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WT/BFA/W/40 3 
5 Octo ber 2016 
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Committee on Budget, Finance & Administration  Original:  English  
 
  REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP CONCERNING AN AUDIT COMMITTEE  
1  INTRODUCTION  
1.1.  On 16  October  2015, the Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration (CBFA) 
established the Working Group Concerning an Audit Committee (Working Group) to examine 
whether there is a need for an audit committee at the WTO (WT/BFA/W/349/Rev.4), which is  
provided as Annex 1 to this report.  
1.2.  The potential desirability of the establishment of an audit committee at the WTO was 
identified by the Head of the Office of Internal Audit in the Int ernal Audit report for the year 2013 
(WT/BFA/W/327, paragraph 3.73), as well as in the 2012 External Audit Report (WT/BFA/W/303, 
paragraphs 22 and 23).  These views were summarized in a document entitled "Audit Committee 
Background Information " (WT/BFA/W/34 5), which is provided as Annex 2 to this report.  
1.3.  The Terms  of Reference mandated the Working Group to:  
a. address the options available  regarding the composition of such an audit committee;  
b. identify the issues that an audit committee could respond to in the W TO; 
c. assess the benefits and costs of an audit committee for the Members and the 
Secretariat, taking into consideration alternative approaches;  
d. consider the potential relationship between the functions of an audit committee and the 
objective of continually improving internal Audit functions within the WTO;  
e. consider existing practices being followed in other International Organizations and the 
experiences of those Organizations with audit committees ; and 
f. report to the CBFA by June 30, 2016.  
1.4.  In carrying out it s work, the Working Group was permitted to seek the input of the WTO 
Secretariat Management, the Internal Auditor/Office of Internal Oversight and the External Auditor 
and/or any other relevant body.  The Working Group was open to participation by represent atives 
of all members of the WTO.  
1.5.  At the 21  June 2016 CBFA meeting, the Working Group requested an extension of its 
mandate until 30  September  2016 due to ongoing debate among the Working Group participants 
concerning the potential roles and responsibiliti es of an audit committee, if one were to be 
established.  
1.6.  This document is intended to report on the substance and process of the Working Group and 
report to the CBFA that the Working Group was not able to reach a consensus among participants 
either to reco mmend or not recommend the establishment of an audit committee, nor could it 
reach consensus on all elements of a background document concerning the potential roles and 
responsibilities of a WTO audit committee if one were to be established.  WT/BFA/W/403  
 
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  2  CONSULTATIONS BY AND MATERIAL REVIEWED BY THE WORKING GROUP  
2.1.  The Working Group met 12 times between February and September of 2016 and, during 
those meetings, held discussions with the following three other International Organizations:  
a. INTERPOL – Interpol has established  an audit committee which is composed of nine 
independent experts who are not paid for their services but are paid per diem expenses, 
and four member representatives.  The experts are selected by Interpol 's member 
countries with no input from the Secretaria t. The Committee 's mandate directs it to 
monitor and assess audit reports (both internal and external audit reports) and monitor 
the implementation of audit recommendations.  
b. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) – the IAEA has a similar structure to 
that of the WTO with a Program and Budget Committee that is similar to the CBFA 
except that it comprises 38 members appointed by the General Conference each year 
and is chaired by the Chair of the General Conference.  It does not have an audit 
committee.  A ma jor reason why the IAEA does not have an audit committee is the very 
sensitive and confidential nature of much of the information provided by individual 
member states and concerns that some members might gain more access to this 
information than other memb ers have.  
c. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (WIPO) – WIPO established an audit 
committee in 2006 with the role of overseeing its large construction project.  Additional 
tasks and duties have been added to the audit committee 's mandate since 2006 and so, 
although the construction project has been completed, the audit committee continues to 
exist.  The committee comprises members representing the six regional g roups that are 
active in WIPO . It was established to provide assurance to Member States on the 
adequacy and effectiveness of internal controls and of internal and external oversight at 
WIPO.  
2.2.   The Working Group also met with a representative of the WTO 's external auditors, 
Mr Bernard Holstein of Bundes Rechnungshof.  Mr Holstein provided his views, as  an independent 
external auditor, on the desirability of an audit committee and answered questions posed by the 
Working Group participants.  He promoted the concept of an audit committee which, he explained, 
could have more opportunities to provide input an d advice to the CBFA than an external auditor 
that performs the annual audit once a year.  
2.3.  At the Working Group 's request, during several of the meetings, WTO Secretariat staff 
provided information on aspects of the Working Group 's deliberations including w ith respect to the 
operations of the Office of Internal Oversight, the apparent rationale for the former Director of 
Internal Audit 's recommendation that an audit committee be established, potential travel and per 
diem costs for experts attending meetings in Geneva, and on potential impacts on the workload of 
the Secretariat of a potential WTO audit committee.  
2.4.  The Working Group participants were also provided with electronic copies of material 
concerning audit committees including, for example:  
 The Audit Fu nction in the United Nations System.  
 The Audit committee : Purpose, Process, Professionalism, prepared by the Institute of 
 Internal Auditors ; and 
 Terms of Reference of the WIPO Independent Advisory Oversight Committee . 
2.5.  A complete list of the material revie wed by the Working Group is provided in Annex 3 to this 
report.  
3  WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS AND DELIBERATIONS  
3.1.  There were many Working Group participants who viewed the establishment of an audit 
committee as desirable ; some participants who, while not opposed  in principle to the concept of an 
audit committee, were not convinced that it would be a beneficial, cost -effective mechanism for WT/BFA/W/403  
 
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  the WTO at this time ; and some participants that were adamantly opposed to the WTO 
establishing such a com mittee at this time . Thus, the Working Group was not able to reach a 
consensus concerning whether to recommend to the CBFA that the WTO establish an audit 
committee.  
3.2.  The Working Group participants that were in favour of a recommendation to the CBFA to 
establish an audit comm ittee submitted that such a committee would provide a desirable additional 
level of oversight that is present in many organizations, including many other international 
organizations, but not in the WTO.  Participants noted that audit committees had become a  "best 
practice " in many international organizations, and that both the previous internal auditor and the 
current and past external auditors had recommended that an audit commit tee be established at 
the WTO . Such a committee would operate at a high level a nd could be helpful in advising the 
CBFA on the effectiveness of the current oversight mechanisms, ensuring that the Organization 
was operating correctly, ensuring that risk management strategies are in place and being followed, 
and to help identify potent ial issue s before they became problems . Properly constituted and 
mandated, it would provide expert advice to the WT O membership through the CBFA . Many noted 
that WTO delegates, for the most part, are not experts in the operations or financial matters of an  
organization such as the WTO, but rather trade or foreign affairs experts.  As such, an audit 
committee comprised of WTO Member delegates was thought to add little value to the existing 
oversight regime.  However, an audit committee would provide a useful b ridge between the 
overview provided the once -a-year audit by the external auditors and the regular operations of the 
CBFA.  Some participants compared having an audit committee to having another insurance policy 
to reduce risk at a low cost.  
3.3.  Further, many p articipants submitted that an Audit committee 's mandate could be expanded 
beyond a review of the internal and external audit reports to include all of the activities of the 
Office of Internal Oversight, including human resource issues such as allegations o f harassment or 
conflict of interest.  The involvement of independent, external experts in such matters, particularly 
if they arose at senior management levels, would be an effective means to ensure that WTO 
members ' interests were being addressed.  
3.4.  In contr ast, some participants believed that the addition of an Audit committee would only 
duplicate or overlap the efforts of the internal (Office of Internal Oversight) and external auditors.  
Also, for a medium -sized organization like the WTO, it would be too co stly for relatively small 
benefits that would be derived or risks averted.  Furthermore, as the position of Head of Internal 
Oversight in the WTO had been vacant for almost two years, the normal oversight system of the 
Organization consisting of both a full y and adequately staffed Office of Internal Oversight and the 
external auditors had not been in place for the past almost two years, making it impossible, in 
their view, to determine, at this time, whether such a committee would be worth establishing.  
Some  participants felt that the efforts of the CBFA would be better used to examine whether, once 
fully staffed and operating, the Office of Internal Oversight was sufficiently resourced to perform 
the tasks that it has been mandated to perform, rather than lo ok at yet another oversight body 
such as an audit committee.  Alternatively, the concept of an audit committee could be 
re-examined once the Office of Internal Oversight had established an operational track record with 
a full complement of staff . In short, these participants submitted that the WTO is functioning well 
without an audit committee, and that establishing such a committee could be viewed "a solution in 
search of a problem ". 
3.5.  Participants also submitted that the CBFA has not availed itself of existi ng options for expert 
advice through closer examination and questioning of the internal and external auditors who could 
be asked  to clarify or explain issues . Finally, some participants felt that the relationship between a 
committee of private or lower -level auditors and the external auditors of the WTO who typically 
are supreme auditors of their country might turn out to be delicate and possibly uncomfortable for 
both parties.  
3.6.  On the last point, it is true that the current WTO external auditors are from th e supreme 
auditing institution in Germany and are likely to be from the supreme auditing institution of a WTO 
member in the future, as are the external auditors of many international organizations . However, 
the current and past WTO external auditors both r ecommended the establishment of an audit 
committee, and audit committees exist in many international organizations that are similarly 
audited by supreme audit organizations, so it does not appear that these supreme audit 
organizations would consider such a n oversight body reviewing their work to be inappropriate.  WT/BFA/W/403  
 
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  4  POTENTIAL ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES  
4.1.  While it was not possible to reach a consensus view on the question of establishing an audit 
committee, the Working Group, in an effort to better understand the  concept of an audit 
committee in terms of the WTO, and to better inform the Working Group participants of the 
potential functioning of such a committee, decided to continue working on a document outlining 
the potential roles and responsibilities of a WTO Audit committee.  This work was done without 
prejudice to any member 's position as to the desirability of recommending the establishment of 
such a committee and all Working Group participants agreed to work on this basis.  
4.2.  The last draft "Potential Roles and  Responsibilities " document, which was sent to CBFA 
members on July 1, 2016, is attached as Annex 4.  Subsequent drafting proposals were received 
concerning Section C of the document and these proposals were explained and discussed during a 
Working Group me eting on August  5, 2016.  At that meeting, participants were not able to agree 
on the inclusion of the suggested drafting changes . Consequently, Section C of the draft document 
Potential Roles and Responsibilities document is highlighted to denote the fact that the Working 
Group participants did not reach a general agreement1 on the content of that section.  However, all 
other sections of the document were generally acceptable to the Working Group participants.  
4.3.  Over a series of meetings and drafts of the Pote ntial Roles and Responsibilities document, 
general agreement was reached by many, if not all, participants on the mandate of a potential 
WTO audit committee (Section A), which would encompass a wider scope of activities than just 
oversight of financial rep orts, and the potential roles and responsibilities of an audit committee 
(Section B).  During this discussion, participants agreed that the use of the term "audit committee " 
was somewhat too narrow in that the proposed body 's work was more than just financi al audits, 
and could be confusing when used in conjunction with the existing WTO council and committee 
structure.  The Working Group, therefore, adopted the term "advisory board " and used this term 
for the over -sight body whose potential roles and responsib ilities were being developed.  For the 
purposes of this report, given the terms of reference for this Working Group, the term "audit 
committee " will be used but means the same as "advisory board ". 
4.4.  Certain aspects of the potential roles and responsibilities document were not agreed by all 
participants.  With respect to membership (Section C), most participants held the view that a 
three -member Audit committee would be sufficiently large to cover all aspects of the mandate, yet 
small enough to be efficient and cost-effective.  Other participants proposed a larger Audit 
committee of five members, which would better allow for attracting members with the range of 
knowledge and expertise demanded by the scope of responsibilities envisaged for the Audit 
committee, as well as to allow for better geographical representation of all WTO members.  
4.5.  While there was general agreement that a selection working group composed of CBFA 
members should be established to vet and select the Audit committee members, there was 
disagreemen t on the issue of eligibility and identification of these potential audit committee 
members.  Many participants felt that audit committee members should be independent from their 
government with respect to the work of the WTO and should be selected from eit her the private 
sector or from within government auditing or oversight institutions.  Others felt that members 
should be selected from government sources only.  While most participants preferred a process 
that would be non -political, whereby the selection co mmittee would seek applications from 
individuals that were qualified and interested in serving, others suggested that WTO members 
should be asked to nominate candidates for these positions.  Finally, while all participants agreed 
that knowledge, experience and competence should be the main criteria, there was disagreement 
on how to word these requirements as well as the scope of secondary criteria.  Most, if not all, 
participants agreed that gender balance and geographical representation should be secondary 
criteria, in the event that there was an excess of candidates with equal knowledge and experience, 
but some participants suggested that the principle of rotation, as well as the level of members ' 
contributions to the WTO (ensuring that members from all leve ls of contribution, not just large 
contributors), should also be considered.  
4.6.  The Working Group participants were in agreement with a proposed tenure for Audit 
committee members of four years, non -renewable (Section D).  Also, there was general agreement 
                                                
1 While general agreement was reached on many aspects of this document, this should not be taken as 
a consensus on those aspects. As with all such documents, "nothing is agreed until it is all agreed" . WT/BFA/W/403  
 
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  on the usual number of meetings per year, the use of virtual meetings whenever possible, and 
support for the Audit committee, as laid out in Section E of Annex 4.  
4.7.  Many Working Group participants, regardless of their views as to the desirability of 
establishin g an audit committee, submitted that, if such a committee were to be established, there 
should be a built -in "review clause ". This would provide the CBFA with an automatic mandate in 
two or three years to review and revise the operations of the committee o r, if it was found to be 
superfluous, to terminate the committee.  
5  COSTS  
5.1.  The issue of costs was an important factor for all Working Group participants and was one of 
the reasons that some participants that were opposed to, or had concerns about, the creatio n of 
an Audit committee.  To address the issue and mitigate incremental costs, the Working Group 
discussed the use of virtual meetings for much of the Audit committee 's work.  That said, it was 
recognized that some "in-person " meetings would likely be requir ed. Given that Audit committee 
members might be travelling from any region of the world, the cost of such a meeting was 
estimated based on recent travel and per diem costs for recent DSB panellists and Appellate Body 
members expenses, which provided a cros s-section of costs from several regions of the world.  
Such a meeting, based on five days of travel and meeting time, was estimated to entail 
incremental costs of approximately CHF 7,000 per Audit committee member – thus a 
three -member Committee meeting of three days would cost approximately CHF 21,000 ; for a 
five-member Committee, the cost would be approximately CHF 35,000.  
5.2.  Another important element of cost would be the additional burden on the WTO Secretariat 
staff. An Audit committee would undoubtedly req uire the support of Administration Division 
personnel and would also incur additional printing, postage, courier fees, etc. W hile the Working 
Group did not obtain a detailed estimate of the burden that supporting an Audit committee would 
place on Secretari at resources, this issue would need to be thoroughly researched if, at some 
future point, the WTO were to re -consider the issue of establishing an Audit committee.  
6  CONCLUSION  
6.1.  While there was widespread interest among Working Group participants to recommend  the 
establishment of a small, well defined Audit committee at the WTO, there was not a consensus 
view on either a positive or negative recommendation.  On a without prejudice basis, Working 
Group participants developed a "Possible Roles and Responsibilitie s on an Advisory Board " 
document for which there was a general agreement on many elements.  However, there was not 
complete agreement on this document, as detailed in paragraphs 22 and 25 above.  
 
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  ANNEX 1  
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WT/BFA/W/349/Rev .4 
16 October  2015 
(15-5466)  Page: 1/1 
Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration   
 
WORKING GROUP CONCERNING AN AUDIT COMMITTEE  
PROPOSED TERMS OF REFERENCE  
Revision  
1. A working group concerning an Audit committee will be established . The aim of the Working 
Group is to examine whether there is a need for an Audit committee at the WTO.  
 
2. The Working Group will address the options availabl e regarding the composition of such an 
Audit committee and identify the issues that an Audit committee could r espond to in the WTO . It 
will assess the benefits and costs of an Audit committee for the Members and the Secretariat . It 
will take into consideration alternative approaches . It will consider the potential relationship 
between the functions of an Audit com mittee and the objective of continually improving internal 
audit functions within the WTO . The Working Group will consider existing practices being followed 
in Other International Organizations and the experiences of those Organizations with Audit 
committe es. 
 
3. In carrying out its work, the Working Group may seek the input of the WTO Secretariat 
Management, the internal auditor/office of internal oversight and the external auditor and/or any 
other relevant body.  
 
4. The Working Group will submit to the CB FA a report that shall include recommendations on 
whether to proceed with the establishment of an Audit committee or not . If the recommendation is 
in favour of the establishment of an Audit committee, draft terms of reference for the Audit 
committee should  be submitted, the necessary revision of WTO financial regulations should be 
highlighted and the estimated costs should be stated . The Working Group may identify alternative 
solutions.  
 
5. The Working Group will provide periodic updates to the CBFA on the status of its work . The 
target and date for the conclusion of the Working Group will be 3 0 June 2016. 
 
6. The Working Group is open to all Members.  
 
 
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  ANNEX 2  
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WT/BFA/W/345  
 
17 November  2014 
(14-6716)  Page: 1/2 
Commi ttee on Budget Finance and Administration   
 
AUDIT COMMITTEE BACKGROUND  INFORMATION  
1  INTRODUCTION  
1.1.  Following the request of some Members of the Committee on Budget Finance and 
Administration (CBFA), this document aims to provide background information on the  issue of 
establishing an Audit committee at the WTO.  
2  INFORMATION ON ESTABLISHING AN AUDIT COMMITTEE  
2.1.   The proposal to establish an Audit committee at the WTO was first discussed by the CBFA on 
its meeting on Wednesday, 2 July 2014 at the occasion of the pr esentation of the Internal Audit 
Report for the year 2013.  
2.2.  An Audit committee should be established according the Head of the Office of Internal Audit 
(HOIA) for the following reasons : 
a. Existing in most International Organization (WIPO, UN, WMO ; etc…) 
b. Recom mended by the Institute of Internal Audit (IIA) Standard 1110 and 1100.A1  
i. The chief audit executive must report to a level within the organization that allows 
the internal audit activity to fulfil its responsibilities . The chief audit executive must 
confir m to the board, at least annually, the organizational independence of the 
internal audit activity.  
ii. The internal audit activity must be free from interference in determining the scope of 
internal auditing, performing work, and communicating results.  
c. Stated in the 2012 External Audit Report WT/BFA/W/303 in paragraphs 22 and 23:  
i. Creating an Audit committee consisting of a few representatives of the Members, 
elected for example by the General Council, as well as a few experts who could be 
appointed by the Audit  committee on the proposal of the Secretariat1; 
ii. Attributing broader responsibilities regarding internal audit to the CBFA, which could 
meet in special session on audit problems, a solution which would have the 
advantage of involving all Members . In this ca se, the CBFA could have recourse to 
experts appointed, for example, according to the methodology described below in the 
event of the creation of a Committee on Risks . This second hypothesis is more 
consistent with the WTO's desire to involve all Members in  the various aspects of 
management.  
                                                
1 This Audit Committee would have other functions such as following the reports of the External Auditors 
and the register of risks.  WT/BFA/W/403  
 
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  iii. The new powers accorded to the Committee thus selected should be modelled on 
those listed above in the already cited Institute of Internal Audit Standards (the 
chosen committee would be linked to the Office of Internal A udit, as is the 
Director -General ; approval by the chosen committee of amendments to the Internal 
Audit Charter ; approval of the internal audit plans and approval of the appointment 
and possible removal of internal audit staff).  
d. Stated in the Internal Audit  Annual Report for 2012 : WT/BFA/W/300 paragraph 3.2  
i. Results of the review identified opportunities for improvement in the Office of 
Internal Audit including ; amending the Internal Audit charter to give jurisdiction to a 
committee of the Organization (proba bly CBFA) to monitor internal audit matters ; 
the establishment and revision of annual audit plans by reference to the risk 
management framework of the WTO and in coordination with the External Auditor ; 
making long -term audit plans and officially revising t hem, if necessary ; specifying in 
the annual audit plans the anticipated time duration for each audit activity and the 
planned completion date ; establishing a quality control and improvement program 
including periodic internal and external evaluations to co ver all aspects of the 
internal audit activity ; establishing an annual training plan and publishing a list of 
courses actually followed each year by the auditors.  
e.  Stated in the Internal Audit Annual Report for 2013 : WT/BFA/W/327 paragraph 3.73  
i. Governance structure  - This refers to the reporting relationships of the HOIA and 
governance processes within the Organization and the environment. […] As 
recommended by the External Auditor and promulgated by the Audit standards, 
consideration should be given to the  establishment of an Audit committee comprising 
members independent of the Organization's management and to which the audit 
function should have a reporting line in order to enhance its independence and 
strengthen the Organization's accountability.  
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  ANNEX 3  
 World Trade Organization, Committee on Budget finance and administration; Document  
WT/BFA/W/345; Audit Committee Background Information, 2014 /11/17. 
 World Trade Organization, Committee on Budget finance and administration; document  
WT/BFA/W/349.Rev.4; Proposed Terms of Reference Concerning  an Audit Committee, 
2015/09/ 29. 
 World Trade Organization, Committee on Budget finance and administration; Secretaria t 
Presentation to the CBFA 2016/04/ 14. 
 2016/05/ 19 - Document on Audit Committee Option s – prepared by John O’Neill as Chair of 
the Working Group.  
 2016/05/ 19 - Typical Roles and Responsibilities of an Audit  Committee – a summary 
prepared by the WTO secretariat at the request of the Working Group.  
 The Institute of Internal Auditors, a brochu re entitled: The Audit Committee, Purpose, 
Process, Professionalism (undated).  
 Presentation prepared by the WTO secretariat for the CBFA concerning an Audit Committee 
for the June 2015 CBFA meeting.  
 Initial information and questions summary prepared by Joh n O’Neill as chair of the working 
group, January 15 2016.  
 RIAS Principles and Good Practices for Audit Committees - position statement on audit 
committees from the representatives of Internal Audit Services of the United Nations entities 
and multilateral i nstitutions; presentation to WIPO, January 26, 2010.  
 The OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID); Survey - Audit Committee Role - 
Standards and Leading Practices, June 2015.  
 Statement to the CBFA in June 2015 concerning a potential Audit Committee ( speaking 
notes).  
 Presentation deck by the Joint Inspection Unit; The Audit Function in the United Nations 
System; Geneva 2010.  
 Terms of Reference of the WIPO -Independent Advisory Oversight Committee; WIPO 
Financial Regulations and Rules, Annex iii.  
 
 
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 WT/BFA/W/403  
 
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  ANNEX 4  
POSSIBLE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF AN ADVISORY BOARD  
A. MANDATE OF THE ADVISORY BOARD  
The Advisory Board is mandated to make observations and provide recommendations to the 
World Trade Organization 's Committee on Budget Finance and A dministration (CBFA) on all 
matters relating to the legality, compliance, effectiveness, efficiency, and economy of WTO 
Secretariat management 's practices, including accounting, finance, ethics, rules, regulations, 
and procedures, in order to assist the CB FA and in carrying out their activities.  
B. THE ADVISORY BOARD SHALL DISCHARGE ITS MANDATE THROUGH THE 
FOLLOWING ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES:  
1. Review and advise the CBFA on : (i) the integrity of financial statements ; (ii) reports of 
the External Auditor in resp ect of matters arising from the audit of financial 
statements and performance audits ; and (iii) reports of the Off ice of Internal 
Oversight (OIO).  
 
2. Review and advise, as necessary, on the effectiveness, independence, and adequacy 
of resources of the WTO 's internal audit functions, including any views on audit 
findings and recommendations, and on the Secretariat 's response to the OIO 's work 
and recommendations.  
 
3. Review and advise the CBFA at least once a year on : (i) the adequacy and 
development of the WTO 's risk management processes including, among others, the 
adequacy of arrangements to detect and prevent fraud, and to encourage an 
anti-fraud culture ; and (ii) the responsiveness of the Secretariat to audit 
recommendations  and progress on implementation.  
 
4. Review and advise the CBFA, as necessary, on plans for internal and external audits, 
including the adequacy of the coverage of significant risks and key controls and 
compliance with professional standards, taking into account the responsibilities of the 
Secretariat 's management in these areas.  
 
5. Provide recommendations to the CBFA for specific internal and ex ternal audit work, as 
necessary.  
 
6.   Undertake such other studies as may be assigned to it by the CBFA ; and 
 
7.  In extraordinary circumstances, address requ ests from the Ministerial Conference or 
the General Council, through the CBFA, including providing advice on issues related to 
handling of ethical misconduct cases when a conflict of interest within senior 
management is alleged . 
 
8.  The Advisory Board may be  invited to appear before the CBFA as necessary.  
 
C.  MEMBERSHIP  
9.  The Advisory Board shall consist of three members with expertise in relevant areas 
such as auditing, accounting , financial and human resources matters;  
 
10. A selection working group comprising mem bers of the CBFA shall be established to 
select appropriate candidates for the Advisory Board in a manner similar to that of the 
working group to select the external auditors;  
 
11. The Advisory Board members shall be nationals of WTO Members and be selected 
primarily on the basis of their knowledge and experience.  If more qualified candidates 
for the positions are available than are needed, further criteria such as geographic 
representation and gender equality may be considered;  WT/BFA/W/403  
 
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  12. Advisory Board members shall be independent from their government with respect to 
the work of the WTO and may be selected from the private sector or from a 
government auditing or oversight institution.  
 
D.  TENURE OF BOARD MEMBERS AND THEIR TERMS OF APPOINTMENT  
13. Board Members shall be appoin ted for a non -renewable period of four years.  
 
E. BOARD MEETINGS AND PARTIES REQUIRED TO ATTEND MEETINGS  
14. The Advisory Board shall meet at least one time per year and may meet up to three 
times per year, if required . However, if special circumstances warrant, the Advisory 
Board may have additional meetings subject to approval by the CBFA.  
 
15. To the greatest extent possible, the Advisory Board shall conduct its meetings 
virtually, employing teleconferenc e or videoconference facilities.  
 
16. The Advisory Board meetings  shall be closed and attended only by members of the 
Board and any relevant parties that the Board may invite to assist them in carrying 
out its mandate, including the Secret ariat and the external auditors.  
 
17. The Secretariat shall provide the administrative  support required by the Advisory 
Board.  
 
 
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