WT/DS471/RPT*  
 
19 January  2018 
(18-0485) Page: 1/28 
  Original: English  
 
UNITED STATES – CERTAIN METHODOLOGIE S AND THEIR APPLICAT ION 
TO ANTI -DUMPING PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING CHINA  
Arbitration  
under Article 21.3(c) of the  
Understanding on Rules and Procedures  
Governing the Settlement of Disputes  
 
Award of the Arbitrator  
Simon Farbenbloom  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
*NOTE CONCERNING DOCUMENT SYMBOL: As of 13 April 2017, for ease of reference, awards of 
arbitrators under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU  bear the symbol WT/DS[number]/RPT.  WT/DS471/RPT  
 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS  
1   INTRODUCTION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..........  6 
2   ARGUMENTS OF THE PAR TIES  ................................ ................................ .....................  7 
3   REASONABLE PERIOD OF  TIME  ................................ ................................ ...................  7 
3.1   Introduction  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................  7 
3.2   Mandate of the arbitrator under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU  ................................ ...............  8 
3.3   Measures to be brought into conformity  ................................ ................................ ........ 10 
3.4   Factors affecting the determination of the reasonable period of time  ................................ .11 
3.4.1    Steps in the implementation process  ................................ ................................ .......... 12 
3.4.1.1    Implementation of the DSB's "as such" recommendations and rulings pertaining 
to the SRP  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................... 12 
3.4.1.2    Implementation of the DSB's "as applied" recommendations and rulings 
pertaining to the 38  anti-dumping determinations at issue  ................................ ...................... 18 
3.4.2    Particular circumstances of this dispute  ................................ ................................ ......24 
4   AWARD  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................  25 
ANNEX A  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................  27 
ANNEX B  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................  28 
  
 WT/DS471/RPT  
 
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ABBREVIATIONS USED I N THIS AWARD  
Abbreviation  Description  
Anti-Dumping Agreement  Agreement on Implementation of Article  VI of the General  Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994  
Appellate  Body Report  Appellate Body Report,  United States – Certain Methodologies and Their 
Application to Anti -Dumping Proceedings Involving China , WT/DS4 71/AB/R   
DSB Dispute Settlement Body  
DSU Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes  
GATT  1994 General  Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994  
NME non-market economy  
Panel Report  Panel Report, United States – Certain Methodologies and Their Application to 
Anti-Dumping Proceedings Involving  China , WT/DS471/R   
Section 123 of the URAA  Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Public Law No. 103 -465, 108 Stat.  4838, 
codified as United  States Code , Title 19, Section 3533  (Exhibit USA -1) 
Section 129 of the URAA  Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Public Law No. 103 -465, 108 Stat.  4838, 
codified as United  States Code , Title 19, Section 3538 (Exhibit USA -2) 
SRP Single Rate Presumption  
USDOC  United  States Department of Commerce  
USTR  United States Trade Representative  
W-T weighted average -to-transaction  
WTO World Trade Organization  
URAA  Uruguay Round Agreements Act  
 WT/DS471/RPT  
 
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CASES CITED IN THIS AWARD  
Short title  Full case title and citation  
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres 
(Article 21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded 
Tyres – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS332/16 , 
29 August 2008, DSR 2008:XX, p. 8581  
Canada – Pharmaceutical 
Patents (Article 21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical 
Products – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS114/13 , 
18 August 2000, DSR 2002:I, p. 3  
Chile – Price Band System 
(Article 21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures 
Relating to Cer tain Agricultural Products – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of 
the DSU , WT/DS207/13 , 17 March 2003, DSR 2003:III, p. 1237  
China – GOES (Article 21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, China – Countervailing and Anti -Dumping Duties on 
Grain Oriented Flat -Rolled Electrical Steel from the United States – 
Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS414/12 , 3 May 2013, 
DSR 2013:IV, p. 1495  
Colombia – Ports of Entry 
(Article 21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, Colombia – Indicative Prices and Restrictions on 
Ports of Entry – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS366/13 , 
2 October 2009, DSR 2009:IX, p. 3819  
Colombia – Textiles 
(Article  21.3(c) ) Award of the Arbitrator, Colombia – Measures Relating to the Importation of 
Textiles, Apparel and Footwear – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the 
DSU, WT/DS461/13 , 15 November 2016  
EC – Bananas III 
(Article  21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, European Communities – Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Arbitration under Article 
21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS27/15 , 7 January 1998, DSR 1998:I, p. 3  
EC – Chicken Cuts 
(Article  21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, European Communities – Customs Classification of 
Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts – Arbitration u nder Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , 
WT/DS269/13 , WT/DS286/15 , 20 February 2006  
EC – Fasteners (China)  Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Definitive Anti -Dumping 
Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China , WT/DS397/AB/R , 
adopted 28 July 2011, DSR 2011:VII, p. 3995  
EC – Hormones 
(Article  21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones) – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS26/15 , 
WT/DS48/13 , 29 May 1998, DSR 1998:V, p. 1833  
EC – Tariff Preferences 
(Article  21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, European Communities – Condit ions for the Granting 
of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries  – Arbitration under Article 
21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS246/14 , 20 September 2004, DSR 2004:IX, p. 
4313 
Japan – DRAMs (Korea) 
(Article  21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random 
Access Memories from Korea – Arbitration under A rticle 21.3(c) of the DSU , 
WT/DS336/16 , 5 May 2008, DSR 2008:XX, p. 8553  
Peru – Agricultural Products 
(Article 21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, Peru – Additional Duty on Imports of Certain 
Agricultural Products – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , 
WT/DS457/15 , 16 December 2015  
US – 1916 Act (Article 21.3(c))  Award of the  Arbitrator, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 – 
Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS136/11 , WT/DS162/14 , 
28 February 2001, DSR 2001:V, p. 2017  
US – COOL (Article 21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling 
(COOL) Requirements  – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , 
WT/DS384/24 , WT/DS386/23 , 4 December 2012, DSR 2012:XIII, p. 7173  
US – Countervailing Measures 
(China) (Article 21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on 
Certain Products from China – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , 
WT/DS437/16 , 9 October 2015  
US – Offset Act (Byrd 
Amendment) (Article 21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy 
Offset Act of 2000 – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) o f the DSU , 
WT/DS217/14 , WT/DS234/22 , 13 June 2003, DSR 2003:III, p. 1163  WT/DS471/RPT  
 
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Short title  Full case title and citation  
US – Oil Country Tubular 
Goods Sunset Reviews 
(Article  21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti -Dumping 
Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina – Arbitration under 
Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS268/12 , 7 June 2005, DSR 2005:XXIII, 
p. 11619  
US – Anti-Dumping 
Methodologies (China)  Appellate Body Report, United  States – Certain Methodologies and Their 
Application to Anti -Dumping Proceedings Involving China , WT/DS471/AB/R  
and Add.1, adopted 22 May 2017  
US – Anti-Dumping 
Methodologies (China)  Panel Report, United States – Certain Methodologies and Their Application to 
Anti-Dumping Proceedings Involving China , WT/DS471/R  and Add.1, adopted 
22 May 2017, as modified by Appellate Body Repo rt WT/DS471/AB/R  
US – Shrimp II (Viet Nam)  Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Shrimp 
from Viet Nam , WT/DS429/R  and Add.1, adopted 22 April 2015, upheld by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS429/AB/R  
US – Shrimp II (Viet Nam) 
(Article 21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain 
Shrimp from Viet Nam  – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , 
WT/DS429/12 , 15 December 2015  
US – Shrimp and Sawblades  Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Shrimp and 
Diamond Sawblades from China , WT/DS422/R  and Add.1, adopted 23 July 
2012, DSR 2012:XIII, p. 7109  
US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) 
(Article 21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Final Ant i-Dumping Measures on 
Stainless Steel from Mexico – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , 
WT/DS344/15 , 31 October 2008, DSR 2008:XX, p. 8619  
US – Washing Machines 
(Article  21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Measures on Large Residential Washers from Korea – Arbitration under  
Article 21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS464/RPT , 13 April 2017  WT/DS471/RPT  
 
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WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION  
AWARD OF THE ARBITRA TOR 
 
 
United States – Certain Methodologies and 
Their Application to Anti -Dumping 
Proceedings Involving China  
 
Parties:  
 
China  
United  States  
 Arbitrator:  
 
Simon Farbenbloom  
 
 
INTRODUCTION  1  
On 22 May 2017 , the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) adopted the Appellate Body Report1 1.1.  
and the Panel Report2 in United States – Certain Methodologies and Their Application to  
Anti-Dumping Proceedings Involving China . This dispute concerns China's  challenge of certain 
methodologies use d by the United  States  in anti-dumping  investigations . The Panel found certain  
of the United States' measures at issue to be inconsistent "as such " or "as applied " with various  
provisions of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 1994 ( Anti-Dumping  Agreement) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994  
(GATT 1994) . These Panel  findings were not appealed by the United States and , in ruling on 
China's appeal,  the Appellate Body did not make  any additional findings of inconsistency  with the 
covered agreements .  
At the meeting of the DSB held on 19 June 2017 , the United  States  indicated its intention to 1.2.  
implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings in this dispute, and stated that it would need a  
reasonable period of ti me in which to do so.3 On 11 July 2017, the United States and China sent a 
joint letter to the Chairman of the DSB. In their letter, the United States and China indicated that, 
in order to allow sufficient time to discuss a mutually  agreed period  of time for implementation , 
they had agreed that, in the event that an arbitration was requested under Article  21.3(c) of the 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ( DSU), it should be 
completed no later than 60 days after the date of the appointment of an arbitrator, unless the 
arbitrator , following consultation with the parties, were to consider that additional time was 
required. In the same letter, the parties also confirmed that any award of the arbitr ator, includ ing 
an award not made within 90  days after the date of the DSB's  recommendations and rulings  in this 
dispute , would be deemed to be an award of the arbitrator for purposes of Article 21.3(c) of the 
DSU in determining the reasonable period of ti me for the United  States  to implement the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB.4  
By letter dated 17 October 2017 , China  informed the DSB that  it had engaged in 1.3.  
consultations with the United  States  on the reasonable period of time  for implementation pursuant 
to Article 21.3(b) of the DSU , but that those consultations had not resulted in an agreement . 
China  therefore requested that th e reasonable period of time  be determined through binding 
arbitration pursuant to Article  21.3(c) of  the DSU. China  expressed its intention to be gin 
discussions with the United  States with a view to reaching agreement on an arbitrator .5  
By letter dated 30 October 2017 , China  informed the Director -General of the World Trade 1.4.  
Organization (WTO) that it had  engaged in consultations with the United  States  but that those 
consultations had not led to mutual agreement on an arbitrator . China  therefore  requested the 
Director -General to appoint an arbitrator pursuant to footnote 12 to Article  21.3(c) of the DSU.  
                                                
1 WT/DS471/AB/R.  
2 WT/DS471/R.  
3 WT/DSB/M/398, para. 2.7.  
4 WT/DS471/13.  
5 WT/DS471/14.  WT/DS471/RPT  
 
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After consulting with the parties, t he Director -General appointed me as the Arbitrator on 1.5.  
7 November  2017.6 On the same day , I informed the parties of my acceptance of the appointment 
as Arbitrator and transmitted to the m a Working Schedule identifying the  dates for the filing of the 
parties' written submissions and the date for the hearing.7  
On 9 November  2017, the United  States  sent a letter requesting that the due date for its 1.6.  
written submission be extended by one week , in light of pre-existing scheduli ng constraints 
affecting  key members of its litigation team, as well as the need for cooperation between two 
federal agencies,  namely,  the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and the United States 
Department of Commerce (USDOC). On the same day , I invited China  to comment on the 
United  States ' letter . On 10 November  2017, China  sent a letter object ing to the United  States ' 
request . China argued that the reasons given by the United States did not justify the requested 
extension and that such extension would cause undue delay in this arbitration.  However, in the 
event that an extension of the due date was granted for the United States' written submission, 
China requested that a similar extension be granted for its written submission.  
Having t aken account of  the United  States ' request and China's comments, and in view of a 1.7.  
number of meetings and other activities taking place in early December 2017, on 
10 November  2017, I sent a revised Working Schedule  to the parties . In accordance with the 
revised Working Schedule, t he United  States  filed its written submission on 17 November 2017, 
and China  filed its written submission on 27  November  2017. The parties elaborated on their 
positions and answered my questions at the hearing held on 8 December  2017. At the hearing, 
I indicated that every effort would be made to issue the Award in January 2018.  The parties  
expressed  no objection.  
ARGUMENTS OF THE PAR TIES  2  
Annexes A and B to this Award contain the executive summaries of the parties' submissions. 2.1.  
Certain d etails of the parties' arguments are further described  below , insofar as they are relevant 
to my analysis . 
REASONABLE PERIOD OF  TIME  3  
3.1  Introduction  
I have been appointed by the Director -General, at the request of China , to determine the 3.1.  
reasonable p eriod of time  for the United  States  to implement the recommendations and rulings of 
the DSB in United States – Certain Methodologies and Their Application to Anti -Dumping 
Proceedings Involving China .  
The United  States  considers  that I  should  determine tha t 24 months is a reasonable period of 3.2.  
time for the United  States  to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings  in this dispute.8 
In China's view, the United States' proposal for 24 months "far exceeds what is reasonable under 
the circumstances " of thi s dispute9, and submits  that a period of 6 months is a reasonable period  
of time for implementation.10  
In this section , I begin by setting out the mandate of an arbitrator under Article 21.3(c) of 3.3.  
the DSU. I then identify  the specific  measure s to be brought into conformity with the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB. Finally,  I examine  the factors affecting the 
determination of the reasonable period of time  in this dispute, including  the steps in the 
implementation process, as well as circumsta nces particular to this dispute that the United States  
has asked me to take into account in reaching my determination .  
                                                
6 WT/DS471/15.  
7 The Working Schedule of 7 November 2017 indicated that the written submission of the United  States 
should be filed on 14 November 2017; the written submission of China should be filed on 21 November 2017; 
and the hearing would be held on 27  November 2017.  
8 United  States' submission, paras. 9 and 55.  
9 China's submission, para. 7.  
10 China's submission, paras. 1 and 28.  WT/DS471/RPT  
 
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3.2  Mandate of the arbitrator under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU  
Article 21.3 of the DSU provides, in relevant part:  3.4.  
If it is impracticable to  comply immediately with the recommendations and rulings [of 
the DSB], the Member concerned shall have a reasonable period of time in which to 
do so. The reasonable period of time shall be:  
... 
(c) a period of time determined through binding arbitration wi thin 90 days 
after the date of adoption of the recommendations and rulings. In such 
arbitration, a guideline for the arbitrator should be that the reasonable 
period of time to implement panel or Appellate Body recom mendations 
should not exceed 15  months fr om the date of adoption of a panel or 
Appellate Body report. However, that time may be shorter or longer, 
depending upon the particular circumstances.11  
The mandate of the arbitrator , pursuant to Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, is therefore to 3.5.  
determine the time  period within which the implementing Member must comply with the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB.12  
Article 21.3(c) provides a guideline for the arbitrator that the period of implementation  3.6.  
should not exceed 15  months . Accordin g to th e last sentence of Article 21.3 (c), the "particular 
circumstances " of the dispute  may affect the length of the reasonable period of time , making it 
"shorter or longer ". Other provisions of the DSU also shed light on the mandate of an arbitrator. 
Article 21.1 states that "prompt compliance " with the DSB's  recommendations and rulings "is 
essential in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes ". Moreover, the introductory clause of 
Article 21.3 stipulates that a reasonable period of time for impl ementation shall be available only 
"[i]f it is impracticable to comply immediately with the [DSB's ] recommendations and rulings ". 
Article 21.2 directs an arbitrator to pay "particular attention … to matters affecting the interests of 
developing country Mem bers with respect to measures which have been subject to dispute 
settlement ".  
The means of implementation chosen by the Member concerned is relevant to the 3.7.  
determination of the reasonable period of time . As noted in past awards, "when  a Member must 
comply  cannot be determined in isolation from the means used for implementation. "13 Therefore,  
"to determine when a Member must comply, it may be necessary to consider how a Member 
proposes to do so. "14 Consistent with previous awards of arbitrators under Article  21.3(c), the  
implementing Member has a measure of discretion in choosing the means of implementation that it 
deems most appropriate. This discretion, however, "is not an 'unfettered' right to choose any 
method of implementation ".15 Rather, it is rele vant to  consider, in particular , "whether  the 
                                                
11 Footnotes 12-13 omitted.  
12 In response to questioning at the hearing in this arbitration, both the United States and China  agreed 
that the following principles are relevant for the determination of the reasonable period of time for 
implementation:  
The implementing Member has discretion to select the means of implementation that it deems most 
appropriate.  
The implementing Mem ber's discretion is not unfettered. Rather, the chosen method of implementation:  
-  must be such that it could be implemented within a reasonable period of time in accordance with 
the guidelines contained in Article 21.3(c);  
-  must be apt in form, natur e, and content to effect compliance; and  
-  should otherwise be consistent with the covered agreements.  
The "particular circumstances" of a dispute may affect the arbitrator's  calculation of the reasonable 
period of time, and may make it "shorter or long er". 
While a Member is not required to utilize extraordinary procedures to bring its measures into 
compliance, it must nevertheless utilize all the flexibilities and discretion available within its legal and 
administrative system in order to implement within the shortest period of time possible.  
13 Award of the Arbitrator, US – COOL (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 68. (emphasis original)  
14 Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article  21.3(c)) , para. 26. (emphasis original) See 
also Awards of the Arbitrators, US – COOL (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 68; US – Washing Machines 
(Article  21.3(c)) , para. 3.8.  
15 Award of the Arbitrator, Colombia – Ports of Entry (Article  21.3(c)) , para. 36.  WT/DS471/RPT  
 
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implementing action falls within the range of permissible actions that can be taken in order to 
implement the DSB 's recommendations and rulings ".16 Thus, the chosen method of 
implementation must be  apt in form, nature, and content to bring the Member into compliance 
with its WTO  obligations.17  
Inasmuch as they elaborate on those aspects of the measure at issue that were found to be 3.8.  
inconsistent with WTO obligations, t he findings by the panel in the under lying dispute offer 
guidance for determining whether the proposed implementing measures are apt to achieve 
compliance,  as well as how long is reasonably needed to do so.18 It is nevertheless  beyond the 
mandate of an arbitrator under Article 21.3(c) to deter mine the consistency with the covered 
agreements of the measure that the implementing Member envisages to adopt in order to comply 
with the DSB's recommendations and rulings. This question, should it arise, is to be addressed in 
proceedings conducted pursu ant to Article 21.5 of the DSU.19 Arbitration under Article  21.3(c) of 
the DSU is limited to determining the period of time within which implementation of the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB is to occur.20 
As regards the length of the reasonable perio d of time, as noted above, Article 21.3(c) of the 3.9.  
DSU provides a guideline for the arbitrator that this "should not exceed 15  months from the date 
of adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report ". As set out above,  Article  21.1 of the DSU 
provides that "prompt compliance " is essential for the effec tive resolution of WTO disputes , and 
the first clause of Article 21.3 stipulates that a "reasonable period of time " for implementation  shall 
be available only "[i]f it is impracticable to comply immediately with  the recommendations and 
rulings " of the DSB. According to the last sentence of Article  21.3(c), the "particular 
circumstances " of a dispute may affect the length of the reasonable period of time,  making it 
"shorter or longer ". In this respect, previous ar bitrators have considered that the reasonable 
period of time for implementation should, in principle, be the shortest period possible within the 
legal system of the implementing Member21 that will enable it to achieve effect ive implementation 
of the DSB's  recommendations and rulings22, taking account of the "particular circumstances " of 
the dispute.23  
In considering the "particular circumstances " under Article 21.3(c), previous arbitrators 3.10.   
have found that the complexity of the implementation process and the n ature of the steps to be 
taken for implementation are relevant to the determination of the reasonable period of time.24 
Previous arbitrators have also highlighted that the objective of "prompt compliance " calls for the 
implementing Member to utilize the flexibilities available within its legal system in implementing 
the relevant recommendations and rulings of the DSB  in the shortest period of time possible .25 
However, an implementing Member is not expected to utilize "extraordinary procedures " to bri ng 
                                                
16 Awards of the  Arbitrators,  Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 48 ; Japan – DRAMs 
(Korea) (Article 21.3(c)), para. 27 ; US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (Article  21.3(c)) , para. 42.  
17 See Awards of the Arbitrators, Colombia – Ports of Entry (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 64; China – GOES 
(Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.2; US – Countervailing Measures (China) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.3; Colombia ‒ 
Textiles (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.4; US – Washing Machines (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.8 . 
18 See Award of the Arbitrator, Colombia – Textiles (Article 21.3(c)) , paras. 3.5 and 3.39 -3.40. 
19 See Awards of the Arbitrators, Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 27; US – 
Countervailing Measures (China) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.4;  Colombia – Textiles (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.6 . 
20 See Awards of the Arbitrators, China – GOES (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.2; US – Countervailing 
Measures (China) (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.4; Peru – Agricultural Products (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.6;  
US – Washing Machines (Article  21.3(c)) , para. 3.8.  
21 See Awards of the Arbitrators, EC – Hormones (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 26;  
Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 25; China – GOES (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.3;  
US – Countervailing Measures (China) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.5 . 
22 See A ward of the Arbitrator, US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 53.  
23 See Awards of the Arbitrators, China – GOES (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.3 ; US – Countervailing 
Measures (China) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.5 . 
24 See Awards of the Arbitrator s, EC – Bananas III (Article 21.3(c)) , para.  19; EC – Tariff Preferences 
(Article  21.3(c)) , para. 53; US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 26;  
US – Countervailing Measures (China) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.19 . 
25 See Awar ds of the Arbitrators, US ‒ Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  64;  
Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article  21.3(c)) , para. 25; Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (Article  21.3(c)) , para. 48; US – 
Stainless Steel (Mexico) (Article  21.3(c)) , para. 42; China – GOES (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.4;  US – 
Countervailing Measures (China) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.5; US – Shrimp II (Viet Nam) (Article 21.3(c)) , 
para. 3.5; Colombia – Textiles (Article 21.3(c)) , paras. 3.51-3.53. WT/DS471/RPT  
 
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its measure into compliance26, and implementa tion "must be effected in a transparent and efﬁcient 
manner that affords due process to all interested parties ".27 
With regard to the burden of proof, it is well esta blished that the implementing Member 3.11.   
bears the overall burden to prove that the time  period requested for implementation constitutes a 
"reasonable period of time ".28 However, this does not "absolve " the complaining Member of its  
duty to provide evidence supporting  why it disagrees with the period of time proposed by the 
implementing Member, and to substantiate  its view  that any shorter period of time for 
implementation  that it proposes  is reasonable.29  
3.3  Measure s to be brought into conformity  
The dispute underlying this arbitration concerns China's challenge of certain methodologies  3.12.   
and their use by the USDOC in a number of  anti-dumping proceedings . At the hearing, the parties 
accepted that the United States' implementing obligations relate to the findings  made by the Panel  
that are s et forth in paragraphs  8.1.a through 8.1.c of the Panel Report , and that the  measures at 
issue could generally be summarized as follows30:  
a. in respect of the Single Rate Presumption (SRP):  
i. the USDOC's  presumption that, in anti -dumping proceedings involving a non -market 
economy (NME), exporters form part of an NME -wide entity and are assigned a 
single anti -dumping duty rate unless each exporter demonstrates, through the 
fulfilment of the criteria set ou t in the "Separate Rate Test ", an absence of de jure  
and de facto  governmental control of its export activities31; and  
ii. the USDOC's determinations to apply the SRP in the 38 anti -dumping determinations 
challenged by China (namely, 13 original investigations and 25  administrative 
reviews)32; 
b. in respect  of the weighted average -to-transaction (W -T) methodology applied in three of 
the 38 anti -dumping determinations challenged by China  (namely, three original 
investigations):  
i. the USDOC's  determinations to apply the W -T methodology on the basis of:  
 its identification of a pattern of export prices which differ significantly among 
different purchasers, regions or time periods33; and  
 its explanation  as to why such differences could not be take n into account by the 
comparison methodologies that are normally to be used34;  
                                                
26 See Awards of the Arbitrators, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 74;  
Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 25; Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 48; 
US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 42; US – COOL (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 70; China – GOES 
(Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.4; US – Countervailing Measures (China) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.5; US – Washing 
Machines (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.9.  
27 Award of the Arbitrator, China – GOES (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.46. See also Awards of the 
Arbitrators, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews (Article  21.3(c)) , para. 51; Japan  – DRAMS 
(Korea)  (Article  21.3(c)) , para. 51; US – Shrimp II (Viet Nam)  (Article  21.3(c)) , para. 3.36.  
28 See Awards of the Arbitrators, Canada – Pharmaceutical  Patents (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 47;  
US – 1916 Act (Article  21.3(c)) , para. 33; EC – Tariff Preferences (Article  21.3(c)) , para. 27;  China – GOES 
(Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.5; US – Countervailing Measures (China) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.6; US – Washin g 
Machines (Article  21.3(c)) , para. 3.10.  
29 Awards of the Arbitrators, Colombia – Ports of Entry (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 67;  
US – Washing Machines (Article  21.3(c)) , para. 3.10.  
30 At the hearing, China also referred to paragraph 6.7 of the Appellate Body  Report in this dispute, 
where the Appellate Body declared certain Panel statements moot. However, China accepted that this finding 
does not create an additional implementation obligation for the United States.  
31 Panel Report, paras. 7.311 and 8.1.c.ii.  
32 Panel Report, para. 8.1.c.iii.  
33 Panel Report, para. 8.1.a.i. I note that the Panel's finding on this point pertains to two of the 
three  original investigations at issue.  WT/DS471/RPT  
 
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ii. the USDOC's application of the W -T methodology to all export transactions35; and  
iii. the USDOC's use of zeroing under the W -T methodology36; and  
c. the USDOC's use of zeroing under the W -T methodology in one of the 38 anti -dumping 
determinations challenged by China (namely, one administrative review).37  
In ruling on the claims raised by China against these measures, t he Panel found:  3.13.   
a. the SRP  to be inconsistent "as such " with Article 6.10 and Article 9.2 of the  
Anti-Dumping  Agreement38;  
b. the United States to have acted inconsistently with Article 6.10 and Article 9.2 of the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement because the USDOC applied the SRP in the 38  anti-dumping 
determinations challenged  by China39;  
c. the United States to have acted inconsistently with Article  2.4.2 of the Anti -Dumping 
Agreement because of certain steps taken by the USDOC in relation to the 
W-T methodology  and its use of zeroing under the W -T methodology in three  original 
anti-dumping investigations40; and   
d. the United States to have acted inconsistently with Article 2.4.2 of the Anti -Dumping 
Agreement and Article  VI:2 of the GATT 1994 because of the USDOC's use of zeroing 
under the W -T methodology in one administrative review .41  
Accordingly, for purposes of this arbitration , the United States' implementation obligations 3.14.   
pertain to the recommendations and rulings of the DSB with respect to one finding  of "as such" 
inconsistency  pertaining to the SRP, as well as  several  findings of  "as applied " inconsistency 
pertaining to the  USDOC's use of the SRP in 38 anti -dumping determinations  and the USDOC's  use 
of the W -T methodology , including its use of zeroing under that methodology,  in four of these 
38 anti-dumping determinations . 
3.4  Factors affecting the determination of the reasonable period of time  
The United  States considers  that I  should  determine that 24 months is a reasonable period 3.15.   
of time for implementing the D SB's recommendations and rulings in this dispute, due to "the 
number and magnitude of modifications to the challenged measures, the procedural requirements 
under U.S.  law, the complexity of the issues involved, and the current resource demands and 
constrai nts on the USDOC ".42 The United States highlights "the brea dth and complexity of the 
DSB's  recommendations ", in particular in light of the "as applied " findings, which relate  to 
38 anti-dumping determinations, and "the significant additional analysis that t he USDOC likely will 
be required to undertake ".43 Regarding the chosen means of implementation, the United  States 
intends to undertake two distinct s ets of proceedings: (i) one proceeding pursuant to 
Section  123(g) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA)44 to address the "as such " 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB pertaining to the SRP; and (ii) 38  separate proceedings 
pursuant to Section  129(b) of the URAA45 to address the DSB's "as applied " recommendations and 
rulings relating to the USDOC's  use of the SRP in 38 anti -dumping determinations, as well as its 
use of the W -T methodology, and zeroing under that methodology, in certain of those 
                                                                                                                                                  
34 Panel Report, para. 8.1.a.ii.  
35 Panel Report, para. 8.1.a.iii.  
36 Panel Report, para. 8.1.a.iv.  
37 Panel Report, para. 8.1.b.  
38 Panel Report, para. 8.1.c.ii.  
39 Panel Report, para. 8.1.c.iii.  
40 Panel Report, paras. 8.1.a.i -8.1.a.iv.  
41 Panel Report, para. 8.1.b.  
42 United  States' submission, para. 10.  
43 United  States' submission, para. 9.  
44 Codified as United  States Code , Title 19, Section 3533(g) (contained in Exhibit USA -1). 
45 Codified as United  States Code , Title 19, Section 3538(b) (contained in Exhibit USA -2). WT/DS471/RPT  
 
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determinations.46 According to the United  States, while these two sets of proceedings must be 
undertaken se quentially, there can be "a small degree of overlap " between them.47 In particular, 
the United  States proposes to commence the Section 129 proceedings once the preliminary 
determination in the Section 123 proceeding has been issued.48 
China does not question  the USDOC's recourse to proceedings under Section 123 and 3.16.   
Section  129 of the URAA for purposes of implementation in this dispute.49 In particular, China does 
not question that a Section  123 proceeding is an appropriate way to implement the DSB's 
"as such" recommendations and rulings pertaining to the SRP. Nor does China object to the degree 
of overlap between these proceedings that the United States indicates would occur. Rather, China 
accepts as reasonable the United  States' proposal to commence the procee dings pursuant to 
Section 129 once the preliminary determination pursuant to Section 123 has been issued.50 China 
nevertheless argues that the amount of time sought by the United States, both for its Section 123 
proceeding  and for the multiple Section  129 p roceedings, is "unreasonably long " in the 
circumstances of this case.51  
In my analysis below, I first address the parties' arguments concerning the specific steps to 3.17.   
be taken by the United  States in proceedings under Section 123 and Section 129, as well as  the 
period of time that is reasonably required to complete such steps. I then address the particular 
circumstances of this dispute alleged by the parties to be relevant to my determination of the 
reasonable period of time.  
Steps in the implementation proc ess 3.4.1   
As indicated above, the parties agree that the implementation of the DSB's "as such " 3.18.   
recommendations and rulings can and should take place through a proceeding under Section 123 
of the URAA and that the implementation of the DSB's "as applied " recommen dations and rulings 
pertaining to the 38 anti -dumping determinations challenged by China can and should take place 
through separate proceedings  under Section  129 of the URAA . The parties disagree, however, on 
the time period necessary to conduct such proce edings. The subsection s below address, in turn, 
the implementation of the DSB's  "as such" recommendations and rulings through a Section 123 
proceeding concerning the SRP, and  the implementation of the DSB's "as applied " 
recommendations and rulings concerning the 38  anti-dumping determinations at issue through 
separate Section  129 proceedings.  
Implementation of the DSB's "as such" recommendations and rulings pertaining 3.4.1.1   
to the SRP  
In order to implement the DSB's recommend ations and rulings pertaining to the Panel's 3.19.   
"as such" finding regarding the SRP, the United S tates intends to utilize the process set out in 
Section  123(g) of the URAA. In addition, the  United  States indicates that, prior to the 
commencement of this proce ss, it needs time to conduct "inter-agency consultations " and related  
activity52 so as to allow the USTR and the USDOC to consider the options available for 
implementation.53 In considering the period of time required to complete both , the initial period of 
inter-agency consultations and re lated activity, and the Section  123 proceeding, the United  States 
emphasizes the "complexity " of the issues involved and the "far-reaching impact " of the 
                                                
46 United  States' submission, para. 30. The United States refers to the Sect ion 123 proceeding and the 
Section 129 proceedings as "Phase I" and "Phase II" of the implementation process, respectively. ( Ibid.,  
paras.  7 and 18 ) 
47 United  States' submission, para. 26. See also para. 49 (United States' proposed timetable).  
48 United  States' submission, paras. 7 and 26.  
49 China's  submission, paras. 35 -36; opening statement and response to questioning at the hearing.  
50 China's submission, paras. 27, 36, and 38; opening statement and response to questioning at the 
hearing.  
51 China's submission, para. 36.  
52 In its proposed timetable, the United States explains that, during this period, the USTR and the 
USDOC consult, "pre -commencement analysis preparation" is undertaken, and the USDOC "begins devising 
methodologies to implement adverse  findings in preparation for commencement of section 123 and section 129 
proceedings". (United  States' submission, para.  49) 
53 United States' submission, para. 32. In its proposed timetable, the United  States indicates that this 
preliminary step took place  from May to December 2017 (i.e. approximately 7 months following the adoption of 
the Panel and Appellate Body Reports on 22 May 2017). (Ibid. , para.  49) WT/DS471/RPT  
 
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implementation process.54 In total, the United  States claims that 15  months are required to 
address the DSB's "as such " recommendations and rulings pertaining to the SRP.55 According to 
the United States, this amount of time is to be allocated as follows: approximately 7  months for 
the initial inter -agency consultations and r elated activity; approximately 4 months to issue the 
preliminary determination once the Section 123 proceeding has commenced; and approximately 
4 months to issue the final determination in the Section 123 proceeding.56 
China disputes that the implementation  of the DSB's "as such " recommendations and 3.20.   
rulings is nearly as complicated as the United States suggests.57 In this context, China contends 
that the reasonable period of time should not include any time after the adoption of the Panel and 
Appellate Body R eports for preparatory work because the USTR a nd the USDOC had at least 
7 months prior to the adoption of those reports to undertake such work.58 Moreover, China  
contests the amount of time that the United States claims it requires to issue the preliminary and 
the final determinations. China submits that, in the present dispute, the United  States requires 
only 15  days to issue a preliminary determination59 and that  the additional time allocated for the 
United  States to issue the final determination "should be brief ".60 
Section 123(g)(1) and (2) of the URAA reads61:  3.21.   
(g) Requirements for agency action  
(1)  Changes in agency regulations or practice  
In any case in which  a dispute settlement panel or the Appellate Body finds in its 
report that a regulation or practice of a department or agency of the United  States is 
inconsistent with any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, that regulation or practice 
may not be amended, res cinded, or otherwise modified in the implementation of such 
report unless and until —  
(A)  the appropriate congressional committees have been consulted under 
subsection (f)62; 
(B)  the Trade Representative has sought advice regarding the modification 
from r elevant private sector advisory committees established under 
section 135 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2155);  
(C)  the head of the relevant department or agency has provided an 
opportunity for public comment by publishing in the Federal Register the  
proposed modification and the explanation for the modification;  
(D)  the Trade Representative has submitted to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report describing the proposed modification, the reasons for 
                                                
54 United S tates' submission, para. 35. See also  heading  II:B of that submission , where the United 
States refers to the "legal and technical complexity of this matter".  
55 United  States' submission, paras. 24 and 36.  
56 United States' submission, para. 49.  
57 China's submission, para. 34.  
58 China's submission, para. 25. See also para. 39.  
59 China's submission,  paras. 44 and 46.  
60 China's submission, para. 47.  
61 Section 123(g)(1) and (2) of the URAA (contained in Exhibit USA -1). 
62 Subsection (f) refers to "[a]ctions upon circulation of reports" and requires that:    
Promptly after the circulation of a report of a  panel or of the Appellate Body to WTO members in 
a proceeding described in subsection (d) of this section, the Trade Representative shall —  
(1) notify the appropriate congressional committees of the report;  
(2) in the case of a report of a panel, consult  with the appropriate congressional committees 
concerning the nature of any appeal that may be taken of the report; and  
(3) if the report is adverse to the United  States, consult with the appropriate congressional 
committees concerning whether to implemen t the report's recommendation and, if so, the 
manner of such implementation and the period of time needed for such implementation.  
(Section 123(f) of the URAA ( contained in Exhibit USA -1)) WT/DS471/RPT  
 
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the modification, and a summary of the advice obtained under 
subparagraph (B) with respect to the modification;  
(E)  the Trade Representative and the head of the relevant department or 
agency have consulted with the appropriate congressional committees on 
the proposed contents of the final rule  or other modification; and  
(F)  the final rule or other modification has been published in the Federal 
Register.  
(2)  Effective date of modification  
A final rule or other modification to which paragraph (1) applies may not go into effect 
before the end of the 60 -day period beginning on the date on which consultations 
under paragraph (1)(E) begin, unless the president determines that an earlier 
effective date is in the national interest.  
Pursuant to Section 123(g)(1), proceedings under that section are us ed to amend, rescind, 3.22.   
or otherwise modify regulations or practices of a department or agency of the United  States in 
response to a WTO dispute settlement panel or Appellate Body report. In the present dispute, the 
Panel found the SRP to be a norm of genera l and prospective application that could be challenged 
"as such " in WTO dispute settlement.63 In reaching this conclusion, the Panel stressed, inter alia , 
the "consistent application " of the SRP since 1991, demonstrating "a pattern of conduct by the 
USDOC t hat one can reasonably expect will be followed in the future ".64 I understand the parties to 
agree that Section 123(g) can and should be used to address the Panel's  "as such " finding  of 
inconsistency pertaining to the SRP .65 
The parties further agree that su bparagraphs (A) through (F) of Section 123(g)(1) above 3.23.   
identify the steps involved in a Section 123 proceeding.66 I note that the only prescribed time 
period is found in Section  123(g)(2), which provides that, normally, the final rule or modification 
may no t go into effect until at least 60 days after the USTR and the USDOC have consulted with 
the relevant congressional committees on the proposed modification. As confirmed by the 
United  States at the hearing, there are no other prescribed time periods for a proceeding under 
Section  123 or for the individual steps involved. I understand from the parties' explanations at the 
hearing that some of the steps of a Section 123 proceeding can take place concurrently. According 
to the United States, whereas a necessar y first step of the process is for the USTR to begin 
consulting with the appropriate congressional committees  in line with the requirements of 
subparagraph (A), the USTR is able  to seek advice from  relevant private sector advisory 
committees at the same time that the public is afforded an opportunity to comment on the 
proposal , as provided for in steps  (B) and (C).67 The United States nevertheless stressed that 
step (D), which involves preparing a re port for the relevant congressional committees, can take 
place only after steps (B) and (C)  are completed , since the report in question must summarize the 
results of the private sector consultations and public comments on the proposed modification. It 
also seems logical  that the consultations with congressional committees foreseen in step (E) could 
be expected to occur only after submission of the report referenced in step (D). I further 
understand that no public notice is given of the date of commencement of a Section 123 
proceeding (step (A)), and that step (C), which involves publishing the proposed modification and 
the explanation for the modification in the Federal Register , corresponds to the "preliminary 
determination " referred to by the parties in th eir submissions.68 I note that the date by which 
step (C) can reasonably be completed in the context of the present dispute is of particular 
significance since the parties agree that the implementation of the DSB's "as applied " 
                                                
63 Panel Report, paras. 7.339 and 8.1.c.ii.  
64 Panel Report, paras. 7.336  and 7.337 , respectively . 
65 United States' submission, para. 7; China's  submission, para. 36; parties' responses to questioning at 
the hearing.  
66 United States' submission, para. 31; China's submission, para. 37; parties' responses to questioning 
at the hearing.  
67 By contrast, China considers that all of the steps described in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) can be 
conducted concurrently. (China's response to questioning at the hearing)  
68 Similarly, I understand that step (F), which involves publishing  the final rule or other modification in 
the Federal Register, corresponds to the "final determination" referred to by the parties in their submissions.  WT/DS471/RPT  
 
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recommendations and rulings t hrough proceedings under Section  129 of the URAA should 
commence upon issuance of  the preliminary determination under  Section 123.  
The parties disagree on the time necessary to complete the process under Section  123 in 3.24.   
implementing the DSB's "as such " recommendations and rulings in this dispute and, in particular, 
on the time that is required for preparatory work and until issuance of a preliminary determination 
under Section 123. As set out above, the United  States indicates that it requires 7 months f rom 
the adoption of the Panel and Appellate Body Reports to conduct inter -agency consultations  and 
related activity prior to commencing  a Section 123 proceeding. Regarding the time required to 
issue the preliminary determination once  the proceeding under S ection 123 has commenced, the 
United  States submits that approximately 4 months are required. In support of these proposed 
time periods, the United States highlights the complexity of the issues at hand in this dispute, in 
particular since it is the first time that the United States is required to conduct such a modification 
of the SRP.69  
By contrast, China maintains that no time after the DSB's adoption of the Panel and 3.25.   
Appellate Body Reports should be awarded for  inter-agency consultations and related act ivity.70 
China argues that the United States had ample time to conduct inter-agency consultation s and 
analysis preparation  prior to the adoption of the se reports.71 Similarly, according to China, 15  days 
are sufficient to issue the preliminary determination in light of the United States' awareness of the 
WTO-inconsistency of the SRP prior to the adoption of the Panel and Appellate  Body Reports.72  
Thus, in setting out their respective positions as to the time periods required to conduct 3.26.   
inter-agency consultati ons and related activity, and to issue the preliminary determination, the 
parties mainly disagree on the complexity of implementing the "as such " recommendations and 
rulings of the DSB and the steps that the United States could and should have undertaken p rior to 
the adoption of the Panel and Appellate Body Reports.  
I first address China's argument that the United  States should have begun taking steps 3.27.   
towards implementation  prior to the adoption of the Panel and Appellate Body Reports, whether in  
the form of inter -agency consultations or other preparatory work prior to the commence ment of 
the Section 123 process, or under Section 123  after the process had commenced .73 In its written 
submission , China emphasizes that, although the reasonable period of time for implementation is 
measured as from the date of adoption of the panel and Appellate Body reports74, to date,  the 
United States "has not commenced any proceedings to revise or repeal its WTO -inconsistent 
measures and does  not intend to begin to do so until [December 2017] ".75 Yet, China points out  
that the United States has known  that the SRP is  WTO-inconsistent since November  2014, when 
the panel report in US – Shrimp II (Viet Nam) was circulate d. China highlights that the panel in 
that dispute also found the SRP to be  WTO-inconsistent, and the United States did not appeal that 
finding.76 China adds that, at the latest, the United States has known that it would have to bring 
certain of its measure s, including the SRP, into conformity with the WTO agreements since 
November 2016, when the United States decided not to appeal the findings of inconsistency 
contained in the Panel  Report in this dispute.77 China also relies on Section 123(f)(3) of the URAA , 
which requires the USTR to consult with the appropriate congressional committees as to the 
manner of implementation "promptly after the circulation " of a panel or Appellate Body report. 
According to China, the USTR was thus required to enter into such co nsultations after the 
United  States' decision not to appeal the Panel Report in November 2016.78 
                                                
69 United States' response to questioning at the hearing.  
70 China's submission, para. 25.  
71 China's subm ission, paras. 39 -40. See also para. 25.  
72 China's submission, para. 46; opening statement and response to questioning at the hearing.  
73 China's submission, paras. 42 -43 and 46.  
74 China's submission, para. 3.  
75 China's submission, para. 5 (referring to Uni ted States' submission, para. 49  (United States' proposed 
timetable) ). See also para. 22 and fn 28 thereto.  
76 China's submission, para. 4 (referring to Panel Report , US – Shrimp II (Viet Nam) , para.  8.1.c).  
77 China's submission, para. 4.  
78 China's submission, para. 42. The United States argued at the hearing that Section 123(f)(3) does not 
require it to start implementation upon circulation of the relevant reports, and reiterated that implementation 
obligations arise as of the date of the DS B's recommendations and rulings. The United States further explained 
that consultations with Congress that take place prior to the adoption of the relevant reports pertain mainly to WT/DS471/RPT  
 
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As an initial matter, I note that previous arbitrators have considered consultations within 3.28.   
government agencies to be a typical aspect of "law-making ", and that , regardless of whether they 
are mandated by law, the time needed to undertake such consultations should be taken into 
account in determining a reasonable period of time for implementation.79 In the specific context of  
this dispute, taking appropriate time for preparatory work – whether in the form of inter -agency 
consultations , other preparatory work,  or consultation s with appropriate congressional committees 
under Section 123(g)(1)(A) – could serve a useful and import ant purpose in ensuring that the 
resulting methodology will be consistent with the covered agreements. In particular, such 
preparatory work could facilitate (and therefore reduce the time required to undertake) 
subsequent steps in the implementation proces s.  
Like previous arbitrators, I consider that formal implementation steps need only be taken 3.29.   
after the adoption of the relevant panel and Appellate Body reports . .80 By the time of the hearing 
in this arbitration, over 6 months had  elapsed since the DSB's  adoption of the Panel and Appellate 
Body Reports in this dispute. According to the United  States, it has taken implementation steps in 
the form of inter -agency consultations during that time.81 In addition, the United States indicated 
at the hearing that co nsultations with the relevant congressional committees required by  Section 
123(g)(1)(A) are ongoing.82 The United  States also clarified that there are no public records of 
these preliminary steps.83 I accept that some degree of consultation among the USDOC, the USTR, 
and the relevant congressional committees has already occurred. Nonetheless, in the absence o f 
specific information from the United States about these  consultations, the nature and timing of this 
preparatory work is unclear.  
Whereas implementati on obligations arise as of the date of the DSB's recommendations and 3.30.   
rulings, I consider that circumstances pre -dating the adoption of the relevant panel or 
Appellate  Body reports may in some instances bear on the determination of the reasonable period 
of time.84 I am aware that the United States did not appeal the Panel's finding of "as such " 
inconsistency pertaining to the SRP. Therefore, the United States was, at least to a certain extent, 
in a position to begin considering its options for implementation prior to the adoption of the Panel 
and Appellate  Body Reports  in this dispute .85 Moreover, as I will explain below, I am not persuaded 
that the implementation options available to the United States are especially numerous or 
complex. Thus, while I accept that preparatory work in the form of "inter-agency consultations " 
between the USD OC and the USTR or consultations with "appropriate congressional committees " is 
justified and, indeed, may well contribute to expediting the remaining steps in the implementation 
process, I do not consider that as many months are needed for these initial s teps as the 
United  States contends. I understand, as well, that these consultations in any e vent continue while 
the Section  123 process is ongoing.86 I further recall that Article 21.1 of the DSU expressly 
identifies prompt compliance with the recommendatio ns and rulings of the DSB as "essential in 
order to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members " and that 
                                                                                                                                                  
whether the United States will declare its intention to implement the repo rts' findings. (United States' response 
to questioning at the hearing)  
79 Award of the Arbitrator, Chile – Price Band System  (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 42.  See Awards of the 
Arbitrators, Chile – Alcoholic Beverages (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 43; US – Hot-Rolled  Steel, para. 38 . 
80 Award of the Arbitrator, US – Countervailing Measures (China) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.44. The 
parties agree that the reasonable period of time for implementation is measured as from the date of adoption 
of the relevant panel and Appe llate Body reports. ( United  States' submission, para. 49; China's submission, 
para. 3 ) 
81 United States' submission, para. 32. See also para. 49 (United States' proposed timetable).  
82 In this respect, I note that, pursuant to Section 123(f)(3) of the URAA, the USTR shall consult with 
the appropriate congressional committees as to the manner of implementation of the report "promptly after the 
circulation" of a panel or Appellate Body report. ( See supra , fn 62) 
83 United  States' response to questioning at the h earing.  
84 See also Awards of the Arbitrators, US – COOL (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 84; China – GOES 
(Article  21.3(c)) , para. 3.30.  
85 I also note that, in US – Shrimp II (Viet Nam) (Article 21.3(c)) , the United States indicated that 
consultations and other preparatory work had been undertaken in relation to the panel's "as such" finding. 
(Award of the Arbitrator, US – Shrimp II (Viet Nam) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.33) In that case, the panel's 
"as such" finding at issue equally related to the USDOC's rebuttable presumption that all companies within an 
NME country belong to a single, NME -wide entity and that a single  rate is assigned to that entity. (Panel 
Report, US – Shrimp II (Viet Nam) , para. 7.122) 
86 At the hearing, the United States explained that background substantive work continues throughout 
the Section 123 process. (United States' response to questioning at the hearing)  WT/DS471/RPT  
 
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implementing Members are expected to use the flexibilities available to them within their domestic 
legal system to achieve s uch prompt compliance.  
I now turn to the United States' argument that implementing the DSB's "as such " 3.31.   
recommendations and rulings in this dispute is particularly complex.87 In this context, the 
United  States emphasizes that it has several options for impl ementing the DSB's "as such " 
recommendations and rulings. According to the United States, the USDOC may need to consider, 
inter alia : (i) the kind and quantity of evidence required to establish governmental control over the 
exporters' export activities; (i i) the bases for requesting information from examined exporters 
regarding government ownership and control; and (iii)  procedural matters associated with the 
collection and examination of such information.88 At the hearing, the United States further 
emphasiz ed the importance of background work in considering t hese options during the 
Section  123 process.89 China takes issue with the alleged complexity of the implementation of the 
DSB's "as such " recommendations and rulings regarding the SRP. China contends that  
implementation is "straightforward " given that the United States is merely required to withdraw its 
practice of applying the SRP.90 
I recall that, in the present dispute, the DSB's "as such " recommendations and rulings 3.32.   
pertain to one Panel finding regardin g the SRP. I further recall that , under the SRP, the USDOC 
presumes that, in anti -dumping proceedings involving an NME, exporters form part of an  
NME-wide entity and are assigned a single anti -dumping duty rate unless each exporter 
demonstrates an absence of de jure and de facto  governmental control of its export activities.91 
I am not convinced that implementation in this case is necessarily straightfo rward , as China 
contends. Although the Panel found the SRP to be inconsistent "as such " with Articles  6.10 and 9.2 
of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, it also agreed with the Appellate Body in EC – Fasteners (China) 
that "an investigating authority may treat mu ltiple exporters as a single entity if it finds, through 
an objective affirmative determination, that there exists a situation that would signal that two or 
more legally distinct exporters are in such a relationship that they should be treated as a single 
entity. "92 Importantly,  as noted above,  the implementing Member has discretion in choosing the 
means of implementation it deems most appropriate . Moreover, w hile Article 3.7 of the DSU refers 
to the "withdrawal " of an inconsistent measure, it is clear that the obligation to bring a measure 
into conformity can  also be met through modification of the measure found to be  
WTO-inconsistent.93  
At the same time, I do not consider that implementation will necessarily be as complicated 3.33.   
as the United  States suggests.  The United States explained at the hearing that it is considering the 
numerous possible options available to address the DSB's "as such " recommendations and 
rulings.94 The United States views the development of an alternative analysis for single -exporter  
treatment as a WTO -consistent option for implementation in this dispute , and adds that this might 
entail  a move from a presumption  to a fact -based, case -by-case analysis.95 In my view, while 
there may  be a number of factors to be considered under such an option, there is a limit to the 
possible parameters  that may be identified as relevant to the conduct of a case -specific factual 
analysis of this nature.96 I also recall that no specific time periods ar e prescribed for any of the 
                                                
87 In its written submission, the United States also refers to the "novel ty" of the issues in the present 
dispute. (United States' submission, para. 35) However, at the hearing, the United States acknowledged that 
this was not the first time that a presumption similar to the SRP was found to be inconsistent "as such" with 
Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement. The United States further clarified that its argument  
regarding any alleged novelty was in fact one relating to the complexity of addressing its implementation 
obligations in this dispute given that this is t he first time that the United States is required to revise the SRP. 
(United States' response to questioning at the hearing)  
88 United States' submission, paras. 23 and 32.  
89 United States' response to questioning at the hearing.  
90 China's submission, para. 47. 
91 See Panel Report, para. 7.311.  
92 Panel Report, para. 7.361 ( referring to  Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China) , para.  376).  
93 Awards of the Arbitrators, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment)  (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 50;  
Japan – DRAMs (Korea)  (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 27; Brazil – Retreaded Tyres  (Article 21.3(c)) , para.  71;  
US – COOL  (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 77; US – Countervailing Measures (China)  (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.18.  
94 United States' opening statement at the hearing. See also Unit ed States' submission, para. 23.  
95 United States' opening statement and response to questioning at the hearing.  
96 In this context, I also note the United States' use of the Separate Rate Test as part of the SRP. As set 
out by the Panel, in order to overcom e the presumption of governmental control and be eligible for a separate 
dumping margin and duty rate, the SRP requires individual exporters to make a specific request to that effect WT/DS471/RPT  
 
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steps preceding the issuance of a preliminary determination under Section 123(g). Moreover, I 
note that Section  123 proceedings have been utilized by the United  States in a number of prior 
disputes for purposes of implementing t he DSB's recommendations and rulings and that , on some 
occasions, the United  States indicated that a much shorter period of time would be sufficient to 
complete the entire process.97  
On the basis of the foregoing, I consider that the United  States could  reasonably conduct 3.34.   
the necessary preparatory work and issue the preliminary determination under Section 123 in 
respect of the DSB's "as such " recommendations and rulings concerning the SRP in significantly 
less time than the 11 months it claims are needed. A s the same time, I do not consider that the  
United  States can reasonably be expected to  issue this preliminary determination within the 
15 days proposed by China.  
Finally, I recall that the parties disagree on the length of time that the United States 3.35.   
requires to complete the Section  123 process through the issuance of a final determination. The 
United States' proposed timetable indicates that, once the preliminary determination is issued, it 
requires approximately 4 additional months to issue the final de termination under Section 123.98 
The United States emphasized that this time period is necessary  to, inter alia , consider and 
address all comments received in response to its proposal before it can publish a final modification 
in the Federal Register.99 China disagrees and submits that the allocated time "should be brief and 
the process should consist mostly of formalities ".100 At the hearing, China explained that it had not 
proposed a particular length of time for this step given that both parties agree that the 
Section  129 proceedings to implement the DSB's "as applied " recommendations and rulings will 
commence as from the issuance of the preliminary determination in the Section  123 proceeding.101  
As a g eneral matter, the full timeframe  within which a Section 123 proceeding can be 3.36.   
completed is relevant to the determination of the reasonable period of time for implementation by 
the United States pursuant to that provision. In this dispute, however, as t he final stage of the 
Section 123 proceeding will proceed in parallel with the Section 1 29 proceedings, the date by 
which the Section 123 proceeding may reasonably be completed is not relevant to the 
determination of the reasonable period of time. This is bec ause of the overlap between  the 
Section  123 and Section 129 proceedings. Both parties agree that the Section 129 proceedings 
should begin upon issuance of the preliminary Section 123 determination. Both parties also agree 
that the time reasonably needed to  undertake the Section  129 proceedings will inevitably exceed 
the time needed between th e preliminary and final Section  123 determinations. Put differently, it is 
clear that it is the end of the Section 129 proceedings that will determine the end of the 
reasonable period of time for implementation in this dispute, and it is also clear that the 
Section  123 proceeding will be completed before the end of the Section 129 proceedings. For these 
reasons, I do not consider it necessary to address further how much time should reasonably be 
allocated for the USDOC to issue the final determination in the Section 123 proceeding.  
Implementation of the DSB's "as applied " recommendations and rulings  3.4.1.2   
pertaining to the 38  anti-dumping determinations at issue  
As indicated a bove, t he United States plans to address the DSB's recommendations and 3.37.   
rulings regarding the Panel's "as applied " findings through multiple proceedings under Section 129 
                                                                                                                                                  
and to pass the Separate Rate Test, which contains certain conditions aim ed to establish de jure and de facto 
independence from governmental control. With respect to de jure  governmental control, the USDOC evaluates 
the relevant laws, regulations, and other enactments in order to ascertain whether there is: (a) an absence of 
restrictive stipulations associated with an individual exporter's business and export licences; (b) any legislative 
enactments decentralizing control of companies; and (c) any other formal measures by the central and/or local 
government decentralizing contro l of companies. As for de facto governmental control, the USDOC assesses 
whether: (a) the export prices are set by, or subject to the approval of, government authority; (b) the exporter 
has the authority to negotiate and sign contracts and other agreements ; (c) the exporter has autonomy from 
the government in making decisions regarding the selection of management; and (d) the exporter retains the 
proceeds of its export sales and makes independent decisions regarding the disposition of profits or financing 
of losses. (Panel Report, para. 7.361 and fn 587 to para. 7.311)  
97 See Awards of the Arbitrator s, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Review (Article 21.3(c)) , 
para. 7; US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 56 . 
98 United States' submission , para. 49.  
99 United States' submission, para. 35.  
100 China's submission, para. 47.  
101 China's response to  questioning at the hearing.  WT/DS471/RPT  
 
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of the URAA. These findings concern the USDOC's use of the SRP in 38 anti -dumping 
determinations, as well as its use of the W -T methodology , and zeroing under that methodology, in 
certain of those determinations.102 The United States claims  that it will  need approximately 
13 months to complete these proceedings103, as from the date of issuance of the preliminary 
determination in the proceeding under Section 123 of the URAA.  
Section  129(b) and (d) of the URAA states104:  3.38.   
(b)  Action by administering authority  
(1)  Consultations with administering authority and congressional 
committees  
Promptly after a report by a dispute settlement panel or the Appellate Body is issued 
that contains findings that an action by the administering authority in a proceeding 
under title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 is not in conformity with the obligations o f the 
United  States under the Antidumping Agreement or the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures, the Trade Representative shall consult with the 
administering authority and the congressional committees on the matter.  
(2)  Determination by administering authority  
Notwithstanding any provision of the Tariff Act of 1930, the administering authority 
shall, within 180 days after receipt of a written request from the Trade 
Representative, issue a determination in connection with  the particular proceeding 
that would render the administering authority's action described in paragraph (1) not 
inconsistent with the findings of the panel or the Appellate Body.  
(3)  Consultations before implementation  
Before the administering authority  implements any determination under 
paragraph  (2), the Trade Representative shall consult with the administering authority 
and the congressional committees with respect to such determination.  
(4)  Implementation of recommendation  
The Trade Representative may, after consulting with the administering authority and 
the congressional committees under paragraph (3), direct the administering authority 
to implement, in whole or in part, the determination made under paragraph (2).  
… 
(d) Opportunity for comment by interested parties  
Prior to issuing a determination under this section, the administering authority or the 
Commission, as the case may be, shall provide interested parties with an opportunity 
to submit written comments and, in appropriate cases, may hold a  hearing, with 
respect to the determination.  
The parties agree that Section 129 proceedings, in which the USDOC will carry out 3.39.   
"redeterminations ", are an appropriate means under US law for implementing the DSB's 
"as applied " recommendations and rulings wi th respect to the 38 anti -dumping determinations.105 
They both also accept that subparagraphs (1) through (4) above identify the steps involved in a 
                                                
102 The United States refers to the Section 129 proceedings as "Phase II" of its implementation  process. 
(United  States' submission, paras. 7 and 18 ) 
103 United States' submission, para. 49.  
104 Section 129 (b) and (d) of the URAA (contained in  Exhibit USA -2). 
105 United States' submission, paras. 6 -7; China's submission, para.  36; China's response to questioning 
at the hearing.  WT/DS471/RPT  
 
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Section  129 proceeding106 and that these four steps are carried out sequentially. I also understand 
both partie s to accept that, in this dispute, the USDOC's "redeterminations " should commence 
once the preliminary determination in the Section 123 proceeding has been issued.107 The parties' 
views, however, diverge on the extent to which the multiple redeterminations t hat are needed can 
be conducted concurrently, and on the time required for these step s, notably with respect to: 
(i) the significance of the reference to a period of 180 days in Section 129(b)(2); and (ii) whether 
my determination of the reasonable period of time for implementation should account for the time 
that may be needed for the USDOC to conduct hearings and verifications in the Section 129 
proceedings.  
The United States' proposed timetable for implementation indicates that the Section 129 3.40.   
proceedin gs will commence in April 2018, once the preliminary determination in the Section 123 
proceedings has been issued.108 The United States contends that a separate Section 129 
proceeding will be needed for each of the 38 anti-dumping determinations found to be 
WTO-inconsistent.109 Furthermore, given the number of redeterminations to be carried out 
pursuant to Section 129, the United States anticipates that the USDOC  will need to divide these 
38 proceedings into three distinct tranches. The United States explains t hat the rationale for this 
"staggered " approach is due to the administrative burden on the USDOC, as well as overlapping  
deadlines for interested parties and the USDOC.110 The commencement of the three tranches is 
expected in April, May , and June of 2018, respectively. The United States' proposed timetable111 
suggests that , between April and November 2018, the USDOC will: (i ) "finalize [its] staggered 
schedule, considering, for example, whether tranches are staggered by product or by type o f 
determination, e.g., investigation rather than administrative review "; (ii) collect additional 
information through, inter alia , the development, finalization, and issuance  of questionnaires 
and/or information requests, the receipt of comments upon the re sponses received , and the 
development and issuance of possible follow -up questions and comments112; and (iii)  determine 
the approach to be used for the first tranche of preliminary Section 129 determinations. According 
to the United States, the USDOC will co ntinue to work in tranches until December 2018, by when 
preliminary determinations in all three tranches will have been issued. The United  States adds 
that, between October 2018 and March 2019, the USDOC will afford interested parties the 
opportunity to co mment on these preliminary determinations ; that the USDOC may need to hold 
hearings and/or conduct verifications ; and that the USDOC will also analyse comments received. 
According to the United States, the USDOC will be able to complete its work on the thr ee tranches, 
including issuance of the final Section 129 determinations and addressing any ministerial error 
allegations relating to them, in the 3-month period ending in May 2019. Also in May 2019, the 
United States expects the USTR and the USDOC to engag e in consultations with congressional 
committees, and the USTR to direct the USDOC to implement the final determinations in all of the 
Section 129 proceedings. Based on these considerations, the United States indicates that it will 
need approximately 13 mo nths – from the issuance of the preliminary Sec tion 123 determination 
in April  2018 through May 2019  – to complete the Section 129 proceedings.113 
                                                
106 United States' submission, paras.  38-39; China's submission, para. 49; p arties' responses to 
questioning at the hearing.  
107 United States' submission, paras. 7  and 26; China's submission, para s. 27, 36 and 38 ; China's 
response to questioning at the hearing.  
108 United States' submission, para. 49.  
109 United States' submission, para. 40; response to questioning at the hearing. In its submission, the 
United States notes  that the Section 129 proceedings for each of the 38 determinations, including the 
13 original investigations and 25 administrative reviews, "likely" would need to be separate. (United States' 
submission, para. 40 ) At the hearing, the United States clarified that the use of the term "likely" is to denote a 
future occurrence and is not meant to sugge st that it is contemplating anything different.  
110 At the hearing, t he United States clarified that these overlapping deadlines occur as interested 
parties often have the same private counsel. (United States' response to questioning at the hearing)  
111 United  States' submission, para. 49.  
112 The United States explains that the USDOC will need to solicit this additional information so as to 
determine, based on positive evidence, whether the relevant exporters or producers are separate legal entities. 
(United States' submission, para. 27 ) 
113 I understand this 13 -month period to be reflected in the United States' proposed timetable as 
follows: (i)  approximately 6 months for the USDOC to issue preliminary determinations; (ii) approximate ly 
3 months for interested parties to submit briefs to the USDOC and for the USDOC to hold hearings, conduct 
verifications, as well as analyse and prepare responses to comments from interested parties; 
(iii) approximately 2 months for the USDOC to issue final determinations and for the USTR to issue a letter 
directing the USDOC to implement the final determinations; and (iv) approximately 2 additional months due to WT/DS471/RPT  
 
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China contends that the United States should be able to complete the Section  129 3.41.   
proceedings within 5 and a hal f months.114 In China's view, all of the Section 129 proceedings 
should be run in parallel. China highlights that, while this dispute technically concerns 
38 anti-dumping determinations, it in fact concerns 13 anti -dumping cases, some of which consist 
of mul tiple-segment proceedings.115 According to China, the redeterminations could be streamlined 
because the USDOC  could  concurrently conduct multiple determinations with respect to the same 
investigation, and the analysis required would be simpler and the time n eeded shorter with respect 
to subsequent administrative reviews that raise the same issue, for example with respect to the 
SRP.116 China argues that the United States' proposal to undertake the implementation of the 
DSB's "as applied " recommendations and rul ings in 13  months is in "gross violation " of 
Section  129 of the URAA given that this provision imposes a maximum of 180 days to issue a 
redetermination .117 According to China, this period of 180 days includes all fact -finding,  
verifications, hearings , and preliminary determinations.118 China also suggests that, in ascertaining 
the time  period that would be reasonable for completion of the Section 129 redeterminations, 
I look for "guidance " from the provisions of US law that govern anti -dumping determinat ions. 
According to China, under the relevant regulations, the USDOC is permitted 215 days "to 
undertake an anti -dumping determination  from scratch ".119 In this regard, China underlines that 
the nearly 400 -day period proposed by the United States to conduct t he Section  129 proceedings 
in this dispute is almost double the length prescribed for original investigations.120 China adds that  
this goes against the reasoning of previous arbitrators under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, who have 
recognized that a redetermina tion should be shorter than an original investigation because the 
implementing Member is "only required to conduct a re -determination to implement a limited 
number of DSB rulings of inconsistency. "121 China also argues that no additional time should be 
grant ed for on -site verifications given that such verifications are not required under Section 129 of 
the URAA and seldom carried out by the USDOC in redetermination processes.122 In further 
support of its proposed 5 and a half month period for the Section 129 proceedings, China refers to 
information published in relation to the Section 129 proceedings  undertaken in response to the 
DSB's recommendations and rulings  in US – Shrimp and Sawblades , showing that the USDOC 
completed its redetermination in that dispute in 180 days and that the USTR directed 
implementation of that determination 18 days later.123 
I begin by considering the United States' proposed approach to the various Section 129 3.42.   
proceedings, including whether these proceedings need to be staggered or conducted concurrently. 
As noted above, the United States identifies the large number of redeterminations needed, as well 
as the associated administrative workload and due process considerations , as key reasons for 
staggering the Section 129 proceedings in tranches .  
China asserts that the United  States' argument regarding the USDOC workload is not a 3.43.   
relevant consideration in determining the reasonable period of time , and that , in any event , the 
USDOC is capable of h andling a large number of investigations and reviews in parallel.124 I recall 
                                                                                                                                                  
the fact that the USDOC's conduct of the redeterminations will be staggered in three tranches. (United  States' 
submissio n, para. 49)  
114 China's submission, para. 27. See also paras. 54 -56. China highlights that a S ection 129 proceeding 
involves three  stages: (i) a consultation stage, which is to be conducted "'promptly' after the circulation of the 
report"; (ii) a determinat ion stage, which is to take place within 180 days; and (iii) a final consultation stage. 
According to China, the first consultation stage should have taken place  after the circulation of the Panel 
Report in this dispute. China further submits that the dete rmination stage can be completed within 5 months, 
and that the final consultation stage can be completed within 15 days. ( Ibid., paras. 51 -56) 
115 China's submission, para. 61.  
116 China's submission, paras. 55 and 61; response to questioning at the hearing.  
117 China's submission , para. 57. See also paras. 52 and 55.  
118 China's response to questioning at the hearing.  
119 China's submission, para. 58. See also China's  opening statement at the hearing. As explained at 
para. 3.46.   and fn 135 below , the United States disputes that the USDOC is required by law to comple te 
original investigations within 215 days.  
120 China's submission, para. 58 . 
121 China's submission, para. 58 (quoting Awards of the Arbitrators, Japan – DRAMS (Article 21.3(c)) , 
para. 48; US – Washing Machines (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.50).  
122 According to China, the USDOC conducted verifications in only three of 20 recent Section 129 
proceedings. (China's submission, para. 59 and fn 67 thereto)  
123 China's response to questioning at the hearing (referring to the dispute in US – Shrimp and 
Sawblad es (DS422)).  
124 China's submission, para. 64.  WT/DS471/RPT  
 
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that several previous arbitrators have considered that, in principle, the workload of the 
implementing authority is not relevant to the determination of the reasonable period of ti me for 
implementation of the DSB's recommendations and rulings .125 I share that view. I further note 
that, in its submission, the United States sets out a possible division of the redeterminations into 
three  tranches: one tranche for the redeterminations in respect  of 13 investigations, a 
second  tranche for the redeterminations in respect of 13 administrative reviews, and a third 
tranche for the redeterminations to be made  in respect of the remaining 12  administrative 
reviews. At the same time, the United Sta tes explains  that this proposed division of work is merely 
"illustrative ", and that the USDOC expects to consider other possible ways of grouping 
redeterminations into tranches, for example by product or by type of determination (investigation 
or administr ative review).126 In my view, the proposed approach of addressing the 
redeterminations in tranches is a matter for the US authorities. In this regard, previous arbitrators 
have said that an implementing Member has a measure of discretion in choosing the mean s of 
implementation that it deems most appropriate.127 Indeed, it is just this type of flexibility, within 
their respective legal systems, that Members are expected to utilize in order to achieve prompt 
compliance with DSB recommendations and rulings. I note that the commonality in the issues to 
be considered and the relationship between original investigations and subsequent administrative 
reviews for the same products are such that it may be possible for the USDOC to expedite its work 
for many of the redete rminations.  
As regards the 180 -day period referred to in Section 129(b)(2)  of the URAA , the 3.44.   
United  States contests China's assertions that this provision constrains the USDOC  to carry out all 
aspects of a redetermination within a maximum of 180 days and that, therefore, the 13 -month 
period proposed by the United States is inconsistent with its own statute.128 The United States 
explains that  Section  129(b)(2) does not set any ove rall limit on the length of time that may be 
used to complete all of the steps involved in a redetermination, because the 180 -day period to 
which it refers is triggered not when the USDOC begins its work pursuant to Section 129, but only 
when the USTR make s a written  request to the USDOC relating to the redetermination. The 
United  States adds that nothing in the statute precludes the USDOC from commencing a 
Section  129 proceeding prior to receipt of a written request from the USTR, and beginning, for 
exampl e to issue questionnaires to parties prior to the receipt of such a request, as has been done 
in prior impleme ntation proceedings. The United  States recognizes that there have been cases 
where an entire Section 129 proceeding could be completed within 180 days; however, whether 
this can be done or not is decided on a case -by-case basis.129 The United States rejects, therefore, 
China's invocation in this dispute of the time taken for the Section 129 proceedings  undertaken in 
response to the DSB's recommendatio ns and rulings in US – Shrimp and Sawblades . The 
United  States explains that the implementation required in this case is very different from that in 
US ‒ Shrimp and Sawblades , given that here the USDOC will be applying a new methodology and 
presumably gath ering information about the relationship between importers and exporters.130 
I note that the period of 180 days specified in the text of Section 129(b)(2) of the URAA 3.45.   
refers to the period within which, following the receipt of a written request from the USTR , the 
USDOC must issue a determination implementing the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. As 
the United States points out, it is the USDOC's receipt of a written request from the USTR, rather 
than the commencement of a Section 129 proceeding, that tr iggers the start of the 180 -day 
period. Such request could, in principle, be received before or after the USDOC begins its work on 
the redetermination. Moreover, subparagraphs (1), (3), and (4) of Section 129(b) set out other 
actions involving the USTR, th e USDOC, and Congress that are to be carried out both before and 
after the written request has been made pursuant to Section 129(b)(2). I am therefore not 
persuaded by China's assertion that Section 129(b)(2) establishes a maximum time period within 
which all steps of  a Section 129 redetermination must be completed. Instead, as previous 
                                                
125 Awards of the Arbitrators, US – 1916 Act (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 38; US – Countervailing Measures 
(China) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.49; US – Shrimp II (Viet Nam) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.55; US – Washing 
Machines (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.63.  
126 United States' submission, fn 10 to para. 7. See also para. 49.  
127 Awards of the Arbitrators, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 48 ; China – GOES 
(Article  21.3(c)) , para. 3.4; US – Countervailing Measu res (China) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.3;  US – Washing 
Machines (Article 21.3(c)) , para . 3.8. 
128 United States' response to questioning at the hearing.  
129 United States' response to questioning at the hearing.  
130 United States' response to questioning at the hearing.  WT/DS471/RPT  
 
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arbitrators have done131, I accept the United States' explanations regarding the scope of this 
provision. This is, of course, without prejudice to the question of how much time is reasonably 
needed to conduct the Section 129 proceedings in this dispute.  
I turn next to the question of the relevance, for the reasonable period of time for 3.46.   
implementation, of the relative scope of original investigations and administrative reviews, on the 
one hand, and redeterminations, on the other hand. Relying on the reasoning of previous 
arbitrators, China argues that, since the scope of the redeterminations needed is much more 
limited, these proceedings require significantly less time than the t ime required in original 
proceedings.132 I accept the logic of this proposition. At the same time, I am mindful that the  
length of time needed for original investigations under US law is contested. While China asserts 
that such proceedings may take a maximum  of 215 days133, the United States contends that they 
may take up to 355 days.134  
In considering the time that is reasonably necessary to conduct the requisite Section 129 3.47.   
proceedings in this dispute, I note that, as clarified by the United States at the hearing, there is no 
provision of US law that mandates that all steps taken in original investigations must also be taken 
in Section 129 redeterminations.135 Moreover, the Section 129 redeterminations may well  be more 
limited in scope than the proceed ings in which the original, WTO -inconsi stent determinations were 
made.  Yet, as noted above, the United States views the development of an alternative analysis for 
single -exporter treatment as a WTO -consistent option for implementation in this dispute , and add s 
that this might entail  a move from a presumption  to a fact -based, case -by-case analysis.136  
I consider that  this renders it less likely that the USDOC will be able to make all of the required  
re-determinations without re -opening its factual record in at least some of the relevant 
proceedings.  
These considerations are also relevant to the disagreement between the parties on whether 3.48.   
or not my determination of the reasonable period of time should account for the time that may be 
needed for the USDOC to hold  hearings and conduct verif ications as part of the Section  129 
proceedi ngs. It is undisputed that: (i)  the USDOC is not required to conduct verifications in such 
proceedi ngs; (ii) pursuant to Section  129(d), the USDOC may, "in appropriate cases ", hold a 
hearing; and (iii) in practice, the USDOC often does not take either of these steps in a Section 129 
proceeding. Nevertheless, bearing in mind the nature of the implementation that the United States 
proposes to undertake in these redeterminations, and mindfu l that investigated exporters and 
producers themselves benefit from the opportunity to defend their interests in hearings and 
through  the process of verification, I  would be reluctant to determine any period of time for 
implementation that would foreclose the possibility that such procedural steps could be taken if 
and when warranted. Lastly, with respect to the 1 month that the United States indicates is usually 
taken for correction of any ministerial errors137, the United  States accepted at the hearing that  the 
process of addressing ministerial errors can be conducted concurrently with the process of 
consulting Congress.138 
On the basis of the foregoing, I consider that the United  States could reasonably complete 3.49.   
all of the Section  129 redeterminations in resp ect of the DSB's "as applied " recommendations and  
rulings concerning the 38 anti -dumping determinations  found to be WTO -inconsistent in 
significantly les s time than the 13 -month period it has proposed . At the same time, I believe that 
the Section 129 redeterminations to be undertaken in this dispute will require more than the 5 and 
a half months proposed by China.  
                                                
131 Awards of the Arbitrators, US – Countervailing Measures (China) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.41 ;  
US – Shrimp II (Viet  Nam) (Article 21.3(c)) ; para. 3.46; US – Washing Machines (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.47 . 
132 China's submission, para. 58 (referring to Awards of the Arbitrators, Japan – DRAMS (Korea) 
(Article  21.3(c)) , para. 48; US – Washing Machines (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.50).  
133 China's submission, para. 58; opening statement at the hearing.  
134 The United St ates explained at the hearing that US law allows for the possibility of extension of the 
deadlines for the issuance of the preliminary and final determinations in an anti -dumping investigation. The 
United States added that, when account is also taken of th e time needed to deal with any potential ministerial 
errors, an entire investigation may take 355  days. (United States' opening statement at the hearing)  
135 United States' response to questioning at the hearing.  
136 United States' opening statement  and respon se to questioning at the hearing.  
137 United States' submission, para. 46.  
138 United States' response to questioning at the hearing.  WT/DS471/RPT  
 
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Particular circumstances of this dispute  3.4.2   
The United  States identifies the following as "particular circumstances " of this dispute that, 3.50.   
in its  view, weigh in favour of a longer period of time for implementation: (i) the number and 
magnitude of modifications to the challenged measures; (ii) the procedural requirements under its 
domestic law; (iii) the complexity and novelty of the issues involved ; (iv) the current workload of 
the USDOC; and (v) the continuing formation of the US administration and the fact that many key 
positions at the USDOC have yet to be filled.139 The United States also points to the agreement 
reached by China and the European U nion in EC – Fasteners (China) , setting the reasonable period 
of time for implementation by the European Union at 14 months and 2 weeks.140 The United States 
highlights the "similarity of one of the major substantive issues " in EC – Fasteners (China) and thi s 
dispute141, and adds that "the significantly larger number of administrative determinations " in the 
present dispute142 warrants a substantially longer reasonable period of time.143 In addition, the  
United States emphasizes that China made a "choice " to bring  "as applied " claims against  
38 distinct anti -dumping determinations.144 For the United States, when a complaining Member 
chooses to bring  a dispute of this magnitude, it must recognize that the responding Member will 
need more time to implement  the DSB's rec ommendations and rulings.145 
For its part, China contends that I should take account of w hat it alleges to be the 3.51.   
United  States' record of failing to meet previous reasonable period of time deadlines in reaching 
my determination of the reasonable period of t ime in this dispute .146 
I have addressed several of t hese circumstances above . With respect to the remaining 3.52.   
circumstances advanced by the United States, China argues that any additional  workload arising 
from the DSB's recommendations and rulings in this dis pute and practical challenges the USDOC  
may face  in handling that workload are not relevant to the determination of the reasonable period 
of time  for implementation of the DSB's recommendations and rulings .147 China also disagrees that 
the reasonable period of time agreed by the parties in EC – Fasteners (China) is relevant to my 
determination of the reasonable period of time in this dispute. In particular, China argues that, 
contrary to  the present dispute, the DSB's  recommendations and rulings in EC ‒ Faste ners (China) 
required implementation through legislative means, which is more time-consuming th an the 
means of implementation proposed by the United States in this dispute. In addition, China 
contends that the USDOC is capable of conducting all relevant redeterminations in parallel and that 
China's "choice " to challenge 38 anti -dumping determinations reflects th e USDOC's widespread use  
of WTO -inconsistent measures and does not warrant the grant of a longer period of time for 
implementation.148 
With respect to the allegedly heavy workload of the USDOC, the United States argues that 3.53.   
my determination of the reasonable period of time should account for the administrative burden 
associated with the addition of 38 implementation proceedings on top of the USDOC's existing 
heavy workload.149 As I have noted above,  previous arbitrators have declined to find that the 
                                                
139 United  States' submission, paras. 10 and 50 -54. With respect to the current workload of the USDOC, 
the United States argues that the USDOC recently experienced "a  significant increase in new  
anti-dumping and countervailing duty petitions covering an array of different products and countries" and that, 
as of 8  November  2017, there were 77 ongoing anti -dumping and countervailing  duty investigations, 
129 ongoing periodic reviews, and seven ongoing new shipper reviews. (Ibid., paras. 51 -52) 
140 United States' submission, para. 11.  
141 United States' submission, para. 12.  
142 The United States contends that the reasonable period of time should account for the need to 
conduct "significant additional analysis" on its part, owing to the 38 determinations that China chose to 
challenge in this dispute, as opposed to one determinatio n in EC – Fasteners (China) . (United States' 
submission, paras. 9 and 12 -13) 
143 United States' submission, para. 12.  
144 United States' submission, para. 13.  
145 Ibid. 
146 China's opening statement at the hearing . China also submit s that I should take into accoun t the 
United States' early awareness of its implementing obligations in my determination of  the reasonable period of 
time. (China's submission, paras. 31, 40, 42 and 46) I have addressed this issue at paragraphs 3.27.  -
3.30.   above.  
147 China's submission, paras. 66 -68. See also para. 64.  
148 China's submission, paras. 30 -32 and 65.  
149 United States' submission, para. 52; response to questioning at the hearing.  WT/DS471/RPT  
 
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workload of the implementing authority warranted a longer period of time for implementation.150 
In this dispute, the United  States has neither de monstrated the impact that the implementation 
process would have on the USDOC's workload, nor explained how such workload should be taken 
into account in my determination of the reasonable period of time. Moreover, I recall that the 
implementing Member is expected to use all available flexibilities within its legal system to ensure 
"prompt compliance " with the DSB's recommendations and rulings in accordance with Article 21 of  
the DSU.151 In my view, prioritizing compliance action in respect of the DSB 's recom mendations 
and rulings at issue in these proceedings would constitute an exercise of flexibility available to the 
USDOC, which it would be expected to utilize.152 Accordingly, I do not consider the USDOC's 
workload to be relevant to my determination of the r easonable period of time for implementation 
in this dispute.  
Regarding the continuing formation of the US administration and the fact that certain key 3.54.   
positions at the USDOC remain vacant, the United  States explained at the hearing that, even 
though an "extra month here or there " has not been added to its proposed schedule for this 
reason, this factor was nevertheless taken into account in developing that schedule.153 The 
United  States added that, while this "particular circumstance " affects both proceedings  under 
Section 123 and Section 129 of the URAA , the former is affected relatively more, given that it is a  
policy process.154 Although the United States has clarified, to some extent, the stages of the 
implementation process where this factor could have an im pact, it has not persuaded me that the 
USDOC would not be able to use the flexibilities and the staff available to it to act with appropriate 
dispatch in achieving compliance with its WTO obligations in this dispute. Therefore, I do not 
consider this to be  a particular circumstance relevant to the determination of the reasonable period 
of time for implementation in this dispute.  
 I am similarly unpersuaded that I should take account of the reasonable period of time 3.55.   
agreed by the parties in EC – Fasteners ( China) . The DSB recommendations and rulings in that 
dispute did not apply to the United States. Rather, they concerned a measure taken by another 
WTO Member, and implementation was undertaken in a different legal system.155 For these 
reasons, I consider that the reasonable period of time agreed  by China and the European  Union in  
EC – Fasteners (China)  is not relevant to my determination in this arbitration.  
Finally, with respect to China's argument regarding the United States' alleged record of 3.56.   
failing to comply within applicable reasonable periods of time in previous disputes , I note that the  
United States contests the existence of such a track -record.156 I am also mindful that each dispute, 
and the implementation proces s that may follow the DSB's recommendations and rulings, embody 
their own set of facts and context. Thus, I do not consider any such alleged track -record to be  a 
particular circumstance relevant to my determination of the reasonable period of time for 
implementation in this dispute.  
AWARD  4  
In light of the foregoing considerations, the "reasonable period of time " for the United  States  4.1.  
to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute is 15  months, from 
22 May 2017, that is, from the date  on which the DSB adopted the Panel and Appellate  Body 
Reports in this dispute. The reasonable period of time for implementation will expire on 
22 August  2018.  
                                                
150 Awards of the Arbitrators, US – 1916 Act (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 38; US – Countervailing Measures 
(China) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.49; US – Shrimp II (Viet Nam) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.55; US – Washing 
Machines (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.63.  
151 See Awards of the Arbitrators, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  64;  
Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article 21.3( c)), para. 25; Brazil – Retreaded Tyres  (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 73;  
US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 42; China – GOES (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.4; 
US ‒ Countervailing Measures (China) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.49;  US – Shrimp II ( Viet Nam) 
(Article  21.3(c)) , para. 3.55;  Colombia – Textiles (Article 21.3(c)) , paras.  3.51-3.53; US – Washing Machines 
(Article  21.3(c)) , para. 3.9. 
152 Award of the Arbitrator, US – Shrimp II (Viet  Nam) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.55.  
153 United States' respo nse to questioning at the hearing.  
154 United States' response to questioning at the hearing.  
155 See Award of the Arbitrator, US – Shrimp II (Viet  Nam) (Article 21.3(c)) , para. 3.38.  
156 United States' response to questioning at the hearing.  WT/DS471/RPT  
 
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ANNEX A 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF  THE UNITED STATES' S UBMISSION  
1. The amount of time a Member requires for implementation of DSB  recommendations 
depends on the particular facts and circumstances of the dispute, including the scope of the 
recommendations and the types of procedures required under the Member's laws to make the 
necessary changes in the measures at issue. Specific circ umstances identified in previous awards 
as relevant to the Arbitrator's determination of the RPT include: (1) the legal form of 
implementation; (2) the technical complexity of the measure the Member must draft, adopt, and 
implement; and (3) the period of t ime in which the implementing Member can achieve that 
proposed legal form of implementation in accordance with its system of government.  
2. The United States would draw the Arbitrator's attention to the reasonable period of time to 
which China agreed pursuant  to Article 21.3(b) of the DSU in the EC – Fasteners (China)  dispute. 
In that dispute, China reached agreement with the European Union on a reasonable period of time 
of 14 months and two weeks. While EC – Fasteners (China) involved an "as such " finding and "as 
applied " findings with respect to one antidumping determination, this dispute involves an "as such " 
finding on a very similar measure and "as applied " findings concerning 38 separate 
determinations . This dispute also involves "as applied f indings " with respect to four of those 
38 determinations concerning the use of the alternative, average -to-transaction comparison 
methodology and "zeroing ". The similarity of one of the major substantive issues in these two 
disputes, coupled with the signi ficantly larger number of administrative determinations involved 
here, warrants a substantially longer compliance period in this dispute, as China logically should 
agree. When choosing to bring a dispute of this magnitude, the complaining Member must 
recog nize that it will take more time for the responding Member to implement any and all adverse 
findings.  
3. Addressing the numerous findings in this dispute requires a multi -phase process. T he most 
practical way under U.S. law to implement the recommendations o f the DSB would be to conduct 
proceedings under both section 123 and section 129 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act  
("URAA "). First, the United States contemplates conducting a proceeding pursuant to section 123 
of the URAA to address the Panel's "as such " findings under the  AD Agreement. Second, the United 
States contemplates conducting proceedings pursuant to section 129 of the URAA to address the 
Panel's "as applied " findings as they relate to 13 original investigations and 25 administrative 
reviews. Th e United States anticipates that it will not be possible to commence the 38 section 129 
proceedings (Phase II) until the section 123 proceeding (Phase I) has been mostly completed. The 
United States expects that a ny approach to address the DSB recommendati ons concerning the 
Panel's "as such " findings under the AD Agreement will need to be developed through the section 
123 proceeding before it could be applied or adapted in the 38 section 129 proceedings concerning 
the challenged determinations. Therefore, P hases I and II must be undertaken sequentially, 
although there could be a small degree of overlap in the two phases.  
4. Both parties, as well as the WTO dispute settlement system as a whole, have a strong 
interest in setting the RPT at a length that allows f or an implementation process that takes account 
of all available information and uses a well -considered approach to implementing the findings in 
the Appellate Body and Panel reports. In this dispute, the RPT determined by the Arbitrator should 
be of suffic ient length to allow the United States to address all of the various DSB 
recommendations in a manner consistent with relevant WTO obligations. Such a result would 
preserve the rights of the United States to have a reasonable time for compliance and to impo se 
appropriate antidumping duties, while at the same time preserving China's rights to ensure that 
antidumping duties are imposed in accordance with WTO rules. If the RPT is too short to permit 
the United States to address the DSB's recommendations effecti vely, the likelihood of a "positive 
solution " to the dispute would be reduced.  
5. The volume and complexity of the DSB's recommendations – in particular the "as applied " 
findings related to the 38 separate determinations that China chose to challenge togethe r in this 
one dispute – and U.S. legal requirements should be considered in determining the appropriate 
reasonable period of time to secure a "positive solution " for this dispute. For the reasons outlined 
in this submission, a period of no less than 24 mon ths is a reasonable period of time for 
implementation.  WT/DS471/RPT  
 
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ANNEX B  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF  CHINA'S SUBMISSION  
1. The reasonable period of time ( "RPT") for the United States to implement the 
recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body ( "DSB") in this dispute should be six 
months from the adoption of the Panel and Appellate body reports. Article 2 1 of the Understanding 
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes  ("DSU") requires a Member to 
promptly comply with DSB recommendati ons, which, according to jurisprudence  developed by 
arbitrators under Article 21.3(c) , requires compliance within the shortest period possible within the 
legal system of the Member. The particular facts and circumstances of the dispute can bear on the 
arbitrator's finding of a reasonable period of time, but only to the extent they assist the arbitrator 
in determining the shortest period possible in which the Member can comply.  
2. The United States' 24 month -request ignores the United States' long period of ina ctivity 
after it became aware it would have to implement the Panel's finding s. The United States knew its 
implementation obligations no later than November 2016, when it chose not to appeal the Panel 
report. It should have been preparing for compliance sin ce that time, and under no circumstances 
should it be granted an RPT that includes time after the DSB's recommendations and rulings were 
adopted  for pre -commencement planning and analysis. This is particularly true considering that 
China requested consulta tions with the United States nearly four years ago now, and its exporters 
have suffered under USDOC's WTO -inconsistent anti -dumping duties for the entire intervening 
time.  
3. The United States reliance on the reasonable period of time agreed to by China in EC – 
Fasteners (China)  is misplaced. Contrary to the United States' contention, China believes that the 
RPT for this dispute should be substantially shorter than that in EC – Fasteners (China) . The 
jurisprudence makes clear that compliance action  requiring legislative means will be more time 
consuming than implementation that can be conducted entirely administratively. The "as such " 
ruling in EC – Fasteners (China)  concerned a statute, not an administrative measure, as here, 
suggesting the RPT in that disput e should be longer than here. Additionally, as the "as such " ruling 
in EC – Fasteners (China)  was appealed, unlike here, the European Union had far less time to 
prepare for implementation prior to the issuance of the DSB's recommendations than the United 
States has had in this dispute, again suggesting the need for a longer RPT. Finally, the number of 
"as applied " determinations that must be addressed is a red herring, as the USDOC is capable of 
running its redeterminations in parallel.  
4. The United States' request for 24 months overstates the complexity of compliance. China 
does not object to the United States' proposal to conduct a proceeding pursuant to section 123 of 
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act  ("URAA ") to address the Panel's "as such" findings under the  
Anti-Dumping Agreement , and then to conduct proceedings pursuant to section 129 of the URAA 
to address the Panel's "as applied " findings. Nor does China object to the United States waiting to 
commence its section 129 proceedings unt il the preliminary determination in the section 123 
proceeding has been issued. China, does, however, object to the time the United States proposes 
each of these processes should take. The USDOC should have concluded any and all "pre-
commencement " preparat ory work prior to the adoption of the recommendations and rulings, and 
should have been able to produce a preliminary determination under Section 123 in two weeks . 
The DSB's "as applied " recommendations relating to 13 original investigations and 
25 adminis trative reviews undertaken by the USDOC likewise will not require anywhere near the 
13 months requested by the United States, which in any case is more than is permitted under 
United States' law. Rather, this aspect of the United States' compliance obligat ions can be 
completed in five-and-a-half months.  
5. China's "choice " to challenge 38 separate USDOC determinations is a function of the 
widespread use of WTO -inconsistent measures by USDOC and should not be the basis for a longer 
RPT. To the extent the Unite d States is arguing for a longer RPT on the basis that the supposedly 
large number of Section 129 proceedings will be work -intensive, previous arbitrators  have 
consistently  rejected the proposition  that the workload faced by the implementing agency of the 
implementing Member is a relevant "particular circumstance " to be considered by the arbitrator in 
setting the RPT.  
 
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