WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  WT/COMTD/LDC/W/43 
14 October 2008 
 (08-4841) 
Sub-Committee on Least-Developed Countries 
  
 
 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AGRICULTURE COMMODITY PRICES AND  
LEAST-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
 
Note by the Secretariat1 
 
 
1. This note builds on the Secretariat note containe d in JOB(08)/49, by providing information on 
agriculture price trends, including factors affecti ng production and trade of agricultural products.  It 
elaborates on the causes of current rise in the pri ces of agriculture products, including its impact on 
the LDCs.  It touches upon the policy issues associat ed with the high prices of agriculture products, 
including the role of the Doha Development Age nda (DDA).  Given the multifaceted nature of the 
issue, the note should not be seen as a stand- alone study addressing all aspects of agriculture 
production and trade.  Any specific aspect of the current high prices of agriculture products could be further examined and elaborated, depending on  the discussion at the Sub-Committee.   
I. SUMMARY 
2. The prices of some agriculture products have in creased substantially over the past few years. 
From a low point in 2001 they have risen, unsteadily at first, but accelerating to a peak in early 2008 
before falling back but to levels well above those of  earlier years.  The rise in prices is particularly 
acute for cereals and oilseeds which are an important  part of human diets, particularly in LDCs.   
3. The prices of agriculture and other commodities ar e usually quoted and traded in US dollars.  
Taking the relative fall in the dollar against many other currencies and rising incomes in LDCs, the 
increase in prices is not as severe as it appears in dolla r terms.  In addition, the transmission of rising 
international prices into different countries' domest ic markets is often considerably less than full as 
local markets are influenced by local conditions. That  is not to suggest that the increase in prices has 
not caused severe hardship for some or improvements in incomes for others.  It is just to note the 
effects of foreign exchange rates, ec onomic growth and price transmissions. 
4. There are many causes behind the increase in ag riculture food prices.  One reason is the 
inherent instability of agriculture prices as they respond sharply to changes in supply and demand.  
Demand has increased due to several factors, incl uding higher human consumption, an increase in 
demand for animal-derived products, biof uels and increased urbanization.   
5. At the same time supply has not kept pace with rising demand.  Lower growth in yields is a 
critical factor.  There are several causes for low yield growth ranging from the impact of government 
policies that encouraged production in the past  in some developed countries and discouraged 
agriculture in some developing co untries and reducing public research  and development and a shift in 
its focus away from productivity improvement.  Even  existing technology cannot be fully utilised in 
many countries, particularly low-income countries,  due to poor farmer e ducation and training and 
poor infrastructure. 
                                                     
 
1 This document has been prepared under the Secret ariat's own responsibility and without prejudice to 
the positions of Members and to their rights and obligations under the WTO. WT/COMTD/LDC/W/43 
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  6. The impact of higher prices varies from one c ountry to another and within countries from one 
household to another.  As LDCs are predominantly ru ral and agriculture is usually a big part of their 
economies it would be expected that they would bene fit.  However, various studies have shown that, 
because relatively few households are net food-sellers, the impact of higher prices is often negative 
for the majority of people, even in rural areas.  Other studies, however, suggest the benefits would be 
more broadly based.  What is clear is that in many cases governments and the international 
community have responded to higher prices with new policies and measures to increase supply or 
reduce cost. 
7. The policy responses to higher food prices can be divided into those which will give results in 
the short-term, the medium-term and the longer-ter m.  One short-term response would be to use 
public food stocks, but with food stocks at very lo w levels there is little scope to use them to regulate 
supply.  Thus, the most common response for net expor ters has been to introduce export restrictions 
or taxes and for net importers to reduce tariffs.  Unfortunately, although these trade-based instruments 
may work in the short-term on the domestic market, they do increase price fluctuations on the world 
market.   
8. One of the main causes of price fluctuations in agriculture markets and of the current increase 
in prices is past and current distortions caused by government policies.  Re ducing the level of support 
directly related to prices or production levels and stabilising and reducing import and export duties 
would reduce distortion.  The successful conc lusion of the Doha Development Agenda would 
contribute to this.   
II. AGRICULTURE COMMODITY PRICES 
A. R
ISING AGRICULTURE PRICES  
9. For decades, agriculture prices were in long-term  decline.  From 1950 to 2000 they fell by 
nearly 50 per cent in real terms.  This took place despite a rapid rise in world population and rising per 
capita consumption of food.  The trend was believe d to be inevitable and an intrinsic part of 
agriculture to the extent that many believed that  national or international public intervention was 
needed to halt the decline in th e belief that higher prices woul d benefit agriculture producers, 
particularly in developing countries.2  One of the few institutions to have predicted that agriculture 
prices would increase rather then continue to fall was the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI) which, in 1999, predicted that agriculture  commodity prices would stop falling and start to 
increase.3 
10. Agriculture prices reached historic lows in  2001 but since then the prices for many 
commodities have been increasing.  However,  between 2001 and 2006 the increase was uneven 
between different commodities and unsteady as prices fluctuated around a rising trend.  In 2007 and into early 2008, the prices of most commodities in creased sharply and, despite recently falling back 
slightly, appear to have stabilised around a ne w higher average.  Projections by OECD-FAO
4 and a 
number of other organisations, including the Worl d Bank, the IMF and the United States Department 
of Agriculture (USDA), the Food  and Agriculture Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) and IFPRI 
                                                      
 2 For example see:   
• FAO, “Can supply management halt the decline in agricultural commodity prices?” FAO Commodity 
Market Briefs No.1, (TC/D/+0772E/1/10.06/100) , Rome October 2006 
• European Commission, 2004 "Agricultural Commodities, dependence and poverty" (COM(2004)89 – 
Final), Brussels, 12 February 2004 
 3 Pinstrup-Andersen, P., Pandya-Lorch, R., Rosegrant, MW, World Food Prospects:  Critical Issues for 
the Early Twenty-first Century, 2020 Vision, Food Policy Report IFPRI, Washington, October 1999.  
 4 OECD/FAO, 2008, OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2008-2017. WT/COMTD/LDC/W/43 
 Page 3 
 
 
  suggest that the prices are likely to remain at relativ ely high levels for the foreseeable future at least, 
although down from the peaks of earlier this year. 
11. Different commodities have seen different price changes.  While some have gone up 
significantly others have not.  In general, cereal and oilseed prices have increased most strongly, particularly wheat, rice, soybeans and edible oils .  On the other hand, international prices for 
beverages, meat and inputs for textiles (cotton, hi des and wool) have not fo llowed the same pattern.  
Indeed, prices for some agriculture commodities are lower now than they were in the early 1980s, 
such as wool, cotton and coffee. 
12. Chart 1 below illustrates the different chang es in prices for three agriculture commodities 
since early 1980.  While wheat prices have increas ed strongly since 2001, particularly over the last 
two years, beef and cotton prices have show little or no corresponding increase.  The same lack of 
correlation would appear to apply to prices fo r cereals and oilseeds when compared to other 
agriculture raw materials (e.g. hides and wool), other meat products (e.g. poultry and pork) and 
beverages (e.g. coffee, tea and cocoa).  (See Annex 1 for annual average prices for different 
agriculture prices.) 
13. In addition to the different price changes th at have affected different commodities other 
factors must also be taken into account before cons idering what the likely impact of any change in 
prices is.  These factors include the exchange rate  between the currency in which prices are quoted 
and the domestic currency of the exporting or impor ting country, the rate of economic growth in the 
importing country, the distribution of welfare gains within the importing country, etc.  WT/COMTD/LDC/W/43 
Page 4  
 
  Chart 1:  Commodity Prices for Beef, Wheat a nd Cotton; January 1980 to August 2008 (current 
US$) 
-50100150200250300350400450500
1980M1 1984M1 1988M1 1992M1 1996M1 2000M1 2004M1 2008M1 Wheat  current $/tonne Beef  cents/lb Cotton cents/lb 
 
Source : World Bank   
Beef, Australian and New Zealand 85% lean fore s, FOB U.S. import pric e, US cents per pound;  
Wheat, No.1 Hard Red Winter, ordinary protein, FO B Gulf of Mexico, US$ per metric tonne; and   
Cotton Outlook 'A Index', Middling 1-3/32 in ch staple, CIF Liverpool, US cents per pound 
 
B. THE FALLING DOLLAR  
14. The United States is the world's largest economy and the largest exporter of agriculture 
products, so it is not surprising that most agriculture  commodities are traded and their prices quoted in 
US dollars terms.  But, within importing countri es agriculture commodities are usually bought and 
sold with domestic currency.  Furthermore, im porting governments and companies usually pay for 
imports based on the domestic currency.  So the fo reign exchange rate against the US dollar and the 
price of the commodity in the domestic currency is of ten more important than are the quoted prices in 
US dollars.  Furthermore, the increase in prices in ma ny commodities also reflects, to some extent, the 
relative decline in the US dollar, in which most  commodities are priced and traded.  Since 2003 the 
dollar has fallen in value against most other trade cu rrencies.  As the dollar has declined, the prices of 
commodities in other currencies have not increased  by as much as the dollar quoted price would 
indicate. 
15. As an example of the effect of the fall in the dollar, Chart 2 below shows the price of wheat in 
US dollars and in CFA francs5.  This shows that, although the pr ice has increased considerably from 
less than CFA 70 000 per tonne in mid-1999 to over CFA 180 000 in early 2008, this is much less 
than the increase in dollar terms which went fro m just over $100 per tonne in mid-1999 to $440 in 
early 2008 (before falling to less than $3 50 per tonne in more recent months). 
                                                      
5 CFA franc (Comunauté financière d'Afrique and Coopération financière en Afrique centrale) used in 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Repub lic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 
Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Republic of the Congo, Sénégal and Togo. WT/COMTD/LDC/W/43 
 Page 5 
 
 
  Chart 2:  Wheat prices in CFA francs and US dollars 
 
Source : Foreign exchange rates IMF, Wheat prices World Bank.  
(Wheat, No.1 Hard Red Winter, ordinary protei n, FOB Gulf of Mexico, US$ per metric tonne) 
 
C. INFLATION AND PER CAPITA INCOME  
16. In addition to changes in foreign exchange rat es it is also important to take into account 
changes in household purchasing power.  That is, if  household incomes increase by more than food 
prices then the impact of higher prices is much less  severe than if household incomes are static or  
falling while food prices are rising.  Alternatively, a household may face reduced food security, if 
food prices increase faster than household income.  However, choosing the right deflator for agriculture commodity prices is not so straightforwar d.  For a net exporter of energy products it might 
be a fuel price index, or for a net exporter of ma nufactured goods it might be the MUV (the unit value 
of exports of manufactured goods) and for othe rs it might be the consumer price index. 
17. The FAO Secretariat's background paper to  the High Level Conference on World Food 
Security held on 3 June 2008
6 showed that taking inflation into account reduced the apparent increase 
in prices.  The FAO used the World Bank's index of  the unit value of global exports of manufactured 
goods (MUV)7, although it also noted the effect of taking other deflators into account.  According to 
this assessment, agriculture commod ities stopped declining in the late 1980s but that current prices are 
well below the very high levels of 1973.  The OECD-FAO Outlook 2008-2017 used the GDP deflator 
to show a similar effect on commodity prices – that the increase in prices in real terms since the early 
1970s is much less than the rise in current prices  and that, in real terms, current prices remain 
substantially below those of 1973.8 
                                                      
6 FAO, HLC/08/INF/1, Soaring Food  Prices:  Facts, Perspectives, Impacts and Actions Required, 
paragraph 8, figure 2 and footnotes 3 and 4. 
7 http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EX TERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS. 
8 OECD-FAO, Agricultural Outlook 2008-2017, Paris, 2008, Chapter 2, page 36. - 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 
1999M1  2000M1  2001M1  2002M1  2003M1 2004M1 2005M1 2006M1 2007M1  2008M1  -0.50001.00001.50002.00002.50003.0000
Wheat  $/tonne  Wheat 1000 CFA/tonne $/1000 CFA (right hand axis)  WT/COMTD/LDC/W/43 
Page 6  
 
  18. Another way to examine the impact of increased prices on different countries is to look at 
how prices have changed relative to the per capita Gross National Income (GNI) of those countries.  
Like all average measures, per capita GNI has a lot of shortcomings.  For food prices one of the main 
shortcomings is that it can suggest that national incomes and growth in na tional incomes are evenly 
distributed, which they are not, as was made clear by the 2008 UNCTAD report on the LDCs.
9  
However, other choices are just as problematic and suffer similar or equally severe drawbacks. 
19. Chart 3 below shows that, on average, the ec onomies of the LDCs have grown rapidly since 
2002 – but that, since 2005, the price of wheat has incr eased at a faster rate.  Although, in real terms, 
it remains below the peak of 1995/96, it still represen ts a considerable increase over the early eighties 
and the early years of this decade.  What the ch art does not show is the relationship between food 
commodities and per capita income in individual LDCs.  The result of comparing GNI per capita to 
food prices varies a lot between different LDCs b ecause the widely different rates of economic 
growth.  In some cases (e.g. Bangladesh, Benin, Ch ad and Lesotho) per capita GNI has more than 
doubled since 1980 while in other cases (e.g. Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Madagascar and Sierra Leone) it has decreased re lative to 1980 (see Annex 2 for GNI per capita in 
least-developed countries from 1995 to 2008). 
Chart 3:  Wheat Prices 1980 to 2008 in current prices (US$) and deflated using changes in GNI 
per capita in LDCs 
-100200300400500600
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008GNI per capita current $/capita Wheat Price current $/tonne Wheat Price $/tonne deflated by ldc GNI per capita
 
Source : World Bank (GNI per capita for 2008 is an estimate ba sed on average growth in the period 2003-2006) and IMF. 
 
20. Whatever the assessments and analysis show , it is clear that prices for the major food 
commodities – cereals and oilseeds – have increased subs tantially since they hit their lowest point in 
2001.  But it is also clear that the amount by which they increased varies from one agriculture 
commodity to another and the impact on different countries depends on a number of factors such as the rate of economic growth and the ex change rate with the US dollar.   
                                                     
 
9 UNCTAD, 2008, The Least Developed Countries Report, 2008, Chapter 2. WT/COMTD/LDC/W/43 
 Page 7 
 
 
  21. Furthermore, while the prices of many ag riculture commodities may have increased, the 
prices of inputs have also increased.  For some commodities, such as meat, input prices may have 
increased by more than output prices.  For other co mmodities, including cereals and oilseeds, the rise 
in input prices has significantly reduced the return s to producers suggested by the increase in the 
commodity price. 
22. Thus, it is clear that, while agriculture prices ha ve changed a lot over the last two years, the 
impact of this change varies from one commodity to  another in terms of both the returns to producers 
and the impact on importers and households. 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. MULTIPLE FACTORS BEHIND THE PRICE INCREASES  
23. The causes for the increase in cereal prices are many  and it is probable that no single factor 
led to the increase but the combination of several that  together have resulted in, first, a halt to the 
long-term decline and subsequently an increase in pr ices.  This paper does not attempt to quantify the 
impact of different factors or to list them in any order of priority or importance.  Nor does the author have much faith in any studies that purport to do so.  But, it appears as though several factors have 
come together to put upward pressure on prices and the combination of these has led to the rapid rise 
seen in 2007 and early 2008.  Some of these factors include: 
 (i) The inherent instability in agriculture  prices as small changes in demand cause large 
price swings; 
  (ii) The increase in, and the changing struct ure of demand for agriculture products for 
human consumption; 
  (iii) New sources of demand for agriculture products;   (iv) Government policies intended to stab ilise domestic prices – which have the opposite 
effect on world prices; 
  (v) The decline in research and deve lopment into improving productivity;  
  (vi) Low stock levels.  
B. A
GRICULTURE PRICES ARE INHERENTLY UNSTABLE  
24. The demand for agriculture commodities depends to a much lesser extent on price than do 
some other commodities, such as metals, and most  consumer items.  Construction projects can be 
delayed or accelerated, the household decision to buy a car or computer can be advanced or postponed 
but people must eat every day.  With demand being inel astic relative to price, it is not surprising that 
agriculture commodity prices should fluctuate consider ably even with modest changes in supply.  For 
the same reason, when demand does increase due to economic growth, changes in consumption 
patterns (such as from cereals to animal products) or new uses for agriculture products (such as 
biofuels) it is not surprising that prices should change significantly. 
25. Another factor which could increase price fluctuations is that increasing wealth in many 
households has reduced the proportion of income sp ent on food.  As income rises, people may eat 
more food of higher quality in a more processed fo rm, and therefore spend more on food but normally 
income will rise faster than spe nding on food.  This relationshi p between income and spending on WT/COMTD/LDC/W/43 
Page 8  
 
  food, known as Engel's Law
10, can have the effect of making food commodity prices more volatile 
because a household's ability to ab sorb an increase in prices impr oves as it becomes wealthier – and 
on average households have been getting wealthier across most countries, including LDCs.   
26. International trade in agriculture commod ities is usually only a small proportion of 
international production (see Chart 4 below) which mean s international prices are set by only a small 
quantity of what is actually produced.  For example, world rice production in 2005 was about 632 
million tonnes while trade was only 29 million tonnes.   Even for wheat, the most heavily traded 
agriculture commodity, production was 627 million t onnes while trade was only 135 million tonnes.  
The small proportion of production that is availabl e for trade also means that small changes in 
demand can have a large impact on trade volumes wi th a correspondingly large increase in price.  For 
example, if world rice production declines by 2 per cent (12.6 million tonnes) this would have 
represented nearly 44 per cent of world trade in rice  in 2005.  On the other hand, the low levels of 
trade compared to production mean that the impact  of changes in international prices may not be 
reflected fully inside a country because local conditi ons may have a greater influence on local prices 
than international prices.  
Chart 4:  Production and Export Data (tonnes) for Selected Cereals 2004 
-100,000,000200,000,000300,000,000400,000,000500,000,000600,000,000700,000,000800,000,000
Barley Maize Rice WheatCereals Production Cereals Exports 
Source : FAOSTAT 
27. The increase in agriculture co mmodity prices over the two years has seen government policy 
intervention in terms of reduced tariffs, export restri ctions, export taxes, etc.  Most exaggerate price 
changes as they change to adapt and reduce the domes tic impact of international price changes.  For 
example, introducing or increasing an export tax will  reduce the domestic price but that means that 
neither domestic production nor exports would increase by as much as would have been expected.  
The result on the world market is that, because suppl y is lower than it would otherwise have been, 
prices increase even more.  On the import side, usi ng tariffs as a form of variable levy to stabilise 
domestic prices, would have the same effect.  Higher tariffs when world prices are low will reduce imports while lower tariffs when prices are high will encourage imports.  The result will be to 
increase price changes on the international market and for those that do not apply such measures. 
                                                     
 
10 E Engel, Die Productions und Consumptions-Verhaltnisse des Königsreicesachsen, Berlin, 1877. WT/COMTD/LDC/W/43 
 Page 9 
 
 
  28. However, a combination of the exchange ra te between the US dollar and the domestic 
currency, the low level of trade compared to production and trade measures taken by importing and 
exporting countries have had the effect of reducing th e increase in real domestic prices of agriculture 
commodities in many developing countries.  The FAO showed that for seven developing countries the proportion of the increase in the world price for rice th at was reflected in the domestic price of each 
country varied from as low as 6 per cent to as high as 64 per cent.
11,12 
29. There could be several factors that explain the poor transmission of international prices onto 
domestic markets.  One is the low level of trade relative to production which means most countries 
rely on domestic production, another could be that  poor infrastructure makes large scale transport 
and/or processing for international sale transport too expensive, or that international standards or 
certification requirements are too stringent to be me t on a consistent basis by local producers.  For 
these and other reasons it means that local supply and demand conditions decide local prices.  In 
addition, of course, the government may have taken trade measures like lowering tariffs or 
introducing export taxes or restrictions which may also have reduced the impact of higher 
international prices.  
C. DEMAND SIDE CAUSES OF HIGHER PRICES  
1. Human consumption:  Population, economic growth, urbanization 
30. Despite increasing quantities of agriculture pr oduction going to animal feed and biofuels, 
direct human consumption remains a major factor in overall demand for agricu lture products.  Several 
factors are driving increasing human consumption at th e international, national and household level.  
As always in human affairs, the increase in cons umption is not even between countries or within 
countries.  Some households are enjoying greater wealth which is leading to higher consumption 
while others are suffering as prices rise faster than  incomes.  However, for most countries, economic 
growth from since 2002 has been sustained and rapid.  With current uncertainty in financial markets, 
prospects for the rest of this year and the next few years, however, are not so clear. 
31. At the national and regional level, economic gr owth since 2004 or even earlier for some 
countries has been rapid.  Developing countries in Asia have shown strong sustained economic 
growth of over 9 per cent a year from 2004 to 2007.  Sub-Saharan Africa also grew by 6 per cent per 
year over the same period.  Similarly, despite con tinued population growth, per capita income has also 
increased rapidly in many developing countries, in cluding in the least-developed.  Since 2002, each 
LDC Member of the WTO for which data exists h as had consistent growth in GNI per capita.   
32. Such economic growth has inevitably led to incr eased consumption of food.  Indeed, the data 
shows that consumption started to increase well before the recent period of sustained economic 
growth.  Between 1995 and 2003 (the most recent y ear for FAO consumption data) consumption of 
cereals in LDCs increased by 29 per cent while consum ption of meat increased by 31 per cent.  At the 
same time consumption in the world as a whole increased by 6 per cent and 23 per cent for cereals and meat respectively.  This faster-than-world gr owth for the LDCs has only happened over the past 
decade or so.  Up to 1995 growth in the LDCs had, in general, been slower than in the world in 
general.  Since then, however, it has consistently been higher. Since 2003, as economic growth in the 
LDCs accelerated compared to the first years of the century, it would be expected that consumption 
has increased as well. 
                                                     
 
11 FAO, April 2008, Soaring Food  Prices: Facts, Perspectives, Impacts and Actions Required, 
HLC/08/INF/1, FAO, Rome 
12 Dawe, D. 2008: Have recent increases in interna tional cereal prices been transmitted to domestic 
economies? The experience in seven large Asian countries.  ESA Working Paper No. 08-03, FAO, Rome. WT/COMTD/LDC/W/43 
Page 10  
 
  33. While human consumption of meat and cereals in  the LDCs has increased more rapidly than 
that of world consumption, other developing countries have seen not only a faster increase in overall 
consumption but also a structural shift in demand in  favour of animal derived protein products.  In 
China, consumption of cereals for human consumpt ion has actually been declining since 1994 while 
consumption of meat has increased.  Similarly, in  India, consumption of cereals has increased at a 
slower pace than that of animal products (see Table 1 below). 
Table 1:  Total Consumption of Cereals and Meat (000 tonnes) 
 
Cereals 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 
 China  228,328 239,850 238,169 239,629  207,227 
 India  126,594 141,215 153,840 154,698  169,357 
 Least developed countries +  67,125 73,468 80,292 92,255  103,278 
 World Developing Countries +  633,981 686,134 727,516 762,333  774,568 
 World +  794,412 851,921 897,579 931,665 948,876 
      
Meat 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 
 China  23,860 32,869 47,995 61,031  71,823 
 India  3,281 3,932 4,459 4,816  5,568 
 Least developed countries +  4,583 4,994 5,404 6,220  7,073 
 World Developing Countries +  64,166 80,147 104,982 124,740  143,162 
 World +  162,353 181,611 203,265 226,175 249,836 
Source : FAOSTAT 
 
34. This shift in demand to animal products and away from cereals has had a strong impact on 
demand for feed grains and other animal feeds.  E ach kilogram of meat required several kilograms of 
feed – which means that an increase in meat consum ption, particularly pig and poultry meat, implies 
an increase in consumption of animal feeds of several times the increase in meat for human 
consumption.  For pig rearing it takes about 4 kg of feed for each kilogram of carcass weight gain.13, 14  
Poultry has a lower ratio but beef and lamb have mu ch higher ones.  Even where livestock are reared 
and fattened on grass this can also have the e ffect of reducing land available for crops. 
35. Another reason for the increase in human consum ption of food, is the increase in population 
in many countries.  Indeed, it has been noted that  LDCs were net exporters  of agriculture goods and 
have become net importers in th e late 1980s and of food (excluding fish) in the late 1970s.  This 
occurred despite increased production and one reaso n was that population increased as quickly as, or 
more rapidly than food production as can be seen in Chart 5.   
                                                      
13 Pork Cooperative Research Centre, The Aust ralian Pork Industry, Pork CRC, April 2008. 
14 Harrison P., Pearce F, 2000, AAAS Atlas of Population & Environment, Dompka Markham V. 
editor, American Associa tion for the Advancement of Science and the University of California Press. WT/COMTD/LDC/W/43 
 Page 11 
 
 
  Chart 5:  Population and Cereals  Production in LDCs, 1961-2007 
-100,000200,000300,000400,000500,000600,000700,000800,000900,000
1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005-20,00040,00060,00080,000100,000120,000140,000160,000180,000
Population-Estimates 2006 rev. Total (1000) Cereals Production (000 tonnes) (right hand scale) 
Source : FAOSTAT and United Nations ESA. 
 
36. In addition to the increase in human consumpti on the rise in urbanization has also contributed 
to increased consumption.  The United Nations  ESA population data suggests that in 2008 the 
proportion of the world’s population living in urban areas passed 50 per cent for the first time ever 
and is likely to continue to increase to 61 per cent in the next three decades.  This has greatly 
increased reliance on food bought on the market over food produced for home consumption on a farm 
and, therefore, exposure to changing prices for food.   
2. Biofuels 
37. Governments' policy responses to high energy pr ices and concerns with energy security have 
greatly encouraged production of biofuels.  A number  of countries, but particularly the United States, 
Brazil and the European Communities, have polici es in place which require or encourage much 
greater use of biofuels.  While these policies have  been criticised on a number of grounds, including 
that they have raised agriculture prices, the extent  to which prices have increased as a result of biofuel 
policies is disputed. 
38. According to the International Food Policy R esearch Institute (IFPRI), the increased biofuel 
demand was estimated to have accounted for 30 per cent in the average grain prices.15  It also noted 
that the increase in production of biofuels, partic ularly bioethanol from maize and sugar cane, had 
shifted land area away from production of crops fo r food and feed.  Furthermore, the demand for 
maize from ethanol had increased prices for maize wh ich had had a knock-on eff ect on prices of other 
grains. 
                                                      
15 Rosegrant, Mark W., 2008, Biofuels and Grain Prices:  Impacts and Policy Responses, Testimony for 
the US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, IFPRI, Washington. WT/COMTD/LDC/W/43 
Page 12  
 
  39. On the other hand the USDA has stated that the im pact of biofuel policies in the United States 
has had a much lesser impact on prices.  Maize pri ces would fall by between 10 and 15 per cent if the 
principal support measures were removed.
16  However, all studies do agree that demand for 
agriculture crops for biofuels has contributed to higher prices, not only for the feedstock crops but, 
through diversion of production to these crops, of other food commodities as well. 
40. Whatever the exact impact of ethanol and bi odiesel programmes have had and will have on 
maize and other agriculture prices, a considerable quantity of maize is being used as feedstock for 
ethanol production – as can be seen from Table 2 below which shows maize production in the 
United States and the amount going to ethanol produc tion.  Nor is the United States alone in diverting 
large quantities of agriculture production to fuel pr oduction.  In the European Union the biodiesel 
sector is estimated to have taken about 60 per cent of rapeseed oil production in 2007 which is 
equivalent to 25 per cent of global production.17 
Table 2:  Maize Production and Utilisation in the United States (tonnes) 
 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 
Production 267.59 332.08 312.12 337.82 
Fuel alcohol 53.82 76.20 103.45 120.57 
Source : FAPRI, University of Missouri, August 2008, Baseline Update for US Agricultural Markets, Projections for 
agricultural and biofuel markets, Missiouri 2008.  (Note corn  bushels converted to tonne s at the rate 39.37 bushels 
per tonne.) 
 
D. SUPPLY -SIDE CAUSES OF HIGHER PRICES  
41. At the same time that demand for agriculture  products has been increasing, a number of 
supply side-factors have also contributed to highe r prices.  Drought in some key exporting countries, 
reduced stocks, lower productivity growth, low in vestment in agriculture, environmental problems 
and, as already mentioned, reduced supply of co mmodities for food as maize, oilseeds and sugar cane 
are diverted to biofuel production.  Many issues re lated to low productivity growth arose from the low 
prices that existed for agriculture products.  Dec lining prices meant declining incentives for farmers to 
invest in their land, governments to invest in infrast ructure and the public and private sectors to invest 
in research and development.  Unfortunately, a ddressing some of these issues does not offer any 
immediate relief to the problems caused by high prices – although they are a major part of the 
medium- to long-term measures suggested by many institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, the 
OECD and IFPRI. 
42. It has also been noted that agriculture polic ies in many countries have discouraged production 
in developing countries generally.  High levels of trade and production-related subsidies and high 
levels of market protection in many developed countries stimulat ed their domestic production which 
was one cause of lower world prices.  At the same time, many developing countries focussed on 
maintaining low food costs through various policies such as low government procurement prices and 
export taxes and restrictions.  The combined effect  of production support in developed countries and 
agriculture policies that discriminated against agriculture in developing countries discouraged 
investment in farming, related infrastructure and research and development in many countries.18   
                                                      
16 USDA Briefing, 19 May 2008, Release No 0130.08. 
17 FAO, April 2008, Soaring Food  Prices: Facts, Perspectives, Impacts and Actions Required, 
HLC/08/INF/1, FAO, Rome, paragraph 21. 
18 Anderson, K., October 2008, Agricultural Price and Trade Distortions:  "Lessons from the Past 50 
years", The University of Adelaide, Australia. WT/COMTD/LDC/W/43 
 Page 13 
 
 
  1. Low harvests in some countries 
43. Given that demand for agriculture commodities is normally quite inelastic relative to prices, it 
follows that prices respond sharply to changes in supply.  Poor harvests in some major exporting countries have reduced production by a significant amount  – such as the recent droughts in Australia – 
have contributed to rising prices.  As cereals trad e is dominated by a few countries in the world the 
problem of lower harvests in any one of them can have a significant impact on trade volumes and 
hence on prices.  
44. Chart 6 below shows how exports of wheat  have evolved since 1993/94 and shows the 
international wheat price for the same period.  It  can be seen that exports from some countries have 
varied considerably from one year to the next.  Furthermore, export declines in 1994/95 and 1995/96 
led to a significant price increase wh ile an increase in exports in 1999/2000 led to a price fall.  
Although overall exports increased up to 2005/06, de mand increased more quickly, and a bad harvest 
in Australia in 2006/07 along with other r easons contributed to further price increases. 
Chart 6:  Exports of wheat and world wheat prices – 1993/94 to 2007/08 
-20,00040,00060,00080,000100,000120,000140,000160,000180,000200,000
1993/1994 1995/1996 1997/1998 1999/2000 2001/2002 2003/2004 2005/2006 2007/2008-50100150200250300350400
United States Argentina Former Soviet Union - 12
EC Australia Canada
Rest of world Average Price US$/tonne (right scale)
 
Note : Average world prices for June-July, EC-15 until 1998/99, EC-27 to 2007/08, FSU = Former Soviet Union 
countries. 
 For more data on expor t quantities see Annex 3. 
Source : Exports – USDA FAS PSD Online http://www. fas.usda.gov/psdonline/psdQuery.aspx  
 Prices – IMF, No.1 Hard Red Winter, ordinary pr otein, FOB Gulf of Mexico, US$ per metric tonne. 
 
2. Lower growth in yields 
45. The past few years have seen a decline in the rate of growth of agriculture productivity.  
Despite many advances made in production systems a nd genetics we have seen the rate of increase in 
yield per hectare falling steadily.  As Chart 7 below shows, the decline in average yield (tonnes per 
hectare) has been particularly noticeable for wheat and rice since the late 1980s while maize 
productivity is still more erratic than rice or wheat  it does appear that yields continue to improve. WT/COMTD/LDC/W/43 
Page 14  
 
  Chart 7:  Yield (tonnes per hectare) for maize, rice and wheat – 1961 to 2007  
0,001,002,003,004,005,006,00
1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005Maize
Rice, paddy
Wheat
 
Source :  FAOSTAT 
 
46. There are numerous reasons for the decline in th e growth of productivity.  One of the main 
reasons is probably the change in focus and the relative decline in public support for research and 
development.  But another reason must be structur al factors which make it harder for farmers to 
improve production such as poor farm structures, lack  of education and training, poor access to inputs, 
etc.  The results are clear – productivity in LDCs h as not improved at the same rate as that seen in 
other countries, including other developing countries.  As can be seen from the chart below, while the 
rate of increase in yield per hectare in France and China has declined, it continues to improve faster 
than in Tanzania where yields have declined rela tive the average level of the 1980s.  Malawi, on the 
other hand, has recorded significant improvements in yield over the past three years but 2007 is thought to be the first year that it managed to exceed 2 tonnes per hectare. WT/COMTD/LDC/W/43 
 Page 15 
 
 
  Chart 8:  Yield (tonnes per hectare) for maize in selected countries – 1961 to 2007 
0.002.004.006.008.0010.0012.00
1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005Brazil China France Malawi Tanzania, United Republic of United States of America 
Note : For more data on producti on and yield see Annex 4. 
Source : FAOSTAT 
 
3. Reducing growth and redirection of research and development 
47. Another reason for the world wide decline in productivity growth has been the decline and 
reorientation of public agriculture research and de velopment in some countries, particularly in high 
income countries.   In the past much of the resear ch that was done was directed towards productivity 
improvements and the results were us ually available to all.  Nowadays, the level of public research in 
agriculture in many developed countries has dec lined in real terms – and the type of research 
undertaken is less focused on productivity improveme nts and more towards other objectives such as 
production methods, quality improvement  and environmental affects of agriculture.  Although a lot of 
research in developed countries on pr oductivity continues, this is bei ng done more in the private than 
in the public domain.  Indeed, in high-income c ountries, more money is now spent on private research 
than on public research. 
48. Although research and development support is incr easing in developing countries, nearly half 
of this is from China, India and Brazil (26.2 per cent of global total for 2000).  In sub-Saharan Africa 
support for research and development has not increased significantly and remains at only 6.3 per cent of world total public agriculture research and devel opment.  Furthermore, in sub-Saharan Africa, the 
level of private research remains very low at  1.7 per cent of total research and development.
19 
                                                      
19 Pardey, PG, Beintema N., Dehmer S., Wood  S., 2006, Agricultural Science and Technology 
Indicators and IFPRI, Food Policy Report, Agricultural Research – A Growing Global Divide? Washington. WT/COMTD/LDC/W/43 
Page 16  
 
  Chart 9:  Public Support for Agricult ure Research and Development in 2000 
Total Support $23 billion  
China
14%
India
8%
Other Asia Pacific
11%
Other Latin America
6%Middle East and North 
Africa
6%United States
17%Other High-income
21%
Brazil
4%
Sub-Saharan Africa
6%Japan
7%
 
Note : In high-income countries private expe nditure on research and development is greater than public expenditure.  In 
all other countries, private expenditure is a small proporti on (between 1.7 and 8.1 per cent for different country 
groups). 
Source : ASTI, IFPRI . 
4. Input prices 
49. Of more immediate concern and no-less serious than the decline in research and development 
on agriculture is the cost of inputs for production.   Input costs have increased along with energy 
prices, particularly in those countries which supply most of the world’s food commodities.  In the 
medium and longer term, however, (and assuming producers react rationally) higher input prices will reduce the supply response which would have b een expected from producers getting higher sale 
prices.  What motivates increased production are in creased profits – but if input costs are rising then 
the full impact or output prices will not get throug h to the farmer who will adjust production based on 
marginal cost and marginal revenue.   
5. Stocks 
50. Agriculture stocks are very low.  As the United States and the European Communities have 
disposed of the stocks built up under their di fferent support policies and those countries that 
traditionally hold large stocks have been using them to counter poor harvests in India in 2002 and in 
China in 2003.  The resulting run down in world stoc k levels has increased exposure to price changes 
and the need to rebuild stocks in the future means prices are unlikely to fall by as much as might have 
been expected. 
51. Table 3 below shows production, consumption and end-stocks for rice and wheat.  These 
show that in some years in the recent past cons umption has exceeded production of both crops.  As a 
result stocks have fallen to current levels whic h, though slightly higher than 2007/08 are still lower 
than the levels held in the early to mid-1980s.   WT/COMTD/LDC/W/43 
 Page 17 
 
 
  Table 3:  Total World Stocks of Rice and Wheat (000 tonnes) 
 Rice Wheat 
 
 Production Consumption End-stocks Production Consumption End-stocks 
2001/2002 399,700 412,455 132,995 583,078 587,784 203,365
2002/2003 378,318 405,681 103,292 568,708 603,482 166,950
2003/2004 391,861 411,615 81,147 553,838 581,123 132,146
2004/2005 401,298 406,545 73,153 625,738 605,943 151,062
2005/2006 418,313 411,629 75,676 620,851 618,392 147,698
2006/2007 419,854 416,927 74,978 596,304 618,699 127,132
2007/2008 429,472 422,257 77,259 610,872 617,195 118,489
2008/2009 431,981 426,942 80,360 676,281 652,234 139,887
 Source : USDA, Foreign Agri culture Service. 
 
6. Financial instruments 
52. As is usual in any financial crises, a popular (a nd often real) culprit for any sudden change in 
price is the financial markets.  However, futures and options and other deriva tives can help to improve 
transparency and predictability in agriculture ma rkets and are used as a means of reducing risk 
exposure.  With declining returns from other areas of investment and low in terest rates agriculture 
derivatives offer interesting returns. 
53. However, both the IMF and IFPRI have concluded that the use of derivatives was the result of 
high prices rather than a cause20 although the OECD noted that increased trade in derivatives could 
lead to higher price volatility because of the volume of these investments and that they can move in 
and out of commodity markets depending on opportunities for profits.21  On the other hand, the CME 
Group (a company of the Chicago Board of Trade) h as also pointed out that there is little relationship 
between non commercial positions and price changes, that many factors affect prices (particularly low 
stocks and demand in excess of supply) and that  prices of commodities which have little or no 
speculator participation have also increased. 
IV. LEAST-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
54. As a group, LDCs were net exporters, but that  was a long time ago when their populations 
were much smaller.  For the current LDC Member s of the WTO, as a group they have had a food 
trade (excluding fish) deficit since 1972.  In 2005, out of the 32 LDC Members of the WTO, only 
Guinea Bissau, the Solomon Islands and Zambia had food trade surpluses.  This is despite rising 
production.  Some of the reasons have been el aborated above and include rising population and 
increasing wealth which led to higher consumption, static productivity per hectare, as most increased 
production came from new areas under cultivation, a focus on non-agricultural development, poor 
infrastructure, etc.   
55. In addition to being net importers of food, LDCs  are particularly vulnerable to shocks caused 
by high food commodity prices for a number of r easons.  Like other countries, urbanization in LDCs 
means a greater number of people have to pay in cash fo r all, or practically all of their food.  Even in 
cases where the result is improved incomes, the house hold is much more aware of changes in food 
prices, forced to reduce consumption of other go ods when food prices increase and, if those food 
prices increase by enough, in danger of having to reduce food consumption.   
                                                      
20 IMF 2006, World Economic Outlook 2006, Chapter 5:  The boom in commodity prices; can it last? 
Washington. 
21 OECD-FAO, 2008, Agricultural Outlook 2008-2017, Prices in Cash and Derivatives Markets, page 
41, Box 2.2, Paris. WT/COMTD/LDC/W/43 
Page 18  
 
  56. As they are less well off on average, househol ds in LDCs tend to spend a greater portion of 
their incomes on food than other goods and services.  Because incomes are so much less than in other 
countries, rising food prices often mean less food is c onsumed.  It has been pointed out that family of 
five living on one-dollar-a-day per person spends US$3.00 on food and US$0.50 on energy each day.  
That does not leave much room to manoeuvre if food prices increase and the result is that less food is 
bought leading to reduced diet quality and increased micronutrient malnutrition.
22 
57. Given the increase in urbanization and with it reliance on food purchases rather than 
cultivation to provide food, and the vulnerability of the poor, to increases in prices it is not surprising 
that there have been protests in many countries a nd that governments have taken measures to respond.  
These countries include 30 LDCs (as of September 2008) which are reported to have taken a wide 
range of measures from restricting exports, reducing tariffs, consumer subsidie s and so on.  Table 4 
below shows lists some of these LDCs and the actions they have taken.   
Table 4:  Trade and consumption for selected LDC Members of the WTO 
Government responsea Member Imports as % of 
consumption of 
main grains Export 
restriction Reduce 
tariffs Consumer 
subsidy Social 
protection Supply 
increase 
Angola 26%     X 
Bangladesh 10% X  X X X 
Benin 40%  X X  X 
Burkina Faso 23%  X X X  
Burundi 14%    X  
Cambodia 3% X X X   
Central African Republic 23%      
Chad 24%      
Congo, DR of 31%  X   X 
Gambia 97%      
Guinea 37%    X  
Guinea-Bissau 40%  X    
Haiti 53%   X X X 
Lesotho 12%      
Madagascar 11% X  X   
Malawi 7% X    X 
Mali 19% X X  X X 
Mauritania 63%      
Mozambique 39%      
Myanmar 1%      
Nepal 2% X     
Niger 61% X X  X X 
Rwanda 31%     X 
Senegal 79%  X X  X 
Sierra Leone 29% X X X X X 
Solomon Islands 71%      
Tanzania, United Republic of 19% X X X   
Togo 31%   X  X 
Uganda 24%    X X 
Zambia 14% X    X 
 a Benson T., Minot N., Pender J., Robl es M., von Braun J., September 2008, Global Food Crises Monitoring and 
Assessing Impact to Inform Polic y Responses, IFPRI, Washington.  
Note : Main grains are maize, rice and wheat.  Data for imports and consumption for 2003. 
 Some LDC Members of the WTO were not included in the table due to lack of data.  
Source :   FAOSTAT and IFPRI. 
                                                      
22 Von Braun J., April 2008, Rising food prices:  Dimension, causes, impact and responses, Keynote 
address at the World Food Programme, slide no 36. WT/COMTD/LDC/W/43 
 Page 19 
 
 
  58. The impact of higher world prices for food commodities in any country or region depends on 
a wide range of factors such as the proportion of the population living in rural areas, the number that depend on food production and the type of food on wh ich they rely, the amount by which input costs 
and farm gate prices have increased, etc.  As ne arly all LDCs are net food-importers it could be 
concluded that they would not be nefit from rising international prices.  On the other hand, the 
majority of people in LDCs still live in rural areas, despite an increase in urbanisation.  According to 
the UN ESA 73 per cent of people in LDCs live in  rural areas compared to 55 per cent in other 
developing country regions. 
Table 5:  Total population (millions) and proportion living in rural areas  
World LDCs Other developing country regions 
 Total % rural Total % rural Total % rural 
1950 2,535,093 71% 200,321 93% 1,521,211  81% 
1955 2,770,753 69% 221,417 92% 1,685,332  79% 
1960 3,031,931 67% 247,317 91% 1,868,519  77% 
1965 3,342,771 65% 278,395 89% 2,097,374  75% 
1970 3,698,676 64% 315,868 87% 2,374,331  73% 
1975 4,076,080 63% 358,263 85% 2,669,714  71% 
1980 4,451,470 61% 405,815 83% 2,962,381  69% 
1985 4,855,264 59% 460,974 81% 3,278,938  66% 
1990 5,294,879 57% 525,473 79% 3,620,342  63% 
1995 5,719,045 55% 601,083 77% 3,942,562  60% 
2000 6,124,123 53% 679,447 75% 4,250,477  57% 
2005 6,514,751 51% 766,816 73% 4,532,300  55% 
Source : Population Division of the UN ESA, World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision and World 
Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unup 
 
59. The high proportion of people living in rural areas does indicate a high dependence on 
agriculture – supported by the fact that agriculture  is a large part of the economies of LDCs – and 
higher prices would be expected to benefit food producers.  However, many people living in rural 
areas are not net food producers and their food security will decline with higher prices.  As the poorest households spend a larger proportion of their income  on food they are particularly likely to suffer 
increased poverty as prices rise. 
60. Different studies have shown different results for rising prices.  For example: 
• IFPRI has stated that the benefits of hi gher prices will accrue almost exclusively to 
net food-producers but these make up on ly a small proportion of low-income 
people.
23   
• A World Bank paper on the impact of price changes on nine low-income countries 
(including four LDCs) genera lly supported this although noting that the impact of 
higher prices depends on agriculture structur es, particularly farm size and ownership, 
and taking changes in wages into account reduced the negative impact.24   
                                                      
23 Von Braun J., December 2007, The World Food S ituation:  New Driving Forces and Required 
Actions, IFPRI's Bi-Annual Overview of the World Food Situation presented to the CGIAR Annual General 
Meeting, Beijing, 3 December 2007. 
24 Ivanic M., Martin W., April 2008, Implications of Higher Global Food Prices for Poverty in 
Low-Income Countries, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4594. WT/COMTD/LDC/W/43 
Page 20  
 
  • On the other hand, the Carnegie Endowment s has stated that its studies on India and 
China show that a rise in the prices of grai ns will have a broad and positive impact on 
reducing poverty.
25 
V. THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA  
61. The 1996 Food Summit stressed that food security is multifaceted but that "trade is a key 
element in achieving" it.  This follows the defi nition of food security based on access to food rather 
than production itself and access to food can be ba sed on national production, exports of goods and 
services which provide the means to import food, a healthy and sustainable national economy and 
many other factors.  At the same time, to be able  to produce, export and import food efficiently and to 
distribute it to consumers requires a reasonable stable  national currency, adequate infrastructure in the 
ports and transport systems, a safe and legally secu re environment in which traders can operate, the 
ability for consumers to choose between competing supplie rs, etc.  Not all of this has much to do with 
globalization.  Nor is all of it the responsibility of the WTO or of other international organizations and 
many of them are the responsibility of sovere ign governments.  However, overseas development 
assistance and the international community, in cluding inter-governmental organizations and 
non-governmental organizations, can help in many ways. 
62. The alternative to trade playing a key role  in food security is self-sufficiency.  But 
self-sufficiency for a nation or household in unlikely to mean food security.  Even for large diversified 
economies which produce a wide variety of agriculture products, it is unlikely to be the most efficient 
way to attain this goal.  Instead a broad mix of policies would seem to work best although the mix of, 
and emphasis on, different policies would vary cons iderably from one country to another; although 
trade would be a key element.  The most appropr iate mix of policies is probably best developed 
without markets being distorted, like they are today,  by high tariffs, subsidies for production, taxes on 
exports, subsidies for exports and the host of othe r trade distorting policies used around the world.  
Current high prices are a problem for millions of peop le and current needs have to be addressed by 
both short-term and long-term policy responses.  Bu t high prices can also be an opportunity to reduce 
support and protection for farmers around the world, to encourage production in developing countries, 
to increase farmers’ incomes and to reduce rural poverty. 
63. It is clear from the Declaration of the High-Level Conference on World Food Security held in 
Rome in June 2008, that trade reform is one importa nt element of the medium to long-term policies to 
address high prices.  However, in the short-term food aid, development assistance and balance of 
payments support will be critical.  In the longer-ter m trade liberalisation, productivity improvement, 
stockpiling of foods security reserves, investment in technology and other measures make important 
contributions to improving food security.   
64. Although the DDA cannot deliver immediate solutions to problems associated with current 
high prices for many food products, it can be part  of the medium to long-term response.  Once 
successfully completed with its intended objectiv es, the DDA can lead to greater efficiency by 
shifting production to countries with comparative a dvantage.  Reduced tariffs and diminished levels 
of domestic support will ensure greater and fairer  competition in trade in food and agriculture 
products, which would help devel opment and production a nd improve access to food.  At the same 
time, governments need to take supportive polici es and investments to re alise the agricultural 
potential of their countries. 
                                                      
25 Polaski S., May 2008, Rising Food Prices, Poverty and the Doha Round, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace,  Policy Outlook.  
  WT/COMTD/LDC/W/43
 Page 21Annex 1 
Simple average annual prices (July-June) for selected commodities 
Barley Beef Cocoa 
beans Rapeseed 
oil Cotton Maize Palm oil Swine Poultry Rice Soya 
beans Sugar Sunflower 
oil Tea Wheat  
US$/tonne  cents/lb  US$/tonne  US$/tonne cents/lb  US$/tonne  US $/tonne  cents/lb  cents/lb  US$/tonne  US$/tonne  cents/lb  U S$/tonne  cents/kg  current 
US$/tonne  
1980M6  65  114 2,498  546  84 113 459 62 31 442 233 31 494 235 158 
1981M6  71  110 1,660  482  86 136 529 105 34 535 265 16 608 199 169 
1982M6  72  108 1,572  433  76 115 408 144 35 292 231 7 488 184 156 
1983M6  67  112 2,298  405  86 135 326 114 34 269 221 11 415 187 152 
1984M6  90  106 2,485  833  84 147 647 127 40 256 287 6 784 318 150 
1985M6  65  95 2,092  613  63 116 459 132 38 223 212 3 577 164 134 
1986M6  43  92 1,906  359  41 105 201 137 40 204 194 6 472 176 106 
1987M6  57  105 1,997  347  79 80 283 146 41 196 206 6 498 134 109 
1988M6  80  110 1,624  538  69 120 410 85 46 269 344 11 617 166 150 
1989M6  68  110 1,252  469  79 113 308 58 53 331 255 13 623 177 169 
1990M6  80  114 1,330  430  90 120 225 121 50 255 221 13 612 181 136 
1991M6  71  123 1,041  415  84 105 257 105 48 293 209 9 589 164 120 
1992M6  85  106 963  450  64 110 334 61 48 266 224 10 582 202 149 
1993M6  75  124 942  441  58 93 294 68 56 189 222 10 650 167 122 
1994M6  68  101 1,459  598  86 112 420 61 59 216 250 12 722 197 139 
1995M6  106  80 1,437  614  104 120 522 56 54 326 217 14 641 146 170 
1996M6  138  77 1,538  594  83 197 447 102 65 342 285 12 585 171 227 
1997M6  95  80 1,694  554  81 113 472 83 61 323 305 11 534 225 148 
1998M6  92  77 1,723  650  69 102 583 60 63 331 231 8 717 218 121 
1999M6  81  80 1,163  413  59 93 331 46 61 255 170 6 463 207 111 
2000M6  78  88 948  359  59 84 272 69 59 198 187 8 373 241 114 
2001M6  95  94 973  362  47 83 209 73 64 168 170 9 413 191 127 
2002M6  104  94 1,656  438  43 93 376 50 64 202 185 5 557 169 132 
2003M6  111  78 1,579  633  59 107 390 65 66 204 230 6 634 197 131 
2004M6  114  117 1,405  749  65 123 409 78 80 244 321 8 584 187 155 
2005M6  93  120 1,539  678  54 98 370 67 74 287 255 9 1,152 223 142 
2006M6  107  112 1,606  889  56 110 386 74 69 306 217 16 673 250 195 
2007M6  184  119 2,013  904  60 165 748 74 81 326 303 9 673 202 223 
2008M6  241  130 3,022  1,640  77 287 1,096 74 86 835 552 12 2,300 285 349 
 
Barley, Canadian no.1 Western Barley, spot price, US$ per metric  tonne.  Beef, Australian and New Zealand 85% lean fores, FOB U .S. import price, US cents per pound.  Cocoa beans, International Cocoa Organization 
cash price, CIF US and European ports, US $ per metric tonne.  Rapeseed Oil; Crude, fob Rotterdam.  Cotton, Cotton Outlook 'A In dex', Middling 1-3/32 inch staple, CIF Li verpool, US cents per pound.  Groundnuts 
(peanuts), 40/50 (40 to 50 count per ounce), cif Argentina, US$ pe r metric tonne.  Lamb, frozen carcass Smithfield London, US c ents per pound.  Maize (corn), U.S. No.2 Yellow, FOB Gulf of Mexico, U.S. price, US$ per 
metric tonne.  Palm oil, Malaysia Palm O il Futures (first contract forward) 4-5 per cent FFA, US$ per metric tonne.  Swine (pork ), 51-52% lean Hogs, U.S. price, US cents per pound.  Poultry (chicken), Whole bird spot 
price, Georgia docks, US cents per pound.  Rice, 5 per cent broken milled white rice, Thailand  nominal price quote, US$ per metr ic tonne.  Soybeans, U.S. soybeans, Chicago Soyb ean futures contract (first contract forward) 
No. 2 yellow and par, US$ per metric tonne.  Sugar, Free Market , Coffee Sugar and Cocoa Exchange (CSCE) contract no.11 nearest future position, US cents per pound.  Sunflowe r oil, Sunflower Oil, US export price from 
Gulf of Mexico, US$ per metric tonne.  Tea, Mombassa, Kenya, Au ction Price, US cents per kilogram.  Wheat, No.1 Hard Red Winter , ordinary protein, FOB Gulf of Mexico , US$ per metric tonne.  Wool, coarse, 
23 micron, Australian Wool Exchange spot quote, US cents per kilogram. 
 
 
 WT/COMTD/LDC/W/43 
Page 22  
 
  Annex 2 
Gross National Income per capita in select ed LDC Members of the WTO (current US$) 
1995 to 2008  
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Bangladesh  310  320 340 340 340  360  360 
Benin  310  310 340 340 330  340  320 
Burkina Faso  230  240 250 240 250  240  240 
Burundi  150  140 140 140 130  120  100 
Central African Republic  330  290 300 280 280  270  250 
Chad  200  200 210 220 200  180  180 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  130  120 110 110 100  80  80 
Gambia, The  330  330 330 300 310  310  290 
Guinea-Bissau  200  220 220 140 150  160  140 
Haiti  280  360 390 400 440  470  440 
Lesotho  770  770 780 650 620  590  540 
Madagascar  230  240 240 250 240  240  250 
Malawi  160  170 200 200 170  150  140 
Mali  270  260 280 280 270  260  250 
Mauritania  630  680 610 560 540  470  420 
Nepal  200  210 220 210 210  220  230 
Niger  190  200 200 200 180  170  170 
Rwanda  220  230 270 260 260  240  220 
Senegal  540  520 520 510 500  490  470 
Sierra Leone  190  220 190 160 150  140  160 
Solomon Islands  890  890 980 900 830  690  630 
Togo  280  290 330 300 290  270  240 
Zambia  340  350 360 310 310  300  310 
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Bangladesh  350  370 410 440 450  470  494 
Benin  330  370 450 510 530  570  624 
Burkina Faso  240  280 340 400 420  430  476 
Burundi  90  90 90 90 100  110  113 
Central African Republic  240  250 300 340 370  380  419 
Chad  190  210 330 410 440  540  650 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  90  100 110 120 130  140  149 
Gambia, The  250  250 260 270 270  320  326 
Guinea-Bissau  130  130 150 180 180  200  217 
Haiti  400  380 390 420 490  560  597 
Lesotho  490  530 660 840 980  1,000  1,166 
Madagascar  220  280 290 290 280  320  320 
Malawi  150  180 220 220 230  250  266 
Mali  250  320 390 450 460  500  547 
Mauritania  460  470 530 600 760  840  947 
Nepal  230  250 270 300 320  340  362 
Niger  170  200 220 250 270  280  302 
Rwanda  210  200 210 250 280  320  348 
Senegal  450  530 640 740 760  820  897 
Sierra Leone  190  200 210 220 230  260  269 
Solomon Islands  560  560 600 630 690  730  769 
Togo  240  260 310 340 350  360  388 
Zambia  320  360 410 500 640  800  924 
Source :  World Bank, World Development Indicators.  Note GNI/capita figures for 2008 are based on average growth in GNI/capita for 
2003-2006. WT/COMTD/LDC/W/43 
 Page 23 
 
 
  Annex 3 
Exports of Wheat 1993/94 to 2007/08 
 
Commodity   Wheat          
 Attribute   Exports  
(000 
tonnes)   Of which        Average 
Price  
Country World Argentina Australia Canada EC FSU United 
States Rest of 
world US$/tonne 
 1993/1994  103,717 5,009  13,707 19, 100 20,066 6,501 33,414  5,920 141 
 1994/1995  98,215 7,318  6,354 20, 851 17,110 4,272 32,340  9,970 156 
 1995/1996  99,195 4,483  13,311 16, 342 13,242 6,004 33,778  12,035 214 
 1996/1997  106,903 10,198  19,225 19, 501 17,835 4,422 27,257  8,465 178 
 1997/1998  104,413 11,151  15,343 20, 134 14,196 6,259 28,315  9,015 140 
 1998/1999  101,284 8,560  16,473 14, 705 14,589 8,752 28,460  9,745 118 
 1999/2000  113,449 11,589  17,844 19, 165 20,380 9,265 29,570  5,636 108 
 2000/2001  101,498 11,272  15,930 17, 316 15,675 4,977 28,904  7,424 125 
 2001/2002  105,707 10,075  16,409 16, 272 12,751 13,935 26,190  10,075 124 
 2002/2003  105,630 6,759  9,146 9, 403 18,132 25,740 23,139  13,311 157 
 2003/2004  108,581 9,407  18,031 15, 836 9,834 7,897 31,524  16,052 157 
 2004/2005  111,245 11,834  14,742 14, 880 14,745 15,526 29,009  10,509 149 
 2005/2006  116,709 9,563  16,012 16, 003 15,694 21,127 27,291  11,019 170 
 2006/2007  111,186 10,500  8,728 19, 638 13,873 22,350 24,725  11,372 202 
 2007/2008  113,592 10,000  7,470 16, 500 12,000 20,601 34,403  12,618 344 
Note : EC-15 to 1998/99, EC-27 to 2007/08. 
 FSU – countries of the Former Soviet Union. 
Source :  Exports – USDA, FAS, PSD Online (http ://www.fas.usda.gov/psdon line/psdQuery.aspx) 
 Prices – IMF  
 WT/COMTD/LDC/W/43 
Page 24  
 
  Annex 4 
Yield and Total Production of Maize in Selected Countries 
 
 Yield (tonnes/hectare) 
 Brazil China France Malawi Tanzania USA 
1965 1,38 1,51 3,98 0,87 0,79 4,65
1970 1,44 2,09 5,10 0,90 0,48 4,54
1975 1,50 2,54 4,18 1,00 1,24 5,42
1980 1,78 3,08 5,32 1,22 1,23 5,71
1985 1,87 3,61 6,58 1,18 1,33 7,41
1990 1,87 4,53 6,02 1,00 1,50 7,44
1995 2,60 4,92 7,72 1,35 2,10 7,12
2000 2,74 4,60 9,08 1,74 0,54 8,59
2005 3,04 5,29 8,25 0,76 1,10 9,29
2007 3,73 5,41 8,85 2,04 1,13 9,48
 
 Production (tonnes) 
 Brazil China France Malawi Tanzania USA 
1965 12 111 921 23 691 079 3 467 800 890 000 751 000 104 216 928
1970 14 216 009 33 087 416 7 491 000 900 000 488 000 105 471 120
1975 16 334 516 47 357 880 8 209 000 1 000 000 1 367 000 148 361 072
1980 20 372 080 62 715 141 9 323 400 1 186 000 1 726 000 168 647 008
1985 22 018 176 64 102 307 12 409 000 1 355 202 2 093 000 225 453 008
1990 21 347 770 97 213 883 9 400 500 1 342 809 2 445 000 201 532 000
1995 36 266 952 112 361 571 12 739 600 1 661 457 2 874 400 187 968 992
2000 31 879 392 106 178 315 16 018 353 2 501 311 2 009 000 251 854 000
2005 35 113 312 139 498 473 13 687 659 1 225 234 3 288 000 282 310 690
2007 51 589 721 151 970 000 13 107 000 3 444 700 3 400 000 332 092 180
Source : FAOSTAT . 
 
 
 
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