G/AG/GEN/ 202 
 
20 June 2022  
(22-4798) Page: 1/7 
Committee on Agriculture  Original: English  
 
 
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION (FAO)  
SUBMISSION ON "COVID -19 AND AGRICULTURE"  
Submission by FAO  
The following submission, dated 20 June 2022, is being circulated at the request of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO).  
 
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1  BACKGROUND  
1.1.  In the last ten years, the frequency and intensity of conflict, climate variability and extremes, 
and economic slowdowns and downturns have increased and are undermining food security and 
nutrition around the world. The increas ed occurrence of these events, exacerbated by the COVID -19 
pandemic, has led to a rise in hunger and has undermined progress in reducing all forms of 
malnutrition, particularly in low - and middle -income countries .1 
1.2.  In 2021, at least 193 million people wer e acutely food insecure – a 38 million increase 
since 2020 and the highest level in six years – with 53 countries/territories requesting external 
assistance .2 The COVID -19 pandemic and the measures to contain its spread have caused a deep 
global economic recession, eroded incomes and livelihoods, and affected people 's ability to purchase 
food. On the supply side, the pandemic affected food security through border closures, travel 
restrictions, quarantines, and market, supply chain and trade disruptions. Al ong with other drivers, 
this led to between 720 and 811 million undernourished people in 2020. After remaining virtually 
unchanged for five years, the prevalence of undernourishment (PoU) increased by 1.5  percentage 
points in 2020 to reach around 9.9 %, causing setbacks on the road to achieving the Zero Hunger 
target by 2030 .3  
1.3.  Today, the world is facing multiple challenges and inter -connected risks. These include: high 
and volatile prices of food, agricultural inputs (especially fertilizers) and energy; logistical 
bottlenecks, for instance in the Black Sea due to the war in Ukra ine; production risks, affecting most 
of the food commodities; climate change and natural resource and ecosystem degradation; and 
increased frequency and intensity of disasters and other shocks.  
1.4.  Moreover, as a consequence of the war in Ukraine, the Intern ational Monetary Fund (IMF) 
reduced its global economic growth forecasts to 3.6 % in both 2022 and 2023, revising downward 
earlier forecasts by 0.8 and 0.2 percentage points, respectively. Similarly, the latest World Bank 
Global Economic Prospects report pr ojects global growth in 2022 to drop to 2.9 %, down from 5.7 % 
in 2021. This is 1.2 percentage points lower than the 4.1 % predicted in January. No tangible recovery 
is predicted to take place in 2023, as global growth is forecast to reach 3 %, mainly as high 
commodity prices and monetary tightening are expected to persist. According to the report, 
 
1 FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. 2021. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2021. 
Transforming food systems for food security, improved nutrition and affordable healthy diets for all. Rome, 
FAO. https://doi.org/10.4060/cb4474en  
2 The Global Network Against Food Crises. 2022. Global Report on Food Crises. 
https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP -0000138913/download/  
3 FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. 2021. The Sta te of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2021. 
Transforming food systems for food security, improved nutrition and affordable healthy diets for all. Rome, 
FAO. https://doi.org/10.4060/cb4474en  G/AG/GEN/ 202 
 
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  compounding the damage from the COVID -19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine has magnified the 
slowdown in the global economy, which is entering a period of feeble growth a nd elevated inflation 
("stagflation ").4 
2  THE STATE OF GLOBAL FOOD MARKETS  
Production  
 
2.1.  FAO's latest estimates5 indicate a year -on-year 0.9 % increase in global cereal production in 
2021, largely attributed to a higher maize output. Cereal utilization is also estimated to increase in 
2021/22, by 1.1 %, driven by (in order of magnitude) expansions in food consumption (especially of 
wheat and rice), other uses (largely of maize), and feed use (mostly of maize). Based on world 
cereal production and utilization estimates, cereal stocks at the end of seasons in 2022 are seen 
rising above their opening levels, but remaining below the record levels reached in 2018/19.  
2.2.  Looking forward to the 2022/23 season, early prospects for cereal production in 20 22 point to 
a decrease, which would mark the first decline in four years. Based on the conditions of crops already 
in the ground and planting intentions for those yet to be sown, world cereal output is forecast to fall 
to 2,784 million tonnes (including ri ce in milled equivalent), which is down 16 million tonnes from 
the record output estimated for 2021. Among the major cereals, the largest decline is foreseen for 
maize, followed by wheat and rice. In particular, global wheat production in 2022 is predicted  to 
decline from the 2021 record level by 0.8 %, reaching 771 million tonnes and marking the first drop 
in four years. Year -on-year falls in production in Australia, India, Morocco and Ukraine will likely 
outweigh expected increases in Canada, the Islamic R epublic of Iran and the Russian Federation. By 
contrast, global outturns of barley and sorghum will increase in 2022, as a result of a partial rebound 
from the reduced level for barley in 2021 and reaching the highest production level of sorghum 
since 2016. 
2.3.  Concerning oilseeds and derived products, FAO 's 2021/22 forecasts point towards a tightening 
market outlook, broadly underpinned by production shortfalls coinciding with a resilient demand, 
while the war in Ukraine and restrictive export policy measures are expected to bring additional 
uncertainty. Global oilseed production is forecast to contract in 2021/22, primarily driven by 
expected lower soybean and rapeseed outputs, with reduced yield levels seen more than offsetting 
a further expansion in harveste d areas. While world oilmeal supply is anticipated to decline 
accordingly, the utilization of meals/cakes is forecast to fall only fractionally, tied to a slowdown in 
feed consumption in response to poor livestock profit margins. Regarding oils/fats, globa l production 
is expected to increase marginally, with the foreseen growth in palm oil production overshadowing 
the estimated losses in soy and rapeseed oil outputs.  
2.4.  Regarding the upcoming 2022/23 season, tentative forecasts suggest a possible sharp reboun d 
in the world production of oilseeds and derived products, while global utilization will likely resume 
growth at a moderate level.  
2.5.  For sugar, FAO 's forecast for world production in 2021/22 (October/September) is pegged at 
174.6  million tonnes, up 5.1 mill ion tonnes (3 %) from the reduced level of 2020/21. The anticipated 
rebound, after three years of decline, reflects expectations of production increases in India, Thailand, 
and the European Union  that will more than offset significant declines foreseen in Brazil and China.  
2.6.  Global meat production is forecast to reach 361 million tonnes (carcass weight equivalent) 
in 2022, expanding by 1.4 % in 2022, albeit at a slower pace than the 4.5 % growth realized in 2021. 
The expansion is driven by a steep growth in meat  output foreseen in China and notable increases 
in Brazil, Australia, and Viet Nam, to be partly offset by anticipated declines in the European Union, 
the United States of America (the United States), Canada, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Argentina.  
 
4 World Bank. 2022. Global Economic Prospects, June 2022. Washington, DC: World Bank. doi: 
10.1596/978 -1-4648-1843-1. 
5 FAO. 2022. Food Outlook – Biannual Report on Global Food Markets. Rome. 
https://doi.org/10.4060 /cb9427en  G/AG/GEN/ 202 
 
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  2.7.  World milk production in 2022 is forecast to reach 937 million tonnes, up 1.0 % from 2021, 
which, if confirmed, would mark the fifth consecutive annual growth slowdown. Milk production in 
Asia is likely to be the primary driver of this year 's global output exp ansion, continued to be driven 
by rising dairy cattle numbers and increasing milk collection efficiency in India and Pakistan, with 
rising output in large -scale farms in China. Milk output may also increase moderately in North 
America and Central America a nd the Caribbean, mostly on improving yields, offset by production 
disincentives brought by squeezed producer margins in some countries. By contrast, milk production 
levels are expected to drop in Europe, South America, and Oceania due to declining dairy c attle 
numbers, rising costs of feed, mounting skilled labour shortages, and less -than desirable pasture 
quality.  
Trade  
 
2.8.  World trade in cereals is expected to fall to a three -year low estimated at 463 million tonnes, 
2.6% below the 2021/22 level. This ant icipated decline reflects a likely contraction in global trade of 
coarse grains and wheat, driven by the ongoing war in Ukraine, trade policy changes in several 
countries, and high international prices, while prospects for rice remain positive. In particul ar, the 
escalation of the war in late February came while Ukraine and the Russian Federation were in the 
midst of their 2021/22 marketing seasons. As such, it had immediate impacts on the countries ' 
capacity to execute existing export contracts and to ente r into new ones for crops already off the 
ground. This has been particularly the case in Ukraine, where the war has led to the cessation of all 
commercial shipping operations, the temporary suspension of activities by private grain and crushing 
operators, damages to inland transport, storage and processing facilities , and the introduction of 
licensing requirements or outright bans on exports of some commodities.  
2.9.  Concerning oilcrops, FAO 's 2021/22 forecasts point towards a tightening market outlook for 
oilseeds and derived products, broadly underpinned by production shortfalls coinciding with a 
resilient demand, while the war in Ukraine and restrictive export policy measures are expected to 
bring additional uncertainty.  
2.10.   World sugar trade in 2021/22 is forecas t at 59.0 million tonnes, slightly down from the 
estimated volume for 2020/21. Despite expectations of record exports from India and a recovery in 
shipments from Thailand, lower exports from Brazil are anticipated to curb world sugar trade. On 
the import s ide, high import costs, coupled with a slowdown in consumption, are likely to negatively 
affect import demand from Asia, particularly China, the world 's largest sugar importer.  
2.11.   World trade in meat and meat products is expected  to reach 42 million tonnes (carcass weight 
equivalent) in 2022, marking the slowest growth in the last seven years. Moderate import expansions 
in several countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, are likely to be partially offset by a steep decline in imports by China, among 
others.  
2.12.   World trade in dairy products is forecast at 88 million tonnes (milk equivalent), down 0.4 % 
from the elevated trading volume registered in 2021. The projected decline i n 2022 is attributable 
to anticipated drops in imports by Ukraine, Sri Lanka, the Russian Federation, Nigeria, and Brazil, 
among others, due to conflicts, economic downturns, and low consumer purchasing power. On the 
export side, New Zealand and Australia are expected to record the most significant declines in sales 
among the major exporters, reflecting tight export availabilities, mostly stemming from lower milk 
production.  
FAO Food Price Index (FFPI)  
 
2.13.   The FFPI (Figure 1) averaged 157.4 points in May 2022 , down 0.9 points (0. 6%) from April, 
marking the second consecutive monthly decline, though still 29.2 points (22.8 %) above its value 
in the corresponding month last year. In March 2022, the FFPI reached its highest levels ever 
(159.7  points).  G/AG/GEN/ 202 
 
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  2.14.   Concerning the sub -indices (Figure 2), the FAO Cereal Price Index averaged 173.4 points in 
May, reaching a new all -time high, and 39.7 points (29.7 %) above the previous year 's value. Tighter 
supplies and market uncertainty, especially for wheat, maize, and barley, as  well as rising energy 
and input prices, will likely keep world cereal prices elevated, at least through the first half of the 
2022/23 season.  
2.15.   Similarly, the FAO Vegetable Oil Price Index averaged 229.3 points in May, markedly above 
its year-earlier level (174.9). The FAO Meat Price Index averaged 122.0 points in May, up 0.6 points 
(0.5%) from April, setting a new all -time high. The FAO Sugar Price Index averaged 120.3 points in 
May, down 1.3 points (1.1 %) from April, marking the first de cline after sharp increases registered 
in the previous two months. The FAO Dairy Price Index averaged 141.6 points in May, down 
5.1 points (3.5 %) from April, marking the first decline after eight consecutive monthly increases, 
but still 20.5  points (16.9 %) higher than its level in May of last year.  
Figure 1. FAO food price index (2014 -16=100)  
 
 
Figure 2. FAO food commodity price indices  (2014 -16=100)  
 
Source:  FAO Food Price Index. https://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/  
  
85.095.0105.0115.0125.0135.0145.0155.0165.0
J F M A M J J A S O N D
2019 2020 2021 2022
85.0105.0125.0145.0165.0185.0205.0225.0245.0265.0
M J J A S O N D J F M A M
Meat Dairy Cereals Oils SugarG/AG/GEN/ 202 
 
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  3  FOOD IMPORT BILLS  
3.1.  The world food import bill is forecast to reach another all -time high in 2022, surpassing 
USD 1.8 trillion, a near 3 % increase (USD 51 billion) from last year 's record level ( Figure  3). 
However, the expansion in international food purchases will moderate significantly, considering that 
the increase from 2020 to 2021 amounted to almost 18 %. The anticipated in crease in the 2022 
import bill is almost entirely driven by higher prices: USD 49 billion are due to higher international 
prices and merely USD 2 billion reflect higher volumes.  
Figure 3. Import bills of total food and food products by region (USD billion)  
 
 
 
Source:  Adapted from FAO. 2022. Food Outlook – Biannual Report on Global Food Markets. Rome. 
https://doi.org/10.4060/cb9427en  
02004006008001,0001,2001,4001,6001,8002,000
World Developed Developing
2019 2020 2021 2022
020406080100120140
LDCs NFIDCs SSA
2019 2020 2021 2022G/AG/GEN/ 202 
 
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  3.2.  The upshot is that many regions will face higher bills in return for lower volumes. Worryingly, 
this development is much more pronounced in economically vulnerable regions. Sub -Saharan Africa 
is expected to spend USD 1.5 billion more on food imports, but could see a decline in volumes worth 
USD 0.9 billion. As for NFIDCs (Net Foo d Importing Developing Countries), with a forecast 
USD 1.3 billion in extra costs for importing food, volumes are anticipated to decline by a value of 
USD 2.2 billion. Similarly, LDCs (Least Developed Countries) are expected to see a contraction in 
their f ood import bill by USD 2.4 billion fully on account of lower volumes.  
3.3.  From a food security perspective, this indicates that importers will find it difficult to finance 
rising costs of food imports, with pressures on foreign currency reserves and pushing f ood inflation.  
4  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
4.1.  During COVID -19, despite the disruptions caused by the pandemic, agrifood systems proved 
to be more resilient than other sectors of the economy. Overall, the pandemic has demonstrated the 
critical role of trade in faci ng food shocks, as much as the importance of open and well -functioning 
global markets for food security and nutrition. In particular, the recent experience with the pandemic 
demonstrated that trade is an integral part of resilient agrifood systems.  
4.2.  The war in Ukraine, the continued prevalence of COVID -19, the high and volatile food and 
fertilizer prices, and the increasing  frequency  climate -related  events are affecting  international 
agrifood markets, global supply chains, and trade levels and patterns , hence reshaping the  short 
and medium -term outlook s for agricultural markets.  
4.3.  In consideration of the multiple and interconnected risks, countries should pay particular 
attention to long -term food security and sustainability objectives and not only to short -term goals, 
and avoid measures that can jeopardize world  food security. For instance, countries should carefully 
consider the potentially damaging effects of trade restrictive measures on international markets.  
Export restrictions, in particular, should be  avoided at all times, as they only exacerbate price 
volatility, limit the buffer capacity of global markets, and have negative impacts over the medium 
to longer term.  
4.4.  Market transparency and policy dialogue should be strengthened, as they play key roles w hen 
agricultural commodity markets are under uncertainty, and disruptions need to be minimized to 
ensure that international markets continue to function properly and trade in food and agricultural 
products flows smoothly. An important initiative in this di rection is the G20 Agricultural Market 
Information System (AMIS), hosted by FAO, which has played a leading  role in reducing the 
likelihood of increased price volatility and has improved policy coordination in times of high food 
price volatility.  
4.5.  To reduce  the vulnerabilities caused by rising food import costs , FAO has developed a proposal 
for a global Food Import Financing Facility  (FIFF)6, which aims to present a mechanism to respond 
to rising food import and input costs. Tapping into the Facility would allow the affected  countries to 
mitigate long -lasting impacts on their agrifood systems and reduce future needs for emergency 
assistance.  
4.6.  The COVID -19 pandemic has also highlighted the importance of digital technologies for the 
resilience and sustainabilit y of our food systems. Advancements in agricultural ICT (Information and 
Communication Technolog ies) can play a pivotal role in the necessary transformation of agrifood 
systems as they can increase transparency and traceability in markets and value chains,  improve 
agricultural productivity  and crop yields, and reduce the use of inputs.  
 
6 FAO. 2022. A Global Food Import Financing Facility (FIFF): Responding to soaring food import costs 
and addressing the needs of the most exposed – Updated  10 June 2022. 
https://www.fao. org/3/cb9444en/cb9444en.pdf   G/AG/GEN/ 202 
 
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  4.7.  Finally, it is essential to provide timely and targeted social protection interventions to alleviate 
the hardship of the most affected segments of the populations. In this re gard, it is crucial to expand 
the coverage of existing social protection program mes, or develop  new ones,  to reach poor and 
vulnerable people  that are not currently covered by  social protection. Existing delivery mechanisms 
(institutional coordination enti ties, registries, payment modalities) of national social protection 
systems can also be used to implement humanitarian assistance program mes. 
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