G/AG/W/135
30 September 2014
(14-5299)  Page: 1/61
Committee on Agriculture   
 
RESPONSES TO POINTS RAISED BY MEMBERS UNDER THE REVIEW PROCESS  
COMPILATION OF RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS RAISED DURING THE COMMITTEE 
ON AGRICULTURE MEETING ON 5 AND 6 JUNE 20141 
The present document compiles responses received in writing by the Secretariat to the questions 
raised in document G/AG/W/127 as well as foll ow-up comments made during the Review Process. 
 
A comprehensive version of the present compilation will be issued once all outstanding responses 
are provided by Members.   
 
_______________ 
 
                                               
1 This document has been prepared under the Secret ariat's own responsibility and is without prejudice 
to the positions of Members or to their rights or obligations under the WTO. G/AG/W/135 
 
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  TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1   MATTERS RELEVANT TO THE IMPL EMENTATION OF CO MMITMENTS: ARTICLE 
18.6 .......................................................................................................................... ....... 4  
1.1   Brazil's 2014-15 Harvest Plan ...................................................................................... 4  
1.1.1   Question by European Union (AG-IMS ID 74022) ......................................................... 4  
1.2   Brazil's domestic support programmes .......................................................................... 4  
1.2.1   Question by United Stat es of America (A G-IMS ID 74021) ............................................ 4  
1.3   Canada's proposed ch anges to tariff  schedule ................................................................ 5  
1.3.1   Question by United Stat es of America (A G-IMS ID 74047) ............................................ 5  
1.4   Canada's dairy policies ............................................................................................... 7  
1.4.1   Question by New Zealand (AG-IMS ID 74058) ............................................................. 7  
1.5   Costa Rica's complian ce with AMS co mmitments ............................................................ 8  
1.5.1   Question by United Stat es of America (A G-IMS ID 74023) ............................................ 8  
1.6   Ecuador's domestic purchase requ irements ................................................................... 9  
1.6.1   Question by United Stat es of America (A G-IMS ID 74024) ............................................ 9  
1.7   Honduras' ta x exemptions .......................................................................................... 9  
1.7.1   Question by United Stat es of America (A G-IMS ID 74025) ............................................ 9  
1.8   India's subsidization policy ......................................................................................... 10 
1.8.1   Question by Pa kistan (AG-IM S ID 74056) .................................................................. 10 
1.9   India's national agri cultural insu rance scheme .............................................................. 10 
1.9.1   Question by United Stat es of America (A G-IMS ID  74049 ) ........................................... 10 
1.10   India's landholding laws ........................................................................................... 12 
1.10.1   Question by United States of America (AG-IMS ID 74051) .......................................... 12 
1.11   India's sugar export subsidies ................................................................................... 13 
1.11.1   Question by Australia (AG-IMS ID 74007) ................................................................ 13 
1.11.2   Question by Br azil (AG-IMS ID 7405 5) .................................................................... 15 
1.12   India's wheat stocks and exports .............................................................................. 16 
1.12.1   Question by Canada (AG- IMS ID  74001) .................................................................. 16 
1.12.2   Question by United States of America (AG-IMS ID 74048) .......................................... 16 
1.13   Saint Lucia's domestic purchase  requirements for poultry and pork ................................ 18 
1.13.1   Question by United States of America (AG-IMS ID 74044) .......................................... 18 
1.14   Thailand's paddy pledging scheme ............................................................................. 19 
1.14.1   Question by India (AG-IMS ID 74053) ..................................................................... 19 
1.14.2   Question by Pa kistan (AG-IM S ID 74057) ................................................................ 19 
1.14.3   Question by United States of America (AG-IMS ID 74050) .......................................... 20 
1.15   Turkey's domestic su pport and export subsidies .......................................................... 21 
1.15.1   Question by Europe an Union (AG- IMS ID 74020) ...................................................... 21 
1.16   Turkey's destination of wheat flour sale ...................................................................... 21 
1.16.1   Question by United States of America (AG-IMS ID 75001) .......................................... 21 
1.17   U.S.  Farm Bill ......................................................................................................... 22 G/AG/W/135 
 
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  1.17.1   Question by Ar gentina (AG-IM S ID 74011) .............................................................. 22 
1.17.2   Question by India (AG-IMS ID 74054) ..................................................................... 27 
1.17.3   Question by In donesia (AG-IM S ID 74059) .............................................................. 30 
2   POINTS RAISED IN CONNECTION WITH INDIVIDUAL NOTIFICATIONS .................... 31  
2.1   IMPORTS UNDER TARIFF AND OTHE R QUOTA COMMITMENTS  (TABLE MA:2) ..................... 31 
2.1.1   Canada (G/AG/N/CAN/95) ....................................................................................... 31 
2.1.2   China (G /AG/N/CH N/26) ......................................................................................... 31 
2.1.3   Costa Rica  (G/AG/N/ CRI/47) ................................................................................... 32 
2.1.4   Dominican Repu blic (G/AG/ N/DOM/22) ..................................................................... 32 
2.1.5   Ecuador (G/AG/N/EC U/38) ...................................................................................... 33 
2.1.6   Russian Federation (G/AG/N/RUS/4) ......................................................................... 33 
2.1.7   Chinese Taipei (G/AG/N/TPKM/112) .......................................................................... 35 
2.2   DOMESTIC SUPPORT COMMITMENTS (TABLE DS:1) ....................................................... 35 
2.2.1   Kingdom of Ba hrain (G/AG/ N/BHR/7) ....................................................................... 35 
2.2.2   Brazil (G /AG/N/BRA/32) ......................................................................................... 36 
2.2.3   Canada (G/AG/N/ CAN/96, G/AG/N /CAN/98) .............................................................. 37 
2.2.4   Costa Rica (G/AG/N/CR I/44/REV.1, G/AG /N/CRI/ 48) .................................................. 38 
2.2.5   Dominican Repu blic (G/AG/ N/DOM/23) ..................................................................... 40 
2.2.6   Guatemala (G/AG/N/GTM/45) .................................................................................. 42 
2.2.7   Indonesia (G/AG/N/ IDN/30, G/AG/N /IDN/34) ............................................................ 42 
2.2.8   Japan (G /AG/N/JP N/191) ........................................................................................ 43 
2.2.9   Thailand (G/AG/N/TH A/75) ..................................................................................... 47 
2.3   NEW OR MODIFIED DOMESTIC  SUPPORT MEASURES (Table DS:2) .................................. 50 
2.3.1   Canada (G/AG/N/CAN/99) ....................................................................................... 50 
2.3.2   Japan (G /AG/N/JP N/192) ........................................................................................ 52 
2.4   EXPORT SUBSIDY COMMITMENTS  (TABLES ES:1, ES :2 AND ES:3) .................................. 56 
2.4.1   Morocco (G/AG/N/MA R/40) ..................................................................................... 56 
2.4.2   Thailand (G/AG/N/TH A/76) ..................................................................................... 56 
ANNEX 1 ....................................................................................................................... . 58 
ANNEX 2 ....................................................................................................................... . 59 
ANNEX 3 ....................................................................................................................... . 61 
 G/AG/W/135 
 
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  1  MATTERS RELEVANT TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMITMENTS: ARTICLE 18.6 
1.1  Brazil's 2014-15 Harvest Plan 1.1.1  Question by European Union (AG-IMS ID 74022) 
According to press reports, on 19 May Brazilian President Rousseff launched the 
government's Harvest Plan for 2014-2015. The reports stated that: "The plan calls for 
R$156 billion (US$71 billion) in credit for the nation's farmers, an increase of 14.7% 
over the 2013-2014 harvest. The average annual interest rate for farm credit lines will 
be 6.5%, below the Selic rate which is curre ntly at 11%. Officials estimated that the 
subsidized interest rates offered to fa rmers will cost the government between 
R$7 billion (US$3.1 billion) and R$10 billion (US$4.5 billion)". 
Could Brazil please provide further details  of how this scheme will operate? Will all 
farmers be eligible for this support? 
Answer by Brazil 
 
The figure presented corresponds to the total value of credit available to producers, cooperatives, processors and traders for the crop-year 2014/2015,  which can be provided by means of a number 
of programmes, encompassing production, marketing and investment credits. The interest rates, 
the maximum terms and the limits of credit by producer/enterprise vary according to the programme in question. The source of the credit pr ovided can be private or public. Not all farmers 
are eligible to all programmes: some of them are available only for family farmers (such 
as PRONAF). The implicit subsidy of each programme will be notified as usual, based on the difference between the applicable interest rate and the Selic rate.  
Follow-up : The European Union flagged interest. The United States of America was particularly 
interested in the subsidized interest rates and sought clarification on whether the programme was 
targeted to specific agricultural sectors or generally available to all sectors.  
 
1.2  Brazil's domestic support programmes 
1.2.1  Question by United Stat es of America (AG-IMS ID 74021) 
a. In response to the U.S. question (AG-IMS 66002), Brazil provided an annex 
indicating benefits under the "Prêmio para Escoamento do Produto" (PEP) programme, Brazilian production, an d exports, for cr op years 2006/2007 
through 2010/2011. 
Please provide an update to the tables included in the annex with the following 
additions: 
i. inclusion of benefits under Brazil' s "Prêmio de Equalização pago ao 
Produtor" (PEPRO) programme; 
ii. quantities of product exported under PEP; 
iii. quantities of product exported under PEPRO; 
iv. a new table for maize. 
b. The United States of America previously  requested data on the quantities of 
products shipped to specific destinatio ns for PEP and PEPRO, including both 
domestic and export destinations, either on  an aggregated or specific basis. If 
Brazil is unable to provide this da ta, please clarify the following. 
i. Since the initial U.S. request in Septem ber of 2011, please describe specific 
steps Brazil has taken to gather the data, including details of CONAB's control mechanism that Brazil noted in response to AG-IMS 71028. G/AG/W/135 
 
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  ii. If not outlined above, please conf irm whether CONAB's control mechanism 
has any internal deadlines and if so, provide the specific dates. 
iii. Has Brazil been able to collect any pr eliminary data that could be shared 
without prejudice to any final submission? 
iv. Please provide a date by which the Unit ed States of America can expect this 
data. 
c. In response to U.S. question AG-IMS 73026, Brazil stated that the 
PEP reassessment is still in progress. Please provide any updates on the 
reassessment and confirm the pr ogramme remains suspended. 
Answer by Brazil 
 
a. The requested updated tables are being provided to the United States of America. 
Nonetheless, please note that there is no available data of quantities of products 
exported under PEP and PEPRO, which are not export-contingent programmes. 
b.  
i. Gathering this data is burdensome, since the information received from PEP 
and PEPRO beneficiaries under CONAB's control mechanism is presented only in hard 
copies. However, CONAB is working on improving its control mechanism so as to be able to provide data covering more recent periods. 
ii. There are no internal deadlines so far. 
iii. Brazil has not been able to collect any preliminary data until now. 
iv. There is no deadline to be provided at this moment. 
c. PEP is still under reassessment and remains suspended. 
1.3  Canada's proposed changes to tariff schedule 
1.3.1  Question by United Stat es of America (AG-IMS ID 74047) 
The United States of America appreciates Cana da's responses to U.S. questions on this 
issue and has follow-up questions: 
a. In Canada's responses to questions posed by the United States of 
America (AG ‑IMS 73027) with respect to Canada's reclassification of certain 
components of certain food preparation products in Chapter 16 of the Canadian 
Customs Tariff Schedule, Canada stated that the measure in question was not 
implemented on a retroactive basis. 
i. Is it correct that if Bill C-31 ("An Act to Implement Certain Provisions of the 
Budget Tabled in Parliament on February 11, 2014 and Other Measures") 
receives royal assent, the effective date will be 29 November 2013? Would 
that be retroactive? 
ii. Please state whether Canada is current ly enforcing the measure and, if so, 
when enforcement began. 
iii. If Canada is enforcing the measure, pl ease explain the legal authority under 
which the government is permitted to do so prior to Bill C-31 receiving royal assent. G/AG/W/135 
 
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  b. In the response to the March 2014 qu estions submitted to this Committee, 
Canada stated that "it is too early to determine how the measure in question will impact trade" and that "various fa ctors" could influence trade patterns. 
Graph 1 below shows that beginning in De cember 2013, the volume of Canada's 
imports of products affected by the me asure and imported into Canada under 
harmonized schedule heading 1601.00. 90.90 dropped by approximately 50% 
and has continued falling. Now that six months have passed since the measure 
became effective, can Canada please explain what factors influenced this 
dramatic decrease in imports? 
Graph 1 
 
 
c. In its March 2014 response, Canada stated  that the "limited gap between the 
tabling of the Notice of Ways and Means and its effective date" was "in order to 
discourage further circumvention of the law". The United States of America 
does not share Canada's characterization that the products impacted by 
Canada's change in tariff classification of processed products containing cheese 
were circumventing Canadian customs du ties. In fact, from October 2006 to 
December 2013, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) maintained in 
certain advance rulings that it relied on World Customs Organization (WCO) 
General Interpretive Rule (GRI) No 1 and the relevant notes of the Customs 
Tariff to determine that certain food pr eparations containing "more than 20% 
by weight" of meat and some cheese shou ld properly be classified under tariff 
heading 1601.00.90.99. 
i. Please explain why CBSA has determined  that its original and subsequent 
advance rulings between 2006 and 2013 pertaining to certain food 
preparations containing "more than 20%  by weight" of meat and cheese are 
no longer correct. 
ii. Please explain whether Canada has ch anged its approach to interpreting 
WCO GRI No 1 for all products contai ning "more than 20% by weight" of 
meat and some cheese. 
iii. Please explain whether there are item s other than cheese that have also 
been incorporated into the certain food  preparations reclassification action. G/AG/W/135 
 
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  Answer by Canada 
a. The effective date of the proposed legislative amendment in Bill C-31 is 
29 November 2013 to mirror the coming into force date specified in the Notice of Ways and Means Motion tabled on 22 November 2013. As previously explained, the tabling of 
a Notice of Ways and Means Motion is a standard parliamentary procedure to give effect 
to domestic taxation changes prior to such time that formal legislation can be brought forward. Longstanding parliamentary convention dictates that taxation proposals will be 
deemed to have come into force as soon as the government tables a Notice of Ways and 
Means Motion (or on an alternate date specif ied therein), even though the government's 
taxation plans have not yet been formally adopted by way of legislation. 
b. It remains impossible to isolate the impact of the measure as various factors influence 
trade patterns and because multiple products are covered by tariff item 1601.00.90.90. 
A decrease in imports within 1601.00.90.90 would not be abnormal as the measure was specifically intended to address imports of goods packaged in a specific, deliberate 
manner solely to circumvent Canada's tariff structure. 
c. CBSA advance rulings dated between 2006 and 28 November 2013 were correctly issued 
on the basis of the Customs Tariff prior to the introduction of the new Supplementary 
Note. The new Supplementary Note introduced by the Notice of Ways and Means Motion 
is intended to ensure the consistent application of Canadian law with respect to cheese imports, by addressing a gap whereby certain imported goods were packaged in a specific and deliberate manner in order to circumvent Canada's import controls, as 
administered through the Customs Tariff. In particular, this amendment stems from 
imports of a "pizza topping" product containing approximately 79% shredded mozzarella cheese and 21% sliced pepperoni, packaged together in a single plastic bag and 
separated by a sheet of wax paper. The packaging allowed the good to qualify as a "food 
preparation" in Chapter 16, effectively exploiting Note 2 to Chapter 16 in order to avoid Canada's tariff rate quotas for cheese. Given the nature of the imports in question, the 
measure is limited to food preparations of a type used commercially in the preparation of 
fresh food products that include ch eese for direct sale to a consumer. 
Follow-up: The United States of America disagreed with Canada's view that the product containing 
mozzarella cheese and pepperoni as stated in part c of Canada's response circumvented Canada's 
tariff structure. The United States of America high lighted the dramatic fall of imports of products 
affected following the application of the measure and was concerned that stakeholders' input was 
not taken into account. New Zealand shared the United States of America concern and was further 
concerned that Canada would take such a process as a precedent to seek tariff reclassifications of other products in the future. 
 
1.4  Canada's dairy policies 
1.4.1  Question by New Zealand (AG-IMS ID 74058) 
New Zealand has been made aware of a pa per drafted by Canadian dairy producers 
outlining an Ingredients Strategy for the Canadian dairy industry. While New Zealand 
acknowledges that the paper is written by  the industry, New Zealand notes there are 
references to the involvement of governme nt in programmes that could potentially 
displace imports and also create the potentia l to export subsidised product outside of 
Canada's current export su bsidy commitments. Could Canada please confirm whether 
the Canadian government: 
a. has been engaging with the industry on this new strategy? 
b. Intends to implement any parts of the strategy requiring government 
involvement? If so, what parts, an d how do they relate to Canada's 
commitments under the Agreement on Agriculture? G/AG/W/135 
 
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  Answer by Canada 
 The ingredient strategy is not a Government of Canada policy: rather it is an industry-led initiative. The Canadian government cannot speculate on possible actions the dairy industry may undertake. 
 
Follow-up: New Zealand reiterated its concern about the potential implications of possible 
government involvement for Canada's obligations under the Agreement on Agriculture. Canada 
was invited to provide complete responses to the two specific points raised in the question. The 
European Union and the United States of America registered interest.   1.5  Costa Rica's compliance with AMS commitments 
1.5.1  Question by United Stat es of America (AG-IMS ID 74023) 
The United States of America appreciates C osta Rica's continued tr ansparency, but notes 
that the figure notified by Costa Rica for its price support programme for rice in its latest 
notification (G/AG/N/CRI/48) is above it s final bound total AMS commitment. The 
United States of America requests re sponses to unanswered questions about 
Costa Rica's price support programme for rice (AG-IMS 73037, AG-IMS ID 71030, and 
AG-IMS ID 72050). 
a. Will producers be able to sell outside of the new system? If not, on what basis 
does CONARROZ have the authority to compel producers to participate in the 
new system? 
b. What is Costa Rica's timeline for publishing these new policies and for notifying 
them to the WTO? 
Costa Rica has previously stated to the Co mmittee that CONARROZ is not a state-trading 
enterprise and the government is not part of CONARROZ's decision-making process or 
General Assembly. According to Decree No 8285 "CREACIÓN DE LA CORPORACIÓN 
ARROCERA", CONARROZ's General Assembly  is composed of representatives of 
producers, agribusiness, and ministers of Ag riculture and Livestock, and the Economy, 
Industry, and Commerce. 
 
c. Please provide citations to any relevant  legislation or decrees that supersede 
Decree No 8285 and Decree 32968-MAG-MEIC,  including specific reference to 
language that removes the government of Costa Rica from CONARROZ. 
Answer by Costa Rica 
 
a. and b. The work involved in coordinating and defining the alternative mechanism due to 
replace the price-setting mechanism for rice, as provided for in Decree No. 37699-MEIC 
(notified to this Committee in document G/AG/GEN/110 of 31 May 2013), is still under way. Costa Rica will be able to provide details regarding the alternative mechanism once 
it has been defined. It will inform the Committee in due course of any development in 
this matter. 
c. Law No. 8285 establishing the National Rice Growers Corporation (CONARROZ) and its 
implementing regulations contained in De cree No. 32968 MAG-MEIC are both in force; 
there is no other legislation removing the government from the Governing Board of 
CONARROZ. Costa Rica wishes to clarify that  the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock 
and the Ministry of the Economy, Industry and Trade are two of the eleven members of 
the Governing Board of this corporation, along with five representatives of the 
production sector and four representatives of the industrial sector. 
Follow-up: The United States of America appreciated the transparency provided by Costa Rica, 
particularly its up-to-date notifications. Canada, the European Union, New Zealand, Pakistan, and 
Uruguay indicated interest. G/AG/W/135 
 
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  1.6  Ecuador's domestic purchase requirements 
1.6.1  Question by United Stat es of America (AG-IMS ID 74024) 
The United States of America appreciates Ecuador's response to U.S. questions in 
AG‑IMS 73038. In Ecuador's response, it refe rs to "technical cooperation agreements". 
a. Are these agreements voluntary? 
b. Please identify any law, regulation or other legal instrument that requires or 
encourages importers or producers to enter into such agreements. 
Ecuador's response also states that tech nical cooperation agreements "are fully 
consistent with the WTO provisions". 
c. Please explain how these agreements  are consistent with Ecuador's 
WTO obligations, including Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture and 
Article III:4 of the GATT 1994. 
Answer by Ecuador 
 Cooperation agreements help to improve the pr oduction chain through the implementation of 
technical cooperation programmes between the public and private sectors. These sectors have 
pushed for cooperation agreements on their own initiative.  These agreements are voluntary and reflect the commitment of the above sectors to Ecuador's 
production development plans. Accordingly, the agreements are not related to any legal 
instruments that encourage or require importers, producers or other actors in the chain to sign such agreements. Moreover, given that these agreem ents deal with technical cooperation, they do 
not affect the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase or distribution of products and therefore 
maintain a level playing field for both Ecuadorian and imported products. Such agreements are also in line with the needs of the domestic production sector, which requires raw materials, inputs 
and capital goods that originate in other countries. 
 These technical cooperation agreements do not in any way affect or impede agricultural trade flows. 
 
Follow-up: The United States of America registered concern about the possible effects on imports 
and indicated intention to follow up on this issue. 
 
1.7  Honduras' tax exemptions  
1.7.1  Question by United Stat es of America (AG-IMS ID 74025) 
The United States of America understands th at Honduras published in Executive Decree 
No 005-2014 on 8 February 2014 a list of 273 products that will not be subject to 
Honduras' 15% sales tax. 
a. Please explain how Decree No 278-2013 is being implemented. 
b. Please explain how Decree No 278-2013 is consistent with 
Honduras' WTO commitments, including Article III of GATT 1994. 
Answer by Honduras 
 
a. Article 17 of Legislative Decree No. 278-2013, published in Official Journal La Gaceta  
on 30 December 2013, contained the list of goods exempt from payment of sales tax. 
This Article was repealed pursuant to Legi slative Decree No. 02-2014 and is therefore no 
longer operative. G/AG/W/135 
 
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  b. The list of goods exempt from payment of sale s tax contained in Article 17 of Legislative 
Decree No. 278-2013 was not inconsistent with Honduras' WTO commitments, given that this Article was generally applicable to both domestic and imported products, 
irrespective of their origin and provenance. 
It should be noted that Honduras, pu rsuant to Executive Decree No. 005-2014 
of 7 February 2014, specifies the list of good s exempt from payment of sales tax, which 
is the existing generally applicable list. 
1.8  India's subsidization policy 
1.8.1  Question by Pakistan (AG-IMS ID 74056) 
It seems that India is following a policy of "double subsidization" for producers of major 
crops such as rice and wheat. Large inpu t subsidies are provided and administered 
prices are announced before the sowing sea son with guaranteed procurement. Could 
India please provide information about the futu re direction of this double-subsidization 
policy? India's important role in agricult ure exports makes such information useful. 
India is now the biggest exporter of rice in  the world and among the top ten exporters of 
wheat. 
Answer by India 
 
India provides support to its farmers as per thei r developmental requirements and in accordance 
with the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture. The Agreement on Agriculture does not, as per India's understanding, bar the simultaneous pr ovision of various forms of support as long as 
these are in accordance with the rules and the commitments of the Member to the WTO. 
 
Follow-up : Pakistan reminded India of the transparency requirement on notifications as stipulated 
by the Agreement on Agriculture. Pakistan was concerned with India's subsidization policy as India 
was the biggest exporter of rice at the moment and India provided support, especially input 
support, to all rice varieties. Pakistan made reference to the value of India's total trade-distorting 
support calculated respectively by the Cairns group and the United States of America and asked 
India to provide information on the actual amount  spent. The United States of America joined 
Pakistan in recalling the importance of receivin g information on domestic support from India, 
preferably in the form of notifications. By hi ghlighting some figures on India's rice export 
quantities and values in 2011-2013, the United St ates of America pointed out that India became 
the largest rice exporter in th e world since 2012 and the volume of its exports in 2012 and 2013 
were approximately 106% of the size of the seco nd largest exporter at that time, counting for 
almost 40% of the global rice trade. With regards to its outstanding notifications, India stated that 
they were completing the next one. India further drew Members' attention to the 
document G/AG/GEN/86 which showed Members' compliance with notification obligations and 
argued that all Members should equally co mply with the transparency provisions. 
 
1.9  India's national agricultural insurance scheme  
1.9.1  Question by United Stat es of America (AG-IMS ID 74049) 
The National Agricultural Insurance Scheme (NAIS) was last notified by India under 
Supporting Table DS:1 as a payment for relie f from natural disasters for expenditures 
that occurred in 2003/2004. According to the NAIS website, three levels of indemnity 
(payments) at the 90%, 80% and 60% level ar e available for all crops based on level of 
risk. However, according the Indian Ministry of Agriculture, more recently under the National Crop Insurance Program and Pilo t Weather Based Crop Insurance Scheme 
these levels were set at 90%, 80%, and 70%, and for the 2013/2014 season would only 
be available at the 90% and 80% levels. Further, according to the Ministry of 
Agriculture, farmers have the option to purc hase insurance of up to 100% of the value 
of the threshold/average yield of the notifi ed area with a normal premium subsidy. 
a. Noting the significant delay in notifica tions by India, please explain how the 
National Crop Insurance Program's current operation differs from the programme notified in Supporting Table DS:1 in 2003/2004. G/AG/W/135 
 
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  b. When can Members expect a Table DS :2 notification for any Green Box 
components of India's insurance programmes? 
c. Noting that farmers have the option to purchase up to 100% of the threshold 
yield and receive a normal premium su bsidy, please explain how this is 
consistent with paragraph 7 or 8 of A nnex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, 
specifically noting the 30% loss threshold. 
d. In India's response to previous questi ons, (AG-IMS ID 65054 and 65055), India 
states that on average the threshold yiel d, which is the basis for the calculation 
of indemnity payments, is not more than 70% of the actual yield, and that the premium paid by farmers constitutes more than 30%. Please provide data demonstrating that this is the case given the absence of legislative or 
regulatory limits preventing payments for losses of less than 30%. 
e. Does India require a formal government recognition of a natural disaster in 
order for indemnity payments to be made  per paragraph 8(a) of Annex 2? If 
not, has India considered notifying any Green Box component of this insurance 
programme under paragraph 7? 
f. Noting the threshold/guarantee yields are based on five-year averages for 
crops other than rice, please confirm whether these are a straight five-year 
average or a five-year Olympic average. 
Answer by India 
 
a. The National Agricultural Insurance Scheme (NAIS) has been re-structured as the 
National Crop Insurance Programme (NCIP) from 2014-2015. Under NAIS the risk was shared between the insurance company and the government. Under NCIP, the premium 
is partly funded by the government and the claim liability is fully met by the insurance 
company. 
b. DS:2 notifications will be submitted shortly. 
c. The premium subsidy complies with the 30% loss threshold. 
d. The number of farmers covered since inception (i.e. 1999 to 2011-2012) under the three 
indemnity levels are as follows: 
• 90% indemnity level: 19.3 million farmers; 
• 80% indemnity level: 67.5 million farmers; 
• 60% indemnity level: 106.2 million farmers. 
The 50% subsidy on premium was only available to small and marginal farmers for the 
first five years and was thereafter reduced to 10%. 
The newly introduced NCIP with components of Weather Based Crop Insurance 
Scheme (WBCIS) and Modified National Ag ricultural Insurance scheme (MNAIS) have 
farmers' share of premium up to 50%. 
e. The scheme covers yield loss due to (non-preve ntable) natural calamities/localized perils 
such as droughts, floods, natural fire, storm,  pests and disease and therefore is covered 
under paragraph 8. 
f. The threshold yield is based on average yield of the last seven years excluding up to two 
years of declared natural calamity. G/AG/W/135 
 
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  1.10  India's landholding laws 
1.10.1  Question by United Stat es of America (AG-IMS ID 74051) 
The United States of America thanks India for its partial response to AG-IMS ID 67026 
and would like to follow up on its responses to gain a better understanding of Indian 
policy. 
a. India has noted that landholding laws in In dia vary from state to state, but that 
"[o]verall, a farmer is not allowed to ha ve more than 10 hectares of irrigated 
land". Also, India's AGST document st ates that it defines low-income or 
resource poor as a landholding of 10 hectares or less. The United States of 
America understands that one of several objectives of India's landholding law 
is to provide adequate means of livelihood for citizens. 
i. Please confirm the objectives of India's landholding laws. 
ii. How do these objectives align with Indi a's requirement, in light of India's 
landholding laws, nearly all farmer s remain by India's definition 
"low‑income or resource-poor"? 
iii. Noting the limit on land ownership, what policies does India have in place 
with regards to the leasing of agricultural land, which would allow individuals to take advantage of econ omies of scale in farm production? 
iv. If the leasing of agricultural land is permitted, please provide any statistics 
on the amount of land leased. 
b. According to Ministry of Agricultur e statistics comparing 2000/2001 to 
2010/2011, the number of marginal (less than 1 hectare) and small (1‑2 hectares) farms/holdings increased by 22% and 9%, respectively. During 
the same period, semi-medium farms (2-4  hectares) declined by 1%, medium 
farms (4-10 hectares) declined by 11% , and large farms (10 hectares and 
above) declined by 19%. Further, th e average size of a marginal farms 
decreased by 5% and small farms remained unchanged from 2000/2001 through 2010/2011. Please explain the in crease in the number of the marginal 
and small farms and the decrease in se mi-medium, medium and large farms. 
c. The United States of America notes that  a number of agricultural policies in 
India include specific provisions that ta rget small and marginal producers. This 
focus on small and marginal farmers is hi ghlighted by the Eleventh Plan of the 
Government of India, which states "the ag ricultural strategy must focus on the 
85% of farmers who are small and margin al, increasingly female, and who find 
it difficult to access inputs, credit and extension or to market their output". 
Further, the Indian National Commission  for Enterprises in the Unorganized 
Sector, using data from the 59th Round  on Situation Assessment Survey of 
Farmers 2003, found significantly lower (or negative) net income for marginal 
and small farmers as compared to farmer s with larger landholdings. Based on 
Indian policy and stated objectives, it appears that marginal and small farmers 
could be more analogous to the term "low-income or resource ‑poor" in 
the WTO. 
Please provide the basis upon which Indi a determined that nearly All farmers 
should be considered "low-income or resource-poor" as compared to a subset 
of farmers, such as those deemed to be marginal and small. G/AG/W/135 
 
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  Answer by India 
 
a. i.and ii. Land ceiling laws are aimed at securing the principles specified in clauses (b) 
and (c) of Article 39 of the Constitution of India. 
iii. L a w s  o n  l a n d  l e a s i n g  v a r y  f r o m  s t a t e  t o  s t a t e .  I n  m o s t  o f  t h e  s t a t e s ,  l e a s i n g  o f  
agricultural land is prohibited or highly restricted. 
iv. Statistics on lease of land are not available. 
b. The increase in number of marginal and small holdings and decline in number of 
medium, semi-medium and large farm holdings indicates an increase in number of 
holdings/population with existing heredity laws. 
c. India has specified in its AGST that farmers with less than 10 hectares of land are 
classified as "low income and resource poor". 
Follow-up: Canada and Pakistan flagged interest. Pakistan was particularly interested in the criteria 
India used for the subsidy notified under "Input su bsidies available to low-income or resource-poor 
producer". The European Union looked forward to  receiving India's upcoming notifications.  
 
1.11  India's sugar export subsidies 
1.11.1  Question by Australia (AG-IMS ID 74007) 
Australia acknowledges India's response to  its questions at the March 2014 Committee 
on Agriculture in relation to its sugar exports subsidies.  
Australia wishes to affirm Australia's view  that these export subsidy programmes are 
inconsistent with India's obligations and contrary to the spirit and letter of the 
Ministerial Declaration on export comp etition agreed last year in Bali. 
a. Can India please provide an update on the new programme brought into effect 
this year, especially in relation to published information about the value of 
export subsidy to be paid per tonne? 
b. Can India confirm that export subsidy payments have been made under the 
Sugar Development Fund (Amendment) Rules, 2014? 
c. Can India advise how many tonnes of raw sugar and how many tonnes of 
refined sugar have been exported: 
i. Since the introduction of the Su gar Development Fund (Amendment) 
Rules, 2014? 
ii. Since the commencement of the 2013/2014 sugar season? 
d. Can India advise how many tonnes of raw sugar and how many tonnes of 
refined sugar were exported:  
i. between February 2013 and the end of the 2013/2014 sugar season? 
ii. during the 2012/2013 sugar season? 
e. If export subsidy payments have been made, Australia seeks further advice on 
the following:  
i. What is the total volume of raw su gar exports and refined sugar exports 
made since 12 February 2014 that have been subject to incentive payments? G/AG/W/135 
 
- 14 - 
 
  ii. What is the total value of all incentive payments made to date on the export 
of sugar since 12 February 2014? 
iii. Can India advise the current average pr ocessing time between lodgement of 
an application for incentive and payment of an incentive? 
iv. Can India provide the latest average c ost of production figures on a tonne 
basis for those Indian raw sugar produc ers that have received an incentive 
payment? 
v. Can India provide the anticipated total value of the incentive payments over 
the expected duration of the scheme?  
f. If export subsidy payments have not b een made, Australia seeks further advice 
on the following: 
i. Can India advise if applications ha ve been received for the incentive 
payment? 
ii. Can India advise when the first payments will be made? 
iii. If applications have been received, can India advise the total value of 
incentive payments to be made against these applications? 
iv. If applications have been received, ca n India advise the total volume of raw 
and refined sugar exports subject to these applications? 
g. Can India advise if there is a maximum cap applicable to the per metric tonne 
incentive payment under the scheme? 
h. Could India provide a list of WTO Members that have been subject to sales of 
subsidies sugar from India under this export subsidy programme? 
Answer by India 
 
a. The government on 12 February 2014 approved the incentive of Rs 3300 per tonne 
towards marketing and promotion services of raw sugar production for February and March 2014. Thereafter, the incentive will be recalculated bi-monthly. It has also been 
decided that the incentive will be reviewed before commencement of the next sugar 
season and made available to sugar mill owners. The government has notified the 
scheme on 28 February 2014. The incentive fo r the bi-monthly period of April-May 2014 
and June-July has been notified at Rs 2277 and Rs 3300 per tonne respectively. 
b. No payments of incentive have been made so far. 
c. Since the introduction of the Sugar Development Fund (Amendment) Rules 2014, i.e. on 
or after 28 February 2014, about 0.53 million tonnes of raw sugar and about 0.25 million 
tonnes of white/refined sugar has been delivered from the factory for export until 
27 May 2014 under Open General Licence (OGL). Since the commencement of the 2013/2014 sugar season, i.e. on or after 1 October 2014, about 1.15 million tonnes of 
raw sugar and about 0.85 million tonnes of refined/white sugar has been delivered from 
the factory for export until 27 May 2014. 
d. Between February 2013 and the end of the 2012/2013 sugar season, 0.04 million tonnes 
of raw sugar and 0.27 million tonnes of  white/refined sugar has been exported 
under OGL. During the 2012/2013 sugar season, about 0.04 million tonnes of raw sugar 
and 0.27 million tonnes of white/refined sugar has been exported under OGL. 
e. So far, no incentive payments have been made under the scheme. 
f. No application for payment of the incentive has been received so far. G/AG/W/135 
 
- 15 - 
 
  g. The maximum cap is Rs 3300 per tonne which is supposed to be paid for the eligible 
quantity after 28 February 2014 and up to 3 March 2014. Thereafter, the rate of incentive has been reduced to Rs 2277 per tonne for the month of April and May 2014. 
h. Sugar mills are free to supply raw sugar to any merchant exporters or export themselves 
to sugar importers of any country including WTO member countries based on their 
commercial prudence. 
1.11.2  Question by Brazil (AG-IMS ID 74055) 
With a view to receiving a more complete resp onse on this occasion, Brazil would like to 
reiterate some of the questions it presente d to India in the context of the March 2014 
Committee on Agriculture regarding sugar exports subsidies. 
Brazil is concerned with the impact in the world market and with the potential adverse 
effects to the interests of other Members caus ed by subsidized sugar exports from India. 
According to India's Official Gazette, dated 28 February 2014, raw sugar exporters from 
India are entitled to export subsidies amounting to Rs 3,300 per metric tonne for 
February and March 2014. These subsidies w ill be subject to recalculation every two 
months taking into account the average ex change rate of the Rupee vis-à-vis the 
US Dollar. 
In this regard, Brazil would like to raise the following questions: 
a. Could India indicate the amount of expo rt subsidies it will grant in budgetary 
outlays and subsidized quantities? 
b. Given that there has been to date no legally-binding decision by the WTO to 
extend the application of Article 9.4 of  the Agreement of Agriculture, what 
would be the legal basis for the provision of these export subsidies? 
c. Could India confirm whether these subsid ies are intended to reduce marketing 
and/or transportation costs? If yes, how the actual costs incurred in the 
marketing and/or transportation of expo rted sugar impact the provision of the 
subsidy? 
d. Could India explain: 
i. the rationale for increasing so significan tly the provision of export subsidies 
for sugar; 
ii. the steps it took to ensure complia nce with the Ministerial Declaration 
adopted in MC-9 according to which Me mbers shall exercise utmost restraint 
with regard to any recourse to all forms of export subsidies? 
Answer by India 
 Through the gazette notification dated 28 February 2014, the government of India has undertaken 
a measure to tackle arrears in payments by sugar mills to Indian sugarcane farmers. 
 The raw material for the sugar industry, sugarcane, is cultivated by an estimated 5 million farmer 
families on individual land holdings which are extremely small and scattered and in general range 
from 0.5 to 2 hectares. This is different from the models in many other countries where sugar mills own sugarcane farms or undertake contractual cultivation.   
The aim of the government intervention is to facilitate payments of outstanding arrears to farmers 
by the sugar mills.  
The intervention is not an export subsidy and is purely aimed at product diversification. The 
mechanism provides for passing on the incentive to the Indian sugarcane farmers, through sugar 
mills which are simply intermediaries in the flow  of funds to the farmers. Sub-Rule (9) of the G/AG/W/135 
 
- 16 - 
 
  gazette notification clearly provides that the incentive shall be utilized for making payment to the 
farmers.  Follow-up: Australia reiterated its view that the subsidy was inconsistent with WTO regulations and 
contrary to the Bali decision to exercise the utmost restraint with regard to all forms of export subsidies. Noting India's response that no subsidies had been paid to date, Australia restated its request that India remove the export subsidy programme. Canada and New Zealand echoed 
Australia's concern. Colombia reiterated its co ncern that the measure taken by India undermined 
its sugar exports, which was one of the main agricultural products Colombia exported. As stated by Colombia, sugar production created 720,000 jobs in Colombia and in 2012 it ranked fourth among all agricultural products. In view of the 11% increase in international sugar stock in 
2012/2013 and the estimated production surplus over consumption, Colombia invited India, the 
second largest global sugar producer in 2012, to reflect on the impact of its measure on the international sugar price. Colombia also reques ted India to abide by the Bali and Hong Kong 
Ministerial Declaration to eliminate all forms of export subsidies. The European Union, Pakistan, 
Thailand, the United States of America and Uruguay expressed concern.  
1.12  India's wheat stocks and exports 
1.12.1  Question by Canada (AG-IMS ID 74001) 
The government of India in August 2013 a pproved the export of two million tonnes of 
wheat from government stocks through global tenders to be completed by 
30 June 2014. 
a. Could India confirm if all of the two million tonnes of wheat have been 
tendered and if not, what volume of this wheat from government stocks was 
sold? 
b. India has previously indicated that ex port prices were between fob US$279.52 
and US$289.90 per tonne. Has there been any change in the range of export 
prices now that the process is a pproaching the completion date?  
Answer by India 
 
As of 26 May 2014, a quantity of 1,524 mil lion tonnes of wheat has been shipped. 
 Since the tender process is on-going, details of the bid cannot be provided because of commercial 
considerations. 
 1.12.2  Question by United Stat es of America (AG-IMS ID 74048) 
In response to AG-IMS 73039, India deta iled the cost of wheat as follows: "[t]he 
acquisition cost and incidental charges for 2 million tonnes of wheat exports from 
Central Pool stocks of FCI [Food Co rporation of India] during 2013-2014 
(December 2013 - February 2014 period) include pooled cost of grains to FCI, handling 
charges, gunny cost, administrative charges,  statutory taxes and storage charges for a 
period of six months". 
The United States of America thanks India for this partial response and notes that 
application of the pooled cost of grains a ppears unwarranted in this case because under 
the wheat export tender specifications prov ided on the PEC, STC and MMTC websites, all 
FCI-owned wheat exported is from the latest crop, i.e., from the 2013 rabi harvest, and 
thus was acquired at the 2013/2014 minimu m support price of Rs 1,350 per metric 
quintal.
 
The United States of America has calculated  the cost to the government of India of 
exported wheat as follows, using informatio n provided by India and applying it to a 
delivery from Karnal, Haryana, to Kandla port  as an example. The United States of 
America has also used the following informatio n derived from "Report of the Comptroller G/AG/W/135 
 
- 17 - 
 
  and Auditor General of India on Storage Mana gement and Movement of Food Grains in 
Food Corporation of India, Report No 7 of 2013"2. 
"Statutory charges include mandi ch arges (Market fee, Dami/Arhatia 
Commission, Rural Development Cess, Au ction fee), purchase/trade tax and 
gunny costs. Statutory charges (except gunny cost) are levied by the State 
Governments as a fixed percentage of the MSP. Non-statutory charges 
include mandi labour, transportation costs, driage losses, custody and 
maintenance charges, intere st and milling charges, etc.  
Mandi labour charges ranged from ₨ 9.47 per quintal to Rs 14.09 per quintal 
in respect of wheat in major procuring states (Punjab, Haryana, UP and MP) during the period 2006-2007 to 2011-2012.  
Transportation and handling charges ranged from Rs 11.83 per quintal to 
Rs 27.98 per quintal in respect of whea t in major procuring states (Punjab, 
Haryana, UP and MP) during the period 2006-2007 to 2011-2012.These 
charges, however, ranged from Rs 11.56 per quintal to Rs 17.97 per quintal 
in respect of Rajasthan during the same period." 
• The United States of America requests th at India confirm the accuracy of these 
estimates for delivery of Haryana 2013 crop wheat to Kandla port in 50-car unit 
trains: 
Item Rs per 
metric 
tonne Dollars 
per 
metric 
tonne1 Source and comments 
Cost of wheat 13,500 221.31 IFY 2013/2014 minimum support price 
Storage charges 368.4 6.04 Rs 3.07/month/50-kg bag at CWC warehouse Karnal 
Handling charges 
(mandi and warehouse labor) 301 4.93 Karnal CWC labor cost s, Rs 40-45/metric tonne per 
movement, times 4 movement s (~Rs 170 total), plus 
mandi labor costs per Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board
2, Rs 6.55 per 50 kg bag, or Rs 131 per 
metric tonne 
Gunny cost 600 9.84 Price of jute bags at Karnal, Rs 30/bag times 20 bags 
per tonne 
Administrative 
charges 334.68 5.49 http://fciweb.nic.in/finances/view/9 , Procurement 
incidentals, wheat 
Statutory taxes 1,417.5 23.24 Haryana tax rate of 10.5% times MSP, which includes 
market fees, market cess, VAT 
Rail transportation 1,486.08 24.36 www.fois.indianrail.gov.in  
TOTAL 18,008 295.21  
1 Exchange rate Rs 61 per US$. 
2 "Market charges (payable by the Buyer per unit for 50 kg)". See page 2 of Memo 
No ME(I)-A-III-2013/76955-7706 dated 3 December 2013, http://hsamb.gov.in/notification.pdf  
 
• The United States of America notes that by this estimate the cost of wheat ex 
FCI's warehouse in Kandla would exceed the minimum export price established by 
India of US$260 per metric tonne by US$35.21. 
Is India considering raising its minimum export  price to ensure that no bids fall below 
the cost to India of its government-owned  wheat shipped to export destinations? 
• The United States of America has al so estimated the cost to India of a 
30,000 metric tonne shipment of FCI whea t exported from Pipava port following 
the tender that closed on 3 February 2014. According to press reports, the price of 
                                               
2 Downloadable from: 
http://saiindia.gov.in/english/home/Our_Products/Audit_Report/Government_Wise/union_audit/recent_reports
/union_performance/2013/Civil/Report_7/Report_7.html  G/AG/W/135 
 
- 18 - 
 
  that wheat as awarded was US$275.20/metric tonne. The United States of America 
has assumed for purposes of this estimate  that the wheat was of Punjabi origin 
and was shipped by 50-car unit train ("50-wagon rake") from Ludhiana. 
Item Rupees 
per 
metric 
tonne Dollars 
per metric 
tonne1 Source and comments 
Cost of wheat 13,500 217.74 IFY 2013/2014 minimum support price 
Storage charges 368.4 5.94 Rs 3.07/month/50-kg bag at CWC warehouse 
Karnal 
Handling charges 
(mandi and warehouse labor) 298 4.81 Ludhiana CWC labor costs, Rs 40-45/metric tonne 
per movement, times 4 movements (~Rs 170 total), plus Rs 11.80 per quintal at the mandi per http://dfpd.nic.in/fcamin/policy/Punjab.pdf  
Gunny cost 646.8 10.44 Rs 64.68/quintal per 
http://dfpd.nic.in/fcamin/policy/Punjab.pdf  
Administrative 
charges 334.68 5.40 http://fciweb.nic.in/finances/view/9 , 
Procurement incidentals, wheat 
Statutory taxes 1,957.5 31.57 Punjab tax rate of 14.5% times MSP 
Rail transportation 1,841 29.69 http://www.fois.indianrail.gov.in/ , 
Ludhiana-Pipava 
TOTAL 18,946 305.59  
1 Exchange rate average of Rs 62 per dollar in February 2014. 
 
According to this estimate, this shipment of wheat was exported at a price US$30.39 
below the total cost to the Indian government. Please confirm the accuracy of these 
estimates. If they are incorrect, please ex plain how and provide an accurate estimate. 
Answer by India 
 
Regarding the pooled cost of grains, the Food Corporation of India (FCI) arrives at the average 
acquisition cost and economic cost by taking into consideration the total quantum of food grains available irrespective of the year in which the crop is procured. There is no clear demarcation of 
stocks for the purpose of exports and the places from where the actual movement is made for the 
purpose of export is not known at the time of floating of tenders and opening of bids. The movement of stocks to the ports is made depend ing on the availability of approved stocks and 
railway rakes at different centres and normally th ere is a mix of stocks from different states. 
 Since the tender process is on-going, other details of the cost cannot be provided because of commercial consideration. 
 
Follow-up : Quoting numbers from Indian Trade Statistics on India's wheat export in 2011-2013, 
the United States of America noted the substantia l increase in both value and quantity terms. 
Canada remained interested in FCI's practices and looked forward to reviewing more detailed 
information once some of the tender processes were completed. Australia, Pakistan and Ukraine also. 
 
1.13  Saint Lucia's domestic purchase  requirements for poultry and pork 
1.13.1  Question by United Stat es of America (AG-IMS ID 74044) 
The United States of America appreciate s Saint Lucia's response to question 
AG-IMS 72055 related to the domestic purc hase requirement for pork and poultry. 
a. Please explain how the quantities for domestic purchase requirements for 
poultry and pork St. Lucia mentions in  its response e. to AG-IMS 72055 
(25% for poultry and 40% for pork) are calculated. 
The United States of America did not receive an answer to question b of AG-IMS 73040. 
The United States of America repeats the request: G/AG/W/135 
 
- 19 - 
 
  b. Please explain how Saint Lucia's domest ic purchase requirements for poultry 
and pork are consistent with Saint Lucia's WTO obligations, including Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agricu lture and Article III:4 of the GATT 1994. 
Answer by Saint Lucia 
Saint Lucia undertook to provide a response at a later stage. 
1.14  Thailand's paddy pledging scheme 
1.14.1  Question by India (AG-IMS ID 74053) 
India is concerned about the reports in me dia about sale of excess paddy from the 
government stocks by Thailand at heavily discounted prices.  
a. India will appreciate if Thailand could sh are details of the quantities procured, 
procurement prices, additional costs of  acquisition and storage as well as 
selling price of paddy/rice (o n monthly basis) in the last two crop years and the 
quantities sold. 
b. How does Thailand ensure that the highly subsidized rice under the paddy 
pledging scheme is not exported? 
c. How does Thailand justify procurement pr ices higher than the export price of 
rice? 
d. Can Thailand provide figures of rice ex ported during the last two crop years 
with export prices? 
e. Thailand may kindly comment on the comp atibility of the action of the Thai 
government in selling rice stocks for exports at a fraction of procurement 
prices, with the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. 
Answer by Thailand 
With the recent change of political situation in Thailand, the current paddy pledging scheme 
ceased to operate after its official termination on 28 February 2014. No new support programme 
has been put in place to date. 
As stated in the last meeting, the previous paddy pledging scheme was operated mainly with 
revolving funds in the procurement. The government expenditures accordingly will cover the payment of different rates of interests, administ rative cost, and other fixed operation costs in. 
B e c a u s e  o f  t h i s  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  p r o g r a m m e  T h a i l a n d  w i l l  n o t  b e  a b l e  t o  c o n f i r m  t h e  e x a c t  
expenditure until the closing of account for each year. 
As to the specific information requested by Memb ers on various aspects of the pledging scheme, 
Thailand is continuing to use its best effort to gather the information. Nevertheless, it should be 
noted that some of this information is considered as business confidential under the law. 
1.14.2  Question by Pakistan (AG-IMS ID 74057) 
According to the Thailand Development Resear ch Institute, "through the rice pledging 
scheme, the price at which the government bought from farmers was unprecedentedly 
high, 50% more than the market price, and for the first time it bought unlimited amounts of rice. This has made the scale of loss massive. There is debate over how 
much loss the scheme incurred a year, ranging from B 150 to B 200 billion (equivalent to 
about 6-8% of the government's current bu dget). Under the most recent rice-pledging 
scheme the government still owes farmers B 140 billion. TDRI research is of the view 
that an alternative rice policy should ai m to protect farming against unanticipated 
negative shocks rather than subsidize the price of rice. And under no circumstances G/AG/W/135 
 
- 20 - 
 
  should the government act as a market player (and especially as a monopoly) in the rice 
industry." 
a. Pakistan understands that this scheme has now finished. Could Thailand please 
explain what alternatives are being considered to reduce government 
involvement in the rice market? 
b. Could Thailand please indicate how much  rice stock has been released from 
these stocks in 2014? 
c. At what price is the government re leasing stock to the private sector? 
d. Is the government also involved directly in the export of long grain rice? How 
much rice (all varieties) was exported by the government in 2013 and 2014? 
e. Pakistan's understanding is that through the Paddy Pledging scheme, the 
government intervened in the market and the effect of that policy was support 
through an administered price. This suppo rt price intervention resulted in an 
artificial increase of rice prices whic h benefitted the rice growers in the short-
term (not in the long term because it  affected competitiveness). When will 
Thailand notify this scheme as described in Annex 3, paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Agreement on Agriculture? 
f. Are there any new programmes to encourage production of long grain rice 
through government intervention? If there is any, could Thailand please explain 
the role of government in promoting such programmes? 
Answer by Thailand 
See response to AG-IMS 74053. 1.14.3  Question by United Stat es of America (AG-IMS ID 74050) 
The United States of America understands th at due to the situation in Thailand, the 
Paddy Pledging Scheme was not conti nued for the off-season MY 2013/2014. 
a. Please confirm that the programme is no longer operational for MY 2013/2014 
or forward. 
The United States of America notes that  the administered price under the Paddy 
Pledging Scheme was B 14,400 per tonne for the main crop, but since the programme was discontinued market prices in Thailand have fallen 
dramatically to approximately B 7,000 per tonne. 
b. Please confirm the quantity of paddy ri ce Thailand procured under the Paddy 
Pledging Scheme for the main crop of  MY 2013/2014. The United States of 
America understands that 11.6 millio n metric tonnes were procured. 
c. Please confirm whether the cost of the Main-Crop Rice Paddy Pledging Program 
is B 190 billion (US$5.8 billion) for MY 2013/2014. 
Further, the United States of America no tes that Thailand conducted a tender of 
nearly 213,000 metric tonnes and that bi ds from both exporters and domestic 
millers ranged from 17%- 33% below market prices, which themselves are less 
than one-half of the administered pric e. In addition, the United States of 
America notes the dramatic declin e in market prices in 2014. G/AG/W/135 
 
- 21 - 
 
  d. Please confirm whether any of these bi ds were accepted and if any tenders 
were exported. 
e. What specific measures is Thailand taki ng to ensure it remains compliant with 
its WTO commitments, particularly export  subsidy commitments as it reduces 
government stocks? 
The United States of America notes that Thailand has not responded to the following 
questions: AG-IMS 73041 and AG-IMS 72056. The United States of America requests 
that Thailand submit responses to these questions. 
Answer by Thailand 
See response to AG-IMS 74053. 
Follow-up: India, Pakistan, and the United States of America flagged concern. Canada registered 
sustained systemic interest in the operation of the scheme, particularly any possible implications 
for Thailand's ability to abide by its commitments. The European Union indicated interest in 
Thailand's plan with the rice stock.  
1.15  Turkey's domestic support and export subsidies 
1.15.1  Question by European Union (AG-IMS ID 74020) 
The European Union would like to repeat the question asked at the Committee on 
Agriculture in March 2014 which has not yet been answered. 
a. Given that Turkey has not submitted domestic support (DS:1) and export 
subsidies (ES:1) notifications to th e Committee on Agriculture since 2001 
and 2000 respectively, could Turkey please indicate when it intends to submit 
these overdue notifications to the WTO? 
b. In the meantime, could Turkey please confirm that since 2001 its budgetary 
outlays and eligible quantity in concept of  export subsidies, including in citrus 
fruits, have remained within its commitments? 
c. Could Turkey please confirm that its AM S has remained since 2002 below its de 
minimis level? 
Answer by Turkey 
Turkey undertook to provide a response at a later stage. 
Follow-up: The European Union was disappointed with Turkey's reply and looked forward to 
receiving the complete response as soon as possible. 
 
1.16  Turkey's destination of wheat flour sale3 
1.16.1  Question by United Stat es of America (AG-IMS ID 75001) 
The United States of America appreciates the responses that Turkey has provided to its 
questions at the January and March 2014 meetin gs of this Committee. The United States 
of America submits some follow-up questions: 
a. Please explain the TMO Sales Regulation (Code of Practice for Grain Sales after 
Export to Product Manufacturer-Exporters) that allows TMO to make sales to 
                                               
3 The United States of America added this question at the meeting and also raised it for the next 
(75th) CoA meeting. G/AG/W/135 
 
- 22 - 
 
  inward processing certificate holders at world prices. Please provide details on 
any other measures that operationalize the TMO. 
b. Public records indicate annual sales of TMO wheat sales to inward processing 
certificate holders over the past seve ral years. Does Turkey confirm that 
TMO sells domestic wheat to Turkey flour millers that export flour and hold 
inward processing certificates? If so, please provide wheat purchase and wheat 
sales prices for these transactions for the last 3 years.  
c. Please describe any government control or verification requirements for inward 
processing of wheat flour.  
d. The United States of America appreciate s Turkey's response on exported flour 
and imported wheat as shown in the table (Annex 2; AG-IMS ID 73042). Are all 
of the quantities listed imported and exported through the inward processing 
system? If not, please elaborate on th is table by stating how much of the 
imports and exports were through the inward processing system. 
e. In AG-IMS ID 73042, the United States  of America requested data concerning 
both the quantity and quality  of wheat imports and flour exports under 
Turkey’s inward processing system. In response, Turkey provided data 
concerning only the quantity of such im ports and exports. Please provide data 
for the last three years listing the quality  of wheat imported and the quality  of 
wheat flour exported under Turkey ’s inward processing system.  
f. Please confirm that the sale and tradin g of inward processing certificates 
received for exporting products occurs and is allowed under Turkey's 
regulations. Please also provide any me asures that regulate this process.  
Answer by Turkey 
Turkey undertook to provide a response at a later stage. 1.17  U.S.  Farm Bill 
1.17.1  Question by Argentina (AG-IMS ID 74011) 
Commodity Provisions 
a. What is the rationale for eliminating programmes such as the CCP (Counter 
Cyclical Payments), SURE (Suppl emental Revenue Assistance) and 
ACRE (Average Crop Revenue Elec tion) and replacing them with 
ARC (Agriculture Risk Coverage) and PLC (Price Loss Coverage)? 
b. Given their similarities, what is the di fference between CCP and PLC? What is 
the difference between ACRE and ARC? How do these differences affect the 
implementation of U.S. commitments in respect of the Agreement of 
Agriculture? 
c. Why have the Direct Payment Programs and the Average Crop Revenue Election 
Programs been eliminated? 
d. The "reference prices" of the new Price Loss Coverage (PLC; Section 1116) 
programme trigger payments to farmers under this programme. They are much 
higher than the similar price used by the predecessor programme in the 
2008 Farm Bill now discontinued, the Counter  Cyclical Payments (CCP), i.e. its 
"target price" minus the "direct payments rate". G/AG/W/135 
 
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  i. What is the rationale of increasing th e reference price in more than 50% for 
most of the covered crops (cereals: ba rley, corn, oats, sorghum and wheat; 
oilseeds: soybeans, minor oilseeds; other crops: dry peas, lentils)? 
ii. How does the United States of America view that the higher reference prices 
in commodity programmes and the enhanced dairy margin protection will be 
consistent with the continuation of the reform process provided for in Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture and the Doha Work Program? 
iii. Based on new target prices and USDA price projections, what is the Amber 
Box (Current Total Aggregate Measures  of Support) estimated for the next 
five years? Is there a mechanism to foresee well in advance the possibility 
of AMS commitments being oversteppe d in a scenario of falling prices? 
e. Agricultural Risk Coverage Program (ARC): 
i. The choice of a farmer for either a "count y" ARC or an "individual" ARC: is it 
for all the crops on a farm or for each  individual crop on the farm? Can the 
f a r m e r  h a v e  t w o  d i f f e r e n t  c r o p s  i n  e a c h  t y p e  A R C  p r o g r a m m e  o r  i s  t h e  
choice applicable to the whole farm? 
ii. The ARC seems to address income risk of farmers. Why can't this risk be 
addressed with market measures, such as risk insurance offered by private 
insurance companies? 
f. Marketing Assistance Loans (MALs): 
Could United States of America expl ain how Marketing Assistance Loans 
operate? 
g. Crop Insurance: 
In order to be able to make a better analysis, could the United States of 
America provide the yearly value of prod uction of the most recent available 
year of each crop covered by the crop insurance programme? 
h. Caps on payments, eligibility and small farmers: 
How many farms do the United States of America estimate are eligible to 
receive support under PCL or ARC, an d Marketing Assistance Loans (MAL)? 
Dairy programmes 
a. Why have the three major price and income support programmes such as Dairy 
Product Price Support Program, Milk In come Loss Contract Program and Dairy 
Export Incentive Program , (DPPSP, MI LC, DEIP) of dairy provisions been 
eliminated? And how will the Margin Protection Program (MPP) and the Dairy 
Product Donation Program (DPDP) operate along with the New Farm Bill? 
b. What are the major differences between the two new programmes 
(MPP, DPDP) and the three programmes (DPPSP, MILC, DEIP) that were 
eliminated? G/AG/W/135 
 
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  c. The newly established Margin Protection  Program (MPP, Sections 1401-1410). 
i. Can the United States of America expl ain why the new Farm Bill introduces 
a double protection for the U.S. dairy producer: 
• against reductions in milk prices; and 
• against increases in feed costs? 
ii. Can the United States of America ca n explain why the new Farm Bill does 
not include a payment cap for each dairy producer (compare with the 
commodity programs of the 2014 Farm B ill and with the repealed dairy MILC 
subsidies of the 2008 Farm Bill)? 
iii. Has the USDA evaluated the impact on the rational expectations of dairy 
producers which could increase production  as a result of their perception of 
less risk for dairy production? 
iv. Do the Farm Bill or USDA implementati on regulations foresee any means to 
reduce the level of subsidies that MPP might add? 
d. Dairy Product Donation Program (DPDP; section 1431) 
i. Which dairy products can be purchased by the government under this 
programme? 
ii. Which state entity will carry out the purchases? What is the role of the 
Commodity Credit Corporation? 
iii. Is there any mechanism to verify that these purchases of dairy products (as 
provided for in Section 1431 (e)1) will not be exported? 
iv. Are there any provisions to ensure that if a non-profit organization receives 
dairy products, transferred from an other non-profit organization as 
foreseen in Section 1431(e)2, they cannot be exported? 
Other general questions 
Could the United States of America info rm about the work of the 2014 Farm Bill 
implementation regulations by the USDA? 
Answer by United States of America 
Commodity Provisions 
a. The 2014 Farm Bill eliminated a number of programmes (including direct and 
countercyclical payments, the ACRE programme, and SURE) in favor of programmes 
designed to address the budget constraints facing the U.S. government by reducing 
overall agricultural spending and better targeting farm programmes. 
b. The CCP and PLC programmes are similar programmes. Under CCP, payment rates were 
the difference between the target price and th e national average market price (or loan 
rate, if higher), minus the direct payment rate. Under PLC, payment rates are the difference between the reference price and the national average price (or the loan rate, 
if higher). Upland cotton was eligible for CCP but is not eligible for PLC payments. 
ACRE was an alternative to countercyclical payments and provided revenue payments based on a two-part trigger at the state and farm level. The ACRE programme participation was lower than anticipated due to producer-perceived complexities and 
delays in payments. The ARC programme was designed to be a simpler programme and 
provides producers with an option to get coverage at the county or farm level. Further, G/AG/W/135 
 
- 25 - 
 
  ARC provides coverage only for losses between 86% and 76% (and on 85% of base 
acres) to prevent an overlap in support from traditional crop insurance and ARC support. The 2014 Farm Bill reduced overall agricult ural spending. Any differences among the 
programmes do not impact U.S. commitments. The United States of America remains 
fully committed to meeting its WTO obligations and the 2014 Farm Bill is fully consistent 
with U.S. WTO obligations. 
c. See response to a. 
d. i. The reference prices were determined by Congress and reflect a significant shift in 
market dynamics seen over the past several years. Given these new market dynamics and growing global demand, it is unlikely that prices will fall to the very low levels seen in the 1996-2005 period. 
ii. The United States of America remains committed to meeting its current 
WTO obligations. The new Farm Bill does not limit any further commitments resulting 
from negotiations under Article 20 and the Doha Work Programme. 
iii. The new Farm Bill has been signed into law, but has not yet been fully implemented. 
As such, the United States of America is unable to predict its notified Amber Box 
expenditures due to the complex set of variables that are involved. As with previous 
Farm Bills, the new Farm Bill contains a "circuit breaker" that gives the Secretary of Agriculture the authority to ensure that the United States of America does not 
exceed its Final Bound Total AMS commitments. 
e.  
i. A farmer may select county-level ARC as an alternative to PLC on a 
commodity-by-commodity basis. However, when a farmer selects 
individual/farm-level ARC, then all covered commodities on the whole farm will be 
enrolled in individual/farm-level ARC. 
ii. The ARC programme is designed to provide revenue risk assurance for risk that is 
not typically covered by traditional crop insurance or by private insurance offerings. 
Traditional crop insurance typically provides 75% or less coverage; while ARC was designed to provide revenue loss coverage of 76-86%. It should be noted that the 
ARC does not provide loss coverage for current planted acreage, but rather, only 
provides support on a share of historical base acres – 85% for county ARC and 65%. 
f. Marketing Assistance Loans provide producers the opportunity to receive immediate cash 
at harvest, through short-term loans using harvested commodity as collateral. These 
loans are offered at below market interest rates. The programme is largely unchanged in 
the 2014 Farm Bill. Producers may receive a 9-month loan equal to the previously announced per-unit loan rate multiplied by the quantity of the eligible commodity a 
producer agrees to store and maintain as security for the loan. By no later than the loan 
maturity date the producer may settle the loan obligation by either repaying the loan and accrued interest or by delivering to the government the commodity used as security. 
When market prices are below the per-unit loan rate, producers can receive a benefit 
equal to the difference between the loan rate  and the average market price. Producers 
who have loans outstanding can repay them at the average market price with unpaid interest waived. Producers who do not take out loans can receive an equivalent benefit 
as a loan deficiency payment. For more details see the response to AG-IMS 28067. 
g. The U.S. Department of Agriculture National Agricultural Statistics Services publishes 
statistics on the value of production for most commodities on its Quick Stats 
website: ( http://quickstats.nass.usda.gov/ ). 
h. Only farms that have base acres are eligible to enrol in either PLC or ARC. This is 
unchanged from programmes using base acres under the 2008 Farm Bill (i.e. direct and 
countercyclical payments). All farms that produce eligible commodities are eligible to 
receive marketing assistance loans support. All three programmes identified are subject G/AG/W/135 
 
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  to individual payment limitations or caps and eligibility limitations based on adjusted 
gross income. 
Dairy programmes 
a. The Dairy Product Price Support Program (DPPSP) (a price support programme) directly 
affected market prices in the United States of America and the Dairy Export Incentive 
Program (DEIP) (an export subsidy program) directly subsidized the export of dairy 
products from the United States of America. These programmes were determined to be outdated methods of supporting the agricult ural sector and the most trade-distorting 
forms of support in the United States of America. The Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) 
programme was eliminated as it was not found to be an effective tool for supporting the sector. These programmes were replaced by the Margin Protection Program (MPP), which is decoupled from actual production and operates much like an insurance programme for 
producer's price/cost margin for qualifying dairy operations. Unlike DPPSP and DEIP, the 
MPP does not directly impact market prices for dairy products in the United States of America nor subsidize exports. MPP provides little incentive for producers to increase 
production since an individual producer's current production decisions do not impact 
their current payments. The MPP, similar to an insurance programme, provides a guarantee of the margin between the national price of milk and national feed costs paid 
on a percentage of historical production (25% to 90%) rather than actual production. 
The programme has a base level (a US$4 per hundredweight margin) that is available to all dairy producers for a set annual administrative fee; however, a producer may purchase additional higher levels of marg in coverage for an additional premium. 
Purchasing higher levels of coverage on historical production greater than 4 million 
pounds results in higher premiums for producers. Payments will only be made when the margin falls below the selected coverage level for an averaged specified consecutive 
two-month period (January-February; March-April; May-June; July-August; 
September-October; November-December). The Dairy Product Donation Program (DPDP) provides dairy products to low-income groups when dairy margins are 
exceptionally low. The DPDP is triggered when the actual dairy production margin has 
been US$4.00 or less per hundredweight for each of the two preceding months. Once 
triggered, the U.S. Department of Agriculture will purchase dairy products at prevailing market prices until the programme is terminated.  
The DPDP is terminated under a variety of scenarios specified in legislation, such as but 
not limited to: 
i. after three consecutive months regardless of margin; and 
ii. when the margin has been greater than US$4.00 for the preceding month. 
b. See response to part a. 
c.  
i. The Dairy Margin Protection Program (MPP) does not provide double protection for 
U.S. dairy producers. Rather, the programme provides protection from a reduction in the difference between the milk price and feed  costs. Payments are not guaranteed if 
milk prices decline (feed prices increase) since feed prices may also decline (milk 
prices may also increase) by a similar value. 
ii. The MPP operates similar to an insuranc e programme by providing producers with 
assurance of a chosen level of margin coverage. Like other insurance programmes, 
there are no caps on payments for dairy producers. Since the programme payments 
are made on the basis of historical production, there is an effective cap in how much an individual producer can receive. 
iii. USDA is still in the process of fully evalua ting the provisions of the 2014 Farm Bill. 
However, it should be noted that the MPP provides payments based on a share of G/AG/W/135 
 
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  historical production, thus any increase in production by an individual producer does 
not result in increased payments. 
iv. The Farm Bill does not include language on specifically reducing the level of subsidies 
under the MPP. USDA is currently wo rking to implement, but has not yet 
implemented, the 2014 Farm Bill. 
d.  
i. The 2014 Farm Bill states that the U.S. Department of Agriculture will consult with 
public and private non-profit organizations that feed low-income populations to 
determine the types and quantities of dairy products to be purchased and distributed under the DPDP. The programme has not yet been implemented; therefore it is premature to say what dairy products will be authorized for purchase and 
distribution. 
ii. The U.S. Department of Agriculture is authorized to use the Commodity Credit 
Corporation, within the Department of Agriculture, for the purpose of implementing 
and administering the program, including the purchase of dairy products. 
iii. Products purchased under the programme will be distributed to public and private 
non-profit organizations for the purpose of nutritional assistance for low-income 
individuals, not purchases of bulk commodities. Organizations will be prohibited from 
selling products back into commercial markets, including commercial export markets. The programme has not yet been implemented, so it is premature to identify what specific mechanisms will be in place for purposes of implementing and administering 
the programme. 
iv. See response to part iii. 
1.17.2  Question by India (AG-IMS ID 74054) 
a. Price Loss Coverage (PLC) Programme 
The PLC programme is similar to the Countercyclical Payments Program. 
However, the PLC Programme will be much more lucrative for farmers as the 
new programme guarantees them much higher prices for covered crops. 
i. In light of this, could the United States of America indicate whether 
termination of CCP Program and introduction of PLC Program will result in 
reducing domestic support? The expect ed reduction or otherwise in the 
domestic support due to the above action may kindly be provided.  
ii. Some estimates suggest that the PLC Pr ogram will result in allocating most 
of the total subsidies to the largest 15% of farms whose owners on average 
earn over US$140,000 per year and whose  wealth is measured in multiple 
millions of dollars. Could the United States of America confirm these 
estimates? 
iii. When will the United States of Am erica notify the trade distorting 
PLC Program under its Amber Box entitlements? 
iv. Peanut and rice farmers benefit especi ally from the PLC. The Act's proposed 
peanut target price exceeds any of th e Congressional Budget Office market 
price forecasts for the next five years.  Could the United States of America 
explain the basis for calculating the ta rget prices for peanut and rice in 
detail? G/AG/W/135 
 
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  b. Supplemental Coverage Option (SCO) Program 
i. Could the United States of Americ a confirm that expenditure under 
the (SCO) Program would be categorized under the Amber Box? 
ii. Could the United States of America indicate the percentage of the total 
expenditure under SCO Program that would flow to the farmers and to farm 
insurance companies respectively? 
c. International Food Aid 
Some studies (Professor Christopher Barre tt of Cornell University and others) 
have estimated that requiring U.S. sourcing and transport of food on 
U.S. flagships increases the costs of aid by 50%. This also slows the delivery of 
such aid by many weeks and months. Could the United States of America 
indicate how the Farm Act will address these issues? 
d. Crop Insurance Programs  
Crop insurance programmes in the United States of America do not meet the 
criteria of Section 7 (government financ ial participation in income insurance 
and income safety net programmes) and Section 8 (payments made either 
directly or by way of government fina ncial participation in crop insurance 
scheme for relief from natural disaster s) of Annex 2 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture. The United States of America has notified crop insurance 
programmes under Amber box support as a non-product specific support. 
However, these crop insurance programme s are aimed at specific commodities 
and not for the whole range of farm pr oducts. These payments also depend on 
expected price and yield of  a specific crop. Even under new Farm Act 2014, crop 
insurance like supplemental coverage option (section 11003) and 
STAX (11017) are based on individu al yield and prices of a crop. 
i. Therefore, the United States of Americ a is requested to clarify the reasons 
for treating crop insurance as a non-pr oduct specific support rather than a 
product specific support under Amber box. 
ii. The United States of America is requested to provide the following 
information related to crop insurance from 2002 onwards: 
• crop-wise as well as total public subsidy for insurance premium; 
• crop-wise as well as total indemnities paid to farmers; 
• crop-wise as well as total insura nce premium paid by farmers. 
iii. The cost of administering insurance cont racts, which is provided by private 
agents but reimbursed by the government and government reinsurance 
(which is provided to the private insu rance companies), were notified in the 
Green Box "General Services" category. Government reinsurance provided to the private insurance companies is  part of the farm subsidy because 
government provided reinsurance is likely to result in lower premiums than 
if an equivalent amount of reinsuranc e had to be purchased in the private 
reinsurance market. Therefore, these expenses should be treated as Amber box as a part of insurance subsidies. The United States of America is 
requested to clarify its position on this issue. 
iv. Stacked Income protection Plan is a crop insurance plan available to cotton 
farmers only. The established coverage based on recent yield data rather 
than historical and fixed production or  area. Therefore, STAX payments are 
coupled support as these subsidies are based on changes in market G/AG/W/135 
 
- 29 - 
 
  revenues and on planted acres. Thus, STAX  should be classified as a product 
specific support for cotton. India requ ests the government of the United 
States of America to clear its position on this issue. 
Answer by United States of America 
a.  
i. The 2014 Farm Bill was designed to reduce overall agricultural spending. The 
2014 Farm Bill has not yet been fully implem ented, and it is therefore premature to 
make any predictions of levels of notified domestic support. 
ii. The 2014 Farm Bill has not yet been full y implemented, and therefore, producers 
have not yet had the opportunity to enrol in programmes, such as PLC. The 
2014 Farm Bill provides producers with a number of options to choose from if they decide to enrol in the new programmes established in the 2014 Farm Bill (such as PLC). It is therefore premature to determine any specifics about enrolment. 
iii. The PLC programme will be implemented fo r the 2014 marketing year; therefore, the 
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  o f  A m e r i c a  w i l l  n o t i f y  t h e  P L C  p r o g r a m m e  a s  p a r t  o f  i t s  n o t i f i c a t i o n  covering the same period in a timely manner. The new Farm Bill has not yet been 
fully implemented by the U.S. Departme nt of Agriculture, making any final 
determination of how the programme will be  notified premature. The United States 
of America will notify the program in a timely and consistent manner. 
iv. The reference prices were determined by Congress and reflect a significant shift in 
market dynamics seen over the past several years. Given these new market dynamics and growing global demand, it is unlikely that prices will fall to the very low levels seen in the 1996-2005 period. 
b.  
i. The new Farm Bill has not yet been fully implemented by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, making any final determination of how the programme will be notified 
premature. The United States of America will notify the programme in a timely and 
consistent manner. 
ii. USDA estimates that approximately two-thirds of the total benefits of SCO would go 
to farmers and about a third to insurance companies. 
c. The Agricultural Act of 2014 (Farm Bill) made several changes to the U.S. international 
f o o d  a i d  p r o g r a m m e s .  F i r s t ,  t h e  F a r m  B i l l  provided a new authority to provide food 
assistance through local and regional procurement of food, vouchers, and cash 
assistance. The Farm Bill authorized a fund ing level of up to US$80 million. Second, the 
largest food aid programme (Food for Peace) received new flexibilities to provide cash to support food aid programmes. This flexibility wi ll reduce the amount of monetization that 
is needed to cover the costs of transportation and monitoring costs. The Farm Bill did not 
change the requirement to use U.S.-flagged sh ips to transport at least 50% of the total 
food aid tonnage each year. In addition to the Farm Bill, other budget laws have 
provided the United States of America with the ability to provide cash, vouchers, and 
locally and regionally procured foods. In 201 3, the United States of America provided 
more than US$530 million for food assistance activities. This assistance complemented the more than US$1.5 billion of in-kind food  aid that the United States of America 
provided. The adjustments in the Farm Bill and budget laws allow the United States of 
America to provide a mix of in-kind commodities, vouchers, cash, and locally and regionally procured food to meet the specif ic needs for each situation. The tools allow 
the United States of America to reduce deliv ery times and costs while continuing to use 
in-kind food aid when food supplies in or near the recipient country are scarce. 
 
d.  
i. Since the parameters are uniform by commodity and such a wide range of 
commodities are covered, this programme is notified as "non-product specific". G/AG/W/135 
 
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  ii. The requested information can be found on RMA's summary of business at 
http://www3.rma.usda.gov/apps/sob/ . 
iii. The U.S. crop insurance programme is a unique programme in that crop insurance 
policies are delivered by private companies, rather than by a government entity. 
Similar to how the United States of America notifies budgetary outlays for 
government agencies that deliver services to agricultural producers, the United States of America has notified the budgetar y outlays associated with the delivery of 
crop insurance policies. Premium rates are set by the USDA Risk Management 
Agency (RMA). Companies must use these rates in selling crop insurance policies. Companies are prohibited from providing additional subsidies to producers through actions like rebating. The reinsurance provided to insurance companies, along with 
administrative and operating subsidies, are benefits provided directly to insurance 
companies through the Standard Reinsurance Agreement. 
iv. The new Farm Bill has not yet been fully implemented by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, making any final determination of how the programme will be notified 
premature. Further, STAX will not be operational until the 2015 marketing year. The United States of America will notify the programme in a timely and consistent 
manner. 
1.17.3  Question by Indonesia (AG-IMS ID 74059) 
In the written response by the United States  of America to question from Indonesia in 
March Meeting (AG-IMS ID 73043), it is stat ed that "…the 2014 Farm Bill has not yet 
been fully implemented. As a result, the administrative provisions for these and other programmes have not yet been established…" Could the U.S. delegates give the latest 
update on the administrative provisions be ing developed to prepare the implementation 
of the Farm Bill? 
Answer by United States of America 
Since the Farm Bill was signed, USDA has made progress throughout all Farm Bill titles including 
announcements on trade and marketing promotion, the establishment of conservation 
programmes, the initiation of specialty crop and local food programmes, funding for rural 
development programmes, and more. Among the first major Farm Bill initiatives to be implemented were disaster relief programmes for livestock producers, many of whom have been waiting years for assistance. On 15 April, USDA announced disaster relief through the Livestock 
Indemnity Program and the Livestock Forage Disaster Program. After the 2008 Farm Bill passed, it 
took over one year to set up disaster assistance programs. In 2014, it took under ten weeks. As of 
1 May 2014, approximately 33,000 applications have been received and US$16.3 million in 
payments has been disbursed. In the coming months, producers will be asked to enrol in one of 
the new farm bill's risk management progra mmes. USDA is now working with land-grant 
universities, 1890 colleges, Hispanic-serving institut ions and tribal colleges to create web-based 
tools that will help provide producers with information on the Agricultural Risk Coverage Program 
and Price Loss Coverage Program, as well as the larger protection programme for dairy and the non-insured crop disaster assistance programme. 
Follow-up: Argentina and India stated their intention to closely monitor the implementation of the 
Farm Bill and the fulfilment of U.S. WTO commitm ents and the Doha mandate in this respect. 
Canada, Indonesia and Mexico expressed interest in the issue. New Zealand, while congratulating 
the United States of America on eliminating th e export subsidy programmes for dairy products, 
noted its concern about the shift towards a highly price contingent model which led to unpredictability in AMS expenditure. Pa kistan shared New Zealand's concern. 
 G/AG/W/135 
 
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  2  POINTS RAISED IN CONNECTION  WITH INDIVIDUAL NOTIFICATIONS 
2.1  IMPORTS UNDER TARIFF AND OTHER QUOTA COMMITMENTS (TABLE MA:2) 2.1.1  Canada (G/AG/N/CAN/95) 
AG-IMS ID 74015: Question by Switzerland - Transparency issues 
In its Customs Tariff 2014
4 Canada records tariff quotas for certain products from 
Chapter 1806. Its Table MA:1 and MA:2 notifi cations, inter alia G/AG/CAN/95, do not 
mention any tariff quotas for 1806. Could Cana da please explain what  these tariff quotas 
are and what their sizes are? 
Answer by Canada 
 
For some tariff lines, Canada's Customs Tariff indi cates the tariff rates applicable within Canada's 
access commitment and over Canada's access commitment in the World Trade Organization (WTO). In the case of products of  heading 18.06, Canada has no specific access 
commitment in volume terms in its WTO schedule of commitments and therefore makes no MA:1 
or MA:2 notification in this respect. Canada's  WTO obligations derive from the Uruguay Round 
negotiations. 
 
2.1.2  China (G/AG/N/CHN/26) 
AG-IMS ID 74002: Question by Canada - Tariff quota fill 
Canada thanks China for its recent Table MA:2  notification for calendar year 2012 and 
welcomes the improvement in China's wh eat TRQ fill since 2009. While China's 
TRQ imports for wheat in 2012 almost triple d from 2011 to 3.701 million tonnes in 2012, 
the TRQ imports still represented less than half of its WTO TRQ quantity (i.e. a fill rate of 
38.4% in 2012). Could China provide:  
a. the reasons for its increased wheat TRQ imports in 2012; 
b. outline the steps China will take to further improve the fill rate for its 
wheat TRQ? 
Answer by China 
 
China's allocation of agricultural TRQs fully complies with requirements over relevant WTO agreements. China made a package of commitments regarding TRQs including TRQ volumes, administrations, in-quota and out-of-quota rates as well as the rules on holders of TRQ and 
STE share reallocations which are more stringent than terms and conditions prevailing 
WTO agreements. Since its accession to WTO, China has undertaken TRQ allocations in strict compliance with its commitments. Enterprises or  traders who received TRQ made their own 
decisions on whether and how much to import in light with market situations. 
a. First, the increase of world production caused the decrease of market price for wheat, 
and in turn, companies imported more. Secondly, substitution among varieties also 
serve as a reason for increase. 
b. The companies with TRQs make their own choices with respect to the importing 
countries, volumes and time. The total wheat imports of China is a result of companies' independent market operation. 
Follow-up: The United States of America was interested in the TRQ operation and reserved the 
right to raise follow-up questions. Specifically, the United States of America sought explanations 
regarding how the National Development and Reform Commission allocated the public sector 
quotas and whether the Commission allocated the full public quota amount each year. The 
                                               
4 
http://saiindia.gov.in/english/home/Our_Products/Audit_Report/Government_Wise/union_audit/recent_reports
/union_performance/2013/Civil/Report_7/Report_7.html  G/AG/W/135 
 
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  U.S.' understood that other organizations such as the State and Administration of Grain used state 
quotas as well.  2.1.3  Costa Rica (G/AG/N/CRI/47) 
AG-IMS ID 74003: Question by New Zealand - Tariff quota fill 
New Zealand notes that for the previous five  years, Costa Rica has made use of its 
import quota for HS 0402 - milk and cream, co ncentrated or containing added sugar or 
other sweetening matter, which has a ta riff quota quantity of 344.2 tonnes. 
The exact numbers of quota fill are: 
Year In-quota imports 
(tonnes)
2008 294
2009 72.5
2010 17.1
2011 89.84
2012 132.641
 
However, in its most recent notification for the 2013 calendar year, Costa Rica has 
notified zero imports under this quota. New Zealand would like Costa Rica to clarify why 
this quota was not utilised in 2013. 
Answer by Costa Rica 
The non-use of the quota for powdered milk (tariff heading 0402) in 2013 is due exclusively to 
market conditions. Imports of this product to the Costa Rican market generally enter under the quotas established in the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA-DR), or under the quota established in Costa Rica's schedule of commitments 
in the WTO. In the first case, the in-quota tariff is zero; given these more favourable market access conditions in terms of tariffs, importers opted for the WTO quota on a supplementary basis, 
when the import volume under CAFTA-DR was insufficient. 
2.1.4  Dominican Republic (G/AG/N/DOM/22) 
AG-IMS ID 74026: Question by Euro pean Union - Tariff quota fill 
The Dominican Republic notifies a high level of  fill rates for most tariff quotas. However, 
there are two exceptions, chicken meat and rice. 
a. For several years, the tariff quota for chicken meat has had a low fill rate (less 
than 18%). Could the Dominican Republic please inform the Committee of the 
reasons behind this low fill rate? 
b. The fill rate of the tariff quota for ri ce has suddenly decreased considerably 
(89% less than notified for 2011). Could the Dominican Republic please inform 
the Committee of the reasons behind the considerably lower fill rate? 
Answer by Dominican Republic 
a. Domestic production largely meets apparent consumption and the Dominican Republic 
does not therefore generally resort to imports. 
b. In 2012 domestic production largely met domestic consumption. Some rice was 
imported, but under preferential arrangements . It should be emphasized that, in any 
case, the WTO tariff quota remains open for use by all importers. G/AG/W/135 
 
- 33 - 
 
  2.1.5  Ecuador (G/AG/N/ECU/38) 
AG-IMS ID 74027: Question by Euro pean Union - Transparency issues 
According to the notification from Ecuador the 17 bound tariff quotas have not been 
used during 2012. 
a. What are the reasons behind this? 
b. Does Ecuador import these products out of quota? 
Answer by Ecuador 
a. Footnote (c) to Ecuador's Table MA:2 notification G/AG/N/ECU/38 of 19 February 2014 
explains why no in-quota imports were recorded. 
b. Ecuador has indeed imported these products. However, in the light of the tariff rates, 
opening quotas under the conditions set out in document G/AG/N/ECU/38 proved 
unnecessary. 
AG-IMS ID 74036: Question by United St ates of America - Transparency issues 
The United States of America appreciates Ecuador's responses to U.S. questions in 
AG‑IMS 73044. The United States of Americ a understands that Ecuador administers 
non‑automatic import licenses to distribute its quotas based on discussions in the 
Import Licensing Committee (see G/LIC/Q/ECU/3 and G/LIC/Q/ECU/4), most recently 
on April 15. The United States of America appreciates Ecuador's initial responses to 
these questions, and looks forward to seeing more complete responses to those 
questions and questions in G/LIC/Q/ECU/5. In  addition, the United States of America 
previously asked Ecuador questions regard ing tariff-rate quota administration, and 
would like further clarification on questions from AG-IMS 73044. 
a. What is the official process for reques ting frozen chicken parts, HS 02071400? 
b. Where can importers and exporters find information about the request 
procedure? 
Answer by Ecuador The relevant provisions of tariff quota procedures and administration in Ecuador are published 
online at http://www.produccion.gob.ec/comexi-2008 . 
 
2.1.6  Russian Federation (G/AG/N/RUS/4) 
AG-IMS ID 74028: Question by Euro pean Union - Transparency issues 
The commitments of Russian Federation include eight bound tariff quotas. Six of them 
are notified individually in a transparent wa y; however two of them, the quota for fresh, 
chilled, frozen pork and the quota for pork trimming are not notified separately but 
merged into a single notification. 
a. The European Union requests the Russian Federation to notify in line with its 
commitments, in particular by notifyin g each individual quota separately. 
b. Further, could the Russian Fe deration explain the relatively low rate of fill for 
the quota for fresh and chilled beef (42. 9% - imports of 17,195 tonnes of an 
overall quota of 40,000 tonnes). G/AG/W/135 
 
- 34 - 
 
  Answer by Russian Federation 
While the volumes of TRQ for fresh, chilled and frozen pork and TRQ for pork trimmings were 
presented separately, the statistical data on in-quo ta imports was indeed presented in the form of 
an aggregated figure, and this was done for the following reasons: some particular HS codes 
attributed to the TRQ for pork trimmings (HS 0203 29 550 2 and HS 0203 29 900 2) were also included in the list of HS codes attributed to the TRQ for fresh, chilled and frozen pork. The 
in-quota tariff rates for pork meat and for pork trimming are the same, which is 0%. In fact that 
gave Russian import companies the possibility to declare pork trimmings at the Russian Federation Customs as imported either under the TRQ for trimmings or under the TRQ for pork meat. In cases 
where pork trimmings were imported into the Russi an Federation under the TRQ for pork meat, it 
was not counted separately from fresh, chilled or frozen pork meat. 
AG-IMS ID 74004: Question by Canada - Tariff quota fill 
Canada notes that the TRQ fill for fresh an d chilled beef TRQ was filled at only 42.9%, 
while the frozen beef TRQ was filled at 90.1%. 
a. Could the Russian Federation clarify the reasons for the low TRQ fill for its fresh 
chilled beef TRQ in 2013? 
b. Could the Russian Federation also out line the reasons why there is a large 
discrepancy in TRQ fill between the fr esh and chilled and frozen beef TRQs? 
c. What steps will the Russian Federation take  to increase the fill rate of its fresh 
and chilled beef TRQ? 
Answer by Russian Federation 
a. According to analysis of the situation in the world market, the principal reason for the 
low fill rate for fresh and chilled beef TRQ in 2013 was the lack of resources in the 
European Union, which was the main supplier, that held a country-specific TRQ of 
29,000 metric tonnes for this product. The Russian Federation and the European Union have considered this issue bilaterally in 2013, and the same reason for the TRQ underfill 
was identified. Further on, in accordance with its WTO obligations the Russian Federation 
in 2013 has reallocated the unused part of the EU country-specific TRQ for fresh and chilled beef in favour of all WTO Members. 
b. The situation was different with regards to th e TRQ for frozen beef. While the underfill of 
the EU country-specific TRQ for frozen beef in 2013 was similarly caused by lack of resources in the European Union, the supplies of the frozen beef under country specific 
TRQ from other WTO Members to the Russian Fe deration were constrained by veterinary 
bans. Following bilateral consultations with concerned WTO Members Russia has 
reallocated the unused parts of the country specific TRQs for frozen beef in favour of all WTO Members. 
After the unused parts of the TRQ for frozen beef and TRQ for fresh and chilled beef had 
been reallocated in 2013, Russian importers wi tnessed a sharp increase of export prices 
for beef, especially for fresh and chilled beef supplied from some countries. Export price 
rally in its turn suppressed the domestic demand for fresh and chilled beef in the Russian 
Federation and served the principal reason  for discrepancy in the TRQ fill between 
fresh/chilled and frozen beef TRQs in 2013. 
c. In case of TRQ underfill the Russian Federation in conformity with its WTO obligations 
and, in order to guarantee the right of importers to supply meat products to domestic 
market at in-quota tariff rate and, thereby, to increase TRQ fill rate, would resort to the mechanism of reallocation of unused parts of a TRQ provided for in para. 364 of the 
Working Party Report on the Accession of th e Russian Federation to the WTO. In case 
that country-specific quotas are underfilled, the mechanism allows importers to import from all WTO Members, including the Member with the original country-specific G/AG/W/135 
 
- 35 - 
 
  TRQ allocation and other country-specific TRQ holders, provided the latter have filled 
their allocation. 
Follow-up: The European Union thanked the Russian Federation for looking into the technical 
issues on how to better report TRQs for pork and pork trimming. The United States of America and 
Uruguay indicated interest in the TRQ operation. 
 2.1.7  Chinese Taipei (G/AG/N/TPKM/112) 
AG-IMS ID 74060: Question by Indonesia - Tariff quota fill 
Chinese Taipei notified the TRQ fill rate for bananas, dried day lily, mangoes, and 
shaddocks at 0% and betel nuts at 0.16%. 
a. What is the reason behind these fill rate levels? 
b. What is the trend of fill rate of th ese products in the last five years? 
c. What is the trend of fill rate of products under TRQ? 
Answer by Chinese Taipei 
 
The TRQ mechanism is the result of Chinese Taipei's WTO accession negotiation. All the 
administration procedures for these TRQ products are in accordance with the principles of transparency, predictability, and equity, and are based on market mechanism. Chinese Taipei is 
committed to implementing TRQs in accordance with WTO rules. 
 
a. Regarding the nil or low quota fill rate for bananas, dried day lily, mangoes, shaddocks, 
and betel nuts, it may be caused by the domestic market supply and demand factors. In 
addition, the major production areas of bananas, mangoes, and shaddocks have suffered 
from quarantine pests and diseases. Importation from the infected areas is not allowed until they meet Chinese Taipei's quarantine requirements. 
b. The fill rate for bananas, mangoes, and shaddo cks has been nil for the last five years. In 
the meanwhile, due to market factors, the fill rate for betel nuts is lower than 1% and the fill rate for dried day lily is 40% in general. 
c. The level of fill rate of tariff quota is based on the market mechanism, and reflects 
supply and demand conditions. Chinese Taipei enjoyed a roughly stable domestic agriculture products market in recent years, and accordingly, the trend of fill rate of 
products under TRQ is generally stable. Specifically, the fill rate for deer velvet, peanuts, 
red bean, dried longans, and rice are higher than 95%. 
2.2  DOMESTIC SUPPORT CO MMITMENTS (TABLE DS:1) 
2.2.1  Kingdom of Bahrain (G/AG/N/BHR/7) 
AG-IMS ID 74037: Question by United St ates of America - Transparency issues 
(including Table DS:2) 
The United States of America appreciates Kingdom of Bahrain's efforts to bring its 
domestic support notifications up to date. The United States of America notes that 
Kingdom of Bahrain has notified for 2013, bu t not 2012. When does Kingdom of Bahrain 
expect to notify 2012? 
Answer by Kingdom of Bahrain. 
 Kingdom of Bahrain undertook to provide a response at a later stage. G/AG/W/135 
 
- 36 - 
 
  AG-IMS ID 74038: Question by United States  of America - Input subsidies available to 
low-income or resource-poor producers 
Kingdom of Bahrain has notified input subsidies for crops and animal products inputs 
generally available to low-income  or resource-poor producers. 
a. How does Kingdom of  Bahrain define "low-income or resource-poor"? 
b. What percent of Kingdom of Bahraini  agricultural producers meets this 
definition? 
c. How is this support measure implemented? 
Answer by Kingdom of Bahrain. 
 
Kingdom of Bahrain undertook to provide a response at a later stage.  2.2.2  Brazil (G/AG/N/BRA/32) 
AG-IMS ID 74041: Question by United St ates of America - Transparency issues 
(including Table DS:2) 
In response to the U.S. question (AG-IMS 73032), Brazil indicated that no budgetary 
expenditures were provided for cotton, coff e e ,  o r  c o r n  i n  c e r t a i n  n o t i f i e d  y e a r s ;  
therefore Brazil has not notified any prog ramme (even with a zero for budgetary 
expenditures). This notification of suppo rt only in years of expenditures limits 
transparency of the full policy pi cture in Brazil. In the past, the United States of America 
notified in the same manner. However, to improve transparency of U.S. agricultural 
policies, the United States of America now in cludes notification via footnote of support 
programmes that are in place, but did not have any expenditure. 
Has Brazil considered doing something similar? Answer by Brazil 
 
Brazil is considering presenting information on support programmes in place but without expenditures via the suggested footnote. 
AG-IMS ID 74042: Question by United States of America - Market price support: Eligible 
production  
In response to the U.S. question (AG-IMS 73 033), Brazil indicated that total production 
is not used for the minimum support price ca lculation because the benefited production 
is limited and depends on th e available budget outlays. 
Please confirm whether the e ligible production notified in Supporting Table DS:5 
represents all production that could have received the administered price for each 
programme, given each programme's limits on purchases. 
Answer by Brazil 
 
In the case of "Aquisições do Governo Federal - AGF" (a minimum support price programme), the 
amount of production notified in Supporting Table DS:5 represents all production that was purchased under that programme, according to the available budgetary outlays. As regards the "Public Option Contracts", the other Brazilian minimum support price programme, the amount of 
production notified in Supporting Table DS:5 repres ents all production that could be sold to the 
government (i.e. the contracted quantity) by producers in public auctions".  G/AG/W/135 
 
- 37 - 
 
  2.2.3  Canada (G/AG/N/CAN/96, G/AG/N/CAN/98) 
AG-IMS ID 74030: Question by European Union - Transparency issues (including 
Table DS:2) 
Regarding G/AG/N/CAN/96: 
a. This notification shows a continuation of  the trend of reductions in Canada's 
Current Total AMS compared to notifications for the time prior to the adoption of 
the Growing Forward policy agreement. Co uld Canada explain which changes to 
the policy in particular contribute to the AMS reductions notified in 2010 and 2011. 
b. In a note to Supporting Table DS:4 Canada explains that "Value of production for 
most products is equal to total market  receipts (source: Statistics Canada, 
Table 002-0001-Farm Cash Receipts, a nnual (dollars), CANSIM (database), 
November 2013). For grains and oilseeds, value of production is equal to 
production multiplied by price (source fo r production: Statistics Canada CANSIM 
Table 001-0010, December 2013; source for price: based on St atistics Canada 
Farm Cash Receipt prices)". Could Cana da clarify why a distinction is made 
between grains and oilseeds and other products in this context? 
Answer by Canada 
 
a. Canada's Growing Forward (GF) Policy Framework focused on building the productivity, 
profitability, and competitiveness of Canada's agricultural industry. Many of its GF programmes were designed to meet the Green Box criteria (G/AG/N/CAN/91). These programmes within GF aimed to help the industry position itself to respond to future 
opportunities and challenges and to achieve its full potential. 
b. For most grains and oilseeds, the methodolog y provides a better estimate of the entire 
value of production (VOP), as the Farm Cash Receipts data from Statistics Canada does 
not account for the value of inter-farm sales within a province or value of crops fed 
on-farm. The methodology ensures that their VOPs reflect all marketing activities including those not captured by Statistics Canada. 
Follow-up : The European Union clarified that the purpose of question (a) was to understand better 
the changes that took place which led to the AMS decrease, rather than the conformity of the 
measure with Green Box criteria as provided in a Table DS:2 notification.  
AG-IMS ID 74062: Question by Indonesia - Tr ansparency issues (including Table DS:2) 
Regarding G/AG/N/CAN/98: 
a. Canada allocates significant amount of product specific support for beef, pork, 
milk and butter. What is the export share of these products on the world 
market in the last five years? 
b. Several products (such as beef, pork, sh eep) seem to receive several types of 
support (either product or non-product specific and either from federal or 
provincial government). Are producers of these products also recipients of 
AgriInsurance (formerly production insurance)? 
Answer by Canada 
 
a. As reported in Canada's 2011 domestic support notification, Canada's total 
product-specific AMS for beef and pork re presents less than 5% of corresponding 
sector's value of production (2.5% and 3.8% respectively) and are considered as de minimis . Moreover, Canada's 2011 Current Total AMS (CAN$522.4 million) is well 
below its annual commitment level of CAN$4.3 billion. Annex 1 contains Canada's export 
shares of these products in the last five years. G/AG/W/135 
 
- 38 - 
 
  b. AgriInsurance is a federal-provincial-producer cost-shared programme in which the 
provinces are responsible for the developmen t, implementation and delivery of their 
insurance products. Provinces have developed products where demand exists from a producer group. Even though the Canada Production Insurance Regulations allow for the 
development of insurance products for the livestock sector, there has been limited 
interest demonstrated by the sector. At this time, the livestock insurance products in place under AgriInsurance are only for bees and cattle mortality. 
AG-IMS ID 74061: Question by Indonesia - Direct payments: income insurance and 
income safety-net programmes 
Regarding G/AG/N/CAN/98, how is income in surance and income safety net programme 
operated? How does Canada determine the elig ibility criteria for farmers to receive such 
payment? 
Answer by Canada 
 
Canada's AgriStability Income Disaster Compon ent, notified under the "income insurance and 
income safety-net programmes" of Annex 2 paragraph 7 (G/AG/N/CAN/91), operates on a 
whole-farm margin in which payments are triggered when a producer's margin in the claim year 
declines by more than 30% compared to the average margin of the preceding five years, excluding the highest and the lowest years (i.e. the Olympic average). The margin is calculated as the total 
eligible sales and other revenues, minus expenses directly related to production (e.g. commodity 
purchases, seed, fertilizer, pesticides, veterinary expenses). In no case will government compensation exceed 70% of the loss. To be eligible to participate in AgriStability, producers must have filed an income tax return, have been actively farming for at least six consecutive months, 
and have completed one production cycle during the programme year. 
AG-IMS ID 74031: Question by European Union - Non-product-specific AMS 
Regarding G/AG/N/CAN/96: 
a. The support notified under AgriInsu rance in Supporting Table DS:9 has 
increased compared to the 2010 notificati on. Could Canada explain the reasons 
for the increase? 
b. Could Canada provide more details on what measures are included under the 
heading "Provincial Programs" in Supporting Table DS:9? 
Answer by Canada 
 
AgriInsurance is a federal-provincial-producer cost-shared programme to which the federal and provincial governments contribute approximately 60% of total premiums. This portion is reported 
as non-product specific support in Supporting Table DS:9. The Farm Income Protection Act 
requires that insurance programmes must be self-sustaining. Also, the Canada Production Insurance Regulations require that the setting of premium rates be established in an actuarially 
sound manner. As a result, premium rates for crop s under AgriInsurance are updated periodically 
on a crop and risk-zone basis and are determined by factors such as the long-term average yield, 
the selected coverage level, the insured pric e, and the producer's experience discount or 
surcharge. The increase can be attributed to a combination of factors, including the effects of 
recent high crop prices. The types of measures  are those that are provided by provinces to 
agricultural producers in general within their province, such as fuel tax exemptions, risk management assistance (e.g. natural disasters), agriculture investment and development 
assistance. 
 2.2.4  Costa Rica (G/AG/N/CRI/44/REV.1, G/AG/N/CRI/48) 
AG-IMS ID 74005: Question by New Zealand - General services: pest and disease control 
Regarding G/AG/N/CRI/44/Rev.1, New Zealand would like Costa Rica to clarify what is 
covered by "improved domestic production" under its Table DS:1 notification heading 
"Pest and disease control - Animal health pr ogramme". This measure apparently covers: 
"General programmes to preserve, protec t and enhance the health status of the G/AG/W/135 
 
- 39 - 
 
  country's livestock through improved domest ic production, animal health, veterinary 
public health and environment protection , and the application of domestic and 
international standards for that purpose". 
Answer by Costa Rica 
 
Costa Rica would like to clarify that the "animal health programme" is included in the National Animal Health Service's (SENASA) budget for controlling, inspecting and fighting both general and 
product-specific diseases. This is how SENASA helps to preserve, protect and enhance the health 
status of the country's livestock and thus contributes to improving domestic production, animal health, veterinary public health and environmental protection. 
AG-IMS ID 74006: Question by New Zeal and - Direct payments: payments under 
environmental programmes 
Regarding G/AG/N/CRI/44/Rev.1, New Zealan d would like Costa Rica to clarify what 
sort of "financial incentives" are being prov ided in the programmes set out under the 
heading "(j) Environmental programmes" in Costa Rica's DS:1 notification. 
Answer by Costa Rica 
 
As regards the three environmental programmes noti fied in Table DS:1, the incentive or economic 
compensation refers to a direct payment to the producer. Notifications G/AG/N/CRI/20 and G/AG/N/CRI/39, corresponding to Table DS:2, set out the details concerning each programme, including the form of payment. 
AG-IMS ID 74008: Question by Canada - Scheduled commitment level 
Regarding G/AG/N/CRI/48, the issue of Co sta Rica exceeding its domestic support 
commitment has been raised and discussed pr eviously at this Committee. Canada notes 
Costa Rica's commitment to transparency an d its engagement with Canada and other 
Members on this issue. At the March 2014 meeting Costa Rica informed the Committee that work was underway to develop an alte rnative mechanism to replace the current 
market price support for rice. The expected implementation date is 1 March 2015. Costa 
Rica's domestic notification for the 2013 reporting period (G/AG/N/CRI/48) shows a 
Current Total AMS that is five times more than its domestic support commitment. Could Costa Rica provide an update on the domest ic process for the elimination of the price 
support for rice and the developmen t of an alternative mechanism? 
Answer by Costa Rica 
 
The work involved in coordinating and defining the alternative mechanism due to replace the 
price-setting mechanism for rice, as provided for in Decree No. 37699-MEIC (notified to this Committee in document G/AG/GEN/110 of 31 May 2013), is still under way. Costa Rica will be able 
to provide details regarding the alternative mechanism once it has been defined. It will inform the 
Committee in due course of any development in this matter. 
AG-IMS ID 74034: Question by Europe an Union - Scheduled commitment level 
Regarding G/AG/N/CRI/48, The European Un ion appreciates Costa Rica's continuous 
transparency via notifications and various exchanges on its rice policy. The current 
notification (G/AG/N/CRI/48) under review ag ain reflects the breach of Costa Rica's 
AMS commitment. 
Could Costa Rica update the Committee on the progress in defining an alternative 
mechanism of support as a follow-up to the delay in the elimination of price support 
mechanism for rice until March 2015? 
Answer by Costa Rica 
 See response to AG-IMS 74008.  G/AG/W/135 
 
- 40 - 
 
  2.2.5  Dominican Republic (G/AG/N/DOM/23) 
AG-IMS ID 74046: Question by United St ates of America - Transparency issues 
(including Table DS:2) 
a. The United States of America underst ands that the government of the 
Dominican Republic also conducts activities to stabilize prices for other agricultural products, including potatoes. 
 
i. Please explain if these activities are included in G/AG/N/DOM/23, and if so, 
where? 
ii. Please describe how this activity is implemented, including information 
about the administrating institution. 
iii. Please provide a list of products benefi ting from price stabilizing activities. 
b. The United States of America underst ands that the government of the 
Dominican Republic is implementing an agricultural support programme 
through the Special Fund of the Agricu ltural Development (FEDA), which is 
funded directly through the Domini can Presidency. For example, the 
FEDA website
5 provides examples of programmes for improved greenhouses, 
support for coffee producers, and develo pment of a genetic collection center. 
Please explain if and how this progra mme is included in G/AG/N/DOM/23. 
 
c. The United States of America underst ands that the government of the 
Dominican Republic contributes funding to Agrodosa, which provides agricultural insurance to agricultural producers. 
i. Please explain if this is the insura nce programme to which the Dominican 
Republic referred in AG-IMS 67021. If  not, please explain where this 
programme is notified in G/AG/N/DOM/23. 
ii. Please describe how this programme is implemented, including the loss 
coverage levels. 
iii. Please confirm that the Ministry of Ag riculture subsidized from 25%-50% of 
the value of the insurance premium, as it states at 
http://www.agricultura.gob.do/sobre -nosotros/dependencias/agrodosa/ . 
iv. Please provide financial outlays for this programme in 2012. 
Answer by Dominican Republic 
 
Dominican Republic undertook to provide a response at a later stage. 
AG-IMS ID 74045: Question by United States  of America - General services: marketing 
and promotion services 
a. In Supporting Table DS:1, the Dominican Republic lists "Promotion of other 
crops" at a value of RD$1,069,137,711, up from RD$600,052,371 in 2012. 
Please explain why there was such a significant increase and if the 
programming changed as a result of increased funding. 
 
b. The United States of America notes that in Supporting Table DS:1, the 
Dominican Republic lists "Construction an d rehabilitation of farm roads" under 
Marketing services. Please explain why the Dominican Republic did not 
categorize this as (vi) Infrastructure services, per Agreement on Agriculture, 
Annex 2, General Services, paragraph 2(g). 
 
                                               
5 http://www.feda.gob.do/  G/AG/W/135 
 
- 41 - 
 
  c. The United States of America notes th at the Dominican Republic notifies 
"Provision of inputs and small-scale tools", which includes providing small 
producers with farming tools and inpu ts needed to grow various crops. 
 
i. Please describe what inputs and sma ll-scale tools are distributed and how 
they are distributed. 
ii. What are the requirements to receive the distributed benefits, including the 
definition of "small producers"? 
iii. Please explain how this programme m eets the requirements of paragraph 2 
of Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, including why this programme is categorized under Marketing services  and how such expenditures do not 
reduce the selling price. 
iv. Please explain why this is not notified  under Article 6.2 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture. 
d. Please confirm that, as was the case in the Dominican Republic's 2012 
DS:1 notification, the Pignoración programme is included under the subheading "Promotion of rice production". Please  also explain if there have been any 
changes in the Pignoración programme, or  if the following are still true (per 
Dominican Republic's response to AG ‑IMS 67021): 
 
i. Benefits of the programme are availa ble to all producers: however more 
than 50% of production arises from "small and medium sized"? 
ii. Pignoración operates by allowing rice producers to obtain an interest-free 
loan equivalent to 70% of the valu e of that deposited in specified 
warehouses? 
iii. The Dominican Republic pays the storage costs, including insurance, and 
those outlays are included in the su bheading "marketing and promotion 
services"? 
e. The United States of America also wo uld like to raise several additional 
questions related to the aforementioned  Pignoración programme questions and 
responses. 
 
i. What percent of producers and processors each participate in the 
Pignoración programme? 
ii. What percent of rice production in Do minican Republic is deposited in the 
specified warehouses? Please also pr ovide further detail regarding what 
percentage of producers deposit rice in the specified warehouses and what 
factors do producers use to determine whether to deposit rice in the specified warehouses or other warehouses? 
iii. Please confirm that the Dominican Repu blic pays all storage costs under the 
Pignoración programme. If not, please  describe what costs are covered and 
if there are any limits. 
iv. Please confirm that under the Pignoración programme that the National Rice 
Commission (CONA), which is compose d of Ministry of Agriculture, 
producers, processors, retailers, amon g others, establishes price controls 
both annually and for each of the two harvest periods. 
v. In response to questions by the Un ited States of America (AG-IMS 66055 
and 67021) regarding the Dominican Republic's notified rice production and 
marketing programme, the Dominican Repu blic stated that the "Pignoración 
programme is not related to the rice price support scheme". Please confirm G/AG/W/135 
 
- 42 - 
 
  that the objective of the "rice price support scheme" is to "maintain price 
stability for production chain participan ts" and is designed to ensure larger 
profit margins, but does not have an e ffect on markets or result in a direct 
economic benefit to producers and purchasers? 
vi. How does Dominican Republic notify the "rice price support scheme" and 
why? 
Answer by Dominican Republic 
 
Dominican Republic undertook to provide a response at a later stage. 
2.2.6  Guatemala (G/AG/N/GTM/45) 
AG-IMS ID 74052: Question by United St ates of America - Transparency issues 
(including Table DS:2) 
The United States of America appreciates Gu atemala's response to U.S. questions in 
AG-IMS 73049. 
a. Please confirm that funding from both domestic sources and external sources 
are included in Guatemala's supporting tables in G/AG/N/GTM/45. 
b. If so, please explain why Guatemala in cluded funding from external sources. 
 Answer by Guatemala 
 
With regard to notification G/AG/N/GTM/45 concerning domestic support programmes for 2002-2012, the relevant checks have been carried out and it has been established that only in 2006 and 2007 did the Institute of Science and Technology (ICTA) operate with domestic 
and external sources of funding. The purpose of notification G/AG/N/GTM/45 is to ensure 
transparency as regards programmes and amounts of support granted.  
Annex 2 contains a table showing the amount of  funding from domestic sources and external 
sources spent respectively by the ICTA.  
Follow-up: For transparency purposes, the United States of America questioned whether in the 
future Guatemala would include designations in the figures in order to distinguish between 
fundings from external and domestic sources.  
2.2.7  Indonesia (G/AG/N/IDN/30, G/AG/N/IDN/34) 
AG-IMS ID 74043: Question by United St ates of America - Transparency issues 
(including Table DS:2) 
The United States of America repeats ques tions previously asked in AG-IMS 73052, 
71031, and 72036 since Indonesia has not noti fied Supporting Tables DS:4 and DS:5, 
nor submitted a revision to its notification  for administered prices during 2001-2004. 
Could Indonesia please explain and provide fu rther clarity regarding the acquisition of 
stocks for its public stockholding for food  security purposes programme in light of 
seemingly contradictory information in its no tifications and responses to questions in 
the Committee. Please address the following points in particular: 
a. the United States of America notes th at Indonesia states that stocks are 
procured at administered prices, which ta ke market prices into account but are 
not the sole determining factor (G/AG/W/111, AG-IMS ID 70026). 
b. The United States of America also no tes that Indonesia has not provided a 
Supporting Table DS:4 or Supporting Ta ble DS:5 to account for the use of 
administered prices per footnote 5 of paragraph 3 of Annex 2 of the Agreement 
on Agriculture. 
c. Further, the United States of Americ a understands Indonesia's response to 
part (b) of AG-IMS ID 70031 to state th at no administered price was reported G/AG/W/135 
 
- 43 - 
 
  after 2001 due to Indonesia's procurem ent being for buffer stock operations. 
Please explain how this is consistent with footnote 5. 
 
Answer by Indonesia 
 
The administered price is used to acquire stock from low-income farmers or resource-poor producers. Another source of procurement is import s. The administered price is set by taking into 
account the market price as well as cost of production by farmers. The administered price has 
already been in place for some time but under different programme names. 
 The public stockholding for food security is mostly channelled for domestic food aid and a very 
small part of it for buffer stock purposes. The public stock is managed in accordance with para. 3 
and 4 and footnote 5 and 6 of the Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  
 
For the time being, Indonesia is still collecting the necessary data across ministries to prepare 
notification of Supporting Table DS: 4 and DS:5. Indonesia expects to notify the documents as 
soon as they are finalized. 
 
Follow-up : In light of the additional information contained in Indonesia's trade policy review 
report, particularly with regards to rice, the United States of America intended to raise some 
follow-up questions.  
 
2.2.8  Japan (G/AG/N/JPN/191) 
AG-IMS ID 74068: Question by Indonesia - Tr ansparency issues (including Table DS:2) 
The government of Japan seems to provide many support programmes to farmers (such 
as agricultural insurance pr ogramme, natural disaster relief loans, farmers' pension 
programme, agriculture loan, payment for co nversation from rice production, payment 
to dairy farmers, payment to farmers in the hilly and mountainous areas, etc.). 
Nevertheless, Japan still launc hed new direct payment programme to motivate farmers 
to continue rice production and othe r payment to stimulate young farmers. 
In Japan's view, how effective is the prog ramme support for farmers in stimulating 
agriculture production in Japan? 
Answer by Japan 
 
As a result of the rapid aging of Japanese fa rmers, their age profile has become obviously 
unbalanced. This should be addressed urgently in order to ensure sustainable agricultural 
production in the future. Payment for new young farmers aims to enhance the number of new 
young farmers by providing incentives and support for young people to initiate and continue farming. 
 
Direct Payments for rice is limited to rice farmers who participate in the rice production-limiting programme. These programmes do not aim to  stimulate agricultural production. 
AG-IMS ID 74063: Question by Indonesia - Public stockholding for food security 
purposes 
The government of Japan conducts a public stockholding programme for food security 
purposes for rice, wheat, barley, soya beans and feed grains.  
a. How does Japan manage its pub lic stockholding programme? 
b. Does the government make domestic procurement? 
c. If so, does Japan use market price or administered price in the procurement? 
d. What is the level of import of each product under the public stockholding 
programme? What is its percentage  vis-à-vis the total production? 
e. There is a slight increase of budget a llocation for public stockholding from 
¥22.7 billion in 2010 to ¥23.3 billion in 2011. What was the reason behind such 
increase? G/AG/W/135 
 
- 44 - 
 
  Answer by Japan 
 
a. With regards to rice, the Ministry of Agricult ure, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) operates 
the government rice reserve, targeting 1 m illion tonnes, against a possible shortage of 
supply. 
With regards to wheat, the government supports the flour mill manufacturers which, 
under the guidance of the MAFF, operate public stockholding of imported wheat 
equivalent to 2.3 months of demand, against a possible shortage of supply (MAFF subsidizes storage cost for manufacturers). 
With regards to feed grains (maize and so rghum), a public corporation, the Compound 
Feed Supply Stabilization Corporation (hereina fter referred to as "the Corporation") is 
responsible for the administration and supervision of stockholding of feed grains under 
the national stockholding programme for feed grains.  
There is no public stockholding of barley and soybeans. (The government had supported 
the Soybean Supply Stabilization Association which, under the guidance of MAFF, 
operates public stockholding of imported soybean using the storage facilities of oilseed processors, targeting the amount equivalent to 2 weeks of demand as a guide 
since 2010.) 
b. With regards to rice, MAFF conducts domestic procurement. 
With regards to wheat, government does not conduct domestic procurement (food wheat 
for stockholding is 100% imported). 
In the case of feed grains, the Corporation procures maize and sorghum exclusively from 
abroad for the stockhol ding of feed grains. 
c. Purchases of rice, wheat and feed grains are made at market price. 
d. There is no imported rice for the public stockholding programme. Public stockholding of 
wheat for food and feed grains (maize and sorghum) are 100% imported. 
e. The government rice stockholding was damaged by the Great East Japan Earthquake 
and the disposal cost increased. A table in Annex 3 shows the data on public stockholding, the imported amount of public  stockholding and the total production for 
rice, wheat for food and grain respectively in Japan (FY2012). 
AG-IMS ID 74064: Question by Indonesia - Direct payments: payments for relief from 
natural disasters 
How does the agricultural insurance scheme op erate? What are the eligibility criteria for 
such scheme? 
Answer by Japan 
The Agricultural Insurance Scheme is operated by the Agricultural Mutual Relief Associations 
consisting of farmers and covers: 
a. yield loss of major crops like rice, wheat, soybeans and fruit from natural calamities such 
as rainstorm, drought and cool-summer; 
b. mortality, economic loss, diseases and injuries of livestock; and 
c. damage to greenhouses due to natural disasters. G/AG/W/135 
 
- 45 - 
 
  The government of Japan subsidizes about a half of the premiums which farmers pay and part of 
operating costs of Agricultural Mutual Relief Associations, and conducts reinsurance of the agricultural insurance programmes. 
The eligibility for participation in the insurance programme is that a person should be a farmer of 
insured commodities, and a farmer in the following cases will not be qualified:  
a. insured accidents are expected to happen with high probability; 
b. the size of the farming is less than a certain level. 
This scheme consists of a number of insurance programmes. The basic indemnity payment system 
is that when a farmers' eligible loss exceeds a ce rtain percentage of average yield of the farmer 
(the percentage is chosen from 50%, 40%, 30%, 20% and 10% by the farmer in advance based on an insurance programme), indemnity is paid out to the farmer. 
AG-IMS ID 74065: Question by Indonesia - Direct payments: structural adjustment 
assistance provided through pr oducer retirement programmes 
What are the eligibility criteria for fa rmers' pension programme? How does the 
programme operate? 
Answer by Japan 
The Farmers' Pension programme is operated by the Farmer's Pension Fund, the Independent 
Administrative Agency, according to the Act on the Farmers' Pension Fund, Independent 
Administrative Agency. The target of this programme is persons who are between 20 and 59 years old, enrolled in National Pension programme as persons insured pursuant to the provision of Item 1, paragraph 1, Article 7 of National Pension Act, and engaged in farming more than 60 days 
per year. 
AG-IMS ID 74009: Question by Canada - Direct payments: payments under 
environmental programmes 
Japan reports payments for "…  maintaining the paddy fields in environmentally good 
condition through growing any plants ot her than rice or other appropriate 
managements". Expenditures amounted  to ¥231.3 billion, ¥228.4 billion and 
¥228.4 billion in 2010, 2011 and 2012 respectively . These expenditures are significant. 
Paragraph 1 of Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture sets the guidelines that any 
domestic support measure for which exemption from the reduction commitments is claimed shall meet the fundamental requirement that they have no, or at most minimal, 
trade-distorting effects or effects on production. Howe ver, providing a monetary 
incentive to encourage producers to grow non- rice crops could distort the production of 
non-rice crops. 
a. Could Japan explain how this kind of pa yment does not distort the production 
of non-rice crops? 
b. Could Japan indicate which non-rice crop s have benefited fr om this measure? 
c. Could Japan elaborate as to how it determines the amount of payment to 
farmers, i.e. does the payment only cover the extra costs to plant non-rice 
crops or the difference in income be tween rice and non-rice crops?  G/AG/W/135 
 
- 46 - 
 
  Answer by Japan 
a. and c. In Japan, as a result of the continuous decrease in demand for rice, need for 
proper preservation of paddy fields has been increasing. The objective of this 
programme is to maintain favourable environmental conditions for paddy fields, and thus 
to prevent floods or soil erosion, to cultivate water resources and to preserve natural environment against a tendency of decreasing domestic demand for table rice. 
The level of payment to farmers in this programme is determined within the loss of 
income when production is shifted from table rice to other crops, taking into account the 
additional cost for switching crops. 
b. The payment is targeted to all crops other than table rice such as wheat, soybean, rice 
for feed and rice for whole crop silage. 
AG-IMS ID 74010: Question by Canada - Pa yments based on 85% or less of the base 
level of production 
In previous notifications Japan reported pa yments to rice producers under the Rice 
Farming Income Stabilization Program, howeve r, in G/AG/N/JPN/191 payments to rice 
producers were made under the measure Direct Payment for Rice. 
a. Could Japan confirm that the Rice Farm ing Income Stabilization Program is no 
longer in effect? According to G/AG/N /JPN/192, this payment was introduced 
as a pilot programme in FY2010 and formally launched in 2011. Subsequent to 
the launch of the programme the payments are much less than from the pilot stage, ¥153.3 billion and ¥155.2 billion in 2011 and 2012, respectively compared to ¥306.8 billion in 2010. 
b. Could Japan elaborate on the reason for the lower payments post the pilot 
phase of the Rice Payment Program? 
c. Could Japan provide information on the to tal amount of production area that 
received a payment in 2011 and 2012? 
Answer by Japan 
a. Japan abolished the Rice Farming Income Stabilization Program in 2009. 
b. Direct Payment for Rice consists of two components : i) the fixed component calculated 
based on the historical gap between the national average cost of production and farm gate price and ii) the variable component which is paid only in the year when the farm 
gate price goes below a fixed threshold. In 2010, when the farm gate price of the year 
was below a fixed threshold, the variable component was paid, while the variable component was not paid in 2011 and 2012, as the farm gate prices were relatively high. 
c. The total amount of area that received the payment in 2011 and 2012 is approximately 
1.13 million hectare. 
AG-IMS ID 74066: Question by Indone sia - Other product-specific AMS/EMS 
How are deficiency payments related to beef, veal and meat of swine operated? 
Answer by Japan 
The programme reported as deficiency payment for beef and veal is a compensatory payment that 
is granted for producers, in case the average cont ract prices at cattle markets calculated quarterly 
falls below guaranteed prices. G/AG/W/135 
 
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  The programme reported as deficiency payment for meat of swine is a compensatory payment that 
is granted for producers to make up 80% of the difference, in case the average wholesale prices for meat of swine calculated quarterly fall below guaranteed prices. 
AG-IMS ID 74067: Question by Indonesia - Non-product-specific AMS 
How does the crop income stabilization payment operate? 
Answer by Japan 
The "Crop income stabilization payment", which is mainly targeted for core-farmers, is basically 
the compensation payment for 90% of the revenue  loss when the sum of the revenues from crop 
production falls below the predetermined reference level. 
2.2.9  Thailand (G/AG/N/THA/75) 
AG-IMS ID 74013: Question by Canada - Tr ansparency issues (including Table DS:2) 
Canada notes that the total expenditures in  Supporting Table DS:1 claimed as exempt 
from the reduction commitment or Green Bo x increased significantly to B 64,019 million 
in 2008 from B 35,092 million in 2007. Most of  this increase can be attributed to 
substantial increases in expenditures re lated to National Extension and Advisory 
Services and Infrastructural Services. 
a. Could Thailand elaborate on the factor s that resulted in the increase in 
expenditures under National Extens ion and Advisory Services from 
B 2,371.34 million in 2007 to B 11,333 million in 2008? 
b. Could Thailand elaborate as to which types of infrastructure listed in the 
description of Infrastructural Services contributed to the increase in 
expenditures from B 25,517.74 million in 2007 to B 42,662.30 million in 2008? 
Answer by Thailand 
a. Expenditures under National Extension and Advisory Services increased from 
B 2,371.34 million in 2007 to B 11,333 million in 2008 because the target group was 
expanded to include various groups of farmers and small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) related to agriculture. 
b. Expenditures under Infrastructural Services increased from B 25,517.74 million in 2007 
to B 42,662.30 million because Thailand gave more priority to water management. 
Examples of projects under this scheme incl ude construction of dams, flood protection, 
and water irrigation. 
AG-IMS ID 74035: Question by European Union - Transparency issues (including 
Table DS:2) 
The European Union appreciates Thailand's no tification covering the calendar year 2008. 
In anticipation of further notifications cove ring more recent years, the European Union 
would like to ask the following questions: 
a. Could Thailand provide further inform ation on the schemes notified under 
Supporting Table DS:7 (Paddy Pledging Sc heme, Market intervention for garlic, 
manioc and longan)? In particular, coul d Thailand explain why they consider 
these schemes should be classified as "o ther product-specific support based on 
budgetary outlays"? 
b. Could Thailand provide further details on what elements of public spending are 
included under the budgetary outlays fo r Paddy Pledging Scheme in Supporting 
Table DS:7? G/AG/W/135 
 
- 48 - 
 
  c. The European Union considers that Suppo rting Table DS:4 should contain all 
support elements presented in Supporting Tables DS:5, DS:6, DS:7 and DS:8 of 
the notification with relevant amounts which take account of the de minimis 
provision where necessary. Such presentation, in the European Union's view, 
correctly reflects the calculation of the Current Total AMS. Would Thailand 
consider revising their notification? 
Answer by Thailand 
a. Under the Paddy Pledging scheme, the govern ment loaned money to farmers by taking 
their rice to the government's stock. If farm ers did not redeem their rice, it was given to 
the government. For longan, garlic and manioc for which the government used market intervention as domestic subsidies, the government buys longan, garlic and manioc from growers without any redemption condition. Thailand would also like to indicate that 
Thailand's 2008 rice scheme was the same as the one Thailand had imposed since 1995, 
which Thailand has notified as "other product-specific support based on budgetary outlays". 
b. The spending under the budgetary outlays includes administrative cost, storage cost and 
other fixed costs in operation, as well as losses occurred at the conclusion of the scheme. 
c. In Supporting Table DS:4, Thailand indicates the current total amount AMS excluding the 
de minimis  information. The explanation of de minimis  provision is explained in "Note to 
Supporting Table DS:7" which may be unconventional compared to the current practice of notifications. Thailand takes note of the European Union's comment but believes that 
all information is available in the notification as a whole. 
Follow-up: Regarding Thailand's reply to question c), the European Union maintained the view that 
Support Table DS:4 should contain all support elements presented in the relevant Supporting 
Tables. 
AG-IMS ID 74014: Question by Canada  - Other product-specific AMS/EMS 
a. Canada notes that in 2008 the support fo r rice in Supporting Table DS:7 is 
provided exclusively from its Paddy Pledging Scheme compared to previous 
years (2005, 2006, 2007) as reported in G/AG/N/THA/72 where support was 
provided under the Paddy Pledging Sche me and the Soft Loan Measure. Could 
Thailand advise if the Soft Loan Me asure is still in effect for rice? 
b. Canada notes that the support for rice increased significantly to 
B 29,654.11 million in 2008 from B 15,054.08 in 2007 under the Paddy 
Pledging Scheme which is reported as  de minimis whereas in 2007 support for 
rice was reported as Current Total AMS. Could Thailand elaborate on the 
reasons for the tremendous increase in the value of production for rice such 
that the 2008 support is de minimis? 
Answer by Thailand 
a. Thailand should be able to confirm this information when Thailand submits further 
notifications. 
b. During that period, the weather conditions in Thailand were ideal for rice production with 
relatively better equipment and technology compared to the past years. The world market price for rice was almost double prices from the previous years. All of these 
factors contributed to Thailand's increasing value of production. G/AG/W/135 
 
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  AG-IMS ID 74040: Question by United States of America - Other product-
specific AMS/EMS 
The United States of America notes that this is Thailand's first DS:1 notification to the 
Committee since 2010 for the years 2005-2007. This notification provides data on 
Thailand domestic support policies for 2008. A number of questions submitted by Members regarding Thailand's domestic support  policies remain outstanding. The United 
States of America has questions subm itted in 2010 that remain unanswered. 
Since 2010, Thailand, a major global trader of  rice, has had two major reforms to its rice 
policy, which account for a large portion of its AMS support. This Committee is 
responsible for reviewing and discussing Member s' agricultural policies, especially those 
policies of any country that plays a key role in international markets. Without 
transparency, Members of this Committee are unable to have the most effective 
discussions possible in understanding ag ricultural policies around the world. 
The United States of America resubm its its questions dated 31 March 2011 
(AG‑IMS 61054) and asks the same question s for notification G/AG/N/THA/75. 
a. For 2002-2004, Thailand's rice AMS had three components: Paddy Pledging 
Scheme, Soft Loan Measure, and Market Price Intervention. For 2005-2007, only the Paddy Pledging Scheme and So ft Loan Measure are included. Could 
Thailand explain what is included with in each category and how the budgetary 
outlays were calculated? For example, ho w is the interest subsidy calculated? 
Why was Market Price Intervention no longer notified for 2005 ‑2007? 
b. How are the various government scheme s to support storage costs accounted 
for in the domestic support notification? 
c. As part of the Paddy Pledging Scheme , the Thai government often acquires 
large stocks of rice. These rice stocks are then sold under government tenders. 
If the rice stocks are sold at a price le ss than the price at which the rice was 
acquired, how is that budgetary loss accounted for in the AMS for rice? 
d. For many years, Thailand has set a mini mum intervention price for rice under 
which the government supports domestic prices; acquires stocks if producers 
choose not to redeem their loans; and ma kes direct sales to companies for use 
in the domestic market or for export. Thai government interventions (such as 
the Paddy Pledging Scheme, the Direct Purchase Programme (of the PWO), and 
others) were intended to increase farm income by increasing the value of rice; that is, by increasing the effective pric e farmers received. Why has Thailand not 
n o t i f i e d  i t s  r i c e  s u p p o r t  a s  m a r k e t  p r i c e support, since the intervention price 
appears to be an applied administered  price, as described in Annex 3, 
paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Agreement on Agriculture? 
e. Could Thailand provide more detail abou t the programme for "consolidation of 
land use in agriculture irrigation  areas", including what programme 
expenditures are for? Does the progra mme buy agricultural land, consolidate 
such holdings, and then provide that land to producers? If so, what are the 
terms at which such land is made available to producers? 
f. Are "intervention prices" connected to th e Paddy Pledging Scheme and the Soft 
Loan Measures in any direct way, i.e. are intervention prices referenced in 
administrative or implementation docu ments and authorities of the "Paddy 
Pledging Scheme" and the Soft Loan Measures? G/AG/W/135 
 
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  Answer by Thailand 
a. For 2002-2004, under the Agreement on Agricult ure, Thailand notified three major rice 
subsidy schemes, which were: 1) Paddy Pledging Scheme 2) Soft Loan Measure and 
3) Market Intervention. For the Paddy Ple dging scheme, the government granted loans 
to farmers using rice as a guarantee. For Soft Loan Measures, the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives loaned money to farmers for agricultural purposes with 
lower interest rates than market rates. For Market Intervention, the government bought 
rice from farmers without any redemption condition. For 2005-2007, the government did not impose market intervention due to the world market price situation at that time 
which made it unnecessary to use the measure. Therefore, it was dropped from the 
notification for that period. 
b. The amount of support for the storage costs are accounted in the AMS. 
c. If rice stocks were sold at a price lower than the acquiring price, the deficit would be 
included in the AMS. 
d. The 2008 rice scheme was the same as the one Thailand had imposed since 1995, which 
Thailand has notified as "other product-specific support based on budgetary outlays". 
e. Regarding the programme for "consolidation of land use in agriculture irrigation areas", 
the main purpose was to develop land for agricultural use by reorganizing land infrastructure such as irrigation, hydrological improvement, land leveling, and soil 
fertility improvement. 
f. See response to a. 
Follow-up : Regarding question a, the United States of America suggested Thailand include a zero 
for Market Price Intervention so as to clarify that the programme was not used during the period in 
question.  
2.3  NEW OR MODIFIED DOMESTIC SUPPORT MEASURES (Table DS:2) 
2.3.1  Canada (G/AG/N/CAN/99) 
AG-IMS ID 74029: Question by European Union - Transparency issues (including 
Table DS:2) 
In its notification Canada states that th e "Aliments du Québec is an organization 
founded by members of industry with mission  to promote Quebec agri-food products". 
By way of clarification, could Canada confirm that public spending is involved in the financing of the "Campagne régionale Aliments du Québec, toujours le bon choix! (Regional Food Campaign of Quebec, Always The Right Choice!)". 
Answer by Canada 
 Canada confirms that public spending is involved up to 50% of the eligible costs. 
AG-IMS ID 74017: Question by Australia - Direct payments: payments under regional 
assistance programmes 
Can Canada provide more detail as to the specific nature of the Programme pilote 
d'appui à multifonctionnalité de l'agri culture (Pilot Programme to Support 
Multifunctionality of Agriculture) and specific ally, what projects have been funded under 
this programme? Specifically, can Canada pr ovide advice against the policy objectives 
outlined below: 
• the development of landscapes; 
• attractiveness of territories; G/AG/W/135 
 
- 51 - 
 
  • accessibility of rural areas; 
• preserving the agricultural heritage; 
• the provision of services to the community. 
In particular, Australia is keen to understand  if the specific projects amount to on-farm 
investments or input subsidisatio n related to farm production. 
There are no policy-specific criteria for mult ifunctionality. In this context, and with 
regard to the compliance of this programm e with the policy specific criteria of 
paragraph 13, can Canada provide additional  detail on how farmers are selected for 
projects under this scheme, and on the basi s which it has determined that eligible 
recipients are in "disadvantaged regions". 
Answer by Canada 
 
The policy objectives of the programme are to promote multifunctionality of agriculture that 
contributes to its economic, social, and environment functions, as well as quality of life in the 
disadvantaged areas identified by municipalité s régionales de comté (or MRC). Agriculture 
production has the ability to shape landscape, protect environment, maintain services in rural communities, and create attractiveness of regions. However, it does not necessarily incorporate 
beneficial practices to achieve such objectives du e to impact on profitability and competitiveness. 
As a result, the programme provides financial assistance to compensate for the extra costs or income losses for farmers in the disadvantaged regions. This is a regional programme and it conforms with the policy criteria of Annex 2 paragraph 13 - Payments under regional assistance 
programmes (G/AG/N/CAN/99). Examples of funded projects are:  
 • "cultures paysagères en rotation": a group of farmers engage in a collective project for 
developing new rotational crops along a frequently-travelled road to improve the quality of 
landscapes, environment, as well as biodiversity in the region; 
• "mise en valeur des friches par l'agroforesterie ": a collective project for the recovery of 
wasteland by developing the practice of inter-cropping (e.g. annual or perennial crops 
between rows of trees or berry bushes). 
Landowners and farmers can enter into a lease agreement. The benefits are to conserve land, as 
well as to improve biodiversity and quality of landscape in the region. The assistance is available to 
all small farms with gross income less than CAN$150,000 and that are located in the 
disadvantaged regions identified by MRC. The disadvantaged region is based on neutral and 
objective biophysical and geographical characteristics such as the potential of the soil (e.g. 
stoniness or terrain), climate (e.g., heat), and di stance from potential markets (e.g. metropolitan 
communities). An index is developed and used for the selection of disadvantaged regions. To be eligible for financial assistance, a successful applicant (farm) must demonstrate that its proposed 
project will carry out beneficial farming practices and will generate benefits for the community. 
The proposal will be assessed by the regional committee, composed of representatives of the 
Ministry (Le ministère de l'Agriculture, des Pêcheries et de l'Alimentation du Québec) and members of external organizations, in accordance with programme's policy objectives and principles. The 
level of assistance is capped at CAN$30,000 per farm for extra costs to implement the approved 
project, and is not related to type or volume of production, prices, or production factors. 
AG-IMS ID 74069: Question by Indonesia - Direct payments: payments under regional 
assistance programmes 
In "Programme Support Multifunctionality of Agriculture", financial assistance is given 
to small farms located in the disadvantaged re gion identified by MRC or regional county 
municipalities.  
a. Is the assistance provided to all small farms in the disadvantaged area? If not, 
what are the criteria for elig ibility to receive such support? 
b. How does Canada define disadvantaged region? G/AG/W/135 
 
- 52 - 
 
  Answer by Canada 
 
a. The assistance is available to all small farms with gross income less than CAN$150,000 
and that are located in the disadvantaged regi ons identified by municipalités régionales 
de comté. To be eligible for financial assistance, a successful applicant (farm) must 
demonstrate that its proposed project will ca rry out beneficial farming practices and will 
generate benefits for the community. The pr oposal will be assessed by the regional 
committee, composed of representatives of the Ministry (Le ministère de l'Agriculture, 
des Pêcheries et de l'Alimentation du Québec ) and members of external organizations, in 
accordance with programme's policy objectives and principles. The level of assistance is capped at CAN$30,000 per farm for extra costs to implement the approved project, and 
is not related to type or volume of production, prices, or production factors. 
b. The definition of disadvantage region is ba sed on neutral and objective biophysical and 
geographical characteristics such as the potential of the soil (e.g. stoniness or terrain), 
climate (e.g. heat), and distance from  potential markets (e.g. metropolitan 
communities). An index is developed and used for the selection of disadvantaged regions. 
2.3.2  Japan (G/AG/N/JPN/192) 
AG-IMS ID 74019: Question by Canada - Direct payments: structural adjustment 
assistance provided through investment aids 
The "Payment for farmland accumulation" aims to make farm operation units more 
efficient by facilitating consolidation of sc attered parcels of land and thereby enlarging 
farmers' operation units. However, it is  unclear whether the payment covers the 
outright title transfer (ownership transfer) from one farmer to another, or a temporary 
management transfer (leasing or renting) for a specific period from one farmer to 
another. Canada understands that under  the "Payment for new young farmers" 
programme, fixed income suppo rt will be provided to new young farmers registered in 
each regional plan during the two-year trai ning period and that the initial operation 
period (up to an additional five years) woul d compensate initial investment costs in the 
form of direct payments.  
a. Could Japan clarify under the provis ions of "Payment for farmland 
accumulation" if a farmland transactio n is an outright purchase or lease 
transfer? 
b. Could Japan provide the eligibility criteria for the "Payment for new young 
farmers" regional plans, such as whet her they will have production-specific 
requirements? 
Answer by Japan 
 
a. The "Payment for farmland accumulation" covers lease transfer. It is a one-time 
payment made when a tenancy contract with six-year duration is made to accumulate the farmland usage. 
b. The requirements of payment for new young farmers are as follows: 
• the age of the farmer is below 45; 
• the farmer owns or has the use right of a farmland, as well as other resources 
necessary for farming; 
• the farmer needs to submit a business plan to show that he/she is able to make a 
living from farming, etc. 
There are no production-specific requirements. G/AG/W/135 
 
- 53 - 
 
  AG-IMS ID 74071: Question by Indonesia - Direct payments: structural adjustment 
assistance provided through investment aids 
a. In the payment for farmland accumulati on programme, is there any limit for 
land accumulation or volume of production? 
b. Indonesia notes that "payment for new young farmers" is an income support 
programme to secure labor force in ag riculture. The payment will be cut off 
when the income of young farmer under the programme exceeds certain 
amount. 
i. How is "new young farmer" defined? 
ii. What is the threshold income to de termine the eligibility for farmers to 
continue the programme? Will the threshold be updated? 
iii. The programme is operational since 1 April 2012. How many farmers have 
been taking part in this programme? 
iv. What is the level of expectation of this  programme in relation to the efforts 
to address the decreasing labor force in agriculture? 
Answer by Japan 
 
a. In the Payment of farmland accumulation programme, there is no necessary condition 
regarding the size of farmland accumulation. Once a land transfer is concluded, the volume and variety of farm products wh ich farmers produce is left to them. 
b.  
i. Farmers under the age of 45. 
ii. The payment will be suspended once farmer 's income excluding this payment in the 
previous year exceeds ¥2.5 million. The threshold does not fluctuate. 
iii. In 2012, 6,800 farmers received this payment. 
iv. Japan expects that 20,000 new young farmers will continue farming as per this 
programme every year. 
AG-IMS ID 74018: Question by Canada - Pa yments based on 85% or less of the base 
level of production 
The payments provided under the new measur e "Direct Payment for Rice" are reported 
in G/AG/N/JPN/191 and are significant am ounts, ¥306.8 billion, ¥153.3 billion and 
¥155.2 billion in 2010, 2011 and 2012 respectively. Could Japan provide further details 
on the two components used to determine the payments under this measure? 
a. What years are used in the "historical gap"? 
b. How is the "fixed threshold" determined? 
Answer by Japan 
 
a. Japan uses seven years (2002-2008) in calculating the national average cost of 
production and three years (2006-2008) for the farm gate price. 
b. A fixed threshold is the average farm gate price for 2006, 2007, and 2008. G/AG/W/135 
 
- 54 - 
 
  AG-IMS ID 74070: Question by Indonesia - Pa yments based on 85% or less of the base 
level of production 
Indonesia noted that in G/AG/N/JPN/192, Japan mentioned that the reason for the new 
direct payment programme for rice is to a ddress the aging and decreasing number of 
farmers and substantial declin e in agricultural income. 
a. How many farmers in Japan are eligible  for this payment and what is the 
percentage vis-à-vis the total number of farmers in Japan? 
b. What is the current level of income  of famers under this programme? 
The payment consists of fixed component calculated based on the historical gap 
between the national average cost of produc tion and farm gate price, and variable 
component when the farm gate price goes below a fixed threshold. 
c. How is the national average cost of production calculated? What are the 
elements in the calculation? 
d. How is the fixed price threshold calculated? Is the threshold updated? How is it 
updated? 
e. What are the variable components ta ken into account in calculating the 
payment? 
f. What is the difference between this new direct payment programme with the 
previous one? 
Answer by Japan 
 
a. In 2012, 980,000 farm households received this payment. The total number of farm 
households was approximately 2.53 million (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries, "Report on Results of 2010 World Census of Agriculture and Forestry in 
Japan", 2010). The percentage of the farm households who received this payment in 2012 was approximately 40%. 
b. In 2012, the agricultural gross income (natio nal average) of farm households engaged in 
paddy field farming (especially rice sector) in Japan was about ¥1.9 million [Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Farm Management and Economy by Sector for Each 
Farming Type (Individual Management, per Household) 2012]. 
c. The national average cost of production is th e five-year average of the production costs, 
which excludes the highest and the lowest out of seven years (2002-2008). 
d. The fixed price threshold is the average farm gate price for 2006-2008 and does not 
fluctuate. 
e. The components taken into account are i) the gap between the farm gate price in the 
year and the fixed price threshold; and ii) the areas under rice cultivation. 
f. The primary difference is the introduction of  the fixed component which is the payment 
per hectare. G/AG/W/135 
 
- 55 - 
 
  AG-IMS ID 74039: Question by United States  of America - Payments based on 85% or 
less of the base level of production 
a. Japan describes its production-limitin g programme, the Direct Payment for 
Rice, (G/AG/N/JPN/192) as having a fixed and variable component to 
payments, which are made on a per unit area of production. Please provide 
further explanation of the payment programme, including: 
i. how the historic gap between the nation al average cost of production and 
the farm gate price is calculated for the fixed component; 
ii. the level and basis for the fixed threshold for the variable component; 
iii. how the programme operates to limit production. 
b. Please explain why funding for Direct Payment for Rice was nearly double 
in 2010 (¥306.8 billion), the pilot year for the programme, as compared 
to 2011 (¥153.3 billion) and 2012 (¥1 55.2 billion) (G/AG/N/JPN/191). 
i. The United States notes that 1.13 million hectares of 2.36 million hectares 
of paddy fields were enrolled in the pilot year. Please include in your 
response: data on enrolled hectares in subsequent years; how enrolment eligibility is determined; and any chan ges to the programme subsequent to 
the pilot year.  
c. Please explain how the Direct Payment for Rice programme differs from the 
Rice Farming Income Stabilization Program notified in previous years as Direct 
Payments under Production-Limiting Programs. 
Answer by Japan 
 
a.  
i. The historical gap is calculated with the national average cost of production and the 
farm gate price; the former is the five-y ear average of the production costs, which 
excludes the highest and the lowest out of seven years (2002-2008), and the latter 
is the three-year average of prices for 2006, 2007, and 2008. 
ii. The level of the fixed threshold is ¥11,978/60 kg. The fixed threshold is the average 
farm gate price for 2006, 2007, and 2008. 
iii. The target of this programme is limited to rice farmers who participate in a rice 
production-limiting programme. 
b. Direct payment for rice consists of two components: i) the fixed component calculated 
based on the historical gap between the national average cost of production and farm 
gate price and ii) the variable component which is paid only in the year when the farm 
gate price goes below a fixed threshold. In 2010, when the farm gate price of the year 
was below a fixed threshold, the variable component was paid, while the variable 
component was not paid in 2011 and 2012, as the farm gate prices were relatively high. 
i. The total amount of area that rece ived the payment in 2011 and 2012 was 
approximately 1.13 million hectare. Subsequent to the pilot year, there have been no changes to the programme. This programme is provided for all farms producing rice 
under the rice production-limiting programme. 
c. The primary difference is the introduction of  the fixed component which is the payment 
per hectare. 
Follow-up : Congratulating Japan on its December 2013 announcement to reform, particularly on 
agricultural subsidies, New Zealand looked forwar d to Japan's future developments in this area. 
 G/AG/W/135 
 
- 56 - 
 
  2.4  EXPORT SUBSIDY COMMITMENTS (TABLES ES:1, ES:2 AND ES:3) 
2.4.1  Morocco (G/AG/N/MAR/40) 
AG-IMS ID 74016: Question by Australia - Spec ial and differential treatment (Article 9.4) 
Australia thanks Morocco for its transparency, including its efforts to bring its 
notifications up to date. Australia seeks fu rther information about the nature of its 
notified export subsidy programme. In part icular, can Morocco please advise a United 
States Dollar (US$) equivalent for its expend iture against the various product groups as 
advised in the latest notification? 
Australia notes its view that Article 9.4 wa s available for the implementation period 
only. Can Morocco please explain the legal ba sis of its continued use of Article 9.4? 
What, if any, plan does Morocco have to  terminate the export subsidy programme, 
consistent with its obligations, and the declaration by Ministers at the 2013 Bali 
Ministerial Conference to "exercise utmost re straint with regard to any recourse to all 
forms of export subsidies"? 
Answer by Morocco 
 
The export subsidies granted by Morocco to certain agricultural products under Article 9.4 
of the Agreement on Agriculture cover part of the co st of international freight by land, sea or air. 
Given Members' general understanding of current practice, the Agreement on Agriculture continues 
to prevail beyond the implementation period  (1995-2000 for developed countries and 1995-2004 
for developing countries) and, in the absence of a new agreement on agriculture resulting from the 
conclusion of the Doha Round, Members continue to implement their commitments at the level of the last year of implementation. This understan ding, common to several other WTO Members, is 
particularly reflected, as far as export subsidies are concerned, in the notifications submitted as 
of 2004 by certain developing countries under Article 9.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Furthermore, the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaratio n, which reaffirms the Declarations adopted in 
Doha, provides that developing country Members will continue to benefit from the provisions of 
Article 9.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture for five  years after the end-date for elimination of all 
forms of export subsidies. This special and differential treatment provision is reflected in 
paragraph 164 of the Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture. 
AG-IMS ID 74033: Question by European Union - Special and differential treatment 
(Article 9.4) 
Morocco notifies the use of export subsidies that are exempted from reduction 
commitments for developing country Members according to Article 9.4 of the Agreement 
on Agriculture. According to the notification, Morocco used export subsidies of the mentioned type to subsidise exports of fruits  during the years 2008 – 2011, flowers and 
vegetables during 2010 – 2011 and olive oil during 2011. According to Article 9.4 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture such export subsidies were exempt from reduction commitments for developing country Member s during the "implementation period". 
What is Morocco's interpretation of the term  "implementation period" in this context? 
Answer by Morocco 
 See response to AG-IMS 74016. 
 
2.4.2  Thailand (G/AG/N/THA/76) 
AG-IMS ID 74012: Question by Australia - Transparency issues 
Australia thanks Thailand for its latest noti fication and notes the advice that Thailand 
did not provide any export subsidies. Can Tha iland please confirm that consistent with 
Article 9.1(b) that it did not sell or disp ose for export non-comme rcial stocks of any 
agricultural product, at a price lower than  the comparable price charged for the like 
product to buyers in the domestic markets? 
In this context, and either at this point or  at a more appropriate future time, Australia 
requests that Thailand provide an upda te regarding its rice pledging scheme. G/AG/W/135 
 
- 57 - 
 
  Answer by Thailand 
 Thailand confirms that Thailand's policy on selling and releasing non-commercial stocks of agricultural product is consistent with Article 9.1(b). 
AG-IMS ID 74032: Question by Euro pean Union - Transparency issues 
Thailand states that it did not provide any export subsidies subject to reduction 
commitments in the years 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013. According to the 
International Sugar Organisation Outlook (MECAS(11)17), Thailand's policy on the 
export of sugar is based on quotas design ated for domestic requirements and export 
commitments. More specifically, the C Quota co vers the exportable surplus of sugar for 
which sugar cane growers are paid a minimum pr ice (which is at least equal to the sales 
value of B Quota sugar). In the light of  this information, for each of the 
years 2009 ‑2013, Thailand is requested to explain: 
a. the method of allocation of A, B and C quotas and the amounts of these quotas. 
b. Whether there is an obligation to export sugar from any of these quotas? 
c. What are the administered prices paid to sugar cane growers for cane which 
used to produce A, B and C quota sugar? 
d. What are the administered prices for A, B and C quota sugar ex-works, at 
wholesale and at consumer level? 
e. What are the market prices for A, B and C quota sugar and for the cane used to 
produce the sugar for each quota? 
f. What is the total cost of production of the sugar cane which is used to produce 
sugar? 
g. What is the total cost of production of the sugar which is exported? 
h. How Thailand justifies the statement that B quota and C quota sugar does not 
benefit from an export subsidy (in the fo rm of payments on export financed by 
virtue of government action within the meaning of Article 9.1(c) of the 
Agreement on Agriculture) provided in  excess of Thailand's WTO commitments. 
Answer by Thailand 
 
Thailand adheres to its export subsidy commitment in the WTO. In any case, Thailand takes note of the European Union's interest in Thailand's sugar policy. The sugar industry in Thailand is 
overseen by the Office of the Cane and Sugar Board, which is made up of the milling industry, 
producers, and representatives of the government as facilitators. All decisions on administration of quotas are made by agreements among millers, fa rmers, and sugar cane producers, and there is 
no government intervention in the sugar industry. Thailand is currently in contact with the relevant 
agencies regarding the European Union's statement and questions.  G/AG/W/135 
 
- 58 - 
 
  ANNEX 1 
CANADA'S EXPORT SHARES OF BEEF, PORK, MILK AND BUTTER IN 2008-2012 
(AG-IMS 74062) 
Canada's Export Shares vs. World 
(by value) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Beef (HS 020110, 020120, 020130, 020210, 
020210, 020220, 020230, & 021020)  5.8% 5.9% 6.2% 4.8% 4.1% 
Pork (HS 020311, 020312, 020319, 020321, 
020322, 020329, 020630, 020641, 020649, 
0209, 021011, 021012, 021019, 1601, 160241, 
160242 & 160249)  14.0% 14.4% 15.1% 14.4% 13.7% 
Milk (HS 040210 & 040210)  1.0% 0.8% 0.3% 0.6% 0.6% 
Butter (HS 040510 & 040590)  0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 
Source: Canada export data (S tatistics Canada); World export  data (Global Trade Atlas). 
 
 
  
  G/AG/W/135
 
- 59 - ANNEX 2 
GUATEMALA'S DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL SOURCES OF FUNDING CORRESPONDING TO THE ICTA PROGRAMME 
(AG-IMS 74052) 
Response based on the notification for 2002-2012. The years 2006 and 2007 include domestic and external sources of funding corr esponding 
to the Institute of Agricultural Science and Technology (ICTA)  programme. Domestic funding was provided in the other years. 
Measure 
type Name Source of funding (in US Dollar thousands) 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Exchange rate (US Dollar to 
Guatemalan Quetzal) Exchange rate (US Dollar to 
Guatemalan Quetzal)  Exchange rate (US Dollar to 
Guatemalan Quetzal)  Exchange rate (US Dollar to 
Guatemalan Quetzal)  Exchange rate (US Dollar to 
Guatemalan Quetzal)  
7.95 7.64 7.63 7.68 7.67 
Domestic External DS:1 Domestic External DS:1 Domestic External DS:1 Domestic External DS:1 Domestic External DS:1 
General 
services, 
Agricultural 
research 
services 
(Annex 2, 
paragraph 2
(a)) Institute 
of Agricultural 
Science and 
Technology 1,991.25 1,991.25 1,745.98 1,745.98 1,682.41 262.12 1,944.53 1,971.76 11.07 1,982.83 1,695.22 1,695.22 
  
  G/AG/W/135
 
- 60 - Measure type Name Source of funding (in US Dollar thousands) 
2009 2010 2011 2012 
Exchange rate 
(US Dollar to Guatemalan Quetzal) Exchange rate 
(US Dollar to Guatemalan Quetzal)  Exchange rate 
(US Dollar to Guatemalan Quetzal)  Exchange rate 
(US Dollar to Guatemalan Quetzal)  
8.31 7.97 7.97 7.83 
Domestic External DS:1 Domestic External DS:1 Domestic External DS:1 Domestic External DS:1 
General 
services, 
Agricultural 
research 
services 
(Annex 2, 
paragraph 2  
(a)) Institute 
of Agricultural 
Science 
and Technology 1,026.31  1,026.31 1,065.39  1,065.39 1,065.39  1,065.39 3,448.28  3,448.28 
 G/AG/W/135 
 
- 61 - 
 
  ANNEX 3 
THE PUBLIC STOCKHOLDING, IMPORTED AMOUNT OF PUBLIC STOCKHOLDING 
AND TOTAL PRODUCTION IN JAPAN (FY2012) 
(AG-IMS 74063) 
 Public stockholding Imported amount of 
public stockholding Total production 
Rice 910a) 0b) 8,519c) 
Wheat for food 909 909 858c) 
Grain for feed 350 350 0d) 
(unit :1000t) 
 a)
 As of July 30, 2013. 
b) With regards to imported  rice, there is no stoc kholding for shortage.  
c) The production data of rice and wheat for food are domestic production volume in 2012. 
d) No maize or sorghum for feed is procured in Japan. 
 
 
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