TN/AG/GEN/35/Rev.1  
 
20 March 2015  
(15-1599)  Page: 1/3  
Committee on Agriculture 
Special Session  Original: English  
 
 REFOCUSING POST-BALI WORK PROGRAMME ON DEVELOPMENT1 
SUBMISSION BY THE G-33 
Revision* 
The following communication, dated 19 March 2015, is  being circulated at the request of the G-33. 
 
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 1.  In response to the recent discussions under th e CoA-SS, the G-33, by this submission, seeks to 
provide its views and expectations with respect to the negotiations for a Post-Bali Work 
Programme by July 2015, including contributions in the CoA-SS Chair-led small group consultations on domestic support and market access involving some Members in different 
configurations. 
2.  At the outset, the G-33 appreciates CoA-SS Chair's intensification of substantive work through 
various formats, and welcomes contributions fr om Members of some ideas and alternatives. 
3.  In July last year, the G-33 submitted to the CoA-SS its priority areas for the Work Programme: 
Special Products (SP) in JOB/AG/28; and Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) in JOB/AG/29. The group also proposed a "permanent solution" on Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes (PSFS) under JOB/AG/27. The G-33 remains deeply concerned that, after nine months from their 
submission and three months to July 2015, the WTO Members have yet to engage substantively on 
these priorities. 
4.  The G-33 observes that some alternatives on market access have been advanced. These 
alternatives seek to depart from the tiered formula and water down the already limited and 
constrained flexibilities (i.e. SP and SSM) for developing countries under the Chair's draft agriculture modalities in 2008 ("Rev.4"). Members should be mindful that in seeking alternatives 
for "simplicity", "doability", and "predictability" at this juncture of the Work Programme talks, they 
should not lead to dilution of the development mandate of the Doha Round. 
5.  For the G-33, the above alternatives and the processes by which negotiations on these would 
be carried out are rather inefficient and radical since these have sought to unravel and revisit the 
stabilized areas of Rev.4 which would have cross-pillar and cross-sector ramifications; thus, 
negating the hard-won, step-by-step building up  of achievements over the last 14 years of 
negotiations. The alternatives also unduly expo se developing countries to disadvantageous and 
uneven negotiating processes - developed countries having an upper hand at the bilateral and 
plurilateral levels. Moreover, these would perpetuate the current imbalances in the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) that emanated from the Uruguay Round. Therefore, the G-33 finds these 
alternatives deviating from the development mandat e that have led our negotiations and are more 
complex and cumbersome than originally intended; thus, not doable. 
6.  The G-33 would like to emphasize that while some have argued that "the world has changed" 
since the launching of Doha, extreme poverty and income inequality, in relative and absolute 
terms, remains high and a big challenge for most developing countries. A current BBC 
                                               
1 Without prejudice to the position of Peru. 
* In English only. TN/AG/GEN/35/Rev.1 
 
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  advertisement/program running on TV and on its website entitled "A Richer World"2 would attest to 
this pressing state. It is also worth noting that "three out of every four poor people live in rural areas in developing countries and that most of them depend on agriculture for their livelihoods"
3 
and "the share of developing countries in global agriculture trade was only slightly higher in 2011 
(37%) than it was in the early 1960s (35%)".4 Thus, there is no legitimate basis for reinterpreting 
the history of the negotiations or abandoning the "development" mandate of Doha for greater commercial gains by a handful few - insisting on this would hardly lead us towards a better future. 
7.  It is critical that Members are reminded of one of the main mandates of agriculture under 
paragraph 13 of Doha Work Programme: 
We agree that special and differential treatment for developing countries shall be an 
integral part of all elements of the ne gotiations and shall be embodied in the 
schedules of concessions and commitments and as appropriate in the rules and 
disciplines to be negotiated, so as to be operationally effective and to enable developing countries to effectively take account of their development needs, including 
food security and rural development … (emphasis added) 
Indeed, special and differential treatment (S&DT) for developing countries must be 
respected and operationalized meaningfully under the negotiations of the three pillars 
for substantial improvement in market access, substantial reduction in domestic 
support, substantial reduction towards elimination of all forms of export subsidies and export measures with equivalent effects. 
8.  The issues faced by the small farmers in de veloping countries since the launching of Uruguay 
Round negotiations remain unresolved, along with the food security, livelihood security, and rural 
development needs of the developing country members. 
Refocusing on "development" 
9.  To concretely move forward, the G-33 reiterates the need to refocus our work without further 
delay by addressing "outstanding issues" particularly SSM under Rev.4, and to preserve its stabilized areas in a Work Programme. While ideas and alternatives may occur and vanish from 
time to time, Members could not simply afford furt her squandering our very limited time especially 
that sensitivities and interests of Members would not simply change or extinguish by mere reformulation of processes or shifting the burden to  the other side. What is needed in this process 
is political will to meaningfully deliver on the development mandate of Doha. 
10.  Therefore, the G-33 of 46 developing countri es representing hundreds of millions of small 
farmers from across continents strongly reiterates the following principles, requirements, and ingredients for developing a Work Programme on time: 
a. "Development" should remain central to the negotiations; hence, meaningful, 
operational, and effective S&DT for developing countries for food security, livelihood security, and rural development is a must. 
b. Members should respect our ministers' agreements under the Doha Mandate, July 
Framework of 2004, Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration of 2005 and Bali Ministerial Decisions and Declarations of 2013. 
c. The SP text under Rev.4 (stabilized since 2008) must be in the Work Programme; self-
designation and zero/no cut must remain the essential and core elements of any SP 
modality - without any dilution in the form of tariff rate quota (TRQ) creation or expansion and elimination of in-quota duty; and SP must remain more flexible than 
Sensitive Products (SeP). 
                                               
2 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-30939041 . 
3 World Bank (2007) World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development, Washington, D.C.: 
World Bank. 
4 World Trade Organization (WTO) (2014), World Trade Report 2014, Trade and development: recent 
trends and the role of the WTO, Geneva: WTO. TN/AG/GEN/35/Rev.1 
 
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  d. As an integral part of a Post-Bali Work Programme, Members should establish an 
accessible, operational, and effective SSM based on the proposal of the G-33 under JOB/AG/29 which is more flexible and user-friendly than the subsisting Special Agricultural Safeguards (SSG). Members are ur ged to engage substantively on this issue 
without further delay given the inherent complex elements under this mechanism. 
e. The G-33 would not be in a position to negotiate any proposal that omits its expectations 
on SP and SSM which should be integral parts of any outcome. 
f. Negotiations must be held in inclusive, bottom-up, and transparent process. More 
number of participation from G-33 members in any CoA-SS Chair-led small group consultations on market access, as well as in domestic support and export competition is needed. 
Permanent Solution on Public Stockh olding for Food Security Purposes 
11.  While public stockholding for food security purposes is not an issue of the Work Programme, 
the dedicated session under the CoA-SS including the Chair-led small group consultation must 
facilitate its work if the Members are to arrive at a permanent solution by December 2015. 
Towards this end, the Chair is requested to nominate  a "Friend of the Chair" as soon as possible to 
whom the Chair would depend on for coordination and facilitating the negotiations for developing a 
permanent solution that is balanced and providing solutions to the public stockholding concerns of 
all developing countries for food security. 
12.  In concluding, the G-33 reaffirms its commitment to remain constructively engaged and 
continue making concrete contributions for a doable "Work Programme on the remaining Doha 
Development Agenda issues" by July 2015, and we  expect that substantive discussions on SP, 
SSM, and PSFS shall be based on the G-33 submissions above. 
 
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