RESTRICTED  
  
WT/DSB/M/395  
 
19 May 2017  
(17-2721) Page: 1/4 
Dispute Settlement Body  
3 April 2017    
 
 MINUTES OF MEETING  
HELD IN THE CENTRE W ILLIAM RAPPARD  
ON 3 APRIL 2017  
Chairman: Mr. Junichi I hara (Japan ) 
Table of Contents  
1   EUROPEAN  UNION – MEASURES RELATED TO PRICE COMPARISON 
METHODOLOGIES  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............  1 
A  Request for the establishment of a panel by China  ................................ ..............................  1 
2   INDIA – CERTAIN MEASURES ON IMPORTS OF IRON AND STEEL PRODUCTS  ..............  3 
A  Request for the establishment of a panel by Japan  ................................ ..............................  3 
 
 
1  EUROPEAN  UNION – MEASURES RELATED TO PRICE COMPARISON MET HODOLOGIES  
A  Request for the establishment of a p anel by China (WT/DS516/9)  
1.1.  The Chairman  recalled that the DSB had considered this matter at its meeting on 
21 March  2017 and had agreed to revert to it. He then drew attention to the communication from 
China contained in document WT/DS516/9 and invited the  representative of China to speak.  
1.2.  The representative of China  said that his country wished to refer to the statement made by 
China at the 21  March  2017 DSB meeting when its request for the establishment of a panel was 
first considered by the DSB. China at tached great importance to resolving this dispute  promptly  
and had requested a special DSB meeting in order to seek the establishment of a panel for a 
second time. China did not wish to repeat its statement made on 21  March  2017, other than to 
reiterate th at the agreement between China and other WTO Members was for special rules to apply 
in anti -dumping proceedings concerning imports from China on a time -bound and temporary basis. 
China noted that the 15 -year transitional period had expired in December  2016. As a consequence, 
the special rules no longer applied. All Members were now obliged to ensure that Chinese imports 
were dealt with under the generally -applicable WTO rules governing the determination of all 
elements of price comparability in anti -dumping  proceedings. At the 21  March  2017 DSB meeting, 
both the EU and the United  States had made a number of comments. China noted that the 
United  States had signaled that it planned to continue discriminatory practices applied prior to the 
expiry of the relevan t provision of China's Accession Protocol. This was WTO -inconsistent.  
1.3.  China did not consider that the present meeting was the appropriate forum to respond to 
each of the points raised at the 21  March  2017 DSB meeting, but would take the opportunity to 
clarify two issues. First, contrary to the EU's suggestion there was no deficiency in China's panel 
request with respect to either the Basic Anti -Dumping Regulation as it currently existed, or to 
modifications, replacements or amendments to that measure. China  considered the EU view with 
respect to the inclusion of modifications, replacements or amendments in this dispute to be 
incorrect as a matter of law and fact. It was not for a responding Member to pick and choose the 
matters that could be brought before t he DSB. Rather, China expected the DSB to refer the matter 
described in China's panel request to a panel . The panel would  then undertake an objective WT/DSB/M/395  
 
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  assessment of the matter. Second, China rejected the EU's position that bringing this dispute was 
prematur e in light of proposals to amend the Basic Regulation. The EU had been aware of the date 
upon which the relevant provisions of China's Accession Protocol would expire for more than 
15 years. And yet the EU had taken no action to ensure the timely WTO -confo rmity of its 
measures on that date. China agreed that Members could use "appropriate WTO tools" to address 
injurious dumping according to WTO law. The problem raised by China in this dispute was that the 
EU had failed to use WTO -consistent tools in anti -dumping proceedings involving China. This 
situation manifestly disturbed the balance of rights and obligations agreed between China and the 
EU at the time of China's accession. China therefore reiterated that this matter be referred to a 
panel.  
1.4.  The represent ative of the European  Union  said that his delegation regretted that China had 
decided to request the establishment of a panel. As the EU had previously explained to China, and 
reiterated at the 21  March  2017 DSB meeting, the EU very much regretted that Chi na had chosen 
to bring panel proceedings with respect to a measure (Article  2(7) of Regulation (EU)  2016/1036, 
related to China) that was currently the subject of a legislative process, which could result in its 
withdrawal. The EU considered that such acti on was unnecessary and ultimately not fruitful  within 
the meaning of Article  3.7 of the DSU. Similarly, the EU wished to recall its concerns about China's 
attempt to create and maintain an unlawful shortcut between this dispute, as it related to 
Article  2(7) of Regulation (EU)  2016/1036, and the, as yet unknown, outcome of the EU's internal 
legislative processes for the reasons already explained at the 21  March  2017 DSB meeting. 
Accordingly, the EU once again called upon China to respect both the letter and  the spirit of the 
DSU, and to withdraw its panel request. In any event, should a panel be established in this 
dispute, the EU would defend its legislation vigorously.  
1.5.  The representative of the of the United  States  said that the United  States  was interveni ng 
again at the present meeting to express its support for the right of the EU to use a non -market 
economy methodology in anti -dumping proceedings involving China. As the United  States had 
explained at the 21  March  2017 DSB meeting, China's Accession Proto col, as it currently existed, 
expressed that the EU and other WTO Members could continue using a non -market economy 
methodology with respect to China as long as such treatment was justified by the facts. China 
appeared to believe that the EU's finding that  China was a non -market economy and use of a 
non-market economy methodology resulted in less favorable treatment. China's argument missed 
the point because it presupposed that China actually was a market economy and should be treated 
like other market econ omies for purposes of dumping comparisons. If the facts showed that China 
had made the reforms necessary to become a market economy, then the EU should treat it as 
such. But if the facts showed otherwise, then the EU did not need to do so. To be clear, the  
United  States did not contend that the expiry of one provision in China's Accession Protocol had no 
meaning. Rather, any continued use of a non -market economy methodology under the Protocol 
had to be justified by the facts in China. But China's apparent v iew that neither the facts in China 
nor the remaining provisions of the Protocol had any relevance was not only implausible, but was 
contrary to the text of the Protocol and the rights of other Members under the WTO Agreement.  
1.6.  Consistent with this view, th e United  States had repeatedly asked China to engage on the 
facts. However, China had declined to request a change in its non -market economy status or to 
request that any of its industries be treated as market -oriented in any recent US anti -dumping 
proceed ing. Despite China's lack of engagement, as Members may have been aware, the 
United  States had decided to initiate a public process to ensure that it had the most recent 
information available regarding the status of China's economy. On 29  March  2017, the 
US Department of Commerce had announced an inquiry into China's non -market economy status 
in the context of an investigation on aluminum foil, the first anti -dumping duty investigation 
involving Chinese products initiated since the change in China's Protoco l. The United  States invited 
China to participate in this transparent and facts -driven process to demonstrate the results of any 
efforts to reduce governmental distortions in China. China should similarly make use of the 
procedures available in the EU, and  other WTO Members, to establish that it was a market 
economy under their respective laws instead of pursuing unnecessary litigation. If China instead 
continued down the path of litigation, the United  States would resolutely stand with the EU, 
supporting i ts right to use an appropriate methodology to defend the interests of its workers and 
its businesses suffering from China's injurious dumping. The United  States strongly encouraged 
other Members concerned about the effects of China's dumping on their worke rs and businesses to 
do so as well.  WT/DSB/M/395  
 
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  1.7.  The representative of Japan  said that, as his country had stated at the 21  March  2017 DSB 
meeting , Japan was generally supportive of the respective positions  of the EU and the US on the 
interpretive issues raised by Chin a in this dispute, and shared their concerns with respect to 
China's interpretations of the various provisions at issue in the WTO Agreement, including China's 
Accession Protocol. In particular, Japan was of the view that the WTO Agreement, including 
China 's Accession Protocol, continued to allow WTO Members to use a methodology not based on a 
strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in China. Japan was also not sure how China's 
reference, in its panel request, to the EU's proposed measures under con sideration in the 
legislative process could satisfy the specificity requirements under Article  6.2 of the DSU. 
A challenge to the EU's future measures, the precise content of which was unknown, appeared to 
be speculative and did not serve the efficient use  of dispute settlement resources.  
1.8.  The DSB took note  of the statements and agreed  to establish a panel in accordance with the 
provisions of Article  6 of the DSU with standard terms of reference.  
1.9.  The representatives of: Australia , Brazil , Canada , Colombia , Ecuador , India, Indonesia , 
Japan , Kazakhstan , Korea , Mexico , Norway , the Russian  Federation , Chinese  Taipei , Turkey  and 
the United  States  reserved their third -party rights to participate in the Panel's proceedings.  
2  INDIA – CERTAIN MEASURES ON IMPORTS OF IRO N AND STEEL PRODUCTS  
A  Request for the establishment of a panel by Japan (WT/DS518/5)  
2.1.  The Chairman  recalled that the DSB had considered this matter at its meeting on 
21 March  2017 and had agreed to revert to it. He drew attention to the communication from  Japan 
contained in document WT/DS518/5 and invited the representative of Japan to speak.  
2.2.  The representative of Japan  said that his delegation thanked the Chairman for agreeing to 
chair the present meeting to consider this matter. Japan  recalled that its p anel request regarding 
this dispute had first been considered by the DSB at its meeting on 21  March  2017. Following that 
meeting, Japan requested, pursuant to Article  6 of the DSU, that the DSB establish a panel, with 
standard terms of reference, to examin e the matter set out in Japan's panel request, in accordance 
with Article  7.1 of the DSU. At the present meeting, Japan did not wish to reiterate its position on 
this matter, as it had already been explained in its panel request and the statement it had 
delivered at the 21  March  2017 DSB meeting. It sufficed to say that India's safeguard measures in 
question were inconsistent with India's various obligations under the GATT  1994 and the 
Agreement on Safeguards. As Japan had also stated at the 21  March  2017 D SB meeting, the 
measures at issue would expire on 13  March  2018 and Japan had been making serious efforts to 
resolve this matter with India since India had initiated the safeguard investigations at issue. Given 
the limited time available before the expiry of the measures, Japan expressed its sincere desire 
that the panel, which would be established at the present meeting, would observe the time -frames 
specifically prescribed in the DSU for the purpose of the prompt and satisfactory resolution of 
disputes. J apan said that it looked forward to working with the panel and India to this end.  
2.3.  The representative of India said that his country was deeply disappointed that, despite its 
sincere and best efforts, and thorough cooperation throughout the consultation pro cess, Japan had 
decided to persist with its stance on the establishment of a panel in this matter. It was unfortunate 
that Japan had persisted with the dispute, despite the fact that India had been able to 
demonstrate that the safeguard measures it had app lied were wholly consistent with the letter and 
spirit of the Agreement on Safeguards and India's obligations therein. During the consultation 
process, India had clearly and very transparently explained the legal framework as well as the 
exceptional circum stances that necessitated the safeguard measures.  India still believed that this 
dispute was avoidable considering the fact that the safeguards measures had been undertaken by 
India under exceptional circumstances, which had been amply explained during the  consultation 
process. India further believed that such disputes would lead to unnecessary burden being placed 
on WTO dispute settlement resources, which were already stretched. India had explained its 
position regarding the measure in question at the 21  March 2017 DSB meeting. India believed that 
its actions were consistent with the provisions of the relevant WTO Agreements. India, once again, 
requested Japan to withdraw its request. If Japan was, nonetheless determined to pursue this 
matter further, India  would vigorously defend its measures before the panel. WT/DSB/M/395  
 
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  2.4.  In India's view the special meeting of the DSB had been requested by Japan without any 
underlying urgency or rationale, particularly given the fact that the regular DSB meeting was a few 
days away. At  the 21  March  2017 DSB meeting, Japan had stated that the safeguard measures in 
question would expire on 13  March  2018 and hoped that the panel, to be established, would 
examine this matter as a matter of urgency and would endeavour  to issue its report as early as 
possible with a view to securing a prompt and satisfactory resolution of this dispute. India stressed 
that every dispute that was initiated by a complainant was urgent and critical and desirous of a 
prompt and satisfactory resolution. Further, Ind ia was also a complainant in many disputes and 
the issues arising in those disputes were also of prime economic and systemic interest to India, for 
which India wanted an expedited process. However, understanding the present circumstances of 
staffing and ot her workload issues, India had accepted current timelines. Therefore any selective 
expedited process, merely because a measure was going to expire, would, in India's view, be 
unjustifiable. India expected the Secretariat as well as the panel, if establishe d, to apply the same 
processes and standards that were applied in all other disputes.  
2.5.  The DSB took note  of the statements and agreed  to establish a panel in accordance with the 
provisions of Article  6 of the DSU with standard terms of reference.  
2.6.  The repres entatives of China , the European  Union , Indonesia , Kazakhstan , Korea , Qatar , the 
Russian  Federation , Singapore , Chinese  Taipei , Ukraine , the United  States  and Viet Nam reserved 
their third -party rights to participate in the Panel's proceedings.  
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