WT/MIN(17)/17  
JOB/DEV/51  
 
5 December 2017  
(17-6699) Page: 1/24 
Ministerial Conference  
Eleventh Session  
Buenos Aires, 10 -13 December 2017  Original: English  
 
 SPECIAL AND DIFFEREN TIAL TREATMENT  
Submission by Rwanda  on behalf of the ACP Group, the African Group and the LDC Group  
 
The following communication is being circulated at the request of the delegation of Rwanda  on 
behalf of the ACP Group, the African Group and the LDC Group.  
 
 
_______________  
 
 
RESPONSES BY UGANDA ON BEHALF OF THE G90  
PROPOSAL NUMBER 01  - TRIMS  
 
12 OCTOBER 2017  
 
 
AUSTRALIA  
 
(i) For each of the ten proposals submitted in JOB/DEV/47, could the G90 please provide 
specific examples of how existing WTO Agreements are limiting developing country 
members’ abilities to take measures necessary for development?  
 
 
EUROPEAN UNION (14 SEPTEM BER 2017)  
 
(ii) Could you explain this proposal in the light of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration 
(Annex F: paragraph 84)?  
(iii) What is the reasoning for insisting on a proposal rejected in 2015? How have the 
circumstances changed since then?  
(iv) What is the econom ic rationale for allowing all developing countries regardless of size to 
introduce TRIMS -inconsistent measures for a potentially indefinite duration?  
(v) Do you agree that the phrase "[t]he Council for Trade in Goods shall, upon…request by a 
developing country  member, accord extensions" means that such extension will be granted 
automatically upon request? Would that mean that the proposal to renew temporary 
modification is equal to allowing for a permanent waiver from the TRIMS Agreement?  
(vi) What is the reasoning for re -introducing in paragraph 1.2 a permanent waiver for LDCs 
from the TRIMS Agreement, already rejected in 2015? How have the circumstances 
changed since then?  
(vii) What are the specific challenges you encounter in the application of specific TRIMS 
provision s and you would like to solve through this proposal?  
 
 
RESPONSES  
 
Thank you for calling this meeting and providing us with the opportunity to respond to the issues 
raised by the members. We received seven questions from Australia and the European Union. We 
thank them for the questions. We come to this Special session wit h one goal in mind, to ensure 
the structural transformation, diversification and industrialisation of our economies with the view WT/MIN(17)/17 • JOB/DEV/51  
 
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  to building the future we want for all of our peoples and to promote the effective integration of the 
G90 into the Multilatera l trading system. To ensure that our peoples get employment, improve 
household incomes, and alleviate the high levels of poverty.  
 
It is important for members to recall, and fulfill the founding objective inscribed in the Marrakesh 
Agreement with the view to recognizing the need for positive efforts designed to ensure that 
developing countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the 
growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development. It is 
upon that background therefore that we would invite members to view our responses to the issues 
raised and these ASPs.  
 
One of the cross cutting questions that is on everyone’s mind is what has changed. Why the same 
proposal, that were rejected in the past ? The problem is that nothing has changed, neither in the 
lives of our people, nor in our respective economies. On the contrary the situation has either 
remained stagnant or in some cases simply become worse.  
 
In 1964, Africa’s share in world trade in goo ds was a staggering 6%. However between 
2009-2016, Africa's share in world exports dropped from 3.1% to 2.2% in goods & from 2.4% to 
2.0% in services. In 2016, exports of primary commodities accounted for almost 80% in 
comparison to about 30% for manufactu red goods. Viet Nam, a country whose economy declined 
in the 1960s and in the 1970s due to the war has now overtaken Africa in exports of manufactured 
goods. In 1995, Africa exported $28 billion and Viet Nam only $2 billion. Yet, in 2016, Africa’s 
exports stand at $92bn compared to about $140bn for Viet Nam.  
 
54% of the population in 46 African countries is still living in poverty. Out of the 420 million youth, 
one-third are unemployed and discouraged, another third are vulnerably employed, and only one 
in six is in wage employment. While 10 to 12 million youth enter the workforce each year, only 3.1 
million jobs are created.  
 
According to the UNIDO Report to the G20 Working Group on Industrialization in Africa   and Least 
Developed Countries of 2016, Africa ’s Manufactured Value Added (MVA) accounted for just 1.6% of 
the global total in 2014 and its growth has lagged far behind that of other regions since 1990. It is 
also important to recall that at about the same time in 2015; world leaders also agreed to del iver 
on SDG 9 on Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure. This precipitated the G90 members to 
closely examine their structural transformation, industrialization and diversification needs and the 
policy measures required to realize them.  
 
A number of stud ies have shown that the main reason why developing countries, especially LDCs 
have not been able to participate effectively in the multilateral trading system is mainly because 
they are lagging behind in terms of industrialization, in particular the produc tion of value added 
and competitive manufactured products. In order to catch up with developed countries, developing 
countries, in particular LDCs and low income economies need the flexibility to use local content 
requirements in order to direct investment s into the productive sectors and catalyse 
industrialization.  
 
This then brings me to the issue specific to LDCs . The circumstances requiring a waiver for LDCs 
will not change as long as a member is an LDC. Nothing has changed. It all remains more of the 
same. Our economic numbers between 2015 and now remain the same. LDCs have low levels of 
industrialization, their exports are concentrated on a few products, and their share in world trade 
is very low. LDCs account for less than 1% of world exports of goods  and commercial services, 
1.9% of global investment inflows and 1% share of manufacturing value added. They also depend 
on exports of primary commodities, mainly minerals and fuels, which are subjected to global price 
fluctuations. These are the 2015 numbe rs. 2017 is not any different. Our view therefore is that the 
position to reject the proposal should be reversed.  
 
Further, LDC status is not self -designated. According to the UN classification criteria, the 
classification of LDCs is contingent on a number  of key human development indicators including 
levels of poverty, literacy, infant mortality and economic vulnerability. There are currently 48 
countries that meet these criteria.  The good news is that according to the 2016 UNCTAD Report 
on LDCs the path to graduation, 16 LDCs are projected to graduate by 2024. 32 LDCs will 
graduate by 2025. It therefore means that the request is not infinite. Given the fact that LDCs 
have spent a lot of time and resources negotiating extensions; there is a need to exempt LDCs WT/MIN(17)/17 • JOB/DEV/51  
 
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  from TRIMS until they graduate from LDC status. This will create investor certainty and allow LDCs 
to use the TRIMS flexibility to industrialise and transform their economies.   
 
ON HOW EXISTING WTO AGREEMENTS ARE LIMITING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES FROM 
TAKING THE NECESSARY MEASURES FOR DEVELOPMENT  
 
Industrialised economies have over the years, as our coordinator has eloquently indicated, 
including to this day, used specific interventions and performance requirements to attract and 
harness the application of investment towards productive capacities in  order to structurally 
transform and industrialise their economies. With the advent of the Uruguay Round agreements, 
detailed disciplines incorporated under the WTO under Trade -Related Investment Measures 
(TRIMS) have severely restricted the use of perform ance measures on foreign investors, thereby 
hampering deployment of a historically heavily -used industrial policy instrument.  
 
In the context of GVCs, the need for policy space is still as relevant as ever, particularly to 
facilitate upgrading of production networks to participate in global value chains. Members will 
recall this as one of the outstanding implementation issues. Developing members have never 
equivocally renounced this issue. Proposals were filed within the TRIMS committee, but politi cal 
obstacles have prevented them previously advancing this issue in the WTO.  
 
Developing countries are significantly constrained in applying policy space to structurally transform 
and diversify their economies in this area. As far as specific examples go,  the record of questions 
in TRIMS committee against developing countries is illustrative: at the most recent TRIMS 
Committee meeting, out of the 9 TRIMS measures re -tabled for continued discussion, 8 of them 
were imposed by developing country members and w ere subject to rigorous scrutiny by 
industrialised countries. Within the TRIMS committee, previous attempts to invoke the flexibility in 
Article 4, which allows developing country Members to temporarily deviate from the provisions of 
Article 2 for balance -of-payments purposes, have been blocked, notably with respect to various 
trade balancing measures developing members sought to apply in the context of developmental 
purposes. This is because access to the Article XVIII B process is cumbersome and very diff icult to 
justify within the BOP committee, with developing countries facing endless rounds of questioning, 
before they can implement the measure.  
 
In addition to rigorous questioning of developing country measures within the TRIMS committee, 
the jurisprude nce is prolific with respect to challenges against developing country use of TRIMS 
measures. Between 1996 and 2016, there are 27 recorded TRIMS challenges against developing 
countries with only 15 against developed countries. Recent jurisprudence over the last 2 years, 
striking down TRIMS measures invoked by certain developing countries that would have diversified 
their economies and assisted development of their domestic industries1, illustrates the inherent 
difficulties and lack of flexibility within the TRIMS agreement, as well as the fact that developing 
countries still require this flexibility . 
 
For example, in the Indonesia –Autos case, the Panel examined the consistency of certain 
Indonesian measures with the TRIMs Agreement. The measures were aimed a t encouraging the 
development of a local manufacturing capability for finished motor vehicles and parts and 
components in Indonesia.2 In examining whether the measures at issue in the dispute before it 
were “trade -related”, the Panel in Indonesia — Autos h eld that local content requirements were 
necessarily trade -related: “[I]f these measures are local content requirements, they would 
necessarily be ‘trade –related’ because such requirements, by definition, always favour the use of 
domestic products over imp orted products, and therefore affect trade ”. The Panel found that 
Indonesia was in violation of Articles (I) and (II): 2 of GATT 1994, Article 2 of the TRIMs 
Agreement, and Article 5(c) of the SCM Agreement. This decision shows how the WTO agreements 
could  potentially constrain industrial policy.  
 
As we indicated during our last session, Since 1995 -2015, of the 29 items considered by the 
Committee, 20 related to measures of developing country Members, and the overwhelming 
                                                
1 DS 456bIndia — Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules; DS 497, DS 472 Brazil — 
Certain Measures Concerning Taxation and Charges.  
2 “The 1993 Programme” provided import duty reductions or exemptions on imports of automotive parts 
based on the local content percent; and  “The 1996 National Car Programme” provided various benefits such as 
luxury tax exemption or import duty exemption to qualifying (local content and etc.) cars or Indonesian car 
companies.  WT/MIN(17)/17 • JOB/DEV/51  
 
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  majority (28/29) of these measures  include issues relating to local content, although in some 
cases they also included other aspects. By 2015, 41 dispute settlement proceedings had been 
initiated, which included a claim under the TRIMS Agreement. Of these 41 proceedings, 27 
involved a deve loping country Member as a respondent, and 25 out of 27 which in effect is (93%) 
included an allegation relating to local content. This shows that a number of developing countries 
still require flexibility to use local content requirements to promote upstr eam and downstream 
linkages with the local economy and achieve industrialization and economic transformation.   
 
These constraints serve to dis -incentivise developing countries’ deployment of these measures in 
order to structurally transform, and accordingl y these entrenched disincentives would be a strong 
motivator for introducing some flexibility for developing countries with regard to TRIMS 
Agreement. An issue was raised that many of the cases that had been raised relate to major 
emerging countries. Madam  Chair, We don’t understand the logic of the concern. Does this 
therefore justify the kicking away of the ladder?  
 
We would also like to deal with the issue on the Relationship with the Hong Kong Ministerial 
decision. It will be recalled that the Hong Kong  Decision allows LDCs flexibility to maintain these 
measures until 2020 subject to procedural requirements. The notification date expired as LDCs did 
not have capacity to take advantage of the notification period.  Given the need for 
industrialization, str uctural transformation and diversification, the proposal takes into account the 
grave lapse of time. It therefore means that the flexibility beyond 2020 is imperative, as LDCs still 
require protection/policy space beyond 2020.    
 
ON DIFFERENTIATION  
 
There  are two points we would like to make (i) the relevant Articles of the TRIMS agreement do 
not differentiate among developing countries. The G90 does not propose to take away the 
legitimate rights enjoyed by developing countries. (ii) That said however, wha t the proposal seeks 
to do is to ensure that Developing countries and LDCs are distinguished in the degree of benefit 
that would accrue to them without taking away the legitimate rights of either group as provided for 
in the Agreement. Which is why Develop ing countries are looking for a specific amount of time, 
while for the LDCs the duration is contingent on their LDCs status, which is already well defined.  
 
In closing Chair, most of the developing and least developed countries are in the process of 
devel oping their industrialization policies and strategies. Trade Related Investment Measures 
(TRIMS) when used in conjunction with other measures, such as local content/performance 
requirements and technology transfer requirements play a vital role in the indu strialisation 
process. Indeed m ost developed countries, while in the early stages of their industrial 
development, employed protective industrial, trade and technological measures including local 
content. The local content requirement could strengthen the backward and forward linkages which 
could be supportive in achieving the SDGs, specifically the SDG -9.  
 
 
_______________  
 
 
RESPONSES BANGLADESH ON BEHALF OF THE G90  
PROPOSAL NO. 2 - ARTICLE 18 A AND C  
 
We have received 11 questions from Australia, European Union and Japan on the proposal on 
Article A and C. We thank them for their questions.  
 
Those, who were present in discussions we had before Nairobi and during Nairobi, may recall that 
we had discussions on use of Article XVIII A and C and we had a report from the secretariat as 
well.  As we mentioned in our submission before the establishment of the WTO, some developing 
countries invoked these sections and releases were granted to them. However, after 1995 no 
developing countries were allowed to u se these sections despite the fact that Article XVIII is 
designed to allow developing country members to provide assistance. From 1995 through 
July 2002, three developing country Members (Colombia, Bangladesh, Malaysia) sought recourse 
to Article XVIII:C.  In the case of Malaysia and Colombia, despite both countries arguing it should 
be taken up in the CTD, it was heard in the CTG.  Bangladesh case was addressed in BoP 
Committee. Discussions on those requests could not yield positive results.  Burdensome WT/MIN(17)/17 • JOB/DEV/51  
 
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  consultation procedures make it difficult for developing countries especially the paragraph 4 (a) 
countries to seek recourse to these sections.  The proposal of G90 intends to bring clarity in the 
procedures of application of Sections A and C of Article XVII I.  The existing text does not specify as 
to where to notify for invoking these sections. Accordingly, the paragraph 2.4 proposes to make 
notification to the Committee on Trade and Development.   Para 2.4 also brings clarity in the 
consultations process an d implementation of the outcome through consultations which are in line 
with the Agreement on Safeguard.  Any rebalancing measures and the application of substantially 
equivalent concessions or other obligations are subject to a time delay of five years be fore they 
can be introduced or exercised. This is designed to give developing countries some breathing 
space before retaliatory measures are taken as the introducing members will take recourse to 
these sections for development purpose.   
 
As you are aware the Paragraph 4 (a) of Article XVIII defines the coverage of members, who can 
resort to these sections. By adding the phrase “developing country member facing constraints” 
G90 tries to focus on the developing country members, who are in ac tual need.  As regards 
question relating to paragraph 20 of article XVIII, we like to mention that the Decision on 
Safeguard Action for Development purposes, of 28 November 1979 (L/4897) (para 1) provides 
similar language, but doesn't leave it as open so a s to give members the leeway to deviate to the 
extent it deems necessary.  
 
The Terms member having “substantial interest” and “principle supplying interest is widely used by 
the WTO. Reference to these two terms may be found in Article XXVIII of GATT 1994  and 
Understanding on interpretation of article XXVIII of GATT 1994.  
 
You may recall that the present texts, which have been substantially modified by taking into 
consideration the discussions we had in 2015, were proposed in December 2015 just before MC1 0 
and members did not have sufficient time to discuss the proposal in detail. G90 believes that 
members are now in position to discuss this proposal more elaborately.   It is noteworthy that the 
adoption of the SDGs at the end of 2015 especially goal 9 req uires policy measures for paragraph 
4 (a) members to meet their structural transformation, industrialization and diversification needs.  
 
As regards one member’s observation on the open list of development objectives proposed in 
paragraph 2.3 of our proposa l, we need to have more clarity on reference to the closed list of 
objectives in Sections A and C?  
 
 
_______________  
 
 
RESPONSES BY EGYPT ON BEHALF OF THE G90  
PROPOSAL NO. 3 - ARTICLE 18(B)  
 
Proposal  
 
3. ARTICLE XVIII OF GATT – SECTION B  
3.1.    Notwithstanding the current provisions in Article XVIIIB and the Understanding, developing 
countries in balance of payments difficulties shall be enabled to take measures to address their 
BOP difficulties including quantitative restrictions and tariffs un til such time these difficulties have 
been overcome.  
3.2.    Members agree that in drawing up its conclusions and recommendations to the General 
Council, including on determining the adequacy7 of reserves for a developing country  referred to in 
paragraph 4(a) of Article XVIII, in particular, a least developed country or a small and vulnerable 
economy, in accordance with Article XVIII:9 (a) and (b), the Committee on Balance of Payments 
Restrictions, while taking account of the find ings, facts, and other determination provided by the 
IMF in accordance with Article XV GATT, shall ensure that its conclusions and recommendations 
are adequate in the context of a members economic development policies as expressed by the 
concerned members and do not undermine the objectives of paragraph 2 and 9 of the Article 
XVIII.  WT/MIN(17)/17 • JOB/DEV/51  
 
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  3.3.    Actions stipulated in the last sentence of Article XVIII subparagraph 12 (c)(ii) and last 
sentence of Article XVIII subparagraph 12(d) shall be suspended for a developin g country Member 
referred to in paragraph 4(a) of Article XVIII, in particular, a least developed country or a small 
and vulnerable economy.  
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS  
 
With reference to the G90 proposal on Article XVIII section B on “BOP”, We have received aroun d 
6 written questions from Japan, EU in addition to 2 general ones from Australia, In addition to the 
comments or questions raised during the previous meetings. We thank All members for their 
active participation and comments and special thanks for those m embers who provided us with 
written submissions for their effective engagements.  
 
The questions and raised concerns seek clarifications or more understanding towards the 
following:  
 
 Problems behind the proposal and challenges facing developing countries.  
 What is the Rational for wanting to improve Art XVIIIB and BOP?  
 Reactions towards Related cases within the WTO especially the most recent one(s).  
 Does the proposal deviate from the current measures ?  
 Comparison between the Current proposal and the 2015 one  with special considerations on 
paragraphs 3.2 , and 3.3 from the proposal.  
 The proposal and the issue of Differentiation.  
1. General remarks  
 
It is important to remind us with what we have all agreed upon that most of the S&D provisions 
were couched in non-mandatory language and thus unenforceable, and for this reason,  we all 
agreed , (Developed countries, Developing  countries and LDCs)  in the Doha mandate that S&D 
provisions  needs to be strengthened and should make it more effective and operational.  
 
 
The Doha mandate did not state as a condition that in order to strengthen the S&D provisions, the 
developing countries need to provide challenges they face when applying the S&D provisions. The 
rational , the challenges and the reasoning for re -introducing  these proposals  again are clearly 
known for all WTO members  since the Doha Mandate till nowadays.  
 
Against this important introduction, I would like to directly address the questions received from the 
esteemed delegates in order to strengthen our discus sions and engagement to achieve a 
meaningful outcome with this regard.  
 
2. Problems behind the proposal and challen ges facing developing countries  
 
Based on the scope of this proposal, Many developing countries and LDCs have demonstrated 
declines in manufacturing and insufficient or a lack of growth in a manner that has devastated 
their potential for sustained industrialization, structural transformat ion of their economies and 
follow -on diversification.  
 
The end of commodity price cycle has negatively  impacted the current accounts and financial 
markets, which may have a deep impact on future competiveness enhancing investments. Since 
the decline in co mmodity prices in 2014, revenues have not managed to keep up with 
expenditures. it has not been easy for adjust to a diminishing inflow of capital. For example, Over 
the past two years, the aggregate macroeconomic environment of Africa has worsened due to 
higher debt, higher public deficit and lower savings.  
 
As we stated before, The balance -of-payments resides at the crux of development. It illustrates 
the intersection of trade and finance and reveals the relationship of a given economy to the 
internationa l marketplace. The reasons for balance -of-payments crises among developing 
countries stem from the basic obstacles that they face in trying to become industrialized, and also 
illuminate why those difficulties are so entrenched.  
 WT/MIN(17)/17 • JOB/DEV/51  
 
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  There are both traditional and more novel causes of balance -of payments crises. A traditional 
cause of balance -of-payments crises is a sudden and severe increase in a country's trade deficit. 
Such an increase might occur, for example, if bad weather like what we suffer nowadays 
drastically reduces production of key export crops and export earnings. Another classic case is one 
in which a steep rise in oil prices dramatically increases a country's import bill.  
 
Thorough analysis of the IMF related work on Why do balance of payments pro blems occur?   We 
can relate it to Bad luck, inappropriate policies, or a combination of the two may create balance of 
payments difficulties in a country —that is, a situation where sufficient financing on affordable 
terms cannot be obtained to meet internat ional payment obligations. In the worst case, the 
difficulties can build into a crisis. The country's currency may be forced to depreciate rapidly, 
making international goods and capital more expensive, and the domestic economy may 
experience a painful dis ruption. These problems may also spread to other countries.  The causes of 
such difficulties are often varied and complex. Key factors have included :  
 
 weak domestic financial systems;  
 large and persistent fiscal deficits;  
 high levels of external and/or p ublic debt;  
 exchange rates fixed at inappropriate levels;  
 natural disasters;  
 or armed conflicts or a sudden and strong increase in the price of key commodities such as 
food and fuel.  
 
Some of these factors can directly affect a country's trade account,  reducing exports or increasing 
imports. Others may reduce the financing available for international transactions; for example, 
investors may lose confidence in a country's prospects leading to massive asset sales, or "capital 
flight." In either case, diagn oses of, and responses to, crises are complicated by linkages between 
various sectors of the economy. Imbalances in one sector can quickly spread to other sectors, 
leading to widespread economic disruption.  
 
3. What is the economic Rational  behind the current proposal on improving Art XVIIIB 
and BOP?  
 
- Currently we are in situation whereby many developing countries are entering into debt 
and are having to go to the IMF/ WB for bailouts. This is due to low commodity prices and 
the reversal of capital flows away developing countries.  
- On the economic front,  instability in capital flows and in relative currency rates continued.  
In 2015 there was a reversal of capital flows to developing countries, with net outflows of 
US$656 billion or 2.7% of their GDP, according to UNCTAD data.  This was a big change 
from a net inflow of 1.3% of GDP in 2013. In the midst of these large fluctuations in 
perceptions and actual flows, many developing countries remain vulnerable to financial 
instability.  
- Going through these cycles, the debt of developing countries has grown.  De veloping 
countries’ external debt rose from US$2.1 trillion in 2000 to $6.8 trillion in 2015.  Their 
overall debt (foreign and domestic) jumped by over $31 trillion with total debt -to-GDP 
ratios reaching over 120% in many countries and over 200% in some ot hers. 
- In some countries, the problem is compounded by currency devaluation (which increases 
the value of external debt) and lower commodity prices.  These countries are thus hit by 
multiple factors  --  lower commodity prices and export earnings,  net outf low of funds, 
devaluation (which causes their foreign debt to increase), a higher cost of servicing debt, 
and a slowdown in  economic growth.  
- More low -income countries are in a downward economic spiral that has led them into or on 
the brink of a new debt c risis.   They have had to turn to institutions like the IMF and 
World Bank for bailouts.  UNCTAD lists Angola, Azerbaijan, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, 
Nigeria, Zambia and Zimbabwe as countries that have already asked for financial 
assistance or are in talks to do so.  
- This points to a shortfall in the international financial system – the lack of an orderly and 
fair debt workout mechanism which countries facing a debt crisis can have recourse to. In 
its absence, indebted countries often face many years of auste rity and recessionary 
conditions imposed by the creditors and rescuing agencies, and with no guarantee that 
their debt level will even decrease. the imminence of debt crises shows how important are 
the issues of preventing debt crises, and to manage them p roperly when they happen.  WT/MIN(17)/17 • JOB/DEV/51  
 
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4. Reactions towards Related cases within the WTO es pecially the most recent one(s)  
 
Since the establishment of the WTO and when it comes to Balance of payments restrictions there 
are about 104 notifications mostly related to sever al members such as Ecuador, Pakistan, Ukraine, 
Bangladesh, Romania, Slovak Republic, Tunisia, Bulgaria ..  
In recent years, some WTO Members have  applied BOP measures in order to addres s specific 
economic concerns. O n 25 February 2015, Ukraine  adopted BOP m easures. We understand that 
Ukraine's BOP measures are no longer in force.  
 
With respect to the question on Nigerian measures , it illustrates even more obviously the need of 
G90 members and developing countries need for flexibility to be able to diversify their economies, 
industrialize and structurally transform.  
 
Ecuador  applied BOP measures in 2009 and again in 2015. In its 2015 notification3, Ecuador 
referred to the "highly unfavourable economic climate prevailing in the country and its impact on 
the bal ance of payments" as the grounds for imposing "a temporary and non -discriminatory tariff 
surcharge for a period of up to 15 months in order to regulate the general level of imports and 
thereby resolve Ecuador's critical balance -of-payments situation". The imposed surcharges were in 
response to a sharp drop in oil prices starting in late 2014, which led to a deterioration in the 
country’s balance of payments. There were applied to nearly 3,000 tariff lines, or 38% of the 
country’s total.  
 
Under the rubric of  "essential products", Ecuador excluded from the scope of the import surcharge 
"capital goods, inputs and raw materials essential to production, medicines and medical 
equipment", and certain other goods. Ecuador's measures have been subject to extensive 
discussions as part of the consultations process which lasted for 6 consecutive rounds, with some 
Members expressing concern as to whether they comply with the relevant requirements of Article 
XVIII of the GATT 1994 . Ecuador began to phase these measures out  earlier in 2016, but following 
the earthquake in April 2016, it informed the BOP Committee that it intended to delay the phase 
out for a year to facilitate recovery from the economic effects of the earthquake. Ecuador informed 
the WTO’s Committee on Balan ce-of-Payments Restrictions on 21 July 2017 that the final phase -
out of the surcharges was made effective on 1st of June 2017. As per the report of the committee 
on balance of payments re strictions , Ecuador informed the committee that the safeguard made it  
possible for Ecuador to protect its external financial situation, restore macroeconomic balance and 
safeguard its dollarized economy.  
 
It is important to emphasize the newly added pressing challenges that we currently face due to the 
climate change and it s negative impact on our efforts towards sustainable development, the new 
norms of fighting the severe waves of natural disasters (typhoons, floods,  and hurricanes adding 
additional burdens on our economic capacities, and leads to balance of payments diff iculties along 
with socioeconomic disruptions. Yet, the need for Balance of Payment measures will remain 
pertinent due to instabilities in the global monetary system.   
 
Based on the IMF data, we can observe that many developing countries have continues de ficit in 
their balance of payments (in its both main indicators the current account and the financial 
account indicators) from the period 2008 till 2015 (most recent available data) this deficit is 
combined with another deficit in the net of international investment positions within the same 
period.  
 
Moreover there are many developing countries, and in particular LDCs that their balance of 
payments has been overall in a deficit zone since the 70s.  
 
And again,  due to onerous procedural requirements our developing countries, SVEs, and LDCs 
have not been able to fully utilize these provisions.  
 
  
                                                
3 WT/BOP/N/79 (7 April 2015).  WT/MIN(17)/17 • JOB/DEV/51  
 
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  5. Concerns related to the devi ation from the current measures  
 
We would like to confirm that we are not deviating the current measures to address balance of 
payments concerns. Allow me to explain more the current measur es and what we are looking for.  
 
1.1.  Article XII and XVIII:B of the GATT 1994 both establish rules allowing WTO Members to 
impose restrictive import measures s pecifically in order to address BOP concerns. Both provisions 
operate as an exception to Article XI:1 of the GATT, which imposes a general prohibition on 
quantitative restrictions and other trade restrictions on imports and exports.  
 
1.2.  Article XII may be inv oked by all WTO Members, whereas Article  XVIII:B may be invoked 
only by developing country Members. Article XVIII:B covers measures to safeguard a Member's 
financial position, and also permits measures "to ensure a level of reserves adequate for the 
implem entation of [the Member's] programme of economic development".4 Article XVIII:B 
authorizes measures to forestall the threat of or to stop "a serious decline in its monetary 
reserves"5 and to achieve a reasonable rate of increase in its "inadequate monetary  reserves".6  
 
1.3.  In terms of procedural requirements, measures taken under both Articles XII and XVIII:B 
must be taken in accordance with the procedures laid out in the Understanding on the Balance -of-
Payments Provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs a nd Trade 1994 (the "Understanding"). 
Pursuant to the Understanding, Members must give preference to measures that have the least 
restrictive effect on trade. These measures may include import duties and surcharges that exceed 
the bound rates in a Member's Schedule. Members should avoid quantitative restrictions unless, 
because of a critical balance of payments problem, price -based measures are not adequate to 
"arrest a sharp deterioration in the external payments position".7   
 
1.4.  In addition, measures taken f or BOP purposes "may only be applied to control the general 
level of imports and may not exceed what is necessary to address the balance -of-payments 
situation".8 In effect, this means that BOP measures should not be used to provide protection to 
specific s ectors. Members may exclude from the scope of BOP measures certain "essential 
products". In the case of developing countries, under Article XVIII:10, this means "products which 
are more essential in the light of [the Member's] policy of economic developmen t" provided that 
the restrictions are applied in "so as to avoid unnecessary damage to the commercial or economic 
interests of any other [Member]". BOP measures must be progressively relaxed as the BOP 
situation improves.9   
 
1.5.  The Committee on Balance of Pa yments ("BOP Committee") must carry out consultations in 
order to review BOP measures. Members imposing BOP measures must notify the General Council 
and the BOP Committee and must enter into consultations, convened by the BOP committee within 
four months o f the application of the measures and measures are subject to periodic review. 
Members must provide justification of the criteria used to determine which products are subject to 
restriction. Pursuant to Article XV:2 of the GATT 1994, the General Council, o nce advised of a BOP 
matter, is required to consult with the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"). These consultations 
are conducted through the WTO's BOP Committee. The WTO is obliged to accept the IMF's findings 
of fact and determinations10 as to whether t he measures are consistent with the IMF's Articles of 
Agreement. Therefore, the view taken by the BOP Committee on BOP measures depends on a 
positive determination by the IMF as to the monetary situation of the requesting country.  
  
                                                
4 Article XVIII:B(9) of GATT 1994.  
5 Article XVIII:B(9)(a) of GATT 1994.  
6 Article XVIII:B(9)(b) of GATT 1994.  
7 Understanding, para. 3.  
8 Understanding, para. 4.  
9 Articles XII:2(b) and XVIII:B(11) of GATT 1994.  
10 This must be based on statistical and other f acts relating to the BOP situation of the WTO Member 
applying the BOP measure.  WT/MIN(17)/17 • JOB/DEV/51  
 
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  1.6.  BOP measures applied pursuant to Article XVIII:B are subject to an biannual review  by the 
BOP Committee.11 
 
6. Specific questions related to the Current proposal and the 2015 one with special 
consid erations on 3.1 , 3.2 , and 3.3  
 
What is the reasoning for re-introducing in paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3 a proposal which was 
rejected back in 2015?  
 
Rejections in 2015 were clearly motivated by disinterest on the part of developed Members in the 
proposals in the first place.  The adoption of the SDG 9 was also a deter mining event at the end of 
2015, which precipitated G90 members closely examining their structural transformation, 
industrialization and diversification needs and the policy measures required to realize them.  
 
With respect to article 3.3, in 2001 Minister s reaffirmed in the 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration 
on Implementation Related Issues and Concerns that Article XVIII is a special and differential 
treatment provision for developing countries and that recourse to it should be less onerous than to 
Article  XII of the GATT 1994. (para 1.1)  
 
With regard to your proposal in paragraph 3.2, we note that it has been very difficult to 
achieve consensus in the Committee. In this respect we reiterate the question we had 
back in 2015: Don't you think that adding furt her discretion to the assessment of 
adequacy would further complicate the achievement of consensus even for the 
application of existing provisions?  
 
G90 is not adding further discretion to the assessment of adequacy by stipulating what the 
committee should  consider in assessing adequacy of monetary reserves for a developing country 
referred to in para 4(a) of Article XVIII. This provision is designed to ensure that the unique 
challenges facing developing countries, including commodity price volatility  and volatile financial 
capital flows are taken into account. In particular, it serves to clarify that short -term financial flows 
should not be included in determining the adequacy of a developing country’s external financial 
position. The recent 2 cases of Ecu ador on 2009 and 2015 are clear examples on that . 
 
Furthermore, Members will recall that this issue was an outstanding implementation issue, notably 
Annex C of the Cancun 28 SDT provisions, viz. provision no 28. We remind members that one of 
the positive f indings of the India -Autos Panel 12, had been that GATT Article XVIII:B allowed the 
use of balance -of-payments provisions for development purposes. G90 is of the view that 
consideration of the issues described in  Paragraph  3.2 will  facilitate the decisio n making process 
with regard to application of Article XVIII: B.  
 
Could the G90 please clarify how differentiation among developing countries is 
addressed in each of the proposals? Would those developing countries that have 
significantly larger economies than others also be entitled to the proposed special and 
differential treatment in the proposals?   
 
Article XVIII:B  clearly dealt with this issue , as it has to be utilized by the developing country 
Members in the early stages of development and with a low  standard of living). GATT Article 
XVIII.B.8  is clear as follows:   
 
 “The contracting parties recognize that contracting parties coming within the scope of paragraph 4 
(a) of this Article tend, when they are in rapid process of development, to experience  balance of 
payments difficulties arising mainly from efforts to expand their internal markets as well as from 
the instability in their terms of trade.”  
 
And to clarify more on the scope of paragraph 4(a):  
 
“ 4.   (a)   … a contracting party, the economy of which can only support low standards of living* 
and is in the early stages of development ,…” 
 
                                                
11 Articles XII:4(b) and XVIII:B(12)(b) of GATT 1994.  
12 India – Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector DS 146 and DS 175 of December 2001.  WT/MIN(17)/17 • JOB/DEV/51  
 
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  In conclusion, it is important to highlight:   
 
1. Article XVIII:B of the GATT 1994 establish rules allowing WTO Members to impose restrictive 
import measures specifically in order to address BOP concerns.  
2. Yet, the status quo of balance of payments restrictions linked with both laudable and troubling 
developments in today's international economic order. the order has gained considerable 
authority and coherence, over the country applies quantitative restrictions regime, and by 
WTO close coordination with the IMF.  
3. the WTO should not employ these efforts to pursue an unduly narrow understanding of the 
goals of the international economic order.  
4. One Final message to our Esteemed Members who raised concerns about the G90 intentions, 
The main objectives of the G90 are to simplify the procedures for invoking BoP m easures to 
enable them to achieve the objectives of this article.  
5. With regard to the Concerns about the WTO consistency and the importance of avoiding 
excessive use of these provisions; I would like to clarify that the proposal respects the WTO 
related pro visions and doesn’t aim to change it. The proposal does not change the 
fundamentals of Article XVIII B . The proposal doesn’t interfere with the consultations with IMF 
nor the bi annual review and consultations carried out by committee on BoP restrictions.  The 
proposal only seeks to allow developing countries to use their right, The right that we “All” .. 
All of us agreed upon. What We propose better guidelines for determining the adequacy of 
Member’s reserves that are adequate within the context of develop ing countries’ economic 
development programmes. We also propose suspension of the right to retaliate against 
countries that use this Article.   
 
The G90 is looking forward to receiving your comments and suggestions on the proposed text and 
open for further  discussions.  
 
 
_______________  
 
 
RESPONSES BY SOUTH AFRICA ON BEHALF OF THE G90  
PROPOSAL NUMBER 04 AND 05  
 
The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and  
  
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)  
 
 
The statement delivered in the previous CTD -SS, on behalf of the G -90 group of countries under 
proposal 4 and 5 (SPS and TBT) brought evidence that justifies a favourable consideration to these 
proposals by all Members. We have also presented on the specif ics of the proposals contained in 
JOB/DEV/48; this statement provides responses to questions received from Members on these 
proposals.  
 
The questions presented gives us the opportunity once more to explain and highlight in a detailed 
manner the challenges  inherent in the application of Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT) in 
the SPS and TBT Agreements. Some of these issues have repeatedly been raised by developing 
countries during the work of the committees with no solutions provided thus far. The G90  has 
evaluated these challenges in drafting the current proposals. The questions we have received 
cover the following issues:  
 
 Re-introduction of proposals discussed in 2015.  
 Capacity constraints.  
 Adversely affected Members.  
 Longer time period for comments and compliance.  
 Capacity building and technical assistance.  
  
These issues continue to be relevant to the G90, as they are closely linked to the obligation to 
provide S&DT more generally. We have previously stated that the incorporation of provisi ons on 
technical assistance and capacity building in the SPS and the TBT Agreement has been an 
acknowledgement that there are challenges faced by developing countries and LDCs in complying WT/MIN(17)/17 • JOB/DEV/51  
 
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  with Non -Tariff Measures (NTMs). Furthermore, Members have acknowle dged that the S&DT 
provisions in these Agreements provide legally weak and vague undertakings, which cannot be 
translated into specific obligations and therefore not enforceable.  
 
The TBT committee has encouraged Members to continue to exchange information  on the 
implementation of Article 12 of the TBT Agreement. In the SPS committee developing countries 
have indicated that although a substantial amount of technical assistance is provided in the SPS 
area, in many cases it is not appropriate and it does not correspond to their needs. Therefore, 
developing Members continue to call for the implementation of S&DT provisions under Article 9 of 
the SPS Agreement.  
 
Re-introduction of proposals discussed in 2015  
 
The G90 proposals are re -introduced in each negotiating Round because they have not been 
considered in a meaningful way in previous negotiating Rounds. These improved proposals aim to 
find concrete ways to strengthen the S&DT provision and to make them more precise effective and 
operational as envis aged by the Mandate which is provided in paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration.  
 
We continue to bear witness that market access for products of export interest to developing 
country Members are increasingly being dependent on the ability to comp ly with trade regulatory 
measures. While these measures are legitimate, they continue to fragment trade. A WTO report on 
challenges facing small economies revealed that as small economies become more specialized in 
products, they are increasingly exposed t o NTMs.  
 
In fact, one major developed member has just announced in The Telegraph (11 October, 2017) 
that it has to align its regulatory framework to comply with the EU`s complex SPS measures, 
which are presenting significant barriers. They specifically me ntion that their agri -producers might 
have to introduce new handling logistics, which is a costly commitment. Can you imagine how 
developing countries and LDCs who lack the necessary capacity continue to grapple with complex 
regulatory measures.   
 
A techn ical note done by UNCTAD13 in 2015 show that developing countries encounter significant 
additional costs while adapting their production processes to comply with foreign regulatory 
measures and standards. This lead to de facto discrimination against exports  of those countries 
that have the highest difficulties to comply with the regulations in export markets due to capacity 
constrains and/or lack of finance. The adverse effect of such measures and standards can be 
reduced by assisting developing countries an d LDCs to comply.  
 
Members facing capacity constraints and adversely affected  
 
While we note that food safety and agricultural health capacity referred to as SPS management 
capacity is an important requirement to ensure compliance with SPS measures in expo rts markets, 
particularly in developed countries. Most often, capacity constraints in developing countries and 
LDCs prevent us to comply with stringent SPS requirements and to undertake the necessary 
conformity checks.  
 
The term referred to in the proposa l as “developing country Members facing capacity constraints” 
is meant to assist Members to examine and determine the extent to which a Member can or 
cannot comply with a regulatory measure. This determination should ensure that exports of a 
Member, facing  capacity constraints are not adversely affected by a measure that is introduced by 
a developed country Member.  
 
Chairperson, I would like to refer to the case of The Gambia on Pesticide residue testing for 
horticultural product exports . This case demonst rates the impact of SPS measures on a developing 
country that has experienced capacity constraints.  
 
Case Gambia : [Pesticide residue testing for horticultural product exports from The 
Gambia] Exports of horticultural products to the EU are relatively small, but they are of great 
economic importance to a country the size of The Gambia and are also considered an important 
                                                
13 If you care about LDCs, care about NTMs, 2015, UNCTAD.  WT/MIN(17)/17 • JOB/DEV/51  
 
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  element of the country’s programme of export development. Although public a uthorities, and in 
particular the Department for Agricultural Services, have implemented the necessary procedures 
to perform SPS certification, as required by the EU, they have experienced a number of problems 
in meeting the EU’s requirements. Indeed, some  consignments of product have been rejected 
following border inspection. The problems faced by the Gambian authorities are two -fold. Firstly, 
they find it difficult to obtain reliable information on the EU’s SPS requirements for the products 
that they expo rt. In particular, the time taken for information to reach the appropriate authorities 
when the EU’s requirements change can delay implementation and in the meantime there is a risk 
that product consignments will be rejected. Secondly, in certain cases the  appropriate testing 
equipment is not available in The Gambia. This is a particular problem in the case of maximum 
residue levels (MRLs) for pesticides, which can be beyond the detection capability of the 
equipment that is available. Thus, in certain cases , tests can be undertaken and certificates issued, 
but there can be no guarantee that the product complies with the EU’s requirements.14 
 
In other cases, involving developing countries when exports have been stopped, despite the 
adequate compliance period a llowed and the standards board approved as the `competent 
authority` to issue licenses to export, they are not able to go back to earlier levels. In certain 
cases, companies are unable to comply with SPS requirements in the time permitted and/or the 
cost o f doing so is prohibitively high.  
 
Longer time period for comments and compliance  
 
A limited time period provided for comments has also presented a challenge for developing 
countries. In the SPS committee over the years,  developing countries have  request ed that  
longer periods for comments be allowed in the case of products of special export interest for 
developing countries.15  Specifically, developing countries have requested that notification 
procedures give developing countries the opportunity to ident ify where they may have potential 
problems meeting new requirements affecting their exports, so they could request a phased -in 
introduction of the proposed measures. Some developing country Members have even requested 
longer time frames for compliance as l ong as 12 months.16 Even though in the TBT committee it 
has been agreed that the normal time for comments on notified technical regulations and 
conformity assessment procedures should be 60 days, developed country Members were 
encouraged to provide more tha n a 60 -day comment period in order to deal with the challenges 
related to transparency and to improve the ability of developing country Members to comment on 
notifications. During the meeting of the TBT committee held in June 201717, a developed country 
expressed concern regarding the possibility to have enough time to comment on new regulation. If 
developed countries can request for more time to comment on regulations imposed by developing 
country Members, the opposite situation is even more true.  
 
It should be noted that due to the large number and complexity of SPS and TBT measures, longer 
time period for comment is required to allow developing countries time to review the notifications 
and send to various stakeholders at the national level including th e private sector and also to 
provide feedback. Such notifications often require some training and capacity building initiatives to 
stakeholders for them to understand the proposed measure and assess the possible implication of 
the measures.  
 
The focus her e is not only on the comments but on other considerations such as the capacity to 
comply with the SPS measure, including technology, human resources and infrastructure needs, 
with a view to exploring solutions to preserve market access for developing count ry Members, 
especially LDCs. Responding to these complex and stringent measures including the determination 
of the appropriate financial and technical assistance cannot be done in 60 days, hence the 
requirement for a longer time period for comments and com pliance.  
 
  
                                                
14 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTARD/864477 -1112355387702/20424577/henson_et+al.pdf   
15 COMTD/219 and G/SPS/GEN/128 (Egypt Proposal 1999).  
16 G/SPS/R/19 dated 2000.  
17 G/TBT/M/72.  WT/MIN(17)/17 • JOB/DEV/51  
 
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  The extent of the technical and financial assistance  
 
The G90 proposals allow Members to determine the extent of the technical and financial assistance 
to be provided to developing countries. A 2002 WTO survey18 that sought to determine the pri ority 
needs of 45 developing countries for technical assistance and capacity building in TBT, with 
reference to the implementation of the TBT Agreement found that the responses varied across 
different priority areas. This shows that the extent of technical  and financial assistance cannot be 
predefined but must respond to specific country needs. This will enable even investments in 
appropriate technology to ensure that developing countries comply with SPS and TBT measures; 
allow them to effectively participa te in Global Value Chains (GVcs) and integrate them into the 
Multilateral Trading System.  
 
 
_______________  
 
 
 
RESPONSES BY CAMEROON ON BEHALF OF THE G90  
PROPOSAL NUMBER 06  
 
THE AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND  
COUNTERVEILING MEASURES  
 
On this proposal, we received 12 questions from 3 Delegations: Australia, European Union and 
Japan. After considering and analysing the issues and concerns raised, we were able to merge 
them in seven questions or seven points. I will take them one after the other.  
 
1. Examples showing how WTO agreements limit DCs abilities to take measures 
necessary for development  
 
Before and during the GATT years, developing countries had a considerably freer hand in the use 
of industrial subsidies until the Uruguay Round, as a preferred instrument to support structural 
transformation.  
 
Historically, many developed members have used subsidies to grow, diversify and industrialise 
targeted sectors, including for the revitalization of distressed regions and the restructuring and 
rationalization of existing industries, as well as providing government support in the form of R&D 
to specific sectors, aerospace being particularly relevant.  
 
Furthermore, support contingent on the use of local content (Buy American) and environmental 
support programs such as commencing production of more fuel -efficient vehicles have also been 
employed.  
 
The WTO’s SCM Agreement has entailed much tighter constraints on subsidy use, just when 
developing countries have sought to industrialise and diversify a nd grow their economies. This 
agreement was originally a Tokyo round plurilateral code, imposed on G90 members to adopt and 
multilateralize in the Uruguay Round, when they had weak capacity to negotiate.  They were not 
part of the negotiation of that agree ment or any of the Tokyo Round Codes.  
 
Recent jurisprudence has also shown that notwithstanding the SDT provisions in Article 27 of the 
SCM Agreement, and the Doha 2001 Implementation Decision with regard to subsidies, these have 
not really assisted devel oping countries seeking to industrialise, diversify and structurally 
transform their economies.  
 
Therefore, the flexibility we seek under the SCM Agreement is not any more than has been 
afforded to and utilised by industrialised members with first mover ad vantages in the past . 
 
  
                                                
18 G/TBT/W/193, 10 February 2003  WT/MIN(17)/17 • JOB/DEV/51  
 
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  2. Developing Countries facing constraints  
 
The intention here is to say that not all developing countries are facing constraints on everything. 
Not all constraints are listed. Criteria are meant to limit to only those with a direct l ink with the 
agreement.  
 
This term was designed to assist in the concept of distinguishing between developing countries.  
The granting Member would examine and determine the extent of capacity constraint on a case by 
case basis, relevant to the specific pr oposal and agreements.  
 
The notification referred to in paragraph 6.3 required to demonstrate the evidence of the criteria 
referred to in paragraph 6.2. As you probably clearly understood, any of the criteria can be 
demonstrated.  The criteria are not cumulative.  
 
3. Conditioning proposal upon expired Article 8 which DCs were unwilling to renew 
in that time (in connection with paragraph 6.1)  
 
At the outset, I should say that the non -renewal of article 8 of the SCM Agreement in 1999 was 
due to a lack of con sensus by all members. However, the issue of non -actionable subsidies was 
also considered in 2001 and consensus was reached  under paragraph 10.2 of the Doha Ministerial 
Decision on Implementation -related issues and concerns . That Decision taken by Ministe rs 
provides that the Ministerial “Takes note of the proposal to treat measures implemented by 
developing countries with a view to achieving legitimate development goals, such as regional 
growth, technology research and development funding, production diver sification and development 
and implementation of environmentally sound methods of production as non -actionable subsidies, 
and agrees  that this issue be addressed …”. It is only logical to address this proposal now after 
more than a decade the Doha Implemen tation Issues Decision has been in place.  
 
The proposal is even more relevant now given the declining trade balance, lack of industrialization 
and diversification of our countries.  We urge Members to agree to a decision on this matter as 
reflected in the  proposals in 2015 for MC10 and now for MC11.  
 
4. The legality of inclusion by making  reference to the requirements of an expired 
provision, which has disappeared  
 
It is legally possible to re -craft any WTO provisions that members by consensus deem useful, 
either in the same or similar terms to what existed before. Furthermore, the SCM Agreement is 
currently on the DDA agenda of rules negotiating issues, under paragr aph 28 (of Doha 
Declaration  2001); with a mandate to ‘clarify and improve’ the agreement.   
 
In fact, in 2004 and 2006, some developed country members sought to reinsert the expired 
deeming provision in article 6.1 (a) (which is in relation to serious prej udice) which also expired at 
the same time as article 8 of the SCM Agreement, on 31 December 1999. Even now, in October 
2017, a current proposal under review in the Rules negotiating group by a developed member (EU) 
proposes to re -introduce a rebuttable pr esumption of serious prejudice in the case of non -
notification of subsidy programmes.  
 
Having participated in the TFA negotiations since Bali, I think every body here can recognize that 
the Decision adopting the Protocole was taken by the General Council i n November 2014. 
Remember the deadline set by the ministerial decision was 31 July.   
 
5. Open list of development goals and closed list of Article 8  
 
Allow me to read the question as it was formulated: “ How do you reconcile the open list of 
development goals  in your proposal with the closed list of Article 8, if the latter would be 
applicable? And how would you see the rest of the requirements of Article 8 apply?”  
 
This question is not clear.  Please explain. Are you suggesting that you will agree to these 
proposals if the criteria proposed under Proposal 6 is utilized for the other proposals as well?  
Please clarify.  
 
  WT/MIN(17)/17 • JOB/DEV/51  
 
- 16 - 
 
  6. Why the reference to DCs listed in Annex VII of the SCM Agreement?  
 
Annex VII of the SCM Agreement, which includes LDCs and listed countries, is the trigger for this 
element.  It is intended to narrow the scope of application.  We recognize that the WTO Secretariat 
has issued a periodic note reporting the status of the listed countries, plus Honduras (added by 
rectification decision i n 2000), in terms of eligibility if the country falls below $1’000 per capita for 
three consecutive years (See most recent - G/SCM/110/Add.14).  Our intention is that the 
procedure is maintained and applicable to this proposal.  
 
7. Significance of the inserti on of the condition “only when the products concerned 
are destined to exports” since the scope of the provision refers to import 
substitution subsidies  
 
Article 3 of the SCM Agreement refers to two types of prohibited subsidies. While recognizing the 
impor tance of subsidies in economic development of the developing countries in paragraph 27.1, 
the Agreement allows Annex VII countries to provide only export subsidies (Article 3.1 (a) type 
subsidies but not subsidies contingent upon the use of domestic over i mported goods (3.1 (b) type 
subsidies).   
 
Since this proposal of G90 is directed towards industrialization, it is proposed to allow Annex VII 
countries to provide 3.1 (b) type subsidies to the products only when products concerned are 
destined for export.   As I explained in September 14, this will limit the use of 3.1 (b) subsidies and 
link this type of subsidy with the 3.1 (a) type subsidies to promote industrialization in Annex VII 
countries.  
 
To conclude my intervention chair, I wish to encourage membe rs to consider the creativity 
reflected in this proposal and how the solution proposed by G90 takes into consideration the issues 
of concerned Developing Countries Members without changing existing rules frameworks.  
 
 
_______________  
 
 
RESPONSES BY SENEGAL ON BEHALF OF THE G90  
PROPOSAL NUMBER 07 – CUSTOMS VALUATION  
 
 
Today, we would like to provide some preliminary replies to the questions raised by the 
European  Union, Japan and Switzerland during the meeting of 21  September  2017.  
 
As you know, prop osal No.  7 on customs valuation aims on the one hand to combat customs 
under -invoicing – a common practice in many developing countries and LDCs in particular – and on 
the other hand to facilitate access to price databases in the LDCs in order to be able t o check more 
accurately the truth of the values declared by economic agents through effective cooperation 
between the LDCs and the exporting countries.  
 
By relieving the LDCs of these constraints, it should be possible to mobilize greater budgetary 
resourc es to finance their economic and social needs and to improve the efficiency of their customs 
control operations.  
 
The European Union wondered about the problems that the LDCs were experiencing in 
implementing the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the GATT, while Switzerland 
wondered what results the technical assistance provided over the past few years had produced.  
 
As we mentioned when introducing proposal No.  7, application of the alternative methods of 
customs valuation in a strict sequence is a constraint and a burden, and slows down the 
implementation process. It requires updated information on the value of identical or similar goods 
as well as information that is not easily available or requires complicated calculations. Moreover, 
applicat ion of the computed value requires investigations in the exporting country and certain 
procedures that are difficult for the LDCs to accomplish owing to financial constraints and limited 
human resources.  
 WT/MIN(17)/17 • JOB/DEV/51  
 
- 17 - 
 
  We would like to refer the European Union to its co mmunication G/VAL/W/112 in which it explains 
the reasons for its concerns in relation to the truth or accuracy of declared values. These include:  
 
- lack of mutual confidence between trade and customs, error, mistrust;  
 
- lack of experience with regular co mmercial flows;  
 
- importers are motivated to take risks by mis -declarations to customs. Cases of fraud 
or attempted fraud leading to generalization of conclusions in relation to loss of 
revenue;  
 
- under -trained customs and inadequate management; conflict  in relations between 
customs and trade;  
 
- uncooperative trade sectors and/or non -structured trade: traders do not keep 
accounts (or proper accounts), traders are not accessible or cannot be relied upon to 
cooperate in case of post import controls or audi t; 
 
- lack of a comprehensive understanding of the Valuation Agreement and its 
applicability to the diversity of trade flows;  
 
- national laws relating to the powers of customs are incomplete or inadequate.  
 
Today as back then, the LDCs and their customs administrations are faced with the shortcomings 
and problems described by the European Union at the time, in spite of all the efforts that have 
been made and the technical assistance provided.  
 
Indeed, technical assistance is not an end in itself. It is a contribution which goes hand in hand 
with human and financial efforts on the part of the beneficiaries to improve a particular situation. 
In fact, not all of the LDCs have benefited from technical assistance. Besides, the projects and 
activities financed i n this context are limited in time and in resources, and do not guarantee 
results, particularly if there is no exit strategy and if there is no long -term provision in the State 
budget, under own resources, to ensure that the project's achievements are pres erved indefinitely. 
We all know that the LDCs have escalating budgetary constraints to which under -invoicing largely 
contributes.  
 
Like many Members, Japan recognizes the difficulties facing the LDCs, particularly those to relating 
to under -invoicing. Neve rtheless, it is worried by the potential negative effects of using minimum 
values, and shares with Switzerland the systemic concerns in connection with the prohibition of 
minimum values by the Customs Valuation Agreement.  
 
We would like to recall, in this connection, that special and differential treatment (S&D) is an 
exception or a derogation from the rules. Seen from this angle, consistency with the Customs 
Valuation Agreement should not be an issue. Moreover, the use of minimum values is authorized 
under  Annex III of the Customs Valuation Agreement. As we recalled at our last meeting, the fact 
that no LDC has applied the reservation under paragraph 2 of Annex III since 2007 is not linked to 
improvement in the capacities of the LDCs or to their need to use  minimum values, but rather to 
the conditions established by the Committee on Customs Valuation in granting S&D to requesting 
countries.  
 
What the LDCs are asking for today comes under the mandate of paragraph 44 of the Doha 
Declaration, namely to make the  S&D provisions effective and operational, and above all to ensure 
that they address the economic and social needs of the LDCs in a meaningful way.  
 
As we mentioned at our last meeting, we are ready to examine whatever modalities Japan thinks 
might ease it s concerns as to the potential negative effects of using minimum values, taking 
account, of course, of the needs and constraints of the LDCs.  
 
In conclusion, in response to the European Union's question regarding the Trade Facilitation 
Agreement's contrib ution to access to price data, we would like to recall that while Article  12 of the 
Trade Facilitation Agreement is indeed, as we stated earlier, a significant step in strengthening 
customs cooperation between WTO Members, the procedures, the limitations a nd the discretion WT/MIN(17)/17 • JOB/DEV/51  
 
- 18 - 
 
  left to the Members to whom the request for assistance is directed can prove burdensome or 
counterproductive for the LDCs, in that no specific provisions were included to take account of 
their particular situation.  
 
Moreover, under Articl e 10.5.1 of the Trade Facilitation Agreement, Members no longer have the 
possibility of requiring the use of preshipment inspections in relation to tariff classification and 
customs valuation.  
 
For some countries that have recourse to preshipment inspecti on firms, this means a transfer of 
those obligations to the customs administrations.  
 
This is the case for certain LDCs that have contracts with preshipment inspection firms and are 
faced with the dual challenge of bringing their TFA commitments into confo rmity and implementing 
the procedures under the Customs Valuation Agreement.  
 
In view of the previously mentioned limits associated with the provision and the effectiveness of 
technical assistance, our view is that the TFA will only be able to provide any possibilities in this 
respect if it enables these constraints to be properly addressed; and it is somewhat premature to 
reach any conclusions at this stage given that the Agreement only entered into force recently and 
that the LDCs are still far from recei ving the support they need in this framework.  
 
I hope that I have answered the questions and concerns raised by Members regarding 
proposal  No. 7. Once again I would like to thank you, Madam Chair, as well as the Members. We 
reaffirm our determination to ac hieve an outcome on the S&D proposals, and on this one in 
particular, in Buenos Aires.  
 
 
_______________  
 
 
RESPONSES BY BANGLADESH ON BEHALF OF THE G90  
PROPOSAL NUMBER 08 - THE ENABLING CLAUSE  
 
We have 5 questions on this proposal from Australia, EU and Japan. G90 expresses its gratitude to 
those members for their questions, which will bring clarity in our proposal and enable us to have 
further discussions.  
 
First of all, G90 likes to emphasize that the proposal is not necessarily an obligation of result.  It is 
merely sought that developed countries give due consideration to meaningful market access.  
 
We refer, as further articulation of article 2 a in the Enabling Clause, the Decision of the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES of 25 June 1971, which envisages, the estab lishment of “generalized, 
non-reciprocal and non -discriminatory preferences beneficial to the developing countries” (BISD 
18S/24).  It is not impractical for developed members, in designing their GSP schemes to 
proactively consider how meaningful market ac cess can be best secured for developing and least 
developed country members. We seek that developed countries, in formulating their GSP schemes, 
should consider how the export interests of relevant developing and least developed country 
members can be ensu red, and make the market access accorded to them under the various GSP 
schemes meaningful.   
 
In this regard,  G90 has some pertinent questions about GSP schemes.  
 
First, don’t the WTO Members consider that GSP was agreed upon by the WTO Members for 
expandi ng export opportunities of the developing countries especially those which have limited 
export products?   In fact, Paragraph 3 (a) of the Enabling clause maintains “Any differential and 
more favourable treatment provided under this clause:  shall be desig ned to facilitate and promote 
the trade of developing countries”.  
 
Second, don’t the members think that proposal of G90 will facilitate operationalization of this 
provision through consultations?   
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  Third, d on’t the WTO Members consider that there is a re sponsibility for the GSP granting countries 
to design their scheme to facilitate and promote the  trade of developing countries?  
 
G90 members are looking forward to having further discussions on the proposal.  
 
 
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RESPONSES BY EGYPT ON BEHALF OF THE G90  
PROPOSAL NUMBER 9 - TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER  
 
 
With reference to the G90 proposal on Technology transfer (TT), We have received around  7  
written specific questions from some members including EU and Canada. We thank Al l members 
for their active participation and comments in previous meetings and special thanks for those 
members who provided us with written submissions for their effective engagements.  
The questions seek clarifications or more understanding towards the f ollowing:  
 
 Why we introduce this new important proposal?  
 how existing WTO Agreements are limiting developing country members’ abilities to take 
measures necessary for development?  
 TRIPS Article 66.2 & its relation with the proposed provision 9.3  
 What is meant by “under the control of developed country members”? Does this mean 
technologies owned by a government?  
 What is meant by “technologies developed with public funding?  
 Specific questions seeking to understand more the concerns of LDCS with regard the 
current practice and initiatives related to ToT.  
 
The following presentation will try to address some of those concerns and rest will be clarifies 
more throughout the discussion sand the interventions of the members especially the LDC 
members in order to bring practical examples from their side.  
 
1. Why we introduce this proposal?  
 
The scope of the G90 proposal is to address the needs for Industrialization, structural 
transformation, and diversification, therefor we introduced this totally new proposal to com plete 
and complement the rest of proposals.  
 
As we stated before , There is no productivity without the adequately needed technology . 
Technological progress is a key factor in economic development and decreasing the technology gap 
between developed and dev eloping countries will have a positive impact on the international trade.  
 
Many developing countries have demonstrated declines in manufacturing and insufficient or a lack 
of growth in a manner that has devastated their potential for sustained industriali zation, and 
structural transformation of their economies. As Developing and Least Developed countries 
continue to struggle with industrialization because many are still far behind technologically, 
specific measures need to be taken within the WTO to encour age such flows of technology.  
 
2. How existing WTO Agreements are limiting developing country members’ abilities 
to take measures necessary for development?  
 
A number of provisions in the WTO agreements mention the need for a transfer of technology to 
take place between developed and developing countries. However, it is not clear how such a 
transfer takes place in practice.  
 
Major aspects of the technology and knowledge deficits in many developing countries are easily 
spotted by observing such indicators as the share of gross domestic product (GDP) devoted to 
scientific and technological research or the low share of manufacturing and technology products in 
exports.  
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  However, a more comprehensive and actionable perspective can be gained by making further 
assessments on the functioning of the national innovation systems. For this, technology and 
knowledge stocks and flows, as well as the supporting institutional and policy frameworks, must be 
brought into the picture.  
 
BARRIERS TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
 
Technology transfer is a four -stage process, consisting in acquisition, learning, adaptation and 
diffusion. Market failures can act as barriers to technology acquisition and diffusion of technology. 
Some forms of market failure may be  particularly important barriers to technology transfers to 
developing countries. The process of technology transfer to developing countries may also 
encounter major obstacles in the pha ses of learning and adaptation.  
 
What are the major barriers to techno logy transfers to developing countries ? There are two types 
of problems - firm-level problems that derive from the specific characteristics of a firm, and 
systemic problems that derive from the environment in which firms operate.  
 
(a)  At the firm level, possible barriers to technology transfers include:  
 
•  incomplete knowledge about all ranges of technological alternatives;  
•  inability to identify the technology that best suits its needs;  
•  limited access to finances;   
•  inadequate workforce skills an d mechanisms for their upgrading;  
•  slower pace of technological development in downstream or upstream firms that inhibits the 
upgrading of technology;  
•  organizational rigidities within firms.   
 
(b)  At the systemic level, barriers to technology transfe rs may include:  
 
•  lack of access to information on new technologies and innovations;   
•  market distortions, including barriers to trade;   
•  lack of education and skills;   
•  ineffective institutions for carrying out R&D;  
•  Universities and research in stitutions disconnected from the needs of industry;   
•  inadequate development of the financial and insurance markets;   
•  lack of resources, knowledge and capabilities within policy institutions;   
•  regulatory constraints.  
  
 
3. Proposal 9.2 related to TRIPS Article 66.2 & its relation with the proposed 
provision 9.3  
 
The proposal benefited from the existing related discussions on Trade and TT within the WTO. The 
proposed provisions especially 9.2 and 9.3 deals with the following fundamentals  : 
 
(1) The Enabling Environment  
 
(2) Role of Home Country Measures  
 
To clarify more, Members have discussed the vital role of domestic policy and framework in the 
generation, transfer and diffusion of technology. There is a recognition that development of human 
capital, infrastructure, legal framework, macroeconomic conditions and the level of indigenous skill 
of workers and the domestic education system are key elements in creating a suitable enabling 
environment for the flow and diffusion of technology. A number of presentations have also 
emphasized the role of absorptive capacity in deriving economic gains from transfer of technology.  
 
- Underlying the importance of partnership in technology transfer and for it to be a win -win 
situation, the evolving discussions seem  to recognize that both home and host countries 
measures are important factors in facilitating transfer of technology. Members share the 
understanding that transfer of technology is a two -way process but have somewhat 
different views on the relative import ance of home and host country measures.  
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  - From developing countries prospect, we continue to hold the view that home country 
measures, including financing for transfer of technology, incentives to stimulate FDIs with 
a technology transfer component, incent ives for Small and Medium Enterprises seeking 
partners in developing countries, simplification of rules of origin and the establishment of a 
database to ensure the flow of all relevant information on technology are much more 
important in facilitating techn ology transfer.  
 
4. With regard to questions that seeks more understanding of Developing countri es 
in particular LDCs concerns  
 
Technology transfer initiatives to developing countries in particular LDCs have not been 
operationalized. For instance, in the TRIPS council, with regard to actions taken or contemplated 
under article 66.2, some members have raised that the programmes repo rted by some developed 
members wherein they are providing tech transfer under article 66.2, are not necessarily 
specifically tailored towards LDCs (November 2016 TRIPS meeting). Indeed, the EU has admitted 
that these programmes are not necessarily targeted  to LDCs but often cover a regional scope 
which include a variety of countries, some including developing countries, who are not the object 
of this mandate. 19  Furthermore, many of the programmes and policies reported are not technical 
in nature nor includ e a technology transfer component. In addition to , Reference has been made 
to an ICTSD study discussing implementation of Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement, wherein it 
was shown that out of the 384 programmes reviewed only 42 qualified as technology tra nsfer 
programmes despite the very liberal definition of technology transfer adopted by the ICTSD for the 
purpose of its study.  Even those programmes were not sufficiently targeted to LDCs or LDCs 
alone. Furthermore, the WGTTT has not made any recommendati on to the GC on steps to increase 
tech flows to developing countries.  
 
5. On the question related to clarification on  9.4, this paragraph   
 
Requests targeted technical assistance to be provided to support LDCs domestic efforts to enhance 
their technologica l base and improve their innovation capacities.  
 
6. Publicly owned technol ogy or publicly funded research  
 
- Historically , governments have played a key role in supporting research and development 
through national laboratories, universities, and through international collaborative 
ventures . 
- Many governments emphasise the contribution that public support to R&D can make to 
economic competitiveness and the importance of commercialising publicly -funded R&D.  
- The country case studies indicate that public fund ing remains a major source for R&D  
activities.  
- Public funding of R&D, according to the UNCTAD, UNEP and UNDESA paper, usually takes 
two forms: general support to national R&D institutions and laboratories, and direct 
funding of specific projects accordin g to set government priorities.  
- There is a close relationship between the governments and the privat e sectors results 'spill 
over'.  
- One example of publicly funded research being made available to the public is the 
mandatory Public Access Policy of the US N ational Institutes of Health (NIH) which requires 
all investigators funded by the NIH to make publicly available their publications through 
the National Library of Medicine’s no later than 12 months after the official date of 
publication, thus improving th e sharing of scientific findings, the pace of medical advances, 
and the rate of return on benefits to the taxpayer. A similar concept could also be 
envisaged to address prompt availability of publicly funded technologies to developing 
countries.  
 
7. On the co ncern or the question related to why WGTTT  ? 
 
The proposal seeks to enhance and revitalise the work of the working Group on Trade and Transfer 
of Technology (ToT) by mandating it to examine certain issues. The Working Group on Transfer of 
Technology was es tablished by the Ministers in Doha and aims to examine the relationship 
between trade and the transfer of technology from developed to developing countries, and ways to 
                                                
19 Minutes of Meeting of November 2016 IP/C/M/83/Add.1 dated  30 January 2017.    WT/MIN(17)/17 • JOB/DEV/51  
 
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  increase the flow of technology to developing countries. As per the reports of the WG o n TT, the 
Chairman reiterated that it had been over 14 years since the Working Group was established by 
the Ministers in Doha with a clear mandate to work upon. The Working Group still remained far 
from fulfilling the Ministerial mandate.  
 
 
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RESPONSES BY BENIN ON BEHALF OF THE G90  
PROPOSAL NUMBER 10 - ACCESSIONS  
 
 
Australia  
 
1. For each of the ten proposals submitted in JOB/DEV/47, could the G90 please provide 
specific examples of how existing WTO Agreement are limiting developing country 
members’ abilities to take measures necessary for development.  
 
5. Could the G90 please clarify what is meant by the term “full restraint” in proposal 10 
similarly, could the G90 clarify what is meant by “fast -tracking” accession process? We 
would also be interested in understanding the proponents’ specific concerns with the 2012 
LDC Accessio n Guideline?  
 
Canada  
 
 What is meant by the term “full restraint” in paragraph 10.2?  
 How do the proponents define “fast track” accession procedure?  
 What concrete steps are envisaged that would lead to the implementation of a “disciplined” 
fast track procedu re? 
 
EU 
 
1. What is meant by “fast track” accession procedure and by the proposed obligation on 
Members to “discipline” it? Assuming that such a procedure would exist, what are the 
suggestions of proponents to discipline it?  
 
 
Thirty LDCs are original WTO mem bers and accession package of nine LDCs have been approved 
among 36 countries since the establishment of the WTO. But there are still a significant number of 
LDCs out of the system of which 8 are in the process with other 13 developing countries in the 
queue.  
 
Because of increasing appetite and demand for a wider market access from the side of Member 
states combined with other constraints associated with LDCs own limitations of development; 
human, institutional, infrastructural & regulatory capacities, acc ession process of LDCs is becoming 
onerous and challenge. From the records so far, accession process on average took nearly 11 
years for developing and 13 years for LDCs. 13 years on average even as high as 20 for some on 
accession process in addition on t heir limited technical capacity to negotiate and limited financial 
resources.   
 
To this effect, the 2002 an LDC Accession Guideline in addition the 2012 General Council Decision 
was to further strengthen, streamline and operationalize the LDCs accession. The Guideline urge 
Member States to exercise restraint in seeking market access concessions and commitments from 
acceding LDCs that is beyond their levels of development in order to facilitate their accession.  
 
The Guidelines stipulate that Members: to exercise restraint in seeking market access concessions 
from acceding LDCs,  while the latter are expected to offer reasonable concessions commensurate 
with their individual development, financial and trade needs. Notwithstanding that the Guideline 
allows fle xibilities to acceding LDCs consistent with their individual development, financial and 
trade needs as a fundamental objective: it also requires LDCs to make a comprehensive binding WT/MIN(17)/17 • JOB/DEV/51  
 
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  coverage on both Agriculture and NAMA. The Guidedelines set basic principl es both for Goods and 
Services negotiation. On goods the principles are:  
 
 Comprehensive binding coverage on both Agriculture and NAMA (50% for Agriculture & 
35% for NAMA);  
 Tariff negotiations should ensure appropriate balance between predictability of tariff 
concessions and to pursue legitimate developmental needs of LDCs to address their 
specific c onstraints or difficulties; and  
 Establishing benchmarks on average bound rates . 
 
On Services to:  
 
 Members to respect the principle of special treatment for LDCs contained in Articles IV20 
and XIX21 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), in particular, Members 
to take into account the serious difficulty of acceding LDCs in undertaking commitments, in 
view of their special economic situation and th eir individual develop ment, financial and 
trade needs;  
 flexibility for acceding LDCs for opening fewer sectors, liberalizing fewer types of 
transactions, and progressively extending market access in line wi th their development 
situation;  
 acceding LDCs shal l not be expected to offer full national treatment, nor are they expected 
to undertake additional commitments under Article XVIII of the GATS on regulatory issues 
which may go beyond their institutional, regulatory, and administrative capacities.  
 
With the se principles, the Guideline among others, gives the flexibilities for acceding LDCs,  
 
 to identify their priority services sectors and sub -sectors and make reasonable offers 
commensurate with their individual development, financial and trade needs as well as their 
regulator y and institutional capacities;  
 be provided with technical assistance, as appropriate, to enhance their regulato ry and 
institutional capacities;  
 not be required to undertake commitments in services sectors and sub -sectors beyond 
those tha t have been committed by existing WTO LDC Members, nor in sectors and sub -
sectors that do not correspond to their individual develop ment, financial and trade needs;  
 Accordingly, WTO Members shall exercise restraint in seeking commitments in trade in 
servic es from the acceding LDCs.  
 
Though LDCs on accession are willing in taking commitments that are consistent to their level of 
development, human, institutional, infrastructural & regulatory capacities, the size and depth of 
commitments that LDC countries to ok indicates the depth of demands and pressures made on 
LDCs for more market access. The commitments are excessive and some commitment terms are 
even much beyond the level of development and ability of LDCs to meet their obligations in 
tandem with their de velopmental ambitions to get their people out of poverty and benefiting from 
the global trading system on balanced terms after accession. i.e., acceding LDC members are still 
exposed to WTO plus  commitments by developed members, hence eroding LDCs’ policy space, 
what was dubbed “kicking away the development ladder”.  
 
We seek Members to respect the principle of special treatment for LDCs contained in Articles IV 
and XIX of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). In particular, Members shall take 
                                                
20 Article IV(1.c) General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) stipulates, the liberalization of market 
access should consider sectors and modes of supply of export interest to them. And Article IV(3) specifically 
refer LDCs as follows: “Special priority shall be given to the least -developed country Me mbers in the 
implementation of paragraphs  1 and  2.  Particular account shall be taken of the serious difficulty of the least -
developed countries in accepting negotiated specific commitments in view of their special economic situation 
and their development,  trade and financial needs”.  
21 GATS Art XIX.2 The process of liberalization shall take place with due respect for national policy 
objectives and the level of development of individual Members, both overall and in individual sectors. There 
shall be appropr iate flexibility for individual developing country Members for opening fewer sectors, liberalizing 
fewer types of transactions, progressively extending market access in line with their development situation 
and, when making access to their markets availabl e to foreign service suppliers, attaching to such access 
conditions aimed at achieving the objectives referred to in Article  IV. WT/MIN(17)/17 • JOB/DEV/51  
 
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  into account the serious difficulty of acceding LDCs in undertaking commitments, in view of their 
special economic situation and their individual development, financial and trade needs.  
 
 
We therefore,  
 
i. seek to discipline the Guideline as an LDC Accession  Instrument and ensure that LDCs 
accede on a fair and equal terms to previous members, and that their conditions of 
access to the WTO should not be onerous than founding members;  
ii. as per the principles of the Guideline, Members to restraint in seeking marke t access 
concessions and commitments from acceding LDCs in trade in services that they are 
not ready to make any concession or take any commitment that is beyond their level 
of development and regulatory capacity. You are all encouraged to attend the Worki ng 
Party on the accession of LDCs to witness what we are talking about.  
iii. because of their limited technical financial resources capacity, it should not be lengthy 
process and be exercised in a fast -track approach.  
 
With the principles of universalizing the multilateral trading system in a balanced term consistent 
with the level of development, ambition and developmental needs of LDCs, we hope that the 
Buenos Aires, M11’s outcomes will ensure;  
 
a) with the principle of not to leave anyone behind in benefitin g from the global trading 
system, full implementation of the Guideline that sets a benchmark for goods and services’  
commitments by disciplining the Guideline as part of Special and Deferential Treatment 
(S&DT) of the LDCs accession,  
b) re-affirm Members comm itment to restraint from seeking market access concessions and 
commitments from acceding LDCs that they are not ready to make concession or take 
commitment  because of their level of development capacities and developmental ambition;  
 
 
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