WT/MIN(17)/11, JOB/GC/167  
JOB/TNC/69, JOB/AG/133  
JOB/DEV/50, JOB/DS/24  
JOB/IP/28, JOB/MA/133  
JOB/RL/10, JOB/SERV/275  
JOB/TE/48  
 
5 December 2017  
(17-6684) Page: 1/5 
Ministerial Conference  
Eleventh Session  
Buenos Aires, 10 -13 December 2017  Original: English  
 
 
 AFRICA AND DEVELOPME NT  
PROPOSAL BY THE AFRI CAN GROUP1 
The following submission, dated 4 December 2017, is being circulated to the General Council, the 
Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) and all negotiating bodies reporting to the TNC, by the 
African Group.  
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1  INTRODUCTION  
1.1.  Development is essential; and development is a human right2. With high levels of 
unemployment, inequality and poverty, Africa is acutely aware of the challenges of inclusivity. We 
are working to address this including through policies that advance structural transformation, and 
industrialisation, diversify and upgrade production, move up the value chain and create new, 
decent jobs for our citizens. Africa is engaged in a developmental regional and continental agenda 
that combines market integration with industrial cooperation and infrastructure development for 
inclusive growth.  
1.2.  The African Group is therefore very sensitive to whether multilateral rules support or 
constrain our efforts3. It is critical for the WTO not only to be seen on paper and in the media, as 
promoting development, but that concrete efforts, deliverables, and implementation of decisions, 
ensure inclusive multilateralism that supports development.  In this regard, we wish to recognise 
and reaffirm the central importance of the development dimension in every aspect of the Doha 
Work Programme, and paragraph 1 of Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishi ng the 
WTO.  
1.3.  Recognising that substantial work still remains to be done on development in the WTO, and 
in view of the emerging perspectives on the future of multilateralism, in particular in the WTO, the 
African Group shares some reflections on our vision for a prosperous Africa based on inclusive 
growth and sustainable development in the WTO.  
2  BUILDING THE AFRICA WE WANT  
2.1.  Africa 's struggle for economic freedom is traced back to a painful historical experience 
beginning in 1884 -85, i.e. the internationalisa tion of decision -making. From colonization and a 
legacy of profound economic, political and social fragmentation, which continued even after 
independence returned to most parts of Africa in the 1950s and 1960s, to the IMF and World Bank 
Structural Adjustme nt Programmes championing free market development economics.  
2.2.  In pursuing our development agenda, Africa 's vision is informed by the African Union's 
Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want. It places at the centre of our development agenda, the 
                                                
1 This submission is without prejudice to the position of Nigeria.  
2 UN Declaration on the Right to Development, 1986  
3 WT/L/1004  WT/MIN(17)/11 • JOB/GC/167 • JOB/TNC/69 • JOB/AG/133 • JOB/DEV/50 • JOB/DS/24  
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  eradication of pove rty through social and economic transformation of the continent. We aspire, 
through the structural transformation, economic diversification and industrialisation of Africa, to 
create shared growth, decent jobs and economic opportunities for all our people.   
2.3.  In 1964, Africa 's share in world trade in goods was a staggering 6%. However, between 
2009-2016, Africa's share in world exports dropped from 3.1% to 2.2% in goods and from 2.4% to 
2.0% in services. In 2016, Africa's share was 3.7% in agriculture; 0.8% i n manufactured products 
and; 8.2% in fuel. 54% of the population in 46 African countries is still living in poverty. Out of the 
420 million youth, one -third are unemployed and discouraged, another third are vulnerably 
employed, and only one in six is in wa ge employment. While 10 to 12 million youth enter the 
workforce each year, only 3.1 million jobs are created.  
2.4.  The end of the commodity price cycle has negatively impacted the current accounts and 
financial markets, which may have a deep impact on future c ompetiveness enhancing investments. 
Over the past two years, the aggregate macroeconomic environment of Africa has worsened due 
to higher debt, higher public deficit and lower savings. According to the UNIDO report to the G20 
Working Group on Industrialisa tion in Africa and Least Developed Countries of 2016, Africa 's MVA 
accounted for just 1.6% of the global total in 2014 and its growth has lagged far behind that of 
other regions since 1990. There are technology and knowledge deficits in many developing 
countries. According to the Africa competiveness report, productivity has grown less in Africa than 
it has in more advanced economies. Currently only one African country is merely transitioning to 
the innovation -driven stage and the rest is left behind.  
2.5.  The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa predicts that by transforming Africa 's 
mineral export by just 5 percent before export, it can create 5 million jobs a year.  
2.6.  A number of studies have shown that the main reason why developing countries, especia lly 
LDCs have not been able to participate effectively in the Multilateral Trading System is mainly 
because they are lagging behind in terms of industrialisation, in particular the production of value 
added and competitive manufacturing products. It is the refore important to note that governments 
have a duty to make strategic and targeted interventions in key sectors of the economy without 
fear of infringing on their WTO commitments or being sued under the DSU.  
2.7.  In order to achieve this, African countries wo uld need some accommodation in the WTO to 
take measures necessary for industrialisation and development. Much like how developed 
countries benefitted from the absence of rules, and then created new rules that constrained 
developing countries, particularly in the early stages of development.  
3  DEVELOPMENT  
3.1.  We express with deep concern and regret that the commitment by all Members to fulfilling 
the object, spirit and intent of the Doha Development Agenda is being seriously undermined. The 
discourse on new issu es such as Electronic Commerce, Investment Facilitation, And Micro, Small 
and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) has overshadowed the development agenda since the Tenth 
Ministerial Conference in the current Doha Round negotiations. Several developed Members have 
also adopted a stiff rejectionist approach to any negotiations on development with respect to the 
paragraph 44 mandate in the Doha Ministerial Declaration, with the view to foster structural 
transformation, diversification and industrialisation in line with  the African Union 's Agenda 2063: 
the Africa We Want. Some Members hold that these proposals cannot obtain multilateral 
consensus in time for concrete deliverables at MC11.  
3.2.  At the same time, however, many of these Members are pursuing a number of deliverab les, 
some without prior agreement or a mandate, that we would qualify as anti -development, and 
which unacceptably narrow the space our Members use and need for policies and regulations that 
support our development objectives. In Domestic Regulation for exa mple, these Members are 
pushing for rules that would erode our right to regulate, intrude into our domestic policy -making 
processes, and hinder the regulatory capacity and policy space for development -driven regulations 
by Africa; promote regulatory captur e and control; and limit the sovereign function of our elected 
parliamentary representatives in discharging their sovereign function of legislating. The inherent 
contradiction by some of these Members are untenable, and point to the need for Members to hav e 
an honest appraisal that can deliver on the commitment to the DDA.  WT/MIN(17)/11 • JOB/GC/167 • JOB/TNC/69 • JOB/AG/133 • JOB/DEV/50 • JOB/DS/24  
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  3.3.  Of particular relevance in the development discourse, is the concept of Special and 
Differential Treatment (S&DT), which was introduced in recognition of the development aspirations 
and s ocio-economic challenges faced by the broad constituency of developing and least developed 
countries (LDCs) of the WTO. It ought to be recalled that Ministers sought, through the 
establishment of the WTO, to ensure that developing countries – and especiall y the least 
developed among them - secure a share in the growth of international trade commensurate with 
the needs of their economic development.  
3.4.  In other words, the ultimate aim was not to promote free trade just for the sake of it, but 
rather to foster economic development by improving inter alia market access conditions and the 
terms of trade in a manner that would steadily raise their living standards and eradicate poverty. 
There was wide acceptance that developing countries and LDCs can deviate from t he general quid 
pro quo rules of the multilateral trading system.  
3.5.  Yet some Members continue to question and undermine the relevance and legitimacy of our 
issues despite having benefitted from a system that supported their development and industrial 
rite o f passage. There is a total disconnect between: the clear commitment to development by 
Ministers; and the stiff rejection by some Members on delivering on it.  
3.6.  Increasingly, the WTO is being looked at as an organisation that does not respond to the 
specifi c needs and concerns of its Members, in particular to effectively addressing the challenges to 
economic development in Africa, despite the most recent commitment by Ministers in Paragraph 5 
of the Nairobi Ministerial Declaration. This then leads us to the following reflections:  
• How does the WTO intend to deliver on its commitment to development?  
 
• Who is the WTO intended to serve if it cannot address the specific development needs of the 
 majority of its Members?  
 
• What does the WTO intend to promote, beyond simply rule -making?  
 
3.7.  It ought to be recalled that S&DT provisions were already negotiated in the adoption of 
existing agreements. They were included as part of the settlements negotiated and arrived at with 
the clear understanding that the balance they had aimed to achieve was necessary and constituted 
the benefits for developing countries and LDCs within the meaning of the WTO Agreement. This 
entitled developing countries and LDCs to legitimate expectations that  these obligations relating to 
S&DT would be faithfully implemented and complied with. Our partners however seem to be 
backsliding on this understanding.  
3.8.  Despite the foregoing, it is perplexing that some Members are advocating for new multilateral 
rules on  E-commerce, Investment Facilitation and MSMEs. We have already undertaken enough 
rules so far. The multilateral rules as they are, are constraining our domestic policy space and 
ability to industrialise. Before the GATT came into being, industrialised Mem bers benefited from 
the absence of rules, through the utilisation of policy space. They then closed this space through 
GATT Agreements notably by prohibiting the use of local content requirements; industrial 
subsidies; infant industry protection, among oth ers. In other words, the policy instruments they 
used during their development process were denied to late -comers through the GATT Agreements. 
This is what we qualified in the Committee on Trade and Development in Special Session (CTD -SS) 
discussions as 'k icking away the development ladder'.  
3.9.  It will be recalled that, contrary to popular belief, this is exactly why the Doha Development 
Agenda was launched with development outcomes and aspirations at the centre for the purpose of 
redressing the systemic and h istoric imbalances inherited from GATT/WTO Agreements. Yet, the 
view that new e -commerce, investment facilitation and MSMEs rules will be good for developing 
countries has been highly contested. Which is why, it is imperative to question the logic of these  
new rules. If developing countries cannot find relief in the current mandates and rules in a 
Multilateral Trading System that is intended to serve all its Members, then what would be the 
rationale for adopting new rules, especially if they are meant to fu rther marginalise poor 
economies? Any new rules would simply entrench existing imbalances and further constrain the 
ability of our governments to implement industrial policy and catch -up.  WT/MIN(17)/11 • JOB/GC/167 • JOB/TNC/69 • JOB/AG/133 • JOB/DEV/50 • JOB/DS/24  
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  3.10.   Developed countries are suggesting that the new approach to develop ment is through the 
provision of time -limited transition periods. Africa 's experience in the Uruguay Round shows that 
the transition periods do not work or at best are not an end in, and of themselves. Developing 
countries - the economy of which can only s upport low standards of living and are in the early 
stages of development, have returned to the WTO numerous times to seek extensions of the 
same, such as in the TRIPS Council under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement; and now in the 
CTD SS for the TRIMS A greement and ASCM, etcetera. under the mandate in Paragraph 44 of the 
Doha Ministerial Declaration.  
3.11.   It is therefore unacceptable for some developed country Members to treat the development 
aspects of the work of this Organisation to conceptual and theoret ical discussions at the Ministerial 
Conference, while on the other hand seeking to extract multilateral disciplines, including on new 
issues in areas of specific interest to them.  
3.12.   Towards that end therefore, the emphatic remarks we have all heard from one  Member who 
has signaled a blanket rejection to any discussion or movement on work on Development, should 
apply horizontally on all issues, and not only on the core development -related work of the WTO, of 
which the African Group has an offensive interest.  
4  WAY FORWARD  
4.1.  In view of the recent developments in the WTO on a so -called reform agenda and potential 
withering away of the centrality of development in the work of the WTO, the African Group 
proposes the following:  
• The WTO respond to the call by its fou nding fathers in the Marrakesh Agreement to 
continue to make positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and 
especially LDCs among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade 
commensurate with the needs of their economic de velopment.  
 
• The G -90 S&DT proposal will be accorded the same treatment as all other potential 
deliverables at the MC11. A meeting of the CTD -SS will be convened to consider the 
draft Ministerial text.  
 
• To reaffirm that the provisions for S&DT remain an in tegral part of existing and future 
WTO Agreements.  
 
• To instruct the CTD -SS to expeditiously complete the review of all the outstanding 
Agreement -specific proposals and report to the General Council, with clear 
recommendations for a decision, at the next Mi nisterial Conference.  
 
4.2.  In the event that any discussion or dedicated session is convened to deliberate on the topic 
of 'Development ' at the MC11, it will not be limited to only the mandate of the CTD -SS. Many 
developed Members have raised important concern s about their conceptual difficulties with 
development. We would therefore propose a horizontal, holistic Ministerial dialogue on 'inclusive 
multilateralism for sustained growth and development '. In these uncertain times, with the 
widespread backlash again st the disruptions caused by trade, globalisation and technological 
change, initiating such a dialogue could be most valuable. The terms of reference for such a 
discussion should not be limited to S&DT only, but it shall consider the wider nexus between: t rade 
and development. This discussion should be convened at a time that all Ministers can participate, 
and not compete for scheduling with other negotiating bodies. Questions to frame this discussion 
include:  
• How can we use trade policy instruments to pro mote structural transformation, 
industrialisation and sustainable economic growth for developing countries and LDCs?  
 
• How can we ensure that S&DT in the WTO is applied in a manner that is effective in 
addressing the problems of those who need it?  
 
• How have the current rules contributed to, or constrained development for developing 
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• How would the rules being proposed in all areas where there are diametrical divergences 
contribute towards the development, and integration of develo ping countries and LDCs 
into the multilateral trading system?  
 
• What is the nexus between domestic regulation and trade? What is the relationship 
between the right to regulate and the interlinkages between regulations and broader 
domestic economic imperativ es?  
 
4.3.  With a view to exploring options for more constructive work post -MC11 that meets our 
developmental objectives, Members should conduct an audit of all existing rules to see how, and 
where WTO rules have contributed to the development, or otherwise of Africa.  
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