RESTRICTED  
  
TN/CTD/M/51  
 
21 March 2016  
(16-1621)  Page: 1/12  
Committee on Trade and Development 
Fifty-First Special Session    
   
NOTE ON THE MEETING OF 24 NOVEMBER 2015, RECONVENED ON 4 DECEMBER 2015 
Chairperson:  Ambassador Tan Yee Woan (Singapore) 
 
A.
 ADOPTION OF TH E AGENDA .................................................................................... 1  
B. REPORT BY THE CHAIR ............................................................................................ 1  
C. OTHER BUSINESS .................................................................................................... 7  
D. RECONVENED SESSION ........................................................................................... 7  
 
 A. ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA 
1. The agenda as contained in Airgram WTO/AIR/TN/CTD/3 of 17 November 2015 was 
adopted. 
B. REPORT BY THE CHAIR 
2. Under this agenda item, the Chairperson briefed Members on the work undertaken in the 
Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Development (Special Session) since the last 
formal meeting on 16 September 2015. She inform ed that the Special Session had held eight 
informal open-ended meetings during which the first reading of the G90 proposals contained in 
document JOB/DEV/29 - JOB/TNC/51 had been completed. In addition, she had held a number of 
bilateral, plurilateral and small-group meetings wi th the proponents (including the African Group, 
ACP Group and the LDC Group Coordinators and thei r focal points on development issues) and with 
other Members. This work had enabled the proponents to revise their proposals, as contained in 
document JOB/DEV/29/Rev.1 - JOB/TNC/51/Rev.1, taking into consideration some of the comments made by other Members. An initial reading of the set of revised proposals had also been 
completed during this intensive phase of work in the Special Session.  
3. Based on those discussions, the Chairperson was able to identify nine proposals, (proposal 
numbers 2, 3, 4, 18, 19, 23, 20, 21 and 22) on wh ich she felt there was a degree of convergence. 
Subsequently, five additional proposals (proposal numbers 8, 9, 17, 14, 16) were added to the list 
at the suggestion of the proponents, as they believed that finding solutions to the underlying 
issues in these proposals by Nairobi was extremely important for them. Later, another five proposals (proposal numbers 1, 6, 7, 5 and 15) we re added to the list by the proponents, thereby 
increasing the list to 19 for consideration as Nairobi deliverables. She stated that the text-based 
discussions in the informal open-ended and small-group meetings helped take the negotiations to another level. While the positions still remained  far apart, the discussion was focussed around 
specific textual suggestions – a commendable step forward. Notwithstanding this positive 
movement, there was need to address a couple of issues so as to develop a common understanding if tangible and concrete results were to be harvested at Nairobi. 
4. The Chairperson explained that one of these issu es was the eligibility/applicability of special 
and differential treatment (S&D) provisions or in ot her words, the scope of the beneficiaries of the 
S&D proposals. In that context, some Members had felt that the flexibilities being sought in the TN/CTD/M/51 
 
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  G90 proposals, could at best be provided to the LDCs. While disagreeing with any notions of 
narrowing down the scope of S&D in WTO disciplines, other Members strongly believed that the basic premise of the S&D regime in the WTO was that it was available to all developing countries. These Members firmly believed that this must remain so. Therefore, any outcome on the G90 
proposals, unless they were LDC-specific, must no t be limited to LDCs or any other category of 
developing countries. 
5. Furthermore, another generic issue on which Members had not been able to close the gaps 
was the perception of what was doable against th e view of what was important. The Chairperson 
reported that it was clear from the various meetings that there were some proposals that were very important to the G90. But it had also been ma de equally clear by the other side that in their 
present form many of these proposals were not doable. 
6. The Chairperson reported that despite outstanding systemic hurdles, progress had been 
made. There was much greater clarity on many of  the underlying issues, especially relating to 
proposal numbers 2, 3 and 4. There had also been a fruitful discussion on some other proposals, 
including proposal number 19, where some textual proposals would be made. Likewise on proposal 
number 23, further bilateral discussions would need to be undertaken. 
7. The Chairperson announced that she would continue with the text-based consideration of 
these proposals in small-group meetings. In orde r to be able to reconvene the meeting of the 
Special Session at short notice, she deemed it a ppropriate to suspend the current meeting at some 
stage. Having said that, the Chairperson opened the floor to Members which might wish to comment at that juncture.  
8. The Ambassador of Barbados, speaking on beha lf of the G90, stated that the Group had 
submitted its textual proposals in July 2015 as JOB/DEV/29 - JOB/TNC/51. The Group, after 
careful consideration and review of the 88 S&D proposals which had remained the focus of the 
Special Session meetings since 2001, had now come up with only 25 proposals that they 
considered as important. 
9. Since the introduction of these proposals in July 2015, the Committee had undertaken a 
five-week first reading of the 25 proposals. During this time, the Group had not only take note of 
the support expressed by some Members, but ha d also listened to the questions and concerns 
expressed by other Members. In a true spirit of  flexibility and accommodation, the G90 had made 
substantive revisions to the texts and had tabled  them in the informal meeting of the Special 
Session on 10 November 2015. The revisions dealt with both technical aspects and systemic 
concerns expressed by some Members.  
10. She stated that at the last informal meetin g of the Special Session, it had been assessed 
that there were two types of proposals which could form the basis for work in small-group 
consultations. These were: (i) proposals on which convergence could be reached based on the deliberations thus far held; and (ii) proposals that were considered to be of utmost importance to 
the proponents. The G90 had further identified fi ve additional proposals for discussion in the 
small-group meetings with the hope of reac hing an agreement on them for the WTO's 10
th 
Ministerial Conference (MC10). She went on to st ate that the G90 wished to highlight that the 
discussions on these proposals was without prejudic e to the Group's overall position on the 25 S&D 
proposals. 
11. The Ambassador of Barbados was very firm in saying that the Special Session should 
continue to pursue what was meaningful, based on the real needs of the G90, rather than what 
was considered by some Members as doable. In th is regard, she stressed that meaningful solutions 
on proposals specific to LDCs and those for non-LDC developing countries would be an important element of a credible outcome in Nairobi. 
12. She further added that the G90 continued to  value the fundamental principles of the 
multilateral trading system (MTS). She, on beha lf of the Group, expressed commitment to working 
with all Members so as to find mutually satisfactory solutions that would address the underlying issues in the proposals without undermining the MTS. For the G90, S&D was one of the 
fundamental principles of the WTO and it need ed to be preserved. The Group's negotiating 
strategy had continued to be guided by paragraph 44 of the Doha Declaration which stated that TN/CTD/M/51 
 
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  "all special and differential treatment provisions shall be reviewed with a view to strengthening 
them and making them more precise, effective and operational" as well as paragraph 12 of the Doha Ministerial Decision on Implementation-Rel ated Issues and Concerns, which instructed the 
Special Session to identify those S&D provisions that were already mandatory in nature and those 
that were non-binding in character. The mandate was to consider the legal and practical 
implications of converting those non-binding S&D provisions into mandatory provisions.  
13. The representative of the European Union stated that her delegation had repeatedly 
reaffirmed its support to the centrality of deve lopment in the MC10 outcomes. While appreciating 
the amount of work that had gone into the revi sed proposals and the attempts of proponents to 
accommodate Members' concerns, she stated that most of the problems that they had highlighted in the first reading had unfortunately not been addressed in the revised text. Therefore, the 
revised proposals still remained unrealistic. In her view, many of the proposals in their current 
form would still overturn some basic WTO rules, and undermine the predictability, internal balance and effectiveness of the MTS. Another issue was that the proposals still targeted, in greatest part, 
all developing countries. The EU acknowledged that LDCs and other vulnerable Members might 
need further flexibilities, but these flexibilities would become meaningless if they were also made available to big emerging economies. 
14. She further stated that her delegation fully supported the need to have S&D and 
less-than-full reciprocity for developing countries. However, it would not be possible for the EU to 
agree to proposals that eroded basic WTO principles, such as the stability of bound rates or the recognition that some forms of subsidies were trade distorting. Nor would the EU ever accept to 
provide further indiscriminate flexibilities to a vast majority of WTO Members, regardless of their 
actual needs and level of development. She added that slightly more than two weeks separated Members from the MC10, and that they should all be open-minded and switch into a problem-
solving mood. Focusing on LDCs would be the best way to find some convergence in the very little 
time left and deliver benefits to the weakest WTO Members. She stated that her delegation had tabled possible compromise language on some proposals in line with their belief that making MC10 
a success was in the interest of all WTO Members, especially the least developed among them. She 
added that the EU would continue to engage constructively in the work of the Special Session. 
15. Finally, she stated that the EU had heard some calls to postpone discussions on those 
proposals where agreement was not foreseeable on post-Nairobi work. Her delegation believed 
that although discussion on S&D would have to continue after Nairobi, it should not be based on 
proposals where landing zones were clearly not in sight. 
16. The representative of India stated that the S&D provisions, which were an integral part of 
the MTS, were meant to enable developing countri es and LDCs to meaningfully integrate into the 
MTS so as to derive maximum economic benefits. Ministers at Doha had given a clear mandate as contained in paragraph 44 of the Doha Declaration to review all S&D provisions with a view to 
strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and operational.  
17. He added that this mandate would not cover an exercise in redefining the scope of 
beneficiaries of the S&D regime in the WTO. In this connection, he said that his delegation would like to draw the attention of Members to paragraph 44 of the Doha Declaration that also noted the 
Framework Agreement on Special and Differential Treatment (WT/GC/W/442) proposed by a group 
of developing countries, including India. In quot ing from paragraph 1 of document WT/GC/W/442, 
he stated: 
"The recognition of inherent inequality of 'players' in the Multilateral Trading System and the 
special needs and development concerns of the developing countries figured, for the first time, in the Havana Charter. The concept of Special and Differential treatment is a 
fundamental building bloc of the multilateral trading system. It was conceived in 
acknowledgement of the fact that developing countries are at a very different stages of 
economic, financial and technological developments and therefore have entirely different capacities as compared to developed countries in taking on multilateral commitments and 
obligations. It had, therefore, been accepted that special advantages and flexibilities must 
be provided to developing countries so that they are able to adopt appropriate national policies to support their trade regime. In essence, therefore, Special and Differential 
treatment provisions are to be looked at not as exceptions to the general rules but more 
importantly as an integral and inherent objective of the multilateral trading system." TN/CTD/M/51 
 
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  18. The representative of India further added that, as per the mandate, the scope of 
beneficiaries of S&D included all developing co untries. There were no grounds for Members to 
import a discussion on differentiation among developing countries in the Special Session.  
19. The representative of Australia stated that his delegation would continue to engage closely 
and constructively in the work of the Special Session. Australia welcomed the revision of the G90 
proposals prepared by the proponents. While noting  the modifications made by the proponents in 
accommodating Members' concerns, he highlighted his delegation's discomfort if the scope of S&D 
was not restricted to LDCs. He joined the EU in  viewing this as a much-needed first step which 
acknowledged inescapable disparities between Members in their levels of development and integration into global trade. He felt that securing S&D outcomes premised on treating the world's largest exporter in the same manner as the world's 180
th was difficult. On the post-Nairobi 
package, he questioned whether enshrining expectations of outcomes on proposals on which there 
are fundamental philosophical disagreements was in  the best interest of the broader, long-term 
S&D agenda. 
20. The representative of Canada stated that  delivering an S&D outcome for MC10 remained a 
priority for her country. She appreciated the effort s made by the G90 in responding to Canada's 
comments and to the questions her delegation had submitted during the first reading. 
Unfortunately, her delegation's concerns we re not met in the revised text. Regarding 
differentiation, Canada positively noted the efforts made by the proponents in clarifying the scope 
of application of some of the proposals, however,  the formulations proposed were either imprecise 
or did not effectively serve to narrow the scope. In the absence of a clear, objective criteria to 
differentiate between developing countries, the delegation of Canada was only willing to look at an 
S&D outcome in Nairobi that was limited to LDCs. 
21. She went on to state that there remained many proposals that would undermine core WTO 
principles, including some proposals identified by  the G90 as priorities. Therefore, Canada would 
have great difficulty agreeing to a post-Nairobi work plan that would continue with such unproductive discussion. Continued inclusion of obligatory technical assistance in the G90's 
proposals was another difficult issue for Canada and, therefore, a non-starter. Finally, the G90 
proposals still included provisions that aimed at limiting Members' rights to regulate in the public interest. In addition, some proposals seemed to make access demands that were extremely unrealistic. Acknowledging that the Chairperson had identified certain areas for further discussion, 
she was firm in saying that Members needed to be pragmatic and would need to engage 
constructively on the basis of the Chairperson's small package on S&D for LDCs for MC10. Failure 
to clearly show support for LDC Members would be a significant setback for the institution and its 
Membership. 
22. The representative of Cameroon stated that his Government attached great importance to 
the S&D negotiations and expected concrete results in this area in Nairobi. He invited the WTO 
Membership to bear in mind the Doha Ministerial mandate on S&D, as contained in paragraph 44. 
23. The representative of Nigeria stated that the ongoing discussions should be without 
prejudice to whatever Members were able to achieve in Nairobi and thereafter in the post-Nairobi 
process. Members needed to move away from rhetorics and work toward delivering concrete 
results that delivered benefits to the developing countries, in particular LDCs and SVEs. It was also 
necessary to have a clear understanding on a post-Nairobi work plan on what is left on the table. He stated that S&D remained the cornerstone of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). It was 
Nigeria's expectation that a meaningful outcome on S&D would enable developing countries, in 
particular LDCs, to benefit more from the MTS.  
24. The representative of Pakistan recognized th at development was at the heart of the WTO 
and S&D remained critical to achieving that objective, as envisaged in paragraph 44 of the Doha 
Declaration. It was regrettable that despite G90 efforts to submit a revised text on the proposals for discussion, the desired level of flexibility by other Members had not been forthcoming. Having said that, he reiterated that Members must have a credible outcome on S&D at Nairobi so as to 
send a positive signal to the world, in particular to Africa, that the WTO was sensitive to the needs 
of developing countries, in particular its LDC Members. 
25. The representative of Uganda stated that the level of development in the LDC countries was 
still low. Their share of manufacturing value added had actually declined from 2% in 1992 to 1% in 
2012. The LDCs' contribution to world merchandise trade was at a meagre 1.23%. Their share in TN/CTD/M/51 
 
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  world services trade was only 0.68%. Four hundred million of their people lived on less than one 
dollar a day. He recalled that in the S&D negotiations, Members had expected the G90 to show: (i) why the G90 needed to harvest outcomes on S&D; (ii) how beneficial would these outcomes be to them; and (iii) what particular problems would these address. The proponents had endeavored 
to respond to all these questions, including those related to systemic concerns raised by Members 
such as reverse consensus and the scope and durati on of the flexibilities sought. The proponents 
had shown readiness to amend their own texts, includ ing, as a sign of flexibility, in choosing to let 
some provisions be included in the post-Nairobi ba sket as a sign of flexibility. Unfortunately, the 
response from partners had not been commensurate to the degree of flexibility shown by the proponents.  
26. He explained that some of the provisions were aimed at addressing issues that pertained to 
industrialization. In the case of most of the proposals, they had in fact, accommodated Members' 
concerns and recalibrated the ambition level in the revised text. The transition periods being sought for were in line with past practices in the Organization - the flexibilities sought in terms of 
transition periods were far shorter than what Members had granted in trade-related arrangements 
taking place elsewhere. He said that in seeking resolution of those S&D proposals, the proponents 
aimed to uphold the principles of transparency and predictability. 
27. He went on to add that it was important that Members agreed to outcomes that would 
provide the requisite policy space for LDCs and SVEs  that promoted industrialization. Such positive 
outcomes would help alleviate and create employment, thus contributing to improving the lives and livelihoods of their people, besides ultimately facilitating integration into the MTS. 
Furthermore, he indicated that proposals that might not find themselves in the Nairobi basket 
should be treated on a priority basis post-Nairobi. 
28. The representative of Norway reiterated the importance that her country attached to 
development issues in the WTO, including the work in the Special Session. While acknowledging 
efforts made by the G90 in coming up with the S&D proposals and thereafter their revisions, Norway lauded the G90 work in coordinating such  a large and diverse group of Members. Norway 
had a particular focus on identifying the needs of the LDCs and finding good and workable 
solutions to them. Norway was also trying to id entify those proposals where Members might be in 
a position to offer something to developing Members in general. The representative of Norway indicated his delegation's readiness to continue discussions on the G90 proposals after MC10. 
Having said that, Norway was not in a position to support suggestions for textual revisions 
implying that the developing countries, LD Cs and SVEs should be treated equally. 
29. The representative of Switzerland stated that his delegation appreciated the Chairperson's 
and the G90's efforts in prioritizing the proposals fo r MC10. In highlighting particular difficulties, he 
stated that, first, the systemic concerns on a number of draft proposals had hardly been taken into account in the revised proposal. It was his delegation's view that S&D provisions could not be a 
way to walk back from longstanding WTO rules or to seek to rewrite those rules; neither should 
they weaken predictability and transparency – the core fundamentals of WTO rules. The second problem was the designation of potential beneficiaries from the possible outcomes on those S&D proposals. His delegation recognized the need for LDCs to benefit from S&D in WTO rules. 
However, differentiation was a critical issue when it came to dishing out benefits of S&D to 
developing countries. In Switzerland's view, S& D should only be given to those developing 
countries which demonstrated a specific need. It must also be a proportionate response to the 
economic needs of a developing country Member. In that context, the scope of the potential 
beneficiary countries needed to be clearly defined. 
30. The representative of the United States stated that it was important for her country to find 
ways to enhance developing countries' integration in the MTS. In that context, the US remained 
committed to addressing the concerns that developing country Members had, but it could not agree to proposals that would bless the use of trade restrictive practices and permit walk-backs from existing commitments and the fundamental pr inciples of the MTS simply for the sake of 
reaching an agreement for the Ministerial Conference. She stressed that Members needed to be 
realistic. The US appreciated the efforts of the pr oponents to identify those issues which were of 
most concern to them, but the discussions to date had revealed that there was no convergence on 
many of the proposals. In considering those pr oposals where agreement could be possible, her 
delegation also noted that, in order to reach agreement, Members had to be quite clear about who the proposal/text applied to. She indicated her delegation's willingness to consider a handful of 
proposals for LDCs only, so as to focus on those Members that needed those flexibilities the most. TN/CTD/M/51 
 
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  Unfortunately, the scope of countries captured by the current formulations in the G90 proposals 
was far from clear.  
31. With regard to the future S&D agenda, her delegation would be ready to discuss specific 
problems developing countries had with regards to S&D post-Nairobi, but his delegation believed 
the appropriate forum for this would be the Monitoring Mechanism. This institutional arrangement 
was established at Bali precisely for those kind of issues. The US felt disappointed that the Mechanism had not been utilized at all, given the time and effort invested into negotiating its 
structure and the mandate. 
32. The representative of Egypt stated that in revising the proposals the G90 had taken into 
account the concerns of other Members. Egypt was open to discuss technical concerns in order to 
find solutions, but this work could be constrained if there were repeated calls to limit the beneficial 
results of S&D work to a certain group of possible beneficiaries. His delegation hoped that the S&D 
outcome emanating from the work in the Special Session, would benefit all Members of the G90. 
33. The representative of Argentina stated that the focus of the Doha Round was development, 
or at least Argentina had been led to believe so. Nevertheless, just a few days from MC10, his 
delegation was disappointed with the lack of any concrete results in this area. He quoted Article XVIII of GATT which stated that contracting parties "recognize that the attainment of the 
objectives of this Agreement will be facilitated by the progressive development of their 
economies". But most of the S&D provisions had b een identified and put forward by the G90, in 
fact, in their current formulation, curbed the pr ogressive development of their economies. That 
was why the proponents had identified such provisions and put forward proposals which sought 
the strengthening of those provisions. It is a fact that for years, developed countries had employed 
those tools to promote their industrial development. It is a pity that the same instruments are now being denied to developing countries. Argentina believed that discussion on those issues should 
continue after Nairobi. Finally, he also cautioned against a debate that sought to create 
differentiation between developing countries. 
34. The representative of Japan indicated that his delegation attached great importance to the 
development issues and to the S&D provisions as a means to promote the integration of the 
developing countries into the MTS. Having said this, he appreciated the proponents' efforts in tabling revised proposals. Nonetheless, he pointed to the fact that there still remained huge gaps between the proponents and the other Member s on a number of issues. In any case, the 
delegation of Japan would remain constructively engaged in the discussions in the Special Session. 
He, once again, encouraged proponents to take into account what had been discussed in the past 
few weeks, including in the latest small-group disc ussions, and to work further on the proposals to 
review the substance of the proposals, as well as the scope of beneficiary countries. 
35. The representative of Brazil confirmed the im portance and the centrality of S&D in the WTO 
and to the MTS. He noted that some progress had been made in the discussions, but the pace had 
been quite modest. It was a matter of deep concern for Brazil that a general attempt was being 
made by some Members to exclude developing countries from the ambit of those proposals as a condition for extending even very limited concessions to the LDCs. Those were worrisome developments which seemed designed to effectiv ely deny the principle of S&D to developing 
countries. His delegation agreed that LDCs' interests needed to be prioritized, but it was just as 
important to recall that S&D was applicable to all developing countries. A departure from that core principle would not be a wise step, as it would flatly contradict the spirit of the DDA and 
compromise one of the pillars of this Organization. 
36. The representative of Nepal stated that the G90 had significantly revised its proposals in 
order to accommodate its partners' key concerns. While doing so, the G90 had demonstrated 
utmost flexibility in order to make the proposal more logical, convincing and doable. It was 
unfortunate to listen to some of the partners that  the proposal did not fully address their concerns 
and were still unrealistic and ambitious – an assessment the G90 did not share. 
37. The G90 was of the firm view that, if there wa s strong political commitment, willingness and 
determination on the part of partners, the proposals were both realistic and doable. The delegation 
of Nepal called upon Members to show flexibilit y and asked for their support and sympathy in 
order to harvest a meaningful outcome in Nairobi. 
38. Responding to the opinion expressed by one de legation that the S&D proposal should be 
discussed in the Monitoring Mechanism, Nepal wished to clarify that the Monitoring Mechanism was not a negotiating forum, and it did not have any mandate to analyse S&D provisions which were 
structurally problematic. The G90 proposals had been prepared in line with the mandate of TN/CTD/M/51 
 
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  paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaratio n. In that respect Nepal believed that the 
Special Session was the appropriate forum to discuss those proposals. 
39. The representative of Tanzania stated that so  far the S&D regime of the WTO had not fully 
assisted developing countries, in particular LDCs, to participate effectively in the MTS. The main 
reason for this was that most of the S&D provisions were couched in best endeavor language and 
had not been fully operationalized. During the second reading of the revised 25 S&D proposals, 
Members had been able to identify some proposals on which consensus could be achieved through 
further discussions in the small group. Tanzania also encouraged Members to consider specific 
proposals in their totality, and not parts of the proposals, as submitted. Furthermore, the representative of Tanzania stressed that there sh ould be a clear pronunciation that the remaining 
S&D proposals which Members would not be able to agree in Nairobi would be addressed in the 
post-Nairobi negotiations. 
40. The representative of Korea, Republic of stated  that his delegation was ready to follow the 
Chairperson's guidance to focus discussions on the prioritized list which reflected what had been 
discussed to date. 
41. The representative of Chinese Taipei noted that some progress had been made in 
small-group discussions. It was very encouraging to hear the Chairperson state that nine proposals 
could be identified for possible convergence. He also cautioned that there would be no progress 
without compromise. Finally, he joined the delegations of India, Argentina and Brazil to stress that a debate on differentiation in the context of curre nt Special Session work, needed to be avoided. 
42. The representative of Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of stated that his delegation remained engaged 
to obtain meaningful and tangible results for Nairobi. 
43. The Chairperson proposed that the Special Session take note of the statements made. 
C. OTHER BUSINESS 
44. No issue was raised under other business.  
45. The meeting was suspended. 
D. RECONVENED SESSION 
46. The 51st Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Development (Special Session) was 
reconvened on 4 December 2015. 
47. Resuming the suspended Special Session, the Ch airperson recalled that the Special Session 
had been suspended to allow work to continue in  informal small-group meetings with a view to 
making progress and then reconvene at short notice to take stock of the progress.  
48. She informed Members that work had continued in a small-group format on an almost daily 
basis. In those meetings the Special Session ha d gone over all the 19 proposals identified for 
discussion. She recalled that she had sensed from the discussion in the informal open-ended 
meetings, that a degree of convergence was visibl e on proposal numbers 2, 3, 4, 18, 19, 23, 20, 
21 and 22. In addition there was another set of ten proposals, 8, 9, 17, 14, 16, 1, 6, 7, 5 and 15, 
on which finding convergence seemed difficult, but the proponents, nonetheless, attached 
importance to them in the context of finding solutions by the Nairobi Ministerial. She stated that at the meeting on 2 December 2015, the G90 had announced its intention of prioritizing the 
proposals which the G90 felt could potentially be harvested at Nairobi. At the G90's request, this 
list was circulated as document WT/MIN(15)/W/31. From then on and in Nairobi the focus of the 
Special Session work would be on those 19 proposals. 
49. In acknowledging that some progress in the Special session had been made, the 
Chairperson stated that it was far from done. Some proposals including those in the latest 
iterations reflected in document WT/MIN(15)/W /31 were clearly more mature than others. 
Members would need to continue their efforts with an open mind, a sense of flexibility and 
accommodation. TN/CTD/M/51 
 
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  50. The Chairperson announced that in the following days before the MC10, she intended to 
continue meeting in a small-group format up to and including 8 December with the aim of fine tuning text on those proposals. The objective would be to finalize a potential package for Nairobi. The Special Session would also have to discuss the future course of action and agree on a mutually 
acceptable way forward on continuing consideration of the remaining S&D proposals. 
51. The representative of Barbados, speaking on be half of the G90, explained that the G90 had 
again prioritized the proposals and reduced the number to 15: the list included proposal 
numbers 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 (merged into one), 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23. She 
added that for those proposals where the G90 coul d not find convergence, the Group maintained 
the original proposal as reflected in JOB/TNC/51/Rev.1 for discussion after Nairobi. The revised language on the 15 proposals was reflected in paragraph 14 of the revised G90 submission. In 
addition, the revision also tightened the scope where possible, by first introducing a definition, for 
example of SVEs, introducing a qualifier for develo ping countries or SVEs with capacity constraints 
and, in the case of proposal 4, suggested a two-tiered approach. The revision, in certain instances, 
also streamlined wording and removed expression s to provide clarity and address the concerns 
which had been raised by Members. However, al l LDC specific proposals remained unchanged. In 
the case of proposal numbers 24 and 25, it was felt  that they should be taken up after Nairobi.  
52. She also stated that some Members had informed the proponents that their capitals were 
reviewing the revised proposals and would soon come back with suggestions, where needed. The proponents had also left a place marker in a footnote for proposal number 4 in light of some constructive comments by Australia. Similarly, the proponents awaited further suggestions from 
Australia on proposal number 2.  
53. Thereafter she proceeded to highlight changes to each proposal in the revised submission. 
54. On proposal number 1, the objectives of the G90 were to simplify the procedures to allow 
developing countries referred to in paragraph 4 of Article XVIII, in particular LDCs and SVEs, to be 
able to take infant industry measures to promote industrialization and positive socio-economic transformation. The proponents were happy that th e proposal generated a lot of discussions in the 
Special Session. Accordingly, as a way forward, th e proponents had decided to revise the proposal 
so as to address the key concerns raised by Members. The key elements of the proposal included a reference to Decision L/4897 of 28 November 1979, which allowed developing countries to take safeguard actions for development purposes. Proponents had also had a fresh look at the scope of 
Article XVIII as indicated in paragraph 4(a) and had placed more emphasis on the weakest 
Members of the WTO, in particular LDCs and SVEs. For the purpose of defining SVEs, the G90 had borrowed existing NAMA and agriculture texts.  
55. On proposal number 2, the main objectives of the proponents were to simplify the 
procedures for invoking balance-of-payments (BOP) measures to enable them to achieve the objectives of paragraphs 2 and 9 of Article XVIII. The text suggested exclusion of short-term 
capital flows and the consideration of both the in put from the IMF and the development policies of 
Members in any assessment of BOP situations. They proposed to maintain the scope to paragraph 4 (a) of Article XVIII and had placed spec ial emphasis on LDCs and SVEs. They had also 
proposed that in making conclusions and proposals for recommendations for the General Council, 
the Balance-of-Payments (BOPs) Committee should consider the findings, facts, and other 
determinations provided by the IMF and should also take into account the overall economic context of the Member concerned.  
56. On proposal number 4,
 the proponents had proposed a text that would ensure the 
participation of concerned developing countries and LDCs in any negotiations which envisaged modification of commitments. They had suggested that when a Member proposed to withdraw or 
modify a concession on a product, a developing country whose exports of that product constituted 
a major part of its total exports to the destination market of the Member invoking the provision should be deemed to have a substantial interest and in the case of an LDC a principal supplying interest.  
57. On proposal number 21, the objectives of the G90 proposal were to ensure that there were 
legally binding commitments for developed countries to take concrete measures including providing adjustment and compensatory assistance to address the problem of preference erosion. TN/CTD/M/51 
 
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  The proposal suggested that developed country Me mbers granting preferences to LDCs must, and 
developing country Members granting preferen ces to LDCs should, endeavour to provide 
adjustment support measures in the trade, financial and technological fields to mitigate adverse effects on export earnings and enable them to cope with increased global competition.  
58. On proposal number 20, the proponents were of the view that arrangements with the 
international financial institutions and the Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) must not undermine the rights and flexibilities that were negotiated by  the WTO Members, in particular the LDCs at the 
WTO. The G90 had proposed that LDCs should also be able to determine whether commitments 
and concessions they undertook were commensurate with their individual development, financial 
and trade needs or their administrative and institutional capacity. Members should also coordinate their work with international lending or development agencies with a view to ensuring that LDC 
Members were not subjected to conditionalities  on loans, grants and official development 
assistance that were inconsistent with their rights under the WTO Agreements. 
59. On proposal number 22, the original proposal from the G90 had sought clarity on the rights 
of developing countries under the Enabling Clause. It aimed to ensure that the G90 was consulted 
when developed countries designed preferential schemes and that the products of interest to 
developing countries were given increased market access. As a way forward, the G90 had now 
proposed that in formulating preferential schemes  under paragraphs 2(a) and (d) of the Enabling 
Clause as well as other non-reciprocal preference schemes, developed country Members should take into account the needs of developing countries and LDC Members by consulting with them, with a view to ensuring that their products of export interest were accorded meaningful market 
access.  
60. With respect to proposal number 5, the original proposal of the G90 was to build on the Bali 
Ministerial Decision on Duty-Free and Qu ota-Free (DFQF) Market Access for LDCs 
(WT/MIN(13)/44) and ensure that LDCs had 100% DFQF for all agricultural products. The proposal 
also sought that those commitments be included in the schedules, concessions and commitments. In that context, the G90 had proposed that developed country Members endeavoured and 
developing country Members declaring themselves to be in a position to do so should endeavour to 
inscribe their commitments on DFQF market acce ss in accordance with Article II of GATT 1994 no 
later than six months after the date of this Deci sion. Members having difficulty to accord DFQF 
market access on all agricultural products should submit a list of the products to the Committee on 
Trade and Development for which DFQF market access was not provided.  
61. On proposal numbers 6 and 7, the original ob jectives of the G90 were to ensure that 
additional flexibility was provided to enable the developing countries and the LDCs to comply with 
the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement and ensure that their exports were not excluded 
from the market of developed countries due to eith er lack of capacity to implement SPS measures 
or through the imposition of SPS measures in an arbitrary manner. Recognizing that Members 
have the right to impose measures in line with the SPS Agreement, the G90 had proposed that 
developed country Members, to the extent practicable, provide a 90-day comment period before the adoption of the measure; that a longer pe riod of time be granted for LDC Members upon 
request; and that longer time-frames for compliance with the measure be accorded, to the extent 
practicable, to products of interest to developing countries, in particular SVE Members with 
capacity constraints and to the LDC Members so as to maintain opportunities for their exports. 
62. Similar text was also put forward on proposal number 15 on the Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT) Agreement. 
63. On proposal number 17, the original objectives of the G90 were to ensure that the LDCs 
were exempted from the TRIMS Agreement until they ceased to be LDCs. The objective was to 
enable them to use TRIMS to promote industrializat ion. In order to address the concerns raised by 
Members, the G90 had now proposed that LDCs be allowed to maintain or introduce existing measures that deviated from their obligations under the TRIMs Agreement. However, they would have to notify the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG) of such measures within five years. LDCs 
would be allowed to maintain these existing measures for seven years. 
64. With respect to proposal number 19, the G90 text aimed at, among others, exempting the 
developing countries from complying with the requirement of a two-year interval period, as TN/CTD/M/51 
 
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  prescribed in the Agreement on Safeguards. This would allow the developing countries to repeat 
the safeguard action on products that were previously subjected to similar measures. In addition, in the revised proposal, the G90 had now reviewed and recalibrated the collective import share criteria for a developing country to accommodate Members' concerns.  
65. The G90 had also proposed that the followin g footnote be added to the Agreement on 
Safeguards: "Members shall comply with Article 9. 1 of the Agreement on Safeguards by providing 
a specific list of the Members excluded from th e safeguard measure and should include information 
on trade shares". Finally, the proposal sugge sted that when assessing the obligations of 
developing countries under Article 8.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, Members must take into account the trade, development, finance and admi nistrative circumstances of developing country 
Members, including the extent to which certain in dustries in the developing country Member were 
able to withstand a potential suspension of co ncessions by an affected exporting Member or 
potential further concessions by the developing country Member. 
66. On proposal number 14, the objective of the proponents was to revive the right to use 
non-actionable subsidies in order to accelerate industrialization. Accordingly, the G90 had 
proposed that LDCs and SVEs should have the right to use non-actionable subsidies for a period of ten and eight years, respectively. 
67. On proposal number 16, the original objective of the G90 proposal was to ensure that 
developing countries were exempt from the obligations in paragraph 1(b) of Article 3 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) to allow them to use subsidies contingent on the use of domestic over imported  goods. However, in order to address concerns 
raised by Members, the G90 had agreed to revise this proposal to limit its scope for the LDCs and 
SVEs.  
68. On proposal number 18, which was specific to LDCs, the G90 had proposed concrete 
measures to be taken to address the issue of under-invoicing and to ensure that technical 
assistance was provided in a legally binding manner. As a way forward, the G90 had agreed to amend the proposed obligation on technical assi stance into a best endeavour commitment. The 
G90 had also proposed that LDCs should be allowed to use minimum or reference values in certain 
circumstances. 
69. On proposal number 23, the G90 wished to ensure that the right to food security was not 
undermined by trade rules. The revised proposal ha d sought to ensure food security in LDCs and 
Net Food Importing Developing Countries (NFIDCs). The proposal stated that non-LDC Members 
did not apply any export restriction on any foodstuff imported by LDCs and NFIDC Members, if the exporting Member was a net exporter of the foodstuff concerned. 
70. With regard to the other outstanding proposals, the G90 would request the Special Session 
to continue to examine the remaining proposals contained in JOB/TNC/51/Rev.1 with a view to achieving agreement on all of the specific propos als by July 2016. With regard to their general 
approach, the G90 would continue to pursue its ob jective of finding meaningful resolution on the 
proposals on the table in line with paragraph 44 of the Doha Declaration.  
71. The representative of Norway recognized that the textual proposals were the result of 
concerted efforts that merged the priorities of  a very large and diverse group of Members. 
However, given the level of ambition in the pr oposals and the differing views among Members, 
Norway seriously doubted that it would be possi ble to reach agreement on a comprehensive draft 
decision by Nairobi. It had become apparent duri ng the small-group consultations, that some of 
the proposals seemed to have a better chance of succeeding, while others had extremely slim 
chances of becoming part of an outcome. Norway  was pleased to see that the G90 had, for the 
time being, taken away some of the proposals that  seemed most difficult for Members to work on. 
It was also encouraging to note that the G90 had amended its proposals based on some of the 
textual suggestions other Members had made during  the discussions. She reiterated that Norway 
had a particular focus on finding good and workab le solutions for the LDCs. However, Norway was 
not in a position to support suggestions for textual revisions implying that LDCs and SVEs should 
be treated equally. TN/CTD/M/51 
 
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  72. The representative of the United States stated  that his delegation did not feel encouraged 
about the situation in which the Group had thus far found itself. The difficulty was not due to 
process failure, or lack of good faith or effort on the part of anyone. It was rather because of the fact that the Group disagreed in their perceptions relating to a much more basic question on the 
relationship of trade rules to development. The US would not be convinced that raising barriers or 
exempting Members from longstanding WTO commitments was good for development. Nor would the US be convinced to accept proposals that soug ht to significantly rewrite the basic rules of the 
WTO. By the same token, the US had no expectat ion that Members of the G90 that disagreed with 
the US perspectives would suddenly come around to believe that the existing rules could and had been proven to advance development objectives. 
73. He went on to state that beyond these over arching fundamental questions, the Group had 
been hindered by a lack of pragmatism demons trated over the course of these discussions. 
Despite the willingness of the US and others to work on a small subset of the proposals, the 
proponents had difficulty adapting to this approach, and had continued to persist with proposals 
that Members, from the outset, had said were non-starters. Further, it was clear that the 
fundamental question of the proposed scope of beneficiaries remained a major hurdle in the discussions. He explained that if obstacles were primarily technical or legal, Members might find a 
way. But what they were really confronted with in the discussion on specific proposals was a clash 
of perspectives and philosophies. He stated that  after 14 years of discussions in the Special 
Session, the time had come to pause and fundamentally rethink how to approach this.  
74. The representative of Cameroon stated that he  took note of the statements that had been 
made and supported the presentation made by the representative of Barbados on behalf of the 
G90. He had listened carefully to the interventi ons by the delegations of  Norway and the US. His 
delegation would like to highlight the fact that efforts had been made on both sides but 
convergence had not been reached so far.  
75. The representative of the European Union stated that some of the reasons why common 
ground on the proposals on the table had not been reached were technical, and that work should 
continue to try to overcome them. Nonetheless, some of the disagreements touched more 
fundamentally on what was understood by S&D. For the EU, S&D was a privileged, special lane 
that led to a better integration in the WTO rulebook – not a motorway leading to open-ended exemptions from certain key WTO principles. The EU acknowledged that LDCs and other vulnerable 
Members might need further flexibilities vis-à-vis  current S&D provisions, but these flexibilities 
would become meaningless if they were also made available to big emerging economies that played a dominant role in world trade.  
76. The representative of India appreciated the efforts of the G90 in tabling the revised 
proposals. As a preliminary observation he stated that his delegation had listened to some 
Members that spoke about the scope of S&D. In the revised proposal, even the proponents had 
tightened the scope by including a definition of SVEs. He wished to make it clear that S&D 
provisions were an integral part of the MTS an d were meant to enable developing countries and 
LDCs to meaningfully integrate into the MTS. The mandate in paragraph 44 of the Doha Declaration did not cover a redefinition of the scope  of beneficiaries. By definition all developing 
countries fell under the ambit of S&D beneficiaries. India did not agree to import a discussion on 
differentiation between developing countries in the negotiation on S&D. 
77. The representative of El Salvador did not see that the proposals were suggesting a new 
category of Members. It was clear that the SVEs shared many of the challenges that LDCs had to 
face and that was the reason why the G90 had included this group among the beneficiaries. 
78. The representative of China stated that the Doha Round was a development round, so 
development and LDC issues should be an integral part of it. In addition, China fully supported the 
statement made by India. 
79. The representative of Egypt stated that clearly the level of ambition has been significantly 
lowered in the revised proposals. Having said that, Egypt wished to make it clear that it would not 
consider further dilution of those proposals. Fu rthermore, Egypt believed that in order to be 
effective, S&D provisions should introduce measures with a clear focus on results and designed to answer the needs of beneficiary countries at the national level. Priority should be given to the TN/CTD/M/51 
 
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  countries with the greatest needs, but the conc erns of all developing countries should be 
addressed. 
80. The representative of Chinese Taipei echoed India's views on differentiation. 
81. The representative of Japan took note of th e modifications in the new revised text which 
had, to some extent, reflected the concerns and questions Japan had during the previous sessions. 
However, there were huge gaps between the proponents and other Members in terms not only of substance but also of the scope of beneficiary countries. A number of proposals still contradicted 
the fundamental rules under the WTO and, theref ore, had no chance of convergence. Diverse 
views continue to exist with regard to two fundam ental issues, namely the scope of the beneficiary 
countries and the way ahead after Nairobi. Under such circumstances it was still a very challenging task for Members to tackle the remaining issues with the time available from now on to Nairobi. 
82. The representative of Nigeria stated that his delegation associated itself with what was said 
by the representative of Barbados and also  shared the sentiments expressed by the 
representatives of Cameroon and Egypt. He said that Members should work towards meaningful 
results, by Nairobi, for LDCs and SVEs as well as for the developing countries. Any attempt to 
narrow down the scope of S&D would be counterproductive. 
83. The representative of Nepal stated that the revised proposals were realistic and doable 
provided there was strong political commitment and conviction from Members. The proposals 
would bring economic benefits to developing countries and the LDCs and would help them better integrate into the MTS. He added that the revised proposals reflected flexibility and accommodation on the part of the G90. It was now up to other Members to reciprocate and extend 
support to the needs of the poor and weak Members. 
84. The representative of Dominica, speaking on be half of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean 
States (OECS) stated that S&D was a basic principle of the WTO and the MTS to which OECS 
attached great importance. The OECS fully agreed that S&D was aimed at benefitting all 
developing countries. It was clear that the needs of the weakest and poorest Members had been emphasized in the G90 proposals, while not undermi ning the rights of other developing countries. 
85. The Chairperson proposed that the Special Session take note of the statements made. 
86. The meeting was adjourned. 
 
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