RESTRICTED  
  
G/C/M/142  
 
17 June 2022 
(22-4742) Page: 1/96 
Council for Trade in Goods    
 
MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS  
21 AND 22  APRIL  2022 
CHAIRPERSON: HE  MR LUNDEG PUREVSUREN  
The meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG, or the Council) was convened by 
Airgram  WTO/AIR/CTG/21 and WTO/AIR/CTG/21/Rev.1; the proposed agenda for the meeting was 
circulated in document  G/C/W/806 and G/C/W/806/Rev.1. The meeting proceeded on the basis of the 
following modified agenda, as detailed below:  
 
1   NOTIFICATION OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS  ................................ ....................  3 
2   STATUS OF NOTIFICATIONS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENTS IN 
ANNEX  1A OF THE WTO  AGREEMENT (G/L/223/REV.29)  ................................ .................  4 
3   APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS TO THE SUBSIDIARY BODIES OF THE COUNCIL  
FOR TRADE IN GOODS  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 9 
4   MEASURES TO ALLOW GRADUATED LDCS, WITH GNP BELOW USD  1,000, BENEFITS 
PURSUANT TO ANNEX  VII(B) OF THE AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND  
COUNTERVAILING MEASURES – COMMUNICATION FROM CHAD ON BEHALF  
OF THE LDC  GROUP (WT/GC/W/742 -G/C/W/752) ................................ ........................  10 
5   INDIA – IMPORT POLICY ON TYRES – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
INDONESIA, THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN  
AND MATSU, AND THAILAND  ................................ ................................ .........................  13 
6   EUROPEAN U NION – IMPLEMENTATION OF NON -TARIFF BARRIERS ON  
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS (G/C/W/767/REV.1) – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA,  
BRAZIL, CANADA, COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECUADOR,  
JAMAICA, PANAMA, PARAGUAY, PERU, THE UNITED STATES, AND URUGUAY  ................  15 
7   CHINA – IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE  
MEASURES – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA  ................................ ................................ ...... 23 
8   CHINA – COSMETICS SUPERVISION AND ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS  
(CSAR) – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, A ND  
THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 27 
9   INDIA – RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN PULSES – REQUEST FROM 
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE UNITED STATES  .....................  32 
10   PLURINATIONAL STATE OF BOLIVIA – EXPORT RESTRICTIONS ON  
AGRICULTURAL AND HYDROBIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM PERU  ...............  34 
11   ECUADOR – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON GRAPES AND ONIONS – REQUEST  
FROM PERU  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................  35 
12   PANAMA – UNDUE DELAYS AND EXPORT RESTRICTIONS ON AGRICULTURAL  
AND HYDROBIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM PERU  ................................ ........  36 
13   EUROPEAN UNION – QUALITY SCHEMES FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND 
FOODSTUFFS – THE REGISTRATION OF CERTAIN TERMS OF CHEESE AS  
GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS – REQUEST FROM NEW ZEALAND AND URUGUAY  ..........  37 
14   EUROPEAN UNION – PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF TRQ  COMMITMENTS:  
SYSTEMIC CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM CHINA AND URUGUAY  ................................ ..... 38 G/C/M/142  
 
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  15   UNITED KINGDOM – DRAFT GOODS SCHEDULE AND PROPOSED 
UK TRQ COMMITMENTS: SYSTEMIC CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM  
CHINA AND URUGUAY  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 39 
16   INDONESIA – IMPORT AND EXPORT RESTRICTING POLICIES AND PRACTICES – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, AND  
THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 41 
17   MEXICO – CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE FOR CH EESE UNDER 
MEXICAN  OFFICIAL STANDARD NOM -223-SCFI/SAGARPA -2018 – REQUEST FROM  
THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 45 
18   CHINA – ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES FOR REGISTRATION OF OVERSEAS 
PRODUCERS OF IMPORTED FOODS – REQUEST FROM INDONESIA AND  
THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 46 
19   INDIA – ORDER RELATED TO REQUIREMENT OF NON -GM CUM GM FREE  
CERTIFICATE ACCOMPANIED WITH IMPORTED FOOD CONSIGNMENT – REQUEST  
FROM THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ............................  51 
20   KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA – SABER CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT ONLINE  
PLATFORM / SALEEM PRODUCT SAFETY PROGRAM – REQUEST FROM  
THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 52 
21   PANAMA – ONIONS AND POTATOES HARVEST LIFE AND SPROUTING –  
REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ .............  54 
22   KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES,  
THE STATE OF KUWAIT, OMAN, AND QATAR – SELECTIVE TAX ON CERTAIN  
IMPORTED PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM SWITZERLAND AND  
THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 55 
23   INDIA – IMPORT RESTRICTION ON AIR CONDITIONERS – REQUEST FROM  
JAPAN AND THAILAND  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 57 
24   NEPAL – IMPORT BAN ON ENERGY DRINKS – REQUEST FROM THAILAND  ...............  58 
25   SRI LANKA – IMPORT BAN ON VARIOUS PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM  
AUSTRALIA AND THAILAND  ................................ ................................ ...........................  58 
26   INDONESIA – IMPORT SUBSTITUTION PROGRAMME – REQUEST FROM  
THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 61 
27   UNITED STATES – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON APPLES AND PEARS –  
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ .........  62 
28   NIGERIA – RESTRICTIVE POLICIES ON AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS –  
REQUEST FROM BRAZIL  ................................ ................................ ................................ . 63 
29   CHINA – EXPORT CONTROL LAW – REQUEST FROM JAPAN  ................................ ..... 64 
30   UNITED STATES – DISCRIMINATORY QUANTI TATIVE RESTRICTION ON  
STEEL AND/OR ALUMINIUM IMPORTS – REQUEST FROM CHINA ................................ .... 67 
31   UNITED STATES – EXPORT CONTROL MEASURES FOR ICT  PRODUCTS –  
REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 68 
32   UNITED STATES – MEASURES REGARDING MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION 
FOR ICT PRODUCTS – REQUEST F ROM CHINA  ................................ ................................  69 
33   AUSTRALIA – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION  
ON 5G  EQUIPMENT – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ . 69 
34   EUROPEAN UNION – SWEDEN'S DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS  
PROHIBITION ON 5G  EQUIPMENT – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ..........  70 
35   EUROPEAN UNION – BELGIUM'S DRAFT LAW INTRODUCING ADDITIONAL  
SECURITY MEASURES FOR THE PROVISION OF MOBILE 5G  SERVICES –  
REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 70 
36   EUROPEAN UNION – CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM  .........................  71 G/C/M/142  
 
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  –  STATEMENT BY CHINA  ................................ ................................ ..........................  71 
–  STATEMENT BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ .........................  71 
37   INDIA – PLAIN COPIER PAPER QUALITY ORDER  2020 – REQUEST  
FROM INDONESIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..........  76 
38   PHILIPPINES – SPECIAL SAFEGUARD ON INSTANT COFFEE – REQUEST FROM 
INDONESIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................  77 
39   UNITED KINGDOM – ENVIRONMENTAL ACT: FORESTRY COMMODITIES –  
REQUEST F ROM INDONESIA  ................................ ................................ ...........................  78 
40   EUROPEAN UNION – COUNTERVAILING DUTIES (CVD) ON STAINLESS  STEEL 
COLD -ROLLED FLAT (SSCR) – REQUEST FROM INDO NESIA  ................................ ............  79 
41   EUROPEAN UNION – EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL (CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT 
MECHANISM AND DEFORESTATION FREE COMMODITIES) – REQU EST FROM  
INDONESIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................  80 
42   EUROPEAN UNION – THE EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL – REQUEST FROM  
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ................................ ................................ ............................  85 
43   AUSTRALIA, CANADA, EUROPEAN UNION, JA PAN, NEW ZEALAND, SWITZERLAND, 
UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES – UNILATERAL TRADE RESTRICTIVE 
MEASURES AGAINST RUSSIA – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  .................  86 
44   EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION EC  NO. 1272/2008 (CLP  REGULATION) –  
REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ .. 94 
45   EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION  (EU)  2017/2321 AND REGULATION  
(EU)  2018/825 – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ...... 95 
46   OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 95 
46.1   Functioning of the CTG and its Subsidiary Bodies – Information from t he Chair  ................  95 
46.2   Date of the Next Meeting  ................................ ................................ .........................  95 
47   ELECTION OF CHAIRPERSON OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS  ....................  95 
 
The Chairperson  observed that, given the long agenda, it would be preferable for Members to keep  
their interventions short , if possible . He invited those Members that were planning to submit longer 
written statements for incorporation into the meeting's minutes to expres sly indicate their intention to 
do so when taking the floor . To ensure transparency in the preparation of the minutes, the Secretariat 
would only reflect what had been  said at the meeting , except in those cases where a Member had 
explicitly indicated that it was their intention to submit a longer statement in writing.  
 
The delegate of the United States  requested to be included as a co -sponsor of Agenda Item  9, "India 
– Restrictions on Imports of Certain Pulses ". 
 
Finally , the Chairperson  informed delegation s that, under agenda item "Other Business", he would 
report on the Functioning of the CTG and its subsidiary bodies, on the Annual Plan of Meetings  
(document  RD/CTG/15 ), and on the date of the Council's next meeting.  
 
The agenda was so agreed . 
 
1  NOTIFICATION OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS  
1.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that, under the working procedures agreed by the Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) and following the adoption by the General Council of the 
Transparency Mechanism1, the CTG was  to be kept informed of Members' notifications of new 
regional trade agreements (RTAs). He informed the Council  that nine RTAs had been notified to the 
CRTA , as followed:  
 
1 Documents  WT/REG/16, WT/L/671, and G/C/M/88.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  • Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans -Pacific Partnership (C PTPP), 
Goods and Services – Entry into Force for Peru ( WT/REG395/N/2 –S/C/N/920/Add.1) ; 
• Agreement on Trade in Services between the Republic of Korea and 
Turkey  (S/C/N/1078);  
• Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between the EFTA States and 
Ecuador, Goods and Services ( WT/REG463/N/1 -S/C/N/1077) ; 
• Free Trade Agreement between Turkey and the EFTA States, Goods and Services 
(WT/REG462/N/1 -S/C/N/1076) ; 
• Free Trade Agreement between Turkey and the EFTA States (1992), Goods 
(WT/REG86/N/2) – Notifi cation of Termination;  
• Free Trade Agreement between Turkey and Serbia, Services (S/C/N/1073) ; 
• Free Trade Agreement between Turkey and Kosovo2, Goods ( WT/REG461/N/1) ; 
• Free Trade Agreement between Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, and the United 
Kingdom, Goods and Services ( WT/REG459/N/1 -S/C/N/1072); and  
• Free Trade Agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) member  States 
and Serbia, Goods (WT/REG458/N/1).  
 
1.2.  The Council  took note  of the information provided.  
2  STATUS OF NOTIFICATIO NS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENTS IN 
ANNEX  1A OF THE WTO  AGREEMENT (G/L/223/REV.29)  
2.1.  The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to document  G/L/223 /Rev.29 containing the status 
of notifications under the provisions of the Agreements in Annex  1A of the WTO  Agreement. The 
first page of this report describe d the discussions by Members that had led to its current format, the 
most recent of which had taken place in 2018, with a view to reflecting the Trade Facilitation 
Agreement. Th e new revision of the report by the Secretariat describe d the status of notifications as 
of 31 December  2021.  
2.2.  In a related matter, the Chair person  also drew  Members' attention to the N otifications Portal, 
available in notifications.wto.org  for which the Secretariat had released a Beta version at the 
beginning of th e year. The Notifications Portal sought to consolidate, under a single syst em, all 
general information concerning notifications and the information for the agreements on trade in 
goods summarized and presented following the template of document  series G/L/223/ -. The 
Chairperson  encourage d the Membership to review the information in the Notifications Portal and to 
contact the Secretariat in case they had  any comment s. 
2.3.  The delegate of Ukraine  indicated the following:  
2.4.  Ukraine's measures  remain transparent ; it continues to fulfil its WTO notification obligations 
and demonstrate its commitment to the fundamental rules of the Organization.  At the most recent  
meetings of the Market Access and Import Licensing  Committees , the delegation of Ukraine apprised 
Members of its measures on the exportation of certain agricultural  products and fertilizers introduced 
due to Russia's military invasion of Ukraine,  and reiterate d that these measures were necessary to 
ensure national food security in the hard and terrifying times being experienced by the people of 
Ukraine . In addition, Ukraine informed Members that all its resources and measures, including trade 
and economic measures , would be directed to maintain ing the  national economy and to saving the 
lives of  the Ukrainian people.  
2.5.  At the same time, such export restricting measures are regularly reviewed and, if possible, 
replaced by less restrictive ones, or abolished altogether.  In particular, the "zero" quota for a number 
of mineral fertili zers has been replaced by a quota of 210  thousand tonnes. Licensing requirements 
for the exportation of sunflower oil and corn have been abolished. Restrictions on the exportation of 
live bovine animals and meat of bovine animals have been replaced by automatic licensing. Wheat 
and some other agricultural products (including poultry and eggs) are subject to automatic licensing.  
In this regard, Ukraine has already provided the relevant notifications to the WTO.  Thus, at present , 
there are no quantitative restrictions on Ukraine's major agricultural goods exports , namely  
sunflower oil, corn , and wheat.  
 
2 Reference to Kosovo shall be understood to be in the context of the United Nations Security Council 
resolution  1244 (1999).  G/C/M/142  
 
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  2.6.  Ukraine's current ability to export is limited not only by the economic situation but largely and 
primarily by Russia's actions, including the continue d planting of  landmines on the fields and the 
deliberate destruction and theft of Ukraine 's property, particular ly its agricultural machinery , and 
most importantly, its blockading of  Ukraine's ports in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov , which  
disrupt Ukraine 's export s. As a result, commodity export s from Ukraine have been partially 
suspended. If the war continues, Ukraine will not be able to supply the world with 6  million tonnes 
of wheat and 15  million tonnes of corn left over from the previous harvest ; nor will it be able to fully 
sow and harvest this year.  
2.7.  Prior to the military invasion, Ukraine exported up to 5  million tonnes of agricultural products 
through the ports of Odessa and Mykolayiv every month, but now, due to Russia's blockade, the 
country can transport barely 500,000  tonnes of grain a month. This leads t o a monthly shortfall of 
about USD 1.5 billion in Ukraine's export earnings.  Therefore, it seems that lifting Ukraine's naval 
blockade would be even more effective for global food security than creating new special supporting 
funds.  The Russian aggression jeopardizes future harvests in Ukraine.  
2.8.  In order to avoid a food crisis not only in Ukraine, but also around the world, despite the current 
extremely difficult conditions in Ukraine, with continuing hostilities, the sowing campaign began in 
all Ukraine's regions, including Luhansk and Donetsk.  In some regions, the sowing campaign is 
carried out only 30  km from the front line. Therefore, farmers are forced to wear bullet -proof vests 
and to begin sowing only after the fields have been de -mined by sappers.  In a pessimistic scenario, 
in the current year Ukraine could be sow ing in only 70% of its cultivated areas.  
2.9.  For most of today 's economic challenges and concerns, there is only one  solution , namely  a 
swift end to the war. And if the war could be stopped, there would still be a chance to mitigate the 
damage and prevent hunger . If not, there  is no saying what will come next.  Since the beginning of 
their full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Russian occupiers have destroyed or d amaged 30% of the 
country's infrastructure , worth USD 100 billion.  
2.10.  On all international platforms, the world's attention is being drawn to the growing global food 
crisis, and everyone is united in understanding that Russia's war against Ukraine is one of t he main 
factors in such a crisis.  According to UN  Secretary -General Ant ónio Guterres, the war in Ukraine 
could condemn more than a fifth of humanity to unprecedented poverty and hunger.  
2.11.  As long as Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine continues, the consequ ences will continue and 
persist , not only for Ukraine but for the world.  Therefore, Ukraine calls upon all Members to stand 
together with Ukraine to counteract Russia's  military aggression by all possible means.  
2.12.  The delegate of  the United Kingdom  indicated  the following:  
2.13.  The United Kingdom  thank s the Secretariat for its preparation of the report. Additionally, the 
UK thank s Ukraine for the updates on their notifications  on this occasion , as well as in the Committee 
on Market Access and in the Committee on Import Licensing; the updates pertain to measures that 
Ukraine judged necessary due to the impacts of Russia 's illegal invasion. Indeed , in the UK 's view, 
the timely manner in which Ukraine's notification has been submitted, in the extraordinary 
circumstances outlined by Ukraine earlier , clearly demonstrates Ukraine 's dedication to the WTO and 
the international rules -based system.  
2.14.  This stands in sharp contrast to the Russian Federation. Ru ssia's illegal war violates 
international law and a cornerstone principle of this institution , which is respect for the international 
rules-based system.  While Russia continues to violate international law, human rights , and multiple 
commitments to peace a nd security, the United Kingdom will continue working with its allies and 
partners across the multilateral system to condemn Russia 's appalling actions and to isolate it on 
the international stage.  As the UK does so, it will remain transparent regarding it s measures , as 
appropriate, including through the WTO, in the Council for Trade in Goods and its subsidiary bodies.  
2.15.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
2.16.  The United States thank s the delegat ion of  Ukraine for their statement and reiter ates its 
strong support for Ukraine.  The United States condemns Russia 's premeditated and unprovoked 
attack on Ukraine as well as the actions of Belarus ' regime , which is aiding Russia 's war of G/C/M/142  
 
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  aggression.  The US calls upon Russia immediately to cease its use of force against Ukraine and to 
refrain from any further unlawful threat or use of force against any UN  member state.  The WTO is 
predicated on certain values, including that a fair and just international order is o ne built on rules, 
reciprocity, and transparency.  
2.17.  The actions of Russia are incompatible with the rules -based system that Members have built 
and worked to improve. Russia's conduct in perpetuating a war of aggression against Ukraine 
undermines its rights in this Organization, and is fundamentally incompatible with the values and 
principles of the WTO.  
2.18.  The United States always finds the data contained in document  G/L/223 to be very 
informative.  In addition, the US welcome s the work under way by the Secretari at to make more 
timely information on notifications available through a WTO  notification portal, including the 
notification information detailed annually in document  G/L/223.  The US observes, upon reviewing 
document  G/L/223/ Rev.29, that there has been no r eal improvement in notification compliance 
across agreements since the previous report , and that Members ' failure  to comply with their 
notification obligations remains a concern for a number of CTG  committees and working parties.  
2.19.  The challenge of tardy, in complete, and missing notifications is not limited to Members of a 
particular region or grouping, but is quite widespread  despite the availability to Members, even 
during the pandemic, of Secretariat assistance and training opportunities. The following are  some 
specific examples:  (i) 25 Members have not submitted an annual subsidies notification as required 
by Article  25.1, even though obligated to do so. The same number have also not submitted 
semi-annual subsidies notifications under Article  25.3 for the period 2019 -2021; (ii) 21 Members 
have not submitted the questionnaire on import licensing procedures (Article  7.3), and an additional 
10 have only submitted the questionnaire once ; (iii)  48 Members have not notified state trading 
enterprises as required b y Article  XVII:4 of GATT  1994, and paragraph  1 of the Understanding on 
the Interpretation of Article  XVII of GATT  1994 during the ten -year period covered by 
document  G/L/223/Rev.29 ; and (iv)  28 Members have never submitted the required annual 
Table  DS:1 notification, and 20 have never submitted the required annual Table  ES:1 notification 
under the Agreement on Agriculture. In total, approximately 26% of all required Agreement on 
Agriculture notifications are outstanding.  
2.20.  WTO Members' persistent challenges i n meeting their notification obligations have a real and 
practical impact on other Members and on the effective functioning of the WTO. Clearly there 
continues to be a pressing need to consider steps to improve the situation.  Addressing the operation 
and e ffectiveness of current notification practices, as supported by the United States and 
21 co-sponsors in the proposal on transparency and notification procedures, is a practical means of 
making progress on reform work that can strengthen the WTO.  
2.21.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
2.22.  The European Union  and its member States ' express their full solidarity with Ukraine and its 
people. The EU condemns , in the strongest possible terms , Russia's unprovoked and unjustified 
military aggr ession, which grossly violates international law and undermines international security 
and stability. It is inflicting unspeakable suffering on the Ukrainian population. The EU resolutely 
supports Ukraine 's right of self -defence. The EU and its member States will continue to provide 
coordinated political, financial, material , and humanitarian support to Ukraine. The EU has also 
adopted significant economic and trade sanctions against Russia and stands ready to move quickly 
with further measures.  
2.23.  Moreover, t he European Union strongly condemns Russia 's actions targeting Ukraine 's food 
supply and production. The food security situation is already dramatic for those directly involved in 
Ukraine. However, the impact of the Russian aggression is not just restricte d to Ukraine and its 
citizens but is also seriously challenging food availability in some vulnerable net food -importing 
countries.  
2.24.  The European Union  calls upon the international community to demand from Russia an 
immediate end to its aggression, the withd rawal of its military , and to respect Ukraine 's sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. Russia 's actions are endangering international peace and security on a global 
scale, and Russia must at all times respect its responsibilities under international humani tarian law.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  2.25.  The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
2.26.  Canada thanks the Secretariat for its report and for the work to provide real -time access to 
this information through the Notifications Portal . Canada also thanks the United States for its 
comments on the situation with respect to notifications , the continued lack of improvement in this 
area, and how the situation seems to be afflicting a number of WTO Members. In this regard, Canada 
encourage s Members to continue to reach out to the Secreta riat for help with their notifications. In 
the meantime, Canada also encourage s Members to support the notifications and transparency 
proposal that the US mentioned  in its intervention . WTO Members need to revive the Working Group 
to help them to find bett er ways to ensure that they live up to their WTO obligations.  
2.27.  Canada also thank s the delegate of Ukraine for his continued work to provide transparency to 
WTO Members, especially given the unimaginable circumstances and challenges his colleagues in 
capital , and his fellow citizens throughout Ukraine,  continue to face.  In coordination with its allies 
and partners , Canada will continue to impose severe costs on the Russian regime for its unjustifiable 
and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and will relentlessly p ursue accountability for Russia's  actions.  
In this respect, Canada recently submitted to the Committee on Market Access (CMA) 
document  G/MA/QR/N/CAN/4/Add.3 , which provides information on a new quantitative restriction 
imposed on imports of petroleum produ cts from the Russian Federation.  Specifically, as of 
10 March  2022, Canada has banned the imports of all petroleum products from Russia.  Canada 
continues to stand by the brave men and women fighting for their freedom in Ukraine.  
2.28.  The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
2.29.  Switzerland  thank s the Secretariat for its report. Switzerland also thank s the delegation of 
Ukraine for the timely update of its notifications in view of the exceptional circumstances in which 
its country finds itself.  Ukraine's  commitment to WTO  disciplines, even in the current situation, is a 
tangible sign of support for international law.  
2.30.  Like other delegations, Switzerland condemns Russia's military aggression against Ukraine in 
the strongest terms. Such aggression b latantly violates international law, most notably the 
prohibition on the use of force and the principle of the territorial integrity of States.  Switzerland calls 
upon Russia to honour its international obligations, reconsider its actions, withdraw its troo ps, and 
help to de -escalate the situation.  Switzerland calls upon all actors to respect international law, in 
particular humanitarian international law.  
2.31.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
2.32.  Japan  thank s the Secretariat for its updated report  on the status of notification s. Japan also 
thank s Ukraine for having explained the background to its notification to the Market Access  and 
Import Licens ing Committee s. 
2.33.  Russia 's invasion of Ukraine clearly infringes upon Ukraine 's sovereignty and territorial 
integrity and constitutes a grave breach of the United Nations Charter, which prohibits the use of 
force. Any unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force is an extremely serious situation that 
shakes the very foundati on of the international order and is totally unacceptable. Japan condemns 
Russia 's actions in the strongest terms. Japan strongly urges Russia to cease its attack and 
immediately to withdraw its forces back to Russian territory. Japan will continue to make efforts to 
improve the situation in cooperation with the international community, including the G7. Japan 
stands in solidarity with Ukraine and its people.  
2.34.  The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
2.35.  New Zealand thank s the Secretariat for pre paring this report . Like other Members, New 
Zealand thank s Ukraine for its updates. Ukraine's approach  is to be commended and clearly 
illustrates its commitment to the WTO and to maintaining the international rules -based system.  
2.36.  Russia's war in Ukraine is exacerbating current global food supply disruptions and food 
insecurity. Ukraine is a significant source of grain, including being the largest source of food for the 
World Food Programme (WFP) by volume in 2021 . The current war , imposed by Russia,  is expec ted 
to have serious ramifications on the WFP's ability to feed the hungry.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  2.37.  New Zealand stands with the international community in condemning President Putin's 
unjustified and illegal attack on Ukraine. Russia's war in Ukraine has very real implications for  global 
peace, security , and economic stability. The actions of President Putin are a grave breach of 
international rules; the use of force to change borders is strictly prohibited under international law, 
as is the targeting of civilians.  
2.38.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
2.39.  Australia commends  the WTO  Secretariat for its important work in promoting 
WTO transparency, including through its update to document  G/L/223  and its development of a 
Notification s Portal.  
2.40.  Australia thanks Ukraine for its intervention, and joins other s in condemning , in the strongest 
possible terms , Russia's unprovoked, unjust , and illegal invasion of Ukraine. Russia's  invasion is a 
gross violation of international law, including the Charter of the Un ited Nations. Australia strongly 
supports Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and calls on Russia to cease its attacks on 
Ukraine and to withdraw its forces from Ukrainian territory.  
2.41.  Russia's war on Ukraine is exacting a catastrophic humanitar ian toll, in addition to trade 
disruptions and a food crisis. Australia supports the collective action of all countries and has imposed 
far-reaching sanctions that have imposed a heavy toll on Russia and those responsible.  
2.42.  The delegate of the Republic of K orea indicated the following:  
2.43.  The Republic of Korea t hanks the Secretariat for its informative report , and the United States 
for its comment s on the report. Korea also encourage s Members to implement the ir notification  
obligations . 
2.44.  The Republic of Korea t hanks Ukraine for its update , and echoes the comments of previous 
speakers regarding the situation in Ukraine. As the UN  Secretary -General mentioned recently , the 
war in Ukraine has created immense human suffering, but it has also seriously damaged the glob al 
economy. Wheat and maize prices have been volatile since the war began and are 30% higher than 
at the beginning of the year. Oil prices are up more than 60% over the previous year and natural 
gas prices have risen by 50% in recent months. As many as 1.7  billion people are now highly exposed 
to disruptions in food, energy , and finance systems. World merchandise trade volume and world 
GDP have been seriously damaged by the war.  
2.45.  The Korean government strongly condemns Russia 's armed invasion against Ukraine as a 
violation of the principles of the UN  Charter. Ukraine 's sovereignty, territorial integrity , and political 
independence must be respected. Korea also share s the international community 's deep concerns  
over the unfolding humanitarian situation in Ukraine.  
2.46.  Reaffirming its commitment to the rules-based global trade order under the WTO, the Republic 
of Korea is concerned by the serious impact of Russia's action s on the global supply chain in many 
areas, including food security. The way to end all t his is obvious, which is for Russia to stop its  
military action in Ukraine.  
2.47.  The delegate of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
2.48.  Chinese Taipei  thank s the Secretariat for its updated report and effort s to set up a 
Notification s Portal.  
2.49.  Chinese Taipei  also thank s Ukraine for its intervention and its latest notification s to the 
relevant committees , despite its very difficult circumstance s. Chinese Taipei joins others in 
expressing its serious concern over Russia 's military aggression in Ukraine, which cont inues to cause 
a devastating loss of human life. From any perspective, this unprovoked and unjustified attack needs 
to be stopped immediately.  Chinese Taipei  calls upon Russia to respect international law and the 
territorial sovereignty of another country. Chinese Taipei stand s firmly by Ukraine and its people as 
it seeks to survive this dreadful crisis.  
2.50.  The delegate of Norway  indicated the following:  G/C/M/142  
 
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  2.51.  Norway thank s the Secretariat for its great work in assisting th e Membership in fulfilling its 
notification obligations. Notifications and transparency constitute  an important WTO pillar, and it is 
important that the Membership fulfils its obligations  in this regard . 
2.52.  Norway also thank s Ukraine for fulfilling its notification obligations  despite the very difficult 
circumstances created by Russia's ongoing aggressive military invasion. Norway condemns Russia's 
military aggression against Ukraine in the strongest possible terms. In addition, Norway expresses 
its concern over the severe destruction and human suffering that Russia's  illegal act of aggression 
is causing. By these unprovoked, unjustified , and premeditated military actions, the Russian 
Federation and its government is grossly violating international law, the cor e principle on which the 
international rules -based order is built, and the fundamental principles of the UN  Charter that have 
prevailed since World War  II. It is an attack against what the UN, the WTO, and Geneva as a capital 
of multilateralism stand for. In conclusion, Norway expresses its full solidarity with Ukraine and its 
people.  
2.53.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
2.54.  The Russian Federation  thank s the Secretariat for document  G/L/223 /Rev.29 . 
2.55.  Regarding Members' interventions, the Russian Federation reject s all the unfounded 
allegations that were voiced by some delegations.  During  the previous two months, Russia has heard 
the same statements from the same small group of Members over and over aga in. These statements 
are clearly aimed at advancing those Members'  self-serving political agenda and reflect on issues 
that have nothing to do with the WTO 's mandate. At the same time, the global economy and the 
multilateral trading system are still strugg ling to recover from the shock of the COVID -19 pandemic, 
while a collective response to global food security risks is urgently required.  Russia  urges the 
Members concerned to show respect to this body, and to other participants at this meeting , and to 
stop sabotaging Members'  common work at this time, when that work is most needed.  
2.56.  Meanwhile, the discussion in the WTO on the trade -related fallout of the situation in Ukraine 
is quite relevant. It is the  same Members  that are wasting our time by making politi cal statements  
that chose the path of economic confrontation, demonstrating blatant disregard for universally 
accepted WTO  rules and fuelling global economic instability. Russia has  introduced a specific agenda 
item on the unilateral restrictive measures  of those Members , including the effect of the measures 
on the world economy and trade. Russia believe s that a frank and meaningful discussion of these 
issues would be much more useful for the future and benefit of this Organization than the statements 
just heard.  
2.57.  The Council took note  of document  G/L/223 /Rev.29 and the statements made.  
3  APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS TO THE SUBSIDIARY BODIES OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE 
IN GOODS  
3.1.  The Chairperson  reminded delegations that the Guidelines for Appointment of Officers to the 
WTO (WT/L/510) , adopted by the General Council on 11  December  2002, provided that the 
Chairperson of the CTG would conduct consultations on the appointment of the Chairpersons of the 
Council's subsidiary bodies, including consultations with the Group Coordinators , in line with the 
practical steps to be taken to improve the process of appointment of officers contained in 
document  JOB/GC/22, dated 27  July 2012.  
3.2.  He reported on the inf ormal meeting that he had held immediately preceding the current formal 
meeting, as required by Rule  7.3 of the Guidelines for Appointment of Officers to WTO  Bodies 
(WT/L/510) . During that meeting, he had reported to Members on the process that had been he ld 
to reach consensus on a slate of names for the CTG's subsidiary bodies. Unfortunately, such a 
consensus had not yet been reached . 
3.3.  In his report on the status of the consultations that had been conducted regarding the 
appointment of officers for the subsidiary bodies of the CTG , he recalled that the Chairperson of the 
General Council  at that time , Ambassador Dacio Castillo, had requested that he, Ambassador Lundeg 
Purevsuren, as Chairperson of the Goods Council, together with the Chairperson of the Council for 
Trade in Services (CTS), Ambassador Ángel Villalobos, proceed with an early launch of the process  G/C/M/142  
 
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  for the election of officers for the subsidiary bodies of the CTG and CT S, with a view to trying to 
avoid some of the challenges  faced during the previous  year's process . On that basis, and after the 
Tier 1 process had advanced, the CTS and CTG  Chairpersons  launched their respective Council's 
procedures at end -January  2022. 
3.4.  On 26 January  2022, he informed Members of th e launch of the CTG process and convened a 
first meeting with the Group Coordinators of the four  Regional Groups, namely Asia and the Pacific, 
Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, and Developed Countries. Thro ughout this process, he had 
proceeded in line with the guidelines set out in documents  WT/L/510 and JOB/GC/22, and ha d 
actively coordinated with the Chairperson of the CTS.  
3.5.  After th e first meeting with the Group Coordinators, the CTS and CTG  Chairpersons  had begun  
to meet jointly with the Group Coordinators, with a view to reaching an agreement on the CTG and 
CTS slates concurrently. They had met in that configuration on 3, 11, and 24  Februa ry. As in the 
past, it had not been an easy task due to overlapping interests and the many candidates presented 
by some of the regional groups.  
3.6.  On the basis of th ose discussions, the CTS and CTG  Chairpersons prepared a tentative slate of 
names that was sen t to Group Coordinators so that it could be consulted on with their constituencies. 
In addition, on 4  March, the CTG  Chairperson  sent a copy of t hat tentative slate of names to those 
Members that were not represented by a Group.  
3.7.  At the end of that process,  it emerged that, unfortunately, there was no consensus on the slate 
of names. Since then, the CTG  Chairperson  had tried on several occasions to meet with the relevant 
delegation that had been  objecting to the slate of names with a view to exploring differ ent ways to 
accommodate their concerns and secure an agreement. For various reasons , this had unfortunately 
proven difficult.  
3.8.  On 8 March, at the request of the Group Coordinators, the CTG  Chairperson had  requested the 
Chairperson of the General Council to assist in the process. The Chair person  of the General Council 
met with interested parties and subsequently asked the Chair person of the CTG  to resume the 
consultations , which  he did, with the CTG Chairper son's most recent consultation with the delegation 
concerned having taken place the previous day. Regrettably, the position of that delegation on not 
joining the consensus on the slate of names had remain ed unchanged.  
3.9.  The Chairperson  then remind ed the Memb ership  of the high risk of facing serious organizational 
problems regarding regular Committee work as a result of th e current situation, and that the issue 
remain ed unresolved in the lead -up to  a Ministerial Conference taking place in only seven  weeks ' 
time. Therefore, s ince time was of the essence, he urged delegations to show their utmost flexibility.  
3.10.  For the se reasons, he proposed that the Council suspend Agenda Item 3, and that the Council 
be reconvened as soon as a slate of names was ready for its consideration. In addition, in light of 
his own imminent departure from Geneva, he had requested the Chair person  of the General Council 
to take up and continue the consultations , and t he Chairperson of the General Council had agreed 
to do so . The CTG would  be reconvened as necessary, including at short notice.  
3.11.  The Council so agreed . 
4  MEASURES TO ALLOW GRADUATED LDCS, WITH GNP BELOW USD  1,000, BENEFITS 
PURSUANT TO ANNEX  VII(B) OF THE AGRE EMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING 
MEASURES – COMMUNICATION FROM CHAD ON BEHALF OF THE LDC  GROUP 
(WT/GC/W/742 -G/C/W/752)  
4.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Chad, on behalf of the LDC  Group.  
4.2.  The dele gate of Chad, speaking on behalf of the LDC  Group, indicated the following:  
4.3.  The current context is extremely difficult for LDCs , with their highly fragile and vulnerable 
countries suffering enormously from  the COVID -19 crisis, and now also with the crisis due to the 
conflict in Ukraine. LDCs are net importers of food products and face a very difficult situation. This G/C/M/142  
 
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  is why the LDC  Group  considers that WTO  Members need to understand the situation of LDCs, and 
to provide their consensual support for this proposal, which has been on the negotiating table for 
some time.  
4.4.  This agenda item is important for LDCs in terms of their smooth economic development and 
better integration into global trade.  Indeed, the  LDC Group has reiterated its desire for a sm ooth 
transition for graduating LDC  economies. To that end, the LDC  Group  reaffirms the importance of its 
proposal on the flexibility to be accorded to graduating LDCs, which remains on the negotiating table 
under document  symbol  G/C/W/752 , and reiterates t he LDC  Group's ongoing support for it.  
4.5.  As the LDC  Group has consistently explained, in the context of the CTG and at bilateral 
meetings, its proposal is simply intended to correct a technical oversight relating to Annex  VII to the 
Agreement on Subsidies an d Countervailing Measures , ensuring that graduated LDCs can benefit 
from the same conditions as non -LDCs listed in Annex  VII, in terms of flexibilities under Article  27.2 
of the SCM  Agreement , providing that the gross national income (GNI) per capita of the graduated 
LDC remains below USD  1,000 (constant 1990  USD), or if this income falls back below USD  1,000. 
Therefore , the LDC Group  calls for this correction to be made in order  for the text simply to refer to 
graduated LDCs.  
4.6.  Chad reiterate s, on behalf of the LDC  Group , that th e possibility for graduated LDCs to continue 
to benefit from such flexibility, as long as their GNI  per capita does not exceed USD  1,000, is not 
clearly enshrined in the 2001  Doha Ministerial D ecision on Implementation -Related Issues  and 
Concerns (WT/MIN(01)/17) . Rather, it  is a technical question that the LDC  Group simply requests to 
be corrected in order for the text to refer to graduated LDCs.  
4.7.  The LDC  Group  believe s that this proposal is sufficiently straightforward and clear,  and it 
follows the request made by LDC  Ministers as part of their declaration adopted in Buenos Aires and 
for MC12 . The LDC  Group thank s the Members that have supported this proposal , and hopes that 
those  Members that have expressed reservations can lift them and state their support for a positive 
decision on the proposal both in the CTG and in the General Council.  Finally, the LDC  Group requests 
that this matter remain on the agenda of the C TG until Members are able to reach a consensus 
decision.  The LDC  Group count s on the understanding of those Members that have expressed their 
reservations  regarding the proposal , and remains open to discussions and bilateral meetings  with 
them. 
4.8.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
4.9.  The United States  thank s the Secretariat for producing its Note of 22  November  2021, as found 
in document  G/SCM/W/585, titled "GNP Per Capita Calculations for all WTO  Members Using the  
Methodology in G/SCM/38 ". The United States has  reviewed the Note carefully, and u nfortunately, 
the Secretariat 's calculations confirm US concerns , namely that gaps  remain in the information that 
is needed for this proposal to be workable from a technical perspective.  The United States is willing 
to consider ideas and proposals as to ho w to address those gaps, or otherwise address the issue 
raised by the proposal.  
4.10.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
4.11.  The European Union  thanks Chad for its intervention and welcomes the circulated document 
showing tables with GNI  per capita for WTO  Members.  The EU supports constructive initiatives to 
better integrate LDCs into the multilateral trading system and encourage s discussing this proposal , 
as any Special and Differential Treatment SDT  proposal , on the basis of  analysis that shows where 
specific problems lie.  The EU is mindful of the challenges that graduating LDCs face , and also takes 
into account the current circumstances , namely  the COVID -19 pandemic and the crisis in Ukraine . 
4.12.  However, the European Union still need s to assess the actual use of export subsidies by LDCs 
in order to establish whether a transition period is needed that would allow graduated LDCs to 
continue using export subsidies. The EU appreciates the LDC  Group's replies given so far. 
Unfortunat ely, the EU still has little knowledge of whether, or to what extent, LDCs use export 
subsidies (or any other subsidies, for that matter) because LDCs hardly submit any notifications 
under Article  25 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measure s (SCM Agreement) . G/C/M/142  
 
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  4.13.  WTO technical assistance is available to support LDCs as concerns  their notifications. In this 
regard, the European Union recall s its suggestion that the LDC  Group could make a presentation on 
how LDCs make use of export subsidies , and h ow such export subsidies help their economic 
development.  In addition, the EU  suggest s that the countries concerned seek assistance for 
reshaping any export subsidies to make them WTO-compatible.  The EU supports other Members' 
requests to the Secretariat t o enlighten the discussion and stands ready to engage in informal 
consultations with the LDC  Group on this matter.  
4.14.  The delegate of Bangladesh  indicated the following:  
4.15.  Bangladesh aligns itself with the statement delivered by Chad on behalf of the LDC  Group. 
The specific objective of this proposal is to correct a technical oversight. According to Article  27.2(a) 
of the SCM Agreement , some Members are eligible to enjoy flexibilities under the Agreement. Those 
Members are specified under Annex  VII to the Agreement , in two  separate categories: (a)  the LDCs ; 
and (b)  some developing countries, as long as their GNI  per capita remains below USD  1,000 in 
constant 1990  US dollar terms.  
4.16.  It is possible that some LDCs, that is , countries listed in Annex  VII(a), may graduate from the 
LDC category while still remaining with a GNI per capita below USD  1,000 in constant 1990  US dollar  
terms . Nepal is a possible example in this regard. It is not clear whether LDCs like Nepal,  after 
graduation, having the GNI  threshold lik e that of  Annex  VII(b)  countries, can still benefit from the 
Article  27.2 flexibility. This is clearly a technical oversight that should be corrected.  
4.17.  Therefore, the LDC Group's submission proposes that an LDC , after graduation, as long as  it 
remains below  the threshold of USD  1,000 in constant 1990  US dollar terms, should be allowed to 
use the flexibility under Article  27.2 of the SCM Agreement . The LDC  Group 's proposal is focused on 
a clarification issue only and is not proposing to change  any rule.  The submission has already 
received wide support and the LDC  Group is grateful to all Members.  
4.18.  The LDC  Group is engaging with the delegations of the European Union  and the United States 
on the concerns that they have raised. Bangladesh, along with other LDC Members , looks forward 
to continuing informal meetings with Members to get positive results on this submission.  
4.19.  The delegate of India indicated the following:  
4.20.  India has already supported this proposal in earlier meetings of the C TG and its position 
remains the same.  
4.21.  The delegate of Nepal  indicated the following:  
4.22.  Nepal  associate s itself with the statement delivered by Chad on behalf of the LDC  Group, and 
wishes to refer to its statement under this agenda item delivered at the Council's previous meeting , 
on 1 November  2021.3 Nepal wishes to reiterate that the provision in question needs to be applied 
in a fair manner by extending the same flexibility to Members even after graduation if they are 
eligible for it, as per the provision and spirit  of the Agreement.  The LDC  Group is not demanding 
anything new but only requesting a minor adjustment as per the spirit of the law.  
4.23.  The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
4.24.  Brazil refers to its previous statements on the topic and reiterates its support for the  
LDC proposal.4 
4.25.  The delegate of Angola  indicated the following:  
4.26.  The Angolan delegation supports the statement made by Chad on behalf of the LDC Group . 
4.27.  The delegate of Zambia  indicated the following:  
 
3 Document  G/C/M/141, paragraph s 6.26-6.34. 
4 Document  G/C/M/141, paragraph s 6.15-6.16. G/C/M/142  
 
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  4.28.  Zambia supports the statem ent delivered by Chad on behalf of the LDC  Group.  
4.29.  The delegate of Chad indicated the following:  
4.30.  The LDC  Group thanks Members for their comments, and especially thanks those Members 
that support the proposal ; at the same time, the LDC  Group takes note of th e concerns raised by 
the United States and the European Union. The LDC  Group is open to holding discussions and 
bilateral meetings to explain  its proposal  in detail . Regarding the calculations referred to by the 
United States, they are not persuaded that i t reflects reality despite the fact that it was calculated 
by the WTO Secretariat. T he LDC  Group  wonders whether the Secretariat could update the figures 
with a view to having a basis on which Members could continu e their discussions towards reach ing 
convergence on the LDC Group's proposal.  
4.31.  The Council took note  of the statements  made . 
5  INDIA – IMPORT POLICY ON TYRES – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
INDONESIA, THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND 
MATSU, AND THAILAND  
5.1.  The Chairp erson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  the 
European Union, Indonesia, the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, 
and Thailand.  
5.2.  The delegate of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
5.3.  The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu would like to register, 
once again, its concerns over India's measure identified under this agenda item.  The situation has 
been ongoing for almost two  years , since June 2020, when India int roduced its restrictive import 
measure on new pneumatic tyres. Chinese Taipei has since registered its concerns on numerous 
occasions, at meetings of this Council , the Committee on Import Licensing , and the Market Access  
Committee . However, d espite Chinese  Taipei's efforts, the measure remains unchanged, which 
Chinese Taipei considers to be a matter of great regret.  
5.4.  Since the new import licensing measure came into effect, Chinese Taipei has noticed that only 
approximately  40% of its application cases have b een approved by India 's Authority, compared to 
the substantially higher average in previous years.  Difficulties in obtaining import licen ces, as well 
as the introduction of lengthy approval processes , have severely affected the levels of Chinese 
Taipei's  exports to India. Chinese Taipei's trade in the products concerned has decreased sharply in 
both 2020 and 2021 compared to the same period in 2019.  
5.5.  It appears to Chinese Taipei  that India is issuing import licen ces only for the kind of pneumatic 
tyres that are not produced domestically, and yet at the same time it is setting a limit on the number 
of such tyres that can be imported. Such a  measure clearly hinders normal trade and may constitute 
a ban on certain tyre imports. Chinese Taipei  must therefore question how this measure could  be 
compatible with WTO  rules concerning quantitative restrictions . 
5.6.  Chinese Taipei urges India to ensure that all applications in full compliance with the quality of 
tyre products it requires are granted import licences without hindrance and undue delay. This is 
important to ensure that non -automatic licensing procedures be implemented in a t ransparent and 
predictable manner, and not create  trade-restrictive or trade -distortive effects on imports that are 
additional to those caused by the imposition of restrictions.  Chinese Taipei  therefore call s upon India 
to review its current practices and to engage with the Members concerned with a view to solving the 
issue in a timely and constructive manner.  
5.7.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
5.8.  The European Union  wishes to reiterate the concerns it already raised in July  2021, regar ding 
the licensing regime for importation of pneumatic tyres for motor cars, buses, lorries, motor scooters 
and motorcycles introduced by India under Notification No.  12/2015 -2020 on "Amendment in Import 
Policy of Tyres " of 12 June 2020.  This has become a long-standing issue and it is very worrying that , 
despite it having been raised on multiple occasions at this Council and at various WTO Committees G/C/M/142  
 
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  (Market Access Committee, TRIMs  Committee , and TBT  Committee) , no progress has been made 
towards a possible resolution.  
5.9.  The European Union  continues to be concerned about the effect of this measure on the 
import ation of tyres, which has become highly restricted since June  2020. Only a limited number of 
licences have been granted to EU  tyres manufacturers. In add ition, these licen ces are limited in 
terms of duration, quantity, and type of tyres. For these reasons, no licen ces have yet been granted 
to bus and truck tyres. This is blatant discrimination against EU bus and truck tyre manufacturers.  
Therefore , the EU urge s India to reconsider and eliminate any implicit or explicit quantitative or 
other ( for example, end-user pri nciple) restrictions on the import of replacement tyres that could 
run contrary to WTO  requirements.  
5.10.  The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
5.11.  At the outset, Indonesia expresses its gratitude to India for their constructive bilateral 
meetings, both on the sidelines  of the TBT  Committee and in the Working Group on Trade and 
Investment, in order to resolve issues relat ing to India's  policy on impor ted tyres from Indonesia. 
However, Indonesia regrets that it has so far not received from India a positive response and the 
right solution to this problem.  
5.12.  Indonesia is aware that India has imposed import restrictions on tyre products with certain 
types an d size categories that can be produced by t yre manufacturers in India. As stated in India's  
Notification No.  12/2015 -2020, dated 12  June 2020, regarding India's amendment to its tyre import 
policy, this regulation was implemented shortly after India had imposed a temporary import ban on 
tyre products to India for a period of six months.  
5.13.  Indonesia intends to request an explanation from India regarding the obligations of Indian 
importing business actors to provide separate statements via email concerning  import restrictions 
based on  the type and size category of imported t yres, while at the same time there are no official 
rules governing those requirements. The requirements have hampered market access for Indonesian 
tyre products to India.  
5.14.  In addition, Indonesia  also intend s to seek further clarification regarding the application of a 
royalty or marking fee policy on t yre products that use the Indian Standard (IS I) mark. Indonesia 
views the imposition of an IS  marking fee on t yre products to be exported to third  countries as 
potentially being a burden on business actors , creating unnecessary barriers to international trade.  
In this regard, Indonesia seeks further clarification , and requests the Indian government 
immediately to review its policy to ensure that its regulation is in accordance with WTO  principles, 
in particular the principle of national treatment.  
5.15.  The delegate of Thailand  indicated the following:  
5.16.  Thailand would like to reiterate its concern regarding India 's import policy  on tyres , which  has 
considerably affected Thailand 's exports of tyre products to India. Moreover, as approval for import 
permit s for tyres could face significant delay s, Thailand reiterate s its request for clarification and 
further details from India regard ing the procedures and time -frames for issuance of import permits 
for tyres.  
5.17.  The delegate of India indicated the following:  
5.18.  India thank s the delegations of the European Union, Indonesia, Chinese Taipei , and Thailand 
for their continued interest in this issue. The issue was also discussed in the Council 's 
November  2021 meeting, and the Committee on Market Access in its October  2021 and March  2022 
meetings , and India believe s that it had clarified Members' questions  on those occasions . 
5.19.  India reiterate s that its non-automatic licensing requirements for tyres are administered in a 
manner consistent with the rules of the Agreement on Im port Licensing Procedures, including  with 
respect to the time -frames for the grant ing of import licences. Accordingly, India considers that its  
licensing procedure is being administered fair ly, as  reflected in the fact that a number of licen ces 
have been g ranted after approval by the Exim Facilitation Committee.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  5.20.  India's  import policy measure has been taken in view of quality issues for tyre product s. For 
granting licen ces under its non-automatic licensing procedure, India has laid down specific criteria 
to evaluate the applications received. The comments of the administrative ministries concerned are 
also taken into account as part of this non -automatic licensing procedure.  
5.21.  Specifically on Indonesia 's questions, it may be clarified that the fee charged is a Marking Fee 
and not a Royalty Fee. The Bureau of Indian Standards operates a Product Certification Scheme as 
per the B ureau of Indian Standards (BIS)  (Conformity Assessment) Regulation  2018 under the 
BIS Act 2016. Under the scheme, the B IS grants Product Certification licence s to domestic or foreign 
manufacturers.  The manufacturer is required to pay  the BIS the necessary marking fee. The marking 
fee for a product is specified as  follows : Minimum Marking Fee per annum; and Unit and Unit rate.  
5.22.  The manufacturer is required to pay the minimum marking fee in advance for the validity 
period of the licence. Additionally, the actual marking fee for each year is calculated by multiplying 
the unit  rate with the quantity (units) marked with  the ISI mark during the year by the manufacturer. 
The actual marking fee thus arrived at is the higher of the two  values. The marking fee as per the 
process described above is the same for domestic and foreign ma nufacturers. The marking fee is 
chargeable on all production of tyres carrying an ISI mark.  
5.23.  India request s the proponents of this agenda item to share their specific data on applications 
submitted and any other substantiating information. India remain s committed to address ing these 
concerns bilaterally.  
5.24.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
6  EUROPEAN UNION – IMPLEMENTATION OF NON -TARIFF BARRIERS ON AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTS (G/C/W/767/REV.1) – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL, CANADA, 
COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA,  DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, JAMAICA, PANAMA, 
PARAGUAY, PERU, THE UNITED STATES, AND URUGUAY  
6.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, the United States, and Uruguay.  
6.2.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
6.3.  Australia, as a co -sponsor of this item, again highlights its ongoing concerns in relation to the 
European Union's  non-tariff barriers on agricultural products, including agricultural chemical 
regulations and policy and the potential negative effect on farmers and trade. Australia's  concern  
includes elements of the E U's Farm to Fork Strategy and its implementation. Australia has previously  
raised its concerns about the EU's risk assessment and import tolerance setting policies in this 
Council, as well as the TBT and SPS  Committees.  
6.4.  Australia raised or supported a numb er of specific trade concerns against the European Union , 
including at the most recent SPS and TBT  Committee meetings. Many other Members also joined in 
expressing concerns, highlighting a strong level of concern from a broad cross -section of Members 
regar ding the EU's measures. It is clear  that these concerns are largely based on the EU's lack of 
transparency and predictability for exporters.  
6.5.  While Australia recogni zes the right of WTO  Members to regulate agricultural and other 
chemicals in a manner that p rotects animal, plant and human health and the environment, Members 
are also bound by WTO  obligations , particularly in relation to undertaking science -based risk 
assessments and ensuring that measures are no more trade -restrictive than necessary. Australia  is 
a strong supporter of robust, risk and science -based regulations of agricultural chemicals.  
6.6.  Australia questions the European Union's  approach to the approval and renewal of plant 
protection product authorizations and import tolerance limits that relies  primarily on hazard -based 
assessment. In doing so, it is unclear how the EU  hazard -based assessment is consistent with 
internationally agreed risk assessment standards for import tolerances.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  6.7.  In the last decade, the European Union's  ban on many active cons tituents on the basis of their 
hazardous properties, and the subsequent reduced availability of plant protection products (PPPs), 
has significantly contributed to the increasing number of emergency authori zations granted under 
Article  53 of Regulation (EC)  No. 1107/2009. Australia notes that , since 2011 , there has been a 
considerable increase in the number of these authorizations, many of which are for non -approved 
plant protection products  (PPP) . 
6.8.  The use of emergency authorizations and the setting of relat ed temporary MRLs to allow the 
supply and consumption of treated produce can lead to trade imbalances that are not in line with 
WTO standards and obligations. Australia is concerned that the establishment of MRLs under 
emergency authorization does not appl y equally to imported and EU  produce. Australia would 
welcome more details on the process of emergency authorization s and the establishment of 
temporary MRLs.  
6.9.  Australia  thank s the European Union  for its engagement  with Australia to date  on these 
long-running issues.  
6.10.  The delegate of Colombia  indicated the following:  
6.11.  Colombia thank s the European Union and its delegates in Geneva for their continued interest 
in and willingness to discuss this issue. Colombia regret s that, since this item was first  placed on the 
agenda, no significant progress has been made on the substance to allow for it to be remove d from 
the agenda. Colombia wishes to express the frustration of its producers, who continue to fear 
restrictions and likewise regret the fact that  to date  no progress has been made.  
6.12.  On the process of setting Maximum Residue Levels ( MRLs), Colombia remain s concerned 
about the European Union's  overall hazard regime, which is evident mainly in the pesticides policy 
that establishes technical and health regulation s that are more restrictive than necessary , and 
possibly discriminatory. This is evident, for example, in the fact that 88% of the Maximum Pesticide 
Residue Limits set in the regulation are default values, and are not scientifically based or based on 
uses authorized by other countries. Colombia has therefore questioned the scientific basis for such 
determinations and, in particular, the precautionary application of new MRLs in the absence of any 
negative information on their effects.  
6.13.  On the apparently discr iminatory aspects  of the implementation of the European Union's 
policy , Colombia has stated that the process is discriminatory when selecting the substances to be 
reviewed, when allowing the involvement of stakeholders, when establishing criteria such as h ow a 
food product is consumed, and in disregarding the different geographical and climatic conditions of 
countries, especially in tropical areas, and, last but not least, when establishing different exemption 
regimes for European and foreign producers. Ind eed, in addition to the problems of the MRL  adoption 
procedure, Colombia  finds that the exceptional measures, in other words the so -called emergency 
authorizations used by European producers, allow the continued use of certain products and also 
appear to b e discriminatory.  
6.14.  On this occasion , Colombia wishes to reiterate all of these arguments and its previous 
statements. Colombia  also call s upon Members to read the questions on the issue that it has raised , 
together with a group of Latin American countries , in the SPS  Committee. The unresolved problems 
that Colombia and others  are bringing back to this forum on this occasion are evident in those 
questions and replies. Colombia  also draw s Members' attention to those EU member States, 
including Belgium, Spain, France, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Greece, Poland, Slovenia, Finland, Hungary, 
Italy, Lithuania, Portugal,  and Romania, that ar e permanent beneficiaries of internal exemptions to 
the European Union's regime. This concern also extends to the non -tariff measures of individual 
WTO Members, with the European Union being the competent authority to implement certain  
measures , such as em ergency authorizations , for example . 
6.15.  Colombia  once again emphasizes the need for the establishment of a structured and 
comprehensive plurilateral dialogue mechanism, in parallel to bilateral discussions, in order to seek 
constructive and substantive soluti ons to this uneven playing field. Colombia proposes the following 
options: (a)  maintaining MRLs established by the Codex Alimentarius in cases in which scientific 
evidence is inconclusive, until the scientific data is complete. In cases in which there are no 
Codex  MRLs, the European Union  could establish a fixed MRL, by default more reasonable than the G/C/M/142  
 
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  existing 0.01% , almost a prohibition , in cases where the information is considered inconclusive; 
(b) creating a simplified import authorization mechanism for  foreign producers, equivalent to the 
existence of emergency authorizations within the EU for European producers, in other words a mirror 
mechanism; (c)  allowing longer transition periods, especially in cases where there are no viable 
alternatives for subs tances not renewed on the market; and (d) establishing a joint review of the 
marketing authorization procedure for a substance, to ensure the effective participation of the 
countries affected during the process.  
6.16.  The delegate of Ecuador  indicated the follow ing: 
6.17.  Ecuador once again deems it necessary to address this matter, in keeping with the trade 
concerns that it has been raising for several years in the SPS and TBT  Committees.  
6.18.  Ecuador refers to its previous statements in this Council5 and once again urges  the European 
Union: (i) to avoid adopting restrictive and discriminatory measures without conclusive scientific 
evidence; (ii) to observe the globally recognized standards on human, plant and animal health 
protection; (iii) to comply with the requirements established in the WTO  SPS Agreement to take a 
risk assessment approach to any measure, rather than one based on the persistent a pplication of 
the precautionary principle; and (iv) to consider suspending the ongoing implementation of 
measures to reduce MRLs and maintain the levels recommended by Codex, granting the necessary 
adjustment period in cases where the reduction of MRLs is shown to be essential.  
6.19.  Bodies such as the Codex Alimentarius offer a key space for science -based discussions on 
issues such as the definition of MRLs and for outlining the effects of the technological and economic 
asymmetries among Members. Tropical develo ping countries like Ecuador face challenges different 
to those faced by producers in temperate climates, which by no means signifies that tropical 
developing countries are not committed to protecting human health and the environment. To put it 
simply, one  size does not fit all.  
6.20.  Non-tariff barriers have a negative impact on small -scale farmers and reduce market access 
opportunities for minor crops, thereby making it difficult to take advantage of the benefits offered 
by trade liberalization agreements. A sig nificant part of the Ecuadorian economy is sustained by 
income from agricultural exports, which is an efficient sector that is not supported by extensive 
subsidy programmes.  
6.21.  Ecuador  hopes to continue exchanging information with other delegations and the Eu ropean 
Union. Ecuador also encourage s use to be made of all the channels available for dialogue in order to 
resolve this very long -standing trade concern.  
6.22.  The delegate of Peru indicated the following:  
6.23.  Peru wishes to support this trade concern regarding the  implementation of non -tariff barriers 
by the European Union , which in practice are unjustified barriers restricting trade in agricultural 
products.  
6.24.  As has been mentioned on a number of occasions in the SPS  Committee, the hazard -based 
approach used by the European Union  for assessing any maximum limit for pesticide residues results 
in such limits being more restrictive than necessary and at the same time does not take into account 
the provisions of the SPS  Agreement, which establishes the need for measures to be based on a risk 
analysis.  
6.25.  This situation be comes  even more concerning given the European Union's moves to take into 
consideration environmental aspects as a factor for future pesticide risk assessments, despite the 
fact that there is no technical bas is for such a policy.  
6.26.  Peru notes that non -tariff barriers do not only refer to MRLs for pesticides, since the European 
Union is also establishing maximum levels for contaminants that deviate from those established 
under the Codex Alimentarius , and which are substantially lower, as in the case of cocoa derivatives. 
Regarding other foods, Peru has also approached the EU bilaterally to request information on the 
 
5 Document  G/C/M/141, paragraph s 10.44 -10.47 . G/C/M/142  
 
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  process for the adoption of new maximum levels for contaminants , and for it to provide adequate 
time-frames for their implementation given that mitigation measures vary and are effective after a 
subsequent extended period of implementation.  
6.27.  Peru requests the European Union  to take into consideration the concerns raised in this Council 
and the SPS  Commit tee, to ensure that its policies are aligned with the provisions of the 
SPS Agreement , and to avoid any further unnecessary disruptions to trade.  
6.28.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
6.29.  The United States joins the concerns of Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay concerning the 
European Union 's implementation of non -tariff barriers on agricultural products. Increasingly, the 
EU is developin g rigid polices with extraterritorial implications that have the impact of forcing 
third countries to adopt European production practices or to abandon trade with the EU.  
6.30.  The European Union continues to lower many M RLs to trade -restrictive levels without c lear 
scientific justification or measurable benefit to human health. The EU 's hazard -based approach to 
pesticide regulation may lead to trade barriers that threaten the security of global food systems.  
6.31.  Further more, the European Union  enforces new reduced M RLs at the point of production for 
domestic goods, and at the point of importation for imported goods. This causes trade inefficiencies 
and disruptions for products destined for the EU  market , depending on when a new reduced MRL is 
enforced , and results in  an unfair advantage for EU  producers, especially for products with  a long 
shelf life. 
6.32.  The United States  remain s concerned that it appears as though the European Union  is 
following a similar approach through its new veterinary drug legislation , which could  prohibit 
producers from using antimicrobials that are not considered medically important. The United States  
recall s its concerns , as raised in the SPS  Committee , that these prescriptive restrictions, which do 
not appear to be based on completed risk asses sments, will apply to foreign producers shipping 
animals and animal products to the EU.  
6.33.  The United States requests that any EU  measure allow flexibility to trading partners to meet 
the EU  level of protection in a manner that is appropriate to the needs of farmers and producers in 
the exporting countries ' own domestic context.  
6.34.  In light of recent calls for coordinated action to ensure predictable trade flow s and support 
international food security, the international community should be working together to sup port 
science -based measures that promote a safe and sustainable food supply, and the United States  
calls upon the European Union to join with its trading partners in identifying such mutually beneficial 
solutions.  
6.35.  The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the foll owing:  
6.36.  Uruguay wishes to reiterate its concern regarding the European Union's  use of a hazard -based 
approach, rather than full risk assessments, in its regulatory decisions relating to SPS matters.  
6.37.  Uruguay understands that every determination of MRLs, particularly when they deviate from 
international standards established by the Codex  Alimentarius , must be based on a full scientific risk 
assessment and conclusive scientific evidence, in accordance with the SPS  Agreement. This is 
essential to maintain the effective balance that must exist between the right of Members to pursue 
their legitimate objectives and the need to avoid unnecessary barriers to trade.  
6.38.  Uruguay  agree s with other Members that the issue of exceptional regimes, including 
emergency autho rizations that are granted by European Union member States to their domestic 
producers, should be discussed in more depth , since Uruguay  understand s that the current system 
carries inconsistencies  that could be discriminatory vis -à-vis third  parties.  G/C/M/142  
 
- 19 - 
 
  6.39.  In pa rallel, this also gives rise to the concern that adequate transition periods are not being 
granted to make the necessary adjustments and to ensure that the products concerned comply with 
the amended MRLs.  
6.40.  Furthermore, Uruguay wishes to reiterate its concer n about persisting uncertainties over the 
approach, definition , and implementation of the new EU  regulations on veterinary drugs, deriving 
from Regulation No.  2019/6, particularly regarding the requirements that would be imposed on 
exporting third  countrie s. In this regard, Uruguay wishes to stress that measures should be based 
on international standards, or on conclusive scientific evidence; that they should take into account 
the specific circumstances of different countries; and that appropriate transitio n periods should be 
provided.  
6.41.  In conclusion , Uruguay once again urge s the European Union, as one of the largest markets 
for agricultural products, to reconsider its regulatory approach in order to avoid the unjustified 
proliferation of barriers to international trade in agricultural products.  
6.42.  The delegate of Canada  indicate d the following:  
6.43.  As noted in its previous interventions on this subject, Canada emphasizes the need for 
transparency and predictability in international trade. An important aspect in achieving this is 
regulatory frameworks that are based on scientific data  and risk analysis, and that are discussed in 
close cooperation with trading partners in order to achieve the outcomes desired while facilitating 
trade where this is feasible and appropriate.  
6.44.  With this in mind, and in accordance with WTO  obligations, Canad a continues to recognize 
Members' right to regulate in the public interest and to apply the food safety measures deemed 
necessary to protect human health. However, such measures must be implemented in a transparent 
manner that does not unjustifiably restri ct international trade.  
6.45.  As such, while Canada shares the European Union 's high standards of health, safety and 
environmental protection, Canada encourages the EU to implement all measures in a predictable 
manner based on assessments of risks, in accordance  with internationally recognized approaches, 
and to provide an opportunity for consultation at an early stage with affected sectors and countries , 
and to take comments received into account.  
6.46.  Moreover, in a context where global food security and food supply  is of utmost importance, 
Canada urges the European Union  to reconsider its current approach to the setting of MRLs for crop 
protection tools authorized in various jurisdictions, in order to allow for solutions that are appropriate 
to their particular circ umstances and needs.  
6.47.  In particular, Canada once again echoes the concerns raised regarding the European Union's  
hazard -based regulation for active substances in plant protection products (PPP) and the 
consequential impacts this may have on the setting of i mport tolerances. Canada continues to urge 
the EU to consider both hazards and exposure for all active substances in its regulatory 
decision -making. This would bring the EU's regulatory framework back in line with internationally 
recognized approaches while continuing to protect users and consumers as well as enhancing global 
food security.  
6.48.  Canada recalls that the European Union  has stated that it will be changing how requests for 
import tolerances are established in the context where the haz ard-based cut off criteria are involved, 
including taking into account certain environmental impacts in the country of origin. Canadian 
growers and exporters have yet to be convinced of the real -world feasibility, commercial viability , 
and compliance with international obligations of the EU 's proposed approach.  Consequently, Canada 
once again requests that the EU consider maintaining MRLs for substances that do not pose 
unacceptable dietary risks to European consumers.  Canada would also appreciate further i nformation 
in this regard, including who would determine what environmental factors would be considered , and 
how these relate to the consumer dietary risk assessment that is the scientific basis for the 
specification of import tolerances.  
6.49.  Additionally, Can ada notes that EU  member States have authorized numerous emergency 
derogations to allow PPPs to be placed on the EU  market. There are many examples of emergency G/C/M/142  
 
- 20 - 
 
  derogations being granted for individual member States for multiple years, and often with a lac k of 
justification for their authorization.  This would seemingly contradict the EU 's approach to renewing 
PPPs as their approval periods expire, as well as allowing domestic producers an unjustified 
advantage through the repeated approval of these derogati ons without affording importers the same 
approvals.  There is also uncertainty regarding how numerous emergency derogations align with the 
EU's low risk tolerance for these substances.  
6.50.  Further more, Canada took note of the EU 's recent "Call for evidence " process for input into a 
planned report on "Imports of Agricultural and Food Products – Applying EU  Health and 
Environmental Standards". Canada again emphasizes that , given the wide variation in countries ' 
sizes, climates, pests, diseases, crop varieties , and infrastructure, farmers and producers rely on a 
wide variety of tools and production methods to feed their populations. A unilateral application of 
EU health and environmental policies to MRLs would be detrimental to the efforts and technological 
advances  made to address the unique challenges faced by countries, and could be detrimental to 
global food security.  
6.51.  Consequently, Canada urges the European Union  to conduct complete trade impact 
assessments and transparent public consultation processes on all reg ulatory proposals impacting 
trading partners. Canada also continues to request that all regulatory changes arising from new 
EU policies impacting trade be commensurate with the level of risk involved, taking into account 
important differences between count ries, such as pest pressures, pesticide use patterns, and good 
agricultural practices.  
6.52.  Canada also requests the European Union to take into account the timelines necessary for 
practical decision -making by farmers and producers, as well as the time and effo rt required to bring 
products to market, particularly for commodities with a long shelf li fe. Transition periods should 
therefore be appropriate to the circumstances and should allow commodities to clear channels of 
trade where no dietary risks of concern to consumers have been identified.  
6.53.  In conclusion, Canada hopes that reiterating its concerns to the Council serves as a clear 
indication of the importance that Canada, and many WTO  Members, attribute to seeking enhanced 
transparency and predictability for trade, particularly in a context where such trade can contribute 
to global food security and supply.  
6.54.  The delegate of Costa Rica  indicated the following:  
6.55.  Costa Rica shares and associates itself with the statements made by those Members that 
previously  took the floor . Costa Rica considers that all the elements of this discussion continue to be 
relevant and so it continues to co -sponsor and support this concern as an agenda item, as well as 
document  G/C/W/767/Rev.1. To save time, Costa Rica wishes to refer Me mbers to its  previous 
statements in this Council6, and calls upon the European Union to address the concerns of Members 
expressed in the various committees and within this body. 
6.56.  The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
6.57.  Brazil regrets that , since th is issue was first  raised , nearly two  years ago, the European Union  
has not provided adequate answers to the many concerns raised by a large number of Members, 
while it has continued to adopt non-tariff barriers that lack scientific evidence and cause further 
imbalance in the trade in agricultural goods.  Brazil  therefore make s reference to its previous 
statements on this topic, as all Brazil's  concerns remain valid.7 Additionally, Brazil wishes to address 
what has been the EU's frequent answer on this topi c. 
6.58.  The European Union  has claimed that the measures being questioned have not prevented it 
from being a large importer of agricultural goods. First, Brazil notes that nowhere in the GATT does 
it say that being a large importer of agricultural goods enables  a Member to adopt discriminatory 
policies. Second, such imports simply reflect the reality that other regions of the world can produce 
more effectively and more sustainably than the EU without the thousands of euros of subsidies per 
farmer. But while enab ling a more efficient allocation of production and promoting the rise of living 
 
6 Document  G/C/M/141, paragraphs  10.63 -10.64.  
7 Document  G/C/M/ 141, paragraph s 10.2-10.9.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  standards through trade are key goals of this Organization, Members  have never had a level playing 
field in the trade of agricultural goods, and the reform mandated by Article  20 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture  is a clear indication of that. Besides, the scientific principle, enshrined in the 
SPS Agreement and materialized through risk analysis , exists for a reason,  namely,  to establish a 
balance between the principle of protection of life and human and animal health and the guarantee 
that the market access conditions negotiated multilaterally are not undermined by unjustified 
non-tariff barriers . 
6.59.  After nearly 30  years, howe ver, the European Union  has not engaged meaningfully in 
negotiations on domestic support and is constantly imposing prohibitions based on the hazard 
approach or recourse to Article  5.7 of the SPS  Agreement, despite contrary technical advice from 
renowned i nstitutions. This not only tilts the balance towards protectionism, but also undermines 
the capacity of developing countries to raise living standards in rural areas. It is important to 
continue to stress this topic: such EU  policies further imbalance trad e in agricultural goods and are 
particularly negative to the poorest in developing countries.  
6.60.  Lastly, Brazil note s that it is still waiting for adequate answers regarding the compatibility 
with WTO  law of the publication by the European Union  of more than 2,600  emergency 
authorizations by its member States of substances under review since 2017, many of which 
presented the same arguments as delegations from other Members on the SPS and TBT  Committees, 
while others simply did not offer any justification and y et were approved.  
6.61.  The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
6.62.  Paraguay regrets having once again to include this matter on the Council's agenda. 
Unfortunately, it has not been possible to move forward with the European Union  on this matter 
and, in fa ct, the EU continues to press ahead with the implementation of these measures without 
listening to its trading partners. This is demonstrated by the proliferation of EU -related trade 
concerns on this meeting's  agenda. Of the 40  trade concerns  listed on the  agenda , over ten have 
been submitted to the EU and more than half affect agricultural products or have the potential to do 
so. 
6.63.  The European Union  continues to apply measures that are inconsistent with its 
WTO obligations. Moreover, the requirement for mir ror clauses, which seeks to ensure compliance 
with standards that the EU's own producers are only able to meet thanks to generous subsidies 
worth millions, does not seem to be an attempt to level the playing field, but rather to unbalance it 
further, parti cularly for small agricultural exporting countries that do not have the policy space  in 
this Organization , according to its rules, and that even if they were to have such policy space, they 
would  still not have the fiscal space to permit them to make use of it. In other words, the EU requires 
us to comply with mirror measures, but without mirror subsidies to do so. These are subsidies that 
the EU has been reluctant to reform in agricultural negotiations. Here Paraguay  echoes the words of 
Brazil.  
6.64.  Members  will ce rtainly hear once again at this meeting that the measures have not had any 
impact on trade and that the European Union  is an important trading partner for many of the 
Members that are again raising their voice s on this occasion . However, the EU knows perfe ctly well 
that its measures are in the early design and implementation stage and that the true effects will 
only be felt in the years  to come . 
6.65.  Paraguay  notes with concern the imminent notification of the ban on import tolerances for 
products treated with n eonicotinoids, while hundreds of emergency authorizations for these very 
products, which have been banned in the European Union  since 2017, are still being granted to its 
own producers. And here  we echo Colombia's words , for when requesting these authoriza tions, 
European producers put forward the same arguments as Paraguay and others have done in this and 
other Committees. However, the "mirrors" required by the EU for compliance are not granted for 
exceptions.  
6.66.  Paraguay considers that the need for tools for efficient and sustainable production, capable of 
feeding the world, is an increasingly important issue, particularly under the current circumstances. 
The lack of a science -based approach damages our producers' capacity , and those of other countries, G/C/M/142  
 
- 22 - 
 
  to con tribute to the massive food security challenge before us  now, and that we will surely continue 
to face, in the coming years . 
6.67.  Paraguay  once again encourage s the European Union to reconsider its approaches and adopt 
measures that are consistent with its WTO  obligations, taking into account its responsibility as the 
main importer of agricultural products, as the EU  delegate will surely recall from their earlier 
response. It is pre cisely for this reason that the EU's  measures have a major impact on this 
Organization's Members , and we therefore urge the EU to explore all avenues for dialogue to seek 
mutually acceptable solutions for all parties involved in this trade concern. Paragua y also  recall s that 
it is still waiting for replies to its latest set of questions submitted in the March  meeting of the 
SPS Committee.  Paraguay looks forward to receiving those replies as soon as possible.  
6.68.  The delegate of Panama  indicated the following:  
6.69.  Panama wishes to echo the statements made by previous speakers. As a co-sponsor of this 
trade concern, Panama reiterates the importance it attaches to this issue. The reduction of MRLs 
without sufficient scientific evidence restri cts access to substances that are vital for agricultural 
production, particularly in countries with a tropical climate, such as Panama.  
6.70.  Panama believes that the European Union's set of policies and practices carries the risk of 
nullifying and undermining t he legitimate rights of WTO  Members that have signed the Agreement 
on Agriculture and the SPS  Agreement.  
6.71.  Panama agrees with the European Union's  goal of supporting the global transition to more 
sustainable world agri -food systems, but such a transition must be based on building solutions 
designed and implemented through dialogue mechanisms and multilateral cooperation frameworks. 
In this regard, Panama  regret s that no progress has been observed to date , and once again urge s 
the EU to listen to the legitimat e concerns of dozens of WTO  Members. Panama  believe s that a 
constructive, serious, and ongoing dialogue, in conjunction with mutually agreed technical 
assistance, will enable Members  to find solutions beneficial to all parties.  
6.72.  The delegate of India indica ted the following:  
6.73.  India thank s the proponents of the communication , and shares the concerns it raises 
regarding the European Union 's application of SPS  standards on agriculture products.  
6.74.  In implementing its SPS  measures, the European Union seems to have impose d its own 
domestic regulatory approach onto its trading partners. India observe s with concern that this is 
becoming a wider trend , as also seen under the  regulations relating to the  European Green Deal. 
India believe s that the European Union has not a ccounted for the feedback provided by the Members 
on its proposed regulations. The hazard -based approach being used by the European Union does not 
adequately balance the twin objectives of protecting human health and facilitating trade.  
6.75.  India notes that, under the previous agenda item , the Council discussed  transparency 
obligations through notifications. The objectives of transparency are discussed vocally in forums like 
the Committee on Agriculture, so much so that transparency has becom e an additional eighth  pillar 
of the Agreement , but when it comes to applying the same principles to their own trade practices, 
the votaries of transparency fail to be consistent. Transparency is not just about notifications ; it is 
also about not erecting trade-restrictive practices that seek to internationalize Members ' domestic 
regulations.  
6.76.  The delegate of Guatemala  indicated the following:  
6.77.  Guatemala wishes to thank the co-sponsors of this agenda item. Guatemala also wishes to 
express its concern about th e process of discussing this topic in the different WTO  committees and 
the lack of a genuine solution to the issues that Members  have raised. The solution indicated by the 
European Union is through import tolerance authorizations, although the conditions attached to 
these are different to those to which European producers are subject (such as emergency requests), 
both in terms of procedure and in terms of time and cost. Guatemala  mention s the cost aspect 
because it is a process that could be out of the econ omic reach of developing countries. Despite 
expressing concern  about this  in this forum, the concerns of Guatemala and others have never been G/C/M/142  
 
- 23 - 
 
  considered, particularly in the solution the European Union offers to tropical countries , such as 
Guatemala,  regar ding the use of these measures. For these reasons, Guatemala support s Colombia's 
request.  
6.78.  Using the precautionary principle without considering risk analyses, which are key tools for 
coping with climatic conditions that are different to those of the Europe an Union, puts tropical 
developing countries, like Guatemala, at a disadvantage. These non -tariff barriers will affect future 
trade with the European Union. The negative outcomes and effects on trade are expected to start to 
be felt in 2023, as each produc tive process works differently , and the region's location influences 
those processes.  
6.79.  Guatemala thank s the European Union for its space for dialogue and for searching for genuine 
alternatives together , particularly as Members face a possible global food cr isis and, therefore, a 
disruption to rural development.  
6.80.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
6.81.  The European Union takes note of the concerns expressed by WTO  Members.  
6.82.  The European Union provided detailed replies to these concerns at previous meetings  of the 
CTG. Without repeating its previous statements in full, the European Union wishes to highlight that 
its earlier statements remain unchanged and valid in their entirety.  
6.83.  The European Union is the biggest importer of agri -food products in the world. The European 
Union has developed a highly trusted, transparent , and predictable system based on its high level 
of consumer health protection, to which some other countries defer in the absence of their national 
MRLs.  
6.84.  The Europe an Union has an open market , and its high level of consumer protection has never 
been an impediment to the import of agricultural commodities, including from the Members raising 
this concern, whose large exports of agricultural products to the European Uni on during these 
five years have remained stable.  
6.85.  The European Union provides technical assistance to developing countries and LDCs, directly 
or through other international organizations, such as the FAO, to support a smooth transition towards 
new products or production systems.  
6.86.  The European Union again emphasizes its commitment to continu ing an open dialogue on its 
policies and measures. The EU stands ready to further engage and explain its policies to its trading 
partners. Finally, based on the outcome of the UN  Food Systems Summit convened in September, 
the EU  believe s that Members have a shared interest in making their food systems sustainable by 
tackling the issue of toxic active substances and protecting their citizens ' health with appropriate 
measures.  
6.87.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
7  CHINA – IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE MEASURES – 
REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA  
7.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Australia.  
7.2.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
7.3.  Australia and China have enjoyed a strong trading relationship built over decades of 
engagement. Australia has welcomed China' s growth, noting the increased prosperity and higher 
standard of living that ec onomic growth provides for the people of China and for the world at large.  
7.4.  Given this close  and mutually beneficial relationship, Australia  continue s to be concerned about 
China' s wide range of trade disruptive and restrictive measures that have been targe ting Australian 
products over the past two  years.  G/C/M/142  
 
- 24 - 
 
  7.5.  As Members will now be familiar, these measures include  the following : (i) de facto  import bans 
or quantitative restrictions;  (ii) the imposition of unjustified anti -dumping and countervailing duties;  
(iii) increased and arbitrary border testing and inspections, including delays, applied without prior 
notification;  and (iv ) unwarranted delays in listing and re -listing export establishments, and issuing 
import licences.  
7.6.  These measures have continued to limit Australia 's trade with China in a wide range of products 
over the last two  years – including barley, coal, copper ores and concentrates, cotton, logs, rock 
lobsters, and bottled wine. China 's measures have also delayed Australia 's technical market access 
for hay and meat, among other commodities. Significantly, Australia is not aware of any Member 
other than China that has found issues or imposed restrictions on these products.  
7.7.  Technical issues arise during the normal course of trade between countries. However, the 
extent and duration of the restrictions that have been imposed on Australian products destined for 
China over the last two  years, and the lack of response from China 's authorities to Australia 's 
detailed submissions, appears to take  these beyond the realm of the technical and into the political. 
Australia  remain s concerned by statements from Chinese officials that directly link China 's actions 
to unrelated issues in Australia's bilateral relationship  with China . For this reason, Australia once 
again raise s these ongoing issues.  
7.8.  Such discriminatory and unfair measures are relevant not only to Australia, but to all Members. 
In January  2022, the European Union initiated a WTO  dispute against China regarding trade 
disruptive and restrictive practices imposed on Lithuania. Similarly, Canada has alleged that 
Canadian canola seed exports to China continue to be arbitrarily and unjustifiably restricted . Canada 
has requested the establishment of a WTO  panel on this matter.  
7.9.  China 's incr easing and ongoing use of trade disruptive and restrictive measures appears to be 
a pattern of behaviour  that poses a risk to all Members and undermines global markets and the 
multilateral trading system on which all Members rely.  
7.10.  Australia continues to be  deeply concerned with China 's failure to observe due process and 
its lack of engagement on the technical merits for each measure, including in response to Australian 
statements. China 's responses to Australia 's requests for advice in this Council and othe r WTO  bodies 
have not provided satisfactory answers on how these measures are consistent with China 's 
WTO commitments. For example, most recently China said  that it was "inappropriate for Australia 
to make groundless speculation on the normal inspection an d quarantine measures taken by China 
and the business decisions made by Chinese enterprises based on the market demand ". 
7.11.  China has also reiterated its belief that "trade and investment cooperation between Members 
based on equality and mutual benefit, and i n accordance with the WTO  rules and market principles, 
is conducive to improving the well -being of people around the world. " Australia  urges China to give 
full effect to this belief by ceasing immediately all non -market practices, including instructions to  
traders, and other discriminatory trade disruptive and restrictive measures targeting Australian 
products, and by taking  steps to ensure that its trade policies are fully consistent with its 
WTO obligations.  
7.12.  Australia  stand s ready to engage with China bil aterally on these matters at any time.  
7.13.  The delegate of  the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
7.14.  The United Kingdom again wishes to show its support for Australia 's concerns about trade 
restrictive measures taken by China.  It is important that trade meas ures are applied in a 
non-discriminatory, predictable manner, and with the necessary transparency around laws in force 
and measures adopted, as required by the relevant WTO  Agreements. It is vital that China, as a 
WTO Member, adheres to the fundamental pri nciples and objectives of free and fair trade 
underpinning the rules -based multilateral trading system.  
7.15.  Actions that are deliberately targeted against goods of certain countries for political reasons 
risk undermining the integrity of, and trust in, the mul tilateral trading system, and could lead to 
direct harmful consequences for business and citizens worldwide.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  7.16.  The United Kingdom continues to closely monitor reports of trade restrictive measures and 
urges China to engage in good faith and in a timely and r esponsive manner, providing clarifications 
to the points raised by Australia.  
7.17.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
7.18.  The United States shares Australia 's concerns  and remains deeply troubled by the information 
provided by Australia,  and that it has also heard from other, credible sources.  
7.19.  The United States  again register s its systemic concern with the broad range of restrictive 
measures, both formal and informal, that China has imposed on certain Australian goods in an 
abusive, arbitrary, and pretextual manner. In  this connection, the United States is concerned by 
reports that Chinese authorities have informally instructed importers not to purchase certain goods.  
7.20.  China 's actions are not isolated to Australia. There are many instances of China using these 
harmful non -market practices against WTO  Members in apparent retaliation for unconnected 
bilateral issues, including China 's discrimination against Lithuanian goods and EU products with 
Lithuanian content.  
7.21.  China claims to uphold the "rules-based multilateral trading system ", but its actions speak for 
themselves. China continues to exploit the rules -based system to its advantage, ignoring or breaking 
rules in order to infl ict harm on others to advance its geopolitical and economic ends.  
7.22.  China 's failure to adhere to global trade norms and WTO  principles threatens and undermines 
the rules -based multilateral trading system and harms relations between its Members.  
7.23.  The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
7.24.  Canada shares the systemic concerns raised by Australia and other WTO  Members regarding 
trade disruptive and restrictive measures adopted by China.  China 's systematic use of trade 
restrictions that are inconsistent with e stablished international practices negatively impacts Canada 's 
agricultural and non -agricultural exports.  
7.25.  In relation to agriculture, China 's lack of transparency and predictability with its application 
of SPS measures continue to restrict Canada 's exports  of food, plant and animal products, which 
continue to experience significant undue delays in China's approval procedures.  
7.26.  Canada requested the establishment of a WTO  panel as a result of China continuing arbitrarily 
and unjustifiably to restrict Canadian canola seed exports to the Chinese market.  
7.27.  In addition, Canada remains concerned with the trade disruptive impact of China 's 
COVID -19 measures on food imports. The latest WHO/FAO  guidance reconfirms that neither food 
nor food packaging is a pathway for the  spread of viruses causing respiratory illnesses, including 
COVID -19. With no scientific evidence to support these measures, the continued suspension of 
Canadian meat establishments can now only be viewed as a tool to block trade.  
7.28.  At a time of rising food prices and disruptions to global supply chains that are impacting food 
security, Canada asks China to take a science -based approach to its decisions and measures.  
7.29.  In non -agricultural trade, Canada notes new significant barriers to trade related to product 
certification requirements, such as expanding the scope of review to the point where product 
certifications that used to take several months now take several years for the same product types, 
as well as for modifications of existing and previously certifie d products.  
7.30.  The use of these trade disruptive and coercive measures challenges and destabilizes the 
rules-based international trading system from which China, Canada,  and all WTO  Members have 
benefited.  Canada  encourage s all WTO  Members, including China, t o abide by their 
WTO commitments.  
7.31.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  G/C/M/142  
 
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  7.32.  The European Union shares Australia 's concerns with regard to  the matters Australia is once 
again raising in this Council  on China 's implementation of trade disruptive and restrictive measures.  
7.33.  On this occasion , the European Union wishes to raise the same points of principle and of law. 
The EU continues to be concerned by the sheer number of alleged measures and the cumulative 
product range and trade value affected. The EU is likewise concerned by the form which these 
measures alleg edly take. GATT  rules also cover  such informal measures. More importantly, informal, 
unpublished , and non -transparent trade regulations are per se  at odds with the WTO 's rules and 
spirit. WTO  Members should not adopt such measures; this is not how internat ional trade , or this 
Organization , can operate.  
7.34.  The European Union is also concerned by the alleged purpose of the measures in question. If 
the true reason for their adoption was an intention to punish, put pressure on , or coerce another 
Member because of a policy choice, which lies within the rights of that Member, then in addition to 
the trade angle, these measures are also at odds with general international law.  
7.35.  Within the European Union, growing concerns as to such practices have led to a legislative 
proposal for a so -called anti -coercion instrument. That proposal is presently being considered in the 
European Union 's legislature.  In addition , the European Union has recently initiated a WTO  dispute 
vis-à-vis China in relation to a range of measures negati vely affecting its trade with China where 
there also appears to be a coercive intention.  
7.36.  The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
7.37.  New Zealand shares a systemic interest in the concerns expressed on this topic.  
7.38.  As New Zealand has repeatedly note d in a number of for ums, the multilateral rules -based 
trading system provides that all Members, regardless of their size or trading capacity, are subject to 
the same rights and obligations.  This provides the predictability and certainty necessary to ensure  
that trade can take place efficiently and with the least possible  friction . Given the challenges all 
Members are facing as a result of the COVID -19 pandemic and other disruptions, the certainty 
provided by the multilateral trading system is more important  than ever.  
7.39.  If Members step away from their commitments, or adopt remedies or other measures 
provided for under the WTO  Agreements in an arbitrary manner and for other purposes, this will 
undermine the predictability and certainty on which the system rests . It will also reflect on 
perceptions of the Member undertaking such actions.  
7.40.  The adoption of measures by WTO  Members that cause widespread disruption to trade and 
lack transparency cause serious concern to New Zealand, including actions undertaken against  a 
range of exports from Australia and other WTO  Members.  
7.41.  New Zealand encourages Members to comply fully with their WTO  obligations, including in the 
application of trade remedies and the obligation to apply them in good faith.  
7.42.  The delegate of Chinese Taip ei indicated the following:  
7.43.  Chinese Taipei shares the systemic concern raised by Australia. China 's coercive trade actions 
attempting to hamper certain Members ' trade interests based on unconnected bilateral issues surely 
poses a systemic risk to the rule s-based multilateral trading system.  
7.44.  Chinese Taipei  notes that Australia has been expressing concerns over a range of disruptive 
measures imposed by China, formally or informally, for a long time now. Chinese Taipei also notes 
that China has imposed discrim inatory trade measures against Lithuanian goods, or any products 
with Lithuanian content, since the beginning of the year. 
7.45.  Chinese Taipei has also experienced China 's unconstructive approach concerning its 
application of unjustified SPS  requirements on the exportation of its fruits to China. This specific 
trade concern has been raised in an earlier meeting of the SPS  Committee. Chinese Taipei  therefore 
calls upon Chin a once again to engage in dialogue aimed at solving this ongoing issue, and to apply 
trade measures in a manner consistent with the principles and obligations of the WTO.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  7.46.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
7.47.  As Japan  commented at the CTG 's previo us meeting, it shares the concerns expressed by 
Australia over China 's trade measures, including trade remedy measures, which should be 
implemented within the framework of the WTO  Agreements, and also that China 's measures should 
comply with the relevant W TO Agreements in the procedures and fact -finding.  
7.48.  As Members pointed out during China's  Trade Policy Review (T PR), its government measures 
conducted in an informal or undisclosed manner are problematic in terms of China 's WTO  accession 
protocol as well as the transparency principle in the WTO. Japan  believe s that it is important that 
China ensures transparency for its relevant measures.  
7.49.  If China operates trade measures in an arbitrary manner , as reported, it  does so in  conflict 
with the international tradin g system , which is  based on free and fair rules. Japan  hopes that China 
will respond to Australia's concerns in good faith and in a timely manner.  
7.50.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
7.51.  China has repeatedly provided its explanations of these China -Australia bilateral trade 
measures , which have been  raised by Australia in previous meetings of this Council and other 
relevant committees . China wishes to refer to its statements made in previous CTG  meetings.8 
7.52.  China  also wishes to reiterate that the measures taken by Chinese authorities against some 
Australian exports to China are aimed at protecting the legitimate rights and interests of domestic 
industries and the safety of consumers . They  are consistent with Chinese laws and r egulations and 
WTO rules. China  also notified these measures to Australia and the relevant communication between 
the government authorities from both sides is open.  
7.53.  China would also like to share some latest trade figures. In 2021, China and Australia bila teral 
trade increased  rapidly , by 35.1%, reaching USD 231 billion. For the first  three  months of the 
current year, 2022, the bilateral trade continued to grow by 2.4% year -on-year. 
7.54.  Meanwhile, China  carefully listened to the interventions made by Members. China considers 
that some of the interventions have gone beyond the China -Australia bilateral trade issue and are 
inappropriately linked to other unrelated trade issues. China  urges Members to focus on this specific 
trade issue when making their statements.  
7.55.  Some Members mentioned economic coercion and non -market practices. China wishes to 
make it clear that it oppose s coercion and non -market practices. China is actually itself the victim of 
economic coercion and non -market practices. China's  high-tech companies are threatened by various 
tailor-made market access restriction measures imposed by certain Members. China's  steel and 
aluminium companies are threatened by 232  tariff measures imposed by one  Member under the  
pretext of national security. So China certainly oppose s economic coercion and non -market practices.  
Having said that, China again urges Members to focus on the specific trade issue under this item 
when making their statements.  
7.56.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
8  CHINA – COSMETICS S UPERVISION AND ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS  (CSAR) – 
REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, AND THE UNITED STATES  
8.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Australia, the European Union, Japan, and the United States.  
8.2.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
8.3.  It is unfortunate that the United States must continue to reiterate its serious concerns , and 
imperative that it finds a resolution to its concerns with China 's development of the C SAR and its 
 
8 Document  G/C/M/141, paragraph s 15.43 -15.44 . G/C/M/142  
 
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  implementing measures. Despite continued multilateral and bilateral engagement from the United 
States, US  industry, and other WTO  Members and stakeholders, significant trade concerns remain.  
8.4.  First, the United St ates has significant concerns that the only means for importers to establish 
conformity with good manufacturing practices in China involves animal testing, unless their 
respective governments do not issue G ood Manufacturing Practice (GMP)  export certificat es. 
Providing a means for companies to establish conformity with the ISO  22716 Guidelines for 
Cosmetics G MP would be a far more effective means of determining that a company follows GMPs 
than animal testing.  The US also question s China 's response to the co mments of several 
WTO Members that its GMP  requirements for imports and domestic products are equivalent.  In this 
regard, the US  reiterates its request that China consider less trade disruptive means for 
US importers to meet China's animal testing exemptio n requirements, such as second - and 
third-party certificates to the ISO  GMP cosmetics standard.  The US also again ask s that China be 
flexible and transparent with respect to which government or other GMP  certificates or production 
licences it will accept a s demonstrating conformity.  
8.5.  Second , the United States understand s that the Good Manufacturing Practices for Cosmetics 
(GMP) was published as final in January and will enter into force in July  2022. The US  again ask s 
China to confirm that , for the purposes of overseas inspections, foreign manufacturers will be 
considered to be in conformity with the Chinese GMP  standard, as provided in Article  17 of the 
Provisions for the Management of Cosmetics Registration and Notification Dossiers (a draft of which 
was no tified as document  G/TBT/N/ CHN/1524), if they are in conformity with international 
GMP standards.  
8.6.  Third, the United States remains concerned that CSAR and its implementing measures require 
overly extensive information to assess conformity and fulfil China 's regulatory objectives. The US is  
disappointed that China has not pared back these highly burdensome requirements. The US asks 
China 's National Medical Products Administration to reconsider the extent of the information 
requirements.  
8.7.  Fourth, the United St ates consider s that China has failed to address concerns that exceptions 
to the provisions protecting confidential business information (CBI) and reference to China 's 
Regulation on the Disclosure of Government Information may undermine protections for trad e 
secrets and CBI. The US  asks that China clarify whether it will develop a specific mechanism for 
companies to indicate to its National Medical Products Administration ( NMPA ) when information 
provided should be treated as trade secrets and CBI, to protect  such information from unauthorized 
disclosure. The US  request s that NMPA provide a mechanism to ensure that the treatment of CBI is 
monitored and legally enforceable within China.  
8.8.  Fifth, the United States requests that China not require duplicative testin g at laboratories that 
have Chinese Metrological Accreditation, if companies provide test results from other laboratories 
that are in conformity with China 's requirements. The US  request s that China consider accepting 
test results from laboratories certifi ed to Good Laboratory Practices or Good Clinical Practices, as 
per the International Council for Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Pharmaceuticals for 
Human Use (ICH) Guidelines.  
8.9.  Sixth, the United States continues to have  a concern over new cosme tics labelling requirements 
potentially creat ing unnecessary obstacles to trade. As explained previously, the US  request s that 
China not require companies to disclose the product manufacturer on the product label and that 
China allow for foreign packaging and labelling, so long as the foreign product safety and claims 
information does not conflict with the Chinese label.  
8.10.  Seventh , the United States is concerned, given the magnitude of some of the new 
CSAR  requirements , that China has not consistently notifie d its transition periods for the new 
CSAR  requirements so as to allow for public comment.  The US asks that China allow importers and 
manufacturers at least two to three  years to update existing registrations and to sell through existing 
inventory for produ cts already on the market.  
8.11.  The United States  request s that China delay finalization of additional measures until these 
trade concerns expressed by the US and many other WTO  Members are addressed.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  8.12.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
8.13.  The European Union  wishes to reiterate its concerns already shared in previous meetings of 
the CTG (July and November  2021) with regard to the Cosmetic Supervision and Administration 
Regulation in force since 1  May 2021, notably  the following : (i) the mandatory disclosure of 
commercially sensitive information, touching on the intellectual property rights  of companies 
involved, in the registration process. In this regard, the  EU requests China to consider the possibility 
of requir ing continuous access  to inspect the sensitive information at the companies ' files, but 
without imposing the obligation to submit it to an external database ; (ii) the amount of information 
required for the notification of new ingredients, as well as potential issues over the d isclosure of 
such information after a certain period of time. In particular, the Chinese legislation requires both 
the specification issued by the raw materials manufacturer and the ingredient composition reported 
by the cosmetic s companies in their produc t application to be exact matching figures , with  any 
mismatch between the information provided by the raw material producer and the cosmetic s 
companies mak ing the application of the latter invalid. Given that the exact composition of raw 
materials is never  completely stable but may vary/evolve over time within certain limits, it is almost 
impossible to guarantee a complete consistency between the figures. Furthermore, access to the 
database would reveal cosmetics ' formulation. The EU encourages China to acc ept a range of values 
instead of exact matching figures ; and (iii)  the need to publish a detailed summary of efficacy 
evaluation, which may damage business secrets.  
8.14.  The European Union  believes that these requirements are unnecessarily stringent to ensure 
consumer safety and traceability of the ingredients used in cosmetics, diverging from international 
practice. Such an  extensive level of information is not required elsewhere in the world for notification 
and registration purposes, and the safety of consume rs is always ensured.  
8.15.  Finally, the European Union  wishes to reiterate its comment that a differentiated approach is 
needed between new products and products already on the market , thus avoid ing a situation where 
product supply could be interrupted for an e xtended period due to insufficient preparation time for 
both industry and the supervisory  authorities.  
8.16.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
8.17.  Australia respects the right of Members to implement technical measures for legitimate policy 
purposes  and in accordance with their WTO obligations. However, Australia remains concerned that 
measures under China 's CSAR and various implementing regulations which entered into force on 
1 May 2021 are more stringent than necessary. In that context, Australia  asks that China pursue its 
objective of ensuring the safety and quality of imported cosmetics using less trade -restrictive 
measures.  
8.18.  Australia requests that China provide a transition period until at least January  2023 for 
cosmetics manufacturers to conside r the regulation 's requirements and make adjustments to their 
processes. Australia  also request s that China clarify why it has maintained its requirement for 
mandatory animal testing of cosmetics products to be used on children, regardless of the level of 
risk presented by those products. Australian exporters are concerned about stringent and inflexi ble 
measures under the CSAR  framework, particularly regarding testing and registration requirements 
and requirements to provide detailed information on production processes and other aspects of their 
intellectual property.  
8.19.  Australia  reiterate s that it is a reliable supplier of high quality and safe cosmetics products 
domestically, and to international markets. As Australia has said on previous occasions, the 
Australian Government stands ready to work with China and to discuss the CSAR and their respective 
systems for cosmetics regulation.  
8.20.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
8.21.  Japan  notes that China has conducted notifications on the C SAR and related implementing 
regulations. Since the March  2019 meeting of the TBT Committee, Japan has continued to e xpress 
its concerns on the aforementioned regulations and their  related implementing regulations.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  8.22.  Japan  wishes to point out that , in terms of the safety and efficacy evaluation of cosmetics, 
there is a problem in that China only approves the results verifi ed by domestic Chinese testing 
laboratories, whereas it does not accept internationally recognized standards and methods of 
investigation , such as  the ISO. 
8.23.  Furthermore, when a cosmetics manufacturer registers cosmetics with the  Chinese  
authorities, it is r equired to provide information about the raw material manufacturer of the 
cosmetics. However, this information is required to be updated every time the raw material 
manufacturer is changed. This practice places  a heavy burden on the cosmetics manufacturer,  
whereas the international practice is to present information about raw material manufacturers at the 
time when the products are made commercially available, rather than at the time of registration, 
when requested by the authorities.  
8.24.  Japan request s China t o ensure that the C SAR is formulated and implemented in accordance 
with Article  2.2 of the TBT  Agreement  and without deviating from the international standard.  
8.25.  The delegate of  the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
8.26.  The Republic of Korea welcomes China's continuous cooperation through bilateral channels, 
especially on its cosmetic s regulations. However, taking into consideration that the cosmetic industry 
is important to China and Korea , Korea echoes the concerns raised by other Memb ers and request s 
China to address this issue  swiftly . 
8.27.  Regard ing China's CSAR, the Republic of Korea is of the view, as it expressed at previous 
meetings of the TBT Committee, that China 's requirements are more rigorous than necessary to fulfil 
the objectiv es of ensuring product safety and compliance with China 's domestic market norms.  For 
example , under the regulation, exporters to China are required to specify the sources and quality 
data of all ingredients in their applications, which Korea  believe s is demanding more information 
than that of any other countries. In fact, s uch information may contain trade secrets that are critical 
to businesses. Similarly, Korea considers China's labelling requirements to be more excessive than 
necessary compared to intern ationally recognized practices.  
8.28.  Accordingly, the Republic of Korea request s China to provide further details and its rationale 
regarding the requirements stipulated in its regulation , while encouraging China to harmonize its 
regulation with international p ractices so as not to raise unnecessary barriers to trade.  
8.29.  The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
8.30.  New Zealand welcomes China 's endeavours to moderni ze its regulatory system for cosmetics 
and also  welcomes the opportunity to comment on specific elements of China's Cosmetic s 
Supervision and Administration Regulations.  
8.31.  While New Zealand  welcome s the intention to improve safety and quality assurance, it would 
like to encourage China to ensure that fac ilitation of trade is considered in the implementation of 
the regulations.  
8.32.  New Zealand notes that , under the measures, non -animal tested cosmetics are able to  enter 
China's market only on the basis that regulator -issued GMP  certification is provided. Non -special use 
cosmetics are considered to be low -risk products in many countries, including New Zealand, and for 
this reason are not subject to regulator -issued GMP certification.  
8.33.  While New Zealand  welcome s the introduction of alternatives to mandatory animal testing for 
imported products, like others, it is disappointed that the measures do not provide for 
non-regulator -issued GMP  certification or other trade fac ilitative mechanisms for providing product 
assurances. This appears to mean that animal testing requirements will still apply for Members that 
cannot offer regulator -issued GMP  certification for cosmetics imported into China. As such , it will act 
as a sign ificant and unnecessary barrier to trade for imported cosmetics products, particularly where 
products are certified to be manufactured in full compliance with the relevant ISO  22716  standard 
by a reputable non -government body.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  8.34.  New Zealand wishes to better understand what consideration China has accorded to less trade 
restrictive alternatives. New Zealand encourage s China to engage directly with it and other affected 
Members to identify a trade -facilitative mechanism to demonstrate GMP  conformity without imp osing 
animal -testing requirements.  
8.35.  New Zealand further requests that China also provide flexibility in respect of product testing 
requirements. In particular, New Zealand  encourage s China to accept test reports from accredited 
laboratories situated outside  of China. If test reports from internationally accredited bodies outside 
of China are not accepted, then this will create burdensome and unnecessary trade barriers for 
exporters that send products to China as well as multiple other markets. Building in fl exibility to 
accept test reports from accredited laboratories outside of China would be trade facilitative and in 
accordance with international best practice.  
8.36.  New Zealand also holds concerns, that it notes are shared by a number of Members, around 
the issu e of China requiring more detailed disclosure of product formulas than is required in other 
markets, including specific sources of each ingredient.  In this regard, New Zealand encourages China 
to limit disclosure requirements to that which is required to a ssure product safety in China 's domestic 
market , particularly that of sensitive information  so as not to compromise intellectual property.  
8.37.  New Zealand looks forward to engaging further with China on its CSAR  measures and 
welcomes China' s response to the co ncerns raised by New Zealand and other Members . 
8.38.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
8.39.  China provided long and detailed explanations of this issue at the TBT Committee 's meeting 
of March  2022. China refers to its statement made at that meeting , and for the sake of time, wishes 
on this occasion to briefly highlight only the following few points : (i) regarding the protection of 
business secrets , China reiterate s that its national Medical Production Administration will strictly 
protect ente rprises ' business secrets according to Chinese laws and regulations when conducting 
registration and filing works ; (ii) regarding cosmetic s labelling, the Measures for the Administration 
of Cosmetics Labels does not require all contents of Chinese labels t o be consistent with those of the 
original packaging labels . The requirement is that the contents of product safety and efficacy claims 
should be consistent with those of the original labels . As for trace ingredients, cosmetic enterprises 
could declare those raw materials with very low amounts, but having certain effects, on the label as 
long as the label fulfils the relevant requirements for efficacy claims.  As for the information of product 
manufacturer and its location, the relevant information need s to be marked on the label and cannot 
cause consumer confusion according to the Measures for the Administration of Cosmetics Labels ; 
(iii) regarding the Chinese cosmetics inspection method, China highlights that it does not require 
toxicological safety assessm ent to be carried out only through animal tests. Alternative methods are 
also allowed ; (iv) regarding the cosmetics inspection institution, cosmetics used for whitening, sun 
protection , and hair loss prevention , are administered  as special cosmetics. The e fficacy evaluation 
test report of such products should be submitted at the time of product registration. Therefore, 
efficacy evaluation tests should be completed in cosmetics registration and filing inspection 
institution s. The institutions should be quali fied for cosmetics inspection and testing (CMA). 
However, China does not prohibit foreign inspection institutions from becoming cosmetic registration 
and filing inspection institutions. At present, many laboratories of foreign inspection institutions 
located in China have obtained COSMETIC  CMA and undertaken cosmetic registration and filing 
inspections ; (v) regarding the toxicology test, in line with the principle of non -discrimination, the 
toxicology test for both domestic and imported ordinary cosmetics c ould be exempted by conducting 
the proper safety risk assessment after obtaining the relevant production quality management 
certification issued by relevant government authorities.  
8.40.  As concerns children's cosmetics, due to insufficient data on safety assess ment, China  
believe s that children's cosmetics should be evaluated for product safety through both safety 
assessment and necessary toxicological tests.  
8.41.  On quality management, the basic principles and requirements in  the "Good Practice for The 
Production Quality Management of Cosmetics" are consistent with those  in ISO  22716. Furthermore, 
they are  aligned with international prevailing requirements aiming to standardize the production 
quality management of cosmetics in China and to ensure the safety  of cosmet ics. G/C/M/142  
 
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  8.42.  China  will continue to engage with interested M embers on this issue.  
8.43.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
9  INDIA – RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN PULSES – REQUEST FROM 
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE UNITED STATES  
9.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Australia, Canada, the European Union, a nd the United States . 
9.2.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
9.3.  Australia 's concerns with India 's restrictive measures on pulses imports are well  known, 
particularly India 's quantitative restrictions (QRs). While Australia has previously welcomed India's 
various temporary suspension s of the renewed QRs for mung beans (Moong), pigeon peas (Tur) , 
and black gram (Urad), this does not address Australia 's underlying concerns and its continued 
request that the QRs be permanently removed.  
9.4.  Australia has pr eviously said in this Council and other relevant WTO  bodies that it believe s that 
India is using these WTO -inconsistent measures as an ongoing means to flexibly manage imports in 
response to changing domestic circumstances. Australia  understand s that the temporary suspension 
of the QRs and the imposition of domestic stock limits for some pulses was intended to address 
concerns about inflation in pulse prices. Australia also notes that , at the same time , India continued 
to increase the minimum support p rices for a range of pulses. This reinforces Australia's concerns 
about how India is using the QRs.  
9.5.  Pulses are not an insignificant commodity for India, neither by tonnage nor by the value of 
production and consumption, nor with respect to trade. Therefore , India 's measures matter in the 
global pulses market. India 's current suite of measures on pulses, including significant levels of 
market price support, high tariffs , and QRs, continue to negatively impact the stability and 
predictability of the global pu lses market, to the detriment of all producers and consumers, including 
those in India.  
9.6.  Australia and other co -sponsors of this agenda item have submitted numerous formal questions 
to India in various WTO  forums, including in this Council. It is important that India provide detailed 
answers to explain the market and other conditions behind its decisions, including the temporary 
suspension, and to explain how its measures are WTO -consistent. While the WTO  Agreements 
contain exceptions, Australia  reiterate s that the onus is on the Member implementing the measure 
to explain how such exceptions may apply.  
9.7.  Australia  welcome s India's recent decision to allow free import of urad and tur. However, 
Australia is disappointed that the period only extends until 31  March  2023 and does not include 
yellow peas or mung beans. Therefore, Australia  asks India to clearly explain the status of all its 
quantitative restrictions remaining on pulses, in particular the status of the QR on yellow peas and 
mung beans for the fiscal ye ar 2022 -2023.  
9.8.  India needs to provide certainty and stability to exporters, traders , and the global pulses 
market, which will not be achieved by continuing to implement potential "temporary suspensions " 
to what were claimed to be "temporary measures " that h ave now been in place since August  2017. 
Australia  request s that India respond to its questions and permanently remove the QRs.  
9.9.  The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
9.10.  As previously noted in this Council and in other committees, Canada continues to  be 
concerned with India 's trade restrictive measures , including quantitative restrictions , minimum 
import prices, restricting imports to one  seaport , and uncertainty introduced by frequent changes to 
tariffs on imports of pulses, in particular for dried peas.  
9.11.  Canada continues to question India 's justifications for these trade restrictive measures and 
calls upon India to immediately implement alternativ e and trade facilitative measures for the import 
of pulses.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  9.12.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
9.13.  The European Union  fully supports the interventions from Australia and Canada.  As mentioned 
before, the European Union  remains concerned with India 's import restrictions for certain pulses and 
urges India to provide certainty and stability when it comes to its import regime  for pulses.  
9.14.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
9.15.  The United States shares the concerns of other Members regarding India 's quantitative 
restrictions for select varieties of pulses.  
9.16.  Similar to its recent statements in the Committee on Import Licensing, the Committee on 
Agriculture, and the Committee on Market Access , the United States  repeat s its previous requests 
for information on how the measures reflect India 's WTO  commitments, and when and how the 
measures will be ended.  
9.17.  Taking not e that earlier this year India reinstated restrictions on certain pulses, the United 
States  continue s to urge India to consider less trade restrictive requirements and to notify future 
relevant measures and regulations in a timely manner.  
9.18.  The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
9.19.  Argentina wishes to associate itself with this concern. This measure affects two of the main 
pulses exported from Argentina to India: yellow peas and mung beans . The latest measures in that 
regard posed an issue for shipme nts that were already on the way to India when that country 
re-notified the restriction on access to these products. As has already been mentioned, Argentina  
does not know whether these are temporary measures or whether they will continue to be applied 
over time. Argentina, like those Members that  have taken the floor before it, reiterates its concern 
over the uncertainty that this measure creates for its exporters.  
9.20.  The delegate of India indicated the following:  
9.21.  India thank s the delegations of Australia, Canada, the European Union, the United States,  
and Argentina for their continued interest in this issue. As addressed in the previous meetings of the 
Committee on Market Access , as well as at the CTG, the measures adopted by India remain 
temporary and are undertaken for the purpose of maintaining food and nutritional security. This is 
an area of great importance to India's  economy and the policies on imports are regularly reviewed 
and updated.  
9.22.  India's  Notification No. 63/2015 -2020 made by the Directorate General of Foreign Trade on 
29 March  2022 on the free import policy of urad (HS code 07133110 ) and tur or pigeon peas 
(HS code 07136000 ) has been extended until 31 March  2023. On the changes to the import of 
moong, the measure has already been notified to the Committee on Import Licensing under 
Article  5.1-5.4 notifications.  
9.23.  India's notification on QRs, document  G/LIC/N/3/IND/21 , made against the Section  7.3 
notification requirement and circulated on 20  January  2022, clearly cal ls out  and gives the 
background to  these measures with full transparency.  
9.24.  Furthermore, India 's notifications in document s G/LIC/N/2/IND/19 and G/LIC/N/2/IND/20 , 
made under Section  5.1-5.4 of the WTO  Agreement on Import Licensing , clearly demonstrate  its 
transparent communication on this issue. These notifications also show that the process of review 
of import restrictions is agile, dynamic , and continuous.  And India continue s to review the measures  
in question . 
9.25.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  10  PLURINATIONAL STATE OF BOLIVIA – EXPORT RESTRICTIONS ON AGRICULTURAL 
AND HYDROBIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM PERU  
10.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Peru. 
10.2.  The delegate of Peru indicated the following:  
10.3.  Peru would like to express before WTO  Members its trade concern regarding various restrictive 
measures that the Government of the Plurinational State of Bolivia has applied on Peruvian 
agricultural exports. These measures have established blockades on the entry into the Bolivian 
market of the main products originating in Peru, such as potatoes and onions, as well as the 
exportation of whole trout.  In this connection, it should be mentioned that Bolivia has implemented 
the measur es indicated below that are in contravention of the provisions of Article  XI of the 
GATT  1994. 
10.4.  The Bolivian government authorities, together with the private sector, have made short -, 
medium - and long -term commitments, inter alia , to control and restrict a ccess to the Bolivian market 
for agricultural products by increasing tariffs and imposing non -tariff restrictive measures such as 
the operation of quotas . 
10.5.  The Bolivian health authorities have indicated that their regulations only allow for the 
marketing of  eviscerated animals and that other types of products could not be accepted under its 
regulatory framework, despite the fact that five  years earlier the same authorities approved a health 
certificate for the exportation of whole Peruvian trout and that the re is no technical justification for 
the ban. 
10.6.  In addition, Bolivia has applied measures that are in contravention of the provisions of the 
SPS Agreement, such as: failure to grant any phytosanitary permits for the importation of Peruvian 
agricultural produ cts such as potatoes and onions; failure to conduct phytosanitary inspections on 
perishable agricultural products originating in Peru; refusal of the importation of potato 
consignments without any evidence of a technical justification for imposing a ban as  an emergency 
measure; and failure to notify the SPS  Committee of the draft regulations that may affect trade.  
10.7.  These actions would also be in breach of the bilateral agreements between Peru and Bolivia, 
which include addressing any type of issue relating t o bilateral trade in agricultural products and 
ensuring the issuance of phytosanitary permits and the conducting of phytosanitary inspections at 
the border.  
10.8.  In view of the above, and as mentioned in the SPS  Committee, Bolivia's actions would 
contravene the  provisions of the GATT, the SPS  Agreement, and the bilateral agreements between 
both Parties. Peru therefore request s Bolivia to rescind any de jure  or de facto  restrictions in place 
on Peruvian exports of perishable goods and whole trout.  
10.9.  The delegate of  the Plurinational State of Bolivia  indicated the following:  
10.10.   The delegation of the Plurinational State of Bolivia takes note of Peru's  comments. While this 
issue is being addressed at the regional level within the Andean Community (CAN) , and was also 
discussed less than a month before in the SPS  Committee, Bolivia consider s it important to reiterate 
its position and to place on record and bring to the attention of Members the relevant information 
concerning Peru's claims.  
10.11.   The alleged effects mentioned by Bolivia's  neighbouring country in relation to ( de facto ) 
blockades over the past three  years have been extensively addressed bilaterally in various formats , 
ranging from technical meetings with the health authorities of both countries to high -level meetings 
between deputy ministers  and Ministers , including commitments made within the framework of the 
Binational Cabinet meeting held at the end of 2021. The agreements reached at those meetings 
address ed the technical difficulties and key aspects that were ident ified in both countries , and which, 
in a spirit of transparency and good faith, were notified to the Peruvian health authority. The 
agreements reached to date are in the process of being implemented by both parties.  G/C/M/142  
 
- 35 - 
 
  10.12.   Peru has triggered the dispute settlemen t mechanism at regional level, which draws even 
greater attention to the fact that the issue continues to be addressed systematically , in all forums , 
without allowing for a reasonable period of time being given for Peru and Bolivia to fulfil the 
commitment s agreed on bilaterally or, where appropriate, to comply with the ruling of the 
Secretary -General  of the Andean Community . 
10.13.   Within this context, Bolivia  wishes to reiterate that it has not applied any restrictive 
measures on the entry of perishable agricult ural products of Peruvian origin, and that, in any case, 
this is demonstrated by the fact that phytosanitary import permits (PFIs) are issued on a regular 
basis, as shown in the Gran Paitití system. It is not true that they are issued "barely ever or on a 
discretionary basis" , or indeed not issued at all, as stated by the Peruvian delegate, since according 
to the system's records, in 2021 alone, 814  PFIs were issued . The issuance rate has obviously 
fluctuated on account of external factors such as COVID -19, the seasonal nature of agricultural 
production , and market behaviour (which affects the will of importing users), aspects that are clearly 
not at all within the remit of Bolivian institutions.  
10.14.   Furthermore, it is vital to make clear that the memorandum of understanding of 
21 July 2021, as referred to by Peru in document  G/SPS/GEN/2009, is directly linked to the  
commitment to fight smuggling head -on as part of a state policy that affects domestic production 
just as much as imports. This policy has not, however, generated restrictions on imports of 
perishable products of Peruvian origin, as there is no legal provision establishing any form of 
restrictive measure that regulates, controls , or increase s import tariffs, especially when imports 
coming from and originating in Peru are exempt from the payment of tariffs provided that they 
comply with rules of origin in accordance with Decision No.  415 of 30  July 1997.  
10.15.   Lastly, so as not to tire the Membershi p by reiterating aspects that are being addressed in 
other forums, Bolivia  consider s it prudent to elaborate on the information concerning inspections, 
alleged QRs, and other allegations made by Peru in those forums, making it clear that Bolivia 
respects i nternational law and is therefore in full compliance with international trade agreements. 
This is even more important when tireless bilateral efforts have been made to resolve the difficulties 
facing both countries with a view to ensuring that they do not lead to trade restrictions, as is 
maintained in the aforementioned claims, which lack objectivity and are based on isolated cases that 
in no way reflect the full picture of the trading relationship between Bolivia and Peru.  
10.16.   The Council took note  of the sta tements made.  
11  ECUADOR – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON GRAPES AND ONIONS – REQUEST FROM PERU  
11.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Peru. 
11.2.  The delegate of Peru indicated the following:  
11.3.  Peru raises this trade concer n with respect to the restrictive measures applied by Ecuador on 
the reopening of access for grapes and onions from Peru.  
11.4.  Despite the fact that the SPS  Agreement provides that approval procedures must be 
undertaken without undue delay, Ecuador has provided  replies that appear to stall access for 
Peruvian grapes to the market concerned beyond what is necessary, as in the following examples: 
Ecuador submitted an unscheduled request for an inspection visit, and the inspection report was 
sent to Peru after seve n months; Ecuador unilaterally changed the action plan proposed by Peru to 
access the market for grapes; it was proposed, without any technical justification and disregarding 
the fact that, historically, trade is conducted by land and that grapes should en ter by ship only via 
the Guayaquil seaport; the use of refrigerated transport for grape consignments was proposed, 
despite this bearing no relation to the risk of the presence of pesticides; in addition, in the case of 
onions, despite the fact that the ban  on Peruvian imports has been deemed to be a trade -restrictive 
measure within the subregion, according to Resolution No.  2253 of the Andean Community, Ecuador 
has requested a  new risk analysis to provide access to its market.  G/C/M/142  
 
- 36 - 
 
  11.5.  It should be noted that the Ec uadorian regulations imposing restrictions on Peruvian exports 
of grapes and onions were not notified to the SPS  Committee, despite the fact that this measure 
establishes additional requirements that have an impact on the trade of other Members.  
11.6.  Considerin g that the measures applied by Ecuador contravene the provisions of the 
SPS Agreement, Peru requests Ecuador: (i)  to avoid proposing measures that violate the provisions 
of the SPS  Agreement and the basic principles of the WTO; (ii)  to ensure that it does not disregard 
the technical agreements previously established; (iii)  to notify its measure and give other 
WTO Members the opportunity to submit comments; and (iv)  to provide access for imports of 
Peruvian grapes and onions.  
11.7.  The delegate of Ecuador  indicate d the following:  
11.8.  Ecuador wishes to highlight that the restrictions have been lifted as provided by the Court of 
Justice of the Andean Community , notwithstanding that both Members have requested a revision of 
the decision.  Accordingly, in line with regional  regulations, Ecuador awaits the dossiers concerning 
onions and grapes in order to be able to proceed with the evaluation that will allow the entry of 
these products into its market.  
11.9.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
12  PANAMA – UNDUE DELAYS AND E XPORT RESTRICTIONS ON AGRICULTURAL AND 
HYDROBIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM PERU  
12.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Peru. 
12.2.  The delegate of Peru indicated the following:  
12.3.  Peru wishes to raise this trade concern regarding Panama's undue delays in renewing 
authorizations or the approval of new authorizations for processing plants of Peruvian fish and 
livestock enterprises, and regarding its re -establishment of trade in Peruvi an onions and potatoes.  
12.4.  Peru wishes to highlight that, despite bilateral meetings and efforts undertaken, as well as 
the trade concerns raised in the SPS  Committee, Panama has failed to renew authorizations or 
include new enterprises authorized to export t o the market concerned; there is also uncertainty as 
to the length of time that would be granted to Peruvian enterprises should renewal or a new 
authorization be secured. This situation is in violation of the provisions of the SPS  Agreement and is 
also dis criminatory in terms of the authorization periods that may be granted to the enterprises of 
other trading partners.  
12.5.  In the case of potatoes and onions, Panama has also implemented measures that contravene 
the provisions of the SPS  Agreement, given that the  measures in question have not been supported 
by proper scientific evidence, international phytosanitary reference standards have not been taken 
into consideration, less trade -restrictive measures have not been taken into account, there are still 
undue del ays, and compliance with transparency provisions has been lacking.  
12.6.  Regrettably, Panama has still not provided any sanitary or phytosanitary reasons regarding 
authorizations for Peruvian enterprises or market access for potatoes and onions, despite the fact  
that these types of measures are to be applied only when necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health, and only when based on a risk assessment.  
12.7.  In view of the above, and to avoid a violation of the provisions of the SPS  Agreement, Peru 
requests Panama to authorize Peruvian enterprises to export to the market in question and to 
provide access to Peruvian potatoes and onions, as well as to avoid any other action that may 
unnecessarily prolong both processes, generating unnecessary and unjustif ied barriers to trade.  
12.8.  The delegate of Panama  indicated the following:  
12.9.  Panama thanks Peru for its comments and takes note of its concerns. Panama is closely 
coordinating with the relevant institutions in capital in order to provide a timely response to Per u's G/C/M/142  
 
- 37 - 
 
  questions. In this regard, Panama reiterates its commitment to working with the delegation of Peru 
to find mutually agreeable solutions.  
12.10.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
13  EUROPEAN UNION – QUALITY SCHEMES FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND 
FOODST UFFS – THE REGISTRATION OF CERTAIN TERMS OF CHEESE AS GEOGRAPHICAL 
INDICATIONS – REQUEST FROM NEW ZEALAND AND URUGUAY  
13.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
New Zealand and  Uruguay.  
13.2.  The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
13.3.  Uruguay regrets having to place this item on the agenda once again and wishes to refer to its 
previous statements9, while reaffirming its concern at the European Union's decision to register the 
term Danbo as a protected geographical indication (PGI), despite objections by several Members.  
13.4.  As Uruguay has long noted, Danbo refers to a cheese manufacturing technique, which does 
not correspond to any known geographical location. This manufacturing technique is covered by 
Codex Alimentarius Standard  264, which lays down the characteristics, form of production, and 
labelling of this type of cheese. This standard has been amended several times, most recently in 
2007, with the approval and participation of the Europ ean Union and its member States. However, 
the European Union subsequently decided to include Danbo cheese as a PGI. It was also included in 
its free trade agreements, thereby indirectly excluding from third  markets non -Danish producers of 
this type of chee se, which, in Uruguay's view, constitutes a limitation on trade. Uruguay therefore 
considers that the registration by the EU of the term Danbo as a PGI is not only contradictory, but 
also amounts to a de facto  monopoly on a Codex standard, which creates le gal uncertainty.  
13.5.  For these reasons, despite the time that has elapsed, Uruguay will continue to maintain this 
trade concern.  
13.6.  The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
13.7.  New Zealand  support s Uruguay's statement. New Zealand is raising this item at the Goods 
Council because it sees a conflict in positions the European Union has taken in standard -setting 
bodies and the actions that they have taken ex post facto  to restrict the labelling within the EU of 
products produced using those standards by pr oducers outside of Denmark. This issue does not 
relate solely to the grounds for granting or denying IP  protection, but also to the importance of legal 
consistency, upholding internationally agreed standards, and not frustrating legitimate expectations 
of businesses operating within those standards.  
13.8.  New Zealand remains concerned that the European Commission has chosen to register the 
terms "Danbo" and "Havarti", despite having previously agreed to a Codex standard in which the 
European Commission and Denmar k both acknowledged that "the country -of-origin statement 
preserves its generic nature".  
13.9.  Such actions will negatively affect producers outside Denmark that have invested with the 
legitimate expectation that the standard could be used. Furthermore, the Euro pean Union's approach 
to registering cheese names for which there are existing CODEX  standards shows disregard for the 
integrity of the standards -setting system that promotes reliability and consistency in international 
trade rules, which New Zealand would  expect the EU to support.  
13.10.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
13.11.   The European Union has consistently said that the fact that a geographical indication name 
is subject to a specific Codex Alimentarius standard, or that it is listed in Annex  B to the Stresa 
Convention, does not imply that the name should be considered as a common or generic term.  
 
9 Document  G/C/M/141, paragraphs  12.2-12.5.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  13.12.   Generic status in the European Union can only be assessed with regard to the perception of 
the consumers on the EU  territory. In the EU, the re levant public is comprised mainly of the 
reasonably well -informed members of the public and/or customers who may purchase the product 
or a like product.  
13.13.   Regulation (EU) No.  1151/2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs, 
as well as s ubsequent delegated and implementing acts, were notified to the WTO under the 
TBT Agreement as they contain provisions relevant to the TBT, such as provisions relating to 
technical standards, definitions, and labelling issues. Nevertheless, even if intelle ctual property 
rights (in particular, elements relating to the substantive protection of geographical indications) are 
part of the notified measures, these are not relevant for TBT  purposes.  
13.14.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
14  EUROPEAN UNION – PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF TRQ  COMMITMENTS: SYSTEMIC 
CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM CHINA AND URUGUAY  
14.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
China and Uruguay.  
14.2.  The delegate of China , addressing Agenda Items 14 and 15 , indicated the following:  
14.3.  China -EU and China -UK negotiations on this TRQ  issue are still ongoing. China wishes to 
reiterate that the outcomes of the negoti ations should reflect the reality of China -EU and 
China -UK bilateral trade , and not diminish the commercial value of China' s existing market access 
in the European Union  and the United Kingdom. Accordingly, China will continue to negotiate with 
the EU and UK and hopes to reach mutually  satisfactory outcomes to these negotiations at the 
earliest possible date. 
14.4.  The delegate of Uruguay , addressing Agenda Items 14 and 15,  indicated  the following:  
14.5.  Uruguay wishes once again to reaffirm its position and trade and systemic concerns on the 
issue of modifications of concessions in the form of European Union tariff rate quotas under 
Article  XXVIII of the GATT  1994.  
14.6.  In Uruguay's view, there was no need for the European Union to modify, as a consequence of 
an internal matter such as Brexit, the concessions set out in its WTO  schedule, as applie d to 
third parties. However, despite the complaints lodged by many trading partners, which saw how 
their conditions of access would be undermined as a result of the apportionment, the EU decided to 
go ahead with the project.  
14.7.  Without prejudice to existing f undamental differences, Uruguay was a committed and 
constructive participant in the process under Article  XXVIII from the outset, taking into account the 
relevance and sensitivity of market access conditions and concessions bound at the WTO by 
important tr ading partners, such as the European Union, with respect to key products for a small 
developing country such as Uruguay, whose economy is largely dependent on its agricultural exports.  
14.8.  As a sign of flexibility and in a spirit of compromise, Uruguay adjuste d its claims downwards, 
with a view to achieving the balance needed to ensure moderate but tangible results, taking into 
account the context and scope of this process. However, even these more modest requests were 
met with nothing more than a further refus al from the European Union.  
14.9.  Unfortunately, refusals from the European Union in this kind of process are not new to 
Uruguay. In fact, Uruguay has systematically reserved its rights in open -ended negotiations 
throughout the successive enlargements of the EU in the past. This is why Uruguay wishes once 
again to reiterate its profound disappointment and dissatisfaction with this current situation, while 
reaffirming its willingness to find a mutually agreed solution, insofar as the European Union 
recognizes Urug uay's specific conditions and needs, and demonstrates the necessary political will to 
reach an agreement.  
14.10.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  G/C/M/142  
 
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  14.11.   India continues to discuss the issue of TRQ commitments with the European Union. India 
share s some of t he concerns raised by previous speakers and continue s to work bilaterally with the 
EU towards resolving these issues.  
14.12.   The delegate of Brazil , addressing Agenda Items 14 and 15,  indicated the following:  
14.13.   Brazil wishes once again to express its systemic concerns with the modification of the 
WTO commitments of the United Kingdom and the European Union due to Brexit. The recent 
circulation of a DS:1  notification by the United Kingdom, indicating that, despite not having its 
schedule certified, it w ould have a  Final Bound Total Aggregate Measure ment of Support ( FBTAMS) , 
reinforces Brazil's  concerns. As Brazil pointed out at a previous CTG  meeting, the conversion 
commitments taken in euro, when the UK was part of the EU, to commitments in pounds sterling , 
with the choice of the period 2015 -2019 instead of 1986 -1988, will yield additional rights to grant 
distortive and environmentally harmful domestic support of nearly GBP 1 billion.  Even worse, at this 
moment, there is a sui generis  situation in w hich, according to the rights claimed by the United 
Kingdom and the EU -27, their most recent DS:1  notification indicates that the sum of their 
FBTAMS  entitlements would be greater than the FBTAMS  entitlements of the EU -28. The exchange 
rate arbitrarily cho sen by the United Kingdom also has the potential to distort the tariff rates it seeks 
to consolidate. Finally, yet importantly, Brazil is also concerned about the non -compliance to 
agreements reached in previous negotiations under Article  XXVIII, in partic ular with regard to tariffs 
applied to one of Brazil's country -specific quotas and the discontinuity in application of certificates 
of origin that had been required for bilateral trade before Brexit.  
14.14.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the followi ng: 
14.15.   The European Union is pleased to report good progress achieved so far with agreements 
formally signed with six  partners, initialled with another three  partners, and negotiations 
progressing well with several other partners.  
14.16.   The European Union welcomes the increased engagement of many WTO  Members and 
remains fully committed to continuing these negotiations and consultations and to bringing them to 
a successful close in the coming months.  
14.17.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
15  UNITED KINGDOM – DRAF T GOODS SCHEDULE AND PROPOSED 
UK TRQ COMMITMENTS: SYSTEMIC CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM CHINA AND URUGUAY  
15.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
China and Uruguay. He also recalled that China had already addres sed this item10, and that Uruguay 
had partially addressed this item11, in their respective interventions under Agenda Item  14. Finally, 
he noted that Brazil's intervention under Agenda Item  14 had also covered this agenda item.12 
15.2.  The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
15.3.  In addition to the various elements raised under the previous item, which are fully applicable 
also to Agenda Item  15, Uruguay wishes once again to reaffirm the following points: (i)  the claim of 
the United Kingdom to have a bound to tal Aggregate Measurement of Support ( AMS) warrants  
analysis and discussion on the part of the Members, and is especially problematic since, more than 
a year after the completion of said Member's exit from the European Union, it has still not lowered 
its bound AMS  levels. In this regard, even though Uruguay recognizes the submission of the 
first DS:1 notification by the United Kingdom within the established deadlines, it notes with concern 
the inclusion of an alleged AMS  entitlement of GBP  4,949.3  million, for which there is no clear or 
convincing justification; (ii)  in connection with  the above, Uruguay recalls that the proposal to 
introduce a currency conversion into the draft schedule of concessions based on the average daily 
exchange rate in the 2015 -2019 period also raises concerns; (iii)  furthermore, it does not seem 
appropriate for the United Kingdom to attempt to replicate the rights to invoke the special 
 
10 Paragraphs  14.2-14.3.  
11 Paragraphs  14.4-14.9.  
12 Paragraphs  14.12 -14.13.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  agricultural safeguard, under Article  5 of the Agreement on Agriculture, for all products and und er 
the same criteria and conditions as set out in the European Union's Schedule.  
15.4.  In this context, Uruguay remains willing to enter into substantive bilateral negotiations, on 
the basis of any meaningful proposals, to arrive at a mutually advantageous agree ment.  
15.5.  The delegate of India indicated the following:  
15.6.  India continues to discuss the issue of the United Kingdom's modified Goods Schedule 
post-Brexit bilaterally. These discussions have focused on three  areas , namely  tariff rate quotas, the 
UK's automatic assumption of special safeguards from the EU -28 Schedule , and the UK's 
determination of its Aggregate Measure ment of Support.  
15.7.  India believes that the use of a near -term exchange rate has led to the United Kingdom 
assuming an additional Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) of almost GBP  1 billion under the  
Agreement on Agriculture. While India appreciates that, for visibility on tariffs, the United Kingdom 
used exchange rates that were current, the same logic cannot be applied to the calculation of the 
AMS. 
15.8.  The AMS was determined for all Members at the time of the WTO coming into force. When 
India and other Members explain their position on the changing nature of economic circumstances 
and relevant factors like inflat ion, there is no appreciation of these issues in the Committee on 
Agriculture. However, the United Kingdom's attempt to recalculate the AMS for itself is actually 
taking a benefit from the near -term exchange rate.  
15.9.  The common response to the demand of India  and other Members  for considering inflation is 
that the decisions taken at the inception of this Organization were cast in stone. However, when it 
comes to deriving a new goods schedule, the United Kingdom has conveniently used near -term 
exchange rates fo r its AMS determination.  
15.10.   India believes that these concerns are also shared by other Members and continues to work 
with the United Kingdom with the expectation of resolving these issues constructively.  
15.11.   The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the follo wing:  
15.12.   The United Kingdom thanks Members for their interest in this item. As the United Kingdom 
has set out at a number of previous meetings, it remains strongly committed to resolving all 
discussions on its Goods Schedule – including through the process un der Article  XXVIII.  
15.13.   Members will be aware that, at the CTG  meeting of November  2021, and in the 
communication dated 21  October  2021, the United Kingdom extended the timelines under 
Article  XXVIII:3 of the GATT by six  months, until 1  July 2022. The United K ingdom has continued to 
have productive discussions with relevant Members towards resolving their concerns since then, and 
its aim remains to work closely with Members and successfully conclude these discussions in the 
coming months.  
15.14.   For more information o n AMS, special safeguards, and currency conversion, the United 
Kingdom refers Members to its earlier statements , as reflected in the minutes of this Council, and 
at the Committee on Market Access, which sets out the UK's position on these issues as it sti ll stands.  
15.15.   The United Kingdom thanks those Members that have engaged constructively on all matters 
relating to its Goods Schedule so far, including for the recent in -person engagement in March. The 
UK continues to welcome constructive bilateral dialogue to wards resolving the concerns voiced by 
Members today.  
15.16.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  16  INDONESIA – IMPORT AND EXPORT RESTRICTING POLICIES AND PRACTICES – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, AND THE UNITED STATES  
16.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States.  
16.2.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
16.3.  The European Union regrets that once again the CTG needs to address Indonesia's import and 
export restricting policies and practices. This long -standing agenda item is an issue of deep concern 
to the European Union given that no real progress towards resolving it has yet been registered. 
Rather, th e number and scope of Indonesia's restrictions seem to have further expanded over time, 
with corresponding negative impacts on trade flows.  
16.4.  In particular, the European Union reiterates its serious preoccupation with Indonesia's 
burdensome and lengthy SPS  import authorization procedures, its complex rules on halal labelling 
and certification, its mandatory use of , and limited possibilities for audits on domestic SNI  standards, 
its wider use of local content requirements  (LCRs) , and its restrictive import lic ensing requirements  
for an increasingly broad range of goods (foodstuff s, textiles, footwear and electronics, tyres and 
auto parts , to name just a few) that de facto  hinder access to the Indonesian market for a variety 
of EU  products and hamper bilateral t rade and investment relations.  
16.5.  Accordingly, the European Union urges Indonesia to reduce its high number of trade barriers, 
which have been affecting EU  trade flows for too long, and to refrain from creating any new barriers. 
In addition, the European Unio n reiterates its call for Indonesia to ensure that all its relevant 
measures are notified to the WTO in order to allow Members an opportunity to provide their 
comments on them.  
16.6.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
16.7.  In past meetings of the CTG and the TRIMs  Committee, Japan has continuously expressed its 
concerns about the WTO -consistency of various Indonesian Local Content Requirement 
(LCR)  measures relating to 4G  LTE equipment, TV  equipment, and the retail industry. In this regard, 
it is regrettab le that Indonesia has declared that it has no plans to review its LCR  measures in the 
near future. Indonesia has repeatedly explained that its LCR  measures relate in general to the 
following three  points: (i)  government procurement; (ii)  policies that invo lve the need to maintain 
the welfare and basic life necessities of the Indonesian people; and (iii)  policies that involve 
state-managed strategic resources. However, not all LCR  measures fall under these reasons or are 
justified by them.  
16.8.  Japan is also conc erned about the increase in import restricting measures for the import 
registration and approval system for textile products and air conditioners, including their consistency 
with Article  XI:1 of the GATT. Japan appreciates that there is an improvement in the level of 
permitted quantities. However, Japan hopes that the criteria will be clear, and that operational 
transparency will be improved.  
16.9.  Moreover, Japan continues to express its concerns with regard to Indonesia's import licensing 
system for steel prod ucts, which has been implemented in accordance with the Minister of Trade 
Regulation No.  20 of 2021. After the introduction of the measure, the number of approved licence 
applications reduced significantly compared to the actual number of applications subm itted, 
regardless of the type of licence.  
16.10.   As a measure that has a trade -restricting effect on imports, this may not be consistent with 
Article  3.2 of the Import Licensing Agreement and Article  XI:1 of the GATT. The volume of 
applications should not be sign ificantly reduced, and the reasons and criteria for the reduction in 
applications should be clarified.  
16.11.   Furthermore, with regard to textile products, it was truly regrettable that Indonesia 
introduced a safeguard measure on carpets on 17  February  2021, even  though Japan had called 
upon Indonesia to reconsider its measure during the Committee on Safeguards, as well as in bilateral 
consultations.  G/C/M/142  
 
- 42 - 
 
  16.12.   Japan sees two  main problems: (i)  the tariff rate, which is as high as 150 -200% in terms of 
ad valorem  tax conversi on; and (ii)  the tariff has been introduced in a situation in which carpet 
exports have dropped sharply.  
16.13.   Japan is concerned about the increase in Indonesia's trade restricting measures and requests 
a concrete explanation regarding their background and cons istency with the WTO  Agreements. In 
particular, Japan submitted written questions to the Import Licensing and TRIMs  Committees earlier 
in the year regarding Indonesia's measures regulating imports of air conditioners, its import licences 
for steel, and its  import regulations for textiles. Japan expects Indonesia to respond promptly to 
these questions.  
16.14.   In conclusion, Japan hopes that Indonesia's import regulations on air conditioners will be 
operated so as not to fall under the category of import restriction s, that its permit standards and 
procedures will be stipulated with more transparency, and that its other measures will be corrected 
or abolished as soon as possible.  
16.15.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
16.16.   New Zealand echoes the concerns rais ed by the European Union and Japan. New Zealand 
believes that Indonesia's restrictions on agricultural imports continue to undermine core 
WTO principles.  
16.17.   Indonesia's frequent changes to import requirements reduces commercial certainty, which 
in turn hamper s returns for farmers and increases price volatility for customers. New Zealand is 
particularly concerned about Indonesia's inconsistent issuance of import licences. Delays in import 
licences lead to commercially significant market access issues for tradin g partners.  
16.18.   New Zealand requests that Indonesia also provide further information to trading partners on 
the development of the Commodity Balance Mechanism, including how the mechanism is calculated, 
and what the schedule is for adding more products into th e mechanism.  
16.19.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
16.20.   The United States again underscores its concerns with Indonesia's import and export 
restricting policies and practices. The US has raised concerns with specific Indonesian policies in past 
meetings of the Council, as well as in the TRIMs, TBT, I nformation Technology Agreement (ITA) , 
and Market Access Committees, and regrets that it must raise them again on this occasion. The US 
believes that Indonesia's trade -restricting policies run counter to its broader economic recovery goals 
as well as the interests of its consumers, workers, a nd businesses. Accordingly, the US strongly 
encourages Indonesia to reconsider its policies.  
16.21.   The United States is specifically concerned by Indonesia's expanding use of local content 
requirements  (LCRs) . As Members know, Indonesia has imposed such requirem ents across a wide 
range of sectors, including telecommunications, mobile technology, energy, retail, and franchising. 
The United States again notes that Indonesia's ICT  Ministry has announced plans to increase existing 
LCRs for 4G and 5G  devices. The Unit ed States requests that Indonesia share further information on 
these plans , make any draft measures it is considering available for public comment , and reconsider 
its use of LCRs generally.  
16.22.   The United States is also concerned by Indonesia's continued pract ice of finalizing 
trade-related measures without sufficient opportunities for stakeholder input. Indonesia has 
demonstrated a pattern of issuing into effect final measures connected to its halal product assurance 
law, without sufficient notification, and w ith little, if any, opportunities for public input. These 
measures have the potential to impact a significant proportion of global goods trade with Indonesia, 
including US  exports. Going forward, the United States strongly encourages Indonesia to adopt a 
more transparent and consultative policy -making process.  
16.23.   Lastly, the United States again wishes to underscore its concerns regarding Indonesia's 
application of tariffs on a category of ICT  products that appear to exceed its WTO  bound tariff 
commitments. The  US has raised this issue several times with Indonesia over the past three  years, 
including in the Market Access and the ITA  Committees, as well as bilaterally. Unfortunately, G/C/M/142  
 
- 43 - 
 
  Indonesia has yet to provide a substantive response to US  concerns. In this rega rd, the United States 
has been patient and constructive, providing concrete examples that clearly illustrate its concerns 
multiple times, as well as preparing several specific questions that were circulated to the 
ITA Committee in April  2021. Unfortunately , Indonesia has yet to provide a substantive response to 
repeated US  attempts at engagement. In addition to calling into question Indonesia's bound 
commitments, the US believes that these policies are to Indonesia's own detriment as they limit 
access for I ndonesian consumers and firms to important high -tech products that form the backbone 
of the digital economy. US  traders have also been actively noting the disincentives to investment 
that result from these tariffs. The US understands that Indonesia has jus t issued its new 2022  tariff 
schedule. The US welcomes further information on this new schedule, including how it might address 
US concerns.  
16.24.   The United States is hopeful that raising these issues again on this occasion could help pave 
the path for greater engagement, and stands ready to work with Indonesia to address these 
concerns.  
16.25.   The delegate of India, addressing Agenda Items 16 and 26, indicated the following:  
16.26.   India remains concerned over Indonesia's import substitution programme and exports 
policies, w hich aim to reduce access to the Indonesian market. Indonesia is maintaining a number 
of restrictions on imports as well as exports, which are affecting Indian businesses, both in terms of 
exports as well as supply chain disruptions.  
16.27.   First, Indonesia has b een applying an annual quota system on importation of bovine meat. 
Indonesia reduced the quota in 2021. Apart from the quota system, there are port restrictions on 
imports, which have led not only to difficulties, but also increases in costs for India's ex ports. There 
is also a quota system on the importation of sugar.  
16.28.   Second, there has been a delay in the issuance of Horticultural Products Import 
Recommendations (RIPH) in respect of agricultural products, including onions and potatoes, without 
assigning an y reason for the same. There have also been cases of RIPH  non-issuance. These issues 
are impacting upon India's exports of its horticultural products. Indonesia has also put dry red chillies 
in its horticulture category, thus subjecting their import to RIP H requirements.  
16.29.   Third, India also requests Indonesia to lift its restrictions on exports of ginger.  
16.30.   Fourth, Indonesia imposes quantitative restrictions on imports of automobile s and 
components thereof. There have also been instances of delay in the issuance of Type Registration 
Certificate ( TPT) import permits for import of commercial vehicles from India.  
16.31.   Fifth, these policies remain a concern for the Indian chemicals and pharmac eutical products.  
16.32.   Lastly, on the exports side, India wishes to inform the Council that Indonesia has put in 
place a high export duty and export levy on palm oil, as well as adopting export curbing procedures, 
which is pushing up the prices of palm oil and edible oils in India. India requests Indonesia to take 
whatever action necessary to avoid resorting to increases in the reference price of palm oil.  
16.33.   India has discussed all of the above -mentioned issues bilaterally with Indonesia, but so far 
no clear respo nse has been received. Therefore, India urges Indonesia constructively and 
transparently to engage with Members on these proposals, and not to adopt trade restrictive 
measures.  
16.34.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
16.35.   Canada wishes to speak specific ally on one  issue in relation to Indonesia, which was the 
issue also raised by the United States relating to ICT  products. Canada considers that Indonesia's 
application of its tariffs is above its bound rates on ICT  products and inconsistent with its  
WTO commitments , as well as being  contrary to the objectives of multilateral trade liberalization. 
Indonesia's application of tariffs on ICT  products has impacted over USD  1 million in Indonesian 
imports from Canada in 2020, which represents a decrease of 29% c ompared to 2019. Canada calls G/C/M/142  
 
- 44 - 
 
  upon Indonesia to uphold its WTO  commitments and eliminate all tariffs on ICT  products, as it had 
committed to do under the I TA. 
16.36.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
16.37.   Indonesia expresses its appreciation to the Eu ropean Union, Japan, New Zealand, the United 
States, India, and Canada, for their continued interest in Indonesia's trade policies and practices.  
16.38.   Regarding the imposition of import duties on telecommunications products, Indonesia is still 
in the coordinati on stage with the relevant Ministries and Agencies. Indonesia reiterates its previous 
statement, namely that it will continue to strive to comply with all its WTO  commitments, including 
those undertaken under the ITA.  
16.39.   On the Domestic Component Level (TKDN)  for the telecommunications, mobile technology, 
energy, textiles, retail, and franchise sectors, and as Indonesia stated in its statement at the most 
recent meeting of the TRIMs  Committee, the TKDN is intended for government procurement policy, 
policies th at involve maintaining the welfare and meeting the needs of the Indonesian people, or 
policies involving the handling of strategic resources managed by the state. Indonesia also informs 
Members that, regarding a comprehensive review of localization measure s, it has begun several 
reviews, and consultations are ongoing . 
16.40.   Regarding the licensing regime for imports of textiles, steel, agricultural and electronic 
products, Indonesia refers to its previous statements delivered at the meetings of the Import 
Licensi ng and TRIMs  Committees, in which it informed Members that Minister of Trade Regulation 
No. 77/2019 had been revoked. Regarding the licensing regime for imports of agricultural products, 
Indonesia has always been committed to implementing the recommendatio ns and decisions of the 
Dispute Settlement Body ( DSB) in WT/DS477 -WT/DS478, and all articles in the law that are not in 
accordance with WTO  rules have been amended and are no longer valid. Regarding the licensing 
regime for imports of steel products, and as previously stated in its intervention at the most recent 
meeting  of the Import Licensing Committee , Indonesia intends to ensure that all steel products 
entering the Indonesian market meet the standards, specifications, and qualifications of the relevant 
health and safety aspects.  
16.41.   With regard to import permit procedures  relating to SPS, Indonesia refers to its previous 
statement at the most recent meeting of the SPS  Committee, in which it informed Members that, 
over the past two  years, EU  accusations of undue delay had no longer been relevant, since Indonesia 
had also ma de progress, improvements, and been transparent in its approval procedures. Indonesia 
also intends to advise the European Union that its SPS  National Inquiry Point in Brussels could 
improve its internal coordination with EU  representatives in Geneva so tha t progress in Brussels 
could be properly conveyed to Geneva.  
16.42.   On safeguards for carpets, Indonesia believes that the whole process of their imposition has 
complied with WTO  rules. Indonesia had also taken Japan's concerns seriously, further to hearing 
those  concerns regularly voiced by Japan in various bilateral and multilateral meetings. However, 
after taking all relevant aspects into serious consideration, and in order to prevent or remedy the 
serious injury faced by the domestic industry, the government o f Indonesia eventually decided to 
impose such necessary , if temporary , measures.  
16.43.   Regarding halal labelling rules, and as previously stated in its intervention at the most recent 
meeting of the TBT  Committee, Indonesia intends to reaffirm its openness and t ransparency for 
international cooperation in the Halal Assurance System, based on the principles of cooperation, 
recognition, and acceptance, and in accordance with international practice and regulations. 
Regarding non -halal labels, labelling is only inten ded to provide information regarding the product's 
ingredients.  
16.44.   On the obligation to use the Indonesian National Standard (SNI), Indonesia notes that the 
purpose of the SNI  policy is to ensure that the relevant products protect the safety, security, and 
health of Indonesian consumers, and that the SNI is applied to both domestic and imported products. 
In addition, Indonesia notes that it always strives to fulfil the transparency obligation by reporting 
every implementation of mandatory SNI  regulations and o ther technical regulations to the WTO.  G/C/M/142  
 
- 45 - 
 
  16.45.   In essence, Indonesia reiterates that it has never intended to impede the flow of international 
trade through import and export policies, especially those relating to government procurement 
policies concerning meeting  the needs and welfare of the Indonesian people. Trade data from 2016 
to 2020 shows that, in general, the products in question did not experience a decline, but rather 
showed a positive comparative trend. Indonesia will always support simplification, trans parency, and 
efficiency to make the implementation of exports and imports easier.  
16.46.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
17  MEXICO – CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE FOR CHEESE UNDER MEXICAN 
OFFICIAL STANDARD NOM -223-SCFI/SAGARPA -2018 – REQUEST FROM THE  UNITED 
STATES  
17.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the United States.  
17.2.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
17.3.  The United States sustains its concerns for Mexico's NOM -223 – Cheese Con formity 
Assessment Procedures (CAP), a measure that was recently updated and re -notified to the WTO.  
17.4.  The US  concern is four -fold. First and foremost, NOM -223 contains a conformity assessment 
scheme that is overly trade restrictive, as the United States has  previously detailed. Providing 
information to consumers about cheese quality is typically a low -risk undertaking. The US and 
industry are concerned that Mexico's scheme may not be proportional to those risks, and that Mexico 
does not appear to have seriou sly considered the alternatives available to meet its consumers' 
needs. The United States requests Mexico to halt the finalization of the regulation and to consider 
the alternatives previously proposed by the US  Government and industry stakeholders, includ ing 
reverting the measure to voluntary and using standards of identity, labelling, or supplier's 
declaration of conformity to demonstrate the completion of third -party test procedures. Second, 
cheese made from animal fat will have to undergo these burdenso me testing and certification 
requirements, while cheese produced from vegetable fat will not. The US requests Mexico to explain 
the reasoning for the difference in treatment of these products. Third, the US asks if Mexico has 
seriously taken into account t he comments it received from WTO  Members and stakeholders. In 
2020, stakeholders provided input into a draft and participated in good faith in the Working Group 
that concluded in September  2020, and yet the final draft is significantly different from the d raft 
agreed by that Working Group. Fourth, the processes for revising NOM -223 are confusing and 
potentially conflicting. The United States asks how Mexico will harmonize the final cheese CAP in 
NOM-223 while the resulting cheese standard in NOM -223 is stil l being formulated in 2022.  
17.5.  The United States again asks Mexico to suspend the cheese CAP in its mandatory form and 
to reconsider the less trade -restrictive alternatives presented to it by other WTO  Members and dairy 
industry stakeholders.  
17.6.  The delegate of Mexico  indicated the following:  
17.7.  Mexico thanks the United States for its comments. As mentioned in the meeting of the 
Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade of 10  March, Mexico had notified a new version of its 
Conformity Assessment Procedure on 8  Februar y, in document  G/TBT/N/MEX/465/Rev.1, with a  
deadline for submitting comments of 9  April.  
17.8.  The delegations of the European Union and the United States had nevertheless requested an 
extension of the deadline to submit their comments to 30  April and 9  May, re spectively. Mexico is 
therefore waiting to receive these comments before continuing with the standardization process, 
which will take place in accordance with the Federal Law on Metrology and Standardization. To date, 
278 comments have been received from 2 1 interested parties.  
17.9.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  18  CHINA – ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES FOR REGISTRATION OF OVERSEAS 
PRODUCERS OF IMPORTED FOODS – REQUEST FROM INDONESIA AND THE UNITED 
STATES  
18.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Indonesia and the United States.  
18.2.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
18.3.  The United States notes that China's Decrees  248 and 249 came into effect on 
1 January  2022, but China has not responded to requests for scientific justification for these 
measures and explanation of how these measures will address food safety and public health 
concerns. The lack of guidance provided by China, and inconsistency in China's implementation and 
enforce ment of the measures, is causing considerable confusion for exporters and competent 
authorities, which is leading to negative trade impacts.  
18.4.  The United States requests China to take the following steps to facilitate trade: (i)  to allow 
entry of all product s from registered facilities until 1  July 2023. This additional time will allow 
facilities to accurately enter or update product information in their online registration; (ii)  to provide 
a point of contact at the General Administration of Customs of China (GACC) for facilities to directly 
submit concerns and feedback about the online registration system; and (iii)  to hold an information 
session, or sessions, in Geneva for trading partners to learn more about GACC's implementation of 
the Decrees.  
18.5.  The delegat e of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
18.6.  Indonesia expresses its gratitude to China for its prompt response at the March  2022 meeting 
of the TBT  Committee regarding the registration process for Indonesian business actors to be able 
to continue distributing their products in China. However, Indonesia reaffirms its concern over the 
implementation of the GACC  Decree No.  248, considering that the regulation has created obstacles  
for Indonesian industry.  
18.7.  In this regard, Indonesia needs and requests further clarif ication from China on the following 
points to rationalize the food product registration process: (i)  explanations and guidelines from China 
regarding the conformity of the HS  Code with the CIQ  Code, considering that the CIQ  Code is only 
applied specificall y to China; (ii)  improvements to be made by the Chinese authorities to the 
guidelines for using the GACC  website; (iii)  China's clarification of the timeline for the registration 
process, and China's provision of a contact point or contact person able to p rovide a quick response 
during the handling of the registration process; and (iv)  clarification from the Chinese authorities 
regarding the new amendments to Article  11 of GACC  Decree No.  248, noting that, since 
February  2022, China has made adjustments usi ng two  mechanisms at once, namely the protocol 
mechanism and the GACC  Decree Registration Mechanism No.  248, which further hampers market 
access for Indonesian food products to China, including for swallow nest products, fishery products, 
and porang produc ts. 
18.8.  Indonesia hopes that China will provide a written response to the issues previously described, 
and consider a relaxation in the implementation of its registration obligations to prevent losses and 
obstacles for business actors exporting to China. China  has become a significant trading partner for 
Indonesia for various products, including food and beverages. Indonesia wishes to continue to be a 
strategic trading partner for China and sincerely hopes that China will reconsider the timing of the 
policy's i mplementation.  
18.9.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
18.10.   The European Union expresses its concern about the implementation of Decree No.  248 of 
the Chinese Customs Administration, in force since 1  January  2022.  
18.11.   The European Union does not  question China's wish to ensure that imported food products 
come from legitimate sources. Overall, the EU shares and supports this objective. However, 
problems persist with the mechanism set up by China, in particular the registration of exporting 
busines ses. Several EU  member States have reported cases of shipments being held up at ports in G/C/M/142  
 
- 47 - 
 
  China due to erroneous or missing information in China's online system. Problems have also arisen 
from the fact that the scope of products under import registration ke eps expanding, and there is no 
full clarity on the categories that are covered. There are also cases of establishments in the meat, 
dairy, and fishery sectors that were notified to GACC before the deadline of 31  December, but which 
have nevertheless still not been registered.  
18.12.   The European Union urges China to take the following actions: (i)  to allow, for a period of 
18 months, registered facilities to export any related product, regardless of whether it is registered 
for that particular HS  code; (ii)  to mai ntain an open dialogue to solve implementation issues in a 
pragmatic way; (iii)  to facilitate new registrations by providing supporting material and guidance 
documents in English; (iv)  to facilitate amendments and corrections to existing registrations; and  
(v) to provide guidance on how the competent authorities have to verify the establishments that 
were registered under the fast -track procedure.  
18.13.   The European Union wishes to thank China for its constructive ongoing dialogue to solve the 
technical issues re lating to Decree No.  248. However, important implementation issues still need to 
be solved in order to reduce disruptions to trade.  
18.14.   The delegate of Norway  indicated the following:  
18.15.   Norway thanks Indonesia and the United States for putting this important iss ue on the 
Council's agenda. As previous ly stated in the SPS  Committee, Norway gives high priority to Members' 
regulations relat ing to trade in seafood products. Norway shares the concerns expressed by other 
Members regarding Decree No.  248 that was impleme nted on 1  January  2022. Norway remains 
concerned that the regulations contained in Decree No.  248 and Decree No.  249 are more trade 
restrictive than necessary to ensure the safety of imported food products.  
18.16.   Norway thanks China for the ongoing dialogue on t he new requirements in recent months. 
However, there are still unresolved questions regarding the se new requirements and the registration 
process. Many Norwegian producers of fish and fishery products have not been able to start or 
complete the registratio n process due to technical errors in the C hina Import Food Enterprise 
Registration (CIFER)  system.  
18.17.   Furthermore, Norway is concerned by the significant bureaucratic impacts the demands in 
the new regulation, as well as the CIFER  system, will have on its com petent authority. Insufficient 
information, lack of information in English, and technical errors in the CIFER  system, have added to 
the burden imposed on Norway's competent authority. So far, Norway has not received any 
information to clarify the questions  posed by its competent authority to the Chinese competent 
authority about these details.  
18.18.   Norway therefore urges China to engage in an open dialogue to solve the implementation 
issues in a swift and pragmatic way. Norway also asks China to make the necessa ry changes to its 
CIFER  system in order to reduce the burden imposed on foreign competent authorities.  
18.19.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
18.20.   The Republic of Korea shares the concerns expressed by other Members regarding China's 
administrative measures for the registration of overseas producers of imported foods. Korea respects 
China's right to ensure food safety and recognizes its efforts to accommodate the concerns raised 
by Members before the measures entered into force this year.  However, Korea's concerns as 
conveyed over the course of previous meetings have still not been duly addressed, and therefore 
remain.  
18.21.   First, the Republic of Korea requests China to provide its rationale behind the Administrative 
Measure, in particular, Art icle 7 of Decree No.  248, which expands its coverage to low -risk products. 
Moreover, Korea would like to request more information from China concerning its scientific data or 
risk analysis used to select its 14  categories. Korea believes that food safety i s a legitimate objective, 
in accordance with relevant international trade norms, but its implementation should not be more 
trade restrictive than necessary.  G/C/M/142  
 
- 48 - 
 
  18.22.   Second, the Republic of Korea considers that the competent authorities of exporting 
Members have al ready been experiencing a heavy administrative burden, having to review 
registration applications of overseas producers and keeping an eye on whether those producers 
remain compliant with China's regulations and standards after their initial registrations.  Korea 
therefore recommends that China work directly with overseas producers on the application process 
and also requests that China share its relevant focal point. It is Korea's belief that this will save time 
and resources, not only for China, but also f or overseas producers and their authorities.  
18.23.   The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
18.24.   The United Kingdom wishes to thank Members for again raising this concern in relation to 
China's administrative measures for registration of overseas m anufacturers of imported foods.  
18.25.   Despite requests from the United Kingdom and other Members to delay the implementation 
of these new measures to allow sufficient and reasonable time for competent authorities and 
businesses to prepare, China's Regulation on Registration and Administration of Overseas 
Manufacturers of Imported Food entered into force on 1  January  2022.  
18.26.   The United Kingdom has made significant efforts to meet China's administrative 
requirements so as to limit any disruption to trade. However, th e UK continues to maintain that the 
blanket application of these measures is incommensurate with the risk posed by many food products. 
In particular, the requirement to audit establishments exporting products that the UK considers to 
be low risk places a s ignificant and unnecessary administrative burden on authorities and businesses.  
18.27.   The United Kingdom therefore requests that China review these measures, applying them in 
a manner that is proportionate with the risks, and not more trade restrictive than nece ssary to 
achieve the appropriate level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection in line with its obligations 
under Article  5.6 of the SPS  Agreement.  
18.28.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
18.29.   My delegation thanks the United States and Indonesia for tabling this agenda item 
concerning China's administrative measures for registration of overseas producers of imported foods . 
With a wide range of our food industries being affected by these measures , Chinese Taipei has also 
raised the same concerns, on multiple occasions, at the meetings of the TBT and SPS  Committees. 
As the measures have already been in force since 1  January  2022, it is becoming even more urgent 
to highlight the difficulties faced b y so many exporters, as well as the serious risks of trade 
disruption.  
18.30.   First, Chinese Taipei considers that one of the greatest difficulties as concerns these 
measures is the lack of information about registration requirements and guidance on how to follow  
the requirements. This issue is even more critical for those facilities that need to file their applications 
themselves. Without sufficient guidance they cannot complete their registrations and, as a direct 
consequence, trade is disrupted. Chinese Taipei therefore urges China to designate and provide an 
enquiry point that permits facilities to engage with the relevant Chinese authorities directly to deal 
with their concerns about the online registration system. Also, Chinese Taipei believes that it would 
be helpful if China could organize an information session at the WTO for its trading partners to learn 
more about the GACC's implementation of the measure.  
18.31.   Second, Chinese Taipei holds many concerns over the review and approval procedure for the 
measures. F or example, the standard or anticipated processing periods are unknown, and the same 
applies to the status of the application stage. In addition, certain of Chinese Taipei's facilities have 
received the GACC's rejection without any further explanation, whi le others are just not able to 
correct their applications on the registration system. Chinese Taipei therefore asks the GACC to 
comply with the requirements as set out under Article  5.2.2 of the TBT  Agreement, which include 
the transparency point and requi re the applicant to be informed in a precise and complete manner 
of all relevant deficiencies, allowing also an opportunity for corrective actions.  
18.32.   Third, Chinese Taipei also faces the difficulty of the extent of the ambiguity in the HS  code 
categorization  and the product scope subject to this measure. Certain of Chinese Taipei's facilities 
have reported that their products faced customs clearance suspension for no apparent reason.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  18.33.   Chinese Taipei has been expressing its concerns ever since China's WTO  notification in 2020, 
and has several times sought clarifications from China through bilateral channels. However, no 
sufficient or detailed response has been received from China so far. Therefore, Chinese Taipei once 
again urges China to offer sufficient and de tailed guidelines and to designate an effective enquiry 
point. Any measure of this magnitude requires far more time for industry to implement, so Chinese 
Taipei also urges China to consider offering a longer grace period for implementation in order to 
avoid yet more serious trade disruption.  
18.34.   Last but not least, Chinese Taipei suggests that China temporarily allow entry of all products 
from registered facilities. This additional time will allow facilities to accurately enter or update 
product information in their online registration.  
18.35.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
18.36.   Canada shares the concerns raised by the United States, Indonesia, and others. Canada and 
other Members continue to raise significant concerns and challenges with regard to China's 
administrative measures for the registration of overseas manufacturers of imported food.  
18.37.   Canada notes that the implementation of the online C IFER system has created trade 
disruptions for foreign companies, including those from Canada, as shipments are bein g refused 
entry into China due to issues with the online registration process.  
18.38.   Canada remains disappointed that China did not engage in open and constructive dialogue 
with trading partners prior to the implementation of CIFER, and nor did China provide a r easonable 
transition period for competent authorities and industry stakeholders to adapt to this new system. 
In this regard, Canada is requesting that China provide, without undue delay, a grace period of 
18 months for all commodities to continue to be all owed to enter China without CIFER  registration. 
This grace period would extend until 1  July 2023, and apply to the following: (i)  all companies that 
were eligible to export to China as of 31  December  2021; and (ii)  the companies currently registered 
in the  CIFER. Canada stresses that this grace period is needed to afford companies sufficient time 
to register and/or amend their registrations, and to avoid unnecessary trade disruptions.  
18.39.   As many questions remain regarding the registration process, Canada also calls upon China 
to create a single contact or enquiry point in CIFER for both industry and competent authorities, or 
alternatively, for China at least to work directly with companies to facilitate the completion of their 
registration. Canada also asks tha t China add to the CIFER  system, without undue delay, all 
Canadian products and establishments previously approved by China, but currently not on the list 
of approved Canadian products and facilities eligible to export to China.  
18.40.   Canada remains deeply conce rned about the impact that these measures are currently 
having on trade and might continue to have on future trade. These measures have resulted in 
significant human and financial resource pressures for competent authorities and industry due to 
their overl y burdensome nature, along with the lack of details and transparency from China regarding 
the implementation of Decrees No.  248 and No.  249. As China continues to implement these 
measures, Canada requests increased attention by China to the CIFER  system to  minimize 
disruptions to trade.  
18.41.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
18.42.   Australia remains concerned that China's Regulation on Registration and Administration of 
Overseas Manufacturers of Imported Food, promulgated as Decree No.  248, will unnece ssarily 
disrupt and restrict trade. Furthermore, Australia is also concerned that Members were not given 
sufficient time and information to register, adjust, and prepare before China's measures entered into 
force on 1  January  2022.  
18.43.   Australia has previously  raised its concerns in this regard in both the SPS Committee and 
the TBT Committee.  
18.44.   Australian exporters are reporting delays in registration and customs clearance that are 
adversely impacting their trade to China. In particular, Australia has, in good faith, provided 
information for registration of establishments that has not been accura tely reflected in China's G/C/M/142  
 
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  registration system. This is causing significant industry concern,  and for some commodities, it has 
been trade restrictive. Australian food exporters are ready and willing to comply with China's food 
safety requirements, but busin esses and governments need clarity and a reasonable time -frame to 
make the changes necessary to comply with the new measures.  
18.45.   In light of the above, Australia requests that China's customs authorities adopt a flexible 
approach to implementation, until 1  July 2023, during which time they would allow entry of products 
in line with historical trade, in addition to entry under China's new system of registration, pending 
completion of outstanding applications, corrections, or updates to the online registrations.  
18.46.   Australia urges China to address these issues promptly and remains willing to work with 
China to minimize trade disruptions.  
18.47.   The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
18.48.    Switzerland shares and supports the concerns expressed by other Members rega rding 
Decrees No.  248 and No.  249 published by the General Administration of Customs of the People’s 
Republic of China (GACC). Switzerland supports China's objective of ensuring that only safe food is 
imported. However, Switzerland regrets that the measure s still include all food categories, 
irrespective of their risk profile, and seem to be more trade restrictive than necessary to ensure the 
safety of imported food products. Switzerland strongly encourages China to allow entry of all 
products from register ed facilities until 1  July 2023. This additional time would enable facilities to 
accurately enter or update product information in their online registration.  
18.49.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
18.50.   As explained at previous meetings of this Council a nd other relevant committees, China 
reiterates that the purpose of its revision of the administrative measures for registration of overseas 
producers of imported foods is to protect people's health and safety.  
18.51.   The process of revision of the above -mentioned  administrative measures is open, 
transparent, and consistent with international rules and common practices. China published the draft 
on 12  April 2021, and the measures came into force on 1  January  2022. In this process, China 
received many reasonable com ments and suggestions from various Members, and these reasonable 
comments and suggestions have been taken into account and adopted. China also notified the 
measure and the transitional period to the WTO, in line with the requirements set out in the TBT and  
SPS Agreements.  
18.52.   While strengthening food safety supervision, China also actively considered how to facilitate 
relevant trade, for example, through the modality of "official recommendation registration" being 
adopted for the overseas production enterprises  of 18 food categories, and simplified procedures for 
overseas production enterprises outside  those 18  food categories, namely a "self -application by 
enterprises" modality.  
18.53.   China has actively engaged with Members on this issue and carried out a lot of prep aration 
work before the implementation of the measure. For example, the G ACC has issued the 
interpretation of the rules, the Guide for Registration Applications, supporting documents and forms 
for registration applications, and the Operation Manual for the  Registration Information System. By 
the end of 2021, the GACC has held video conferences with 114  Members, conducted training for 
more than 2,000  overseas enterprises, and answered various questions raised by Members.  
18.54.   Since the implementation of the measu re, and as of 25  February  2022, more than 
100 Members have provided the list of enterprises recommended for registration, and a total of 
64,036  overseas manufacturers covering 31  food categories have been registered. To date, the 
measure has been smoothly implemented. China wishes to continue to engage with those Members 
that are interested in this issue.  
18.55.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  19  INDIA – ORDER RELATED TO REQUIREMENT OF NON -GM CUM GM FREE CERTIFICATE 
ACCOMPANIED WITH IMPORTED FOOD CONSIG NMENT – REQUEST FROM THE UNITED 
STATES  
19.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the United States . 
19.2.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
19.3.  As noted at the March  2022 meetings of the WTO TBT and SPS  Committees, the United States 
once again reiterates its serious concerns with India's measure mandating "non -GM (genetically 
modified) origin and GM  free certificates" for certain agricultural imports into India, notified on 
2 September  2020, as document  G/TBT/N/IND/168, and a later notified entry -into-force date of  
1 March  2021.  The United States again urges India to withdraw this requirement, and to engage 
with its trading partners to find a science -based and trade -facilitating alternative . 
19.4.  The United States also notes the trade -limiting nature of the Order. Indeed, since it went into 
effect in March  2021, the Order has limited the trade of certain processed products that are not 
listed in Annex -I of the Order, despite language that stipula tes that the Order does not apply to 
processed food products in general.  
19.5.  The United States also wishes to encourage India to accept its offer for technical cooperation 
with the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) to explore alternatives to  this 
measure.  
19.6.  The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
19.7.  Uruguay wishes to thank the delegation of the United States for once again including this 
concern on the Council's agenda. As Uruguay has previously stated, there is international consensus 
that genetically modified products, approved by exporting countries on the basis of Codex 
recommendations in relation to the risk assessment methodology, are equivalent to their 
conventional counterparts.  
19.8.  Therefore, in Uruguay's view, there does not appear t o be any technical justification for the 
implementation of the certification measure adopted by India, taking into account the legitimate 
objective, cited in the standard in question, of ensuring the safety and wholesomeness of imported 
food. Also taking a ccount of this objective, Uruguay wishes to know why the measure has still not 
been notified to the SPS  Committee, as requested by a number of delegations.  
19.9.  Uruguay wishes to stress the importance of Members establishing measures based on 
scientific princip les and particularly of applying such measures with the objective of minimizing 
negative trade effects, in line with the provisions of the SPS  Agreement.  
19.10.   Uruguay remains attentive to any comments or questions that the delegation of India may 
have in respon se to Members' concerns expressed in both Geneva and New Delhi, including in a joint 
note submitted by a number of countries, including Uruguay, in January  2021.  
19.11.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
19.12.   Paraguay thanks the delegation of the United  States for including this item on the agenda. 
Paraguay has submitted a new trade concern on this matter in the SPS and TBT  Committees, and 
has also made bilateral efforts in New Delhi to handle this concern that unfortunately has not yet 
been resolved. Paraguay hopes that India will address the concerns raised and offer effective replies 
shortly , as many of these requests have been submitted bilaterally more than a year before , as also 
noted by the delegation of Uruguay . 
19.13.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
19.14.   Argentina also thanks the United States for the inclusion of this concern on the agenda. With 
regard to this measure, although Argentina was able to resolve the issue , it does mean that  this new 
requirement is not  an obstacle to t rade. At the same time, it remains a meaningless  measure since, G/C/M/142  
 
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  as other Members  have stated repeatedly , including in the meetings of WTO  committees, and as 
supported by Argentina, it has no scientific explanation to support it. Argentina is concerned that  
accepting this requirement would set a precedent to include , in the future , other products , or even 
their derivative products , meaning that trade with Argentina would subsequently be affected.  
19.15.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
19.16.   Like others, C anada continues to raise specific trade concerns in the WTO  TBT and 
SPS Committees related to India's non -GM Order, which mandates that a non -genetically modified 
(non-GM) or GM  free certificate accompany imported consignments of 24  imported food products.  
While Canada welcomes India's recent decision to accept Canada's attestation for 
non-GM certification on bean products, it remains concerned that India's Order disproportionately 
impacts upon the ability of GM -producing countries to export to India, as we ll as unnecessarily 
restricting international trade.  
19.17.   Canada is concerned with the lack of scientific support for India's measure given the broad 
scientific consensus that GM  products are as safe as their conventional counterparts , as well as the 
undue burd en and negative commercial impact the measure creates on exporting countries through 
unjustified certification requirements.  Canada encourages India to consider the scientific and 
technical information in its approach to support a transparent, predictable,  risk- and science -based 
trading environment in line with India's WTO  commitments.  
19.18.   Canada once again requests that India suspend the implementation of this measure and 
allow trade to continue without a GM -free certificate requirement. This would provide an  opportunity 
for India to further engage with Members to discuss and consider alternative, less trade -restrictive 
approaches that would meet India's objectives and minimize impacts on trade. Canada would be 
pleased to contribute to these discussions and sh are its extensive experience in this area.  
19.19.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
19.20.   India thanks the delegations of the United States, Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina, and 
Canada for their interest in this issue. India wishes to inform Members that the requirement to 
regulate import of GM  food is based on the already existing provisions of the Environment Protection 
Act (1986) and is not a new requirement.  
19.21.   The Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (F SSAI ) Order dated 21  August  2020, 
requiring a n on-GM certificate for import of 24  food crops is only an assurance provided by the 
competent authorities of exporting countries that the food crops that are not approved by the Genetic 
Engineering Appraisal Committee (GEAC) for genetic modification are not  imported into India. It 
may also be noted that this requirement has already been notified to the WTO, and is not trade 
restrictive as it is uniformly applicable to imports from all countries.  
19.22.   India also wishes to clarify that the requirement for a non -GMO certificate is not applicable 
to imports of processed food and animal feed. Moreover, the non -GM attestation on phytosanitary 
certificate, which is already issued for every consignment, is also acceptable. India also requests 
Members to note that several major trading partners are complying with this requirement and 
furnishing the copy of their non -GMO certificate in the prescribed format for their export 
consignments. Nevertheless, India is open to discuss this issue further bilaterally with all Members.  
19.23.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
20  KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA – SABER CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT ONLINE PLATFORM 
/ SALEEM PRODUCT SAFETY PROGRAM – REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATES  
20.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the United States.  
20.2.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
20.3.  The United States brings its concerns over the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's SABER  Conformity 
Assessment Online Platform/ SALEEM  Product Safety Program t o the Council on this occasion to find G/C/M/142  
 
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  a resolution to its concerns regarding the lack of clarity in Saudi Arabia's conformity assessment 
program covering 40  technical regulations on a wide range of goods. Despite having discussed 
US concerns over this pro gram at the Council's previous meeting, as well as at previous meetings 
of the TBT Committee, US concerns , like those of other Member s, have gone unresolved.  
20.4.  SABER is an online system that was introduced by the Saudi Arabia Standards, Metrology, 
and Qualit y Organization (SASO), to operate the SALEEM  program. SABER is designed to enable 
exporters, importers, and local manufacturers to electronically submit and obtain the required 
certificates of conformity. Unfortunately, the design and implementation of the  system has posed 
some significant barriers to trade.  
20.5.  As a procedural matter, this mandatory conformity assessment program has never been 
notified to the WTO. Furthermore, the registration and certification process is inordinately complex 
and time -consuming; HS  codes in the system often do not match internati onal HS  codes, causing 
confusion; it is still not clear in the system what information is required to apply for the Gulf mark 
and registration number; and finally, there is inconsistency and a lack of clarity in the conformity 
assessment procedures as impl emented by the notified bodies.  
20.6.  The United States asks the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to notify the measure and looks forward 
to Saudi Arabia's substantive responses to its concerns.  
20.7.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
20.8.  The European Uni on wishes to express concerns similar to those of the United States. The 
implementation of the electronic certification system SALEEM through the web portal SABER remains 
a concern for the European Union. And while the European Union wishes to thank the Ki ngdom of 
Saudi Arabia for engaging constructively in bilateral talks, the difficulties with SABER still have a 
major negative impact on the imports of several products from the European Union to Saudi Arabia. 
Although the conformity assessment requirements  differ depending on the sector, several European 
industries coincide, for example, in reporting their overly costly, burdensome, and time -consuming 
nature. The toys, textiles, and machinery sectors are particularly affected, but the system is being 
gradua lly extended also to other products.  
20.9.  The European Union wishes to invite the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to ensure efficient and less 
costly procedures for all products included in the new conformity assessment system. To this end, 
the EU remains available to continue its bilateral discussions. The EU also requests Saudi Arabia to 
notify its measure to the WTO.  
20.10.   The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
20.11.   Switzerland is concerned over the potential negative impact of the SABER  Conformity 
Assessment Online Platform on bilateral trade with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia across  a range of 
products. As other WTO  Members, Switzerland is also following this matter in the TBT  Committee.  
20.12.   The registration and certification process remains n on-transparent, complex, and 
time-consuming for Switzerland's exporters. The industry continues to report that the CAPs lead to 
disproportionate fees and in many cases to unnecessary administrative burden, costs, and 
duplicative requirements. Depending on the sector, strict CAPs apply for products considered in their 
majority to be low risk products. In particular for companies exporting quality products in small 
quantities, the registration and certification process leads to disproportionate costs and 
documentation requirements that are prohibitive to entering the market.  
20.13.   Switzerland requests the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to ensure that the registration and 
certification process is not more strict than necessary to give adequate confidence that products 
fulfil the applicable requirements. Furthermore, Switzerland encourages the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
to base the documentation and certification requirements on international standards and to ensure 
that the requirements are applied in an equal and uniform manne r. Switzerland thanks the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia for the useful engagement with its stakeholders and looks forward to further 
cooperation on this matter.  
20.14.   The delegate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  indicated the following:  G/C/M/142  
 
- 54 - 
 
  20.15.   The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia than ks the United States, the European Union, and Switzerland 
for raising their concerns regarding the SABER  Conformity Assessment Online Platform / 
SALEEM  Product Safety Program.  
20.16.   The SALEEM  program works through the development of integrated systems of regula tions 
and standards that conform to internationally recognized professional practices by developing a 
highly efficient system for measuring product safety indicators in the market through mechanisms 
and procedures that comply with the technical regulations  of each product, especially essential 
requirements for the health of humans and animals, and environmental protection . These integrated  
systems of regulations and standards ensure the effectiveness of the services provided by legislative 
and regulatory bo dies to achieve safety by the conformity of those products to SASO  Standards. 
Within the framework of SASO, Saudi Arabia aims to develop conformity assessment activities 
(certification, audit and inspection, and testing activities) that enable it to become  one of the 
tributaries that raises the level of quality in the national industry and the safety of imported goods 
presented in the Saudi market.  
20.17.   By accepting the conformity assessment bodies in the various conformity assessment 
activities, this process ai ms to ensure the efficiency of the outputs of the accepted conformity 
assessment bodies operating in the conformity verification activities within the systems and 
requirements of the technical regulations approved to provide the necessary activities accord ing to 
the scope of acceptance of these bodies. Therefore, SASO chose to engage a notified third  party 
responsible for granting conformity certificates in accordance with the international standard 
ISO/IEC  17067 as part of the Kingdom's pre -market approach . 
20.18.   The main purpose of SABER is to improve the import experience and obtain the certificates 
of conformity and shipment by using one  platform integrated with other entities. In this regard, 
SABER has reduced the time required to 1 to 7  working days compared  to 7 to 15  working days 
previously.  
20.19.   SABER is implementing a series of improvements to the user experience of the 
SABER  Platform (UX  Project) and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is committed to continuing to improve 
the user experience on the platform. SABER has added the ability to add products in bulk, and to 
apply for certificates of conformity in bulk quantities.  In addition, SABER has now reduced two  steps 
in the platform where, after adding products, users can proceed to apply for a product certificate of  
conformity ( PCOC ). The Users' Manual is available in Arabic and English and in text format and video 
clips to clarify the process to the users on the platform.  
20.20.   The SABER Platform reflects technical regulations that had been notified to the WTO. In fact, 
the SABER platform is a tool that helps local importers and local manufacturers to save time and 
apply for the conformity assessments scheme. It does not add more policies or requirements. In 
conclusion, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia remains permanently avail able to collaborate and engage 
with all stakeholders and looks forward to further cooperation on this matter.  
20.21.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
21  PANAMA – ONIONS AND POTATOES HARVEST LIFE AND SPROUTING – REQUEST FROM 
THE UNITED STATES  
21.1.  The Chairpe rson recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the United States.  
21.2.  The delegate of the United States  indicated  the following:  
21.3.  The United States was extremely disappointed to learn that Panama recently finalized and 
began impl ementation of its new technical regulations for potatoes. Given extensive attempts by the 
US to constructively engage with Panama on this issue, including through requests made at multiple 
TBT Committee meetings, at the previous CTG, and at a recent high -level mission to Panama, the 
US is concerned with Panama's lack of substantial response, particularly with regard to the scientific 
justification for these measures.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  21.4.  The United States continues to maintain that this measure and a similar measure for onions 
unnecessarily disrupt trade and appear to lack scientific justification. In this regard, the US asks for 
Panama to ensure consistency with its international and bilateral obligations, and maintains its 
availability and commitment to work with Panama to ref ine the measures so that they meet 
Panama's legitimate objectives while not being unnecessarily restrictive.  
21.5.  In the interim, the United States reiterates its request that Panama provide the scientific 
justification for its measures or suspend implementatio n of both the potato and onion regulations 
until the US has an opportunity to conduct technical discussions regarding these two  measures.  
21.6.  The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
21.7.  Canada would like to thank the United States for once again raising this specific trade concern.  
21.8.  As a long -standing supplier of fresh potatoes to Panama with year -round exports, Canada 
continues to share some of the concerns raised by the United States. In its interventions at the 
three  most recent meetings of the TBT Committee, Canada indicated that implementing these new 
quality requirements could have a direct impact on Canada's ability to export potatoes to Panama.  
21.9.  Canada recognizes that Panama has twice delayed the implementation of these measures to 
allow for further consultations with trading partners. Canada also appreciated the bilateral technical 
meeting that was held to address its elements of concern on this issue. However, in spite of this 
positive engagement, Canada notes that its concerns – including r estrictive time -limits for storage  
and marketing, as well as a zero  tolerance for sprouting – have not been taken into account by 
Panama in the latest version of its quality requirements.  
21.10.   Canada also notes that these requirements were implemented with litt le advance notice, on 
17 February  2022, and much earlier than the previously scheduled entry -into-force date of 
2 April 2022. Finally, Canada also observes that Panama did not notify the WTO until after these 
requirements had already entered into force.  
21.11.   Canada continues to believe that a long -term solution that would provide a more predictable 
environment for both importers and exporters can be found through further technical dialogue. 
However, until such a long -term solution can be found on the elements of concern, Canada 
respectfully requests that Panama indefinitely suspend the enforcement of this new regulation.  
21.12.   The delegate of Panama  indicated the following:  
21.13.   Panama thanks the United States and Canada for their comments. Capital continues to work 
bilaterally in order to respond to this trade concern and hopes to find mutually satisfactory solutions. 
As mentioned by Canada, Panama has been responding to its trading partners' concerns, as 
evidenced by the delayed implementation of its measures regarding p otatoes. Panama will share 
with the Council any progress reached through bilateral discussions.  
21.14.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
22  KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, THE 
STATE OF KUWAIT, OMAN, AND QATAR – SELECTIV E TAX ON CERTAIN IMPORTED 
PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM SWITZERLAND AND THE UNITED STATES  
22.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Switzerland and the United States.  
22.2.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the  following:  
22.3.  The United States, along with the European Union, Japan, and Switzerland, circulated 
questions in March  2021 to GCC  member State governments regarding the selective tax on 
beverages.  
22.4.  While the United States appreciates the information provided during the last C TG meeting in 
November, it notes that it has still to receive written responses to those questions and asks the G/C/M/142  
 
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  Members concerned to provide an update as to when such responses will be provided. As previously 
conveyed, the United States al so requests a substantive update on revisions to the GCC  excise tax 
model and its implementation plan under the GCC  Unified Excise Tax Agreement, and notes the 
importance of timely engagement with interested parties regarding this issue.  
22.5.  The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
22.6.  Switzerland refers to its past statements in this Council13, as well as in the Committee on 
Market Access, where it repeatedly raised its serious concerns with regard to several aspects of the 
selective tax. Switzerland i s disappointed that there has been no progress for a certain time on this 
issue. In particular, like the United States, Switzerland seeks a clarification on the state of play 
relating to the current domestic consultation procedures on the tax reform, and w hether a target 
date to complete the consultation procedures is foreseen.  
22.7.  The GCC  member States indicated several times that they would modify the current 
ad valorem tax into a tiered volumetric tax. Switzerland requests more details on this issue, and to 
know whether the tax will be based on the quantity of sugar or the volume of the beverages. For 
many years the beverage industry has been negatively impacted and Switzerland calls upon the 
GCC not to wait any longer and to harmonize the tax rate at 50% for  all sugar -containing beverages 
and to exempt all zero  sugar beverages from the tax.  
22.8.  Switzerland wishes to underline the importance of a timely engagement from the GCC and 
hopes that this trade irritant will be resolved in the near future.  
22.9.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
22.10.   As previously conveyed in meetings of the C TG and the CMA, the European Union wishes to 
reiterate its request for a substantive update on revisions to the GCC  excise tax model and its 
implementation plan under the GCC  Unified Excise Tax Agreement, while noting the importance of 
timely engagement with interested parties regarding this issue.  In its consultations with capital and 
Geneva -based representatives of October  2021, the GCC  agreed to convene a meeti ng in 
January  2022 to review progress. The European Union stands ready to hold such a meeting with the 
competent GCC  authorities without delay.  
22.11.   The European Union wishes to recall that it seeks GCC  confirmation that, in the revised tax 
system, energy drink s will fall within the scope of a sweetened beverage tax, and be taxed according 
to the same criteria as applied to other sweetened beverages, meaning solely on the basis of their 
sugar content.  
22.12.   The European Union also wishes to underline its call to provi de immediate industry relief 
until the ongoing GCC  excise taxation revision takes effect by exempting all zero  sugar beverages 
from the tax and harmonizing the tax rate at 50% for energy drinks and all other categories of 
sugar -sweetened beverages subject to the tax.  
22.13.   The European Union stands ready to continue engaging with the GCC on this important issue.  
22.14.   The delegate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  indicated the following:  
22.15.   On behalf of the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar, and the State of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia wishes to thank 
the delegations of the United States, Switzerland, and the European Union for the interest they 
attach to the GCC  excise tax regime and for their commu nication on the application of the excise 
tax on carbonated soft drinks, malt beverages, energy drinks, sport drinks, and other sweetened 
beverages.  
22.16.   As for the timeline of the ongoing process of the new GCC  excise tax model and its 
implementation, the King dom of Saudi Arabia recalls, once again, that the revision of the excise tax 
on beverages is a complex exercise that requires great effort, extensive coordination, and 
comprehensive studies. To this end, the GCC  Working Group on Tax Issues is sparing no ef fort to 
 
13 Document  G/C/M/141, paragraphs  23.5-23.7.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  complete this exercise in order to submit to the GCC  member States appropriate results and a high 
standard excise tax model. In addition, an appropriate procedures and timeline will be adopted by 
the GCC  member States for the revision of their exci se tax regime. Once the process is completed, 
the related information will be immediately shared with WTO  Members. Finally, Saudi Arabia invites 
Switzerland, the European Union, and the United States to engage in a bilateral meeting in May for 
further disc ussion of this matter with the competent authorities in the GCC  member States.  
22.17.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
23  INDIA – IMPORT RESTRICTION ON AIR CONDITIONERS – REQUEST FROM JAPAN AND 
THAILAND  
23.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Japan and Thailand.  
23.2.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
23.3.  Japan continues to express its concerns that India's import ban on air conditioners, including 
refrigerants, introduced in October  2021 through Notif ication No.  41/2015 -2020, is a measure that 
unreasonably imposes the restructuring of corporate supply chains. Japan is seriously concerned 
that this measure is likely to constitute an import ban that is inconsistent with Article  XI:1 of the 
GATT as well a s Article  2.1 of the TRIMs  Agreement.  
23.4.  India responded at its T PR, and at past meetings of the CTG, that the measure was consistent 
with its obligations under the Montreal Protocol. However, Japan considers India's import ban to be 
superfluous and irrational in that it covers a wide range of air conditioners that use refrigerants. 
Furthermore, these air conditioners are not subject to India's reduction and elimination obligation 
under the Montreal Protocol, or the regulation for freon gas causing oz one layer depletion under 
India's domestic regulation.  
23.5.  In this respect, after considering the previous answers received, Japan submitted written 
questions to the TRIMs  Committee meeting in September  2021 to request more detailed 
elaborations from India. In  this regard, Japan expects India to provide prompt answers to its 
questions. India has said that it is open to discussing the matter with Japan bilaterally. However, in 
order to have a constructive discussion, it is important for India to respond in good faith to Japan's 
written questions.  
23.6.  In addition, and as mentioned in the CMA recently, with regard to air conditioners, the 
scheduled date for the IS  Mark certification system based on the Quality Control Orders for air 
conditioners and their parts to come  into effect has been postponed from January  2022 to 
January  2023. Japan  appreciate s that India has postponed the date on which the order will come 
into force. However, in order to prevent delays in the certification procedure for imported products, 
Japan  requests  that the Bureau of Indian Standards (B IS) conduct smooth overseas factory 
inspections, or if it is difficult to travel overseas, Japan requests  India to consider alternative 
procedures for certification other than overseas factory inspection.  
23.7.  The delegate of Thailand  indicated the following:  
23.8.  Thailand join s Japan in reiterat ing its  concern , raised several times, regarding India 's import 
prohibition on air conditioners with refrigerant. Thailand considers  that India's  measure may be 
inconsistent with the WTO  principle of n ational treatment , since domestic producers are allowed to 
inject refrigerant into domestically manufactured air conditioners , but importing producers are not. 
Therefore, Thailand request s that India amend its measure to ensure that it is in compliance with its 
commitments under the WTO.  
23.9.  The delegate of India indicated the following:  
23.10.   India thanks the delegations of Japan and Thailand for their continued interest in this issue. 
This issue was also discu ssed earlier in the C TG, in November  2021, and in the C MA meetings of 
October  2021 and March  2022, and India believes that it had clarified the questions  on those 
occasions.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  23.11.   India wishes to draw attention to the notification it made to the Committee on Imp ort 
Licensing under Article  5.1-5.4 notifications.14 This notification clearly spells out the details of the 
banned substances, which are relevant to this agenda.  
23.12.   Having addressed this in earlier meetings, India reiterates that its measure has been taken 
to reduce risk to human, animal and plant life and health. As per the Ozone Depleting Substances 
(Regulation and Control) Amendment Rules, 2014, import of air conditioners containing Group  VI 
substances (hydrochlorofluorocarbons) is prohibited since 1  July 2015. India also notes that the 
measure was necessary for the application of standards and regulations in line with India's 
commitment to the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol.  
23.13.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
24  NEPAL – IMPORT BAN ON ENE RGY DRINKS – REQUEST FROM THAILAND  
24.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Thailand.  
24.2.  The delegate of Thailand  indicated the following:  
24.3.  Thailand wishes to reiterate that it is deeply concerned by the Nepali government's measure 
prohibiting imports of caffeinated mixed energy drinks and flavoured synthetic drinks from Thailand 
to Nepal since 2019.  
24.4.  Thailand also wishes to recall Nepal's statements where it justified its action regarding its 
import prohib ition measure on energy drinks on the grounds that it was a balance of payment and 
foreign exchange reserves matter. Moreover, Nepal had informed the Council that it would provide 
an official notification to further clarify the precise WTO  legal basis to j ustify its temporary adoption 
of such a measure, as well as discussing the matter with the relevant organizations to consider the 
measure's implementation. In this regard, Thailand requests Nepal to update the Council regarding 
its progress as concerns its  official WTO  notification, as well as its consideration to eliminate the said 
measure.  
24.5.  Finally, Thailand notes that it would welcome bilateral consultations with Nepal with a view to 
finding a mutually acceptable solution to this issue.  
24.6.  The delegate of Nepal indicated the following:  
24.7.  Nepal thanks Thailand for its statement and its continued interest in Nepal's trade policy 
measures. Nepal notes that this concern has also been raised at the C MA. By way of response to the 
concern raised today, Nepal refers to  its statements delivered at the meeting of the C MA held in 
March  2022. If Nepal receives any update from capital, it will be shared with Thailand.  
24.8.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
25  SRI LANKA – IMPORT BAN ON VARIOUS PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM AUST RALIA AND 
THAILAND  
25.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Australia and Thailand.  
25.2.  The delegate of Thailand  indicated the following:  
25.3.  As stated in previous meetings, Thailand wishes once again to express its  concern over 
Sri Lanka's import measures, including its temporary suspension of imports, its imports on a credit 
basis, and its import control licences. In this regard, Thailand urges Sri  Lanka to notify the 
above -mentioned measures to the WTO.  
 
14 Document  G/LIC/N/2/IND/21.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  25.4.  These meas ures have greatly impacted Thailand's exports to Sri Lanka, especially its exports 
of small passenger vehicles. In this connection, Thailand considers that the measures may be more 
restrictive than necessary. However, Thailand understands that Sri Lanka ha s been facing significant 
challenges arising from problems relating to its balance of payments. Therefore, Thailand requests 
Sri Lanka to update Members on the impact that the measures in question have had on relieving 
Sri Lanka's foreign exchange reserve shortage.  
25.5.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
25.6.  Australia welcomed the updates provided by Sri Lanka on its series of import restrictions at 
previous meetings of the C TG and CMA, including its most recent update at the March  meeting of 
the CMA . 
25.7.  Despite these updates, Australia wishes to reiterate its concerns with respect to the range of 
import measures currently being implemented and their cumulative impact. These measures appear 
to be overly trade -restrictive  and do not have a clear end -date. Specifically, Australia notes the 
Sri Lankan Ministry of Finance's Gazette Notice  2270/18 of 9  March  2022, announcing import 
licensing arrangements on a range of products, including essential food products.  
25.8.  Australia ackn owledges the extremely challenging circumstances that Sri  Lanka is under as a 
result of the impacts of COVID -19, including on its economy and trade. Nevertheless, a 
well-functioning, transparent, predictable, and stable global trading system remains fundam ental to 
global economic stability. Australia welcomes Sri Lanka working with the Secretariat to ensure these 
measures are adequately notified to the WTO.  
25.9.  Australia also requests Sri Lanka to reassure Members that the measures are justified and 
implemented  in a manner consistent with its WTO  obligations. Australia remains open to engaging 
further with Sri Lanka on this issue, including through the suggested briefing with interested Geneva 
delegations.  
25.10.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
25.11.   Argen tina wishes to express its support for the concern raised by Australia and Thailand , 
and reiterate s that Argentina's main export to Sri Lanka, mung beans, has been affected by the 
measure.  
25.12.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
25.13.   The Eur opean Union wishes to express its support for the concerns expressed by Australia 
and Thailand, noting that the measures have already been in place for two  years. The European 
Union is also aware of the serious economic and foreign debt crisis that Sri  Lanka is currently facing 
and stands ready to continue working together with Sri Lanka in a constructive manner. The 
European Union hopes to receive information on a restructuring plan soon, according to which these 
import restrictions can be lifted.  
25.14.   The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
25.15.   The United Kingdom thanks Australia and Thailand for tabling this item, and echoes the 
concerns raised by Argentina and the European Union. Sri Lanka's current import restrictions are 
significantl y impacting the UK's trade to Sri  Lanka. The UK appreciates the challenges regarding Sri 
Lanka's current domestic situation. However, the UK wishes to reiterate the necessity for every 
Member to show transparency in order to facilitate a well -functioning m ultilateral trading system.  
25.16.   As the United Kingdom set out at the C MA, Sri Lanka has had almost two  years to notify 
these import measures, consult with fellow WTO  Members, and provide an explanation for their 
WTO basis. The UK therefore asks Sri Lanka again  for an update on when these measures will be 
formally notified to the WTO. The UK would also ask Sri Lanka to clarify its plans to enter 
consultations with other WTO  Members regarding the measures adopted. Finally, the UK would ask 
Sri Lanka to provide an  update regarding the time schedule for when they see an end date for these 
temporary measures.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  25.17.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
25.18.   Japan shares the concerns expressed by other Members. Indeed, Japan believes that these 
measures may be an import  ban that does not comply with Article  XI:1 of the GATT, even if Japan 
understands that Sri Lanka considers these measures necessary due to difficulties with its balance 
of payments (BOP). At the same time, such an import restriction should not be introduc ed lightly  
and needs to be carried out with the utmost caution and due consideration for the substantive and 
procedural requirements set out in the WTO  Agreements.  
25.19.   In addition, Japan has noted Sri Lanka's explanation in the previous CTG that it has not 
"introduced any measures besides some on automobiles, plastic products, and chemicals since 
June 2020." Furthermore, in the most recent meeting of the C MA, Sri Lanka also explained that 
"regarding certain automobiles and chemicals, these measures were taken w ith consideration for 
the impact on the domestic environment."  
25.20.   In this regard, Japan wishes to ask Sri Lanka to explain the following: (i)  what the specific 
target items are for which import restrictions are being implemented; (ii)  what aspects of which 
system correspond to measures that take into consideration the impact on the domestic 
environment; and (iii)  which domestic laws and regulations stipulate the content of these measures. 
Sri Lanka has repeatedly explained that these measures are temporary mea sures due to difficulties 
with its BOP caused by COVID -19. Accordingly, Japan requests the early withdrawal of these 
measures in light of improvements in the COVID -19 situation.  
25.21.   The delegate of Sri Lanka  indicated the following:  
25.22.   Sri Lanka thanks the delega tions of Australia, Thailand, Argentina, the European Union, the 
United Kingdom, and Japan for their continuous interest in Sri Lanka's trade policy measures 
introduced to curb the adverse impact of the COVID -19 pandemic on its economy.  
25.23.   As Sri Lanka has al ready stated at meetings of various committees , including at previous 
meetings of the CTG , several steps have been taken by Sri Lanka to relax most of those  import 
measures in a progressive manner that were introduced since April  2020 to curb the impact of  the 
COVID -19 pandemic.  Most recently, at the C MA held on 30  March  2022, Sri Lanka made a detailed 
statement on the current status of its import measures and the steps taken by the Government to 
relax them from time to time. Therefore, Sri Lanka does not w ish to make a lengthy statement on 
this occasion.  
25.24.   Having said that, Sri Lanka wishes to provide the following clarifications of a few concerns 
recently expressed by Members regarding Sri Lanka's import measures: (i)  on the concerns 
regarding the newly intr oduced 369  items to the list of items requiring import licence, the 
Government of Sri  Lanka, through its Regulation No.  2270/18, dated 9  March  2022, introduced 
369 new items to the list of items requiring import licence. Importation of these items is not 
suspended or banned. Any importer, after obtaining a licence from the Department of Import and 
Export Control, can import these items into Sri Lanka; (ii)  on the concerns regarding temporary 
suspension of automobiles and parts, and as Sri Lanka previously e xplained at various committee 
meetings, importation of automobiles into Sri Lanka is highly dependent on the duty -free car permits 
issued to Government officials from time to time. However, Sri Lanka is not in a position to release 
much needed foreign curr ency to import automobiles, which are classified as non -essential items, 
due to the current economic crisis in the country. Currently, Sri Lanka gives priority to the 
importation of essential items such as medicine, fuel, and food items with its limited fo reign currency  
available. Once the economy recovers from the current crisis, non -essential items such as 
automobiles and the spare parts thereof will be permitted to be imported as usual; and (iii)  on the 
concerns regarding the notification of its import m easures to the WTO, Sri Lanka has already made 
its capital -based officials aware of the concerns expressed by Members regarding the delay. Sri 
Lanka will soon take action in this regard.  
25.25.   Sri Lanka has taken note of the statements made by delegations on thi s occasion and will 
provide its responses soon. Finally, Sri Lanka wishes to inform Members that it has officially begun 
negotiations with the International Monetary Fund to request its assistance in addressing Sri Lanka's 
economic crisis, including the BO P issues that the country is currently encountering.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  25.26.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
26  INDONESIA – IMPORT SUBSTITUTION PROGRAMME – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN 
UNION  
26.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the re quest of 
the European Union.  He also noted that India's intervention under Agenda Item  16 had also covered 
this agenda item.15 
26.2.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
26.3.  Indonesia's  import -restrictive policies and practices are a long -standing item in several 
WTO committees. The European Union is deeply concerned by the fact that the number and scope 
of Indonesia's  restrictions seem to have further expanded over time, with negative impacts on trade 
flows, which take on an even larger ma gnitude at a time when growth and economic integration are 
under major stress due to the pandemic.  Against this background, the European Union considers it 
necessary once again to bring to the attention of the Council some worrisome recent developments 
regarding Indonesia's increased focus on import substitution.  
26.4.  Notably, the European Union has serious concerns on reported plans by the Indonesian 
Ministry of Industry to achieve, by the end of the year, a reduction of imports equivalent to 35% of 
the value o f its 2019  import potential through a range of measures that include expanding local 
content requirements and the mandatory use of national "SNI"  standards, as well as the further 
promulgation of cumbersome import licensing procedures.  
26.5.  Implementation of th is approach appears to be already under way, for example with the 
adoption of import restrictions on medical devices through the "freezing" of several foreign devices 
in the Indonesian e -catalogue for public procurement, preventing their purchase by govern ment 
health institutions.  
26.6.  EU operators across a variety of sectors are already negatively affected by the many 
import -restrictive measures implemented by Indonesia, which will also hamper Indonesia's 
post-pandemic economic recovery, which cannot be achieved through export promotion alone.  
26.7.  Accordingly, the European Union requests Indonesia's clarification of its reported plans for an 
import substitution programme and its underlying rationale, the introduction of the "commodity 
balance" system as the b asis for issuing import (and export) approvals, the implementing measures 
that it intends to undertake, and how it would ensure that such practices will be compliant with its 
WTO obligations.  
26.8.  The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
26.9.  Switzerland  shares the concern that has just been raised by the European Union, in particular 
Indonesia's plans regarding an import substitution programme aimed at reducing, by end -2022, the 
import value by 35% compared to its 2019  levels. Switzerland also requests I ndonesia's clarifications 
in this regard.  
26.10.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
26.11.   In 2018, Japan noted that Indonesia had implemented its P3DN  programme, which 
stipulates that the purchase and use of domestic products should be prioritized. Japan ha s also noted 
the Minister of Industry's statement in February  2022 of its intention to accelerate this programme. 
Japan shares the concerns that the European Union has raised regarding such import substitution 
programmes.  
26.12.   Japan has repeatedly expressed its  concerns about the fact that Indonesia has introduced 
and maintained local content requirements in various fields. Japan has also expressed its concern 
 
15 Paragraphs  16.25 -16.33.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  that Indonesia's import licence -related measures have been a de facto  restriction of import quantity. 
Japan is concerned that this situation will be exacerbated by the P3DN  programme.  
26.13.   Japan requests Indonesia's clarification of how it intends to implement the 
P3DN  programme. Japan also requests Indonesia to explain how it aims to ensure WTO  consistency 
with the measures that it is working to implement in order to realize its plan.  
26.14.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
26.15.   The United States continues to share the European Union's concerns regarding the 
Indonesian government's statements that it will suppress imports with the goal of "substituting 
35% of imported products" in 2022.  
26.16.   The United States asks if Indonesia has any updates on this item, if it is proceeding with an 
import substitution programme, and if it will make the draft measures t hat it is developing publicly 
available and hold a notice and comment period to ensure that affected parties have the opportunity 
to provide their input.  
26.17.   At the most recent meeting of the C MA, Indonesia stated that its policy was not intended to 
hinder imp orts from other WTO  Members. However, the United States considers that it is difficult to 
see how this could be possible, and requests Indonesia to provide further clarity on the intent and 
scope of its import substitution programme.  
26.18.   In conclusion, the Uni ted States again strongly urges Indonesia to rethink its 
counter -productive and trade -disruptive goal.  
26.19.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
26.20.   Indonesia wishes to express its appreciation to the European Union, Switzerland, Japan, and 
the United  States for their continued interest in the issue of its import substitution programme.  
26.21.   Indonesia reiterates its statements delivered at previous CTG and CMA meetings, namely 
that the import substitution programme is not intended to hinder imports from oth er Members; 
rather, its intention is to increase competitiveness by enhancing productivity and endorsing adoption 
of new technology. In addition, the import substitution programme has no element of protectionism, 
since protectionism might instead reduce th e competitiveness of Indonesia's domestic industry.  
26.22.   Indonesia once again emphasizes that the issuance of import licences and the Indonesian 
National Standard (SNI) technical regulation in principle are not related to the import substitution 
programme. Like wise, the purpose of Indonesian National Standard (SNI) regulations are to ensure 
that related products fulfil the safety, security, and health aspects necessary to protect consumers 
in Indonesia. With regard to the SNI, Indonesia reminds the Members conce rned that the policy is 
applied indiscriminately and to both domestic and imported products alike. Therefore, Indonesia 
concludes that its import substitution programme is already aligned with WTO  regulations.  
26.23.   Finally, Indonesia always strives to comply wi th the principle of transparency by reporting 
every single implementation of mandatory SNI and other technical regulations to the WTO.  
26.24.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
27  UNITED STATES – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON APPLES AND PEARS – REQUEST FROM 
THE EUROPEAN UNION  
27.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the European Union.  
27.2.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
27.3.  The European Union regrets to report that the United States has still not resolved this 
long-standing issue and continues to refuse to take the final and purely administrative step 
necessary to complete the approval of imports of apples and pears from the EU under a so -called G/C/M/142  
 
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  "systems approach" to replace the current c ostly pre -clearance system imposed by the United 
States.  
27.4.  The initial application from the European Union dates from 2008. All the necessary scientific 
groundwork has been carried out and the United States finalized its assessment in a satisfactory 
manner a lready several years ago. The outcome of this scientific work demonstrated that apples and 
pears from the EU are safe for import into the United States under the systems approach. However, 
the United States continues to delay the publication of a Final Not ice to allow trade to start.  
27.5.  While it is true that the US  market is already open for apples originating from several 
EU member States, in practice trade is nearly inexistent due to the overly high costs linked to the 
current pre -clearance approach imposed by the United States. The European Union regrets that,  
despite continued bilateral contacts on the matter, the publication of the Final Notice authorizing the 
systems approach for imports of apples and pears is still pending without any scientific or other  
motivation being provided. In consequence, the European Union considers that the United States 
does not respect its obligations under the WTO SPS  Agreement.  
27.6.  The European Union urges the United States to base its import conditions on science, to 
resolve th is important matter without further delay, and to play its part in supporting a constructive 
and mutually beneficial cooperation.  
27.7.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
27.8.  The United States thanks the European Union for its continued inter est in the status of the 
request from eight EU  member States to export apples and pears under a systems approach to the 
United States. The US  Department of Agriculture continues to work through its administrative 
procedures on this request. The US again no tes that the EU is able to export apples and pears to 
the United States under the existing preclearance program.  
27.9.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
28  NIGERIA – RESTRICTIVE POLICIES ON AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM 
BRAZIL  
28.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Brazil.  
28.2.  The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
28.3.  In recent years, Nigeria has bee n increasingly adopting a series of tariff and non -tariff 
measures in order to restrict the access of imported agricultural products to its domestic market. 
These measures range from providing no answer to sanitary certification proposals to maintaining 
unjustified import bans. Brazil invites Nigeria to provide answers to the questions posed by Brazil 
during the 98th, 99th, and 100th meetings of the Committee on Agriculture. Brazil also request s to 
receive answers to the sanitary certification proposals tha t it had already sent, and which Brazil had 
mentioned during the 80th meeting of the SPS  Committee.  
28.4.  Nigeria's position on these issues lacks transparency and is not in accordance with the 
principles of the SPS Agreement, especially Articles  2, 5, 8, and it s Annex  C, as well as Article  4 of 
the Agreement on Agriculture. Brazil expects Nigeria to provide answers so that progress on these 
matters can be made.  
28.5.  The delegate of Nigeria  indicated the following:  
28.6.  Nigeria wishes to thank Brazil for placing this issue  on the Council's agenda. As with other 
WTO Members, Nigeria's agriculture policies comprise several elements. It would have been helpful 
if Brazil had placed a specific element of Nigeria's agricultural policies of concern on the agenda of 
this meeting to  enable Nigeria to clarify the measure at issue. To the best of Nigeria's knowledge, 
Brazil has not raised an SPS -related trade concern with Nigeria. What Nigeria does have with Brazil 
is a proposal for Nigeria and Brazil to negotiate a bilateral arrangeme nt, and Nigeria does not know G/C/M/142  
 
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  at what point a proposal to negotiate became a trade concern. Therefore, Nigeria requests Brazil to 
clarify its concern so that Nigeria can respond accordingly.  
28.7.  Nigeria's  agricultural policies are consistent with its WTO  commi tments under the GATT and 
the Agreement on Agriculture. Notwithstanding, Nigeria has had to implement some temporary 
measures pursuant to Article  XII of the GATT  1994 to address the economic shocks that have 
negatively impacted Nigeria's external reserve a nd exerted unprecedented pressure on its currency , 
the Naira. These shocks have also significantly weakened Nigeria's ability to finance its import s, 
have undermine d its BOP position , and have increased Nigeria's chances of defaulting on its 
sovereign debt if timely and appropriate measures are not taken. These temporary measures are 
also being implemented pursuant to Article  XVIII:4(a) of the GATT  1994 to address Nigeria's 
livelihood and extreme poverty difficulties. Nigeria's  extreme poverty  and livelihood security 
difficulties, as well as its high rate of youth unemployment (35% as of December  2021), ha ve also 
triggered an exponential increase in social ills and vices that have further worsen ed Nigeria's national 
security situation. These te mporary measures are also geared towards addressing Nigeria's national 
security difficulties pursuant to Article  XXI of the GATT.  Its current difficulties notwithstanding, 
Nigeria's government is working assiduously to address its economic and national sec urity difficulties 
with a view to phasing out these measures as soon as possible.  
28.8.  Nigeria notes that it looks forward to receiving specific details from Brazil. In addition, 
regarding Brazil's same concern, as possibly raised in the Committee on Agricultur e, Nigeria will 
provide a response in due course in line with its statement just delivered.  
28.9.  Nigeria thanks Brazil for its interest in Nigeria's agricultural policies and will continue to 
engage constructively with Brazil towards strengthening their thrivin g bilateral ties.  
28.10.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
28.11.   Brazil thanks Nigeria for its constructive engagement on these matters. As a point of 
clarification, Brazil is still waiting for Nigeria's written responses to Brazil's questions presented i n 
the Committee on Agriculture. Brazil has presented its questions at three  different meetings of the 
Committee on Agriculture ( CoA) and is yet to receive any answers from Nigeria. Accordingly, Brazil 
requests Nigeria to submit its written answers to the q uestions from Brazil that Nigeria has received.  
28.12.   The delegate of Nigeria  indicated the following:  
28.13.   Nigeria is working on its responses to the questions that Brazil has raised through the 
Information Management System (IMS), and will submit a response before the next meeting of the 
CoA. Nigeria will also reach out to Brazil bilaterally to see how it can touch upon issues of interest 
to Brazil, with whom they have strong and close ties.  
28.14.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
29  CHINA – EXPORT CONTROL LAW – REQUEST FROM JAPAN  
29.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Japan.  
29.2.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
29.3.  Japan continues to have concerns over China's Export Control Law, which entered into force 
in December  2020. The details of China's export -controlled items, and the details of the law's 
regulations and operations, are still unclear.  
29.4.  As it has stated in past Council meetings, and considering that the objective of the law is to 
safeguard national in terests, Japan wishes to reiterate its concerns over three  points in particular. 
First, Japan is concerned that the scope of products subject to export controls may possibly be  
excessive. Second, Japan is concerned that there may be cases requir ing unnecessary disclosure of 
technological information during classification and end -user or usage investigations. Third, Japan is  
also concerned that the provisions on countermeasures for discriminatory export regulation by other 
countries are maintained in  the law.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  29.5.  Japan believes that the aforementioned export restrictions stipulated in this law may 
constitute an overly stringent export regulation or be unnecessary in light of the international export 
control regime. Therefore, they may equate to export res trictions prohibited under Article  XI of the 
GATT and consequently be inconsistent with the WTO  Agreement.  
29.6.  In this regard, Japan wishes to reiterate the following two  points, as highlighted in previous 
meetings of the Council. First, Japan is concerned tha t the draft regulations on rare earths published 
in January  2021 mentioned a plan to set out strategic reserves. Japan believes that this plan could 
mean that China may introduce controls on exports of rare earths and related products in accordance 
with th e aforementioned Export Control Law. Second, regarding the "Unreliable Entities List" and 
export prohibition list based on the external trade law, Japan is concerned by the lack of clarity in 
the relationship between the entities list in the Export Control  Law and the items covered in the law 
and the technology list. In particular, with regard to the "Untrusted Entity List" measures, Japan is 
concerned about whether the fairness and transparency of the certification application of foreign 
entities to be lis ted and the content of measures taken against foreign entities would be ensured. 
Since it could be said that the predictability of the operation is extremely low, this could be seen as 
being inconsistent with Article  X of the GATT.  
29.7.  Japan understands that C hina explained at the Council's previous meeting that it was still 
drafting the supporting regulations and control lists of the Export Control Law, and also that it would 
maintain communications with relevant Members and provide updates in due course. Acco rdingly, 
Japan will continue to observe the details of the regulations on implementing the law and hopes that 
its concerns will be resolved in the final draft of the regulations. In addition, Japan is of the view 
that the countermeasure provisions should b e removed from the law.  
29.8.  Japan requests China to provide information on the detailed regulations and their timeline in 
full transparency, while also providing ample time for their consideration.  
29.9.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
29.10.   As stated at the CTG's previous meeting, the European Union is closely following 
developments on China's new Export Control Law, which took effect on 1  December  2020.  
29.11.   The European Union acknowledges the publication of the Export Control White Paper in 
Decemb er 2021. However, the EU is concerned that the White Paper is more about safeguarding 
China's national interests than contributing to international peace and security. For example, the 
White Paper seems to imply that existing international export control r egimes jeopardize the stability 
of global value chains and the rights of developing countries.  
29.12.   While recognizing that the Chinese Export Control Law consolidates China's non -proliferation 
commitments and export controls, the European Union still wishes to recall its five  major concerns 
regarding this measure, namely: (i)  the extra -territorial application of the law; (ii)  the rules on 
deemed exports and re -exports; (iii)  the scope of controls; (iv)  the retaliation clause; and, finally, 
(v) the Euro pean Union wishes to request China to explain the relationship between the technologies 
that are subject to the restrictions under the Export Control Law (for example, the lists formulated 
under the implementing administrative laws and regulations) and the  list of technologies that are 
prohibited or restricted to be exported under the Catalogue of Technologies Restricted or Forbidden 
for Export.  
29.13.   The European Union notes that, at the November CTG  meeting, China referred to its answers 
in the context of the T PR exercise. In the TPR, China replied that "[T]he Catalogue of Technologies 
Restricted or Forbidden for Export does not lie in the applicable scope of the Export Control Law. […] 
The former was made according to the Export Control Law, while the latter wa s under the Regulations 
on [the] Unreliable Entity List". However, the Export Control Law explicitly stipulates that the 
purpose of the legislation is to safeguard national security interests, while the Catalogue of 
Technologies Restricted or Forbidden for  Export also aims to regulate management over 
technological exports and maintain national economic security. The EU requests China to further 
clarify the differences in this regard, in particular in terms of the consequences for EU  companies G/C/M/142  
 
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  and operators in China. The EU refers to its previous CTG  statement for full details of these 
five concerns.16 
29.14.   In addition, the European Union requests China to clarify whether the lists originate from 
multilateral non -proliferation efforts or if they are based rather o n national considerations, and if so, 
which. Finally, the EU also requests China to clarify whether the corresponding references to the 
lists of multilateral export control regimes will be published in order to provide legal clarity.  
29.15.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
29.16.   Taking note of the Export Control White Paper issued by the State Council Information Office 
in December  2021, Canada requests further clarity regarding the scope and application of China's 
Export Control Law (ECL). For example, C anada understands that the ECL includes a concept of 
"national interests" that goes well beyond the scope of international export control regimes that are 
based on national security and international non -proliferation considerations. Canada requests more 
information on how China defines "national interests" in this context, and how its definition could 
affect the breadth of export controls that could be considered under the ECL. Canada asks if, for 
instance, its definition would allow China to adopt any exp ort controls intended to promote economic 
development and industrial policy objectives.  
29.17.   Canada also understands that the ECL includes a provision stipulating that China could take 
reciprocal measures against foreign countries or regions that "abuse" its ex port control measures. 
Canada would appreciate further clarity on how "abuse" of export control measures by foreign 
countries is defined, particularly "abuse" deemed to be endangering China's "national interests."  
29.18.   Canada notes the importance of transparenc y in the application of the ECL to ensure that 
legitimate commercial activities are not impeded and welcomes any clarifications China could provide 
in this regard.  
29.19.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
29.20.   Australia notes the statements by Japan, the European Union, and Canada, in relation to 
China's Export Control Law  (ECL) . 
29.21.   As set out in its submission to China's consultation with interested parties ahead of the 
adoption of this law in December  2020, Australia welcomed efforts to codify the regul atory 
framework for defence export controls. Australia also welcomes China's efforts to clarify aspects of 
its export control regime through the publication of a White Paper in December  2021.  
29.22.   However, Australia still has concerns about the broad scope of t he ECL. Australia encourages 
China to continue to provide greater clarity in relation to key elements of the law, including its 
jurisdiction, the scope of its administrator powers, and confirmation that the law is consistent with 
China's international comm itments, including under the WTO's  rules and the China -Australia Free 
Trade Agreement (ChAFTA).  
29.23.   Australia continues to urge China to take account of the concerns of foreign businesses and 
Members in the implementation of this law and the development of fut ure measures.  
29.24.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
29.25.   China wishes to thank Japan, the European Union, Canada, and Australia for their continuous 
interest in China's E xport Control Law . 
29.26.   China wishes to provide the following clarifications:  
29.27.   First, Ch ina has accelerated the formulation and amendment of the supporting laws and 
regulations to its E xport Control Law  in order to provide clearer and more specific guidance for all 
parties to help them implement and abide by the Export Control Law. China enco urages Members to 
 
16 Document  G/C/M/141, paragraphs  28.9-28.16.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  continue their engagement with China in this regard, including through submitting their comments 
and suggestions during the public consultation period for supporting laws and regulations.  
29.28.   Second, China wishes to reiterate that China's Exp ort Control Law is not intended to impose 
general restrictions on the general trade between Chinese and foreign enterprises.  
29.29.   Third, on the relationship between the technologies that are subject to the restrictions under 
the Export Control Law and the list of technologies that are prohibited/restricted to be exported 
under the Foreign Trade Law, China notes that any technologies that are civil -military dual -use 
technologies shall be subject to the Export Control Law.  
29.30.   Fourth, on Article  48 of the Export Contr ol Law, China's aim in including this provision is to 
target abuse of export control measures by foreign countries. China considers that including such a 
provision conforms to the basic norms governing international relations, WTO  rules, and 
internationall y recognized practice.  
29.31.   Fifth, on the restriction list under Article  18 of the Export Control Law and the Unreliable 
Entity List, these are based on different legal systems. The restriction list under Article  18 targets 
importers and end -users that "have vi olated the requirements for end users or end use 
management" or "may endanger national security and interests" or "have used the Controlled Items 
for terrorist purposes".  
29.32.   Finally, China wishes to continue its engagement with those Members that are interest ed in 
this important issue.  
29.33.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
30  UNITED STATES – DISCRIMINATORY QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTION ON STEEL 
AND/OR ALUMINIUM IMPORTS – REQUEST FROM CHINA  
30.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
China.  
30.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
30.3.  China raised this concern at the March meeting of the C MA. China thanks the United States 
for responding to its concern. However, China's key concerns remain. China took no te of the most 
recent development regarding the US  Section  232 tariffs, where the US will adopt tariff -rate quotas 
for products previously covered by Section  232 tariffs from the European Union, Japan, and the 
United Kingdom.  
30.4.  China's first question is whether, and when, the United States intends to notify the C MA of 
these measures. Its second  question is what the legal basis is for these measures under the 
WTO rules. China took note that the US had clarified its national legal basis fo r the measures in the 
March meeting of the CMA, but nevertheless wishes to know how the US  national legal basis for 
these measures is consistent with WTO  rules. On top of that, China wishes to raise the concerns 
indicated below.  
30.5.  First, any measures that br ing in new quotas, maintain tariffs above the ceiling binding, or 
discriminate between WTO  Members, seem difficult to reconcile with the WTO  rules, including 
Article  I, Article  XI, and Article  XIII of the GATT. Indeed, one  Member that had just concluded su ch 
an arrangement with the United States issued a statement calling "these duties incompatible with 
World Trade Organization rules".  
30.6.  Second, China does not know how to name the approach of raising tariffs first and then 
reducing them for selected trading p artners, but it does constitute a dangerous precedent. China 
believes that this kind of arbitrary and discriminatory trade policy is contrary to both the letter and 
the spirit of the WTO  rules, as well as the history of the multilateral trading system.  
30.7.  Last but not least, what deeply worries China is that the parties that signed these 
trade-restrictive and discriminatory arrangements are major WTO  Members. As part of the G/C/M/142  
 
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  arrangement, one  Member has even suspended the ongoing WTO  dispute regarding this measu re. 
China believes that this kind of practice will significantly undermine the rules -based multilateral 
trading system.  
30.8.  It has been almost four  years since the United States implemented its Section  232 tariffs on 
aluminium and steel. Steel prices remained elevated, and trade was disrupted. Instead of selectively 
removing tariffs on certain partners, the US should correct its course by removing these tariffs and 
quotas altogether, as required by the letter and the spirit of the WTO  Agreements.  
30.9.  The delegate o f Türkiye  indicated  the following:  
30.10.   Additional duties by the United States on imports of steel and aluminium products, also 
known as Section  232 tariffs, have been in force since 2018. Türkiye has been one of the countries 
subject to these additional duties , which in Türkiye 's view violate the WTO  Agreement on Safeguards 
as well as the GATT  1994. These additional duties are also being challenged in the panel proceeding 
WT/DS564.  
30.11.   What Türkiye has been witnessing from the very beginning is that an increasing n umber of 
Members are being exempted from the additional duties on the basis of certain bilateral agreements 
with the United States. Although within certain quantitative limits, these Members are now receiving 
favourable treatment when entering the US  marke t, without paying any additional duty at all. The 
market share of the Members that received or are about to receive a favourable treatment amounts 
to 78% of the US  market as of 2021.  
30.12.   Türkiye  is of the view that there is no convincing reason for lifting the se measures for certain 
Members while excluding others, in a manner undermining the very basis of the multilateral trading 
system. Indeed, these quantitative restrictions, and the discriminatory manner in which they are 
now being applied, appears to be in violation of the core WTO  provisions, in particular the 
non-discrimination principle in Article  I, Article  II:1(a), and Article  II:1(b) of the GATT  1994. These 
measures are also contrary to the obligations of the United States under Article  XI:1 of the 
GATT 1994, on the elimination of quantitative restrictions.  
30.13.   Therefore, Türkiye  reiterates its request for the total elimination of all additional duties and 
quantitative restrictions, thus removing any further impediments to global trade in these products.  
30.14.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
30.15.   The United States takes note of the comments and questions raised by China regarding the 
WTO consistency of the Section  232 measures. The United States has invoked Article  XXI(b) of the 
GATT  1994 and  its actions are therefore wholly consistent with the WTO.  
30.16.   Regarding questions relating to the operation of the Section  232 quotas, the United States 
refers Members to the proclamations issued by the President under Section  232, and to the quota 
implementa tion information published on the website of US  Customs and Border Protection.  
30.17.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
31  UNITED STATES – EXPORT CONTROL MEASURES FOR ICT  PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM 
CHINA  
31.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
China.  
31.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
31.3.  China considers that it is a pity to have to raise this issue again. In February  2022, the United 
States added another 33  Chinese entities to its so -called unverified list to restrict their ability to 
receive shipments from US  exporters. In recent years, the US has been using export controls as a 
tool of economic bullying, constantly taking unilateral measures to crack down on Chinese 
enterprises, inst itutions, and individuals. China firmly opposes this practice, which disregards basic 
WTO rules, undermines the market principle and the principle of fair competition, and endangers the G/C/M/142  
 
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  security of global supply chains. China urges the US to abide by the W TO rules and immediately to 
stop these unjust and unfair practices.  
31.4.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
31.5.  As stated previously, the United States does not believe that the WTO  Council for Trade in 
Goods is the appropriate forum to disc uss issues related to national security.  
31.6.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
32  UNITED STATES – MEASURES REGARDING MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION FOR 
ICT PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM CHINA  
32.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agend a at the request of  
China.  
32.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
32.3.  It is unfortunate that China has to raise this issue again, as two  more Chinese companies 
were banned in March  2022 from provid ing telecommunication s services on the US market. China  
wishes to reiterate its serious concerns over the relevant measures taken by the United States 
restricting China's companies from provid ing telecommunication s products and services in the US. 
China urges the US to abide by the WTO 's rules and immediately to stop these unjust and unfair 
practices.  
32.4.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
32.5.  As stated previously, the United States does not believe that the WTO  Council for Trade in 
Goods is the appropriate forum to discuss issues related to nat ional security.  
32.6.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
33  AUSTRALIA – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION ON 5G  EQUIPMENT – 
REQUEST FROM CHINA  
33.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
China.  
33.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
33.3.  China regrets to have to raise this issue again as no progress has yet been made  on it. The 
key questions that China sent to Australia have still not yet been directly answ ered. China also has 
serious concerns that the market restriction and prohibition measures targeting certain Chinese 
telecommunications companies have been extended to both 5G and existing 4G  networks. China 
urges Australia to review its regulatory policie s and to provide fair market access for Chinese 
companies to participate in its telecommunications sector, and to bring its action into line with 
WTO rules.  
33.4.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
33.5.  Australia again notes China's statement. China f irst raised this issue in the WTO in late  2018. 
Since then, Australia has engaged constructively with China to explain the rationale for its position 
on 5G  networks. As previously stated, Australia's position on 5G  networks is country agnostic, 
transparent , risk-based, non -discriminatory, and fully WTO  consistent.  
33.6.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  34  EUROPEAN UNION – SWEDEN'S DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION ON 
5G EQUIPMENT – REQUEST FROM CHINA  
34.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had be en included on the agenda at the request of  
China.  
34.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
34.3.  China regrets to have to raise this issue again. Despite its repeated requests, to date, China 
has not seen any evidence provided by the Swedish Post and Tele com Authority (PTS) showing that 
Chinese companies' products pose any security risks to Sweden. China requests Sweden immediately 
to withdraw its non -transparent and discriminatory measure, to provide fair market access to 
Chinese companies to operate in S weden, and to bring its action into line with WTO  rules.  
34.4.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
34.5.  The European Union notes that the matter raised by China in relation to the recent Swedish 
5G spectrum auction is still under legal proceed ings in Sweden. In light of these ongoing 
proceedings, the EU will not enter into details on this issue in the Council on this occasion.  
34.6.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
35  EUROPEAN UNION – BELGIUM'S DRAFT LAW INTRODUCING ADDITIONAL SECURITY 
MEAS URES FOR THE PROVISION OF MOBILE 5G  SERVICES – REQUEST FROM CHINA  
35.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
China.  
35.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
35.3.  China raised this concern regarding Belgium's "Draft Law Introducing Additional Security 
Measures for the Provision of Mobile 5G  Services" on several occasions in meetings of the 
TBT Committee . In particular, China wishes to refer to its statement made in the TBT  Committee 
meeting held on 11  March  2022. China thank s the European Union for its clarification of the issue at 
that meeting , while nevertheless noting with regret that the above -mentioned draft law had already 
been adopted in Febr uary 2022, without effectively addressing China's concerns.  
35.4.  China wishes to reiterate that its major concerns on this issue remain, particular ly regarding 
Article  105, Section  4, of the above -mentioned law. China recognizes that WTO  Members are 
legitimatel y entitled to protect the security of their 5G  network, but the TBT  Agreement is very clear 
that a technical regulation is a document that lays down product characteristics or their related 
processes and product methods. Moreover, Article  2.8 of the TBT  Agreement  requires Members to 
specify technical regulations based on product requirement in terms of performance, whenever 
appropriate. In this context, China requests Belgium to ensure that its  risk assessment on vendors' 
products be based on objective tech nical criteria instead of non -technical elements.  
35.5.  In addition, according to the European Union's response to China's concerns expressed at the 
March meeting of the TBT  Committee, China noticed that, in Belgium's law, the risk assessment 
criteria are based on the factors set out in the EU's NIS  Cooperation Group's 5G  Toolbox. It is worth 
noting that the contents of the Toolbox are quite broad,  and its application could create unnecessary 
barriers to international trade. China suggests to the EU that it notif y the law to the WTO while 
providing a reasonable time for other Members to make their comments on it in writing.  
35.6.  China also wishes to express its concern on the notification  G/TBT/N/BEL/45 in the 
TBT Committee regarding the Royal Decree and relevant regul ations and technical standards. 
Chapter  2 of the notified Royal Decree prohibits or restricts 5G  mobile network operators from using 
active elements produced by "high -risk equipment manufacturers", but does so without indicating 
any specific criteria. In t his regard, China wishes to point out that there exist international industry 
standards based on technical criteria. Accordingly, China urges Belgium to comply with Article  2.4 
of the TBT  Agreement and adopt internationally recognized technical standards t hat can assess 
product security  objectively.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  35.7.  Finally, China notes and appreciates the European Union's intervention made at the 
TBT Committee meeting in March indicating that it would notify  to the Committee, with a new 
commenting period, the revised Royal  Decree (G/TBT/N/BEL/45). China looks forward to receiving 
that notification as soon as possible.  
35.8.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
35.9.  The European Union thanks China for its interest in the "Draft Law Introducing Additional 
Security  Measures for the Provision of Mobile 5G  Services" and the draft "Royal Decree for the 
Secured Rollout of 5G", notified by Belgium to the WTO in documents  G/TBT/N/BEL/44 and 
G/TBT/N/BEL/45.  
35.10.   During the commenting period for those notifications, for which th e initial comment period 
(60 days) was extended by addendum at China's request, China submitted written comments to 
which the European Union  replied on 8  November  2021. Additionally, in a detailed oral exchange at 
the TBT  Committee meeting in March  2022, t he EU responded to further concerns raised by China.  
35.11.   The notified draft law was adopted on 10  February  2022 and no revision is foreseen in the 
near future.  
35.12.   As to the concerns raised by China, the European Union refers to its detailed statement at 
the TBT  Committee, and reasserts notably that, in its view, the adopted law is in line with the 
TBT Agreement. Risk assessment by the competent authority refers to the most appropriate existing 
best practices and international standards in accordance with Article  2.4 of the TBT  Agreement, as 
appropriate, where those norms exist.  
35.13.   On non -technical vulnerabilities, no relevant best practices or international standards 
currently  exist. Therefore, solely referring to existing international standards to evaluate the 
performance of the product would be an ineffective and inappropriate means by which to fulfil the 
legitimate objective pursued.  
35.14.   Additionally, the draft Royal Decree does specify to what degree and in what way high risk 
vendors are forbidden or restricted. Those restrictions are differentiated according to the various 
parts of a 5G  network to ensure that they do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the 
legitimate objective of the measure. Moreover, the adopted law provides for sufficient legal remedies  
against the decision classifying economic operators as high -risk vendors.  
35.15.   Finally, the European Union wishes to note that the draft Royal Decree is currently being 
re-drafted and will be notified in accordance with the TBT  Agreement as a revision with a n ew 
commenting period in due course.  
35.16.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
36  EUROPEAN UNION – CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM  
–  STATEMENT BY CHINA  
–  STATEMENT BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
36.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
China and the Russian Federation.  
36.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
36.3.  China notes that, in March  2022, the EU  Council agreed a general approach on the C arbon 
Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) . However, China's major concerns remain.  
36.4.  First, China wishes to know how the European Union will phase out the free allowances 
allocated to the EU's enterprises under the EU  Emission Trading S ystem  (ETS). Prior to those free 
allowances being phased out, China also a sks how the CBAM could be considered to be consistent 
with the WTO  principle of national treatment when the EU  charges import products under the CBAM.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  36.5.  Second, China requests the European Union to explain whether it will still treat products that 
are differ ent only in terms of embedded emissions as like or similar products. If so, China questions 
how the CBAM could be considered to be consistent with the most-favoured -nation ( MFN) principle 
when the EU charges different carbon prices for these like or simila r products.  
36.6.  Third, if imported products must pay prices for their embedded emissions under the CBAM, 
and the relevant costs on these imported products exceed the EU's commitment in its Goods 
Schedule, China questions how the CBAM could be considered to be consistent with Article  II of the 
GATT  1994.  
36.7.  Fourth, China asks the European Union how it can ensure that the methods of calculation and 
verification of the embedded emissions of import products and other import procedural requirements 
will not constitute some new non -tariff barriers for imported products.  
36.8.  Fifth, China asks if the European Union intends to use the general exception in Article  XX of 
GATT  1994 to ensure the CBAM's WTO  compatibility.  
36.9.  Sixth, China asks if the European Union intends to set up ca rbon costs refund arrangements 
for EU  exports. If so, China considers that these could amount to prohibited subsidies.  
36.10.   China believes that effectively to address climate change and promote sustainable 
development, Members need actively to implement the Uni ted Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement, as well as promote trade and investment 
liberalization in green sectors. UNFCCC  Article  3, paragraph  5, clearly stipulates that measures taken 
to combat climate change, in cluding unilateral measures, should not constitute a means of arbitrary 
or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. However, the CBAM, 
as a unilateral measure, is neither consistent with the basic principles of "commo n but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities" and "nationally determined contributions" under the 
UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement, nor with the WTO  principles and spirit of a free and open 
multilateral trading system.  
36.11.   Finally, China hop es that the European Union enhances its transparency in the process of 
drafting the CBAM by fully taking into account Members' concerns and comments intended to ensure 
the CBAM's compatibility with WTO  rules and that no new trade barriers are created by it . 
36.12.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
36.13.   The Russian Federation reiterates its statements made at previous meetings of the C MA and 
the CTG and expresses its deep concern with regard to the European Union's proposed C BAM. Russia 
supports international efforts aimed at combating climate change. Russia also believes that climate 
change should be tackled only in cooperation between all members of the international community. 
However, the EU has chosen to act unilaterally by elaborating a trade measure, namely, CBAM , 
which could result in additional trade restrictions in the EU  market.  
36.14.   The Russian Federation wishes to draw WTO  Members ' attention to the fact that , according 
to paragraph  1 of Article  1 of the European Union's draft regulati on establishing a CBAM, the goal of 
the CBAM is "to prevent the risk of carbon leakage". According to the Explanatory Memorandum to 
this draft regulation , "carbon leakage occurs if, for reasons of different ambitions related to climate 
policies, businesses  in certain industry sectors or subsectors were to transfer production to other 
countries with less stringent emission constraints or imports from these countries would replace 
equivalent but less greenhouse gas (GHG)  emissions intensive products due to th e difference in 
climate policy".  
36.15.   The Russian Federation wishes to remind the European Union and all Members that the 
UNFCCC, as well as the Paris Agreement, allow their Parties to define their own way of achieving 
climate goals that are most effective for them. According to Article  3 of the UNFCCC, "policies and 
measures to deal with climate change should be cost -effective so as to ensure global benefits at the 
lowest possible cost. To achieve this, such policies and measures should take into account differ ent 
socio-economic contexts, be comprehensive, cover all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of 
greenhouse gases and adaptation, and comprise all economic sectors".  G/C/M/142  
 
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  36.16.   In addition, Article  5 of the UNFCCC provides for the cooperation of its Parties in orde r "to 
promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to sustainable 
economic growth and development in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus 
enabling them better to address the problems of climate change. M easures taken to combat climate 
change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade".  
36.17.   Despite all these provisions, the European Union has decided t o punish all countries that 
have applied policies different from the EU's own climate policies. Thus, according to the draft 
Regulation, the CBAM "should apply to goods imported into the customs territory of the Union from 
third countries, except where the ir production has already been subject to the EU Emission Trading 
System (EU  ETS), whereby it applies to third countries or territories, or to a carbon pricing system  
fully linked with the EU  ETS". Russia notes that the exclusion of certain Members from th e application 
of the CBAM is unlikely to be justified by WTO  rules, or provisions of the international climate 
agreements.  
36.18.   In addition to such a discriminatory approach to the application of the CBAM, in March  2022, 
the EU  Council proposed amendments accor ding to which an accredited verifier under the CBAM may 
be a person accredited in accordance with Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 
No. 2018/2067, in other words, the European Union's own people. It makes mutual recognition of 
verification between th e EU and its trading partners, even in theory, impossible. Russia also notes 
that the EU  Council's proposals also expand the scope of products subject to the CBAM.  
36.19.   For the sake of time, the Russian Federation will not spell out all the CBAM  provisions that  
restrict trade. Russia has circulated its written questions to the European Union in 
document s G/MA/W/172 and G/C/W/800. However, the EU has failed to provide answers.  Russia 
urges the EU to consider its questions and provide their responses. Russia also expects that the EU 
will fully respect current trade rules and international climate agreements.  
36.20.   The delegate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  indicated the following:  
36.21.   The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia thanks the proponents for raising the matter of the CBAM. 
From Saudi Arabia's  perspective, while the European Union stated that the proposed mechanism 
would  be in conformity with WTO  rules and other international obligations, the EU is yet to provide 
explanations of how it aims to achieve this . While the EU is intending to address the risk of 
investment leakage from the EU to other countries , the main objecti ve is in fact to maintain the 
competitiveness of EU  industries. Saudi Arabia's  very preliminary review indicates that the proposed 
mechanism raises very serious concerns due to its potential medium and long -term negative 
implications on global trade.  
36.22.   The K ingdom of Saudi Arabia considers the CBAM's  consistency with fundamental WTO rules 
to be questionable. Therefore, the burden of proof to confirm that this mechanism is consistent with 
the EU 's obligations and commitments regarding MFN, national treatment, rules of origin , and 
non-tariff barriers ( NTBs), lies with the EU  itself. Furthermore, monitoring and calculating the carbon 
emissions embedded in the products covered by the CBAM is not a straightforward task and many 
details of the calculation methodolog y are not yet clear . For these reasons, Saudi Arabia requests 
that the EU provide further clarification on this matter.  
36.23.   The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia kindly requests the European Union to specify articles in the 
WTO Agreements that allow it to adopt this unn ecessarily complicated mechanism. Saudi Arabia also 
urges the EU to further engage in consultations with Members in order to ensure the CBAM's full 
compliance with WTO  rules and Agreements and to ensure that the proposed mechanism will not 
create unnecessa ry barriers to trade, or be used as a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade, or to be applied in a manner that 
constitutes protection to EU  domestic industries. Finally, Saudi Arabia looks forw ard to receiving 
further details and reflections from the EU on its proposed mechanism, and the Kingdom stands 
ready to engage with the EU and interested Members on this matter.  
36.24.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  G/C/M/142  
 
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  36.25.   Paraguay wishes  to reiterate  its interest in this trade concern and requests  that its previous 
statements be recorded in the meeting's minutes.17 Accordingly, Paraguay  again request s the 
European Union to provide information on whether it is planning a tariff reduction for imported 
products with a low carbon footprint and a tariff increase for those with a larger footprint. Paraguay 
is of the view that incentives are equally as important as penalties where  such measures are 
concerned.  
36.26.   The delegate of Türkiye  indicated the following:  
36.27.   Türkiye has shared its comments on the proposed Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism 
(CBAM) of the European Union on many occasions, including in the C MA and the Committee on Trade 
and Environment, as well as on bilateral platforms and during the public cons ultation process carried 
out by the European Commission.  
36.28.   Türkiye thanks the European Commission for its transparent approach and constant 
information -sharing exercises in the Committee meetings on the current design of the CBAM. Türkiye 
believes that the i nternational community needs to increase its collective action to mitigate the 
impact of climate change. However, unilateral response measures risk constituting arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination in favour of domestic producers, and being disguised restrictions on 
trade. Türkiye hopes that the CBAM will be fully compatible with WTO  rules, both in its design and 
in its implementation.  
36.29.   Türkiye also considers that the CBAM, as proposed by the European Commission, appears 
to lack a proper consideration o f the different circumstances and historical responsibilities of 
Members. In this regard, Türkiye considers that the CBAM should be implemented commensurate  
with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.  
36.30.   Finally, Türkiye wishes to highlight that it will continue to follow the process closely and from 
the perspective of WTO  rules, as well as the multilaterally accepted principles of the environmental 
agreements.  
36.31.   The delegate of the Kingdom of Bahrain  indicated t he following:  
36.32.   The Kingdom of Bahrain shares similar concerns to those raised by the  item's  proponents 
and wishes to recall , in this regard,  its statement made at previous Council meetings.18 
36.33.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
36.34.   Brazil refers to its previous statements on the topic19 and continues to  urge the European 
Union  to take into due consideration the comments made by Brazil in the process of its drafting and 
implementing  of the measures under its "Green Deal", and hopes that a channel of d ialogue will be 
established between the competent authorities.  
36.35.   The delegate of India, addressing Agenda Items 36 and 41, indicated the following:  
36.36.   India's statement applies to this item and the other agenda items on the European Green 
Deal and the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism  (CBAM). 
36.37.   India has been raising its concerns on the proposed rules under the EU Green Deal in various 
WTO forums , and considers that  trade and sustainability policy should create a just and inclusive 
global green econom y where all countries , developed as well as developing , have equal competitive 
opportunities to supply goods and services. Trade and sustainability policy should avoid establishing 
a two -tier economy where the developed countries have the resources and cap acity to transition to 
a green economy, while the rest of the world is left in a brown economy.  
36.38.   Environment is the global commons that Members should all be worrying about the most. 
Indeed, the world is coming together in an unprecedented manner in address ing the challenges of 
 
17 Document  G/C/M/141, paragraphs  39.45 -39.49.  
18 Document  G/C/M/140, paragraphs  28.11 -28.12.  
19 Document  G/C/M/141, paragraphs  39.17 -39.24.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  the environment and climate change. This was demonstrated in COP -26 in Glasgow and more 
recently in Nairobi at the UNEP  summit.  
36.39.   At Glasgow, which hosted 194  countries, the world kept in reach the goal of limiting global 
warming to 1.5 °C above pre -industrial levels. For its part, India's Prime Minister announced India's  
NetZero plans by 2070, presented five  nectars or Panchamrit, some with near -term 
2030 commitments, and stressed the importance of the acronym LIFE – Lifestyle for Enviro nment.  
36.40.   In Nairobi, 175  countries came together and made possible the adoption of a landmark 
resolution to Beat Plastic Pollution, which is a major step forward in global efforts to make peace 
with nature. An agreement to create a legally binding internatio nal instrument is an historic 
achievement.  
36.41.   These efforts show collective resolve, which is what is required to solve environmental and 
climate problems. International Trade Law cannot form the unilateral basis for addressing these 
concerns. The principles enshrined in International Environment Law, discussions on which predate 
the formation of the WTO by more than two  decades, should be fully reflected in the measures 
proposed under International Trade Law. The cherry -picking of environment law or measures into 
trade is not the right way to address the biggest challenge currently faced by humankind. Instead, 
countries should tackle transboundary environmental problems on the basis of international 
cooperation.  
36.42.   India continues to study the various provisions of the European Green Deal and, within that, 
its CBAM. India prima facie  believes that these measures encroach upon the sovereign policy -making 
rights of Members. The proposed measures also violate the basic principles of the International 
Environment Law,  namely common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities.  
36.43.   India remains opposed to such externalization of domestic laws as a matter of principle and 
continues to analyse the substantive aspect of the proposed legislations.  
36.44.   The delegate  of Canada  indicated the following:  
36.45.   Canada is carefully monitoring developments of the CBAM  regulation proposal, and  will 
continue its discussions with the European Union to ensure that all of Canada's carbon pricing 
systems are recognized under the CBAM. Canada also expects that the CBAM  implementation will 
respect the EU's international trade obligations, including un der the WTO and the Canada -EU CETA.  
36.46.   Canada recognizes the importance of trade tools to address carbon leakage as WTO  Members 
take ambitious climate action. Canada, for example, is exploring carbon border adjustments as a 
potential tool to mitigate carbon l eakage.  
36.47.   Canada looks forward to collaborating with the European Union, as well as other 
WTO Members, on how carbon border adjustments could fit into a broader strategy to meet climate 
targets while addressing potential carbon leakage risks.  
36.48.   The delegate of  Japan  indicated the following:  
36.49.   Climate change is one of the most important issues. Members must raise their ambitions 
and policy efforts to achieve carbon neutrality worldwide by 2050, while at the same time ensuring 
a level playing field and preventing c arbon leakage. Policy coordination is important for the 
production and introduction of products with low carbon intensity.  
36.50.   When discussing policy coordination, each Member has been making reduction efforts in the 
past according to their own circumstances, such as energy source constraints and the industrial 
environment, and in principle the focus should be on carbon intensity as the "result of such reduction 
efforts". In other words, if the carbon intensity of a country or sector is low, the country or sect or 
has taken sufficient measures, and it is unlikely that there would be a problem in terms of the level 
playing field or carbon leakage.  
36.51.   In this regard, the European Union's CBAM is designed to be charged when targeted products 
enter the EU's borders, dep ending on the level of explicit carbon prices as a policy tool at that time. G/C/M/142  
 
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  However, if any products that are equally carbon intensive and that produce no carbon leakage have 
tax imposed on the grounds of explicit carbon price differences, it presumably w ill not be justified 
for environmental purposes.  
36.52.   In addition to the aforementioned institutional design issues, it is essential that this measure 
be designed in a manner that is consistent with WTO  rules, as has been repeatedly pointed out.  
Japan considers  that it is paramount to discuss this issue in depth and at the international level.  
36.53.   The delegate of Kazakhstan  indicated the following:  
36.54.   Kazakhstan reiterates its position as expressed at the Council 's previous meeting and 
continues to follow developments around the European Union's C BAM. Kazakhstan urges the EU to 
fully consider the CBAM's compatibility with WTO  rules and regulations and to ensure that any such 
mechanism does not create obstacles to trade.  
36.55.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
36.56.   The Republic of Korea appreciates the European Union's leading role and efforts in tackling 
ongoing climate change. Korea understands that, in an attempt to address the issue of possible 
carbon leakage, the EU has introduced the f ramework of a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism 
(CBAM).  
36.57.   The Republic of Korea wishes to reiterate that trade -related measures, such as the CBAM, 
should be consistent with WTO  rules, while being carefully designed so as not to function as an 
unnecessary tr ade barrier or pose an excessive administrative burden. Korea thus believes that it is 
essential to provide sufficient information and opportunities for Members to submit their opinions to 
those that will be affected by the measure. Moreover, with a view t o reaching a common 
understanding on this issue among Members, thereby avoiding an unexpected negative result, it is 
important to have sufficient discussion and to build a common understanding among international 
communities, including the WTO, before its actual implementation.  
36.58.   The Republic of Korea hopes that the CBAM will be implemented in a manner that fulfils the 
WTO's objectives of ensuring sustainable development and facilitating free trade. Korea will continue 
to look closely at the process of introd ucing the CBAM.  
36.59.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
36.60.   The European Union will deliver its statement on the CBAM under Agenda Item 41. 
36.61.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
37  INDIA – PLAIN COPIER PAPER QUALITY ORDER  2020 – REQUES T FROM INDONESIA  
37.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Indonesia.  
37.2.  The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
37.3.  Indonesia expresses its gratitude to India regarding progress achieved in the ir efforts  towards 
resolving the issue of Indonesian paper exports barriers to India, which has previously resulted in 
considerable losses for Indonesian exporters since the implementation of Plain Copier Paper (Quality 
Order)  2020.  
37.4.  Indonesia wishes to inform India that there has been a relaxation of the mandatory quarantine 
policy, such that the factory visit to Indonesia can now be carried out  more feasibly . In this regard, 
Indonesia seeks information from India regarding the readiness and schedule of inspection of  the 
Bureau of Indian Standards  (BIS) auditors to conduct on -site factory inspections in Indonesia.  
37.5.  Furthermore, Indonesia requests India to accept testing results from accredited conformity 
assessment bodies in Indonesia as a mean s of facilitating conform ity assessment procedures . G/C/M/142  
 
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  Accordingly, a Mutual Recognition Arrangement could be put in place to ensure the acceptance and 
recognition of Indonesia's conformity assessment bodies by BIS.  
37.6.  The delegate of India indicated the following:  
37.7.  The Bureau of Indian Standards operates its product certification activities as per Scheme -I 
of the BIS (Conformity Assessment) Regulations, 2018. Under the Scheme, factory inspection is a 
mandatory requirement for the purpose of granting licences.  
37.8.  The licence to use th e Standard Mark on a product is granted after assessment of the 
manufacturing and testing capabilities of the applicant manufacturer through factory inspection of 
the manufacturing premises. During that visit, a sample of the product is drawn and tested at  a 
third-party testing laboratory, or in -house, or through a combination of both for establishing 
conformity of the product to the requirements of the relevant Indian Standard. At present, there is 
no provision in the BIS (Conformity Assessment) Regulation s, 2018 to undertake remote (virtual) 
inspection for the purposes of conformity assessment activities.  
37.9.  Factory inspections were earlier on hold due to the restrictions on international travel because 
of the COVID -19 pandemic. This position was not discrimi natory against any individual Member. 
Currently, the BIS has started physical inspections for applications received from foreign 
manufacturers, where the country to be visited is facilitating the visit of fully vaccinated BIS  officers 
who are carrying a ne gative RT -PCR test report, without the requirement of quarantine or quarantine 
of up to three  days for which the applicant has to bear the charges incurred due to any quarantine.  
37.10.   The updated rules, as mentioned by the delegate of Indonesia, would be commun icated to 
capital.  
37.11.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
38  PHILIPPINES – SPECIAL SAFEGUARD ON INSTANT COFFEE – REQUEST FROM 
INDONESIA  
38.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Indonesia.  
38.2.  The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
38.3.  Indonesia wishes to thank the Philippines for responding to its concern at recent meetings of 
the CoA and CMA. However, the Philippines has still not provided infor mation on whether or not it 
will stop the imposition of the special safeguard ( SSG) measure for instant coffee from Indonesia. 
The SSG  measure has been applied by the Philippines for four  years , since 2018. Since then, the 
Philippines has received a stagge ring amount of USD  92.5 million from Indonesia.  Therefore, 
Indonesia seeks further clarification on the implementation duration of the measure.  
38.4.  Indonesia believes that the application of an SSG should be temporary or otherwise it would 
undermine tariff com mitments made by the Philippines and the legitimate expectations of other 
Members concerning tariff liberalization. At the same time, the applied tariff imposed as a result of 
the application of the SSG  mentioned above might also be seen as being inconsist ent with the tariff 
commitments of the Philippines enshrined under Article  II of the GATT  1994. Indonesia also urges 
the Philippines to comply with the WTO  principle of transparency and WTO  regulations, especially 
Article  5 of the Agreement on Agriculture,  by updating its notification of the operation of its 
SSG measure. Finally, Indonesia sincerely hopes that the Philippines will review, and immediately 
stop, the application of its SSG to Indonesian instant coffee products.  
38.5.  The delegate of the Philippines  indicated the following:  
38.6.  The Philippines thanks Indonesia for its statement on the Philippines' Special Safeguard on 
Instant Coffee. The Philippines notes that Indonesia had also raised this matter in the Committee on 
Agriculture, to which the Philippines had provided its preliminary responses. In accordance with 
Article  5.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture, an SSG may be invoked on an SSG -eligible product if 
its c.i.f.  import price falls below the trigger price. The trigger price for instant coffee was amon g G/C/M/142  
 
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  those provided in the Philippines' up -front notification in document  G/AG/N/PHL/27, in 2002, which 
is the basis for the imposition of a price -based SSG. The  prices of most imports of coffee entering 
the country during the period were lower than the trigg er price, which warranted the application of 
the price -based SSG.  
38.7.  The price -based SSG on instant coffee was imposed in August  2018 and its imposition 
continues since a majority of imports into the Philippines is still coming in at prices below the trigger 
price and the share of imported brands still dominates the local market. The Philippines lifted the 
application of its SSG on coffee beans (HS 09.01) in 2018, but the SSG for instant coffee (HS  21.01) 
remained, as reflected in the Philippines' MA:5  notific ations for 2019 and 2020. The Philippines will 
submit its MA:5  Annual Summary of SSG  Action for 2021  notification in due course.  
38.8.  The Philippines continues to coordinate on this matter with Manila, and looks forward to 
receiving a copy of Indonesia's statem ent in writing so that it may be conveyed to capital. The 
Philippines stands ready to further discuss the issue with Indonesia and remains committed to 
addressing the matter in the appropriate forum.  
38.9.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
39  UNITED KIN GDOM – ENVIRONMENTAL ACT: FORESTRY COMMODITIES – REQUEST 
FROM INDONESIA  
39.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Indonesia.  
39.2.  The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
39.3.  Indonesia recognizes the importance of preserving the environment and combating illegal 
deforestation, as well as WTO  Members' rights to do so. Nevertheless, Indonesia is of the view that 
such action should be in accordance with the WTO  rules and main principles. In this regard, 
Indonesia wishes to seek clarification from the United Kingdom regarding the mechanism and certain 
imported forestry products or commodities that would be covered by the provisions in the 
UK Environmental Act, especially in the Due Diligence on Forest Risk Commodities policy.  
39.4.  Accordingly, Indonesia requests the United Kingdom for more information on the possibility 
of a Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA), regarding the recognition of Indonesian standards in the 
UK's Due Diligence policy. Finally, Indonesia r equests the UK to provide an update on the 
development of its internal discussions regarding the secondary legislation derived from the 
UK Environmental Act.  
39.5.  The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
39.6.  Argentina wishes to express its support for thi s concern. On this point, Argentina  believe s 
that the measure could be discriminatory and overly  burdensome, that it could impose significant 
social costs on developing countries , and that it could prove counterproductive to the United 
Kingdom's environmen tal objectives. The additional costs would fall on both overseas agricultural 
producers and on companies based in the UK that use the products concerned, which would, in all 
likelihood , lead to diversions of trade, to the detriment of farmers in developing  countries who abide 
by strict domestic environmental regulations.  
39.7.  The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
39.8.  Brazil supports the adoption of policies that seek to pursue legitimate environmental 
objectives , but is concerned about the possible adoptio n of unilateral environmental measures that 
result in unnecessary negative impacts on international trade. Brazil believes that it is essential that 
environmental measures related to trade adopted by the United Kingdom are fully compatible with 
WTO rules, including the principles of most favoured  nation and national treatment , in order to avoid 
potential protectionist bias or the adoption of discriminatory measures . 
39.9.  Brazil recalls that sustainability cannot be addressed without due attention to its social a nd 
economic pillars. In this context, Brazil notes that both the UK and EU  proposals on due diligence G/C/M/142  
 
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  requirements for commodities related to deforestation are based on a flawed assumption that 
reducing demand for commodities that could be related to defor estation would lead people involved 
in such activities to magically start dedicating themselves to legal and sustainable activities. This 
clearly overlooks the many challenges that developing countries face, and disregards the principles 
of the 2030  Agenda . Besides, there are many studies that indicate that,  without proper cooperation 
initiatives, similar diligence policies do not achieve their alleged environmental goals.  
39.10.   Finally, Brazil urges the United Kingdom to take into full consideration its concerns  as 
expressed by Brazil's Embassy in London.  
39.11.   The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
39.12.   The United Kingdom thanks Indonesia for its continued interest in the "Implementing Due 
Diligence on Forest Risk Commodities Consultation Document", as  well as Argentina and Brazil for 
their interventions. As the UK stated at the Committee on Agriculture, and uploaded to Ag -IMS on 
15 March, the consultation period closed on 11  March  2022, and the UK aims to publish a report 
summari zing the feedback withi n 12 weeks of this closing date. The UK would be happy to have 
further bilateral discussion with Indonesia and other Members on the UK's due diligence, if helpful.  
39.13.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
40  EUROPEAN UNION – COUNTERVAILING DUTIES (CVD) O N STAINLESS  STEEL 
COLD -ROLLED FLAT (SSCR) – REQUEST FROM INDONESIA  
40.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Indonesia.  
40.2.  The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
40.3.  Indonesia wishes to raise its serious concerns over the imposition of trade remedy measures 
by the European Union on Stainless Steel Cold -Rolled (SSCR) products from Indonesia, in particular, 
the CVD. On 15  March  2022, the European Commission  issued Implementing Regulation 
No. 2022/433  regarding the imposition of CVD on SSCR  products imported from Indonesia. 
Previously, in July  2021, the EU had imposed Safeguards Duties on Indonesian SSCR  products, as 
well as Anti -Dumping Duties in November  2021. Therefore, Indonesia seeks the EU's clar ifications 
as to its reasons and justification for imposing three  different trade remedy instruments at once, on 
SSCR  products from Indonesia.  
40.4.  The simultaneous imposition of these trade remedies has practically closed access for 
Indonesian SSCR  products to  the European Union and does not accord with the WTO  spirit of free 
and open trade. Specifically for the CVD, Indonesia is of the view that export restraints and 
transnational subsidies, as used by the EU as the basis for its measures, could still not just ify the 
imposition of such a CVD on Indonesia's SSCR  products. Thus, Indonesia believes that the imposition 
made by the EU in implementing the CVD is based on reasons that cannot be justified and a biased 
and misleading interpretation of the WTO  Agreements . For these reasons, Indonesia seeks the EU's 
further clarifications regarding this matter.  
40.5.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
40.6.  China wishes to thank Indonesia for including this agenda item. China is highly concerned 
about the European Union's so-called cross -country subsidy investigation practice in this case. China 
believes that the investigation practice is in violation of both Article  1 and Article  2 of the 
SCM Agreement and the EU  Basic Regulation (EU  2016/1037). The EU also incorrectly int erpreted 
and applied the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts adopted by the 
International Law Commission of the United Nations.  
40.7.  China note s that similar investigation practices had been carried out in other cases and 
relevant enterprises had filed lawsuits against this kind of investigation practice. China is of the view 
that the EU's investigation practice in this case abuse s the SCM Agreement, undermine s the 
legitimate rights of relevant enterprises, and negatively affec ts normal economic cooperation and G/C/M/142  
 
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  cross-border investment. China firmly opposes this investigation practice and requests the EU to 
rectify it as soon as possible.  
40.8.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
40.9.  The European Union appreciates a nd respects Indonesia's right to develop its steel industry 
and exploit its considerable nickel reserves. However, this legitimate industrial policy aim should be 
carried out in line with WTO  rules. The EU recalls that it lodged a WTO  complaint against Ind onesia's 
export ban on nickel ore. This EU  countervailing duty case targets two  key subsidies that undermine 
many competitive EU  industries in the emerging new landscape of unfair trade: first, subsidized raw 
materials critical for industrial value chains;  and second, cross -border subsidies deriving from China 
that Indonesia accepted as its own based on the numerous documents found.  
40.10.   Two further features need also to be highlighted: first, the Indonesian authorities only 
partially cooperated in many aspects of the investigation so that the European Union had to rely in 
part on so -called "facts available"; and second, this case has revealed a large number of agreements 
between the authorities of Indonesia and China for channelling cross -border subsidies.  
40.11.   The E uropean Union has acted in full compliance with the WTO  rules. The EU did not 
countervail subsidies granted outside the national jurisdiction of the exporting country. In fact, the 
Chinese subsidies are clearly attributable to the Indonesian government, as  evidenced by Indonesia's 
dense web of agreements with the Chinese government in the framework of a close cooperation.  
40.12.   In sum, the European Union's investigation revealed that, by providing subsidies to exporting 
producers established in Indonesia with the  express acceptance and acknowledgment of the 
Indonesian authorities, China is creating additional capacity and opening new channels in order to 
export subsidi zed products to the EU, thereby causing injury to EU  producers.  
40.13.   As long as distortive, WTO -counte rvailable subsidies continue damaging the EU  steel 
industry and jeopardizing tens of thousands of jobs, the European Union will have no choice but to 
exercise its legitimate WTO  rights to their fullest extent.  
40.14.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
41  EUROPEAN UNION – EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL (CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT 
MECHANISM AND DEFORESTATION FREE COMMODITIES) – REQUEST FROM INDONESIA  
41.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Indonesia.  He also noted that In dia's intervention under Agenda Item  36 had also covered this 
agenda item .20 
41.2.  The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
41.3.  Indonesia wishes to reiterate its interest in this proposal and to request further information 
from the European Union regarding  the European Green Deal policy, particularly as concerns the 
EU's proposals for its Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and Deforestation Free 
Commodities (DFC). This is an issue that is also of interest to Indonesia, based on benchmark setting 
and mutual acceptance of certifications.  
41.4.  Indonesia is of the view that these policies have the potential to create different treatment 
between products produced in the European Union and imported products, especially for products 
covered by the CBA M and DFC, including iron and steel products, alumin ium, electronic products, 
and wood products. It is also feared that this situation could lead to an increase in the price of 
imported products, making these products uncompetitive on the European market. Furthermore, 
Indonesia also intends to request clarification from the EU regarding the certification mechanism 
and international standards used in the EU  Green Deal policy.  
41.5.  More specifically, regarding the DFC, Indonesia request s the European Union for cla rification 
regarding the reasons for setting benchmarking per country. Meanwhile, regarding the CBAM, 
 
20 Paragraphs  36.35 -36.43.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  Indonesia requests clarification regarding the development of discussions on the issue of Mutual 
Acceptance Verification (MAV).  
41.6.  Indonesia is of the view t hat the issue of climate change cannot be used as an excuse to 
hinder trade, especially for agricultural products, as stipulated in Article  XX of the GATT  1994. In 
addition, any policies relating to sustainability must also pay attention to the needs and c apacities 
of developing countries without disrupting the multilateral trading system; nor should they be used 
as a means of transferring the obligations of certain developed countries to developing countries.  
41.7.  Therefore, Indonesia also intends to clarify wh ether there has been a review of the planned 
EU Green Deal programme in terms of its conformity with the main principles and regulations of the 
WTO, in particular the principles of MFN and national treatment.  
41.8.  The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the followin g: 
41.9.  Paraguay wishes to thank the delegation of Indonesia for including this concern. Paraguay 
submitted its questions on the deforestation strategy to the European Union in the Committee on 
Agriculture , the responses to which it considers have been less tha n satisfactory.  
41.10.   The proposed mechanism contains certain trade requirements that would have an impact on 
trade in goods, which could represent an inconsistency with a number of Articles of the GATT  1994. 
The measures cover only certain types of product, inc luding some that are produced thanks to 
massive subsidies in the European Union, such as meat products and soya. There are no criteria set 
out for the selection of these products, and no evidence is provided to justify their link to 
deforestation in the co untries of origin. A forest is defined as land spanning 0.5  hectares with trees, 
which is extremely restrictive in terms of what would not be considered a forest. The 
deforestation -related measures seem solely to cover forests that are no longer found in p laces such 
as the EU, and to penalize Members that, for centuries, have contributed to the planet's well -being 
through ecosystem services, and continue to do so. They fail to take into account a basic principle 
of international environmental law, namely, c ommon but differentiated responsibilities. They also 
fail to take into consideration the economic and social aspects of sustainability, which are key for 
developing countries.  
41.11.   The due diligence requirements entail a major cost for small and medium -sized pr oducers 
and Micro, Small and Medium -Sized Enterprises ( MSMEs ) in developing countries, and it is unclear  
from the draft measure what type of requirements, in terms of the information adequacy and 
verifiability criteria, will exist in practice when the meas ure is implemented. It is also unclear which 
criteria will be used for the risk assessment methodology and the compliance management 
obligation, how the European Union will classify countries in its risk assessment system for countries 
of origin, and when these countries would be notified of their classification.  
41.12.   Paraguay requests the European Union to inform Members of these elements and to submit 
their corresponding clarifications.  
41.13.   The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
41.14.   Uruguay wishes to thank the delegation of Indonesia for including this item on the agenda. 
Uruguay remains interested in learning more about the concrete implementation on the ground of 
the general policy objectives outlined in the European Green Deal, tak ing into account their potential 
impact on international trade and production beyond the borders of the European Union. Uruguay 
shares the objectives of combating climate change and protecting the environment, as reflected in 
the commitments that it has ma de under the multilateral agreements on the matter, including the 
Paris Agreement, and the policies adopted to comply with those agreements.  
41.15.   However, Uruguay is concerned at attempts to impose the view that a single model of 
production and sustainable deve lopment should be emulated worldwide, without taking into account 
the specific characteristics and conditions of different countries and regions, the situation of their 
production systems, and their relative contributions to the problems to be addressed. A nother source 
of concern is the restrictive effects that several of the strategies and policies announced in the 
European Green Deal may have on international trade.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  41.16.   The C BAM, regarding which a proposal for a Regulation was presented by the European 
Commis sion on 14  July 2021, and which is being considered by the EU  co-legislators, is a policy for 
which the process of development, adoption, and implementation is still being closely followed by 
Uruguay. In this regard, Uruguay wishes, once again, to stress t he importance of ensuring that this 
measure and other measures to be adopted under the European Green Deal are compatible with the 
European Union's commitments under the WTO  Agreements. In addition , Uruguay remains 
interested to know how any inconsistencie s resulting from the possible simultaneous application of 
the CBAM for imported products and the "free allowances" for domestic products would be avoided. 
Uruguay also wishes to know how, in the respective calculations, carbon reduction policies will be 
taken into account separately from the carbon pricing applied by different countries. Lastly, Uruguay 
wishes to ask how the European Commission addressed the principle of "common but differentiated 
responsibilities", enshrined in the Paris Agreement, when pr eparing the proposal.  
41.17.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
41.18.   Argentina supports the trade concern raised by Indonesia and reiterates it s own concern 
over these measures, which are a matter of growing concern among Member s generally . All Members  
have a duty to combat climate change , but the actions that they take, and the instruments that they 
use, must be in compliance with their international commitments. Those actions and instruments 
must neither be more trade -restrictive than necessary to ful fil a Member's legitimate objectives, nor 
constitute a disguised restriction on international trade. Against this backdrop, Argentina notes with 
concern the European Union's intention to impose the same level of ambition globally, without taking 
into consi deration the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. Argentina wishes to 
stress the importance of avoiding unilateral actions , and considers that such initiatives have the 
potential to create a major disruption to international trade by di scriminating against imported 
products in an arbitrary and unjustified manner.  
41.19.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
41.20.   The Russian Federation shares Indonesia's concerns on the proposal by the European 
Commission in its draft Regula tion on making available on the EU  market, as well as in exports from 
the EU, certain commodities and products associated with deforestation and forest degradation. In 
Russia's view, it is another example of unilateral trade -related climate measures under the European 
Green Deal.  
41.21.   The measure is supposed to cover six  groups of products, namely, coffee, cacao, beef, palm 
oil, soy, and wood, as well as their derived products. The measure implies due diligence rules in 
order to prove that the manufacturing of a  product has not caused deforestation and forest 
degradation, and that its production has complied with the national legislation of the country of 
origin. However, it is unclear not only how the European Union intends to assess the deforestation 
or forest degradation caused by the production of a particular product, but also on what basis the 
EU will consider compliance of the production of the product with the legislation of country of origin. 
Nevertheless, in those cases where the European Commission deci des that the manufacturing 
process has damaged forests, imports of the products covered by the regulation shall be prohibited. 
In sum, this measure may disrupt traditional trade flows, hamper supply chains, and seems to be in 
contradiction with the WTO  rules. 
41.22.   The Russian Federation expects that the European Union's environmental policies will not 
result in an imposition of unnecessary restrictions on international trade , but will be in compliance 
with WTO  rules.  
41.23.   The delegate of Brazil , addressing Agenda Items 41 and 42, indicated the following:  
41.24.   Brazil wishes to thank both Indonesia and the Russian Federation for raising these issues . 
Brazil supports the adoption of policies with legitimate environmental objectives, but is concerned 
about the adoption of un ilateral measures that result in unnecessary negative impacts on 
international trade, contrary to commitments made by Members in other for ums. As countries 
discuss the interdependence between trade, climate change, and environmental sustainability, it is 
important that they do so based on the terms, commitments, and principles that are enshrined in 
the 2030 Agenda  for Sustainable Development, the UNFCCC, and in international environmental law  
more broadly. Most importantly, Brazil recall s the principle of " common but differentiated G/C/M/142  
 
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  responsibilities and respective capacities", which stems from the different historical responsibilities 
in relation to the global problem of climate change.  
41.25.   Against this backdrop, Brazil believes that the EU  Green Deal, and CBAM, and their due 
diligence requirements in particular, must comply not only with core WTO  rules, but also with the 
fundamental principles established in international environmental law. In both the UNFCCC and the 
Paris Agreement, the European Union has agreed  to take into account historical responsibilities and 
respective capabilities, thus committing itself not to seek to impose its standards on other countries. 
These core principles have then, and continue to be, fundamental to the environmental framework 
developed over the past 50  years. It is hence very worrying that the EU is constantly engaged in 
watering down any reference to its responsibilities. At the same time, it does not fulfil its 
commitments with regards to finance for climate change and technolo gy transfer, and continuously 
adopts unilateral measures that weaken the environmental regime. This is certainly not the 
constructive role the world needs and expects from a major actor such as the EU.  
41.26.   Hence, Brazil believes that the claim that the EU  Green Deal, and CBAM in particular, is an 
ambitious measure is a claim that should be taken with a few grains of salt. First, historical 
responsibilities mean that countries that industrialized first, benefiting from cheap and more 
polluting energy sources, sh ould bear a larger brunt of the costs of emissions reductions. Members 
should also take into account how European companies have benefit ed from polluting activities all 
over the world, and that the fiscal capacity the EU currently has to finance and subsid ize its transition 
towards a low carbon economy, derives, to a large extent from centuries of practices that have been 
far from sustainable, to put it mildly.  
41.27.   Second, access to finance is a fundamental aspect. A country with a debt to GDP  ratio of 
more tha n 100% that can borrow at very low cost is not necessarily more ambitious in its 
investments or policies than a country with a much lower debt to GDP  ratio but facing the many 
challenges highlighted in the recent reports by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank. Fiscal capacities are certainly different. Therefore, although the European Union seeks to 
advance in several for ums that a model based on thousands of euros of subsidies per farmer should 
be a benchmark for sustainability, its mo del is simply not replicable in developing countries with 
limited fiscal capacity. Therefore, the CBAM is not sustainable, is not in agreement with 
EU commitments in multilateral environmental agreements, and overlooks the social and economic 
pillars of su stainability.  
41.28.   Third, if each Member were to use criteria more advantageous to itself, Brazil could impose 
taxes on countries that did not match its "ambition" of having an energy grid based on 80% of 
renewable energy sources. Or to use another example, Bra zil notes that it is not only concerned 
about the environment in the Amazon, but also about the livelihood of  25  million people and growing 
violence in the region. Or should Members perhaps label countries according to how their demand 
for drugs or illega lly sourced timber or minerals are fuelling violence in the region, and tax their 
products accordingly? This would certainly be a legitimate concern, and other Members could 
similarly choose other concerns, but unless Members respect the core principles an d norms of the 
WTO, they are further weakening the multilateral trading system.  
41.29.   Thus, in order to avoid potential protectionist bias or the adoption of discriminatory 
measures, Brazil urges the European Union to take into due consideration the comments mad e by 
Brazil in the process of drafting and implementing the measures under its "Green Deal", and hopes 
that a channel of dialogue will be established between the competent authorities on these topics.  
41.30.   Brazil observes that many stakeholders have called for trade negotiators to work closely with 
environmental experts, as these topics cannot be addressed in silos. In this context, Brazil believes 
that the best way to move forward in discussions on sustainable development at the WTO is through 
full respect not only for the WTO  rules, but also for those concepts, principles, and commitments 
that have been agreed in other for ums and that reflect the balanced outcomes achieved  there.  
41.31.   Unfortunately, taken together, measures such as the CBAM, "due diligence requireme nts", 
and NTBs in dissonance with SPS  requirements and others, suggest a very concerning pattern, where 
the European Union acts unilaterally and in clear opposition to the core principles and norms of both 
the trade and environmental regimes, thus impairin g the capacity of those regimes to provide global G/C/M/142  
 
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  solutions to global problems. Brazil is very proud of the very constructive role it has played in both 
regimes and urges the EU to reconsider the systemic impact of its unilateral actions.  
41.32.   The delegate of t he European Union  indicated the following:  
41.33.   The European Union appreciates the interest of Indonesia, Paraguay, Uruguay, Argentina, 
Brazil, and India in this important issue. Recently, in March  2022, WTO  Members had the opportunity 
to exchange with the EU's  representative, who explained the state of the CBAM  proposal and 
provided clarifications regarding the mechanism's scope. There is an urgency to tackle climate 
change and Members can only do it by scaling up global ambition. Indeed, only by taking ambitio us 
actions will it be possible to halt global warming and keep the 1.5°C Paris Agreement goal in reach, 
while lessening the economic, social , and environmental impacts of climate change. Keeping 
temperature increase s below 1.5°C is still within reach if co untries scale up their global ambition. 
The EU has stepped up its own climate ambition, fully translating the implementation of the Paris 
Agreement into legislation, and invites its partners to share a comparable level of ambition.  
41.34.   The introduction of a CB AM to address the risk of carbon leakage is an integral part of the 
EU's implementation and ambition, as reflected in the European Green Deal , to avoid that EU  climate 
action is undermined. The CBAM is only one of many components of the European Green Deal , which 
sets out a path towards achieving the EU's climate targets. It aims to provide market incentives to 
the private sector to green their production. The CBAM is a purely climate -oriented environmental 
policy tool, which will be applied in a non -discriminatory and even -handed manner, in full compliance 
with WTO  rules and other international obligations. The proposal is based on the actual carbon 
content of a product. And by mirroring the existing EU  Emissions Trading System (E TS), it ensures 
that foreig n and domestic producers are treated equally.  
41.35.   The CBAM does not target third  countries but is addressed to companies as it applies to 
goods of certain carbon -intensive sectors and takes into consideration the application of carbon 
pricing systems by third  countries (opening possibilities for reduction or non -payment of the 
CBAM  charge) and the carbon footprint of individual producers (the CBAM will be charged according 
to the actual emissions of imported goods).  
41.36.   Under the proposal, and with a view to providing third countries with legal certainty and 
stability, a monitoring and reporting system would apply from 2023 and finish at the end of 2025, 
giving time for the final system to be put in place. This transitional period will give trading partners 
time to prepare. The system will be subject to a review in 2025.  
41.37.   The impact of the CBAM will be limited on third  countries. The European Union has been in 
dialogue with the most affected companies and governments.  
41.38.   The proposed CBAM would begin to be applied,  with revenue collection, only in 2026. As of 
2026, the CBAM will gradually begin to be applied to the products covered in direct proportion to the 
reduction of free allowances allocated under the EU  ETS for those sectors. Over time, the CBAM will 
replace the free allocation of allowances.  
41.39.   The Fit for 55  package of proposals, including the CBAM, is currently undergoing legislative 
procedure before the EU  co-legislators. In March  2022, the EU  Council adopted a common approach 
on the CBAM  proposal, which is c urrently being debated in the European Parliament. The 
co-legislators will analyse the package in depth and come to a joint agreement in order to adopt the 
different proposals. The EU stands ready to engage with trade partners and international 
organizatio ns to inform, and where possible, to assist with the implementation of the measure.  
41.40.   As regards the proposal for a regulation on deforestation -free products, the European Union 
would like to underline that the measure aims at enhancing trade in products fro m 
"deforestation -free" supply chains. This proposal aims at creating more sustainable supply chains 
and takes action against deforestation and forest degradation. The draft measure would impose 
obligations on operators and traders aiming to place the commo dities and products in its scope on 
the EU  market.  
41.41.   The draft measure is based on the following principles: first, transparency, accountability, 
and a sound scientific and methodological basis; second, consistency with agreed international G/C/M/142  
 
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  commitments, nota bly halting deforestation at the levels of December  2020, in line with SDG  15; 
and third, non -discrimination, as it treats domestic and imported commodities and products equally, 
and covers both imports and exports.  
41.42.   The draft measure is part of a broader set of policies. It will be implemented hand -in-hand 
with other measures including, where appropriate and feasible, support to producing countries, 
dialogue with other large consumer countries, and cooperation at international level, especially in 
the relevant multilateral for ums. The European Union is open to engage with producer countries 
concerned by the draft measure to jointly address deforestation and forest degradation and facilitate 
adaptation to the incoming new EU  rules on deforestation.  
41.43.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
42  EUROPEAN UNION – THE EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION  
42.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
the Russian Federation.  He also noted that  Brazil's intervention under Agenda Item  41 had also 
covered this agenda item.21 
42.2.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
42.3.  The Russian Federation reiterates its statements made during the previous meetings of the 
CTG and expresses its  deep concern in respect of the European Green Deal and its implementation. 
Russia wishes to note that these measures cover all sectors of the economy. Russia also notes that 
WTO Members are currently raising specific trade concerns with regard to certain elements of the 
Green Deal in the meetings of different WTO  working bodies.  
42.4.  Unfortunately, the Russian Federation can already see that certain of the European Union's 
"green" measures may impede trade and be used as a means of "green protectionism", includ ing as 
an instrument of import substitution policy. Russia will provide only a few examples. Earlier in the 
meeting, Members discussed the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism  (CBAM) . It is no secret that 
the imposition of this mechanism is closely related t o the desire of the EU to substitute imported 
energy products by their own energy sources. Such substitution has already caused a rise in 
production costs on the EU  market and the transfer of production from the EU to other countries, 
also called "carbon l eakage".  
42.5.  Another EU  proposal under the Green Deal umbrella is the reduction in the use of fertilizers 
by 20% , and pesticides by 50% , by 2030. These initiatives are fixed in the Farm to Fork strategy 
and the strategy on biodiversity. These requirements, upo n their implementation, will inevitably lead 
to a rise in food production costs, which will lead to a need to impose new restrictions on imported 
products. In fact, Members already see proposals aimed at restricting trade in agricultural products. 
For exam ple, under the previous agenda item, Members discussed the European Union's regulation 
on deforestation -free commodities. However, Members cannot exclude the expansion of restrictive 
measures in the future.  
42.6.  Another measure that causes deep concern is the d raft EU  Batteries Regulation notified in 
document  G/TBT/N/EU/775. This measure sets out product requirements for new batteries as a  
condition for access to the EU  market, as well as material recovery targets for waste batteries. This 
regulation specificall y sets requirements on the maximum level of carbon footprint over the life cycle 
of batteries and the minimum level of recycled materials, such as cobalt, lithium, lead, and nickel. 
Apparently, the requirement for the minimum level of recycled materials in  batteries is aimed at 
reducing the use of primary metals in the EU, which are in most cases imported. The requirements 
in this draft Regulation are not based on science, nor on international standards or guidelines that 
specify the content of recycled mat erials in batteries, material recovery targets, and the levels and 
methodologies for the calculation of carbon footprint over the life cycle of this product.  
42.7.  Of course, the European Green Deal is not limited to the listed measures. It also provides for 
the promotion of EU  energy standards and technologies at the global level, the diversification of 
 
21 Paragraphs  41.23 -41.31.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  energy sources of supply, the adoption of new technical regulations, the revision of competition 
rules, and so on. Most of the respective projects are, or will b e, heavily subsidized, and their 
implementation would lead to the replacement of traditional foreign supplies from the EU  market.  
42.8.  Members already see the compensation of costs for reduction of indirect emissions in 
accordance with the EU  ETS State Aid Guid elines. In this context, the Russian Federation was 
surprised by the European Union's launch of a dispute against the UK's measures related to 
renewable energy. Russia will closely monitor the development of this dispute.  
42.9.  Summing up, the Russian Federation  draws Members' attention to the fact that, whatever 
activity WTO  Members plan within the framework of environment and climate change, it should be 
carried out in accordance with fundamental WTO  principles and rules and should not result in any 
kind of dis crimination or disguised restrictions on trade. Russia expects that current trade rules will 
be fully respected.  
42.10.   The Council took note  of the statement made.  
43  AUSTRALIA, CANADA, EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, SWITZERLAND, 
UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED  STATES – UNILATERAL TRADE RESTRICTIVE 
MEASURES AGAINST RUSSIA – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
43.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the Russian Federation.  
43.2.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
43.3.  The Russian Federation wishes to draw Members' attention and express its deep concern in 
respect of unilateral trade restrictive measures imposed by, inter alia , Australia, Canada, the 
European Union, Japan, New Zealand,  Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States, in 
trade with Russia.  
43.4.  The measures affecting international trade with Russia that have been introduced recently 
amount to the tune of several thousands. The most relevant measures for the mandate of the C TG 
– introduced or announced – include, among others, the following: Australia's import ban on Russian 
oil, oil products, coal, gas, an additional tariff of 35% for all imports from Russia, prohibition on 
export of alumin ium ores and concentrates, cor undum, and alumin ium oxide hydroxide; Canada's 
import ban on petroleum originating from Russia, an additional tariff of 35% for all imports from 
Russia, and an export ban on goods used for oil exploration and production; the European Union's 
import ban on certain Russian energy products, coal, iron and steel, sea products, cement, 
chemicals, wood products, paper, furniture, gas turbines, vessels, quantitative restrictions on import 
of fertilizers, export ban on goods and technology used in the energy sector , including in oil refinery 
and gas production, vessels, marine engines, maritime navigating systems, aircrafts and parts 
thereof, semiconductors, and noting that the EU's import and export ban embrace hundreds of 
product categories; Japan's import ban on certain alcohol products, wood and wood products, electric 
machines, increase in import duties for certain sea and wood products, export ban on 
semiconductors, integral circuits, analog -to-digital converters, solar cells, resistors, marine and 
aviation saf ety equipment, diesel engines, computers and their parts, oil refining equipment, 
navigation equipment, and others; New Zealand's announced application of 35% tariffs to all imports 
from Russia, export prohibition on industrial products such as ICT  equipme nt and engines; 
Switzerland's import ban on Russian iron and steel, coal, wood and wood products, cement, seafood, 
alcohol products, export ban on goods for oil refinery, tubes and other products used in oil and 
liquefied gas production, navigation equipme nt, industrial robots, and certain chemicals; the United 
Kingdom's additional import duty of 35% for certain products originating from Russia, such as 
fertilizers, wood, pneumatic tyres, cement, beverages, spirits, glass and glassware, cereals, paper 
and p aperboard, machinery, ships, boats and floating structures, an import ban on iron and steel, 
quantitative restrictions and prohibitions on export of critical -industry goods and technology, 
aviation and space products and technology, and energy -related good s; the United States' 
prohibition on imports from Russia of all energy products, coal, fish and fish products, alcohol 
beverages, non -industrial diamonds and any products that may be defined by the Minister of 
Finance, permanent normal trade relations stat us revoked, export prohibition or restrictions on 
equipment used for the extraction and refinery of oil and gas, microelectronics, telecommunication G/C/M/142  
 
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  equipment, navigation equipment, aviation parts and components, this export ban also covering 
products supp lied by third  countries that are made with the use of US  software and technology.  
43.5.  In most cases the import and export restrictions introduced against Russia are not notified to 
the WTO, which makes it more difficult to track them. And the above listing was  just a fraction of 
the measures adopted or announced by the aforementioned WTO  Members. For the sake of time, 
Russia is not specifying all of the measures. However, the above -listed measures that are directly 
applied to trade in goods are just the tip of the iceberg as there are also measures resulting in an 
immense impact on trade in goods introduced by the aforementioned WTO  Members against Russia's 
largest banks, insurance agencies, transportation companies, export support agencies, industrial 
companies , seaports, legal and natural persons, including top management, and the owners of 
Russia's largest companies that operate in such sectors as oil and gas, energy, fertilizer production, 
finance, transportation, and many, many others. The unilateral measure s introduced also involve 
the closure of airspace for Russian aircraft and bans on the use of foreign seaports. Measures against 
companies and individuals include the freezing of assets and a prohibition to deal with such persons. 
International transportat ion and trading companies are also coerced to refuse to work with Russian 
exporters, including those from the food, energy, and fertilizer sectors. Foreign governments are 
also coerced to cease dealing with Russia, including buying its energy resources.  
43.6.  All these measures not only contradict the WTO  rules but also massively disrupt international 
trade flows, break global supply chains , and lead to increasing energy costs and spikes in  food prices 
globally. Russia is the third  largest oil  and second  largest natural gas producer in the world , and the 
world's largest oil and gas exporter. Unilateral measures against Russia's  oil and gas producers, 
financial sector, as well as pressure on international transportation, trading companies, and foreign 
governments, not to work with Russia's  oil and gas sector have led to the increased oil and gas 
prices.  
43.7.  High energy prices translate into higher consumer prices across the full board of products, 
including food, fuelling inflation expectations and slowing economic grow th. The UN  Report, issued 
on 13  April 2022, indicates that "spot freight rates continue at historically very high levels, although 
they have been declining over the last weeks (…) mostly due to seasonal reasons. Rates to charter 
container ships are at hist orical highs." There are press reports saying that to undercut fuel prices 
the US  Administration has announced increased sales of biodiesel which results in even higher 
agricultural commodity prices.  
43.8.  Higher gas prices also lead to higher manufacturing cost s for fertilizers that are produced 
from natural gas. Russia and Belarus account for over 20% of world exports of fertilizers , with 15.4% 
accounted  for by Russia and the rest by Belarus. Moreover, Russian fertilizer producers are 
multinational corporations  with production facilities across the world. Unilateral measures have led 
to significant disruptions in their operation and in some cases have resulted in the suspension of 
production process es in facilities located not just in Russia but also abroad, inc luding in the European 
Union , due to the lack of raw materials from Russia and Belarus.  
43.9.  Fertilizer deficit could result in a substantial decrease in the harvest yielded in 2022, and 
consequently food shortages around the world. The risk of a global food cr isis relates not only to 
supply disruptions, but also to supply chains and logistical interruptions caused by the unlawful 
unilateral measures of the aforementioned WTO  Members. According to the UN  Food and Agriculture 
Organization, "supply chains and logi stical disruptions on Russian grain and oilseed production will 
have significant food security repercussions", especially for the 50  countries that depend on Russia 
for wheat supply. Many of these countries are least developed or low -income, food -deficit c ountries 
in Northern Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.  
43.10.   Considering the situation on the wheat market, which is a particularly important crop for 
developing and least developed countries, the WTO, in its Secretariat paper entitled "The Crisis in 
Ukraine", issued on 11  April 2022, underlines that the direct effect of the special military operation 
in Ukraine has a limited impact on global wheat prices, whereas unilateral measures against Russia 
are projected to have a larger impact on global consumer prices of wheat. According to this paper, 
66% of the projected increase in the consumer price of wheat globally will be due to the unilateral 
measures. Vulnerable populations in developing and least -developed countries are particularly 
exposed to these price swin gs as they dedicate a larger share of their income to food and energy.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  43.11.   The UN  Report, issued on 13  April 2022, indicates that global inflation rose to a decade high 
of 5.2% in 2021, forcing many central banks to signal sooner -than-expected increases in int erest 
rates, leading to higher debt servicing costs for the developing world; given further increases in 
energy and food prices driven by unilateral trade restricting measures, this scenario will become 
even more prominent.  
43.12.   The same UN  Report continue s by stating that "[r]ate hikes alongside financial disorder 
would be a double blow for developing economies, of 'taper -tantrum -like"' effects through interest 
rate rises and greater volatility in commodity futures and bond markets, leading to increased ris k 
premiums on top of exchange rate pressures." Given the uneven access to financial resources in 
developing countries, they also have fewer means to address the consequences. Members are 
already witnessing the effects of the trade restrictive policies in c ertain developing countries, where 
high prices on energy and food products have already caused social unrest and political crisis.  
43.13.   As rightly stated in the WTO  Secretariat paper issued on 11  April 2022, "[I]n the 1930s, the 
division of the world economy (…) led neither to prosperity nor peace. That experience is at the 
foundation of the rules -based multilateral trading system." Abundant unilateral trade restrictive 
measures tearing the world economy into pieces is the last thing that the world nee ds now. Such a 
vast and outright violation of WTO  rules is a massive blow to the WTO  system. It undermines the 
role of the WTO as a guarantor of international trade rules and shows that no Member is safe from 
such vast, unjustified, and unlawful measures i n future.  
43.14.   The Russian Federation expresses its concern over the attempt to replace the system of 
global economic governance with unilateral restrictive measures of extraterritorial scope. Despite 
different pretexts for such destructive policies, they in fa ct put at serious risk the prospects for global 
economic growth and disproportionally hit developing countries. Being of a complex nature, these 
unilateral restrictive measures already have systemic negative implications on global value chains, 
internation al markets, and price stability. In this context, the Russian Federation calls upon its 
partners to restore the smooth functioning of the international economic institutions and their legal 
frameworks in an open and non -discriminatory manner.  
43.15.   The Russian F ederation urges the WTO  Members in question to immediately lift their 
unilateral trade restrictive measures, including those with extraterritorial implications, and to stop 
their coercive actions intended to force other WTO  Members to follow suit.  
43.16.   The dele gate of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
43.17.   This item would not be on this meeting's agenda if it were not for Russia's illegal invasion of 
Ukraine. As already laid out under Item  2, Russia's actions are an egregious violation of international 
law. Indeed, it is Putin's aggression – and not the measures Russia refers to – that lies behind the 
most recent rises in global food, energy, and other commodity prices. The crises are the 
responsibility of one  WTO Member only: the Russian Federation. And the  solution lies with one 
WTO Member: Russia must withdraw its troops.  
43.18.   The United Kingdom recognizes the huge strain that the impact of Russia's invasion is putting 
on trade in goods for many countries, particularly those dependent on wheat and fuel imports.  
Members have heard from Ukraine that they are losing USD  1.5 billion in grain exports per month. 
According to Ukrainian officials, Ukraine is unable to export 13  million tonnes of corn and 3.8  million 
tonnes of wheat. Current estimates suggest that approx imately 1.25  million tonnes of grains and 
oilseeds are sitting in ships blocked in Ukrainian seaports due to Russia's invasion and occupation. 
Their cargo may deteriorate in the near future, and alternative transport options are limited. Again, 
the UK impl ores Russia to withdraw its troops so that Ukraine can plant, harvest, produce, and 
export the food needed to feed the world.  
43.19.   Not only is Russia's illegal invasion reducing Ukrainian exports but, when the UK looks at 
Russia's own controls, it notes that Ru ssia has put in place restrictions on, for example, fertilizer 
exports. And the Russian Federation has also put in place restrictions on wheat, and on many other 
grains, including meslin, rye, barley, corn, sunflower seeds, and rapeseed seeds.  The Russian 
Federation has also put in place restrictions on  exports of sugar as well as sunflower oil.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  43.20.   The United Kingdom, by contrast, does not have any restrictions on the export of essential 
foods. Instead, the UK recognizes that such restrictions would cause furt her harm for the most 
vulnerable countries and people suffering from Russia's attack and its global repercussions. The UK 
understands that this is not just a short -term hit, and that some of the impacts will be sustained 
due to the longer -term implications  of Russia's illegal war. For example, Ukrainian farmers and 
manufacturers cannot plant, harvest, or produce because of Russian tanks in Ukrainian fields. 
Therefore, at least this year's crop in Ukraine is being disrupted, and the scope for other producers  
to respond is limited until next year. The UK also recognizes that the fall -out from Russia's illegal 
invasion is exacerbating trends already in place as a result of the COVID -19 disruptions, and that, 
from tight supply chains to fiscal pressures, develop ing countries are still dealing with the fallout of 
the COVID -19 pandemic. Russia's invasion is impacting an already fragile situation. Working with its 
international partners, the UK is therefore determined to support countries to mitigate the impact 
on their economies and their people.  
43.21.   To conclude, the United Kingdom will continue to take any actions that it considers necessary 
to protect its essential security interests in accordance with Article  XXI of the GATT, including 
measures or actions to suspend concessions or other obligations with respect to the Russian 
Federation. As it does so, the UK will remain transparent in its measures, as appropriate, including 
through the WTO in the C TG and its subsidiary bodies.  
43.22.   The delegate of the United States  indica ted the following:  
43.23.   The intervention by the sponsor of this agenda item does not deserve a specific response. 
The United States condemns Russia's premeditated and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. 
US measures addressing the threat to the national security and  foreign policy of the United States 
are fully consistent with its WTO  rights and obligations. The United States wishes to express strong 
support for Ukraine during this difficult time. The United States is deeply impressed with the quiet 
heroism of the Uk rainian people and the courage of their armed forces and their leaders.  
43.24.   Russia's premeditated and unjustified war has brought catastrophic loss of life and human 
suffering in Ukraine. Russia is solely responsible for this death and destruction. The human c ost of 
Russia's unjustified war of aggression increasingly extends beyond Ukraine's borders. Russia's 
invasion has spurred a refugee crisis. It has driven energy prices higher, which leaves poor families 
across the world with less money to buy food and med icine. And Russia's invasion has damaged 
Ukraine's production and transportation infrastructure necessary to produce and export goods to the 
world. According to press reports and information from Ukraine's government, Russia, as of late 
March, had destroye d 92 factories and warehouses, 12  airports, 7  thermal and hydroelectric power 
plants, 1  nuclear plant, 8,300  km of roads, 260  bridges, 2  ports and their facilities, and Ukraine's 
single functioning oil refinery.  
43.25.   Moreover, Russia's invasion and resulting de struction is stoking fear of serious supply 
disruptions in agriculture that will magnify inflation and hunger, particularly in developing countries 
in Africa and the Middle East, pushing millions, including children, from daily hunger into near 
starvation.  Seventy percent of Ukraine is farmland, and Ukraine is a major agricultural producer and 
exporter. Ukraine is one of the world's largest exporters of wheat and corn, and the largest exporter 
of sunflower oil. Russia has turned Ukraine's farms into battlef ields. Russian forces have mined 
farmland, blown up farming equipment and machines, destroyed fuel reserves, shelled warehouses, 
destroyed granaries and their crops, and killed livestock. This has paralyzed harvests and damaged  
prospects for spring plantin g. A recent survey by the Ukrainian government found that Ukrainian 
farmers have 20% of the fuel they need for the planting season. Then there is the direct human toll 
of Russia's aggression, including farm workers wounded and killed, while others have lef t the fields 
to defend their country, replaced by women and children.  
43.26.   At the same time, Russia's war has severely damaged Ukraine's ability to export. Russia has 
blocked access to the Black Sea, the primary export route for Ukrainian agricultural goods. Ca rgo 
trains face many logistical hurdles, including damaged and destroyed rail lines and bridges, and 
truck transit has been stymied because men aged 18 to 60 cannot leave the country because their 
country has been invaded. During the first five  weeks of th e war alone, Ukraine had already lost 
USD 1.5 billion in grain exports, and was unable to export 13  million tonnes of corn and 3.8  million 
tonnes of wheat, according to a press report quoting a Ukrainian official in late March.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  43.27.   Continued uncertainty caused  by Russia's invasion of Ukraine is exacerbating already higher 
commodity prices that occurred during 2020 and 2021. Prices of some agricultural commodities may 
be global, but these shocks are inequitable. They hurt the poor the most. In one  African LDC, w here 
more than 4% of GDP is spent on importing a year's worth of wheat, wheat imports have dropped 
60% and the price of bread has nearly doubled since Russia's invasion, according to a press report 
in early April. The International Committee of the Red Cro ss assesses that one  quarter of the 
population on the African continent is facing a food security crisis, as the hardship wrought by 
Russia's invasion compounds already high prices.  
43.28.   Who is to blame for the misery and suffering in Ukraine and in many other countries? The 
answer is simple. Full responsibility rests with the Russian Federation. The most effective way to 
stop this misery is for Russia to cease its attacks on Ukraine, immediately withdraw its forces, and 
fully respect Ukraine's sovereignty. The United States will continue to work with its allies and 
partners to impose a severe economic and diplomatic price on Russia for its premeditated and illegal 
war of aggression, and on Belarus for its complicity in that war.  
43.29.   The delegate of the European Unio n indicated the following:  
43.30.   It has been the European Union's policy not to respond to the statements of the Russian 
Federation since the beginning of their unprovoked and premeditated war of aggression in Ukraine, 
as it is not possible to continue business as usual in the face of such grave attacks to the rules -based 
international order, including violations of international law relating to atrocities against civilians. 
However, the Russian Federation has now embarked on a further campaign of disinformation in the 
context of the WTO. In the face of this, the EU, alongside its partners, deems it important to set the 
record straight for the benefit of the Membership.  
43.31.   In a transparent manner, the European Union and partners have issued a Joint Statement 
in relat ion to the trade measures that the EU and other Members are adopting against Russia. 
Following the horrific images in the wake of Russia's withdrawal from the North of Ukraine, we have 
taken further measures to help Ukraine,  on the one  hand, and to sanctio n the Russian Federation  
on the other. The EU is greatly concerned about the trade impact of the illegal, unprovoked, 
unjustifiable aggression against  Ukraine of the Russian Federation, in particular as regards the 
supply of a number of commodities, notabl y agricultural products and fertilizers.  
43.32.   The European Union strongly condemns Russia's actions targeting Ukraine's food supply and 
production. It has been highlighted by credible reports that Russian forces are attacking grain silos 
in Ukraine as well as d amaging and removing Ukrainian farm equipment. Furthermore, the closure 
of the Black Sea by Russian armed forces effectively blocks the exports of grains via Ukrainian sea 
ports. The food security situation is already dramatic for those directly involved i n Ukraine. The 
impact of the Russian aggression is, however, not just restricted to Ukraine and its citizens but is 
also seriously challenging food availability in some vulnerable net food -importing countries in 
particular. The Russian government has also placed restrictions on exports of cereals. This puts 
Russian wheat, even if available, out of reach for many import -dependent Members. Russia's 
statement to (possibly) export food only to "friendly" countries could further worsen the situation, 
putting und er pressure the agriculture and food security of many countries.  
43.33.   The European Union would like to underline that the EU's sanctions do not target the 
agricultural sector of the Russian Federation. For example, while the EU's latest sanctions stop 
Russian s hips from entering EU  ports, ships with agricultural commodities and food products are 
exempted. The same approach, based on exemptions for agricultural and food products, is applied 
to freight road operators , where exemptions cover agricultural and food p roducts. The sanctions are 
primarily directed at the Russian Government, the financial sector, and the economic elites. They 
target the ability to finance the Russian aggression against Ukraine and its people.  
43.34.   Therefore, the European Union, alongside its p artners, strongly condemns Russia's attempts 
at putting the blame on international sanctions for the global food security crisis that is directly 
caused by Russia's aggression against Ukraine and its people. The EU will continue to provide 
humanitarian aid  to alleviate the suffering of Ukrainian civilians by securing their access to basic 
goods and services, notably food. The EU will also help Ukrainian farmers to continue planting and 
growing cereals and oilseeds, much needed for themselves and for the wor ld, and to facilitate their 
exports.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  43.35.   Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine is jeopardizing the food supply to some of the most 
vulnerable parts of the world, threatening the food security of millions of people. Food prices are 
already increasing and projec tions by the FAO and the WTO  Secretariat suggest that further 
increases can be expected. The European Union again invites Russia immediately to stop its military 
aggression in Ukraine, which is the only way to stop the humanitarian and food security crisis . 
43.36.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
43.37.   Canada strongly condemns Russia's unjustifiable and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. This 
invasion is causing devastating humanitarian consequences and the senseless deaths of innocent 
people. The consequenc es of Russia's actions have already extended well beyond Ukraine's borders, 
making it a direct concern to every Member represented here. Russia's hostile act is not just an 
attack on Ukraine and its people, or a reckless decision taken at a fragile moment in the global 
economic recovery from COVID -19. It is a blatant violation of international law and the rules -based 
international order.  
43.38.   The global trade consequences of the Russian invasion are real and catastrophic: the price 
of essential commodities, incl uding oil and gas, staple foods, and critical minerals has indeed 
skyrocketed. According to the FAO, in the previous month, the cost of the most commonly traded 
food commodities has risen 12.6%, accounting for more than a third of the price increase in the  last 
year. All of us feel the effects of this turmoil, but it is the poorest among us who suffer the most. 
Canada is deeply concerned that this most acutely threatens the food security of developing 
countries.  
43.39.   To be clear: Russia is solely responsible for  this crisis. Russia has destroyed Ukraine's ability 
to supply the world with food, and Russia has cut itself off from the global trading system. Canada 
rejects any suggestion that measures applied by it to Russia prevent any other Member, including 
Russia , from exporting or importing agricultural products or fertilizers.  
43.40.   What Russia has done cannot, and will not, be normalized. Holding Russian leadership to 
account, calling on it to abandon this path of war and to return to good -faith diplomacy, represents  
the best means of addressing what is not only an urgent humanitarian emergency in Ukraine, but 
also a growing global food security challenge, and a threat, which Russia alone has created, to the 
very core of the rules -based institutions.  
43.41.   Canada is acting to protect its essential security interests, which are inextricably linked to 
that rules -based international environment. In addition, Canada will continue to work closely with 
like-minded partners to promote peace and security for all sta tes and their citizens.  
43.42.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
43.43.   Russia's invasion of Ukraine clearly infringes upon Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial 
integrity and constitutes a grave breach of the United Nations Charter, which prohibits the use  of 
force. Furthermore, this is a unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force that shakes the 
foundation of the international order, and is totally unacceptable. It is an extremely serious situation 
that has rocked the international order to its v ery core , not only in Europe,  but also in Asia. In this 
regard, Japan condemns Russia's actions in the strongest terms.  
43.44.   In addition, it has come to light that a series of cruel and inhumane acts by Russia have 
taken place not only in Bucha, near Kyiv, but also in various parts of Ukraine. The killing of a large 
number of innocent civilians is a serious violation of international humanitarian law and constitutes 
an absolutely unforgivable war crime. Russia must be held accountable for such inhumane acts.  
43.45.   From the beginning, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which is a sovereign state, has been a 
unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force, and is an act that shakes the foundation of the 
international order. This is a clear violation of international law and is totally unacceptable, which 
Japan condemns in the strongest terms. It is to be expected that the international community, 
including Japan, impose s sanctions on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine.  
43.46.   As stated in the G7  Leaders' Statement, Russia's inva sion of Ukraine is causing global 
economic turmoil. The impact on Ukraine's internationally important agricultural sector places a G/C/M/142  
 
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  serious burden on global food security, for which Russia is responsible. Japan continues to work with 
its partners, including  international organizations, to proactively address the impact of Russia's 
invasion of Ukraine on areas such as energy and food, among others, across many countries.  
43.47.   Japan and other countries have been carefully addressing the situation by imposing 
sancti ons in a manner that does not hinder the provision of humanitarian assistance or the operation 
of global agricultural trade.  
43.48.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
43.49.   Other Members have outlined the harrowing realities of Russia's invasion of Uk raine. To be 
very clear, it is Russia's illegal war in Ukraine that is exacerbating current global food supply 
disruptions and food insecurity. It is also Russia's illegal war in Ukraine that has caused widespread 
humanitarian consequences and resulted in the senseless deaths of innocent people. It is also 
Russia's illegal war in Ukraine that is undermining the global trading system. The international 
community must respond to this crisis together and take active steps now to promote open and 
transparent tr ade. 
43.50.   New Zealand has joined the international community in applying sanctions as a means to 
limit the Putin regime's ability to continue the war in Ukraine and to influence people with power in 
Russia to break their support for the invasion. From 25  April 2022, New Zealand will apply a 
35% tariff on imports from Russia and will prohibit the exports of certain products to Russia and 
Belarus that are closely connected to strategic Russian industries. This targeted action is a direct 
response to Russia’s illeg al and unprovoked war in Ukraine and is intended to limit Russia's ability 
to finance and equip the war. In keeping with the principle of transparency, information on New 
Zealand's tariff and export prohibitions in response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine i s publicly available, 
including online.  
43.51.   The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
43.52.   Switzerland condemns Russia's military aggression against Ukraine in the strongest terms 
and calls on Russia to take military de -escalation measures, to end hostil ities, and immediately to 
withdraw its troops from Ukrainian territory. Switzerland considers that this military attack blatantly 
violates international law, most notably the prohibition on the use of force and the principle of the 
territorial integrity of  States.  
43.53.   In response to the Russian military aggression, Switzerland has taken a number of economic 
measures. These measures are exceptional in nature and have been taken on account of this 
violation of international law by Russia. The measures taken by Sw itzerland are in accordance with 
international law, including WTO  law. 
43.54.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
43.55.   Russia's unprovoked, unjust, and illegal invasion of Ukraine  is a gross violation of 
international law, including the Charter of the United Nations. Russia's war on Ukraine is exacting a 
catastrophic humanitarian toll and a food crisis. Australia supports the collective action by the 
international community and has imposed far -reaching sanctions to inflict heavy costs on Russia and 
those responsible. Australia has implemented trade measures, including the following: the ban on 
imports of Russian oil, refined petroleum products, coal and gas, effective 25  April; the ban on 
exports of alumina and bauxite to Russia, effective 20  March; the ban on the export of luxury goods 
to Russia, effective 7  April; and Australia will deny Russia access to most -favoured -nation tariff 
treatment and will impose an additional tariff of 35% on goods originating from Russia, effective 
25 April.  
43.56.   These measures are commensurate and justified given Russia's unprecedented attack. They 
are justified under WTO  rules, including Article  XXI of the GATT. Russia's actions violate Ukraine's 
sovereignty and territorial integrity and undermine the rules -based international order. Australia is 
committed to upholding these principles, which are essential to international, regional, and domestic 
stability and security. The notion that sanctions are to be blamed for the trade disruptions and food 
crisis is untenable, and Members  need to look at the root cause of these disruptions, namely Russia's 
unprovoked, unjust, and illegal invasion of Ukraine.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  43.57.   Ukraine is a major staple food and feed grain producer and exporter, supplying numerous 
vulnerable and import -dependent countries in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. The invasion by 
Russia and its destruction of agricultural resources and infrastructure have disrupted global food 
supplies by not only impeding exports of wheat, barley, corn and sunflower oil, but also by 
compromising t he planting of the upcoming season's crop, effectively prolonging the food crisis.  
43.58.   Russia's withdrawal from Ukraine is the best means of restoring Ukraine's ability to 
participate in the global trading system, and in so doing help alleviate the related foo d crisis and 
trade disruptions. Moreover, the response to global food crises such as this should not be to resort 
to trade restrictive measures on food trade or the stockpiling of foods. Such policies only exacerbate 
food shortage issues by denying access to vulnerable and net food -importing countries. Long -term 
food security is best assured through open and efficient markets, which is why Members must 
maintain a broader focus on an agricultural outcome at MC12.  
43.59.   The delegate of Norway  indicated the following:  
43.60.   Norway has not been explicitly mentioned by Russia under this agenda item. However, 
Norway implements the same sanctions as the European Union. The measures taken by Norway as 
a reaction to Russia's unprovoked military actions are  fully consistent with its WTO  rights and 
obligations.  
43.61.   Russia's military attack on Ukraine is an unprovoked and illegal attack on a peaceful 
neighbour. Russia's military attack has caused death and destruction, as well as human suffering on 
a horrendous sc ale, with millions of refugees and internally displaced people. Norway condemns 
Russia's military attack on Ukraine in the strongest possible terms. Russia's aggressive military 
actions are a clear violation of Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and terr itorial integrity. We 
must defend our world order, where relationships between States are determined not on the basis 
of power, but by international law. Norway condemns Russia's false narrative on its invasion of 
Ukraine and its effects, including the eff ects of sanctions implemented by other countries as a 
reaction to Russia's military invasion.  
43.62.   The effects of Russia's military invasion can increasingly be felt beyond Ukraine's borders, 
causing a refugee crisis, and rises in the prices for food, energy, a nd other commodities. Ukraine is 
a major agriculture producer and exporter. The Russian government is directly responsible for the 
shock impact on global food systems, with consequences that are felt worldwide, especially by the  
world's poorest and most vu lnerable.  
43.63.   With its military invasion, Russia has shown its complete disregard for the multilateral 
system and forfeited the right to use the system for its own purposes. It is of the utmost importance 
that we all understand these realities, and counter the  Russian attempts to create false narratives, 
here at the WTO  CTG, and in all other relevant for ums. 
43.64.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
43.65.   The Republic of Korea has been strongly condemning Russia's armed invasion against 
Ukraine. Regarding the current topic, Korea believes that it is essential to focus on the very origin 
of the sharply aggravating situation on global supply chains in many areas, which is posing a 
significant threat to the rules -based global trade order under the WT O. The way to end all this is 
obvious, that is, for Russia to cease its military action in Ukraine.  
43.66.   The delegate of Ukraine  indicated the following:  
43.67.   From the outset, Ukraine wishes to express its gratitude to the Members that are helping 
Ukraine, including  for their leadership and unwavering support at the hardest possible  time. 
According to the Preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement, Members should work together to improve 
the welfare of people around the world, to raise living standards, create jobs, and imp rove people's 
lives by "entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the 
substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory 
treatment in international trade relations", and t o "develop an integrated, more viable and durable 
multilateral trading system". Sadly, these noble goals and principles of our work were horrendously 
destroyed on 24  February  2022 by the Russian aggression.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  43.68.   This day marks the 57th day of the full -scale, un provoked, and unjustified war launched by 
Russia against Ukraine. For two  months, the Ukrainian nation has defended the unity and 
independence of its country, its democratic values, economic and trade rights, and the possibility of 
prosperity and developme nt for us all. The Ukrainian government estimates that overall direct 
economic losses in Ukraine caused by Russia's military aggression have already reached 
USD 565 billion. The IMF has already valued the fall in Ukraine's GDP at 35% in 2022, and forecasts  
that the impact of the war will contribute to downgrades for 143  economies this year, accounting for 
86% of global GDP.  
43.69.   Every day, Russian troops kill, kidnap, torture, and rape civilians in Ukraine, destroy civil 
infrastructure, living buildings, health facilities and schools, transport, energy and industrial 
infrastructure, which have been built by generations of Ukrainians. They wage war not just with 
Ukraine, but with all of us , it just has different faces. Many companies have suspend ed their 
operations either because of a military threat or because of blocked access to the markets or raw 
materials. According to preliminary estimates , about 30% of companies have completely stopped 
their activities, while 45% have reduced their producti on. 
43.70.   The fighting is taking place in an area that accounts for almost three -quarters of Ukraine's 
GDP and employs about 10  million people before the war, which amounts to almost 64% of the 
employed population. Russia is destroying Ukrainian agricultural ent erprises, food distribution 
centres, agricultural equipment and petroleum depots in Ukraine, as well as planting landmines in 
the fields. Why do they do this? Because they also see starvation as their weapon, a weapon against 
ordinary people in the world, and as a tool to dominate the world.  
43.71.   Russia's aggression has caused economic losses not only for Ukraine; without exaggeration, 
this aggression will have consequences for the whole world. Members are already witnessing the 
destabilization of the world mark ets, another surge in inflation, the shutdown of enterprises due to 
the loss of supply chains, one of the biggest migration crises since World War  II, and worsening 
expectations of economic agents. Many countries are now on the edge of a food crisis as Rus sia has 
blocked all of Ukraine's seaports along with ships that were already loaded with agricultural products 
for export. According to experts, 400  million people in the world depend on Ukrainian grain supplies. 
The longer Russia's aggression continues in  Ukraine, the greater the economic consequences for the 
world.  
43.72.   Ukraine is very grateful to all Members that have stood with it in these terrifying times, and 
that have adopted, or are in the process of adopting, strong economic sanctions against the Russia n 
Federation in pursuance of the obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. At the same time, Ukraine believes that those measures are 
disproportionate to the scale of the Russian aggression and no t enough to stop "feeding the military 
engine" of the aggressor. There is no grey zone, there is no alternative solution or compromise, but 
only a fair and strict position. Ukraine calls upon WTO  Members to stand in solidarity with Ukraine 
on this issue.  
43.73.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
44  EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION EC  NO. 1272/2008 (CLP  REGULATION) – REQUEST 
FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
44.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the Russian Federatio n. 
44.2.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
44.3.  The Russian Federation reiterates its statements made during previous meetings of the 
relevant WTO  bodies with regard to the cobalt classification as a carcinogen  1b for all routes of 
expos ure. Russia appreciates the efforts of the European Union on the adoption of the gastric 
bioelution protocol at the EU and OECD  levels. In this regard, Russia requests an update on the 
developments in this area.  
44.4.  The Council took note  of the statement made.  G/C/M/142  
 
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  45  EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION  (EU)  2017/2321 AND REGULATION (EU)  2018/825 
– REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
45.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the Russian Federation.  
45.2.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
45.3.  The Russian Federation reiterates its concerns regarding the amendments to the EU  basic 
regulation on protection against dumped imports introduced by Regulation (EU)  No. 2017/2321 and 
Regulati on (EU)  No. 2018/825. At previous CTG  meetings, Russia pointed out the discriminatory 
nature of the amendments, which can be illustrated by the following: (i)  the European Commission 
may punish the exporters twice for the same situation labelled by the ame ndments as "significant 
distortions" and "raw material distortions"; and (ii)  the European Commission has issued only 
two "reports" on so -called "significant distortions" in two  particular exporting countries, which clearly 
shows the discriminatory nature of the EU's approach regarding the application of anti -dumping 
measures.  
45.4.  Without going into further detail, Russia wishes to reiterate its systemic concern over the 
WTO-inconsistency of the amendments. Russia urges the European Union to abstain from the 
application of discriminatory provisions and not to violate its WTO  obligations.  
45.5.  The Council took note  of the statement made.  
46  OTHER BUSINESS  
46.1  Functioning of the CTG a nd its Subsidiary Bodies – Information from the Chair  
46.1.  The Chairperson  drew Members' attention  to room document  RD/CTG/15, which contained 
the latest version of the Annual Plan of Meetings for the CTG and its subsidiary bodies for the year 
2022 and the currently available information for the year 2023. The document had been prepared 
in close coordi nation between the Secretary of the Goods Council and the Secretaries of the 
CTG subsidiary bodies, with the aim to avoid overlaps and to ensure an optimal scheduling of 
meetings.  He had also requested the Secretariat to prepare an update of this Annual Pl an for each 
CTG meeting to facilitate identifying any potential issues at an early stage, while at the same time 
allowing the Membership to plan for meetings accordingly.  
46.2  Date of the Next Meeting  
46.2.  The Chairperson  noted that the next meeting of the Council w as scheduled to take place on 
7 and 8  July 2022. Those dates would be confirmed in due course.  
47  ELECTION OF CHAIRPERSON OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS  
47.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that the Chair of the General Council had carried out consultations 
on a slate  of names for Chairpersons to the different WTO  standing bodies in accordance with the 
established Guidelines for the Appointment of Officers. These proposed nominations had been 
approved by the General Council at its most recent  meeting. In line with the nominations, he 
proposed that the CTG elect Mr Etienne Oudot de Dainville from France as Chairperson of the Council 
by acclamation.  
47.2.  The Council so agreed . 
47.3.  The outgoing Chairperson  congratulated Mr  Oudot de Dainville for his election and expressed 
his appre ciation to delegations, and to the Secretariat, for their unwavering efforts and dedication 
to carrying out the work of the CTG. Deputy Director -General Xiancheng Zhang and the incoming 
Chairperson  thanked Ambassador Purevsuren for his work.  
47.4.  The incoming C hairperson  recalled that, as agreed under Agenda Item 3, the election of 
officers of the subsidiary bodies of the Council had been suspended, and that Ambassador Didier 
Chambovey , Chairperson of the General Council, would take up and continue those consultations. G/C/M/142  
 
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  Once there was an agreed slate of names , the CTG  Chair would reconvene the CTG to deal 
exclusively with that agenda item.  
47.5.  The meeting was closed . 
__________