RESTRICTED  
  
G/SCM/M/107  
 
6 February 2019  
(19-0678) Page: 1/21 
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures    
 
MINUTES OF THE REGUL AR MEETING  
HELD ON 23 OCTOBER 2 018 
CHAIR: LUIS ADOLFO F ERNÁNDEZ (COSTA RICA ) 
1. The Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("Committee") held a regular 
meeting on 23 October 2018, convened in WTO/AIR/SCM/24 dated 12 October 2018.  
 
2. China  reiterated its concerns  regarding agenda item 6 titled "subsidies and overcapacity ", noting 
that overcapacity was not an issue  that was  relevant to the operation of the SCM Agreement or the 
furtherance of its objectives as referred in  Article 24.1 of the Agreement. In China's view, the 
Committee was not an appropriate forum to discuss this  issue. China did not oppose the Members ' 
briefing to the WTO on the outcome of the G -20 submit . However, as  stated in previous meetings , 
the inclusi on of this item into the agenda should neither constitute any precedent nor represent any 
degree of consensus by Members on including similar issues into the agenda of future meetings of 
the Committee or any subsidiary bodies of the  WTO. China asked the sp onsors of this agenda item 
to exercise restraint and not put irrelevant issues on the agenda that would interfere with the work 
of the Committee. China requested the Committee to take note of its stated position.  
 
3. The Committee took note  of the statement m ade and adopted  the following agenda:  
 
1   NATIONAL LEGISLA TION ................................ ................................ ............................  2 
1.1   Review of notifications of new or amended legislation or regulations not previously 
reviewed by the Committee (including Supplemental Notifications of existin g provisions 
not previously reviewed)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 2 
1.1.1    Afghanistan (G/SCM/N/1/AFG/1)  ................................ ................................ ...............  2 
1.1.2    Cambodia  (G/ADP/N/1/KHM/2 -G/SCM/N/1/KHM/2 -G/SG/N/1/KHM/2)  ............................  3 
1.1.3    Canada (G/ADP/N/1/CAN/4/Suppl.2 - G/SCM/N/1/CAN/4/Suppl.2 - 
G/SG/N/1/CAN/3/Suppl.1)  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 3 
1.1.4    China  (G/ADP/N/1/CHN/2/Suppl.7 – G/SCM/N/1/CHN/1/Suppl.5 -
G/SG/N/1/CHN/2/Suppl.5)  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 3 
1.1.5    European Union  (G/ADP/N/1/EU/3/Suppl.3 -G/SCM/N/1/EU/2/Suppl.3)  ...........................  3 
1.1.6    Japan (G/ADP/N/1/JPN/2/Suppl.9 -G/SCM/N/1/JPN/2/Suppl.9)  ................................ ...... 3 
1.1.7    Chinese Taipei  (G/ADP/N/1/TPKM/1/Suppl.2 –G/SCM/N/1/TPKM/1/Suppl.2)  ....................  4 
1.2   REVIEW OF NOTIFICATIONS OF NEW OR AMENDED LEGISLATION OR 
REGULATIONS WITH OUTSTANDING WRITTEN QUESTIONS  ................................ ....................  4 
1.2.1    Cameroon (G/ADP/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1 -G/SCM/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1 -
G/SG/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1)  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 4 
1.2.2    El Salvador (G/ADP/N/1/SLV/3/Suppl.1 -G/SCM/N/1/SLV/3/Suppl.1 -
G/SG/N/1/SLV/3/Suppl.1)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 4 
1.2.3    European Union ( G/ADP/N/1/EU/3/Suppl.2 –G/SCM/N/1/EU/2/Suppl.2)  ..........................  4 
1.2.4    Liberia (G/SCM/N/1/LBR and G/SCM/N/1/LBR/Corr.1)  ................................ ..................  5 G/SCM/M/107  
 
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  2   SEMI -ANNUAL REPO RTS OF COUNTERVAILIN G DUTY ACTIONS (ARTI CLE 25.11) – 
G/SCM/N/334 AND G/SC M/N/334/SUPPL.1  ................................ ................................ ... 5 
3   PRELIMINARY AND FINAL COUNTERVAI LING DUTY ACTIONS: N OTIFICATIONS 
(ARTICLE 25.11)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..............  6 
4   ARTICLE 27.4 EXT ENSIONS OF THE TRANS ITION PERIOD FOR THE  ELIMINATION OF 
EXPORT SUBSIDIES  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........  7 
5   IMPROVING THE TI MELINESS AND COMPLET ENESS OF NOTIFICATIO NS AND OTHER 
INFORMATION FLOWS ON  TRADE MEAS URES UNDER THE SCM A GREEMENT ....................  8 
6   SUBSIDIES AND OV ERCAPACITY – ITEM RE QUESTED BY THE EUROP EAN UNION, 
JAPAN AND THE UNITED  STATES  ................................ ................................ ...................  11 
7   ARTICLE 25.8 QUE STIONS TO CHINA ON P OTENTIAL STEEL SUBSI DIES – ITEM 
REQUESTED BY THE EUR OPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES  ................................ . 15 
8   IMPLEMENTATION O F PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE  MINISTERIAL DECISIO N ON FISHERIES 
SUBSIDIES (WT/MIN(17 )/64; 13 DECEMBER 20 17) – ITEM REQUESTED  BY ARGENTINA, 
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, T HE EUROPEAN UNION, I CELAND, JAPAN, NEW Z EALAND, 
NORWAY, AND THE UNIT ED STATES  ................................ ................................ ..............  18 
9   PERMANENT GROUP OF EXPERTS  ................................ ................................ ..............  21 
10   OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 21 
11   DATE OF NEXT REGU LAR MEETING  ................................ ................................ ..........  21 
12   ANNUAL REPORT O F THE COMMITTEE ON S UBSIDIES AND COUNTER VAILING 
MEASURES TO THE COUN CIL FOR TRADE IN  GOODS (ARTICLE 32.7 ) .............................  21 
 
1  NATIONAL LEGISLATION  
1.1  Review of n otifications of new or amended legislation or regulations not previously 
reviewed by the Committee ( includ ing Supplemental Notifications of existing provisions 
not previously reviewed)  
4. The Chair noted that, in accordance with the Committee's procedures (G/SCM/W/293/Rev.1), 
the new legislative notifications on the agenda were those that had been circulated in all three 
languages not less than six weeks before the meeting. The deadline for written questions on these 
notifications was 1 October 2018. In accordance with the  review  procedures, legislative notifications 
of Cameroon, El Salvador, the European Union and Liberia were taken up under this item due to 
outstanding written questions about them.  
 
5. Oral questions could be asked at the meeting, and any Member wishing to receive a written 
answer to any such question would have to submit its question in writing to the Member concerned 
and to the Secretariat not later than 12 November 2018 . Written ans wers were due not later than 
3 December 2018 .1  
   
6. The primary review of these notifications was held in the Committee on Anti -Dumping 
Practices. Members were thus requested to limit their questions to issues specifically related to 
countervailing measures , and to save horizontal and anti -dumping -specific questions for the Anti -
Dumping Committee.  
 
1.1.1   Afghanistan ( G/SCM/N/1/AFG/1 ) 
7. No written questions were posed with respect to this notification.  
  
8. The Committee took note  of the notification.  
  
                                                
1 Relevant deadlines for written follow -up questions and written answers in November and 
December  2018, respectively, can be found in section 1 of document G/ADP/W/ 502-G/SCM/W/57 7-
G/SG/W/24 4. G/SCM/M/107  
 
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  1.1.2   Cambodia  (G/ADP/ N/1/KHM/2 -G/SCM/N/1/KHM/2 -G/SG/N/1/KHM/2)  
9. Written questions with respect to this notification can be found in:  
 
• G/ADP/Q1/KHM/1 -G/SCM/Q1/KHM/1 -G/SG/Q1/KHM/1 G/SCM/Q1/KHM/1  – questions 
from the United States  
10. The Committee took note  of the notification and questions . 
 
1.1.3   Canada (G/ADP/N/1/CAN/4/S uppl.2-G/SCM/N/1/CAN/4/S uppl.2- 
G/SG/N/1/CAN/3/S uppl.1) 
11. Written questions and responses with respect to this notification can be found in:  
 
• G/ADP/Q1/CAN/18 -G/SCM/Q1/CAN/18 -G/SG/Q1/CAN/2  - questions from the 
United  States   
 
• G/ADP/Q1/CAN/1 9-G/SCM/Q1/CAN/1 9-G/SG/Q1/CAN/ 3 – replies to the United States2  
 
12. The Committee took note  of the notification and questions . 
  
1.1.4   China  (G/ADP/N/1/CHN/2/S uppl.7–G/SCM/N/1/CHN/1/S uppl.5-
G/SG/N/1/CHN/2/S uppl.5) 
13. Written questions and responses with respect to this notification can be found in:  
 
• G/ADP/Q1/CHN/71 -G/SCM/Q1/CHN/71 -G/SG/Q1/CHN/31 – questions from the 
United  States  
 
• G/ADP/Q1/CHN/72 -G/SCM/Q1/CHN/72 -G/SG/Q1/CHN/32 – questions from Canada  
 
• G/ADP/Q1/CHN/7 3-G/SCM/Q1/CHN/7 3-G/SG/Q1 /CHN/3 33 and Corrigendum 14 – 
replies to the United States  
 
• G/ADP/Q1/CHN/7 4-G/SCM/Q1/CHN/7 4-G/SG/Q1/CHN/3 4 – replies to  Canada5 
 
14. The Committee took note  of the notification and questions . 
 
1.1.5   European Union  (G/ADP/N/1/EU/3/S uppl.3-G/SCM/N/1/EU/2/S uppl.3) 
15. Written questions with respect to this notification can be found in:  
 
• G/ADP/Q1/EU/9 -G/SCM/Q1/EU/9  - questions from the United States  
 
• G/ADP/Q1/EU/14 -G/SCM/Q1/EU/14  – replies to the United States6 
 
16. The Committee took note  of the notification and questions.  
 
1.1.6   Japan (G/ADP/N/1/JPN/2/S uppl.9-G/SCM/N/1/JPN/2/S uppl.9) 
17. No written questions were posed with respect to this notification.  
  
18. The Committee took note  of the notification.  
  
                                                
2 Circulated on 6 November 2018.  
3 Circulated on 24 October 2018.  
4 Circulated on 29 October 2018.  
5 Circulated on 29 October 2018.  
6 Circulated on 30 October 2018.  G/SCM/M/107  
 
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  1.1.7   Chinese Taipei  (G/ADP/N/1/TPKM/1/S uppl.2–G/SCM/N/1/TPKM/1/S uppl.2) 
19. Written questio ns and answers with respect to this notification can be found in:  
 
• G/ADP/Q1/TPKM/7 -G/SCM/Q1/TPKM/7 - questions from the United States  
 
• G/ADP/Q1/TPKM/ 8-G/SCM/Q1/TPKM/ 8 – replies to the United States7  
 
20. The Committee took note  of the notification and questions . 
 
1.2  REVIEW OF NOTIFICATIONS OF NEW OR AMENDED LEGISLATION OR REGULATIONS 
WITH OUTSTANDING WRITTEN QUESTIONS  
1.2.1   Cameroon (G/ADP/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1 -G/SCM/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1 -
G/SG/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1)  
21. Written questions with respect to  this notification can be found in:  
• G/ADP/Q1/CMR/3 -G/SCM/Q1/CMR/3 -G/SG/Q1/CM R/3 – questions from the 
United  States  
22. The Committee took note  of the notification and questions.  
 
1.2.2   El Salvador (G/ADP/N/1/SLV/3/Suppl.1 -G/SCM/N/1/SLV/3/Suppl.1 -
G/SG/N/1/SLV/3/Suppl.1)  
23. Written questions with respect to this notification can be found in:  
 
• G/ADP/Q1/SLV/8 -G/SCM/Q1/SLV/8 -G/SG/Q1/SL V/7 - questions from the 
United  States  
 
• G/ADP/Q1/SLV/9 -G/SCM/Q1/SLV/9 -G/SG/Q1/SLV/8 - questions from Mexico  
 
24. Mexico  noted that it awaited El Salvador's response to its questions.  
  
25. The Committee took note  of the notification and questions and the statement made.  
  
1.2.3   European Union ( G/ADP/N/1/EU/3/ Suppl.2–G/SCM/N/1/EU/2/S uppl.2) 
26. Written questions and answers with respect to this notification can be found in:  
 
• G/ADP/Q1/EU/5 -G/SCM/Q1/EU/5 – questions from Mexico  
 
• G/ADP/Q1/EU/ 6-G/SCM/Q1/EU/ 6 – questions from Saudi Arabia,  Kingdom of  
 
• G/ADP/Q1/EU/ 7-G/SCM/Q1/EU/ 7 – questions from the Russian Federation  
 
• G/ADP/Q1/EU/8 -G/SCM/Q1/EU/8 – questions from Kazakhstan  
 
• G/ADP/Q1/EU/ 10-G/SCM/Q1/EU/10 – replies to Mexico  
 
• G/ADP/Q1/EU/11 -G/SCM/Q1/EU/11 - replies to  Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of  
 
• G/ADP/Q1/EU/12 -G/SCM/Q1 /EU/12 - replies to  the Russian Federation  
 
• G/ADP/Q1/EU/13 -G/SCM/Q1/EU/13 - replies to Kazakhstan8 
 
                                                
7 Circulated on 22 October 2018.  
8 Circulated on 22 October 2018.  G/SCM/M/107  
 
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  27. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  reserved its right to raise issues at the Anti -Dumping Committee. 
The Russian Federation reiterated its interest in the CVD aspect of the EU legislation and reserved 
its right to raise questions on this notification.  
 
28. The Committee took note  of the notifi cation , questions and  answers . 
 
1.2.4   Liberia  (G/SCM/N/1/LBR and G/SCM/N/1/LBR /Corr. 1) 
29. Written questions with respect to this notification can be found in:  
 
a. G/SCM/Q1/LBR/1 - questions from the United States  
30. The Committee took note  of the notification and questions.  
 
31. The Chair , recalling the Committee's agreed procedures, informed Members that for new 
legislative notifications to be placed on the agenda of the spring 2019 meeting, they would have to 
be circulated in all three langua ges by 18 March 2019 . Shortly after that date, the Secretariat would 
circulate a document informing Members of all legislative notifications to be reviewed at the fall 
meeting. Pursuant to paragraph 8 of document G/SCM/W/293/Rev.1, any legislative notifica tion in 
respect of which written answers to written questions had not been provided would be placed on the 
agenda of the Committee's subsequent regular meeting. Written questions concerning new 
legislative notifications to be reviewed should be submitted t o the notifying Member and to the 
Secretariat by 8 April 2019 . 
 
32. To place a previously -reviewed legislative notification on the agenda of the Committee's spring  
2019 regular meeting, written questions had to be submitted to the Member concerned and to the 
Secretariat not later than 18 March 2019 . The Member receiving such questions should submit its 
written answers not later than 15 April 2019 . The Secretariat would circulate the usual triple -
symbolled document containing these and the other deadlines shortl y after the meeting.9  
 
33. Some Members had yet to submit any notification concerning legislations. The Chair 
underlined the importance of these notifications in terms of transparency, and recalled that for many 
Members all that would be required was a single  nil notification. For any Members that conducted 
countervailing duty investigations but had not yet notified their legislation, it was all the more 
important for the Committee to have the opportunity to review and ask questions about that 
legislation. The refore, the Chair encouraged  all Members that had not yet made a legislative 
notification to do so as promptly as possible.   
 
34. The Chair referred to the document G/SCM/N/18/Add.4 6 which contained the latest revision 
of the list of authorities competent to initiate and conduct investigations  within the meaning of 
Article  25.12 of the SCM Agreement and invited all Members with such an authority to submit the 
required notification pursuant to Article 25.12 of the SCM Agreement, or to review and update as 
necessary their previously -submitted notifications.  
 
35. The Committee took note  of the Chair's statement.  
 
2  SEMI -ANNUAL REPORTS OF COUNTERVAILING DU TY ACTIONS (ARTICLE  25.11) – 
G/SCM/N/334 AND G/SC M/N/334/S UPPL .1 
36. The Chair recalled that document G/SCM/N/334 and G/SCM/N/334 /Suppl. 1 had invited all 
Members to submit no later than 15 June 2018, their semi -annual reports under Article 25.11 of the 
SCM Agreement of countervailing duty actions taken during the period 1 January th rough 
30 June 2018.  Document G/SCM/N/334/Add.1  provided the current status of Members' reporting for 
that period. Paragraph 1 of the document listed those Members reporting countervailing duty actions 
during the period. Paragraph 2 listed Members that had notified having taken no countervailing duty 
action during the period. Paragraph 5 of the document listed the 40 Members that had submitted a 
one-time notification that they had no investigating authority, had taken no countervailing actions 
to date, and d id not anticipate taking any such actions in the foreseeable future.  
   
                                                
9 G/ADP/W/ 502-G/SCM/W/57 7-G/SG/W/24 4, circulated on 6 November 2018.  G/SCM/M/107  
 
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  37. One-time notifications served a useful transparency function, as they assisted non -active 
Members to meet their notification requirements in a streamlined way. Any eligible Member that  had 
not already done so thus was urged to submit a one -time notification. The Secretariat was ready to 
assist any Member in this regard.  
 
38. Unfortunately, as listed in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the document, 41 Members ha d not 
submitted a semi -annual report for  January -June 2018. The Chair  urged those Members to submit 
their reports as soon as possible.  
   
39. No comments or questions were raised concerning the semi -annual reports of Australia,  Brazil, 
Canada, China, Egypt, European Union, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru,  Chinese Taipei and Turkey.  
 
40. With respect to the semi -annual report of India , China  expressed concerns over the increased 
use of countervailing duties by India. China noted the evidentiary standards for initiating the 
investigation and asked India to follow the relevant rules. China also urged India to reveal the 
accuracy and adequacy of the information provided in the petition to determine if the eviden ce was 
sufficient to justify initiation of an investigation. India noted China's concerns but requested China 
to provide specific points on which it requested answers.  
 
41. Regarding the semi -annual report of t he United States , the European Union  raised concer ns 
over the imposition of countervailing duties on Spanish ripe olives. The European Union was 
concerned with the imposition of high duties on this product despite numerous and well substantiated 
interventions on its part. The European Union was taking thi s matter seriously as it considered its 
Agricultural Policy Support schemes to be fully compatible with its WTO obligations. It disagreed 
with the reasoning used by the US authorities, which it considered to be inconsistent with WTO rules 
and cases. The Eu ropean Union was currently examining all possible options with respect to these 
measures.  
 
42. Turkey  asserted that the United States' determinations on public body, specificity, benefit 
calculation and cross -cumulation issues were inconsistent with WTO rules.  It noted that it had made 
a complaint to a WTO panel. Turkey asked the United States to take into account WTO panel and 
Appellate Body reports and not cumulate the effects of subsidized imports with that of non -
subsidized dumped imports. Turkey also noted  that according to Article 27.8 of the SCM Agreement 
any countervailing investigation on products originating in a developing country shall be terminated 
as soon as the authorities concerned determines that the overall level of subsidization does not 
excee d 2% of its volume calculated on a per unit basis. Turkey asked the United States to act 
consistently with the rules and jurisprudence.  
 
43. With respect to points raised by the European Union, the United States  noted that its 
countervailing duty investigation s were consistent with the US law, which in turn were consistent 
with the WTO rules. With respect to Turkey's intervention, the United States noted that the issues 
raised by Turkey had been addressed previously and asked Members to refer to previous meetin gs. 
The United States submitted that its actions were consistent with  reports of the DSB. The 
United  States also asserted that it had found that Turkey was not a developing country and had set 
out the basis for this determination.  
 
44. The Committee took note  of all semi-annual reports  submitted as well as the statements 
made.  
 
3  PRELIMINARY AND FINA L COUNTERVAILING DUT Y ACTIONS: NOTIFICAT IONS 
(ARTICLE 25.11)  
45. The Chair reported that since the Committee's April 2018  regular meeting, notifications under 
Article 25.11 of preliminary and final countervailing duty actions had been received from Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, India, Mexico, and the United States. Those notifications were listed in documents 
G/SCM/N/333, G/SCM /N/335/Rev. 1, G/SCM/N/ 336, G/SCM/N/ 337, G/SCM/N/ 338, and 
G/SCM/N/ 339. 
 
46. No Member took the floor regarding those notifications.  
 
47. The Committee took note  of the notifications . 
 G/SCM/M/107  
 
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  4  ARTICLE  27.4 EXTENSIONS OF THE TRANSITION PERIO D FOR THE ELIMINATIO N OF 
EXPORT SUBSIDIES  
48. The Chair recalled that Members that had been granted extensions under Article 27.4 pursuant 
to the procedures in WT/L/691 were required, under paragraph 2(c) of the procedur es, to submit 
transparency notifications in respect of each year of the final two -year phase -out period, i.e. calendar 
years 2014 and 2015. The deadline for the notification pertaining to 2014 was 30  June 2015. A 
reminder to this effect had been circulated  in document G/SCM/N/290/INF.  
49. Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Jamaica, Jordan, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines had submitt ed these notifications, which had been circulated in 
the G/SCM/N/290 series.  
 
50. Furthermore, given that 2015 was the final year of the two -year phase -out period pursuant 
to the previously mentioned procedures, the Members with extensions needed to have compl eted 
the elimination of their export subsidies by 31 December 2015. They also had to provide a final 
transparency notification in respect of calendar year 2015 not later than 30 June 2016. A reminder 
concerning that final round of Article 27.4 –related noti fications had been circulated in document 
G/SCM/N/299. For the information of Members, the Chair  had asked Secretariat to prepare a room 
document indicating the current status of notifications and of actions reported by Members with 
extensions under Articl e 27.4.10 
51. To date, fourteen  of the beneficiary Members – Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Costa Rica, 
Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Jamaica, Jordan, Mauritius, Papua 
New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Navis, and Saint Vincent and the G renadines - had submitted those 
final notifications. The Chair reminded other Members with extensions to submit their final 
transparency notifications as soon as possible. The deadline for the elimination of the export 
subsidies had been three  years earlie r while for submitting the final notification had been more than  
two years earlier. He emphasized the importance for the system that both the Members benefit from 
extensions complete their compliance with the corresponding substantive and transparency 
obligations.  
 
52. Jordan assured Members that it would terminate its subsidy programme by the end of 2018 
in line with the action plan that it had submitted to the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG) in document 
G/C/W/705/Rev .2. Jordan stated that a new WTO -complian t program, which had been developed 
with the assistance of experts funded by USAID, would be implemented as of 2019. Jordan also 
submitted its final transparency notification issued in document G/SCM/N/315/JOR/Suppl .1 and 
G/SCM/N/ 299/JOR/Rev .2 as mentioned  in the Committee's last meeting in April 2018.  
  
53. Barbados  informed the Committee that the process to submit its final transparency notification 
was still ongoing. Barbados had moved a step further since submission of its no tification 
G/SCM/N/275/BRB/Suppl. 1, which had been submitted to the Committee on 29 August 2016 in 
relation to the Fiscal Incentive Program. The cabinet of Barbados had subsequently approved the 
decision to repeal the Fiscal Incentives Act. This takes effect on 2  January 2019. Thus, Barbados 
wished to underscore its commitment to this process and to the multilateral rules -based system of 
the WTO.  
 
54. New Zealand  noted that this agenda item had been before the Committee for a couple of years 
and that there were still outs tanding notifications for several Members. New Zealand noted that 
Article 27.4 export subsidies were to be phased out by 31 December 2015. Those Members that 
maintained them should have submitted their final transparenc y notification by mid -2016. 
New Zeala nd noted that since the previous Committee meeting, Antigua and Barbuda, Jordan and 
Saint Kitts and Navis had made their final transparency notifications. New Zealand asked Saint Kitts 
and Navis to confirm the status of their export subsidy programs as the y had indicated in their 
notification that the program was ongoing, and no final date had been provided. Members who had 
not submitted their notifications such as Barbados, Fiji, Saint Lucia and Uruguay were encouraged 
to submit their notifications before the spring meeting. New Zealand also noted that for many of 
them it might be an administrative matter given almost all of the Members concerned had previously 
                                                
10 RD/SCM/36/Rev.2.  G/SCM/M/107  
 
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  reported the time limits and nature of the planned termination of their export subsidy programmes . 
New Zealand requested to keep this item on the agenda for the spring meeting.  
 
55. The United States  saw the Article 27.4 exercise as a success story of this Committee and the 
WTO generally. There were a group of countries that had expressed a concern which had been 
addressed in a professional and structured manner. The United States thanked all countries that had 
lived up to their transparency obligations pursuant to the accepted procedures and were pleased to 
see four new transparency notifications provided . The United States urged all countries that were 
yet to submit their transparency notifications to do so as soon as possible.  
 
56. Japan  echoed the points raised by New Zealand and the United States, and considered that 
the Committee should follow up on the r elevant export subsidies following the transparency 
requirements decided and set forth by the General Council.  
 
57. The Chair  noted that the Committee would revert to that issue at the next meeting.  
 
58. The Committee took note  of the statements made.   
 
5  IMPROVING THE TIMELINESS AND C OMPLETENESS OF NOTIF ICATIONS AND OTHER 
INFORMATION FLOWS ON  TRADE MEASURES UNDE R THE SCM AGREEMENT  
59. The Chair  recalled that since the request of the Chairman of the Trade Policy Review Body in 
spring 2009, the Committee had been discussi ng, at formal and informal meetings, "ways to improve 
the timeliness and completeness of notifications and other information flows on trade measures". 
The substance of those discussions was reflected in the minutes of the previous meetings.  
60. The Chair recal led that at Committee's April 2018  meeting a number of Members had indicated 
their willingness to continue discussions on ways to improve timeliness and completeness of 
notification obligations under the SCM Agreement, with the notification of subsidies be ing the most 
fundamental.  The Chair noted that Australia had informed him  that it d id not wish to raise its   
suggestions regarding the Secretariat document on the status of Member 's notifications. In this 
regard, there were two topics to cover under this agenda item, (i) the status of Membe rs' 
notifications of subsidies and (ii) the US proposal regarding a written process for questions and 
answers under Articles 25.8 and 25.9 of the SCM Agreement.  
61. Regarding the status of subsidy notifications, the Chair n oted that the Secretariat had 
prepared and updated a background note (G/SCM/W/546/Rev.9) at the request of Members, 
providing a snapshot of the level of compliance with the various notification obligations und er the 
SCM Agreement since 1995, the most recen t of which had been circulated on 29 March 2018 i n 
document G/SCM/W/546/Rev. 9. 
62. Since the April 2018 meeting of the Committee, the following Members ha d submitted their 
2017 new and full notifications: Afghanistan; Antigua and Barbuda; Brazil; China; India; Israel; 
Russian Federation; and Saint Kitts and Nevis.  
 
63. Unfortunately, compliance with the obligation to notify subsidies remained low. 78 Members 
had not made their 2017 new and full subsidy notification for  which the deadline had been 
30 June 2017. Sixty -three  Members still had not made their 2015 new and full subsidy notification, 
although the deadline had been more than  three years earlier. Further,  fifty-six Members still had 
not made their 2013 notifications, which had been due more than  five years earlier. Many of these 
Members either had never notified or had done so only in the distant past. The chronic low 
compliance with this fundamental trans parency obligation constituted a serious problem in the 
proper functioning of the Agreement.  
64. The Chair invited the Members that had not yet submitted their 2017 notifications to provide 
an update to the Committee on their progress in preparing those notifications.  No such delegation 
took the floor.  
 
65. New Zealand  expressed concerns with the low levels of compliance with WTO notification 
obligations. Without those notifications it was not possible to assess what programmes were in place 
and whether those  programmes might be affecting the trade interests of other Memb ers. 
New Zealand appreciated the opportunity to ask questions of other Members particularly regarding G/SCM/M/107  
 
- 9 - 
 
  their notified fisheries subsidies programmes and the timely r esponse to those questions. 
New Zealand had also provided responses to Members' questions re garding changes in 
New Zealand's domestic countervailing duty legislation. Those questions had given New Zealand an 
opportunity to get external perspectives on its legislation and also to rece ive questions and 
perspectives on its programmes that it might not have otherwise considered. Many Members had 
not submitted a nil notification although they did not have any s ubsidy programmes in place. 
New Zealand encouraged those Members who had not sub mitted their notifications to do so as soon 
as possible. Those facing difficulty should seek assistance from the Secretariat. New Zealand also 
thanked those Members who had made proposals for including time limits and responsiveness of 
notifications, such as the United States and other Members who were making efforts in general to 
improve notification compliance.  
 
66. Canada  agreed that the subsidy notification process was fundamentally an important 
transparency exercise and expected Members to make every effor t to provide their notifications and 
responses to questions from Members in a timely and complete manner.  
 
67. The European Union  noted that it was imperative that Members made their best effort not 
only to provide subsidies but also to do so on time. Due to l ate filing of the subsidy schemes, 
Members could see the relevant information only after they had expired. The European Union 
encouraged Members to provide their notifications in a comprehensive and timely manner which was 
extremely important to the work o f the Committee.  
 
68. Norway  echoed the points raised and noted that the assistance from the Secretariat should be 
available for those Members. It encouraged those Members which had not yet submitted their 
notifications to do so as soon as possible.  
 
69. Switzer land shared the concerns raised and noted its support to the initiative to improve 
transparency and remained ready to further discuss the issue in order to find a solution.  
 
70. The United States  echoed the points and concerns raised by previous speakers. The 
Secretariat report showed that the compliance with Members' notification obligations was continuing 
to decline over the years despite the fact that this item had been on the agenda for many years and 
that there was a Ministerial Decision made in Buenos Air es. Transparency was one of the foundational 
elements of the SCM Agreement and if the obligations were not adhered to, the Agreement could 
not function as intended.  
 
71. Australia  echoed the concerns raised by previous speakers and noted that this transparenc y 
obligation was a core provision of the Agreement. Without notifications it would be very difficult for 
exporters and producers to know what was going on in other markets. Australia urged other 
Members to make every effort to comply with their obligations  and supported ongoing technical 
assistance by the Secretariat where appropriate.  
   
72. Chinese Taipei  expressed its concerns regarding the low level of compliance with the 
notification obligations and urged those Members which had not yet provided their not ifications to 
do so in a timely manner.  
 
73. Japan  echoed the statements made by the previous speakers and urged Members to make 
timely and complete notifications.  
 
74. Singapore  echoed the points raised by the previous speakers and shared those views to 
improve t he transparency. It also supported the idea of additional technical assistance for those 
Members.  
 
75. The Chair urged Members that had not yet submitted their notifications to do so, and recalled 
that the Secretariat continued to be available for enquiries about compliance with notification 
obligations. The Secretariat had assisted many Members in the past and Memb ers finding themselves 
unable to comply with their obligations were encouraged to consult the Secretariat. There was a 
range of resources that delegations could draw upon in working to rectify the situation, including the 
Secretariat Handbook on Notificati on Requirements for the SCM  Agreement and the two Geneva -
based Internship Programmes coordinated by the Secretariat.  
 G/SCM/M/107  
 
- 10 - 
 
  76. With respect to the second topic under this agenda item, the Chair recalled that at the 
Committee's April 2018  regular meeting, a number o f Members had indicated their willingness to 
continue discussions on the proposal from the US regarding procedures for questions and answers 
under Articles 25.8 and 25.9 of the SCM  Agreement.11  
 
77.  The United States  recalled that previously it had introduced  its formal proposal that written 
answers to initial questions under Article 25.8 be provided within sixty days and that follow -up 
questions be answered in thirty days.  Although the mandatory deadlines for written answers to 
questions under Article 25.8 were necessary for the proper functioning of the provision, it recognized 
the concerns raised by some developing countries. Since no consensus had been reached on 
mandato ry deadlines previously, the United States proposed an alternative under which Members 
would agree to non -mandatory deadlines for responses to Article 25.8 questions.  
 
78. Under the new proposal, Members would only agree to make their best efforts to submit 
written responses to Article 25.8 questions within sixty days and written responses to follow -up 
questions within thirty days. According to the United States, such guidelines would signal that 
Members of the Committee were committed to making the important t ransparency provisions 
contained in the SCM Agreement function properly.  
 
79. Finding ways to enhance transparency was a goal that all Members should embrace, 
considering the outcome at the Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires, where Ministers had re -
committ ed to the implementation of existing notification obligations under Article 25.3 of the 
Agreement. Where written responses to questions posed under Article 25.8 were not provided in a 
timely manner, or not at all, that important tool would be rendered inef fective and thus undermine 
transparency and the proper functioning of the SCM Agreement. The idea of Members committing 
to providing written responses to Article 25.8 questions within a specified time was not a radical one 
and was in fact rooted in the acc epted practices of the Committee.  
 
80. Although it had been reluctant to do so, the United States had modified its position to take 
into account the concerns raised by certain Members previously. The United States expected that 
the new proposal would overcome those concerns and Members could meet somewhere in the 
middle.  
 
81. The United States reminded that this provision was used infrequently which suggested it was 
not being abused. It was, however, an important transparency tool and the new proposal would 
advanc e its proper functioning. The United States remained flexible in finding a pragmatic solution 
that would satisfy the underlying objective of enhancing the exchange of information.  
 
82. New Zealand  noted that the timely responses to questions were crucial for p roductive and 
transparent dialogue amongst Members. It found written question and answer process as a valuable 
one and supported the new US proposal encouraging other Members to do so as well.  
 
83. Japan  supported the new US proposal and encouraged Members to  engage constructively in 
the discussion and advance the work to improve the Committee's work on the timeliness and 
completeness of notifications and answers. The US proposal provided certain dates which were 
important to have clarity in the answering proc ess. In this respect, making guidelines or procedures 
would be very helpful for all Members. Japan appreciated the efforts by the United States, making 
the new proposal seeking for a guideline or best practices rather than making a new rule and 
encouraged Members to consider the proposal constructively.   
  
84. Canada noted that the information request process contemplated under Articles 25.8 and 25.9 
of the SCM Agreement were important pillars for achieving the transparency objectives of the 
Agreement and reit erated its openness to explore a mechanism to address Article 25.8 requests. It 
expected that other Members could support the proposal as well.  
 
85. Australia  expressed its support for the new US proposal and appreciated the US' flexibility in 
looking at ways to accommodate the concerns raised by some Members. This was a very important 
part of the Committee's work and Members' approach on Articles 25.8 and 25.9 should be in the 
same manner as for any non -notification under Article 25 of the Agreement.  
                                                
11 The most recent version of the proposal was contained in document G/ SCM/W/557/Rev. 3 which was 
circulated on 26 October 2018 . G/SCM/M/107  
 
- 11 - 
 
   
86. The European Union  reiterated that the importance of transparency was imperative to the 
working of the SCM Agreement and the question and answer process under Articles 25.8 and 25.9 
was a very important complimentary aspect to improve transparency. It expresse d its support for 
the proposal and invited other Members to do so.  
 
87. Korea  expressed its support for the revised proposal of the US which could serve as a guideline 
in operating Article 25.8 of the Agreement. With respect to the first discussion topic under  this 
agenda item, it noted that enhancing transparency was crucial.  
 
88. Chinese Taipei  thanked the US for its flexibility and indicated that it was open for the revised 
proposal.  
 
89. China  recalled its position at the previous meetings noting that Article s 25.8 and 25.9  did not  
provided for the submission of written replies. The requirement for making written answers would 
impose newly added substantive obligations on Members for which there was no legal basis. As 
expressed by many Members during previous meetin gs of the Committee, this might disturb the 
balance of rights and obligations reflected in the results of negotiations on relevant articles.  As for 
the questions under Article 25.8, the relevant Member would provide oral responses at the regular 
meetings f or which Members could always refer to the minutes.  
 
90. Brazil  noted that it would convey the proposal to its capital and provide its comments later.  
 
91. The Russian Federation  welcomed  the efforts to increase  timely responsiveness of Members 
which would benefit  all Members. There was a room for improvement on that issue ; however, 
Members should take into account of the difficulties faced by Members with complex state structure 
and allocation of budget funding . For example, it might take longer for those Members to collect and 
process the information from regional authorities. The opportunity to agree on other deadlines might 
make it easier to comply with the proposal ; however  the practicalities were still unclear. In particular, 
how much time would the requesting  and responding Members have to reach an agreement? How 
long could it take to prepare for consultations on other deadlines? What should the final deadline be 
in case of failure in finding a mutually acceptable one? The Russian Federation remained open for 
further discussions.  
92. Mexico  indicated that it would consider the proposal and come back with further comments.  
 
93. The United States  noted the arguments indicating that Article 25.9 did not require written 
responses. However, the Agreement did not say anythin g about written responses with respect to 
the normal question and answer process when examining Members' normal subsidy notifications. 
That was an agreement within the Committee and the United States did not see why the Committee 
could not agree on that is sue as well. This was a common -sense  approach to full exchange of 
information with respect to Members' subsidy programmes. Members could check the minutes; 
however very often, either the oral responses were provided late or very incomplete.  
 
94. The Chair stated that it appeared that Members wished to continue discussions on those issues 
at the next regular meeting of the Committee.  
 
95. The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
 
6  SUBSIDIES AND OVERCA PACITY – ITEM REQUES TED BY THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN 
AND THE UNITED STATES  
96. The European Union  noted that industrial overcapacity had become a major problem for the 
global economy as it distorted international trade and created multiple negative externalities. G20 
leaders had also recognized that subsidies and o ther types of support from governments or 
government -sponsored institutions could cause market distortions and contribute to global excess 
capacity and therefore required attention.  
 
97. According to the EU, the distortions caused by capacity -maintaining or cr eating subsidies were 
a major concern for the international trade community as the existing rules were not sufficient to 
appropriately address the subsidies that contribute to overcapacity. It recalled that in the context of 
the recent WTO Public Forum, th e EU, the United States and Japan had organised a working session G/SCM/M/107  
 
- 12 - 
 
  called "Make the playing field level again! (Ensuring global fair trade by 2030)" the purpose of which 
had been to identify and discuss the most harmful types of subsidies that result in an uneven playing 
field and create significant negative  externalities.  
 
98. The four participating speakers had discussed whether WTO Members were currently able to 
defend themselves against such subsidies, and whether the WTO rulebook on subsidies need ed to 
be improved and updated. Some speakers had referred to the ongoing trilateral cooperation between 
the EU, Japan and the US where the strengthening of WTO subsidy rules was being discussed in 
detail. The EU referred  to the ministerial joint statement of 31 May 2018 by the European Union, 
Japan and the United States  which contain ed a scoping paper to define the basis for the development 
of stronger rules on industrial subsidies.  
 
99. The first speaker, Mr Orlando Perez Garate had described the difficulties Mexican in dustries 
were facing when confronted with heavy subsidisation by other Members. He had spoken about the 
experience of the steel industry and pointed to international efforts in the steel sector to curb harmful 
subsidies which in his view were the main cont ributor to overcapacity. He had referred to both the 
OECD and the Global Steel Forum and identified the main sources of concern for stakeholders in 
Mexico which were lack of transparency, lack of stronger disciplines on state -owned enterprises, 
subsidies a t the sub -central level and lack of rules on subsidies in the services sector. He had also 
indicated that some responses to those issues had been found in the USMCA and in the CPTPP.  
 
100.  The second speaker, Mr James Goodrich had described how a highly globali sed, transparent, 
and market -based industry like semiconductors had been and could be disrupted by government 
subsidies, the current government subsidies landscape, and how new rules governing subsidies were 
essential to ensuring healthy growth of the sect or.  He had referred to the emergence of large multi -
billion government investment funds that provided equity infusions to state -owned enterprises, 
which in some cases might lead to excess capacity.  Those new government subsidy programmes 
brought challeng es to the global semiconductor industry, as those government investment funds 
provided equity infusions to domestic firms in a very non -transparent manner. Some governments 
believed that they could avoid their transparency obligations by claiming those fun ds were not public 
bodies. In addition, some of those programmes that may lead to excess capacity had the overt goal 
of displacing current market participants, yet current WTO rules required high evidentiary standards 
to prove adverse effects.   
 
101.  Finally, he had discussed how a new and modernised WTO subsidies agreement was needed 
referring to the trilateral cooperation between the European Union, Japan and the United States. 
Regarding the modernisation, he had noted that, first, efforts should be made to i ncrease 
transparency by establishing a presumption of serious prejudice for programmes that governments 
failed to notify; second, public bodies should be clearly defined based on an objective, simple control 
standard; and third, subsidy rules needed to be strengthened to more effectively capture adverse 
effects they created which could include broadening the categories of prohibited subsidies.  
 
102.  The third speaker, Professor Jennifer Hillman had argued that the inability to properly 
discipline subsidies was the most burning failure of the existing trade rules. She had addressed the 
existing remedies such as CVD investigations and WTO dispute settlement. While CVD investigations 
provide d a quicker and unilateral remedy, they were only available after the  subsidised goods c ame 
into the market of the investigating authority.  CVD investigations also had a tendency of pushing 
the subsidised goods into other m arkets. Therefore,  they would  never address the underlying 
problem, namely the existence of a subsidy  and the effects of such a subsidy, such as excess 
capacity. She had highlighted three issues that hinder ed the proper functioning of the SCM 
Agreement:   
 
• First was the issue of the proper definition of "public body, " which was currently interpreted 
too na rrowly, looking purely at the function of the body and thus, disregarding other ways 
of approaching the grantor of a subsidy, including ownership or control. She had argued that 
there was a need to change the definition of a public body such that it could encompass all 
or a combination of the above factors.  
 
• Second was the problem of remedies that were only possible prospectively. Instead, 
remedies needed to be designed to force repayment of subsidies retrospectively.  
 G/SCM/M/107  
 
- 13 - 
 
  • Finally, there was the problem of the evidentiary standard which was compounded by other 
problems such as the lack of transparency and difficulties in proving the adverse effects of 
a subsidy. The latter was also problematic because it required complaining Members to wait 
until the effect of t he subsidy occurred. In reality, it would often too late and the negative 
effect was irreparable. To address those problems, new subsidy disciplines should create 
more rebuttable presumptions in favour of finding adverse effects based on the type of the 
subsidy, the amount of the subsidy, the increase in production and output following the 
receipt of the subsidy and any increases in exports of the products receiving subsidies. She 
also had argued that the evidentiary burden would be reduced if the prohibite d subsidies 
under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement had been expanded and if the expired provisions of 
the SCM Agreement, including Article 6.1 (presumption of serious prejudice) along with 
Article 8 (non -actionable subsidies) had been renewed. As regards the  possible types of 
prohibited subsidies, she had mentioned below -market financing, transfers of funds to cover 
operating losses, loans to uncreditworthy entities, loans to insolvent enterprises without a 
credible restructuring plan, and the provision of ke y material inputs at below market rates.  
 
103.  In addition, she had referred to the ongoing process to tackle those three issues, namely the 
trilateral cooperation between the EU, Japan and the US that had begun at MC11, the scoping paper 
dated May 2018, in particular.  
 
104.  The fourth speaker, Mr Mark Wu referred to a mismatch between existing rules and evolving 
economic structures. He had highlighted that th e debate  was not about picking on a particular WTO 
Member but rather about modernising the rules on subsi dies to the benefit of all Members. He had 
suggested that even if language was found that would improve the substantive rules on subsidies, 
such as a new public body definition, three fundamental problems plaguing the current rules would 
still remain:  
 
• The remedies were wrongly designed in that they had prospective effects only. Hence, there 
was no clawback of gains achieved by the subsidising member. This might motivate 
subsidising Members to temporarily violate the law when the economic/political gains we re 
large enough. The failure of the current system to provide remedies that adequately deter 
temporary breaches would lead to the use of unilateral remedies that might bring faster and 
more effective results.  
 
• The problem was exacerbated by the transparenc y failures. There was a considerable time 
lag between the date of a notification and the period covered. Even economically relevant 
Members failed to notify at all, or notified in an incomplete manner because the current 
system did not penalise or incentiv ise Members to comply with their notification obligations 
that were necessary to make the system work.  
 
• The 1980s division of economic models (market and non -market economy) was obsolete 
now as there was a third archetype where market forces operated but the state retained 
control over capital and key economic infrastructure. This model was neither a market nor 
a non -market economy. Under this type of economic system, it was quite easy to circumvent 
the rules because in such a system there was often no act ual policy measure to attack, and 
even if there was, it was not specific. In addition, there was no explicit direction or 
entrustment in such a system. Hence, there was no effective means allowing a complaining 
Member to attack it.  
 
105.  The United States  empha sized that the G20 recognized the link between subsidies and 
overcapacity. It also noted that the common themes of the Public Forum's working session had been 
(i) the need for greater transparency; (ii) stronger subsidy rules; and (iii) the need to revisit  the 
rules on public bodies and state -owned enterprises.  
 
106.  Japan  indicated that subsidies and other types of market distorting supports by governments 
was one of the major causes of overcapacity in iron and steel, aluminium, semiconductor, and 
shipbuilding industries. Japan was concerned with such subsidies and it highlighted the importance 
of having further discussions on this issue in  the Committee. The document G/SCM/W/575 had 
pointed out in what ways the disciplines set out in the SCM Agreement were inco mplete or 
inadequate to address the issue of global overcapacity. At the Public Forum, there had been concrete 
discussions on those issues. The experts had identified several aspects of the current SCM 
Agreement which were not working well, pointing out, a mong others, transparency failures; the G/SCM/M/107  
 
- 14 - 
 
  issues related to the grantor of subsidies; the public body issues; the difficulties collecting evidence, 
especially to prove actionable subsidies; and the problem of remedies that only had prospective 
effects. Those  issues were precise and worth exploring further in the Committee.  
 
107.  In order to address the underlying overcapacity problem, Japan encouraged Members to 
seriously consider the issue and continue discussions to explore how the current disciplines of the 
Agreement could be improved. It also noted that the trilateral cooperation among the European 
Union, the United States and Japan, as well as recent FTA provisions, could be helpful references to 
this en d.  
 
108.  Canada  recalled that it had co -sponsored various act ions at the WTO, OECD and the G20 to 
draw attention to the effects of subsidies on global overcapacity. This demonstrated the ongoing 
concern with the role of government interventions with respect to the global excess capacity in 
certain sectors which resu lted in trade and market distortions affecting all manufacturing economies. 
To be effective, actions had to aim to address the underlying causes of excess capacity including 
subsidization and government interventions. The WTO and the Committee were uniquel y situated to 
support discussion on the role of subsidies on global overcapacity, as well as how to address them.  
 
109.  Mexico  reiterated that subsidies could cause distortion and excess capacity which required 
Members' full attention. Mexican industries were f acing with the excess capacity. Mexico had been 
very active to raise the awareness on that problem and to find ways to solve it. It recognized the 
need for transparency and expected to continue to discuss that issue at the next meetings of the 
Committee.  
 
110.  Norway  indicated that the present situation required an open discussion in the WTO on how 
to address the sources of trade distortions. It was the common responsibility of the Membership to 
ensure that the rules for the world trade were respected and the ru lebook had been updated 
whenever needed. World trade was dominated by complex value chain structures meaning that the 
production of goods sold in any given market was normally taking place in the territories of several 
Members. There were sectors that rece ived subsidies at the various points of the production chain 
which were non -transparent and difficult to identify. There was an obvious risk that subsidies could 
create overcapacity which was a concern for a number of Members including Norway. Trade 
distor tions took place not only in the domestic market of a producer but also in the third markets 
which was a fairly new and complex situation because the WTO rulebook did not necessarily have 
the tools available for remedying the situation. Norway was of the v iew that it was necessary to 
discuss this issue to develop new disciplines and remained ready to engage such work. Regarding 
the issue of state -owned enterprises, Norway noted that part of the complexity of the problem was 
due to the operations of state -owned enterprises. The core of the problem was not labelling of an 
operator as an SOE but the harmful behaviour of certain operators. SOEs as such did not constitute 
a problem. If they ran under market terms and were kept in an arms -length distance from 
governments they would not create distortions in the markets.  
 
111.  Australia  shared the concerns raised previously regarding the industrial overcapacity and the 
distorting effects that subsidies might have on markets. It was supportive of clarifying and improving 
the subsidy rules and agreed that there was a need to update subsidy  rules to reflect contemporary 
challenges. Existing subsidy rules lacked clarity and robustness to counteract and remedy unfairly 
subsidized imports. It had been supportive in past negotiations to consider strengthening the current 
rules. Namely (i) to ens ure that the category of prohibited subsidies was just that a  rules based 
breach with the presumption of egregious trade effects and (ii) to look at renewing the dark amber 
category of serious prejudice whereby a threshold was created and a rebuttable pres umption of 
serious prejudice was re -instated with limitations on certain types of subsidies. Australia also noted 
the need for improved transparency and notification obligations relating to subsidies. It was also 
supportive of new, well -crafted rules on SO Es, in particular to clarify and improve the existing rules 
to more effectively capture the market distorting practices of SOEs. SOEs engaging in commercial 
activities should act in accordance with commercial considerations. Australia remained ready to be 
involved in further work and would be interested in the sponsors' views on how the discussion could 
be taken forward.  
 
112.  Switzerland  supported approaches that aimed at limiting trade distorting practices. Developing 
adequate and efficient solutions required to identify the source and form of such trade distorting 
measures. According to Switzerland, the working session organized during the Public Forum had 
offered a useful contribution to the debate and it would welcome additional analytical and detailed G/SCM/M/107  
 
- 15 - 
 
  work on that matter. It was important that Members maintained an open dialogue with a view to 
achieve implementable solution within the WTO context.  
 
113.  Chinese Taipei  noted that the working session had provided insight on the possible causes of 
overcapacity as w ell as the possible approach to update of the SCM Agreement to address 
overcapacity and market distortions caused by subsidies. The existing rules were not always 
sufficient to address those market distortions. Chinese Taipei would welcome further discussi ons and 
initiatives and expected to continue to discuss this issue at the Committee.  
 
114.  China  recalled its statement made at the beginning of the meeting and reiterated that the 
Committee was not the proper forum to discuss overcapacity  and subsidies were n ot the major cause 
of it. Overcapacity was a global, periodic and structural problem and the root cause was the slow 
recovery of the global economy as well as the sluggish demand conditions since the international 
financial crisis in 2008, which had also b een confirmed by the G20 Leaders. The modest upturn in 
global demand together with a slowdown in capacity growth in recent years ha d helped to reduce 
the gap between world steel demand and capacity recently.  
115.  Addressing the overcapacity issue  was requir ing collective action and global cooperation. 
China  had taken concreate action through the supply -side structural reform. In 2016 and 2017, it 
had successfully reduced the steel excess capacity by over one hundred million tonnes which had 
cost China a hefty pr ice. China should not be the only one that was making painful efforts while 
other Members were watching or taking action in the opposite way. Referring to the rise of 
protectionism in recent years, China noted that unilateral trade actions by some Members had 
triggered wide -spread concerns about a trade war which could erode the business confidence that 
was vital for the global growth.  
116.  China recalled that the G20 Leader 's Declaration in Hamburg ha d called for the removal of 
market -distorting subsidies and other types of support by governments and related entities. The 
Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity, facilitated by  the OECD, ha d also required Members to share 
information including supportive policies or measures on steel sector. Therefore, the unremit ting 
efforts and great contribution made by the Global Forum  to analyse the links between subsidies and 
creation of excess shall not be neglected or depreciated.  
117.  China noted that t he abusive use or overuse of trade remedies, as a reactive instrument, had 
made industr ial overcapacity even worse. Focusing on only subsidies while ignoring other important 
elements would  not help to solve the problem but  instead  lead Members to an erroneous direction 
and cause a rise in protectionism.  
118.  New Zealand  recalled that i t had been supportive of reforming subsidies disciplines noting its 
general concerns with trade distorting subsidies and their impacts on Members' interests. It was 
keen to engage in considering new proposals as they related to new disciplines and enhancin g 
transparency.  
 
119.  The Russian Federation  recalled that it had been more than two years since G20 Leaders had 
confirmed their commitment to tackle overcapacity in steel sector and appreciated the efforts taken 
by the G20 Members since 2016. However, the stru ggle with the excess capacity was still ongoing 
and further steps were necessary which the Russian Federation was ready to discuss. It noted that 
usefulness for overcoming excess capacity should not be the only criterion for the Membership to 
consider prop osals on stronger subsidies disciplines. Possible side effects should be taken in to 
account and the eventual influence of those new disciplines on the functioning of all WTO Members' 
economies should be carefully assessed. The Russian Federation reiterate d its concerns over the use 
trade barriers as a tool to struggle overcapacity. Trade protectionism would not solve the problem; 
rather dialogue and constructive engagement of Members could help.  
 
120.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
7  ARTICLE 25.8  QUESTIONS TO CHINA ON POTENTIAL STEEL S UBSIDIES – ITEM 
REQUESTED BY THE EUR OPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES  
121.  The United States  recalled that it had been concerned with the lack of transparency of China's 
industrial subsidy regime since 2001. To prompt a m ore fulsome disclosure of China's subsidy 
programmes, it had raised questions to China under the old Transitional Review Mechanism, G/SCM/M/107  
 
- 16 - 
 
  pursuant to Article 25.8 of the Agreement, under the normal Committee procedures and also 
counter -notified subsidy measures under Article 25.10.  
122.  As steel was a vital sector in the US, it had raised questions and counter -notified numerous 
possible steel subsidy measures in China. Notwithstanding its claim to the contrary at prior meetings, 
however, China had not notified the va st majority of its steel subsidy programmes over the last 
seventeen years of its WTO Membership.  
123.  The growth of the steel industry in China had been remarkable since China had become a WTO 
Member. Its steel capacity had grown over 500 % since 2001 and it acc ounted for half of the global 
steel production. The growth of capacity in China had outpaced the growth in demand. Its steel 
capacity exceeded domestic demand by over 400 million tons.  
124.  In a market economy, when capacity outpaced demand, the owners of that  capacity were 
threatened by financial loses which forced them to reduce capacity or exit from the market. In a 
market economy, when there was excess capacity in an industry it would be difficult to obtain 
commercial financing for even more capacity invest ments. However, those fact patterns did not 
appear to apply in China.  
125.  The financial crisis in 2008 had led to a severe drop in global demand for steel. In China, 
however, the financial crisis had not affected the increase in capacity. Steel capacity in China had 
gone up substantially by over 330 million tons or 46 % since 2009.  
126.  Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of China and many market analysts agreed 
that China's steel demand had peaked, and it had been declining  since 2013.  
127.  China's exces s production had spilled over to export markets while there was insufficient 
domestic demand. China's exports had grown from less than 7 million tons to 73 million tons between 
2001 and 2017 which had led to a rise in trade remedy cases in both developed a nd developing 
countries against Chinese steel products.  
128.  According to China, the growth in capacity and exports – in both good and bad times - had 
been accomplished with little or no government subsidy support, even for those companies owned 
by the governme nt, while a superficial examination of the annual reports of several of the largest 
steel companies in China indicated the otherwise. In those reports, under the title of "government 
subsidies" or "government grants", many of China's top steel companies li sted dozens of 
government -funded projects through the provision of grants.  
129.  The Article 25.8 questions co -submitted by the European Union and the US in April 2017 asked 
about 160 government subsidies or government grants listed in the annual reports of six  of the 
largest steel companies in China. More recent annual reports indicated the same general level of 
government subsidies. Not all those listed programmes might be notifiable under Article 25, but 
certainly there were more than the three non -specific p rogrammes which China had claimed 
previously or the few other programmes that notified under different names or were not specified 
as claimed by China. If all those other programmes were from provincial and local governments as 
argued by China in other for a, why had they not been notified in China's subsidy notification covering 
sub-central government entities. It had taken China sixteen years to submit its first sub -central 
subsidy notification however it was clear how deficient the notification was.  
130.  Accor ding to steel company annual reports, several of China's steel companies had also 
received government equity infusions which were not surprising given that most of the largest steel 
companies in China were government -owned. While it was possible that none of the government 
equity infusions had provided a benefit to the recipient companies, the US and the EU had asked 
China to explain whether those government investments could be commercially justified.  
131.  The European Union  reiterated that compliance with the notification obligations under 
Article  25 of the Agreement was crucial for the effective work of the Committee. The submission of 
a subsidy notification was a step to meet the obligations under the Agreement but not sufficient 
without complete information on all specific subsidies. The European Union also reiterated its 
concerns over the incomplete nature of China's notifications and noted that despite the questions G/SCM/M/107  
 
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  raised under Article 25.8 of the Agreement and having had the opportunity to do so, China ha d not 
included any of those subsidies in its latest notification which had been submitted in July 2018.  
132.  The European Union  acknowledged that some of the schemes  referred in the questions  might 
not be subject to notification requirements.  However, it was c oncerned with the fact that the most 
recent notification of China only mentioned steel in relation to two schemes, neither of which related 
to the questions raised but rather on the schemes that were used to address overcapacity.  
 
133.  Japan  supported, as a mat ter of transparency,  to continue the discussion on this issue in the 
Committee.  
 
134.  China  reiterated its commitment to enhance transparency of subsidies over recent years. 
There had been a positive progress with respect to the notification of subsidies, where  information 
gathering ha d long been a tremendous obstacle for China as the largest developing Member. 
Following its first subsidy notification at the sub -central government level , China had submitted the 
2017 new and full notification before the seventh T PR of China by overcoming numerous difficulties , 
in which subsidies involving steel sector  had also been included . In addition, all provinces ha d been 
covered in th at notification  which demonstrate d China 's unremitting efforts in improving the 
completeness  of its notification.  
 
135.  According to China, t he completeness of the notification was up to the capacity of each 
Member to some extent, while it was also a matter of technical issues.  Firstly, the SCM Agreement 
authorize d Members to independently submit notifications based on their own understandings of the 
Agreement. Pursuant to Article 25.7, notification of a measure does not prejudge either its legal 
status under th e Agreement, the effects under th e Agreement, or the natu re of the measure itself.  
China was of the view that it was natural that Members ha d different understandings of the specificity 
and completeness of the notification.  
 
136.  Secondly, given the lack of clear definition on sub -central subsidies in the SCM Agreem ent 
itself, Members m ight have different understandings of the definition in this regard. The sub -central 
subsidies notified by China refer red to those either covered by local finance only or jointly covered 
by central and local finance. Therefore, subsidi es released in the name of local governments while 
covered by central finance alone shall be classified as central level subsidies rather than sub -central 
level ones. This  was the main reason why, as far as the United States and the European were  
concerned , many subsid ies released in the name of local governments were not included in the 
notifications of subsidies at the local level.  
 
137.  China ha d taken note of the concerns raised over its steel sector  and was willing to make 
clarifications to the best of its ability.  It noted that those subsidies were mainly concerning 
environmental protection and energy saving projects.  After checking with relevant authorities and 
local governments, it had  incorporated many subsidies involving steel sector in its updated 
notification. Basically, these policies were not specific to steel industry. At the central governmental 
level, such as : 
 
i. Preferential tax treatment for projects for environmental protection, water and energy 
conservation.  
ii. Fund for energy conservation and emi ssion reduction.  
iii. Fund for air pollution prevention and control.  
iv. Fund for the development of international economic relations and trade.  
v. Support for restructuring industrial enterprises  
 
138.  At the sub -central governmental level, such as : 
 
i. Fund for environmental protection, Jiaozuo City of Henan Province  
ii. Fund for prevention and control of air pollution, Jiaozuo and Xinxiang  City of Henan Province  
iii. Fund for e nvironmental protection, Hunan P rovince  
iv. Fund for energy conservation, Tianjin Municipa lity 
v. Reward and support fund for dissolving overcapacity, Yunan province  
vi. Fund for prevention and control of air pollution, He bei Province  
vii. Fund for energy conservation, emission reduction and ecological protection,  Jilin Province  
viii. Fund for pollution prevent ion and control and environmental monitoring and supervision,  
Jilin Province  G/SCM/M/107  
 
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139.  Regarding  the program mes indic ated in the annual report s, China indicated that the annual 
report s of those listed companies were  formulated upon supporting program mes, while China 's 
notification was based on policies. In this case, different program mes might  come from the same 
policy and there  was no one -to-one correlation between them. Even with the same program, there 
could be duplication of statistics among different  subsid iaries.  
   
140.  Referring to statement by the United States, China noted that the US had not provided any 
concrete data to show how massive or tremendous that the subsidies given to the China's steel 
sector. According to the 2017 report by the Global Trade Ale rt entitled " Going Spare: Steel, Excess 
Capacity, and Protectionism ", in 2016, the subsidies received by Chinese steel companies stood for 
only 0.4 % of their sales revenues, which was the second highest figure in the history. Most of the 
years, this figure  was below 0.2 % of the sales revenues of those companies which reflected that the 
general scale of those programmes was quite limited especially compared to 25 % additional tax 
imposed by certain countries. For this reason, according to China, the distortiv e effect of the Chinese 
steel subsidies to the supply chain of global steel industry was relatively limited.  
 
141.  The United States  agreed that it was up to each individual Member to decide what programmes 
to be notified; however there was a legal standard wh ich was set out in the Agreement. All Members 
were obligated to interpret that legal standard in an objective manner.  
 
142.  China had mentioned that many of the programmes were for energy conservation or other 
environmental reasons; however, the United States urged Members to look at the 160 programmes 
listed in the annual reports of the Chinese steel companies. They were not all for energy conservation 
or environmental protection programmes, but rather for increasing production capacity of those 
companies.   
  
143.  Regarding China's allegation that there was no concrete data, the United States noted that 
the relevant information had been directly provided from the annual reports of the steel companies 
in China which reflected the budgeted and expended amounts.  
 
144.  China recalled that it had concerns over the transparency o f steel subsidies of the 
United  States and it had submitted questions under Article 25.8 in April 2018.  
 
145.  The United States  indicated that it had responded all those Article 25.8 questions in writing 
and it was still waiting for China's responses.  
 
146.  The European Union  noted its willingness to continue discussing that issue either under the 
same agenda item or while reviewing China's 2017 notification.  
 
147.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
8  IMPLEMENTATION OF PA RAGRAPH 2 OF THE MIN ISTERIAL DECISION ON  FISHERIES 
SUBSIDIES (WT/MIN(17 )/64; 13 DECEMBER 20 17) – ITEM REQUESTED  BY ARGENTINA, 
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, T HE EUROPEAN UNION, I CELAND, JAPAN, NEW Z EALAND, NORWAY, 
AND THE UNITED STATE S 
148.  The United S tates recalled that at the Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires, Ministers had 
re-committed to the implementation of existing notification obligations under Article 25.3 of the 
Agreement with a view toward strengthening transparency with respect to fishe ries subsidies. It also 
reiterated that the Members' record in meeting their subsidy notifi cation obligation under Article  25.3 
was dismal as more than half of all Members had not submitted their 2017 subsidy notification.  
149.  Some of the notifying Members had  not notified all of their fisheries subsidies among which 
there were some of the largest producers in the world. For example, in 2014, China's Trade Policy 
Review had noted that approximately 30 fisheries programmes had not been notified which remained 
largely unnotified.  Moreover, one of the other largest producers of fish products had not provided a 
notification since 1996. On the other hand, other Members, such as India, had notified their fishery 
subsidy programmes.  
150.  In light of the Ministerial directiv e from Buenos Aires, Members had to seriously re -commit 
themselves to meeting their existing notification obligations.  It was time to advance that important G/SCM/M/107  
 
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  issue and to deliver on the commitment made by Ministers. In order to accomplish that objective 
the Committee should undertake some concrete actions to ensure that all Members were in a position 
to provide their notifications.  
151.  Recognizing  the difficulties indicated by several Members in meeting their notification 
obligations in a timely manner  which cou ld be attributable to capacity and resource constraints in 
certain instances,  the U nited States  suggested the following:  
• The Secretariat could enhance its subsidy notification training/technical assistance, including 
by adopting the training to more specif ically address notifications of fisheries subsidies.  
 
• Members could share best practices, in particular those Members that had consistently or 
recently provided complete fisheries subsidies notifications. For example, India had recently 
provided comprehen sive notifications. Other Members would likely benefit from learning about 
the steps and procedures that those Members had followed to collect the relevant information 
and submit their notifications.  
152.  The U nited States  was open  to other ideas that would hel p to ensure that all Members comply 
with the Ministerial directive from Buenos Aires to provide fisheries subsid ies notifications under 
Article  25.3. It recalled that in addition to the question of how to improve compliance with the 
notification requiremen ts in Article 25.3 it had proposed in prior meetings that the Committee 
considered ways to enhance and improve fisheries subsidies notifications. In this regard, it had asked 
what other information might be needed to assess the trade and resource impacts t hat a fishery 
subsidy might have. Specifically, it had suggested that notifications included additional information 
on catch data; status of the fish stocks; fleet capacity; and conservation and management measures 
to the extent available.  
153.  Recognizing tha t the issue of enhanced transparency relevant to fisheries subsidies has been 
under discussion in the Rules Negotiating Group, the United States was of the view that the 
Committee could also contribute to consideration of the issue.  
154.  Finally, the U nited Sta tes indicated that the ultimate goal was to provide greater transparency 
through notifications that was unique to fisheries subsidies programmes and allow a better 
understanding of the operation of notified programmes. The first step, however, was to adher e to 
the Ministerial Decision and to submit complete and timely notifications of fisheries subsidies.  
155.  Norway  noted the importance of having the issue of fisheries subsidies notifications on the 
Committee's agenda and thanked the Secretariat for having prep ared the compendium of 
notifications regarding fisheries subsidies. It urged all Members to look at not only other Members' 
subsidies, but also their own, to make sure that all relevant fisheries subsidies had been reflected in 
the compendium which showed that there have been lacunas needed to be filled. Norway recalled 
the points that it had raised in April 2018, noting the need for setting a specific deadline for 
submitting fish eries subsidies notifications. To this end, it proposed either June or Septemb er 2019, 
and expected to see whether Members could reach a consensus on such a deadline. Norway also 
indicated that the Secretariat should make a special effort to assist those Members requesting 
assistance.  
156.  Japan attached great importance to improving Me mbers' compliance with the notification 
obligations in the area of fisheries subsidies. Improving the implementation of existing notification 
obligations through paragraph 2 would significantly contribute to the proper functioning and 
operationalization of  fisheries subsidies disciplines . In order to enhance transparency, Members 
should improve the implementation of the existing obligations. Japan would like to cooperate with 
other Members to discuss the necessary measures including strengthening  of Secreta riat's support 
of training  and technical  assistance on notification.  
157.  The European Union  recalled the paper co -sponsored by the EU, Japan and the United States 
which had addressed the questions and the problems relating to transparency and notifications and  
expected to have a broader and wider discussion about that paper.  The issue of transparency and 
notifications on fisheries subsidies was also important for the European Union. It recalled that it had 
provided comprehensive information about subsidy progra mmes at both the EU -wide and at 
member -state levels under Article 25 of the SCM Agreement.  G/SCM/M/107  
 
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  158.  The European Union noted that the WTO Ministerial Decision of 13  December 2017 provided 
that "Members re -commit to implementation of existing notification obligation s under Article 25.3 of 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures thus strengthening transparency with 
respect to fisheries subsidies." It recalled that Members had agreed to abide by already existing 
obligations. However, the compendium docum ent prepared by the Secretariat showed that only 
twenty -five Members had notified fisheries subsidies. The EU noted that a  detailed knowledge of 
existing fisheries subsidies would be beneficial for the successful conclusion of the ongoing 
negotiations on fisheries subsidies.  
159.  Given the dire state with regard to abiding by the basic pre -existing obligations, Members 
should be careful in terms of adding further layers of complexity and requirements. As already been 
discussed by Members in the context of the R ules Negotiation Group, any enhanced transparency 
over and above Article 25 of the SCM Agreement would depend, and should depend entirely on the 
actual disciplines arrived at following those negotiations. Therefore, the EU suggested caution, as 
well as inc reased activity on the part of those Members who had yet to notify at all, or who had yet 
to notify completely their notifications.  
 
160.  Argentina  joined previous speakers recognising that in the recent informal meetings of the 
Rules Negotiating Group, some d elegations had called attention to the need for greater flexibility in 
fisheries subsidies in order to fulfil the Ministerial mandate in a timely manner. Argentina encouraged 
Members to double their efforts in order to meet transparency commitments and to exchange views 
with regard to proposals which could be of useful for Members facing limitations.  
161.  Australia  echoed the views welcoming paragraph 2 of the Ministerial Decision re -committing  
Members to implement existing notification obligations with the view towards strengthening 
transparency. It recalled its support for the US suggestions raised at the April 2018 meeting noting 
that it would be useful for the WTO Secretariat to adapt its tr aining to specifically address fisheries 
subsidies notifications. Australia also agreed with the US saying that Members' sharing best practice 
would also be useful in this Committee. The Rules Negotiating Group September cluster had had 
some useful exchang es on how Members have been preparing subsidy notifications specifically for 
fisheries subsidies. Members had also shared their experiences and difficulties in gathering 
information. Australia welcomed the broad range of Members, both developed and develop ing, who 
had shared their experiences and noted that the detailed notifications provided by some developing 
Members have suggested that complying with that fundamental obligation of the SCM Agreement 
should be an achievable task for all WTO Members. It als o indicated that a type of status report 
would be useful which the WTO Secretariat had provided in September 2018 noting that a Member 
might update the Committee on progress in its subsidy notification preparation under the Agenda 
item on improving the tim eliness and completeness of notifications.  
162.  Canada  welcomed the re -commitment of Members at MC11 to implement their notification 
obligations and supported discussions in the Negotiating Group on Rules aimed at improving 
enhancing disciplines on notification  of fishery subsidies programmes. In order for such disciplines 
to be useful, it was critical that Members comply with their notification obligations. Canada invited 
all Members to abide by their notification obligations and deliver on the commitment made at MC 11 
which means having Members submit complete and accurate information on existing fisheries 
subsidies programmes. It also welcomed the suggestions made on ways to facilitate compliance by 
Members with their notification requirements such as enhancin g the technical assistance provided 
by the Secretariat and sharing best practices to collect and submit relevant information on fisheries 
subsidies. The Committee should continue considering such concrete proposals.   
163.  New Zealand  was supportive of enhanced  transparency and had welcomed the Ministerial 
Decision in December 2017. Recent research suggested that fishing at the current scale has been 
enabled by large government subsidies without which as much as 54% of the present high seas 
fishing grounds would  be unprofitable at current fishing rates. Given the significant capacity of many 
global fishing fleets, international concerns with overfishing and the risk of collapse of many fisheries, 
an understanding of the fisheries subsidies programmes that were in  effect it was crucial first 
addressing sustainability and fish stock management issues as well as concluding the ongoing 
negotiations. Thanking those Members who had provided comprehensive notifications, New Zealand 
encouraged all Members maintaining such  programmes to notify them as soon as possible or seek 
further assistance from the Secretariat.  G/SCM/M/107  
 
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  164.  China  noted that the importance of faithful fulfilment of notifying fisheries subsidies under the 
SCM Agreement for the ongoing negotiations. In its updated not ification, China had reported many 
subsidies concerning fisheries industry such as:  
i. Preferential tax policies for enterprises engaged in projects of preliminary processing of 
agricultural, forest, animal and fishery products . 
ii. Preferential tax policies on i mports of fish fries (breeds) . 
iii. Fund for agricultural resources and ecological protection  (here, Subsidies on aquatic organisms 
multiplication release, ocean pasture construction, reduction in the number of fishing vessels 
and change of fishermen 's producti on are included)  
iv. Subsidy for standardization of inland water vessels  
v. Subsidy for scrapping and dismantling vessels and for ship type standardization   
vi. Fisherman onshore resettlement subsidy  
vii. Aquatic improved breed subsidy   
165.  China also indicated that many fis heries subsidies released in the name of local government 
were financed by central government.  For this reason, many subsidy program mes released in the 
name of local governments were not included in the notifications of subsidies at the local level.  
166.  The Russian Federation  recalled that Members had re -committed to implementation of existing 
notification obligations under Article 25.3 of the SCM Agreement in Buenos Aires bearing in mind 
that strengthened transparency regarding fisheries subsidies would be hel pful in ongoing 
negotiations. The existing lack of information on fisheries subsidies shaded the picture provided and 
could not contribute to fruitful negotiations. It encouraged Members to do their best to follow the 
notification obligations under Article  25.3 of the Agreement with respect to fisheries subsidies.  
167.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
9  PERMANENT GROUP OF E XPERTS  
168.  The Chair recalled that the terms of Mr  Welber Barral and Mr Chris Parlin as members of the 
Permanent Group of Experts had ended in spring 2017 and spring 2018, respectively. Following the 
previous Chairperson's consultations and at the previous meeting of the Committee, some issues 
had been  raised and the Committee could not finalize the process of filling those vacancies .  
 
169.  Unfortunately, no progress could  be reported since the April 2018 meeting  of the Committee .  
The Chair noted that he would inform the Committee on any developments that m ight arise in 
relation to th at issue.  
 
170.  The Committee took note  of the Chair's statements.  
10  OTHER BUSINESS  
171.  No Member raised any items under other business.  
11  DATE OF NEXT REGULAR  MEETING  
172.  The Committee decided  to hold its next regular meeting during the week of 2 9 April 2019, 
with the exact date to be confirmed in due course. As usual, that meeting would be immediately 
preceded by a special meeting for review of subsidy notifications.  
 
12  ANNUAL REPORT OF THE  COMMITTEE ON SUBSID IES AND COUNTERVAILI NG 
MEASURES TO THE COUN CIL FOR TRADE IN GOO DS (ARTICLE 32.7)  
173.  The Committee adopted  its Annual Repor t (201 8) to the Council for Trade in Goods.12 
 
174.  The meeting was closed .  
__________  
                                                
12 G/L/1272 -G/SCM/ 152.