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WT/PCTF/M/8  
 
21 November 2014  
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Preparatory Committee on Trade Facilitation    
 
 MINUTES OF THE MEETING 
HELD IN THE CENTRE WILLIAM RAPPARD 29 SEPTEMBER 2014 
Chairman: H.E. Mr. Esteban Conejos (Philippines) 
 
  
1  INTRODUCTION 
1.1.  The Chairman recalled that the proposed agenda had been circulated in WTO/AIR/4344 and 
that it contained two main items: the Preparatory Committee (PCTF) would first receive the 
notifications of category A commitments that Memb ers had submitted since the last meeting; that 
would be followed by an informal working sessi on in which delegations would be invited to 
exchange their views on the road ahead. 
1.2.  The agenda was adopted. 
2  RECEIPT OF CATEGORY A NOTIFICATIONS 2.1.  The Chairman informed that Members ha d submitted category A notifications in great 
numbers - almost 40 were received since the Committee last met at the beginning of July. Many of 
those submissions had been tabled before the en d of that month and even more were notified 
after the 31st - several even during the summer recess.  
2.2.  The list of new notifications covere d submissions from the following Members:  
Mauritius (WT/PCTF/N/MUS/1), Turkey (WT/PCTF /N/TUR/1), Honduras (WT/PCTF/N/HND/1), The 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (WT/PCTF/N/SAU/1), Ma laysia (WT/PCTF/N/MYS/1), The State of Kuwait 
(WT/PCTF/N/KWT/1), Chile WT/PCTF/N/CHL/1), Qatar (WT/PCTF/N/QAT/1), Thailand (WT/PCTF/N/THA/1), Peru (WT/PCTF/N/PER/1),  Uruguay (WT/PCTF/N/URY/1), El Salvador 
(WT/PCTF/N/SLV/1), Brazil (WT/PCTF/N/BRA/1 ), Mongolia (WT/PCTF/N/MNG/1), Morocco 
(WT/PCTF/N/MAR/1), Viet Nam (WT/PCTF/N/VNM/1 ), Tajikistan (WT/PCTF/N/TJK/1), Dominican 
Republic (WT/PCTF/N/DOM/1),  Sri Lanka (WT/ PCTF/N/LKA/1), Israel (WT/PCTF/N/ISR/1), 
Philippines (WT/PCTF/N/PHL/1),  Guatemala (W T/PCTF/N/GTM/1), Ecuador (WT/PCTF/N/ECU/1), 
Kyrgyz Republic (WT/PCTF/N/KGZ/1), Panama (WT/PCTF/N/PAN/1), Indonesia (WT/PCTF/N/IDN/1), Congo (WT/PCTF/N/COG/1), Côte d'Ivoire (WT/PCTF/N/CIV/1), Ukraine 
(WT/PCTF/N/UKR/1), Brunei Darussalam (WT/PCTF/N/BRN/1), Oman (WT/PCTF/N/OMN/1), 
Tunisia (WT/PCTF/N/TUN/1), Albania (WT/ PCTF/N/ALB/1), Republic of Moldova 
(WT/PCTF/N/MDA/1) and Jordan (WT/PCTF/N/JOR/1).  
2.3.  The Committee received those notifications.  
2.4.  The Chairman reported that the overall num ber of notifications had grown to 46, which was 
an encouraging sign of Members' engagement. He was particularly heartened to see the 
notification process continue despite the challenges of the current situation.  
2.5.  Additional submissions were being prepared and expected to reach the Committee shortly. In 
that context, the Chairman invited the Secretariat to say a few words on some of the technical aspects related to that procedure.  WT/PCTF/M/8 
 
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  2.6.  The Secretariat recalled the procedural fram ework for the notification process since there had 
been a few queries. While there was a common understanding that the Trade Facilitation 
Agreement represented the basis and the starting po int for the exercise, there was also a potential 
challenge in that were two versions of the document: (i) the text resulting from the Bali Ministerial 
(WT/L/911) and (ii) the final language as it had emerged from Members' legal review. It therefore 
seemed worth recalling that it was the latter that should be used for the notification exercise. Circulated as WT/L/931, this document had been adopted by Members before the summer break. 
Delegations which had not yet submitted their notifications were invited to make sure that they 
used the right document. This was of relevance since there were a few differences between the two texts.   
2.7.  First, Members had agreed to change the overall structure of the Agreement, moving from a 
two-segment arrangement to one that contained th ree sections. A substantive difference resulting 
from that change - and one that had caused a few issues with some of the notifications - related to the fact that the provision on the establishment of a National Committee was no longer part of 
Section I and therefore equally not part of the notification exercise. It was now contained in 
Section III.  
2.8.  There had also been a few changes on th e numbering side. Apart from the modification 
already mentioned, Members had altered the enumer ation of some of the articles, paragraphs and 
sub-paragraphs. Changes had also been made to how certain headings were termed. The articles most affected by those modifications were 4, 9 and 10.9.  
2.9.  The last point related to the kind of comp liance that the notifications were meant to convey. 
It was certainly permitted to split provisions into sub-parts. Members who were fortunate – or 
unfortunate - enough to have followed the negotiating process would recall that discussions had referred to "provisions" and "sub-parts of provis ions" when talking about flexibility arrangements 
under the S&D section. This understanding still  stood. Members were free to break down the 
articles into segments. What was not meant to happen, on the other hand, was that a notification signalled only partial compliance. This marked a difference to some of the parameters – and 
related documentation - used for the needs assessments, but that exercise had a somewhat 
different purpose and a different direction. There was no place for a compliance column in a category A notification. Whatever was chosen to be placed in that category should be notified without any qualification in terms of "partial" or "substantial" compliance.   
3  EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE ROAD AHEAD  
3.1.  This part of the meeting was conducted in informal mode.  
3.2.  The Committee took note of the statements made. 
4  OTHER BUSINESS 4.1.  The Chairman took up the date of the next session.  
4.2.  While the current situation made it somewhat challenging to anticipate the Committee's 
prospective needs, one should prepare for another meeting in the not too distant future to ensure 
that the requirements of the Bali mandate were met. 
4.3.  He proposed 7 November as the date of the next Preparatory Committee meeting. This would 
not preclude the Committee from meeting earlier, should the situation warrant it.  
4.4.  The representative of the United States of  America said that a linkage had been made and 
that the discussion had moved to the General Council. That linkage worked both ways. It was 
therefore the view of the United States of Americ a that, given the current situation, the PCTF had 
concluded its work. Consequently, the US did not support the scheduling of further Committee 
meetings at the moment.   
4.5.  The representative of Nigeria stated that Nigeria had no problem with a next meeting on 
7 November. As far as the US invention was concerned, it might be useful to consult. He hoped WT/PCTF/M/8 
 
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  that the 7 November date would be kept in view. It was important to have clarity on the 
processes. The Committee was discussing substance.  
4.6.  What would happen to the notification proc ess? His delegation was of the view that that 
process was continuing. At what point would that stop? Could there ever be a point where the 
Committee would no longer receive category A notifications?  Nigeria was in the process of 
finalising its notification. It was therefore important to have clarity on how to proceed in procedural terms – the earlier, the better. Delegations who might wish to invite capital to attend 
Preparatory Committee sessions would also need to know early on when the next meeting would 
be held.   
4.7.  It should not become an issue of interpretation as to when the Committee had ended its 
work. Nigeria stood ready to be guided by the Chairman.  
4.8.  The representative of India said that the Committee had been assigned a certain mandate by 
Ministers in Bali, including the receipt of category A notifications, and that work was not over yet. 
The Preparatory Committee was required to meet and his delegation supported the Chairman's 
proposal for the next session to take place on 7 November. 
4.9.  The representative of Barbados supported th e interventions by Nigeria and India on the role 
of the Preparatory Committee. It would seem rather unusual for the Committee to determine that 
it was closing itself. That would require a de cision by a body higher than the Committee, 
particularly in view of the fact that it had been set up to conclude tasks – such as the drafting of 
an amendment protocol - that had not yet been accomplished. The Committee's work was still incomplete. The Committee would be acting rather peremptorily by deciding that its work was 
done.  
4.10.  The representative of Cameroon observed that things were looking a bit obscure.  Perhaps 
legal experts could shed some light on them. He thanked the Chairman for his leadership and the 
wisdom with which he conducted the Committee's work.   
4.11.  The representative of the European Un ion said that, if there had been a need to 
demonstrate that one was not in "business as usual" modus operandi, the current meeting was a 
clear demonstration of that fact. He did not have a particular view as to whether there should be a 
meeting on 7 November. Rather than speculatin g about the role of the Committee one should 
concentrate on the single issue which prevented it from moving ahead: the adoption of the 
amendment protocol. 
4.12.  The representative of Lesotho said that it would be important to fully understand what was 
meant by suggesting that work had moved up to the General Council and that the Committee 
could not consider all the issues that had been placed on its shoulders. Clarity was needed, 
especially in view of the comments made by Barbados. Cameroon's comment had been 
constructive.  
4.13.  The representative of Ecuador noted that it was the Chairman who decided whether to 
convene a meeting and who decided on the date . Members could only make comments on the 
agenda of a Committee session once it had been pu t forward. They did not have the capacity to 
decide whether meetings were held or not. The Preparatory Committee's work had not yet been concluded. 
4.14.  The representative of Uganda wondered how the Committee would proceed. How would it 
wind up its work? From what some Members had said, it seemed that the Committee could keep 
some of its work but could lose another portion. Would the General Council then be required to 
negotiate the protocol? Since the WTO's Director-General was leading those consultations, where 
would work take place? In the Trade Negotiat ions Committee (TNC), the General Council or 
elsewhere?  
4.15.  It had been said that the Committee had been established by Ministers and that it would 
take another Ministerial to decide on the next steps, with the General Council possibly meeting in its place. Clarification was required.  WT/PCTF/M/8 
 
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  4.16.  The representative of Nepal supported th e interventions by India, Nigeria and Uganda.  
Given the fact that the Committee still had tasks which were not yet completed such as the receipt 
of category A notifications and the drafting of an amendment protocol, Nepal agreed with the Chair's proposal to convene the next meeting in November. 
4.17.  The representative of Cuba said that work in the Committee had to continue. There were 
still many countries preparing their notification s. The Committee's work proceeded on the legal 
basis described by Ecuador and needed to carry on.   
4.18.  The representative of Egypt said that, accord ing to the Ministerial Decision in Bali, the PCTF 
had three main tasks: to conduct a legal review, to receive notifications of category A 
commitments and to draft the amendment protocol. Closing the work of the PCTF at this stage would go against the decision that Ministers took in Bali. The Preparatory Committee did not have 
the power to change it. That was why the Committee had to continue its work until it had finished 
its mission.  
4.19.  The representative of the Bolivarian Repu blic of Venezuela acknowledged the Chair's efforts 
to move work forward. As other delegations had stated, work in the Committee had been clearly 
defined by the Bali Ministerial mandate. Everyo ne knew what it entailed. The Preparatory 
Committee had not yet completed that work. Therefore, his delegation agreed with the Chair that 
a further PCTF meeting should be convened at the proposed date. The Chair clearly had the legal 
backing for convening such a meeting. The Committ ee's work was of a technical nature, extending 
to the amendment protocol. Although the protocol  contained political elements it did have a 
considerable amount of technical issues that were unresolved. There were still paragraphs in 
square brackets as they had not yet benefited from a consensus decision. The Preparatory 
Committee's work needed to continue.   
4.20.  The representative of Zimbabwe supporte d previous statements about the work of the 
Preparatory Committee. From the Bali Ministerial Decision it was very clear that the Committee's 
mandate was to draw up the protocol of amendmen t which the General Council was then to adopt. 
The PCTF's work on the protocol was not yet conc luded and therefore had to continue. The General 
Council was not in a position to do any work on the protocol since there was no protocol to adopt 
so far.    
4.21.  The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia agreed  that the Preparatory 
Committee had not yet completed its work. He supported the announced date for the Committee's 
next meeting.   
4.22.  The representative of Cameroon wondered whether the Committee approaching this matter 
i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  a  f o r m a l  P C T F  s e s s i o n  o r  a s  a n  i n f o r m a l  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  a  f o r m a l  p a r t  o f  t h e  
meeting.   
4.23.  The Committee faced a highly legal question linked to the functioning of an international 
organization. A committee had been created by a Ministerial Decision with clear terms of 
reference. Was the Committee then to understand that developing countries that had not yet 
notified their category A commitments would see their commitments directly transferred to category B? Assuming that the PCTF was no longer working would imply that the Committee could no longer receive category A commitments. Was that what one should understand from that 
position? The General Council had never had an agenda item concerning category A commitment 
notifications. From a legal point of view, the PCTF could not cease to exist without a formal decision by a WTO body qualified to do so.  Even if the Preparatory Committee were to decide so 
by consensus, it did neither have the capacity nor the ability to dissolve a body which had been 
created by Ministers. Only those who had taken th e decision to set up the Committee could change 
it.  
4.24.  The Chairman commented on the exchanges under this agenda item. He recalled that one 
delegate had stated his view that the work of the PCTF had been completed with there therefore 
not being a point in scheduling a next Committee meeting. Many delegations had taken a different position and stated that the PCTF had to continue its work until it completed: 1) the receipt of 
category A commitments and 2) the drawing up  of the protocol of amendment. They had 
highlighted that the PCTF was a creation of the Mi nisterial Conference and that it had received its WT/PCTF/M/8 
 
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  mandate directly from the Ministerial Conference. As a result, only the Ministerial Conference, or 
during an intersessional period, the General Council, could declare that the PCTF no longer had the mandate to continue its work.  
4.25.  Some delegations had also said that one sh ould not be focussing on the work of the PCTF, 
but rather on the issues that had prevented the PC TF from moving ahead with its work of drawing 
up the protocol. Those were the three strands of thought that the Committee had been getting 
from the discussion.   
4.26.  While it clearly was the Chairman's prerogative to convene a meeting, he always favoured a 
non-confrontational approach, and since there was one delegation not wanting to hold a PCTF meeting on 7 November, he would not press ahead with scheduling the next session at the moment.    
4.27.  Many delegations had sought clarifications on what the Committee was going to do. His 
intention was to consult with Members after the meeting. He would also consult with the Secretariat and inform the Chairmen of the General Council and of the TNC.  
4.28.  The representative of Nigeria sought another clarification. What would be the implication of 
the Committee not meeting on 7 November? Would holding such a meeting still be subject to 
further consultation? His delegation would not insist that the PCTF met on 7 November, but the 
Committee needed to be very clear as to the implications of whatever decision was going to be 
taken.   
4.29.  Nigeria had no strong view on the matter. They just wanted to understand the process 
itself. Was the Chairman saying that there would be no meeting on the 7th? Or was there a 
possibility that that meeting could still take place? He reverted back to the Chairman to find out 
what the conclusion had been.  
4.30.  The representative of Barbados suggested a way forward. It would seem that there was a 
majority opinion that the Preparatory Committee had not yet completed its mandate and therefore 
had to continue to meet. She proposed that the Committee took the date which the Chairman had set as provisional, subject to the Chairman's cons ultations on the next steps. She suggested that 
the Committee stuck to the 7 November as the date of its next meeting, but subject to 
confirmation.   
4.31.  The representative of Egypt appreciated the Chairman's point of view. His delegation did not 
think that there should be a decision to cancel the meeting of 7 November because of there not 
being consensus on holding such a meeting. He re minded Members that, during the previous year, 
there had been a meeting on the first day of their feast. All Arab countries had been against this meeting, but the meeting had taken place nevertheless and everybody attended. The meeting had 
not been cancelled as a result of there being objections by part of the membership to it taking 
place. Similarly, there had also been a TNC meeting during the feast this year. Arabic countries had not liked that and yet realized that they could not prevent that meeting. The consensus 
principle did not apply to the scheduling of meetings.     
4.32.  The representative of India sought a clarification on how the Preparatory Committee was to 
complete its work. If the Committee would not meet, how would it receive the remaining category 
A notifications? And if the Committee did not receive them, which was the WTO body that would 
do so? He did not think that there could be an im plication that, in the absence of a PCTF meeting, 
Members who had not yet filed their category A notifications would be considered to have switched everything to category B. He also doubted that the Preparatory Committee could declare itself 
non-functional.  
4.33.  The representative of the United States of America stated that the United States of America 
had not created the linkage. They were forced to li ve by the linkage imposed upon them by others.  
It was remarkable how everyone in the room was suddenly seized with passion and concern about 
the life of the PCTF.  They should all take a st ep back and realize that the Trade Facilitation 
Agreement was what was at stake. Without the Tr ade Facilitation Agreement, there was no PCTF. 
At that very moment, they did not have a Trade Facilitation Agreement because of certain actions WT/PCTF/M/8 
 
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  by certain delegations linking this issue and revising their position vis-à-vis  Bali. The PCTF only 
existed if there was a Trade Facilitation Agreement.  
4.34.  The Director-General was currently consulting. There was a meeting coming up very soon to 
see what was going to be done about that issue. If the matter could not be resolved, there was no 
Trade Facilitation Agreement and thus no PCTF. It did not make sense to navel gaze and moan 
about whether or not one wanted to schedule a meeting of the Committee for an Agreement that did not exist. Members needed to focus on the Agre ement itself and to make sure that that linkage 
was either removed or that issue was resolved. Until that time it was silly and nonsensical to 
forecast as business as usual a set of meetings to support an Agreement that did not exist at that point in time. 
4.35.  The representative of Ecuador was willing to accept whatever decision the Chairman chose 
to take on the matter, but wanted to place his concern on record as to the way in which matters 
were proceeding. It would be unprecedented in the WTO that a meeting would not be convened as a result of one Member opposing the Chairman's  call to convene it.  His delegation was very 
concerned about the consequences that could result from such a situation. Ecuador was 
nevertheless willing to accept whatever the Chairman would decide. It understood that there might be comments on the date of such a meeting, bu t his delegation really did not understand how the 
Chairman could decide to renounce his power to convene a meeting.   
4.36.  The representative of Brazil said that th ere were two fundamental issues: one regarding the 
substance of the Agreement, which was something that had to be resolved, either in this 
Committee or elsewhere. There was also the matter of the form in which decisions took place in 
the WTO. It was important to have clarity on whether a Member had the right to cancel a meeting 
and to understand how far the consensus rule applied.    
4.37.  The representative of Nigeria said that Members had concluded the Trade Facilitation 
Agreement. There was no doubt that they had completed the legal scrubbing of its text. One could 
not go back to re-negotiating the Agreement. It was necessary to be very clear on that. 
4.38.  It was also important that the Committee was guided on the meeting rules. The Secretariat 
should be able to inform Members of those rules. There were different reasons for why a meeting 
could not take place. It could be for religious or other reasons and delegations should have sympathy with that. The Arab Group had pointed out that the clash of their holiday had not prevented the TNC from meeting. Nigeria had no diff iculty with that. Even on a national holiday his 
delegation attended meetings, despite the fact that they ought not to. His delegation would comply 
with whatever decision was taken by the Chair in the best interests of the system. It was important that they had clarity as to how meetings were convened.    
4.39.  Nigeria had no difficulty with the proposal by Barbados. One could schedule a Committee 
meeting on a provisional basis. His delegation be lieved that the consultations were ongoing and 
was optimistic that something could result from them. One must actively try to ensure that this 
happened.  
4.40.  Nigeria's interpretation of business as usual was different. The Committee should continue 
to do its work. One should watch to see advancement in all areas of work, including trade facilitation and the other Bali issues Members had faithfully committed to implementing. His 
delegation believed that missing the deadline had im plications for the rest of the work – there was 
no doubt about that. But having a stalemate within the PCTF also had implications for the continuation of the work – not only in the PCTF but also in General Council. The Chairman wanted 
to ensure that every delegation's interest was preserved. It was nevertheless important that the 
procedural rules were observed. One should not revert  to this kind of discussion in the future.    
4.41.  The representative of Uganda remarked th at any decision would set a precedent with very 
serious implications for the future. Perhaps the Chairman did not wish to take a definitive decision 
on the matter, given the diametrically different positions taken by Members. Did he consider 
suspending discussions on the matter, pending further consultations?  
4.42.  The representative of Lesotho said that there was merit in Uganda's intervention. If the 
meeting was shut down that day there would never be another opportunity to consider the issue in WT/PCTF/M/8 
 
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  that configuration. He echoed the point raised by Brazil about the importance of obtaining a 
required clarification. 
4.43.  The tone of the exchange seemed to be changing. While this was understandable, he had 
heard very strong words in reference to comm ents and interventions by delegations. His 
delegation represented the African Group, an d he did not think that they would accept 
characterisations such as "silly". Such comments were unacceptable. 
4.44.  The representative of Indonesia said that she was not aware of any decision to discontinue 
the PCTF's mandate - not from ministers, not from the General Council. As a result, it was still the 
Chairman's right to convene a meeting unless ther e was a decision by ministers or the General 
Council to revoke the Committee's mandate. The Chai r should exercise his right to decide the date 
of the next meeting. As Chairman, he had the mandate from the General Council and from 
Ministers to conduct PCTF meetings. Since the PCTF was still alive, he had the right to convene 
sessions.    
4.45.  The representative of the European Union sa id that all interventions and different views had 
to be put in the right context. When speaking about precedents one should not forget that the 
most serious and unprecedented precedent in the life of the WTO was that there had been a Ministerial agreement reached in Bali with set de adlines – which had not been respected. This had 
very serious and potentially systemic implications on the negotiating branch of the organization 
and beyond. That was a sad fact. There was no n eed to emphasise to what extent the EU, with 
good reason, was committed to the functioning of the multilateral trading system. 
4.46.  Even if the Chairman would convene a meeting on 7 November, what progress could be 
made in the current situation? There was no need for the Chairman to take a decision immediately 
just for procedural reasons. It was better to wait until 6 October, at the very least, to see whether there was some evolution on the major issue, the adoption of the protocol. The Chairman still had 
the right to convene a meeting subsequently. It seemed best to reflect on the situation and to wait 
for the 6 October deadline and perhaps other import ant milestones to pass. The Chair could then 
come back to the Committee with a proposal to convene a meeting.   
4.47.  The representative of India stressed th at the work of the Committee was not over. His 
delegation was comfortable with suggestions to suspend the discussion, for the time being, or to 
consult. In any event, the Chairman maintained  his right to convene Committee meetings as and 
when required. He strongly supported the ob servations of the African Group about some 
unfortunate remarks that had been made. Delegati ons needed to exercise restraint and to keep 
the debate parliamentary. One should not get worked up about the situation which was a situation many delegations had concerns with.  
4.48.  The representative of Cuba said that, changi ng a proposed Chair date as a result of a clash 
with a Member's national or religious ceremony might be acceptable, but he had not yet heard any 
delegate of the Russian Federation protesting against a meeting date because it clashed with their 
celebration of the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution according to the Gregorian Calendar, 
which might cause them some injury. He urged the Chairman to exercise his right of convening a 
meeting of the Preparatory Committee on 7 November based on the very relevant elements that had been clearly expressed by the delegate of Indonesia.  
4.49.  The representative of Australia said that the PCTF was a technical body. The stand-off the 
Committee faced was a political one as a result of one Member deciding not to implement the 
Trade Facilitation Agreement. His delegation questioned the usefulness of holding technical 
meetings when there was no political solution in sight. 
4.50.  The representative of Cameroon said that he could not add to what Australia had said. The 
deadlock was a political one. Perhaps wisdom would advise to wait, as the European Union had 
said, until the political deadlock was over. Once  it was over, the Preparatory Committee could 
finalise its work. He supported the Chairman's suggestion to consult. It was not the first time that there had been problems within negotiations. They  all remembered them, but they also knew that 
negotiators had to keep a cool head in the fa ce of combat. Cameroon trusted the Chairman's 
leadership.    WT/PCTF/M/8 
 
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  4.51.  The Chairman observed that it must have been the first time that there had been an 
extended discussion on the scheduling of the Committee's next meeting.  
4.52.  Many delegations had said that the Chairman  should exercise his right as Chair to set the 
date of the meeting. Setting the date was a proc edural step. In the present case, an issue of 
jurisdiction had been raised as well. If this had been a court of law and one of the parties had 
raised the issue of jurisdiction, the immediate impact on the court's ability to continue with the proceedings would have been a motion for a call to order. Court proceedings would have been 
suspended. That had at least been his experien ce, from the legal perspective. In the current 
situation, since there had been questions about the role of the PCTF, he preferred to consult with Members before proceeding with setting a date for the next meeting.    
4.53.  He thanked Brazil for their proposal. He would definitely consult on the matter. He was not 
the type of person who would leave things undon e. For the time being, he would not convene a 
meeting on 7 November, not even provisionally. He would continue to consult with Members and with the Secretariat before deciding on how to move forward. That was how he saw the situation 
at that point. 
4.54.  The representative of India said that his delegation respected the Chairman's decision and 
they could go along with it. But he raised another related question. If it was a question of 
jurisdiction, how far back did it go?  Did it mean  that everything the Committee had done that day 
was also without jurisdiction? Legally, where did th e question of jurisdiction start and where did it 
end? There needed to be some clarity on that also. 
4.55.  The Chairman said that he could rule on  that. Items one and two of the agenda were in 
order. The question of jurisdiction had only been raised with respect to the last agenda item. It 
was merely with respect to the other business item that the jurisdictional issue had been raised. The previous discussions and the issue of notifications were not affected. He proposed to consult 
on that matter before taking a decision. It was important to solve all outstanding questions.  
4.56.  The representative of Cameroon asked as of what date the PCTF would no longer be 
functioning. If it had no further legal existence after 31 July, then everything the PCTF had been 
doing since then was in a legal void. Nothing could have legal force. It was important to get a legal 
opinion on that. He completely agreed with th e Chairman and supported his proposed way to 
proceed.  
4.57.  The representative of Cuba said that Members were facing a tricky situation. He wondered 
whether it would be possible to get immediate legal advice. Given that it was still early in the day, 
it might be possible to obtain such advice before  the meeting was over. He would be happy to wait 
until then.  
4.58.  The representative of the United States of America said that he was confused by the 
question of jurisdiction and where that was headed. The point was that there may or may not be a 
Trade Facilitation Agreement after 6 October. That had implications on the PCTF. It seemed 
premature and irresponsible to schedule dates for PCTF meetings when Members were faced with 
whether or not they had a Trade Facilitation Agreement. The Director-General had called for a meeting. There might be a solution to that issu e or there might not, but there would be some 
clarity as to whether one could proceed. He was happy to revisit the issue when it had been 
decided that Members would in fact have a Trade Facilitation Agreement. Then there should be a 
meeting of the PCTF. If there was an open questi on as to what the General Council would do to 
resolve the impasse, and there was a date set for that - October 6 - it seemed prudent to wait 
until after that meeting before starting to plan PCTF  dates. It was not a question of jurisdiction, it 
was a question of common sense.   
4.59.  The Chairman explained that they had gotten into this discussion on jurisdiction because in 
his first intervention, the representative of the United States of America had expressed his view 
that the PCTF had ceased to exist. If the United States of America was now saying that it was not really a question of jurisdiction but one of practi cality, of why the Committee should meet when in 
a few more days there might be a resolution of the underlying issue which would allow the 
Committee's work to continue and if the Unites St ates of America was effectively not questioning 
the mandate of the Committee to continue to work, then it was a different story. They had entered WT/PCTF/M/8 
 
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  into this discussion on jurisdiction because the United States of America's first position had been 
that there was a case of functus offici o, that the PCTF had ceased to exist.  That was why he had 
said that it was a serious question on which he would like to consult before taking a decision. But if it was an issue of practicality, he was fine with that. Whatever it was, his decision would remain – 
no November 7 meeting, no provisional date, and he would continue to consult on the best way 
forward. 
4.60.  The representative of the United States of America clarified his position. What he had said in 
his earlier intervention was that his delegation viewed the PCTF's work as complete. It had been 
quite clear that positions had not changed and that no further technical work could be carried out. As a result, the US was of the view that the work had been completed. It was not up to the United 
States of America - there was another delegation in the room that had taken ownership of whether 
it lived or died.  That was not his delegation's call. That would be made by another delegation who 
had already said it could not move forward. It was therefore not a question of what he thought about the PCTF. Rather, the point was that its work had been completed. No positions had 
changed. There was a Director-General-chaired meeting on 6 October to determine whether, as an 
institution, one would proceed or not, and whet her there was a Trade Facilitation Agreement or 
not. 
4.61.  The representative of Nigeria asked why the PCTF had met. They needed to know - 
otherwise he should not have been in that meeting. What had been the basis for holding it? One 
could rationalise whatever views and positions one held. Nigeria had heard that there was a necessity to meet. If the Preparatory Committee felt  there was need for another meeting, then it 
should meet.   
4.62.  There were two issues now. If the issue of the mandate were to be resolved, that would be 
fine. Members were still discussing mandate issues . If they discussed jurisdiction, then on what 
basis was the Chairman even consulting? If the Committee had ceased to be, why was there a 
Chair?  
4.63.  It was very clear that Members faced a very difficult situation. They were mindful of all of 
those linkages, of what was happening not only in the PCTF itself but also on other issues. Perhaps 
it was reasonable to wait, like the Chairman and some other Members had mentioned, for the TNC to meet on 6 October. Whatever judgement were to result from that might determine the life of the Committee as well as of the post Bali work programme mandated by Ministers. He would be 
happy if the Chairman could give it consideratio n. Was there somebody from the Secretariat who 
could give an indication of what the difficulty wa s in procedural terms? If Members heard what the 
rules were, there might be a change of mind or of attitude.  
4.64.  The Committee was in the Chair's hands. Nigeria had always said that the substance was as 
important as the process, because they all had implications. If a process was faulty, he could imagine the consequences. Perhaps somebody from the Secretariat could brief the Committee 
before it ended its current session. Members need ed to have clarity. October 6 was very near. 
They could be patient to see what resulted from the consultation process.  
4.65.  The representative of Tanzania said that the issue was very difficult and touchy. Given that 
there were still were 35 to 40 minutes of meeting time left, it would be good to proceed as Cuba 
had suggested. It would be useful to break for five minutes to get legal advice. This would be the 
best solution for those who wished to leave the room with an idea of how work would be carried forward. If Members were willing, they could break for five minutes, and get a legal expert to 
come and try to clarify the matter. 
4.66.  The Chairman took note of what the United States of America had just said, noting that it 
was very significant. He thanked the US representative for that clarification. What he had taken 
from that last statement was that the United States of America was not really questioning the 
jurisdiction or the mandate of the Committee. Rather, they were saying that, as far as they were concerned, the Committee had concluded its work, meaning that work had now shifted to some other body such as the General Council or the TNC, trying to address the underlying issues that 
actually prevented the Committee from moving ahead with its work. Essentially, they were saying 
that there was no point, no need, and no usef ulness to call for another meeting of the Committee 
when it had worked on the draft on two occasions already. The Committee had not been successful WT/PCTF/M/8 
 
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  then. There was no reason to believe that it could be successful if it tried again at this moment, 
given the outstanding nature of those underlying issues. That changed the whole reflection, even on the legal issue that had been raised. It was not anymore a matter of existence or jurisdiction of the Committee. Rather, it was the practicality that the United States of America was objecting to – 
the usefulness and viability of having another meeting in a situation that had not changed since 
July 10. He hoped that he had correctly understood it. He appreciated that the US had clarified it. It was therefore now clear that there was no questioning of jurisdiction or of the continued 
mandate of the Committee. What was being questioned was the propriety, desirability and 
advisability of holding another meeting when those issues remained outstanding. That was why it had been said that the focus should be on resolving those issues so that the Committee could go ahead with work on the protocol. 
4.67.  As far as the next steps are concerned, it did not look like one should schedule a meeting at 
this point. The best thing he could do was to continue consultations with Members and to see where they moved from there. It was preferable to go for a consensual, non-confrontational 
approach.  
4.68.  The representative of Panama said that they had heard a lot of questions and concerns - 
complicated issues on which he did not dare to have an opinion. The Committee needed to allow 
itself to be governed by a proverb that said that one should not rush into decisions. He fully 
supported the Chair and the way in which he had decided to move forward. He recommended consultations with Members as the Chairman had said. The questions that had been raised, as important as they were, did not require an immediate reply, nor a reply under pressure - not in 
the next 30 minutes in any case. The Committee did not need that to enable it to resolve the issue 
in a satisfactory manner, in a way that allowed the Committee to move forward. The Committee s h o u l d  b e  g o v e r n e d  b y  t h e  r u l e  o f  j u d i c i a l  e c o n o m y .  H e  r e i t e r a t e d  h i s  f u l l  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  
Chairman's leadership and his proposed way forward. His delegation was very happy to cooperate 
in any consultations that the Chair decided to hold, in whatever format.   
4.69.  The representative of Jamaica said that there was no harm in the suggestion to break for a 
while to get a legal opinion. He understood that th e Chairman felt that there was no need for that, 
but he would urge caution and recommended not rushing into a decision, as Panama had suggested. He thanked the United States of America for the clarification but in Jamaica's recollection, other delegations had asked for clarification of several other issues besides the matter 
that the United States of America had raised. Therefore, while the purpose of having a legal 
clarification might have been removed from the point of view of the United States of America, other delegations might still wish to have clarifications. It might be best if the Chair did not rush 
into a decision before other Members got the clarifications they were looking for. Jamaica would be 
guided by whatever the Chairman said but they would just advise caution. It would not do any 
harm to get a legal clarification. 
4.70.  The Chairman said that the issue had b een addressed exhaustively. There would be no 
meeting scheduled for 7 November. Instead, he would continue to discuss and to consult.  Some 
delegations had suggested to also get views fr om the Secretariat. Normally, as Ambassador 
Suescum had said, as a matter of principle, the Secretariat did not get involved in hypothetical 
questions. But he would tell the Secretariat that those issues had been raised and get its feedback. 
But for the moment, his decision was to postpone the convening of a subsequent meeting. He would first consult to see how to move forward.  
4.71.  The representative of Tanzania sought clarification on whether the Chairman's summary 
meant that he was not consulting with the Secretariat anymore, despite related requests from the 
floor. 
4.72.  The Chairman said that his conclusion on the other business item was as follows: First, no 
specific date would be set for the next meeting of  the PCTF at that point. He would first consult 
with Members and those who would like to share their views on the issues discussed. He would 
continue to discuss matters with the Secretariat as well. In addition, he would also talk to the 
Director-General and the Chairman of the General Council. They had to be aware of those things. 
On the basis of those consultations with Members and with others, he would have a better sense of where one could move from there.  WT/PCTF/M/8 
 
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  4.73.  The representative of the Bolivarian Repu blic of Venezuela said that there was one point 
that was not yet clear to his delegation. One big elephant in the room had been solved, which was 
related to one or two square brackets in the text of the protocol. Was there any intention for the remaining square brackets to be addressed in the Committee once Members had resolved the 
other issues? 
4.74.  The Chairman said that that would also be part of his consultations with Members. The 
beauty of informal consultations was that all kind s of issues could be raised, on all sides. The 
mandate of the Committee was very broad.  It had been tasked by Ministers in Bali to perform all 
functions necessary to ensure the Agreement's expe ditious entry into force. That was a very broad 
mandate that covered almost anything under the sun. Under this extensive mandate, Ministers 
had identified three specific tasks which they want ed the Committee to prioritise.  He was open as 
to what could be part of his consultations with Members. 
4.75.  The Preparatory Committee took note of the statements made.    
4.76.  The meeting was adjourned. 
 
 
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