TN/RL/W/263  
 
20 October 2015  
(15-5531)  Page: 1/3  
Negotiating Group on Rules  Original: English  
 
 EU TECHNICAL PAPER IN FOLLOW-UP OF ITS TRANSPARENCY SUBMISSION 
(TN/RL/W/260) 
The following communication, dated 20 October 2015, is being circulated at the request of the 
Delegation of the European Union. 
 
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 INTRODUCTION 
The EU in its communication dated 16 July 2015 (T N/RL/W/260) outlined possible ways to improve 
transparency across the four rules negotiating areas which could form part of the outcome of 
MC10. During the discussion at the Rules Negoti ating Group on 29 July 2015, Members generally 
welcomed the EU suggestions on transparency , but also raised questions and requested 
clarifications for certain elements of the EU proposals. The present technical paper provides further 
details on possible transparency outcomes on rules.  
1  HORIZONTAL SUBSIDIES 
In its communication of 16 July 2015 (TN/RL/W/260), the EU suggested that existing notification 
mechanisms could be better exploited in order to increase transparency. The EU would like to offer 
additional clarifications as to how such a system could operate. 
 
Under Article 25.11 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Members are required to submit to the WTO semi-annual reports on any countervailing duty actions taken within 
the preceding six months. These semi-annual reports are prepared in accordance with a format 
agreed by the members and set out in G/SCM/2/Rev.1. This format requires Members, when completing the tables showing actions taken, either in original or review investigations to provide 
the name of the countervailed programme. Not all of these countervailed programmes are notified 
by the Member granting the subsidy.  In order to improve transparency in the area of  subsidy notifications and in order to combat 
instances of non-reporting, the EU suggests to fu rther develop the existing reporting requirement. 
 Members reporting in the semi-annual reports the countervailing actions they have taken would as 
a first step check the subsidy notification of the Member against whom the action is taken to 
determine whether or not the countervailed programme was notified. Where this is not the case, the reporting member would provide a 'supplementary ' notification giving details of the scheme in 
question. This notification would be made in the format and would provide, to the extent possible, 
the level of detail required under the normal Subsidy notification requirements as contained in G/SCM/6/Rev.1. However, the 'supplementary' noti fication would be done only in relation to 
schemes which are subject to definitive countervailing measures. Any reporting in the semi-annual 
reports on provisional actions taken would not generate such a notification given that, following 
the imposition of such measures the situation is  subject to change on the basis of additional 
information received from interested parties following disclosure. 
 
These 'supplementary' notifications would fall under  the normal review procedure carried out in the 
Special meetings of the SCM Committee held in Spring and Autumn. Prior to these meetings (6 
weeks before) the WTO Secretariat would circulate the notification, inviting the Member granting 
the subsidy to provide any complementary information in advance of the Committee meeting itself. During the meetings, special attentio n would be brought to these 'supplementary' TN/RL/W/263 
 
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  notifications with the WTO Secretariat inviting the Member granting the subsidy in question, or 
indeed any other Member who may have countervailed it, to provide any supplementary information to complete any remaining gaps in the notification. Two weeks after the meeting, the notification would be circulated by the WTO Secretariat as a supplement to any notification of the 
Member granting the subsidy.  
 The above procedures would already go a long way towards addressing the growing problem of 
missing or incomplete notifications and would help stimulate a constructive dialogue among WTO 
Members on subsidy notifications. At the same time, the proposed mechanism would not entail any increases in the notification burden of Members granting subsidies as the mechanism would be triggered by the Member notifying countervailing action. It is important to stress that the aim of 
inviting the Member granting the subsidy to provide additional information is to allow that Member 
to complete its notification. The purpose is not to create any alternative reporting scheme, nor to diminish the reporting obligations of Members under the SCM Agreement. The 'supplementary' 
notification would be limited to instances where a scheme has been definitively countervailed, so 
as to avoid adding any unnecessary burden to the member taking the countervailing action.  
Finally the proposal would also serve as a useful complement to existing procedures under 
Article 25 of the SCM Agreement, in particular Article 25.10, by injecting more dynamism into the existing transparency obligations.  
2  ANTI-DUMPING 
As set out in the EU's submission of 16 July, the increase in use of the anti-dumping instrument 
among WTO Members has shown that there is room for improvement as regards the monitoring of 
Members' actual anti-dumping policies and practice s. In this context, the objective of Members' 
work in the run-up to MC10 would be to develop a process which would help Members get a better understanding of each other's practices, and which would thereby contribute to a reduction of 
disputes. 
 In this regard and in view of the discussion at the RNG on 29 July 2015, the EU believes that the RNG can proceed to discussions on the basis of the un-bracketed Chair's text of 2011 
(TN/RL/W/254) on a new Article 18.6 and Annex III [Procedures for the review of Members' AD 
policy and practices]. The objective of this work  w o u l d  b e  t o  a g r e e  o n  the establishment of a 
factual review system of each Member's AD practices which would cover actual policies, practices, 
as well as organisational issues. 
 3  FISHERIES-SUBSIDIES 
At the RNG meeting on 29 July, a number of WT O members expressed interest in improved 
transparency and notification of fish subsidies. In its original submission (TN/RL/W/260), the EU 
proposed improving the content of notifications for fish subsidies. In order to limit the burden on developing nations, the idea of a threshold for more detailed notification was also mentioned. 
These two elements are explored further below. 
 While it is up to the proponents of disciplines on fisheries subsidies to further develop possible 
approaches in view of MC10, the ideas set out below constitute the EU's contribution to this 
debate.  
Content of the additional notification 
 
The table below sets out existing notification requirements alongside ideas for possible improvements. TN/RL/W/263 
 
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  WTO format for 
subsidies notification1 OECD GFT Database Ideas for possible improvements 
EU paper 
(TN/RL/W/260) 
Additional elements for 
consideration Other ideas linked 
to proposal of other 
WTO Members 
1. Title of the subsidy 
programme, if relevant, or brief description or identification of the subsidy. 2. Period covered by the notification 3. Policy objective and/or purpose of the subsidy. 4. Background and authority for the subsidy 5 .  F o r m  o f  t h e  s u b s i d y  (i.e., grant, loan, tax 
concession, etc.). 
6. To whom and how the subsidy is provided 7. Subsidy per unit, or in cases where this is not possible, the total amount or the annual amount budgeted for that subsidy 9. Duration of the subsidy 1. Duration of the 
programme  2. Production-linked 3. Income or effort threshold 4. Fishing behaviour constraints required 5. Restricted to specific species or gear or area 6. Vessel length limits 7. Kind of recipient 8. Private co-financing or counterpart required 1. Categories of subsidies 
by nature and/or objective. 2. Management measures associated with the subsidies 3. Rules on public aid intensity 4. Fleet concerned (gear, vessel length, etc.). 1. Specification 
whether a subsidy, in its entirety or partially, may directly contribute to an increase in the fishing capacity of the fleet (e.g. subsidies for the acquisition of new vessels, construction of vessels, modernization of fishing vessels resulting in an 
increase in the fishing 
capacity of the vessels) 2. Specification whether a subsidy may, in its entirety or partially, directly or indirectly, potentially benefit a vessel or operator previously or currently engaged in IUU fishing? If no, what are the mechanisms in place to avoid subsidising IUU vessels or operators 
 
Threshold triggering the additional notification 
 
Previous discussions on fish subsidies have iden tified different approaches to the issue of 
threshold. However, these approaches were discussed in relation to possible substantive disciplines rather than any proposal for increased transparency. These approaches have been summarised in 
the communication from the RNG Chairman of 21 April 2011. 
 One approach would be that only the main fi shing nations would be required to respect 
strengthened notification provisions. Other fishing nations would continue to notify their fish 
subsidies in accordance with current obligations. The first 50 Members of the WTO in terms of 
marine capture or Members representing 90% of the world marine captures could for example be submitted to this additional notification. 
 
Another approach would be that a threshold is defined in absolute monetary terms. Fish subsidies would continue to be notified in accordance with the current obligations. In addition, the 
notification of subsidies above a threshold to be defined (irrespective of the country which is 
providing the subsidy) would need to be accompan ied with additional information as compared to 
the current requirements.  
These two approaches are not mutually exclusive. 
 4  RTAS 
In view of the discussion at the RNG on 29 July 2015, the EU believes that the RNG can proceed to 
discussions on the basis of the Chair's text of 2011 (TN/RL/W/252) with the objective of making the Transparency Mechanism for RTAs permanent.  
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1 Abridged. Full text in G/SCM/6/Rev.1 (11 November 2003).