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WT/CTE/M/65  
 
21 September 2018  
(18-5916) Page: 1/26 
Committee on Trade and Environment    
 
REPORT OF THE MEETIN G HELD ON 28 JUNE 2018  
NOTE BY THE SECRETAR IAT1  
The Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE Regular) met on  28 June 2018 , chaired by 
Ambassador Sondang Anggraini  (Indonesia) . The Committee adopted the Airgram,  
WTO/AIR/CTE/ 7, issued on 31 May 2018 . The latest list of documents of the Committee was 
circulated on 29 February 2016 in document WT/CTE/INF/ 5/Rev.12 . The Report of the last 
CTE meeting, held on 1st Novembe r 2017 is contained in WT/CTE/M/6 4.   
_______________  
 Contents   
1   PARAGRAPH 32 OF THE DOHA MINISTERIAL  DECLARATION  ................................ ....... 3 
1.1   Paragraph 32(i)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........  3 
1.1.1    Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform (FFSR)  ................................ ................................ ..............  3 
1.1.2    Ocean Economy  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........  7 
1.1.3    Palm Oil  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...................  9 
1.2   Other items of the CTE work programme (Items 1, 2, 3(a), 4, 5, 7, 9, and 10)  .................. 12 
1.2.1    Item 1  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 12 
1.2.1.1    The United Nations Framework Convention on Clima te Change (UNFCCC)  .................... 12 
1.2.1.2    Presentation by Chinese Taipei  ................................ ................................ ............... 12 
1.2.1.3    Presentation by Australia  ................................ ................................ ....................... 15 
1.2.1.4    Presentation by UNFCCC  ................................ ................................ ........................ 17 
1.2.2    Item 4  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 18 
2   OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 18 
2.1   Update on the Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA) negotiations  ................................ .18 
2.2   Briefing on the WTO Secretariat's report on "Mainstreaming trade to attain the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)" ................................ ................................ ............... 20 
2.3   Briefings by observer organizations  ................................ ................................ .............. 21 
2.3.1    Briefing by the OECD  ................................ ................................ ............................... 21 
2.3.2    Briefing by the IMO Secretariat ................................ ................................ .................. 22 
3   DATE OF NEXT MEE TING ................................ ................................ ............................  24 
ANNE X 1: ITEMS OF THE CT E WORK PROGRAMME  ................................ ..........................  25 
ANNEX 2: PARTS OF TH E DOHA MINISTERIAL D ECLARATION THAT RELA TE  TO 
THE WORK  OF THE CTE  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 26 
_______________  
                                                
1 This document has been prepared under the Secretariat's own responsibility and is without prejudice 
to the positions of Members or to their rights and obligations under the WTO.  WT/CTE/M/65  
 
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  ACRONYMS  
 
APEC   
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation  
CoP Conference of the Parties  
CSPO  Certified Sustainable Palm Oil  
CTE Committee on Trade and Environment  
EDB WTO Environmental  Database  
EGA Environmental Goods Agreement  
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations  
FFSR Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform  
GDP Gross Domestic Product  
GHG Greenhouse Gas  
IEA International Energy Agency  
IMO United Nations International Maritime Organization  
ISPO Indonesian sustainable palm oil  
LDCs Least developed countries  
LULUCF  Land use, land -use change, and forestry  
MC Ministerial Conference  
MEAs  Multilateral Environmental Agreements  
MSPO  Malaysian Sustainable Palm Oil  
NDC Nationally Determined Contribution  
NGOs  Non-governmental organizations  
OECD  Organi sation for Economic Co -operation and Development  
PAWP  Paris Agreement Work Programme  
RSPO  Roundtabl e on Sustainable Palm Oil  
RTA Regional Trade Agreement  
SDG Sustainable Development Goal  
TPR Trade Policy Review  
UNCTAD  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development  
UNEP  United Nations Environment Programme  
UNFCCC  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change  
  
 
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 WT/CTE/M/65  
 
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  1  PARAGRAPH 32 OF THE DOHA MINISTERIAL DEC LARATION  
1.1  Paragraph 32(i)  
"The effect of environmental measures on market access, especially in relation to 
developing countries, in particular the least  developed among them, and those 
situations i n which the elimination or reduction of trade restrictions and distortions 
would benefit trade, the environment and development."  
1.1.1   Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform (FFSR)  
1.1.  Following the showing of a video entitled "425 Billion Reasons for Change"2, the 
representat ive of New Zealand3 recalled that at the Eleventh Session of the WTO Ministerial 
Conference (MC11) held in Buenos Aires (Argentina), the following 12  developing and developed 
Members launched a Ministerial Statement on Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform (FFSR): Ch ile, Costa 
Rica, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Mexico, the Republic of Moldova, New Zealand, Norway, Samoa, 
Switzerland, the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu Kinmen and Matsu, and Uruguay.4 
In this statement, the signatories confirmed their intention  to seek the rationalisation and phase 
out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encouraged wasteful consumption, while recognising that 
reform needed to take into account the specific needs and conditions of developing countr y 
Members  and to minimize the possible adverse impacts on their development in a way that  
protected poor and affected communities. This was consistent with commitments by leaders to 
reform fossil fuel subsidies under Sustainable Development Goal (SDG)  12(c) of the 2030 Agenda, 
and pledges in the context of the G20, G7, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and V20, as 
well as the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and the Addis  Ababa Action Agenda on Financing 
for Development.  
1.2.  The signatories of the FFSR Statemen t at MC11 also recognized the importance of the WTO 
as a forum to advance discussions to achieve ambitious and effective disciplines, including through 
enhanced transparency and reporting to enable the evaluation of the trade and resource effects of 
fossil fuel subsidies programmes. At the launch of the statement, and the preceding side event co -
hosted by New Zealand and Finland, Ministers and senior officials from signatory and other 
interested Members explained further their reasons for supporting FFSR.  
1.3.  For example, New Zealand's Minister for Trade and Export Growth stated that the large 
amounts of money currently spent on subsidising fossil fuels distorted the market and impeded 
new technologies from being brought forth. He also noted that removing the su bsidies would 
create a more efficient use of fossil fuels, while allowing financial resources to be made available 
for other purposes, such as health and education. Samoa's Minister of Commerce, Industry, 
Labour and Public Enterprises underlined the import ance of FFSR efforts in achieving the SDGs, 
and the urgency of doing so given the threat that rising sea levels were leading to the loss of 
cultures in the islands. Finland's Minister of Trade and Development focused on the need to 
abandon most fossil fuel  subsidies within the next 10 to 15  years, noting that the failure to do so 
would mean that the targets of the Paris Agreement would not be met.  
1.4.  The Chief Trade Representative of Chinese Taipei noted their commercial interests in a range 
of products relate d to renewable energy and their determination to increase the use of renewable 
energy domestically. The Vice -Minister of Foreign Trade of Costa Rica explained the importance 
placed on smart production and consumption. Indeed, taxing fossil fuels instead of  subsidising 
them had allowed Costa Rica to use the additional tax to invest in reforestation, resulting in 
economic and ecological growth. France's Minister of State attached to the Minister for Europe and 
Foreign Affairs emphasised the need to level the playing field through broader participation in 
fossil fuel subsidy reform efforts. Sweden's State Secretary briefly outlined Sweden's own reform 
efforts showing that it was possible to achieve economic growth and reductions of CO 2 emissions 
at the same tim e if a combined approach to trade, innovation and FFSR was taken. Such 
statements reflected the triple win of trade, economic, environmental and social benefits that FFSR 
could deliver.  
                                                
2 https://vimeo.com/247762496 . 
3 The statement is available in document JOB/TE/51.  
4 This statement can be found at WT/MIN(17)/54.  WT/CTE/M/65  
 
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  1.5.  The signatory Members would continue to raise awareness in the coming months on the 
impacts of fossil fuel subsidies and the opportunities of reform, including through a range of events 
with partner agencies and organisations in Geneva and beyond, for instance in WTO trade policy 
reviews. The signatories to the Ministerial S tatement invited all Members to join their efforts to 
address FFSR at the WTO  and support the energy transition necessary to implement the SDGs 
through mutually reinforcing trade and environment actions. As a first step, the signatory 
Members hoped to have  a more interactive exchange in the CTE, and invited Members to discuss 
and share experiences in reforming fossil fuel subsidies. Members' views on how action could be 
taken at the WTO to implement leaders' commitments under SDG 12(c) to reform fossil fuel  
subsidies were welcome.  
1.6.  The representative of Mexico  recognize d the importance of the WTO as an adequate forum to 
discuss future  ambitious disciplines in this area, including the strengthening of transparency and 
reporting to allow an assessment  of the tr ade effects of fossil fuel subsidy programs . Mexico was 
committed to the objectives outlined  by New Zealand.  
1.7.  The representative of Switzerland  noted that Switzerland attached great importance to this 
subject, as one of the key elements that could significa ntly lower CO 2 emissions globally and 
contribute to mitigate the effects of climate change. FFSR would not only benefit the environment, 
but also reduce trade distortions and benefit the economy overall. In addition, given that climate 
change would affect trade flows in a significant way, unforeseen events should be anticipated 
before it was too late. Switzerland reiterated the invitation to all WTO Members to support a 
constructive discussion on fossil fuel subsidies at the WTO and in the CTE and invited i nterested 
delegations to contact the signatories of the Buenos Aires Statement.  
1.8.  The representative of Costa Rica  expressed the view that the WTO had a role to play in better 
understanding the linkages between FFSR and trade. Trade could be a powerful enabling force 
towards sustainable development and addressing FFSR could be a way to help WTO M embers 
achieve their climate mitigation goals and better implement the Paris Agreement. With very limited 
exceptions, Costa Rica did not provide subsi dies to fossil fuels but rather  taxed them. Part of the 
revenue from the fuel tax was used for the national fund for forestry financing  that operated the  
environmental services scheme. Over US$ 220 million dollars had been generated since 1995 for 
this fund , which ha d helped Costa Rica increase its forest coverage from 21 % in the late 1990s to 
nearly 54  % in recent years; this was just one example of how Members  could benefit from 
opportunities provided by FFSR.  
1.9.  The representative of Chinese Taipe i noted that Chinese Taipei had participated in the fossil 
fuel subsidy reform peer review process led by the APEC Energy Working Group in 2016, and was 
the fourth volunteer member economy to do so since 2014. This exercise had  provided useful 
information on Chinese Taipei's economy and energy use, as well as a description  of the subsidies 
chosen for the peer review process. T he panel 's findings and recommendations on potential 
inefficiencies from these subsidies  were also useful elements . Chinese  Taipei's delegation could 
present their experience in this regard. It was of paramount importance to level the playing field 
through broader participation in fossil fuel subsidy reform efforts. Chinese Taipei recognized the 
large impact of fossil fuel subsidies on climate change and supported the continuation of 
discussions on fossil fuel subsidies in the WTO.  
1.10.   The representative of Pakistan  explained that Pakistan adhered to the idea of using global 
resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable developm ent and in a manner consistent 
with its needs, as enshrined in the SDGs and the Marrakesh Agreement. As a developing country  
Member  with a rising rate of economic growth and rising energy needs, Pakistan relied 
predominantly on hydrocarbo n-based fuels with  more than 85% of energy sourced from fossil 
fuels. However, Pakistan was highly conscious of the need for alternative, sustainable and 
renewable energy resources. Therefore, Pakistan had taken a series of initiatives to reduce 
inefficient subsidies in the  electricity sector and promote alternative energy sources.   
1.11.   In Pakistan, over the last five years, 12'230 M egawatts (MW)  of electricity had been added 
to the national grid, of which 1'556 MW were from renewable energy sources. These included 
18 wind powe r projects, six solar power projects and six sugar mills (biomass related). By the end 
of fiscal year 2016 -2017, Pakistan brought down its energy subsidies from ove r 2.3% to 0.6% of 
Gross Domestic Product ( GDP) in three years. At the same time, energy pove rty was a stark 
reality. According to the World Bank, per capita use of energy in major developed countries ranged WT/CTE/M/65  
 
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  between 2'757 and 7'032 kg of oil equivalent (kgoe). In contrast, in developing economies  the 
range was between 400 and 2'029 kgoe . The figures in least developed countries (LDCs) were 
below 205 kgoe. This showed a wide gap in per capita use of energy between developed and 
developing economies  with some regions across the world still deprived of any kind of energy. In 
developed count ries, the increase in energy demand due to higher living standards was offset by 
energy efficiency gains borne by the use of better technology and energy conserving 
infrastructure. But at the same time, some Members resorted to restrictions on energy effic ient 
technologies such as solar cells, which could further widen the clean energy divide.  
1.12.   Pakistan noted the joint statement on FFSR at MC11. Pakistan was carrying out its own 
reforms. However, being still predominantly dependant on fossils fuel, Pakistan was of the view 
that specific needs of developing country Members and global energy poverty should be taken into 
consideration to minimise any adverse impacts on development during the reform process. The 
use of renewable energy could be enhanced through t ransfer of technologies from developed to 
developing countr y Members  and LDCs, which would help replace or upgrade energy inefficient 
power generation plants with energy efficient ones. Pakistan encouraged other Members to 
facilitate the transfer of enviro nmentally efficient technologies to developing countr y Members  to 
help reduce carbon emissions. Pakistan saw itself as a responsible member of the global 
community and was continuing its efforts  to perform this role to the best of its ability, despite 
internal difficulties.  
1.13.   The representative of Argentina  informed the CTE  that at the recent meeting of the 
G20 Energy Ministers, held in June 2018 in Bariloche, Argentina, Ministers reiterated their support  
to continue  the peer review pro cess. In this context , Argentina and Canada jointly announced that 
they would  work on a  peer review process in 2019. In the Final Communiqué of the G20 Ministers 
of Energy , the paragraph refer ring to the subject read  as follows :  
"In 2009, the Pittsburgh Leaders Declaration cal led for medium term rationalisation 
and phasing -out of Inefficient Fossil Fuel Subsidies that encourage wasteful 
consumption while providing targeted support for the poorest. We reaffirm this joint 
commitment. We welcome the efforts made by those G20 membe rs who have already 
participated in voluntary peer reviews, and we encourage those who have not yet 
done so to initiate their peer reviews as soon as feasible."  
1.14.   The representative of Norway  said Norway was strongly committed to the work on FFSR and 
in part icular in relation to the role of the WTO as a forum to advance discussions to achieve 
ambitious and effective disciplines. In the future, Norway was interested in addressing FFSR at the 
WTO and would welcome exchanges with Members.  
1.15.   The representative of Canada  echoed Argentina's statement on Canada's and Argentina's 
peer review process regarding the phasing out of inefficient fossil fuels subsidies.  
1.16.   The representative of the Kingdom of S audi Arabia  thanked New Zealand for the update on 
the issue of phasing  out fossil fuel subsidies and appreciated the highlights of the statement made 
on the margin of MC11 by several Ministers on this issue. To recall, this issue was dealt with under 
the G20, where the voluntary phasing out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidi es that encouraged 
wasteful consumption was done with two clear qualifiers: voluntary and in accordance with 
Members' national circumstances, priorities and needs. Saudi Arabia did not agree to link this issue 
to the WTO and did not agree to discuss it or establish a process under the WTO.  
1.17.   The representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela  pointed out that this discussion 
only concerned G20 members. It was worrying that several delegations insist ed on rai sing this 
issue in the WTO rather than focusing their  efforts on subsidies that were within  the WTO's sphere 
of competence and that were trade  distortive and had a major impact on  greenhouse gas ( GHG) 
emissions, for instance those in agriculture . Venezuela was concerned about discussing  issues for 
which the WTO did not  have a mandate.  Despite being an oil producing  Member , Venezuela  did not 
have high GHG  emissions, and was working hard to address the factors affecting  climate change. 
Venezuela  supported the statement by Saudi Arabia and  did not  support the proposal of 
New Zealand.   WT/CTE/M/65  
 
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  1.18.   The representative of China  noted that FFSR was considered to be the "low -hanging" fruit to 
climate action and in 2009 the G20 had already committed to phasing out inefficient fossil fuel 
subsidies. As part of this end eavour, China and the United States took the lead in completing the 
voluntary peer review of phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encouraged wasteful 
consumption under the G20. The results were released publicly at the G20 meeting in Hangzhou , 
China in 2016. The first peer review produced useful findings and insights for G20  members as 
they moved forward dismantling inefficient subsidy programs. Therefore, China believed that the 
G20 was the right platform and continued to encourage the G20 to  chart a course forward that 
built on these accomplishments and created a more robust process for subsequent rounds of 
review.  
1.19.   The representative of New Zealand  said that New Zealand looked forward to continuing to 
discuss this issue in the CTE and elsewh ere. New Zealand encouraged G20 members to continue 
their efforts. In response to Venezuela's comment on the importance of agriculture subsidies, the 
representative said that New  Zealand was also concerned with the massive amounts of public 
money spent on agriculture subsidies.  
1.20.   The representative of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
gave an update on the recent activities of the OECD regarding the support measures for fossil 
fuels. In 2017, following the release of  the Invento ry of Support Measures for Fossil F uels, the 
OECD  published the Companion Report that tracked progress in the reform of support for fossil 
fuels and that included  two methodological contributions. First, it provided a method for exploiting 
the complementar ity between estimates by the International Energy Agency (IEA) and OECD. The 
combined database covered  76 economies  countries. Secondly, it provided a method for 
estimating government credit support, particularly loan guarantees and preferential loans.  The 
Companion Report showed that the total support estim ates in 43 OECD and selected economies 
remained high at about US$ 150 billion  per year , despite signs of a decline. The downward trend in 
support was mostly driven by the reforms that had taken place in O ECD economies such as 
Mexico, and in partner economies such as India and Indonesia. The support went mostly to 
petroleum products, followed by natural gas.  
1.21.   OECD also participated in G20 work on inefficient fossil  fuel subsidies that encourage d 
wasteful co nsumption. The OECD chaired and led the peer review process for economies  that had 
volunteered. Germany's  and Mexico's  peer reviews were released at the 23rd Conference of Parties 
(CoP23) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change  (UNFCCC ) in 
November  2017. Indonesia and Italy initiated the peer review process in the summer 2017. The 
OECD also prepared, with the IEA, and in consultation with the International Energy Forum, the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries ( OPEC ), and t he World Bank, a G20 update on 
recent progress in reform of inefficient fossil  fuel subsidies that encourage d wasteful consumption.  
1.22.   The SDGs included a target calling for the phasing out of "inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that 
contribute to wasteful co nsumption" by 2030. To monitor progress towards achieving that goal, 
indicator SDG 12.c.1 was proposed, which expresse d the amount of  fossil fuel subsidies per unit of 
GDP and as a share of total national expenditure on fossil fuels. SDG 12.c.1 was a Tier 3 indicator, 
meaning that, at the time of its proposal, no internationally established method or standards were 
yet available for the indicator . Since the last Joint Meeting  of Tax and Environment Experts , the 
OECD, working with the Global Subsidies Initia tive, produced  a draft "options paper" for 
UN Environment (the "custodian" of the indicator) on the suggested scope and methods for 
constructing the indicator. That draft would be discussed and approved in the fourth quarter of 
2018 at the 8th meeting of the Inter -agency and Expert Group on SDG Indicators . UN Members 
would be asked, voluntarily, to start reporting information relating to that indicator in 2020, and to 
continue doing  so on an annual basis through at least 2030. These efforts wou ld complement the 
already existing data collection efforts of the OECD, IEA and the International Monetary Fund .  
1.23.   The representative of Switzerland  noted that the OECD's work contributed substantially to 
highlight ing the trade component of the  discussion o n the effects of fossil fuel subsidies which 
were not only harmful for the environment, but also had trade distorting effects and impact ed 
competition. Switzerland welcomed the continued update by organizations such as the OECD on 
relevant developments in the field of fossil fuel subsidies.  WT/CTE/M/65  
 
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  1.24.   The representative of New Zealand  was of the view that the update of the database would 
be very useful in terms of transparency and to better understand the size of the problem, how it 
affected trade and environment and how steps could be taken to address these subsidies.  
1.25.   The representative of the Kingdom of Saudi  Arabia  thanked the OECD for the presentation 
and considered this for information only and not to be carried further.  
1.26.   The representative of the United Nations En vironment Programme ( UNEP ) noted that  
SDG 12 focused on ensuring sustainable consumption and production patterns. It included a target 
to rationalize inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encouraged wasteful consumption. Understanding 
the size of existin g fossil fuel subsidies was an important first step to achieve this target. 
Transparent data on fossil fuel subsidies could be an impetus for reform by informing decision -
making, increasing awareness and building support for reform among stakeholders. As c ustodian 
of the indicator for SDG12, UNEP  had developed a methodology to measure fossil fuel subsidies 
and was responsible for collecting data on this to evaluate global and national progress. This 
monitoring and reporting of fossil fuel subsidies would pr ovide an important push to global efforts 
to reform inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, helping to address climate change and move towards a 
sustainable future.  
1.1.2   Ocean Economy  
1.27.   The representative of Norway  made a presentation on Norway's strategy for ensurin g 
sustainable growth in ocean industries. SDG 14 on the conservation and sustainable use of the 
oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development was most relevant. Its key 
message was that while developing ocean industries, blue growth needed to also be green. The 
oceans represented huge economic potential that was yet to be fully realised in relation to 
different economic activities, innovation, employment, food and pleasure. Through traditional and 
new activities there were possibilities for trade, revenues and increased employment.  Many ocean 
economy industries had been growing faster than world GDP, for instance offshore wind, fish 
processing and marine aquaculture. Increased employment was also encouraging. The 
representative referred to a  report commissioned by the OECD on "T he Ocean Economy in 2030 " 
which gave  more details on this topic.5 Emerging ocean -based industries included: aquaculture and 
farming of species other than salmon and trout; harvesting of macroalgae, such as kelp; 
harvest ing of mesopelagic ("deep sea") fish and other species; bioprospecting; coastal -based 
tourism; m inerals on , and under, the seabed ; and  electric power, i.e. wind, wave and tidal power.  
1.28.   However, there were serious environmental challenges, for instance: marine pollution and 
plastics, climate change and ocean acidification, loss of biological diversity and unsustainable 
fishing. New shipping routes opening up in the Arctic and elsewhere due to climate change raised  
environmental concerns.  Estimates showed that about 8 million tons of plastic reached the oceans 
each year. In December 2017, the UN Environment Assembly adopted a resolution, proposed by 
Norway, aimed to stop the flow of wastes and micro plastics into the ocean. In 2018, 
Norway  allocated about 2 8 million euros to a new programme to reduce marine waste and plastics 
in developing countries.  Norway also established a multi -donor fund in the Worl d Bank. Given that 
more than 90% of global transport of goods was carried by ships, the adoption by the Un ited 
Nations International Maritime Organization (IMO) of an Initial strategy on reduction of GHG 
emissions from ships was a major step in the right direction. On the role of trade, the 
representative noted that fisheries subsidies negotiations had a clear  relevance to building a 
sustainable ocean economy  and a  finaliz ation of these negotiations would be an important element 
to ensur e a more sustainable use of the world's ocean s. 
1.29.   The representative also gave an overview of Norway's ocean policy and explaine d that 
traditional ocean industries such as oil, gas, maritime sector and seafood played a crucial role in its 
economy. These were hi ghly productive and export -oriented industries based on natural resources . 
The representative referred to two reports  on oc ean strate gies for sustainable growth:  the White 
Paper to the Parliament  on the place of the oceans in Norway' s foreign and development po licy, 
reflecting the Government' s high ambitions with respect to ocean questions, both domestically and 
in the interna tional arena6; and the  Strategy on sustainable growth of Norway’s ocean -based 
                                                
5 See http://www.oecd.org/environment/the -ocean -economy -in-2030-9789264251724 -en.htm . 
6 See https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/meld. -st.-22-20162017/id2544710 /. WT/CTE/M/65  
 
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  industries.  Examples of Norwegian initiatives included: the hosting in Norway in October  2019 of 
"Our Ocean Conference"; and the establishment of a High -level Panel on Building a  Sustainable 
Ocean Economy, l aunched by Norway's  Prime Minister in Davos in January  2018 and co -chaired 
with Palau's President.  
1.30.   The representative of Canada  shared Norway's perspective that responsible and sustainable 
stewardship of the oceans and ocean re sources needed to be a priority. Indeed, one of Canada's 
G7 priorities for 2018 was "Working together on climate change, oceans and clean energy", and 
"Oceans" was the topic of discussion with leaders from country members  outside the G7 (including 
Norway a nd several small island developing economies ) during the Leaders' Summit in Charlevoix 
in June  2018. The G7 Leaders adopted the Charlevoix Blueprint for Healthy Oceans, Seas and 
Resilient Coastal Communities which aimed to enhance the resiliency of coastal  communities, 
improve ocean knowledge, support sustainable oceans and fisheries, and address ocean plastic 
waste and marine litter. In line with this commitment, Canada announced CAN$ 100 million 
dedicated to addressing the problem of plastic waste, which  represented both an environmental 
and economic threat to coastal communities. Such investment would help countries in vulnerable 
areas  prevent the entry of plastic into the environment. Canada also announced CAN$ 162 million 
to build stronger and more r esilient coasts and communities including supporting the expansion of 
climate risk insurance coverage in the Caribbean, supporting the expansion of their clean energy 
systems and infrastructure, as well as supporting efforts by developing countries  to adap t to the 
impacts of climate change. This fall, Canada would host the G7 Ministerial meeting on this theme 
in Halifax. Canada looked forward to a productive discussion and to continuing working with 
partners to advance towards a sustainable, resilient, low carbon future and healthy oceans and 
coastal communities.  
1.31.   The representative of the European Union  noted that the European Union, like Norway, 
regarded the oceans as economic drivers with great potential for innovation and growth. The 
European Union  shared  Norway's view that oceans needed to be  managed sustainably. Global 
problems such as over -fishing, pollution, marine litter, plastic s and global warming required closer 
international cooperation and the European Union  considered Norway a key partner, at bo th 
regional and international level s. The European looked forward to developing its partnership with 
Norway and encouraged other Members to become involved  in this area.  
1.32.   The representative of New Zealand  welcomed Norway's White paper on the place of the 
oceans in Norway's foreign and development policy . New Zealand  saw the critical role of oceans 
and the importance of ensuring sustainable growth in the developmen t of trade. In the Pacific, 
New Zealand was  a strong supporter of the blue economy. New Zealand believed that Members  
had to  be empowered to realise the full potential of marine resources, including by facilitating and 
developing sustainable economic growth in trade. New Zealand considered the Paci fic as a 
potential world leader on emerging issues like acidification , which touched on both environmental 
and economic interests. New Zealand was investing in the Pacific to increase the economic returns 
from sustainable fishing, including through a  NZ$ 1.5 million grant to the Office of the Pacific 
Ocean Commissioner for 2018 -2021. New Zealand had also joined other Members  in banning the 
sale and manufacture of microbeads to help prevent the entry of plastics in to the marine 
environment, and hoped that ot her Members  would join th is initiative.  
1.33.   The representative of Chinese Taipei  noted that Chinese Taipei was pleased to see that 
ocean, sea and coastal ecosystem resources had received the attention they deserved as one of 
the key pillars of sustainable development in today's discussion. The Separate Customs Territory of 
Taiwan, Pen ghu, Kinmen and Matsu was a sub -tropical island with a 1'200 km long coastline 
surrounded by ocean and had strong interest in learning about this issue from the economic and 
environmental perspectives. Chinese Taipei looked forward to continuing discussing  how to 
promote sustainable development in oceans in the CTE, including how to promote  offshore wind 
and prevent plastic pollution in oceans.  
1.34.   The representative of Norway  thanked delegations for their comments and reiterated the 
importance of joint efforts  to tackle the crucial ly important common  challenges.  
1.35.   The representative of UNEP  noted that together with the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development  (UNCTAD ), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO), the Commonwealth, the Africa n Caribbean and Pacific ( ACP) Group of States and the 
International Oceans Institute, UNEP  would co -host the second Oceans Forum on trade -related WT/CTE/M/65  
 
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  aspects of SDG 14 on healthy oceans. This year's forum would focus on "Enabling sustainable and 
integrated seafood and living marine resources value chains and related services" and would be 
held on 16 -17 July 2018 in Geneva. The Forum would be followed by a presentation of a proposed 
Trade -related Plan of Action towards achieving SDG 14. The Trade -related Plan of Action would 
provide a roadmap towards delivering on the j oint voluntary commitment of UN  Environment, 
UNCTAD, and FAO, issued at the 2017 UN Oceans Conference, to support countries  to design 
trade -related policies for healthy oceans and to posi tion themselves in this regard.  
1.1.3   Palm Oil  
1.36.   The representative of Indonesia  made a presentation on  Indonesia's approach to the 
management of sustainable palm oil. The Marrakesh  Agreement establishing the WTO prov ided the 
space for WTO Members to regulate sust ainability aspects, taking into account the needs and 
concerns of Members at different levels of development. Moreover, according to the 1994 WTO 
Ministerial Decision on trade and environment, Members had the mandate to discuss 
environmental regulations an d consider trade -related concerns  for different  Members . Palm oil was 
an important and strategic export commodity for Indonesia. It faced various challenges and 
barriers , including discriminatory treatment  based on  several misconceptions and a 
misunderstanding of GATT  Article XX(b) .  
1.37.   The first misconception related to  the reduction in forest areas , which  was not a result of  an 
increase in the area of palm oil plantation. From 1950 to 2014, there had been  a reduction  of 
approximately 24.5 million hectares in the forest area in the Sumatra Islands. However, from 1985 
to 2014, the area of palm oil plantation had increased by 6.25 million hectares. The gap showed 
that the deforestation of 18.25  million hectares was not a result  of palm oil plantation but of other  
factors .  Similarly , in 1985 in Borneo, there were 40  million hectares of forest area, which by 2014 
had been reduced to approximately 25.6 million hectares. In 1985, palm oil plantation covered 
around 42 '000 hec tares of land, which in 2014 had increased to  3.4 million hectares. Another 
misconception related to  the reduction of protected fore sts. In fact, 46.9% of the total land area in 
Indonesia was covered wit h forest area, whereas only 6.5% was devoted to palm oil plantation. 
This showed that Indonesia had protected and preserved the forest areas.   
1.38.   Regarding carbon stock, although palm oil plantation had lower carbon stock than primary 
forests and mangroves, it had an ave rage carbon stock of 63 million tonnes per hectare per year.  
On CO2 absorption and oxygen production, the gross assimilation of tropical forest was comparable 
to that of  palm oil plantation. Oxygen production from palm oil plantation was higher than for 
tropical forest. Finally, c oncerning the is sue of global peat areas, Indonesia did not have the 
largest peat area in the world . Compared with Europe and R ussia for example, which had 44%  of 
the total global peat area, Indonesia had only 6.95 %.  
1.39.   The representative of Indonesia recalled the origins o f palm oil plantation in Indonesia with 
the introduction of palm oil seeds  in 1848 by  a Dutch scientist  who planted them in Bogor Royal 
Botanical Garden. The first palm oil plantation s in Indonesia were built in 1911 and in 1918  by a 
Belgian and a German c ompany , respectively . Palm oil plantation s developed thereafter 
significantly  and today Indonesia was the largest producer of palm oil in the world.  
1.40.   It was expected that  the consumption of vegetable o il in the world would increase in the 
future, requiring  an additional  5 million ton nes of vegetable oil per year. To meet the extra 
demand, the production of vegetable oil from soybean, rapeseed and sunflower would require 115 
million, 60 million and 84 million hectares of new land, respectively. However, if t he additional 
demand for vegetable oil was met by palm oil, it would take 15 million hectares of new land, as 
the productivity rate of palm oil was significantly h igher than for other vegetable oils . It meant 
that if the demand of vegetable oil was not met  by palm oil but by oth er resources, environmental 
degradation would be more important than if palm oil plants were used instead.  
1.41.   Indonesia had taken several measures to increase productivity of palm oil plantation by 
managin g it in a sustainable fashion.  First, Indonesia had imposed a moratorium on the conversion 
of primary forest and peatland for economic activities,  including palm oil plantation. At the same 
time, Indonesia had improved the governance and management of the palm oil industry  by 
revamping  the Indonesian Sustainable Palm O il (ISPO) system involving various actors, including 
government, non-governmental organizations ( NGOs ), academics and business. Indonesia was the WT/CTE/M/65  
 
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  largest producer of Certified Sustainable Palm Oil (CSPO) based on the Round table on Sustainable 
Palm Oil (RSPO) scheme.  In addition , Indonesia applied good practices on biodiversity, 
environmental services , landscape management  as well as socio -economic aspects . Indonesia had 
also mandatory  standard operation procedures to preven t forest fires and initiated the Fire-Free 
Village Program in collaboration with local government s, communities and NGOs.  
1.42.   Indonesia continued to focus on social and environmental issues  and economic development  
as part of i ts commitment to the 2030 Agenda . Indonesia used a balanced approach towards palm 
oil production by increasing  productivity of existing palm oil plantation s while enhancing  the 
enforcement of regulations to contain deforestation. For Indonesia, palm oil plantation was 
necessary as it provided for the livelihood of 17 million Indonesians.  
1.43.   The representative of Malaysia  shared Malaysia's experience on efforts to ensure sustainable  
managemen t of palm oil. Malaysia recogniz ed the importance of SDGs and had developed the 
National SDG Roadma p to integrate Agenda 2030 into national policies and programmes. In the 
context of forest conservation and the reduction of GHG emissions, extensive efforts and measures 
had been implemented, along with international pledges made by Malaysia. Malaysia was  
commi tted to maintaining at least 50% of the total land area in Malaysia as forest cover. This 
commitment was first made in 1992 at the Rio Earth Summit.  
1.44.   Malaysia also pledged in its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) under the 
Paris Agreement to re duce its GHG emissions intensity of GDP by 45%  by 2030 relative to 200 5. 
This consisted of 35%  on an uncon ditional basis and a further 10% was conditioned upon receipt 
of climate finance, technology transfer and capacity building. Malaysia was firmly on tr ack to 
achieving its NDC by  2030. Nationally, Malaysia had two significant forestry initiatives: the Central 
Forest Spine Initiative covering 5.3  million hectares in Peninsular Malaysia; and the Heart of 
Borneo Initiative, a trilateral cooperation between Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia, covering an 
area of over 20 million hectares. These initiatives helped to strengthen the world's resilience to 
climate change by conserving carbon sinks and creating a huge green lung for the world while at 
the same time pro tecting the livelihoods of forest -dependent communities.   
1.45.   While committed to preserving and protecting the environment, Malaysia was also 
determined to eradicate poverty and increase the socio -economic status of rural communities. In 
1956, Malaysia establi shed the Federal Land Development Authority which provided land to the 
poor and landless to be developed into agricultural land for rubber and oil palm plantations. The oil 
palm was the nation's most valuable agricultural crop, contributing significant exp ort earnings 
annually and providing job opportunities to millions of people.  
1.46.   Malaysian palm oil was produced in a sustainable manner and the oil palm industry was 
committed to producing palm oil in accordance with sustainable principles and criteria under the 
Malaysian Sustainable Palm Oil (MSPO) standard, which would be implemented on a mandatory 
basis by 31  December 2019. The MSPO Certification Scheme covered the general requirements for 
sustainability, applicable to independent smallholders, plantations and organised smallholders and 
palm oil mills. The inclusion of smallholders in the MSPO standard was especially significant, as 
smallholders contributed 40%  of the total cultivated area in Malaysia. MSPO provided a platform to 
ensure that palm oil produce d in Malaysia had a path to sustainable palm oil certification. MSPO 
was an inclusive standard which was a perfect example of the seriousness of Malaysia in getting 
the industry on board with sustainability. Smallholders were given particular attention and  
assistance in obtaining the MSPO certification.  
1.47.   The Malaysian oil palm industry also implemented measures to ensure sustainable  
development including: the application of integrated pest management at the oil palm plantation 
to reduce the use of pesticide s; the reduction of GHG emissions by trapping biogas at palm oil 
mills; and the use of a life cycle assessment approach to identifying hotspots to improve 
environmental performance. Research and development programmes were carried out 
continuously to enhan ce productivity without having to open up new areas for oil palm cultivation, 
while farm mechanisation and automation was used to reduce GHG emissions throughout the 
supply chain.  
1.48.   The Malaysian palm oil industry practiced a holistic approach on sustainabi lity, balancing 
people, planet and profit. The area of p alm oil plantation  in Malaysia was only 5.81 million hectares  WT/CTE/M/65  
 
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  which translated into about two per cent of the total planted area for oilseed crops globally. The 
Malaysian palm oil industry was one of the best regulated in the world with more than 60 laws and 
regulations related to its development. This was because palm oil was the most productive and 
efficient oil crop with a yield five times higher than other vegetable oil.  
1.49.   In addition, palm oil was a perennial crop with an economic life of about 25 years. It 
minimised land use change and reduced potential GHG emissions from land conversion. This was 
already acknowledged by several leading NGOs. The need and use of more land would directly 
increase de forestation and species loss if palm oil was avoided. The palm oil industry in Malaysia 
had successfully lowered the poverty level among rural farmers, generated productive employment 
and job opportunities, ensured food security and improved nutrition, pro moted economic growth, 
developed sustainable towns and communities, provided good health, well -being and education, 
and created new industries, innovations and infrastructure.  
1.50.   With a head start of more than 100 years in the palm oil business, Malaysia had  a 
competitive advantage and would continue to improve to ensure the industry remained resilient 
and sustainable. Malaysia was committed to ensuring sustainable production of palm oil and to 
making Malaysian palm oil the global benchmark. Malaysia would co ntinue to encourage and 
ensure adherence of the palm oil industry to domestic and relevant international laws and 
regulations. Continued research would be undertaken to ensure long term sustainability of the 
palm oil industry and a development in harmony w ith the environment. To conclude, Malaysia 
showed a video entitled "Oil Palm: Man and Nature"7 highlighting the sustainable management 
practices of the Malaysian oil palm industry.  
1.51.   The representative of the European Union  welcomed Indonesia's and Malaysia' s 
commitment to strengthen ing the sustainability of palm oil production. Palm oil was a complex 
issue that required a balanced approach. The European Union appreciated the importance of the 
palm oil sector as a source of growth and employment in producing Members , including for small 
holders. At the same time, there were legitimate concerns on the possible negative implications of 
palm oil production, such as deforestation, biodiversity loss  and GHG  emissions. The European 
Union and producing Members  had a common interest in addressing possible negative 
environmental and social impact s of palm oil production by ensuring it s sustainability . The 
European Union looked forward to continuing dialogue on the implementation of ISPO and MSPO, 
in particular regarding  the coverage and degree of implementation. It was important to elaborate 
further on concrete initiatives undertaken to reach out to smallholders and support their 
engagement in sustainability practices. The European Union stood ready to work with producin g 
Members  in this regard.  
1.52.   The representative of Switzerland  noted that sustainable consumption and production was 
part of Agenda 2030 and SDG 12. Sustainable production, in particular sustainable palm oil 
production, was very important to the Swiss consum er. Palm oil production had important impacts 
on the environment, in particular when large scale forest conversion was involved. The 
consequences included biodiversity losses, peatland degradation, air pollution and an increase in 
CO2 emissions. Switzerlan d supported initiatives that contributed to the sustainable production of 
palm oil, for example through the facilitation of access to certification for small scale producers. 
The representative asked how Indonesia and Malaysia saw the future evolution of t he various palm 
oil standards, including what could be done to facilitate access of smallholders to sustainable 
practices and certification schemes; and whether there was a potential for collaboration between 
national standards and private initiatives, suc h as the RSPO.  
1.53.   The representative of Côte d'Ivoire  spoke on the increased demand of vegetable oil 
production  and the related environmental degradation. It was therefore very important to find  a 
sustainable solution bas ed on international cooperation. In Côte d'Ivoire, palm oil was usually 
produced by small scale producers, particularly by young farmers and women. The bad press that 
palm oil had received had  led to a reduction in its demand and consumption , which had an impact 
in regions engaged in palm oi l production  and also indirectly contributed to people moving  from 
rural to urban areas. Côte d'Ivoire's  authorities had taken a series of measures to preserve the 
environment by improving standards for producers. However, producers needed help to produce in 
                                                
7 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aSeo6vciV4k . WT/CTE/M/65  
 
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  the most sustainable way. That would  only be possible through cooperation between producing 
and consuming Members .  
1.54.   The representative of Indonesia  explain ed the differences between sustainability schemes : 
RSPO was a multi -stakeholder arrangement volunt ary in nature  while ISPO and MSPO were 
government -based and mandatory . Moreover, the  International Sustainability and Carbon 
Certification  was a scheme required by the European Union Renewable Energy Directive.  
1.55.   The representative of Malaysia  recognised the  importance of sustainability and making the 
MSPO mandatory was one of the important steps taken by the government. The Malaysian palm oil 
board with some other relevant competent authorities had been working to include smallholders in 
various programs, su ch as providing financial assistance to acquire relevant certification.  
1.2  Other items of the CTE work programme (Items 1, 2, 3(a), 4, 5, 7, 9, and 10)  
1.2.1   Item 1  
"The relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and trade 
measures for environmental purposes, including those pursuant to multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs)."  
1.2.1.1   The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ( UNFCCC ) 
1.2.1.2   Presentation by Chinese Taipei  
1.56.   The representative of Chinese Taipei  explained that the non -paper, submitted in 
document  JOB/TE/49, tried to present some ideas  about a trade framework design ed to support 
the implementation of the Paris  Agreement. The non -paper was not a proposal for negotiations 
and both the non -paper and the presentation were d elivered without prejudice to Chinese Taipei's 
positions in the relevant negotiations, including the Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA). The 
intention was to present some ideas from experiences and observations of past negotiations and 
recent developments  in international environmental forums. Such experience sharing could 
contribute to more ideas about trade and environment issues.  
1.57.   The representative started with some background information on the Paris Agreement and 
its primary goal to keep the global a verage temperature below 2°C. However, the Paris Agreement 
did not specify any policy instruments to achieve this goal. It was up to the parties to outline 
climate actions to contribute to this end in their NDCs. Many climate actions mentioned in NDCs 
had trade dimensions. According to the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development survey of existing NDCs ,  almost all of them included references to elements that 
were in one way or another related to trade. For example, some NDCs mentioned the reduction of 
trade barriers on climate friendly products, while others mentioned the regulation of trade of 
climate u nfriendly products. Moreover, many NDCs referred to green energy policies, energy 
subsidies or technology transfer. These elements were WTO -related. That was why the 
Paris Agreement created a new context for the interface between climate change and trade 
policies.  
1.58.   Despite the close link between the Paris Agreement and trade, reactions in the WTO were 
not sufficient. The status quo was that average bound rates on certain green energy products, 
such as wind turbines, were still high; energy services were rar ely covered by Members' 
commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) ; the coverage of the 
Government Procurement Agreement was further limited in the relevant sectors; and technology 
transfer for developing countr y Members  or LDCs to  develop green energies was still difficult. 
Therefore, Chinese Taipei had started to explore what WTO  could do to support the Paris 
Agreement and came up with the idea of a trade framework to liberalize trade in green energy -
related goods and services so as to help WTO Members adopt green energies and reduce carbon 
emissions.  
1.59.   In considering the details of the trade framework, Chinese Taipei's delegation heavily relied 
on experience in the past negotiations, especially the EGA talks. The first preliminary idea was WT/CTE/M/65  
 
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  that, in setting the scope of the framework, a focal point may be needed. The Paris  Agreement 
was considered a good focal point.  
1.60.   The second idea was that the trade framework should cover both goods and services. In 
most climate industry sectors, goods and services were highly complementary. Moreover, services 
often accounted for a significant portion, or even a majority of the value of the sector. For 
example, in the cost structure of an offshore wind power project, the goods part accounted for 
only one third of the total cost and the remaining cost was almost all for services. Similarly for 
solar power, the goods part accounted for around 50% of the cost and the remaining cost was for 
services. In this regard, for the trade framework to effectivel y help achieve the goal of the 
Paris Agreement, the relevant services needed to be covered.  
1.61.   Looking at history of the EGA negotiations, services were not covered because of 
negotiations taking place in the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA). Bureaucracy m ight be 
another reason for not including services, as some governments found it difficult to harmonize 
positions of different authorities in charge of goods and services. From the perspective of 
negotiations, having both goods and services might lead to a very different negotiation scenario 
and bargaining structure. In many sectors, such as green energy, it was often a service supplier, 
or a project developer, who would bid and get the project contract and set the overall project 
value. The project develope r, on the other hand, sourced products from goods producers and the 
prices of goods were decided between them. This transaction pattern, if being taken into account 
by negotiators, could lead to a different bargaining game in the negotiation.  
1.62.   Chinese Taip ei's view was that services should be given more importance than that 
represented by their nominal trade values. Furthermore, the trade framework could cover some 
other elements, including: government procurement, as in certain Members the energy sector wa s 
dominated by the government; and technology transfer , so as to set up certain mechanisms to 
encourage and facilitate technology owners to transfer the technologies to Members who needed 
them, helping to strike a better balance between developed and devel oping Members. In short, the 
non-paper tried to envisage a trade framework to liberalize trade in climate goods and services. To 
this end, Chinese Taipei suggested that the scope of the framework should be more focused on the 
reduction of carbon emissions,  relevant services should be covered and other elements like 
government procurement and technology transfer mechanism could be considered.  
1.63.   The representative of Chile asked about the reasons for the focus of  Chinese Taipei on 
environmental goods related t o the Paris Agreement even though  other MEAs  could also be 
relevant, for instance MEAs that dealt  with chemicals ; and c onsidering the EGA process , about the 
way in which Chinese Taipei envisioned  both process es, as parallel or merged initiatives.  
1.64.   The repre sentative of Costa Rica  noted that trade and trade policies could make a significant 
contribution to achieving the objectives set by  WTO Members with regard to sustainable  growth 
and development, and believe d that the liberalization of environmental goods was fundamental in 
that context. Costa Rica hoped that  the EGA negotiations could be resumed i n the short term and 
that further discussions on these issues could take place in the future.  
1.65.   The representative of Canada  shared the view  that the WTO ha d an im portant contribution 
to mak e in helping  Members  achieve the ir climate change objectives as outlined  in their NDCs. 
However, Canada was focusing its efforts on re -launching the EGA negotiations  which offer ed the 
best opportunity in the short term for WTO Members to contribute to the fight against climate 
change.  
1.66.   The representative of Australia  said that Australia was committed to the implementation of 
the outcomes of the Paris Agreement. She  agreed that trade and trade rules could play an 
important role in combating climate change and in addressing its impacts , and that demonstrating 
the WTO's credentials in this area remained a worthy goal. Australia's role as EGA chair highlighted 
Australia's commitment to progress in this area and this commitment had alwa ys been nuanced by 
a sense of what could be realistically achieved.  
1.67.   The representative of Japan  asked whether  Chinese Taipei had any pre -existing list of  items 
relevant  to carbon reduction.  WT/CTE/M/65  
 
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  1.68.   The representative of Singapore  noted that Singapore remained  interested in this area and 
open to engaging i n the different elements outlined in the proposal.  
1.69.   The representative of Norway  said that Chinese Taipei's presentation  addressed crucial 
challenges with regard to climate cha nge and how to fulfil the Paris Agreeme nt. Norway wa s ready 
to engage in discussion s on the liberalization  of environmental goods and services at any time and 
in this regard Norway saw the EGA as an important instrument.  
1.70.   The representative of the European Union noted that Chinese  Taipei 's non-paper was an 
importa nt contribution to keep alive the EGA -related debate on how trade could contribute  to the 
implementation of the Paris Agreement. A number of element s raised  in the paper  were welcome, 
in particular the discussion on services related to environmental  goods as the European Union  had 
advocated  for the inclusion of  such services  in the EGA negotiations . Moreover, the 
European  Union was  in favour of focusing  on an ambitious and comprehensive list of products with 
environmental relevance . In a ddition, the European Union was an advocate  of a forward looking 
approach that allowed  regular reviews that could reflect  the development of new environmental 
technologies . The European Union looked forward to continui ng this exchange.  
1.71.   The representative o f Switzerland  agreed with Chinese Taipei that trade and trade policies 
had an important role to play in the implementation of Agenda 2030 and the Paris  Agreement. 
Further liberalization of environmental goods and related services was one of the cornerstone s of 
global efforts to achieve the objectives set by leaders in the Paris Agreement and Members should 
aim at an ambitious outcome in this field. Chinese Taipei had introduced some interesting concepts 
such as the role of trade in environmental services. H owever, other aspects of the non -paper such 
as limiting the scope of product coverage or new concepts that were not part of the scope of 
previous discussions seemed more difficult to address at this stage. Switzerland looked forward to 
continuing discussio ns, but preferably in existing forums such as the EGA.  
1.72.   The representative of New Zealand  reminded that New Zealand considered that trade and 
environment issues were of critical importance and believe d that a complementary  approach  was 
needed in order to ac hieve sustainable development and address  climate change.  
1.73.   The representative of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  was of the view  that the issue of climate 
change was a very delicate and controversial one. Therefore, Saudi Arabia did not agree to create 
a parall el discussion or start any process by linking climate issues with trade, let alone making 
proposals . Saudi Arabia took note of Chinese Taipei's explanation  at the beginning of the 
presentation that this was not a proposal. Thus, climate change issues neede d to be  deliberated 
and discussed only under the UNFCCC forum and not linked to WTO.  
1.74.   The representative of  the Russian Federation  said that climate change was a  priority issue 
for Russia in the context of multil ateral diplomacy. Russia aimed at  the Paris A greement 's full 
implementation in order to arrive at its final destination of lowering the temperature of our planet. 
The agreement itself envisioned that  meaningful  progress could be achieved  through  a tailor -made  
approach reflecting  national circumstances . Russia  took a broad commitment to cut GHGs by 70%  
by 2030 from the 1990  benchmark . However, the  implementation of the Paris  Agreement should 
be primarily addressed through its  own structures and process es and not be artificial ly brought 
into other international frameworks . Such inappropriate activism could only incur damage. A "one -
size-fits-all" approach was  not the right way to move forward and any abuse of trade measures for 
climate change -related reasons could only complicate matters on both sides. The representative 
asked Members to refrain from seeking any universal solution  in the CTE and to focus on  items on 
the CTE's  agenda .  
1.75.   The representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela  did not support a parallel debate 
on this subject,  which should be dealt within the UNFCCC . 
1.76.   The representative of Argentina  welcomed Chinese Taipei's clarification that  the 
presentation and the non -paper were  for informati on purposes and not with a negotiating 
objective. Even though Argentina agreed on the  importance to  fight climate  change , negotiating 
proposals should be made in the context of the  Committee on Trade and Environment in special 
session.  WT/CTE/M/65  
 
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  1.77.   The representative of China  shared Saudi Arabia's concern concerning the discussion of this 
topic in the CTE. Firstly, regarding the background part of the document, she noted that the 
Paris Agreement was built upon the UNFCCC and implemented under the UN framework. The 
relationship between existing WTO rules and specific trade obligations set out in MEAs had  been 
clearly stated in paragraph  31 (i) of the Doha Ministerial Declaration. The introduction of concepts 
from other organizations into the WTO should be avoided, and the negotiations were limited in 
scope to the applicability of such existing WTO rules a s among parties to the MEA  in question. 
Liberalization commitments in goods and services were closely linked to market access, and 
needed to be discussed under related committees if necessary, rather than the CTE.  
1.78.   Secondly, concerning the part of the docum ent on the EGA, the representative recalled that 
by the end of 2016, EGA participants had conducted a total of 18 rounds of negotiations to clarify 
the definition and coverage of environmental goods and had been very close to a final agreement. 
Instead of trying to seek a solution to the suspension of the EGA negotiation, the current 
document was proposing to reopen a new round of discussions on the definition of environmental 
goods and services. Today, the WTO was faced with unprecedented challenges, namel y how to 
respond to unilateralism and protectionism and how to keep Members' confidence in the 
multilateral trading system. It was therefore important to be extremely cautious with adding any 
new disagreement and opposition among Members.  
1.79.   Thirdly, concerning the part of the document on the initial thinking, it gave a comprehensive 
picture covering environmental goods and services, public procurement, technology transfer and 
domestic regulations. A lot of research and a series of discussions , followed by many rounds of 
negotiation would be required. Even putting the EGA negotiation aside, it was important to 
concentrate and focus on low -hanging fruit with a clear mandate and promising results, such as 
fishery subsidies and food security, rath er than to distract limited human resources and attention 
on new controversial issues. China recommended no further discussion on this issue.  
1.80.   The representative of Chinese Taipei  replied that like other EGA parties, his delegation had 
spent a lot of time,  effort, and resources on the EGA negotiations and hoped for their completion. 
However, given the long stagnation of the talks, it was not harmful to think beyond as it could also 
help resolve the current dilemma. Regarding Chile's question, the reasons fo r choosing the Paris 
Agreement included: the recent adoption of the Agreement; the fact that it had been agreed 
almost globally, which signalled very strong political will; and the serious and dangerous nature of 
the climate problem that required to be add ressed properly and in a timely manner. Regarding 
Japan's question on the list of goods, Chinese Taipei confirmed that the delegation had a list of 
goods in mind, as shown in the presentation with the examples of wind power, solar power, and 
energy saving equipment. Finally, the representative stressed that the non -paper was not a 
proposal for negotiations and was only intended to provide some ideas on trade and environment. 
Chinese Taipei looked forward to further discussion on this topic.  
1.2.1.3   Presentation by  Australia  
1.81.   The representative of Australia  presented on Australia's climate change circumstances and 
policies. Average annual temperatures in Australia had increased by one degree Celsius since 
1910. Additionally, Australia had experienced an increase in e xtreme weather events as evidenced 
by the increase in record breaking heat which had led to longer fire seasons. Despite Australia's  
strong population growth, emissions per capita had decreased overall due to changes in the 
economy, including falling emiss ions intensity of the electricity grid and improvements in energy 
efficiency . Australia specialized in areas where it enjoyed comparative trade advantage, including 
fuels and mining products,  which accounted for approximately 60 % of Australia's exports  by value, 
and agriculture , which  accounted for approximately 15% of exports by value. Like most developed 
countr y Member s, Australia's economy was now services -based. The fastest growing of all 
industrial sectors in Australia was mining whereas manufacturing had declined.  
1.82.   Australia had met its emission reduction target in their first commitment under the 
Kyoto  Protocol and was on track to overachieve their second commitment target,  equivalent to a 
reduction of 5% below 2000 levels by 2020. Australia's NDC included the commitment to reduce 
emissions by 26 to 38% below 2005 levels by 2030. Australia was  making headway on their 2030 
target.  Emissions per capita and per unit of GDP were the lowest in 28 years. Electricity  was the 
largest source of emissions (35% ) followed by transport (19% ). Land use, land -use change, and WT/CTE/M/65  
 
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  forestry (LULUCF) was another i mportant source of emissions , even though  LULUCF emissions ha d 
significantly decli ned since 1990 due to Australia' s reduct ion in the rate of land clearing.  
1.83.   Australia's policy suite put a strong emphasis on the role of research, development and 
innovation and included: the Emissions Reduction Fund, which helped Australian farmers and 
businesses reduce emissions; the Safeguard  Mechanism , which  complemented the Fund by 
providing a framework for the largest emitters to measure, report and manage their emissions; 
the Renewable Energy Target , which was  expected to increase the share of renewable energy to 
around 23% of electricity supply by 2020; the National Energy Productivity Plan , which  aimed at 
improving Austra lia's energy productivity by 40% by 2030; support to clean energy innovation; 
the voluntary National Carbon Offset Standard to manage GHG emissions and provide a 
benchmar k for organizations seeking to make their operations, products, services, buildings, 
precincts or events carbon free;  and the phase -down of hydrofluorocarbons imports under the 
Montreal Protocol. Australia would develop a long -term emissions reduction stra tegy as called for 
under the Paris Agreement, that would be reviewed and refined every five years to ensure that 
government actions remained in step with the global community and provided businesses the 
predictability they needed. In Australia's NDC submit ted in 2015, Australia committed to consider 
a potential long -term emissions reduction goal beyond 2030.   
1.84.   The representative of New Zealand  noted that presentations on NDCs by WTO  Members in 
CTE meetings were very helpful. For instance, Australia's messag e that they had over -achieved 
their emissions reduction target whilst also pursuing economic growth was very important.  
Presentations on NDCs showed how different Members were approaching a common challenge . 
New Zealand  encouraged other Members to present their NDCs in the CTE .  
1.85.   The representative of the European Union  highlighted the importance of presenting NDCs in 
the CTE . Moreover, t he European Union highly valued the cooperation on climate change with 
Australia, both in the multilateral and bilateral c ontext s. In this regard, the European Union looked 
forward to including ambitious provisions on trade and climate change under a future free trade 
agreement with Australia.  
1.86.   The representative of Norway  looked forward to further information exchange on NDC s in 
future CTE meetings.  
1.87.   The representative of the Kingdom of S audi Arabia  noted that the information provided by 
Australia was appreciated but that this topic was much more suited to the UNFCCC as it was the 
only forum for climate change.   
1.88.   The represen tative of Chinese Taipei  noted that Australia's presentation helped Members to 
understand Australia's efforts on climate change. Chinese Taipei would also try to share 
information on their efforts in this area at the next CTE meeting.  
1.89.   The representative of  Switzerland  said that the implementation of NDCs went beyond the 
solution of environmental issues as it encompassed many aspects including the economy and 
trade.  
1.90.   The representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela  pointed out that climate change 
was an issue of vital importance in today's world and that the UNFCCC was the main actor to  deal 
with this problem.  Venezuela did  not support the inclusion of the topic o f climate change in the 
CTE's agenda , considering that the appropriate forum was the UNFCCC.  
1.91.   The representative of Canada  agreed with comments made by New Zealand, Chinese Taipei, 
Switzerland and others on the importance of linking the trade and environment regimes.  
1.92.   The representative of Haiti welcomed Australia's presentation  and echoed comments made 
by other Members .  
1.93.   The representative of Australia  said that Australia recognised the value of presentations on 
NDCs in the CTE and the important links between trade and climate change. Echoing previous 
comments, Australia encouraged other Me mbers to present  on their NDC s in future meetings.  WT/CTE/M/65  
 
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  1.2.1.4   Presentation by UNFCCC  
1.94.   The representative of UNFCCC  provided an update o f the negotiation process. During the 
May session in Bonn, good progress had been made, in particular on the technical elements, even  
though not as fast as had been hoped for. Therefore, a n additional negotiating session  had been 
scheduled for September  in Bangkok to facilitate the preparation of the C oP24 package, which 
included work on the Paris Agreement Work Programme (PAWP). PAWP w as extremely complex to 
negotiate because it encompassed several highly technical and political issues. Bringing all the 
pieces together was challenging and would have to happen in the context of C oP24 in Katowice, 
Poland,  in December 2018.  
1.95.   Another importa nt feature of the May session in Bonn was the  Talanoa Dialogue, a 
facilitative dialogue  conducted under the leadership of Fiji's Presidency  and agreed to in Paris to 
take stock of  the collective efforts towards the long -term goal of the Paris  Agreement and  to 
inform the preparation of parties' future contribution s. During one day, o ver 250  participants, both 
parties and governmental  actors, shared stories about climate change, how it affected them and 
how they were fighting it. A synthesis report of the Dialogue would be prepared and another  
Talanoa  Dialogue was scheduled during C oP24, with ministerial participation.  Furthermore, sev eral 
high-level events would be held at C oP24 in parallel to the negotiations, including  on access to 
finance , the contributions to the pre-2020 commitments and the global climate action agenda.  
1.96.   Looking ahead, a joint reflection note from the presiding off icer was expected to be 
submitted to the session i n Bangkok . A roundtable was scheduled to examine  the various elements 
negotiated under different bodies, how these were linked and how they could be brought together 
to a successful conclusion. Lastly, ther e had been  good progress in individ ual items like 
agriculture, e ducation and public awareness. Climate finance and transparency  were among the 
challenging issues tha t needed to be addressed at C oP24.  
1.97.   The representative of  the European Union  noted that par ties to the Paris Agreement had an 
ambitious agenda for this autumn, in particular with regard to reaching an agreement on the rule 
book. The European Union strongly encouraged all parties to work together and engage towards a 
successful C oP24. 
1.98.   The represe ntative of Canada  was firmly committed to working with all parties under the 
UNFCCC to finalize in 2018 a common and robust set of implemen tation guidelines for the 
Paris Agreement that would enable ambitious and credible climate action by all. Trade was a n 
important tool to help enhance global cooperation on climate change and facilitate the transition to 
a low -carbon and climate resilient economy. Canada highlight ed that domestically, it was 
committed to implementing its Pan -Canadian Framework on Clean Gr owth and Climate Change, a 
plan to curb GHG emissions while growing the economy. This Framework also included a 
commitment that Canada would work with international partners to ensure trade rules supported 
climate policy. In that context, Canada looked for ward to working with all partners to explore the 
interlinkages between trade and climate policy further .  
1.99.   The representative of Australia  was of the view that discussions on the state of play of 
climate change negotiations were useful elements to inform th e work in the WTO, including how 
trade and trade rules could assist in combatting climate change and addressing its impact.  
1.100.   The representative of Chile took note of the progress made in the climate negotiations and 
said that it was critical to build guidelines to implement the Paris Agreement , notwithstanding 
existing complexities. Chile hoped that the next sessions in Bangkok and Katowice would achieve 
further progress.  WT/CTE/M/65  
 
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  1.2.2   Item 4  
"The provisions of the multilateral trading  system with respect to the transparency of trade 
measures used for environmental purposes and environmental measures and requirements 
which have significant trade effects. " 
1.101.   The representatives of the WTO Secretariat  presented the Environmental Database (E DB)8 
for 2016 circulated on 18 June 2018 in document WT/CTE/EDB/16 (and Add.1).9 Two updates of 
the EDB (2014 and 2015) had been circulated in 2018. Nearly 20 years of data was available 
covering all WTO notifications and trade policy reviews (TPRs).  The S ecretariat was working on 
moving the EDB to a web -based application to improve its user interface. In 2016, 
575 notifications ( or 15.4 %) were environment -related out of around  3'750 submitted by 
Members. Within these 575 notifications,  1'176 environment -related measures were identified. 
There were also 1'148 environment -related entries from the 21 TPRs published in 2016. The 
Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement accounted for the highest number of environment -related 
notifications – around two thirds – followed by the Sanitary and Phytosanitary  Agreement and the 
Agreement on Agriculture.  
1.102.   Seventy seven Members had submitted environment -related notifications in 2016. The 
environment -related objectives mostly referred to in 2016 were: chemical, toxic and hazar dous 
substances management; general environmental protection; energy conservation and efficiency; 
and MEAs' implementation and compliance. The types of measures notified included support 
measures and regulatory measures. The environment -related entries in the TPRs also included 
regulatory measures, quantitative restrictions, and price or market -based measures and support 
schemes.  
1.103.   The representative of the European Union  said that the EDB was a unique and useful tool 
for policy makers and researchers. He re cognized that EDB's preparation was resource intensive 
and welcomed the migration of the database to a web -based application, which would improve the 
resear chability and accessibility of its data.  
1.104.   The representative of New Zealand  commended efforts made to  update the EDB and 
welcomed the move to a web -application as helpful to make the data available in a user -friendly 
manner.   
1.105.   The representative of Chile appreciated the extensive work done on the database on an 
annual basis and considered the EDB an impor tant tool to provide information on environmental 
measures being adopted by Members. The EDB provided a complete picture of the notifications 
related to the environment, helped Members to follow notifications across several years and 
allowed the identifica tion of all environment -related notifications in a single database. He 
recognized that the amount of work involved in updating the database could not be undertaken by 
a Member alone and encouraged the Secretariat to continue updating the database.  
2  OTHER BUSINESS  
2.1   Update on the Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA) negotiations  
2.1.  The representative of Australia , as Chair of the EGA negotiations, reiterate d the considerable 
environmental and commercial benefits the EGA  would provide.  It was not possible for the  EGA 
Members to reach a full conclusion at their last meeting in December  2016. Nonetheless, t he 
meeting was valuable in providing EGA Members with clarity on key outstanding issues. Sin ce that 
meeting, EGA M embers had had the opportunity to reflect on the ir core priorities and sensitivities, 
as well as the increasing importance of delive ring a final outcome. The  EGA could play an 
important role in enhancing global commitments to trade and  environment. If concluded, the EGA 
would provide significant commerc ial benefits, boosting trade and providing cheaper access to 
environmentally beneficial technologies. It would also demonstrate the positive con tributions  the 
multilateral tra ding system could  make to overcoming serious environmental challenges, and in 
                                                
8 The presentation is available  in document  RD/CTE /135. 
9 The EDB is also available on the WTO website: www.wto.org/edb .  WT/CTE/M/65  
 
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  the future,  would  provide a platform for further liberalization of trade in environmental goods and 
services.  
2.2.  The innovative  and fundamentally trad e-liberalising approach that had  been pursued in the 
EGA negotiations wa s a positive example for the WTO overal l. This example was important not 
only in relation to the trade and environment agenda but also more broadly given the need for the 
membership to think positively about the WTO and its trade negotiating function. The 
representative conclude d by noting th at the membership of the EGA had  always been open to all 
WTO Members who share d the ambition and vision of global free trade in environmental goods. 
While EGA members continue d to reflect upon a way forward in the negotiations, the 
representative urged other  Members to consider joining the EGA .  
2.3.  The representative of Norway  noted that the g lobal environmental challenges , and in 
particular , the one s from climate we re valid arguments to restart the  negotiations. The EGA wa s 
an avenue to address this issue. Norw ay had been an active participant  during the EGA 
negotiation s and was ready to start whenever there wa s an opportunity to do so.  
2.4.  The representative of Turkey  noted that  Turkey was one of the EGA participants and believed 
that the EGA negotiations would continue, hopefully with the participation of other WTO Members, 
and conclude  to deliver something credible both commercial ly and environmentally.   
2.5.  The representative of Japan  noted that Japan remained  strongly committed t o the 
EGA negotiations and looked  forward to their resumption  and conclusion, when circumstances 
would be favourable. W orkshops and seminars were beneficial for rebuilding the momentum of the 
negotiations. In this regard, Japan had organised an EGA Symposium in Beijing in August  2017. 
Japan would welcome similar efforts by other members.  
2.6.  The representative of Costa Rica  said that Costa Rica believe d that the liberalisation o f trade 
in environmental goods wa s essential for addressing  urgent global challenges like climate change. 
Therefore, Costa Rica  remain ed committed to the  negotiations and look ed forward to their 
resumption and conclusion.  
2.7.  The representative of Singapore  noted that the EGA wa s an important initiative which 
concretely demonstrated  the role trade could  play in mitigating climate change and strengthening 
environmental protection.  Singapore hoped to resume and conclude the  EGA negotiations  soon. 
2.8.  The representative of New Zealand  reaffirmed their delegation's commitment to reaching an 
ambitious and timely EGA a nd expressed their desire to work closely with others towards renewing 
engagement at the right time.  
2.9.  The representative of Chinese Taipei  recalled that Chinese Taipei was an active supporter of 
the EGA and urged others to join. Chinese Taipei stood ready to continue the work and believe d 
that once concluded, it would help efforts to overcome serious environmental challenges, including 
meeting climate -related commitments under the Paris  Agreement.  
2.10.   The representative of Hong Kong, China , as an EGA participan t, was committed to the 
negotiations and look ed forward to their early resumption and conclusion for the benefit of trade 
and environment. All Members were welcome  to join  the EGA.   
2.11.   The representative of  the European Union welcomed initiatives by EGA m embers to maintain 
the momentum and highlight ed the importance of liberalising environmental products as a 
contribution to environ mental protection , including for climate action. The European Union  
remained  strongly committed to concluding an ambitious EGA  and looked forward to relaunching 
the negotiations , once circumstance s would  allow and participants we re ready to reengage.  
2.12.   The representative of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  viewed this presentation as information 
sharing and did not agree to address suc h issue in the Committee since this work was outside the 
scope of the CTE.  WT/CTE/M/65  
 
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  2.13.   The representative of Switzerland  reiterate d their  commitment to wards  concluding  the EGA 
negotiations , which was one important exampl e of a win -win negotiation both for  trade  and the 
environment .  
2.14.   The representative of Canada  noted that Canada remained committed to concluding an 
ambitious, future oriented EGA that covered a broad range of goods. A successful EGA would 
create a win -win for trade and the environment. Canada encouraged  renewed engagement from 
EGA participants and would also welcome other Members' participation in this important initiative.  
2.2  Briefing on the WTO Secretariat's report on "Mainstreaming trade to attain the 
Sustai nable Development Goals (SDGs)"  
2.15.   The representative of the WTO Secretariat  briefed delegations on its recent report on 
"Mainstreaming trade to attain the SDGs", which looked at how engaging in international trade 
could help Members gain access to new markets and new investments, therefore  boosting growth, 
raising living standards and promoting sustainable development. The report w as intended as a tool 
to guide M embers on the various aspects of how trade could contribute to the central objectives of 
reducing poverty through economic expansi on. It first outlined how Members could get organized 
to mainstream trade to expand economic opportunities for poverty reduction. This was very 
important because trade had cross -cutting effects in the economy and significant linkages to other 
sectors. In o rder for Members to fully reap the benefits of trade, it was necessary to adopt 
approaches which aimed to mainstream trade into their national sustainable development 
strategies.  
2.16.   The publication covered the three dimensions of the Sustainable Development Agenda - 
economic, social and environmental – and sketched how trade could contribute to delivering 
positive outcomes in each of these areas. Under each of these sections, the report addressed in 
more detail the topic of measuring progress under specific t rade-related SDG targets through the 
inclusion of charts where the corresponding indicators could be tracked statistically. On the 
economic dimension of Agenda 2030, the report looked at how to pursue broad -based growth that 
delivered opportunities for all . Progress towards achieving the trade -related targets under SDGs 17 
and SDG 8 was also measured. For the social dimension, the report outlined how to improve living 
standards through trade, including by empowering women through international trade and 
analyzing the complex linkages between trade, technology and innovation. Under this section, 
progress was also measured towards achieving the trade -related targets in SDG  2, SDG 3 and  
SDG 10. On the environmental dimension, the report looked at how to use tr ade to achieve better 
economic growth that was coupled with better environmental outcomes. It also recounted progress 
on delivering on SDG target 14.6 related to fisheries subsidies.  
2.17.   Within each section the booklet also had boxes presenting some Member and sector case 
studies on mainstreaming, as well as some important facilities in the trade area that could help 
Members better take advantage of trade opportunities. The publication was forward -looking and 
attempted to identify emerging issues that required  the attention of the international community. 
The report concluded by outlining the following steps which could help to ensure that international 
trade contributed to accelerating progress in achieving the SDGs: mainstream trade into national 
and sector s trategies to achieve the SDGs; strengthen the multilateral trading system and its 
contribution to inclusive growth, jobs and poverty reduction; continue reducing trade costs 
including through full implementation of the WTO's Trade Facilitation Agreement; b uild supply -side 
capacity and trade -related infrastructure in developing country Members and LDCs; focus on 
export diversification and value addition; enhance the services sector; apply flexible rules of origin 
to increase utilization of preference schemes ; ensure non -tariff measures do not become barriers 
to trade; make e -commerce a force for inclusion; and support micro, small and medium -sized 
enterprises to engage in international trade.  
2.18.   The representative of Mexico  appreciated that the report addressed the link between the 
SDGs and trade, as well as the link with economic, s ocial and environmental factors, and valued 
particularly Chapter 6 on  "Recommendations on ways to accelerate progress in achieving the 
SDGs".  
2.19.   The representative of the European Union  noted that  the report would be a useful addition 
to the discussion on how trade could contribute to the achievement of the SDGs. It was an WT/CTE/M/65  
 
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  important topic in which the European Union was actively engaged, having participated in the 
recent "ECOSOC Forum on  Financing for Development" held in New York in April. In the context of 
the CTE, the European Union had shared  information on  its efforts to contribute  to the 
environmental SDGs 12  through 15. GSP Plus arrangements and the trade and sustainable 
developmen t chapters of the EU trade agreements committed partner economies  to ratify and 
implement MEAs  which could contribute to the se SDGs. As the report recognised, Aid for Trade 
could have a catalysing effect in leveraging trade 's contribution  to the SDGs. The European Union 
had recently updated its Aid for Trade strategy to maximise its contribution in this regard. 
Moreover, the European Union was an active participant in the ongoing fisheries subsidies 
negotiations to fulfil SDG target 14.6.  
2.20.   The representativ e of New Zealand  welcomed the WTO Secretariat's efforts to develop the 
policy links between trade and the achievement of the SDGs , including through the preparation  of 
reports. New Zealand agreed with the report's assessment that trade was a useful tool in spurring 
global development and that further progress at  the WTO could help fuel national development 
efforts. New Zealand also agreed that to maximise the develop ment potential of trade, trade 
policies needed to be considered in the context of the broader policy agenda , which catered to the 
specific development needs across economic, social and environmental spheres. New Zealand was 
focused on building a productive , sustainable and inclusive economy in which trade could serve as 
an important means to lift the productivity growth and aggregate income s and  on maximising the 
inclusive and sustainable aspects of economic growth.  
2.21.   New Zealand was shifting their focus on developing the capability to identify, evaluate and 
maximise the contributions of trade to the environment and society more broadly by looking at 
how trade could  help benefit women or indigenous people in pursuit of those broader objectives. 
New Zealand en couraged WTO Members to further explore this crucial policy area in their own 
context and to share any findings and experience with colleagues in the CTE and the Committee on 
Trade and Development. New Zealand was also a strong supporter of the work in the  fisheries 
subsidies negotiations.   
2.22.   The representative of Chile noted that  the report  was very useful to highlight the important 
role of trade for attaining the SDGs. Members  and international organisations had been working 
towards them. In that context, the WTO had an important role to play, for instance, in the area of 
fisheries subsidies.  
2.3  Briefings by observer organizations  
2.3.1   Briefing by the OECD  
2.23.   The representative of the OECD  provided an update on trade and environment work. First, 
on Regional Trade Agr eements (RTAs), a recent publication  on "Assessing the Implementation of 
Environmental Provisions in RTAs " identified  some  of the  elements  for a  successful 
implementation , such as capacity building , interagency coordination or public participation.  There 
was also s ome relevant anecdotal evidence, for instance: the strengthening of environmental laws 
and regulations ; the introduction of  new institutional arrangements ; and the improvement of  
environmental awareness in governance. The OECD had also released a paper on " Assessing the 
Effectiveness of Environmental Provisions in RTAs: An Empirical Analysis" , which  examined 
whether the se provisions improve d environmental quality. However, more research was necessary 
as there was not enough evidence to demonstrate a statistical ly significant contribution. In 2018, 
OECD had also conducted a "Workshop on RTAs and Environment" in Chile covering several issues, 
including  "Greening RTAs ", which was an on-going project looking into ensuring coherence among 
all chapters of  RTAs and not only environment -related ones.  
2.24.   Second, the OECD was working on  the topic of circular economy, which had gained a lot of 
political attention. There were i ncreasing linkages between international trade and circular 
economy for instance  with trade in second hand goods, refurbishment and remanufacturing, waste 
for recovery and secondary raw materials. OECD was investigating these interactions in various 
ways, including: the impacts of trade on circular economy; the possible necessity for policy 
alignment; the trade flows of wastes, secondary raw materials and second hand goods; and 
whether there was a need for international cooperation in this area.  WT/CTE/M/65  
 
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  2.25.   Third, th e OECD was developing a set of policy indicators on trade and environment . These  
were quant itative metrics designed to carry out policy -oriented analytical work and provide a 
technical basis for discussions on associated issues. The focus was on how trade patterns and 
environmental performance influence d each other , using the following  indicator s: the v olume of 
trade in environmental goods ; the v olume of trade in waste and scrap ; the n utrient balance of 
exports ; the e mbedded carbon emissions in trade ; and the e mbedded raw materials in trade . 
There were also  indicators that approached the question  of how environmental policies affect ed 
trade patterns (metrics on renewable energy support and fossil fuel subsidies)  as well as the 
relationship between trade policies and environmental performance  with the use of t ariffs on 
environmental goods.  
2.26.   Regardi ng future work,  and subject to the availability of funding, the OECD planned t o 
undertake work on three projects: an empirical analysi s on the drivers  of clean technology 
diffusion (the funding for this project had been approved for 2019 -2020); carbon leak age and the 
measurement of  the magnitude of carbon leakage , if any; and t rade in waste  and scraps  and the 
assessment of the  extent to which domestic environmental policies influence d economies  to export 
waste and scraps,  in so-called "pollution havens" . Finally, funding allowing, s ome delegations were 
interested  in two additional indicators : carbon emissions from trade -related international freight;  
and volume of i llegal trade in forestry products.  
2.27.   The representative of Switzerland  welcomed OECD's regular  update s on work o n trade and 
environment.  
2.28.   The representative of Chinese Taipei  noted that circular economy was a key economic policy 
in Chinese Taipei. For instance, there was a project to promote the "Application Scheme for 
establishing the Nationwide C ircular Zone Pilot Project and New Material Circular Industrial Park 
Project". The objective was to increase the waste -to-resources rate to two per cent and reduce the 
waste landfill and incineration rate to three per cent by 2020. A number of pilot projec ts would be 
developed in this regard. Chinese Taipei encouraged Members to share their policy experience on 
circular economy in the CTE.  
2.29.   The representative of the European Union  was particularly interested in OECD's work on 
greening RTAs, circular economy and indicators. Such work was particularly useful if done by 
neutral and respected bodies such as the OECD. The European Union looked forward to hearing 
updates on OECD's work in future meetings of the CTE.  
2.30.   The representative of New Zealand  expressed appr eciation for  the OECD 's work on trade 
and environment.  
2.31.   The representative of Chile shared information on the results of the "OCED -Chile W orkshop 
on RTAs and Environment ". The workshop had been held in Santiago  in January 2018 with the 
financial support of  the European Union. The workshop consisted of five sessions : an introduction 
on RTAs and the environment ; international and regional experience, particularly in Latin America; 
challenges in the monitoring and evaluation of environmental impacts of trade a greements ; the 
role of public participation in trade  agreements and the environment; and  the emerg ing topic of 
"Greening RTAs" , in particular, the provisions on investment protection. In conclusion, it was found 
that governments included environmental prov isions in their RTAs for four reasons:  to contribute 
to the overarching goal of sustainable development;  to ensure  a level-playing field among parties 
to the agreement ; to enhance environmental cooperation of shared  interest ; and to pursue  
environmental objectives. Moreover, in the current global context , governments were increasingly 
encouraged to take actions to improve the public perception o f trade and trade agreements and to 
contribute to the SDGs and the Paris Agreement.  
2.32.   The represen tative of OECD  looked forward to sharing future work in upcoming 
CTE meetings.  
2.3.2   Briefing by the IMO Secretariat  
2.33.   The representative of the IMO Secretariat  reminded delegations that  IMO had been  created  
70 years ago  as an international framework for the regulation of international shipping, aiming, 
inter alia, to enable  free trade. The international shipping sector was responsible for transporting  WT/CTE/M/65  
 
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  80% of world trade  by volume , and more than 70 % by value. Historically focused on safety, 
IMO had been increasing ly addressing  environmental impact s of international shipping. The Marine 
Environmental Protection Committee  was the main body responsible  for environmental regulation. 
Already i n 1997 , a resolution on " CO2 emissions from ships " had been  adopted , even  before the 
Kyoto Protocol. In December 2003, an Assembly Resolution had been  adopted on policies and 
practices related to the reduction of GHG emissions , spurring  an investigation of technical 
operations and market -based measures to reduce carbon emissions fro m international shipping.  
2.34.   Another important element of IMO's framework was the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships. Annex VI of the Convention  contained a chapter on energy 
efficiency and  provided for the control of nitrogen oxide , sulphur dioxide  and volatile organic 
compound emissions from ships . In 2020, a new regulation  would come in to force reducing the  
sulphur content of fuel oil used by  ships. Globally, the impact of that regulation  had been  
estimated at US$30 - 60 billion annually in additional cost s to the shipping sector.  IMO had also 
introduced mandatory energy efficiency standards  as well as mandatory reporting of fuel oil 
consumption data to further understand  consumption patterns  and related  emissions.  
2.35.   Although the Paris Agreement did not expressly mention international shipping and aviation 
emissions, anthropogenic sources targeted by the Agreement included those from these sectors. 
The inherent international nature of these sectors however made it hard to address their emissions 
through the Paris framework of NDCs. The Agreement thus reverted to the IMO to take action on 
emissions from the shipping sector. I n December 2017, the IMO Assembly had adopted a new 
strategic direction regarding the sector's response to climate change, fully recognising the role of 
international shipping in supporting SDGs  and Agenda  2030. According to the IMO's third 
GHG Study  (2014), international shipping emissions amounted to 800 million tonnes of CO2 
in 2012, represent ing about 2.2 % of global anthropogenic emissions,  the equivalent of Germany's 
emissions . The expected growth of shipping meant that, if no further mitigation action was taken , 
emissions would increase  between 50 % and 250 %, account ing for over 10 % of global GHG 
emissions in 2050.    
2.36.   In April 2018, the IMO had adopted its Initial Strategy on reduction of GHG emissions from 
ships. The Initial S trategy covered vision, levels of ambition and guiding principles . It also aimed 
at identifying measures to address GHG emis sions from international shipping , while addressing 
impacts and recognizing the critical  role of the sector  in supporting the continued development of  
global trade and maritime transport services . Another important aspect of the strategy would be 
addressin g barriers and supporting measures , including  technical cooperation and research and 
development  of new technologies and alternative fuels, a key area  for the maritime  sector . Under 
the Initial Strategy , IMO remained committed to reduc ing GHG emission s and aimed to pha se 
them out as soon as possible.  Specifically, t he Strategy called for a reduction of total annual GHG 
emissions by at least 50 % by 2050 compared to 2008 whilst pursuing efforts towards phasing 
them out on a pathway of CO 2 emissions reduction consistent with the Paris Agreement 's 
temperature goals . The Strategy also aimed at improv ing the energy efficiency o f ship s, reducing 
their carbon intensity by at least 40 % by 2030 , purs uing efforts towards 70%  
by 2050, compared to 2008. This  essentially meant that  more cargo would be carried with less 
energy over time . However, a caveat was included that such reductions  could only be done if 
alternative technologies were available , including zero-carbon or low -carbon fuels .  
2.37.   On the issue of technology, th e representative mentioned some future technologies, 
concepts and alternative fuels being considered by the sector, including an EU funded hydrogen 
initiative in Scotland, the potential use of ammonia -based fuel and an autonomous Norwegian 
electric ship. R eferring to a study conducted by the OECD's International Transport Forum , which  
focused on port -based incentive schemes , the representative noted the  importa nce of the whole 
logistic supply chain in support ing IMO goals of reducing GHG emissions.  
2.38.   The rep resentative of Norway  noted that m any issues presented by IMO  were highly 
relevant for the CTE. The sustainable use of the oceans was Norway's priority. Norway  welcomed 
IMO's  vision to reduce GHG emissions as well as  the concrete steps IMO had taken and lo oked 
forward to seeing more work of IMO on this issue in the future.  
2.39.   The representative of the European Union  said that  the agreement on the Initial Strategy  
was a great success and a good starting point . The European Union looked forward to seeing more 
concrete measures to ensure that the objectives of the Strategy were met, in cluding  in relation to WT/CTE/M/65  
 
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  the reduction of emissions from international shipping by 50 % by 2050. The European  Union 
looked forward to future updates o n IMO's work  in the CTE.  
2.40.   The representative of Panama  enquired whether IMO had conducted a study on the impact 
of the new Panama Canal. Prior to 2015 , most maritime ships were measured as Panamax, i.e. the 
maximum size of a ship that could go through the Panama Canal  (up to 5'000 containers ). With 
the new Panama Canal expansion, Neopanamax  boats could now transport up to 13 '000 
containers. As a result,  fewer ships with more cargo were going through the Panama Canal, using 
less fresh water . 
2.41.   The representative of New Zealand  commende d IMO 's marine environment protection and 
Initial Strategy for provid ing a clear and unambiguous signal for the shipping industry to phase out 
GHG emissions. New Zealand also welcomed the call to consider the impact on  LDCs and small 
island developing economies  who faced unique challenges to participate in trade. New Zealand was 
currently undertaking analytical work including in consultation with its industries to understand the 
impact of the Initial Strategy. New Zealand agreed that new technologies and in  particular, the 
uptake of zero carbon fuels , would be required to achieve the long -term ambition. New Zealand 
looked forward to engaging in IMO's work  and in further discussions to operationalise the strategy 
and finalise the work program to enable the revision of the strategy in 2023.   
2.42.   The representative of Canada  noted  that the Initial Strategy represented a key milestone  in 
IMO's work to address the impact of climate change from international shipping . Canada would 
have preferred a more ambitious strategy that included an agreed plan of action for 
imple mentation with a focus on short -term measures. However, Canada was  pleased  with the 
progress made thus far and remained committed to supporting work at the IMO in this area. 
Canada looked forward to working with international partners to develop measures to ensure that 
the agreed targets were supported by meaningful actions that would yield emissions reductions as 
soon as possible.  
2.43.   The representative of Chile noted that his delegation  was satisfied with the adoption of the 
Initial Strategy. The initiative would contribute to global mitigation efforts for the achievement of 
the Paris Agreement goal and the accomplishment of SDG 13 on climate change. This was  a very 
relevant first step  and discussions would now focus on the design of short -term measures. It was 
important to work together to make further progress but also  to consider  the impact s on Members .  
2.44.   The representative of the IMO Secretariat  said that c oncerns had been raised during 
discussions o n the Initial Strategy about the impact of potential measures  and f or instance  how 
the speed of shipping goods to distant markets  might be affected . Therefore, such concern s 
needed to be addressed when  going forward and that had been  recognised in the Strategy. At an 
upcoming IMO meeting, the action plan to start implementing the Strategy would be prepared  and 
short-term measures would be discussed . 
3  DATE OF NEXT MEETING  
3.1.  The next meeting of the Committee would take place in October/November 2018. The precise  
date would be communicated to Members in due course.  
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  ANNEX 1: ITEMS OF TH E CTE WORK PROGRAMME  
 
Item 1:  The relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and 
trade measures for environmental purposes, including those pursuant to 
multilateral environmental agreements.  
Item 2:  The relationship between environmental policies relevant to trade and 
environmental measures with significant trade effects and the provisions of the 
multilateral trading system.  
Item 3(a):  The relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and 
charges and taxes for environmental purposes.  
Item 3(b):  The relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and 
requirements for environmental purposes re lating to products, including standards 
and technical regulations, packaging, labelling and recycling.  
Item 4:  The provisions of the multilateral trading system with respect to the transparency 
of trade measures used for environmental purposes and environm ental measures 
and requirements which have significant trade effects.  
Item 5:  The relationship between the dispute settlement mechanisms in the multilateral 
trading system and those found in multilateral environmental agreements.  
Item 6:  The effect of envi ronmental measures on market access, especially in relation to 
developing countries, in particular to the least developed among them, and 
environmental benefits of removing trade restrictions and distortions.  
Item 7:  The issue of exports of domestically pr ohibited goods.  
Item 8:  The relevant provisions of the Agreement on Trade -Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights.  
Item 9:  The work programme envisaged in the Decision on Trade in Services and the 
Environment.  
Item 10:  Input to the relevant bodies in respect of appropriate arrangements for relations 
with intergovernmental and non -governmental organizations referred to in 
Article  V of the WTO.  
 
 
 WT/CTE/M/65  
 
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  ANNEX 2: PARTS OF TH E DOHA MINISTERIAL D ECLARATION THAT RELA TE  
TO THE WORK  OF THE C TE 
 
32. We instruct the Committee on Trade and Environment, in pursuing work on all items on its 
agenda within its current terms of reference, to give particular attention to:  
 
(i) the effect of environmental measures on market access, especially in relation to 
developing cou ntries, in particular the least  developed among them, and those situations 
in which the elimination or reduction of trade restrictions and distortions would benefit 
trade, the environment and development;  
 
(ii) the relevant provisions of the Agreement on T rade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights; and  
 
(iii) labelling requirements for environmental purposes.  
 
Work on these issues should include the identification of any need to clarify relevant WTO rules. 
The Committee shall report to the Fifth S ession of the Ministerial Conference, and make 
recommendations, where appropriate, with respect to future action, including the desirability of 
negotiations. The outcome of this work as well as the negotiations carried out under 
paragraph  31(i) and  (ii) sh all be compatible with the open and non -discriminatory nature of the 
multilateral trading system, shall not add to or diminish the rights and obligations of members 
under existing WTO agreements, in particular the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary a nd 
Phytosanitary Measures, nor alter the balance of these rights and obligations, and will take into 
account the needs of developing and least  developed countries.  
 
33. We recognize the importance of technical assistance and capacity building in the field of trade 
and environment to developing countries, in particular the least  developed among them. We also 
encourage that expertise and experience be shared with members wishing to perform 
environmental reviews at the national level. A report shall be prepare d on these activities for the 
Fifth Session.  
 
51. The Committee on Trade and Development and the Committee on Trade and Environment 
shall, within their respective mandates, each act as a forum to identify and debate developmental 
and environmental aspects of the negotiations, in order to help achieve the objective of having 
sustainable development appropriately reflected.  
 
 
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