RESTRICTED  
  
G/ADP/M/52  
 
28 July 2017  
(17-4146) Page: 1/22 
Committee on Anti -Dumping Practices  Original: English  
 
 MINUTES OF THE REGUL AR MEETING  
HELD ON 27 APRIL 201 7 
CHAIR: MR PEIRA SHAN NON (AUSTRALIA)  
1. The Committee on Anti -Dumping Practices (the "Committee") held a regular meeting 
on 27 April 2017.  
2. The Committee adopted the following agenda contained in docum ent WTO/AIR/ADP/14:  
1   NATIONAL LEGISLATION ................................ ................................ .............................  2 
1.1   Review of notifications of new or amended legislation or regulations not previously 
reviewed by the Committee (including supplemental notifi cations of existing provisions 
not previously reviewed)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 2 
1.1.1    Armenia (G/ADP/N/1/ARM/3 -G/SCM/N/1/ARM/3 -G/SG/N/1/ARM/3)  ................................  2 
1.1.2    Brazil (G/ADP/N/1/BRA/3/Suppl.8 and G/ADP/N/1/BRA/3/Suppl.8/Cor r.1) .......................  2 
1.1.3    El Salvador (G/ADP/N/1/SLV/3/Suppl.1 -G/SCM/N/1/SLV/3/Suppl.1 -
G/SG/N/1/SLV/3/Suppl.1)  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 2 
1.1.4    European Union (G/ADP/N/1/EU/3)  ................................ ................................ .............  2 
1.1.5    Japan ( G/ADP/N /1/JPN/2/Suppl.8 -G/SCM/N/1/JPN/2/Suppl.8 ) ................................ .........  3 
1.1.6    Kyrgyz Republic ( G/ADP/N/1/KGZ/3 -G/SCM/N/1/KGZ/3 -G/SG/N/1/KGZ/3 ) .......................  3 
1.2   Review of notifications of new or amended legislation or regulations wi th 
outstanding written questions  ................................ ................................ ...............................  3 
1.2.1    Cameroon (G/ADP/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1 -G/SCM/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1 -
G/SG/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 3 
1.2.2    Russian Federation (G/ADP/N/1/RUS/2 -G/SCM/N/1/RUS/2 -G/SG/N/1/ RUS/2)  ..................  3 
2   SEMI -ANNUAL REPORTS OF AN TI-DUMPING ACTIONS (ART ICLE 16.4) 
(G/ADP/N/294) ................................ ................................ ................................ ...............  4 
3   PRELIMINARY AND FINA L ANTI -DUMPING ACTIONS: NOT IFICATIONS  ....................  15 
4   CHAIRPERS ON'S REPORT ON THE M EETING OF THE INFORM AL GROUP ON 
ANTI -CIRCUMVENTION  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 18 
5   CHAIRPERSON'S REPORT  ON THE MEETING OF TH E WORKING GROUP ON 
IMPLEMENTATION  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........  18 
6   AMENDMENTS TO THE AN TI-DUMPING LEGIS LATION OF INDIA – ITEM 
REQUESTED BY UKRAINE  ................................ ................................ ...............................  18 
7   EUROPEAN UNION – DRAFT AMENDMENTS TO THE BASIC ANTI -DUMPING 
REGULATION CONCERNIN G METHODOLOGIES OF N ORMAL VALUE 
DETERMINATION – ITEM REQUESTED BY TH E RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ...........................  19 
8   COSTA RICA – IMPOSITION OF AN ANT I-DUMPING MEASURE ON W HITE 
CRYSTAL SUGAR, UNREF INED (HS CODE 1701.9 9.0099) FROM BRAZIL – ITEM 
REQUESTED BY BRAZIL  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 21 G/ADP/M/52  
 
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  9   OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 21 
10   DATE OF THE NEXT REG ULAR MEETING  ................................ ................................ ... 22 
11   ELECTION OF OFFICERS  ................................ ................................ ..........................  22 
 
1  NATIONAL LEGISLATION  
1.1  Review of notifications of new or amended legislation or regulations not previously 
reviewed by the Committee (including supplemental notifications of existing provisions 
not previously reviewed)1 
1.1.1   Armenia (G/ADP/N/1/ARM/3 -G/SCM/N/1/ARM/3 -G/SG/N/1/ARM/3)  
1.1.  Written questions regarding this notification were posed and can be found in the following 
documen t: 
 G/ADP/Q1/ARM/7 -G/SCM/Q1/ARM/7 -G/SG/Q1/ARM/4 - Submitted by Mexico  
 
1.2.  Written answers to Mexico's written questions can be found in the following document:  
 G/ADP/Q1/ARM/8 -G/SCM/Q1/ARM/8 -G/SG/Q1/ARM/5 – Replies to Mexico  
1.1.2   Brazil (G/ADP/N/1/BRA/3/Suppl.8 and G/ADP/N/1/BRA/3/Suppl.8/Corr.1)  
1.3.  Written questions regarding this notification were posed and can be found in the following 
document:  
 G/ADP/Q1/BRA/33 -G/SCM/Q1/BRA/33 - Submitted by the United States ("US")  
 
1.4.  Written answers to the US' written questions can b e found in the following document:  
 G/ADP/Q1/BRA/34 -G/SCM/Q1/BRA/34 – Replies to the US  
1.1.3   El Salvador ( G/ADP/N/1/SLV/3/Suppl.1 -G/SCM/N/1/SLV/3/Suppl.1 -
G/SG/N/1/SLV/3/Suppl.1 ) 
1.5.  Written questions regarding this notification were posed and can be found in the fol lowing 
documents:  
 G/ADP/Q1/SLV/8 -G/SCM/Q1/SLV/8 -G/SCM/Q1/SLV/7 - Submitted by the US  
 G/ADP/Q1/SLV/9 -G/SCM/Q1/SLV/9 -G/SG/Q1/SLV/8 – Submitted by Mexico  
 
1.6.  El Salvador  stated that it was working on replies to the questions and confirmed that they 
would be circ ulated once ready.  
1.1.4   European Union ( G/ADP/N/1/EU/3 ) 
1.7.  Written questions regarding this notification were posed and can be found in the following 
documents:  
 G/ADP/Q1/EU/1 -G/SCM/Q1/EU/1 – Submitted by US  
 G/ADP/Q1/EU/2 -G/SCM/Q1/EU/2 – Submitted by the Russian Fe deration  
 
1.8.  The European Union ("EU") referred to the changes made to its anti -dumping procedures 
in 2014 by virtue of Regulation 37/2013 and the subsequent notification made by the EU to the 
Committee, which stated that once those changes were consolidated,  the outcome would be sent 
                                                
1 Relevant deadlines for written follow -up questions and written answers in November and 
December  2016 respectively can be found in section 1 of document G/ADP/W/498 -G/SCM/W/573 -
G/SG/W/241.  G/ADP/M/52  
 
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  to the WTO. The EU further explained that the notification currently under review was a mere 
follow -up to its previous notification without any substantive or procedural change.  
1.9.  The United States  and the Russian Federation  looked  forward to receiving written replies to 
their questions from the EU.  
1.1.5   Japan ( G/ADP/N/1/JPN/2/Suppl.8 -G/SCM/N/1/JPN/2/Suppl.8 )  
1.10.   Written questions were posed regarding this notification and can be found in document:  
 G/ADP/Q1/JPN/16 -G/SCM/Q1/JPN/16 – Submitte d by US  
1.11.   Written answers to the US' written questions can be found in the following document:  
 G/ADP/Q1/JPN/17 – Replies to US' questions  
1.1.6   Kyrgyz Republic ( G/ADP/N/1/KGZ/3 -G/SCM/N/1/KGZ/3 -G/SG/N/1/KGZ/3 ) 
1.12.   Written questions were posed regarding this notificatio n and can be found in document:  
 G/ADP/Q1/KGZ/7 -G/SCM/Q1/KGZ/7 -G/SG/Q1/KGZ/3 – Submitted by Mexico  
1.13.   Written answers to Mexico's written questions can be found in the following document:  
 G/ADP/Q1/KGZ/8 -G/SCM/Q1/KGZ/8 -G/SG/Q1/KGZ/4 – Replies to Mexico  
1.2  Review o f notifications of new or amended legislation or regulations with 
outstanding written questions  
1.2.1   Cameroon ( G/ADP/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1 -G/SCM/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1 -
G/SG/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1 ) 
1.14.   Written questions were posed regarding this notification and can be found in document:  
 G/ADP/Q1/CMR/3 -G/SCM/Q1/CMR/3 -G/SG/Q1/CMR/3 – Submitted by the US  
1.15.   Cameroon was not present at the time.  Oral answers were not provided at the meeting 
nor have written answers been received to date.  
1.16.   The Committee took note  of the notifications and  questions.  
1.2.2   Russian Federation ( G/ADP/N/1/RUS/2 -G/SCM/N/1/RUS/2 -G/SG/N/1/RUS/2 ) 
1.17.   Written questions were posed regarding this notification and can be found in document:  
 G/ADP/Q1/RUS/7 -G/SCM/Q1/RUS/7 -G/SG/Q1/RUS/7 and G/ADP/Q1/RUS/7/Corr.1 
G/SCM/Q1/RUS/7/Cor r.1-G/SG/Q1/RUS/7/Corr.1  – Submitted by US  
1.18.   Written answers to US' written questions can be found in the following documents:  
 G/ADP/Q1/RUS/8 -G/SCM/Q1/RUS/8 -G/SG/Q1/RUS/8 – Replies to US  
1.19.   The Chair  indicated that with respect to the agenda item pertaining to continuing review of 
legislative notifications previously reviewed by the Committee, no Member submitted – by the 
13 March 2017 deadline - any written questions relating to such notifications. Thus the item 
entitled "National Legislation – Continuing Revie w of Legislative Notifications Previously Reviewed 
by the Committee" was not on the agenda of the Committee's April meeting.  
1.20.   The Chair reminded Members that pursuant to paragraph 8 of document 
G/ADP/W/284/Rev.1, all unanswered written questions pertaining to new legislative notifications G/ADP/M/52  
 
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  reviewed at the meeting, as well as the subject notifications, shall automatically be retained on the 
agenda of the next Committee meeting and on the agendas of subsequent Committee meetings 
until written answers are submit ted. 
1.21.   The Chair noted that new legislative notifications from the European Union  and India , as 
well as any others received and circulated by the applicable deadlines2, would be on the agenda for 
review at the regular meeting of the Committee in October 2017 . 
1.22.   The Chair expressed concern that some Members had yet to submit a notification on 
legislation, particularly where all that would be required is a nil notification. He encouraged 
Members that had not yet made a legislative notification to do so as promptl y as possible.  
1.23.   Concerning the revised list of competent authorities contained in document 
G/ADP/N/14/Add.43, the Chair invited Members that had not done so to submit the information 
required by Article 16.5 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, and encouraged Mem bers to review and 
update previously submitted information where necessary.  
1.24.   The United States  appreciated the fact that most Members have submitted a notification 
with their domestic anti -dumping ("AD") legislation or a one -time nil notification. However,  some 
countries which have not provided a notification of their legislative status, have submitted in the 
context of trade policy review reports indicating that they do have AD laws in effect. In other 
words, the respective WTO  Members have already gone to  the effort of informing the WTO of its 
AD legislation status, albeit in another forum. The US, therefore, encouraged Members to review 
their respective situations and to make the appropriate notification promptly.  
1.25.   The Committee took note  of the statement s made.  
2  SEMI -ANNUAL REPORTS OF AN TI-DUMPING ACTIONS (ART ICLE 16.4) 
(G/ADP/N/294)  
2.1.  The Chair recalled that a request for submission of semi -annual reports for the second half of 
2016 had been circulated in document G/ADP/N/294. Members taking no AD actions should submit 
a simple letter to that effect twice per year. This would not apply to those Members that had 
already submitted a one -time notification under Articles 16.4 and 16.5 of the AD  Agreement.  
2.2.  He noted that a significant number of Members had not y et responded to the request for 
semi-annual reports. This notification requirement applied to all Members, whether or not they had 
taken AD  actions during the period in question, except for the 46 Members that had already 
submitted a one -time notification.3  
2.3.  The Chair urged Members to comply with this important notification requirement.  
2.4.  The Chair drew Members' attention to document G/ADP/N/193/MDG/Rev.1 relating to the 
establishment of an investigating authority in charge of trade remedies by Madagascar ("A NMCC").  
2.5.  Madagascar  explained that it had established the ANMCC under Article 6 of the Competition 
Law. Madagascar stated that it was working on a subsequent legislation and consulting with its 
private sector to meet its expectations.  
2.6.  Japan  demonstrated the  frequent use of AD measures in recent years. The number of 
initiations of AD  investigations was 230 in 2014, 236 in 2015, and 145 in just the first half of 
2016. The number of measures imposed was 157 in 2014, 181 in 2015 and 76 in the first half of 
2016.  Japan acknowledged that in these years AD measures have been used by a wide variety of 
Members, including both traditional AD users and emerging countries. It suggested that this was 
caused by an oversupply in steel, aluminium and some other major industr ies, mainly among 
emerging economies, due to the expansion of production capacities that might not necessarily 
follow an economic rationale. It requested Members to ensure that their investigations satisfy the 
requirements of the AD  Agreement.  
                                                
2 Relevant de adlines can be found in section 1 of document G/ADP/W/498 -G/SCM/W/573 -G/SG/W/241.  
3 All such notifications are contained in the G/ADP/N/193 series of documents.  G/ADP/M/52  
 
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  2.7.  The United S tates expressed serious concern with the fact that of 22 Members that have 
reported AD  activity in the second half of 2016, 18 (82%) have done so vis-à-vis China, and 16 
(89%) involved steel or aluminium products from China. The US stated that China's Gove rnment 
has adopted non -market -oriented policies in those sectors that have led to significant excess 
capacity, and that the surplus product was dumped around the world. According to the US, 
Members have been left with no choice but to address the injury to  their industries.  Several 
Members had urged China to take steps to stop harmful government intervention in those sectors. 
If China allowed the market to function properly, it could correct the problem of excess capacity 
that forced Members to rely on AD m easures. However, when government policies, rather than 
market forces, were the drivers of investment and production decisions, severe and long lasting 
imbalances were the result.  In the US' view, China did not appear to be inclined to allow the 
market to dictate results in the steel and aluminium sectors, and appeared to be planning to 
increase government intervention in other sectors as well, as was made obvious by plans like Made 
in China 2025. The US believed this should be a concern to all Members. Unt il China adopted the 
market -based reforms it had promised when it joined the WTO, industries injured as a result of 
dumped imports would continue to seek relief from their governments. This recourse would be 
commensurate with the nature of China's economy and government intervention.  
2.8.  Mexico  expressed concern that the government of China or any other Member intervened in 
the normal functioning of markets. Such intervention could lead to significant distortions and injury 
both in the market concerned and in o ther economies. Mexico expressed these concerns in various 
fora and made efforts to generate an objective vision that could facilitate a solution to this 
problem. Mexico requested that Members reconsider the degree of their intervention to ensure a 
normal functioning of the markets.  
2.9.  Canada , referring to the statement by the US, suggested that this worrying situation was 
precipitated by the overcapacity and oversupply in the steel and aluminium sectors. Canada stated 
that trade remedies provided a legitimate  response to these conditions and would continue to be 
used so long as oversupplied or subsidized goods were dumped in world markets. Canada also 
believed that, although legitimate, trade remedies were not an optimal solution to the problem. 
Canada referre d to the paper on subsidies and overcapacity that it submitted together with EU, 
Japan and US in the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Canada urged 
Members to engage constructively in order to address the underlying causes of overcapacity  and 
find long -term solutions in the steel and aluminium sectors.  
2.10.   China  suggested that the Committee was not the appropriate forum to discuss overcapacity, 
government intervention or their links to AD investigations. China was opposed to a similar 
discussi on in the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and believed that this 
Committee was even less appropriate to hold it.  China submitted that overcapacity and 
government intervention had to be reviewed carefully and thoroughly, as government int ervention 
could come in different forms and entails positive as well as negative consequences. China 
suggested that initiation of AD investigations by certain Members against products originating in 
China was also a form of government intervention. China f urther submitted that overcapacity was 
a necessary element in free market conditions, being a prerequisite for competition. China 
suggested that without overcapacity, markets would be rolling back to a planned economy.  China 
cautioned against establishing causal link between government intervention, overcapacity and the 
alleged injury that industries may be suffering because of Chinese exports. China explained that its 
manufacturing base in the sectors mentioned accounted for close to 40% of the world's tot al. This 
production base could not have been created by government intervention alone, which would be of 
a size that no government could sustain. China reminded that if support was generally available to 
the economy, this was not considered an illegal subs idy under WTO rules.  
2.11.   China demonstrated the active use of AD measures with respect to steel products by a 
certain Member. Overall, this Member implemented a total of 202 AD and countervailing measures 
involving steel and iron products. In the last 30 years , this Member initiated 100 investigations 
targeting one product, namely carbon and alloy steel plates and these investigations lead to AD 
measures in the majority of cases. Products from China had been subject to a measure at the level 
of 128.9% for 20 ye ars. Chinese exports accounted for only a small portion of this Member's 
imports of those products. This Member had recently started to have recourse to more rarely used 
remedies. China asked whether this behaviour should be considered trade -restricting an d what 
kind of a useful purpose this number of investigations and measures served.  China acknowledged 
that its output of steel products took up half of the world's total, and only a small percentage of G/ADP/M/52  
 
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  those products were exported. China recognized that th is could lead to difficulties and even injury, 
and stated that it did not take issue with trade remedies so long as they were applied consistently 
with the rules -based multilateral system. China referred to the example of a certain Member 
whose steel indus try was suffering from overcapacity and stated that both the government and the 
industry concerned had taken a lot of efforts to restructure and readjust, of which trade remedies 
were an important part. However, it seemed to China that, in doing so, this M ember was leading 
an internationally concerted effort to restrict Chinese exports.  
2.12.   China explained that its government had taken measures in accordance with the law and 
market principles to cut down excess capacity. It had cut down outdated, non -efficient capacity, as 
well as capacity creating pollution. In 2016, China cut down excessive production capacity of 
65 million tonnes and was targeting another 50 million in 2017.  
2.13.   The United States  believed that in order to correct oversupply one had to adjust supp ly and 
not continue to develop more supply and export the amount that could not be consumed in the 
home market. China had created an epidemic that was spreading worldwide. US believed that it 
was long overdue for China to take responsibility for creating t his situation and return to reforming 
its economy by giving primacy to the market rather than government intervention. This approach 
was not only in everyone's interests, but in China's interests as well. US suggested that China's 
year-on-year decreases in  economic growth would only continue unless reforms were undertaken. 
US believed that reforms were the only course of action that China could take to remedy the 
situation it had created.  
2.14.   China  drew Members' attention to the latest trend of trade restrictin g measures taken by 
the US in the past months. Ever since the new administration took office, the US initiated 24 AD 
and countervailing duty ("CVD") investigations against 12 Members. Among those, there were 4 
AD and 3 CVD investigations involving products  from China. China also noted that the US has 
recently taken other very rarely used measures, including the initiation of Section 232 
investigation on steel and aluminium products, and Section 201 investigation on photovaltic cells. 
China was concerned abo ut the impact that these actions may have on international trade, and 
suggested that they might reflect the protection -oriented nature of the US trade policy. China 
asked the US to clarify the intention of its recent practices and how they could serve any 
legitimate purpose.  
2.15.   The United States  stated that China was raising measures that were outside of the purview 
of the Committee and suggested that they should not be addressed in its framework.  
2.16.   The Committee reviewed the semi -annual reports for the first ha lf of 2016. No Member 
raised questions or made comments concerning the reports of Argentina; Australia; the Member 
States of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kingdom of; Kuwait, the State of; Oman; Saudi 
Arabia, Kingdom of; Qatar and United Arab Emir ates); Chile; Colombia; Costa  Rica; El Salvador; 
Indonesia; Israel; Japan; Malaysia; New  Zealand; Pakistan; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; South 
Africa; Chinese Taipei; Trinidad and Tobago and Viet Nam.  
2.17.   On the semi -annual report of Armenia , the Chair drew Me mbers' attention to document 
G/ADP/Q2/ARM/3 containing the written questions posed by Ukraine and the written replies 
submitted by Armenia contained in document G/ADP/Q2/ARM/4.  
2.18.   Ukraine  reserved the option to address its questions to Armenia upon the review  of the 
Russian  Federation's semi -annual report, as they pertained to investigations conducted by the 
Eurasian Economic Commission ("EEC") for all Member States of the Eurasian Economic Union 
("EAEU")  
2.19.   On the semi -annual report of Brazil , Turkey  referred to  the sunset review of a measure on 
polyethylene terephthalate ("PET") films initiated on 24 February 2017. Bearing in mind the low 
quantities of PET film exports to Brazil during the period of review, Turkey was of the view that the 
extension of AD duty (" ADD") was no longer necessary and its revocation would not likely lead to 
continuation or recurrence of material injury and dumping. Turkey requested Brazil to repeal the 
ADDs in question as soon as possible.  G/ADP/M/52  
 
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  2.20.   Brazil  stated that the sunset review in questio n was ongoing and Brazil would comply with 
the relevant obligations under Article 11.3 of the AD  Agreement.  
2.21.   On the semi -annual report of Canada,  the European Union  referred to the investigation on 
certain fabricated industrial steel components from China, Korea, Spain, United Arab Emirates and 
the United Kingdom ("UK"). The EU believed that Canada had neither taken full account of the EU's 
comments provided at the previous meeting of the Committee, nor of the comments made by 
interested parties during the i nvestigation. The EU was concerned with the fact that Canada's 
investigation targeted two EU Member -States despite the fact that their import volumes were 
below the de minimis  threshold . While the UK had been excluded from the investigation, Spain 
remained  a target, despite the fact that its export volume was also de minimis, even based on a 
longer period of investigation used by Canada. The EU was also concerned that Canada was basing 
its de minimis  thresholds on import value and not import volume, contrar y to Article 5.8 of the 
AD Agreement. EU considered that any measure applied to Spain as a result of this investigation 
would be in breach of the WTO rules and reiterated that the investigation against Spain should be 
terminated without further delay.  
2.22.   On the EU's question, Canada  explained that the final dumping determination in this case 
was made on 24 April 2017 and the statement of reasons explaining the decision of the 
investigating authority ("IA") for dumping would be issued on 10 May 2017. The final injury 
determination was due on 25 May 2017 and at this stage Canada would terminate the 
investigation in respect of any country found to have a negligible volume of dumped imports. 
Canada explained that value was originally used in this case because of th e lack of a consistent 
unit by which to measure volume, and that the final dumping determination included a proper 
assessment of import volumes. In respect of the longer than usual period of investigation 
(1 January 2014 - 30 June 2016), Canada explained t hat it had been selected to ensure that the 
period was representative and that there was a sufficient number of transactions in order to 
provide for an accurate calculation of normal values, as the subject product was used in large 
infrastructural projects  which may take several years to complete. Canada confirmed that it took 
its obligations under the AD  Agreement very seriously, and was prepared to discuss the EU's 
concerns bilaterally.  
2.23.   On the semi -annual report of China , Japan  made several comments in re lation to the 
investigation on vynylidene chloride initiated in April 2016. First, the investigation did not involve a 
dynamic assessment of price developments and trends. China compared the range of price 
reduction without comparing the prices of domestic  products and dumped imports themselves. 
Second, imports from Japan have been decreasing in both absolute and relative terms, the share 
of Japanese imports in the Chinese market declined, while the production capacity in China, as well 
as the share of the domestic industry, was increasing. The Chinese IA did not provide a 
satisfactory explanation of how the dumped imports adversely affected the domestic industry, 
which was inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.4 and 3.5 of the AD  Agreement. Japan regretted that  
the final determination had been made without the appropriate consideration of interested parties' 
concerns.  
2.24.   China  explained that the case referred to by Japan was initiated on 13 July 2015 and 
concluded on 13 July 2016. In conducting its injury investiga tion, China strictly followed the 
requirements of Article 3.4 of the AD  Agreement and based its final determination on 
a comprehensive analysis of all factors, whether negative or positive. China noted that there was 
no single factor that had a prevailing role in the determination of injury. China also examined all 
other factors that were causing injury to the domestic industry according to Article 3.5 of the 
AD Agreement. China stated that this information was available in the public notice.  
2.25.   On the semi -annual report of Egypt,  the Chair drew Members' attention to document 
G/ADP/Q2/EGY/1 containing the written questions posed by Ukraine and the written replies 
submitted by Egypt contained in document G/ADP/Q2/EGY/2.  
2.26.   Ukraine  expressed its concerns about the i nvestigation on steel rebar as it believed that the 
application that served as basis for its initiation did not comply with the requirements of Article 5.2 
of the AD  Agreement. Ukraine submitted its comments and expected Egypt to take them into 
account.  G/ADP/M/52  
 
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  2.27.   On the semi -annual report of the European Union , the Russian Federation  referred to the 
investigation in on aluminium foil and the definitive AD measure imposed thereupon in December 
2015. During the investigation, interested parties submitted their concerns  as regards the IA's 
causation determination, which included, inter alia , the assessment of imports from third 
countries. After the investigation, the EU looked into supplies from other countries in the context 
of an anti -circumvention review . This led to new findings regarding the actual volumes of imports 
originating from sources other than the Russian Federation during the period of the original 
investigation. The Russian Federation believed that these findings provided sufficient evidence for 
EU to reco nsider its causation determination in the original investigation and eventually to 
withdraw the measure. The Russian Federation requested the EU to clarify whether it was planning 
to perform such reconsideration in light of these new findings. The Russian Federation was open to 
bilateral dialogue with the EU on this matter.  
2.28.   The European Union  stressed that Russian Federation had the opportunity to ask for a 
review of the injury determination in this case. The EU was open to bilateral discussion with the 
Russian Federation on this issue.  
2.29.   On the semi -annual report of India , the Chair drew Members' attention to document 
G/ADP/Q2/IND/17 containing the written questions posed by Ukraine and the written replies 
submitted by India contained in document G/ADP/Q2/IND /18. 
2.30.   Ukraine  referred to India's reply as regards the extension of the provisional measure on 
cold-rolled/cold -reduced flat steel products up to 8 months and requested India to provide the 
names of exporters that requested this extension.  
2.31.   Japan  made commen ts about India's investigation on cold -rolled flat steel products and hot -
rolled flat products of alloy or non -alloy steel in coils and not in coils. First, Japan was concerned 
with the scope of the product under consideration which included products with different physical 
features, price ranges and end -uses. Japan referred to the evidence provided by the interested 
parties and requested India to give sufficient consideration to the differences between subject 
imports and domestic like products in the dete rmination of injury, in accordance with Article 3.2 of 
the AD  Agreement . Moreover, due to the method used by the Indian IA to calculate the amount of 
ADDs, Japan was not able to assess the appropriateness of the duties and whether their amount 
was not in e xcess of dumping margins. It, therefore, questioned India's compliance with 
Articles  9.2 and 9.3 of the AD  Agreement. In addition, Japan cited the short time -frame (3 
business days) given to the interested parties to comment upon the disclosure of essentia l facts, 
and stated that the final determination was published only two days after this deadline. This, in 
Japan's view, raised questions as to the consistency of India's actions with Article 6.9 of the 
AD Agreement.  
2.32.   Japan further expressed its concern wit h India's investigation on resorcinol. Referring to 
Article 6.5 of the AD  Agreement and the relevant jurisprudence, Japan questioned the consistency 
of India's actions with its obligations as regards certain essential facts that were treated as 
confidentia l in the absence of a non -confidential summary or  a statement of reasons why 
summarization was not possible. Japan further submitted that using the applicant's production cost 
to determine the constructed normal value instead of using Japanese costs was in consistent with 
Article 2.2 of the AD  Agreement. Japan doubted that the application submitted to the Indian IA 
contained sufficient evidence in respect of, inter alia , the injury margin and causal link, which 
could be considered inconsistent with Article 5 .2 of the AD  Agreement. Japan requested the Indian 
IA to proceed with the investigation in a manner consistent with the AD  Agreement . 
2.33.   Qatar  referred to the Indian AD measure on linear alkyl benzene from Qatar, China and Iran 
imposed in April after a 15 -month investigation. Qatar referred to the failure by the Indian IA to 
comply with procedural and substantive requirements of the AD  Agreement in the conduct of this 
proceeding. Qatar noted that its authorities and exporters actively cooperated with the IA, b ut the 
latter failed to properly consider their comments. First, in violation of Article 6.1.3 of the 
AD Agreement, the Indian IA did not provide Qatar with a copy of the initial application that 
resulted in the initiation of the investigation, and provide d the revised copy 37 days after the 
initiation. Second, contrary to Article 2.2.1.1 the Indian IA did not use verified cost of production 
data to construct the normal value for the sole producer in Qatar. The IA used an improper 
denominator in its calcula tion of costs, added an artificially high profit margin and improperly 
adjusted the export price downwards. In the absence of those steps, the dumping margin for the G/ADP/M/52  
 
- 9 - 
 
  product from Qatar would have been negative. Third, in violation of Article 6.9 of the 
AD Agreement, the Indian IA did not provide interested parties with essential facts that formed the 
basis of its determination. According to Qatar the exporters did not have information on how the 
Indian AD measures were determined two weeks after their impos ition. 
2.34.   Qatar also requested India to provide an update on the investigation in respect of caustic 
soda from Qatar and Japan. Qatar explained that the sole exporter provided its questionnaire 
response to the Indian IA in January 2017 but did not receive any  subsequent information. Qatar 
requested India to comply with the relevant requirements of the AD  Agreement.  
2.35.   Turkey  expressed concern in relation to India's initiation of an AD investigation on dimethyl 
acetamide. Turkey was concerned with the scope of the  investigation, which included certain tariff 
subheadings where Turkey had no history of exports to India. Turkey believed that any issues 
relating to false declaration should not be attributed to its exporters, and that an investigation 
carried out on a p roduct as broadly defined would lead to misleading conclusions on the injury side 
and implementation problems at customs. In addition, Turkey believed that the application did not 
contain sufficient and adequate evidence to justify the initiation of an inv estigation, notably 
considering the mismatch of import trends with certain injury indicators (domestic sales, 
employment and wages), which raised questions with respect to Articles 5.2 and 5.3 of the 
AD Agreement. Turkey expected India to terminate the inv estigation without imposing a measure.  
2.36.   China  expressed concern regarding India's "complete value chain" practice in recent 
investigations. China referred to paragraph 5 of Annex II and Article 6.8 of the AD  Agreement and 
stated that if an unrelated company  did not provide the required information on export chains, the 
export information and prices from the exporting producer should not be rejected by the IA. China 
believed that facts available should be used reasonably and in accordance with the AD  Agreemen t 
so as to not shift the burden for the failure of unrelated companies to cooperative exporting 
producers onto the exporters.  
2.37.   On the questions posed, India acknowledged that it gave full recognition to the 
AD Agreement. In response to Japan's question, Ind ia stated that during the investigation the IA 
fully considered submissions on likeness, properly assessed confidentiality requests according to a 
long-established process and determined the duties using the lesser -duty rule. In response to 
Qatar, India me ntioned that the issue of the copy of the application was reflected in its 
determination. India confirmed that the IA took account of Qatar's confidential data and provided 
appropriate confidential disclosure; in addition, the IA held a hearing to settle c oncerns. In relation 
to the investigation on caustic soda, India confirmed that the investigation would be conducted 
consistently with the AD  Agreement. On the question by Turkey, India explained that different 
tariff headings were not included with a view  to expand the scope of the investigation, but to take 
account of all the imports when they can be cleared under different headings. On the question of 
China, India stated that decisions are made on a case -by-case basis, taking account of what was 
rational . India requested Members to provide their questions in writing.  
2.38.   On the semi -annual report of Kazakhstan , the Chair  drew Members' attention to document 
G/ADP/Q2/KAZ/3 containing the written questions posed by Ukraine and the written replies 
submitted by Ka zakhstan contained in document G/ADP/Q2/KAZ/4.  
2.39.   Ukraine  reserved the option to address its questions to Kazakhstan upon the review of the 
semi-annual report of the Russian  Federation, as they pertained to investigations conducted by the 
EEC for all Member S tates of the EAEU.  
2.40.   On the semi -annual report of  Korea, Republic of , Japan  expressed its concern with regard 
to the sunset review on stainless steel bar. Japan explained that this product had been subject to 
ADDs in Korea for more than ten years. Japan not ed that its exports to Korea were very low, while 
exports from other Members, such as China and Chinese Taipei, had been increasing. Japan 
believed that in these circumstances the expiry of the duty would not be likely to lead to 
continuation or recurrence  of dumping and injury. In addition, Japan believed that its exports 
should not be cumulatively assessed with those of other countries subject to the review, notably 
India and Spain, due to the absence of competitive relationship between them. Japan reques ted 
Korea to eliminate the AD measure in accordance with Article 11.3 of the AD  Agreement.  G/ADP/M/52  
 
- 10 - 
 
  2.41.   Korea, Republic of explained that the measure on stainless steel bar from Japan had been 
introduced in full compliance with the AD  Agreement and confirmed that the I A would take the 
comments by Japan into account in the sunset review. Korea requested Japan to provide its 
concerns in writing.  
2.42.   On the semi -annual report of the Kyrgyz Republic , the Chair drew Members' attention to 
document G/ADP/Q2/KGZ/3 containing the wr itten questions posed by Ukraine and the written 
replies submitted by the Kyrgyz Republic contained in document G/ADP/Q2/KGZ/4.  
2.43.   Ukraine  reserved the option to address its questions to the Kyrgyz Republic upon the review 
of the semi -annual report of the Rus sian Federation, as they pertained to investigations conducted 
by the EEC for all Member States of the EAEU.  
2.44.   On the semi -annual report of the Mexico , the Chair  drew Members' attention to document 
G/ADP/Q2/MEX/4 containing the written questions posed by Uk raine in relation to the investigation 
concerning imports of seamless steel tubes.  
2.45.   Mexico  observed that Ukraine's questions pertained to the time -period between the end of 
the period of the investigation ("POI") and the date of imposition of the measure. I n this context, 
Ukraine referred to the jurisprudence in Mexico – AD Measures on Rice . However, in Mexico's view 
it was difficult to see how this example related to the case at hand, as the final determination had 
not been reached yet, and, consequently, t he time -period in question is still unknown. In any 
event, Mexico did not believe that this time -period would be extended in a way similar to the rice 
investigation. Mexico stated that the AD  Agreement had no guidance on the length of that period 
and assum ed that it would be acceptable so long as it was within reasonable parameters. In the 
instant case, Mexico did not believe that the period of 8 months between the end of the period of 
investigation and the date of initiation was of such length that it rend ered the data of the 
investigation irrelevant. Mexico referred to the dispute settlement outcome in Mexico – Steel Pipes 
and Tubes where a similar period was found to be compliant. On Ukraine's question in relation to 
positive evidence, Mexico explained th at its national legislation did not contain a specific provision 
to describe the concept, but that its IA was obliged to follow this obligation through the application 
of the AD  Agreement. On the question posed by Ukraine in relation to the methodology use d for 
non-attribution, Mexico explained that the preliminary and final stages of the investigation in 
question were yet to follow, and while there were no provisions specifically describing the non -
attribution methodology, any approach used by the IA would  be consistent with the 
AD Agreement. Mexico confirmed that it was open to bilateral consultations with Ukraine.  
2.46.   Ukraine  urged Mexico to change the POI in the case at hand to ensure compliance with 
Article 3.1 of the AD  Agreement, in particular with respec t to the positive evidence requirement. 
Ukraine expected to receive Mexico's replies in writing.  
2.47.   Kazakhstan  expressed its concern with respect to the continuous application by Mexico of an 
AD measure on cold -rolled sheet since 1999. In the original investi gation, the Mexican IA applied 
the "non -market economy" methodology, whereby surrogate values obtained in Spain had been 
used in order to determine the normal value for Kazakhstani producers and exporters. In 
subsequent sunset reviews, the Mexican IA used surrogate values obtained from Brazil. 
Kazakhstan claimed that this approach was inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the AD  Agreement. 
Moreover, the original measure was taken 18 years ago on the basis of threat of injury, and 
Kazakhstan believed that the sit uation of threat could not last for such a long period. Kazakhstan 
claimed that the sporadic nature of its imports did not confirm the fact that they were causing 
injury to the domestic industry in Mexico. Kazakhstan requested Mexico to revoke the AD measu re 
in question as soon as possible.  
2.48.   Mexico  confirmed that it would follow its WTO obligations and assured Kazakhstan that its 
concerns would be taken into consideration.  
2.49.   On the semi -annual report of Morocco , Turkey  referred to the AD measure applied by 
Morocco to imports of hot -rolled steel sheets since October 2014; Turkey recalled the concerns 
that it had repeatedly raised as regards the use of adverse facts available. Turkey informed the 
Members that consultations with Morocco failed to result in a mutua lly acceptable solution, and G/ADP/M/52  
 
- 11 - 
 
  that the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") accepted Turkey's request to establish a panel to 
resolve this matter.  
2.50.   In addition, Turkey expressed its concern regarding the imposition of a provisional AD 
measure on refrigerators, de spite the fact that Morocco did not observe the evidentiary standards 
provided for in Articles 5.2 and 5.3 of the AD  Agreement, in particular with respect to injury. 
Turkey expected Morocco to terminate the investigation without taking any definitive measu re. 
2.51.   Morocco  noted that the parties to the dispute had received all communications relevant to 
the hot -rolled steel sheets case. As regards the investigation on refrigerators, Morocco confirmed 
that the IA examined all evidence contained in the complaint th at had been filed by the domestic 
industry. Morocco confirmed that the decision to apply provisional measures was based on the 
information obtained during the investigation, in accordance with the AD  Agreement. Morocco 
invited Turkey to pose its questions in writing.  
2.52.   The European Union  referred to an investigation on ceramic tiles from Spain. It believed 
that any unfounded initiation should be avoided as it unnecessarily disturbed the market. The EU 
stated that the Moroccan domestic industry was not sufferi ng injury, and, even if it were, this 
injury could not be attributed to Spanish imports. The EU noted that most of the indicators in the 
complaint showed positive trends, while certain information, such as profitability and price effects, 
was missing. In a ddition, questionnaire replies confirmed that profits of the domestic industry had 
been increasing. The EU believed that the information on the record showed that Spanish 
companies were not dumping, or had de minimis  margins. EU also stated that other fact ors should 
be appropriately taken into consideration, namely, investment in new capacity despite a capacity 
utilization rate of 50%, decrease in demand, increase in energy prices and salaries, and imports 
from other sources, notably from China and Egypt. T he EU urged Morocco to terminate the 
investigation.  
2.53.   In response to the question by the EU, Morocco  explained that the IA had received the 
application in respect of goods from Italy and Spain, and determined that the evidence was 
sufficient to justify an in itiation of the investigation only in respect of Spain. Morocco also noted 
that a positive trend in one factor was insufficient to say that the industry was not suffering injury, 
as indicators viewed as a whole may paint a picture of injury. Morocco claime d that the industry 
experienced a decline in profitability and that it could not increase its prices to be competitive. 
Morocco confirmed that all of the necessary elements would be analysed during the investigation, 
and its results would be published and communicated to the EU.  
2.54.   On the semi -annual report of the Russian Federation , the Chair drew Members' attention 
to document G/ADP/Q2/RUS/4 containing the written questions posed by Ukraine and the written 
replies submitted by the Russian Federation containe d in document G/ADP/Q2/RUS/5.  
2.55.   Ukraine  acknowledged the responses by the Russian Federation, but it was still unclear as to 
Ukraine how the date of 28 April 2015 could be considered the date of conclusion of the 
investigation on bars and rods when the final  report of the investigation was published on 
29 March 2016. Consequently, Ukraine considered that this investigation was conducted during 
28 months, and therefore violated the AD  Agreement.  
2.56.   In addition, Ukraine expressed its concern as regards the investi gation on steel angles. 
Upon reviewing the preliminary report published on 29 December 2016, Ukraine was of the view 
that the conclusions of the IA and the proposal to apply a provisional AD measure were not in line 
with the AD  Agreement. The IA failed to present sufficient evidence of material injury caused by 
imports from Ukraine. As such, imports from Ukraine decreased during the period of investigation, 
and the indicators of the applicant remained stable. In Ukraine's view, the IA did not provide a 
comp lete analysis of other factors that were at the same time affecting the domestic industry. 
Ukraine insisted on termination of the investigation without the imposition of AD measures.  
2.57.   In response to Ukraine, the Russian Federation  stated that the AD measure  on bars and 
rods was under consideration of the EAEU Court and that the Ukrainian producers could defend 
their rights during this proceeding.  G/ADP/M/52  
 
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  2.58.   With respect to the investigation on steel angles, the Russian Federation noted that it was 
still ongoing, and th e IA provided full opportunity for Ukrainian companies to defend their rights, 
including by providing comments and participating in hearings. The Russian Federation stated that 
the EEC's actions were in line with the AD  Agreement, and that all comments and  objections would 
be duly addressed in the final report of the IA.  
2.59.   On the semi -annual report of Thailand, Turkey  referred to an AD investigation on hot -rolled 
non-alloy steel in coils and not in coils initiated in January 2016. Turkey expressed its regret with 
the extension of the provisional AD measure applied by Thailand for another two months. Turkey 
stated that, in accordance with Article 3.5 of the AD  Agreement, Thailand should not attribute the 
alleged injury to Turkish imports. Turkey submitted that injury indicators had deteriorated before 
the increase in Turkish imports happened, and that inherent inefficiencies in the Thai steel market, 
poor investment decisions of the domestic producers, natural disasters and political turmoil were 
apparent other factors of injury . Turkey requested Thailand to terminate the investigation without 
the imposition of a definitive measure.  
2.60.   Thailand  mentioned that on 17 November 2016 it provided Turkey with a notice of 
imposition of the provisional measure and the releva nt essential facts. Thailand believed that its 
investigation complied with the AD  Agreement. Thailand cited import statistics that showed a 
dramatic increase of Turkish imports in the period of investigation (from 1024 tonnes in 2012 to 
47,554 tonnes in 20 15, or 4543%). Thailand had provided the opportunity for Turkish exporters to 
provide comments, and had held a hearing that was attended by Turkey. Thailand was open to 
bilateral consultations with Turkey on the matter.  
2.61.   On the semi -annual report of Turkey , Brazil  referred to the investigation on bleached 
kraftliner paper. Brazil explained that Turkey's limitation of the injury investigation period by 30 
months (2,5 years) was inconsistent with the recommendation of the Committee contained in 
document G/ADP/ 6, and no explanation had been given to this end. Brazil also stated that the 
injury assessment performed by Turkey for the purpose of initiation was inconsistent with the 
provisions of Article 3.1 and 3.5, as clarified in the dispute settlement outcome in  Mexico – 
AD Measures on Rice . 
2.62.   Turkey  mentioned that its investigation had recently been initiated, and confirmed that it 
would be carried out in line with the AD  Agreement. Turkey was open to engaging bilaterally with 
Brazil.  
2.63.   On the semi -annual report of Ukraine , the Russian Federation expressed deep concern  
about the investigation on certain nitrogen fertilizers. The Russian Federation claimed that the 
investigation was conducted inconsistently with the AD  Agreement and, in particular, paragraph 3 
of Anne x II thereto, because the Ukrainian IA rejected the information submitted by a Russian 
producer, although it was verifiable, had been appropriately submitted and supplied in a timely 
fashion. The Russian Federation further stated that Ukraine improperly an alysed the effects of the 
Russian imports, the volumes of which declined during the period of investigation, while the 
Ukrainian producers' market share increased against the backdrop of weakening demand. The 
Russian Federation had its doubts as to the con sistency of the determination of injury and causal 
relationship with Articles 3.4 and 3.5 of the AD  Agreement. Russia also believed that Ukraine 
violated Article 2.2 and Article 2.2.1.1 of the AD  Agreement in its construction of the normal value 
by rejecti ng natural gas costs actually incurred by Russian exporters and replacing them with the 
price of gas exported from the Russian Federation  to Ukraine. The Russian Federation cited the 
Appellate Body finding in EU – Biodiesel which stated that costs could no t be established pursuant 
to a benchmark that was unrelated to the cost of production in the country of origin.  
2.64.   The Russian Federation explained that this was not the first time Ukraine had recourse to 
this method – the same approach was used in the review  of the AD measure on ammonium 
nitrate, currently challenged by Russia in a WTO dispute. The Russian Federation also asked 
Ukraine to clarify whether the recent interim review on ammonium nitrate had been initiated with 
a view to extend the scope of the pr oduct subject to the measure. The Russian Federation stated 
that Ukraine was totally neglecting WTO jurisprudence by continuing to use impermissible 
methodologies in AD investigations, and attempting to arbitrarily increase the volume of imports 
affected b y such measures. The Russian Federation urged Ukraine to abstain from such practices, 
not to apply measures on nitrogen fertilizers, and to use the interim review of the ammonium 
nitrate measure only for the purpose of bringing it into compliance with WTO rules.  G/ADP/M/52  
 
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  2.65.   Ukraine  stated that it was conducting its investigations in accordance with the 
AD Agreement and relevant Ukrainian legislation. Ukraine also explained that during the 
investigation on nitrogen fertilizers, all interested parties, including the Russ ian competent 
authorities, were given an opportunity to register, provide information and defend their interests. 
Ukraine also explained that according to the decision of the Interdepartmental Commission on 
Foreign Trade in February 2017, the imposition of  definitive ADDs was postponed until 1 July 2017 
due to national interest.  
2.66.   On the ammonium nitrate investigation, the Ukrainian IA determined that the complaint 
submitted by a domestic producer contained sufficient prima facie  evidence  that the ADDs were 
not sufficient to prevent dumping and injury. Ukraine explained that registration of parties was 
ongoing and the IA was collecting comments as regards the initiation of the review.  
2.67.   On the semi -annual report of the United S tates , the European Union  referred to the 
investigation on carbon and alloy steel cut -to-length plate from Austria, Belgium, France, Germany 
and Italy. In this case, the US' IA included countries with very low import volumes through 
cumulation (notably, Austria and Belgium only just above 1 % of imports) and inflated dumping 
margins by applying WTO -inconsistent zeroing in a situation of alleged targeted dumping. The EU 
was mindful of the implementation period for the finding in the recent US – Washing Machines  
dispute, but  it expressed its de ep regret that the US continued to apply this contentious 
methodology. The EU gave the example of a German exporter that would not have been found to 
be dumping if no zeroing had been used. It urged the US to refrain from using the zeroing 
methodology and to avoid targeting countries with low import volumes that were not the source of 
the problem.  
2.68.   Japan  also referred to the US' investigation on carbon and alloy steel cut -to-length plate. 
Japan stated that the product scope in this investigation included two  different types of steel, 
which varied in terms of components, end -uses and price ranges. Japan explained that its 
producers and exporters contended that tool steel, which was included in the product scope, did 
not have an adverse impact on the producers of the like domestic product in the US. Japan 
cautioned against an injury determination that would not appropriately take into account these 
differences, which could amount to violation of Article 3 of the AD  Agreement.  
2.69.   Japan reiterated its concerns relati ng to the lengthy US AD measures against Japanese 
products. The US had 17 measures in force against Japanese products, 6 of which were in force for 
more than 20 years, and the longest measure had been in force for more than 38 years. It 
referred to Article  11.3 of the AD  Agreement and noted that the Appellate Body had ruled that an 
affirmative likelihood determination should be made only if evidence demonstrated that dumping 
would be probable if the duty were terminated, and not simply if the evidence sugge sted that such 
a result might be possible or plausible. However, in about 100 sunset reviews against Japanese 
exports, there was no case of denying continuation or recurrence of dumping. As a result, 
exporters might have less incentive to participate in so me sunset review proceedings. In addition, 
Japan understood that the IA would not provide the questionnaire of dumping investigation again 
in sunset review proceedings. Japan doubted that the IA would be able to obtain the evidence 
demonstrating that dumpi ng would be probable and appropriately recognize the requirement of 
continuation or recurrence of dumping as stipulated in Article 11.3 of the AD  Agreement. Japan 
requested the US to swiftly revoke these unjustifiably long -standing measures.  
2.70.   Korea, Republi c of expressed its concerns regarding the US' total facts available practice, 
whereby it rejected all information submitted by a respondent company and simply applied the 
duty rate requested by the petitioner. Korea referred to investigations on corrosion resistant steel 
products, cold -rolled flat steel products, hot -rolled flat steel products and large transformers, 
where this practice led to substantially increased dumping margins in the final stage of the 
investigation as compared to the preliminary stag e. Korea explained that the 2015 amendments to 
US legislation gave the IA more discretion in the application of total facts available, and, by 
removing the conditions used to distinguish between the different types of facts available appeared 
to ignore the  Appellate Body's finding in the US – Carbon Steel (India)  dispute. Since those 
amendments, the US' IA consistently applied total facts available to Korean manufacturers. Korea 
stated that the companies targeted by US' investigations were world -class manuf acturers that 
accorded utmost importance to their reputation, and spared no effort in cooperating with the IA. 
However, since  2016 the US IA had been stating that these companies stopped providing 
information within a reasonable period, which, in Korea's v iew, was untrue. Korea believed that G/ADP/M/52  
 
- 14 - 
 
  the facts available provisions in US law were applied in such a fashion that no matter how hard 
companies tried to cooperate in an investigation, they could not avoid punitive rates once the IA 
decided to use its extens ive discretion.  
2.71.   Additionally, Korea expressed its concern in relation to the US administrative review of the 
AD order on oil country tubular goods ("OCTG"), where the US' IA determined that a particular 
market situation ("PMS") existed in Korea. This dete rmination was based on several 
circumstances, which Korea demonstrated to be unfounded. First, in relation to the premise that 
domestically subsidized or Chinese -originating hot -rolled coil was used to produce OCTG, Korea 
stated that these contentions were  not supported by any evidence and were based on the 
application of the total facts available principle. Second, Korea was of the view that an alleged 
strategic alliance between OCTG and hot -rolled coil producers did not give grounds to reject actual 
transaction prices between them without an arm's -length test. Third, the IA did not conduct any 
analysis to conclude that electricity prices in Korea were distorted. Citing a letter sent to the US' IA 
by the Director of the National Trade Council, Korea suggest ed that the finding of PMS in this case 
had been made from a political perspective, without Korea having a chance for its position to be 
heard. Korea cited amendments to the US' laws and regulations in relation to PMS that had been 
made in 2015 and believe d they were problematic in several aspects. First, the recourse to 
constructed normal values in the case of a PMS should not permit the IA to disregard the 
requirements of Article 2.2.1.1 of the AD  Agreement. Second, the existence of PMS should not be 
asserted without any analysis to this end. Korea referred to the finding of the Appellate Body in 
EU – Biodiesel  and explained that a market distor tion alone does not constitute a legally sufficient 
basis for concluding that the producers' records do not reaso nably reflect the costs associated with 
production.  
2.72.   Korea believed that the issues it raised had serious implications for the fundamental 
fairness; transparency  and legitimacy of the trade remedy system. Korea requested the US to 
carefully consider its con cerns  and was ready to further deliberations on the matter.  
2.73.   China  shared Korea's concerns about the OCTG case. China believed that while the 
AD Agreement did not contain a detailed definition of a PMS, it should not be viewed as a basket 
that contained eve rything. China was particularly concerned about the reference to Chinese -
sourced raw materials in the determination of the PMS in the Korean case, and doubted both the 
rationale and the legitimate purpose of that conclusion. China cited the language of Sec tion 504 of 
the US Trade Preferences Extension Act ("TPEA") and stated that it remained concerned with the 
US trade policy directions and the distortions they may bring to the global supply chain. China 
requested the US to clarify the intention and purpose  of its practices as applied in the OCTG case, 
and the consistency of its regulations with WTO rules. China also shared Japan's concerns on the 
long-term, or even permanent, application of AD measures by the US. This issue had been 
reflected in China's rec ent proposal submitted in the context of the WTO negotiations on Rules.  
2.74.   The Russian Federation  stated that it closely followed the development of the PMS test 
practices among Members, including US. The Russian Federation referred to the numerous 
concerns i t raised about the proliferation of flawed methodologies in the application of the relevant 
provision of the AD  Agreement, as it had a systemic interest in this matter.  
2.75.   In response to the EU and Japan, the United States  mentioned that the final injury 
determination in the cut -to-length plate investigation was due in mid -May and parties were free to 
make comments, as necessary. The US believed that further comments were inappropriate, as the 
investigation was ongoing.  
2.76.   With regard to the repeated concerns by  Japan on the length of its measures, the US 
reiterated that it found no basis for Japan's chronic complaints. The expiry proceedings conducted 
by the US were consistent with the US' obligations under the AD  Agreement. Japan seemed to 
imply that an older m easure was no longer valid solely on the grounds that the measure was old. 
The US disagreed and emphasized that the purpose of an expiry proceeding was to allow 
administering authorities to examine whether dumping and injury would be likely to continue or 
recur if the measures were removed. The US explained that the expiry process was evidence -
based and that the participation by Japanese companies in expiry proceedings would be helpful 
both in terms of the relevant information to be provided and the argumen ts to be made by 
interested parties. Furthermore, many measures involving Japanese exports had, in fact, been G/ADP/M/52  
 
- 15 - 
 
  terminated. Since the commencement of expiry reviews, there had been 64 measures reviewed 
involving Japan. Of those, 51 or 80% had resulted in ter mination of the measure.  
2.77.   For 8 of the oldest 10 measures that remain in effect, Japanese industry had failed to 
meaningfully participate in any sunset review proceeding. In fact, as recently as February 2017 the 
Japanese industry had been again given an op portunity to explain whether the revocation of the 
orders would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of material injury and again the 
industry had refused to participate. Lack of respondent participation and the consequent lack of 
evidence provi ded by respondents limit the information provided to the IA. In other words, 
Japanese producers may themselves be partly responsible for the result. In many of the expiry 
processes that involved imports from both Japan and other Members, respondents from o ther 
Members have meaningfully participated in the review and have made relevant arguments as to 
why the measure should be terminated as to their specific country, and the measure had been 
terminated. The US suggested that Japan inquire with its own indust ries as to why there was a 
lack of interest in participating in the process, particularly given that participation had been a vital 
element in the termination of measures applied with respect to goods from other Members that 
also covered goods from Japan.  
2.78.   In response to Korea, the US mentioned that the application of facts available was based on 
the circumstances before the IA in any given case. The US explained that neither the TPEA nor any 
changes made to US' law with regard to corroboration had resulted  in a new threshold as far as 
what facts warranted the application of facts available. US stated that the IA's treatment of 
respondents from Korea was no different from its treatment of respondents in any other case, and 
there was no new standard applied. In each of the cases involving the application of facts 
available, the IA either found that significant necessary information was requested and not 
provided, or significantly new and previously unreported factual information was discovered at 
verification.  As such decisions were made on a case -by-case basis, the US referred Korea to the 
decision memoranda for any proceeding where it had a concern.  
2.79.   On the application of PMS in the OCTG administrative review, the US explained that the 
petitioner had claimed t hat PMS existed in Korea with respect to OCTG producers' costs for hot -
rolled coil and electricity, such that the IA should use an alternative calculation methodology in 
place of the Korean producers' reported production costs. These were the first such al legations 
under TPEA Section 504, adopted in 2015, which had been notified to the Committee shortly after 
enactment. Section 504 added the concept of PMS to the examples used to illustrate "ordinary 
course of trade". Furthermore, for purposes of constructe d value, Section 504 provided that if a 
particular market situation exists such that the cost of materials and fabrication or other 
processing of any kind does not accurately reflect the cost of production in the ordinary course of 
trade, the IA may use an other calculation methodology. On the allegations made in the context of 
determining PMS in Korea, the US stated that after considering the facts on the record of the 
review, along with the legal arguments put forward by all interested parties, the IA conc luded that 
the allegations, when considered collectively, provided evidence of PMS in the Korean market for 
OCTG.  
2.80.   As this was the first time the US' IA applied the PMS methodology under the new legislation, 
it will continue to develop the concepts and type  of analyses when future allegations are made. 
Such determinations will occur on a case -by-case basis when the facts and circumstances warrant 
doing so.  
2.81.   No comments were made with respect to semi -annual reports that the Committee had not 
previously reviewe d due to late circulation.  
2.82.   The Committee took note  of the semi -annual reports, the statements made, the questions 
posed and the answers provided.  
3  PRELIMINARY AND FINA L ANTI -DUMPING ACTIONS: NOT IFICATIONS  
3.1.  The Chair referred to the notifications of prelimina ry and final AD actions submitted by 
Members since the Committee's last meeting listed in documents G/ADP/N/292, 293, 295, 296, 
297 and 298. During this period Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Brazil; Canada; Chile; China; 
Dominican Republic; Egypt; El Salva dor; India; Indonesia; Israel; Japan; Kazakhstan; Korea; G/ADP/M/52  
 
- 16 - 
 
  Kyrgyz Republic; Mexico; Morocco; New Zealand; Pakistan; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; 
Russian  Federation; South Africa; Chinese Taipei; Turkey; Ukraine and US notified preliminary 
and/or final AD act ions, which were listed in these documents. Since document G/ADP/N/291 was 
circulated, Argentina, Australia, Egypt, EU, Kyrgyz Republic, Mexico, Russian Federation, Turkey, 
Ukraine, US and Viet Nam had submitted such a notification, which would appear in t he next list 
circulated by the Secretariat.  
3.2.  The Chair drew attention to the continued apparent lack of full compliance with this 
notification requirement. These reports were a key element of the required transparency 
concerning Members' AD actions, and the  Committee could not effectively carry out its monitoring 
and discussion functions if Members did not fulfil their obligations in this regard. He strongly urged 
all Members taking AD actions to provide these notifications of preliminary and final actions, 
consistently and in a timely fashion. The minimum information format for these notifications 
adopted by the Committee in October 2006 and revised in October 2009 (document 
G/ADP/2/Rev.2), contained important guidance as to the kinds of actions that should be notified 
and the information that should be provided.  
3.3.  Kazakhstan  expressed concern in relation to an investigation by Canada  on silicon metal. 
According to Kazakhstan, the IA initiated the investigation on the basis of an unsubstantiated 
complaint that  contained mere assertions, contrary to Article 5.2 of the AD  Agreement. In 
particular, the applicant had estimated the normal value for Kazakhstan using production costs in 
Brazil, Norway and Thailand, instead of using price information from the country o f origin, as 
required by Articles  2 and 5.2 of the AD  Agreement. Kazakhstan believed that the absence of 
domestic pricing information should not be a basis for constructing the normal value and 
suggested that the complainant had shifted its burden of proof  as regards normal value to the IA. 
Kazakhstan explained that Canada had already been applying AD measures on the largest exporter 
of silicon metal to its market, which accounted for 60% of all the imports, since 2013. At the same 
time, Kazakhstani share i n Canadian imports had not increased since 2015 and stood at 4%. 
Despite being in a considerably advantageous position vis-à-vis the other participants of the 
market, Canadian producers continued to suffer, which suggested that there was a systemic 
product ivity and efficiency problem that should not be attributed to imports from Kazakhstan. In 
addition, the investigation suffered from a number of procedural flaws, namely with respect to 
confidential information. Many pages in the complaint were left complet ely blank with the 
information redacted, while non -confidential versions were vague and had neither allowed for a 
reasonable understanding of the redacted information, nor included reasoning as to why 
summarization was not possible, in line with Article 6. 5.1 of the AD  Agreement. Kazakhstan noted 
that its government and its producers were unable to effectively defend their rights in the absence 
of a meaningful copy of the complaint – a situation which had been mentioned in Kazakhstani's 
comments upon initia tion. However, the treatment of confidential information by the Canadian IA 
was still inconsistent with Article 6.5.1 of the AD  Agreement. Kazakhstan requested Canada to 
bring its investigation proceedings into compliance with WTO rules and to terminate th e 
investigation in question. Kazakhstan was ready to engage with Canada bilaterally on this matter.  
3.4.  Canada  stated that it took its obligations under the AD  Agreement very seriously. It 
explained that the case was ongoing, encouraged Kazakhstan to participa te fully in the 
investigation and to submit their comments in writing to the relevant IA so that they may be 
considered in the investigation. Canada confirmed that it would relay Kazakhstan's concerns back 
to capital.  
3.5.  Turkey  commented on a sunset review co nducted by the Dominican Republic  on steel 
reinforcing bar and the consequent extension of the measure until 2021. Turkey explained that the 
Dominican Republic's IA had disregarded a negative dumping margin for one of the cooperating 
exporters and imposed a uniform ADD of 14% on all exporters. Turkey had its doubts as to the 
consistency of the measure as extended with the AD  Agreement, as there were no imports of the 
Turkish product into the Dominican Republic during the period of review and supposedly no i njury 
to the domestic producers. Turkey was disappointed with the extension and mentioned that the 
case could be taken to the DSB.  
3.6.  Turkey also commented on an interim review of an AD measure introduced by Israel  on float 
glass and suggested that substantia l decreases in the volume of exports from Turkey to Israel of 
the subject product and its market share demonstrated that Turkey was not a threat to the Israeli 
market. Turkey expected Israel to terminate the measure.  G/ADP/M/52  
 
- 17 - 
 
  3.7.  In addition, Turkey referred to an AD m easure applied by China  in respect of acrylic fibre. 
Turkey highlighted that China had imposed an ADD in the amount of 8.2% for  the only Turkish 
producer of the subject product and 16.1% for all other producers. Turkey submitted that the 
Chinese IA had not  duly taken into account the points raised by the Turkish exporter and 
authorities, and failed to provide reasonable explanations, particularly on the calculation of the 
constructed normal value and the date of sale. Turkey further submitted that China app lied facts 
available and determined a higher duty rate for all other Turkish exporters, while there was only 
one Turkish firm producing and exporting the subject product to China. Citing Article 9.3 of the 
AD Agreement, Turkey stated that in such a situati on non -cooperation of other producers became 
meaningless, unjust and unfair. Turkey expected China to repeal the measure in question.  
3.8.  The Dominican Republic  referred Turkey to the facts and reasoning stated in the 
determination of its IA, issued on 30 Nov ember 2016. The Dominican Republic confirmed that the 
determination was in line with AD  Agreement and its national legislation and expressed its 
willingness to engage with Turkey bilaterally.  
3.9.  Israel  requested Turkey to provide its questions in writing.  
3.10.   China believed that it was acting consistently with the rules by calculating a separate "all 
others" duty rate for unknown exporters and producers. While the AD  Agreement contained no 
guidance for the determination of an amount or level of such a duty rate, i t was nevertheless clear 
that such approach was permitted. According to China, if no duty was imposed on unknown 
producers, this would undermine the credibility and effectiveness of the ADDs. China cited the 
dispute settlement outcome in China – Broiler Pr oducts  to support its view that, while there may 
be other ways to determine the "all others" rate, facts available was one of the ways to do so, if 
the IA published a notice and specified the information requested in detail. China stated its actions 
in thi s respect were in conformity with WTO rules. As regards constructed normal value, China 
stated that the respondents in this case had not provided relevant information and evidence and 
consequently the IA used facts available for the normal value determinat ion. 
3.11.   The Russian Federation  expressed its concern with an investigation on silicon metal by 
Canada , in particular with respect to the initiation of the investigation. It believed that the IA did 
not conduct a proper analysis of the complaint as required by  Article 5.3 of the AD  Agreement and 
was of the view that the estimation of normal value for Russian producers based on costs obtained 
in Norway, justified only by geographic proximity, was invalid. The Russian Federation also stated 
that according to open -source official Canadian trade statistics, the volume of its imports into 
Canada stood at 2,72%, which was lower than the negligible threshold of Article 5.8 of the 
AD Agreement. Nevertheless, based on undisclosed information, the IA arrived at the figure  of 3%. 
The Russian Federation requested Canada to clarify this new figure and the reasons why it differed 
from the one reported in official statistics, and urged Canada to terminate the investigation 
immediately in accordance with Article 5.8 of the AD  Agreement.  
3.12.   Canada  confirmed that it conducted its AD investigations in full compliance with WTO rules 
and that the investigation into any country found to have negligible amounts of imports would be 
terminated. Canada explained that the IA consulted its own internal customs data in order to 
determine import volumes, and that this information would be reported in the statement of 
reasons. Canada encouraged the Russian Federation to participate fully in the investigation and 
submit comments in writing to the IA . Canada was open to bilateral dialogue with the 
Russian  Federation and would relay its concern back to the capital.  
3.13.   The Chair noted that some Members were still submitting the same ad hoc notifications 
pertaining to certain AD actions via different means;  i.e. electronically, by fax and post. In certain 
instances, certain Members, while submitting new ad hoc notifications, also tended to resubmit 
previously notified actions and in some cases provided electronic links that did not correspond to 
the notifica tion the Member submits. In addition, some of these notifications were not submitted to 
CRN directly, but to the Rules Division Secretariat which had to resend it to CRN for registration. 
He reminded all Members that a given ad hoc notification, as in case  of all other notifications, 
should be sent electronically and only once to CRN with a copy to the Secretary of the Committee 
and that any previously submitted notifications should not be resubmitted. He also requested 
Members, instead of providing electro nic links to general website, to attach directly the relevant 
document containing the action they wish to notify in WORD or PDF formats. He stressed the need G/ADP/M/52  
 
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  to avoid any confusion; repetition or duplication as these notifications were the source of 
necess ary information contained in Annex D of the Committee's annual report.  
3.14.   The Committee took note  of the statements made, questions posed and answers provided.  
4  CHAIRPERSON'S REPORT  ON THE MEETING OF TH E INFORMAL GROUP ON 
ANTI -CIRCUMVENTION  
4.1.  The Chair recalled  that the Informal Group on Anti -Circumvention met on 27 April 2017. The 
EU provided a detailed explanation of its anti -circumvention law and practice. A very interesting 
and lively discussion followed, with Members posing questions and offering comments.  
4.2.  The Committee took note  of the report made.  
5  CHAIRPERSON'S REPORT  ON THE MEETING OF TH E WORKING GROUP ON 
IMPLEMENTATION  
5.1.  The Chair  recalled that on 26 April 2017 the Working Group on Implementation had held a 
meeting, at which it discussed the issue of stand ards for initiation of investigations, operation of 
the standing test and ensuring effective participation in AD investigations. Mr Marco Fonseca of 
Brazil served as discussant for the meeting and circulated a roadmap of issues in advance of the 
meeting to  assist delegations in their work. The Members had a good discussion at which 
representatives of many different IAs shared their practices and asked questions of others.  
5.2.  This meeting was the fourth at which the Working Group has taken a new, topic -based 
approach to its work, and the Chair believed that it was working well. On 24 April 2017, the Chair 
circulated by fax the proposed two topics and a discussant. The Chair recalled that many 
delegations wished that Members agree to the topic of the October Wor king Group meeting well in 
advance. The Chair recognized that more time was required for Members to consult with their 
capitals. If Members had any concerns about his proposals, the Chair suggested they inform the 
Secretariat within the two weeks that foll owed. If the Secretariat had not heard any concerns by 
12 May 2017, he suggested the Members treat the topics and discussant as agreed.  
5.3.  The Committee took note  of the report and the statement made.  
6  AMENDMENTS TO THE AN TI-DUMPING LEGISLATION OF INDIA – ITEM  REQUESTED BY 
UKRAINE  
6.1.  The Chair drew Members' attention to document G/ADP/W/496 containing the written 
questions posed by Ukraine.  
6.2.  Ukraine  mentioned that, following its questions, on 21 April 2017 India  notified the 
amendments that had been made to its AD legislation in 2002 and 2003. Ukraine emphasized the 
delay of 15 years in notifying those amendments. According to the notification, the Indian IA 
would determine in each case whether a country or territory was to be considered a market 
economy. Pursuant t o paragraph 8 of Annexure I to the Customs Tariff, the term "non -market 
economy" meant any country which the IA determines as not operating on market principles of 
cost or pricing structures. Ukraine believed that this constituted a presumption of non -market 
economy for any country or territory. Ukraine asked India to clarify how this presumption was 
consistent with the AD  Agreement and what steps India would take to ensure that the Committee 
was notified of amendments to its AD legislation within a reasona ble period of time.  
6.3.  In response to Ukraine,  India explained that the absence of the relevant notification to the 
Committee was entirely due to oversight. However, the relevant amendments were made public on 
the national customs website and also the website  of the IA. India further explained that the 
legislation in question replaced the old approach of designating non -market economies based on a 
positive list. India stated that its procedures for designation of market or non -market economies 
drew from the pr inciples of Article 2.2.1.1 of the AD  Agreement, and were applied in order to 
ensure that the costs used during the investigation were undistorted and reasonable. India 
believed that the new rules were actually clarifying this situation.  G/ADP/M/52  
 
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  6.4.  The Committee took note  of the statements made, questions posed and answers provided.  
7  EUROPEAN UNION – DRAFT AMENDMENTS TO THE BASIC ANTI -DUMPING 
REGULATION CONCERNIN G METHODOLOGIES OF N ORMAL VALUE DETERMIN ATION – 
ITEM REQUESTED BY TH E RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
7.1.  The Chair drew Mem bers' attention to document G/ADP/W/497 containing the written 
questions posed by the Russian Federation.  
7.2.  The Russian Federation  expressed its deep concerns with respect to the proposed 
amendments to the EU AD law published in November 2016, in particular with relation to rules on 
normal value determination. While the EU seemed to have decided to abandon its "non -market 
economy" methodology, it seemingly sought to replace it with another WTO -inconsistent 
procedure. According to the new draft, the EU IA woul d test whether "significant distortions" 
existed in the exporting country, which in practice meant determining whether the reported 
exporters' prices or costs, including of raw materials, resulted from market forces or were affected 
by government's interve ntion. The draft foresaw no positive or objective criteria for measuring the 
level of intervention. The Russian Federation noted the substantial discretion of the IA in 
performing this test and that, if failed, it would lead the IA to construct the normal value based on 
international prices or costs of production in a third country. Russia also mentioned that the EU 
intended to issue reports on "significant distortions" that could be accepted by the IA as evidence 
in the initiation process. The Russian Fede ration cited the outcome of the EU – Biodiesel  dispute 
and believed that the draft amendments were contrary to the standards established therein.  
7.3.  The Russian Federation urged all Members to pay special attention to the EU's proposal. In 
the Russian Federat ion's view, the EU intended to punish all Members that had comparative 
advantages simply for the fact of having them, for the purpose of offsetting those advantages and 
creating a more favourable marketplace position for EU goods. The Russian Federation su bmitted 
that the proposed amendments were inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the AD  Agreement 
and VI:1(b)(ii) of the GATT 1994.  
7.4.  The Russian Federation cautioned the EU and its Member -States against the attempts to 
correct the legal form of flawed practices l eaving their substance almost unchanged. The Russian 
Federation also asked the EU to clarify for what purpose and how exactly the market conditions in 
the exporting countries would be assessed and how the EU IA intended to determine whether the 
distortions  it found were indeed "significant".  
7.5.  The Kingdom of Bahrain , on behalf of the GCC, shared a number of concerns expressed by 
the Russian Federation. It noted that the proposed draft outlined four non -exhaustive criteria to 
assess the existence of "significa nt distortions", but each of those was very broad and could be 
loosely interpreted. It seemed that the proposal sought to apply different and less advantageous 
rules to certain imports based on unclearly defined concepts, leading to the possible unwarrante d 
and discriminatory application of AD measures. It recalled that rejection of cost and price data and 
their replacement with international reference prices was found to be inconsistent with the 
AD Agreement in dispute settlement proceedings. Inasmuch as t he EU's proposal was intended to 
deal with issues other than private pricing behaviour of exporters, such as allegations of 
subsidization, the Kingdom of Bahrain recalled that a separate AD provision was unnecessary and 
countervailing measures could be imp osed instead. Bahrain understood that the amendments were 
still being reviewed and no decisions had been taken, but sought clarifications from the EU on the 
status of its November 2016 proposal, the timetable for next steps, and the approaches the EU 
would  use to define and apply certain concepts in its proposal, notably "significant distortions".  
7.6.  China  commended the EU for the shift in position in terms of removing of the list of non -
market economy countries, as reflected in its new proposal. However, Chin a shared the concerns 
raised in respect of methodologies for normal value determination and cautioned against 
introducing amendments that deviated from the multilateral rules that could increase uncertainty 
and provoke more demand for protection. China ref erred to the proposal it submitted in the 
context of the WTO negotiations on Rules. As other Members, China was also concerned with the 
notion of "significant distortions", noting that the concept lacked both theoretical and practical 
underpinning. China n oted that in the drafting process, the criteria to determine "significant 
distortions" had been expanded from 4 to 8, including concepts similar to the non -market G/ADP/M/52  
 
- 20 - 
 
  economy definition. China requested the EU to clarify the definition, standards and applicati on 
procedures of the "significant distortions" and explain how such provisions would be consistent 
with the existing WTO rules. China requested the EU to refrain from drafting reports on "significant 
distortions" in other Members, which, in its opinion, wo uld constitute a judgement without trial and 
could lead to abuse of the alleged evidence in both AD and countervailing duty proceedings.  
7.7.  Pakistan  raised its systemic concern with respect to the matter, which it had been following 
closely, and requested the  EU to provide further clarifications and updates on the status of its 
proposal.  
7.8.  Kazakhstan  associated itself with the concerns of other Members. In addition, Kazakhstan 
raised serious concern in relation to the treatment as a non -market economy in the cur rent AD 
and countervailing duty investigations, which Kazakhstan believed was inconsistent with GATT 
Article I, Article 2.2 of the AD  Agreement and Explanatory Note 8 to GATT Article II. Kazakhstan 
explained that it applied for a graduation to market econo my status with the EU as early as 2004, 
provided comprehensive answers and evidence of economic reforms in the country, and still had 
not received market economy status, even after its accession to the WTO. In addition, Kazakhstan 
believed that the propose d amendments could not ensure a fair treatment for Members as regards 
the determination of normal value, notably because a "significant distortion" could be found based 
on a mere assertion that the government could be intervening just by fact of its presen ce in 
enterprises, even in cases where there is no governmental monopoly on trade or price -setting by 
the State. Kazakhstan believed that there was no provision in the WTO Agreement that entitled a 
WTO Member to breach the principle of non -discrimination o nly by virtue of governmental 
presence in certain sectors of the economy. Kazakhstan requested the EU to exclude it from its list 
of non -market economies, apply standard WTO rules, reconsider its proposed draft amendments 
and bring them into compliance wit h WTO rules.  
7.9.  Indonesia  indicated that the substance of the draft amendment required further clarification, 
especially in relation to the determination of "government interventions". The text of the proposal 
was drafted in a way that could afford inappropri ate discretion to the IA. Indonesia sought further 
clarifications from the EU as to the determination of distorted markets and prices.  
7.10.   The European Union  explained that the draft amendments were currently only a proposal, 
and were subject to the ordinary l egislative procedure, whereby it would be examined by the 
European Parliament and Council. The timing and the outcome of that process were not known, 
and the proposal could change as a result of that process. Concerning the way in which dumping 
will be cal culated if there is significant market distortions or where the state has a pervasive 
influence on the economic impact, prices and costs, the draft regulation contained a non -
exhaustive list of factors that would be relevant and have an impact in that cont ext, including state 
policies and influence, the presence of state -owned enterprises, policies discriminating in favor of 
domestic suppliers or other policies affecting free market forces. As the EU was not in a position to 
pre-judge the outcome of the leg islative process, it stated that it was not in a position to answer 
any questions that were pertaining to the text of the regulation. The EU confirmed that if and when 
any changes to the EU AD legislation take place, the Committee would be informed and Mem bers 
would be entitled to ask questions in this respect. In response to the Russian Federation's 
concerns, the EU reiterated that its trade defence investigations were carried out following the 
highest possible standards and in strict compliance with WTO r ules. 
7.11.   China  and the Russian Federation  asked the European Union  whether there was any 
opportunity for a government of a Member to provide comments in the drafting process.  In 
addition, the Russian Federation referred to the report on the proposal published  by the European 
Parliament on 11  April 2017, which only exacerbated its concerns, as the list of criteria used to 
determine "significant distortions" became longer and the requirements tougher.  
7.12.   The EU recalled that it had conducted a full impact assessmen t prior to the adoption of the 
legislative proposal, and had conducted an online consultation on the website of the European 
Commission, which was open to the public. In addition to the public consultation, the EU also held 
a dedicated meeting in March 201 6 that was open to the public, which was attended by a Chinese 
representative. The EU mentioned that there have been numerous meetings with China in relation 
to this proposal at all levels, including the highest level at the EU Commission. The EU stated th at 
contacts were also maintained at the level of both the European Parliament and Council.  G/ADP/M/52  
 
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  7.13.   The Committee took note  of the statements made, questions posed and answers provided.  
8  COSTA RICA – IMPOSITION OF AN ANT I-DUMPING MEASURE ON W HITE CRYSTAL 
SUGAR, UNRE FINED (HS CODE 1701. 99.0099) FROM BRAZIL  – ITEM REQUESTED BY 
BRAZIL  
8.1.  Brazil  explained that it was concerned with the application of definitive AD measures against 
its sugar exports, as it may have breached the AD  Agreement. The investigation had been 
conclu ded 18 months after its initiation, contrary to the provisions of Article 5.10 of the 
Agreement. The final decision in this investigation was taken on 3 February 2017, while it should 
have been taken no later than 31 January 2017. Brazil was of the view th at regional legislation, 
used by Costa Rica as a justification of this delay, should not have precedence over the specific 
requirements of the AD  Agreement. The Decision by the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Trade 
No. DM -010-2017 was contrary to the Cos ta Rican IA recommendation to terminate the 
investigation without the imposition of a measure. The IA had initially concluded that the dumping 
margin was de minimis , there was no substantial increase in imports from Brazil, no material 
injury or threat the reof and no causal link were present. Brazil believed that the subsequent 
decision by the Ministry to recalculate the dumping margin and to reassess the injury 
determination was contrary, inter alia , to Articles 1, 9.1 and 6.2 of the AD  Agreement. Brazil 
requested that the AD measure in question be immediately terminated and duties refunded.  
8.2.  Costa -Rica recalled that it was not an often user of AD measures, and always advocated the 
strengthening of disciplines of the AD  Agreement. It also reaffirmed its comm itment to the 
AD Agreement and the relevant obligations. Costa Rica explained that its IA, which is itself a 
Division of the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Trade, was not empowered to take decisions on 
the application of AD measures, and that its compet ences were limited to the investigation phase 
and the issuance of technical recommendations. The competence to take decisions, however, lay 
with the Minister of Economy, Industry and Trade, for whom the recommendations of the IA were 
not binding, and whose  decisions may take another form, so long as they were justified. In the 
instant case, the Minister decided to apply an ADD of 6,82% on the imports of white sugar from 
Brazil, which was subsequently reduced to 3,67%, and the decision contained sufficient 
explanation to this end. Costa Rica stated that the AD  Agreement, and in particular Article 9.1 
thereof, did not specify a particular institutional structure that Members needed to have in order to 
implement AD measures. With regard to the length of the inv estigation, Costa Rica observed the 
relevant deadline and considered that the investigation was concluded on 30 January 2017, when 
the IA sent its technical report to the Minister for his consideration. Costa Rica pointed out that 
Brazil was provided suffi cient opportunities throughout the investigation to present information 
and defend its interests, in keeping with the provisions of Article 6.2 of the AD  Agreement. Costa 
Rica was open to further discuss this matter with Brazil bilaterally.  
8.3.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
9  OTHER BUSINESS  
9.1.  The Chair encouraged Members that had issues to raise with other Members under other 
business to provide sufficient notice to the Member concerned prior to the meeting in order to 
ascertain whether or not an  answer could be obtained at the meeting.  
9.2.  China  recalled that Article 15 of its Accession Protocol included a sunset clause regarding the 
use of the surrogate country methodology in AD investigations on Chinese products. China 
explained that as of 11 Decem ber 2016 Members were not entitled to use this methodology in AD 
investigations against Chinese companies. This had been an agreement between China and other 
Members 16 years ago and was an obligation that Members had to comply with, in accordance 
with the  basic principles of international law. While most of the Members that had applied this 
methodology had clearly terminated its application, certain Members had not yet fulfilled their 
commitment. According to China, the surrogate country methodology had to  be terminated. China 
urged Members to abide by the obligation contained in Article 15 of its Accession Protocol in a 
thorough manner. China emphasized that this was a legal issue that should not be politicized, and 
a legal obligation that should not be ci rcumvented by referring to domestic laws. China stated that 
its companies waited 15 years for the sunset, and that China would use all relevant means to 
defend its interests.  G/ADP/M/52  
 
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  9.3.  On China's statement, the United States  did not consider the Committee to be an a ppropriate 
forum to discuss this question as this issue was being litigated in the framework of a dispute. The 
US referred Members to its statement at the DSB where it explained that the expiration of a single 
provision of China's Accession Protocol did no t require Members to grant China market economy 
status or to discontinue the application of a non -market economy methodology. Rather, the 
WTO Agreement permits Members to treat China as a non -market economy for as long as the facts 
on the ground showed tha t this is the case.  
9.4.  Mexico  shared the concerns of the US in relation to the appropriateness of the Committee as 
a venue to hold a debate on the Chinese question. Mexico also observed that China did not seem 
to have consistent criteria as regards the inclu sion of items into the agenda of WTO Committees, 
recalling China's objection to discuss the issue of subsidies and overcapacity in the Committee on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Mexico did not agree with China's interpretation of the 
language of t he Accession Protocol, and suggested that it might be interpreted in different ways.  
9.5.  Japan  was of the view that the WTO agreements and China's Accession Protocol continued to 
allow WTO Members to use a methodology that was not based on a strict comparison with 
domestic prices or costs in China.  
9.6.  China  believed  that the issue at hand was pertinent to the way AD investigations were 
conducted and should be discussed in the framework of the Committee. China warned Members 
against confusing the terms "surrogate c ountry methodology" and "market economy status", the 
latter not being mentioned in WTO rules. In China's view, propaganda and bad publicity were used 
to mislead the public and to support excuses for the use of inappropriate trade remedies. China 
explained that it had brought its challenge to the DSB because it was a supporter of the 
multilateral trading system, and wished to save other Members from suffering the same 
unjustifiable treatment. China stated that the Protocol had been a compromise between the 
negotiators, and anyone knowing the background of the negotiation understood that there was no 
question that the words of the Protocol meant that the surrogate country methodology should be 
terminated after 15 years. In China's view, no Member should enjoy the benefits of the multilateral 
trading system, while at same time not fulfilling their obligations.  
9.7.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
10  DATE OF THE NEXT REG ULAR MEETING  
10.1.   The next Regular meeting of the Committee would be held in the week of 2 3 October 2017.  
11  ELECTION OF OFFICERS   
11.1.   The Chair informed Members that consultations as regards the selection of the new chair of 
the Council of Trade in Goods (CTG) and the chairs of the Committees under the CTG were still 
under way. The Chair suggested th at the Secretariat send a fax once the CTG has completed its 
work, indicating the Chair identified by the CTG. The new Chair would be deemed to be elected by 
the Committee absent any objection4. The Chair proposed to postpone the election of a 
Vice-Chairpe rson until the new Chair was appointed5. 
__________  
 
                                                
4 On 22 May 2017 a fax was sent conveying to the membership the appointment of Mr Faisal Al Nab hani 
(Oman) by the CTG as the Chair of the Committee. No objection was received and the Chair was deemed to be 
elected by the Committee.  
5 On 11 July 2017, Mr Faisal Al Nabhani, the Chair of the Committee, sent a fax to the membership 
conveying the appoint ment of Mr Bruno Raphael Hassig  (Switzerland) as the new Vice -Chair of the Committee. 
No objection was received and the Vice -Chair was deemed to be elected by the Committee.