RESTRICTED  
  
S/C/M/134  
 
5 April 2018 
(18-2071) Page: 1/27 
Council for Trade in Services    
 
REPORT OF THE MEETIN G HELD ON 2 MARCH 2018 
NOTE BY THE SECRETAR IAT1 
The Council for Trade in Services held a meeting on 2 March 2018, chaired by Ambassador Julian 
Braithwaite (United Kingdom). The agenda was contained in document WTO/AIR/CTS/1 4. 
 
The Chairman  said that, under Other Business, he would make an announcement on the 
appointment of the new Chairperson to the Council for Trade in Services, and the Secretariat 
would also make a brief announcement on its technical assistance activities schedule d for 2018.   
The representative of South Africa  said that she wished to add an item of Other Business, to share 
with Members i nformation about a Panel Discussion on the Risks of Regulatory Capture.  
 
The agenda was adopted as modified . 
The Chairman  asked d elegations, when taking the floor, to speak at a reasonable, moderate pace 
and, if possible, to provide the interpreters with an advance copy of any written statements they 
intended to deliver. He recalled that this was, first and foremost, in delegations'  own interest, as it 
helped ensure that interventions were properly conveyed and understood when translated in the 
other two official languages.  
1  ITEM A:  NOTIFICATIONS PURSUA NT TO ARTICLES III:3  AND V:7 OF THE GATS  
1.1.  With regard to the notifications made pur suant to GATS Article III:3 (transparency), the 
Chairman  drew the Council's attention to the communication received from Swi tzerland, contained 
in document  S/C/N/897. He suggested that the Council take note of the notification made.  
1.2.  It was so agreed . 
1.3.  Concerning the notifications made pursuant to GATS Article V:7 (Economic Integration), the 
Chairman  drew the Council's attention to the communication received from Hong Kong, China and 
Macao, China in document S/C/N/898. He suggested that the Council take note  of the notification 
made, and that the agreement notified be referred to the Committee on Regional Trade 
Agreements for consideration.  
1.4.  It was so agreed .  
1.5.  While on the subject of the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA), the Chairman  
wished to sh are some factual information that he thought  could be of interest to Members. He 
drew delegations' attention to the fact that, at its meeting scheduled for 5 and 6 April, the CRTA 
would be considering two regional trade agreements that covered trade in ser vices. The 
agreements in question were the 'Economic Partnership Agreement' between Japan and Mongolia 
and the 'Agreement on Trade in Services' between the Republic of Korea and the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).   
1.6.  A representative of the Secretariat  introduced its annual Note on notifications , which provides 
a statistical account of the notifications made by Members under relevant GATS provisions, 
                                                
1 This document has been prepared under the Secretariat's own responsibility and is without prejudice 
to the positions of Members or to their rights and obligations under the WTO.  S/C/M/134  
 
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  updated to incorporate notifications submitted be tween January and December 2017 (document 
Job(09)/10/Rev.8). She said that, f or ease of reference, the Note listed  all GATS notification 
requirements applicable to Members, irrespective o f whether any notifications had  been submitted 
under those Articles. As ind icated in the Note, during 2017, 19 notifications had been  submitted  
pursuant to Article III:3, by five Members,  and seven  economic integration agreements had been 
notified under Article V:7(a). Three observations could  be made based on  the Note.  First, n o 
mutual recognition agreements had been notified under Article VII:4 in 2017, a continuation of the 
trend noted in the previous update. Second, c ompared to 2016, the number of notifications 
submitted  pursuant to Article III:3 had more than tripled . Third,  2017 had seen fewer economic 
integr ation agreeme nts notified by Members than had been  the case in 2016.  
1.7.  The Chairman  suggested that the Council take note of the statement made .   
1.8.  It was so agreed .  
2  ITEM B: OPERATIONALI ZATION OF THE LDC SE RVICES WAIVER  
2.1.  The Chairman  recalled that, at the Oct ober meeting of the Council, the LDC Group had 
shared its appraisal of the preferential measures notified under the Waiver by Liechtenstein and 
Uruguay. Panama had also reverted to its notification, to provide detailed answers to the questions 
previously p osed by LDCs.  
2.2.  After qualifying the Waiver preferences as "a success", the LDC Group had called on Members 
to help LDC suppliers avail themselves of those preferences. Members were urged to develop 
projects that built supply capacity in LDCs and to raise aw areness of the Waiver among their 
respective domestic constituencies. Recalling paragraph 1.6 of the Nairobi Waiver Decision, LDCs 
had also advocated that Members explore what recommendations the Council may make "on steps 
that could be taken towards enhan cing the operationalisation of the Waiver".  
2.3.  The representative of Uganda , speaking on behalf of the LDC Group, referred to the 
Secretariat N ote on "Market ac cess for products and services of export interest to Least Developed 
Countries ", contained  in document WT/COMTD/LDC/ W/65 of September  2017. She noted that,  in 
the period 2005 -2016, LDCs' services exports  had expanded  on average  by 12% per year, 
compared to 8% in other developing economies and 5% in the developed group. Following a 
decade of sustain ed growth, however, LDCs' exp orts of commercial services had  slowed down 
starting in  2014. This downward trend had accelerated in 2016, when services exports had fallen 
by 4% , to US$32 billion. In 2016, LDCs' participation in global exports of commercial s ervices 
stood at 0.7%, up from 0.4% in 2005.  
2.4.  The integration of LDCs in inte rnational services trade remained limited due to a number of 
constraints , including poor infrastructure, limited skills and lack of financial resources. Indeed, 
services trade in LDCs remained concentrated within a few economies, an unchanged pattern since 
2005. In 2016, the top -ten leading exporters accounted for almost  70% of the group’s services 
receipts.  
2.5.  As the Group had stated previously , it wa s important to recall th at for LDCs, services trade 
went beyond pure economic significance , due to the major role services play ed in achieving social 
and development objectives and as a means of addressing poverty, upgrading welfare, improving 
universal availability and access to basic services, and in ensuring sustainable development, 
including its social dimension.  In that  regard , LDCs  welcome d the 24 notifications that had  been 
submitted  until then  by developed and developing Members  under the Waiver. The Group  
applaud ed them.  
2.6.  The W aiver Decisions had  always  recognized the need for supply -side and other capacity 
building for LDC suppliers. In addition, more needed to be done to assist LDC suppliers to benefit 
from the preferences  in a concrete manner , rather than  any general assistanc e program mes that 
might  or might  not be geared tow ards the notifications. There was  therefore  need to collaborate , 
to build the necessary assistance to enable LDC suppliers to avail themselves of the preferences . 
2.7.  In this respect, she reiterated the Group's  appeal in line with p aragraph 3.2 of the LDC  
Collective Request  and paragraph 1.4 and the third bullet  of paragraph 1.5  of the N airobi S/C/M/134  
 
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  Ministerial Decision on the Waiver. LDCs had increasingly c ome to the conclusion that it was more 
helpful to their servi ce suppliers if donor M ember s, development partners and agencies could 
design and  provide technical assistance to projects and program mes that were based in their  
respective countries or regions , with a view to building  LDC su pply capacity on the ground. T hose 
program mes should help to, among others , sensitize their  citizens about the benefi ts accruing as a 
result of the W aiver, towards building an inclusive space of shared prosp erity that truly ensured  
the integration of LDCs in the  multilateral trading sy stem. The Group  called upon Members to 
share with the  Council what specific program mes had been put in place in that  regard.  
2.8.  Further, in line with paragraph 1.6 of the Nairobi Decision, Members  needed to explore steps 
that could  be taken towards enhancing the operationalization of the Waiv er. 
2.9.  As previously indicated, LDCs also wished to request that Members undertake some Waiver -
related domestic  awareness raising among their respec tive constituencies , so as to afford them 
sufficient understanding of the pre ferential treatment that ha d been granted to LDCs.  
2.10.   The representative of Bangladesh  supported the statement made by Uganda, which put the 
issue under discussion in perspective. He noted the difficulties in identifying preferences in the 
notifications submi tted until then. Such difficulties were exemplified by one case that had been 
brought to the notice of the Member concerned; his delegation was hopeful that the issue would be 
addressed by the Member in question.  
2.11.   Bangladesh very much welcomed the LDC Waiv er Decision of 2011, which it hoped would 
allow Members to take measures to improve  the competitiveness of LDC suppliers in their 
respective markets and thus help increase LDC participation in international services trade. For 
that reason, his delegation continued to raise the issue of the implementation of the Waiver 
Decision. Banglades h was grateful to the whole Membership for positively responding to the call 
from LDCs and agreeing to two  successive  Decisions on the implementation of the Waiver. He 
thanked those Members which  had submitted notifications under the Waiver; the LDC Group had 
completed its preliminary assessment of all those notifications.  
2.12.   It was now time for the notifying Members and the Council to take action in line with 
paragraph 1.5 of the relevant Nairobi Decision. In that context, he made three propositions. First, 
the CTS should initiate a process to review the operation of notified preferences, on the basis of 
information provided by notifying Members. He urged those Members to come up with information 
on the scope of the preferences granted to LDC, preferences alr eady enjoyed by LDC suppliers in 
their markets, forms and extent of such preferences and their effect s on LDC services imports into 
their markets. The Secretariat might provide the necessary inputs in that regard. Second, notifying 
Members might bring to t he notice of the Council the technical assistance activities they had been 
carrying out in line with paragraph 1.5 of the Nairobi Decision. Third, the CTS might initiate a 
discussion on any other issue that might be required to be held to facilitate the be nefits envisaged 
in the preferences  notified . His delegation  looked forward to an interactive and fruitful discussion 
on those issues to achieve full implementation of Ministers' Decisions, in letter and spirit, with a 
view to increasing the participation of LDCs in international services trade.  
2.13.   The representative of the European Union  thanked Bangladesh and Uganda for opening the 
discussion on the LDC Waiver. His delegation was discovering the different ideas and proposals at 
that meeting and would be happ y to discuss them further with Uganda and Bangladesh. The EU 
would be open to discussing in the Council technical assistance measures as covered by the 
Nairobi Decision , and could indeed exchange information on existing aid instruments, such as the 
EU Aid for Trade Strategy, which actually expressly prioritised both LDCs and services as a 
thematic focus. He had also heard references to specific issues covered by the preferences that 
had been discussed in the past in the Council; the EU was open to addressin g specific sector -based 
or country -based issues that were covered by the Waiver preferences, but it was not appropriate 
in that context to address other market access  issues that were not pertinent or relevant to the 
preferences granted.  
2.14.   The Chairman  sugge sted that the Council take note of the statements made and said that 
the Council would revert to the  item at its next meeting.  
2.15.   It was so agreed . S/C/M/134  
 
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  3  ITEM C:  CERTAIN WTO -INCONSISTENT MEASURE S APPLIED BY UKRAINE  − 
STATEMENT BY THE RUS SIAN FEDERATION  
3.1.  The Chairman  indicated that the item had been added to the agenda of the Council at the 
request of the delegation of the Russian Federation.  
3.2.  The representative of the Russian Federation  recall ed her delegation's  previous statements in 
respect of the measures related to the reform of the unified gas transportation system of Ukraine,  
through impleme ntation of the Law of Ukraine N° 1645-VII "On amendments to some legislative 
acts of Ukraine on reforming the managemen t system of the Unified Gas Transportation System of 
Ukraine" and the Law of Ukraine N° 329-VIII "On the Natural Gas Market" of  9 April 2015.  
3.3.  The Russian Federation was  disappointed by the fact that , despite numerous concerns 
expressed by her delegation on a number of occasions since November 2014 , Ukraine had  failed to 
bring into compliance a clear violation of the fundamental principles of the GATS, namely MFN and 
the specific commitments undertaken by Ukraine under the GATS.  
3.4.  The Russian Federation  urged Ukraine to respect its international obligations under the WTO 
Agreement s. 
3.5.  The representative of Ukraine  said that his delegation had consider ed the Russian 
Federation's recurrent concerns about  the consistency with the GATS  and Ukraine's  commitments  
under the GATS  of the Law of Ukraine "On the Natural Gas Market" of 9 April 2015. The issue had  
been continuously raised by the Russian Federation in the Council  and had been placed on the 
Council's agenda  for several years, specifically since 2015. In that rega rd, his delegation wished to 
share its thinking.  
3.6.  First, Ukraine had taken  note of the concerns expressed and wished to reiterate that the Law 
of Ukraine "On the Natural Gas Market" established the principles of non -discrimination and equal 
treatment of th e natural gas market players regardless of their origin. The Law d id not constitute a 
measure that prohibit ed or restrict ed other WTO Member s' service  supplier s in any way, since it 
applied  to state infrastructure only and did  not require or prohibit  any specific type of legal entity 
for the purpose of  supplying pipeline transmission services.  
3.7.  The Law of Ukrain e "On the Natural Gas Market" did  not make a distinction based on the 
origin of  the gas market operator, which mean t that there wa s no discrimi nation between 
operators. His delegation also wished to underline that Ukraine ha d no evidence regarding the 
infringement of transit companies' rights in the course of the transportation  of gas  from th e 
Russian Federation to EU M ember  States  through the te rritory of Ukraine.  
3.8.  Non-discriminatory access was  exhaustively proved by the data of the Ukrainian gas 
transportatio n company Ukrtransgaz (the data were available online  from the company's website,  
at www.utg.ua) . The volume of gas transit to European con sumers thro ugh the territory of Ukraine 
had reached record level s during the previous  eight years and amounted to 93.5 billi on cubic 
meters in 2017, 13.7% higher than the transit performance in 2016.  
3.9.  Second, in terms of procedure , the issue seemed  to have become a p ermanent item of the 
CTS agenda. His delegation wished to draw Members' attention to Rule 27 of the "Rules of 
Procedure for Meetings of the General Council " (document WT/L/28 ), which stated:  
"Representatives should make every effort to avoid the repetition of a full debate at each meeting 
on any issue that has already been fully debated in the past and on which there appears to have 
been no change in Members' positions al ready on record" .  His delegation was not opposed to th e 
chronic presence of that item on the CTS agenda, but was not sure whethe r it wa s reasonable to  
repeatedly  burden Members with that  issue.  
3.10.   Third, Ukraine  recognize d the Russian Federation's wish  for further clarification s on 
Ukraine's legislation related to t he natural gas ma rket. With that  in mind , his delegation was  ready 
to continue engaging on the question -and-answer approach that it had already started by 
providing  comprehensive replies. At the same time , Ukraine  was open to consider ing other 
opportunities to address the Russian Federation's  concerns in  a proper way under the auspices of 
the WTO.  S/C/M/134  
 
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  3.11.   In conclusion, the representative  reiterate d Ukraine's commitment to comply with the rules, 
principles and obligations of the WTO in its relations  with all WTO Members. He wished  to assure  
the Membership that Ukraine would  address in a prompt manner any concern on that issue raised 
by interested M embers.  
3.12.   The Chairman  suggested that the Council take note of the statements made.  
3.13.   It was so agreed . 
4  ITEM D: WORK PROGRAM ME ON ELECTRONIC  COMMERCE  
4.1.  The Chairman  invited any delegation wishing to share information under the "exchange of 
information and experiences based on submissions by Members" sub -item to do so at that 
juncture.  
4.2.  The representative of India welcomed the Ministerial Decisio n on the Work Programme 
adopted at MC11 as e -commerce was one of the very few areas where Ministers had provided 
clear guidance. The Decision stated that Members "will endeavour to reinvigorate" relevant work, 
based on the existing mandate as set out in WT /L/274. In her delegation's view, issues that could 
be relevant for exploratory discussions included the scope of trade created by electronic means 
and the moratorium on customs dut ies on electronic transmissions. On the latter, the issues raised 
in the st atement by Indonesia at MC11, in document WT/MIN/(17)/68, were extremely important. 
Other issues that could be discussed included classification issues, technological neutrality of the 
GATS, the relationship between movement of natural persons and e -commer ce, regulatory 
challenges faced by governments arising from e -commerce, issues related to transfer of 
technology, and supporting the development of digital infrastructure in developing countries to 
reduce the digital divide.  
4.3.  The representative of China  said that, before MC11, Members had submitted more than 30 
communications on e -commerce and had held extensive discussion on the matter. The Friends of 
E-commerce for Development (FED) and the MIKTA group had organized a number of seminars in 
Geneva to enhan ce Members' understanding of e -commerce, especially on its development 
dimension. China commended the efforts made by Members, which had contributed to the 
adoption of the Ministerial Decision in Buenos Aires to continue the work under the Work 
Programme.  
4.4.  China valued multilateral discussions on e -commerce, which contributed to the WTO staying 
relevant and helped MSMEs, women and young people from developing Members to participate in 
trade and benefit from the inclusiveness of the multilateral trading syst em. It was important to 
maintain the momentum created in Buenos Aires and discuss the trade aspects of e -commerce, 
including by reflecting innovatively on effective approaches to move forward multilateral 
discussions, considering Members' different stages of development and the needs of developing 
Members, particularly LDCs.  
4.5.  China welcomed constructive suggestions by Members, and encouraged the WTO to enhance 
cooperation with other international organizations, such as the World Customs Organization and 
the Universal Postal Union, with a view to exploring the development dimension of e -commerce 
and exchanging relevant research outcomes. Considering the complexity of e -commerce and the 
different levels of development among Members, multilateral discussions sh ould reflect 
inclusiveness and uphold development principles. Discussions should focus on issues that enjoyed 
a certain degree of consensus to balance the needs of different Members, particularly developing 
ones, while managing Members' levels of ambition to get all Members on board, move forward and 
achieve meaningful outcomes. China stood ready to continue working with other Members towards 
that goal.  
4.6.  The Chairman  indicated that two new communications had been submitted under the Work 
Programme by Chinese Taipei. They were contained in documents JOB/SERV/277 and 
JOB/SERV/278, and addressed, respectively, "Removing cyberspace trade barriers: Towards a 
digital trade environment with reciprocally equal access" and "How cyberspace intrudes on the 
physical space – Case Studies: 3D printing and the sharing economy".   S/C/M/134  
 
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  4.7.  The representative of Chinese Taipei  reminded Members of the two non -papers submitted by 
his delegation a t the October meeting of the Council. The key message of those documents had 
been that there were two major transformations in the digital area. The first was the "atoms -bits 
transformation"; while, under traditional trade, a magazine printed in London wou ld be shipped to 
New York, nowadays such a magazine would be transmitted as a PDF file. The original form of 
transporting papers or atoms had changed into transmitting PDFs or bits. The second 
transformation was the "static/mobile" transformation, which wa s not related to the topic of that 
meeting. Rather, the main questions related to the implications of the "atoms -bits transformation".  
4.8.  Most traditional trade barriers, such as customs duties or import restrictions, applied to 
"atoms" as they crossed borde rs. But for "bits" there were various other trade barriers, which his 
delegation's paper referred to as "cyberspace trade barriers" (CTB). These were not necessarily 
discussed in the traditional WTO arena.  
4.9.  His presentation would focus on two main aspects related to e -commerce, as per his 
delegation's papers. JOB/SERV/277 related to CTBs and whether existing WTO rules were sufficient 
to address them or, if they were not, what were the problems and how could they be addressed. 
JOB/SERV/278 addressed how e -commerce had changed trade practices, and pointed to some 
implications or regulatory issues that might arise, including with regard to taxes. While taxes were 
not traditionally a matter of concern for the WTO, for practical purposes, he would see them as 
relevant in terms of the "moratorium".  
4.10.   Regarding CTBs, the concept most commonly associated to CTBs in the WTO was cross -
border data flows. That idea, which appeared in various papers submitted on e -commerce, was 
expressed using different terms, including "tr ansaction data". The main idea was that businesses 
were concerned with possible restrictions to cross -border data flows. Some governments, instead, 
were concerned with privacy protection. Therefore, there was an issue of "privacy" vs. "efficiency" 
with cro ss-border data flows. This was also the main concern of several papers on e -commerce 
submitted in the past.  
4.11.   In his delegation's view, in a cyber world, it was important to have a broader definition of 
data or "communications". In e -commerce, transactions were completed through the internet . 
Before matching potential consumers with suppliers, many communications had to take place 
between them, such as browsing, searching, quoting, comparing prices, etc. He referred to such 
communications as "stage one". Eac h "click" of the mouse constituted a "communication". There 
were many ways in which those "clicks" or communications could be blocked, impeding the match 
between consumers and suppliers from being formed or completed, barring any trade opportunity 
in the f irst place. Only after a transaction ha d been made, in the "stage two" of the process, 
traditional data concerns might appear.  
4.12.   Hence, it was important to consider also CTBs applying in stage one, before the transaction 
was made. For instance, if Member A blocked individuals from accessing any MSME supplier in 
Member B, there would be no way in which such suppliers could sell their goods or services to 
consumers of Member A. In addition, the waiting time could be a barrier. If each click took about 
60 secon ds, and a transaction required 10 clicks, then no one would wait 600 clicks to make a 
transaction. It was important to distinguish between stages one and two, and to acknowledge that 
most cross -border data flow concerns related to stage two, after the tran saction had been made. 
While privacy protection concerns were important, perhaps too much emphasis had been placed on 
that issue, ignoring CTBs arising in stage one. Stage one barriers were particularly important for 
MSMEs, since large businesses could ove rcome those barriers by establishing a branch office in a 
target country. However, MSMEs had access to other countries mainly through the internet . 
Therefore, for MSMEs, transparency and accessibility were particularly important. To sum up, it 
was importan t to bear in mind that CTBs could appear in stages one and two, i.e. before and after 
a transaction was made.  
4.13.   It was necessary to look at the WTO rulebook to see whether there were sufficient 
disciplines to deal with CTBs. Of all the WTO Agreements, the G ATS might be the most relevant to 
CTBs. The disciplines contained in the GATS might be deemed sufficient because of its 
"technological neutrality", which meant that anything that applied to the "physical" world should 
also apply to the "cyber" world. In pr actice, however, some problem s might arise given that many 
GATS commitments had been made twenty years earlier. The UN Central Product Classification 
system used by most Members in their schedules of commitments was the 1991 version. New S/C/M/134  
 
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  internet  operators  or business models, such as search engines, had appeared in recent years. 
Applying exiting disciplines to services that had appeared only recently would be unlikely, even if 
theoretically possible.  
4.14.   As to goods, Article XI of the GATT 1994 dealt with simil ar restrictions. If Member A blocked 
its citizens from accessing a website in Member B, there would be a de facto  restriction. If Member 
B argued before a dispute settlement panel that there was a de facto  restriction, it would have to 
answer the "what if"  question, i.e. what would be the trade between the Members concerned if 
there were no such CTBs. The latter question was difficult to answer. The WTO security exceptions 
set forth in Articles XXI of the GATT 1994, XIV bis of the GATS and 73 of the TRIPS A greement 
might also be relevant. There had been no dispute settlement cases on that matter, although two 
on-going cases might be relevant to the issue of CTBs. Any national security or moral concerns 
would need to be subject to proportionality. It was impo rtant to identify, first, what were the 
problems that Members were trying to address. The next step would be for Members to discuss 
how to address those problems. One possible approach could be to adopt non -binding principles, 
for instance, to identify the  scope of legitimate police objectives for which CTBs could be justified. 
Thereafter, Members could consider moving to rule -making on the CTB issue.  
4.15.   The second paper by his delegation, in JOB/SERV/278, addressed changes in trade patterns 
resulting from ne w technologies and some of their implications. For example, for trade in goods, 
traditionally, a consumer would buy a toy imported from another country. Nowadays, a consumer 
could log onto a designer website and send an email to a local 3D printer to buy a  toy. A producer 
would import from abroad the 3D printer machine and the printing materials. After the consumer 
had placed the order, the local company would print the toy. Another example could be tourism 
services. Traditionally, a foreign tourist would r egister in a hotel only after crossing the border. 
Nowadays, a tourist would probably log onto a website before travelling, such as Airbnb, possibly 
registered in a tax heaven, to send a message to the owner of an apartment where the tourist 
would stay. It  was difficult for the regulatory authorities to trace the relevant transaction or 
payment, and impose any taxes or regulations. While hotels needed to be registered and were 
subject to regulations, such as sanitary or security regulations, spare room apar tments were not 
subject to those regulations.  
4.16.   The asymmetric regulatory treatment between new and traditional trading models could 
create "a race to the bottom". While some regulations were not needed, others might be 
necessary. Besides, as 3D printing de veloped, this would make the scope of the e -commerce 
moratorium broader. Those developments posed great challenges to many Members, particularly 
developing countries, since the latter relied more on tax revenue and customs duty collection. To 
sum up, Membe rs should reflect on the implications of new forms of e -commerce, as well as the 
differences between traditional trade barriers and CTBs. Traditional trade rules might not be able 
to address those issues; therefore, it was important for Members to first identify and understand 
them.  
4.17.   All delegations who took the floor  thanked Chinese Taipei for its communications and 
presentation.  
4.18.   The representative of Peru said that the papers addressed important issues arising from the 
use of new information technologies s uch as tax matters, regulatory issues and the fair or unfair 
competition resulting from the emergence of new business models that exploited in different ways 
the advantages resulting from new ICT. In his delegation's view, the papers could help to enrich 
the discussions taking place under the auspices of the Work Programme and other initiatives 
started by some Members.  
4.19.   The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia  said that the papers submitted were 
in line with the Decision on the Work Programme  adopted at MC11 and the 1998 Work 
Programme. They raised issues relevant to trade in services; however, some of those issues 
required further clarification and others might be controversial.  
4.20.   The first paper (JOB/SERV/277), referred to the term cyberspace  as an abstract concept, 
similar to the "cloud" concept that had been addressed by other proposals in the past. He 
requested Chinese Taipei to clarify the term "cyberspace" in its paper. Besides, his delegation 
considered highly controversial the assertion  contained in the paper that landlocked developing S/C/M/134  
 
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  countries (LLDCs) and small and medium -sized enterprises were benefiting more from the 
availability of the internet  than large multinational companies. He requested Chinese Taipei to 
provide the source of such information. Bolivia was an LLDC and, as most LLDCs, Bolivia faced 
problems of internet  and broadband access. Therefore, he did not understand how an LLDC could 
benefit more than a large multinational company from e -commerce.  
4.21.   His delegation also had doubts about whether interventions by governments in cross -border 
data flows should be limited. Many publications, such as "The Economist", had affirmed that, in the 
new digital economy, "data" was the new oil, and Members should not lose the possibility o f 
regulating the data collected in their jurisdictions. This was directly linked to the notion of 
cyberspace, given that the data was stored and processed in specific jurisdictions, where big 
multinationals or platforms were appropriating such data. This i ssue was linked to internet  
governance, which should be addressed in wider fora, such as the United Nations.  
4.22.   His delegation wished to seek clarification on what was the basis for asserting that the GATS 
was technologically neutral in paragraph 3.2 of Chin ese Taipei's paper. In his delegation's view, 
there was no agreement among Members on that issue, as was shown in several WTO documents. 
Paragraph 3.3 suggested that the specific commitments undertaken by Members in the 90ies 
might not match today's techno logical realities. A discussion that allowed Members to review their 
market access commitments, including limitations contained therein, according to the regulatory 
needs emerging from the new digital environment was needed. Bolivia stood ready to discuss that 
matter. He shared the view expressed in paragraph 3.3 that it was necessary to update the CPC to 
address classification issues arising from e -commerce and new services. That might provide an 
opportunity for revitalizing the work of the Committee on Sp ecific Commitments (CSC), which had 
not met in 2017. Regarding paragraph 4.1 and the need for "equity" in e -commerce, he sought 
clarification from Chinese Taipei on whether the suggestion was to work on "anti -concentration" 
clauses, given that, according t o UNCTAD, about eight platforms or transnationals controlled close 
to 80% of the global e -commerce market. As for the need for clarifying existing rules and 
commitments, he reiterated the need to work on classification issues and new services in the CSC. 
Finally, according to discussions held in the WPDR, Members' right to regulate was on the margins 
of the WTO Agreements; as such, a very fine work was needed to avoid broadening the digital 
divide between Members.  
4.23.   The representative of Brazil  emphasized th e importance of the 1998 Work Programme and 
the Decision adopted at MC11 to reinvigorate it. The papers by Chinese Taipei were still being 
examined in capital and, therefore, he had only preliminary comments at that juncture. His 
delegation welcomed the pa pers, which represented a move from concept papers to something 
more concrete that was in line with reinvigorating the Work Programme. Having papers that were 
not too long was also viewed as positive. He had two substantive comments. First, on CTBs, the 
paper provided the regulator's perspective on the issue of data flows, or some of the reasons 
behind CTBs, which were necessary elements to the discussion. Second, the papers were an 
attempt to frame technical discussions in WTO language, including with rega rd to the relationship 
between the GATS and CTBs. The papers avoided any extreme views and attempted to strike a 
balance by making the point that, while CTBs were not alien to the GATS, at the same time the 
GATS was not absolutely perfect. In its papers, C hinese Taipei had explained its position and had 
suggested a possible way forward.  
4.24.   The representative of Canada  said that his delegation was committed to multilateral 
discussions under the Work Programme and welcomed the papers, which could stimulate 
substantive discussions. Canada agreed with the conclusion captured in paragraph 4.3 of 
document JOB/SERV/277 that Members might wish to consider disciplines specifically addressing 
restrictive digital measures and supported holding discussions in the WTO on w hat gaps should be 
addressed by new rules. His delegation had also specific comments on the papers. Like Brazil, 
Canada also appreciated that first attempt of linking WTO rules to specific types of trade barriers.   
4.25.   His delegation had also specific comment s on the paper. Paragraph 3.3 suggested that it 
was difficult to classify modern business models under the Services Sectoral Classification List in 
document W/120. Chinese Taipei and Canada were both co -sponsors of the Understanding on 
Computer and Related  Services, which went some way to addressing that issue, and Canada 
encouraged other Members to review and endorse that document. The paper might give the 
impression that the GATS did not cover the barriers it identified. It was important to note that 
Article I of the GATS stipulated that the Agreement applied to all measures “affecting trade in S/C/M/134  
 
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  services”, which would include CTBs affecting trade in services. Article XVI might not be well -
suited to addressing the specific issues raised in the paper. However , Article XXIII:3 might apply 
to some of the barriers identified in the paper, depending on the circumstances. With this in mind, 
improved market access commitments would go a long way in addressing the gap in coverage in 
the GATS. New rules regarding spec ific types of measures would eliminate the need to rely on 
nullification or impairment of benefits, and would also offer regulators clearer guidance on how to 
maintain consistency with trade obligations. They would also avoid any debate over whether the 
measures applied to trade in goods or trade in services. This exchange demonstrated the 
importance of exploring the value added of new rules in the area of e -commerce. However, 
Canada did not support negotiating guidelines regarding the interpretation of exi sting GATS 
commitments, nor did his delegation support any limitation on the right to regulate in the form of 
a closed list of legitimate policy objectives.  
4.26.   On JOB/SERV/278, he focused his comments on the services -related elements of the 
document. There wa s no doubt that disruptive business models posed new challenges to 
regulators. However, Canada did not consider the CTS to be an appropriate forum for addressing 
taxation issues or regulation for health, safety, etc. In Canada's view, discussions in the CT S 
should focus specifically on trade matters.  
4.27.   The representative  of Hong Kong, China  said that his delegation, as a supporter of e -
commerce, was committed to seeking progress through all possible avenues to address the 
opportunities and challenges arising from the growing importance of e -commerce. He remained 
open-minded on approaches and working constructively with Members. Chinese Taipei’s papers 
had provided a lot of food for thought for all Members. While the specific problems illustrated in 
the papers might reflect the reality to some extent, it remained to be seen how multilateral trade 
rules could play a role or would be relevant, as those problems appeared to concern mainly 
domestic regulatory issues and might not be applicable to all Members.  
4.28.   His delegation requested Chinese Taipei to elaborate on how the two examples suggested in 
JOB/SERV/278 concerning 3D printing and matching services would be related to multilateral 
trade, as they appeared to be domestic regulatory issues and different Memb ers could have 
different approaches to devising their own policy if they considered such issues a problem. The 
same question applied to the liability issue raised in paragraph 3.8 and the safety issue in 
paragraph 4.7, as they also appeared to be domestic policy issues. Paragraph 5.4 of the same 
paper postulated that there was an asymmetric regulatory treatment that would create unfair 
competition between new and traditional trading models, and which could not be solved entirely by 
the GATT and GATS. It see med that, as technology evolved, the trading landscape would 
inevitably change and, therefore, it was unclear whether there would be unfair competition and 
why the GATS, GATT and other trade agreements should address such issues. His delegation 
wished to l earn more about the views of Chinese Taipei and other Members. Hong Kong, China 
was committed to advancing discussions on e -commerce and welcomed contributions to provide 
different perspectives.  
4.29.   The representative of Japan  said that, in Buenos Aires, all Members had agreed to continue 
the work under the Work Programme and to endeavour  to reinvigorate that work. Turning to the 
papers by Chinese Taipei, he noted the suggestion in paragraph 4.2 of JOB/SERV/277 that 
Members clarify existing WTO rules and commi tments related to CTB measures. Japan evaluated 
positively that suggestion, which was fully consistent with the 1998 Work Programme. As 
suggested in paragraph 2.1, the CTS could examine the treatment of e -commerce in the GATS 
legal framework, and Japan wou ld be willing to engage actively in such discussions.  
4.30.   The representative of India said that the papers were interesting and thought -provoking. 
They were still under detailed review in capital and, therefore, she only had preliminary comments 
at that junctu re. The comments were provided without reference to specific assertions in the 
papers, such as on the issue of GATS technological neutrality or the suggested solution of 
requiring the localization of 3D printing machines. India welcomed purely exploratory discussions 
of the issues identified in the papers.  
4.31.   Document JOB/SERV/277 proposed that Members consider developing a set of non -binding 
guiding principles on CTBs addressing two aspects. First, clarify ing existing WTO rules and 
commitments relating to CTB , which her delegation found useful but which should be done bearing 
in mind the essence of the GATS positive list approach. Second, identify ing the scope of legitimate S/C/M/134  
 
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  policy objectives that could justify applying CTBs, considering that government respons es in 
addressing the challenges arising out of digital trade could be influenced by several factors, 
including Members' stage of development, resource availability, etc. Hence, any attempt to limit 
the scope of policy responses by Members or any "one -size-fits-all" approach might not be feasible 
or even desirable. In that regard, exchanges of information and the sharing best practices were 
extremely important. The paper concluded that, in the long run, Members might further consider 
reaching concrete, legal ly binding disciplines on CTB issues.  
4.32.   Taxation, regulatory and other aspects related to some new emerging technologies and 
business models such as 3D printing and the sharing economy were identified in JOB/SERV/278. 
India agreed that the WTO had seldom tal ked about taxation issues. Hence, the core issue was 
whether those matters belonged to the WTO in the first place; if WTO Members wished to 
deliberate on such matters, participation of relevant sector experts would be needed. Her 
delegation also agreed tha t digital technology, including technologies for 3D printing, had indeed 
the potential for a 'paradigm shift' in trade, which posed new challenges, both for domestic and for 
cross border e -commerce. It was essential, therefore, to provide sufficient policy  space for 
appropriate domestic and trade policies.  
4.33.   In that context, UNCTAD’s 2017 Information Economy Report provided some interesting 
statistics and insights into global e -commerce. Total global e -commerce was of the order of USD 
25 trillion in 2015. Th e top ten economies constituted an overwhelming 64% of the global e -
commerce in the B2B and B2C space. A significant digital divide still remained. Although 
connectivity had improved over the past five to ten years, developing countries and LDCs lagged 
behind in terms of fixed broadband penetration, household access to ICT services and internet use, 
access to financial infrastructure, adequate human expertise and skills, stable power supply, 
delivery infrastructure and regulatory responses to those challeng es. In LDCs, only one in six 
people was connected to the internet . Clearly, digital gaps remained and new ones were emerging. 
For example, more than half of the world’s population remained offline and the broadband divide 
was ever wider. While more than 70 % of the population in developed countries bought goods or 
services over the internet , less than 5% did so in developing countries. Therefore, it was clear 
that, while e -commerce had created new and exciting trade and investment opportunities, it also 
posed new infrastructure and regulatory challenges which needed to be addressed by governments 
first. This would bring the other 50% of the global population into the mainstream.  
4.34.   India believed that those issues, some of which had been raised in the papers on  the table, 
needed to be deliberated in detail under the Work Programme. Those issues might include the 
following. First, the challenges in measuring the evolving digital economy; in that regard, India 
thanked the Secretariat for organising a very useful s ession on developments and trends related to 
statistics on trade in services in the digital age. Second, classification issues regarding whether 
trade in digital products needed to be treated as trade in goods or services. Third, whether existing 
WTO rules  applied to the digital economy and to what extent. Fourth, the relationship and possible 
substitution effects between e -commerce and traditional forms of commerce. Fifth, the fiscal 
implications of e -commerce moratorium and, more specifically, the revenue  loss due to non -
imposition of custom duties on electronic transmissions. In addition to the WTO Secretariat 
document mentioned in JOB/SERV/278, Members should also look at other studies, such as 
UNCTAD's paper on 'Rising Product Digitalisation and Losing Trade Competitiveness'. Sixth, the 
impact of e -commerce on competition and market structures; this included, for instance, issues 
such as capital dumping and the emergence of digital monopolies the world over. India had noted 
from UNCTAD’s 2017 Information  Economy Report that market capitalisation of the large global e -
commerce players was even larger than the GDP of many WTO Members. Seventh, jurisdictional 
issues and applicability of laws, such as the issue of origin and destination. Eight, the constraint s 
that prevented developing countries' SMEs from benefitting from e -commerce. Finally, evidence 
that international rules would help in linking SMEs with export markets.  
4.35.   Coming to the issue of the need for concrete, legally binding disciplines on CTBs, as 
suggested in the first paper, India considered that unless there was clear and cogent discussion on 
the above -mentioned issues, it might not be desirable to conceptualize, let alone prepare, non -
binding guiding principles on trade barriers that might arise in cyberspace. In India's view, 
Members first needed to understand the exact nature of electronic trade by discussing the relevant 
issues as highlighted by India, and understanding the regulatory response that might be needed 
before Members could get to th e issue of trade barriers.  S/C/M/134  
 
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  4.36.   The representative of South Africa  indicated that JOB/SERV/278 provided a useful outline of 
important issues, while JOB/SERV/277 provided some useful points for further reflections. At that 
juncture, she would share her delegati on´s preliminary views on JOB/SERV/277 only. If the 
assertions made in paragraphs 1.1 and 1.2 were true, she said that the benefits of the internet  to 
international trade had taken place, and thrived in the absence of rules. On paragraph 1.2, she 
sought in formation from Chinese Taipei about the research cited in the paper. Indeed, the internet  
had created favourable conditions for big companies in developed countries to benefit more than 
MSMEs in developing countries, at least in absolute terms. The figures  showed that, while the 
relative growth might be higher for MSMEs in developing countries, it paled in comparison to the 
absolute growth, revenue and market capitalization of the largest companies in developed 
countries. In fact, if those numbers were put into perspective, the wealth of those companies 
outstripped the economies of many Members. The asymmetry in the existing global digital 
environment posed an enormous challenge for inclusive and sustainable growth and development.  
4.37.   Paragraph 1.4 seemed to es tablish the premise of the paper, suggesting that government 
interventions locked foreign entrants out of domestic markets but without specifying which 
government interventions. She asked Chinese Taipei to elaborate on the specific government 
measures rela ted to the dramatic assertion that "the supplier can be completely blocked out from 
any potential customers whatsoever". Her understanding was that data localisation requirements 
stipulated that data, or specific types of data  to be  stored in servers locat ed within the national 
territory of a country. In paragraph 1.3, the paper recognised that those requirements were 
applied to protect the privacy of the data owners and to preserve the domestic authority’s access 
to those data. Nevertheless, mandatory data  localisation was not the only or primary tool to 
protect personal data. The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation provided one 
illustration of another tool, which required that data could not be exported unless the recipient 
jurisdiction had  adequate data protection. It was important to point out that there could also be a 
number of economic motivations for data localisation requirements, as this would require 
companies to establish or rent data centres, which could mean new jobs and investme nt.  
4.38.   Government intervention might have trade implications but it might be motivated by a 
range of non -trade concerns that could be of greater importance or value to the particular 
government and society. This had come up regularly in the extensive discuss ions on domestic 
regulation. However, the question of what was an acceptable international standard for data 
protection and privacy was not a matter to be negotiated in the WTO. Many countries considered 
privacy and data protection to be a human rights iss ue, that transcended trade issues. For others, 
there were questions of national security and national development that could also be of greater 
importance than trade per se . 
4.39.   Regarding paragraph 3.2, she pointed out that there was no agreement that the GATS  was 
technologically neutral. South Africa agreed that Members’ commitments made in the early 1990s 
in no way envisioned the technology realities of today. Uruguay Round Schedules did not envisage 
new services, new business models or new technologies becau se they did not exist at the time 
they were negotiated, nor were they technically feasible or commercially viable. In her 
delegation´s view, the paper had made a number of broad assumptions that could not be taken as 
given. On the suggestions for future wo rk, the paper leaped to conclusions about securing the free 
flow of information among Members via the internet , and ensuring that all Members had an 
unequivocal right to access each other’s network on a reciprocal and equal basis. The suggestion 
that there  should be an even more restrictive approach on which measures were allowed, i.e. that 
what WTO Members understood as a general exception should be replaced by measures taken in 
"exceptional circumstances" and explicitly agreed by Members seemed to go agai nst the perceived 
flexibility offered by general and security exceptions in WTO Agreements, and equated to a 
necessity test to achieve legitimate policy objectives.  
4.40.   There was a need for a proper sequencing: without international norms, principles and rule s 
on competition, anti -trust, abuse of market power, platform dominance, and taxation of the cyber -
economy, there could not be a meaningful discussion of trade issues that fell under the purview of 
the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO. Furthermore,  several of those issues could not be 
negotiated within the WTO because they concerned areas that were not trade -related, but rather 
related to human rights law, tax law and anti -trust law. The WTO should only become involved 
after agreements had been reac hed in the relevant bodies that dealt with those aspects of 
international law, and should be limited to trade. The sequencing of the two papers on the table 
also raised profound questions because Chinese Taipei pointed out that it was important to discuss S/C/M/134  
 
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  the economic implications of international cyber -transactions, notably taxation. Without that 
broader discussion, the data flow question was premature. South Africa was willing to engage in a 
deeper discussion on those issues, within the context of the Wor k Programme, in the CTS as per 
the GATS legal framework, and reaffirmed its commitment to the multilateral framework on e -
commerce established by the Work Programme.  
4.41.   The representative of New Zealand  welcomed Chinese Taipei’s systematic and thoughtful 
approach in its papers and, like other Members, viewed them as a useful effort to help kick -start 
the reinvigoration of the Work Programme.  Her delegation was still considering the papers in 
capital, but would share some general reactions.  While as a proponent  of e-commerce, New 
Zealand welcomed further discussion, including and especially multilaterally, some elements of the 
papers might be better dealt with by other agencies and organisations, such as on taxation and 
internet  governance. It would be helpful t o be clear on how the topic chosen for discussion fit with 
the WTO’s trade mandate and the expertise of both delegates and the Secretariat. The other 
important parameter arose in regard to the questions raised by Chinese Taipei as to how existing 
rules and  frameworks fit with e -commerce. New  Zealand agreed with Canada that existing rules, 
commitments and exceptions did apply to e -commerce. While New Zealand was also advocating 
for new rules in e -commerce, her delegation viewed them as operating in addition,  and believed 
that those new rules could be helpful to deal with some of the novel and more precise aspects that 
had emerged, as it had been her delegation's experience in FTAs. New Zealand would be happy to 
engage further with other Members in the CTS and other fora.  
4.42.   The representative of Australia  welcomed the commitment by Ministers in Buenos Aires to 
endeavour to reinvigorate work under the e -commerce Work Programme. The papers by Chinese 
Taipei contributed to stimulating discussions under the Work Prog ramme. The issue of 'asymmetric 
regulatory treatment' between new and traditional trading models was an increasingly relevant 
issue that could have a significant impact on trade in services. It was an issue that many 
governments, including her own, were cu rrently grappling with and her delegation saw value in 
Members sharing information to build understanding. However, customs duties and domestic or 
internal taxes were two separate issues which should not be conflated. Members were not 
prevented from imposi ng internal taxes or fees, as long as this was done in a GATS -consistent 
way. 
4.43.   With regard to CTBs, Australia continued to welcome discussions in the CTS on that issue. 
As noted in previous statements, the ability to store and transmit data across borders w as integral  
to international services trade. A balance needed to be struck between allowing business 
maximum flexibility in how the y stored and transmitted data, and ensuring that governments 
could respond to legitimate public policy concerns, including re lating to security, privacy and 
consumer protection. Australia saw value in exchanging information and experiences on how 
Members struck that balance. At the same time, her delegation shared some of the concerns 
raised by Canada and other Members in relati on to proposals to negotiate guidelines on the 
application of GATS commitments or to negotiate a closed list of public policy measures, as 
Australia did not see those as useful steps in the current context.  
4.44.   The representative of Cuba welcomed the resumptio n of work under the Work Programme 
and considered it important to continue discussions in that multilateral forum, in accordance with 
the Decision adopted at MC11. Cuba only recognized the mandate on e -commerce that ha d been 
established through the 1998 Wo rk Programme and endorsed by Ministers in Buenos Aires. On 
that basis, Cuba stood ready to continue working constructively in the multilateral setting. Cuba 
was still reviewing the papers by Chinese Taipei and, as such, only had preliminary comments. She 
reserved her right to revert with detailed comments at a later stage. Given the complexity of the 
issues addressed in the papers, she wished to raise some questions at that juncture.  
4.45.   Similarly to other delegations, she sought clarifications from Chinese Ta ipei on the 
statement in paragraph 1.2 of JOB/SERV/277 to that effect that landlocked developing countries 
and small and medium -sized enterprises were benefiting more from the availability of the internet  
than large multinational companies. She asked Chine se Taipei to share the sources of that 
statement, and to explain how the benefits in question had been measured. With regard to 
paragraph 1.3, she sought clarification on the term of "cyberspace", including its definition and 
coverage. As for paragraph 1.4 , she requested clarification on how public intervention could 
increase trade costs and whether the reasons for such interventions, which could be legitimate, 
had been taken into consideration. Her delegation shared the views expressed by Bolivia, South S/C/M/134  
 
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  Africa and other delegations that the technological neutrality of the GATS had not been agreed and 
that the issue required further analysis, by taking different perspectives into consideration. Finally, 
with regard to suggestions for future work, the paper n oted that while there could be public 
intervention, it was essential to secure the free flow of information among Members. This seemed 
to contradict paragraph 1.3 of the paper, which stated that restrictions or data localization 
requirements might be justi fied for legitimate reasons. The proposals made in paragraphs 4.2 
and 4.3 seemed premature at that stage, and in particular the suggestion to develop disciplines; it 
was essential first to carry out a complete analysis of the relevant issues and find out m ore about 
other organizations' work on those matters. Any discussion of e -commerce should take as a 
starting point the digital divide. The paper recognized the importance of internet  access to 
participate in e -commerce; however, half of the world's populat ion did not have access to the 
internet  or only had limited access. As such, rushing into rule -making would only aggravate the 
digital divide.  
4.46.   The representative of Uganda , speaking on behalf of the LDC Group, said that Ministers in 
Buenos Aires had decid ed to continue discussions on e -commerce based on the 1998 Work 
Programme. It needed to be recalled that those discussions were exploratory in nature and should 
take place in the relevant WTO bodies, as set out in paragraphs 2 to 5 of the Work Programme. 
Furthermore, no negotiating mandate was provided. Any attempts to circumvent that Ministerial 
Decision through approaches aimed to arriving at outcomes that were not mandated by the 
Ministerial Conference would create a precedent that would render Ministers  and their subsequent 
decisions redundant. The LDC Group cautioned against any moves in that direction and, on that 
note, had taken note of the papers that had been submitted taking into consideration those 
important aspects.  
4.47.   There was no denying that the  digital era was upon Members and that there was a lot to be 
gained from it. However, the gains were not automatic, nor were they self -germinating. Indeed, 
some studies estimated that as much as two -fifths of the economic value from the internet  of 
Things would accrue to developing countries, including LDCs. However, aside from the fact that 
those were only estimates, of greater concern was the fact that those estimates were premised on 
either non -existent or insufficient baselines. LDCs still faced basic c hallenges, such as access to 
electricity, basic infrastructure and skills, and even putting in place the requisite regulatory and 
policy frameworks. As the Group had observed before, in Sub -Saharan Africa, out of 915 million 
people, 600 million had no acce ss to basic electricity supply. In instances where they had access to 
electricity, it was either intermittent or expensive. Three factors were important for purposes of e -
commerce readiness: availability, reliability and affordability. In Africa, 75% of th e entire 
population had no internet  access and only 15% of the population of LDCs used the internet . 
Those were basic requirements for people and enterprises in LDCs, as they were everywhere else, 
to successfully engage in, and derive benefits out of, the digital economy.  
4.48.   The LDC Group also wished to make some preliminary observations on the papers by 
Chinese Taipei. With regard to paragraph 1.2 of JOB/SERV/277, perhaps if LDCs were super 
economies, it would be right to say that landlocked developing count ries and SMEs were 
benefitting more from the availability of the internet  than developed countries and large 
multinational companies. However, the top 10 largest companies in the world were digital 
companies and none were from an LDC or from Africa. In fac t, SMEs faced challenges in achieving 
demand -side economies of scale, with mounting allegations of predatory pricing, and had been 
unable to compete with many of the giant digital companies.  
4.49.   The paper rightly pointed out in paragraph 1.4 that, in the digit al era, having access to the 
internet  and being able to reach or to be reached was a fundamental and necessary condition of 
participation. The LDC Group could not agree more with that statement. Affordable access to 
different ICTs was essential for people and enterprises to take active part i n the evolving digital 
economy and reap development gains from it. LDCs were still lagging far behind in various 
aspects, such as broadband penetration, which remained largely low, broadband services, which 
were costly, and download and upload speeds, whic h were low. Many LDCs were still having 
challenges with household access to ICTs, as well as internet  use. For example, in 2016, it was 
estimated that only 16 % of individuals in LDCs were using the internet . For th ose reasons, LDCs 
sought a comprehensive a pproach to build their capacities in e -commerce.  S/C/M/134  
 
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  4.50.   The LDC Group did not share the view in paragraph 3.2 of the paper that the GATS was 
technologically neutral. There had been no such agreement amongst the WTO Membership. The 
Group welcomed a discussion of t hat issue to resolve the legal uncertainty.  
4.51.   As for paragraph 4 of the paper, the Group noted that the 1998 Work Programme did not 
call for the complete opening up of e -commerce markets, but rather doing so with policy space 
considerations in the GATT and G ATS. The LDC Group had concerns with the assertion contained in 
the paper that data should flow freely and held the view that data was the raw material of the 
future. The way it was treated, managed and exported would determine which development path a 
country or group of countries would take in the digital age. Therefore, it was important for the 
Group to pursue digital industrial policies with the view to determining how LDCs treated and 
managed data towards structural transformation and industrialisation . 
4.52.   JOB/SERV/278 highlighted one critical element underpinning the discourse on e -commerce. 
The question concerned the framers of the 1998 Work Programme Decision, which required the 
CTD, in paragraph 5.1, to examine and report on, among other things, the fi nancial implications of 
e-commerce for developing countries. For instance, what would be the fiscal implications as 
companies moved from commercial presence to cross -broader supply, or the financial implications 
of the customs duties moratorium, as well as  the impact of e -commerce on structural 
transformation and industrialization, especially in light of infant industries where most of the 
offline line trade went on -line. Those were critical concerns for LDCs that depended on taxes for 
their economic liveli hood.  
4.53.   According to a UPS 2017 publication, the 3D printing market had grown by 30% per annum 
since 2012. Western countries accounted for more than two -thirds (i.e. 68%) of the market 
revenue. It was forecast that 3D printing technology would capture aroun d 5% of global 
manufacturing capacity, which would make 3D printing a US$  640 billion industry. Consumer 
electronics and automotive industries were rapidly increasing their use of this technology and with 
the exports of their products being done via the el ectronic transmission of the relevant computer 
files and software, a permanent moratorium that had custom duties at zero on those kinds of files 
would imply that Members were effectively agreeing to reducing tariffs to zero on almost all of 
their non -agricultural manufactured products. There was a fiscal and revenue question to be 
clarified, especially for developing countries and LDCs. Therefore, it was important that Members 
engage in such a discussion, in line with the 1998 Work Programme. That was a dis cussion that 
had a strong development dimension and should be appropriately addressed in the Committee on 
Trade and Development. However, the LDC Group was not sure whether Members could 
appropriately fashion outcomes on the question of taxation, given tha t the WTO did not have 
competence on that issue. It was evident that the continued suspension of customs duties on 
electronic transmission was not doing LDCs any good. On the contrary, LDCs were losing out on 
fiscal revenue benefits.  
4.54.   The representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela  said that his delegation would 
continue working within the framework of the Decision on the Work Programme adopted in Buenos 
Aires and on the basis of document WT/L/274. The papers by Chinese Taipei were still being 
reviewed in capital and he had only preliminary comments at that juncture. In particular, on the 
issue of technological neutrality, he noted that in document S/L/74 Members had expressed the 
view that the issue was complex and needed further examination. On c ross border data flows, his 
delegation was concerned with the suggestion of having to justify legitimate policy objectives from 
a trade perspective. With regard to paragraph 2.1 of JOB/SERV/277, he requested more 
information in support of the assertion tha t landlocked developing countries and small and 
medium -sized enterprises were benefitting more from the availability of the internet  than 
developed countries. Finally, Venezuela considered it too early to suggest the adoption of non -
binding guiding princip les on CTBs. It was important to continue discussions and to address as a 
matter of priority the concerns of developing countries relating to internet  access and the digital 
divide.  
4.55.   The representative of Turkey  said that her delegation had been supportive  of e-commerce 
discussions in the WTO as e -commerce constituted a growing and global reality, which required 
global approaches given that national regulations were not sufficient. It was important to start 
discussing technological advances affecting trade.   S/C/M/134  
 
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  4.56.   Chapters on e -commerce were increasingly included in RTAs; however, Turkey would prefer 
discuss ing e-commerce in a multilateral context, to avoid creating different and overlapping 
frameworks through RTAs. She noted that many e -commerce chapters in FTAs already included 
provisions on customs duties; therefore, for some Members, the moratorium had alrea dy become 
binding through their FTAs. Other FTAs included stand -alone chapters on e -commerce, covering 
both trade in goods and services, which did not benefit from the exceptions provided in the 
services chapter. The latter issue raised questions on the co verage of customs duties in the new 
area of 3D printing. Neither the GATT, nor the GATS, fully addressed the issues arising from 
technological advances. Turkey was concerned that, if Members did not start a discussion towards 
rule-making in that area, tech nology would find its own rules, which might not go in the best 
interest of governments. Furthermore, regulations might end up being futile, or even disruptive, if 
they came too late.  
4.57.   On the issue of data transfers, while her delegation held the view that  cross-border data 
flows should not be impaired for the smooth operation of international trade, she also remarked 
that Members might require data localization for inspection and data protection purposes. 
Therefore, a balance needed to be struck between th e interests of the public and the private 
sector, and data localization requirements should not be perceived necessarily as restrictions to 
the free flow of data. The possible additional costs derived from data localization requirements 
could be justified in the public interest. Turkey supported the suggestion for future work contained 
in paragraph 4.2 of Chinese Taipei's paper, to clarify existing WTO rules and commitments in 
relation to CTBs and to identify the scope of legitimate policy objectives for a balanced approach.  
4.58.   On taxation evasion problems as a result of new forms of digital trade, she thanked Chinese 
Taipei for highlighting that growing concern. While focusing on losses of tax revenue, the paper 
also raised the issue of the asymmetric applica tion of government supervision in given sectors, or 
the inability of having statistical information on digital trade. Turkey was intrigued by the fact that 
GATS rules might indeed be an impediment for governments to take actions to address 
technological ad vances. She wondered how much of Members' existing commitments in mode 1, 
for example, would restrain the ability of governments to regulate new business models. Turkey 
suggested that the Secretariat examine Members' commitments in light of  emerging busine ss 
models, such as the sharing economy. Turkey supported the conclusion of the paper that the WTO 
needed to deal with those issues as a matter of urgency. She encouraged all Members to ensure 
that e -commerce discussions remained in the multilateral platfor m, and to start discussions before 
technological advances took over rule -making in international markets.  
4.59.   The representative of China  said that the WTO mandated Members to discuss the trade -
related aspects of e -commerce, which was a different concept from  digital trade, a term used in 
the papers by Chinese Taipei. In China's view, Members should have discussions within the WTO 
mandate and terms. The papers recognized Members' right to regulate online activities. With the 
increasing popularity of the intern et, cybersecurity was becoming an important issue. For instance, 
the spread of internet viruses had already caused damage to cyberspace and data security, which 
had affected internet  users globally. Therefore, it was essential for governments to regulate c ross-
border data flows, to guarantee the sustainable and healthy development of e -commerce. Those 
regulations were also commonly used by Members to achieve various national policy objectives, 
which were not related to CTBs. In an era of economic globalizat ion, it was essential to find a 
balance between cybersecurity and free data flows. It was legitimate for Members to design 
regulations in line with their specific conditions and needs, so as to protect the interests of their 
citizens. The evolution of the internet  and economic globalization had created a need for cross -
border data flows and had brought challenges to cyber data security, as well as to personal 
information protection, which could not be ignored. Guaranteeing national cyber security and the 
protection of personal information was a pre -requisite for legal and orderly cross -border data flows 
and for promoting inclusive trade growth.  
4.60.   The representative of Colombia  considered that the papers by Chinese Taipei brought a 
different perspective to the  discussion and contributed to enriching it. The papers were still being 
reviewed in capital, but the representative wished to make some preliminary comments. His 
delegation shared the view in document JOB/SERV/277 that e -commerce benefited MSMES, 
particul arly those of developing countries. Colombia also shared the view that the GATS was 
technologically neutral, and believed that it would be important to discuss the applicability of 
Members' specific commitments under the GATS, as suggested in paragraph 3.4 . Any new 
obligations on those issues, as suggested in paragraph 4.3, could not affect existing ones. S/C/M/134  
 
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  Regarding document JOB/SERV/278, he said that paragraph 3.7 provided an interesting analysis of 
3D printing and the sharing economy. It would be important  to deepen the analysis of the business 
models referred to in the paper, including by separating the different sectors or sub -sectors 
involved in those models. Colombia was also interested in continuing discussions on the 
conclusions reached in paragraph 5 .1, taking into consideration previous discussions on digital 
means and carrier mediums.  
4.61.   The representative of Bangladesh  said that the papers by Chinese Taipei were very 
substantive. Bangladesh shared the views expressed by other delegations that the pape rs could 
help enrich e -commerce discussions. His capital was still reviewing the papers, and he had only 
preliminary comments at that stage. Bangladesh considered that it would be very useful for 
Members to share experiences on the issues raised in the pap ers, in order to enhance their 
understanding of those issues. The basic problem was that some Members were less exposed to 
the challenges arising from e -commerce and, therefore, it was difficult for them to contribute to 
the debate. It was important to mak e the discussions on e -commerce more inclusive, so that all 
Members could participate.  
4.62.   The representative of Chinese Taipei  thanked delegations for their comments  and responded 
to some of the issues raised. On the definition of "cyberspace", he said that i t was possible to find 
over ten definitions in Wikipedia. One defined it as "the global network of interdependent 
information technology infrastructures, telecommunication networks and computer process 
systems". Perhaps one of those definitions could be ad ded to the paper.  
4.63.   His delegation's papers made three main points. The first was that traditional trade barriers 
were different from CTBs. The former dealt with "atoms" and took place at the border, while CTBs 
had to do with "bits", for which there were no  borders. Members should pay attention to those 
differences when developing rules in the WTO. The second point related to statements that the 
WTO should not touch upon internal taxes. In principle, he agreed with those statements. 
However, such a dichotomy  would make sense if those two areas were separated, but, as 
explained with the 3D printing case, more and more of the traditional shipment of goods would be 
replaced by the transmission of bits. Given that the transmission of bits was duty -free because of  
the moratorium, the duty -free block was getting larger. Instead, traditional regulations or taxes 
were shrinking. In his view, those two areas were interdependent, but it was up to the Members to 
decide whether they should deal with them. The third point was that his delegation was not 
proposing any revisions of the GATT or the GATS, but just identifying some issues to consider in 
assessing if there was a need to add to existing rules. His delegation would be happy to follow  up 
on any remaining questions o n a bilateral basis.  
4.64.   The Chairman  thanked Chinese Taipei for the rich presentation and all delegations that had 
intervened. It had been an interesting and instructive debate. He suggested that the Council take 
note of the statements made and revert to tha t item at its next meeting.  
4.65.   It was so agreed . 
5  ITEM E: MODE 4 – ASSESSMENT OF BARRIE RS TO ENTRY – STATEMENT BY INDIA  
5.1.  The Chairman  recalled that that item had been placed on the agenda of the Council at the 
request of the delegation of India.  
5.2.  The representa tive of India recalled her delegation's statement at the October meeting  of the 
Council . As Members might remember, India had put forward a proposal  for the CTS  to hold a 
thematic seminar on mode 4. The proposal was originally contained in document RD/SERV/135, 
but had subsequently been significantly revised. The revised proposal, which was arrived at after 
consultation s with Members who had expressed concerns, was contained in document 
RD/SERV/135/Rev.1. The proposed programme for the seminar contai ned two parts. The first part 
sought to provide an overview of the scope of GATS commitments and MFN exemptions related to 
mode 4, the practice under RTAs and the economic impact of mode 4. The second part proposed 
to deal with mode 4 in action. Her delega tion viewed the seminar in an experience -sharing mode, 
where interested Members could propose speakers with a view to having a good exchange  of 
experiences on the various aspects outlined.  S/C/M/134  
 
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  5.3.  Now that MC11 was over, India felt that the time was ripe to hold an information -sharing 
seminar on mode 4. As mentioned on earlier occasions, India would be happy to engage with 
Members in case there were any concerns on the revised draft programme and looked forward to 
working with them and the Secretariat on the organ ization of the seminar.  
5.4.  The representative of Turkey  said that mode 4 had been the most neglected mode of supply 
in terms of levels of commitments and development of disciplines under the GATS. At the same 
time, mode 4 was also indispensable to the effect ive exploitation of commitments under other 
modes. Her delegation was a strong proponent of the development of robust disciplines on 
mode  4, particularly because restrictions in the form of domestic regulation of entry and 
temporary stay of natural persons  had a direct impeding effect on the supply of services under all 
other  modes. She wished to st art discussions on the effect that  restrictions  on entry and 
temporary stay of natural persons had on trade in services under all modes.  India's proposal to 
hold a seminar was a good way to commence such discussions. Her delegation was ready to 
participate in the seminar , by sharing the experience  of Turkey's  service providers facing 
restrictions in their operations and Turkey's approach to tackling those obstacle s via the 
development of mode 4 disciplines in its FTA negotiations . She suggested that the seminar be held 
on the margins of the next services cluster and indicated that follow -up events could additionally 
be organised , with a view to an MC12 deliverable on mode 4 . 
5.5.  The representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela  said that, although his delegation 
was not a demandeur in the services area, he could support the proposal to organize a CTS 
seminar on mode  4.  
5.6.  The representative of Bangladesh  undersco red the importance of mode 4, welcomed the 
proposal to hold a seminar and indicated his delegation's willingness to participate in the event.  
5.7.  The representatives of Brazil , Cuba, Ecuador , Argentina  and Peru all supported India's 
proposal to hold a seminar on mode 4.  
5.8.  The representative of Canada  said that his delegation was open to proposals for  thematic 
work in  the CTS on issues related to services trade , but noted that the mode  4 seminar proposal 
was now to be considered  on its own, whereas beforehand it had been pro posed alongside another 
seminar . He suggested that  Members revisit the agenda for the seminar. His delegation had 
previously made some suggestions, including explor ing market access more fully in the seminar 
and removing t he reference to "immigration frameworks"  from the draft programme . He was 
confident that his delegation could engage with India to find an agenda that was suitable  for all 
Members . 
5.9.  The representative of the European Union  was pleased to note t hat Members had walked 
away from hostage -taking and linkages that had been made in the past and that they were  now 
addressi ng specific topics on their own merits. He welcomed the change in approach , which he 
hoped would be dis played also with regard to oth er discussions in the Council . As for the mode 4 
seminar India was proposing, his delegation could be open and was ready  to discuss . It was very 
important that the agenda  and the approach to the seminar be balanced and without prejudice, 
and conducive to  a setting in which all Members were comfortable. He was insisting on that point 
given that the seminar had been proposed as follow -up to discussions of a document which 
contained some allegations that his delegation had contested. If Members could walk away  from 
contentious issues and have a very balanced seminar, without prejudice, i t should be possible to 
find an acceptable way forward.  
5.10.   The representative of the United States  had some questions and clarifications for India. The 
interventions from Canada an d the European Union had spoke n to what the ambiguities were; his 
delegation was not entirely sure what was being proposed by India  exactly , whether to pick up the 
previous agenda as it stood or  to start a new process. He indicated that his delegation was open to 
discussions that allowed to take  a fresh look at the issue , and perhaps break from previous 
linkages, and find a way to engage  constructively in a manner  that all owed all  Members to 
contribute .  
5.11.   The representative  of Norway  said that his delegation looked at the proposal in a positive 
spirit. Naturally  the details  of what was being proposed  needed to be considered carefully , but in S/C/M/134  
 
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  general his delegation looked positively at ideas that might pave the way for a wide  and 
constructive engagement amongst Members to bring the agenda forward .  
5.12.   The Chairman  said that delegations were generally open to India's suggestion to organize a 
seminar on mode 4, but that the programme for the event needed to be looked at again. He 
suggested organizing informal consultations, with a view to Members agreeing on the agenda for 
the seminar. He then suggest ed that the Council take note of the statement s made.  
5.13.   It was so agreed . 
6  ITEM F: CYBERSECURIT Y MEASURES OF CHINA AND VIET NAM – REQUESTED BY 
JAPAN AND THE UNITED  STATES  
6.1.  The Chairman  indicated that the item had been added to the agenda of the Council at the 
request of the delegations of Japan and the United States. The United States had also submitted a 
communication on the issue, t itled "Measures adopted and under development by China related to 
its Cybersecurity Law", which was  contained in document S/C/W/376, dated 23 February 2018.   
6.2.  The representative of Japan  said that , in continuation from the previous meeting, Japan 
appreciat ed the opportunity to share  again  its concerns on China and Viet Nam 's recent measures 
related to cybersecurity.  
6.3.  Starting with China's measures, the representative recalled that, at  the October Council 
meeting, Japan had  expressed its concern s regarding China's existing and proposed cybersecurity 
measures  in detail . China, however,  had responded  that the concerns raised were based on quite a 
lot of misunderstandings of the relevant Chinese laws and regulations, and had not sufficiently 
address ed the concerns raised by Japan and othe r Members. Japan fou nd it truly regrettable that , 
in spite of such an insufficient response, China had continued to form ulate other related 
cybersecurity measures. As the con cerns of Japanese companies had  been growin g, Japan wished 
to express its concerns again at that meeting . Japan call ed upon China to respond clearly and 
address the concerns raised at the Council  before issuing or implementing final measures.  
6.4.  Turning to the c oncrete concerns , the representative re ferred, first, to the o bligation on 
foreign operators of critical information infrastructure to store spec ific data domestically. At the 
previous Council meeting, China had  explained that "local data storage requirements are imposed 
on critical information  infrastructure operators and not on all network operators." However, his 
delegation  feared that government officials would arbitrarily judge whether foreign companies 
could be classified as "critical information infrastructure operators" or "network opera tors" because 
the scope of  "critic al information infrastructure" wa s broad and vague, and the dividing line 
between "critical information infrastructure opera tors" and "network operators" was not  at all  
clear. It seemed  to be very difficult for foreign c ompanies to judge whether they we re classified as 
"critical information infrastructure operators" that we re required  to store data within China. That  
lack of clarity could generate uncertainty for business operations in China.  
6.5.  Generally speaking, the headqu arters of foreign operators own ed and manage d all of their 
data centrall y outside China. Therefore, it wa s not hard to envisage that foreign business operators 
could be forced to bear the additional burden of establishing a separate server inside China for  the 
purpose of storing information and changing the headquarters -centred  system in order to store 
information and data within China. In this way , the draft L aw could place foreign operators under 
conditions that render ed them less competitive than local o perators, and could be related to the 
national treat ment obligation under Article XVII  of the GATS.  
6.6.  Second, the representative referred to the o bligation to conduct security assessment on 
cross-border data transfers . At the previous  meeting, China had explained that "the data which is 
really necessary to be transferred across borders is allowed to flow abroad, once the results of 
security assessment indicate no harm to national security and social public interests."  
6.7.  While foreign business operators we re allowed to transfer information or data as a result of 
the security assessment, Japan was concerned that foreign business operators , rather than 
domestic operators , would be forced to bear the burden of additional human resources and time 
required to foll ow the procedures necessary to apply to the designated authority for approval and S/C/M/134  
 
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  to receive consent from personal information holders. Thus,  there was a possibility that, even 
though the security assessment had been  cleared, business would be hindered by the increased 
lead time required for delivery to consumers and the negative effect on th e speed of transactions. 
In that  way, the security assessment requirement could place foreign operators in a less 
competitive situation than domestic operators, and cou ld be related to the national treat ment 
obligation under Article XVII  of the GATS.  
6.8.  In addition, with regard to the security assessment requirements, Article 37 of  the 
Cybersecurity Law indicated  that it target ed critical information infrastructure operato rs, but in 
Article 2 on "Measures on the Security Assessment of Cross -Border Transfer of Personal 
Information and Import ant Data" the scope of the Law wa s extended to network operators. Japan 
wished  to know t he reason why the scope of that A rticle wa s different.  
6.9.  Third, another big concern was the ambiguity of  the legal terms. It was possible that a lot of 
foreign business operators, including manufacturers that use networks to operate in China, would  
be affected directly or indirectly because the scope of the definitions used in the proposed 
legislation , including the definition of  network operators that require d security assessment, wa s 
broad and vague.  
6.10.   At the October  meeting, China had explained that "objects of the security assessment are 
limited to per sonal information and important data. The important data refers to those of 
importance for the nation, not for the enterprises or individuals" . However, as for "critical data ", 
Annex A of the Guidelines for Data Cross -Border Tr ansfer Security Assessment li sted a lot of data 
that we re usually indispensable in doing business, including information on production, sales, 
research and development by electronics information enterprises (A6c), information on credit 
research on enterprises (A20), and registration i nformation on e -commerce platforms (A27b). In 
each of the clauses A 1 to A27 , a provision was included that stated  "this clause covers the data 
listed herein but is not limited to that data" . As a result , the scope bec ame significantly wider and 
more ambigu ous. Furthermore, the definition of "critic al information infrastructure" wa s extremely 
ambiguous and broad in scope. Therefore, Japan  feared that government officials would  arbitrarily 
judge whether security assessment on the local data storage requiremen ts or data transfer 
overseas wa s needed or not.  
6.11.   China ha d committed to full and partial liberalization in various sectors under the GATS, 
including computer  and related  services, telecommunication services  and financial services. 
Therefore, China's existing and proposed measures would  affect trade in services that China ha d 
committed to because the targets we re so broad in scope. Japan believe d that the critical 
information infrastructure that was required to conduct security assessment should be minimalized 
for the purpose of national security and  in the public interest. To that  end, Japan request ed that 
China explain the reason why such business related information as that listed under Annex A of 
the Guide lines should be restricted in relation to the aspects of national security and the public 
interest.  
6.12.   At the previous  meeting, China had  stated that "it is within the right of any WTO Member to 
define the scope of the terms u sed in the laws and regulations ". However, as ambiguous 
definitions of terms could harm transparency and predictability for business operations, Japan 
urged China to promptl y clarify the definitions it had  used.  
6.13.   Japan appreciate d that China had  shown leadership on the discussion on inve stment 
facilitation and at the same time would like to remind China that it had  pointed out the importance 
of transparency and predictability in that discussion.  
6.14.   Turning to the issue of Virtual Private Networks (VPN), the representative of Japan 
appreciat ed the initiative of the United States in a ddressing the issue of China's C ircular on VPNs. 
In Japan's view, the Circular might  be interpreted as restricting the use of  VPNs only to intra -
corporate communications and prohibiting its use for connecting dome stic or foreign data cent res 
and business platforms to provide telecommunications services. Japan shared  the US concerns 
regardi ng that C ircular because there was a possibility that it might severely affect the activities of 
service suppliers. Taking tho se elements into account, Japan wished to ask China to share its 
views on the  matter.  S/C/M/134  
 
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  6.15.   In October, China had emphasized that it had  been abiding by the relevan t transparency 
obligations and wa s dedicated to guaranteeing the right of public comment in its leg islative 
process . However, Japan and other M embers continue d to hold concerns that had  not yet been 
addressed. The concerns raised at that meeting would affect not only foreign business operators 
but also China's domestic operators that operate d globally. Consequently, the proposed Law would 
negatively affect China' s development. Japan understood  that, at the end of that  year, China 
planned  to implement its "Measures on the Security Assessment of Cross -Border Transfer of 
Personal  Information and Important Data" . Japan request ed that China refrain from issuing or 
implementing final measur es until the concerns raised were  addressed, and expect ed that the  
proposed draft regulations would  be revised with the aim of striking  a balance between purpose 
and means, and to be fully consistent with GATS.  
6.16.   In conclusion, Japan call ed upon China to provide a clear  response to the concerns that his 
delegation had mentioned at that meeting  and on other occasions.  
6.17.   Turning to the measures by Viet Nam , resuming wher e his delegation had left off at the 
previous  meeting, Japan reiterated its  concerns with regard to the Vietnamese draft Cyb ersecurity 
Law. Japan recognized that Viet Nam  had given  the Members  concerned an opportunity to  
comment on its revised draft Law. H owever, Japan found  it regr ettable that the revised draft L aw 
had not addressed the concerns  raised by Japan and other M embers. Japan wished to point out 
three concerns  specifically . 
6.18.   The first concern related to the obligation to locally store Vietnamese u sers' data and o ther 
important data. The draft L aw, in particular Article 41.3  thereof, intended  to clearly target foreign 
enterprises providing telecommunication and internet services in Viet Nam , and obliged  those 
foreign enterprises to store Vietnamese users' data and other important data within Viet Nam . As a 
result of the new Law, it wa s envisaged that foreign operators could be forced to bear the 
additional burden of establishing a separate server inside Viet Nam  for the purpose of storing 
inform ation and data, as foreign business operators usually collect ed and store d information and 
data in their headquart ers outside the country. In that  way, the draft Law could place foreign 
companies under conditions that render ed them less competitive than local companies, and could 
be related to the national trea tment obligation under Article XVII  of the GATS. Japan also point ed 
out that the draft Law did not clearly define what wa s meant by "important data" , which could lead 
to a loss of predictability for foreign operators.  
6.19.   Japan's  second concern regard ed the obligation to carry out security assessments on cross -
border data transf ers. The draft Law, in particular Article 42. 4 thereof, obliged  owners of 
information systems critic al to national security to conduct assessments of security levels when 
transferring out of the country so -called "personal information" and "critical data" collected within 
Viet Nam . A possible consequence of that provision wa s that foreign companies would  be forced to 
bear an additional time and human resources burden compared to d omestic operators that usually 
did not need to transfer such info rmation and data overseas. Co nsequently, that  requirement could 
place foreign operators in a less competitive sit uation compared to domestic operators, and such 
possible treatment could be related to the national treatment obligation under Article XVII of the 
GATS.  
6.20.   Japan's third concern related to  the obligation to establish pe rmanent facili ties within Viet 
Nam. The draft L aw, in particular Article 41.3b  thereof , oblige d foreign enterprises providing 
telecommunication and internet services in Viet Nam  to locate their head offices or represe ntative 
offices in Viet Nam. That  requirement could substantially restrict the provision of cross -border 
services. Japan wished to know the rationale for imposing such an obligation and in what way 
Viet Nam's decision to oblige foreign enterprises to locate their offices in Viet Nam was  conducive 
to attaining Viet Nam's  primary objec tive. 
6.21.   The concerns raised at that meeting  could hinder participation of foreign business operators 
in the Vietnamese market. The consequent decrease in foreign investment to Viet Nam  would have 
a negative effect on the country's development. At the previou s meeting, Viet Nam  had stated that 
concerns raised would be considered in the process of  legislation. Japan strongly request ed that 
Viet Nam  address the concerns raised before submitting the revised draft law to the National 
Assembly and that the draft L aw be made fully consistent with the GATS.  S/C/M/134  
 
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  6.22.   Finally, Japan call ed upon Viet Nam  to provide a clear response to the  concerns  his 
delegation had  raised at th at meeting and on other occasions.  
6.23.   The representative of the United States  said that his delegation had requested the inclusion 
of that topic on the agenda in order to remind Members of the concerns raised at the previous 
Council meeting about Chinese and Vietnamese measures purporting to address cybersecurity, and 
to inform Members of a n ew, related measure issued by China.   
6.24.   The United States brought the matter before the Council because, by restricting cross -
border data transfers, the potential effects of the measures at issue extended across all service 
sectors and had bearing on the ri ghts of many Members. Where those measures affected sectors 
for which China and Viet Nam had made both commercial presence and cross -border services 
commitments, both of which often relied on the cross -border transfer of information, his 
delegation asked C hina and Viet Nam to fully justify the need for such trade -distortive restrictions, 
and inform the WTO Membership of any possible planned modificati ons to address cited concerns.  
6.25.   With respect to China’s measures, as his delegation had noted in October, the United States 
had communicated directly to high -level authorities in China, but up to that point China had not 
provided any assurance that it would resolve concerns expressed by the United States and other 
Members or provide concrete assurances that it would make all necessary changes to its regime to 
ensure that cross -border transfers of information could take place unimpeded. The international 
business communi ty had warned that those measures would disrupt communications between 
China and other WTO Member s' territories, increase co sts, and reduce data security. His delegation 
looked forward  to an update from China on that  critical issue.  
6.26.   In a separate but related development, Chi na’s recent issuance of a Circular on "Cleaning up 
and Regulating the internet  Access Service Market " appeared  to restrict cross -border information 
transfers even further.  The new C ircular would prohibit the use of two forms of specialized and 
widely used telecommunication services: "virtual private network s", or VPNs, and leased lines. 
Specifically, the C ircular would prohibit the use of th ose two means of telecommunication "for 
connecting domestic and foreign data centr es" or to enable "business platforms  to provide  
telecommunications services. "  
6.27.   Many cross -border service suppliers use d leased lines and VPNs on a regular basis for 
critical communications with customers and suppliers , in order to ensure security and 
confidentiality.  Given the widespread usa ge of th ose services by foreign service suppliers and their 
customers in China, the Circular’s potential effect on such companies was quite severe. For 
example, how could a China -based travel agent access international flight information without 
connecting  to a foreign data centr e? Likewise, many software platforms located outside China 
incorporate d messaging functions to perform technic al support or customer service;  would a client 
in China be prohibited from "chatting " with its foreign accounting firm?  The scope of potentially 
affected service sectors included  many covered by China’s GATS commitments, such as cross -
border data processing services, travel related servic es, and professional services.  
6.28.   The United States wa s deeply concerned that th e measure, i n addition to China’s other 
measures purporting to address cybersecurity, would disrupt trade and impair the rights of 
Members.  His delegation therefore request ed that China respond to those  questions and concerns , 
and consider changing  its regime, both for the measures relating to its Cybersecurity L aw cited at 
the previous Council  meeting, and prior to the  specific Circular’s entry into force on March 31.  
6.29.   With respect to Viet Nam’s measures, at the outset his delegation  wanted to ackno wledge 
its appreciation fo r the constructive engagement it  continue d to have with the Government of 
Viet Nam and its National Assembly. The bilateral dialogue had proven fruitful in many ways and , 
while concerns remain ed, the United States wished to than k Viet Nam for its continued cooperati on 
on the  issue.  
6.30.   As noted by the United States and other Members at the October meeting of the Council, 
the United States was  also concerned about cybersec urity measures proposed by Viet  Nam, 
specifically its most recen t version of the  draft 2018 Cybersecurity Law. His delegation's comments 
were based on its  review o f Draft 15, released earlier that  year. The previous  week, his delegation S/C/M/134  
 
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  had provided detailed comments directly to Viet  Nam’s National Assembly, which the United States  
would be happy to share with any interested WTO Member.  
6.31.   Many of the US  concerns about Viet N am’s draft Cybersecurity Law parallel ed those that the 
United States  and other Members had raised about China’s similar measures.  The draft Law had a 
very broad scope, used vague terminology, and applied  a prescriptive approach to cybersecurity 
protection that could seriously hinder cross -border service suppliers by restrict ing the data flows 
that under lay such services.  
6.32.   Key trade concerns we re as foll ows. First, there was a local presence requirement for any 
"internet " services with more than 10,000 users in Viet  Nam. This appeared  to affect many cross -
border services that f ell within the scope of Viet  Nam’s GATS commitments.  Second, the 
requirement to  store user information in Viet  Nam, by requiring the maintenance of redundant 
facilities, would undermine the ability of cross -border service suppliers to compete wit h domestic 
suppliers. Third, there was a requirement that owners of information systems u ndergo a "security 
levels " assessment by the Ministry of Public Security prior to allowing certain, unspecified data to 
be transferred cross -border. The Law wa s vague as to both what sort of information transfer would 
be subject to such a requirement, and how systems would be assessed. The practical result could 
be to significantly impede cross -border data flows.  
6.33.   In sum, Viet N am’s Cybersecurity Law impose d special scrutiny and ill -defined assessment 
requirements on a potentially wide array of sectors. It a lso disproportionately affect ed foreign 
internet service suppliers with its requirements to establish a loca l office and to localize data. 
Implementation of tho se proposals could impede the supply of cross -border services in many 
sectors where Viet  Nam ha d undertaken GATS commitments. The United States urged Viet Nam to 
consult with other Members to resolve th ose concerns before finalizing that  Law. The United States 
was ready to engage with Viet  Nam on how to achieve its goal of increasing cybersecurity wh ile 
protecting digital innovation and observing its international trade commitments.   
6.34.   The representative of the European Union  recalled his delegation's concerns about the 
measures stemming from China's "Cybersecurity Law" that had been  raised  at the Coun cil meeting 
in October 2017. The EU cons idered  the safety of network operations and network information to 
be valid objectives which should , however , be pursued using a balanced set of measures that did  
not place foreign network operators substantially at a disadvantage when compared to national 
operators. His delegation  had expressed the view that the Law an d its implementing measures had  
the potential to lead to significant adverse impacts on foreign companies that operate d in sectors 
where China ha d undertaken  liberalization commitments.  
6.35.   The European Union had submitted written comments in response to the public consultation 
on the draft "Measures on the Security Assessment of Cross -Border Transfer of Personal 
Information and Important Data" and the "Draft National Standard – Guidelines for Data Cross -
border Transfer Security Assessment", which, as explained previously, together could result in 
significant restrictions on cross -border data  flows of personal data and of "important data" .  
6.36.   The European Union request ed China to provide an update of the developments with respect 
to the draft measures, in particular whether and how key concerns, including those  expressed by 
the industry, had been add ressed. His delegation also invite d China to take the nece ssary time to 
consult and take on board the opinion of foreign business es operating in the country before issuing 
any new implementing measure.  
6.37.   In ge neral, the European Union shared  the concerns expressed about measures that could 
make cross -border data  transfers more burdensome. His delegation was also interested in hearing 
China's response to the questions raised by the United States on the Circular on the internet  
Access Service Market.  
6.38.   Equally, the European Union  remain ed concerned about the legislativ e developments in 
Viet Nam. The EU had  recently communicated its concerns to the relevant authorities. The EU 
consider ed that ensuring the security of ne tworks and information systems wa s of key importance. 
However, the draft Cybersecurity Law, as it stood , gave  reason for concern , as it require d foreign 
telecommunications and internet service providers to establish a local presence, have servers and 
store data in Viet  Nam.  S/C/M/134  
 
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  6.39.   While the EU  consider ed that Members were entitled to apply measures for the prot ection of 
personal data, which wa s a fundamental right in the European Union, the measures referred in the 
Vietnamese draft  Law did not seem to achieve that  legitimate objective. The Cybersecurity Law did 
not only apply to users' data, and in that case only above a certain threshold (namely a specific 
number of Vietnamese users), but also to an undefined, potentially broad circle of 'other impo rtant 
data'. Such requirements were discriminatory, de j ure or de facto, as they only affect ed foreign 
companies oper ating in Viet  Nam and put them in a less competitive situation when compared to 
domestic operators, including in sectors in which Viet  Nam had  taken full or partial GATS market 
access or national treatment commitments.  
6.40.   The European Union hoped  to see its k ey concerns addressed by Vi etnamese authorities and 
invited Viet N am to take the necessary time to adequately review the draft Cybersecurity Law, 
taking into account the  concerns and the views expressed by foreign business es operating in the 
country.  
6.41.   The representative of Canada  said that his delegation appreciated  China’s transparency in 
seeking comments on cyber -related draft legislation, regulations and standards. Canada had  
submitted comments encouraging China to apply security standards objectively , providing foreign 
and domestic companies an equal opportunity to meet Chinese security standards and compete on 
a level playing field. His delegation's concerns relate d specifically to data localization, cross -border 
data flows and the ability for Canadi an technologies to compete for procurement contracts.  
6.42.   As other  Member s had done, his delegation also  thank ed Viet Nam for its engagement with 
Canada on its draft law on Cyber Security. The 15th version of the draft law did not resolve 
Canada’s concerns. Article 34 had  been revised to remove the requirements of server s housed in 
Viet Nam, but retained  requirements that user data be stored in Viet  Nam. That "data residency 
requirement " was still a form of data localization.  Those requirements we re not feasibl e 
technically, and would  hamper Viet N am’s ability to harness the potential of cloud computing and 
other technology. Canada encouraged  Viet Nam to consider international best practices, which 
focused on incident response, cyber hygiene, public -private info rmation sharing, and inter -agency 
coordination.  
6.43.    The representative of New Zealand  recalled her delegation's statement at the October 
meeting of the Council. New Zealand remained concerned that data localisation requirements and 
proposed restrictions on cross-border transfer of data had the potential to impact on foreign firms 
operating in the Chinese market, and place them at a disadvantage relative to domestic 
competitors.  
6.44.   Her delegation recognised that s tates had the right to regulate on important pub lic interest 
grounds such as cybersecurity, however it wished to underscore that any such measures should, 
nonetheless, be introduced and implemented in a manner that was consistent with international 
law and obligations, including with the GATS, minimised  negative impacts on trade, and 
contributed to the development of norms of responsible state behaviour online.  New Zealand 
continued to closely monitor cybersecurity -related measures adopted and under consideration by 
China.   
6.45.   With regards to China's MIIT  Circular on cleaning up and regulating the internet service 
market, she noted China’s earlier assurances that those measures were not intended to impact on 
international businesses’ normal business operations. Her delegation also continued to monitor 
that issue closely.  
6.46.   New Zealand looked forward to further opportunities to engage with China on those 
measures and obtain further clarity about how they would apply.  
6.47.   The representative of Australia  said that her delegation continued to have an interest in 
discussing the Cybersecurity Laws of China and Viet Nam in the Council, given their effect on trade 
in services. The ability to store and transmit data across borders was integral to international 
services trade, and restrictions on free flow of data added c onsiderable costs to doing business.  
6.48.   Australia shared the view that safeguarding cybersecurity was a legitimate policy objective 
by governments, but believed in finding the least trade -restrictive manner to achieve that S/C/M/134  
 
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  objective. The default position shou ld be that data flows were allowed unless a clear and legitimate 
public policy reason for restriction existed, rather than the other way around. Global problems like 
cybersecurity required global solutions. Her delegation urged Members to utilise internati onal 
standards to deal with data security concerns, to maximise transparency and minimise 
unnecessary barriers to trade, particularly the ISO 27000 series on information security 
management systems.  
6.49.   Australia remained concerned that China’s Cybersecurity L aw and its implementing 
measures were ambiguous in scope and application. It was unclear which service suppliers and 
what data the measures applied to. It was unclear in what circumstances cross -border data flows 
were permitted. That ambiguity might create  circumstances where service suppliers could not be 
confident that they were in compliance with the Law. Her delegation was concerned that this would 
discourage cross -border data transfers, and result in the burden of compliance falling 
disproportionately on foreign service suppliers.  
6.50.   Her delegation also had some concerns about Viet Nam’s draft Law on Cyber Security. 
Australia, along with other Members, had provided feedback on Viet Nam’s draft law, noting its 
interest in seeing a law that supported increased participation in global e -commerce, and 
enhanced the business environment in Viet Nam, including by being transparent, clear and 
compliant with international trade commitments. Her delegation would continue to provide 
comments to Viet Nam on the evolving draft, and thanked Vie t Nam for its engagement on that  
matter.  
6.51.   Australia continued to welcome Members raising issues in the CTS that were relevant to 
trade in services as it thought that discussion of such measures was an important transparency 
function of the Council.  
6.52.   The representative of Chinese Taipei  thanked the United States and Japan for having 
formally inscribed that item on the Council's agenda. His delegation shared some of the concerns 
raised by Members concerning certain of the measures  at issue. When it came to electronic 
commerce, he wished to underline that the benefits of the internet  on international trade were 
already largely acknowledged  and that, by providing  the only possibility to enter international 
markets , its benefits were greatest for MSMEs . His delegation was of the view that the challenges 
faced by MSMES in terms of market access could be grouped under three headings: accessibility, 
connectivity and transparency. Accessibility referred to all actors having equal opportuni ties to 
appear on on -line platforms in order to reach potential  foreign consumers. His delegation wished 
to underscore the importance of equitable access, and of having reciprocally equal market access. 
The WTO aimed  to facilitate fair trade.  His delegatio n would continue to follow developments with 
the measures at issue.  
6.53.   The representative of India said that  she had referred to her authorities the matter raised in 
the latest US communication, in document S/C/W/376, relating to China’s recent Circular entit led 
"Cleaning up and Regulating the internet  Access Service Market", which was set to enter into force 
on 31 March 2018, and its possible impact on the use of virtual private networks and leased lines.  
6.54.   On the larger issue of cross -border data flows, howeve r, she wished to recall her 
delegation's statement at the previous CTS meeting, namely that India believed that cross -border 
transfer s of data by electronic means, including personal data, for the purposes of cross -border 
supply of services especially in s ervice sectors in which commitments had been taken, were 
important. At the same time, India recognized that privacy and protection of personal data were 
indeed important public policy objectives.  
6.55.   The challenge before all Members was how to balance the int erests of service suppliers, 
especially those service suppliers with a global delivery model , for whom cross -border data flow 
was a lifeline, with the public policy objectives of privacy and data protection. The discussions on 
that issue that were taking p lace at that meeting had been enlightening. Ind ia continued to 
welcome exchanging  information and sharing best practice experiences on thos e critical issues.   
6.56.   The representative of South Africa  registered her delegation's interest in the conversation, 
more so from the perspective of how government regulation could aim to promote public interest, S/C/M/134  
 
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  national security, national economic development and consumer protection and how trade could 
serve tho se objectives.  
6.57.   The conversation had highlighted a number of reasons that might compel governments to 
introduce legislation and regulation over cyberspace. In recent years and weeks, there had been 
greater focus on the intersection of trade policy and nati onal security. That issue might become 
increasingly relevant as the digital economy grew, and questions emerged on privacy and data 
protection, and the broader links to economic development that, itself, had security dimensions.   
6.58.   The discussion offered Me mbers an opportunity to reflect on all those dimensions in the 
context of the internet  economy; who defined what it was, and the relationship between regulatory 
sovereignty and multilateral trade rules.  
6.59.   The representative of China  said that his delegation took note of the statements made by 
Members under that item and the communication submitted by the United States in document 
S/C/W/376, dated 23 February, and wished to respond as follows.  
6.60.   Starting with issues related to China’s Cyber Security Law, his de legation had provided 
substantial responses to relevant questions at the  previous  Council meeting in October. China 
reiterated that government regulation on cross -border data flows was essential to guaranteeing 
the sustainable and healthy development of e -commerce, and was also a common practice for 
Members in order to achieve their policy objectives. Given the need for cross -border data flows in 
the era of economic globalization, in finding a balance between cyber security and guaranteeing 
the flowing of d ata, Members had the right to design regulatory measures in line with their specific 
conditions and needs, so as to protect the interest of their people.  
6.61.   Turning to  the issues raised by some Members on VPNs and leased lines, his delegation 
wished to clarif y a number of issues. First, the relevant Circular did not impose any restrictions on 
users of VPNs and leased lines. On 17 January 2017, China had issued the Circular on Cleaning up 
and Regulating the internet  Access Service Market. According to the Circu lar, the Ministry of 
Industry and Information Technology had decided to carry out a nationwide work of cleaning up 
and regulating the internet  access service market from the issuance of the Circular to 
31 March  2018.  
6.62.   The Circular prescribed that "users ar e not allowed to establish or use leased lines (including 
VPNs) and other telecommunication channels for cross -border operations. Basic telecommunication 
enterprises, when leasing international lines to its users, shall establish consolidated user records,  
and specify to its users that the line shall be used exclusively for internal office purposes, and shall 
not be used for connecting  domestic and foreign data cent res or business platforms to provide 
telecommunications services". The purpose of the Circula r was to overhaul and regulate illegal 
operation actions. By enhancing the administration of licensing  and access resources, China  wished 
to guarantee a fair and orderly market, and  to protect the interest  of consumers. The Circular did  
not impose any new restrictions on service providers and consumers  who used leased lines or 
VPNs through regular channels. As a result, the assumption that "the Circular will impose new 
restrictions on the use of VPNs and leased lines" in the US communication wa s not correct .  
6.63.   Second, relevant regulations of China d id not affect normal operation s of domestic or 
foreign enterprises. The Circular served  to regulate those enterprises or individuals who used 
leased lines or VPNs to conduct illegal cross -border telecommunication operations, without the 
international telecommunications operation qualification and the approval from telecommunication 
authoriti es. When companies or transnational corporations need ed a line for cross -border 
connection for in ternal office purposes, they could  lease such lines from legally established and 
authorized telecommunication operators. The Circular would by no means affect their normal 
operation s. 
6.64.   The US communication mentioned that "the Circular would expressly prohibi t the use of 
leased lines and VPNs for connecting domestic and foreign data centres  and business platforms ". 
This was a misinterpretation. The Circular prohib ited unapproved cross -borde r telecommunication 
operations  that used leased lines to connect  domestic and foreign data centres  or business 
platforms. T he US communication also assumed  that "the potential impact of the Circular both on 
foreign service suppli ers and their customers in China appears to be quite severe ". As a matter of S/C/M/134  
 
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  fact, the Chinese authorities had not received  up to that point  any complaints from eith er domestic 
or foreign supplies  who leased lines through lawful channels.  
6.65.   Third, C hina’s r egulatory requirements we re in line  with WTO rules. The GATS allowed  
Members to regulate their  domestic service suppliers to achieve certain policy objecti ves. 
According to Article 5(f) (vi) of the  GATS  Annex on Telecommunications, conditions for access to 
and use of public telecommunications tra nsport networks and services might  include notification, 
registration and li censing. Furthermore, Article 5(g) of the same  Annex stipulate d that a 
developing Member might , in a way consistent with its level of develo pment, place reasonable 
conditions on access to and use of public telecommunications transport network and services 
necessary to strengthen its domestic telecommunication infrastructure and service capacity. Such 
conditions had to  be specified in the Me mbers’ schedule. Pursuant to that  Article, China had  
specified that "all international telecommunications services shall go through gateways established 
with the approval of China’s telecommunication authorities ".  
6.66.   China beli eved that the approval requirement s for providing cross -border telecommunication 
services through l eased  lines applied  equally  to both domesti c and foreign enterprises, and we re 
consistent with relevant WTO ru les. The Chinese Government would always respect WTO rules, 
and welcome d the operation of foreign enterprises in China in accordance with Chinese laws and 
regulations.  
6.67.   Fourth, the  notification required by the United States  in its communication was beyond 
China's GATS obligations. According to Article 5(c) of the Annex o n Tele communications, " each 
Member shall ensure that service supplies of any other Member may use public 
telecommunications transport networks and services for the movement of information within and 
across borders, including for intra -corporate communicati ons of  such service suppliers.  Any new or 
amended measures of a Member significantly affecting such use shall be notified and shall be 
subject to consultation, in accordance with relevant provisions of the Agreement. " As previously  
mentioned , the Circular aimed  at cleaning up illega l operation activities, and did  not impose new 
measures nor did it modify existing measures. It would  not affect legitimate suppliers and 
consumers of cross -border telecommunications services.  
6.68.   The representative of Viet Nam  said that his delegation took note of the concerns raised by 
Japan and the United States with respect to Viet Nam's draft Law on Cybersecurity.  
6.69.   Pursuant to Viet Nam's legislative drafting process, the draft Law had been submitted by the 
Government to the National As sembly in 2017 . The National Assembly had arranged a hearing 
session on the draft Law in January 2018. At the hearing session, the draft Law had undergone a 
number of significant changes, to take into account the debate and comments from legislators, 
who h ad listened carefully to opinions from the public and from different stakeholder s, including 
the private sector  and representatives of foreign Embassies, companies and associations. Following 
that session, the Defence and Security Commission of the Nationa l Assembly would continue to 
consider and review further the draft Law before bringing it to the National Assembly's Plenary 
Session in May for final debate. The Commission and related Government agencies had also had a 
number of meetings with stakeholders , to explain the draft Law and the changes that had been 
made, as well as to listen to further comments.  
6.70.   Viet Nam wished to emphasize, therefore, that the whole drafting process was transparent, 
progressive and led with an open -minded spirit.   
6.71.   With regard  to the specific comments raised by Japan,  the United States and other 
Members, his delegation noted that many of those comments had been conveyed to the 
Vietnamese National Assembly's drafting commission through the respective Embassies in Ha Noi. 
As prev iously explained, the Defence and Security Commission of the National Assembly would 
continue to consider the comments received.  
6.72.   Lastly, he could not  prejudge the outcome of the final debate at the National Assembly, for 
that process was very dynamic. Howe ver, it was expected that all genuine stakeholders' interests, 
whether of investors, trading partners or the general public, as well as the inherent right of the 
Government to regulate in order to achieve legitimate public policy objectives, would be taken  into 
account.  S/C/M/134  
 
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  6.73.   The Chairman  suggested that the Council take note of the statements made.   
6.74.   It was so agreed .  
7  ITEM G: OTHER BUSINESS  
7.1.  As he had indicated at the beginning of the meeting, the Chairman  made a statement on the 
appointment of the new Chairperson to the Council for Trade in Services. The rules of procedure 
for meetings of the Council (document S/L/15) stipulated that the election of the Chairperson was 
to take place at the first meeting of  the year and took effect at the end of that meeting. However, 
the appointment of chairpersons to WTO C ouncils and Committees, including the services Council, 
would only be taken up by the General Council when it met the following week. As a result, the 
handover of the Chairmanship of the Services Council would take place at the beginning of its next 
meeting.  
7.2.  Therefore, it was only after the following week's meeting of the General Council that, as 
outgoing Chairman of the CTS, he would start his consultatio ns on the appointment of 
Chairpersons to the subsidiary bodies of the services Council for 2018. Delegations would all be 
informed by fax, in due course, about the organisation of his consultations, but he nevertheless 
wished to  invite Members to start thinking, and consult with each other, about possible candidates. 
His consultations would  result in a proposed slate of names, on the basis of which elections would 
take place in each subsidiary body.   
7.3.   The representative of South  Africa  wished to inform Members about her delegation's 
intention to convene a panel discussion on the international harmonisation of regulatory practices 
and the potential risk of regulatory capture. South Africa was planning to hold the p anel discussion 
on the side -lines of the following services cluster. Given the relevance of th ose issues to many 
WTO Members, and cognizant of the recent rhetoric about international regulatory harmonisation 
to new aspects of trade, her delegation hoped that the panel dis cussion would contribute 
meaningfully to the growing discourse. This panel discussion would be open to all Members, and 
she would reach out to the Secretariat in due time for their support.  
7.4.  A representative of the Secretariat  explained that several Member s had  requested the 
Secretariat to provide early notice of technical assistance ev ents on trade in services that we re 
foreseen for the year 2018, so as to assist them in their planning. To respond to tho se requests, a 
note had been issued, in JOB/SERV/279,  which detailed  the dates and venues of the three 
specialized region al events that the Secretariat wa s preparing in 2018, as well as the dates of the 
Geneva -based Advanced Trade in Services Course.  The regional activities for 2018 ha d been 
identified by th e ITTC Division, on the basis of consultations with the relevant regional groupings. 
As always, the Geneva Missions would  receive invitation letters for tho se events about 10 to 
12 weeks in advance.   
7.5.  The meeting was adjourned . 
__________