WT/DS437/R  
 
14 July 2014  
(14-3948)  Page: 1/106  
 Original: English  
 
  
UNITED STATES – COUNTERVAILING DUTY MEASURES  
ON CERTAIN PRODUCTS FROM CHINA 
 
REPORT OF THE PANEL 
 
 WT/DS437/R 
 
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  TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
1   INTROD UCTION  ........................................................................................................ 11  
1.1   Complaint by China ................................................................................................... 11 
1.2   Panel establishm ent and comp osition .......................................................................... 11 
1.3   Panel proceedings ..................................................................................................... 11 
1.3.1   Genera l ............................................................................................................... . 11 
1.3.2   Request for enhanc ed third party rights .................................................................... 12 
1.3.3   Preliminary ruling .................................................................................................. 12 
2   FACTUAL ASPECTS ..................................................................................................... 13  
2.1   The measures at issue ............................................................................................... 13 
3   PARTIES' REQUESTS FOR FI NDINGS AND RECO MMENDATIONS ................................ 13  
4   ARGUMENTS OF  THE PARTIES ................................................................................... 14  
5   ARGUMENTS OF TH E THIRD PA RTIES ........................................................................ 14  
6   INTERIM REVIEW ...................................................................................................... 14  
6.1   Enhanced third party rights ........................................................................................ 15 
6.2   Preliminary ruling ..................................................................................................... 15 
6.3   Terms of  reference ................................................................................................... 15 
6.4   Claims under Article 1. 1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement .................................................... 15 
6.5   Claims under Article 11 of the SCM Agr eement – evidence of a financial contribution .......... 16 
6.6   Claims under Articles 1.1(b)  and 14(d) of th e SCM Agreement ........................................ 17 
6.7   Claims under Articles 2. 1 and 2.4 of the SCM Agreement ............................................... 18 
6.8   Claims under Article 11 of the SCM Agreement – evidence of specificity ............................ 18 
6.9   Claims under Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement ........................................................... 18 
6.10   Claims under Articles 2.2 and 2.4 of the SCM Agreement .............................................. 19 
6.11   Claims concerning  export re strain ts ........................................................................... 19 
6.12   Editing and ty pographical changes ............................................................................ 20 
7   FIND INGS ................................................................................................................. 20 
7.1   Introduction ............................................................................................................. 20 
7.1.1   Measur es at issue .................................................................................................. 20 
7.2   General principles regarding treaty inte rpretation, standard of review and burden of 
proof .............................................................................................................................. 21 
7.2.1   Treaty interpreta tion .............................................................................................. 21 
7.2.2   Standard of review ................................................................................................. 21 
7.2.3   Burden  of proof ..................................................................................................... 22 
7.3   Whether the preliminary determinations in Wind Towers and Steel Sinks are within 
the Panel's terms of refe rence ........................................................................................... 22 
7.3.1   Intr oducti on ..........................................................................................................  22 
7.3.2   Relevant Provisions ................................................................................................ 22 
7.3.3   Main arguments of parties ....................................................................................... 23 
7.3.3.1   United States ..................................................................................................... 23 
7.3.3.2   China ............................................................................................................... . 24 
7.3.4   Evaluation by the Panel .......................................................................................... 24 WT/DS437/R 
 
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  7.4   Whether the USDOC's findings that certai n SOEs were public bodies are inconsistent 
with Article 1.1 (a)(1) of the SCM Agreement ....................................................................... 26 
7.4.1   Intr oducti on ..........................................................................................................  26 
7.4.2   Relevant provisions ................................................................................................ 26 
7.4.3   Main argu ments of China ........................................................................................ 27 
7.4.4   Main arguments of the United  States ........................................................................ 28 
7.4.5   Main argument s of third parties ............................................................................... 30 
7.4.6   Evaluation by the Panel .......................................................................................... 32 
7.5   Whether the USDOC's "rebuttable presumption" is inconsistent "as such" with 
Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement .............................................................................. 38 
7.5.1   Intr oducti on ..........................................................................................................  38 
7.5.2   Main argu ments of China ........................................................................................ 38 
7.5.3   Main arguments of the United  States ........................................................................ 40 
7.5.4   Main argument s of third parties ............................................................................... 41 
7.5.5   Evaluation by the Panel .......................................................................................... 41 
7.5.5.1   Relevant excerpt from the Kitchen Shelving Issues and Decision Memorandum ............ 41 
7.5.5.2   Whether the USDOC's "rebuttable presumption" is a "measure" and if so, 
whether it can be ch allenged "a s such " ............................................................................... 43 
7.5.5.3   Is the Kitchen Shelving's rebuttable presumption inconsistent as such with 
Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement? ..................................................................................... 49 
7.6   Whether the USDOC's initiations of investigations are inconsistent with Article 11 of 
the SCM Agreement due to insufficient evidence of a financial contribution ............................... 50 
7.6.1   Intr oducti on ..........................................................................................................  50 
7.6.2   Relevant provisions ................................................................................................ 51 
7.6.3   Main argu ments of China ........................................................................................ 51 
7.6.4   Main arguments of the United  States ........................................................................ 52 
7.6.5   Main argument s of third parties ............................................................................... 52 
7.6.6   Evaluation by the Panel .......................................................................................... 53 
7.7   Whether the USDOC's determinations that SOEs provided inputs for less than 
adequate remuneration are inconsistent, as applied, with Articles 1.1(b) and 14(d) of the SCM Agreement ............................................................................................................... 56
 
7.7.1   Intr oducti on ..........................................................................................................  56 
7.7.2   Relevant Provisions ................................................................................................ 56 
7.7.3   Main argu ments of China ........................................................................................ 56 
7.7.4   Main arguments of the United  States ........................................................................ 58 
7.7.5   Main argument s of third parties ............................................................................... 60 
7.7.6   Evaluation by the Panel .......................................................................................... 61 
7.7.6.1   In troducti on ....................................................................................................... 61 
7.7.6.2   The factual prem ise of China' s claims ..................................................................... 61 
7.7.6.3   The appropriate interpretation of Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement with 
regard to when an investigating authority can resort to an out-of-country benchmark ................ 64 
7.8   Whether the USDOC's determinations regarding the specificity of alleged input 
subsidies are inconsistent with Articl es 2.1 and 2.4 of the SCM Agreement ............................... 65 WT/DS437/R 
 
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  7.8.1   Intr oducti on ..........................................................................................................  65 
7.8.2   Relevant provisions ................................................................................................ 65 
7.8.3   Main argu ments of China ........................................................................................ 66 
7.8.4   Main arguments of the United  States ........................................................................ 68 
7.8.5   Main argument s of third parties ............................................................................... 69 
7.8.6   Evaluation by the Panel .......................................................................................... 69 
7.9   Whether the USDOC's initiations of investigations are inconsistent with Article 11 of 
the SCM Agreement due to insuffic ient evidence of specificity ................................................. 76 
7.9.1   Intr oducti on ..........................................................................................................  76 
7.9.2   Relevant provisions ................................................................................................ 77 
7.9.3   Main argu ments of China ........................................................................................ 77 
7.9.4   Main arguments of the United  States ........................................................................ 78 
7.9.5   Main argument s of third parties ............................................................................... 79 
7.9.6   Evaluation by the Panel .......................................................................................... 79 
7.10   Whether the uses of "adverse facts available" by the USDOC are inconsistent with 
Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement ..................................................................................... 80 
7.10.1   Intr oducti on ........................................................................................................ 80 
7.10.2   Relevant provision ................................................................................................ 81 
7.10.3   Main arguments of China ....................................................................................... 81 
7.10.4   Main arguments of the United  States ...................................................................... 82 
7.10.5   Main arguments of third parties .............................................................................. 83 
7.10.6   Evaluation by the Panel ......................................................................................... 84 
7.11   Whether the USDOC's findings of regional specificity are inconsistent with 
Articles 2.2 and 2.4 of the SCM Agreement .......................................................................... 87 
7.11.1   Intr oducti on ........................................................................................................ 87 
7.11.2   Relevant provisions .............................................................................................. 87 
7.11.3   Main arguments of China ....................................................................................... 88 
7.11.4   Main arguments of the United  States ...................................................................... 88 
7.11.5   Main arguments of third parties .............................................................................. 89 
7.11.6   Evaluation by the Panel ......................................................................................... 89 
7.12   Whether the USDOC's treatment of certain export restraints in Magnesia Bricks 
and Seamless Pipe is inconsiste nt with the SCM Agreement ................................................... 91 
7.12.1   Intr oducti on ........................................................................................................ 91 
7.12.2   Relevant provisions .............................................................................................. 92 
7.12.3   Main arguments of China ....................................................................................... 92 
7.12.4   Main arguments of the United  States ...................................................................... 94 
7.12.5   Main arguments of third parties .............................................................................. 96 
7.12.6   Evaluation by the Panel ......................................................................................... 96 
7.13   China's claims under Articles 10 and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement and Article VI:3 
of the GA TT 1994 ........................................................................................................... 103  
8   CONCLUSIONS AN D RECOMMEND ATION ................................................................. 105  WT/DS437/R 
 
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  LIST OF ANNEXES 
ANNEX A 
REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING 
PARTIES AND THIRD PARTIES SUBMISSIONS OR 
EXCECUTIVE SUMMARIES THEREOF 
Contents Page 
Annex A-1 Executive Summary of the Request of the United States for a Preliminary 
Ruling A-2 
Annex A-2 Executive Summary of the Response of China to the United States Request for 
a Preliminary Ruling A-9 
Annex A-3 Comments of the United States on China's Response to the United States 
Preliminary Ruling Request A-12 
Annex A-4 Comments of China on the United States Request for a Preliminary Ruling A-19 
Annex A-5 Third Party Comments of Brazil on the United States Request for a Preliminary 
Ruling A-24 
Annex A-6 Executive Summary of Third Party Comments of the European Union on the 
United States Request for a Preliminary Ruling A-28 
Annex A-7 Response of the United States to Third Party Comments on the United States 
request for a Preliminary Ruling  A-33 
Annex A-8 Communication from the Panel - Preliminary Ruling (WT/DS437/4)  A-34 
ANNEX B 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES OF  THE FIRST WRITTEN  
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES 
Contents Page 
Annex B-1 Executive Summary of the First Written Submission of China B-2 
Annex B-2 Executive Summary of the First Written Submission of the United States B-9 
ANNEX C 
THIRD PARTIES WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS OR  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES THEREOF 
Contents Page 
Annex C-1 Third Party Written Submission of Australia C-2 
Annex C-2 Executive Summary of the Third Party Written Submission of Brazil C-5 
Annex C-3 Executive Summary of the Third Party Written Submissi on of Canada C-6 
Annex C-4 Executive Summary of the Third Party Written Submission of the 
European Union C-9 
Annex C-5 Third Party Written Submission of Norway C-14 
Annex C-6 Executive Summary of the Third Party Written Submission of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia C-20 
ANNEX D 
ORAL STATEMENTS OR EXECUT IVE SUMMARIES THEREOF OF 
THE PARTIES AT THE FIRS T SUBSTANTIVE MEETING 
Contents Page 
Annex D-1 Executive Summary of the Opening Statement of China at the First Meeting of 
the Panel D-2 
Annex D-2 Opening Statement of the United States at the First Meeting of the Panel D-7 
Annex D-3 Closing Statement of the United States at the First Meeting of the Panel D-14 WT/DS437/R 
 
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  ANNEX E 
THIRD PARTIES ORAL STATEMENTS AT  
THE FIRST MEETING OF THE PANEL 
Contents Page 
Annex E-1 Third Party Oral Statement of Aust ralia at the First Meeting of the Panel E-2 
Annex E-2 Third Party Oral Statement of Brazil at the First Meeting of the Panel E-4 
Annex E-3 Third Party Oral Statement of Cana da at the First Meeting of the Panel E-6 
Annex E-4 Third Party Oral Statement of India at the First Meeting of the Panel E-9 
Annex E-5 Third Party Oral Statement of Japan at the First Meeting of the Panel E-13 
Annex E-6 Third Party Oral Statement of Korea at the First Meeting of the Panel E-15 
Annex E-7 Third Party Oral Statement of Norw ay at the First Meeting of the Panel E-17 
Annex E-8 Third Party Oral Statement of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia at the First Meeting 
of the Panel E-19 
Annex E-9 Third Party Oral Statement of Turk ey at the First Meeting of the Panel E-22 
ANNEX F 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES OF THE SECOND WRITTEN  
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES 
Contents Page 
Annex F-1 Executive Summary of the Second Written Submission of China F-2 
Annex F-2 Executive Summary of the Second Written Submission of the United States F-11 
ANNEX G 
ORAL STATEMENTS OR EXECUT IVE SUMMARIES THEREOF OF 
THE PARTIES AT THE SECO ND SUBSTANTIVE MEETING 
Contents Page 
Annex G-1 Executive Summary of the Opening Stat ement of the United States at the 
Second Meeting of the Panel G-2 
Annex G-2 Executive Summary of the Opening Statement of China at the Second Meeting 
of the Panel G-12 
Annex G-3 Closing Statement of the United States at the Second Meeting of the Panel G-19 
ANNEX H 
WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL 
Contents Page 
Annex H-1 Working Procedures of the Panel H-2 
 WT/DS437/R 
 
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  CASES CITED IN THIS REPORT  
Short title Full case title and citation 
Brazil – Aircraft Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft , 
WT/DS46/AB/R, adopted 20 Augu st 1999, DSR 1999: III, p. 1161 
Canada – Dairy Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk 
and the Exportation of Dairy Products , WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS113/AB/R 
and Corr.1, adopted 27 October 1999, DSR 1999:V, p. 2057 
Canada – Dairy 
(Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US) Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk 
and the Exportation of Dairy Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by New Zealand and the United States , WT/DS103/AB/RW, 
WT/DS113/AB/RW, adopted 18 Dece mber 2001, DSR 2001:XIII, p. 6829 
China – GOES Panel Report, China – Countervailing and Anti -Dumping Duties on Grain 
Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the United States , WT/DS414/R 
and Add.1, adopted 16 November 2012, upheld by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS414/AB/R 
EC – Commercial Vessels Panel Report, European Communities – Meas ures Affecting Trade in 
Commercial Vessels , WT/DS301/R, adopted 20 June 2005, DSR 2005:XV, 
p. 7713 
EC – Countervailing Measures 
on DRAM Chips Panel Report, European Communities – Counterv ailing Measures on Dynamic 
Random Access Memo ry Chips from Korea , WT/DS299/R, adopted 
3 August 2005, DS R 2005:XVIII, p. 8671 
EC – Hormones Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones) , WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, 
DSR 1998:I, p. 135 
EC and certain member States 
– Large Civil Aircraft Appellate Body Report, European Communities and Certain Member States – 
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft , WT/DS316/AB/R, adopted 
1 June 2011, DSR 2011:I, p. 7 
EC and certain member States 
– Large Civil Aircraft Panel Report, European Communities and Certai n Member States – Measures 
Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft , WT/DS316/R, adopted 1 June 2011, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS316/AB/R, DSR 2011:II, p. 685 
Guatemala – Cement I Appellate Body Report, Guatemala – Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding 
Portland Cement from Mexico , WT/DS60/AB/R, adopted 25 November 1998, 
DSR 1998:IX, p. 3767 
Guatemala – Cement II Panel Report, Guatemala – Definiti ve Anti-Dumping Measures on Grey 
Portland Cement from Mexico , WT/DS156/R, adopted 17 November 2000, 
DSR 2000:XI, p. 5295 
Japan – DRAMs (Korea) Panel Report, Japan – Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random Access 
Memories from Korea , WT/DS336/R, adopted 17 December 2007, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS336/AB/R, DSR 2007:VII, p. 2805 
Korea – Commercial Vessels Panel Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels , 
WT/DS273/R, adopted 11 April 2005, DSR 2005:VII, p. 2749 
Korea – Dairy Appellate Body Report, Korea – Definitive Safeguar d Measure on Imports of 
Certain Dairy Products , WT/DS98/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000, 
DSR 2000:I, p. 3 
Mexico – Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Rice Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef 
and Rice, Complaint with Respect to Rice , WT/DS295/AB/R, adopted 20 
December 2005, DSR 2005:XXII, p. 10853 
Mexico – Steel Pipes and Tubes Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Duties on Steel Pipes and Tubes from 
Guatemala , WT/DS331/R, adopted 24 July 2007, DSR 2007:IV, p. 1207 
US – Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties (China) Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China , WT/DS379/AB/R, 
adopted 25 March 2011, DSR 2011:V, p. 2869 WT/DS437/R 
 
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  Short title Full case title and citation 
US – Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties (China) Panel Report, United States – Definitive An ti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Duties on Certain Products from China , WT/DS379/R, adopted 25 March 2011, 
as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS379/AB/R, DSR 2011:VI, 
p. 3143 
US – Carbon Steel Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervai ling Duties on Certain 
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Stee l Flat Products from Germany , 
WT/DS213/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 19 December 2002, DSR 2002:IX, p. 3779 
US – Continued Zeroing Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Existence and Application 
of Zeroing Methodology , WT/DS350/AB/R, adopted 19 February 2009, 
DSR 2009:III, p. 1291 
US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel 
Sunset Review Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping 
Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carb on Steel Flat Products from Japan , 
WT/DS244/AB/R, adopted 9 January 2004, DSR 2004:I, p. 3  
US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel 
Sunset Review Panel Report, United States – Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on 
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon St eel Flat Products from Japan , WT/DS244/R, 
adopted 9 January 2004, as modified by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS244/AB/R, DSR 2004:I, p. 85  
US – Countervailing Duty 
Investigation on DRAMS Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervaili ng Duty Investigation on 
Dynamic Random Access Memory Se miconductors (DRAMS) from Korea , 
WT/DS296/AB/R, adopted 20 July 2005, DSR 2005:XVI, p. 8131 
US – Countervailing Measures 
on Certain EC Products Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Measures Concerning 
Certain Products from th e European Communities , WT/DS212/AB/R, adopted 
8 January 2003, DSR 2003:I, p. 5 
US – Customs Bond Directive Panel Report, United States – Customs Bond Directive for Merchandise 
Subject to Anti-Dumping/Countervailing Duties , WT/DS345/R, adopted 
1 August 2008, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS343/AB/R / WT/DS345/AB/R, DSR 2008:VIII, p. 2925 
US – Export Restraints Panel Report, United States – Measures Trea ting Exports Restraints as 
Subsidies , WT/DS194/R and Corr.2, adopted 23 August 2001, DSR 2001:XI, 
p. 5767 
US – Gambling Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services , WT/DS285/R, adopted 20 April 2005, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS285/AB/R, DSR 2005:XII, p. 5797 
US – Lamb Appellate Body Report, United States – Safeguard Measures on Imports of 
Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Me at from New Zealand and Australia , 
WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R, adopted 16 May 2001, DSR 2001:IX, 
p. 4051 
US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd 
complaint) Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large 
Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint) , WT/DS353/AB/R, adopted 23 March 2012 
US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd 
complaint) Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft 
(Second Complaint) , WT/DS353/R, adopted 23 March 2012, as modified by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS353/AB/R 
US – Oil Country Tubular 
Goods Sunset Reviews Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina , WT/DS268/AB/R, 
adopted 17 December 2004, DSR 2004:VII, p. 3257 
US – Shrimp (Thailand) Panel Report, United States – Measures Relating to Shrimp from Thailand , 
WT/DS343/R, adopted 1 August 2008, as modified by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS343/AB/R / WT/DS345/AB/R, DSR 2008:VII, p. 2539 
US – Softwood Lumber III Panel Report, United States – Preliminary Determinations with Respect to 
Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada , WT/DS236/R, adopted 
1 November 2002, DSR 2002:IX, p. 3597 
US – Softwood Lumber IV Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty 
Determination with Respect to Ce rtain Softwood Lumber from Canada , 
WT/DS257/AB/R, adopted 17 February 2004, DSR 2004:II, p. 571 WT/DS437/R 
 
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  Short title Full case title and citation 
US – Softwood Lumber IV Panel Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with 
Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada , WT/DS257/R and Corr.1, 
adopted 17 February 2004, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS257/AB/R, DSR 2004:II, p. 641  
US – Softwood Lumber VI 
(Article 21.5 – Canada) Appellate Body Report, United States – Investigation of the International 
Trade Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada – Recourse to 
Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada , WT/DS277/AB/RW, adopted 9 May 2006, 
and Corr.1, DSR 2006:XI, p. 4865 
US – Steel Plate Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on 
Steel Plate from India , WT/DS206/R and Corr.1, adopted 29 July 2002, 
DSR 2002:VI, p. 2073 
US – Upland Cotton Appellate Body Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton , 
WT/DS267/AB/R, adopted 21 March 2005, DSR 2005:I, p. 3 
US – Wool Shirts and Blouses Appellate Body Report, United States – Measure A ffecting Imports of Woven 
Wool Shirts and Blouses from India , WT/DS33/AB/R, adopted 23 May 1997, 
and Corr.1, DSR 1997:I, p. 323 
US – Zeroing (EC) Appellate Body Report, United States – Laws, Regulations and Methodology 
for Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing") , WT/DS294/AB/R, adopted 
9 May 2006, and Corr.1, DSR 2006:II, p. 417 
US – Zeroing (EC) Panel Report, United States – Laws, Regu lations and Methodology for 
Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing") , WT/DS294/R, adopted 
9 May 2006, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS294/AB/R, DSR 2006:II, p. 521 
 
 WT/DS437/R 
 
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  ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS REPORT 
Abbreviation Description 
DSB Dispute Settlement Body 
DSU Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
GATT 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
Vienna Convention Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Done at Vienna, 23 May 1969, 
1155 UNTS 331; 8 International Legal Materials 679 
WTO World Trade Organization 
SCM Agreement Agreement on Subsidies an d Countervailing Measures 
USDOC United States Department of Commerce 
SOEs State-owned enterprises 
 
 WT/DS437/R 
 
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  1  INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Complaint by China 1.1.  On 25 May 2012, China requested consultations with the United States under Article 4 of the 
DSU, Article XXIII:1 of GATT 1994,  and Article 30 of the SCM Agreement with respect to the 
United States' countervailing duty measures on certain products from China as described in 
document WT/DS437/1. 
1.2.  Consultations were held on 25 June 2012 and 18 July 2012 with a view to reaching a 
mutually satisfactory solution. These consultations clarified certain issues pertaining to this matter, 
but failed to resolve the dispute. 
1.2  Panel establishment and composition 1.3.  On 20 August 2012, China requested the estab lishment of a panel pursuant to Article 6 of the 
DSU with standard terms of reference.
1 At its meeting on 28 September 2012, the DSB established 
a panel pursuant to the request of China in document WT/DS437/2, in accordance with Article 6 of the DSU.
2 
1.4.  The Panel's terms of reference are the following: 
To examine, in the light of the relevant pr ovisions of the covered agreements cited by 
the parties to the dispute, the matter referred to the DSB by China in document 
WT/DS437/2 and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the 
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those agreements.3 
1.5.  On 14 November 2012, China requested the Director-General to determine the composition 
of the panel, pursuant to Article 8.7 of the DSU. On 26 November 2012, the Director-General 
accordingly composed the Panel as follows: 
Chairperson: Mr Mario Matus 
 
Members:  Mr Scott Gallacher 
    Mr Hugo Perezcano Díaz 
 
1.6.  Australia, Brazil, Canada, the European  Union, India, Japan, Korea, Norway, the 
Russian Federation, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Saudi Arabia), Turkey and Viet Nam notified 
their interest in participating in the Panel proceedings as third parties. 
1.3  Panel proceedings 
1.3.1  General 1.7.  After consultation with the partie s, the Panel adopted its Working Procedures
4 and timetable 
on 19 December 2012. Following its adoption, the Panel introduced subsequent modifications to its 
timetable.  
1.8.  The Panel held a first substantive meetin g with the parties on 30 April and 1 May 2013. A 
session with the third parties took place on 30 April 2013. The Panel held a second substantive 
meeting with the parties on 23-24 July 2013. On 2 Au gust, the Panel issued the descriptive part of 
its Report to the parties. The Panel issued its Interim Report to the parties on 28 February 2014. The Panel issued its Final Report to the parties on 9 May 2014. 
                                               
1 WT/DS437/2. 
2 See WT/DSB/M/322. 
3 WT/DS437/3 and Corr.1. 
4 See the Panel's Working Procedures in Annex H-1. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  1.3.2  Request for enhanced third party rights 
1.9.  On 4 December 2012, Canada requested the Panel to grant it enhanced third party rights in 
the Panel's working procedures. Subsequently, Australi a, Brazil and Turkey endorsed this request.  
1.10.  In a communication dated 20 December 2012, addressed to Canada, Australia, Brazil and 
Turkey, and copied to the parties and all other th ird parties, the Panel declined Canada's request 
for enhanced third-party rights in these proceedings and indicated that it would provide its reasoning on this matter in its report.   
1.11.  The Panel notes, first, that the parties to the dispute have opposed the request of Canada 
that it be accorded enhanced third party rights. In addition, the Panel has carefully reviewed the reasons advanced by Canada to support its request. In the Panel's view, these reasons are not among those that would justify departing from the third party rights established in paragraphs 2 
and 3 of Article 10 of the DSU, paragraph 6 of Appendix 3 of the DSU, and subsequent panel 
practice regarding enhanced third party rights.  
1.12.  In its request, Canada argues that "it ha s significant legal and systemic interests in the 
outcome of this dispute, particularly because any clarifications made to the provisions of the 
[SCM Agreement] raised in this dispute may have potentially wide-ranging implications for the methodology used by authorities in subsidy investigations and the results of such investigations". 
According to Canada, "[t]he rights traditionally granted to third parties are inadequate to allow the 
Panel to fully take into account Canada's interests in this dispute".  
1.13.  In the Panel's view, what Canada characterizes as its "significant legal and systemic 
interests in the outcome of this dispute" means that Canada has a "substantial interest" within the 
meaning of Article 10.2 of the DSU in the matter before this Panel. However, the Panel fails to see 
how those legal and systemic interests differentiate Canada from any other WTO Member, such as to warrant the granting of enhanced third party rights. Canada does not assert that it is affected 
by this particular dispute in a manner that differentiates it from any other third party. The Panel 
observes that in recent practice panels have ge nerally rejected requests for enhanced third party 
rights based on assertions of interests of a general systemic nature and where the parties 
requesting enhanced third party rights have failed to identify how they are specifically affected by 
a particular dispute.
5 The Panel is further of the view that Canada has not explained why the 
existing third party rights are inadequate to allow the Panel to fully take into account Canada's interests. 
1.3.3  Preliminary ruling 
1.14.  On 14 December 2012, the United States submitted to the Panel a request for a preliminary 
ruling concerning the consistency of China's request for the establishment of the Panel with 
Article 6.2 of the DSU.  
1.15.  On 8 February 2013, the Panel issued a preliminary ruling to the parties. After consulting 
the parties to the dispute, the Panel decided to inform the DSB of the content of its preliminary 
ruling.
6 
1.16.  The preliminary ruling provides that it "is an integral part of the Panel's Final Report, subject 
to any changes that may be necessary in the light of comments received from the parties during Interim Review". 
                                               
5 See, e.g. the discussion of pa nel practice regarding enhanced th ird party rights in Panel Report, US – 
Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint) , paras. 7.16-7.17. 
6 WT/DS437/4. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  2  FACTUAL ASPECTS 
2.1  The measures at issue 2.1.  China's claims relate to 32 initiations of investigations or preliminary or final determinations 
in 17 countervailing duty investigations conducted from 2007 through 2012.
7 
3  PARTIES' REQUESTS FOR FI NDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
3.1.  China requests that the Panel find that: 
a. In connection with the alleged provision of input goods for less than adequate 
remuneration: 
i. The USDOC's findings of financial contribution are inconsistent with Article 1.1(a)(1) 
of the SCM Agreement, because the USDOC incorrectly determined, or did not have a sufficient basis to determine, that certain SOEs are "public bodies" within the 
meaning of that provision in the input subsidy investigations listed in CHI-1; 
ii. The "rebuttable presumption" established and applied by the USDOC in respect of 
whether SOEs can be classified as "public bodies" is, as such, inconsistent with 
Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement; 
iii. The USDOC's initiation of countervailing duty investigations in respect of allegations 
that SOEs confer countervailable subsidies through their sales of inputs to 
downstream producers, in the absence of sufficient evidence in the petition to 
support an allegation that SOEs constitute "public bodies" within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement, and in the absence of a sufficient review of the petition by the USDOC in respect of this allegation, is inconsistent with 
Articles 11.2 and 11.3 of the SCM Agreement in the Steel Cylinders, Solar Panels, 
Wind Towers, and Steel Sinks investigations; 
iv. The USDOC's findings of benefit are inconsistent with Article 1.1(b) and Article 14(d) 
of the SCM Agreement, because the USDOC improperly found that the alleged 
provision of goods for less than adequate remuneration conferred a benefit upon the 
recipient, and improperly calculated the amount of any benefit allegedly conferred, 
including, inter alia , its erroneous findings that prevailing market conditions in China 
were "distorted" as the basis for rejecting actual transaction prices in China as benchmarks in the input subsidy investigations listed in CHI-1; 
v. The USDOC's findings of specificity are inconsistent with Articles 2.1 and 2.4 of the 
SCM Agreement, because the USDOC failed to make a proper determination on the 
basis of positive evidence that the alleged provision of inputs for less than adequate 
remuneration was specific to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or 
industries in the input subsidy investigations listed in CHI-1; 
vi. The USDOC's initiation of countervailing duty investigations in respect of the alleged 
provision of inputs for less than adequate remuneration, in the absence of sufficient 
evidence in the petition to support an allegation that any such subsidy would be 
specific under Article 2 of the SCM Agreement, and in the absence of a sufficient review of the petition by the USDOC in respect of this allegation, is inconsistent with Articles 11.2 and 11.3 of the SCM Agreement in the input subsidy investigations 
listed in CHI-1. 
b. In connection with all of the identified countervailing duty investigations in which 
the USDOC has issued a preliminary or final countervailing duty determination: 
i. The USDOC's use of so-called "adverse fact s available" to support its findings of 
financial contribution, specificity, and benefit is inconsistent with Article 12.7 of 
                                               
7 See table in paragraph 7.1.  of this Report. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  the SCM Agreement in the instances identified in CHI-2 because the USDOC did not 
rely on facts available on the record. 
c. In connection with the alleged provision of land and land-use rights for less than 
adequate remuneration: 
i. The USDOC's findings of specificity are inconsistent with Articles 2.2 and 2.4 of 
the SCM Agreement, because the USDOC fail ed to make a proper determination on 
the basis of positive evidence that the alleged subsidy was specific to an enterprise 
or industry or to a group of enterprises or industries in the land specificity 
investigations listed in CHI-1. 
d. In connection with export restraints allegedly maintained by China: 
i. The USDOC's initiation of countervailing duty investigations in respect of these 
allegations is inconsistent with Articles 11.2 and 11.3 of the SCM Agreement in the 
Magnesia Bricks and Seamless Pipe investigations; 
ii. The USDOC's determination that export restraints provided a "financial contribution" 
is inconsistent with Article 1.1(a) of the SCM Agreement in the Magnesia Bricks and 
Seamless Pipe investigations. 
3.2.  China requests that in each instance where the Panel makes a finding of inconsistency, the 
Panel also find that, as a consequence, the United States has acted inconsistently with Articles 10 
and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement and Article VI:3 of  the GATT. It also requests that the Panel 
recommend that the United States bring the challenged measures into conformity with its obligations under the relevant covered agreements. 
3.3.  The United States requests that the Panel reject China's claims in this dispute. It also 
requests the Panel to disregard China's claims pertaining to the preliminary determinations in Wind Towers and Steel Sinks. As China did not request consultations on these determinations, such 
determinations should thus be outside the terms of reference of this panel proceeding. 
4  ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES 4.1.  The arguments of the parties, other than in their answers to questions, are reflected in their 
written submissions, oral statements or their executive summaries thereof, provided to the Panel 
in accordance with paragraph 16 of the Working Procedures adopted by the Panel (see Annexes A, B, D, F and G). 
5  ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES 
5.1.  The arguments of the third parties, other than  in their answers to questions, are reflected in 
their written submissions, oral statements or their executive summaries thereof, provided in accordance with paragraph 16 of the Working Procedures adopted by the Panel (see Annexes A, C 
and E). The arguments of Australia, Canada, Norway and Saudi Arabia are reflected in their third-
party written submissions and third-party oral statements or their executive summaries thereof. The arguments of Brazil are reflected in its third-party comments on the United States' request for 
a preliminary ruling, the executive summary of its third-party written submission and in its third-
party oral statement. The arguments of the European Union are reflected in the executive summary of its third-party comments on the United States' request for a preliminary ruling and in the executive summary of its third-party written submission. The arguments of India, Japan, Korea 
and Turkey are reflected in their third-party oral  statements. The Russian Federation and Viet Nam 
did not submit third-party written or oral arguments to the Panel. 
6  INTERIM REVIEW 
6.1.  On 28 February 2014, the Panel submitte d its Interim Report to the parties. On 
14 March 2014, China and the United States each submitted written requests for the review of 
precise aspects of the Interim Report. On 11 April 2014, each party submitted comments on the 
other's requests for review. Neither part y requested an interim review meeting. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  6.2.  In accordance with Article 15.3 of the DSU,  this section of the Report sets out the Panel's 
response to the parties' requests made at the interim review stage. The Panel modified aspects of its Report in light of the parties' comments where it considered it appropriate, as explained below. Due to changes made as a result of our review, th e numbering of footnotes in the Final Report has 
changed from the Interim Report. The text below refers to the footnote numbers in the Interim 
Report, with the corresponding footnote numbers in the Final Report (if different) in parentheses for ease of reference. 
6.1  Enhanced third party rights 
6.3.  Regarding paragraphs 1.11-1.13, the United States requests the deletion of part of the 
reasons provided by the Panel for the rejection of Canada's request for enhanced third party rights. The United States argues that the opposition of the parties to a request for enhanced 
third party rights serves as an independent and sufficient basis for such a request to be rejected. 
As such, the United States requests that the addi tional reasons provided by the Panel be deleted. 
The United States is concerned that these additional reasons could be misread to imply that a 
panel has discretion to grant enhanced third party rights for any number of reasons, potentially 
even where each party to the dispute has objected to granting enhanced rights. 
6.4.  China does not comment on the United States' request. 
6.5.  The Panel has decided to reject the United States' request, as it is well established that it is 
within a panel's discretion whether to grant enhanced third party rights. In particular, the Appellate Body has confirmed that, beyond the minimum rights guaranteed under Article 10 and Appendix 3 to the DSU, "[p]anels enjoy a discretion to grant additional participatory rights to third 
parties in particular cases, as long as such 'enhanced' rights are consistent with the provisions of 
the DSU and the principles of due process".
8 As such, the Panel has made no modifications to 
paragraphs 1.11-1.13. 
6.2  Preliminary ruling 
6.6.  Regarding paragraphs 1.14-1.16, the United States requests that the findings contained in 
the preliminary ruling be set out as a part of the Final Report, instead of being incorporated by 
reference. In addition, the United States requests that certain editing and typographical errors be 
corrected in the preliminary ruling.  
6.7.  China does not comment on the United States' request. 6.8.  The Panel notes that it is consistent with previous panels' practice to circulate the preliminary 
ruling as a separate document. However, for the sake of completeness, the Panel has added a 
footnote to paragraph 8.1 to reiterate that the Panel's conclusions incorporate those set forth in its preliminary ruling, as contained in the docume nt WT/DS437/4, circulated on 21 February 2013, 
which has been attached to this Report as Annex A-8. 
6.3  Terms of reference 6.9.  Regarding paragraph 7.25, China requests that the first sentence of the paragraph be 
modified to conform with China's response to Panel question No. 2, cited therein. 
6.10.  The United States does not comment on China's request. 6.11.  The Panel has made modifications to the first sentence of paragraph 7.25 to reflect China's 
request. 
6.4  Claims under Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement 
6.12.  Regarding paragraph 7.92, China requests that the description, in the first sentence of the 
paragraph, of Kitchen Shelving as "the only available written evidence" of the USDOC's policy be 
                                               
8 Appellate Body Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC) , para. 243. See also Appellate Body Reports, EC – 
Hormones , para. 154; and US – 1916 Act , para. 150. WT/DS437/R 
 
- 16 - 
 
  modified to reflect the fact that the application of the same policy by the USDOC in subsequent 
CVD cases also constitutes evidence of the policy.  As such, China requests that the Panel either 
replace the word "only" with the word "first" or, alternatively, that the first sentence of the paragraph be rephrased as follows: "We begin ou r assessment of this claim by looking at the 
relevant excerpt of Kitchen Shelving, where according to China the USDOC first articulated its 
policy." 
6.13.  The United States submits that it does no t support China's reformulation of paragraph 7.92. 
Nonetheless, the United States does not oppose China's alternative proposed modification, subject 
to the addition of commas after the terms "where" and "China". 
6.14.  The Panel has modified the first sentence of paragraph 7.92 in line with the alternative 
wording put forth by China, while also accepting the modification to this wording proposed by the 
United States. 
6.15.  Regarding paragraph 7.116, the United States requests that the wording of the second 
sentence of the paragraph be modified to accurately reflect the statement made by the USDOC in 
the Solar Panels Issues and Decision Memorandum, and quoted in that paragraph. Accordingly, the 
United States provides a modified wording for the sentence. 
6.16.  China submits that the Panel should reject the United States' request on the grounds that 
the wording of paragraph 7.116 is appropriate, especially when taking into account the context of 
the USDOC's statement. In China's view, the cont ext is important as it shows that the USDOC's 
statement was meant to convey a lack of intent to modify the USDOC's approach to the public 
body issue, despite the Appellate Body Report in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Duties (China) . 
6.17.  The Panel has modified the second sentence of paragraph 7.116 according to the wording 
provided by the United States, as well as made ce rtain editorial changes, to improve the clarity of 
the Report. 
6.18.  Regarding paragraph 7.127, the United States requests that the last two sentences of the 
paragraph be deleted, and that the first sentence of paragraph 7.127 be moved to the end of 
paragraph 7.126. The United States makes its request on the grounds that neither the text of the 
Kitchen Shelving Issues and Decision Memorandum nor US domestic law supports the Panel's conclusion that the USDOC is restricted from considering other evidence beyond ownership. 
6.19.  China submits that the Panel should reject the United States' request, as it merely restates 
the arguments presented by the United States in support of the proposition that the policy 
articulated in the Kitchen Shelving Issues and Decision Memorandum could not be challenged "as such". Nonetheless, China suggests modified wording for the second sentence of paragraph 7.127.  
6.20.  The Panel has amended paragraph 7.127 in accordance with the wording suggested by 
China, as it considers that this modification most appropriately addresses the issue raised by the United States.  
6.5  Claims under Article 11 of the SCM Agreem ent – evidence of a financial contribution 
6.21.  Regarding paragraph 7.138, which summarises the United States' arguments, the United 
States requests that the first sentence of that pa ragraph be modified to properly characterise the 
United States' arguments on the initiation issue. As a related matter, with respect to 
paragraph 7.139, the United States requests th at a sentence be added to the end of that 
paragraph to fully reflect the United States' arguments. 
6.22.  China submits that the Panel should reject the United States' request to modify 
paragraph 7.138, as that paragraph accurately reflects the United States' argument.  
6.23.  The Panel notes that the first sentence of paragraph 7.138 accurately reflects the 
United States' rejection, in paragraph 115 of its second written submission, of the argument made 
by China in paragraph 32 of its opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel. Nonetheless, 
the Panel accepts the United States' requests to modify the first sentence of paragraph 7.138 and WT/DS437/R 
 
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  to add a sentence to paragraph 7.139, with some editorial changes, to clarify and fully reflect the 
United States' core arguments on the initiation issue.  
6.6  Claims under Articles 1.1(b) and 14(d) of the SCM Agreement 6.24.  Regarding paragraph 7.166, which summarises the United States' arguments, the 
United States requests the deletion of the adjectiv e "right" in the fourth sentence of the paragraph 
from the characterization of the test for determining a benefit. 
6.25.  China does not comment on the United States' request. 
6.26.  The Panel has modified paragraph 7.166 as requested by the United States. 
6.27.  Regarding paragraph 7.167, which summarises the United States' arguments, the 
United States requests that certain modifications be made to the first and second sentences of the paragraph, and that two sentences be added after the second sentence of the paragraph, in order 
to more accurately reflect the United States' arguments made in its submissions. 
6.28.  China submits that the Panel should reject the United States' request to make certain 
modifications to the first sentence of paragraph 7.167, as China considers that the paragraph of 
the submission cited by the United States in support  of its request does not speak in favour of the 
modification.  
6.29.  The Panel has modified paragraph 7.167 as requested by the United States, with certain 
editorial changes. 
6.30.  Regarding paragraph 7.167, which summarises the United States' arguments, and 
footnotes 212 (223) and 213 (224), the United States requests that certain modifications be made to the footnotes to better reflect the United States' arguments. 
6.31.  China does not comment on the United States' request. 
6.32.  The Panel has modified footnotes 212 (223) and 213 (224) as requested by the 
United States. 
6.33.  Regarding paragraph 7.186, and footnotes 235 (246) and 238 (249), the United States 
requests that the footnotes be modified to more accurately reflect the determinations cited in support of the Panel's factual findings. With re spect to footnote 235 (246), the United States 
requests that the reference to Aluminum Extrusions be deleted, since it does not lend support to 
the statement that "some determinations are based on the market share of government-
owned/controlled firms in domestic production alone". With respect to footnote 238 (249), the United States requests that the reference to Steel Cylinders be deleted, since it does not lend 
support to the statement that "some determinat ions are based on the market share of the 
government plus the existence of … export restraints". 
6.34.  China submits that if the Panel accepts the United States' requested deletion of Aluminum 
Extrusions from footnote 235 (246), a reference to Aluminum Extrusions should be added to 
footnote 238 (249). Similarly, if the Panel accepts the United States' requested deletion of Steel Cylinders from footnote 238 (249), China requests that a reference to Steel Cylinders be added to 
footnote 236 (247), since it involves recourse to adverse facts available. 
6.35.  The Panel has modified footnotes 235 (246) and 238 (249) in accordance with the requests 
made by the United States and China, as they  enhance the factual accuracy of the Report. 
However, the Panel has decided to reject China's related request to add a reference to Steel 
Cylinders to footnote 236 (247), as the Panel does not consider the reason given by China for this 
addition to be factually accurate. 
6.36.  Regarding paragraph 7.187, the United States requests that certain modifications be made 
to the paragraph to better reflect the factual evidence underlying the Panel's evaluation. 
6.37.  China does not comment on the United States' request. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  6.38.  The Panel has modified paragraph 7.187 as requested by the United States. 
6.39.  Regarding paragraph 7.197, the United States requests that the Panel add findings with 
respect to Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement. 
6.40.  China does not comment on the United States' request. 
6.41.  The Panel has modified paragraph 7.197 as requested by the United States, as well as 
paragraph 8.1 for the sake of completeness. 
6.7  Claims under Articles 2.1 and 2.4 of the SCM Agreement 
6.42.  Regarding paragraph 7.215, which summarises the United States' arguments, the 
United States requests that a sentence be added to the end of that paragraph for the sake of completeness.  
6.43.  China does not comment on the United States' request. 
6.44.  The Panel has added the sentence suggested by the United States, with some editorial 
changes, to the end of paragraph 7.215. 
6.45.  Regarding paragraph 7.229 and footnote 293 (305), as well as paragraph 7.239 and 
footnote 307 (319), the United States requests that the references to the Oxford English 
Dictionary be made more specific.  
6.46.  China does not comment on the United States' request. 
6.47.  The Panel has made certain modifications to footnotes 293 (305) and 307 (319) to reflect 
the United States' requests.   
6.8  Claims under Article 11 of the SC M Agreement – evidence of specificity 
6.48.  With respect to paragraph 7.282, the United States suggests adding the term "for purposes 
of initiation" in order to elucidate the meaning of the sentence. 
6.49.  China does not comment on the United States' request. 6.50.  The Panel has modified paragraph 7.282 as suggested by the United States. 
6.9  Claims under Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement 
6.51.  Regarding paragraphs 7.284 and 7.307, and footnotes 345 (357) and 378 (deleted), the 
United States requests that the introduction to section 7.10 be brought in line with the introduction 
to section 7.8 with respect to the exclusion of the preliminary determinations in Wind Towers and 
Steel Sinks, and that footnote 345 (357), rather than footnote 378 (deleted), reflect this.  
6.52.  China does not comment on the United States' request. 6.53.  The Panel has made the modifications requested by the United States to paragraph 7.284 
and footnote 345 (357), and has deleted footnote 378 (deleted), to consistently reflect the finding 
that the preliminary determinations in Wind Towers and Steel Sinks are not within the Panel's terms of reference. 
6.54.  Regarding paragraph 7.318 and footnote 390 (401), the United States requests that the 
references to the preliminary determination in Wind Towers be removed, in light of the finding that it is not within the Panel's terms of reference.  
6.55.  China does not comment on the United States' request. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  6.56.  The Panel has made the modifications requested by the United States to paragraph 7.318 
and footnote 390 (401), to properly reflect the find ing that the preliminary determination in Wind 
Towers is not within the Panel's terms of reference. 
6.57.  Regarding paragraph 7.324, the United States requests the deletion of that paragraph on 
the grounds that the USDOC's statements referred to therein are not part of China's affirmative 
case in support of its claim, and that the paragraph is therefore extraneous to the Panel's analysis.   
6.58.  China submits that the Panel should reject th e United States' request. According to China, it 
has provided the specific language in each investigation that demonstrates the lack of factual 
foundation in the adverse facts available determinations referenced by the Panel. As such, the Panel is acting within its mandate.  
6.59.  The Panel has decided to reject the United States' request to delete paragraph 7.324. We do 
not agree with the United States that paragraph 7.324 is extraneous to the Panel's analysis. While 
China does fail to discuss, or even acknowledge, the meaning of these statements, the statements 
themselves form part of the evidence provided by China to the Panel in its Exhibits in support of its 
case. As such, the Panel is within its rights to express concern over these statements. 
6.10  Claims under Articles 2.2 and 2.4 of the SCM Agreement 6.60.  Regarding paragraph 7.326 and footnote 405 (416), the United States requests that a 
reference to exhibits CHI-1 and CHI-121, identifying the regional specificity determinations 
challenged by China, be added to footnote 405 (416) for purposes of greater clarity.  
6.61.  China does not comment on the United States' request. 6.62.  The Panel has modified footnote 405 (416) in  accordance with the United States' request. 
6.63.  Regarding paragraph 7.328, the United States suggests that the first sentence of the 
paragraph be clarified by using the terminology of the SCM Agreement. 
6.64.  China does not comment on the United States' request. 
6.65.  The Panel has modified paragraph 7.328 in accordance with the United States' suggestion. 
6.66.  Regarding paragraph 7.349, China requests that the paragraph be modified to correctly 
reflect China's argument, namely that the relevant inquiry under Article 2.2 is whether the 
financial contribution (i.e. the provision of land-use rights, in this case) or the benefit is limited to 
the identified industrial park or economic development zone. China has however provided no alternate wording for paragraph 7.349.  
6.67.  The United States submits that the Panel sh ould reject China's request, since, despite the 
use of slightly different language by the Panel, paragraph 7.349 accurately reflects China's 
arguments. 
6.68.  The Panel has made certain modifications to paragraph 7.349 to reflect China's request and 
more clearly align the language used therein with the language used in China's submissions. 
6.11  Claims concerning export restraints 6.69.  Regarding paragraph 7.374, which summarises the United States' arguments, the 
United States requests that wording be added to  the paragraph to more accurately reflect the 
argument that the applications contained evidence which supports the USDOC's initiations of investigations.  
6.70.  China does not comment on the United States' request. 
6.71.  The Panel has modified paragraph 7.374 as requested by the United States. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  6.72.  Regarding paragraph 7.375 and footnote 454 (465), the United States requests that a 
further reference to the United States' first written submission be added to footnote 454 (465). 
6.73.  China does not comment on the United States' request. 6.74.  The Panel has modified footnote 454 (465) as requested by the United States. 
6.12  Editing and typographical changes 
6.75.  In addition to the specific requests discussed above, the parties have asked the Panel to 
make changes of an editorial nature to improve clarity and accuracy or better reflect the language 
used in their submissions. The Panel has considered these requests and made the changes that it 
considered appropriate. In addition, the Panel also corrected typographical errors and made changes to other paragraphs to improve the clarit y of the text and better express its reasoning. 
7  FINDINGS 
7.1  Introduction 
7.1.1  Measures at issue 7.1.  In this dispute China advances "as applied" claims with respect to 17 countervailing duty 
investigations
9 initiated by the USDOC in the period 2007-2012:  
Short Title Full Title 
Thermal Paper Lightweight Thermal Paper From the People's Republic of China  
Investigation C-570-921  
Pressure Pipe Circular Welded Austenitic Stainless Pressu r e  P i p e  f r o m  t h e  P e o p l e ' s  R e p u b l i c  o f  
China  
Investigation C-570-931  
Line Pipe Certain Circular Welded Carbon Quality Stee l Line Pipe from the People's Republic 
of China Investigation C-570-936  
Citric Acid Citric Acid and Certain Citrate Salts From the People's Republic of China 
Investigation C-570-938  
Lawn Groomers Certain Tow Behind Lawn Groomers and Ce rtain Parts Thereof from the People's 
Republic of China Investigation C-570-940  
Kitchen 
Shelving Certain Kitchen Appliance Shelving and Racks from the People's Republic of China  
Investigation C-570-942  
OCTG Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods from the People's Republic of China 
Investigation C-570-944  
Wire Strand Pre-Stressed Concrete Steel Wire Strand from the People's Republic of China  
Investigation C-570-946  
Magnesia Bricks Certain Magnesia Carbon Bricks From the People's Republic of China Investigation 
C-570-955  
Seamless Pipe Certain Seamless Carbon and Alloy Steel Standard, Line, and Pressure Pipe from the 
People's Republic of China  
Investigation C-570-957  
Print Graphics Certain Coated Paper Suitable for High-Q uality Print Graphics Using Sheet-Fed 
Presses From the People's Republic of China 
Investigation C-570-959  
Drill Pipe Drill Pipe From the People's Republic of China 
Investigation C-570-966  
Aluminum 
Extrusions Aluminum Extrusions From the People's Republic of China 
Investigation C-570-968  
Steel Cylinders High Pressure Steel Cylinders From the People's Republic of China 
Investigation C-570-978  
                                               
9 In its request for establishment of a panel in document WT/DS437/2, Chin a advances "as applied" 
claims in respect of 22 countervailing duty investigations. China explains in its first written submission to the 
Panel that it is not pursuing its claims with re spect to the countervailing duty investigations in Wire Decking 
from the People's Republic of China , Certain Steel Grating from the People's Republic of China , Certain Steel 
Wheels from the People's Republic of China , Galvanized Steel Wire from the People's Republic of China , and 
Multilayered Wood Flooring from th e People's Republic of China . China's first written submission, fn 2. WT/DS437/R 
 
- 21 - 
 
  Short Title Full Title 
Solar Panels Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not Assembled Into Modules, 
From the People's Republic of China  Investigation C-570-980  
Wind Towers Utility Scale Wind Towers From the People's Republic of China 
Investigation C-570-982  
Steel Sinks Drawn Stainless Steel Sinks From the People's Republic of China  
Investigation C-570-984  
 
7.2.  In respect of 14 of these investigations10, China's claims relate to: (i) findings of the USDOC 
that Chinese SOEs were public bodies; (ii) findings of the USDOC that the provision of certain 
inputs by the Chinese SOEs conferred a benefit; (iii) findings of the USDOC that alleged subsidies 
arising from the provision of inputs at less than adequate remuneration were specific; and (iv) the decisions of the USDOC that there was sufficient evidence with respect to specificity of the alleged 
subsidies to justify the initiation of a countervailing duty investigation. With respect to four of 
these 14 investigations
11, China's claims relate to the USDOC's treatment of Chinese SOEs as 
public bodies for purposes of the initiation of the countervailing duty investigation.  
7.3.  With regard to 15 of the 17 countervailing duty investigations at issue in this dispute12, 
China's claims concern the USDOC's resort to the use of adverse facts available.  
7.4.  With regard to seven countervailing duty investigations13, China's claims relate to findings of 
the USDOC that subsidies in the form of the provision of land use rights are specific.  
7.5.  Finally, with regard to two countervailing duty investigations14, China's claims concern the 
USDOC's initiation of countervailing duty instigations into export restraints and its findings that these export restraints are financial contributions.  
7.6.  In addition to these "as applied" claims, Ch ina presents an "as such" claim with respect to the 
USDOC's "rebuttable presumption" that SOEs are public bodies.  
7.2  General principles regarding treaty interpretation, standard of review and burden of 
proof 
7.2.1  Treaty interpretation 7.7.  Article 3.2 of the DSU provides that the WT O dispute settlement system serves to clarify the 
existing provisions of the covered agreements "in accordance with customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law". It is generally accepted that the principles codified in 
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on th e Law of Treaties are such customary rules.  
7.2.2  Standard of review 
7.8.  Panels generally are bound by the standard of review set forth in Article 11 of the DSU, which 
provides, in relevant part, that: 
[A] panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an 
objective assessment of the facts of the case  and the applicability of and conformity 
with the relevant covered agreements. 
7.9.  The Appellate Body has explained that where a Panel is reviewing an investigating authority's 
determination, the "objective assessment" standard  in Article 11 of the DSU requires a panel to 
review whether the authorities have provided a reasoned and adequate explanation as to (i) how 
                                               
10 Pressure Pipe, Line Pipe, Lawn Groomers, Kitchen Shelving, OCTG, Wire Strand, Seamless Pipe, Print 
Graphics, Drill Pipe, Aluminium Extrusions, Steel Cylinders, Solar Panels, Wind Towers and Steel Sinks.   
11 Steel Cylinders, Solar Panels, Wind Towers, and Steel Sinks. 
12 China makes these claims with respect to all countervailing duty investigations except the 
investigations in Thermal Paper and Kitchen Shelving. 
13 Thermal Paper, Line Pipe, Citric Acid, OCTG, Wire Strand, Seamless Pipe and Print Graphics. 
14 Magnesia Bricks and Seamless Pipe. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  the evidence on the record supported its factual findings; and (ii) how those factual findings 
support the overall determination.15  
7.10.  The Appellate Body has clarified that a panel should not conduct a de novo review of the 
evidence, nor should it substitute its judgment for that of the authority. A panel must limit its 
examination to the evidence that was before the ag ency during the course of the investigation and 
must take into account all such evidence  submitted by the parties to the dispute.16 At the same 
time, a panel must not simply defer to the conclusions of the investigating authority; a panel's 
examination of those conclusions must be "in-depth" and "critical and searching".17  
7.2.3  Burden of proof 7.11.  The general principles applicable to the a llocation of the burden of proof in WTO dispute 
settlement require that a party claiming a violation of a provision of a WTO Agreement must assert 
and prove its claim.
18 Therefore, China bears the burden of  demonstrating that the challenged 
measures are inconsistent with the SCM Agreement. The Appellate Body has stated that a complaining party will satisfy its burden when it establishes a prima facie  case, namely a case 
which, in the absence of effective refutation by the defending party, requires a panel, as a matter 
of law, to rule in favour of the complaining party.
19 Finally, it is generally for each party asserting a 
fact to provide proof thereof.20 
7.12.  The United States argues that in respect of most of its claims China has failed to make a 
prima facie  case. The United States submits that China's first written submission relies on broad 
and inaccurate generalisations regarding the facts of the USDOC's preliminary and final determinations and fails to discuss how the provis ions of the SCM Agreement apply to any of the 
determinations made by the USDOC.
21 By contrast, China considers that with respect to all of its 
claims it has met each of the elements that the Appellate Body has deemed necessary to establish a prima facie  case.
22 The Panel will address the issue of China's alleged failure to make a prima 
facie case to the extent that this is necessary to make a finding on the merits of each of China's 
claims.23   
7.3  Whether the preliminary de terminations in Wind Towers and Steel Sinks are within 
the Panel's terms of reference 
7.3.1  Introduction 7.13.  The United States requests the Panel to ru le that the preliminary determinations in Wind 
Towers and Steel Sinks  are not  within the Panel's terms of reference because they were not  
subject to the consultations requested by China in this dispute.
24  
7.3.2  Relevant Provisions 7.14.  Article 4 of the DSU provides, relevantly: 
4. … Any request for consultations shall be submitted in writing and shall give the 
reasons for the request, including identification of the measures at issue and an indication of the legal basis for the complaint. 
                                               
15 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para. 186; see also 
Appellate Body Report, US – Lamb , para. 103. 
16 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS , paras. 187-188. 
17 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber VI (Article 21.5 – Canada),  para. 93. 
18 Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses , p. 14. 
19 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 104. 
20 Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses , p. 14. 
21 United States' second written submission, paras. 12-16. 
22 China's second written submission, paras. 14-24. 
23 In the Panel's view, there is no requirement that  a panel make a separate finding as to whether a 
complainant has made a prima facie  case before it can proceed to consider  the merits of a complainant's claim. 
See, e.g. Appellate Body Report, Korea – Dairy , paras. 144-145. 
24 United States' first written submission, para. 12. WT/DS437/R 
 
- 23 - 
 
  7. If the consultations fail to settle a dispute within 60 days after the date of receipt of 
the request for consultations, the complaining party may request the establishment of a panel. The complaining party may request a panel during the 60-day period if the consulting parties jointly consider that consultations have failed to settle the dispute.  
7.15.  Article 6 of the DSU provides, relevantly: 
2. The request for the establishment of a panel shall be made in writing. It shall 
indicate whether consultations were held, identify the specific measures at issue and 
provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the 
problem clearly. 
7.3.3  Main arguments of parties 7.3.3.1  United States 
7.16.  The United States argues that the preliminary determinations in the Wind Towers and Steel 
Sinks investigations are outside the terms of reference of the panel proceeding.
25 The 
United States notes that these preliminary de terminations have never been the subject of 
consultations between the two parties because they were not included in China's request for 
consultations. Their inclusion would have been in any event impossible because both determinations were issued after China's request for consultations. The latter included only the 
initiations of the corresponding investigations.
26 The United States argues that based on 
Articles 4.4 and 4.7 as well as 6 of the DSU, a complaining party must request consultations regarding a matter before the latter may be referred to the DSB for the establishment of a panel, which in turn establishes the terms of reference for the panel proceeding in accordance with 
Article 7.1 of the DSU. The United States further contends that China tries to circumvent the 
requirements of DSU by not having filed an additional or supplemental consultations request.
27 In 
addition, the United States argues that in the pa nel request, China made additional legal claims 
relating to the public body, facts available, benchmark and specificity findings of the preliminary 
determinations of Wind Towers  and Steel Sinks which expands the scope of the dispute.28 
7.17.  The United States argues that there is an  inherent contradiction between, on the one hand, 
China's argument that the addition of the preliminary determinations in Wind Towers and Steel 
Sinks does not expand the scope of the dispute because these determinations are the "next phase" of the investigations initiated, and, on the other,  China's argument that the addition of the legal 
claims associated with these preliminary determinations does not expand the scope of the dispute 
because the same legal claims have been raised for other final determinations. The United States 
also submits that China's argument reading preliminary determinations as "next phases" could arguably open the door for complainants to add "next phases" of an investigation after the 
consultation request while they included in the latter only the initiation of the investigation in 
question. The United States further contends that China fails to recognize that preliminary determinations are distinct from the initiations of investigations.
29 
7.18.   Moreover, the United States argues that the legal claims of China regarding the preliminary 
determinations are not a natural evolution from the legal claims associated with the measures consulted upon – the initiation of the investigations. The United States considers that each legal claim for each measure stands independently of each other. According to the United States, the 
only similarity in the scope of the dispute between  the consultation and panel request is that China 
challenges separate, different measures using th e same claims it has used for other measures.
30 
                                               
25 United States' first written submission, paras. 13-21. 
26 United States' first written submission, para. 13 and fn 12, where the United States clarifies that 
China's request for consultations is dated 25 May 2012 while the preliminary determination in Wind Towers was issued on 6 June 2012 and the one in Steel Sinks on 6 August 2012. 
27 United States' response to Pa nel question No. 1, para. 4. 
28 United States' response to Pa nel question No. 1, para. 5. 
29 United States' second written submission, paras. 6-9. 
30 United States' second written submission, paras. 9-11; United States' comments on China's responses 
to the Panel question No. 82, paras. 3-4. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  7.19.  The United States also contends that China has failed to establish a proper legal foundation 
for challenging preliminary determinations as compared to final determinations31, and in particular 
has failed to explain why, in light of the langua ge of a particular provision and the preliminary 
nature of the determinations, it would be appropriate to make a finding under that provision with 
respect to a preliminary determination that is subject to change.32  
7.3.3.2  China 7.20.  China submits that the Wind Towers and Steel Sinks investigations  are the "measures at 
issue" in the sense of Article 4.4 of the DSU and both the initiation and preliminary determinations 
are the "specific measures at issue" in  the context of Article 6.2 of the DSU.
33 Both the initiation 
and preliminary determinations concern the same investigation of the same products from the same country by the same agency. China further argues that the Appellate Body has held that 
Articles 4 and 6 do not require a "precise and ex act identity" between the specific measures that 
were the subject of consultations and those identified in the panel request as long as the complainant does not "expand the scope of the disp ute" or change the "essence of the challenged 
measures".
34 The preliminary determinations are merely the next phase of the investigations, the 
initiation of which was identified in the consultation request, and together with which they represent a "continuum of events". There is theref ore a "sufficient degree of identity" to warrant a 
conclusion that the inclusion of the preliminary determinations in the panel request does not 
expand the scope of the dispute.
35  
7.21.  In addition, China argues that the inclusion of these two preliminary determinations in the 
panel request has no effect on the scope of China's legal claims in this dispute. The 
two preliminary determinations represent two additional instances of the same claims that China 
has already raised in respect of other measures at  issue in this dispute. China thus requests the 
Panel to reject the US assertion that these determinations are not within the Panel's terms of 
reference.36 Moreover, China contends that its two arguments are not contradictory; rather the 
second one, with respect to the legal claims, reinforces the fact that including the next phase of an investigation, the initiation of which was identified in the consultations request, does not expand 
the scope of the dispute.
37 
7.22.  In relation to the inclusion of preliminary determinations in its complaint, China argues that 
the SCM Agreement does not contain a provision eq uivalent to Article 17.4 of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement which China interprets as an expression of an unconditional right to 
challenge preliminary countervailing duty determinations. China cites in support of its position the 
US – Softwood Lumber III dispute, where the challenged measures on which the panel 
reached findings and made recommendations were preliminary countervailing duty determinations 
of the USDOC.38 
7.3.4  Evaluation by the Panel 7.23.  In order to decide whether the preliminary affirmative countervailing duty determinations in 
Wind Towers and Steel Sinks, which were not subject to the consultations held in this dispute, are 
within our terms of reference, we must determine whether the inclusion of these determinations in China's panel request has expanded the scope of this dispute.
39 We may examine the scope of the 
dispute in terms of both the measures at issue and the claims advanced by China.40 We are guided 
in our assessment by the Appellate Body's stat ement that a "precise and exact identity" of 
                                               
31 United States' first written submission, para. 12, fn 11. 
32 United States' response to Pa nel question No. 3, para. 16. 
33 China's response to Panel question No. 2, para. 7. 
34 China's second written submission, para. 9, citing Appellate Body Reports, Brazil – Aircraft , para. 132; 
US – Upland Cotton , para. 293; and Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice , para. 137. 
35 China's second written submission, para. 10. 
36 China's response to Panel question No. 1, paras. 4-6; China second written submission, para. 11. 
37 China's response to Panel question No. 82, paras 1-3. 
38 China's response to Panel question No. 3, paras. 8-11. 
39 Appellate Body Reports, US – Continued Zeroing , paras. 224 and 228; US — Shrimp (Thailand) / 
US — Customs Bond Directive , para. 293. 
40 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing , para. 233. WT/DS437/R 
 
- 25 - 
 
  measures between the two requests is not ne cessary, "provided that the 'essence' of the 
challenged measures had not changed".41 
7.24.  In both its request for consultations and its panel request, China identifies the specific 
measures at issue as those preliminary and final determinations listed in Appendix 1 of each 
request. China explains:  
The measures include the determination by the USDOC to initiate the identified 
countervailing duty investigations, the conduct of those investigations, any 
preliminary or final countervailing duty determinations issued in those investigations, 
any definitive countervailing duties imposed as a result of those investigations, as well as any notices, annexes, decision memoranda, orders, amendments, or other instruments issued by the United States in connection with the countervailing duty 
measures identified in Appendix 1.
42 
7.25.  Indeed, as noted above, in response to a question from the Panel, China asserted that 
"[t]he Wind Towers  and Steel Sinks  investigations are, broadly speaking, "measures at issue" in 
the sense of article 4.4 of the DSU ...".43 However, the investigations are not measures 
themselves, but rather proceedings, i.e. a series of  activities involving a formal or set procedure.44 
Certainly, they lead to the adoption of measures , and specifically the initiations and preliminary 
and final determinations (although they may involve other measures, e.g. the decision to accept 
an undertaking pursuant to Article 18 of the SCM Agreement). The nature and purpose of each of these measures is different and there are significan t distinctions especially between the decision to 
initiate an investigation and the preliminary and final determinations. For instance, as we have 
noted elsewhere in this Report
45, the SCM Agreement does not require an investigating authority 
to make any findings or explain its understanding of key issues (such as the financial contribution, the benefit or specificity) when initiating an investigation, which contrasts with the requirements of 
preliminary or final determinations. Indeed, Article 22.2 requires that the public notice of the 
initiation of an investigation contain or make available adequate information on inter alia  "a 
description of the subsidy practice or practices to be investigated". In contrast, Article 22.3 
requires that the public notice of any preliminary or final determination set forth in sufficient detail 
"the findings and conclusions reached on all issues of fact and law considered material by the investigating authority".
46  
7.26.  Their effects are also quite different. As already noted, the notice of initiation describes the 
subsidy practice or practices to be investigated . The preliminary and final determinations may be 
affirmative or negative, and they may or may not impose provisional or final countervailing duties, respectively. In fact, an affirmative preliminary determination does not necessarily lead to an 
affirmative final determination.  
7.27.  In its request for consultations China challenges, among other things, the USDOC's 
treatment of the alleged provision of input goods for less than adequate remuneration. In this 
regard, China's request for consultations claims that the USDOC acted inconsistently with the 
SCM Agreement in 14 final affirmative countervaili ng duty determinations and two preliminary 
countervailing duty determinations
47 by finding that certain SOEs were public bodies, by finding 
that the alleged provision of input goods for less than adequate remuneration was specific, and by 
finding that the alleged provision of input goods for less than adequate remuneration conferred a 
                                               
41 Appellate Body Report, Mexico — Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice , para. 137 (referring to 
Appellate Body Report, Brazil — Aircraft,  para. 132). 
42 China's request for the establ ishment of a panel, p. 1.  
43 China's response to Panel question No. 2, para. 7. 
44 Oxford Dictionaries, accessed on 19 February 2014, 
<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/de finition/american_english/proceedings >. 
45 See paragraphs 7.149.  -7.154.  of this Report. 
46 See paragraphs 7.149.  -7.154.  of this Report.  
47 In its request for consultations at footnote 4, China appears to have mistakenly referred to the 
preliminary determination in Steel Cylinders, since the final determination had already been issued and it is the latter that it is included in Appendix 1 thereof. It made the correction in its panel request. That is why the number of final determinations changed from 14 in the re quest for consultations to 15 in the panel request, 
and the number of preliminary determ inations changed from two to three, respectively. In reality there were 
15 final determinations involved in both requests, but only one preliminary determination in the request for consultations. WT/DS437/R 
 
- 26 - 
 
  benefit upon the recipient. In its panel request China advances exactly the same claims with 
respect to 15 final affirmative countervailing duty determinations and three preliminary countervailing duty determinations. While China's claims in this dispute in respect of the alleged provision of input goods at less than adequate rem uneration appear to be of a horizontal nature, 
its specific claim regarding the initiation of four investigations (including Wind Towers and Steel 
Sinks) is different to those concerning the USDOC's findings in its preliminary and final determinations. As explained in detail in section 7.6 of this Report, China contended that the 
initiations are inconsistent with Article 11.3 beca use they were based on the application of an 
incorrect legal standard  — as opposed to findings  that SOEs were public bodies. This Panel has 
rejected this claim by China, for the reasons set forth in section 7.6. 
7.28.  The fact that the USDOC later made findings similar to those of the other investigations 
does not change the different nature, purpose and effects of a decision to initiate an investigation 
and a preliminary (or final) determination. It may well be that such an outcome is the result, at least in part, of the application of a deliberate policy of general and prospective application, as 
China has also contended in this case. China has properly challenged such a policy as an "as such" 
measure and we deal with that claim in the appropriate section of this Report. 
7.29.  In  light of the foregoing considerations, the Panel finds that the preliminary countervailing 
duty determinations in Wind Towers and Steel Sinks are not within the Panel's terms of reference.  
7.4  Whether the USDOC's findings that certai n SOEs were public bodies are inconsistent 
with Article 1.1 (a)(1) of the SCM Agreement 
7.4.1  Introduction 
7.30.  In this section of the Report, the Pane l turns to China's claims regarding the USDOC's 
findings that certain Chinese SOEs were "public bo dies" within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1) of 
the SCM Agreement in 12 of the 17 countervailing du ty investigations at issue in this dispute, 
namely Pressure Pipe, Line Pipe, Lawn Groomers,  Kitchen Shelving, OCTG , Wire Strand, Seamless 
Pipe, Print Graphics, Drill Pipe, Aluminum Ex trusions, Steel Cylinders and Solar Panels.
48 
7.31.  In each of these 12 investigations, the US DOC found that financial contributions existed in 
the form of provisions of certain inputs to the re spondents. In this context, the USDOC determined 
that SOEs which provided the inputs to the respondents were "authorities" within the meaning of section 771(5)(B) of the US Tariff Act of 1930.
49 
7.32.  China claims that the United States acted inconsistently with Article 1.1(a)(1) of the 
SCM Agreement because the USDOC determinations that certain SOEs in China were public bodies 
are inconsistent with the interpretation of the te rm "public body" set out by the Appellate Body in 
its report in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) . Furthermore, as a consequence 
of these inconsistencies with Article 1.1(a)(1), China claims that the United States acted 
inconsistently with Articles 10 and 32.1 of th e SCM Agreement, as well as Article VI:3 of the 
GATT 1994. 
7.4.2  Relevant provisions 
7.33.  The present claim mainly concerns Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement, which relevantly 
provides the following: 
1.1 For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if: 
(a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any 
public body within the territory of a Member (referred to in this Agreement as "government") 
                                               
48 See table in paragraph 7.1.   of this Report. We recall that the Panel has found that the preliminary 
determinations in Wind Towers and Steel Sinks fall outside the Panel's terms of reference. 
49 The USDOC uses the US statutory term "authority" in its determinations. See 19 U.S.C. 
Section 1677(5)(B). The term "authority" is defined to include a "public entity". The United States has 
explained that a "public entity" is the same as a "publi c body". China's first writte n submission, fn 8, citing 
Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) , para. 8.99. WT/DS437/R 
 
- 27 - 
 
  7.4.3  Main arguments of China  
7.34.  China claims that the United States acted inconsistently with Article 1.1(a)(1) of the 
SCM Agreement because the USDOC determinations that certain SOEs in China were public bodies are inconsistent with the interpretation of the te rm "public body" set out by the Appellate Body in 
its report in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China).  
7.35.  China points out that in  US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) , the Appellate 
Body determined that "'being vested with, and exercising, authority to perform governmental 
functions' is the 'core feature' that defines a publ ic body" within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1). 
China highlights the significance attached by the Appellate Body to the use of the collective term 
"government" in Article 1.1(a)(1) and the Appellate Body's reliance upon its finding in Canada – 
Dairy  that the "essence of government is that it enjoys the effective power to regulate, control, or 
supervise individuals, or otherwise restrain their co nduct, through the exercise of lawful authority". 
China argues, in this connection, that a public body, like government in the narrow sense, thus 
must itself possess the authority to "regulate, control, supervise or restrain" the conduct of others. 
China recalls that the Appellate Bo dy found further support for its interpretation of the term "public 
body" in sub-paragraph (iv) of Article 1.1 and in the object and purpose of the SCM Agreement.
50 
7.36.  China recalls that the Appellate Body found in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Duties (China)  that in the cases before it the USDOC had not complied with its obligation "to 
ensure that its determinations were based on a sufficient factual basis" because evidence of government ownership "cannot, without more, serve as a basis for establishing that the entity is vested with authority to perform a governmental function".
51 China submits that the input subsidy 
investigations at issue in the present dispute suffer from the same inconsistency identified by the 
Appellate Body in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) because the USDOC found 
that the SOEs selling inputs to downstream producers of the products under investigation were 
public bodies based on the same control-based test that the Appellate Body rejected in that 
dispute. China argues that the USDOC's financial contribution determinations are inconsistent with the SCM Agreement both in those investigations where the USDOC's "government authority" 
findings were based on evidence submitted by China and in those cases where the USDOC relied 
on "adverse facts available". This is because the USDOC applied the same flawed control-based 
standard in all of the input subsidy investigations at issue in this dispute.
52  
7.37.  China argues53 that, in its consideration of China's claims under Article 1.1(a)(1), the Panel 
should be guided by the principles that the Appe llate Body has established regarding the relevance 
of its legal interpretations of the covered agreements. While the Appellate Body has never had occasion to elaborate upon what sort of "cogent reasons" might justify departing from a legal 
interpretation embodied in a previously adopte d Appellate Body report, simply advancing minor 
elaborations on arguments already considered and rejected by the Appellate Body cannot constitute "cogent reasons".
54 In China's view, the arguments advanced by the United States 
before this Panel regarding the interpretation of the term "public body" are not significantly 
different from the arguments advanced by the United States, and rejected by the Appellate Body, in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) .
55 China considers that the allegedly 
"new" control-based standard advocated by the Un ited States in this dispute differs in no 
meaningful way from the "old" control-based standard that the United States advocated in US – 
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) .56 The new standard advanced by the 
United States is also irrelevant because it is undisputed that the USDOC's public body findings at 
issue in this dispute all reflect the prior control-based standard that the Appellate Body found 
inconsistent with Article 1.1(a)(1).57 China expects the Panel to follow the Appellate Body's ruling 
in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) because that is the only outcome 
                                               
50 China's first written submission, paras. 20-25. 
51 China's first written submission, paras. 26-29. 
52 China's first written submission, paras. 30-31. 
53 China's first oral statement, paras. 10-12. 
54 China's first oral statement, para.15; second written submission, paras. 31-36. 
55 China's first oral statement para. 15; second written submission, paras. 34-35; Exhibit CHI-127. 
56 China's response to Panel question No. 17. 
57 China's second written submission, para. 34, fn 36; comments on response of the United States to 
Panel question No. 87.   WT/DS437/R 
 
- 28 - 
 
  consistent with the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and with the 
objective of a prompt settlement of this dispute.58 
7.38.  China submits that the identical term for pub lic body in the Spanish text of Article 1.1 of the 
SCM Agreement – "organismo público" – is used in the plural form in the Spanish text of 
Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture to me an "agencies" of a "government". According to 
China, the requirement to give effect to the inte grated nature of the different agreements under 
the WTO Agreement means that identical terms in different agreements must ordinarily be given 
the same meaning. China argues that the Engl ish terms "public body" and "government agency" 
must be treated as functional equivalents, since that is how the Spanish texts of the SCM Agreement and the Agreement on Agriculture treat the corresponding terms. Thus, a public 
body – like a government agency and like an "o rganismo público" – must be "an entity which 
exercises powers vested in it by a 'government'  for the purpose of performing functions of a 
'governmental' character, that is, to 'regulate', 'restrain', 'supervise' or 'control' the conduct of 
private citizens".
59 China considers that the United States provides no support for its assertion that 
the context and object and purpose of the SCM Agreement and the Agreement on Agriculture are 
different. China argues that Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture and Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement in fact have very similar contexts in that each provision addresses the question of 
what entities other than the government itself ma y bestow subsidies subject to the disciplines of 
the respective agreements.
60  
7.4.4  Main arguments of the United States 7.39.  The United States argues that the Panel should reject China's claims because they rest on a 
flawed interpretation of the term "public body " in Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement. 
Interpreted according to the customary rules of interpretation of public international law pursuant to Article 3.2 of the DSU, the term "public body " in Article 1.1(a)(1) means an entity that is 
controlled by the government such that the government can use that entity's resources as its own.  
7.40.  The United States argues that dictionary definitions of "public" and "body" suggest that a 
public body is an entity of, belonging to, or pertaining to the community as a whole and that 
nothing in those dictionary definitions would restrict the meaning of that term to an entity vested 
with, or exercising, government authority. The United States also argues in this regard that if the drafters had wished to convey the meaning of "ves ted with or exercising governmental authority" 
they could have used terms such as "governmenta l body", "public agency",  "governmental agency" 
or "governmental authority".
61 
7.41.  The United States argues that reading the term "public body" in context supports the 
conclusion that a public body is any entity contro lled by the government such that the government 
can use that entity's resources as its own. The pr inciple of effectiveness in treaty interpretation 
requires that the term "public body" be interpre ted in a manner that does not make it redundant 
with the word "government". Thus, the term "public body" in Article 1.1(a)(1) of the 
SCM Agreement should be interpreted as meaning something other than an entity that performs 
"functions of a 'governmental' character, that is to  'regulate', 'restrain', 'supervise' or 'control' the 
conduct of private citizens".62  
7.42.  The United States argues that the us e of the term "government" as a shorthand 
reference for the phrase "a government or any pu blic body within the territory of a Member" in 
Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement does no t require a narrow interpretation of the term 
"public body". While the shorthand reference suggests that government and public body are 
related, understanding the relationship to be one in which the government has authorized the 
public body to perform governmental acts would make the term "public body" redundant and would be inconsistent with the dictionary definitions of "public body". Understanding the 
relationship as one of control of a public body by "a government" (on behalf of the community it 
represents) gives meaning to both terms and avoids reducing the term "public body" to 
                                               
58 China's first oral statement, para. 16. 
59 China's second written submission, paras. 38-47, response to Panel question No. 84. 
60 China's response to Panel question No. 83. 
61 United States' first written submission, paras. 36-47. 
62 United States' first written submission, paras. 49-51. WT/DS437/R 
 
- 29 - 
 
  redundancy. It is also consistent with the dict ionary definitions relevant to the term "public 
body".63 
7.43.  The United States argues that the cont ext provided by the term "private body" in 
Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) supports an understanding of th e term "public body" as an entity controlled by 
the government such that the government can use the entity's resources as its own. Logically, 
since the ordinary meaning of the term "public" is  the opposite of "private", the term "public" 
means "provided or owned by the State or a public body rather than an individual". 
7.44.  The United States argues that a financial contribution within the meaning of 
Article 1.1(a)(1) is a conveyance of value and that entities controlled by the government can convey value just as the government can and the value conveyed can be precisely the same as that conveyed by the government. There is no reason why the concept of financial contribution 
would cover a transaction, for example a direct transfer of funds, in which a Member conveys 
value directly to an economic actor through its government but not a transaction in which the Member conveys value through an entity that it controls such that it can use that entity's 
resources as its own.
64  
7.45.  The United States argues that the context pr ovided by the "entrusts or directs" language in 
Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) does not weigh against an understanding of the term "public body" as an 
entity controlled by the government such that the government can use the entity's resources as its 
own. The fact that an entity has the "authority" or "responsibility" to do a task, such as selling steel or chemicals, which can be entrusted to anothe r entity if the first entity so chooses, does not 
mean that the entity has "authority" or "responsibility" to perform governmental functions. 
Further, even assuming arguendo that the authority or responsibility to entrust or direct is the 
same as the authority or responsibility to perform governmental functions, it does not follow that all public bodies must have this authority. Ad ditionally, the suggestion that the reference to 
governmental functions in Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) relates to the "authority to 'regulate, control, 
supervise or restrain' the conduct of others" is unsupported by the text. It is circular to read Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) as requiring that the term "public body" be interpreted as meaning an entity 
vested with or exercising authority to perform governmental functions.
65 The United States 
considers that the Appellate Body's characterization of governmental functions in Canada – Dairy  
and US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China)  is incomplete in that the organs of a 
government might perform many other functions that do not involve the regulation, control, 
supervision, or restraint of individuals or do so only in the broad sense of trying to control the 
conditions of society and the economy.66 
7.46.  The United States argues that the obje ct and purpose of the SCM Agreement support an 
interpretation of the term "public body" as mean ing an entity controlled by the government such 
that the government can use the entity's resource s as its own, without the additional requirement 
that the entity must be vested with authority from the government to perform governmental 
functions. Interpreting the term "public body" in this way preserves the strength and effectiveness 
of the subsidy disciplines and inhibits circumvention because it ensures that governments cannot escape those disciplines by using entities under their control to accomplish tasks that would potentially be subject to those disciplines were the governments themselves to undertake them.
67 
7.47.  The United States argues that the Panel sh ould make its own evaluation of the meaning of 
the term "public body" in accordance with the customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law, taking due account of interpre tations of that term in previous WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings. China's position that the Panel must apply the standard adopted by the 
Appellate Body in  US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China)  is contrary to the 
requirement in Article 11 of the DSU that the Pa nel make "an objective assessment of the matter 
before it, including an objective assessment of the case and the applicability of and conformity 
with the relevant covered agreements". In addition , Appellate Body reports have no binding effect 
                                               
63 United States' first written submission, paras. 56-62. 
64 United States' first written submission, paras. 66-74; Comments on Chin a's responses to Panel 
question No. 83, para. 8. 
65 United States' first written submission, paras. 80-90. 
66 United States' response to Panel question No. 24; comments on China's response to Panel question 
No. 84. 
67 United States' first written submission, paras. 94-100; second written submission, paras. 39-43. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  other than in the context of the particular disp ute between the parties. The United States also 
argues that China itself is seeking a significant modification of the Appellate Body's interpretation of the term "public body" when Ch ina argues that a public body must itself possess authority to 
regulate, control, supervise or restrain the conduct of others. The United States points out that the 
interpretation which it is advocating in this disput e is not the same as the interpretation considered 
by the Appellate Body in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) .
68  
7.48.  The United States argues that the interpretation of the term "public body" that it proposes 
in this dispute is similar to the concept of "m eaningful control" discussed and relied upon by the 
Appellate Body in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China)  in its analysis of USDOC's 
determinations that state-owned banks in China were public bodies.69  
7.49.  The United States argues that China's argu ment regarding the use of "organismo público" in 
Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture implies that China's position is that a public body is a 
"government agency". This position is contrary  to the principle of effectiveness in treaty 
interpretation in that it renders the term "pub lic body" redundant or inutile. In making this 
argument, China also ignores the differences between that provision and Article 1.1(a)(1) of the 
SCM Agreement.70  
7.4.5  Main arguments of third parties 
7.50.  Australia  submits that the Appellate Body's conclusion in US – Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties (China)  regarding the interpretation of the term "public body" was that "a 
public body within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1 ) of the SCM Agreement must be an entity that 
possesses, exercises or is vested with governmental authority". These descriptions appear to be 
alternatives  to one another. In Australia's view, this conclusion is broader than is indicated in 
China's submission. In addition, Australia notes th at the Appellate Body's discussion of "core" and 
"key" features of a public body does not fully explain what the other features might be and 
whether an entity might be considered a public body  if it has other features of a public body even 
if not the core or key ones. Finally, Australia notes that it would not support a view that an entity must be vested with governmental authority in order to be regarded as public body because public 
bodies have such authority without being vested with it, while the notion of "being vested with" 
could also transpose artificially to the public body determination the test for "entrustment or direction".
71  
7.51.  Brazil  notes that the "exercise of lawful authority" is a necessary element to the definition 
of a public body and contends that only when a b o d y  i s  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  b e  v e s t e d  w i t h  t y p i c a l  
governmental functions and exercises the authority inherent to such functions, may it be classified 
as public body. Mere link of ownership is not suffi cient; rather the entity should be able to be 
considered part of the government itself. Brazil also argues that an investigating authority should 
conduct a broader analysis, on a case-by-case basis, going beyond the verification of a governmental majority of assets, in order to determine whether the entity under investigation is, 
in fact, a public body.
72 
7.52.  Canada submits that an entity controlled by a go vernment should constitute a public body 
within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement. Canada submits that such interpretation maintains the effet utile  of the term public body and distinguishes it from a "private 
body". At the same time, this interpretation ensures that the disciplines of the SCM Agreement are 
given a sufficiently broad scope in terms of the en tities to which they apply and as such prevents 
the creation of loopholes allowing for the circumvention of the SCM Agreement.
73 
7.53.  The European Union  submits that while the Appellate Body Report in US – Anti-Dumping 
and Countervailing Duties (China)  i s  p a r t  o f  t h e  W T O  acquis, it does not provide a definitive 
                                               
68 United States' first written submission, paras. 119-124; second written submission, paras. 22-30. 
69 United States' second written submission, paras. 35-38; responses to Panel questions Nos. 25 
and 26. 
70 United States' second oral statement, para. 15; comments on China's response to Panel 
question No. 83. 
71 Australia's third-party submission, paras. 4-12. 
72 Brazil's third-party submission, paras. 2-12. 
73 Canada's third-party su bmission, paras. 4-10. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  interpretation of the term "public body" and ca n be the subject of further, complementary, 
clarification in subsequent Appellate Body reports.  The European Union considers that the right 
test for determining if an entity is a public body is one that "focusses on a more specific link  
between the conduct  in question and the government , that is, "'… the use  by a government  of its 
resources, or resources it controls …'"." The Euro pean Union also suggests that the Panel should 
determine whether the fact patterns of the 14 challenged investigations are the same for all relevant purposes to the fact patterns of the measures in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Duties (China) and whether the USDOC asked for information, other than ownership information 
and how such information or lack thereof was assessed by the USDOC, for example what inferences the USDOC may or may not have drawn and/or what other available facts it might have relied on, especially beyond government ownership and control in general terms.
74 
7.54.  India  is of the view that the issue raised in the present dispute concerning the 
interpretation of the term "public body" is iden tical to the issue before the Appellate Body in US – 
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) , and the United States has not provided any 
"cogent" reasons different from those argued in th at dispute. Therefore, the Panel must interpret 
this issue in a consistent manner.75 
7.55.  Japan  observes that a public body may be an entity which enjoys some form of financial 
backing or guarantee from the government. This underlying financial backing or guarantee could 
indicate, under the relevant circumstances, that the entity in question is not seeking its own interest or profits; rather, it advances public poli cy goals even if it accumulates losses. In Japan's 
view, mere governmental majority shareholding would not be sufficient to allow an entity to 
advance such goals without seeking profits.
76 
7.56.  Korea  argues that the Panel should confirm and apply the legal standard established by the 
Appellate Body in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China)  to the facts of this case. 
Korea is of the view that, subject to the Panel's evaluation of all the information on the record, 
there is no persuasive reason to disturb the clearly articulated jurisprudence of the Appellate Body in this regard.
77 
7.57.  Norway  agrees with the interpretation of the term "public body" as articulated by the 
Appellate Body in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) . Norway considers that 
Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) provides important context to the interpretation of the term "public body" and that paragraph 5(c) of the GATS Annex on Financial Services sheds light on the intent of the 
Members when considering conduct that should be attributable to the government. Norway further 
argues that just because a public body is vested with the power to exercise certain governmental functions, this does not equate a public body  with government in the narrow sense. Norway 
further highlights that in order to ascertain whether a certain "function" is governmental, relevant 
factual elements are the practice of the legal order in the relevant WTO Member and the classification and functions of entities within WTO members generally.
78 
7.58.  Saudi Arabia  agrees with the Appellate Body's interp retation of the term "public body" in 
US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) . Saudi Arabia contends that investigating 
authorities must base their public body determination on positive evidence establishing that an entity possesses, exercises or is vested with gove rnmental authority. Any evidential weight given 
by an investigating authority to government ownership or control should not undermine the 
governmental authority standard.
79 
7.59.  Turkey  argues that government ownership is the most important decisive indicator showing 
control of the entity in question. An entity controlled by a government should constitute a public 
body within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement. In the light of the Appellate 
Body's findings in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) , Turkey considers that 
                                               
74 European Union's third-party submission, paras. 25-31.   
75 India's third-party statement, para. 6. 
76 Japan's third-party statement, paras. 6, 7 and 9. 
77 Korea's third-party statement, para. 6. 
78 Norway's third-party su bmission, paras. 3-25. 
79 Saudi Arabia's third-party submission, paras. 3-22.   WT/DS437/R 
 
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  factors other than "shareholder ownership" can be useful indicators in the public body analysis, but 
are subsidiary to the main legal standard of "government ownership".80 
7.4.6  Evaluation by the Panel  7.60.  The question before the Panel is whether in the 12 countervailing duty investigations at 
issue
81 the United States acted inconsistently with Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement when 
the USDOC found that SOEs that were majority-owned, or controlled, by the Government of China constituted public bodies.
82  
7.61.  Although the relevant sections of China' s written submissions do not actually discuss the 
public body findings made by the USDOC in each of the 12 individual countervailing duty investigations
83, we consider that in Exhibits CHI-1 and CHI-123 China has provided sufficient 
evidence to support its assertion that in each of these investigations the USDOC determined that 
the relevant input suppliers were public bodies on the grounds that these suppliers were majority-
owned or otherwise controlled by the Government of  China, either on the basis of the evidence on 
the record or by assuming such government ow nership or control when the USDOC applied facts 
available.  
7.62.  This is evident from the excerpts from the Issues and Decision Memoranda  that China has 
provided in Exhibit CHI-123, the relevant parts of which we cite below:  
Pressure Pipe 
Based on our review of the information subm itted by the GOC, we determined in the 
preliminary determination that domestic suppliers of the Winner Companies' SSC that were majority-owned by the GOC during the POI constitute government authorities. 
Line Pipe  
[…] we find that the GOC has failed to act to the best of its ability in terms of 
providing the Department with the information it requested concerning the ownership 
of respondents' HRS suppliers. Therefore, pursuant to section 776 of the Act, we are 
assuming that all of the respondents' HRS suppliers were government-owned and 
government authorities that provided financial contributions to respondents under 
section 771(D)(iii) of the Act. 
Lawn Groomers  […] the use of facts available is warranted, given that the Department was unable to 
verify the precise relationship  between HRS-provider-X and ZMIPOAMC. […] 
[c]ombined with the GOC's unwillingness to place on the record of this investigation 
relevant information regarding the ownership of HRS provider-X that we examined at 
verification, justifies the use of AFA. As a result, we determine that HRS-provider-X 
was a state-controlled producer of hot-rolled steel during the POI and a government 
'authority' under the Act. 
Kitchen Shelving 
The Department considers firms that are majority-owned by the government to be 
'authorities' within the meaning of section 771(5)(B) of the Act. […] 
In this investigation, the GOC holds a majority ownership position in certain of the 
wire rod producers that supply Wire King. Consistent with the policy explained above, 
we are treating these producers as 'authorities' and, hence, the wire rod they provide 
                                               
80 Turkey's third-party stat ement, paras. 4 and 6. 
81 See table in paragraph 7.1.   of this Report. The Panel recalls its finding that the preliminary 
determinations in Wind Towers and Steel Sinks fall outside its terms of reference. 
82 The relevant term under US counte rvailing duty law is "authorities".  See footnote 49 of this Report. 
83 China's first written submission, paras. 12- 31; second written submission, paras. 26-47. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  to Wire King constitutes a countervailable subsidy to the extent that it is sold for LTAR 
and is specific. 
OCTG In the instant investigation, the GOC has identified numerous steel rounds suppliers 
as SOEs and the information submitted in GOC FIS shows that the state holds a 
majority ownership position in these firms. As explained further in Comment 9, we are 
treating these suppliers as authorities. 
Wire Strand 
Based on information in the new Information memorandum as well as on information 
included in interested parties' […] comments, we find that the corporate owners of Producer A's parent company are linked to  a SASAC and, therefore, are subject to 
GOC control. As such, we find that Producer A, by virtue of this ownership chain, is 
ultimately under the control of a SASAC. […] 
While the GOC has not specified the level of ownership the state-owned firm held in 
the parent of Producer A during the duration of the POI, we determine for purposes of 
this investigation that in the absence of data to the contrary, there is sufficient evidence to establish that the state-owne d firm owned a significant share of the 
parent of Producer A during the POI, thereby rendering the parent of Producer A a 
GOC authority during the POI. Accordingly, we further determine that Producer A, in 
turn, operated as a GOC authority […] 
Seamless Pipe 
[Regarding the USDOC's finding on the input of Steel Rounds] 
[…], for majority-government-owned co mpanies, respondents can rebut the 
presumption that majority ownership results in control, and the GOC has not done so 
here. For enterprises that are less than majority-owned by the government, including 
private companies and FIEs, the Department sought information to ascertain whether those enterprises are, nonetheless, controlled by the government. While the GOC 
provided certain ownership information for these companies, it failed to provide the 
full information needed. Accordingly, the Department was unable to determine whether the government did not control these companies. […] the Department has continued to apply AFA, with the result that all the steel rounds suppliers are being 
treated as authorities. 
[Regarding the USDOC's finding on the input of Coking Coal] 
Thus, we determine, as AFA, that all of Valin Xiangtan's non-cross-owned suppliers of 
coking coal are "authorities" […] 
Because record evidence demonstrates that certain of the coking coal producers are 
majority government-owned, the Department continues to find that these producers 
constitute authorities. 
With respect to coking coal producers that are less-than majority government-owned or private, in the Hengyang Post-Preliminary Analysis, the Department found that the GOC did not provide the information reques ted by the Department concerning, e.g., 
ownership and direction of and decision-mak ing within these companies. […] the GOC 
has not provided the information relevant to determine whether the government may be exercising control of these companies and,  therefore, as AFA have determined that 
these companies […] constitute authorities. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  Print Graphics 
[…], for majority-government-owned co mpanies, respondents can rebut the 
presumption that majority ownership results in control, and the respondents have not 
done so here. For enterprises that are less than majority-owned by the government, 
including private companies and FIEs, the Department sought information to ascertain whether those enterprises are, nonetheless, controlled by the government. While the GOC provided certain ownership information for these companies, it failed to provide 
the full information needed. […] the Department has continued to apply AFA, with the 
result that all the papermaking chemicals suppliers are being treated as authorities. 
Drill Pipe 
[Regarding the USDOC's finding on the input of Steel Rounds] 
With respect to the GOC's failure to provide ownership information about a certain 
producer of the steel rounds, we are assuming adversely that this producer is a 
government authority. 
[…] for those producers that the DP Master Group identified as SOEs, we determine 
that the producers are government authorities […] 
[Regarding the USDOC's finding on the input of Green Tubes] 
[…] both the GOC and the DP Master Group reported that the only supplier of green 
tubes to the companies during the POI is an SOE, thereby conceding that the green 
tube producer is a government authority. 
Aluminum Extrusions 
[…] we have continued to treat majority state-owned input producers as GOC 
authorities capable of providing primary aluminum for LTAR. 
Steel Cylinders [Regarding the USDOC's finding on the input of HRS] 
The GOC reported that these hot-rolled steel producers are majority owned and 
controlled by the GOC […] Thus, we determin e these suppliers are "authorities" within 
the meaning of section 771(5)(B) of the Act. 
[Regarding the USDOC's finding on the input of Seamless Tubes] […] based on AFA, we determine that the producer of seamless tube steel owned by 
individuals from which BTIC purchased inputs  during the POI is an "authority" […]  
As AFA, we find that the seamless tube st eel produced by the producer BTIC first 
informed us of at verification was pr oduced by a government authority […] 
The GOC provided ownership information indicating that certain seamless tube steel 
producers are SOEs. Thus, we determine these producers are "authorities" […] 
[Regarding the USDOC's finding on the input of Steel Billets] 
The GOC provided ownership information for these input producers indicating that all 
are directly or indirectly majority owned by the GOC. As explained above, the 
Department has determined that majority government ownership of an input producer 
is sufficient to qualify it as an "authority." WT/DS437/R 
 
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  Solar Cells 
[…] we have determined as AFA that the producers of the polysilicon purchased by 
both respondents are "authorities" […] 
7.63.  The United States does not contest that in the 12 countervailing duty investigations at issue 
in this dispute the USDOC actually applied an ow nership-based control test in determining whether 
Chinese SOEs were public bodies.84  
7.64.  While we are required by Article 11 of the DSU to make our own objective assessment of 
the matter before us, the Appellate Body has affirmed that "[f]ollowing the Appellate Body's 
conclusions in earlier disputes is not only appropriate, it is what would be expected from panels, especially where the issues are the same".
85 We therefore begin by reviewing what we consider to 
be the most relevant findings made by the Appellate Body in order to consider the extent to which 
they may offer relevant guidance for our objective assessment of China's claim. 
7.65.  The meaning of the concept of "public bo dy" in the sense of Article 1.1(a)(1) of the 
SCM Agreement has been the subject of lengthy interp retative analysis by the Appellate Body in its 
report in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China). The Appellate Body observed that:   
… a 'public body' in the sense of Article 1.1(a)(1) connotes an entity vested with 
certain governmental responsibilities, or exercising certain governmental authority.86 
… being vested with, and exercising, authority to perform governmental functions is a 
core feature of a 'public body' in the sense of Article 1.1(a)(1).87 
A public body within the meaning of Articl e 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement must be 
an entity that possesses, exercises or is vested with governmental authority.88  
What matters is whether an entity is vested with authority to exercise governmental 
functions, rather than how that is achieved.89 
7.66.  We understand the Appellate Body to have found that the critical consideration in identifying 
a public body is the question of authority to perform governmental functions. Therefore, an 
investigating authority must evaluate the core features of the entity in question and its relationship to government, in order to determine whether it has the authority to perform 
governmental functions.
90  
7.67.  We are not persuaded by China's argument that the fact that a public body must possess or 
be vested with authority to exercise governmental functions necessarily means that "[a] public body, like government in the narrow sense, thus must itself possess the authority to 'regulate, 
control, supervise or restrain' the conduct of others".
91 In our view this proposition is not 
supported by the Appellate Body's findings in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Duties (China).  The Appellate Body does not state explicitly  in that Report that a public body must 
have the "effective power to regulate, control, supervise individuals, or otherwise restrain their 
                                               
84 The Panel observes that the fact patterns of the 12 challenged investigations are equivalent, for all 
relevant purposes, to the fact patterns of the measures in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Duties (China) . The panel in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China)  found that "the USDOC 
determined that the SOEs were "public bodies" that pr ovided financial contributions in the form of certain 
goods – HRS, rubber, and petrochemica ls – to investigated producers of , respectively, CWP, LWR, OTR and 
LWS … [I]n all of the investigations at issue, the USDOC determined that the SOE input suppliers were "public bodies" … by applying a rule of majority  government ow nership". See Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties (China) , paras. 8.97-8.114. 
85 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing , para. 362. 
86 Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Coun tervailing Duties (China) , para. 296. 
87 Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Coun tervailing Duties (China) , para. 310. 
88 Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Coun tervailing Duties (China),  para. 317. 
89 Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Coun tervailing Duties (China),  para. 318. 
90 Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Coun tervailing Duties (China),  para. 318. 
91 China's first written submission, para. 22; response to Panel question No. 84. WT/DS437/R 
 
- 36 - 
 
  conduct, through the exercise of lawful authority".92 In our view, China misreads the 
Appellate Body's reference to its prior finding in Canada – Dairy that:  
The essence of "government" is, therefore,  that it enjoys the effective power to 
"regulate", "control" or "supervise" individuals, or otherwise "restrain" their conduct, 
through the exercise of lawful authority. This meaning is derived, in part, from the 
functions performed by a government and, in part, from the government having the powers and authority to perform those functions. A "government agency" is, in our 
view, an entity which exercises powers vested  in it by a "government" for the purpose 
of performing functions of a "governmental" character, that is, to "regulate", "restrain", "supervise" or "control " the conduct of private citizens.
93  
7.68.  We first observe that China's interpretati on would equate the term "public body" with the 
term "government agency", an appr oach that the Appellate Body in US – Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties (China)  has not followed. 
7.69.  We also observe that the above-mentioned definition of the Appellate Body in Canada-Dairy  
refers to the "essence" of a government. The use of the word "essence" would indicate that the 
Appellate Body did not consider that this defi nition exhausted the scope of the powers and 
functions that modern governments routinely have or perform.94 As the Appellate Body itself 
recognized dictionaries are not "the sole source for determining the ordinary meaning of a treaty 
term".95 Other sources such as the Encyclopædia Britannica  demonstrate that the range of 
functions, tasks and activities that governments perform is quite broad (including not only 
regulation of the economy but also the provisio n of goods and services) and depend on how the 
State actually operates.96 Furthermore, in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) , 
the Appellate Body stated that: "the performance of governmental functions or the fact of being 
vested with, and exercising, the authority to perform such functions are core commonalities 
between government and public body".97 In our view, governments, either directly themselves or 
through entities that are established, owned,  controlled, managed, run or funded by the 
government, commonly exercise or conduct many functions or responsibilities that go beyond "the 
effective power to 'regulate', 'control' or 'supervise' individuals, or otherwise 'restrain' their 
conduct". Such entities can include SOEs (including banks and other financial institutions); universities, libraries and other academic institutions; scientific research and development centres; hospitals and other healthcare institutions; museums, orchestras, and other cultural organizations; 
sports organizations; and many others. 
7.70.  Within the context of this interpretation of  "public body", we focus on the Appellate Body's 
finding that ownership and control in and of themselves are not sufficient for determining that an 
entity is a public body.  
State ownership, while not being a decisive criterion, may serve as evidence 
indicating, in conjunction with other elements, the delegation of governmental 
authority.
98 
The USDOC relied "principally" on information about ownership. In our view, this is 
not sufficient because evidence of government ownership, in itself, is not evidence of meaningful control of an entity by government and cannot, without more, serve as a 
basis for establishing that the entity is vested with authority to perform a 
                                               
92 Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Coun tervailing Duties (China) , para. 290. 
93 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy , para. 97. 
94 The Panel, however, does not endorse the view that  that all activities that involve a government in 
fact constitute "governmental functions". Whether a func tion is of a governmental nature requires a case-by-
case analysis, looking at how the government and the state of the relevant WTO Member actually operate. 
95 Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Counte rvailing Duties (China), para. 335. 
96 The Encyclopædia Britannica  defines "government" by reference to the political system  
(http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/240105/government , last visited on 25 February 2014) which 
is, in turn, defined as "the set of fo rmal legal institutions that constitute  a "government" or a "state". … [t]he 
term comprehends actual as well as prescribed forms of political behaviour, not only the legal organization of 
the state but also the reality of how the state functions". 
(http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/467746/political-system , last visited on 25 February 2014) 
97 Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Counte rvailing Duties (China), paras. 288-290. 
98 Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Coun tervailing Duties (China),  para. 310. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  governmental function. Accordingly, such evidence, alone, cannot support a finding 
that an entity is a public body.99 
7.71.  The Appellate Body specifically rejected the idea that an entity can be found to be a public 
body based on a notion of control in the sense of  the "everyday financial concept of a 'controlling 
interest' in a company".100 In our view, other than "the effective power to regulate, control, or 
supervise individuals, or otherwise restrain their co nduct, through the exercise of lawful authority", 
it is not self-evident that all activities that involve a government in fact constitute "governmental 
functions". For instance, government ownership or control may be temporary and purely 
circumstantial — for example where a government ta kes over an enterprise temporarily in order to 
save it from going bankrupt, to avoid a strike or to guarantee continuity in the provision of certain 
services (such as air traffic control services). 
7.72.  Therefore, as noted by the Appellate Body, simple ownership or control by a government of 
an entity is not sufficient to establish that it is a public body. A further inquiry is needed. Indeed, in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) , the Appellate Body confirmed that, upon 
review of the USDOC's more comprehensive anal ysis, certain State-owned commercial banks were 
properly identified as public bodies. 
7.73.  It is not in dispute that in the 12 countervailing duty investigations at issue the USDOC 
found that SOEs were public bodies by relying on a concept of control based, in most cases, on 
(majority) ownership of an entity by the government. In none of these investigations did the USDOC rely on evidence of the kind that led the Appellate Body to conclude in US – Anti-Dumping 
and Countervailing Duties (China)  that the USDOC had before it evidence indicating that state-
owned commercial banks exercised "governmental functions".
101 This is evident from the excerpts 
from the relevant Issues and Decision Memoranda that we have reproduced in paragraph 7.62.   
above. 
7.74.  The United States argues in this proceed ing that the Panel should interpret "public body" 
within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement to mean an entity that is controlled 
by a government such that the government can use the resources of that entity as its own; and 
that this interpretation is similar to the concept of "meaningful control" relied upon by the 
Appellate Body in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China)  when it upheld the 
USDOC's findings that certain state-owned commercial banks were public bodies.102 We note that 
the findings made by the USDOC in the 12 countervailing duty investigations at issue in this 
dispute were not based on the interpretation of the term "public body" advocated by the 
United States in this dispute.103 As a consequence, even if we concluded that this interpretation is 
consistent with the Appellate Body's reliance on the concept of "meaningful control", this could not 
constitute a basis to find that in the investigations at issue the USDOC's public body findings were 
consistent with the meaning of the term "public  body" as interpreted by the Appellate Body.  
Therefore we do not consider it necessary to reflect on whether this interpretation is consistent 
with the "meaningful control" concept used by the Appellate Body in US – Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties (China) .  
                                               
99 Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Counte rvailing Duties (China), para. 346. 
100 Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Coun tervailing Duties (China) , para. 320. 
101 Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Coun tervailing Duties (China),  paras. 349-350. 
102 The United States observes: "The Appellate Body agreed that there were sufficient links between the 
government and the SOCBs such that when the banks 'e xercised[d] … their functions (lending), they were 
effectively carrying out governmental functions. The Appellate Body called  the links 'meaningful control'. We 
think the clearest way to understand the links sufficient to constitute 'meaningful control' is to examine the economic relationship betw een the government and an entity. As we  have suggested, there will be sufficient 
links when a government controls an en tity such that it can use the entity's resources as its own. Using this 
approach, the government certainly had 'm eaningful control' over the SOCBs in US – Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties (China) , so that when the banks carried out their lending activities it was appropriate to 
consider that lending a financial contribution attributable to the Government of China". United States' second 
written submission, para. 37. See also United States' second oral statement, para. 10; response to Panel 
question No. 87, para. 7. 
103 As acknowledged by the United States. United States' response to Panel question No. 87, para. 8. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  7.75.  In light of the foregoing considerations, the Panel finds that in the 12 countervailing duty 
investigations challenged by China the United States acted inconsistently with Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement when the USDOC found that SOEs were public bodies based solely on the grounds that these enterprises were (majority) ow ned, or otherwise controlled, by the Government 
of China.  
7.5  Whether the USDOC's "rebuttable presum ption" is inconsistent "as such" with 
Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement 
7.5.1  Introduction 
7.76.  In this part of the Report, the Panel addresses China's claim that "the USDOC's 'rebuttable 
presumption' that majority government-owned enterprises are 'public bodies' is inconsistent, with the covered agreements, as such".
104  
7.5.2  Main arguments of China 
7.77.  China argues that in the final determinat ion issued in July 2009 in the Kitchen Shelving 
investigation the USDOC stated its policy with regard to analysing whether a firm is a public body, 
and that this policy is a "rebuttable presumption" that majority government-owned enterprises are 
"authorities" (public bodies). China argues that this "rebuttable presumption" is a rule or norm of general and prospective application that may be subject to an "as such" challenge in WTO dispute 
settlement, and which is inconsistent with the proper legal standard for determining whether an 
entity is a public body under Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement.
105 
7.78.  In support of its view that the "rebu ttable presumption" established by the USDOC in 
Kitchen Shelving is a rule or norm of general and prospective application, China points out that the 
USDOC stated that "[i]n most instances majority government ownership alone indicates that a firm 
is an authority "and that, in order for a party to demonstrate that an entity with majority government ownership is not an authority, the burden would be on that party to "demonstrate that 
majority ownership does not result in control of the firm". The USDOC subsequently described the 
"policy" it articulated in Kitchen Shelving as "a rebuttable presumption that majority-government owned enterprises are authorities within the me aning of section 771(5)(B) of the Act". China 
argues that based on this rebuttable presumption the USDOC has consistently determined in 
investigations involving imports from China that majority-state-owned input producers are authorities.
106  
7.79.  China argues, with reference to the Appellate Body report in US – Zeroing (EC),  that it has 
demonstrated that the Kitchen Shelving policy sets forth a rule or norm that is attributable to the 
United States; that it has demonstrated the precise content of this rule or norm and that it has demonstrated that this rule or norm does have general or prospective application. The Kitchen 
Shelving policy is a rule or norm attributable to the United States in that it articulates a "policy" to 
address the "recurring issue" of analysing whether entities controlled by the Government of China 
are public bodies and thereby "provides guidance and creates expectations among the public and 
among private actors". Regarding the precise conten t of the Kitchen Shelving policy, China argues 
that it has demonstrated that this policy reflects an irrebuttable presumption that a government's control over an entity makes it a public body in al l cases. Finally, China argues that the facts refute 
the argument of the United States that the Kitchen Shelving policy has no general and prospective 
application on the grounds that it only "describes what has been done in the past". According to 
China, the express terms of the Kitchen Shelving determination establish that it sets forth a rule or norm that is intended to apply to all subsequent countervailing duty investigations in which the 
question of whether SOEs are public bodies arises. China considers that its position on the general 
and prospective character of the Kitchen Shelving policy is corroborated by evidence 
                                               
104 In its first written submission China refers to the measure that is the subject of its "as such" 
challenge as the "USDOC's 'rebuttable presumption' th at majority-government-owned enterprises are 'public 
bodies'". China's first written submissi on, paras. 32-44. In its second writ ten submission China refers to the 
measure at issue as "the policy articulated by the USDO C in Kitchen Shelving" or "Kitchen Shelving policy". 
China's second written submission, paras. 48-69. 
105 China's first written submission, paras. 32-44. 
106 China's first written submission, paras. 35-36. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  demonstrating that the USDOC has systematically applied the Kitchen Shelving policy in all 
subsequent determinations in which the public body issue has arisen.107  
7.80.  China rejects the argument of the United States that the Kitchen Shelving policy cannot be 
subject to WTO dispute settlement because it is mere practice or repeat action. China argues, in 
this regard, that the Appellate Body has made it  clear that the scope of measures that can be 
challenged in WTO dispute settlement is broad and has not excluded the possibility that concerted 
action or practice can be susceptible to challenge in WTO dispute settlement. China also argues 
that the panel report in US – Export Restraints  does not support the view that practice cannot be 
challenged in WTO dispute settlement. China also argues that, unlike the complainant in US – 
Steel Plate , in this dispute China does not rely exclusively on "repetition of an action" to discern 
the normative content of the Kitchen Shelving policy.108 China disagrees with the United States 
that there is an "independent operational status" requirement for a measure to be susceptible to 
challenge in WTO dispute settlement.109 
7.81.  China considers that the Kitchen Shelving policy sets forth a per se  legal rule, rather than a 
mere rule of evidence because parties can only rebut the factual question of whether majority 
government ownership establishes control of the firm. Parties cannot rebut the USDOC's legal interpretation that government control over a firm makes the latter a public body. Thus, Kitchen 
Shelving sets forth a per se  legal rule pursuant to which the USDOC indicated that it would treat 
government control as legally determinative of whether an entity is a public body in all subsequent cases.
110 
7.82.  China contends that the argument of the United States that Kitchen Shelving merely reflects 
the USDOC's reasoning in the context of a particular investigation is directly contradicted by the 
text of the Kitchen Shelving determination. In Kitchen Shelving the USDOC applied the rule or norm of general application that it had just articulated in that case as the "policy" to address the 
"recurring issue" of how to analyse whether part icular entities were public bodies. Subsequent 
cases refer back to the policy articulated in Kitchen Shelving as the only ratio decidendi  for the 
relevant public body findings.
111 China argues that the fact that the Kitchen Shelving policy was 
articulated in the body of a final determination, rather than in a stand-alone document like the 
Sunset Policy Bulletin, is irrelevant.112  
7.83.  China argues, in its first written submissi on, that the USDOC "rebuttable presumption" that 
majority government-owned enterprises are public bodies is inconsistent, as such, with 
Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement because it  is premised on the idea that government 
control over an entity, by itself, is sufficient evidence on which to base a finding that an entity is a "government authority", and that majority government ownership presumptively establishes such 
control. This is inconsistent with the Appellate Body's interpretation of Article 1.1(a)(1) in US – 
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), according to which  government control, is 
insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish th at an entity has been vested with authority to 
perform governmental functions.
113  
7.84.  China claims that the argument of the United States that the Kitchen Shelving policy does 
not necessarily result in a breach of Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement because the USDOC 
has discretion to abandon the policy in the future is based on a mandatory/discretionary 
distinction, the continued relevance of which is debatable. The fact that, as held by the 
Appellate Body, non-mandatory measures may be challenged as such logically also implies that on the merits such measures may be found to be inconsistent as such with the relevant provisions of 
the covered agreements.
114 China further submits that even assuming that the 
mandatory/discretionary distinction were relevant to the Panel's assessment of the merits of China's "as such" claim, the relevant question is not whether the USDOC retains the theoretical 
discretion to abandon the Kitchen Shelving policy in the future but whether the policy itself 
provides the USDOC with discretion to act consistently with Article 1.1(a)(1) of the 
                                               
107 China's second written submission, paras. 56-62; re sponse to Panel question No. 10, paras. 31-32. 
108 China's second written submission, paras. 51-55. 
109 China's response to Panel question No. 85, para. 23. 
110 China's first written submission, para. 36; and re sponse to Panel question No. 85, paras. 21-22. 
111 China's second oral statement, paras. 9-10; response to Panel question No. 88, paras. 13-20. 
112 China's second oral statement, para. 11. 
113 China's first written submission, paras. 42-43. 
114 China's second written submission, paras. 63-66. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  SCM Agreement. In this respect, China argues th at the application of the Kitchen Shelving policy 
always results in a breach of Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement because this policy establishes an irrebuttable presumption that all go vernment-controlled entities are public bodies 
and thus reflects the same control-based standard that the Appellate Body has found to be 
insufficient to establish that an entity is a public body.
115  
7.85.  China argues that because the United States is acting inconsistently, as such, with 
Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement, it follows that the United States does not impose countervailing 
duties in accordance with the requirements of the SCM Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994 
and thereby acts in violation of Article 10 of the SCM Agreement. It also follows that the United States acts inconsistently with Article 32. 1 of the SCM Agreement because it takes specific 
actions against subsidies that are not in accordance with the provisions of the GATT 1994, as 
interpreted by the SCM Agreement.
116  
7.5.3  Main arguments of the United States 7.86.  The United States argues that China has failed to establish that the Kitchen Shelving 
discussion necessarily results in a breach, nor has China shown that discussion is a "measure". 
First, the United States argues that to succeed in an "as such" challenge China must demonstrate that the discussion in Kitchen Shelving necessarily results in the USDOC acting in a WTO-
inconsistent manner. The United States contends that China has failed to do so and that the 
challenged discussion simply explains the USDOC's historic approach, at the time of Kitchen Shelving, to the public body issue. That discu ssion does not commit the USDOC to any future 
course of action and does not necessarily lead to any action inconsistent with any WTO provision. 
Even labelling the Kitchen Shelving discussion as a "policy" or "practice" by the USDOC would not 
necessarily result in a breach of the SCM Agreement because it is well-established as a matter of US domestic law that the USDOC can change a practice or policy at any time provided it is 
permissible under the statute and the USDOC has a reason for doing so. The United States argues 
that the Kitchen Shelving discussion is an explanation of the USDOC's past practice, which can be changed adapted, modified or abandoned at an y time and that it is intended to explain 
the USDOC's actions, not to create binding rules.
117 
7.87.  Second, the United States contends that the USDOC's discussion in Kitchen Shelving is not a 
"measure" and therefore that discussion cannot result  in a breach. Even labelling the discussion as 
a "policy" or "practice" does not lead to the conclusion that China has established the existence of 
a measure that can be challenged because an administrative practice is not a "measure". The 
United States refers to  the panel findings in US – Export Restraints  and US – Steel Plate  as support 
for the view that practice has no independent operational status and can therefore not be 
challenged as a "measure".118 The United States argues that even with China's broad and 
problematic definition of a measure as "any act or omission attributable to a WTO Member", the explanation in Kitchen Shelving is not an "act or omission" because, on its own, it does not do or 
accomplish anything and has no "independent operational status such that it could independently 
give rise to a WTO violation". As a discussion of the USDOC's historic approach to the public body issue, it is descriptive rather than prescriptive.
119 The United States argues that China has not 
found any causation between the Kitchen Shelving memorandum and any other action by the 
United States that would indicate that it is an "act" or is "doing something".120 The United States 
also argues that the USDOC's references to the Kitchen Shelving  discussion in other 
determinations that followed do not establish it as a "measure" or give it "legal effect".121  
7.88.  The United States considers that the discussion in Kitchen Shelving does not have "general 
and prospective application". There is no indication in that discussion that the USDOC intended the Kitchen Shelving reasoning to apply to all cases, nor "to conclusively treat all entities controlled by 
the Government of China as 'public bodies' in all cases …". The United States argues that, on the 
                                               
115 China's second written submission, paras. 67-69. 
116 China's first written submission, para. 44. 
117 United States' first written submission, paras. 131-133; response to Panel question No. 29, 
paras. 63-65. 
118 United States' first written submission, paras. 135-136; response to Panel question No. 10, 
paras. 36-39.   
119 United States' second written submission, para. 45. 
120 United States' opening statement at the second meeting with the Panel, para. 22. 
121 United States' response to Pa nel question No. 10, para. 39. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  contrary, the language used in Kitchen Shelving indicates that the USDOC would in the future 
examine evidence and arguments that "majority ownership does not result in control of the firm" and would consider "all relevant information".
122 In this connection, the United States distinguishes 
the Kitchen Shelving discussion from the USDOC's policy bulletin found to be a "measure" in US – 
Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews  and also discussed in US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel 
Sunset Review, which provided "guidance regarding the conduct of sunset reviews".123 The 
United States contends that China's argument that the Kitchen Shelving discussion creates an 
"irrebutable presumption" that all government-con trolled entities are public bodies ignores the 
context and the plain language of the Kitchen Shelving determination because the USDOC's statement in Kitchen Shelving did not address the issue of whether or not all government-controlled entities are public bodies under the SCM Agreement.
124 
7.89.  The United States claims that China can cite to no prior dispute in which a panel or 
Appellate Body has found that an investigating authority's explanation of its reasoning  in the 
context of a trade remedy investigation is a "measure" that can be challenged "as such". Only 
stand-alone policy documents with stated prospective effect, or well-established methodologies 
reflected in computer programming, have been found to be measures.125 The United States also 
argues that China's argument that the Kitchen Shelving discussion is a measure that can be 
challenged as such is inconsistent with Arti cle 22.5 of the SCM Agreement because it would 
transform the provision of reasons, an obligation under Article 22.5, into an independent measure.
126  
7.90.  The United States argues that China's statem ent that the Kitchen Shelving policy is the only 
ratio decidendi  mentioned by the USDOC in its public body findings made subsequent to Kitchen 
Shelving is an unsupported assertion as China fails to identify a single case that solely uses the Kitchen Shelving memorandum as the reasonin g for relevant public body findings. The 
United States submits that public body findings  in proceedings subsequent to Kitchen Shelving 
were based upon the facts and circumstances of each investigation and not solely reliant on the reasoning in Kitchen Shelving.
127  
7.5.4  Main arguments of third parties 
7.91.  The European Union  contends that the nature of the alleged measure, of the rebuttable 
presumption, is that of a rule of evidence rather than a rule of substance. The European Union considers that it may be reasonable that the authority draws an inference, at the end of an 
investigation, after having posed precise question s that have not been fully answered, and after 
having provided a prior indication of the inferenc e that is intended to draw. However, it may not 
necessarily be reasonable for an authority to posit the same inference at the outset of the 
investigation in the form of a presumption. In the European Union's view, this specific procedural 
context must inform the Panel's consideration of whether or not China has demonstrated the existence and precise content of the measure at issue.
128 
7.5.5  Evaluation by the Panel 
7.5.5.1  Relevant excerpt from the Kitchen Shelving Issues and Decision Memorandum 
7.92.  We begin our assessment of this claim by  looking at the relevant excerpt of Kitchen 
Shelving, where, according to China, the USDOC first articulated its policy. We find it is the 
appropriate starting point for examining whether China has established the existence and content 
of the "measure" at issue and subsequently, its alle ged inconsistency, on an "as such" basis, with 
Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement. The rele vant part of the USDOC's Issues and Decision 
Memorandum in Kitchen Shelving provides the following: 
                                               
122 United States' second written submission, paras. 46-47. 
123 United States' second written submission, para. 48. 
124 United States' second or al statement,  para. 23. 
125 United States' second written submission, para. 49. 
126 United States' second written submission, para. 51. 
127 United States' response to Pane l question No. 88, paras. 9-10. 
128 European Union's third-pa rty submission, para. 36. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  The Department considers firms that are majority-owned by the government to be 
"authorities" within the meaning of section 771(5)(B) of the Act. This treatment is reflected in the CVD Preamble,
[135] which identifies "treating most government-owned 
corporations as the government itself" as a longstanding practice. It is also reflected 
in numerous determinations in which the Department has treated government-owned 
firms providing such goods and services as electricity, water, natural gas, and iron ore as authorities without any discussion of the matter or any questioning of this 
treatment by the parties to the proceeding
.[136] 
[ORIGINAL FOOTNOTES] 
135 See CVD Preamble, 63 Fr at 65402. 
136 See, e.g., Final Magnesium from Canada at "Exemption from Payment of Water Bills; Steel 
Products from Argentina at Regional Tariff Zone s for Natural Gas); Steel Sheet and Strip from 
Korea at Electricity Discounts Under the Requested Load Adjust ment Program; and Hot-Rolled 
Steel from India at Iron Ore. 
However, in certain cases, including certain instances involving firms with majority 
government ownership, the Department has considered additional relevant 
information to support its determination that firms should be treated as authorities for 
purposes of the countervailing duty law. Because our approach to analyzing whether a firm is an authority has become a recurring issue particularly in CVD investigations of 
imports from the PRC, we are taking this opportunity to clearly state our policy in this 
regard. 
One of the earliest instances in which the Department was faced with the issue of 
whether a business (as opposed to a ministry or policy bank) should be treated as a 
government entity was in a 1987 investigation of fresh cut flowers from the Netherlands.
[137] Specifically, in that investigation, we considered whether Gasunie, a 
firm that was fifty percent owned by th e government, was conferring a subsidy 
through its provision of natural gas to the flowers growers. 
[ORIGINAL FOOTNOTE] 
137 See Flowers from Netherlands. 
Because the government did not have a controlling interest in Gasunie, the 
Department looked to other indicators and determined that the government provided 
subsidies through Gasunie. In some subsequent cases, where it was unclear whether 
a firm was an authority based on ownership information alone, the Department examined broadly similar indicators as in the flowers case, namely: 1) government 
ownership; 2) the government's presence on the entity's board of directors; 3) the 
government's control over the entity's activities; 4) the entity's pursuit of governmental policies or interests; and 5) whether the entity is created by statute.  
Commerce does not analyze each of these "five factors" for every firm in every case, 
however. In most instances, majority government ownership alone indicates that a firm is an authority. Indeed, a careful examination of the five factors reveals that when a government is the majority owner of a firm, factors one through four are 
largely redundant. If the government owns a majority of the firm's shares, then the 
government would normally appoint a majority  of the members of the firm's board of 
directors who, in turn, would select the firm's managers, giving the government 
control over the entity's activities. 
It has been argued that government-own ed firms may act in a commercial manner. 
We do not dispute this. Indeed, the Department's own regulations recognize this in 
the case of government owned banks by stating that loans from government-owned 
banks may serve as benchmarks in determining whether loans given under government programs confer a benefit. Howe ver, this line of argument conflates the 
issues of the "financial contribution" being provided by an authority and "benefit". If 
firms with majority government ownership provide loans or goods or services at WT/DS437/R 
 
- 43 - 
 
  commercial prices, i.e., act in a commercial manner, then the borrower or purchaser 
of the good or service receives no benefit. Nonetheless, the loans or good or service is 
still being provided by an authority and, thus, constitutes a financial contribution within the meaning of the Act. 
For the reasons given above, it normally is not necessary for the Department to apply 
the five factor analysis in situations where the provider of the financial contribution is majority government owned. This does not preclude parties from arguing that firms 
with majority government ownership are not authorities, but to succeed in such an 
argument a party must demonstrate that majority ownership does not result in control of the firm. Such situations may exist, but they are rare. Where majority ownership does not exist, the Department will consider all relevant information regarding the 
control of the firm, including, where appr opriate and necessary, some or all of the 
five factors discussed above, in determining whether the firm should be treated as an authority. 
In this investigation, the GOC holds a majority ownership position in certain of the 
wire rod producers that supply Wire King. Consistent with the policy explained above, we are treating these producers as "authorities" and, hence, the wire rod they provide 
to Wire King confers a countervailable subsidy to the extent that it is sold for LTAR 
and is specific.
[138] 
[ORIGINAL FOOTNOTE] 
138 See Memorandum Accompanying the Final Determ ination, "Analysis Concerning Authorities" 
dated July 20, 2009 ("Authorities Memorandum") 
7.5.5.2  Whether the USDOC's "rebuttable presumption" is a "measure" and if so, 
whether it can be challenged "as such" 
7.93.  As a starting point, we note that the parties disagree on whether the "rebuttable 
presumption", as set out in the Kitchen Shelving Issues and Decision Memorandum, is a "measure" 
that can be challenged under WTO dispute settlement proceedings. The United States considers 
that the relevant articulation is only a discussion in the context of an investigation that cannot be challenged, while China argues that it reflects a policy statement. The parties further disagree on whether the challenged "rebuttable presumption" is a measure that can be challenged on an "as 
such" basis. 
7.94.  We now turn to examine, firstly, whether the "rebuttable presumption" policy, as framed by 
China in this dispute, constitutes such a "measure" and, secondly, whether it can be challenged 
"as such". 
a. Is the rebuttable presumption/Kitchen Shelving discussion a "measure" susceptible to 
WTO dispute settlement? 
7.95.  Starting with the concept of "measure", we recall Article 3.3 of the DSU
129 which refers to 
"situations in which a Member considers that any benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly under the covered agreement are being impaired by  measures taken by another Member " (emphasis 
ours). The Appellate Body in United States – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review  stated that 
this "phrase identifies the relevant nexus, for purposes of dispute settlement proceedings, between 
the 'measure' and a 'Member'".
130  
7.96.  In previous cases, the Appellate Body ha s addressed, in the context of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement, the scope of "measures" that may be the subject of WTO dispute settlement. In US – 
Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review , the Appellate Body indicated that, "[i]n principle, any act 
or omission attributable to a WTO Member can be a measure of that Member for purposes of 
                                               
129 Article 3.3 provides that "The pr ompt settlement of situations in which a Member considers that any 
benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly under the covered agreements are be ing impaired by measures 
taken by another Member is essential to the effective functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of a proper 
balance between the rights and obligations of Members". 
130 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant  Steel Sunset Review , para. 81. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  dispute settlement proceedings. The acts or omissi ons that are so attributable are, in the usual 
case, the acts or omissions of the organs of th e state, including those of the executive branch".131  
7.97.  We also believe that the provisions of Ar ticle 32.5 of the SCM Agreement are relevant to the 
question of the type of measures that may, as such, be submitted to dispute settlement under the 
SCM Agreement. Article 32.5 contains an explicit obligation for each Member to "take all necessary 
steps, of a general or particular character" to ensure "the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with the provisions of this Agreement as they may apply to the Member 
in question." Similar to the conclusion of the Appellate Body in United States – Corrosion-Resistant 
Steel Sunset Review  regarding the corresponding provision of Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement, the phrase "laws, regulations and administrative procedures" seems to encompass the entire body of generally applicable rules, norms and standards, for purposes of WTO law, adopted 
by Members in connection with the conduct of countervailing duty investigations. If some of these 
types of measures could not, as such, be subjec t to dispute settlement under the SCM Agreement, 
it would frustrate the obligation of "conformity" set forth in Article 32.5.
132 
7.98.  As the Appellate Body further explained in  that same case, the determination of the scope 
of "laws, regulations and administrative procedures" must be based on the "content and substance" of the alleged measure, and "not merely on its form".
133  
7.99.  In relation to whether a "practice", "policy" or a "methodology" can be a "measure" that 
could be challenged in dispute settlement proceedings, previous findings have not always been consistent. Two previous panels have observed that when a "practice" is only established by "repetition" or does not do something or require  the investigating authority to do something, or 
refrain from doing something, then it does not appear to have independent operational status such 
that it could independently give rise to a WTO violation.
134 However, another panel and the 
Appellate Body, in US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products , accepted that an 
"administrative practice" could be a measure subject to WTO dispute settlement proceedings.135 
Moreover, the panel in US – Gambling also stated that even a "" practice " can be considered as an 
autonomous measure that can be challenged in and of itself or it can be used to support an 
interpretation of a specific law that is challenged "as such"".136 Further, in US – Zeroing (EC) , the 
panel accepted that the "measure" was specific lines of computer code contained in the USDOC's AD Margin Programme ("Standard Zeroing Procedures") and the " consistent practice " (or 
                                               
131 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC) , para. 188, citing Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-
Resistant Steel Sunset Review , para. 81. 
132 Appellate Body Report, US — Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review , para. 87. Such an 
interpretation is also consistent with the Ministeria l Declaration on Dispute Settlement Pursuant to the 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 or Part V of 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Coun tervailing Measures, in which Ministers underlined "the need for the 
consistent resolution of disputes arising from an ti-dumping and countervailing duty measures". 
133 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant  Steel Sunset Review , para. 87. 
134 Panel Reports, US – Steel Plate , para. 7.23; and US – Export Restraints , para. 8.126. However, the 
panel in US – Export Restraints  had cited approvingly in paragraph 8.80 of  its report the Appellate Body finding 
in Guatemala – Cement  that it found no reason or basis to rule in  the abstract that a given type of instrument 
or action cannot be the subject of claims in WTO disput e settlement. The panel also stated in paragraph 8.123 
of the report that, in its view, the complainant (Canada) had not clearly identified what it referred to when it 
used the term "practice" and as a result the panel had gr eat difficulty in conceiving of "practice" as a measure 
in that dispute. 
135 Appellate Body Report, United States – Counte rvailing Measures on Certain EC Products , paras. 128-
129. The practice in question in that dispute was the "same person" methodology  used by the USDOC to 
determine whether a "benefit" continues to exist followin g a change in ownership. That method was prescribed 
neither by United States st atute nor by USDOC regulations. Rather, the USDOC had developed this method as 
an administrative practi ce in the course of responding to orders of the United States Court of International 
Trade in the appeals of certain countervailing duty cases. 
136 Panel Report, US – Gambling , paras. 6.196-6.197, citing Panel Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant 
Steel Sunset Review , and Appellate Body Reports, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review ; US – 
Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products ; and US – Carbon Steel , and stating:  "The panel in US – 
Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review  stated that "practice" under WTO law is "a repe ated pattern of similar 
responses to a set of circumstances". The Appellate Body in the same case indicated that "practice" in the form, for example, of a policy bullet in, may be challenged "as such". In US – Countervailing Measures on 
Certain EC Products , the Appellate Body issued a recommendation that the US bring its "practice" into 
conformity with the SCM Agreement. The Appellate Body in US – Carbon Steel  indicated that "practice" may 
also be used to provide evidence of ho w laws are being interpreted and applied". WT/DS437/R 
 
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  methodology ) as such of the United States with regards to zeroing.137 Finally, the Appellate Body 
in EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft did not exclude  the possibility that 
"concerted action or practice could be susceptible to challenge in WTO dispute settlement", and that it was not necessary for the complainant to establish "the existence of a rule or norm of 
general and prospective application in order to show that such measure exists".
138 
7.100.  The Appellate Body has also acknowledged that a "measure" may be any act of a Member, 
whether or not legally binding, and it can include even non-binding guidance  by a government.139  
7.101.  Based on the above, we are of the view that , in principle, even a policy or practice of an 
investigating authority could be a "measure" subject to WTO dispute settlement proceedings. 
7.102.  Moving to the facts of the present dispute, in order to decide whether the so-called 
"rebuttable presumption" or " Kitchen Shelving policy " is a "measure", we start by looking at the 
available text describing the challenged measur e. The most direct characterisation of the 
"rebuttable presumption" comes from the USDOC itself when it introduces the discussion in the Kitchen Shelving Issues and Decision Memorandum by stating that: "Because our approach to 
analysing  whether a firm is an authority … we are taking this opportunity to clearly state our policy  
in this regard". (emphasis ours) We see no reas on to question the USDOC's acknowledgment and 
portrayal of a "policy" regarding its own approach to interpreting whether an entity is a public 
body. Further, the countervailing duty Preamble characterises this approach as a "long standing 
practice". The introductory language of the countervailing duty Preamble also clarifies that these rules "deal with countervailing duty methodology " and "codify certain administrative practices ".  
7.103.  We also observe that this policy has been applied consistently over a long period of time. 
The USDOC states in the Kitchen Shelving Issues and Decision Memorandum that its practice "is 
also reflected in numerous determinations in which the Department has treated government-owned firms providing such goods and services as electricity, water, natural gas, and iron ore as 
authorities without any discussion of the matter or any questioning of this treatment by the parties 
to the proceeding". Some of the determinations cited by the USDOC were made several decades ago. China has also provided evidence demonstrating that this methodology has been applied in all 
the challenged cases subsequent to the "policy" announcement in the Kitchen Shelving Issues and 
Decision Memorandum as well.
140  
7.104.  The language of this policy is not "mandatory" as it does not have any legal effect upon 
the USDOC. It is its own internal policy. It does provide, though, that the USDOC would normally 
apply first the "rebuttable presumption" and only if there are convincing arguments and evidence 
to the contrary would the USDOC reconsider its by-default approach. The text does not define what such arguments or evidence could be, nor what weight they might have over the USDOC's 
standard approach. On the contrary, the text presumes that such occasions would be "rare" and 
shifts the burden of proof on the interested parties to prove a negative.  
7.105.  Finally, the issue is not what the status  of the "rebuttable presumption" within the 
domestic legal system of the United States is but rather whether it is a "measure" that may be 
challenged within the WTO system. It may be that the policy articulated in the Kitchen Shelving Issues and Decision Memorandum is not "binding" upon the USDOC under US law and that the USDOC is free to depart from that policy at any time. However, as the Appellate Body has stated, 
it is not for us to opine on matters of United States domestic law. Our mandate is confined to 
clarifying the provisions of the WTO Agreemen t and to determining whether the challenged 
measure is consistent with those provisions.
141  
7.106.  Based on the above, we understand what is challenged is not a mere "discussion" limited 
to the Kitchen Shelving investigation or the Kitchen Shelving Issues and Decision Memorandum as such, rather it is the "policy" which is expressed through that Issues and Decision Memorandum. 
This policy has been applied both before and subsequent to the Kitchen Shelving Issues and 
                                               
137 Panel Report,  US – Zeroing (EC) , para. 7.72. 
138 Appellate Body Report, EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft , para. 794. 
139 Appellate Body Report, Guatemala – Cement I , fn 47 to para. 69, citing Japan – Trade in Semi-
Conductors , adopted 4 May 1988, BISD 35S/116. 
140 See paragraph 7.115 below of this Report. 
141 Appellate Body Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews , para. 187. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  Decision Memorandum. In our view, the scope of this "policy" concerns the legal standard that the 
USDOC applies by default to determine that a majo rity government-owned entity is a public body. 
We therefore find that what is challenged is a measure susceptible to WTO dispute settlement. 
b. Can the rebuttable presumption/Kitchen Shelving discussion be challenged "as such"? 
7.107.  In principle, we share the Appellate Body's view that "allowing claims against measures, as 
such, serves the purpose of preventing future disp utes by allowing the root of WTO-inconsistent 
behaviour to be eliminated".142 Moreover, the Appellate Body found no basis, either in the practice 
of the GATT and the WTO generally or in the pr ovisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, for 
finding that only certain types of measures can be challenged "as such" in dispute settlement proceedings under the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The Appellate Body thus saw no reason to conclude that, in principle, non-mandatory measures cannot be challenged as such. In our view, 
this conclusion should also apply in dispute settlements proceedings under the SCM Agreement.
143 
7.108.  In United States – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review,  the Appellate Body stated that 
measures consist "not only of particular acts applied only to a specific situation, but also of acts 
setting forth rules or norms that are intended to have general and prospective application  [original 
footnote omitted]. In other words, instruments of a Member containing rules or norms could constitute a "measure", irrespective of how or  whether those rules or norms are applied in a 
particular instance".
144  
7.109.  The Appellate Body then set out the relevant standard for bringing an "as such" challenge 
against a "rule or norm". A complaining party must clearly establish, through arguments and supporting evidence, at least that the alleged "rule or norm" is attributable to the responding 
Member; its precise content; and indeed, that it does have general and prospective application. 
Evidence may include the concrete instrumentalities and proof of the systematic application of the challenged "rule or norm".
145 
7.110.  The Panel in US – Zeroing (EC)  also concluded that the above findings of the 
Appellate Body apply even where the measure in question is not "a legal instrument" under the law of a Member and does not bind an administering agency.
146 In the same case, the 
Appellate Body recalled that both participants agreed that an "as such" challenge can, in principle, 
be brought against a measure that is not expressed in the form of a written document.147  
7.111.  Similar to the analysis undertaken by the Appellate Body in US — Oil Country Tubular 
Goods Sunset Reviews  concerning the Sunset Policy Bulletin, we also consider that the "rebuttable 
presumption" articulated in Kitchen Shelving has normative value, as it provides "administrative 
guidance and creates expectations among the public and among private actors".148 This is evident 
from the declaratory style of the text, as articulated in the Kitchen Shelving Issues and Decision 
Memorandum and the consistent application of this policy by the USDOC. In its response to our 
questions, the Unites States admits that a "policy" announcement provides "the public with guidance as to how [the USDOC] may interpret and apply the statute and regulations in individual 
cases".
149 In our view, all the above demonstrate that this "policy" has normative value and is 
therefore a "rule or norm".  
7.112.  In our view, it is clear that the parties do not disagree that the "rebuttable 
presumption/Kitchen policy" is attributable to the United States as it is applied by the executive 
branch of the US government in US countervailing duty investigations.  
                                               
142 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant  Steel Sunset Review , para. 82. 
143 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant  Steel Sunset Review , para. 88. Such an 
interpretation is also consistent with the Ministeria l Declaration on Dispute Settlement Pursuant to the 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 or Part V of the Agreement on Subsidies and Coun tervailing Measures, in which Ministers underlined "the need for the 
consistent resolution of disputes arising from an ti-dumping and countervailing duty measures". 
144 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant  Steel Sunset Review , para. 82. 
145 Appellate Body, US – Zeroing (EC) , para. 198. 
146 Panel Report,  US – Zeroing (EC) , para. 7.96. 
147 Appellate Body Report,  US – Zeroing (EC) , para. 194. 
148 Appellate Body Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews , para. 187. 
149 United States' response to Pa nel question No. 29, para. 64. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  7.113.  As for its precise content, we understand from the text of the "rebuttable presumption" 
that the USDOC's policy is to presume that any entity that is majority-owned by the government is a public body. When there is no majority-ownership by the government, the USDOC could still reach a public body finding based on other elements beyond government ownership.
150 The 
USDOC mentions explicitly four such other elements, on the basis of which it could find that an 
entity is a public body if it is controlled by the government. The text is not explicit, though, as to whether the USDOC will reach a public body finding only on the basis of governmental "control".  
7.114.  This policy seems, in our view, to have general and prospective application, as it is 
intended to apply to future investigations.
151 Based on the text itself, the USDOC explains that this 
policy has been applied for some time, that the USDOC is clarifying its policy for the public through the Issues and Decision Memorandum and that the USDOC will continue applying it, hence the use 
of the words such as "normally" reflecting both the historic and expected approach of the USDOC 
in cases in the future as well as the use of the future tense in stating what the USDOC "will consider [all other information]". 
7.115.  In addition, we have also before us evidence  regarding the application of this "policy" in all 
determinations challenged in this dispute that followed the Kitchen Shelving Issues and Decision Memorandum:
152 
i. Wire Strand: "following the reasons set forth in Racks from the PRC, we have 
continued to treat majority state-owned input producers as GOC authorities capable 
of providing wire rod for LTAR."153 
ii. Aluminum Extrusions: "following the reasons set forth in Racks from the PRC, we 
have continued to treat majority state-owned input producers as GOC authorities 
capable of providing primary aluminum for LTAR."154 
iii. Print Graphics : "Having determined that ownership/control is central to deciding 
whether an enterprise is an authority, the Department looks to whether the 
enterprise is majority owned or not. … [F]or majority government-owned companies, respondents can rebut the presumption that majority ownership results in control, 
and the GOC has not done so here.  For enterprises that are less than majority-
owned by the government, including private companies and FIEs, the Department sought information to ascertain whether those companies are, nonetheless, controlled by the government."
155  
iv. OCTG: "In [Kitchen Shelving], the Department explained with respect to the 
five factors test that majority-government-owned firms are normally treated as 
[public bodies].  Thus, determining the ownership of a company is a threshold matter 
in our investigations.  In the instant investigation, the [Government of China] has 
identified numerous steel rounds suppliers as SOEs and the information submitted in [Government of China] FIS shows that the state holds a majority ownership position 
in these firms. As explained further in Comment 9, we are treating these suppliers as 
[public bodies]."
156  
v. Seamless Pipe: After initially recalling that "[i]n [Kitchen Shelving], we have 
established a rebuttable presumption that  majority-government-owned enterprises 
                                               
150 China's response to Panel question No. 10, para. 31. 
151 Appellate Body Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews , para. 188. 
152 China's second written submission, para. 62, fn 81 and 82. 
153 China's first written submission, para. 36, citing  Wire Strand, Issues an d Decision Memorandum, 
p. 75 (CHI-52). "Racks from the PRC" is the same  case herein referred to as Kitchen Shelving. 
154 China's first written submission, para. 36, citi ng Aluminum Extrusions, Issues and Decision 
Memorandum, p. 91 (CHI-87). 
155 China's response to Panel question No. 85, para . 22 and fn 38, citing Print Graphics, Issues and 
Decision Memorandum, pp. 67-68, (CHI-73). 
156 China's comments on the United States' response  to Panel question No. 88, fn 16, citing OCTG, 
Issues and Decision Memorandum, p. 70, (CHI-45). In Comment 9, the USDOC again notes that in Kitchen 
Shelving, "the Department clarified its policy with respect to application of the five factors test", noting that the 
"aspect of that policy that is relevant here is the Department's treatment of enterprises that are majority-
owned by the government as 'authorities'". Ibid. p. 72. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  are [public bodies]", the USDOC goes on to find that: "Having determined that 
ownership and control is central to deciding whether an enterprise is [a public body], the Department looks to whether the enterprise is majority-government-owned or not.  As explained above, for majority -government-owned companies, respondents 
can rebut the presumption that majority ownership results in control, and the 
[Government of China] has not done so here.  For enterprises that are less than majority-owned by the government … the Department sought information to 
ascertain whether those enterprises are, nonetheless, controlled by the government.  
While the [Government of China] provided certain ownership information for these companies, it failed to provide the full information needed.  Accordingly, … all steel round suppliers are being treated as [public bodies]."
157   
vi. Steel Cylinders: the USDOC does not expressly refer to Kitchen Shelving but rather 
to an earlier decision ( OTR Tires ) that reflects the same substantive "rebuttable 
presumption" and concludes that "the Department determined that majority 
government ownership of an input producer is sufficient to qualify it as [a public 
body].  Thus, we determine these suppliers (sic) are [public bodies]."158   
vii. Solar Panels: "For each producer in which the GOC was a majority owner [we stated 
that] the GOC needed to provide the following information that is relevant to our 
analysis of whether that producer is an "authority". […] documents that demonstrate the producer's ownership during the POI", etc. … [and] "[a]ny other relevant evidence the GOC believes demonstrates that the company is not controlled by the 
government."
159 
viii. Drill Pipe: "with respect to the specific companies that produced the steel rounds 
purchased by the respondents, we asked the [Government of China] to provide 
particular ownership information for these producers so that we could determine 
whether the producers are [public bodies]. Specifically, we stated in our questionnaire that the Department normally treats producers that are majority 
owned by the government or a government entity as [public bodies] . Thus, for any 
steel rounds producers that were majority government-owned, the GOC needed to provide the following ownership information if it wished to argue that those producers were not authorities: … Any relevant evidence to demonstrate that the 
company is not controlled by the government , e.g., that the private, minority 
shareholder(s) control the company."160 
7.116.  The references in the text of the Kitchen Shelving Issues and Decision Memorandum to 
both previous countervailing duty proceedings, to the countervailing duty Preamble as well as the 
evidence provided by China on the approach followed in countervailing duty investigations after the Kitchen Shelving proceeding, demonstrate that  the application of this policy has been a 
constant feature of the US countervailing proceedings for a considerable period of time. We recall 
that the USDOC has stated that the findings of the panel and Appellate Body in US – Anti-Dumping 
and Countervailing Duties (China)  were limited to the four investigations at issue in that dispute . 
The relevant text provides:   
[R]egarding the DSB's reports in the DS 379 proceeding, we note that, while we have 
reached section 129 final determinations in the four investigations at issue in that dispute, the decisions of the panel and the appellate body regarding whether a 
producer is an authority (a "public body" within the WTO context) were limited to 
those four investigations.
161 
                                               
157 China's comments on the United States' response to Panel question No. 88, para. 16, fn 18, citing 
Seamless Pipe, Issues and Decision Memorandum (CHI-66), p 65. 
158 China's comments on the United States' response to Panel question No. 88, para. 16, fn 17, citing 
Steel Cylinders, Issues and Decision Memorandum, (CHI-99), p. 17. 
159 China's comments on the United States' response to Panel question No. 88, para. 17, fn 20, citing 
Solar Panels, Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 77 Federal Register 17439 (CHI-105). 
160 China's comments on the United States' response to Panel question No. 88, para. 18, fn 23, citing 
Drill Pipe, Issues and Decision Memora ndum (CHI-80), p. 6 (emphasis added). 
161 China's first written submission, para. 40, citing Solar Panels, Issues and Decision 
Memorandum, p. 31. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  7.117.  The above statement, in conjunction with the manner in which the USDOC explained its 
policy in the Kitchen Shelving Issues and Decision Memorandum reflects, in our view, a deliberate policy. In our view, the evidence before the Pane l shows that what is at issue goes beyond the 
simple repetition of the application of a certain methodology to specific cases. 
7.118.  We also do not agree with the United States that the discussion in the Kitchen Shelving 
Issues and Decision Memorandum merely responds to the "specific factual and legal questions in a particular investigation" and "does not have any identifiable legal or normative value over other 
investigations". This statement is not factually accurate. The relevant part of the text does not 
discuss the specific facts of the Kitchen Shelving investigation. On the contrary, the USDOC as it states in the Kitchen Shelving Issues and Decision Memorandum, "takes this opportunity to clearly state our policy  in this regard". We consider that the USDOC, through the Kitchen Shelving Issues 
and Decision Memorandum, expressed in more deta il its policy on public body that has been 
effective for some time before that specific investigation. For this reason we also do not agree with the United States' argument that a finding that the Kitchen Shelving policy is a "measure" would 
compromise Members' obligations under Article 22.5 of the SCM Agreement. The policy reflected in 
Kitchen Shelving is not an explanation regarding the USDOC's reasoning for the specific factual and legal questions in the Kitchen Shelving investigation alone. It is a policy announcement that 
has been inserted within the final determin ation of a countervailing duty proceeding. 
7.119.  Based on the above, we find that the challenged measure is a single rule or norm of 
general and prospective application that provides for finding that majority government-owned entities are public bodies. Therefore, we find that it can be challenged "as such". 
7.5.5.3  Is the Kitchen Shelving's rebuttab le presumption inconsistent as such with 
Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement? 
7.120.  We begin our assessment by relying on the Appellate Body's finding in United States – 
Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review  where it was stated that "When a measure is challenged 
"as such", the starting point for an analysis must be the measure on its face. If the meaning and content of the measure are clear on its face, then the consistency of the measure as such can be 
assessed on that basis alone. If, however, the me aning or content of the measure is not evident 
on its face, further examination is required".
162 
7.121.  We also take note of the Appellate Body's statement in United States – Corrosion-Resistant 
Steel Sunset Review  that "we have not, as yet, been required to pronounce generally upon the 
continuing relevance or significance of the mandatory/discretionary distinction. […] We do, 
nevertheless, wish to observe that, as with any such analytical tool, the import of the "mandatory/discretionary distinction" may vary from case to case. For this reason, we also wish to 
caution against the application of this distinction in a mechanistic fashion".   
7.122.  We also note that both parties agree that for such a claim to be successful the measure 
should necessarily  result in an inconsistency. Within this general framework, we rely on the 
approach taken by the Appellate Body when faced with analogous considerations
163, and follow a 
similar two-step approach based on: (i) whether the policy obliges USDOC to consider majority-ownership as a sufficient basis for a public body finding; and (ii) whether the policy restricts the USDOC's consideration of evidence relating to factors other than ownership in a particular 
investigation?  
a. Whether the policy obliges the USDOC to consider majority-ownership as a sufficient 
basis for a public body finding 
7.123.  The "rebuttable presumption or Kitchen Shelving policy"
164 clearly instructs USDOC to 
consider by priority evidence of majority-o wnership by the government because "in most 
instances, majority government ownership alone indicates that a firm is an authority".165 The 
USDOC attaches therefore decisive weight to th is factor. Majority-ownership is presumed to 
                                               
162 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant  Steel Sunset Review , para. 168. 
163 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant  Steel Sunset Review , para. 174. 
164 See footnote 104 above of this Report. 
165 Kitchen Shelving, Issues and Decision Memorand um for the Final Determin ation, Exhibit CHI-38, 
p. 43. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  constitute sufficient evidence that an entity is a public body. Such a presumption might have had 
some validity if the Appellate Body had reached an  interpretation of the term "public body" based 
on ownership. However, this is not the case.  
7.124.  In our view, a firm evidentiary foundati on is required in each case for a proper 
determination of an entity bein g a public body. Such a determination cannot be based solely on 
the mechanistic application of presumptions. The consistency of the "rebuttable presumption" with Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement hinges upon whether it instructs USDOC to treat majority-
ownership as determinative or conclusive, on the one hand, or merely indicative or probative, on 
the other hand, of the likelihood of a public body finding. On the face of the text, this policy is qualified by the word "normally". We understand th at this qualifying word seems to suggest that 
there is some scope for the USDOC not to make an affirmative finding of public body even if the 
majority-ownership element exists; and also identifies that the USDOC will consider other 
elements when the majority-ownership element do es not exist. However, in our view, what is 
crucial is that the presumption suggests that majority-ownership will be regarded as conclusive. 
Although there is never an automatic presumptio n and the outcome would depend on the facts of 
the case, absent evidence to the contrary the existence of majority-ownership would necessarily  
lead to a public body finding.  
7.125.  We also take note of the consistent application of this presumption in numerous cases over 
a long period of time, as mentioned in paragraph 7.115.   above as supportive evidence that this policy necessarily leads the USDOC to consider majority-ownership as a sufficient basis for a public body finding. 
b. Whether the policy restricts the USDOC to consider evidence other than majority-
ownership 
7.126.  The USDOC recognises a number of factors other than ownership as potentially relevant to 
its public body determination. We understand that this list of other factors is not exhaustive.  
7.127.  However, the policy establishes that the burden is on an interested party to provide 
information or evidence that would warrant consideration of any other factors. As a consequence, 
under the policy of the "rebuttable presumption", the USDOC does not look for other information, 
unless an interested party raises it. It effectively thus restricts the USDOC to consider other evidence on its own initiative. 
7.128.  In conclusion, based on the above considerations and given the Panel's finding regarding 
the correct interpretation of the term "public body",  we find that the "policy" articulated in Kitchen 
Shelving is also inconsistent on an "as such" basis to the extent it leads the USDOC to act inconsistently with Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement by using the government-majority 
ownership/control as the basis on which an entity can be a public body contrary to the Appellate 
Body's finding in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) that ownership of an entity 
by a government, in itself, is not sufficient to establish that an entity is a public body.  
7.6  Whether the USDOC's initiations of invest igations are inconsistent with Article 11 of 
the SCM Agreement due to insufficient ev idence of a financial contribution  
7.6.1  Introduction 7.129.  The Panel now turns to the claims advanced by China concerning evidence of a financial 
contribution in the USDOC's initiation of four investigations, namely Steel Cylinders, Solar Panels, 
Wind Towers, and Steel Sinks.
166 
7.130.  The USDOC initiated a countervailing duty investigation in Steel Cylinders  on 8 June 2011, 
pursuant to an application for the initiation of such an investigation filed on 11 May 2011; in Solar 
Panels on 16 November 2011, pursuant to an application for the initiation of such an investigation on 19 October 2011; in Wind Towers on 24 January 2012, pursuant to an application for the 
initiation of such an investigation on 29 Dece mber 2011; and in Steel Sinks on 27 March 2012, 
pursuant to an application for the initiation of such an investigation on 1 March 2012.  
                                               
166 See table in paragraph 7.1.   of this Report. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  7.131.  China claims that the USDOC's initiation of these countervailing duty investigations in 
respect of allegations that SOEs confer countervailable subsidies through their sales of inputs to downstream producers, in the absence of suffic ient evidence in the petition to support an 
allegation that SOEs constitute public bodies within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1) of the 
SCM Agreement, and in the absence of a sufficient review of the petition by the USDOC in respect 
of this allegation, is inconsistent with Articles  11.2 and 11.3 of the SCM Agreement. Furthermore, 
as a consequence of these inconsistencies with Articles 11.2 and 11.3, China claims that 
the United States acted inconsistently with Articles 10 and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement and 
Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994. 
7.6.2  Relevant provisions 7.132.  The present claims concern Articles 11.2 and 11.3 of the SCM Agreement, which relevantly 
provide the following: 
11.2 An application under paragraph 1 shall include sufficient evidence of the 
existence of (a) a subsidy and, if possible, its amount, (b) injury within the meaning 
of Article VI of GATT 1994 as interpreted by  this Agreement, and (c) a causal link 
between the subsidized imports and the alleged injury. Simple assertion, unsubstantiated by relevant evidence, cannot be considered sufficient to meet the 
requirements of this paragraph. The application shall contain such information as is 
reasonably available to the applicant on the following: 
… (iii)  evidence with regard to the existence, amount and nature of the 
subsidy in question; 
… 
11.3 The authorities shall review the ac curacy and adequacy of the evidence 
provided in the application to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to justify 
the initiation of an investigation. 
7.6.3  Main arguments of China 
7.133.  With regard to the United States' claim that China has failed to present a prima facie  case, 
China states generally that is has done the following with respect to each of its claims: (i) identified the challenged measure at issue and pr ovided explicit citations to the portions of the 
measure pertinent to the claim; (ii) identified th e relevant provisions of the SCM Agreement with 
which it alleges the challenged measures are inconsistent, and presented its understanding of the 
legal obligation each such provision imposes; and (iii) explained the basis for its claim that each of the challenged measures is inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the SCM Agreement, 
properly interpreted.
167 
7.134.  China claims that the USDOC's initiation of four investigations in respect of allegations that 
SOEs confer countervailable subsidies through their sales of inputs to downstream producers, in 
the absence of sufficient evidence in the petition  to support an allegation that SOEs constitute 
public bodies within the meaning of Article 1.1(a )(1) of the SCM Agreement, and in the absence of 
a sufficient review of the petition by the USDOC in respect of this allegation, is inconsistent with Articles 11.2 and 11.3. In particular, China objects to the initiation of the four investigations solely 
on the basis of evidence of majority government ownership, without any indication that the SOEs 
were "vested with, and exercising, authority to perform governmental functions".
168 
7.135.  China has clearly stated in the course of these proceedings that its above claim is 
contingent on the Panel finding that a public body under Article 1.1(a)(1) is an entity "vested with, 
and exercising, authority to perform governmental  functions", as the Appellate Body held in US – 
                                               
167 China's response to Panel question No. 4, para. 14. 
168 China's first written submission, paras. 45-58. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) .169 Indeed, China submits that the initiations are 
inconsistent with Article 11.3 because they were based on the application of an incorrect legal standard. In this regard, China submits that the USDOC's challenged initiations are based on the application of the same legal standard that China is challenging under Article 1.1(a)(1).
170 China 
argues that when an investigating authority initiates a countervailing duty investigation on the 
basis of an incorrect legal standard, it necessarily acts inconsistently with Article 11.3. Indeed, China takes the view that the "adequacy" and "su fficiency" of evidence, required by Article 11.3, 
can only be assessed in relation to a legal standard.
171 
7.136.  In the course of these proceedings, China stated that, in its view, it would be appropriate 
for the present Panel to follow the approach taken by the panel in China – GOES , namely to read 
the obligations in Article 11.3 together with Article 11.2, but to make findings only under 
Article 11.3.172 
7.6.4  Main arguments of the United States 7.137.  The United States submits that China has failed to establish a prima facie  case with regard 
to its claims.
173 In particular, the United States submits that initiation decisions are fact-specific, 
and the question of whether an investigating authority has complied with the standard set out in Article 11 of the SCM Agreement is similarly depend ent on the facts presented by each individual 
application.
174 
7.138.  Furthermore, the United States rejects China's assertion that the USDOC's initiations were 
predicated on an incorrect legal standard and argues that regardless of the ultimate legal interpretation of the term "public body", ther e was adequate evidence within the meaning of 
Article 11 to support the USDOC's initiations. The United States submits that Article 11 speaks to 
providing and evaluating evidence; it does not require that applicants allege or that an investigating authority recites any particular standard. For initiation purposes under Article 11, 
what is required is adequate evidence tending to prove or indicating the existence of a financial 
contribution by a government or public body, in  light of what is reasonably available to the 
applicant.
175 
7.139.  However, the United States contends that, even accepting China's interpretation of the 
term "public body", the USDOC's initiation of investigations was consistent with Article 11 since in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China)  the Appellate Body held that evidence of 
"meaningful" government control over an entity can serve as relevant evidence that the entity 
possesses, exercises or is vested with governmental authority.
176 The United States argues that 
the four initiations challenged by China were supp orted by sufficient evidence tending to prove, or 
indicating, that public bodies provided goods,  under either the definition of "public body" 
advocated by the United States or the defi nition of "public body" advocated by China.177 
7.6.5  Main arguments of third parties 7.140.  Canada  submits that Article 11.3 of the SCM Agreement permits an investigating authority 
to take into account, when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, that access to relevant 
information may be limited. According to Canada, a subsidizing Member should not be able to evade its obligations under the SCM Agreement because it is in a position to make information relating to subsidies inaccessible or "unavailable".
178 
7.141.  The European Union  considers that the information an applicant might be expected to 
adduce must be a function of the availability of such information in the public domain. According to 
                                               
169 China's response to Panel question No. 53, para. 143. 
170 China's second written submission, paras. 150-153. 
171 China's second written submission, paras. 154-163. 
172 China's second written submission, fn 161, citing Panel Report, China – GOES , para. 7.50. 
173 United States' first written submission, para. 210. 
174 United States' first written submission, paras. 210 and 233. 
175 United States' second written submission, paras. 115-117. 
176 United States' first written submission, paras. 240-277. 
177 United States' first written submission, paras. 240-254. 
178 Canada's third-party su bmission, paras. 43-55. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  the European Union, information and evidence conc erning the types of additional factors over and 
above ownership and control, which the Appellate Body has indicated may be relevant in the assessment of whether an entity is a public body, may prove difficult for an applicant to obtain.
179 
7.142.  Turkey submits that the determination of sufficiency of evidence and reasonable 
availability of information is case and fact-specific, and at the investigating authority's discretion. 
The reasonable availability of information depends in particular on a government's record keeping and publication requirements, on companies' publication requirements, and access to laws and 
regulations. The non-fulfilment of notification  requirements contained in Article 25 of the 
SCM Agreement adversely affects access to information.
180  
7.6.6  Evaluation by the Panel 7.143.  We note at the outset that, according to China, it would be appropriate for the present 
Panel to follow the approach taken by the panel in China – GOES , namely to read the obligations in 
Article 11.3 of the SCM Agreement together with Article 11.2, but to make findings only under Article 11.3.
181 
7.144.  In this regard, the panel in China – GOES stated the following:  
In the Panel's view, the obligation upon Members in relation to the sufficiency of 
evidence in an application finds expressi on in Article 11.3 of the SCM Agreement, 
which provides that an investigating authority must assess the accuracy and adequacy 
of the evidence in an application to determine whether it is sufficient to justify initiation. The obligation in Article 11.3 must be read together with Article 11.2 of the SCM Agreement, which sets forth the requir ements for "sufficient evidence". If an 
investigating authority were to initiate an investigation without "sufficient evidence" 
before it, this would be inconsistent with Article 11.3. Given this interpretation, the Panel considers it appropriate to make findings under Article 11.3 with respect to the 
11 programmes at issue. The Panel will reach its conclusions by reference to the 
requirements for "sufficient evidence" set fort h in Article 11.2, but does not consider it 
necessary to reach separate conclusions under this provision.
182 
7.145.  This is also in line with statements made by the panel in Mexico – Steel Pipes and Tubes  
with regard to Articles 5.2 and 5.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.183 W e  n o t e  t h a t  t h e  
United States does not appear to oppose China's request. As such, in this instance, we find no reason not to limit our findings to Article 11.3, read together with Article 11.2, as requested by 
China.  
7.146.  The Panel agrees with the reasoning of the panel in China – GOES  with regard to the 
meaning of the concept of "sufficient evidence " as used in Articles 11.2 and 11.3 of the 
SCM Agreement
184 and the standard of review that applies to a review of a claim under 
Article 11.3.185  
                                               
179 European Union's third-part y submission, paras. 39-41. 
180 Turkey's third-party st atement, paras. 13-18. 
181 China's second written submission, fn 161, citing Panel Report, China – GOES , para. 7.50. 
182 Panel Report, China – GOES , para. 7.50. 
183 Panel Report, Mexico – Steel Pipes and Tubes , para. 7.21. 
184 Panel Report, China – GOES, paras. 7.54-7.55: 
"The term 'evidence' is defined, relevantly, as 'the av ailable facts, circumstances, etc. supporting 
or otherwise a belief, proposition, etc., or indica ting whether or not a thing is true or valid' and 
'information given personally or drawn from a do cument etc. and tending to prove a fact or 
proposition'. The term 'sufficient' is defined, relevantly, as 'adequate'. The Panel notes that the phrase 'sufficient evidence' in Articles 11.2 and 11.3 of the SCM Agreement is used in the context 
of determining whether the initiation of a counterva iling duty investigation is justified. In making 
this determination, the investigating authority is balancing two competing interests, namely the interest of the domestic industry 'in securing the initiation of an investigation' and the interest of 
respondents in ensuring that 'investigations ar e not initiated on the basis of frivolous or 
unfounded suits'. It is clear that at the stage of initiating an investigation, an investigating 
authority is not required to reach definitive co nclusions regarding the existence of a subsidy, 
injury or a causal link between the two.  Rather, as the panel noted in Guatemala – Cement II, WT/DS437/R 
 
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  7.147.  In making its claims, China takes the position that the challenged initiations are 
inconsistent with Article 11.3 because they were based on the application of an incorrect "legal standard". Indeed, China states that if the Pane l agrees that the legal standard applied by the 
USDOC at the time of initiation with respect to financial contribution is inconsistent with 
Article 1.1(a)(1), then the USDOC was without a proper basis to conclude that there was sufficient 
evidence of a financial contribution to justify initiation in the investigations under challenge.
186 
7.148.  More specifically, China objects to the fact that the applications allege merely that entities 
that are majority-owned by the Government of Chin a provided inputs to producers, and that this 
constitutes a financial contribution187, and that the USDOC continued to initiate investigations into 
allegations concerning subsidies allegedly provided by SOEs based on nothing more than evidence of majority government ownership.
188 The United States rejects China's assertion that the USDOC 
initiated the investigations on the basis of the same control-based standard that the Appellate 
Body rejected in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) .189 According to the 
United States, the USDOC did not explain that it was initiating based upon any particular 
interpretation of the term "public body".190  
7.149.  Article 11.2 states most relevantly that "[ a]n application shall include sufficient evidence of 
the existence of … a subsidy …". Furthermore, Arti cle 11.2(iii) specifies that the application shall 
contain "evidence with regard to the existence, amount and nature of the subsidy in question". 
Article 11.3 in turn states that "[t]he authorities shall review the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the application to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to justify the 
initiation of an investigation". Evidence of a subsidy must plainly be evidence of a financial 
contribution by a government or any public body within the territory of a Member, in one of the 
forms described in Article 1.1(a)(1), that confers a benefit.  
7.150.  We agree with the United States that evid ence of government ownership of an entity can 
serve as evidence that the entity is a public body  within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1). Indeed, 
the Appellate Body found in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China)  that while 
evidence of government ownership is in itself insufficient to support a final finding that an entity is 
                                                                                                                                               
an 'investigation is a process where certainty on the existence of all the elements necessary in 
order to adopt a measure is reached gradually as  the investigation moves forward'. Indeed, both 
parties appear to agree with the reasoning of the panel in US – Softwood Lumber V, in examining 
the analogous provisions under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, that 'the quantity and the quality 
of the evidence required to meet the threshold of  sufficiency of the evidence is of a different 
standard for purposes of initiation of an investig ation compared to that required for a preliminary 
or final determination'.   
 
Therefore, while the amount and quality of the evidence required at the time of initiation is less 
than that required to reach a final determination,  at the same time the requirement of "sufficient 
evidence" is also a means by which investigating authorities filter those applications that are 
frivolous or unfounded. Although definitive proof of  the existence and nature of a subsidy, injury 
and a causal link is not necessary for the purposes  of Article 11.3, adequate evidence, tending to 
prove or indicating the existence of these elements, is required. Indeed, in considering the quality of the evidence that should be provided in an application before an investigation is justified, we note that Article 11.2 requires 'sufficient evidence of the existence of a subsidy',  
meaning that the evidence should provide an indication that a subsidy actually exists. It is also clear from the terms of Article 11. 2 that "simple assertion, unsubs tantiated by relevant evidence" 
is not sufficient to justify the initiation of an investigation." (footnotes omitted) 
185 Panel Report, China – GOES , para. 7.51: 
"Regarding the standard of review that the Panel should apply under Article 11.3 of the SCM Agreement, both parties agree with the interpretation of the analogous provision under the Anti-Dumping Agreement adopted by the panel in US – Softwood Lumber V. In particular, the 
parties submit that a panel shou ld determine 'whether an unbiased and objective investigating 
authority would have found that the applicatio n contained sufficient information to justify 
initiation of the investigation'. The Panel agrees with the parties that its role is not to conduct a de novo review of the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence to arrive at its own conclusion 
regarding whether the evidence in the application was sufficient to justify initiation. Rather, the Panel must consider the reasonableness of MOFC OM's conclusions, by reference to the test 
articulated by the panel in US – Softwood Lumber V ." (footnote omitted) 
186 China's second written submission, para. 163. 
187 China's first written submission, para. 48. 
188 China's first written submission, para. 45. 
189 China's opening statement at the fi rst meeting of the Panel, para. 29. 
190 United States' second written submission, para. 122. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  a public body, such evidence can serve as eviden ce that an entity is a public body: "State 
ownership, while not being a decisive criterion, may serve as evidence indicating, in conjunction with other elements, the delegation of governmental authority".
191  
7.151.  Furthermore, we agree with the panel in China – GOES  that the quantity and quality of the 
evidence required to meet the threshold of sufficie ncy of the evidence is of a different standard for 
purposes of initiation of an investigation compared to that required for a preliminary or final determination.
192 Although definitive proof of the exis tence and nature of a subsidy is not 
necessary for the purposes of Article 11.3, adequa te evidence, tending to prove or indicating the 
existence of these elements, is required.193 
7.152.  As such, we consider that evidence of government ownership may be considered to 
amount to evidence "tending to prove or indicati ng" that an entity is a public body capable of 
conferring a financial contribution. 
7.153.  However, China argues that a finding by the Panel that the evidence in the applications 
was sufficient for initiation purposes despite the application of an incorrect legal standard would 
amount to a de novo review by the Panel.194 Indeed, China submits that if the Panel were to 
evaluate whether the evidence before the USDOC would have justified initiation, had the USDOC applied the legal standard adopted by the Appellate Body in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Duties (China) , such an evaluation would constitute an improper de novo review.
195 
7.154.  We do not agree with China's position. In making its case, China focuses on certain 
evidence contained in the applications, to a large extent overlooking how the USDOC handled such evidence. While China stated in the course of these proceedings that the initiation checklists are 
where the USDOC provides its reasoning for its initiation determinations, China provides no 
discussion of that reasoning.
196 The initiation checklists in fact do not contain any explanation of 
the USDOC's understanding of a financial contribution or public body. This is unsurprising since the 
SCM Agreement does not require an investigating authority to make any findings or explain its 
understanding of a financial contribution or public body when initiating an investigation. This is in contrast with the requirements imposed by th e Agreement on investigating authorities when 
making preliminary or final determinations. Indeed, Article 22.2 requires that the public notice of 
the initiation of an investigation contain or make available adequate information on inter alia  "a 
description of the subsidy practice or practices to be investigated". In contrast, Article 22.3 requires that the public notice of any preliminary or final determination set forth in sufficient detail 
"the findings and conclusions reached on all issues of fact and law considered material by the 
investigating authority". The distinction between the requirements imposed by Articles 22.2 and 22.3 well reflects the fact that the initiation of an investigation is only a preliminary stage of 
an investigation, from which point an investigating authority's reasoning is developed. Therefore, 
we do not consider that a finding by the Panel that the evidence in the applications was sufficient for initiation purposes amounts to a de novo  review by the Panel.  
7.155.  In light of all of the above, the Panel fi nds that China has failed to establish that the 
USDOC acted inconsistently with the United States' obligations under Article 11 of the SCM Agreement by initiating the challenged investigations without sufficient evidence of a financial contribution.
197  
                                               
191 Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Coun tervailing Duties (China) , para. 310. 
192 Panel Report, China – GOES , para. 7.54. 
193 Panel Report, China – GOES , para. 7.55. 
194 China's opening statement at the firs t meeting of the Panel, paras. 32-34. 
195 China's second written submission, fn 177. 
196 China's second written submission, para. 150. 
197 While the Panel acknowledges the United States' argument on whether China has established a prima 
facie case, the Panel does not consider it necessary to address this issue in light of the Panel's finding under 
this claim. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  7.7  Whether the USDOC's determinations th at SOEs provided inputs for less than 
adequate remuneration are inconsistent, as a pplied, with Articles 1.1(b) and 14(d) of 
the SCM Agreement 
7.7.1  Introduction 
7.156.  China claims that the USDOC's determinations that SOEs provided inputs for less than 
adequate remuneration (LTAR) are inconsistent, as applied , with Articles 1.1(b) and 14(d) of the 
SCM Agreement in the 12 countervailing duty proceedings, namely Pressure Pipe , Line Pipe , Lawn 
Groomers , Kitchen Shelving , OCTG , Wire Strand , Seamless Pipe , Print Graphics , Drill Pipe , 
Aluminum Extrusions , Steel Cylinders and  Solar Panels.198  
7.7.2  Relevant Provisions 7.157.  Article 1 provides the definition of a subsidy as follows: 
1.1 For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if: 
(a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body within the 
territory of a Member (referred to in this Agreement as "government"), i.e. where:  
… 
(iii) a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure, or 
purchases goods;  
… 
and (b) a benefit is thereby conferred. 
7.158.  Article 14 provides for the calculation of the amount of a subsidy in terms of the benefit to 
the recipient, as follows: 
For the purpose of Part V, any method used by the investigating authority to calculate 
the benefit to the recipient conferred pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article 1 shall be 
provided for in the national legislation or implementing regulations of the Member 
concerned and its application to each particular case shall be transparent and adequately explained. Furthermore, any such method shall be consistent with the 
following guidelines: 
… (d) the provision of goods or services or pu rchase of goods by a government shall not 
be considered as conferring a benefit unless the provision is made for less than 
adequate remuneration, or the purchase is made for more than adequate 
remuneration. The adequacy of remuneration  shall be determined in relation to 
prevailing market conditions for the good or service in question in the country of 
provision or purchase (including price, quality, availability, marketability, 
transportation and other conditions of purchase or sale). 
7.7.3  Main arguments of China 
7.159.  China argues that the USDOC used out-of-country benchmarks in the benefit calculation on 
the basis of market distortion caused by the pr edominant role of the government. China argues 
that the USDOC used its public body findings as the essential factual predicate to find that the government, in the collective sense of the term, plays a "predominant" role in the market for the 
                                               
198 Exhibit CHI-1. We recall that the Panel has found that the preliminary determinations in Wind Towers 
and Steel Sinks fall outside the Panel's terms of reference. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  relevant input.199 In doing so, China argues that, in fact, Commerce applied the same erroneous 
ownership/control test for finding SOEs were government suppliers in both the financial contribution and distortion analysis.
200  
7.160.  China submits that these facts are eviden t on the face of the excerpts provided in 
Exhibits CHI-1 and CHI-124, and are not in dispute.201 
7.161.  China's legal claim is based on two legal arguments, namely (i) that the interpretation of 
the term "public body" established in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) should 
be applied for determining whether an entity is a government supplier for purposes of the 
distortion inquiry under Article 14(d);202 and (ii) that the above argument stands because, the only 
legitimate potential cause of "distortion" that the Appellate Body has ever recognised is where "the government's role in providing the financial contribution is so predominant that it effectively 
determines the price at which private suppliers sell the same or similar goods".
203 
7.162.  China further argues that Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement sets forth a single 
definition of the term "government" which applie s throughout the SCM Agreement, covering also 
Article 14(d).204 The government that provides the financial contribution is "a government or any 
public body"; an entity that is neither of these two should not be a government supplier under Article 14(d).
205 China considers that it follows, as a matter of law, from the finding of the 
Appellate Body in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) that government 
ownership and control alone must be an insufficient basis on which to conclude that the provision of goods by an SOE is the conduct of a governme nt supplier or indicate "government involvement" 
for purposes of the distortion inquiry.
206 China further argues that the application of a different 
legal standard would result in a nonsensical outcome where an entity being found to be a "private 
body" under Article 1.1(a)(1) could be considered a government supplier under Article 14(d).207 In 
addition, China contends that, contrary to the US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties 
(China) jurisprudence, the USDOC rejected the relevance of evidence other than government 
ownership and market share in its benchmark determinations.208 In China's view, SOE presence in 
the market could support a distortion finding only if the SOEs at issue were properly found to be 
public bodies within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1).209  
7.163.  According to China, the distortion inquiry is not premised on a generic governmental 
"ability to affect prices" or "the potential for government to influence prices in this market" as this statement expands the Appellate Body's jurisprudence
210 in an impermissible way.211  
                                               
199 China's first written submission, pa ras. 59-72. China argues that the mere fact  that SOEs provided a 
"substantial" portion of the relevant input provides an insufficient basis  on which to conclude that the 
government played a "predominant role" in those mark ets. Therefore, the USDOC had no lawful basis for 
rejecting Chinese prices  as a benchmark. See China' s second written submission, para. 70; response to Panel 
question No. 32, para. 76; and respon se to Panel question No . 33, para. 88. China argues that because the 
USDOC is applying the wrong legal standa rd in its distortion analysis, it do es not matter if its findings were 
based on evidence on the record or on "adverse fact s available" as its recour se to an out-of-country 
benchmark is inconsistent with the SCM Agreement in either case. 
200 China's opening statement at the firs t meeting of the Panel, paras. 46-47. 
201 China's second written submission, para. 71; response to Panel ques tion No. 32, para. 76. 
202 See China's first written submission, paras. 70-72; opening statement at the first meeting of the 
Panel, paras. 38-43; response to Panel question No. 31, paras. 72-73; response to Panel question No. 32, 
para. 77; response to Panel question 33, paras. 84-87;  second written submission , paras. 72 and 78; and 
opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 13. 
203 China's second written submission, paras. 81 and 86-93; opening statement at the first meeting of 
the Panel, para. 41; response to Panel question No. 33, para. 86; response to Panel question No. 86, 
paras. 26-27; and comments on the United States' response to Panel ques tion No. 89, para. 24. 
204 China's opening statement at the first meeting with  the Panel, para. 40; second written submission, 
para. 80. 
205 China's response to Panel question No. 86, paras. 26-27. 
206 See China's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 39-40; response to Panel 
question No. 33, paras. 84-87; and second written submission, paras. 73-74. 
207 China's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel,  para. 43; and second written 
submission, paras. 84-85. 
208 China's first written submission, fn 82. 
209 China's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 17. 
210 Appellate Body Reports, US – Softwood Lumber IV , para. 93; and US – Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties (China) , paras. 444 and 446. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  7.164.  Moreover, China dismisses the United States' argument that the US – Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties (China) supports the US position because, in China's view, the 
Appellate Body decided the case in the posture that was presented to it and did not address the same question of legal interpretation as in the present dispute.
212  
7.165.  China finally argues that the USDOC di d not rely on any "other facts" beyond SOE 
presence in a market because, in the seven investigations where this occurred, these facts did not provide an independent basis for the USDOC's find ings, rather only "further" evidence, and both 
"low level of imports" and "export restraints" ca nnot say anything about the extent to which the 
government may be a predominant supplier in a given market, without the principal finding of SOE market share as the appropriate foundation. China further argues that export restraints should not be part of the distortion analysis because they do not constitute a financial contribution nor do 
they involve a government "pricing strategy" capable of forcing private prices to align with a 
government price.
213  
7.7.4  Main arguments of the United States 
7.166.  The United States dismisses China's arguments and contends that China erroneously 
conflates two separate legal analyses, that of the financial contribution and that of benefit, contrary to the Appellate Body jurisprudence.
214 The United States finds support in the Appellate 
Body finding in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China)  where the Appellate Body 
examined the USDOC's use of out-of-country be nchmarks and, notwithstanding its decision 
concerning public bodies, upheld the USDOC's determinations. The United States argues that the Appellate Body's benchmark findings did not concern whether or not SOEs are public bodies, but 
rather whether the extent of SOE involvemen t in a marketplace supported a determination 
consistent with Article 14(d) that prices in that market were distorted and thus the use of an external benchmark was appropriate.
215 Further, the Appellate Body's findings also support the 
view that Article 14(d) is focused exclusively on  the adequacy of the remuneration, which is the 
test for determining benefit. While the term "governm ent" appears in Article 14(d), it is only in the 
context of the financial contribution analysis, not benefit analysis, which is a different inquiry, 
while the term "government supplier" appears nowhere in Article 14(d).216 According to the 
United States, the Appellate Body finding also demonstrates that a public body analysis is not an essential factual predicate for the market distortion analysis and that these findings are different because the underlying inquiries (the entity providing the financial contribution and the adequacy 
of remuneration) are fundamentally different.
217 In addition, the United States argues that there is 
no basis in the text of the SCM Agreement for China's assumption, when it discusses the term " p r i v a t e  b o d y " ,  t h a t  u n l e s s  a n  e n t i t y  h a s  b e e n  f o u n d  t o  b e  a  p u b l i c  b o d y  o r  i s  p a r t  o f  t h e  
government in the narrow sense, it cannot be taken into account when an authority examines 
price distortion in the benchmark analysis.
218 The United States thus contends that the USDOC's 
determinations regarding SOEs being public bodies are legally and factually separate from its 
distortion analysis on the basis of SOEs/government's involvement.219  
7.167.  In addition, the United States contends that China mischaracterises the analyses 
underlying and facts of the USDOC's determinations.220 In the United States' view, China has not 
established that in each challenged investigation the USDOC equated SOEs with public bodies.221 
The United States contends that even if China had established that the USDOC equated SOEs with 
public bodies for its benefit analysis, it would not support China's argument. Instead, it would 
                                                                                                                                               
211 China's comments on the United States' response  to the Panel question No. 89, paras. 25-26. 
212 See China's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 44-45; and response to Panel 
question No. 33, paras. 79-81; where China stated that, before the Appellate Body, China had assumed the validity of the USDOC's (and the panel's) equation of SOEs with government suppliers for purposes of the 
distortion inquiry as  China had only challenged USDOC's exclusive reliance on a per se , quantitative test of SOE 
market share. 
213 China's second written submission, paras. 86-93. 
214 United States' first written submission, paras. 147-152. 
215 United States' first written submission, paras. 147-152. 
216 United States' second written submission, para . 57; United States' opening statement at the 
second meeting with the Panel, paras.  31-34; United States' response to Panel question No. 89, paras. 12-13. 
217 United States' second written submission, paras. 62-64. 
218 United States' response to Pa nel question No. 89, para. 16. 
219 United States' first written submission, paras. 147-152. 
220 United States' second written submission, paras. 60 and 67-69. 
221 United States' second written submission, para. 60. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  demonstrate that the USDOC considered the ownership or control test was appropriate to an 
analysis of distortion of private prices in the relevant market.222 The USDOC did not deem the 
market share held by SOEs equivalent to the market share held by the government itself. Rather, the USDOC used data on domestic production, consumption and market share as provided by 
China in response to the USDOC's Questionnaires.
223 Moreover, the United States argues that it is 
inaccurate, as also shown in Exhibit CHI-124, that  each of the USDOC's distortion determinations 
was relying exclusively on the degree of gove rnment production in the Chinese market. The 
USDOC relied on other facts as well.224 Moreover, where China failed to provide information that 
USDOC requested to assess the government's role in the relevant input market, the USDOC's benefit findings, based on facts available, are consistent with Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement and consequently not inconsistent with Articles 1.1(b) and 14(d) of the SCM Agreement.
225  
7.168.  Furthermore, the United States claims that China erroneously considers that distortion can 
be found only when a government's role in the market is so predominant that the benefit analysis becomes circular. In the United States' view, the distortion analysis is made on a case-by-case 
basis and although sometimes the government's pr edominant role may be sufficient on its own, 
there can be also other circumstances  under which an investigating authority may reach a 
distortion finding.
226  
7.169.  For example, the United States contends that the term "predominance" also refers to 
"market power" which the Appellate Body has equated with the ability to influence prices ;227 
government ownership or control, can therefore be an appropriate test for determining the government's ability to affect private prices in the relevant market.
228 SOE presence in a particular 
market is evidence of such ability.229 Government ownership or control—in and of itself—is an 
appropriate test for determining whether SOE presence in a given market indicates government involvement in that market.
230 Where the government maintains a controlling ownership interest in 
SOEs, the government, like any owner of a company, has the ability to influence that entity's 
prices. In addition, the United States contends that the larger the SOE presence vis-à-vis private producer and import presence, the stronger the market power of the SOEs and, through the SOEs, 
the government and its ability to affect private prices in the relevant market. Moreover, the 
United States recalls that the USDOC also considers other forms of government involvement in the market beyond SOE presence.
231 
                                               
222 United States' second written submission, para. 60. 
223 The USDOC sent a question about the volume and value of domestic production by companies in 
which the government maintained an ownership or ma nagement interest in orde r for the USDOC to assess 
whether the GOC controlled the relevant industry. Chin a provided data, for example, on the "total output 
volume of wire rod produced by State-owned companie s, defined for purposes of  this response as those 
companies with 50% or more government ownership or  other SOE ownership …". The United States argued 
that the USDOC used the market share data reported by China and based on Chin a's definition of SOEs 
calculated the percentage of the relevant input produced by the government. See United States' first written submission, paras. 153-157. 
224 United States' first written submission, paras. 158-167; United States' second written submission, 
paras. 67-69. The United States argues  that the fact that China had to change its argument that the USDOC 
findings were based exclusively (in its first written subm ission) on its equation of SOEs with the government 
suppliers to "exclusively or primarily" (in its second  written submission) demonstrates that there is no 
generally applicable measure by which the USDOC finds dist ortion in particular market, rather it is a case-by-
case analysis. Therefore, in the United States' view, ev en if control and ownership could not be an appropriate 
basis for a finding of market distortion, the US DOC did not rely solely on this factor.   
225 United States' second written submission, paras. 70-71. 
226 United States' first written submission, paras. 158-167; United States' second written submission, 
para. 54. 
227 US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) (AB) , para. 444. 
228 United States' second written submission, paras. 58-64. 
229 United States' second written submission, paras. 58-59. 
230 United States' second written submission, para. 60. 
231 United States response to Pa nel question No. 31, para. 75. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  7.7.5  Main arguments of third parties 
7.170.  Australia  argues that, on the basis of previous findings of the Appellate Body, the use of 
out-of-country benchmarks is not inconsistent with Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement but such possibility is very limited and must be made on a case-by-case distortion analysis.
232 
7.171.  Brazil  focuses its comments in clarifying the concept of "market power" in relation to the 
concept of "predominance" of government in the market. In Brazil's view, governments may play different roles in different markets. The objectives pursued and the way in which governments act 
in their respective markets seem to provide context to understand the concept of "market power" 
and, therefore, of predominance. Brazil also high lights that the description of "prevailing market 
conditions" under Article 14(d) mirrors textually the "commercial considerations" in Article XVII of the GATT 1994. The language in Article XVII could inform how a government should be deemed to 
act under prevailing market conditions, with adeq uate remuneration. In such a case, a government 
would not be using its power and market share to influence prices. Consequently, in-country benchmarks should not, for this reason alone, be discarded.
233 
7.172.  Canada  considers that price distortion may arise not only where the government itself is a 
supplier of the good, but also where the suppliers  of the good are owned and controlled by the 
government. The latter suppliers, such as SOEs, do not need to be public bodies under 
Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement to be in a position to distort private prices in the market 
and for these prices to constitute an improper benchmark as a result. In Canada's view, this is confirmed by the Appellate Body decision in US-Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) . 
Canada thus submits that an investigating authority may reject the use of in-country private 
transaction prices for a good where the evidence on the record shows that private prices are 
distorted because of the predominant role of go vernment-controlled entities in the market as 
providers of the same or similar good.
234 
7.173.  The European Union  notes its understanding that, according to China, this claim would 
appear to be largely consequential on the preceding public body claim. As a result, the role of government market share or predominance is not per se  at issue. Consequently, the Panel should 
reject China's claim if it considers that China has failed to demonstrate that either the public body 
determinations are WTO inconsistent or that the be nefit determinations rest upon the public body 
determinations. Further, the European Union refers to the Appellate Body's findings in US – 
Softwood Lumber IV  and states its agreement with the United States' concurrence with the 
Appellate Body in that respect.
235 
7.174.  Korea  recalls the Appellate Body's finding that an investigating authority cannot refuse to 
consider evidence relating to factors other than government market share and simply base itself 
on a finding that the government is the predominant supplier of the relevant goods. In Korea's 
view, the USDOC's benefit analysis in the determinations at dispute was closely related and even dependent on its "government ownership-determin ative" public body findings. Consequently, 
Korea argues that if the public body findings of the USDOC are found to be inconsistent with the 
SCM Agreement, its benefit findings should be equally inconsistent.
236 
7.175.  Saudi Arabia  c l a i m s  t h a t  a l t e r n a t i v e  b e n c h m a r k s  m a y  b e  u s e d  o n l y  w h e r e  i t  h a s  b e e n 
established that domestic prices of the good at issue are distorted; while the government's 
predominant role as a supplier of that good in the home market may not be used as a per se  proxy 
for price distortion; and finally government predominance may not be found simply because SOEs sell the good and have a significant share of th e home market. Moreover, in Saudi Arabia's view, 
the same standard for defining "government" or "public body" under Article 1.1(a)(1) must apply 
when determining whether the government is the predominant supplier of a good such that prices 
                                               
232 Australia's third-party submission, paras.  13-16, citing Appellate Body Reports, US – Softwood 
Lumber IV , paras. 101 and 102; and US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) , para. 446. 
233 Brazil's third-party submission, paras. 15-18. 
234 Canada's third-party su bmission, paras. 14-18. 
235 The European Union's third-party submission, para. 44. 
236 Korea's third-party st atement, paras. 7-9. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  of that good are distorted and the benefit must be calculated under Article 14(d) using an 
alternative benchmark.237 
7.176.  Turkey  submits that an investigating authority may reach a finding that prices are 
distorted based on the government's predominant role in the market on the basis of various 
possible factual situations. Either because the government is a supplier of the investigated 
product, or because it owns and controls suppliers of the relevant product, or because it regulates 
the supply or price of the raw material of the prod uct concerned; or on the basis that government 
entities or public bodies interfere to the domestic  market price of the investigated product. Turkey 
considers that the overwhelming role of the state in the domestic market is a strong proxy that 
domestic prices fail to reflect the levels that are normally observed in market conditions free from government intervention.
238 
7.7.6  Evaluation by the Panel 
7.7.6.1  Introduction 7.177.  The first question before the Panel is whether China has established that the USDOC found 
in each of the challenged determinations of market distortion that SOEs were public bodies and 
thus part of the government in its collective sense.  
7.178.  The second question before the Panel is whether Article 14(d) allows for the resort to an 
external benchmark only in a situation where a government's role in providing a financial 
contribution is so predominant that it distorts private prices in the market. 
7.7.6.2  The factual premise of China's claims 7.179.  China argues that the only "fact" that is relevant for purposes of determining whether the 
USDOC is acting inconsistently with Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement is that the USDOC 
premised its recourse to an out-of-country benchmark in each of the 12 investigations under challenge on an impermissible equation of SOEs with the government.
239 China claims that the 
USDOC's equation of SOEs with the government is explicitly or implicitly based on its interpretation 
that entities majority-owned and controlled by the government are public bodies.  
7.180.  The evidence before us does not support China's assertion. Our review of the relevant 
Issues and Decision Memoranda reveals that it is only in a few cases that the USDOC's findings of 
a predominant role of the government in the relevant market, because of the market share of SOEs, refer to the SOEs as public bodies. The first such investigation is Kitchen Shelving, where the relevant text provides the following: 
The GOC has reported  that SOEs accounted for approximately 46.12 percent of the 
wire rod production in the PRC during the POI. The GOC further reported that 1.85 
percent of wire rod producers were cla ssified as "collectives." In the final 
determination of LWRP from the PRC, the Department affirmed its decision to treat 
collectives as government authorities . Therefore, we find that the GOC has direct 
ownership or control of  at least 47.97 percent of wire rod production. While this is not 
a majority of the production, the substantial market share held by the SOEs shows 
that the government plays a predominant role in this market. (emphasis added) 
7.181.  The above excerpt seems to acknowledge that at least the "collectives" were considered by 
the USDOC to be public bodies and thus part of the government's role in the market. 
7.182.  In both OCTG
240 and Seamless Pipe241, which referred to the provision of "steel rounds and 
billets", the USDOC relied on Adverse Facts Available to determine that certain public bodies were 
                                               
237 Saudi Arabia's third-part y submission, paras. 23-37. 
238 Turkey's third-party st atement, paras. 10-12. 
239 See footnote 9 of this Report. The Panel recalls that it has found that the Wind Towers and Steel 
Sinks preliminary determinations fa ll outside its terms of reference. 
240 OCTG, Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination, 23 November 2009, p. 14. 
241 Seamless Pipe, Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determinat ion, 10 September 2010, 
p. 17. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  taken into account in assessing the government's role in the market. In both investigations, the 
USDOC found that: 
"GOC authorities" play a significant/predominant role (respectively) in the PRC market 
for steel rounds and billets and the prices actually paid in the PRC for this input during 
the POI are not an appropriate tier one benchmark under section 351.511(a)(2)(i) of 
our regulations. 
7.183.  The last case where it is explicit that the government's predominant role is based on the 
market share of SOEs on the basis that they are "authorities" (public bodies) is Solar Panels242, 
where the part of the determination dealing with this point states that: 
The Department has preliminarily determined that all the producers of polysilicon 
purchased by the respondents during the POI are ‘‘authorities''  within the meaning of 
section 771(5)(B) of the Act. Because the GOC did not provide the production volumes 
for any of the polysilicon producers in the PRC, the Department cannot determine, on the basis of production volumes, what percentage of total domestic production or total 
domestic consumption is accounted for by the producers determined to be 
"authorities". Therefore, we have determined whether polysilicon consumption in the 
PRC is dominated by the GOC based on the number of producers that are 
"authorities" . In addition to the 30 producers determined to be "authorities", the GOC 
reports it maintains an ownership or management interest in another seven, bringing to 37 the number of producers through which the GOC influences and distorts the 
domestic market for polysilicon , out of a total universe of 47 producers in the PRC. 
Therefore, we determine that the GOC is the pred ominant provider of polysilicon in 
the PRC and that its significant presence in  the market distorts all transaction prices . 
As such, we cannot rely on domestic prices in the PRC as a ‘‘tier-one'' benchmark. For 
the same reasons, we determine that impo rt prices into the PRC cannot serve as a 
benchmark. 
7.184.  In another case, Steel Cylinders, the USDOC characterised SOEs as "government-owned 
providers" but it stopped short of characterising them as "authorities (public bodies)", so it is not 
clear whether the USDOC took them into account in  its benefit analysis on the basis of a finding 
that they are public bodies and thus part of the government in the collective sense.243 
7.185.  In addition, China's argument that the USDOC's consideration of the level of imports and 
of the existence of export restraints does no t provide an independent basis for the USDOC's 
findings is also not supported by the text of all the relevant determinations. More specifically, the low level of imports provides only "further support" to an initial finding of the government's 
predominant role in Kitchen Shelving and Wire St rand. However, in Seamless Pipe, Print Graphics  
and Steel Cylinders the USDOC seems to take this element into account on equal footing with the 
other reasons before reaching a distortion finding.
244 Similarly, we find that the existence of 
                                               
242 Solar Panels, Preliminary Affirmat ive Countervailing Duty Determinat ion, Federal Register, Vol. 77, 
No. 58, 26 March 2012, pp. 17448-17449. 
243 Steel Cylinders: "Based on the GOC's response, companies that the GOC classified as state-owned 
accounted for 70 percent of hot-rolled steel production in the PRC during the POI and, therefore, government-
owned providers constitute a majority of the market".  Steel Cylinders, Issues and Decision Memorandum for 
the Final Determination, 30 April 2012, p. 18. 
244 The Seamless Pipe determination provides: "Statistics in the GICCR show that imports of coking coal 
accounted for only 0.66 per ce nt of domestic coking coal consumption in the PRC during the POI". Seamless 
Pipe, Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination, 10 September 2012, p. 31.  
In Print Graphics, the relevant part of the determination provides: "[combining the percentage of the 
industry owned by SOEs and collective s] with the fact that imports as a share of domestic consumptions are 
insignificant, we may reasonably conclu de that domestic prices in the PRC for caustic soda and kaolin clay are 
distorted such that they cannot be used as a tier on e benchmark. For the same re asons, we determine that 
import prices into the PRC cannot se rve as a benchmark. […] The Department has previously determined that 
high levels of import penetration ma y indicate that domestic prices are not distorted, even where government 
ownership of domestic production is significant." Print Graphics, Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final 
Determination, 20 September 2010, p. 22. 
In Steel Cylinders, the relevant pa rt of the determination also provid es that: "Moreover, imports as a 
share of domestic consumption are insignificant. […] Fo r the same reasons, we determine that import prices 
into the PRC cannot serve as a benchmark". Steel Cylind ers, Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final 
Determination, 30 April 2012, p. 18. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  certain export restraints is considered as a stand-alone factor for the market distortion finding in 
Wire Strand, Seamless Pipe245 while it could arguably be an additional factor confirming the 
government's predominant role in Kitchen Shelving  and Aluminum Extrusions. 
7.186.  Moreover, China's argument that the USDOC applied the same framework for evaluating 
whether market prices for a particular input in China are distorted is not accurate. Each 
determination's analysis is somewhat different from another depending on the facts before the 
USDOC. In our view, some determinations are based on the market share of government-
owned/controlled firms in domestic production alone246, others on adverse facts available247, 
others on the market share of the government plus the existence of low level of imports248 and/or 
export restraints.249  
7.187.  Furthermore, after examining also the USDOC's benefit findings on the basis of Adverse 
Facts Available (AFA)250, we observe that China's claim that the USDOC based its findings solely on 
the lack of information regarding state ownership is not accurate. For example, in Lawn Groomers, 
the USDOC applied AFA because the GOC failed to provide, among other information, information 
on domestic consumption and in Drill Pipe because the GOC failed to provide information on both 
domestic production and consumption. 
7.188.  We would thus conclude that China has not established its claim's basic factual premise, 
i.e. that the USDOC has actually treated SOEs as pu blic bodies and thus part of the government in 
the collective sense in the context of the benefi t analysis in each challenged determination. 
                                               
245 Wire Strand findings included the following text : "In addition, […] the Department determined that 
the 10 percent export tariff and export licensing requ irement instituted by the GOC contributed to the 
distortion of the domestic market in  the PRC for wire rod. […] such expo rt restraints can discourage exports 
and increase the supply of wire rod in the domestic market , with the result that dome stic prices are lower than 
they would otherwise be". Wire Strand, Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination, 
14 May 2010, p. 21. 
In the Seamless Pipe determination, the relevant ex cerpt provides: "Further, Petitioners placed on the 
record evidence that coking coal exports were subject to a 10 percent tariff in 2008 and a five percent tariff in 2007, and that the GOC had export quotas in place on coking coal during the POI. Export tariffs and quotas 
can increase the domestic quantity of good subject to the tariffs and quotas that is available in the PRC with the result that they suppress domestic prices". Seamless Pipe, Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination, 10 September 2010, p. 31. 
246 See, for example, Issues and De cision Memoranda for the Final Dete rminations in Pr essure Pipe and 
Solar Panels. 
247 See, for example, Issues and De cision Memoranda for the Final Dete rminations in Line Pipe, Lawn 
Groomers, OCTG, Seamless Pipe, and Drill Pipe. 
248 See, for example, Issues and De cision Memoranda for the Final Dete rminations in Print Graphics and 
Steel Cylinders. 
249 See, for example, Issues and De cision Memoranda for the Final Dete rminations in Kitchen Shelving, 
Aluminum Extrusions and Wire Strand. 
250 Line Pipe: due to the GOC's refusal to provide ownership information concerning HRS suppliers, the 
USDOC assumed that government-owned producers manufa ctured all HRS in China. Line Pipe, Issues and 
Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination, 17 November 2008, p. 18. 
Lawn Groomers: due to GOC's failure to provide all necessary information concerning its involvement in 
the PRC hot-rolled steel market (notably data on dome stic consumption), the USDOC made an adverse finding 
that GOC is a predominant supplier and an adverse in ference that the portion of domestic consumption 
supplied by private parties/ imported is negligible. Lawn Groomers, Issues and Decision Memorandum for the 
Final Determination, 12 June 2009, pp. 15 and 16. 
OCTG: based on the GOC's failure to provide the requ ested information, an adverse inference was made 
and the USDOC assumed that GOC-owned or controlled firms dominate the steel ro unds market in the PRC. 
OCTG, Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Fi nal Determination, 23 November 2009, p. 14. 
Seamless Pipe: the USDOC relied on AFA to conclude that GOC authorities  play a predominant role in 
the production of steel rounds and billets. Seamless Pipe, Issues and Decision Me morandum for the Final 
Determination, 10 September 2010, p. 4. 
Drill Pipe: GOC indicated there were no official stat istics readily available regarding the production and 
consumption of steel rounds in the PRC and […] did not provide the requested information. […] determine that 
the GOC did not provide … share of st eel rounds accounted for by SOEs … we  are drawing an adverse inference 
with respect to the percentage of steel rounds produc ed by SOEs during the PO I … determine that SOEs 
accounted for a dominant share … domestic prices… ca nnot serve as a viable tier -one benchmark… […] GOC 
indicated no official statistics available for green tube production … the Department finds no evidence that the 
GOC is not cooperating to the best of its ability . .. application of FA is warranted … [i]n several CVD 
investigations involving the PRC that various steel inputs cannot serve as viable tier-one benchmarks … we 
determine GOC has a predominant role in the green tube market. Drill Pipe, Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination, p. 7 et seq. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  Moreover, we have found that several other factual assertions made by China are also not 
supported by the evidence before us.  
7.7.6.3  The appropriate interpretation of  Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement with 
regard to when an investigating authority can resort to an out-of-country benchmark 
7.189.  We understand that China's approach regard ing the reading of the Appellate Body report in 
US – Softwood Lumber IV  is that the only circumstance under which an investigating authority can 
resort to an external benchmark is when the government's role as the provider of the financial 
contribution is so predominant that it distorts private prices in the market.   
7.190.  However, in our view, both the panel and the Appellate Body in US – Softwood Lumber IV  
have suggested that there can be other circumstances that could justify an investigating authority's decision to use an alternative benchmark. We find support for this understanding in the 
Appellate Body's following statements: 
[…] the Panel nevertheless acknowledged that "it will in certain situations not be 
possible to use in-country prices" as a benchmark, and gave two examples of such 
situations, neither of which is found to be present in the underlying countervailing 
duty investigation: (i) where the government is the only supplier of the particular goods in the country; and (ii) where the government administratively controls all of 
the prices for those goods in the country. In these situations, the Panel reasoned that 
the "only remaining possibility would appear to be the construction of some sort of a proxy for, or estimate of, the market price for the good in that country.
251 
7.191.  We also consider important another statem ent of the Appellate Body in the same dispute: 
Considering that the situation of government predominance in the market, as a 
provider of certain goods, is the only rais ed on appeal by the United States, we will 
limit our examination to whether an investigating authority may use a benchmark 
other than private prices in the country of provision in that particular situation.252 
7.192.  The above statements show that  the Panel and the Appellate Body in US – Softwood 
Lumber IV did not provide an exhaustive list of the circumstances under which an authority can 
resort to out-of-country benchmarks. We also find that China has not explained sufficiently why 
the relevant Appellate Body findings in US – Softwood Lumber IV  support its position.  
7.193.  In addition, we see merit in the argument  of the United States that a government can 
distort prices in other ways than through its role as a provider of the financial contribution.  
7.194.  Moreover, we recall that the Appellate Body was faced with a very similar situation in US – 
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures (China). In that case, the Appellate Body, after having 
found that the USDOC's findings on "financial contribution" were inconsistent with Article 1.1(a)(1) 
of the SCM Agreement because of an erroneous inte rpretation of the term "public body", upheld 
the USDOC's use of out-of-country benchmarks in the same determinations.253 The Appellate 
Body's benchmark findings did not concern whether or not SOEs are public bodies (and thus 
government) but rather whether the extent of SOE involvement in a marketplace supports a 
determination consistent with article 14(d) that prices in that market were distorted and thus the use of out-of-country benchmarks was appropriate.
254 
7.195.  We find that the USDOC's benchmark analysis in the presently challenged investigations is 
very similar to the approach followed in USDOC's determinations reviewed by the Appellate Body 
in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures (China) . We find it appropriate to rely on the 
Appellate Body's reasoning that "given the evidence regarding the government's predominant role 
as the supplier of the goods […] and having consid ered evidence of other factors, […] the USDOC 
                                               
251 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV,  para. 98, citing Panel Report, para. 7.57. 
252 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV,  para. 99. 
253 Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Coun tervailing Duties (China) , paras. 425-458 and 
611. 
254 Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Coun tervailing Duties (China) , paras. 425-458 and 
611. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  could, consistently with Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement, determine that private prices were 
distorted and could not be used as benchmarks  for assessing the adequacy of remuneration".255 
7.196.  In light of the above consideration, we conclude that apart from the fact that China has not 
sufficiently substantiated the factual premises of its "as applied" claims for each investigation 
challenged, China's claims also fail on the grounds that they rest on an erroneous interpretation of 
Article 14 (d) of the SCM Agreement.   
7.197.  In light of the above, we find that China has not established that the USDOC acted 
inconsistently with the obligations of the United States under Article 14(d) or Article 1.1(b) of the 
SCM Agreement by rejecting in-country private prices in China as benchmarks for the relevant challenged investigations. 
7.8  Whether the USDOC's determinations re garding the specificity of alleged input 
subsidies are inconsistent with Articl es 2.1 and 2.4 of the SCM Agreement 
7.8.1  Introduction 7.198.  The Panel now turns to the claims advanced by China concerning the USDOC's specificity 
determinations across 12 investigations, namely Pressure Pipe, Line Pipe, Lawn Groomers, Kitchen 
Shelving, OCTG, Wire Strand, Seamless Pipe, Print Graphics, Drill Pipe, Aluminum Extrusions, Steel 
Cylinders and Solar Panels.
256 
7.199.  In each of these investigations, the USDOC made a finding of de facto  specificity with 
respect to one or several inputs as follows: in the Pressure Pipe  investigation, the USDOC made a 
finding of de facto  specificity with respect to the provision of stainless steel coil; in the Line Pipe 
investigation, with respect to the provision of hot-rolled steel; in the Lawn Groomers investigation, 
with respect to the provision of hot-rolled steel; in  the Kitchen Shelving investigation, with respect 
to the provision of wire rod; in the OCTG investigation, with respect to the provision of steel rounds; in the Wire Strand investigation, with respect to the provision of wire rod; in the Seamless 
Pipe investigation, with respect to the provision of steel rounds; in the Print Graphics investigation, 
with respect to the provision of caustic soda; in the Drill Pipe investigation, with respect to the provision of steel rounds as well as green tubes; in the Aluminum Extrusions investigation, with 
respect to the provision of primary aluminium; in the Steel Cylinders  investigation, with respect to 
the provision of hot-rolled steel as well as seamless tube steel and billets; and in the Solar Panels investigation, with respect to the provision of polysilicon.
257  
7.200.  China claims that the USDOC's specificity determinations are inconsistent with Articles 2.1 
and 2.4 of the SCM Agreement because the USDOC fa iled to make a proper determination on the 
basis of positive evidence that the alleged provision of inputs for less than adequate remuneration was specific to an enterprise or industry or grou p of enterprises or industries in the above input 
subsidy investigations. Furthermore, as a consequence of these inconsistencies with Articles 2.1 
and 2.4, China claims that the United States acte d inconsistently with Articles 10 and 32.1 of the 
SCM Agreement and Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994.  
7.8.2  Relevant provisions 
7.201.  Article 2.1 of the SCM Agreement reads as follows: 
2.1 In order to determine whether a subsidy, as defined in paragraph 1 of Article 1, 
is specific to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries (referred to 
in this Agreement as "certain enterprises") within the jurisdiction of the granting 
authority, the following principles shall apply: 
                                               
255 Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Coun tervailing Duties (China) , paras. 456. 
256 See table in paragraph 7.1.   of this Report. The Panel recalls its finding that the preliminary 
determinations of the USDOC in Wind Towers and Steel Sinks fall outside its terms of reference. 
257 Exhibit CHI-1. See also China's response  to Panel question No. 37, paras. 104-106. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  (a) Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which 
the granting authority operates, explicitly limits access to a subsidy to certain enterprises, such subsidy shall be specific. 
(b) Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which 
the granting authority operates, establishes objective criteria or 
conditions governing the eligibility for, and the amount of, a subsidy, specificity shall not exist, provided that the eligibility is 
automatic and that such criteria and conditions are strictly adhered 
to. The criteria or conditions must be clearly spelled out in law, regulation, or other official documents, so as to be capable of verification. 
(c) If, notwithstanding any appearance of non-specificity resulting from 
the application of the principles laid down in subparagraphs (a) and (b), there are reasons to believe that the subsidy may in fact be 
specific, other factors may be considered.  Such factors are:  use of 
a subsidy programme by a limited number of certain enterprises, predominant use by certain enterprises, the granting of 
disproportionately large amounts of subsidy to certain 
enterprises…In applying this subparagraph, account shall be taken of the extent of diversification of economic activities within the jurisdiction of the granting authority, as well as of the length of 
time during which the subsidy programme has been in operation. 
(footnotes omitted) 
7.202.  Article 2.4 of the SCM Agreement, in turn, states the following: 
2.4 Any determination of specificity under the provisions of this Article shall be 
clearly substantiated on the basis of positive evidence. 
7.8.3  Main arguments of China 
7.203.  China claims that, in 14
258 input subsidy investigations, the USDOC's findings of specificity 
are inconsistent with Articles 2.1 and 2.4 of the SCM Agreement, because the USDOC failed to 
make a proper determination, on the basis of positive evidence, that the alleged provision of inputs for less than adequate remuneration was specific to an enterprise or industry or group of 
enterprises or industries. 
7.204.  In support of its claim, China presents evidence in order to show that, in each of the 
relevant specificity determinations, the USDOC applied one and the same "legal standard". China 
refers to this as an ""end-use" approach" to specificity since it is based exclusively on an 
examination of the end uses of the particular in put that the USDOC has decided to investigate. 
More specifically, China submits that the USDOC's specificity determinations follow a predictable 
format, whereby the USDOC begins from the unstated premise that it should evaluate specificity at 
the level of the particular input that it decided to investigate as a potentially countervailable subsidy; during the investigation, the USDOC seeks information from the respondents concerning the types of enterprises or industries that make use of this particular input; the USDOC then 
invariably determines that the types of enterprise s or industries that make use of the input are 
"limited in number"; because the USDOC finds in each instance that the types of enterprises or industries that make use of a particular input are limited in number, the USDOC concludes that the 
recipients of the subsidy are specific.
259 In China's view, the excerpts from the USDOC's Issues 
and Decision Memoranda and preliminary determinat ions cited in Exhibit CHI-1, and provided in 
Exhibit CHI-122, show that the USDOC applied this legal standard.260 Further to this, China 
                                               
258 China's claim includes the preliminary determinations in Wind Towers and Steel Sinks which the 
Panel has found to be outsid e its terms of reference. 
259 China's first written submission, paras. 89 and 90. 
260 China's response to Panel question No. 5, paras. 20 and 21. WT/DS437/R 
 
- 67 - 
 
  provides a short discussion of the facts in three in vestigations to "illustrate the consistent pattern 
of these determinations".261  
7.205.  China claims that the end-use approach to specificity applied by the USDOC suffers from 
the four following flaws: (i) failure to apply the first of the "other factors" under Article 2.1(c) in 
light of a prior "appearance of non-specificity" resulting from the application of the principles laid 
down in subparagraphs (a) and (b); (ii) failure to identify a "subsidy programme"; (iii) failure to 
identify a "granting authority"; and (iv) failure to take into account the factors in the final sentence 
of Article 2.1(c).262 
7.206.  China argues that the USDOC's failure to carry out the four aspects of a specificity analysis 
required under Article 2.1(c) is "evident" from th e excerpts cited in Exhibit CHI-1 and provided in 
Exhibit CHI-122, since the USDOC was entirely silent with respect to these four factors.263 The 
USDOC's findings demonstrate, on their face, that the USDOC applied an incorrect interpretation of 
Article 2.1(c).264 
7.207.  Firstly, China submits that the USDOC fail ed to apply the first of the other factors under 
Article 2.1(c) in light of a prior appearance of non-specificity resulting from the application of the 
principles laid down in subparagraphs (a) and (b), as required under Article 2.1. Indeed, China argues that an investigating authority must first consider the principles set forth under 
subparagraphs (a) and (b).
265 This argument is primarily base d on the ordinary meaning of the 
first sentence of Article 2.1(c), and the clause "notwithstanding any appearance of non-specificity resulting from the application of the principles laid down in subparagraphs (a) and (b)". According to China, the use of the word "if" immediately before this clause introduces a condition that must 
be satisfied before an investigating authority "may" consider the other factors specified in the 
remainder of Article 2.1(c).
266 In addition, China points to the context and framework of Article 2.1 
as support for its position. In this regard, Ch ina argues that subparagraphs (a) and (b) have 
primacy in the overall structure of Article 2.1 and must feature in any Article 2.1 analysis, whereas 
subparagraph (c) is an exception that may be taken into account when the prior application of subparagraphs (a) and (b) has resulted in an appearance of non-specificity.
267 China finds support 
for its position in prior findings by the Appellate Body, particularly in US – Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties (China)  and US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint) .268 
7.208.  Secondly, China submits that the USDOC failed to identify any subsidy programme, as 
required under the first of the other factors in Ar ticle 2.1(c). In China's view, a subsidy programme 
indicates a series of subsidies that is planned. As such, there must be evidence that the subsidies 
at issue were "intended" and "planned" as a distinct "series of subsidies";269 that there was a "plan 
or outline" requiring SOEs to provide subsidised inputs to downstream producers of manufactured 
products.270 China seems to suggest that such a planned series of subsidies will always be 
evidenced by either one or several written docume nts, or an express act or pronouncement by the 
granting authority.271 In that regard, China argues that the USDOC has provided no evidentiary 
support for the existence of the alleged subsidy programmes, and has merely assumed their 
existence. In particular, China argues that the USDOC should have provided a reasoned and adequate explanation in its published determination of how the evidence on the record supported the existence of the alleged programmes. Furthermore, the USDOC failed to explain why the 
alleged input subsidy programmes were separate programmes, instead of a single overarching 
programme.  
                                               
261 China's first written submission, para. 91. 
262 While the Panel notes that China presents these four specific aspects of its claim in a different 
sequence in its first written submis sion, they are presented here in th e sequence they appear in China's 
second written submission. 
263 China's second written submission, fn 114. 
264 China's second written submission, paras. 96 and 97. 
265 China's first written submission, para. 85. 
266 China's second written submission, para. 106. 
267 China's second written submission, fn 130. 
268 China's first written submission, paras. 85 and 86. 
269 China's response to Panel question No. 91, para. 30. 
270 China's first written submission, para. 109. 
271 China's response to Panel question No. 38, para. 108. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  7.209.  Thirdly, China submits that the USDOC failed to identify the relevant granting authority, as 
required under Article 2.1. According to China, it  is the proper identification of the relevant 
granting authority that situates the analysis of specificity within a particular governmental jurisdiction, as required by the chapeau of Article 2.1.
272  
7.210.  Fourthly, China submits that the USDOC failed  to consider the factors in the final sentence 
of Article 2.1(c), namely "the extent of diversification of economic activities within the jurisdiction of the granting authority, as well as the length  of time during which the subsidy programme had 
been in operation", as required by that provision.
273 
7.8.4  Main arguments of the United States 7.211.  The United States firstly argues that China has failed to make a prima facie  case with 
respect to its claims that the USDOC's specificity determinations were inconsistent with Article 2 of 
the SCM Agreement. More specifically, the United States submits that China has not discussed the 
elements of the USDOC's analysis on a case-by-ca se basis, and explained why each analysis is 
inconsistent with Article 2.
274 Furthermore, China has not provided support for its argument that 
the USDOC should have disregarded evidence relating to the existence of a subsidy programme 
constituting the provision of an input for less than adequate remuneration.275  
7.212.  In addition to the above, the United States argues that China bases its challenge regarding 
the USDOC's specificity determinations on four incorrect interpretations of Article 2.1.  
7.213.  Firstly, the United States rejects China's claim that Article 2.1 contains any order of 
analysis. According to the United States, the purpose of the dependent "notwithstanding" clause in the first sentence of Article 2.1(c) is to convey that a finding of non-specificity under 
subparagraphs (a) or (b) does not prevent further consideration of a subsidy under (c). 
Furthermore, the instruction in the chapeau of Article 2.1 that certain principles apply neither explicitly nor implicitly mandates the manner in which an investigating authority should apply 
these principles in a specificity analysis. In addi tion to the above, the evidence before the USDOC 
unequivocally indicated that the subsidies were not specific under subparagraph (a), thus any consideration under subparagraphs (a) or (b) was unnecessary. Finally, the Appellate Body has 
repeatedly confirmed that there is no mandatory order of analysis in Article 2.1, and that 
subparagraphs (a) through (c) are principles that should be concurrently applied in a manner appropriate given the facts of any particular specificity analysis.
276  
7.214.  Secondly, the United States submits that Article 2.1 does not require an investigating 
authority to identify a formal subsidy progra mme. A subsidy programme can just as well be 
formally or informally established through its operation, a "series of activities or events".277 
Furthermore, the United States argues that its investigating authority's findings on the existence 
of subsidy programmes were supported by the record of the investigations. The subsidy 
programmes evaluated under Article 2.1(c) were the use of a specific input being provided for less than adequate remuneration by a limited number of enterprises.
278 Finally, in response to China's 
argument that the USDOC did not explain why the alleged input subsidy programmes were 
different programmes instead of a single overarching programme, the United States contends that there was no basis for the USDOC to assume the ex istence of such a scheme in the absence of any 
evidence on the record of such a single overarching scheme.
279 The United States in addition 
points out that China itself refutes the existence of such a scheme.280 
7.215.  Thirdly, the United States argues that it is not necessary to analyse and identify the 
granting authority as part of its specificity anal ysis under Article 2, when the granting authority 
has already been identified as part of the financial contribution analysis under Article 1.1. 
                                               
272 China's first written submission, para. 95. 
273 China's first written submission, para. 115. 
274 United States' first written submission, paras. 170-173. 
275 United States' second written submission, para. 74. 
276 United States' second written submission, paras. 86-91. 
277 United States' second written submission, para. 76. 
278 United States' second written submission, para. 75. See also United States' response to Panel 
question No. 91, para. 25. 
279 United States' first written submission, paras. 182 and 183. 
280 United States' response to Pa nel question No. 44, para. 92. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  However, the United States clarified in the course of  the proceedings that it is not claiming that the 
SOEs are the granting authorities.281 The United States further argued that the relevant inquiry for 
the purposes of the specificity analysis is what jurisdiction the subsidy is available in, and pointed out that, in each case, the USDOC considered the jurisdiction within which it was conducting the 
specificity analysis to be China.
282 
7.216.  Fourthly, the United States argues that a requirement to "take into account" the 
two factors in the last sentence of Article 2.1(c) does not mean that an investigating authority 
must explicitly analyse the two factors in every investigation. No such analysis is required where 
there is no reason to believe that either factor would alter the specificity analysis.283 
7.8.5  Main arguments of third parties 7.217.  Canada  submits that Article 2.1 of the SCM Agreement sets out several principles that 
assist in determining whether a subsidy is specific, but does not require a specific order of 
analysis. In some cases, certain principles may not be relevant to the specificity analysis at all. In the absence of any allegation that there were formal limitations or objective factors relevant to the 
specificity analysis, the facts of the dispute between China and the United States seem to 
exemplify a situation where an analysis under su bparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article 2.1 is not 
required.
284 Furthermore, Canada argues that the identification of the granting authority may not 
be a strict necessity when conducting a specificity analysis. Canada recalls the Appellate Body's 
statement in US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint)  that the analysis under Article 2.1 focuses 
on ascertaining whether access to the subsidy in question is limited to a particular class of eligible recipients. Moreover, with regard to the applicat ion of the criteria in the last sentence of 
Article 2.1(c), Canada argues that there should not be an obligation on an investigating authority 
to mechanically address the state of diversification of the economy. Citing the panel report in US – 
Softwood Lumber IV , Canada argues that where it is well-established that an economy is highly 
diversified, this fact is likely to be taken into account by an investigating authority in its analysis of 
de facto  specificity.
285 
7.218.  The European Union  notes that in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) , 
the Appellate Body stated  that the principles in Article 2.1 of the SCM Agreement are to be applied 
concurrently, although it may not be necessary to consider all sub-paragraphs in all cases, and caution should be exercised when applying one sub- paragraph if the potential for the application of 
the others is warranted on the facts of the case. The Appellate Body confirmed this in US – Large 
Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint). Therefore, the Panel should consider the circumstances in which it is 
permissible to resort directly to sub-paragraph (c ). Furthermore, it would be for China to provide 
evidence that different public bodies in different  industries provide diverse inputs as part of a 
single subsidy "programme".
286 With regard to the identification of a subsidy programme more 
specifically, the European Union notes that if a subsidy is granted to all firms in a particular sector or industry, or using a particular product, then each of the subsidies in question is de jure  specific. 
In addition, there is reason to believe that, as a matter of fact, the Member in question is 
operating a subsidy programme, even if it is unwritten or if the text of the relevant measure is undisclosed.
287 
7.219.  Saudi Arabia  submits that investigating authorities must take into account the level of 
diversification of economic activities in the exporting country when determining de facto specificity 
under Article 2.1(c) of the SCM Agreement.288 
7.8.6  Evaluation by the Panel 
7.220.  In essence, China argues that the USDOC applied one and the same legal standard289, 
namely an end-use approach, in making its specificity findings in each of the challenged 
                                               
281 United States' second written submission, para. 97. 
282 United States' second written submission, para. 94. 
283 United States' first written submission, paras. 197-199.   
284 Canada's third-party su bmission, paras. 19-29. 
285 Canada's third-party st atement, paras. 9-12. 
286 European Union's third-part y submission, paras. 45-56. 
287 European Union's response to Panel question No. 7, para. 7. 
288 Saudi Arabia's third-part y submission, paras. 38-43. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  investigations, and that this legal standard is contrary to Articles 2.1 and 2.4 of the 
SCM Agreement in the following four specific respec ts: (i) failure to apply the first of the "other 
factors" under Article 2.1(c) in light of a prior "appearance of non-specificity" resulting from the application of the principles laid down in subparagraphs (a) and (b); (ii) failure to identify a 
"subsidy programme"; (iii) failure to identify a "granting authority"; and (iv) failure to take into 
account the factors in the final sentence of Article 2.1(c).
290 
7.221.  We consider the application of what China calls an end-use approach to be fairly evident 
from the excerpts cited in Exhibit CHI-1 and provided in Exhibit CHI-122, where the USDOC's 
specificity determination is explicitly based on the finding that the industries using a specific input are limited in number.
291 While this is somewhat less evident in the investigations where the 
USDOC's specificity determinations are based on "facts available"292, the United States itself seems 
to suggest that the USDOC followed one and th e same approach across all of the challenged 
investigations.293  
7.222.  Furthermore, we consider it to be quite evident on the face of the evidence provided by 
China that this end-use approach does not apply Article 2.1 of the SCM Agreement in the manner 
interpreted by China with regard to the application of th e subparagraphs of Article 2.1, the 
identification of a "subsidy programme", and the two factors in the final sentence of Article 2.1(c).  
                                                                                                                                               
289 China's response to Panel question No. 7, para. 24. 
290 The Panel will address these four specific aspects of China's claim in the sequence they appear in 
China's second written submission. See footnote 262 above. 
291 Issues and Decision Memorandum  for the Final Determination, Ki tchen Shelving, Exhibit CHI-38, 
p. 16: "we determine that the industries named by the GOC are limited in number and, hence, the subsidy is specific. See section 771(5A)(D)(iii)(I) of the Act."; Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination, OCTG, Exhibit CHI-45, p. 75: "We have co ntinued to find provision of steel rounds to be de 
facto specific under section 771(5A)(D)(iii)(I). … the produc ts listed by the GOC (reb ar, plain bar, merchant 
bar, light sections, narrow strip, wire rod, and seam less tubes) are a limited group of industries under 
Section 771 (5A)(D)(iii)(I)." (emphasis original); Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination, Wire Strand, Exhibit CHI- 52, p. 24: "The GOC stated that the end uses of wire rod relate to the 
type of industry involved as a direct  purchaser of the input. … Based on ou r review of the data and consistent 
with our past practice, we determine that the industries named by the GOC are limited in number and, hence, 
the subsidy is specific. See section 771(5A)(D)(iii)(I) of the Act …." (emphasis original); Issues and Decision 
Memorandum for the Final Determination, Seamless Pipe, Exhibit CHI-66, p. 18: "with respect to specificity, the GOC … stated, "Steel rounds … are {used} by the seam less pipe industry." Section 771(5A)(d)(iii)(I) of the 
Act clearly directs the Department to conduct its specif icity analysis on an indust ry or enterprise basis. 
Therefore … we determine that this subsidy is specific because the recipients are limited in number."; Issues 
and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination, Dr ill Pipe, Exhibit CHI-80, with respect to the provision 
of steel rounds, p. 31: "With regard to  specificity, the GOC stated that st eel rounds are used by producers of 
various types of seamless pipe (including the drill pipe industry). Therefore, we determine that this subsidy is specific because the recipients are limited in number. See section 771(5A)(D)(iii)(I) of the Act …." (emphasis 
original); with respect to the provision of green tubes, pp. 24 and 25: "With respect to specificity, we determine that the program is specific under section 771(5A)(D)(iii)(I) of the Act because the industries that utilize green tubes are limited. This finding is in keep ing with the Department's determination in other China 
CVD investigations where we found the industries that us ed a particular steel input to be limited"; Issues and 
Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination, Alum inum Extrusions, Exhibit CHI-87, p. 36: "with respect 
to specificity, the GOC has provided information on end uses for primary aluminium. … Based on our review of 
the data and consistent with our past practice, we dete rmine that the industries named by the GOC are limited 
in number and, hence, the subsidy is specific. See sect ion 771(5A)(D)(iii)(I) of the Act." (emphasis original); 
Issues and Decision Memorandum for th e Final Determination, Steel Cylinders, Exhibit CHI-99, with respect to 
hot-rolled steel, p. 17: "t he GOC has reported that hot-rolled steel is only provided to steel consuming 
industries, we determine that the subsidy is being provided  to a limited number of industries and is, therefore, 
specific"; with respect to seamless tube steel, p. 19: "The GOC has reported that seamless tube steel is used by a "wide variety of steel consuming industries," an d the GOC specifically identified the following uses: 
plumbing and heating systems, air conditioning units,  sprinklers, and in the co nstruction and repair of 
refineries and chemical plants. Becaus e seamless tube steel is only provided to steel consuming industries, we 
determine that the subsidy is being provided to a limited number of industries and is, therefore, specific"; with 
respect to billets, p. 20: "Because billets are provided  only to steel consuming in dustries, we determine that 
the subsidy is being provided to a limited number of industries and is, therefore, specific." (all footnotes 
omitted) 
292 Pressure Pipe, Line Pipe, Lawn Groom ers, Print Graphics and Solar Panels. 
293 United States' second written submission, para. 72. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  7.223.  As China challenges four specific aspects of what it calls the end-use approach applied by 
the USDOC in its specificity determinations, the Panel will address each of these aspects in turn.294 
a. Application of the subparagraphs of Article 2.1 of the SCM Agreement 
7.224.  One aspect of China's claim under Article 2 of the SCM Agreement relates to the 
application of the subparagraphs of Article 2.1. In terms of the facts, there seems to be no 
disagreement between the parties that the USDOC did not conduct a specificity analysis under subparagraphs (a) and (b) in the challenged investigations, but merely under subparagraph (c).
295 
Therefore, the question before the Panel is whet her a correct application of Article 2.1(c) must 
always follow the application of subparagraphs (a) and (b), or whether it may, in certain circumstances, be permissible for an investigating authority to proceed directly to a specificity analysis under Article 2.1(c). In particular, we note that the parties advance somewhat differing 
interpretations of statements made by the Appella te Body regarding the relationship between each 
of the subparagraphs of Article 2.1 of the SCM Agreement. The Panel will address these below. 
7.225.  With regard to the ordinary meaning of the first sentence of Article 2.1(c), the parties 
disagree on what the application of "other factors" is conditional upon. According to China, the 
ordinary meaning of the first sentence of Article 2.1(c) clearly conditions any evaluation of "other factors" under that provision on a prior "appearance of non-specificity" resulting from the 
application of the principles laid down in subparagraphs (a) and (b).
296 The United States, 
however, takes the view that the ordinary meaning of the first sentence of Article 2.1(c) indicates 
that the evaluation of "other factors" is conditio nal upon the existence of "reasons to believe that 
the subsidy may in fact be specific", and that a finding of non-specificity under subparagraphs (a) 
or (b) does not prevent further consideration under subparagraph (c).297 
7.226.  We do not agree with the interpretation advanced by China. The word "if" in Article 2.1(c) 
refers to the clause "there are reasons to believe that the subsidy may in fact be specific". As 
such, Article 2.1(c) conditions the possibility to  consider other factors upon the existence of 
"reasons to believe that the subsidy may in fact be specific", notwithstanding any appearance of non-specificity resulting from the application of subparagraphs (a) and (b). The Appellate Body has 
indeed clarified that "Article 2.1(c) proceeds where "there are reasons to believe that the subsidy 
may in fact be specific"", and that such reasons "relate to the factors set in subparagraph (c)".
298 
However, we note that the clause "reasons to belie ve that the subsidy may in fact be specific" is 
not the focus of China's present claim.299 
7.227.  The fact that the clause "notwithstanding any appearance of non-specificity resulting from 
the application of the principles laid down in subp aragraphs (a) and (b)" is placed between "if" and 
"there are reasons to believe that the subsidy may in fact be specific" does not mean that "if" 
relates to what comes directly after. The "notwithstanding …" clause could equally have been 
placed in last position, as follows: "if there are reasons to believe that the subsidy may in fact be specific, notwithstanding any appearance of non-specificity resulting from the application of the 
principles laid down in subparagraphs (a) and (b), other factors may be considered". This is in fact 
what has been done in the Spanish version of Article 2.1(c): "Si hay razones para creer que la subvención puede en realidad ser específica aun cuando de la aplicación de los principios enunciados en los apartados a) y b) resulte una apariencia de no especificidad, podrán 
considerarse otros factores".
300 As such, the clause "notwithstanding any appearance of non-
specificity resulting from the application of the principles laid down in subparagraphs (a) and (b)" signifies that the principles embodied in subparagraph (c) can be applied even if the application of 
the principles in subparagraphs (a) and (b) indica tes an appearance of non-specificity, provided 
there are "reasons to believe that the subsidy may in fact be specific". 
                                               
294 China's response to Panel question No. 92, para. 31. 
295 United States' first written submission, para. 188: "Accordingly, it was appropriate for Commerce to 
focus its analysis solely on Article 2.1(c)". 
296 China's second written submission, para. 125. 
297 United States' second written submission, paras. 83 and 84. 
298 Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint) , paras. 797, 877 and 878. 
299 See, for example, China's response to Panel question No. 90, para. 28. 
300 For the sake of completeness it will be noted that the French version uses the same sentence 
structure as the English text: "Si, nonobstant toute apparence de non-spécificité résultant de l'application des 
principes énoncés aux alinéas a) et b), il y a des raison s de croire que la subvention peut en fait être 
spécifique, d'autres facteurs pourro nt être pris en considération". WT/DS437/R 
 
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  7.228.  In terms of the context of the first sentence of Article 2.1(c), China considers that 
subparagraphs (a) and (b) have primacy and must feature in any concurrent application of Article 2.1, while subparagraph (c) is of the nature of an exception that may be taken into account if the application of subparagraphs (a) and (b) lead s to an appearance of non-specificity. According 
to the United States, the reference in the chap eau of Article 2.1 to the fact that certain 
"principles … apply" to a specificity analysis neither implicitly nor explicitly mandates the manner in which an investigating authority should apply the principles in any particular factual circumstance. 
In this regard, we note that China's position is linked to its views on what can amount to a 
"subsidy programme". In particular, China explains that it considers subparagraphs (a) and (b) to have primacy within the framework of Article 2.1 since subsidies will normally be administered 
pursuant to legislation, and it therefore makes sens e for an evaluation of specificity to start with 
any written instrument.
301 Indeed, China takes the position that an examination of the principles in 
subparagraphs (a) and (b) would have led the USDOC to realise that there is no legislation or other type of official measure providing for the alleged subsidies, and no programme.
302 
7.229.  It is explicit in the chapeau of Article 2.1 that subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) set out 
"principles", as opposed to "rules", as highlighted by the Appellate Body.303 The Appellate Body has 
furthermore specified that these principles must be applied "concurrently"304, meaning "running 
together … as parallel lines"; "going on side by side"; "occurring together"; "existing or arising 
together"; "conjoint, associated".305 The Panel agrees with China to the extent that the 
subparagraphs of Article 2.1 follow a certain logical structure, and this has also been recognised by 
the Appellate Body: "the structure of Article 2.1 suggests a sequence  for their application in which 
application of the principles in subparagraphs (a) and (b) precedes the application of the principle 
in subparagraph (c)".306 However, the Panel does not consider this logical structure in Article 2.1 
to translate into procedural rules that investigating authorities must follow in each specificity 
analysis under that provision. This is in line wi th a certain degree of flexibility recognised by the 
Appellate Body in the application of the principles  in Article 2.1. Indeed, the Appellate Body has 
stated that the structure of Article 2.1 indicates that the application of subparagraph (c) will 
"normally" follow the application of subparagraphs (a) and (b).307 The application of these 
principles must take into account the "various legal and factual aspects of a subsidy in any given case", as well as the "nature and content of measures challenged in a particular case" when applying these principles, and "there may be instances in which the evidence under consideration 
unequivocally indicates specificity or non-specificity by reason of law, or by reason of fact, under 
one of the subparagraphs, and that in such circumstances further consideration under the other subparagraphs of Article 2.1 may be unnecessary".
308  
7.230.  In our view, the set of facts before us in  this dispute embody such circumstances. Indeed, 
it is undisputed that the USDOC's findings are not based on an explicit limitation of access by the granting authority or the legislation pursuant to which the granting authority operates; nor are 
they based on criteria or conditions that were spelled out in law, regulation, or other official 
document. It was the unwritten nature of the subsidies that the USDOC found to exist that led it to consider "other factors" under subparagraph (c). 
7.231.  Therefore, with respect to China's clai m on the application of the subparagraphs of 
Article 2.1 of the SCM Agreement, the Panel finds that, given the nature of the subsidies that the 
USDOC found to exist, the USDOC did not act in consistently with Article 2.1 by analysing 
specificity exclusively under Article 2.1(c). 
                                               
301 See China's second written submission, para. 119. 
302 China's first written submission, para. 101. 
303 Appellate Body Reports, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) , para. 366; and US – 
Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint) , para. 796. 
304 Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Coun tervailing Duties (China) , para. 371. 
305 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary , L. Brown (ed.) (Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 470. 
306 Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), para. 796. (emphasis added) 
307 Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), para. 796. 
308 Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Coun tervailing Duties (China) , para. 371. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  b. Identification of a subsidy programme 
7.232.  Turning to another, related aspect of China's claim, we note at the outset that it is 
uncontested that the USDOC's challenged specificit y determinations were made under the first of 
the "other factors" of Article 2.1(c) of the SCM Agreement.309 
7.233.  The parties appear to agree that the analysis of specificity under the first of the "other 
factors" of Article 2.1(c), namely the "use of a subsidy programme by a limited number of certain enterprises", requires some form of identification  of a "subsidy programme". However, the parties 
essentially disagree on two closely-related aspects, namely what amounts to a "subsidy 
programme" and how a "subsidy programme" can be identified and evidenced, and whether the USDOC identified and evidenced a "subsidy programme" in each challenged investigation. 
7.234.  China suggests that it would be highly unus ual for there to be no written evidence of a 
subsidy programme, and even in the unusual case in which there is no written evidence, the 
subsidy programme would be reflected in expre ss pronouncements by the granting authority.
310 
With regard to how the USDOC actually identified subsidy programmes in the investigations at 
issue, China states that the USDOC has merely referred in its determinations to input-specific 
programmes, such as the "provision of wire rod for LTAR program".311 However, China argues that 
this is not sufficient to properly identify a subsidy programme, since the USDOC has failed to 
provide evidentiary support  for the existence of these alleged programmes.312  
7.235.  The United States takes the view that a subsidy programme can be identified and 
evidenced through the operation of the subsidy itself and its recipients313, by the stream of 
subsidies to "certain enterprises" using such a subsidy programme.314 The United States claims 
that in Aluminum Extrusions, for example, the application alleged, and contained sufficient 
evidence for purposes of initiation, that primary aluminium was being provided by SOEs to primary aluminium consumers in China for less than adequate remuneration, and that the provision of the 
input was specific to a limited number of users.
315 
7.236.  We firstly recall that the specificity requirement of Article 2 is concerned with establishing 
a limitation of access to a subsidy, not the existence of the subsidy itself, which is dealt with under 
Article 1.1. Indeed, this distinction is well reflected in Article 1.2, which states that "[a] subsidy as 
defined in paragraph 1 shall be subject to the provisions of Part II or shall be subject to the provisions of Part III or V only if such a subsidy is specific in accordance with the provisions of Article 2". In this respect, our position is in line with that of the panel in US – Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties (China) .
316 
7.237.  In our view, it is clear from the language of Article 2.1(c) that the "use … by a limited 
number of certain enterprises" is to be evaluated with respect to a "subsidy programme". In this 
regard, the starting point of an analysis of specificity under that factor should be the identification 
of the relevant subsidy programme. As such, we agree with the finding of the panel in EC and 
certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft , made in the context of the second of the "other 
factors" in Article 2.1(c), that "when considering whether there is "predominant use" of a subsidy 
                                               
309 United States' second written submission, para. 72. 
310 China furthermore submits that written documents could include a piece of legislation, published 
eligibility requirements, an applicatio n form or budget allocations. An express pronouncement would need to be 
sufficient to determine that a particular  series of subsidies is a planned seri es of subsidies, and to identify the 
characteristics of the subsidy programme that distinguish it from the provision of other subsidies. China's response to Panel question No. 38, para. 108. See also  China's first written submission, paras. 101 and 121. 
311 China's first written submission, para. 109. 
312 China's first written submission, para. 109. 
313 United States' response to Pa nel question No. 91, para. 24. 
314 United States' second written submission, para. 76. 
315 United States' response to Pane l question No. 91, para. 25; also see response to Panel question 
No. 34, para. 77; second written submission, para. 79. 
316 "[T]he specificity requirement is not about the existence of a subsidy, which is dealt with in 
Article 1.1, but rather about access thereto". Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties 
(China) , para. 9.21. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  programme within these terms, the starting point should be the identification of the relevant 
subsidy programme".317 
7.238.  Article 2 refers to a subsidy "programme", as opposed to a subsidy, in Article 2.1(c) only. 
In our view, the use of the term "subsidy programme", as opposed to "subsidy", is not lacking in 
significance. Indeed, we agree with the panel in EC and certain member States – Large Civil 
Aircraft  that "it would not have been difficult for th e drafters of the SCM Agreement to include a 
reference to a subsidy programme in the text of the third specificity factor, as they did for the first 
and second specificity factors. However, the drafters chose not to do so".318 At the same time, we 
note that the SCM Agreement remains silent as to the definition of a "programme". This contrasts with the detailed definition of a "subsidy" provided in Article 1. 
7.239.  With regard to the ordinary meaning of the word "programme", its dictionary definition 
indicates most pertinently "[a] plan or outline of (esp. intended) activities; a planned series of 
activities or events".
319 This ordinary meaning must be read in  light of the context of Article 2.1(c), 
as well as of the object and purpose of the SCM Agreement as a whole. Whereas Article 2.1(a) 
addresses "explicit" limitations on access to a subsidy (commonly referred to as de jure  
specificity), Article 2.1(c) addresses situations where "the subsidy may in fact be specific" 
(commonly referred to as de facto  specificity). As such, Article 2.1(c) is clearly concerned with 
facts. As succinctly expressed by the panel in US – Softwood Lumber IV , Article 2 as a whole is 
"concerned with the distortion that is created by a subsidy which either in law or in fact is not broadly available".
320 
7.240.  In our view, Article 2.1(c) reflects the diversity of facts and circumstances that 
investigating authorities may be confronted with when analysing subsidies covered by the 
SCM Agreement. The fact that, in Article 2, the term "programme" is used only in the context of de 
facto specificity, combined with the fact that the Ag reement provides no definition of the term, in 
our view suggests that "subsidy programme" should be interpreted broadly. A broad interpretation 
gives due recognition to the reality that "subsidies can take many forms and can be provided through many different kinds of mechanisms, some more and some less explicit".
321 Conversely, a 
narrow interpretation of "subsidy programme" could enable the circumvention of the disciplines of 
the SCM Agreement and even discourage the transparent management of subsidies.  
7.241.  As such, the fact that the USDOC allegedly identified subsidy programmes that are neither 
in writing nor expressly pronounced by the granting authority does not in and of itself render the 
USDOC's specificity determinations inconsistent with Article 2.1(c).  
7.242.  In each of the challenged investigations, the application alleges that a specific input is 
being provided by SOEs for less than adequate remuneration. In the absence of any written 
instrument or explicit pronouncement, the USDOC co ncluded that this type of systematic activity 
or series of activities – the consistent provision by the SOEs in question of inputs for less than adequate remuneration – constituted a subsidy programme. 
7.243.  Therefore, with respect to China's claim on the identification of a subsidy programme, we 
find that evidence of such systematic activity or series of activities provided an objective basis for 
the USDOC to sufficiently identify subsidy programmes for the purposes of the first of the "other factors" under Article 2.1(c) of the SCM Agreem ent in the relevant specificity determinations. 
c. Identification of the granting authority 
7.244.  A further aspect of China's claim under Article 2 of the SCM Agreement concerns the 
identification of the granting authority.  
7.245.  China submits that, in the challenged investigations, the USDOC failed to identify who the 
relevant granting authority is in relation to the provision of inputs for less than adequate remuneration. China argues that the identification of the granting authority is essential for 
                                               
317 Panel Report, EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft , para. 7.993. 
318 Panel Report, EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft , para. 7.965. 
319 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary , L. Brown (ed.) (Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 2371. 
320 Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV , para. 7.116. 
321 Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) , para. 9.32. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  evaluating whether a particular subsidy is specific to certain enterprises "within the jurisdiction of 
the granting authority".322 As such, China claims that the USDOC failed to identify the relevant 
granting authority, and ergo the relevant jurisdiction for an inquiry under Article 2.1.323 China 
makes no specific references to the facts of any challenged investigations in making this claim.  
7.246.  The United States claims that in each instance, the USDOC considered the jurisdiction 
within which it was conducting its specificity analysis, i.e. the jurisdiction of the granting authority, to be China.
324 I n  s u p p o r t  o f  t h i s  c l a i m ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  r e f e r s  t o  s p e c i f i c  e x c e r p t s  f r o m  
applications, initiation checklists, questionnaires and questions posed by the USDOC, preliminary 
determinations, Issues and Decision Memoranda, and final determinations, some of which are contained in Exhibit CHI-122.
325  
7.247.  The chapeau of Article 2.1 contains a reference to the granting authority. The ordinary 
meaning and context of the chapeau, as well as the negotiating history of Article 2, suggest to us 
that the reference to "within the jurisdiction of the granting authority" firstly indicates that specificity may only exist within the territory of a Member, and secondly recognises that, in certain 
countries, subsidies may be granted not only by  the central authorities, but also by other 
subdivisions. The chapeau of Article 2.1 thus situ ates the assessment of a limitation of access 
within the jurisdiction of the granting authority.  
7.248.  Looking at the USDOC's determinations, and the specific excerpts provided by the 
United States in particular, it appears to us that the relevant jurisdiction was at the very least implicitly understood to be China in the challenged investigations. 
7.249.  As such, we find that China has failed to establish that the USDOC acted inconsistently 
with Article 2.1 of the SCM Agreement by failing to explicitly identify the relevant granting 
authority, and ergo the relevant jurisdiction, in the specificity determinations at issue. 
d. Factors in the last sentence of Article 2.1(c) 
7.250.  A fourth aspect of China's claim under Article 2 of the SCM Agreement concerns the final 
sentence of Article 2.1(c). The question before the Panel is whether the factors in the final sentence of Article 2.1(c), namely "the extent of diversification of economic activities within the 
jurisdiction of the granting authority" and "the length of time during which the subsidy programme 
has been in operation", must be taken into account by an investigating authority in every Article 2.1(c) analysis.  
7.251.  With regard to the ordinary meaning of th e final sentence of Article 2.1(c), we are of the 
view that the use of the term "shall" clearly connotes an obligation. Indeed, the term is defined as 
"has a duty to; more broadly, is required to".
326 The decision by the drafters of the 
SCM Agreement to use the term "shall" instead of te rms such as "should" or "may" is significant.  
7.252.  With regard to the context of Article 2.1(c) more broadly, as we have seen above, 
subparagraph (c) concedes a certain flexibility for investigating authorities to consider specificity in a number of factual scenarios that may arise. In this context, we consider the last sentence of 
Article 2.1(c) to function as a safeguard that keeps in check this flexibility. Indeed, where 
economic activities within the jurisdiction of the granting authority are less diversified, the use of a 
subsidy programme by a limited number of certain enterprises may nonetheless lead to a finding of non-specificity. Use by a limited number of certain enterprises may similarly lead to a finding of 
non-specificity where the subsidy programme has been in operation for a limited period of time 
only.  
7.253.  In light of the above, the Panel agrees with the finding of the panel in US – Softwood 
Lumber IV  that taking into account the two factors in the final sentence of Article 2.1(c) need not 
be done explicitly.
327 Similarly, the panel in  EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips  did not 
                                               
322 China's first written submission, para. 95. 
323 China's first written submission, paras. 95 and 96; second written submission, para. 138. 
324 United States' second written submission, para. 94. 
325 United States' second written submission, fn 150. 
326 Black's Law Dictionary , 1999, p. 1379. 
327 Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV , para. 7.124. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  find it unreasonable for an investigating authority to not include an explicit  statement that these 
factors had been taken into account.328 In US – Softwood Lumber IV , however, the panel found 
that a certain statement of the investigating authority indicated that these factors had been taken into account implicitly.
329  
7.254.  In the present dispute, we see no evidence  that the two factors in the final sentence of 
Article 2.1(c) were taken into account, either explicitly or implicitly, nor has the United States pointed to any such specific evidence.
330 
7.255.  Furthermore, we find no support in Article 2.1(c) for the United States' assertion that the 
requirement in the final sentence of Article 2.1(c) is dependent upon whether an interested party raised the relevance of the two factors. 
7.256.  As such, the Panel finds that the USDOC failed to take into account the two factors in the 
final sentence of Article 2.1(c) of the SCM Agreement, as required by that provision. 
e. Overall conclusion of the Panel's evaluation 
7.257.  The Panel finds that the USDOC acted inconsistently with the obligations of the 
United States under the last sentence of Article 2.1(c) of the SCM Agreement by failing to take 
account of the two factors listed therein when making the relevant specificity determinations.  
7.258.  However, the Panel finds that, in the specificity determinations at issue, the USDOC did not 
act inconsistently with Article 2.1 by analysing specificity exclusively under Article 2.1(c); that the 
USDOC sufficiently identified subsidy programmes for the purposes of the first of the "other factors" under Article 2.1(c); and that China has failed to establish that the USDOC acted inconsistently with Article 2.1 by failing to explicitly identify the relevant granting authority.
331 
7.259.  In light of the fact that China has pres ented no substantial evidence or arguments in 
support of its claim under Article 2.4 of the SCM Agreement, the Panel considers its above findings 
sufficient to resolve the dispute between the parties under this claim. 
7.9  Whether the USDOC's initiations of invest igations are inconsistent with Article 11 of 
the SCM Agreement due to insufficient evidence of specificity 
7.9.1  Introduction 
7.260.  The Panel now turns to the claims advanced by China concerning evidence of specificity in 
the USDOC's initiation of 14 investigations, namely Pressure Pipe, Line Pipe, Lawn Groomers, Kitchen Shelving, OCTG, Wire Strand, Seamless Pipe, Print Graphics, Drill Pipe, Aluminum Extrusions, Steel Cylinders, Solar Panels, Wind Towers and Steel Sinks.
332 
7.261.  The USDOC initiated a countervailing duty investigation in Pressure Pipe on 
25 February 2008, pursuant to an application for th e initiation of such an investigation filed on 
30 January 2008; in Line Pipe on 29 April 2008, pursuant  to an application for the initiation of such 
an investigation filed on 3 April 2008; in Lawn Groomers on 21 July 2008, pursuant to an 
application for the initiation of such an investigation filed on 24 June 2008; in Kitchen Shelving on 26 August 2008, pursuant to an application for th e initiation of such an investigation filed on 
31 July 2008; in OCTG on 5 May 2009, pursuant to an application for the initiation of such an 
investigation filed on 8 April 2009; in Wire Strand on 23 June 2009, pursuant to an application for the initiation of such an investigation filed on  27 May 2009; in Seamless Pipe on 15 October 2009, 
pursuant to an application for the initiation of such an investigation filed on 16 September 2009; in 
                                               
328 Panel Report, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips , para. 7.229. 
329 The panel read the USDOC's statement that "the vast majority of companies and industries in 
Canada does not receive benefits unde r the programmes" as implying that th e two factors in the final sentence 
of Article 2.1(c) had been taken into account. Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV , para. 7.124. 
330 United States' response to Panel question No. 45, paras. 95-97. 
331 The Panel notes that, throughout its submissions, China makes statements criticising the alleged 
circularity of the USDOC's approach to specificity. Ho wever, while China has raised  this issue, we do not 
consider that China has asked the Panel to make specific findings on this issue. 
332 See table in paragraph 7.1.   of this Report. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  Print Graphics on 20 October 2009, pursuant to an application for the initiation of such an 
investigation filed on 23 September 2009; in Drill Pipe on 27 January 2010, pursuant to an application for the initiation of such an investigation filed on 30 December 2009; in Aluminum Extrusions on 27 April 2010, pursuant to an applicat ion for the initiation of such an investigation 
filed on 31 March 2010; in Steel Cylinders on 8 June 2011, pursuant to an application for the 
initiation of such an investigation filed on 11 May 2011; in Solar Panels on 16 November 2011, pursuant to an application for the initiation of such an investigation filed on 19 October 2011; in 
Wind Towers on 24 January 2012, pursuant to an application for the initiation of such an 
investigation filed on 29 December 2011; and in  Steel Sinks on 27 March 2012, pursuant to an 
application for the initiation of such an investigation filed on 1 March 2012. 
7.262.  China claims that the USDOC's initiation of these 14 countervailing duty investigations in 
respect of the alleged provision of inputs for less than adequate remuneration, in the absence of 
sufficient evidence in the petition to support an a llegation that any such subsidy would be specific 
under Article 2 of the SCM Agreement, and in the ab sence of a sufficient review of the petition by 
the USDOC in respect of the allegations, is inconsistent with Articles 11.2 and 11.3 of the 
SCM Agreement. Furthermore, as a consequence of these inconsistencies with Articles 11.2 and 11.3, China claims that the United States acte d inconsistently with Articles 10 and 32.1 of the 
SCM Agreement and Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994. 
7.9.2  Relevant provisions 7.263.  The present claim concerns Articles 11.2 and 11.3 of the SCM Agreement, which relevantly 
provide the following: 
11.2 An application under paragraph 1 shall include sufficient evidence of the 
existence of (a) a subsidy and, if possible, its amount, (b) injury within the meaning of Article VI of GATT 1994 as interpreted by  this Agreement, and (c) a causal link 
between the subsidized imports and the alleged injury. Simple assertion, 
unsubstantiated by relevant evidence, cannot be considered sufficient to meet the requirements of this paragraph. The application shall contain such information as is 
reasonably available to the applicant on the following: 
… (iii)  evidence with regard to the existence, amount and nature of the 
subsidy in question; 
… 
11.3 The authorities shall review the ac curacy and adequacy of the evidence 
provided in the application to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to justify 
the initiation of an investigation. 
7.9.3  Main arguments of China 7.264.  With regard to the United States' claim that China has failed to present a prima facie  case, 
China states generally that is has done the following with respect to each of its claims: 
(i) identified the challenged measure at issue and pr ovided explicit citations to the portions of the 
measure pertinent to the claim; (ii) identified th e relevant provisions of the SCM Agreement with 
which it alleges the challenged measures are inconsistent, and presented its understanding of the 
legal obligation each such provision imposes; and (iii) explained the basis for its claim that each of 
the challenged measures is inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the SCM Agreement, properly interpreted.
333  
7.265.  China claims that the USDOC's initiation of 14 investigations in respect of the alleged 
provision of inputs for less than adequate remuneration in the absence of sufficient evidence in the petition to support an allegation that any such subsidy would be specific under Article 2 of the 
SCM Agreement, and in the absence of a sufficient review of the petition by the USDOC in respect 
                                               
333 China's response to Panel question No. 4, para. 14. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  of this allegation, is inconsistent with Articles 11.2 and 11.3. In particular, China objects to the 
initiation of the investigations on the basis of evidence that the inputs were used by a limited number of industries or enterprises, since such ev idence fails to address the four factors required 
under an Article 2.1 specificity analysis.
334 
7.266.  China submits that the initiations are inconsistent with Article 11.3 because they were 
based on the application of an incorrect legal standard. In this regard, China submits that the USDOC's challenged initiations are based on the application of the same legal standard that China 
is challenging under Article 2.
335 China argues that when an investigating authority initiates a 
countervailing duty investigation on the basis of an incorrect legal standard, it necessarily acts inconsistently with Article 11.3. Indeed, China take s the view that the "adequacy" and "sufficiency" 
of evidence, required by Article 11.3, can only be assessed in relation to a legal standard.
336 
7.267.  In the course of the proceedings, China stat ed that, in its view, it would be appropriate for 
the present Panel to follow the approach taken by the panel in China – GOES , namely to read the 
obligations in Article 11.3 together with Article 11.2, but to make findings only under 
Article 11.3.337  
7.9.4  Main arguments of the United States 7.268.  The United States submits that China has failed to establish a prima facie  case with regard 
to its claims.
338 In particular, the United States submits that initiation decisions are fact-specific, 
and the question of whether an investigating authority has complied with the standard set out in Article 11 of the SCM Agreement is similarly depend ent on the facts presented by each individual 
application.
339 The United States furthermore submits that China has failed to make a prima facie  
case due to its focus on the relevant applications and failure to discuss the USDOC's initiation 
decisions made on the basis of those applications.340 
7.269.  Furthermore, the United States argues that the identification of and evidence on a facially 
non-specific subsidy programme, the granting authority, and the two factors in the last sentence 
of Article 2.1(c), as understood by China, is not required as part of an Article 2.1(c) analysis, and much less so under Article 11.
341  
7.270.  The United States submits that the relevant issue under the first factor of Article 2.1(c) is 
whether there are a limited number of users of th e subsidy programme; as such, the question of 
which enterprises use the input is relevant to the inquiry. In this regard the United States refers to the observation by the panel in US – Softwood Lumber IV  that "[i]n the case of good that is 
provided by the government … and that has utility only for certain enterprises …, it is all the more 
likely that a subsidy conferred via the provision of that good is specifically provided to certain enterprises only".
342  
7.271.  Furthermore, the United States rejects China's assertion that once an investigating 
authority initiates an investigation on the basis of an incorrect legal standard, it necessarily acts inconsistently with Article 11. The United States  submits that Article 11 speaks to providing and 
evaluating evidence; it does not require that applicants allege or that an investigating authority 
recites any particular standard. For initiation purposes under Article 11, what is required is adequate evidence tending to prove or indicating the existence of specificity, in light of what is reasonably available to the applicant.
343 
                                               
334 China's first written submission, para. 126; second written submission, para. 152. 
335 China's second written submission, paras. 150-153. 
336 China's second written submission, paras. 154-163. 
337 China's second written submission, fn 161, citing Panel Report, China – GOES , para. 7.50. 
338 United States' first written submission, para. 210. 
339 United States' first written submission, para. 210. 
340 United States' first written submission, para. 217. 
341 United States' second written submission, para. 112. 
342 United States' second written submission, paras. 110 and 111, citing Panel Report, US – Softwood 
Lumber IV , para. 7.116. 
343 United States' second written submission, paras. 115-117. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  7.9.5  Main arguments of third parties 
7.272.  Canada  submits that Article 11.3 of the SCM Agreement permits an investigating authority 
to take into account, when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, that access to relevant information may be limited. According to Canada, a subsidizing Member should not be able to 
evade its obligations under the SCM Agreement because it is in a position to make information 
relating to subsidies inaccessible or "unavailable".
344 
7.273.  The European Union  considers that the information an applicant might be expected to 
adduce must be a function of the availability  of such information in the public domain.345 
7.274.  Turkey submits that the determination of sufficiency of evidence and reasonable 
availability of information is case and fact-specific, and at the investigating authority's discretion. The reasonable availability of information depends in particular on a government's record keeping 
and publication requirements, on companies' publication requirements, and access to laws and 
regulations. The non-fulfilment of notification  requirements contained in Article 25 of the 
SCM Agreement adversely affects access to information.
346 
7.9.6  Evaluation by the Panel 
7.275.  We note at the outset that China states that, in its view, it would be appropriate for the 
present Panel to follow the approach taken by the panel in China – GOES , namely to read the 
obligations in Article 11.3 together with Article 11.2, but to make findings only under 
Article 11.3.347 For the same reasons as explained in paragraphs 7.143.   to 7.145.   above, we 
find no reason not to limit our findings to Ar ticle 11.3, read together with Article 11.2, as 
requested by China. 
7.276.  As noted in paragraph 7.146.   above, the Panel agrees with the reasoning of the panel in 
China – GOES  with regard to the meaning of the conc ept of "sufficient evidence" as used in 
Articles 11.2 and 11.3 of the SCM Agreement, and th e standard of review that applies to a review 
of a claim under Article 11.3. 
7.277.  In making its claims, China takes the position that the challenged initiations are 
inconsistent with Article 11.3 because they were based on the application of an incorrect legal 
standard. Indeed, in China's view, if the Panel agre es with China that the legal standard applied by 
the USDOC at the time of initiation with respect to specificity is inconsistent with Article 2, then the USDOC was "without a proper basis to conclude that there was sufficient evidence" of these elements of a subsidy to justify initiation in the investigations under challenge.
348 
7.278.  Within the context of specificity, the legal standard that China objects to is one based on 
an erroneous understanding of Article 2.1(c), which fails to address the four essential factors contained in that provision.
349 Indeed, according to China, in not a single instance did an 
application contain evidence of "use of a su bsidy programme by a limited number of certain 
enterprises"; the applications failed to present evidence of any subsidy programme, much less evidence of a facially non-specific subsidy programme that, in practice, was used by a limited 
number of certain enterprises; nor did the applicatio ns present evidence relating to the identity of 
the relevant granting authorities or evidence that would be relevant under the last sentence of Article 2.1(c).
350 
7.279.  We observe that China's assertion that "[e]ach of the applications at issue contains nothing 
more than an assertion, usually limited to a single sentence, that the recipients of the alleged 
input subsidies are "limited in number""351 seems to be factually incorrect. The applications did 
contain evidence of the limited number of users of the alleged subsidy; however, whether this was 
                                               
344 Canada's third-party su bmission, paras. 43-55. 
345 European Union's third-part y submission, paras. 39-41. 
346 Turkey's third-party st atement, paras. 13-18. 
347 China's second written submission, fn 161, citing Panel Report, China – GOES , para. 7.50. 
348 China's second written submission, para. 163. 
349 China's opening statement at the fi rst meeting of the Panel, para. 63. 
350 China's first written submission, para. 126. 
351 China's first written submission, para. 125. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  the only evidence, as well as the quality of the evidence, varies from investigation to investigation. 
Upon further review of the petitions, we agree wi th the United States that "[s]ome applications 
relied on evidence such as research reports and the financial statements of Chinese companies, in support of claims of specificity, while others, instead, or in addition, relied on prior determinations 
of Commerce".
352 Moreover, China contradicts its above statement by contending that "[i]n some 
cases, the application also asserts that the alleged input subsidies are either predominantly used 
by certain enterprises or that disproportionately  large amounts of subsidy are granted to certain 
enterprises, or both . These, too, are single-sentence assertions unsupported by any evidence 
whatsoever".353 
7.280.  In addition to the above, we note that  China challenges the USDOC's initiation of the 
challenged investigations as inconsistent with Article 11.3 despite essentially overlooking how the 
USDOC handled the evidence contained in the applications. In this regard, we note the USDOC's 
observation that in the Kitchen Shelving  investigation, for example, the USDOC requested further 
information from applicants with regard to the description of the industries that purchase wire rod, 
as well as an explanation as to why those industries comprise a specific enterprise or industry or 
group thereof.354 
7.281.  As the Panel concludes in paragraph 7.258.   above, the understanding of Article 2.1 
advanced by China is mostly incorrect in the Panel's view. In particular, the Panel disagrees with 
China's interpretation regarding the identification of a subsidy programme, the application of the subparagraphs of Article 2.1, and the iden tification of the granting authority. 
7.282.  While we find that the two factors in the final sentence of Article 2.1(c) should have been 
taken into account by the USDOC, this procedural requirement imposed on investigating 
authorities does not affect what "reasonably available" evidence was required of applicants, "tending to prove or indicating" the existence of specificity for purposes of initiation.
355 
7.283.  As such, the Panel finds that China has not established that the USDOC acted 
inconsistently with the United States' obligations under Article 11 of the SCM Agreement by initiating the challenged investigations without sufficient evidence of specificity.
356 
7.10  Whether the uses of "adverse facts avai lable" by the USDOC are inconsistent with 
Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement 
7.10.1  Introduction 7.284.  The Panel now turns to the claims advanced  by China with regard to the USDOC's use of 
"adverse facts available" in 42 instances across 13 investigations, namely Pressure Pipe, Line Pipe, 
Citric Acid, Lawn Groomers, OCTG, Wire Strand, Magnesia Bricks, Seamless Pipe, Print Graphics, Drill Pipe, Aluminum Extrusions, Steel Cylinders and Solar Panels.
357  
7.285.  Across the 15 investigations challenged by China, the USDOC found non-cooperation by 
the interested parties and made 48 positive determinations on financial contribution, benefit and specificity on the basis of adverse facts available with respect to input subsidies as well as other 
types of subsidies.  
7.286.  China claims that the USDOC's use of so-called adverse facts available to support its 
findings of financial contribution, benefit and specificity is inconsistent with Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement in 48 instances because the USDOC did not rely on facts available on the record. 
                                               
352 United States' first written submission, para. 223. 
353 China's first written submission, fn 124. (emphasis added) 
354 United States' second written submission, fn 181. 
355 Panel Report, China – GOES , para. 7.56. 
356 While the Panel acknowledges the United States' argument on whether China has established a prima 
facie case, the Panel does not consider it necessary to address this issue in light of the Panel's finding under 
this claim. 
357 See table in paragraph 7.1.   of this Report. See Exhibit CHI-2; China's first written submission, 
para. 146 and fn 136. The Panel recalls its finding that the preliminary determinations of the USDOC in Wind 
Towers and Steel Sinks fall outside the Panel's terms of  reference. As a result, the number of "instances" 
challenged by China, as per Exhibit CHI-125, and fallin g within the Panel's terms of reference, is 42 instead 
of 48. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  Furthermore, as a consequence of these inconsistencies with Article 12.7, China claims that the 
United States acted inconsistently with Articles 10 and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement and Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994.  
7.10.2  Relevant provision 
7.287.  The present claim concerns Article 12. 7 of the SCM Agreement, which provides the 
following: 
12.7 In cases in which any interested Member or interested party refuses access to, 
or otherwise does not provide, necessary information within a reasonable period or 
significantly impedes the investigation, preliminary and final determinations, affirmative or negative, may be made on the basis of the facts available. 
7.10.3  Main arguments of China 
7.288.  China claims that 48 instances in which the USDOC uses adverse facts available in making 
determinations on financial contribution, benefit and specificity across 15 investigations are inconsistent with Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement because the USDOC did not rely on facts 
available on the record.
358  
7.289.  In support of its case, China provides as Exhibit CHI-125 what it considers to be the 
relevant excerpts from the determinations, previously identified in Exhibit CHI-2. China considers 
these excerpts to be relevant to its claim as they are those portions of the USDOC's 
determinations in which the USDOC applies what China considers to be an incorrect legal standard with respect to the use of facts available.
359 China provides some case-specific discussion in 
support of its claim with regard to three of the challenged investigations, namely Line Pipe, OCTG 
and Print Graphics.360 These are intended to serve as examples of the USDOC's pervasive use of 
adverse facts available.361  
7.290.  China argues that the USDOC's determinat ions lack a factual found ation. Once the USDOC 
finds that there is non-cooperation by a respondent, it simply pronounces the ultimate legal 
conclusion at issue, without relying on any fa cts on the record. Instead, the USDOC either 
assumed the ultimate conclusion of its inquiry, or based its conclusion on evidence or conclusions 
drawn from a different investigation.362 
7.291.  China in particular objects to the USDOC's use of adverse facts available. According to 
China, the term is a misnomer, because the USDOC do es not rely on facts that are available on the 
record, adverse or otherwise. What the USDOC refers to as "adverse facts available" is, in fact, 
more accurately described as the use of adverse inferences.363  
7.292.  China submits that the use of facts availabl e is fundamentally different from the drawing of 
adverse inferences. The use of facts available allows an investigating authority to use facts on the 
record to make a determination in the face of incomplete information. The drawing of adverse 
inferences, if authorized, would provide a vehicle for an investigating authority to punish non-cooperation by reaching a result adverse to the interests of the responding party.
364 China points 
to the finding of the panel in China – GOES  that the drawing of adverse inferences is contrary to 
the purpose of the facts available mechanism under Article 12.7.365 
7.293.  Furthermore, China argues that what the USDOC refers to as "adverse inferences" in fact 
amounts to "assumptions". China defines an assumption as "a conclusion that is taken for granted 
                                               
358 Exhibit CHI-2; China's first written submission, para. 146 and fn 136. 
359 China's response to Panel question No. 7, para. 24. 
360 China's first written submission, paras. 147-153; op ening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, 
paras. 70-72, 76. 
361 China's first written submission, para. 152. 
362 China's first written submission, paras. 128-156. 
363 China's first written submission, para. 145. 
364 China's first written submission, para. 139. 
365 China's first written submission, paras. 141 and 142, citing Panel Report, China – GOES , para. 7.302. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  rather than having an actual basis in fact".366 China argues that where the USDOC relies on 
"adverse inferences" in the 48 instances at issue, it is clear that the USDOC's determination is not an inference drawn from facts on the record, but is, instead, just another way of stating that the USDOC's determination is based on an "assumption".
367 In response to the United States' 
definition of "inference" as "[a] process of reasoning by which a fact or proposition sought to be 
established is deduced as a logical consequence from other facts, or a state of facts, already proved or admitted"
368, China responds that this definition bears no relationship to Commerce's 
use of adverse inferences in the determinations under challenge.369 China then states, referring to 
the conclusion of one challenged facts available de termination, that "[a]s is evident in the example 
above, Commerce's "inferences" are mere "assumptions"".370 Furthermore, China states that the 
USDOC often uses the term "assumption" interchangeably with the term "inference".371 
7.294.  China concedes that the use of facts available by an investigating authority could be 
adverse to the interests of the non-cooperating party. However, China stresses that the investigating authority must still use facts available.
372  
7.295.  In response to the United States' argument that China has failed to present a prima facie  
case, China submits that the incompatibility be tween the requirements of Article 12.7 and the 
48 instances of adverse facts available that China has identified is evident in the rationale – or lack 
thereof – that the USDOC provided in each instance.373 Indeed, when the USDOC says that it is 
adversely "assuming" or "inferring" the legal conclu sion at issue, making no reference of any kind 
to facts on the record, it is evident that those determinations are not based on available facts.374 
Moreover, China argues that the USDOC follows a consistent pattern in the 48 instances at 
issue.375 
7.296.  Further in this regard, China submits that the mere existence of a particular fact on the 
record of an investigation is insufficient to fulfil the requirements of Article 12.7.376 China submits 
that it was the USDOC's obligation as the investigating authority to provide a reasoned and 
adequate explanation of how the evidence on the record supported its application of facts available under Article 12.7. Referring to the Appellate Body's findings in US – Countervailing Duty 
Investigation on DRAMS
377, China argues that investigating authorities have to provide a reasoned 
and adequate explanation of (i) how the evidence on the record supported their factual findings, and (ii) how those factual findings supported the overall subsidy determination. Such an explanation should be discernible from the published determination itself.
378 According to China, 
Exhibit USA-94 only confirms the inconsistency of the USDOC's challenged determinations with 
Article 12.7.379 
7.10.4  Main arguments of the United States 
7.297.  The United States primarily argues that China has failed to make a prima facie  case in 
support of the 48 alleged breaches of Article 12. 7 of the SCM Agreement. Instead, China bases its 
claims on sweeping and inaccurate generalizations.  In particular, Exhibit CHI-125 fails to advance 
China's arguments, as it only consists of excerpted text, taken out of context and merely providing 
a description of the USDOC's conclusion with respect to each determination. Exhibit CHI-125 fails to explain how or why China views these excerpts  as support for the proposition that the USDOC 
failed to base its determinations on available facts on the record in the investigations.
380 
                                               
366 China's second written submission, para. 177. 
367 China's second written submission, para. 177. 
368 United States' first written submission, para. 333, citing Black's Law Dictionary  (1991), p. 536. 
369 China's opening statement at the fi rst meeting of the Panel, para. 72. 
370 China's opening statement at the fi rst meeting of the Panel, para. 72. 
371 China's opening statement at the fi rst meeting of the Panel, para. 72. 
372 China's response to Panel question No. 74, paras. 184-185. 
373 China's second written submission, para. 178. 
374 China's opening statement at the fi rst meeting of the Panel, para. 78. 
375 China's opening statement at the fi rst meeting of the Panel, para. 70. 
376 China's response to Panel question No. 103, para. 53. 
377 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS , para. 186. 
378 China's second written submission, paras. 175-191. 
379 China's response to Panel question No. 103, para. 50. 
380 United States' second written submission, paras. 145 and 146. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  7.298.  Furthermore, the United States rejects China's assertion that the USDOC's facts available 
determinations follow a "pattern". The facts and circumstances of each determination are unique because the USDOC's facts available determinations are case-specific and rely on the totality of the evidence in any given investigation. The United States furthermore points out that China has 
not challenged a measure of general applicability with respect to the USDOC's facts available 
determinations. In such circumstances, China sh ould have demonstrated that the USDOC acted 
inconsistently with Article 12.7 in each of the 48 separate uses of facts available. In particular, 
China should have demonstrated that each of the USDOC's determinations is not supported by the 
record of the investigations.
381  
7.299.  In addition, the United States argues th at, in the course of the proceedings, China has 
attempted to refocus its position by alleging th at the USDOC failed to provide a "reasoned and 
adequate explanation" of its facts available determinations. In the United States' opinion, this is a 
matter under Article 22 of the SCM Agreement, not Article 12.7. Moreover, contrary to China's assertion, the USDOC was not required to provide a citation to each individual fact that underlies 
each facts available determination. No such obli gation exists in the SCM Agreement, nor has any 
panel or Appellate Body report described such an obligation.
382 
7.300.  In terms of the facts, the United States  submits that China has mischaracterized the way 
in which the USDOC employs facts available, and adverse facts available in particular. The 
USDOC's use of an adverse inference in selecting from among the facts otherwise available is, by its terms and in each case, based on facts available.
383 
7.301.  The use of the terms "inferring" or "assuming"  merely reflect the fact that, due to a lack of 
cooperation, there was often very little factual information on the record, other than the evidence 
provided in the application, for the USDOC to make the applicable determination. The USDOC used this limited factual basis to make inferences to reach its determination. Because necessary 
information, which might have been more direct  evidence on the issue to be determined, was 
unavailable due to a lack of co-operation, an "inference" was needed to connect the fact relied upon to the conclusion in the determination.
384 
7.302.  In support of its case, the United States provides case-specific discussion of the USDOC's 
facts available determinations in four investigations, namely Print Graphics, Magnesia Bricks, Line Pipe and OCTG.
385 Furthermore, the United States submitted Exhibit USA-94 which, according to 
the United States, provides the complete discussion from the relevant Issues and Decision 
Memoranda and/or preliminary determinations for each determination. 
7.303.  Finally, in terms of legal arguments, the United States takes the view that the facts 
surrounding an interested party's failure to cooper ate form part of the totality of the evidence 
before the investigating authority, in light of which one possible inference may be more reasonable 
or logical. The more uncooperative a party is in fact, the more attenuated and extensive the inferences that it may be reasonable to draw. Ho wever, whether a certain inference is reasonable, 
in light of all the circumstances, is a matter than can only be determined on a case-by-case 
basis.
386 
7.10.5  Main arguments of third parties 7.304.  Canada  agrees with the United States that in a situation of non-cooperation by an 
interested party, an investigating authority may use an inference that is adverse to the interests of 
a party, where it is choosing among facts otherwise available. In the absence of facts provided by 
                                               
381 United States' second written submission, paras. 143 and 144. 
382 United States' comments on China's response to Panel questions No. 103 and 104, para. 51. 
383 United States' second written submission, para. 145. 
384 United States' second written submission, para. 146. 
385 United States' first written submission, paras. 290 and 291, and 334-337; second written 
submission, para. 145; response to Panel question No. 77, paras. 134-136; and opening statement to the 
second meeting of the Panel, para. 65. 
386 United States' response to Panel question No. 80, para. 141. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  the respondent, the next set of facts available to an investigating authority may be the facts 
reasonably available to, and provided by the petitioners.387 
7.305.  The European Union  observes that as a matter of principle, WTO law permits 
investigating authorities to put appropriate questions to interested parties and to draw inferences 
if responses are not forthcoming. In drawing inferences, an authority is not permitted to identify 
two different but equally possible inferences, and then select the inference most adverse to the interests of a particular party, solely because it the most adverse. Rather, the authority must draw 
the inference that best fits the facts that have been evidenced. This may include a consideration of 
the behaviour of the interested party in question.
388 
7.306.  India  argues that Article 12.7 places a restraint on the investigating Member to only apply 
those facts that are the most fitting or most appropriate. Furthermore, the provision places a 
positive obligation on the investigating Member to arrive at this most fitting or most appropriate 
information after engaging in an evaluative, comparative assessment of all the available evidence. Thirdly, the investigating Member is prohibited from using the facts available standard in a punitive 
manner so as to draw adverse inferences against the non-cooperating party. In particular, India 
argues that the United States disregards facts from secondary sources  that may lead to better 
results, and only chooses those secondary facts that lead to the least favourable result. Indeed, 
according to India, the United States' approach fo recloses the possibility of considering facts from 
secondary sources which may lead to better results.
389 
7.10.6  Evaluation by the Panel 7.307.  Under the present claims, China's challenge specifically concerns whether the USDOC 
based 42 "adverse facts available" determinations on facts. As such, the relevant question before 
the Panel is whether China has established that, in the 42 challenged adverse facts available determinations, the USDOC failed to base its determinations on facts, in contravention of 
Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement.  
7.308.  Article 12.7 is an essential tool which permits authorities to carry out investigations despite 
the non-cooperation of interested parties by replacing missing information with the facts available. 
As stated by the Appellate Body, "Article 12.7 is intended to ensure that the failure of an 
interested party to provide necessary information do es not hinder an agency's investigation. Thus, 
the provision permits the use of facts on record solely for the purpose of replacing information that may be missing in order to arrive at an accurate subsidization or injury determination".
390 
7.309.  We consider the requirement to base an y determination made on the basis of the facts 
available on facts to be explicit in the text of Article 12.7. This has furthermore been confirmed by 
panels in previous disputes.391  
7.310.  We note that the Appellate Body has explained that under the applicable standard of 
review, a panel should examine whether the investigating authority's determination is "reasoned and adequate", based on the information containe d in the record and the explanations given by 
the authority in its published report.
392 
7.311.  Applying this standard of review, the task  of this Panel is to consider whether the USDOC 
provided sufficient explanation of the challenged adverse facts available determinations to assess 
whether the USDOC based these determinations on facts. As such, for the purposes of the Panel's 
assessment of this claim under Article 12.7, the leve l of explanation required is that sufficient to 
assess whether the USDOC based its adverse facts available determinations on facts. However, we see no procedural requirement in the text of Ar ticle 12.7 in and of itself for an investigating 
authority to explicitly cite each fact on the basis of which it makes facts available determinations. 
                                               
387 Canada's third-party su bmission, paras. 30-42. 
388 European Union's third-part y submission, paras. 57-65. 
389 India's third-party st atement, paras. 16-21. 
390 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice , para. 293. 
391 Panel Reports, EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips , para. 7.61; and China – GOES , 
para. 7.296. 
392 Appellate Body Reports, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS , paras. 186-188; and 
US – Softwood Lumber VI (Article 21.5-Canada) , para. 93.   WT/DS437/R 
 
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  Whether the USDOC has disclosed in "sufficient deta il the findings and conclusions reached on all 
issues of fact" or "all relevant information on matters of fact" is a separate question which concerns Article 22 of the SCM Agreement, and is not within the terms of reference of this Panel. 
7.312.  As mentioned in paragraph 7.289.   above, China argues that the USDOC applied one and 
the same legal standard in the challenged adverse facts available determinations.
393 In support of 
its case, China essentially points to the conclusions of the challenged adverse facts available determinations, cited by China in Exhibit CHI-2 an d supplied in Exhibit CHI-125. China argues that 
it has provided only some references to the facts of each investigation because those references 
are all that is necessary to establish that the USDOC applied an incorrect legal standard with respect to its determinations relating to the use of facts available.
394  
7.313.  China takes the position that these determinations' inconsistency with Article 12.7 is 
evident on the face of their conclusions, and in  particular from the terminology used in the 
conclusions. According to China, the incompatibility between the requirements of Article 12.7 and the instances of adverse facts available that China has identified is evident in the rationale – or 
lack thereof – that the USDOC provided in each instance. Indeed, China submits that 
determinations that are based on "assumptions" and unfounded "inferences", especially "adverse" 
inferences, are inconsistent on their face with Article 12.7.
395 
7.314.  We do not agree with China's position. Indeed, we consider the evidence put forth by 
China in support of its claim, relating in great part to the terminology used in the conclusions of the determinations, to be insufficient to establish that each of the 42 challenged adverse facts available determinations lacked a factual foundation.  
7.315.  We observe, at the outset, that China does not challenge the use of "adverse facts 
available" by the USDOC on an "as such" basis. In stead, China's claim is made on an "as applied" 
basis, with respect to each of the 42 challenged adverse facts available determinations. 
7.316.  Furthermore, as is clear from  the Panel's review of Exhibit USA-94
396 and the full Issues 
and Decision Memoranda and Preliminary Determinations provided by China as exhibits, we note that the USDOC's adverse facts available determinations go well beyond the conclusions cited by 
China in Exhibit CHI-2 and provided in Exhibit CHI-125. The challenged adverse facts available 
determinations were made in a wide va riety of different factual scenarios.  
7.317.  Crucially, contrary to what China asserts, we do not consider it evident on the face of the 
evidence provided by China that  one and the same legal standard
397 was applied across the 
42 challenged adverse facts available determinations. We observe, in particular, that one of the 
42 instances challenged by China does not apply adverse facts available.398 
7.318.  More specifically, the terminology used in the conclusions of the determinations, on which 
China relies heavily, is not as homogenous as China suggests. Firstly, not all conclusions of the 
adverse facts available determinations challenged by China refer to "assumptions", "adverse inferences" or "similar terminology".
399 In one challenged instance in Lawn Groomers, the USDOC 
states it is "making the adverse finding  that the GOC is a predominant supplier of hot-rolled 
                                               
393 China's response to Panel question No. 4, para. 19. 
394 China's response to Panel question No. 4, para. 19. 
395 China's second written submission, para. 178. 
396 We note that Exhibit USA-94 does not cover the USDOC's public body  determinations; see 
United States' Second Written Submission, fn 255. 
397 China's response to Panel question No. 7, para. 24. 
398 Drill Pipe, Exhibit CHI-80, p. 10, designated as instance 33 in Exhibit CHI-125:  
"With respect to the GOC's failure to provide th e requested information ab out the production and 
consumption of green tubes in the PRC, we find that the GOC acted to the best of its ability in responding to 
the Department's informatio n request. Unlike its response with respect to steel rounds, the GOC provided 
details regarding the efforts it took to obtain inform ation regarding green tubes. Therefore, the Department 
must rely on "facts available" in making the determination on the PRC green tubes industry. See section 776(a)(1) of the Act. Because the record is void  of any information on the production and consumption 
of green tubes in the PRC, we find that the use of an external benchmark is warranted for calculating the 
benefit that the DP Master Group received from pu rchasing green tubes from an SOE during the POI." 
399 China's second written submission, para. 177. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  steel".400 In a further six of the 42 challenged facts available determinations, the USDOC makes no 
reference to "assumptions", "adverse inferences" or  "similar terminology", and instead only refers 
to the application of adverse facts available.401 
7.319.  Secondly, certain adverse facts available determinations that do use the term "adverse 
inferences" use it in the context of one of the following formulations: " in selecting from among the 
facts otherwise available , we have employed adverse inferences";402 "we have employed adverse 
inferences in selecting from among the facts otherwise available ";403 "we have employed an 
adverse inference in selecting from among the facts otherwise available ";404 and "we have applied 
an adverse inference in our choice of the facts available ".405  
7.320.  We do not consider it evident on the fa ce of the statement "we have applied an adverse 
inference in our choice of the facts available"406, for instance, that the determination concerned is 
not based on facts. That statement, on its face , suggests exactly the opposite. China attempts to 
address such variations in terminology by stating, without reference to the analysis carried out by the USDOC, that, "[n]otwithstanding Commerce's repeated assertions that it is applying facts 
available, the "facts" are conspicuously absent from its analysis".
407 
7.321.  In this respect, we note China's reliance on findings made by the panel in China – GOES  
specifically regarding "adverse inferences". The panel stated that "the use of facts available should 
be distinguished from the application of adverse inferences".408 The panel further explained that 
"[w]hile non-cooperation triggers the use of facts available, non-cooperation does not justify the drawing of adverse inferences. Nor does non-cooperation justify determinations that are devoid of any factual foundation".
409 In making these statements, the panel appears to be responding to an 
argument by China that "authorities may draw certain inferences – plainly adverse – from [the] 
failure to cooperate ".410 Furthermore, in China – GOES , there was in fact evidence that the 
inferences drawn were contrary to record evidence.411 
7.322.  Thirdly, while we agree with China that  "assumptions" and "adverse inferences" have 
different connotations, we do not consider China to have established that each reference to "adverse inferences" in the challenged determinations in fact equates to an "assumption".
412 
7.323.  Since it is not entirely evident that one and the same legal standard413 was applied across 
the 42 challenged adverse facts available determinations, China's failure to address the specific facts of each of the challenged investigations is problematic for its claim. Crucially, contrary to what China asserts, it is not evident on the face of the evidence provided by China that the 
USDOC's application of adverse facts available equates to the lack of a factual foundation in each 
of the 42 challenged adverse facts available determinations. 
7.324.  Notwithstanding the above, we observe that the language used in the conclusions of 
certain adverse facts available determinations potentially raises concerns. In one such 
determination in the Drill Pipe investigation, for instance, the USDOC states that "[b]ecause the 
record is void of any information on the production and consumption of green tubes in the PRC , we 
find that the use of an external benchmark is warranted for calculating the benefit that the 
                                               
400 Lawn Groomers, Exhibit CHI-31, p. 15, designat ed as instance 11 in Exhibit CHI-125. (emphasis 
added) 
401 Wire Strand, Exhibit CHI-52, p. 13, designated as instances 17-19 in Exhibit CHI-125; Drill Pipe, 
Exhibit CHI-80, p. 10, designated as instance 33 in Exhibit CHI-125; and Solar Panels, Exhibit CHI-105, pp. 17451 and 17445, designated as instances 39 and 42 in Exhibit CHI-125. 
402 Pressure Pipe, Exhibit CHI-12, p. 42, designated as instance 2 in Exhibit CHI-125. (emphasis added) 
403 Line Pipe, Exhibit CHI-19, p. 6, designated as instances 5 and 6 in Exhibit CHI-125. (emphasis 
added) 
404 Citric Acid, Exhibit CHI-24, p. 8, designated as instance 9 in Exhibit CHI-125. (emphasis added) 
405 Steel Cylinders, Exhibit CHI-99, p. 10, designat ed as instance 38 in Exhibit CHI-125. (emphasis 
added) 
406 Steel Cylinders, Exhibit CHI-99, p. 10. 
407 China's opening statement at the fi rst meeting of the Panel, para. 71. 
408 Panel Report, China – GOES , para. 7.302. 
409 Panel Report, China – GOES , para. 7.302. 
410 Panel Report, China – GOES , para. 7.301. (emphasis added) 
411 Panel Report, China – GOES , para. 7.303. 
412 See paragraph 7.293.   of this Report. 
413 China's response to Panel question No. 7, para. 24. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  DP Master Group received from purchasing green tubes from an SOE during the POI".414 In the 
challenged determination in Aluminum Extrus ions, the USDOC refers to "those programs for which 
we lack the necessary information  and for which the GOC failed to cooperate".415 While we 
consider such statements to be potentially of co ncern, China fails to discuss, or even acknowledge, 
the meaning of such statements.   
7.325.  In light of all of the above, however, th e Panel finds that China has not established that 
the USDOC acted inconsistently with the United States' obligations under Article 12.7 of the 
SCM Agreement by not relying on facts available on the record. 
7.11  Whether the USDOC's findings of regi onal specificity are inconsistent with 
Articles 2.2 and 2.4 of the SCM Agreement 
7.11.1  Introduction 
7.326.  The Panel now turns to the claims advanced by China with regard to the USDOC's findings 
of regional specificity in the following seven investigations: Thermal Paper, Line Pipe, Citric Acid, OCTG, Wire Strand, Seamless Pipe, and Print Graphics.
416 
7.327.  In each of these investigations, the USDOC found purchases of granted land-use rights to 
be regionally specific within the meaning of Ar ticle 2.2 of the SCM Agreement. In six of these 
investigations, namely Thermal Paper, Line Pipe, Citric Acid, OCTG, Wire Strand, and Seamless 
Pipe, the regional specificity determination was based on a finding that the land at issue was 
within an industrial park or economic development zone, a "designated area", which in turn was within the jurisdiction of the seller of the land rights.
417 In Print Graphics, the regional specificity 
determination was based on "facts available".418 
7.328.  China claims that the USDOC's findings of specificity are inconsistent with Articles 2.2 
and 2.4 because the USDOC failed to make a proper regional specificity determination on the basis of positive evidence that the alleged subsidy was specific to an enterprise or industry or to a group 
of enterprises or industries in the above investigations. Furthermore, as a consequence of these 
inconsistencies with Articles 2.2 and 2.4, China claims that the United States acted inconsistently with Articles 10 and 32.1 of the SCM Agr eement and Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994. 
7.11.2  Relevant provisions 
7.329.  The present claim concerns the first senten ce of Article 2.2 of the SCM Agreement, which 
provides the following: 
2.2 A subsidy which is limited to certain enterprises located within a designated 
geographical region within the jurisdiction of the granting authority shall be specific. 
7.330.  Article 2.4 of the SCM Agreement, in turn, states the following: 
2.4 Any determination of specificity under the provisions of this Article shall be 
clearly substantiated on the basis of positive evidence. 
                                               
414 Drill Pipe, Exhibit CHI-80, p. 10, designated as instance 33 in Exhibit CHI-125. (emphasis added) 
415 Aluminum Extrusions, Exhibit CHI-87, p. 16, designated as instance 34 in Exhibit CHI-125. 
(emphasis added) 
416 See table in paragraph 7.1.   of this Report, as well as Exhibits CHI-1 and CHI-121. 
417 Thermal Paper: Issues and Decision Memorandum, 25 September 2008, Exhibit CHI-5, p. 25; Line 
Pipe: Issues and Decision Memorand um, 17 November 2008, Exhibit CHI-19, p. 14; Citric Acid: Issues and 
Decision Memorandum, 6 April 2009, Exhibit CHI-24, pp. 23 and 24; OCTG: Issues and Decision Memorandum, 23 November 2009, Exhibit CHI-45, p. 20; Wire Stra nd: Issues and Decision Memorandum, 14 May 2010, 
Exhibit CHI-52, pp. 24 and 25; and Seamless Pipe: Issues and Decision Memorandum, 10 September 2010, 
Exhibit CHI-66, p. 21. 
418 Print Graphics: Issues and Decision Memorandum, 20 September 2010, Exhibit CHI-73, pp. 24 
and 25. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  7.11.3  Main arguments of China 
7.331.  With regard to the United States' claim that China has failed to present a prima facie  case, 
China submits that it has demonstrated what analysis of regional specificity was used in each of the challenged investigations, and that each such analysis is inconsistent with the 
SCM Agreement.
419 
7.332.  China claims that the USDOC's regional specificity findings with respect to the provision of 
land-use rights for less than adequate remuneration are inconsistent with Articles 2.2 and 2.4 of 
the SCM Agreement because the USDOC failed to de monstrate, on the basis of positive evidence, 
that either the financial contribution or the benefit of the subsidy was "limited to certain enterprises located within a designated geographical region", as required by that provision. More specifically, China claims that, in none of the determinations at issue, did the USDOC identify an 
explicit limitation on access to the financial contribution or benefit.
420   
7.333.  China submits that, in the determinations  at issue, the USDOC applied a legal standard 
whereby a finding of regional specificity was premised solely on two factors, namely (i) a finding 
that the land in question was within an industrial park or economic development zone, and (ii) a 
finding that the park or zone was within the seller's (e.g. municipality's or county's) jurisdiction. In other words, China argues that the USDOC's regional specificity determinations amount to a 
finding that because land constitutes a "geographica l region", the provision of land-use rights is 
regionally specific.
421 Absent from this standard is any finding that either the provision of land-use 
rights or the alleged benefit was actually limite d to the relevant industrial park or economic 
development zone.422  
7.334.  China further submits that this legal standard is the same one applied by the USDOC in the 
Laminated Woven Sacks investigation, which the panel in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Duties (China)  found to be inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the SCM Agreement. In this regard, 
China moreover states that there are no material differences between the facts in Laminated 
Woven Sacks  and the seven investigations at issue in the current dispute.423 
7.11.4  Main arguments of the United States 
7.335.  The United States primarily argues that China has failed to make a prima facie  case with 
respect to any of the alleged breaches of Article 2.2 of the SCM Agreement. More specifically, the 
United States submits that China has failed to explain the facts at issue in each investigation, as well as what the USDOC ultimately determined. Furthermore, China has failed to explain how 
those facts are relevant to each of its claims.
424  
7.336.  More specifically, according to the United States, China's legal arguments under this claim 
consist of assertions that the findings in another dispute, namely US – Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties (China) , should apply in the present dispute. However, the regional 
specificity finding in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China)  was made on an "as 
applied" basis and was "driven by the specific facts that were on the record of that investigation". 
The United States argues that China does not address the facts of the seven investigations at issue 
in this dispute and does not explain how the legal reasoning in US – Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties (China) is applicable to the individual regional specificity analyses challenged 
by China.425  
7.337.  As it considers that China has not met its burden as the complaining party, the 
United States asserts that it cannot respond substantively to China's claims.426 
                                               
419 China's second written submission, paras. 143-147. 
420 China's first written submission, paras. 157-164. 
421 China's responses to Panel questions No. 47 and 48, paras. 136-138. 
422 China's response to Panel question No. 46, para. 134. 
423 China's first written submission, paras. 158-162. 
424 United States' response to Panel question No. 52, para. 102. 
425 United States' first written submission, paras. 203-208. 
426 United States' response to Panel question No. 52, para. 103. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  7.338.  Nonetheless, the United States rejects China's claim that findings of regional specificity in 
Print Graphics were a result of the application of the same legal standard, despite being based on facts available.
427 
7.339.  Furthermore, reacting to certain responses made by China to questions from the Panel, the 
United States argues that a finding that the provision of land-use rights takes place within an 
industrial park or economic development zone is material to the analysis of whether the land at issue constitutes a "geographical region". According to the United States, the weight of such a 
finding depends on the case-specific facts that are available on the record.
428  
7.11.5  Main arguments of third parties 7.340.  The European Union  submits that the issue raised by China was dealt with by the panel, 
and to a limited extent the Appellate Body, in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Duties (China) . The European Union anticipates that the Panel may follow a similar approach in 
this case.
429 
7.341.  Korea  submits that, since it is critical that an investigating authority demonstrate that 
either the financial contribution or benefit was "limited to certain enterprises located within a 
designated geographical region", the terms "limitation" and "designation" are the key concepts in finding regional specificity. Mere reference to a geographical element may not satisfy the 
"limitation" and "designation" requirements.
430 
7.342.  Saudi Arabia  submits that it would be useful for the Panel to provide guidance on what 
may constitute a "designated geographical region" and thus regional specificity. In doing so, the Panel should refer to case-law under Article 2.1, as both Articles 2.1 and 2.2 are subject to a 
limiting principle. In the context of Article 2.2, th is limiting principle designates a point at which a 
subsidy has been provided to a sufficiently broad geographic region, to be determined on a case-by-case analysis, as to not be considered specific.
431 
7.11.6  Evaluation by the Panel 
7.343.  The question before the Panel is whether China has established that, in the challenged 
investigations, the USDOC failed to establish that the subsidies in question were limited  to certain 
enterprises located within a designated geographical region, as required under Article 2.2 of the 
SCM Agreement. 
7.344.  In essence, China argues that the USDOC applied one and the same legal standard432, in 
making its seven challenged regional specificity determinations, whereby a finding of regional 
specificity was premised solely on two factors, namely (i) a finding that the land in question was 
within an industrial park or economic development zone, and (ii) a finding that the park or zone was within the seller's (e.g. municipality's or county's) jurisdiction. 
7.345.  With respect to Line Pipe, Thermal Paper, Citric Acid, OCTG, Wire Strand, and Seamless 
Pipe, we consider it to be evident on the face of  the excerpts cited by China in Exhibit CHI-1 and 
subsequently provided in Exhibit CHI-121 that the USDOC applied the legal standard opposed by 
China whereby a finding of regional specificity was premised solely on two factors, namely (i) a 
finding that the land in question was within an industrial park or economic development zone, and (ii) a finding that the park or zone was within the seller's jurisdiction. Indeed, the USDOC's regional specificity determinations in each of the challenged investigations seem fairly succinct. It 
appears to us that the excerpts cited in Exhibi t CHI-1 and provided in Exhibit CHI-121 essentially 
capture the USDOC's reasoning and conclusions on regional specificity. For these reasons, we do not consider China's lack of case-specific discussion of the facts of each of the challenged 
investigations to be problematic to its claim. 
                                               
427 United States' second written submission, para. 105. 
428 United States' second written submission, para. 104. 
429 European Union's third-part y submission, paras. 66-70. 
430 Korea's third-party stat ement, paras. 10 and 11. 
431 Saudi Arabia's third-part y statement, paras. 12-14. 
432 China's response to Panel question No. 7, para. 24. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  7.346.  However, with respect to Print Graphics, where the regional specificity determination was 
based on "facts available", the Panel finds the fact ual foundation of China's claim to be erroneous. 
Indeed, China's assertion that the USDOC made a finding of regional specificity in Print Graphics on the basis of the same two factors, namely (i) a finding that the land in question was within an 
industrial park or economic development zone, and (ii) a finding that the park or zone was within 
the seller's jurisdiction, is not supported by the evidence provided by China and appears to be factually inaccurate. Keeping in mind that China's challenge of the regional specificity 
determination in the Print Graphics  investigation is made on an "as applied" basis, the Panel does 
not consider it sufficient for China to argue that there is no indication that the USDOC departed from its "usual legal standard", even though it used a finding of non-cooperation to jump straight to the legal conclusion that the alleged subsidy is specific.
433  
7.347.  Article 2.2 of the SCM Agreement requires a subsidy to be limited to certain enterprises 
located within a designated geographical region in order to be specific. The Appellate Body has clarified that a limitation of access to a subsidy can be effected through a limitation on access to 
the financial contribution, to the benefit, or to both.
434 
7.348.  The relevant issue in the present dispute is whether a limitation of access to certain 
enterprises located within a designated geographical region can be established by finding that the 
land in question was within an industrial park or  economic development zone, and that the park or 
zone was within the jurisdiction of the seller of the land in question. 
7.349.  China argues in this regard that whether or not the land at issue is located within an 
industrial park or economic development zone is immaterial to a determination of regional 
specificity unless it has been established that either the provision of land-use rights or the alleged 
benefit is limited to the relevant indust rial park or economic development zone435; in other words, 
unless the provision of land-use rights within the park or zone is distinct from the provision of 
land-use rights outside the park or zone. 
7.350.  In what is essentially its only argument relating to the substance of Article 2.2, the 
United States argues that whether the provision of land-use rights takes place within an industrial 
park or economic development zone is material to the analysis of whether the land at issue 
constitutes a "geographical region".436 
7.351.  The Panel finds that, with respect to the Line Pipe, Thermal Paper, Citric Acid, OCTG, Wire 
Strand and Seamless Pipe investigations, China has established that the USDOC failed to ascertain 
a limitation on access to either the financial contribution or the benefit when making its 
determinations of regional specificity. The United States has largely failed to rebut this argument.  
7.352.  The Panel agrees with China that the fact that the land in question is located within an 
industrial park or economic development zone, and that that park or zone is within the seller's 
jurisdiction, is insufficient by itself  to establish that there is a limitation of access to the subsidy, in 
the absence of any finding that the provision of land within the park or zone is distinct from the 
provision of land outside the park or zone. In othe r words, whether the provision of land-use rights 
takes place within an industrial park or economic development zone can be relevant for the finding 
of a limitation, but only if  it is determined that the provision of land within the park or zone is 
distinct from the provision of land outside the park or zone. Establishing that the conditions for the 
provision of land within the park or zone were different from and preferential to the conditions 
outside the park or zone, in terms of special rules or distinctive pricing, for instance, would have established the required limitation. 
7.353.  A very similar issue was considered by the panel in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Duties (China)  in connection with the Laminated Woven Sacks investigation. The panel in that 
dispute found fault in the USDOC's failure to assiduously pursue its inquiry into whether there was 
evidence that distinguished the provision of land inside the industrial park in question from the 
provision of land outside the park, or any other evidence that the park constituted a unique land-use regime. In particular, the panel found that an investigating authority should examine evidence 
                                               
433 China's response to Panel question No. 51, para. 142. 
434 Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Coun tervailing Duties (China) , para. 378. 
435 China's response to Panel questions No. 47 and 48, paras. 136-138. 
436 United States' second written submission, para. 104. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  of special rules, distinctive pricing, or other elements that distinguished the provision of land inside 
and outside the industrial park or zone to determine whether a distinct land regime exists.437 We 
observe that in five of the seven investigations at issue, the USDOC explicitly relies upon its findings in Laminated Woven Sacks to reach a conclusion regarding the existence of regional 
specificity.
438  
7.354.  In light of the above, the Panel finds that, with respect to six of the seven challenged 
investigations, namely Line Pipe, Thermal Paper, Citric Acid, OCTG, Wire Strand and Seamless 
Pipe, China has established that the USDOC acted inconsistently with the United States' obligations 
under Article 2.2 of the SCM Agreement by making positive determinations of regional specificity while failing to establish that the alleged subsidy was limited  to certain enterprises located within a 
designated geographical region within the jurisdiction of the granting authority. 
7.355.  With respect to the Print Graphics investig ation, however, the Panel finds that China has 
failed to establish that the USDOC acted inconsistently with the United States' obligations under Article 2.2 of the SCM Agreement by making a positive determination of regional specificity while 
failing to establish that the alleged subsidy was limited  to certain enterprises located within a 
designated geographical region within the jurisdiction of the granting authority. 
7.356.  In light of the fact that China has pres ented no substantial evidence or arguments in 
support of its claim under Article 2.4 of the SCM Agreement, the Panel considers its above findings 
sufficient to resolve the dispute between the parties under this claim. 
7.12  Whether the USDOC's treatment of certai n export restraints in Magnesia Bricks 
and Seamless Pipe is inconsiste nt with the SCM Agreement  
7.12.1  Introduction 
7.357.  The Panel now turns to the claims advanced by China with regard to the USDOC's 
treatment of certain export restraints in the countervailing duty investigations in Magnesia Bricks 
and Seamless Pipe.
439 
7.358.  The USDOC initiated countervailing duty investigations in Magnesia Bricks and Seamless 
Pipe on 25 August 2009 and 15 October 2009440, respectively, pursuant to applications for the 
initiation of such investigations filed on 29 July 2009 and 16 September 2009. Among the 
measures that were the subject of these applications and the ensuing investigations were certain export restraints applied by the Government of China with regard to magnesia and coke, respectively.
441 In its final affirmative countervailing duty determinations in these investigations 
the USDOC found that these export restraints constitute countervailable subsidies.442 In making 
                                               
437 Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) , paras. 9.159 and 9.162. 
438 Thermal Paper: Issues and Decision Memorandum (Exhibit CHI-5), p. 25: "consistent with LWS from 
the PRC, we determine that …"; Citric Acid: Issues and Decision Memorandum (Exhibit CHI-24), pp. 23 and 24: "consistent with LWS from the PRC, we find …"; OCTG : Issues and Decision Memorandum (Exhibit CHI-45), 
p. 20: "The Departme nt determined in LWS from the PRC that  …"; Wire Strand: Issues and Decision 
Memorandum (Exhibit CHI-52), p. 25: "consistent wi th LWS from the PRC, we determine that …"; and 
Seamless Pipe: Issues and Decision Memorandum (Exh ibit CHI-66), p. 21: "Consistent with LWS from the 
PRC …, we find that …". 
439 See table in paragraph 7.1.   of this Report. 
440 Magnesia Bricks, Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation, Federal Register, Vol. 74, No.163, 
25 August 2009 (Exhibit CHI-57), pp. 42858-42861; Seamle ss Pipe, Initiation of Countervailing Duty 
Investigation, Federal Register, Vol. 74, No.198, 15 October 2009 (Exhibit CHI-64), pp. 52945-52948.   
441 These measures consisted of expo rt quotas and bidding policies fo r export quotas in respect of 
magnesia (Magnesia Bricks) and export taxes, export qu otas and restrictive export licensing requirements on 
the export of coke (Seamless Pipe). Magnesia Bricks , Petition for the Imposition of Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties Pursuant to Sections 701 and 731 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, Information 
Relating to the People's Republic of  China – Countervailing Duties, Volume II-A ("Application, Magnesia Bricks", 
Exhibit CHI-55), pp. 20-23; Seamless Pipe, Petition for the Imposition of Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties Pursuant to Sections 701 and 731 of the Tariff Act, As Amended, Vol. III, Information relating to the People's Republic of China – Countervailing Duties ("Application, Seamless Pipe", Exhibit CHI-62), pp. 120-124. 
442 Magnesia Bricks, Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, Federal Register, Vol. 75, 
No.147, 2 August 2010 (Exhibit CHI-60), pp. 45472-45474; Seamless Pipe, Final Affirmative Countervailing 
Duty Determination, Final Affirmative Critical Circumstances Determination, Federal Register, Vol. 75, No.182, 21 September 2010 (Exhibit CHI-67), pp. 57444-57449. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  these findings, the USDOC relied on the use of facts otherwise available and drew adverse 
inferences.   
7.359.  China claims that: (i) the initiation by the USDOC of these investigations into export 
restraints is inconsistent with Articles 11.2 and 11. 3 of the SCM Agreement; (ii) the findings of the 
USDOC that these export restraint measures are subsidies are inconsistent with Article 1 of the 
SCM Agreement; (iii) and, as a consequence of these inconsistencies with Articles 11 and 1, the United States has acted inconsistently with Articles 10 and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement and 
Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994.  
7.12.2  Relevant provisions 7.360.  Articles 11.2 and 11.3 of the SCM Agreement provide, relevantly: 
11.2 An application under paragraph 1 shall include sufficient evidence of the 
existence of (a) a subsidy and, if possible, its amount, (b) injury within the meaning 
of Article VI of GATT 1994 as interpreted by  this Agreement, and (c) a causal link 
between the subsidized imports and the alleged injury.  Simple assertion, 
unsubstantiated by relevant evidence, cannot be considered sufficient to meet the 
requirements of this paragraph.  The application shall contain such information as is reasonably available to the applicant on the following: 
 … 
 (iii) evidence with regard to the existence, amount and nature of 
the subsidy in question. 
 … 
11.3 The authorities shall review the ac curacy and adequacy of the evidence 
provided in the application to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to justify the initiation of an investigation. 
7.361.  Article 1 of the SCM Agreement further provides, relevantly: 
1.1 For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if: 
(a)(1)  there is financial contribution by a government or any public 
body within the territory of a Member (referred to in this 
Agreement as "government"), i.e. where:  
… (iv) a government makes payments to a funding 
mechanism, or entrusts or directs a private body to carry out 
one or more of the type of functions illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which would normally be vested in the government 
a n d  t h e  p r a c t i c e ,  i n  n o  r e a l  s e n s e ,  d i f f e r s  f r o m  p r a c t i c e s  
normally followed by governments; … 
7.12.3  Main arguments of China 
7.362.  China submits that the initiation by the USDOC of investigations with respect to petitioners' 
export restraint claims in Magnesia Bricks and Seamless Pipe is inconsistent with Article 11.2 of the SCM Agreement because the applications did not "provide an indication that a subsidy actually exists". China also claims that the initiation of these investigations is inconsistent with Article 11.3 
because in the absence of any evidence of a financial contribution, an unbiased and objective WT/DS437/R 
 
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  investigating authority would not have "found that the application contained sufficient information 
to justify initiation of the investigation".443  
7.363.  In support of these claims, China argues  that WTO jurisprudence compels the conclusion 
that export restraints do not constitute a "financial contribution" within the meaning of 
Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement. China considers that the Panel should first evaluate 
whether the export restraints concerned in the Magnesia Bricks and Seamless Pipe investigations can, as a matter of law, constitute fina ncial contributions within the meaning of 
Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv). If the Panel finds this not to be the case, it necessarily follows that the 
initiation of the two investigations is inconsistent with Article 11.
444  
7.364.  China argues that the panel report in US – Export Restraints held that an export restraint 
cannot constitute the government-entrusted or  government-directed provision of goods and 
therefore cannot constitute a "financial contribution " within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1). First, 
the panel concluded that entrustment and direction requires the presence of: "(i) an explicit and 
affirmative action, be it delegation or command; (ii) addressed to a particular party; and (iii) the 
object of which action is a particular task or duty".445 Second, the panel emphasized the need to 
determine the existence of a financial contribution on the basis of the nature of the action of the 
government rather than on the basis of its effects. Third, the panel rejected the argument 
advanced by the United States that excluding export restraints from the scope of the 
Article 1.1(a)(1) would frustrate the object and pu rpose of the SCM Agreement. Finally, the panel 
found confirmation of its interpretation of the term "financial contribution" in the negotiating history of the SCM Agreement.
446 China submits that subsequent WTO jurisprudence has 
repeatedly endorsed both the reasoning and the holding of the panel in US – Export Restraints.447 
The Appellate Body in US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS endorsed without 
qualification those aspects of the panel's reasoning in US – Export Restraints  that were central to 
its conclusion that export restraints cannot, as a matter of law, constitute government-entrusted 
or –directed provision of goods.448  
7.365.  China rejects the argument of the United States that Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the 
SCM Agreement supports an interpretation that export restraints may constitute a financial 
contribution. First, with reference to the Appella te Body's interpretation of "entrustment" and 
"direction" in US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, China argues  that for an export 
restraint to qualify as a government-entrusted or government-directed provision of a good, it must 
involve either (i) the government giving responsi bility to a private body to provide goods, or 
(ii) the government exercising its authority over a private body to provide goods. China submits that an export restraint involves neither of these things. An export restraint is merely a 
governmental regulatory measure that imposes specific limitations and/or conditions on the export 
of particular items. China considers that the attemp t of the United States to explain how an export 
restraints falls within the ordinary meaning of the terms used in Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) is wholly 
unpersuasive. An export restraint does not "invest" private bodies with a "trust" to do anything; it 
merely imposes conditions on private bodies' export of goods. Moreover, the United States' argument that an export restraint constitutes government direction focuses on the effects or 
results of a government action, rather than on its nature. This "effects based" approach was 
rejected by the panel in US – Export Restraints . Furthermore, the Appellate Body agreed in US – 
Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS that government entrustment or direction cannot be 
inadvertent or a mere by-product of governmental regulation.
449  
7.366.  Second, China argues that the contextual argument advanced by the United States for its 
position that export restraints may constitute a financial contribution is little more than a repackaging of an argument advanced by the Un ited States, and rejected by the panel, in US – 
Export Restraints . In China's view, the alleged breadth or narrowness of subparagraphs (i)-(iv) has 
                                               
443 China's first written submission, paras. 186-190. 
444 China's response to Panel question No. 70, para. 178; second written submission, paras. 173-174. 
445 Panel Report, US – Export Restraints , para. 8.31. 
446 China's first written submission, paras. 169-179. 
447 China refers to the Appellate Body Reports in US – Softwood Lumber IV and US – Countervailing 
Duty Investigation on DRAMS , and to the Panel Reports in US – Large Civil Aircraft  and China – GOES . China's 
first written submission, paras. 180-184. 
448 China's statement at the first me eting of the Panel, paras. 87-89. 
449 China's response to Panel question No. 68, paras. 164-171. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  no relevance to the interpretative question of whether an export restraint constitutes the 
entrustment or direction of a private body to provide goods.450  
7.367.  Third, China argues that the argument of the United States regarding the object and 
purpose of the SCM Agreement is unpersuasive for the reasons identified by the panel in US – 
Export Restraints .451  
7.368.  China contends that the circumstances relating to China's claims in this case fall squarely 
within those that led the panel in US – Export Restraints  to conclude that export restraints cannot, 
as a matter of law, constitute a financial contribution. In this respect, China argues that: (i) the 
export restraints in Magnesia Bricks and Seamless Pipe  are identical to those considered by the 
panel in US – Export Restraints ; (ii) the petitioners alleged that the effect of the restraints was to 
lower the cost of raw materials to downstream customers, thus providing a benefit to them; and 
(iii) the sole basis for the petitioners' claims that the export restraints constituted a financial 
contribution was the assertion that through such measures the Government of China was entrusting or directing domestic suppliers to pr ovide the inputs to downstream producers of the 
subject merchandise. The USDOC initiated these investigations into export restraints based solely 
on the petitioners' evidence and assertions concer ning the mere existence of the export restraints 
and their purported effects on the prices at which downstream consumers purchased raw material 
inputs.
452 China considers that there is no support in the evidence before the Panel for the 
argument of the United States that there was "contextual evidence" that the export restraints at issue were part of a broader government policy to promote the manufacture and export of downstream products. More importantly, the United States has not explained how such contextual 
evidence affects the analysis of whether those export restraints entrust or direct private parties to 
provide goods.
453 
7.369.  China notes that, consistent with its position that export restraints cannot be treated as 
financial contributions, it had informed the USDOC in the investigations in Magnesia Bricks and 
Seamless Pipe that it would not respond to certain requests for factual information in the USDOC's questionnaires regarding these alleged subsidy programmes. As a consequence, the USDOC 
resorted to "adverse facts available" in concluding  that the export restraints at issue provided a 
financial contribution that was specific. China argu es that these findings of the USDOC are unlawful 
because they were made pursuant to investigations that were initiated in violation of Article 11 of the SCM Agreement and because they are based on  actions that do not constitute financial 
contributions.
454 
7.12.4  Main arguments of the United States 7.370.  The United States submits that USDOC's initiation of investigations into certain export 
restraint policies imposed by China is consistent with the SCM Agreement. The United States 
argues that China has not made a prima facie  case in relation to its export restraint claims. This is 
because China relies on a single panel decision to invalidate all of the USDOC's determinations, 
rather than making an adequate legal argument for each of its claims, based on the facts of each 
investigation.
455 
7.371.  The United States argues that the USDOC's decision to initiate investigations into China's 
export restraints is not inconsistent with Articles 11.2 and 11.3 of the SCM Agreement because the 
applicants submitted sufficient evidence of the existence of a subsidy to justify the initiation of an 
investigation.456 Specifically, the evidence before USDOC indicated that "China was implementing 
measures that entrusted or directed private entities to change their behaviour in a way that was 
                                               
450 China's response to Panel question No. 68, paras. 172-173. 
451 China's response to Panel question No. 68, paras. 174-175. 
452 China's first written submission, paras. 186-187;  statement at the first meeting of the Panel, 
paras. 82-84, response to Panel question No. 65, paras. 155-158; response to Panel question No. 67, paras. 160-163; second written submission, paras. 164-168. 
453 China's first written submission, paras. 186-187;  statement at the first meeting of the Panel, 
paras. 82-84, response to Panel question No. 65, paras. 155-158; response to Panel question No. 67, paras. 160-163; second written submission, paras.164-172;  oral statement at second meeting of the Panel, 
paras. 49-52; comments on United States' responses to  Panel questions Nos. 101 and 102, paras. 39-52. 
454 China's first written submission, paras. 191-193.   
455 United States' first written submission, para. 282; response to Panel question No. 63, para. 115. 
456 United States' first written submission, paras. 284-291. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  providing goods to Chinese domestic entities at prices drastically lower than their foreign 
competitors".457  
7.372.  The United States rejects China's argument that export restraints cannot constitute a 
financial contribution through entrustment or direction for purposes of the SCM Agreement. The 
United States submits that Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement supports an interpretation 
that export restraints may constitute a "financial contribution" within the meaning of Article 1.1. First, subparagraphs (i) through (iv) are worded broadly to encompass a wide spectrum of 
potentially actionable government behaviours and contain non-exhaustive lists of examples of 
activities that fall under a particular type of conduct. An export restraint can be one of the activities that falls under the rubric of a financial contribution from a private body that is entrusted or directed by the government to provide a good in the domestic marketplace.
458 Second, the 
ordinary definitions of "entrust" and "direct" support the notion that export restraints can 
constitute a financial contribution such as a government provided good or service through entrustment or direction.
459 Third, the initiation of an investigation into whether export restraints 
constitute a financial contribution through a government-entrusted or government-directed 
provision of a good is supported by the fact that entrustment or direction is not necessarily explicit and that an investigating authority may need to rely on circumstantial evidence.
460 Finally, 
allowing a case-by-case analysis of whether an export restraint constitutes a financial contribution 
through entrustment or direction is consistent with the object and purpose of the SCM Agreement.
461  
7.373.  The United States argues that China's reliance on the panel's decision in US – Export 
Restraints is misplaced in light of subsequent Appellate Body and panel reports that have adopted 
a broader interpretation of entrustment and direction. In US – Countervailing Duty investigations 
on DRAMS  the Appellate Body disagreed with the US – Export Restraints  panel's finding that 
"entrust" and "direct" must include some notion of "delegation" or "co mmand", respectively, and 
the panels in Japan – DRAMs  and Korea – Commercial Vessels  rejected the US – Export Restraints  
panel's interpretation that "entrusts" or "directs" must be "an explicit and affirmative action".462 
The United States argues that a further reason why the findings of the US – Export Restraints  
panel are not persuasive for this dispute is the di fference in evidence before that panel and the 
evidence before this Panel. Whereas the US – Export Restraints  panel considered a hypothetical 
scenario, in the present case there are actual export restraint measures at issue and contextual 
and circumstantial evidence exists to inform the analysis of those measures.463 
7.374.  The United States rejects China's assertion that the USDOC initiated the investigations into 
China's export restraint schemes merely on the basis of evidence concerning the existence and 
effects of export restraints, and instead contends th at when considered in its totality, the evidence 
in the applications supported the USDOC's initiations. In this regard, the United States argues that the applications contained evidence that the export  restraints at issue were applied as part of a 
policy to promote the export of higher value goods. The United States agrees with the European 
Union's suggestion in its third-party submission that evidence of the government's intention to support the downstream industry, or the existe nce of other government measures ensuring a 
particular result on the market could be relevant in determining the existence of a financial 
contribution under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv). Furthermore, the United States argues that evidence 
provided in the applications of price differences between coke and magnesite sold in China and sold abroad can reasonably be interpreted as tending to prove or indicate the existence of 
entrustment or direction to suppliers in China to sell domestically to the downstream industry 
because normally a firm would prefer to sell at the higher price.
464  
7.375.  The United States argues that the USDOC's decisions to countervail China's export 
restraints on coke and magnesia are not WTO-inconsistent where they were based upon the use of 
                                               
457 United States' first written submission, para. 293. 
458 United States' first written submission, para. 297; second written submission, para. 131. 
459 United States' first written submission, paras. 298-299. 
460 United States' first written submission, paras. 300-301; response to panel question No. 65, 
para. 123. 
461 United States' first written submission, para. 301; second written submission, para. 134. 
462 United States' first written submission, paras. 306-309; second written submission, paras. 136-138. 
463 United States' second written submission, para. 139. 
464 United States' responses to Panel questions Nos. 65 and 71; second written submission, paras. 126-
129; responses to Panel questions Nos. 101 and 102. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  facts available pursuant to Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement. The use of facts available was 
required after China declined to provide necessary information based on its erroneous position that, as a legal matter, an export restraint cannot constitute a financial contribution encompassed by Article 1.1(a) of the SCM Agreement.
465 
7.12.5  Main arguments of third parties 
7.376.  Australia does not rule out the possibility that an export restraint may constitute a 
financial contribution. However, Australia notes that Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) requires that a private 
body is entrusted or directed by a government "t o carry out one or more of the type of functions 
illustrated in (i) to (iii)". While the United Stat es has referred briefly to the function listed in 
Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii), it has not analysed this element.466 
7.377.  Canada  submits that export restraints cannot be a subsidy because they are not listed as 
one of the types of government conduct that can constitute a financial contribution under 
Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement. This was confirmed by the panel in US – Export 
Restraints . Canada argues that the imposition of export restraints is one of the many instances of 
government regulation of a market where there is no immediate link between the regulatory 
measure and the actions that private entities may or may not take based thereon.467 With 
reference to the Appellate Body's findings in US – Countervailing Duty Investigations on DRAMS  
regarding "entrustment or direction" under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv), Canada submits that when 
imposing an export restraint, a government neither gives responsibility to, nor exercises its authority over producers of a good to do anything.
468 
7.378.  The European Union observes that the Appellate Body and other panels have agreed 
with the panel in US – Export Restraints that it is the nature of government action, rather than its 
result or effect in the market, that is relevant under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement. This implies that the producers of the product subj ect to export restraints must be "directed" to 
sell locally (i.e. by effectively eliminating the free choice of private operators in the market). The 
European Union notes that the extent to which prod ucers subject to export restraints have options 
other than selling domestically at reduced prices must be examined on a case-by-case basis. There 
must be a demonstrable link between the government  and the conduct of the private body. In this 
regard, evidence of the government's intention to support the downstream industry, or the existence of other government measures ensuring a particular result in the market (e.g. an export restraint together with a government measure preventing operators subject to export restraints 
from stocking their products), may be relevant to the existence of a financial contribution under 
Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement.
469 
7.379.  Saudi Arabia  submits that an export restraint does not constitute a subsidy because there 
is no financial contribution by the government, as defined under Article 1.1(a)(1) of the 
SCM Agreement. Specifically, where a government re stricts exportation of a certain good, it does 
not thereby "entrust or direct" a private producer of those goods to provide them to domestic 
purchasers. Rather, entrustment and direction requires an affirmative demonstration of the link 
between the government and the specific conduct at issue.470 Saudi Arabia further notes that an 
export restraint cannot compel a producer to sell the specific product domestically because the producer may for instance decide to produce and sell other products.
471 
7.12.6  Evaluation by the Panel  
7.380.  China advances claims regarding the initiation of investigations into export restraints 
under both Article 11.2 and Article 11.3 of the SCM Agreement. As explained in 
paragraphs 7.143.   to 7.145.   and 7.275.   above, and consistent with the approach of the panel 
in China – GOES,  the Panel will make findings only under Article 11.3.  
                                               
465 United States' first written submission, paras. 279 and 314-321. 
466 Australia's third-party submission, paras. 17-20. 
467 Canada's third-party su bmission, paras. 56-66. 
468 Canada's response to Panel question No. 5, paras. 7-11. 
469 European Union's third-part y submission, paras. 71-78. 
470 Saudi Arabia's third-part y submission, paras. 52-63. 
471 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 1. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  7.381.  As noted in paragraph 7.146.   above, the Panel agrees with the reasoning of the panel in 
China – GOES  with regard to the meaning of the conc ept of "sufficient evidence" as used in 
Articles 11.2 and 11.3 of the SCM Agreement and the standard of review that applies to a review 
of a claim under Article 11.3. 
7.382.  Thus, the question before us is whether an unbiased and objective investigating authority 
would have found that the information provided in the applications in Magnesia Bricks and Seamless Pipe on certain export restraints applied by the Government of China is "adequate 
evidence tending to prove or indicate" that the Government of China provides a financial 
contribution within the meaning of Article 1.1(a )(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement by entrusting or 
directing a private body to provide magnesia and coke to users in China.  
7.383.  The application for the initiation of a countervailing duty investigation in Magnesia Bricks 
alleges that "the GOC restrains exports of various raw materials, including but not limited to 
magnesia".
472 In support of this allegation, the application submits the following information: 
i. Minutes of the 2002 Coordination Meeting of  Light-Burnt and Dead-Burnt Magnesia 
Successful Bidders, which indicate that China imposes export quotas for light-burnt 
and dead-burnt magnesia, and bidding policies for the quotas.473 
ii. An Industry Study on Refractories, indicating that prices for magnesia in the 
United States  have risen to unprecedented levels.474 
iii. A regression analysis in which the conclusion is reached that China's restraints on 
the supply of magnesite (and its conspiracy to fix prices) resulted in United States purchasers paying higher prices for magnesite than they would have absent the 
restraints (where the price in the United  States prior to the existence of the 
restraints and price fixing was used as the benchmark).
475 
iv. An Industry Study on Refractories, indicating that the purpose of the export 
restraints was to encourage the export of higher value-added products from 
China.476  
7.384.  The application in Magnesia Bricks contends that:  
By restricting exports of magnesia, magnesium and magnesium compounds, and 
magnesite, the GOC is suppressing prices of magnesia sold to domestic manufacturers of MCB. The lower price of these raw materials available to domestic producers of MCB, yet unavailable to foreign producers, is a substantial benefit bestowed on the 
manufacturers of MCB in the GOC. As the Department pointed out in the Preamble to 
its CVD regulations, this type of intervention in the market is countervailable under U.S. law.
477  
and: 
By restricting the exports of raw materials, the GOI entrusts or directs domestic 
magnesia, magnesium and magnesium compo und, and magnesite suppliers to sell 
magnesium and magnesite at suppressed prices to domestic consumers thus 
providing a good for less than adequate remuneration as described in Sections 771(5)(B)(iii) and 771(5)(D)(iii) of the Act.
478  
7.385.  The countervailing duty Investigation Initia tion Checklist in Magnesia Bricks characterizes 
the alleged financial contribution in similar terms: "by restraining exports of magnesia the GOC 
entrusts or directs domestic suppliers to provide magnesia to domestic customers as described in 
                                               
472 Application, Magnesia Bric ks, p. 20, Exhibit CHI-55. 
473 Application, Magnesia Bricks , (Exhibit I-29), Exhibit US-53. 
474 Supplement to Magnesia Bricks Application, (Exhibit S-4), Exhibit US-54. 
475 Supplement to Magnesia Bricks Application, (Exhibit S-5), Exhibit US-55. 
476 Application, Magnesia Bricks , (Exhibit I-23 at p. 36), Exhibit US-73. 
477 Application, Magnesia Bric ks, p. 22, Exhibit CHI-55. 
478 Application, Magnesia Bric ks, p. 22, Exhibit CHI-55. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  Section 771(5A)(D)(i) of the Act". The USDOC found with respect to this allegation that 
"[p]etitioner has made a proper allegation ba sed on information reasonably available. In 
particular, petitioner has provided adequate pricing data to support the allegation".479 
7.386.  The application for the initiation of a countervailing duty investigation in Seamless Pipe 
alleges that pursuant to the GOC's Steel Policy the GOC "imposes several restraints on exports of 
coke from China, including an export tax, export quota, and export licensing requirements".480   
7.387.  In support of this allegation, the application includes the following information: 
i. "Steel Business Briefing" articles, discussing increases in export taxes on coke, from 
15% to 25% in January 2008, and then to 40% on 20 August 2008.481 
ii. "Steel Business Briefing" article discussing the existence of export quotas for coke 
in 2008 and an Announcement from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce detailing the 
allocation of coke export quotas in 2008.482 
iii. The application contends that a 2008 USTR Report to Congress on China's WTO 
Compliance provides information indicating that China imposed restrictive export 
licensing requirements on the export of  coke. In the report the USTR discusses 
export quotas and duties relating to coke . The report also lists a number of export 
restrictions, including export licensing requirements, and a number of raw materials, 
including coke, to which "some or all" of the listed export restrictions apply. 
Therefore, although it is possible that ex port licensing requirements apply to coke, 
this is not entirely clear from the report at issue.483 However, the application also 
refers to a "Steel Business Briefing" article entitled "China cuts the number of 
authorised coke exporters", which seems to indicate that coke exporters must be 
licensed.484 
iv. The 2008 USTR Report to Congress on China's WTO Compliance, which states that 
export restraints resulted in a Chinese domestic price for coke that was $400/MT less 
than the comparable world market price during 2008.485 
v. A paper on China's industrial policy regime, indicating that the government policy is 
to promote the export of higher-value goods to overseas markets and that strict 
plans should apply to the export of major resource commodities that are vital to the national interest.
486  
7.388.  The application in Seamless Pipe alleges that:  
[t]he GOC's export restrictions on coke provide a financial contribution to China's 
seamless pipe producers by artificially increasing the domestic supply of coke, thereby suppressing coke prices in China.
487  
7.389.  The application in Seamless Pipe also no tes that "the Department's determinations in 
lumber and leather establish that when export restrictions suppress domestic prices, a financial contribution exists".
488 
7.390.  The countervailing duty Investigation Initiation Checklist in Seamless Pipe notes the 
applicants' allegation that "the PRC's export restrictions provide a financial contribution to 
                                               
479 Countervailing duty investig ation Initiation Checklist, pp. 9-10, Exhibit CHI-56. 
480 Application, Seamless Pipe, p. 120, Exhibit CHI-62. 
481 Application, Seamless Pipe , Exhibit III-242, III-244 and III-246, Exhibit US-49. 
482 Application, Seamless Pipe , Exhibit III-249 and III-250, Exhibit US-50. 
483 Application, Seamless Pipe , Exhibit III-165, Exhibit US-47. 
484 Application, Seamless Pipe , p. 121, fn 431, Exhibit CHI-62 (referring to Exhibit III-171, which is not 
provided as an Exhibit by either party). 
485 Application, Seamless Pipe , Exhibit III-165, Exhibit US-47. 
486 Application, Seamless Pipe , Exhibit III-109, Exhibit US-71. 
487 Application, Seamless Pipe, p. 123, Exhibit CHI-62. 
488 Application, Seamless Pipe, p. 124, Exhibit CHI-63. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  seamless pipe producers by artificially increasing the domestic supply of coke, thereby suppressing 
coke prices in the PRC".489  
7.391.  Based on our review of the financial contribution allegations in the petitions in Magnesia 
Bricks and Seamless Pipe in relation to the export restraints and the evidence provided in support 
of those allegations, we find that these allegati ons are predicated solely on the existence of the 
export restrictions and their suppressing effect on prices of magnesia and coke sold to domestic producers in China. The applicants argue that the "entrustment" or "direction" by the Government 
of China arises from the export restraints themse lves. As stated in the application in Magnesia 
Bricks, "[b]y restricting the exports of raw materials, the GOI entrusts or directs domestic … suppliers to sell magnesium and magnesite at suppressed prices … thus providing a good for less than adequate remuneration …". There is nothing in the applications to suggest that the 
entrustment or direction results from the export restrictions applied in conjunction with some other 
kind of measure. We also find nothing to indicate that the petitioners' allegations of financial contribution and the USDOC's acceptance of those allegations for purposes of initiating the 
investigations involves the contextual evidence referred to by the United States in this proceeding 
indicating that the export restraints are part of broader governmental policies to promote development of higher value goods producing industries.  
7.392.  Therefore, we consider that the key issue before us in this case is whether it is consistent 
with Articles 11.2 and 11.3 of the SCM Agreement for an investigating authority to initiate a 
countervailing duty investigation based on an allegation and evidence that a financial contribution exists by virtue of an export restraint applied by  a foreign government and its effects on domestic 
prices in the exporting country.
490 
7.393.  We note that one previous WTO panel has considered whether export restraints amount to 
a financial contribution within the meaning of Article 1.1. In US – Export Restraints,  the issue was 
whether United States legislation mandated a violation of the SCM Agreement because it required 
the treatment of export restraints as countervailable subsidies. In this context,  the panel 
addressed the issue of whether, under the SCM Agreement, an export restraint can constitute a 
financial contribution. In the circumstances of the dispute, an export restraint was considered to 
be "a border measure that takes the form of a government law or regulation which expressly limits the quantity of exports or places explicit condit ions on the circumstances under which exports are 
permitted, or that takes the form of a governme nt-imposed fee or tax on exports of the product 
calculated to limit the quantity of exports".
491 The panel concluded that an export restraint, as 
defined in the dispute, could not constitute government-entrusted or government-directed provision of goods under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement and therefore could not 
constitute a financial contribution. The panel rejected the United States' argument that, to the 
extent an export restraint causes an increased domestic supply of the restrained good, it is the same as if a government had expressly entrusted or directed a private body to provide the good 
domestically.
492 
7.394.  In reaching this conclusion, the panel in US – Export Restraints  held that the ordinary 
meanings of the terms "entrust" and "direct" re quire that the action of the government under 
Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement cont ain a notion of delegation (in the case of 
entrustment) or command (in the case of direction). The panel concluded that both the act of 
entrusting and that of directing necessarily embody  three elements: (i) an explicit or affirmative 
action, be it delegation or command; (ii) addressed to a particular party; (iii) to perform a 
particular task or duty.493 On this basis, the panel in US – Export Restraints  noted that 
government entrustment or direction is very different from the situation in which the government intervenes in the market in some way, which may or may not have a particular result simply based 
on the given factual circumstances and the exercise of free choice by the actors in that market.
494 
The panel emphasised the existence of a financial contribution must be proven by reference to the nature of the action by the government, rather than by reference to the reaction of affected entities. Further, accepting the United States' position would seem to imply that any government 
                                               
489 Countervailing Duty Initiation Checklist, p. 28, Exhibit CHI-63.   
490 We note that China does not contest the evidence provided in the application regarding the existence 
of the export restraint measures and their effects on prices of magnesia and coke in China.   
491 Panel Report, US – Export Restraints, para. 8.17. 
492 Panel Report, US – Export Restraints, para. 8.75. 
493 Panel Report, US – Export Restraints, para. 8.29. 
494 Panel Report, US – Export Restraints, para. 8.31. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  measure that creates market conditions favourable to or resulting in the increased supply of a 
product in the domestic market would constitute a government-entrusted or directed provision of goods and hence a financial contribution.
495 Finally, the panel in US – Export Restraints  found that 
the object and purpose of the SCM Agreement,  and its negotiating history, supported its 
conclusion.496  
7.395.  The panel in Korea – Commercial Vessels  agreed with the interpretation given to the terms 
"entrust" and "direct" in US – Export Restraints  as delegation and command, respectively. 
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h e  p a n e l  a g r e e d  t h a t  s u c h  d e l e g a t i o n  o r  c o m m a n d  m u s t  t a k e  t h e  f o r m  o f  a n  
affirmative act. In this regard, the panel stated that "[t]he object of a Member's responsibility 
should be its acts, as such, rather than the reactions to or consequences of those acts, as alleged reactions and consequences may simply be the result of happenstance or chance".
497 However, the 
panel disagreed with some of the specific conditions imposed in US – Export Restraints .498  
7.396.  In US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS the Appellate Body considered that 
the definition of the terms "entrustment" and "direction" that the panel in US – Export Restraints 
had adopted was too narrow. In particular, the Appellate Body held that the term "entrusts" 
connotes the action of giving responsibility to someone for a task or an object, while the term 
"directs" conveys the sense of au thority exercised over someone".499 Further to the above, the 
Appellate Body stated that "[i]n most cases, one would expect entrustment or direction of a 
private body to involve some form of threat or inducement, which could, in turn, serve as evidence of entrustment or direction"; in any case, "[t]he determination of entrustment or direction will 
                                               
495 Panel Report, US – Export Restraints, para. 8.35. 
496 Panel Report, US – Export Restraints, paras. 8.60-8.72. 
497 Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels , para. 7.370. 
498 Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels , paras. 7.370 and 7.372: 
"[W]e see nothing in the text of Article 1.1(a)(1)(i v) that would require the act of delegation or 
command to be "explicit". Althou gh the particular facts of the US – Export Restraints  case may 
have caused that panel to employ  the term "explicit", no such qualification is included in the 
terms of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv). In our view, the a ffirmative act of delegati on or command could be 
explicit or implicit, formal or informal."  "[A]lthough the plain meaning of entrustment an d direction requires th at something must be 
delegated to someone, or that someone must  be commanded to do something, the plain 
meaning of those terms does not require that su ch someone or something must necessarily be 
specified in great detail. That being said, the evidence of entrustment or direction must in all cases be probative and compelling. Thus, whatever the nature or form of the affirmative acts of 
delegation or command at issue, the evidence must demonstrate that each entity allegedly providing, or participating in, a financial co ntribution was entruste d or directed by the 
government to do so." 
499 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS , paras. 110 and 111: 
"The term 'entrusts' connotes the action of givi ng responsibility to someone for a task or an 
object.  In the context of paragraph (iv) of Arti cle 1.1(a)(1), the governme nt gives responsibility 
to a private body 'to carry out' one of the types of  functions listed in para graphs (i) through (iii) 
of Article 1.1(a)(1).  As the United States acknowledges, 'delegation' (the word used by the Panel) may be a means by which a government give s responsibility to a private body to carry out 
one of the functions listed in pa ragraphs (i) through (iii).  Delegation is usually achieved by 
formal means, but delegation also could be info rmal.  Moreover, there ma y be other means, be 
they formal or informal, that governments could employ for the same purpose.  Therefore, an 
interpretation of the term 'entru sts' that is limited to acts of  'delegation' is too narrow.  
 As for the term 'directs', we note that some of the definiti ons—such as 'give authoritative 
instructions to' and "order (a person) to do"—suggest that the person or entity that 'directs' has 
authority over the person or entity that is dire cted.  In contrast, some of the other definitions—
such as 'inform or guide'—do not necessarily convey  this sense of authority.  In our view, that 
the private body under para graph (iv) is directed ' to carry out'  a function underscores the notion 
of authority that is included in some of the definitions of the term  'direct'.  This understanding of 
the term 'directs' is reinforced by th e Spanish and French versions of the SCM Agreement , which 
use the verbs 'ordenar" and 'ordonner', respective ly. Both of these verb s unambiguously convey 
a sense of authority exercised over someone.  In the context of paragraph (iv), this authority is 
exercised by a government over a private body.  A 'command' (the word used by the Panel) is 
certainly one way in which a government can exercise authority over a private body in the sense foreseen by Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv ), but governments are likely to have other means at their 
disposal to exercise authority over a private body.  Some of these means may be more subtle 
than a "command" or may not involve the same de gree of compulsion.  Thus, an interpretation 
of the term 'directs' that is limited to  acts of 'command' is also too narrow." WT/DS437/R 
 
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  hinge on the particular facts of the case".500 Nonetheless, the Appellate Body made a clear 
distinction between entrustment and direction on the one hand and encouragement on the other. 
Indeed, it held that entrustment and direction "imply a more active role than mere acts of encouragement".
501 In this regard, the Appellate Body pointed out that, by way of contrast, 
Article 11.3 of the Agreement on Safeguards specific ally uses the term "encourage" by stating that 
"Members shall not encourage or support the adoption or maintenance by public and private enterprises of non-governmental measures equivalent to those referred to in paragraph 1". 
Article 11.1 refers to voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements, or any other 
similar measures on the export or import side.
502  
7.397.  In discussing entrustment and direction, the Appellate Body noted its agreement with the 
panel in US – Export Restraints that Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement does not cover the 
situation in which the government intervenes in the market in some way, which may or may not 
have a particular result simply based on the given factual circumstances and the reaction of actors in the market. The Appellate Body held that entrustment and direction "cannot be inadvertent or a 
mere by-product of government regulation".
503 It noted that this was consistent with its statement 
in US – Softwood Lumber IV that "not all government measures capable of conferring benefits 
would necessarily fall within Article 1.1(a)". To find otherwise would render paragraphs (i) through 
(iv) of Article 1.1(a) unnecessary "because all government measures conferring benefits, per se , 
would be subsidies".504 In this regard the Appellate Body seems to implicitly agree with the 
observations made by the panel in US – Export Restraints  on the negotiating history of the concept 
of "financial contribution".505 Furthermore, the Appellate Body recalled its statement in Canada – 
Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US) , when interpreting a provision of the Agreement on 
Agriculture, that "[g]overnments are constantly en gaged in regulation of different kinds in pursuit 
of a variety of objectives".506  
7.398.  Finally, we note that the panel in China – GOES rejected the argument of China that 
certain voluntary restraint agreements could constitute a financial contribution under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv). The panel stated that it "does not consider that when a government policy, 
such as a border measure, has the indirect effect of increasing prices in a market, the government 
has entrusted or directed private consumers to pr ovide direct transfers of funds to the industry 
selling the good in the affected market".
507 The panel held that "when the action of a private party 
is a mere side-effect resulting fr om a government measure, this does not come within the meaning 
of entrustment or direction under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv)".508  
7.399.  As discussed above, the Appellate Body has interpreted "entrustment" and "direction" in 
Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) to mean that the government gives responsibility to, or exercises its authority 
over, a private body to carry out one of the type of functions in (i) through (iii) of Article 1.1(a)(1). 
The type of function at issue here is the provision of goods within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii). The question therefore is whether an unbiased and objective investigating 
authority would have found that the applications in Magnesia Bricks and Seamless Pipe provide 
"adequate evidence, tending to prove or indicating"
509 t h a t  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  C h i n a  g i v e s  
responsibility to, or exercises its authority ov er, Chinese producers of magnesium and coke to 
carry out the function of providing magnesium and coke to users of these products in China.  
7.400.  With regard to whether the evidence in the applications in Magnesia Bricks and Seamless 
Pipe is "adequate evidence, tending to prove or in dicating" that the Government of China provides 
a financial contribution by entrusting  a private body to carry out the function of providing goods to 
domestic producers, we fail to see how the eviden ce presented in the applications of the existence 
                                               
500 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS , para. 116. 
501 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS , para. 114. 
502 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS , fn 182. 
503 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para. 114. 
504 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para. 114, citing 
Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV , fn 35. 
505 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, fn 185, citing Panel 
Report, US – Export Restraints , para. 8.65. 
506 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS , fn 184, citing Appellate 
Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US) , para. 115. 
507 Panel Report, China – GOES, para. 7.90. 
508 Panel Report, China – GOES, para. 7.91. 
509 See paragraph 7.151.   of this Report. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  of export restraints and their price effects indicates that the Government of China "gives 
responsibility" to domestic producers to carry out the function of providing goods to domestic users in China. As discussed above, in both cases the measure allegedly giving rise to the financial contribution is the export restraint itself. In our view, when the Government of China limits the 
ability of domestic producers of magnesia and coke to export those products, it does not "give 
responsibility" to domestic producers to do anything. We find unpersuasive the argument of the United States that through the export restraint measures at issue in this dispute, private entities 
are "invested with a trust" that they will sell the good to the domestic market.
510 In this regard, we 
agree with the panel in Korea – Commercial Vessels  w h e n  i t  s t a t e d  t h a t  " [ t ] h e  o b j e c t  o f  a  
Member's responsibility should be its acts, as such, rather than the reactions to or consequences of those acts, as alleged reactions and consequences may simply be the result of happenstance or 
chance".
511  
7.401.  With regard to whether evidence in the applications in Magnesia Bricks and Seamless Pipe 
is "adequate evidence, tending to prove or indicating" that the Government of China provides a 
financial contribution by directing  a private body to carry out the function of providing goods to 
domestic producers, we note that the Appellate Body has held that "direction" means that the 
government exercises its authority over a private body in order to effectuate a financial 
contribution.512 We do not contest that, as argued by th e United States, the evidence submitted by 
the applicants in Magnesia Bricks and Seamless Pipe demonstrates that the Government of China "exercises its authority over the private entities through formal measures that induce them to change their economic behaviour under penalty of law".
513 However, the Panel is not persuaded 
that such evidence demonstrates that this exercise of authority occurs in respect of the function of 
providing goods to domestic users in China of magnesia and coke. Rather, this exercise of authority relates only to the conditions of export of magnesia and coke. The fact that the 
Government of China exercises its authority and thus engages in an act of direction with respect to 
the conditions under which magnesium and coke may be exported from China, is not sufficient to establish that the Government of China exercises authority over a private body to carry out the 
function of providing magnesium and coke to domestic users in China. In order for a government 
action to constitute "direction" within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement, it 
is not sufficient that the action involves an exerci se of authority over a private body. The exercise 
of authority must have as its object one of "types of function" within the meaning of 
Articles 1.1(a)(1)(iv). To interpret "direction" to occur where an exercise of authority in respect of 
a restriction leads producers to increase their supply to the domestic market essentially means that direction is found to exist on the basis of the economic effects of the export restraint.  
7.402.  We note, in this respect, the argument of the United States that there is "direction" in this 
case because, as a result of China's policies, the private entities are "caused to move in a specified direction"; if they are to continue the sales of their products, they must sell the good to the 
domestic market.
514 We consider that this argument is inconsistent with the idea that "the 
existence of each of the four types of financial contribution is determined by reference to the action of the government concerned rather than by reference to the effects of the measure on a market".
515 We also consider that this argument is in contradiction with the statements of the 
Appellate Body that entrustment and direction "imply a more active role than mere acts of 
encouragement", that entrustment or direction "cannot be inadvertent or a mere by-product of governmental regulation" and that "in most cases, one would expect entrustment or direction of a 
private body to involve some form of threat or inducement, which could, in turn, serve as evidence 
of entrustment or direction".
516 Furthermore, we find pertinent the Appellate Body's observation 
that "there must be a demonstrable link between the government and the conduct of the private 
party".517 In the latter regard, we agree with Canada's comment that "[t]here is no such 
demonstrable link between an export restraint and the reactions of market operators, because the government does not task market operators to sell in the domestic market".
518   
                                               
510 United States' first written submission, para. 299. 
511 Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels , para. 7.370. 
512 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para. 113. 
513 United States' first written submission, para. 299. 
514 United States' first written submission, para. 299. 
515 Panel Report, China – GOES , para. 7.85; US – Export Restraints , para. 8.34. 
516 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, paras. 114 and 116. 
517 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para. 113. 
518 Canada's response to Panel question  No. 5 to third parties, para. 11. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  7.403.  We have carefully considered the arguments of the United States in support of its view 
that the initiation of the investigations into export restraints in the investigations in Magnesia Bricks and Seamless Pipe was justified in light of certain contextual and circumstantial evidence. As discussed above, we consider that the evidence in the applications is insufficient on conceptual 
grounds insofar as it pertains only to the export restraints themselves and their price suppressing 
effects and does not pertain to any action of the Government of China other than those export restraints. The arguments of the United States re garding the significance of the contextual and 
circumstantial evidence do not address this prob lem. For example, assuming that the evidence 
demonstrates that the Government of China purs ues the objective of supporting production and 
export of processed products, the fact remains that  the alleged financial contribution is the export 
restraint itself.  
7.404.  Thus, in sum, in the absence of any information in the applications in Magnesia Bricks and 
Seamless Pipe on how the Government of China "gives responsibility to" or "exercises authority over" a private body in China specifically to carry out the function of providing magnesia and coke 
goods to domestic users, (as distinguished from information about the application of the export 
restraints themselves) we consider that an unbiased, objective investigating authority would not have found that the evidence in the applications in Magnesia Bricks and Seamless Pipe is 
"adequate evidence tending to prove or indicating" the existence of a financial contribution in the 
form of a government-entrusted or government-directed provision of goods. Our finding is based on the particular facts of the two cases before us. We do not exclude the possibility that initiation of a countervailing duty investigation with respect to measures involving export restraints might 
be justified under other factual scenarios. 
7.405.  We are not persuaded by the United States' argument that finding the export restraints in 
Seamless Pipe  and Magnesia Bricks to not constitute a financial contribution under Article 1.1 
would enable the circumvention of the SCM Agre ement, contrary to its object and purpose.
519 The 
Appellate Body has noted that "[p]aragraph (iv), in particular, is intended to ensure that governments do not evade their obligations under the SCM Agreement  by using private bodies to 
take actions that would otherwise fall within Arti cle 1.1(a)(1), were they taken by the government 
itself. In other words, Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) is, in essence, an anti-circumvention provision".
520 
However, it is also well-established that not all government actions capable of conferring benefits 
were intended to be captured and disciplined as subsidies under the SCM Agreement. The concept 
of "financial contribution" was incorporated into the definition of a subsidy specifically to limit the 
scope of the agreement's disciplines.  
7.406.  In conclusion, the Panel finds that the USDOC's initiation of two countervailing duty 
investigations in respect of certain export restraints is inconsistent with Article 11.3 of the 
SCM Agreement. 
7.407.  The Panel notes that China also requests that the Panel find that the USDOC acted 
inconsistently with the SCM Agreement when the USDOC determined in these investigations that 
the export restraints at issue constituted financial contributions. In light of the very limited argumentation provided by China in support of this claim, the Panel considers that such a finding is not warranted. 
7.13  China's claims under Articles 10 and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement and Article VI:3 of 
the GATT 1994 
7.408.  China requests that in each instance where the Panel makes a finding of inconsistency, the 
Panel also find that, as a consequence, the United States has acted inconsistently with Articles 10 
and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement an d Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994.
521 
                                               
519 See in particular United States' second written submission, para. 134. 
520 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS , para. 113. 
521 China's first written submission, para. 194. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  7.409.  Article 10 of the SCM Agreement provides: 
Application of Article VI of GATT 1994 Members shall take all necessary steps to ensure that the imposition of a 
countervailing duty
36 on any product of the territory of any Member imported into the 
territory of another Member is in accordance with the provisions of Article VI of GATT 
1994 and the terms of this Agreement. Countervailing duties may only be imposed pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in accordance with the provisions of 
this Agreement and the Agreement on Ag riculture. (footnotes omitted in part) 
_____________________________ 
36 The term "countervailing duty" shall be understood to mean a special duty levied for the 
purpose of offsetting any subsidy bestowed di rectly or indirectly upon the manufacture, 
production or export of any merchandise, as provided for in paragraph 3 of Article VI of GATT 1994.  
7.410.  Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994 provides that: 
No countervailing duty shall be levied on any product of the territory of any 
contracting party imported into the territory of another contracting party in excess of an amount equal to the estimated bounty or subsidy determined to have been 
granted, directly or indirectly, on the manufacture, production or export of such 
product in the country of origin or exportation, including any special subsidy to the transportation of a particular product. The term "countervailing duty" shall be understood to mean a special duty levied for the purpose of offsetting any bounty or 
subsidy bestowed, directly, or indirectly, upon the manufacture, production or export 
of any merchandise.  
7.411.  Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement provides: 
No specific action against a subsidy of another Member can be taken except in 
accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by this Agreement.
56 
_____________________________ 
56 This paragraph is not intended to preclude  action under other relevant provisions of 
GATT 1994, where appropriate. 
7.412.  In US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) , the Appellate Body observed: 
We recall that the Appellate Body has treated claims under Articles 10 and 32.1 of the 
SCM Agreement  as consequential claims in the sense that, where it has not been 
established that the essential elements of the subsidy definition in Article 1 are 
present, the right to impose a countervailing  duty has not been established and this, 
as a consequence, means that the countervailing duties imposed are inconsistent with Articles 10 and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement . Accordingly, we are of the view that 
China was not required to advance further arguments to establish a consequential 
violation of Articles 10 and 32.1.
522 (footnote omitted) 
and 
We have already explained that when a Member's measures do not satisfy the express 
conditions for the imposition of a countervailing duty set out in relevant provisions of the SCM Agreement , this means that the right to impose a countervailing duty has not 
been established and, as a consequence, such measures are also inconsistent with 
Articles 10 and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement . Accordingly, we are of the view that 
                                               
522 Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Coun tervailing Duties (China) , para. 358. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  China was not required to advance further arguments to establish a consequential 
violation of Articles 10 and 32.1.523 
7.413.  We have found in this dispute that the United States acted inconsistently with Articles 1, 2 
and 11 of the SCM Agreement. As a consequence, we also find that the United States has acted 
inconsistently with Articles 10 and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement. We do not consider it necessary to 
make a finding under Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994. 
8  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION 
8.1.  For the reasons set forth in this Report, the Panel concludes as follows:524 
i. With respect to 12 countervailing duty investigations, namely Pressure Pipe, Line 
Pipe, Lawn Groomers, Kitchen Shelving, OCTG, Wire Strand, Seamless Pipe, Print Graphics, Drill Pipe, Aluminum Extrusions, Steel Cylinders and Solar Panels
525, the 
United States acted inconsistently with Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement when 
the USDOC found that SOEs were public bodies. 
ii. The USDOC's policy, articulated in Kitchen Shelving, to presume that a majority 
government-owned entity is a public body, is inconsistent, as such, with 
Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement.  
iii. With respect to four countervailing duty investigations, namely Steel Cylinders, Solar 
Panels, Wind Towers, and Steel Sinks526, China has failed to establish that the 
USDOC acted inconsistently with the United States' obligations under Article 11 of the SCM Agreement by initiating the challenged investigations without sufficient evidence of a financial contribution. 
iv. With respect to 12 countervailing duty investigations, namely Pressure Pipe, Line 
Pipe, Lawn Groomers, Kitchen Shelving, OCTG, Wire Strand, Seamless Pipe, Print Graphics, Drill Pipe, Aluminum Extrusions, Steel Cylinders and Solar Panels
527, China 
has failed to establish that the USDOC acted inconsistently with the obligations of the 
United States under Article 14(d) or Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement by rejecting in-country private prices in China. 
v. With respect to 12 countervailing duty investigations, namely Pressure Pipe, Line 
Pipe, Lawn Groomers, Kitchen Shelving, OCTG, Wire Strand, Seamless Pipe, Print Graphics, Drill Pipe, Aluminum Extrusions, Steel Cylinders and Solar Panels
528, China 
has established that the USDOC acted inconsistently with the obligations of the 
United States under the last sentence of Article 2.1(c) of the SCM Agreement by 
failing to take account of the two factors listed therein. However, China has not established that the USDOC acted inconsistently with the obligations of the 
United States under Article 2.1 of the SCM Agreement by failing to apply the first of 
the "other factors" under Article 2.1(c) in light of a prior "appearance of non-specificity" resulting from the application of subparagraphs (a) and (b); by failing to 
identify a "subsidy programme"; or by fa iling to identify a "granting authority". 
vi. With respect to 14 countervailing duty investigations, namely Pressure Pipe, Line 
Pipe, Lawn Groomers, Kitchen Shelving, OCTG, Wire Strand, Seamless Pipe, Print Graphics, Drill Pipe, Aluminum Extrusions, Steel Cylinders, Solar Panels, Wind 
Towers and Steel Sinks
529, China has not established that the USDOC acted 
inconsistently with the United States' obligations under Article 11 of the 
                                               
523 Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Coun tervailing Duties (China) , para. 610. 
524 The Panel's conclusions incorporate those set forth in its preliminary ruling, as contained in document 
WT/DS437/4, circulated on 21 February 2013 and included as Annex A-8 to this Report, and which forms an integral part of this Report. 
525 See table in paragraph 7.1.   of this Report. 
526 See table in paragraph 7.1.   of this Report. 
527 See table in paragraph 7.1.   of this Report. 
528 See table in paragraph 7.1.   of this Report. 
529 See table in paragraph 7.1.   of this Report. WT/DS437/R 
 
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  SCM Agreement by initiating the challenged investigations without sufficient evidence 
of specificity. 
vii. With respect to 13 countervailing duty investigations, namely Pressure Pipe, Line 
Pipe, Citric Acid, Lawn Groomers, OCTG, Wire Strand, Magnesia Bricks, Seamless 
Pipe, Print Graphics, Drill Pipe, Aluminum Extrusions, Steel Cylinders and Solar 
Panels530, China has not established that in 42 instances the USDOC acted 
inconsistently with the United States' obligations under Article 12.7 of the 
SCM Agreement by not relying on facts available on the record. 
viii. With respect to six countervailing duty investigations, namely Line Pipe, Thermal 
Paper, Citric Acid, OCTG, Wire Strand and Seamless Pipe531, China has established 
that the USDOC acted inconsistently with the United States' obligations under 
Article 2.2 of the SCM Agreement by making positive determinations of regional 
specificity while failing to establish that the alleged subsidy was limited to certain enterprises located within a designated geographical region within the jurisdiction of 
the granting authority. With respect to the Print Graphics investigation
532, however, 
China has failed to establish that the USDOC acted inconsistently with the United States' obligations under Article 2.2 of the SCM Agreement by making a 
positive determination of regional specificity while failing to establish that the alleged 
subsidy was limited to certain enterprises located within a designated geographical region within the jurisdiction of the granting authority. 
ix. With respect to two countervailing duty investigations, namely Magnesia Bricks and 
Seamless Pipe
533, China has established that the USDOC acted inconsistently with 
the obligations of the United States under Article 11.3 of the SCM Agreement by initiating investigations in respect of certain export restraints. 
x. As a consequence of the inconsistencies of the USDOC's actions with Articles 1, 2 
and 11 of the SCM Agreement, the United States has acted inconsistently with Articles 10 and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement. 
8.2.  Under Article 3.8 of the DSU, in cases wh ere there is an infringement of the obligations 
assumed under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie  to constitute a case of 
nullification or impairment. We conclude that, to the extent that the measures at issue are inconsistent with certain provisions of the SCM Agreement, they have nullified or impaired benefits 
accruing to China under that agreement. 
8.3.  Pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, we recommend that the United States bring its measures 
into conformity with its obligations under the SCM Agreement. 
 
 
__________  
 
                                               
530 See table in paragraph 7.1.   of this Report. See Exhibit CHI-2; China's first written submission, 
para. 146 and fn 136. 
531 See table in paragraph 7.1.   of this Report. 
532 See table in paragraph 7.1.   of this Report. 
533 See table in paragraph 7.1.   of this Report.