WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
14 February  2019 
(19-0884) Page: 1/45 
General Council  Original: English  
 
 
AN UNDIFFERENTIATED WTO: SELF -DECLARED D EVELOPMENT STATUS RI SKS 
INSTITUTIONAL IRRELE VANCE  
COMMU NICATION FROM THE UN ITED STATES  
Revision  
The following communication, dated 1 4 February 2019, is being circulated at the request of the 
delegation of the United  States.  
 
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1  INTRODUCTION  
1.1.  In the preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization , the 
Parties recognized that "their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavor should be 
conducted with a view to raisi ng standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and 
steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and 
trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world 's resources in ac cordance 
with the objective of sustainable development…. " 
1.2.  Since the WTO 's inception in 1995, Members have made significant strides in pursuing these 
aims.  Global Gross National Income (GNI) per capita on a purchasing -power -parity (PPP) basis, 
adjusted for inflation, surged by nearly two -thirds, from $9,116 in 1995 to $15,072 in 2016.1 The 
United Nations Development Program 's (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI) for the world 
increased from 0.598 to 0.728 between 1990 and 2017.2 According to the World Bank, between 
1993 and 2015  — the most recent year for which comprehensive data on global poverty is available  
— the percentage of people around the world who live in extreme poverty fell from 33.5 percent to 
10 percent, the lowest poverty rate in recorded histo ry.3 Despite the world population increasing by 
more than two billion people between 1990 and 2015, the number of people living in extreme poverty 
fell by more than 1.1 billion during the same period, to about 736 million.4  
1.3.  Trade appears to have been an i mportant contributor to these positive trends.5 Between 1995 
and 2017, exports of goods more than tripled and exports of services more than quadrupled, 
increasing by 260 percent and 315 percent, respectively.6 Underpinned by principles of 
                                                
1 World Bank , World Development Indicators (WDI) , accessed on 7 January 2019. See:  
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world -development -indicators# .  
2 UNDP Human Development Reports, Table 2: Human Development Index Trends, 1990 -2017, accessed 
on 7 January 2019.  See:  http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/trends .  
3 The World Bank 's preliminary forecast is that extreme poverty has declined to 8.6 percent in 2018.  See: 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press -release/2018/09/19/decline -of-global -extreme -poverty -continues -
but-has-slowed -world -bank  
4 World Bank, Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2018: Piecing Together the Poverty Puzzle , p. 1 .  See: 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/30418/9781464813306.pdf .  
5 A 2015 study by the World Bank and the WTO found a  link between economic growth spurred by trade, 
and the reduction of poverty.  See: The Role of Trade in Ending Poverty, p. 7 , at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e /worldbankandwto15_e.pdf . 
6 World Bank, WDI, accessed on 7 January 2019.  Data are in current US dollars.  WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
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  transparency, ope nness, and predictability, WTO rules were crafted in part to set conditions most 
favorable for increasing trade, attracting investment, and improving efficiency.  
1.4.  The economic tides since the creation of the WTO have lifted nearly all boats.  Regional data, 
as shown in Table 1, makes this clear.7 For example, the share of the population in East Asia and 
the Pacific living in extreme poverty fell from 54 percent in 1993  to 2 percent in 2015 (from 
902 million people in 1995 to 47 million, a 95 percent decline);  in Sou th Asia, the share fell from 
45 percent in 1993 to 12 percent in 2015 (from 542 million people to 216 million, a 60 percent 
decline); and in Latin America and the Caribbean, the share fell from 13 percent in 1993 to 4 percent 
in 2015 (from 61 millio n people to 26 million, a decline of nearly 58 percent).  However, it is clear 
that some countries have not benefited as much from the rising tides.  In Sub -Saharan Africa, the 
decline in the share of population living in extreme poverty was much more modest , from 59 percent 
in 1993 to 41 percent in 2015.89 Notably, the number of extremely poor people in Sub -Saharan 
Africa actually rose by 26 percent (from 327 million to 413 million.)10 A review of economic, social, 
trade, and other data for individual WTO Members reveals an even starker picture of economies that 
have substantially advanced in development and those whose gains have been more modest.  
1.5.  Despite the great development strides made in the years since the WTO 's inception, the WTO 
remains stuck in a simplistic and clearly outdated construct of "North -South " division, developed and 
developing countries.  Each is a seemingly static set, regardless of economic, social, trade, and other 
indicators.  This binary construct does not reflect the realities of 20 19. Nor does it reflect how 
Members viewed development at the time the WTO was created.  The preamble to the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization  recognizes there are "needs and concerns at 
different levels of economic development, " implying there could be many levels of development.  
1.6.  We should  also recall that in the preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization , Members also expressed their desire to contribute to the objectives noted above 
"by enteri ng into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial 
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in 
international trade relations. "  Indeed, this is a foundational pri nciple going back to the GATT 1947.  
1.7.  There has been much discussion lately about staying committed to the "rules-based multilateral 
trading system. " However, if you look behind the curtains, that system is hardly monolithic.  All the 
rules apply to a few (th e developed countries), and just some of the rules apply to most, the self -
declared developing countries.  The perpetuation of this construct has severely damaged the 
negotiating arm of the WTO by making every negotiation a negotiation about setting high st andards 
for a few, and allowing vast flexibilities or exemptions for the many.  These are not "reciprocal and 
mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other 
barriers to trade and to the elimination of discrimin atory treatment in international trade relations. " 
1.8.  Other international organizations have recognized that in order to properly carry out their 
functions, they must make distinctions among what have traditionally been considered "developing 
country " members . To not do so, puts those that need special and differential treatment (S&D) the 
most at a disadvantage and perpetuates conduct that is no longer warranted by factual 
circumstances.   
2  INDICATORS OF A TRAN SFORMED WORLD SINCE 1995  
2.1  Human Development Index  
2.1.  UNDP uses the Human Development Index (HDI), a composite index of life expectancy, 
education, and per capita income indicators, to place countries into four tiers of human development.  
A country scores a higher HDI when lifespan, education level, and GDP per capita are higher.  In its 
2016 report, UNDP declared that the progress in human development since 1990 had been 
"impressive, " pointing to several statistics:  more than 1 billion people had escaped extreme poverty; 
2.1 billion had gained access to improved sanitation; more than 2.6 billion had gained access to an 
                                                
7 World Bank, Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2018: Piecing Together the Poverty Puzzle , p. 8.  
8 These trends also appear at income thresholds above the extreme poverty line of US$1.90 per day, 
including the $3.20 per day line and the US$5.50 per day line. See Table 1.  
9 World Bank, Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2018: Piecing Together the Poverty Puz zle, p. 42 . 
10 Ibid, p. 42 . WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
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  improved source of drinking water; the global under -five mortality rate had been more than halved; 
and the incidence of HIV, malaria, and tuberculosis had declined.11 HDI values reflect these positiv e 
developments, having increased for nearly every country from 1990 to 2017 by an average of more 
than 20 percent, with encouraging improvements for LDCs  and Sub-Saharan Africa , among 
others.  
2.2.  UNDP noted that progress was uneven since 1998.  However, UNDP di d not attempt to explore 
the uneven progress across countries, and instead left it to the reader to sift through the statistical 
tables.   
2.3.  Since 1990, there has been a significant reordering among countries in the HDI, as shown in 
Table 2.  In 1990, China 's HDI value (0.502) was far below the world average (0.598); by 2017, it 
had increased by nearly 50 percent and exceeded the world average (0.752 versus 0.728).  The 
same is true for countries such as Colombia ; Thailand ; and Turkey . India 's HDI also surged 
nearly 50 percent; in 1990, its HDI value was close to the composite figure for Sub-Saharan Africa , 
but by 2017 India 's HDI value had pulled significantly ahead.  
2.4.  Several countries improved their HDI scores to surpass the OECD composite figure and enter 
the top tier of the HDI.  In 1990, the HDI values of countries and customs territories such as 
Singapore ; the Republic of Korea ; and Hong Kong , China were lower than the average of the 
members of the OECD.  By 2017, each of their HDI values had surged past the OE CD average12. 
During the same period, Singapore 's ranking in the index (among countries or territories that were 
ranked in 1990) improved from 38th to 5th. Countries such as Chile ; Argentina;  and Qatar  made 
significant gains to near the OECD average.  
2.2  Macroe conomic Indicators: Economic Production, Per Capita Income, Agriculture, and 
Urbanization  
2.5.  Several macroeconomic indicators show increasing economic differentiation among WTO self -
declared developing country Members since 1995.  As shown in Table 3, China 's GDP in 1995, 
measured in constant 2010 US dollars, was 2.2 times as large as Sub-Saharan Africa 's combined 
GDP and 5.4 times as large as the combined GDP of the LDCs . Over the next 22 years, China 's 
GDP increased by approximately 587 percent.  In 2017, China's GDP was 5.8 times as large as all 
of Sub-Saharan Africa  and 11 times as large as the LDCs ' GDP. Similarly, India 's GDP jumped 
340 percent between 1995 and 2017.  India 's GDP was 10 percent smaller than the GDP of Sub -
Saharan Africa in 1995, but by 2017 it was 50 percent larger.  During the same period, India 's 
economy rose from the tenth - to the fifth -largest in the world, leapfrogging Australia ; Mexico ; 
Russia n Federation ; Canada ; and Brazil . 
2.6.  Figures tracking gross national income (GNI) also reveal greater economic differentiation 
among WTO self -declared developing country Members, as shown in Graph 1.  In 1995, China 's GNI 
per capita (on a purchasing power parity (PPP) bas is, measured in constant international dollars) 
was slightly higher than that of Sub-Saharan Africa , at $2,530.  Between 1995 and 2016, China 's 
GNI per capita surged more than five -fold to $14,354, while Sub-Saharan Africa 's GNI per capita 
increased to just  $3,387.  The GNI per capita of both India and Viet Nam were smaller than that of 
Sub-Saharan Africa  in 1995; by 2016, both countries ' GNI per capita had nearly tripled, and were 
nearly double that of Sub-Saharan Africa . 
2.7.  Moreover, certain WTO Members with r elatively high GNI per capita in 1995 significantly 
outpaced the growth of OECD Members through 2016.  For example, during that period, Singapore 's 
and Hong Kong , China 's GNI per capita jumped more than 70 percent, while the average GNI  per 
capita of OECD members increased at half that rate.  By 2016, Singapore 's GNI per capita of 
$78,427 was more than double the OECD 's average, and Hong Kong , China 's was 44 percent 
higher.  The Republic of  Korea more than doubled its GNI per capita to $35 ,122, nearly matching 
                                                
11 UNDP, Human Development Report 2016: Human Development for Everyone , p. 1 -3.  See:  
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016_human_de velopment_report.pdf .  
12 Average figures for OECD members can be a useful point of comparison given OECD  members ' relatively 
high income and human development scores.  OECD members  account for  63 percent of world GDP, three -
quarters of world trade, 95 percent of world official development assistance, over half of the world 's energy 
consumption, and 18 percent of the world 's population.  See: https://usoecd.usmission.gov/our -
relationship/about -the-oecd/what -is-the-oecd/ . WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
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  the OECD average.  Many Members, including Chile ; Colombia ; Egypt ; Israel; Malaysia;  Macao , 
China;  Mexico ; Peru; Philippines; Thailand ; and Turkey  also posted strong increases during 
the two decades following the creation of the WTO.  
2.8.  In addition, a number of Members in 2016 had GDP per capita figures well above the average 
for OECD Members, including Brunei  Darussalam  ($76,870) ; the State of  Kuwait  ($74,109) ; 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  ($51,329) ; and the United Arab Emirates  ($68,121).  
2.9.  Graphs 2 and 3 help illustrate the economic differentiation that took place between 1995 and 
2017.  Graph 2 shows China ; Viet Nam; India ; Sub-Saharan Africa ; and the LDCs  clustered 
relatively close together in 1995, in terms of GNI  per capita on a purchasing -power -parity basis.  
Between 1995 and 2017, Sub-Saharan Africa and the LDCs  grew only modestly.  After 2000, Viet 
Nam's and India 's GNI per capita growth accelerated, while China 's figure surged ahead of those 
of South Africa  and Colombia . Graph 3 shows the Republic of  Korea  gaining on the OECD 
average, Hong Kong , China  and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  outpacing the OECD average, and 
Singapore  vaulting above the stratospheric levels of the State of  Kuwait  and Brunei 
Darussalam . 
2.10.   Sectoral employment data points to Members ' different levels of success in moving the 
workforce away from agriculture.  As seen in Graph 4, the share of employment in agriculture as a 
share of total employment in Sub-Saharan Africa  and in LDCs  fell by 15 percen t and 20 percent, 
respectively, between 1995 and 2017. India 's figure fell by 30 percent.  Meanwhile, China 's share 
of employment in agriculture fell by nearly two -thirds – a pace only exceeded by 13 much smaller 
economies.  Shares for Chile, the Republic of Korea , and South Africa  also fell sharply, pulling 
nearly even with the OECD 's average share.  The shares for Singapore ; Hong Kong , China ; 
Argentina ; Bahrain ; Israel ; and Qatar  remain well below that of OECD members.  
2.11.   Graph 5 shows the contin ued rise of China  and India  as agricultural powers.  As of 2016, 
China  and India  had the largest share of global agricultural value added  — the net output of the 
agricultural sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs  — at more t han 
24 percent and 11 percent, respectively.  This data suggests China and India experienced massive 
improvements in agricultural productivity between 1995 and 2016, as a smaller pool of labor 
produced significantly higher value added output.  Meanwhile, the  EU's and Japan 's shares of global 
agricultural value added fell sharply from 1997 to 2016.  The LDCs ' share increased, but only 
modestly.  
2.12.   Urbanization has a role to play in economic and social progress, and data trends since 1995 
broadly track with econom ic indicators.  In 1995, China 's urban population, as a share of its total 
population, was similar to that of Pakistan ; Thailand ; Sub-Saharan Africa ; and Tajikistan , 
among others.  By 2017, China 's share had nearly doubled, far surpassing the shares of those 
countries as well as the average levels of middle -income countries and of the world.  Graph 7 also 
shows that the urban population shares of Turkey ; Malaysia ; Costa Rica ; and Mexico  neared the 
OECD member average, while the shares of Colombia  and Oman  surpassed the OECD member 
average during the same period.  The urban population shares of the Republic of Korea ; Chile ; 
Bahrain ; Argentina ; and Israel  exceeded the OECD member average throughout the p eriod.  
2.3  Trade  
2.3.1   Total Exports  
2.13.   Trade data also points to increased differentiation among WTO self -declared developing 
country Members between 1995 and 2015.  Graph 7 shows certain Members ' share of global exports 
of goods and services during that period.  The sh are of global exports of LDCs  and Sub-Saharan 
Africa  grew modestly but remained relatively low.  India 's share,  which at the beginning of the 
period was very close to the LDCs ' share, surpassed Sub-Saharan Africa 's share of global exports 
and is closing in on the shares of Singapore ; Hong Kong , China ; and the Republic of  Korea . 
China 's share of global exports jumped five -fold to surpass Japan 's share and  — for several years  
— the United States ' share.  Meanwhile, the shares of the United States , EU, and Japan  dropped 
significantly.  WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
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  2.14.   Graphs 8 and 9 illustrate sweeping changes in Members ' share of global exports of goods 
between 1995 and 2017.  China 's share jumped five -fold, particularly in the first 14 years after its 
WTO accession, making China  the largest glob al exporter of goods since 2008.  Viet Nam; India ; 
Mexico ; Turkey ; and the Republic of Korea  registered significant gains.  In 1995, India 's share 
was less than half of the share of Sub-Saharan Africa , but it had caught up to Sub-Saharan 
Africa 's share by 20 16. Meanwhile, the shares of Sub-Saharan Africa  and of LDCs  grew only 
modestly between 1995 and 2016 and peaked in 2011 and 2014, respectively.  The shares of the 
United States ; Germany ; Japan ; the United Kingdom (UK) , and France all decreased, 
particularly  after 2000.  The shares of Japan  and the UK fell by nearly half; the EU's overall share 
declined by more than one -fifth. 
2.15.   Export volume and value indices from 2000 to 2016, as shown in Graphs 10 and 11, tell a 
similar story of increasing differentiation amo ng many WTO Members.  China , India , and Viet Nam 
registered significant increases in exports by value and volume across that period.  A wider range of 
Members, including the Republic of Korea ; Singapore ; Colombia ; Brazil ; Chile ; Turkey ; and 
Hong Kong , China  also showed impressive growth, seeing their index values double and even triple 
from 2000 levels.  On the other hand, Members such as the United States  and Canada  had much 
lower growth, while others such as Japan ; France ; and the UK  saw little growth or  — in volume 
terms  — even small declines between 2000 and 2016.  
2.3.2   High -Technology Trade  
2.16.   Between 1995 and 2016, a new set of Members broke into the top ranks of exporters of high - 
and medium -technology products.  In 1995, the top five exporters of high technology products by 
value were the United States , Japan , Germany , Singapore , and the UK. China  ranked 
thirteenth.  By 2016, as shown in Graph 12, the top five exporters of high technology products were 
China ; Germany ; the United States ; Singapore ; and the Republic of Korea ; in that order.  
China 's high technology exports, as a share of total manufacturing exports, had risen from 10 
percent to 25  percent (Graph 13).  For several Western countries, that share fell significantly.  
Examining a wider set of exports, Graph 1 4 shows that Viet Nam; China ; Costa Rica ; Turkey ; 
South Africa ; Colombia ; Argentina ; India ; and Thailand  significantly increased their share of 
high- and medium -technology exports as a share of manufacturing exports between 1995 and 2015.  
Meanwhile, the sh ares of several Western countries stagnated or declined.  
2.17.   Export data for goods classified as advanced technology products (ATP) provide striking 
examples of China 's emergence as an exporting powerhouse of high -technology goods, including 
its outright domin ance in several categories.13 Graph 15 shows that China 's exports in the ATP 
categories jumped 3400 percent in value terms between 1995 and 2016, exceeding the exports of 
the United States ; Japan ; Germany ; the UK ; and France  combined . Singapore ; the Republic 
of Korea ; and Viet Nam also registered impressive growth.  The other ATP bar graphs 
(Graphs  15(a) -15(j)) show China 's explosive growth and dominance in exporting high technology 
goods in a wide range of categories, including computer equipment,  electrical equipment, electrical 
power transmission equipment, office equipment and machines, optical instruments, 
telecommunications equipment, television receivers, and valves and transistors.  
2.3.3   Intellectual Property Royalties  
2.18.   The benefits of trade in int ellectual property rights and intellectual property -intensive goods 
and services flow to owners and licensors as well as users and licensees, and to the public generally, 
through the rapid dissemination of new technologies and continued investment in the b reakthroughs 
of tomorrow.  While such benefits take several forms, one example is benefits in the form of the 
receipt of royalties by entities for use of their intellectual property by others.  By this measure, 
differentiation has evolved.  In 1996, the EU; the United States ; and Japan  received 96 percent of 
these royalties.  Over the next 20 years, as shown in Graph 16, receipts due to Singapore ; the 
Republic of Korea ; and China  surged as their enterprises increasingly licensed patented 
technologies.  By 2017, the share of royalties received by the EU; the United States ; and Japan  
                                                
13 About 500 of some 22,000 commodity classification codes used in reporting US merchandise trade are 
identified as "advanc ed technology" codes and they meet the following criteria: the code contains products whose 
technology is from a recognized high technology field (e.g., biotechnology); these products represent leading 
edge technology in that field; and such products const itute a significant part of all items covered in the selected 
classification code.  WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
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  combined had dropped by more than 10 percentage points, as the pool of intellectual property 
generators expanded.  
2.4  Foreign Direct Investment  
2.19.   Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a categor y of cross -border investment in which an investor 
resident in one economy establishes a lasting interest in and a significant degree of influence over 
an enterprise resident in another economy.  A country 's stock of outward FDI  is the value of its 
resident investors ' equity in and net loans to enterprises in foreign economies; a country 's stock of 
inward FDI is the value of foreign investors ' equity in and net loans to enterprises resident in the 
reporting economy.14 A country 's stocks of inward and outward FDI are useful indicators of the 
degree of its integration in into the global economy.  
2.20.   Data on stocks of inward and outward FDI illustrate China 's deep integration into the global 
economy.  In 2005, as shown in Graph 17, China 's outward direct investment position was far below 
that of many OECD members and other developed countries. Over the past decade, China 's outward 
direct investment position has vaulted ahead of that of Australia ; France ; and the Russia n 
Federation ; reached the levels of Canada  and Japan , and is now just slightly smaller than the 
positions of Germany  and the UK. In 2016  — the latest year for which full data is available  — 
China 's outward direct investment position exceeded those of 33 of the 36 OECD members.  
2.21.   Graph 18 shows China 's emergence as a top destination for FDI among developed countries.  
In 2005, China 's inward FDI position was sizeable and already topped that of Japan ; Russia n 
Federation;  and France . By 2017, China  had surged past Germany ; Canada ; the UK; and the 
Netherlands . Its inward FDI position exceeded those of 3 5 of 36 OECD members; of the 
35 members, the inward FDI position of its closest competitor, the Netherlands , was 42 percent 
smaller than that of China . 
2.5  Corporate Size  
2.22.   The Fortune Glob al 50015 — a ranking of the biggest companies in the world by revenue  — 
shows how corporate power in 2018 is less concentrated in the United States, Japan, and Europe 
than it was in 1995 (Table 4).  Companies headquartered in other Members, particularly in A sia, have 
entered the ranking in significant numbers.  In 1995, companies from 25 countries were in the 
ranking, but at least 473 of the 500 companies were headquartered in the United States, Japan, or 
Europe.16 In 2018, 33 countries are represented on the l ist, and only 328 of the 500 companies are 
headquartered in the United States, Japan, or Europe.  Of these 145 positions that previously were 
occupied by companies headquartered in the United States, Japan, or Europe, 109 were filled by 
companies headquarte red in China . The remainder were filled primarily by companies 
headquartered in the Republic of  Korea ; Chinese Taipei ; Brazil ; India ; Singapore ; and 
Mexico . 
2.23.   The surge of China 's companies into the Global 500 deserves special mention.  In 1995, the 
Global 50 0 included just two companies headquartered in China ; by 2018, 111 companies 
headquartered in China ranked in the top 500, with a combined $6.7 trillion in annual revenue. 
Moreover, 78 of these companies were majority -owned by the Chinese government, a ver y 
conservative metric for understanding the government 's influence and control over corporate 
entities.  Of the top 38 Chinese companies listed on the Global 500  — all of which rank in the top 
168 companies on the list  — 34 are majority -owned by the governm ent. 
2.6  Supercomputers  
2.24.   Since the creation of the WTO, China has emerged as a supercomputing power.  On a biannual 
basis, the TOP500 project ranks and details the 500 most powerful non -distributed computer 
systems in the world.17 As shown in Table 5, the ranking in November 1994 was dominated by the 
                                                
14 See: https://data.oecd.org/fdi/fdi -stocks.htm . 
15 See: http://fortune.com/global500/list/ . 
16 See: http://fortune.com/global500/1995/ .  The Global 500 list shows only 483 companies. It is 
therefore possible that the number of companies on the list in 1995 that were headquartered in the United 
States, Japan, or Europe was slightly higher than 473.  
17 The rankings can be accessed at: https://www.top500.org/lists/top500 . WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
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  United States  (257), Japan  (84), Germany  (48), the UK (23), and France  (19); China  was not 
among the 29 countries with at least one supercomputer to make the list.  In the most recent ra nking 
in November 2018, China  dominates the list, with 227 of the 500 most powerful computer systems 
in the world  — a 45 percent share  — and two of the top five.  The United States  (109) is a distant 
second, followed by Japan  (31), the UK (20), France  (18), and Germany  (17).18 
2.7  Space  
2.25.   China  has also emerged as a space power, with an ambitious national space program and a 
rapidly growing space -technology sector.  In January 2019, China became the first country to land a 
spacecraft on the far side of the moon.  Graph 19 shows one indicator of China 's prominence in this 
field – the number of satellites in space as of 30 November 2018.  China  is second to the United 
States  but ranks far above other developed countries.  China  has nearly double the number of 
satellite s in space as the Russian Federation , which holds the third position.  
2.8  Defense  
2.26.   It has long been established that economic capacity is a core foundation of military power, 
and that there is a strong correlation between the productive and revenue -raising capa cities of states 
and their military strength.  Prevailing in protracted armed conflict depends not only upon the military 
forces that a state can muster initially but also upon the state 's ability to mobilize economic and 
industrial capacity to produce sust ained combat power throughout the conflict.19 
2.27.   As expected, increased differentiation among self -declared developing country Members since 
1995 in economic production, trade, and technology is translating into increased differentiation in 
military spending a nd capabilities.  Graph 20 shows the military expenditures from 1995 to 2017 of 
select WTO Members  — mostly self -declared developed country Members  — whose expenditures 
exceeded $25 billion in 2017, measured in constant 2016 USD.  Since 1995, the military ex penditures 
for the European Members and Japan have changed little, while the expenditures of the Russia n 
Federation ; India ; and the Kingdom of  Saudi Arabia  have increased significantly.  China , once 
again, is in a class of its own, with its military expenditures jumping from an estimated US$25 billion 
in 1995 to an estimated US$228 billion by 2017 – ranking second only to the United States and 
three -times higher than the Member with the third -highest expenditure, Saudi Arabia.20 
2.28.   In fact, recent naval s hipbuilding data illustrates that China  has not simply just differentiated 
itself from developing countries, in terms of capabilities.  Rather, China  squarely fits among many 
developed countries in this regard.  Graph 21 compares Chinese naval shipbuilding s ince 2014 with 
the total size of select navies.  Measured in tonnage displaced, Chinese shipbuilding since 2014 is 
nearly equal to the size of the navies of the UK and Japan . China 's tonnage built since 2014 far 
outdistances the size of the French  navy, and  it nearly equals the combined sizes of the navies of 
Chinese Taipei ; Spain ; and Germany . Also since 2014, China  has launched more submarines, 
warships, principal amphibious vessels, and auxiliaries than the total number of ships currently 
serving in the n avies of the UK; Germany ; India ; Spain ; and Chinese Taipei .21 
3  OTHER INSTITUTIONS A DAPT TO CHANGED REAL ITIES  
3.1.  As differentiation among self -declared developing country Members has increased across a 
wide range of indicators, and as understanding of the multi-faceted nature of development has 
deepened, some international institutions have reformed how they classify countries by level of 
development.  
                                                
18 On average, the systems in the United Stat es are more powerful, resulting in an aggregate system 
performance of 38 percent, compared to 31 percent for  China.  See: 
https://www.top500.org/news/lists/2018/11/press -release .  
19 Goldman, Emily O. and Blanken, Leo J. "The Economic Foundations of Military Power ." University of 
California -Davis, 2006, p. 2 -3.  See: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/21806/GoldmanBlanken.pdf . 
20 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure database, accessed on 
11 January 2019.  See: https://www.sipri.org /databases/milex . 
21 The International Institute for Strategic Studies Military Balance Blog, "China's naval shipbuilding, 
delivering on its ambition in a big way," 1 May 2018 , accessed on 11 January 2019 .  See: 
https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military -balance/2018/05/china -naval -shipbuilding . WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
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  3.2.  There is no generally accepted criterion for classifying countries by level of development.22 
Characterizing  countries as developed or developing has long been a common approach, but there 
are other terminologies, including North/South, pioneers/late -comers, developed/underdeveloped, 
developed/undeveloped, industrialized/developing, rich/poor, and First World/Th ird World.23 
3.3.  Each of these formulations is flawed.  At the root of the problem is the difficulty in clearly 
articulating what constitutes development and in answering basic definitional questions, such as 
whether the threshold for evaluating development is a bsolute or relative.  In an IMF Working Paper, 
"Classifications of Countries Based on Their Levels of Development: How it is Done and How it Could 
be Done, " author Lynge Nielsen argues that it is not obvious where to draw the line between 
developing and dev eloped countries.  He suggests that the developed/developing country dichotomy 
therefore is too restrictive and fails to capture the diversity in development levels across countries.24 
3.4.  Some international organizations have used membership in the OECD as the main criterion for 
developed country status.25 The preamble to the Convention on the OECD provides justification for 
this approach.  The governments that founded the OECD stated their belief that "economically more 
advanced nations should cooperate in assist ing to the best of their ability the countries in process of 
economic development. "26 In 1995, the OECD was comprised of 25 countries, including Mexico  and 
Turkey . By 2018, the OECD had expanded to 36 members, including Chile ; Israel ; and the 
Republic of  Korea. The OECD approved Colombia 's accession in 2018 , and it is in the process of 
being finalized.  Costa Rica  is currently in the accessions process, and others seeking to apply 
include Argentina ; Brazil ; and Peru (see Table 7).  If membership in the OECD is  a proxy for 
developed country status, then for those countries that seek membership  — a form of "self-
declaring " — there seems to be no reason to allow those same countries to be able to "self-declare " 
as developing at the WTO.  Of course, making a choice not to seek OECD membership is not indicative 
of that country 's development status.  
3.5.  Other organizations have revised their country classification systems, sometimes for analytical 
purposes, other times for operational decision -making.  These revisions are h ighlighted, not to assert 
that any one approach is necessarily a model, but to emphasize that some international 
organizations have sought to address changing realities and increasing complexity regarding 
development by reforming how they classify countrie s by development level.  
3.1  International  Monetary Fund  
3.6.  The founding Articles of Agreement  of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), adopted in 1944, 
do not distinguish among its members based on development.  For operational purposes, the IMF 
distinguished amo ng its members based on development for the first time in 1975, as it crafted a 
facility to help countries adjust to the oil price shocks.27 In 1978, amendments to the Articles of 
Agreement recognized that "balance of payments assistance may be made availab le on special terms 
to developing members in difficult circumstances, and that for this purpose the Fund shall take into 
account the level of per capita income. "28 
3.7.  In 2010, the IMF Executive Board adopted the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) 
framew ork for determining members ' eligibility for concessional Fund financing.29 Countries are 
added to the PRGT -eligibility list if their annual gross GNI per capita is below the applicable income 
                                                
22 Nielsen, Lynge. Classifications of Countries Based on Their Level of Development: How it is Done and 
How it Could be Done. " IMF Working Paper  WP/11/31, February 2011, p. 3.  
23 Ibid, p. 4.  
24 Ibid, p. 3.  
25 Ibid, p. 4.  
26 Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development . See: 
http://www.oecd.org/general/conventionontheorganisationforeconomicco -operationanddevelopment.htm . 
27 Lynge, "Classifications of Countries Based on Their Level of Development: How it i s Done and How it 
Could be Done, " p. 15-16. 
28 Ibid, p. 16.   The quoted text is from Article V, Section 12 of the IMF's Articles of Agreement .  
29 IMF Policy Paper, "Eligibility to Use the Fund 's Facilities for Concessional Financing,  2017" May 2017, 
p. 5. WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 9 - 
 
  threshold and if they do not have the capacity to access interna tional financial markets on a durable 
and substantial basis.30 As of January 2019, 70 countries were eligible.31 
3.8.  The IMF 's analytic classification of countries ' levels of development has evolved to reflect 
greater differentiation among countries.  In early 19 80, the IMF 's International Financial Statistics 
publication introduced a simple, two -tier system consisting of "industrial countries " and "developing 
countries. " In 1993, the IMF 's World Economic Outlook  added an additional grouping, "countries in 
transit ion."32 
3.9.  In 1997, the "industrial country " group was renamed the "advanced country " group.  Israel ; 
the Republic of  Korea ; and Singapore  were added to that group, reflecting their "rapid economic 
development and the fact that they now all have a number of important characteristics with the 
industrial countries, including relatively high income levels (comfortably within the range of those in 
the industrial country group), well -developed financial markets and high degree of financial 
intermediation and diver sified economic structures with rapidly growing service sectors. "33 
Subsequently, Hong Kong , China  and Chinese Taipei  were included in the grouping, which was 
renamed "advanced economies. "34 Between 1990 and 2010, the share of countries that the IMF 
consider ed developed increased from 13 percent to 17 percent.35 
3.10.   In 2004, the IMF combined the developing countries group and the "countries in transition " 
group to create a new "emerging and developing countries " category.36 The IMF effectively 
subdivided this categ ory in 2014 by introducing the Low -Income Developing Countries " (LIDC) group 
to "(a) facilitate enhanced coverage of low income country issues in the Fund 's flagship products 
and (b) serve as a standardized definition of the 'low income country ' universe i n staff analytic 
work. "37 According to the IMF, the primary determinant for inclusion in this category is a level of 
gross national income per capita that falls below a threshold level ($2,700 as of 2017) that is 
adjusted to reflect average growth in per ca pita income.  In the case of reclassifying a country, the 
IMF uses a set of socioeconomic indicators to facilitate its assessment.  
3.11.   As of 2017, 59 countries were in the LIDC group.38 The IMF currently divides LIDCs further 
into commodity exporters (26 total, comprised of 6 fuel exporters and 20 non -fuel commodity 
exporters) and diversified exporters (33).  Within each of these groups, the LIDCs are subdivided 
into frontier markets, fragile states, and developing markets.  The IMF defines "fragility " on the basis  
of experience of conflict and/or weak institutional capacity, which is defined by reference to a 
country 's World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment score.  
3.2  United Nations Development Program  
3.12.   The classification system developed by the United N ations Development Program (UNDP) 
centers on the Human Development Index (HDI).  In 1990, when UNDP launched the HDI, countries 
were divided into three categories: low -, medium -, and high -human development.  The threshold 
values separating the categories wer e 0.5 and 0.8.  In 2009, UNDP added a fourth category, "very 
high human development. "39 
3.13.   In 1990, UNDP also began classifying countries as either "industrial " or "developing; " the 
former was a subgroup of the high human development category.  By 2007 -2008, UNDP had replaced 
the industrial country category with: (1) member countries of the OECD, and (2) Central or Eastern 
                                                
30 Ibid, p. 5.  
31 IMF, "List of LIC DSAs for PRGT -Eligible Countries As of January  1, 201 9."  See: 
https://www.imf.org/external/Pubs/ft/dsa/DSAlist.pdf . 
32 Lynge, "Classifications of Countries Based on Their Level of Development: How it is Done and How it 
Could be Done, " p. 16-18. 
33 World Economic Outlook , May 1997, p. 118.  
34 Lynge, "Classifications of Countries Based on Their Level of Development: How it i s Done and How it 
Could be Done, " p. 17.  
35 Ibid, p. 19.  
36 Ibid, p. 19.  
37 IMF Policy  Paper, "Macroeconomic Developments and Prospects in Low -Income Developing Countries – 
2018, " March 2018, p. 62 -67. 
38 Ibid, p. 62 -67. 
39 Lynge,  "Classifications of Countries Based on Their Level of Development: How it i s Done and How it 
Could be Done, " p. 8-9. WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 10 - 
 
  Europe or members of the Commonwealth of Independent States.  However, this structure was short -
lived, perhaps due at least in  part to some overlaps in membership between categories. 40 
3.14.   In 2009, UNDP created a new category, "developed " countries, consisting of the countries 
with very high human development scores – the top quartile of countries in the HDI index.  Countries 
in the o ther three quartiles  — the low -, medium -, and high human development categories  — are 
considered developing countries by UNDP.41 
3.3  World Bank  
3.15.   The World Bank has used an income classification to group countries for analytic purposes 
since 1978.  The first class ification  — included in the launch of the World Development Report  and 
its annexed World Development Indicators (WDI)  — divided countries into three categories: 
developing countries, industrialized countries, and capital -surplus oil -exporting countries.  Rather 
than using income to determine the threshold between developing and industrialized countries, the 
World Bank used membership in the OECD, with some exceptions.42  
3.16.   In 1989, the World Bank revised its classification system by dividing countries into four  
groups: low income, lower middle income, upper middle income, and high income.43 The income 
thresholds are adjusted each year in line with price inflation.  For the current 2019 fiscal year,  low-
income economies are defined as those with a GNI per capita of  $995 or less in 2017; lower middle -
income economies are those with a GNI per capita between $996 and $3,895; upper middle -income 
economies are those with a GNI per capita between $3,896 and $12,055; and high -income 
economies are those with a GNI per capit a of $12,056 or more.44 
4  SELF -DECLARED PARALY SIS AT THE WTO  
4.1.  The WTO 's approach to determining development status has not varied since the creation of 
the organization in 1995.  The WTO Agreement does not specify criteria or a process for determining 
developme nt status.  Nor does it establish gradations among developing Members, with one 
exception – LDCs.45 The WTO  — unlike the UN, the IMF, and the World Bank  — does not have an 
analytic classification system for development status.  
4.2.  Lacking formal guideposts, any WTO Member can "self-declare " as a developing Member and 
thereby assert its right to benefit from S&D treatment —such as longer implementation timeframes  
— afforded to self -declared developing Members.  According to the  WTO Secretariat, there are 
145 distinct S&D provisions contained in the WTO agreements.46 
4.3.  Whether the WTO 's status quo approach to development status was sensible at its dawn, it 
makes no sense today in light of the vast changes in development and increasing heterogeneity 
among Members, seen in a number of economic, social, and other indicators explored in Section 1.  
For example, OECD members, G20 members, and other Members who have made significant gains 
in development can claim to be developing Members whenever and wherever they see fit , as if the 
world has stood still since the inception of the WTO.  This does not seem to align with the original 
intent of S&D, which was conceived as a tool to help Members thought to be having difficulty 
integrating into the world trading system.  
4.4.  Self-declaration can lead to unpredictable and illogical results in the operation and 
implementation of existing WTO agreements.  For example, Kazakhstan  — ranked in UNDP 's "Very 
High Human Development " quartile and having made no previous claim to developing Membe r 
status —claimed such status for the first time for the purposes of implementing its obligations under 
the Trade Facilitation Agreement.  Some of the wealthiest WTO Members  — including Singapore;  
                                                
40 Ibid, p. 8 -9. 
41 Ibid, p. 8 -9. 
42 Fantom, Neil and Serajuddin, Umar . "The World Bank 's Classification of Countries by Income, " World 
Bank Group Policy Research Working Paper No. 7528, January 2016, p. 2 -3. 
43 Ibid, p. 2 -3. 
44 World Bank data, accessed on 11 October 2018 at 
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519 -world -bank-country -and-lending -groups . 
45 Article XI:2 points to the UN 's criteria for recognition in the Least Developed Countries group.   
46 See WT/COMTD/W/219.  WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 11 - 
 
  Hong Kong , China ; Macao, China; Israel;  the State of Kuwait ; the Republic of Korea ; United 
Arab Emirates ; Brunei  Darussalam ; and Qatar  — insist on being considered developing Members 
and can avail themselves of S&D provisions at their discretion – just like Sub-Saharan Africa .47 In 
addition, the Bali Decision on tari ff rate quota (TRQ) administration saw the creation of a mechanism 
to ensure unfilled TRQs were not a result of protectionist measures.  Unfortunately, in the end, the 
mechanism applied only to developed Members; self -declared developing Members were only 
required to address the issue on a best -endeavor basis.  While additional flexibilities and exemptions 
had been proposed in the Doha agriculture text and rejected, Bali was the first time that Members 
agreed to use development status to exempt all self -declared developing Members from a new 
commitment rather than take a smaller cut or a longer time to implement.  
4.5.  Simply put, self -declaration has severely damaged the negotiating arm of the WTO by making 
differentiation among Members near impossible.  By demandi ng the same flexibilities as much 
smaller, poorer Members, export powerhouses and other relatively advanced Members  — as 
evidenced by the indicators in Section 1  — create asymmetries that ensure that ambition levels in 
WTO negotiations remain far too weak to sustain viable outcomes.  Members cannot find mutually 
agreeable trade -offs or build coalitions when significant players use self -declared development status 
to avoid making meaningful offers.  Self-declaration also dilutes the benefit that the LDCs and o ther 
Members with specific needs tailored to the relevant discipline could enjoy if they were the only ones 
with the flexibility.  
4.6.  The following sections provide illustrative examples of how self -declaration negatively affected 
negotiations at the WTO in th e past.  Ongoing negotiations and proposals for future work may need 
to confront this issue as well.  For example, fisheries subsidies negotiations provide an important 
testing ground for the WTO 's ability to develop effective disciplines that prohibit the w orst forms of 
fisheries subsidies – those that support illegal fishing and contribute to overcapacity and overfishing.  
In order to be effective, these disciplines must apply to the world 's largest fishing nations, many of 
which are self -declared developing  countries.48 In agriculture, China  and India  — the world 's two 
largest providers of trade -distorting support  — have put forward a proposal that calls for the 
elimination of the Total Aggregate Measurement of Support only for developed Members, as a 
prerequ isite for self -declared developing Members to make any domestic support reforms.  
4.1  Non-Agricultural Market Access Negotiations  
4.7.  Negotiations on Non -Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) collapsed during the failed Doha Round 
principally because the advanced self -declared developing Members lacked ambition commensurate 
with their weight in the global trading system and were able to use their self -declared development 
status to deflect pressure to make meaningful commitments.  
4.8.  At the start of the negotiation, there w as no differentiation among self -declared, non -LDC 
developing Members; any distinction had to be negotiated.  Over time, some self -declared Members 
split into various groups, including Paragraph 6 Countries,49 the NAMA 11,50 Low Income Economies 
in Transition , Very Recently Acceded Members (VRAMs), and Small Economies, among others.51 
4.9.  Unfortunately, the emergence of these groups did not reflect actual differentiation.  With no 
meaningful commitments from advanced self -declared developing Members on the table, th ese 
                                                
47 Chinese Taipei set an encouraging example for other Members at its Trade Policy Review meeting in 
September 2018, s tating that it will not claim special and differential treatment afforded to developing country 
Members in future rounds of WTO negotiations. See WT/TPR/ M/377 .  
48 China is by far the world 's largest marine capture fisheries producer, with approximately 15 million tons 
of production.  Indonesia is the second largest producer, with approximately 6.2 million tons.  Peru, India, Viet 
Nam, and the Philippines are also among the world 's top ten largest marine capture fisheries producers.  See: 
Food and Agricultur e Organization, The State of the World Fisheries and Aquaculture  (2018), at Table 2.  
49 Group of countries with less than 35% of non -agricultural products covered by legally bound tariff 
ceilings. They had  agreed to increase their binding coverage substantially, but want ed to exempt some products. 
(In paragraph 6 of the first version of the NAMA text, later paragraph 8.)  WTO Members: Cameroon ; Congo ; 
Côte d'Ivoire ; Cuba; Ghana ; Kenya ; Macao, China;  Mauriti us; Nigeria ; Sri Lanka ; Suriname ; Zimbabwe.  
50 Coalition of developing countries seeking flexibilities to limit market opening in industrial goods trade.  
Despite its name, it only included  10 WTO Members: Argentina ; Brazil ; Egypt ; India; Indonesia ; Namibia ; 
Philippines ; South Africa ; Tunisia ; and Bolivarian Republic of  Venezuela.  
51 For a full list of NAMA country groupings , see: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/markacc_e/nama_groups_e.htm . WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
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  groups became a vehicle to demand more and more flexibilities and carve -outs from tariff cuts, even 
after members of these groups had already reached the point where they would contribute 
essentially nothing.  When Members ' focus finally turned to advan ced self -declared developing 
Members, it became obvious that these Members were undifferentiated from the groups that had 
emerged.  These Members easily exploited their self -declared developing status to deflect pressure 
to make meaningful contributions.  They refused to offer commitments commensurate with their role 
in the global trading system.  
4.2  Agriculture Negotiations  
4.10.   Differentiation issues played a significant role in the failure of the negotiations on market 
access, domestic support, and export competiti on during the Doha Development Round.  Complex 
negotiating modalities and Members ' unwillingness to differentiate poor developing Members from 
richer Members led to the collapse in agricultural negotiations.  Negotiations simply could not keep 
pace with dram atic changes reshaping the global agricultural landscape.  
4.11.   Negotiations on domestic support and market access during the Doha Round  — compared to 
the negotiations during the Uruguay Round  — focused on more aggressive and larger cuts, leading 
to calls by gro ups of Members for numerous carve -outs through complex modalities, often using 
development status as a criterion to lower the cuts.  This also resulted in Members negotiating for 
new categories of development beyond those that had previously existed, such a s Small and 
Vulnerable Economies, Recently Acceded Members (RAMs), and VRAMs.  
4.12.   However, as in the case of the NAMA negotiations, this proliferation of groupings provided 
only a mirage of differentiation among Members, all with an intent to limit reforms.  For example, 
China and Chinese Taipei  aligned themselves with the RAMs, which also included Cape Verde and 
Tonga.  On the basis of its RAMs status, China  sought complete exemption from new domestic 
support rules for nearly a decade after it joined the WTO, despite being one of the largest, if not the 
largest, subsidizers in the world.  In claiming RAMs status, Chinese Taipei sought to limit its tariff 
reduc tions below developing country cuts, even though Chinese Taipei committed in its WTO 
accession that it would not claim any right granted to developing country Members.52 India  used its 
status as a developing Member to press for continued exemption f rom its commitments of some 
$30 billion in input subsidies, a rule intended to address development for some of the poorest 
farmers in the world.  Under this massive subsidy scheme, India  would continue to receive the same 
exemption as that of a country like Rwanda.   
4.13.   Negotiations on the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) and Public Stockholding for Food 
Security (PSH) have continued at the insistence of self -declared developing Members, which have 
used development status as an excuse to pursue increased protectionism rather than meaningful 
trade reform initiatives at the WTO.  Members such as India  and Indonesia , which have high bound 
tariffs and already provide high levels of trade -distorting domestic support, framed SSM and PSH as 
development issues to skirt existing limits.  They also created support among poorer Members for 
their own proposed exemptions that would benefit them as self -declared developing Members.  
4.3  Committee on Trade and Development – Special Session Negotiations  
4.14.   Self-declared developing status and diff erentiation also played a significant role in the failure 
of negotiations in the Committee on Trade and Development – Special Session (CTD -SS) to review 
existing S&D provisions with a view to making them more precise, effective, and operational.  The 
discus sion in the CTD -SS revealed profound disagreements among Members about the purpose of 
S&D provisions and the relationship between trade rules and development.  Most WTO Members 
assert that S&D provisions are a means to help developing countries integrate in to the multilateral 
trading system and reap the benefits of this system, while some developing countries view S&D 
provisions as a means to maintain policy space outside WTO rules.  
4.15.   Compounding those fundamental disagreements was the insistence of some Membe rs that 
they continue to have access to S&D provisions, including any new provisions agreed to by the CTD -
SS, by virtue of their self -declared development status.   They would have access not just to proposed 
transition periods, but also to proposed near -total carve -outs from existing disciplines on subsidies, 
                                                
52 WT/ACC/TPKM/18, paragraph 6.  WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 13 - 
 
  local content rules, and in other areas.  In short, in the context of the CTD -SS negotiations, the ability 
to self -declare as a developing Member meant that every negotiating proposal would have 
undermi ned the predictability of WTO rules.  Self-declaration also meant that global trade rules would 
only apply to a small group of countries.  This is untenable.  
5  CONCLUSION  
5.1.  Defenders of the status quo approach by some WTO Members for determining development 
status — self-declaration  — may argue that Members effectively agreed to it by consensus in 1995.  
They may even claim their authorities would never have sought WTO membership if they could not 
self-declare as developing.  Unfortunately, clinging to this approac h leads to a system that prevents 
true liberalization while anchoring all Members to a world that no longer exists.  This contradicts the 
goals stated by Members in the preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO.  
5.2.  Self-declaration and its first -order consequence  — an inability to differentiate among Members  
— puts the WTO on a path to failed negotiations.  It is also a path to institutional irrelevance, whereby 
the WTO remains anchored to the past and unable to negotiate disciplines to address th e challenges 
of today or tomorrow, while other international institutions move forward.  
_______________  
 WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 14 - 
 
  APPENDIX  
Table 1: Poverty rates by region, 1993 -2015  
Region  USD 1.90  USD 3.20  USD 5.50  
1993  2015  1993  2015  1993  2015  
East Asia and Pacific  54.0 2.3 79.7 12.5 93.2 34.9 
Europe and Central Asia  5.0 1.5 15.1 5.4 35.9 14.0 
Latin America and the Caribbean  13.2 4.1 27.1 10.8 48.0 26.4 
Middle East and North Africa  6.7 5.0 28.9 16.3 59.4 42.5 
South Asia  44.9 12.4*  80.4 48.6*  95.0 81.4*  
Sub-Saharan Africa  58.9 41.1 78.2 66.3 90.4 84.5 
* Estimate  
Note:  Data are the shares of population living on less than the indicated US$ per day.  
Source:  World Bank, Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2018 . 
  WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 15 - 
 
  Table 2: Human Development Index (HDI)  
Country  Value  (%) Ranking  
1990  2017  Growth  1990  2017^  Change  
India 0.427  0.640  49.9 113 107 6 
China  0.502  0.752  49.8 102 73 29 
Turkey  0.579  0.791  36.6 86 57 29 
Thailand  0.574  0.755  31.5 91 69 22 
Indonesia  0.528  0.694  31.4 100 95 5 
Singapore  0.718  0.932  29.8 38 5 33 
Colombia  0.592  0.747  26.2 82 76 6 
Korea, Republic of  0.728  0.903  24.0 36 21* 15 
Costa Rica  0.656  0.794  21.0 59 56 3 
Chile 0.701  0.843  20.3 48 42 6 
Hong Kong, China  0.781  0.933  19.5 19 7* 12 
Mexico  0.650  0.774  19.1 61 64 -3 
Argentina  0.704  0.825  17.2 45 45 0 
Germany  0.801  0.936  16.9 12 5 7 
France  0.779  0.901  15.7 20 23 -3 
Israel  0.792  0.903  14.0 15 21* -6 
Qatar  0.754  0.856  13.5 26 35 -9 
Switzerland  0.832  0.944  13.5 5 9 -4 
Norway  0.850  0.953  12.1 3 1 2 
Japan  0.816  0.909  11.4 9 18 -9 
United States  0.860  0.924  7.4 2 13 -11 
Sub-Saharan Africa#  0.398  0.537  34.9 NA NA NA 
LDCs#  0.346  0.524  51.4 NA NA NA 
World  0.598  0.728  21.7 NA NA NA 
 
UNDP categories  
Low human  
development  High human 
development  
Medium human 
development  Very high human 
development  
 
^ Ranking among countries who had HDI scores in 1990 . 
* HDI score of this country was tied with the score of another country . 
# Not all countries in these groups fall within the "Low Human Development" category; however, the 
composite score for the group would fall within that category.  
Source:  UNDP Human Development Data, accessed on 7 January 2019 at: http://hdr.undp.or g/en/data . 
 
  WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 16 - 
 
  Table 3: Growth of 20 largest economies, 1995 -2017  
 Rank  GDP (USD trillions)  
 1995  2017  1995  2017  Change (%)  
European Union  1 1 12.79  18.75  46.7 
United States  2 2 10.30  17.30  68.0 
China  4 3 1.48 10.16  587.0  
Japan  3 4 5.06 6.16 21.6 
India 10 5 0.60 2.63 339.9  
Brazil  5 6 1.39 2.28 64.3 
Canada  6 7 1.10 1.88 70.8 
Russian Federation  7 8 0.88 1.68 91.3 
Australia  9 9 0.69 1.38 99.8 
Korea, Republic of  11 10 0.54 1.35 147.6  
Mexico  8 11 0.71 1.28 81.6 
Turkey  14 12 0.43 1.21 181.8  
Indonesia  12 13 0.44 1.09 149.4  
Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of  15 14 0.35 0.68 96.0 
Switzerland  13 15 0.43 0.65 49.2 
Iran 18 16 0.27 0.56 105.5  
Norway  16 17 0.31 0.48 56.9 
Nigeria  26 18 0.13 0.46 243.1  
Argentina  19 19 0.27 0.46 72.4 
South Africa  20 20 0.23 0.43 83.4 
Note:  GDP figures for Sub -Saharan Africa and LDCs:  
Sub-Saharan Africa  NA NA 0.66 1.75 164.7  
LDCs NA NA 0.27 0.92 235.7  
Note:  GDP measured in constant 2010 US D. 
Source:  World Bank WDI, accessed 7 January 2019 .   
  WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 17 - Graph 1: GNI Per Capita (PPP), Select WTO Members and Groups  
 
 
Source: World Bank WDI, accessed on 7 January 2019.  
 
Hong Kong, China    
  WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 18 - Graph 2: GNI Per Capita, Select WTO Members, 1995 -2017  
  
Source: World Bank WDI, accessed on 7 January 2019.  
 
 
 
  
  WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 19 - Graph 3: GNI Per Capita, Select WTO Members, 1995 -2017  
 
 Source: World Bank WDI, accessed on 7 January 2019.  
  
  
  WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 20 - Graph 4: Employment in Agriculture, 1995 -2017  
 
  
Source: World Bank WDI, accessed on 7 January 2019.  
  
  
  WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 21 -  
Graph 5: Shares of Global Agricultural Value Added, 1997 -2016  
 
Note:  Shares for Sub -Saharan Africa do not include shares for Nigeria, which are shown separately.  
Source : World Bank WDI, accessed on 7 January 2019; data is modeled ILO estimate.  
 
 
  
  WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 22 - Graph 6: Urban Population as a Share of Total, 1995 -2017  
 
Source:  World Bank WDI, accessed on 7 January 2019.  
 
 
  
  WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 23 - Graph 7: Share of Global Exports of Goods and Services, Select Members, 1995 -2016  
 
Notes:  Calculations based on global exports in current US D. Data for LDCs are not available for 1995 -1999.  
Source:  World Bank WDI , accessed on 9 January 2019.  
 
 
 
  
  WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 24 - Graph 8: Select WTO Members' Share of Global Exports of Goods, 1996 -2017  
 
Note:  2017 figures are not available for LDCs, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, or Sub -Saharan Africa.  
Source:  World Bank WDI, accessed on 9 January 2019.  
  
  WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 25 - Graph 9: Shares of Global Exports of Goods, 1995 versus 2017  
 
Notes:  
* Shares of global exports of goods are calculated for 1996 and 2017  
** Shares of global exports of goods are calculated for 1995 and 2016  
Source:  World Bank WDI, accessed on 9 January 2019.  
  
  WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 26 - Graph 10: Export Volume Index, 2000 -2016 (Year 2000=100)  
 
Sourc e: World Bank WDI, accessed on 11 January 2019.  
  
  
  WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 27 - Graph 11: Export Value Index, 2000 -2016 (Year 2000=100)  
 
Source:  World Bank WDI, accessed on 11 January 2019.  
  
  
  WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 28 - Graph 12: High Technology Exports, 1995 and 2016  
  
Note:  The World Bank WDI defines high -technology exports as products with high R&D intensity, such as in aerospace, computers, pharmaceut icals, scientific instruments, and 
electrical machinery.  
Source:  World Bank WDI, accessed on 12 January 2019.  
  
  
  WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 29 - Graph 13: High Technology Exports as a Share of Manufacturing Exports, 1995 and 2016  
 
Note:  The World Bank WDI  defines high -technology exports as products with high R&D intensity, such as in aerospace, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific instrume nts, and 
electrical machinery.  
Source:  World Bank WDI, accessed on 12 January 2019.  
  
  
  WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 30 - Graph 14: Medium - and High -Tech  Exports as a Share of Manufacturing Exports, 1995 and 2015  
  
Source:  World  Bank WDI, accessed on 11 January 2019.  
  
  
  WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 31 - Graph 15: Exports of Advanced Technology Products (ATP), 1995 and 2016  
 
* Viet Nam figures in Graphs 15 -15(j) are from 1997 and 2016.  
Source:  US Census Bureau data, July 2018.  
Graph 15(a): ATP Exports – Computer Equipment, 1995 and 2016  
 
  
  
  WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 32 - Graph 15(b): ATP Exports – Electrical Equipment, 1995 and 2016  
 
 
Graph 15( c): ATP Exports – Electrical Power Transmission Equipment, 1995 and 2016  
  
 
  
  
  WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 33 - Graph 15(d): ATP Exports – Office Equipment, 1995 and 2016  
 
 
 
Graph 15(e): ATP Exports – Office Machines, 1995 and 2016  
 
  
  
  
  WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 34 - Graph 15(f): ATP Exports – Optical Instruments, 1995 and 2016  
 
 
Graph 15(g): ATP Exports – Rotating Electric Plants, 1995 and 2016  
 
 
  
  
  WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 35 - Graph 15(h): ATP Exports – Telecomm Equipment  
 
 
 
Graph 15( i): ATP Exports – Television Receivers, 1995 and 2016  
 
  
  
  WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 36 - Graph 15(j): ATP Exports – Valves, Transistors, Etc, 1995 and 2016  
 
 
  
  
  WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 37 - Graph 16: Receipts of Charges for Use of Intellectual  Property, 1995 -2017  
 
Notes:  Data set does not contain data for China for 1995 -96; for Hong  Kong, China for 1995 -97 and 2016 -17; for Japan for 1995.  
Source:  World Bank WDI, accessed on 11 January 2019.  
  
  
  WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 38 - Graph 17: Outward Direct Investment Positions, Select WTO Members  
  
Source:  https://stats.oecd.org, extracted on 8 January 2019.  
  
  
  WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 39 - Graph 18: Inward Foreign Direct Investment Positions, Select WTO Members  
 
Source:  https://stats.oecd.org, extracted on 8 January 2019.  
 
WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 40 - 
 
  Table 4: Fortune Global 500 Companies by Member  
  Number of Companies  
  1995  2018  
United States  151 126 
China  2 111 
Japan  148 53 
Germany  44 32 
France  40 28 
United Kingdom  35 21 
Korea, Rep ublic of 8 16 
Netherlands  12 15 
Switzerland  14 14 
Canada  5 12 
Other  41 72 
Chinese Taipei  2 9 
Brazil  2 7 
India 1 7 
Singapore  0 3 
Mexico  2 4 
Notes:  
- The Global 500 list for 1995, accessed on 11 January 2019 at http://fortune.com/global500/1995/ , 
includes 483 companies. For purposes of Table 4, the missing 17 firms are included in the "Other " 
tally. A p ress article from 7 August 1995, accessed at 
https://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1995/08/07/205131/index.htm , stated 
that the United Sta tes had 151 companies in the Global 500, and Japan had 149. This would leave 
16 unidentified companies in the "Other " tally. 
- UK and Netherlands figures for 1995 include two companies whose headquarters are designated as 
UK/Netherlands.  
- UK and Netherlands figures for 2018 include one company whose headquarters is designated as 
UK/Netherlands.  
Source: Fortune Global 500, accessed on 13 January 2019 at: http://fortune.com/global500 . 
 
  WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 41 - 
 
   
Table 5: Distribution of Supercomputers in the Top50 0 List of November 1994, 
by WTO  Member  
  Top 10  Top 100  Top 500  
United States  5 59 257 
Japan  5 23 84 
Germany    3 48 
UK   5 23 
France    4 19 
Netherlands      8 
Australia      7 
Switzerland    3 7 
Canada    2 5 
Sweden      5 
China      0 
Other      37 
 
Table 6: Distribution of Supercomputers in the Top50 0 List of November 2018, 
by WTO  Member  
Source:  The Top500, at: https://www.top500.org/lists/top500 . Accessed on 8 January 2019.  
 
   Top 10  Top 100  Top 500  
China  2 10 227 
United States  5 35 109 
Japan  1 15 31 
UK   7 20 
France    7 18 
Germany  1 9 17 
Ireland      12 
Canada    1 9 
Italy   4 6 
Korea, Republic of    3 6 
Netherlands      6 
Australia      5 
Other    34  
  WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 42 - Graph 19: Satellites in Space, as of 30 November 2018  
 
Note:  Country is derived from "Country of Operator/Owner."  "Other" category includes satellites for which more than one country of operator/owner is listed in the database.  
Source:  Union of Concerned Scientists' Satellite Database, accessed on 7 January 2019 at: https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear -weapons/space -weapons/satellite -database . 
  
 
  WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 43 - Graph 20: Military Expenditure by Country, 1995 -2017  
 
Note:  Figures for China, Saudi Arabia, Russian Federation, Italy, and Australia contain estimates. Figures for Saudi Arabia are for  the adopted budget, rather than actual 
expenditure. For more details, see: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/5_Footnotes.pdf . 
Source:  Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database, accessed on 11 January 2019 at: https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex . 
 
  WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 44 - Graph 21: Comparison of Chinese Naval Vessels Launched Since 2014 and the Total Size of Selected Navies  
 
Note:  China naval vessels include PLA Navy vessels only. Data as of April 2018.  
Source:  The International Institute for Strategic Studies Military Balance Blog, "China's naval shipbuilding, delivering on its ambition in a big way," 1 May 2018. See: 
https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military -balance/2018/05/china -naval -shipbuilding .
WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1  
 
- 45 - 
 
  Table 7: OECD Membership, Applicants, and Key Partners  
 
Notes:   Countries shaded in orange became members after 1995. Countries highlighted in red have not self -
declared as developed Members of the WTO.  
 
OECD Applicants, 2019  
Current:   Costa Rica . 
Prospective:  Argentina ; Brazil;  Bulgaria ; Croatia ; Peru; Romania . 
 
Note:  The OECD approved Colombia 's application for membership in 2018, and it is in the process of being 
finalized.  
 
OECD "Key Partners " 
Brazil ; China ; India; Indonesia ; South Africa.  
 
__________  
 
 OECD Members, 1995  
Australia  Finland  Ireland  Netherlands  Sweden  
Austria  France  Italy New Zealand  Switzerland  
Belgium  Germany  Japan  Norway  Turkey  
Canada  Greece  Luxembourg  Portugal  UK 
Denmark  Iceland  Mexico  Spain  USA 
OECD Members, 2019  
Australia  Denmark  Hungary  Korea  New 
Zealand  Spain  
Austria  Estonia  Iceland  Latvia  Norway  Sweden  
Belgium  Finland  Ireland  Lithuania  Poland  Switzerland  
Canada  France  Israel  Luxembourg  Portugal  Turkey  
Chile Germany  Italy Mexico  Slovak 
Republic  UK 
Czech 
Republic  Greece  Japan  Netherlands  Slovenia  USA