RESTRICTED  
  
G/C/M/130  
 
22 March 2018  
(18-1764) Page: 1/49 
Council for Trade in Goods    
 
MINUTES OF THE MEETI NG OF THE COUNCIL FO R TRADE IN GOODS  
10 NOVEMBER 2017  
CHAIRPERSON: HE MR K YONGLIM CHOI  
The meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG, or the Council) was convened by 
Airgram  WTO/AIR/CTG/9; the proposed agenda for the meeting was circulated in 
document  G/C/W/747. The meeting proceeded on the basis of the following agenda:  
 
1   NOTIFICATION OF REGI ONAL TRADE AGREEMENT S ................................ ....................  3 
1.1   Free Trade Agreement between the EFTA  States and Georgia (WT/REG386/N/1); ................  3 
1.2   Free Trade Agreement between Chile and Thailand (WT/REG387/N/1);  ..............................  3 
1.3   Free Trade Agreement between Canada and Ukraine (WT/REG388/N/1 and 
WT/REG388/N/1/Rev.1); and  ................................ ................................ ...............................  3 
1.4   Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreeme nt between the European Union and 
Canada (WT/REG389/N/1)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 3 
2   ACCESSION OF THE REP UBLIC OF ARMENIA TO THE EURASIAN ECONOMI C 
UNIO N: PROCEDURES UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 – REQUEST 
FROM THE REPUBLIC OF  ARMENIA (G/L/1110/AD D.3) ................................ ...................  3 
3   ACCESSION OF THE K YRGYZ REPUBLIC TO TH E EURASIAN ECONOMIC 
UNION: PROCEDURES UN DER ARTICLE XXVIII:3  OF GATT 1994 – REQUEST 
FROM THE KYRGYZ REPU BLIC (G/L/1137/ADD.2 ) ................................ ...........................  4 
4   ENLARGEMENT OF THE E UROPEAN UNION: PROCE DURES UNDER ARTICLE 
XXVIII:3 OF GATT 199 4 – REQUEST FROM THE EUR OPEAN UNION 
(G/L/1051/ADD.8)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..........  6 
5   MARKET ACCESS ISSUES  ................................ ................................ .............................  7 
5.1   Draft Decision on the Derestriction of Additional Negoti ating Materials 
(G/MA/W/131)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................  7 
5.2   Introduction of Harmonized System Changes into the WTO Schedules of 
Concessions – Collective  Requests for Waiver Extensions  ................................ .........................  7 
5.3   Introduction of Harmonized System 2002 Changes into the WTO  Schedules of Tariff 
Concessions – Draft Waiver Decision (G/C/W/741)  ................................ ................................ .. 7 
5.3.1    Introduction of Harmonized System 2007  Changes into the WTO  Schedules of  
Tariff Concessions – Draft Waiver Decision (G/C/W/742)  ................................ ..........................  7 
5.3.2    Introduction of Harmonized System 2012  Changes into the WTO  Schedules of 
Tariff Concessions – Draft Waiver Decision (G/C/W/743)  ................................ ..........................  7 
5.3.3    Introduction of Harmonized System 2017  Changes into the WTO Schedules of 
Tariff Concessions – Draft Waiver Decision (G/C/W/744; G/C/W/744/Corr.1; and 
G/C/W/744/Corr.2)  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............  8 
6   JORDAN – REQUEST FOR A WAIVER  RELATING TO THE TRAN SITIONAL 
PERIOD FOR THE ELIMI NATION OF THE EXPORT  SUBSIDY PROGRAM FOR 
JORDAN (G/C/W/705, G /C/W/705/CORR.1, G/C /W/705/REV.1 AND 
G/C/W/705/REV.2)  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........  8 G/C/M/130  
 
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  7   PROCEDURES TO ENHANC E TRANSPARENCY AND S TRENGTHEN 
NOTIFICATION REQUIRE MENTS UNDER WTO  AGREEMENTS - COMMUNICATION 
FROM THE UNITED STAT ES (JOB/GC/148 – JOB/CTG/10) ................................ ...............  9 
8   INDIA – QUANTITATIVE RESTRIC TION ON IMPORTS OF B EANS OF THE 
SPECIES VIGNA MUNGO HEPPER OR VIGNA RADI ATA WILCZEK – REQUEST 
FROM AUSTRALIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..........  21 
9   KAZAKHSTAN – BORDER RESTRICTIONS - REQUEST FROM THE KYR GYZ 
REPUBLIC (G/C/W/745)  ................................ ................................ ...............................  22 
10   UNITED STATES OF AME RICA – SECTION 232 INVESTIG ATIONS ON THE 
EFFECT OF IMPORTS OF  STEEL AND ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS ON US NATIO NAL 
SECURITY – REQUEST FROM THE RUS SIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ...............  25 
11   INDONESIA'S IMPORT A ND EXPORT RESTRICTIN G POLICIES AND 
PRACTICES - REQUEST FROM THE EUR OPEAN UNION, JAPAN, AND THE UNITED 
STATES ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........................  27 
12   INDIA – CUSTOMS DUTIES ON IC T PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM CANADA,  
THE EUROPEAN UNION, NORWAY, JAPAN, CHINE SE TAIPEI, AND THE UNITED 
STATES ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........................  30 
13   UNITED STATES OF AME RICA – SEAFOOD IMPORT MONIT ORING 
PROGRAMME – REQUEST FROM THE PEO PLE'S REPUBLIC OF CH INA ..............................  34 
14   THE RUSSIAN FEDERATI ON – TRADE RESTRICTING PR ACTICES – REQUEST 
FROM THE EUROPEAN UN ION ................................ ................................ ........................  35 
15   MEXICO – ANTI -DUMPING DUTIES CALCU LATED ON THE BASIS O F 
"NON -MARKET ECONOMY" METH ODOLOGIES – REQUEST FROM THE RUS SIAN 
FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................  37 
16   EGYPT – MANUFACTURER REGISTR ATION SYSTEM – REQUEST FROM THE 
EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........  38 
17   CHINA – CUSTOMS DUTIES ON CE RTAIN INTEGRATED CIR CUITS – REQUEST 
FROM THE EUROPEAN UN ION, CHINESE TAIPEI,  AND THE UNITED STATE S ...................  39 
18   BRAZIL – MEASURES RESTRICTING  BANANA IMPORTS – REQUEST FROM 
ECUADOR  ................................ ................................ ................................ .......................  41 
19   NIGERIA – IMPORT RESTRICTING M EASURES – REQUEST FROM NORWAY  .............  42 
20   WORK PROGRAMME ON EL ECTRONIC COMMERCE  ................................ ...................  43 
21   CONSIDERATION OF ANN UAL REPORTS OF THE S UBSIDIARY BODIES OF 
THE COUNCIL FOR TRAD E IN GOODS  ................................ ................................ .............  47 
22   ADOPTION OF  THE ANNUAL REPORT OF  THE COUNCIL FOR TRAD E IN 
GOODS TO THE GENERAL  COUNCIL (G/C/W/746)  ................................ .........................  48 
23   OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 48 
23.1   APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS TO THE SUBSIDIARY BODIES OF THE COUNCIL FOR 
TRADE IN GOODS  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 48 
23.2   DATE OF THE NEXT MEETING  ................................ ................................ ..................... 48 
 
At the start of the meeting, the Chairperson  informed delegations that, as indicated in the 
proposed Agenda for this meeting, circulated in document  G/C/W/747, the item relating to a 
communication from Kenya, Uganda, and the United States (JOB/CTG/11) had been withdrawn at 
the request of the sponsors. He also indicated that , under agenda item "Other Business" , he would 
raise the following issues: (i)  the election of Officers to the CTG 's subsidiary bodies ; and (ii) the 
date of the Council 's next meeting.  
 
The agenda was so agreed . 
 G/C/M/130  
 
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  1  NOTIFICATION OF REGI ONAL TRADE AGREEMENT S 
1.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that, under the working procedures agreed by the Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA), and following adoption by the General Council of the 
Transparency M echanism, the CTG was to be kept informed of Members ' notifications of new 
regional trade agreements.1 He informed the CTG that there had been four regional trade 
agreements notified to the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements:  
1.1  Free Trade Agreement betwe en the EFTA  States and Georgia (WT/REG386/N/1);  
1.2  Free Trade Agreement between Chile and Thailand (WT/REG387/N/1);  
1.3  Free Trade Agreement between Canada and Ukraine (WT/REG388/N/1  and 
WT/REG388/N/1/Rev.1 ); and  
1.4  Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between  the European Union and 
Canada (WT/REG389/N/1)  
1.2.  The delegate of Ukraine  informed the Council that , with regard to the Free Trade Agreement 
signed between his country and Canada, Ukraine had sent to the R TA Committee all relevant tariff 
and trade data . 
1.3.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statement made and also of the 
information presented.  
1.4.  The Council so agreed . 
2  ACCESSION OF THE REP UBLIC OF ARMENIA TO THE EURASIAN ECONOMI C UNION: 
PROCEDURES UNDER ART ICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 – REQUEST  FROM THE REPUBLIC 
OF ARMENIA (G/L/1110 /ADD.3) 
2.1.  The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated 26  September  2017, 
the delegation of Armenia had requested the Secretariat to circulate document  G/L/1110/Add.3 
relating to the extension of the time period for the withdrawal of concessions, in conne ction with 
Armenia 's accession to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), until 1  January  2019. In that 
document, Armenia had indicated that Members that had submitted a claim pursuant to 
Article  XXIV:6 of GATT  1994 were not precluded from withdrawing substantial ly equivalent 
concessions under Article  XXVIII:3 of GATT  1994, provided that the claiming WTO  Member 
withdrew concessions not later than 48  months after Armenia 's modification of concessions (or 
1 January  2019). He also recalled that this Council had exten ded the deadline on three  occasions, 
namely at its meetings of 26  March and 10  November  2015, and of 17  November  2016.  
2.2.  The delegate of Armenia  reminded delegations that , after becoming a full member of the 
Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) , Armenia had starte d to apply the EAEU  common external tariff 
(CET) and, consequently, it had entered into GATT  Articles  XXIV and XXVIII  procedures, including 
tariff negotiations and consultations , to address the compensatory adjustment provided therein. 
Following the previo us extension , Armenia had engaged in a number of consultations and 
communications with interested Members and wished to thank delegations for the se positive and 
productive meetings. However, as a full member of the EAEU, Armenia coordinate d its trade and 
economic policy with its EAEU  partners , and this implied a mutually agreed negotiation position. 
Armenia had endeavoured to  accelerate and to  intensify the consultation process with its 
EAEU  partners. Indeed, Armenia had raised the issue of the current stat us of the compensatory 
adjustment negotiation at a number of the EAEU 's meetings. Substantive discussions had taken 
place on this issue and relevant instructions had been issued to facilitate the ongoing negotiations. 
In this vein, Armenia was ready to dis cuss with all interested Members the possibility of organizing 
the next round of negotiations in Geneva in the coming months.  
2.3.  Considering the number of Members interested and involved in the process, as well as the 
scope of the technical work to be carried  out, Armenia believed that additional time would be 
                                                
1 See documents  WT/REG16, WT/L/671, and G/C/M/88.  G/C/M/130  
 
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  required for further  consultations and negotiations. As indicated in document  G/L/1110 /Add.3 , 
Armenia wished to preserve Members ' rights to withdraw substantially eq uivalent concessions 
under GATT  Article XXVIII pending the communication to the WTO  Secretariat of the agreements it 
would reach in the context of GATT  Article  XXIV. Therefore , Armenia had requested an extension 
for an additional 12  months, until 2  January  2019. 
2.4.  The delegate of the European Union  expressed the ongoing concern of her delegation over a 
lack of progress in these procedures. The EU had tabled its compensation requests to the Kyrgyz 
Republic and Armenia 18  months ago but had still not received any answer to allow substantial 
negot iations  to begin . Despite Armenia 's latest statement, the EU considered that nothing had 
changed since the previous meeting of the  CTG, and urged both the Kyrgyz Republic and Armenia 
not to delay the negotiations any further . In reply to the EU 's requests,  a joint offer from Armenia, 
the Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan,  and the Russian Federation  should be tabled without delay. The 
EU had been informed that the EAEU had met one month before to agree on a mandate to conduct 
these negotiations but had heard nothing more since then. The EU looked forward to resuming the 
negotiations on that basis , and  in earnest , and stood available for bilateral negotiating rounds at 
any time and, if possible, starting immediately . The EU also  indicated that if there were no 
movem ent soon it would consider all available options so as to ensure that the EU be appropriately 
compensated for the increase in tariffs in Armenia and the Kyrgyz Republic.  
2.5.  The delegate of Japan  recalled that Japan had also submitted a claim of interest and that it 
continued to have a systemic interest in this matter. Japan stood ready  to engage in negotiations 
and consultations with Armenia and other interested Members with a view to receiving an 
appropriate level of compensation under GATT  Articles  XXIV and  XXVIII.  
2.6.  The delegate of Canada  thanked Armenia for its update and reiterated Canada 's interest in 
discussing with Armenia the claim of interest it had submitted following Armenia 's modification of 
its WTO  commitments under Article  XXVIII. He encouraged Ar menia to conclude its Article  XXVIII 
negotiations for compensatory adjustments without further delay.  
2.7.  The delegate of the Russian Federation , in response to the EU , indicated that Russia 
acknowledged its significant role in these negotiations and that it would endeavour to formulate a 
proposal as soon as possible . 
2.8.  The delegate of Brazil  echoed the call s made by the EU and others and urged Armenia to 
engage more intensively in negotiations with a view to submitting an adequate revised offer.  
2.9.  The delegate of Chinese Taipei  thanked Armenia for the update on this issue and encouraged 
Armenia to conclude its Article  XXVIII negotiation s without further delay.  
2.10.   The delegate of Armenia  informed the Council  that Armenia was currently working with the 
EAEU  commission a nd member States on this issue and hoped shortly to provide  a coherent reply 
to WTO  Members ' requests. He would convey Members ' concerns to Capital in due course. Armenia 
also hoped that the ongoing process would be accelerated and was ready to continue discussing 
the issue with interested WTO  Members in a pragmatic and constructive way. Armenia would also 
continue , on a regular basis, to inform the CTG and interested Members of developmen ts in its  
ongoing compensatory adjustment negotiations.  
2.11.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made and of 
Armenia 's communication , and that it agree on the extension of the deadline set out in Armenia 's 
communication , docume nt G/L/1110/Add.3 , until 2  January  2019.  
2.12.   The Council so agreed . 
3  ACCESSION OF THE KYR GYZ REPUBLIC TO THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UN ION: 
PROCEDURES UNDER ART ICLE XXVIII:3 OF GAT T 1994 – REQUEST FROM THE KYR GYZ 
REPUBLIC (G/L/1137/ ADD.2) 
3.1.  The Chairperson  informed del egations that , in a communication dated 20  September  2017, 
the delegation of the Kyrgyz Republic had requested the Secretariat to circulate 
document  G/L/1137/Add.2 on the extension of the time period for the withdrawal of concessions in G/C/M/130  
 
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  conne ction with the  Kyrgyz Republic 's accession to the EAEU, until 12  February  2019. In that 
document, the Kyrgyz Republic had indicated that Members that had submitted a claim pursuant 
to Article  XXIV:6 of GATT  1994 were not precluded from withdrawing substantially equivale nt 
concessions under Article  XXVIII:3 of GATT  1994, provided that the claiming WTO  Member 
withdrew concessions not later than 42  months after the Kyrgyz Republic 's modification of 
concessions , or 12  February  2019. He also recalled that this Council had ext ended the deadline on 
three  previous occasions, namely at its meetings of 26  March and 10  November  2015, and 
14 July 2016.  
3.2.  The delegate of the Kyrgyz Republic  informed delegations that his authorities had continued 
to conduct informal consultations both in ternally and with interested Members with a view to  
clarifying certain technical details and other relevant data analysis, based on the initial claims 
received from interested Members. He assured Members that, as soon as the internal matters and 
consultati ons with its EAEU  partners were agreed, the Kyrgyz Republic would be in a position to 
respond to interested Members regarding their claims. He also noted that the extended period in 
which  Members ' rights to withdraw substantially equivalent concessions were preserved would 
expire on 12  February  2018.  
3.3.  Considering that additional time would be required to conduct these negotiations , and with a 
view to ensuring Members ' rights to withdraw concessions pending the conclusion of 
Article  XXVIII:3 negotiations , and pending the communication to the WTO  Secretariat of the 
agreements reached in the context of Article  XXIV:6 of the GATT  1994, the Kyrgyz Republic 
requested a further extension of Members ' rights , for an additional twelve  months, until 
12 February  2019.  Therefore, the Kyrgyz Republic would not assert that WTO  Members that had 
submitted a claim were precluded from withdrawing substantially equivalent concessions because 
this withdrawal occurred later than six  months after the Kyrgyz Republic 's withdrawal of 
concessions, provided that the claiming WTO  Member withdrew concessions no later than 
42 months after the Kyrgyz Republic 's modification of its concessions.  
3.4.  The delegate of the European Union  recalled its statement delivered under the previous 
agenda it em and reiterated that it expected, without delay, to receive a joint offer from Armenia, 
the Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan, and the Russian Federation,  in reply to its requests. The EU had 
been informed that the EAEU had met one month before to agree on a m andate to conduct these 
negotiations but had heard nothing more since then. In the absence of any positive development 
the EU would consider all available options to ensure that it be duly compensated for the increase 
of tariffs in Arme nia and the Kyrgyz R epublic.  
3.5.  The delegate of Japan  thanked the Kyrgyz Republic for its update and recalled Japan 's 
systemic interest in this issue. Japan looked forward to receiving a response to its claim of interest 
and would continue to be engaged in further negotiations and consultations with the Kyrgyz 
Republic and other interested Members with the aim of achieving appropriate compensation under 
GATT  Articles  XXIV and XXVIII.  
3.6.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  acknowledged its significant role in these negotiations 
and would endeavour to submit a proposal shortly.  
3.7.  The delegate of Switzerland  thanked the Kyrgyz Republic for its update and for the recent 
bilateral exchanges and , having  itself submitted a claim of interest, Switzerland urged the Kyrgyz 
Republic to begin substantive negotiations promptly.  
3.8.  The delegate of the Kyrgyz Republic  said that his delegation had taken note of the 
statements made and would convey these to Capital in due course . 
3.9.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made and of the 
communication from the Kyrgyz Republic, and agreed on the extension of the deadline set out in 
document  G/L/1137/Add.2 , until 12  February  2019.  
3.10.   The Council so agreed . G/C/M/130  
 
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  4  ENLARGEMENT OF THE EU ROPEAN UNION: PROCED URES UNDER ARTICLE X XVIII:3 OF 
GATT 1994 – REQUEST FROM THE EUR OPEAN UNION (G/L/105 1/ADD.8) 
4.1.  The Chairperson  drew Members ' attention to document  G/L/1051/Add.8 concerning the 
accession of the Republic of Croatia to th e European Union on 1  July 2013. In this communication, 
the EU had indicated that it would not assert that Members that had submitted a claim pursuant to 
Article  XXIV:6 of GATT  1994 were precluded from withdrawing substantially equivalent concessions 
under  Article  XXVIII:3 of GATT  1994 because this withdrawal occurred later than six  months after 
the EU 's withdrawal of concessions, provided that the claiming WTO  Member withdrew concessions 
no later than 60  months after the EU 's modification of concessions. H e recalled that the CTG had 
extended the deadline on eight  occasions, namely at its meetings of 27  November  2013; 9  April 
and 17  November  2014; 26  March and 10  November  2015; 15  March and 17  November  2016; and 
6 April 2017.  
4.2.  The delegate of the European Uni on recalled that , at the June  2017 meeting of this Council , 
her delegation had already informed delegations that the EU considered that the negotiations 
following the EU 2013  enlargement had been finalized given that the agreements with China, 
Uruguay, and  Brazil,  were already in force. The EU had notified these agreements and the 
corresponding report to the WTO  Secretariat on 29  September  2017. Regarding the agreement 
with New Zealand, the EU had complete d its internal procedures on 17  July 2017 and would 
shortly submit an addendum and a report to its notification of 29  September  2017.  
4.3.  As a result of the four  agreements already mentioned, compensatory adjustments would be 
provided on an erga omnes  basis to address the interests of other countries that had participated 
in the compensation exercise. Due to the time necessary to finalize all the procedures and to 
ensure the entry into force and implementation of the agreement with New Zealand, the EU had 
requested a further extension of the period in which Members were allowed to withdraw 
substantially equivalent concessions.  
4.4.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  said that he regretted to note that, since the last 
extension, no progress had been achie ved with regard  to its participation in the renegotiation 
process. The Russia n Federation  had officially submitted a claim of interest but had not received 
any substantial answer from the EU as the latter had systematically refused to recognize it as a 
participant in the compensatory adjustment negotiations for procedural reasons. The Russian 
Federation believed that WTO  Members could not be deprived of their rights under Articles  XXIV 
and XXVIII of the GATT on the grounds of  procedural requirements. He urg ed the EU to engage in 
substantive negotiations and consultations with  the Russian Federation with  a view to providing it 
with appropriate compensation under GATT  Articles  XXIV and XXVIII.  
4.5.  The delegate of the European Union  recalled that the Russian Federa tion had asked to enter 
into negotiations  in a communication dated 16  October  2013. However , this communication had 
been sent long after  the deadline set  out in the applicable Procedures for Negotiations under 
GATT  Article  XXVIII , adopted in 1980. In addit ion, the letter did not indicate any specific claim , 
and nor did it provide any supporting evidence. In 2016, the Russia n Federation  had submitted a 
specific request for compensation on poultry. In this regard , she indicated that , even if Russia 's 
request had been submitted three  years earlier , in conformity with the procedures and within the 
deadlines applicable under WTO  rules, the Russian Federation would still not have been entitled  to 
compensation for the tariff lines included in that request as it did  not export poultry to Croatia 
during the reference period set  up for establishing compensation. Therefore, the Russia n 
Federation  held neither negotiation nor consultation rights with regard to the tariff lines in 
question . 
4.6.  The Chairperson  proposed that t he Council take note of the statements made and also of the 
EU communication contained in document  G/L/1051/Add.8. He also proposed that the Council 
agree on the extension of the deadline , as set out in document  G/L/1051/Add.8 , until 1  July 2018.  
4.7.  The Counc il so agreed . G/C/M/130  
 
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  5  MARKET ACCESS ISSUES  
5.1.  The Chairperson  noted that, as indicated in the Airgram, the Committee on Market Access 
had forwarded the following five  items for the consideration of this Council.  
5.1  Draft Decision on the Derestriction of Additional Negot iating Materials  
(G/MA/W/131)  
5.2.  The Chairperson  drew Members ' attention to document  G/MA/W/131 containing a Draft 
Decision on the "Derestriction of Additional Negotiating Materials". This draft Decision had been 
considered by the Committee on Market Access ( CMA) at its meeting of 22  September  2017, at 
which the CMA agreed to forward the final draft text to the General Council for its adoption , via the 
Goods Council. In the absence of any comments he proposed that the Council forward the draft 
decision contain ed in document  G/MA/W/131 to the General Council for adoption.  
5.3.  The Council so agreed . 
5.2  Introduction of Harmonized System Changes into the WTO  Schedules of Concessions 
– Collective Requests for Waiver Extensions  
5.3  Introduction of Harmonized System 2002 Changes  into the WTO  Schedules of Tariff 
Concessions – Draft Waiver Decision  (G/C/W/741)  
5.4.  The Chairperson  drew Members ' attention to the collective draft waiver decision , circulated in 
document  G/C/W/741, in connection with the introduction of HS2002  changes into WTO schedules 
of tariff concessions. The current waiver decision was contained in document  WT/L/996 and would 
expire on 31  December  2017. The one -year extension, as provided for in the draft waiver decision 
contained in document  G/C/W/741, had been  the sub ject of consultations in the CMA  meeting that 
had taken  place on 22  September  2017. In the absence of comments , he proposed that the 
Council forward the draft waiver decision contained in document  G/C/W/741 to the General Council 
for adoption.  
5.5.  The Council so agreed . 
5.3.1   Introduction of Harmonized System 2007  Changes into the WTO  Schedules of 
Tariff Concessions – Draft Waiver Decision  (G/C/W/742)  
5.6.  The Chairperson  drew Members ' attention to the collective draft waiver decision circulated in 
document  G/C/W/742, in connection with the introduction of HS2007  changes into WTO  schedules 
of tariff concessions. The current waiver decision was contained in document  WT/L/997 and would 
expire on 31  December  2017. The one -year extension, as provided for in the dra ft waiver decision 
contained in document  G/C/W/742, had been  the subject of consultations in the CMA  meeting that 
had taken place on 22  September  2017. In the absence of comments he proposed that the Council 
forward the draft waiver decision contained in d ocument  G/C/W/742 to the General Council for 
adoption.  
5.7.  The Council so agreed . 
5.3.2   Introduction of Harmonized System 2012  Changes into the WTO  Schedules of 
Tariff Concessions – Draft Waiver Decision  (G/C/W/743)  
5.8.  The Chairperson  drew Members ' attention to the col lective draft waiver decision , circulated in 
document  G/C/W/743, in connection with the introduction of HS2012  changes into WTO  schedules 
of tariff concessions. The current waiver decision was contained in document  WT/L/998 and 
Addendum  1 and would expire on 31  December  2017. The one -year extension, as provided for in 
the draft waiver decision contained in document  G/C/W/743, had been  the subject of consultations 
in the CMA meeting that had taken  place on 22  September  2017. In the absence of comments , he 
proposed that the Council forward the draft waiver decision contained in document  G/C/W/743 to 
the General Council for adoption.  
5.9.  The Council so agreed . G/C/M/130  
 
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  5.3.3   Introduction of Harmonized System 2017  Changes into the WTO  Schedules of 
Tariff Concessions – Draft Waiver  Decision  (G/C/W/744; G/C/W/744/C orr.1; and 
G/C/W/744/C orr.2) 
5.10.   The Chairperson  drew Members ' attention to the collective draft waiver decision , circulated 
in documents  G/C/W/744, G/C/W/744/Corr.1, and G/C/W/744/Corr.2 , in connection with the 
introduction of  HS2017  changes into WTO  schedules of tariff concessions. The current waiver 
decision was contained in document  WT/L/999 and Addenda  1 to 8, and would expire on 
31 December  2017. The one -year extension , provided for in the decision annexed to 
documents  G/C/W/744, G/C/W/744/Corr.1, and G/C/W/744/Corr.2 , had been the subject of 
consultations in the CMA  meeting that had taken  place on 22  September  2017. In the absence of 
comments he proposed that the Council forward the draft waiver decision contained in 
docum ents G/C/W/744, G/C/W/744/Corr.1, and G/C/W/744/Corr.2 to the General Council for 
adoption.  
5.11.   The Council so agreed . 
6  JORDAN – REQUEST FOR A WAIVER  RELATING TO THE TRAN SITIONAL PERIOD FOR 
THE ELIMINATION OF T HE EXPORT SUBSIDY PR OGRAM FOR JORDAN (G/ C/W/705, 
G/C/W/705/CORR.1, G/ C/W/705/REV.1 AND G/ C/W/705/REV.2)  
6.1.  The Chairperson  drew Members ' attention to document  G/C/W/705/Rev.2, containing both a 
waiver request and a draft waiver decision submitted by Jordan in respect of the transitional period 
for the elimination of the export subsidy programme for Jordan. He recalled that,  at the 
June meeting of this Council, it was agreed that the CTG would revert to this matter at its 
November  2017 meeting, when Jordan would update Members on any  developments concerning 
this issue.  
6.2.  The delegate of Jordan  recalled that , at the las t CTG  meeting , his delega tion had indicated 
that the high -level committee established to propose a new WTO -consistent programme had 
submitted in April  2017 a recommendation to the Council of Ministers according to which a 
percentage of the net income from industrial activity would  be subject to income tax without any 
linkage to export activity; this proposal was compliant with the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM).  The Council of Ministers had approved this recommendation in 
July 2017 and the legislative proc ess to incorporate the new WTO -compliant  programme into the 
Income Tax L aw was ongoing but respected the timetable contained in 
document  G/C/W/705/Rev.2.  
6.3.  Regarding its current subsidy programme , Jordan assured Members that it would be 
terminated by end-2018, and recalled that Regulation No.  106/2016 stated that income resulting 
from the export of goods of local origin outside Jordan was totally exempted from tax only until 
31 December  2018.  
6.4.  He thanked Members for their cooperation and understanding of the c hallenges faced by the 
Jordanian economy and requested that this item be included in the agenda of the Council 's next 
meeting , when Jordan would again update delegations on progress made.  
6.5.  The delegate of the United States  thanked Jordan for its reform effo rts and congratulate d 
Jordan on the approval of the Alternate Support Program. The US had been actively involved in 
providing technical assistance to resolve the underlying issue and considered this experience to 
have been an example of Members working together, cooperatively and creatively, with a view to  
implementing the decisions of the General Council. The US looked forward to the termination of 
the support programme at issue and the implementation of the new programme i n accordance 
with the schedule submitted by Jordan.  
6.6.  The delegate of Australia  thanked Jordan for its update and expressed it s appreciation for 
Jordan 's transparent, open, and constructive approach.  
6.7.  The delegate of Japan  also thanked Jordan for the update; Japan expected Jordan to 
eliminate the current export subsidy programme by end-2018 and would continue to monitor this 
issue closely . G/C/M/130  
 
- 9 - 
 
  6.8.  The delegate of Chinese Taipei  likewise thanked  Jordan for its update on this issue.  
6.9.  The delegate of Jordan  thanked Member s for their statements and support.  
6.10.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made and, as 
requested by Jordan, agree to revert to this matter at its meeting in March  2018, when Jordan 
would again report on developments concerni ng its current programme and implementation of its 
replacement programme . 
6.11.   The Council so agreed . 
7  PROCEDURES TO ENHANC E TRANSPARENCY AND S TRENGTHEN NOTIFICATI ON 
REQUIREMENTS UNDER W TO AGREEMENTS - COMMUNICATION FROM T HE UNITED 
STATES (JOB/GC/148 – JOB/CTG/1 0) 
7.1.  The Chairperson  drew Members ' attention to document  JOB/GC/148 –JOB/CTG/10, dated 
30 October  2017 and circulated at the request of the delegation of the United States,  which 
referred to a Draft Decision for MC11 on "Procedures to Enhance Transparency and  Strengthen 
Notification Requirements under WTO  Agreements".  
7.2.  The delegate of the United States  recalled that , at the July  2017 General Council meeting, 
and in subsequent comments, the United States had recommended that Members use the time left 
before MC11  to identify and address some of the systemic and institutional issues faced by the 
WTO in its 20  years of existence so as to reinvigorate and drive it towards a more successful and 
sustainable future.  
7.3.  One area of work was to address the deficiencies and gaps in notifications and transparency. 
As evidenced by the Secretariat 's annual report on notifications provided to this Council in 
document  G/L/223 and its revisions, there was an inadequate level of compliance with the 
notification requirements of the W TO Agreements. Indeed, Revision  24 of the aforementioned 
Annual Report indicated that fewer than half of the WTO 's Members had provided their 
2015 subsidy notifications. A similar situation existed for Agriculture, where a third of regular 
notifications remained outstanding for the period 1995 -2015. And one  third of those Members that 
had not notified their domestic support for 2013 accounted for approximately 30% of the total 
value of agricultural production by WTO  Members. This lack of transparency was pr oblematic for 
traders and undermined the proper functioning and operation of the WTO  Agreements.  
7.4.  From a systemic perspective, it became difficult to develop, evaluate , and assess negotiating 
proposals to improve the overall operation of the WTO  Agreements without the information that 
should already have been provided under existing notification obligations. Lack of compliance with 
basic notification obligations also undermined confidence in the system. If Members could not 
comply with the ir most basic oblig ations there was also no certainty that they would comply with 
their more substantive obligations . 
7.5.  With the aim of improving Members ' compliance with notification obligations, the US had 
carefully reviewed the Secretariat 's report to the CTG. Given that th e report included all the goods 
agreements under the purview of the CTG, the US had limited the scope of its proposal , in 
two separate elements , to only those agreements: first , mechanisms to encourage Members to 
submit their outstanding notifications; and  second , a small handful of agreements where 
improvements could be made to the notification requirements  themselves . 
7.6.  Regarding the mechanisms to encourage the submission of notifications, the proposal 
recommended was to raise the issue to the ministerial l evel so as to reaffirm Members ' 
transparency commitments (paragraph  1), and to include more information on notifications in 
Members ' Trade Policy Reviews (TPRs) (paragraph  3). As was the case in certain  
WTO Agreements , the proposal also encouraged the use of counter -notifications  as an option that 
could be employed more broadly (paragraph  4). Beyond these suggestions, the proposal treated 
the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) differently, as the US understood that, since 1995, when the 
notification timeline wa s established in document  G/AG/2, Members had discovered significant 
challenges in adhering to it in the case of subsidy notifications. Thus, the AoA was treated 
differently under the section on improvements to specific notification requirements.  G/C/M/130  
 
- 10 - 
 
  7.7.  The US pr oposal was not changing the notification obligations of any Member under the 
WTO Agreements. Nevertheless , in the case of the Committee on Agriculture (CoA) , the US was 
proposing to modify document  G/AG/2, which set out time -frames for all notifications un der the 
AoA. These referred to flexibilities extended to all Members to afford them additional time for 
agriculture notifications. For all other notification requirements across the agreements listed in 
paragraph  1(b) of the US  proposal the existing notifi cation requirements continued to apply, 
whether these notification requirements occurred on an annual basis or on an ad hoc basis as and 
when new measures  were issued . 
7.8.  Even though some notification requirements fell on an annual or biannual basis, with a set 
date by when such notifications were due, and other notifications were required only when a new 
measure was proposed, as in the case of newly proposed regulations notified under the TBT or 
SPS Agreements, the US 's proposed Ministerial Decision would app ly to all notifications of the 
Agreements listed in its paragraph  1, where the US had seen delinquency in each type o f 
notification.  
7.9.  In the case of the Agreements listed in paragraph  1(b), the proposal encouraged greater 
transparency even when a notificati on had not been submitted; it did so  by asking Members to 
provide information by 1  November of each year on the reason for any delay  in their notification , 
to indicate when the outstanding notification was likely to be submitted, and also to indicate  any 
partial notification information that may already be available.  
7.10.   The US also  considered that various notifications were missing as a result of a lack of 
understanding of what needed to be notified ; for this reason, the proposal also included an option 
whereby the Secretariat could assist Members in the preparation of their notification s 
(paragraph  5). This was the case , for example,  with State Trading Enterprises (STEs), where a 
number of Members simply needed to notify that they did not maintain STEs.  
7.11.   The proposal also indicated that , if after two  years a due notification had still not been 
provided, administrative measures could then be applied to the Member concerned (paragraph  6). 
Unfortunately the Secretariat 's annual reporting on outstanding notifi cations and the specific 
efforts of the standing Committees to discuss the challenges of missing notifications were not 
sufficient  to resolve the problem.  
7.12.   The administrative measures set out in the proposal referred to those currently used by the 
WTO and w ere derived from the Budget Committee 's document  WT/BFA/W/410 , "Outstanding 
Contributions from Members and Observers" , addressed to Members in arrears, and including such 
measures as a Member not being considered eligible for chairmanship of WTO  bodies, and loss of 
access to WTO  documentation. All of the proposed measures had been agreed to by Members and , 
in the context of the US proposal , were not intended to punish Members but rather to encourage 
them to achieve  a better rate of compliance with existing notification requirements , and to do so 
by utilizing existing WTO  mechanisms. In addition, paragraph  7 of the proposal, under which the 
Director -General would notify the Ministers of Members on an annual basis of their outstanding 
notifications, was also derived from the Budget Committee approach.  
7.13.   With respect to improvements that could be made to the notification requirements 
themselves, the proposal contained recommendations on agriculture, fisheries subsidies, a nd 
TBT notifications. Regarding agriculture notifications, the US had been concerned by a lack of 
transparency for a number of years  already . Recognizing that the deadlines currently set out in 
document  G/AG/2 were difficult to meet because of  the length o f time required to compile all the 
relevant data, the proposal recommended that the CoA review and update the notification 
requirements as necessary and with a view to establishing more realistic time -frames. A new 
flexibility proposed for Members ' conside ration allowed them additional time to bring themselves 
into compliance with their notification obligations, but nevertheless to do so no later than 720  days 
or 2 years beyond the time -frames set out in document  G/AG/2. If a Member did not provide its 
notifications within the new time -frames, 60  days after the notification deadline (after two  years), 
the Member was to provide its explanations for the delay to the CoA, at the same time indicating 
an anticipated time -frame for the submission of its outsta nding notifications , and already to 
provide any partial information available to it in respect of the notification s concerned . However, if 
Members persisted in failing to comply with their notification obligations, even  after introduction of  
the proposed new flexibilities, then the administrative measures set out in the proposal would be 
applied to them to in order to highlight the importance of transparency in the WTO.  G/C/M/130  
 
- 11 - 
 
  7.14.   With regard to notifications of fisheries subsidies program mes, WTO  Members in general 
had shown a low level of compliance , as was also the case in other areas . Moreover, the 
information currently required under Article  25.3 of the SCM  Agreement did not allow for a 
sufficiently clear understanding of the nature, scope, and impact of fisheries  subsidies 
program mes. In addition to a renewed but general commitment to provid ing such notifications, the 
proposal also required Members to provide additional categories of information in their fisheries 
notifications.  
7.15.   Negotiations on fisheries subsidies  in the Rules Negotiating Group were ongoing but finding 
agreement on substantive disciplines had proven elusive. The US believed that it was unlikely that 
the membership would reach consensus on these issues in the few days remaining before MC11. 
Moreover , negotiations on these disciplines were to a certain extent taking place in a vacuum  
given that  Members did not have a complete understanding of the scope, nature, and impact of 
existing fisheries subsidies program mes because  of the poor compliance record with existing 
notification requirements and the inadequacy of the information collected through existing 
notifications.  
7.16.   The US proposal would result in the notification of information on existing fisheries 
program mes that would b e highly relevant to the ongoing work on meaningful substantive 
disciplines. Indeed, with a more comprehensive picture of existing program mes, and specifically 
their trade and conservation impact, Members would be better placed to develop appropriate 
disciplines on subsidies that contribute to overfishing, overcapacity, and illegal fishing. The US 
believed that its proposal could provide a solid foundation on which to base future substantive 
work on fisheries subsidies.  
7.17.   On the TBT  Agreement, the TBT  Committee had recommended that Members notify 
proposed, updated , and final technical regulations (TR) , and conformity assessment procedures 
(CAPs) , along with a copy of, or website link to , the full text of each measure. To prov ide 
consistency among Members, the recommendation also proposed that Members maintain the same 
notification number when notifying updated information, revision of final TRs , or CAPs , as 
addenda, corrigenda, or revisions. As the US was itself now doing, it also encouraged Members to 
follow the recommendations contained in document  G/TBT/35 on  the Coherent Use of Notification 
Formats; this would facilitate an understanding of the notification content by Members, traders, 
and particularly micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs).  
7.18.   The US believed that improving transparency through existing WTO  notification 
requirements was the kind of institutional reform necessary to facilitate future negotiations across 
a range of negotiating topics , and that it would be a worthy and desirable outcome for MC11. If 
the timing did not permit agreement to be reached at MC11, the US proposed that Members 
continue to work on this proposal as part of broader post-MC11 institutional reform , and remained 
available to respond to  any questions Members may have with regard to the proposal . 
7.19.   The delegate of Canada  thanked the US for the explanations provided and reserved 
Canada 's right for further reflection, analysis, and discussion of the overall proposal. Nevertheless, 
by way of p reliminary comment, Canada agreed with several elements contained in the proposal 
and supported a further discussion on institutional reform, including in the context of the 
Organization 's regular work of monitoring implementation of the WTO  Agreements. Ca nada 
strongly supported the proposal 's objective of enhancing transparency and improving notification 
performance and agreed with the US that a poor record o n notifications hindered the work of 
committees and Members ' ability to monitor activities and to m ake progress in negotiations.  
7.20.   As to the substance of the proposal, it included constructive and positive options for 
address ing certain issues such as the appropriateness for Ministers to instruct regular bodies to 
take the necessary steps to reinforce com pliance with transparency obligations, including through 
notification workshops. The proposal for Ministers to instruct the Trade Policy Review (TPR) Body 
to ensure that all trade policy reviews include a focus on Members ' compliance with their 
transparenc y obligations was another constructive approach to improving overall performance.  
7.21.   However, Canada questioned whether certain aspects of the proposal would truly 
complement or possibly rather detract from ongoing work outside of the CTG. This was the case , 
for example,  with the proposed disciplines on fisheries contained in the US proposal. In light of  G/C/M/130  
 
- 12 - 
 
  ongoing and active negotiations on fisheries subsidies, Canada was not convinced that discussing 
these types of issues in the CTG was the best or most product ive use of Members ' time. Indeed, 
Canada shared US  concerns over Members ' lack of compliance with their subsidies notifications  – 
but this lack of compliance was not specific to fisheries subsidies. Given that there were already 
active discussions in the Negotiation Group on Rules (NGR) on fisheries subsidies, including 
notification requirements similar to those proposed by the US, Canada believed that the NGR 
would be a better forum for fruitful discussion on enhanced transparency requirements for fisheries 
subsidies. Canada looked forward to further discussion of the proposal.  
7.22.   The delegate of the European Union  welcomed the US  proposal given that the EU also 
attached great importance to enhancing transparency. The EU shared the US  diagnosis, namely 
that the low level of compliance with notification requirements and the resulting lack of 
transparency were hampering the proper functio ning of several WTO  Agreements ; the EU also 
agreed with the objective of designing remedies to the notification problem and was ready to work 
with Members in this regard both in the short and medium -term.  
7.23.   A number of suggestions in the US  proposal had meri t, such as instructing a body like the 
Working Group on Notification Obligations and Procedures, which did some useful work in the 
mid-nineties, to carry out a detailed analysis of notification compliance and challenges and put 
forward proposals. Such work  could draw on the annual Secretariat report on notification 
compliance prepared for the CTG, which was a good reference document but underutilized. The EU 
also considered that Trade Policy Reviews, counter -notifications , and a greater involvement on the 
part of the Secretariat in preparing notifications were ideas worth exploring. To complement these 
ideas, she drew Members ' attention to the different suggestions that the EU had itself put forward 
for improving notifications and transparency overall.  
7.24.   First, in the area of horizontal subsidies, the EU had submitted a paper to the NGR in 
May 2017 containing three  options that would improve the state of subsidy notifications. The 
first option was streamlined monitoring of compliance with notification obligatio ns consisting of a 
greater involvement by the WTO  Secretariat. The second  option was the creation of a general 
rebuttable presumption according to which all non -notified subsidies would be presumed to be 
actionable. The third  option was a presumption of ac tionability based on the mechanism of 
Article  25.10 of the SCM  Agreement, relating to counter -notified subsidies. The EU was convinced 
that the rebuttable presumptions , in particular,  would build concrete and tangible incentives for 
Members to comply with their notification obligations in the area of horizontal subsidies.  
7.25.   Second, the EU  proposal on "Transparency of Regulatory Measures for Trade in Goods", 
co-sponsored by a number of Members in the Negotiating Group on Market Access (NAMA), 
proposed that TBT  and SPS  notifications include final measures, not only draft regulations, and 
that notifications also include internet links so that traders could retrieve relevant information 
more easily.  
7.26.   The EU shared the US  concerns regarding the specific notification  requirements on 
agriculture, fisheries subsidies, and TBT, and agreed with the need to improve such notifications. 
With regard to fisheries subsidies, the EU sought clarification from the US  as to how to interpret 
"to the extent possible" set out in the c hapeau of paragraph  12 of the US  proposal. This language 
looked like a best -endeavo ur provision that would not necessarily increase transparency. The EU 
remained ready to engage constructively on these and other suggestions aimed at enhancing 
transparency,  and specifically the notification problem that many Members had been deploring for 
a long time.  
7.27.   The delegate of Switzerland  thanked the US for its proposal and explanation. For 
Switzerland , transparency was a key pillar of a well -functioning multilateral trading system and a 
prerequisite for an effective monitoring of compliance. Accordingly, Switzerland had been a 
long-term advocate for enhanced transparency at the WTO and was in principle supportive of 
proposals seeking to improve notifications. In view of MC11, his delegation was engaged in the 
effort to increase transparency in the area of export restrictions in agriculture, shared the general 
objective of the US  proposal , and remained open to discuss ing it further.  
7.28.   The delegate of New Zealand  thanked the US for its communication and explanation. 
Members had clear and binding obligations that were important to the functioning of the WTO. G/C/M/130  
 
- 13 - 
 
  However, New Zealand did not believe that , in cases of persistent non -compliance, developing 
appropriate inc entives was a good idea. Nevertheless , it believed in providing adequate support to 
assist Members to complete their  notifications when such support was necessary. New Zealand 
was interested in exploring this element in more detail, as well as in further e xploring what was 
covered, what was not covered, and where certain issues may have been missed out . This would 
help Members to better understand the current situation  and, as in the case of notification 
requirements under the TRQ  Decision agreed in Bali, should  also be included in the discussion.  
7.29.   New Zealand agreed that a lack of transparency in respect of fisheries subsidies was a 
particular problem that should be addressed at MC11 as part of a wider deliverable that responded 
to all elements of the STD  target 14.6. This issue should be included in the vertical text of the 
NGR. New Zealand also believed that significant commonality existed between elements in the 
US proposal and certain elements contained in the proposals from New Zealand, Iceland, and 
Pakistan, as well as in the text submitted b y six Latin American countries.  
7.30.   On domestic support , New Zealand was eagerly awaiting notifications from a range of 
Members, including some large subsidizers who were delinquent not just by the deadline standard 
of the 90  days currently reflected in document  G/AG/2 but also by the 720  days proposed by the 
US. There were certainly challenges in assembling certain notifications in the CoA but New Zealand 
did not wish that particular deadline to be extended any further. However, it might be practical to 
look again at the time -frame set  out in document  G/AG/2.  
7.31.   New Zealand was also interested in developing a clearer understanding of the US  position 
concerning a commitment to further strengthening the CoA as a forum in which Members could 
discuss implementation of their policies. It was certainly an issue that would be better addressed 
once Members had a clearer understanding of  the situation regarding subsidies. His delegation 
remained ready to explore  the US  proposa l further . 
7.32.   The delegate of Singapore  welcomed all efforts to improve transparency and Members ' 
adherence to their WTO  notification obligations. Members ' timely and complete notifications were 
crucial to the WTO 's monitoring function and contributed to the predictability and transparency of 
the multilateral trading system . Singapore had been and continued to be supportive of all efforts 
to enhance Members ' compliance with their notification obligations across all WTO  bodies. This was 
an ongoing  journey and o ne where long -term perspective s and long -term efforts deserved  serious 
consideration . The US proposal was currently being assessed in C apital prior to further discussion . 
7.33.   The delegate of the Plurinational State  of Bolivia  took note of the US  proposal , which was 
currently being considered  in Capital. Nevertheless, Bolivia wished to make some preliminary 
comments on the proposal. First, Bolivia considered the proposal to be extremely ambitious not 
only in terms of its adoption at MC11 but in particular with regard to WTO  standards. In addition, 
Bolivia did not consider that the proposal would solve the pro blems that Members needed to 
address.  
7.34.   Like others, Bolivia also considered transparency to be extremely important . It was 
important not only in respect of the notification obligations in the WTO  Agreements but also in 
relation to all aspects of the WTO 's work and, in particular , with regard to how decisions were 
adopted at ministerial conferences. Bolivia believed that if the US  proposal were to be adopte d 
now, some 70-80% of the WTO  Membership would be judged to be delinquent because of their 
lack of notifications in the area of Agriculture, for example, which was a sector of capital 
importance to Bolivia. In addition, Bolivia did not believe that an incentive and punishment method 
would be appropriate  in the context of the multilateral trading system . What Bolivia considered 
important was rather for Members to reac h meaningful compromise. Therefore, rather than 
resorting to a punishment method, Members should build a positive agenda  with the aim of  
improving the notification system and transparency, and one that included an understanding and 
identification of the re al problems faced by the majority of Members that were not submitting their 
notifications . This positive agenda should also be developed on the basis of capacity building, 
including the use of new technologies and solutions to address a lack of resources , and with 
assistance from the Secretariat for those Members whose notifications were delayed or 
outstanding . G/C/M/130  
 
- 14 - 
 
  7.35.   If Members were to apply the measures proposed by the US, the WTO would find that only 
30-40% of its Members remain ed active. Bolivia asked Members if it would be possible and valid 
for the Organization to continue its work under such circumstance s? 
7.36.   The majority of agreements covered by the US  proposal concerned goods , but not all of 
them – such as Agriculture. The US should explain the reasoning behi nd this exception and why, 
as pointed out by New Zealand, the Bali Decision on the Administration of Quota Restrictions was 
not included in the proposal. Explanations should also be provided with regard to the exclusion of 
notification requirements contain ed in GATS  Article  3, under which the US had made only one 
notification since 1998. Another concern related to agriculture notifications that, according to the 
proposal, would become biannual, rather than annual , as was currently the case , so as to 
accommo date the notification time-frame applied by the US.  
7.37.   In sum, Bolivia believed that a punishment and incentive -based system would not 
necessarily result in an increased compliance with notification obligations. The US had call ed for 
pragmatism and realism and not to pursue  MC11 proposals that were unlikely to result in 
consensus. Such pragmatism should also apply to this proposal , which was complex and which, in 
order to reach consensus , would require a tremendous amount of work from the Organization, the 
proponents , and other Members. Bolivia reserved its right to submit more detailed and specific 
comments at a later stage.  
7.38.   The delegate of Argentina  thanked the United States for its proposal , which demonstrated  
US engagement in the multilateral trading system and aimed to achiev e specific results at MC11. 
Argentina also agreed that transparency was a fundamental pillar of the WTO  system. Despite 
certain terms used in the draft Ministerial Decision, Argentina considered that some of the  
solutions and incentives it contained were interesting and deserved further analysis. On the issue 
of transparency, Members should also consider the special situation and limitations faced by 
certain developing and least -developed countries (LDCs). Theref ore, appropriate consideration 
should be given to TA  activities carried  out by the WTO  Secretariat to assist the Members 
concerned to comply with their notification obligations.  
7.39.   The delegate of Japan  thanked the United States for its proposal and supported  the 
US objective of enhancing the effectiveness of transparency requirements so as to strengthen the 
WTO's institutional framework . Japan believed that compliance with notification requirements was 
essential to the work of the various WTO bodies in implementing the WTO  Agreements. Japan was 
carefully examining the details of the proposal and would provide comments where necessary. 
Japan also wished  to discuss this issue further , and with all Members.  
7.40.   The delegate of Brazil  thanked the United States for its proposal and indicated that it was 
being reviewed in Capital. Brazil also attached great importance to transparency provisions and 
notification obligations in the WTO  Agreements. Brazil was also open to discussing initiatives that 
could contribute to improvements in implementation  and monitoring of these commitments on the 
part of the Membership. In this regard, he recalled the discussions that had taken place in this 
Council based on the factual report by the Secretariat contained in d ocument  G/L/223 and it s most 
recent  revision,  Revision  24, already mentioned by the US and other Members.  
7.41.   However, Brazil believed that , as also highlighted by a number of other Members,  the 
approach proposed in the draft ministerial decision was not the m ost appropriate. The work of the 
regular WTO bodies was designed to be collaborative in nature. This had also been the spirit of the 
Decision on Notification Procedures adopted in the Uruguay Round and the subsequent decisions 
taken by different WTO  bodies  over the last 20  years. The combination of notification obligations 
with the work of the TPRM of the Trade Policy Review Body meant that, since the establishment of 
the WTO, real progress had been made in terms of transparency. Today, Members knew much 
more about each other 's trade policies than ever before, even if there were still problems that 
needed to be tackled and addressed. However, Brazil was not averse to change and improvement 
and recognized certain aspects in the proposal that deserved consider ation, such as  enhanced 
cooperation between Members faced with difficulties in submit ting notifications, through the 
Secretariat , as indicated in paragraphs  2 and 5 of the proposal.  
7.42.   Brazil considered that the approach set out in paragraph  6 of the proposal  could have 
unintended harmful consequences for the proper functioning of WTO  bodies, with no guaranteed G/C/M/130  
 
- 15 - 
 
  benefits in terms of improving the frequency and, especially, the quality of Members ' notifications. 
Furthermore, Brazil was not convinced that the ana logy with administrative measures applied to 
Members in arrears in the budgetary field was appropriate. The design and application of those 
measures was mandated by Article  VII.2(b) of the Marrakesh Agreement  but no  such framework  
existed for non -compliance in relation to notification obligations. His delegation was also concerned 
by the provisions in paragraph  5 referring to the possibility of the Secretariat making notifications 
on behalf of Members. As noted by other delegations, concerns also e xisted with regard to the 
duplication of work currently undertaken in the context of the fisheries subsidies negotiations 
which, in Brazil 's view, was the proper place for such discussions.  
7.43.   Brazil 's concerns were substantive with regard to this proposal ; nevertheless , Brazil was 
ready to discuss with the US and other interested Members different approaches to the issue of 
enhancing  compliance with notification obligations in the WTO.  
7.44.   The delegate of Hong Kong, China  thanked the United States for its submiss ions, which 
provided an opportunity to give focus to the discussion on transparency. Transparency was crucial 
to the effective functioning of the WTO, and Hong Kong, China , agreed that enhanced efforts to 
improve the overall notification performance should  be undertaken. The paper contained elements 
that were interesting and worth y of further exploration . There were certainly differences in the 
complexity of the various notification formats and requirements in different WTO  bodies , or under 
different agreements, and there were also reasons or genuine difficulties explaining 
non-compliance with notifications in different areas. The WTO  Secretariat had done a very good 
job in reaching  out and addressing the obstacles that resulted in non-compliance.  
7.45.   At this point her delegation was not clear as to whether or not alternative actions or rather 
assistance would be more effective in improving notification compliance ; perhaps more information 
was required so as more clearly to understand the difficulties causing non-compliance , which  in 
turn would  help Members more effectively to consider this proposal and possible next steps. She 
echoed Canada 's comments concerning the parallel discussions on fisheries subsidies in light of the 
fact that there existed an NGR with experts in the area. Thus, there existed a doubt as to whether 
or not it was appropriate to devote time in the CTG to discussing issues that were already being 
handled by another group.  
7.46.   Regarding the proposal that the Secretariat prepare notifications  on behalf of a Member she 
noted that, under the WTO  Agreements , transparency was a Member 's' obligation. In this vein , 
what would be the legal basis for the Secretariat to make noti fications on behalf of Members?  
7.47.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  welcomed US  efforts to enhance transparency 
requirements and supported the US  approach to strengthening transparency in the areas where 
there existed established WTO  rules. He echoed the comments made by Canada, Brazil, and Hong 
Kong, China, on fisheries subsidies, and drew Members ' attention to the fact that this issue was 
somewhat different because it related to rules that were still to be established. Russia believed 
that further discussion on notification requirements for fisheries su bsidies should be held in the 
NGR and within the scope of the fisheries subsidies negotiations. Russia had certain issues that it 
wished  to raise in relation to particular elements of the US  proposal on fisheries and his delegation 
was open to further discuss all of the issues raised in the US  proposal.  
7.48.   The delegate of Australia  thanked the United States for its proposal and supported the 
objective of increasing compliance with WTO  notification and transparency obligations ; indeed, 
Australia was interested in exploring the various options through which to do so and looked 
forward to working with the US and other Members to support these objectives in the lead -up to 
MC11 and beyond.  
7.49.   The delegate of South Africa  took note of the US  proposal and recalled that t he objective of 
the WTO, as stated in the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO , was that 
relations in the field of trade and economic endeavo ur should be conducted with a view to raising 
standards of living, ensuring full employment and  a large and steadily growing volume of real 
income and effective demand, and expanding the production of trade in goods and services, while 
at the same time allowing for an optimal use of the world 's resources in accordance with 
sustainable development  objectives , seeking both to protect and preserve the environment , and to G/C/M/130  
 
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  enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with Members' respective needs and 
concerns , and at their different levels of economic development.  
7.50.   Although transparency, made eff ective through notifications, was a vital element in the 
WTO's work, the WTO 's primary objective was of still greater importance  and, as such, the focus of 
Ministerial Conferences should be on the development of a trade environment that supported and 
contributed to further development and growth globally, and in particular for developing  and least 
developed countries.  
7.51.   South Africa did not believe that the institutional effectiveness of the WTO would be 
enhanced by expanding the transparency mandate to the p oint that it required punitive 
administrative measures, the results of which would render Members inactive and lose them 
access to WTO  resources. This decision could also subject WTO  Members to dispute settlement. 
South Africa was concerned that such an approach  would have a disproportionately large and 
negative impact upon the very Members that most required assistance , and that would now find 
themselves additionally penalized as a consequence of their capacity constraints. It was also not 
clear from the  proposal how one -off notifications , ad hoc notifications , and notifications without a 
clear deadline could be subjected to punitive administrative measures  based only on these 
timelines.  
7.52.   The proposal did not consider how the various reasons for inadequate  compliance with 
notification requirements could be addressed in order to assist Members in the process of 
preparing their notifications . Delayed or absent notifications could be explained by  a number of 
factors , including but not limited to the following:  most notifications were technical in nature and 
often required coordination across different government departments ; there was often a lack of 
awareness and capacity to notify among Members ; and, in some cases , the domestic technical 
infrastructure, espec ially of developing country Members, added to the difficulties faced by 
Members when attempting to notify adequately, appropriately , and comprehensively.  
7.53.   The WTO  Secretariat already monitored Members ' compliance relating to regular notification 
obligations  by providing updates on the status of notifications in the different Committees, and 
often TPRs also gave an update on Members ' notification status. However, these were not intended 
to serve as the basis for the enforcement of specific obligations under t he Agreements, for dispute 
settlement procedures, or to impose new commitments, but rather were meant to provide a better 
understanding of Members ' trade policies and practices. Moreover, with regard to the agreements 
covered by the proposal, the WTO  Secretariat could not submit notifications on behalf of Members 
when there was no mandate and certainly no agreement among Members for it to do so. Most of 
the WTO  Agreements contained GATT  Article  X-type provisions, such as publication and 
administration of trade regulations; these related to transparency and due procedural process. 
Clarifications were also required as to why the proposal focused only on the WTO Agreements in 
Annex  1A and introduced a specific standard focused on such Agreements in Members ' TPRs, while 
at the same time excluding  Annex  1B and the GATS.  
7.54.   South Africa did not see the need for a Ministerial Decision simply to encourage Members to 
fulfil their transparency obligations and when all monitoring of notification requirements could be 
taken up in the relevant committees ; therefore, South Africa was not in a position to agree on this 
proposed Ministerial Decision at MC11. If Members agreed, the issue could be taken up for further 
consideration after MC11.  
7.55.   The delegate of Senegal  also tha nked the US for its proposal , which was under 
consideration in  Capital; therefore, Senegal 's comments , concerning fisheries subsidies  in 
particular , were only preliminary. Like others, Senegal attached great importance to compliance 
with the notification r equirements contained in the WTO  Agreements. Nevertheless, at least as far 
as fisheries subsidies were concerned, Senegal did not believe that the CTG was the appropriate 
forum for their consideration . Senegal was rather of the view that questions concerni ng 
transparency should not be linked to prohibitions ; the focus should rather be on the provision of all 
necessary information so as to enable Members  to evaluate compliance with disciplines , but not as 
a goal in itself and nor as an instrument to make it possible simply to amass additional subsidies 
information . G/C/M/130  
 
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  7.56.   Senegal was of the view that transparency in general should not lead to burdensome 
requirements for developing countries , and LDCs in particular, given their limited capacity and the 
fact that their levels of subsidies  were generally marginal . Senegal would possibly provide further 
comments on this proposal and  also request further clarification from the United States.  
7.57.   The delegate of  the Republic of Korea  thanked the United States for its propos al, which 
continued to be reviewed in Capital . Nevertheless, Korea could provide a number of  preliminary 
comments. Korea agreed with the US that enhancing transparency and rebuilding confidence in 
the multilateral trading system was an important issue , and that notification requirements 
constituted a fundamental element in WTO obligations. Nevertheless, given the technical aspects 
of this proposal and the limited time before MC11, it would seem to be difficult to reach a 
consensus on this issue either before or during Buenos Aires. For this reason, Korea looked 
forward to a further discuss ion of  this issue after MC11, especially in light of  the implications of the 
proposal for the relevant WTO  rules.  
7.58.   The delegate of Cameroon  echoed the statements made by Sou th Africa and Senegal, and 
also thanked the United States for its communication , which provided a clear initial diagnosis but 
also contained a number of radical solutions that required further consideration . 
7.59.   The US and Canada 's statements contained food for thought but also showed that it was still 
necessary to deepen these issues. The ideas put forward by the US, as well as other ideas that 
Members might present in the future, could be further explored and improved  upon. Indee d, 
Bolivia and Argentina had referred to important aspects of transparency that Members should take 
into account , such as Members ' capacity to implement the suggestions made. Regarding the 
timetable and Ministers ' commitment s on this issue, Brazil had prov ided an analysis which 
deserved to be taken into account . In sum, it was not just a matter of notification commitments to 
be respected ; there could be other aspects , too. 
7.60.   However, there were also other types of commitments that had not been mentioned  in the 
proposal , and where Members failing to comply with those commitments had not been described 
as delinquent. Perhaps the time had come for the WTO to identify the full range of its systemic  
problems  and to deal with them  as a whole ; in other words, was the  problem of transparency the 
only problem in the WTO , or were there others ? Similarly, would addressing the issue of 
transparency in the way proposed not risk to create more problems than it resolved?  
7.61.   In Cameroon 's view , Members should pause to evaluate th e situation, consider all the 
aspects mentioned above and, as other s had indicated, study the issue in depth with a view to 
developing a clearer understanding of the current situation ; this would enable Members and the 
Secretariat to propose solution s but to do so without running behind deadlines that were too short 
and that did not allow Members sufficient  perspective to work out the optimal solutions.  
7.62.   The delegate of Egypt  thanked the United States for its proposal , which was currently being 
assessed in Capital; nevertheless , Egypt wished to share some preliminary comments. Egypt 
believed that it was more appropriate to address the issue of enhancing notification compliance 
within the respective committees, especially given that the WTO  Secretariat already monitored 
Members ' notification compliance . The suggestion that the WTO  Secretariat provide a notification 
on behalf of a Member would be difficult to implement for both technical and legal reasons; and 
proposing administrative measures  was stringent and would likewise be difficult to implement  in 
the area of notification compliance.  
7.63.   Egypt believed that, in order to enhance notification compliance, the priority should be to 
address  the needs of developing countries and LDCs in the areas of capacity -building and technical 
assistance with a view  to help ing these countries to fulfill their current commitments under the 
WTO Agreements. In sum, Egypt was of the view that the proposed draft ministerial decision was 
too ambitious for MC11 and th at it would  also be difficult to take the text as a basis for 
negotiation s. Nevertheless, Egypt firmly believed that a discussion on transparency was vital for 
the effectiveness of the WTO and that this discussion should take place in the different 
committ ees. 
7.64.   The delegate of Ecuador  recognized that transparency was an important pillar of the 
multilateral trading system  and that the issue was  cross-cutting in nature . Indeed, the US  proposal G/C/M/130  
 
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  concerned Ecuador directly, as notifications represented a considerable administrative burden , and 
to developing and LDC  Members  in particular . For example , many LDCs did not have the necessary 
administrative capacity to compile and hence provide timely information. Punitive  sanctions could 
therefore affect a Memb er's ability not only to deal with the additional burden but also to comply  
with existing WTO obligations . On fisheries subsidies , she indicated that it was an issue being 
addressed in the NGR.  
7.65.   In sum, Ecuador considered that , in order to promote transpare ncy, Members should think 
to establish a positive agenda that could be developed together with technical assistance 
addressed to Members needing to strengthen their capacity so as to provide timely notification s, 
rather than developing a punitive system that would only lead to still greater inequalities.  
7.66.   The delegate of Norway  appreciated the US  initiative to improve notification  compliance , 
which Norway considered to be necessary. The US  submission contained several interesting 
proposals and Norway was ready to engage in future discussion  of the issue . However, as already 
expressed by many other delegations, Norway believed that , to improve notification compliance,  
positive incentives could prove to be more effective than punitive  action . 
7.67.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  thanked the US for its proposal and explanation. Her 
delegation attached great importance to transparency and recognized the relevant objectives set 
out in the proposal . Chin ese Taipei was also concerned by the low compliance with notification 
requirements and welcomed any effort to enhance transparency.  
7.68.   Her authorities, like others, were still studying the proposal carefully, and her delegation 
reserved the right to revert to  the issue as necessary. Nevertheless , Chinese Taipei wished to 
share some preliminary comments regarding fisheries subsidies, particularly with regard to 
paragraph  12 of the proposal that, as indicated by the EU, could be understood as a best 
endeavour ap proach. The US should provide further clarification of this issue, as well as on the 
issues raised by Canada ; Hong Kong,  China;  Brazil ; and the Russian Federation,  regarding the 
best forum in which to discuss fisheries subsidies.  
7.69.   The delegate of the Boliva rian Republic of Venezuela  took note of the US  proposal and 
expressed Venezuela's interest in strengthening the procedures guaranteeing transparency at the 
WTO. The document was being discussed in Capital but he was nevertheless in a position to share 
some  preliminary comments on the substance  of the proposal . He noted , first of all , that the 
proposal covered the goods agreements bu t not services and other areas.  He also noted that 
Venezuela preferred that fisheries notifications be discussed in the NGR.  
7.70.   Venezuela was concerned that paragraph  5 of the proposal gave competence to the 
Secretariat to submit a notification on a Member 's behalf; however, Venezuela did not understand 
the intention behind this aspect of the proposal . 
7.71.   The proposal was also based on administrative procedures applied to Members in arrears 
that, in Venezuela's view, was an approach that was neither pragmatic nor realistic. His delegation 
wondered if the intention of the proposal was to give positive incentives to Members to improve 
their notifications or rather to focus just on punitive measures. In conclusion , Venezuela 
considered that the proposal should not be  submit ted to MC11.  
7.72.   The delegate of Cuba thanked the United States for its proposal , which was currently being 
considered in Ca pital; nevertheless , Cuba wished to share some preliminary comments. Cuba 
believed that transparency was the most fundamental pillar of the WTO  system  and that it s 
importance  could not be overestimated; even so, Cuba considered that the US  proposal seemed 
only to add obligations to those already there , particularly when it made reference to providing 
explanations as to why a Member had not been able to comply with its notification obligation s in 
respect of the Agreements covered. This would only add to the existing list of notification 
obligations with which Members had to comply and, consequently, would also serve only to 
increase the workload  of Members . Moreover, the proposal did not recognize Special and 
Differential (S&D) Treatment for develo ping and Least Developed Members , while nonetheless 
containing administrative measures to be imposed on those Members unable to comply. Cuba 
wondered if the US would apply the same approach to those Members that for many years, and in G/C/M/130  
 
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  relation to many disp utes, had not respected the rulings and recommendations of the Dispute 
Settlement Body.  
7.73.   The low level of compliance with notification obligations highlighted in the US  proposal 
indicated that a majority of WTO  Members , most of whom were developing countries,  experienced 
real problems in this area . Therefore, Cuba could not accept punitive measure s being imposed on 
Members that , as a result of resource constraints,  were already finding it difficult to fulfil their 
notification obligations . 
7.74.   Like other  Members, Cuba also believed that negotiations on specific agreements should be 
dealt with in the context of the relevant competent body; nor did Cuba consider it appropriate to 
take a decision on this issue at MC11, particularly when the implications for developing and least 
developed Members  were significant . 
7.75.   The delegate of Chile thanked the US for its proposal on transparency given that this issue 
was crucial not only for Chile but for all WTO  Members. Chile wished to share some  preliminary 
comments but also indicated that it would wish  to pose  some  more specific questions to the US at 
a later date . Chile asked for clarification from the US with regard to paragraph  3 of its proposal 
and also drew Members ' attention to the work th at was being done on fisheries subsidies in the 
NGR. Like others, Chile was more inclined to adopt incentives rather than punitive measures when 
it came to notification obligations.  
7.76.   The delegate of China  in general favoured holding discussions on enhancing  transparency in 
the WTO. In the long term,  such discussions would be beneficial in helping Members to understand 
each other 's trade policies, as well as maintaining and strengthening the multilateral trading 
system with a view to further promoting  global trade , trade investment liberalization , and trade 
facilitation. China believed that all Members, including the proponent, should continue in their 
efforts to improve the implementation of their transparency obligations.  
7.77.   In the meantime, Members should alwa ys give full consideration to the lack of capacity 
faced by developing and LDC  Members. In this vein, China also believed that punitive measures 
might not help Members to enhance and implement their transparency obligations. Many of the 
punitive measures m entioned in the prop osal were difficult to realize.  
7.78.   Instead, China proposed to enhance transparency through  encouragement, such as 
rewarding those Members that had performed well in the area of notifications and transparency, 
and suggested that Members beg in by expanding capacity -building with a view to improving the 
current status quo. In this vein , the Secretariat could establish training courses on notification and 
transparency and could also invite those WTO  Members that performed well in this area to share 
their experiences, practices , and ideas.  
7.79.   China called  upon Members to further enhance transparency in the area of notifications, and 
encouraged discussion and an exchange of views among Members with a view to exploring 
collectively possible ways to e nhance implementation with regard to transparency obligations, and 
specifically the notification s themselves  and, in doing so, to make a further contribu tion to the 
strengthening the multilateral trading system . 
7.80.   The delegate of Ghana  took note of the US  proposal , which was currently being considered 
in Capital. Ghana did not support the idea of taking the proposal to the upcoming Ministerial 
Conference, especially given that  most of the issues were already being considered under various 
Committees , and that the remaining time prior to MC11 would be taken up with other issues, such 
as rules in fisheries subsidies . 
7.81.   Additionally, imposing punitive measures against developing and LDC  Members would prove 
onerous to them, particularly at a time when the WTO  Membership was discussing the challenges 
faced by those Members with a view  to address ing their difficulties so as to allow them to 
participate more fully in the multilateral trading system . As suggested by other s, Ghana was 
supportive of the recommendation  that incentives be granted for compliance rather than punitive 
measures that would make it still more difficult for developing countries and LDCs fully to 
participate in the multilateral trading system . G/C/M/130  
 
- 20 - 
 
  7.82.   The delegate of Nigeria  thanked the United States for its statement on the proposal. Nigeria 
had taken note of the proposal , currently being considered in Capital , and would provide 
substantive comments at a later date . 
7.83.   The delegate of India thanked the United States for having submitted a detailed proposal  on 
enhancing transparency. Like other delegations, India believed transparency to be a main pillar of 
the rules -based multilateral trading system . It provided the membership with information and 
clarity as to Members' laws and regulations, the relevant facts and figures, and measures taken by 
other Members that had an impact upon their international trade. Despite the difficulties in 
collecting and collating this information, facts, and notification requirements, India had 
significantly improved its compli ance with its notification obligations.  
7.84.   However, there was a difference between wilful default and default due to inherent systemic 
constraints, such as the availability of information and the resources available to developing and 
least developed countries. Indeed, developing countries , in spite of their willingness to notify on 
time and to fulfil their WTO  obligations , might not be able to do so for the above -mentioned 
reasons , and also because of their limited expertise in notify ing under the WTO  Agreements. The 
proposal was currently being considered in Capital  and India would revert to it at a later date . 
7.85.   The delegate of Turkey  thanked the United States for its proposal , which was currently 
being evaluated in Capital. Like many delegations, Turk ey was also of the view that the notification 
requirements regarding fisheries subsidies should be dealt with  in the  context of the  NGR, and that 
any additional transparency requirements beyond Article  25.3 of the SCM  Agreement should be 
determined accordi ng to the agreed prohibitio ns in the ongoing negotiations.  
7.86.   Another issue of concern for Turkey was the approach taken in Article  6 of the US  proposal. 
Members should be extremely careful not to damage the overall structure and functioning of the 
WTO when trying to fix the low compliance problem in transparency. Turkey also considered that 
the WTO  Membership was not in a position to achieve consensus on this proposal before or during 
MC11. Therefore, discussions on this issue should take place after the Buen os Aires Ministerial 
Conference , when Turkey and other Members would be ready to work on it. 
7.87.   The delegate of Brazil  asked for clarification from the United States as to how it intended 
the discussion of this  issue to continue after MC11 , in the post -Minist erial agenda, and in particular 
as the proposal had been tabled at CTG  level or, in other words , und er the WTO's regular work 
programme . 
7.88.   The delegate of the United States  thanked all Members that had taken the floor for their 
constructive preliminary comments and for their willingness to engage in a discussion of the 
proposal. He also apologized for not being in a position to respond in a short statement to all of 
the comm ents made.  
7.89.   With respect to the procedural question posed by Brazil, time was an important factor, and 
the current discussion had given to both his own delegation , and the wider WTO  Membership, 
useful material for a continued reflection upon the best next s teps for this discussion, including 
consideration by Ministers of work priorities at and after MC11.  
7.90.   With regard to the questions from the EU and Chinese Taipei on transparency in the 
fisheries subsidies sector, where the proposal used the wording "to the extent possible", the US 
considered that the use of such terminology did not indicate that this was optional or a best 
endeavour commitment. Members might provide the information if the information was available 
to them. The US believed that no Member coul d credibly say that it was not possible to submit the 
name of a programme, as required under Article  25.3 of the SCM. Therefore, "to the extent 
possible" was intended to qualify other elements, such as catch data by species, which might not 
be avai lable to  fisheries authorities.  
7.91.   Regarding comments concerning  delegation of additional functions to the Secretariat, he 
noted that, as indicated in paragraph  5 of the proposal, the intention was not to give the 
Secretariat interpretative power under this draft dec ision. The text referred clearly to a role for the 
Secretariat but only in consultation with the relevant Member, and the suggestion that the 
Secretariat should perform this action in consultation with Members was a formulation that already G/C/M/130  
 
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  existed in the RTA Transparency Mechanism. Consequently, a precedent existed for asking the 
Secretariat to undertake certain tasks but without giving it the ability to act in the absence of 
agreement from the Member that was  then the focus of the Secretariat 's work.  
7.92.   The Chairperson  said that the discussion indicated that transparency was indeed very 
important to the WTO 's work, and he reminded delegations that, at the April  2017 meeting of this 
Council, when Members considered the "Status of Notifications under the Provis ions of the 
Agreements in Annex  IA of the WTO  Agreement", as contained in the compilation prepared by the 
Secretariat, which included all notifications of a regular or periodic nature, a thorough discussion, 
promoted by the delegation of New Zealand, had t aken place on Members ' performance with 
regard to their notification obligations. During that discussion, Members had recognized the value 
of complete and timely notifications , which undoubtedly contributed to predictability and 
transparency. He therefore proposed that the Council take note of the statements made under t his 
agenda item.  
7.93.   The Council so agreed . 
8  INDIA – QUANTITATIVE RESTRIC TION ON IMPORTS OF B EANS OF THE SPECIES 
VIGNA MUNGO HEPPER OR VIGNA RADIATA WILCZE K – REQUEST FROM AUSTRAL IA 
8.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 27  October  2017, the 
delegation of Australia had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on  the meeting's 
agenda.  
8.2.  The delegate of Australia  noted that , on 21  August  2017, India 's Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry had announced a quantitative restriction of 300,000  tonnes annually for imports of beans 
of the species Vigna Mungo Hepper or Vigna Radiata Wilczek, or mung bea ns. Australia had raised 
its concerns about  this restriction bilaterally with India and also at the WTO 's CoA meeting of 
17 October  2017. Australia had sought India 's justification for the restriction in light of India's 
WTO obligations. At the aforesaid meeting, India had responded only that it would notify the 
restriction and provide the relevant information to the appropriate Committee in due course. 
Australia had also made representations to India regarding a shipment of Australian mung beans 
that had b een d etained as a result of  the restriction.  
8.3.  Australia considered that that the general prohibition on the use of quantitative restrictions 
was one of the core disciplines of the GATT and the WTO  Agreement on Agriculture. Nevertheless, 
there were certain e xceptions to this  general prohibition.  Australia therefore wished  to understand 
on what basis India had imposed such a quantitative restriction on mung beans.  
8.4.  The delegate of Canada  shared the concerns raised by Australia regarding India's quantitative 
restrictions on mung and black beans. Canada noted that India had also placed quantitative 
restrictions on pigeon peas. Canada asked India to explain the rationale for imposing these 
quantitative restrictions , and on what grounds India considered them to be  consistent with its 
WTO obligations. In addition , Canada asked India if these  restrictions had been notified to the 
WTO.  
8.5.  The delegate of the European Union  expressed the EU 's systemic interest in this issue, and 
emphasized the importance it placed on Member s respect ing their transparency obligations and 
notify ing to the WTO  any introduction of quantitative import or export restrictions , or export bans.  
8.6.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  joined previous speakers in expressing their concern 
over the restrictions applie d by India on imports of beans.  
8.7.  The delegate of New Zealand  sought explanations from India with regard to the quantitative 
restriction it had imposed on beans  and, in particular , with regard to the rationale and 
characteristics of the measure.  
8.8.  The delegate of Brazil  signalled  his delegation 's interest in  this issue, and in particular India 's 
clarification of the measure.  G/C/M/130  
 
- 22 - 
 
  8.9.  The delegate of India thanked Members for their interest in India's import measures on 
beans. This was the first time  that the issue had been raised in the CTG ; thus, Members ' concerns 
would be transmitted to Capital. With regard to transparency and notifications, he assured 
Members that India would notify the import quota and the relevant information to the Council at 
the appropriate time.  
8.10.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council ta ke note of the statements made.  
8.11.   The Council so agreed . 
9  KAZAKHSTAN – BORDER RESTRICTIONS - REQUEST FROM THE KYR GYZ REPUBLIC 
(G/C/W/745)  
9.1.  The Chairperson  drew Members ' attention to document  G/C/W/745, dated 17  October  2017 
and circulated at the request of the Kyrgyz Republic,  on certain measures recently applied by 
Kazakhstan at its border with the Kyrgyz Republic. He welcomed Mr  Almaz Sazbakov, Vice -Minister 
of Economy of the Kyrgyz  Republic.  
9.2.  The representative of the Kyrgyz Republic  stated that this was the first  time in almost 
19 years of the Kyrgyz Republic 's WTO  Membership that his country had felt compelled to raise a 
concern at CTG  level. The nature of the facts at the Kyrgyz -Kazakh borde r, and the negative 
impact of the measures imposed by Kazakhstan against his country , were having a severe impact 
on the economic and social situation in his country. He added that the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) growth forecast for Kyrgyzstan had be en revised to a 0.3%  decrease due to the ongoing 
restrictions imposed by Kazakhstan, which amounted to around US$200  million of economic loss to 
date. He also recalled that , in October  2017, his delegation had submitted document  G/C/W/745 , 
which informed M embers of  the border restrictions imposed by Kazakhstan ; his delegation now 
intended to present the full case and the full information concerning the major trade difficulties 
faced at its border since 10  October  2017. To do so, a high-level delegation from  Capital, presided 
over by the Vice -Minister of Economy, was present at this meeting. He therefore gave the floor to 
Mr Almaz Sazbakov, Deputy -Minister of Economy , to present  the case in detail.  
9.3.  The Vice-Minister of Economy  expressed the grave concerns of his country with regard to 
Kazakhstan's border measures, which were discriminatory against the Kyrgyz Republic and 
nullified and impaired its ben efits under the WTO's fundamental principles and rules. Indeed, as 
from 10  October  2017, and withou t providing any notification or explanation, Kazakhstan had 
unilaterally put in place barriers that impeded the moveme nt of goods across the border.  
9.4.  One month after the application of such restrictions the average daily cargo flow of Kyrgyz 
goods had decre ased by more than a third . Inspections carried out by the Ministry of Economy 
during the period 10  October to 7  November  2017 i ndicated that around a thousand  lorries 
carrying goods from Kyrgyzstan were stuck at the border; this resulted in a queue of more  than 
10 kilometres. More than 20% of the affected goods  were perishable  and, on average , it took each 
cargo lorry five days to cross the border. The border restrictions had also affected more t han 
50 train wagons , which had been stuck in Kazakhstan. In sh ort, these unexpected restrictions 
resulted in a daily loss counted in millions of dollars. As previously mentioned, the IMF had 
indicated that in 2017 there would be a 0.3% decrease in the growth forecast of the Kyrgyz 
economy, which represented around US $200 million.  
9.5.  Kazakhstan had violated various WTO  principles  with its border restrictions , including  
transparency ; it had not informed the Kyrgyz Republic either bilaterally , through mass media , or 
via the WTO notification system, of the measures that it had applied since 10  October  2017. The 
one announce ment that  it did make was incomplete and did not provide sufficient time for 
producers and carriers to adapt to the new trade barriers imposed at the border.  
9.6.  Along with its neglect of the non -discriminatio n principle, Kazakhstan, as the most 
geographically convenient country for trade between the Kyrgyz Republic and other 
WTO Members, had also denied freedom of transit  to the Kyrgyz Republic . Indeed, as of the first 
day of application of the se trade barrier s, lorries and railway  wagons coming from and going to the 
Kyrgyz Republic had been subject to burdensome cargo and control inspections, even though the 
carriers concerned were operating in full conformity with the TIR  Carnet system.  G/C/M/130  
 
- 23 - 
 
  9.7.  Kazakhstan 's border re strictions also undermined the objective s and efficiency of the Trade 
Facilitation Agreement (TFA). Although Kazakhstan had notified various TFA  provisions under 
Category  A, such as promptly informing carriers when goods were detained , releasing perishable  
goods in the shortest possible time , and cooperating with the border agencies of other Members, it 
clearly fell short in  terms of compliance with its TFA  obligations.  
9.8.  Consequently, the Kyrgyz Republic considered that Kazakhstan had violated Articles  I, V, X, 
and XI of the GATT  1994, and Articles  5.2, 7.9, 8, and 11 of the TFA.  
9.9.  The delegate of Japan  thanked the delegation of the Kyrgyz Republic for its explanation and 
invited Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic to solve the issue bilaterally. Japan was also  
interested in receiving further clarification of the measures taken by Kazakhstan.  
9.10.   The delegate of  the Republic of Korea  also believed that this issue could be solved in a 
mutually satisfactory manner  bilaterally, and encouraged both Members to continue t heir 
discussion with a view to agreeing a prompt solution consistent with international law and the 
relevant WTO  rules.  
9.11.   The delegate of  the Republic of Moldova  thanked Kyrgyzstan for its explanation of the trade 
concerns raised in document  G/C/W/745 and encouraged both countries to solve their economic 
and trade concerns bilaterally, within the context of the relevant WTO  bodies, and in line with the 
multilateral trading system and the commitments underta ken by both Members in the WTO.  
9.12.   The representative of  Kazakhstan  stated that Kyrgyzstan was not only a neighbouring state 
but also a strategic political and economic partner within the Central Asian Region and the 
Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The border measures applied by her country were aimed solely 
at ensuring the fulfilment of Kazakhstan 's national legislation that, in turn, was based on the 
WTO rules and EAEU  agreements; their principal objective was to ensure that products imported to 
the Common Eurasian Economic Union market  were safe . 
9.13.   The objective of Kazakhstan 's measures and transport controls was to verify the weight 
parameters for cargo trucks and freight transport, as well as the requirement to possess a 
certificate to transport perishable goods. These measures were applied equally to both domestic 
and foreign carriers subject to transport control.  
9.14.   The Kyrgyz delegation had noted that the SPS  measures adopted by Kazakhstan had not 
been notified prior to their application. She indicated that the restriction s in question  were in fact 
of a temporary nature, applied only to certain types of fruits, and had be en notified to the relevant 
WTO Committee in November  2016. The veterinary measures wer e based on the 
EAEU  Agreements . 
9.15.   The objective of the technical regulations applied by Kazakhstan wa s to impede the 
importation of counterfeit products and to ensur e that all conformity assessment certificates were 
based on the appropriate rules of origin for goods manufactured within Kyrgyzstan.  
9.16.   The objective of the border control measures on physical p ersons was to ensure the 
fulfilment of Kazakhstan 's migration laws at the common border and properly to administer any 
import duti es and taxes due on imported goods.  
9.17.   Her authorities were of the view that all of the above -mentioned border measures were in 
conformity with GATT  Articles  I, III, and V , on MFN, National Treatment, and Freedom of Transit, 
respectively. Similarly, the SPS and TBT  measures were in conformity with  their respective 
WTO Agreements.  
9.18.   As other delegations had mentioned, Kazakhstan also believed that the existing bilateral 
mechanisms for resolving the outstanding issues between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan  had not 
been fully utilized . Moreover, a road map that had been established by high -level authorities from 
both countries , and  representi ng the ir respective  Prime Ministers , had still to be implemented in 
order to solve all the outstanding issues bilaterally. Similarly, o ther mechanisms existed within the 
EAEU that could also be used for addressing these issues bilaterally. Indeed, her authorities G/C/M/130  
 
- 24 - 
 
  believed that these issues could be resolved bilaterally in the near future , adding that Kazakhstan 
also expected the Kyrgyz Republic to implement its own EAEU  commitments.  
9.19.   The representative from the Kyrgyz Republic  thanked Members for their comme nts and 
recommendation s to solve the issue bilaterally, and informed delegations that , during the past 
four months , the Kyrgyz Republic had indeed been trying to solve this issue bilateral ly. However, 
this possibility had been exhausted. In any case, the Kyrgyz Republic had not expect ed any other  
reaction from Kazakhstan since , from the beginning , the Kazakh authorities had been offering the 
same explanation concerning the numerous rest rictions that they had put in place.  
9.20.   When the restrictive measures were first introduced, Kazakhstan had accused the Kyrgyz 
Republic of resorting to  threats. Kazakhstan had now circumscribed the issues by reference to 
sanitary and phytosanitary threats, supplies of counterfeit and smuggled goods, and by accusing 
Kyrgyzstan of being a hothouse for weapons and illegal drugs. And this was not true. Indeed, the 
excessive and distortive manner in which Kazakhstan applied its SPS controls fell short of meeting 
the requirements of the WTO  guidelines and the recommendations set out in the SPS  Agreement. 
For example , Kazakhstan had not notified the changes to its SPS  measures, nor provided 
information on these, as required under Article  7 of the SPS  Agreement. Additionally, Annex  B of 
the SPS  Agreement required Members not only to publis h, at an early stage, the SPS  measures  
introduced,  so as to enable interested Members to become acquainted with them , but also to 
notify other Members, through the Secretariat, of the products that would be covered by the new 
measure s, together with a brie f indication of their objective and rationale. Additionally, Article  2 of 
the SPS  Agreement provided that Members had to ensure that any SPS  Measure be based on 
scientific principles. Kazakhstan had not notified  these measures , had not allowed time for 
comment upon them, and had not provided any scientific evidence to justify them;  nor had it 
conducted a preliminary risk assessment taking into account the risk assessment techniques 
developed by the relevant international organizations, as provided for in Ar ticle 5 of the 
SPS Agreement. In addition , the restrictions had been  imposed on all agricultural products , without 
recourse to any risk management principle.  
9.21.   On the issue of smuggled goods, Kyrgyzstan doubted the reliability of the information 
provided by Kazakhstan, arguing that its assumptions required deeper analysis and further study 
with regard to the methodology of the calculations, countries of origin, types of products involved, 
and so on . He argued that Kazakhstan 's actions also contradicted the TR IPS Agreement given that, 
in that Agreement's Article  41, it was established that procedures to enforce intellectual property 
rights should be applied without creating barriers to legitimate trade and providing safeguards 
against their abuse. In addition, TRIPS Article  51 established that the competent administrative or 
judicial authority should take action on the basis of a written statement by the right  holder on the 
suspension by the customs authorities of release of such goods for free circulation. Kaza khstan 
had introduced measures on goods crossing the border without providing any explanation or 
justification  of the measures  and also without notifying them, as required under TRIPS Article  63. 
The Kyrgyz Republic considered that these restrictions were trade distorting  and therefore 
unacceptable.  
9.22.   The situation at the border remained critical; more than 300  trucks remained blocked on the 
Kyrgyz side of the border; and those that had successfully reached the border crossing itself had 
been subjected to ext ensive border control s in Kazakhstan, detained for several days , and 
unjustifiably penalized. In addition , lorries from Kazakhstan destined for Kyrgyzstan tail backed  
four kilometres.  
9.23.   The Kyrgyz Republic had brought these concerns to the CTG so as to call upon Kazakhstan 
to abide by WTO  rules and to eliminate the trade restrictive measures that it was currently 
applying at its border.  
9.24.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council ta ke note of the statements made.  
9.25.   The Council so agreed . G/C/M/130  
 
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  10  UNITED STATES OF AME RICA – SECTION 232 INVESTIG ATIONS ON THE EFFECT  OF 
IMPORTS OF STEEL AND  ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS O N US NATIONAL SECURI TY – REQUEST 
FROM THE RUSSIAN FED ERATION  
10.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that , in a communication dated 30  October  2017, the 
delegation of the Russi an Federation had requested the Secretariat to include this issue  on the 
meeting's agenda.  
10.2.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  reiterated the systemic and commercial concerns of 
his delegation regarding two  US investigations initiated in April  2017 on t he effect of imports of 
steel and aluminium products on US  national security. Currently, the US  Department of Commerce 
(US DOC) was considering whether steel and aluminium were being imported into the United 
States in such quantities and under such circums tances as to threaten to impair national security. 
According to the statutory deadlines , the proceedings could be concluded in January  2018; in case 
of affirmative findings, the US  DOC would recommend remedy measures to ad just imports of these 
products.  
10.3.   In Russia 's view, both of the current procedures lacked transparency and predictability since 
the key parameters of the investigations remained obscure. He again asked the US to clarify the 
following issues: (i)  the intended date of the introduction of any measures; (ii)  the product scope 
of the investigations; (iii)  the form the measures would take; (iv)  the treatment that the United 
States would grant to countries with which it had free trade agreements , or so -called "allied 
relationships" ; (v) its reasons for imposing additional trade limit ations on top of the almost 
200 anti-dumping measures currently applicable to steel and aluminium; (vi)  clarification as to 
how any measures, whether tariff increases or in any other form, would remain within US bound 
levels and not constitute quantitative import restrictions; and (vii)  confirmation that such 
measures would be consistent with US obligations under GATT  Articles  I, II, VI, X, XI, XVI, and 
XIX, under the ADA, under the SCM  Agreement, and under the Safeguards Agreement.  
10.4.   Overall, and as indicated at the CTG 's last meeting, the Russian Federation believed that, to 
stabilize world markets of steel and aluminium , it would be better if the US refrained from 
introducing any trade restrictive measures following the in vestigations at issue, given that such 
restrictions would not eliminate the root causes of the market imbalances and therefore not 
provide any lasting solutions. What was needed was more energetic and concerted international 
action from the G20 in the cont ext of best efforts made at the Global Forum on Steel Excess 
Capacity. The Russian Federation looked forward to receiving the replies and confirmations from 
the US concerning these issues.  
10.5.   The delegate of Australia  stated that Australia 's steel and alumini um industries had also 
been affected by the global excess and a range of government interventions in the sectors at 
issue. Australia had imposed trade remedy measures to address injurious dumping and 
subsidization of imports in Australia 's market. Undoubte dly, this was a global challenge . Australia 
shared the concerns of others in maintaining that, in addressing this global challenge, international 
trade rules should nevertheless still be upheld.  
10.6.   Australia believed that any recommendations and subsequent ac tions resulting from these 
investigations might still remain consistent with international trade rules and be objectively 
justifiable. However, any unjustifiable measures could further exacerbate global market distortions 
and result in retaliation and tit -for-tat measures, which would then harm Members ' economies.  
10.7.   The delegate of the European Union  reiterated her delegation 's concerns about the 
two US investigations at issue and asked for clarification from the US as to the current status of 
these investiga tions. The EU believed that Section  232 investigations could le ad to the imposition 
of US  trade restrictions against the EU and other trading partners; if so, the EU would be among 
those most affected, particularly if Members like Canada or Mexico were exe mpt. 
10.8.   The EU wondered whether such investigations were compliant with the US 's international 
obligations, and recalled that no GATT  exception could justify an import restriction taken outside 
the framework of trade remedies for the purpose of protecting a d omestic industry against foreign 
competition. While the GATT did provide for security exceptions, the scope of those exceptions was 
circumscribed to specific situations and conditions that appeared to be absent in the context of G/C/M/130  
 
- 26 - 
 
  these investigations. The E U also believed that a proliferation of Section  232 investigations would 
create unacceptable systemic risks.  
10.9.   The EU was also concerned that due process had not been followed in these investigations : 
there had been no in -depth study of the sector by the International Trade Commission ; no 
questionnaires had been sent to producers and downstream users of steel or aluminium ; and only 
hasty public hearings had been held , in which only a limited number of stakeholders had had an 
opportunity to provide their vi ews. Moreover, the investigations had not been requested by the 
industry itself but had instead been self-initiated by the administration.  
10.10.   The EU also noted that US  steel production, based on  prices, stock market valuation of 
companies, and production volu mes, was actually picking  up and in a much healthier situation 
than was the case a few years before , while primary aluminium prices had risen substantially in 
2017.  
10.11.   The delegate of China  expressed China 's concern over the Section  232 investigations at 
issue, and called upon the US carefully and fairly to assess the impact of such investigations so as 
to avoid a surge in trade barriers in the name of national security.  
10.12.   The delegate of  the Republic of  Korea  said that any Member wishing to apply trade remedy 
measures should do so in compliance with the relevant WTO  rules provided in the Anti -Dumping, 
the Countervailing Duties, and the Safeguard Agreements. If measures were to be taken under the 
security exception, the emergency nature of this concept and its im plications for normal trade 
should be considered, and it should only be applied when absolutely necessary and when  strictly in 
conformity with GATT  Article  XXI. 
10.13.   Korea was concerned that a new form of import restriction might be imposed based on 
Section  232 investigations on the effects of steel imports on US  national security. Korea hoped 
that, when taking a final decision, the US Government would fully consider this principle , based on 
the relevant WTO  rules and in a transparent manner.  
10.14.   The delegate of Brazil thanked the Russian Federation for again bringing this item to the 
CTG. Like previous delegations, Brazil remained seriously concerned by the possibility that the US 
would adopt restrictive measures on imports of steel and aluminium products based on national 
security concerns.  
10.15.   As highlighted by previous speakers, WTO Members were familiar with the provisions and 
very strict boundaries of GATT  Article  XXI. Brazil did not exclude the possibility that, within those 
boundaries, circumstances could  arise w here essential security interests were indeed at stake. 
However, Brazil was concerned by the systemic implications for trade if Members did not continue 
to follow the time -tested approach of not resorting to trade restrictive measures based on security 
concerns unless those concerns fell clearly within the bounds of Article  XXI. On the contrary, an 
elastic interpretation of what constituted security interests for  the purposes of international trade 
could lead to results that would not be in the interests of  any Member.  
10.16.   The delegate of Japan  expressed his delegation 's interest in this matter. Japan would 
continue to closely monitor any further developments.  
10.17.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  indicated that her delegation also had a systematic concern 
with regard to this issue , and that Chinese Taipei 's stakeholders had also expressed their concern 
about these investigations, and about their comprehensive s cope in particular .  
10.18.   The delegate of the United States  thanked delegations for their interventions and informe d 
them that Section  232 investigations on steel and aluminium were being conducted by the Bureau 
of Industry and Security (BIS), a Department of the US  Commerce Agency, and that the 
Commerce Secretary 's report to the President was under preparation. The st atutory deadline was 
270 days to complete each investigation and report, which equated to January  2018, although this 
was a maximum rather than a minimum deadline.  
10.19.   The purpose of these investigations was to determine the effect of steel and aluminium 
impor ts on US  national security, and whether the global excess capacity problem in those G/C/M/130  
 
- 27 - 
 
  industries was threatening the ability of the United States to meet its national security needs. The 
Commerce Department was carefully considering the views of all stakehol ders as it prepar ed its 
report to the President.  
10.20.   The Chairperson  thanked delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made.  
10.21.   The Council so agreed . 
11  INDONESIA'S IMPORT A ND EXPORT RESTRICTIN G POLICIES AND PRACT ICES - 
REQUEST FROM THE EUR OPEAN UNION, JAPAN, AND THE UNITED STATE S 
11.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council t hat, in a communication dated 30  October  2017, the 
delegations of the European Union, Japan, and the United States had requested the Secretariat to 
include this item  on the meeting's agenda.  
11.2.   The delegate of the European Union  noted that her delegation had been raising this issue for 
a very long time , but unfortunately to no avail. Despite the reforms announced by Indonesia in 
2015, the high number of r estrictive trade measures applied by Indonesia had not yet decreased. 
Rather, additional barriers had recently been issued or reinstated , such as the content requirement 
for solar panels , established in February  2017, whose implementation had been postponed. The 
persistently high number of restrictive and protectionist trade and investment measures as well as 
the lack of predictability and transparency negatively affected the business environment. For 
example:  
– Indonesia's use of local content requirements persisted in various sectors, such as 
telecoms, retail, energy, construction, and public procurement;  
 
– there were high and discriminatory minimum capital requirements of USD800,000  to 
establish a new company  in Indonesia ; in the case of fore ign freight forwarders, the 
minimum capital requirement was USD4  million versus only USD150,000 for local 
companies;  
 
– Indonesia's import requirements applied in a wide range of sectors  were complex and 
time-consuming  as, for instance, in the meat and dai ry industry; for fresh plants, 
horticulture, wood, and forestry products; and for cosmetics. The measures were 
often amplified by the implementation of quantitative restrictions as, for example, on 
meat, alcohol products, and steel;  
 
– export restrictions were applied  in Indonesia  to certain raw materials;  
 
– Indonesia's conformity assessment procedures were burdensome and discriminatory, 
and there was a growing proliferation of mandatory technical standards;  
 
– Indonesia's very far-reaching halal law, once  implemented, would affect food and 
beverages, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, and leather goods exports. Its implementing 
measures, once finalized, could bring trade in these goods to a complete halt.  
 
11.3.   In addition , European businesses from a wide range of sec tors had raised concerns about 
the adverse effects of the law on investment decisions, and on broader market access issues. As 
such, the law on investment affected not only existing and potential investors, but many other 
European companies exporting – or seeking to export – goods to Indonesia, and would increase 
costs not only to businesses, but also for Indonesian consumers, and create supply issues for  raw 
materials.  
11.4.   The EU requested Indonesia to clarify whether, as of 2019, products not certified and 
labelled in accordance with the Law might be placed on the Indonesian market, and whether 
non-Halal products exported to Indonesia would be subject to mandatory labelling or any other 
type of restriction.  G/C/M/130  
 
- 28 - 
 
  11.5.   The EU noted with concern that, instead of reversing the current trend, Indonesia was in 
fact issuing new trade -restrictive measures , such as the Ministry of Agriculture 
Regulation  26/2017 , whose Articles  23 and 34 required, respectively, business partners producing 
processed milk to enter into a partnership  with local farmers and cooperatives and that , when 
issuing an importation recommendation, such partnership were to be considered. In line with 
Indonesia's G20  commitments, she urged Indonesia to eliminate existing trade barriers and to 
refrain from issuin g new ones.  
11.6.   The delegate of Japan  echoed the EU in its concerns regarding a series of laws and 
regulations introduced by Indonesia ; namely, the Mining Law ; Laws on Trade and on Industry ; 
restrictions in the retail sector ; local content requirements on 4G  mobile phones ; and local content 
requirements for investment in the telecommunications sector. No improvements had been made 
by Indonesia to address these issues . Japan once again urged Indonesia to keep WTO  Members 
informed of any developments , and to mak e further efforts to review the measures and to ensure 
their compliance with the WTO  Agreements, thereby contributing to a transparent and stable 
environment for trade and investment.  
11.7.   At the last meeting of the TRIM S Committee, Japan had reiterated its con cerns in relation to 
the Mining Law. Some reforms had been adopted with the aim of lifting the total export ban on 
nickel ore; however, these reforms were only valid for five years and required the fulfilment of 
certain conditions to obtain export permissi on. Japan believed that this mea sure was inconsistent 
with GATT  Article  XI and would continue to monitor any developments.  
11.8.   The delegate of the United States  noted that the Council was well aware of his delegation's 
breadth of concerns with regard to an eve r growing number of trade and investment restrictions in 
Indonesia, including localization, import licensing and standards requirements , as well as 
pre-shipment inspection requirements and export restrictions, including taxes and prohibitions, 
among others . These types of restrictions affected a broad range of sectors. Concerns had also 
been raised about the general lack of transparency in Indonesia.  
11.9.   Indonesia had recently introduced new measures on dairy products that required local 
purchase and establishe d import licensing restrictions; these were similar to other concerns 
already expressed with regard to other sectors. Indonesia was apparently considering new 
requirements on soybeans, which could also restrict imports.  
11.10.   The US hoped that President Jokowi's  focus on improving the business and investment 
climate would improve the current situation; however, recent developments indicated that for the 
time being little had changed in Indonesia. The US noted that other Members had also expressed 
their concerns a bout these policies in this Counc il and in other WTO  Committees.  
11.11.   The US had shown patience and had made efforts to work with the Indonesian 
Government, both bilaterally and at the WTO, to address these concerns ; however, the results , 
with limited exception s, had been disappointing . Nevertheless, the US hoped that its efforts would 
soon produce results that would ensure free and f air trade between their countries.  
11.12.   The delegate of Brazil  reiterated, as he had done on previous occasions in the CTG , his 
delegation's support for the expressions of concern voiced by other delegations regarding 
restrictive Indonesian trade policies  and, in particular, in the case of Brazil, regarding exports of 
meat and meat products. Brazil encouraged Indonesia to eli minate these barriers and reinstate 
trade flows, and to implement the recommendations and findings of the panel in DS484, which 
was scheduled for adoption at the next DSB  meeting. Brazil would continue to work with Indonesia 
to this end.  
11.13.   The delegate of Canada welcomed the recent progress made on improving Indonesia's 
business climate but considered that more still needed to be done. Canada continued to share the 
concerns of other Members regarding Indonesia's ongoing import restricting policies and practic es. 
Canada was particularly concerned by restrictions in the mining and oil and gas sectors, increasing 
local content requirements across many sectors, including renewable energy, and uncertainties 
surrounding halal certification requirements. Canada also remained concerned by import licensing 
requirements on horticultural products. Canada continued to encoura ge Indonesia to respect its 
WTO obligations.  G/C/M/130  
 
- 29 - 
 
  11.14.   The delegate of Switzerland  echoed the concerns raised by other Members regarding 
Indonesia's newest regu lation , Regulation No.  26/2017 on the supply and distribution of dairy 
products. Currently, companies had no clarity about the functioning of the new trade regime in 
dairy products , and current trade had either already been interrupted or else was under th reat of 
being interrupted. Local content requirements should not be applied in such a way that resulted in 
foreign exporters being discriminated against and excluded from the Indonesian market. He 
therefore asked Indonesia to clarify the new regime, to ens ure transparency with regard to the 
implementation measures adopted, and also to ensure their compliance with WTO  rules.  
11.15.   The delegate of New Zealand  acknowledged the efforts made by Indonesia to improve its 
business environment and echoed many of the concerns raised by the EU, Japan, and the US.  
11.16.   As mentioned at previous meetings, New Zealand believed that Indonesia's restrictions 
undermined core WTO  principles and were inconsistent with key obligations in the 
WTO Agreements. New Zealand continued to have significant concerns over a number of import 
restrictions in Indonesia's laws and regulations that affected trade across a range of agricultural 
produ cts, including horticultural and animal products. As also stated on past occasions, Indonesia's 
restrictions did not only hurt exporters, but also Indonesian consumers, processors, and 
producers, all of whom had also been negatively affected by these measu res; indeed, Indonesia's 
measures had contributed to rising food prices in Indonesia, including for basic foodstuffs and on 
ingredients for the domestic manufacturing sector. New Zealand hoped that Indonesia would in 
future implement its reform plans using  policies that were consistent with its WTO  obligations.  
11.17.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  shared the concerns voiced by other Members but, 
given that this item had been on the CTG's agenda for a number of years, he chose on this 
occasion to address ju st two main issues of concern. First, he requested Indonesia to reform the 
pre-paid corporate income tax on importers under Article  22 of the Income Tax Law of Indonesia 
in order to make it consistent with WTO  rules. The tax in question was an unfair and discriminatory 
measure against imported goods and violated Article  3.4 of the GATT. Second, Korea continued to 
have concerns over the Industry Law and Trade Law of Indonesia as these were vague and broad 
and consequently created a policy space for future a doption of trade restrictive measures. Korea 
strongly encouraged Indonesia to formulate their implementation regulations in conformity with 
WTO rules and to share any progress made in a fully transparent manner. His delegation would 
continue to monitor the se issues closely and hoped for a positive response from Indonesia in the 
near future.  
11.18.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  stated that her delegation continued to be concerned about 
Indonesia's trade and investment import and export restricting policies. Despit e the efforts made 
by Indonesia to improve its business environment, concerns remained about its restrictive policy 
on 4G mobile devices. Chinese  Taipei believed that this measure would adversely affect trade and 
urged Indonesia to ensure its compliance wi th regard to its WTO  obligations.  
11.19.   The delegate of Australia  stated that his Government continued to share the concerns of 
other WTO  Members about Indonesia's import restricting policies in recent years, particularly as 
they affected agricultural trade. Aus tralia noted that Indonesia frequently amended its regulations 
on the importation of agricultural products, often without notification and, when notified, with only 
limited opportunity for consultation with trading partners. He stated that notification and  
consultation were critical to the continuing effectiveness of the rules-based global trading system 
under the WTO. Consultation with trading partners also provided an opportunity for trade 
measures to be implemented in the most efficient way for all parti es. 
11.20.   The delegate of Indonesia  thanked the previous speakers for their interest in Indonesia's 
market and policy measures, and acknowledged the concerns that had been raised and their 
possible impact on  international trade. These policies were intended to i mprove national capacity 
so as to enable Indonesia to participate in international trade in a more balanced manner while 
ensuring that its measures were at the same time WTO -compliant.  
11.21.   Indonesia was currently confronting some significant challenges:  first, an increased 
number of imported goods had been flooding the market whose quality and characteristics were 
below Indonesian standards ; second , the loss of livelihood of most Indonesians working in 
productive sector s; and third, irresponsible and destructiv e exploitation of natural resources. This G/C/M/130  
 
- 30 - 
 
  imbalance needed to be resolved. Nevertheless , Indonesia was a WTO  Member supportive of the 
smooth flow of international trade in support of development and recognized that it would never 
be able to resolve its tra de imbalance if it undermin ed its WTO  commitments.  
11.22.   Indonesia assured Members that its trade policies were being implemented on an equal 
basis for all Members, and including in relation to its own nationals. Furthermore, the current 
administration was making ongoing efforts  to promote transparency and predictability in order to 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of doing business in Indonesia.  
11.23.   She indicated that Indonesia stood ready to discuss its trade policy bilaterally with 
interested Members so as to find an agreed solution that would be to the satisfaction of all. 
11.24.   The Chairperson  thanked delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made.  
11.25.   The Council so agreed . 
12  INDIA – CUSTOMS DUTIES ON IC T PROD UCTS – REQUEST FROM CANADA,  THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, NORW AY, JAPAN, CHINESE T AIPEI, AND THE UNITE D STATES  
12.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated 30  October  2017, the 
delegations of Canada, the European Union, Norway, Japan, Chinese Taipei, and the United States, 
had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the meeting's agenda. He also informed 
delegations that the United States had circulated a Room Document (RD/CTG/4) , which was also 
available in the room. 
12.2.   The delegate of  the United States  regretted to be compelled to raise  again , for the 
fourth  time in this Council, concerns regarding India's tariff increases on telecommunications and 
ICT products. In July 2017, shortly after  the June  2017 CTG  meeting, India had increased  its tariffs 
on additional ICT products , as indicated in India's Customs Notification  56/2017. These new 
customs duties affected several essential IT  products, such as smartphones, base stations, and 
printer ink cartridges, in addition to the duties that I ndia had already imposed on other 
telecommunications equipment p ursuant to Customs Notification  11/2014. These were product 
categories for which India had a WTO  binding obligation to provid e duty-free treatment. 
Document  RD/CTG /4, mentioned by the Chair, contained an example of the inconsistencies 
between India's duty-free bound commitments and duties actually being charged at the border on 
certain products.  
12.3.   The snapshot of India's bound schedule in HS2007 nomenclature (WT/Let/1 072), contained 
in page  2 of the room document , indicated that , with regard to tariff line  8517.62 , India had a 
binding commitment of zero  duty. This commitment also applied at the HS  subheading level ; 
consequently , any national tariff line falling under t he subheading was also subject to a bound rate 
of zero. However, when looking at the snapshot of India's MFN  tariff schedule, as contained in 
page 3 of the room document, the applied rate for tariff line HS  8517.62.90 was 10%. This was 
contrary to India's WTO bound commitment indicated in document  WT/Let/1072 , and an example 
of India's apparent inconsistencies in relation to its WTO  tariff commitments.  
12.4.   In addition , India's tariff increases imposed on 1  July 2017 had not been updated in the 
information avail able from India's Central Board of Excise and Customs since 30  June 2016. This 
lack of transparency made it almost impossible for traders to verify the actual applied rate and 
created uncertainty for US and global companies ; for example, any business and trader seeking 
information on India's tariff on mobile phones or base stations would assume that India's tariff for 
those tariff lines was zero, and would have no way of knowing that India had in fact raised its duty 
on these items to 10% pursuant to Customs Notification  56/2017.  
12.5.   Several US  companies had indicated that , in order to determine the effective tariff rate 
applied to their products , they were obliged to refer to multiple customs notifications that had 
been issued over a decade ag o. If this had been a challenge for large multinational companies, one 
could easily imagine how difficult it would be for a micro, small, or medium -sized business to 
determine the duty rate that would actually be applied to their products.  G/C/M/130  
 
- 31 - 
 
  12.6.   She drew the Cou ncil's attention to a recent stakeholder consultation paper on "Promoting 
Local Telecom Equipment Manufacturing", issued by India's Tel ecom Regulatory Authority on 
18 September  2017, whose purpose was "to arrive at recommendations that would enable Indian 
telecom industry to transition from an import dependent industry to a global hub for 
manufacturing." One of the questions asked in this paper was whether there were "any issues 
under ITA which need to be addressed for making the local Telecom Manufacturing  more 
competitive and robust". In this vein, the US asked India whether it was actively considering to 
raise customs duties on additional products for which it had a bound duty rate of zero in its 
certified WTO  schedule, and if the comments received in res ponse  to this paper, the deadline for 
which was 30  October  2017, would be made publicly available on the internet and , if so,  where 
Members could access those comments.  
12.7.   The US again urged India to revoke Customs Notific ations  11/2014 and 56/2017, to 
reinst ate duty-free access where India had committed to provide duty-free access, and to ensure 
that it would refrain from raising customs duties on products where India had a WTO  commitment 
to provide duty -free access to its market. She also called upon India t o update its official tariff 
schedule as published on its Customs website and also to notify its current MFN  applied schedule 
to the WTO , and to do so  without delay.  
12.8.   The delegate of Japan  echoed previous concerns raised over India's applied customs duties 
on ICT  products, an issue that had long been discussed in the ITA and Market Access Committees, 
as well as in the CTG. Japan was still not convinced by India's explanation concerning the 
ICT products in question, and in particular with regard to the introd uction, as from July  2017, of a 
10% duty on eight  tariff lines. This increased the costs for Japanese companies as India's binding 
tariff commitments for the eight  items at issue was clearly zero. Japan believed that this duty rate 
was inconsistent with In dia's Schedule of Concessions and adversely affected India's investment 
promotion and business environment. Japan urged India immediately to reinstate zero duties on 
the ICT  products at issue.  
12.9.   Japan was also closely monitoring the notice for public comment  circulated on 
18 September  2017 by the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, which suggested that the 
Government could be considering imposing new duties on ITA  products. Japan believed that any 
future action taken by the Government of India should be fully consistent with the 
WTO Agreements.  
12.10.   The delegate of  the European Union  reiterated the concerns of her delegation regarding 
the imposition of a 10%  customs duty  on an increasing number of ICT  products in India, including 
base stations, mobile phones and  their parts, ink cartridges, and other products. The EU and other 
Members had addressed questions to India seeking clarification on th e classification of certain 
ICT products falling under the scope of ITA-1, including two  other products that did not respect 
India's binding commitments under the ITA-1 coverage, namely "digital still video cameras", 
classified under tariff line  8525.80.20, and "other electronic integrated circuits (EICs)" classified 
under tariff line  8542.39. 00. The EU remained unconvinced by India's limited responses to these 
questions, and in particular with regard to the maintenance of the 10%  import duty on IT  products 
covered by ITA-1 and bound at zero in India's schedule of commitments. The EU regretted to be 
compelled to raise these issues again but , after several attempts to solve them in various 
committees, as well as bilaterally, India had still not addressed these issues . India was the only 
ITA Member that levied duties on these products. The EU woul d also closely monitor the public 
comment procedure on "Promoting Local Telecom Equipment Manufacturing'', recently launched by 
India. The European Union called upon India to refrain from re -introducing duties on any other 
ITA products.  
12.11.   The delegate of Canada shared the concerns previously raised by other delegations in the 
CTG, as well as in the ITA and Market Access Committees , regarding the increase in India's applied 
tariffs on a broad range of ICT  products that, in Canada's view, was inconsistent with India's 
bound commitments and ran contrary to the objectives of multilateral tariff liberalization. Canada 
had both systemic and commercial concerns with regard to these applied rates as well as with 
India's unwillingness to respond meaningfully to Member' s quest ions and concerns in this area.  
12.12.   India's justification , contained in India's Customs Notification No. 56/2017, dated 
30 June 2017, for raising tariffs to 10% on eight  additional ICT  products , was not acceptable. 
Canada repeated its call to India immediately to rescind tariff increases above its bound G/C/M/130  
 
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  commitments and to refrain from pursuing any further tariff increases. The room document  
circulated by the United States clearly illustrated why this issue had been raised by Members at a 
number of meetings of this Council and at other committees. The examples therein were 
extremely clear. Canada looked forward to an update from India as to when it would bring its 
applied tariffs in to line wit h its bound tariff commitments.  
12.13.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  recalled that her delegation had raised this issue on several 
occasions in this Council and in the ITA and Market Access Committees. Chinese Taipei also 
remained unconvinced by India's explanation a nd still had significant concerns with regard to this 
issue. Like others, Chinese Taipei considered that the increased tariffs on ICT  products ran against 
the objective of trade tariff liberalization . Chinese Taipei encouraged India to eliminate the tariff  
applied on certain ICT  products and to ensure that its measures were fully consistent wit h its 
obligation s under the ITA.  
12.14.   The delegate of Norway  said that , for Norway,  this was a WTO  trade concern at the most 
basic level because , in Norway's view, a Membe r's applied tariffs must not exceed those listed in 
their schedules and technological advancement within the product segment did not in any way 
alter that simple fact. The US room document  clearly showed that this was not the case with 
India's applied tari ffs. An interpretation implying that a product segment could somehow be 
automatically released from binding commitments upon technological advancement would 
seriously undermine the system. Norway had both an economic and a systemic interest in this 
issue a nd considered it fundamental that Members abide by their WTO  obligations. He called upon 
India to provide further clarification on this issue.  
12.15.   The delegate of Viet Nam  reiterate d Viet Nam 's concerns expressed at the 
6 November  2017 meeting of the ITA  Committee regarding India's recent tariff increase on certain 
ICT products. Viet Nam considered that the tariff increases were not consistent with India's 
WTO binding commitment and called upon India promptly to clarify the issue.  
12.16.   The delegate of Thailand  echoed the previous concerns raised regarding India's increase in 
duties on certain ICT  products through Customs Notifications No.  11/2014 and No.  56/2017. The 
increased duties for ICT  products above bound levels were inconsistent with India's WTO  binding 
commitments. She called upon India to justify the introduction of import duties in light of India's 
commitment s pursuant to the ITA and its Schedule of concessions.  
12.17.   The delegate of Singapore  reiterated Singapore's continued interest in this issue , which 
had already appeared on the agendas of this Council and the Market Access and ITA  Committees. 
Singapore had engaged bilaterally with officials in New Delhi and would continue to monitor any 
new developments on this issue.  
12.18.   The delegate of  the Republi c of Korea  thanked the United States for the room document 
showing a snapshot of India's tariff schedule on ICT  products. As an IT -exporting country, Korea 
had already raised this issue in previous CTG  meetings but was disappointed that India had so far 
not changed its position regarding customs duties applied to ICT  products in order to bring these 
into line with its ITA  commitments. Like other delegations, Korea was not convinced by India's 
arguments and again called upon India to reinstate zero duty rate s on IT  products covered by the 
ITA in fulfilment of its WTO  obligations. India sho uld further clarify this issue.  
12.19.   The delegate of Switzerland  also shared the concerns expressed by other Members 
regarding the duty treatment of certain telecommunication s equipment in India. This issue related 
directly to India's binding commitments given India's imposition of import duties on information 
technology products that were above the rates bound by India in its Schedule of Concessions, 
namely a bound rate of 0%.  This represented a breach of India's WTO  commitments and deserved 
clarification. Switzerland also urged the Indian Government to reconsider its intention to impose 
import duties on additional IT  products, such as mobile phones, for which India's bound rat e was 
also at 0%, as reflected in India's HS2007 certified Schedule for its tariff line  8517.12.00. Any 
decision to impose an import duty on these goods would be fully inconsistent with that 
commitment.  
12.20.   India's latest certified schedules showed that, in the case of HS  tariff line 8517.62 , the 
bound duty rate was zero while , in the published MFN  tariff rates , the duty levied at the border by G/C/M/130  
 
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  India for this tariff line was 10%. Therefore, the only conclusion one could reach was that the 
MFN published tariff r ates were inconsistent with India's 2015 certified Schedule of concessions. 
But there were other IT  products for which the same situation prevailed, such as mobile phones , 
as indicated in India's HS  tariff line  8517.12.00. Switzerland believed that any dec ision taken by 
India to impose an import duty higher than that set out  in its Schedule of concessions would be 
fully inconsistent with its binding commitments.  
12.21.   The delegate of Australia  shared the concerns expressed by previous speakers.  
12.22.   The delegate of India thanked delegations for their continued interest in India's customs 
duty regime for certain ITC  products. Interventions had referred to the following four  concerns: 
(i) the imposition of customs duties on certain IT and telecom items as indicated in Cu stoms 
Notification  No. 11/2014; (ii)  the imposition of a customs duty on certain telecom products, 
including mobile phones , effective as from 1  July 2017; (iii)  the issue of transparency; and (iv)  the 
public comment procedure on "Promoting Local Telecom Eq uipment Manufacturing''.  
12.23.   With regard  to India 's Notification No.  11/2014 , he recalled the written responses filed by 
India in document  G/IT/W/45, containing the questions posed by certain Members in 
document  G/IT/W/42. India had also provided replies  to these questions  in various meetings of the 
Committee on Market Access and the CTG. Therefore, interested Members should refer to India 's 
written replies and oral statements made in the aforementioned WTO  bodies. India was ready to 
consider any specific  issue delegations might have in relation to the technical aspects of these 
products and their tariff classification while keeping in mind the technological progression in 
telecom and IT  products.  
12.24.   On the customs duty imposed on certain telecom products in July 2017, India had provided 
Customs Notifi cations No.  56 and 57 of 30  June 2017, and had also provided written responses to 
the questions addressed to it. India was fully aware of its commitments under the ITA -1 and 
abided by these . India had signed the ITA-1 in 1997 and had submitted its Schedule of 
Concessions, which had been subsequently certified in document  WT/Let/181. India did not intend 
to act beyond the scope of its ITA -1 commitment , contained in document  WT/Let/181. Intensive 
discussions had tak en place among India 's relevant agencies on the coverage of these products 
and India 's ITA commitments. Consequently, India considered that these products were not part of 
ITA-1 signed by India. India would welcome inputs from the concerned delegations on their 
perception of the coverage of these products under ITA -1. 
12.25.   On the transparency issue , raised by the United States , he indicated that , in July  2017, 
when the GST had been launched for the first  time, there had been some disruption but that 
India's webs ite cbse.gov.in contained all the relevant information in English, including information 
relating to customs duties and MFN  tariffs applied to ITC  products. India was ready to discuss with 
the US any issue relat ing to transparency on its websi te, such as the duty component.  
12.26.   India would like to receive further information from Members regarding  their concerns on 
the public comment procedure, particularly as this was the first  time that the issue had been 
raised. In this vein , he requested interested delegat ions to provide their statements in written 
form fo r their consideration in Delhi.  
12.27.   The delegate of the United States  thanked India for its responses. However, she reiterated 
the call made to India at the previous meeting  of the ITA  Committee , to respond directly to the 
room document,  in which there was an apparent inconsistency between India's binding 
commitments for the telecom equipment products classified under tariff line  8517.62 versus the 
10% duty actually applied on the same product. Regarding the pu blic comment procedure , she 
clarified that this was a reference to document  12/2017 , issued by India 's Telecom Regulatory 
Authority. With regard to the issue on transparency , she indicated that , while speaking,  she was at 
the same time consulting India's w ebsite of the Central Board of Excise and Customs , and could 
see that the tariff schedule published therein was from 2016, effective for 2016 -2017. Thus, 
Members' concern s on this issue remained valid.  
12.28.   The Chairperson  thanked delegations for their interven tions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made.  G/C/M/130  
 
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  12.29.   The Council so agreed . 
13  UNITED STATES OF AME RICA – SEAFOOD IMPORT MONIT ORING PROGRAMME – 
REQUEST FROM THE PEO PLE'S REPUBLIC OF CH INA 
13.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated 30  October  2017, the 
delegation of China had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the  meeting's  agenda . 
13.2.   The delegate of China  said that , being both the largest developing Member and a major  
fishing Member, China attached great importance to combating illegal fishing, as well as to 
protecting marine mammals. China wished to further strengthen cooperation with the US both in 
this regard and in the promotion of the sustainable development of gl obal fisheries. However, 
China believed that there was an unreasonable aspect in the two US  acts issued in 2016 relating to 
trade in aquatic products, namely the Seafood Import Monitoring Programme (SIMP) and the fish 
and fish products import regulations u nder the Marine Mammal Product Act, MMPA.  
13.3.   With regard to aquatic species exported by China to the US, around 50% were aquaculture 
products and 46% were processed products with imported material. Only around 4% were marine 
fishing products. Aquaculture prod ucts had no relation to the fishing of marine mammals, and the  
traceability of aquaculture products outside the US did not help in preventing IOU  fishing and 
aquatic products fraud. Therefore, it was obviously unreasonable for the two  acts to include 
cultivated species in the scope of their application. China hoped that the US would revise the 
two acts in order to remove aquaculture and aquatic products from their application and so as to 
promote a healthy bilateral trade in aquatic products. In the meantim e, China requested the US to 
formulate the relevant laws and regulations on the basis of non-violation of  WTO rules, not 
creating new trade barriers, and ensuring a normal bilateral aquatic trade. China hoped that the 
fisheries industry, fishermen's liveli hood, and the food needs of both countries would not be 
adversely affected. China and the US were both major fishing and fish -consuming countries , as 
well as being major trading partners in aquatic products. China requested the US for a further 
exchange of  views on the acts  in question . 
13.4.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  shared China 's views relating to the US  SIMP and 
recalled the issues raised by his delegation at previous CTG  meeting s in 2016 and 2017. The 
Russian Federation looked forward to seeing the SIMP 's practical implementation, especially with 
regard to data verification aimed at ensuring that fish and seafood had not been caught by 
IOU fishermen. In its view , the verification of whether fish had been caught legally or not could not 
be performed without close cooperation with the competent authorities of third countries. In the 
absence of such verification, new requirements could be considered as excessively burdensome for 
busin ess and especially for small and medium -sized enterprises (SMEs).  
13.5.   The Russian Federation was of the view that measures aimed at combatting IOU  fishing 
should be an essential part of a government's fisheries management policy. Nevertheless, such 
measures should be WTO-compliant, based on close cooperation with other countries, and not 
more tr ade restrictive than necessary.  
13.6.   The delegate of the United States  noted that this agenda item referred only to the US  SIMP 
although China had referred to two  acts. There fore, sh e would refer only to the SIMP  in her 
responses . 
13.7.   The NOAA had welcomed the opportunity to visit China in early November  2017 to discuss 
the SIMP 's implementation. On 9  December  2016, NOAA Fisheries had published the final rule 
establishing the SIMP  in the Federal Register, establishing a mandatory compliance date as f rom 
1 January  2018 for the species included in the Rule. Notable aspects of the final Rule included 
streamlined requirements for small -scale fishers and an indefinite suspension of the reporting and 
record keeping requirements for shrimp and abalone. The US looked forward to continuing its 
engagement with Ch ina on the SIMP 's implementation.  
13.8.   With regard to the second  act mentioned by China, she indicated that China's comments 
would be conveyed to Capital and requested China to provide a written copy of its statement.  G/C/M/130  
 
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  13.9.   The Chairperson  thanked delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made.  
13.10.   The Council so agreed . 
14  THE RUSSIAN FEDERATI ON – TRADE RESTRICTING PR ACTICES – REQUEST FROM 
THE EUROPEAN UNION  
14.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated 30  October  2017, the 
delegation of the European Union had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the 
meeting's agenda. 
14.2.   The delegate of the European Union  regretted to have to refer again to issues that had 
already been raised at the last CTG  meeting but was obliged to do so as no progress had been 
made on these issues since then. The six  issues in question were as fol lows: (i)  the GOST  cement 
standard, which was a concern raised not only in this Council but also at the TBT  Committee; 
(ii) good manufacturing practices for pharmaceuticals; (iii)  the ban on exports of skins and hides; 
(iv)  import duties applied by Russia ; (v) the ban on fishery products from Estonia and Latvia; and 
(vi) the taxation regime concerning wine.  
14.3.   The GOST  cement standard was an issue that had already been raised three  times in this 
Council, and in the TB T Committee , but to date without result. T he EU deplored the fact that the 
Russian Federation had resorted to certification requirements and enforced them without prior 
consultation or even notification (for example, the 2017  amendments to the GOST  standard on 
cement certification, the standard GO ST R 56836 2016 , had not been notified). The current system 
was such that all cement imports had become impossible except for a few white cement 
shipments, for which it seemed that Russia was not self -sufficient; this could perhaps have 
explained why the authorization of EU  exports had been made on a piecemeal basis. There seemed 
to be no rationale for such disproportionate certification requirements and controls, which 
included, among others, strength tests to be carried out exclusi vely at the border, and quality 
controls to be issued by bodies that were in fact not nominated. These technical questions had also 
been raised by the EU in the TBT  Committee. And these concerns had only been further increased 
by the fact that a draft legi slation , at the level of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) , had added 
cement to the list of goods subject  to certification requirements.  
14.4.   With regard to the "good manufacturing practice" (GMP) certificates for pharmaceuticals, 
this was a requirement that had not yet been notified to the WTO, although it had been adopted in 
December  2015 and had entered into force on 1  January  2016 for new products, requiring them to 
have marketing authorization , and on 1  January  2017 for renewals of such authorization. The  EU 
had indicated at the last TBT  Committee meeting that the requirement in question implied a high 
number of controls abroad, which was hardly compatible with the existing Russian resources in 
terms of trained and available inspectors. Russia's written re sponse had confirmed the slow pace 
for the inspect ion of  plants and the allocation of the necessary certificates. Consequently, the EU 
had called for several measures to be taken by the Russian Federation in this regard , including an 
appropriate transition  period; and the EU had also requested that the specific issue of double 
inspection of veterinary products of sites manufacturing "Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients" and 
final products be reconsid ered by the Russian Federation.  
14.5.   On the ban on exports of ski ns and hides introduced by Government Decree No.  826 of 
19 August  2014, she recalled that it had been established initially for a period of six  months but 
had subsequently been extended several times . As a result, the export ban would have been in 
place f or approximately three and a half years given that it had been introduced in August  2014 
and had been recently renewed until 6 April 2018; this  was clearly not a temporary ban . The EU 
had raised this issue several times in the Committee on Market Access bu t the replies from Russia 
had not been convincing, especially since the latest renewal of the ban, already in place, 
invalidate s GATT  Article  XI(2)(a). The EU would appreciate further details and explanations 
regarding  the latest renewal of the ban.  
14.6.   On the issue of import duties, she again indicated that Russia continued to apply excessive 
duties on several tariff lines in spite of the case that the EU had successfully brought against G/C/M/130  
 
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  Russia five  years after its accession. She called upon Russia to al ign its applied tariffs to its bound 
schedule.  
14.7.   She recalled that the EU had several times raised the Russian ban of June  2015 on fishery 
products from Estonia and Latvia as a concern in the SPS  Committee but had still not re ceived a 
satisfactory response.  
14.8.   On the taxation regime concerning wine she noted that, in summer  2017, Russia had 
established a taxation regime that was heavier on imported than on domestic wines . According to 
this regime, only wines with geographical indications (GIs) could benefit from  lower taxation rates , 
but only domestic Russian w ines could qualify as GI  wines.  
14.9.   The EU would appreciate any updates from the Russ ian Federation on these issues.  
14.10.   The delegate of the United States  echoed the concerns raised by the EU regarding Russia's 
temporary ban on exports of raw hides and skins. The US had often been opposed to export bans 
as these were contrary to WTO rules, except under very limited circumstances, and asked if  Russia 
were using export bans as another tool in its toolbox of import sub stitution measures. By 
prohibiting exports, Russia depressed domestic prices and encouraged consumption of the 
domestic product to the detriment of imports. Like the EU, the US looked forward to receiving 
answers to the questions addressed to Russia, parti cularly with regard to the current status of the 
ban and Russia's p lans for removing it.  
14.11.   Like the EU, the US had also raised concerns over Russia's requirements for good 
manufacturing practice certificates, although it supported Russia's objective of ensur ing that 
pharmaceutical products were safe and effective . The US echoed the concerns raised by the EU 
about Russia's limited resources to implement its GMP  requirements, and the slow pace of 
inspections. Industry and local stakeholders in Russia had report ed that the GMP  requirement had 
caused significant delays in the registration of new medicines, and that the lives of Russian 
patients could be at stake. This requirement, from the agricultural perspective, could lead to a 
shortage of veterinary medicines for livestock, which could then negatively impact upon Russia's 
goal of increasing its food production. Also like the EU, the US had suggested steps to ensure that 
Russia's system would not be trade restrictive or discriminatory.  
14.12.   Her delegation also shared  the EU 's concerns about what appeared to be discriminatory 
taxes on imported versus domestically produced wine. National treatment was a fundamental 
principle of the WTO, and Ru ssia should clarify this issue.  
14.13.   The delegate of Ukraine  echoed the concerns raised by previous speakers about the 
Russian Federation's measures and called upon Russia to comply with its WTO  commitments, to 
ensure predictable and transparent conditions for trade, and to remove unjustifiable bans and 
discriminatory barriers  to trade.  
14.14.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  took note of the previous concerns and reminded 
Members that, as had already been explained in the TBT  Committee, the rationale for the 
mandatory certification of cement was to protect human health and safe ty as well as the 
environment. The requirements established by the technical regulation were applied equally to 
both domestic and foreign producers. The issue of GMP  certificates had also been discussed at the 
TBT Committee , and bilaterally, where Russia h ad fully explained its measure to the interested 
Members. The export ban on raw hides and skins aimed at assuring the implementation of State 
defence procurement. The problems concerning wine taxation had been partially addressed with 
interested Members, a nd the remaining issues may already have  been resolved with the 
amendments introduced to the tax code of the Russian Federation,  which had clarified that high 
excise duties on imported wines were not to be claimed for the period from 1  January  2016 to 
30 April 2017. The issue of tariffs was currently being discussed with the competent authorities. 
The concern about  temporary restrictions on imports of fishery products from Latvia and Estonia 
had been explained at the last SPS  Committee meeting, and the Russ ian competent authorities 
had been closely cooperating with the ir Latvian and Estonian colleagues in search of a positive 
outcome and an early resumption in safe trade. The solution would depend on the effectiveness of 
such cooperation.  G/C/M/130  
 
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  14.15.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
14.16.   The Counc il so agreed . 
15  MEXICO – ANTI -DUMPING DUTIES CALCU LATED ON THE BASIS O F "NON -MARKET 
ECONOMY" METHODOLOGI ES – REQU EST FROM THE RUSSIAN  FEDERATION  
15.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a  communication dated 30  October  2017, the 
delegation of the Russian Federation had requested the Secretariat to include this issue  on the 
meeting's agenda.  
15.2.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  informed the Council that , since 1990, Mexico had 
imposed four  anti-dumping measures on imports of steel from the Russian Federation. The duties 
were calculated on the basis of "non -market economy" methodologies. At the time of their 
imposition, the Russian Federation was not a WTO  Member; however, after more than five years 
since Russia's accession to the WTO the said measures were still in force. The latest expiry reviews 
of all of these four  measures had been conducted within these five  years, and in all of them, the 
Mexican inve stigating authorities had used "surrogate country" data for the calculation of normal 
values.  
15.3.   WTO law required the use of costs from the country of origin of the exported goods and 
there were only two possible justifications for derogation from this rule: (i)  when the exporting 
country had a complete or substantially complete monopoly of its trade and all its domestic prices 
were fixed by the State; and (ii)   when there were specific accession commitments regarding price 
comparability. Neither case was  applicable to the Russian Federation.  
15.4.   During various bilateral and multilateral meetings with the Mexican authorities, Mexico had 
suggested that the measures might be reconsidered only if Russian exporters would fully 
participate in the reviews and demonstrat e that the Russian Federation's  economy was indeed a 
"market economy". This approach was unacceptable for at least two  reasons: (i)  there was no 
legal justification for exporters to bear an additional burden to substantiate market conditions in 
the Russian  Federation; and (ii)  the non -participation of Russian exporters in the review was not 
an excuse for the continuation of the application of duties based on non -market economy 
methodology. Russia called upon Mexico to draw the attention of the investigating  authorities to 
this problem and urged it to bring the measures at issue, as well as the anti -dumping practices, 
into compliance with the WTO  rules.  
15.5.   The delegate of Mexico  said that her authorities had been surprised by this agenda item 
because , over the last two  years , bilateral consultations had taken place between experts from 
both regulatory authorities, such that at the last four  Anti-Dumping (AD) Committee meetings, 
Russia had not raised this question. Given that the issue had not been rais ed at the Committee 
level it could not be implied that such instance had been exhausted, particularly as there had been 
no discussion at that level. Mexico considered that the Committee meetings were the appropriate 
place for Members to express and address  specific trade concerns before bringing them to the 
attention of the Goods Council.  
15.6.   Regarding Mexico's AD  procedures and the five -year reviews, she indicated that Mexico's 
general regulatory system allowed, on a case -by-case basis, to consider a country o r a particular 
industry subject to an investigation as a non -market economy (NME). In this vein, and according 
to the Declaracion Con junta (Joint Declaration) of 28  June 2011, made by the Mexican and Russian 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, both countries agr eed that when it came to dealing with trade remedy 
disputes, and in conformity with WTO  rules and the Mexican Law on International Trade and its 
Regulation, Russia would receive the same treatment as any other country. Consequently, what 
both countries had  agreed was that the Mexican authority would determine , on a case -by-case 
basis, if the sector or industry under investigation was operating in conformity with market 
economy principles, and would examine on that basis any information presented by Mexican 
producers, foreign producers, or any other interested party. In other words, in the said 
Declaration, Mexico had confirmed that there would be no automatic determinations as to the 
market economy status of the Russian economy , but that when it applied  the general regime 
Mexico would also consider the particular situation of the sector or industry concerned . Such G/C/M/130  
 
- 38 - 
 
  analysis would be based upon information provided by Russian exporters, the Russian 
Government, Mexican producers, and others.  
15.7.   During the meetings held with Russian officials, Mexico had emphasized the need for 
Russian exporters and the Russian Government to provide the Mexican authorities with detailed 
information as to the way in which their economy was operating  in respect of e ach anti -dumping 
procedure . This was in line with domestic and international regulations, and with the said 
agreement between Russia and Mexico. However, no relevant  information had been provided.  
15.8.   In light of the above, the Mexican authority had reached it s decision based on the 
information available, including that provided by Mexican producers and the Mexican Investigating 
Authority. Consequently, the treatment provided to the Government of Russia and its exporters 
was in keeping with the provisions of the WTO Agreements, Mexican domestic regulations, and the 
Joint Declaration of 28  June 2011. Moreover, Mexico had raised this issue with Russian 
Government officials in the past, and remained ready to deal with this matter with Russia through 
the relevant re gulatory bodies.  
15.9.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
15.10.   The Council so agreed . 
16  EGYPT – MANUFACTURER REGISTR ATION SYSTEM – REQUEST FROM THE EUR OPEAN 
UNION  
16.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that , in a communication dat ed 30  October  2017, the 
delegation of the European Union had requested the Secretariat to include this item on the 
meeting 's agenda . 
16.2.   The delegate of the European Union  recalled the calls that her delegation had made to Egypt 
in the TBT  Committee inviting E gypt to suspend its manufacturers' registration system so as to 
fully abide by WTO  rules. These measures overlapped with existing requirements in a number of 
sectors and lacked transparency. The EU would appreciate the prompt granting of authorizations 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for mandatory registration of foreign companies wishing to export 
to Egypt under Decree  43/2016, particularly when Egypt's General Organization of Export and 
Import Control (GOEIC) had accepted and processed the f iles regard ing these companies.  
16.3.   The EU was concerned about the disproportionate obstacles to trade that these measures 
created, and which, in addition, were detrimental to Egypt's economy, and which had hampered 
EU exporters from reaching Egyptian markets for more th an a year.  
16.4.   The EU acknowledged that the measures had been adopted in a context of serious foreign 
currency shortages but, following the recent implementation of economic reform s under the 
IMF programme, including floatation of the Egyptian currency, foreign reserves were now almost 
at their peak and had exceeded pre -2011 levels; there was thus no further need to maintain 
restrictive meas ures aimed at reducing imports.  
16.5.   The EU called upon Egypt t o reconsider and revise its arrangements in consultation with its 
stakeholders, but also to notify them to the TBT  Committee before their enforcement. Such revised 
arrangements should meet the objectives sought without creating a disproportionate impact on  
trade, should be WTO -compliant , and should be notified in conformity with WTO  rules, including 
allowing sufficient time for consultation before their adoption and entry into force.  
16.6.   The delegate of Switzerland  reiterated the concerns on this issue expresse d by his 
delegation at previous CTG and TBT  Committee meetings. Switzerland still had difficulty 
understand ing the rationale behind such stringent quality certification and registration 
requirements, and how this decree would contribute to the public polic y objectives of the Egyptian 
authorities. Switzerland believed that the requirements created unnecessary obstacles to trade and 
remained concerned about the lack of clarity in the registration process, the requirements to be 
fulfilled, and the actual imple mentation of the measure.  G/C/M/130  
 
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  16.7.   Nevertheless, he thanked Egypt for the recent progress made during bilateral exchanges on 
this issue, for the availability of Egypt's delegation , and for having provided information and 
clarification a bout the registration process . Since the latest information had only been provided the 
day before the meeting, Switzerland would carefully analyse it and revert  back to Egypt with any 
questions or comments it may have  as soon as possible. Switzerland acknowledged the capacity 
constrai nts faced by Egypt.  Even so, he encouraged Egypt to create a publicly accessible database 
of registered companies in order to improve transparency in the regis tration process.  
16.8.   The delegate of the United States  thanked the EU for having again raised this is sue; the US 
had similar concerns , which had likewise  not yet been addressed by Egypt.  
16.9.   The delegate of Ukraine  echoed the EU's concerns and indicated that there had been no 
progress made in bilateral consultations between Ukraine and Egypt. He encouraged Eg ypt to 
consider a less trade -restrictive measure to bring its legislation and implementation of the 
manufacturers' registration system  into compliance with the WTO and TBT  principles and rules.  
16.10.   The delegate of Egypt  thanked delegations for their ongoing interest in this matter, took 
note of the concerns raised, and referred the Council to the replies provided at its previous 
meetings2 and at meetings of the TBT  Committee. Egypt believed that any credible manufacturer 
could easily comply with the requireme nts of Decree  43/2016; indeed, since its entry into force, 
not only had hundreds of producers and manufacturers been registered after having successfully 
submitted their complete files, but no t one company's registration request had been rejected to 
date. Decree  43/2016 was permanent in nature and currently Egypt was not considering 
suspending or reviewing its application.  
16.11.   With regard to transparency, privacy restrictions did not allow for the publication of some 
of the data , such as the list of companies t hat had submitted applications and those that had been 
accepted. However, Egypt had shared with interested delegations the list of their registered 
companies and continued to encourage its trading partners to approach Egypt's authorities with 
regard to any  pending applications. Consequently, after more than 18  months since its application, 
and given the number of companies  registered , Egypt believed that the regist ration requirement 
under Decree  43/2016 was not more trade restrictive than necessary, and tha t it complied with 
WTO rules and those under the TBT  Agreement in particular. He encouraged interested delegations 
to address this issue in the context of the TBT  Committee and expressed Egypt's readiness to 
provide assistance to foreign companies facing d ifficulties in the registration  process . All Members' 
concerns would be conveyed to Capital . 
16.12.   The Chairperson  thanked delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made.  
16.13.   The Council so agreed . 
17  CHINA – CUSTOMS DUTIES ON CERTAIN IN TEGRATED CIRCUITS – REQUEST FROM 
THE EUROPEAN UNION, CHINESE TAIPEI, AND THE UNITED STATES  
17.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in communications dated 30  October  2017, the 
delegations of the European Union, Chinese Taipei, and th e United States, had requested the 
Secretariat to include this issue  on the meeting's agenda.  
17.2.   The delegate of the European Union  recalled that this issue had been raised by the EU and 
other Members in several WTO  committees and also bilaterally. The semico nductor industry 
associations from several Members had also expressed their concerns in writing  to the Chinese 
government. Regrettably, no progress had thus far been made.  
17.3.   She recalled that, as reflected in China's certified WTO  Schedule of concessions, Ch ina had 
committed to maintain zero  tariffs on some of the product lines identified as MCOs that were 
already duty free. However, China's duty rate for 2017 had been increased for some MCOs, from 
                                                
2 See document  G/C/M/129, paragraphs  11.13–11.17, and document  G/C/M/128, 
paragraphs  20.63 -20.68. G/C/M/130  
 
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  0% in 2016 to 3.4%, including some MCOs covered under ITA  duty-free lines. This went against 
the spirit of the ITA.  
17.4.   The EU was particularly concerned by the tariff rate after transposition of line  8542.39.10, 
whose new tariff rate was 3.4%, while for ten of the original tariff line s the bound tariff in China's 
1 July 2016 Schedule was already zero. The new duties seemed to have been calculated by means 
of the duty averaging method and were well above the simple average of the original lines ( that is,  
2%). The EU believed that this also went against the letter and spi rit of the ITA and could 
constitute a violation of China's ITA  obligations. The EU looked forward to receiving an official 
clarification of the method followed by China and again requested China to r estore a zero tariff on 
all MCO  product lines covered by the ITA  Agreement.  
17.5.   The delegate of the United States  elevated again the concerns of the United States with 
regard to the change in China's applied duty rates for semiconductor products. This issue had 
previously been raised in both  the ITA  Committee and at the CMA.  
17.6.   In sum, since 1  January  2017, China had been imposing tariffs on a number of 
semiconductor products that were previously duty free by virtue of China's WTO  bound 
commitments. Unfortunately, and despite the issue having been raised in the WTO and bilaterally, 
to date the situation had not changed and semiconductor shipments were still subject to duty 
when less than one year ago the shipments would have been duty free. China should clarify the 
consistency of this situation  in relation to its WTO  binding tariff commitments, particularly as it 
appeared to be part of a trend in support of the "Made in China  2025" campaign.  
17.7.   China had indicated that this was merely a technical issue and that it had simply used one 
of the WTO -sanctioned methodologies to perform a complex HS  transposition for the 
semiconductor products  in question . However, the General Council Decision on HS  transpositions 
had made it clear that bound rates in a new HS  nomenclature should fully reflect the same lev el of 
concessions as in the previous nomenclature – that is , the scope of conce ssions should remain 
unchanged.  
17.8.   The core of the issue was that the scope of China's concessions had changed substantially 
and the value of those concessions had been impaired in  that the semiconductor products that 
were duty free for over a decade were now subject to duties. China had noted  that, while the tariff 
rates had increased for the ten  products that were previously duty free, the tariff rates were now 
relatively lower fo r the seven  other tariff lines that were previously subject to duty . While this was 
a truism of simple mathematics, what it concealed was the fact that 93% of China's imports on 
these 17  items entered under the 10  duty-free ta riff lines , based on 2015  trade. 
17.9.   The US pointed out that the General Council Decision on HS  transpositions allowed for the 
use of an alternative methodology only if combining the tariff lines was "unavoidable" as part of 
the HS  transposition process but, in the case of MCOs, the use of  a simple arithmetic average was 
most certainly avoidable. For example, China could have chosen to apply the lowest rate of any 
previous tariff line to the entirety of the new tariff line – in this case, to apply a zero  duty. 
17.10.   The US was not asking China to  apply a zero  duty to products that were previously subject 
to duty but to maintain its duty-free concessions by creating additional national tariff lines under 
HS heading  8542 for certain end-use products such as appliances. This was, indeed, the standard  
methodology that Members should apply in a transposition exercise.  
17.11.   Other ITA  Members had managed to implement the HS2017  transposition without difficulty 
and without raising rates on semiconductors . She asked why China could not do the same . She 
also urged China to reinstate zero  duties on all products previously under duty -free tariff lines in 
the previous nomenclature. China had an obligation to provide this duty-free treatment pursuant 
to its WTO  bound commitments, and should do so without delay.  
17.12.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  reiterated the concerns of her delegation over China's 
attempt, since the beginning of 2017, to impose tariffs on multiple component integrated circuit 
products at a higher rate than its current WTO  bound rate of zero  duty. Thi s was not a technical 
issue but an issue that had a direct bearing on China's WTO  binding commitments, and which 
violated its obligation s under GATT  Article  II. Her delegation called upon China to provide G/C/M/130  
 
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  additional explanation as to China's justification of its measure to apply an automatic average to 
the previous rate of duty, and immediately to eliminate the tariff rates applied to imports of 
multiple component integrated circuit s. 
17.13.   The delegate of Thailand  echoed the concerns raised by previous speakers,  registered 
Thailand's interest in this topic , and requested China to provide a comprehensive response.  
17.14.   The delegate of Singapore  also registered Singapore's interest in  this implementation 
issue; Singapore would be closely monitoring this matter.  
17.15.   The dele gate of Japan  echoed the previous concerns raised about China's customs duties 
on certain products using multi -component semi -conductors (MCOs). China had explained that 
they had changed the MCO  applied duties by using the arithmetic average of the previous duty 
rates. However, China had not explained which specific tariff line and which tariff rate it had used 
to calculate the current MCO  applied tariff rates. Japan called upon China once again t o provide a 
"correlation table" clarifying the relationship between the previous duty rates for each tariff line at 
issue and the current duty rates.  
17.16.   At the CMA of 22  September  2017, China had said that it had reduced the duty rates of the 
four tariff line s in June  2017 but Japan had not been able to find any facts to confirm this remark. 
He called upon China to provide detailed information in this regard . 
17.17.   Japan also asked China to confirm its commitment to fulfil ling the phase -out schedule 
under the ITA  expansion, including the complete elimination of duti es on all MCO  products by 
2021.  
17.18.   The delegate of  the Republic of  Korea  requested China to reinstate a zero  duty rate on 
MCO items pursuant to its ITA  expansion commitments . 
17.19.   The delegate of China  thanked delegations for their interventions and said that China, one 
of the major trading partners in ICT  products, had fully participated in the ITA  expansion 
negotiation. China had separately implemented the tariff reduction commitment in accordance wit h 
the 2017  Chair's amendments to the WCO –MCO tariff lines which had been reclassified although 
the tariff levels had been based on the original tariff lines. Therefore, they were fully consistent 
with the relevant rules on tariff transposition and China's WTO commitment s. China had provided 
explanations on this issue , and in a detail ed manne r, in the ITA and MA  Committees.  
17.20.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
17.21.   The Council so agreed . 
18  BRAZIL – MEASURES RESTRICTING  BANANA IMPORTS – REQUEST FROM ECUADOR  
18.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated 30  October  2017, the 
delegation of Ecuador had requested the Secretariat to include this item  on the meeting's agenda.  
18.2.   The delegate of Ecuador  recalled that her delegation had repeatedly raised its concerns , in 
various WTO  bodies , regarding the restrictions placed by Brazil on importers of Ecuadorian  
bananas into its market. This issue began 20 years ago; since then , Ecuador had made every 
possible effort to m eet the requirements indicated by Brazil for those imports. For the last 
three  years, Ecuador had presented a work plan for those exports , thereby  fulfilling the 
requirements laid down by the Brazilian pest risk assessment of 2015. Despite the bilateral 
agreement reached with Brazil in the previous year, the work plan had been adjusted several 
times to respond to additional requirements laid down by Brazil. Thus far, the Brazilian market 
continued to be closed to Ecuadorian  bananas.  
18.3.   Maintaining such a prohibition , and doing so  for 20  years , represented a clear violation of 
the WTO Agreements, and Articles  5.1, 2.2, 5.6, 5.5, 2.3, and 5.7 of the SPS  Agreement  in 
particular . The situation had been further exacerbated in June  2017 when Brazil, instead of 
complying with the agreement reached to open its market to Ecuadorian  bananas, then requested 
Ecuador to provide guarantees on the application of a number of entirely new requirements. This G/C/M/130  
 
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  action reaffirmed the restrictive nature of the  measures and demonstrated that these measures 
were not in line with the risk assessment carried out by Brazil many years ago and that had led to 
Ecuador 's work plan to solve this problem.  
18.4.   Ecuador believed that it had fully complied with the phytosanitary requirements stipulated 
by Brazil and could not accept that, having reached an agreement 30  years ago on the conditions 
to regularize and legalize Ecuadorian  banana imports into Brazil, Brazil continued to lay down new 
requirements and adopt clearly protec tionist measures. This ran counter to WTO standards, 
provisions , and rules. Brazil should implement the instruction issued in March  2014 that stipulated 
phytosanitary requirements for banana imports and exports. Ecuador had done everything 
necessary to com ply with such requirements.  
18.5.   The delegate of Colombia  expressed the interest of his delegation in Br azil's responses to 
this issue.  
18.6.   The delegate of Brazil  referred to the clarifications prov ided by his delegation at the 
2 November  2017 meeting of the SPS  Committee and indicated that the Brazilian Government had 
been acting in line with its obligations under the SPS  Agreement. The process to authorize such 
imports required a thorough exchange of technical information in order to ensure that all 
phytosanitary risks were properly addressed. Brazil had b een transparent and had been 
cooperating closely with the Ecuadorian sanitary authorities. On 16  July 2017, the Brazilian 
sanitary authorities had requested from their Ecuadorian counterparts changes to the work p lan to 
mitigate the Mycosphaerella Filiensis  pest. On 8  November  2017, Ecuador responded to that 
request and its response was being considered by the competent Brazilian authorities. Brazil was 
interested in achieving a positive outcome for this issue, as had been the case regarding 
Ecuadorian shrimp exports to Brazil, an is sue that had also been raised at the last CTG  meeting. 
Brazil remained available for further bilateral consultations with Ecuador.  
18.7.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
18.8.   The Council so agreed . 
19  NIGERIA – IMPORT RESTRICTI NG MEASURES – REQUEST FROM NORWAY  
19.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated 30  October  2017, the 
delegation of Norway had requested the Secretariat to include this item on the meeting's agenda . 
19.2.   The delegate of Norway  said that the re had been some positive development s with regard 
to exports of certain products to Nigeria, Norwegian seafood  in particular , and that the currency 
restrictions had been replaced by import duties. He also acknowledged that Nigeria had altered its 
customs valuation practice such that the agreed price on the invoice was now used as the basis for 
calculating the customs fee.  
19.3.   The delegate of Nigeria  thanked Norway for his positive statement with regard to Nigeria 's 
efforts to address Norway 's concerns, and rec alled that at the last CTG  meeting her delegation had 
assured Members that Nigeria was committed to the WTO , regardless of Nigeria's current 
challenges. Additional  progress had been made by Nigeria in addressing the concerns raised by 
Members in past meeti ngs, including on  the issue of the exchange rate , which had now stabilized 
such that importers and exporters were able to access foreign currency at an official rate. There 
had also been improvement on ease of doing business thanks to reforms to enhance transparency 
and efficiency in the business environment. Members had also witnessed the seriousness of the 
present administration regarding advances in the process of business registrations , approval of 
permits, approval of visas, and the streamlining of port operations in Nigeria. Consequently, 
companies from certain Members had now indicated an investment interest in various sectors of 
Nigeria 's economy.  
19.4.   Other concerns previously raised by  Members had also been taken into account, and once 
the pertinent adjustment or changes had been finalized, those concerns would likewise be 
addressed. As soon as the relevant processes were completed  Nigeria would notify the changes to 
the WTO or dir ectly to the concerned Members.  G/C/M/130  
 
- 43 - 
 
  19.5.   She urged concerned delegations, especially Norway, to allow the internal consultations to 
continue in order to ensure that the Government receive d input from all the concerned parties. 
Nigeria was ever ready to continue with bil ateral consultatio ns with all interested Members.  
19.6.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
19.7.   The Council so agreed . 
20  WORK PROGRAMME ON EL ECTRONIC COMMERCE  
20.1.   The Chairperson  reminded delegations that, at the Council's previous meeting, the interim 
Chairperson had recalled that Ministers in Nairobi had adopted the  decision contained in 
document  WT/L/977 on the "Work Programme on Electronic Commerce" (Work Programme, or 
WPEC). In that Decision, Ministers had reaffirmed not only th e mandate of the "Work Programme 
on Electronic Com merce", adopted on 25  September  1998 and contained in document  WT/L/274, 
but also the subsequent Ministerial Declarations and Decisions on the Work Programme. Therefore, 
Ministers had decided to continue th e work under the WPEC since the last session, based on the 
existing mandate and guidelines and on the basis of proposals submitted by Members in the 
relevant WTO bodies, as set out in paragraphs  2 to 5 of the Work Programme. To this end, they 
had instructe d the General Council to hold periodic reviews in its sessions of July and 
December  2016 and July  2017 and to report to the next session of the Ministerial Conference 
based on the reports that might be submitted by those WTO  bodies entrusted with the 
imple mentation of the Work Programme. In this vein, and in order to fulfil the mandate, he invited 
delegations to express their opinions and to make suggestions as to how to work on the 
preparation of the periodic reviews to be held in the General Counc il at it s session of July  2017.  
20.2.   He also recalled that, at the last CTG  meeting, a thorough discussion on E -Commerce had 
taken place, where various delegations had explained the particularities of their submissions 
and/or expressed their views on different aspects of E-Commerce. As indicated in the meeting's 
agenda, four  JOB documents had been submitted, respectively, by Chinese Taipei 
(two documents ), ASEAN, and China. He therefore invited those delegations that had submitted 
documents on this issue to take the floor first, to be followed by other delegations that also wished 
to provide comments and views on the proposals tabled or with regard to any particular 
E-Commerce  aspect or topic , and mindful of the fact that at the next meeting of the General 
Council he would, under his own responsibility, present a factual report of the discussions held in 
this Council.  
20.3.   The delegate of China  reminded delegations that, in November  2016, China and Pakistan 
had submitted a communication on the WPEC to this Council, the CTS,  the CTD, and the General 
Council. Since then , China had further elaborated its proposal in the various meetings of the 
aforementioned WTO  bodies, and had proposed to focus discussions on how to further facilitate 
internet -enabled cross -border trade in goo ds, as well as related payment and logistic s services. 
China had also emphasized that the discussions on E -Commerce in the WTO should continue on 
the basis of the existing mandate, should uphold the development dimension, and should focus on 
areas  of commo n interest to Members.  
20.4.   China had proactively shared its experience in E -Commerce development with Members so 
as to promote in a pragmatic manner progress on this issue in the WTO. China had also 
encouraged Members to exchange information and compare best p ractice on E -Commerce in the 
relevant WTO  bodies, so as to facilitate a better understanding of E -Commerce among Members, 
especially developing country Members, and thereby to enable the development of E -Commerce 
and to benefit from it while fully reflecti ng the inclusiveness of the multilateral trading system.  
20.5.   China noted that, based on the proposals submitted, extensive and valuable discussions had 
taken place on E -Commerce in the relevant bodies, including the CTG, with particular consideration 
given to the specific concerns and needs that Members had raised dur ing the E -Commerce 
discussions.  
20.6.   In its communication on E -Commerce Elements for MC11 , submitted to the relevant 
WTO bodies on 18  October  2017, in document  JOB/CTG/9, China had identified some eleme nts of 
interest to most of the Members that could encourage worthwhile  continued discussion in the G/C/M/130  
 
- 44 - 
 
  future. China hoped that these elements would be reflected in the E -Commerce outcomes at MC11 
and as building blocks for future work on this issue. Without prejudice to continuing the ongoing 
respective discussions under the relevant bodies, and given the cross -cutting nature of 
E-Commerce, the elements could be explored in the dedicated discussion of the General Council, 
or at a body to be agreed upon by all Members.  
20.7.   On the moratorium, China considered that Members might decide to maintain the current 
practice of not imposing customs duties on electronic transmissions until the next session of the 
Ministerial Conference , to be held in 2019, as had been the case at previous Ministerial 
Conferences. China also considered that the free zones and customs warehouses, as well as other 
good practices aimed at facilitating cross -border E -Commerce, had playe d a key part in promoting 
the development of industries and had also facilitated parties' on -line transactions. These good 
practices could not only save time for cross -border logistics and delivery so as to cut costs, 
improve E -Commerce customer experience , and enhance the transaction efficiency for both sellers 
and buyers, but also facilitate the job of regulatory authorities by reducing the administrative costs 
while raising the administrative efficiency in the regulation of relevant goods. In this vein, China 
noted that that the use of free zones and customs warehouses to facilitate the operation of 
cross-border E -Commerce was without prejudice to Members' trade policies, their regulatory 
framework, and the implementation aspects. China encouraged Members  to share and explore 
successful experiences and other good practices with other Members, and suggested that the 
Secretariat, if Members so requested, should build a cooperative relationship with the World 
Customs Organization (WCO) to further explore faci litating measures relating to E-Commerce and 
better serve the objective of promoting inclusive trade and development through E -Commerce.  
20.8.   On the promotion of paperless trading, China believed that improved transaction efficiency, 
reduced transaction costs, and saved resources, were the greatest advantages of paperless 
trading. The Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) contained specific provisions in this regard, and 
Members should endeavour to promote paperless trading to the extent possible and, in particular , 
explore, through the implementation of the TFA, effective ways and means to encourage the 
development of E -Commerce, including the possibility of accepting trade administrative documents 
submitted electronically and those documents being granted the same  legal status as paper 
versions, and also to make trade administration documents available to the public in electronic 
form. A number of E -Commerce proposals also referred to electronic signatures, electronic 
authentication, and electronic contracts. In ac tual fact , cross -border internet -enabled trade in 
goods was not possible  without first signing and implementing an e -contract. E-signatures and 
e-authentication were key to the process itself . Furthermore, the recognition and standardization 
of e-signature s, e-authentication, and e -contracts, would help to enhance efficiency in 
transactions, secure electronic transactions, and improve consumer experience. The UNCITRAL 
Electronic Commerce Signature Model Law could serve as a basis for Members ' future discuss ions 
in the WTO.  
20.9.   In addition to the above -mentioned elements, China believed that Members might also 
exchange information on relevant policies, in particular with regard to transparency . Enhanced 
transparency, including appropriate policy changes, could help Members and their business 
communities to better understand each other's policies in the area of E-Commerce. Therefore, 
transparency was conducive to the development of E -Commerce, and the attainment of the goals 
of inclusive growth. Ch ina was also of the view that transparency was a fundamental principle in 
the WTO  Agreement s, and that trade -related policies concerning E -Commerce were wide -ranging 
due to the cross -cutting nature of E -Commerce. Therefore, Members should endeavour to enha nce 
transparency with regard to their E -Commerce policies.  
20.10.   China believed that the development of E -Commerce itself was inclusive in nature. Indeed, 
many Members' experience of E -Commerce development had proven that it was conducive to 
development and help ed small farmers and MSMEs in remote areas to integrate into vast domestic 
and international markets. China reiterated that work a t the WTO on E -Commerce should take into 
account the different stages of Members' development, in particular the specific dema nds of 
developing and least developed Members, and to strive to solve their developmental problems and 
enhance their ability to benefit from E -Commerce, while still taking into account the Special and 
Differential Treatment principle as an integral part of  the WTO 's work on E -Commerce.  
20.11.   Given the complexity of E -Commerce, and Members' realities  at different developmental 
stages, China believed that a pragmatic approach to preparations in the lead -up to MC11 would be  G/C/M/130  
 
- 45 - 
 
  to cooperate in a spirit of solidarity and  focus on areas of common interest. Moreover, in parallel 
with ongoing discussions in the relevant bodies, Members might jointly explore how to achieve 
more effective exchanges in an appropriate way to promote positive progress at MC11 and 
beyond. China we lcomed Members' extensive engagement in the discussions on the 
above -mentioned issues; these would spur the discussion onwards and contribute collectively to 
maintain ing the relevance of E -Commerce to the multilateral trading system.  
20.12.   The delegate of Chines e Taipei  introduced the technical views of his delegation contained 
in documents  JOB/CTG/7 and JOB/CTG/8 and referred to the explanations already provided in the 
Council for Trade in Services , and contained in document  RD/SERV/147 , of 13 October  2017.  
20.13.   Document  JOB/CTG/7 dealt with "The Paradigm Shift of Digital Trade", where a "deductive 
approach" had been adopted to try to identify the qualitative or fundamental differences between 
E-Commerce and traditional trade. The major difference was the so -called "atoms bits 
transformation" which meant that in the digital world bits were transferred, like an e-book, instead 
of atoms, like a paper magazine. The key issue was that atoms had borders, but bits did not. On 
this basis , two  issues could be extracted: fi rst, for the digital trade world what mattered was to 
think about how to remove trade barriers for bits, not atoms; and second, it was essential to have 
a better understanding of the new trade features under the digital revolution.  
20.14.   Document  JOB/CTG/8 addre ssed "Information Insufficiency in E -Commerce" or the 
difficulties with accessing E -Commerce markets from three  dimensions. The first difficulty was 
"Accessibility" , which related to whether each E -Commerce operator had an equal opportunity of 
being seen o nline and thus having equal access to potential customers. When certain cyberspace 
trade barriers were applied that restricted access to online markets these actually prevented 
potential buyers (or consumers) from even noticing the existence of the supplie rs. The second 
dimension concerned  "Connectivity" and related to infrastructure insufficiency, such as lack of 
electricity, or optical fibre. It was important for all Members to be able to connect to as many 
international potential buyers, or sellers, as p ossible. The third dimension, "Transparency", related 
to another important difficulty, which was "regulatory barriers". The requirements to comply with 
different regulations and standards represented significant costs for E -Commerce operators.  
20.15.   Two issues d eserved to be emphasized  with a view to contributing to greater fairness: the 
importance of reciprocally equal access and the removal of accessibility blocks. Increasing access 
to ICT  infrastructure was also a key factor in addressing the digital divide, as was making 
regulations transparent so as to allow  businesses to prepare themselves to enter into any possible 
future market. The two  documents explained above were not relevant to MC11 E -Commerce 
discussions but were intended simply to clarify the fundam ental issues of E -Commerce with a view 
to facilitating future discussions in the WTO.  
20.16.   The delegate of Canada  noted that over the past few years and, indeed, since 1998, there 
had been enlightening and substantive discussions in the CTG  and across the WTO on the technical 
or trade -related aspects of E -Commerce. However, it was time to take the next step at MC11 by 
establishing a working party entrusted to conduct preparations for and to carry out negotiations on 
related disciplines. Cana da was also in favour of extending the customs moratorium for a further 
two years to allow time for the negotiation of a permanent, binding prohibition on raising customs 
duties on electronic transmissions. Canada hoped that the outcome of MC11 would demon strate 
that the WTO remained relevant and capable of delivering results that could benefit all Members in 
an inclusive manner.  
20.17.   The delegate of Singapore  recalled that at the last CTG  meeting her delegation had already 
introduced the ASEAN  submission contai ned in document  JOB/CTG/6 and , with  regard to 
document  JOB/CTG/9, indicated that China's latest  submission had highlighted the various issues 
on which WTO  Members had positively been engaged for over one and a half  years . Singapore was 
interested in contin uing the E -Commerce discussions post -MC11 in a focused manner; China's 
proposal was instructive in this regard. Singapore believed that the WTO could be at the forefront 
of addressing emerging and contemporary trade issues, such as E -Commerce, and would co ntinue 
to work with all like -minded Members in the endeavour to ensure a good outcome on E -Commerce 
at MC11 and beyond.  G/C/M/130  
 
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  20.18.   The delegate of  the European Union  welcomed Members' submissions, particularly the new 
submissions from Chinese Taipei and the revised submission from China. The latter had clarified 
certain of the EU's questions about the previous version, which the EU looked forward to 
discuss ing further  with China. She also reminded delegations that the EU, together with other 
Members, had submitted doc ument  JOB/GC/140/Rev.1 , proposing the establishment of a Working 
Party on Electronic Commerce to address cross -cutting issues and to prepare and develop a debate 
and negotiations on trade -related aspects of E -Commerce on the basis of Members' proposals. The 
EU believed that this approach was balanced and constructive, and was mindful of Members' 
different views on what should be done at the WTO on E -Commerce, allowing any Member to bring 
any issue it consider ed important in to the Ministerial Decision and ensuing debate. This responded 
to the mandate Members had agreed in the WTO and was also mindful of existing sensitivities 
across the Membership. The EU was not suggesting adopting a pre -set agenda on E -Commerce  but 
proposing collectively to shape a negotiating agenda for the coming years, and looked forward to 
engaging further on that proposal.  
20.19.   The delegate of Ecuador  thanked delegations for their submissions and reiterated 
Ecuador's view that priority should be  given to negotiations on the issues under the Doha Agenda. 
Most of the proposals tabled referred to the establishment of a working group with the aim of 
begin ning negotiations on market access issues that went beyond the 1998  Mandate of the WPEC. 
Ecuador believed that , as a first step , Members should find solutions on the basis of which to close 
the digital gap before moving on the E -Commerce negotiations to goods and services. If not, it 
would be impossible for developing countries to compete on equal terms and, as indicated in 
China's proposal, the Special and Differential Treatment was the mechanism by which to increase 
the developing country capacities  to better benefit from E -Commerce, while taking into account 
their differing situations and their vary ing levels of development. However, China' s proposal also 
referred to work towards MC11, which would also go beyond the existing mandate. The WPEC had 
a clear mandate as concerned its function, including mechanisms to deal with the relationship 
between E -Commerce and development in an articulated manner, on the basis of discussions in 
the relevant bodies , and without the pressure of fulfilling a negotiating mandate. Any ministerial 
decision on electronic commerce should reaffirm the WPEC and continue with t he same mandate.  
20.20.   The delegate of South Africa  recalled and reaffirmed the statement delivered by her 
delegation on behalf of the African Group at the previous  CTG meeting, and requested that the 
Secretariat refer to it  in the minutes of this meeting .3 In the short time before MC11, she urged 
Members to engage substantively in the process led by the Chairman of the General Council.  
20.21.   The delegate of Bangladesh  thanked the proponents for their submissions on the way 
forward on E -Commerce. Bangladesh believ ed that E-Commerce had the potential to benefit SMEs 
and make trade inclusive for all. This potential should be realized; however , there were other 
issues besides trade, such as digital infrastructure, consumer protection, cyber security, and 
competition, which related to E -Commerce and that required an holistic approach in order to 
benefit SMEs , to make trade inclusive for all , and to work for all . 
20.22.   Some proposals were apparently denying the existing Work Programme , but this had not 
been put at issue, nor d enied , since it was established . The WPEC had been renewed by Ministers  
on several occasions  and its core elements remained  valid. Therefore, discussions should focus on 
some of the elements of the Work Programme, and also on technical issues, particularly  in the 
case of delegations such as Bangladesh whose  knowledge of E-Commerce  issues remained limited . 
Consequently, before launching any negotiation on E -Commerce, various Members needed first to 
develop a better understanding of the core elements  in the E-Commerce  discussion ; otherwise it 
would be immature to initiate a negotiation on it. In conclusion, the technical discussion should 
continue so as to address the core elements of the Work Programme.  
20.23.   The delegate of Switzerland  thanked the proponents and s aid that, as stated in other fora, 
Switzerland wished  for a multilateral declaration on E -Commerce, and supported all efforts that 
contributed towards this goal. The Ministerial Declaration should help to structure the work in a 
targeted manner. Therefore,  Switzerland supported the establishment of a formal Working Group 
which could evaluate if and which rules needed to be strengthened or elaborated in order to foster 
E-Commerce. Switzerland also welcomed a commitment towards development issues in this work  
and supported making the moratorium on E -Commerce permanent.  
                                                
3 See document  G/C/M/129, paragraphs  19.19 to 19.25.  G/C/M/130  
 
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  20.24.   The delegate of Brazil  also recalled that his delegation had already introduced the joint 
submission made together with Argentina and Paraguay. Given the horizontal aspect that the 
discussion wa s taking, Brazil believed that the most appropriate forum for discussion of this  issue 
in the short time before MC11 would be the consultations that the Chair of the General Council was 
conducting. With regard to the issue of the moratorium , he clarified t hat this related to a 
moratorium on electronic transmissions. Brazil reserved its right to provide its views on this issue 
during the GC Chair's consultations.  
20.25.   The delegate of Cuba welcomed the different submissions and noted that there was a 
movement to p romote initiatives in the form of the elaboration of disciplines on aspects that were 
still far from being clear. Substantial debate was still required  on the analysis of the digital divide 
and gap that developing countries and LDCs were suffering from , with minimal access to the 
internet , and the impact on developing countries and LDCs that the 4th Industrial Revolution would 
have. Cuba was not in favour of going beyond the current WPEC but was ready to explore and 
continue to discuss all these topics that were of great interest to many countries.  
20.26.   The delegate of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela  thanked delegations for their efforts 
in submitting proposals on E -Commerce. His delegation acknowledged the importance of 
continuing to work with the existing Work Programme and on each of the elements that had been 
identified in each of the bodies mentioned in the WPEC. It was important to understand this 
Programme and its implications for developing countries. Venezuela thanked China for having 
included this i n paragraph  6 of the proposal.  
20.27.   The delegate of Pakistan  welcomed China's new proposal and considered it a useful 
contribution. Pakistan looked forward to engaging in future discussions with China in a constructive 
manner.  
20.28.   The delegate of Australia  welcomed China's new proposal , as well as the positive 
contributions on E -Commerce from across the Membership . Australia supported the aim of 
realizing pragmatic progress on E -Commerce at MC11, incl uding extending the moratorium.  
20.29.   In Australia's view, elec tronic authentication and e -signatures facilitated both domestic and 
cross-border E -Commerce. Australia's legislation was technologically neutral and consistent with 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce (1996). E -signatures would be a good subject  
for the continuation of E-Commerce discussions in 2018.  
20.30.   China's proposal in relation to e -signatures, which Austra lia would continue to assess, 
might overlap with the EU  proposal contained in document  TN/S/W/64. Australia looked forward to 
working with Ch ina and other Members to advance E -Commerce discussions in the WTO both in 
the lead up to MC11 and in 2018.  
20.31.   The Chairperson  thanked delegations for their interventions and proposed  that the Council 
take note of the statements made.  
20.32.   The Council so agreed . 
21  CONSIDERATION OF ANNU AL REPORTS OF THE SU BSIDIARY BODIES OF T HE 
COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN  GOODS  
21.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that, pursuant to the "Procedure s for an Annual Overview of 
WTO Activities and for Reporting Under the WTO" (WT/L/105), which were adopt ed by  the General 
Council on 15  November  1995, all bodies constituted under Agreements in Annex  1A of the 
WTO Agreement were required to submit annually a factual report to the Council for Trade in 
Goods, and the Council was to take note of these reports.  
21.2.   The Chairperson proposed that the Council take note of th e following annual reports: 
(i) Committee on Agriculture, document  G/L/1194; (ii)  Committee on Trade -Related Investment 
Measures, document  G/L/1197; (iii)  Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measur es, 
document  G/L/1195; (iv)  Committee on Anti -dumping Practices, document  G/L/1193; 
(v) Committee on Safeguards, document  G/L/1192; (vi)  Committee on Market Access, 
document  G/L/1190; (vii)  Committee on Import Licensing, document  G/L/1187; (viii)  Committee G/C/M/130  
 
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  on Customs Valuation, document  G/L/1199; (ix)  Committee on Sanitary and Phyto sanitary 
Measures, document  G/L/1202; (x)  Committee of Participants on the Expansion of Trade in 
Information Technology Products, document  G/L/1200; (xi)  Preshipment Ins pection – Independent 
Entity, document  G/L/1191; (xii)  Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, document  G/L/1203; 
(xiii) Committee on Rules of Origin, document  G/L/1188; (xiii)  Committee on Trade Facilitation, 
document  G/L/1201; and (xiv)  Working Party o n State Trading Enterprises, document  G/L/1196.  
21.3.   The Council so agreed . 
22  ADOPTION OF THE ANNU AL REPORT OF THE COU NCIL FOR TRADE IN GO ODS TO THE 
GENERAL COUNCIL (G/C /W/746)  
22.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that the draft Annual Report of the Council had been circulat ed in 
document  G/C/W/746. In accordance with the "Procedure s for an Annual Overview of 
WTO Activities and for Reporting under the WTO" (WT/L/105), adopted by the General Council on 
15 November  1995, it was agreed that " [T]he respective sectoral Councils sh ould report in 
November each year to the General Council on the activities in the Council as well as in the 
subsidiary bodies" and that the reports of the sectoral Councils should be "factual in nature, 
containing an indication of actions and decisions tak en, with cross -references to reports of 
subordinate bodies and could follow the model of the GATT  1947 Council reports to the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES". He noted that the draft report would be updated in light of this meeting.  
22.2.   The Chairperson proposed that the Council agree to adopt the report, subject to update and 
revision to take into account the Council's work at this meeting.4 
22.3.   The Council so agreed . 
23  OTHER BUSINESS  
23.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that , at the star t of the meeting , he had said that he would raise 
two issues  under "Other Business" : (i) the appointment of officers to the subsidiary bodies of the 
Council for Trade in Goods; and (ii) the date of the next meeting.  
23.1  APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS TO THE SUBSIDIARY BODIES OF THE COUNCIL FOR 
TRADE IN GOODS  
23.2.   The Chairperson  reminded delegations that , at the last General Council meeting, and in line 
with the Guidelines for the Appointment of Officers to WT O bodies set out in document  WT/L/510, 
the Chairperson ha d announced that at the next GC  meeting he would make a f ormal 
announcement to begin the process of consultations for the  appointment of officers to WTO  bodies 
for 2018. In turn, as CTG  Chair, he had the intention to launch the process for the appointment of 
officers to the subsidiary bodies of the CTG in the se cond half of January  2018 and that, in this 
process, he would coordinate closely with the Chairperson of the Council for Trade in Services. He 
therefore encouraged group coordinators promptly to start their consultation process and to aim to 
be in a positi on to present their candidate s as early as possible in 2018.  
23.2  DATE OF THE NEXT MEETING  
23.3.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that the next meeting of the Council was scheduled to 
take place on Thursday, 15  March  2018.5 The Agenda would close on Friday, 2  March 2018.  
23.4.   With regard to closure of the CTG  Agenda he reminded delegations that, according to the 
Rules of Procedure, meetings of WTO  bodies were convened by a meeting notice (Airgram) issued 
not less than ten  calendar days prior to the date set for the mee ting. The agenda itself therefore 
closed one  WTO working day prior to circulation of the meeting notice; in other words, 11  calendar 
days before the date set for the meeting (or, if the date fell on a weekend, the previous Friday).  
                                                
4 The Annual Report to the General Council was circulated in document  G/L/1204.  
5 The date of the meeting was then moved to Friday, 23  March  2018. The Agenda closed on Monday, 
12 March  2018.  G/C/M/130  
 
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  23.5.   The meeting was closed . 
__________