TN/RL/GEN/182  
 
16 November  2016 
(16-6292) Page: 1/3 
Negotiating Group on Rules  Original: English  
 
 PRINCIPLES AND ELEME NTS FOR CONCLUDING N EGOTIATIONS ON  
FISHERIES SUBSIDIES RULES IN THE WTO  
SUBMISSION BY RWANDA ON BEHALF OF THE ACP GROUP 
The following communication, dated 15 November  2016, is being circulated a t the request of the 
Delegation  of Rwanda on behalf of the ACP Group . 
 
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1  INTRODUCTION  
1.1.  The present submission circulated on behalf of the ACP Group, proposes principles and 
elements for discussion in negotiations on fisheries subsidies in the Negotiating Group on Rules. It 
builds on and refines previous ACP submissions including JOB/TNC/46 and JOB/TNC/50 and 
TN/RL/W/267. It is not intended as a textual proposal but rather as an input to stimulate 
constructive engagement in the negotiating Group on Rules.  
2  THE CONTEXT  
2.1.  Fisheries are a c rucial source of income and employment, particularly in developing countries, 
and contribute directly to economic growth, food and nutrition security. According to the FAO, fish 
provide more than 3.1 billion people with almost 20 % of their average per capi ta intake of animal 
protein, and the sector supports the livelihoods of between 10 and 12 % of the global population. 
For several ACP countries, fish also represent a vital share of total exports and provide critical 
opportunities for value addition. Overfi shing, however, is undermining fisheries ability to play their 
crucial role in supporting food security and development.  
2.2.  Within this backdrop, stocks are faced with depletion.  Today, 58 % of the stocks are fished at 
maximum levels with no room to grow, whil e the share of overfished stocks increased from 10 % in 
1974 to over 31 % in 2013. Fisheries subsidies, e stimated at over 35 billion dollars annually, are a 
major factor contributing to overfishing and overcapacity. This is particularly the case of harmful 
subsidies granted to large -scale industrial fishing in areas beyond national jurisdictions, targeting 
straddling or highly migratory stocks in the high seas and close to the EEZ of developing countries.  
2.3.  At the WTO, fisheries subsidies negotiations follow an  original mandate from 20011 "to clarify 
and improve WTO disciplines on fisheries subsidies, taking into account the importance of this 
sector to developing countries " and a supplementary mandate agreed in 20052, under which WTO 
Members were instructed to:  "strengthen disciplines on subsidies in the fisheries sector, including 
through the  prohibition of certain forms of fisheries subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and 
overfishing […]. Appropriate and effective of special and differential treatment (S &DT) for 
developing and least  developed Members should be an integral part of the negotiations, taking into 
account the importance  of this sector to development priorities, poverty reduction, and livelihood 
and food security concerns ". Finally, paragraph 3 1 of the Nairobi Ministerial Declaration restates 
the strong commitment of all Members to advance negotiations on the remaining Doha issues 
including rules. Ministers also stated that this work shall maintain development at its centre  and 
reaffirmed that p rovisions for special and differential treatment shall remain integral.  
                                                
1 See WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1.  
2 See Annex D of the Ho ng Kong Ministerial Declaration WT/MIN(05)/DEC.   TN/RL/GE N/182  
 
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  2.4.  In addition to the WTO mandates, Goal 14.6 of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda 
aims to  prohibit  by 2020 "certain  forms  of fisheries  subsidies  which  contribute  to overcapacity  and 
overfishing, eliminate subsidies that contribute  to illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing  and 
refrain from introducing new such subsidies, recognizing that appropriate and effective special and 
differential treatment for developing and least develo ped countries should be an integral part of 
the World Trade Organization fisheries subsidies negotiation ". 
3  THE PROCESS  
3.1.  In light of the context described above, negotiations aimed at establishing effective 
disciplines on fisheries subsidies must continue as  a matter of priority, within the Negotiating 
Group on Rules leading to a multilateral outcome. Given the urgency facing the international 
community and the need to meet the 2020 deadline agreed under SDG goal 14.6, negotiations 
should also aim at deliveri ng concrete results by the eleventh Ministerial Conference. Furthermore, 
disciplines by MC11 must deliver on the development dividend on their own merit without being 
hampered by linkages with other negotiating areas.  
4  THE SCOPE OF DISCIPL INES  
4.1.  Overall, nego tiations should aim to discipline fisheries subsidies3 which contribute to 
overcapacity and overfishing, and eliminate subsidies to illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) 
fishing.4 As a priority, disciplines should target subsidies provided to large sca le commercial or 
industrial fishing and subsidies to fishing activities outside of the Member 's maritime jurisdiction, 
(i.e. in the high seas or in the EEZ of another Member e.g. through access agreement5). 
4.2.  In addition to the scope proposed above, to furth er address most developing country and 
LDC Members ' concerns, Members might consider adopting the principle that "nothing shall 
prevent " a developing country or LDC Member from maintaining or granting subsidies that do not 
contribute to overfishing and ove rcapacity or do not affect third countries such as subsidies  to: 
 Coastal fishing activities related exclusively to the artisanal, small scale, 
subsistence and livelihood of the fishermen and their families within the Member's 
territorial waters;  
 
 Fishing a ctivities, which exclusively exploit domestic fish stocks whose ranges are 
confined to the Members' EEZ;  
 
 Fishing activities, which exclusively exploit quotas or any other rights, established by a 
regional fisheries management organization (RFMO) or a regi onal fisheries management 
arrangement.  
 
5  STRUCTURE OF THE DIS CIPLINES  
Prohibited subsidies  
 
5.1.  Within the scope described above, disciplines should aim at prohibiting, at a minimum, the 
following types of subsidies with due regard given to specificities of jur isdictions with multi -species 
catch:  
                                                
3 Negotiations should cover subsidies as defined in paragraph 1 and 2 of Article 1 of the ASCM. They 
should be confined to wild marine capture and should not apply to inland fisheries or aquaculture. In case  of 
government -to- government payment for access by foreign vessels to fishing resources of a developing 
country’s EEZ or to quotas or any other rights established by a RFMO, a fishery subsidy shall be deemed to 
exist only if a benefit is conferred in the onward transfer of those access rights from the paying government.  
4 The terms "illegal fishing ", "unreported fishing " and "unregulated fishing " should have the same 
meaning as in paragraph 3 of the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Elimin ate Illegal 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing of the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO).   
5 The scope of prohibited subsidies would only be attributable to Members granting the subsidies 
regardless of the flag(s) of the vessels(s) inv olved or the application of rules of origin of the fish involved, and 
would not be attributed to Members granting access in their territorial waters or EEZ to foreign subsidized 
vessels including those involved in multi -species catch.  TN/RL/GEN/182  
 
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   Subsidies to fishing vessels or fishing activity negatively affecting fish stocks that are in an 
overfished condition; and  
 
 Subsidies provided to vessels or operators engaged in illegal, unreported and unregulated 
(IUU)  fishing.  
 
5.2.  In addition to these two prohibitions and in accordance with the mandates, negotiations will 
need to consider further disciplines on subsidies which increase fishing capacity and efforts  that 
contribute to overfishing and overcapacity, often at the expense of local and mostly artisanal 
fishers in ACP countries who rely on fisheries for their livelihood and development prospects.  
Special and differential treatment  
 
5.3.  Appropriate and effective special and differential treatment for developing countri es including 
LDCs and SVEs shall be an integral part of any additional disciplines beyond those envisaged under 
5.1 and should take into account the importance of the sector to development priorities, poverty 
reduction, livelihood, and food security concer ns. Such provisions should include among others:  
 Prohibitions beyond those outlined in 5.1 above should not apply to LDCs, and SVEs;  
 
 Flexibilities in the design and implementation of disciplines;  
 
 Technical assistance and capacity building to address inst itutional and financial constraints 
faced in the implementation of disciplines;  
 
 Transparency and notification requirements that is proportionate to the capacity of 
developing countries and their contribution towards overfishing and overcapacity.  
 
6  CONCLUSI ON 
6.1.  The above principles and elements represent the perspectives of the ACP Group for a 
meaningful and developmental outcome at the multilateral level on fisheries subsidies rules for the 
Eleventh Ministerial Conference. The ACP Group hopes that this submis sion will contribute to 
deeper and fuller engagement in the Negotiating Group on Rules recognizing that there is limited 
time to achieve the desired goals and mandates on fisheries subsidies rules.  
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