G/AG/W/127  
 
26 May 2014  
(14-3153)  Page: 1/32  
Committee on Agriculture    
 
POINTS RAISED BY MEMBERS UNDER THE REVIEW PROCESS 
COMPILATION OF QUESTIONS FOR THE MEETING ON 5 AND 6 JUNE 20141 
The present document compiles questions receiv ed by the Secretariat by the deadline of 
22 May 2014 as specified in WTO/AIR/4298. 
  
_______________ 
 
                                               
1 This document has been prepared under the Secret ariat's own responsibility and is without prejudice 
to the positions of Members or to their rights or obligations under the WTO. G/AG/W/127 
 
- 2 - 
 
  Table of contents 
1   MATTERS RELEVANT TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMITMENTS: 
ARTICLE 18.6 .................................................................................................................. . 4 
1.1   Brazil's 2014-20 15 Harvest Plan .................................................................................. 4  
1.1.1   Question by European Union (AG-IMS ID 74022) ......................................................... 4  
1.2   Brazil's domestic support programmes .......................................................................... 4  
1.2.1   Question by United Stat es of America (A G-IMS ID 74021) ............................................ 4  
1.3   Canada's proposed ch anges to tariff  schedule ................................................................ 5  
1.3.1   Question by United Stat es of America (A G-IMS ID 74047) ............................................ 5  
1.4   Canada's dairy policies ............................................................................................... 6  
1.4.1   Question by New Zealand (AG-IMS ID 74058) ............................................................. 6  
1.5   Costa Rica's complian ce with AMS co mmitments ............................................................ 6  
1.5.1   Question by United Stat es of America (A G-IMS ID 74023) ............................................ 6  
1.6   Ecuador's domestic purchase requ irements ................................................................... 7  
1.6.1   Question by United Stat es of America (A G-IMS ID 74024) ............................................ 7  
1.7   Honduras' ta x exemptions .......................................................................................... 7  
1.7.1   Question by United Stat es of America (A G-IMS ID 74025) ............................................ 7  
1.8   India's subsidization policy .......................................................................................... 7  
1.8.1   Question by Paki stan (AG-IMS ID 74056)  ................................................................... 7  
1.9   India's national agri cultural insura nce scheme ............................................................... 7  
1.9.1   Question by United Stat es of America (A G-IMS ID 74049) ............................................ 7  
1.10   India's landholding laws ............................................................................................ 8  
1.10.1   Question by United States of America (AG-IMS ID 74051) ........................................... 8  
1.11   India's sugar export subsidies .................................................................................... 9  
1.11.1   Question by Australia (AG-IMS ID 74007) ................................................................. 9  
1.11.2   Question by Br azil (AG-IMS ID 7405 5) .................................................................... 10 
1.12   India's wheat stocks and exports .............................................................................. 11 
1.12.1   Question by Canada (AG- IMS ID  74001) .................................................................. 11 
1.12.2   Question by United States of America (AG-IMS ID 74048) .......................................... 11 
1.13   Saint Lucia's domestic purchase  requirements for poultry and pork ................................ 13 
1.13.1   Question by United States of America (AG-IMS ID 74044) .......................................... 13 
1.14   Thailand's paddy pledging scheme ............................................................................. 13 
1.14.1   Question by India (AG-IMS ID 74053) ..................................................................... 13 
1.14.2   Question by Pa kistan (AG-IM S ID 74057) ................................................................ 14 
1.14.3   Question by United States of America (AG-IMS ID 74050) .......................................... 14 
1.15   Turkey's domestic su pport and export subsidies .......................................................... 15 
1.15.1   Question by Europe an Union (AG- IMS ID 74020) ...................................................... 15 
1.16   U.S. Farm Bill ......................................................................................................... 15 
1.16.1   Question by Ar gentina (AG-IM S ID 74011) .............................................................. 15 
1.16.2   Question by India (AG-IMS ID 74054) ..................................................................... 17 G/AG/W/127 
 
- 3 - 
 
  1.16.3   Question by In donesia (AG-IM S ID 74059) .............................................................. 18 
2   POINTS RAISED IN CONNECTION WITH INDIVIDUAL NOTIFICATIONS .................... 19  
2.1   IMPORTS UNDER TARIFF AND OTHE R QUOTA COMMITMENTS  (TABLE MA:2) ..................... 19 
2.1.1   Canada (G/AG/N/CAN/95) ....................................................................................... 19 
2.1.2   China (G /AG/N/CH N/26) ......................................................................................... 19 
2.1.3   Costa Rica  (G/AG/N/ CRI/47) ................................................................................... 19 
2.1.4   Dominican Repu blic (G/AG/ N/DOM/22) ..................................................................... 19 
2.1.5   Ecuador (G/AG/N/EC U/38) ...................................................................................... 20 
2.1.6   Russian Federation (G/AG/N/RUS/4) ......................................................................... 20 
2.1.7   Chinese Taipei (G/AG/N/TPKM/112) .......................................................................... 20 
2.2   DOMESTIC SUPPORT COMMITMENTS (TABLE DS:1) ....................................................... 21 
2.2.1   Bahrain, Kingdo m of (G/AG/ N/BHR/ 7) ...................................................................... 21 
2.2.2   Brazil (G /AG/N/BRA/32) ......................................................................................... 21 
2.2.3   Canada (G/AG/N/ CAN/96, G/AG/N /CAN/98) .............................................................. 21 
2.2.4   Costa Rica (G/AG/N/CR I/44/REV.1, G/AG /N/CRI/ 48) .................................................. 22 
2.2.5   Dominican Repu blic (G/AG/ N/DOM/23) ..................................................................... 23 
2.2.6   Guatemala (G/AG/N/GTM/45) .................................................................................. 25 
2.2.7   Indonesia (G/AG/N/ IDN/30, G/AG/N /IDN/34) ............................................................ 25 
2.2.8   Japan (G /AG/N/JP N/191) ........................................................................................ 26 
2.2.9   Thailand (G/AG/N/TH A/75) ..................................................................................... 27 
2.3   NEW OR MODIFIED DOMEST IC SUPPORT MEASU RES (DS:2) .......................................... 29 
2.3.1   Canada (G/AG/N/CAN/99) ....................................................................................... 29 
2.3.2   Japan (G /AG/N/JP N/192) ........................................................................................ 30 
2.4   EXPORT SUBSIDY notification s (TABLES ES:1, ES:2 AND ES:3) ....................................... 31 
2.4.1   Morocco (G/AG/N/MA R/40) ..................................................................................... 31 
2.4.2   Thailand (G/AG/N/TH A/76) ..................................................................................... 32 G/AG/W/127 
 
- 4 - 
 
   
1  MATTERS RELEVANT TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMITMENTS: ARTICLE 18.6 
1.1  Brazil's 2014-2015 Harvest Plan 1.1.1  Question by European Union (AG-IMS ID 74022) 
According to press reports, on 19 May Brazilian President Rousseff launched the government's 
Harvest Plan for 2014-2015. The reports stated that: "The plan calls for R$156 billion (US$71 billion) in credit for the nation's farm ers, an increase of 14.7% over the 2013-2014 
harvest. The average annual interest rate for farm credit lines will be 6.5%, below the Selic rate 
which is currently at 11%. Officials estimated that the subsidized interest rates offered to farmers will cost the government between R$7 billion (US $3.1 billion) and R$10 bi llion (US$4.5 billion)." 
 
Could Brazil please provide further details of how this scheme will operate? Will all farmers be 
eligible for this support?   
1.2  Brazil's domestic support programmes 
1.2.1  Question by United Stat es of America (AG-IMS ID 74021) 
a. In response to the U.S. question (AG-IMS 66002), Brazil provided an annex indicating 
benefits under the "Prêmio para Escoamento  do Produto" (PEP) programme, Brazilian 
production, and exports, for crop years 2006/2007 through 2010/2011. 
Please provide an update to the tables included in the annex with the following 
additions:  
i. inclusion of benefits under Brazil’s "Prêmio de Equalização pago ao Produtor" 
(PEPRO) programme; 
ii. quantities of product exported under PEP; 
iii. quantities of product exported under PEPRO; 
iv. a new table for maize. 
b. The United States of America previously requ ested data on the quantities of products 
shipped to specific destinations for PEP and PEPRO, including both domestic and export 
destinations, either on an aggregated or specific basis. If Brazil is unable to provide this data, please clarify the following: 
i. Since the initial U.S. request in September of 2011, please describe specific steps 
Brazil has taken to gather the data, including details of CONAB's control mechanism 
that Brazil noted in response to AG-IMS 71028; 
ii. If not outlined above, please confirm whether CONAB's control mechanism has any 
internal deadlines and if so, provide the specific dates; 
iii. Has Brazil been able to collect any preliminary data that could be shared without 
prejudice to any final submission? 
iv. Please provide a date by which the United States of America can expect this data. 
c. In response to U.S. question AG-IMS 73026,  Brazil stated that the PEP reassessment is 
still in progress. Please provide any upda tes on the reassessment and confirm the 
programme remains suspended. G/AG/W/127 
 
- 5 - 
 
  1.3  Canada's proposed changes to tariff schedule 
1.3.1  Question by United Stat es of America (AG-IMS ID 74047) 
The United States of America appreciates Canada's responses to U.S. questions on this issue and 
has follow-up questions: 
 
a. In Canada's responses to questions posed by the United States of America 
(AG-IMS 73027) with respect to Canada's reclassification of certain components of 
certain food preparation products in Chapter 16 of the Canadian Customs Tariff 
Schedule, Canada stated that the measure in question was not implemented on a retroactive basis. 
i. Is it correct that if Bill C-31 ("An Act to Implement Certain Provisions of the Budget 
Tabled in Parliament on February 11, 2014 and Other Measures") receives royal 
assent, the effective date will be 29 November 2013? Would that be retroactive? 
ii. Please state whether Canada is currently enforcing the measure and, if so, when 
enforcement began. 
iii. If Canada is enforcing the measure, please explain the legal authority under which 
the government is permitted to do so prior to Bill C-31 receiving royal assent. 
b. In the response to the March 2014 questions submitted to this Committee, Canada 
stated that "it is too early to determine how the measure in question will impact trade" and that "various factors" could influence trade patterns. Graph 1 below shows that beginning in December 2013, the volume of Canada's imports of products affected by 
the measure and imported into Canada under harmonized schedule heading 
1601.00.90.90 dropped by approximately 50% and has continued falling. Now that six months have passed since the measure became effective, can Canada please explain 
what factors influenced this dramatic decrease in imports? 
Graph 1 
 
 
c. In its March 2014 response, Canada stated that the "limited gap between the tabling of 
the Notice of Ways and Means and its effective date" was "in order to discourage further circumvention of the law". The United States of America does not share Canada's characterization that the products impacted by Canada's change in tariff classification of 
processed products containing cheese were circumventing Canadian customs duties. In G/AG/W/127 
 
- 6 - 
 
  fact, from October 2006 to December 2013, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) 
maintained in certain advance rulings that it relied on World Customs Organization (WCO) General Interpretive Rule (GRI) No 1 and the relevant notes of the Customs Tariff to determine that certain food  preparations containing "more than 20% 
by weight" of meat and some cheese should properly be classified under tariff 
heading 1601.00.90.99. 
i. Please explain why CBSA has determined that its original and subsequent advance 
rulings between 2006 and 2013 pertaining to certain food preparations containing 
"more than 20% by weight" of meat and cheese are no longer correct. 
ii. Please explain whether Canada has changed its approach to interpreting 
WCO GRI No 1 for all products containing "more than 20% by weight" of meat and 
some cheese. 
iii. Please explain whether there are items ot her than cheese that have also been 
incorporated into the certain food preparations reclassification action. 
1.4  Canada's dairy policies 
1.4.1  Question by New Zealand (AG-IMS ID 74058) New Zealand has been made aware of a paper drafted by Canadian dairy producers outlining an 
Ingredients Strategy for the Canadian dairy industry. While New Zealand acknowledges that the 
paper is written by the industry, New Zealand notes there are references to the involvement of government in programmes that could potentially displace imports and also create the potential to export subsidised product outside of Cana da's current export subsidy commitments. 
Could Canada please confirm whether the Canadian government: 
 
a. Has been engaging with the industry on this new strategy? 
b. Intends to implement any parts of the strategy  requiring government involvement? If so, 
what parts, and how do they relate to Canada's commitments under the Agreement on Agriculture? 
1.5  Costa Rica's compliance with AMS commitments  
1.5.1  Question by United Stat es of America (AG-IMS ID 74023) 
The United States of America appreciates Costa Rica's continued transparency, but notes that the 
figure notified by Costa Rica for its price support programme for rice in its latest notification 
(G/AG/N/CRI/48) is above its final bound total AMS commitment. The United States of America 
requests responses to unanswered questions about Costa Rica's price support programme for rice (AG-IMS 73037, AG-IMS ID 71030, and AG-IMS ID 72050).  
 
a. Will producers be able to sell outside of the new system? If not, on what basis does 
CONARROZ have the authority to compel producers to participate in the new system?  
b. What is Costa Rica's timeline for publishing these new policies and for notifying them to 
the WTO?  
Costa Rica has previously stated to the Committee that CONARROZ is not a state-trading 
enterprise and the government is not part of CONARROZ's decision-making process or General 
Assembly. According to Decree No 8285 "C REACIÓN DE LA CORPORACIÓN ARROCERA", 
CONARROZ’s General Assembly is composed of re presentatives of producers, agribusiness, and 
ministers of Agriculture and Livestock, an d the Economy, Industry, and Commerce.  
 
c. Please provide citations to any relevant legislation or decrees that supersede Decree 
No 8285 and Decree 32968-MAG-MEIC, including specific reference to language that 
removes the government of Costa Rica from CONARROZ. G/AG/W/127 
 
- 7 - 
 
  1.6  Ecuador's domestic purchase requirements 
1.6.1  Question by United Stat es of America (AG-IMS ID 74024) 
The United States of America appreciates Ecuador's response to U.S. questions in AG-IMS 73038. 
In Ecuador’s response, it refers to "technical cooperation agreements". 
 
a. Are these agreements voluntary? 
b. Please identify any law, regulation or other legal instrument that requires or encourages 
importers or producers to enter into such agreements. 
Ecuador's response also states that technical cooperation agreements "are fully consistent with the 
WTO provisions".  
c. Please explain how these agreements are consistent with Ecuador's WTO obligations, 
including Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Ag riculture and Article III:4 of the GATT 1994. 
1.7  Honduras' tax exemptions  
1.7.1  Question by United Stat es of America (AG-IMS ID 74025) 
The United States of America understands that Honduras published in Executive Decree 
No 005-2014 on 8 February 2014 a list of 273 produc ts that will not be subject to Honduras' 
15% sales tax. 
 
a. Please explain how Decree No 278-2013 is being implemented. 
b. Please explain how Decree No 278-2013 is consistent with Honduras' 
WTO commitments, including Article III of GATT 1994. 
1.8  India's subsidization policy 1.8.1  Question by Pakistan (AG-IMS ID 74056) 
It seems that India is following a policy of "double subsidization" for producers of major crops such 
as rice and wheat. Large input subsidies are provided, and administered prices are announced 
before the sowing season with guaranteed proc urement. Could India please provide information 
about the future direction of this double-subsidization policy? India's important role in agriculture 
exports makes such information useful. India is no w the biggest exporter of rice in the world and 
among the top ten exporters of wheat. 
 
1.9  India's national agricultural insurance scheme 
1.9.1  Question by United Stat es of America (AG-IMS ID 74049) 
The National Agricultural Insurance Scheme (NAIS) was last notified by India under Supporting 
Table DS:1 as a payment for relief from natural disasters for expenditures that occurred 
in 2003/2004. According to the NAIS website, three levels of indemnity (payments) at the 90%, 80% and 60% level are available for all crops based on level of risk. However, according the 
Indian Ministry of Agriculture, more recently under the National Crop Insurance Program and Pilot 
Weather Based Crop Insurance Scheme these levels were set at 90%, 80%, and 70%, and for the 2013/2014 season would only be available at the 90% and 80% levels. Further, according to the Ministry of Agriculture, farmers have the option to  purchase insurance of up to 100% of the value 
of the threshold/average yield of the notifi ed area with a normal premium subsidy. 
 
a. Noting the significant delay in notifications by India, please explain how the National 
Crop Insurance Program's current operation differs from the programme notified in 
Supporting Table DS:1 in 2003/2004. G/AG/W/127 
 
- 8 - 
 
  b. When can Members expect a Table DS:2 notification for any Green Box components of 
India's insurance programmes? 
c. Noting that farmers have the option to purc hase up to 100% of the threshold yield and 
receive a normal premium subsidy, please explain how this is consistent with 
paragraph 7 or 8 of Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, specifically noting the 
30% loss threshold. 
d. In India's response to previous questions, (AG-IMS ID 65054 and 65055), India states 
that on average the threshold yield, which is the basis for the calculation of indemnity 
payments, is not more than 70% of the actual yield, and that the premium paid by farmers constitutes more than 30%. Please provide data demonstrating that this is the case given the absence of legislative or regu latory limits preventing payments for losses 
of less than 30%. 
e. Does India require a formal government recognition of a natural disaster in order for 
indemnity payments to be made per paragraph 8(a) of Annex 2? If not, has India 
considered notifying any Green Box component of this insurance programme under 
paragraph 7? 
f. Noting the threshold/guarantee yields are based on five-year averages for crops other 
than rice, please confirm whether these are a straight five-year average or a five-year 
Olympic average. 
1.10  India's landholding laws  1.10.1  Question by United Stat es of America (AG-IMS ID 74051) 
The United States of America thanks India for its partial response to AG-IMS ID 67026 and would 
like to follow up on its responses to ga in a better understanding of Indian policy. 
 
a. India has noted that landholding laws in India vary from state to state, but that 
"[o]verall, a farmer is not allowed to have more than 10 hectares of irrigated land". Also, India's AGST document states that it defines low-income or resource poor as a 
landholding of 10 hectares or less. The United States of America understands that one of 
several objectives of India's landholding law is to provide adequate means of livelihood for citizens. 
i. Please confirm the objectives of India's landholding laws. 
ii. How do these objectives align with India's requirement, in light of India's landholding 
laws, nearly all farmers remain by India's definition "low-income or resource-poor"? 
iii. Noting the limit on land ownership, what policies does India have in place with 
regards to the leasing of agricultural land, which would allow individuals to take 
advantage of economies of scale in farm production? 
iv. If the leasing of agricultural land is permitted, please provide any statistics on the 
amount of land leased. 
b. According to Ministry of Agriculture statistics comparing 2000/2001 to 2010/2011, the 
number of marginal (less than 1 hectare) and small (1-2 hectares) farms/holdings increased by 22% and 9%, respectively. Du ring the same period, semi-medium farms 
(2-4 hectares) declined by 1%, medium farms (4-10 hectares) declined by 11%, and 
large farms (10 hectares and above) declined by 19%. Further, the average size of a marginal farms decreased by 5% and small farms remained unchanged from 2000/2001 
through 2010/2011. Please explain the increa se in the number of the marginal and small 
farms and the decrease in semi-medium, medium and large farms. 
c. The United States of America notes that a number of agricultural policies in India include 
specific provisions that target small and marginal producers. This focus on small and G/AG/W/127 
 
- 9 - 
 
  marginal farmers is highlighted by the Eleven th Plan of the Government of India, which 
states "the agricultural strategy must focus on the 85% of farmers who are small and marginal, increasingly female, and who find it difficult to access inputs, credit and extension or to market their output". Further, the Indian National Commission for 
Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector, using data from the 59
th Round on Situation 
Assessment Survey of Farmers 2003, found significantly lower (or negative) net income for marginal and small farmers as compared to farmers with larger landholdings. Based 
on Indian policy and stated objectives, it appears that marginal and small farmers could 
be more analogous to the term "low-income or resource-poor" in the WTO. 
Please provide the basis upon which India determined that nearly All farmers should be 
considered "low-income or resource-poor" as compared to a subset of farmers, such as 
those deemed to be marginal and small. 
1.11  India's sugar export subsidies 1.11.1  Question by Australia (AG-IMS ID 74007) 
Australia acknowledges India's response to its questions at the March 2014 Committee on 
Agriculture in relation to its sugar exports subsidies.   
Australia wishes to affirm Australia's view that these export subsidy programmes are inconsistent 
with India's obligations and contrary to the spirit and letter of the Ministerial Declaration on export competition agreed last year in Bali.  
a. Can India please provide an update on the new programme brought into effect this year, 
especially in relation to published information about the value of export subsidy to be paid per tonne? 
b. Can India confirm that export subsidy payments have been made under the Sugar 
Development Fund (Amendment) Rules, 2014? 
c. Can India advise how many tonnes of raw sugar and how many tonnes of refined sugar 
have been exported: 
i. since the introduction of the Sugar Development Fund (Amendment) Rules, 2014? 
ii. Since the commencement of the 2013/2014 sugar season? 
d. Can India advise how many tonnes of raw sugar and how many tonnes of refined sugar 
were exported:  
i. between February 2013 and the end of the 2013/2014 sugar season? 
ii. during the 2012/2013 sugar season? 
e. If export subsidy payments have been made, Australia seeks further advice on the 
following:  
i. what is the total volume of raw sugar exports and refined sugar exports made since 
12 February 2014 that have been subject to incentive payments? 
ii. What is the total value of all incentive payments made to date on the export of sugar 
since 12 February 2014? 
iii. Can India advise the current average processing time between lodgement of an 
application for incentive and payment of an incentive? 
iv. Can India provide the latest average cost of  production figures on a tonne basis for 
those Indian raw sugar producers that have received an incentive payment? G/AG/W/127 
 
- 10 - 
 
  v. Can India provide the anticipated total va lue of the incentive payments over the 
expected duration of the scheme?  
f. If export subsidy payments have not been made, Australia seeks further advice on the 
following:  
i. can India advise if applications have been received for the incentive payment? 
ii. Can India advise when the fi rst payments will be made? 
iii. If applications have been received, can India advise the total value of incentive 
payments to be made against these applications? 
iv. If applications have been received, can India advise the total volume of raw and 
refined sugar exports subject to these applications? 
g. Can India advise if there is a maximum cap applicable to the per metric tonne incentive 
payment under the scheme? 
h. Could India provide a list of WTO Members that  have been subject to sales of subsidies 
sugar from India under this export subsidy programme? 
1.11.2  Question by Brazil (AG-IMS ID 74055) 
With a view to receiving a more complete response on this occasion, Brazil would like to reiterate 
some of the questions it presented to India in the context of the March 2014 Committee on 
Agriculture regarding sugar exports subsidies. 
 "Brazil is concerned with the impact in the world market and with the potential adverse effects to 
the interests of other Members caused by subsidized sugar exports from India. 
 
According to India's Official Gazette, dated 28 February 2014, raw sugar exporters from India are entitled to export subsidies amounting to 3,300 Rupees per metric tonne for February and 
March 2014. These subsidies will be subject to recalculation every two months taking into account 
the average exchange rate of the Rupee vis-à-vis the US Dollar.  
In this regard, Brazil would like to raise the following questions: 
 
a. Could India indicate the amount of export subs idies it will grant in budgetary outlays and 
subsidized quantities? 
b. Given that there has been to date no legally-binding decision by the WTO to extend the 
application of Article 9.4 of the Agreement of  Agriculture, what would be the legal basis 
for the provision of these export subsidies? 
c. Could India confirm whether these subsidies are intended to reduce marketing and/or 
transportation costs? If yes, how the actual costs incurred in the marketing and/or transportation of exported sugar impact the provision of the subsidy? 
d. Could India explain:  
i. the rationale for increasing so significantly the provision of export subsidies for 
sugar; 
ii. the steps it took to ensure compliance with the Ministerial Declaration adopted in 
MC-9 according to which Members shall exercise utmost restraint with regard to any 
recourse to all forms of export subsidies? G/AG/W/127 
 
- 11 - 
 
  1.12  India's wheat stocks and exports 
1.12.1  Question by Canada (AG-IMS ID 74001) The government of India in August 2013 approved the export of two million tonnes of wheat from 
government stocks through global tender s to be completed by 30 June 2014.  
 
a. Could India confirm if all of the two million tonnes of wheat have been tendered and if 
not, what volume of this wheat from government stocks was sold? 
b. India has previously indicated that export prices were between fob US$279.52 and 
US$289.90 per tonne. Has there been any change in the range of export prices now that the process is approaching the completion date?  
1.12.2  Question by United Stat es of America (AG-IMS ID 74048) 
In response to AG-IMS 73039, India detailed the cost of wheat as follows: "[t]he acquisition cost 
and incidental charges for 2 million tonnes of wheat exports from Central Pool stocks of FCI [Food Corporation of India] during 2013-2014 (December 2013 - February 2014 period) include pooled 
cost of grains to FCI, handling charges, gunny cost, administrative charges, statutory taxes and 
storage charges for a period of six months".  
The United States of America thanks India for this partial response, and notes that application of 
the pooled cost of grains appears unwarranted in this case because under the wheat export tender specifications provided on the PEC, STC and MMTC websites, all FCI-owned wheat exported is from 
the latest crop, i.e., from the 2013 rabi harvest, and thus was acquired at the 2013/2014 
minimum support price of 1,350 rupees per metric quintal. 
 The United States of America has calculated the cost to the government of India of exported wheat 
as follows, using information provided by India and applying it to a delivery from Karnal, Haryana, 
to Kandla port as an example. The United St ates of America has also used the following 
information derived from "Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India on Storage 
Management and Movement of Food Grains in Food Corporation of India, Report No 7 of 2013"
2. 
 
"Statutory charges include mandi charge s (Market fee, Dami/Arhatia Commission, 
Rural Development Cess, Auction fee), purchase/trade tax and gunny costs. Statutory 
charges (except gunny cost) are levied by the State Governments as a fixed 
percentage of the MSP. Non-statutory charges include mandi labour, transportation costs, driage losses, custody and maintena nce charges, interest and milling charges, 
etc. 
Mandi labour charges ranged from rupees 9.47 per quintal to rupees 14.09 per quintal 
in respect of wheat in major procuring states (Punjab, Haryana, UP and MP) during 
the period 2006-07 to 2011-12.  
Transportation and handling charges ranged from rupees 11.83 per quintal to rupees 
27.98 per quintal in respect of wheat in major procuring states (Punjab, Haryana, UP and MP) during the period 2006-07 to 2011-12.These charges, however, ranged from 
rupees 11.56 per quintal to rupees 17.97 per quintal in respect of Rajasthan during 
the same period." 
                                               
2 Downloadable from: 
http://saiindia.gov.in/english/home/Our_Products/Audit_Report/Government_Wise/union_audit/recent_reports
/union_performance/2013/Civil/Report_7/Report_7.html  G/AG/W/127 
 
- 12 - 
 
  a. The United States of America requests th at India confirm the accuracy of these 
estimates for delivery of Haryana 2013 crop wheat to Kandla port in 50-car unit trains: 
Item Rupees 
per metric 
tonne Dollars 
per 
metric 
tonne1 Source and comments 
Cost of wheat 13,500 221.31 IFY 2013/2014 minimum support price 
Storage charges 368.4 6.04 3.07 rupees/month/50-kg bag at CWC warehouse Karnal 
Handling charges 
(mandi and warehouse labor) 301 4.93 Karnal CWC labor costs, 40-45 rupees/metric ton per 
movement, times 4 movements (~170 rupees total), plus mandi labor costs per Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board,
2 6.55 rupees per 50 kg. bag, or 
131 rupees per metric ton 
Gunny cost 600 9.84 Price of jute bags at Karnal, 30 rupees/bag times 
20 bags per ton 
Administrative charges 334.68 5.49 http://fciweb.nic.in/finances/view/9 , Procurement 
incidentals, wheat 
Statutory taxes 1,417.5 23.24 Haryana tax rate of 10.5% times MSP, which includes 
market fees, market cess, VAT 
Rail transportation 1,486.08 24.36 www.fois.indianrail.gov.in  
TOTAL  18,008  295.21   
1 Exchange rate 61 rupees per dollar. 
2 "Market charges (payable by the Buyer pe r unit for 50 kg)". See page 2 of Memo 
No ME(I)-A-III-2013/76955-7706 dated 3 December 2013, http://hsamb.gov.in/notification.pdf  
 
b. The United States of America notes that by this estimate the cost of wheat ex FCI's 
warehouse in Kandla would exceed the mini mum export price established by India of 
$260 per metric tonne by $35.21. 
Is India considering raising its minimum export  price to ensure that no bids fall below 
the cost to India of its government-owned wheat shipped to export destinations? 
c. The United States of America has also estimated the cost to India of a 30,000 metric 
tonne shipment of FCI wheat exported from Pipava port following the tender that closed on 3 February 2014. According to press report s, the price of that wheat as awarded was 
$275.20/metric tonne. The United States of Am erica has assumed for purposes of this 
estimate that the wheat was of Punjabi origin and was shipped by 50-car unit train 
("50-wagon rake") from Ludhiana. G/AG/W/127 
 
- 13 - 
 
  Item Rupees 
per metric 
tonne Dollars per 
metric 
tonne1 Source and comments 
Cost of wheat 13,500 217.74 IFY 2013/2014 minimum support price 
Storage charges 368.4 5.94 3.07 rupees/month/50-kg bag at CWC warehouse 
Karnal 
Handling charges 
(mandi and warehouse labor) 298 4.81 Ludhiana CWC labor costs, 40-45 rupees/metric ton per 
movement, times 4 movements (~170 rupees total), plus 11.80 rupees per quintal at the mandi per http://dfpd.nic.in/fcamin/policy/Punjab.pdf  
Gunny cost 646.8 10.44 64.68 rupees/quintal per 
http://dfpd.nic.in/fcamin/policy/Punjab.pdf  
Administrative charges 334.68 5.40 http://fciweb.nic.in/finances/view/9 , Procurement 
incidentals, wheat 
Statutory taxes 1,957.5 31.57 Punjab tax rate of 14.5% times MSP 
Rail transportation 1,841 29.69 http://www.fois.indianrail.gov.in/ , Ludhiana-Pipava 
TOTAL  18,946  305.59   
1 Exchange rate average of 62 rupees per dollar in February 2014. 
 
According to this estimate, this shipment of wh eat was exported at a price $30.39 below the total 
cost to the Indian government. Please confirm the accuracy of these estimates. If they are 
incorrect, please explain how and provide an accurate estimate.  1.13  Saint Lucia's domestic purchase  requirements for poultry and pork 
1.13.1  Question by United Stat es of America (AG-IMS ID 74044) 
The United States of America appreciates Saint Lu cia's response to question AG-IMS 72055 related 
to the domestic purchase requirement for pork and poultry.  
 
a. Please explain how the quantities for domestic purchase requirements for poultry and 
pork St. Lucia mentions in its response e. to AG-IMS 72055 (25% for poultry and 40% 
for pork) are calculated. 
The United States of America did not receive an  answer to question b of AG-IMS 73040. The 
United States of America repeats the request: 
b. Please explain how Saint Lucia's domestic purchase requirements for poultry and pork 
are consistent with Saint Lucia's WTO obligations, including Article 4.2 of the Agreement 
on Agriculture and Article III:4 of the GATT 1994. 
1.14  Thailand's paddy pledging scheme 
1.14.1  Question by India (AG-IMS ID 74053) 
India is concerned about the reports in media about sale of excess paddy from the government 
stocks by Thailand at heavily discounted prices.  
 
a. India will appreciate if Thailand could share details of the quantities procured, 
procurement prices, additional costs of acquis ition and storage as well as selling price of 
paddy/rice (on monthly basis) in the last two crop years and the quantities sold. 
b. How does Thailand ensure that the highly subsidized rice under the paddy pledging 
scheme is not exported? 
c. How does Thailand justify procurement prices higher than the export price of rice? G/AG/W/127 
 
- 14 - 
 
  d. Can Thailand provide figures of rice exported during the last two crop years with export 
prices? 
e. Thailand may kindly comment on the compatibility of the action of the Thai government 
in selling rice stocks for exports at a fr action of procurement prices, with the WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture. 
1.14.2  Question by Pakistan (AG-IMS ID 74057) According to the Thailand Development Research In stitute, "through the rice pledging scheme, the 
price at which the government bought from farmers was unprecedentedly high, 50% more than 
the market price, and for the first time it bought unlimited amounts of rice. This has made the scale of loss massive. There is debate over how much loss the scheme incurred a year, ranging from 150 to 200 billion baht (equivalent to about 6-8% of the government's current budget). 
Under the most recent rice-pledging scheme the government still owes farmers 140 billion baht. 
TDRI research is of the view that an alternative rice policy should aim to protect farming against unanticipated negative shocks rather than subsidize the price of rice. And under no circumstances 
should the government act as a market player (and especially as a monopoly) in the rice industry." 
 
a. Pakistan understands that this scheme has now finished. Could Thailand please explain 
what alternatives are being considered to reduce government involvement in the rice 
market? 
b. Could Thailand please indicate how much rice stock has been released from these stocks 
in 2014? 
c. At what price is the government releasing stock to the private sector? 
d. Is the government also involved directly in the export of long grain rice? How much rice 
(all varieties) was exported by the government in 2013 and 2014? 
e. Pakistan’s understanding is that through the Paddy Pledging scheme, the government 
intervened in the market and the effect of that policy was support through an administered price. This support price intervention resulted in an artificial increase of rice 
prices which benefitted the rice growers in the short-term (not in the long term because 
it affected competitiveness). When will Thailand notify this scheme as described in Annex 3, paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Agreement on Agriculture? 
f. Are there any new programmes to encourage production of long grain rice through 
government intervention? If there is any, could Thailand please explain the role of 
government in promoting such programmes? 
1.14.3  Question by United Stat es of America (AG-IMS ID 74050) 
The United States of America understands that due to the situation in Thailand, the Paddy Pledging 
Scheme was not continued for the off-season MY 2013/2014.  
a. Please confirm that the programme is no longer operational for MY 2013/2014 or 
forward. 
The United States of America notes that the administered price under the Paddy Pledging Scheme 
was B 14,400 per tonne for the main crop, but since the programme was discontinued market 
prices in Thailand have fallen dramatically to approximately B 7,000 per tonne. 
b. Please confirm the quantity of paddy rice Thailand procured under the Paddy Pledging 
Scheme for the main crop of MY 2013/2014. The United States of America understands 
that 11.6 million metric tonnes were procured. 
c. Please confirm whether the cost of the Main-Crop Rice Paddy Pledging Program is 
B 190 billion (US$5.8 billion) for MY 2013/2014. G/AG/W/127 
 
- 15 - 
 
  Further, the United States of America notes that Thailand conducted a tender of nearly 
213,000 metric tonnes and that bids from both exporters and domestic millers ranged from 
17%-33% below market prices, which themselves are less than one-half of the administered price. 
In addition, the United States of America notes the dramatic decline in market prices in 2014. 
d. Please confirm whether any of these bids were accepted and if any tenders were 
exported. 
e. What specific measures is Thailand taking to ensure it remains compliant with its WTO 
commitments, particularly export subsidy commitments as it reduces government 
stocks? 
The United States of America notes that Thailand  has not responded to the following questions: 
AG-IMS 73041 and AG-IMS 72056. The United States requests that Thailand submit responses to 
these questions. 
1.15  Turkey's domestic support and export subsidies 1.15.1  Question by European Union (AG-IMS ID 74020) 
The European Union would like to repeat the ques tion asked at the Committee on Agriculture in 
March 2014 which has not yet been answered. 
a. Given that Turkey has not submitted domestic support (DS:1) and export 
subsidies (ES:1) notifications to the Co mmittee on Agriculture since 2001 and 2000 
respectively, could Turkey please indicate when it intends to submit these overdue 
notifications to the WTO? 
b. In the meantime, could Turkey please conf irm that since 2001 its budgetary outlays and 
eligible quantity in concept of export subsidies, including in citrus fruits, have remained 
within its commitments?  
c. Could Turkey please confirm that its AMS has remained since 2002 below its de minimis  
level? 
1.16  U.S. Farm Bill 1.16.1  Question by Argentina (AG-IMS ID 74011) 
Commodity Provisions 
 
a. What is the rationale for eliminating prog rammes such as the CCP (Counter Cyclical 
Payments), SURE (Supplemental Revenue Assi stance) and ACRE (Average Crop Revenue 
Election) and replacing them with ARC (Agriculture Risk Coverage) and PLC (Price Loss 
Coverage)? 
b. Given their similarities, what is the difference between CCP and PLC? What is the 
difference between ACRE and ARC? How do these differences affect the implementation 
of U.S. commitments in respect of the Agreement of Agriculture?  
c. Why have the Direct Payment Programs and the Average Crop Revenue Election 
Programs been eliminated? 
d. The "reference prices" of the new Price Loss Coverage (PLC; Section 1116) programme 
trigger payments to farmers under this pr ogramme. They are much higher than the 
similar price used by the predecessor programme in the 2008 Farm Bill now 
discontinued, the Counter Cyclical Payments (CCP), i.e. its "target price" minus the 
"direct payments rate". 
i. What is the rationale of increasing the reference price in more than 50% for most of 
the covered crops (cereals: barley, corn, oats, sorghum and wheat; oilseeds: 
soybeans, minor oilseeds; other crops: dry peas, lentils)? G/AG/W/127 
 
- 16 - 
 
  ii. How does the United States of America view that the higher reference prices in 
commodity programmes and the enhanced dairy margin protection will be consistent with the continuation of the reform process provided for in Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture and the Doha Work Program? 
iii. Based on new target prices and USDA price projections, what is the Amber Box 
(Current Total Aggregate Measures of Support) estimated for the next five years? Is there a mechanism to foresee well in advance the possibility of AMS commitments 
being overstepped in a scenario of falling prices? 
e. Agricultural Risk Coverage Program (ARC) 
i. The choice of a farmer for either a "county" ARC or an "individual" ARC: is it for all 
the crops on a farm or for each individual crop on the farm? Can the farmer have two 
different crops in each type ARC programme or is the choice applicable to the whole 
farm? 
ii. The ARC seems to address income risk of farmers. Why can't this risk be addressed 
with market measures, such as risk insurance offered by private insurance 
companies? 
f. Marketing Assistance Loans (MALs) 
Could United States of America explain how Marketing Assistance Loans operate? 
g. Crop Insurance 
In order to be able to make a better analysis, could the United States of America provide 
the yearly value of production of the most re cent available year of each crop covered by 
the crop insurance programme? 
h. Caps on payments, eligibility and small farmers  
How many farms do the United States of Amer ica estimate are eligible to receive support 
under PCL or ARC, and Marketing Assistance Loans (MAL)? 
Dairy programmes 
 
a. Why have the three major price and income support programmes such as Dairy Product 
Price Support Program, Milk Income Loss Contract Program and Dairy Export Incentive Program , (DPPSP, MILC, DEIP) of dairy provisions been eliminated? And how will the Margin Protection Program (MPP) and the Dairy Product Donation Program (DPDP) 
operate along with the New Farm Bill? 
b. What are the major differences between th e two new programmes (MPP, DPDP) and the 
three programmes (DPPSP, MILC, DEIP) that were eliminated? 
c. The newly established Margin Protection Program (MPP, Sections 1401-1410). 
i. Can the United States of America explain why the new Farm Bill introduces a double 
protection for the U.S. dairy producer: 
 against reductions in milk prices; and 
 against increases in feed costs? 
ii. Can the United States of America can explain why the new Farm Bill does not include 
a payment cap for each dairy producer (compare with the commodity programs of the 2014 Farm Bill and with the repealed  dairy MILC subsidies of the 2008 Farm 
Bill)? G/AG/W/127 
 
- 17 - 
 
  iii. Has the USDA evaluated the impact on the rational expectations of dairy producers 
which could increase production as a result of their perception of less risk for dairy production? 
iv. Do the Farm Bill or USDA implementation regulations foresee any means to reduce 
the level of subsidies that MPP might add? 
d. Dairy Product Donation Program (DPDP; section 1431) 
i. Which dairy products can be purchased by the government under this programme? 
ii. Which state entity will carry out the purcha ses? What is the role of the Commodity 
Credit Corporation? 
iii. Is there any mechanism to verify that these purchases of dairy products (as provided 
for in Section 1431(e)1) will not be exported? 
iv. Are there any provisions to ensure that if a non-profit organization receives dairy 
products, transferred from another non-profit organization as foreseen in Section 1431(e)2, they cannot be exported? 
Other general questions 
 Could the United States of America inform abou t the work of the 2014 Farm Bill implementation 
regulations by the USDA? 
1.16.2  Question by India (AG-IMS ID 74054) 
a. Price Loss Coverage (PLC) Programme 
The PLC programme is similar to the Countercyclical Payments Program. However, the 
PLC Programme will be much more lucrative for farmers as the new programme guarantees them much higher prices for covered crops. 
i. In light of this, could the United States of America indicate whether termination of 
CCP Program and introduction of PLC Program will result in reducing domestic support? The expected reduction or otherwise in the domestic support due to the 
above action may kindly be provided.  
ii. Some estimates suggest that the PLC Program will result in allocating most of the 
total subsidies to the largest 15% of fa rms whose owners on average earn over 
US$140,000 per year and whose wealth is measured in multiple millions of dollars. 
Could the United States of America confirm these estimates? 
iii. When will the United States of America no tify the trade distorting PLC Program under 
its Amber Box entitlements? 
iv. Peanut and rice farmers benefit especially from the PLC. The Act's proposed peanut 
target price exceeds any of the Congressional Budget Office market price forecasts for the next five years. Could the United States of America explain the basis for 
calculating the target prices for peanut and rice in detail? 
b. Supplemental Coverage Option (SCO) Program 
i. Could the United States of America confirm that expenditure under the (SCO) 
Program would be categorized under the Amber Box? 
ii. Could the United States of America indicate the percentage of the total expenditure 
under SCO Program that would flow to the farmers and to farm insurance companies respectively? G/AG/W/127 
 
- 18 - 
 
  c. International Food Aid 
Some studies (Professor Christopher Barrett of Cornell University and others) have 
estimated that requiring U.S. sourcing and tr ansport of food on U.S. flagships increases 
the costs of aid by 50%. This also slows th e delivery of such aid by many weeks and 
months. Could the United States of America indicate how the Farm Act will address these 
issues? 
d. Crop Insurance Programs  
Crop insurance programmes in the United Stat es of America do not meet the criteria of 
Section 7 (government financial participation in income insurance and income safety net programmes) and Section 8 (payments made either directly or by way of government financial participation in crop insurance scheme for relief from natural disasters) of 
Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. The United States of America has notified crop 
insurance programmes under Amber box support as a non-product specific support. However, these crop insurance programmes are aimed at specific commodities and not 
for the whole range of farm products. These payments also depend on expected price 
and yield of a specific crop. Even under new Farm Act 2014, crop insurance like supplemental coverage option (section 11003) and STAX (11017) are based on 
individual yield and prices of a crop. 
i. Therefore, the United States of America is requested to clarify the reasons for 
treating crop insurance as a non-product specific support rather than a product specific support under Amber box. 
ii. The United States of America is requested to provide the following information 
related to crop insurance from 2002 onwards: 
 Crop-wise as well as total public subsidy for insurance premium; 
 Crop-wise as well as total indemnities paid to farmers; 
 Crop-wise as well as total insurance premium paid by farmers. 
iii. The cost of administering insurance contract s, which is provided by private agents 
but reimbursed by the government and government reinsurance (which is provided 
to the private insurance companies), were notified in the Green Box "General Services" category. Government reinsurance provided to the private insurance companies is part of the farm subsidy because government provided reinsurance is 
likely to result in lower premiums than if an equivalent amount of reinsurance had to 
be purchased in the private reinsurance ma rket. Therefore, these expenses should 
be treated as Amber box as a part of insurance subsidies. The United States of 
America is requested to clarify its position on this issue. 
iv. Stacked Income protection Plan is a crop insurance plan available to cotton farmers 
only. The established coverage based on recent yield data rather than historical and 
fixed production or area. Therefore, STAX payments are coupled support as these 
subsidies are based on changes in market revenues and on planted acres. Thus, STAX should be classified as a product specific support for cotton. India requests the government of the United States of America to clear its position on this issue. 
1.16.3  Question by Indonesia (AG-IMS ID 74059) 
In the written response by the United States of America to question from Indonesia in March 
Meeting (AG-IMS ID 73043), it is stated that "…the 2014 Farm Bill has not yet been fully 
implemented. As a result, the administrative pr ovisions for these and other programmes have not 
yet been established…" Could the U.S. delegates give the latest update on the administrative 
provisions being developed to prepare the implementation of the Farm Bill? 
 G/AG/W/127 
 
- 19 - 
 
  2  POINTS RAISED IN CONNECTION  WITH INDIVIDUAL NOTIFICATIONS 
2.1  IMPORTS UNDER TARIFF AND OTHER QUOTA COMMITMENTS (TABLE MA:2) 2.1.1  Canada (G/AG/N/CAN/95) AG-IMS ID 74015: Question by Switzerland - Transparency issues 
In its Customs Tariff 2014
3 Canada records tariff quotas for certain products from Chapter 1806. 
Its Table MA:1 and MA:2 notifications, inter alia  G/AG/CAN/95, do not mention any tariff quotas 
for 1806. Could Canada please explain what these tariff quotas are and what their sizes are? 
 
2.1.2  China (G/AG/N/CHN/26) 
AG-IMS ID 74002: Question by Canada - Tariff quota fill 
Canada thanks China for its recent Table MA:2 notification for calendar year 2012 and welcomes 
the improvement in China’s wheat TRQ fill sinc e 2009. While China’s TRQ imports for wheat in 
2012 almost tripled from 2011 to 3.701 million tonnes in 2012, the TRQ imports still represented less than half of its WTO TRQ quantity (i.e. a fill  rate of 38.4% in 2012). Could China provide:  
 
a. the reasons for its increased wheat TRQ imports in 2012; 
b. outline the steps China will take to further improve the fill rate for its wheat TRQ? 
2.1.3  Costa Rica (G/AG/N/CRI/47) 
AG-IMS ID 74003: Question by New Zealand - Tariff quota fill 
New Zealand notes that for the previous five years, Costa Rica has made use of its import quota 
for HS 0402 - milk and cream, concentrated or containing added sugar or other sweetening 
matter, which has a tariff quota quantity of 344.2 tonnes.  
 The exact numbers of quota fill are: 
 
Year In-quota imports 
(tonnes) 
2008 294 
2009 72.5 
2010 17.1 
2011 89.84 
2012 132.641 
 However, in its most recent notification for the 2013 calendar year, Costa Rica has notified zero 
imports under this quota. New Zealand would like Costa Rica to clarify why this quota was not utilised in 2013.  
2.1.4  Dominican Republic (G/AG/N/DOM/22) 
AG-IMS ID 74026: Question by Euro pean Union - Tariff quota fill 
The Dominican Republic notifies a high level of fill rates for most tariff quotas. However, there are 
two exceptions, chicken meat and rice. 
 
a. For several years, the tariff quota for chicken meat has had a low fill rate (less 
than 18%). Could the Dominican Republic please inform the Committee of the reasons 
behind this low fill rate? 
                                               
3 
http://saiindia.gov.in/english/home/Our_Products/Audit_Report/Government_Wise/union_audit/recent_reports
/union_performance/2013/Civil/Report_7/Report_7.html  G/AG/W/127 
 
- 20 - 
 
  b. The fill rate of the tariff quota for rice has suddenly decreased considerably (89% less 
than notified for 2011). Could the Dominican Republic please inform the Committee of the reasons behind the considerably lower fill rate? 
2.1.5  Ecuador (G/AG/N/ECU/38) 
AG-IMS ID 74027: Question by Euro pean Union - Transparency issues 
According to the notification from Ecuador the 17 bound tariff quotas have not been used during 
2012. What are the reasons behind this? Does Ecuador import these products out of quota? 
AG-IMS ID 74036: Question by United St ates of America - Transparency issues 
The United States of America appreciates Ecuador's responses to U.S. questions in AG-IMS 73044. 
The United States of America understands that Ecuador administers non-automatic import licenses to distribute its quotas based on discussions in the Import Licensing Committee (See 
G/LIC/Q/ECU/3 and G/LIC/Q/ECU/4), most recently  on April 15. The United States of America 
appreciates Ecuador's initial responses to these questions, and looks forward to seeing more 
complete responses to those questions and questions in G/LIC/Q/ECU/5. In addition, the United 
States of America previously asked Ecuador questions regarding tariff-rate quota administration, 
and would like further clarification on questions from AG-IMS 73044.   
a. What is the official process for requesting frozen chicken parts, HS 02071400? 
b. Where can importers and exporters find in formation about the request procedure? 
2.1.6  Russian Federation (G/AG/N/RUS/4) AG-IMS ID 74028: Question by Euro pean Union - Transparency issues 
The commitments of Russian Federation include eight bound tariff quotas. Six of them are notified 
individually in a transparent way; however two of them, the quota for fresh, chilled, frozen pork and the quota for pork trimming are not notified separately but merged into a single notification. 
 
a. The European Union requests the Russian Federation to notify in line with its 
commitments, in particular by notifying each individual quota separately. 
b. Further, could the Russian Federation explain the relatively low rate of fill for the quota 
for fresh and chilled beef (42.9% - imports of 17,195 tonnes of an overall quota of 40,000 tonnes). 
AG-IMS ID 74004: Question by Canada - Tariff quota fill 
Canada notes that the TRQ fill for fresh and chilled beef TRQ was filled at only 42.9%, while the 
frozen beef TRQ was filled at 90.1%.   
a. Could the Russian Federation clarify the reason s for the low TRQ fill for its fresh chilled 
beef TRQ in 2013?  
b. Could the Russian Federation also outline th e reasons why there is a large discrepancy 
in TRQ fill between the fresh and chilled and frozen beef TRQs?  
c. What steps will the Russian Federation take to increase the fill rate of its fresh and 
chilled beef TRQ?  
2.1.7  Chinese Taipei (G/AG/N/TPKM/112) 
AG-IMS ID 74060: Question by Indonesia - Tariff quota fill 
Chinese Taipei notified the TRQ fill rate for bananas, dried day lily, mangoes, and shaddocks at 0% 
and betel nuts at 0.16%.  
 
a. What is the reason behi nd these fill rate levels? G/AG/W/127 
 
- 21 - 
 
   
b. What is the trend of fill rate of these products in the last 5 years?  c. What is the trend of fill rate of products under TRQ? 
 
2.2  DOMESTIC SUPPORT CO MMITMENTS (TABLE DS:1) 
2.2.1  Bahrain, Kingdom of (G/AG/N/BHR/7) 
AG-IMS ID 74037: Question by United St ates of America - Transparency issues 
(including Table DS:2) 
The United States of America appreciates Bahrain's efforts to bring its domestic support 
notifications up to date. The United States of America notes that Bahrain has notified for 2013, but 
not 2012. When does Bahrain expect to notify 2012? 
AG-IMS ID 74038: Question by United States  of America - Input subsidies available to 
low-income or resource-poor producers 
Bahrain has notified input subsidies for crops and animal products inputs generally available to 
low-income or resource-poor producers.   
a. How does Bahrain define "low-income or resource-poor"?  
b. What percent of Bahraini agricultural  producers meets this definition?  
c. How is this support measure implemented?  
2.2.2  Brazil (G/AG/N/BRA/32) 
AG-IMS ID 74041: Question by United St ates of America - Transparency issues 
(including Table DS:2) 
In response to the U.S. question (AG-IMS 73032), Brazil indicated that no budgetary expenditures 
were provided for cotton, coffee, or corn in certai n notified years; therefore Brazil has not notified 
any programme (even with a zero for budgetary expenditures). This notification of support only in years of expenditures limits transparency of the full policy picture in Brazil. In the past, the United 
States of America notified in the same manner. However, to improve transparency of 
U.S. agricultural policies, the United States of America now includes notification via footnote of support programmes that are in place, but did not have any expenditure.   
Has Brazil considered doing something similar? 
 
AG-IMS ID 74042: Question by United States of America - Market price support: Eligible 
production  
In response to the U.S. question (AG-IMS 73033), Br azil indicated that total production is not used 
for the minimum support price calculation because the benefited production is limited and depends 
on the available budget outlays. 
 Please confirm whether the eligible production notified in Supporting Table DS:5 represents all production that could have received the administered price for each programme, given each 
programme's limits on purchases. 
 2.2.3  Canada (G/AG/N/CAN/96, G/AG/N/CAN/98) 
AG-IMS ID 74030: Question by European Unio n - Transparency issues (including Table 
DS:2) 
Regarding G/AG/N/CAN/96, 
 
a. This notification shows a continuation of the trend of reductions in Canada's Current 
Total AMS compared to notifications for the time prior to the adoption of the Growing G/AG/W/127 
 
- 22 - 
 
  Forward policy agreement. Could Canada explain which changes to the policy in 
particular contribute to the AMS reductions notified in 2010 and 2011. 
b. In a note to Supporting Table DS:4 Canada explains that "Value of production for most 
products is equal to total market receipts (source: Statistics Canada, 
Table 002-0001-Farm Cash Receipts, annual (dollars), CANSIM (database), November 
2013) . For grains and oilseeds, value of production is equal to production multiplied by 
price (source for production: Statistics Canada CANSIM Table 001-0010, 
December 2013; source for price: based on Statistics Canada Farm Cash Receipt 
prices)".  Could Canada clarify why a distinction is made between grains and oilseeds and 
other products in this context? 
AG-IMS ID 74062: Question by Indonesia - Tr ansparency issues (including Table DS:2) 
Regarding G/AG/N/CAN/98, 
 
a. Canada allocates significant amount of produc t specific support for beef, pork, milk and 
butter. What is the export share of these products on the world market in the last 5 years?  
 
b. Several products (such as beef, pork, sheep) seem to receive several types of support 
(either product or non-product specific and either from federal or provincial government). 
Are producers of these products also recipients of AgriInsurance (formerly production insurance)?  
AG-IMS ID 74061: Question by Indonesia - Direct payments: income insurance and 
income safety-net programmes 
Regarding G/AG/N/CAN/98, 
 
How is income insurance and income safety net programme operated? How does Canada 
determine the eligibility criteria for farmers to receive such payment?  
AG-IMS ID 74031: Question by European Union - Non-product-specific AMS 
Regarding G/AG/N/CAN/96, 
 
a. The support notified under AgriInsurance in Supporting Table DS:9 has increased 
compared to the 2010 notification. Could Ca nada explain the reasons for the increase? 
b. Could Canada provide more details on what measures are included under the heading 
"Provincial Programs" in Supporting Table DS:9? 
2.2.4  Costa Rica (G/AG/N/CRI/44/REV.1, G/AG/N/CRI/48) 
AG-IMS ID 74005: Question by New Zealand - General services: pest and disease control 
Regarding G/AG/N/CRI/44/Rev.1, 
 
New Zealand would like Costa Rica to clarify what is covered by "improved domestic production" under its Table DS:1 notification heading "Pest and disease control – Animal health programme". This measure apparently covers: "General programmes to preserve, protect and enhance the 
health status of the country's livestock through improved domestic production, animal health, 
veterinary public health and environment protection, and the application of domestic and international standards for that purpose". 
AG-IMS ID 74006: Question by New Zeal and - Direct payments: payments under 
environmental programmes 
Regarding G/AG/N/CRI/44/Rev.1, 
 
New Zealand would like Costa Rica to clarify what sort of "financial incentives" are being provided in the programmes set out under the heading "(j) Environmental programmes" in Costa Rica's DS:1 notification. 
 G/AG/W/127 
 
- 23 - 
 
  AG-IMS ID 74008: Question by Canada - Scheduled commitment level 
Regarding G/AG/N/CRI/48, 
 The issue of Costa Rica exceeding its domestic support commitment has been raised and discussed 
previously at this Committee. Canada notes Costa Rica's commitment to transparency and its 
engagement with Canada and other Members on this issue. At the March 2014 meeting Costa Rica informed the Committee that work was underway to develop an alternative mechanism to replace 
the current market price support for rice. The expected implementation date is 1 March 2015. 
Costa Rica's domestic notification for the 2013 reporting period (G/AG/N/CRI/48) shows a Current Total AMS that is five times more than its domestic support commitment. Could Costa Rica provide an update on the domestic process for the elimination of the price support for rice and the 
development of an alternative mechanism? 
AG-IMS ID 74034: Question by Europe an Union - Scheduled commitment level 
Regarding G/AG/N/CRI/48, 
 
The European Union appreciates Costa Rica's continuous transparency via notifications and various exchanges on its rice policy. The current notification (G/AG/N/CRI/48) under review again reflects 
the breach of Costa Rica's AMS commitment.  
 Could Costa Rica update the Committee on the progress in defining an alternative mechanism of support as a follow-up to the delay in the elimination of price support mechanism for rice until 
March 2015? 
 2.2.5  Dominican Republic (G/AG/N/DOM/23) 
AG-IMS ID 74046: Question by United St ates of America - Transparency issues 
(including Table DS:2) 
a. The United States of America understands  that the government of the Dominican 
Republic also conducts activities to stabilize prices for other agricultural products, 
including potatoes. 
i. Please explain if these activities are incl uded in G/AG/N/DOM/23, and if so, where? 
ii. Please describe how this activity is implemented, including information about the 
administrating institution. 
iii. Please provide a list of products benefi ting from price stabilizing activities. 
b. The United States of America understands  that the government of the Dominican 
Republic is implementing an agricultural support programme through the Special Fund of 
the Agricultural Development (FEDA), which is funded directly through the Dominican Presidency. For example, the FEDA website
4 provides examples of programmes for 
improved greenhouses, support for coffee pr oducers, and development of a genetic 
collection center. Please explain if and how this programme is included in G/AG/N/DOM/23. 
c. The United States of America understands  that the government of the Dominican 
Republic contributes funding to Agrodosa, which provides agricultural insurance to 
agricultural producers. 
i. Please explain if this is the insurance programme to which the Dominican Republic 
referred in AG-IMS 67021. If not, please explain where this programme is notified in 
G/AG/N/DOM/23. 
ii. Please describe how this programme is implemented, including the loss coverage 
levels. 
                                               
4 http://www.feda.gob.do/  G/AG/W/127 
 
- 24 - 
 
  iii. Please confirm that the Ministry of Agri culture subsidized from 25%-50% of the 
value of the insurance premium, as it states at http://www.agricultura.gob.do/sobre-
nosotros/dependencias/agrodosa/ . 
iv. Please provide financial outlays for this programme in 2012. 
AG-IMS ID 74045: Question by United States  of America - General services: marketing 
and promotion services 
a. In Supporting Table DS:1, the Dominican Republic lists "Promotion of other crops" at a 
value of DR$1,069,137,711, up from DR$600,052,371 in 2012. Please explain why there 
was such a significant increase and if the pr ogramming changed as a result of increased 
funding. 
b. The United States of America notes that  in Supporting Table DS:1, the Dominican 
Republic lists "Construction and rehabilitation of farm roads" under Marketing services. 
Please explain why the Dominican Republic did not categorize this as (vi) Infrastructure services, per Agreement on Agriculture, A nnex 2, General Services, paragraph 2(g). 
c. The United States of America notes that the Dominican Republic notifies "Provision of 
inputs and small-scale tools", which includes providing small producers with farming tools and inputs needed to grow various crops. 
i. Please describe what inputs and small-scale tools are distributed and how they are 
distributed. 
ii. What are the requirements to receive the distributed benefits, including the definition 
of "small producers"? 
iii. Please explain how this programme meets the requirements of paragraph 2 of 
Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agricultur e, including why this programme is 
categorized under Marketing services and ho w such expenditures do not reduce the 
selling price. 
iv. Please explain why this is not notified under Article 6.2 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture. 
d. Please confirm that, as was the case in the Dominican Republic's 2012 DS:1 notification, 
the Pignoración programme is included under the subheading "Promotion of rice production". Please also explain if there have been any changes in the Pignoración 
programme, or if the following are still true (per Dominican Republic’s response to 
AG-IMS 67021): 
i. Benefits of the programme are available to all producers: however more than 50% of 
production arises from "small and medium sized"? 
ii. Pignoración operates by allowing rice producers to obtain an interest-free loan 
equivalent to 70% of the value of th at deposited in specified warehouses? 
iii. The Dominican Republic pays the storage costs, including insurance, and those 
outlays are included in the subheading "marketing and promotion services"? 
e. The United States of America also would like to raise several additional questions related 
to the aforementioned Pignoración programme questions and responses. 
i. What percent of producers and processors each participate in the Pignoración 
programme? 
ii. What percent of rice production in Dominican Republic is deposited in the specified 
warehouses? Please also provide further detail regarding what percentage of 
producers deposit rice in the specified warehouses and what factors do producers use G/AG/W/127 
 
- 25 - 
 
  to determine whether to deposit rice in the specified warehouses or other 
warehouses? 
iii. Please confirm that the Dominican Republic pays all storage costs under the 
Pignoración programme. If not, please describe what costs are covered and if there 
are any limits. 
iv. Please confirm that under the Pignoración programme that the National Rice 
Commission (CONA), which is composed of Ministry of Agriculture, producers, 
processors, retailers, among others, establishes price controls both annually and for 
each of the two harvest periods. 
v. In response to questions by the United States of America (AG-IMS 66055 
and 67021) regarding the Dominican Republic's notified rice production and 
marketing programme, the Dominican Republic stated that the "Pignoración program 
is not related to the rice price support sch eme". Please confirm that the objective of 
the "rice price support scheme" is to "maintain price stability for production chain 
participants" and is designed to ensure larger profit margins, but does not have an 
effect on markets or result in a direct ec onomic benefit to producers and purchasers? 
vi. How does Dominican Republic notify th e "rice price support scheme" and why? 
2.2.6  Guatemala (G/AG/N/GTM/45) 
AG-IMS ID 74052: Question by United St ates of America - Transparency issues 
(including Table DS:2) 
The United States of America appreciates Guatemala's response to U.S. questions in 
AG-IMS 73049. 
 
a. Please confirm that funding from both domestic sources and external sources are 
included in Guatemala's supporting tables in G/AG/N/GTM/45. 
b. If so, please explain why Guatemala included funding from external sources. 
2.2.7  Indonesia (G/AG/N/IDN/30, G/AG/N/IDN/34) 
AG-IMS ID 74043: Question by United St ates of America - Transparency issues 
(including Table DS:2) 
The United States of America repeats question s previously asked in AG-IMS 73052, 71031, and 
72036 since Indonesia has not notified Supporting Tables DS:4 and DS:5, nor submitted a revision 
to its notification for administered prices during 2001-2004. 
 Could Indonesia please explain and provide further clarity regarding the acquisition of stocks for its 
public stockholding for food security purposes programme in light of seemingly contradictory 
information in its notifications and responses to  questions in the Committee. Please address the 
following points in particular: 
 
a. The United States of America notes that Indonesia states that stocks are procured at 
administered prices, which take market prices into account but are not the sole determining factor (G/AG/W/111, AG-IMS ID 70026). 
b. The United States of America also notes that Indonesia has not provided a Supporting 
Table DS:4 or Supporting Table DS:5 to account for the use of administered prices per footnote 5 of paragraph 3 of Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
c. Further, the United States of America understands Indonesia's response to part (b) of 
AG-IMS ID 70031 to state that no administered price was reported after 2001 due to Indonesia's procurement being for buffer stock operations. Please explain how this is 
consistent with footnote 5. G/AG/W/127 
 
- 26 - 
 
  2.2.8  Japan (G/AG/N/JPN/191) 
AG-IMS ID 74068: Question by Indonesia - Tr ansparency issues (including Table DS:2) 
The government of Japan seems to provide many support programmes to farmers (such as 
agricultural insurance programme, natural disaster relief loans, farmers' pension programme, 
agriculture loan, payment for conversation from rice production, payment to dairy farmers, 
payment to farmers in the hilly and mountainous areas etc.). Nevertheless, Japan still launched new direct payment programme to motivate farmers to continue rice production and other 
payment to stimulate young farmers. 
 In Japan's view, how effective is the programme support for farmers in stimulating agriculture production in Japan? 
 
AG-IMS ID 74063: Question by Indonesia - Public stockholding for food security 
purposes 
The government of Japan conducts a public stockholding programme for food security purposes for 
rice, wheat, barley, soya beans and feed grains.   
a. How does Japan manage its public stockholding programme? 
  b. Does the government make domestic procurement?   
c. If so, does Japan use market price or administered price in the procurement? 
 d. What is the level of import of each product under the public stockholding programme? What is 
its percentage vis-à-vis the total production? 
 e. There is a slight increase of budget allocation  for public stockholding from ¥22.7 billion in 2010 
to ¥23.3 billion in 2011. What was the reason behind such increase? 
 
AG-IMS ID 74064: Question by Indonesia - Direct payments: payments for relief from 
natural disasters 
How does the agricultural insurance scheme operat e? What are the eligibility criteria for such 
scheme? 
AG-IMS ID 74065: Question by Indonesia - Direct payments: structural adjustment 
assistance provided through pr oducer retirement programmes 
What are the eligibility criteria for farmers' pension programme? How does the programme 
operate? 
 
AG-IMS ID 74009: Question by Canada - Direct payments: payments under 
environmental programmes 
Japan reports payments for "… maintaining the paddy fields in environmentally good condition 
through growing any plants other than rice or other appropriate managements". Expenditures 
amounted to ¥231.3 billion, ¥228.4 billion and ¥228.4 billion in 2010, 2011 and 2012 respectively. These expenditures are significant. Paragraph 1 of  Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture sets 
the guidelines that any domestic support measure for which exemption from the reduction 
commitments is claimed shall meet the fundamenta l requirement that they have no, or at most 
minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on pr oduction. However, providing a monetary incentive 
to encourage producers to grow non-rice crops could distort the production of non-rice crops. 
 
a. Could Japan explain how this kind of payment does not distort the production of non-rice 
crops? 
b. Could Japan indicate which non-rice crops have benefited from this measure? G/AG/W/127 
 
- 27 - 
 
  c. Could Japan elaborate as to how it determines the amount of payment to farmers, i.e. 
does the payment only cover the extra costs to plant non-rice crops or the difference in income between rice and non-rice crops?  
AG-IMS ID 74010: Question by Canada - Pa yments based on 85% or less of the base 
level of production 
In previous notifications Japan reported payments to rice producers under the Rice Farming 
Income Stabilization Program, however, in G/AG/N/JPN/191 payments to rice producers were 
made under the measure Direct Payment for Rice. 
 
a. Could Japan confirm that the Rice Farming Income Stabilization Program is no longer in 
effect? According to G/AG/N/JPN/192, this payment was introduced as a pilot 
programme in FY2010 and formally launched in 2011. Subsequent to the launch of the 
programme the payments are much less than from the pilot stage, ¥153.3 billion and ¥155.2 billion in 2011 and 2012, respectively compared to ¥306.8 billion in 2010. 
b. Could Japan elaborate on the reason for the lower payments post the pilot phase of the 
Rice Payment Program? 
c. Could Japan provide information on the total amount of production area that received a 
payment in 2011 and 2012? 
AG-IMS ID 74066: Question by Indonesia -
 Other product-specific AMS/EMS 
How are deficiency payments related to beef, veal and meat of swine operated? 
 
AG-IMS ID 74067: Question by Indonesia - Non-product-specific AMS 
How does the crop income stabilization payment operate? 
 
2.2.9  Thailand (G/AG/N/THA/75) 
AG-IMS ID 74013: Question by Canada - Tr ansparency issues (including Table DS:2) 
Canada notes that the total expenditures in Supp orting Table DS:1 claimed as exempt from the 
reduction commitment or Green Box increased si gnificantly to B64,019 million in 2008 from 
B35,092 million in 2007. Most of this increase can be attributed to substantial increases in expenditures related to National Extension and Advisory Services and Infrastructural Services. 
 
a. Could Thailand elaborate on the factors that resulted in the increase in expenditures 
under National Extension and Advisory Services from B2,371.34 million in 2007 to B11,333 million in 2008? 
b. Could Thailand elaborate as to which types of infrastructure listed in the description of 
Infrastructural Services contributed to the increase in expenditures from B25,517.74 million in 2007 to B42,662.30 million in 2008? 
AG-IMS ID 74035: Question by European Unio n - Transparency issues (including Table 
DS:2) 
The European Union appreciates Thailand's notification covering the calendar year 2008. In 
anticipation of further notifications covering more recent years, the European Union would like to 
ask the following questions: 
 
a. Could Thailand provide further information on the schemes notified under Supporting 
Table DS:7 (Paddy Pledging Scheme, Market in tervention for garlic, manioc and longan)? 
In particular, could Thailand explain why they consider these schemes should be 
classified as "other product-specific  support based on budgetary outlays"? 
b. Could Thailand provide further details on what elements of public spending are included 
under the budgetary outlays for Paddy Pledging Scheme in Supporting Table DS:7? G/AG/W/127 
 
- 28 - 
 
  c. The European Union considers that Supporting Table DS:4 should contain all support 
elements presented in Supporting Tables DS:5 , DS:6, DS:7 and DS:8 of the notification 
with relevant amounts which take account of the de minimis  provision where necessary. 
Such presentation, in the European Union's view, correctly reflects the calculation of the 
Current Total AMS. Would Thailand consider revising their notification? 
AG-IMS ID 74014: Question by Canada  - Other product-specific AMS/EMS 
a. Canada notes that in 2008 the support for rice in Supporting Table DS:7 is provided 
exclusively from its Paddy Pledging Scheme  compared to previous years (2005, 2006, 
2007) as reported in G/AG/N/THA/72 where support was provided under the Paddy Pledging Scheme and the Soft Loan Measure. Could Thailand advise if the Soft Loan Measure is still in effect for rice?  
b. Canada notes that the support for rice increased significantly to B29,654.11 million in 
2008 from B15,054.08 in 2007 under the Paddy Pledging Scheme which is reported as de minimis  whereas in 2007 support for rice was reported as Current Total AMS. Could 
Thailand elaborate on the reasons for the trem endous increase in the value of production 
for rice such that the 2008 support is de minimis ?  
AG-IMS ID 74040: Question by United Stat es of America - Other product-specific 
AMS/EMS 
The United States of America notes that this is Thailand's first DS:1 notification to the Committee 
since 2010 for the years 2005-2007. This notification  provides data on Thailand domestic support 
policies for 2008. A number of questions submitted by Members regarding Thailand's domestic 
support policies remain outstanding. The United States of America has questions submitted in 
2010 that remain unanswered.  
Since 2010, Thailand, a major global trader of rice, has had two major reforms to its rice policy, 
which account for a large portion of its AMS support. This Committee is responsible for reviewing and discussing Members' agricultural policies, especi ally those policies of any country that plays a 
key role in international markets. Without transparency, Members of this Committee are unable to 
have the most effective discussions possible in understanding agricultural policies around the world.  
The United States of America resubmits its qu estions dated 31 March 2011 (AG-IMS 61054) and 
asks the same questions for notification G/AG/N/THA/75.  
a. For 2002-2004, Thailand's rice AMS had three components: Paddy Pledging Scheme, 
Soft Loan Measure, and Market Price In tervention. For 2005-2007, only the Paddy 
Pledging Scheme and Soft Loan Measure are included. Could Thailand explain what is 
included within each category and how the budgetary outlays were calculated? For 
example, how is the interest subsidy calculated? Why was Market Price Intervention no longer notified for 2005-2007? 
b. How are the various government schemes to support storage costs accounted for in the 
domestic support notification? 
c. As part of the Paddy Pledging Scheme, the Th ai government often acquires large stocks 
of rice. These rice stocks are then sold under government tenders. If the rice stocks are 
sold at a price less than the price at which the rice was acquired, how is that budgetary 
loss accounted for in the AMS for rice? 
d. For many years, Thailand has set a minimum intervention price for rice under which the 
government supports domestic prices; acquires stocks if producers choose not to redeem 
their loans; and makes direct sales to companies for use in the domestic market or for export. Thai government interventions (such as the Paddy Pledging Scheme, the Direct 
Purchase Programme (of the PWO), and others) were intended to increase farm income 
by increasing the value of rice; that is, by increasing the effective price farmers received. 
Why has Thailand not notified its rice support as market price support, since the G/AG/W/127 
 
- 29 - 
 
  intervention price appears to be an applied administered price, as described in Annex 3, 
paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Agreement on Agriculture? 
e. Could Thailand provide more detail about the programme for "consolidation of land use 
in agriculture irrigation areas", including what programme expenditures are for? Does 
the programme buy agricultural land, consolidate such holdings, and then provide that 
land to producers? If so, what are the terms at which such land is made available to producers? 
f. Are "intervention prices" connected to the Paddy Pledging Scheme and the Soft Loan 
Measures in any direct way, i.e., are intervention prices referenced in administrative or implementation documents and authorities of the "Paddy Pledging Scheme" and the Soft 
Loan Measures?  
2.3  NEW OR MODIFIED DOMESTI C SUPPORT MEASURES (DS:2) 
2.3.1  Canada (G/AG/N/CAN/99) AG-IMS ID 74029: Question by European Unio n - Transparency issues (including Table 
DS:2) 
I n  i t s  n o t i f i c a t i o n  C a n a d a  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  " A l i m e n t s  d u  Q u é b e c  i s  a n  o r g a n i z a t i o n  f o u n d e d  b y  
members of industry with mission to promote Quebec  agri-food products". By way of clarification, 
could Canada confirm that public spending is involved in the financing of the "Campagne régionale 
Aliments du Québec, toujours le bon choix! (Regional Food Campaign of Quebec, Always The Right Choice!)". 
AG-IMS ID 74017: Question by Australia - Direct payments: payments under regional 
assistance programmes 
Can Canada provide more detail as to the specific nature of the Programme pilote d'appui à 
multifonctionnalité de l'agriculture (Pilot Programme to Support Multifunctionality of Agriculture) 
and specifically, what projects have been funded under this programme? Specifically, can Canada 
provide advice against the policy objectives outlined below:  
 the development of landscapes; 
 attractiveness of territories; 
 accessibility of rural areas; 
 preserving the agricultural heritage; 
 the provision of services to the community. 
In particular, Australia is keen to understand if the specific projects amount to on-farm 
investments or input subsidisation related to farm production. 
 
There are no policy-specific criteria for multifunctionality. In this context, and with regard to the compliance of this programme with the policy specific criteria of paragraph 13, can Canada provide 
additional detail on how farmers are selected for projects under this scheme, and on the basis 
which it has determined that eligible recipients are in "disadvantaged regions". 
AG-IMS ID 74069: Question by Indonesia - Direct payments: payments under regional 
assistance programmes 
In "Programme Support Multifunctionality of Agriculture", financial assistance is given to small 
farms located in the disadvantaged region identifi ed by MRC or regional county municipalities.  
 
a. Is the assistance provided to all small farms in the disadvantaged area? If not, what are the 
criteria for eligibility to receive such support?  
b. How does Canada define disadvantaged region? G/AG/W/127 
 
- 30 - 
 
   
2.3.2  Japan (G/AG/N/JPN/192) 
AG-IMS ID 74019: Question by Canada - Direct payments: structural adjustment 
assistance provided through investment aids 
The "Payment for farmland accumulation" aims to  make farm operation units more efficient by 
facilitating consolidation of scattered parcels of land and thereby enlarging farmers' operation units. However, it is unclear whether the payment covers the outright title transfer (ownership 
transfer) from one farmer to another, or a temporary management transfer (leasing or renting) for 
a specific period from one farmer to another. Canada understands that under the "Payment for 
new young farmers" programme, fixed income support will be provided to new young farmers registered in each regional plan during the two-ye ar training period and that the initial operation 
period (up to an additional five years) would compensate initial investment costs in the form of 
direct payments.   
a. Could Japan clarify under the provisions of "Payment for farmland accumulation" if a 
farmland transaction is an outright purchase or lease transfer? 
b. Could Japan provide the eligibility criteria for the "Payment for new young farmers" 
regional plans, such as whether they w ill have production-specific requirements? 
AG-IMS ID 74071: Question by Indonesia - Direct payments: structural adjustment 
assistance provided through investment aids 
a. In the payment for farmland accumulation programme, is there any limit for land 
accumulation or volume of production? 
b. Indonesia notes that "payment for new young farmers" is an income support programme 
to secure labor force in agriculture. The payment will be cut off when the income of 
young farmer under the programme exceeds certain amount. 
i.  How is "new young farmer" defined? 
 
ii. What is the threshold income to determine the eligibility for farmers to continue the 
programme? Will the threshold be updated?  
iii. The programme is operational since 1 April 2012. How many farmers have been 
taking part in this programme?  
 
iv. What is the level of expectation of this programme in relation to the efforts to address 
the decreasing labor force in agriculture? 
 
AG-IMS ID 74018: Question by Canada - Paym ents based on 85 per cent or less of the 
base level of production 
The payments provided under the new measure "Direct Payment for Rice" are reported in 
G/AG/N/JPN/191 and are significant amounts, ¥306.8 billion, ¥153.3 billion and ¥155.2 billion in 2010, 2011 and 2012 respectively. Could Japan provide further details on the two components 
used to determine the payments under this measure: 
 
a. What years are used in the "historical gap"?  
b. How is the "fixed threshold" determined?  
AG-IMS ID 74070: Question by Indonesia - Pa yments based on 85 per cent or less of the 
base level of production 
Indonesia noted that in G/AG/N/JPN/192, Japan mentioned that the reason for the new direct 
payment programme for rice is to address the aging and decreasing number of farmers and substantial decline in agricultural income.   G/AG/W/127 
 
- 31 - 
 
  a. How many farmers in Japan are eligible for this payment and what is the percentage vis-à-
vis the total number of farmers in Japan?   
b. What is the current level of income of famers under this programme? 
 
The payment consists of fixed component calcul ated based on the historical gap between the 
national average cost of production and farm ga te price, and variable component when the farm 
gate price goes below a fixed threshold. 
 c. How is the national average cost of production calculated? What are the elements in the 
calculation? 
 
d. How is the fixed price threshold calculated? Is the threshold updated? How is it updated? 
 
e. What are the variable components taken into account in calculating the payment? 
 
f. What is the difference between this new direct payment programme with the previous 
one?  
 
AG-IMS ID 74039: Question by United States of America - Payments based on 85 per 
cent or less of the base  level of production 
a. Japan describes its production-limiting programme, the Direct Payment for Rice, 
(G/AG/N/JPN/192) as having a fixed and variable component to payments, which are made on a per unit area of production. Please provide further explanation of the 
payment programme, including:  
i. how the historic gap between the national average cost of production and the farm 
gate price is calculated for the fixed component; 
ii. the level and basis for the fixed threshold for the variable component; 
iii. how the programme operates to limit production. 
b. Please explain why funding for Direct Payment for Rice was nearly double in 2010 
(¥306.8 billion), the pilot year for the programme, as compared to 2011 (¥153.3 billion) 
and 2012 (¥155.2 billion) (G/AG/N/JPN/191). 
i. The United States notes that 1.13 million hectares of 2.36 million hectares of paddy 
fields were enrolled in the pilot year. Please include in your response: data on 
enrolled hectares in subsequent years; how enrollment eligibility is determined; and 
any changes to the program subsequent to the pilot year.  
c. Please explain how the Direct Payment for Ri ce programme differs from the Rice Farming 
I n c o m e  S t a b i l i z a t i o n  P r o g r a m  n o t i f i e d  i n  p r e v i o u s  y e a r s  a s  D i r e c t  P a y m e n t s  u n d e r  
Production-Limiting Programs.  
2.4  EXPORT SUBSIDY notifications (TABLES ES:1, ES:2 AND ES:3) 2.4.1  Morocco (G/AG/N/MAR/40) 
AG-IMS ID 74016: Question by Australia - Spec ial and differential treatment (Article 9.4) 
Australia thanks Morocco for its transparency, including its efforts to bring its notifications up to 
date. Australia seeks further information about the nature of its notified export subsidy 
programme. In particular, can Morocco please advise a United States Dollar (USD) equivalent for 
its expenditure against the various product groups as advised in the latest notification?  
Australia notes its view that Article 9.4 was av ailable for the implementation period only. Can 
Morocco please explain the legal basis of its contin ued use of Article 9.4? What, if any, plan does 
Morocco have to terminate the export subsidy programme, consistent with its obligations, and the G/AG/W/127 
 
- 32 - 
 
  declaration by Ministers at the 2013 Bali Ministeria l Conference to "exercise utmost restraint with 
regard to any recourse to all forms of export subsidies"? 
AG-IMS ID 74033: Question by European Union - Special and differential treatment 
(Article 9.4) 
Morocco notifies the use of export subsidies that are exempted from reduction commitments for 
developing country Members according to Article 9.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture. According to the notification, Morocco used export subsidies of the mentioned type to subsidise exports of fruits 
during the years 2008 – 2011, flowers and vegetables during 2010 – 2011 and olive oil 
during 2011. According to Article 9.4 of the Agreem ent on Agriculture such export subsidies were 
exempt from reduction commitments for developing country Members during the "implementation period". 
 
What is Morocco's interpretation of the term "implementation period" in this context?  
2.4.2  Thailand (G/AG/N/THA/76) 
AG-IMS ID 74012: Question by Australia - Transparency issues 
Australia thanks Thailand for its latest notification and notes the advice that Thailand did not 
provide any export subsidies. Can Thailand please confirm that consistent with Article 9.1(b) that it 
did not sell or dispose for export non-commercial stocks of any agricultural product, at a price 
lower than the comparable price charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic markets?  
In this context, and either at this point or at a more appropriate future time, Australia requests 
that Thailand provide an update regarding its rice pledging scheme. 
AG-IMS ID 74032: Question by Euro pean Union - Transparency issues 
Thailand states that it did not provide any export subsidies subject to reduction commitments in 
the years 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013. According to the International Sugar Organisation Outlook (MECAS(11)17), Thailand's policy on the expo rt of sugar is based on quotas designated for 
domestic requirements and export commitments. More specifically, the C Quota covers the 
exportable surplus of sugar for which sugar cane growers are paid a minimum price (which is at least equal to the sales value of B Quota sugar). In the light of this information, for each of the years 2009-2013, Thailand is requested to explain: 
 
a. the method of allocation of A, B and C quotas and the amounts of these quotas. 
b. Whether there is an obligation to export sugar from any of these quotas? 
c. What are the administered prices paid to sugar cane growers for cane which used to 
produce A, B and C quota sugar? 
d. What are the administered prices for A, B and C quota sugar ex-works, at wholesale and 
at consumer level? 
e. What are the market prices for A, B and C quota sugar and for the cane used to produce 
the sugar for each quota? 
f. What is the total cost of production of the sugar cane which is used to produce sugar? 
g. What is the total cost of production of the sugar which is exported? 
h. How Thailand justifies the statement that B quota and C quota sugar does not benefit 
f r o m  a n  e x p o r t  s u b s i d y  ( i n  t h e  f o r m  o f  p a y m e n t s  o n  e x p o r t  f i n a n c e d  b y  v i r t u e  o f  
government action within the meaning of Arti cle 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture) 
provided in excess of Thailand's WTO commitments. 
__________