JOB/GC/83  
 
9 October 2015  
(15-5275)  Page: 1/6  
General Council    
 
  AGENDA ITEM 1: REPORT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE  
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS COMMITTEE  
THURSDAY, 8 OCTOBER 2015 
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1.1.  At the last General Council meeting, on 28 July, I reported that limited progress had been 
made on developing a work programme by the Ju ly deadline. I then convened a TNC meeting on 
31 July to take stock of progress and to discuss the way forward. That meeting ended with an 
unequivocal and united message from Members that we must now focus our efforts towards delivering outcomes in Nairobi.  
1.2.  With that in mind, we restarted our work  in September with renewed impetus. I held a 
Room W meeting with heads of delegations on 17 September to report in detail on the 
consultations to date. I gave my assessment of the situation at that point. I said that progress on some key issues, like domestic support, and market  access in agriculture, NAMA and services was 
looking very difficult.  
1.3.  While continuing our work on those efforts, I said that it was time for us to start working 
more intensely on issues where there appeared to be more convergence and which might be 
potential deliverables for MC10. These included — but were not necessarily limited to: 
 development issues with a particular focus on LDCs, 
 export competition in agriculture, and 
 a set of possible outcomes to improve transparency in a number of areas.  
1.4.  A range of consultations have taken place since that last Room W meeting which have further 
pointed things in this direction, even though it is not the preferred outcome for many of you.  
1.5.  I have continued my consultations in a variety of configurations. I held numerous bilateral 
meetings with ministers where possible — for exam ple in the margins of the Public Forum, the 
G20, or the UN Sustainable Development Summit in New York. 
1.6.  In addition, on 29 September I convened a meeting focused on advancing LDC issues. And 
on the 1 October I held a meeting to start discussing how we approach our work after Nairobi. 
I have also taken part, by invitation, in a number of meetings convened by Members, including meetings in Istanbul with a small group of mini sters, and then with G20 trade ministers at the 
invitation of the Government of Turkey. I think it would be helpful to give a short overview of each 
of these meetings, before drawing some conclusions about where things stand today.  
Report on recent consultations 
1.7.  I will start with the meeting on LDC issues which was held on 29 September. 
1.8.  Given the emerging view in favour of delivering an LDC package in Nairobi, I asked the Group 
Coordinator, Ambassador Shameem Ahsan of Bangla desh, to give an indication of what their JOB/GC/83 
 
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  forthcoming proposals might contain. He gave a helpful overview of the potential issues, which 
included: 
 Some elements of S&D treatment, 
 All issues of interest to LDCs in Agriculture, including domestic support, 
 Action on Non-Tariff Barriers, including a horizontal mechanism, 
 Binding DFQF market access through scheduling, 
 A reflection of flexibility that has already been  agreed upon in various decisions, guidelines 
and Ministerial declarations in trade in services, 
 Adoption of simplified procedures for taking anti-dumping action for use by LDCs and 
increasing the threshold on non-application of anti-dumping duties for LDCs, and  
 Strengthening of technical assistance.  
1.9.  There was not a detailed discussion of these issues in the meeting. Rather, reflecting the 
proximity of MC10, there was a desire to move to discussing textual proposals as soon as possible.  
1.10.  We also briefly reviewed progress on implementation of the Bali issues. I won't say too 
much about this now as the General Council Chair will cover these issues under agenda item 2. 
However, I did want to mention Rules of Origin – and the submission from the LDC Group on this issue — as this falls under the TNC.  
1.11.  I am pleased to say that I have appointed Steffen Smidt, who you all know in his role as 
LDC Facilitator, to take forward this proposal on my behalf, as TNC Chair — so he will be a Friend of the Chair. I thank Steffen for his continued commitment to LDC issues and wish him luck in this important role, where he will have my full support.  
1.12.  While I am talking about LDC issues I would like, very quickly, to mention a few other 
points. 
1.13.  First, I was delighted that the terms of Li beria's WTO Membership were agreed earlier this 
week. I congratulate the Government of Liberia on this achievement — and all those in Geneva 
who have been involved in making this happen. I very much look forward to formally agreeing this accession in Nairobi.  
1.14.  Second, I would like to remind Members that we are holding an LDC event on Monday at 
10 a.m. in Room W, looking at 20 years of supporting the integration of LDCs in to the multilateral trading system. That will be an important opportunity to discuss what has been achieved on this front since the WTO was created — and, perhaps more significantly, what we can aim to deliver in 
the future. 
1.15.  Third, preparations are underway for the Pledging Conference to support Phase Two of the 
EIF. I will be chairing the event, which will be held in Nairobi on 14 December. A successful 
pledging conference would be a significant outc ome of the ministerial and I strongly urge all 
existing and potential donors to be ready to lend their support. 
1.16.  Now, continuing with my report of recent consultations, I held a meeting last Thursday, 
1 October. My preference was in fact to call an other Room W meeting, but with the Public Forum 
still ongoing and in full swing most rooms in th e house were occupied. The Forum is an important 
outreach event and a symbol of our openness as an organization, so I did not want to disrupt proceedings. Instead I convened a session in my own meeting room so we were quite crowded in, 
with some 48 delegations attending.  
1.17.  This meeting was a chance to update Memb ers on the state of play. We also discussed the 
question of how we can intensify our work, including on the specific outcome documents for 
Nairobi, and how we will continue our work after Nairobi.  JOB/GC/83 
 
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  1.18.  A range of views were expressed. I floated an idea at the meeting on a possible way 
forward. In concluding the meeting I promised to bring that idea to the General Council today — so I will come back to this point in a moment.  
1.19.  Indeed, the post-Nairobi issue has become  a feature of many of my consultations over 
recent weeks, and I will come back also to this point in a moment.  
1.20.  I want to turn now to meetings convened by Members.  1.21.  On 28 September and 1 October, I was invited to participate in a meeting hosted by 
Australia. It included representatives from Brazil, China, the EU, India, Japan and the US. The 
Chairs of the General Council, the Special Session of the Agriculture Committee and the NAMA Negotiating Group also joined the meeting. 
1.22.  In both meetings, discussions revolved  around our possible outcomes for Nairobi. 
In particular, participants discussed the possibility  of agreeing on a subset of DDA issues in 
Nairobi, combined with a statement on our post-Nairobi work.  
1.23.  On the Nairobi package itself, participants mentioned again, export competition, a 
development and LDC package, and some transparen cy provisions. They all agreed, however, that 
there would be challenges in negotiating these issues. These were promising issues, but not "sure outcomes". Participants did not discuss the details of the difficulties that they thought they might 
face. 
1.24.  Again, a key issue discussed was our post-Nairobi work. Here, the views were quite 
divergent. Some wanted to continue our work and reaffirm the Doha architecture and constructs. Others said they would be prepared to engage on issues we have been negotiating under Doha, 
but were not willing to pursue them  under the current DDA framework.  
1.25.  Participants also acknowledged that it would be difficult to find common language on the 
post-Nairobi work, but no-one disagreed with the importance of trying to work out a common 
message on the future, which would form part of the overall Nairobi outcome.  
1.26.  Participants explored their commonalities in terms of guidance for our future work. If 
Members deliver the package that has been outlined for Nairobi, centred around development, 
transparency, and export competition, no-one disa greed that it would be a meaningful outcome.  
1.27.  Participants also argued that such a pa ckage would not mean that it would successfully 
address the DDA single undertaking. After Nairobi, participants would be willing to think about how to make progress on issues that might not have been fully addressed by MC10.  
1.28.  I must say this was a very preliminary conversation. Some participants noted they had no 
instructions on these issues. It was clear that, even if there were some commonalities about our 
future work, important differences still existed. Finally, participants went through the different 
possibilities in terms of the nature of the outcome documents. Again, I will come back to this point 
in a moment.  
1.29.  Those same participants accepted Australia’s invitation and met at the Ministerial level in 
the margins of the G20 trade ministers meeting in Istanbul earlier this week. This time, 
Ambassador Amina Mohamed, as Chair of MC10, joined the meeting as well.  
1.30.  The conversation focused on what issues pa rticipants thought could be dealt with in Nairobi 
and what the approach should be to post-Nairobi wo rk. So as you can see, it is a repetition of the 
familiar conversation — focusing these two points.  
1.31.  Participants were asked to say whether they were prepared to proceed on a package of 
issues which would be DDA minus, along the lines of what I have already outlined. And they were 
asked if they were willing to evaluate whether an d how we should start working on a final Nairobi 
document.  JOB/GC/83 
 
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  1.32.  The conclusion that I took from that meeting was that participants were willing to work on 
both fronts. This is encouraging. 
1.33.  In addition to the arguments made in previous meetings, some other elements emerged 
more clearly this time. Some participants said that reassurance regarding post-Nairobi was needed 
for a successful outcome in Nairobi. No-one seemed to fundamentally disagree with this. Some 
stressed the importance of a balanced outcome even  in the context of a package containing some 
issues only.  
1.34.  Some noted that the post-Nairobi agenda should be open to issues that are relevant to all 
Members, and some made the point clearly that the DDA issues must remain the primary focus and cannot be forgotten. No-one disagreed that development should stay central to our conversations after Nairobi and that principles like S&D treatment and less-than-full reciprocity 
should be kept in our post-Nairobi work. 
1.35.  Differences still remained on the role of the DDA framework in the post-Nairobi agenda. In 
spite of that, there was no apparent disagreement on the desirability of a consensual document, a 
Ministerial Declaration, as part of the outcomes for MC10.  
1.36.  I told participants that I would bring thes e discussions to the General Council, as I am doing 
now. I also stressed the importance of not leaving the discussion about our future work to the last 
minute, so as to avoid the risk of having a chaotic process in Nairobi. I was reassured by the 
participants. All of them expressed willingness to engage in negotiations in Geneva along the lines 
of what I described here, and they underscored the need of discussing these issues with the wider 
Membership, which we are doing here. 
1.37.  On Tuesday, I attended the G20 trade ministers meeting in Istanbul. Again, Cabinet 
Secretary Amina Mohamed also joined the meet ing. I set out the shape of the potential 
deliverables that had been discussed in Geneva and posed the two key questions: 
 First: was there a willingness to proceed on the ba sis of a package of specific issues which is 
DDA-minus — and therefore should we intensify our work on the more promising issues that I outlined earlier, without prejudice to the other items we were already negotiating? And  
 Second: should we start work on a final Nairobi document immediately, without prejudice to 
the outcome of this exercise, either in terms of substance or format? I was pleased with the 
response.  
1.38.  There was strong support to begin working — in the negotiating groups  — more 
intensively on a package of specific substantive outcomes for Nairobi, with a focus on areas where 
outcomes seem to be more likely to be successfully concluded. Again, however, it was clear that work on these issues should not preclude work on other areas where some Members felt 
consensus may still be achievable.  
1.39.  I cautioned ministers that there was still a great deal of intensive work ahead if we were to 
narrow the gaps between positions and reach outcomes , even on the specific issues identified as 
part of the potential package. Ministers also gave  their backing to a parallel discussion on the path 
of future work on unresolved Doha issues after Nairobi.  
1.40.  No-one disagreed with the continuing centra l importance of development to this work — nor 
that core DDA issues which remain unresolved, such  as agriculture, industrial goods and services, 
will continue to be an important part of the post-Nairobi discussion.  
1.41.  Overall I think a very clear, high-level po litical message emerged from this meeting that the 
political will exists, among these important players, to make Nairobi a success.  
Post-Nairobi 
1.42.  So, drawing on all of these meetings and co nsultations, let me now focus on the issue of our 
post-Nairobi work in a bit more detail. While there is a potential  package on the table, it seems JOB/GC/83 
 
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  that, whatever we deliver in Nairobi, it will not be viable or credible, to announce it as an agreed 
conclusion of the DDA single undertaking. This seems to be a consensual view. 
1.43.  In this scenario, the unavoidable question is: what to do with the DDA issues that are not 
properly addressed in the Nairobi package? At this point, there are divergent views on what 
happens after Nairobi. Many say that if there is no consensus to end the Doha Round then it will 
simply continue — you would need consensus to end it — and that we should state this clearly. Others say that if we do not deliver Doha by Nairobi then that will be it — even without a formal 
statement affirming the demise of the DDA. 
1.44.  Clearly these views will be extremely difficult to reconcile. However, I think we cannot 
disregard important commonalities when thinking about the way ahead. For example, I think we 
all agree that: 
 We want to deliver something in Nairobi and that it should be meaningful. 
 Whatever we deliver will not be agreed to be the end of negotiations on the DDA issues. 
 We are still ready to keep pursuing the core issues of the DDA and their development 
dimension after Nairobi — although there is no agreement on how to do this: whether under 
the DDA framework, or whether under a reformulated architecture. 
1.45.  The question is whether we can — or whether we want — to capture these and other 
possible commonalities in a consensual text in Nairobi. We have a number of options in terms of 
the type of document that could result from the Ministerial. It could be:  
 a Ministerial Declaration, which is the usual type of document that you get from these 
meetings;  
 a non-consensual Chairperson’s statement, which is something we have done before;  
 or a hybrid of some sort — for example it could be partly consensual text and partly non-
consensual text.  
1.46.  So those are the potential options. Then we arrive again at the question of how such a 
document can be produced — how do we get there? This is not a small challenge and it is important that we need to think now about the process that would allow us to find convergence on 
a satisfactory solution. 
1.47.  I would suggest that we start working on the basis that we will have a Ministerial 
Declaration that would take stock of the decisions taken at MC10 and that gives us guidance on our future work. Of course, this would be without prejudice to what outcome we will have in 
Nairobi, but it is important to start somewhere and to aim for the highest possible result.  
1.48.  My proposal to you therefore is to start a pr ocess that will lead us to text based negotiations 
on an MC10 Ministerial Declaration. There are still different views on what this process would look 
like and I will be informally consulting you about this. Whatever this process is — and as I say, 
I don’t know what it will look like — we should bear some things in mind: 
 It must be progressive (for example, right no w we still don’t know what the Nairobi package 
will look like);  
 It must be a bottom-up, transparent and inclusive process; 
 It will not deal with substance — that will happen in the negotiating groups; 
 My instinct is that it should probably start with a focus on the post-Nairobi elements of the 
declaration.  JOB/GC/83 
 
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  1.49.  These are just my preliminary views. As I have indicated, I will be holding consultations to 
hear your own views.  
Conclusion 
1.50.  Through the various consultations over recent weeks I think Members have identified a road 
to success in Nairobi. Clearly there are many obstacles along the way, but none in my view are 
insurmountable. We have very little time remaining.  
1.51.  I think we have a general sense of what may be on the table in terms of substantive 
deliverables (though it is not a closed package, or a sure package) — and I think we should 
recognize that agreement on the elements we are talking about would represent real progress. They would have a major economic and developmenta l impact, even though we must strive to do 
much more in the future. So now we need to fi rm these up with textual proposals that can be 
advanced through the negotiating groups.  
1.52.  But it is now very clear that the post-Nairobi conversation must take place at the same 
time. These two elements need to move in parallel. Otherwise the differences we already see 
today could compromise any chance of success on the substantive issues. 
1.53.  So this is where we are today, Mr Chai rman. I hope it provides food for thought.  
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