RESTRICTED  WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  TN/AG/R/18 
22 March 2005 
 (05-1202) 
Committee on Agriculture 
Special Session   
 
 
SUMMARY REPORT ON THE TWENTY-NINTH MEETING  
OF THE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, SPECIAL SESSION  
HELD ON 11 FEBRUARY 2005 
 
Note by the Secretariat1 
 
 
1. The Special Session of the Committee on Agricu lture, which was established by the General 
Council (WT/GC/M/53), is pursuing negotiations under paragraphs 13, 14 and other relevant 
provisions of the Doha Ministerial Declaration.  The twenty-ninth formal meeting was held on 
11 February 2005 under the chairman ship of Ambassador Tim Groser. 
2. The agenda as contained in WTO/AIR/2482 of 21 January 2005 was adopted. 
ITEM A (I):  STATEMENT BY CHAIR  
3. This was delivered by the Chair after Item A ( ii).  A summary of the Chairman's statement is 
attached. 
ITEM A (II):  STATEMENTS BY PARTICIPANTS  
4. Benin, on behalf of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group, took the opportunity to 
comment on the issue of preferences, associating itself with the corresponding statements by the 
African Group, the LDCs, CARICOM, the EC and the G10 made during the informal Special Session.  The ACP Group also welcomed the positive statements  made by the US and the G20.  Recalling the 
importance that preferences played in helpi ng ACP countries achieve their development goals, 
particularly with respect to revenue generation fo r food security, the representative of Benin remarked 
that paragraph 44 of the Agreed Fr amework had been a critical element in ensuring the support of the 
preference receivers for the General Council Decision of 1 August 2004.  Paragraph 44 provided the 
basis for addressing preference erosion in conjunc tion paragraph 13 of the Doha mandate and the 
overall development philosophy of the Doha negotiations.  Acknowle dging that preferences receivers 
were facing a difficult adjustment process as pr eference margins are reduced by liberalisation, 
preferences nonetheless continue to play a vital role  in the development policies of these countries.  
Citing findings from the FAO that preferences account ed for only one percent of world trade, Benin 
noted that preferences could not, therefore, be considered to have a distorting impact on world 
markets.  Describing comments made during the in formal Special Session regarding the link between 
preferences and the Enabling Clau se as destructive, Benin noted that such Members had omitted 
mentioning one important element of the Enabli ng Clause, Article 3(c), which required that 
preferences be designed and modified to respond to the development and other needs of developing 
countries.  It was the view of the ACP group that the final outcome of the Doha negotiations should, 
while allowing for the continued reform of agricultura l markets, continue to make adequate provision 
for the co-existence and sustainability of different forms of agricultural systems.  Only under these 
                                                     
 
1 This document has been prepared under the Secret ariat's own responsibility and is without prejudice 
to the positions of Members or to their rights or obligations under the WTO. TN/AG/R/18 
Page 2  
 
 conditions could a balanced and ade quate outcome be achieved.  In this regard, the treatment afforded 
to paragraph 44 would play a vital role in shaping the views of the ACP countries on the consensus of the final outcome.  The representative of Benin conc luded by noting that throughout the course of the 
GATT/WTO Members have been able to make signi ficant progress on multilateral reform despite the 
continuing existence of preferences.  
5. The comments made by Benin on behalf of the ACP Group, where supported by Barbados, 
Guyana, Jamaica, Mauritius, Rwanda  (on behalf of the African Gr oup), Senegal (on behalf of the 
LDCs) and Tanzania.  
6. Tanzania noted the important role that pref erences played in its economy, especially their 
contribution to fighting poverty.  Tanzania ha d over six million small-scale producers who depended 
on a few agricultural commodities, with the agri cultural sector accounting for over 50 percent of 
Tanzania's GDP.  Agricultural exports accounted fo r over 60 percent of its foreign exchange earnings 
and the majority of these exports are destined for preferential markets.  Without preferences it would 
be very difficult for Tanzania to maintain any mean ingful share of these markets in the face of stiff 
competition from other more efficient producers.  Pr eferences had provided Ta nzania with the room 
to strengthen its productive capacity.  Indeed its agricultural trade had become more competitive but 
continued improvement could only be achieved wi th the necessary support to address supply-side 
constraints and non-tariff barriers.  These two restra ints limit Tanzania's ability to take advantage of 
duty and quota free access to some developed countr y markets.  Acknowledging the level of ambition 
in the area of market access that Ministers had ag reed to at Doha, the Tanzanian representative noted 
that Members also needed to remember that de velopment was the central element of the Doha 
mandate.  As such, preference erosion, without c oncrete compensatory mechanisms, would be "anti-
Doha".  Without a satisfactory solution to this issue within the ambitious mandate, the weak and 
vulnerable countries, especially the LDCs, would be further marginalised and perhaps even excluded 
from the multilateral system, thereby denying them the opportunity to trade their way out of poverty.  
7. South Africa raised concerns about the current pace of progress in the negotiations.  While 
some areas did appear to be making good progress, th e pace needed to be substantively accelerated in 
other areas if Members were to have a realistic  chance of agreeing to modalities at the Hong Kong 
Ministerial.  With respect to market access, Sout h Africa raised concerns that the methodology for 
converting non- ad valorem  tariffs into their ad valorem  equivalents was yet to be agreed.  It 
considered this issue to be one of the basic build ing blocks for achieving progress in the market access 
pillar.  It also noted that developing countries were  at a severe disadvantage in  this area because most 
of them had all, or practically all, of their tariff commitments expressed in ad valorem  terms.  With 
regards to preferences, South Africa understood the role that long standing preferences had played and 
were still playing in the development of some develo ping countries.  It noted that paragraph 44 of the 
Framework committed Members to addressing preferen ces and that it indicated that paragraph 16 of 
the Harbinson text should be a starting point.  Sout h Africa fully agreed that all efforts should be 
made to cushion possible negative effects on pref erence receiving countries that might arise from the 
erosion of preferences as a result of the Doha nego tiations.  That said, preferences could not be used 
as an excuse to delay the reform process.  South Africa agreed with the statement made during the 
informal special session by the African Group on the need to establish concrete and binding 
commitments directed at addressing supply-side constraints in developing countries to assist them in making better use of current preference schemes a nd to help them diversify their agricultural 
production and trade base.  Such commitments needed  to be targeted, sustained and demand driven.  
South Africa also believed that there is a need to  examine why some preferential schemes have low 
utilisation rates, though concentrating only on pref erences themselves would not deliver the results 
Members were seeking.  Regional initiatives were al so important in helping to reduce the dependence 
on certain preferences from developed countries.  With respect to export credits, South Africa 
believed that this was one area where good progress c ould be made over the next few weeks.  They 
welcomed the initiative taken by the African group with support from the FAO and UNCTAD in  TN/AG/R/18 
 Page 3 
 
 
 searching for a solution to addressing food security.  South Africa was disappointed that the European 
Union had decided to reinstate export subsidies for wheat at a time when the Membership was 
negotiating their elimination.  
8. The representative of Morocco commented that special and differential treatment needed 
more examination if developing countries were to pa rticipate more fully in the international trading 
environment.  The representative also asked the Chai rman to circulate the list of topics for discussion 
at the next meeting as far in advance of the meeting as possible to enable sufficient time for 
consultation. 
9. A number of delegates requested that their statements from the informal Special Session be 
included in the summary record of the formal Speci al Session.  The Chairman reminded delegates that 
any delegation wishing to have their informal st atements included in the record summary of the 
formal Special Session, would need to submit, elec tronically, to the Secretariat, their statement as 
soon as possible.  Statements from the following delega tions were forwarded to the Secretariat and are 
attached to this summary:  Bolivia (tariff quota ad ministration);  Colombia (preferences and tariff 
quotas);  Cuba (export restrictions);  Switzerland ( on behalf of the G10 – formulae for reductions in 
trade distorting domestic support, export prohibitions restrictions and preferences);  Brazil (on behalf 
of the G20 – formulae for reductions in trade di storting domestic support, export prohibitions and 
restrictions and preferences);  Mauritius (tariff quota administration, export credits, ad valorem  
equivalents and preferences);  Philippines ( ad valorem  equivalents);  Senegal (on behalf of the LDCs 
– preferences). 
ITEM B: OTHER BUSINESS  
10. The Chairman noted that the first meeting of the Sub-Committee on Cotton would take place 
on 16 February 2005.  In addition, the next form al Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture 
would take place on 18 March 2005 with informal c onsultations or an informal Special Session 
starting on Monday 14 March. 
11. In response to the Chairs proposed list of issues to be discussed at the next informal Special 
Session of the Committee on Agriculture, Brazil reca lled its comments on behalf of the G20 at the 
December Special Session.  To include paragraph 49 issues, "issues of interest but not agreed", on the agenda of the March Special Session was to put them on the same level as other issues in the Framework and this could be understood as an implicit re-interpret ation of the Framework.  This was 
supported by Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Nigeria, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
12. In response to the intervention by Brazil, Switzerland remarked that the entire Framework had 
been adopted by consensus.  To try now to pick  and choose topics was a very dangerous precedent for 
the WTO.  This was supported by the EC, who lik ewise insisted on the inclusion of paragraph 49 
issues on the March agenda. TN/AG/R/18 
Page 4  
 
 Statement by Ambassador Tim Groser
 
 
Chairman, Special Session, Committee on Agriculture 
  
1. As you will all know by know, I like to use this time in the formal Speci al Session to provide 
you with my views on how the week has shaped-up,  and what are the key stepping stones in the 
weeks ahead.  This has been an intensive week of discussions.  As you are aware, we have meet in a 
variety of formats, the open-ended informal Speci al Session, open-ended consultations in Room D 
and some smaller representative groupings.  I also k now from contacts with delegations that you have 
been meeting both bilaterally and as groups throughout the week in order to accelerate the process.  
2. All of this intensive work is aimed at m eeting the objective of a first approximation of 
modalities by the end of July.  I am, however, coming to the view that in order to achieve this 
objective, meeting for one week per month is not enough for us to achieve this objective. 
FIRST APPROXIMATION 
 
3. On this issue, or concept, of a first approxi mation of full modalities, I have been asked by 
many delegations on numerous occasions as to what is it that I actually have in mind.  I had originally 
anticipated using today to provide more shape to th is concept to you.  However, following discussions 
with a number of delegations I have  decided that the time is not right and so I will come back to this 
issue at a later time.  
SEQUENCING OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS 
 4. Instead, I want to use today to outline how I see th e months ahead and what it is that must be 
achieved over the course of the coming weeks to ensu re that we are on track for the end of July.  
Looking across the board at all of the issues in the Framework that must be resolved, they can be put 
into two categories:  those on which we must make substantial progress by the end of July;  and those 
that can be left until later in the year.  This s econd category contains some of the biggest political 
questions.  The difference between the two cate gories is about the sequencing of issues in a 
negotiating sense.  Indeed the most difficult political  questions should end up in the September to 
December period, but only if we, as senior officials,  have done our job in resolving the other issues 
first.  
AD VALOREM  EQUIVALENTS 
 5. Looking at all of the issues in front of us, it is clear that the most important issue to be 
resolved without delay is the conversion of non- ad valorem  tariffs to their ad valorem  equivalents, or 
AVEs.  As I said earlier, it is all about sequencing.  I do not believe that the issue of AVEs is near the 
top of the importance hierarchy, but, due to the pr ocess of the negotiations, it is thrust into that 
position for the moment.   
6. One can think of AVEs under three headings that are very closely connected:  there are issues 
about timing, issues of a technical nature and th ere are over-arching political issues at stake here. 
Timing 
 
7. On timing, if we work backwards from the Hong Kong Ministerial meeting, through the first 
approximation of full modalities by the end of July, I believe there is a wide ly-shared view, and one 
that I agree with, that this issue must be settled within the next few weeks.   TN/AG/R/18 
 Page 5 
 
 
 8. In order to achieve this we must keep utterm ost in our thinking the point made by many 
people – and not just from one side of the debate either – that exact precision in conversion to AVEs 
is not possible, nor is it even required.  We are seeking what many delegations have called, a "fair 
approximation" of the AVE for the purposes of putti ng it into an appropriate  tier of the reduction 
formula.  But please remember, the term 'fair' approximation means fair approximation. 
9. That said, I am pleased to be able to say that  I am getting very constructive engagement from 
the Membership.  While nobody is trying to disrupt the negotiations the failure to resolve this issue 
soon will, because of the dynamics of the negotiatin g process, disrupt the negotiations – not because 
of any malicious intent, but because it is just  the why these types of negotiations evolve.  
Technical Issues 
 10. With respect to the technical issues, I'm very grateful for the wide support for using my paper 
as a working basis for resolving the AVE  issue.  I am also grateful fo r the flexibility of countries that 
have raised issues with the paper as it stands a nd I have taken careful note of your concerns. 
11. For example, one of the areas that has received a lot of discussion over the course of the week 
is the issue of verification.  As many of you have pointed out, the issue of verification is addressed in 
the paper only by a heading.  In that sense it is clea rly an area that requires further work and I am very 
thankful for the high degree of realism on the pa rt of the Membership expressed today and throughout 
the week on a readiness to develop this issue, and i ndeed to further develop the paper into something 
that we can reach a consensus on in due course.  But in due course is, of course, in weeks.  
12. With respect to other technical issues, I am  hearing from the Membership certain common 
lines in terms of the need to develop filters and the need to look at some a lternatives to deal with 
situations where the basic methodology is not suitable.  I think we are moving in a reasonably constructive way, but we all need to recognise that in advancing our preferred positions that in this 
case a one-size-fits-all approach will not always wo rk.  I will seek to revise the current draft on the 
basis of this week's discussions and the papers  that have been circulated by delegations.  
Political 
 
13. The over-arching political issue, is the strategic significance of the AVE issue towards 
progress on a global front to the Doha negotiations.  The key issue in this respect, as has been articulated to me on a number of occasions, is havi ng a verification procedure that has a shared sense 
of responsibility for the burden of proof when diffe rences of opinion arise with respect to someone's 
calculation of an AVE.  This will be a critical element of the process.  Please remember that when you 
as a delegation submit your AVEs you make it absolu tely clear to the various lobbies and special 
interest groups that these figures are still open for discussion.  If delegations come to the table with the attitude that what has been submitted cannot be  changed this will lead to a breakdown in the 
negotiations.  
14. AVEs are an area of great sensitivity to both importing and exporting countries, but please 
remember that the purpose of the exercise as it currently stands is to  try and advance the negotiations 
as a whole.  TN/AG/R/18 
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 CONCLUSION 
 15. To conclude, I want to re-emphasis that I believe  this issue, AVEs, is the gateway to progress 
in the agriculture negotiations and it must be resolv ed in the coming weeks.  Ladies and gentlemen, I 
thank you very much for your co-operation today and over the course of what has been both an 
intense and fruitful week.  I will attempt, at a la ter meeting of course, to do what I wanted to do, 
which is try and give you greater shape about my th inking with respect of a first approximation of full 
modalities.    TN/AG/R/18 
 Page 7 
 
 
 Members Statements from the Informal Special Session 
 
 
Statement by Bolivia  
  
Tariff Quota Administration 
 
Mr Chairman:  
1. Mention has been made of the principles of transparency, opportunity, and predictability, 
which we all agree should govern the administration of quotas.  Emphasis has also been placed on the 
market impact element.  However, certain develo ping countries do not benefit from any quotas, and 
although we are not seeking to introduce or create new quotas because we are engaged in the process 
of negotiating trade liberalization, we would like our situation to be taken in to consideration in the 
decisions to be made, at least as regards special a nd differential treatment, in order to ensure improved 
market access for our exportable supply. 
 
 
 TN/AG/R/18 
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 Statement by Colombia
 
 
 
Preferences 
 Thank you, Mr Chairman.  
 1. After listening to the statements by Nigeri a, Jamaica, the European Communities, 
Switzerland, Mauritius, Senegal and Benin, Colombia considers it vitally important to adopt the right 
approach to this subject.  Indeed, your fax of 10 January proposed that this meeting specifically 
discuss paragraph 44 of the Working Framework of July 2004, which refers to the importance of 
long-standing preferences and states that the issue of preference erosion will be addressed during the agricultural negotiations, using paragraph 16 of the Harbinson text as the point of reference.   
2. During the consultations carried out by Harb inson at the time, Colombia posed various 
questions about the text, for example, requesting clarification on the types of scheme held to be 
long-standing;  whether those schemes include trad e or partnership agreemen ts, or just unilateral 
schemes;  which products are classified as being of  vital importance to the countries benefiting from 
preferences;  which countries those are.  The answ ers to these questions would make it possible to 
visualize the scope of the proposed text, as well as to  understand its implicati ons.  We have still not 
received definite answers to these questions. 
3. Recent studies show the importance to developi ng countries of trade preferences granted by 
industrialized countries in a unilateral manner, whic h we believe are the schemes referred to in 
paragraph 16 of the Harbinson text, a nd also analyse their many weaknesses. 
4. Among the undesirable effects of prefer ence schemes, a recent World Bank
2 study refers to 
the following: 
- Under the Doha negotiations, preferences bolster  external support for highly protectionist 
policies in industrialized countries and weaken  proposals that would substantially reduce 
such levels of protection; 
 - preferences can create a high degree of dependence that constrains flexibility and 
diversification and results in high -cost production of preferred products; 
 
- the beneficiaries of trade preferences are not always the poorest producers in developing 
countries.  When income does accrue in devel oping countries, it tends to accrue to the 
owners of the most intensively used factor s.  With agricultural preferences, the main 
beneficiaries are the owners of land.  Preferences could have a strong impact on poverty if the landowners are poor or, when they are not poor, if policies for redistribution are in 
place; 
 - even when preferenc es create substantial transfers for producers in developing countries, 
they may not necessarily stimulate the long-term  growth of exports or reduce poverty, and 
they can lead to a less-diversified export base. 
 
                                                     
 
 2 "The Impact of Agricultural Trade Preferences, Wi th Particular Attention To The Least–Developed 
Countries".  Paul Brenton and Takako Ikezuki.  Taken from the book "Global Agricultural Trade And 
Developing Countries".  World Bank.  Washington, 2004.  TN/AG/R/18 
 Page 9 
 
 
 5. For Colombia the trade preferences unilatera lly granted by developed countries are of 
especial importance, given that some of our main  export products have benefited from those same 
preferences in our main markets, that is to say, the United States and the European Union.  However, 
the discussions taking place within the WTO agri cultural negotiations do not cover preference 
schemes, which will remain in place after this R ound as an exception to the Most Favoured Nation 
principle.  Instead, they deal with preference eros ion, which has its own "demandeurs" and which, in 
turn, must keep to the framework of the Doha  Mandate which seeks substantial improvements in 
market access for all Members. 
6. It is precisely here that we come up agai nst difficulties in accepting paragraph 16 of the 
Harbinson text.  An exception to the Most Fa voured Nation principle should not obstruct tariff 
reduction or elimination at the multilateral le vel, nor can it go against the Doha Mandate. 
7. It is worth noting that paragraph 44 of the Wo rking Framework for 2004 forms part of special 
and differential treatment regarding market access, by which we understand it to be in favour of all 
developing countries and not in favour of developed countries. 
8. Therefore, it is not compatible with the inter ests of a group of countries, including Colombia, 
to have the products linked to preference erosion classi fied as sensitive products in the industrialized 
countries, as they would be subject to a lesser dept h of tariff cuts and to exceptional treatment on 
account of preference erosion, with a proposed appli cation period of twice the normal duration.  If this 
is so, where would the substantial improvement  in market access for these products come in? 
9. It was agreed in Doha that special and di fferential treatment will be operational for all 
developing countries and will take account of thei r development needs, including food security and 
rural development.  We feel, as others have st ated, that herein lie the offensive and defensive 
components of special and differential treatment.  Fo r this reason, its application cannot affect the 
interests of other developing countries, such as the in terest we have called for so many times since the 
outset of these negotiations, namely, securing the fu llest liberalization of trade in tropical products 
and those obtained through the replacement of illic it crops, as recognized in the preamble to the 
Agreement on Agriculture and agreed on by GATT Members prior to the completion of the Uruguay 
Round, in the Mid-Term Review of that Round. 
10. Most agricultural products benefiting from tr ade preferences in developed countries are 
tropical products, that is to say, they are produced in the tropics, as is shown by various studies.  They are in any case tropical products such as cane sugar,  bananas and tobacco, which are undeniably crops 
from tropical regions. 
11. I would point out that, in any case, the po licies applied to these products by some 
industrialized countries will change in the short term due to shortcomings in the WTO dispute 
settlement system, or because of internal reforms.   Changes in the market conditions affecting these 
products seem inevitable and those countries which currently benefit from preferences should already 
prepare themselves for this. 
12. Again, I should add that in the short term  some unilateral preference schemes will also 
develop into trade or partnership agreements.  Beca use of this, the unilateral preference schemes for 
which there is a wish to maintain the margin  of preferences will not exist for much longer. 
13. What is absurd about all this is the fact that  the industrialized countries which have sought to 
make use of paragraph 44 "demandeurs" for their ow n ends, want to continue to protect inefficient 
producers of these products and punish effi cient exporters in developing countries. TN/AG/R/18 
Page 10  
 
 14. A trade solution such as that propo sed in the first part of paragr aph 16 of the Harbinson text is 
not viable, unless those who support it are, in turn , ready to provide financial compensation for all 
those of us affected by it.  We venture to ask, Mr  Chairman, where is the benefit in these negotiations 
for developing countries that are efficient exporters  of tropical products if exceptional tariff reduction 
treatment is agreed for these products? 
15. For all these reasons we do not believe such a discussion can continue to be held within the 
WTO, nor can the question of preference erosion be dealt with in the manner referred to in the first 
part of paragraph 16 of the Harbinson text. 
16. Colombia is in favour of seeking other viable solutions within the framework of development 
programmes for the countries most affected by the inevitable erosion of preferences as a consequence 
of multilateral negotiations.  In this regard, we conc ur with the last sentence of paragraph 16 of the 
Harbinson text, which states that:  "The prefer ence-providing Members shall undertake targeted 
technical assistance programmes and other measures, as appropriate, to support preference-receiving countries in efforts to diversify their economies and exports", an idea which we  hope will continue to 
be developed, with contributi ons from various Governments a nd international organizations. 
17. It should come as no surprise that the European  Communities have allocated billions of euros 
to programmes for productive restructuring in these products.  Indeed, for nearly a decade they have 
been allocating resources to prepare these countries fo r the new market conditions .  This is made clear 
in introductory paragraphs 4 and 9 of Regulation No. 856 of 22 April 1999 of the Council of the 
European Communities and Article 1, which estab lishes a wide-ranging framework of assistance for 
Belize, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire  (Ivory Coast), Dominica,  Grenada, Jamaica, 
Madagascar, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent a nd the Grenadines, Somalia and Suriname.  
18. Actually, many efforts are being made in this  regard that we should highlight, such as: 
- Re-structuring programmes for the sugar and banana sectors in Jamaica, which, as Jamaica 
informed us in its recent Trade Policy Review , anticipate the changes envisaged for the 
external banana market and in the price paid for ACP sugar; 
- the special framework for EC assistance to twelve traditional suppliers of bananas in 
Africa and the Caribbean, which has been in  place since 1999 and which I have already 
referred to.  (The distribution of these resources is based on the difference in their competitiveness vis-à-vis third country suppliers and the importance of the banana sector 
to their economies.  It is only in the last tw o years that this effort has been channelled 
towards diversification and the resources assigned have gone from 46 million euros in 
1999 to 34 million euros in 2004, making a total of 86 million euros for programmes to increase productivity and 107 million euros for diversification programmes); 
- the multilateral strategy adopted to resolve the difficulties of cotton-producing countries, 
which was recently circulated by the WTO Secretariat. 
 
19. Consequently, we must rely on recent studies on th e issue which reveal similar options to be 
taken in the international context.  We are also  awaiting the results of other studies and proposals, 
such as the study recently announced by the Wo rld Bank which will be presented during Geneva 
Week at the beginning of April.  Nevertheless, there must be more consistency in the domestic 
policies of those developing countries affected that  will allow them to c onvert production to other 
sectors with export potential, as well as a commitm ent to adjust, reshape and restructure the 
preference-dependent sectors. 
20. We hope to continue working with you, Mr Ch airman, with the developing countries affected, 
the Governments of the countries committed to a non-trade solution to this problem and those  TN/AG/R/18 
 Page 11 
 
 
 international organizations working to come up with alternative solutions designed to support 
adjustment, sectoral restructuring and export diversification programmes. 
21. Lastly, I should like to point out that in January  of this year seven Heads of State of Latin 
American banana-producing countries issued a Declar ation in Quito, Ecuador, urging that in this 
multilateral round of negotiations, e fforts should be made to fulfil the long-standing commitment to 
seek the fullest liberalization of trade in tropical products. 
 
Tariff Quota Administration (paragraph 35) 
 
General Comments 
22. Allow me to make some general comments on attachment 1 to the Harbinson text on this 
matter, which forms part of annex 1 to document TN /AG/10.  Although we consider this text to be 
useful for the discussion, we also consider that its structure could be improved.   
23. First of all, in yesterday's discussion, several  delegations including Bolivia, Switzerland, 
Brazil and others referred to a set of principles to be taken into account in th e administration of tariffs, 
such as transparency, predictability, non-discriminati on and so forth.  Consequently, we propose the 
insertion of a new paragraph 2, to include the exis ting text of paragraph 2( a), which would cover all 
the principles to be observed in the administrati on of tariff quotas, including as a necessary minimum 
the principle of non-discrimination between suppliers , to which many delegations referred yesterday, 
and which my delegation supports.   
24. Regarding the present text of paragraph 2, some delegations referred to the objective for tariff 
quota administration set out in the chapeau, namely  ensuring opportunities for market access, which 
Colombia supports inasmuch as there have been subs tantial changes since the base period used in the 
Uruguay Round for the establishment of tariff quotas, i.e. 1986-1988, changes in the conditions of 
production and in the markets for products, with mark ed repercussions on countries' imports.  This 
situation also helps to explain the lo w quota fill rates for some products.  
25. Paragraphs 3(a) and 3(b) pa rallel the categories employed in the Agreement on Licensing 
Procedures, namely automatic licences and non-automa tic licences, and we should like to be sure that 
that is the case so as to avoid subsequent problems  in the implementation of the provisions agreed in 
the agricultural negotiations and the existing provisi ons of the Agreement on Licensing Procedures.   
26. We consider that paragraph 3(c)  should be deleted, since count ry-specific allocations require 
licences.  I shall come back to this point.   
27. We also feel that a new subparagraph should be  drafted to deal with quota underfill, and I 
shall also return to this point later.  
Paragraph 2 
28. Not all quota administration methods or additional conditions that yield a low quota fill 
according to the Secretariat document3 appear to be prohibited by paragraph 2.  We propose the 
inclusion of categories such as: 
- The method of licences on demand; 
- the method of allocation to historical importers; 
- the condition of limits on tariff quota shares per allocation; 
- the past trading performance condition;  and 
                                                      
3 TN/AG/S/6. TN/AG/R/18 
Page 12  
 
 - the establishment of end use requirements, regardless of the nature of such use. 
 
29. We are also concerned about quota underfill or  low fill under certain other methods, such as 
the "applied tariffs" and "first-com e, first-served" methods, which should be the subject of more 
detailed study in order to ascertain how these met hods work, which countries exhibit low quota fill, 
which products are concerned, and whether other cond itions are applied that are detrimental to access.  
We reserve the right to return to these methods on another occasion. 
Paragraph 2(b) 
30. Allow me to point out once again that Colombia  has difficulties with this paragraph, which 
prevents the imposition of domestic purchasing re quirements or other measures having the same 
effect.  On this subject I would point out once agai n that the aim of introducing into the Agreement on 
Agriculture tariff quota administration disciplines di fferent from those included in the Agreement on 
Import Licensing Procedures stems from the discussions  held in the Committee on Agriculture since 
1995 following an analysis of Members' notifications  which showed a low rate of quota fill, averaging 
60 per cent between 1995 and 2000.  This gave rise to  the idea of including broader disciplines on the 
subject in the Agreement on Agriculture, with the aim of possibly ensuring that the administration 
methods employed do not restrict quota access and that market access opportu nities are made fully 
and effectively available. 
31. When a condition such as the one relating to a domestic purchasing requirement is applied, 
we note from the data compiled by the Secretariat in document TN/AG/S/6 of 22 March 2002 that it is 
one of the additional conditions which guarantee one of the highest quota fill rates, namely 81 per cent.  We do not agree, therefore, that the app lication of this condition should be prohibited. 
32. Moreover, some Members argue that this cond ition involves one of the measures referred to 
in the illustrative list contained in the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, which were 
subject to a transition period for dismantling that h as already expired.  I would question that assertion, 
Mr Chairman, since a number of both developed and developing country Memb ers have applied these 
conditions since 1995, and there have been no  problems within the Organization regarding 
compliance with the above-mentioned Agreement.  Fo r the sake of transparency  on the subject, I wish 
to report that Colombia made use of the trans ition period and notified dismantling of the measures on 
its expiry. 
33. I would also note that, in any event, and at least  as regards the implementation of this type of 
measure by developing countries, the matter is still under discussion in other bodies within this 
Organization and was the subject of consultatio ns a few days ago, as one of the outstanding 
implementation-related issues cove red by tiret 40 of document JOB(01)/152/Rev.1, an item that was 
put forward by India and Brazil and which reads:  "T iret 40:  Specific provisions shall be included in 
the Agreement to provide developing countries th e necessary flexibility to implement development 
policies (intended to address, among others, social , regional, economic, and technological concerns) 
that may help reduce the disparities they face vis-à-vis  developed countries."  Consequently, inasmuch 
as this is an outstanding implementation-related is sue, we oppose its inclusion in the agricultural 
negotiations and consider, therefore, th at paragraph 2(b) should be deleted. 
Paragraph 2(d) 
34. We request clarification of the wording of the l ast part of the sentence in Spanish, comprising 
the phrase "o que restrinja la importación de tales pr oductos en forma elaborada o para la venta a los 
consumidores finales" ("or which restricts importati on of such products in processed form or for sale 
to final consumers"), since it is not clear whether the reference is to products within the tariff line 
quota concerned or to products within other tariff lines.  TN/AG/R/18 
 Page 13 
 
 
 Paragraph 3(c) 
35. Although this subparagraph ostensibly relates to country shares, it actually deals with under-
utilization.  Bearing in mind that this is a probl em that should be addressed under these disciplines, we 
propose the deletion of subparagraph 3(c) and the addition of a new subparagraph on under-
utilization, which would have to be elaborated at a later stage. 
36. On the subject of country-specific allocation,  a method also defined in terms of export 
certificates, which is another form of licensing requirement, I would refer to what has been stated by various countries, including Colombia, about the principle of non-discrimination which must be 
applied in the area of quota administration.  Country-specific allocation is a blatant form of discrimination, and this type of administratio n should therefore be explicitly prohibited in 
paragraph 2. 
37. In any event, since there would be an increase in  quotas, at least for some sensitive products, 
we consider that any increase in tariff quotas resulting from the current negotiations should be 
allocated on a most-favoured-nation, not a country-speci fic, basis, and this point should be added to 
paragraph 2.  Colombia is interested in continui ng to diversify and increase it s exports and in having 
access to markets where it faces restrictions under this mechanism. 
Paragraph 6 
38. Colombia is unhappy with the second sentence of  this paragraph, given the existence of 
precedents established by certain dispute settlement  cases where it was found that the country-specific 
allocation of tariff quotas for an agricultural product was discriminatory precisely because only 
developing countries were involved.  We theref ore request the deletion of the second sentence of 
paragraph 6, in case any attempt is made to legalize such allocations by this means. 
 
 TN/AG/R/18 
Page 14  
 
 Statement by Cuba
 
 
 
Export Restrictions (Paragraph 50) 
 1. My delegation supports the statement delivered  by the representative of Brazil on behalf of 
the G-20. 
2. Cuba attaches great importance to the negotiati ons on agriculture and in particular to the 
strengthening of disciplines on e xport restrictions and prohibitions. 
3. This is not an issue of concern to Cuba al one since paragraph 50 of Annex A to the July 
Package represents a commitment on the part of all the WTO Members.  It is also important to 
emphasize that this matter should be kept separate from the issue of export taxes, which is addressed 
in paragraph 49 of the Annex. 
4. Cuba is willing to devote considerable atten tion to this matter, so as to ensure that the 
disciplines on export restrictions and prohibitions are strengthened in such a way that the new 
disciplines to be established do not affect food securi ty in net food-importing developing countries. 
5. As Brazil pointed out, an important element in achieving the objective set out in paragraph 50 
is to assure the temporary and non-discriminatory na ture of such measures, which means that the new 
disciplines should be accompanied by a m onitoring and surveillance mechanism. 
6. Additionally, we endorse the exceptions in favour  of the developing countries provided for in 
Article 12.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture , which is not part of these negotiations. 
 
  TN/AG/R/18 
 Page 15 
 
 
 Statement by the G-10  
  Formulae for Reductions in Trade-Distorting Domestic Support 
 1. In spite of the vulnerability of this sector, we  have been reforming our agricultural policies 
substantially for many years to adjust our agri cultures to constantly evolving international and 
domestic circumstances. Our difficult production co nditions require the prov ision of governmental 
domestic support in order to sustain agricultural production.  Domestic support is therefore an 
essential pillar to achieve food security, rural devel opment and other NTCs.  On the other hand, we 
have decided to actively move toward less trad e-distorting domestic support measures, and we 
continue to advance this reform.  This of course provided the Green Box will remain intact as another 
important tool to address NTCs.  We are ready to discuss this issue and othe r pillars constructively, 
provided our NTCs are taken into account.  Th e following are general comments concerning the 
formulae for reductions in trade-distorting domestic support. 
1. Overall reduction / Final bound total AMS 
 Number of bands and thresholds 
 
2. We greatly appreciate the Secretariat's compilation of domestic support based on Members' 
notifications, which will facilitate our negotiations.  To achieve reduc tions with a harmonizing effect, 
the overall base level of all trade-distorting su pport and final bound total AMS will be reduced 
according to a tiered formula.  Based on such a fo rmula, higher levels of permitted trade-distorting 
domestic support will be subject to deeper cuts. 
3. It should be underlined that, it is obvious from the documents prepared by the Secretariat, the 
level of the final total bound AMSs of three Memb ers are far above the average, while the other 
Members' levels are far below that average.  Anot her fact we should pay attention is that the base 
level of all trade-distorting domes tic support mainly consists of fi nal bound total AMS.  The reduction 
commitments of should be discussed further, taking into account of those elements, with appropriate 
S&D treatment whenever it applies.  
4. Although reduction rates within each band will be  decided upon at a later stage, we believe 
that the best way forward would be that the thr ee Members, whose levels of trade-distorting support 
are by far the highest in absolute terms, should commit themselves first to a substantial reduction. 
Base level for reduction 
 
5. The framework states clearly that "final bound to tal AMS will be reduced substantially" and it 
is obvious that the substantial reduction should be  made from the level of final bound total AMS. 
6. This is therefore different from the base period for de minimis  and blue box which still need 
to be defined in order to establish the base le vel of overall reduction.  Once the base period is 
determined, the base level for each Member will be basically fixed, however, with regard to permitted 
de minimis , some adjustment to make it more e quitable among Members may be required. 
7. In order to allocate the base level of each Member to a particular tier, it is necessary to select 
an appropriate reference currency a nd to convert base levels expressed in the original currency to the 
reference currency.  One of the most widely di stributed currencies and the averages of market 
exchange rates over a representative period provided by  a reliable international authority can be used. 
 TN/AG/R/18 
Page 16  
 
 Rate of cut within each band 
 
8. The framework states that Members having higher levels of trade-distorting domestic support 
will make greater reduction.  Consequently, reducti on rates in higher bands should be higher than 
those in lower bands.  Anyway, as mentioned above,  reduction rates within each band will be set at a 
later stage. 
9. It seems that some Members, who have suffered from excessive inflation, have problems to 
keep their total AMS within their bound levels.  The problems should be duly settled because inflation 
has nothing to do with their efforts in agricultural policy reforms.  As already provided for in the 
Agreement on Agriculture, adjustment for inflation w ill be necessary in order to evaluate AMS levels 
appropriately. 
Implementation period 
 
10. It seems only natural that the implementation period be discussed when we have a more 
precise understanding of the tiered formula and the reductio n rates.  We should therefore revert to this 
issues at a later stage, taking into account implem entation periods envisaged in the other pillars.  
Staging of commitment 
 
11. We suggest equal annual installments for both the overall reduction commitment and final 
bound total AMS.  
2. De minimis 
 12. Although many developing countries have no total AMS commitment, de minimis  is still 
essential for them.  When we discuss de minimis  for developing countries, Members should take into 
account the importance of Amber Box support fo r subsistence and resource-poor farmers. 
13. The issues of reduction rates and the implementa tion period should be considered in the same 
manner as overall reduction and final bound total AMS,  taking into account S&D.  It will also be 
appropriate to opt for equal annual installments. 
 
Export Prohibitions and Restrictions 
 
1.Focus of negotiations 
 
14. It is an important matter for the negotiations  to establish strengthened disciplines on export 
prohibitions and restrictions in orde r to continue to ensure food security in importing countries in the 
wake of trade liberalization.  As a matter of fact, trade liberalization completely alters the premises upon which their food security is based.  As we will demonstrate in this statement, it is a matter of 
guaranteed access to resources vs. reduced border prot ection.  In other words, trade liberalization 
without free access to food and feed jeopardizes th e balance of rights and obligations between 
importing and exporting countries. 
15. At the outset, the G10 recalls that all Member s have agreed on the phrase "Disciplines on 
export prohibitions and restrictions in Article 12.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture will be 
strengthened" in the July framework agreement.   TN/AG/R/18 
 Page 17 
 
 
 16. Now, Members should focus on examining what kind of measures are most suitable to ensure 
the food security in importing countries.  It is not productive to continue a th eoretical discussion, let 
alone backtrack to previous negotiating positions. 
2. The proposals to strengthen the disciplines 
 17. Regarding the measures to strengthen the disciplines on export restrictions, Members, 
including the G10, have proposed (1) there shall be  no export restrictions in respect of agricultural 
products (2) all export prohibitions a nd restrictions shall be replaced by export taxes and the latter be 
bound and reduced step by step, (3) prior notifica tion and consultation with other members shall be 
strengthened. 
18. The G10 is of the view that the measures of strengthening disciplines on export prohibitions 
and restrictions should be adequate to ensure the effective food security in importing countries, in line 
with their increasing dependence on food and feed imports. 
3. Examination of each proposal: tariffication of all export restrictions, and phased reduction 
 19. The GATT rules are generally applied both to  importation and exportation in an equal 
manner.  This general principle is laid  down in GATT 1947 Article XI:1, which " does not allow for 
any prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, ta xes or other charges … on the exportation or sale 
for export of any product ".  
20. However, there are several exceptions to this  principle with regard to importation and 
exportation under Article XI:2 (c) and (a) respectively. 
21. As for the exception to this principle with regard to importation  of agricultural products, all 
non-tariff border measures including import quan titative restriction in the context of GATT 
Article XI:2(c) were replaced by tariffs  as a result of Uruguay Round.  Moreover, all tariffs were 
bound and had to be reduced durin g the implementation period.  
22. On the other hand, as for  the exception to this principle with regard to exportation , even 
though some additional disciplines on export quan titative restrictions in the context of GATT 
Article XI:2(a) were included in Article  12 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, these disciplines 
are not as stringent as the tariffication applied to quantitative import restrictions . 
23. Even if the export prohibitions or restrictions that may be instituted by exporting countries are 
temporary measures, they may produce grave ne gative effects on the food  security in importing 
countries.  
24. Therefore, the G10 which are formed mostly by food importing countries, thinks it is of vital 
importance to fully apply the said principle to agricultural exports .  More specifically, export 
prohibitions and restrictions  applied to agricultural products based on GATT Article XI:2(a) should 
be replaced by export taxes, bound in Members' sch edules and made subject to reducing commitments  
under the revised AoA, just like import prohibitions a nd restrictions had to be tariffied and reduced 
under the Uruguay Round commitments. 
25. Concerning developing countries other than net-e xporters of the specific products concerned, 
to avoid overload for them, they shall be allowe d to apply export prohibitions and restrictions 
measures subject to the present WTO rights and obligations.  
26. [The details of this proposal are in documen t number JOB (03) / 41 which Japan proposed.] TN/AG/R/18 
Page 18  
 
 4. Examination of each proposal:  strengthe ning of prior notificat ion and consultation 
 
27. The G10 also have examined another proposal , which strengthen the current disciplines of 
Article 12 AoA, so that modified disciplines can  ensure the effective food security in importing 
countries. 
28. General elimination of quantitative restri ction on importation and exportation under 
Article XI:1 shall be observed by all Members. 
29. However, the exceptional import restrictions  specific to agricultural products under GATT 
Article XI:2(c) ceased to apply  by the provision of Article 4.2 of the AoA, which provides for the 
tariffication of all forms of non-tariff measures as already mentioned. 
30. In contrast, with regard to the exceptional export restrictions  specific to agricultural products 
under GATT Article XI:2 (a), no similar discipline has been adopted, and moreover exporting 
countries can institute export restrictions  under Article 12.1 of the AoA unilaterally without any 
compensation . 
31. We would like to emphasize again our concerns that even if such export prohibitions or 
restrictions are temporary measures, they may prod uce grave negative effects on the food security in 
importing countries.  
32. Therefore, in order to ensure the food security in importing countries and to redress the 
imbalance of rights and obligations  between import and export countri es, G10 would like to offer the 
following proposal. 
a)  We should establish some verification syst ems that can objectively and clearly identify 
that temporary export prohibitions or restrictions meet the justifiable situation, that is, critical 
shortage of foodstuffs or othe r products have occurred as stipulated in GATT Article XI:2(a). 
 
b) We should establish some rules that e ffectively ensure the existing provision 
(Article12.1(a) of the Agreement on Agricultu re) that the Member instituting the export 
prohibition or restriction shall give due consid eration to the effects of such prohibition or 
restriction on importing Member's food security. 
 
In order to fully materialize this rules, befo re the Member institute an export prohibition or 
restriction, it should give notice in writing to  the Committee on Agriculture, and consult, upon 
request, with any other Member having a subs tantial interest as an importing country.  
Effective remedies for importing country should be established in case of failing to reach an 
agreement.  
 
c) In case of adapting this discipline to developing Members, special and differential treatment should be considered. 
 
33. The G10 wishes to focus attention on both pr oposals as a means by which food security in 
importing countries is fully attainab le, through future negotiation. 
5. Request to the WTO secretariat  
 
34. The G10 would like to make a proposal on how to advance a future agreement.  
35. There are few export prohibitions and restricti ons notified to the WTO secretariat, and the 
present situation is that we are aware of only what  was widely published in the press.  In order to  TN/AG/R/18 
 Page 19 
 
 
 secure suitable disciplines about export prohibition and restrictions, the G10 would like to request the 
Secretariat to endeavour to collect the necessary da ta on export prohibitions and restrictions of all 
Members including what is still bei ng continued without notification. 
 
Preferences 
 
36. The G10, cognizant of, and advocating, the n eed for flexibility to adequately address the 
concerns of all and to ensure that less-competitive agriculture has the means to survive, has always 
lent its support to the claim of those countries, for which longstanding preferences are vital.  Indeed, 
the issue of preferences is critical for a vast cons tituency at the WTO.  A ccordingly, the G90 as well 
as the ACP, the LDCs and the African Group, at the highest political level, called for the inclusion of 
provisions relating to longstanding preferences.   
37. In the Framework Agreement, th is coordinated action has resulted in the incorporation of 
para. 44: 
"The importance of long-standing preferences is fu lly recognised.  The issu e of preference erosion 
will be addressed.  For the further consideration in this regard, paragraph 16 and other relevant 
provisions of TN/AG/W/1/Rev.1 will be used as a reference." ,  
as an S&D measure.  38. The export earnings arising from preferential access are very important for these countries 
which for many reasons are severely constrained by the inadequacy of financial and natural resources 
resulting in their vulnerability to internal and external  shocks.  Yet, these countries have to attain their 
development goals which necessarily include non- trade concerns.  Accordingly the agreed 
conclusions of both the 2001 NTC Conference, held in  Mauritius, and the 2002 one  held back to back 
with the Rome Food Summit, referred to the use of  preferential export earnings to address non trade 
concerns, such as food security/procurement, ru ral development, and the preservation of the 
environment. 
39. The attainment of these objectives is essential to  give full effect to the Doha Development 
Agenda. 
40. The G10, as indicated on several instances, firm ly believes that the final outcome of these 
negotiations should, while enabling the reform of ag riculture to continue, ma ke adequate provision for 
the co-existence and sustainability of the different form s of agricultural systems.  It is only then that a 
balanced and equitable outcome would be achieved.  
41. As pointed out so far, the G10 is committed to work with all concerned so that our shared 
target in respect of the Hong Kong Ministerial is met and would in this regard come up with more 
focused inputs when the process moves to rooms D and F. 
 TN/AG/R/18 
Page 20  
 
 Statement by the G- 20
 
  Formulae for Reductions in Trade-Distorting Domestic Support 
 1. Chairman, on the issue of formulae for reducti ons in trade-distorting domestic support, the 
G20 has the following comments to make. 
2. Overall reductions in trade distorting domestic s upport, in all its forms, which amounts to real 
cuts in spending, is a prerequisite to achieve th e level of ambition envisaged by Ministers in Doha, 
and reconfirmed by the Framework Agreement.  
3. This overall reduction must be based on credible in itial numbers and arrive at a final, credible 
outcome in order to ensure real substantial reductions  that will stand technical and political scrutiny.  
Lessons drawn from the Uruguay Round point out th e importance of getting the initial numbers right 
from the outset.  The existing entitlements of the major users of domestic support are so inflated that 
the adjustment measures provided in paragraph 7 of the July Framework require further strengthening.  
There are many technical alternatives to address this question. 
4. The second bullet of paragraph 6 of the Framewor k Agreement makes it explicit that a strong 
element of harmonisation following from the substantial reductions in trade distorting domestic 
support made by developed Members is also an obj ective.  A cut based on a tiered formula, which 
results in those with higher absolute levels making d eeper cuts, will enable us to fulfil the mandate. It 
is recognised by all that the larger the abso lute levels, the greater the distortions caused. 
5. The sum of the cuts in the three components i.e. AMS, Blue Box and de minimis  should be 
such that it will contribute to the attainment of  substantial overall reduction in trade distorting 
domestic support. 
6. With regard to AMS, absolute levels should be used as the basis for the bands, while also 
addressing high levels of relative AMS.  
7. Special and differential treatment will, as envi saged in the framework involve lower reduction 
levels over longer periods of time , and as such the parameters of  the tiers will be determined 
accordingly. 
8. As far as the Blue box is concerned, the G 20 emphasises the importance of continuing the 
discussions on how value of production will be measured and verified and inter alia which would be 
the appropriate base period to use in order to determ ine a credible base level.  The question of S&D in 
respect of this form of trade distorting domestic support remains to be addressed. 
9. The current Blue Box already embodies the problem of inflated entitlements.  This 
underscores the need for improved disciplines and monito ring in order to ensure the mandate is met. 
10. Similarly with de minimis, the levels from which reductions w ill take place also depends on 
the issue of value of agricultural production.  It is further the view of the G20 that de minimis  and 
AMS support represent the same type of trade dist orting domestic support and so the totality of 
reductions of these two types of support should be ta ken in conjunction with each other and should 
not be considered in isolation.  This w ould also avoid any double-counting of AMS and de minimis 
for any given product in a given year.   TN/AG/R/18 
 Page 21 
 
 
 11. In this regard, any reductions in the de minimis of developing countries will need to be 
justified, given the fact that all developing countries allocate almost all their de minimis to subsistence 
and resource poor farmers. 
12. Achieving substantial reductions in trade dist orting domestic support re mains of fundamental 
importance to the G20 and we will actively particip ate in the discussions on all elements closely.  
 
Export Prohibitions and Restrictions (Paragraph 50)  
 
13. Little attention was paid to export prohibiti ons and restrictions during the agricultural 
negotiations of the Uruguay Round.  As a result, e xport prohibitions and restri ctions of Art. XI of 
GATT 94  instituted by some Members were overlooked and to date some Members continue to apply 
them.  
14. Paragraph 1 of Article 12 of the Agreement on Agriculture is limited in this regard, as 
reference is made only to restrictions described in paragraph 2(a) of Article XI of GATT 1994, that is, 
those temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs.  The Agreement on 
Agriculture says nothing about restrictions or prohib itions of art. XI:1 of GATT 94 existing prior to 
the Uruguay Round. 
15. In this connection, we need to recall paragr aph 1 of Article XI of GATT 1994 on the general 
elimination of quantitative restricti ons to exports.  This should form the basis of our approach to the 
development of modalities, guided by paragraph 50 of the July Framework Agreement on Agriculture, 
which states that "Disciplines on export prohibitions a nd restrictions in Article 12.1 of the Agreement 
on Agriculture will be strengthened". 
16. The new disciplines to be agreed on in Art. 12. 1 shall ensure that, in the specific case of 
foodstuffs or animal feed, existing or newly establishe d export prohibitions or restrictions of Art. XI 
of GATT 94 are instituted exclusively to preven t or relieve critical shortages experienced by 
exporting Members.  As provided for in the Ag reement on Agriculture and the GATT 1994, they 
should be applied on a temporary a nd non-discriminatory basis.  Ensuring that the food security needs 
of Members are not compromised, it will be necess ary to further discuss what criteria and/or 
parameters would need to form part of the strengthened disciplines.  
17. Moreover, one way of strengthening the provisi ons in Article 12.1 on export prohibitions and 
restrictions, is to make them more transparent a nd effective.  This will also form part of the 
discussions under paragraph 48 on m onitoring and surveillance.  
18. The G20 believes that it is in the interest of all Members that the disciplines on export 
prohibitions and restrictions of Art. 12.1 are st rengthened, and in that light anticipate future 
discussions on the issue.  
 
Preferences 
 
19. The G20 would like to take this opportunity to make a few general comments on the issue of 
preferences.  The Group notes that long-standing pr eferences have played a role in facilitating 
development in some developing countries, hence we stand ready to work towards addressing adverse 
effects that further commitments in the Market Acce ss pillar could have on these countries.  It is clear 
that the adverse consequences of preference erosion de rives from structural causes, and in order to be 
adequately addressed, a comprehensive approach should be taken.  TN/AG/R/18 
Page 22  
 
 20. Our position, as we have previously stated in  December last year remains that the tariff 
reduction formula is the main component of the Ma rket Access pillar.  Once  the formula and other 
elements of the pillar have been resolved, only then will we be able to assess the magnitude and 
impact of any preference erosion.  
21. As noted in paragraph 44 of the July Fram ework agreement, the approach envisaged in 
paragraph 16 of the Harbinson text (TN/AG/W/1/Rev.1) sets a useful starting point for discussion.  It 
provides ideas as to the sort of data which would need  to be in place to enable us to address the issue 
of preference erosion effectively and expeditiously when establishing the modalities.  We will need to 
define the abstract concepts contained in the text, including numbers or parame ters where applicable.  
This will provide the basis upon which an analytical  impact assessment of the preference erosion 
could be made on the "products which are of vita l export importance to the preference beneficiary 
countries".  
22. It is to be noted that there is little informa tion available at the WTO regarding preferential 
trade.  It is fundamental that Members provide such information so as to enable decision-making on a sound basis.  
23. We note that paragraph 16 recognises that the diversification of developing economies and 
exports is also an element of addressing preference eros ion. In this regard targeted technical assistance 
and other measures aimed at addressing supply- side constraints, including compliance with 
international standards, will play a fundamental role in enabling developing countries, including 
LDCs, to increase their exports.  This cannot be done by the WTO alone, but must form a part of joint 
efforts with other relevant institutions to ensure  the realization of a development gain for those 
countries, who stand to be adversely affected by  the erosion of long-standing preferences.   
24. The G20 reiterates its willingness to co-ope rate and work with all Members towards 
addressing the issue of preference erosion.  
 
  TN/AG/R/18 
 Page 23 
 
 
 Statement by Mauritius  
 
 Tariff Quota Administration 
 
1. Para. 2(f) of Attachment I of Rev 1 on TRQ Administration 
(i) Para. 2(f) has to be read in the light of what  has been agreed in the FA, in particular 
para. 35 which contains some key words " balanced result ", "flexibility ", "DCs", 
"existing " and " fully benefit "; 
(ii) there seems to be a consensus on a cut off approach which would call for different 
treatment for existing and new quotas; 
(iii) the G10 proposal is a reasonable solution to this complex issue. 
 
2. Para. 6 of Attachment I of Rev 1 on TRQ Administration  
(i) Para. 6 is the most effective instrument to give meaningful effect to the S&D 
embodied in para. 35 and accordingly, pa ra. 6 should be viewed from the post 
Framework perspective; 
 
(ii) We have taken good note of the points ma de by Colombia, Bolivia and Paraguay for 
a share for new suppliers and have equally ta ken note of the issue of distant suppliers; 
 
(iii) para. 14(a) of TN/AG/10 contains a proposal  to reserve a part of TRQs, or their 
expansion, for small (commodity) supplie rs; this was a proposal of the African 
Group; 
 
(iv) para. 6 is an important issue for many sma ll DCs to enable them to fully enjoy the 
opportunities offered under TRQs; 
 
(v) the intent is to give effect to para. 35 and not to deny access to other DCs nor to 
impair their existing benefits; 
 
(vi) as pointed out by Guyana, para. 6 is also one of the elements to enable the 
implementation of para. 44
 of the FA; 
 
(vii) would para. 6 be useful in case of a compromise on para. 45 of the FA? 
  
Export Credits 
 3. Export Credits and the S&D dimension  
 Para 8 of Chair's text and its surrounding issues 
 
(i) the mandate for para. 24 of Annex A of th e FA is to be found in para. 4 of the 
Marrakesh Decision which calls for S&D provi sions in the formulation of disciplines 
on export credits;  
 (ii) there should be S&D provisions for reproductiv e and breeding material;  as they will 
improve production capacity; 
 TN/AG/R/18 
Page 24  
 
 (iii) in S&D provisions, the actual cost of the cred it is critical and in working out the best 
mix for this purpose, due regard should be  had to currency fluctuation risks which 
generally play against DCs;  
 (iv) the scope of products to be covered has to be defined,  Annex 3 of TN/AG/10 did refer 
to basic foodstuffs, this could be a good basis for work; 
 (v) the derogation of para. 8 with respect to paras. 4, 5 and 6 should be spelt out; 
 
(vi) the monitoring and notification requireme nts of para. 24 of Annex A of the FA are 
more stringent than for any other para. of  Annex A of the FA, this, it is believed, 
should allay the fears of those who fear the circumvention of rules once they are 
established, including with the S&D provisions; 
 
(vii) the principles enunciated in paras. 22 and 23 of Annex A of the FA should be used to 
work out the S&D implementation details; 
 
(viii) the demarcation line between paras. 18 and 24 of Annex A of the FA has to be 
determined; 
 
(ix) where does the ambit of para. 24 of Annex A of the FA end and where does that of 
para. 26 start; what happens in case of a de fault by a DC, which para. applies 24 or 
26; 
 
(x) there could be a confusion between the use of the term " special  circumstances " in 
para. 9 of the Chair's text and the title of para. 26 of Annex A of the FA;  although the 
text of para. 26 uses the term " exceptional circumstances " for avoidance of doubt this 
possible confusion has to be cleared;  
 (xi) the 180 day issue can be tackled in two ways: 
 
(a) extend it to take into account the constraints of NFIDCs/LDCs;  or 
 
(b) keep the 180 day limit but offer a pack age which effectively reduces the cost 
of food. 
 
(xii) currently, NFIDCs/LDCs account for only 2% of export credits and even with an 
increased percentage would not to any rec koning have any distortive effect;  and 
 
(xiii) the issue of export credits has to be viewed in the context of a: 
 
(a) holistic approach on food security:  food aid, export credits, STEs, importing 
and exporting, SP/SSM, food procuremen t capacity through export earnings, 
food production; 
 
(b) balancing act to mitigate losses incu rred by NFIDCs/LDCs in the reform 
process. 
 4. Para. 4(a) of Chair's Text 
 
The date of arrival could better address the constraints of NFIDCs/LDCs. 
  TN/AG/R/18 
 Page 25 
 
 
 Ad valorem  Equivalents 
 
5. AVEs 
(i) In a critical path approach, comfort to all is equally critical and in particular in respect 
of those making the most significant commitments; 
 
(ii) the concessions secured in, and paid for, regarding the UR should be carefully 
considered and should not be unwound when  dealing with TRQs and preferential 
trade in these negotiations; 
 
(iii) the difficulties of small countries to grapple with fairly complex issues have to be 
reckoned. 
 
Preferences 
 
6. Para. 44 
(i) The political ownership of the process led to the conclusion of the FA.  Similarly the 
ownership of the outcome of the negotiations would lead to their success and 
acceptability.  Para. 44 was an essential el ement which led to the acceptance of the 
FA by the G90; 
 (ii) Preferences represent a minimal amount of world trade, yet they are critical for many 
vulnerable developing countries; 
 (iii) The issue of preferences was intimately  linked to other elements of the Market 
Access pillar, in particular: Sensitiv e Products, TRQs, AVEs, SSG and tariff 
reduction formula; 
 
(iv) Para. 16 of the Harbinson had some shortcomings which should be addressed, for 
instance, the " total merchandise exports " referred to therein, might not be an 
appropriate benchmark for comparing the re lative importance of preferences in the 
economies of preference beneficiaries. In this regard other parameters, such as " net 
export earnings " or the " status as Single Commodity Exporters ", determined by FAO, 
could be useful. 
 (v) Preferences was an essential element of " balance for small developing countries " 
 
(vi) it was noted that para. 44 of the FA, was agreed by all WTO Members, including 
Costa Rica.  This para. makes no reference to the terms "conditions to be agreed" - 
therefore Costa Rica's comments thereon was besides the point;  
(vii) the reliability and credibility of World Bank Studies are more and more being 
questioned; 
 
(viii) the forceful interventions of C. Rica and ors on the high level of efficiency of their 
agriculture call for a simple conclu sion, these countries do not need S&D; 
 (ix) Mauritius had a very constructive attitude  when the issue of tropical products, was 
discussed in the CR and made several suggesti ons to facilitate technical work and it is 
regretted that several concerned countries are not reciprocating with a similar spirit; 
 TN/AG/R/18 
Page 26  
 
 (x) the importance of bananas for C. Rica a nd ors is acknowledged a nd the point made by 
Colombia that seven Heads of State attended a meeting on this issue is noted, in the 
case of preferences the issue was discussed  at the Head of State Summits of the 
constituent elements of the G90. 
 
  TN/AG/R/18 
 Page 27 
 
 
 Statement by the Philippines  
 
 
Ad valorem  Equivalents 
 1. Mr. Chairman, just as the tariff reduction formula is the base for the mark et access pillar, the 
methodology for the conversion of non-ad valorem  tariffs is core to the airworthiness or viability of 
any formula.  The relative precision of this conversion methodology is important not only to 
developing countries but to all members that have  used the more transparent and predictable ad 
valorem  regime in being assured that others are similarly on the same level of transparent 
comparability when the agreed tariff reduction formula is applied.  In addition, the importance of the 
process is underscored by the fact that flexibilit y has already been granted to sensitive products 
subject to fair compensation.  
2. The fairness of the compensation is tied to the fairness of the conversion process.  Mindful of 
the impossibility of absolute precision in estimati ng AVEs, the Philippines is nevertheless seriously 
concerned about any methodology that allows sy stematic underestimation even as we recognize 
equally serious concerns by relevant parties about  overestimation.  We need not repeat here the 
sequential consequences of underestimation; suffice it to say that meaningful operationalization of 
core concepts in Doha and the framework that are first order c onditions for developing countries, 
indeed the reform program that is addressed by these negotiations, such as the very purpose of the 
tiered approach, the developmental dimensions of  increased access to developed country markets, 
progressivity and proportionality are in serious risk of being perverted.  
3. Having said this, we feel that the Chairman's draft text offers a good start in unlocking and 
solving the technical complexities in the right direction.  We recognize, however, that certain elements of the text would still have to be addressed  to avoid possible loopholes.  The Philippines will 
come back to those items as we examine the draft in detail.  
4. One last but equally important point, Mr. Chai rman.  We recognize the urgency of pushing 
the pace to resolve the issue of AVE s, so that we can tackle the equally important next steps to 
develop the tiers & the formulae.  Considering the universal importance of AVEs to all members, full 
transparency and inclusiveness must not be casualtie s in any contemplated fast-tracking of both the 
Geneva and select political processes.  We cannot, at this crucial stage of the negotiations, afford asymmetries in information and participation.  
5. Mr. Chairman, it is important that we have proper resolution of these issues as these are basic 
to fulfilling the principles agreed in the framework  and objectives laid down in the Doha mandate.  TN/AG/R/18 
Page 28  
 
 Statement by Senegal on behalf of the Group of Least Developed Countries
 
 
 
Preferences 
 1. Tariff preferences are of vital importance to the LDCs.  An estimated 75 per cent of non-oil 
exports from the LDCs towards the developed countries enter entirely duty free.
4  It is therefore 
important that the negotiations on agriculture shoul d deal adequately with the issue of preference 
erosion, which represents a real threat to LDC exports. 
2. The fact that the Doha Development Agenda has made improvement of market access for the 
LDCs one of the major challenges facing Members in  their effort to boost LDC participation in world 
trade makes it all the more important that the issue of preference erosion should be properly 
addressed.  In that respect, the marginalization of LDCs  is a serious problem, and one that will have to 
be resolved if trade is to contribute to poverty reduction in the countries concerned. 
3. The LDC Group does not think that trade liberalizat ion will automatically be beneficial to all 
Members.  As a rule, it is the countries with str ong, competitive and efficient economic structures that 
are in a position to seize the opportunities offered by th e general opening up of markets.  Similarly, it 
is the countries with sufficient financial resources that  are in a position to finance the reforms that are 
needed to adjust their economie s to changes in their environment.  On the other hand, the 
vulnerability of the LDCs will clearly be a factor  in the serious difficulties they will inevitably 
encounter when their export markets en ter the accelerated competition phase. 
4. This is why the July Framework Package has included preference erosion among the subjects 
to be addressed by accepting the Harbinson text5 as a reference for further work.  The text is a 
working basis, and as such, it should in no way prev ent Members from seeking solutions that are more 
suited to the development needs of the LDCs.  Ac cordingly, the LDC Group would like to highlight 
the following elements which it considers essential to  the appropriate treatment of their preferences: 
5. Any approach to the treatment of  preferences must be part of  a more general endeavour to 
improve market access for the LDCs.  It is theref ore more imperative than ever in addressing this 
question that we accept the idea of duty-free and quot a-free market access for all products originating 
in the LDCs.  This question remains highly topical , since it would be pointless to wait until markets 
have been opened up to other Members before ach ieving that objective.  All of the developed 
countries must undertake to grant full duty-free and quota-free market access to LDC products.  
Furthermore, the advanced developing countries, whose markets are dynamic, are urged to grant 
preferences to the LDCs to enable them to divers ify their outlets and to reduce their dependence on 
traditional markets that are constantly opening up to ever tighter competition.   
6. It is also essential that the preferences gr anted to the LDCs should be bound in order to 
provide the necessary predictability, which will constitute an incentive for investment in the LDCs.  
Indeed, this is an important stability factor that c ould help to encourage investment, including foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in the export sectors of t hose countries.  At the same time, if such a measure 
is to effectively improve market access for the LDCs, it must be taken as rapidly as possible, no later than the beginning of the implementation of the negotiation results. 
7. While not opposing liberalization, we consider that the existence of a preference for LDCs 
should be an essential component, among others, in an y mechanism aimed at solving the problem of 
preferences.  It follows that whenever preferen ce erosion threatens to cause serious prejudice to an 
                                                     
 
4 WT/COMTD/LDC/W/35 
5 TN/AG/W/1/Rev.1  TN/AG/R/18 
 Page 29 
 
 
 LDC, the priority in addressing the issue should be  to preserve the margin of preference before 
envisaging any other solution.  For example, the situation of LDCs that depend on a very small 
number of export products needs to be carefully considered in this respect. 
8. In any case, a technical and financial assist ance mechanism will be established at the 
multilateral level to help with the adjustment of secto rs affected by preference erosion and to promote 
LDC exports.  It is extremely urgent that Members commit themselves to concre te and targeted efforts 
with respect to non-tariff barriers affecting LDC products that benefit from preferences, in the 
framework of a comprehensive approach aimed at improving LDC market access. 
9. The LDC Group is convinced that all Members ar e aware of the importance of preferences in 
trade with LDCs.  The LDCs are prepared to see k workable solutions in response to the Group's 
legitimate concerns. 
 
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