WT/TPR/M/345  
25 November 2016  
(16-6487) Page: 1/75 
Trade Policy Review Body   
28 and 30 September 2016  
  TRADE POLICY REVIEW  
RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
MINUTES  OF THE MEETING  
Chairperson: Ms Irene Young (Hong Kong, China)  
CONTENTS  
 
1  INTRODUCTORY REMARKS  BY THE CHAIRPERSON  ................................ .......................  2 
2  OPENING STATEMENT BY  THE REPRESENTATIVE O F THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION   ................................ ................................ ................................ ...................  4 
3  STATEMENT BY THE DIS CUSSANT  ................................ ................................ ................  8 
4  STATEMENTS BY MEMBER S ................................ ................................ ........................  14 
5  REPLIES BY THE REPRE SENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATI ON AND 
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS  ................................ ................................ ...............................  59 
6  CONC LUDING REMARKS BY TH E CHAIRPERSON  ................................ .........................  74 
 
 
Note: Advance written questions and additional questions by WTO Members, and the replies 
provided by the Russian Federation  are reproduced in document WT/TPR/M/ 345/A dd.1 and will be 
available online at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  1  INTRODUCTORY REMARKS  BY THE CHAIRPERSON  
1.1.  The first Trade Policy Review of the Russian Federation was held on 28 and 
30 September  2016. The Chairperson, Ms. Irene Y oung (Hong Kong, China), welcomed the 
delegation of the Russian Federation headed by Mr. Maksim Medvedkov, Head of the Department 
for Trade Negotiations of the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation; the 
delegation from Moscow; and the discussant, Ambassador Vangelis Vitalis (New Zealand) .  
1.2.  The Chairperson recalled the purpose of the Trade Policy Reviews and the main elements of 
the procedures for the meeting. The report by the Russian Federation  was co ntained in document 
WT/TPR/G/345  and that of the  WTO Secretariat in WT/TPR/S/345 . 
1.3.  Questions by the following delegations had been submitted in writing before the deadline: 
Malaysia; Oman; Canada; Australia; Switzerland; Singapore; Mexico; China; European Union; 
Norway; Japan; United States;  Argentina; Ukraine; Chinese Taipei; Costa Rica; India; Chile; Peru; 
Indonesia and Korea . The following delegations submitted written questions after the deadline: 
Benin; Brunei Darussalam; Colombia; Saudi Arabia; Hong Kong, China; New Zealand; Paraguay; 
Thailand; Republic of Moldova; El Salvador; Ecuador and Turkey . 
1.4.  The economic environme nt in the Russian Federation had  been challenging over the last few 
years. Real GDP  had decreased by 3.7% in 2015, and was expected to dip further this year. The 
main cau se for this contraction had  been the fall in oil prices, coupled with insufficient 
diversification in the exports. Economic sanctions imposed by some countries and the 
countermeasure s by the Russian Federation had  also p layed a role. The Government had  
responded with an anti -crisis plan, but GDP growth was slow to pick up. There was clearly a need 
to accelerate economic reforms. But were  there factors undermining their success? What further 
steps the authorities were taking, or plan ned to take, to spur the c ountry 's development? Members 
wished to know more about the broader economic context in which Russia 's trade policies 
operate d.  
1.5.  Focussing on trade  policies , Russia 's accession to the WTO in 2012 had been a historic 
moment; a landmark in the country 's inte gration into the multilateral tr ading system. It had come 
with wide -ranging commitments in goods and services, which require d fundamental changes to 
Russia 's domestic legislation and trade regime. Four years on, Members  had witnessed 
tremendous liberaliz ation efforts and remarkable improvements, but this was still very much an 
ongoing process. Tariff reductions, for instance, will not be completed until 2020, and accession 
negotiations for the Gover nment Procurement Agreement had  yet to begin. While Members  could 
expect elimination of W TO-inconsistent measures applied under the  Auto Investment Programme 
in 2 years ' time, in other areas such as customs control and import restrictions, Members had 
raised new concerns. Some of these issues were addressed in oth er WTO bodies, and could only be 
resolved in those contexts . As far as this TPR was concerned, Members could expect greater 
transparency of the policies involved.  
1.6.  At the regional level, economic integration of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) Member 
states was a key priority of the Russian Federation. The authority over many aspects of Russia 's 
foreign trade regime now rested  with the EAEU institutions, and there was coordinated policy for 
sectors such as agricultur e. As the Secretariat remarked , to a certain extent, the EAEU guided  the 
trade policy reform a genda of the Russian Federation . The policies and legal competence of the 
Eurasian Economic Commission were therefore matters of considerable interest to WTO Members. 
Many questions had  been asked about  these, as well as EAEU 's first comprehensive FTA with 
Vietnam. Members  looked forward to the delegation 's elaboration.  
1.7.  In two crucial trade areas, namely services and investment, the competence for negotiations 
were retained by individual EAEU members. Fr om the advance  questions, the Chairperson had 
seen a lot of interest in Russia 's investment regime, in particular regarding market access 
limitations, approval procedures and the reform 'roadmaps '. In vi ew of the predominance of 
state-owned enterprises in many sectors including banking, transport and energy, and the huge 
untapped potential for pr ivate investment, questions had  also been raised regarding the much 
delay ed privatiz ation programme.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  1.8.  Regarding sectoral trade policies, the Chairperson expect ed interesting discussion on Energy 
from both market access and environmental perspectives, given Russia 's influence as the world 's 
second -largest oil and gas producer. Agriculture was also the focus of many questions, mainly in 
relation to import bans, TRQs, do mestic  support and export assistance.  
1.9.  The more than 700 questions of course cover ed much more than what the Chairperson  
highlighted above. She invited  Members to discuss in greater detail trade issues of interest to 
them and of systemic importance to the m ultilateral trading system.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  2  OPENING STATEMENT BY  THE REPRESENTATIVE O F THE RUSSIAN FEDERATI ON 
(MR. MAKSIM MEDVEDKOV ) 
2.1.  I am very pleased to head the Russian delegation to attend the first WTO Trade Policy Review 
of Russia. On behalf of the delegation, I wou ld like to thank you, Madam Chair, for your warm and 
substantive opening remarks.  
2.2.  Many thanks also go to Ambassador Vitalis for assuming the role of discussant.  
2.3.  I would like also to express my sincere gratitude to the Secretariat for outstanding hard work 
in preparing comprehensive report – the first one for Russia – as well as for organizing this 
meeting. We deeply appreciate the excellent cooperation we have had with Mr. Willy Alfaro and his 
team of experts.  
2.4.  Last but not least, let me extend our deep appre ciation for the Members ' visible interest in 
Russia 's trade policies and practices. We have received 753 questions from 33 M embers (including 
ASEAN and LDC group) by yesterday. For the past few weeks we have been working on them 
around the clock together w ith our colleagues from two dozen government agencies. By now, 
written responses for 617 of questions have been circulated. Please be assured that the remaining 
responses will be provided in line with the established practices.   
2.5.  We hope that our answers a s well as the discussion today will enable Members to better 
understand Russia 's and Eurasian Economic Union 's trade policies. We also hope that through this 
process we can get a clearer picture of how Members assess specific elements of Russia 's trade 
regime and gather valuable ideas aimed at improving its efficiency.  
Challenges  
2.6.  Saying that, I come down to business. Four years have passed since Russia acceded to the 
WTO. Now we can conclude that both the process and the implementation of the terms of the  
accession gave an extra impetus to increasing competitiveness of Russia 's economy. It helped to 
boost demand in foreign markets for some commodities produced in our country and maintained 
stability of the domestic regulatory system.  
2.7.  In the years following  the accession, Russia has faced numerous economic challenges. Our 
economy was hit by the global economic and financial crisis. It w itnessed volatility of the 
post-crisis recovery process, depressed global business environment, and decline in world prices 
on main export products.  
2.8.  The key process in our economy these days can be described as steady structural adjustment 
of the Russian economy to both external shocks and internal challenges.  
2.9.  The major external shock was a three -fold drop in hydrocarbon pric es, which substantially 
reduced the role of the export revenues in economic growth. Now , almost 60 % of budgetary 
revenues come from sectors other than energy, 3 years ago the picture was opposite. Effects of 
the oil price shock for the Russian economy were  also strengthened by restrictive measures 
imposed a gainst our country by some WTO M embers.  
2.10.   A negative impact of external factors was balanced by the need to stimulate internal sources 
of economic growth. Our economic policy is to resolve this challenge b y implementing a number of 
comprehensive measures. They include increasing public demand (through the regulation of 
money supply and implementation of national projects), developing sector -specific incentives in 
the industry and agriculture and optimizing the regulatory functions of the G overnment.   
2.11.   Doing this, we keep in mind obligations in the WTO and give priority to market based 
regulatory instruments. The Bank of Russia practices the same approach in its monetary and 
exchange rate policies.  
2.12.   Timely an d comprehensive series of anti -crisis measures taken by the Russian G overnment 
allowed to minimize negative effects  from external economic shocks.  It maintained social stability WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  and employment level, attenuated risks of inflation and financial instability,  helped to restore 
confidence and protect interests of investors.  
2.13.   Government activities aimed at sustainable economic development are gradually yielding 
results. Despite the remaining challenges , we see positive signs in Russia 's economy. The pace of 
GDP d ecline is expected to slow down to 0.2 % in 2016 . By the end of this year, we expect the 
economy to restore modera te growth. GDP growth rate of 0.8% in 2017, 1.8% in 2018, and 2.2 % 
in 2019 is expected. Industrial and agricultural production is expected to e xpand by a nnual 
average growth rates of 1.6% up to 2.3 % in 2017-2019 accordingly to effect positively on GDP 
dynamics. In addition, we foresee gradual growth of non -energy exports, controlled 
unemployment (with the rate of 5.8 % at the beginning of 2016), and declining inflation (less than 
6.5% on annual basis by the end of this year). There are also some positive investment trends as 
capital flight pace is reduced and major investors are gradually returning to Russia.  
2.14.   At the same time, the challenges that Russia had faced triggered an accelerated search and 
implementation of solutions for the systematic trade and economic problems, such as export 
diversification, development of domestic high -tech industries, and of small and medium -sized 
enterprises, explor ing new opportunities on foreign markets for trade and investment.  
2.15.   Russian foreign trade strategy is reflected in the Government program me for the 
development of foreign economic activity (FEA) until 2018, approved in April 2014 .  
2.16.   Goals set by this Progra mme include improving export specialization of Russia; increasing 
the number of companies - exporters of goods by 1.5 times; reaching higher ranking in the World 
Bank's Ease of Doing Business Index by the "International Trade " indicator. We also aim at 
reaching a qualitatively higher level of economic and trade cooperation with the EAEU Members, 
other CIS countries, as well as APEC, ASEAN, BRICS. In order to achieve these goals , the Russian 
Government is preparing a series of practical tools (including road maps and priority projects), 
designed to create business environment of a "new quality ", improve corporate governance and 
streamline export and import procedures.  
2.17.   The Russian Federation extends its range of export products. We explore new directions. 
This year, Russia became the largest supplier of wheat worldwide, strengthening its position in the 
world grain market. In the next five years , we plan to substantially increase our agricultural 
products export, which explains why we are  very much  interested in  maintaining the talks in the 
WTO.  
2.18.   Russia maintains its role as a reliable global supplier of raw materials and energy resources 
that provides world market stability. We also attach great importance to deeper integration into 
global value chains, moving up  the value chains in prospective industries and increasing domestic 
added value. Russia takes same steps as many other countries do – reforming economy in 
accordance with needs shaped by external and internal factors and challenges.  
Russia in the Multilate ral Trading System  
2.19.   With regard to the multilateral trading system, Russia takes a responsible and proactive 
approach as a dedicated supporter of and contributor to the WTO.  
2.20.   Russia strongly adheres to the rules of the multilateral trading system. Our key p riority is to 
maintain the centrality of the WTO as the global forum for trade and to strengthen its negotiating 
function. It is for these aims that we actively participate in the multilateral trade negotiations in 
full cooperation with other M embers.  
2.21.   Russia largely contributed to  the multilateral efforts to reach agreements on Bali package in 
2013 and Nairobi package last year. We continue to emphasize the need for an expeditious and 
efficient implementation of the outcomes we achieved during these minist erials. Russia ratified the 
TFA Agreement and presented its instruments of ratification to the Director General in April 2016. 
We also eliminated agricultural export subsidies well before WTO accession.  
2.22.   In our minds, the WTO is a unique platform for establ ishing universal trade rules. We 
strongly believe that it is time for a membership to launch the negotiation process on the issues WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  that might be delivered by the next Ministerial. We are still confident that it is possible to reach 
consensus with regards t o the formation of the new direction if we start working towards this goal 
now.  
2.23.   We believe that the new agenda should include the outstanding Doha issues that have a 
high potential of reaching agreement by the Membership. As we see it, such issues could b e: 
domestic support, remaining elements of export competition and agricultural market access, as 
well as parts of rules agenda. Consequently, the new agenda could also include other issues in the 
list of negotiating tracks, such as: rules in antidumping an d subsidies, domestic regulation in 
services, transparency in RTAs, as well as evaluation of their impact on the multilateral trading 
system, investment regulation, e -commerce and environmental aspects of trade.  
2.24.   We are ready  to work vigorously with other Members in order to reach tangible results by 
the next Ministerial conference. We made some textual proposals before and intend to make new 
soon.  
2.25.   We have been investing efforts into the improvement of global trading rules, not only in 
Geneva, but also in o ther international fora. As the Chair of APEC in 2012 and within the "G20" in 
2016, we worked hard together with others to deliver a strong message in support of the central 
role of the WTO in the multilateral trading system.  
2.26.   As of June 2016, Russia has m ade 73 regular notifications to the WTO and has 
systematically submitted tariff data to the WTO Integrated Data Base.  
2.27.   As a new Member , Russia is actively participating  in the work of the WTO, its committees, 
working groups and councils.  
2.28.   Since 2012 , we part icipated in 32 TPRs.  
2.29.   Against the backdrop of increased efforts in developing domestic regulation disciplines in 
accordance with a built -in agen da under GATS Article VI:4, in J une, Russia co -sponsored the 
initiative of Friends of Domestic regulation group a imed at launching substantive discussion on this 
issue within the relevant working group.  
2.30.   We also fully support revived discussions on electronic commerce in the WTO. We support 
an "evolutionary " approach in dealing with e -commerce challenges: first, revea ling issues in the 
field of e -commerce development, including barriers and gaps in the institutional framework 
regulating e -commerce, and then trying to identify optimal ways to address the abovementioned 
issues. This is why in July Russia co -sponsored the  document proposed by Japan that exemplified 
such approach.  
2.31.   Russia is of the view that the WTO can and should be one of the platforms for observing a 
reformation of the respective investment regulation, as it already has the basis for furthering  the 
discussions on this issue.  We are currently working on the relevant investments -related initiatives, 
and Russia is committed to work closely with all WTO partners in a constructive manner that will 
help this institution move forward into a new successful decade .  
Bilateral and Regional Developments  
2.32.   While strengthening the multilateral trading system remains our key priority, we also 
continue to expand bilateral and regional trade and economic cooperation.  
2.33.   We are actively involved in regional integration. Therefo re, we place high value on 
enhancing transparency of the regional economic agreements. We continue to call  for the 
transformation of the current provisional Transparency Mechanism into a permanent one. We are 
convinced that regional trade agreements cannot  serve as an alternative to global trading rules 
and should complement rather than substitute coherent multilateral rules.   
2.34.   We carry our work on deepening economic integration with our partners on the principles of 
openness, inclusiveness and compatibilit y with the multilateral trading rules.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  2.35.   On this basis, we are  promoting integration within the Eurasian Economic Union (the EAEU). 
Now The EAEU is a common market with a population of over 180 million people, with a total GDP 
of US$1582.1 billion and foreig n trade turnover of more than US$500 billion (in 2015).  
2.36.   Further, in an effort to deepen international partnerships, Russia places a great emphasis on 
developing trade and investment ties to foster closer cooperation between the EAEU, the 
Association of Sou theast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO).  
2.37.   Last year, the EAEU signed the first Free Trade Agreement with Vietnam, which will enter 
into force on 5 October 2016.  
2.38.   Together with the EAEU Member St ates, we consider several proposals to launch 
negotiations on free trade agreements.  
2.39.   We firmly believe in the paramount importance of our joint work in strengthening and 
improving an open, rules based and balanced multilateral trading system. We will combine these 
efforts with fur ther integrating Russia 's economy into the global economic architecture and 
creating business - and investment -friendly environment.  
2.40.   We approach Russia 's first TPR as a valuable opportunity to listen and to learn. We look 
forward to participating in this e xchange of opinions and ideas. Our delegation is ready to receive 
comments and questions. Thank you.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  3  STATEMENT BY THE DIS CUSSANT  
3.1.  Let me at the outset warmly welcome the Head of the Department for Trade Negotiations of 
the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, Mr . Medvedkov , and his 
high-level team from Moscow.  
3.2.  For my own part, it is a particular pleasure and privilege – in equal measure - for me to be 
the discussant for this the first WTO Trade Policy Review of the Russian Federation.   
3.3.  I have some experience in working on Russia -related trade policy since the WTO accession 
process commenced and which I covered as a junior officer attached to the New Zealand Embassy 
in Moscow.  
3.4.  Subsequently, I worked for a time at the Russian Ministry o f Agriculture as part of the EU 's 
TACIS programme. In particular, I was part of a team which developed a partial equilibrium model 
of the Russian agricultural sector. The objective was to help the Russian Ministry of Agriculture 
assess the likely effects o f WTO accession on the agricultural sector.  
3.5.  In preparing my remarks for this process today, I could not help recalling the words of 
Herman n from Pushkin 's great novella "The Queen of Spades ". Hermann says "I am not in the 
position to sacrifice the necessa ry in the hope of winning the superfluous ". That quote has a 
particular meaning and relevance for me as I read the Secretariat 's thorough report, as well as the 
range o f questions Members have posed.  
Introduction  
3.6.  This - the First Trade Policy Review (TPR) of the Russian Federation - is an important 
milestone. It is the first such scheduled review since Russia joined the WTO four years ago. Its 
significance , therefore , cannot be understated. In this regard, it is worth reflecting briefly on the 
situation for  Russia 's trading partners before its accession was concluded, not least in terms of 
some of the core WTO principles such as transparency and non -discrimination. Put simply, prior to 
WTO accession there were very low levels of transparency, numerous instan ces of discrimination 
and a distinct lack of certainty about the overall direction of travel of Russia 's trading system .  
3.7.  The same is not true today. Taken together, it is clear that on a comparative basis with the 
situation prior to 2012, the process of a ccession has substantively improved matters for WTO 
Members. That is a positive development, though further effort is needed if the full benefits of 
WTO membership are to be realised both by Russia and the wider multilateral trading system. It is 
in this c ontext that the following three inter -related trade policy issues are considered with a view 
to informing Members ' engagement on this TPR:  
 Structural trade policy issues;  
 Sectoral trade policy issues, with a particular emphasis on agriculture; and  
 Systemi c trade policy issues with a focus on preferential trade agreements and fossil fuel 
subsidies.  
Structural  Trade Policy  Issues  
3.8.  The objectives of Russia 's international trade policies are clearly laid out in a range of Russian 
Federal Laws dating from 1999 t o 2003. It is useful to benchmark the findings of this TPR against 
those objec tives which include: to moderniz e and diversify the Russia n economy; accelerate 
Russia 's integration into the global economy and to create favourable conditions for traders - 
exporters and importers - as well as consumers.1 These objectives should be kept in mind and 
should inform this Trade Policy Review.  
3.9.  After WTO accession, Russia 's trade policies were demonstrably heading in the right direction, 
including in terms of its overall trade policy objectives. The final bound rate for all products is 
                                                
1 Federal Law No. 164 -FZ of 8 December 2003  on the Fundamentals of the State Regulation of Foreign 
Trade Activity  in the Russian Federation; and Feder al Law No. 160 -FZ of 9 July 1999 o n Foreign Invest ment in 
the Russian Federation.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  moving to 7.8% in keeping with the agreed implementation process.2 This represents a significant 
improvement over the terms and conditions that governed trade with Russia prior to its ac cession. 
Moreover, the commitments made by Russia in goods, services and elsewhere, while 
commensurate to those of other recently acceded Members, compare favourably with many 
so-called 'older' WTO Members who have been long standing members of the GATT.  
3.10.   As with any WTO M ember, there remain areas for improvement. To state the obvious, 
ensuring that its tariff bindings are not breached for whatever reason is an important principle and 
Russia 's assurances to this end will be appreciated. Similarly, greater t ransparency and efficiency 
would also be achieved through the exclusive use of ad valorem  tariff rates, rather than the mixed 
rates which feature in its existing schedule of commitments.  
3.11.   In terms of more specific structural trade issues, this assessment h as necessarily narrowed 
its focus in the interest of time on three areas: the expanding role of the Euras ian Economic Union 
(EAEU); the "ease of doing business " in Russia; and the increased emphasis on import substitution 
and the role of State -Owned Enterp rises.  
The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)  
3.12.   The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is a significant new structural development in Russia 's 
trade policy. On the one hand , the EAEU has been developing rapidly, including on trade policy 
where the Eurasian Economic  Commission (EEC) increasingly has competency. The initial 
assessment of the EAEU appears on balance to be broadly positive,3 including in terms of the 
potential future direction it may take.4  
3.13.   On the other hand, the role of the Eurasian Economic Commissio n in managing the EAEU 
members ' Customs Union may have created certain misunderstandings in some Members ' minds 
about the management of the EAEU 's external tariff and trade remedies ' regimes. It would be 
useful to clarify these matters and the broader comp etencies of the EEC during this review . It 
appears, for instance, that the EEC has an increasingly important role to play on technical barriers 
to trade, as well as competition policy – all of which touch on trade policy.  
3.14.   The experience of Members trading  with Russia and the EAEU also suggests that further 
work is needed to improve trade facilitation procedures in Russia and the EAEU itself. Such 
improvements will deliver obvious economic benefits to Russia, the EAEU and their trading 
partners. Ratificatio n of the Trade Facilitation Agreement is a positive development not least for 
the helpful signal this sends about Russia 's commitment to the multilateral trading system. The 
implementation of the commitments contained in that Agreement will be useful for R ussia and its 
EAEU partners in terms of their own focus in this area.  
3.15.   More directly, it  is encouraging to note that a "single window " clearance process is already 
being tested within the EAEU through a pilot programme under  way in several maritime ports. A 
high priority should be accorded to th e accelerated roll -out of this "single window " for improved 
customs procedures. These procedures also need to be better aligned across all members of the 
EAEU , not just Russia . Intensified effort will also be needed by Russia and other members of the 
EAEU to reduce and eliminate the significant number of non -tariff measures and regulatory 
requirements that continue to chill trade flows, including within the EAEU itself.  
The Ease of Doing Business  
3.16.   There are a series o f indices that are used to rank and rate the ease of doing business in 
Russia. These include, for instance, indices which assess customs procedures or trading across 
borders – aspects where there is some work still to be done by Russia in this area.  
                                                
2 https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/acc_rus_10nov11_e.htm  accessed on 
17 September  2016.  
3 See for instance: F. G Carneiro (2013) What Promise does the Eurasian Customs Union Hold for the 
Future? The Economic Premise, World Bank, Washington, February, Number 108.  
4 See for instance: Bertelsmann Stiftung (2016) Free Trade from Lisbon to Vladivostok , Guetersloh.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  3.17.   One p articular index usefully draws together a set of variables that arguably provides the 
most complete picture of the 'ease of doing business ' in a particular country. This is the World 
Bank's eponymous index of 'the Ease of Doing Business '.  
3.18.   Immediately afte r WTO accession in 2013, Russia was ranked 112th on the World Bank 's 
Ease of Doing Business index. Currently, it is ranked 51st. This is a rapid and marked 
improvement over three years.5 Nevertheless, for a G20 Member of Russia 's standing it cannot be 
satisfied with a ranking outside of the top twenty. It is encouraging therefore that Russia has a 
long-standing programme in place that has an explicit target to move its ranking to 20th in the 
World Bank Index by 2018 "and maintain that position by 2020 ".6 In fact, securing a place in the 
upper portion of the top twenty should  be the level of ambition that drives the next phase of 
Russian reforms in this area.   
Import Substitution and Trade Policy  
3.19.   Perhaps most significantly in structural terms, including the long term trajectory of Russia 's 
trade policy has been the recent re -invigoration of a policy of import substitution. As a supplement 
to this, if not directly related there is a matter worth reflecting on regarding the increasing role of 
state-owned enterp rises in the domestic economy and trade. Import substitution as a formal policy 
mechanism was enacted through the establishment in August 2015 of the Governmental 
Commission on Import Substitution.7 In fact, import substitution was already an active policy  since 
2014 for the agriculture sector.  
3.20.   In terms of the functioning and structure of this instrument and indeed the role of state 
owned enterprises therein, there is a considerable amount of written material available about this 
Commission on Russian Gove rnment websites. This is to be commended, though one does need to 
be able to read Russian to access the relevant material in this specific instance.  
3.21.   Several Members have asked about the role which the Commission on Import Substitution 
has in domestic poli cy setting. It is somewhat unclear, for instance, how this mechanism facilitates 
the role that trade and competition – i.e. including exports and imports of goods and services - 
plays in driving domestic innovation and growth. There is also a risk that thi s policy of import 
substitution will create a number of rent seekers domestically who will have a vested interest in 
sustaining a mechanism over time that, according to the relevant legislation (Number 758), is 
intended only to be a temporary measure. More over, the role of state -owned enterprises in this 
process is an are a of some interest to Members. It would  be useful for Members to understand 
how products and projects are identified as suitable for import substitution. What review 
mechanism is utilised t o keep the indicative list of such products and projects updated to reflect 
both external and internal developments? Is there scope for foreign suppliers and domestic 
importers to engage on the list of import substitutable projects and products? Further in formation 
on these matters will be appreciated by Members.  
Sectoral Issues: Trade and Agriculture  
3.22.   Prior to 2014 , Russia 's agriculture sector was an increasingly competitive and outward 
looking one. Its overall output growth had expanded considerably betwe en 2003 and 2013 and this 
had been driven by very sharp increases in Total Factor Productivity (TFP). In fact, Russia 's TFP in 
agricult ure is well above the global average.8  
3.23.   In the meantime, the ongoing transition to fully implement Russia 's accession com mitments 
in agriculture is still under  way. By way of example, the average tariff for all agricultural products 
in 2011, i.e. before accession, was 13.2%. In accordance with the Protocol of Accession, the 
transitional phase since then has in fact led to an  overall increase in tariffs to 17.6% in 2012. This 
has been be followed by a gradual decline to 14.6% this year. By the end of the transition period 
                                                
5 http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/russia/  accessed on 10 September 2016  
6 See in particular: Government of the Russian Federation Number  467-r of 29 March 2013 which 
included a specific objective of moving from its then 120th ranking to 20th by 2018.  
7 Government of the Russian Federation Resolution Number 758 of 4 August 2015.  
8 OECD (2016) Agricultural Polic y Monitoring and Evaluation 2 016, OECD, Paris.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  the average tariff for agricultural goods will be 10.8%.9 As noted earlier, this average rate is 
compar able to other recently acceded M embers but it compares favourably with  the tariff regimes 
of certain "older" WTO Members. As with the wider tariff regime, Russia is again to be encouraged 
for transparency and efficiency reasons to move to ad valorem  tariffs  rather than the mixed rates 
which remain a feature of certain parts of the agriculture -related section of Russia 's schedule of 
commitments.  
3.24.   Since 2014, the Government 's agricultural policies appear to have shifted. In particular, 
there has been an intensif ication of focus on self -sufficiency in agriculture. This was detailed in the 
Russian Federation 's Doctrine of Food Security launched in 2010, though substantive 
implementation only commenced in 2014. The results have been mixed. The importation of 
agricul tural products , for instance, remains significantly greater than exports. In fact, despite 
stated commitments to diversify agricultural exports, the country 's dependence on wheat exports 
remains, with this product alone accounting for nearly a third of all  exports in 2015.10 In the 
meantime, some imports have increased while the declines in other sectors are marginal. While 
the bi -directional sanctions between Russia and some of its partners have been a factor in the 
changing fortunes of the sector, as well as the issue of transit arrangements, they are not the only 
reason for the sector 's difficulties. The challenges the sector faces are structural. It is clear that 
import substitution policies risk having the reverse intended effect, creating an uncompetiti ve and 
inefficient system over time. A reinvigorated reform process would address many of these in an 
efficient and effective manner.  
3.25.   In terms of domestic support to the agricultural sector, Russia has a long standing  tradition 
of intervention in this area.  Its accession to the WTO took this historical commitment to the sector 
into account and Russia is transitioning the reduction of its total trade distorting support to the 
agriculture sector to US$4.4 billion by 2018. It is also positive that part of the a ccession process 
includes an agreement to avoid excessive concentration of support on individual products11 and, 
like other recently acceded M embers, Russia has also eliminated all of its agricultural export 
subsidies. Again, with regard to export subsidies , this is something which other 'older' WTO 
Members with such entitlements have only recently agreed to do at the end of last year through 
the Nairobi WTO Ministerial.  
3.26.   It should be noted too that Russia 's notifications in several areas are not up to date.  This 
needs to be urgently rectified. It is also important as a factual matter, however, also to 
acknowledge that in terms of its compliance with notification commitments for both agricultural 
domestic support and export subsidies for agricultural products . Russia is one of only twenty -nine 
WTO Members that is fully compliant with its notifications to 2014. Indeed, of these 29 Members, 
Russia is one of only four developed WTO Members that is up to date.12  
3.27.   This review has already highlighted the potential ro le of the Eurasian Economic Union 
(EAEU) in catalyzing  improvements for the bloc 's trading partners. In this context, it would be 
interesting to understand how the EAEU is engaged in the Russian agriculture sector. The 
Russian -language website for the EAEU , for instance, notes that agricultural policy coordination is 
an area of expanding interest and engagement for the Eurasian Economic Commission.13 There is 
an existing agreement on, for instance, Unified Rules for State Support for Agriculture.14 More 
information on what this involves would be welcomed.   
                                                
9 https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/acc_rus_10nov11_e.htm  accessed on  
18 September  2016.   
10 WTO (2016) Trade Policy Review: Russian Federation , Geneva, WT/TPR/S/345, Table 4.2  
11 https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/acc_rus_10nov11_e.htm  accessed on 
18 September  2016.  
12 The others are Australia, New  Zealand and Norway ( JOB/AG/80 of 20 July 2016 refers)  
13 See for instance the range of material on: 
http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/act/prom_i_agroprom/Pages/default.aspx  accessed on 18 and 
19 September 2016.  
14 http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/act/prom_i_agroprom/dep_prom/projects/Pages/default.aspx  
accessed on 17 September 2016.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  Systemic Issues: Preferential Trade Agreements and the WTO: Trade and Fossil Fuel 
Subsidies  
3.28.   There are a range of systemic issues that Members have identified for consideration through 
their questions and en gagement in past Trade Policy Reviews. Indeed, given the focus of the TPR 
process on how policies may affect the multilateral trading system, the inter -action between 
preferential trade agreements and the multilateral trading system is of particular intere st. 
Specifically, there is the que stion of how the former can be "building blocks " rather than 
"stumbling blocks " to the latter.  
3.29.   This is not an academic point. Paragraph 28 of the WTO Ministerial Declaration in Nairobi 
reaffirms Members ' wish to ensure th at preferential arrangements "remain complementary to, not 
a substitute for " the multilateral trading system. Further, Ministers have instructed additional work 
in this area, including enhancing  the transparency of these arrangements.15 This is important 
work, particularly if we are to manage the risk of what Professor Bhagwatti called "the termites in 
the system. "  
3.30.   In this regard therefore, it is interesting to note that Russia through the EAEU is seeking to 
expand its network of preferential trade arrangem ents, including to the Asia -Pacific in which of 
course two -thirds of Russia 's territory lies. Given the accelerating level of economic integration 
underway across the region already, not least through the range of ASEAN+ agreements, as well 
as the non -trivial development of two mega -regionals - the recently concluded Trans -Pacific 
Partnership Agreement and the Regional Comprehensive Partnership Agreement (or the ASEAN+6 
FTA)16 – Russia and the EAEU will want to move swiftly to engage on processes that can ca talyse 
integration.  
3.31.   At this point, however, neither Russia, nor the EAEU is involved in any of these processes. 
There is considerable interest therefore in the approach Russia is likely to take to deepen its 
integration with this dynamic region. In the me antime, it will be important for Russia and the EAEU 
in their areas of trade competence to negotiate high quality and comprehensive outcomes as they 
conclude their first suite of preferential trade agreements in the region. This will reassure the 
region an d WTO Members more generally about the contribution that Russia can make to economic 
integration and supporting the multilateral trading system. The opposite signal, i.e. for low quality 
and less than comprehensive outcomes from its FTA agenda will not be helpful, neither to the 
region nor indeed to efforts by the EAEU or Russia to deepen their integration and to be actively 
invited to and included in the dynamic integration processes already well under  way in the region.  
3.32.   In this regard, the level of ambit ion being displayed by Russia and the EAEU at least in 
terms of the number of negotiating partners suggests a busy forward agenda of FTA negotiations. 
This will be of ongoing systemic interest to many Members. As noted above, the early signals 
Russia sends  about levels of ambition and commitment to high quality and comprehensive 
outcomes will be carefully monitored. In this context, the recently concluded preferential 
agreement with Viet Nam will be a litmus test. Once this agreement comes into force, Russi a and 
its fellow WTO Members of the EAEU will be expected to notify this outcome consistent with the 
relevant WTO obligations. Further information as to how this agreement therefore meets the test 
of comprehensivity and quality as well as its role as a 'building block ' to multila teralism will be 
appreciated.  
Fossil Fuel Subsidies and Trade  
3.33.   Another area that has become of increasing systemic interest to Members through the Trade 
Policy Review process is the issue of fossil fuel subsidies. Such incentives hav e both trade 
distorting and environment -related effects.17 Moreover, the link between reform in this area, the 
multilateral trading system, policy coherence and achieving UN Sustainable Development Goal 12 
is obvious.  
                                                
15 The Nairobi Declaration is available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc10_e/mindecision_e.htm  Accessed on 19 September 2016.  
16 RCEP includes the ten ASEAN Members, Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea and New Zealand.  
17 On the trade effects of fossil fuel subsidy reform see in particular J Burniaux, J Chateau and 
J Sauvage (2011) The Trade Effects of Phasing out Fossil Fuel Consum ption Subsidies, OECD Trade and 
Environment Working Papers , 2011/05, OECD, Paris.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  3.34.   Russia 's subsidies to fossil fuels are  focused on producer measures and involve tax 
concessions or targeted reductions in export duties for oil and gas. The International Energy 
Agency has also identified subsidies through dual or under -pricing of electricity and natural gas.18 
Reform of such i ncentives will deliver both trade and environmental benefits both domestically and 
globally.  
3.35.   In this context, the recent reduction of some export duties for oil and gas by Russia is, on 
the face of it, an example of sound trade policy. That said, it is wo rth noting that the measures 
that appear to have replaced these duties have had perverse effects, including the selective 
increase of production from particular fields or in particular regions (e.g. East Siberia or the 
Caspian Sea). This may be an issue wo rth focusing on as Russia considers the next phase of its 
reforms. Russia is also to be commended for the fact that refined petroleum products in Russia are 
not under -priced at the retail stage.19  
3.36.   In terms of specific policy suggestions through this Trade Policy Review, Russia is 
encouraged to actively consider joining other WTO Members in participating in a peer review of its 
policies in support of fossil fuels.20 In addition, Members may be interested to discuss how trade 
policy reform in this area can con tribute to enhanced welfare effects at the domestic economy 
level as well multilaterally not least as a way to achieve the objective set out by Leaders through 
UNSDG 12.  
Conclusion  
3.37.   Taken together, the reforms codified in Russia 's Accession P rotocol are sig nificant and 
far-reaching. The Secretariat 's report combined with Members ' questions underlines two things. 
First, the progress that the Russian Federation has made since accession has been considerable. 
Second, the period after 2014 remains a work in prog ress and in some areas more work and an 
intensified process of reform will be needed. It is to be hoped that this TPR can assist in the 
forward process.  
3.38.   More generally, and in order to leverage the full benefits of Membership and its participation 
in a ru les-based international trading system, Russia is encouraged to utilise the WTO as a whole. 
This means not only being active in its negotiating processes, though this is important, but also 
through Russia 's active engagement in regular committee work acros s the institution. In this way, 
trade policy in Russia can be a reinforcing instrument that complements and supplements its 
domestic reform agenda.  
3.39.   Finally, it is to be hoped that a focus through this set of remarks as part of the TPR – 
structural; sector al; and systemic - can assist Russia 's ongoing reflection of both the direction and 
pace of its post -accession reform agenda. In this way, the constructive engagement by all 
Members on technical and substantive trade policy issues during the TPR process ov er the coming 
two days will matter . If this is achieved, the TPR will have made a measurable contribution to 
helping the Russian Federation achieve its ambitious trade policy objectives and helped us 
collectively to sustain and reinforce the multilateral t rading system over time.  
                                                
 18 Respectively US$22.1 billion and US$17.5 billion last year. The full IEA dataset is available here: 
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2015/Subsidies20122014.xlsx  accessed on 
20 September.  
19 The exception, however, is of diesel fuel used in the agricultural sector.  
20 The US and China recently concluded their peer reviews through the G20 which is available here: 
http://www.g20.org/English/Documents/Current/index.html  accessed on 20 September 2016. New  Zealand 
and Peru have undertaken peer review s through the APEC process. New  Zealand's review is available here: 
http://www.mbie.govt.nz/info -services /sectors -industries/energy/international -relationships/apec -fossil-fuel-
subsidy -reform -peer-review   accessed on 20 September 2016.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  4  STATEMENTS BY MEMBER S 
MALAYSIA  ON BEHALF  OF ASEAN  
4.1.  I am making this statement on behalf of ASEAN.  
4.2.  The Russian Federation was ASEAN 's eighth largest trading partner in 2014. After a decade of 
consistent  trade growth from a modest US $4.2 billion up to 2014,  where total trade peaked at 
US$23 billion, trade contracted signifi cantly in 2015 to just over US$ 13 billion. Despite challenging 
economic conditions, Russia remains to be one of ASEAN 's major trade trading partners.  
4.3.  Recognizing th e potential for enhanced economic and trade cooperation, both sides have 
agreed to enhance ASEAN -Russia trade and economic relations. This includes encouraging our 
private sector and SMEs to explore business opportunities with each other. Recent examples o f 
such exchanges were the ASEAN -Russia Business Forum held in May 2016 in Sochi, Russia, 
followed by Russian Business Missions to ASEAN including in Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia and 
Viet Nam.  
4.4.  At the Fourth ASEAN Economic Ministers and Russia Consultations held in August 2015 in 
Kuala Lumpur, Ministers endorsed the Post -2015 ASEAN -Russia Trade and Investment Cooperation 
Work Program which is expected to deepen economic ties and enhance trade and investment 
relationship. Russia also submitted a list of 57 new  projects to be annexed to the ASEAN -Russia 
Trade and Investment Roadmap which include areas such as technology, agriculture products, 
energy, and tourism as key areas for growth.  
4.5.  We share the view of Ambassador Vitalis of the importance of stepping up eng agement with 
ASEAN, one of the fastest growing regional groupings.  
4.6.  We very much welcome the Federation of Russia 's active engagement in the WTO since its 
membership. In this, we welcome her ratification of the Trade Facilitation Agreement which we 
hope ca n be fully implemented soon.  
4.7.  We also express our thanks to Ambassador Gennady Ovechko and the colleagues in the 
Russian Mission for their constructive engagement with the ASEAN delegations here in Geneva.  
MALAYSIA   
4.8.  We commend the Russian Federation for its  commitment to liberalize the trade regime at 
acceding the WTO. This includes improvement of access for goods and services, and help 
participation in the Plurilateral Information Technology Agreement. We encourage the Russian 
Federation to join the expande d ITA , currently with 24 participants including Malaysia. We look 
forward to Russia 's continuous  integration and reforms under th ese rules based multilateral trading 
system.  
4.9.  We noted that the Russian economy was hit hard in 2015, as most of us, particular ly by the 
weakening crude oil price s and the depreciation of the Rou ble. We therefore welcome the steps 
taken by the Russian Federation in stabilizing the situation and setting the foundations for 
recovery.  
4.10.   Although bilateral trade in 2015 saw a decline of  up to 40%, for the first part of this year  we 
saw that trade has picked up by some 3% , which is encouraging  and up to US$2.9 billion. There is 
certainly a big room for improvement for our bilateral trade.  
4.11.   It was noted too that Russia is a favorite destina tion for students looking for affordable 
medical education. We have over 2 000 students currently studying in universities in Russia.  
4.12.   There are additional written questions from our capital. While w e welcome the reforms 
undertaken over the review  period, we are interested to learn more about the Auto Investment 
Programme and the progress of eliminating WTO inconsistent measures under the said 
programme. We also seek further  elaboration of changes to the existing tax regime on crude oil 
given that this may affect the foreign establishments in Russia.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.13.   We also note that Russia imposes customs clearances and charges for customs  escort of 
goods and storage. We would like to know the take-up rate in terms of quantity and data and the 
movements of goods transporte d into and towards the Russian Federation.  
4.14.   We wish to highlight that there is great interest among our business community in exploring 
opportunities in the Russian Federation. It would certainly be helpful to our businesses to have 
comprehensive trade tech nical information readily available in English on the Russian customs 
website.  
OMAN  
4.15.   The Sultanate of Oman and the Russian Federation enjoy excellent political as well as 
economic relations. Oman anticipates that these relations will further expand and stre ngthen in the 
coming years to the mutual benefit of both countries.  
4.16.   The Russian Federation is a strong supporter of the multilateral trading system. It is a firm 
believer in the role the WTO has played and will continue to play in providing a rules -based s ystem 
for the conduct of world trade and the liberalization of international trade. The Russian Federation 
is of the view that there exists an imbalance between the rights and obligations of the original 
WTO Members and Article XII Members. It calls for th e elimination of such imbalances, a 
sentiment which the Sultanate of Oman fully shares.  
4.17.   Oman is pleased to note that the Russian Federation 's efforts to diversify its economy from 
mineral resources are meeting with success. According to the Secretariat Rep ort, in 2015 services 
accounted for 62.3% of GDP followed by manufacturing at 13.6%, mining and quarrying at 9.5%, 
construction at 7.0%, and agriculture and related activities at 4.0%.  
4.18.   It is encouraging to note that since accession the Russian Federation h as been able to 
reduce the MFN applied tariffs from a simple average of 11% to 8.3%.  
4.19.   Since 1 January 2015, the Russian Federation as a member of the Eurasian Economic Union 
has been applying the common external tariff.  
4.20.   The Russian Federation has taken var ious steps to simplify customs procedures and thus 
improve efficiency for both importers and exporters. It has made significant commitments in trade 
in services and as part of its WTO commitments has liberalized important services sectors 
including the tel ecom sector.  
4.21.   Oman commends the Russian Federation for adhering to the rules and disciplines of the 
WTO. It has been abiding by its commitments under the multilateral trade agreements. Its policies 
and practices have no doubt a positive impact on the functi oning of the multilateral trading 
system. We would like to thank the Russian Federation for their active engagement and positive 
role in the Group of Article XII Members.  
CANADA  
4.22.   Russia 's accession to the WTO in August 2012 was an important and welcome step . Canada 
acknowledges the efforts of the Russian Federation in completing its first Trade Policy Review and 
welcomes the work Russia has undertaken to meet its WTO obligations.  
4.23.   Russia 's economic picture has changed markedly since its accession. The strong  growth of 
the Russian economy in 2010 -12 was followed by slowed growth in 2013 and 2014 and a 
significant contraction in 2015. While the Russian economy has, to a great extent, been able to 
cope with the global challenge of weak commodity prices, it has a lso been negatively affected by 
the risk and uncertainty arising from its own actions on the international stage and by continued 
structural challenges which impede the progress of its private sector. The Russian Federation has 
within its power to take the  actions necessary to alleviate these challenges. Canada would 
welcome such developments.  
4.24.   Looking first to the structural challenges that impair the performance of the Russian 
economy, I would point to two areas where sustained efforts would support econo mic growth - WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  continued work to reduce the involvement of the State in the economy, and efforts to both address 
corruption and improve  the business environment. The S tate continues to be heavily involved in 
the Russian economy, by virtue of direct ownership and its administrative  and regulatory 
presence. State -owned enterprises comprise roughly half of Russia 's GDP, and have a dominant 
position in key sectors including banking, transport, and energy. This diminishes overall efficiency, 
productivity, and compe tition. The Government 's over -involvement in these sectors also 
exacerbates the harmful effects that low global commodity prices and slow economic growth have 
had on Russia 's economy. We welcome efforts already made by the Russian Federation to reduce 
the number of State owned enterprises and call for additional work in order to achieve a  more 
efficient capital allocation and a more competitive private sector.  
4.25.   Regulation can promote strong governance practice, deal effectively with a range of 
externalities  and encourage the growth of a healthy private sector. However, burdensome 
administrative and regulatory regimes discourage growth, both in Russia 's private sector and in its 
investment climate. In this regard, I echo the recommendations of the IMF 's most recent World 
Economic Outlook when I say that boosting potential economic growth in Russia will involve a 
concerted effort to address the disproportionate effect of the State in its economy, including 
through greater competition, lower administrative barri ers and regulation, and stronger 
governance.  
4.26.   The Russian economy also continues to be adversely affected by corruption. Despite efforts 
including ratification of the OECD 's Anti -Bribery Convention, investors still point to corruption as a 
major concern for  their operations in Russia. More specifically, foreign investors report that they 
face worryingly high levels of corruption from law enforcement officials. According to the OECD 's 
Phase 2 Follow -Up Report on Corruption and Bribery this year, Russia has on ly partially 
implemented 21 out of 50 anti -corruption recommendations and failed to implement 19. Canada 
encourages Russia to continue to make efforts in addressing this important concern.  
4.27.   Turning to the international stage, and underlining that this is no t a political forum, it bears 
observing that some of Russia 's actions in the non -trade sphere have contributed to an uncertain 
business climate, including sanctions and some issues that are now before the WTO 's dispute 
settlement mechanism.  
4.28.   At the same tim e, Russia 's concurrent engagement of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), 
beginning in 2015, appears to have sometimes strengthened and sometimes weakened its pursuit 
of fulfilling its WTO obligations. Canada notes Russia 's sometimes competing objectives in  these 
two bodies. On the one hand, Russia has sought to implement some of its WTO commitments 
through EAEU measures including, for example, the broader enforcement of IPRs. On the other 
hand, Russia has been found to be applying tariffs on goods under the  Common Customs Tariff of 
the Eurasian Economic Union in excess of its Schedule of Concessions including, for example, on 
paper and refrigerators. It is our view that when international trade objectives are pursued 
inconsistently across competing organizat ions, these may further risk damaging Russia 's economy 
and undermine the multilateral trade system which benefits Russia. Therefore, while Canada 
welcomes Russia 's efforts to work multilaterally and plurilaterally to strengthen the international 
trade fram ework, but cautions against efforts that detract from the pursuit of a global, transparent 
and coherent trading system.  
4.29.   Within the WTO, Canada notes Russia 's active participation in dispute settlement both as 
complainant and respondent. We also note with interest Russia 's plan to begin negotiations to 
accede to the GPA in the second half  of this year, and continue to welcome and support Russia 's 
pursuit of its international trade objectives in the WTO.  
4.30.   Canada hopes that these recommendations will support Russia 's efforts at the WTO. We 
have also prepared a set of questions touching on some of themes previously mentioned, including 
coherence between EAEU regulations and WTO rules, particularly in the spheres of SPS and TBT, 
as well as other issues such as g overnment procurement and government support for the 
agriculture section. Canada looks forward to receiving responses from the Russian Federation.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  AUSTRALIA  
4.31.   Australia welcomes the opportunity to participate in the Russian Federatio n's first Trade 
Policy R eview. The review process is an important step in Russia 's further inte gration in the global 
economy.  
4.32.   The Reports of the Secretariat and of Russia, as well as the issues raised by Member States 
in their advance written questions, reveal a range of areas wh ere further reform is either required 
or where there are concerns about increased protecti onist sentiment and practices. Clearly, current 
political tensions are affecting policy s ettings and constraining trade.  We must be realistic about 
this. But even as we counsel Russia against encouraging protectionist policies we also acknowledge 
and commend the progress that has also been made in liberalising trade and investment, largely 
as a res ult of Russia 's WTO Accession.  
4.33.   We encourage Russia to take further steps  on the road to economic reform. We believe this 
will require addressing issues such as excessive regulation, weak governance, inadequate 
competition in goods and services markets and significant government interventions in the 
economy that have discourage d trade and investment. It will also require efforts to resist and 
reverse, as I said previously, the self -damaging effects of protectionist policies and practices.  
4.34.   Australia has a modest trade relationship with Russia, with two -way merchandise trade 
worth  AUD 874 million in 2015, making Russia Australia 's 44th largest trading partner. Growing 
bilateral trade, particularly in the mining equipment, technology and services (METS) sector and in 
the education sector, is supporting modernization and enhancing pr oductivity in Russia. Australia 
looks forward to future growth in bilateral trade in these, and other, sectors.  
4.35.   Australia commends the Russian Federation on having ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation 
Agreement (TFA) in April 2016. Australia would welcome a ny new efforts by Russia to facilitate and 
streamline procedures related to qu arantine and customs clearance. In particular, harmoniz ing - 
and clarifying - regulatory requirements for imported foods and coordinating border inspection and 
clearance systems for imports to Russia would lower costs for importers and , in turn, domestic 
consumers. Accordingly, Australia welcomes advice that the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) 
is developing a single -window for customs procedures, which is, of course, a componen t of the 
WTO TFA.  
4.36.   Currently , Russia represents less than 1% of Australia 's agricultural exports, with Russian 
policy settings currently preventing g rowth in trade in many sectors.  In addition, technical barriers 
to trade in agricultural products create ad ditional challenges for Australian ex porters.  We 
encourage Russia to ensure its measures are consistent with international standards and 
guidelines.  
4.37.   The challenges currently faced by the Russian economy, including the global decline in oil 
(and other commo dity) prices, highlight the importance of pursuing growth strategies that support 
a flexible, versatile and resilient economy. Although there are some positive signs for the Russian 
economy, with the latest IMF figures predicting Russian GDP to grow by 0.8 % in 2017, the delay in 
structural reforms, weak investment, and more recently, moves to restrict trade liberalization, are 
affecting the potential for further economic growth.  
4.38.   Australia 's own experience of trade liberalization and economic reform has demo nstrated 
that while the process can be painful in the short -term, the long -term benefits are clear. This year 
Australia has realized 25 years of continuous economic growth – an achievement that is a clear 
indicator of the value of open markets and internat ional trade in creating a sust ainable and 
resilient economy. We encourage Russia to reduce barriers to trade and to deepen its integration 
into the global economy.  
4.39.   Finally, we would like to thank the Russian Federation for its responses to Australia 's writ ten 
questions.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  SWITZERLAND  
4.40.   Accession to the multilateral trading system four years ago was a landmark for both the 
Russian Federation and the WTO. On the part of the Russian Federation, it implied wide -ranging 
reform efforts and the establishment of a gen erally liberal trade regime. For WTO, it represented a 
big step towards universality.  
4.41.   As reflected in the reports by the Russian Federation and the Secretariat, reforms have 
continued in various fields since 2012, implementing commitments undertaken at acc ession as well 
as pursuing a broader agenda of modernization and internationalization.  
4.42.   We welcome these advances made over the past four years in various fields, such as 
customs and IPR, which have contributed to lifting the Russian Federation to position 51 in the 
World Bank 's latest Doing Business Report.  
4.43.   Since 2013, economic and political shocks have strongly impacted the Russian Federation 's 
economy and its terms of trade, facing the Government and the Central Bank with a number of 
major challenges. Swi tzerland welcomes the recent signs of stabilization and recovery, including 
with respect to the Rouble and to inflation.  
4.44.   At the same time, we note that about half of the Russian GDP is still generated by 
state-owned or state -controlled enterprises and that  the privatization programme for the period 
2014-16 has come to a halt. We encourage the Russian Federation to resume that programme as 
soon as possible, enhance corporate governance of remaining state -owned enterprises and inform 
the WTO membership about relevant developments in line with notification commitments made 
upon accession.  
4.45.   Another area of concern for Switzerland are recent policy  and regulatory developments 
pertaining to import substitution and accompanying localization requirements, including f or 
pharmaceutical products and in government procurement. Such measures can undermine 
competitive markets and the participation of Russian producers in international value chains.  
4.46.   Switzerland welcomes the Russian Federation 's recent communication to initia te accession 
to the GPA, as well as regulatory and institutional progress made during the reporting period on 
government procurement. We believe that further strengthening transparency, the rule of law and 
the fight against corruption holds great potential  for efficiency gains, in government procurement 
and the economy at large, and look forward to engaging with the Russian Federation in the GPA.  
4.47.   We note the Russian Federation 's objective to massively reduce the country 's high energy 
intensity over the comi ng years, as part of efforts to diversify and upgrade the economy away 
from mineral resources. In this context, Switzerland encourages the Russian Federation also to 
address fossil fuel subsidies in line with its G20 commitment and the goals set by COP21.  
4.48.   Switzerland ranks among Russia 's top ten partners for foreign direct investments, with 
sizeable two -way flows and FDI holdings. Our enterprises investing in the Russian Federation 
acknowledge steady improvements of the business environment in recent years.  At the same time, 
they still see significant room for further strengthening of various aspects, notably with respect to 
implementation of regulations and to legal certainty.  
4.49.   Before concluding, I would like to express Switzerland 's appreciation for the Rus sian 
Federation 's active and constructive role played in the WTO and in support of the Multilateral 
Trading System since accession. We look forward to further engagement in view of MC11 and 
beyond.  
SINGAPORE  
4.50.   Singapore appreciates the Russian Federation 's efforts to integrate with the multilateral 
trading system, further regional eco nomic integration, and liberaliz e its trading regime. Russia 's 
undertaking of commitments in its accession to the WTO, as well as the entry into force of the 
Eurasian Economic Un ion (EAEU) Treaty on 1 Janua ry 2015 , have been major milestones in this 
process.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.51.   Russia has made extensive economic restructuring efforts since its WTO accession. In the 
area of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, Russia has passed long -awaited  legislation, as 
well as established its Intellectual Property Rights Court in July 2013. The revisions made to 
Russia 's Civil Code are considered one of the major legislative initiatives since the first Part of the 
Civil Code was adopted in 1995. We note that Russia 's ranking in the World Bank 's Ease of Doing 
Business Report has improved tremendously since its WTO accession. Russia ranked 51 in the 
2016 Repor t compared to 120 in the 2012.  
4.52.   These positive developments have also been reflected in our bilatera l trade relationship, 
which has grown significantly since Russia 's WTO accession. Total bilateral trade in goods between 
Singapore and Russia grew at a compound annual growth rate of 13.11%, from S$4.68 billion in 
2011 to S$7.66 billion in 2015, making Rus sia our 21st largest trading partner worldwide. 
Singapore companies have found that with Russia 's integration into the rule -based multilateral 
trading system, they have had greater and more predicta ble access to Russia 's market.  
4.53.   At the WTO, Russia has bee n consistent in advocating the strengthening of the WTO as the 
main platform for multilateral trade negotiations, as well as the development and enforcement of 
the multilateral trade rules. We note Russia 's good track record of making regular notifications  to 
the WTO and that there were only few outstanding notifications at the end of 2015. We hope that 
Russia would deal with the outstanding notifications as soon as possible. We welcome Russia 's 
deposit of its instrument of acceptance of the Trade Facilitat ion Agreement in April 2016, as well as 
Russia 's intentions to proceed with the Government Procurement Agreement accession 
negotiations. We encourage Russia to also accept the Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement. 
We further encourage Russia to address th e issue of applied tariffs exceeding its bound tariff 
commitments for some tariff lines which was highlight ed in the Secretariat 's report.  
4.54.   Singapore looks forward to continuing our close cooperation with the Russian Federation in 
the WTO, and the EAEU, to further our common goal towards deeper and more progressive trade 
liberalisation at all levels. We commend the commitment of Russia to the multilateral trading 
system and the constructive contributions of Russia 's Permanent Representative Ambassador 
Gennady Ovechko and his able team. Finally we thank the Russian Federation for their timely 
responses to our questions and wish them every success in their first Trade Policy Review.  
MEXICO 
4.55.   I shall begin my substantive statement by joining other delegations that  spoke before me in 
congratulating Russia for the efforts it has made to integrate into the multilateral trading system. 
Last year, Mexico and Russia celebrated 125 years of diplomatic relations. Our trade relations have 
grown much closer since Russia 's entry into the WTO. Imports of Russian products into Mexico 
increased by 88% between 2008 and 2015, while exports of Mexican products to the 
Russian  Federation rose by 73% over the same period. Mexico welcomes this performance and 
trusts that our relationshi p will continue to grow.  
4.56.   Russia is the biggest country in the world and the world 's tenth largest economy. It also has 
abundant natural resources ranging from wood to natural gas and oil.  
4.57.   We note from the reports that state -owned enterprises continue to pl ay a very important 
role in the Russian economy, being involved in numerous activities from the extraction and export 
of natural resources to the provision of financial services. These enterprises account for almost 
50% of GDP. We also note that seven -tenths of Russian exports consist of crude oil, petroleum 
oils, natural gas and mineral products. Such an export profile means that the Russian economy is 
largely dependent on international oil prices.  
4.58.   Over the period 1999 -2008, GDP grew at an average annual r ate of 7%, but rose by only 
4.1% between 2010 and 2012, owing to the slump in oil prices. The Russian economy contracted 
by 3.7% in 2015. As other delegations have emphasized, this points to the need for a strategy 
geared towards greater diversification of  Russian production and exports.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  Tariffs  
4.59.   Russia applies a simple average MFN tariff of 8.3%. The rate is 14.6% for agricultural 
products and 6.5% for non -agricultural products. Although the average applied rate remains close 
to the average bound tariff, w e note that more than 2,000 tariff lines are still subject to reduction 
commitments, which we hope will be made in the future.  
Trade facilitation  
4.60.   Turning to trade facilitation, my delegation congratulates Russia on having deposited its 
instrument of accept ance in April of this year. This was largely made possible by the significant 
steps taken by Russia regarding, for example:  
 the draft Customs Code of the Eurasian Economic Union; and  
 the Eurasian Economic Commission 's plan of action for the staged implemen tation of a single 
window system, among other measures.  
Ease of doing business  
4.61.   My delegation highlights Russia 's performance, as described in the World Bank 's 
Doing  Business 2016  report cited by other delegations, where the country scored an enviable 
5th position in enforcing contracts and was ranked 8th in registering property, 29th in getting 
electricity and 41st in starting a business.  
4.62.   Nonetheless, we are concerned to note that Russia came 170th out of 189 countries in 
cross-border trade, mainly because of the number of hours needed to meet border requirements 
and the number of documents required. Although the Russian authorities have already clarified the 
situation, we would urge Russia to continue streamlining these procedures, which will undoubtedly 
be facilitated by the effective and prompt implementation of the Trade Facilitation Agreement.  
4.63.   Likewise, we would encourage the Russian Federation to continue simplifying its regulations 
and preventing State enterprises from distorting the market, and to pur sue its efforts to combat 
corruption.  
Obstacles relating to goods in transit  
4.64.   Lastly, I would like to express my delegation 's systemic concern about the measures 
introduced by Russia to restrict the transit of products from another WTO Member and other form s 
of economic retaliation against other Members, as well as the sanctions imposed on Russia by 
certain Members, without following the procedures laid down in the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding. I would also like to urge the Members involved to come t o a negotiated solution 
and not to allow political conflicts to escalate to the point of affecting other WTO Members and the 
multilateral trading system as a whole.  
Conclusion  
4.65.   I will end my statement by encouraging Russia to pursue its process of transitio n to a 
market economy, and thank it for its responses to the questions already submitted by my 
delegation.  
CHINA  
4.66.   The Russian Federation became the 156th WTO Member in A ugust 2012. As a fellow 
article  12 Member, China deeply understands the difficulties and  challenges in implementing the 
accession commitments. Therefore, we highly appreciate the tremendous efforts and achievements 
made by Russia to live up to their binding commitments on trade and investment liberalization.  
4.67.   Since its accession to the WTO, t he Russian Federation has been engaged in creating a 
business friendly environment both for trade and investment. It has established high -tech parks, 
industrial clusters and special economic zones (SEZs) and offered preferential treatments to WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  foreign - and domestically -funded enterprises therein; it created a market environment for fair 
competition by enabling the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia (FAS) to focus on serious 
violations of the Law On the Protection of Competition; and strengthened intellec tual property 
enforcement by amending the IP chapters of the Civil Code in 2014 and establishing the 
Intellectual Property Rights Court.  
4.68.   China firmly believes that a rules -based, transparent, non -discriminatory, open and inclusive 
multilateral trading sys tem serves the interests of all. It is important that all the trade and 
investment related measures, including those adopted by some members on Russia should be 
WTO-consistent.  
4.69.   Russia has also actively participated in the negotiations to expand the Informa tion 
Technology Agreement, ratified the Trade Facilitation Agreement in April 2016, and started 
negotiations to accede to the Government Procurement Agreement accession. In addition, Russia 
has duly performed its transparency obligations and regularly noti fied the implementation of its 
relevant domestic trade policies to the WTO. We also hope that, in the future, Russia may further 
open its market, optimize the investment climate and improve the level of trade facilitation. We 
highly commend all these posit ive developments which have taken place since Russia 's Accession 
in 2012.  
4.70.   The Russian Federation and China have a long history of friendly relations. The two 
countries are important trade and investment partners. China is Russia 's biggest trading partner 
and the fourth biggest source of investment. The bilateral trade between China and Russia has 
generally maintained rapid growth in recent years. In 2014, the bilateral trade volum e reached a 
record level of US$ 95.28 billion. From January to August 2016, the  bilateral trade volume was 
USD$ 44.3 billion, expanded 1% compared with the same period of last year. In terms of 
investment, by the end of 2015, China 's cumulative non -financial direct i nvestment in Russia 
reached US$ 10.03 billion and these investments we re mainly distributed in energy, agriculture, 
forestry, building materials, communications and services, etc.  
4.71.   In recent years, the bilateral economic and trade structure has been further optimized, the 
trade volume of agricultural products has increased, t he implementation of strategic major 
projects in energy, high -speed rail and cross -border infrastructures has been accelerated, financial 
cooperation has been constantly expanded, and cross -border e -commerce and other new trading 
patterns are also doing we ll. The Sino -Russian economic and trade cooperation, with its solid 
foundation, has huge potential and broad prospects.  
4.72.   With the deepening of bilateral economic and trade development between China and Russia, 
Chinese enterprises wish to learn more details of Russian economic and trade policies and 
regulations. We would hereby thank the Russian delegation for their reply to China 's questions, 
which we will go through carefully.  
EUROPEAN  UNION  
4.73.   It has escaped nobody 's attention that no specific mechanism was c reated to monitor the 
Russian Federation 's implementation of its commitments (contrary to when the People 's Republic 
of China and Viet  Nam entered this Organiz ation). Today is , therefore , an extremely important 
moment for the life of our Organiz ation.  
4.74.   As many of you will recall, high expectations surrounded the accession of the Russian 
Federation. This review allows us to collectively confront these expectations with reality. It is with 
great regret that we must admit today that in the EU 's view, the Russi an Federation has so far not 
made the best use of the opportunities afforded by its membership, including transforming its 
economy and advancing on its objectives of modernization and innovation. We are concerned that 
instead of continuing the reforms intr oduced in view of its accession, the Russian Federation has 
moved down the path of import substitution that started the day after the Russian Federation 
joined this Organization.  
4.75.   The EU is of the view that this policy, is neither in line with the objective s and principles of 
the WTO, nor does it bring any of the benefits claimed. The Russian Federation 's economy has not 
been strengthened, it has not acquired new pro -growth impulses, and its exporters have not WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  increased their share of international markets. At the same time Russian consumers have not 
received higher quality products and their choices have been narrowed.  
4.76.   The best illustration of this ove rall situation is the fact that  the Russian Federation 's trade 
with many of its partners, and not just with  the EU, has shrunk since its WTO accession. Even 
though this reduction has to be examined in a broader context which takes into consideration the 
overall economic situation, including the fall of oil prices and the devaluation of rouble, it is telling 
that compared to 2014, its trade with China decreased by 30%, with the United States by 29% 
with Japan by 32% in 2015 according to calculations based on Federal Customs Service of Russia 
statistics.  
4.77.   The same trend holds true for trade with the EU. At the time  of accession, the Russian 
Federation was the EU 's third trading partner, now it is its fourth. Its trade with the EU decreased 
by 40% since 2012 and has now reached its lowest level since 2010.  
4.78.   This being said, the Russian Federation remains a key partne r for the EU representing 6% of 
our total trade. For some of our Member States it is even the first external trading partner.  
4.79.   The EU continues to be most important source of FDIs in Russia, despite the fact, that it is 
getting increasingly difficult for t he Russian Federation to attract investment. A dramatic drop in 
FDI flows was recorded between 2013 and 2015, falling from US$69 billion to US$6 billion.  
4.80.   Multiple explanations can be put forward for this phenomenon. There is of course the 
restriction of t he sectors where FDI is allowed. However, more generally, the main factor seems to 
be the lack of predictability of the conditions for doing business, as well as the opaque, ever 
changing legal environment. EU operators complain that this is a real obstacl e: legislation changes 
too often and there is insufficient time for business to be consulted, nor is the legislation 
systematically notified to the relevant WTO committees in a timely manner for consultation. Once 
legislation is adopted, the entry into for ce does not leave time for operators to adjust (in order to 
implement the changes). The recent requirements regarding cement certification or the good 
manufacturing practices in the area of pharmaceuticals are just two examples among the many 
obstacles and  lack of transparency that impede our trade.  
4.81.   There are unfortunately many more. These include the food ban imposed on the EU and a 
large number of  restrictive sanitary and phyto sanitary measures that the Russian Federation has 
introduced, often without pr oper risk assessment and in breach of international standards. Such 
measures have a strong distortive effect on trade in agricultural products.  
4.82.   Then there are the unilateral restrictions on road and railway transit from Ukraine to 
Kazakhst an and to Kyrgyzs tan, both WTO M embers. Compliance of these measures with WTO rules 
and principles is highly questionable.  
4.83.   All in all, the EU has raised about 110 questions to the Russian Federation, which, taking 
into account that this is the first review since the Federa tion acceded the WTO, should be viewed 
as a rather modest figure. We could have raised many more. Apart from the issues already 
mentioned, we raised concerns and clarification questions regarding the role of the State in the 
economy, the  modalities of pric e controls, custom procedures that are not in compliance with 
commitments made during accession, alignment to international standards, IPR enforcement, local 
content requirements and subsidization among many other issues.  
4.84.   The EU very much welcomes this im portant opportunity for Members to express their views 
regarding the Russian Federation 's overall implementation of its WTO commitments, even if in the 
different Committees and in the relevant working groups we have regularly expressed our specific 
trade c oncerns.  
4.85.   Differences are , of course , a normal occurrence in the WTO but the rapid increase in the 
numbers of formal disputes launched against the Russian Federation provides evidence of the 
problems just highlighted and suggests a worrying trajectory.  
4.86.   This being said, the EU hopes that the ratification of the Trade Facilitation Agreement and its 
future entry into force will lead the Russian Federation to adopt more business friendly and WTO WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  compliant custom procedures; that the full implementation of the S PS Agreement will be actively 
promoted and implemented without delays, because it would help to boost agricultural trade; and 
that the Russian Federation 's recent notification of its intention to accede to the GPA will lead to a 
fundamental review of its l egal framework for government contracting, in particular the abolition of 
the existing discriminations as the current system would not allow for accession.  
4.87.   Before concluding, the EU would like to recall that many of the competences of the Russian 
Federatio n have now been transferred to the bodies of the Eurasian Economic Union (e.g. tariffs, 
customs, trade defence measures, SPS and TBT). While this is a fundamental change, it remains 
that the Eurasian Economic Union is bound by the Russian Federation 's comm itments. In this 
context, it would be useful if the Russian Federation would use this meeting to report (preferably 
in writing) on the implementation of its commitments since its accession taking due account of the 
transfer of competences to the Eurasian E conomic Union.  
4.88.   The EU strongly supported and actively contributed to the Russian Federation 's accession. 
We hope that the Russian  Federation now opts for maximiz ing the benefits of its membership to 
diversify its economy, use fully its comparative advantag es and rich endowments and modernize 
its economy in compliance with WTO rules and in full transparency.  
NORWAY  
4.89.   The Russian economy has great potential. The Russian Federation has extensive access to 
arable land, vast oil and gas reserves, a highly educated  population and, in several areas, an 
advanced industry.  
4.90.   Since 2013, the Russian economy has experienced slowdown and contraction in real GDP 
growth rates, primarily due to the oil price slump amid insufficient diversification of exports. 
Restrictive meas ures and subsequent retaliatory import restrictions im posed by the Russian 
Federation  have also played a role. The TPR report from the WTO secretariat points out that the 
economic uncertainty caused by these developments have contributed to capital outflow s, a sharp 
decline in the value of the Rouble, and an increase in inflation.  
4.91.   However, the Russian G overnment 's measures to deal with the economic challenges appear 
to contribute to stabiliz ation of the economy. These measures include switching to a floati ng 
exchange rate regime, fiscal stimulus and an anti -crisis plan aimed at stabilising the banking 
sector. According to the IMF, there will be a 1.8 % GDP contraction in 2016, but an expansion in 
2017. In 2015, Russia was Norway 's 15th largest source of impo rts and 20th largest export 
destination.  
4.92.   Challenges related to corruption, inadequate transparency, uncertainty in the area of rule of 
law, complexity of tax regulations, difficult access to financing, and inadequate respect for 
property rights neverthele ss continue to be issues for investors in Russia. To secure continued 
development of the Russian economy, it will be important to build a predictable framework in the 
Russian market for traders and foreign investors, including the independence of the judic iary. 
4.93.   Both Russia and Norway attach great importance to the multilateral trading system. 
Working to demonstrate the credibility of the WTO and delivering on the outcomes from the 
Ministerial Conference in Nairobi is crucial. We urge Russia to consider memb ership in ITA II and 
other initiatives like the EGA.  
4.94.   As regards fossil fuels subsidies reform, we would encourage Russia to join other G20 
members in utiliz ing the G20 peer review process to assist with reform of fossil fuel subsidies as a 
mechanism for re viewing fossil fuel policies.  
4.95.   Russia and Norway are both world leading maritime nations. Our maritime cooperation is 
significant, and we have a shared interest in working for open markets and fair competition in the 
international maritime transport service s sector.  
4.96.   According to media reports, as well as reports by the International Chamber of Shipping, we 
understand that Russia is debating pos sible changes to its so -called "Subsoil Law ", whereby the 
carriage of Russian "shelf hydrocarbons " might be restrict ed to Russian -flagged ships from 2020. WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  It is unclear to what extent these changes might apply to international trades in addition to 
cabotage. We believe that such a bill would be contrary to Russian GATS -commitments for 
maritime services, and urge Russia to reconsider.  
4.97.   Russia is one of the largest fishing nations in the world. As neighbours, Norway and Russia 
work together constructively on resource management. We note that Russia has a support 
programme in place, including for construction and reconstruc tion of fishing vessels. How is this 
support tempered to not contribute to detrimental overcapacity? We urge the Russian Federation 
to join actively in the WTO negotiations on fisheries subsidies. Already at this TPR, it would be 
beneficial for the members hip to hear Russia 's general views on this.  
4.98.   Finally , some concerns about seafood. Norway fully recogniz es each WTO Member 's right to 
set its own appropriate level of protection. From the experiences with inspections of seafood 
enterprises performed in Nor way by the Russian Federation after its accession to the WTO, it is 
Norway 's understanding that these inspections do not constitute a system audit of our competent 
authority, but instead target the individual enterprises. This is contrary to the Russian "Regulation 
on common system of joint inspections of objects and sampling goods (products), subject to 
veterinary control (supervision) " that confirms that system audits is the basic approach. We urge 
Russia to apply its own regulation and use systems audits .  
4.99.   The Eurasian Economic Union represents a large market and is an important vehicle for 
economic integration. We appreciate the written answer from the Russian Federation to our 
question on this. However, we would appreciate further clarifications as to w hether the EAEU has 
one common list of enterprises that authorises access to this market or if each member of EAEU 
has its own individual list. If the latter is the case, what are the consequences of discrepancies in 
the individual member countries lists f or the circulation of products in the EAEU?  
4.100.   Finally, we acknowledge Russia 's progress, in the current challenging economic 
environment and we look forward to seeing the Russian economy achieve its full potential.  
JAPAN  
4.101.   According to the Secretariat 's repor t, because of the country 's unstable political situation, 
the actual rate of Russia 's GDP growth slowed from 2013 to 2014. Then in 2015 as a result of the 
drop in the price of crude oil, Russia 's GDP went down again as far as -3.7%.  
4.102.   On top of that, financ ial sanctions and countermeasures adopted by Russia led to a rapid 
fall in the value of the rouble , and a rise in the rate of inflation.  
4.103.   Having said that, Japan highly evaluates Russia 's measures to liberalize trade, including 
simplification and streamlin ing of customs inspections as well as tax -reduction measures in special 
economic zones.  
4.104.   Since Russia 's accession to the WTO in 2012, the country has been steadily reducing its 
rate of customs tariffs. According to the Secretariat 's report, in 2016 the ave rage MFN tariff rate 
on agricultural produce was 14.6%, which represented a reduction in the rate to just slightly 
higher than the final tariff concession rate of 13.6%. Furthermore, the average MFN tariff rate on 
non-agricultural produce was 7.1%, which w as below the final tariff concession rate of 13.6% and 
is helping to promote trade liberalization.  
4.105.   In addition, Japan commends Russia 's measures towards greater liberalization of trade, 
including the country 's participation in the Information Technology Ag reement (ITA) as well as its 
participation as an observer in the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA).  
4.106.   According to the Secretariat 's report, Russia has already concluded RTAs with 10 countries 
and Japan welcomes this active promotion of trade libera lization on its part. We expect the RTAs 
that Russia has concluded to supplement and contribute to strengthening th e multilateral trading 
system.  
4.107.   While Japan positively commends Russia on the contributions it has made since joining the 
WTO, we continue to hold some concerns.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.108.   To avail of the subsidies that were introduced by Russia this May, namely subsidies for 
after-sales, salary and energy, it is necessary to fulfil strict localization requirements. This has 
made it difficult for some foreign companies to  avail of the subsidies. As such, Japan expects 
Russia to provide further information about those requirements, and to also consider relaxing the 
requirements for these subsidies. We believe that this will help to ensure that foreign corporations, 
which ar e contributing to Russia 's economy with their high levels of technological expertise, can 
smoothly conduct their business operations.  
4.109.   Reports have been brought to our attention of the following situation in the case of 
corporations based in Turkey. When su ch corporations export produce and production parts to 
Russia, strict customs inspections are being carried out, including inspections of the entire freight . 
Japan expects Russia to ease these kinds of  strict inspections, to enable stable production in the  
country.  
4.110.   Japan is also aware of reports that as part of Russia 's import substitution policies, 
restrictions have been imposed on government procurement of foreign manufactured goods. We 
understand that Russia plans to engage in negotiations towards joini ng the Agreement on 
Government Procurement (GPA). As such, Japan expects Russia to ensure that its government 
procurement related measures are compatible with the GPA.  
4.111.   Lastly, I would like to make some comments on the collection of compensation for the 
proposed measures for audiovisual recordings for private use as well as the free reproduction of 
audiovisual works based on Russia 's system of collective management of copyright. We are aware 
of a case where, even though imported items consisted of goods for  business consumption that are 
not subject to the aforementioned system, a judicial decision was made to impose compensation 
based on the HS codes at time of import. Japan expects Russia to create an appropriate 
competitive environment.  
4.112.   To conclude, Japan  stands ready to work with the Russian Federation, and appreciates the 
opportunity to participate in this review of Russia 's trade policy.  
UNITED  STATES  
4.113.   Russia became a Member in 2012 after the longest accessi on negotiation in WTO history. 
During those 18  years, Russia made numerous changes to its legal regime to be in a position to 
comply with its WTO obligations.  It introduced significant market -liberalizing reforms, and spurred 
its evolution from a centrally -planned, extractive -industry -based economy to ward a dive rsified 
market -driven economy. The United States was hopeful about Russia joining the WTO and 
integrating into the global trading system, and anticipated the many benefits to the global trading 
order that would accrue as a result of Russia 's WTO  membership.  
4.114.   During the years since Russia 's accession, we have appreciated the efforts of Ambassador 
Ovechko and his team to contribute constructively to our work here in Geneva, including through 
Russia 's participation in, and subsequent ratification of , the Trade Facilitation Agreement. Russia 
has rapidly become a well -established and collaborative member of our community here at the 
WTO.  
4.115.   We have, however, been extremely disappointed to see Russia turning away fr om the core 
tenets of the WTO - liberal t rade, transparency, predictability,  in favo ur of inward -looking, 
import -substitution, economic policies.  Russia, like most of the world economy, suffered as a result 
of the global recession, and even more acutely by the more re cent decline in energy prices . 
However, much of Russia 's economic pain is a re sult of its own economic policies. As reflected in 
the written questions submitted by the United States in the context of this TPR, we are greatly 
concerned about the increased reliance on local content and import substitut ion policies adopted 
by Russia.  Moreover, Russia has expanded these import substitution policies to cover its numerous 
state-owned enterprises, which, as the Secretariat 's Report notes, remain "significant " in Russia 's 
economy. In addition,  Russia fails to base its sanitary/phytosanitary measures in international 
guidelines, but rather appears to base them on political motivations. While we continue to monitor 
these policies and call on Russia to ensure they are applied consistent with its o bligations. And  it is 
important to note that these policies undermine the trade liberalizing intent of the WTO.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.116.   Another core tenet of the WTO which Russia seems to have mov ed away from is 
transparency. The Secretariat 's report notes that Russia has not me t certain notification 
obligations, such as those governing state -trading enterprises and industrial support program mes. 
The United States has asked numerous questions seeking to understand various aspects of 
Russia 's trade regime, including its export con trol regime, industrial developme nt policies, and gas 
exports.  
4.117.   The United States also seeks greater clarity regarding the working of the Eurasian 
Economic Union.  As a general matter, the United States does not oppose regional trade 
agreements as such, but we are concerned when such arrangements do more to protect certain 
industries than to creat e incentives to increase trade. The Secretariat 's report prompted the United 
States to ask various questions regarding the mechanics of the Eurasian Economic Union – for 
example, the breadth of its competence, how it develops its trade policies, how it applies different 
tariff levels, and the degree to which the regulatory r egimes of the member S tates are 
harmonized.   
4.118.   Russia 's adherence to international standards and  its enforcement and protection of 
intellectual property rights have also been long -standing c oncerns for the United States. The 
Secretariat 's report notes that Russia is a member of various international organizations in the 
area of food safety but, in th e view of the United States, Russia has often ignored the rules and 
guidelines of those organizations. Concerning intellectual property rights, Russia continues to 
inadequately enforce its own laws, particularly with reg ard to piracy on the internet.  
4.119.   Being  a Member of the WTO brings numerous benefits which, when boiled down to their 
core, are: transparency, predictability and rule of law.  However, just as WTO Members receive 
these benefits from other Members, so they must ac cord those benefits to others. As Russia 
continues to turn inwards, it misses the opportunities for economic growth and global engageme nt 
that WTO Membership brings. Furthermore, by ignoring the rules of the international organizations 
to which it is a member, Russia is de nying these bene fits to others.  It's a significant lost 
opportunity.  
4.120.   A TPR, particularly a first one, is, no doubt, a difficult and challenging process, and we 
thank Russia for the seriousness with which i t has approached this process. TPRs are a critical 
element in the WTO's transparency mission.  We hope that the Russian representative and his team 
will see today 's discussion as an opportunity, not unlike the accession process, to learn from 
others ' questions and comments with the goal of improving Russia 's trade regime to the mutual 
benefit of all WTO Members.  
ARGENTINA  
4.121.   The Russian Federation plays a very important part in the global economy, since it comes 
10th in the world 's economic rankings. Despite the projections pointing to a contraction of Russia 's 
GDP growth rat e in 2016, we take comfort in the economic stabilization and growth outlook for 
2017.  
4.122.   We also welcome the efforts made by the Russian Government to ensure stable 
socioeconomic development of the country through actions aimed, inter alia , at strengthening t he 
business climate, promoting investment, modernizing the economy, boosting overall 
competitiveness, and thus creating conditions conducive to achieving continuous economic growth 
and sustainable development.  
4.123.   There is substantial bilateral trade between t he two countries, which amounted to 
US$1,151 million in 2015. Argentina 's exports were worth US$472 million and imports totalled 
US$679 million.  
4.124.   Bilateral trade rose to US$454.1 million over the first half of 2016 (exports accounting for 
US$235.7 million a nd imports for US$218.4 million), with a balance in favour of Argentina.  
4.125.   Argentina 's exports to the Russian market consist mainly of agricultural products, 
essentially fruit (pears, apples, mandarines and lemons), frozen beef, poultry and horse meat, and 
dairy products. Imports consist of diesel fuel and, to a lesser extent, of fertilizers (phosphates and WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  urea) and capital goods. In 2015, the main items were flat rolled products, sulphur, paper and 
paperboard, and newsprint.  
4.126.   Other points worthy of mention a re a number of cooperation initiatives in areas such as 
hydroelectric energy (the Russian Federation has a large stake in the Chihuido hydroelectric plant 
project in the Argentine province of Neuquén), agriculture, fishing, aquaculture, and mining. The 
two countries also have a Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with respect to Taxes 
on Income and Capital.  
4.127.   We therefore believe that there is potential for growth and diversification in our bilateral 
trade relationship, which will be mutually bene ficial in strengthening our economic ties and 
cooperation.  
4.128.   Lastly, while reiterating our appreciation of this renewed opportunity to exchange 
information and comments on the Russian Federation 's trade policies and practices, we would like 
to draw attention  once again to the importance of this exercise in transparency from every point of 
view, and to wish the Russian authorities a successful conclusion to this first trade policy review.  
UKRAINE  
4.129.   The Ukrainian delegation welcomes the first Trade Policy Review of the Russian Federation. 
Ukraine believes this multilateral review is vitally needed as policies and practices adopted by the 
Russian Federation in recent years raised concerns of the WTO Members.  
4.130.   The Russian Federation was once Ukraine 's largest trade p artner. In 2012, its share in 
Ukraine 's overall trade in goods amounted to about 30%. It accounted for over 25% of Ukraine 's 
total exports.  
4.131.   Ukraine welcomed the Russian Federation 's accession to the WTO because we expected 
adherence to international trade  rules and principles and transparent application of the WTO 
Agreements. We also expected the Russian Federation 's WTO membership would further 
contribute to the development of a rules -based multilateral trading system.  
4.132.   Ukraine always believ ed that rules m ust be respected.  
4.133.   Unfortunately, numerous policies and practices adopted by the Russian Federation in 
recent years do not exemplify the predictability, transparency, and consistency with the WTO 
Agreement that is expected of WTO Members.  
4.134.   Although previous ly Ukrainian products encountered occasional trade barriers to enter the 
Russian market, access to this market has considerably deteriorated since 2014. The Russian 
Federation has de facto introduced an intensive economic pressure in its aggression towards  
Ukraine.  
4.135.   Initially, during 2014 -2015, the Russian Federation 's restrictive trade measures targeted 
certain Ukrainian goods (confectionery, dairy produce, juices, beer, wallpaper, railway equipment, 
etc.). The Russian Federation banned imports of these goo ds on the pretext of the alleged non -
compliance with labelling , hygiene or safety requirements.  
4.136.   After the initial wave of trade restrictive measures, dozens mo re products  that had been 
exported to the Russian market for years and decades – and that are cu rrently being supplied 
without any problems to a wide range of international partners – have allegedly also been found to 
be in violation of Russian TBT and/or SPS requirements.  
4.137.   Trans parency simply has not existed.  Despite repeated requests, the Russian F ederation 
has not provided, either our traders or our Government, any information (such as the results of 
tests, findings of examinations that were allegedly conducted by Russian authorities), which could 
justify the imposition of these discriminatory meas ures. It is quite disappointing that the Russian 
Federation constantly disregards these critical transparency provisions of the WTO agreements.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.138.   As a result of these trade restrictive measures, the Russian Federation 's share in Ukraine 's 
overall trade in go ods dropped to about 16% in 2015. Ukrainian -Russian trade decreased from 
US$45 billion in 2012 to US$12.3 billion in 2015. The Russian Federation 's share in Ukrainian 
exports decreased to 12% in 2015 and amounted to about 9% in the first half of 2016. Expo rts of 
juices dropped from US$72.7 million in 2013 to US$0.8 million in 2015 ( -98.8%). Exports of 
railway locomotives, wagons and parts thereof decreased from US$1.7 billion in 2013 to 
US$110  million in 2015 ( -93.7%). 
4.139.   1 January 2016 marked the beginning of  another phase of the economic pressure. From 
that date, the Russian Federation:  
 unilaterally suspended the CIS Free Trade Agreement with respect to Ukraine;  
 banned imports of agricultural products, raw materials and foodstuffs originating in Ukraine 
(the food embargo); and  
 imposed restrictions on traffic in transit from Ukraine to the Republic of Kazakhstan via the 
territory of Russia until 1 July 2016.  
4.140.   Further escalation of the economic pressure took place on 3 July 2016. The Russian 
Federation extended the restrictions on traffic in transit until 31 December 2017 and:  
 expanded restrictions to transit of goods from Ukraine to the Kyrgyz Republic via the 
territory of the Russian Federation;  
 banned the transit of goods via the territory of the Russian Feder ation, which are subject to 
the food embargo; and  
 prohibited the transit of goods subject to the tariff rates higher than zero under the Eurasian 
Economic Union 's Customs Tariff (about 85% of tariff lines are subject to the rates 
exceeding 0%).  
4.141.   Collective ly, these measures impose a practical prohibition on transit of the majority of 
goods from Ukraine via the territory of the Russian Federation to countries of Central and Eastern 
Asia and the Caucasus. Ukraine believes that these measures represent a flagr ant violation of WTO 
rules, in particular, Article V of the GATT 1994. As a result of these restrictions, Ukrainian exports 
to countries of Central and Eastern Asia and the Caucasus d ecreased by 35% in 
January -June 2016. Exports to Kazakhstan fell 45.5% in  the first half of this year.  
4.142.   It is worth highlighting on the transit measures, that in April 2016, the Russian Federation 
presented its instrument of acceptance of the WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation aiming, inter 
alia, at clarifying and improving re levant transit (Article V) and transparency (Article X) provisions 
of the GATT 1994 "with a view to further expediting the movement, release and clearance of 
goods, including goods in transit ". We expect to see this implemented in practice as well as spiri t 
for all WTO Members.  
4.143.   To illustrate the unpredictability of trading conditions and the non -transparency of Russian 
trade measures we draw attention to one particular example. Ukraine was one of the largest 
suppliers of edible salt to Russia. In early 201 5, the Russian Federation banned the import of this 
product supplied by a major Ukrainian producer due to alleged non -compliance with requirements 
concerning purity, iodine content, and organoleptic parameters. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian producer 
held valid certificates issued by accredited conformity assessment bodies in the Russian 
Federation. Despite repeated requests, Russian authorities have not provided any findings 
regarding the alleged tests conducted on this product. As a result of the prohibition, U krainian 
exports of edible salt to Russia decreased from US$22.2 million (390.7 thousand ton nes) in 2014 
to US$1.7 million (33.5 thousand ton nes) in 2015. After a shor t respite in this policy, on 
10 September 2016 , the Russian Federation included salt in t he list of products subject to the food 
embargo. That policy will enter into force on 1 November 2016. Multiple, ever -changing measures, 
all absent the necessary transparent underpinnings, have and continue to dislocate and disrupt 
trade.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.144.   Taking this oppor tunity, the Ukrainian delegation would like to call on the Russian 
Federation again to take the necessary actions to eliminate the restrictions on traffic in transit 
from the territory of Ukraine through the territory of the Russian Federation to third cou ntries.  
4.145.   In addition to the aforementioned issues, Ukraine has also posed a number of questions 
concerning technical regulations, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, customs requirements, 
domestic support, and anti -dumping measures, among other polic y are as. Unfortunately, the 
non-responsive answers provided by the Russian Federation can hardly be considered adequate, 
especially given the wide effect on Ukraine and other Members ' trade.  
4.146.   We urge the Russian Federation to respect WTO rules.  Pacta sunt servan da. 
THE SEPARATE  CUSTOMS  TERRITORY  OF TAIWAN,  PENGHU,  KINMEN  AND  MATSU  
4.147.   The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu  recognizes many 
external challenges that Russian Federation 's economy has to face. The reforms implemented by 
the Russ ian Federation in the past few years, however, are encouraging, and will hopefully lead to 
further integration into the global economy, more trade policy liberalization and diversification of 
trade relations, as well as greater transparency in the policy -making process.  
4.148.   Russian Federation 's efforts at streamlining regulations are very welcome, especially in the 
areas of customs procedure, establishing single -window and etc. They should produce a more 
favourable business environment, which in turn will attra ct a greater amount of foreign 
investment.  
4.149.   We were pleased to see, as well, that the Russian Federation submitted its letter of 
acceptance of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement on 22 April 2016, contributing to our joint 
efforts to accelerate the entry i nto force of the Agreement. We commend the Russian Federation 
for undertaking the steps necessary to ratify this important agreement. We also encourage the 
Russian Federation to move forward  on important WTO initiatives and commitments, including 
continuin g its accession to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement.  
4.150.   Since acceding to the WTO membership in 2012, the delegation of the Russian Federation 
under the excellent leadership of H.E. Mr. Ambassador Gennady Ovechko, has played an active 
role in the D DA negotiations and, as a fellow -member of the Article XII Group, we expect to 
engage closely together in the negotiations that lie ahead.  
4.151.   On trade policy, in advance, we submitted several questions to the Russian Federation 
covering, among other areas, mi ning and energy, and intellectual property rights. We thank the 
Russian Federation for its response and we shall study it with great interest. There are just a few 
specific points, though, that I wish to mention here, if I may.  
4.152.   Needless to say, the Russian  Federation 's most important trade policy initiative is probably 
the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). We hope that such process contributes to the Russian 
Federation 's development, without creating trade barriers or trade diversion to other Members.  
4.153.   Neverth eless, while the Russian Federation has clearly demonstrated its commitment to 
open trade, some concerns do remain in the context of this TPR. We note, for example, from the 
Secretariat 's report, that, in the area of state -owned enterprises (SOEs), "some o f the large SOEs 
occupy a dominant position in key sectors… ". We note that the Russian Government is taking steps 
to improve corporate governance and privatize SOEs to increase productivity, competition and 
efficiency. We would therefor encourage the Russi an Federation to adopt the necessary reforms in 
order to guarantee the transparency of the related procedures and promote competition, which 
would not only open up more opportunities for foreign investment, but could also help promote 
diversity.  
4.154.   On the bil ateral front, I am pleased to say that trade between the Russian Federation and 
us has steadily increased since 2007. Bilateral two -way goods trade between the Russian 
Federation and us rose steadily from just over US$ 2.7 billion in 2007 to around US$5 bil lion in 
2015, covering products such as steel products, machinery, coal and natural gas. But, potential WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  certainly exists to increase and diversify our bilateral trade, not only in goods, but also in services 
and investments if we can identify the greater c omplementarity of our trading sectors.  
4.155.   In closing, I would like to express the hope that the Russian Federation continues to 
benefit from the foundations it is building through its own efforts, and that it finds constructive 
support and feedback from fello w WTO Members in this, its first Trade Policy Review. We strongly 
encourage the Russian Federation to hold firm to its strategy of economic and trade policy 
reforms.  
COSTA  RICA 
4.156.   The Russian Federation is a major player in world trade. We therefore believe t hat its 
accession to the WTO in 2012 has been most useful and will positively influence the reforms that 
Russia has started to implement as part of its process of integration in the global economy.  
4.157.   The reforms made to its competition and government procure ment regimes and the 
improvements introduced in its IPR enforcement legislation are only some examples of the 
changes that will enable the Russian Federation to better adapt and modernize its economy.  
4.158.   Improvements in its customs administration system, incl uding the recent ratification of the 
Trade Facilitation Agreement, are also significant steps forward.  
4.159.   We agree with the Russian Federation that foreign investment, technology transfer and 
innovation are essential to this process. We therefore eagerly awai t the progress that the Strategy 
for Innovative Development of the Russian Federation 2020 may bring in this regard in the coming 
years.  
4.160.   Although the Russian Federation only recently joined the WTO, its incorporation in the 
multilateral trading system is a lready beginning to show positive effects. This is reflected in better 
rankings in the World Bank 's Doing Business 2106 report and in the World Economic Forum 's 
Global Competitiveness Index 2015 2016, where the Russian Federation has been moving upwards 
since 2012.  
4.161.   Nonetheless, there are still major challenges to be addressed.  
4.162.   The Russian Federation 's entry into the WTO coincided with a period of strong economic 
instability caused by a variety of factors, such as the oil price slump, insufficient diversific ation of 
exports, and the economic sanctions imposed by some countries.  
4.163.   This state of affairs has caused problems such as a sharp decline in the value of the rouble, 
capital outflows, and increased inflation.  
4.164.   According to IMF forecasts, growth prospects ar e more positive for the coming years but 
could be better if the Russian Federation were to encourage improved governance, speed up the 
structural reforms needed to address distortions in the economy and create a more favourable 
investment climate.  
4.165.   Diversif ication of the economy has been highlighted as one of the Russian Federation 's key 
priorities in addressing these challenges. We are pleased to note how the country proposes to 
reduce its energy dependence by taking a series of measures, including the prom otion of 
renewable energy. It would be interesting to know whether Russian energy policies are considering 
reforms to the country 's fossil fuel subsidy schemes.  
4.166.   For this trade policy review, Costa Rica submitted a set of questions concerning Russia 's 
services, investment and intellectual property systems. I appreciate the attention given to these 
questions and will conclude by wishing the Russian Federation a successful first trade policy 
review.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  INDIA  
4.167.   According to the S ecretariat 's report, the global econ omic crisis of 2008 -09 caused a 
contraction of 7.8% in the real GDP of the Russian Federation in 2009, but it rebounded with 
annual growth rates of 4.1% on average over the period 2010 -12. Since then, real GDP growth 
rates slowed to 1.3% and 0.7% in 2013 a nd 2014, respectively, while it contracted by 3.7% in 
2015. The main cause for this significant fall in GDP growth was the oil price slump amid slow 
structural reforms, weak investment, and adverse population dynamics which are affecting 
potential growth. We have noted that according to the IMF, the Russian Federation is on a 
stabilization course; it expects GDP growth to contract by 1.8% in 2016 and to grow by 0.8% in 
2017.  
4.168.   We would like to commend the Russian Federat ion for moving several places, 51st pla ce 
(out of 189) in 2016 from being ranked 120th (out of 183) in 2012 in the World Bank 's ease of 
Doing Business rating. We also appreciate the Russian Federation for taking steps fo r facilitating 
trade in Goods.  
4.169.   We have noted that the establishment of the  Eurasian Economic Union aims at creation of 
a single market for goods services, capital and labour within the union. It would also spur growth, 
enhance modernisation and co mpetitiveness of the economies.  
4.170.   India and Russian Federation share multifaceted and  long-standing ties rooted in history. 
Since the signing of "Declaration on the India -Russia Strategic Partnership " in October 2000, 
India-Russia ties have acquired a qualitatively new character with enhanced levels of cooperation 
in almost all areas of th e bilateral relationship including economic, trade and investment areas. 
There has been a regular exchange of visits at the highest levels, including Annual Summit 
meeting between the Prime Minister of India and the President of the Russian Federation. Ind ia 
and Russian Federation are also partners under the BRICS framework and are working together on 
a variety of issues such as global governance and sustainable development.  
4.171.   In 2015, bilateral trade amounted to US$ 6.83 billion, with Russian  exports to India  
amounting US$ 4.17 billion and Indian exports to Russia amounting US$ 2.66 billion. The 
cumulative Indian investment between the years 2000 to 2014 in Russia are estim ated to be about 
US$8 billion, while Russian inv estments in India are about US$ 3 billion. During the annual summit 
held in December 2015, both sides have highlighted the importance of further enhancing trade and 
economic cooperation and have reiterated the commitment to increase the bilateral trade to 
US$30 billion by 2025 and the bilateral inv estment each way to US$15 billion by 2025. India is 
keen to engage more closely with Russia and the CIS countries to further intensify trade and 
economic cooperation with this region.  
4.172.   Both sides have enhanced cooperation to promote trade in the area of da iry products and 
Bovine meat. India has submitted a number of questions and we thank the Russian delegation for 
the replies provided. The prices of the essential drugs exported to Russia are capped at the rate of 
first supply from India (fixed in year 2010 ). Subsequent price revision of these products have been 
allowed to local companies on proven justification on account of increase in cost of manufacturing, 
transportation and other incidentals. However the same is not applicable to products imported into 
Russia from India in spite of proven justification in i ncrease of cost of production. We would like to 
seek a clarification from the Rus sian Federation regarding this.  
4.173.   To conclude, we look forward to working with the authorities of the Russian Federation i n 
further expanding our trade and inves tment ties for mutual benefit. We wish the delegation of the 
Russian Federation a productive and successful TPR.  
CHILE  
4.174.   We submitted nine questions for this review, and appreciate the replies received on the 
various to pics concerned, which included the formulation of Russia 's trade policy, the trade 
agreements signed by the Eurasian Economic Union ( EAEU), foreign investment, anti -dumping 
measures, and state trading enterprises.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.175.   Since Chile re -established diplomatic rela tions with the Russian Federation in the early 
1990s, three Presidents of the Republic of Chile have visited the country. The President of the 
Russian Federation came to Santiago in 2004, on the occasion of the APEC Summit, a forum to 
which both countries belong.  
4.176.   Russia is a relevant partner for Chile. Our bilateral relations are growing gradually stronger 
thanks to a number of agreements, regular political consultations, cooperation in the fields of 
defence, science and technology, and the fact that we bot h belong to various bodies forming part 
of the multilateral trading system.  
4.177.   Trade between Chile and the Russian Federation has increased by 13% over the past six 
years, totalling US$664 million in 2015, with a balance in favour of our country. Nonetheless,  our 
exports to Russia have declined in recent times, and the volume of trade does not yet reflect the 
magnitude of the Russian market. There is therefore ample scope for growth in our exports and 
reciprocal trade in general.  
4.178.   Russia is a major market for C hilean exports of frozen fish and pork, fresh grapes, dried 
fruit, wine and processed fruit products, such as fruit pastes, purees and jam, and Chile hopes to 
bring its exports of these products up to their previous growth levels.  
4.179.   As regards the promotion of our economic relations, we attach considerable importance to 
the establishment of business councils between our countries.  
4.180.   Some years ago, Russia set up a Russia Chile Business Council, but the Chile Russia 
Business Council, its counterpart in Santiago,  did not come into existence until 2013. The latter 
contacted its counterpart in Moscow, thus stimulating economic and trade activities. Both Councils 
are in operation, supporting the work done in Russia by the National Committee for Economic 
Cooperation w ith Latin American countries (NC ECLAC).  
4.181.   In a broader context, Chile has expressed interest in driving forward a trade agenda with 
the EAEU. A concrete expression of this interest is the public private mission headed by our Vice 
Minister of International E conomic Relations, who is currently on a working tour of Russia, 
Kazakhstan and Belarus.  
4.182.   A memorandum of scientific and technological cooperation will be signed during this visit 
between Chile 's Agricultural Research Institute and the North Caucasian Scien tific Research 
Institute of Horticulture and Viticulture, specifically in order to strengthen horticulture and 
viticulture in the two countries.  
4.183.   Turning to the Secretariat report, we note that Russia has been moving towards an 
outward oriented economy. Lib eralization of trade and investment, driven by the commitments 
undertaken in the context of its accession to the WTO and the entry into force of the EAEU Treaty 
on 1 January 2015 have been major milestones in this process.  
4.184.   On the other hand, we also note t hat the State continues to play a key role in the Russian 
economy, and although the number of state owned enterprises (SOEs) has declined recently, they 
still account for about half of GDP.  
4.185.   Our understanding is that the Russian authorities are taking steps  to improve corporate 
governance in order to increase productivity, competition and efficiency; as stated in the report, 
however, the bulk of the SOE privatization programme 2014 2016 has been postponed.  
4.186.   We regard Russia 's ratification of the Trade Facilit ation Agreement in April of this year as 
highly relevant and a sign of the country 's commitment to the system.  
4.187.   We are interested to see that Russia has been taking steps to improve customs operations 
and the efficiency of the import and export process. In addition, the Eurasian Economic 
Commission is working on developing the basis for a single window mechanism in order to move 
forward on these matters, among other measures.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.188.   Our conclusion from the report is that Russia has made headway with trade policy re forms 
as a result of its accession to the WTO and that, as the report says, in the long run consistent and 
determined implementation of these reforms will help lift the Russian economy towards its true 
potential.  
PERU  
4.189.   Peru welcomes the efforts that the Rus sian Government has made in the economic sphere 
to deal with the adverse and uncertain circumstances of recent years. Two points worthy of 
mention are the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union as an environment promoting regional 
trade and the economic d evelopment of its member countries, and the measures being 
implemented by the Eurasian Economic Commission to improve customs operations, which have 
led to the development of a single window mechanism to streamline customs procedures. Peru 
hopes that the R ussian economy will experience renewed growth, in which case Peru is a partner 
that offers great potential.  
4.190.   The close cooperation between Peru and the Russian Federation has reached strategic 
partnership level with the signing of an agreement to that end i n November 2015. The agreement 
has opened the way for an even higher degree of cooperation, in the energy and engineering fields 
in particular. Thanks to their excellent political relations, Peru and Russia already have a series of 
agreements to promote ex changes in areas such as environmental protection, defence, nuclear 
energy, culture, and sports. Trade relations between the two countries are thriving and prospects 
are good. Trade between Russia and Peru has increased sevenfold over the past ten years an d 
exceeded US$500 million in 2103. Nonetheless, there is still a significant trade imbalance in favour 
of the Russian Federation, and Peru stands ready to diversify and balance exports in both 
directions.  
4.191.   Peru has submitted a number of questions on the bas is of the content of the reports 
prepared for this review. Some of our questions concerned the Intervention Fund 's scope for 
stabilizing the prices of some products in Russia 's domestic market. Peru also asked Russia to 
expand on the functions, powers and procedures within the Eurasian Economic Union, in particular 
as regards decision making in anti -dumping and safeguard cases. It expressed concern and wished 
to know to what extent Russia had implemented its trade commitments in respect of fisheries 
product s; this included the Russian Federation 's policy of granting subsidies for fishing 
organizations, which the Sustainable Development Goals seek to ban because they may affect the 
sustainability of the marine ecosystem.  
4.192.   Peru thanks the Russian Federation for  its replies, which will be carefully analysed, and 
wishes it every success in its first trade policy review.  
INDONESIA  
4.193.   Indonesia associates itself with the ASEAN statement made by the Malaysian Ambassador.  
4.194.   In light of the trade policy review which we are commencing today, Indonesia notes with 
positivity that Russia has coped well with economic turbulence during the period under review 
(2012 -2016) – characterized by strong capital outflows, a sharp decline in the value of the Rouble, 
and an increased inflat ion. Indonesia commends the steady exit of Russia 's economy from a state 
of recession to an expected GDP growth of 0.8% in 2017 – according to the IMF.  
4.195.   This positive growth forecast is a tribute to Russia 's economic reform commitment, to 
continuously trans form its, then, centrally -planned economy to a market -oriented one; which 
entices liberalizing its trade and investment regimes, consistent with Russia 's commitments taken 
during its accession to the WTO just over four years ago in August of 2012.  
4.196.   Indonesi a shares Russia 's experience in the need to diversify exports. Indonesia 
commends the strong role of Russia in promoting trade and investment liberalization through 
regional, sub -regional, and bilateral co -operations.  
4.197.   Some similarities in our trade strateg ies and experiences – as they relate to our respective 
national development plans – are the basis to some of the questions that Indonesia has posed to WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  Russia. These questions merit transparent answers, especially for its imbedded experience -sharing 
values.    
4.198.   As such, Indonesia sees Russia not only as one of the largest economies and trading 
entities in the world, but also as one of Indonesia 's few strategic partners. Through Russia 's 
development experiences, Russia plays a critical role in the multilateral trading system, including 
in negotiations on the remaining DDA issues.  
4.199.   A strategic partnership between Indonesia and Russia entails a mutually -beneficial bilateral 
trade relationship, mutually beneficial independent of the prevailing macro -economic conditi ons of 
the Russian Federation. And such describes Indonesia 's ties with the Russian Federation.  
4.200.   Although the average growth of bilateral trade value in goods and commodities has shown 
a decrease of 3.2 % between 2011 to 2015, the Russian people and industr y still enjoy, among 
others, palm oil, electrical machineries, coffee beans, rubber, cocoa, and coconut oil. In return, 
Indonesia remains customer, among others, to Russian oil and gas, iron and aluminium alloys, 
potassium chloride, aeronautic products, as bestos, and diesel fuel.  
4.201.   Aside from the strong and positive economic ties between Indonesia and Russia, we do find 
some trade and trade -related barriers that have become Indonesia 's concerns, such as import 
measures related to palm oil and fishery products . We believe that through this Trade Policy 
Review, those issues can be addressed. We have submitted a number of questions related to our 
concerns on Russia 's trade policies and practices, and we thank the Russian Federation for some 
written responses. We will look into them and conduct a further study on them. In the meantime, 
we look forward to receiving the remaining answers to our questions, which was submitted as 
additional questions.  
4.202.   Indonesia believes that Russia will respect the wide -ranging commitm ents on market 
access for goods, services, and elsewhere made during its accession to the WTO.  
4.203.   Finally, I would like to conclude my remarks by expressing once again my profound 
appreciation to Russia 's delegation – and Ambassador Gennady Ovechko, Permanent  
Representative of the Russian Federation to the WTO – for their hard work, and wish Russia every 
success in its first Trade Policy Review. I look forward to working further with you Ambassador 
Ovechko.  
COLOMBIA  
4.204.   We congratulate Russia on its first trade po licy review after becoming the 156th Member of 
this Organization in 2012. Since its entry into the WTO, Russia has carried out sweeping reforms 
to create an outward oriented economy, by liberalizing trade and investment.  
4.205.   The global importance of the Russia n economy is reflected in its rankings as the world 's 
tenth largest economy, seventh largest exporter and 11th largest importer, second largest oil and 
gas producer, and fourth largest exporter of electricity, among others. This makes it a major 
multilater al player, warranting careful study of the impact of its trade policy developments.  
4.206.   According to the Secretariat report, insufficient diversification of Russian exports, 
significant decline in international reserves, rising inflation and exchange rate depr eciation 
increased the economy 's dependency and vulnerability on the international scene.  
4.207.   Economic growth has been moderate since 2013 and according to the World Economic 
Forum, the situation is expected to improve and stabili ze once the results of the ant i-crisis plan 
become known. The economic revival plan consists in stabilizing the banking system, introducing a 
floating exchange rate regime, providing fiscal stimuli, and reducing State intervention, all of 
which is expected to improve the investment cli mate and lead to diversification of the country 's 
export supply.  
4.208.   Turning to the multilateral issues being addressed in this review, we welcome the efforts 
that Russia has been making to facilitate trade by automating customs procedures and introducing WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  a single window, adjusting its intellectual property rules, privatizing state trading enterprises and 
improving the government procurement system.  
4.209.   We note Russia 's active engagement in the negotiations, fulfilment of its transparency 
commitments by making noti fications, ratification of the Trade Facilitation Agreement, and its 
status as a party to the ITA Agreement and an observer to the WTO Agreement on Government 
Procurement.  
4.210.   Nonetheless, we also not e Russia 's frequent use of anti -dumping measures, safeguards , 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, measures restricting transit and limits on imports of 
agricultural and food products, all of which have given cause for concern in the WTO. We hope that 
Russia will promptly notify its state trading enterprises.  
4.211.   Lastly, as regards our bilateral relations, we note that trade flows reached US$464 million 
in 2015 and consisted primarily of Colombian exports of roses and beef and imports of potassium 
chloride and ammonium nitrate. Russia being a major global player, we emp hasize our interest in 
further deepening and diversifying our trade relationship and investment flows.  
4.212.   We hope that the reforms undertaken by the Russian Government to maintain a liberal 
trade regime, modernize and diversify its economy, reduce State parti cipation and improve the 
business environment will place the country back on the path to growth.  
4.213.   We wish the Russian delegation every success in this first trade policy review and look 
forward to receiving replies to the questions submitted by Colombia.  
HONG KONG,  CHINA  
4.214.   Hong Kong, China and the Russian Federation have enjoyed steady and mutual ly beneficial 
trade relations. We value the Russian Federation a s an important trading partner.  Our total 
bilateral merchandise trade amounted to US$2.4 billion last y ear, and in 2014, our total bilateral 
services trade amounted to US$479 million.  
Trade facilitation  
4.215.   Since its accession to the WTO, the Russian Federation has made commendable efforts in 
improving its customs operations.  This is done through an action plan , with a series of measures to 
simplify customs pro cedures and improve efficiency.  These measures have significantly reduced 
the aver age time for import clearance. We also welcome the unified information platform, Seaport 
Portal, which is being implemented  as an electronic single window for handling and processing 
cargo at Russian seaports.  
4.216.   We are pleased to note that the Russian Federation has deposited the instrument of 
acceptance of the Agreement on Trade Facilitation, contributing to our joint efforts t o accelerate 
the entry into force of the Agreement.  
State Trading and Services  
4.217.   State -owned enterprises (SOEs) continue to play a significan t role in the Russian economy. 
Despite a decline in the number of SOEs over the last few years, they still account f or about half of 
Russia 's GDP. In particular, we note that SOEs are heavily involved in key service sectors such as 
banking, transport and energy. As a services -oriented economy, Hong Kong, China, firmly believes 
that services liberalisation w ould induce ec onomic growth. We therefore encourage the Russian 
Federation to further liberalise its trade regime for foreign investment.  
4.218.   Some SOEs also face governance issues that undermine productivity, and while 
privatisations have taken place, the overall programme was delayed because of unfavourable 
market situation. We encourage the Russian Federation to expedite reforms in these areas.  
4.219.   At the same time, we note that the Russian Federation had not made any notification to 
the WTO on state -trading enterprises and we  encourage the Russian Federation to ensure 
compliance of WTO notification requirements.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  Tariffs  
4.220.   Turning to tariffs, we note that the Russian Federation has a complex tariff structure 
comprising ad valorem duty and non -ad valorem  duty. Upon its accession t o the WTO in 2012, the 
Russian Federation has bound all of its tariff lines and committed to phase in its tariff reducti ons 
within eight years by 2020.  It is commendable that the simple average rate of its applied MFN 
tariff has been reduced from 11.0% in 2012 to 8.3% in 2016, which is lower than the simple 
average final bound tariff of 8.4%.  
4.221.   However, more than 1,700 tariff lines at the 10 -digit level stil l carry non -ad valorem  
duties. For some tariff lines, applied MFN tariffs may exceed their bound tarif fs because the applied 
tariffs are ad valorem but not less than their specific duties, while boun d tariffs are ad valorem  
only. Moreover, Russia 's tariff shows tariff escalation with the simple average of 6.1% on products 
at the first stage of processing, 6.7% for semi -processed products, and 9.5%  for fully processed 
products. We encourage the Russian Federation to improve these aspects with a view to 
simplifying its tariff regime, observing its bound tariff rates, reducing escalations, and enhancing 
predic tability.  
Anti-Dumping  
4.222.   We note that the Russian Federation has been active i n using anti -dumping measures. To 
avoid creating unnecessary restrictions to trade, we encourage the Russian Federation to exercise 
cautions and restraints in using such measures, and to conduct thorough reviews to ensure that 
any measures in force are fully justified.  
Government Procurement  
4.223.   We appreciate Russian Federation 's effort in reforming its government procurement 
system. We are delighted to note its recent application for a ccession to the WTO GPA and look 
forward to reviewing its accession offers when they are available.  
Concluding Remarks  
4.224.   This is the first Trade Policy Review for Russian Federation since its accession to the  WTO. 
We appreciate its efforts in integrating int o the multilate ral trading system and liberaliz ing its 
trading  regime in the past few years. We certainly recogniz e the challenges involved, but the 
benefits from such reforms will pay off in the long run . 
NEW  ZEALAND  
4.225.   New Zealand and Russia have a lengthy trading relationship, although our current trade 
levels are below historical levels. We welcome the opportunity to engage with Russia in this forum 
and hope this exercise will be useful to Russia for the further development of its trade policies and 
practi ces.  
4.226.   As the WTO Secretariat r eport notes, the Russian Federation is on an economic 
stabilisation path, following the severe impact of the glob al economic crisis of 2008 -09. The report 
however illustr ates that this stabiliz ation faces a number of challenge s. These include the slump in 
the oil price which has significantly impacted Russia 's economy which is highly dependent on 
energy exports; slow structural reforms; factors inhibiting investment; and l ow population growth.  
4.227.   As a more specific example, the Se cretariat report notes that import substitution has 
become a key factor in  Russia 's agricultural policy. Our own past experience with import 
substitution policies strongly suggests that openness to trade rather than efforts to promote 
import substitution i s the best way to generate economic growth therefore we encourage greater 
structural  reform efforts in this area.  
4.228.   Another point of concern flagged in the Secretariat report is Russia 's imposition of bans on 
the imports of agricultural and food pr oducts fro m certain countries. This is an issue of systemic 
concern that New Zealand and others have raised in the WTO in the past and which we reiterate 
here. WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.229.   Paragraph  2.22 of the Secretariat report notes that Russia has ten outstanding WTO 
notifications. New Zeal and encourages Russia to fulfil its reporting obligations, in line with the 
requirement for transparency, which is fundamental to the operation of the WTO. We look forward 
to an update from Russia on progress on these outstanding notifications. That said, we should also 
record that we welcome the fact that Russia is one of only four developed Members to be fully up 
to date with their notification requirements on agricultural domestic support and export subsidies 
for agriculture.  
4.230.   New Zealand also commends th e ongoing and broadly positive developments on market 
access for goods and services, and on the improvement and simplif ication of customs procedures. 
We encourage further progress, including in the context of Russia 's ongoing implementation of its 
Accessio n Protocol. And as we do other Members, we encourage Russia to convert its mixed tariff 
rates to ad valorem rates as a measure to enhance transparency and facilitate access. We also 
appreciate the information provided in the reports of the Secretariat and the Russian Federation on 
the operations of the Eurasian Economic Union.   
4.231.   In our written questions we have sought more information on the application of SPS 
stand ards in the Russian Federation.  In particular, and as required by the WTO SPS Agreement, 
we seek more information from Russia about the scientific basis for those instances where it 
applies more stringent requirements than inte rnational standards and norms. Similarly, we have 
also asked for clarification as to whether the audit of the system of su pervision in third countries is 
carried out against measures equivalent to that of the Eurasian Economic Union, even where these 
are more stringent than the relevant international standards.   
4.232.   We welcome the advice in the Secretariat report that the Russia n Federation may officially 
initiate GPA accession negotiations in the second half of 2016. We ask when Russia expects to be 
in a position to submit its first GPA offer and pose questions on the application of GPA principles, 
including on the compatibility  of Russia 's preference schemes with the GPA 's principle of non -
discrimination.  
4.233.   We would also appreciate clarification concerning the use of public funds for Russian 
agricultural businesses seeking to increase export sales to confirm that this is not an ex port 
subsidy.  
4.234.   Like other Members, we consider subsidy issues to be a h orizontal and systemic matter. 
Given Russia 's significant fishing industry we have some questions concerning the support 
provided to the sector and look forward t o Russia 's responses on these. With regard to fossil fuel 
subsidies, given their impact on trade, we would also be interested to know when Russia will join 
other G20 members, most recently China and the US, in utilising the G20 peer review process to 
assist with Russia 's ongoing reform of fossil fuel subsidies.  
4.235.   We acknowledge Russia 's progress, in the current challenging economic environment and 
we look forward to seeing the Russian economy achieve its full potential.  
REPUBLIC  OF KOREA  
4.236.   Korea highly appreciates Russia 's hard work and significant achievements in turning into a 
market -oriented economy during the last two decades and half. Since its accession to the WTO, 
Russia has continued liberalizing its market and reforming its trade regime to meet the WTO 
commitments. In this re gard, Korea welcomes Russia 's acceptance of the TFA this spring and its 
recent decision to initiate negotiations for its accession to the GPA.  
4.237.   However, Korea also notes that for the last couple of years, the Russian economy was hit 
by various factors, poli tical and economic, and internal and external, which inevitably have had a 
negative impact on its trade with other countries, and to some degree, on its efforts for structural 
reforms. Despite these difficulties, Korea hopes that Russia will continue worki ng toward for 
deeper integration into the multilateral trading system.  
4.238.   Turning to the bilateral side, Korea and Russia share many economic interests, in 
particular, regarding the development of Russia 's Far Eastern region.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.239.   Around 40 % of Russia 's bilateral trade involves this region, in which Korea was the largest 
export destination in 2014. We would like to highlight that early  this month President Park 
Geun-hye reaffirmed Korea 's willingness to contribute to Russia 's efforts for the development of 
this reg ion when she participated in the second  Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok.  
4.240.   I very much appreciate Russia 's response to Korea 's advanced written questions and 
requests. In this regard, please allow me to take this opportunity to emphasize our main conce rns 
about some of its trade measures and encourage Russia to address them.  
4.241.   First, many Korean companies face difficulties when they enter the Russian market due to 
customs administration and procedures. The difficulties include the arbitrary classification  and 
application of HS codes to electronic goods, notably smartwatches, as well as burdensome 
document requirements. As Russia accepted the TFA in April, Korea looks forward to seeing 
greater improvements in its customs administration and procedures in the  near future.  
4.242.   We also hope to see more transparency in SPS measures, especially when relevant laws 
are amended or revised, so that Korean companies do not have difficulties in finding required 
documents.  
4.243.   Second, as many of the previous speakers pointed o ut today, Korea is also concerned 
about import substitution measures in Russia 's government procurement system. Many Korean 
companies experience difficulties with government procurement, especially regarding construction 
equipment, automobiles and medical products. In this context, Korea welcomes Russia 's decision 
to initiate negotiations for the GPA and hopes for an early conclusion of the negotiations.  
BENIN ON BEHALF  OF THE LDC GROUP  
4.244.   On behalf of the LDC Group, the delegation of Benin congratulates the R ussian Federation 
on its first trade policy review since joining the WTO in 2012, and thanks Russia for the important 
information received on its economic and trade achievements. The LDC Group welcomes Russia 's 
legislative and regulatory reforms, which are  helping to increase the country 's integration in the 
multilateral trading system.  
4.245.   The LDC Group also welcomes the signing of 81 bilateral investment agreements, including 
one agreement with Cambodia, which is a member of the Group. It encourages Russia to  conclude 
agreements with the other LDCs.  
4.246.   The LDCs are running a trade deficit with the Russian Federation, which reached its peak in 
2011. This is largely attributable to the high prices of oil and wheat imports. Some Asian LDCs 
have succeeded in reducing  their trade imbalance with Russia, whereas there is a notable increase 
in the deficit in African LDCs.  
4.247.   The leading LDC exporters to the Russian Federation are Bangladesh, Cambodia, Malawi, 
Tanzania, Mozambique, Myanmar and Ethiopia. Altogether, these LDCs  account for around 90% of 
total LDC Group exports to the Russian Federation.  
4.248.   The leading LDC export products include textiles and clothing (60%), agricultural products, 
especially tobacco, coffee, rice and shrimp, and metals such as aluminium and uranium.  On the 
import side, the LDC Group mainly purchases wheat, petroleum, fertilizer, wood, aircraft and 
weapons from the Russian Federation.  
4.249.   As regards services, some LDCs have imported education and infrastructure services from 
the Russian Federation. Accord ing to the Secretariat 's 2012 report, Russia for its part imported 
US$38.5 million worth of services from LDCs, including, in particular, other business services and 
transport, construction and telecommunications services from Senegal, Liberia and Afghanis tan. 
These data show that trade in services between Russia and the LDCs is dynamic and can be 
further expanded.  
4.250.   We encourage Russia, which has expressed interest in LDCs being granted preferential 
treatment for goods, to go one step further by notifying sp ecific preferences for LDC services 
suppliers, in response to our collective request. We especially urge Russia to abolish administrative WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  restrictions and provisions applicable to LDCs in respect of visa applications, work permits, licences 
and residence p ermits. We also request the removal of obstacles to market access as regards the 
entry and establishment of contract ual services suppliers and self -employed professionals from 
LDCs, differentiating them from those of non LDC origin. If Russia applies quota s in the services 
area, we recommend the introduction of specific quotas for LDCs.  
4.251.   The LDC Group looks forward to receiving Russia 's replies to its questions, in accordance 
with the WTO rules. The Group would greatly appreciate further consultations with R ussia on the 
Group 's priorities, both within the WTO and in its member countries, and on its objectives of 
industrialization, integration in the multilateral trading system and global value chains, and 
poverty reduction.  
4.252.   On behalf of the LDC Group, the del egation of Benin takes this opportunity, a few days 
after the first meeting of the South -South Dialogue on LDCs and Development held in Annecy, 
France, to urge the other technical and financial partners to continue assisting the LDCs in their 
efforts to pr omote economic and social development.  
4.253.   The LDC Group appreciates Russia 's support for the pursuit of the Doha Development 
Agenda and the conclusion of outstanding DDA issues, and particularly welcomes its contribution 
to the process.  
KINGDOM  OF SAUDI  ARABI A 
4.254.   Despite the impact of the financial crisis, the crash of oil prices and the severe 
International economic sanctions over the period of review, the Russian Federation 's economy 
remained open and resilient. The Russian G overnment has been implementing a ra nge of policies 
and measures to adapt to its new economic reality and even managed to stabilize its economy and 
further open its market as part of its extensive WTO accession commitments.  
4.255.   While recovery will be long and painful, t he Russian G overnment mad e a clear point up 
front about the importance of trade and investment liberalization for the country 's economic 
recovery. GDP growth is projected to return to a positive 1.1 % in 2017 due to improving 
investment dynamics, led by expected rising oil pr ices a nd declining credit cost.  
4.256.   The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia commends the reform program me undertaken by the Russian 
Federation which aimed at transforming a centrally -planned economy to a market -oriented and 
fosteri ng its global competitiveness.  
4.257.   The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia trusts that the efforts undertaken by the Russian authorities 
to accelerate economic reforms and aim at enhancing competition in goods and services markets, 
improving property rights, and revamping transport and telecommunications infrastructu re to 
improve the business climate and boost investment will create favo urable conditions for its 
continuous growt h and sustainable development.  
4.258.   The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Russian Federation enjoy friendly and substantive 
economic and trade relat ionship underpinned by commercial ties and supported by shared 
membership in the G20. The value of two -way trade between the two countries exceeded 
US$1.2 billion in 2015.  
4.259.   The high -level exchange of visits between the two countries and the establishment o f the 
Saudi -Russian Joint Economic Commission contributed to enhancing the bilateral business ties and 
help expand and diversify tr ade between the two countries.  
4.260.   In November 2015, during the Saudi Russian Investment Forum in Moscow, a number of 
agreements  and memorandums of understanding were signed between the two countries 
especially in the field of distributing products of Russian companies in the Saudi market, expanding 
the provision of Russian ports services in the Kingdom, marketing the Russian oil p roducts, 
cooperating in the training of Saudi cadres in operation and maintenance of the 
telecommunication, information technology, maintenance and operation of water and electricity 
stations.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.261.   The importance of trade to the Russian Federation is reflected in its commitment to the 
WTO and the multilateral trading system.  
PARAGUAY  
4.262.   The world financial crisis of 2008 2009, political instability in the region and the sanctions 
imposed by major trading partners all hit the Russian economy especially hard. These f actors also 
explain why the 2010 2012 economic recovery was overshadowed by a subsequent slowdown in 
real GDP growth in 2013, 2014 and 2015. Moreover, the drop in oil prices significantly affected the 
country 's foreign exchange earnings, resulting in a sha rp decline in the value of the rouble and an 
increase in inflation.  
4.263.   The Government responded to this situation by introducing  an interesting package of 
anti-crisis measures aimed primarily at stabilizing the banking sector and providing the economy 
with fi scal stimuli. These measures also included an import substitution programme. The Russian 
authorities acknowledge the need to accelerate economic reforms and have made it their aim to 
enhance competition in goods and services markets, improve property right s, and revamp 
transport and telecommunications infrastructure, with a view to improving the business climate 
and boosting investment. As we have seen in reports by multilateral financial institutions, the 
Russian economy is on a stabilization course; in th is respect, the IMF expects GDP growth to 
contract by 1.8% in 2016 and to improve by 0.8% in 2017.  
4.264.   In this regard, we hope that Russia will soon be able to complete its transition to a market 
economy.  
4.265.   Turning to trade policy, the Russian Federation 's WTO a ccession in 2012 represented a 
milestone in the country 's integration into the multilateral trading system, bringing about 
structural changes in trade legislation that make the country a more predictable partner with 
which to do business. Since its WTO acc ession, Russia has gradually reduced its applied tariff 
protection level to 6.09%.  
4.266.   Russia also participated actively in the conclusion of the Trade Facilitation Agreement, and 
has subsequently taken steps to expedite customs formalities and reduce the rele ase time for 
goods, including by removing redundant barriers imposed by customs regulations, streamlining 
customs procedures, and reducing the amount of time required for customs formalities.  
4.267.   There are, however, various challenges on the horizon, as reflec ted in the vast number of 
questions posed by Members during this review exercise. These include questions on notifications, 
trade defence mechanisms, and schemes to encourage production. My delegation has also 
submitted some specific questions on the impor t substitution programme, transit policies and trade 
in services. We thank Russia for its partial replies to these questions, which we will study very 
carefully.  
4.268.   As a landlocked country, we would also like to express our systemic concern regarding 
certain steps taken by Russia to restrict the international transit of goods through its territory to 
third markets. We hope that these issues can be resolved shortly, in accordance with GATT Article 
V and the Agreement on Trade Facilitation.  
4.269.   Nevertheless, I would  like to emphasize my country 's excellent bilateral relations with 
Russia, not only at the economic level, but also politically, socially and culturally. Trade flows in 
both directions increased significantly during the period under review, to the extent t hat Russia is 
now one of the main destinations for Paraguayan exports, most notably beef and soya pellets, 
which together amount to a value of US$750 million. Paraguay, for its part, imports diesel, 
fertilizers and other chemical products from Russia. We b elieve, however, that there is still 
enormous potential in this area, and both Governments are determined to work together in this 
regard.  
4.270.   It should also be noted that there has been significant Russian investment in Paraguay in 
recent years, particularly in the livestock and industrial sectors.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.271.   Lastly, we wish to emphasize that Paraguay and Russia share the same views regarding 
the need to strengthen the multilateral trading system and would both like to see the swift 
implementation of the Trade Facilitati on Agreement, together with a development oriented WTO.  
THAILAND  
4.272.   Thailand associates itself with ASEAN 's statement previously d elivered by Ambassador 
Mariam.  
4.273.   Russia and Thailand have a cordial and long -standing trade relation. In 2015 , Russia was 
Thailand 's 31st trading partner in the world, with trade value of US$2.3 billion. Russia ranked as 
our 37th export destination, although we note that there was a sharp decline from an average 
total export value of approximately 1.1 billion between 2011 and 2014 to 700 million in 2015, this 
is due in large part to the sharp drop in our top exports to Russia in the past five years, especially 
automobiles and electric machinery. In terms of Imports Russia ranked as Thailand 's 24th largest 
source of import, having decli ned from 14th in 2010 as Thailand 's importation of fuel, fertilizers, 
and iron and steel fell sharply in the past five years.  As we look forward, we hope that our 
fundamentally strong relationship will help our bilateral trade to rejuvenate and induce furt her 
growth in the near future.  
4.274.   The r eport by the Secretariat indicate that Russia 's economy has contracted by 3.7% in 
2015 owing to various factors including the political instability in the Crimea region, the fall in oil 
prices, and the two -way economic sanctions between some western countries and Russia. We 
hope that Russia will continue to strengthen its efforts in transforming and liberalizing its economy 
to a market -oriented one, and in doing so, achieve a sustainable and positive growth in the near 
future.   
4.275.   We would like to commend Russia 's strong efforts to further liberalize trade and 
investment since its accession to the WTO.  
4.276.   Thailand is also pleased with Russia 's efforts in regard to investment facilitation and 
promotion through special tax and infrastructure incentives, and we look forward to improvements 
in transparency, tax rates and complexity of tax regulations, access to financing, and improvement 
in intellectual property protection to further enhance Russia 's investment environment.  
4.277.   Thaila nd also believes Russia to be an active contributor to the WTO, with its ratification of 
the Trade Facilitation Agreement as well as its participation in the ITA expansion.  
4.278.   In this review, Thailand submitted quite a number of questions to Russia, covering  the 
policies and measures of our interests regarding Investment policies and Competition policies. We 
look forward to Russia 's responses, for which we will study carefully with great interest.  
4.279.   In conclusion, Thailand would like to express its appreciation  to the Russian deleg ation for 
today 's presentation.  We are thankful for the cooperat ion with Russia in every level and wish 
Russia every success in its first trade policy review.  
REPUBLIC  OF MOLDOVA  
4.280.   Becoming a M ember of the WTO in august 2012, Russia has committed to abide by its 
rules and principles in accordan ce with the WTO rules undertaken  by the Protocol of Accession, in 
order to improve the competitiveness of the Russian economy and to successfully integrate into 
the global marketplace.  
4.281.   We would like  to congratulate the Russian Federation on its ratification of the Trade 
Facilitation Agreement on 22 April 2016, further encouraging the Russian authorities to move 
forward with the negotiation process on the ratification of the GPA Agreement.  
4.282.   It is impo rtant to note and commend that upon accession, the Russian Federation joined 
the Information Technology Agreement, aiming to liberalize trade and growing sector of the global 
economy.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.283.   Since 2012, Russia has been annually moving upwards in the Doing Busines s rating 
compiled by the World Bank Group. From being ranked 120th in 2012, Russia moved to the 51st 
place in 2016. Despite this achievement, some of the macro -economic indicators remain unstable. 
Since joining the WTO, the real GDP of Russia 's economic gr owth rates slowed to 1.3% and 0.7% 
in 2013 and 2014, respectively, while a contraction of 3.7% occurred in 2015 due to the external 
and internal challenges, certain geopolitical challenges, currency devaluations in trading partner 
countries, trade sanction s, the oil price slump below US$50 per barrel, coupled with the insufficient 
diversification of Russian exports. Merchandise exports decreased from US$524.8 billion in 2012 to 
US$343.9 billion in 2015.  
4.284.   Among the factors that have a negative impact on the v olume of bilateral trade are: loss of 
economic ties with Ukraine and some of the other CIS countries and access to their market, 
including some of the main line tariffs from Moldova, depreciation of the national currency, the 
reduced financial capacity of the local population and financial challenges of enterprises.  
4.285.   The Russian Federation has been one of the most important trading partners of Moldova. 
Even if the trade volume has declined significantly from a deficit of US$156 million  in 2013 to a 
double on e of US$300 million in 2015, Russia still remains among top 5 trade partners of the 
Republic o f Moldova, descending from the first  export partner of Moldova to the third one in 2016. 
The value of exported Moldovan fruits has decreased from US$90 million in 2013 to only US$13.6 
in 2015, which is a decrease of approximately 85%. Customs duties imposed on fruits vary 
between 5 -10%.  
4.286.   The Moldovan delegation looks forward to receiving responses to the recently submitted 
questions to the Government of the Russian Federation regarding additional transparency 
measures planned to be introduced by the Russian Federation on dumping investigations and 
procedures, as well as regarding to the ban imposed on all international transit of cargo by road 
and rail from Ukraine t o Kazakhstan through the territory of the Russian Federation and its 
compatibility with GATT Article V, which requires WTO Members to apply a free transit regime.  
4.287.   Regarding the RTAs, the Republic of Moldova notes that starting with 2014, and in spite of 
agreed free trade preferences under the CIS FTA, the Russian Federation has imposed trade 
restrictions on certain Moldovan products. As a result, this has greatly reduced the volumes of 
Moldovan exports to Russia in 19 agricultural products, which represent  Moldova 's main exports. 
The trade restrictive measures have taken the form of increased import duties on these prod ucts 
from a previous level of 0 –5% to a current level of 15% (under Governmental  Decision No . 736 
from 31 July 2014).  
4.288.   The exports of certai n agricultural products have been generally banned. These include 
fresh fruit and vegetables, wines and other alcoholic drinks, canned fruit and canned vegetables, 
and processed meat. Currently, only certain pro ducers placed on a special list  can export so me of 
these products to Russia. Thus, only 123 exporters are eligible to  export fruits falling under 
HS 0808 and 0809. The exports of other agri -vegetal products are permitted only to 248 Moldovan 
exporters. As a result, during 2013 -2016, the value of Mold ovan export s to the Russian Federation 
has decreased by 61.8%, having a highly disruptive impact on the economy and the regional trade 
system.  
4.289.   While we are fully aware of the economic difficulties in Russia, in view of proper 
implementation of the legally  binding CIS Free Trade Agreement, an d giving full effect to 
Article  XXIV of GATT, the Republic of Moldova requests the Russian Federation to lift the applicable 
restrictions allowing to restore  the traditional volumes of trade between the two countries.  
4.290.   In spite of the economic difficulties caused by these measures to the Moldovan economic 
agents, the Republic of Moldova has not taken steps to litigate the issue neither under the CIS FTA 
nor under the WTO rules. This reflects our willingness and good fait h in a process where amicable 
and mutually acceptab le solutions are explored. The G overnment of the Republic of Moldova looks 
forward to revisiting and solving this issue under the auspices  of our bilateral governmental 
commission meetings and further disc ussions among diplomats in Geneva, in order to find 
mutually agreeable solutions, with respect to the WTO commitments and principles. In this regard , 
we appreciate the consultations held in Moscow and Chisinau by high level officials and we hope 
that the r ecent meeting at the highest level between our leaders will bring positive results soon.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.291.   The Republic of Moldova is confident that the first exercise of the trade policy review will 
help Russia to attain its economic objectives and fully honour its intern ational commitments.  
4.292.   We look forward to continuing strengthening our bilateral relations wi th Russia and on 
behalf of the d elegation of the Republic of Moldova I wish the Russian d elegation the utmost 
success during the first WTO Trade Policy Review Cycle . 
EL SALVADOR  
4.293.   This exercise is a clear example of one of the benefits of Russia 's accession to the WTO.  
4.294.   The Russian Federation 's economic environment is clearly experiencing a slowdown in 
growth, mainly due to external factors such as the global financial crisis, and other factors of a 
political nature. According to the Government report, foreign trade turnover was also affected 
between 2012 and 2015, decreasing by 37.5%, primarily due to the devaluation of the rouble that 
reduced the demand for imports, an d the fall in world prices that affected exports.  
4.295.   It is, however, important to note the significant efforts made by the Russian Federation as 
a result of its WTO accession, mainly with regard to tariffs. According to the Secretariat report, the 
country has  bound all its tariff lines and undertaken to reduce its bound tariffs to an average of 
8.4% by the year 2020. This average should be compared with the average applied tariff rate, 
which is currently 8.3% ad valorem, including AVEs (ad valorem equivalents)  of non -ad valorem  
duties, i.e. almost the same level as the average bound tariff.  
4.296.   We congratulate Russia on having deposited the Trade Facilitation Agreement. We also 
note that it is party to a number of plurilateral initiatives, such as the Information T echnology 
Agreement, and an observer to the plurilateral Government Procurement Agreement. Since the 
country 's accession in 2012, it has also actively participated in the Dispute Settlement Body, as 
both a party and a third party. We encourage the Russian Federation to notify the protocol 
amending the TRIPS Agreement.  
4.297.   We would also like to highlight the steps taken by the Russian Federation to facilitate 
trade, such as the ratification of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, the elimination of 
excessive re gulation, the streamlining of customs formalities, and the implementation of the 
electronic single window. We particularly welcome its efforts in respect of the latter.  
4.298.   At bilateral level, diplomatic relations between our two countries were established in 1992 
and have gone from strength to strength, partly as a result of Russia 's cooperation with 
El Salvador in fields such as science, technology, tourism and security. We are sure that the 
signing of the agreement to eliminate the visa requirement in respec t of all types of passports will 
help to boost business between our countries.  
4.299.   While trade between our countries is currently not very significant, we view it as fairly 
complementary. From 2013 to 2015, El Salvador exported sugar, green coffee, unrooted cu ttings, 
cocoa beans, and clothing, while imports consisted mainly of mineral fertilizers, iron and steel 
products, aluminium wire, and paper and paperboard.  
4.300.   We hope to continue strengthening our bilateral ties with the Russian Federation in the 
future and to increase the existing level of trade between our countries.  
4.301.   May I also take this opportunity to thank Ambassador Gennady Ovechko and his team for 
their firm commitment to, and active participation in, the regular and special work of the WTO.  
ECUADOR  
4.302.   In recent years, the Russian Federation has continued to push forward reforms aimed at 
modernizing its economy, fostering competitiveness and creating favourable conditions for 
sustainable growth and development. However, a troubled external sector, marked by  the global 
financial crisis of 2008 2009 and the fall in commodity prices, as well as other factors, have 
prevented the country from achieving the results it hoped for. In this light, the Russian Federation 
has promoted a new industrial policy based on su pport for exporters, fiscal incentives and import WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  substitution. We hope that this new policy, accompanied by initiatives aimed at the diversification 
of the economy and the reduction of the country 's dependence on mineral and energy resources, 
will help to  restore economic growth.  
4.303.   The Russian Federation 's accession to the WTO in August 2012 is one of the linchpins of its 
efforts to transform itself from a centrally planned economy into a market based one. Measures 
such as binding all its tariff lines and ph asing in reductions by 2020, opening up its service sectors 
and limiting export duties, have required substantial changes to trade policy. Given the country 's 
historical background, the challenges involved in implementing such measures should not be 
undere stimated.  
4.304.   In addition to its active participation in the multilateral sphere, the Russian Federation has 
chosen to enter into various regional agreements in which a privileged position is held by the 
Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). This customs union has a pplied a  common external tariff since 
1 January 2015 and has been given important trade related responsibilities, such as the 
establishment of a coordinated agricultural policy. The consolidation of the EAEU 's internal market 
and its position in internatio nal markets is one of the Russian Federation 's key trade policy 
challenges.  
4.305.   Trade between Ecuador and the Russian Federation is substantial and amounted to more 
than US$900 million in 2015. The Russian Federation is one of Ecuador 's main markets for 
agricu ltural products such as bananas, flowers, shrimps and coffee, and we therefore pay 
particular attention to the rules and regulations applicable to our agricultural sector, including in 
respect of sanitary and phytosanitary matters. Regarding imports, Ecuad or receives agricultural 
inputs and machinery from the Russian Federation. Furthermore, the complementarity of our 
economies suggests the existence of greater space for the deepening of trade relations between 
our two countries.  
4.306.   We have submitted written q uestions on certain aspects of the Russian Federation 's trade 
policy and thank the country in advance for its replies. We wish it a successful conclusion to its 
first WTO trade policy review.  
TURKEY  
4.307.   Russian Federation 's accession to the WTO marked a signif icant development for its 
integration into the rules based multilateral trading system. With a nominal GDP of 
US$1,326  billion in 2015, the Russian Federation, a G -20 member, ranked tenth in the world 
economy. Moreover, it is the largest country covering m ore than one eighth of the world 's 
inhabited area, also the world 's second -largest oil and gas prod ucer and one of the most 
energy -intensive economies.  
4.308.   With regard to the economic environment of the Russian Federation, as has been pointed 
out in the Secret ariat report, the economy had averaged 7% annual growth during the period 
1998-2008, driven largely by rapidly increasing oil and gas revenues and mining investments. 
However, the glob al economic crisis of 2008 -2009 and the sharp decline in the global oil prices 
since 2014, have adversely and deeply affected the economy and financial situation of Russia. 
Geopolitical uncertainty as well as international sanctions and counter -sanctions, mostly during the 
period under review, further aggravated the situation.  Due to these developments , real GDP 
growth rates slowed down to 1.3% and 0.7% respectively in 2013 and 2014 , and a contraction of 
3.7% occurred in 2015.  
4.309.   Having said that, Turkey is pleas ed to observe that the Russian G overnment has adopted  
an anti -crisis plan comprising:  stabilizing the banking system, implementing a fiscal stimulus and 
accelerating the move to a floating exchange rate regime to restore confidence and stabilize the 
financial system. Taking into account that the Russian Federation derives about 50% of its federal 
government revenues from oil and gas related activities, I believe that developing plans and 
policies aiming at economic diversification and promoting a non -oil economy would further 
increase the resilience of the economy. Moreover , accelerating the implementation of consistent 
and determined economic reforms would help lift the Russian economy towards its true potential.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.310.   As referred to in the G overnment report, Russia 's accession to the WTO was accompanied 
by fundamental legislati ve changes that has improved predictability of the Russian market for all 
stakeholders, including foreign trade operators. As a result, the incorporation of the WTO rules in 
the national legislation has contributed to an improvement in Russia 's internation al ratings. In this 
context, the upward move of Russia in the World Bank 's "Ease of Doing Business Report " from 
120th in 2012 to 51st place in 2016 is commendable.   
4.311.   From a trade policy perspective, Turkey welcomes the steps taken by the Russian 
Federation  to expedite customs formalities and reduce the release time for goods through an 
action plan that sets out a series of measures to simplify customs procedures and improve 
efficiency for both imports and exports since mid -2012.   
4.312.   Sharing the same geography  and having strong historical ties, bilateral relations between 
Turkey and Russian Federation had its periods of competition and cooperation over the course of 
history. Following a rapid development of economic relations in the 90s, our bilateral relations  
entered a new positive phase in the early 2000 's and then attained an institutional character with 
the establishment of the High Level Cooperation Cou ncil between the two countries in 2010.  
4.313.   On the other hand, our relations faced a serious test which affected both economies as a 
result of military activities in connection with the ongoing Syrian crisis. However, in line with the 
mutual desire of the Turkish and the Russian peoples and with the common sense of the 
Presidents of the two countries , a politica l dialogue has been re -established and subsequently a 
normalization process was launched recently. However, these positive steps have not yielded 
desired results yet in the areas of bilateral trade and economic relations. At this stage, we 
especially expec t that Russia will take measures to solve the current problems regarding the 
export of Turkish -origin fresh fruits and vegetables to Russia, as immediately as possible.  
4.314.   Economic and trade relations constitute the driving force behind the Turkish -Russian 
relations. Russia is one of our most important trade partners. Bilateral trade volume, which 
reached US$38 billion in 2008, before the global economic crisis, decreased to US$24 billion in 
2015. However, we are confident that the normalization process that was launched by the 
Presidents of the two countries would serve to attain the previous trade volume levels and further.  
4.315.   On the other hand, just before our foreign ministers meeting scheduled for 9 October, 
negotiations of a free trade agreement between  the two countries, covering services and 
investment , will be held. Our aim is to conclude, as soon as possible, this FTA which we believe 
would serve to increase bilateral trade volume to US$100 USD.  
4.316.   Turkey submitted a number of written questions in advance  and we are looking forward to 
receiving responses in due course.  
4.317.   To conclude, I commend Russian Delegation 's active participation in, and contributions to, 
the WTO negotiations under the leadership of my friend Ambassador Gennady Ovechko.  
ICELAND  
4.318.   Iceland strongly supported the accession of the Russian Federation to the WTO and was 
even directly involved for a while. With this in mind , I noted in particular with pleasure the clear 
commitment of the Russian delegation to the WTO system made in the opening st atement this 
morning.   
4.319.   Iceland and Russia have enjoyed a long and strong bilateral relationship, although these 
days we are unfortunately experiencing some challenges. Despite that we continue close and 
regular dialogue on various issues, including trade.   
4.320.   We have for decades enjoyed mutually beneficial trade relations, which hopefully can be 
restored soon, but our trade has contracted tremendously over the past couple of years.  
4.321.   Let me in the context of this review highlight two particular issues.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.322.   Firstly, the application of SPS rules which has caused major difficulties for some of our 
exporters of fish and now meat producers.  
4.323.   More concretely, f or close to two years , three of the biggest exporters of lamb meat in 
Iceland have been blocked from the Russian  market based on SPS rules. This is causing 
considerable damage to the exporters who have invested a lot of time, effort and money in 
establishing themselves on the Russian market.  
4.324.   During this period , Icelandic authorities and the companies in question ha ve worked 
extensively on meeting all requirements put forward by Russian authorities only to be repeatedly 
faced with rejections from the Russian side to recognize official documents, information and facts 
submitted.  
4.325.   Despite all the measures that have bee n taken to meet the requirements indicated the 
situation remains.  
4.326.   Thus, let me echo what a number of delegations have mentioned regarding what we see as 
a lack of predictability and transparency in application of SPS rules.  
4.327.   We urge the Russian authorities  to concretely clarify as soon as possible all the 
requirements that still need to be fulfilled in order for all stakeholders to be able to take the 
necessary measures to meet such requirements. Icelandic authorities continue to be fully 
committed to work directly and concretely with Russian authorities in this regard.  
4.328.   In this context , Iceland has noted with interest the recent outcome of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body in Case DS475.   
4.329.   Secondly, allow me to echo concerns of a number of delegations when it comes to 
application of subsidies in Russia, in particular fisheries subsidies. For a country as rich in 
resources as Russia, embarking on a course of sustainable resource management is essential to 
securing sustainable growth.  Iceland strongly encourages Russia to join a growing and diverse 
group of members committed to negotiating real disciplines to abolish harmful fisheries subsidies 
in the WTO instead of embarking on comprehensive state supported projects of increasing the 
capacity of its fishing fleet .   
4.330.   Finally , allow me to complement the whole Russian delegation for the enormous work you 
have put into your first TPR and my delegation wishes you all the success . 
KAZAKHSTAN  
4.331.   Russia is the second  trading partner of Kazakhstan after the European Union and  our major 
investment partner. In 2015 , annual trade turnover with Russia amounted to US$14.5 billion . 
4.332.   I would like to note positive influence of Russia 's accession to the WTO in terms of the 
country 's recent fundamental legislative changes that led to the  creation of a solid and predictable 
business enviro nment for market participants. Since 2012 , Russia moved up 69 places in the 
World Bank 's Doing Business ranking (Russia #51, Kazakhstan #41).  
4.333.   Kazakhstan pays a great deal of attention to this review.  
4.334.   We commend Russia 's efforts in developing trade policy regime that is coherent with the 
requirements of the Multilateral Trading System and the Government 's adherence to the 
transparency obligations.  
4.335.   Let me also highlight Russia 's growing share of non -trade d istorting support for agricultural 
producers.  
4.336.   We welcome the recent ratification of the Trade Facilitation Agreement by Russia.  
4.337.   Let me note our joint efforts within the EAEU to improved customs administration and 
developed a new EAEU Customs Code that wil l simplify customs operations.   WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.338.   We are confident that there is still a lot of potential to further improve our mutually 
beneficial trade and economic cooperation as EAEU evolves.  
4.339.   I thank the Government of Russia and personally Mr. Medvedkov and his team for their 
support to the accession of Kazakhstan to the WTO. Both our countries experienced quite a 
lengthy and complex accession exercises that helped to find solutions to some longstanding 
systemic issues of the WTO.  
BRAZIL  
4.340.   It is a matter of great satisf action for Brazil to take part in this first Trade Policy Review of 
the Russian Federation, a valuable partner of Brazil, bilaterally, here at the WTO, in the BRICS and 
many other fora. The accession of Russia to the WTO represented a landmark event not on ly for 
Russia, as highlighted in its Government report, but also for the multilateral trading system, 
consolidating the integration and commitment of Russia, with its substantial economic weight, to 
our common set of rules and principles.  
4.341.   Brazil commends t he significant reforms undertaken by the Government of the Russian 
Federation, following the wide -ranging commitments on market access in goods and services 
which resulted from its accession process to the WTO. As highlighted in the reports, legislative or  
regulatory action has taken place in a number of areas, such as simplification of customs 
procedures, competition, government procurement, investment, intellectual property, TBT and 
trade remedies, among others, in order to enhance and consolidate Russia 's openness to trade and 
investment flows. Brazil is particularly encouraged by Russia 's efforts to bring its agricultural 
policies in line with its WTO obligations. Let me also highlight our good dialogue with Russia on 
SPS measures applicable to Brazilian  products which are crucial in our bilateral trade relations.  
4.342.   We also would like to praise Russia 's record in the notificatio n of trade measures, one of 
the pillars of the multilateral trading system, as remarked by the Secretariat, covering virtually all 
the WTO set of disciplines.  
4.343.   Russia 's economic performance was affected by the intern ational economic crisis of 
2008-2009 and its aftermath, and later by the widespread fall in commodity prices, especially, in 
its case, oil and gas prices. While not being a ble to avoid weaker growth or event negative growth 
rates in some years between 2012 and 2015, the Russian Federation 's economy has avoided the 
kind of crisis that occurred in the late nineties. A number of policies were crucial in this area. Some 
point in  the direction of a more liberal economic policy, such as the adoption of a floating exchange 
rate; others possibly translate as a choice for more regulation and government intervention, 
including an import substitution programme. Although we do acknowledg e Russia 's right to use all 
WTO-consistent policy options, we hope that it will always choose the least trade alternatives to 
promote economic recovery.  
4.344.   On the bilateral Brazil -Russia agenda, exchanges have decreased from US $7.1 billion in 
2011 to US$4.6 b illion in 2015, after a brief recovery in 2014. Brazil and Russia are still grappling 
with adverse economic conditions, which, by depressing imports in both economies, can easily 
explain the trajectory of bilateral trade flows. This trend requires careful attention on the part of 
our Governments, bearing in mind that, in 2004, on the occasion of the first state visit by a 
Russian Head of State to Brazil, a technological partnership was established with the goal of 
increasing bilateral trade to US$10 billion . Brazil is also interested in continuing to work together 
with Russia to increase the complementary of our economies and diversify our bilateral trade, 
which already comprises a range of agricultural and industrial products, towards higher 
value -added goo ds. 
4.345.   One way to foster our economic ties would be to identify and explore investment 
opportunities, with positive side effects on bilateral trade. In this context, we noted with interest 
Russia 's decision, highlighted in the Secretariat report, to promote f oreign investment and 
innovation through the establishment of high -tech parks, industrial clusters and special economic 
Zones (SEZs).  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  MONTENEGRO  
4.346.   Montene gro wishes to congratulate the G overnment of the Russian Federation on becoming 
the 156th member of the  World Trade Organization in 2012, and to congratulate the Government 
on its first trade policy review cycle. We are convinced that Russia 's active membership will 
continue to contribute to the strengthening of its responsibilities and compliance with WTO rules 
and principles, and enable it to enjoy the benefits that the Organization brings to all of its 
Members. To this end, Montenegro notes with appreciation the Russian Federation 's ratification of 
the Trade Facilitation Agreement and welcomes the intende d application to join the Government 
Procurement Agreement that will support the necessary improvements in its domestic 
governmental procurement system.  
4.347.   In addition, Montenegro notes from the report  of the Government of the Russian 
Federation that between  2012 and 2015, the regional integration process within Eurasian 
Economic Union and beyond, was actively developing. Montenegro firmly believes in the 
importance of strong regional trading partnership and the benefits that deep economic integration 
and coo peration bring to States and their populations.  
4.348.   As the Secretariat notes, in 1991 , the Russian Federation embarked on a reform 
program me aimed at transforming a centrally planned economy to a market orientated one. In this 
regard, Montenegro is pleased to  read the finding of the Secretariat that Russia has "largely met " 
its objective of creating an outward -orientated economy. In agreement with the Secretariat , 
Montenegro considers that liberaliz ation of trade and investment (driven by commitments taken 
during Russia 's accession to the WTO) has been a major milestone in the reform project.  
4.349.   Notwithstanding the clear benefits marked by Russian accession to the WTO, Montenegro 
notes the findings of the Secretariat that Russia was hit exceptionally hard by the global financial 
crisis. Montenegro hopes that the future economic growth of Russia will become more stable and 
return to higher levels that had previously been experienced.  
4.350.   Montenegro has economic and trade relations with the Russian Federation, guided b y the 
Joint Committee for trade, economic and technic al cooperation between our two G overnments. 
Montenegro would like to use this opportunity to express its strong interest to continue 
consultations on the Protocol concerning current trading framework and  to expand cooperation, 
particularly in the sector of tourism.  
4.351.   Finally, Montenegro is looking forward to continuing its co nstructive engagement with the 
delegation of the Russian Federation in Geneva and my distinguished colle ague Ambassador 
Gennady Ovechk o. 
KINGDOM  OF MOROCCO  
4.352.   Morocco endorses the statement made by Benin on behalf of the LDCs.  
4.353.   It is an immense pleasure for my country to participate today in the first trade policy 
review of Russia, which , I am sure , will enable WTO Members to take stock of t he considerable 
progress made by this country in terms of its integration into the multilateral trading system.  
4.354.   At the international level, Russia is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the 
WTO and the G20, which it held the presidency of in 201 3. 
4.355.   On the economic front, while Russia is one of the BRICS emerging countries, it is also an 
increasingly important economic power. The country is currently one of Morocco 's most valued 
partners and priority markets.  
4.356.   The numerous high level public and priv ate sector visits that have taken place and the 
organization of the first Morocco Russia economic forum events show the Kingdom of Morocco 's 
desire to build on its achievements while maintaining its market share and strengthening its 
position through the d iversification of its export base.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.357.   This growing interest in the Russian market is also illustrated by the launch, four years 
ago, of a shipping line linking the Moroccan city of Agadir to Saint Petersburg. The port of Agadir 
forms a strategic point of liai son between Europe and Africa.  
4.358.   One of the key events marking our bilateral relations was the official visit of His Majesty 
King Mohammed VI to the Russian Federation in October 2002, which was the occasion of the 
signing of the declaration on the strategic  partnership encompassing trade, information technology 
and marine fisheries. The recent official visit of His Majesty King Mohammed VI to Russia has once 
again enhanced relations between our two countries, within the framework of an in depth strategic 
partnership that constitutes a veritable roadmap for public and private stakeholders, enabling 
them to increase their level of practical cooperation in respect of the economy, trade and 
investment. In the context of this visit several months ago, operators fr om both countries 
launched the Economic Council.  
4.359.   Regarding fisheries, the Kingdom of Morocco is aware of the need to revitalize cooperation 
between the two countries in this key sector and has concluded a new four year cooperation 
agreement with Russia, th e sixth of its kind since 1992.  
4.360.   The future is looking bright for economic relations between Morocco and Russia. The two 
countries maintain strong ties that will strengthen even further thanks to a shared desire for 
consolidation in all areas of common inte rest. From now on, trade will no longer be limited to 
agricultural products, hydrocarbons and fishery products.  
URUGUAY  
4.361.   For Uruguay, this review provides an excellent opportunity to examine and understand how 
the WTO membership of a country as important as  the Russian Federation can strengthen and 
contribute to the Organization while providing the country itself with tools to address enormous 
economic and trade challenges. We believe that the balance and results so far are positive for both 
the Russian Fede ration and the Organization, as will undoubtedly be revealed from the discussion 
that takes place during this exercise.  
4.362.   Uruguay has maintained friendly and constructive relations with Russia for over 150 years. 
Economic relations with Russia have developed  in a very dynamic fashion in recent years. Trade in 
goods currently forms the basis of our relationship: Uruguay imports mainly oil, fertilizer and 
chemicals, while exporting foodstuffs such as dairy products, meat, fruit and fish.  
4.363.   Uruguay gives special i mportance to Russia as an export destination and strongly expects 
to double or triple its Russia bound exports, in particular in the meat, dairy and fruit and vegetable 
sectors. Following a general fall in meat exports, our countries approved a Protocol be tween the 
health authorities.  
4.364.   Bilateral dialogue at various levels is very fluid and numerous technical missions take place 
between the countries. In recent months, we have made progress on issues relating to obtaining a 
permit for supplying high quality m eat, which provides access to the premium market without any 
quantitative limits and with a 15% tariff. We hope this will increase our sales of high quality cuts.  
4.365.   We prioritize our ties with Russia and intend to strengthen them, exploring opportunities 
for working together in areas such as the formation of joint venture companies in the agro 
industrial sector, the use of free zones, and collaboration in high technology areas such as 
biotechnology, telecommunications, electronics, agriculture, and renewable energy.  
4.366.   As a final comment, we would like to underscore the interest of both countries in 
combining efforts not only to achieve the swift and successful completion of the trade negotiations 
with a high level of ambition, but to strengthen the multilateral trading system based on 
predictable, transparent and balanced rules as a tool for development.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  ARMENIA  
4.367.   As we know, observation and monitoring of national trade policies are one of the 
fundamental WTO activities. We strongly support the TPR mechanism aimed  at enhancing of 
transparency and building of confidence in the multilateral trading system.  
4.368.   As it was mentioned today, this is the first review after Russian accession to the WTO in 
2012. Armenia having strong trade and economic links with the R ussian Fed eration  was among 
those WTO Members who were the most interested into its full membership to the WTO.  
4.369.   Historically, Armenia and the Russian Federation have very close links in various sectors of 
the economy. Russia is an important strategic partner for Arm enia both in trade and investment. 
Currently, we have more than 1,000 companies with the Russian capital successfully operating in 
Armenia. Russia is one of the main destinations for Armenian exports and also is the main source 
of Armenian imports. Almost 30% of all Armenian exports go to the Russian Federation. Trade 
between our two countries has grown substantially over the past 15 years.  
4.370.   As you know, Armenia became a full member of the EAEU in 2015 and , since then , 
together with the other EAEU members , has been enjoying benefits from being par t of the big, 
almost 200 -millio n market. In view of this, we are very much interested in the further 
development and expanding of our economic and trade cooperation with all EAEU members.  
4.371.   We believe that Russian acce ssion to the WTO provides the country with grounds for 
formation of an open, liberal, predictable, and transparent trade policy. Thanks to the Trade Policy 
Review, we have an excellent opportunity to better understand the Russian trade and investment 
policies and assess their compliance with the WTO rules and practices.  
4.372.   In the years following its accession, Russia has made a significant progress in adopting 
economic reforms and increased the openness of its economy for trade and investment.  
4.373.   Despite all well -known challenges, Russia has shown its commitment to further integration 
into the global trading system by undertaking a number of reforms targeted at foreign trade 
liberalization, infrastructure development and business environment improvement.  
4.374.   We do hop e that the efforts undertaken by the Russian Federation to modernize and 
diversify its economy will further promote the country on the path of sustainable and inclusive 
growth.  
SRI LANKA  
4.375.   We believe that the accession of the Russian Federation to the World Trade Organization 
on 22 August 2012 was a very important landmark in the country 's economy. We highly appreciate 
the dedication and the efforts taken by the Russian Government in the accession process to 
integrate the Russian economy with the multilateral  trading system. We are pleased to note the 
progress made by Russia in this direction. We are optimistic that Russia would be able to 
overcome its negative growth experienced in the recent past in the years to come with the 
developments in its trade policy  orientation.  
4.376.   Going through  the comprehensive reports by the Russian Government and the WTO 
Secretariat, we have noted the significant contribution from the services sector of the economy 
which accounts for around 62% to the Russian GDP. With regard to the  tariff, Russia maintains the 
average applied MFN rate of 14.6% for the agricultural products while maintain 6.5% for the 
non-agricultural products. The Russian authorities have identified the need of accelerating 
economic reforms, and enhancing market thr ough transparent policies for the goods and services 
with the objective of boosting the investment in the country. A good indicator towards this 
achievement is the higher ranking position Russia maintains in the Global Doing Business Index.  
4.377.   Let me also bri efly reflect on the historical close bilateral r elations between Russia and 
Sri Lanka. The history shows that the formal relations between the two countries started in 1892 
with an establishment of Russian Consulate in Galle, Sri Lanka. The diplomatic rela tions between 
the two countries stared in 1957. Russia is a very important trading partner for Sri Lanka and the WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  strong relationship between the two countries has grown steadily over the time. The value of total 
trade turnover between the two countries has  increased from U S$212 million in 2007 to 
US$436  million in 2015, registering an increase of around 106% compared to 2007. Russia has 
been the single largest buyer of Ceylon Tea for several years.  
4.378.   The two countries have signed bilateral agreements in many areas. The first agreement of 
Economic and Technical Cooperation was signed in 1958, supporting establishment of Sri Lanka 's 
steel cooperation, a flour mill and tyre cooperation. The same year, both countries signed the first 
trade agreement which permitte d the exchange of goods between the two countries. This 
agreement was subsequently updated in 1964, 1975 and 1977. In 1977, another agreement was 
signed by both countries enabling the currency system to be convertible. In the front of the 
cooperation in ed ucation, Sri Lanka has many students who have graduated from Universities in 
the Russian Federation in different fields. In order to further strengthening the close bilateral 
relations between the two countries, an intergovernmental Commission on Trade -Economic and 
Scientific -Technical Cooperation has been established and the first meeting of the Commission was 
held in February this year in Moscow.  
4.379.   My delegation highly appreciates Russia 's continued commitment to the multilateral trading 
system and its acti ve engagement in the negotiations in the WTO. We welcome Russia 's joining 
the Trade Facilitation Agreement on 22 April 2016, becoming the 77th Member to deposit its 
instrument of acceptance of the TFA. The dynamic role played by Ambassador Gennady Ovechko 
and his team in proactively engaging in ongoing activities of the WTO is highly commendable.  
CUBA  
4.380.   The Government of Cuba welcomes Russia 's presentation of its first WTO trade policy 
review report and wishes to highlight this country 's commitment to transpa rency as regards its 
trade policy regime.  
4.381.   As stated in the report, Russia 's accession to the WTO in August 2012 was, I quote, 
"accompanied by fundamental legislative changes that laid solid and predictable foundations in the 
Russian market for all its part icipants, including foreign trade operators ". The incorporation of WTO 
rules into national legislation has thus helped to improve Russia 's international doing business 
ratings. From being ranked 120th in 2012, the country has moved to 51st place in 2016.  
4.382.   In the past four years, this Member 's trade policy has focused predominantly on the 
country 's further integration into the multilateral trading system and the liberalization of its trade 
regime, both in the context of WTO commitments and through regional ec onomic integration.  
4.383.   Despite these achievements, the Russian economy has been in slowdown since the end of 
2012. In 2015 and early 2016 in particular, its development was adversely affected by external 
factors. A deteriorating external economic  environment together with anti -Russian trade sanctions 
have had serious consequences for the Russian economy, including the depreciation of the rouble, 
a decline in the positive trade balance, increased economic uncertainty, and stricter non price 
related lending cond itions. Cuba has always denounced the adverse effects that unilateral coercive 
measures have on States and their populations, and reiterates the need to eliminate such 
measures as soon as possible.  
4.384.   In the first half of 2016, the economic recession slowed d own, which indicated that the 
Russian economy was adjusting to recent external shocks. Moreover, the GDP growth rate is 
expected to rebound in 2017.  
4.385.   The Cuban Government recognizes Russia 's efforts to integrate itself little by little into the 
multilateral  and regional context, and its compliance with WTO rules and principles. We would also 
like to emphasize the excellent state of our bilateral relations, which extend into various spheres, 
not only that of the economy and trade.  
4.386.   We congratulate Russia on it s dynamism within this and other international forums and 
wish it every success in its trade policy review.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  BURUNDI  
4.387.   My delegation associates itself with the statement made by Benin on behalf of the LDCs.  
4.388.   We congratulate Russia on its first trade policy re view since its accession to the WTO in 
2012 and on its ratification of the Trade Facilitation Agreement, and thank it for the important 
information that it has provided on the steps taken in the economic and trade spheres to improve 
the trade and investmen t liberalization climate.  
4.389.   My delegation welcomes the legislative and regulatory reforms undertaken by Russia, 
which are helping to deepen its integration into the multilateral trading system and liberalize its 
trade regime.  
4.390.   Burundi is delighted with the ex cellent ties of friendship and cooperation that have existed 
between our country and the Russian Federation since diplomatic relations were established in 
1962. These relations have given rise to the sig ning of a large number of inter -governmental 
agreemen ts, most notably in the areas of air transport, communications, science and culture, as 
well as in the military sphere.  
4.391.   Our relations have been notably enhanced by the visit to  Burundi in May of 
H.E. Mr M.L. Bogdanov, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of  the Russian Federation and Special 
Presidential Representative for the Middle East. During this visit, Mr Bogdanov and his Burundian 
counterpart agreed to conclude an agreement on the promotion and reciprocal protection of 
investments.  
4.392.   Similarly, a partne rship agreement between the Bank of the Republic of Burundi (BRB) and 
Gazprombank (a Russian bank) was signed in Moscow in June 2 016 during the visit of 
H.E. Mr Joseph Butore, second Vice President of the Republic of Burundi. In this light, my 
delegation w ould like to highlight the need, and express its willingness, to renew cooperation in 
other economic spheres.  
4.393.   My delegation welcomes the Russian Federation 's decision to develop a policy to stabili ze 
consumer prices for the well -being of the population.  
4.394.   My delegation also welcomes the Russian Government 's willingness to take steps to 
improve the investment climate, including by creating conditions for the growth of national and 
foreign investments, with a view to furthering the expansion of international tr ade in a transparent 
manner and enhancing economic competitiveness for all.  
4.395.   Burundi notes that Russia is developing services and infrastructure to support the 
universalization of telecommunications, in particular in rural areas. This includes the building of 
high speed fibre optic networks.  
4.396.   My delegation encourages Russia 's interest in granting preferential treatment to the least 
developed countries by supplementing its provisions with specific preferences benefiting LDC 
service providers.  
KYRGHYZ  REPUBLIC  
4.397.   On 12 August 2015 , the Kyrgyz Repub lic became a full member of the EAEU joining the 
Russian Federation, Armenia, Belarus and Kazakhstan in further regional economic integration. 
Accession to Customs Union has opened wide spectrum of opportunities to the Ky rgyz Republic for 
promotion of Kyrgyz goods and services on markets of Russi an Federation and other member 
States of the EAEU.  
4.398.   The Russian Federation is the strategic partner of the  Kyrgyz Republic. More than 
200 agreements have been concluded between the Kyrgyz Republic and the Russian Federation. In 
2015, the share of the Russian Federation in the Kyrgyz R epublic 's trade turnover was 25%, i.e. 
9.4% of export and 31. 2% of import. Russian business sector and enterprises are widely 
represented on the market of the Kyrgyz Republic.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.399.   Russian investments into the Kyrgyz Republic 's economy demonstrate rising tendency, the 
total volume which , for 2015 , comprised US$1573. 2 million . In order to finance entrepreneurship 
projects , the Kyrgyz -Russian Development Fund wa s established and is functioning with an equity 
capital of US$500 million.  
4.400.   The Kyrgyz Republic supports the efforts undertaken by the Russian Federation on trade 
regime liberalization in accordance with the obligations and WTO rules.  
MYANMAR  
4.401.   First of all,  I would like to extend a warm welcome to the delegation of  the Russian 
Federation and appreciate their comprehensive information on Trade Policy to enhance cooperation 
with international partners.  
4.402.   The Russian Federation became the 156th WTO Member in Augu st 2012. This Trade Policy 
Review is first of its kinds for Russian Federation and has provided an opportunity for member 
states to better understand the economic and trade policies of the Russian Federation.  
4.403.   We welcome this Review and have optimistic on p olitical and economic reforms of the 
Russian Federation.  
4.404.   Myanmar and Russia have established diplomatic relations since 18 February 1948.  
4.405.   According to our record, the bilateral trade between Myanmar and Russia were gradually 
increased. In the 2015 -2016 Fi scal Year, the two -way trade reached over US$28 million . We would 
like to see the continuation of this positive trend to meet the target of bilateral trade between our 
two countries.  
4.406.   In terms of the Foreign Direct Investment in Myanmar, the current volume of investment 
from the Russian Federation is US$ 94 million according to the F DI statistics published in 
June 2016.  
4.407.   In 2014, Myanmar -Russia Trade and Economic Cooperation Commission was held in 
Myanmar and adopted a trade cooperation roadmap. We are looking  forward to hold the Second 
Trade and Economic Cooperation Commission meeting in the near future.  
4.408.   The Russian Federation is an important player of both the regional and multilateral trading 
systems. We are glad to note that the Russian Federation has been supportive of the need to bring 
the current trade negotiations forward, including the DDA negotiations.  
4.409.   The delegation of Myanmar is pleased to convey our sincere thanks and appreciation to 
Mr. Maksim Medvedkov and his delegation for their constructive eng agement throughout this first 
TPR. 
PHILIPPINES  
4.410.   The Philippines would like to associate itself with the ASEAN statement in recognizing 
Russia as  one of ASEAN 's major trading partners.  
4.411.   This year marks the 40th anniversary of the establishment of d iplomatic r elations between 
the Philippines and the Russian Federation. In June 1976, the Philipp ines established its diplomatic 
relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).  Subsequently, robust bilateral 
relations continued, with the Philippines fo rmally recognizing the  Russian Federation in 
December  1991.  
4.412.   Since 1991, the Philippines and the Russian Federation have bee n sharing cordial and 
expanding relations. This was manifeste d through the exchange of high -level officials and 
recognition of initiatives in the field of politics, economics, culture and tourism.  
4.413.   Russia has been an important trading partner of the Phili ppines. Among the top commodity 
exports of the Philippine to Russia include carrageenan, part s of air conditioning machines, ignition WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  wiring sets, and desiccated coconuts. While among the top imports of the Philippines from Russia 
include petroleum oils, semi -finished products of iron or non -alloy steel, and coal.  
4.414.   In November 2015, the Philippines and the Russian Federation have signed an  Agreement  
creating the Philippines -Russia Joint Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation (JCTEC)  at 
the sidelines of the APEC Economic Leaders ' Meeting in Man ila. The JCTEC will serve as an 
overarching framework to facilitate and promote trade and eco nomic cooperation  between the 
Philippines and Russia. The Philippines is in the process of comple ting the executive ratification of 
the Agreement and is in coordination with Russia in identifying  possible topics for the agenda of 
the inaugural JCTEC meetin g. 
4.415.   Russia is one of the largest markets in Europe with a population of over 150 million people. 
Its accession to the WTO in August 2012 marked a landmark in its in tegration into the multilateral 
trading system. This resulted in the implementation of the WT O rules into its national legislation, 
which contributed to improvements in its international ratings. Th e Philippines notes that Russia 
has been annually moving upward in the World Bank 's Doing B usiness rating since 2012. From 
being ranked 120th (out of 1 83) in 2012, Russia has moved up to 51st place (out of 189) in 2016.  
MAURITIUS  
4.416.   Since its accession to the WTO, the Russian Federation has been an active participant in 
the deliberations that shaped the outcomes at various levels at the WTO. This is also vi sible in the 
progress made by the Russian Federation in its wide ranging commitments including tariff 
reductions it made when acceding to the WTO.  
4.417.   Russia is a member of the Information Technology Agreement (ITA), in which Mauritius 
has been an active part icipant.   
4.418.   We are encouraged by the Russian Government 's efforts for improving the doing business 
climate and environment and to efforts for macro -economic stability in the face of international 
constraints.  
4.419.   Mauritius and Russia are exploring ways to impro ve our bilatera l trade and economic 
relations.  Tourist arrivals into Mauritius from Russia have been increasing, thanks to a carefully 
crafted strategy aimed at diversifying our tourism source markets. We look forward to an 
expansion of trade possibilitie s with the Russian Federation. Mauritius has submitted a proposal for 
a Mauritius -Russian Free Trade Agreement. We have also proposed a Double Taxation Avoidance 
Agreement and an Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement. We hope that the Russian 
author ities would extend a favourable consideration to our proposals.  
4.420.   We look to prospect opportunities in the field of industry, given the wide industrial base of 
the Russian Federation, seafood exports, training and capacity building in high technology 
industr ies, assaying and metrology, mutual recognition of educational qualifications.  
VIET  NAM 
4.421.   It is our pleasure to associate ourselves with the ASEAN statement presented by 
Ambassador Mariam Salleh of Malaysia.   
4.422.   It is highlighted in the Secretariat 's report th at the Russian Federation ranks tenth in the 
world economy, with a nominal GDP of around US$1,326 billion in 2015. The ratio of merchandise 
trade (exports and imports) to GDP averaged about 40% during the period 2012 -15. In 2014, the 
Russian Federation ran ked 7th among world merchandise exporters and 11th among importers. It 
is one of the world 's largest manufacturers. The main industries include oil and gas, mining, 
processing precious stones and metals, aircraft building, aerospace production, weapons and  
military machinery manufacture, transport, and agricultural machinery production.  
4.423.   The WTO multilateral trade system has been beneficial to the economic development of all 
members including Russian Federation and Viet Nam. In return, the Russian Federatio n has also 
contributed to the system by its active and constructive engagement. Viet Nam also commends 
the Russian Federation for ratifying the Trade Facilitation Agreement earlier this year.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.424.   In recent years, the bilateral economic relationship between Vie t Nam and Russian 
Federation has a significant increase. The two countries have achieved a number of satisfied 
results in trade, investment and economic cooperation. We appreciate the development of the 
bilateral ties between our two countries which have g one from strength to strength.  
4.425.   The Russian Federation is a  traditional partner and becomes (one of the most) important 
trade partners of Viet Nam in trade and investment. In the first seven months of 2016, The 
amount of two -way tr ade between Viet Nam -Russia reaches US$ 1,56 billion, increased more than 
30% in comparison to which of the same time of last year.  
4.426.   The Russian Federation has 113 existing investment projects in Viet Nam with the total  
registered capital of up to US$2  billion, ranking the 17th out  of 114 investment partners in 
Viet Nam. The Russian Federation directly invests in most of the economic fields from oil and gas 
exploitation to telecommunication, agricultural and fishery processing, infrastructure construction, 
etc. In return, Viet Nam h as 20 existing investment projects in Russia with  the total capital of 
around US$3  billion.  
4.427.   Viet Nam appreciates the outcome of the 19th meeting of the Inter -Governmental 
Committee between Viet Nam and Russia that has been recently conducted this September  2016. 
At the 19th meeting, two sides agree to promote importation of agricultural products, especially to 
accelerate negotiation of a bilateral agreement on food safety for these imported products. The 
remaining issues of differences between two sides wil l be continued to discuss in a bilateral and 
cooperative manner.  
4.428.   Viet Nam would like to appreciate efforts of Russia in development of the Viet Nam -Eurasia 
Economic Union Free Trade Agreement (VN -EAEU FTA) which features Viet Nam, Russia 
Federation, Belar us, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan. Thi s FTA was initiated from 
March,  2013 and after eight official rounds of negotiations and many mid -term meetings, the 
Agreement was signed on 29 May 2015 and will come into force in some days, i.e. from 
5 October  2016. The Agreement includes contents of trade in goods, trade in services, investment, 
customs cooperation, sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), technical barriers to trade (TBT) 
and legal and institutional issues in accordance with regulations of t he World Trade Organisation 
(WTO). The signing of the FTA is regarded as a crucial move to promote the cooperative and boost 
trade and investment for the sake of both sides. When the FTA is implemented, the two -way trade 
turnover will make a new record. Vi et Nam also believes that the FTA would contribute 
considerably to the development of cooperation between the Eurasia Economic Union and other 
nations in ASEAN.  
4.429.   Last but not least, we acknowledge the important role that the Russian Federation plays in 
the multilateral trading system. We look fo rward to enhance the Viet Nam –Russian Federation 
connectivity even further in the year to come.  
4.430.   I would like to conclude this statement by putting on record our high appreciation for the 
contribution to the system by wishing Russian Federation every success in its economic and social 
development and the Russian delegation a fruitful trade policy review.  
GUATEMALA  
4.431.   Diplomatic relations between Guatemala and the Russian Federation were first established 
in 1945 and were r enewed in the 1990s. Since then, trade and cooperation between our countries 
have intensified. This is reflected in the signing of the Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments (APRI) at the end of 2013. This instrument now only n eeds to be 
approved by our legislative body before entering into force. It provides for the establishment of 
rules and standards that will allow for the legal promotion and protection of Guatemalan and 
Russian investments and investors, in each of our terr itories. Following the signing of the APRI, a 
delegation of Guatemalan businessmen organized a successful trade mission to Moscow in the first 
quarter of 2014 to explore business, investment and cooperation opportunities.  
4.432.   The Russian Federation has also fo rged closer ties at regional level, through the 
rapprochement that has taken place within the framework of the Central American Integration 
System (SICA). Last year, the Russian Federation formalized its request to become an extra WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  regional observer of the System. Our countries are also engaged in dialogue on how to establish 
mechanisms to enhance mutual cooperation in areas such as security and the fight against drug 
trafficking, as well as in respect of cultural, economic and trade matters.  
4.433.   Trade relations  between our countries have grown steadily in the last decade. The flow of 
trade in goods amounted to more than US$51 million by the end of 2015, a 400% increase in 
relation to 2005, and mainly involved coffee, fertilizers, tobacco and plastic products.  
4.434.   Foreign direct investment from Russia has also increased considerably in recent years. 
Between 2012 and 2016, Guatemala received more than US$460 million from the Russian 
Federation, which was invested mainly in agriculture, oil, mining and quarrying. It sho uld be noted 
that, in light of the above mentioned rapprochement, there is significant potential for the growth of 
bilateral trade flows and investment.  
4.435.   With regard to the review we are discussing today, we would like to highlight the efforts 
made by the R ussian authorities to increase the efficiency of customs operations by streamlining 
import and export procedures. The launch of a single window and the bringing together of 
information into a single electronic platform will make a significant contribution in this respect. 
Similarly, we believe that internal fiscal and administrative reforms aimed at facilitating the 
understanding of regulations in these areas will have a very positive impact, as will the 
strengthening of the government procurement system to  ensure greater transparency throughout 
the procurement process.  
4.436.   Regarding short term challenges, we believe it is of great importance to continue the 
efforts to privatize State trading enterprises, and to speed up structural reforms, given the major 
contribution that they could make to fostering rapid economic growth.  
PAKISTAN  
4.437.   Prior to the joining of the WTO, the Russian Federation had already embarked on a long 
journey of reforms towards achieving the objective of a market oriented -economy. And since its 
accession in 2012 to the WTO membership, the Russian Federation has started to trade and 
compete at an international level within the multilateral trade systems of the WTO.  
4.438.   During the period under review, the Russian federation was faced with several chall enges, 
and therefore a modest economic growth was achieved during the first three years of period under 
review, and a contraction of 3.5% were registered in 2015.  
4.439.   Within this context, we would like to praise the swift and effective response of the Russian  
Government to overcome the situation by taking appropriate measures such as the introduction of 
fiscal incentives and a substitution programme. These well targeted strategies were implemented 
during 2015 and 2016, and today, forecast for the Russian feder ation predicts a positive growth by 
2017.  
4.440.   During the period under review, we would like to also commend the different reforms 
undertaken by the Government to facilitate trade and investment and to boost competition as well 
as improving its Intellectual Pro perty Rights regime in way of its legislation, administration and 
enforcement. Particularly, we noted with appreciation the ratification of the Trade Facilitation 
Agreement by the Russian Federation in April this year.   
4.441.   From the period of 2015 -2016, the G lobal Competitiveness Index, ranked the Russian 
Federation at 45th place, an improvement of eight places as compared to its previous ranking. 
This demonstrates the important efforts undertaken by the Government to achieve a highly 
competitive economy.    
4.442.   A few words on the bilateral trade between Pakistan and the Russian Federation, the two 
countries have started to actively engage through different initiatives in order to boost bilateral 
trade, given that the current trade volume of US$ 350-400 million does  not reflect the real trade 
potential of both countries.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.443.   During the year 2014 -2015, the two countries held several sessions of Pakistan -Russia 
Inter-Governmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation and the 
fourth session was  held in Islamabad in November 2015. At these sessions, there was a clear 
willingness of the business communities of both countries to increase trade and investment 
opportunities in energy, oil/gas explorations, leather products, pharmaceutics, vegetables and 
fruits.  
4.444.   It is worthwhile to mention that North -South Gas pipeline, which will be a major energy 
artery for our country, is being built by foreign investment from Russia. This is very important for 
meeting our energy security needs. We appreciate this i nvestment and that the Russian federation 
for their assistance and cooperation in that regard. The Project is estimated to cost around 
US$2.5  billion. It will be capable of transporting 1.2 BCFD of gas from Karachi to Lahore via 42 " 
dia 1100 Km pipeline sy stem.  
4.445.   At WTO, we appreciate the active role and engagement of Russian Federation led by 
H.E. Ambassador Mr. Gennady Ovechko and his team in Geneva.  
TAJIKISTAN  
4.446.   Tajikistan and Russia are strategic partners and historically linked by centuries -old 
tradition,  close interaction and deep  interpenetration of cultures. W e have also shared the 
moments of sadness and happiness under one roof of the Soviet Union. Today, Tajikistan and 
Russia have common positions on the majority of conceptual questions of the interna tional and 
regional policy as well as economic integrations.  
4.447.   It should be noted that being a major trading partner Russia over the past few years made 
direct investments in Tajikistan close to  US$1  in industries such as energy, manufacturing, metals 
and mi ning, construction industry, aviation, rail transportation, high technology and agriculture.  
4.448.   We welcome Russia 's efforts and measures to keep its economic stability despite the 
challenges faced like the financial crisis and decrease of oil prices during th e review years which 
has also an impact on economy of Tajikistan.  
4.449.   We compliment the increase in ranking of the doing business and wish Russia to become 
top 20 in this ranking.  
4.450.   We are in a view that the mechanism of TPR is a unique platform to revise the ob ligations 
and take homework from the members to further improve the national trade regime.  
4.451.   We welcome Russia 's commitment to Multilateralism as well as the ratification of the Trade 
Facilitation agreement.  
LAO PDR 
4.452.   Allow me first to commend the Russian Fede ration for its efforts in conducting their first 
TPR exercise.  We appreciate the efforts put in conducting of such comprehensive trade review. 
Your report underlines well that how over the recent years, the business environment and balance 
of payments impr oved despite the economic downturn.  
4.453.   Regarding trade between the Russian Federation and Lao PDR, total merchandise trade 
between the two countries was valued at US$ 16.5 million in 2015 with a largely positive trade 
balance for Russia. Laotian exports to Rus sia consist essentially of articles of apparel, wood and 
footwear, whilst leading imports from Russia are motor vehicles for the transport of goods, unused 
postage and articles of goldsmiths ' or silversmiths ' wares.  In sum, trade in goods between 
Lao PDR a nd the Russian Federation increased by 35.3% in 5 years (from 2011 to 2015) at an 
annual average growth of 6.2%.  
4.454.   With respect to tariffs, we are glad to see that the applied tariff rates are being 
continuously reduced since 2012. Lao PDR benefits from Russ ia's Generalised System of 
Preferences, although we believe that it would be highly beneficial for LDCs to extend the coverage 
of DFQF unilateral preferences, both in terms of covered tariff lines and reduction of rates to zero.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  4.455.   Concerning customs formalit ies, Lao PDR would like to signal Russia 's effort in simplifying 
substantially its customs procedures, which includes a welcomed draft Customs Code, a Single 
Window approach to formalities, a drastic reduction in the number of required documents to 
provide  and a system for automatic goods declaration. Furthermore, we very much appreciate the 
fact that the Russian Federation has deposited on 22  April 2016 the instrument of acceptance of 
the Agreement on Trade Facilitation.  Indeed, a prompt entry into force o f this Agreement is of the 
utmost importance for landlocked developed countries like Lao PDR.  
BELARUS  (OBSERVER ) 
4.456.   This TPR is of particular interest to the Republic of Belarus since the Russian Federation is 
our key economic partner in the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).  
4.457.   The accession of the Russian Federation to the WTO in 2012 was a milestone event 
streamlining international  trade in our region in compliance with the world 's best practices. The 
Russian membership also had an important WTO -consistency impact  on the integration process 
within  the EAEU.  
4.458.   It should be recognized that Russia has achieved progress over the last four years in the 
implementation of its WTO commitments. As a result, the average weighted customs tariff was 
decreased  to the level of roughly 6%. Belarus supported fulfilment of the Russian Federation 's 
WTO commitments by adopting the necessary changes to the Single Customs Tariff of the EAEU.  
4.459.   Russia rendered its support to the trade liberalization initiatives, like Trade Facilitation 
Agreement, and consistently promoted the central role of the WTO in various international fora. 
These developments confirm  Russia 's commitment to the multilateral trading system.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  5  REPLIES BY THE REPRE SENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATI ON AND ADD ITIONAL 
COMMENTS  
5.1.  Please allow me to start with my words of appreciation for interventions of those developed 
and developing Members, who gave their positive assessment of Russia 's fulfilment  of its WTO 
commitments.  
5.2.  In your statements we felt sincere suppor t of the Membership for Russia 's efforts to stabilize 
and improve economic situation and we are thankful for your positive reactions to the anti -crisis 
measures carried out by our Government and the Central Bank.  
5.3.  We were also very pleased to receive high e valuation of Russia 's role as a devoted supporter 
of the rules -based multilateral trading system and an active participant in most WTO processes. 
Please be assured that Russia will do its best to continue playing an active and constructive role in 
all area s of the WTO activity.  
5.4.  It was also a pleasure for us to hear warm and well deserved words in respect of Russia 's 
notification discipline, in particular, in agricultural sector. We feel it is especially important because 
this positive assessment that comes from the M embers who are well -known for their role as the 
guardians of the WTO principles and rules.  
5.5.  Our special thanks go to our EAEU neighbo urs: Armenia, Bela rus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan  
who expressed their firm stance and commitment to continue to eng age in our joint efforts on 
building and maintaining fully WTO -compatible trade regime of our Eurasian Economic Union.  
5.6.  We thank Members for their detailed and insightful questions on Russia 's trade regime. 
Indeed, you brought our attention to some elements  of our WTO commitments which were beyond 
the main focus of our implementation work within the TPR period. Your fair (even sometimes 
negative) assessment of some trade -policy measures helped us to get a fuller picture of the 
priorities of the Members regar ding Russia 's implementatio n of the WTO commitments. This will 
enable us to structure and streamline our policies to make our work more effective . 
5.7.  This is the first TPR of the Russian Federation. It is held in the course of the transitional 
period of imple mentation of our commitments in the WTO amidst accommodation of Russia 's trade 
regime and trade policy to the WTO environment.  
5.8.  Thus, it is no surprise that some Members point at (and in our view sometimes exaggerate) 
the issues which, as they believe, show  certain deficiencies in Russia  fulfilling its commitments. 
They claim lack of predictability in doing business in Russia  ignoring the fact that Russia 's ranking 
in the World bank 's Doing Business index moved from 112th to 51st during 4 years upon 
accessio n. They claim that import substitution policies are not in line with the objectives and 
principles of the WTO, ignoring the fact that these policies are currently implemented only within 
the framework of governmental procurement system, which is o utside Ru ssia WTO commitments.  
5.9.  At the same time , a great number of delegations estimate that the implementation process is 
on the right path, and, with due attention and engagement of the Russian authorities, the issues 
which are on the agenda of this TPR  will be s uccessfully solved. The argument of those Members – 
that maintaining open and transparent trade regime will contribute to the prompt recovery of the 
Russian economy – is an important message for us.  
5.10.   We also took note of an argument put forward by the deleg ation of Mexico in its statement: 
that politics should not interfere with trade. Interestingly enough though: the statements of those 
Members who most actively resort to politics in their trade relations with Russia were the most 
critical ones.  
5.11.   For the sak e of accuracy , let me remind you that those Members initiated economic and 
financial restrictions, directly proclaiming economic isolation of Russia and weakening of its 
economy as their primary goal. Those measures added to economic recession. The imports  
slumped (as well as exports from Russia, by the way). And now it 's Russia who gets  all the blame 
for that. This is just not fair.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  5.12.   And it 's our feeling that we are not alone in that estimate. Most other Members share our 
view and, as we heard here on Wedn esday, are looking forward to develop mutually beneficial 
trade and investment relations with Russia. I would like to underline that Russia is open for 
cooperation with all interested economies.  
5.13.   Now let me move to answering some of the major trade -related concerns expressed by the 
Members on the first day of our TPR.  
Areas of competence of the EAEU  
5.14.   The competence of the Eurasian Economic Union is established by the Treaty on the 
Eurasian Economic Union signed  29 May 2014 and international treaties in the f ramework of the 
Union. Supranational competence of the Union covers the following main areas: import tariff rates, 
tariff preferences, tariff -rate quotas, non -tariff measures (e.g. import or export restrictions, import 
licensing), trade remedy investigatio ns and imposition of trade remedy measures, customs 
regulation, technical regulation and SPS measures, competition an d antitrust regulation on 
cross-border markets. In these areas , the Eurasian Economic Commission is empowered to take 
decisions that have d irect effect on the Member States of the Union.  
Transparency of the EAEU  
5.15.   Both draft and adopted decisions are published on the Internet portal of the Union within 
the time limits that ensure legal certainty and meet reasonable expectations of persons whose  
rights and/or obligations may be affected by these regulatory legal acts, but in any case before 
their effective dates (entry into force). Draft regulatory acts shall b e generally published within 
30 calendar days before the date of their adoption. Public ations of draft decisions include 
explanation of the purpose of their adoption. Moreover, the decisions that might affect 
environment or business activity in the Union are subject to prior regulatory impact assessment.  
Transparency in trade remedy investi gations  
5.16.   The trade remedy practice of the Union is fully transparent. Notices regarding trade remedy 
investigations are published on the official website of the Eurasian Economic Commission. Each 
participant of the investigation may also apply for access to  full electronic non -confidential record 
of the investigation through the website.  
5.17.   Public notices are also forwarded by an investigating authority (i.e. Department for Internal 
Market Defence, or DIMD) to the competent authority of the exporting third cou ntry and other 
interested parties known to the investigating authority.  
EAEU Compliance with WTO Commitments  
5.18.   Given the competence of the EAEU in some trade policy issues certain commitments taken 
by the Russian Federation, as well as by other EAEU members  during their WTO accessions are 
being implemented through the decisions taken by the EAEU bodies.  
5.19.   Conformity of the Union 's legal framework and the decisions taken by the Union with the 
relevant WTO Agreements is ensured by the Treaty on the Functioning o f the Customs Union in the 
Framework of the Multilateral Trading System,  which was  signed on 19 May 2011.  
5.20.   The Treaty on the Functioning of the Customs Union in the Framework of the Multilateral 
Trading System , signed on 19 May 2011,  ensures conformity of the law and practice of the 
Eurasian Economic Union ( "EAEU ") with regard to application of trade measures, including trade 
defense measures with the relevant WTO Agreements. This treaty imposes an obligation on 
Unions ' bodies to effectively implement WTO c ommitments of its Members.  
Import substitution  
5.21.   One of our big trading partners believes that Russia started import substitution immediately 
after its WTO accession.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  5.22.   In fact, we started seriously considering this policy two years later, after this big tradi ng 
partner of ours introduced restrictive measures on trade and economic cooperation with Russia. It 
was a response to external threats, which limited our access to money and technologies, and 
threatened to spread into other imports and even exports.  
5.23.   Import substitution in Russia means creation of competitive domestic production rather than 
elimination of foreign products from domestic market. For instance, with respect to industrial 
policy , the key objectives are the development of innovative, high techno logy, environmentally 
friendly industrial production, stimulation of scientific research, efficient use of financial, labo ur 
and environmental resource.  
5.24.   It is based not on administrative preferences but on creation of favo urable institutional and 
macroeco nomic conditions for the development of domestic enterprises – our future world market 
champions. In this sense , this policy is very much different from usual import substitution policies 
applied wide ly 10-20 years ago by many WTO M embers.  
5.25.   Only in the area  of government procurement, where Russia has no WTO commitment in this 
area, we restricted procurement of some goods from abroad.   
5.26.   In August 2016 , we informed Members about our intention to join GPA, and we will proceed 
with submitting an offer. Naturally , successful completion of these negotiations m ay influence 
these  restrictions.  
5.27.   In agriculture, import substitution is also considered to be within the framework of food 
security concept. Respective strategies never aim at achieving a 100 % share of domesti c products 
in internal consumption and allow for substantial share for imports. All this is in line with our WTO 
commitments.  
5.28.   In addition, the Russian legislation does not provide for any preferences to domestic 
agriculture producers.  
5.29.   It is also worth men tioning that  we take appropriate measures to secure consistency of all 
our import substitution policies with WTO rules. In case of deviations, like preferences for investors 
in automotive sector, such deviations are justified by our negot iated accession ob ligations.  
Fossil fuel subsidies  
5.30.   This is a new trade issue for us, and I fear we may have different views  in respect of our 
policies in the energy sector. We have not registered any internal subsidies in respect of fossil 
fuels, as they are defined in the WTO Agreement. Duties for oil export decreased in parallel with 
an increase of natural resources extraction tax. In respect of gas, current export duty is in line 
with our WTO commitments, and we consider it not as a subsidy but as a fiscal instrument.  
5.31.   In this context , on Wednesday , some M embers brought up our dual pr icing for gas. Like 
many other M embers, we do consider dual pricing fully WTO consistent. Nevertheless, our 
Government decided to gradually approximate incomes from domestic and export sales of  gas for 
industrial users. It 's not a secret that energy consumption in Russia per 1 GDP unit is higher than 
for instance, in France by 4.8 times and Italy by 5.6 times. We acknowledge this problem and will 
continue to work on its solutions.  
Customs  
5.32.   On Wed nesday , many WTO Members appreciated recent developments in simplification of 
Russian customs formalities revealing common positive attitude to our Customs ' performance in 
this area. The Russian Customs works in close cooperation with international experts  assessing 
cross border operations and procedures according to the indices of doing business ranking. It is 
highly welcomed that the approach and the methods applied by these experts are being more and 
more refined with consideration to implementation of s tringent indicators set to Customs by the 
Government and various logisti cal and infrastructure aspects.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  5.33.   I would like to note that Russia and its EAEU Partners efficiently coordinate common 
customs policy through the Union legislation in order to harmonize and simplify customs 
procedures, including in the areas of customs valuation, rules of origin, classification and customs 
tariff.  
5.34.   The new revised Customs Code of the EAEU is expected to come into force in 2017. It will 
focus among other areas on simplified  customs operations and procedures, namely  
 implementa tion of a Single Window concept;   
 priority of electronic declaration;  
 further reduction of goods release time; and  
 submission of declarations without supporting documents.  
5.35.   Our Federal Customs Service h as already de facto implemented a number of many 
important decisions based on international standards to facilitate foreign trade at the national 
level. To mention some of them, a single electronic environment for EDI purposes between 
Customs and other Age ncies is established, 99 % of all customs declarations are filed electronically, 
and the number of documents required for customs control and goods release time is significantly 
reduced in accordance with target indicators set and monitored by the Governmen t.  
SPS 
5.36.   We share the interest to the issues raised by the Members and are aware of the effect of 
SPS measures on trade.  
5.37.   As a WTO M ember, in applying its SPS measures , the Russian Federation adheres to the 
standards, guidelines and recommendations of the C odex Alimentarius Commision, World 
Organization for Animal Health and the International Plant Protection Convention.  
5.38.   We are ensuring harmonization of the SPS legislation with the relevant international 
standards both on the EAEU level and at the national level. Harmonization is still an on -going 
process. To give you some examples: pesticides, veterinary drugs, antibiotics and MRLs are 
harmonized at the EAEU level. At the national level , we adopted amendments to the Federal Law 
on veteri nary concerning regi onalization  and introduced electronic certification and traceability.  
5.39.   The Russian Federation treats with due diligence all concerns raised by the WTO Members 
within the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. We aim at resolving them on 
bilatera l basis using different instruments. Together with our trading partners we are open to hold 
bilateral meetings and consultations. Sometimes they end positively removing a Member 's 
concern. Some issues may need further attention as the risk for human, anima ls' and plants ' lives 
and health underlying a particular measure still persists.  
5.40.   I reiterate that our SPS measures are justified and applied to protect human, animal and 
plant life or health in accordance with transparency principle. In response to specifi c SPS issues 
raised during the TPR and repeated at the meeting, we have provided  detailed answers in writing.  
Lack of predictability of doing business  
5.41.   I would like to make exemption  from the rule not to react to M embers ' specific comments 
because of a rath er critical nature of the statements made by two particular  Members.  
5.42.   One M ember raised some points concerning negative trends in bilateral economic relations. 
Let us all be clear, all me asures by Russia affecting the trade with that M ember were taken in 
response to that M ember 's own actions and are of a reciprocal and defensive nature.  
5.43.   As we explicitly laid out in our responses to advance questions, the beginning of declin e in 
bilateral trade with that M ember is related to t he measures implemented by the M ember as a 
result of its alignment with restrictions i ntroduced by some other WTO M embers.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  5.44.   It is worth mentioning that following this course of trade restrictive action , the M ember went 
much further than those other WTO Members,  thus causing great harm to us. The fact is that the 
Russian economy is also affected by this undesirable decrease of bilateral trade.  
5.45.   Another aggravating factor was the M ember 's decision to suspend implementation of the 
trade -related arrangements within the CIS in the course of the implementation of its FTA with the 
European Union.  
5.46.   This is a "lose-lose" situation and we tried our utmost to address it through various channels 
and formats, including trilateral consultation mechanism. Up to now, all our efforts turned out to 
be in vai n. 
Non-implementation of tariff commitments  
5.47.   This issue was hig hlighted by many M embers and deserves immediate reaction. Indeed, we 
really had a few problems with implementation of bound rates upon our accession. We achieved 
compliance well before panel  proceedings on request of the c omplaining Member. We still need to 
adjust applied tariffs in respect of five tariff lines of paper products. Please note also t hat the panel 
decided that the c omplaining Member – and I quote – "failed to establish its claims  of 
inconsistency with GATT Article 2.1.a) and b) because it did not demonstrate the existence of the 
systematic duty variation by Russia ".  
State -owned and state trading enterprises  
5.48.   We certainly recognize the importance of this issue. In fact, SOEs may be le ss effective and 
less commercially successful compared to private companies. That is why it is important to secure 
proper legal framework, establishing same rules for all companies irrespective of their ownership. 
That was done in Russia 10 years ago, and state-owned and private companies compete in Russia 
on equal footing in almost all sectors including banking and energy.  
5.49.   What is also important, we allow foreign investors to participate in capital of all major SOEs, 
including Gazprom in the energy sector and Sberbank in the banking sector . 
5.50.   Like other countries, we plan to gradually privatize some of our SOEs, including in the 
energy sector. The G overnment is interested to get a fair price, which can be a bit of a challenge 
these days, taking into account t he drastic depreciation of the national currency.  
5.51.   And I very much doubt that our situation in respect of SOEs role in economy is specific to 
Russia. In a number of developed WTO Members in Europe SOEs control 100 % of the energy 
sector. As for Russia, this  figure is much lower, depending on the type of energy produced. In 
top-2000 Forbes list of major world enterprises , about 20 % are state owned. This means that the 
problem is not in the ownership but in the terms of the operation. This is a different issue , and we 
would certainly be ready to deal with it.   
5.52.   The time limit for my statement does not allow me to give detailed responses to all the 
issues raised by the Members within this TPR. Nevertheless, I would like to underline that our 
delegation will addr ess the rest of them in our written responses and stands ready to discuss them 
further in any appropriate format.  
5.53.   In conclusion, I would like to thank Hono urable Ms. Irene Young for her brilliant conduct of 
this meeting, Ambassador Vitalis for his fair and  extremely competen t contribution, Mr. Alfaro, 
Mr. Milthorp, Mr. Finn, Mr. Barba, Mr. Marinov and all Secretariat 's team for their hard and highly 
professional work on this TPR, and again all Members for their valuable engagement and 
cooperation.  
DISCUSSAN T 
Introduction  
5.54.   On the day that the Russian Federation became the 157th member of the World Trade 
Organiz ation, then WTO Director -General Pascal Lamy observed that WTO membership was a WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  priority for Russia and the wider membership because "trade can bring a predictable and st able 
basis for economic growth ". He added that "joining the WTO is a sign of confidence in the 
organization and in what it can deliver for its members. "21 It is worth recalling those words as we 
reflect back on this, the first Trade Policy  Review of the Russian Federation, since its accession four 
years ago.  
5.55.   A key signal of the spirit in which this process would be undertaken was included in Russia 's 
opening statement on 28 Sept ember. This emphasiz ed its express commitment to use the TPR t o 
"listen and to learn. " In short, there is a shared understanding about the value of this Trade Policy 
Review process – it is to inform and help shape trade policy thinking.  
5.56.   This is an important point. After all, the purpose of the Trade Policy Review Me chanism 
(TPRM) is not to assess whether a particular trade policy is WTO compatible, i.e. whether it is 
'legal' or not. As the Chair reminded the Membership on 28 September in her opening remarks and 
as Annex 3 to the Marrakesh Agreement makes similarly cl ear, the TPRM is explicitly not intended 
to serve as a basis for the enforcement of obligations under WTO Agreements, nor is it to be used 
for dispute -settlement purposes.22 Rather, the objective of the TPRM is "to enable a multilateral 
assessment of the ef fects of policies on the world trading system. "23 This is an important 
distinction and has informed my approach – as an economist - to the role of Discussant in this 
review process.  
5.57.   It is against this background that I have drawn three specific conclusions  from this TPR. 
These are based on listening closely to the exchanges during the review process itself as well as 
reviewing the written answers Russia has submitted to date:  
1. Membership matters : Russia 's membership of the WTO has been a benefit to it and th e 
wider membership, not least when one considers the alternative;  
2. Progress positive since 2012, but more is needed : Taken together, progress since 
2012 in terms of Russia 's Protocol of Accession has been, on balance, positive but there 
remains a considerab le amount of work to be done; and  
3. Being WTO consistent is not necessarily the same as having a good trade policy: 
Some measures that Russia is currently using may not necessarily contravene its WTO 
obligations. The more pertinent question in terms of the W TO's Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism is, however, whether those measures are in fact (a) good trade policy; and (b) 
how they impact on the multilateral trading system.  
5.58.   As a factual matter, I want to make clear that this last point is not unique to Russia 's TPR. It 
has featured in other recent TPRs and that has not been conducive to the kind of exchange we 
should be having in this format. This is a matter that Members may wish to reflect on, including in 
the context of the actual purpose of this important mec hanism for WTO transparency.  
5.59.   With the above three conclusions in mind, the following clusters a number of particular 
observations as follows:  
 General Comments;  
 Structural issues;  
 Sectoral issues; and  
 Systemic issues.  
5.60.   Please note that in the interests of t ime I have not covered every issue raised by Members 
through this review. Rather, I have sought to identify those matters where there appeared to be 
particular insights to be gained in policy terms which Russia might find most useful in terms of its 
own co nsideration of further reforms.  
                                                
 21 https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres12_e/pr671_ e.htm  accessed on 28  September 2016.  
22 See the full text at: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/29 -tprm_e.htm  accessed on 
29 September 2016.  
23 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm11_e.htm  accessed on 
29 September  2016.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  General Observations  
5.61.   This TPR has reaffirmed that the Russian Federation remains a significant actor in both trade 
and economic terms. Many Members in their own assessments underlined the value of WTO 
accession both to the Russian Federation, but  also to themselves and to the "health " of the 
multilateral trading system. The unhappy period prior to accession was recalled by many Members, 
noting – and in some cases enumerating - the substantive improvements since then. Others 
underlined the need for more effort by Russia to fully realiz e the benefits of WTO membership.  
Trade and Structural Issues  
5.62.   It is noteworthy that Russia and many Members in their interventions during the TPR 
process highlighted the structural challenges tha t Russia has faced following its recovery from the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008 -09. Many of you also highlighted that by 2013 those initial 
improvements that Russia made were and remain ed at risk.   
5.63.   Many Members suggested that this emerging risk w as a consequence in part  of two factors - 
the declining oil price and the impositi on of bi -directional sanctions.  I do not necessarily concur 
with the implication that these are the only reason for the challenges that Russia is facing.  
5.64.   The contraction rat es in GDP since 2012 which many Members explicitly noted reflect in my 
view a rather different set of structural difficulties. Comparing the movement underway in Russia 's 
exports and imports since 2012 is instructive. By way of a concrete example, in 2012 Russia 's 
exports (fob) were worth nearly US$535 billion. By 2015, these had declined to US$344 billion. 
Compounding this shift has been the decline in imports, from US$316.2 billion in 2012 to 
US$182.8 billion last year.  
5.65.   These contractions are structural.  They cannot be adequately explained only by the 
combination of collapsing oil prices and bi -directional sanctions. Rather, the impact of both has 
been compounded by slow -moving structural reforms, declines in trade flows; diminishing levels of 
investment across the economy, regulation that is hampering business growth and innovation, 
alongside increased state intervention. It is these factors, rather more than falling oil prices and 
bi-directional sanctions which are hampering Russia 's ability to achieve i ts own stated trade policy 
objectives.  
5.66.   More directly, Members appeared to broadl y concur that immediately post -accession, 
Russia 's trade policies were heading in the right direction.24 Many contrasted, for instance, the 
situation at the Russian border befo re accession with the post -accession period, noting the decline 
in tariffs and uncertainty, even if several of you also identified ongoing difficulties, in some cases 
serious ones.  
5.67.   In terms of specific structural recommendations, many Members encouraged R ussia to 
transition to ad valorem tariff rates exclusively, rather than th e mixed approach which is utiliz ed in 
some parts of Russia 's Schedule of Commitments. It is clear that such a transition would deliver 
both transparency and efficiency, while providi ng benefits to domestic producers and consumers.   
5.68.   The following three broad elements – the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU); the World 
Bank's 'ease of doing business ' index; and Russia 's shift to import substitution policies  - emerged 
as particular areas of  interest in structural terms from the exchanges on 28 September.  
The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)  
5.69.   The Eurasian Economic Union was of particular interest to Members. Almost all Members 
referred to this evolving body and I expect therefore that this will be a particular focus for the next 
review when the EAEU will be much more firmly embedded as a core element in Russia 's trade 
policy -making process.  
                                                
24 https://www.wto.org/english /news_e/news11_e/acc_rus_10nov11_e.htm  accessed on 
17 September  2016.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  5.70.   It was interesting to note too that all of the members of the EAEU, including Belarus wh ich 
of course is n ot yet a WTO M ember, underlined their expectation during this TPR that the EAEU 
would be an important catalyst for trade growth over time – a perspective that is more widely 
shared as well.25 That said, many Members underlined the need for the EAEU and Russ ia to make 
more progress more quickly in clarifying where specific competencies lie, as well as to enhance 
trade facilitation procedures within the bloc and for third partners. Russia 's written responses to 
questions in this regard are worth reading very carefully in this context. It is clear too that Belarus ' 
membership of the WTO would further intensify integration of this body into the multilateral 
trading system.  
Ease of Doing Business  
5.71.   Almost every Member who took the floor referred in positive terms t o Russia 's rapid move 
through the rankings in the World Bank 's Ease of Doing Business index. Russia was encouraged to 
work on further improvements to ensure that its own formal policy objective of reaching and 
staying in the top twenty can be achieved.26 To state the obvious, in trade policy terms, improving 
the way companies can do business in Russia will have positive structural effects including to drive 
trade and investment flows.  
Import Substitution and Trade Policy  
5.72.   Arguably the policy measure which at tracted the greatest interest from Members was 
Russia 's establishment in August 2015 of a Governmental Commission on Import Substitution.27  
5.73.   The written question and answer process and the statements delivered on 28 September are 
worth reading on this parti cular policy measure. Several questions queried the WTO compatibility 
of the measure. As several Members made clear during the exchanges on 28 September, while 
Russia is of course entitled to use all WTO -consistent policy options, it should be seeking the least 
trade distortive ones, not least to promote its own economic recovery. Moreover, while Members 
may be reassured by assertions that the measure is WTO -consistent, the actual questions for this 
TPR must be, as I noted in my introduction: (a) is it good  trade policy? and (b) what is its impact 
on the multilateral trading system?  
5.74.   The response to both questions in terms of import substitution is, in my view, 
straightforward. I have not heard in the exchanges during this TPR, nor read in the written 
respons es a persuasive economic, let alone trade policy rationale for this measure.  
5.75.   Import substitution is a policy that was a staple of the 1960 -1980s, including in my own 
country. Such policies retard trade and competition, thereby having a chilling effect on domestic 
innovation. In New  Zealand 's case one cannot even say that the results of import substitution were 
mixed. They set back by a decade the development of New  Zealand 's manufacturing and 
agricultural sectors. If the history of such measures in other M embers is any guide – and several 
other Members referred to their own negative experiences - there is also a serious political 
economy risk. This is that such import substitution will create its own domestic constituency who 
will have a vested interest in retaining the mechanism to preserve their 'rents'. This risks 
subverting the stated purpose of Russia 's tade policy which is to provide "temporary " relief given 
the challenging economic circumstances it finds itself in.  
5.76.   As to the impact of Russia 's import  substitution policy on the multilateral trading system, 
many Members have observed that their working assumption remains that this will be negative, 
not least given the economic influence Russia exerts in its immediate region and beyond. Russia is 
encoura ged therefore to reflect on these assessments and the international experience of others as 
it considers the way forward with this policy.  
                                                
25 See for instance: F. G Carneiro (2013) What Promise does the Eurasian Customs Union Hold for the 
Future? The Economic Premise, World Bank, Washington, February, Number 108  
26 See in pa rticular: Government of the Russian Federation Number 467 -r of 29 March 2013 which 
included a specific objective of moving from its then 120th ranking to 20th by 2018.  
27 Government of the Russian Federation Resolution Number 758 of 4 August 2015.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  5.77.   In the meantime, formal confirmation from Russia that this policy instrument is indeed a 
temporary measure will be a welcome signal for Members. It will also be  important for the next 
TPR to "check -in" on the evolution or abolition of this newly established instrument of trade policy.  
Sectoral Issues  
5.78.   Many Members raised questions about a range of sectoral policies such a s those in place in 
the automotive, manufacturing, fisheries and agricultural sector, including in terms of their impact 
on the multilateral trading system. Concerns were expressed, for instance, by many Members 
about the apparent absence of science -based risk assessment for SPS -related measures.  
5.79.   In some cases , it may be too early to fully assess the impact of particular policies both on 
Russia and on the wider multilateral trading system. That said, several Members indicated  concern 
about the direction of  travel for policies in particular sectors. Others have outlined in some detail 
the immediate and negative effect of some measures and these will need to be urgently addressed 
by Russia.  
5.80.   In fact, the initial indications in a number of sectors appear to be  discouraging, both from 
the perspective of Russia 's own stated trade policy priorities, as well as the likely impact on the 
multilateral trading system. I note in this regard particularly the comments by Members regarding, 
for instance, the impact of subs idies to vessel construction in the fisheries sector, as well as 
questions about the potential for policies aimed at supporting manufacturing in general and the 
automotive sector in particular. There is a perception that some of these may have trade distor ting 
impacts beyond Russia 's borders.  
5.81.   Taken together, it will be important for the next Trade Policy Review to reflect – with the 
benefit of a more meaningful time series data set - on what progress has been made and what 
needs to be done to ensure that t he full competitiveness of specific sectors can be realised.  
5.82.   In terms of notifications, many Members encouraged Russia to ensure that it complies with 
its transparency obligations. Ten such notifications in specific sectors of the WTO 's work are now 
overd ue. Russia 's assurances that it intends to meet its obligations in this regard are welcomed 
and Members will  no doubt  look forward to considering these in the appropriate regular bodies.  
5.83.   In the meantime, and from the perspective of notifications for both agricultural domestic 
support and export subsidies, several Members commended Russia for being one of only four 
Developed Members that is up to date in these areas.28  
Systemic Issues: Preferential Trade Agreements; Fossil Fuel Subsidies; and the Ongoing 
Post-Nairobi Negotiations  
5.84.   As in previous TPRs , Members have identified a number of systemic issues of ongoing 
interest and in this respect, this TPR was no different.  
Preferential Trade Agreements  
5.85.   In their statements on 28 September, many Members expressed considerable interest in 
Russia and the EAEU 's approach to preferential trade agreements. A particular avenue of inquiry 
was how specifically such agreements will support the multilateral trading system. Several 
Members also encouraged Russia to ensure qua lity and comprehensivity in any negotiated 
outcomes, noting that this would send an important signal about Russia 's long term trade policy 
perspective. Russia 's reassurances in this regard were welcomed, as indeed were Vie t Nam 's which 
is the first WTO M ember to conclude an agreement with Russia and the EAEU. Advice about the 
ratification and implementation of this new agreement was also appreciated and Members will look 
forward to hearing more details about this in line with the existing transparency requi rements.  
                                                
28 The ot hers are Australia, New  Zealand and Norway ( JOB/AG/80 refers).  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  Trade and Fossil Fuel Subsidies  
5.86.   Given  that Russia has the second largest reserve base of coal and is the second largest 
producer of fossil fuels more generally, it was not surprising that several Members referenced the 
need for Russia to consider  reforms of its subsidies for fossil fuels.  In terms of specific policy 
suggestions, Russia was encouraged to join other G20 and WTO Members in participating in a peer 
review of its policies in support of fossil fuels with a view to further reform. The con tribution this 
would make to achieving UNSDG 12 was also highlighted.  
Post-Nairobi Negotiations  
5.87.   Russia 's strong commitment to the ongoing negotiations post -Nairobi was referenced in its 
opening statement, as well as in a number of its written responses to questions. This was warmly 
welcomed.  
5.88.   Members will also have taken careful note of Russia 's comment about the role of Article XII 
Members. Russia observed that the contributions made by those (Article XII) Membe rs to 
"advancing trade liberaliz ation" should  be taken into account in any negotiation. Russia also made 
clear that "Article XII membership should not by itself mean endles s shelter from further 
liberaliz ation commitments. We, thus expect of other Article XII partners to continue to be 
responsible WT O Members making their further contribution to r eaching the goals of the 
Organiz ation".29 
Conclusion  
5.89.   Taken together, the reforms codified in the Russian Federation 's Protocol of Accession were 
significant and far -reaching. The Secretariat 's report combined with Members ' written questions 
and Russia 's answers as well as the exchanges on 28 September during the formal TPR chart the 
progress that the Russian Federation has made, both in the immediate aftermath of its accession 
to 2014 and – if rather more slowl y - thereafter. It is also clear from this TPR that more needs to 
be done and, in some cases, in an intensified manner if the full benefit o f WTO membership is to 
be realiz ed, both by Russia and by the multilateral trading system.  
5.90.   As Members are well aware , however, securing the benefits of WTO membership and 
ongoing economic and trade -related reform is far from automatic. The greatest positive welfare 
effects accrue to Members that demonstrate a sustained commitment to domestic economic pol icy 
reform which  is well organiz ed and implemented coherently. The period ahead in Russia therefore 
needs to be viewed as an opportunity to use the WTO accession to help transform its domestic 
economy into a genuinely competitive and innovative one.  
5.91.   In my introductory co mments , I observed that I had drawn three conclusions from this 
Trade Policy Review. These were that:  
1. WTO membership matters;  
2. Russia 's progress since 2012 has been, on balance, positive, but there are some risks 
emerging and certain serious issues have b een identified since 2014 that require urgent 
attention.  
3. Being WTO consistent is not necessarily the same as having a sound trade policy. In the 
context of the TPR process, the test of a policy should not be its legality – that should be a 
given. Instead it should be whether it is sound economic or trade policy; and how the 
measure may impact on the multilateral trading system.   
5.92.   Finally, it is to be hoped that addressing many of the constructive questions Members have 
posed through this Trade Policy Revie w process, including the focus on structural, sectoral and 
systemic issues can help shape and inform domestic economic reform in Russia over the coming 
period. In this way, the TPR will have measurably assisted in delivering on the promise enunciated 
by th en Director -General Pascal Lamy when he welcomed Russia 's accession to the WTO 
                                                
29 See for instance, Russia's Written Response to a Written Question from Oman. A similar point was 
included in Russia's Opening Statement to the TPR on 28 September, 2016.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  suggesting that it would deliver "a predictable and s table basis for economic growth ".30 In this 
context , therefore , the next and second TPR of the Russian Federation will be a c rucially important 
check -point for progress both for Russia and for the multilateral trading system.  
UKRAINE  
5.93.   Ukraine is highly affected by the Rus sian Federation 's trade policy.  As Members know well, 
our traders and our economy have been very negatively i mpacted by a series of restrictive trade 
measures implemented by the Russian Federation during the past several years.  
5.94.   Ukraine has posed a number of questions concerning trade and transit restrictions, technical 
regulations, SPS measures, customs requirem ents, domestic support, and anti -dumping measures, 
among other policy areas.  
5.95.   The TPR provides an opportunity to exchange information to improve the functioning of the 
multilateral trading system.  
5.96.   Unfortunately, the Russian Federation 's inadequate and ofte n dismissive responses have 
disappointed again. In this context, we would like to make five reflections based on its answers or 
lack thereof.   
5.97.   First, the Russian Federation conducts a highly politicized trade policy. It uses trade as a 
punishment tool.  
5.98.   Second, WTO Members should not refuse to be responsive to partners ' concerns and 
requests as the Russian Federation has repeatedly done.  
5.99.   For example, we refer Members to the Russian Federation 's non -answer to our questions 
regarding import prohibitions. As we have noted over the past several months and years, an 
increasingly long list of Ukrainian goods are simply blocked from entry into the Russian Federation 
without adequate justification.  
5.100.    Or, there is the longstanding trend of the Russian Federation 's use of SPS measures to 
block or slow many Members ' trade. Unfortunately, the same approach is increasingly applied in 
terms of TBT measures as well.   
5.101.   Third, there is also a very worrisome subtext about the Russian Federation 's unilateral 
interpretation of W TO rules to suit its needs.  
5.102.   There is not one set of rules for the Russian Federation and one set of rules for th e rest of 
us. We refer Members to the Russian Federation 's views on FTAs as justification for imposing 
retaliatory trade measures as just one e xample.  
5.103.   Fourth, the imposition of transit measures blocking our trade to third countries is a new 
dimension to the Russ ian Federation 's trade policy. While the rest of the WTO is hailing the utility 
of the Trade Facilitation Agreement, the Russian Federati on is actively moving in the entirely 
opposite direction, by systematically blocking trade and trade in transit . This should be a concern 
to all.  
5.104.   Finally, our fifth systemic concern relates to the Russian Federation and the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EAEU).  
5.105.   WTO Members have been trying to pin down how EAEU authorities and law overlap and 
interplay with Russian authorities and national la w since Russia 's WTO accession.  Unfortunately, 
the Russian Federation 's answers continue to fog this critical issue.  
5.106.   The Ru ssian Federation failed to answer several basic questions about how the EAEU 
formulates, decides, and imple ments specific trade policies. This is basic transparency that would 
be req uired of any other WTO Member.  
                                                
 30 https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres12_e/pr671_e.htm  accessed on 28 September 2016.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  5.107.   Customs Unions are not meant to establish a n impermeable trade wall within which Russia 
can control international trade for its own purposes. Indeed, WTO rules allow customs unions only 
when they are overall trade liberalizing.  
5.108.   Increasingly , it seems that the Russian Federation uses C ustoms Union structures and 
rules to exercise Russia 's political trade policy and to keep the markets of other EAEU countries 
captive for Russian suppliers.   
5.109.   We truly appreciate the work that the Secretariat, other WTO Members and you Chair do to 
work through and analyse these critical issues.  It is a rare moment when the wider trading 
community focuses on the details that we, unfortunately, face as a normal matter of business on a 
daily basis.  
UNITED  STATES  
5.110.   We wish to speak briefly today, first to thank Mr. Medvedkov and the Russian Federation 
delegation for their constructive p articipation in this first TPR.  It has been good to see many 
familiar faces back in Geneva - congratulations to you all on accomplishing this impor tant "rite of 
passage " for WTO M embers.   
5.111.   For all of the hard work and coordination required by a TPR, the United States consistently 
finds this exercise to be helpful for us during our biennial reviews. As we 've heard just now from 
Ambassador Vitalis, it 's good to hear the views of other Members, to l earn of their interests and 
concerns, and to be reminded of the value of transpar ency and constructive scrutiny.  We hope that 
our Russian colleagues will leave this process wi th similar impressions.  
5.112.   We thank Max and his team for the thought that went into preparing the statem ent we 
have heard this morning.  The Russian delegation has clearly listened carefully during this review, 
and we appreciate the reflections offered in response, even if we may not agree with all of the m, 
such as import substitution.  We welcome the reflections by Ambassador Vitalis as to consideration 
of what is go od trade policy.   
5.113.   Again, we thank the Russian Federation for providing written answers to our questions. 
Most of the answers were helpful, althoug h some were rather perfunctory . In any case, these 
written exchanges will give us a basis for ongoing discussion in the context of our  relationship here 
at the WTO. We have submitted a few follow -up questions, and will appreciate replies wi thin the 
established timelines.  
5.114.   It has been pa rticularly interesting for us to participate in this TPR and to observe some 
common themes, both from Member statements and the views of our very able Discussant . 
5.115.   Clearly , the large number of Members who participated actively in this TPR reflects the 
wides pread interest in  Russia and its trade policies.  This is to be expected, especially for an 
economy of Russia 's significance. It has struck us that this interest is also very much connected to 
some common threads of concern with regard to Russia 's trade pol icies and how some of those 
policies relate to the commitments Russia undertook in becoming a Member.  
5.116.   As I've mentioned, we 've taken particular note of apparent broad concern with respect to 
policies that appear to be driven by moti vations of import substi tution.  We expect to follow up on 
some of these concerns through the ac tivity of other WTO committees.  
5.117.   We also have noticed common themes of concern in this room regarding fossil fuel 
subsidies, questionable imposition of additional sanitary/phytosanitary measures, restrictions on 
transit, inadequate protection of intellectual property rights, and an unpr edictable investment 
climate.  We've heard from Director Medvedkov this morning on all of t hese issues, which is 
helpful. Clearly , we need to look for ways to maintain an ongoing dialogue on these and other 
issues.   
5.118.   In closing, let me again say thanks to our Russian colleagues for their serious approach to 
this important process, and to wish safe travels to those returning to Moscow.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  EUROPEAN  UNION  
5.119.   We welcom e the Russian delegation, led by Mr. Maxim Medvedkov, back to the second day 
of the 1st Trade Policy Review of the Russian Federation.  
5.120.   As you have noted, the EU pays very close attention to the trade related policies of the 
Russian Federation. And this sho uld be of no surprise: the EU is the most important trading 
partner of the Russian Federation and a source of significant flows and stocks of foreign direct 
investments.  
5.121.   This is a trade policy review - not trade "politics " review; so I will abstain from c ommenting 
on the Russian delegation 's remarks about sanctions.  
5.122.   We fully share the remarks by the Discussant that we are here not to assess the legality of 
Russia 's trade measures, but rather whether these measures make good trade policy. We invite 
Russia to respect the letter and spirit of the WTO agreements. We should all make efforts to devise 
good trade policies, rather than to construct legally viable bad trade policies.  
5.123.   We have expressed our assessment of the first four years of Russia 's WTO membersh ip 
already quite clearly on the first day of this review. In doing so, we are convinced that a relevant 
and straightforward feedback from both sides on how we see the trading policies of the Russian 
Federation can substantially contribute to a positive dev elopment of our mutual trading relations. 
That was also the reason why we highlighted some very real problems to our Russian partners 
from our perspective.  
5.124.   It is worth noting that a number of issues raised in the EU statement were mentioned by 
several othe r WTO M embers as well, indicating that the EU perception of Russia 's trade related 
policies is in line with those of  other important trading partners. Therefore, we sincerely hope that 
these messages can help improving Russia 's trade and economic policies back in the capital.  
5.125.   The Russian Federation is an important player in the WTO system; it has demonstrated a 
good record of agriculture related notifications and constructive participation in the Trade 
Facilitation Agreement negotiations. EU is of the opini on that a policy of economic opening and 
trade liberalization, together with consistent implementation of WTO rules, are the most effective 
tools to achieve a full and sustained economic recovery, after an uneasy period of recession.  
5.126.   We would like to than k the Russian Federation for its efforts in answering our 114 advance 
questions and their contribution to this exercise. However, after an analysis conducted quickly by 
the EU, we regret to note that some Russia 's replies are still missing the point. On so me occasions 
we have even noticed considerable divergences between the information provided in the replies 
and the actual situation occurred.  
5.127.   Therefore the EU would strongly urge the Russian Federation to provide more detailed 
information in number of are as, notably on subjects such as:  
 Import substitution policies – for example in the car sector where you can have subsidies if 
you have an agreement with the ministry that imports are related to an "industrial assembly 
mode ". However, there is no definition  of what that is and the outcome is that smaller 
foreign operators who do not buy parts in the local market are discriminated against. 
Furthermore, we would like to recall - in reaction to the statement of Russian Federation just 
now – that the import subs titution policy was already there before the accession to the 
WTO. In this context, we once again the share the remarks of the Discussant that import 
substitution policies remain bad in the short and long term;  
 
 The actions and role of some STEs – while we  can agree that state ownership is not 
necessarily a negative factor, the state behaviour and regulatory environment certainly are;  
 
 EAEU – the EU fully supports regional integration that is outward looking and a imed at 
increasing and liberaliz ing trade, however, this has not been the case recently;  
 WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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   Customs documentation and procedures – we note with interest that Russia will adopt a new 
Customs Code next year that will include some important TFA provisions and look forward to 
its implementation;  
 
 Compl iance of some measures to the SPS Agreement – the interpretation of the spirit and 
letter of the rules governing SPS measures clearly differs among some Members. For 
example, in relation with the export ban on fishery products of some EU Member States 
Russia stated that – and I quote – "the EU competent authorities were duly informed, 
preliminary consultations were held on the identified violations, and the competent 
authorities were alerted on possible temporary restrictions if these violations would not b e 
eliminated. So the exporting countries had possibility to take corrective measures, but they 
did not use a chance ". However, this was hardly the case. The Russian Federation audit to 
relevant enterprises took place 17 -23 May 2015; on 25th of May Rosselho znadzor published 
information about the audit. On 3rd of June, the relevant office in the EU was informed by 
phone that all imports of fisheries products from that particular EU Member were suspended. 
We would invite the Russian Federation to address SPS r elated issues in a much less trade 
disruptive matter.  
 
 Business environment – Russian Federation should feature much higher in the Ease of Doing 
Business ranking. The fact that it has lost trade with most of major trading partners, clearly 
indicates that there remains more to be done. Legal certainty and predictability is of utmost 
importance as demonstrated also by the issue of tariffs on paper products that was a 
negotiation issue before the accession, became an implementation issue immediately after 
it, and still continues to be a problem;  
 
 Regulatory practices and standards.  
5.128.   To that effect we have submitted several follow -up questions on those and other issues 
and we would expect the Russian Federation to deliver satisfactory replies and provide necess ary 
details within the established timeframe after this meeting.  
5.129.   To conclude, the EU wishes to thank the Russian Federation for its committed and helpful 
participation in this important transparency exercise. We look forward to the next TPR and hope to 
see improvements and more positive developments on the ground.  
IRAN  (OBSERVER)  
5.130.   The Russian Federation became the 156th WTO Member in August  2012 after a long 
process of negotiation on accession during which it could make an impressive reform in its legal 
regime to be able to comply with the WTO obligations. It could also make significant economic 
reforms particularly in liberalizing market a nd creating diversified market -driven economy.  
5.131.   The Russian Fede ration has become the 77th WTO M ember to ratify the new Trade 
Facilitation Agreement (TFA). The Russian Federation 's Minister o f Economic Development, 
H.E Mr. Alexey Ulyukaev, met with Director -General H.E Mr.  Roberto Azevêdo on 22 April and 
presented his country 's TFA instrument of acceptance.  
5.132.   The Islamic R epublic of Iran commends Russia 's establishing a single window as a pivotal  
part of TFA and believes that s uch an important move opens u p a new horizon for the country 's 
trade policy sound and adopted with WTO rules.  
5.133.   The volume of Tehran -Moscow trade transac tions has increased considerably since 
20 March this year, and the number of visas issued for tourists and businessmen have also 
increased by 100 %. Iran and Russia have also boosted their trade transactions by 70 % over the 
past six months in the current ye ar. 
5.134.   Signing different documents between the two countries, especially in the trade and 
economic fields, and also setting up Russia 's 5-billion -dollar credit line that has als o been approved 
by the Iranian P arliament shows the two countries ' serious determi nation to develop their 
relations. Referring to the agreements, reached between Iran and Russia in the 12th Iran -Russia 
Joint Economic Cooperation Commission session, the two sides expressed their readiness for WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  development of all -out ties. Therefore , the Russian Federation remains a key partner in our total 
trade.  
5.135.   In spite of adversely affecting developments in recent years, causing hurdles and leading 
into oil price slump and devaluation of the Rouble and decrease in trade wi th some countries, the 
Russian Government responded appropriately utilizing an anti -crises plan aimed at stabilizin g the 
banking sector, a fiscal stimulus, switching  to a floating exchange rate regime, and introducing an 
import substit ution programme. As per to the IMF report, the Russi an Federation is on a 
stabilization course.   
5.136.   Finally, it is believed that Russia , with great potentials in its economy, enjoying highly 
educated population, vast resources of oil and gas among others, can deal with economic 
challenges and meet WTO rules a nd regulations specially through the acceleration of economic 
reforms aiming at enhancing competition in goods  and services markets, improving property 
rights, and revamping transport and telecommunications  infrastructure to improve the business  
climate an d boost investment.  WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  6  CONCLUDING REMARKS B Y THE CHAIRPERSON  
6.1.  This is the first Trade Policy Review of the Russian Federation since its accession in 2012. 
Therefore, as some delegations have pointed out, it is the first opportunity for Members to learn 
about developments in the Russian Federation 's economic and trade policies since then, and to 
review the country 's participation in the multilateral trading system as a Member of the WTO.  
6.2.  During this 2 -day meeting, we have had a useful discussion, thanks to the contributions from 
the head of the Russian delegation, Mr. Maxim Medvedkov, Head of the Department for Trade 
Negotiations of the Ministry of Economic Development; our discussant, Ambassador Vangelis 
Vitalis from New Zealand; and also the 53 delegations tha t have taken  the floor.  
6.3.  This Review took place at a time when the Russian Federation faced a challenging economic 
environment. While the sharp decrease in GDP might had stabilized and growth was expected to 
resume next year, the recovery seemed slow and mo dest. During the discussion, Members noted 
that the fall in oil prices, the sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation by some countries, and 
the counter measures taken by the Russian Federation were among the main reasons for the 
contraction in the econo my. There were ongoing structural reforms to diversify the economy and 
reduce reliance on hydrocarbons. However, several delegations stated that more could be done, 
given the high level of education, excellence in technology, and the wide range of resource s 
available in the Russian Federation.  
6.4.  Members had a frank exchange on how Russia 's trade policies could best be oriented to make 
a difference. More specifically, several Members noted that the Government 's response to the 
economic crisis had focused on th ree principal measures, namely: a fiscal stimulus; the floating of 
the Rouble by the Central Bank; and import substitution. While the first two were viewed 
favourably in general, some delegations questioned how the third could align with the basic 
principl es of the WTO. They pointed out that policies based on this objective would undermine 
trade liberalization efforts and discourage competition, which would be detrimental to sustainable 
economic growth.  
6.5.  From the trade policy perspective, this is also an int eresting time for a review, because the 
expanding roles of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Eurasian Economic Commission mean 
that many policies and practices are now decided and applied at a regional rather than national 
level. Examples include the com mon external tariff, the development of a new customs code, 
negotiation of free trade agreements, and the investigations and application of contingency 
measures. During this Review, many Members sought further information on the policies of the 
Union and t he legal competence of the Commission.  
6.6.  Commenting on its participation in the WTO, most delegations acknowledged that  the Russia n 
Federation  was an active Member, and had made significant contribution to multilateral 
negotiations. Many highlighted the con siderable progress that  the Russia n Federation  had made in 
liberalizing its trade regime both before and after accession to the WTO. The Russian Federation 
was commended in particular for its ratification of the Trade Facilitation Agreement, tariff 
reducti ons, simplification of customs procedures, participation in the Information Technology 
Agreement, as well as improvement to its intellectual property legislation.  
6.7.  As noted by many delegations, these reforms had helped the Russian Federation move up 
quickl y in the World Bank 's Ease of Doing Business index. In addition, the country was recognized 
for having met many of its notification requirements, and indeed for being one of the only four 
developed country Members that had updated its notifications on dome stic support and export 
subsidies for agriculture. However, several notifications were still outstanding, including those on 
state-trading enterprises.  
6.8.  Some Members expressed concern about the local content requirements that  the Russia n 
Federation  applied  to its government procurement and state -owned enterprises. These 
requirements could be particularly trade distorting, given that the state was heavily involved in the 
economy through the companies that it owned and controlled, which altogether represented  over 
half of the country 's GDP and dominated key sectors such as banking, transport and energy. Many 
Members suggested that better governance of these companies, restarting the stalled privatization WT/TPR/M/345 • Russian Federation  
 
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  programme, along with accession to the WTO Government Pr ocurement Agreement could help 
improve transparency, reduce distortions and stimulate growth.  
6.9.  Several delegations were particularly concerned about the Russian Federation 's use of SPS 
and TBT measures that were apparently not based on international standar ds, as doing so had 
created considerable trade barriers for them. Furthermore, they were concerned about restrictions 
on import to the Russian Federation and on the transit of goods through the Russian Federation to 
other countries, which had greatly reduc ed trade. They were of the view that the lack of 
transparency and predictability in the administration of these measures had posed additional 
difficulties for their traders.  
6.10.   Many other issues were raised during our discussion, including fossil fuel subsidi es, fisheries 
subsidies, use of contingency measures, efforts in fighting corruption, the use of non -ad valorem  
tariffs, and incentives conditional on strict localization requirements.  
6.11.   The Russian delegation has taken this  opportunity to explain its econom ic strategies and 
foreign trade policies. It had also responded in detail to Members ' comments in the key areas. It 
acknowledged the systemic trade and economic challenges that the country was facing, and found 
solutions in export diversification, developm ent of domestic high -tech industries and of small and 
medium -sized enterprises, as well as exploring new opportunities in foreign markets for trade and 
investment.  
6.12.   The delegation affirmed the Russian Federation 's strong support for the multilateral trading  
system and its adherence to WTO rules. It also underlined the country 's determination to continue 
playing an active and constructive ro le in all areas of WTO activity.  The Russian Federation looked 
forward to developing mutually beneficial trade and inves tment relations with other WTO 
Members.  
6.13.   Overall, the active participation of Members during these  two sessions and the large number 
of advance written questions were testimony to the importance of this exercise and of Members ' 
interest in the Russian Feder ation's trade policies. This Trade Policy Review will be completed 
within the next month when the Russian Federation has replied to all outstanding questions.  
6.14.   Although the Russian Federation is facing a challenging economic environment, it also has 
many ad vantages in minerals, hydrocarbons, agriculture, forestry, fishing, and, most importantly, 
human resources. I  very much  hope that an open and transparent trade and investment regime, 
reinforced by good policies based on WTO principles, commitments and rule s, would help the 
Russian Federation diversify its economy and maximize its growth potentials.  
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