RESTRICTED  
  
TN/CTD/M/50  
 
4 December 2015  
(15-6440)  Page: 1/10  
Committee on Trade and Development 
Fiftieth Special Session    
   
NOTE ON THE MEETING OF 24 JUNE 2015, RECONVENED ON 16 SEPTEMBER 2015 
Chairperson:  Ambassador Tan Yee Woan (Singapore) 
 
A.
 ADOPTION OF TH E AGENDA .................................................................................... 1  
B. REVIEW OF THE STATUS OF WORK ON SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL 
TREATMENT ............................................................................................................. 1  
C. OTHER BUSINESS .................................................................................................... 3  
RECONVENED SESSION .................................................................................................... 3  
 
 
A. ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA 
1. The agenda as contained in Airgram WTO/AIR/TN/CTD/2 of 5 June 2015 was adopted. 
B. REVIEW OF THE STATUS OF WORK ON SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT 
2. Before addressing agenda item B, The Chairperson reported to Members on an informal 
small group meeting that she had convened for 10 June. The objective of the meeting was to 
review and discuss the status of work, particular ly the work being undertaken by the proponents 
on developing textual proposals on the 25 special and differential treatment (S&D) provisions 
identified by them earlier in February 2015, and to give delegations an idea of what to expect in 
terms of discussion for the formal meeting. Sh e stated that the delegations of Argentina; 
Australia; Bangladesh; Barbados; Brazil; Cameroon; Canada; China; Colombia; Cuba; Egypt; the 
European Union; Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; Japan; Lesotho; Mexico; Nepal; 
New Zealand; Norway; Switzerland; and the United  States had attended the small group meeting. 
In sharing her thoughts, she stated that without having seen the textual proposals, it was difficult 
to have a sense of the scope of the work in the Special Session of the Committee on Trade and 
Development (Special Session). She, therefore, urged the proponents to circulate the proposals as soon as possible. She stated that during the co urse of the small group meeting, the proponents 
had informed that they were finalizing the submi ssion of a consolidated list of proposals and hoped 
to table them before the forthcoming formal meeting of the Special Session on 24 June. The 
Chairperson went on to state that certain procedural questions had been raised by some Members, such as: (a) how work in the Special Session would proceed; (b) would Members negotiate on the 
textual proposals in preparation for the finalization of the July Work Program; (c) if so, would the 
negotiated text be reflected in the Work Program; (d) if not, then how would the proposals be reflected in the Work Program; and (e) what would be the contribution of the Special Session to 
the Work Program in July and thereafter for the WTO's 10
th Ministerial Conference (MC10) in 
Nairobi. 
3. The Chairperson added that some Members had felt that these questions were relevant, but 
not unique to the Special Session alone. They felt  that answers to many of these questions could 
only be considered after the proposals had been tabled and seen by Members. Members generally 
agreed that coming up with a Work Program by July 2015 was a priority for them and this could 
subsequently pave the way for delivering a substantive outcome for Nairobi. TN/CTD/M/50 
 
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  4. There were no comments from Members on the re port by the Chairperson. Having concluded 
her report, she invited Members to make comments. No Member requested the floor. 
5. The Chairperson then proceeded to take up agenda item B. She said that even if the 
proposals had not been introduced, she intended to discuss other related issues, such as the pace 
of work in the Special Session from then on to the end of July. She invited proponents to brief 
Members on the status of their work on the textua l proposals. She also invited Members to express 
views on how to structure and plan future work in the Special Session. 
6. The representative of Egypt, speaking on behalf  of the African Group, stated that the Group 
was working in the G90 format to submit combined proposals with a view to strengthening the 
S&D provisions in accordance with paragraph 44 of the Doha Declaration. He added that work had been concluded at the technical level and awaited political endorsement in the very near future. 
7. At this stage, the Chairperson intervened to  urge an early submission of the textual 
proposals. In this context, she underlined the fact that Members had very little time left until 
31 July. She also recalled that a formal meeting of the General Council was scheduled for 
27-28 July and she anticipated that the Special Session would be required to report on its work to 
the General Council at that meeting. 
8. The representative of Nepal, speaking in his ca pacity of the LDC Group's focal point on trade 
and development, associated himself with the vi ews expressed by the delegation of Egypt, on 
behalf of the African Group. He stated that the LDCs attached great importance to S&D and that following paragraph 44 of the Doha Declaration, they had identified 25 provisions with a view to making them precise, effective and operational. He recalled that a list containing these provisions 
was tabled by the LDC Group at an informal open-ended meeting of the Special Session in 
February 2015. He also added that the LDCs were working towards tabling a combined G90 submission. In reiterating the LDC Group's commitm ent to completing the process at the earliest, 
he requested the Chairperson to consult with the proponents before convening the next meeting. 
9. He went on to state that strengthening S&D provisions with binding effect should be an 
integral part of the post-Bali work program. He also expressed hope that the Group would receive 
active cooperation and engagement from Members in finding solutions on S&D by MC10. 
10. The representative of the United States stated that his delegation continued to look forward 
to engaging constructively on the proposals. Howe ver, he cautioned that delay well beyond what 
they had been led to expect would seem to complicate prospects for meaningful engagement. The 
United States would need time to process the proposals and be able to engage. 
11. The representative or Argentina expressed the hope that the proposals would be tabled 
sooner than later and that his delegation was eager to engage in substantive discussions. He 
added that since the focus of the Doha Round was on development, it would be inconceivable to 
agree on a post-Bali work program without the issues within the purview of this Committee. 
12. The representative of Nigeria said that there was no lack of effort from proponents. It was 
not easy to work within groups in order to come up with a consolidated proposal. Nonetheless, the 
work at the technical level had been completed and they only awaited political endorsements that should happen soon. 
13. The representative of the European Union stat ed that her delegation remained committed to 
finalizing the post-Bali work program as well as  completing the DDA. The EU was ready to discuss 
on the basis of concrete proposals that should be  put forward by the proponents. As in all areas, 
the main focus of efforts should be on issues of concern to LDCs. Pragmatism, realism and 
doability should guide the discussion for any real progress by MC10. 
14. The delegation of Japan stated that developmen t should be an essential pillar of the post-
Bali work program. It was a fact that S&D issues had been on the table for quite some time and 
had been discussed intensively without real substantive outcomes. Finding realistic solutions to 
these issues was a tough challenge because some of the proposed solutions could undermine the basic concepts of the WTO. Nonetheless, he expr essed Japan's readiness to engage constructively, 
once the proponents had tabled the textual proposals which he hoped would be done soon TN/CTD/M/50 
 
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  15. The Chairperson thanked the proponents for their intense work at the technical level and 
urged them to formally table the textual proposals in the coming days, so that the Special Session 
could proceed with substantive work on them. Sh e also took note of the request made by the 
representative of Nepal and indicated that she wo uld consult with the proponents before convening 
the next formal meeting  
C. OTHER BUSINESS 
16. No issue was raised under Other Business.  
17. The Chairperson hoped that over the coming w eeks, Members would work constructively in 
advancing the work in the Special Session. 
18. The meeting was suspended until further notice. 
RECONVENED SESSION 
19. The 50th Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Development (Special Session) was 
reconvened on 16 September 2015. 
20. The Chairperson recalled that the 50th formal meeting of the Special Session held on 24 June 
2015 was suspended so that it could be reconvened quickly, as and when the textual proposals 
were tabled by the proponents. On 30 July 2015, the Special Session had received a G90 submission containing detailed textual proposals on  the 25 S&D provisions that had been identified 
by the proponents earlier in the year. These were contained in a dual-symbol document 
JOB/DEV/29-JOB/TNC/51.  
21. The Chairperson offered the floor to the proponents with the request to formally introduce 
their proposals. 
22. The representative of Barbados, on behalf of  the G90, began by saying that S&D was an 
integral component of the WTO. This was evidenced by the fact that the S&D was reflected in more 
than 148 provisions in WTO Agreements. However, the challenge was that the S&D regime had not 
assisted developing countries, in particular, LDCs , SVEs, and low-income developing countries, to 
participate effectively in the multilateral trading system (MTS), mainly because most of the S&D provisions were couched in hortatory and best endeavour language and had not been fully 
operationalized. Also, in general, complex procedural hurdles were built into the relevant S&D 
provisions, thereby diluting the intended flexibilities. In addition, a number of other S&D provisions lacked clarity.  
23. She went on to state that at the beginning of the DDA negotiations, developing countries 
had submitted 88 Agreement-specific proposals for negotiation, from which 28 Agreement-specific 
proposals were agreed, in principle, at the Canc ún Ministerial Conference, but were not formally 
adopted. However, at the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, Members were able to take concrete 
decisions on only five of the LDC-specific propos als, though the implementation of some of those 
decisions still remained unsatisfactory. In line with the mandate in paragraph 44 of the Doha Declaration, the G90 had recently identified 25 S&D proposals for consideration by the Special 
Session. The G90 felt that these proposals were crucial for promoting industrialization, increasing 
the productive capacity in developing countries an d LDCs to enhancing their capacity to participate 
effectively in regional and global value chains, thereby facilitating the G90's participation in the MTS.  
24. The G90 submission contained in JOB/DEV/29-JOB/TNC/51 was based on a thorough review 
of the S&D provisions in the WTO Agreements. The review included: evaluating whether the 
provisions were operational based on a review of the challenges Members have faced in trying to 
access the flexibilities; assessing the added value of reviewing the provisions to make them more 
"precise, effective and operational"; reviewing the proposals presented by developing countries since the mandate of paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration was established, and why 
meaningful progress could not be achieved on them in the past 14 years. These included the 
proposals tabled in the process by the African Group, the LDC Group, and the ACP Group, as well as proposals by other developing country Members.  TN/CTD/M/50 
 
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  25. After the general remarks, the representative  of Barbados proceeded to introduce the 
proposals.  
26. Proposal Number 1 dealt with sections A and C of GATT Article XVIII on infant industry 
protection. These sections were intended to allow developing countries and LDCs to modify or 
withdraw concessions or provide governmental assistance in order to protect infant industries. 
However, the conditions and procedures for invoking infant industry measures were too stringent and made it difficult, if not impossible, for developing countries and LDCs to utilize these 
provisions. There were elaborate consultation procedures and developing countries could be 
required to provide compensatory adjustments, or could be subject of retaliation. The initial duration of the infant industry measure was also not clear. If history be the guide, Section A had never been utilized since the inception of th e WTO. Three developing countries had sought 
recourse to Article XVIII:C, which had even more onerous conditions and could be taken as a 
measure of last resort, but no results were achi eved for those countries. In order to address the 
challenges above, the proponents had now propos ed a simple process for temporary modification 
or deviation from WTO commitments for an initial period of 15 and 20 years (renewable) for 
developing countries and LDCs respectively, using a broader definition of infant industry that also included industries affected by climate change or hostilities.  
27. Proposal Numbers 2 and 3 dealt with Article XVIII Section B and the Uruguay Round 
Understanding on Balance-of-Payment (BOP) Provisions, which allowed Members to impose import restrictions in order to safeguard their BOP situation. Again, due to onerous procedural requirements, developing countries, SVEs, and LDCs had not been able to fully utilize these 
provisions. Proposal Number 2 sought for better guidelines for determining the adequacy of 
developing countries' reserves within the contex t of their economic development programmes. It 
also proposed a suspension of the right to reta liate against countries that used this Article. 
Furthermore, it had been proposed that short-term financial flows should also be excluded as they 
did not give an accurate picture of a country's BOP situation.  
28. With regard to Proposal Number 3, developing countries and LDCs had challenges complying 
with onerous procedural requirements, including "full consultation". The proposal was to use 
simple consultation procedures in the case of LDCs. The proponents had also proposed that for developing countries, full consultation procedures only be used when it was not appropriate to use simplified consultation procedures. Simplified cons ultation procedures should also be used when 
the Trade Policy Review of a developing country  Member was scheduled for the same calendar 
year as the date fixed for the BOP consultations.  
29. Proposal Number 4 was on Article XXVIII and its Understanding, which allowed WTO 
Members to modify or withdraw concessions, af ter negotiation and agreement with any other WTO 
Member with which such concession was initially negotiated and with any other WTO Member determined by the Members to have a principa l supplying interest. The proposal had three 
elements. One, clarifying the meaning of substantial interest to include countries which had a 
significant share of export to the Member wishing to renegotiate its commitments. Two, if the proposed modification or withdrawal adversely a ffected the exports of LDCs, they needed to be 
exempted from the impact of such modification or withdrawal. Three, in forming or joining a 
customs union, developing countries would be allowed to withdraw or modify their tariff 
commitments in accordance with the common external tariff maintained by the customs union. 
30. Proposal Number 5 referred to Article 15.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture - an LDC-specific 
proposal. It provided that S&D for developing countries must be included in the relevant provisions 
of the Agreement and the schedules of commitmen ts and concessions. However, LDCs had not 
been able to fully utilize the S&D provisions because they were couched in hortatory and 
non-binding language. Therefore, developed country  Members must bind all their LDC preferences 
for agricultural products under Article II of GATT,  with a goal to provide duty-free and quota-free 
(DFQF) market access for all agricultural products on a lasting basis. 
31. Introducing Proposal Numbers 6 and 7 that dealt with Article 10 of the Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) Agreement, the dele gation of Lesotho stated that the proposal 
sought to make the notification, by developed co untries, of all proposed SPS measures mandatory. 
The challenge was that the special needs of developing countries and LDCs were not fully taken 
into account when preparing and applying SPS measures. The proposal, among others, sought a TN/CTD/M/50 
 
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  longer time-frame for comment and compliance periods for developing countries and the LDCs in 
view of their capacity constraints. 
32. Proposal Number 15 related to Article 12.3 of the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
Agreement with obligations similar to Articles 10.1 and 10.2 of the SPS Agreement. It required 
Members to "take account" of the special development, financial and trade needs of developing 
countries in the preparation and application of technical regulations, standards and conformity 
assessment procedures and ensure that these TBT measures did not create obstacles to exports 
from developing countries. Similarly, the propos al, among others things, sought a longer time-
frame for comment and compliance period for developing countries and the LDCs in view of their capacity constraints. 
33. Proposal Numbers 8, 9, as well as 17, addressed the Trade-Related Invest Measures (TRIMs) 
Agreement. They sought to allow developing countries, in particular LDCs, SVEs and low-income 
countries, to introduce TRIMs inconsistent measures as provided for in Article 4 of the TRIMs Agreement, but without being constrained by GATT Article XVIII. They should also be allowed to 
introduce new TRIMs including the pursuit of local content development policies, in order to 
promote domestic manufacturing capabilities, stim ulate transfer of technology, promote domestic 
competition and correct restrictive business practices, among other things. The developing country 
Members shall notify these new investment measures (effective for an initial 15 years), to the 
Council for Trade in Goods within six months af ter the adoption of these measures. This will 
provide these countries with adequate time to promote industrialization and economic transformation. Given that LDCs are often requ ired to spend a lot of time and resources 
negotiating extensions, there was a need to exem pt LDCs from TRIMs until they graduated from 
LDC status.  
34. Proposal Numbers 10 and 11 related to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The proposals stated that despite the fact that it was well 
known that LDCs did not have the capacity to comply with the TRIPS Agreement, they were 
required to undergo difficult negotiations seeking extension of the limited transitional periods 
which hardly were sufficient to build a viable technological base. This process consumed a lot of 
LDC resources. In order to address the above challenges, the G90 had proposed that LDCs should be exempted from the TRIPS Agreement till they ceased to be LDCs.  
35. On Proposal Number 11 relating to Articles 70.8 and Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement, 
the proponents explained that even if LDCs were enjoying the TRIPS transitional period under 
Article 66.1, they still had to provide a means by which applications for patents for pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemical products  could be filed and provide exclusive marketing 
rights to applicants for patents. The proposal sought a waiver for LDCs from the obligations in 
Articles 70.8 and 70.9, for as long as a country remained an LDC.  
36. The subsequent proposals were introduced by the representative of Bangladesh. Referring to 
Proposal Number 12, he stated that it pertained to increasing participation of developing countries 
in services trade. Article IV of GATS was vague, imprecise and not effective, as it did not clearly 
stipulate the measures that must be taken to increase the participation of developing countries, in particular the LDCs in world trade in servic es. The proposal was designed to improve the 
participation of developing countries in trade in services.  
37. Proposal Number 13 clarified Article V.3 of GATS. This was an equivalent provision to GATT 
Article XXIV, and governed the formation of regional trade agreements (RTAs) in the context of 
trade in services. The challenge was that Article V.3 was couched in vague language; for example, 
there was no clarity on the meaning of "flexibility ", and "more favourable treatment". In order to 
address these challenges, the proponent proposed that flexibility in North-South RTAs dealing with 
services and the concept of "more favourable treatment" in the context of South-South RTAs 
should be interpreted to mean that developing countries would not be required to eliminate substantially all discrimination or comply with substantial sectoral coverage in order to promote progressive regional integration in Services Agreements.  
38. Proposal Numbers 14 and 16 related to Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) 
Agreement. On Proposal Number 14, the proponen ts stated that it highlighted the role that 
subsidies could play in the development process of  developing countries and the LDCs and sought TN/CTD/M/50 
 
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  flexibility for use of non-actionable subsidies. Article 27.1 recognized that subsidies "may" play an 
important role in economic development programmes of developing countries. However, the challenge was that the use of the word "may" in Article 27.1 did not fully recognize the role played by subsidies in industrialization and economic development. There was also no clarity as to 
whether subsidies implemented by developing countries, in particular LDCs and SVEs, with a view 
to achieving legitimate development goals, such  as regional growth, technology, research and 
development funding, production diversificat ion and development and implementation of 
environmentally sound methods of production would be considered as non-actionable subsidies. In 
order to address the challenges above, the propon ents had proposed to delete the word "may" in 
Article 27.1 of the SCM Agreement and make it clear that the subsidy programmes used by developing countries, in particular LDCs and SVE s, should be considered as non-actionable. 
39. Proposal Number 16 dealt with Article 3.1( b) of the SCM Agreement which prohibited 
subsidies contingent upon the use of domestic ov er imported goods. The challenge was that even 
though Article 27.3 of the SCM Agreement provided a transitional period for developing countries 
and LDCs to use local content subsidy programme until 2002, they were constrained by obligations 
in the TRIMs Agreement, which prohibited the use of local content requirements. The other 
challenge was that the transitional periods that were provided under Article 27.3 of the SCM 
Agreement had expired, but developing countries  and LDCs still needed to use local content 
subsidies to accelerate industrialization and economic transformation. In order to address these challenges, developing country Members had sought  exemption from the obligations in Article 3.1 
(b) of the SCM Agreement to allow them to use subsidies contingent on the use of domestic over 
imported goods.  
40. Proposal Number 18 relating to the Customs Valuation (CV) Agreement pointed to an 
important issue, i.e. the issue of import under-i nvoicing, which had deprived LDC governments of 
revenue for development expenditures. The proponen ts, therefore, proposed that LDCs be allowed 
to use minimum or reference values to address this issue. The proposal also linked technical and financial assistance, customs cooperation and access to international pricing data to compliance 
with the provisions of the CV Agreement. It ha d been proposed that the LDCs should not be 
required to implement provisions of the Agr eement until implementation capacity had been 
acquired, a principle already accepted in the Trade Facilitation (TFA). Developed countries and developing countries in a position to do so should provide technical and financial assistance to 
enable LDCs to comply with the Customs Valuation Agreement. 
41. Proposal Number 19 dealt with the Agreement on Safeguards. The proponents stated that 
Article 9.1 provided that exports of a develo ping country Member may be exempted from 
safeguard actions by importing WTO Members under certain conditions. Article 9.2 allowed 
developing countries to enter safeguard measures for another period of two years in addition to the eight years provided in Article 7.3 subject to certain conditions. The major challenge for the 
developing countries to effectively utilize the flexibilities was the excessive procedural 
requirements envisaged in the Safeguards Agreem ent. In order to address these challenges, the 
proponents had proposed that for instance under Article 9.1, a Member might not apply a safeguard measure on an LDC whose import share in to that country was 10% or less, or 3% in the 
case of developing countries. The proposal also required that while imposing a safeguard measure, 
developed countries provide a list of Members excluded from safeguard measures. In addition, developing countries should be allowed to extend  the application of safeguard measures for an 
additional period and to take fresh safeguard measures against products that were previously 
subjected to safeguard measures.  
42. Proposal Number 20 related to paragraph 6 of Article XXXVI of GATT and the Declaration on 
the Contribution of the WTO to Achieving Cohere nce in Global Economic Policy. Article XXXVI.6 
pertained to international lending agencies' financial assistance and its relationship with trade and development. The challenge was that financial assistance provided by international lending agencies was often subject to conditions which undermined the rights of WTO Members under the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements (MTA) and hence constrained their ability to put in place the 
necessary instruments to industrialize and boos t their exports. Lack of effective coherence 
between the lending agencies and the WTO in econom ic policy making undermined, more often, if 
not always, the negotiated rights of developing countries, in particular the LDCs. In order to 
address the above challenges, the G90 had proposed that more effective measures be taken to ensure coherence between the WTO and international lending agencies, and that WTO Members 
coordinate their work to ensure that LDCs were not subjected to conditionalities on loans, grants TN/CTD/M/50 
 
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  and official development assistance (ODA) that were inconsistent with their rights under the WTO 
Agreements.  
43. P r o p o s a l  N u m b e r  2 1  r e f e r r e d  t o  t h e  D e c i s i o n  o n  M e a s u r e s  i n  F a v o u r  o f  L D C s  –  M a r k e t  
Opportunities. The challenge was that Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) tariff liberalization as foreseen 
in the Doha Round could lead to diminished tr ading opportunities for LDCs due to preference 
erosion. Hence, certain general solutions had been proposed to address this problem, mainly by putting obligations on developed countries to provide compensatory and adjustment support. 
44. Proposal Number 22 related to the Enabling Clause, which provided the basis for non-
reciprocal preferences to developing countries and LDCs. The challenge here was that LDCs and developing countries were not fully consulted wh en developed countries offered non-reciprocal 
preferences. In order to address these issues, it had been proposed that developed countries 
consult with LDCs to ensure that meaningful market access in sectors of their interest was 
provided under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and other non-reciprocal schemes for LDCs.  
45. Proposal Number 23 concerned joint action in the area of trade and development policies. 
The problem here was that there had not been effective coordination between the WTO and FAO on the vital issue of food security. Certain trade measures could compromise food security for the 
poor in the developing countries, in particular, LDCs. In order to address the challenge pertaining 
to food security, it had been proposed that Memb ers collaborate to achieve the objective of food 
security and to uphold the right to adequate food . More specifically, they had proposed to make 
the right to adequate food an objective of current and future WTO negotiations. In addition, LDCs 
should have the flexibility to adjust their applied tariffs beyond the bound level in order to 
safeguard this human right. 
46. Proposal Number 24 referred to state trading enterprises (STEs). STEs fulfilled a range of 
essential and vital functions in developing countries. The proposal sought to reaffirm the role of 
STEs and to also clarify that only the MFN princi ple, and not the National Treatment obligation, fell 
within the scope of the general princi ple referred to in Article XVII:1(a). 
47. Finally, Proposal Number 25, pertaining to di spute settlement, highlighted the particular 
problems and interests of developing countries and LDCs, before establishment of a panel as well as during panel proceedings. The proposal also sought to clarify the obligation to "exercise due restraint in raising matters under these procedures involving a least developed country Member" 
under Article 24.1 of the Understanding on Rule s and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, as well as the phrase that "particular consideration shall be given to the special situation of least developed country Members" to ensure that the needs of LDCs were fully taken into 
account, including in cases where they participated as third parties. 
48. In closing the presentation of the proposals, the representative of Barbados said that the 
content and rationale of the proposals were not new. The underlying issues had been voiced for 
more than a decade in the WTO Committees. She hoped that Members would engage 
constructively in finding satisfactory solutions to the underlying concerns and towards the common goal of achieving a successful development pack age for Nairobi, including agreement on these 
proposals.  
49. The representative of Argentina welcomed th e G90 submission and expressed satisfaction 
that the proposals sought to implement paragraph 44 of the Doha Declaration, as well as the 
Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns. He reminded Members that one of the 
main reasons why the DDA was launched, was, precisely, to address the imbalances in GATT/WTO 
rules that had existed for years. In his view, th e proposals would give developing countries the 
policy space they needed for enhanced developmen t of their economies, so that they could be 
better integrated into the MTS. He added that the forthcoming Ministerial was being held in an 
African continent, so it was the best context to make progress in crucial areas for developing countries.  
50. The representative of Egypt stated that his delegation would like to highlight Egypt's 
understanding that there was a common accept ance among Members of the importance of 
development issues. Quoting from a recent stat ement of the WTO Director-General that the TN/CTD/M/50 
 
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  "Nairobi Ministerial must deliver on development", he invited Members to approach negotiations in 
a positive and solution-finding mode. 
51. The representative of Nepal, speaking on behalf of the LDC Group, stated that while 
developing the S&D proposals, the proponents had analysed them from the perspective of realism, 
doability and their relative potential to contribute to the development dimension and the question 
of larger integration into the world trading system. LDCs held the conviction that S&D provisions were an integral part of the MTS, enshrined in  various WTO Agreements and Decisions that were 
distinctly in favour of the developing country Members, and LDCs in particular. Despite having 
more than 148 S&D provisions in the WTO Agreements, only a few of them had yielded the desired results. Most of the S&D provisions had inherent structural shortcomings because of their hortatory and best endeavoured nature. This situation had not only subjected LDCs to further 
marginalization, but could have, in their view, al so weakened the credibility of the WTO system. 
52. The representative of the United States thanked the G90 for its proposals and stated that for 
her delegation it was deeply important to find ways to enhance developing countries' integration 
into the MTS and to increase trading opportuni ties for them. Nevertheless, she expressed her 
delegation's concern that nearly all of the proposals appeared to arise from a premise that the rules of the WTO, as they currently existed, were inhibiting economic development, and should be 
radically revised in order to enable the creation of more, rather than fewer, barriers to trade. She 
added that they were disappointed that, after two decades of discussion in the WTO, there 
appeared to be little progress in bridging differences over the most fundamental questions surrounding the relationship between trade and de velopment. The proposals created a perception 
that the system had not succeeded in demonstrat ing that open markets and reasonably balanced 
and applied rules were essential to advancing national economic development. Many of the proposals put forward by the proponents and their advisors appeared to walk back from 
longstanding WTO rules, and even sought to rewrite those rules. The United States was concerned 
about the lack of predictability and transparency  that would result from such proposals, and 
because many of the proposals would give enormous flexibilities to countries which did not need 
such flexibilities. Nonetheless, her delegation would do its best, working with the Chairperson and 
the members of the negotiating group, to enhance developing countries' integration into the MTS. 
53. The representative of Hong Kong, China expressed her appreciation for the G90's effort to 
consolidate and compile proposals. She hoped that Members, now, could begin substantive 
discussion on the proposals. She said that he r delegation was flexible and open-minded on 
proposals that could assist LDCs and developing countries to better integrate into the MTS ensuring that these conformed to WTO principles. 
54. The representative of India stated that his delegation believed that the MTS was in the best 
interest of developing countries, especially th e poorest and most marginalized among them. The 
S&D provisions, which were an integral part of the MTS, were meant to enable developing 
countries and LDCs to meaningfully integrate into the MTS, so as to derive maximum economic 
benefits. For his delegation, substantial progress and outcomes on the "development aspects" of the Doha Work Program were essential. In this context, his delegation believed that the textual proposals introduced by the G90 provided a useful basis to advance work in this very important 
area for developing countries, including LDCs.  
55. The representative of the European Union recalled that her delegation had repeatedly 
reaffirmed its support to the centrality of develo pment in the DDA and underlined that the EU was 
ready to engage constructively on development outcomes for MC10, in particular on issues 
concerning LDCs. However, most of the current proposals raised a series of concerns and questions. Most importantly, it was difficult for the EU to understand the specific issues that the 
proposals were trying to address. She added that the criteria that the EU would apply in 
consideration of the proposals could be summarized in two questions: what difficulties do developing country Members face with the existing  S&D provisions? Are we trying to tackle real 
problems? And if so, were the proposed solutions proportionate with what the proponents intended 
to achieve through these proposals? Many of the proposals seemed to have as a starting point that 
whatever was binding in WTO rules was not go od for development. The EU, fundamentally, 
disagreed with this perception. Nevertheless, th ey were fully committed to work hard and to 
engage constructively to find pragmatic solutions to real problems faced by the developing 
countries and the LDCs.  TN/CTD/M/50 
 
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  56. The representative of Australia, expressed commitment to engage constructively. However, 
he expressed surprise and confusion on the G90 pr oposals, as some of the proposals were more 
far reaching in scope than those that were deemed unworkable in 2003. Some of the proposals challenged the basic WTO principle of predictabili ty. He added that his delegation would support 
realistic proposals that granted genuine benefits  to countries which needed them, strengthened 
the multilateral system, and retained predictability of trade. 
57. The representative of Chinese Taipei thanked the G90 for its proposals. He hoped that 
Members could reach a meaningful outcome on S&D proposals and development issues for MC10 
in Nairobi. Nonetheless his delegation would highlight some concerns on these proposals in the coming discussion. 
58. The representative of New Zealand stated that his country shared the view that 
development was important and would need to fe ature in any credible outcome of the Doha 
Development Round. He said that New Zealand's consideration of the proposals would be guided by the following principles: the extent to which proposals supported and respected the MTS, 
including whether they built on, rather than detracted from, the existing Uruguay Round 
Agreements and whether and how they might affect fundamental WTO principles. New Zealand would also look at the specific problems which the proposals sought to address and the relative 
effectiveness, efficiency and precision of the proposed solutions in the proposals. 
59. The representative of Japan found that the proposals were ambitious and unrealistic. She 
agreed that S&D was an exception to the basic principles of the MTS: "Rule of Law" and "non-
discrimination". Considering that the developing Members were more than two thirds of the WTO 
Membership, Members should be very careful in granting open-ended exceptions, otherwise the 
whole system would be at risk. In principle, S& D should only be granted to the countries which 
really needed it, and also to the extent necessary  for them to reap the benefits from the MTS. 
Nonetheless, Japan was ready to engage in the discussion. Members should be pragmatic and 
realistic if they were serious to achieve a meaningful outcome for MC10. 
60. The delegation of Korea said that the proposals covered broad and complex subjects, which 
would need to be discussed and clarified in the coming weeks. That would allow Members to 
assess the possible impact of the proposals on the MTS. In addition, since the proposals covered almost all the negotiating agenda, the discussion would be closely related to the progress in other sectors of negotiations. He added that discussions needed to focus on how to better integrate 
developing countries, including LDCs, into the global economy without undermining the basic 
principles of the MTS. 
61. The representative of Uganda stated that 20 years after the conclusion of the Marrakesh 
Agreement, LDCs were still awaiting the realizat ion of the promise of integration into the MTS 
without much success. The LDCs' share in world merchandise trade in 2013 was a paltry 1.24%, with a staggering deficit of US$60.6 billion. Their participation in world services exports was 
0.68%. Investments flowing into LDCs did not present any different picture. According to the 2013 
UNCTAD Investment Report, inflows to the LDCs re presented only 1.9% of the global figure. LDCs' 
exports were concentrated on a few products and to a few markets largely because of low productive and manufacturing capacity. What the LDCs looked for in the negotiations on S&D 
proposals was to assure themselves of a developmental outcome that should be delivered in time 
for MC10. The work of the Committee should focus on having texts on the proposals that met the DDA test in paragraph 44 of the Doha Declaration. To that end, therefore, the solutions needed to 
be drafted in legally binding language and not in best endeavour language. These must contribute 
to addressing the specific challenges faced by LD Cs. The outcome solution needed to be precise, 
effective and operational and result in a better integration of LDCs into the MTS. 
62. The representative of Switzerland stated that his delegation was also surprised to note that 
some of the proposals went considerably beyond what had been previously discussed, notably the 
Agreement-specific proposals of 2013. Nevertheless, Switzerland remained committed to engaging intensively and constructively on this key DDA component in the limited time left until MC10, with 
the aim of identifying S&D provisions that had the potential of gathering consensus.  
63. The representative of Canada said that his country was committed to working towards a 
credible Nairobi package, including the S&D component. The discussions in this body should make TN/CTD/M/50 
 
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  an important contribution to that package. Canada was prepared to engage in good faith. He 
added that the Director-General of the WTO had emphasized the importance of doability in making and pursuing proposals for Nairobi. Their prelim inary assessment suggested that many of these 
proposals would not help developing Members to better integrate into the MTS, but rather would 
isolate them from global trade and leave them and all WTO Members vulnerable to discriminatory 
and trade distorting practices. His delegation had particular concerns about the lack of differentiation between developing countries, the inclusion of obligatory technical assistance, the 
proposed adoption of a reverse consensus approa ch to decision-making, broad carve outs from 
WTO obligations and market access demands that simply could not be met. Nonetheless, Canada was prepared to work constructively to reach positive results.  
64. The representative of Norway stated that her delegation's first impression was that the list 
of proposals seemed to be far more comprehe nsive than what Members could reasonably be 
expected to reach consensus on within the shor t timeframe until MC10. Norway would focus on 
those proposals that it believed would contribute to the effective integration of developing 
countries into the MTS, in particular those which would bring meaningful economic development 
for LDCs. Norway would continue to contribute constructively in the negotiations in order to reach consensus before or in Nairobi at the MC10. 
65. The representative of Brazil stated that the proposals were currently under examination in 
his capital. He joined other Members in reiterating the importance of striving to deliver a 
significant outcome on the development pillar in Na irobi. Now that the proposals had been tabled, 
Members should engage with an open mind and consider the next steps to make the S&D 
provisions more precise, effective and operational, as per paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration. 
66. The representative of Paraguay believed that increasing international trade flows and 
encouraging predictability would contribute to job creation and development, especially in 
countries with small domestic markets. Ambitious results in the Doha Round, by delivering substantial improvement in market access and reducing trade distortions and restrictions, would 
remain the guiding principles of Paraguay's work. 
67. The representative of Venezuela stated that her delegation was ready to work constructively 
and endorsed the G90 proposals. 
68. The Chairperson proposed that the Special Session take note of the statements made. 
69. She followed on to state that it was encouraging to hear expressions of commitment to 
constructively engage from across the room with the aim of producing credible outcomes on the proposals. It was also satisfying to hear that Members remained committed to the fact that S&D 
was an integral and indispensable component of th e overall Doha Round outcome. The first task of 
the Special Session was to complete a first reading of the 25 S&D proposals, tabled by the G90. This could take place in an informal setting. Sh e proposed to take up proposals sequentially, 
following the numbering of the proposals by the proponents except for Proposal Number 15, on 
TBT, which could be read with Proposal Numbers 6 and 7, on SPS. Similarly, Proposal Number 17, 
on TRIMs, could be discussed along with Prop osal Numbers 8 and 9. The Chairperson also 
indicated that she was making arrangements with the Secretariat to ensure that the experts from 
the bodies to which the substance of the proposal pertained were present in the meetings to 
respond to queries or to provide advice or background information. 
70. She encouraged Members to engage with an open mind and constructively, with the aim of 
achieving the goal of making concrete progress by the Nairobi Ministerial.  
71. The meeting was adjourned. 
 
 
  
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