WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION   
WT/MIN(11)/ST/22 
16 December 2011  
 
(11-6570) 
MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE 
Eighth Session Geneva, 15 - 17 December 2011 Original: English 
 
  
NEW ZEALAND 
 
Statement by the Hon. Tim Groser 
Minister of Trade 
  
Thank you for the opportunity to address Trade Ministers at this Eighth Ministerial 
Conference of the WTO.  I would like to we lcome the four new WTO Members, Montenegro, 
the Russian Federation, Samoa, and Vanuatu. 
  With respect to the Doha Round, we need to fa ce the facts;  wishful thinking will serve no 
one's interests.   We are collectively in a situation that arguably none of us want to be in: 
 
 We have worked for ten years to devel op texts and understandings to deliver the 
Doha Development Agenda;  we are deeply resistant to throwing that achievement 
away on the naive belief that these 20
th century problems they address will somehow 
go away.  But at the same time, we know that they do not in themselves provide 
a sufficient basis for concluding the Round and implementing the results. 
 
 Further, probably most of us, certainly New Zealand, know in our h eart of hearts that 
it is unlikely we will discover the political basis for doing so anytime soon. 
 
 At the same time, there are deep macroeconomic disturbances, particularly in the 
major centres of developed country power, that will accelerate even more profound 
shifts in global economic power to emerging economies.  To say this is a "distraction" 
is an heroic understatement.  The political leadership that will be required finally 
to close the Round successfully is very diffe rent to the leadership used in the 
20th century to close previous multilateral trade rounds. 
 
 Finally, while most of us are indeed moving forward on trade liberalization 
regionally, we all know that for regionalis m to remain politically and economically 
benign, we need a vibrant multilateral tradi ng system.  We are all bound together by 
the global supply chain.  It is called "global" for good reason.  Given the structural shifts in the world economy, it is inconceivable that 1994, when the Uruguay Round was concluded, can forever rest as the high water mark of multilateral economic 
rules, underwriting commercial transactions in the 21
st century.  It is imperative we 
close the deal, identify the next set  of trade issues and move ahead. 
 
 In such a difficult situation, the old politi cal rule of "avoid doing harm" must guide our 
thinking.  WT/MIN(11)/ST/22 
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 This is the most severe downturn in 70 year s and it may get worse.  But we know that 
governments have been remarkably successful so far in resisting making the mistake of the 1930s and 
resorting to protectionism on any systemic scal e.  This institution, the WTO, embodies that 
philosophy.  We need to keep it robust and protect it for stormy weather ahead.  Our real defence here 
is the binding commitments in the WTO rule set, and the huge body of jurisprudence built up on that 
basis over some 60 years.  It makes sense to reaffirm that commitment politically at this 
Ministerial meeting.   It is not enough however.  The Doha Agenda is about building on t hose commitments since 
there are obvious imbalances in that acquis .  On the one hand, we cannot just put the partial results of 
the Doha Round into a political freezer.  If we do that, we will never discover what might make 
progress possible, particularly in the major centres of power.  Only a small economy like New Zealand can afford politically to state the obviou s:  we will never get a deal that does not meet 
the political interests of the most powerful countries.  We can say this because we know that this will 
be the essential platform on which our interests, and the many different interests of small countries 
can be carried forward to success.   We need to listen more carefully to each othe r to discover the essential political interests that 
have not yet been accommodated adequately in the text s that have been developed.  In our view, the 
least useful way to do this is to spend next y ear trying to negotiate highly prescriptive "roadmaps", 
agreed work programmes, timetables, stock-takes, guid elines - call this what you will.  All this will do 
is cement positions, create yet further frustration and cynicism amongst our professional negotiators 
in Geneva who won't believe any of this is real the moment Ministers have got on the plane to go 
home.  Such approaches become proxy fights that  increase rigidity in negotiating positions when 
flexibility is required.  Most important, an overly prescriptive approach will do nothing to build trust 
and a deeper understanding of the adjustments a nd additions that will be necessary to meet 
key political interests.  Let's not set ourselves up for further guaranteed failure.   We are not going to redefine the developm ent dimension of the Doha Round.  That is 
a negotiating dead-end.  Part and parcel of our efforts will be how to advance the interests of 
developing countries.  We of course have a very st rong view that further integration into the trading 
system is a pre-requisite to development.  When one thinks of the spectacular success of so many 
countries that have emerged from very difficult circum stances over the past three-four decades, it is 
impossible to make the argument that they coul d have done this without  export-led development 
strategies and fuller participation in the multilate ral trading system.  Obviously, New Zealand has 
a particular interest in agriculture and we know ther e can never be any result that meets the test of 
"development friendly" that is not based, at least in part, on a very solid result on agriculture, 
including an ambitious result on cotton - and I say th at as a former chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Cotton.   While we strengthen the existing system, deal with the 20
th century problems that lie at the 
heart of the Doha Development Agenda, we also need to look forward to emerging issues.  The 
WTO is the place countries deal with the whole gamu t of trade issues.  The Doha mandate covers a 
subset of those issues.  We n eed to accelerate our understanding of these emerging issues.  This will 
be politically possible only if it is done explicitly on the basis that we are not trying to redefine the 
mandate.  The developing countries would reject such an approach out of hand.  But we need to start 
understanding emerging issues like the implications  of the global supply chain for WTO Rules.  
Similarly, there is a whole set of issues in the trade and environment space that are going to demand 
attention, not simply the issue of environmental goods and services and the agreement we need on fishery subsidies that must be part of any Doha outcome.  If we can develop a sense amongst negotiators that there are some solutions out ther e, this will exert positive gravitational pull on the  WT/MIN(11)/ST/22 
 Page 3 
 
 
  Doha mandated issues and deal in part with the leg itimate concern that we need to keep our system up 
to date.   Our thinking is based on a frank admission that the path forward is by definition unclear.  
Therefore a more subtle, less prescriptive approach aimed at three levels - strengthening the existing 
defences against protectionism, finding ways forward on the 20
th century agenda defined by the 
Doha Mandate with development at the centre of th at mandate, and starting to point the way forward 
on 21st century issues - is the way forward. 
 
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