WT/REG347/2/Add.1  
20 June 2014  
(14-3599)  Page: 1/4  
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements  Original: English/Spanish  
 
  FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN COSTA RICA AND SINGAPORE 
(GOODS AND SERVICES) 
QUESTIONS AND REPLIES 
Addendum 
The following communication, dated 19 June 2014, is being circulated at the request of the 
delegations of Costa Rica and Singapore. 
 
 This document reproduces the questi ons addressed to the Parties and the 
responses submitted.  
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 Questions from the delegation of Peru
1 
 Regulatory provisions on trade in goods 
Anti-dumping and countervailing measures 
 1.1.  Paragraph 3.36. In accordance with para graph 2(c) of Articl e 7.10 (Transparency 
and Legal Certainty) in the chapter on trad e remedies, one of the practices that the 
Parties agree to observe in anti-dumping and countervailing measures cases is that, 
a Party's investigating authority, upon the re quest of an exporter from the other Party, 
shall make available the time-frames, proc edures and any documents necessary for the 
offering of an undertaking. 
In terms of undertakings, both Singapore and Costa Rica have notified their laws 
and regulations to the WTO (doc uments G/ADP/N/ 1/SGP/2/Suppl.1, 
G/SCM/N/1/SGP/2/Suppl.1, G/ADP/N/1/CRI/3 and G/SCM/N/1/CRI/3). 
Could Singapore and Costa Rica indicate whethe r, in addition to the laws and regulations 
notified to the WTO, they have provid ed for these time-frames, procedures 
and documents necessary for the offering of an understanding in their domestic laws 
on anti-dumping and countervailing measur es or in another legal framework? 
If so, could they point out the specific provis ions in that legislation and, if available, 
provide the electronic link to access the documents? 
 There is no additional legislation or regulation to that notified by Costa Rica and Singapore 
under the WTO with respect to offering of an undertaking.  
 1.2.  Paragraph 3.36. Pursuant to Article 7. 12 (Consideration of  Public Interest) 
in the chapter on trade remedies, anti-d umping or countervailing measures may not 
be applied by a Party when it can clearly be co ncluded that it is not in the public interest 
to apply such measures. Public interest sh all take into account the situation of the 
domestic industry, importers and their repres entative associations, representative users 
and representative consumer organizations, to  the extent they have provided relevant 
information to the investigating authorities. What are the criteria that would be taken 
into account in order to determine that the application of such measures is not in the 
public interest, considering that the assessment, according to Article 7.12, 
                                               
1 Questions were submitted to the Parties on 28 May 2014 (three weeks, five days before the meeting). WT/REG347/2/Add.1 
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  would be based on the situation of intere st groups that have divergent interests 
and that are affected by or benefit fr om the application of an antidumping 
or countervailing measure in different ways? 
 The application of the clause on public intere st in Article 7.12 (Consideration of Public 
Interest) is facultative and shall be applied in accordance with the circumstances of each concrete 
case. Its inclusion responds precisely to the fact that the application of an antidumping or countervailing measure may affect other interests, besides those pointed out by the domestic 
industry petitioning for the measure. Therefore, even in cases where all formal and substantive 
requirements have been met, the decision to not apply it may be taken based on public interest. 
For the application of this clause, a balance must  be made among the interests at play, based on 
the information provided by the interested parties during the course of the investigation. 
 
Other provisions 
Competition policy 
 1.3.  Paragraph 5.16. According to Article 9.1 (Ob jective) in the chapter on competition 
policy, the Parties consider "anti-competit ive mergers and acquisitions or economic 
concentrations" to be an anti-competitive prac tice. In this regard, what criteria do the 
Parties use to determine whether a merger , acquisition or economic concentration 
is anti-competitive? How does this practice  differ from those listed in paragraphs (a) 
and (b) of Article 9.1? 
 In the case of Costa Rica, the Law on Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer 
Protection
2, Law No. 7472 and its reforms, establishes in its Article 10 the prohibition or sanction 
of those monopolistic practices that prevent or restrict competition or the entry of competitors to 
the market, or those that promote competitors to move out of the market. Specifically, absolute 
monopolistic practices (horizontal) and relative monopolistic practices (vertical) under certain conditions are addressed. Moreover, the am endment to the Law No. 9072 of September 20
th, 
2012, establishes the prior review of concentrations that meet certain thresholds on assets and 
incomes by requiring notification to the Commission for Competition Promotion3 (COPROCOM) 
before or within five days following the date on which the agreement was signed. The COPROCOM shall revise the concentration in order to approve it or to establish conditions for such approval. 
Among the criteria that shall be considered are:  
 "Article 16°.-Concentrations: 
 
(…)   In the concentration investigation, the criteria on measurement of the substantial power in 
the relevant market, established in this law regarding relative monopolistic practices, shall be 
followed.   
1.- The Commission shall approve concentrations th at do not have the object or effect of:  
 
a. Significantly acquiring or increasing substantial power implying a limitation or 
displacement of the competition.   
b. Facilitating express or tacit coordination among competitors or produce adverse 
results for consumers.  
c. Diminishing, harming or impeding competition or free attendance, with regards to 
identical, similar or substantially related goods or services.  
 2.- If it is determined that the concentratio n has any of the abovementioned objectives or 
 effects, for the approval of the conc entration the Commission shall evaluate: 
 
                                               
2 "Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor." 
3 "Comisión para Promover la Competencia." WT/REG347/2/Add.1 
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  a. If the concentration is necessary to reach economies of scale or to develop 
efficiencies, such as referred to in article 12 of this law, which benefits surpass its anti-competitive effects.  
b. If the concentration is necessary to prevent productive assets of one of the economic 
agents part of the concentration to move away from the market of, as would be the 
case of an untenable financial situation.  
c. That the anti-competitive effects could be counterbalanced by the conditions imposed 
by the Commission.  
d. Any other circumstance that protects the interests of domestic consumers in the view 
of the Commission.  
(…)" 
 Moreover, in May 2014 COPROCOM adopted the "Guidelines for the analysis of economic 
concentrations". The Guidelines elaborate on the di fferent elements that should be considered in 
the concentration analysis, which includes the definition of the relevant market, the substantial 
power in the relevant market, anticompetitive effects to be considered from different types of 
concentrations (horizontal, vertical and conglomerate concentrations), among other effects. These Guidelines are available at the following link: 
 
 http://www.coprocom.go.cr/ser vicios_tramites/requisitos /guia_analisis_concevf.pdf  
 
 A concentration may have similar effects on the market to those of absolute or relative 
monopolistic practices. What should be analysed in the context of previous analysis of 
concentrations are possible practices of a new economic agent that result from a merge of different economic agents (competitors or potential competitors, previously independent agents at 
different levels of the value chain or even agen ts operating in different markets that could be 
closely related).   
 In the case of Singapore, the Competition Ac t ("the Act") provides a generic law to protect 
consumers and businesses from anti-competitive prac tices of private entities. It also sets out the 
various powers and processes in the administering and enforcement of the Act. The Competition Commission of Singapore ("CCS") is tasked with administering and enforcing the Act in Singapore. 
The Competition Act prohibits three main activiti es: (a) Agreements, decisions and practices which 
prevent, restrict or distort competition ("the section 34 prohibition"); (b) Abuse of a dominant position ("the section 47 prohibition"); and Mergers that substantially lessen competition ("the 
section 54 prohibition").  
  Under section 54 of the Act, mergers that have resulted, or may be expected to result, in a 
substantial lessening of competition ("SLC") within any market in Singapore for goods or services 
are prohibited. The CCS published the "CCS Guidelines on the Substantive Assessment of Mergers", which set out some factors and circumstances which the CCS may consider in determining whether a merger has infringed, or an anticipated merger, if carried into effect, will 
infringe the section 54 prohibition. Specifically, the Guidelines explain the concept of a substantial 
lessening of competition ("SLC") and provide a description of what constitutes mergers and the approach taken in identifying appropriate counterfactuals, as well as the broad analytical elements 
that the CCS will consider in assessing whether a merger has resulted, or may be expected to 
result, in a SLC. The Guidelines are available at the following link:  
 http://www.ccs.gov.sg/content/dam/ccs/PDFs/CCS Guidelines/substantiveassessmerger_Jul0
7FINAL.pdf  
 
1.4.  Paragraph 5.16. Pursuant to Article 9.4 (Consultations) in the chapter 
on competition policy, in order to fost er understanding between the Parties, 
or to address specific matters that arise under this Chapter, a Party shall, at the request of the other Party, enter into consultations.  In its request, the Party shall indicate, 
if relevant, how the matter affects trade or investment between the Parties. The Party 
to which a request is addressed shall consider  the issue of concern to the other Party, 
and inform it of the outcome of such consider ation. What, exactly, is meant by the fact WT/REG347/2/Add.1 
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  that the Party to which the request is addr essed must consider the issue of concern? 
What kind of consideration does this invo lve and what elements would be included 
in the report submitted to the other Party? 
 In the Competition Policy Chapter, it is understood that the Party that receives the request 
for consultations shall consider arguments based on the provisions of the Chapter, specifically, its 
objectives to promote fair competition and to proscribe anti-competitive practices within the free trade area. The enforcement measures to promote fair competition and to proscribe 
anti-competitive practices shall be implemented in accordance with the respective national 
competition legislation of the Parties. The enforcement policy of the Parties' authorities shall be consistent with the principles of transparency, timeliness, non-discrimination and procedural fairness.  
 
1.5.  Paragraph 5.16. Pursuant to Article 9.4 (Consultations) in the chapter 
on competition policy, the Party shall indicate in its request how the matter affects trade 
or investment between the Parties. What criteria do the Parties consider should 
be observed in order to determine whet her an activity that is the subject 
of consultations affects trade or investment between the Parties. 
 This will depend on the subject matter raised in the request for consultations. Specifically, 
the requesting party will need to demonstrate or justify to the receiving party how the subject matter has impacted on trade or investment between the two parties.   
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