WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  WT/TPR/M/176 
28 March 2007 
 (07-0921) 
Trade Policy Review Body 
12 and 14 February 2007  
 
 
TRADE POLICY REVIEW 
 
ARGENTINA 
 
Minutes of Meeting  
 
Chairperson:  H.E. Mrs. Claudia Uribe (Colombia)  
 
 
  Page 
 
I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON 3 
II. OPENING STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA 4 
III. STATEMENT BY THE DISCUSSANT 7 
IV. STATEMENTS BY MEMBERS 10 V. REPLIES BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA AND 
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS 25 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON 34
 
 
 
Note:   Advance written questions by WTO Memb ers and the replies provided by Argentina are 
reproduced in document WT/TPR/M/../A dd.1 and will be available online at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tr atop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm. WT/TPR/M/176 
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I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON 
1. The third Trade Policy Review of Argentina was held on 12 and 14 February 2007.  The 
Chairperson, H.E. Mrs. Claudia Uribe (Colombia), welcomed the delegation of Argentina, headed by 
H.E. Ambassador Néstor Stancanelli, National Direct or of International Economic Negotiations at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affaires, International Trade and Worship, as well as H.E. Ambassador Alberto 
Dumont, Permanent Representative of Argentina to  the WTO, and the discussant H.E. Ambassador 
Bruce Gosper (Australia).  As usual, the discu ssant would speak in his personal capacity and, in 
accordance with established procedures, had made ava ilable in advance a broad outline of the themes 
he intended to raise (document WT/TPR/D/152). 
2. The Chairperson recalled the purpose of the Trad e Policy Reviews and the main elements of 
the procedures of the meeting.  The Report by Argentina was contained in document WT/TPR/G/176 
and that of the Secretariat in document WT/TPR/S/176.  As indicated in document WT/TPR/6/Rev.1, 
the Member under review should provide written answers,  by the beginning of the review meeting, to 
questions submitted at least two weeks before the m eeting.  Questions posed subsequently should be 
answered, to the extent possible, be fore the start of the second session of the meeting.  Questions left 
unanswered at the end of the second session should be  answered in writing no later than one month 
after the meeting.  Questions by the following dele gations had been submitted in writing at least two 
weeks in advance of the meeting and had been tran smitted to the delegation of Argentina:  Mexico;  
Japan;  Canada;  Australia;  Chile;  Switzerland;   China;  Peru;  Colombia;  the European 
Communities;  the United States;  and Costa Rica.  Copies of these questions and of the answers provided by the delegation of Argentina were availa ble in the meeting room.  Korea;  Singapore;  
Brazil;  Pakistan;  Hong Kong, China;  Turkey;  South Africa;  Bolivia;  and Chinese Taipei had 
submitted written questions after the two-week deadlin e.  Copies of all advance questions, as well as 
the responses received from the delegation of  Argentina, were reproduced in document 
WT/TPR/176/Add.1.   
3. The Chairperson congratulated Argentina for its  remarkable economic recovery from its most 
severe crisis in recent years.  She noted that the Government had made strong efforts to strengthen the 
external sector as a long-term development instrument, while maintaining the conditions for macroeconomic stability.  It was encouraging that the Argentinean Government had reaffirmed its 
engagement with the multilateral system, committing to make efforts towards achieving open and fair 
world trade.  Argentina could benefit consider able from a positive outcome of the DDA, and she 
trusted that Argentina would continue  to work actively to this end. WT/TPR/M/176 
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II. OPENING STATEMENT BY THE RE PRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA 
4. The representative of Argentina
 stated that his country had undergone a profound economic 
and social crisis through 2001-02, characterized by  many as the worst in Argentina's history.  The 
policies followed during the 1990s had led to this cris is.  First was the policy of pegging the exchange 
rate to the U.S. dollar at a rate of one-to-one  in a period when the U.S. currency appreciated 
substantially against other currencies.  Also, policies that had led to an increasing fiscal deficit, among 
which the privatization of the pension system, which had left the State without the workers' contributions.  In this context, he noted that an  economic policy that did not  benefit the population had 
no sense.  This was confirmed by statement in th e preamble to the WTO and the GATT, which noted 
that the purpose multilateral system was to foster an  improvement in living standards, employment, as 
well as the expansion of global demand.  The comp osition of Argentina's delegation to the meeting 
was evidence of this belief. 
5. The privatization of the pension system had led to an increasing deficit in fiscal accounts, 
while the appreciation of the exchange rate had gi ven rise to a significant deficit in the balance of 
payments;  there had been parallel fiscal and bala nce of payments deficits and the country had not 
been able to generate adequate external savings.  The fixed exchange rate, appreciating currency, and 
high interest rate triggered by the perceived count ry risk, had encouraged speculative capital inflows, 
leading to the subsequent outflows of the benefits obtained;  this had worsened the external deficit.  In 
addition, the international situation was complicat ed, as witnessed by crises in Latin America Latina 
in 1995, in South-East Asia in 1997, and in Russia in 1998.  Lower international prices for 
commodities and a lack of exchange rate adju stment on the part of MERCOSUR countries had 
aggravated this situation.  Public debt had conti nued to rise, and in 1999 the Government had had to 
resort to large tax increases, which had led to  an economic recession and the 2001-02 economic and 
social crisis.  The situation had become unsustain able.  Argentina had lost access to international 
credit, capital had fled from the banking system, and a serious economic crisis had emerged, resulting 
in a 27% decline of GDP between 1998 and 2002.  For Argentina this had been much more serious 
than the 1930s crisis. 
6. The current Government had changed the ec onomic policy stance drastically, relying on a 
floating exchange rate regime that, through a chang es in relative prices, had stimulated agricultural 
production and exports;  this had tr iggered growth in related activiti es.  Resuming growth had allowed 
an improvement of the fiscal balance, mainly th rough an increase in income, and had resulted in a 
fiscal surplus.  At the same time, the change in re lative prices had been instrumental in achieving and 
maintaining trade and balance-of-payments surpluses.  Another important aspect of the plan had been 
the renegotiation of public debt.  Also, money demand had been stimulated within a policy of 
monetary prudence, to prevent price increase repercussions.  An important feature of the programme had been the priority placed on social inclusion pol icies.  The increase in employment generated by 
the recovery had been accompanied by plans to fu rther reduce unemployment.  All these policies had 
been implemented within a context of an open trad e policy.  Argentina, despite the crisis, had not 
made recourse to balance-of-payments measures;  its bound tariff rates had been maintained, in a 
context of general openness to international trad e, prioritizing the multilateral trading system's 
objectives and disciplines, and the process of integration within South America. 
7. The Argentine economy had grown by almost 40% between 2002 and 2006, at an average 
annual rate of 9%.  There had been a significant in crease in investment and exports;  the latter had 
practically doubled in four years.  The share of investment in GDP had reached some 23%.  
Manufactured goods, both agricultural and indust rial, had become Argentina's main exports.  
Industrial production had increased by 68% between  2002 and 2006.  Construction had been one of 
the most dynamic activities;  in agriculture, th e increase in grain production, from 70 million to 
94 million tonnes in 2006, w as particularly striking.  WT/TPR/M/176 
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8. The fiscal surplus had reached 3.5% of GDP, and the financial surplus, after debt payments, 
was around 1.5%.  Economic growth had led to a substantial reduction in unemployment:  the 
estimate for the last quarter was 9.6%, down from 22% during the crisis.  However, despite the dramatic economic improvement, there were still su bstantial problems to solve, particularly dealing 
with social inclusion.  In the second half of 2002,  58% of the population had been living in poverty, 
while 28% were living in extreme poverty.  Although these percentages had dropped to 29% and 
11%, respectively, in the second half of 2006, they re mained considerably high compared with those 
of the 1970s and 1980s and with the Government's goals.  The Gini coefficient measuring income 
distribution had improved, but very slowly;  it was under 50%, but still far from the 35% that had 
characterized Argentina previously.  Some trade po licy instruments had played a very important role 
in poverty alleviation and unemployment reduction.  Sometimes, these instruments, export taxes, 
which were also used by developed countries, were  not fully understood.  Argentina's exports were 
highly concentrated on natural or agricultural r esources, which were also important staples for 
domestic consumption, such as meat, diary products, flours, cereals, and oils.  Export taxes served the 
purpose of assigning to the Government part of the re nts generated by the change in relative prices;  
they also lowered domestic consumption prices, hen ce favouring those living in poverty.  It would be 
very difficult and costly to implement social incomes programmes that were as effective as export 
taxes in achieving these social goals while also generating fiscal revenue source to meet debt 
payments.  Argentina would not have a sustaina ble budget without this policy tool, which also 
allowed it to honour its debt and favour the more needy sectors of its population.  Export taxes were 
an important policy tool in Argentina's economic and social programme.  They also provided an 
answer to tariff escalation, enabling the developmen t of value-added-generating activities, so as to 
avoid limiting the country to a role of mere exporter of commodities.  
9. The fiscal surplus had exceeded 3% of GDP in the past consecutive four years.  The share 
of public debt in GDP had fallen from 134% to 66% .  The exchange rate had stabilized at around 
Arg$3 per US$, and international reserves had incr eased;  this was insuranc e for future external 
debt payments.  There had been a decline in r eserves in January 2006, due to Argentina's payment 
of its entire debt to the IMF;  afterwards r eserves had continued to increase and were currently 
at US$33 billion.   
10. The trade balance had reached almost US$12 billion in 2006, as a result of a strong increase 
in merchandise exports, to US$46.5 billion, and reco rd imports of almost US$35 billion.  The overall 
balance-of-payments surplus had been in the US $6-7 billion range.  This was an indication of 
Argentina's increasing participation in internati onal trade, especially on the import side, with 
Argentina's imports increasing much more rapidly than world imports.  Exports of manufactured 
industrial or agricultural goods accounted for practically  two thirds of merchandise;  a third in each 
case.  Capital goods and inputs were the main impor t items, but imports of consumer goods had been 
growing swiftly.   
11. Although MERCOSUR was a priority in Argentina's foreign trade policy, and trade with 
MERCOSUR countries had been increasing substantiall y, trade with the rest of South America, 
NAFTA members, the EU and China had also incr eased and become more diversified.  Services 
exports and imports had also increased to the poi nt that the deficit in the services balance had 
practically disappeared;  exports of professiona l services had been particularly dynamic.   
12. Argentina considered it important to continue with its policy of fiscal discipline, and posting 
surpluses in both fiscal and external accounts.  It in tended to continue to comply adequately with its 
debt obligations, so as to enhance confidence in to its future, keeping the open markets that 
characterized MERCOSUR, and implementing trade po licies based on economic policy pillars such as 
a floating exchange rate,  fiscal discipline and surpluses, a prudent monetary stance, and open 
markets, granting priority to the multilateral tradi ng system.  Argentina hoped that the DDA would be 
concluded satisfactorily and, to this end, would collaborate with the Chairman of the TNC and the 
WTO's Director General.   WT/TPR/M/176 
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13. Regional economic integration had a key ro le in Argentina's economic policy and 
MERCOSUR was central in this process.  Argentina wi shed to see this integration extended to other 
countries in Latina America:  it was a platform to in ternational trade in the spirit of the GATT, where 
these agreements were first regarded as an ex ception within the multilateral system, and then 
considered as a means for developing countries to increase their efficiency, acquire larger economies 
of scale, and contribute positively to international tr ade.  Argentina was worried by the proliferation 
of bilateral agreements, which could lead to discrimin ation instead of a process of integration.  It was 
important  to achieve market diversification in the negotiations.   
14. Argentina's economic policy was also geared towards developing sm all and medium-sized 
enterprises, fostering institutional development and training, and promoting regional development.  
Argentina was also attempting to achieved an active presence in commercial missions abroad, and 
international fairs.  In this respect, the Cabinet, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs led frequent 
missions abroad with the participation of small and medium-size enterprises.   
15. These economic and trade policies could only succeed  if they took place in a sustainable and 
cooperative international scenario where nations bri dged their differences, reinforced the multilateral 
trading system, respected its objectives, norms, and disciplines, and tried to reach a successful 
conclusion of the DDA.  Members had to make an e ffort to open markets to  trade, especially in 
sectors where there had been discrimination, wh ile maintaining the balance required to allow 
developing countries to carry forward their industrial  policies.  This conjunc tion of healthy domestic 
policies and a favourable international scenario was fundamental for the success of Argentina's 
economic and trade policy plan, and to achieve social  inclusion, which was one of its main objectives.  WT/TPR/M/176 
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III. STATEMENT BY THE DISCUSSANT 
16. The discussant  H.E. Mr. Bruce Gosper noted that, sin ce its last review in 1999, Argentina had 
suffered a devastating economic crisis and recession,  from which it had now largely recovered.  The 
crisis and recovery had been accompanied by drama tic changes in policy, and some of the measures 
adopted by Argentina had been unorthodox.  Howe ver, he would focus on Argentina's current 
economic situation and its economic and trade polic ies in terms of their suitability to sustain 
continued growth and improved pr osperity into the future.  
17. Argentina was to be congratulated for the rec overy that it had staged, and for the associated 
declines in unemployment and poverty.  Over the pe riod 1999-02, Argentina's GDP had contracted by 
some 20%;  it had recorded annual growth rates of 8% to 9% in each of the last four years.  
Unemployment, having reached a peak of over 20% , had fallen to 10.4% by the second quarter of 
2006, and the participation rate con tinued rising.  In 2002,  poverty levels had reached a peak of 57.5% 
of the population, and extreme poverty 27.5%;  by  mid 2006 the poverty level had fallen to 31.4%, 
while the proportion of those in extreme poverty had declined to 11.2%.  Though still high, this was a 
remarkable turn-around in a short period of time.   
18. As a matter of policy, Argentina had maintain ed twin fiscal and external account surpluses 
through the recovery.  Fiscal accounts had been in surp lus since 2003.  This had been, in part, a result 
of measures the authorities had identified as temporary,  such as a major increase in the use of export 
taxes.  Argentina had faced a challenge in main taining its fiscal surplus while shifting revenue 
collection onto a more permanent footing.  This challenge would be greater if rising domestic or 
international interest rates also led to an increas e in interest payments.  Argentina had also been 
posting large surpluses in its current account balan ce since 2002, mainly as a result of lower external 
debt payments, growing exports and, initially, lower im ports.  Since the fall in the value of the peso in 
2002, Argentina had maintained a low exchange rate  in the face of sustained intervention by the 
central bank.  This had required continued sterili zation of the resultant increase in the money supply, 
through placement of central bank bills, although the effectiveness of such me asures seemed likely to 
decline, putting upward pressure on inflation.   
19. Controlling inflation was clearly one of the G overnment's main macroeconomic concerns.  
Inflation had risen to 12.3% in 2005, but in 200 6 it had been contained at around 10%, including 
through modest adjustments in the monetary stance and a range of administrative measures, namely the use of price agreements with industry and re tail groups, the freezing of prices for certain utilities 
and services, and taxation and other restrictions on exports.  Continued reliance on administrative 
measures to control inflation, while providing  temporary relief, risked building imbalances, 
exacerbating capacity constraints, and undermining the investment climate.  The risk of a resurgence 
of inflation remained if these administrative measur es broke down or if the eventual realignment in 
relative prices did not go smoothly.   
20. Argentina's unorthodox mix of measures had, arguably, underpinned its remarkable economic 
recovery.  The challenge was now to move from po licies geared to bringing about a rapid economic 
recovery to policies that would sustain economic and social development for the long term, without 
inflation breaking out.   
21. Argentina was an original member of the WTO,  and had been an active participant in the 
multilateral trading system, including successive r ounds of multilateral trade negotiations under the 
GATT.  In the Uruguay Round, Argentina had bound its entire tariff in ad valorem  terms with a 
maximum tariff of 35%, for both agriculture and non-agricultural goods.  Argentina’s average MFN 
tariff was just 10.4%, having fallen by just over thre e percentage points since its last Review.  This 
was set against its WTO bound average of 30.7%.  The overall picture hid some fluctuations, 
including temporary tariff increases up to bound ceilings that had been imposed during 2001-03.  Argentina applied MERCOSUR's Common External Tariff, although with some exceptions.  Noting WT/TPR/M/176 
Page 8  
 
that 2008 appeared to be the final year for these ex ceptions to end, he invited Argentina to clarify 
whether this was fixed, or whether the possibility  of future exceptions remained.  Given that 
MERCOSUR members maintained their separate WTO bound schedules, the implementation of 
market access outcomes from the Doha Round seeme d to raise further questions of tariff policy 
coordination.  
22. The Secretariat’s Report had raised a number of  questions regarding Argentina’s application 
of other duties and charges, and internal taxes on im ports.  He invited Argentina to clarify some of 
these aspects, particularly the steps it had taken to modify its regime following the findings by a WTO 
Panel in 2002.  With respect to the comprehensive system of import licensing, involving both automatic and non-automatic licences, he was in terested to know the reasons for maintaining 
automatic licensing requirements, in particular, on su ch a wide range of products, covering at least 
52 HS chapters according to the Secretariat’s report. 
23. As part of its response to the crisis, Argentin a had substantially increased its use of export 
taxes since 2002, with primary products generally  subject to higher rates than more processed 
products.  While these changes had been introduced  as temporary measures, export taxes now made 
up around 10% of domestic tax reve nue, and no end date had been announced.  This was a complex 
topic, involving domestic revenue co llection and consumer prices, but also possible distortion of price 
signals for domestic producers, as well as impacts on in ternational trade.  It would be appropriate for 
Argentina to provide further clarification as to both its broad policy with regard to the use of export 
taxes and its specific future plans for the current arrangements.   
24. Investment in Argentina was open, with some ex ceptions.  Foreign investors had, in principle, 
the right to repatriate their investment and profits ;  this was, however, currently subject to prior 
approval requirements.  In addition, inward capital fl ows associated with direct investments could be 
required to lodge 30% deposits.  These measures instituted as a result of the crisis, seemed to discourage needed investment, and might need to be reviewed. 
25. The TRIPS Agreement had entered into eff ect for Argentina on 1 January 2000, and 
Argentina's legislation had been examined by the TRIPS Council in November 2001.  Among issues 
on which Argentina could further update Members was its regime for the protection of test data for 
pharmaceutical products, and furthe r details on implementation and enforcement would be useful. 
26. Argentina had a strong comparative advantage in agriculture, especially in cereals and 
livestock.  Agricultural products had represented about 48% of Argentine exports in 2005, and 
agriculture (excluding food processing) had made up 9.2% of GDP.  Argentina was one of the world’s 
top five producers of beef and of soybeans;  beef was one of the staples of Argentina’s diet and 
economy.  In 2002, beef along with other commod ities had been made subject to export taxes, 
currently set at 15%;  it had also been made subj ect to export restrictions in 2006.  This raised 
questions as to Argentina’s future plans for this sector.  
27. Notwithstanding Argentina’s strengths in ag riculture, the manufacturing sector had also 
performed very strongly in the period under review .  Its share of GDP had increased to 23.3% in 
2005, reflecting both enhanced competitiveness follo wing the devaluation of the peso in 2002, and 
strong domestic demand.  In 2006, industrial manu factures had been Argent ina’s fastest growing 
export sector, and the fastest growing product categor y within this had been vehicles and transport 
equipment.  In the past decade the automotive indus try, in particular, had successfully moved away 
from its previous inward-orientation;  some 55% of production was exported, with Brazil and Mexico 
being the largest markets.  This had been accompanie d by an expansion of exports in auto parts and 
components.  In addition to advantages gained from a low peso, the manufacturing sector benefited 
from horizontal fiscal incentive schemes and special  customs zones.  Special support schemes were 
applied for the automotive industry, while the bi lateral auto agreement with Brazil contained a 
provision that included trade-balancing requirements.  WT/TPR/M/176 
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28. The oil, natural gas, and electricity sectors were all important for Argentina’s continued 
growth and development.  Argentina was the f ourth-largest crude petroleum producer in Latin 
America, and possesses the third-largest natural gas reserves.  Argentina had, however, faced growing 
imbalances in these markets:  export taxes, domestic  price controls, and regulatory uncertainty had all 
contributed to a lack of investment in recent year s.  He was interested to know how Argentina would 
ensure that the new investment needed in the sector was forthcom ing, and cushion the impact of 
domestic consumer price increases. 
29. Argentina had undertaken specific commitments in  6 of the 12 service sectors specified in the 
GATS.  In the framework of the DDA, Argentina had presented an in itial offer in services in April 
2003.  Since November 2000 all telecommunications services had been provided under a regime of 
full competition.  Nevertheless, fixed telephony c ontinued to be dominated by the two "historical 
operators", for which tariffs had been frozen in 2 002.  As at mid 2006, certain tariff adjustments had 
been allowed, but the ratification of new contract s was still pending.  The financial sector had been 
deeply affected by the crisis, and the measures adopted  by the authorities to deal  with it.  Current bank 
transactions were subject to a special tax.  In insurance, companies had been posting losses for most 
of the past 10 years.  There were no restrictions  to the entry of new financial entities, but foreign 
insurance companies were granted national treatment  based on the principle of reciprocity, and prior 
authorization was required.   
30. Argentina’s success in recovering from the 19 99-02 crisis spoke more strongly than any 
doctrine about the policies that it had adopted.  The immensity of the challenge it had faced should be 
recognized and Argentina was to be congratulated  on its achievements.  The great challenge for 
Argentina was how to move to policies that ensu red not only sustained its recovery but moved it 
beyond that, to fulfil its potential.  Clearly, the international economic environment would play an 
important part in sustaining Argentina’s conti nued growth:  bringing the Doha Round to a successful 
conclusion would be of considerable  benefit for Argentina.  Argentina had been an active contributor 
in the Doha Round, pushing particularly for amb itious outcomes in the agriculture negotiations.  
Given, however, Argentina’s strong recent performan ce as a growing exporter of manufactured 
products, it would equally benefit from a comparably ambitious outcome in NAMA and other areas of 
the negotiations.   WT/TPR/M/176 
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IV. STATEMENTS BY MEMBERS 
31. Members welcomed the delegation of Argentina, led by H.E. Ambassador Nestor Stancanelli.  
They commended Argentina for its economic recove ry since the 2001-02 crisis, and for its active 
participation in the WTO and contribution to  the DDA negotiations.  Members congratulated 
Ambassador Uribe for her performance as Chair of the TPR Body in the previous year. 
32. The representative of Mexico
 noted that his country and Argentina had strong ties and a long 
history of bilateral contact.  Their relationship ha d been strengthened with the signing, within LAIA, 
of an Economic Cooperation Agreement (ACE 6), in  force since 1993, and had been substantially 
improved by the signature of a much more ambitious  agreement in June 2006.  Likewise, Argentina 
and Mexico shared an agreement on automotive products as container in the Second Additional 
Protocol to Appendix I of the MERCOSUR-Mexico Agreement.  Currently, Mexico was the fifth 
importer of Argentinean products after Brazil, the EU , the United States, and China.  Bilateral trade 
between had exceeded US$1.7 billion in 2005, and had reached over US$1.6 billion between January 
and August 2006.  Trade comprised mainly high-value-added products such as cell phones, computers, automobiles, chemicals, pipes and tubes.  
33. Investment had also played an important role in bilateral relations.  As at September 2005, 
accumulated Argentine investment in Mexico totalled US$ 54.9 million, some 4.5% of total investment form Latin America and the Caribbean .  Meanwhile, as at January 2006, Mexico's 
accumulated investment in Argentina totalled US$1.87 billion, or 7.8% of all Mexican investment in 
Latin America and the Caribbean;  Argentina was the sixth recipient of Mexican investment.  
34. The economic and trade measures adopted by the Argentine Government following the 
financial crisis, had allowed Ar gentina to overcome the worst crisis in its history, reduce 
unemployment to 11.4%;  the percentage of peopl e living below the poverty line was half of its 2002 
level.   
35. Mexico was concerned by Argentina's use of hor izontal investment incentive schemes;  their 
compatibility with WTO rules was not clear.  Mexico  also asked for clarification on:  the law on 
supply, and whether it represented a market access obstacle;  whether there were any pending plans 
for services liberalization;  and a more detailed e xplanation of the operation of industrial promotion 
regimes in Argentina.  Mexico also  requested a list of goods that were not granted national treatment.  
With respect to the additional charges on imports , Mexico asked about the measures adopted to 
comply with the decision adopted in the WTO.  
36. The representative of Brazil
 congratulated Argentina for its process of economic recovery.  
Since its last Trade Policy Review, Argentina had gone through the most serious crisis in its history.  
Crises were, however, also opportunities for change.  The economic recovery had translated into an 
annual average growth rate of 9%, soci al advances, and employment growth.  
37. Brazil and Argentina had been strategic partne rs in the construction of MERCOSUR, which 
was created out of the belief that countries like th em needed to cooperate to face a globalization 
process that was asymmetric from economic, political, and social perspectives.  Substantial progress 
had been achieved in the integration process:  in  2006, internal MERCOSUR trade had totalled over 
US$30 billion.  Brazil was the main recipient of Ar gentina's industrial manufactured exports, due to 
integration in the production chain in sectors such as  for example automotive products and chemicals;  
it was one of the main destinations chosen by sma ll and medium size enterprises for their first-time 
exports.  
38. Likewise, Brazilian exports to Argentina had gr own at an impressive annual average rate of 
52.4% since 2003.  This was a clear sign of Argentina's economic recovery.    WT/TPR/M/176 
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39. MERCOSUR had also shown impor tant advancements recently in the financial area through 
the creation of the Structural Convergence Fund.  This was a sign that Brazil and Argentina were 
engaged in a balanced relationshi p with all MERCOSUR members.  However, there were a number of 
challenges to be met to complement economic gr owth policies with policies to foster equality, 
sustained improvement in living st andards, and poverty reduction.  
40. Brazil noted with satisfaction the conviction of  the Argentine authorities that the Doha Round 
was a unique opportunity to strengthen the multilatera l trading system and show that it could benefit 
all nations.  A priority was to make progress in reducing domestic support policies and subsidies, as 
applied by the larger economies, since these distorted production and trade for agricultural products.  
41. In paragraphs 41 to 50 of the Government re port, Argentina had underlined the importance of 
the agriculture sector to overcome the crisis and foster growth.  Paragraph 41 had made reference to 
the importance of Government action to ensure that positive developments in the sector translated into 
socially sustainable growth, while paragraph 42 ha d emphasized the need fo r measures that allowed 
growth to translate into higher economic and social welfare.  Brazil asked Ar gentina to elaborate on 
these assertions and to offer more information rega rding these measures.  Similarly, paragraphs 144 
and 145 of Argentina's Report dealt with support to  small and medium-sized enterprises and presented 
a list of support mechanisms.  Brazil asked for more details on these mechanisms and initiatives.  
42. The representative of Canada  stated that Argentina and Canada  were continuing to strengthen 
their economic and commercial relati ons.  Bilateral trade had grown quickly over the past few years, 
reaching roughly US$517 million in 2005.  Canada's cumulative direct investment in Argentina had 
also increased, totalling US$4 billion at the end of 2005, making Canada one of the most important 
foreign investors in Argentina.  The growing trade relationship increased appreciation for the 
importance of agreements that created a more stab le commercial environment.  As such, Canada was 
pleased to have signed a bilateral Foreign Investment  Protection Agreement (FIPA) with Argentina in 
1991 and a Double Taxation Agreement (DTA) in 1993.   Canada commended Argentina for its strong 
participation in many internati onal and regional forums, and recognized the work accomplished as the 
two countries had collaborated in areas of shared interest.  Within the Cairns Group, their long-
standing relationship demonstrated their commitment to the principles of free and open trade, as they 
had worked to eliminate trade barriers and subsid ies affecting agricultural and food products.  A 
recent case regarding GMO market access into the EC, provided another example of successful efforts 
within the WTO.  Canada looked forward to Argentina's support and collaboration on similar 
endeavours in the future.  
43. Canada commended the Government of Argentina for its efforts in maintaining a liberal and 
transparent trade regime, which would allow it to  more fully enjoy the benefits of increased 
international trade.  In this light, Canada noted Argentina's efforts to simplify customs procedures 
since its last Review.  However, Argentina's tariff s were still high and relatively complex, and Canada 
would welcome further work in this area.  In add ition export taxes had a deterrent effect in attracting 
greater investment.  
44. Argentina's improved economic performan ce since 2001 and its accomplishments in 
renegotiating its public debt and paying back the IM F were notable.  However, Argentina still had a 
number of hurdles to overcome, such as strong inflat ionary pressures domestically, and the settlement 
of outstanding Paris Club debt.  Therefore, Canada encouraged the Government to continue its efforts 
to improve conditions for economic growth.  
45. Argentina's investment regime was open, and fo reign investment received national treatment.  
However, investor confidence could be further increased.  Predictability in sectoral policies and 
observance of contractual commitments and interna tional investment obligations, would also help 
improve investor confidence.  WT/TPR/M/176 
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46. As highly trade-dependent economies, Canada and Argentina benefited from a strong rules-
based multilateral trading system.  Canada looked fo rward to working with Ar gentina in regional and 
international trade policy institutions, as they  further expanded their trade relationship. 
47. The representative of Australia
 noted that bilateral relations with Argentina were based on 
many shared interests and similar perspectives.  They were both large Sout hern Hemisphere nations 
with relatively small populations and strong resource bases.  As founding members of the Cairns 
Group, Argentina and Australia shared a long-stand ing commitment to the comprehensive reform of 
global agricultural trade.  As wine producing nations , Australia and Argentina also worked together, 
through the World Wine Trade Group, to advance fa vourable international trade conditions for wine.  
While total two-way trade was only around A$400 m illion in 2005-06 there was scope to expand, 
particularly in mining and agri-business.  Argentine technology was also enjoying success in 
Australia, evidenced by the successf ul bid by an Argentine company to design, build and commission 
the replacement of Australia's only nuclear reactor at Lucas Heights in Sydney.  The new reactor was 
expected to open in April 2007.   
48. There had been very significant economic devel opments in Argentina since its last Trade 
Policy Review in 1999.  Between 2000 and 2002 the economy had suffered a profound economic 
crisis, with a significant contraction in GDP and ri se in unemployment, and concomitant increase in 
the proportion of the population liv ing in poverty.  Argentina was to be commended for its success in 
overcoming this economic crisis, with GDP now well above pre-crisis levels and significant 
improvements in social indicators.  
49. This successful recovery had involved some me asures taken to handle a crisis situation.  
However, as Argentina's economy moved onto a sounde r footing, policy settings would need to be 
reconsidered.  For example, price controls, export ta xes, and export restrictions might be re-visited as 
policies were developed to encourage future investme nt and to provide the basis for sustained growth 
and development.  
50. Australia and Argentina had a sh ared interest in a strong and open multilateral trading system.  
Australia agreed with Argentina that ambitious resu lts on agriculture were central to the achievement 
of the goals of this Round.  Australia also cons idered that comparably ambitious outcomes in other 
areas leading to the expansion of international tr ade had an important contribution to make to the 
achievement of the development agenda.  Accordingly,  Australia joined others in welcoming the full 
resumption of negotiations in the Doha Round.  
51. The representative of Chile commended Argentina for the measures adopted to restore growth 
and improve social conditions.  The economic recove ry had also helped to enhance bilateral trade 
between the two countries.  Argentina was Chiles's f ourth largest trading partner.  In 2006, bilateral 
trade had reached US$5 billion, of which almost US$4.3 billion were Argentine exports.  Argentina 
was the main source of imports for Chile, and the trading partner with which Chile had the largest 
trade deficit.  This would not be a problem provide d the relationship was fluid and predictable.  For 
Chile, imports and even a bilateral trade deficit were an indication of  economic vitality.  Chile was the 
third most important market for Argentina's exports. 
52. Some 40% of total Chilean investment abroad went to Argentina;  accumulated investment 
totalled US$14 billion in December 2006.  Argentina and Chile share similar views with respect to the 
multilateral trading system, especially on agricultur al liberalization, as reflected in their joint 
participation in the G-20 and the Cairns Group 
53. Chile was concerned, however, about three sets of measures applied by Argentina, for which 
compatibility with WTO rules was questionable:  diffe rential export taxes;  the economic equivalent 
to price fixing for corn, wheat, sunflower and soy;   and the subsidies granted to these same products 
and, recently, to some dairy products.  These meas ures had been constantly modified, undermining  WT/TPR/M/176 
 Page 13 
 
 
the predictability of the business environment, a nd had been complemented by measures that had 
harmful effects on Chile.  These questionable measures,  particularly the subsidies granted to dairy 
products, had led to statements by Argentine ac ademics and entrepreneurs that such measures 
undermined Argentina's position in the multilateral syst em, in particular with respect to the reduction 
of domestic support and the elimin ation of export subsidies.  
54. Chile would follow closely the evolution of these measures and hoped that the clarification 
provided by Argentina during this Review and furthe r analysis by Argentina, would allow a definitive 
end to their detrimental effect on Chile.  
55. The representative of Switzerland noted his country's close ties with Argentina.  Argentina 
was Switzerland's third most important trading partner in Latin America.  A protocol to their bilateral 
double taxation agreement had been signed in 2006.  Several Swiss firms had been active for many 
years in key sectors of the Argentine economy, such  as food, pharmaceuticals, and machines.  Swiss 
direct investment in Argentina amounted to over SFr1.5 billion.  
56. Switzerland commended the Argentine Government  for the fast recovery from the severe 
financial, economic, and social cris is of 2001-02.  The subsequent strong devaluation of the peso, the 
macroeconomic adjustment programme, and domestic  and export demand had le d to annual growth 
rates of 8% and more.  The recovery had been st rengthened by strong surpluses on the trade, current 
account, and budget fronts.  Poverty and unemploymen t rates, which had skyrocketed as a result of 
the economic crisis, had been brought down.  The ex ternal financial situa tion had improved with a 
settlement of three quarters of public debt and full reimbursement of the IMF debt.  Important tasks 
remained, however, to put the economy back on a su stainable growth path.  Inflationary pressures had 
to be addressed with appropriate market instruments;   prices, in the energy sector in particular, should 
ensure sufficient return for new investments to be undertaken;  a nd bottlenecks had to be urgently 
addressed.  On the fiscal side, the reliance on e xport taxes for revenues should be progressively 
diminished.  As to investment, significant effort s should be made to settle outstanding claims by 
foreign investors.  Argentina also had to regain full access to the international financial markets with 
the settlement of its debt with the Paris Club as well  as the remaining private creditors.  This was all 
the more important since Argentina faced a very heavy debt burden for the future.  
57. Between 1998 and 2005, the share of trade in GD P had increased by almost 20%, to 43%.  
Switzerland noted with interest the significant ro le of MERCOSUR for manufactured exports owing 
to regional production chains.  In addition, a broa d network of economic complementary agreements 
with other South American countries and Mexico would introduce progressively free trade during the 
coming years, and strengthen regional trade.  Switzerla nd also noted the diversification of trade, with 
a significant increase with the rest of the world, in  particular China, which had become Argentina's 
most important partner in Asia.  
58. Argentina was active in the WTO and, like Sw itzerland, had a strong interest in a rapid 
resumption of the Doha negotiations.  The latest c ontacts at Ministerial level had shown that a positive 
outcome was possible provided expectations of all pa rties could be brought to a realistic level.  
Switzerland looked forward to working with Argent ina and other countries toward the conclusion of 
the Round, and invited Argentina to join the Plur ilateral Agreement on Gove rnment Procurement in 
order to improve market access opportun ities for Argentine and Swiss firms. 
59. The representative of China  noted that, having overcome one of  the worst financial crises in 
its modern history, Argentina's economy had grow n at a fast pace since 2003, with average annual 
GDP growth of more than 9%.  This demonstr ated the success of Arge ntina’s macroeconomic 
adjustment and development of a sound financial system.  China commended Argentina for its highly 
transparent and liberal trading regime, and for the reorientation of its trade with countries outside 
MERCOSUR, which was a striking feature in its recent development of foreign trade.  WT/TPR/M/176 
Page 14  
 
60. Argentina was China’s fourth largest trading pa rtner in Latin America, and China had become 
Argentina’s largest export market in Asia.  China was very satisfied with the development of the 
bilateral trade, which had reached over US$5 billion in 2006.  Furthermore, China and Argentina had 
developed cooperation in many fiel ds, including processing, maritime transport, resource exploration, 
and contracting services.  China was convinced that wider and more comprehensive economic 
cooperation would be beneficial to both sides. 
61. China very much appreciated Argentina's st rong commitment to the Doha Round and the 
multilateral trading system.  China commended Argentin a for its great contribution in the negotiations 
on agriculture for elimination of export subsidi es and substantial reducti on of domestic support.  
Argentina’s strong support for development dimens ion of the Round was also greatly appreciated.  
China would work closely with Argentina for its success.   
62. The representative of Colombia
 congratulated Argentina on its recovery from the serious 
economic crisis, which had put institu tional continuity at risk.  Despite the sustained growth over the 
past four years, GDP and income per capita had not yet reached, in current dollar terms, the peak 
observed in 1998.  Colombia was pleased that current  economic policies had been directed to tackle 
poverty, which had translated in an increase in em ployment, real wage recovery, and a reduction of 
poverty and extreme poverty.  All this had helped  to restore confidence in public institutions.  
63. Since 2002 and the devaluation of the peso, all e xports had been subject to export taxes.  The 
justification for the use of this instrument was a deterioration in fiscal revenue and the need to 
smoothen the effect of exchange rate fluctuations on domestic pri ces.  Although export taxes were a 
legitimate measure, Colombia suggested that it was not the most appropriate to achieve the policy 
objectives mentioned, and that it created barriers to tr ade.  It was, however, heartening, to learn that, 
despite the use of export taxes, Argentine expor ts had posted a healthy increase during the period 
under review. 
64. Imports had contracted sharply in 2002, from an annual average of US$25 billion in 1998-01, 
to US$8.4 billion.  As mentioned by Argentina in its report, starting 1998 there had been a 
deceleration in the liberalization process, which had le d to a dramatic decrease in Argentina's share of 
world trade.  Import patterns seemed to be corre lated with the use of different trade restrictive 
measures, such as anti-dumping and safeguard measures, minimum specific import duties, the temporary increase of the CET, an increase, in 2001, of tariffs on numerous  consumption goods, the 
use of phytosanitary measures.  Argentina's trade balance had posted an increasing surplus since 2000.  
Apparently, this had soothed private sector pressure, and allowed some of the restrictive measures, to 
be dismantled.   
65. Colombia had posted systematically a trade defic it with Argentina.  The ratio of Argentina's 
exports to Colombia to Colombia's exports to Argen tina was 8 to 1.  This imbalance had been partly 
caused by the trade restrictive measures still maintain ed by Argentina, including:  (a) regulations on 
the sale of foreign pharmaceutical products that l acked clarity and transparency.  Notwithstanding 
Colombia's laboratories compliance with WHO good pr actice rules, the discretionary use of these 
regulations made access to the Argentine market almost impossible;  (b) import duties on sugar imports calculated as the difference between the histor ical international price and their last quotation 
in the London Stock market on the day prior to emba rkation, seemed to be equivalent to a variable 
levy and to present the same lack of predictab ility as the Band Price System, which Argentina had 
recently challenged with success;  (c) Colombia had also  been affected by the use of criterion values.  
As a result of this practice, various products of Colombian origin could no longer be exported to 
Argentina; among them, artificial acrylic teeth, wh ich were well accepted in the Argentine market for 
their quality and price. 
66. Colombia hoped that putting in practice th e recently concluded FTA between MERCOSUR 
and the Andean Community would help to narrow th e trade gap by dismantling the restrictive trade  WT/TPR/M/176 
 Page 15 
 
 
measures mentioned.  Colombia congratulated Arge ntina for the resumption of growth and for posting 
a high trade balance. 
67. The representative of the European Communities  noted that Argentina had great economic 
and trade potential, that it supported fully the multil ateral system, and, as a consequence, its trade 
policies and practices had a great impact on other Members.  The EC and Argentina maintained close 
trade relations;  the EC was Argentina's second largest  trading partner and the main destination for its 
exports.  In 2005, exports to the EC had increased by 13%, while imports had grown by 15%.  The EC 
was also the largest investor in Argentina.  Bilateral trade relations took place under the WTO 
framework.  In parallel, the two parties maintain ed a regular dialogue on economic and commercial 
topics through the Framework Agreement between the European Communities and Argentina.  
The EC was also looking forward to the successful  conclusion of the negotiation of a balanced 
interregional association agreement with MERCOSUR.   
68. The EC congratulated Argentina for its swift ec onomic recovery.  The EC urged Argentina to 
continue the process of establishing the necessar y conditions for long-term sustainable growth, 
favouring social inclusion.  The adoption of reforms and the existence of a stable and transparent legal 
framework would enhance competitiveness and foster investment, both key elements of sustainable 
economic growth.  
69. The EC was a clear example that the st rengthening of long-te rm regional economic 
integration could help achieve a more stable macro economic environment.  In this respect, the EC 
encouraged Argentina to advance in  the process of consolidating MERCOSUR, to be able to take full 
advantage of the opportunities that trade and economi c integration offered, including a clear boost for 
economic and social development.  Economic pr ogress should be within the reach of the whole 
population:  it was important to achieve a correct  balance between economic growth, and social 
development, while respecting the environment and ensuring the conditions for sustainable growth  
For that reason, the EC applauded the general objec tives of Argentina's trade policy:  the welfare of 
the population, economic growth, and full employm ent.  Argentina was promoting an economic 
growth model based in the creation and quality of  employment.  The EC also commended Argentina 
on its efforts to eradicate poverty and encouraged it to  continue advancing in this direction.  The EC 
noted the section in Argentina's report linking tr ade policy and the labour market and encouraged 
Argentina to move forward in this area a nd share with others the results obtained. 
70. Resolution No. 11/2002 had introduced the gene ral but temporary use of export taxes, 
adopted as a key element of the price control policy, to protect domestic production prices from 
exchange rate and world price fluctuations.  However, export taxes had been maintained, and 
modified, for the past five years.  Key export products such as soy, meat, leather and petroleum, had been subjected to price control, which prev ented the proper functioning of supply and demand 
mechanisms.  Delinking domestic prices from those in  international markets, added to the quantitative 
restrictions to which some products had been subj ect to, discouraged production destined for export, 
damaging considerably the country's export potential a nd its trade relations with other countries.  The 
EC was also concerned about the foreseeable supply shortage in international markets of Argentine 
products subject to export taxes.  Industries dependi ng mainly on these products could be affected.  
The EC urged Argentina to reformulate this price po licy and to reconsider the need to maintain the 
temporary measures taken following the economic recessi on.  Export restrictions should be eliminated 
progressively to make trade flows more transparent and predictable.  
71. The EC recognized Argentina's efforts to transpo se international rules into its IPR legislation, 
and urged Argentina to continue to enforce protec tion.  There was a lack of adequate protection 
for some products, such as agri-chemicals, toys , pharmaceuticals, and textiles.  Similarly, 
EC geographical indications were frequently used in a fraudulent way.  The EC therefore requested 
Argentina to improve control and provide further protection for IPRs.  The appropriate WT/TPR/M/176 
Page 16  
 
implementation of legislation in place was very important for the EC;  the EC offered to help and 
cooperate with the Argentine authorities to achieve this. 
72. The services sector had been very dynamic in the pa st few years;  this had been reinforced by 
liberalization in the sector.  The EC encouraged Ar gentina to continue promoting the service sector, 
since it had a great potential.  Argentina had a competitive service sector, that could benefit 
considerably from further opening to external market s.  Promoting direct foreign investment was key 
to the development of the service  sector and of exports;  in th is respect an appropriate legal 
framework was of the utmost impor tance.  The EC encouraged Arge ntina to take this into account 
when liberalizing services in MERCOSUR, or in international negotiations.  
73. Argentina had taken a prominent role in th e WTO, as an emerging economy with great 
trading potential.  In the last few years Argentin a had developed and broade ned its export base, and 
had increased the share of exports of manufactures.  This had been clearly supported by Argentina's 
participation in the multilateral trading system.  Th e EC encouraged Argentina to continue supporting 
the WTO system, from which it could continue to benefit in its process of economic and trade 
development.  For this reason, Argentina had a gr eat responsibility in contributing to the progress of 
the Doha negotiations.  It was necessary for all Me mbers to show a positive and constructive stance to 
overcome the issues in which positions diverged mo st significantly, for example market access for 
non-agricultural goods. The EC would continue to wo rk and cooperate with Argentina, so as to 
overcome obstacles and to narrow positions, cont ributing the a successful conclusion of the DDA 
negotiations.  
74. The representative of the United States
 stated that bilateral trade relations with Argentina had 
grown significantly in the past several years.  U.S. imports from Argentina had increased by 166% 
since the end of the Uruguay Round, and by 21% from 2004 to 2005.  U.S. exports to Argentina had 
increased by 23% in 2005.  Trade in services had al so continued to grow, with two-way trade at 
US$2.6 billion in 2005.  The United States acknowle dged Argentina’s impressive economic growth 
following the devastating 2002 crisis.  The annual gr owth rates exceeding 9% in 2004-06 had been 
fuelled by strong domestic demand, particularly i nvestment, as well as an international environment 
that favoured export growth, particularly in commodities.  
75. Some of Argentina's policy measures, however coul d threaten the sustainability of its growth.  
Argentina had imposed export tariffs on almost a ll exported products, including significant tariffs 
on key hydrocarbon and agricultural commodity export s, in order to generate revenue and increase 
domestic supplies of these commodities to constrain domestic price increases.  These export 
tariffs discouraged the flow of Argentine products into the world market, constraining economic 
growth.  These levies also had negative effects on  Argentina’s trade partners.  Therefore, the 
United States urged Argentina to eliminate this trade-distorting export tariff structure, including on 
wheat derivatives and the soybean complex. 
76. The United States shared Argentina’s interest in establishing a viable biofuels programme.  
Noting that both biodiesel and ethanol had a 5% g overnment mandate by 2010, the United States 
encouraged Argentina to carry out this mandate incl uding the promotional tax benefits, subsidies, and 
quotas covered under new legislati on in a WTO-consistent manner. 
77. The United States appreciated Argentina's contri bution to the Doha negotiations to develop 
effective disciplines on subsidies that contributed to  overcapacity and overfishing.  Argentina was to 
be particularly commended for its proposal to complement a broad-based prohibition on fisheries 
subsidies with an effective provision for special a nd differential treatment for developing countries.  
The United States looked forward to continued collabor ation with Argentina on this issue and in other 
areas of the negotiations towards the successful conclusion of the Doha  Development Round.   WT/TPR/M/176 
 Page 17 
 
 
78. The representative of Costa Rica  congratulated Argentina for its economic recovery;  she 
welcomed its economic progress as well as the succe ssful results on poverty alleviation achieved as a 
result of the outstanding growth since 2003.  
79. Argentina was an important trading partner fo r Costa Rica.  Argentina and Costa Rica also 
shared a great ambition with respect to the result of the Doha Round on agriculture.  As members of 
the Cairns Group, Argentina and Costa Rica shared the struggle for agricultural reform;  Costa Rica 
appreciated Argentina's valuable contributions on these issues.  She referred to two of Costa Rica's 
written questions to Argentina, regarding SPS and TBT issues.   
80. The representative of the Republic of Korea  noted that Argentina was one of Korea’s main 
trading partners in Latin America.  Bilateral trade volume had increased steadily over the years, to 
reach over US$800 million in 2006.  Korea welcomed  Argentina's remarkable economic recovery and 
its continued economic growth since 2001.  Korea commended the Argentine government for 
engineering its strong macroeconomic performance ove r the years.  Korea encouraged Argentina to 
continue its on-going structural reform programme and to implement further trade liberalization 
measures to sustain rapid growth in the long te rm, and thereby raise living standards and reduce 
poverty.  In particular, Korea encouraged the Govern ment to take policy measures to enhance investor 
confidence and attract the new investment essential for sustained growth.  This could be done by 
broadening and deepening WTO commitments in th e context of the current DDA negotiations.  
81. For this review, Korea had submitted a number of questions related to Argentina’s trade 
policy measures. In particular, Korea wished to register its concern about the frequent use of 
antidumping measures by the Argentine govern ment.  Between 1998 and mid 2005 Argentina had 
initiated the fourth largest number of anti-dumping cases per year among all WTO Members.  Korea 
urged Argentina to use this remedy as carefully and as sparingly as possible so as to enhance the 
predictability and the transparency of its trade syst em.  Korea also hoped to continue to work with 
Argentina in the DDA negotiations toward the clar ification and improvement of the WTO rules. 
82. The representative of Singapore  stated that Argentina had undertaken a wide range of far-
reaching policy measures in turning its economy around.  A combination of these, including the 
adoption of a flexible exchange rate system , had yielded positive results.  During 2003-06, 
Argentina’s economy had grown at a remarkable annua l rate of 9%.  Growth had been driven by 
significant increases in exports and investment.  Priv ate investment had surpassed its pre-crisis levels, 
while exports had doubled.  Nonetheless, like many  developing countries, Argentina faced numerous 
challenges.  Inflationary pressure remained a key challenge.  Argentina’s good economic track record 
in the last four years served to underscore the Government’s continued de termination to pursue 
difficult but effective reforms to create economic stability.  With international trade contributing 
about 40% of its GDP in 2005, trade was obviously vital to Argentina’s economy.   
83. Argentina’s trade policy regime had been commenda ble.  First, Argentina had bound its entire 
tariff in the WTO.  Like many other developing co untries, there was room for further improvements, 
particularly given the sizeable gap between its  average bound tariff of 30.7% and average applied 
tariff of 10.4%.  Moreover, there were signs of tariff escalation in the tariff regime:  the average applied MFN tariff on fully processed products and semi-processed products were 11.8% and 9.5% 
respectively;  whereas, the rate for unprocessed products was 6.6%.  Singapore hoped that tariff 
escalation and the wide gap between bound and applie d rates would be reduced.  This would bring 
about benefits for consumers and businesses, and boost investor confidence.  Second, like many other 
developing countries, Argentina's services sector played  a significant role in the economy;  in 2005, it 
had accounted for about 55% of GDP.  The importance of services to Argentina was also seen in its 
active role in the DDA negotiations:  Argentina had so  far adopted commitments in 6 of the 12 sectors 
in the GATS.  Singapore looked forward, to Argentin a's submission of a revised offer in the context 
of the current negotiations. WT/TPR/M/176 
Page 18  
 
84. Argentina had always been deeply committed to  the multilateral trading system and a very 
active negotiating partner in the current negotia tions.  Singapore was committed to working with 
Argentina and the WTO membership in bringing  the Doha Round to a successful conclusion.   
85. The representative of Japan
 highlighted the bilateral rela tionship between Argentina and 
Japan.  In order to further promote the economic relationship in both regions, Japan had announced in 
2004 "A Vision for a New Japan - Latin America Pa rtnership".  This policy package addressed the 
importance of the DDA as a means of enhancing the multilateral trading system and of aiming towards prosperity in the international community.  In this context, Japan has provided technical 
assistance to support sustainable economic development in Argentina.  
86. Japan appreciated the recent improvements in Argentina's economic environment, such as the 
fast growth rate of real GDP, although some issu es, like the increase in the consumer price index and 
public and private debt remained unsolved.  Japan al so appreciated Argentina's active participation in 
the multilateral trade negotiating rounds  since acceding to GATT in 1967.  
87. Japan noted Argentina's effort to facilitate laws and regulations for the protection of 
intellectual property rights, but sought clarification with respect to the possibility of initiating 
ex officio investigations in cases of copyright in fringement.  In particular, Japan wondered whether 
ex officio investigations and prosecution could be in itiated without a request by the right-holder.   
88. The representative of Pakistan
 noted that, since its previous Review in 1999, Argentina's 
economy had passed through a turbulent period and suffe red a serious jolt in 2002.  However, for the 
last four years Argentina had had uninterrupted expo rt-led growth.  This recovery had been far more 
robust than anticipated.  Argentina had been able to deepen structural reforms, particularly in trade 
liberalization and openness.  The tariff reforms and treatment of non-tariff barriers had been given 
strong impetus by regional and multilateral negotia tions and commitments.  The average MFN tariff 
had been reduced from 13.8% in 1998 to 10.4% in 2006, but about 26% of tariff lines still had 
international tariff peaks.  Tourism had been boom ing, with a record 3.7 million foreign tourists 
visiting in 2005.  The economic expansion was creating jobs, and unemployment had dropped from 
20.4% in the first quarter of 2003 to 10.4% in the second quarter of 2006.  Investment in real terms 
had jumped 22.7% in 2005.  
89. Pakistan and Argentina had close friendly rela tions, though their bilateral trade volume was 
limited.  One of the reasons for this low level were  high tariffs and other impediments to Pakistan's 
exports in Argentina.  The textile and clothing sect or, which constituted 75% of Pakistan's export to 
Argentina, was highly protected and subject to strict import rules:  a very strict certificate of origin 
was required for these items, and imports were put through customs 'red procedure' clearance, where 
both products and documents were inspected.  Pakistan's textiles exports also faced high tariffs, of 
35% in some cases, while rates for some competitors  were much more favourable, even at zero rates 
of duty.  Pakistan's surgical and manicure inst ruments were also subject ed to high duties, and 
Pakistani-produced shoes were restrained by high ta riff walls.  Pakistan urged Argentina to look into 
these impediments and initiate softening-up measures accordingly.  To overcome these difficulties, 
Pakistan was engaged in bilatera l negotiations with Argentina and a plurilateral dialogue with 
MERCOSUR for a mutually beneficial preferential trad e solution.  In July 2006, Pakistan had signed 
a Framework Agreement on Trade with MERCOSUR.   The two sides were now engaged in the 
process of negotiations to conclude a Preferential Trade Agreement which could lead to a FTA.  In 
addition, a leading Argentine company had recently entered into a joint venture for the production of 
pharmaceuticals in Pakistan. 
90. Pakistan and Argentina were also trying to promote south-south trade through the UNCTAD 
GSTP mechanism.  On the DDA front, Argentina' s strong push for the removal of agricultural 
distortions and the opening of markets was well-appr eciated by its colleagues in the G20, the Cairns 
Group, and a large number of other deve loped as well as developing countries.   WT/TPR/M/176 
 Page 19 
 
 
91. The representative of Hong Kong, China  noted the very good trade relations between 
Argentina and Hong Kong, China.  Bilateral trad e had grown by 18% in 2005;  Hong Kong, China 
hoped that this trend would contin ued.  Hong Kong, China congratulated Argentina for its persistent 
efforts in liberalizing its trade regime.  Argentina had bound all its tariff lines, and the average applied 
tariff had been reduced from 13.8% in 1998 to 10.4% in 2006.  This provided certainty and 
predictability to its trading partners, and encourag ed trade and investment.  However, predictability 
was undermined by the large gap between Argentina' s bound and applied rates.  Moreover, products 
like textile products, footwear, and certain types of vehicles were still subject to tariff as high as 35%.  
Hong Kong, China encouraged Arge ntina to address these issues.  
92. Hong Kong, China noted with appreciation that Argentina used international standards as a 
reference for its national techni cal regulations and standards as well as SPS measures;  it was also 
pleased that Argentina and other MERCOSUR countries had taken steps to harmonize these standards 
and measures.  Hong Kong, China encouraged Argentina to continue its efforts in  this regard in order 
to facilitate international trade flow.  
93. The services sector had accounted for a dominant share of Argentina's GDP over the years.  
Continued liberalization of trade in services had the potential both to provide new market 
opportunities for its trading partners, and to contri bute to its own economic development.  In this 
connection, Hong Kong, China appreciated Argentin a's commitment to the market access negotiations 
on services and the disciplines of the GATS.  However,  direct state participation and market access 
barriers were still in place for certa in services, notably the infrastruct ural ones, such as transport and 
financial services.  Besides, Argentina had not undertaken any commitments on transport services in 
its GATS schedule.  Thus, Hong Kong, China encouraged Argentina to undertake further 
liberalization in those infrastructur sectors, and offer new or improved commitments binding its de 
facto liberal regime in the current round of ser vices negotiations.  Argentina maintained an MFN 
exemption on the provision of satellite facilities of  geostationary satellites operating fixed satellite 
services, which was subject to reciprocity conditions .  Hong Kong, China urged Argentina to remove 
such exemptions in its next offer on services, as MF N exemptions based on reciprocity ran counter to 
the MFN principles of the multilateral trading system  and effectively stymied negotiations for further 
liberalization in the sector.  
94. The representative of Turkey  noted that, since its previous Review, Argentina had 
experienced a severe economic and social crisis.  However, the review had clearly showed that Argentina had overcome the detrimental effects of this crisis and achieved strong economic 
growth through the effective implementation of  comprehensive policy measures.  Argentina's 
economy had grown at annual rates in excess of 9% over 2004-06, due mainly to strong domestic 
demand as well as a favourable external climate.  Pragmatic trade policies, adopted as from 2003 had 
played a remarkable role in this economic recovery  by maintaining healthy trade surpluses.  In this 
context, Argentina's exports had almost doubled in l ess than four years, growing at an average annual 
rate of 16%. 
95. However, the outlook for the Argentine economy was not fully free of risks, which could be 
triggered by market deficiencies.  In this respect , Turkey encouraged Argentina to take measures 
within future macroeconomic polic ies to better deal with the risk  of inflation and the effects on 
economic growth and government finance of an  increase in international interest rates. 
96. Besides Argentina's active role in a numbe r of regional integration schemes, it was a 
committed supporter of the multilateral trading sy stem and an active participant in the DDA 
negotiations. 
97. With regard to trade policy implementation, Turkey commended Argentina for the steps taken 
to simplify its customs procedures and binding the entire tariff;  this enhanced its trade regime 
predictability.  However, the wide gap between applied  and bound tariffs cast a shadow on this WT/TPR/M/176 
Page 20  
 
predictability.  Turkey invited Argentina to furthe r enhance the predictability of its tariff regime.  
Turkey had posed questions and requested further elaboration with regard to some specific trade 
policy measures, including excise duties and import licensing. 
98. The representative of Bolivia
 noted that Argentina had managed to achieve average annual 
growth of 9% over the past three years after overc oming its worst economic a nd social crisis, through 
the use of a wide range of policies.  This positive outcome was also reflected in the improvement of 
social indicators, such as the reduction of unempl oyment to an estimated 9.6% for 2006, and of the 
share of the population living below the poverty line , from 57% in 2002 to 29% in the second half of 
2006.  She highlighted the contribution of the industr ial sector to growth, as well as the diversification 
and growth of exports with high va lue added, not only in terms of va lue and volume, but also of the 
number of destination markets. 
99. Bolivia and Argentina participated in processes of  integration such as the Plata Basin Treaty;  
with respect to trade, this took place under ACE 36, with Bolivia as an associate state of 
MERCOSUR.  Although the trade balance was favourable to Argentina, there ha d been an increase in 
trade flows during the past three years.   
100. As a G-20 and Cairns Group member, Bolivia shar ed with Argentina its goals of eliminating 
export subsidies, reducing domestic support distorting trade, increasing market access particularly to 
developing countries and through tari ff reductions and the elimination of  tariff peaks, and eliminating 
tariff escalation. 
101. Bolivia considered that a stable and predicta ble market-access horizon was essential in order 
to attract investment to export-oriented sectors, a nd that this should be complemented by competitive 
development policies.   
102. The representative of the Separate Customs Te rritory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu  
(Chinese Taipei) noted that Argentina had overcome one  of the worst recessions in its history.  Its 
economy had been growing consistently at a fast pace since 2003, at annual rates in excess of 9% in 
2004 and 2005.  Although both inflation and unemploym ent remained at significant levels, the strong 
performance of exports as well as domestic demand – reflecting growing i nvestor and consumer 
confidence − suggested that Argentina had not only acco mplished a remarkable economic turnaround, 
but that it could also expect even higher levels of growth in the future.  The Government of Argentina 
had been making substantial efforts to stabilize the economy and strengthen its trade regime through 
policies introducing further liberalization.  These efforts seemed to have brought it into greater 
conformity with WTO rules and had made it more attractive to its trading partners outside the 
MERCOSUR.  
103. Argentina was an important exporter of ag ricultural goods, its exports of manufactured 
products were growing, and inte rnational trade in services was becoming an increasingly important 
factor in the economy.  He commended Argentina on the active role it continued to play in the 
activities of the WTO and noted that Argentina woul d benefit considerably from a positive outcome to 
the DDA negotiations.  However, further domestic polic y reform would likely be required to sustain 
future growth.  The main priorities might be to  prevent the economy from overheating and market 
distortions from becoming entrenched.  A degree of government intervention in domestic price formation and trade-related measures was necessary in  response to the recession.  However, as the 
macroeconomic environment was more stable, Ar gentina should be encouraged to abolish the 
adjustment programme and measures.  Further liber alization of trade and investment, plus other 
structural reforms to improve productivity an d economic governance, would make Argentina more 
competitive in the Southern Common Market.   
104. Chinese Taipei enjoyed very close and long-standi ng economic ties with Argentina.  In 2006, 
the total value of two-way trade had been about  US$312 million.  Imports from Argentina were  WT/TPR/M/176 
 Page 21 
 
 
agricultural products and exports c onsisted mainly of manufactured pr oducts and textile materials;  
there was great potential for expanding bilateral trade and investment. 
105. The representative of El Salvador  noted that to attain economic recovery, Argentina had 
applied a macroeconomic adjust ment programme and measures to support the financial system, 
successfully refinancing three quarters of its public de bt in very favourable terms.  Growth had been 
supported by strong domestic demand, especially inv estment, and by a favourable international 
situation, which had helped e xports expand rapidly.  Argentina had used a number of policy 
instruments included in its 2002 Economic Emer gency Law to achieve its economic objectives, 
including price moderation agreements, freezing prices for certain utilities and services provided by the private sector under concession contracts.  As a result, the trade balance had posted a 
US$2.36 billion surplus in the first half of 2006;  exports had reached US$9.73 billion. 
106. Argentina's current macroeconomic framework pr ovided a set of stable rules and a structure 
of contracts that helped to extend the private se ctor's planning horizon, encouraging investment, and 
promoting small and medium-sized enterprises.  
107. Argentina had participated actively in the DDA negotiations, in particular in agriculture, but 
also in services, NAMA, special and differential treatment for developing countries, intellectual 
property, and the reduction of barriers to trade in  environmental goods and services.  Argentina had 
also used the notifications system extensively,  having notified 96 SPS measures and 247 technical 
regulations during the period under review.  
108. Latin American governments faced the enorm ous challenge of generating stability and 
governance, so as to enhance co mpetitiveness.  This required a transforming production improving 
quality, and seeking new products and market niches .  A country progressed when those who created 
employment and wealth had clear rules and a secure environment.  
109. The representative of Ecuador
 stated that Argentina was one of the most dynamic WTO 
Members; Argentina had participated  very actively in the Doha negotiations in the pursuit of a strong 
and credible multilateral system.  It  was important to highlight the efforts undertaken by the Argentine 
Government to design an economic policy cohere nt with its external and domestic needs.  
110. Argentina's success in overcoming the 2001-02 econo mic crisis was to be applauded.  GDP 
had been growing at an annual average rate of 9% , and Argentina had been gradually improving its 
fiscal solvency, showing monetary prudence, using a flexible exchange rate, and achieving social 
inclusion and export dynamism.  Argentine exports had almost doubled in four years, posting annual 
average growth of 16%;  there had been considerable  diversification, especially towards products with 
a higher value added. 
111. Ecuador and Argentina shared the same global vision with respect to the WTO:  the G-20 
countries agreed on the general goals of elimina ting domestic support and obtaining real market 
access for their agricultural products.  In the DDA, Ecuador and Argentina hoped to obtained 
balanced results in all areas of interest to developing countries. 
112. Bilateral trade relations were fluid.  Econom ic Complementarity Agreement No. 59, under the 
framework of LAIA, had been in force since 1 Ap ril 2005;  its objective was to improve market 
access conditions for both countries' products, and it fo resaw the establishment of a free-trade area by 
2018.  Argentine exports to Ecuador had been in creasing rapidly, leading to a trade deficit for 
Ecuador of US$377 million.   
113. Ecuador also observed with interest the effect s and results of Argentina's payments to the 
IMF, with which it had cancelled its debt.   WT/TPR/M/176 
Page 22  
 
114. Ecuador congratulated Argentina for its conti nued reform process, which had allowed the 
economy to overcome domestic difficulties and external  crises.  These measures, aimed at investing in 
human capital, increasing productivity, and obtaining a stable macroeconomic environment, would 
help improve living standards and re duce social and economic inequalities. 
115. The representative of the Dominican Republic
 noted that overcoming the economic crisis had 
been mainly the result of important economic polic y measures.  GDP growth was proceeding at an 
average annual rate of 9%, and social advancemen ts had been achieved, with unemployment falling 
from 23% in 2002 to 11% in  2005, minimum wages increasing by 70% in real terms compared to the 
pre-crisis level, and a reduction of the popula tion living in poverty.  Exports had increased 
substantially, favoured by the intern ational environment and the exchange  rate, but also by the use of 
adequate policies and of an export-oriented trade policy.  The increase in agricultural exports had 
been particularly significant:  they had represented 46% of total exports in 20 05, but industrial exports 
had also increased swiftly, as well as exports of servi ces, mainly tourism.  The Government had been 
fostering the development of small and medium-siz ed enterprises, which were important agents for 
the creation of employment. 
116. The Dominican Republic noted Argentina's dynamism in the area of international 
negotiations, as witnessed by its participation in the MERCOSUR integration process, and the 
negotiation of economic complementarity agreemen ts with countries outside the MERCOSUR, while 
continuing to place great importance in the multilateral trading system and the current WTO negotiations.  Argentina had also participated activ ely in the negotiations in the framework of the 
Generalized System of Trade Preferences among developing countries. 
117. Argentina had bound its entire tariff in the WTO.   During the period under review, the applied 
MFN tariff had declined, reaching 10.5% in 2005, al though there was still a large gap between applied 
and bound tariff levels.  The Dominican Republic tr usted that this gap would be narrowed in the 
course of the current round of multilateral negotiations 
118. Argentina had shown clear interest in adva ncing the current round of WTO negotiations, 
having submitted proposals in most areas of the negotiations, some in conjunction with other 
countries, like the Dominican Republic, in the case of the proposals of Mode 4 of supply in services.  The Dominican Republic encouraged Argentina to c ontinue to take an active role in the DDA, and 
was confident that Argentina would continue to show its disposition to acquire new commitments 
provided its interests as a devel oping country were well served.   
119. The representative of India
 stated that it was heartening to note that Argentina had left behind 
the period of recession and its worst economic crisis  in recent times and had achieved higher growth 
rates and been relatively successful in curbing inflation.   However, there were risks with regard to the 
sustainability of the present model, and to the po ssibility of a “soft landing” or whether it would 
prevent another boom-bust cycle. 
120. Relations between India and Argentina were mark ed by traditional friendship.  In 2006, India-
Argentina trade been around US$1.23 billion.  Argen tine exports to India were US$ 949 million and 
Indian exports to Argentina just US$290 million;  th e balance of trade was in favour of Argentina by 
over three-fold.  The bilateral trade volume did not  fully capture the potential;  India had identified 
Latin America as one of the four focus areas for enhanc ing its trade relations and in the realization of 
this objective, Argentina had a special place.  Thus , it would be useful if Argentina could assist in 
removing some of the NTBs that hampered exports of goods and services to the country.  This would 
facilitate the entry of Indian investments and goods into Argentina.  A majo r Indian pharmaceutical 
company, one of the top ten generic companies worldw ide, had been trying to register its products in 
Argentina but had been waiting for a team from the National Drug, Food and Medical Technology 
Administration (ANMAT) to visit India for over a year and a half.  India requested the Argentine  WT/TPR/M/176 
 Page 23 
 
 
delegation to expedite the visit of ANMAT to India.  India hoped that in the years ahead, India-Argentina trade and economic relati ons would witness a healthy growth. 
121. India had signed a preferential trade agreem ent (PTA) with MERCOSUR in 2004.  The PTA 
would be operational after the ratification by th e MERCOSUR countries was completed.  Talks were 
also under way to increase the number of products c overed and the tariff concessions agreed to by 
each side.  
122. The representative of Nicaragua
 observed that Ambassador Stancanelli's presentation had 
shown how it was possible to prioritize poverty reduction, while maintaining macroeconomic 
balances and trade openness.  These were precisely the goals that Nicaragua's Government had set 
following the worst economic crisis in its history,  Argentina's recovery had been amazing both in 
terms of its magnitude and speed.  The combinati on of an orthodox monetary policy that favoured 
market forces, fiscal discipline, and creative economic  policies that sought wider social insertion, had 
allowed Argentina to register high growth rates.  The devaluation and the adoption of policies to 
support domestic demand had improved the industrial sector's comp etitiveness.  It was satisfying to 
note Argentina's achievements with respect to pov erty reduction during the period under review, at 
some 40% in four years, and in lowering unemploymen t, thanks to the use of redistributive policies, 
facilitating access to credit for small enterprises, and lowering the price of basic services, among 
others.  
123. Argentina was a particularly active WTO Member and had been a successful user of the 
mechanisms made available by the WTO, especially trade remedy measures and recourse to the 
dispute settlement mechanism.  Argentina had al so submitted numerous and creative proposals to the 
negotiating groups in the Doha Round.  A successful  conclusion to the Doha Round, resulting in the 
elimination of distortions in agricultural mark ets, would enhance Argentina's competitiveness and 
ensure sustainable growth, allowing the replacement  of some of the emergency measures in place for 
more market-oriented policies. 
124. The representative of Uruguay  noted that Argentina's economic programme in place since 
2003 had been very successful:  its goals had been fiscal balance, monetary control, a flexible 
exchange rate, social integration and an increase in exports.  Positive results had included average 
GDP growth of 9%, unemployment and poverty reduc tion and an export boom, both in agricultural 
and manufactured products.  Uruguay hoped that the se results could be consolidated in a sustainable 
and equitable development process. 
125. Uruguay and Argentina shared efforts to achieve  regional integration in MERCOSUR and, as 
exporters of agricultural products, defended common  interests in the WTO.  Both countries were 
members of the G-20 and the Cairns Group and pa rticipated actively in the WTO Agriculture 
Committee negotiations with the goal of enhanci ng market access, reducing trade-distortionary 
domestic support, and eliminating ex port subsidies in agriculture. 
126. Uruguay requested information on export taxes and import licences.  According to the 
Secretariat report there were six export tax rat es in 2005, ranging from 5% to 45%, applied on the 
f.o.b. value.  She asked about the rationale for having different rates, and their effect on the  
agri-industrial production chain.  The Secretariat report had also noted that these export taxes were 
temporary.  Considering their importance in gene rating fiscal revenues – between 2002 and 2005 they 
had accounted for some 2.2% of GDP – she wondere d whether their reduction or elimination would 
be feasible.  The Secretariat report had also stat ed that the Banco de la  Nación Argentina provided 
credit for the agriculture sector at preferential rate s.  Uruguay was interested  to know what interest 
rates were applied, and what percentage of credit was allocated at preferential rates.   
127. The representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela  highlighted Argentina's success in 
dealing with the crisis, which it had overcome swif tly and effectively by using the right corrective WT/TPR/M/176 
Page 24  
 
measures.  All economic and social indicators had improved, and were currently reaching levels not 
seen before in Argentina.  The Bolivarian Repub lic of Venezuela was also pleased to note the 
significant improvement of almost all financial i ndicators.  GDP had grown continuously since 2002, 
while inflation had been brought down to a ma nageable level, and the increase in unemployment 
observed until 2002 had been stopped.  Another im portant indicator was Argentina's increasing 
participation in world trade, and especially, the re lationship between this participation and the positive 
evolution of social indicators, as had been shown in point 6 of Argentina's report.  
128. Argentina was an important trading partner of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
bilaterally and in the framework of MERCOSU R.  Trade between them had increased from 
US$150 million in 2002 to some US$650 million in 2006.  Additionally, Argentine investment in 
Venezuela had reached record levels:  some US$1. 2 billion in 2006.  These numbers would continue 
increasing in the future as trade and investment were  fostered by strategic cooperation agreements in 
various sectors, the organization of bilateral bus iness rounds, and by both countries participation 
in MERCOSUR.    WT/TPR/M/176 
 Page 25 
 
 
V. REPLIES BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA AND ADDITIONAL 
COMMENTS 
(i) Economic and institutional environment 
129. The representative of Argentina (Ambassador St ancanelli) noted that the 2001-02 crisis had 
been not only economic and financial, but mainly soci al;  this had been the result of the disruption in 
production, and of the serious disparities in income  distribution.  Economic and trade policy design 
since 2002 had thus taken place in a context of economic deep economic depression, and the 
unravelling of Argentina's institutional and social  framework.  This situation had been reached 
through the application – with the exception of fi scal policy – of orthodox policies, which had been 
widely praised:  until 1998-99 Argentina had been  pointed out as an exam ple by international 
financial organizations.  And this  despite a substantial fiscal de ficit and increasing indebtedness, 
which eventually led to the crisis.  These imba lances had been addressed through a more stringent 
adjustment, in a context of economic recession.  Th e IMF had later recognized that this had not been 
the right approach.  Although this recognition had come  too late for Argentina, when the crisis was 
already in place, it was to be hoped that, in the future, recommendations to countries facing recessions 
would be looked at more carefully.  And, since this  recognition had come later, Argentina had had to 
face the implementation of its economic plan without  help, applying some orthodox measures, such as 
fiscal discipline, and some unorthodox or creative ones to solve the structural problems that had given 
rise to this situation. 
130. Countries faced different circumstances a nd hence no single policy recommendation was 
applicable to all.  The crisis had emerged with  a major social upheaval that had put institutional 
stability and democratic governance at risk.  To face the crisis, and lead the economy back to a growth 
path, a number of policies had been adopted,  and the se had had to take into account the complexity of 
the problem to be solved, and thus they tended to be  of a comprehensive nature.  They needed to take 
into account:  political considerations such as  the need to strengthen democracy;  economic 
considerations, such as recovering growth and promoting employment;  and social issues, such as the 
reduction of structural unemployment and facing  the population's basic needs with respect to 
education, health, and housing.  It was evident that orthodox economic policies would not solve the 
crisis, since these policies were in large part re sponsible for the depression.  Therefore, innovative 
policies were adopted to address the challenges Arge ntina had faced and would continue to face;  
these were comprehensive because they were aimed at  achieving an institutional strengthening of the 
democratic system, and an economic policy pursuing growth, development, and social inclusion.  
Argentina had overcome the crisis and was on path  of fast growth.  Debt reduction was another 
important factor for future investment decisions, since it enhanced predictability. 
131. Argentina's current economic programme was su stainable in the medium and long run.  
Measures would be adjusted gradually according to the evolution of the economic and social 
situations, but it would continue to  pursue fiscal discipline, foreign trade openness (that is, the respect 
of the WTO rules, disciplines and objectives, and ac tive participation in the DDA to obtain significant 
results) and fight inflation.  High growth would be  promoted, as well as a friendly environment, both 
for foreign and domestic investment.  It was also necessary to continue to apply a prudent monetary 
policy, which would take into account the evolut ion of the demand for money, and to continue 
building up international reserves.   
132. These policies would be complemented by the promotion of Latin American integration, 
taking into account the priority assigned to the WTO.   This integration could take place with the 
MERCOSUR as a starting point, through association agreem ents with other countries.  Argentina also 
considered it important to promote bilateral c ooperation with countries outside the region.  An 
example was the excellent relations between Arge ntina and Australia, as the discussant had pointed 
out.  It was also important to pursue a policy of institutional trade promotion and support to small and WT/TPR/M/176 
Page 26  
 
medium-sized enterprises, encouraging for example,  the adoption of international standards, and 
helping them diversify th eir production and exports. 
133. He noted that concern had been expressed with respect to inflation control.  In response he 
noted that both traditional and non-traditional instrume nts were used to fight inflation.  Regarding 
traditional instruments, a prudent monetary policy was in place, with the Central Bank conducting a 
policy of foreign exchange reserves accumulation.  Wh en the crisis had started, net reserves had been 
negative;  currently they amounted to almost a year of imports.  This was an important safety valve as 
sizeable foreign exchange reserves could act as a buffer in case of a speculative attack on the 
Argentine economy.  Noting comments concerning measures to discourage speculative capital from 
entering Argentina, he mentioned that the Centra l Bank required the retention of 30% of all capital 
entering Argentina for purposes other than investment.  Interest earned on capital subject to retention 
was lower than for capital without restrictions.  The goal was to channel capital mainly into 
investment activities.  The Central Bank monetary  policy tried to adapt money supply to demand 
through a number of instruments, to avoid the bu ild-up of inflationary pressure in the economy.  
134. Regarding to non-traditional anti-inflationary in struments, several dele gations had mentioned 
the use of export taxes.  Respecting their legality , these taxes were mentioned in Article 11 of the 
GATT as legitimate instruments;  they were not quan titative restrictions but ta riffs applied on exports.  
While some delegations had men tioned that export taxed could im ply some kind of subsidy, WTO 
panels and the Appellate Body ha d ruled that, since there was no payment by the Government nor any 
foregone fiscal revenue, export taxes could not be considered subsidies in the terms of the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.  Argentina did not consider that they had a 
negative effect on other countries;  export tax es lowered consumer prices and hence increased 
domestic demand, so they neither hindered nor promoted exports.  Seve ral countries used export 
taxes, especially those with abundant natural re sources, for example, almost all oil exporting 
countries, wood exporting countries, and large exporte rs of minerals.  Apart from anti-inflationary 
reasons, export taxes were applied also for fiscal revenue purposes.  For Argentina, export taxes had 
been essential for its social programmes, and to achieve a fiscal surplus.   
135. Regarding the differential export tax rates, accord ing to the stage of processing, differential 
tariffs existed both for exports and imports, and Ar gentina had proposed that tariff escalation be 
reduced in the Uruguay Round and during the current ne gotiations.  If import tariff escalation were to 
be reviewed, then Argentina could revisit the app lication of differential export tariff rates;  import 
tariff escalation was a means of promoting imports of raw materials while discouraging imports with 
higher value added.  Examples of this, were the ta riffs applied on processed cocoa products by the EC 
and the United States, as well as soybeans, which were imported duty free by the EC and the United States, while imports of soybean oil faced a duty of 10% in the EC and of 19% in the United 
States.  The discussions on tariff escalation would continue, as partners like the EC and the united 
States showed reluctance to redress tariff escalati on and to address the issue of domestic production 
support.  In the current round, there was no mandate to discuss export taxes. 
136. Investment was very important to Argentina;  it was a structural part of its anti-inflationary 
policy, since the increase of supply in different sector s would help to contain inflationary pressure.  
The Constitution granted the same rights to foreigners  as to Argentinians;  so national treatment had 
preceded the GATT.  Argentina granted national tr eatment to foreign investors across the board;  
practically no sector, except those linked to national s ecurity, had exclusions or limitations for foreign 
investors.  Investment had been growing rapidly in Argentina, exceeding consumption growth, fed by 
the improving economic conditions, th e regional integration policy and the respect of international 
rules.  Investment and exports were the engin es of growth.  The Government was also actively 
promoting investment in infrastructure.  There were  currently some important investments in energy, 
like the construction of gas pipeline with Bolivia, the construction of electric energy plants, roads, and 
railways.  WT/TPR/M/176 
 Page 27 
 
 
137. With respect to the future th e policy of achieving a fiscal surp lus would remain and the goal 
was to achieve a permanent surplus so as to guarant ee public debt payments.  Argentina was intent in 
negotiating some US$5 billion of pending official debt with Paris Club creditors.  These actions 
would contribute to the sustainability of economic and trade policy.  However, the social situation was 
not yet normal, and for this reason the Law of Economic Emergency had recently been extended.  
138. On social issues, the representative of Argentin a (Dr. Novick) noted that Argentina's use of 
innovative, unorthodox measures was achieving good resu lts with respect to employment and social 
indicators.  Argentina's 2001-02 crisis had been fu ndamentally a social crisis, which had emerged in 
the form of a large social outburst that had menaced  institutional stability and democratic rule.  Social 
and labour policies had focused on employment generation as a medium- and long-run central 
instrument of social inclusion.  As a conseque nce, labour policies had gradually replaced the initial 
emphasis place on social matters.   
139. In early 2002, a plan of revenue transfers had been put in place to families with an 
unemployed family head, and children younger than  18 years.  This progr amme had covered over 
2 million people, making it the broadest in Latin Amer ica.  As the economy began to grow, a number 
of measures geared towards the labour market had been put in place, including employment 
generation and quality improvement policies.  In 2004, legislation had been introduced to promote 
better labour standards:  a policy to regularize employment was put in place and in two years some 238,000 firms and 800,000 employees were  covered, resulting in the regularization of some 35% of 
non-regularized labour.  Additionally, a programme to help employment seekers was put in place, 
creating 145 employment offices. 
140. With respect to incomes policies, fixed sum increases had been introduced to support 
workers with lower incomes.  Since 2004, an e ffective minimum wage ha d been reintroduced (it 
had been frozen since 1992), and collective bargaini ng had been encouraged:  in 2006, 930 collective 
agreements encompassing some 3 million employees had been signed.  In sum, labour measures, in conjunction with trade and economic policies, and soci al policies, had contributed to a sharp reduction 
in poverty and extreme poverty.  
(ii) Trade policy by measure 
141. The representative of Argentina (Mr. Makuc) noted that comparing average applied and 
bound tariff rates did not give a clear idea of the situation in each sector.  In Argentina, applied and bound levels were similar in some  sectors;  gaps between applied and bound rates were larger in 
particularly sensitive sectors, su ch as textiles and clothing, footwear, automotive products, among 
others.  In all case, where applied and bound tariffs co incided, there was an important trade flow;  this 
was not the case with respect to the agricultural pr oducts for which tariffs ha d been bound at high 
levels by developed countries.  
142. Responding to a question on specific import duties, he noted that, Argentina applied 
compound duties for a small number of tariff lines representing a limited trade value.  Compound 
duties had never exceeded the bound level of 35% ad valorem .  Specific duties would be maintained 
in principle until 31 December 2007.  With respect to the use of a statistical tax on imports, this was 
meant to cover the cost of the services rendered, and was applied on all impor ts, independent of their 
origin.   
143. With respect to questions regarding the application of national treatment in the 
implementation of domestic taxes, Argentina highli ght that all imports received national treatment.  
Different methodologies were used to calculate the tax for domestic products and imports due to the 
incidence of other taxes on the calculation basis u sed for domestic products.  Regarding advance VAT 
payments, Argentina had been gradually ex tending this system to domestic producers. WT/TPR/M/176 
Page 28  
 
144. A number of questions had been raised about customs procedures and valuation.  It was 
important to highlight that risk assessment methods for the determination of value had been evolving, 
and a World Customs Organization directive had r ecognized that data bases kept for valuation 
purposes could be used for risk assessment.  This po licy change had allowed Argentina to improve the 
concept of reference value, and replace it with the concept of criterion value;  the latter was a more 
consistent value since it used a number of sources of  information, for example, the Customs offices 
from the countries of origin of the goods, allowing , additionally, for integration with the private 
sector.  The criterion values established by Argentina were aimed at tackling fiscal evasion and undervaluation practices.  These values were calculated  by Customs, using both domestic and external 
sources of information, including the computerized im port registry system, results of interventions in 
the area of valuation, import prices declared at  Customs offices in other MERCOSUR members, and 
export prices to Argentina. 
145. Regarding the specific question with respect to acrylic teeth, the calculation of the criterion 
value had been made using the commercial measure ment unit used (six front teeth or eight back 
teeth), and that this had proven very difficult to  implement;  as a result Argentina was currently 
reviewing the pertinent regulation, to clarify the problem with respect to the unit of measurement:  
146. On contingency measures, he noted that the Secretariat report had extensively described 
Argentina's legal framework, and it strictly refl ected WTO rules.  Procedures had been improved 
since 1995, when this legal framework had been pu t in place.  The notifications submitted to the 
different committees had allowed Argentina to accu mulate experience, as it had benefited from the 
observations and comments by other WTO Member s participating in those committees.  He 
highlighted that all investigations that took place in Argentina followed the procedures established in 
the multilateral agreements and ensure d the participation of all interest ed parties within the timeframe 
and modalities stipulated in those agreements.  
147. On SPS and TBT measures, he noted that, in th e framework of the implementation of these 
WTO agreements, Argentina had taken action to stre ngthen the human and technical resources of both 
the national notification authorities and the national in formation service.  This was a permanent task 
and had the goal of enhancing transparency when  adopting SPS measures and technical regulations 
and when carrying out conformity assessment proce dures.  The respective national authorities were 
available to attend any doubt or query from WTO Me mbers with respect to the adoption of rules and 
regulations in these areas. 
148. Referring to the queries on import licensing, he stated that both automatic and non-automatic 
licences were applied in conformity with WTO rules;  they covered only a limited share of the tariff.  
Automatic licences were applied on only 15% of all tariff lines of MERCOSUR's common 
nomenclature, approximately 1,300 positions, and they did not pose a barrier to imports.  Non-
automatic licences covered a group of goods that in cluded:  toys, footwear, refrigerators, washing 
machines, gas stoves, bicycles, motorcycles, bicycle tyres and some kinds of paper.  This type of 
licences was also granted according to the respect ive rules and did not represent a hindrance to 
imports. 
149. Argentina had no plans to join the plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement.  With 
respect to the use of preferences for domestic suppl iers, the goal was to diversify supply sources and 
promote capacity and production expa nsion in small and medium-sized enterprises.  The low margin 
of preference and the procedures applied ensured the participation of bot h domestic and foreign 
suppliers in all cases.  All procedures were advertised  publicly;  interested parties could consult the 
National Procurement Office website , which contained information on all tenders, as well as statistics 
on purchases by the various public bodies in Argentina.   
150. 
The Secretariat Report showed that Argentina protected intellectual property rights in all 
areas.  Argentina also protected undisclosed inform ation.  Legislation in all these areas was fully  WT/TPR/M/176 
 Page 29 
 
 
consistent with the TRIPS Agreement.  All questi ons posed on this issue had been addressed in the 
written answers.  However, referring to a question po sed the EC, he stressed that Argentina did not 
grant or use geographical indications in a fraudulen t manner.  Argentina made use of the flexibilities 
and exceptions foreseen in the TRIPS Agreement, wh ile EU legislation could be considered to be 
TRIPS plus.  In other words, while European legi slation did not, for example, recognize homonymous 
or generic products, Argentine legislation did. 
151. Argentine legislation allowed any right holde r to opposed the granting of a geographical 
indication.  Additionally, the j udiciary could be petiti oned to nullify the concession of a geographical 
indication, or for compensation for damages.  It was also possible to have recourse to competition 
defence legislation.   
152. With respect to the investme nt incentives by Argentina, these were compatible with 
multilateral agreements, in particular with the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
and with the TRIMs Agreement.  The incentives were aimed at promoting and consolidating 
investment in general, and in so me sectors, such as agriculture, i ndustry and infrastructure, through 
fiscal instruments that did not entail a subsidy, and were not conditional up on fulfilling requirements 
regulated and limited by the TRIMs Agreement. 
153. Regarding export promotion, he emphasized that this did not imply financial support to small 
and medium-sized enterprises, but just advice on how to initiate and consolidate exports to new 
markets.  
(iii) Sectoral policies 
154. With respect to questions raised about the pr ogramme for agriculture, the representative noted 
that the National Bank of Argentina offered sever al commercial credit lines with different options, 
including for sowing, working capital, acquisition of r eal estate or machinery.  A preferential interest 
rate was offered in the case of balance re-programmi ng for small agricultural producers, and for credit 
lines to producers affected by natural disasters. 
155. It had been necessary to reconstruct the manufactur ing industry after the crisis.  To this end, 
incentives had been put in place to stimulate i nvestment in equipment and technology, using 
instruments such as import duties and some fiscal and tax instruments, always bearing in mind 
Argentina's engagements in the WTO.  The automo tive and auto parts sector, although one of the few 
sectors to receive special treatment in the 1990s, had not escaped the crisis.  Specific measures for this 
sector had been put in place to foster investment th at reflected technological change and the needs of 
the domestic and possible export markets.  Howeve r, none of these measures could be considered a 
subsidy, or be considered to include mandato ry requirements regulated and limited by the TRIMs 
Agreement. 
156. A number of questions had been raised on hydrocarbons:  the Secretariat report had 
extensively covered the legal framework;  throu gh Law No. 24.145 of 1992, and the reform of the 
1994 Constitution, the provinces had competence over the hydrocarbons fields in their provincial 
territory.  Most companies participating in hydr ocarbon exploration activities were foreign companies 
or were controlled by foreign capital.  
157. Argentina had undertaken a high level of ser vices commitments during the Uruguay Round 
considering that it was a developing country.  To  assert that Argentina had made commitments in 
6 out of 12 service sectors presented a limited picture of the scope of the commitments undertaken.  During the Uruguay Round, Argentina had made commitments in 208 out of 620 possible 
concessions, above the Latin American average.  Moreover, two thirds of these commitments had 
been made without restrictions;  th is percentage was not only higher than that of other Latin American 
countries, but was also above the average for th e OECD countries, which did not reach 60%.  As WT/TPR/M/176 
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acknowledged by other WTO Members, Argentina had participated actively in the current 
negotiations on market access and rules for services.   Argentina had submitted an initial offer with 
important improvements to mode 4, which was on the main requests of developing countries.  On the 
other hand, Argentina's trading pa rtners had recognized the high le vel of commitments undertaken in 
financial services and telecommunications and in othe r sub-sectors of interest to both developed and 
developing countries, such as distribution services, informatics, professional services, and tourism.  
The lack of progress in areas of interest to Argentin a reflected in the revised offers presented, did not 
justify the presentation of a new offer on the part of  Argentina.  Contrary to some other Members, 
who had worsened their offer, Argentina preferred to maintain its official offer without modifications.  
Argentina was willing to improve its offer, without excluding a priori  sectors or modes of supply, 
provided that the negotiations aimed at a result that  took into account its interests, sensitivities, and 
development needs, in services a nd in other negotiating areas.  
158. The representative (Mr. Petri) noted that export taxes were a legitimate instrument and 
compatible with WTO rules.  Apart from their le gality, from a WTO point of view, they had been 
necessary in order to maintain th e policy space that the WTO granted its Members in terms of food 
security, as well as to finance social programmes for pove rty alleviation, and, in  general, to maintain 
fiscal balance, including public debt service. 
159. Export taxes were not protectionist, since they did not affect imports;  on the contrary, they 
stimulated consumption and broade ned domestic demand.  It was incorrect to state that export taxes 
were not transparent:  in Argentina, they had th e same publicity procedures and application as import 
duties.  Export taxes did not prevent or discourage investment, or attempted increases.  In the specific 
case of agriculture, investment in the past few years had increased at a higher rate than before export 
taxes had been widely applied.  Export taxes did not constitute quantitative restrictions, as had been 
suggested during the discussion;  they did not establish any limitation, in volume or value.  Export taxes were fully consistent with Article 11 of the GATT 1994;  they were simply ad valorem  duties.  
160. With respect to the different levels of export taxes, it was important to highlight that these 
were established in the context of a new economic policy, and taking into account the contribution 
capacity of each productive sector.  On the other ha nd, it was necessary to take into account tariff 
escalation in the main developed countries, whic h discriminate against higher value added in 
developing countries.  It was also important to highlight that export taxes had been used by a large number of countries, in particular developing coun tries, showing that they were a central policy 
element for many countries.  In the next few years Argentina would face increasing debt service 
levels, as a result of pending renegotiation of agreem ents, such as that with the Paris Club.  These 
payments could only be addressed if large trade a nd fiscal surpluses were maintained.  Within this 
context, export taxes would help to generate th e surplus needed to meet  the payments agenda. 
161. Argentina did not maintain any export restric tions.  In March 2006, Argentina had limited 
temporarily the exportation of certain commonly cons umed bovine meat cuts, due to supply shortages 
on the domestic market, as a result of a strong increase in internationa l prices.  These initial 
restrictions had later been made more flexible, a nd export flows had gradually been restored to their 
initial level.  Export values in 2006 were practica lly the same in 2005, which showed that the 
temporary restriction did not have significant effects. 
162. With respect to price stabilization measures fo r basic foodstuffs, he noted that these measures 
had not represented a transfer of revenue in favour of producers, since market transactions had been 
taking place a prices below the administratively determin ed price.  This was the case in particular for 
wheat.  The objective of this programme was to st abilize prices by establishing a maximum price for 
domestic consumption, which was the price in place en November 2006.  Thus, producers could 
receive support if they did not increase their prices  for the domestic market.  Moreover, the explicit 
limit of the programme was to achieve the average dom estic consumption level of  the 2005-06 period.   WT/TPR/M/176 
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These measures were not applied on exports, and were aimed exclusively at ensuring domestic 
supply.  In Argentina's view they did not have any effect on international trade.   
163. With respect to tariffs on sugar, Argentina' s applied tariff was cons istent with its WTO 
commitments.  This tariff was one of the lowest applied by a WTO Member.  Currently, negotiations 
were being held among MERCOSUR members to de velop a common regime that took into account 
the asymmetries among the different member countries. 
164. The discussant  thanked the delegation of Argentina fo r its serious approach to its Trade 
Policy Review and for its contribution in explai ning Argentina's economic and trade policies.  
Argentina had played a leading role in creating the WTO and was playing a leading role in strengthening and improving the institution, because it recognized that it was an important part of the 
overall system.   
165. There had been quite a few issues raised in this  TPR, in the context of Argentina's devastating 
economic and social crisis a number of years ago, a nd its recovery from that crisis.  There had been 
universal recognition of how severe that crisis ha d been and of Argentina's remarkable job in 
recovering from it.  Equally, however, many Members were concerned about th e sustainability of the 
policy framework and whether it would allow Arge ntina to continue to strengthen its economic 
prosperity.  There had been a productive and frank discussion, from which all had benefited.   
166. The representative of the European Communities
 thanked the delegation of Argentina for the 
comprehensive replies provided to the EC's questi ons.  However, she wished to raise a few more 
issues.  First, the EC would appreciate more information concerning several export credit and 
promotion programmes, as well as confirmation from Argentina that they were compliant with the 
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measu res.  On tariffs, she raised the issue of 
Argentina's decision to increase its import duty fo r olive oil from all origins.  She asked how 
Argentina intended to reconcile that decision with  MERCOSUR's declared engagement to harmonize 
special import regimes (currently applied unilaterally by the States parties), by which total or partial 
exemption from the CET was granted for specific im ports of parts and com ponents and inputs, as well 
as with the objective of an effective application of th e CET in most areas of trade with the rest of the 
world, with a reduction in the number of produc ts included in the list of exceptions and the  
establishment of a timetable for their phasing out by the year 2008. 
167. The EC had taken note of the responses pr ovided by Argentina on SPS measures;  
nevertheless, the EC believed that a more trade-or iented approach could be put in place for import 
authorization of new vegetables products without  compromising the high level of SPS protection 
required in Argentina.  
168. The EC had taken note of Argentina's statement concerning of air transport services, and 
specifically cabotage;  she stated that the Falkland Islands had formed part of the Annex to the EC 
Treaty listing the Overseas Countries and Territories since 1973, and any discussions on the status of 
the islands were of bilateral nature between th e United Kingdom and the Republic of Argentina.  
169. Concerning Argentina's answer regarding the provision of satellite services, the  EC 
considered that the issue of reciprocity was al ready covered through the undertaking of relevant 
commitments by a WTO Member, and that there sh ould be no need for additional agreements.  The 
EC asked four further questions on this issue:  (i) were all applications for authorization that were 
submitted to the relevant authorities for launching  satellites granted, as long as they fulfilled the 
reciprocity requirements?  Where there was already an authorization for a foreign satellite operator, 
would it not be reasonable that authorizations fo r the launch of each additional satellite by this 
operator should constitute only a pro cedural matter?;  (ii) would the launch of the Argentine satellite 
(ArSat) have any effect on granting authorizations , upon request, to foreign third parties already 
engaged in providing services in Arge ntina?;  (iii) would it be satisf actory for Argentina in taking all WT/TPR/M/176 
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necessary steps to open up its satellite market and provide to an y given WTO Member similar market 
access as enjoyed by Argentina on the market of th at WTO member?;  (iv) did the introduction of 
certain wireless technologies in the "extended" C-band (3.4-3.7 GHz) and the "standard" C-band  
(3.7-4.2 GHz) used by satellite ope rators for the transmission of signal to earth pose any risks of 
harmful interference in the principal servi ces provided by foreign satellite operators? 
170. The representative of Chile
 thanked Argentina for the written answers provided and noted 
that, in particular those answers dealing with price stabilization measures for domestic consumption 
would be submitted to Santiago for further analys is.  He referred to Ambassador Stancanelli's 
observation with respect to Chile's use of export tax es.  It was likely that he had referred to the so-
called "copper reserve" (reserva de cobre), that th e Chilean Government maintained for many years 
with respect to exports:  this measure had been  abolished a few years ago when the free-trade 
agreement with Canada had been signed.  The Secret ariat Report for the latest Trade Policy Review of 
Chile, which had taken place in 2003, stated that Chile did not apply export duties on any product.  
171. The representative of Nicaragua  thanked the Argentine delegation for the explanations 
provided.  Nicaragua had been particular pleased to  hear about the policies of social insertion, since 
poverty alleviation was a priority for all Governme nts.  Social policies, especially employment 
polices, resource transfer plans, labour legisla tion, labour intermediation, and training had had 
considerable effects, together with economic and trade measures to stabilize prices and ensure food 
security.   
172. The representative of the United States  stated her appreciation for the efforts of Argentina’s 
delegation in answering questions.  It had been esp ecially useful to consider whether Argentina’s 
trade policies could sustain its economic growth in the future.  In that regard, the United States 
thanked the Argentine delegation for its responses re garding inflation control policies, export tariffs, 
import licenses, subsidies, government procurement, social policy, and other topics.  The United States appreciated Argentina's need to ba lance the various social and economic factors.  
Nevertheless, it urged Argentina to carefully consider issues raised by Members in this TPR;  
initiating various changes suggested by Members c ould lead to efficiency gains in Argentina’s 
economy, and better sustain future economic growth.   
173. The representative of Colombia
 thanked Argentina for the replies provided.  His delegation 
had taken note in particular of the reply concerni ng criterion values for acrylic teeth, which was one 
of the difficulties faced by its exporters.  On the i ssue of export taxes, Colombia had no doubt of their 
legality from a WTO point of view, and it recognized  that each country was autonomous in fiscal 
matters.  However, Colombia cons idered that export taxes were a barrier to trade.  Argentina's 
answers implied that if export taxes were eliminat ed, there would be a fiscal deficit.  He wondered 
whether the calculations used to assert this were correct, since an economy did not function in a linear 
manner.  According to the example in the responses,  Arg$14 billion had been collected in export taxes 
in 2006, and without this there would been a Arg$3 b illion fiscal deficit.  However, it could also be 
argued that enterprises had lost Arg$14 billion in prof its, and that these profits constitute rents that 
could have been captured by the fiscal regime in other ways, for example, through profit taxes.  
Hence, an elimination of export taxes would not necessary entail a reduction in tax revenue of the 
same magnitude.   
174. Argentina had stated that an objective of export taxes was to lower consumer prices and 
increase domestic demand.  That would be true in the current context of high or increasing 
international commodity prices;  but in a scenario of declining international prices, they would not 
have this effect.   
175. With respect to the third argument presented,  namely that export taxes countered tariff 
escalation, he wondered whether export tax es had had any effect in this respect.  WT/TPR/M/176 
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176. The representative of Separate Customs Terr itory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu  
expressed his delegation's appreciation for the answ ers provided.  His delegation had no further 
question for the moment, would study carefully the replies and raise follow-up concerns in due courses if necessary.   
177. The representative of Uruguay
 thanked Argentina for the res ponses provided, which would be 
sent to her capital to be analyzed in detail, give n the importance of the subject for the authorities of 
her country.  She would provide the Argentinean dele gation with a copy of further questions received 
from the capital. 
178. The representative of Argentina  noted that the European Union had mentioned import duties 
on olive oil.  He stressed that th e increase in these duti es resulted in tariffs below the levels bound at 
the WTO.  Regarding MERCOSUR, he noted that  olive oil was on the CET list of exceptions 
consisting of 100 tariff positions.  Argentina was willi ng to negotiate the reduction of this duty with 
the European Union;  however, it should be born in mind that the EU's tariff for the same product was 
85%, some three fold that of Argentina's.  So, if  the EU was willing to lower its tariff, negotiations 
would be welcomed by Argentina.  
179. Argentina had taken noted of the comments a nd questions on SPS measures, with respect to 
accreditation of establishments, and would provide wr itten answers to these questions.  However, he 
noted that the Argentine authorities consid ered the SPS regime to be transparent. 
180. On the air transport topic, he noted that th e cabotage clause had been included because the 
Islas Malvinas were an Argentinean province, at  just 400 miles from the mainland.  There was a 
bilateral dispute between Argentina and one of th e EU's Member States, and Argentina had been 
consistently requesting consultations  to solve this sovereignty issue.  Argentina hoped that this EU 
Member State, the United Kingdom, would accept to engage in discussions about this issue, as 
requested permanently by the Unite d Nations General Assembly.    
181. With respect to satellite services, Argentina app lied and maintained the reciprocity principle, 
the same applied to maritime transport. 
182. Referring to the intervention by Chile, he noted that he understood that the state company 
CODELCO was subject to a 10% tax on its foreign ex change export proceeds.  If there was confusion 
regarding this, it could be clarified bilaterally.  
183. With respect to the discussant's intervention, he wished to note that Argentina was open to all 
the remarks and comments made during the trade policy review, which they found very useful.  
Argentina's economic programme was a dynami c one, and took into account changes of 
circumstances, both domestic and international.   
184. On Colombia's intervention with respect to export taxes, a long academic discussion would 
probably be necessary to clarify some of the issues.  However, he could state that income taxes would 
not work as replacements of export taxes;  for this  to be the case, it would be necessary to apply an 
additional income tax of 100%.  With respect to th e impact on prices, the current scenario was not one 
of declining prices.   
185. He wished to end by thanking the Chair, the di scussant, the Secretariat and all the delegations 
that had participated in the meeting. 
186. After reading, her concluding remarks, the Chair announce the election of a new Chairman 
for the Trade Policy Review Body.  H.E. Mr. Vesa HIMANEN (Finland) would take over the Chairmanship for the year 2007/08 WT/TPR/M/176 
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VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON 
187. This third Review of the trade policies of Argentina has contributed to a much better 
understanding of their evolution during a particularly  eventful period for the Argentine economy.  We 
owe this to the active participation of Ambassador s Stancanelli and Dumont as well as of the rest of 
the Argentine delegation;  to the insightful interv entions by the discussant, Ambassador Gosper;  and 
to the engagement of the many Members which took part in this exercise. 
188. Members unanimously congratulated Argentina on its remarkable economic recovery since 
2003, following one of the country's most severe econom ic crises in modern history.  They expressed 
great satisfaction for Argentina's success in reduc ing unemployment and poverty, and for the clear 
improvements in the internal and external balan ces.  However, several Members expressed concern 
about the long-term sustainability of Argentin a's economic policy mix, noting that reliance on 
administrative measures to control inflation might provide temporary relief but risked building supply 
and demand imbalances and undermining the investme nt climate.  Argentina was thus invited to 
consider removing temporary measures, and to rely to a greater extent on market forces to allocate resources. 
189. Members noted that the investment regime is  generally open but encouraged Argentina to 
enhance investor confidence.  To achieve th is, Argentina could expa nd its GATS commitments, 
which Members observed covered only 6 of the 12  sectors specified in the GATS.  Closing the 
considerable gap between applied a nd bound tariffs would also bring gr eater predictability to the trade 
and investment regime.  The DDA offers Arge ntina an excellent opportunity to seek such 
improvements, while buttressing the international tr ading environment within which Argentina plays 
an important role as an exporter of agricultural co mmodities and, increasingly,  of industrial products.  
In this regard, Members pointed out that Argentin a has much to gain from a successful conclusion of 
the DDA, recognizing at the same time Argentina's very active pa rticipation in the WTO and the 
current negotiations.  
190. Members commended Argentina for having lowered its average applied tariff since its last 
Review while expressing concern with respect to th e use and impact of export taxes.  Argentina 
emphasized that export taxes are intended to comply with financial obligations, and that there is no 
definite target date for their elimination.  Me mbers acknowledged that these taxes were an important 
source of fiscal revenue but noted that export ta xes can distort trade patterns and have a negative 
impact on trading partners. 
191. Replying to Members' queries, Argentina indicated that imports receive national treatment on 
the application of internal taxes and that local-c ontent requirements linked to incentive schemes were 
not mandatory.  Argentina also provided inform ation on its import licensing regime, government 
procurement procedures, and certain IPR-relate d issues, with Members recognizing Argentina's 
efforts to improve IPR protection. 
192. In response to questions concerning agriculture, Argentina indicated that export restrictions 
are no longer in place, and described new measur es being introduced to prevent increases in the 
consumer price of certain food items.  On fuel-relate d matters, Argentina explained the causes for the 
restrictions on natural gas exports, noting that by  law national demand must be met first.  Also 
provided were clarifications concerning various asp ects of insurance and professional services, as well 
as cabotage restrictions and exceptions in air and maritime transport.  Members expressed their 
appreciation for the extensive responses and explanati ons provided by the Argent ine delegation[;  they 
looked forward to receiving answers on still outstanding questions].  WT/TPR/M/176 
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193. In conclusion, Members welcomed Argentina's economic recovery and the marked 
improvement in its key social indicators since 2003.   Members also encourag ed Argentina to pursue 
policies that would ensure the sustainability of grow th and allow the fulfilment of its potential.  Sound 
foundations for this can be established by building such policies on the WTO principles of transparency, predictability and non-discrimination.   This would also befit Argentina's strong 
historical support for the multilateral trading system.  In this regard, we look forward to Argentina's 
continuous and construc tive role in the DDA. 
__________