RESTRICTED  
  
WT/TPR/G/367  
16 January  2018 
(18-0413) Page: 1/15 
Trade Policy Review Body   Original: English  
 
TRADE POLICY REVIEW  
REPORT BY  
EGYPT 
Pursuant to the Agreement Establishing the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (Annex 3 of the 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization), the policy statement by Egypt  is 
attached.  
 
 
Note: This report is subject to restricted circulation and press embargo until the end of the first 
session of the meeting of the Trade Policy Review Body on Egypt . WT/TPR/G/367 • Egypt  
 
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  Contents  
1   EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  ................................ ................................ ................................ . 3 
2   EGYPT AND THE MULTIL ATERAL TRADING SYSTE M ................................ .....................  3 
3   NATIONAL ECONOMIC VI SION  ................................ ................................ ....................  4 
3.1   National Development and Economic Growth Goals  ................................ ..........................  4 
3.2   Macroeconomic Overview  ................................ ................................ .............................  5 
3.3   Investment Policy  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........  6 
3.4   Entrepreneurship Policy  ................................ ................................ ................................  7 
3.5   Industrial Policy ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........  7 
3.6   Energy Policy  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..............  8 
3.7   Fiscal and Monetary Policy  ................................ ................................ ............................  9 
4   TRADE POLICY FRAMEWO RK ................................ ................................ .......................  9 
4.1   Trade Policy Objectives  ................................ ................................ ................................  9 
4.2   Tariff Policy  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................ 10 
4.3   Trade Facilitation  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 10 
4.4   Trade Defense Policy  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...10 
4.5   Regional and Bilateral Arrangements  ................................ ................................ ............. 11 
5   TRADE POLICY DEVELOP MENTS SINCE 2005  ................................ .............................  11 
5.1   Standards, Technical Regulations and Conformity Assessment  ................................ ......... 11 
5.2   Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Matters ................................ ................................ ......11 
5.3   Trade and Agriculture ................................ ................................ ................................ ..12 
5.4   Trade and Competition  ................................ ................................ ................................ 12 
5.5   Trade and Consumer Protection  ................................ ................................ .................... 12 
5.6   Trade -Related Environmental Matters  ................................ ................................ ........... 12 
5.7   Trade -Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights  ................................ ...................... 13 
5.8   Developments in Services Sectors  ................................ ................................ ................ 13 
6   EGYPT AND THE WAY FO RWARD F OR THE WORLD TRADE O RGANI ZATION 
(WTO)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................  14 
 
 
  WT/TPR/G/367 • Egypt  
 
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  1  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
1.1.  Egypt is firmly committed to the WTO and the multilateral trading system, to its rules 
frameworks and to its objectives, including those objectives that recognize that international 
economic relations in general —and specifically, international trade —are in tended to raise 
standards of living and increase employment, as is enshrined in the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO).  
1.2.  The primary economic policy objective by 2030 is to raise Egypt’s real per capita Gross 
National Income  (GNI) classification from the lower -middle -income economy  grouping to the 
higher -middle -income economy  grouping.  This objective is unlikely to be realized without Egypt’s 
deep and further engagement in international trade.  
1.3.  Rapid macroeconomic development in Egypt since 2005 was briefly interrupted by a rare 
transitory shock of popular socio -political transformation between 2011 and 2013, temporarily 
impedin g the pace of economic growth. Since 2014, however, the economy has accelerated and 
exceeded the expe ctations of key observers, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
1.4.  Aggressive economic reforms, including slashing subsidies, floating the national currency and 
massive national investment in infrastructure have all result ed in stimulating the eco nomy. This 
has strengthened Egypt’s capacity to serve as a major hub for the manufacture and export of 
medium -technology goods and to serve as a major location for the development and delivery of 
value -added s ervices in a range of sectors.  
1.5.  Investment, entr epreneurship, industrial and trade policies are all structured to cohesively 
interact to produce a very welcoming business environment in Egypt, a market of over 100 million 
people, where consumer spending has increased by around 500% since 2005.  
1.6.  Egypt’s n ear-term trade policy objectives seek to ensure that exports contribute to 25% of 
the annual GDP growth rate, that exports increase year -on-year by at least 10% and that the 
balance -of-trade deficit is reduced to 4% of GDP by 2030.  
1.7.  Tariffs constituted arou nd 1% of Egypt’s total revenues in 2016, reflecting one measure of 
Egypt’s openness to international tra de. Egypt’s trade defense policy is to only access defense 
instruments as a last resort; indeed, Egypt has not filed any complaints within the WTO nor b een a 
respondent on any dispute since 2011.  
1.8.  Egypt has notified 6 bilateral and regional arrangement s since membership in 1995. National 
policy looks favourably upon bilateral and regional arrangements when they yield a net positive 
impact on world trade.  
1.9.  Other major developments since 2005 include a strengthening of the trade facilitation 
framework, the establishment of a system of Economic Courts, a Competition Authority and a 
National Food Safety Authority.  
1.10.   Egypt views the way forward for international tr ade and the WTO to currently be premised 
upon ensuring that Members do not reverse the cumulative gains made since 1995, regardless of 
the domestic pressures of neo -protectionism that some Members face.  
2  EGYPT AND THE MULTIL ATERAL TRADING SYSTE M 
2.1.  With well over 160 Members and 22 Observers, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is the 
sole forum with a truly global mandate for organizing the modern multilateral trade sy stem and its 
rules frameworks. Indeed, it is based on a worldwide system that Egypt has been a participant and 
member of since nearly three decades before the WTO’s establishment in 1995 at the end of the 
Uruguay Round. Egypt’s world trade story is much deeper and older than that, however.  
2.2.  The history of Egypt is all too synonymous with the vivid imagery of its well -known 
contributions to human civilization in a wide range of disciplines, but the true story of Egypt’s 
history —of what made its contribution s possible, is one of commerce: it is a story of world trade. 
From agriculture to finely -worked  metals, from medical innovations to incense and oils, Ancient WT/TPR/G/367 • Egypt  
 
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  Egyptians traded for millennia with their contemporaries throughout the Mediterranean, incl uding 
Asia, Africa and Europe. World trade is a not just a critical aspect of what made Egypt’s past s o 
glorious, it is a fundamental cornerstone of the sustainability of its future economic development.  
2.3.  In that context, Egypt is firmly committed to the WTO system, to its rules frameworks and to 
its objectives, including those objectives that recognize tha t international economic relations in 
general —and specifically, international trade —“should be conducted with a view to raising 
standards of living, ensuring full employment … and to enhance the means for doing so in a 
manner consistent with … respective n eeds and concerns at different levels of economic 
development”.1    
2.4.  As such, the spirit of Egypt’s approach to the multilateral trading system is a comprehension 
that trade, like any dynamic relationship, is a constru ctive, forward -looking process.  Its lon g-term 
success is premised upon the predictability of expectations by all parties to a transaction, the 
reliability of rules frameworks when expectations appear not to be met, and most of all, the 
development dividend that accrues from international trade —a dividend that, taken cumulatively, 
must necessarily transcend beyond the private parties most immediately engaged in the 
transaction itself, so as to resonate in the public domain.  
2.5.  Towards this end, and to introduce what is presented in this document, th e Government of 
Egypt’s (GoE’s) National Economic Vision reflects these shared beliefs that are interconnected to 
the multilateral trade system. At its core, they are wholly aligned with the WTO Members’ common 
vision that raising standards of living and m aximizing employment  are nece ssary goals, among 
many others.  As a prelude to the GoE’s trade policy framework, six areas of economic policy are 
highlighted in this document within the macroeconomic policy context, including investment policy, 
entrepreneurs hip policy, industrial policy, fiscal and monetary policy, among others. Next, the 
GoE’s Trade Policy Framework is presented in greater depth, including national trade policy 
objectives, tariff policy, trade facilitation policy and policies on regional arr angements. Following 
this, a separate, specific section outlining trade -specific developments by the GoE since 2005 
precedes a final section, which presents the GoE’s vision on the way forward for the WTO and the 
multilateral trading system at a critical j uncture in time.  
3  NATIONAL ECONOMIC VI SION  
3.1  National Development and Economic Growth Goals  
3.1.  The GoE’s near -term national development and economic growth goals are enshrined in its 
2030 Sustainable Development Strategy (2030 SDS).2 The 2030 SDS is an integrate d, holistic 
approach towards Egypt’s near -term sustainable development. At the macro -level, the strategy is 
constructed around three key dimensions:  (1) economic, (2)  social and (3) environmental. While 
ambitious, the 2030 SDS has been carefully crafted t o ensure the feasibility of an accelerated 
near-term development plan while reflecting the evolution of national socio -political and economic 
priorities since Egypt’s most recent Trade Policy Review in 2005 and, more particularly, since 
2011.  
3.2.  The economic dimension of the 2030 SDS provides a clear vision and focus on a 
singular over -arching economic target by 2030: to raise Egypt’s real per capita Gross 
National Income (GNI) classification from the lower -middle -income economy grouping 
to the higher -middle -income economy grouping.3 This objective reflects the GoE’s current 
implementation of raising standards of living in Egypt, exactly as is also enshrined by WTO 
Members in the preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO.  
3.3.  The ambitiousness of thi s real per capita GNI target by 2030 is supported by the robustness 
of the Go E’s unwavering political will. This political will is, in turn, reflected in a progressive policy 
mix that includes, among many other items, very large -scale national infrastructu re projects 
across all of the major geographic regions of Egypt, an aggressively favo urable posture towards 
the attraction of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and the considerable enhancement of a 
                                                
1 Preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1994.  
2 In the original Arabic documentation, the '2030 SDS' is sometimes also alternatively referred to as 
'Vision 2030' or as 'SDS Egypt 2030'.  
3 Classifications based on the World Bank’s Atlas method . WT/TPR/G/367 • Egypt  
 
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  regulatory and business environment favourable to stimulate and sustain three drivers of rapid 
economic development and employment, while maintaining an environmentally sustainable 
economic model:  (a) high -skilled knowledge -based innovation, (b) entrepreneurship and (c) the 
high-value -added manufacturing of goods with projected long -term growth in export demand and 
global consumption.  
3.4.  Other specific targets of the national economic vision intended by 2030 include reducing 
public debt to 50% of GDP, to reduce the national budget deficit to no more than 5% of GDP, 
targeting at least a 7% average rate of economic growth, to reduce unemployment to no more 
than 5% of the workforce and to lower overall energy intensity by 2030 in Egypt by at least 14%.  
3.5.  Finally, with regards to the national economic vision, a proactive pe rformance monitoring 
system with a high frequency of periodic reporting at the highest levels of government is intended 
to ensure that the vision is realized. The spirit of national expectations arising from socioeconomic 
developments in Egypt since 2011 i s embedded within the mechanics of how the vision will be 
achieved, with a focus on using indicators that help make certain that genuine economic 
inclusiveness occurs tangibly, in line with the social justice objective of the 2030 SDS. This 
approach will h elp ensure that a higher real per capita GNI is more adequately distributed among 
the many —precisely so that it does not concentrate the net increase in income differentials among 
just a few.  
3.2   Macroeconomic Overview  
3.6.  Egypt’s macroeconomic development since 2005 is best understood as a continuous upward 
trajectory of relatively fast -paced economic growth, driven by progressive economic policies and 
phased reforms, but briefly interrupted by a rare transitory shock of popular socio -political 
transformation tha t temporarily impeded economic activity (ref lecting the period 2011 -2013). The 
latter period marked, in 2013, the end of an era of asymmetric distributions of the gains from 
economic growth and the start of a new era and approach, as is evidenced by the so cial justice 
formula embedded within the 2030 SDS.  
3.7.  Viewed in this manner, Egypt’s macroeconomic development during undisturbed periods 
(reflecting the vast majority of time) since 2005 has averaged a real Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) growth r ate of over 5. 6% through 20164, placing it among the top 10 fastest -growing large -
population economies worldwide5 over the period 2005 -2016. Egypt also exceeded the 
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) 2016/2017 GDP growth estimate by 20%.6 The GoE outlook 
for the peri od 2020 -2024 is an average real GDP growth rate in the 5% -6% range.  
3.8.  Relatively diversified, the main components of Egypt’s productive GDP are services, 
manufacturing and agriculture, which respectively accounted for 55.3%, 17.1% and 11.9% of GDP 
in 2015/20 16.7 Within the services sector, retail distribution  (including food and beverages 
establishments ) as well as real estate services have led growth by a substantial margin, 
underlining the phenomenal five -fold increase in the total financial value of consumer spending in 
Egypt since 2005. This is driven (in part) by the growth in Egypt’s pop ulation by over 30% since 
20058 and the gradual (but consistent) increase in the purchasing power of its growing middle 
class over the same time period, creating on e of the largest consumer markets in the Middle E ast 
North Africa (MENA) region.  
3.9.  Most key economic indicators suggest that the more challenging impacts of Egypt’s recent 
socio-political transformation phase between 2011 and 2013 are over, although there re mains a 
lag in unemployment which peaked at 12.8% in 2015, revealing a weakening in the job markets 
                                                
4 Excluding the brief period of econom ic shock during 2011 -2013.  
5 Economies with a population greater than 75 million persons since 2005.  
6 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 27 September, 2017.  
7 Central Bank of Egypt (CBE), 2017.  
8 In 2017, Egypt’s Central Agency for Public Mobilization and  Statistics (CAPMAS) published figures 
showing that g lobally, Egypt’s population surpassed 100 million in 2017, with just under 95 million residing 
(geographically) within Egypt’s territorial boundaries . WT/TPR/G/367 • Egypt  
 
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  since unempl oyment stood at 11.2% in 2005.9 On the other hand, this has contributed to wages 
remaining relatively competitive in global terms through 2017, particularly for semi -skilled labo ur. 
3.10.   At the sectoral level, tourism remains among the slowest of the key sectors to recover from 
the socio -political tran sformation phase of 2011 -2013. Both per capita  spending by visitors as well 
as the number of visitors declined sharply, from peaks in 2010 of $938 spent per visitor by around 
14.5 million visitors, to 2015 figures of $742 spent per visitor by around 9.3 million visitors. The 
decline in per capita  spending can be attributed to a range of factors, however, i ncluding more 
competitive pricing models in the hospitality sector ( relative to previous periods). When new 
investments that are being made in both the history tourism and seaside resort tourism sub -
sectors are taken into consideration (especially for the new National Museum within proximity of 
the Pyramids of Giza and an adjacent airport, among others), overall tourism remains a projected 
strong growth sector over the coming decade.  
3.3  Investment Policy  
3.11.   The GoE’s overall, long -term national investment policy looks beyond the 2030 SDS and is 
multi-dimensional; it is aimed at creating a competitive environment that, in the long -term, can 
attract and incubate the research, design, development, production and delivery of goods and 
services that will drive the glob al economy in 2050 and beyond.  
3.12.   As such, it is sequenced along a trajectory that includes factors such as balanced 
geographical coverage (to both strengthen underdeveloped areas as well as to reflect the legacy 
clustering of specific labour skill -sets in ce rtain geographic areas), investment in infrastructure 
that yields positive economic network effects (based on sensitivity analyses for optimal economic 
returns), investment in the development of industrial capacity in sectors with downstream 
diversificatio n and knowledge dissemination effects and, finally, investment in educational 
opportunities indexed to disciplines and sub -disciplines which are likely to contribute to 
technological and process -based disruptive advances in consumer behaviour and business models 
beyond 2030.  
3.13.   The GoE’s near -term national investment policy revolves around stimulating 
infrastructure and productive investment as the primary instruments of driving macro -
economic growth and employment creation through 2030.  
3.14.   Within the context of the near -term 2030 SDS, therefore, Egypt has taken a very robust 
approach to investment, both in terms of public and private investment. Government spending on 
very large -scale national infrastructure projects has been a hallmark of Egypt’s economic 
revita lization since 2014. In parallel, the encouragement of private investment (and public -private 
partnerships) by both domestic and international parties, in agriculture, construction, energy 
infrastructure, transport and logistics (including the Suez Canal e xpansion project, roads and 
railways, airports and seaports) and oil and gas has been advanced as part of the 2030 SDS.  
3.15.   Complementing this effort, and to further accelerate the practical aspects of stimulating 
investment (sourced both domestically and inte rnationally), a series of regulatory packages have 
been put into force between 2015 and 201710, including a new Investment Law11 that replaced 
previous legislation.12 The new law guarantees reciprocal national treatment, consolidates several 
procedural elemen ts involved in the application process for various licenses, including using e -
systems, further empowers key institutions to provide the full panoply of required services in a 
single location supported by Investors’ Service Centers (ISCs) and within pre -defined time limits 
for several processes, institutionalizes and strengthens dispute resolution systems and 
considerably improves the facilitation of temporary residency documentation for non -Egyptians 
attached to entities licensed under the new investment l egislation.  
3.16.   Shortly after implementation of some elements of the 2030 SDS’ investment strategy, and 
even before new legislation was passed and entered into force, Egypt received US$8.1 billion in 
                                                
9 CBE. 
10 These include elements of Presidential Decr ee 17 of 2015.  
11 Law 72 of 2017 (the Investment Law) and its Executive Regulations, as administered by the Ministry 
of Investment and International Cooperation (MIIC).  
12 Law 8 of 1997.  WT/TPR/G/367 • Egypt  
 
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  Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) during 2016, a 17.1% increas e on the prior year, making it the 
second -ranked reci pient of FDI in 2016 in Africa.13 
3.4  Entrepreneurship Policy  
3.17.   Following on from the over -arching aspects of the national investment policy, Egypt’s 
National Entrepreneurship Policy seeks to provide mechanisms  and modalities to 
encourage and capture global and local private investment,  including investment that has 
not yet been capitalized, is not necessarily capital -intensive or may not be easily categorized using 
traditional business models. The primary funct ion of Egypt’s entrepreneurship policy, therefore, is 
to encourage all scales of value -adding business operations while preventing market failures from 
foreclosing innovation opportunities, employment -creation opportunities, the formalization of new 
or exi sting micro or small -scale economic activity or the expansion and scaling -up of existing small 
and medium -sized enterprises.  
3.18.   To implement this policy, different key institutions within the GoE have each put in place 
complementary programs to build a nested  framework of supporting interventions for 
entrepreneurship, Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) and larger -scale or traditional 
industrial operations.  
3.19.   At the horizontal level, the GoE  established the MSME Development Agency as a quasi -
governmental body, with a mandate to lead national MSME policymaking, to provide low -cost 
technical support, including capacity -building, sectoral guidance, financial assistance and access to 
soft credit,  including to facilitate access to more comprehensive business development services 
available in the private sector throu gh more lenient payment terms. For larger -scale or traditional 
industrial operations, the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) provid es specialized support 
services and a single clearinghouse for all industr y-related licensing procedures.  All of these 
services through the MSME Development Agency and the IDA are accessible to firms legally 
established in Egypt irrespective of the nationa l origin of shareholders or controlling interest.  
3.20.   The Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) has also allocated a facility of LE 200 billion between 2016 
and 2021 for onward lending to banks licensed in Egypt with a two -tier structure of soft credit 
terms accessible only to MSMEs to support entrepreneursh ip and MSME economic activity. 
Incentives are also in place to encourage banks to allocate up to 20% of their lending portfolio to 
entrepreneurship and MSMEs.14  
3.21.   The Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) has also put in  place special rules aimed at 
facilitating the access of MSMEs to simplified industrial licensing processes through the IDA that 
are tailored for smaller operations, while the Ministry of Investment and International Cooperation 
(MIIC) provides support for  MSME incorporation services at multiple regional outreach centers 
throughout Egypt. All national institutions are required to provide special assistance to facilitate 
support for entrepreneurship and MSME assistance sought by women, youth and the physical ly-
challenged.  
3.5  Industrial Policy  
3.22.   The GoE’s long -term Industrial Policy seeks to pull Egypt further downstream along the 
curve of value -added manufacturing at an accelerated pace.  
3.23.   Within the context of the 2030 SDS, near-term industrial policy seeks to (1) make 
Egypt a leading industrial economy in the MENA region and the primary export base for 
medium -technology industrial goods by 2025, (2) to foster an environment of innovation 
that can facilitate industrial research and development, (3) to leverage energ y efficiency 
within production processes as an instrument to enhance national competitiveness and 
                                                
13 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Inv estment Report, 2017.  
14 CBE, 2017. Lending rate tiers are determined by the average annual turnover of applicant firms, with 
more favo urable terms avail able to smaller establishments.  Loan tenors are medium -term, ranging between 5 
and 7 years . WT/TPR/G/367 • Egypt  
 
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  (4) to more rapidly acquire greater technical know -how and engage a higher proportion 
of semi -skilled labo ur in the industrial sector.15 
3.24.   To translate this near -term policy into measurable objectives, the MTI has put in place a 
series of five -year Trade and Industrial Development Strategies,  with the current cycle (2016 -
2020) focused on five key objectives by 2020: (1) Industrial Development —to increase the annua l 
industrial growth rate to 8% and the contribution of industrial activity to GDP to 21%, (2) Export 
Development and Competitiveness —to raise the annual rate of export growth to 10%, (3) MSME 
Development —to increase the contribution of MSMEs and the private sector to GDP by 10%, (4) 
Technical and Vocational Labo ur Development and Integration —to stimulate the creation of at 
least 3 million new job opportunities with a living wage and (5) Business Climate C ontinuous 
Improvement —to further improve the regulatory environment for business while advan cing 
institutional development.16 
3.25.   In line with the 2030 SDS, the GoE’s near -term industrial vision maintains a heavy focus on 
green initiatives and environmental sus tainability. This includes a shift towards eco -friendly 
industrial parks, growth of the Green Economy and a gradual regulatory move towards the 
application of more protective environmental standards and rules within the context of energy 
efficiency, manufa cturing processes and the efficient functionality of industrial goods.  
3.26.   Through the IDA, the MTI has very aggressively consolidated systems and streamlined the 
procedures for industrial license issuances, reducing the entire process from stretching over 600  
days in 2005 to under 7 days in 2017 for over 80% of applications, with no application requiring 
more than 30 days to process in all cases. The pace of allocating industrial real estate for 
manufacturing purposes has also been rapidly accelerated since 20 05, alongside the deployment of 
an Industrial Map system which facilitates investor’s comprehension of the GoE’s priority 
geographical zones under its spatial industrial policy, where investment and industrial incentives 
are more enhanced so as to ensure a  more inclusive economy in regions where greater investment 
is needed.  
3.27.   Early results17 of these policies have resulted in the industrial sector capturing the majority 
of investment capital during 2016/2017, the industrial production growth rate peaking at 3 3% 
during 2017 (a global high) and a 17% improvement in the balance of trade between 2015 and 
2017.  
3.6  Energy Policy  
3.28.   In line with overall national economic policy under the 2030 SDS, Egypt is in the 
process of comprehensively reforming the energy sector (incl uding petroleum, gas and 
electricity), with a view towards increasing energy security by improving efficiency, 
improving the overall economic model and substantially increasing the share of 
renewables in the energy mix. The strategy also aims to reduce gre enhouse gas 
emissions generated by the sector by 10% and energy intensity by 14%, both by 2030.  
The objective is to ensure an uninterrupted, cost -efficient and environmentally -conscious supply of 
energy products to both businesses and households with a net  energy surplus.  
3.29.   Already, the elimination of a range of energy subsidies has served to launch the 
modernization of the economic model and unlock investment opportunities, while new investment 
in infrastructure (particularly in natural gas, electricity and nuclear) and regulatory reforms to 
stimulate investment in the renewable energy sub -sector have served to implement the policy, 
including through the establishment of the Egypt’s National Renew able Energy Authority (NREA) .18 
Sustainable and environmentally -friendly technologies and approaches are an integral aspect of 
the policy.  
3.30.   A new regulatory framework for electricity which further opens -up the power generation and 
distribution markets has been in place since 2016; it allows contracts with durations of u p to 25 
                                                
15 MTI, 2016.  
16 Ibid. 
17 As of 2017.  
18 In 2014, Egypt also restructured the Ministry of Electricity and Energy into the Ministry of Electricity 
and Renewable Energy (MERE).  WT/TPR/G/367 • Egypt  
 
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  years for special feed-in tariffs with both the private sector and public -private partnerships.19 This 
has stimulated the launch of  substantial investment in the renewable energy sector.  
3.31.   Similarly, the new regulatory framework for the natural gas su b-sector serves to establish a 
rules framework for the sub -sector to both ensure uninterrupted supplies as well as to strengthen 
consumer protection. It has also enhanced the investment climate by creating a more transparent 
marketplace, regulating the com petition elements of gas networks that are also essential f acilities 
and improving safety.20 
3.7  Fiscal and Monetary Policy  
3.32.   Overall, the GoE’s fiscal policy in the current period seeks to dramatically reduce 
the budget deficit . This is being achieved by reducin g expenditures on non -productive activities, 
while simultaneously enhancing the value of the tax base through the stimulation of productive 
investment (to expand the tax base) and improved tax collection systems (particularly the full 
implementation of the  Value -Added Tax [VAT] system).  The GoE’s monetary policy in the 
current period is primarily focused on inflation -targeting , having shifted away from currency 
support after the floatation of the currency in 2016 allows the exchange rate mechanism to 
functi on in a capacity that better shields the domestic economy from exogenous shocks.  
3.33.   The fiscal policy’s key modalities of expenditure reduction involve a shift to a more focused 
social safety net model that uses targeted transfer payments and downstream suppo rt to reach 
underprivileged citizens (within the welfare context) at the user -level, rather than less -focused 
upstream subsidies that less -efficiently reached a wider base than the intended target.  
3.34.   In terms of monetary policy, the major liberalization of t he national currency (the Egyptian 
Pound [EGP] or Livre Egyptienne [L.E.]) in 2016 with regards to foreign exchange rates has been 
tentatively challenging for consumers, with an expected spike in real inflation throughout 2017, 
but price stability is forec ast during 2018 with an expected substantial decline in inflationary 
pressures as monetary policy has tightened. This has had the secondary effect of increasing the 
competitiveness of Egyptian exports of both goods and services as well as of inward investm ent 
opportunities; although this is only one dimensi on of overall competitiveness. Finally, near -term 
monetary policy aims to bring inflation be low 10% before the end of 2018.21 
3.35.   Several international financial institutions, including the International Monet ary Fund (IMF) 
have praised Egypt’s national economic program and endorsed the fiscal and monetary policy 
dimensions of the program in 2016. In parallel, the IMF completed in November, 2017, a positive 
2017 Article IV Consultation Process and Second Review  Mission to Egypt relevant to the Extended 
Fund Facility currently in place.22 
4  TRADE POLICY FRAMEWO RK 
4.1  Trade Policy Objectives  
4.1.  Egypt’s overall long -term trade policy is to further integrate deeply into the multilateral trade 
system as an indispensible hub fo r the innovation, manufacture and export of high -technology 
value -added goods, as well as a regional leader for the development, provision and distribution of 
highly -skill-based services across all four modes of delivery.  
4.2.  Within the context of the 2030 SDS , Egypt’s near -term trade policy objectives seek to ensure 
that exports contribute to 25% of the annual GDP growth rate, that exports increase year -on-year 
by at least 10% and that the balance -of-trade deficit is reduced to 4% of GDP by 2030.  
4.3.  To support ex port growth, the GoE has established (under the auspices of the MTI) a new 
national trade promotion organization, the Export Development Agency (EDA). In addition to the 
traditional functions of a trade promotion organization, the EDA will also be directly  involved in 
                                                
19 Law 87 of 2015 is a part of the new regulatory framework.  
20 Law 148 of 2017.  
21 CBE, 2017.  
22 IMF, 2017.  WT/TPR/G/367 • Egypt  
 
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  working with the private sector to identify target areas for regulatory reform, including 
streamlining import and export procedures as well as establishing modalities to ensure a higher 
level of private sector know -how, with regards to market information, technical requirements and 
conformity assessment.  
4.2  Tariff Policy  
4.4.  The GoE’s  long-term tariff policy is to establish an environment where tariffs do not create 
obstacles to consumer choice. In that context, in 2017, tariffs reflected around 1% of fiscal 
revenues and will, over the long -run, likely gradually decline further in term s of fiscal 
importance.23  
4.3  Trade Facilitation  
4.5.  Egypt’s trade policy reflects a commitment to the continuous improvement of trade 
facilitation processes, including through the use of new technolo gies as they become available.  
4.6.  This commitment to improve trade facilitation was most recently reflected in its ratification of 
the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) earlier in 2017. The TFA has bee n transposed into 
national law.24 
4.7.  A new WTO Enquiry Point has been established in support of the newer WTO arrangement s 
that include the TFA. The GoE has also activated a Single Administrative Document (SAD) system 
for import and export processes in this context.25 The introduction of the SAD system was carried 
out in 2017 to continue improving trade facilitation processes , with a special emphasis on digital 
modalities to reduce costs and time fo r all parties to a transaction.  This is a preliminary step 
towards the eventual implementation of an electronic single -window system.  
4.8.  Extensive capacity -building efforts and investments in strengthening the Risk Management 
systems at Egypt’s border conformity assessment body26 between 2005 and 2016 have resulted in 
dramatic improvements to processing times for several border clearance processes. Similar 
capacity -building and in vestment efforts at the Egyptian Customs Authority between 2006 and 
2012 have also resulted in considerably faster processing times.  
4.9.  Furthermore, the GoE reduced the number of documents required for import and export 
procedures in 2015.27 An additional stre amlining pro cess was implemented in 2016.28 
4.10.   The World Bank’s 2017 Doing Business Indicators  (for Trading Across Borders) captured the 
initial impact of these cumulative trade facilitation improvements, where the number of documents 
required to implement an import transaction into Egypt was reduced from 11 documents in 2016 
to 6 documents in 2017. Similarly, the number of documents required to execute an export 
transaction declined from 9 documents in 2016 to 5 documents in 2017.  
4.11.   In line with Egypt’s policy o f continuous improvement in trade facilitation, the GoE is 
currently preparing to finalize new rules before 2019 that would reduce the number of documents 
required to carry out import or export transactions to be not more than 3 in total.  
4.4  Trade Defense Pol icy 
4.12.   3.4.1  Egypt maintains a policy of evaluating trade defense contexts in full compliance with 
the relevant frameworks within  the WTO’s covered agreements. Trade defense processes are 
considered by Egypt as a costly modality of addressing unfair trade pra ctices or other instances 
where sovereign ec onomic rights are compromised. As a matter of policy, therefore, the use of 
trade defense processes and instruments is only considered as a last resort, after all other options 
                                                
23 Ministry of Finance, 2017.  
24 Presidential Decree 149 of 2017.  
25 Ministry of Finance Decree 40 of 2017.  
26 The General Organization for Export and Import Control (GOEIC).  
27 Ministry of Finance Decree 256 of 2015.  
28 Prime Ministerial Decree 545 o f 2016.  WT/TPR/G/367 • Egypt  
 
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  are exhausted between relevant part ies, and only in full compliance with the relevant WTO rules 
frameworks.  
4.13.   With regards to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), Egypt has participated in eleven 
(11) WTO disputes since 1995 as a third party, and has neither filed any complaints nor been a 
respondent to any dispute since 2011.  
4.14.   As is customary, Egypt has continuously notified the WTO on a timely basis wherever 
required, on matters involving Trade Defense.  
4.5  Regional and Bilateral Arrangements  
4.15.   Egypt maintains a policy of proactive engagement in both regional and bilateral dialogues on 
special trade arrangements, both for existing and notified arrangements, as well as potential new 
arrangements. In each case, the GoE’s policy is to examine the net economic impact from its 
participation in such arr angements before initiating deeper discussions, with an impact analysis 
carried out not just for direct Egyptian interests, but also for the interests of other existing trade 
partners, in terms of how any new arrangement might impact the dynamics of their existing trade 
relationships with Egypt. Foremost in the GoE’s analytical approach is legal compliance with 
relevant WTO rules on such arrangements29, in addition to an assessment of if there will be an 
overall net increase in global trade that accrues from  the new arrangement.  
4.16.   Currently, Egypt is playing a leading role in both the Tri-Partite  and Continental Free Trade 
Area (CFTA)  negotiations processes in Africa, as well as deepening the Common Market for Eastern  
and Souther n Africa (COMESA)  arrangement. Efforts towards African economic integration remain 
a very high political and economi c long -term priority for Egypt.  Similarly, Egypt remains active in 
deepening the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA),  and to conduct exploratory dialogues with 
both the European Union (EU) and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA)  on further strengthening 
trade relations within the context of regional arrangements.  
4.17.   In parallel, Egypt is exploring new trade dialogues with trade partners in Asia, while working 
to start utilizin g the arrangements reached with the Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur)  by helping 
to promote business -to-business (B2B) trade relationships on both sides of the arrangement once 
it enters into force.  
4.18.   Egypt continues to maintain a bilateral trade arrangement with Turkey.  
4.19.   Egypt has notified the WTO of six (6) regional and bilateral arrangements in this context.  
5  TRADE POLICY DEVELOP MENTS SINCE 2005  
5.1  Standards, Technical Regulations and Conformity Assessment  
5.1.  Since 2005, Egypt has continued to play an active role o n the multilateral stage with regards 
to the alignment of its overall approach to a national quality infrastructure system in a manner 
consistent with key international arrangements.  
5.2.  In the period since 2005, the Egyptian Accreditation Council (EGAC) has b ecome a full 
member of the International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation (ILAC)  and the International 
Accreditation Forum (IAF).30  
5.2  Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Matters  
5.3.   Egypt’s policy on SPS matters since 2005 has not change d since the launch of t he WTO. The 
policy has been to invest in the alignment and harmonization of its SPS rules, requirements and 
methodologies with prevailing international standards, g uidelines and recommendations. Primarily, 
these are developed or agreed within the Codex Ali mentarius Commission  regarding matters of 
                                                
29 Such as Article XXIV GATT (1947) and Article V GATS.  
30 EGAC has also been a longstanding member of both Arab Accreditation (ARAC) and African 
Accreditation Cooperation (AFRAC) . WT/TPR/G/367 • Egypt  
 
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  food safety, the International Office of Epizootics  regarding matters of animal health and the 
International Plant Protection Convention . 
5.4.  Within that context, the GoE has worked extensively since 2005 to bring toge ther all of the 
different national bodies involved in matters of food safety in par ticular, into a single agency. This 
has finally resulted in the statutory establishment in 2017 of Egypt’s National Food Safety 
Authority (NFSA),  a body which is under trans itional functionality in 2017 and which will be fully 
functional by 2019.31  
5.5.  In 2007, Egypt strengthened the transparency requirement for rapidly notifying all SPS and 
technical regulations both do mestically and internationally.32 
5.3  Trade and Agriculture  
5.6.  Agriculture, although slightly overtaken by manufacturing and services since 2005 in terms of 
its share of the GDP, remains a strategically critical pillar of the Egyptian economy33 and a major 
employer.34 
5.7.  As such, agriculture is a major focus of policy atte ntion in Egypt both before and after 2005. 
In 2009, the GoE launched its Sustainable Agriculture Development Strategy 2030 (SADS 2030),  
which focuses on (a) the sustainable use of natural agricultural resources, (b) increasing land and 
water -use productivi ty, (c) increasing food security in strategic commodity groups, (d) 
strengthening agricultural products’ competitiveness, (e) improving the climate for agricultural 
investment and (f) poverty alleviation in rural areas.  
5.8.  GoE support to agriculture is focuse d primarily on non -product -specific technical agricultural 
extension service support, including with irrigation and drainage management processes.  
5.9.  All 728 (100%) of Egypt’s agriculture tariff lines are bound, with only 14 ad valorem  tariff 
lines.  
5.10.   There are  no tariff quotas or import restrictions applied on agricultural products, with the 
exception of WTO -compliant SPS requirements.  
5.4  Trade and Competition  
5.11.   Since 2005, the nexus between ‘trade’ and ‘competition’ (regarding unfair trade practices) is 
coordinated  between the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Egyptian Competition Authority 
(ECA).35 
5.5  Trade and Consumer Protection  
5.12.   Some types of unfair trade practices fall under the aegis of ‘consumer protection’, and in 
this context, there has also been a trade po licy-related development since 2005 with the 
establishment of Egypt’s Consumer Protection Agency (ECPA).36  
5.6  Trade -Related Environmental Matters  
5.13.   Egypt continues to be an active and engaged participant in the preservation of the 
environment at the multilatera l, regional and bilateral level, committed to international efforts to 
strengthen environmentally -sustainable policies in all areas, including those which are trade -
related.  
                                                
31 As established by Act of Parliament in Law 1 of 2017.  
32 As per Prim e Ministerial Decree 2489 of 2007.  
33 11.9% of GDP in 2015/2016.  
34 2015 estimates for employment in this sector in Egypt are around 7 million persons.  
35 The ECA was established by Law 3 of 2005.  
36 As per Law 67 of 2006.  WT/TPR/G/367 • Egypt  
 
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  5.14.   Since 2005, in the areas of climate change, Egypt has ratified and implemented the  Kyoto 
Protocol and signed the Paris Agreement .37 
5.15.   With reference to nature conservation, since 2005, Egypt has ratified the Nagoya Protocol 
on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their 
Utilization.38  
5.7  Trade -Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights  
5.16.   Since 2005, the GoE’s enforcement and management of matters falling under the ambit of 
the WTO’s Trade -Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) Agreement is organized 
by an interlocking set of  bodies that include the GoE IPR Contact Point, the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Finance (specifically, the Egyptian Customs 
Authority) and the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology’s Information  
Technology Industry Development Agency (ITIDA). Together, these bodies coordinate the vigilant 
implementation of Egypt’s relevant legal regimes that protect Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs), 
including software, media, counterfeit goods and other infrin gements of IPRs, including 
cybercrimes.39 Egypt’s IPR policy requires the GoE to continuously engage in rel evant international 
dialogues.  
5.17.   Since 2005, the GoE has stepped -up efforts to train and inform the business community, 
particularly MSMEs, on the impor tance of respecting IPR rules and the legal consequences of a 
failure to do so.  
5.18.   Between 2011 and 2017, the GoE’s IPR Contact Point processed over 2,200 complaints, with 
the overwhelming majority related to copyright infringement.  
5.19.   In 2008, Egypt established  a system of specialized Economic Courts, which handle cases of 
a predominantly economic or commercial nature, including both civil and criminal matters related 
to Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs).40  
5.20.   In 2009, Egypt (which was one of the first 15 members  of the Madrid System  for the 
International Registration of Marks ), acceded to and put into force the Protocol Relating to the 
Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks .41  
5.21.   In 2015, the Council of the International Union for the Pr otection of New Varieties of Plants  
(UPOV)  rendered a positive decision regarding Egypt’s draft amendments to its IPR legislation, 
paving the way for Egypt to take the necessary steps to accede to the UPOV Convention.42  
5.22.   The Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agre ement entered into force in Egypt in January, 2017.43  
5.8  Developments in Services Sectors  
5.23.   Since 2005, there are no new developments related to Egypt’s scheduled commitments 
under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)  in the services sectors. Egypt  has, 
however, submitted a revised conditional offer in the context of the Doha Development Agenda 
(DDA) framework. Highlights of salient developments with a trade -relevant dimension are 
identified in below only for sectors and sub -sectors for which there are substantial developments.  
5.24.   Financial Services:  The share of foreign banks in Egypt (foreign -controlled and branches 
of foreign banks) has risen from 15.4% in 2005 to 27% in 2015.  
                                                
37 Egypt's Ministry of the Environment, 2017.  
38 Ibid. 
39 Law 82 of 2002 and its relevant Executive Regulations, all as amended.  
40 Ministry of Justice, 2010.  
41 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 2017.  
42 International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (U POV), 27 March, 2015. The d raft 
amendments were made to ' Book 4:  Plant Variety Protection ' of the Law 82 of 2002 (the IPR Law).  
43 Egypt had  submitted its accep tance of the Protocol in 2008. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article X of 
the Marrakesh Agreement Es tablishing the WTO , two-thirds of the Members must accept the amendments 
before they may enter into force.  WT/TPR/G/367 • Egypt  
 
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  5.25.   Logistics:  Considerable investment has been made since 2005 to develop the  Suez Canal 
Economic Zone (SCEZ), and in particular, for logistics, including port -related logistics, 
warehousing, distribution and an array of other services. Foreign investment into the SCEZ is 
considerable with regards to logistics, especially since 201 5. 
5.26.   Telecommunications:   Since 2005, Egypt has issued several licenses for both third (3G) 
and fourth (4G) generation network bandwidths to both domestic and foreign operators.  
5.27.   Transport:   Since 2005, there has been extensive investment in and development of the 
road transport infrastructure, increasing the national network of paved roads by thousands of 
kilomet res. This has paved the way for increasing trade, both with neighbo uring countr ies as well 
as internally, to ports and airports, therefore strengthening the export model. A new regulatory 
framework governing road transport was promulgated in 2012.  
6  EGYPT AND THE WAY FO RWARD FOR THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION ( WTO)  
6.1.  Egypt takes this oppor tunity to re -affirm its commitment to the WTO and the importance of 
its role in safeguarding the multilateral trade system.  
6.2.  In that context, Egypt views current challenges to the multilateral trading system, 
particularly from the pendulum of trade policie s that swing between neo -protectionism and trade 
liberalization, as one which should not be ignored by WTO Members.  
6.3.  A reasoned approach by WTO Members will allow for a meaningful stock -taking of the sources 
of national pressures that drive the popularity o f such policies, against a serious assessment of the 
benefits of not reversing the gains already made in the multilateral trade system. It is important to 
collectively invest in the research and analysis necessary to distinguish between the illusion of 
potential gains from neo -protectionism and its costs, especially when such policies are driven by 
popular arguments rather than those of a robust empirical analysis.  
6.4.  On the other hand, for developing economies (and especially peer WTO Members in Africa), 
the importance of recognizing the developmental interests of these e conomies cannot be 
overstated. The continued reliance on extractive industries, rather than processing or value -added 
activities, can only be altered through greater meaningful market access t o developed economies, 
while recognizing that a greater degree of protecting their domestic markets is a reality of the 
preconditions necessary for their long -term capacity to benefit from the current multilateral  trade 
system.  
6.5.  While the dual challenge of balancing demands for neo-protectionism  against demands for 
greater market access  is perennial and nothing new, the manner in which these challenges are 
currently manifesting themselves, however, has not occurred since the 1930s —the ensuing effects 
of thes e global policy mismatches was not lost upon the original Contracting Parties to the General 
Agreement on Tar iffs and Trade (GATT)  in 1947. Egypt hopes that it will not be lost upon WTO 
Members today.  
6.6.  Egypt continues to be a pro -active participant in each WTO Ministerial since the organization’s 
establishment, and has continuously looked favo urably upon its ever -expanding Membership. In 
that regard, no territory that seeks to observe or accede to the WTO system should be denied the 
opportunity to engage in such a process, if the WTO is to be inclusive and as expansive as 
originally intended.  
6.7.  In its capacity as an individual WTO Member and a member of various groupings including 
the African Group,  Egypt has also been actively engaged in the consultations and negotiations on a 
variety of matters, to ensure the adoption of the Protocol of Amendment to the Trade Facilitation 
Agreement into Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement,  as well as the decision on Public Stockholding 
for Food Security purposes in 2014.  
6.8.  At the 10th  WTO Ministerial Conference held in Nairobi, 2015, Egypt played (together with its 
trading partners) an important role towards ensuring that the needs of Net Food Importing 
Developing Countries (NFIDCs) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) were adequately addressed 
in the adopted Ministerial Decisions on Agriculture.  WT/TPR/G/367 • Egypt  
 
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  6.9.  Egypt strongly believes, however, that there is still much more to be done in addressing the 
needs and interests of NFIDCs in order to enhance their food security and agricultural productivity 
in line with the Marrakesh Decision  in this regard.  
6.10.   Furthermore, enhancing special and differential treatment for developing countries, as per 
Paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration and allowing for the appropriate policy space for 
developing cou ntries to pursue their long -term developmental objectives (on matters such as trade 
in services, trade facilitation and so forth) is vital to ensure their smooth integration into the world 
economy.  
6.11.   Looking ahead, Egypt remains committed to continue work wi th its trading partners towards 
a strengthened multilateral trading system that remains resilient to the changes of the global 
economy, while maintaining the special needs of developing and least developed members.  
6.12.   Egypt attaches great importance to succe ssfully concluding the legacy of the agenda agreed 
in Doha, while strengthening the technical capacities of developing and least developed countries 
in new areas of dialogue before new negotiations, so as to reduce the risk that insufficient 
technical comp etences may impede the pace or degree of progress at the multilateral level.  
__________