RESTRICTED  
  
G/C/M/124  
 
13 April 2016  
(16-2063)  Page: 1/37  
Council for Trade in Goods    
 
MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF TH E COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS 
10 NOVEMBER 2015 
CHAIRPERSON: H.E. MR. HÉ CTOR CASANUEVA (CHILE) 
1   NOTIFICATION OF RE GIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS .................................................... 2  
2   NOTIFICATION OF ACTIONS TAKEN UNDER THE 1999 WAIVER FOR 
PREFERENTIAL TARIFF TREATMENT FOR LEAST-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
(WT/L/304 AND WT/L/759) ........................................................................................... 2  
3   MARKET A CCESS ISSUES ............................................................................................. 3  
3.1   DERESTRICTION OF HISTORICAL BILATERAL NEGOTIATING DOCUMENTATION OF 
THE TOKYO ROUND – DRAFT DECI SION (G/MA/W/ 115/REV.1)  ................................................ 3  
3.2   INTRODUCTION OF HARMONIZED SY STEM CHANGES INTO THE WTO SCHEDULES 
OF CONCESSIONS – COLLECTIVE REQU ESTS FOR WAIVER EXTENSIONS .................................. 3  
3.2.1   Introduction of Harmonized System 2002 Changes into WTO Schedules of Tariff 
Concessions – Draft Waiver Decision (G/C/W/715) ................................................................ 3  
3.2.2   Introduction of Harmonized System 2007 Changes into WTO Schedules of Tariff 
Concessions – Collective Request for Waiver Extension (G /C/W/716/Re v.1)............................... 3  
3.2.3   Introduction of Harmonized System 2012 Changes into WTO Schedules of Tariff 
Concessions – Collective Request for a Waiver Extensio n (G/C/W/717) ..................................... 4  
4   JORDAN – REQUEST FOR A WAIVER  RELATING TO THE TRANSITIONAL 
PERIOD FOR THE ELIMINATION OF THE EXPORT SUBSIDY PROGRAM FOR 
JORDAN (G/C/W/705, G/C/W/705/CORR.1, G/C/W/705/REV.1, AND 
G/C/W/705/REV.2) ......................................................................................................... 4  
5   UNITED STATES OF AMERICA – REQUEST FOR A WAIVER – AFRICA GROWTH 
AND OPPORTUNITY ACT (AGOA AS  AMENDED) (G/C/W/713) ....................................... 10  
6   ENLARGEMENT OF TH E EUROPEAN UNION ................................................................ 11  
6.1   PROCEDURES UNDER ARTICLE XXVIII OF GATT 1994 (G/L/1051/ADD.4) .......................... 11 
6.2   ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UN ION (CROATIA) – STATEMENT BY BRAZIL ................ 12 
7   ACCESSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA TO THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC 
UNION: PROCEDURES UNDER ARTICLE XXVIII:3 OF GATT 1994 (G/L/1110/A DD.1) ........................................................................................................ 14
 
8   ACCESSION OF THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC TO THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC 
UNION: PROCEDURES UNDER ARTICLE XXVIII:3 OF GATT 1994 (G/L/1137) ................ 16  
9   NIGERIA – IMPORT RESTRICTION MEASURES – REQUEST FROM CHILE, THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, ICELAND,  NORWAY, AND URUGUAY ................................................ 16  
10   INDONESIA'S IMPORT AND EXPORT RESTRICTING POLICIES AND 
PRACTICES – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPE AN UNION, JAPAN, AND THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERIC A ...................................................................................................... 19 
11   ECUADOR – IMPORT RESTRICTING MEASURES – REQUEST FROM JAPAN ................ 23  
12   CHINA – ISSUES RELATED TO TRADE IN SEAFOOD – REQUEST FROM 
NORWAY ........................................................................................................................  26 G/C/M/124 
 
- 2 - 
 
  13   ILLICIT TRADE: FIGHTING MONEY LAUNDERING IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
(CONCLUSIONS OF THE PANEL AT THE WTO PUBLIC FORUM 2015) – STATEMENT BY COLOMB IA ................................................................................................................ 28
 
14   UKRAINE – ISSUES RELATED TO CUSTOMS VALUATION – REQUEST FROM 
NORWAY ........................................................................................................................  29 
15   INDIA – PORT CLOSURES FOR APPLE IMPORTS – REQUEST FROM CHILE, 
THE EUROPEAN UNION, NEW ZEALAND, AN D THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ........... 31  
16   BRAZIL – NON-AUTOMATIC IMPO RT LICENSING – REQUEST FROM THE 
EUROPEAN UNION ......................................................................................................... 34  
17   PAKISTAN – DISCRIMINATORY TAXES – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN 
UNION AND THE UNITED ST ATES OF AMERICA .............................................................. 34  
18   CONSIDERATION OF ANNUAL REPO RTS OF THE SUBSIDIARY BODIES OF 
THE COUNCIL FOR TR ADE IN GOODS ............................................................................. 36  
19   ADOPTION OF THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN 
GOODS TO THE GENERAL CO UNCIL (G/C/W/718) ......................................................... 36  
20   OTHER BU SINESS .................................................................................................... 37  
20.1   Information about the expiry date of Section 15(a)(ii) of the Protocol on the 
Accession of  China ........................................................................................................... 37 
20.2   Date of next meeting............................................................................................... 37 
The meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG, or the Council) was convened by 
Airgrams WTO/AIR/CTG/3 and WTO/AIR/CTG/3/Add.1; the proposed agenda for the meeting was 
circulated in document G/C/W/719. The meeting pr oceeded on the basis of the following agenda. 
 At the start of the meeting, the delegate of Ch ina informed the Council that, under the agenda 
item "Other Business", his delegation intended to inform the Council about the expiry date of 
Section 15(a)(ii) of the Protocol on the Accession of China.  
The Chairperson indicated that, for consistency and methodological reasons, he would like to 
propose to the Council to consider the issue of th e extension of the period for the withdrawal of 
concessions requested by the Kyrgyz Republic, included in the Airgram as agenda item 17, 
immediately after agenda item 7 concerning Armenia's accession to the Eurasian Economic Union 
(EAEU), as both referred to negotiations under Article XXIV:6 of the GATT 1994. He also 
announced that he would refer to th e date of the next CTG meeting. 
 
The agenda was so agreed. 
 
1  NOTIFICATION OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
1.1.  The Chairperson recalled that, under the wo rking procedures agreed by the Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA), and follow ing adoption by the General Council of the 
Transparency Mechanism, the CTG was to be kept  informed of Members' notifications of new 
regional trade agreements.1 He informed the CTG that the Accession of the Kyrgyz Republic to the 
Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) (WT/REG366/N/1) had been notified to the CRTA 
and proposed that the Council take note of the information provided. 
1.2.  The Council so agreed. 
2  NOTIFICATION OF ACTIONS TAKEN UNDER THE 1999 WAIVER FOR PREFERENTIAL 
TARIFF TREATMENT FOR LEAST-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (WT/L/304 AND WT/L/759) 
2.1.  The Chairperson informed the Council that, under this agenda item, Thailand had submitted 
document G/C/W/714 and WT/COMTD/N/46, containing a notification of its duty-free quota-free 
scheme for least developed countries (LDCs). This notification had been made to the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD) under the prov isions in the Transparency Mechanism for 
                                               
1 See documents WT/REG16, WT/L/671, and G/C/M/88. G/C/M/124 
 
- 3 - 
 
  Preferential Trade Arrangements, and recalled that  this Council, at its meeting in March 2001, 
agreed to a method for handling notification s under the 1999 Waiver on Preferential Trade 
Treatment for LDCs. Accordingly, such notifications shall be referred by the CTG to the Sub-Committee on Least Developed Countries for Members' consideration and advice. The 
Sub-Committee, if necessary, would then report ba ck to the CTG on its discussions. It was clear 
that this approach did not preclude the CTG from engaging in discussions on any matter with regard to the 1999 Waiver for LDCs. He also indicated that Thailand's notification had been 
forwarded by the CTD to the Sub-Committee on LDCs for its substantive consideration, and where 
the notification had been considered at the meeting that took place on 18 September 2015. 
2.2.  In light of the above the Chairperson invited th e Council to take note of  Thailand's notification 
contained in document G/C/W/714 and WT/COMTD/N/46. 
2.3.  The Council so agreed. 
3  MARKET ACCESS ISSUES 
3.1.  The Chairperson noted that the Committee on Market Access (CMA) had forwarded four items 
for consideration by the Council and suggested that they be taken up in the order in which they 
were listed in the Airgram. 
3.1  DERESTRICTION OF HISTORICAL BI LATERAL NEGOTIATING DOCUMENTATION OF 
THE TOKYO ROUND – DRAFT DECISION (G/MA/W/115/REV.1) 
3.2.  The Chairperson drew Members' attention to  the draft decision on the "Derestriction of 
Historical Bilateral Negotiating Documentation" concerning the Tokyo Round contained in 
document G/MA/W/115/Rev.1. He informed the Council that, at its meeting of 4 June 2015, the 
Committee on Market Access had approved this decision on an  ad referendum basis and Members 
had been given two months to comment. As no co mments had been submitted, the decision could 
be considered as approved by that Committee. He also indicated that the Committee on Market 
Access had requested that the draft decision, once  approved, be forwarded to the General Council 
for adoption. 
3.3.  The Council so agreed. 
3.2  INTRODUCTION OF HARMONIZED SYSTEM CHANGES INTO THE WTO SCHEDULES OF 
CONCESSIONS – COLLECTIVE REQUESTS FOR WAIVER EXTENSIONS 
3.2.1  Introduction of Harmonized System 2002 Changes into WTO Schedules of Tariff 
Concessions – Draft Waiver Decision (G/C/W/715) 
3.4.  The Chairperson drew Members' attention to th e collective draft waiver decision circulated in 
document G/C/W/715, made in connection with the introduction of HS2002 changes into 
WTO schedules of tariff concessions. The current waiver decision was contained in 
document WT/L/945 and would expire on 31 December 2015. The proposed one-year extension of 
the waiver decision contained in document G/C/W/715 was considered at the formal meeting of the Committee on Market Access that took place on 29 September 2015 and forwarded to the CTG 
for action. He proposed that the Council approve the draft waiver decision contained in 
document G/C/W/715 and forward it to the General Council (GC) for adoption. 
3.5.  The Council approved the draft waiver decision contained in document G/C/W/715 and 
agreed to forward it to the GC for adoption. 
3.2.2  Introduction of Harmonized System 2007 Changes into WTO Schedules of Tariff 
Concessions – Collective Request for Waiver Extension (G/C/W/716/Rev.1) 
3.6.  The Chairperson drew Members' attention to th e collective draft waiver decision circulated in 
document G/C/W/716/Rev.1, made in connection with the introduction of HS2007 changes into 
WTO schedules of tariff concessions. The current waiver decision was contained in document WT/L/946 and would expire on 31 December 2015. The proposed one-year extension of 
the waiver decision was considered at the formal meeting of the Committee on Market Access that G/C/M/124 
 
- 4 - 
 
  took place on 29 September 2015 and forwarded to the CTG for action. He proposed that the 
Council approve the draft waiver decision contained in document G/C/W/716/Rev.1 and forward it to the GC for adoption. 
3.7.  The Council approved the draft waiver deci sion contained in document G/C/W/716/Rev.1 and 
agreed to forward it to the General Council for adoption. 
3.2.3  Introduction of Harmonized System 2012 Changes into WTO Schedules of Tariff 
Concessions – Collective Request for a Waiver Extension (G/C/W/717) 
3.8.  The Chairperson drew Members' attention to th e collective draft waiver decision circulated in 
document G/C/W/717, made in connection with the introduction of HS2012 changes into 
WTO schedules of tariff concessions. The current waiver decision was contained in document WT/L/947 and would expire on 31 December 2015. The proposed one-year extension of 
the waiver decision was considered at the formal meeting of the Committee on Market Access that 
took place on 29 September 2015 and forwarded to the CTG for action. He proposed that the Council approve the draft waiver decision contained in document G/C/W/717 and forward it to the 
General Council for adoption. 
3.9.  The Council approved the draft waiver decision contained in document G/C/W/717 and 
agreed to forward it to the GC for adoption. 
4  JORDAN – REQUEST FOR A WAIVER RELA TING TO THE TRANSI TIONAL PERIOD FOR 
THE ELIMINATION OF THE EXPORT SUBS IDY PROGRAM FOR JORDAN (G/C/W/705, 
G/C/W/705/CORR.1, G/C/W/705/REV.1, AND G/C/W/705/REV.2) 
4.1.  The Chairperson reminded delegations that, at the Council meeting of 17 November 2014, 
Jordan had submitted document G/C/W/705 containing a request for an extension of the 
transitional period for the elimination of its export subsidy programme. Subsequently, Jordan had submitted document G/C/W/705/Corr.1, clarifying the exact date of the extension of the 
transitional period. He also reminded delegati ons that, according to Article IX:3(b) of the 
Marrakesh Agreement, on 20 February 2015 his predecessor had made a factual report to the General Council informing it that this issue had been under the CTG's consideration for more than 
90 days, and that the CTG would continue its consideration of this request. Finally, he informed 
delegations that, on 23 June 2015, Jordan had submitted document G/C/W/705/Rev.1, in which Jordan limited its request for an extension of the current programme to only four years and that, on 7 November 2015, Jordan submitted a new revised request, in document G/C/W/705/Rev.2, 
reducing the extension of its phase-out programme to only three years and attaching a timetable 
indicating the further steps it would take to put in place a replacement and WTO–consistent programme. He also recalled that on 26 June the Co uncil had agreed to revert to this issue at its 
next meeting. 
4.2.  The delegate of Jordan thanked delegations for their continued interest in Jordan's waiver 
request and informed the Council that, since the last meeting, his authorities had worked closely 
with the Secretariat of the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures in order to 
explore an alternative programme consistent with WTO disciplines on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM). Indeed, a technical assistance activity had taken place in Amman at which the Secretariat had met with Jordanian officials responsible for this issue. In addition, Jordan 
continued to hold consultations both in Geneva and Amman with those Members that had 
expressed their readiness to provide technical assistance to Jordan so as to facilitate the phasing-out of the current subsidy programme an d to identify possible alternative programmes 
within the WTO legal framework through which to offer support to Jordanian Small- and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs). 
4.3.  As a result, and after having considered internally the critical and special circumstances being 
faced by the Jordanian economy given its geopolitical situation, his authorities had decided to 
further reduce the requested phase-out period to only three years counted as from 2015. Moreover, Jordan had also prepared and included in its revised request a detailed schedule during which it would undertake intensive work, in cooperation with interested Members and the 
WTO Secretariat, to replace the current export subsidy programme with a new and WTO-compliant 
programme, as indicated in document G/C/W/705/Rev.2. G/C/M/124 
 
- 5 - 
 
  4.4.  The proposed schedule included the following steps: (i) the first six months of 2016 would be 
dedicated to data collection and exploring alternative programmes; (ii) the second six months of 2016 would be dedicated to a revision of the data  and designing the new programme according to 
WTO rules; (iii) during the first six months of 2017, following close consultations with stakeholders 
and Members, the drafting of the new legislatio n would be finalized; and (iv) by end-2018, the 
Government would endorse the new regulation in order to terminate the current export subsidy programme and then, on 1 January 2019, to impl ement the new programme. If the new subsidy 
programme were not ready by 2018, the current ex port subsidy programme would in any case be 
automatically terminated. All these steps would take place in cooperation with the USAID, the WTO Secretariat, and any interested Member. This schedule demonstrated Jordan's strong commitment to fulfilling its WTO obligations in a transparent and constructive manner. 
4.5.  The purpose of the requested extension was to allow Jordan to continue providing benefits 
under the programme to the existing beneficiaries while providing Jordan with the necessary time 
to design and implement an entirely new and WTO-consistent subsidy programme to benefit its 
SMEs. As previously stated, the exceptional geopolitical situation and the severe instability in the 
region continued negatively to affect the Jordanian economy and hindered the industrial sector. Indeed, the ongoing regional instability had dominated Jordan's government agenda and had 
impeded its efforts to design and implement a WTO-compliant replacement programme. This had 
also made budget planning difficult given that it was tougher to find funds to support any new subsidy programme. In addition, Jordan continued to suffer from the repercussions of several crises in the region. For example, since the comp lete closure of the Jordanian-Syrian border in 
April 2015, the Iraqi authority had recently closed its border with Jordan in an attempt to restore 
stability in the crossing area; commercial traffic had been diverted to alternative routes at tripled freight cost. 
4.6.  Under such circumstances, Jordan's only fe asible option was to extend, under the appropriate 
legal cover and as WTO rules and principles permit ted, the existing programme in its current form 
for a modest period while it established its new program. Jordan still needed the extension not 
only to phase out the existing programme but also  to be prepared for an alternative programme 
with regard to the necessary technical, budge tary, and legal framework. Therefore, Jordan 
requested the Goods Council to consider its request favourably. 
4.7.  The delegate of Qatar, on behalf of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and associating his 
delegation with the statement that would be delivered on behalf of the Arab Group, welcomed the 
Secretary-General of the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Supply of Jordan, and reiterated the 
support of the GCC countries for Jordan's request for a waiver extending the elimination of its 
export subsidy programme in view of the exceptional circumstances in the region. He recognized 
the worsening geopolitical, financial, and security situation faced by Jordan since first submitting 
its request. Indeed, during the first half of 2015, Jordan's exports had contracted by over 8%, 
while both the IMF and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development had downgraded 
their growth forecasts for the Jordanian economy. Furthermore, the loss of two of Jordan's biggest 
trading partners, Syria and Iraq, had weighed negatively on goods exports as these two countries had together accounted for 20% of Jordan's export trade, with other Jordanian export destinations 
also relying on key transit routes through these countries. Currently both borders remained 
completely closed. 
4.8.  He also recalled that, since the start of th e regional crisis, Jordan had accepted more than 
1.4 million Syrian refugees, taking Jordan's tota l refugee population to above 2.7 million, or 
around 34% of the total population. As a result , Jordan's unemployment rate had increased to 
12.9% while key sectors struggled to handle the burden. 
4.9.  Regarding the waiver request, he noted that  Jordan had continuously shown its flexibility in 
taking into account certain Members' concerns on this issue. In its revised proposal Jordan had, despite the ongoing regional circumstances, fu rther limited the scope and duration of the 
programme and adopted an action plan with a view to finalizing a WTO-compliant programme. 
Awarding the temporary waiver pending Jordan's adoption of a replacement programme would 
significantly help to alleviate some of the difficulties faced by Jordan's SMEs. He therefore urged Members to give their favourable consideration to Jordan's request. 
4.10.  The delegate of the Kingdom of Saudi Ar abia, on behalf of the Arab Group, welcomed 
Mr Yousef AlShamali, Secretary-General of the Jo rdanian Ministry of Indu stry, Trade and Supply, G/C/M/124 
 
- 6 - 
 
  and thanked Jordan for its efforts in exploring alternative programmes in line with the 
SCM Agreement. She referred to the important role SMEs played in the world economy given their contribution to economic development, social welfare, and political stability, particularly in countries facing major economic and political challenges. In line with this, Jordan's revised request 
for a waiver was not only limited in scope to extending the transitional period but also intended to 
a f f o r d  S M E s  a n  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  d e a l  w i t h  t h e  u n precedentedly difficult regional situation, and 
challenges both political and economic in nature. The regional instability and the global financial 
and economic slowdown had had serious implicatio ns for Jordan's economy, and the spillovers 
from conflicts in neighbouring countries continued to subdue Jordan's economic activities. The revised request contained a clear time-frame, including detailed action plan, that illustrated Jordan's engagement with and commitment to the WTO and the Multilateral Trading System. 
4.11.  Her delegation considered that the WTO existed as a means to an end, and that end was to 
enhance the welfare and living conditions of all, both within and across countries, developed and developing alike. This required coherence between trade policy and public policy goals; therefore, 
approval of the request was essential to help Jordan overcome its difficulties. On behalf of the Arab 
Group she called the Council to lend its support to Jordan's waiver request. 
4.12.  The delegate of Chinese Taipei recalled prev ious statements of his delegation in support of 
Jordan's revised request. 
4.13.  The delegate of Yemen associated his delegation with the statement made by Saudi Arabia 
on behalf of the Arab Group, and supported Jordan 's revised request which, in his view, was clear, 
scope-limited, time-bound, and contained a well- defined Action Plan. Moreover, the extension 
requested was only meant to enable Jordan's SMEs to overcome difficult circumstances and 
challenges during a limited period. In conformity with its obligations, Jordan had submitted annual notifications to the Committee on SCM and had indicated that it would continue doing so. Yemen 
believed that Jordan's request fully met WTO rules and procedures on the granting of waivers, and 
called upon Members to consider it positively, particularly as Jordan's presentation at this meeting had been not only convincing but had al so explained the request's rationale. 
4.14.  The delegate of the Kingdom of Bahrain associated his delegation with the statements made 
on behalf of the Arab Group and the GCC, and re affirmed its support for Jordan's request for an 
extension of the phase-out period for its current export subsidy programme. Since the last CTG meeting, Jordan had consulted with interested delegations in order to address their concerns; 
as a result of those consultations, Jordan had submitted a second revision to its request, which 
included a shorter phase-out period than that originally requested, a commitment to submit annual notifications and to replace its subsidy plan with another and fully WTO-consistent plan, and an 
engagement not to request any further extension. 
4.15.  As stated at previous CTG meetings, Jordan was faced with economic challenges and 
geopolitical instabilities that were adversely affecting its economy. And to continue with the 
current programme was crucial in order to counteract these adverse effects. Bahrain 
acknowledged that some Members held systemic concerns over export subsidy programmes in general; however, Bahrain believed that this spec ific export subsidy programme would not have an 
overall trade-distorting effect. Jordan was a develo ping country with a share of less than 0.1% of 
world export trade. Moreover, the current progra mme excluded Jordan's largest industries and 
o n l y  t a r g e t e d  S M E s .  F i n a l l y ,  B a h r a i n  c o n s i d e r e d  t h a t  t h i s  p r o g r a m m e  w o u l d  h a v e  a n  o v e r a l l  positive effect upon trade in the region, and hoped that Jordan's request would receive the 
Council's favourable and positive consideration. 
4.16.  The delegate of Egypt associated his delega tion with the statement made on behalf of the 
Arab Group. He thanked Jordan for its revised request and for addressing other Members' 
concerns, and indicated that Jordan, with its smal l share of 0.04% of world exports, should be 
considered a Small and Vulnerable Economy (SVE), which should receive special and differential treatment in accordance with Paragraph 35 of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). Moreover, 
Jordan had suffered from political tension and instability in the region during the last few years. He 
urged Members to consider Jordan's waiver requ est positively, and to approve an extension of 
Jordan's export subsidy programme until December 2018. G/C/M/124 
 
- 7 - 
 
  4.17.  The delegate of Canada acknowledged the impa ct of regional conflict on Jordan's economy, 
including the large influx of refugees into Jordan that had placed additional strain upon its 
infrastructure, public services, and domestic labour market. As stated during the previous two meetings of this Council, Canada supported Jordan's waiver request. Canada also welcomed 
and supported the revised request, and was encouraged by Jordan's efforts to develop a 
WTO-consistent programme as expeditiously as possible. 
4.18.  The delegate of Turkey thanked Jordan fo r its presentation and, referring back to its 
statements at previous meetings, reiterated its support for the requested extension, including the 
reduction of the request to only three years, and a new replacement programme. Given the difficult situation Jordan was facing, Turkey en couraged Members to support Jordan's request. 
4.19.  The delegate of the European Union reiterated the support of his delegation for Jordan's 
request and reaffirmed the EU's recognition of the extraordinary and unique situation that Jordan 
continued to face. The EU acknowledged the efforts made by Jordan to address the concerns of those Members that had raised systemic issues, including through a reduction of the extension 
period requested. Indeed, the EU also shared the systemic concerns raised by certain Members. 
And the EU was mindful of the need not to create situations that might gradually prejudice WTO disciplines and commitments. The EU also encouraged Jordan to continue in its efforts to 
phase out its export subsidy programme in the near future, and engaged to continue working 
closely with Jordan and interested Members with a view to finding a positive outcome. 
4.20.  The delegate of Oman associated his delega tion with the statements made on behalf of the 
Arab Group and the GCC countries. With a view to  affording SMEs a further opportunity to deal 
with the exceptional and extraordinary challe nges faced by the Jordanian economy, Oman 
welcomed Jordan's revised request to limit the ph ase-out period of the current programme to only 
three years. Oman also welcomed the inclusion of a detailed action plan and clear deadline. 
4.21.  Media reports described the unprecedented geopolitical situation and severe instability in 
the region; these continued negatively to affect the Jordanian economy, and to hinder its industrial sector in particular. 
4.22.  The main concerns raised by the few delegations that had indicated objections to the waiver 
request related to the risk of such a request setting a precedent in the subsidies area. Oman 
believed that the exceptional and dire circumstances faced by Jordan made its situation unique and rendered these concerns unrealistic. Oman also considered that Members, in their assessment 
of Jordan's request, should take into account th ese specific circumstances and consider Jordan's 
request favourably. 
4.23.  The delegate of Pakistan welcomed Jordan's continued efforts to address the concerns of 
certain Members, as reflected in its revised waiver request. It would be regrettable if at this 
juncture these Members would continue to express concerns that Jordan would not know how to satisfy. On previous occasions certain other waiv ers had been granted, and in more extenuating 
circumstances. Pakistan was not a supporter of waivers per se , but if a rule existed, it had to exist 
for all and not just for one specific and single Member. Waivers were granted not only in relation to trade considerations, but needed also to consider non-trade social values. To achieve this intricate 
balance it was important to take into account a broader perspective. 
4.24.  The delegate of the United Arab Emirat es welcomed Jordan's Secretary-General of the 
Ministry of Industry, Trade and Supply, and associat ed its delegation with the statements made on 
behalf of the Arab Group and on behalf of the GCC countries. He echoed previous speakers in 
recognizing that, despite the big challenges face d by the Jordanian economy due to the difficult 
situation in the region, Jordan had made every e ffort to satisfy the concerns of Members. He 
invited the Council to consider the revised request by Jordan favourably. 
4.25.  The delegate of the Republic of Korea appreciated Jordan's continued efforts to reach 
consensus on this issue, and reiterated Korea's support for Jordan's request. Korea hoped that 
Members would consider this request favourably in light of the exceptional geopolitical difficulties and challenges faced by Jordan. G/C/M/124 
 
- 8 - 
 
  4.26.  The delegate of Morocco associated his delega tion with all the statements made in favour of 
Jordan's request to extend the transitional period for the elimination of its export subsidy 
programme within the proposed time-frame, and the action plan contained in the revised proposal. 
4.27.  The delegate of China acknowledged Jordan 's revised waiver request and stated that, in 
light of the exceptional circumstances and diffic ulties faced by Jordan, China supported this 
request. 
4.28.  The delegate of Norway acknowledged the exceptional and extraordinary challenges that 
Jordan was facing, and that justified its request, including the unprecedented geopolitical situation, 
the severe instability in the region, and the consequences for the industrial sector. Norway had strong systemic interests in maintaining a well-functioning multilateral trade regime and was of the view that Members should refrain from introducing or maintaining measures that undermined 
WTO principles, and that could also set a precedent. However, these circumstances were 
exceptional. She thanked Jordan for its revised request, including the reduction in years required to phase out its current programme. Norway reiterated its support for Jordan's request. 
4.29.  The delegate of Japan recognized the vital role that Jordan had played and continued to play 
in the context of peace-building and stabilization in the Middle East, as well as the challenges that 
Jordan had been facing, including those caused by the massive influx of refugees from 
neighbouring areas. Like other Members, Japan was ready to support Jordan's continuing effort to 
restore a sound environment for trade and investment. 
4.30.  He thanked Mr AlShamali for the detailed ex planation of Jordan's revised request, as Japan 
appreciated very much Jordan's approach, which wa s expeditiously to transform its export subsidy 
programme into a WTO-consistent measure. The revised request increased the transparency of 
Jordan's action plan and the time-frame in which Jordan undertook to phase out the current programme. Japan's position on the request for a waiver remained unchanged, and mostly for 
systemic reasons. However, Japan was interested in continuing the discussion with Jordan and 
other Members in search of an alternative solution to this important matter. 
4.31.  The delegate of Switzerland acknowledged  the extraordinarily challenging situation that 
Jordan continued to face. For this reason, Switzerland supported the exceptional extension 
requested by Jordan. Switzerland also apprecia ted the systemic concern raised by several 
WTO Members that Jordan's request not create a situation that might gradually come to undermine WTO disciplines. In this context, his delegation welcomed Jordan's continuous efforts to 
phase out its programme in the near future. 
4.32.  The delegate of the United States of Amer ica thanked Jordan for its intervention, its revised 
draft waiver request, and the time it had spent di scussing its request with her authorities both in 
Geneva and Amman. In this vein, the US also appreciated Jordan's diligence in meeting its 
transparency obligations under the 2007 extension mechanism currently in place, as well as the transparent manner in which it had pursued its waiver request. Jordan's actions in this regard had 
been exemplary. 
4.33.  The US was also aware of Jordan's situation with regard to regional conflict and instability, 
which had led not only to a massive influx of refugees that placed enormous pressure on Jordan's limited resources, but which had led also to disruption in trade routes, and a hesitant investment 
environment. Together with Jordan's situation, the US had also considered the history of this 
particular issue, the legal requirements for granting a waiver, and the nature of WTO waivers granted in the past. These matters had been discussed with Jordan on numerous occasions, 
reviewing the particulars of the programme at issue and offering several specific WTO-consistent 
alternatives. Moreover, the US had also arranged for continued technical assistance for Jordan from both a lawyer and an economist, and woul d continue to provide any further assistance 
required by Jordan on this issue. 
4.34.  The US welcomed Jordan's initiative to put forward an action plan, and continued to be 
ready to work together with Jordan to accomplish this work on an ambitious schedule that would correspond to the current and difficult circumst ances. However, as expressed on previous 
occasions, her delegation's preference was to see a modified programme or a replacement export 
subsidy programme consistent with Jordan's most recent proposed timeline and obligations under G/C/M/124 
 
- 9 - 
 
  the SCM Agreement. The US acknowledged that a change to the current programme might take 
some time but did not support a waiver to cover this period. Nevertheless, the US expected that all WTO Members would appropriately take into account the particular circumstances Jordan would face in its follow-up work. 
4.35.  The delegate of Australia also welcomed  the presentation made by Mr AlShamali, and 
acknowledged Jordan's difficult situation and the exceptional circumstances faced by the Jordanian 
economy. Australia appreciated Jordan's open and transparent approach to this matter and, in 
particular, its compliance with the transparency obligations under the 2007 General Council 
Decision. His delegation also welcomed Jordan's constructive efforts to develop a replacement programme but noted that this process would take time. Jordan's revised request containing an action plan for putting in place a WTO-consistent replacement programme was also a positive step. 
Australia appreciated the continuing constructive bilateral discussions towards an alternative 
solution to this issue, and encouraged all WTO Members to be understanding of Jordan's unique 
circumstances as Jordan continued working on this issue with a view to reaching a WTO-consistent 
outcome. 
4.36.   The delegate of New Zealand appreciated Jordan's transparent approach at the CTG level 
and bilaterally to explain the challenges that it had been facing to eliminate its export subsidy 
program and why, as a consequence, it considered the waiver to be necessary. He also thanked 
Jordan for updating the CTG. New Zealand was en couraged to hear about the steps Jordan had 
been taking to make progress in its reforms, including with the support of the WTO Secretariat and other Members. New Zealand also welcomed Jordan's assurances that these efforts would continue 
and that they would result in the termination of its current export subsidy program for systemic 
reasons, an important outcome for New Zealand. 
4.37.  Indeed, the bilateral discussions had prov ided an opportunity for New Zealand and Jordan 
not only to develop a clearer understanding of each other's perspectives on these issues but also 
to fully explain New Zealand's concerns over the use of a waiver to continue an export subsidy. It was abundantly clear that Jordan was facing significant and unique difficulties in the context of the 
region and, like others, New Zealand was deeply sy mpathetic to Jordan's situation and recognized 
the significant refugee burden being shouldered, as well as the role Jordan was playing in countering the threat from ISIL. Despite the fact  that Jordan had provided the WTO membership 
with a reform timetable to ensure the complete removal of its export subsidy and had invited 
Members to give their input into this process, like other Members, New Zealand was unable to 
support the request. Nevertheless, the initial bila teral discussions on the timetable had proven to 
be a useful basis for further dialogue. 
4.38.  In light of all these factors, New Zealand expected Members to continue giving their careful 
consideration to Jordan's unique situation as Jordan worked towards finding a WTO-consistent outcome. 
4.39.  The delegate of Jordan thanked delegations that had signalled their support for Jordan's 
revised request, and also those that had expressed their interest and had looked favourably on the 
proposed time-frame. He indicated that the revised request contained a clear time-frame, including detailed action plan, which illustrated Jord an's level of engagement and its respect for its 
WTO commitments and the multilateral trading system. Jordan also appreciated Members' 
acknowledgement of the need for an additional time-period to allow the Government to continue working on defining an alternative programme that would take into account the exceptional 
challenges faced by its economy and the severe deficit in the national budget. 
4.40.  He emphasized Jordan's commitment to fulfilling all its obligations under the 
SCM Agreement, including the phase-out of the current export subsidy programme in due time. 
Jordan was also ready to continue working constructively and in a transparent manner with 
concerned Members towards reaching a positive outcome that would address the economic, financial, and development needs of Jordan. 
4.41.  The Chairperson stated that the 21 interventions that had been made on this issue were 
evidence of the importance that Members attached to Jordan's situation, and that from these it 
could be inferred that there was broad support for Jordan's waiver request and its revision. However, in spite of explicitly recognizing the difficulties and exceptional situation that Jordan had G/C/M/124 
 
- 10 - 
 
  been experiencing, some delegations continued to have systemic concerns with Jordan's request 
and could not support it; at the same time, concerned Members recognized and welcomed Jordan's efforts, openness, and transparency to address thei r concerns, and particularly the inclusion in its 
revised request of an action plan to establish and apply a replacement and WTO-compatible 
programme. He invited interested delegations to co ntinue their consultations in the meantime and 
to seek a prompt and satisfactory solution to this issue. 
4.42.  The delegate of Jordan thanked the Ch airperson for his statement and requested the 
Secretariat to include the Chair's concluding remarks in the CTG's Annual Report to the General 
Council. 
4.43.  The Chairperson proposed that the Council take note of the statements made and revert to 
this issue at its next meeting. 
4.44.  The Council so agreed. 
5  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA – REQUEST FOR A WAIVER – AFRICA GROWTH AND 
OPPORTUNITY ACT (AGOA AS AMENDED) (G/C/W/713) 
5.1.  The Chairperson informed the Council that, in a communication dated 16 July 2015, the 
delegation of the United States of America had requested the Secretariat to circulate 
document G/C/W/713, containing a request to extend  the waiver concerning the Africa Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA). 
5.2.  The delegate of the United States of Amer ica indicated that her delegation had submitted a 
request aimed at extending duty-free treatment to  eligible products from sub-Saharan African 
countries. This request was circulated in document  G/C/W/713, and at the meeting of the General 
Council on 15 July 2015 the United States had presented its annual report on the operation of the 
programme. 
5.3.  The AGOA had been the cornerstone of th e United States' engagement with sub-Saharan 
Africa on trade and investment since its enactmen t in 2000. By providing duty-free entry into the 
United States for almost all products of benefici ary countries, the AGOA had helped to expand and 
diversify two-way trade between the US and sub-Saharan Africa, had fostered an improved 
business environment in many sub-Saharan African countries, and had established a high-level 
dialogue on trade and investment in the form of an annual meeting called the "AGOA Forum". 
5.4.  In August 2015, the US and Gabon co-hosted the 14th AGOA Forum in Libreville. The subject 
of the 2015 Forum was " AGOA at 15: Charting a Course for a Sustainable U.S.-Africa Trade and 
Investment Partnership ." The 2015 Forum celebrated the recent reaffirmation and important role 
of women, civil society, and the private sector in promoting trade, expanding inclusive and sustainable economic growth, and generating prosperity. At present, 39 countries and territories 
had received benefits under the AGOA. In 2014, US imports under AGOA provisions were 
$11.8 billion. Over 91% of US imports from AGOA -eligible countries had entered the US duty-free 
under the AGOA Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), or other zero-tariff provisions. Detailed 
trade data was available in the United States' most recent report on this issue. 
5.5.  The United States had also provided substantial trade-related technical assistance to 
AGOA beneficiary countries to help them make the most of the trade opportunities available under the programme. Under the four-year, $120 million African Competitiveness and Trade Expansion 
(ACTE) initiative, the US Agency for International Development operated three Regional Hubs for 
Global Competitiveness, in Botswana, Kenya, and Ghana; these had assisted African governments and businesses to identify and develop market opportunities for African products in the US, 
especially value-added and non-traditional products such as those covered under the AGOA. 
5.6.  She highlighted some of the key developm ents since the last waiver was granted in 2009: 
(i) during his visit to sub-Saharan Africa in the summer of 2013, President Obama had announced 
a new initiative, Trade Africa, which was a new partnership between the US and sub-Saharan 
Africa aimed at increasing internal and regional trade within Africa and expanding trade and economic ties between Africa, the US, and other global markets. Trade Africa had initially focused on the East African Community (EAC) member states and had helped to mobilize resources to G/C/M/124 
 
- 11 - 
 
  support increased US-EAC trade and investment. In February 2015, the US and the EAC signed a 
cooperation agreement that would increase trade- related capacity in the region and deepen the 
economic ties between the US and the EAC. The Cooperation Agreement would build capacity in three key areas: Trade Facilitation (TF), SPS, and TBT. In July 2015, the US Government had 
announced the expansion of Trade Africa partne rships to Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mozambique, 
Senegal, Zambia, and the Commission of the Economic Community of West African States; (ii) in August 2014, President Obama held a United States-Africa Leaders' Summit, the first of its kind 
and the largest event with African heads of state and governments held by any US President. 
Trade and investment issues were major themes of the Summit. The Leaders agreed on the importance of expanding trade and investment ties between the US and Africa. President Obama also issued a Presidential Memorandum that esta blished a Trade and Investment Capacity Building 
Steering Group for US Government programmes aimed at supporting trade and investment 
capacity building efforts in sub-Saharan Africa; (iii) finally, in June 2015, the US enacted a legislation extending the AGOA for 10 years, to 2025. This extension would provide greater 
certainty to producers, importers, and traders. 
5.7.  The US was committed to working in partnership with sub-Saharan Africa to advance mutual 
interests and increase trade and investment. The AGOA was a key element in US efforts to help 
sub-Saharan African countries participate more fully in the global economy and it also 
complemented work by other Members to promote growth and development in the region. 
5.8.  The Chairperson proposed that the Council take note of the statement made, approve the 
draft request and draft waiver decision submitted by the United States in document G/C/W/713, 
and forward the draft waiver decision to the Gene ral Council for adoption at its next meeting. 
5.9.  The Council so agreed. 
6  ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
6.1.  The Chairperson informed the Council that, under this agenda item, there were two directly 
linked issues to be considered by the CTG: first,  the request made by the EU on the accession of 
Croatia; and second, a statement by Brazil referring to the negotiations relating to the said 
enlargement. 
6.1  PROCEDURES UNDER ARTICLE XXVIII OF GATT 1994 (G/L/1051/ADD.4) 
6.2.  The Chairperson drew Members' attention to document G/L/1051/Add.4, concerning the 
accession to the European Union on 1 July 2013 of the Republic of Croatia. In this document, the 
EU indicated that it would not assert that Members that had submitted a claim pursuant to 
Article XXIV:6 of GATT 1994 were precluded from withdrawing substantially equivalent concessions under Article XXVIII:3 of GATT 1994 because such wi thdrawal occurred later than six months after 
the EU's withdrawal of concessions, provided th at the claiming WTO Member withdrew concessions 
no later than 36 months after the EU's modification  of concessions. He recalled that the CTG had 
extended the deadlines on four occasions, namely at its meetings of 27 November 2013, 
9 April and 17 November 2014, and 26 March 2015. 
6.3.  The delegate of the European Union inform ed the Council that, following the accession of 
Croatia to the EU his delegation had requested, in document G/L/1051/Add.4, an extension of the 
period in which Members' rights to withdraw subs tantially equivalent concessions were preserved. 
The EU hoped that this period would be extended  until all relevant agreements with interested 
parties would enter into force. 
6.4.  Under this agenda item the EU report ed the progress that had been made in the 
renegotiations. It would do so on this occasion without prejudice with regard to what would then 
be discussed, at the request of Brazil. In this ve in, he informed the Council that the negotiations 
with China, the EU trading partner most affected by the modification of Croatia's commitments, 
had been concluded. An agreement on compensatory adjustment had been reached on 
7 October 2015, and the internal procedures for its implementation were already under way. 
6.5.  Regarding the other trading partners (A rgentina, Australia, Brazil, New Zealand, and 
Uruguay), he recalled that, in October 2014, the EU had submitted its offers to these Members in G/C/M/124 
 
- 12 - 
 
  accordance with WTO rules and practice, which provided for reasonable and equitable 
compensatory adjustments. Some of these countri es had not yet reacted to those offers, while 
others had reacted by seeking additional concessions that, in the view of the EU, went beyond the compensation to which they were entitled. The EU 's aim was to conclude these negotiations in a 
reasonable, equitable, and expediti ous way. However, it should be clear that the EU could not, 
under any circumstances, grant disproportionate co mpensation in light of WTO rules and practice. 
Thus, the EU reiterated the offers it had made to these countries and looked forward to a swift 
conclusion of these negotiations. 
6.6.  Brazil, however, had sought additional concessions, invoking arguments that deserved 
consideration. It had raised a number of complex issues relating to what it had called conflicting statistics, and to the application of the methodology consistently used by the EU in previous 
enlargements. Progress was being made in assessing these complex issues, and the EU remained 
committed to reaching a mutually beneficial agreement with Brazil on possible but justified and reasonable compensatory adjustments. 
6.7.  In light of the above, he repeated his ca ll to delegations to extend the period in which 
Members' rights would be preserved, until an agreement was reached with all relevant parties. 
6.8.  The Chairperson proposed that the Council ta ke note of the information submitted by the EU 
and approve the extension of the period set out in document G/L/1051/Add.4. 
6.9.  The Council so agreed. 
6.2  ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (CROATIA) – STATEMENT BY BRAZIL 6.10.  The delegate of Brazil informed the Council that, since mid-2013, following the 
EU enlargement of 2013 (Croatia), Brazil had been involved in negotiations with the EU. According 
to WTO rules, this enlargement implied an assessment of whether or not it had affected Members' trade flows. Consequently, in case of trade losses, compensations were due according to 
Article XXVIII of GATT 1994. Before Croatia's accession  to the EU, Brazil's trade flow with Croatia 
in a variety of products had been significant. 
6.11.  Despite the various meetings that had ta ken place between Brazil and the EU since 2013, 
positions remained apart on several issues. Brazil was also aware that the same situation had 
occurred with regard to other WTO Members involved in the negotiations. At the last CTG meeting, Brazil had raised the issue of the slow pace of  these negotiations, but without any satisfactory 
results. 
6.12.  Brazil wished to highlight some methodological issues that had arisen in the course of the 
negotiations and that might be of interest to a ll WTO Members. Brazil considered that the main 
principle in a negotiation of compensation under GATT Article XXVIII was that indicated in 
Paragraph 6 of the Understanding on Article XXVIII: "The amount of compensation provided 
should exceed the amount of trade actually affect ed by the modification of the concession". In 
other words, actual trade was the parameter and any other method or formula, like the 
duty-based formula proposed by the EU, must resp ect this principle. Moreover, the determination 
of the adequate period might also represent a chal lenge and might lead to very different results. 
6.13.  Brazil also believed that the establishment of a prohibitive intra-quota tariff or tariffs might 
end up nullifying whatever quantities or quotas ha d been agreed in the context of current market 
conditions, and could not be in line with the overarching principle of actual compensation. In this 
regard, an illustrative case was the compensation for sugar, where the previous intra-quota tariff of 98 euros/ton was an outcome of negotiations that had taken place long ago and under different 
market circumstances. Currently, this should not be considered as a benchmark for due 
compensation, particularly when comparing the 98 euro tariff with the 11 euro tariff average 
applied by Croatia and imposed on Brazilian expo rters during the most recent representative 
period. 
6.14.  Brazil still preferred to reach a mutually satisfactory conclusion to these negotiations, and 
invited the EU to engage in negotiations that would lead to real compensation for actual trade lost. G/C/M/124 
 
- 13 - 
 
  6.15.  The delegate of Uruguay stated that her co untry had reserved its rights with regard to the 
EU's most recent renegotiations, following Croatia's accession. Uruguay had done the same on the 
occasion of the accession of Bulgaria and Romania,  and the EU-25. During the EU's fourth process 
of enlargement, Uruguay had argued for compensa tion without success with regard to its fruit 
exports to Sweden and its wool fabric to Aust ria. Only in 1981, on the occasion of Greece's 
accession to the then European Economic Community (EEC), did Uruguay receive compensation. The first bilateral renegotiation with the then EEC, as a result of its conformation and then the 
subsequent modification of its tariff concessions, took place in 1960. 
6.16.  Uruguay's claims and concerns on the modification of the EU commitments both in the WTO 
and the GATT were not mere coincidence. Indeed, Europe, in all of its formats and with all its members, had always been one of the main export markets for Uruguayan products. However, as 
of 1996, Uruguay's conditions for accessing the different markets of the EU-member States had 
been adversely affected. Over two decades, 16 EU  markets onto which Uruguayan products had at 
one time entered under more favourable conditions, had altered such that Uruguayan products 
now had to face tariffs, sanitary, phytosanitary, and technical regulations, tariff-quota rates, and 
special regimes. In neither the fourth, fifth, or  sixth EU enlargements did the EU understand or 
acknowledge that the market access conditions to these 16 European markets had been adversely 
affected and that, consequently , Uruguay had had the right to claim special compensation. The 
evolution of the current renegotiations was also not encouraging. 
6.17.  Each and every one of these EU enlargements had directly affected real trade interests and 
trade flows. Possibly at the time the European Union had considered these trade flows to be 
irrelevant, and a specific compensation unjustified. But trade did exist and also underwent change. 
Access to certain markets was restricted and trade opportunities were consequently affected. These changes had been systematic and had affected certain sensitive products of interest both to 
the EU and Uruguay; this was particularly the case with meat, rice, citrus fruits, and dairy 
products, although other products were also affected. 
6.18.  Taking into account all the EU accessions,  and the subsequent concession modifications, 
what initially did not seem important in fact became increasingly relevant. Indeed, some duties 
increased from zero to 16%, tariffs rates were converted into TRQs and vice-versa, entry prices were put in place, and so on. All these changes a ffected both real and potential trade, something 
that, in the case of Uruguay, a country fully reliant on exports, implied a loss of market access. 
Uruguay therefore believed that it was time to consider the situation in which it currently found 
itself as a whole. Indeed, GATT Article XXVIII allo wed a Member to modify or withdraw a tariff 
concession after a negotiating or renegotiating process with other Members that enjoyed initial 
negotiating rights, or that met the requirement and conditions to be recognized by Members as 
having a principal supplying or substantial interest. 
6.19.  From Uruguay's experience one could conclude that the fact of having an original 
negotiating right did not guarantee compensation  for the modification or withdrawal of a 
concession  per se . The concerned trade partner required proof that a concrete interest had been 
affected, with a meaningful impact on trade volu me. As set out in the Interpretative Note to 
GATT Article XXVIII:1, for a Member to be consider ed a principal supplier, it must have had, 
during a reasonable period of time prior to the renegotiations, a large share in the market of the 
Member requesting the modification or withdrawal of the concession, or else it must have proven 
that it would have had such a share in the absence of certain discriminatory quantitative 
restrictions maintained by the requesting Member. On the other hand, there was no clear criterion 
to establish how to determine whether or not a Member had a substantial interest, even though the Interpretative Notes suggested that it should  be those Members with at least a 10% share of 
the requesting Member's market. 
6.20.  Uruguay was an efficient exporter of agricultural products but, except in the case of bovine 
meat (where it enjoyed international recognition), Uruguay was not easily definable as a principal supplier or as a country with a substantial interest, or at any rate not if the latter was understood 
as accounting for over 10% of imports. The issue that Uruguay was raising was a key issue for 
almost 80% of the WTO membership, and small- and medium-sized countries would certainly share these concerns about the interpretation of GATT Article XXVIII. 
6.21.  In addition, goods in the EU tended to be imported by trading companies even when the 
final destination was not an EU member State but a third country in the region. This was normal G/C/M/124 
 
- 14 - 
 
  practice in the case of countries neighbouring EU territory, such as Croatia. However, this volume 
of real trade, which existed in certain value chains, was nevertheless not reflected in the official statistics of bilateral trade. Furthermore, the Understanding on the Interpretation of GATT Article XXVIII acknowledged the problems that these limitations could cause to small 
countries, and established that "the Council for Tr ade in Goods five years after from the date of 
entry into force of the WTO Agreement with a view to deciding whether this criterion has worked satisfactorily in securing a redistribution of nego tiating rights in favour of small and medium-sized 
exporting Members. If this is not the case, cons ideration will be given to possible improvements 
[…]". Uruguay wondered if the time had now come  to reconsider the Interpretative Notes to 
Article XXVIII. 
6.22.  Uruguay considered that, after 20 years of  successive enlargements of one of the world's 
largest importers of food products, the provisions  contained in Article XXVIII, taken literally and 
applied indiscriminately to all Members, had prevented compensation for loss of trade flow, which might not be very relevant for some but, when  taken together, was very important for others, 
such as Uruguay. 
6.23.  The delegate of Argentina thanked the EU for the information provided and joined Brazil and 
Uruguay in their concerns about the slow pace of these renegotiations, which had been ongoing for 
more than two years. Argentina had also submitted its claim of interest on 20 June 2013, but real 
progress had as yet not been made. Unfortunately these delays had an adverse impact upon Argentinian products. 
6.24.  To date, the EU had shown no will to find a balanced and mutually satisfactory solution to 
this process, and in such a way as to compensate the adverse effects of Croatia's accession to the 
EU. The EU had explained its position with regard to this issue, including in a report to the WTO 
dated 14 August 2015. Argentina had not received any reply to its requests but looked forward to 
finding a satisfactory solution to this issue. 
6.25.  The delegate of New Zealand indicated that  his delegation would continue working with the 
EU towards resolving this issue in such a way as to address Members' legitimate commercial 
interests in this renegotiation. 
6.26.  The delegate of Australia indicated that hi s authorities remained keen to ensure that this 
enlargement did not raise barriers to trade for other WTO Members, and appreciated the 
constructive approach taken by the EU in relation to this enlargement process. 
6.27.  The delegate of the European Union indicated that his delegation had taken note of the 
comments and remarks made by Members at today's meeting. The EU would continue to be 
engaged in the process of working towards a prompt solution. 
6.28.  The Chairperson thanked delegations for th eir interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made. 
6.29.  The Council so agreed. 
7  ACCESSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA TO THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION: 
PROCEDURES UNDER ARTICLE XXVIII: 3 OF GATT 1994 (G/L/1110/ADD.1) 
7.1.  The Chairperson drew the Council's attentio n to document G/L/1110/Add.1, submitted by the 
Republic of Armenia on 9 October 2015, containing a request concerning Armenia's accession to 
the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). In that document, Armenia indicated that it would not assert 
that Members who had submitted a claim pursuant  to Article XXIV:6 of GATT 1994 were precluded 
from withdrawing substantially equivalent concessions under Article XXVIII:3 of GATT 1994 
because such withdrawal occurred later than six months after Armenia's withdrawal of 
concessions, provided that the claiming WTO Member withdrew concessions no later than 24 months after Armenia's modification of concessions. 
7.2.  The delegate of Armenia reminded delegations that, after completion of the ratification 
procedures of the EAEU on 2 January 2015, Armenia had become a full member of the EAEU, and 
that since then it had been applying the EA EU's Common External Tariff (CET). Armenia had G/C/M/124 
 
- 15 - 
 
  submitted its notification under the procedures co ntained in Article XXIV, and had also informed 
interested Members that it would be ready to enter into Article XXIV and XXVIII negotiation procedures, including tariff negotiations or consultations to address the compensatory adjustments provided under Article XXIV. 
7.3.  As a result, Armenia had received claims of interest from 11 Members, followed by a number 
of requests concerning technical issues on the statistics provided by Armenia, and requesting 
clarification on certain tariff line adjustments. So me Members had also asked for clearer statistics, 
while others had requested a concordance between th e tables so as to enable a correlation among 
the annexes. All these requests had been addressed and Armenia was currently working together with the Secretariat on some remaining issues. Additionally, a number of positive consultations and communications with interested Members had taken place, including some discussions and 
exchanges of information on the issues of concern. 
7.4.  Given the number of interested Members involved in this process, 11 from the WTO and 
five from the EAEU, as well as the scope of the technical work to be carried out, Armenia believed 
that additional time was necessary, particularly with regard to a one-year extension to continue 
consultations and negotiations and to facilitate the exchange of the information required. Consequently, in document G/L/1110/Add.1, Armenia had indicated that "[…] it will not assert that 
WTO Members who have submitted a claim pursuant to Article XXIV:6 of the GATT 1994 are 
precluded from withdrawing substantially equivalent concessions under Article XXVIII:3 of the GATT 1994 because this withdrawal occurs later th an six months after Armenia's withdrawal of 
concessions, provided that the claiming WTO Member withdraws concessions no later than 
24 months after Armenia's modification of concessions", or, in other words, that Armenia was 
ready to provide interested Members with an ex tension of 12 months, or until 2 January 2017, to 
withdraw substantially equivalent concessions. 
7.5.  Armenia hoped that the further consultations and negotiations would be as constructive and 
fruitful as they had been to date, and assured the CTG that it would be fully engaged in completing this process as soon as possible and in full compliance with WTO rules and procedures. 
7.6.  The delegate of Ukraine stated that, foll owing the Understanding on the Interpretation of 
GATT Article XXVIII, on 15 January 2015 Ukraine ha d submitted to Armenia and the Secretariat its 
claim of interest and reserving its right to renego tiate certain concessions listed in Schedule CLV, 
including compensatory adjustments. Ukraine hoped to receive Armenia's response soon so as to 
begin the pertinent consultation process, and looked forward to constructive and mutually 
beneficial negotiations with Armenia in accordance with GATT Article XXVIII. 
7.7.  The delegate of Chinese Taipei supported Armenia's request to extend the period during 
which Members were allowed to withdraw substantially equivalent concessions following its 
accession to the EAEU. Chinese Taipei had also submitted a claim of interest and had held a fruitful discussion with Armenia on this issue in June 2015. His delegation was ready to engage in further 
consultations with Armenia in the near future. 
7.8.  The delegate of the European Union welcomed Armenia's request to extend for 12 months 
the completion of the negotiations following Armenia's accession to the EAEU. He indicated that his 
intervention would also refer to the accession of  the Kyrgyz Republic to the EAEU, and recalled 
that the EU had submitted claims of interest rega rding all the lines included in the Armenian and 
the Kyrgyz Republic's notifications contained in documents G/SECRET/37 and G/SECRET/38, respectively, in which the EU could have negotiating rights. 
7.9.  On 8 July 2015 the EU had sent a note to  Armenia, the Kyrgyz Republic, and the Russian 
Federation, requesting the clarification of the modification of commitments notified by Armenia, and the import data to be provided, in particul ar by the Russian Federation. These data were 
needed for negotiating the compensatory adjustments although to date no answer to the request 
had been received. 
7.10.  In particular, the EU had requested to receive: (i) a revised submission from Armenia under 
GATT Article XXIV:6 to include, in particular, the relevant "Final Bound Rate" and the "Final 
Implementation Year" for each of the lines in its initial submission; (ii) Armenia's import data for 
the year 2013; (iii) a complete set of import data from the Russian Federation covering the years G/C/M/124 
 
- 16 - 
 
  2010-2011-2012-2013, and including import data concerning all the Russian Federation's tariff 
lines included in GATT Article XXIV:3 submission s from both Armenia and the Kyrgyz Republic. 
Without complete responses to these requests it would be difficult for the EU to engage in negotiations with Armenia and the Kyrgyz Republic. 
7.11.  The delegate of Japan took note of Armenia's request to extend the negotiation period 
under GATT Article XXVIII:3, and recalled that Ja pan had submitted a claim of interest given its 
systemic concerns on this issue. Japan was ready to engage in substantial consultation with 
Armenia and other interested Members in the near future. 
7.12.  The delegate of Armenia indicated that he had taken note of all the statements made and, 
regarding Ukraine's intervention, he informed Me mbers that Armenia and Ukraine had agreed not 
only a bilateral free trade agreement but also a mu ltilateral free trade agreement, implying that 
both countries were trading at a zero rate. 
7.13.  The Chairperson proposed that the Council ta ke note of the statements made and agreed to 
grant the extension requested by Armenia in document G/L/1110/Add.1. 
7.14.  The Council so agreed. 
8  ACCESSION OF THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC TO THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION: 
PROCEDURES UNDER ARTICLE XXVIII:3 OF GATT 1994 (G/L/1137) 
8.1.  The Chairperson drew Members' attention to document G/L/1137 in which the Kyrgyz 
Republic had asked to extend the deadline for the withdrawal of concessions so that the 
agreements reached with interested Members could be communicated to the Secretariat. 
8.2.  The delegate of the Kyrgyz Republic inform ed the Council that, following completion of the 
ratification procedures of the EAEU on 12 August 2015, the Kyrgyz Republic had become a full 
member of that Union. He also indicated that the Kyrgyz Republic had submitted document G/L/1137 in order to preserve Members' rights to withdraw substantial concessions 
while the negotiation process continued, in line with the Kyrgyz Republic's notification of 
16 April 2015 contained in document G/SECRET/38. In document G/L/1137 the Kyrgyz Republic had indicated that it would not assert that WTO Members having submitted a claim of interest 
pursuant to GATT Article XXIV:6 were precluded from withdrawing substantially equivalent 
concessions under GATT Article XXVIII:3 because this withdrawal would occur later than 
six months after the Kyrgyz Republic's withdrawal  of concessions (9 May 2015), provided that the 
claiming WTO Members withdrew concessions no la ter than 18 months after the Kyrgyz Republic's 
modification of concessions, that is, until 9 November 2016. 
8.3.  She also informed the Council that, to co nduct these negotiations, a special delegation had 
been established by Government Order No. 453-P of 15 September 2015. A meeting of this 
delegation would take place in Bishkek by end-2015. Her delegation would inform the Council 
about the further steps in the negotiations in a timely manner. 
8.4.  The Chairperson thanked delegations for th eir interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made and approve th e extension requested by the Kyrgyz Republic in 
document G/L/1137. 
8.5.  The Council so agreed. 
9  NIGERIA – IMPORT RESTRICTION MEASURES – REQUEST FROM CHILE, THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, ICELAND, NORWAY, AND URUGUAY 
9.1.  The Chairperson informed the Council that, in a communication dated 20 October 2015, the 
delegations of Chile, the European Union, Icelan d, Norway, and Uruguay requested the Secretariat 
to include the following item on the agenda of  this meeting: "Nigeria – Import Restricting 
Measures". 
9.2.  The delegate of Norway stated that, in July 2015, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) had 
issued a Circular Note restricting access to foreign exchange to importers of products included in a G/C/M/124 
 
- 17 - 
 
  list of 41 items. The Note was not a total restriction on importing the items listed. However, 
importers of these products had to do so withou t access to foreign exchange currencies. This 
limitation represented a considerable restrict ion on trade between Nigeria and a number of 
countries, including Norway. Norwegian exporters were experiencing difficulties in exporting to 
Nigeria products such as fish and seafood produc ts, which constituted the main Norwegian exports 
to that country. During bilateral consultations her authorities had addressed a number of written and oral questions to the CBN and the Mi nistry of Foreign Affairs in Abuja. 
9.3.  Norway acknowledged that the WTO Agreements allowed Members to introduce restrictions 
affecting imports under certain conditions. However, on this issue concerns remained as to whether or not the current import restrictions were in line with Nigeria's obligations under the WTO, specifically under GATT Article XI. Several references had been made by economic operators 
and the press to a "quota regime"; however, Norway had received no information or confirmation 
from the Nigerian authorities on the current status of the import regime for fish. Norway asked Nigeria to indicate the official sources where in formation on this regime had been published, 
including clarification on how possible quotas for fish would comply with Nigeria's obligations under 
the GATT and the WTO Agreements. 
9.4.  In sum, Nigerian import restrictions, including the latest currency restrictions, were adversely 
affecting trade, including Norwegian trade and the trading activity of importers and re-sellers in 
Nigeria. Norway asked Nigeria to clarify the import restrictions, both in terms of currency restrictions and fish importation policy. 
9.5.  The delegate of Chile indicated that her dele gation regretted to be compelled to request once 
again the inclusion of this issue in the agenda of this Council, as Chilean exporters continued to 
face problems on the Nigerian market. Chile had raised the issue for the first time in 2013 but the situation had since worsened. Exports of Chilean froz en mackerel to Nigeria were affected not only 
by the decisions of the Nigerian authorities, which had restricted access to foreign currencies for 
trade purposes, but also by the lack of clarity regarding new import licences. These concerns had also been raised by Chile in the Committees on  Import Licensing and Market Access. Despite the 
written notes addressed in 2014 to Nigeria's auth orities by the Chilean embassy in Kenya, which 
was also Chile's embassy for Nigeria, these issues had not been clarified and continued to impede the Chilean export sector from adequately foreseeing the conditions operating in the Nigerian market. 
9.6.  The delegate of the European Union recalled that this was an issue that had been raised by 
his authorities on several occasions, in this Council and in other WTO fora, without as yet receiving 
solid arguments from Nigeria concerning the rationale behind such policies. To the contrary, the 
restrictions on foreign currency exchange adopted by the CBN in July 2015 had negatively affected 
and were restricting imports to almost 40 items, which represented more than 800 tariff lines. This also had significant consequences on the national economy and on Nigeria's trading partners. The 
national impact was affecting the poorest segment of the population, for which prices of necessity 
products not produced in sufficient quantities in Nigeria to meet the levels of national demand had increased. 
9.7.  The measures adopted by the CBN, in place for more than four months, exceeded the 
time-frame established for Members to notify the Committee on Balance of Payments 
(BOP Committee). On the other hand, it seemed that Nigeria had not sought approval from the IMF for adopting its foreign exchange restrictions . The EU requested Nigeria not only to clarify 
these measures but also to terminate them without delay. 
9.8.  The delegate of Iceland recalled that, like other Members, his delegation had repeatedly 
raised concerns about the Nigerian measures relati ng to the importation of fish and other seafood 
products. On several occasions Iceland had requested transparency on these issues and had also 
encouraged the Nigerian authorities to avoid adopting measures that would negatively affect imports of fish products. Despite these calls, the measures taken by Nigeria since the last CTG meeting had created more obstacles to the import ation of fish products into Nigeria. This was 
the case with the Circular Note of the CBN impeding importers of fish from accessing its foreign 
exchange market and obtaining foreign currency. In  addition to this Circular Note, the Nigerian 
authorities had implemented other measures aimed at restricting importation of fish into Nigeria, 
such as the apparent increase in tariff rates on certain fisheries products. G/C/M/124 
 
- 18 - 
 
  9.9.  For decades Nigeria had been an important tr ading partner of Iceland; indeed, it was one of 
Iceland's most important export markets, with a tr ade built almost exclusively on exports of fish 
into Nigeria, where Icelandic products had provided Nigerian consumers with a healthy, high-quality, and affordable source of food. Exports to Nigeria were also an important activity for 
many vulnerable coastal communities in Iceland. Unfortunately, the recent measures by the 
Nigerian authorities posed a serious threat to this long-standing trade relationship, to the detriment of Icelandic producers and Nigerian consumers alike. 
9.10.  Iceland was fully aware of Nigeria's strong interest in further developing its own domestic 
fish production, and also sympathized with Nigeria's recent economic difficulties. However, when adopting policies aimed at developing domestic industries, all WTO Members must respect their commitments under the WTO Agreements and avoid resorting to protectionist measures. Iceland 
called upon the Nigerian authorities to withdraw an y measures that restricted or prevented imports 
of fish products into its market, particularly th e aforementioned Circular of the CBN, and urged 
Nigeria to show transparency and to respect its WTO commitments when adopting any measures 
that might affect the importation of fish into Nigeria. 
9.11.  The delegate of Uruguay shared the concerns raised by the previous speakers about market 
access conditions for fish and fish products into Nigeria. Uruguay had been significantly affected by 
these trade restricting measures, and its concerns and difficulties with these measures had been 
repeatedly raised at the Council since 2013. Nigeria was an important destination for Uruguayan fish products, and Uruguay hoped that Nigeria would address all of these issues and provide a solution. 
9.12.  The delegate of the United States of Americ a shared the concerns previously raised by other 
delegations, particularly regarding the CBN measure prohibiting foreign exchange transactions in 
excess of USD$5,000 for imports from 41 product categories. This measure was having a negative 
impact upon a broad range of US exports to Nigeria,  including agricultural goods, plastics, aircraft, 
aircraft parts, metal and metal products. In 2013 and 2014 the US exports to Nigeria in all of the affected sectors had exceeded $500 million. 
9.13.  The CBN Circular had been issued "in order to encourage local production of these items", 
which illustrated its protectionist purpose. The US believed that this measure, rather than increasing investment and employment in Nigeria, was having the opposite effect and would actually damage the Nigerian economy. Moreover, the CBN had recently tightened these 
restrictions further, requiring daily reports of ov erseas naira-denominated card transactions and a 
halt on foreign currency cash deposits. 
9.14.  Her authorities were also unaware of any effort by Nigeria to take steps to justify the 
measure at the WTO, and had raised this concern with the Nigerian government at the highest 
levels. The US also remained concerned about certain measures that appeared to require the use of local content in Nigeria's oil and gas industry. The US had posed written questions to Nigeria in 
September 2011, had described its understanding of the measures in a meeting in October 2011, 
had raised this issue at each subsequent m eeting of the TRIMS Committee, and at several 
meetings of the CTG. At the last TRIMS Committ ee meeting, the Nigerian representative had once 
again stated that the government would provide answers to the factual questions posed to it long 
ago by the US and other delegations, although these responses had not in fact been provided. 
9.15.  The issue had been taken to the CTG given the systemic concerns deriving form Nigeria's 
failure to address the factual questions. The local content issues had also been raised with Nigeria 
in a number of bilateral contexts. As previously noted by her delegation, the WTO Committee 
system provided a forum to gain a basic understan ding of the trade policies of other Members, and 
to raise concerns outside the context of the dispute settlement mechanism. However, in the 
current case, the information that had been gathered about these measures originated from 
non-official sources. She urged Nigeria to clarify any misunderstanding and to explain its view of the relationship of these measures to Nigeria's obligations under the TRIMS Agreement. 
9.16.  The US had also noted that new measures requiring the use of local content were spreading 
to new sectors in Nigeria, most recently the ICT sector. Such measures imposed a long-term cost 
upon Nigeria, as investors questioned their ability to operate in the market and instead considered alternative locations where the investment climate might be more favourable. The US looked G/C/M/124 
 
- 19 - 
 
  forward to working bilaterally and multilaterally with Nigeria to address these concerns, and 
invited Nigeria to commit itself to engaging with WTO Members through the committee system. 
9.17.  The delegate of Thailand echoed the previous concerns regarding Nigeria's restrictions upon 
importers' access to its foreign exchange market for certain imported products. As an exporter of 
agricultural products, Thailand believed that the inclusion of agricultural items in the list of the 
CBN represented a restriction upon trade between Thailand and Nigeria. In August 2015, Thailand's concerns with this measure had been raised with Nigeria in written form and clarification 
sought; the response was still pending. He urged Nigeria to respond promptly and to endeavour to 
eliminate the measure as soon as possible. 
9.18.  The delegate of Malaysia expressed the systemic interest of his authorities on the 
restrictions to foreign exchange currency adopted by the CBN. His delegation would continue to 
monitor the issue closely. 
9.19.  The delegate of Switzerland also expressed systemic concerns with regard to this measure 
and the long list of items to which it referre d, and requested Nigeria to clarify the issue. 
9.20.  The delegate of Nigeria thanked the previo us speakers for their interventions and indicated 
that his authorities, deeply concerned about this situation, wished to assure the Council that they 
were doing everything possible to work on this particular challenge that Nigeria was facing. He also 
indicated that Nigeria had been trying to solve the issue bilaterally although no solution had been 
reached to date. Nigeria valued and underscored the particular importance of transparency and would try to address these issues and continue to respect its WTO commitments, as it had done when submitting its notification. 
9.21.  His authorities were aware of the CBN regu lation as its statutory responsibility was to 
develop monetary policies that rectified dwindling oil revenue and stabilized Nigeria's foreign exchange figures. As soon as the measure had co me into force, the Ministry of Trade had drawn 
the attention of the CBN to the need to undertake wider consultation with stakeholders. He also 
indicated that, on certain occasions, the Ministry of Trade had requested the rollback of certain trade policies pending wider consultation, including the issue of rationalization of foreign exchange 
allocations. These actions had been taken at ministerial level, but internal consultations were 
ongoing and for this reason his delegation could provide no further update on the concerns raised. 
9.22.  His authorities were also mindful of the local content requ irements, which had always been 
applied in the most transparent manner. His delegation would refer to these requirements again at 
a later stage, when reporting on the efforts that Nigeria had made at the national level in order to 
ensure consistency with its WTO obligations. 
9.23.  He also mentioned that there was a new government in place and that the Cabinet would 
only take up its functions on the day after this CTG meeting, when ministerial responsibilities 
would be assigned. To this end, his Ambassador was in Abuja taking part in the consultative 
process to underscore the importance that his delegation attached to these issues. Once the new 
ministerial responsibilities were assigned, Nigeria would be in a better position to address these 
concerns in more concrete terms, including at the next meeting of this Council. 
9.24.  The Chairperson thanked delegations for th eir interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made. 
9.25.  The Council so agreed. 
10  INDONESIA'S IMPORT AND EXPORT RESTRICTING POLICIES AND PRACTICES – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
10.1.  The Chairperson informed the Council that, in a communication dated 10 October 2015, the 
delegations of the European Union, Japan, and the United States of America, requested the Secretariat to include in the agenda of this m eeting an item entitled: "Indonesia's Import and 
Export Restricting Policies". G/C/M/124 
 
- 20 - 
 
  10.2.  The delegate of the United States of Amer ica stated that this Council was well acquainted 
with the breadth of concerns that the US had been raising since 2013 with regard to Indonesia's 
trade restricting practices and policies. These included import licensing requirements, unique technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures–such as those for toys, pre-shipment 
inspection requirements, export restrictions, and local content and domestic manufacturing 
requirements, including those in the energy and information and communication technology (ICT) sectors. Instead of promoting domestic economic goals, these policies were distorting trade 
and investment and hindering the private sector's ability to fulfil its economic potential. These 
kinds of measures could have long-term detrimental effects on economies by stifling the competition and innovation encouraged by competition. 
10.3.  The US had nevertheless been encouraged by recent statements by Indonesian government 
officials, including those made by President Joko  Widodo and Trade Minister Thomas Lembong in 
Washington, where they had recognized a need to  improve the business and investment climate in 
Indonesia. Similarly, the Economic Policy Pack ages (EPPs) recently announced indicated that 
Indonesia was heading in the right direction. For instance, the US had welcomed the recent 
changes to the labelling requirements introduced by  the Ministry of Trade, and hoped that future 
announcements under the EPPs would address the long-standing concerns raised by Members in 
this Council and relevant Committees at the WTO through the introduction of fundamental changes 
in the direction of Indonesia's trade policy. 
10.4.  These changes would hopefully lead also to  improvements in Indonesia's import licensing 
regime. Over the last four years, Indonesia had introduced import licensing requirements on an 
ever expanding list of products, such as ag riculture, ICT and consumer goods, including 
electronics, household appliances, and food and beverages, measures which appeared to be WTO-inconsistent. For instance, the ministries of Trade and Industry used import permits and 
licences to restrict the quantities of imported ce ll phones, tablets, and handheld computers, and to 
force importers to commit to developing local manufacturing. 
10.5.  The EPPs were also intended to address other long-standing concerns regarding Indonesia's 
expanded use of localization requirements, including but not limited to local content requirements 
and domestic manufacturing, and requirements for data centres, such as those in the retail sector and recently implemented for 4G LTE. 
10.6.  The US also hoped that, as part of its efforts, Indonesia would address the general lack of 
transparency in its trade regimes. Indonesia had not notified its subsidy programmes since 1995, 
or some 20 years ago. Indonesia had also been asked to notify its pre-shipment inspection requirements. Concerns also existed with regard to other instances where the government had 
failed to notify technical regulations, confor mity assessment procedures, and SPS measures, as 
required by the relevant WTO agreements. These concerns had been continuously raised in the appropriate WTO Committees, including Import Lice nsing, Agriculture, TBT, Customs Valuation, 
and TRIMS Committees. The US hoped that the calls made at the WTO and bilaterally would help 
and encourage Indonesia to introduce positive changes and a new direction to its trade policy. 
10.7.  The delegate of the European Union indicate d that his delegation had also been raising this 
issue for a long time in this forum as well as in the Import Licensing, TBT, TRIMs, and 
SPS Committees. The EU welcomed the recently announced reform packages in Indonesia but 
continued to be concerned by the continuing re strictive and protectionist trade and investment 
measures. The EU hoped that the announced measures would finally address this situation and 
shift the direction of Indonesia's economic and trade policies. 
10.8.  As examples of Indonesia's measures adversely affecting trade the EU referred to the 
following: (i) multiple layers of general and specific import licensing requirements as well as 
pre-shipment verifications that negatively affected trade flows; (ii) the legislation on distribution in 
the retail sector that had the potential considerably to restrict the possibility for non-locally produced goods or non-local marks actually to be sold. It seemed that some exemptions were foreseen but these were of a temporary nature and with unclear rules; it was also unclear whether 
or not these measures were currently under review; (iii) the imposition of a pre-paid corporate 
income tax to importers which continued to add up to restrictive import measures, discriminatory in nature; (iv) the entry port restrictions in the Jakarta main port, which continued to undermine 
the EU's ability to export food, in particular; (v) export restrictions, which continued to be applied 
on certain raw materials, noting that, despite the amendments introduced in 2014 by Indonesia to G/C/M/124 
 
- 21 - 
 
  the law on export tariffs, the ban on exports on unprocessed minerals had been left unchanged. 
These measures disrupted international markets, in creased input costs for producers, and resulted 
in uncertainty in terms of supply. 
10.9.  The EU also reiterated its call for more  transparency on the implementation of these 
measures. Indeed, the general lack of transpar ency and consultation created a climate of 
uncertainty and ambiguity for exporters, importers, and investors alike. This applied in particular but not only to the 2014 Laws on Industry an d Trade, whose potential impact on trade and 
investment could be significant in terms of trade disruption, if fully implemented in their current 
form. 
10.10.  The EU had taken note of Indonesia's statement at the TRIMs Committee of 
5 October 2015, when it informed Members of 134 regulations to be repealed, of which 32 related 
to trade. The EU wished to receive the list of  these regulations and more detailed information 
about the state of play of the implementation of the Trade and Industry laws, and on the impact of 
the recently announced reform packages. 
10.11.  The delegate of Japan associated his dele gation with the statements made concerning the 
increasingly restrictive trade policies of Indonesia, such as local content requirements and 
restrictions on imports and exports, and which violated WTO rules. Japan, together with other 
delegations, had raised its concerns about the Mining Law and the Laws on Trade and Industry, 
restrictions in the retail sector, sales restrictions on 4G mobile phones, and local content requirements for investment in the telecommunications sector. These trade-restrictive policies had still not been rectified. In the mid- and long-term, the consequences of these trade-restrictive 
policies would affect the domestic industry and Indonesian consumers, and went against the 
efforts of Indonesia to improve its business envi ronment through the relaxation of regulations. 
10.12.  Japan requested Indonesia promptly to im plement the deregulation and structural reforms 
that had been announced to stimulate its economy, and urged Indonesia seriously to address the 
concerns raised by Members so as to achieve a more transparent and stable trade and investment environment. 
10.13.  The delegate of Canada shared the co ncerns expressed at this meeting regarding 
Indonesia's continuing import restricting po licies and practices. The number of measures, 
especially those relating to agricultural products, negatively affected Canada's ability to compete in the Indonesian market. He encouraged Indonesia to respect its WTO obligations, in particular 
regarding import licensing requirements. 
10.14.  The delegate of Australia shared the concerns of other WTO Members with regard to 
Indonesia's import and export restricting policies in recent years, and particularly in terms of their 
impact on agricultural trade. He thanked Indonesia for its explanations of its measures in 
WTO committee meetings and in bilateral discussions in Jakarta and in Geneva. However, Australia remained especially concerned about Ministry  of Agriculture Regulation No. 139-PEMENTAN-
PD.410/12/2014, and its amendment of January 2015, on the importation of carcass meat and/or 
processed meat products into the Indonesian ma rket. This regulation allowed only state-owned 
enterprises to import secondary beef cuts, and only in limited circumstances, in volumes determined by officials, and with Ministerial a pproval. In this context, Australia noted that 
GATT Article XVII required state trading enterprises to make purchases solely in accordance with 
commercial considerations. 
10.15.  The regulation also limited the types of offal that could be imported and imposed on 
imported meat products requirements on packag ing, labelling, and indication of use; these 
requirements did not apply to domestic products. 
10.16.  A further concern was the use by Indonesia of its import permit system for agricultural 
products, including live cattle, boxed beef, and hort icultural goods, for the imposition of quotas on 
imports which, in the case of certain agricultural products, had been prevented from coinciding with domestic production cycles. Moreover, the recently released 2015 Regulation No. 71 of the 
Ministry of Trade on horticultural product import provisions would re-establish an explicit quota on 
horticultural imports. Article 3 of this Regulation stated that each year the total number of 
horticultural products should be set at a coordination meeting. Australia remained concerned by G/C/M/124 
 
- 22 - 
 
  the impact of these measures on trade between the two countries and sought further information 
about the consistency of these regulations with Indonesia's WTO obligations. 
10.17.  The delegate of New Zealand echoed the concerns raised by previous speakers. New 
Zealand believed that Indonesia's restrictions undermined core WTO principles and were 
inconsistent with key WTO obligations. A number of import restrictions in Indonesia's laws and 
regulations affected trade across a range of agricultural products, including horticultural and animal products, and not only hurt exporters but also Indonesian consumers, processors, and 
producers, as these measures had contributed to rises in food prices in Indonesia, including for 
basic foodstuffs. The measures also undermined the positive efforts undertaken by the Indonesian Government to increase local capacity and jobs, given that they would have an impact on supply chains. New Zealand hoped that Indonesia's reform plans would steer its policies back in a more 
WTO-consistent direction. 
10.18.  The delegate of Brazil shared the concerns already expressed on the trade restrictions 
applied by Indonesia. Brazil had already ma de use of the DSU in case DS484 to analyse 
Indonesia's restrictions on the imports of poultry, but other import restrictions, like those on beef, 
were also a source of concern to Brazil. Brazil joined its voice to calls made on Indonesia to bring its measures into conformity with its WTO obligations. 
10.19.  The delegate of Chinese Taipei associated his delegation with the comments made by other 
speakers. At a previous meeting of this Counci l Chinese Taipei had expressed its concern with 
regard to Indonesia's import and export measures and specifically with the new licensing requirement for fish and fish products. Chinese Taipei would continue to monitor Indonesia's 
import licensing regime, including in the context of dispute settlement, and encouraged Indonesia 
seriously to improve its import licensing procedures so as to ensure their conformity with all relevant WTO Agreements. 
10.20.  The delegate of Switzerland shared the same  systemic concerns with regard to Indonesia's 
import and export measures. Nevertheless, Switzerland was pleased to hear that Indonesia's 
reform plans were going in the right direction, and encouraged Indonesia to address the remaining 
concerns raised by other WTO Members in the relevant committees. 
10.21.  The delegate of Norway also shared th e systemic concerns previously raised about a 
number of measures in Indonesia's import and expo rt policies, and especially with regard to its 
import licensing regime on fish and fish produc ts. Norway urged Indonesia to continue with its 
reform process and to bring its policies into line with its WTO commitments. 
10.22.  The delegate of Indonesia thanked Members for their interest in Indonesia's import and 
export policies, acknowledged that this item had been a long-standing agenda item in this Council, 
and recalled that her delegation had replied to these issues at the last CTG meeting. In order not 
to make a long and repetitive statement, she referred to the minutes of the previous meeting.2 
10.23.  However, she highlighted that the general principles adopted by Indonesia in its import 
and export policies were justified on safety, health, environment, and moral hazard grounds. The 
policies were not intended to act as barriers to trade. Indonesia's policies were "living policies", which would evolve and be readjusted and recalibrated commensurate with the challenges emerging from a global trading system in which Indonesia was well integrated. Her authorities had 
always tried to respond to the needs of current economic conditions, particularly with a view to 
improving and to facilitating import and export activities. As acknowledged in the interventions made by the US and the EU, in September 2015 her government had released a first policy 
package, a deregulation programme. The purpose of this policy package was to facilitate the flow 
and distribution of goods into and out of Indonesi a, and consisted in the revision of 134 Ministerial 
Decrees and related import and export policies of several ministries. Since the deregulation was 
still in progress, Members should wait to see the outcome of this programme. Indonesia remained 
committed to working with other Members in the WTO, and other fora, to address Members' concerns while also taking into account Indonesia's need to address its own development challenges. 
                                               
2 See document G/C/M/123, paragraphs 6.25-6.29. G/C/M/124 
 
- 23 - 
 
  10.24.  The Chairperson thanked delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made. 
10.25.  The Council so agreed. 
11  ECUADOR – IMPORT RESTRICTING MEASURES – REQUEST FROM JAPAN 
11.1.  The Chairperson informed the Council that, in a communication dated 29 October 2015, the 
delegation of Japan requested the Secretariat to in clude in the agenda of today's meeting an item 
entitled: "Ecuador – Import Restricting Measures". 
11.2.  The delegate of Japan indicated that his delegation would raise two issues: first, import 
restricting measures on automobiles; and second, Ecuadorian BOP measures. On the first issue, 
Japan considered that Ecuador's measures were inconsistent with GATT Article XI. Japan had not found convincing the explanation of these measures  provided by Ecuador at the last meeting of 
this Council. Despite continuous requests from Japan and other Members, Ecuador had not made 
any modification or taken any corrective action with regard to these measures. He urged Ecuador to remove the measures as soon as possible, or else to confirm that the measures would expire 
and be completely removed no later than December 2015, as initially planned, and that no new 
measures would then be introduced. 
11.3.  With respect to the second issue, Japan welcomed the notification by Ecuador of its 
tentative phase-out plan of BOP measures, as it continued to hold concerns about their 
consistency with GATT Article XXVIII. Japan considered that consultations on this issue should continue at the BOP Committee level. 
11.4.  The delegate of Mexico indicated that Ecuador's import restrictions affected a number of 
sectors, although Mexico's concerns related especially to technical regulations applied by Ecuador 
on the automobile sector, and to the further extens ion of their phase-out period by two years. As 
previously expressed in this Council and in the TBT Committee, Mexico reiterated its request to 
Ecuador to accept UNECE's technical regulation s, as well as the US, Japanese, Korean, and 
Brazilian technical regulations on automobiles. This would imply that Ecuador's technical regulations complied with Article 2.4 of the TB T Agreement. Given the characteristics of the 
automobile industry, Ecuador should also accept se lf-certification by automobile producers. Mexico 
reiterated its call to Ecuador to accept the aforementioned technical regulations in order to make its technical regulations WTO-consistent. 
11.5.  The delegate of Colombia stated that Colombia's concerns were of more than a systemic 
nature. Indeed, Colombia and Ecuador enjoyed a strong trading relationship at various levels: 
trade, investment, and tourism. Therefore, it was not difficult to understand Colombia's concerns about the imposition of a safeguard measure for BOP reasons. This affected negatively a 
commercial relationship that had taken ye ars to build. Indeed, between March and 
September 2015, Colombia's exports had dropped by  23% when compared to the same period in 
2014; this situation was worsening month by month. 
11.6.  Some sectors covered by the safeguard measure indicated drops far higher than acceptable. 
Some examples taken from the Ecuadorian Central Bank indicated that exports of glass and glass 
manufactured products had dropped by 74.4%; f ood preparations by 61.6%; gas and electric 
household appliances by 50.3%; exports of truc ks, an especially important sector, by 47.6%; 
sweets and candies by 44%; and paper and the publishing industry by 40%. 
11.7.  In addition to the safeguard measure, there were other trade restrictive measures still in 
force, such as the issuance of technical regu lations and conformity assessment procedures, the 
imposition of quota-imports for vehicles, and the ban imposed to imports of advertising material. 
All these issues had been discussed at the WTO and bilaterally but had still not been resolved. 
11.8.  Colombia acknowledged the difficult situation faced by the Ecuadorian economy. 
Nevertheless, Colombia believed that measures applied with a view to improving this situation 
should not harm a commercial relationship that had taken years to build. And these concerns were only increased further by the growing number of measures that Ecuador had been taking. Colombia believed that these measures could have  long-term effects and urged Ecuador to reflect G/C/M/124 
 
- 24 - 
 
  on this. The solution to the difficulties that Ecuador was facing was not to restrict trade but rather 
the opposite, to stimulate greater trade and investment flows, and to promote tourism. 
11.9.  The delegate of Panama thanked Ecuador for the information it had provided at the 
Committee on BOP concerning the implementation of the safeguard measure that had been 
applied since March 2015 in light of its balance-of-payments imbalance. The safeguard measure 
harmed Panama's commercial interests as it had an impact upon the re-export of goods; this represented over 90% of transactions carried  out from within the Colón Free Trade Zone 
(Colon FTZ) to the Ecuadorian market. 
11.10.  As mentioned by Panama at the last BOP Committee meeting, this measure did not seem 
to be applied in conformity with BOP provisions. Moreover, it was the second time that Ecuador had resorted to this kind of measure in a five-yea r period. If the measure had not been effective in 
the recent past it was difficult to understand how it would be effective this time. Ecuador's 
repeated use of these restrictive measures generated systemic concerns. Panama considered that BOP measures were not effective in restoring balance to the BOP in a healthy and lasting manner; 
indeed, after eight months of the measure's enforcement, Ecuador's situation had not improved. 
Panama would raise the same concerns at the BOP Committee meeting. 
11.11.  The delegate of Chile thanked Ecuador for the information it had provided during the 
consultations that took place at the BOP Committee on 29 June and 16 October 2015. Chile joined 
previous speakers in their calls upon Ecuado r to address, at the next meeting of the 
BOP Committee, the concerns expressed about its BOP measures, which had been in place now for eight months. Specifically, Chile was concerned about Ecuador's selective measures to fix the 
BOP situation, especially in terms of product cove rage and the differentiation made in respect of 
applied charges. 
11.12.  The drop in Chile's exports to Ecuado r since the implementation of these safeguard 
measures was evident. Therefore, Chile requested Ecuador to revise its schedule for dismantling 
these measures, particularly the highest charges, which constituted an obstacle for the exports of Ecuador's trading partners and that were in any case not solving Ecuador's BOP problems. 
11.13.  The delegate of Peru thanked Ecuador for its willingness to continue with consultations in 
the BOP Committee, and stated that during the period March–August 2015 various Peruvian 
products had been adversely affected by the Ecuado rian measures, and particularly in the textiles, 
agricultural, and chemicals sectors. Peru requested Ecuador to lift the measures it had taken under 
GATT Article XXVIII, to address the concerns raised  at the BOP Committee, and to terminate these 
measures. This would assist Ecuador in moving its economy forward on a healthier and more enduring basis. 
11.14.  The delegate from the United States of America reiterated 'continued US concerns 
regarding the different measures imposed by Ec uador. These were adversely affecting imports 
from the US and other Members. Her authorities had engaged with the Government of Ecuador on 
this issue since 2013, both bilaterally and in various WTO Committees, but to date Ecuador had 
declined to resolve the matter fully. She cited the case of Resolution 116 that required exporters to procure unobtainable Certificates of Conformi ty, and established various arbitrary technical 
regulations that resulted in a prohibition to the import and sale of more than 300 products. 
11.15.  Ecuador had also implemented other measures, such as new labelling requirements for 
alcoholic beverages and processed foods for human consumption, and new requirements in the context of the sanitary food registration proc ess. Ecuador had asserted that many of these 
measures were necessary to address legitimate health and safety concerns. However, these 
measures were in fact intended to reduce imports in an effort to balance trade. Indeed, several press articles had quoted Ecuadorian government  officials who repeatedly asserted that these 
measures were intended to promote import substitution and balance trade. 
11.16.  The US remained concerned that Ecuador was neither notifying these measures nor 
allowing her delegation and other Members to comment on the measures before their implementation, as required by the TBT Agreement.  In some cases, Ecuador had either failed to 
notify a measure or had issued emergency notifications. Both circumstances impeded Members 
from providing comments before the measures were  implemented, especially in the context of a G/C/M/124 
 
- 25 - 
 
  claim of unspecified urgency implying immediate implementation of specific new product 
requirements. 
11.17.  The US had closely followed developments with respect to these measures and continued 
to seek information not only about how Ecuador was implementing them but also about their 
impact on US exports. Her delegation, as well as  those of several other WTO Members, had raised 
these and other issues in the TBT and BOP Committees. So far, only a few positive signs had been seen indicating Ecuador's willingness to address these concerns, as in the cases of footwear and 
motor vehicle safety standards. 
11.18.  In October 2015 Ecuador had presented a plan to the BOP Committee to phase out in 2016 
its tariff surcharge imposed for BOP purposes. The US encouraged Ecuador to advance its timeline 
as discussed in that Committee but remained concerned that Ecuador had no plans to phase out 
its associated automobile quota, which in 2015 had reduced 42% of imports compared to 2013. 
11.19.  The US urged Ecuador promptly to address the concerns raised at today's meeting by 
terminating its import-restrictive measures and practices. If, however, Ecuador continued to 
maintain these measures, the US believed that Ecuador should provide a detailed written 
explanation of how, in its view, these measures were WTO-consistent. 
11.20.  The delegate of Switzerland recognized th e challenging situation faced by Ecuador and its 
efforts to adapt to the changing economic la ndscape. Switzerland also welcomed Ecuador's 
notification of a time schedule to phase out its BOP. Like other delegations, Switzerland had concerns with regard to the design and application of the measure, as his delegation had communicated in the consultations in the context of the BOP Committee. Moreover, there were still 
some outstanding questions, which were being addressed bilaterally and that remained of interest 
to Switzerland. He invited Ecuador to maintain quarterly reviews of its measures, and to consider the prompt dismantlement of the surcharges, even  before the deadline of 15 months as initially 
indicated by Ecuador. 
11.21.  The delegate of the Republic of Korea in dicated that Korea shared the concerns expressed 
by other delegations, and recalled that Ecuador had maintained various import restrictive 
measures on a number of manufacturing goods, such as automobiles, home appliances, and 
mobile phones and, through the resolutions of COME X, in particular, an import quota on imported 
automobiles since June 2012. This quota was to be terminated in 2014; however, Ecuador had decided to extend it until end-2015. 
11.22.  These import-restrictive measures had negatively impacted trade between Korea and 
Ecuador, as well as Ecuador's industry and employment. Korea believed that these measures were not in conformity with GATT Article XI and, lik e other delegations, Korea requested Ecuador to 
terminate these measures according to the phase-out plan presented during the 
BOP consultations. With respect to the BOP safeguard, Korea still had commercial and systemic concerns and hoped to continue working together with Ecuador to find a mutually acceptable 
solution. 
11.23.  The delegate of Canada reiterated the syst emic concerns of his delegation about Ecuador's 
import restrictions in the automotive sector, and called on Ecuador to ensure that its measures 
were consistent with its WTO obligations. 
11.24.  The delegate of the European Union echo ed previous statements and recalled that the 
EU considered that the quota currently applied on  imports of vehicles, although already sharply 
reduced, should be totally dismantled without dela y. In the EU's view, the quota was incompatible 
with Ecuador's WTO obligations. On the BOP-related measures, the EU urged Ecuador to take 
immediate steps to dismantle them, and in any case to provide detailed information and an 
explanation as to how, in its view, these measures could be consistent with WTO rules. 
11.25.  The delegate of Ecuador, with respect to the concerns expressed about motor vehicles, 
stated that his country had been facing serious problems with greenhouse gases (GHG), and that 
Ecuador had adopted a series of measures with a view to solving this problem. Indeed, the measure contained in COMEX Resolutions 65 and 66 aimed to reduce the increase of 110% of GHG 
in the automobile sector, particularly in the main cities where there had been a massive increase G/C/M/124 
 
- 26 - 
 
  in the number of cars. These Resolutions applied to all WTO Members and also and equally 
affected nationally produced vehicles. Ecuador also had a national air plan for its main cities and was currently developing other measures to mitigate the effects of greenhouse gases produced by cars. Some additional programmes had been adopted,  such as improving the quality of gasoline so 
as to reduce gas emissions, and improving air qual ity in cities so as to preserve human health. 
Ecuador was also implementing a plan of incentives for the use of electric cars. Therefore, Regulations 65 and 66 of COMEX had been adopted with the aim of protecting human health and 
life, according to the standards of the multilateral trading system, and fell under the general 
exceptions contained in GATT Article XX. With respect to the BOP measures, he indicated that his delegation had taken note of the concerns expressed but invited delegations to revert to these matters in the BOP and TBT Committees, which were the relevant fora. 
11.26.  The delegate of the European Union, in re sponse to Ecuador's intervention, stated that it 
was difficult for his delegation to understand Ecuador's argument that the measures imposed on 
motor vehicles were based on environmental standards, not because the EU did not care about or 
give its consideration to the environment, but because the EU believed that this rationale had not 
been developed in the system that Ecuador had put in place. Moreover, the system itself appeared 
to discriminate between imports and origin of assembled products. The EU would look at this issue 
carefully. 
11.27.  The Chairperson thanked delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made. 11.28.  The Council so agreed. 
12  CHINA – ISSUES RELATED TO TRADE IN SEAFOOD – REQUEST FROM NORWAY 12.1.  The Chairperson informed the Council that, in a communication dated 29 October 2016, the 
delegation of Norway requested the Secretariat to include in the agenda of this meeting an item 
entitled: "China – Issues Related to Trade in Seafood". 
12.2.  The delegate of Norway stated that, si nce December 2010, China had implemented several 
measures that had severely affected Norwegian exports of salmon, and that, in the future, could 
potentially affect all kinds of Norwegian exports of seafood to China. The measures included 
quarantine and testing procedures, allocation of "import licences" for salmon, and a non-updated list of Norwegian companies authorized to export to China. Norway was concerned about China's use of different trade-restricting measures, and re quested China to act transparently in order to 
create predictable conditions for trade. 
12.3.  Quarantine in China referred to the following: (i) quarantine measures established since 
December 2010, which had affected salmon of No rwegian origin. The marked share for Norwegian 
salmon in China had dropped from 95% in 2010 to  less than 10% by April 2015; (ii) quarantine 
and testing measures that in April 2015 had been extended to include testing for up to 40 different substances, and whose scope had also been enla rged to include all seafood from Norway. The 
prolonged quarantine caused delays to the cons ignments and increased the cost for exporters, 
importers, and consumers alike. Seafood was kept under custody while the tests were taking place; the time taken could be considerable, with severe consequences for the shelf life of perishable food like fresh salmon. Consequently, since April 2015, exports to China had stopped 
almost completely. Norway welcomed China's ratification of the Agreement on Trade Facilitation, 
as its Article 7.9 contained important provisions on perishable goods, and expected that, in the 
future, China would give appropriate consideration to fresh salmon, a perishable good; 
(iii) Norwegian authorities had not received any information from China concerning a change or a 
possible change to these import controls. Addition ally, there had been no findings reported from 
the AQSIQ to the Norwegian Food Safety Authority that could warrant the increase in magnitude 
and volume of the import controls that were  currently being applied to Norwegian seafood. 
12.4.  China's import licensing system for salmon was a de facto quantitative restriction on imports 
from Norway. Reports from the Norwegian seafood industry indicated that their applications for import licences were simply not processed, whereas import licence applications from other 
countries were. G/C/M/124 
 
- 27 - 
 
  12.5.  Since March 2015, Norway had repeatedly requested China to update its list of Norwegian 
companies authorized to export seafood to China.  However, this list had not been updated and 
China had not provided any information on this issue or indicated when the list would be updated. 
12.6.  Norway had repeatedly raised this issu e in the SPS Committee and bilaterally, and had 
requested China to provide information on its regime for import control and quarantine procedures 
for seafood in general, and in particular with regard to whatever specific measures it applied to Norwegian seafood. Norway believed that in-depth bilateral technical consultations were necessary 
in order to address all of these issues. Trade in  seafood products between Norway and China had 
been severely disrupted. Norway was disappointed by a lack of opportunities to discuss these issues bilaterally and in a constructive manner, and urged China to address these concerns promptly and in a transparent and predictable manner. 
12.7.  The delegate of the European Union recalled the importance for his delegation of import 
procedures being transparent, predictable, in  conformity with international standards and 
WTO commitments, and not more trade restrictive than was reasonable and necessary. 
12.8.  The delegate of China stated that, in recent years, the Chinese entry and exit inspection and 
quarantine authorities had detected on several occasions imports of salmon non-compliant with 
China's sanitary measures. Those non-compliant products posed a threat to consumers' health, 
particularly with regard to the pathogenic bacteria carried by instant chilled salmon. This situation 
led directly to illness and could even endanger lives. Chinese experts had carried out risk analysis, the results of which had shown that salmon, especially chilled farmed salmon, represented a high risk. Therefore, to protect Chinese consum ers' health, in 2011 AQSIQ had issued an 
announcement that it would further strengthen the inspection and quarantine measures for salmon 
exported to China from all WTO Members. All the relevant measures in the announcement were based on existing Chinese laws and regulations and were not new measures. 
12.9.  There were other issues that his delegation wanted to highlight. First, in recent years, there 
had been constant world reports about the presence of drug residues, parasites, pathogenic micro-organisms, diseases, and other quality and safety problems in Norwegian salmon. Moreover, 
in recent years, ISA virus had been detected repeatedly in Norwegian salmon. China had sent 
letters to Norway on several occasions indicating its concern about the ISA virus in Norwegian salmon. With regard to other seafood products, in  recent years there had also been media reports 
about the quality and safety risks of Norwegian cod fish and other seafood products. Moreover, the 
Norwegian media had also reported that toxic su bstances such as dioxins and dioxin-like PCBs 
detected in the liver of Norwegian cod fish exceeded the maximum limit established in EU standards, and had alerted consumers not to eat liver of cod fish origin. Consequently, to 
ensure the safety of imported seafood products, China was monitoring imported seafood products 
based on the different risk level of products, and had strengthened the inspection and quarantine of products of high risk. China had also maintained fluid communications with Norway through 
multiple channels, such as communications between the competent authorities, the competent 
authority and the Chinese Embassy in Norway, and between the two WTO Missions in Geneva. 
China would continue to work closely with Norway to ensure the safety of seafood products and protect consumer health. 
12.10.  With regard to Norway's request to update  the list of authorized companies, he indicated 
that the CNCA would update the list and would also certify those Norwegian companies that could ensure disease control and prevention of health threats to seafood products. 
12.11.  The delegate of Norway thanked China for it s responses, and indicated that the findings to 
which the Chinese delegate had referred had never been communicated to her authorities. These 
justified the need to hold technical consultations with China. She indicated that Norwegian food 
safety regulations were fully harmonized with EU regulations, through the European Economic 
Area (EEA), and reflected the relevant requirements of the CODEX, the OIE, and the ITPC. Therefore, seafood produced anywhere in the EEA , including in Norway, complied with the same 
food safety requirements. 
12.12.  The Chairperson thanked delegations for their interventions, and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made. G/C/M/124 
 
- 28 - 
 
  12.13.  The Council so agreed. 
13  ILLICIT TRADE: FIGHTING MONEY LAUNDERING IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
(CONCLUSIONS OF THE PANEL AT THE WTO PUBLIC FORUM 2015) – STATEMENT BY COLOMBIA 
13.1.  The Chairperson informed the Council that, in a communication dated 29 October 2015, the 
delegation of Colombia had requested the Secretar iat to include in the agenda of today's meeting 
an item entitled: "Illegal Trade – Fighting Money Laundering in International Trade – Conclusions 
of the Panel at the WTO Public Forum 2015". 
13.2.  The delegate of Colombia informed the Council that, during the Public Forum that had taken 
place on 1 October 2015, his delegation had organized a Panel on illegal trade and combating 
money laundering. The Panel's objectives had been to sensitize the WTO community about illicit 
trade, a problem that increasingly affected both developed and developing countries, and to 
stimulate a discussion about possible strategies collectively to face this phenomenon that concerned both exporting and importing countries. 
13.3.  In order to provide an overall view of th is problem, OECD, WCO and INTERPOL experts, as 
well as representatives from the private sector and academia had participated in the Panel. An issue on which all experts agreed was that illicit trade was a global problem that continued to grow 
in seriousness and magnitude. In their presentations, international organizations coincided in 
believing that illicit trade represented between 8 and 15% of global GDP, a percentage that could 
be higher still in certain developing countries, and the WTO estimated that counterfeited goods represented 7% of global trade. With regard to money laundering, the IMF considered that it might 
represent between 3 to 5% of global GDP, and that significant illicit activity was taking place under 
the guise of international trade. 
13.4.  The so called "dark side" of trade also covered other illicit activities, such as drug trafficking, 
trafficking in people, wildlife and endangered species, illegal trade in wood, toxic wastes, antiques, 
and stolen artworks. Experts also agreed that real ties existed between illicit trade and international crime gangs, and pointed out that these were not isolated practices where some 
small trading companies tried to avoid taxes and other transaction costs. Illicit trade was rather an 
activity in which organized international crime gangs sought ways to launder the profits from their illegal activities. The increase in monitoring of financial activity by the international community had also increased the use of these means for mone y laundering purposes. None of the panellists 
believed that the solution was to reverse the trade liberalization that had taken place thanks to the 
WTO. On the contrary, they recommended fi nding new mechanisms in the WTO and other 
commercial fora to foster international cooperation and fight more effectively against illicit trade. 
13.5.  Experts also described the ongoing work on this issue in the OECD, the World Customs 
Organization (WCO), INTERPOL, and certain private sector organizations. Each one of these organizations had an ambitious programme. Howeve r, as the WTO itself was the principal forum 
dealing with international trade, experts highlighted the need for the WTO also to help in the 
search to find ways effectively to tackle this problem. Some experts even asserted that an absence of measures to fight illicit trade in a WTO Member's domestic legislation could be considered non-compliance with regard to its WTO obligations. 
13.6.  Colombia considered that illicit trade was a problem that undermined the multilateral 
trading system and affected WTO Members, and th at the WTO had to acknowledge and face this 
challenge. Given the scenario described, the seriou sly adverse effects of illicit trade on other 
efforts carried out in the WTO, and the important contribution that the WTO could make to combat 
illicit trade, Colombia considered it necessary to incorporate the issue of illicit trade into the WTO agenda. This would help to clarify the relationship between WTO rules and illicit trade, and to 
see what mechanisms could be adopted to enhance Members' cooperation on this issue. Colombia 
would continue its consideration of this issue and looked forward to working with all WTO Members interested in engaging in consultations. 
13.7.  The delegate of Peru agreed with Colombia that illicit trade was a serious issue that should 
be dealt with in the WTO, particularly given its relationship to Members' trading activities. He also G/C/M/124 
 
- 29 - 
 
  informed Members that Peru had enacted legislation against illicit trading activities, as it did 
against any other illicit activity. 
13.8.  The delegate of the European Union thanked Colombia for its efforts in organizing a Panel 
during the WTO Public Forum in 2015. The EU considered that it had been an interesting event 
that had helped to develop an awareness of illicit trade. It was an example of an interesting and 
useful event that connected WTO Members to the real world. 
13.9.  The delegate of Costa Rica agreed with Colombia that illicit trade was undermining the 
multilateral trading system and its Members, and that it was also laying the ground for future 
problems for the WTO. There was a growing need  to establish mechanisms that would enable 
Members to address this problem without affecting the measures in place for facilitating and liberalizing trade. Costa Rica shared Colombia's wish to incorporate illicit trade into the 
WTO's agenda. Moreover, a dialogue should take place that aimed to ensure cooperation among 
Members on this matter. 
13.10.  The delegate of Mexico thanked Colombia for having reported on the Panel on Illicit Trade 
at the Public Forum. Mexico recognized the international efforts being made to combat an issue of 
growing importance and that had clear links to  the work of the WTO, particularly as the 
WTO estimated that illicit trade represented 7% of total world trade. This was three times Mexico's 
share of world trade. Mexico would like to cons ider work on this issue in the near future. 
13.11.  The delegate of Guatemala also thanked Colombia for its report on this issue. Like 
Colombia and the experts who had participated in the panel, Guatemala recognized that illicit trade 
was a global problem and one that had been increasing in magnitude and importance. 
Nevertheless, this problem should not be allowed to become an obstacle to trade liberalization 
efforts at the WTO. On the contrary, illicit trade could encourage Members to engage in a frank discussion aimed at improving international cooperation. Guatemala also supported the inclusion of 
illicit trade on the WTO agenda. In particular, Guatemala would support a discussion of possible 
links between WTO Agreements and agreements on illicit trade, as well as on instruments that 
could be adopted in order to strengthen international cooperation. 
13.12.  The delegate of Chile thanked Colombia for its thorough report on the results of the Panel 
on Illicit Trade held at the 2015 Public Forum. 
13.13.  The delegate of Colombia thanked delegations for their interventions, and for agreeing 
with Colombia that illicit trade was an increasingly important issue, which the WTO would have to 
address. Colombia would continue working on this issue in cooperation with all interested 
Members. 
13.14.  The Chairperson thanked delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made. 13.15.  The Council so agreed. 
14  UKRAINE – ISSUES RELATED TO CUSTOMS VALUATION – REQUEST FROM NORWAY 
14.1.  The Chairperson informed the Council that, in a communication dated 29 April 2016, the 
delegation of Norway requested the Secretariat to include in the agenda of this meeting an item 
entitled: "Ukraine – Issues Related to Customs Valuation". 
14.2.  The delegate of Norway stated that the issue of customs valuation in Ukraine had been 
brought to the Council's attention for the first time  in 2011 by the EU and Norway; it had also been 
dealt with bilaterally. The Norwegian industry had not reported anything about this for some time. However, a few weeks ago Norwegian seafood exporters had indicated to her authorities that the 
value that served as the basis for determining the transaction value of herring imported into 
Ukraine was higher than the agreed price on the invoice. This represented additional duties and 
value added payments on imports. Norway believed that the use of indicative prices to calculate 
transaction values and the implementation of Resolution No. 724 by Ukrainian customs authorities 
could be the cause of these problems. G/C/M/124 
 
- 30 - 
 
  14.3.  In a meeting between the Norwegian repr esentative in Kiev and authorities from the 
Ministry of Finance, the Ukrainian vice-minister had indicated Ukraine's intention to introduce changes to Cabinet Resolution No. 724. There were some positive developments, such as the actual invoice price becoming the basis for the calculation of the transaction value for customs 
purposes. However, problems remain ed with regard to the calculation of customs duties and other 
levies occurring at the Ukrainian border. 
14.4.  Ukraine should strive to find a permanent solution to these problems, and the Ukrainian 
Customs Code should therefore be amended so as to bring it into conformity with the 
WTO Agreement on Customs Valuation and the methodology indicated therein by which to determine transaction value. Norwegian seafood producers and exporters were important players 
in the Ukrainian market and, in addition, the industry intended to develop further trade in seafood 
with Ukraine. Ukraine needed to import Norwegia n seafood, both because it served as a protein 
base and because many internal jobs depended upon imports of Norwegian seafood. 
14.5.  Norway urged Ukraine to revise Cabinet Resolution No. 724 in line with international trade 
law. Ukraine's laws and procedures should also ensure predictability and transparency by being in 
full compliance with the WTO Agreement on Customs Valuation. 
14.6.  The delegate of Iceland stated that this was an issue of systemic concern to Iceland. He 
echoed Norway's recommendation to the Ukrainian authorities to address this promptly, and that 
its customs valuation methodology be brought into full conformity with the WTO Agreement on Customs Valuation. 
14.7.  The delegate of Switzerland echoed th e concerns expressed by Norway and Iceland 
because, as already indicated at previous CTG meetings, Swiss companies faced the same problem 
in the area of customs valuation. Since the beginning of 2015, the situation had not improved, in spite of the fact that the problem had been ra ised by Switzerland and other Members on many 
occasions, both bilaterally and within the WTO.  Like Norway, Switzerland also had reason to 
believe that the application of Cabinet Resolution No. 724 had the effect of significantly increasing 
the value of imported goods given that Ukrainian customs officials used average values. This also 
caused delays in customs clearance procedures as the methodology was dependent upon 
numerous documentation requirements. 
14.8.  Concerns also existed about the lack of tr ansparency in the use of benchmarks by fiscal and 
customs authorities. Switzerland believed that Cabinet Resolution No. 724 would not solve the 
issue of the correct determination of transaction value for customs purposes. Swiss exports of 
chemicals to be used as inputs, perishable good s, and machines, were directly and negatively 
affected by the application of Cabinet Resolution No. 724. 
14.9.  Switzerland remained ready to work constr uctively with Ukraine to find a satisfactory 
solution to this issue, expected to see concrete results soon, and was pleased to note that the Ministry of Finance had indicated its willingness to introduce changes to Cabinet Resolution 
No. 724, and that there now existed an ongoing pr ocess to do so. Switzerland invited Ukraine to 
bring the implementation of its customs valuation legislation into full conformity with its WTO commitments in this area, and to continue in its efforts to ensure that local customs authorities applied these rules in a transparent, uniform, and consistent manner. 
14.10.  The delegate of Ukraine, in response to the concerns previously expressed, indicated that 
Ukraine had always favoured the implementation of other Members' best practices on customs 
issues to its customs valuation methods. In document G/VAL/W/199, Norway had posed written 
questions to Ukraine on its customs valuation procedures. The responses provided by Ukraine had 
been circulated in document G/VAL/W/248, where Ukraine had indicated that its legislation concerning customs valuation issues was in full conformity with GATT Article VII, and that for 
these purposes Ukraine's customs authorities ap plied the transaction value, the first method 
provided for by the Agreement on Customs Valuation when determining customs value. 
14.11.  In fact, Ukraine had undertaken a process to reform its Customs Code, approved by 
Parliament on 13 March 2012, and notified in document G/VAL/N/UKR/2. Such reforms contained 
significantly improved customs procedures. Howeve r, controls over the accuracy of the customs 
value determination had been undertaken by Uk raine's Customs Services. These had revealed G/C/M/124 
 
- 31 - 
 
  that, when proceeding to customs clearance, no t all importers presented reliable data to the 
customs authorities, including data relating to the determination of customs value. Ukraine considered that issues relating to the determination of taxation were among the most sensitive for importers. Therefore, an enhanced control in the area of customs valuation would always be 
considered as burdensome. 
14.12.  Cabinet Resolution No. 724, "On the Use of Test Customs Values in Risk Management 
Systems" of 16 September 2015, had introduced estimated customs values for goods applicable 
for customs clearance purposes and release. Such estimated values were an element of the risk 
management system for ensuring a single approach to controls concerning the truth and accuracy of the declared customs value of goods. 
14.13.  According to the Ukrainian legislation, there was no determination of customs value based 
on minimum, arbitrary, or fictitious values, including indicative or reference prices. In practice, 
when customs control was conducted, particularly concerning the determination of the customs value, customs officials applied the analysis as indicated in the risk management system. This 
approach corresponded fully to the "International  Convention on Simplification and Harmonization 
of Customs Procedures". Moreover, Chapter 6 of the WCO "Guide to the General Application of 
Custom Value" recommended the use of the custom s value of goods where a risk existed. The use 
of the value resulting from the application of the analysis and risk management system was only 
part of the recommendation that customs officials use additional forms of customs control, including verification of documents and data, and confirmation of the customs value of the goods. The risk management system also helped customs authorities significantly to reduce the time 
spent in verifying customs value. Ukraine would endeavour to answer any further written 
questions concerning its customs valuation procedures. 
14.14.  The Chairperson thanked delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made. 14.15.  The Council so agreed. 
15  INDIA – PORT CLOSURES FOR APPLE IMPORTS – REQUEST FROM CHILE, THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, NEW ZEALAND, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
15.1.  The Chairperson informed the Council that, in a communication dated 29 October 2015, the 
delegations of Chile, the European Union, New Zealand, and the United States of America, 
requested the Secretariat to include in the agenda  of today's meeting an issue entitled: "India – 
Port Closures for Apple Imports". 
15.2.  The delegate of the United States of  America expressed US concerns about India's 
announcement, on 14 September 2015, that it wo uld limit entry of apple imports to the Nhava 
Sheva port only. Several attempts had been made  to obtain information from India's Director 
General of Foreign Trade about the objective of this sudden and potentially significant disruptive measure. However, a written response by the Dire ctor General had not clarified the objective of 
this restrictive measure. 
15.3.  The lack of advance notice of this measure to Members and stakeholders created concerns 
as the port of entry restriction negatively affected  the overall ease of doing business in India. The 
US apple industry had begun its harvest for the 2015 season and the US authorities were 
concerned in relation to the exclusive use of Nhav a Sheva port with regard to its storage capacity 
and other infrastructure requirements necessary to handle the 5 million cartons of apples that US producers expected to export to India during 2015. The apple industry had also reported that 
the main port of entry for US apples had previous ly been Chennai. India should provide a cogent 
explanation as to its reasons for suddenly restricting the entry of apples to only one port, particularly as this was a potentially disruptive action. 
15.4.  The delegate of New Zealand indicated that  his delegation was co-sponsoring this agenda 
item. New Zealand had two main concerns: first, India's closure of its ports for apple imports; 
second, India's insufficient and evasive response s to Members' enquires on this matter at the 
WTO. Indeed, India's decision to restrict entry of imported apples to the Nhava Sheva Port of 
Mumbai had seemingly been very sudden. This port restriction had surprised New Zealand's G/C/M/124 
 
- 32 - 
 
  exporters, as not only had it been taken without prior consultation, but also it was implemented 
with immediate effect. Prior to the implementation  of this decision, New Zealand apple exports had 
entered India through the port of Nhava Sheva and five other ports. Limiting port access in the 
way that India had now done caused undue delays and extra costs, affected the stability of supply, 
and increased price volatility. 
15.5.  These port closures generated particular concerns under Article 4 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture and GATT Article XI. Over the past si x weeks, New Zealand had sought an explanation 
from India as to its reasoning on this issue at the WTO Committees on Agriculture, SPS, Import 
Licensing, and TBT. However, in each Committee, India had argued that the issue was not relevant to that committee. This lack of response, clarification, and notification from India had forced New Zealand to bring the issue to the CTG. Four qu estions had been addressed to India, seeking 
clarification about: (i) the rationale and justification for its decision to restrict port of entry to only 
one port; (ii) why apples were being treated differently to other imported products; (iii) how long these port closures would last, and (iv) when would India notify this measure to the WTO. 
15.6.  The delegate of Chile shared the concerns  previously expressed about the port of entry 
restriction adopted by India for apples, and reques ted India to clarify not only the rationale and 
grounds for this measure but also under which WTO Agreement it could be supported. Likewise, 
Chile asked India to clarify whether this was a temporary or a permanent measure and, if 
temporary, for how long it would last, and if a study would be or had been carried out that justified the measure. India should in any case notify its measure to the WTO without further delay. 
15.7.  As New Zealand had indicated, Chile and other Members had raised this issue at several 
WTO committees although in each and every one In dia had limited its response to an indication 
that, in its view, the measure did not fall under  the purview of the committee concerned. Chile 
hoped that India would provide a concrete answer at today's meeting of the CTG. 
15.8.  The delegate of Canada stated that, as a significant exporter of apples to India, Canada 
shared the concerns raised by other Members regarding India's restriction of apple imports to only 
one port. This measure was creating an unnecessary trade barrier and was already having an 
impact on the price of apples for Indian consumer s. Canada asked India to reconsider its decision 
and to allow agricultural imports at all its ports. 
15.9.  From a systemic perspective, Canada was concerned that India had not provided Members 
with a justification of its measure, neither at the WTO Committees on Agriculture, Import 
Licensing, SPS, nor TBT, and looked forward to  India's clarification and explanation about the 
rationale for this trade-restrictive measure. 
15.10.  The delegate of Australia supported the previous concerns raised by other Members as 
India had neither met its transparency obligation s nor provided an opportunity to comment. The 
port of entry restriction for imports of apples had entered into force on 14 September 2015. This 
issue had been raised by other Members in various WTO bodies, such as the committees on 
Agriculture, SPS, Import Licensing, and Technical Barriers to Trade, where India had 
systematically responded at each instance that the measure could not be discussed as India did not believe that the measure fell within the purview of any of the committees concerned. 
15.11.  Given that the concerns with regard to this measure were now being raised by a number of 
Members at the CTG, and in the interests of transparency, Australia requested that India clarify 
the objective and rationale of its measure and resp ond to the various queries raised by Members. 
15.12.  The delegate of the European Union indicated that, following the limitation to one port for 
entry of imports of apples, several EU traders were facing higher transportation costs to reach the 
Indian market as well as delays in the delivery of apples, which were perishable goods. Given the lack of information on the rationale and duration of this measure, it could only be assumed that 
Members were here facing a serious violation of WTO rules. The EU asked India to reconsider its 
measure and to fulfil its transparency obligations. 
15.13.  The delegate of China indicated that Indi a's recent regulation limiting entry into India 
through one single port of all apple imports might cause several inconveniences to relevant apple G/C/M/124 
 
- 33 - 
 
  exporters. China hoped that India would provide a detailed explanation concerning the purpose of 
and need for such a regulation. 
15.14.  The delegate of India thanked delegations for their interventions concerning a recent 
change in its trade policy in respect of the importation of apples into India. India had carefully 
listened to the issues raised. Members were mainly questioning: (i) how India could modify a 
policy without notifying it in advance to WTO Members; (ii) what were the rationale and policy objectives behind the measure; and (iii) how long the measure would remain in force. Some 
Members had also expressed the concern that pr obably Nhava Sheva port was heavily congested 
and not well equipped to handle such a flow of imports. Members had also cited difficulties faced by traders and a perceived loss of competitiveness. Members who took the floor had also indicated that this issue had previously been raised in some WTO committees, but that no satisfactory 
explanation had been provided so far. 
15.15.  It was acknowledged that the issue had been raised previously in four WTO committees, 
namely the Committees on Agriculture, Import Licensing, SPS, and TBT. However, his delegation 
was of the view that the matter did not fall under  the purview of any of these Committees in terms 
of the relevant scope of the respective WTO Agreements. This point had been sufficiently explained in the respective committee meetings. 
15.16.  The issue was now being raised for the first time in the CTG. India had carefully noted 
Members' concerns and questions, and would ap preciate it if Members could convey these 
concerns in writing, along with an indication of the specific provisions and WTO rules in the matter. These questions would then be conveyed to capital for a response in due course. India was also 
willing to work bilaterally with interested Members on this issue. 
15.17.  The delegate of Chile indicated that Indi a's responses were a repetition of the responses 
given in the various other WTO committees. This concern had now been brought to the CTG, the 
supreme body of all of those other committees, precisely in order to obtain concrete answers from 
India, answers that India had not done yet given. Written questions had been sent to India at the 
committee level and therefore India's reply at this Council was difficult to understand. She urged 
India to explain to Members the rationale behind its measure. 
15.18.  The delegate of India, responding to th e previous intervention, indicated that, in the 
committee meetings where the issue had been rais ed, India had questioned the applicability of 
respective WTO Agreements with regard to the scope of this particular issue. Now that the issue 
had been brought to the CTG, India was taking cognizance of the questions raised, had taken note 
of all the questions and concerns, and was open to provide answers and replies. India was also 
open to bilateral meetings with interested Members to resolve this issue. 
15.19.  The delegate of New Zealand shared Chile's sentiments concerning the questions posed 
already in other WTO committees, and bilaterally. None of the questions raised at today's meeting 
could have come as a surprise. His delegation invited India to respond at this meeting. 
15.20.  The delegate of the European Union joined Chile and New Zealand in expressing 
disappointment with India's statement, but thanked India for its commitment to reply to the 
questions posed in the near future. Questions po sed at today's meeting could indeed have been 
expected, and the EU looked forward to India's answers. 
15.21.  The delegate of Australia joined previous  speakers in expressing its disappointment at 
India's intervention, noting that Members had in various committees tried without success to 
obtain clarification from India and that this issue had therefore been "live" for almost a month. 
15.22.  The Chairperson thanked delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made. 
15.23.  The Council so agreed. G/C/M/124 
 
- 34 - 
 
  16  BRAZIL – NON-AUTOMATIC IMPORT LI CENSING – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 
16.1.  The Chairperson informed the Council that, in a communication dated 20 October 2015, the 
delegation of the European Union requested the Secretariat to include in the agenda of this 
meeting an item entitled: "Brazil – Industrial Nitrocellulose Import Ban"3. 
16.2.  The delegate of the European Union reiter ated the concerns expressed on several occasions 
in the Committee on Import Licensing with regard to Brazil's non-automatic licensing (NAL) regime 
for industrial nitrocellulose used for printing inks, wood lacquer, and nail varnish. The EU did not 
believe that import licensing was appropriate in a context where industrial nitrocellulose could only be used for commercial end uses and not for military purposes. The NAL regime currently applied by Brazil represented a de facto ban since import licenses were systematically denied and no 
imports of nitrocellulose were allowed into the Brazilian market, or at least not nitrocellulose that 
originated in the EU. However, Brazil allowed imports of nitrocellulose for military purposes, with a content of nitrogen above 12.5%, and which,  markedly, was twice more expensive than 
nitrocellulose for industrial purposes. The EU once more urged Brazil immediately to eliminate 
these restrictions. 
16.3.  The delegate of Brazil welcomed the additi onal opportunity provided by the EU to reiterate 
Brazil's views as already expressed at the meetin g of the Committee on Import Licensing and in 
Brazil's written replies to the questions submi tted by the EU. Brazil's measures were being 
misrepresented as an import ban given that they were an NAL requirement, but Brazil's NAL regime was in conformity with the WTO Agre ement on Import Licensing. Brazil had engaged 
bilaterally with the EU in the context of the Brazil-EU Economic and Trade Sub-Commission, and 
Brazil considered that this discussion had been exhausted at the Committee level, particularly because the EU, since the Committee on Import Licensing's April 2015 meeting, had still not 
submitted additional questions on the issue nor brought new arguments to substantiate its concern 
over the Brazilian measure. As at this meeting, other Members had not intervened at the Committee level, and appeared satisfied with the information provided by Brazil. Brazil therefore 
did not find any reason for keeping this item on the CTG's agenda. 
16.4.  The Chairperson thanked delegations for th eir interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made. 
16.5.  The Council so agreed. 
17  PAKISTAN – DISCRIMINATORY TAXES – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION AND 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
17.1.  The Chairperson informed the Council that, in a communication dated 29 October 2015, the 
delegations of the European Union and the United States of America requested the Secretariat to 
include in the agenda of today's meeting an it em entitled: "Pakistan – Discriminatory Taxes". 
17.2.  The delegate of the European Union regrette d to be compelled once again to raise the EU's 
concerns about what appeared to be discriminatory taxation between products imported into 
Pakistan and like domestically manufactured products. According to Pakistan's Statutory 
Regulatory Order (SRO) 1125 on domestic sales taxes, which covered a large number of products destined for both industrial use and retail sale, imported finished goods ready for use by the 
general public were charged with a sales tax of 17%  while like locally manufactured goods in retail 
sales were charged with a tax of only 5%. 
17.3.  EU companies had complaints about this di scriminatory treatment and higher sales tax rate 
applied to imported products as these negatively affected their exports to Pakistan, and 
particularly with regard to EU exports of leather, leather articles, and leather footwear. All of these products had seen their export figures decrea se between 2013 and 2014 in a situation where 
overall EU exports to Pakistan were increasing. 
                                               
3 See paragraphs 19.2, 19.3, and 19.4 below. G/C/M/124 
 
- 35 - 
 
  17.4.  In the course of bilateral consultations held  following Pakistan's offer to address this matter 
bilaterally, the EU had been informed that Pakistan intended to maintain this discriminatory treatment until 2017, when SRO 1125 would be el iminated. The EU appreciated that, in the 
context of reforms to its tax regime, Pakistan ha d undertaken a review of all SROs. However, the 
reform plan could not be used as grounds for continued discrimination contrary to WTO rules. 
17.5.  The EU requested Pakistan to take expedi tious action to ensure that any discriminatory 
treatment of imported goods with regard to its sales taxes would be removed and brought into line 
with Pakistan's WTO obligations. 
17.6.  The delegate of Canada reiterated Canada's commercial and systemic concerns as 
expressed at the CTG's previous meeting with re gard to Pakistan's tax treatment of imported 
products under its SRO, and requested Pakistan to explain how these taxes were consistent with 
GATT Article III:1, and when it planned to address th is issue to ensure that the national treatment 
principle would be respected. 
17.7.  The delegate of the United States of America reiterated the continued concerns of her 
delegation regarding a series of SRO put in place by Pakistan, the most recent being 
SRO 420(I)/2014, which increased the sales tax on imported items like apparel, footwear, leather, and sporting goods from 5 to 17%. In their vi e w ,  t h i s  S R O  a s  w e l l  a s  p r e v i o u s  S R O s  o n  
discriminatory tax regimes would require review under GATT Article III on national treatment 
applied to internal taxation and regulation. 
17.8.  In early 2015, the US had engaged bilatera lly on this issue with Pakistan's Ministry of 
Finance and the Federal Board of Revenue. Both officers had given assurances that the sales tax 
on domestically-produced items would eventually be equalized; however, this had not taken place. 
Her delegation would welcome any updates from Pakistan on steps taken or future plans for remedying a tax policy that appeared to apply in ternal taxes to imported products in a manner 
contrary to the principles set forth in GATT Article III. 
17.9.  The US appreciated Pakistan's update on the progress it had made towards the elimination 
of all trade-distorting SROs. As noted by the Secr etariat during Pakistan's TPR, earlier this year, 
the use of SROs "severely undermines the predicta bility of the trade regime" and served as "a 
central source of deviation from MFN rates." 
17.10.  The delegate of Japan indicated that his delegation had systemic concerns with regard to 
this issue and would continue to monitor it closely. 
17.11.  The delegate of Switzerland indicated that his delegation also had systemic concerns with 
regard to this issue, and encouraged Pakistan to further clarify the matter. 
17.12.  The delegate of Pakistan thanked delegati ons for their interest in this issue and in a 
prompt outcome. With regard to SRO 1125, which was the cause of the concerns expressed, he 
indicated that painstaking efforts were being made towards its revision. As pointed out by the US, bilateral meetings had indeed been held. These had taken place in Brussels, Geneva, and at the 
Pakistani Ministry of Commerce, which had been ma ndated to engage and advance on this issue. 
He asked other interested Members also to engage bilaterally with Pakistan with regard to this issue. 
17.13.  The present government had planned a serious road map to remove the entire 
SRO regime, and the permanent measures under Revision 2025 were intended to instil legal 
certainty and predictability, making Pakistan's domestic regime more trade friendly than ever before, as well as bringing it into full conformity with WTO rules. Pakistan acknowledged the 
concerns expressed, was fully aware of their importance, and was engaged in undertaking 
structural adjustments permanently to eliminate the SRO instrument. 
17.14.  He had been instructed by his authorities to announce that an indicative date for the 
withdrawal of the measures would soon be announc ed. He expressed surprise concerning the EU's 
announcement that withdrawal of the measures would take place in 2017 given that nobody in his capital, including the Ministry, had been aware of this. G/C/M/124 
 
- 36 - 
 
  17.15.  The Chairperson thanked delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made. 
17.16.  The Council so agreed. 
18  CONSIDERATION OF ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE SUBSIDIARY BODIES OF THE 
COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS 
18.1.  The Chairperson recalled that, pursuant to the "Procedures for an Annual Overview of 
WTO Activities and for Reporting Under the WTO" (WT/L/105), which were adopted by the General 
Council on 15 November 1995, all bodies constituted under Agreements in Annex 1A of the 
WTO Agreement were required to submit annually a factual report to the Council for Trade in Goods, and the Council was to take note of these reports. 
18.2.  The Chairperson proposed that the Council take note of the following annual reports: 
(i) Committee on Agriculture, document G/L/1126; (ii) Committee on Trade Related Investment 
Measures, document G/L/1123; (iii) Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, document G/L/1133; (iv) Committee on Antidumping Practices, document G/L/1134; 
(v) Committee on Safeguards, documents G/L/1130 and G/L/1130/Rev.1; (vi) Committee on 
Market Access, document G/L/1131/Rev.1; (vii) Committee on Import Licensing, document G/L/1132; (viii) Committee on Customs Valuation, document G/L/1135; (ix) Committee 
on Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Measures, docume nt G/L/1129; (x) Committee of Participants on 
the Expansion of Trade in Information Technology  Products, document G/L/1125; (xi) Preshipment 
Inspection - Independent Entity, document G/L/1136; (xii) Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, document G/L/1138; (xiii) Committee on Rules of Origin, document G/L/1127. Following 
the Ministerial Decision of 7 December 2013, contained in document WT/L/917, the Committee on 
Rules of Origin would submit its annual report on the Preferential Rules for LDCs directly to the General Council; and (xiii) Working Party on St ate Trading Enterprises, document G/L/1124. 
18.3.  The Council so agreed. 
19  ADOPTION OF THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS TO THE 
GENERAL COUNCIL (G/C/W/718) 
19.1.  The Chairperson recalled that the draft Annua l Report of the Council had been circulated in 
document G/C/W/718. In accordance with the "Procedures for an annual overview of 
WTO Activities and for Reporting under the WTO"  (WT/L/105), which was adopted by the General 
Council on 15 November 1995, it was agreed that "The respective sectoral Councils should report 
in November each year to the General Council on the activities in the Council as well as in the 
subsidiary bodies" and that the reports of the sectoral Councils should be "factual in nature, containing an indication of actions and decisions taken, with cross references to reports of 
subordinate bodies and could follow the mo del of the GATT 1947 Council reports to the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES". He noted that the draft repo rt would be updated in light of this meeting. 
19.2.  The delegate of Brazil requested that, if th e EU did not oppose, the title of agenda item 16 
be changed from "Brazil – Industrial Nitrocellulose Import Ban" to "Brazil – Non-automatic Import 
Licensing" to avoid any misrepresentation of the Brazilian measure. 
19.3.  The Chairperson asked the EU if it could agree with this change. 
19.4.  The delegate of the European Union expressed his agreement with this change. 
19.5.  The Chairperson proposed that the Council agree to adopt the report, subject to the update 
and revision to take into account the Council's work at this meeting.4 
19.6.  The Council so agreed. 
                                               
4 The Annual Report to the General Council was circulated in document G/L/1140. G/C/M/124 
 
- 37 - 
 
  20  OTHER BUSINESS 
20.1  Information about the expiry date of Section 15(a)(ii) of the Protocol on the 
Accession of China 
20.1.  The Chairperson reminded delegations that, at the start of the meeting, the delegation of 
China had requested inclusion under agenda item "O ther Business" a report on the expiry date of 
Section 15(a)(ii) of China's Protocol of Accession. 
20.2.  The delegate of China informed the Council that Section 15(a)(ii) of its Protocol of Accession 
would expire on 11 December 2016. According to this section, in cases of Anti-dumping (AD) 
investigations, when the Chinese producers could not clearly show that market economy conditions prevailed, the investigating authorities could us e a surrogate or analogue country methodology 
that, according to China, resulted in much higher  prices than those of Chinese producers. This 
methodology was outdated, discriminatory, and unfair. Since Section 15(a)(ii) would expire in 
December 2016, and in order to avoid disputes, China had called those Members having established, in their AD laws, regulations, and practices, such analogue or surrogate 
methodologies, to take the necessary steps to amend or put their legislation in line with the new 
conditions to apply after the expiry date of Section 15. 
20.3.  The Chairperson thanked China for the information it had presented and proposed that the 
Council take note of the statement made. 20.4.  The Council so agreed. 
20.2  Date of next meeting 20.5.  The Chairperson informed the Council that the first meeting of the Council in 2016 was 
scheduled to take place on Friday, 15 April 2016. The agenda would close on Monday, 
4 April 2015. 
20.6.  The meeting was closed. 
__________