RESTRICTED  
  
G/ADP/M/53  
 
25 January 2018  
(18-0612) Page: 1/17 
Committee on Anti -Dumping Practices  Original: English  
 
 
MINUTES OF THE REGUL AR MEETING  
HELD ON 25 OCTOBER 2 017 
CHAIR: MR FAISAL SAUD SULAIMAN  AL-NABHANI  (OMAN)  
1.  The Committee on Anti -Dumping Practices (the "Committee ") held a regular meeting on 
25 October  2017.  
2.  The Committee adopted the following agenda contained in document WTO/AIR/ADP/17:  
1   NATIONAL LEGISLATION ................................ ................................ .............................  2 
1.1   Review of notifications of new or amended legislation or regulations not previously 
reviewed by the Committee (including supplemental notifications of exist ing provisions 
not previously reviewed)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 2 
1.1.1    European Union ( G/ADP/N/1/EU/3/Suppl.1 ) ................................ ................................ . 2 
1.1.2    India (G/ADP/N/1/IND/2/Suppl.8 -G/SCM/N/1/IND/2/Suppl.8) ................................ ........  2 
1.1.3    New Zealand (G/ADP/N/1/NZL/2/Suppl.6/Rev.1 -
G/SCM/N/1/NZL/2/Suppl.6/Rev.1)  ................................ ................................ ........................  2 
1.2   Review  of notifications of new or amended legislation or regulations with 
outstanding written questions  ................................ ................................ ...............................  3 
1.2.1    Cameroon (G/ADP/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1 -G/SCM/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1 -
G/SG/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 3 
1.2.2    El Salvador (G/ADP/N/1/SLV/3/Suppl.1 -G/SCM/N/1 /SLV/3/Suppl.1 -
G/SG/N/1/SLV/3/Suppl.1)  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 3 
1.2.3    European Union (G/ADP/N/1/EU/3)  ................................ ................................ .............  3 
2   SEMI -ANNUAL REPORTS OF AN TI-DUMPING ACTIONS (ART ICLE 16.4) 
(G/ADP/N/300) ................................ ................................ ................................ ...............  4 
3   PRELIMINARY AND FINA L ANTI -DUMPING ACTIONS: NOT IFICATIONS  ....................  13 
4   CHAIRPERSON'S REPORT  ON THE MEETING OF THE INFOR MAL GROUP ON 
ANTI -CIRCUMVENTION  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 14 
5   CHAIRPERSON'S REPORT  ON THE MEETING OF TH E WORKING GROUP ON 
IMPLEMENTA TION  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........  14 
6   EUROPEAN UNION – DRAFT AMENDMENTS TO THE BASIC ANTI -DUMPING 
REGULATION CONCERNIN G METHODOLOGIES OF N ORMAL VALUE 
DETERM INATION – ITEM REQUESTED BY TH E RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ...........................  15 
7   OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 17 
8   DATE OF THE NEXT REG ULAR MEETING  ................................ ................................ ..... 17 
9   ANNUAL REPORT TO THE  COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN  GOODS (ARTICLE 18.6)  ..............  17 
 G/ADP/M/53  
 
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  1  NATIONAL LEGISLATION  
1.1  Review of notifications of new or am ended legislation or regulations not previously 
reviewed by the Committee (including supplemental notifications of existing provisions 
not previously reviewed)1 
1.1.1   European Union ( G/ADP/N/1/EU/3/Suppl.1 ) 
3.  No written questions were posed regarding the notificat ion of the European Union ( "EU"). 
4.  The EU explained that the issue had been discussed at the previous meeting and referred 
Members to the document  submitted.  
1.1.2   India ( G/ADP/N/1/IND/2/Suppl.8 -G/SCM/N/1/ IND/2/Suppl.8 ) 
5.  Written questions regarding this notification were posed and can be found in the following 
documents:  
 G/ADP/Q1/IND/26 -G/SCM/Q 1/IND/26 – Submitted by Ukraine  
 G/ADP/Q1/IND/27 -G/SCM/Q 1/IND/27  – Submitted by Mexico  
 
6.  Ukraine was concerned with subparagraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of paragraph 8 of Ind ia's Customs 
Tariff Rules, which contained the presumption of "non-market economy treatment " that could be 
invoked against any country, allowing the use of "surrogate country information " for determining 
normal value. Ukraine cited the provisions of the in terpretive note ad Article VI of GATT 1994 and 
asked India to clarify how its legislation was consistent with WTO rules.  
7.  In response to Ukraine, India referred to Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti -dumping ( "AD") Agreement. 
In India 's view, in order to establish that the exporter 's accounts reasonably reflected the costs 
associated with the product, it was necessary to determine that market forces were in place for the 
particular exporter under investigation. India confirmed that its legislation was based on WTO 
principles.  
8.   In response to both Mexico  and Ukraine , India confirmed that written answers to their 
questions would be available shortly.  
1.1.3   New Zealand ( G/ADP/N/1/NZL/2/Suppl.6/Rev.1 -
G/SCM/N/1/NZL/2/Suppl.6/Rev.1 ) 
9.  Written questions regarding this notification were posed and can be found in the following 
documents:  
 G/ADP/Q1/ NZL/3 -G/SCM/Q1/NZL/3 – Submitted by the United States ( "US") 
 G/ADP/Q1/ NZL/4 -G/SCM/Q1/NZL/4 – Submitted by Australia  
 
10.  New Zealand  provided oral explanations in response to the questions posed and confirmed 
that written answers would be available shortly.  
11.  The US requested Members to carefully consider the inclusion of web links into notifications 
instead of the text of the relevant r egulations. The US pointed out that web links could be updated, 
taken down for IT maintenance, or archived, and that this could be detrimental to transparency.  
12.  The Committee took note  of the notifications, statements, questions and answers.  
 
                                                
1 Relevant deadlines for written follow -up questions and written answers regarding the notifications of 
legislation reviewed in the October 2017 meeting can be found in section 1 of document G/ADP/W/500 -
G/SCM/W/574 -G/SG/W/242.  G/ADP/M/53  
 
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  1.2  Review of noti fications of new or amended legislation or regulations with 
outstanding written questions  
1.2.1   Cameroon ( G/ADP/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1 -G/SCM/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1 -
G/SG/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1 ) 
13.  Written questions were posed regarding this notification and can be found in docume nt: 
 G/ADP/Q1/CMR/3 -G/SCM/Q1/CMR/3 -G/SG/Q1/CMR/3 – Submitted by the US  
14.  Cameroon was not present at the time . Oral answers were not provided at the meeting, 
nor had written answers been received to date.  
1.2.2   El Salvador ( G/ADP/N/1/SLV/3/Suppl.1 -G/SCM/N/1/SLV/3/S uppl.1 -
G/SG/N/1/SLV/3/Suppl.1 ) 
15.  Written questions were posed regarding this notification and can be found in the following 
documents:  
 G/ADP/Q1/SLV/8 -G/SCM/Q1/SLV/8 -G/SG/Q1/SLV/7 – Submitted by the US  
 G/ADP/Q1/SLV/9 -G/SCM/Q1/SLV/9 -G/SG/Q1/SLV/8 – Submitted b y Mexico  
16.  El Salvador was not present at the time . Oral answers were not provided at the meeting 
nor had written answers been received to date.  
1.2.3   European Union (G/ADP/N/1/EU/3)  
17.  Written questions were posed regarding this notification and can be found in the following 
documents:  
 G/ADP/Q1/EU/1 -G/SCM/Q1/EU/1 – Submitted by the US  
 G/ADP/Q1/EU/2 -G/SCM/Q1/EU/2 – Submitted by the Russian Federation  
18.  Written answers were provided and can be found in documents:  
 G/ADP/Q1/EU/3 -G/SCM/Q1/EU/3 – Replies to the Russian Federation  
 G/ADP/Q1/EU/4 -G/SCM/Q1/EU/4 – Replies to the US  
19.  The EU provided clarifications about its notification, noting that it related to the codification of 
previously notified laws and regulations. The codification was the sole reason for the publicati on in 
the EU Official Journal and there had been no substantial change to the text of the Regulation.  
20.  The Russian Federation  asked the EU to clarify whether it had intended to give a single reply 
to all of the questions posed in writing or if it planned to  provide detailed responses to each of the 
six questions posed.  
21.  The EU confirmed that the reply given was the only one it had intended to provide, as the 
legislation had been thoroughly reviewed by the Committee and the notification in question only 
referr ed to the codified version of an existing law.  
22.  The Chair indicated that with respect to the agenda item pertaining to continuing review of 
legislative notifications previously reviewed by the Committee, no Member submitted – by 
11 September 2017 deadline - any written questions relating to such notifications. Thus the item 
entitled "National Legislation – Continuing Review of Legislative Notifications Previously 
Reviewed by the Committee " was not on the agenda of the Committee 's October meeting.  G/ADP/M/53  
 
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  23.  The Chair informed Members that pursuant to the Committee 's agreed procedures in order for 
a new legislative notification to be placed on the agenda of the April meeting of the Committee, 
the notification should be circulated in all three languages by 12 March 2018 . Shortly after this 
date, the Secretariat will circulate a document informing Members of all legislative notifications to 
be reviewed at the next Committee meeting in April 2018.  
24.  The Chair reminded Members that pursuant to paragraph 8 of document G/ADP/W/ 284/Rev.1, 
all unanswered written questions pertaining to new legislative notifications reviewed at the 
meeting, as well as the subject notifications, shall automatically be retained on the agenda of the 
next Committee meeting and on the agendas of subsequ ent Committee meetings until written 
answers are submitted.  
25.  The Chair noted that a new legislative notification from Liberia , as well as any others 
received and circulated by the applicable deadlines2, would be on the agenda for review at the 
regular meeti ng of the Committee in April 2018.  
26.  The Chair expressed concern that some Members had yet to submit a notification on 
legislation, particularly where all that would be required is a nil notification. He encouraged 
Members that had not yet made a legislative  notification to do so as promptly as possible.  
27.  Concerning the revised list of competent authorities contained in document 
G/ADP/N/14/Add.44, the Chair invited Members that had not done so to submit the information 
required by Article 16.5 of the AD Agreem ent, and encouraged Members to review and update 
previously submitted information where necessary.  
28.  The US appreciated the fact that most Members had submitted a notification with their 
domestic AD legislation or a one -time nil notification. However, some countries which had not 
provided a notification of their legislative status had indicated in the context of their trade policy 
review reports that they had AD laws in effect. In other words, the respective WTO  Members had 
already gone to the effort of info rming the WTO of their AD legislation status, albeit in another 
forum. The US, therefore, encouraged Members to review their respective situations and to make 
the appropriate notification promptly.  
29.  The Committee took note  of the notifications, statements,  questions and answers.  
2  SEMI -ANNUAL REPORTS OF AN TI-DUMPING ACTIONS (ART ICLE 16.4) 
(G/ADP/N/300)  
30.  The Chair  recalled that a request for submission of semi -annual reports for the first half 
of 2017 had been circulated in document G/ADP/N/300. Members taking no AD actions should 
submit a simple letter to that effect twice per year. This would not apply to those Members that 
had already submitted a one -time notification under Articles 16.4 and 16.5 of the AD  Agreement.  
31.  He noted that a significant number of Mem bers had not yet responded to the request for 
semi-annual reports. This notification requirement applied to all Members, whether or not they had 
taken AD  actions during the period in question, except for the 47 Members that had already 
submitted a one -time notification.3 The Chair urged Members to comply with this important 
notification requirement.  
32.  Japan  demonstrated the frequent use of AD measures in recent years. The number of 
measures imposed was 181 and 163 in 2015 and 2016, respectively. Japan acknowl edged that in 
these years AD measures were used by a wide variety of Members, including both traditional and 
new AD users. It suggested that this had been caused by an oversupply in steel, aluminium and 
some other major industries, mainly among emerging ec onomies, due to the expansion of 
production capacities that might not necessarily follow an economic rationale. Japan observed that 
AD measures taken by Members tended to be prolonged against the backdrop of overcapacity. 
In the case of AD measures against  Japanese products, 25 measures continued to be applied after 
10 years. While Japan recognized the need to address the overcapacity problems, it was 
                                                
2 Relevant deadlines can be fo und in section 1 of document G/ADP/W/500 -G/SCM/W/574 -G/SG/W/242.  
3 All such notifications are contained in the G/ADP/N/193 series of documents.  G/ADP/M/53  
 
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  nevertheless concerned with the situation. It requested Members to ensure that their 
investigations satisfi ed the requirements of the AD  Agreement.  
33.  The Committee reviewed the semi -annual reports for the first half of 2017. No Member raised 
questions or made comments concerning the reports of Armenia; Australia; the Member States of 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kingdom of; Kuwait, the State of; Oman; Saudi Arabia, 
Kingdom of; Qatar and United Arab Emirates, "GCC"); Chile; Colombia; Costa  Rica; Egypt; 
El Salvador; Indonesia; Japan; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyz Republic; Malaysia; New  Zealand; Peru; 
Philippines; So uth Africa; Chinese Taipei; Thailand; and Viet Nam.  
34.  On the semi -annual report of Brazil , the Russian Federation  expressed its deep concern 
in relation to an AD investigation on hot -rolled steel. As it followed  from the disclosure of 
19 June 2017, the Brazi lian investigating authority ( "IA") determined the dumping margin for the 
Russian producer that had participated in the investigation on the basis of facts available at the 
level of almost 56%. The Russian producer cooperated with the Brazilian IA in good faith, provided 
the requested information and facilitated a verification visit. The Russian Federation believed that 
the Brazilian IA had a sufficient subset of verifiable data that could have been used without undue 
difficulties. Brazil resorted to facts available due to minor discrepancies in the reported data on 
domestic sales that had been unveiled during the verification visit. These discrepancies accounted 
for less than 1% of the reported sales volume. The producer did not intend to withhold any 
information, and clearly explained the reasons that forced it to do so. However, the Brazilian IA 
deemed the exporter non -cooperative and disregarded all of its information. The 
Russian  Federation was of the view that Brazil breached Article 6.8 of the AD Agree ment and 
paragraphs  3.5 and 7 of its Annex II. These concerns were communicated to the Brazilian Mission, 
and the Russian Federation was grateful for the bilateral engagement regarding the issue. The 
Russian Federation called on Brazil to reconsider its fi ndings, taking due account of the information 
provided by the Russian exporter.  
35.  Turkey  referred to the sunset review of a measure on polyethylene terephthalate ( "PET") films 
initiated on 24 February 2017. Bearing in mind the low quantities of PET film expo rts to Brazil 
during the period of review, Turkey was of the view that the extension of AD duty ( "ADD") was no 
longer necessary and its revocation would not likely lead to continuation or recurrence of material 
injury and dumping. Turkey requested Brazil t o repeal the ADDs in question as soon as possible.  
36.  In response to the Russian Federation, Brazil  clarified that at the time of initiation of the 
investigation the Brazilian IA  notified all interested parties about the information it requested. The 
parties received questionnaires and had an opportunity to submit evidence in order to defend their 
interests. The Brazilian IA calculated the normal value for the exporter in question on the basis of 
facts available for two reasons . First, during the verification the IA discovered sales  of the like 
product that the exporter had failed to report in its questionnaire response, allegedly because they 
pertained to steel sold for military use. Because of secrecy, the company had also failed to classify 
the product type.  After the issuance of the verification report, the IA notified the company of the 
application of facts available. In response, the company alleged that the product in question was 
outside of the scope of the investigation. However, the Russian company fai led to provide any 
corresponding proof. Brazil emphasized that the problem in this case was not the secrecy, but the 
fact that the exporter had not provided the information to the Brazilian IA. Second, the company 
also failed to report other sales in the d omestic market and submitted incomplete cost of 
production information. Brazil explained that it applied facts available to the calculation of normal 
value, while it accepted the company 's data for the calculation of export price. Brazil also applied 
the "lesser duty " rule with respect to the Russian exporter. In Brazil 's view, the IA fully recognized 
the attempt of the Russian exporter to cooperate.  
37.  In response to Turkey, Brazil stated that the sunset review in question pertained to a measure 
originally in troduced in 2012 and that it was ongoing. Brazil invited Turkey to submit comments 
before 8 November 2017 so that the Brazilian IA could formally consider them. Brazil confirmed 
that it would comply with the relevant obligations under Article 11.3 of the A D Agreement. It 
reminded Turkey that low quantities of imports during the period of review were not sufficient to 
conclude that likelihood of recurrence of dumping did not exist.  
38.  On the semi -annual report of Canada,  Lao People 's Democratic Republic  ("Lao P DR") raised 
concern in relation to the investigation on silicon metal. Lao PDR  questioned the consistency of 
Canada 's decision to initiate the investigation with Articles 5.2(iii) and 5.3 of the AD Agreement.  G/ADP/M/53  
 
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  Lao PDR  explained that the complainants in this  case constructed normal values for Lao - and 
Malaysian -originating products based on costs of production in Thailand. L ao PDR  contended that 
the use of constructed normal value information in applications should be limited to specific 
circumstances and sho uld be subsidiary to the use of domestic prices. In addition, Lao PDR  
claimed that the Canadian IA did not conduct a proper examination of the accuracy and adequacy 
of the evidence in the application as it simply endorsed the applicant 's approach to estima ting 
production costs, general, selling and administrative expenses , financial expenses and amounts for 
profits, without providing an adequate and reasoned explanation. Finally, Lao PDR  believed that in 
light of Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement , Canada should have terminated the investigation in 
respect of Lao -originating product  due to insufficient evidence.  Lao PDR was open to bilateral 
consultations with Canada on the matter . 
39.  Kazakhstan  raised additional concerns in relation to the same investigation.  In making its final 
determination on dumping with respect to Kazakhstan, the Canadian IA did not take into account a 
number of factors that could have seriously affected the decision. As regards Kazakhstan, it did 
not take into account the specifics of pr oduction management and legislation, the legal basis 
underlying the companies ' documentation and other information provided by the Government of 
Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan was ready to provide  additional information in connection with the 
investigation and req uested Canada to take into account these inputs when making its final 
decision.   
40.  In response to Lao PDR, Canada  stated that its IA had initiated the investigation upon receipt 
of a properly documented complaint that contained information reasonably availab le to the 
applicant on the elements required by the AD Agreement. The Canadian IA thoroughly examined 
complaints to determine whether there was adequate and sufficient evidence to justify the 
initiation of an investigation. This examination included valida ting the information in the complaint 
and conducting an internal analysis of Canada 's import data and other available information. In the 
instant case, the Canadian IA determined that the product had been dumped and that there was 
reasonable indication tha t dumped imports had caused or threatened to cause material injury to 
the Canadian industry. Canada was open to pursuing bilateral discussions with both Lao PDR and 
Kazakhstan as regards their comments.  
41.  On the semi -annual report of China , Korea, Republic of referred to the initiation of an 
AD investigation on styrene monomers in June 2017. Korea requested that the Chinese IA ensure 
a fair and objective investigation in accordance  with the AD Agreement. Korea cautioned against a 
result that might cause seri ous damage to its manufacturers and to Chinese companies with high 
demand for the product . 
42.  China  stated that it initiated cases in accordance with the AD Agreement. The Chinese IA 
would carefully look into information submitted during the investigation, pr ovide opportunities for 
parties to submit comments and take those comments into account when making its preliminary 
and final determinations.  
43.  On the semi -annual report of the Dominican Republic , Turkey  referred to the continued 
application of an AD measure  on steel reinforcing bar since 2011. The Dominican Republic applied 
a uniform ADD of 14%  to all Turkish products  despite having calculated a  negative dumping for 
one of the cooperating firms. Turkey stated that by applying the ADD in this form the Dominic an 
Republic  breached numerous provisions of the AD Agreement. Turkey considered taking the case 
to the Dispute Settlement Body.   
44.  The Dominican Republic  explained that the measure continued to apply pursuant to a sunset 
review performed in 2016 in accordance with the provisions of the AD Agreement . It invited 
Turkey to discuss the matter bilaterally.  
45.  On the semi -annual report of the EU, China  urged the EU to honour its obligation under 
Article 15 of China 's Protocol of Accession to the WTO and te rminate the use of the "surrogate 
country " methodology when calculating normal value in AD proceedings against China. It also 
raised concern with regard to the interim review of the AD measure on solar panels, where 
Chinese companies were only given 2 work ing days to provide comments to the EU IA 's disclosure 
and thus could not fully assess its content. In addition, China was concerned that in the 
investigation on tubes and pipe fittings of stainless steel (butt -welding fittings) the EU IA had not G/ADP/M/53  
 
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  made a pr ovisional disclosure and, consequently, made available a large part of important 
information for the first time only in the final disclosure. China contended that the period given 
was not sufficient for interested parties to adequately deal with the data a nd to submit their 
comments.  
46.  The EU confirmed that it took due account of the interested parties ' right to comment and 
ensured full compliance with the AD Agreement. EU stated that in the tubes and pipe fittings case,  
even though there had been no provisi onal disclosure, the IA gave companies the usual minimum 
time period of one month to submit comments on the final disclosure, which, in the EU 's view, was 
in line with WTO requirements.  
47.  On the semi -annual report of India , Japan  expressed its concern with the investigation on 
resorcinol. Referring to Article 6.5 of the AD  Agreement and the relevant jurisprudence, Japan 
questioned the treatment of certain essential facts that as confidential in the absence of a non -
confidential summary or  a statement of reasons why summarization was not possible. Japan 
further submitted that India acted inconsistently with Article 2.2 by using the applicant 's 
production cost to determine the constructed normal value instead of using Japanese costs. Citing 
Article 5.2 , Japan d oubted that the application submitted to the Indian IA contained sufficient 
evidence in respect of, inter alia , the injury margin and causal link . Japan requested the Indian IA 
to give sufficient consideration to interested parties ' positions in this investigation - in particular, 
the users of the product in India. Japan requested the Indian IA to proceed with the investigation 
in a manner consistent with the AD  Agreement . 
48.  Japan additionally commented on the method used by the Indian  IA to calculate the amount 
of ADDs.  Japan understood that India established reference prices and  that ADD amount s were 
determined by the difference between that reference price and the price of subject imports . 
However, in some cases the methodology for c alculating reference prices was not clear and Japan 
was not able to assess neither the appropriateness of the ADDs nor whether their amount was not 
in excess of dumping margins. It, therefore, questioned India 's compliance with the AD  Agreement  
and request ed it to carefully examine in each investigation whether the measures satisfied the 
pertinent requirements .  
49.  The Russian Federation  raised concern in relation to India's investigation on  ammonium 
nitrate. Several Russian producers participated in the investigation in good faith and provided all 
the requested information. At the provisional stage, the Indian IA calculated zero dumping margin s 
for two Russian producers that belonged to the same trading entity. However, at the final stage 
individual duty rates remained only for exports made through non -affiliated distributing 
companies. Therefore, exporters that supplied products to India directly or through a distributor 
not specifically mentioned in the decision would be subject to all -others duty rate.  The 
Russian  Federation believed that by applying ADDs in this form , India violated Articles 6.10, 9.3 
and 5.8 of the AD Agreement. In addition, contrary to Articles 6.2 and 6.9, Russian producers had 
not had an opportunity to comment on the final determina tion of the Indian IA and the essential 
facts that formed its basis. The Russian Federation urged India to eliminate these inconsistencies.  
50.  Qatar  raised concern in relation to India 's AD measure on linear alkyl benzene ( "LAB") 
imposed in April after a 15 -month investigation. Qatar stated that the Indian IA failed to comply 
with procedural and substantive requirements of the AD  Agreement in this proceeding. Qatar 
noted that its authorities and exporters had actively cooperated with the Indian IA, but the lat ter 
had not properly considered their comments. First, in violation of Article 6.1.3 of the 
AD Agreement, the IA had not provided Qatar with a copy of the initial application that resulted in 
the initiation of the investigation, and only provided the revis ed copy 37 days after the initiation. 
Second, contrary to Article 2.2.1.1 the Indian IA did not use verified cost of production data to 
construct the normal value for the sole producer in Qatar. The IA used an improper denominator in 
its calculation of cos ts, added an artificially high profit margin and improperly adjusted the export 
price downwards. Had it not done so, the dumping margin for the product from Qatar would have 
been negative. Third, in violation of Article 6.9 of the AD  Agreement, the Indian IA did not provide 
interested parties with essential facts that formed the basis of its determination. According to 
Qatar, the exporters did not have information on how the Indian ADDs were determined 
six months after their imposition. Qatar requested India to reconsider its determination and 
terminate the measure.  G/ADP/M/53  
 
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  51.  Qatar was c oncerned with similar inconsistencies in India 's investigation in respect of caustic 
soda. In Qatar 's view, petitioners failed to demonstrate that imports of the product were being  
dumped. Contrary to Articles 2.2 and 2.2.1 of the Agreement, the petitioners relied on a 
constructed normal value  without any justification , and used cost of production data that did not 
relate to the production of caustic soda in Qatar. Moreover, as the petitioners withdrew the 
complaint with respect to Japan, and because imports of caustic soda from Qatar declined during 
the later st age of the investigation, the injurious effects of imports from Qatar should have been 
reassessed.  Qatar explained that the  joint effects  of imports from Japan and Qatar could not be 
equivalent to those of declining and limited imports from Qatar only, and believed that the 
investigation should be terminated.  In addition, the Indian industry was not suffering material 
injury, as the volume of sales, profitability , selling price, capacity utilization, productivity and the 
number of employees had increased during the period of investigation. Qatar also claimed that 
there was no correlation between the volume and value of imports and the performance of the 
Indian industry. Citing Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement, Qatar believed that the Indian IA should 
reject the application and terminate the investigation without imposing the measure.  
52.  In response to Japan 's question, India invited Japan to discuss issues of confidentiality as they 
applied to dumping margins bilaterally. India submitted that the application of ADDs in the form of 
a reference price was a well -established procedure. India explained that the reference price was  
calculated on the basis of the difference between the non -injurious price of the good and its landed 
value, both of which were clearly defined in India 's law. The final numbers were not disclosed as 
they were based on confidential information supplied by the domestic industry. India also 
confirmed that because it followed the "lesser duty rule ", it would always choose the lower 
between the dumping margin and the injury margin and thus did not collect duties in excess of the 
margin of dumping. India also ex plained that if circumstances changed within a year of the 
application of the measure, the IA could re -compute reference prices.  
53.  In response to the Russian Federation, India explained that Russian exporters were subject to 
the lowest AD D rates in comparis on to the other exporters. India confirmed that margins had been 
calcula ted on an individual basis. As such, one Russ ian exporter received a zero ADD rate, another 
received an individual rate and the rest were subject to an all -others rate. India stated th at one of 
the Russian producers under investigation did not receive an individual margin as it had not 
provided complete information on export price. India invited the Russian Federation to consult 
bilaterally.  
54.  In response to Qatar 's question as regards th e LAB investigation, India explained that the IA 
circulated the revised petition due to the fact that the period of investigation had been changed. 
The IA explained this situation in its final determination. India confirmed that the IA had used the 
Qatari exporter 's data even though it had not provided sales data for one of its exporting channels. 
India also stated that its domestic industry had challenged LAB measure in the Customs Tribunal, 
claiming that the IA should have rejected Qatari data in its enti rety. India explained that the IA 
had successfully defended its approach. In addition, the IA used the undistorted cost data of the 
Qatari producer and determined a reasonable profit margin on the basis of sales this producer 
made to third countries, as th ere were no domestic sales of LAB in Qatar. India further submitted 
that during the post -disclosure hearing the IA had rectified certain computational errors pointed 
out by the Qatari producer. As regards caustic soda, India confirmed that the petition con tained 
sufficient prima facie  evidence to initiate the investigation. India invited Qatar to submit all of its 
comments, including in relation to the condition of the domestic industry and causal link, during 
the upcoming oral hearing. India was open to di scussing both investigations bilaterally with Qatar.  
55.  On the semi -annual report of Israel , Turkey  referred to the investigations on low voltage 
copper cables and Portland cement . In both cases,  financial information in the complaints was 
neither indexed nor  summarized in sufficient detail. This hindered the interested parties ' right to 
defend their interests and was contrary to Article 6.5.1 of the AD Agreement. Furthermore, the 
respective complaints did not have sufficient injury -related evidence that would  justify the 
initiation of AD investigations within the meaning of Articles 5.2 and 5.3 of the AD Agreement. 
Neither of the complaints contained any assessment as regards causal link and other factors 
causing injury. As regards the Portland cement investig ation in particular, Turkey stated that its 
exports of the product dropped significantly in both absolute and relative terms during the 
investigation period. This confirmed that imports from Turkey were not a threat to the Israeli 
industry. In addition, th e analysis of economic and financial parameters did not cover the whole G/ADP/M/53  
 
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  period for injury determination. Turkey expected Israel to terminate both investigations without 
taking any measures.  
56.  Turkey additionally raised concern in relation to Israel 's decisi on to extend the AD measure on 
float glass for 4 years. In making this decision, the Israeli IA did not undertake any new analysis 
and had simply relied on conclusions it had made in the original investigation. Turkey reiterated its 
view that in conducting  the original investigation the Israeli IA had acted inconsistently with 
Articles 6.5, 3.2, 9.3 and 3.5 of the  AD Agreement. Turkey observed that the profitability of the 
Israeli industry had increased while prices did not, and believed that this developme nt contradicted 
the argument that injury had been caused by dumping. Turkey submitted that the report of the 
Israeli IA did not contain sufficient evidence so as to justify extending the measure.  
57.  On the questions posed by Turkey, Israel  stated that the inv estigations on low voltage copper 
cables and Portland cement were in early stages and that co -operation by Turkish exporters in 
both cases was insufficient  or partial . Israel urged Turkey to encourage its companies to 
participate more actively in investiga tions so that decisions could take into account all pertinent 
information of the Turkish exporters. As regards the measure on float glass, Israel mentioned that 
its IA had only submitted a recommendation and the final decision was yet to be made by the 
Minister and Parliament.  
58.  On the semi -annual report of  Korea, Republic of , Japan  expressed its concern with regard to 
the extension of the AD measure on stainless steel bar in June 2017. Japan contended that the 
Korean IA had not properly taken into account th e differences between subject products exported 
from Japan and other countries and the domestic like product, the changes in the Korean market, 
in particular the market share of the domestic like product, and the data on production capacity 
submitted by Ja panese exporters. Japan questioned the consistency of the measure as extended 
with Article 11.3 of the AD  Agreement.  
59.  Ukraine  raised concern in relation to the provisional AD measures imposed by Korea on 
ferrosilicon manganese, which had been in effect for more than 4 months. Referring to Articles 7.4 
and 16.4 of the AD Agreement, Ukraine asked Korea to clarify whether exporters  had indeed 
requested  the Korean IA to extend  the provisional AD measure  and when Korea had notified the 
Committee of the imposition of provisional measures in this case.  
60.  Korea, Republic of  submitted that its IA had initiated and conducted the investigatio n on 
stainless steel bar from Japan in fairness and transparency, in accordance with the AD  Agreement. 
The Korean IA had received and considered Japan 's views, and additionally collected opinions of 
other interested parties, including Japanese exporters, d uring the public hearing in 
December  2016. The Korean IA decided to extend the measure in accordance with Article  11.3. 
61.  In response to Ukraine; Korea, Republic of offered to consult bilaterally.  
62.  On the semi -annual report of Mexico , Kazakhstan  expressed its  concern with respect to the 
continu ed application by Mexico of an AD measure on cold -rolled sheet since 1999. In the original 
investigation, the Mexican IA applied the "non-market economy " methodology, whereby surrogate 
values obtained in Spain were used in order to determine the normal value for Kazakhstan 's 
producers and exporters. In subsequent sunset reviews, the Mexican IA used surrogate values 
obtained from Brazil. Kazakhstan claimed that this approach lacked any legal foundation in the 
AD Agreement . Furthermore, Kazakhstan doubted that the Mexican IA had properly taken into 
account all factors other than dumped imports that could have been causing injury to the Mexican 
industry, especially when it continued to confront a likelihood of continuation of  dumping or injury 
after four periods under the measure 's protection. Moreover, Mexico imposed the original measure 
on the basis of threat of injury, and actual material injury had never been caused by imports from 
Kazakhstan . Kazakhstan explained that the  volumes of its exports in 1996 and 1998 were 
insufficient to cause any injury . Kazakhstan requested Mexico to revoke the AD measure in 
question as soon as possible.   
63.  Mexico  confirmed that it would look into Kazakhstan 's comments. It invited Kazakhstan to 
submit its specific concerns within the framework of appropriate procedures. Mexico offered to 
clarify the procedural stages at which Kazakhstan could intervene and invited Kazakhstan to G/ADP/M/53  
 
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  consult bilaterally if it had questions of a general nature. Mexico c onfirmed that it had acted in full 
compliance with the AD Agreement.  
64.  On the semi -annual report of Morocco , Turkey  referred to the imposition of an AD measure 
on refrigerators in September 2017. Turkey claimed that the Moroccan IA had not taken into 
account the arguments put forward by Turkey in the written submission following the disclosure of 
essential facts. Turke y contended that the Moroccan IA had selected an unnecessarily long 6-year 
period for its injury analysis, which enabled it to manipulate injury data. Turkey additionally stated 
that the IA 's report did not contain a satisfactory explanation as to why the requested price 
adjustments had been rejected . Referring to Articles 3.1 and 2.4 of the AD Agreement, Turkey 
requested Morocco to revisit its injury analysis and price comparison methodology . 
65.  Morocco  confirmed that its investigation had been cond ucted in c onformity with the 
AD Agreement. As such, the IA informed all parties, including Turkey, of the preliminary results, 
received and analysed the relevant comments and finally recomm ended the application of the 
AD measure. Morocco invited Turkey to submit its  questions in writing so that they could be fully 
examined by the authorities in capital.  
66.  On the semi -annual report of Pakistan , Brazil  referred to the investigation on certain coated 
writing and printing paper. Brazil pointed out that the investigatio n had been initiated in 
January  2016 and thus had been ongoing for more than 20 months, contrary to Article 5.10 of the 
AD Agreement. Brazil requested Pakistan to consider terminating the investigation without the 
imposition of measures.  
67.  Pakistan clarified th at the 18 -months period was not obligatory under its national law, and 
proceedings could go beyond this period due to certain reasons. Pakistan was open to consult with 
Brazil bilaterally and to provide a response in writing.  
68.  On the semi -annual report of t he Russian Federation , the EU referred to the investigation 
on herbicides. The EU expected the IA to carefully address the issues put forward during the 
investigation and submitted that the application of AD measures in this case would not be justified 
by WTO rules. The EU believed that the examination of economic factors of the domestic industry 
did not support a finding of material injury, since most indicators showed positive trends and the 
companies in question recorded rather high profits. The EU claim ed that any alleged effect had 
been caused by other factors. In particular, the EU pointed out that Chinese imports, which had a 
higher market share and lower prices than imports from the EU, were not subject to the 
investigation. The EU  stated that in its  preliminary report the IA had not taken appropriately into 
account several important factors, such as increased raw material prices and cost of production, 
inflation and the devaluation of the Russian currency. The EU submitted that these factors clearly 
broke the causal link between the injury and the EU 's imports. The EU expected this investigation 
to conclude without the imposition of measures.  
69.  The Russian Federation  confirmed that the investigation was conducted in full compliance with 
its obligations under the WTO and that all parties had ample opportunity to defend their interests. 
The IA had collected and analysed information from bot h the domestic producers and 
EU exporters. The Russian Federation further confirmed that the EU 's comments would be du ly 
taken into account and reflected in the relevant reports of the IA.  
70.  On the semi -annual report of Turkey , Brazil  referred to the investigation on unbleached 
kraftliner paper. Brazil explained that Turkey ignored the Committee 's recommendations contained 
in document G/ADP/6 by using a period shorter than 3 years for its injury analysis without a 
proper justification. In addition, the Turkish IA performed its injury analysis by comparing data 
relating to the first semester of eac h year. Brazil submitted that this approach might be 
inconsistent with Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement, as clarified by the Appellate Body in Mexico — 
AD Measures on Rice . Brazil believed that the Turkish IA should terminate the investigation 
without imposition of measures.  
71.  Ukraine  referred to the AD measure on copper wire rod, whi ch Turkey had been applying 
for 10 years. Ukraine submitted that the circumstances in its metallurgical industry had 
significantly changed, in particular, due to the situatio n in the east of the country. Referring to 
Articles 11.1 and 11.3 of the AD Agreement, Ukraine stated that there was no reason for Turkey to G/ADP/M/53  
 
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  further maintain AD measures on Ukrainian products. Ukraine also stated that the Turkish IA 
initiated an expiry rev iew of this measure in July 2016 and that the review had been ongoing for 
15 months, contrary to Article 11.4 of the AD Agreement. Ukraine urged Turkey to term inate 
AD measures on its copper wire rod.  
72.  In response to Brazil, Turkey  confirmed that it conduct ed its inve stigation in line with 
Articles  3.1 and 3.4 of the AD  Agreement. On Ukraine 's question, Turkey explained that the 
investigation had been extended by 6 months and would be concluded according to the provisions 
of the AD Agreement. Turkey confirme d that opinions of all interested parties were taken into 
account in this investigation.  
73.  On the semi -annual report of Ukraine , the Russian Federation  referred to two proceedings. 
First, in relation to the interim review of the AD measure on ammonium nitrat e, the 
Russian  Federation claimed that Ukraine wrongly interpreted the provisions of Article  11.2 of the 
AD Agreement. The Russian Federation contended that the sole purpose of the interim review was 
to expand the measure to another product, namely, mixtur es of ammonium nitrate . Ukraine had 
not conducted an original investigation involving mixtures of ammonium nitrate and had not  
analysed  them as a "like product " for the purposes of establishing injury and causal link. In 
Russian Federation 's view, this was  contrary to the position expressed by the Panel in EC – Tube 
or Pipe Fittings . Second , the Russian Federation submitted that Ukraine had initiated the 
investigation on armature and wire rod based on a complaint that lacked sufficient evidence of 
dumping, injury and causal link, contrary to Article 5.2 of the AD Agreement. In addition, the 
Ukrainian industry did not appear to produce goods that were "like products " to several types of 
the product under consideration. It was unclear how any injury or causal link could be established 
with respect to those goods.  The Russian Federation urged Ukraine to reconsider its approach to 
product scope determinations and to terminate its interim review and investigation immediately.  
74.  Ukraine  stated that it was conducting its reviews and investigations in accordance with the 
provisions of the AD  Agreement and the relevant national legislation. Ukraine clarified that in the 
ammonium nitrate case, public hearings were yet to be held. Ukraine also explained that during 
the inv estigation on armature and wire rod, all interested parties, including the Russian competent 
authorities, had been given an opportunity to register, express their views and defend their 
interests. The public hearing in this investigation was held in Septem ber 2017. Currently, the 
Ukrainian IA has been analysing the information received in order to arrive at an objective 
determination of dumping, material injury and causal link. Ukraine confirmed that in both cases 
the main findings and conclusions of its IA  would be forwarded to all interested parties, including 
the competent authorities of the Russian Federation.  
75.  On the semi -annual report of the US, Japan  reiterated its concerns relating to the prolonged 
period of application of US AD measures against Japanese products. The US had 19  measures in 
force against Japanese products, 6 of which were in force for more than 20 years. Japan continued 
to closely mon itor the operation of US sunset reviews and requested the US to swiftly revoke these 
unjustifiably long -standing measures.  
76.  The Russian Federation  raised concern in relation to the US investigation on wire rod. The 
Russian Federation recognized that the two  exporters that had been selected as mandatory 
respondents had not participated in the investigation. Nevertheless, the Russian Federation 
believed that the US ' IA should not have simply applied the highest possible dumping margin 
obtained from the petitio n. Instead, the task of the IA was to ensure that the determination of the 
dumping margin was objective, rather than as harmful to the non-cooperating producers as 
possible . The Russian Federation referred to the requirements of Article 6.8 and paragraph 7  of 
Annex II to the AD Agreement and suggested that the margins of dumping as calculated by the 
US' IA were not objective.  
77.  Korea, Republic of  expressed its concerns regarding the US ' practice of applying adverse facts 
available ( "AFA") in investigations ag ainst Korea, after a recent revision of the relevant law gave 
considerable discretion to the US ' IA. Korea referred to investigations on c olour-coated, hot -rolled, 
cold-rolled steel sheets and steel plates . Experts who  had examined these determinations 
explained that it was impossible for Korean companies to avoid the punitive applica tion of AFA 
under the current US law, even if they d id their utmost to respond. The Korean government was 
therefore under significant p ressure from the private sector  to pursue  a WTO dispute settlement 
proceeding against the US . G/ADP/M/53  
 
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  78.  Additionally, Korea expressed its concern in relation to the second administrative review of 
the AD order on oil country tubular goods ( "OCTG "), where the US ' IA again determined that a 
particular market  situation ( "PMS") existed in Korea. This determination was based on several 
circumstances, namely, the use  by a Korean OCTG exporter  of domestic raw material that was 
subject to a countervailing duty  in the US , the use of low -priced raw material imported from China, 
a strategic partnership between a raw material supplier and a steel pipe manufacturer , and Korea 's 
electricity tariff system.  The US ' IA reversed its initial opinion that there were insufficient grounds 
for individual PMS  claims and applied PMS on the basis of their cumulative effect , which  Korea 
found un justified in view of the AD Agreement. In addition, Korea claimed that it had not provided 
any subsidies to manufacturers of hot -rolled coils, and that the countervailing duty had been 
imposed based on AFA, without regard to whether subsidies had been  actually provided . Korea 
believed that there were no legitimate grounds to make an upward adjustment to a dumping 
margin imposed on the manufacturer o f the finished product due to controversies that arose in the 
process of investigating the material supplier . 
79.  China  urged the US to honour its obligations under Article 15 of China 's Protocol of Accession 
to the WTO and terminate the use of the "surrogate country " methodology when  calculating 
normal value in AD proceedings against China. In addition, China submitted that the US wrongly 
regarded Chinese state -owned enterprises as one whole entity and was wrongly denying them 
individual duty rates in AD proceedings.  
80.  With regard to th e repeated concerns by Japan on the length of its measures, the US 
reiterated that Japan seemed to imply that an older measure was no longer valid solely on the 
grounds that the measure was old. The US disagreed and emphasized that the purpose of an 
expiry  proceeding was to allow administering authorities to examine whether dumping and injury 
would be likely to continue or recur if the measures were removed. The US explained that the 
expiry process was evidence -based and that the participation by Japanese c ompanies in expiry 
proceedings would be helpful both in terms of the relevant information to be provided and the 
arguments to be made by interested parties. Furthermore, many measures involving Japanese 
exports had, in fact, been terminated. Since the comm encement of expiry reviews, there had 
been 64 measures reviewed involving Japan. Of those, 51 or 80% resulted in termination of the 
measure.  
81.  For 7 of the oldest 10 measures that remained in effect, the Japanese industry had failed to 
meaningfully participa te in any sunset review proceeding. In fact, multiple times just in 2017 the 
Japanese industry was again given an opportunity to explain whether the revocation of the orders 
would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of material injury and again  the industry had 
refused to participate. Lack of respondent participation and the consequent lack of evidence 
provided by respondents limit the information provided to the IA. In other words, Japanese 
producers may themselves be partly responsible for the  result. In many of the expiry processes 
that involved imports from both Japan and other Members, respondents from other Members 
meaningfully participated in the review and made relevant arguments as to why the measure 
should be terminated as to their spec ific country, and the measure was terminated. The US 
suggested that Japan inquire with its own industries as to why there was a lack of interest in 
participating in the process, particularly given that participation had been a vital element in the 
terminat ion of measures applied with respect to goods from other Members that also covered 
goods from Japan.  
82.  In response to both the Russian Federation and Korea, the US mentioned that the proceedings 
in question were either ongoing or in litigation, and the US c onsidered it inappropriate to 
comment. Any concerns could be raised by those Members in other appropriate fora. The US 
explained that when a party did not participate in the proceeding, the IA would apply facts 
available. However, the US IA would not simpl y apply the petition rate in all cases – it would look 
for the most appropriate set of facts to be applied in each case.  
83.  In response to China, the US believed that as the matter raised was in litigation, it was 
inappropriate to offer comments in the Commi ttee. The US confirmed that it would make its views 
known in the context of the relevant disputes, either as a party or as a third party in parallel 
proceedings.  
84.  No comments were made with respect to semi -annual reports that the Committee had not 
previousl y reviewed due to late circulation.  G/ADP/M/53  
 
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  85.  The Committee took note  of the semi -annual reports, the statements made, the questions 
posed and the answers provided.  
3  PRELIMINARY AND FINA L ANTI -DUMPING ACTIONS: NOT IFICATIONS  
86.  The Chair referred to the notifications of preliminary and final AD actions submitted by 
Members since the Committee 's last meeting listed in documents G/ADP/N/299, 301, 302 
(and Corr.1), 303, 304 and 305. During this period Argentina; Australia; Brazil; Canada; Chile; 
China;  Egypt; EU; GCC Member States; India; Israel; Japan; Kazakhstan; Korea, Republic of; 
Kyrgyz  Republic; Mexico; Morocco; Pakistan; Philippines; Russian Federation; South Africa; 
Turkey; Ukraine; US; and Viet  Nam notified preliminary and/or final AD actions, which were listed 
in these documents. Since document G/ADP/N/305 was circulated, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 
Egypt, El  Salvador, EU, Morocco, Pakistan, Russian Federation, South Africa and the US had 
submitted such a notification, which would appear in the next list circulated  by the Secretariat.  
87.  The Chair drew attention to the continued apparent lack of full compliance with this 
notification requirement. These reports were a key element of the required transparency 
concerning Members ' AD actions, and the Committee could not ef fectively carry out its monitoring 
and discussion functions if Members did not fulfil their obligations in this regard. He strongly urged 
all Members taking AD actions to provide these notifications of preliminary and final actions, 
consistently and in a t imely fashion. The minimum information format for these notifications 
adopted by the Committee in October 2006 and revised in October 2009 (document 
G/ADP/2/Rev.2), contained important guidance as to the kinds of actions that should be notified 
and the inf ormation that should be provided.  
88.  Ukraine  expressed its concern regarding the provisional measure imposed by Egypt  on steel 
rebar. Ukraine questioned the consistency of the measure with Article  7.1 of the AD Agreement, as 
the Egyptian domestic industry 's operation proved stable and showed positive developments. In 
addition, the Egyptian IA had not properly analyse d other factors in accordance with Article 3.5, 
namely competition between domestic producers, inflationary recession in the local market and 
decline in labo ur productivity. Ukraine further submitted that Egypt 's public notice did not meet 
the requirements of Article 12.2.1. Referring to Article 7.4 , Ukraine requested Egypt to name the 
Ukrainian exporters who requested the provisional AD measures to be extended up to 6 months.  
89.  Referring to the same investigation, Turkey  stated that the Egyptian IA had not established 
injury consistently with Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement  as the domestic industry 's economic 
indicators, such as prices, sales, emplo yment, wages and profit, showed an upward trend. Turkey 
believed that the real reasons behind the indicators that in fact had deteriorated - such as 
production, productivity and cost  - were energy shortage, foreign exchange shortage, currency 
depreciation and the decrease in exports by the domestic industry. Citing Article 3.5, Turkey  
remin ded Egypt that injury caused by those factors should be separated and not attributed to 
dumped imports. Turkey expected the Egyptian IA to terminate the investigation wit hout taking 
any definitive measure.  
90.  In response to Ukraine and Turkey, Egypt  stated that its investigation fully complied with the 
AD Agreement. Egypt could not provide the names of exporters requested by Ukraine offhand, but 
suggested that the measures co uld have been extended further to a request coming f rom another 
exporting country. Referring to Article 3.4, Egypt contended that not all economic indicators have 
to be in decline in order to establish material injury, and no one of the factors could have more 
weight than the other  in this determination . Egypt explained that the complaint contained 
sufficient evidence that injury had been caused by dumped imports. Egypt confirmed that all 
comments would be taken into account during the investigation.  
91.  Turkey  raised a concern in relation to India 's investigation on sodium dichromate. Turkey 
submitted that  several of the Indian industry 's economic indicators did not show any negative 
signs during the period of investigation. In particular, Turkey referred to the growth of production 
capacity, capacity utilization and total sales. Furthermore , Turkey stated that the share of its 
imports in the Indian market during the period concerned was minimal as compared to other 
sources and believed that injury could not have been caused by Turkish imports.  G/ADP/M/53  
 
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  92.  In response to Turkey, India explained that the investigation  in question  had just been 
initiated. India confirmed that its IA would analyze the existence of injury and reflect all views in 
its findings.  
93.  The EU raised a concern in relation to Colombia 's investigation on frozen fries. The EU 
questioned the legal authority of the association which had filed the complaint with the Colombian 
IA to represent domestic producers of the like product. The EU was also concerned ab out whether 
the standing requirement had been met  in this case . Moreover, contrary to Article 5 of the 
AD Agreement , available documents did not contain sufficient evidence on injury or causal link. 
The EU  mentioned that it had filed a submission in this i nvestigation but had not received any 
reaction from the Colombian IA. The EU believed that the application of provisional measures in 
this case was unwarranted.  
94.  Colombia  confirmed that its IA would assess all of EU 's comments and reflect them, as well as 
any data received in questionnaire responses , in the preliminary determination which was due to 
be published in a few weeks. Colombia  stated t hat its investigation was conducted in accordance 
with the relevant national and multilateral procedures. Colombia was open to engage with the EU 
bilaterally on the issue.  
95.  The Chair noted that some Members were still submitting the same Ad hoc  notifications 
pertaining to certain antidumping actions via different means; i.e. electronically, by fax and post. 
In certain instances, certain Members, while submitting new Ad hoc notifications, also tended to 
resubmit previously notified actions and in some cases provided electronic links that did not 
correspond to the notification the Member submits. In addition, some of thes e notifications were 
not submitted to CRN directly, but to the Rules Division Secretariat which had to resend it to CRN 
for registration. He reminded all Members that a  given Ad hoc notification, as in case of all other 
notifications, should be sent electr onically and only once to CRN with a copy to the Secretary of 
the Committee and that any previously submitted notifications should not be resubmitted. He also 
requested Members, instead of providing electronic links to general website, to attach directly t he 
relevant document containing the action they wish to notify in WORD or PDF formats. He stressed 
the need to avoid any confusion; repetition or duplication as these notifications were the source of 
necessary information contained in Annex D of the Commit tee's annual report.  
96.  The Committee took note  of the statements made, questions posed and answers provided.  
4  CHAIRPERSON 'S REPORT ON THE MEET ING OF THE INFORMAL GROUP ON 
ANTI -CIRCUMVENTION  
97.  The Chair recalled that the Informal Group on Anti -Circumvention met on 25 October 2017. 
The US provided a detailed explanation of its first determination made under the Enforce and 
Protect Act of 2015. The US shared with the Group the challenges it had faced, as w ell as the new 
experiences it had in implementing this new system on duty evasion of ADDs and countervailing 
duties. A very interesting and lively discussion followed, with Members posing questions and 
offering comments. India offered to make a presentatio n on its Anti Circumvention practice at the 
next regular meeting of the Committee in April 2018.  
98.  The Committee took note  of the report made.  
5  CHAIRPERSON 'S REPORT ON THE MEET ING OF THE WORKING G ROUP ON 
IMPLEMENTATION  
99.  The Chair reminded that the Working Group on Implementation would hold a meeting on 
26 October 2017, continuing, as required, on 27 October 2017, at which it would discuss 
two injury -related issues: the analysis of the effects of imports on domestic industry prices  and the 
methodology for analysing imports by the domestic industry. Mr Wolfgang M üller of EU, serving as 
discussant for the meeting, had circulated a roadmap of issues in advance of the meeting in 
document RD/ADP/WGI/9 to assist delegations in their work.  The Chair encouraged all Members to 
attend and to participate actively in the discussions.  
100.  The Committee took note  of the report and the statement made.  G/ADP/M/53  
 
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  6  EUROPEAN UNION – DRAFT AMENDMENTS TO THE BASIC ANTI -DUMPING 
REGULATION CONCERNIN G METHODOLOGIES OF N ORMAL VALUE DETERMINA TION – 
ITEM REQUESTED BY TH E RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
101.  The Chair drew Members ' attention to document G/ADP/W/497 containing the written 
questions posed by the Russian Federation and to document G/ADP/W/499 containing the EU 's 
responses.  
102.  The Russian Federation  reiterated its concerns with respect to the proposed amendments to 
the EU AD law in light of the results of interinstitutional negotiations published in October 2017. 
The Russian Federation contended that as of 1 January 2018, the EU may effectively extend to all 
WTO Members its "non-market economy " and "cost adjustment " methodologies when calculating  
normal value  in AD proceedings. The Russian Federation explained how the EU 's new rules would 
operate. First, the EU 's IA would look for "significant distortions " in the  exporting country 's market 
– a situation when the reported prices and costs, including the cost s of raw materials and energy, 
were affected by government intervention . The Russian Federation enumerated seven factors 
relevant fo r this consideration and observed that the draft legislation did not provide any clear 
definitions for them . The Russian Federation thus saw no limits for the possible discretion and bias 
of EU investigators . It submitted that these factors seemed to replicate the assessment of "non-
market economy " conditions prevailing in exporting countries or industries. Moreover, they de 
facto introduced into EU 's practice the concepts of "social " and "ecological " dumping.  Second, if it 
found distortions, the EU 's IA c ould disregard the price and cost data  reported by exporters and 
construct the normal value based on "undistorted prices and benchmarks ", such as international 
prices or costs in a third country . This approach was s imilar to the "surrogate country " and "cost 
adjustment " methodologies.  The Russian Federation further explained that the EU complainants 
would be able to rely on special country reports prepared by the E U's IA, which would describe the 
specific "significant distortions " in export markets. Exporte rs, in turn, would bear the nearly 
impossible burden of proof to "conclusively " demonstrate that their costs and prices were not 
distorted. The Russian Federation believed that such an approach would infringe on exporters ' 
rights.  
103.  The Russian Federation fu rther submitted that the proposed amendments were not 
compatible with the AD Agreement. Notably, Article 2.2 of the Agreement did not have any 
reference  to "free market forces " or "significant distortions " and A rticle 2.2.1.1 did not allow 
disregard ing actual costs based on arbitrary findings of "significant distortions ". Moreover, the 
AD Agreement did not contain obligations for exporters to rebut any presumption of "distortions ". 
104.  As a result of the amendments, the Russian Federation expected the EU's AD policy to shift 
from targeting unfair pricing behaviour  to focusing on the situation in exporting countries ' 
markets. The new AD law would make it easier for the EU IA to impose higher ADDs on foreign 
competitively priced goods, thus depriving exporters  of their competitive advantages.  
105.  The Russian Federation requested the EU to provide clarity on  the core notions used in the 
draft, in particular, how the EU 's IA would establish that distortions were "significant ". The Russian 
Federation asked the EU if i t planned to issue reports on "significant distortions " in all countries or 
only in particular ones , and how it would select those countries.  The Russian Federation urged the 
EU and its Member -States to reconsider the draft amendments and abstain from adopting WTO-
inconsistent rules for AD investigations . 
106.  Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of ; Bahrain, Kingdom of ; Kuwait , the State of ; Oman ; and Qatar , 
associated themselves with the statement of the Russian Federation and voiced similar concerns.  
107.  The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  referred to the position of the Appellate Body in EU – Biodiesel  
and sug gested that, read in this light;  the right of the EU 's IA to use "undistorted international 
prices, costs or benchmarks " raised significant questions. It  was also concerned with  the possible 
unwarranted and discriminatory applicati on of AD rules by the EU based on the consideration of  
domestic wages and the social and environmental protection offered by an exporting country when 
determining  the "appropriate " price or cost benchma rks.  
108.  The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia also questioned the procedural fairness of EU 's new approach. 
As such, the EU 's IA would assist domestic  producers by preparing reports that they could invoke G/ADP/M/53  
 
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  to argue the existence of "significant distortions ", while resp ondents would only be given 10 days 
to rebut such a finding.  It underst ood the EU 's proposal was intended , at least in part, to address  
production overcapacities and forms of state intervention/subsidization. It recalled that Members 
could use anti-subsidy  (countervailing) disciplines to remedy the injurious effects of subsidized 
products. AD rules should not be used for this purpose.  It requested the EU to clarify the different 
scenarios under which it could determine that "significant distortions " existed, the thresholds or 
level of detail applied to the factors that the EU IA would analyse in this context and the method 
used to determine appropriate benchmarks. Saudi Arabia also requested the EU to clarify how it 
would ensure an impartial and obje ctive assessment of "significant distortions " when allegation s 
were based on a report prepared by the EU's IA itself.  
109.  In a written statement sent to the Committee, the United Arab Emirates criticized that the 
EU's IA would be  allowed to reject domestic se lling prices and costs kept by the exporter or 
producer under investigation for the construction of the normal value, which is at the heart of 
Article 2 of the AD Agreement, because of the alleged "significant distortions " and that it would be  
encouraged i nstead to replace them with costs from producers in a third country, which was found 
in very similar circumstances by the WTO Appellate Body to be in consistent with the 
AD Agreement. The Appellate Body made it very clear in the context of the EU – Biodiese l dispute 
that an IA cannot "simply substitute the costs from outside the country of origin for the cost of 
production in the country of origin ". As such, it appears that the new proposed approach would 
raise serious concerns about its consistency with the  WTO A D Agreement and would therefore 
require further clarifications from the EU.  The United Arab Emirates was particularly concerned 
with the unlimited discretion granted to the EU's IA to investigate into what it considers to be 
"significant distortions " and it was again unclear how the generally worded "considerations " that 
could trigger the application of the EU 's new normal value methodology would  be applied in 
practice. It associated itself with the questions posed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.   
110.  China commended the EU for the shift in position in terms of removing of the list of non -
market economy countries, as reflected in its new proposal. However as other Members, China 
was concerned with the concept of "significant distortions " contained in the amended law. China 
was wary of the possibility that the "surrogate country " methodology would continue to apply in 
alternative ways and would extend to other Members, including, but not limited to, China. China 
contended that EU 's new approach lacked legal  basis in the AD Agreement and was thus 
inconsistent with WTO rules. It would do harm to the WTO 's AD legal system by increasing 
uncertainty in the application of AD measures. China stated that it would closely monitor the 
application of the new rules by t he EU.  
111.  Kazakhstan  associated itself with the concerns of other Members and referred to the 
statement it had made during the previous Committee meeting. Kazakhstan hoped that the EU 
would take due account of the positions of the Members concerned.  
112.  Egypt  shared the concerns of other Members and expected to receive the EU 's clarifications 
on the matter.  
113.  Colombia  asked the EU to explain the link between labour and environmental concerns with 
the application of the AD Agreement, in particular Articles 2.2.1 and  2.2.2. Colombia reminded 
that in applying their AD legislation, Members should be mindful of the requirements of the 
WTO legal framework.  
114.  The EU explained that the European Commission adopted a proposal to make changes to the 
EU's AD legislation on 9 Nove mber 2016. Following its adoption, the proposal became subject to 
the legislative process in the EU and had to be considered by the European Parliament and 
Council. On 3 October 2017, interinstitutional negotiations between the co -legislators resulted in 
an agreement on the Commission 's proposal. However, the legislative process had not yet been 
finalized and the proposal remained a draft text that could not enter into force unless the 
necessary steps had been completed. When the changes to the legislation were finalized, the EU 
would inform the Committee in line with the relevant notification requirements, at which time it 
would be subject to the normal review procedures. Therefore, the EU considered it inappropriate to 
respond to any questions raised on th e draft text at this stage.  
115.  The Committee took note  of the statements made, questions posed and answers provided.  G/ADP/M/53  
 
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  7  OTHER BUSINESS  
116.  The Chair encouraged Members that had issues to raise with other Members under other 
business to provide sufficient notice to the Member concerned prior to the meeting in order to 
ascertain whether or not an answer could be obtained at the meeting.  
117.  The Committee took note  of the statement made.  
8  DATE OF THE NEXT REG ULAR MEETING  
118.  The next Regular meeting of the Committee would be held in the week of 23 April 2018.  
9  ANNUAL REPORT TO THE  COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN  GOODS (ARTICLE 18.6)   
119.  The Committee adopted  its 2017  Annual Report to the Council for Trade in Goods.  
 
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