RESTRICTED  
  
WT/DSB/M/378  
 
20 June 2016  
(16-3331)  Page: 1/7  
Dispute Settlement Body 
9 May 2016    
 
 MINUTES OF MEETING 
HELD IN THE CENTRE WILLIAM RAPPARD 
ON 9 MAY 2016 
Chairman: Mr. Xavier Carim (South Africa) 
Table of Contents 
1   UNITED STATES – MEASURES CONCERNING THE IMPORTATION, MARKETING 
AND SALE OF TUNA AND TUNA PRODUCTS ....................................................................... 1  
A.  Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States: request for 
the establishment of a panel ............................................................................................... 1  
2   ARGENTINA – MEASURES RELATING TO TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES ................. 4  
A.  Report of the Appellate Bo dy and Report of  the Panel ........................................................ 4  
 
 1  UNITED STATES – MEASURES CONCERNING THE IMPORTATION, MARKETING AND 
SALE OF TUNA AND TUNA PRODUCTS 
A.  Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States: request for 
the establishment of a panel (WT/DS381/32) 
1.1.  The Chairman recalled that the DSB had considered this matter at its meeting on 
22 April 2016 and had agreed to revert to it. He drew attention to the communication from the 
United States contained in document WT/DS381/32, and invited the representative of the United States to speak. 
1.2.  The representative of the United States sa id that, as discussed at the April DSB meeting, the 
rule issued by the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ("NOAA") directly 
addressed the DSB's findings on the US dolphin safe labelling measure, and brought the 
United States into compliance with its WTO obligat ions. Despite discussing this rule with Mexico on 
a number of occasions, Mexico continued to indicate that it was not prepared to refer the matter of compliance back to a compliance panel. Rather, Mexico continued to insist that the arbitration under Article 22.6 of the DSU to review Mexico's request for authorization to suspend concessions 
must move forward immediately. At the DSB meeting on 23 March 2016, Mexico had gone so far 
as to say that it considered that the US compliance action was not legally pertinent for the arbitration. Mexico appeared to be pursuing a course of action that would have the DSB ignore 
that the measure at issue was changed and that Me xico could require the WTO to act to authorize 
suspension of concessions even if the United States had come into compliance. This was not correct. As a result, the United States respectfully requested that the DSB establish a compliance 
panel pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU to confirm that the United States had brought its 
measure into compliance with the DSB's recommendations and rulings. 
1.3.  The representative of Mexico said that, as his country had explained at the previous DSB 
meeting, the United States did not request consultations under the new Article 21.5 compliance 
proceedings, and therefore its panel request was incomplete. Even if the panel requested by the 
United States was established at the present meeting, it would be demonstrated that establishing WT/DSB/M/378 
 
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  such a panel was incorrect. In 2001, in the "Mexico – Corn Syrup" (Recourse to Article 21.5 of the 
DSU by the  United States)  dispute, the Appellate Body had addressed procedural aspects relating 
to the absence of consultations under Article 21.5 compliance proceedings. The Appellate Body had found that it was necessary for a party to raise objections regarding the failure to hold 
consultations at the DSB meeting when such a panel was being established as well as before the 
panel during the early stages of the proceedings. Mexico had failed to do so in that dispute. At the present dispute, Mexico wished to explicitly express its objection to the US failure to hold 
consultations before requesting the establishment of a panel. The jurisdiction of this panel was 
therefore deficient. The "Mexico – Corn Syrup"  (Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the 
United States) dispute had taken place at a time when compliance procedures under Article 21.5 were being developed. Since then, a new procedure had been adopted whereby consultations were 
held before the panel request was made. The on ly exception was where there was a sequencing 
agreement providing for an exemption from cons ultations. In the present case, there was no 
sequencing agreement for this second stage of  compliance proceedings. The United States had 
followed the new practice regarding consultations. It had, for instance, requested consultations in 
the "China – GOES" dispute (WT/DS414/15). Other Members, for their part, had also complied with the consultation requirement under Article 21.5 proceedings in other cases where the 
United States had been party to the dispute, su ch as in the disputes: "EC – Fasteners" (China) 
(WT/DS397/17), "US – Large Civil Aircraft" (2nd complaint) (WT/DS353/16), "US – Stainless Steel" (Mexico) (WT/DS344/18), "EC – Hormones " (Canada) (WT/DS48/21) and "US – Zeroing" 
(EC) (WT/DS294/22), to name but a few. 
1.4.  In light of the foregoing, Mexico was of the view that the establishment of the panel was 
inappropriate, at least until the correct procedures had been complied with. Furthermore, as stated at the previous DSB meeting, Mexico would requ est the establishment of a compliance panel under 
Article 21.5 of the DSU, including formal consulta tions, in respect of the US measures that had 
been amended in March 2016. Mexico would submit its request for consultations to the United States shortly, and hoped that its request for a panel would be considered by the DSB at a 
future meeting. As Mexico had stated on previous  occasions, the 2016 IFR was not consistent with 
the obligations of the United States under eith er the TBT Agreement or the GATT 1994, and did 
not resolve the Tuna dispute. In conclusion, Mexico was glad that the Director-General had appointed a third individual to serve as the Arbitr ator in the proceedings under Article 22.6 of the 
DSU
1, and hoped that these proceedings would progress expeditiously. As Mexico had pointed out 
previously, the correct sequence was Article 22.6 proceedings first, followed by the proceedings under Article 21.5 of the DSU. 
1.5.  The representative of Chinese Taipei said  that since many delegations had expressed their 
views on this matter at the previous DSB meeting, his delegation would only briefly share some of 
its thoughts at the present meeting. Chinese Taipei agreed with Mexico, Guatemala, Australia and 
some other delegations that, in the absence of an agreement between the parties, the pending 
Article 22.6 arbitration could not be suspended simply because of a declaration of compliance by the Member concerned or due to the establishment of another compliance panel under Article 21.5 of the DSU. Chinese Taipei found no legal basis for such a suspension. In addition, it was 
Chinese Taipei's understanding that if the Article 21.5 compliance panel was established at the 
present meeting, it should be carried out in pa rallel with, and independently from, the pending 
Article 22.6 arbitration, unless the parties agreed otherwise. In particular, Chinese Taipei noted 
that paragraph 8 of the US and Mexico's "Seq uencing Agreement" (WT/DS381/19) provided that 
the parties would cooperate to enable the Arbitrator to circulate its decision within 60 days. On the other hand, the panel to be established at the present meeting would have at least 90 days to 
review the compliance dispute. Chinese Taipei was of the view that neither time-period should be 
compromised for the other if there was no agreem ent between the parties. Chinese Taipei agreed 
with the other delegations that, in the end, the most effective solution to the complex issue was an agreement between the parties. It may be further mediated by the Arbitrators or the panelists. 
1.6.  The representative of the United States said that, first, the United States regretted that 
Mexico was raising the issue of consultations at the present meeting. The United States would 
explain why Mexico's view was incorrect as a matter of substance. But just as importantly, the 
United States regretted that this issue had not be en discussed and resolved by the parties prior to 
the present meeting. The United States had sought to engage with Mexico in more depth on this issue, including through discussion with the DSB Chair, but Mexico had not been willing to have 
                                               
1 See document WT/DS381/34. WT/DSB/M/378 
 
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  such a conversation. The United States did not consider it helpful for parties to avoid direct 
discussion of these DSB issues which helped to reach a deeper understanding of the DSU. The responsibility for the effective f unctioning of the DSB and the disp ute settlement system ultimately 
resided with WTO Members, and it was in that spirit that the United States had sought, 
unsuccessfully, to engage in a meaningful dialogue with Mexico and the DSB Chair. With respect to 
the disputes Mexico cited at the present meeting, the United States would encourage Mexico to review the procedures agreed by the parties to those disputes. While parties may sometimes agree 
in the context of a particular dispute to hold consultations prior to the establishment of a 
compliance panel, it did not mean that the DSU required such consultations. In fact, when agreeing to hold consultations, parties often ma de explicit their agreement that the DSU did not 
require such consultations.
2 Turning to the substance, Mexico's position was not correct. There was 
no requirement to request consultations under Article 4 of the DSU as a condition for requesting 
the establishment of a compliance panel pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU, a point that the Appellate Body had made in two reports, one of which had involved Mexico as a party.
3 Indeed, 
while recourse to the original panel was mentioned as a possible step in Article 21.5, consultations 
were not referred to. The United States could not see how Article 4 of the DSU could apply to an instance in which it was the Member concerned who was requesting a compliance panel to confirm 
that Member's compliance. Accordingly, any object ion to the US panel request based on the failure 
to request Article 4 consultations could not prevent the establishment of a panel. The United States also noted that, in any event, the parties had already consulted on the initial matter giving rise to the situation under Article 21.5. Further, the United States had discussed the recent 
rule with Mexico on a number of occasions, including under the Understanding between the 
United States and Mexico Regarding Procedures under Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU.
4 Of course, 
as the United States had mentioned previously, th e United States stood ready to consult further 
with Mexico on this matter as long as those consultations did not cause any delay in the 
compliance panel proceedings. Finally, the United States would note that this was consistent with the approach agreed under that same Understand ing, which had specified that Mexico was not 
required to hold consultations with the United States prior to requesting the establishment of an 
Article 21.5 panel.
5 
1.7.  The representative of Mexico said that, with regard to the comments made by the 
United States concerning an informal meeting wi th the US, Mexico and the DSB Chairman prior to 
the present meeting, Mexico wished to state that the forum for discussing DSB matters was the 
DSB meeting in the presence of all Members. Mexi co did not consider it appropriate to address 
DSB issues in advance of formal meetings withou t the rest of the Membership being aware of and 
having the opportunity to share their points of vi ew. Mexico had attended one meeting with the US 
and the DSB Chair as a matter of courtesy and diplomacy in order to discuss aspects on which Mexico and the United States clearly did not agr ee, as mentioned at the previous DSB meeting. 
However, Mexico viewed a second meeting as an abuse. In its view, it was not right to hold that 
type of meetings. The right thing was to discuss su ch matters at the DSB meeting in front of all 
Members. Regarding the comments made by the United States on sequencing agreements, Mexico was aware that sequencing agreements existed, but, in this case, the United States was not 
entitled to be exempted from consultations. Ar ticle 21.5 of the DSU was clear, the proceedings 
must be decided "through recourse to these dispute settlement procedures". This included consultations, appeals, etc., as Mexico had made clear in its first statement made at the present 
meeting. The United States could read paragraphs  45, 47, 50 and 64 of the Appellate Body report 
in the dispute "Mexico - Corn Syrup" (Recourse to  Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States), 
which explained what Mexico had referred to in its first statement. Mexico stressed that it was, in 
this case, the complainant. Mexico had initiated this dispute eight years ago and hoped to be able 
to resolve it. As had been mentioned previously, the DSU provisions indicated that inconsistent measures were to be removed or eliminated. The United States had failed to do so and had done so unsuccessfully on two occasions, and Mexico would demonstrate, for the third time, that the 
United States was not meeting its obligations. 
                                               
2 See, e.g., WT/DS414/14. 
3 See "Mexico – HFCS" (Article 21.5) (AB), paragraph 65; "US – Continued Suspension" (AB), 
paragraph 340. 
4 Understanding between the United States and Mexi co regarding procedures under Articles 21 and 22 
of the DSU, WT/DS381/19, paragraph 10 (circulated on 7 August 2013). 
5 Understanding between the United States and Mexi co regarding procedures under Articles 21 and 22 
of the DSU, WT/DS381/19, paragraph 2 (circulated on 7 August 2013). WT/DSB/M/378 
 
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  1.8.  The DSB took note of the statements and agreed, pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU, to 
refer to the original Panel, if possible, the matter raised by the United States in document 
WT/DS381/32. The Panel would have standard terms of reference. 
1.9.  The representatives of Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, Guatemala, 
India, Japan and Norway reserved their third-party rights to participate in the Panel's proceedings. 
2  ARGENTINA – MEASURES RELATING TO TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES 
A.  Report of the Appellate Body (WT/DS453 /AB/R and Add.1) and Report of the Panel 
(WT/DS453/R and Add.1) 
2.1.  The Chairman drew attention to the comm unication from the Appellate Body contained in 
document WT/DS453/11 transmitting the Appellate Body Report in the dispute: "Argentina – 
Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services", which had been circulated on 14 April 2016 in 
documents WT/DS453/AB/R and Add.1. He reminded delegations that the Appellate Body Report 
and the Panel Report pertaining to this dispute ha d been circulated as unrestricted documents. As 
Members were aware, Article 17.14 of the DSU requ ired that: "An Appellate Body report shall be 
adopted by the DSB and unconditionally accepted  by the parties to the dispute unless the DSB 
decides by consensus not to adopt the Appellate Body report within 30 days following its circulation to Members. This adoption procedure is without prejudice to the right of Members to 
express their views on an Appellate Body report". 
2.2.  The representative of Argentina said that, on 14 April 2016, the Appellate Body had 
circulated to Members its Report in the dispute: "Argentina - Measures Relating to Trade in Goods 
and Services". As a result of the amendments ma de to the Panel Report, the Appellate Body had 
not made any recommendation to Argentina under Article 19.1 of the DSU. Argentina was satisfied 
with the outcome of this dispute, which had various systemic implications. First, the findings of both the Panel and the Appellate Body confirmed that the GATS gave Members ample margin to 
maintain defensive anti-abuse measures relati ng to transparency and the exchange of tax 
information as a way of protecting public re venue, preventing risks deriving from money 
laundering and curbing tax evasion. The outcome of this dispute significantly supported the active 
efforts made by the G20, the OECD Global Forum and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to 
prevent the aforementioned risks. Furthermore, the Appellate Body's endorsement of the Panel's 
findings regarding Article XIV of the GATS and th e "prudential exception" confirmed that Members 
enjoyed broad discretion to adopt this type of an ti-abuse measure, provided that they met the 
conditions established by these provisions. 
2.3.  Second, Argentina had maintained throughout the dispute that the services and service 
suppliers originating in jurisdictions not participating in the exchange of tax information with other 
jurisdictions were fundamentally different from the services and service suppliers originating in 
jurisdictions that did, whether from a trade or regulatory point of view. For this reason, the dispute had to be resolved on the basis of a correct inte rpretation of the concept of "likeness". In that 
respect, this was the first dispute in which the Appellate Body had established the standard for 
determining likeness in the context of Articles II and XVII of the GATS. The Appellate Body had 
established that the assessment of likeness of services should not be undertaken in isolation from considerations relating to the service suppliers, and, conversely, the assessment of likeness of 
service suppliers should not be undertaken in isolation from considerations relating to the likeness 
of the services they provided. 
2.4.  The Appellate Body had also determined how a panel should proceed in assessing the 
"likeness" of services and service suppliers in the particular context of Article II:1 and 
Article XVII:1 of the GATS. In that respect, it had been made clear that the criteria for assessing "likeness" traditionally employed as analytical tools in the context of trade in goods were relevant 
for assessing the competitive relationship of services and service suppliers, provided that they 
were adapted as appropriate to account for the specific characteristics of trade in services. Furthermore, as maintained by Argentina througho ut the dispute, establishing "likeness" on the 
basis of a presumption was significantly more complex in trade in services. In that respect, within 
the GATS framework, the scope of "presumption of likeness", on the basis of which a measure 
made a distinction between services and service suppliers based exclusively on origin, was limited. As had been noted by the Appellate Body, this was due, in particular, to the role that domestic WT/DSB/M/378 
 
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  regulation may play in shaping, for example, the characteristics of services and service suppliers 
and consumers' preferences. Finally, in this di spute, the "prudential exception" that had been 
established in paragraph 2(a) of the GATS Annex on  Financial Services was interpreted for the first 
time. Few provisions, not only of the GATS, but of all the WTO Agreements, had been as widely 
examined and discussed as the prudential except ion. The Panel had agreed with Argentina and 
various third parties in this dispute that this provision reflected a "broad policy space" to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system. The Appellate Body, for its part, had found that 
the prudential exception may be invoked to justify inconsistencies with all of a Member's 
obligations under the GATS and that there were no restrictions on the type or form of a "measure" 
falling under that provision. It had also been established that the Members' broad conception of the prudential exception informed the negotiation and the scope of the commitments that they had 
negotiated and had inscribed in their schedules of specific commitments. For this reason, a narrow 
interpretation of the scope of application of the provision or of the conditions under which the prudential exception could be invoked would possibly alter the balance of rights and obligations 
under the GATS. In conclusion, Argentina thanked the WTO Secretariat, in particular the Legal 
Affairs Division and the Appellate Body Secretariat, for their work in this dispute. Argentina also thanked the translators and interpreters, who had made it possible for this dispute to be 
conducted in Spanish. 
2.5.  The representative Panama said that his country thanked the Appellate Body, the Panel and 
the Secretariat for their work and assistance to the parties in these proceedings. The Appellate 
Body's decision corrected a fundamental flaw in the Panel's reasoning which, if it had been upheld, 
would have seriously undermined the principle of non-discrimination in trade in services. The 
Panel's interpretation of "less favourable treatment" with respect to the non-discrimination obligations under the GATS was erroneous from a legal point of view, and problematic from a 
systemic point of view. The Appellate Body was pe rfectly clear in its conclusion that Members may 
not neutralize competitive advantages enjoyed by services and service suppliers of other Members 
through discriminatory measures and claim not to violate the fundamental most-favoured-nation 
and national treatment obligations set forth in Articles II.1 and XVII of the GATS. It was also 
encouraging that the Appellate Body should have recognized that the presumption of "likeness" 
was warranted, whether between goods or services and service suppliers, when the measure at issue made distinctions on the basis of their origin. That confirmation, which set a precedent, 
made it easier to question less favourable treatmen t of services or service suppliers on the basis of 
lists in which distinctions were made only on the basis of origin. In a nutshell, the well-established case law on likeness in the context of trade in goods applied in the same way to trade in services. 
Panama regretted that the Appellate Body had reversed some of the Panel's findings on the 
grounds that the Panel had not conducted a sufficiently thorough analysis, without completing the legal analysis of "likeness" between the services and service suppliers in question. The DSU did not 
allow the Appellate Body to send a case back to the Panel when the latter had not conducted a 
sufficiently thorough analysis. Panama had been adversely affected by that limitation in this dispute, and would have to consider what action to take. However, in Panama's view, the Appellate Body should have completed the analysis  in order to provide a prompt solution to the 
dispute. In spite of these concerns, Panama welcomed the fact that the Appellate Body had not 
endorsed a discriminatory system of lists of count ries that violated the basic principles of the 
multilateral system and had been dictated by the regulatory environment. 
2.6.  The representative of the United States said that his country thanked the members of the 
Appellate Body, the Panel, and the Secretariat assist ing them for their work on this dispute. As a 
third-party in this dispute, the United States had noted throughout that the facts and 
circumstances were unusual. In the course of the Panel proceedings, Argentina had shifted 
Panama to "cooperating country" status for purposes of tax treatment, a shift that Argentina had considered might resolve Panama's complaint, but which had not, and which the Panel had appeared to construe as arbitrary and had used as the basis for a number of its adverse findings. 
At the same time, a number of the legal positions taken by Panama concerning interpretation of 
GATS provisions on national treatment, most-f avoured-nation treatment, and the prudential 
exception, had appeared to be inconsistent with a plain reading of the text of the GATS. The 
United States therefore appreciated the Appellate Bo dy's reversal of the Panel's approach to "like 
services or service suppliers". The Appellate Body had recognized that a determination of "likeness" in a national treatment or most-f avoured-nation treatment claim under the GATS 
required a rigorous analysis, taking into account all relevant facts that may bear on the "likeness" 
issue. Having resolved the appeal on the first, threshold issue of "likeness", it would have been 
appropriate to stop the analysis at that point. Indeed, given the unusual circumstances, there were WT/DSB/M/378 
 
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  even greater reasons than usual to consider only those issues necessary to resolve the dispute. 
Regrettably, the Appellate Body Report did not take the appropriately cautious approach. Rather, it went on to consider issues on appeal that the Appellate Body itself had considered not necessary 
to resolve the dispute. As the Report stated at paragraph 6.83: "Our reversal of these findings [on 
likeness] means that the Panel's findings on 'treatment no less favourable' are moot because they 
were based on the Panel's findings that the relevant services and service suppliers are 'like'. Moreover, as a consequence of our reversal of th e Panel's 'likeness' findings, there remains no 
finding of inconsistency with the GATS. This, in turn, renders moot the Panel's analysis … pursuant 
to Article XIV(c) of the GATS and … paragraph 2(a) of the GATS Annex on Financial Services". But after clarifying that all of the Panel's findings  other than "likeness" were rendered moot, the 
Appellate Body in paragraph 6.84 stated that "[w]ith these considerations in mind, we turn to 
address the issues raised in Panama's appeals". That is, after clarifying that Panama's appeals 
concerned "moot" panel findings, the Appellate Body went on to address those moot appeals. The United States was concerned that this approach did not reflect the role of dispute settlement as set 
out in the DSU. It was not the role of this system to make legal findings or interpretations outside 
the context of resolving a dispute. Indeed, as the Appellate Body itself had noted in its Report in the dispute "Wool Shirts and Blouses": "Given the explicit aim of dispute settlement that 
permeates the DSU, we do not consider that Article 3.2 of the DSU is meant to encourage either 
panels or the Appellate Body to "make law" by clarifying existing provisions of the WTO Agreement outside the context of resolving a particular dispute".
6 It followed that if an issue on appeal was 
not necessary to resolve a particular dispute, because for example the panel findings had been 
rendered "moot" as a result of another legal error, then the Appellate Body should decline to make 
law by resolving that unnecessary issue. The DSU di rected panels and the Appellate Body to make 
findings on those issues of law that were necessary to assist the DSB in helping resolve the 
dispute.7 Indeed, while the United States may consider certain of the Appellate Body's statements 
in the remaining 46 pages of its Report correct in substance, those statements were unfortunately not findings but more in the nature of obiter dicta . Members may wish to reflect on the significant 
impact that the issuance of such advisory opinio ns would have on the functioning of the dispute 
settlement system. 
2.7.  The representative of Canada said that hi s country thanked the Appellate Body, the Panel and 
their respective Secretariats for their work in helping the parties resolve this dispute. Although it 
was not a third-party to this dispute, Canada wished nonetheless to take the opportunity to 
provide its views on certain issues raised in the Re port of the Appellate Body. First, the outcome of 
this dispute turned on the Appellate Body's reversal of the Panel's findings that the services and 
service suppliers in question were "like", which came early on in the Report at paragraph 6.83. In 
previous reports, the Appellate Body had indicated that, where it overturned panel findings, it may 
complete the analysis where the panel record provided a sufficient factual basis to do so. Given the 
importance of the prompt resolution of disputes , Canada accepted the usefulness of the Appellate 
Body doing so. In light of the importance of th e Panel's likeness finding to the outcome of this 
dispute, Canada was therefore surprised that the Appellate Body had not sought to complete the analysis following its reversal of the Panel's finding that the services and service suppliers in 
question were "like", nor to explain why it had b een unable to do so. According to the Report, the 
parties seemed to have presented arguments and some evidence with respect to various criteria for establishing "likeness". Receiving an explanation from the Appellate Body as to why it had been 
unable to complete the analysis was useful for WTO Members as guidance for how to conduct 
themselves in future dispute settlement proceedi ngs. Moreover, given the absence of a remand 
mechanism, the Appellate Body's decision not to complete the analysis when it might have been 
able to do so, deprived the complaining party of  an opportunity to have all of its arguments 
considered. 
2.8.  Second, regarding the "treatment no less favourable" standard to be applied under GATS 
+Articles II:1 and XVII, Canada welcomed the Appellate Body's clarification, at paragraph 6.111, 
that the analysis should assess whether the measure at issue modified the conditions of 
competition to the detriment of like services or service suppliers in question, and that it did not contemplate a separate step of the analysis into the measure's "regulatory aspects". Canada also 
agreed with the Appellate Body that the GATS strikes a balance between a Member's obligations 
under the Agreement and its right to pursue policy objectives, including through various flexibilities and exceptions. Canada also considered that regulatory flexibility could be 
                                               
6 "US – Wool Shirts and Blouses", WT /DS33/AB/R and Corr. 1, at page 19. 
7 See DSU, Articles 3.7, 7.1, 11. WT/DSB/M/378 
 
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  accommodated under the "likeness" component of the GATS less favourable treatment analysis. 
For instance, under the GATT as elaborated in particular in the "EC – Asbestos" dispute, where otherwise like products posed different risks, they may be found to not be "like". The same concept should apply to considerations of "likeness" in the services context. Third, and finally, 
Canada welcomed the Appellate Body's affirmatio n at paragraphs 6.259-6.260 that the scope of 
the measures that potentially fell within the prudential exception in paragraph 2(a) of the Annex on Financial Services was broad, and that any a priori  restriction on this scope would be 
incompatible with the balance of rights and obligations that was expressly recognized in the 
preamble of the GATS. It was important that Memb ers continued to have the flexibility to take 
measures for prudential reasons to ensure the in tegrity and stability of the financial system. The 
Appellate Body's finding preserved that flexibility. 
2.9.  The DSB took note of the statements and adopted the Appellate Body Report contained in 
documents WT/DS453/AB/R and WT/DS453/AB/R/Add.1 and the Panel Report contained in 
documents WT/DS453/R and WT/DS453/R/Add.1, as modified by the Appellate Body Report. 
__________