TN/RL/W/267  
 
13 November 2015  
(15-6008)  Page: 1/3  
Negotiating Group on Rules  Original: English  
 
FISHERIES SUBSIDIES 
ACP PROPOSAL1 
The following communication, dated 3 November 2015,  is being circulated at the request of the 
African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States.2 
 
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 The Ministerial Conference,  
Having regard  to paragraph 1 of Article IX of the Ma rrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization (the "WTO Agreement");  
Acknowledging  the critical importance of the fisheries sector to poverty reduction, livelihood and 
food security in developing countries including LDCs and SVEs;  
Recalling  that the rules negotiations on fisheries subsidies constitute a central element of the 
development component of the Doha Round;  Reaffirming our commitments under goal 2 and 14 of the 2030 Development Agenda including the 
target to prohibit, by 2020, certain forms of fish eries subsidies which contribute to overcapacity 
and overfishing, eliminate subsidies that contribu te to illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing 
and refrain from introducing new such subsidies, recognizing that appropriate and effective special 
and differential treatment for developing and least developed countries should be an integral part 
of the WTO fisheries subsidies negotiation.  
Decides as follows:  
 1. The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (hereafter the "ASCM") shall be amended to incorporate the provisions annexed hereto. 
 
2. In accordance with the Annex D paragraph 9 of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, negotiations aimed at further strengthening disciplines on subsidies in the fisheries sector beyond 
the set of disciplines defined in Annex I, shall continue, with a view to addressing fisheries 
subsidies that contribute to overcapacity an d over-fishing ambitiously, expeditiously and 
specifically. 
 
3. Appropriate and effective special and differential treatment for developing countries including LDCs and SVEs shall be an integral part of these negotiations, taking into account the importance of this sector to development priorities , poverty reduction, liveli hood and food security 
concerns in accordance with the Annex D paragraph 9 of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration. 
Such negotiations should not consign developing countries, which will need subsidies for their expansion, to only artisanal and small scale fishing. 
 
4. In the meantime, subject to their individu al development needs, Members should refrain 
from providing capacity enhancing subsidies to their fishing fleets that affect the sustainability of 
fish stocks and undermine the development, liveli hood and food security prospects of developing 
countries including LDCs and SVEs. 
                                               
1 South Africa reserves its position on this proposal. 
2 This communication was previously circulated as JOB/RL/5 dated 4 November 2015. TN/RL/W/267 
 
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  ANNEX I 
FISHERIES SUBSIDIES 
Article I 
Prohibition of Certain Fisheries Subsidies1 
 
I.1  The following subsidies within the meaning of paragraph 1 and 2 of Article 1 of the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (hereafter "ASCM") shall be prohibited: 
 
a. Subsidies the benefits of which are conferred on any vessel engaged in illegal, 
unreported or unregulated fishing.2 
b. Subsidies the benefits of which are conferred on any fishing vessel or fishing activity3 
negatively affecting fish stocks4 that are in an unequivocally overfished condition.5 
Article II 
Notifications and Surveillance 
II.1  Members shall notify any subsidy to fishing vessels or fishing activities granted or 
maintained within their territories in accordance with Article 25 of the ASCM.  
II.2 In addition to the information notified pu rsuant to Article 25 of the ASCM, Members whose 
share of the value of global marine wild capture calculated as a moving average of the value of 
wild catches over the three most recent years for which FAO data is available, exceeds [X] per 
cent, shall ensure that their notification are su fficiently specific to enable other Members to 
evaluate the contribution of the notified subsidy programme to overcapacity6 and over-fishing.7 In 
this connection, Members shall ensure that their notifications contain the following information:  
                                               
1 Any subsidy referred to in this Agreement shall be attributable to the Member  conferring it, regardless 
of the flag(s) of the vessel(s) involved or the appl ication of rules of origin to the fish involved. 
2 For the purpose of this Agreement, the terms "illegal fishing", "unreported fishing" and "unregulated 
fishing" shall have the same meaning as in paragraph 3 of the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter 
and Eliminate Illegal Unreported an d Unregulated Fishing of  the United Nations Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO). 
3 For the purpose of this Agreement, the term "fishing activity" shall mean any activity related to fishing 
for marine wild capture stocks, as well as any operation in support of such fishing including harvesting, landing, processing, transhipping at sea or in port, refuelling, resupplyi ng and transporting.  
4 For the purpose of this Agreement, the term "fish stock" shall mean fish th at a regional fisheries 
management organization treats as a unit for the purp ose of conservation and management. In the absence of 
any relevant consideration of the issue by a regional fisheries management organization, a "fish stock" means fish, identified on the basis of geographical and scientif ic characteristics that can be reasonably treated as a 
unit for purposes of conservation and management. 
5 For the purpose of this Agreement, the term "fish stock that are in an unequivocally overfished 
condition" shall mean the following: 
(a) Fish stocks within the jurisdiction of a Member that are designated by the Member, based on 
sufficient scientific evidence, to be in such conditions; or 
(b) Fish stocks designated by Regional Fisheries Management Organizations and Arrangements, 
among fish stocks falling under their respective competence, to be in such conditions; or 
(c) Fish species listed in the Appendices I or II of the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). 
6 For the purpose of this Agreement, the term "overc apacity" shall mean that the fishing capacity at 
issue is greater than a desirable level of fishing capacity  (i.e. target level) which may be either a long term 
target sustainable yield, as reflected in the short-term in a total allowable catch (TAC), or a related long-term target for fixed inputs employed in fish ing activity for the fishery in question. 
7 For the purpose of this Agreement, the term "overfi shing" is normally expressed in terms of fishing 
mortality levels, that is, in terms of how many fish are killed during a cert ain reference period. Thus overfishing 
exists when total fishing mortality (harvesting) is at a rate that exceeds the maximum level that the stock can 
withstand on a sustainable basis (i .e. the maximum sustainable yield). TN/RL/W/267 
 
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  a. Catch data; 
b. Fleet capacity; 
c. Status of the fish stock; 
d. Maximum sustainable yield that that the stock can withstand; 
e. Conservation and managements measures in place in the relevant fishery; 
II.3  The SCM Committee shall hold a dedicated annual review of progress in the implementation 
of this Agreement. This review shall be supported  by a WTO Secretariat report based on Members' 
notifications complemented by relevant information provided by Members and information from 
other international organizations.  
Article III 
Transitional Arrangements 
III.1  Subsidy programmes referred in Article I paragraph 1. (b) which have been established 
within the territory of any Member before the date of this decision and which are inconsistent with 
the provisions of this Agreement shall be: 
a. notified to the SCM Committee not later than 90 days or, in the case of a developing 
country 180days, after the date of the en try into force of this Agreement and; 
b. brought into conformity with the provisions of  this decision within three years after the 
entry into force of this Agreement. 
III.2 No Member shall extend the scope of any such programme, nor shall such a programme be 
renewed upon its expiry. 
 
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