to other WTO Members. India w as surprised about the proposal that the right to 
comment should apply to judicial decisions as well.  It was India’s understanding that before passing a 
judicial order, the affected parties were given an opportunity to put forth their views. India saw no 
justification to extend that into a generalized co mmitment of seeking comments before a judicial 
decision was passed.  
414. As regards New Zealand’s proposal to use obj ective criteria for tariff classification of goods 
(TN/TF/W/24), India supported the proposal to use an  objective criterion for tariff classification of 
goods by adopting the WCO's HS Convention.  India however felt that that would by itself be a 
sufficient method to ensure an objective determination of classification as the HS System contained a 
comprehensive guideline for classification through interpretative notes, section and chapter notes and 
comprehensive HS explanatory notes. Hence, India did not see the need to adopt the further 
understanding proposed by New Zealand that, wh ere a test was necessary to determine the 
classification, it should satisfy requirements of obj ectivity, scientific basis,  wide acceptance and 
impartiality.   
415. With respect to Chinese Taipei's proposal to use the GAAP for determining direct and indirect 
costs of services rendered (TN/TF/W/25), India recognized that that paper had made a useful practical contribution in illustrating  a method of calculating the cost of services. However, that might not be a 
viable method in all cases.  Members would need to  have flexibility to adopt their own methods for 
calculating fees and charges, which in essen ce should be reasonable and transparent. 
416. On the proposal for periodic review of levels of fees and charges, it was India’s view that 
periodic review was in any case an economic necessity  in order to take into account inflation and 
other factors impinging upon cost.  Such a review c ould lead to either increase or decrease in the 
existing rates of fees.  In that view, it might not be justifiable to fix a standard time period for review 
of fees and charges; instead review could be undertaken as and when necessitated.      
417. With respect to the creation of enquiry point s suggested by China in document TN/TF/W/26, 
India had commented earlier on the need for flexibili ty in the number and location of enquiry points. 
On the suggestion to have specific time periods fo r reply, India proposed that that should only be 
indicative in nature and should not  entail legal consequences (for instance, extending benefit of a 
notification for which the requested clarification ha d not been received within a stipulated time.)   
418. India, however, did not support the proposal that reply of an enquiry should represent the 
authoritative view of the Member government. Firstly, if such enquiry points were not centrally based 
and were located customs-station wise, it would be difficult for them to provide an authoritative view  TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 55 
 
 
 of the government.  Secondly, such a mechanism would impinge upon the quasi-judicial function of 
the field formations and of the advance ruling authority.  
419. The representative of Turkey  commented on the submissions  under Articles VIII and X put 
forward in the previous meetings. 
420. Turkey believed that customs and border forma lities must be simple, easy to understand, and 
must be applied in a consistent, fair and transp arent manner so that the potential value of trade 
liberalization efforts would be maximized.  The gain s of trade facilitation were especially great for 
small- and medium-sized companies and traders in  developing countries, for whom the costs of 
compliance with trade procedures were proporti onately higher and disincentive to trading 
internationally. 
421. Turkey supported the following proposals:  Pre-arrival acceptance of customs documents and 
documentary examination in customs declarati on procedure put forward by Japan and Mongolia 
(TN/TF/W/17);  risk management, authorized trader and post-clearance control put forward by several proponents;  reducing the number documents sou ght in importation and exportation, and using 
documentary standards developed by  other international organizations such as the UN Layout Key, 
the WCO Kyoto Convention, etc.;  periodic revi ew of trade documents sought, proposed under 
TN/TF/W/17;  coordination among the border authoriti es and integrated border controls proposed by 
Canada in TN/TF/W/18 (which was a revised  Kyoto Convention standard, namely 3-35). 
422. Regarding the proposals of disciplining fees and charges relating to exportation and 
importation, Turkey appreciated the efforts to contro l the amount and diversity of fees and charges in 
order to prevent unforeseen and unjus tifiable applications.  Turkey su ggested that the proponents of 
those proposals provided the Group with an illustrativ e list of fees and charges in question so that 
Members could come up with a definition of those to  be prohibited or limited in their costs.  In 
addition, Turkey supported the idea to establish a national periodic review of fees and charges;  
Turkey was of the opinion that they or their calculation methods should be publicized anyway. 
423. Turkey also recalled its previously expressed support of the proposal of accepting copies of 
import and export documents put forward by Korea and Japan. 
424. Turkey appreciated the proposals concerning a single window and submission of relevant 
documents to a single authority as an early step to a single window.  Although not yet implementing it, Turkey already initiated "e-Document Project in Fo reign Trade" which set up the infrastructure of a 
single window approach.  That project was being purs ued in order to produce, share and circulate the 
documents used on the foreign trade, in the elect ronic environment.  A free-trade zone had been 
determined as a pilot zone for the implementation of the project. 
425. Turkey believed that minor formal errors in trade documents and customs declarations should 
not be a ground to reject them unless they gave rise to an ambiguity in interpretation and/or correct 
implementation of relevant provisions.  Tu rkish Customs operated in such a manner. 
426. Turkey supported the proposal by the EC of  declaring standard release time of goods.  
However, that declaration should only be consider ed as an indicator of standard and harmonized 
implementation.  A standard release time could be  pursued only if the goods were accompanied by all 
relevant documents and the cu stoms operation in question did not define a risk factor. 
427. In respect of the release of goods, the extensi on of the scope of Article 13 of the Customs 
Valuation Agreement needed some further study on whether that extension would cover the release of 
goods, which were subject to a disputed decision w ith regard to health standards or consumer 
protection.  Turkey understood from the clarification provided by the proponents of that proposal that TN/TF/M/5 
Page 56  
 
 the aim was to save time in clearance procedure where a dispute had occurred in relation to the 
payable obligations which could be compensated ever y time.  In Turkey’s opinion, the extension of 
Article 13 to other areas such as tariff classification s hould be allowed as far as the expected result of 
dispute could affect only the duty or tax amount payable but not other trade-policy measures applicable. 
428. Turkey shared the views on the need for leaving time to third parties to comment on the drafts 
of new arrangements by means of publicizing them.  Ho wever, the question mark raised at that point 
was at which stage of the adoption process they s hould be publicized.  Furthermore, the adoption 
process differed according to the hierarchy of the le gal arrangement.  Turkey was open to discuss it.  
On the other hand, Turkey disagreed with the idea to  present them to other Members in order to have 
their comments taken into account as proposed by New Zealand.  Turkey believed that such an 
obligation could not be justified under Article X, as it went beyond the trade facilitation concerns and 
the limits of the mandate.  In addition, it w ould conflict national constitutional disciplines. 
429. Turkey supported the proposal by Pakistan and China regarding the identification of 
individual needs and priorities. Each Member should start to define its needs and priorities using, for 
instance, the WCO's Checklist. 
430. The representative of Egypt
 wished to offer some comments and questions on the previous 
proposals presented at the last meeting.   
431. With respect to paper TN/TF/W/17 by Japan and Mongolia, Egypt shared the questions and 
comments about the periodic review made with respect to the paper proposed by Mongolia (TN/TF/W/28).  Did the sponsors of that paper e nvisage a specific time period for accomplishing such 
reviews? And, would such reviews be mandatory ? In addition, there was a need for further 
explanation of the "acceptance of required documents in  copies to the extent possible, with a view to 
reducing the time and...." mentione d under paragraph 7, bullet 2. Egypt would like to know how the 
implementation would guarantee the balances betw een facilitating trade and minimizing the chances 
for fraud.  
432. Paper TN/TF/W/15 submitted by the United Stat es envisioned a significant enhancement of 
certainty and consistency for treatment of e xpress shipments through a commitment to provide 
separate expediting procedures "and the availability of the de minimis  procedures" for low value 
shipments.  In that regard, Egypt needed clarity  on how far the obligation would be to provide 
separate expedited procedures for express shipments,  especially against the background that such a 
requirement was not mentioned in Article VIII of  GATT 1994?  Clarification was also needed on the 
meaning of " de minimis"  procedures and "low value shipment s". Also, identification was needed 
regarding those listed procedures.   
433. In TN/TF/W/21, the United States proposed to maintain a system by which goods might be 
released from the custody of customs before final pa yment of duties or resolution of customs matters, 
utilizing, as necessary, a guarantee as surety, bond or deposit.  In that regard, Egypt was seeking more 
elaboration on the relation between that proposal an d Article 13 of the Customs Valuation Agreement.  
Egypt noted with concern that that proposals seemed to go beyond the CVA.  In addition, Egypt wondered how SMEs could gain from such a proposal  within their limited resources and capabilities.  
434. Paper TN/TF/W/18 by Korea suggested in secti on 4, paragraph 20, that, where the release 
took longer than the aver age time, traders would have the right  to ask customs authorities for the 
reasons for the processing time for those goods having  been longer. Egypt was of the view that it was 
normal for the release of goods to sometimes exceed th e average time. That was the very definition of 
"average".  Therefore, it was important to define  what was meant precisely by "average time" and 
how it would differ from developed to developing c ountries.   Paragraph 23 suggested that the NG  TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 57 
 
 
 should recommend that Members introduce and utilize pre-arrival processing, post-entry auditing and 
risk management systems and that Members adopt  those measures as soon as they were feasible for 
each Member.  Clarification was needed on what was meant by "as soon as they were feasible", and 
what determined whether or not the measures were feasible and who would take the decision in that regard. 
435. With respect to the proposal presented by the EC  in its submission TN/TF/W/6, calling for "a 
provision requiring Members to publish and make ea sily available" (....) and other government 
agencies' management plans..." Egyp t was of the view that that propo sal wished to extend the scope of 
Article X by adding the publication of those management plans. Such a measure would be more demanding and might impose unnecessary burdens on developing countries and LDCs in fulfilling 
notification obligations in that area. Therefore, it would be appreciated if th e EC could provide more 
explanation on the main objective of that propo sal, especially since those plans were dynamic and 
changeable over time.  In addition, Egypt wished to  know to which extent the publication requirement 
would be binding. 
436. Paper TN/TF/W/12 by the Unites States, proposed in section 2, paragraph 1 to "make 
available, upon request of a trader in advance of  trade binding rulings in certain specific subject 
areas".  It would be helpful if the US could provide more clarification on the mechanism to be put in place for those binding advance rulings, particularly with respect to the degree of compliance.  Also, 
Egypt wished the US to clarify what advance rulings under that proposal were offered beyond Article 2 of the Agreement on Rules of Origin.     
437. Korea's proposal made in TN/TF/W/7, paragraph 7, for Members to notify the WTO 
Secretariat of the media through which the aforementioned measures and their amendments were 
published with the Secretariat then disseminating that notice to other Members, might create an 
additional burden on Members still struggling to cope  with notification requirements in the context of 
the SPS and TBT Agreements.  In addition, Egypt ha d concerns regarding footnote 3 in the sense of 
those obligations going beyond prevailing obliga tions in the SPS and the TBT Agreements.   
438. Egypt also wanted Korea to clarify what was meant by the term "core measures" used in 
section 2, paragraph 7.  Egypt also wanted to know  the duration of the envisaged commenting period.  
439. With respect to the provisions requiring consu ltation between interested parties as suggested 
in papers TN/TF/W6, 7, 8, 24 and 26, submitted by the EC, Korea, Japan and Mongolia, New 
Zealand, and China, Egypt wanted to clarify the scope of "interested parties". Did those proposals 
refer only to interested parties in the home country or also to all WTO Members?  If the latter was the 
case, Egypt wanted an explanation as to what m echanism was envisaged for the implementation to 
avoid delays in publication and ratification of laws, rules and regulations.  Egypt would also 
appreciate if the sponsors could shed some light on their experience in that area, taking into account 
the technological gap (e.g., internet access etc...) between developing, least-developed, and developed 
countries. 
440. Paper TN/TF/6 by the EC called for Members and traders be given the right to comment on 
proposed laws, regulations and administrative ruli ngs and for those comments to be taken into 
account.  In that regard, Egypt sought clarification about the extent to which the country was obliged to take all comments of WTO Members into account.  And how did the home country deal with possible contradictions or conflicts among interest ed parties?  Egypt had serious reservations 
regarding multilateral commitments on prior consultati ons as that would constrain the ability of many 
developing countries. 
441. Regarding Canada's proposal in TN/TF/W20 to set up a single window, Egypt was of the 
view that a transitional period  should be granted to developing and least-developed countries to allow TN/TF/M/5 
Page 58  
 
 them to upgrade their abilities. Information was furt her sought as to what would be the criteria (e.g., 
time lag, conditions etc.) for applying that a pproach on different groups of countries.   
442. Egypt still had additional comments and questi ons that would be submitted in writing.  
443. The representative of th e European Communities
 responded to the question raised by India on 
the need to consolidate fees and charges, if nece ssary, that, having reviewed one’s schedule of fees 
and charges, it was normal to reduce them, if there was a case for simplification. Given that 
Article VIII already recognized the need to reduce the number and diversity of fees and charges, it 
was quite normal that, having reviewed one's schedul e of fees and charges and found that there was a 
case for simplifying and reducing that,  such a reduction was done. It was the logical next stage from the review. As for India’s questioning of the need to  identify a list of permissible fees and charges, the 
EC had started to identify fees and charges which might not be permissible. The proposal from some 
delegations last time to prohibit consular fees a nd charges was one example of a fee which would not 
be permissible. Whether one looked at that in terms of what was permissible or what should be or not 
be allowed in the sense of a positive or negative list,  the outcome would be effectively the same.  The 
EC was open on what approach to take. 
444. As for Egypt’s question as to why there should be a commitment or a suggestion that customs 
administrations made public their management plans to the extent that those plans could affect trade, the EC considered it very important that the trad ing community obtained some knowledge as early as 
possible of changes in the management plans of cust oms which could affect their day-to-day business.  
Typically, the kind of changes in customs that woul d appear in the management plans as opposed to 
legislation would be changes in the operating hours of border crossing posts, reallocation of personnel 
from one part of the country to another which coul d have an impact on the speed with which goods 
cleared through different entry points.  Those were things which affected trade, making it quite legitimate for traders to know in advance. 
445. With respect to Egypt’s concern about the idea that there should be some prior notification 
and consultation requirement on ru les and regulations in customs,  the benefit for the trading 
community was substantial. It was very important to have some level of information in advance of the 
imposition of new rules and regulations . All exporters and, in particul ar, importers wanted to know as 
far as possible in advance what kind of rules and regul ations were going to affect their trade.  That 
reduced their costs and increased pred ictability.  Therefore, it was an  essential part of any provisions 
the Group was negotiating.  
446. The representative of the Philippines
 said that the Philippines also would have some questions 
on the March proposals. Those questions would perhaps be consolidated together with the other Core 
Group Members.  The Philippines would like to draw attention to document JOB(05)/64, where some of the questions had already been put in writing. It would be very useful for an interactive discussion 
if replies to that document could be provided at the next meeting to allow for a better understanding of 
each of the proposals. 
447. The Chairman
 asked Members to make both their ques tions and answers to those questions 
available in writing. 
448. The representative of Kenya  recalled that, in commenting on the EC’s submission 
TN/TF/W/35, Kenya had inquired about the EC's  understanding of the issue of "routes most 
convenient for international transit" as contained in Artic le V.  Kenya wished to hear an answer to that 
question.  
449. The representative of the European Communities  said that the EC would try to provide a more 
detailed answer to Kenya’s question in writing as soon as possible. Basically, what the Communities  TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 59 
 
 
 observed was that notwithstanding the principle that  operators should have the choice of the routes 
most convenient for their transit, in practice, that freedom of choice was frust rated.  Therefore the EC 
was of the view that there was a case for giving more weight to the right sort of freedom of the transit 
operator to choose the most convenient route.  
450. Obviously, in all territories, there might be legitimate reasons to restrict their choices of 
certain routes for health and safety reason or for environmental requirements, because a particular 
route was not sufficiently strong to bear certain loads.    Those were quite leg itimate exceptions which 
were already catered for under the GATT rules.  Bu t there were cases where countries, unjustifiably, 
restricted or prohibited operators of choosing the routes most convenient for their transit.  If there were no health, safety or environment reasons  for doing that, it should not be allowed. 
451. The representative of the United States
 commented on the questions raised by Egypt. The first 
one related to the US proposal on express shipments a nd suggested a need for greater clarity regarding 
elements such as de minimus and low value.  The US agreed on that being useful and would follow up 
in writing with regard to Egypt's question as it required further elaboration.   
452. With regard to express shipments, it was the inte ntion of the United States to hold at the next 
session a so-called mini-workshop on the US proposal s.  Egypt had also raised a question about 
release and an alleged bias against small enterprise s.  The US was of the view that the proposals 
actually had a bias in favour of small enterprises.  Those enterprises were particularly harmed by any 
inability to obtain rapid release.  The procedures rela ted to the US proposal might be helpful in that 
regard.    
453. As regards the third question on advance rulings a nd the relationship to Article II of the Rules 
of Origin Agreement, the US wished to indicate th at they were proposing to build upon that provision, 
suggesting that ruling regimes should cover certain other topics beyond just origin as already existed 
in the Agreement. The US hoped to further refine the proposal.  
454. The representative of Japan  wished to comment on the intervention by Brazil regarding 
Japan's proposals on Articles VIII and X in documents TN/TF/W/17 and TN/TF/W/8.  
455. Japan welcomed the support expressed by Brazil regarding the introduction of an authorized 
trader and an advance ruling system, which w ould contribute to exped ited movements of goods 
worldwide.  With respect to the questions and concerns expressed on the suggested acceptance of 
copies, Japan had begun some time ago to receive  copies of certain business documents such as 
invoices which had contributed to the facilitation of pr ivate business.  However,  whenever there was a 
legitimate need for authorities to require original do cuments, they should certainly be able to require 
originals of documents.  That was the reason wh y Japan had proposed the acceptance of required 
documents in copies "to the extent possible". 
456. On the issue of a single window, Brazil had mentioned that that should be based on the use of 
IT to avoid further red-tape.  While Japan did not de ny that the use of IT would contribute to more 
efficient and streamlined import and export formalities, Japan was of the view that use of IT was not a 
precondition for introducing a single window environm ent. For instance, allo wing traders to manually 
submit import or export documentation to a single authority instead of multiple authorities was 
considered to be one way of having a single window system. Japan was of the view that the type of single window system to be implemented by a Member should be based on its policy priorities.  
457. With respect to the issue of enquiry points th at Japan proposed as a measure to improve and 
clarify Article X, Japan was pleased to hear that Brazil could support th e idea.  Japan wished to clarify 
that Japan had no intention to duplicate the roles of various enquiry points as stipulated in the TBT or 
SPS Agreements, nor was it suggesting to create a singl e enquiry point that would be able to answer TN/TF/M/5 
Page 60  
 
 any kind of question.  As long as traders could obtain necessary information or the right contact point 
to get the information they needed, the form and the number of enquiry points could be left for each 
Members' discretion, depending on its circumst ances.  That would include coordination among 
existing enquiry points of each border authority. In the case of Japan, when the Customs Counsellors 
Office, which was the enquiry point of Japan Cu stoms, received enquiries regarding quarantine 
procedures from importers, the person was introduced to  the relevant enquiry point of the quarantine 
authority since customs was not the compet ent authority to answer such enquiries. 
458. Lastly, on the question of publication of judicial and administrative decisions against lodged 
appeals, Japan was of the view that such publica tion would contribute to enhanced predictability and 
transparency.  In the case of Japan, major admi nistrative decisions against lodged appeals were 
published with due respect to confidentiality issues of the parties concerned in the appeal.  As for 
judicial decisions, that was something that depended upon the judicial system within each Member. In  Japan, such decisions were published. 
459. The representative of New Zealand
 welcomed the interest that had been shown for the New 
Zealand proposal and the questions asked. 
460. With respect to India's comments regarding Ne w Zealand's proposal for a right to comment, 
New Zealand basically agreed with India's point that such a right should not be too onerous and should be broadly applied.  The idea was that all inte rested parties, which, in New Zealand's view,   
should include other Members and the traders, woul d have the right and the opportunity to comment 
on new rules and regulations of commercial affect that would impact on them.  New Zealand was not 
suggesting that every Member would have to respo nd to each and every comment.  But a justification 
should be provided on when they chose not to take comments into account.  That did not have to be a 
justification for each and every comment that was not taken into account.  Rather, those responses 
could be in general terms, responding to each of th e general issues that had been raised.  Some of 
those justifications might include matters like na tional security or protection of human health and 
safety or conflicts with existing legislation. The id ea behind that proposal and the justification was to 
build on the experience from the TBT context and to make sure that the right to comments provision 
was robust and effective. 
461. With respect to India's question on the refere nce to judicial decisions in New Zealand's 
proposal, New Zealand wished to explain that the language in relation to that proposal originated 
directly from Article VIII. However, New Zealand accepted India's point about the appropriateness of 
including judicial decisions and the right to co mment.  New Zealand therefore suggested that the 
language in that paragraph should be entitled "expe rience provides a clearer indication of the scope 
with the  intended approach".  New Zealand was grateful to India for drawing attention to that point. 
462. As for India's suggestion regarding the use of an objective standard for tariff classification of 
goods that the adoption of the WCO HS system would be sufficient with there not being any need for an over-reaching objective standard for tariff classifi cation and testing standards, New Zealand agreed 
that adoption or use of the WCO HS System would indeed be an excellent first step.  That would 
largely achieve what New Zealand was hoping to do in that area.  Many Members already used the 
HS system and many were also Members of the WCO.   
463. New Zealand would use that opportunity to note the benefits of becoming a Member of the 
WCO.  The advantage of approaching that issue that  way was that it allowed access to the WCO tools, 
research, decisions, opinions, technical expertise,  tariff classification opinions, e-learning modules 
and on-site technical assistance.  But some Memb ers had chosen to use the HS system without 
formally becoming Members of the WCO, which was an alternative option.  With respect to the 
question of whether an over-reaching objective standa rd would be necessary, New Zealand was of the 
view that that would help ensure that the HS syst em was implemented in an impartial in an objective  TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 61 
 
 
 manner and that any necessary testing was also treated  in the same way.  Such an objective standard 
would set a WTO benchmark for tariff classification decisions.  
464. As for Turkey's points about the 'right to comments' proposal going beyond the mandate and 
their concerns about how that proposal might impi nge on a Member's sovereignty and conflict with 
national guidelines, New Zealand believed that the ma ndate to clarify and improve Articles V, VIII 
and X did not prevent Members from building on existing provisions, where they did not meet the 
needs of the modern trading environment.   New Zealand believed that Members should keep a 
practical and pragmatic concept of improvement and not restrict themselves to theoretical constraints.  With respect to the questions about sovereignty, Ne w Zealand wished to recall its point about a very 
similar obligation already existing in the WTO in th e TBT context.  All New Zealand intended was to 
include it in the trade facilitation context as well.  New Zealand was not proposing a measure that 
would diminish or remove the sovereign right of Members to introduce measures, but to ensure that 
such measures were well founded and based on fully informed decisions.   
465. With respect to Egypt's question about the precise meaning of "interested parties", New 
Zealand had thought of it to include all those who w ould be affected by new rules and regulations. As 
for their call for national experiences about cons ultation and providing the right to comment to 
interested parties, New Zealand just wished to  mention that a number of broad and inclusive 
consultative processes had been established in its system, designed to encourage dialogue between 
users and border control agencies.  New Zealand al so provided specific opportunities for comment for 
all interested parties through a legislative pro cess, both at the policy-making stage before the 
legislation was drafted and after, with it then being published before entering into force.   
  
466. The representative of Zambia
, speaking on behalf of the LDC Group , said that the LDCs 
recognized the importance of trade facilitation measu res in boosting their trade potential and realizing 
cost savings and efficiency gains through an overa ll upgrading of the trade facilitation chain.  At the 
same time, LDCs were aware that the co sts of such trade facilitation measures, vis-à-vis  their limited 
financial, administrative and institutional capacities had been the major impediment hampering their 
ability to undertake various trade facilit ation measures and customs reforms.   
467. It was therefore welcome to the LDC Group, th at Members agreed to negotiations on trade 
facilitation aimed not only at clarifying and improving  the relevant aspects of GATT Articles V, VIII 
and X, but also at "enhancing technical assistance and support for capacity building in that area".  The LDC Group took the opportunity to remind Members th at increased technical assistance and capacity-
building support was an integral objective of those negotiations.  It was very important to the LDCs 
that negotiations be conducted centrally to achieve th at objective, so as to enable them to benefit from 
more efficient and smoother flows of trade.   
468. In recognizing the developmental challenges th at the LDCs faced, the modalities in Annex D 
adopted a novel approach.  The LDC Group welcom ed that approach of linking implementation 
obligations to the capacity of LDCs in terms of th e extent and timing of entering into commitments.  
The modalities also linked implementation to the pr ovision of technical and financial assistance, as 
well as support for capacity building.  That was particul arly reflected in paragraphs 2, 3, 5 and 6 of 
Annex D.  Specifically, the LDCs wished to under score paragraph 3 of Annex D which read:  "LDCs 
should only be required to undertake commitments to  the extent consistent with their individual 
development, financial and trade needs or thei r administrative and institutional capabilities."   
469. As a Group, it was the LDCs considered position that the modalities set out in Annex D of the 
July package should be the basis for the negotiations .  In that light, the LDC Group wished to make 
some preliminary comments on the various proposals submitted so far.   TN/TF/M/5 
Page 62  
 
 470. First, even though a number of proposals sought to create some new legally binding 
obligations related to the three GATT Articles, ther eby presuming the final legal instruments to be 
binding, the LDC Group wished to stress that footnot e 1 of Annex D stated that:  "it was understood 
that that (negotiations aimed to clarify and improve  relevant aspects of GATT Articles V, VIII and X) 
was without prejudice to the possible format of th e final result of the nego tiations and would allow 
consideration of various forms of outcomes".  Accordingly, the nature and scope of possible 
commitments were yet to be determined, including the applicability or otherwise, of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.  Thus, ne gotiations at that stage should be without prejudice to the final 
outcomes of the negotiations.   
471. Second, it was not entirely clear to the LDCs whether some proposals indeed fell within the 
negotiating mandate.  That was particularly the case with those proposals related to binding advance 
rulings for customs purposes, the obligatory use of HS tariff classification system , release of goods, 
including the use of collateral or monetary security, pre-arrival clearance and post-clearance audit systems, and express shipments.  The proposals required substantial investment, including in 
infrastructure, and therefore their implementation must be linked to countries’ capacities.   
472. Third, some proposals entailed direct and indi rect financial costs although the implementation 
costs tended to be defined narrowly, referring only to direct financial costs or minimum personnel 
training needs.  However, it could not be denied that  some of the proposals entailed considerable cost 
(e.g., publication of laws through Internet, estab lishment of enquiry points, risk management, post 
clearance audit system) and implications.  The LDC Group therefore requested that more careful and detailed assessments be carried out by the proponents, in terms of the projected direct and indirect 
cost implications for governments against the expected  benefits to traders, based on quantitative data.   
473. Fourth, related to implementation costs, broade r legal and administrative implications of the 
proposed measures needed to be more appropriate ly taken into account.  Some proposals seemed to 
require the institution of capital and physical inve stments, institutional, administrative and human 
resource investments.  The LDC Group had yet to  see concrete commitments to providing those 
resources as envisaged in the July package.   
474. Furthermore, some proposed legal obligations  such as the binding advance rulings would 
have profound legal implications, as a failure to meet those requirements would invoke judicial 
review and some remedial measures by affected pa rties within the domestic legal and administrative 
instances, and eventually at the WTO dispute settle ment system (if applicable).  The LDC Group 
welcomed some clarification on how the burden th at that would bear on them was going to be 
addressed.  Thus, legal and administrative implic ations of proposed measures needed careful 
examination against the existing institutional and administrative capacities in LDCs.   
475. In addition, even though a number of pr oposals referred to SDT, the LDC Group was 
concerned that the kind of SDT suggested by some of  those proposals was, in most cases, limited to 
the traditional longer transition periods.  Furthermore,  the assessment of individual situations by use 
of "diagnostic tools" was suggested in determ ining the length of transition periods, and full 
implementation of the proposed measures by "every  Member" was explicitly proposed.  That was not 
adequate in nature and sufficient in scope, gi ven that through the Annex D Modalities, "Members 
recognize that S&D should extend beyond the gran ting of traditional transition periods for 
implementing commitments".  In particular, it was fu rther provided that "the extent and the timing of 
entering into commitments shall be related to th e implementation capacities of developing and least-
developed Members".  Thus, Members wishing to create new obligations applicable to the entire 
Membership were invited to clarify on what the co mponent of SDT would be, translated in practice, 
in relation to the proposed specific measures.  SDT should not simply be regarded as purely transitory 
measures but also include provision of technical a nd financial assistance to help LDCs implement the 
provisions agreed to during those negotiations.  In addition, some appropriate LDC-specific SDT  TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 63 
 
 
 would need to be proposed for each proposal.  In pr inciple, LDCs should not be subject to mandatory 
legal obligations.   
476. Finally, the need for technical assistance and capacity-building support was referred to in 
most proposals.  However, it was often not clear how  that could be implemen ted in practice, and to 
what extent.  It might be recalled that enhancing technical assistance and capacity building was one of 
the stated objectives of the trade f acilitation negotiations.  It was propo sed that Members, particularly 
those suggesting enhanced technical assistance a nd capacity building in connection with specific 
proposals, contractually committed adequate financ ial resources for such assistance and support.  The 
LDC Group believed that that merited se rious consideration by Members.   
477. The representative of Chinese Taipei  wished to reply to a number of questions raised in 
JOB(05)/64.  
478. With respect to the question on risk manageme nt and post-clearance audit systems raised in 
paragraph 6 of the submission, Chinese Taipei shared the views expressed therein.  A written explanation on how to tackle the problems mentione d in that context would be given later. But 
clearly, it was one of the characteristics of "risk" that it could not be fully controlled.  It was ever-
changing.  The process of "risk management" started with identifying the risks.  Then, the risks were 
analysed, evaluated and prioritized. Later, the stra tegies were worked out how to tackle the risks, 
identify the high risk group, and implement the inspections and examinations. 
479. Chinese Taipei Customs conducted post-clearance audit on imported goods in order to make 
up for insufficient examinations for the sake of speedy clearance.  Since implementation had begun 
years ago, various violations had been discovered, leading to the r ecovering of huge amounts of short-
paid duties.  Risk management and post-clearance audit helped Chinese Taipei Customs to strike a 
balance between the need for speedy clearance and compliance of regulations. Chinese Taipei 
attached great importance to technical assistance  and capacity-building issues and was committed to 
providing necessary technical assistance and to shar e its experience with other Members. It was 
necessary to encourage more effort s in that regard, and to hold more workshops. Workshops such as 
the ones organized by the United States on advance rulings were most useful.   
480. The representative of Canada
 wished to reply to key questions raised with respect to the three 
Canadian submissions on advance rulings, release of  goods and border agency coordination.  Canada 
was also happy to provide written answers to those questions in the near future. 
481. With respect to the submission on advance rulings and the question presented in JOB(05)/64 
regarding costs, Canada wished to share its expe rience. Canada was in a unique position, being the  
third largest country in the world with a land border of 4,000 kilometres with the Unites States, with 
about 350 billion dollars of trade going through every y ear. Canada was also the fifth largest trader in 
the world.  The number of advance ruling requests Canada received every year on tariff classification was approximately 1500.  Given th e millions of customs transactions taking place every year in 
Canada, that was a relatively small amount.  The f eedback from traders was very positive, and such a 
measure really helped in terms of predictability.  The advance ruling programme had been in place for 
more than 15 years.  When setting the system up,  there had not been a lot of extra new resources 
committed to administer that programme. That wa s because an administrative system had already 
been in place for the convenience of traders which had simply been formalized and expanded.   While 
not being obliged by regulation to do so, Canada  was providing information on tariff classification 
and origin for non-preferential purposes.   
482. It should also be kept in mind that providing  advance rulings was essentially about doing 
something in advance that had to be done anyway  when the actual customs transaction took place.  
The requirements in terms of costs and legislation ha d been introduced as part of amendments to the TN/TF/M/5 
Page 64  
 
 Canadian custom laws that had to be put into pl ace anyway.  Another cost Canada had to face was to 
make those regulations publicly ava ilable. But, given that those ruli ngs were essentially provided on a 
responsive basis, the cost had been fairly limite d to the subset of 1500 requests that Canada was 
getting every year.  In some cases, a small number of  additional officers were required to examine the 
requests from traders, and some extra training had be en provided as well. That gave an indication of 
the type of costs involved. 
483. With respect to Egypt’s request for clarification in terms of scope, Canada would like to note 
that Canada's proposal focused on tariff classificati on. The communication highlighted that it covered 
tariff classification, provided for rulings for a define d period of time, for them to be binding, and 
being made publicly available, which gave an indi cation of what Canada had in mind.  There was 
already a commitment for such ru lings in the area of rules of origin, but nothing on tariff 
classification. 
484. With respect to the proposal on release, Cana da would like to echo the points by the United 
States on the importance of that measure for SMEs . Canada was seeking commitments in that area 
because of its SMEs, which considered that to be  important for them.  With respect to Egypt’s 
question regarding the link with Article 13 of the Cu stoms Valuation Agreement, Canada wish to note 
that the inclusion of that Article in the CVA was an  indication of its usefulness in responding to a real 
need. Canada was of the view that that langua ge needed to be suppl emented and extended to 
circumstances other than the mere case of it be ing necessary to delay the final determination of 
customs value.  There was real benefit to expand the scope there.  
485. With respect to the Canadian communication on  border agency coordination and the question 
raised by Egypt in that context, the whole philoso phy was to provide a practical means to facilitate 
trade.  The key word in that proposal was coordination. 
486. Canada was not proposing an obligation to establish a single agency or single window.  But it 
would be important in the context of the NG to consider commitments on how to ensure that the 
activities and requirements of customs or border agencies were coordinated.  There were a variety of 
ways to do that. The Canadian proposals covered bot h the coordination on the one side of the border 
and across the border.  Some indications had been ma de about that raising practical problems in some 
circumstances. That was the spirit behind the propo sal that needed to be considered.  How could 
coordination be ensured in practice?  There was a wa y to do so in a fashion that did not involve major 
physical infrastructure, without changing the prer ogative of individual agencies. If there was a way, 
for example, for traders to be able to submit all the documentation to a single agency that could then 
despatch the documentation to the various specializ ed agencies with regulatory responsibilities, that 
would help the trader to find his way in the maze of regulatory agencies.   
487. The representative of Korea
 said that, against the background of the vast amount of questions 
being raised, which were not easy to digest, it woul d be helpful if questions could be provided in 
writing, allowing others to respond to them in a more appropriate manner at the next session. 
488. The representative of the Philippines  said that the Philippines had found the mini-workshop 
organized by the EC, the United States and Canada to be very useful. That was a way forward to give 
a better understanding of the proposals. 
489. The representative of Egypt  raised an issue of a general nature concerning the minutes of the 
meeting.  Egypt recognized what a huge task it was for the Secretariat to prepare those minutes.  At 
the same time, perhaps one of the reasons for the repetition of some questions  and of responses could 
have been avoided if Members received the minutes not  just a few days before the meeting, to allow 
for a better comparison of what questions had alrea dy been raised.  Egypt therefore wondered whether  TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 65 
 
 
 the Chairman could try to get the Secretariat some additional help in terms of more human resources 
to help them make the minutes available a bit earlier.  That would be very helpful for everybody.  
490. The Chairman  said that it would also be useful if delegations could provide the Secretariat 
with written copies of their statements. Even hand-written ones would be accepted. 
491. The representative of Cuba  commented on document TN/TF/W/22 by Uganda and the United 
States proposing the "prohibition of requiring consul ar transactions, including consularization-related 
fees and charges, in connection with the importation of goods". 
492. Cuba did not see any explanation of the kind of g oods covered by the proposal:  did it refer to 
all goods, or only to goods for commercial purposes?  Cuba would appreciate clarification from the 
proponents on that matter. 
493. If it referred to all kinds of goo ds, whether or not for commerc ial purposes, Cuba wished to 
make the following points: First, the prohibition of requiring consular transactions would deprive 
Cuba of an important source of revenue, and require it to give up a border control mechanism which 
was also important;  Second, the introduction of  new systems such as the one proposed would 
generate additional costs that were unpredictable for the developing countries in general if such 
systems were adopted without the full recognition of  their institutional and administrative complexity, 
among other things;  Third, the proponents should be ar in mind that, among other limitations, most of 
the developing countries did not have the capacity to  set up computerized information systems rapidly 
unless they were covered by binding technical , financial, and capacity building assistance 
commitments.  Finally, the proposed outright prohi bition would deprive governments of the option of 
exploring the solutions most appropriate to  their circumstances and limited resources. 
494. Cuba hoped that the proponents would b ear those considerations in mind.  
495. The Chairman said that, as there were no further requests for the floor under this item, he 
would like to turn to the contributions by the inte rnational organizations pa rticipating on an ad hoc 
basis, which had made progress in their work on identifying Trade Facilitation needs and priorities as 
well as in the area of technical assistance. Progress had also been made in developing tools in support 
of the Group's work and in analysing some of the underlying questions.     
496. The representative of the World Bank  reported on the first of a series of six planned pilot 
workshops associated with the World Bank Trade Facilitation Negotiations S upport Project which had 
been conducted in Jamaica the previous week.   
497. The workshop had been conducted to test the content of the World Bank's Trade Facilitation 
Negotiations Support Guide that had been distributed in draft form at the last meeting of the NG.    
498. Being one of the organizations listed in Annex D of the July package, the Bank looked at how 
to best assist the process.  The Bank had met with  a number of negotiators from developing and least-
developed countries and determined that the Bank co uld assist the process in two key ways.  First, and 
most obviously, the Bank had an important role to  play in financing the implementation of any 
commitments that might be agreed as part of a WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement.  At previous 
meetings the scale and scope of the Bank's Trad e Facilitation programmes throughout the world had 
been outlined and it had been stressed that the Worl d Bank remained ready to invest further in that 
area as long as the client countries ranked it as a high priority for development support.  The Bank had 
invested in over 120 Customs-related projects in the last 20 years and would continue to do so in the 
future.  Second, the Bank believed that it had a role to  play in both assisting the negotiators to develop 
an ambitious but realistic agreement and in a ssisting them to identify needs, priorities and 
implementation costs and benefits specifically as they  relate to the issues under negotiation.  It had TN/TF/M/5 
Page 66  
 
 been found, however, that the needs and priorities issue was a far more complex undertaking than first 
envisaged.  The problem was not a shortage of data as such, but of data specific to the negotiating 
agenda.  In the Bank's opinion, which had been conf irmed in discussions with many negotiators, many 
developing countries were handicapped in their capacity  to effectively participate in the negotiations 
by their very small and overstretched missions a nd a lack of access to technical information and 
support from their capitals.   
499. It was for that reason that the Trade Facilitation Negotiations Support Guide had been 
developed which provided a series of practical  guidelines on how to establish and manage support 
groups in Members' capitals that were able to an alyze proposals as they were tabled in Geneva and 
communicate their findings and recommendations in "r eal time" to their negotiators in Geneva.   
500. To prove that the concept worked  in practice, the Bank, together with the WCO and interested 
donors such as the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affair s and the UK's DFID, decided to test the Guide 
through the conduct of six national pilot projects thr oughout the world.  The first of them had been 
conducted the previous week in Jamaica with the second one scheduled to take place the following 
week in Uganda.    
501. In developing the Guide and the pilot works hops, the Bank was conscious of the following 
issues:  (i) that needs, priorities and implemen tation capacities varied enormously from region to 
region and from country to country;  (ii)  that it was not possible to undertake a thorough and definitive gap analysis;   (iii) that the best people to determine the feasibility of any proposals under 
consideration already existed in Member countries and simply needed to be brought together to discuss and analyze the proposals (an assessment templa te was included in the WB Guide to facilitate 
that process);  (iv) that the needs and priorities assessment process should focus at that time on the 
WTO negotiating agenda and not on deep and compre hensive reform and modernization of Customs 
and border management agencies, or on trade-related infrastructure such as ports and roads.  That was 
not meant to suggest that such work was not useful and necessary, and the Bank and other donors 
were already investing in that area, but simply to  note that focusing on the totality of such reform 
efforts would do little to help Members assess the speci fic needs, priorities an d costs associated with 
issues that could potentially be included in the outcome of the WTO negotiations on Trade Facilitation;  (v) that, while many organizations ha d produced useful assessment tools, they were 
typically extremely resource intensive to apply (by, for example, requiring international consultants to 
conduct them) or were not focused specifically on the issues currently under negotiation.  The 
exception to that was the WCO checklist, which the Bank had used as a resource tool, but even that 
did little more than identify in a very broad sense so me of the gaps that might exist relative to the 
GATT Articles as they were prior to negotiations  commencing and the relevant provisions of the 
Kyoto Convention.   
502. As a result, donors at the national, regional and international level were currently struggling 
to come to grips with the scope and nature of the technical assistance and capacity-building needs 
facing Members.  In the Banks view, which had been  reinforced following last week's workshop, the 
assessment of needs and priorities had to be an ongoing process and must proceed in tandem, not too 
far in advance of, the negotiation process.  To atte mpt to produce a definitive and global list of 
technical assistance needs and priorities at the present stage was almost impossible.  It was therefore 
important that each Member developed the capacity to undertake that assessment on an ongoing basis.  
Over time, however, and based on the collective re sults of workshops such as the recent one in 
Jamaica, some general trends and themes were lik ely to emerge. The Bank hoped to detail them in a 
paper in September.    
503. During the workshop in Jamaica, a Jamaican Tr ade Facilitation Group had been formed that 
brought together relevant specialists from a ll the key government agencies and private sector 
organizations involved in trade f acilitation and border management.    TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 67 
 
 
 504. The role of the Group was to analyze propo sals tabled in the WT O Trade Facilitation 
Negotiating Group, to develop any proposals that Jamaica might wish to submit to the WTO for consideration, and to identify any capacity-building needs, priorities, and implementation issues that 
might flow from any commitments being considered in the context of the WTO Trade Facilitation negotiations.   
505. During the workshop, participants agreed on th e mandate, terms of re ferences and operating 
modalities for the group itself, the chair and coordi nating agency and the individual members of the 
group.  They also reviewed all the proposals that had been tabled so far and analyzed a smaller 
number of proposals using the template provided by the Bank and included in the Guide distributed at 
the last meeting.   
506. In particular, they looked at legal impedime nts, administrative and/or procedural changes 
required, existing commitments such as those included  in regional or bilate ral agreements, financial 
and other resource requirements, training, tec hnical assistance and capacity-building needs, time 
required to achieve effective impl ementation, and most importantly, the benefits to government and 
traders of any proposals that had been tabled.  Those were significant.   
507. In the Bank's view, the workshop had been ve ry successful and Jamaica now had an ongoing 
mechanism for supporting its Geneva negotiators.  The Bank was also satisfied with the content of the 
Trade Facilitation Negotiations Support Guide and en couraged Members to make  practical use of the 
Guide to establish similar groups in their own capitals .  A simplified version would be available at the 
next meeting of that Group and issued as a formal WTO document, if Members so wished.   
508. During the workshop, it had become clear th at the process for analyzing proposals was 
complex and time consuming and that members of the Jamaican Trade Fac ilitation Group would have 
to commit a significant amount of time to the exercise .  For example, determining the needs, priorities 
and implementation issues for just four of the proposals took the group nearly two days.   
509. The Bank wished to thank the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs who funded the pilot 
workshop, the WCO who assisted in its conduct a nd provided its GATT checklist and technical know-
how, and to Ambassador Smith and his team for agreeing to be the guinea pig for the first pilot and 
for travelling to Jamaica to set the scene for partic ipants and to participate in the final presentation 
provided to key stakeholders by the Members of the Jamaican Trade Facilitation Group.   
510. While the Bank knew that it would not be feasible to provide those workshops in every 
country that may want one, the Bank wished to en courage delegates to u se its Guide to establish 
similar groups in their own capitals.  It was designed as a self-directed process. 
511. The representative of Jamaica
 wished to offer some additio nal comments on the recent events 
in Kingston which had already been presented by  the World Bank representative very accurately.  
512. Delegations with resource constraints in Ge neva as well as those with better resources all 
recognised how difficult it was to focus attention on elements of the WTO negotiations not only in a general way but in terms of specifi c concrete issues being negotiated. 
513. The great value of the Pilot Project carried out  with the World Bank, for which Jamaica was 
deeply appreciative, was that it helped to focus concrete atte ntion on specific issues in the 
negotiations. Jamaica was very satisfied by what had taken place.  The Trade Facilitation Negotiations 
Support Guide by the World Bank had been the basis for that work.  The team brought together in Kingston represented the range of inte rests and stakeholders in Trade Facilitation.  It included, at one 
time or another, the Customs Department, the Minist ry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade itself, 
the Trade Board of the Ministry of Health, the Mini stry of Agriculture, the private sector through the TN/TF/M/5 
Page 68  
 
 Jamaican Chamber of Commerce and through the private- sector organizations of Jamaica.  Indeed, the 
Head of the Customs Department himself, the He ad of the Tax Department, and the Head of the 
Investment and Trade Promotion Agency were all present at some time, participating in the work. 
514. It had brought together the key players in the area of trade facilitation in an intimate, 
interactive context which was very important because  the work that needed to be done in examining 
proposals and assessing needs and gaps really required focused work.  That was what the group had 
managed to achieve in Kingston.  Some players had seen the proposals for the first time so their 
reactions were only of a preliminary nature, but the feedback was expected to be deepened over time. 
One of the important elements was the Group, wh ich called itself "Trade Facilitation Group", chaired 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the vice- Chairmanship of the Cust oms Department, stayed 
together over time.  The Group would be a focal po int for the interface of the Geneva mission in 
assessing the proposals on the table, and the needs, particularly in terms of technical assistance. 
515. The WCO Checklist was also a very useful tool that had been utilized during the proceedings.  
A few caveats were also necessary.  Jamaica certainly believed in the importance of looking at export 
interests as well.  It was not sufficient to analyze pr oposals in terms of what Jamaica might need to do 
with respect to modernization.  It was important th at the Group looked at what others should be asked 
to do.  That was one of the points Jamaica wished to  emphasize.  It was necessary to take an outward-
looking approach as well.  There was sometimes a te ndency to view trade facilitation simply in terms 
of what was made at the national level which wa s not the entire point of the trade facilitation 
negotiations in the WTO. 
516. Another issue of importance was a proposal's need to be examined on its own merit.  
Technical assistance and capacity building were certa inly critical.  Nevertheless, the proposals had to 
be examined on their own merit. Technical assi stance and capacity building could be a necessary 
condition for accepting proposals.  It could never be a sufficient condition.  
517. By taking that preliminary look, Jamaica had discovered that quite a number of the proposals 
would require legislative changes to existing legislation.    That was important to know as, in Jamaica, 
legislative drafts and skills were at a premium b ecause of the number of negotiations Jamaica was 
undertaking and the work that had to be done to servi ce all those negotiations.  Therefore, that was an 
immediate area where quite a bit of assistance woul d be needed.  Technical assistance and capacity-
building needs assessment would need to be ongoing and had to take place in parallel with the 
examination of the proposals in the Negotiating Group.   
518. Having brought together the trade facilitation grou p in Kingston, Jamaica expected it to stay 
together and work closely together.  The objectiv es were to be in a position to have real time 
responses to issues emerging in Geneva.  Given Ja maica's experience in customs modernization and 
the fact that Jamaica had a solid history of customs modernization, a number of the players were in fact familiar with several of th e issues the NG dealt with.  That would make it easier for them to 
respond.  
519. Overall, Jamaica was very thankful to the Ba nk providing the opportunity to establish a Trade 
Facilitation Group in Kingston.    
520. The representative of the Philippines
 thanked the World Bank Representative for informing 
the Group about the pilot project and Ambassador  Smith for informing Members about the good 
experience with the project.  The Philippines wished to take up the offer by the World Bank to hold a 
lunchtime workshop for all Members. Perhaps at  the next NG meeting, one could organize that 
illustration of the Trade Negotiating Support Guide,  as it would exceed the  World Bank resources to 
respond to individualized requests for technical assistance.  TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 69 
 
 
 521. The representative of the Dominican Republic  thanked the World Bank for engaging in the 
Pilot Project and congratulated Jamaica on their su ccess achieved as a result.  The project could be 
very useful for a number of countries in the region.  The Dominican Republic was delighted by the excellent results achieved. 
522. The Dominican Republic wondered where the results  of the seminar held in Jamaica could be 
accessed, as they could be of interest to other co untries in the region.  Were they available on a 
website?  
523. Information was also sought on another aspect.   The Representative of the World Bank had 
said that the Banks' policy was to strengthen the ne gotiations and not to reform the entire customs 
system.  The Dominican Republic had its own views on that and would like to know whether that was 
a definitive policy graved in stone, or whether it was something the World Bank was promoting in the 
current situation.  The Dominican Republic was of the view that it was not enough to simply discuss 
the three GATT Articles.   In countries which had a dvanced further in the field of customs reforms, 
those three Article might be of particular use.  But from the Dominican Republic’s own experience, it 
was clear that many of those things were only pa rt of the reforms. The Dominican Republic supported 
the negotiations and wished to know whether the Bank ’s statement was to be seen as a fixed policy or 
as something that could be modified, depending on the circumstances in which the Bank could 
provide support beyond the scope of the negotiations. 
524. The representative of Nigeria
 thanked the World Bank for its reports and for the Pilot Project 
in Jamaica. In his presentation, the Representative of the World Bank had mentioned the fact that  
needs and priorities should focus for now on the ne gotiating agenda of the NG and not entirely on 
customs reform.  The representative of the Dominica n Republic had raised a similar issue. Nigeria 
was of the view that that approach might not fo rbid the much needed solutions, because focusing on 
only one segment or part of what Members were doi ng, might not provide a general efficiency that 
was needed to consolidate trade at the national level.   
525. Many countries were undertaking extensive reforms and Nigeria was of the view that a broad 
and encompassing approach by the World Bank w ould be more helpful than focusing on specific 
aspects.  Nigeria suggested for the World Bank to take a broad-based approach in reviewing their 
activities from time to time.  That might be useful  and would provide countries with needed assistance 
in the area of trade facilitation. 
526. Nigeria was pleased to hear that the next proj ect would be launched in  Uganda and wondered 
whether the World Bank had any plans to extend the project to other countries. 
527. The representative of the World Bank  replied to the interventio n by the Philippines that it 
would be pleased to conduct a lunchtime workshop, and would be happy to do that at the next 
meeting. 
528. With respect to the questions from the Domini can Republic about sharing the results of the 
workshop conducted in Jamaica, those results were the property of Jamaica.  Included were some 
general lessons learnt from that process, such as, the personal view that the examination of proposals 
and the determination of needs and priorities was a long and somewhat complex process and that a 
group had to work together with the public sector.  In terms of the decisions or recommendations 
made about the proposals, he would recommend discu ssing that with Jamaica directly as they were 
the property of Jamaica.   
529. That was not to say that the Bank was not inter ested in the results. The opposite was true. Part 
of the process the Bank was currently going through was to create a process to assist negotiators.  
From the first time the Bank attended those meetings , the Bank had been promoting its view that an TN/TF/M/5 
Page 70  
 
 ambitious agreement was good for development a nd that least-developed and developing countries 
had the most to gain from an ambitious agreement.  But the Bank also believed in a careful analysis of 
the proposals.  It was necessary to have a real anal ysis of what their implications were. The Bank was 
conducting that work for development reasons and be lieved that being fully armed with the costs, 
benefits and implications of wh at was being negotiated would actua lly equip and give confidence to 
the negotiators. 
530. With respect to the question from the Dominican Republic and Nigeria about the Bank being 
interested in customs reforms, the Bank wished to make clear that it was very much interested in far-
reaching and comprehensive customs and border pr ocessing reforms.  The World Bank was financing 
a number of projects around the world in that area,  going beyond the matters negotiated in the WTO. 
The Bank did even more.  It published a custom s modernization handbook which talked about the 
importance of deepened comprehensive reforms of  the whole border infrastructure.  The Bank was 
keenly interested in that, as well as in ports, roads and all the things that collectively could assist with 
trade facilitation.  However, the particular pr oject in question, namely the Trade Facilitation 
Negotiation Support Project, was designed for a much  narrower purpose.  It was designed to assist 
and to determine the needs and priorities and im plementation consequences with respect to the 
outcome of the WTO negotiations on Trade Facilitati on.  Therefore, the focus was narrower in that 
area.  That was not to say that customs and borde r processing reforms in the broader sense would not 
be sensible.  Many countries were in fact in the middle of reforming their customs and border processing infrastructures with that being valuable ir respective of the results of the Geneva process.   
531. The representative of Nigeria
 wondered whether the World Bank had any plans for an 
extension of that project to other countries, particularly in Africa.  
532. The representative of the World Bank  replied that the Bank had no such plans.  The Bank 
would conduct another workshop in French-speaking A frica later that year. But the Bank did not have 
any plans to roll it out across Africa in a series of  national workshops. The World Bank was in touch 
with several donors at the moment because the Bank believed that they could carry out a number of 
focused workshops for Africa, which would be on a regional basis, but which would incorporate most 
of the value of national workshops.  The Bank appreci ated that there was a need and quite a demand 
for such activities, but it was simply impossible to  do much more than the Bank was already doing as 
those activities were very resource intensive. Th ey required the participation of the WCO, World 
Bank staff and consultants, and an  enormous amount of administrative work. The Bank would like to 
do more but was really limited in its resources a nd funding available for that particular project. 
533. The representative of the WCO  said that the WCO was pleased  to be associated with the 
workshop in Jamaica and with the recognition of WC O instruments and standards, particularly the 
Harmonized System, Customs Data Model, Time Re lease Study and Revised Kyoto Convention.  An 
information note was available on the links between  WCO instruments and the three relevant GATT 
Articles.  
534. With respect to the number of signatories to the protocol of amendments to the Revised Kyoto 
Convention, the number now stood at 38.  40 of the 63 contracting parties to the Kyoto Convention  
were required before the Conventio n would enter into force.  Seve n additional countries had promised 
to launch the documents either after or before th e WCO’s annual Council meeting at the end of June. 
Therefore, the Convention should enter into force around the beginning of autumn. 
535. The Customs Data Model followed from a G-7 Initiative. It provided for the maximum 
framework of standards and harmonized sets of data  and standard electronic messages to be submitted 
by trade, for customs and other regulatory purp oses to accomplish formalities for the arrival, 
departure, transit and clearance of goods in interna tional cross border trade.  The WCO was currently 
developing version two which would take into account  transit. The next cycle, starting immediately  TN/TF/M/5 
 Page 71 
 
 
 after the Council that year, would take into account  other government agencies' requirements.  That 
process of standardization was a prerequisite a nd should facilitate the introduction of the single 
window. 
536. The WCO had a number of instruments relate d to capacity building, with the Diagnostic 
Framework being the most prominent example. It was available to all WCO Members.  The delegates 
to next week's high-level meeting on capacity build ing, a Steering Group on Capacity Building within 
the WCO, should be made aware of some of the in terventions made in Gene va and of the importance 
of capacity building in the context of any future  trade facilitation agreement negotiated. The WCO 
would share that information with the delegates. 
537. The representative of UNCTAD  updated the Group on the activities carried out within the 
framework of the Trust Fund financed by the governments of Sweden, Spain and France.  A 
workshop would be carried out in Spanish on 10  May in Geneva, organized in cooperation with 
GRULAC, coordinated with the mission of Argentin a.  A regional workshop was further scheduled to 
take place on 26-27 May in Bangkok in cooperation w ith UNESCAP.  Regional workshops were also 
planned in Lusaka, Zambia in cooperation with CO MESA (2-3 June) and Guatemala (27-29 June) in 
cooperation with the WTO.  In addition, an Expert  Meeting and a Workshop were foreseen to take 
place in September at UNCTAD premises.  
538. UNCTAD also contributed to various recent a nd upcoming events with other organizations, 
such as workshops in China (with the WTO), Gene va (with the ECE and ECA) and Sri Lanka (with 
the OECD) as well as to three workshops planned w ith the ACP during the second half of the year.  
Technical notes had been initiated for a total of 12 topi cs, with more being planned.  The idea was to 
have all of them ready for distribution prior to  the Expert Meeting from 21-23 September and the 
subsequent workshop on 26-27 Se ptember.  More information on the activities (including all 
publications) was available under www.gfptt.org/topics/wto .  
539. The representative of the OECD  updated the Group on upcoming OECD activities in the area 
of trade facilitation.  The OECD had already reported about its ongoing work on the costs of 
introducing and implementing trade facilitation measures.  That was not something that would give 
the precise indication about what the trade facilita tion agreement, which was not yet negotiated, 
would cost to each and every country.  It had been  intended as an indicative analysis of the kinds of 
costs and complexities that some illustrative sets of measures that were on the table might cost. 
540. That work was proceeding with the OECD expa nding its coverage. It was hoped that by the 
end of the summer, 15 developing and least-developed  countries would be covered. As the analysis 
would be completed by then, the OECD had started to organize a conference for next fall that would 
present the outcome of that work on the costs of trade facilitation measures and link it to the point 
made in the July Package about the necessity to connect commitments to the implementation 
capacities of countries.  The workshop, which would be open to all WTO Members, would be held in 
Colombo, Sri Lanka, on 18 and 19 October.  The OECD would soon be preparing formal invitations 
for all WTO Members, which the OECD would disse minate through the delega tions in Geneva.  The 
OECD was also working with a number of donors to  sponsor some travel expenses of developing-
country representatives. 
541. As the negotiations had been progressing and as there had been quite a lot of discussions and 
concerns expressed about putting together and c oordinating appropriate technical assistance and 
capacity building in the area of trade facilitation, the OECD had mobilized its Development Assistance Committee to look at the issue.  The OECD’s Development Assistance Committee was the 
forum where all donors met and discussed development assistance policies.  It was the body that, in 
cooperation with the WTO, had put in place the da tabase on trade-related technical assistance.  The 
Development Assistance Committee met 10 days a go and agreed to sit down and discuss good donor TN/TF/M/5 
Page 72  
 
 practices in the area of trade facilitation and make su re that all assistance in the area was coordinated 
to the best extent possible. 
542. The representative of Sri Lanka
 was pleased to hear that a useful workshop was going to be 
held in Colombo in October.  That type of ev ent would certainly help Sri Lanka generate the 
necessary momentum and help in understanding in-depth the issues at stake with the participation of 
key stakeholders, academia, and trade chambers.  Sri Lanka welcomed the support from the donors to 
facilitate the participation of developing countries.  
543. As countries lined up to launch the trade f acilitation negotiating support project, Sri Lanka 
was also very pleased to hear the successful conclu sions of what had already taken place in Jamaica 
and wished to share that experience and pa rticipate effectively in the negotiations. 
544. The Negotiating Group took note of the statements made. 
B. AD HOC ATTENDANCE OF RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS , INCLUDING THE 
IMF,  OECD,  UNCTAD,  WCO  AND THE WORLD BANK, AT THE NEXT MEETING OF THE 
NEGOTIATING GROUP  
545. The Chairman  suggested inviting relevant internati onal organizations, including the IMF, 
OECD, UNCTAD, WCO and the World Bank to atte nd the next meeting of the Negotiating Group on 
an ad hoc  basis, as provided for in the Work Plan.  
546. It was so agreed . 
C. OTHER BUSINESS  
547. The Chairman  suggested that the next meeting of th e Group take place on 13-14 June 2005, as 
proposed in the indicative list of dates he had shared with Members at the Group's meeting in 
November 2004. 
548. It was so agreed . 
549. The meeting was closed.  
_________