WT/MIN(24)/W/ 10/Add.1  
 
16 February 2024  
(24-1436) Page: 1/16 
Ministerial Conference  
Thirteenth Session  
Abu Dhabi, 26 -29 February 2024  Original: English  
 
 
ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS ON  FISHERIES SUBSIDIES  
DRAFT TEXT  
Addendum  
The attached document from the Chair of the Negotiating Group on Rules is the explanatory note 
accompanying the Additional Provisions on Fisheries Subsidies circulated in document 
WT/MIN(24)/W/ 10. 
_______________  
INTRODUCTION  
As Chair of the Negotiating Group on Rules, I am today submitting a draft of Additional Provisions 
on Fisheries Subsidies for the attention of Ministers, in document WT/MIN(24)/W/ 10. This  Addendum 
is intended to assist Ministers and their delegations in understanding the background of and reasons 
for the draft Additional Provisions contained in this new text. The new draft represents my honest 
and best assessment of what in my view would b e a balanced outcome to these negotiations, taking 
into account the wide diversity of views held by Members in respect of all of the issues addressed in 
its provisions.  In preparing this draft, I drew upon the countless hours of deliberations by Members 
as they expressed their views and provided me with text, particularly bridging language to address 
difficult issues for which there was difference in positions among Membe rs.  
Since the beginning of 2023, the Negotiating Group on Rules has been engaged in negotiations to 
develop disciplines on subsidies contributing to overcapacity and overfishing (OCOF), pursuant to 
the mandate in the Ministerial Decision on the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies, adopted at the 
Twelfth WTO Ministerial Conference (MC12) with a view to making recommendations to the 
Thirteenth Ministerial Conference (MC13). In the course of this work, and on the basis of proposals 
and suggestions from Members, I have circulated a series of documents for Members' consideration 
on my own responsibility, initially in the RD/TN/RL series, and most recently – in December 2023  – 
in the form of a Chair's text in document TN/RL/W/277 (W/277). Compilations of Members' te xtual 
suggestions made on the drafts that preceded W/277 – RD/TN/RL/174 and RD/TN/RL/184 – have 
been circulated in documents RD/TN/RL/180/Rev.1 and Add.1, and RD/TN/RL/183, respectively.  As 
an attachment to this Addendum, you will find the complete list of  all submissions to the Negotiating 
Group, both by me and Members.  
Starting in mid -January this year, the Negotiating Group has engaged on the basis of W/277, in an 
intensive "Fish Month" of continuous negotiating activities in different formats and config urations. 
The new draft text in document WT/MIN(24)/W/ 10 (the new text), is the result of all of the intensive 
collective work carried out by the Negotiating Group over the past year, and most notably during 
the Fish Month. As a result of this work, we hav e made very considerable progress in deepening our 
understanding of Members' positions and in developing convergence language in numerous areas.  
As with the previous drafts that I have circulated since assuming the  role of the  Chair of the 
Negotiating Gro up in January 2023 (documents RD/TN/RL/174, RD/TN/RL/184, and TN/RL/W/277), 
it is well understood that nothing in the new text is agreed, and that it remains a draft until WT/MIN( 24)/W/ 10/Add.1  
 
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  everything is agreed. While this text reflects my best attempt to identify a balance  that I see as 
most likely to build consensus, the final outcome remains in the hands of Members working together.  
To assist the work at the Ministerial Conference, I have bracketed language in a few places in the 
new text to draw attention to issues in respect of which significant divergences in views remain . In 
these areas,  I am not in a position to present either a clear suggested outcome, or binary options . 
I believe Ministers’ attention  to these areas  will be particularly warranted. One of the princi pal areas 
for attention concerns the treatment of certain subsidies to distant water  fishing  under Article A.2 of 
the new draft. Another is  the issue of  artisanal fishing  where Members have been seeking an elusive 
balance between description of the intende d beneficiaries and the geographical scope.  Related to 
this is the overall balance of certain figures associated with the special and differential treatment 
(SDT) provisions in Article B. These numbers are: the length of a possible transition period for 
graduated least developed country (LDC) Members; the share of global marine capture fishing below 
which a developing country Member would have access to a de minimis exemption from the 
disciplines;  and the transition period during which other developing coun try Members would be 
exempt from the discipline . Finally, related to SDT, Article B.5 provides two options for certain 
developing Members that are large industrialized fishers to not have access to SDT. Other areas for 
Ministers’ attention, which are not b racketed, include transparency provision s on the use of forced 
labour, and on non -specific fuel subsidies.  
Work will not pause with the circulation of the new text. Indeed, Members remain engaged, with me 
and with each other, trying to further narrow diffe rences and eliminate brackets in the time 
remaining before MC13. As such, supplementary documents on the draft Additional Provisions  on 
fisheries subsidies may be circulated before and during MC13.  
Turning to the specifics of this Addendum, it provides bac kground, context, and explanations for the 
new text circulated today. Members will recall that on 4 September 2023, I circulated a draft text in 
RD/TN/RL/174 as the starting point for our text -based work during the fall of 2023. The circulation 
of that tex t was followed by extensive deliberations on its provisions as well as on Members' textual 
suggestions regarding modifications to that text. While views often diverged, many Members also 
came forward with bridging text and ideas. On 1 December, I circulated document RD/TN/RL/184 
as an attempt at capturing some of Members'  ideas on how to further develop Article  A.1 on the 
discipline and Article B  on special and differential treatment  . 
On 21 December 2023, I circulated a Chair's text in document TN /RL/W/277  containing a 
comprehensive set of draft provisions. This draft drew on Members' feedback on document 
RD/TN/RL/184, as well as the submissions and deliberations over the preceding several months.  
As I have indicated before, the core discipline con tained in the new text should lead to a meaningful 
reduction in subsidies contributing to overcapacity and overfishing, not only through the statement 
of prohibition that the core discipline contains, but also through the rigorous Committee review 
procedur e that is as central to the working of the discipline as the prohibition itself. The draft core 
discipline and the special and differential treatment provisions taken together essentially would 
allocate Members into three groups – Members subject to the to p, stricter tier of the two -tier hybrid 
discipline, Members subject to the lower, less -strict tier of the two -tier hybrid discipline , and thirdly 
LDC Members and certain developing country Members that would be excluded from the scope of 
the hybrid discipl ine by virtue of the SDT provisions in Articles B.1 and B.2. These three groups 
would be subject to varying degrees of scrutiny as explained in detail below.  
The other provisions of the new text address  notification and transparency  in Article C , other 
overcapacity - and overfishing -related  provisions  in Article  D, and the relation of the Additional 
Provisions  with the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies  in Article E . 
_______________  
 
  WT/MIN(24)/W/ 10/Add.1  
 
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  DETAILED EXPLANAT ION OF THE PROVISIONS OF WT/MIN(24)/W/ 10 
1  ARTICLE A: SUBSIDIES CONTRIBUTING TO OVERCAPACITY AND OVERFISHING  
1.1  Article A.1  
1. Article A.1,  and its subparagraphs  A.1.1 and A.1.2 , comprise the core discipline on subsidies 
contributing to overcapacity and overfishing (OCOF). The drafting is based on the hybrid approa ch 
combining a statement of the prohibition and a list of presumptively prohibited fisheries subsidies, 
with a qualification based on sustainability elements. The basic hybrid structure of the core OCOF 
discipline emerged several years ago as a compromise between a pure list -based approach and a 
pure effects -based approach, and has been reflected in the various Chair's documents since 2020 .1  
2. As is well known, the aim and operation of the hybrid approach is to ensure that sustainability 
measures factor in as one important consideration in the granting and maintaining of fisheries 
subsidies, and to ensure that decisions on subsidization likewise should factor into sustainability 
decisions. Under this approach, subsidies would need to be notified along with a demonstration that 
sustainability measures are in place for the fish stocks in respect of which the subsidies are provided. 
This demonstration process would begin with notifications to the Committee on Fisheries Subsidies  
established pursuant to Art icle 9 of the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies (AFS) .  
3. In the new text contained in WT/MIN(24)/W/ 10 (the new text), this long -standing hybrid 
approach is maintained, with certain important further elaborations which emerged from the second 
wave of fisherie s subsidies negotiations on the OCOF pillar. In particular, the new text now uses a 
two-tier hybrid approach. Under this approach, the top tier applies stricter requirements on certain 
Members identified based on a combination of criteria, namely level of subsidization, engagement in 
what can be referred to for convenience as  far distant water fishing, and level of development. The 
differentiation of the core OCOF discipline into two tiers was widely supported during the second 
wave of negotiations, and man y Members have supported it as reflecting the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibility  (CBDR) , which they consider appropriate given the sustainability 
focus of WTO disciplines on fisheries subsidies. This two -tier structure was first introduc ed in 
RD/TN/RL/174 circulated in September 2023 and was maintained in the W/277 text circulated in 
December 2023.  
4. While the principle of two tiers was broadly supported by Members throughout the period 
following its introduction, the criteria for dividing  Members into the two tiers as well as the precise 
disciplines applicable to the Members falling under the two tiers have been the subject of deep and 
lengthy debates. In the new text, both the criteria for assignment to the tiers, and the specific 
require ments under each  of them , reflect considerable evolution from the drafting of the 
corresponding parts of previous texts .  
5. Following these introductory considerations, the rest of this section will explain in greater 
detail the different elements of the core OCOF discipline in the new text, especially in relation to the 
corresponding provisions in those previous texts.   
1.1.1   The c hapeau and illustrative list in Article A.1  
6. The core OCOF discipline starts with Article A.1, which contains in its first sentence  the 
following  statement of the prohibition regarding subsidies contributing to overcapacity or 
overfishing :  
No Member shall grant or maintain subsidies to fishing or fishing -related activities that 
contribute to overcapacity or overfishing.  
It continues with  an illust rative list of certain presumptively prohibited subsidies. The chapeau also 
maintains  a footnote  from the previous texts  indicating that Article A.1 does not apply to subsidies 
provided in respect of overfished stocks.  
 
1 Including WT/MIN(21)/W/5 (W/5), WT/MIN(22)/W/20 (W/20), RD/TN/RL/174, and TN/RL/W/277 
(W/277).  WT/MIN( 24)/W/ 10/Add.1  
 
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  7. In relation to the chapeau, in recent  discussions some Members proposed to add could , may 
or can before the word include  in the second sentence of the chapeau. The Members making these 
suggestions indicated that they wished to convey that the subsidies in the indicative list do not in all 
cases contribute to overcapacity and overfishing. Some other Members, however, raised the concern 
that the addition of any of the suggested words in the second sentence would have the effect of 
fundamentally altering the intended meaning and operation of the hybrid approach.  
8. To respond to these drafting suggestions relating to the chapeau,  a new footnote 2 has been 
added to clarify that the subsidies listed in Article A.1 shall not be deemed to contribute to 
overcapacity and overfishing when  granted or maintai ned in accordance with the provisions of 
Article  A.1.1 . In other words, this footnote confirms what has long been a shared understanding that 
together the provisions in Article s A.1 and A.1.1 operate as a qualified  prohibition. That is, a subsidy 
will not be prohibited if the sustainability -based conditionality contained in Article A.1.1 is fulfilled in 
relation to that subsidy. This implicit understanding is now explicit with the addition of the new 
footnote.  
9. The n ext element of Article A.1 is the list of presumptively prohibited subsidies, contained in 
paragraphs (a) through (h). In recent discussions of this list, Members have suggested a variety of 
modifications.  
10. One such suggestion was to add the word maintenan ce to items (a) and (b) of the list, to 
reflect the fact that subsidies to maintenance of vessels and equipment, respectively, may not be 
covered by those items in spite of their similar nature and potential effects on sustainability . This 
suggested change  has been made for the clarity and completeness of items (a) and (b).  
11. Another suggested change, to add the words specific or not , after the word fuel in item (c), 
was not made. The Members supporting this change explained that it would strengthen the disci pline 
by expand ing the coverage of the fuel subsidies subject to it. These Members noted that research 
identifies fuel subsidies, regardless of their specificity, as amongst the most harmful forms of 
fisheries subsidies. A significant number of other Membe rs expressed strong opposition to this 
suggestion, including because such subsidies are not within the scope of the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures or that of the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidie s.2 
12. There also were several suggestions to  change other items in the list by excluding certain 
types of subsidies from their respective scopes, on the basis that such subsidies either were not 
harmful or were helpful to sustainability. Numerous delegations expressed the concern that 
modifications of this type would both weaken the discipline by entirely excluding from scrutiny or 
discipline certain types of subsidies that could in certain circumstances harm sustainability, and that 
such exclusions thus would defeat the purpose of the sustainability -based demonstration provided 
for in Article A.1.1.  
13. One proposed modification that received considerable support and little opposition  was 
included. This was to retain the language that had been introduced, in brackets, in item (e) of the 
list as contained  in W/277. This language excludes from the scope of item (e) subsidies implemented 
for subsistence purposes during seasonal closures. The language was introduced to address the 
concern that if a Member's provision of this type of assistance became prohibit ed through the 
operation of the discipline, that Member would be prevented from pursuing the important 
socioeconomic and sustainability objectives of supporting vulnerable communities so that they were 
able to comply with closed seasons implemented as a su stainability measure.  
1.1.2   Article A.1.1(a)  and (b)  
14. The next element of the core OCOF  discipline is Article A.1.1, which sets out the two -tiered 
sustainability -based conditionality as well as certain notification requirements through which the 
conditionality would be operationalized. As explained below in relation to Article B, the Members  that 
would be subject to the discipline in one of the two tiers set forth in Article A.1.1 are Members  that 
are not least developed country (LDC) Members or developing country Members falling under the de 
minimis  threshold set forth in Article B.2.  
 
2 Non-specific fuel subsidies also are discussed below in connection with Article C.3 and Article D.  WT/MIN(24)/W/ 10/Add.1  
 
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  15. Article A.1.1 has three subparagraphs. Subparagraph (a) sets out the stricter 
sustainability -based conditionality of the top tier. Subparagraph (b) contains language to divide the 
Members subject to Article A.1.1 into the two tiers, by describing the Members th at would not be 
subject to Article  A.1.1(a). This provision also contains the less -strict sustainability based -
conditionality of the lower tier. Subparagraph (c) contains rules concerning the information to be 
notified pursuant to Article A.1.1(a) and Arti cle A.1.1(b).  
16. In the operation of the main OCOF discipline, the first step  would be the identification of 
Members that would fall under each of the two tiers based on the criteria in Article A.1.1(b). 
Subparagraph (a) – that is the stricter tier – would a pply generally to all Members, while 
subparagraph (b) would remove certain developing country Members from the scope of the stricter 
tier in subparagraph (a), assigning them instead to subparagraph (b). Specifically, subparagraph (b) 
would remove from the stricter tier developing country Members that do not fall under Article B.5, 
that are not amongst the top -ten largest providers of fisheries subsidies by annual aggregate value 
as notified under Article C.4 , and that are not significantly engaged  in far distant water fishing .  
17. Thus, elements regarding the criteria for allocating the relevant Members to the two tiers 
contained in subparagraph (a) in TN/RL/W/277 were moved into subparagraph (b) of the new text. 
Effectively, this means that the crite ria in subparagraph (b) would subdivide the non -LDC and 
non-de minimis  developing country Members  between the two tiers of the discipline.  
18. First, the chapeau  of Article A.1.1(b) limits the potential applicability of the lower tier of the 
disciplines set forth in this provision only to certain developing country Members, i.e., not to 
developed Members, and not to developing country Members covered by Article B.5. This means 
that the developed Members and the developing country Members covered by Article  B.5 
automatically would fall into the stricter tier of the discipline set forth in Article A.1.1(a). Regarding 
Article B.5, as explained further below, discussions on its specific content are still ongoing, and two 
alternative formulations of that provision are included in the new text. Regardless of how Article  B.5 
is eventually worded, per the chapeau of Article A.1.1(b) the Members covered by Article B.5 would 
be subject to the stricter tier of the discipline from the beginning.  
19. Subparagraphs  (i) and (ii)  of Article A.1.1(b) describe the two groups of relevant developing 
country Members that can access the lower tier of the disciplines set forth in Article A.1.1(b). The 
first group, referred to in subparagraph (i), is Members that are not amongst the ten largest 
providers of fisheries subsidies by annual aggregate level of fisheries subsidies.  
20. As was the case in W/277, Article A.1.1(b) identifies notifications provided by Members to the 
WTO pursuant to Article C.4 as the basis for identifying the top -ten largest providers of fisheries 
subsidies by annual aggregate value. The process through which this list of top subsidizers would be 
prepared is set out in Articles C.4 and C.5. Those provisions are explained in the section on Article  C.  
21. The list of the top-ten subsidizers referred to in subparagraph (i) would be an overall list based 
on information provided by all Members. In other words, subparagraph (i) does not refer to the list 
of top -ten subsidizers amongst developing country Members only, but to the list of top -ten 
subsidizers amongst all Members. Any developing country Member amongst the top-ten subsidizers 
overall would be subject to the stricter tier of the discipline set forth in Art icle A.1.1(a).  
22. As for this subparagraph's  reference to the ten largest providers of fisheries subsidies, 
Members actively debated what figure would be most appropriate here. Several Members advocated 
a larger number, most commonly 20. Others, however, cons idered that a considerably smaller 
number should be used, reasoning that basing the discipline on top -20 subsidizers would treat alike 
Members with major differences in subsidization levels.  
23. The figure ten used in the new text reflects the structural chang e in the methodology for 
establishing the two tiers compared with that in W/277. In that text, the higher  tier was composed 
of the top -20 subsidizers, regardless of their development status (except for LDCs and developing 
countries falling under the de min imis threshold in Article B.2). Thus, the lower tier in W/277 was 
accessible to a mix of developed and developing country Members. Because in the new text the 
lower tier is accessible only by developing country Members the smaller number of top subsidizers  
in the new text would have an approximately equivalent effect in practice as the larger number in 
W/277. In other words, the use of a combination of factors for assigning Members to the two tiers WT/MIN( 24)/W/ 10/Add.1  
 
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  means that all developed Members, Members falling under Art icle B.5, and Members significantly 
engaged  in far distant water fishing will necessarily be in the stricter tier, regardless of whether they 
are amongst the top subsidizers. The developing country Members amongst the top -ten subsidizers 
overall would be added to  the list of Members falling into the stricter tier, rather than being the only 
Members falling into that tier.  
24. Subparagraph  (ii) of Article A.1.1(b) identifies the second group of relevant developing country 
Members t hat can access the lower tier of the disciplines set forth in this provision. This group 
consists of such Members that are not significantly engaged  in what is referred to for convenience 
in this Addendum as far distant water fishing . The definition of thi s concept is the same as that 
contained in the first formulation of Article B.5 presented in the new text. The details are explained 
further below in the section concerning Article B.5.  
25. The use of this combination of factors to allocate Members to the two tiers is one significant 
way in which the two -tier hybrid discipline in the new text differs from that contained in the 
counterpart provisions of W/277 and RD/TN/RL/174. Those  texts relied on the annual aggregate 
level of subsidization as the sole criterio n for allocating Members to the two tiers. The combination 
of three factors used in the new text reflects extensive discussions of both of those earlier texts, in 
which various possible options for additional or alternative criteria were explored. These di scussions 
showed  that Members wanted the criteria to be clear, predictable, and designed in a way that would 
allow for the movement of Members from Article A.1.1(b) to Article A.1.1(a).  
26. Aside from the three factors used in the new text to assign Members to  the two tiers, other 
factors discussed as potential criteria for this purpose included subsidy intensity, engagement in 
large scale industrial fishing , and annual  volume of  marine capture production. Although discussed 
at least to some extent, these alter native criteria are not reflected in the new text because they did 
not attract broad support among st Members.  
27. Assignment of the relevant Members to the two tiers of the discipline is the first step in its 
operation. Those Members in the top tier would be subject to the stricter standard and procedures 
set forth in Article  A.1.1(a), and those in the lower  tier would be subject to the less -strict standard 
and procedures set forth in Article A.1.1(b). Both tiers operate on the basis of certain 
demonstrations,  to be made through notifications and review of notified information by the 
Committee on Fisheries Subsidies.  
28. Concerning the stricter tier, Article A.1.1(a) of W/277 would have required a Member to 
demonstrate that measures are implemented that can reasona bly be expected to ensure that the 
stock or stocks  in the relevant fishery or fisheries are at a biologically sustainable level . This wording 
was intended to tighten the standard applicable to Members falling in the stricter tier, compared 
with the language in the less -strict tier, measures are implemented to maintain  the stocks at such 
a level. During discussions on the text in W /277, however, some Members expressed uncertainty as 
to whether the wording of the top tier in fact constituted a stricter standard than was in the lower 
tier. Numerous Members also strongly called for the word maintain  to appear in both tiers.  
29. In response  to this call, in the new text the word maintain  was added in Article A.1.1(a), and 
the standard was redrafted to provide that a Member is  to demonstrate that measures are 
implemented to maintain  the stocks in question at a biologically sustainable level. Attached to this 
requirement is an addition to footnote 3 on biologically sustainable level that further elaborates for 
greater clarity, that the biologically sustainable level of stocks may be influenced by factors beyond 
the control of the subsidizing Me mber. Article  A.1.1(a) then describes the standard for the referenced 
demonstration, namely that it shall include an explanation of how the measures ensure or can 
reasonably be expected to ensure that the stocks in question are maintained at a biologically  
sustainable level.  
30. The rest of the provision is essentially as it was in W/277, requiring that the demonstration, 
including the explanation referred to above, be made through a notification to the WTO. In respect 
of existing subsidy programs, Members wou ld make the demonstration through their regular 
notifications in accordance with Article 25 of the SCM Agreement  and Article 8.1 of the Agreement 
on Fisheries Subsidies of the draft text. Footnote 5 has been added for clarity in respect of existing 
subsidi es. In respect of new subsidy programs, Members would need to make the demonstration 
through a notification to the WTO within six months after the subsidy comes into effect.  WT/MIN(24)/W/ 10/Add.1  
 
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  Article  A.1.1(a) also has  a footnote clarifying that a coastal Member that is not the subsidizing 
Member shall not be required to provide data to enable the subsidizing Member to invoke 
Article  A.1.1.  
31. The timeline for providing the notifications concerning new subsidy programs  has been 
increased to six months from the three months s tipulated in W/277. Several Members had expressed 
the view that the maximum of three months in W /277 was too short. While some suggested 
12 months, most Members that addressed this issue indicated that six months would be workable. 
Members also noted that a six-month  maximum for providing these notifications was congruent with 
the biannual meeting schedule of the Committee on Fisheries Subsidies . The primary obligation in 
this regard is to submit such notification as soon as practicable . Therefore,  six mont hs is the 
maximum amount  of time that a Member falling under Article A.1.1(a) could take to submit a 
notification regarding a new subsidy program.  
32. Members falling under Article A.1.1(b) would have to demonstrate that measures are 
implemented to maintain the stock or stocks  in the relevant fishery or fisheries at a biologically 
sustainable level. Such Members would have to make this demonstration through their regular 
notifications under Article 25 of the SCM Agreement  and Article 8.1 of the Agree ment on Fisheries 
Subsidies.  
33. The requirements  of Article A.1.1(a) differ from those of Article A.1.1(b) in two key ways – 
first, in terms of what Members would need to notify in relation to their subsid ies to fulfil the 
sustainability -based conditionalitie s of the two provisions; and second, how frequently  they would 
need to provide their notifications. These differences give Article A.1.1(a) a stricter effect than 
Article  A.1.1(b).  
34. As regards what Members will need to notify, the difference stems from the  more elaborate 
demonstration standard contained in Article A.1.1(a). As reflected above, Members falling under 
Article A.1.1(a) will need to include in their notifications an explanation of how their fisheries 
management measures ensure or can reasonably be expected to ensure that the stocks in question 
are maintained at a biologically sustainable level. This additional language is not present in 
Article  A.1.1(b). Therefore, to demonstrate the sustainability -based conditionality under 
Article  A.1.1(a), Mem bers would have to provide a more detailed  explanation in their notifications 
than under Article A.1.1(b).  
35. Regarding the respective  frequency of the notifications, the difference is that Members falling 
under Article A.1.1(a) would be obliged to submit th e notifications referred to in Article A.1.1(a) in 
respect of a new subsidy program no later  than six months after it came into effect. The Members 
falling under Article  A.1.1(b) would have to submit the notifications referred to in that provision in 
accor dance with the schedule for their regular notifications of fisheries subsidies, regardless of when 
those subsidies came into effect.  
36. As Members falling  under Article A.1.1(a) would have to provide more elaborate and more 
frequent notifications, the Committ ee review process, including the possibility to receive requests 
for clarification or additional information pursuant to Article A.1.2, also could be expected to be more 
intensive than that for notifications provided pursuant to Article A.1.1(b).  
37. The new t ext also includes certain technical adjustments to Articles A.1.1(a) and (b) to more 
accurately identify the provisions in the SCM Agreement and the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies 
concerning regular notifications of fisheries subsidies.  
38. Several Members have continued to propose that the sustainability -based conditionality under 
Article A.1.1(a) would only apply within the subsidizing Member's own EEZ, while others have 
strongly opposed this proposal. This is related to the questions concerning Article A. 2 and will be 
addressed in the section on Article A.2.  
1.2  Article A.1.1(c)  
39. As in W/277, Article  A.1.1(c) in the new text contains additional requirements concerning the 
notifications referred to in Article A.1.1(a) and Article A.1.1(b). These notifications w ould form the 
basis for Members to evaluate whether a notifying Member has met the demonstration standards WT/MIN( 24)/W/ 10/Add.1  
 
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  referred to in those provisions. To this effect, the chapeau of Article A.1.1(c) requires that the 
information in the Article A.1.1 notifications sha ll enable other Members to effectively evaluate  the 
subsidy according to the conditions set out in Article A.1.1. The chapeau also contains a new footnote 
indicating, for greater clarity, that Members would be free to supplement, revise or correct their 
notifications, and that the demonstration could include such information as well as information 
provided in written answers to written questions received as part of the Committee review process, 
as set out in Article A.1.2.  
40. The requirement in Article A.1.1( c) of the new text for notifications to enable effective 
evaluation  replaces the language in W/277 for the notifications be to sufficiently precise  to enable 
Members to evaluate the consistency of a subsidy with the conditions in Article  A.1.1. The modifie d 
language has the same underlying intent, i.e. to ensure that the notifications are robust and 
conducive to effective Committee scrutiny. The modifications have been introduced because of 
concerns raised by Members that the sufficiently precise  language w as unclear.  
41. Article A.1.1(c) also lists certain information that the notifications referred to in Article A.1.1 
would need to include. Several changes have been made compared to the corresponding list in 
W/277.  One change is that the items were reordered to put conservation and management measures 
first. In addition, former references in the list to relevant fish stocks  were moved into the chapeau, 
simplifying the drafting of the list of items, as is the case for item (i). Second, in item (ii), on the 
status of the fish stocks, unknown  has been added as a reportable status. This change was made in 
response to some Members' concerns that the provision as previously drafted might have required 
them to assess 100% of their fish stocks, which many indicated was  not feasible or realistic. 
The footnote from W/277 describing the reference to shared stocks  is also included in the new text.  
42. Also in this provision , footnotes were added, first to indicate that a Member should report the 
assessments of all the stocks it  assesses, and second to indicate that where a stock is managed by 
an RFMO /A, the stock status information provided by the notifying Member is to include available 
stock status information from the RFMO /A. The most substantive change to the list of items is the 
addition of item (iii), catch data by species or group of species as compiled by a Member, with the 
same footnote as in the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies pertaining to multi -species fisheries. 
The reference to data compiled by a Member  was introduced in items (iii) and (iv) in response to 
differences of view over whether the provision of such data should be subject to the qualifier to the 
extent possible . 
1.3  Article A.1.2  
43. Article A.1.2 operationalizes  certain aspects of the Committee review pro cess of Members' 
notifications under the two tiers of the discipline. In particular, Article A.1.2 provides that other 
Members can pose questions and seek clarifications about the information referred to in Article  A.1.1 
and establishes rules for the subsi dizing Member's responses. As such, Article A.1.2 encapsulates a 
dynamic aspect of the peer review process that would be conducted through the Committee on 
Fisheries Subsidies.  
44. This provision is materially  the same as Article A.1.2 in W/277. An additional sentence, similar 
to language in Article 8.5  of the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies, has been added as the second 
sentence of this provision . It indicates that when a Member seeks a clarification or consi ders that 
required information has not been provided, the Member may bring the matter to the attention of 
such other Member or to the Committee on Fisheries Subsidies. The third sentence, which was 
present in materially the same form in W/277, concerns the  subsidizing Member's response to such 
questions.  
45. In this context, it is important  to note that notification s pursuant to Article A.1. 1 as well as 
the written exchanges between the Members in the Committee pursuant to Article A.1.2 would form 
the basis for  a Member's demonstration of the sustainability -based conditionality. The second 
sentence of the newly added footnote 11 reflects this understanding.  
46. Article A.1.3 of W/277 has not been retained in response to the concern raised by numerous 
Members that the provision was redundant, given that the other elements of Article A.1 necessarily 
imply that in the absence of a notification that fulfils the conditions of Article A.1.1, th e prohibition 
in Article A.1 would apply.  WT/MIN(24)/W/ 10/Add.1  
 
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  1.4  Article A.2  
47. Article A.2, like its counterpart  in W/277 contains a prohibition of subsidies contingent on 
fishing or fishing related activities in areas beyond the subsidizing Member's jurisdiction, whether 
solely o r as one of several other conditions. This prohibition, contained in Article A.2(a) is 
free-standing and not subject to either the sustainability flexibilities in Article A.1.1 or the SDT 
provisions in Article  B. It thus would be applicable to all Members.  This language has been with us 
for a long time and was included in W/20. Article  A.2 is the subject of strongly -held and sharply 
divergent views as to how subsidies to distant water fishing should be treated in the se Additional 
Provisions . Supporters of A rticle A.2(a) consider this provision critically important, as they view the 
types of subsidies it covers to be the most harmful to sustainability, because such subsidies 
compensate fishers to use their capacity in areas that are beyond the jurisdiction of  the subsidizing 
Member.  
48. Some Members oppose this provision equally strongly. They argue that such contingent 
fisheries subsidies are no more likely to cause harm than non -contingent fisheries subsidies, 
provided that the subsidies are used for regulated fishing – that is, to fulfil quotas allocated by 
RFMO /As or to fish in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and under the authorization of another 
Member or coastal non -Member. These Members therefore call for Article A.2 to be entirely deleted, 
or, at most m oved its contents into the list in Article A.1.1, as was the case in W/5. This would have 
the effect of treating contingent subsidies the same as other subsidies, i.e., making them subject to 
the sustainability -based flexibilities in Article A.1.1.  
49. Somewhere in the middle  are proposals that would provide for some limited flexibility in the 
application of Article A.2. First, there is a long -standing proposal to accompany this prohibition with 
a provision for flexibility for the non -collection from operators or vessels of the  
government -to-government fees for accessing the fisheries resources of another Member or coastal 
non-Member, so long as the requirements for the sustainability -based flexibilities of the hybrid 
discipline are met. Some Members oppose it on the grounds tha t it either weakens the prohibition, 
or in practice would address situations of relevance to at most a very few Members. This flexibility 
language was included in W/20, but not in W/277. Instead, the latter text contained an empty 
placeholder for possible flexibility  for this prohibition. As explained below, this long-standing  
proposed flexibility language appears in the new text in Article A.2(b), in brackets.  
50. A more recent flexibility proposal , in RD/TN/RL/188, would exclude from the coverage of 
Article  A.2(a) contingent subsidies provided by LDC and de minimis Members to fishing or 
fishing -related activities in areas beyond such Members' jurisdiction under bilateral agreements or 
quotas and/or rights established by RFMO/As, on condition that the requirem ents set out in 
Article  A.1.1(b) were met. This proposal appears to partially overlap with the bracketed language in 
Article A.2(b) of the new text.  
51. At the opposite end of the spectrum  are Members with the view that Article A.2(a) does not 
go far enough. T hey propose deleting its contingency language such that it would become a strict 
prohibition of subsidies to fishing outside of a subsidizing Member's EEZ. This proposal would have 
the same effect as proposals  that were submitted  to limit the flexibilities under Article A.1.1(a) to 
the subsidizer's own EEZ.  
52. Given the importance of this provision  to a large number and broad diversity of Members, 
holding irreconcilable positions, it has not been possible to include proposed landing  zone language 
for this issue . Instead the use of square brackets in relation to the prohibition in Article A.2(a) 
provision and the flexibility language in Article A.2(b) is intended to reflect the spectrum of positions 
that have been expressed. First, in  respect of Article A.2(a), the entire provision is bracketed to 
reflect the view that it should be entirely deleted, and its contingency language  – including the 
related footnote – also is bracketed to reflect the view that this language should be removed . The 
whole of Article A.2(b) is in brackets, to represent the proposals to delete it or to alter it.  
53. The treatment under the Additional  Provisions of subsidies to distant water fishing is of central 
importance to reaching an outcome on such provisions at  MC13. Members will need to work very 
creatively with each other to bridge the gaps in this area and develop a compromise that all will be 
able to accept as part of the final balance in these provisions.  WT/MIN( 24)/W/ 10/Add.1  
 
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  2  ARTICLE B: SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT  
2.1  Artic le B.1  
54. A significant change to Article  B.1 compared with the corresponding provision of W/277 is the 
omission of the geographic limit from the flexibility available to a graduated LDC Member. Article  B.1 
of W/277 allowed a graduated LDC Member to grant or maintain subsidies referred to in Arti cle A.1 
for fishing or fishing related activities in its EEZ or in the area and for species within the competence 
of a relevant RFMO /A. The current text expands this flexibility by omitting that geographic limit.  
55. Certain language has been added to this pr ovision to indicate that the second sentence of 
Article  B.1 would be available to graduated LDC Members that were not already covered by 
Article  B.2. This change reflects the generally shared understanding amongst Members that the 
transition period in the second sentence of Article B.1 would be irrelevant to a graduated LDC 
Member with a de minimis  share of global marine capture production, as that Member could avail 
itself of Article B.2.  
56. Pursuant to these changes, graduated LDCs above the de minimis  threshold at the time of 
their graduation could avail themselves of the transition period of [X] years referred to in Article  B.1 
without geographic limitations. Further, a new footnote has been added stating that the peace 
clause , and the mechanism for possib le extensions thereof , foreseen in Article B.3(b) and (c) would 
apply, mutatis mutandis , to a graduated LDC Member not covered by Article B.2, from the end of 
the transition period referred to in Article B.1.  
57. The text of Article B.1 also contains certain t echnical adjustments clarifying the language on 
UN General Assembly decisions on LDC graduation.  
2.2  Article B.2  
58. The only change made to Article  B.2 concerns the wording of the footnote clarifying that 
graduated LDC Members falling within the [0.8] per cent th reshold would fall within the scope of 
Article  B.2 upon graduating. The corresponding footnote in W/277 indicated that graduated LDC 
Members within the de minimis  threshold would fall under Article B.2 only after the transition period 
referred to in Articl e B.1. However, as discussed above, the transition period in Article B.1 now 
applies only to those graduated LDC Members that are above the de minimis  threshold. In conformity 
with that change to Article B.1, Article B.2 would apply to all graduated LDC Me mbers falling within 
the de minimis  threshold, without regard to the transition period referred to in Article B.1.  
2.3  Article B.3  
59. Article B.3(a) in the new text is a simplified version of the corresponding provision in W/277. 
To recall, the construct of the two -tier OCOF discipline in W/277 placed into the stricter tier all 
Members – developed or developing – that were amongst the top -20 subsidizers. Given that i n 
W/277 the level of development was not a criterion for assigning Members to the tier of the OCOF 
discipline, Article B.3(a) of W/277 afforded certain developing country Members two transition 
periods. The  first transition period allowed eligible developi ng country Members a maximum of 
[X] years after entry into force of the Additional Provisions  to grant or maintain the subsidies referred 
to in Article A.1 within their exclusive economic zones and in the areas and for species under the 
competence of a rel evant RFMO/A. Second, Article B.3(a) of W/277 afforded a developing country 
Member whose level of subsidization would have placed it under Article A.1.1(a), an additional 
maximum of [Y] years after the [X] years, during which it would have been able instea d to apply 
Article A.1.1(b).  
60. The drafting changes in Article  A.1.1 of the new text explained above, in particular the 
incorporation of the level of development as a criterion for sorting Members into the two tiers made 
the second transition period of [Y] years unnecessary. Therefore, Article B.3 in the new text foresees 
only one transition period of a maximum of [X] years.  
61. As was the case in W/ 277, Article B.3(a) would apply only to developing country Members 
that were not excluded from availing themselves of SDT pursuant to Article B.5, or were already 
exempted from the discipline in Article A.1 by virtue of falling under Article B.1 or B.2. Artic le B.3(a) WT/MIN(24)/W/ 10/Add.1  
 
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  in the new text introduces a footnote that clarifies that if a Member exited Article B.2 due to its share 
of global marine production during the transition period of [X] years referred to in Article B.3(a), 
that Member would benefit from the rema inder of that period. The footnote also makes the peace 
clause provisions in Article B.3(b) and (c) applicable, mutatis mutandis , to a Member that exited 
Article B.2 for the first time.  
62. Article B.3 also contains a technical change concerning language ident ifying the relevant 
RFMO /As in respect of which the flexibility in Article B.3(a) applies. W/277 identified such RFMO /As 
as "an RFMO/A through which the Member has fishing rights ". During discussions of this provision 
in the fish month, some Members sugges ted that the wording "an RFMO/A through which the 
Member is authorized to engage in such fishing or fishing related activities " is more technically 
appropriate. The text of Article B.3(a) has been rephrased accordingly. This rephrasing is not 
intended to a ffect the substance of this provision.  
63. Article B.3(b) and (c) contain  rules concerning the application of a peace clause in respect of 
subsidies granted or maintained during the transition period provided for in subparagraph (a). 
Article  B.3(b) is unchanged from W/277. The new text of Article B.3(c), which concerns the extension 
of the peace clause set out in Article B.3(b), contains a couple of substantive changes compared 
with the counterpart provision of W/277. Article B.3(c) in the new text limi ts potential extensions of 
the peace clause provided for in Article B.3(b) to a maximum of two two -year extensions. This 
change has been made to address the widespread concern that in the absence of such a limit, 
Article  B.3(c) could lead to a potentially indefinite application of the peace clause. This means that  
a Member may receive an extension of the peace clause for up to four years, in addition to the two 
years available through Article B.3(b).  
64. The second sentence  of Article B.3(c) has been modified to reflect that the Committee is to 
give due and sympathetic  consideration  to peace clause extension requests of developing country 
Members that demonstrate concrete progress toward implementing Article  A.1. The corresponding 
phrase in W/277 was sympatheti c consideration . 
65. As explained above, footnotes  18 and 20 of the new text taken together place LDC Members 
and developing country Members that would be below the de minimis  threshold at the entry into 
force of these Additional Provisions  on an equal footing with other developing country Members in 
relation to the ability to benefit from the peace clause and the possible extensions thereof foreseen 
in Articles B.3(b) and B.3(c).  
2.4  Article B.4  
66. Article B.4 has been split into two subparagraphs compared wit h the counterpart provision of 
W/277. The first subparagraph sets out an exemption for certain subsidies to certain small scale and 
artisanal fishing or fishing related activities. The second subparagraph contains corresponding 
notification obligations rel ated to the implementation of the first paragraph.  
67. The discussions on Article  B.4 have been marked by the search for balancing two priorities 
that are recognized as legitimate by nearly all Members – first, safeguarding the livelihood of 
vulnerable fishin g communities, and second, ensuring that the provision is fit for purpose and targets 
those intended beneficiaries. Members have explored a number of tools to create this balance, such 
as a range of characteristics to identify the intended beneficiaries, t erminology that would cover the 
intended beneficiaries but not commercial fishing, geographic limits, national definitions, and 
notifications to the WTO. The formulation of Article B.4 in the new text combines some such tools to 
focus the application of th is provision , without overly constraining or burdening developing country 
Members.  
68. The terminology used to refer to the intended beneficiaries has been broadened. Article B.4 
of W/277 referred to low income, resource poor [and][or] livelihood fishing or f ishing related 
activities . The  new text adds the terms small scale and artisanal  to the formulation, with the 
qualification that such fishing or fishing related activities are primarily low income, resource poor or 
livelihood in nature . The basis for ident ifying such fishing or fishing related activities is a Member's 
operational definition to be notified to the WTO pursuant to subparagraph (b). Article B.4 also 
includes a footnote that identifies a range of characteristics  that may be taken into account as  
guiding points in considering small scale and artisanal fishing or fishing related activities . The WT/MIN( 24)/W/ 10/Add.1  
 
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  characteristics referred to in this footnote were proposed and discussed by Members in the course 
of the negotiations.  
69. Article B.4(a) also contains  bracket ed geographic limits within a Member's jurisdiction. The 
two bracketed figures, 12 and 200 nautical miles from the baselines, reflect the extensive debate 
over whether the exemption for the small -scale and artisanal fishing should be limited to activities 
relatively close to shore or instead extend through the entirety of a Member's area of jurisdiction. 
The purpose of the lower limit, which has been in previous texts going back several years, was to 
serve as a proxy to ensure that the exemption did not app ly to commercial -scale fishing and fishing 
related activities. For some Members, flexibility in relation to the geographic scope of the exemption 
under Article B.4  is related to  other SDT  flexibilities and the overall balance of the text.  
70. Article B.4(b) provides guidance  for a Member availing itself of Article B.4(a) to notify its 
operational definition of the fishing or fishing related activities referred to in subparagraph (a). In 
partic ular, this definition is to be provided as part of the Member's regular subsidy notifications, and 
can take the form of an electronic link.  
71. Similarly to Article B.4, this provision would apply to Members not excluded from SDT pursuant 
to Article B.5 and no t already covered under Article B.1 or B.2.  
2.5  Article B.5  
72. Article B.5 of the new text is the counterpart of Article  B.6 of W/277, containing provisions to 
exclude certain developing country Members from using the special and differential treatment 
provisio ns.  
73. The new text presents two alternative versions of Article B.5. The first version would exclude 
from access to Articles B.3 and B.4, in a legally binding way, developing country Members 
significantly engaged  in far distant water fishing . The alternativ e version encourages developing 
country Members with competent fisheries management capabilities to make binding commitments 
not to avail themselves of the SDT provisions of Article B. The specifics of both versions are 
elaborated below.  
74. The first version  resembles  Article B.6 of W/277  and operates on the basis of engagement in 
fishing or fishing related activities in the third (or farther) FAO Major Fishing Areas from the Member's 
jurisdiction . The important difference  from W/277  is that this provision is  limited to Members that 
are not only engaged,  but considered to be significantly  engaged  in such fishing of fishing related 
activities. Through a newly added footnote, the provision indicates that a Member is significantly 
engaged  if its annual catch from such far distant areas constitutes more than two percent of its own  
overall annual catch. Notably, this two percent figure is not to be confused with the de minimis  figure 
contained in Article B.2. While Article B.2 is concerned with a Member's share of the annual global  
marine catch, Article B.5 speaks to the share of a Member's annual catch from far distant areas as 
a percentage of that Member's own  overall annual catch. This qualification to the scope of Article 
B.6 has been introduced to avoid inadvertent impact on certain Members with a low level of 
engagement in far distant water fishing.   
75. A second new footnote  added to this provision  stipulates that the FAO Major Fishing Areas 
referred to in the provision would be those delineated in the FAO Major Fishing Area map in effect 
at the time of adoption of the Additional P rovisions, as circulated by the WTO Secretariat. The 
footnote was inc luded to address concerns that any future  change in the configuration of FAO Major 
Fishing Areas by the FAO could detract from the intended functioning of this provision.  
76. A third new footnote has been added to address the concerns raised by certain Member s 
regarding FAO Major Fishing Areas to which they do not have a territorial connection but which they 
access for fishing through a maritime canal.  
77. Another important  change to this provision in the new text is the deletion of reference to 
Articles  B.1 and B .2 that appeared in W/277. This clarifies that the provision would not preclude any 
LDC or de minimis  Members from availing themselves of the SDT set out in Articles B.1 and B.2. 
Thus, the  omission of Articles B.1 and B.2 in the new text is in line with th e intention of applying WT/MIN(24)/W/ 10/Add.1  
 
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  Article  B.5 only to developing country Members with large scale industrial fishing capacity and 
activities.  
78. In recent discussions  concerning this provision, some Members suggested that it should refer 
to subsidization of , rather than engagement in , fishing activities or fishing related activities in the 
third FAO Major Fishing Area out from a Member's territorial sea, as this was mo re reflective of the 
purpose of the Agreement to discipline subsidies. Other Members, however, asserted that using 
subsidization as the criterion for the relevant far distant water fishing would be very difficult to 
identify, making the provision challengi ng to apply and enforce. Thus, the new text is based on 
significant engagement  in far distant water fishing rather than subsidization.  
79. The alternative version  of Article B.5  is based on a proposal by the Member most concerned. 
This version  is a mechanism for developing country Members to voluntarily opt out of using SDT in 
a legal ly binding way. In particular, this provision encourages Members with competent fisheries 
management capabilities to make a binding commitment not to avail themselves of Articles B.1, B.2, 
B.3, and B.4. An attached footnote stipulates that such binding commitments would be recorded by 
the Council for Trade in Goods and will be compiled and published publicly on the WTO website. The 
footnote also contains a placeholder to reference any binding commitments that may already have 
been made at the time of the adoption of these Additional Provisions .  
80. Notably, both versions  of Article B.5 are temporally open, that is, they could come to include 
additional Members over time.  
3  ARTICLE C: NO TIFICATION AND TRANSPARENCY  
81. Article C sets forth the notification and transparency provisions. A new footnote has been 
added to the title of Article C, indicating that targeted technical assistance and capacity building 
assistance to developing country Members, including LDC Members, shall be available for the 
purpose of implementing the provisions contained in the new text.  
82. Article C.1 clarifies  that in addition to the specific notification obligations set out in these 
Additional Provisions , Members are required to comply with their notification obliga tions under Article 
25 of the SCM  Agreement and Article 8 of the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies. It should be noted 
that Article  C.1 would not affect the operation of footnote 13 in the Agreement on Fisheries 
Subsidies, which provides that LDCs and devel oping country Members with an annual share of the 
global volume of marine capture production not exceeding 0.8 per cent can notify certain specified 
information every four years, rather than every two years as is the case for other Members. This is 
reflected in a new footnote 28 to Article C.4 . The rest of t his provision is identical to its counterpart 
in document W/277.  
83. Article C.2(a) pertains  to the notification of information indicating the use of forced labour by 
vessels or operators. This provision is  identical to its counterpart in W/277. Many Members consider 
that this issue should be dealt with outside the WTO, or that the provision as drafted may be 
incompatible with domestic legal systems, while other Members  have highlighted that the provision 
is limited to transparency and  advocate strongly for its retention . 
84. Article C.2(b) pertains  to information about government -to-government fisheries access 
agreements or arrangements. This provision is identical to its counterpart in W/277. Although some 
Memb ers consider that sub -item (iii) should be deleted, including due to concerns regarding 
confidentiality, other Members note that in addition to the obligation being to the extent possible , 
this provision should be read together with Article 8.8 of the Agre ement on Fisheries Subsidies.  It is 
now proposed that th ese concerns  will be dealt with by Article C.7.  
85. Article C.3 provides for the notification of information concerning non -specific fuel subsidies. 
This provision is identical to its counterpart in W/27 7. While some Members continue to support the 
inclusion of this provision, others feel strongly that it should not be retained . However, some 
Members indicated that this provision could be further discussed if the placeholder in Article D for a 
possible su bstantive provision  on non -specific fuel subsidies in W/277 was  removed. Articles C.4 and 
C.5 serve to operationalize the two tiers in Article A.1.1 by setting out a mechanism for the 
identification of the largest subsidizers. Article C.4 of this text rese mbles Article C.4 of W/277 with 
some modifications. Article C.5 is  is based on discussions among Members during the Fish Month.  WT/MIN( 24)/W/ 10/Add.1  
 
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  86. Like in Article C.4 of W/277, Article C.4 of this text sets out two timelines for Members to 
submit information concerning the aggregate levels of their fisheries subsidies. The first is for 
Members to submit this information no later than 120 days from th e entry into force of these 
Additional Provisions . The idea behind this requirement is to establish the list of top subsidizers soon 
after the entry into force of the Additional Provisions  to ensure the operationalization of Article A.1.1. 
The 120 days pro vided for this purpose in the new text is a change from the 90 days referred to in 
W/277, as several Members indicated that under their systems a 90 -day deadline to notify the 
required information would be unworkable. This initial information submitted by Members would 
build on existing notifications under Article  25 of the SCM Agreement and Article 8.1 of the 
Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies.  The second timeline in Article C.4 would require Members 
thereafter to submit information on the aggregate levels o f their fisheries subsidies in their regular 
notifications of fisheries subsidies. This would ensure that the assignment of Members to the two 
tiers would be based on the latest data and would dynamically take into account any changes in 
ranking based on t he amounts of subsidies notified by Members.  
87. The reference to Article 8 of the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies has been changed to 
Article  8.1 to more accurately identify the provision in that Agreement that pertains to regular 
notifications. Similar tec hnical adjustments have been made throughout the text where regular 
notifications of fisheries subsidies have been referred to.   
88. Article C.5 mandates  the WTO Secretariat to compile and make publicly available a list of 
Members ranked in descending order of  annual aggregate level of fisheries subsidies, on the basis 
of information referred to in Article C.4. The Secretariat would compile the first list within one year 
of the entry into force of these Additional Provisions  and would update the list in accorda nce with 
the cycle of regular notifications under Article 25 of the SCM Agreement and Article 8.1 of the 
Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies. The WTO Secretariat could request technical clarifications from 
subsidizing Members concerning the notified subsidies . This process would not involve any 
substantive evaluation of the subsidies by the Secretariat. The Committee on Fisheries Subsidies 
would review the list at its regular meetings.   
89. Article C.6  reflects some Members' willingness to show more flexibility on the wording of Article 
B.4 provided that transparency is generally ensured throughout the Additional Provisions.  This 
provision stipulates that a Member may invoke Articles  A.1.1, B.2, B.3, or  B.4 only in respect of 
subsidies that it has notified under Article 25 of the SCM Agreement and Article 8.1 of the Agreement  
on Fisheries Subsidies . Members hold strongly divergent views in relation to this provision, which 
may need to be further consider ed alongside the SDT provisions. Therefore, it is in brackets.  
90. Article C.7 clarifies that the provisions contained in the new text shall not require Members to 
submit  confidential information, including business confidential information. This provision 
represents the landing zone that Members arrived at through an exchange of concerns regarding 
the balance between transparency and protection of sensitive information, for example pertaining 
to access agreements.  
4  ARTICLE D : OTHER OVERCAPACITY - AND OVERFISHING -RELATED  PROVISIONS  
91. In W/277, Article D contained two placeholders. The first placeholder pertained to substantive 
provisions on non -specific fuel subsidies. This provision was extensively debated throughout the 
second wave of negotiations. Give n that the majority of Members, including some that initially 
supported its inclusion, have strongly opposed  the inclusion of any such provision, the first 
placeholder has not been retained. However, the transparency provision in respect of such subsidies 
in Article C.3 remains under consideration.  
92. The second placeholder  was to provide space for other possible provisions that Members might 
agree to insert. The possibility reserved by the second placeholder has been used to introduce two 
provisions in the n ew text.  
93. Article D.1 is modelled on the review clause in Article 9.4 of the Agreement on Fisheries 
Subsidies, taking into consideration the specificities of these Additional Provisions. Article D.1 
contains  a review clause of the operation of the se Additio nal Provisions . In particular, it mandates 
the Committee on Fisheries Subsidies to review the overall impact on overcapacity and overfishing 
of these provisions and identify any necessary modifications to improve their effectiveness. The WT/MIN(24)/W/ 10/Add.1  
 
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  review would be co nducted not later than three years after the expiry of the transition period of 
[X] years referred to in Article B.3(a). The Committee would report the outcome of the review, 
including any resulting proposals to amend the text of the se Additional  Provision s, to the Council for 
Trade in Goods. After this first review, the issues referred to in this provision would be addressed in 
the periodic reviews under Article 9.4 of the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies.  
94. Article D.2 requires  all Members to consider the c onsequence of a subsidy on overcapacity 
and overfishing before granting that subsidy. This provision is intended to replace both the 
chaussette  contained in Article A.1 and Article B.5 of W/277. It affirms the implicit objective of the 
OCOF disciplines to ensure that sustainability measures factor in as one important consideration in 
the granting and maintaining of subsidies.  Many developing country Members objected to Article B.5 
of W/277 , considering it both burdensome and redundant in the light of the chaussette  in Article  A.1 
of W/277 . In addition, many Members questioned the placement of the chaussette  without 
necessarily objecting to its content . This proposed change should address both concerns  
5  ARTICLE E : RELATIONSHIP WITH AGREEMENT ON FISHERIES SUB SIDIES  
95. You will note that the text now includes a new Article E. This article has been added to describe 
the legal relationship between the se Additional Provisions and the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies, 
and to identify, through cross -references, the art icles in the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies that 
would apply, mutatis mutandis , to the se Additional Provisions . Article E.1 establishes that the 
Additional Provisions , along with the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies, constitute the 
comprehensive disciplines  referred to in Article 12 of that Agreement and the comprehensive 
agreement  referred to in the Ministerial Decision from the Twelfth WTO Ministerial Conference 
adopting the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies. Accordingly, the two instruments would apply 
together as one integrated set of rules.  
96. The cross -references  in Article E.2 would operate to this effect, by ensuring that Articles 1, 2, 
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 of th e Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies would apply, mutatis mutandis , to 
the Additional Provisions . The footnote attached to this article is intended to clarify two issues. First, 
that the expedited dispute settlement process described in Article 4 of the SCM Agreement, which 
is referred to in Article 10.2 of the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies, would also apply to disputes 
under Article A of the Additional Provisions . Second, the footnote clarifies that Article A would not 
prevent a Member from granting a sub sidy for disaster relief in accordance with  Article 11.1 of the 
Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies.  
_______________  
 
  WT/MIN( 24)/W/ 10/Add.1  
 
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  ATTACHMENT  
• RD/TN/RL/165 (Norway)  
• RD/TN/RL/166 (China)  
• RD/TN/RL/167 (Australia, New Zealand, and Vanuatu)  
• RD/TN/RL/168 (Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and, Uruguay)  
• RD/TN/RL/168/Rev.1 (Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, and, Uruguay)  
• RD/TN/RL/169 (Kenya on behalf of the ACP Group of States)  
• RD/TN/RL/169/Rev.1 (Kenya on behalf of the ACP Group of States an d South Africa)  
• RD/TN/RL/169/Rev.2 (Samoa on behalf of the ACP Group of States, Pakistan and 
South  Africa)  
• RD/TN/RL/170 (Fiji)  
• RD/TN/RL/170/Rev.1 (Fiji)  
• RD/TN/RL/171 (Djibouti on behalf of the LDC Group)  
• RD/TN/RL/172 (Indonesia)  
• RD/TN/RL/173 (United Kingdo m) 
• RD/TN/RL/174 (Draft Disciplines on Subsidies contributing to Overcapacity and Overfishing,  
• and related elements)  
• RD/TN/RL/175 (India)  
• RD/TN/RL/176 (Cameroon on behalf of the African Group)  
• RD/TN/RL/176/Rev.1 (Cameroon on behalf of the African Group)  
• RD/TN/RL/177 (Russian Federation)  
• RD/TN/RL/178 (Australia)  
• RD/TN/RL/179 (Samoa on behalf of the ACP Group of States and South Africa)  
• RD/TN/RL/180 - Compilation of Members' textual suggestions concerning the draft text 
RD/TN/RL/174  
• RD/TN/RL/180/Rev.1 - Compi lation of Members' textual suggestions concerning the draft 
text RD/TN/RL/174  
• RD/TN/RL/180/Rev.1/Add.1 - Compilation of Members' textual suggestions concerning the 
draft text RD/TN/RL/174  
• RD/TN/RL/182 (Australia and New Zealand)  
• RD/TN/RL/183 - Compilation of Members' textual suggestions concerning the draft text 
RD/TN/RL/174  
• RD/TN/RL/184 ( Article A.1 and Article B)  
• TN/RL/W/277 (Draft Disciplines on Subsidies contributing to Overcapacity and Overfishing, 
and related elements)  
• RD/TN/RL/185 (Barbados)  
• RD/TN/RL/186 (African Group)  
• RD/TN/RL/187 (Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Peru)  
• RD/TN/RL/188 (Türkiye)  
• RD/TN/RL/189 (Samoa on behalf of the ACP Group and South Africa)  
• RD/TN/RL/190 (Malaysia)  
• RD/TN/RL/191 (Ecuador and Panama)  
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